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Yol. LVII, No. U75 

October 2, 1967 



iy Ambassador John A. GronousM 1)32 


by Under Secretary Rostow Ji£2 

For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1475 Publication 8296 
October 2, 1967 

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Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker Discuss Viet-Nam 
in TV-Radio Interviews 

Secretary Rush afpeared on the American 
Broadcasting Co7n'pany''s program "/sswes and 
Answers^'' on September 10, and on the same day 
an intervieio filmed in Saigon with Ellsworth 
Bunker, the A7nerlcan Ajnbassador to the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, was broadcast on the Co- 
lumbia Broadcasting System''s program ^^Face 
the Nation.''^ Folloioing are transcripts of the 
two interviews. 


Mr. Clark [Robert E. Clark, ABC Capitol 
Hill correspondenf] : Mr. Secretaiy, welcome 
back to "Issues and Answers." 

Secretary Rusk: Thank you, Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark : South Viet- Nam's new President- 
elect, General Thieu, says when he takes office he 
will suggest peace talks to Hanoi. These are his 
words. "If Hanoi demands a gesture of good 
will," he said, he would like to have a bombing 
pause of 1 week. Would we agree to such a re- 
quest from General Thieu? 

Secretary Rusk: I think both from the point 
of view of General Thieu and the point of view 
of the United States a good deal turns on the at- 
titude of Hanoi. In the program which just pre- 
ceded this one, David Schoenbmn reported that 
Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of North 
Viet-Nnm, demanded that we stop the bombing 
unconditionally. Now, all of our information is 
that that means a permanent and unconditional 
cessation of the bombing, and Pham Van Dong 
added in that interview, "There will be no reci- 
procity, there will be no bargaining." 

Now, I think President-elect Thieu has ex- 
pressed his interest in some sort of response from 
Hanoi; so I think the important thing here is 
not Saigon and Washington. AYe want peace. 
The important thing is the attitude of Hanoi. I 
regret very much the harshness of the statements 
attributed to Pham Van Dong by Mr. Schoen- 
brim, because, among other things, statements 
like that on the public record make it more dif- 

ficult for the Prime Minister of Hanoi to take 
another view in private discussions. So every- 
thing turns on Hanoi, not on Saigon and 

Mr. Harsch [Joseph C. Harsch, ABC News'\ : 
Mr. Secretai-y, isn't there one question thei'e 
though about the freedom of Saigon to conduct 
its own aiiairs? Suppose they actually re- 
quested us to do a 1-week pause in the bombing. 
If we say "No," it lays us open to the charge of 
not letting them run their own affairs. 

Secretary Rusk: This really isn't the question, 
Mr. Harsch. I am sure we and Saigon will be 
in very close touch with each other on all mat- 
ters of this sort. We have in the past; we will 
in the future. 

President-elect Tliieu has not said that, re- 
gardless of the attitude of Hanoi, he would ask 
for a cessation of the bombing or for a pause 
in the bombmg. Now again, he was talking 
about a pause, 1 week. From everything that we 
know, Hanoi considei-s a 1 week's pause, or a 
pause of any sort, as an ultimatinn. We have had 
several pauses in the past, a half dozen of them. 
One of them lasted as long as 37 days. During 
the Tet pause this year. Prime Minister Ky of- 
fered to meet representatives of Hanoi in the de- 
militarized zone to discuss the extension of that 
cease-fire, and Hanoi refused. So again, you see, 
everything turns on Hanoi, not on Saigon and 
Washington, who both want peace as much as 
anybody in the world. 

Hanoi's Rejection of Peace Negotiations 

Mr. Clark: Well, are you saying, Mr. Secre- 
tary, you think it is unlikely Saigon will ever 
get to a point in feeling out Hanoi where it will 
ask us for a bombing pause ? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I would suppose that 
Saigon will feel out Hanoi, because everybody 
does that, not only Saigon— they have done it 
in the past — we have done it many times — other 
goveriunents and groups of governments and 
personalities and private visitors have felt out 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 


Hanoi. But again, you see, the point is Hanoi, 
not Saigon and not Washington. 

Mr. Glarh: Yes, sir, but what I mean is do 
you feel it is unlikely Saigon will get any re- 
sponse from Hanoi that would even bring them 
to the point of asking us to accept a bombing 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we would hope that 
they would. Now, you do have in South Viet- 
Nam an elected government that is going to be 
forming a Cabinet and taking responsibility. 
We think that such a government would have 
a chance to proceed with somewhat more free- 
dom of action, witli a certain mandate from the 
Vietnamese people, a mandate to try to work 
out an honorable peace, among other things, if 
an honorable peace is possible. We also think 
it is just possible. We see no signs of this: that 
Hanoi may realize that the election of a gov- 
ernment in South Viet-Nam changes at least one 
aspect of their own predictions. They have been 
hoping that South Viet-Nam would collapse 
politically, internally. Now, that isn't going to 
happen. There is going to be an elected govern- 
ment taking office there, and perhaps that could 
have some influence on Hanoi. But we have no 
problem with President-elect Thieu on these 
matters. We are as interested in peace as anyone. 
And on other occasions they have offered to be 
in touch with Hanoi and try to work out a 
peace, and Hanoi has consistently rejected it. 

Mr. Harsch : Mr. Secretary, this matter of the 
bombing pause once more, please: You say it 
is up to Hanoi, but isn't it unrealistic to think 
that they would ever tell us in advance what 
they might do in return? Don't you have to 
try a pause again to find out whether there 
might be a response? 

Secretary Busk: Well, this is not something 
that we feel we have to speculate about, Mr. 
Harsch. A good many people say, "Stop the 
bombing and something might happen." Now, 
we can ask Hanoi, we do ask Hanoi what will 
happen if we stop the bombing, and they tell 
us "Nothing." Now Pham Van Dong apparently 
told David Schoenbrun : "There will be no reci- 
procity, there will be no bargaining." No one 
has been able to whisper behind his hand that 
those North Vietnamese divisions in the demili- 
tarized zone won't attack our Marines if we 
stop the bombing. 

I am not suggesting here we are resistant to 
the idea of deescalation. We have tried it on 
many occasions. Time and time again, we have 
put to the other side: Wliat will you do if we 

ourselves begin to deescalate? So we are pre- 
pared to do it. After all, we wanted to demili- 
tarize the demilitarized zone. We did our best 
to get the International Control Commission 
in there for that purpose. We wanted to guaran- 
tee Prince Sihanouk that there would be no 
hostile forces using the territory of Cambodia. 
We have tried on a number of occasions to bring 
about some de facto deescalation of the violence. 
We have had no response whatever from Hanoi. 

Role of the New Saigon Government 

Mr. Clark: Well, in the face of this, as you 
note, very hard line from Planoi, what do you 
see as the proper role the new Saigon govern- 
ment could or should play in ti-ying to work out 
some peaceful settlement of the war? 

Secretary Busk: Well, I think in the first in- 
stance to mobilize the people and the resources 
of South Viet-Nam, to make it clear to Hanoi 
that South Viet-Nam itself, the people of South 
Viet-Nam, under no circumstances will accept 
the seizure of their country by force from the 

Secondly, to make it very clear that as far as 
Saigon, the United States, and the other allies 
who have forces in Viet-Nam are concerned — 
that as far as our side is concerned — there can 
be peace vei-y promptly if North Viet-Nam is 
mterested in peace. 

Now, if Hanoi is still determined to take over 
South Viet-Nam, if they are not interested in 
peace, then we have some problems. That is 
what the war is all about. That is why there is 
shooting in the first place. Hanoi was deter- 
mined in 1959 and '60 to move in there and 
seize South Viet-Nam by force. 

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, how do you con- 
ceive the proper role of the United States vis-a- 
vis the new government in Saigon? They have 
had an election. It seems to have been fair and 
free. How much should we influence the forma- 
tion of that government toward the broader po- 
litical base, for example ? 

Secretary Busk: Well, I think the actual con- 
stitution of the government is for the South 
Vietnamese themselves to work out. They do 
not ask us to nominate candidates for posts in 
the Cabinet, for example, but we do know that 
they are consulting different elements in their 
political structure. They are studying very care- 
fully the basis on which they would form a new 
Cabinet. My guess is that there will be a very 
considerable nimiber of civilians in that Cabinet 



and that different groups in the population will 
be represented. 

The Senate and the House of Eepresentatives 
to be elected next month will themselves reflect 
different elements in the population. So they are 
on the right track, and they don't need our 
coaching in detail from the sidelines. If they ask 
us for advice, we will be glad to give it, but this 
is basically their job because they have got to 
get a government which represents them and 
their aspirations, their people, and I think they 
are going about it, and I am reasonably optimis- 
tic about the possibilities. 

Mr. Clarh: Do you feel the new government 
is obligated to carry out the fundamental social 
and land reforms and clean up the corruption 
that has been widespread in the past ? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes. They have committed 
themselves to those programs, and as a matter 
of fact, prior to the election, a good many steps 
have been taken in that direction. We think that 
the election will itself open up new chapters 
in getting on with some of the basic reforms that 
they recognize are necessary and that we would 
be glad to see them undertake. I think we will 
see a good deal of that in the months ahead. 

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, we have just had 
a bulletin in here. It says, from Tolryo : "Com- 
munist North Viet-Nam has sharply criticized 
American efforts to use the United Nations as 
a channel for entering the war." It calls it a U.S. 
move to legalize the war and prolong the divi- 
sion. Have you any comment on that ? 

Secretary Rusk : This has been the consistent 
attitude of Hanoi for a very long time. 

Mr. Harsch : Nothing new in it ? 

Secretary Rusk: No; and this is one of the 
reasons why some members of the U.N. believe 
therefore the U.N. should not take this matter 
up but should leave it to the Geneva machinery. 
Now, we could accept that, but the other side 
won't even accept the Geneva machinery. So 
this is the same deadlock we are familiar with. 

Mr. Harsch: I want to go back to the question 
of bombing and ask you if there isn't an honest 
difference of opinion in Washington as to the 
importance of bombing to us. I cite, for ex- 
ample, what you said on Friday : ^ "If they are 
talking about stopping our half of the war" — • 
that is, you appeared to be saying the bombing 
represented pretty much our half of the war — 
whereas Mr. McNamara on August 25 says 

^ For the transcript of Secretary Rusk's news con- 
ference of Sept. S, see Bulletin of Sept. 25, 1967, p. 381. 

"There is no basis to believe that any bombing 
campaign, short of one which had population 
as its target, would by itself force Ho Chi 
Minh's regime into submission." 

Secretary Ru^k: There is no contradiction 
there. Secretary McNamara was talking about 
a dramatically stepped-up bombing program as 
distinct from the kind of bombing that we are 
doing now. One of the problems is that opera- 
tionally we cannot say to our soldiers and our 
Marines that they must not strike the enemy 
that is coming at them until they are 2 miles 
away. We can't say to our Marines "Don't hit 
them when they are 9 miles away, that would 
be too rude, that is across the I7th parallel." 

I don't myself quite see what Hanoi's incen- 
tive for peace would be, if they were sitting 
there completely safe, undisturbed, able to send 
men and anns into South Viet-Nam at their 
pace for the next 30 or 40 years. Now, the con- 
centration of Hanoi on the bombing, and the 
international campaign which they and other 
Communist capitals have organized to get the 
bombing stopped, indicates that the bombing 
is a very important element in this situation. We 
hear much more about the bombing tlian we do 
about four points and five points and all the 
paraphernalia of political discussion. Now this, 
therefore, is important to them. 

Now, we can stop it very quickly, but what we 
want to know is what will happen if we do stop 
it, and so far they have not been able to tell us 
anything that they would do. 

Mr. Harsch: I can understand your not want- 
ing to stop it if you are sure it really is having 
an effect on the war in the South. But if it ceases 
to have much appreciable effect, as I thought 
Mr. McNamara was saying, then the reason for 
not stopping is certainly a good deal smaller, 
isn't it? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I don't think he was say- 
ing it had no effect on it. I think it has had a 
considerable effect on lines of communication, 
the capacity of the North to maintain a war at 
certain magnitudes. 

]Mr. Schoenbrun in the earlier program talked 
about all these people in North Viet-Nam who 
are there to repair railways and repair bridges 
and things of that sort. If all those people were 
free to bring arms piggyback to support men in 
South Viet-Nam, the situation would be quite 
different. So that there is no doubt at all that 
the bombing has had some real effect on their 
capacity to sustain a particular level of opera- 
tions ill the South. But in any event, it also 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 


brings home to them that peace is a matter of 
reciprocal action on both sides and that they 
cannot expect to sit there in a sanctuaiy while 
they launch these wicked attacks on Sonth 

U.S. Bombing Military Targets 

Mr. ClarJc: President-elect Thieu said yester- 
day, and again, these are his words : "Any tar- 
get in North Viet-Nam which can help the Com- 
munist invader to continue the war should be 
destroyed." Would you agree with this ? 

Secretary Ritsh: Well, the selection of targets 
has to take into accoimt very many things. We 
have been bombing militarj' targets extensively 
in North Viet-Nam. There are very few mili- 
tary targets which have not been hit. We have 
no desire to take on the civilian population. 
Wlien people like David Schoenln-un and Har- 
rison Salisbury visit Hanoi, they find Hanoi 
and they wander aromid the city, and they have 
to go out looking for bomb damage. That itself 
demonstrates we are not after civilians up there. 

In a broadcast just yesterday from Hanoi 
they announced that we had killed 500 civilians 
in North Viet-Nam by our bombing in the past 
6 months — the first 6 months of 1967. Now that 
figure of 500 is Just about the same number of 
South Vietnamese civilians killed by the Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese forces in the South 
during the election campaign which has just 
closed — during about 4 weeks. And this is a 
matter of policy on the part of the Viet Cong. 
They were ordered to do so, whereas the civilian 
casualties in the North were unfortunate by- 
products of attacks on military targets. 

Mr. Clarh: Would it be correct to say that we 
are gomg to continue to make basic military de- 
cisions in the war, including decisions on what 
is or is not going to be bombed, despite the new 
civilian government in Saigon? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think we do that in 
consultation with the Government m Saigon, 
and in consultation with our other allies who 
are involved in Viet-Nam. The general bombing 
policy is a matter we discuss with them. The 
selection of actual targets is a matter that the 
Commander in Chief has to take as his respon- 
sibility in terms of those that might be sensitive. 
It is not something that Senators or correspond- 
ents or very many people can get into with any 

Mr. Harsch : Mr. Secretaiy, Secretary McNa- 

mara has announced the policy of attemptmg to 
build a military barrier of sorts between North 
and South Viet-Nam. He did not say that it 
could go all the way across to Thailand. Would 
you discuss the political problem of extending 
that barrier right across so that we really could 
cut the Ho Chi Minh trail ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, Secretary McNamara 
did make a statement on that. There has been a 
great deal of speculation, but he refused to take 
additional questions. I don't think it is for me 
to take up that question and speculate about it 
for the future. We don't want to give that kind 
of information to North Viet-Nam. I just prefer 
to stay out of that, quite frankly, 

Mr. Harsch: Can't you tell us anything about 
the attitude of the people on our side in Laos to 
the idea of putting it across? 

Secretary Rusk: If there is a story there, it 
will be a story some weeks and months from 
now, and there is no point in my trying to make 
it a story today. 

Mr. Harsch : Can you tell us this, whether if 
a barrier became militarily effective it would 
reduce tlie importance of the bombing to the 
extent that it was effective? 

Secretary Rusk : No. Again, if I were a regi- 
mental commander up there, to prevent the 
intrusion of these forces from North Viet-Nam 
across the DMZ, I would be glad to have my 
men reinforced by materiel. That is the basic 
element in the situation. 

Mr. Clark : Mr. Secretary, Governor Eomney 
has now offered a further explanation of his 
charge that he was "brainwashed" by the ad- 
ministration into supporting its Viet-Nam 
policy, at least for a time. He says he wasn't 
talking about the Russian type of l>rainwashing 
but what he calls the LBJ kind. What he meant, 
he says, is the credibility gap, the snow job, or 
just manipulating the news. Would you like to 
reply to any or all of these ? 

Secretary Rusk: If you ask me if I would like 
to, the answer is "No," but I don't know which 
Eomney to answer and which statements to 
answer. Certainly the charge that the Johnson 
administration has l^een trying to mislead the 
Americiin people is nonsense. We are trying to 
give effect to a Southeast Asia Treat}-, which 
was negotiated and ratified under a Republican 
administration, with broad bipartisan support, 
with only one dissenting vote in the Senate. And 
everj'one understood at that time what that 
treaty meant. The Senate Foreign Relations 



Committee at that time understood ■what it 
meant, and we are now giving effect to the com- 
mitments we made in support of the security 
of the countries that are covered by that treaty. 

Now, Mr. Romney, I think, has some prob- 
lems about sorting this out within his own party 
and, ahhough tlie Secretary of State has many 
responsibilities, what happens in the Republi- 
can Party is not one of them. 

Mr. Clark: Are you disturbed by all the re- 
cent i)oliticking over the Viet-Nam issue, which 
many politicians have been saying for 2 years 
they hoped could be kept out of politics? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, naturally we would 
hope, and I thinlv there ai-e some leaders in both 
parties who would hope, that in an issue of this 
sort, which has been bipartisan in the past and 
is bipartisan in terms of the future stakes of 
this country in the results, could be kept out of 
politics. But we are pretty lusty in our country 
and pretty boisterous when we start moving 
into presidential elections; so it is inevitable, 
at least, some discussion of it. 

The Situation in China 

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, has the chaos in 
China yet reached the point where you can 
begin to see some outline, to draw some conclu- 
sion about what is happening and what may 
come of it? 

Secretary Rusk: It is very difficult for us to 
try to predict exactly what is happening in 
China. Now, we are very much interested in the 
outcome there. AVe have great stakes in it, and 
we have interests in their attitudes toward their 
neighbors from Korea all the way around from 
Southeast Asia to India. 

We try to watch very carefully the actual 
events there, the groups that seem to be oppos- 
ing each other, the issues on which they oppose 
each other — militancy against peaceful coexist- 
ence, for example. We take into full accomit our 
private discussions with them in Warsaw. We 
watch their economic problem. Here is a coun- 
try where the gross national product is one- 
tenth that of the United States, on which they 
have to feed and take care of some 700 million 
people. We watch closely their relations with 
the Soviet Union, with Britain, with India, 
with Bunna, with Hanoi — even with such coun- 
tries as Kenya and Switzerland, with whom 
they have had great difficulties lately. We watch 
also the disposition of their forces and their 
force deployments. 

We camaot honestly tell you exactly what the 
outcome inside China is going to be. I don't 
think anyone knows that, particidarly the lead- 
ers in China. We are interested in whether they 
are going to intrude themselves into adjacent 
areas, such as Southeast Asia or India. I can tell 
you that we do not have present indication that 
they are disposing their forces for a significant 
intervention in these border areas. 

Now, we can't g-uarantee that for the future. 
There is a risk in all of these situations, but 
there has been a risk m all of them since the end 
of the war, and that risk has to be taken into 
account. Now, we can't say that there is no risk 
whatever of China involving itself in some of 
these problems, but it is a risk which we antici- 
pated. We could not say that alliances dissolve 
simply because we recognize there might be a 
risk, because it was the presence of the risk that 
caused the alliance to be formed. When the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955 rec- 
ommended the SEATO Treaty, it said : 

The committee is not impervious to the rislis which 
this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance 
of these additional obligations commits the United 
States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the 
Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own 
highest interests. There are greater hazards in not ad- 
vising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, 
and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which 
might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions. 

And we have gone to great lengths, Mr. 
Harsch, to make it clear to China that we have 
no designs on China. We are not trying to stim- 
ulate a pretext for a preventive war against 
China. We want to live at peace with mainland 
China, and we have done the same thmg as far 
as North Viet-Nam is concerned. We have no 
desire to destroy North Viet-Nam. 

As far as we are concerned, we could leave 
North Viet-Nam alone tomorrow afternoon if 
they would join with us in making some peace 
in Southeast Asia. So we hope the leaders in 
Peking will understand that we have no designs 
on them and that they will exercise prudence, 
as they have thus far with respect to Southeast 

Mr. Clark: Well, Mr. Secretary, in our rela- 
tions with China, in these very hazardous and 
delicate areas involving the Viet-Nam war, we 
are obviously taking some serious chances, and 
chances that have disturbed Congress and the 
American people. 

Would you, for instance, consider it an act of 
aggression by China if some of those North 

OCTOBER 2, 196 7 


Viotnamose MIG's that are now on Cliinese 
buses (low into combat against AnicriL-an planes 
over North Vict-Nam? That is an iffy question, 
I know, but it is the sort of tiling — 

Secretary linsk: At my last press conference, 
out of '23 questions, 19 qiiestions had to deal 
with the future. Now, 1 can deal with the future 
one day at a time in terms of what happens. 
Now, we don't anticipate that this will happen. 
If it should begin to happen, that is a question 
that we and Peking would have to grapple with. 

Mr. Clark: You don't think we are takhig 
any unnecessary risk in the current air war in 
bombing within 10 miles — 

Secretary Rusk: I think that our actions — 
none of our actions in Southeast Asia arc un- 
necessary. Now, there are some risks involved, 
of course, but remember there are risks also for 
the other side. We have limited our objective 
there, we have limited our military operations, 
■we have made it very clear that we have no hos- 
tile intentions toward mainland China. Now, we 
cannot guarantee what their decisions will be, 
but we see no basis at the present time for sup- 
posing that they are moving toward a major 
intervention in Southeast Asia. 

Mr. Ilarsch: Mr. Secretarj', another ques- 
tion — I think this is a quick one. You said on 
Friday that you would ask Israel to allow more 
Arab refugees to go to their homes on the Israeli 
side of the Jordan River. Has there been any 
response ? 

Secretary/ Busk: We haven't had a real re- 
sponse on that. We made our views known to a 
number of governments. I thinlv the events will 
give us our response. 

Mr. Harsch: One last, very quick question. 
It has been suggested tluit maybe you and Mr. 
McNamara would both be happier if you could 
change jobs. Is there any merit in the idea? 

Secretary Ritsk: No, I think the Department 
of Defense has never had a more brilliant Sec- 
retary of Defense, and no Secretary of State has 
ever been more blessed with a Seci-etary of De- 
fense than I have been with Secretary' 

Mr. Clark: You sound like a man who is 
quite happy in j'our present job, then. 

Secretai'y Rusk : Yes, yes, I am trying to do 
my duty. 

Mr. Clark: We are very happy to have had 
you with us on "Issues and Answers." Thank 
you very much for being our guest. 


Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, two-thirds of 
South Viet-Nam's almost 5 million voters cast 
their ballots not for the military but for the 
civilians. Do you regard this as a repudiation 
of the military and as a call for peace? 

Amhassador Bunker: No, I don't regard it as 
a repudiation of the military. I think with 11 
candidates in the field and a vote of something 
over 35 percent for the Avinning ticket, it is 
evidence that the winning ticket has a demon- 
strable democratic base. 

Anno'imcer: In Saigon, capital of South Viet- 
Nam, in color, "Face the Nation," a spontaneous 
and unrehearsed news interview, filmed in the 
American Embassy on Thursday [September 7] 
with the U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam, Ells- 
worth Bunker. Ambassador Bunker will be 
questioned by CBS News correspondent Bert 
Quint, R. W. Apple, Jr., Saigon bureau chief 
of the New York Times, and CBS News corre- 
spondent Bernard Kalb. 

3Ir. Kalb: Do you think, Mr. Ambassador, 
that General Thieu will follow through on his 
campaign pledge to call for a 1-week suspen- 
sion of the bombing over North Viet-Nam? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think tliat Gen- 
oral Thieu of course has this in mind. I think 
that whatever is done will be done, of course, as 
the result of consultation between the Govern- 
ment of Viet-Nam, our own Government, and 
the other governments who supply troops here. 
I am sure that whatever move is made in any 
direction will be a considered move. 

3Ir. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, the strong race 
made by Mr. [Truong Dinh] Dzu, tlie peace-at- 
any-price candidate, has been interpreted by 
many people as a repudiation of the Govern- 
ment, as almost a shout for peace by the South 
Vietnamese people. Would you so interpret it? 

Ambassador Bunker: No. I don't interpret it. 
I tliink the vote for the Government, as I say, 
which was more than twice the vote for Mr. 
Dzu, is a demonsti-atiou that people here, in ad- 
dition to wanting peace, want stability and se- 
curity, and continuity is another factor. I think 
Mr. Dzu's strong sliowing is probably due to a 
number of factors, including, of course, his 
advocacy of peace but also the fact that he was 
an articulate speaker, a very vigorous cam- 
paigner, sharp critic of the Government. In any 
election, whether it is in the United States or 



anywhere else, there is always a substantial ele- 
ment of the people who are "agin" the govern- 
ment. And I think that also is another element 
in the strength of his showing. 

Mr. Quint: The United States has said that it 
hopes that this election will make it easier to 
negotiate with North Viet-Nam. But if the 
North Vietnamese consider this not a represent- 
ative election and the same generals who 
headed South Viet-Nam before head it now, 
what makes you think that it will be easier to 
achieve negotiation and peace ? 

Amhassador Bunker: Well, of course, it takes 
two to negotiate. I mean the North Vietnamese 
have got to show some willingness to come to 
negotiation. But it seems to me that with an 
elected government, a constitutional, function- 
ing government, there is evidence then, as far as 
the North Vietnamese are concerned, that there 
is stability here, permanence here, to a degree 
that did not exist before, that there is a consti- 
tutional government which came about as a 
result of a very large vote and a very large pro- 
portion of the population voting. And therefore 
there is a government with whom they can ne- 
gotiate. Wliat the reaction of Hanoi will be, of 
course, is difficult to say now, but it seems to me 
that there should be an improved prospect of 
coming to negotiation. 

Mr. Quint: Are you — is the United States 
willing to negotiate — take into consideration in 
the negotiations the Viet Cong? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think we have 
made it clear, the Secretary has, the President, 
too, that there would be no problem about hav- 
ing the views of the Viet Cong represented in 

Mr. Apj)Ie: Mr. Ambassador, what about the 
possibility of the United States encouraging di- 
rect negotiations between the new elected gov- 
ernment of South Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong ? 
Wouldn't this really offer a better hope than 
trying to get the United States and Hanoi to 
the bargaining table ? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think we have 
made it clear that if the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment and Hanoi can settle this problem 
themselves, we would be very happy to see it. 
General Tliieu — 

Mr. Afple: How about the South Vietnamese 
Government and the Viet Cong? 

Amhassador Bunker: Well, the Viet Cong, we 
must remember in the first place, is controlled 

by Hanoi. There is no question about that, I 
think. I think the evidence of captured docu- 
ments and everything else indicates that very 
clearly. Consequently, I doubt that the Viet 
Cong as such is a free agent. But as General 
Thieu has said, he is ready to talk to the Viet 
Cong individually, guarantee any of them safe 
conduct here, and has indicated that he is ready 
to make an approach to the Viet Cong. 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, has the United 
States encouraged the new leaders of South 
Viet-Nam in any direction toward negotiations, 
whether an approach toward Hanoi, whether 
an approach toward the Viet Cong or any kind 
of approach ? 

A Constant Search for Peace 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I don't know that 
there has been any specific effort. We are always 
looking for ways to negotiate. I think the last 
rejection by Hanoi of approaches — I think some 
41 efforts have been made toward opening up 
negotiations ; all of them have been rejected by 
Hanoi. So that it is not a question of doing 
something at a specific time. It is a constant 
search for peace. And we would, of course, en- 
courage the Vietnamese Government to make 
their own approaches. 

Mr. Kalb : Mr. Ambassador, the winning mil- 
itary ticket managed to capture only 35 percent 
of the vote, and a good deal of that, though, 
came from the military, which is composed of 
about 620,000 voters. Do you think that this new 
military government will be able to win the 
confidence of the people, the great majority of 
the people, in fact two-thirds of the voting 
population ? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, in the first place, 
Bernie, I am not — about your first premise, 
there is no telling how many of the military 
voted for the military ticket. I think that the 
chances are that many of the military — in fact, 
we find evidence — supported other candidates. 
But I think this present government, by enlarg- 
ing their administration, by, as I presume they 
will, including in it elements of other political 
parties and the civilian sectors of the country, 
of the population, could very well establish 
quite a broad base here on which to command 
popular support. And I would think that would 
be probably the way in which they would pro- 
ceed, although obviously it is their government 

OCTOBER 2, 19G7 


and they will make their own detennination. 
But certainly that is a very — it seems to me a 
very reasonable assumption. 

Mt. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, you spoke a 
moment ago of the Diem regime. One of the 
reasons that that regime was brought down 
was the overrepresentation of Koman Catholics 
in it, which created great resentment among the 
Buddhists. Now we have a new President who 
is a Roman Catholic, and we have a Senate in 
which at least half and perhaps more than half 
of the Members are Roman Catholics. The 
Catholics make up 10 percent of the popula- 
tion. Do you think this could again cause trouble 
with the Buddhists, and particularly the mili- 
tant Buddhists ? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I don't know 
what the attitude of the militant Buddhists may 
be, but I should doubt it veiy much. I think 
there is not only the Senate but also the lower 
House to be elected. I don't know how the com- 
position of the Lower House may turn out. That, 
as you know, is selected by constituencies, and 
I think that the local interests will be much 
more in evidence in the campaign for the lower 
House. Again, I think certainly General Thieu 
is an extremely reasonable, open-minded man, 
and I don't look for trouble on that score. 

Mr. Kali : Mr. Ambassador, there is now an 
elected government, and you have great skill as 
a negotiator, as you demonstrated in the Domiia- 
ican Republic and in Indonesia on the West 
Irian settlement. Does the fact that there is now 
an elected leadership in this country open the 
way for Ambassador Bunker to use liis skills as 
a negotiator to possibly find a way to end the 
war? This, as you know, has been one of the 
suppositions when you first arrived here, one 
of the speculations. 

Arribassador Bunker: No — well, I don't think 
that I can really answer that. I don't know what 
the opportmiities are going to be. We are always 
looking for opportunities — not only I, but 
everybody in our administration is looking for 

Mr. Kalb : Have you, in your months out here, 
Ambassador Bunker, detected anything at all 
that might indicate a vulnerability on the part, 
of the other side toward responding to negotia- 
tions, or has it all been one blank wall ? 

Amhassador Bunker: I must confess that so 
far I have not seen any indication of Hanoi's 
readiness yet to come to negotiations. But then 

it is very difficult to know what is going on in 
the minds of the people in Hanoi. 

Mr. Quint: Mr. Ambassador, the United 
States Government has denied with some ve- 
hemence several times lately that there is a stale- 
mate, either in the military or in the pacifica- 
tion program. Do you have any evidence of real 
progress toward winning either militarily or 
politically, say, in the last 6 months? 

Steady Progress Being Made 

Ajnbassador Bunker: Yes, I think we are 
making steady progress — not spectacular prog- 
ress — it is not that kind of situation. I think 
we are making steady progress. Tliis is a situa- 
tion which cannot be solved overnight. It takes 
time. It takes patience. It takes steady applica- 
tion of pressure. As I say, it is not a situation 
where you have spectacular things happening. 
It is a question of keeping on the pressure, 
gradually moving ahead. 

Mr. Quint: Do you feel today that the end is 
any closer in sight than it was, say, a year ago ? 

Ambassador Bunker: Yes, I do, very defi- 
nitely. I think that we have made very steady 
progress. I think we are now beginning to see 
light at the end of the tunnel. 

Mr. Quint: Mr. Ambassador, you talk about 
light at the end of the tunnel. How long is this 
tminel ? 

Ambassador Bunker: I don't think that you 
can put it into any particular time frame, a 
situation like this. It is very difficult to say that. 

Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, how do you 
know that you've made — that you are further 
along the road than you were a year ago if you 
don't Imow how long the road is? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think by bench 
marks on the road. I think the voting is one of 
them. The number of hamlets and collages that 
are coming under protection and imder secure 
areas is another indication. And these are all — 
you know what the final objective is, as far as 
pacification or security : It is to get all of the 
population under it, of course. Now, another 
thing — and why I say I don't think it is profit- 
able to try to pin it clown to any definite time 
frame, because I think it is very possible — in 
my view quite probable — that the process will 
accelerate, and as we increase the pressure and 
as pacification gets better organized, into gear, 
that that also will accelerate. Now, if pacifica- 



tion succeeds, obviously it cuts the ground from 
under the North Vietnamese; there is notliing 
left here for them to support. 

Mr. Kalb: That is an extraordinaiy assump- 
tion — if pacification succeeds. We have been 
hearing about pacification since — 

Ambassador Bunker: I don't think it is an 
extraordinary assumption, Bemie, because pac- 
ification — there is another thing, I think, that 
you have got to remember — first, and in its pres- 
ent concept, is relatively new. This present gov- 
ernment, which has been in 2 years, took the 
first year to reestablish order and get some sem- 
blance of stability. Remember, 2 years ago the 
coimtry was close on the brink of defeat. Now, 
it took that time — it was not possible, really, to 
initiate programs of this kind in the first year of 
the administration. Consequently, it has only 
been going for a year. As I said in the begin- 
ning, it takes a vast amount of organization, a 
vast amount of trainmg. But once you get peo- 
ple trained and once you get the organization 
functioning, then it is perfectly reasonable to 
exjiect acceleration, it seems to me. 

Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, to put this in 
historical perspective a little bit — you talk 
about pacification succeeding, about beating the 
main forces. Can you cite an insurgency within 
the last 20 years, withm tlie last 25 years, that 
has been defeated with a long, open frontier like 
this one? I can think of several that have been 
defeated, none that has ever succeeded, no 
comiterinsurgency effort that has ever succeeded 
when the enemy was able to keep pouruag more 
and more people in. 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I don't know that 
we have ever had — this is, I think, a rather 
unique situation and a difficult situation, of 
course, because of the sanctuaries which Laos 
and Cambodia provide. And that makes it in- 
creasinglj^ difficult. And I think that new meth- 
ods probably have to be devised to choke down 
the infiltration. 

Mr. Kalb : Mr. Ambassador, how do you think 
this will eventually end ? I think your predeces- 
sor. Ambassador Lodge, once said he thought it 
would simply fade away. Wliat is your own 
guess, having sat through — 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I haven't any firm 
opmion about it. That is one possibility, of 
course. The other possibility is that it will come 
to negotiations. And I hope it will. 

Mr. Kalb: Do you think negotiations might 

take place before the presidential elections in 
the United States ? 

A^nbassador Bunker: It seems to me it is pos- 
sible, yes. 

Mr. Kalb : You think it is jiossible ? 

Ambassador Bunker: I think it is possible. 

Mr. Kalb : Wliat gives you that hope, sir ? 

Ambassador Bunker: Nothing very tangible, 
except that I think several factors could con- 
tribute to it. One I have already mentioned, and 
that is a realization on the part of Hanoi that 
there is permanence here, there is stability, 
there is a functioning constitutional govern- 
ment, and a realization of the futility, there- 
fore, of going on indefinitely with the fighting. 
Another thmg is the fact — the psychological 
effect of the elections here, which indicate, it 
seems to me, to the Viet Cong, to all the Viet- 
namese people, including the Viet Cong, that 
there is now a government to which they can 
adhere, under which their rights can be pro- 
tected under the constitution, and imder which 
they can become integrated into the social and 
political structure of the countiy. 

Evolution of the Constitutional Process 

Mr. Kalh: Do you think the putting of sev- 
eral million pieces of paper in ballot boxes es- 
sentially to choose a President and Vice Presi- 
dent here will have this dramatic, dynamic, 
magnetic impact? 

Ambassador Bunker: I think it is a very sig- 
nificant development, a very significant devel- 
opment. I thijak that — ^two things: that the 
evolution of the constitutional process and the 
development of the pacification program is as 
important as the military aspect of this war. 

Mr. Kalb : Do you think all of this could dove- 
tail together to produce a negotiation possibly 
before next November — '68 ? 

Ambassador Bunker: I think it could very 
well, yes. 

Mr. Kalb : Do you know something, Mr. Am- 
bassador, that we don't about negotiations? 

A?nbassador Bunker: I doul^t if I know any- 
thing the press doesn't know, Bemie. I was 
hoping to get information from you on that 

Mr. Apple: Wliat about Hanoi's statement 
yesterday that it would turn down any peace 
offer from any government headed by General 

OCTOBER 2, 196 7 


Ambassador Bunker: That is a negative fac- 
tor, obviously. But I don't say that that is neces- 
sarily something that is conclusive, that will 
always be the attitude of Hanoi. 

Mr. Quint: Are you hoping that — 

Ambassador Bunker: I don't think you can 
put any fixed premises into a situation of this 

Mr. Quint: Are you basing your hopes on 
progress in the pacification program and the 
military, progress that you hope to see for the 
future, or are you basing it on sometliing that 
you can see now ? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I am basing it on 
what I think is happening now and what I 
therefore feel that I have reason to believe may 
happen in the future. 

Mr. KaJb: Mr. Ambassador, do you detect 
any anxiety on the part of the South Vietnam- 
ese leaders that there might be a drastic 
change or even a minor change in American 
policy toward Viet-Nam because of the Novem- 
ber 1968 presidential elections in the U.S. ? 

Ambassador Bunker: I have not observed 
any, no. 

Mr. Kalb : Are they then taking it for granted 
that the American commitment is that long- 
range at the present time ? 

Am,bassador Bunker: I don't know what they 
are taking for commitment — as a commitment, 
Bernie— or taking for granted, as you say. I 
think you would have to ask them. I really have 
not had any discussion with them about the 
forthcoming elections in the United States. 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, in talking about 
the possibility of negotiations before November 
1968, you introduced a possibility or a factor 
that an elected govermnent could rally the con- 
fidence of the people. Now, the fact is that the 
election returns show that two-tliirds of the 5 
million people — almost 5 million — who voted, 
voted for civilians and not for the military. Ob- 
viously, there is a sense of dejection and disap- 
pointment that the military won by that great 
majority of voters. Now, why should one believe 
that these people will rally to the side of a mili- 
tary ticket that in effect has been repudiated by 
them, if you choose to interpret it that way; 
certainly they voted for civilians and not. for 
the military. There seems to be a contradiction 
in all this. 

Ambassado"' Bunker: I don't think there is a 
contradiction. I think that with 11 candidates 

people are bound to exercise a choice, and that 
is what we want to see them do — exercise a free 
choice. That is what the whole electoral process 
is about. The reason — the fact that I vote for 
Jolin Doe instead of Henry Jones does not mean 
that I am disaffected, it does not mean that in 
case of war I won't back Henry Jones. I mean 
we have it all the time in the United States and 
in every country. In the last war — I mean there 
is no reason to suppose, I think, because people 
vote for a certain individual that they won't 
back a duly constituted government, and, as I 
said a while ago, particularly if the government 
does broaden its base, does include opposition 
members in the government, or a broad spec- 
tnun of the civilian elements in the coimtry. 
The country is at war, after all. I think there is 
every reason why now the elements who were 
opposition should close ranks, as we do and as 
is done elsewhere and everywhere, with a threat 
to the country. 

Mr. Apple: Mr. Bunker, several of the lead- 
ing civilian candidates, among them Mr. [Tran 
Van] Huong, Mr. [Truong Dinh] Dzu, and Mr. 
[Phan Khac] Suu, have said that they and their 
followers would accept no part in the Thieu 
government. You said a few moments ago that 
you hoped that the government would draw ele- 
ments of the defeated slates into it. Are there 
other meaningful people who could — other 
meaningful candidates — who could make a sig- 
nificant contribution ? 

Ambassador Bunker: I don't say it has to be 
the candidates themselves, but their representa- 
tives or members of their party. And I don't 
know either, Jolmny — certainly I think it is our 
experience that what may be said in the heat of 
the campaign is not always a considered opin- 
ion. So I would want to see what develops in 
that respect. 

Attitude of Communist China 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, have you ever 
had any restless nights wondermg about 
whether the Chinese Communists might re- 
spond to American bombing very close to the 
North Vietnamese-Chinese border? 

Ambassador Bunker: I have been sleeping; 
quite well, Bemie. 

Mr. Apple :Wi\iyt is your appraisal of the 
probable Chinese attitude toward such a move? 
I am sure you have thought about it. 



Ambassador Bunker: Oh, we are very care- 
ful, I think, in the bombmg pattern to keep 
away from China itself. They seem to be having 
a good many problems of their own at the pres- 
ent moment. And I don't anticipate — I see no 
evidence that there is any indication of their in- 
volvement. I am not even sure that Hanoi would 
welcome their involvement. 

Mr. Apple: We have had a plane shot down 
over China. 

Amhassador Bunker: Yes, that was a stray 
plane. And obviously — two planes, yes. The Chi- 
nese reaction was quite moderate, as a matter of 

Mr. Kalb: There is always the chance you 
may get a stray Chinese response. Mr. Ambas- 
sador, I wonder if I could ask you this question, 
please. We all know about the lack of romance 
between General Thieu and Marshal Ky, the 
newly elected President and Vice President of 
South Vict-Nam. Do you think this lack of 
camaraderie in all senses between the two lead- 
ei's of South Viet-Nam poses any danger of 
instability for this country? 

Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think that is a 
pretty sweeping statement. You say "lack of 
camaraderie in all senses." I think they have 
worked together quite well in the last 2 years. 
They have both said they intend to do so in the 
future. I would expect so. 

Mr. Kalb: You don't see any particular 
threat, as a result of the — 

Ambassador Bunker: No, I do not, I think — 
as a matter of fact, I think they have worked 
well together and I think they worked well to- 
gether through the campaign, and I think they 
both have said that they look forward to work- 
ing together. 

Mr. Kalb: Thank you very much, Ambassa- 
dor Bunker, for being with us here to "Face the 

Ambassador Bunker: Thank you very much, 
Bernie, too — all of you. You put me on the 
griddle, but I have always enjoyed that among 

President Sends Congratulations 
to Vietnamese Chief of State 

The following text of a message from Presi- 
dent Johnson to Chief of State Nguyen Van 
Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam was made 
public at Saigon on September 10. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : I extend my warm con- 
gratulations to you and to Prime Minister Ky 
on your victory in the election of a President 
and Vice President. 

I have just received a detailed and most mov- 
ing accomit of your election from the distin- 
guished Americans whom you invited to 
Viet-Nam as observers. They returned believing 
in the fairness of the procedures and observed 
the intense interest of the Vietnamese people in 
this major step toward creating your own 
popularly chosen and constitutionally based 

Their individual reports were a testimonial to 
the courage and determination of the Vietnam- 
ese people to remain free and to create their 
own political institutions in their own way. 

The election was a milestone along the path 
toward the goal you have set for yourselves — a 
free, secure and peaceful Viet-Nam. But it is 
not the end of the journey. Many hard tasks 
remain. Not the least of these now is the cre- 
ation of a strong, effective and broadly based 
government that will help you and your comitry 
achieve the objectives you set forth in your 

The American Government and I, personally, 
look forward to continued close cooperation 
with you and your colleagues in the days and 
months ahead. I am confident that our efforts — 
joined with those of our other allies — will be 
crowned with success and that mider your 
leadership, a peaceful democratic, strong and 
prosperous Viet-Nam will emerge. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 


"(9wr chance for achieving order and progress in the world 
would ie greater if Europe and North America were to develop 
their relationship in close concert. Such association annong us 
could become the nucleus of hroader relationships with other 
free natlotis, which could deal with the varied prohlons of world 
politics affecting their com,mon interests.''"' 

Concert and Conciliation: The Next Stage 
of the Atlantic Alliance 

hy Eugene V. Rostow 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

I am happy to address the general assembly 
of the Atlantic Treaty Association. The asso- 
ciation is one of the most influential among the 
private groups whose function it is to propagate 
ideas. Such bodies are the pride and glory of 
free societies. Their watchword — the sound 
motto of responsible democratic citizenship 
always — is that policy is too important to be 
left to governments. The Atlantic Treaty Asso- 
ciation is not a large company. But it has proved 
to be an effective catalyst of opinion, helping to 
overcome the inherent inertia of governments 
and stirring them to undertake some, at least, 
of the many tasks they should be doing. 

Wliat brings us together today is our convic- 
tion tliat Europe and North America, which 
share a common civilization, also share common 
interests, common responsibilities, and a com- 
mon destiny. We believe that a vital, politically 
more active Atlantic system is the surest road 
to peace and progress, both for our own coun- 
tries and for the world at large. 

The North Atlantic Treaty was a formal first 
expression of the Atlantic idea. But, as Presi- 
dent Johnson said last October : ^ 

. . . we know that the wnrkl is changing. Our policy 
must reflect the reality of today — not yesterday. In 
every part of the world, new forces are at the gates : 
new countries, new aspirations, new men. In this spirit, 
let us look ahead to the tasks that confront the Atlan- 
tic nations. 

The members of the alliance are now engaged 
in a year-long study of its future political tasks 
and of its procedures for carrying out those 
tasks. The resolution ' definmg the terms of ref- 

erence for that study was proposed by the dis- 
tinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium, M. 
Pierre Harmel. It was drawn in comprehensive 
terms. It requires the alliance to consider its 
political responsibilities as "a factor for a dur- 
able peace" in the light of the changes which 
have taken place m the political condition of 
the world smce 1949 and those which are in 
prospect for the years ahead. The Belgian 
initiative followed one of comparable import 
proposed by the Canadian Government some 
time earlier. 

The United States Government welcomed 
M. Harmel's proposal last fall, and it welcomed 
the strong support the resolution received from 
all our allies. It is our hope that the report of 
the alliance study group next December will 
signal a new birth of vitality for the alliance — 
a period of innovation as creative as that of the 
late forties and early fifties. 

For the times do require a new start for the 
political work of the alliance. We are not on 
the brink of disaster as we were 20 years ago. 
But there are stresses in our system of security, 
serious stresses it would be wise to face now and 
to resolve together before they become acute. 
We have proved many times that we can co- 
operate to deal with crises. The challenge of 
events today is that of preventive statesman- 
ship : Can we bring ourselves to act together in 

' Address made before the Atlantic Treaty Associa- 
tion at Luxembourg on Sept. 11 (press release 194). 

° For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., 
on Oct. 7, 1966, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 

' For text, see iUd., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 52. 



the absence of a full crisis, to use all our re- 
sources of influence to further our common 
interests in order and progress in the world? 

For the United States, the Atlantic relation 
is a first principle of our foreign policy. 

It seems self-evident to us that the alliance 
■will continue to be needed for the indefinite 
future. The agenda of world politics is formi- 
dable. A new sj'stem of assured order must be 
achieved. And conditions of harmonious prog- 
ress must be organized by the developed and 
the developing countries working together. As 
a practical matter the tasks ahead cannot be 
dealt with except by the cooperative efforts of 
the nations or groups of nations primarily 

Naturally, the varied issues which concern 
world politics will involve different sets of 
nations. But almost all affect the common inter- 
ests of Europe and North America. 

I propose to talk today about those interests 
and about the future of the relationship between 
Europe and North America. 

Paradoxes in U.S.-European Affairs 

Our affairs are in a posture of paradox. Let 
me mention four aspects of that posture. 

We have never been stronger, better orga- 
nized, or more secure. Yet we are in jeopardy 
still. It does not take Cassandra's eye to see 
danger beyond the comforting array of our 
missiles and tanks. There is a popular yearning 
to believe that danger has already passed. But 
the facts do not justify that belief. Our societies 
can flourish only in a reasonably open and stable 
world environment. Such stability is hardly 
assured, even in Europe itself, as the recent 
explosion in the Middle East — on the flank of 
Europe — reminded us only a few weeks ago. 

Resistance to Idea of Interdependence 

Secondly, we are being drawn together and 
drawn apart at the same time. Our interde- 
pendence has never been more obvious. In every 
realm, our lives are inextricably interwoven. 
Wlierever we look, the trend is the same and the 
degree of our interdependence is being steadily 
accelerated — in the field of security; in educa- 
tion, science, and teclmology; in economic 
affairs; and above all, in politics. 

Yet we do not fully accept interdependence 
as the premise of our political relationship : On 
both sides of the Atlantic, strong voices resist 

the idea of interdependence and call for recip- 
rocal withdrawal and isolation. 

For Europe, there has been resentment at its 
dependence upon the United States. Eelieved of 
the burden of empire, there is a current of Euro- 
pean feeling against any involvement in security 
problems outside Europe and some even against 
involvement in the security problems of Europe 
itself. "Good riddance," these men say. "Let 
America take care of security, or better still, 
let security take care of itself." 

Such impulses are strengthened by the com- 
plex of problems surrounding the development 
of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union and the 
United States move ahead in this field at an 
accelerating pace. In consequence, Europe is 
still dependent on American nuclear protection. 
That fact finds expression in a mood of fatalism 
which reinforces impulses of withdrawal. 
Instead of seeking solutions of shared respon- 
sibility, the victims of this mood protest against 
what they call American domination and fall 
back on policies of nonparticipation in world 

Some Europeans wonder whether the United 
States is now so powerful that Europe has 
become irrelevant in world affairs or at least 
irrelevant in American thought about the secu- 
rity problem. That suspicion is a source both 
of relief and of concern. Some victims of this 
doubt justify withdrawal because of the gap in 
power between Europe and the United States. 
Others see the United States preoccupied with 
efforts to pacify Southeast Asia and to master 
grave domestic problems. They are tempted to 
conclude that the United States has lost interest 
in Europe. 

On the American side, the pattern of protest 
has mirrored that in Europe. 

The first and most fundamental source of 
protest in America is the fact that the United 
States now necessarily shares with Europe 
responsibility for maintaining a balance of 
power in the world. During the 19th century 
the United States lived safely within a system 
of order which others exerted themselves to 
preserve. The existence of that system was 
largely invisible to American opinion. We 
objected to the very idea of the balance of 
power and associated it with the blackest 
aspects of imperialism. 

American thought has most unwillingly faced 
the fact that the society of nations, like any 
other society, rests on accepted arrangements 
governing the use of force. From the moment 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 
270-580— G7— 


in 1947 when President Truman announced our 
policy of supporting "free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures," " there has 
been a continuing and sometimes fierce debate 
in the United States. On one side of that debate 
are those who recognize that our own national 
security requires us to accept direct responsi- 
bility for the balance of power because the 
Concert of Europe can no longer do so. The 
otlier part consists of men who insist that we 
should avoid corrupting involvement in the 
problem of power and confine ourselves to 
domestic affairs. 

Thus, when some Americans see Europeans 
restricting their concerns to local problems and 
aspirations, they complain that Europe fails to 
carry a fair share of the burden of building a 
peaceful and progressive world. Wlien others 
see Europeans indifferent to some non-European 
problems, they are encouraged to emulate them. 

The Paradox of Increasing Poverty 

Let me note a third paradox in our common 

Our societies today are more successful, and 
more nearly just, than at any previous moment 
in history. I do not mean to suggest that we in 
the West have solved all our social problems. 
Not at all. Speaking only for my own country, 
we know that progress and social change gen- 
erate new problems almost as rapidly as old 
ones are met. And we know, too, that we in the 
United States have not yet fully achieved equal 
justice for our Negro citizens, the command of 
conscience which President Johnson has 
insisted be taken up as a major program of 

But our Western social systems have made 
unmistakable progress during the last 20 years. 
Our economies are governed by ideas and 
institutions which have given the West, and 
the world, 20 years without a major depression, 
20 years of rapid growth and of spreading 
wealth. As the ideas and institutions of capital- 
ist planning are perfected, they should offer 
man a new degree of control over his social 
destiny and a new opportunity to build an 
environment in which his human and political 
freedom can be assured. 


' For President Truman's message delivered before 
a joint session of Congress on Mar. 12, 1947, see ibid., 
Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534. 

Yet precisely because social freedom and 
affluence are now felt to be within reach, pov- 
erty has never been a more serious social prob- 
lem. Thus far the industrialized countries have 
failed to harness our rich economies and social 
systems to those of the developing world. The 
pattern of progress in the developing world is 
mixed. Some countries have been spectacularly 
successful. Others have been sluggish or lagged 
behind. We know enough about the process of 
development to be certain that sustained growth 
is possible in a developing coimtry under condi- 
tions of freedom. But we know, too, that by and 
large, real income for each person in the de- 
veloping world may well be falling. 

All that we have done to improve our own 
societies can be lost imless we confront and help 
to overcome the rising tide of hunger, disease, 
and illiteracy in the world. 

I used the word "rising" deliberately. This is 
the fact, and it is the most shocking statistic 
with which we live, more shocking even than the 
nuclear statistics or those of arms expenditure. 
Hunger, disease, and illiteracy are increasing in 
the world as a whole, not declining. This fact, 
and not ideology, is the specter which haunts 
mankind today. 

Contrast Between Ideals and Reality 

Finally, let me mention the contrast between 
the rational and humane ideals of our civiliza- 
tion, and the world in which we have no choice 
but to live. 

After his experience with the barbarisms of 
this century, civilized man is sickened by war 
and cruelty and longs for brotherhood. The 
progress of many advanced societies nourishes 
his brave, unquenchable hope that a Utopian 
world is not, may not be, need not be, far off. 

Yet, if we look back at the history of this 
century, it would be difficult to name an epoch 
in history more tortured by war and by the fear 
of war, by tyraimy and indeed by chaos — a 
period more deeply riven by hatreds and by the 
spirit of destruction for its own sake. 

The ethical feeling of our common civiliza- 
tion rebels at believing that irrationality and 
aggression are social forces which nearly match 
in influence those of progress and reform. We 
find it hard to accept that Freud and Hobbes 
were nearer to the heart of things than Locke 
or Eousseau. It is not remarkable that many of 
our finest spirits turn from the burdens of world 



responsibility to the refuge of private concerns 
or of purely local problems. 

It is difficult not to sympathize with these 
impulses. Western man has been tormented by 
crises for at least half a century. No wonder he 
is tired of the security problem, after a series 
of wai-s which failed to produce peace or even 
to exorcise the threat of further war. 

But fatigue cannot be the basis for policy. 
Hopes and wishes are no substitute for reality. 
And responsible statesmen should not live by 
the rule of Micawber or PoUyanna. 

Process of Redefining Common Interests 

In this context, I should like to turn now to 
certain practical problems. Is the Atlantic idea 
a valid basis for policy for the year 1968 or for 
the decade of the 1970's? If so, for what poli- 
cies — for all our foreign policies or only for 
some? For safeguarding equilibrium in Eu- 
rope? In the Middle East and North Africa? 
In the world at large? For nuclear affairs or 
for all security problems except those concerned 
with nuclear weapons? 

Outside the realm of security, should we ap- 
proach economic problems as collaborators or 
as rivals? Should Atlantic solutions be sought 
in the realms of trade and monetary policy? 
In aid to the developing world? 

In short, do our long-term interests really 
coincide or coincide as closely as they did some 
years ago? 

These are legitimate questions. It is right to 
ask and re-ask them. The essence of our relation 
is the process of defining the interests we have 
in common and then considering together what 
we can and should do to promote them. 

This process of redefinition is particularly 
appropriate at a time when two major interna- 
tional crises have posed in many minds the 
question whether the interests of Europe and 
those of the United States are necessarily the 

The hostilities in Viet-Nam have been and 
remain deeply troubling to some of you in Eu- 
rope, as they are to some Americans. These men 
and women find it difficult to recognize the issues 
in the Vietnamese conflict wliich justify an 
American military effort, with all its attendant 
tragedy and loss. 

The other recent crisis I have in mind is the 
continuing crisis in the Middle East. 

The Middle East war was an occasion of 

concern to thoughtful Europeans. For the first 
time in centuries a major conflict was fought 
on the shores of the Mediterranean without any 
of the traditional Mediterranean powers of 
Europe, or Western Europe as a whole, able to 
exercise significant influence upon it. 

This was certainly not the desire of the United 
States. In the weeks immediately before the 
outbreak of violence in June, the United States 
and the United Kingdom sought to engage their 
allies in collective measures aimed at preventing 
the clash of arms in the Middle East. We cannot 
know whether peace might have been preserved 
had we acted together and in time. But we do 
know that we did not prevent the war. 

About Viet-Nam, let me start with the prem- 
ise that the first task of those who wish peace is 
to build and secure a reasonable balance of 
power — a balance of power capable of deterring 
both attack and the threat of attack. 

During these last 20 years of tension, a pru- 
dent rule of reciprocal safety has emerged, first 
in Europe and then m Asia. It is a simple rule 
and therefore minimizes uncertainty and mis- 
calculation. I should put the rule this way : The 
possibility of equilibrium and therefore the pos- 
sibility of detente requires mutual respect for 
the principle that there be no unilateral changes 
in the frontiers of the systems by force, or by the 
threat of force. Such action, imlike certain other 
fonns of change, threatens the general equilib- 
rium and therefore risks a confrontation be- 
tween great powers. 

This principle is the essential idea of the Tru- 
man doctrine, announced 20 years ago in de- 
fense of Greece and Turkey. It has been tested 
in a long cycle of episodes, from Berlin to 
Korea. We can hope it has been accepted by the 
Soviet Union and its allies as essential to peace 
on the continent of Europe, although the flow 
of Soviet arms into the Middle East casts a 
shadow on that hope. 

We regard the conflict in South Viet-Nam as 
an episode of this kind — an attempt at takeover 
by force challenging the rule of prudence on 
which the general equilibrium depends — more 
serious than most of its predecessors, since guer- 
rilla warfare, and especially guemlla warfare 
sustained by arms, munitions, and men moving 
across international frontiers, has always been 
so difficult to control. 

I can illustrate the point I wish to make by a 
recent experience at a meeting of one of the 
subsidiary organs of the United Nations. The 

OCTOBER 2, 196" 


speakers from Communist countries all stressed 
two propositions as self-evident : First, we had 
to accept the division of Germany as a fact of 
nature and admit the representatives of the 
East German regime forthwith. Their second 
proposition was treated as equally manifest — 
we had to acknowledge the inherent right of 
North Viet-Nam to unite the Vietnamese people 
by force. 

There surely is a basic contradiction between 
these two propositions. I suspect that everyone 
in this room, and all informed opinion in Eu- 
rope, would regard any efforts to unify Ger- 
many by force as the gravest kind of threat to 
the general peace. 

Viet-Nam a Test of the American Guarantee 

Does the same reasoning apjDly to the conflict 
in Viet-Nam ? 

Whatever view one takes of the disputed ori- 
gins of the war in Viet-Nam — whether it is con- 
sidered an insurrection against the authority of 
the South Vietnamese state aided by North 
Viet-Nam or, as we believe, an mfiltration and 
invasion from North Viet-Nam — the issue of in- 
ternational law and politics is the same. In 
either view of the facts. North Viet-Nam is 
waging war against South Viet-Nam. And 
South Viet-Nam has the right to ask for the 
help of the international community in resist- 
ing the North Vietnamese attack. 

Neither South Viet-Nam nor the United 
States is interested in conquering North Viet- 
Nam or in overturning its Communist regime. 
The central issue of the war is whether North 
Viet-Nam will be allowed to conquer South 

But, men ask, does the United States have 
any national interest in South Viet-Nam ? Does 
the conflict in Viet-Nam threaten the general 
balance of power or otherwise justify interven- 
tion ? Or is it the kind of local conflict, unfortu- 
nate for the participants, which the world 
should pass by on the other side ? 

There are several answers to the question 
from the point of view of the United States. 

The United States is loyal to the SEATO 
treaty, as it is to NATO itself. We regard the 
commitments of that treaty as controlling in 
this case, and we are acting accordingly. 

Secondly, the obligations of the United Na- 
tions Charter are not suspended when perma- 
nent members of the Security Council disagree. 
The principles of the charter are still binding 

on signatories as rules of international law, even 
though neither the Security Council nor the As- 
sembly has been willing as yet to act officially. 
Those principles condemn the attack of North 
Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam and authorize the 
members of the organization to offer South 
Viet-Nam assistance in its efforts of self-defense. 

Thirdly, it has seemed to us all along that 
the preservation of the independence of South 
Viet-Nam was directly related to the fate of 
Southeast Asia as a whole. If South Viet-Nam 
were to be taken over, the parallel expansionist 
designs of Communist China and North Viet- 
Nam would surely be encouraged and the re- 
sistance to these designs seriously weakened 
throughout the area and perhajDS beyond. In 
Asian terms, and as responsible opinion virtu- 
ally throughout Southeast Asia sees it, the 
stakes in Viet-Nam involve the most drastic al- 
ternatives for Southeast Asia and for Asia as a 
whole. One only has to look at what is now hap- 
pening in Laos, Thailand, and Burma to under- 
stand this. 

Finally, it is obvious that both the Soviet 
Union and China regard the conflict in Viet- 
Nam as a test for a teclmique of revolution. As 
Soviet spokesmen have made clear, nuclear war- 
fare is unthinkable, and massed frontal attacks 
of the Korean type are too dangerous to be tried. 
The spread of communism, they have said, must 
therefore dej^end on what they call "wars of na- 
tional liberation," that is to say, insurrections 
supported from abroad or wars among others 
which they incite. On their present scale, the 
hostilities in Viet-Nam could hardly continue 
for any length of time without large-scale aid 
from China and the Soviet Union. Deescalation 
of the fighting should follow logically if that 
aid were to be reduced. 

So far, however, the Soviet Union has not re- 
sponded either to proposals of this kind or to re- 
quests that it join with the United Kingdom in 
reactivating the enforcement procedures for the 
Geneva agreements dealing with Laos or 

However the war began, it has been made a 
test of the American guarantee and therefore a 
matter of importance to the network of security 
arrangements on which the equilibrium of the 
world depends. 

It does not follow that as members of the 
alliance we must agree and act together in every 
situation affecting peace in every region of the 
world. We should not expect a perfect identity 
of concerns and policies among us outside the 



area protected by the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Such unity has never existed and never will 
exist. We are not a bloc, and we do not wish to 
become one. 

What the confident mtimacy of our alliance 
does require is that we understand each other 
and exert evei-y effort to consult at length about 
our general views of policy. Out of that con- 
sultative process we can hope and expect 
harmonization will emerge as the Wise Men's 
report of 1956 ^ recommended and that dis- 
agreement can be confined to difference. 

The Alliance and Changing Conditions 

Let me turn now from issues of stress to the 
fundamental elements of common interest 
which are at the heart of our relationship. The 
Atlantic alliance is a living organism. It is 
growing in response to changing conditions. A 
basic responsibility of our peoples and of our 
governments is to nurture that process of adap- 
tation so that the bonds between the United 
States and its Atlantic partners, in President 
Johnson's phrase, continue to provide "the 
strength on which the world's security 

Wlien the crosscurrents of conflicting opinion 
on both sides of the Atlantic are analyzed, only 
one conclusion is possible : Our mterdependence 
is an objective fact and will remain the starting 
point of policy for as far ahead as we can fore- 
see. The decisions we face are not whether we 
have common interests in security, in economic 
affairs, or m education, science, and teclinology, 
but how we deal with those mterests: not 
whether we make a joint effort for defense but 
how great an effort and of what kind; not 
whether we pursue East- West reconciliation but 
how; not whether we should cooperate in eco- 
nomic affairs but how we organize that coopera- 
tion; not whether we work together in science 
and technology but how to improve the govern- 
ment of science in order to assure the most 
fruitful possible development of science as a 
resource of humanity. 

One way to answer these questions is t« try 
to describe the goals we seek — to fill in a mental 
picture of the Atlantic system we wish to build. 

Let me offer an American view of some of 
the main elements we see as implicit in the 
evolution of the alliance over the years ahead. 

In the early postwar years an equilibrium of 

^ For text, see Hid., Jan. 7, 1957, p. 18. 

sorts was constructed around the fact of NATO- 
Soviet confrontation in Europe. It was not a 
satisfactory equilibrium. But it did give West- 
ern Europe a breathing spell and made its 
resurgence possible. 

Politically and psychologically, we are begin- 
ning to move away from that cold-war equilib- 
rium. The boundary line in Central Europe still 
bristles with menace. At the same time, however, 
leaders of aJmost evei-y country of Europe, 
East and West, are reexamining previously fixed 
relationshij^s and experimenting with new ap- 
proaches to old issues. Pragmatic adjustments 
are the order of the day. 

The Socialist coimtries of Eastern Europe are 
experimenting with new economic policies in- 
tended to release energies previously unavail- 
able. Students and tourists are opening doors, 
and opening minds, to new possibilities by way 
of coexistence. Their instinctive goal is a new 
design for Europe, better suited to the realities 
of European recovery and to the needs of the 
postwar generation. 

Wliat are the principal features of the new 
Europe, and the new Atlantic system, which 
are likely to emerge from this process ? 

NATO's Military Mission 

First, naturally, we must consider the issue 
of safety. 

Thus far, the main institution of the alliance 
has been the NATO military system. NATO was 
born in the cold war with a military mission: 
to deter either massive or local aggression 
against Western Europe and North America. 
That mission remains valid. The Soviet unple- 
ments of war arrayed in Europe or pointed at 
Europe are more powerful today than ever 
before. Europe alone cannot defend the West. 
Nor can the United States. The business of se- 
curity remains a common enterprise. That 
security requires both conventional and nuclear 
forces, established and maintained at stable, 
agreed levels. 

Aggression has been deterred by the collective 
defensive potential of the West. It is not reason- 
able to argue that because aggression has been 
stayed for 18 years the instrument of deterrence 
can now be dispensed with. INIoreover, the power 
and resolution which NATO symbolizes will be 
needed to reach the peaceful goals to which we 
aspire. We can never advance — nor control — 
the process of making Europe whole unless we 
retain the power to deter. 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 


We should use NATO as a military organiza- 
tion to provide the greatest protection at the 
least cost. This was one major reason for an 
integrated command. But we are only just be- 
ginning to seize other opportunities to increase 
efEciency. NATO's force planning exercise, now 
far advanced, will be an important step toward 
placing the deployment and design of our de- 
fense forces on a more rational, long-term basis. 
A nuclear planning group has been established 
to make the first international study of nuclear 
deterrence and plan for the management of the 
Western deterrent. Within the last year the first 
test messages have been sent through an experi- 
mental NATO communications satellite system ; 
they announce a revolution in the processes of 
control and command in the alliaaice. A new 
NATO mechanism to exploit opportunities for 
joint development and the production of arma- 
ments — long a neglected area — has just begun 

But the NATO military organization does 
not exist for its own sake. It has always been 
conceived as a defensive force, which should in 
time make possible the negotiation of detente 
and an end of the cold war. If we succeed in our 
political efforts, the military arm of NATO in 
tlie 1970's should look quite different from the 
institution which has served us and the cause 
of peace so well. 

That transformation will depend on the 
progress we can make in ending the risk that 
Western Europe be attacked or threatened from 
the East, directly or indirectly, frontally or 
from its flanks. 

Healing the Division of Europe 

For 20 years now, Europe has been the main 
issue between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. We have had differences with the Soviet 
Union in other parts of the globe — in the Far 
East and the Middle East, for example, and in 
Cuba, too. But the principal element in the con- 
frontation between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, with all its risks, has been the 
possibility that the independence of Western 
Europe be compromised. It has been clearly 
understood that such a change in the balance 
of power would be too serious to be tolerated. 

How can the risk in Europe be resolved? 
How, that is to say, can the division of Ger- 
many and of Europe be ended, thus eliminating 
the most dangerous point of friction between 
the Soviet Union and the United States? 

Let me say at once that we do not see the 
coming together of the peoples of Europe, and 
of the Soviet Union and the United States, as 
an event, but as a process. Under the best of 
circumstances, it is likely to be a long process. 
Surely it is a matter for us to pursue together 
as allies, for our common interests are deeply 
and directly involved. We need not negotiate 
together as an entity. But our chances for suc- 
cess in conducting a campaign of reconciliation 
will be considerably greater if we remain in 
parallel courses. They will surely be less if we 
follow conflicting paths. Such policies could 
even imperil the security of the West as a whole. 

Planning and coordinating such a campaign 
of reconciliation should be one of the main 
political tasks of the alliance in the years before 
us. It is one of the subjects on which we expect 
the study of the future of the alliance to make 
practical suggestions this fall. 

We are all agreed, I think, on the two re- 
lated propositions President Johnson stated 
last October : that until the division of Germany 
has been resolved, peace in Europe will not be 
secure, and that the division of Germany must 
be healed peacefully and with the consent of 
Eastern European countries and the Soviet 
Union. "This will happen," he said, "only as 
East and West succeed in building a surer foun- 
dation of mutual trust." None of us has a magic 
formula for healing the division of Europe. But 
clearly Germany cannot end either its essential 
role in the political and economic life of West- 
ern Europe or its geographic and historical ties 
with the East. The Federal Republic of Ger- 
many has embarked on a new and promising 
diplomacy of peace in Eastern Europe, which 
we strongly support. Other European countries 
are also exploring the possibilities of coopera- 
tion, in many fields. And both the OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] and the Economic Commission 
for Europe are pursuing useful multilateral 
initiatives in the same direction. 

In our own dialog with the Soviet Union, 
we shall continue to use every resource, both in 
words and in acts, to maintain a fair and open 
alternative of agreement. We believe the two 
nations, by reason of their size and power, owe 
special duties of reciprocal cooperation to their 
own peoples and to the world community. Such 
cooperation should be a force for peace, welcome 
in every nation. But cooperation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union will never 
be arranged over the heads of our allies nor at 



the expense of their interests. Quite the con- 
trary, we can envision such a transformation 
taking place only as part of a broader process 
of reconciliation between East and West 
achieved in consultation with our allies and in 
large part through their own efforts and those 
of international bodies. 

A More Deeply Unified Western Europe 

A third vital aspect of the Atlantic system of 
the future which we see as likely and desirable 
is a more deeply unified Western Europe. 

To us, this seems not only right but inevitable. 
After 10 years, the Common Market can no 
longer be described as an experiment or a hope. 
No one could participate in the Kennedy Round 
negotiations or the monetary talks without 
realizing that economic Europe exists, and 
flourishes, and that in this realm the Atlantic 
partnership among equals is a functioning 
reality. Its atmosphere is bracing. Its bargain- 
ing is not easy. But its accomplishments are 

The European Community will evolve and 
grow. It should continue to radiate a dynamic 
influence on the economic and social systems of 
all of Europe, of Africa and the Middle East, 
and of the world at large. The countries of 
Eastern Europe feel the magnetic pull of West- 
ern Europe's economic strength. They are not 
indifferent to the advantages of economic co- 
operation with the West. 

The emergence of a political Europe within 
the Atlantic alliance would be — I venture to say 
that it will be — a step of capital impoi'tance for 
the security and prosperity of all our countries 
and for the peace and stability of the whole 
world. Such a step will not occur automatically. 
The formation of a political Europe requires 
an act of will on the part of Europe, a decision 
to resume her rightful place in the responsible 
politics of the larger world. 

A voice speaking for Europe in our Atlantic 
dialog and in the assembly of the nations would 
of itself transform the balance of influence in 
the world and transform it in ways altogether 
favorable to conciliation and peace. So far as 
the United States is concerned, you may be sure 
that such a step would be regarded as natural 
and welcome. 

Perhaps a decision on intra-European polit- 
ical cooperation within the alliance will be made 
in the course of the study of the future political 
tasks of the alliance to which I referred earlier. 

It may be that the time is not yet ripe for that 
decision. It is, in any event, a decision for 
Europeans to make. 

We believe, however, that the effective pro- 
tection of our common interests— and the effec- 
tive discharge of our common responsibilities — 
does call now for more European participation 
in the broader processes of decisionmaking on 
the part of those European nations which wish 
to undertake it. Either the institutions of the 
alliance or new procedures which may be pro- 
posed by its members are needed to define and 
coordinate our conmion interests outside Europe 
itself. This is where the greatest threats to our 
tranquillity seem likely to arise. It is also where 
we have been least effectively coordinated. I 
have already alluded in this regard to the frus- 
trations of the Middle Eastern crisis. To our 
mind, that experience defines a problem which 
we hope will be solved by a prompt reform in 
the consultative procedures of the alliance. 

Relations With the Developing World 

Let me mention one further area where we 
anticipate change in the pattern of alliance dur- 
mg the next few years: that of our relations 
with the developing world. Members of the 
alliance, together with Japan and other coun- 
tries, have cooperated effectively in a large num- 
ber of multilateral programs of continuing 
assistance to developing countries. These power- 
ful and constructive programs are the prototype 
of efforts on a new scale which will clearly be 
required before the rich and the poor societies 
of the world are knit together in a state of 

We have had nearly 20 years of experience 
with the process of economic assistance to 
developing countries. Some of those programs 
have been successful. Others have failed. "Wliat 
is needed now is agreement between the devel- 
oped and the developing countries as to the 
meaning of that experience, and a cooperative 
effort to base the next round of such programs 
on what we have learned together from the 
trials and errors of the past. 

The world's need for European talent and 
resources will increase in the years ahead. The 
looming crisis of population, food supply, and 
economic growth in the developing lands chal- 
lenges all mankind to a vast multilateral effort. 
To undertake responsibilities beyond one's 
immediate environment may prove to be an 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 


expensive and seemingly thankless venture. Yet 
given our ethos and our interests, Europe and 
America have no other choice. 

Achieving Order and Progress 

We are a long way from the new system 
toward which we are beginnmg to grope. But 
the call to define our future tasks is itself a 
step forward. The effort will surely generate 
impulses for action. 

We already have an array of instruments 
ready at hand, in the multilateral institutions 
built up over the last generation: NATO, 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] , OECD, the European Community, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, and a host of specialized international 
bodies. They stand ready to be adapted, ex- 
panded, or transformed as the needs of the 
future require. 

When we agree on ends, means will be found 
to achieve them. 

My purpose today has been to present an 
American view of some of the more difficult 
issues we face together in the years ahead. The 
list is not complete, I know. I have not had time 
today to discuss nuclear problems nor those of 
our economic relations. 

But I hope I have said enough to define a 
general thesis. Let me summarize that thesis in 
these terms: Our chance for achieving order 
and progress in the world would be greater if 
Europe and North America were to develop 
their relationship in close concert. Such asso- 
ciation among us could become the nucleus of 
broader relationships with other free nations, 
whicli could deal with the varied problems of 
world politics affecting their common interests. 
Under such circumstances, our combined influ- 
ence and that of Japan and other like-minded 
countries could be brought to bear effectively in 
belialf of security, conciliation, economic devel- 
opment, and aid to tlie developing world. On 
such a footing, we could seek with renewed zeal 
to persuade the Soviet Union to accept the 
reconciliation of Europe and to give up adven- 
tures like its recent policies in Cuba and the 
Middle East. We could once more and together 
affirm our invitation that the Soviet Union join 
us in a regime of peaceful and competitive 
coexistence or, better still, of cooperation for 
peace. On such a footing, too, we could seek to 
bring China into the world community with 
more assurance of success. 

We cannot meet our responsibility as citizens 
or as public officials if we evade the challenge 
of Soviet or Chinese rivalry or pretend it isn't 
there. But we cannot meet even higher responsi- 
bilities if we abandon for a moment the effort 
to transmute such rivalry into the rivalry of 
peaceful emulation. 

President Authorizes Additional 
Wheat Shipments to India 

Statement hy President Johnson ^ 

Last March the Congress authorized ship- 
ment to India of up to 3 million tons of U.S. 
wheat, "provided it is appropriately matched" 
by contributions from other industrialized 

Last May our efforts to mobilize other 
donors — and our painstaking measures to assure 
that their donations were large and real enough 
to fulfill the matching criterion established by 
the Congress — brought us to the point where the 
United States agreed to send half this wheat— 
1.5 million tons. That action was taken in the 
light of more than $96 million in contributions 
from other donors. 

For the past few weeks, relevant senior officers 
of the U.S. Government have been engaged in a 
deep and detailed review of India's current food 
needs and the performance of other donors dur- 
ing the past 3 months. This review has included 
careful documentation of food production and 
consumption conditions in Lidia, as well as a 
thorough assessment of our ability to help, con- 
sistent with the letter and spirit of the 

On the basis of this review, the President has 
today authorized a new agreement, providing a 
further 1 million tons of U.S. wheat to India. 
This decision reflects the following facts : 

1. The food situation in India continues 
desperate. Public stocks are at their lowest 
point in living memory. Private stocks are com- 
pletely exhausted. Food rations in major cities 
are at subsistence level and are the object of 

' Made at his news conference on Sept. 1 and also is- 
sued as a White House press release that day. 

° For background and text of joint resolution (H.J. 
Res. 267: Public Law 90-7), see Bulletin of May 1, 
1967, p. 700. 



increasing political nnrest. The immediate 
future of the ^YOl■ld's largest democracy is 
greatly threatened. Free and peaceful develop- 
ment of Asia hangs in the balance. 

2. However, this is only the short-term out- 
look. Current reports on the monsoon rains 
suggest that 2 years of severe drought are over 
and that, with luck, India can look forward to 
a record grain crop next crop year, with the 
fruits reaching Indian markets beginning in 
December of this year. 

3. Since last May, India has received pledges 
from other industrialized nations totaling 
$122.2 million in new aid which provides food, 
food-related resources, or frees Indian foreign 
exchange to buy food. If it could be counted 
in full against the matching criterion, it would 
justify nearly 2 million tons in additional 
United States wheat. 

4. However, in order to be meaningful, the 
new aid from other donors must be a real incre- 
ment to Indian resources and it must be addi- 
tional to regular contributions to the India Aid 
Consortium. No one's interests are served by a 
charade in which real American wheat is 
"matched" by meaningless financial transac- 
tions or by funds which would otherwise be pro- 
vided through the Consortium anyway and are 
merely earmarked for this purpose. 

5. In all franlmess, we do not now know pre- 
cisely how much of the $122 million in new 
pledges meets these additional criteria. There 
is strong evidence that much of it does. If only 
about half of it does, we have a basis for pro- 
viding 1 million tons of United States wheat. 

6. We will not be able to make a precise esti- 
mate of how much of this aid is eligible for 
matching until the next meeting of the India 
Consortium, which will probably be held in 

But starvation and threat of political chaos 
cannot wait. Therefore, I have determined to 
authorize now a further 1 million tons on the 
expectation that at least half of the new con- 
tributions from others will in fact be proven 

real and additional to normal Consortium 

However, in order to assure that this Govern- 
ment behaves in strict accordance with the terms 
of the congressional resolution, I have also 
determined that the size of the United States 
contribution to the Consortium will not be 
finally determined until it is clear how much of 
the new aid contributions meets these criteria. If 
there is any shortfall between the cost of the 
grain authorized today and the amount of real 
and additional aid supplied by other donors 
since last May, the United States contribution 
to the Consortium can be reconsidered. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Ecuador, Carlos Mantilla Ortega, presented his 
credentials to President Jolmson on Septem- 
ber 12. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated September 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Jamaica, 
Egerton Rudolf Eichardson, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Johnson on September 12. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remaxks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated September 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Polish People's Republic, Jerzy Michalowski, 
presented his credentials to President Johnson 
on September 12. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated September 13. 

OCTOBER 2, 10C7 


The Intellectual and American Foreign Policy 

hy John A. Gronoushi 
Avibassador to Poland'^ 

My subject tonight is tlie role of the intel- 
lectual in the development of American foreign 
policy. As a diplomat I always try to stay with 
the safe, nonexplosive subjects! 

I should begin by saying that I do not pre- 
tend to have a precise definition of an intel- 
lectual. Certainly he is a person who is likely to 
be reasonably well educated, comfortable in the 
world of ideas and abstractions, and possessed 
of scholarly traits. He is also a person who has 
an interest in issues outside his professional 
field, interests to which he devotes a significant 
part of his energies and about which he formu- 
lates judgments. 

Since most members of a university consider 
themselves intellectuals or aspire to become 
intellectuals, I would think that the topic I have 
chosen is appropriate for the audience. 

Whether it will be popular or not is an 
entirely different question. For I am about to 
suggest that because of their emotional pre- 
occupation with a single foreign policy issue— 
Viet-Nam- — academic intellectuals are in danger 
of becoming one of the most ineffectual seg- 
ments of our society. And I am not going to 
soften this commeiat by suggesting that the fault 
lies either in the Wliite House or in Foggy 

It is not the issue of Viet-Nam that disturbs 
me. Nor is it the intellectuals' dissent. God help 
the intellectual if he ever ceases to probe and 
analyze — and disagree when he believes the 
facts warrant it. 

What bothers me is not the intellectuals' posi- 
tion on Viet-Nam, but the fact that there seems 
to be just one position — prefabricated, official, 
inviolate, and all too often followed by rote. 

This is puzzling. It is puzzling because in an 
issue so inherently difficult to evaluate, where 

' Address made before the Wisconsin Union Forum 
Committee at Madison, Wis., on Aug. 8. 

judgments must be based on so many un- 
proved — and often unprovable — assumptions, 
one would certainly expect more diversity of 
thought within the intellectual community. 

An observer camiot be blamed for suspecting 
that all too many intellectuals have become 
reluctant to express views and opinions that are 
in conflict with those expounded by the articu- 
late, self-designated leaders of the intellectual 
elite. And even those who do stray from the 
accepted paths seem to do so in a voice too soft 
to be distinctly heard. 

I am suggesting that dissent may be an 
acceptable tool of the mtellectual community 
but, on the subject of Viet-Nam, it is no longer 
acceptable within the intellectual community. If 
you doubt me— as I'm sure many of you do — 
ask yourself one question : Wliat would happen 
to your standing among your peers if tomorrow 
you were to defend Lyndon Johnson's policy in 
Viet-Nam as a reasonable course of action ? 

I am suggesting, also, that out of such con- 
formity of thought have come not reasonable 
alternatives but valueless slogans. 

Is "Stop the Bombing" really a substitute for 
a reasoned intellectual position? Or "Negotiate 
Now" or "Get Out of Viet-Nam" or "Defy the 

I submit that America has a right to expect 
something better than vague slogans offering 
easy solutions to complicated issues from the 
most trained and disciplined mmds it possesses. 

Let me give j'ou another example. From the 
tone of prevailing intellectual comment, the 
President, the Secretary of State, and all of 
their advisers are bent only on escalating the 
war and winning total victory — that they really 
are not interested in a negotiated settlement. 

I happen to know this to be false. The entire 
administration — from the President down — 
would move heaven and earth, if that were pos- 



sible, to end the shooting and achieve a nego- 
tiated settlement. I happen to know that for the 
simple reason that I have been personally en- 
gaged in a part of the massive and imceasing 
effort to work out such a settlement. 

But among the intellectual community, 
neither my judgment nor my word count for 
very much these days. For whatever I may have 
been for 20 years before joining the State De- 
partment, I am now a member of the "establish- 
ment" and am automatically suspect. I am no 
longer a free agent, for my job depends on 
supporting the President. It is implicitly as- 
sumed that whatever I was before, having 
joined the Department of State, I will now 
compromise any and every principle. 

It is curious to me that intellectuals, who 
value so highly their intellectual integrity, hold 
in such low esteem the integrity of those from 
their own ranks who have assumed positions of 
responsibility in the execution of American 
foreign policy. Former university deans, former 
professors of economics, philosophy, political 
science, law, and international affairs from our 
most respected universities — these are among 
the chief Presidential advisers in the conduct 
of foreign policy. These men have explicitly 
expressed our Government's wish for a cease- 
fire and for the immediate start of negotiations. 
But they are now a part of the establishment 
and have thereby forfeited their intellectual 
credentials and all claim to personal and intel- 
lectual integrity. 

By the same token, any of you in the audience 
tonight would fall victim to the same fate if 
you were to join the State Department tomor- 
row. You would have "sold out." There would 
be no possibility that you had joined the Gov- 
ernment to make your own voice and your own 
convictions more strongly felt. 

Again, I am not suggesting that any aspect of 
the nation's foreign policy should be off limits 
to critical analysis. Men of integrity can be 
wrong — in the establishment as well as out of 
the establishment — and members of the intel- 
lectual community have the obligation to offer 
constructive criticism to positions they deem 
ill advised. 

But engaging in the popular sport of im- 
pugning the integrity of those in policymaking 
roles is no substitute for analysis. Nor is the 
implicit assumption that once a member of the 
intellectual community assumes responsibility 
in the conduct of foreign affairs he loses his 
capacity to intelligently and objectively eval- 

uate the vast amount of information available 
to him. 

This attitude stems in part from different 
ground rules which govern intellectuals in their 
various capacities. For example, when academic 
intellectuals decide that a specific course of ac- 
tion offers promise of resolving the Viet-Nam 
conflict, they have no reservations about pub- 
licizing their proposal to the fullest extent 
possible. Use of the full-page newspaper ad for 
this purpose has become standard practice. 

But it may well be — in fact, it has often been 
the case — that their proposal has already been 
advanced by their Government and rejected by 
the Hanoi regime. But the establishment intel- 
lectual is precluded from publicly stating this 
fact, for a U.S. peace proposal — past, present, 
or future — has not the slightest chance of suc- 
cess unless it is offered confidentially and is 
devoid of propaganda overtones. 

Thus, being unable to state where responsibil- 
ity lies for the failure of an idea, which may have 
appeared promising to those in Government as 
well as those m academic life, the establishment 
intellectual becomes fair game to the charge of 
rigidity and intransigence. And he must take 
the criticism without defending himself except 
in the most general and unconvincing terms, for 
to succumb to the urge to verify his credibility 
in the eyes of his peers would automatically 
discredit him and his Government among those 
to whom the proposition was originally offered. 

Failure of academic intellectuals to appreciate 
this necessity for tactful silence is behind much 
of the conflict and distrust that has grown 
up between the academic and establisliment 

The academic intellectual is quick to react to 
this silence by disparaging members of the es- 
tablisliment as timid, unimaginative, and in- 
capable of advancing or even recognizing a 
fresh peace initiative. The Government policy- 
makers and their advisers are accused of in- 
tellectual dishonesty, stupidity, or worse. Tliose 
charged with the conduct of foreign policy, in 
turn, find it difficult to maintain an attitude of 
rapport with a group which incessantly chal- 
lenges their motives and morality. 

Thus do academic intellectuals become more 
and more alienated from their own Govern- 
ment's decisionmaking process. This alienation 
would be serious enough if it was confined to 
the issue of Viet-Nam and Viet-Nam was the 
only critical problem of immediate concern to 
American foreign policy. 

OCTOBER 2, 1967 


Unfortunately, neither of these conditions 
reflect the real world. We are faced today with 
several major foreign policy problems, in addi- 
tion to Yict-Nam, which are of vital concern to 
the United States. How wisely we resisond to the 
challenges they present will be the basis on 
which future historians will measure our present 
contribution to world peace. 

Yet, academic intellectuals have become so 
preoccupied with their attack on our Viet-Nam 
policy and, in the process, so alienated from 
those charged with formulating American for- 
eign policy that they seem totally uninterested 
in generathig support for any administration 
foreign policy program, however much it ac- 
cords with their own professed foreign policy 
objectives. It is a tragedy of major proportions 
when the best trained minds in America volun- 
tarily withdraw from exercising influence over 
eveiy aspect of United States foreign policy save 

I do not believe, for example, that a philos- 
ophy professor legitimately can become so con- 
cerned over Viet-Nam that he will sign his name 
to a formal protest and yet feign complete in- 
difference to what is happening in the rest of 
the world. But that is just what is occurring 
with depressing regularity on campus after 
campus across the nation. 

Nowhere are the consequences of this with- 
drawal more apparent than in its effect on the 
President's policy of "buildmg bridges" with 
Eastern Europe. In a landmark statement on 
American foreign policy, the President on Oc- 
tober 7 last year flatly rejected cold war and 
containment as elements of our policy toward 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European 
allies.^ He articulated instead a policy of "peace- 
ful engagement," designed to reduce tensions 
and, through increased trade, exchanges, and 
other modes of cooperation, immediately reduce 
and ultimately eliminate the threat of a thermo- 
nuclear war which would devastate manlvind 
and pale into insignificance the tragedies of 

Wliere were the intellectuals when the pro- 
grams introduced by the President to implement 
this policy shift ran into deep trouble under the 
sustained attack of those to whom peaceful en- 
gagement is being "soft on communism" and 
who would intensify rather than ameliorate the 
cold w^ar? 

- For President .lohnson's address at New York, 
N.Y.. on Oct. 7, 1966, see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1066, 
p. 622. 

Where are the full-page ads now that the 
East-West trade bill, the cornerstone of our new 
and enlightened policy, is in danger of congres- 
sional extinction? 

And where are the full-page ads supporting 
the President's decision, which is now under 
serious attack, to extend Government credit 
guarantees to U.S. companies participating in 
the construction of a Fiat automobile plant in 
the Soviet Union and for other projects in 
Eastern Europe? 

What expressions of concern came from the 
intellectual community when Congress recently 
refused to provide $10 million for renewal of a 
program which has provided the people of 
several countries, including Poland, with the 
means to buy American books, journals, maga- 
zines, newspapers, plays, movies, and TV pro- 
grams? Wliat did they say to some of their 
congressional allies who voted to kill this 
program ? 

And where are the intellectuals now when a 
single Congressman threatens to undermine the 
foundation of our policy toward Poland and 
Eastern Europe, and the confidence of our 
Western allies in the sincerity of our engage- 
ment policy, by passing legislation to deprive 
Poland of most-favored-nation tariff treatment ? 

But I need not limit my questions to Eastern 
Europe — or even to foreign affairs. Where were 
the full-page ads last spring when Congress 
refused to approve a resolution strengthening 
the President's hand — and his nation's sincer- 
ity — at Punta del Este? And where was the 
voice of the intellectual last month when the 
President's rat extermination bill was voted 
down ; or last year when his open housing bill 
was allowed to die ; or a few days ago when his 
model cities program was sliced in half ? 

Can it be that Viet-Nam is the sole legitimate 
concern of the entire intellectual community? 
That intellectuals evaluate a President's pro- 
gram on the basis of whether or not they like 
his "style" or his accent rather than on the basis 
of the program's content? Or that because of 
frustration with the President's Viet-Nam posi- 
tion they are prepared to sit on their hands and 
permit a whole series of enlightened programs 
which he has advanced to suffer defeat with 
hardly a murmur of protest, simply because of 
his sponsorship ? 

I hope tliis is not the case, for if it is we will 
all be the loser. In a world trying desperately to 
accommodate two competing social systems, 
each one suspicious and fearful of the other; 



with millions of people struggling to throw off 
the bonds of ignorance, poverty, subservience, 
and despair; with the shadow of the hydrogen 
bomb clouding our vision and distorting our 
perspective — no group, least of all the com- 
munity of mtellectuals, can be afforded the lux- 
ury of abdicating from responsibility. 

I do not ask you to perform as a rubber stamp 
for this or any other administration. But I do 
ask you to serve as a thoughtful, responsible 
contributor to the full development of Amer- 
ican policy — foreign and domestic — unfettered 
by either personal antagonisms or professional 

I ask you to defend your own intellectual 
integrity whether or not you agree with your 
Government's policies. 

I ask you to defend the intellectual integrity 
of your coUeag-ues even when you disagree with 
them and even when they have moved from the 
campus to the center of power. 

I ask you to not stand silent when a fellow 
intellectual goes before the television cameras 
and disdamfully dismisses a responsible official 
of your Government as a "loon." 

Most of all, I ask you to express yourself 
independently, even though it might cost you 
the ephemeral respect of your fellow intel- 

Looking back, I suppose I should have added 
one more definition of an intellectual. I should 
have said he is a person who has the courage 
of his conclusions ; who is unintimidated by the 
possible alienation of his peers. 

If you can meet that test, I have no quarrel 
with you. If after reexamining your foreign 
policj^ positions you can still say that you 
arrived at your conclusions objectively and 
honestly, unuifluenced by emotion, slogans, or 
the prevailing opinion among your colleagues — 
if you can do that, then you will have fulfilled 
your obligation as an mtellectual. 


Calendar of International Conferences ^ 

Scheduled October Through December 1967 

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (resumed Geneva .... 

May 18, 1967). 

ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Rapporteurs on Sanitary Geneva. . . . 

Control at Frontiers. 

FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Food Production Resources Rome .... 

ECE Senior Economic Advisers Geneva . . . 

IMCO Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels London .... 

NATO Science Committee Rome .... 

ILO International Symposium on Ergonomics in Machine Design .... Czechoslovakia 

Mar. 14, 1962- 

Oct. 2-4 

Oct. 2-4 
Oct. 2-6 
Oct. 2-6 
Oct. 2-6 
Oct. 2-7 

1 This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Sept. 15, 1967, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October-December 
1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these 
are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

Following is a kev to the abbreviations: BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property; "EC A, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and 
Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on T.ariffs .and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy 
Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; 
ICAO, Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovern- 
mental M.aritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAH(J, Pan 
American IIe.alth Org.anization; U.N., United N.ations; UNCTAD, United N.ations Conference on Irade and 
Development; UNESCO, United N.ations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; 
WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

OCTOBER 2, 19 6 


Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

Scheduled October Through December 1967 — Continued 

FAO North American Forestry Commission: 4th Session 

South Pacific Commission: 7th Conference 

BI RPI Committee of Experts on International Patent Cooperation . . . 

ECOSOC Population Commission 

PAHO Directing Council: 17th Meeting and 19th Meeting of the Re- 
gional Committee of the WHO for the Americas. 
OECD Worliing Parties on Primary Commodities and LDC Regional 

FAO International Rice Commission: 10th Session 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program: 12th 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group 

U.N. Development Program: Pledging Conference 

ECE Timber Committee 

OECD Working Party VI: Industry Committee 

FAO Study Group on "Bananas: 2d Session 

ILO Technical Meeting on Rights of Trade Union Representatives at the 

Level of Undertakings. 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 55th Statutory 

5th Inter- American Statistical Conference 

ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on National 
Accounts and Balances. 

UNESCO Executive Board: 77th Session 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs of the Working Party on Customs .... 

ILO Meeting of Consultants on Young Workers Problem 

South Pacific Commission: 30th Session 

OECD Special Committee for Oil 

OECD Economic Pohcy Committee: Working Group on Short-Term 

ECE Rapporteurs on World Market for Iron Ore 

OECD Group for Research on Water Management 

UPU Management Council of the Consultative Committee on Postal 

OECD Working Party on German Border Taxes 

ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 

UNCTAD Exploratory Meeting on Copper 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working 

Group on Mutual Assistance. 
FAO/ WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on General 

International Rubber Study Group 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions 

ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 5th Session . . 

OECD Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel 

NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Far East) 

IMCO Assembly: 5th Session 

ECE Steel Committee: 35th Plenary Session 

FAO Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics: 1st Session . . 

OECD Trade Committee 

FAO Conference on Fish Behavior 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 5th Session . 

NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group 

IAEA Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage . . 
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Legal Protection of Gas Pipelines . . 
lA-ECOSOC Inter- .\merican Telecommunications Commission .... 

FAO Conference Technical Committees 

EGA Conference of African Statisticians: 5th Session 

OECD International Conference on Employment Stabilization in a 
Growth Economy. 

NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Africa) 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Natural Gas Resources 

FAO Subgroup on Cocoa: 21st Session 

ECAFE Subcommittee on Water Transport: 8th Session 

FAO Council: 4f^th Session 

ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 

Mexico City. 
Noumea, New 

Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 

Paris . 

New Delhi 
Rome . . 

Geneva . . 
New York 
Geneva . . 
Canary Islands 


Geneva . 

Paris . . 
Paris . . 
Paris . . 
Paris . . 

Paris . . 
Bogotd . 



Paris . . 

Paris . 

Sao Paulo 
Italy . . . 
Paris . . 
Rome . 
Paris . . 
Bergen . 
Paris . . 
Vienna . 
Mexico . 
Rome . 
Addis Ababa 

Rome . 
Rome . 

Oct. 2-7 
Oct. 2-7 

Oct. 2-10 
Oct. 2-13 
Oct. 2-13 

Oct. 3-6 

Oct. 3-8 
Oct. 5-14 

Oct. 6-12 
Oct, 9 (1 day) 
Oct. 9-13 
Oct. 9-13 
Oct. 9-17 
Oct. 9-18 

Oct. 9-18 

Oct. 9-19 
Oct. 9-20 

Oct. 9-Nov. 3 
Oct. 10-12 
Oct. 10-13 
Oct. 10-18 
Oct 10-23 
Oct. 11-12 
Oct. 11-12 

Oct. 11-13 
Oct. 11-13 
Oct. 11-27 

Oct 12-13 
Oct. 12-18 

Oct. 13-14 
Oct. 16-18 

Oct. 16-20 

Oct 16- 
Oct. 16- 
Oct. 16- 
Oct 17 
Oct. 17 
Oct. 17 
Oct. 18 
Oct. 18 
Oct. 19 
Oct. 19 
Oct. 19 
Oct. 23- 
Oct. 2.3- 
Oct. 23 
Oct. 23 
Oct. 23 
Oct. 23 
Oct. 24 



Nov. 3 
Nov. 3 

Oct. 24-27 
Oct. 25-27 
Oct. 26-27 
Oct. 26-Nov. 2 
Oct. 30-Nov. 2 
Oct. 30-Nov. 3 



Paris . . 

London . 
Paris . . 

ITU World Plan Committee Mexico . 

GATT Contracting Parties: 24th Session Geneva 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee Paris . . 

UNCTAD Preparatory Meeting for Sugar Conference Geneva 

FAO Conference: 14th Session Rome . 

13th World Road Congress Tokyo . 

ECE Preparatory Group for the 2d Symposium on Urban Renewal . . Geneva 

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris . . 

IMCO Subcommittee on Life Saving Appliances London . 

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Annual Meeting . . Tokyo . 

and Scientific Committee Meeting. 

ECAFE Working Group on National Accounts: 3d Session Bangkok 

ILO Governing Body: 170th Session Geneva. 

ECE Joint Working Party of Agriculture and Inland Transport Commit- Geneva . 

tees on Perishable Foodstuffs. 

NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Latin America) Brussels. 

NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Eastern Europe) Brussels. 

ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Coordination Committee on Rail- Bangkok 

way Research. 

OECb Working Party II (Economic Growth) 

International Whaling Commission: Special Meeting of the North Pacific 


NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Soviet Policy) 

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea .... 
ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology 

to Development: ISth Session. 

ECE Working Party on Standardization of Foodstuffs 

NATO Regional Ex-pert Meeting (Middle East) 

ICAO Air Navigation Conference 

OECD Industry Committee Examination of U.S. Policies 

Inter-American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly 

ECAFE Working Group of Experts on Water Codes 

WMO Commission for Agriculture Meteorology 

NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee 

ECE Electric Power Committee 

ECE Subcommittee on Road Transport 

IMCO Legal Committee 

ECE Group of Experts on the Situation and Development of Water Plc- 


ECAFE/WHO Inter- Regional Seminar on Hydrology Bangkok 

UNESCO Meeting of Experts to Review the Florence and Beirut Agree- Geneva . 

ments on the Fi-ee Flow of Information. 
ILO Meeting of Heads of Official Services for Occupational Safety and Geneva 

Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in Rangoon 

South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan) : 18th Ministerial and 

Official Conference. 

FAO Council: 50th Session Rome . 

ECAFE Seminar on the Organization and Conduct of Census of Popula- Bangkok 

tion and Housing. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability London 

ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 16th Session Geneva 

ECE Gas Committee: Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the Forecasting of Geneva 

Gas Demand. 
UNIDO International Symposium on Industrial Development .... Athens . 

FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: l()th Session Port-of-Spain 

Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Congress Montevideo 

ECOSOC Preparatory Committee of Experts for the Conference of New York 

Ministers of Social Welfare. 
ILO Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Geneva 

Workers: 6th Session. 
ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 20th Plenary Meeting . . . Geneva 
ECE Working Party on Customs Questions Affecting Transport . . . Geneva 

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London 

FAO Committee on Wood-Based Panel Products: 1st Session Rome . . 

IBE Council: 33d Meeting Geneva . 

UNESCO International Coordination Group for the Cooperative Study Honolulu . 

of Kuroshio Current: 5th Meeting. 
UNESCO Executive Committee of International Campaign To Save the Paris . . . 

Monuments of Nubia. 
BIRPI Ad //oc Conference of the Madrid Agreements on Trademarks . Geneva 

International Wheat Council London 

NATO Ministerial Council: 40th Meeting Brussels . 

Geneva . . . 
Brussels. . . 
Montreal . 
Paris . . . . 
Montevideo . 
Bangkok . . 
Manila . . . 
Brussels. . . 
Geneva. . . 
Geneva . . . 
London . . , 
Geneva . . . 

Oct. 30-Nov. 15 
Oct. 30-Nov. 17 
Nov. 4-23 
Nov. 5-11 
Nov. 6-S 
Nov. 6-8 
Nov. 6-10 
Nov. 6-11 

Nov. 6-13 
Nov. 6-17 
Nov. 7-10 

Nov. 7-10 
Nov. 7-10 
Nov. 8-15 

Nov. 9-10 
Nov. 13 (tenta- 
Nov. 13-16 
Nov. 13-17 
Nov. 13-24 

Nov. 14-17 
Nov. 14-17 
Nov. 14-Dec.M5 
Nov. 15-17 
Nov. 15-25 
Nov. 15-29 
Nov. 15-29 
Nov. 16-18 
Nov. 20-23 
Nov. 20-24 
Nov. 20-24 
Nov. 20-24 

Nov. 20-25 
Nov. 20-29 

Nov. 20-29 

Nov. 21-Dec. 8 

Nov. 24 (1 day) 
Nov. 24-Dec. 1 

Nov. 27-Dec. 1 
Nov. 27-Dec. 4 
Nov. 28-30 

Nov. 29-Dec. 20 
Dec. 4-9 
Dec. 4-13 
Dec. 4-14 

Dec. 4-15 

Dec. 11-15 
Dec. 11-15 
Dec. 11-15 
Dec. 12-14 
Dec. 13-15 



OOTOBiaa 2, 19G7 


Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected BibSiography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed 'below) may 6e consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space : 
Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 
sixth session. A/AC.105/37. July 14. 1967. SI pp. 
Information furnished by the United States on ob- 
jects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF. 
169-170. September 5, 1967. 
Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
on the work of its fifth session. A/AC.105/39. Sep- 
tember 6, 1967. 13 pp. 

United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teach- 
ing. Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation 
of International Law. Register of experts and 
scholars in international law. A/6677. July 25, 1967. 
109 pp. 

Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimtna- 
tion Against Women. Note by the Secretary-General. 
A/607S. July 28, 1967. 10 pp. 

International Year for Human Rights. Note by the 
Secretary-General. A/6687. August 9, 1967, 3 pp. 

The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa. Correspondence from the 
representative of South Africa concerning his Gov- 
ernment's reply to articles printed in the March and 
May 1967 issues of the United Nations Monthly 
Chronicle. A/6688. August 11, 1967. 33 pp. 

Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina- 
tion. Report of the Secretary-General. A/6691. Au- 
gust 30, 1967. 66 pp. 

Law of Treaties. Report of the Secretary-General. 
A/6827. August 31, 1967. 32 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Evaluation of Technical Co-Operation Programmes. 
Report of the Administrative Committee on Co- 
ordination. E/4338. June 9, 1967. 62 pp. 

Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East. Summary prepared by the Secre- 
tary-General. E/4358 (Summary). June 9, 1967. 8 pp. 

Annual Report of the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees. E/4390. June 12, 1967. 122 pp. 

General Discussion of International Economic and 
Social Policy — Economic Survey of Europe in 1966. 
E/ECE/656 (Summary). June 12, 1967. 15 pp. 

External Financing of Economic Development of the 
Developing Countries. International Flow of Capital 
and Assistance. Factors Affecting the Ability of the 
Developed Countries To Provide Resources to the 
Developing Countries. Report of the Secretary-Gen- 
eral. E/4375. June 14, 1067. 61 pp. 

Development and Co-Ordination of the Activities of the 
Organizations Within the United Nations System. 
Report of the Committee for Programme and Co- 
ordination. B/4395. June 20, 1967, 24 pp. 

Transfer to the United Nations of the Responsibilities 
and As.sets of the International Relief Union. Report 
by the Secretary-General. E/4402. June 22, 1967. 9 pp. 


Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary importation of 

private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. 

Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943. 

Accession deposited: Ireland, August 14, 1967. 
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 

Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 

September 11, 1957. TIAS 3S79. 

Accession deposited: Ireland, August 14, 1967. 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accessions deposited: Barbados, March 22, 1947; 
Panama, September 12, 1967. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination. Adopted by the United Na- 
tions General Assembly December 21, 1965.' 
Sigyiature: Belgimn, August 17, 1967. 
Ratification deposited: Panama, August 16, 1967. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to Chapter II of the international conven- 
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). 
Adopted at London November 30, 1966.' 
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, August 18, 1967. 


Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade and institutions and practices similar 
to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956." 
Ratification deposited: San Marino, August 29, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, Including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig- 
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 
27, 1967.' 
Signature: Pakistan, September 12, 1967. 



Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at 
Bangkok May 29, 1966.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 11, 1967. 

' Not in force. 

" Not in force for the United States. 



INDEX Octoler £, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. 1475 

China. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker 
Discuss Viet-Nam in TV-Radio Interviews 
(transcripts) 411 

Developing Countries. Concert and Conciliation : 
The Next Stage of the Atlantic Alliance 
(Rostow) 422 

Ecuador. Letters of Credence (Mantilla) . . . 431 

Europe. Concert and Conciliation: The Next 
Stage of the Atlantic Alliance (Rostovr) . . 422 

Foreign Aid. President Authorizes Additional 
Wheat Shipments to India (Johnson) . . . 430 

India. President Authorizes Additional Wheat 
Shipments to India (Johnson) 430 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
Calendar of International Conferences . . . 435 

[ Jamaica. Letters of Credence (Richardson) . . 431 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Concert and 
Conciliation : The Next Stage of the Atlantic 
AUiance (Rostow) 422 

Poland. Letters of Credence (Michalowski) . . 431 

Presidential Documents 

President Authorizes Additional Wheat Ship- 
ments to India 430 

President Sends Congratulations to Vietnamese 
Chief of State 421 

Public Affairs. The Intellectual and American 

Foreign Policy (Gronouski) 432 

'Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 438 

United Nations. Current U.N. Documents . . 438 


Concert and Conciliation: The Next Stage of 
the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) 422 

President Sends Congratulations to Vietnamese 
Chief of State 421 

I Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker Dis- 
cuss Viet-Nam in TV-Radio Interviews 
(transcripts) 411 

Name Index 

Bunker, Ellsworth 411 

I Gronouski, John A 432 

I Johnson, President 421, 430 

Mantilla Ortega, Carlos 431 

Michalowski, Jerzy 431 

Richardson, Egerton Rudolf 431 

Rostow, Eugene V 422 

Rusk, Secretary 411 

Check List of Department of State 


> Releases: September 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 

of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 







U.S.-Thailand treaty of amity and 
economic relations approved by 
the Senate. 



Rostow : "Concert and Conciliation : 
The Next Stage of the Atlantic 



Oliver : "The Business of Develop- 



Revision of Middle East travel 



Regional foreign policy conference, 
St. Louis, Mo., Oct. 17-18. 



Rusk: opening statement. Joint 
U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Economic AfCairs (revised). 



Joint U.S.-Japan Committee: joint 



Program for visit of President 
Guiseppe Saragat of Italy. 

1 201 


Secretary Rusk and Japanese 
Foreign Minister Takeo Miki : 
joint news briefing. 


* Not prin 

t Held for a later issue of the Buixetin. 




ssvw Noi9oa 

98H xoa 

AHViign a I land 

S 030-9SQ 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 













It of IXicuments 

. u 1957 

Vol. LVII, No. im 

October 9, 1967 


Opening Statement by Secretary Busk and Text of Joint Communique 1^51 
News Conference of Secretary Rush and Foreign Minister Miki 455 


by Assistant Secretary Oliver It70 



hy Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara kJtS 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1476 Publication 8299 
October 9, 1967 

For sale by tlie Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Oovemment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $15.00 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BUI,LETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
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Department. Information is included 
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States is or may become a party 
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Publications of the Department, 
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national relations are listed currently. 

The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy 

hy Robert S. McNamara 
Secretary of Defense ^ 

I want to discuss with you this afternoon the 
gravest problem that an American Secretary of 
Defense must face: tlie planning, preparation, 
and policy governmg the possibility of thermo- 
nuclear war. 

It is a prospect most of mankind would pre- 
fer not to contemplate. That is understandable. 
For teclmology has now circmnscribed us all 
with a conceivable horizon of horror that could 
dwarf any catastrophe that has befallen man in 
his moi'e than a million years on eaxth. 

Man has lived now for more than 20 years in 
what we have come to call the atomic age. What 
we sometimes overlook is that every future age 
of man will be an atomic age. 

If, then, man is to have a future at all, it will 
liave to be a future overshadowed with the per- 
manent possibility of thermonuclear holocaust. 

About that fact, we are no longer free. Our 
freedom in this question consists rather in fac- 
ing the matter rationally and realistically and 
discussing a,ctions to minimize the danger. 

Xo sane citizen, no sane political leader, no 
sane nation, wants thermonuclear war. But 
merely not wanting it is not enough. We must 
understand the difference between actions which 
increase its risk, those which reduce it, and those 
which, while costly, liave little influence one way 
or another. 

Now this whole subject matter tends to be 
psychologically unpleasant. But there is an even 
greater difficulty standing in the way of con- 
structive and profitable debate over the issues. 
And that is that nuclear strategy is exceptionally 
complex in its technical aspects. Unless these 
complexities are well understood, rational dis- 

^ Address made before the annual convention of 

United Press International editors and publishers at 

San Francisco, Calif., on Sept IS (Department of 
Defense press release) . 

cussion and decisionmaking axe simply not 

Wliat I want to do this afternoon is deal with 
these complexities and clarify them with as 
much precision and detail as time and security 

"Assured Destruction Capability" 

One must begin with precise definitions. The 
cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to 
be to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the 
United States, or its allies, by maintaining a 
highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable 
degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or 
combination of aggressors, at any time during 
the course of a strategic nuclear exchange — even 
after our absorbing a surprise first strike. This 
can be defined as our "assured destruction 

Now, it is imperative to understand that as- 
sured destruction is the very essence of the whole 
deterrence concept. 

We must possess an actual assured destruction 
capability. And that actual assured destruction 
capability must also be credible. Conceivably, 
our assured destruction capability could be ac- 
tual without being credible — ^in which case it 
might fail to deter an aggressor. The point is 
that a potential aggressor must himself believe 
that our assured destruction capability is in fact 
actual and that our will to use it in retaliation 
to an attack is in fact unwavering. 

The conclusion, then, is clear : If the United 
States is to deter a nuclear attack on itself or on 
its allies, it must possess an actual and a credible 
assured destruction capability. 

Wlien calculating the force we require, we 
must be "conservative" in all our estimates of 
both a potential aggressor's capabilities and his 
intentions. Security depends upon taking a 

OCTOBER 9, 19G7 


"worst plausible case" — and having the ability 
to cope with that eventuality. 

In that eventuality we must be able to absorb 
the total weight of nuclear attack on our coun- 
try — on our strike-back forces; on our command 
and control apparatus ; on our industrial capac- 
ity; on our cities; and on our population — and 
still be fully capable of destroying the aggres- 
sor to the point that his society is simply no 
longer viable in any meaningful 20th-century 

That is what deterrence to nuclear aggression 
means. It means the certainty of suicide to the 
aggressor— not merely to his military forces but 
to his society as a whole. 

"First-Strike Capability" 

Now let us consider another term : "first-strike 
capability." This, in itself, is an ambiguous 
term, since it could mean simply the ability of 
one nation to attack another nation with nuclear 
forces first. But as it is normally used, it con- 
notes much more : the substantial elimination of 
the attacked nation's retaliatory second-strike 
forces. This is the sense in which "first-strike 
capability" should be understood. 

Now, clearly, such a first-strike capability is 
an important strategic concept. The United 
States cannot — and will not — ever permit itself 
to get into the position in which another nation 
or combination of nations would possess such a 
first-strike capability, which could be effectively 
used against it. 

To get into such a position vis-a-vis any other 
nation or nations would not only constitute an 
intolerable threat to our security, but it would 
obviously remove our ability to deter nuclear 
aggression — both against ourselves and against 
our allies. 

Now, we are not in that position today — and 
there is no foreseeable clanger of our ever get- 
ting into that position. 

Our strategic offensive forces are immense: 
1,000 Minuteman missile launchers, carefully 
protected below ground ; 41 Polaris submarines, 
carrying 656 missile launchers — with the major- 
ity of these hidden beneath the seas at all times ; 
and about 600 long-range bombers, approxi- 
mately 40 percent of which are kejit always in 
a high state of alert. 

Our alert forces alone carry more than 2,200 
weapons, averaging more than 1 megaton each. 
A merb 400 1-megaton weapons, if delivered on 


the Soviet Union, would be sufficient to destroy 
over one-third of her population and one-half 
of her industry. 

Aiid all of these flexible and highly reliable 
forces are equipped with devices that insure 
their penetration of Soviet defenses. 

Now, what about the Soviet Union? Does it 
today possess a powerful nuclear arsenal ? 

The answer is that it does. 

Does it possess a first-strike capability against 
the United States? 

The answer is that it does not. 

Can the Soviet Union, in the foreseeable fu- 
ture, acquire such a first-strike capability 
against the United States ? 

The answer is that it cannot. It cannot because 
we are determined to remain fully alert and we 
will never permit our own assured destruction 
capability to be at a point where a Soviet first- 
strike cai^ability is even remotely feasible. 

Is the Soviet Union seriously attempting to 
acquire a first-strike capability against the 
United States? 

Although this is a question we cannot answer 
with absolute certainty, we believe the answer 
is "No." In any event, the question itself is, in 
a sense, irrelevant. It is irrelevant since the 
United States will so continue to maintain — and 
where necessary strengthen — our retaliatory 
forces that, whatever the Soviet Union's inten- 
tions or actions, we will continue to have an 
assured destruction capability vis-a-vis their 
society in which we are completely confident. 

But there is another question that is most 
relevant. And that is: Do we — the United 
States — possess a first-strike capability against 
the Soviet Union? 

The answer is that we do not. 

And we do not, not because we have neglected 
our nuclear strength. On the contrary, we have 
increased it to the point that we possess a clear 
superiority over the Soviet Union. 

We do not possess first-strike capability 
against the Soviet Union for precisely the same 
reason that they do not possess it against us. 
And that is that we have both built up our 
"second-strike capability" ^ to the point that 
a first-strike capability on either side has become 

Tliere is, of course, no way in which the 

"A "second-strike capability" is the capability to 
absorb a surprise nuclear attack and survive with suf- 
ficent power to inflict unacceptable damage on the 
aggressor. [Footnote in original.] 


United States could have prevented the Soviet 
Union from acquiring its present second-strike 
capability — short of a massive preemptive first 
strike on the Soviet Union in the 1950's. 

The blunt fact is, then, that neither the Soviet 
Union nor the United States can attack the other 
without being destroyed in retaliation ; nor can 
either of us attain a first-strike capability in the 
foi'eseeable future. 

The further fact is tliat both the Soviet Union 
and the United States presently possess an ac- 
tual and credible second-strike capability 
against one another — and it is precisely this 
mutual caiiability that provides us both witli 
the strongest possible motive to avoid a nuclear 

(U.S. Nuclear Superiority 

The more frequent question that arises in this 
connection is whetlier or not the United States 
possesses nuclear superiority over the Soviet 

The answer is that we do. 

But the answer is — like everythmg else 
in this matter — teclmically complex. The com- 
plexity arises in part out of what measurement 
of superiority is most meaningful and realistic. 

Many commentators on the matter tend to 
define nuclear superiority in terms of gross 
megatomiage or in terms of the number of mis- 
sile launchers available. 

Now, by both these two standards of measure- 
ment, the United States does have a substantial 
superiority over the Soviet Union in the weap- 
ons targeted against each other. 

But it is precisely these two standards of 
measurement that are themselves misleading. 
For the most meaningful and realistic measure- 
ment of nuclear cajiability is neither gross 
megatonnage nor the number of available mis- 
sile launchers, but rather the number of sep- 
arate warheads that are capable of being deliv- 
ered with accuracy on individual high-priority 
targets with sufficient power to destroy them. 

Gross megatonnage in itself is an inadequate 
indicator of assured destruction capability, since 
it is unrelated to survivability, accuracy, or pen- 
etrability and poorly related to effective elimi- 
nation of multiple high-priority targets. There 
is manifestly no advantage in overdestroying 
one target at the expense of leaving undamaged 
other targets of equal importance. 

Further, the number of missile launchers 

OCTOBER 9, 1967 

available is also an inadequate indicator of as- 
sured destruction capability, since the fact is 
that many of our launchers will carry multiple 

But by using the realistic measurement of the 
number of warheads available, capable of being 
reliably delivered with accuracy and effective- 
ness on the appropriate targets in the United 
States or Soviet Union, I can tell you that the 
United States currently possesses a superiority 
over the Soviet Union of at least three or four 
to one. 

Furthermore, we will maintain a superiority — 
by these same realistic criteria — over the Soviet 
Union for as far ahead in the future as we can 
realistically plan. 

I want, however, to make one point patently 
clear: Our current nmnerical superiority over 
the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate, and effec- 
tive warheads is both greater than we had orig- 
inally plamied and in fact more than we require. 

Moreover, in the larger equation of security, 
our "superiority" is of limited significance; 
since even with our current superiority, or in- 
deed with any numerical superioritj' realistic- 
ally attainable, the blunt, inescapable fact x-e- 
mams that the Soviet Union could still — with its 
present forces — effectively destroy the United 
States, even after absorbing the full weight of 
an American first strike. 

I have noted that our present superiority is 
greater than we had planned. Let me explain to 
you how this came about ; for I think it is a sig- 
nificant illustration of the intrinsic dynamics of 
(he nuclear arms race. 

In 1961, when I became Secretary of Defense, 
the Soviet Union possessed a very small opera- 
tional arsenal of intercontinental missiles. 
However, they did possess the technological and 
industrial capacity to enlarge that arsenal very 
substantially over the succeeding several years. 

Now, we had no evidence that the Soviets did 
in fact plan to fully use that capability. But as I 
have pointed out, a strategic planner must be 
"conservative" in his calculations; that is, he 
must prepare for the worst plausible case and 
not be content to hope and prepare merely for 
the most probable. 

Since we could not be certain of Soviet inten- 
tions — since we could not be sure that they 
would not undertake a massive buildup — we had 
to insure against such an eventuality by under- 
taking ourselves a major buildup of the Minute- 
man and Polaris forces. 


Thus, in the course of hedghig against what 
was then only a theoretically i^ossible Soviet 
buildup, we took decisions which have resulted 
in our current superiority in numbers of war- 
heads and deliverable megatons. 

But the blunt fact remains that if we had had 
more accurate information about planned Soviet 
strategic forces we simply would not have 
needed to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we 
have today. 

Now let me be absolutely clear. I am not say- 
ing that our decision in 1961 was unjustified. I 
am simply saying that it was necessitated by a 
lack of accurate information. Furthermore, that 
decision in itself — as justified as it was — in the 
end could not possibly have left unaffected the 
Soviet Union's future nuclear plans. 

^Yha.t is essential to imderstand here is that 
the Soviet Union and the United States mutu- 
ally influence one another's strategic plans. 
"VVliatever be their intentions, whatever be our 
intentions, actions — or even realistically poten- 
tial actions — on either side relating to the 
buildup of nuclear forces, be they either offen- 
sive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger 
reactions on the other side. It is precisely this 
action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms 

Nonnuclear Forces Required 

Now, in strategic nuclear weaponry the arms 
race involves a particular irony. Unlike any 
other era in military history, today a substan- 
tial numerical superiority of weapons does not 
effectively translate into political control or 
diplomatic leverage. 

While thermonuclear power is almost incon- 
ceivably awesome, and represents virtually im- 
limited potential destructiveness, it has proven 
to be a limited diplomatic instrument. Its 
uniqueness lies in the fact that it is at one and 
the same time an all-powerful weapon and a 
very inadequate weapon. 

The fact that the Soviet Union and the United 
States can mutually destroy one another — re- 
gardless of who strikes first- — narrows the range 
of Soviet aggi'ession which our nuclear forces 
can effectively deter. 

Even with our nuclear monopoly in the early 
postwar period, we were unable to deter the 
Soviet pressures against Berlin or their sup- 
port of aggression in Korea. Today, our nuclear 
superiority does not deter all forms of Soviet 
support of Communist insurgency in Southeast 


^^Hiat all of this has meant is that we, and 
our allies as well, require substantial nonnu- 
clear forces in order to cope with levels of ag- 
gression that massive strategic forces do not in 
fact deter. 

This has been a difficult lesson both for us and 
for our allies to accept, since there is a strong 
psychological tendency to regard superior nu- 
clear forces as a simple and unfailing solution 
to security and an assurance of victory imder 
any set of circumstances. 

IVliat is important to miderstand is that our 
nuclear strategic forces play a vital and ab- 
solutely necessary role in our security and that 
of our allies but it is an intrinsically limited 

Thus, we and our allies must maintain sub- 
stantial conventional forces fully capable of 
dealing with a wide spectrum of lesser forms of 
political and military aggression — a level of ag- 
gression against which the use of strategic nu- 
clear forces would not be to our advantage and 
thus a level of aggression which these strategic 
nuclear forces by themselves cannot effectively 
deter. One cannot fashion a credible deterrent 
out of an incredible action. Therefore, security 
for the United States and its allies can only arise 
from the possession of a whole range of grad- 
uated deterrents, each of them fully credible in 
its own contest. 

Now, I have pointed out that in strategic 
nuclear matters the Soviet Union and the 
United States mutually influence one another's 
plans. In recent years the Soviets have sub- 
stantially increased their offensive forces. We 
have, of course, been watching and evaluating 
this very carefully. 

Clearly, the Soviet buildup is in part a reac 
tion to our own buildup since the beginning of 
this decade. Soviet strategic planners undoubt- 
edly reasoned that if our buildup were to con- 
tinue at its accelerated pace, we might conceiv- 
ably reach, in time, a credible first-strike 
capability against the Soviet Union. 

That was not in fact our intention. Our inten- 
tion was to assure that they — with their theo- 
retical capacity to reach such a first-strike 
capability — would not in fact outdistance us, 

But they could not read our intentions with 
any greater accuracj' than we could read theirs. 
And thus the result has been that we have both 
built up our forces to a point that far exceeds 
a credible second-strike capability against the 
forces we each started with. 

In doing so, neither of us has reached a first- 


strike capability. And the realities of the situa- 
tion being what they are — whatever we believe 
their intentions to be and whatever they believe 
our intentions to be — each of us can deny the 
other a first-strike capability in the foreseeable 

Now, how can we be so confident that this is 
the case? How can we be so certain that the 
Soviets cannot gradually outdistance us — either 
by some dramatic tecluiological breakthrough 
or simply through our imperceptively lagging 
behind, for whatever reason: reluctance to 
spend the requisite fimds, distraction with mili- 
tai-y problems elsewhere, faulty intelligence, or 
simple negligence and naivete? 

All of these reasons — and others — have been 
suggested by some commentators in this coim- 
try, who fear that we are in fact falling behind 
to a dangerous degi'ee. 

The answer to all of this is simple and 
straightforward. "We are not going to permit 
the Soviets to outdistance us, because to do so 
would be to jeopardize our very viability as a 
nation. No President, no Secretary of Defense, 
no Congress of the United States — of whatever 
political party and of whatever political per- 
suasion — is going to permit this nation to take 
that risk. 

Hope for Arms Limitation Agreement 

"We do not want a nuclear arms race with the 
Soviet Union — primarily because the action-re- 
action phenomenon makes it foolish and futile. 
But if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union 
from obtaining first-strike capability over us is 
to engage in such a race, the United States pos- 
sesses in ample abimdance the resources, the 
technology, and the will to nm faster in that 
race for whatever distance is required. 

But what we would much prefer to do is to 
come to a realistic and reasonably riskless 
agreement with the Soviet Union which would 
effectively prevent such an arms race. We both 
have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess 
of a credible assured destruction capability. 
These arsenals have reached that point of excess 
in each case for precisely the same reason : "We 
each have reacted to the other's buildup with 
very conservative calculations. We have, that is, 
each built a greater arsenal than either of us 
needed for a second-strike capability, simply 
because we each wanted to be able to cope with 
the "worst plausible case." 

But since we now each possess a deterrent in 
excess of our individual needs, both of our na- 

tions would benefit from a properly safe- 
guarded agreement first to limit, and later to 
reduce, both our offensive and defensive strate- 
gic nuclear forces. 

We may, or we may not, be able to achieve 
such an agreement. "We hope we can. And we 
believe such an agreement is fully feasible, 
since it is clearly in both our nations' interests. 
But reach the formal agreement or not, we can 
be sure that neither the Soviets nor we are go- 
ing to risk the other obtaining a first-strike ca- 
pability. On the contrary, we can be sure that 
we are both going to maintain a maximum 
effort to preserve an assured destruction 

It would not be sensible for either side to 
launch a maximum effort to achieve a first- 
strike capability. It would not be sensible be- 
cause, the intelligence-gathering capability of 
each side being what it is and the realities of 
leadtime from technological breakthrough to 
operational readiness being what they are, 
neither of us would be able to acquire a first- 
strike capability m secret. 

Now, let me take a specific case in point. 

The Soviets are now deploying an anti-ballis- 
tic-missile system. If we react to this deploy- 
ment intelligently, we have no reason for alarm. 

The system does not impose any threat to our 
ability to penetrate and inflict massive and im- 
acceptable damage on the Soviet Union. In other 
words, it does not presently affect in any signif- 
icant manner our assured destruction capabil- 

It does not impose such a threat because we 
have already taken the steps necessary to assure 
that our land-based Minuteman missiles, our 
nuclear submarine-launched new Poseidon mis- 
siles, and our strategic bomber forces have the 
requisite penetration aids and, in the sum, con- 
stitute a force of such magnitude that they 
guarantee us a force strong enough to survive 
a Soviet attack and penetrate the Soviet ABM 

Deployment of an ABM System 

Now, let me come to the issue that has received 
so much attention recently: the question of 
whether or not we should deploy an ABM sys- 
tem against the Soviet nuclear threat. 

To begin with, this is not in any sense a new 
issue. We have had both the technical possibility 
and the strategic desirability of an American 
ABM deployment imder constant review since 
the late 1950's. 



^\niile we have substantially improved our 
technology in the field, it is important to under- 
stand that none of the systems at the present or 
foreseeable state of the art would provide an 
impenetrable shield over the United States. 
Were such a shield possible, we would certainly 
want it — and we would certainly build it. 

And at this point, let me dispose of an ob- 
jection that is totally irrelevant to this issue. 
It has been alleged that we are opposed to de- 
ploying a large-scale ABM system because it 
would carry the hea\n;r price tag of $40 billion. 
Let me make it very clear that the $40 billion 
is not the issue. If we could build and deploy a 
genuinely impenetrable shield over the United 
States, we would be willing to spend not $40 
billion but any reasonable multiple of that 
amount that was necessaiy. The money in itself 
is not the problem: The penetrability of the 
proposed shield is the problem. 

There is clearly no point, however, in spend- 
ing $40 billion if it is not going to buy us a 
significant improvement in our security. If it is 
not, then we should use the substantial resources 
it represents on something that will. 

Every ABM system that is now feasible in- 
volves firing defensive missiles at incoming of- 
fensive warheads in an effort to destroy them. 
Biit what many commentators on this issue over- 
look is that any such system can rather obviously 
be defeated by an enemy simply sending more 
offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than 
there axe defensive missiles capable of disposing 
of them. 

And this is the whole crux of the nuclear ac- 
tion-reaction phenomenon. 

Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system 
throughout the United States, the Soviets would 
clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their 
offensive capability as to cancel out our defen- 
sive advantage. 

It is futile for each of us to spend $4 billion, 
$40 billion, or $400 billion— and at the end of all 
the spending, and at the end of aJl the deploy- 
ment, and at the end of all the effort, to be 
relatively at the same point of balance on the 
security scale that we a,re now. 

In point of fact, we have already initiated 
offensive weapons programs costing several bil- 
lions in order to offset the small present Soviet 
ABM deployment and the possibly more exten- 
sive future Soviet ABM deployments. That is 
money well spent; and it is necessary. But we 
should bear in mind that it is money spent be- 
cause of the action-reaction phenomenon. 
If we in turn opt for heavy ABM deploy- 


ment — at whatever price — we can be certain that 
the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we 
would hope to gain. 

It is precisely because of this certainty of a 
corresponding Soviet reaction that the four 
I^rominent scientists — men who have served with 
distinction as the Science Advisers to Presidents 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson — and the 
three outstanding men who have served as Di- 
rectors of Research and Engineering to three 
Secretaries of Defense have unanimously rec- 
ommended against the deployment of an ABM 
system designed to protect our population 
against a Soviet attack. 

These men are Doctors [James E.] Killian, 
[George B.] Kistiakowsky, [Jerome B.] Wies- 
ner, [Donald F.] Hornig, [Herbert F.] York, 
[Harold] Bi-own, and [John S.] Foster. 

OfFensive and Defensive Capabilities 

The plain fact of the matter is that we are now 
facing a situation analogous to the one we faced 
in 1961 : We are micertain of the Soviets' 

At that time we were concerned about their 
potential offensive capabilities; now we are 
concerned about their potential defensive capa- 
bilities. But the dynamics of the concern are 
the same. 

We must continue to be cautious and con- 
servative in our estimates, leaving no room in 
our calculations for unnecessary risk. And at 
the same time, we must measure our own re- 
sponse in such a manner that it does not trigger 
a senseless spiral upward of nuclear arms. 

Now, as I have emphasized, we have already 
taken the necessary steps to guarantee that our 
offensive strategic weapons will be able to pene- 
trate future, more advanced, Soviet defenses. 

Keeping in mind tlie careful clockwork of 
leadtime, we will be forced to continue that effort 
over the next few years if the evidence is that the 
Soviets intend to turn what is now a light and 
modest ABM deployment into a massive one. 

Should they elect to do so, we have both the 
leadtime and the technology available to so in- 
crease both the quality and quantity of our of- 
fensive .strategic forces — with particular atten- 
tion to highly reliable penetration aids — that 
their expensive defensive efforts will give them 
no edge in the nuclear balance whatever. 

But we would prefer not to have to do that. 
For it is a profitless waste of resources, pro- 
vided we and the Soviets can come to a realistic 
strategic arms limitation agreement. 


As you know, we have proposed U.S.-Soviet 
talks on this matter. Should these talks fail, we 
are fully prepared to take the appropriate meas- 
ures that such a failure would make necessary. 

The point for us to keep in mind is that should 
the talks fail — and the Soviets decide to expand 
their present modest ABM deployment into a 
massive one — our response must be realistic. 
There is no point whatever in our responding 
by going to a massive ABM deployment to pro- 
tect our population, when such a system would 
be ineffective against a sophisticated Soviet 

Instead, realism dictates that if the Soviets 
elect to deploy a heavy ABM system, we must 
further expand our sophisticated offensive 
forces and thus preserve our overwhelming as- 
sured destruction capability. 

But the intractable fact is that should the 
talks fail, both the Soviets and ourselves would 
be forced to continue on a foolish and feckless 
course. It would be foolish and feckless because, 
in the end, it would provide neither the Soviets 
nor us with any greater relative nuclear capa- 
bility. The time has come for us both to realize 
that and to act reasonably. It is clearly in our 
own mutual interest to do so. 

Having said that, it is important to distin- 
guish between an ABM system designed to pro- 
tect against a Soviet attack on our cities and 
ABM systems which have other objectives. 

Communist China's Nuclear Threat 

One of the other uses of an ABM system 
which we should seriously consider is the 
greater protection of our strategic offensive 
forces. Ajiother is in relation to the emerging 
nuclear capability of Communist China. 

There is evidence that the Chinese are devot- 
ing very substantial resources to the develop- 
ment of both nuclear warheads and missile 
delivery systems. As I stated last January, in- 
dications are that they will have medium-range 
ballistic missiles within a year or so, an initial 
intercontinental ballistic missile capability in 
the early 1970's, and a modest force in the 

Up to now, the leadtime factor has allowed us 
to postpone a decision on wliether or not a light 
AB!M deployment might be advantageous as a 
countermeasure to Communist China's nuclear 
development. But the time will shortly be right 
for us to mitiate production if we desire such a 

China at tlie moment is caught up in internal 

strife, but it seems likely that her basic motiva- 
tion in developing a strategic nuclear capability 
is an attempt to provide a basis for threatening 
her neighbors and to clothe herself with the 
dubious prestige that the world pays to nuclear 
weaponry. We deplore her development of these 
weapons, just as we deplore it in other coun- 
tries. We oppose nuclear proliferation because 
we believe that in the end it only increases the 
risk of a common and cataclysmic holocaust. 

President Johnson has made it clear that the 
United States wUl oppose any efforts of China 
to employ nuclear blackmail against her 

We possess now, and will continue to possess 
for as far ahead as we can foresee, an over- 
whelming first-strike capability with respect to 
China. And despite the shrill and raucous prop- 
aganda directed at her own people that "the 
atomic bomb is a paper tiger," there is ample 
evidence that China well appreciates the de- 
structive power of nuclear weapons. 

China has been cautious to avoid any action 
that might end in a nuclear clash with the 
United States — however wild her words — and 
imderstandably so. We have the power not only 
to destroy completely her entire nuclear offen- 
sive forces but to devastate her society as well. 

Is there any possibility, then, that by the 
mid-1970's China might become so incautious 
as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United 
States or our allies? It would be insane and 
suicidal for her to do so, but one can conceive 
conditions under which China might miscalcu- 
late. We wish to reduce such possibilities to a 

Advantages of Light Deployment of U.S. ABM's 

And smce, as I have noted, our strategic 
planning must always be conservative and take 
into consideration even the possible irrational 
behavior of potential adversaries, there are 
marginal grounds for concluding that a light 
deployment of U.S. ABM's against this possi- 
bility is prudent. 

The system would be relatively inexpensive — 
preliminary estimates place the cost at about 
$5 billion— and would have a much higher de- 
gree of reliability against a Chinese attack than 
the much more massive and complicated system 
that some have recommended against a possible 
Soviet attack. 

Moreover, such an ABM deployment designed 
against a possible Chinese attack would have 
a number of other advantages. It would provide 

OCTOBER 9, 19 Gl 


an additional indication to Asians that we in- 
tend to deter China from nuclear blackmail and 
thus would contribute toward our goal of dis- 
couraging nuclear weapon proliferation among 
the present nonnuclear countries. 

Further, the Cliinese-oriented ABM deploj'- 
ment would enable us to add — as a concurrent 
benefit — a further defense of our Minuteman 
sites against Soviet attack, which means that 
at modest cost we would in fact be adding even 
greater effectiveness to our offensive missile 
force and avoiding a much more costly expan- 
sion of that force. 

Finally, such a reasonably reliable ABM 
system would add protection of our population 
against the improbable but possible accidental 
launch of an intercontinental missile by any 
one of the nuclear powere. 

After a detailed review of all these consid- 
erations, we have decided to go forward with 
this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment; and 
we will begin actual production of such a system 
at the end of this year. 

Psychological Dangers 

In reaching this decision, I want to empha- 
size that it contains two possible dangers, and 
we should guard carefully against each. 

The first danger is that we may psychologi- 
cally lapse mto the old oversimplification about 
the adequacy of nuclear power. The simple 
truth is that nuclear weapons can serve to deter 
only a narrow range of threats. This ABM 
deployment will strengthen our defensive pos- 
ture and will enhance the effectiveness of our 
land-based ICBM offensive forces. But the in- 
dependent nations of Asia must realize tliat 
these benefits are no substitute for their main- 
taining, and where necessary strengthening, 
their own conventional forces in order to deal 
with the more likely threats to the security of 
tlie region. 

The second danger is also psychological. 
There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to 
the development of all new nuclear weaponry. 
If a weapon system works — and works well — 
there is strong pressure from many directions 
to procure and deploy the weapon out of all 
proportion to the prudent level required. 

The danger in deploying this relatively light 
and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is 
going to be that pressures will develop to ex- 
pand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM 

We must I'esist that temptation firmly, not 
because we can for a moment afford to relax our 
vigilance against a possible Soviet first strike 
but precisely because our gi-eatest deterrent 
against such a strike is not a massive, costly, 
but higlily penetrable ABM shield but rather a 
fully credible offensive assured destruction 

The so-called heavy ABM shield — at the pre- 
sent state of teclmology — would in effect be no 
adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack 
but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets 
to vastly increase their own offensive forces. 
That, as I have pointed out, would make it nec- 
essarjr for us to respond in turn ; and so the arms 
race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible 
purpose on either side. 

Let me emphasize — and I cannot do so too 
sti'ongly — that our decision to go ahead with 
a limited ABM deployment in no way indicates 
that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union 
on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive 
and defensive forces is any the less urgent or 

The road leading from the stone ax to the 
ICBM, though it may have been more than a 
million years in the building, seems to have run 
in a single direction. If one is inclined to be 
cynical, one might conclude that man's history 
seems to be characterized not so much by con- 
sistent periods of peace, occasionally punctuated 
by warfare, but rather by persistent outlu-eaks 
of warfare, wearily put aside from time to time 
by periods of exhaustion and recovery that 
parade under the name of peace. 

I do not view man's history with that degree 
of cynicism, but I do believe that man's wisdom 
in avoiding war is often surpassed by his folly 
in promoting it. 

However foolish unlimited war may have 
been in the past, it is now no longer merely 
foolish, but suicidal as well. 

It is said that nothing can prevent a man from 
suicide if he is sufficiently determined to com- 
mit it. The question is what is our determina- 
tion in an era when unlimited war will mean 
the death of hundreds of millions — and the 
possible genetic impairment of a million gen- 
erations to follow? 

Man is clearly a compound of folly and wis- 
dom, and history is clearly a consequence of the 
admixture of those two contradictory traits. 
History has placed our particular lives in an 
era when the consequences of human folly are 



waxing more and more catastrophic in the mat- 
ters of war and peace. 

In tlie end, the root of man's security does not 
lie in his weaponry. In the end, the root of man's 
security lies in his mind. 

Wliat the world requires in its 22d year of 

the atomic age is not a new race toward arma- 
ment. What the world requires in its 22d year 
of the atomic age is a new race toward reason- 

We had better all run that race— not merely 
we the administrators but we the people. 

U.S.-Japan Joint Economic Committee Holds Sixth Meeting 

The sixth meeting of the Joint United States- 
Japan Gominittee on Trade and Economic Af- 
fairs was held at Washmgto7i Scptemher 13-15. 
Following are texts of an opening stateinent 
made hy Secretary Rush on September 13 and a 
final communique issued at the close of the 
meeting, together with the transcript of a news 
conference held hy Secretary Rush and Japa- 
nese Foreign Minister Taheo Mihi on Septem- 
her 15. 


Opening Statement by Secretary Rusk 

Press release 198 (revised) dated September 13 

I now declare the sixth meeting of the Joint 
United States-Japan Committee on Trade and 
Economic Affairs open. At the Tery beginning, 
I should like to extend a very warm welcome 
indeed to our colleagues the Ministers of Japan 
and to other distinguished oiScials and visitors 
who are with us in Washington at this time. It 
has been my privilege to have participated in 
each meeting since this Committee was estab- 
lished in 1961 ;^ and I see at the table, on both 
sides, Ministers who have attended more than 
one of these earlier meetings. So, as relations 
between nations go, this Committee has had a 
remarkable continuity. Over the years we have 
conducted an increasingly free and frank dia- 
log based on growing friendship and greater 
understanding. These friendships formed in the 
course of our meetings are very pleasant in 
themselves, but they are also an important in- 

' For texts of joint communiques is.sued at the con- 
clusion of the five previous meetings, see Bulletin of 
Nov. 27, 1061, p. 891 ; Dec. 24, 1962, p. 9.59 : Feb. 17, 1964, 
p. 235 ; Aug. 9, 1965, p. 247 ; and Aug. 1, 1966, p. 178. 

gredient in the successful conduct of business 
between our two great nations which share so 
many common interests. 

This Joint Committee has made a substantial 
contribution to understanding between Japan 
and the United States, two countries diverse in 
history and culture but so alike in many ways^ 
with energy and inventiveness, ideals — and 
which share a common dedication to a free and 
peaceful and prosperous world. 

Since our first meeting at Hakone in 1961, the 
nature of our economic relations has changed 
almost beyond recognition. Only two trends 
have been consistent : an ever-increasing volume 
of trade in goods and services between our two 
coimtries and a steady lessenmg in irritations in 
our bilateral economic problems. 

At the time of oiu" first meeting our Japanese 
colleagues were concerned about a large and 
seemingly chronic trade deficit with the United 
States. Recently, some of my colleagues have 
been concerned that the sizable United States 
trade deficit with Japan might become chronic. 
Tliis year the trend appears to be in the direc- 
tion of closer balance. 

Our two-way trade has grown at a greater 
rate than our overall trade. Contrary to many 
expectations, the United States share of Japan's 
rapidly expanding market has remained rela- 
tively constant, although the pattern of our ex- 
ports has shown major shifts over the years. 
Japan's share of the United States market has 
been growing steadily, and the pattern of its 
exports has shown an even more remarkable 
change and diversity. With the successful con- 
clusion of the Kennedy Round we look forward 
to an even greater increase in mutually profit- 
able trade. 

Some members of our delegations, Mr. Min- 
ister, do not work on a day-to-day basis with the 

OCTOBER 9, 196T 


usual international questions but are immersed 
in domestic concerns. But one lesson of the mod- 
ern world is clear: There are no longer any 
purely domestic concerns. We share the same 
earth and atmosphere ; we exploit the same lim- 
ited resources of the seas. Meteorological condi- 
tions do not respect national boundaries; 
typhoons and hurricanes lash many countries 
alike. The recent Water for Peace Conference ^ 
underlined that the human race as a whole has 
a stake in the conservation of water to meet 
growing needs for human consumption and for 
industry and agriculture. And, as the popula- 
tion of our planet continues to grow, it becomes 
more and more apjjarent that we have a com- 
mon interest in, and a common responsibility 
for, the wise use of world resources to increase 
the production of the basic necessities of life. 

Mr. Minister, we applaud Japan's rapidly 
growing leadership in promoting regional co- 
operation. An outstanding example is its calling 
of the Ministerial Conference for Southeast 
Asian Economic Development, which recently 
held its second meeting. Japan has had a major 
role in the founding of the Asian Development 
Bank. It made a large initial capital contribu- 
tion. It has committed resources for special 
funds to permit the Bank to carry out urgent 
activities not encompassed in conventional bank- 
ing. These actions have all helped to make this 
regional institution an important catalyst of 
economic development in Asia. 

The United States and Japan are working in 
close consultation in rendering assistance to 
Asian regional institutions. We are developing 
a real partnership in the process of carrying out 
our mutual responsibilities in the area. And in 
all good partnerships, each partner contributes 
individual talents and strengths but the com- 
bined contribution can be greater than the sum 
of the parts. 

I would add, Mr. Minister, that the United 
States also appreciates Japan's leadership in the 
U.N. and other world councils in the search for 
peace. The United States is committed to peace. 
That is the objective of the United States and 
our allies in Viet-Nam, in Southeast Asia, in the 
Western Pacific, and in the world as a whole. 
We have committed our blood and treasure to 
secure a lasting peace in which the people of the 
world can live in freedom and security under 
institutions of their choice. We impose no con- 

" For background, see iMd., June 19, 1967, ij. 902. 

ditions on peace except the honoring of the basic 
right of every people to choose its own destiny 
and not be absorbed by force. 

And so, Mr. Minister and gentlemen, we are 
looking forward to these discussions, both at this 
table and in our counterpart discussions. I have 
no doubt that they will be valuable not only to 
us as individual officials carrying hea\'y respon- 
sibilities and to our two Governments but also 
to the peoples of our two coimtries. So you are 
most welcome, sir, and we are delighted to have 
you with us. 

Joint Communique 

Press release 199 dated September 15 

The Sixth Meeting of the Joint United States- 
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Af- 
fairs was held in Washington on September 13, 
14, and 15, 1967, under the Chairmanship of the 
Secretary of State, Dean Eusk. 

The Committee reviewed the general world 
situation with particular emjDhasis on the con- 
tinuing conflicts in Asia and tensions in the 
Middle East. The Committee welcomed initia- 
tives and concrete achievements by Asians in 
strengthening regional cooperation within Asia. 
It agreed that these developments were for the 
region and the world, a significant contribution 
to stability, prosperity and peace. Conscious of 
the numerous and complex difficulties, dangers, 
and anxieties which burden mankind, particu- 
larly men, women and children in developing 
countries, the two Governments pledged con- 
tinviing partnership in strengthening Asia- 
Pacific cooperation. 


1. The Committee noted that both countries 
were enjoying prosperity but that both faced 
economic adjustment problems requiring the at- 
tention of their Governments. The delegations 
agreed on the importance of a steady but sus- 
tainable expansion of both economies which 
will also contribute to the continuing growth 
in trade between the United States and Japan 
which already had surpassed $5 billion in 1966. 

2. The Committee took note of recent Jap- 
anese actions to strengthen Japan's balance of 
payments as well as the determination of the 
United States to bring its balance of payments 
into equilibrium by measures consistent with 



world economic 


and progress. The 

Committee recognized that there had been much 
useful consultation between the two Govern- 
ments in dealing with their respective balance 
of payments difficulties in recent years. It was 
agi-eed that this balance of payments consulta- 
tion should be continued. 

3. The Committee discussed a wide range of 
problems involved in trade and economic rela- 
tions between Japan and the United States, 
including specific difficulties faced by particular 
industries in both nations. Satisfaction was ex- 
pressed on the overall growth of United States- 
Japanese trade, and the close relationship be- 
tween the two countries which enables both 
Governments to deal constructively with poten- 
tial reductions of trade barriers in a friendly 
atmosphere. Both Governments undertook to 
examine jointly problems presently at hand or 
likely to arise. 

4. The Committee considered international 
investment problems. The Japanese Delegation 
reported on its program to liberalize the entry 
of private investment into Japan which had 
been put into effect July 1, 1967, and stated that 
it was the intention of Japan to review the pro- 
gram at intervals of one or two years for further 
liberalization in substantially wider areas of its 
economy by early 1972. The United States ex- 
pressed appreciation for the effort that went 
into the formulation of the Japanese program 
as a first, although somewhat disappointing, 
step, and expressed the hope that liberalization 
be accelerated as soon as possible. It also ex- 
pressed concern over recent measures which ap- 
pear adversely to affect the operations of exist- 
ing United States businesses in Japan. The 
United States Delegation reiterated that 
Japanese investment in the United States is 
actively encouraged and expressed pleasure at 
Japan's growing interest in investments which 
contributed to the development of Alaska. 

5. The Committee discussed matters related 
to fisheries and noted that mutually acceptable 
arrangements had been made between the two 
countries in the past year with respect to some 
problems concerning fisheries. 

6. The Committee examined developments 
during the past year in shipping, aviation and 
travel matters, and agreed to continue close con- 
sultations. The Committee agreed on close con- 
sultation particularly with respect to study of 
and cooperation on developments pertaining to 
urban transportation problems; sea, air and 

President Johnson Welcomes 
Japanese Cabinet Ministers 

Following is a toast hy President Johnson 
at a White House luncheon on September 13 in 
honor of the Japanese Cabinet }finisters attend- 
ing the sixth meeting of the Joint V.S.-Japan 
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. 

White House press release dated September 13 

It is a very great pleasure to welcome you here. 

These meetings are testimony to the friendship 
that unites two great nations. They are infused 
with a sense of urgency and of confidence. The 
problems of Asia and the Pacific provide the 
urgency ; the record of America and .Japan in 
these past years inspires the confidence. 

Each of us can learn from the other's experi- 
ence with the problems of modern urban socie- 
ties : how to cleanse the environment, how to 
transport and house our people, how to enrich 
the lives of individual men and women. 

We share other problems as well, inherited 
from the past. We in America welcome the op- 
portunity to explore those problems with you. 

Together, we face the vast problems of an 
Asia straining to achieve a better and more 
secure life. We have seen hope stir in hungry 
lands — and we have responded to it. The world's 
future stability demands that the peoples of the 
Pacific find their way, in peace, out of the agonies 
of the past. 

One heartening development is the growing 
spirit of regional cooperation in Asia — a spirit 
which Japan has strongly helped to promote. 

America's own commitment to Asia is firm. 

Our two nations do not always see our respon- 
sibilities in the same light. But we in America 
will always welcome your wisdom and counsel. 

There is much that we can do together. We 
share the experience of growth and prosperity. 
And out of that, we share a knowledge which 
can change and enrich the future of our neigh- 
bors. It is our task to work in partnership toward 
a goal worthy of the greatness of our people : 
the progress, the peace and security of the 
Pacific. These meetings help show us the way. 

I ask you now to join with me in a toast : 
Gentlemen, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor 
of Japan. 

land transportation teclmology and safety ; and 
environmental pollution related to transporta- 
tion. Tlie Committee agreed to establish an ap- 
propriate panel to study methods to facilitate 
sea and air travel and cargo movement between 
the two nations. Particular note was taken of 
the need to develop improved techniques for 
handling passengers because of the requirements 

OCTOBER 9, 19C7 


generated by Expo 70 at Osaka as well as the 
Visit USA program. 


1. Continuing close cooperation between the 
United States and Japan in multilateral eco- 
nomic forums designed to minimize inhibitions 
on the free flow of goods and services, capital 
and persons among nations was emphasized by 
the Committee. The Committee welcomed the 
outstanding success of the Kennedy Round as 
an example of what can be accomplished to 
expand world trade through reciprocal under- 
standing and patient negotiations. While 
recognizing the major contribution to the expan- 
sion of world trade made by the Kennedy 
Round, the Committee pointed out that much 
remains to be done through the GATT [Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in reduc- 
ing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and in 
increasing the participation of the developing 
areas of the world in trade as a requisite for 
their development. Botli Governments will be 
studying what future trade measures might be 
taken in cooperation with other countries to 
achieve these objectives. 

2. The Committee devoted special attention 
to the trade problems of the develojDing coun- 
tries, recognizing the importance of construc- 
tive measures to support the efforts by the devel- 
oping countries to accelerate their economic 
development. The Committee noted that the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment constitutes an important forum for 
the consideration of trade problems of the de- 
veloping countries. The Committee agreed that 
the question of preferential tariffs would be a 
principal theme at the Second Meetmg of 
UNCTAD at New Delhi next year and the 
Japanese Delegation emphasized the prob- 
lems involved for Japan if tariff preferences 
were to be extended and stated that Japan was 
seriously studying the problem. The Commit- 
tee agi-eed to continue consultations on this 

3. The two delegations discussed problems in 
East-West trade relations and the respective 
policies of their Governments. The United 
States Delegation stated that its policies on 
trade in non-strategic goods with Eastern 
European countries and the U.S.S.R. are under 
continuous review as part of its efforts to open 
useful avenues of communication and contact 
with these countries. It reviewed the reasons for 


having no economic relations with Communist 
Chma, North Korea and North Viet-Nam and 
for economic embargo of Cuba by the Organi- 
zation of American States. The Japanese Dele- 
gation explained the current situation in its 
trade with Communist China and stated its in- 
tention to develop further trade relations with 
the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European 

4. The Committee welcomed the important 
step that has been taken in the Group of Ten ' 
and within the International Monetary Fund in 
developing an Outline Plan for Special Draw- 
ing Rights in the Fund to provide supplemen- 
tary reserves when needed, so as to assure that 
a shortage of world reserves will not inhibit the 
growth of international trade and investment. 
The delegations expressed the hope that this 
Plan will be approved at the Rio de Janeiro 
meeting of the International Monetary Fund. 


1. The Committee observed the growing 
awareness among Asian countries of the need 
for self-help and regional cooperation reflected 
in the Second Ministerial Conference for Eco- 
nomic Development in Southeast Asia held in 
Manila m April 1967 and in other important 
regional meetings. 

2. The Committee noted that the Asian De- 
velopment Bank is now an operating institution 
contributing to the economic development of the 
area. The United States Delegation noted par- 
ticularly Japan's strong and consistent support 
of the Bank and its leadership in emphasizing 
the importance of agriculture to the develop- 
ment of Asia. The Committee noted that Japan 
had decided to make a contribution amounting 
to $100 million to a Special Fund primarily for 
agriculture to be administered by the Asian 
Development Bank. The Committee also noted 
that the President intended to request the 
United States Congress to authorize a contribu- 
tion of $200 million to Asian Development Bank 
Special Funds for various purposes, including 
agriculture, over a period of four years. 


The Committee received its annual progress 
report on United States-Japan cooperation in 
development and utilization of natural re- 
sources. Recognizing the contribution that this 


' For background, see ibid., Sept. 25, 1967, p. 392. 



bilateral cooperation program had made to 
broadening exchanges in the fields of science, 
technology, and conservation between the 
United States and Japan, the Committee agreed 
to joint examination of a current problem of 
reconciling conservation and trade interests in- 
volved in mutual United States and Japanese 
concern in the use of timber resources of the 
Pacific Northwest and Alaska. 


The Committee expressed satisfaction with 
the agreement between the two countries to 
undertake a joint study of employment and 
observed that the study was expected to make a 
significant contribution to the full utilization 
of human potential in both countries. 


The United States Delegation accepted the 
invitation of the Japanese Delegation to hold 
the next meeting in Japan. 


Tlie United States was represented by Dean 
Eusk, Secretary of State; Henry H. Fowler, 
Secretary of the Treasury; Stewart L. Udall, 
Secretary of Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Sec- 
retary of Agriculture; Alexander B. Trow- 
bridge, Secretary of Commerce; W. Willard 
Wirtz. Secretary of Labor ; Alan S. Boyd, Sec- 
retary of Transportation ; and Gardner Ackley, 
Chairman of the President's Council of Eco- 
nomic Advisers. U. Alexis Jolmson, United 
States Ambassador to Japan ; William M. Roth, 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ; 
William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for 
International Development; and advisers from 
the various departments concerned were also 

Japan was represented by Takeo Miki, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs; Mikio Mizuta, Min- 
ister of Finance; Tadao Kuraishi, Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry ; Wataro Kanno, Min- 
ister of International Trade and Industry; 
Takeo Ohashi, ISIinister of Transportation; 
Takashi Hayakawa, Minister of Labor; and 
Kiichi Miyazawa, Director General, Economic 
Planning Agency. Takeso Shimoda, Japanese 
Ambassador to the United States; Shinichi 
Kondo, Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs; and advisers from the Ministries con- 
cerned were also present. 


Press release 201 dated September 15 

Secretary Rusk: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. I am delighted to have a chance to 
meet j'ou in the company of my distinguished 
colleague the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. 

I would mvite Mr. Miki to make some open- 
ing observations. 

There will be translation of both languages 
on this occasion. 

Minister Miki [In English^ : I was intro- 
duced by Secretai-y Rusk. I am the Japanese 
Foreign Minister. 

[Inferpretationi : This is the third time that 
I have had the pleasure of taking part in the 
meetings of the Joint United States-Japan 
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. My 
experiences with these meetings make me feel 
that, as we continue to meet annually, personal 
friendship as well as mutual understanding be- 
tween your American Secretaries and our Min- 
isters from Japan deepen, creating an atmos- 
phere conducive to free, candid, and active 
dialog between us. This is no less than a signifi- 
cant indication of ever-closer relationship be- 
tween the United States and Japan. 

Naturally, there are various problems of 
trade and economy that arise as our trade and 
economic relations between the United States 
and Japan further progress, but our mutual 
understanding, and good will, will undoubtedly 
solve these problems. 

Wliile we recognize the importance of these 
problems that lie between the United States and 
Japan, this meeting has seen discussions of not 
only problems pertaining to trade and economic 
affairs but also discussions of international 
problems pertaining to trade and economy in 
the whole world in which the United States and 
Japan have common interests. We have 
strongly felt the need for furthering our mu- 
tual cooperation, based not only on a bilateral 
basis but on a much wider basis. 

Common enthusiasm was expressed to fur- 
ther our cooperation in order to promote Asia's 
economic and social development for peace and 
stahility in Asia. 

This 3-day meeting between your American 
Secretaries and the Japanese Ministers has seen 
a discussion of a multitude of problems. How- 
ever, as we look at the outcome of the entire 
conference, I am happy to report to you that 

OCTOBER 9, 1967 


throughout the discussions we have constantly 
endeavored to pursue the path toward the 
worldwide stability and prosperity. We have 
also discussed the means — possible means and 
methods of achieving such stability and pros- 
perity for the entire world. I would say through- 
out the conference, during the past 3 days, both 
sides expressed deep interest in achieving such 
goals. The 3-day conference has thus helped to 
deepen mutual luiderstanding between the 
United States and Japan. 

I would attach a specific and special signifi- 
cance to the outcome in this fashion of this 
particular conference. 

This meeting has, also, been conducted under 
the able and competent leadership and chair- 
manship of your Secretary of State, Mr. Dean 
Rusk. All of the Ministers representing the Gov- 
ernment of Japan at this particular conference 
are extremely grateful for the wonderful lead- 
ership which your Secretary of State, Mr. Dean 
Rusk, has shown throughout the conference. 

We also would like to add, at this point, that 
all of the Ministers representing the Govern- 
ment of Japan will certainly look forward to 
our next joint meeting on trade and economic 
affairs, which is to be held in 1968 in Japan. 

Thank you. 

Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much, 
Mr. Miki. 

As a veteran of all six of our joint Cabinet 
meetings, I should like to recall that these meet- 
ings were initiated by the late President Ken- 
nedy and the late Prime Minister Ikeda.* It 
was not intended that these discussions be looked 
upon as formal negotiations for the purpose of 
taking specific decisions on specific points. Those 
are matters which will be dealt with by the 
ministries on both sides in the usual fashion, and 
through the normal channels through which our 
Governments do business. Nonetheless, these 
meetings are a most important opportunity for 
these two great trading partners to come togeth- 
er to look both at bilateral economic relation- 
ships and at the general world economic 

Since our last meeting, last year, there have 
been some very dramatic developments which 
we should recall. 

The Kennedy Round has been completed. 
And Japan and the United States took an active 
and leading part in the successful conclusion of 
those important trade negotiations. 

The Group of Ten has reached agreement on 

the creation of new facilities m reserves to help 
free international trade from the artificial limi- 
tations deriving from the quantity of gold. 

The Asian Development Bank is a Irving in- 
stitution. Japan and the United States each 
contributed 20 percent of its capital stock, and 
each countiy plans to make important resources 
available to the Special Fund of the Asian De- 
velopment Bank in order to stimulate and ex- 
pedite the economic and social development of 
the Asian comitries members of that bank. 

So we have some important steps forward 
that we could report to each other on this 

I would simply add that it is always a privi- 
lege for me to meet with my colleague the For- 
eign Minister and to have a chance in our — what 
we call our counterpart discussions to have a 
broad review of the world situation, and par- 
ticularly the situation in Asia, in order that we 
can understand each other better and work to- 
gether more closely in the great common inter- 
ests which do, in fact, link our two countries. 

Now, gentlemen, we have time for a few ques- 
tions. Since this is a joint press conference, I 
would suggest that we alternate between Japa- 
nese correspondents and all the rest. But, please, 
in asking your questions indicate to whom the 
question is addressed. May I have your 
questions ? 

Q. Secretary Rusk, would you give us your 
reaction, flease, to the proposal of Senator 
[Mike'\ Mansfeld in Japan yesterday — tliat the 
United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union 
should all get together to discuss the questions 
of security and peace? 

Secretary Rusk: Senator Mansfield made it 
clear that he was speaking individually and 
not for the Government. We have the most ex- 
tensive conversations with our friends in Japan 
about common interests in security and other 
problems in the Pacific Ocean area, and of 
course, we are also in touch with the Soviet 
Union on points of agreement or points of dis- 
agreement. "Wliether there is any point in bring- 
ing these three Governments together for com- 
bined talks is something that I have not really 
taken up. So I really don't want to go into that. 
It is a suggestion by the Senator. We will think 
about it. But I am not at all clear that this is 
the way in which these great questions are going 
to be resolved. 

* For background, see ibid., July 10, 1961, p. 57. 



Q. [Inte/yretatioTi] : Mr. Secretary, I would 
like to pose this question at this point. This is in 
relation to the question that has just been raised. 
Senator Mansfield made a statement on the loth 
of this month in Shimoda that he did not believe 
it xoould be difficult, nor would it take much 
time, for the United States to return the Bonin 
Islands to the sovereignty of Japan. I am inter- 
ested, Mr. Secretary, at this point in knowing 
what your thoughts are on this point. 

Secretary Rusk: This was not a subject on 
the agenda of the Cabinet meeting on trade 
and economic affairs. This is a matter which 
Mr. ]\Iiki and I have discussed. We have dis- 
cussed this and sunilar problems in some of our 
earlier meetings. We expect to continue these 
discussions on Saturday, and perhaps while he 
and I are together at the United Nations. This 
is a matter on which our two Governments will 
continue to be in close contact. 

But I would not wish to suggest any conclu- 
sions at this point. Again, Senator Mansfield 
was speaking for himself. 

Q. I wonder 

Secretary Rusk: We must have interpreta- 
tion. [Interpretation followed.] 

Q. [Interpretation]: Mr. Miki, I wonder if 
you, could tell us what you regard as the m.ost 
important problem between Japan and tlie 
United States in the realm of trade and eco- 

Minister Miki [Interpretation} : In response 
to your question, I would like to advance the 
following reply. 

The Government of Japan today is vitally 
interested in the post-Kemiedy Round United 
States trade policies. Since the negotiations 
have now been brought to a successful conclu- 
sion, the Government of Japan sincerely hopes 
that in formulating and implementing the fu- 
ture trade policies vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
the Government of the United States will con- 
tinue to pursue the principles of free and non- 
discrimmatory treatment for the goods that are 
traded among the nations of the world. 

The Government of Japan has show^n a great 
concern over some visible tendencies m the 
United States and among American industry 
toward protectionist movements. In this regard 
the Government of Japan during the course of 
this meeting requested the continued coopera- 
tion of the United States Government in inform- 

ing the American mdustries that protectionist 
movements are not desirable; and especially 
with regard to the products and merchandise 
of the textile and steel industries that are ex- 
ported from the United States we specifically 
requested the understanding and continued co- 
operation on the part of the United States 
Government in curbing and controlling such 
protectionist movements. 

Secretary Rusk: I might add a comment on 
this question, because it involves some of our 
problems here. 

I think our immediate task here is to consoli- 
date gains of the Kennedy Round. Now, I sup- 
pose it's only human that those who benefit from 
the Kennedy Round remain rather satisfied but 
also quiet, while those who feel themselves 
under some disadvantage or some pressure as 
a result of the Kennedy Round will speak with 
a loud voice and will try to enlist action of the 
Congi-ess to revise in some way the conclusions 
of the Kemiedy Round. Our administration 
thinks this would be a great mistake. 

In our relations with Jaj^an, there has been a 
dramatic increase in two-way trade. Two years 
ago, something like four billions ; last year, five 
billions. This year, we are reaching toward six 
billions. So those figures themselves show that a 
great deal is right in the relations between our 
two countries. 

Now, there are some trading problems on 
both sides and we have had very frank discus- 
sions of those problems at this meeting. But it 
is the policy of this country to liberalize inter- 
national trade ; and I would hope that we would 
be able to avoid the mistake of retreating on the 
Kennedy Roimd and find ways to keep the 
channels of international trade continually ex- 
panding, because this would be important to 
our own prosperity, quite apart from the eco- 
nomic interests of other countries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Rusk: We are alternating. 

Q. [Interpretation] : Pd like to pose this 
question to Mr. Secretary. This pertains to the 
question of a possible return of Okinawa to 
Japanese sovereignty. I would like to know if 
it is impossible to return Okinawa to Japanese 
sovereignty, or is there any possibility open 
for such return of Okinatoa to Japanese sov- 
ereignty, now or sometime in the future, under 
certain specific conditions? 

I woidd greatly appreciate your response to 



this question, Mr. Secretary, within tlie context 
of whatever information you feel you can di- 
vulge at this •particular point. 

Secretary Busk: Well, this is a question that 
has to do with the future. We, of course, as you 
know, recognize the residual sovereignty of 
Japan in the Kyukyu Islands. We have kept in 
close touch with our friends in Japan about 
those islands and what is happening there and 
the well-being of the people in those islands for 
a period of some years. 

Now, we are aware of a lively interest in the 
question of possible reversion. These are mat- 
ters which we are discussing between our two 

In diplomacy, we don't use words like "im- 
possible" or "possible"' very often. These are 
mattere of frank and friendly exchanges be- 
tween our two Governments. We have no 
annomicements to make on that subject today. 
If we had such amioimcements, we would make 
them; but we will be in touch with eacli other 
on that matter. I think I cannot give you a more 
specific reply at this point. 

The United States carries very heavy re- 
sponsibilities for security in the Pacific Ocean 
area, not only in our treaty relationship with 
Japan but also with Korea, the Philippmes, the 
Kepublic of China, and with certain countries in 
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. 

So these are matters which I think are well 
imderstood on both sides, and these are matters 
which we will continue to discuss. 

Perhaps we have time for one more question 
on each side. Mr. Hightower [John Hightower, 
Associated Press]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the subjects you 
have been discussing' here, at least in general 
terms, is the state of the war in Viet-Nam and 
the prospects for a diplomatic way out of that 
conflict. There have been in the last day or so 
some reports from Hanoi, including one through 
the Canadian Goveimment, that there was an 
increasing interest in the possibility of discus- 
sions or contacts on peace talks. Can you tell us 
how you assess these reports? 

Secretary Rusk: I have read these reports. I 
would be interested in learning what might be 
behind them, if anything. So far as I know, the 
situation has not changed since my last press 

Q. ^Interpretation'] : Mr. Secretary, usually 
when the gu£stions are asked by the Japanese 
cori'espondents at conferences such as this, we 
oftentimes attempt to deviate from the inain 
current of the discussion. However, at this 
point, Pd like to ask you a specific question 
which is related directly to the contents of the 

I have had the pleasure of reading your com- 
munique, and one of the items that I notice in 
this communique pertains to the paragraph 2 
under section IV. It says that '■^The Committee 
noted that Japan had decided to make a contri- 
bution amounting to $100 million to a Special 
Fund primarily for agriculture to be adminis- 
tered by the Asian Development Bank.'''' 

Noto, it says that '■'■The Committee also noted 
that the President'''' — President Johvson, that 
is — '■'■ intended to request the United States Con- 
gress to authorize a contribution of $200 million 
to Asian Development Ba^tk Special Funds for 
various purposes, including agriculture, over a 
period of four yearsP 

Now, my question is, Mr. Secretary: At what 
specific point is President Johnson likely to 
make such a request to the United States 

Secretary Rusk: I cannot give you an actual 
time on that. We have very important legisla- 
tion before our Congress at the present time. We 
are providing something on the order of $5 bil- 
lion of resources for foreign aid, not only in our 
aid bill but in appropriations for international 
institutions and the Food for Freedom pro- 
gram, the Peace Corps, so that we have to con- 
sult with the leadership of the Congress in order 
to determine just what the legislative schedule 
ought to be. So I can't give you a time. 

But the President has already made it known 
in the state of the Union message and elsewhere 
that he expects to ask the Congress to rein- 
force the Asian Development Bank, which is 
under the leadership of your distinguished 
countryman, Mr. [Takeshi] Watanabe, with 
important funds for this purpose. 

Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for 
being here today. Oh, excuse me. 

Q. [Interpretation'] : Mr. Secretary, nvy ques- 
tion is not entirely fnished at this point — if I 
may have a slight indulgence on their part, may 
I continue my question? 



Secretary Rusk : Yes, please. 

Q. [Interpretatioii] : Thanh you. Mr. Secre- 
tary, if I may he allowed to -pursue my question 
further at this point., getting hack to this ques- 
tion of the possible reversion of Bonin Islands 
to Japanese sovereignty, article 3 of the peace 
treaty says that the people living on the Bonin 
Islands are to he given the same status and treat- 
ment and privileges as the people who reside on 
the Island of Okinawa. Legally, this signifies, 
Mr. Secretary, that they are entitled to similar 
or the same status. My understanding is that 
currently there are 200 persons living on the 
Bonin Islands, £00 people of Japanese 

My question at this point, Mr. Secretary, is 
whether the United States has been and is pro- 
viding the same degree of education, same privi- 
leges of education, welfa7'e, and health? Has the 
United States heen providing similar services in 
these areas to the Japanese nationals living on 
Bonin Islands as it has heen providing for the 
residents of the Okinawa Islands? Also, has 
there heen Japanese language service offered to 
the children of these residents living on the 
Bonin Islands? Has it also heen possible for 
fishermen operating out of this Bonin Island to 
have access to the central fish market in Tokyo? 
[Laughter.] Also, is the tinifed States Govern- 
ment willing, or is the United States Govern- 
ment prepared, to provide such services to the 
residents and their children on the Bonin Islands 
in the future? 

Secretary Rusk: I thought we were havino; 
the second part of a question on the Asian De- 
velopment Bank. [Laughter.] I think in the 
House of Commons when a minister is asked a, 
question that plows new ground to this extent, 

that the minister usually says that he must 
have notice of that question. 

Quite frankly, the answer to some of ^our 
questions, I don't know. But, in any event, we 
will be discussing this lietween Mr. Miki aaid 
myself. I have nothing more to say on this. 

Q. Thank you. 

U.S. Passports Valid for Travel 
to Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen 

Press release 196 dated September 12 

United States passpoiis are now valid, with- 
out special endorsement, for travel to Iraq, 
Jox-dan, and Yemen. United States citizens wish- 
ing to travel to Iraq and Yemen are warned, 
however, that customaiy protection services af- 
forded to United States citizens abroad by con- 
sular officials cannot be provided. 

Travel restrictions remain in effect for two 
countries in the Middle East : the Syrian Arab 
Republic and the United Arab Kepublic. In ac- 
cordance with existing regulations, validations 
for travel to these countries will be gi"anted to 
persons whose travel is regarded as being in the 
interest of the United States. 

This amiouncement is part of the Depart- 
ment's previously declared policy of lifting re- 
strictions to the comitries involved in the recent 
Middle East hostilities as soon as conditions 
warrant. On June 21 the ban on travel to Israel, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia 
was removed; on July 10 the restriction on 
travel to Lebanon was lifted; and on August 1 
the Department announced that travel to 
Algeria, Libya, and the Sudan was permitted. 

OCTOBER 9, 196 7 

277-095 — 67- 



57001 9-67 


A treaty signed April 4, 1949. by which 
"the parties agree that an armed £.ttaclc 
against one or more of thera In Europe 
or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all; and . . . each of 
them . . ■ will assist the . . . attacked by 
taking forthwith, ludtvidually and In 
concert with the other Parties, eucb 
action as it deems necessary Including 
the use of armed force . . ." 


A treaty signed September 2. 1947, which 
provides that an armed attack against 
any American State "shall be considered 
as an attack against all the American 
States and . . . each one . . . undertakes 
to assist In meeting the attack . . ." 






3 BElGltIM 









11 CUBA 







29 PERU 








ANZUS (Australia-New 
Zealand-United States) 

A treaty signed Septem- 
ber 1. 1951. whereby each 
of the parties "recognizes 
that an armed attack In 
the Pacific Area on any of 
the Parties would be dan- 
gerous to its own peac2 
and safety and declares 
that it would act to meet 
the common danger in 
accordance with its con- 
stitutional processes." 






gust A treaty signed Januftry 19, 

i' the 1960, whereby each party "rec- 

E that ognizes that an armed attack 

the against either Party in the terri- 

l T of toriea under the administration 

1 Ian- of Japan would be dangerouis 

n eace to its own peace and safety and 

c each declares that it would act to 

' will meet the commcn danger in ac- 

mon cordance with its constitution si 1 

' ance provisions and processes." The 

t onal treaty replaced the security 

treaty signed September 8. 1951. 




(South Korea) TREATY 

A treaty Elgned October 
I, 1953. whereby each 
party "recognizes that an 
ariaed attack In the Pa- 
cific area on either of the 
Parties . . . would be dan- 
gerous to Its own peacs 
and safety" and that each 
Party "would act to meet 
the common danger In 
accordance with Its con- 
stitutional processes." 




A treaty signed Septem- 
ber 8. 1954. whereby each 
Party "recognizes that 
aggression by means of 
armed attaclc In the 
treaty area against any of 
the Parties . . . would en- 
danger Its own peace and 
safety" and each will "In 
that event act to meet 
the common danger In 
accordance with its con- 
stitutional processes." 





37 AySTRAllA 




OCTOBER 9, 196^ 

(Formosa) TREATY 

A treaty signed Decem- 
ber 2. 1954, whereby each 
of the parties "recognizes 
that an armed attack In 
the West Pacific Area di- 
rected against the terri- 
tories of either of the 
Parties would be danger- 
ous to Its own peace and 
safety." and that each 
"would act to meet the 
conimon danger In ac- 
cordance with Its consti- 
tutional processes." The 
territory of the Republic 
of China Is defined as 
"Taiwan (Formosa) and 
the Pescadores." 



Department Gives Facts Regarding 
Ashmore-Baggs Contacts With Hanoi 

Department Statement 

Press release 202 dated September IS 

We have liad a number of inquiries concern- 
ing news stories published today [September 
18] , based on an article by Mr. Harry Ashmore 
in a publication of the Center for the Study 
of Democratic Institutions (CSDI). 

The facts concerning the Department's con- 
tacts with Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs are as 
follows : 

1. During the summer of 1966, Mr. William 
Baggs told the Department that CSDI was 
planning a major conference in May of 1967 in 
Geneva, to follow up on the first Pacem, in Terris 
meeting held in New York in Febniary of 1965. 
Mr. Baggs disclosed to us efforts that the Center 
was making to invite North Viet-Nam to at- 
tend, and the Department responded sympathet- 
ically to the idea of the conference and to these 
efforts. These initial contacts were with Mr. 
George Ball [then Under Secretary of State] 
and Mr. William Bundy [Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs]. The Presi- 
dent and Secretary Rusk were informed, and 
Mr. Ball was directed to handle contacts with 
Mr. Baggs on behalf of the U.S. Government. 

2. In mid-November and again in early 
December, Mr. Baggs was joined by Mr. Ash- 
more in calls at the Department. In these calls, 
the progress of the conference plans was re- 
viewed, and the two visitors indicated that they 
had a tentative invitation to go to Hanoi, with 
Mr. Luis Quintanilla of Mexico. Messrs. Baggs 
and Ashmore also suggested that, if they were 
able to visit Hanoi, they might be able to con- 
duct useful explorations of Noi-th Vietnamese 
views toward peace. Mr. George Ball having 
then left the Department, the primary respon- 
sibility for these conversations passed to his suc- 
cessor, Mr. [Nicholas deB.] Katzenbach, who 
kept the President and the Secretary of State 
informed as a matter of 

In these conversations. Department represent- 
atives accepted the Baggs- Aslimore suggestion 
and undertook to cooperate fully. Accordingly, 
the position of the United States Government 
on key issues relating to peace was discussed 
at some length, so that Baggs and Ashmore 
could represent it accurately in Hanoi. 


3. On December 23, Baggs visited the Depart- 
ment just prior to the departure of the three- 
man group on December 28. At that meeting, 
the basic understanding of the United States 
Government position was reaffirmed, and it was 
further agreed that Baggs and Ashmore would 
report confidentially what they were able to pick 
up in Hanoi. 

4. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore visited Hanoi 
from January 6 to January 14. They then re- 
turned to the United States and on January 18 
dictated for the Department a full and con- 
fidential account of their conversations. This 
covered in particular a conversation with Presi- 
dent Ho on January 12. In this conversation. 
Ho had insisted that there could be no talks 
between the United States and Hanoi unless the 
bombing were stopped, and unless also the 
United States stopped all reinforcements during 
the period of the talks. Ho was reported to be 
adamant against any reciprocal military re- 
straint by North Viet-Nam. The record does not 
show that he solicited any U.S. Government re- 
sponse to these remarks. 

5. Concurrently, prior to Januai-y 18, on 
United States initiative and without any connec- 
tion to the Baggs-Ashmore actions, United 
States Govermnent representatives had estab- 
lished a direct channel for coirununication with 
North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow. 
With the apparent agreement of both sides, this 
channel was being kept wholly confidential, and 
was therefore not revealed to Messrs. Baggs and 
Ashmore in their discussions at the Department. 
It is, of course, fundamental to the United 
States Government dealings with Messrs. Baggs 
and Ashmore that there existed at the time this 
direct and secret channel. Exchanges through 
this direct channel continued through Janu- 
ary and early February and culminated in Presi- 
dent Johnson's letter to President Ho of Febru- 
ary 8 ^ (mistakenly stated by Mr. Ashmore as 
February 2). As has been stated by representa- 
tives of the Department, a wide variety of pro- 
posals was put before Hanoi in these Moscow 
contacts, witliout at any time producing anj' 
useful response. 

6. Toward the end of January, Messi-s. Baggs 
and Ashmore refunded to Washington and ex- 
pressed to the Department the strong hope that 
they could be given a message for transmission 

' For texts of President Johnson's letter and Presi- 
dent Ho"s reply, see Bulletin of Apr. 30, 1067. p. 595. 


to Hanoi. Tlie Department decided tliat, while 
the direct channel in Moscow was crucial and 
must at all costs be preserved, it would be use- 
ful to send a more general message through 
Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore, which would be 
consistent with the important messages being 
exchanged in Moscow. In view of this channel 
(of which Baggs-Ashmore were unaware) there 
was some question as to the further utility of 
detailed informal communications. It seemed 
clear from the account given by Messrs. Baggs 
and Ashmore that their chamiel of communi- 
cation had been established with the primary 
purpose of exchanges concerning North Viet- 
namese attendance at the May conference. 
Nevertheless, Baggs and Ashmore said they 
could send any messages for Hanoi through the 
regular mail to a North Vietnamese representa- 
tive in Phnom Penh, who in turn would relay it 
to a North Vietnamese official who had been tlie 
principal contact of Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore 
in Hanoi. Accordingly, the letter now published 
by Mr. Ashmore was worked out with the repre- 
sentatives of the Department, and authorized 
to be sent on February 5. We were subsequently 
informed by Mr. Aslunore that this letter 
reached Phnom Penh on February 15. 

7. No useful i3urix)se could be served by giv- 
ing further details on what took place in the 
Moscow chaimel. We can say, however, that on 
February 7, while that channel was still open 
and in operation, separate discussions were ini- 
tiated in London between Prime Minister Wil- 
son and Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. The 
combined reading of the Moscow channel and of 
these discussions led to the dispatch on Febna- 
ary 8 of President Johnson's letter to President 
Ho. This letter was of course published uni- 
laterally by Hanoi on March 21, and is a matter 
of public record. It rested on, and was of coui'se 
read by Hanoi in relation to, the various pro- 
posals that had been conveyed in the iloscow 

chamiel. There was no change of basic position 
whatever between February 5 and February 8, 
but President Jolinson's letter did include a spe- 
cific action proposal that speaks for itself, as 
does the tone of his communication. 

8. As already noted, Hanoi had not responded 
in any viseful way to the variety of suggestions 
conveyed in the Moscow channel. Its sole and 
apparently fuial response was reflected on Feb- 
ruary 13, m a letter by President Ho to Pope 
Paul VI. This letter, in the words of one press 
account today, "coupled an unconditional end 
to the bombing with the withdrawal of Ameri- 
can forces and the recognition of the National 
Liberation Front." On February 15, President 
Ho replied formally to the President in similar 
terms. At the same time, Hanoi broke off the 
Moscow channel. 

9. Hanoi's attitude remained negative 
throughout. The Baggs-Ashmore efforts were 
necessarily handled by the Department with an 
eye to the direct and then-confidential channel 
that existed concurrently to Hanoi. The latter 
appeared to be by far the more reliable and 
secure method of ascertaining Hanoi's views. 

10. Finally, we note with regret that Mr. Ash- 
more is apparently ignorant of the subsequently 
published reports of the Moscow contacts, and 
of their confirmation by Department representa- 
tives. We note with still greater regret that at 
no time since has he consulted with the Depart- 
ment in order to attempt to understand the inter- 
relationship that necessarily obtained between 
the Moscow channel and his own eiforts. As 
this case shows, the administration has been 
prepared at all times to cooperate with private 
individuals who may be in contact with Hanoi 
in any way, and who are prepared to act respon- 
sibly and discreetly. This policy continues, al- 
though it seems clear that the present disclosure 
will not reassure Hanoi that such private con- 
tacts will be kept secret. 

OCTOBER 9, 1967 


Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam 
in Interview on "Meet the Press" 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Ambassador at Large Henry Cabot Lodge 
on the National Broadcasting Com,yany''s radio 
and television program '■''Meet the Press" on 
Septeniber 17. Interviewing Ambassador Lodge 
were Pauline Frederick.^ NBC News; Robert 
Kleiman, New York Times; Peter Lisagor, 
Chicago Daily News; and Lawrence Spivak, a 
permanent member of the panel. Neil Boggs, 
NBC News, was the moderator. 

Mr. Boggs: Our guest today on "Meet the 
Press" is Henry Cabot Lodge, who served two 
tours as the U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam and 
is now Ambassador at Large. . . . 

Mr. Spivak: Ambassador Lodge, there are an 
increasing number of Americans who are in dis- 
agreement witli the President on Viet-Nam. Are 
you still in basic complete agreement with him 
on his policy in Viet-Nam? 

Ambassador Lodge : I completely support his 
policy of warding off the aggi-ession and doing 
it in such a way as to avoid world war III. 

Mr. Spivak: Does that mean that there are 
some things that you are in disagreement with 
him on, but the basic — 

Ambassador Lodge: I agree on the basic 
policy. It is not human to expect complete agree- 
ment on every detail of tactics and strategy. You 
could only get that in a police state. 

Mr. Spivak : Nothing, however, that is funda- 
mental ? 

Ambassador Lodge: No. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, Secretary- 
General Thant expressed the opinion again yes- 
terday that if the U.S. stops the bombing of 
North Viet-Nam- — and these were his words — 
"there will be meaningful talks between Hanoi 
and Washington in 3 or 4 weeks." Don't you 
think the time has come to accept that assur- 

Ambassador Lodge: I would like to say two 
things in reply to that question. First of all, the 
bombing of the North is of very great impor- 
tance to our soldiers, with whom, of course, all 


of us must feel ourselves very closely identified. 
The bombing of the North means that 175,000 
North Vietnamese are devoted to air defense — 
antiaircraft, artillery and rockets — that another 
325,000 North Vietnamese are devoted to re- 
pairing bridges and roads. This is 500,000 men. 
If those 500,000 men, because of the stopping 
of the bombing, were to be put into North Viet- 
Nam, it would have a very tragic effect on our 
soldiers. I have heard figures as high as 20,000 
as the American casualties that would be caused. 
Now that is one point. 

The second pouit is that of course nobody 
stands to gain more than our American soldiers 
if we can get peace. Therefore the question is : 
If, in return for stoppiiig this program which 
is of such great value to our troops, we can get 
some significant, some meaningful, some solid 
indication that peace will result, then of course 
that would be very much worth looking at. 
Frankly, I don't think such an indication has 
yet occurred. 

Mr. Spivak : I am not talking about a perma- 
nent stoppage, I am just talking about stopping ,1 
for a while to see if what Kosygin has said and 'i 
what U Thant has said will come true and that i 
there will be meaningful negotiations. What f 
possible risk do we take if we stop the bombing i 
for a little while again ? | 

Ambassador Lodge: We take the risk that the f 
hostile activities of the enemy against our troops | 
will increase and that they will move and get 
themselves into favorable positions as they have 
done on other occasions when the bombing has 
been suspended. We suspended the bombing for 
37 days when I was out there in January '66. 
They just took advantage of the pause to move 
themselves into advantageous positions. Now, 
that is just no good. 

Mr. Spivak : At one time you were reported as 
believing that negotiations could not be under- 
taken until the political situation in South Viet- 
Nani is stronger. Do you think that the recent 
election makes the political situation in South 
Viet-Nam strong enough to undertake — 


Ambassador Lodge: I think it does make it 
stronger, and I think it means that we are on 
the way to getting a govenmient the legitimacy 
of which cannot be questioned and which can 
speak with much greater authority in interna- 
tional affaire than the provisional government 

Basis for Negotiations 

Mr. Spivak: If you don't think we are going 
to get a negotiation by stopping tlie bombing, 
how are we going to get negotiations ? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, there are many 
things that could cause them to conclude that 
this aggression of theirs hasn't worked out and 
that it would be advantageous to them to stop 
it. One thing which could make them think 
that is if we and the South Vietnamese learned 
how to overcome the guerrilla terrorist, the 
hard-core guerrilla, what Ho Chi Minli calls the 
"guerrilla infrastructure." That is one thing. 

Another thing would be if they were really 
persuaded that their propaganda doesn't work 
in America and that American will and persist- 
ence were beyond question. 

Mr. Spivak: Everybody has been talking 
about the importance of negotiations to bring 
peace to Viet-Nam, but not much on what to 
negotiate on. Now, what would we negotiate on, 
since all we want is to have them stop the aggres- 
sion ? What is there to negotiate ? 

Ambassador Lodge: Let me say one thing I 
should have said at the beginning and that is 
that I recognize this is a very controversial 
question, and I respect those who differ with 
me. The thing that you would negotiate about 
would be how to end the war. But in order to 
do that, both sides must want to end it. Now, 
at present we want to end the war — we want 
peace and they want conquest. This isn't a ques- 
tion of a misunderstanding that needs to be 
elucidated by a third party. They want funda- 
mentally different things from us. Now, their 
state of mind has got to change before you can 
have negotiations. 

Mr. Kleiman: Ambassador Lodge, you have 
probably noticed this morning that General 
Lauris Norstad has proposed a plan for ending 
the war in Viet-Nam. His suggestion is that the 
bombing be stopped without setting a iime limit 
on how long it would be suspended and that the 
President go to Geneva, announcing beforehand 
that he was prepared to meet there with anyone 
who wanted to come to discuss peace ; and the 

suggestion was that he send emissaries on ahead 
who would be jjrepared to have preliminary 
meetings, determine an agenda, and try to ar- 
range a peace conference. What do you think of 
this proposal? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, I just said what I 
thought about bombing suspension; so I won't 
duplicate that. I have great admiration and re- 
gard for General Norstad, and any idea of his I 
would want to study very carefully. Beyond 
that, I can't say. I haven't had an opportunity to 
study it yet. 

Mr. Kleiman: The interesting tiling — and on 
this I would like to ask you further about the 
bombing suspension that General Norstad pro- 
poses. As you know, he was an Air Force com- 
mander in the Pacific and in Europe during the 
last war. He was the Supreme Commander of 
the NATO alliance in Europe for many years. 
He was an appointee of General Eisenhower's. 
Secretary McNamara has also in recent days, 
as you know, stated that the bombing can neither 
reduce the infiltration to the South nor can it 
bring Hanoi to the conference table to sue for 
peace. He has pointed out tliat only a few trucks 
per day carry all the supplies that North Viet- 
Nam sends to the South and they have been able 
to increase this manyfold under the bombing. 

In these circumstances, isn't it really a psycho- 
logical question rather than something that 
really atfeots casualty levels among American 
troops in the South? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, if the bombing is 
keeping 500,000 North Vietnamese out of South 
Viet-Nam where our troops don't have to cope 
with them, that is a definite gain for our troops, 
and that shouldn't be given up without some 
kind of a solid assurance of peace. 

I agree with you that the problem is very 
largely psychological, too, and it is a question of 
getting four or five men in Hanoi to make up 
their minds to stop what they are doing. I don't 
disagree with anything that Secretary McNa- 
mara said in that regard, but what I said doesn't 
contradict what he said. 

Mr. Lisagor: Ambassador Lodge, there have 
been stories, apparently administration-inspired 
stories, in the last week that we are doing re- 
markably well in Viet-Nam, that the South 
Vietnamese and the Allied forces are controlling 
more of the population, that the Viet Cong de- 
fections are up, and so on. In fact, the suggestion 
is that they are just hanging on. Do you agree 
with that? 

Ambassador Lodge : I think we are doing bet- 

OCTOBEE 9, 1967 


ter than we were. I think there has been a very 
great gain covering the period beginning in 
August of '65 wlien I went out there for my 
second tour. At that time wc used to worry about 
the country being cut in two at Highway 19. We 
don't worry about it. We used to worry about 
the Couununists taking a provincial capital and 
establishing a Conmiunist government center 
there. We never thmk about that. We used to 
worry about a wildcat runaway inflation where 
people wouldn't have enough to eat. We don't 
think about that. AVe used to wori-y about the 
Communist coup taking over the Govermnent 
from the inside and telling us to get out. We 
don't worry about that. 

On the positive side, the country has moved 
toward constitutional government. The Chieu 
Hoi rate — that is, the defectors from the Viet 
Cong who come into these camps — was double in 
'66 what it was in '65, and it is double in '67 what 
it was in 'CO. The Viet Cong weapons loss is up. 
The ARVN [Army of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam] desertions are down. The open roads are 
up. The secure population is up. 

Mr. Lisagor: Yet, Mr. Ambassador, we are 

Ambassador Lodge: In other words — Just a 
moment; let me finish. You asked me a big 
question, and I have got to give you a big 

So we have accomplished a great deal, and 
there is still a great deal more to accomplish. 

Mr. Lisagw: I was going to ask you: The 
casualties go up for the Americans as well as the 
South Vietnamese, and the war still goes on. 
Do you have any estimate at all of how long it 
will be before the Viet Cong and Hanoi get the 
message ? 

Amiassador Lodge: The thing that is going 
wrong is — I have listed the things that are 
going right — the things that are going wrong 
are that the infiltration still continues and that 
the hard-core terrorists still are assassinating 
village chiefs, schoolteachers, health workers, 
and so on. I have considerable faith that, as we 
get nation-building well organized, these in- 
filtraters will be picked up — in the best place 
to catch them of all, and that is in the com- 
munity, when you have solid political institu- 
tions under which a police program can be con- 
ducted. I think that is coming. 

3Ir. L'lmgor: You have often said that 
the tough jjroblem will be the guerrilla 

Ambassador Lodge: Yes. 


Mr. Lisagor: I assume that is what you mean, 
there. Now, we have heard it said, and you may 
have heard it said yourself, that the South 
Vietnamese themselves will have to do this. And 
yet there are stories today in the paper — an 
Associated Press story that says South Viet- 
namese troops are on a 5i^-day week, that they 
won't fight at night, still. Are we making any 
headway at all? 

Ambassador Lodge: Now, the man who said 
that is in flat contradiction with the opinion of 
a very distinguished American, who is also a 
general and is also very truthful and who has 
a whole staff all over the counti-y on which to 
base his judgments — and that is General [Wil 
liam C] Westmoreland. He disagrees flatly with 
that story. 

I'd like to remind you that at this correspond- 
ing time in the Korean war, the Korean Army 
had many problems and yet it turned out to 
be, today, one of the finest armies in the world. 

Also, I remember at least 50 occasions when 
the young West Point-graduate captains in our 
army who advised the Vietnamese battalions 
have told me that the Vietnamese soldier is ai 
brave, long-suffering man, but the trouble is 
that the organization isn't right. If the organiza- 
tion had been right, this Viet Cong tiling would' 
never have gotten started. So I don't take that 
story very seriously. 

Military Shield for Nation-Building 

Miss Frederick : Ambassador Lodge, does the 
United States want a militarv victoi-y in Viet- 

Ambassador Lodge : You can't solve the Viet- 
Nam war exclusi^'ely by military means. You 
must have military success as a shield behind! 
which you do your nation-building. 

Miss Frederick : In other words, you — 

Amhassador Lodge: This is different from 
World War II in which when you defeated the 
German Army the war was over. In this war you ' 
defeat the Army of North Viet-Nam and the 
main forces of the Viet Cong, and you still must 
go ahead and ferret out the hard-core terrorists. 

Miss Frederick : How do you defeat this army 
only by killing Vietnamese and not necessarily 
taking real estate ? ] 

Ambassador Lodge: They are killing Viet-| 
namese. I 

Miss Frederick: But you are killing — | 

Ambassador Lodge: We are killing Viet" 
Cong, yes. We are killing Viet Cong. 


Miss Frederick : Isn't this the basis of — 

Ambassador Lodge : I have the latest figures : 
It is a nine-to-one ratio. 

Miss Frederick : But isn't this the basis of our 
progress, of our reports on progress, not the 
taking of real estate, and how can you have a 
victory when there is still such great manpower 
in Viet-Nam still not in — 

Ambassador Lodge: Because the land in the 
war in Viet-Nam is comparable to the ocean in 
naval war. It is something you move aroimd on, 
but it is not something which is intrinsically 
important as such, the way land was in Europe 
in World War II. "^^Hiat you are trying to do 
is to build your nation around the jDopulation 

Mi«s Frederick: Secretary-General Thant 
spoke yesterday of information about an agree- 
ment between Hanoi and some of its friends for 
supplying voluntai'y air crews, pilots, gunners, 
and engineers to North Viet-Nam. Can you tell 
us anything about that ? 

Amiassculor Lodge: We know nothing of 
that, and we haven't found any persoimel other 
than North Vietnamese. 

Miss Frederick: Mr. Ambassador, if the 
United States does not know anything about 
this, how can we be absolutely sure that the 
United States knows that Communist China 
will not come into the war when we are bombing 
within seconds of the border ? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, they have 40,000 
Commimist Chmese in North Viet-Nam, now — 
line-of -communication troops that have been 
there right along. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ajnbassador, Governor 
Koimiey was reported as saying the other day 
that the Republican Party will be the peace 
party in 1968 if the Viet-Nam war is still in 
progress. Do you think it is possible for the 
Republican Party to carve out a role as the 
peace party in opposition to the jjosition — - 

Ambassador Lodge: I would rather discuss 
that question without going into personalities. 
I think everybody is for peace. Both parties are 
for peace. All of the responsible officials that I 
know of are for peace. The difference of opin- 
ion is in how to get it. 

Mr. Spivak: Well, do you think it is possible 
to get out of Viet-Nam both with honor and 
speed ? 

Ambassador Lodge: I don't think "speed" in 
the American sense. Now, speed in the Viet- 
namese sense — you have seen an illustration of 
it in the way they moved toward a constitution. 

They held elections in September '66 for dele- 
gates, they drafted the constitution, and then 
on September 3, '67, they had elections. Now that 
is going very fast for Viet-Nam. As a matter 
of fact, that is going pretty fast here in this 

There is a limit to how fast a country with 
these antecedents, with this kind of a past, can 
go. If you try to huriy them too much, it is like 
tightening the fanbelt on an automobile engine. 
If you tighten it too much, the thing just spins 
around and there is no traction. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, you occupied 
an important position in the Republican Party 
and for many years you have played a significant 
role in Viet-Nam. What position would you like 
to see the Republican Party take in 1968 on the 
iasue of Viet-Nam? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, I think the Re- 
publicans in Congress have in general taken a 
very good, very patriotic attitude — ■ 

Mr. Spivak: Which Republicans ? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, you might ask me 
which Democrats, as far as that goes. I am not 
going to go into personalities. But this is a ques- 
tion which transcends party politics. Party 
politics are very important and the two-party 
system is a great thing, but when young Ameri- 
cans are in combat, then it ceases to be a Re- 
publican-Democratic question. World War II 
wasn't a Republican-Democratic question, and 
neither is this war. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, have you to 
date made any commitment to any Republican 
for the 1968 nomination ? 

Ambassador Lodge: No, sir. 

Mr. Spivak: Would you get into the cam- 
paign if a Republican took a position on 

A77ibassador Lodge: For the nomination — I 
don't plan to get into the campaign for the 

Mr. Spivak: Suppose the issue of Viet-Nam 
became an important one. 

Ambassador Lodge: I am an American citi- 
zen who has a right to express his opinion. I 
intend to exercise that right if it becomes 

Mr. Kleiman: Mr. Ambassador, Governor 
Romney said when he was in Viet-Nam some 
years ago he was brainwashed by yourself and 
by General Westmoreland. Can you tell us any- 
thing about that ? 

Ambassador Lodge: AVell, Mr. Kleiman, in 
Viet-Nam we briefed several hundred distin- 

OCTOBER 9, 19G- 


guished Americans. Governors, Senators, ad- 
mirals, generals, Cabinet oiScers, subcabinet, 
foreign statesmen, and many distinguished 
journalists like yourself. And it was always 
entirely factual. And these briefings were done 
under my overall direction. We presented the 
facts. We didn't argue. We didn't harangue ; we 
didn't try to persuade, and we let the person 
being briefed draw his own conclusions. There 
was never any brainwashing of anybody by 

Mr. Kleiman: We know that there are now 
300,000, approximately, Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam. Yet 
when the American military activities began 
6 years ago, there only were, as I believe official 
reports indicate, some 12 or 14 thousand Viet 
Cong. Do you think we can reduce the Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese forces back to that level 
of 12 or 14 thousand, and if we do so, will we be 
in any better position than we were in in 1961 
when we felt we had to intervene ? 

Afniassador Lodge : The big change that has 
taken place is that the South Vietnamese Viet 
Cong, who a year and a half ago were carrying 
80 percent of the load of combat, are now carry- 
ing something between 40 and 50 percent and 
that the main load of combat is now being 
carried by the North Vietnamese troops who 
have come in as overt aggressors. That is the big 
change. I think there isn't any doubt that we can 
overcome the main-force units and the main 
units of the Army of North Viet-Nam whenever 
we can find them. The problem is still the terror- 
ist, and I think we are better organized on that 
than we ever have been, and I expect to see real 
progress on that. 

Mr. Kleiman: But the Government figures, as 
I understand them, are that there are 50,000 
North Vietnamese troops and 250,000 Viet 
Cong, which is roughly 20 times the force they 
had in '62. 

A7nbassador Lodge: And yet 250,000 South 
Vietnamese Viet Cong today are only carrying 
40 percent of the load of combat. That gives you 
some idea of what has happened. 

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Ambassador, on the bomb- 
ing in the North, would you favor hitting other 
targets such as the dikes, which would make a 
shambles of the North Viet-Nam economy, as I 
understand it ? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, I have never 
thought that would be a good thing to do. I have 

favored military targets, lines of communica- 
tion, that sort of thing, as support for our 
troops. I don't believe escalating the bombing 
is going to produce very sensational results, nor 
do I think diminishing the bombing is going to 
produce very sensational results so far as peace 
is concerned. I think they do have a great effect 
on our infantry and our soldiers in South 

Mr. Lisagor: One of the key issues on the is Haiphong Harbor. Now, that is a 
transport, it is a center of supply. Would you 
favor closing off Haiphong Harbor ? 

Ajnbassador Lodge: That involves making a 
judgment on the effect that that would have on 
a worldwide scale, and that is a judgment that 
I don't feel competent to make. I assume — and 
I have every reason to believe — that it is being 
intelligently done. 

3Ir. Lisagor: Wlien you were still Ambas- 
sador, you thought that the Viet Cong would 
hold on at least until after the congressional 
elections of 1966 to see how those turned out. 
Now do you believe they will hold on until after 
the presidential elections of 1968 to see how that 
turns out in the hopes they might get a better 
deal out of it ? 

Ambassador Lodge: I think they would like 
to if they could, yes. 

Viet-Nam and the United Nations 

Miss Frederick: Mr. Ambassador, when you 
were head of the United States delegation to the 
United Nations, as a member of the Cabinet 
you advised President Eisenhower to make great 
use of his moral leadership by coming to the 
United Nations. Do you think it might be useful 
for President Jolmson to come to the United 
Nations, particularly to explain the Viet-Nam 
policy which, as you know, is not very popular 
at the U.N. ? 

Amha.ssador Lodge: Well, I have been away 
from the U.N. for so long that I hesitate to ex- 
press an opinion about that. When I was ad- 
vising President Eisenhower to come, I was 
there every day, as you know, and I was in 
close touch with everybody, and on a question 
of that kind I would rather get Ambassador 
Goldberg's opinion. 

Miss Frederick: Have you lost faith in the 
U.N., or do you think Viet-Nam would be 
pretty difficult to explain there ? 



Ambassador Lodge: I don't think Viet-Nam 
is difficult to explain anywhere. I believe our 
policy in Viet-Nam is morally right; I think 
it is legally sound; I think it is sagacious and 
prudent. I tliink it is in our own national in- 
terests and in the interests of freedom-loving 
people everywhere. So I am not afraid to ex- 
plain the policy in Viet-Nam on any platform. 

Miss Frederick : The United Nations Charter 
pledges all members to settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means. Now, when you 
were there, you know the Suez war occurred, 
and you were very active in trying to prevent 
the use of force, and this has been true in many 
other areas — Kaslunir, Cj'prus, and so on. 

How do you justify one of the most powerful, 
if not the most powerful, member of the United 
Nations using force in Viet-Nam when it has 
this other attitude — • 

Ambassador Lodge: Because the Charter of 
the United Nations contains a provision with 
which I am sure you are familiar, and that is the 
suppression of aggression; and that is a word 
I don't hear coming out of the United Nations 
much these days. 

Now, what we are trying to do is suppress 
aggression in accordance with the charter, and I 
can remember World War I and World War II, 
when people said it is international anarchy, 
we have got to get some kind of a peace organi- 
zation that is going to put down aggression; 
and now people would have you believe that it 
only applies to aggression when it is transat- 
lantic and it doesn't apply to aggression when it 
is transpacific. When they wrote the charter, 
they didn't exclude the coimtries on the trans- 

Miss Frederick : But the United Nations has 
never called this aggression, and besides the 
tenn "aggression" has never been defined legally. 

Amhassador Lodge: Well, the United Na- 
tions has never enacted the Ten Commandments, 
but that doesn't mean the Ten Commandments 
don't apply. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, you, as you 
said, had a long experience in the United Na- 
tions. Do you think the United Nations can play 
any useful role in bringing peace to Viet-Nam ? 

Ambassador Lodge : Oh, it could if it wanted 
to. I would like to see them undertake the re- 
sponsibility for the whole thing, but there hasn't 
been the will there to do it, and when there isn't 
the will then they haven't got the tools. If they 
had the will, they might get the tools ; but there 
isn't the will. 

Mr. Spivak: Is there no way of bringing it 
before the General Assembly ? 

Ambassador Lodge: Oh, I suppose there is, 
and there is a way to bring it before the Secu- 
rity Council, but— 

Mr. Spivak : Do you think that — • 

Ambassador Lodge: But you know very well 
that the Soviet Union and the countries that 
follow the lead of the Soviet Union would 
exercise — probably exercise — the veto. 

Mr. Spivak : Do you think the United States 
would be ready to leave the whole issue to the 
United Nations ? 

Ambassador Lodge: If the United Nations 
had the muscle and had the will to cope with 
it, I think it would be a fine thing. 

Mr. Spivak: You think they would let them 
make the decision on the whole business? 

Ambassador Lodge: I think it would be a fine 
thing if the United Nations were able and will- 
ing to take this responsibility, which is in com- 
plete harmony with the charter. 

Mr. Boggs: I am soiTy to interrujit but our 
time is up. Thank you. Ambassador Lodge, for 
being with us today on "Meet the Press." 

OCTOBER 9, 19G7 


The Business of Development 

iy Covey T. Oliver 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ^ 

I am delighted to have this opportunity to 
pay tribute to a figure of rising eminence and 
growing importance in this hemisphere: the 
modern business leader, as represented in this 
room and every day increasingly in the develop- 
ing countries of the Western Hemisphere. 

You who have done business in Latin Ameri- 
ca for years know far l^etter than I tlie history — 
and the potential — of U.S. investments and 
partnei'ships among our neighboring nations to 
the south. We all recognize that our private- 
sector relationships have been generally of mu- 
tual benefit — providing needed capital, jobs, 
and benefits to many thousands of workers, as 
well as returning profits to the investor and aid- 
ing the transfer of modern managerial skills to 
Latin Americans. 

But we recognize with equal clarity that, fair 
or not, even today many Latin Americans still 
associate foreign investment with such concepts 
as "exploitation" or "imperialism," rather than 
partnership or local benefit. The Council for 
Latin America recognizes this problem and is 
doing something about it. 

So in representation of our Government, I 
salute the prototype American businessman of 
today and tomorrow, who is proving to the 
world that good corporate citizenship and real 
service to the local community and to the host 
country are not only moral obligations but good 
business as well. And because this modern style 
of doing business abroad is a growing phe- 
nomenon, especially in Latin America, I believe 
that private capital — so necessary for develop- 
ment — will be increasingly welcome in our 
neighbor nations. 

"Wliat happens in Latin America during the 
next few years will be crucial to all of us — in 

government, in business, in whatever walk of 
life. I should like to take the next few minutes 
to review with you the scene in our hemisphere 
today, as we begin the seventh year of the Alli- 
ance for Progress, and to oiler some comments 
as to the future. 

Already, 1967 has been a notable year in 
inter-American affairs. The most significant 
single event, of course, was the Summit Meeting 
of American Presidents at Punta del Este in 

Wliy so significant? For at least two main 
reasons: First, because thanks to thorough 
preparation, the Presidents made decisions and 
recommendations that unquestionably changed 
the course of development in this hemisphere. 
And secondly, it was especially important be- 
cause at that meeting the fundamental spirit of 
the Alliance came into its own: the spirit of 

Self-help is known to be basic — psychologi- 
cally, politically, and economically — to develop- 
ment assistance. At the Summit there was 
strong new evidence of the recognition by the 
Latin American leaders that the future of their 
peoples lies primarily in Latin American 
hands. This is not mere rhetoric; this self-help 
determination is real — and the attitudes it 
symbolizes, the potential for motivation it con- 
tains, are more significant than any figures I 
could cite to you today. 

The next question is, "What progress has 
been made since the Summit ?" 

Here in the United States, we have seen some 
gains and some setbacks. The President already 
is making good his promises made to colleagues 
at the Summit that lie within Executive author- 

' Adflress mafle before the Council for Latin America 
at Chicago, 111., on Sept. 13 (press release 19.o). 

■ For statements by President Johnson and text of 
the Declaration of the Presidents of America, see 
Bulletin of May 8, 1967, p. 706. 



ity. Where feasible, under existing legislative 
authority, we have sought to increase Alliance 
for Progress programs in agriculture, science 
and technology, education, and health. The 
Congi-ess has granted the President's request for 
20 percent higher support to the Inter- American 
Development Bank, from $250 to $300 million 
a year for 3 years. At the same time, Latin 
American contributions to the Bank have been 
stepped up even more significantly. 

Despite these positive developments, the 
recent cuts made by both the Senate and the 
House in the foreign aid bill "hit" (as headline 
writers put it) the Alliance for Progress, 
though Alliance programs were not cut so much 
as other assistance programs. There contmues 
to be widespread public support especially for 
the Alliance, as is shown by editorials I have 
seen from across the nation. One can readily 
understand the mood for economy of the Con- 
gress, concerned as they have to be by expendi- 
tures for our country's obligations abroad and 
at home. But I believe that the enduring qual- 
ity of the foreign aid program, and particularly 
the Alliance for Progress, will over time con- 
tinue to be recognized by our citizenry; and I 
am hopeful that in the appropriation stage of 
legislation this year the program might be 
spared further cuts. 

Tliere are a few in this country — and, alas, 
more in Latin America — who say that these con- 
gressional actions represent a kind of national 
pulling-back, a neoisolationism. I doubt this. 
And if you will pardon a somewhat professorial 
afterthought, let me point out that even in its 
heyday the old isolationism did not apply to 
our Western Hemisphere neighborhood. 

So we who believe in the Alliance for Prog- 
ress have only one course : As the President said 
the other day, "We will persevere." ^ We will 
keep on trying, because we know the Alliance is 
in the vital interests of this nation and of the 
whole neighborhood. 

^Vhile these cuts in U.S. funding have hurt, 
their greatest damage is perhaps to the spirit, 
rather than to the achievements, of the Alliance. 
To many thoughtful Latin Americans, for ex- 
ample, the rescission of the multiyear authori- 
zation is seen as more damaging than the loss of 
assistance funds. Knowing that authorizations 
do not automatically bring appropriations — - 

' For remarks by President Johnson at the Pan 
American Union, Washington, D.C., on Aug. 17, see 
ma., Sept. 4, 1967, p. 2S7. 

how well that is known ! — they ask "Why ?" For 
they know that progress within the Alliance de- 
pends not so much upon outside tangible assist- 
ance as upon the confidence and verve of Latin 
Americans themselves. 

As to self-help, our friends in the south have 
made a good record and it is getting better. Let 
me give you two examples : 

One is in domestic savings. At the birth of the 
Alliance, it was expected that some 80 percent 
of total gross of some $20 billion investment 
would have to come from Latin American do- 
mestic savings. In fact, they have bettered 
this — at 87 percent. The second example con- 
cerns improved collection of taxes: Total cen- 
tral government revenues have risen by about 25 
percent in real terms since the beginning of the 

Trade and Development 

Another milestone of Latin American action 
since the Summit was the meeting in Paraguay 
about 2 weeks ago of the Latin American Free 
Trade Association and the Central American 
Common Market. 

"Latin America will create a common mar- 
ket," reads the first item in the Declaration of 
the Presidents at Punta del Este ; and these men 
were meeting in Paraguay to come to grips with 
the problems of economic integration. They 
made important decisions to form a subregional 
market of the west coast countries, and they 
took stock of the obstacles to integration which 
they will meet again soon to reexamine. 

We can look back to the experience of the 
European Economic Community and recall the 
time it took, and is still taking, the advanced 
Western European countries to work out ar- 
rangements for wider new markets. We know 
that the process of adjustment to Latin Ameri- 
can economic integi-ation will not be quick or 
easy. We are encouraged by these first, realistic 
steps being taken with detennination by our 
Latin American friends toward establishing a 
common market by 1985. 

Wliere does the United States stand in this 
undertaking? We are an interested observer, 
ready to do what we can to help. We wish to see 
an economically strong, increasingly independ- 
ent neighbor in Latin America as a region. As 
discussions at Punta del Este show, we wish to 
see increased trade among the Latin American 
countries, as well as between them and the 
United States. We have urged more effective 


trade promotion toward this end. The benefits 
of increased and diversified trade are unques- 
tionable. Sometimes, however, we see statements 
that "trade not aid" is the key to development. 
In this context we must look at trade in another 

In the first place, the items that underdevel- 
oped countries have to trade are not in all in- 
stances sufficient in terms of attractiveness to 
the world market to guarantee that more liberal 
terms for their trading would automatically 
bring in all that such a country needs to give its 
people better lives. 

Secondly, development is not only economic. 
It is social and distributive as well ; and in look- 
ing over the world scene it is not difficult to find 
situations in which exports are flourishing with- 
out there being much more than a too slow 
trickle-down of benefits within. Development 
means not only increased capital, including espe- 
cially private capital from domestic and world 
savings; it means modernization, reform, and 
social improvement as well, as the Charter of 
Punta del Este well shows. 

But with the above perspective taken into ac- 
count, trade is vital. 

The question of trade preferences is one of 
special interest to our Latin American friends. 
Until recently, the United States has tradition- 
ally opposed preferences of any kind. A poten- 
tially vast change is seen in the offer made by 
President Johnson at Punta del Este to con- 
sider with other developed countries the estab- 
lislunent of generalized nonreciprocal prefer- 
ential treatment for all developing countries. 

Food Production and Population Growth 

Here in Chicago, the center of our nation's 
vast, rich, high-production farming area, one 
feels strongly the importance of agriculture to 
a nation's well-being. Citizens of this area might 
be interested in farm production in Latin Amer- 
ica for four reasons: 

1. Latin American export food products that 
do not duplicate your production are on local 
dinner tables every day ; 

2. Growing numliers of more prosperous 
Latin American farmers are in the market for 
modern farm machinery — much of it produced 
in this area ; 

3. Per capita caloric intakes are on a down- 
ward trend in some Latin American countries ; 

4. Some foodstuffs that are parts of customary 

diets, such as wheat, cannot be grown efficiently 
in a number of Latin American countries. 

It is not that food production has not 
increased during the Alliance years. It has — 
nearly 9 percent in real terms. But this rate of 
increase is not enough to keep up with the num- 
ber of mouths to feed, which increases at 3 
percent yearly— the highest rate in the world. 
Forecasts are that if present birth rates con- 
tinue the 237 million Latin Americans of today 
will be 650 millions by the end of this century. 
It is asked whether the birth rate might go 
down in the foreseeable future. This is difficult 
to predict. Many countries now — this is a fairly 
recent development— do have family planning 
groups or movements, whose long-range effects 
remain to be seen. As you laiow, the policy of 
the U.S. Government in this matter is to provide 
information and assistance only to those coun- 
tries which request it. 

The food-population problem in Latin Amer- 
ica is not— yet— a matter of starvation or sur- 
vival. Though the caloric intake is declining in 
some countries, it still compares favorably with 
that of many other underdeveloped areas of the 
world. Our Food for Peace program is pro- 
viding some stopgap assistance, of course. "What 
is alarming is the projection of present trends 
of population versus production into the next 
generation. Clearly, farming methods are going 
to have to be modernized quickly and drasti- 
cally if the basic needs of a gi-owing population 
are going to be met. 

Greater numbers of people will bring with 
them greater problems of many kinds. One of 
them concerns education, so essential to the 
progress of peoples. 

Today, more than 40 percent of the people of 
Latin America are under 15 years old, and the 
average age becomes steadily younger. Present 
educational facilities are woefully inadequate 
for these youngsters— and it will take a mighty 
effort merely to keep pace with the population 

The highest priority, I believe, is in the uni- 
versity. To be sure, there are some excellent insti- 
tutions of higher learning in Latin America 
with many wise and dedicated teachers. But 
much more needs to be done to modernize the 
universities, where tomorrow's leaders, upon 
whom so much depends, are now preparing 
themselves for the challenge of leadership. 
Many of these young people of real ability and 
potential have overcome great personal obstacles 



to get to the public universities, only to discover 
in all too many cases that the curriculum is out- 
dated, the jDrofessors are part-timers who do not 
really care, and there is nowhei'e to turn for 
help — except to the extremist political agitators. 

Castro Regime's Attempts on Its Neighbors 

The frustrations of youth in any comitiy, in 
any generation, are many and part of the human 
condition. But one can have great sympathy 
with the Latin American young person who 
sincerely, passionately, wants to help his people 
and his country but does not always find the con- 
structive way to do it. It is no wonder that the 
blandishments of extremism, the promise of easy 
solutions and perhaps somewhat glamorous ad- 
venture, do appeal to some of these youngsters. 
Wliat is remarkable, and a testimony to the good 
sense of the young people, is that so few axe 
really taken in by the shrill, long-winded toot- 
ing blown aroimd the hemisphere by that aging 
professional "young revolutionary," Fidel 

Castro can sound very emotional on the sub- 
ject of "U.S. imperialism," et cetera; but this 
does not deter him from preaching and practic- 
ing intervention into the affairs of other nations. 
The meeting a few weeks ago of the ironically 
named Latin American Solidarity Organization 
showed there is anything but solidarity among 
the Communists of Latin America,, but it also 
offered proof that Fidel is still bent on exporting 

One of the major effects of all the sound and 
fury out of Havana is that the rest of the hem- 
isphere is united against the Castro regime's 
attempts on its neighbors. This will come into 
public focus later this month when the foreign 
ministers of member countries of the Organiza- 
tion of American States meet in Washington to 
hear Venezuela's charge against Castro Cuba 
for armed intrusion with intent to subvert pro- 
gressive democracy with violence and terror. 

Castro-inspired subversion and guerrilla vio- 
lence is not a major menace on the general Latin 
American scene today, but it is serious enough 
to merit constant vigilance by all coimtries of 
the hemisphere. 

Continuing problems of internal disorder or 
the danger thereof require many of our neigh- 
bors to face the need of modernizing their or- 
ganized security forces — new training methods, 
replacement of wornout or obsolete equipment, 

et cetera. Wlien nations begin to think about 
replacing outmoded equipment, this makes in- 
ternational news ; headlines proclaim that there 
is an "arms race" going on in Latin America; 
and many well-meaning persons in our country 
fail to see the matter in its true perspective. Let 
there be reason here. 

In fact, there is today no such "arms race"; 
Latin America as a whole spends a lower per- 
centage of its GNP on military affairs than 
most, if not all, other developing areas. The 
percentage of national budgets devoted to de- 
fense has actually declined 50 percent over the 
last 20 years. Today the total annual military 
equipment expenditures of all Latin America 
are only half of what New York City spends 
each year to operate a police department. 

True, the acquisition of replacement equip- 
ment is a difficult problem, one in which the 
United States is necessarily involved because 
of our economic assistance role under the Alli- 
ance for Progress. 

Our position is clearly defined : We subscribe 
to the Action Program signed at Punta del Este, 
which urges the maximum utilization of scarce 
national resources for developmental purposes 
and recommends limitation of the purchase of 
sophisticated, expensive military equipment. 
We recognize that cases must be judged indi- 
vidually. We are hopeful that through realistic 
planning and good will, each nation will find the 
way to utilize wisely its own resources and those 
obtained from outside its borders so that an 
optimum balance can be struck between self- 
protection and forward development. 

U.S. Policy Based on Positivism 

Our policy in Latin America is based on this 
kind of positivism. The Alliance for Progress 
is the keystone of our whole hemispheric inter- 
national relations policy. That is why I am 
Coordinator of our Alliance effort as well as 
Assistant Secretary. Our desire is not to main- 
tain the status quo but to support meaningful 
reform, modernization, and betterment of the 
conditions of life. We wish not to exploit but 
to join hands with our neighbors as strong and 
equal partners in the world community of 
nations. Our number-one concern is to help 
bring improved living conditions to millions 
who require assistance. We believe we must do 
this not only because of humanitarian concern, 
but because we know the United States cannot 
continue indefinitely to be a palace of affluence 

OCTOBER 9, 19G7 


in a neighborhood of need. Let us keep in mind 
that the average per capita i:icome in Latin 
America is only about $300. 

Wliat we know as the Alliance for Progress 
might well be called our war on poverty in the 
neighborhood of this hemisphere. Recent ex- 
periences in onr own country with the destruc- 
tive and irrational violence that frustration and 
a sense of injustice sparked have had and could 
have far worse parallels in our international 
neighborhood, Latin America. 

To those who question whether we can afford 
to be involved in this hemispheric war on pov- 
erty in view of our other foreign and domestic 
obligations, the answer must be: We cannot 
afford not to. In terms of our productivity, 
there is no question about it, with about six- 
tenths of 1 percent of our GNP designated for 
all foreign aid. In terms of budgeting, the 
answer is likewise affirmative. 

No one supposes it will be easy or brief, this 
struggle to create better lives through the 
Alliance for Progress. President Joliiison has 
said this : * 

If what we do is to really last, we must make tbis 
commitment to ourselves and to all of Latin America : 
We will persevere. There is no time limit to our com- 
mitment. We are in this fight to stay all the way. 

Time does speed by. It is startling to realize 
that of the 6 years of the Alliance for Progress, 
four of them have been under the leadership 
in this country of President Johnson. 

Let me make a personal observation. His 
steady, consistent direction during these years 
and his personal commitment to the support of 
the Alliance have been recognized by govern- 
ment leaders in the hemisphere. But until this 
year and Punta del Este, the public had per- 
haps not come to appreciate fully these quali- 
ties — perhaps because ideas are associated with 
men and the tragic death of John Kennedy 
meant to many the end of his bold venture, the 
Alliance for Progress. With President Jolm- 
son's personal visit to Latin America during the 
Simimit, I think, Latin Americans have come 
to see our President in a more personal way — 
as a Western Hemisphere leader and a warmly 
human man, deeply committed to a better future 
for all Americans, North and South. 

We are on solid ground. The Alliance is not a 
partisan issue. The policies laid down by the 
President these last 4 years follow general lines 


established by the Kennedy administration, 
which in turn go back to the Act of Bogota, 
durmg the Eisenhower years. Historically, all 
these ideas had Latin American origins: an 
inter-American bank, a union for development, 
a common market. Constantly, we have sought 
to refine and improve, to modernize institutions 
and relationships, aJl with the view to bring the 
goals of the Alliance closer to more people. 

Modernization must occur as to certain of our 
political relationships in our neighborhood deal- 
ings with each other. We must remember that 
the AYorld's most powerful superstate is in the 
Western Hemisphere. The overwhelming pre- 
ponderance of the United States is for us the 
single most significant fact about political rela- 
tionships with our neighbors. 

In folklore, giants were always a problem for 
normal-sized people. Most giants were terrible 
monsters. Some were good, but so clumsy that 
they hurt people without intending to do so. A 
few were very wise, very understanding, very 
caxeful about putting their weight down. This, 
until an economically integrated Latin Amer- 
ica begins to equal us in strength, is the kind of 
giant we ought to be. 

Our 1903 arrangements with Panama are out 
of date. I do not see how there could be much 
doubt about that. Today I cannot, even if time 
permitted, go into the details of the three closely 
related treaties that would modernize our rela- 
tions with Panama bej'ond saying that under the 
President's directive a very able and wise negoti- 
ating team headed liy President Eisenhower's 
Secretary of the Treasury [Robert B. Anderson] 
has worked with a Panamanian delegation of 
great integrity and skill for 3 years to find new of agreement. These new bases were ration- 
ally arrived at. They are designed to modernize 
U.S.-Panamanian relationships in a way that 
befits two sovereign and independent nations. 
They look toward tlie needs of world commerce 
in a not very distant future. They are in keeping 
with fine and much admired pages of our his- 
tory, such as giving independence to the Philip- 
pines and the freedom of choice given to Puerto 

Finally, I offer for your evaluation the con- 
clusion that there is no cause for pessimism or 
desperation regarding the future. There has not 
been enough social or economic progress yet to 
eliminate basic problems, bitt there has been 
enough to prove that we are on the right track — 
enough progress to help people now as well as 
to brighten their hopes for the future. Demo- 



cratic processes and institutions are not yet nni- 
versal, but it is a pleasure to note that there 
have been no extraconstitutional changes in 
government for more than a year in Latin 

The general situation is hopeful. But there 
is no room for complacency. We must all get on 
with the job. 

I believe that the ideology of the Alianza — 
the feeling that "we can do it, in peace and in 
freedom" — this is catching on and growing, and 
it will dominate in the end. 

A new generation of Latin Americans, devel- 
opment-orientated and positive of will, is com- 
ing into positions of leadership and decision. 
They, too, have a rendezvous with destiny. They 
will determine the ultimate success of this 
"revolution of sweat, rather than of blood or 

U.S. and Mexico Discuss 
Fisheries in 12-Mile Zone 

Press release 206 dated September 21 

Mexican and United States Government 
officials completed discussions on fishery prob- 
lems of common concern at Mexico City on 
September 19 and have submitted a report, to 
their Governments.^ Fishing industry represent- 
atives from both countries also attended the 
meetings as observers. The delegations agreed 
on recommendations to their Governments 
which would regulate the fisheries of each 
count i"y operating within the contiguous fishery 
zone of the other. 

It is contemplated that after study of the re- 
port the two Governments will conclude a 
formal executive agreement, if they consider it 

The discussions just concluded arose out of the 
action of the Government of Mexico late in 1966 
extending its jurisdiction over fisheries in ad- 
jacent waters to a distance of 12 nautical miles 
from shore. Like the Mexican law on the ex- 
clusive fishery zone, the United States law of 
1966 ^ which extended the Nation's fishery juris- 
diction to 12 nautical miles from shore also pro- 
vides for continuation of such traditional fish- 

' For a statement issued on May 25 at the close of 
TJ.S.-Mexioan talks at Washington, see Btju-etin of 
June 19, 1967, p. 919. 

' Pulilic Law S9-65S. 

ing within the zone as may be recognized by the 
Govermnent having jurisdiction. 

The delegation of Mexico was headed by 
Ambassador Oscar Rabasa, Legal Adviser to the 
Secretary of State for External Relations, and 
included Antonio Gonzalez de Leon, Director 
General of the Diplomatic Service, Ministry of 
External Relations; Enrique Azuara Salas, Di- 
rector General of Internal Revenue, Ministry of 
Finance and Public Credit; Jorge Echaniz 
Ruvalcaba, Director General of Fisheries and 
Related Industries, Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce; and Comdr. Gilberto Lopez Lira, 
Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Navy. 

Cochairmen of the U.S. delegation were Am- 
bassador Donald L. McKernan, Special As- 
sistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secre- 
tary of State, and the U.S. Ambassador to 
jMexico, Fulton Freeman. The U.S. delegation 
also included Raymund T. Tingling, Legal Ad- 
viser for Special Functional Problems, Depart- 
ment of State; William M. Terry, Assistant Di- 
rector for International Affairs, Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries [United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service] ; Seton H. Thompson, South- 
eastern Regional Director, Bureau of Commer- 
cial Fisheries; Gerald V. Howard, Pacific 
Southwest Regional Director, Bureau of Com- 
mercial Fisheries; Milton J. Lindner, Director, 
Galveston Biological Laboratory; Lt. Comdr. 
C. J. Blondin, Law Enforcement Division, 
United States Coast Guard; and Philip M. 
Roedel, State of California Dcpai'tment of Fish 
and Game. 

President Names U.S. Members 
to Investment Disputes Panels 

White House press release dated September 20 

The President on September 20 designated 
eight members to serve for 6-year tenns on the 
Panel of Arbitrators and the Panel of Concili- 
ators of the International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes. 

The Panel of Arbitrators includes Thurman 
W. Arnold, Washington attorney and former 
associate justice of the the U.S. Court of Ap- 
peals for the District of Colmnbia; Leon 
Jaworski, Houston, Tex., attorney and banker 
and director of the x\merican Red Cross ; Sola 
Mentschikoff, professor of law at the University 

OCTOBER 9, 1907 


of Chicago Law School and chairman of the 
Committee on Commercial Arbitration and Con- 
ciliation of Investment Disputes of Interna- 
tional and Comparative Law; and Michael 
DiSalle, former Governor of Ohio. 

Designated members of the Panel of Concil- 
iators are Horace Busby, Washington manage- 
ment consultant and former Special Assistant 
to the President and Secretary of the Cabinet 
(1963-65) ; Maxwell Kabb, New York attorney 
and former Presidential Assistant and Secre- 
tary to the Cabinet (1954-58) ; Kobert M. Mc- 
Kinney, Santa Fe, N. Mex., newspaper pub- 
lisher and former U.S. Ambassador to the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency and former 
Ambassador to Switzerland; and James W. 
Trimble, former Congressman from Arkansas. 

The International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes is an international organi- 
zation affiliated with the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development with head- 
quarters in Washington, D.C. The Center offers 
facilities for the arbitration and conciliation of 
investment disputes between private investors 
of one country and the governments of other 
countries. The Center maintains panels of arbi- 
trators and conciliators from which the parties 
to a dispute may choose persons to sit on an 
Arbitral Tribunal or a Conciliation Com- 

The International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes was established in 1966 by 
a multilateral international treaty. The Center 
opened its doors on February 2, 1967. The Con- 
vention has been ratified by 36 countries and 
signed preparatory to ratification by an addi- 
tional 18 countries. Each country which has 
ratified the Convention is authorized to name 
four persons to each of the two panels to serve 
for a term of 6 years. 

Members of U.S. Delegation 
to IAEA Conference Confirmed 

The Senate on September 20 confirmed the 
nomination of Glenn T. Seaborg to be the repre- 
sentative of the LTnited States to the 11th session 
of the General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energj Agency. 

The nominations of the following-named 
persons to be alternate representatives of the 

United States to the 11th session of the IAEA 
General Conference also were confirmed on that 
date : 

Verne B. Lewis 
Herman Pollack 
James T. Ramey 
Henry DeWolf Smyth 
Gerald F. Tape 

Foreign Policy Conference 
To Be Held at St. Louis 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 15 (press release 197) that Eugene V. 
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
would be the principal speaker in a regional 
foreign policy conference in St. Louis, Mo., 
October 17-18. The conference is being co- 
sponsored by the St. Louis Council on World 
Affairs and the Department of Stat«. Invita- 
tions are being extended to civic and commu- 
nity leaders, educators, and representatives of 
the news media in eastern Missouri and western 

The opening session will convene at 8 :00 p.m. 
on October 17, and the final luncheon session is 
expected to adjourn at 2 :15 p.m. on October 18. 
The program will feature an address by Under 
Secretary Kostow on overall U.S. foreign policy 
and discussions by senior State Department 
officers on f oreigTi policy issues in Europe, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East. All ses- 
sions will be on the record and will include ques- 
tion-and-answer periods. 

In addition to Under Secretary Rostow, the 
following State Department officers are now 
scheduled to participate : Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European 
Affairs; John K. Emmerson, diplomat-in- 
residence, Stanford University, and recently 
Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Tolry-o; 
John E. Horner, country director for Cyprus, 
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs; and Reuben Sternfeld, Alternate U.S. 
Executive Director, Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, and Special Assistant to the U.S. 
Coordinator, Alliance for Progress. 

This will be one of a series of regional con- 
ferences on foreign policy conducted by the De- 
partment of State at the request of and in co- 
operation with local organizations. 




Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty 
of Amity and Economic Relations 

Press release 193 dated September H 

The new Treaty of Amity and Economic Kela- 
tions with Thailand ^ which was approved by 
the Senate on September 11, 1967, is one of a 
number of agreements negotiated in response 
to congressional policy on facilitating trade and 
investment as expressed in the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1961. It is aimed at the promotion of 
mutually beneficial investment, trade, and cul- 
tural relations between our two countries on a 
basis of equality, security, freedom, and 

This treaty is the latest and most complete of 
a series of commercial treaties between the 
United States and Thailand beginning with the 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce of March 20, 
1833. That treaty provided: ". . . trade shall 
be free on both sides, to sell, or buy, or exchange, 
on the terms and for the prices the owners may 
think fit," and began with the declaration that : 
"the Siamese and the Citizens of the United 
States of America, shall, with sincerity, hold 
commercial intercourse in the Ports of their 
respective nations, as long as Heaven and Earth 
shall endure." Subsequent revisions of that 
treaty, in 1856, 1920, and 1937, have maintained 
the same principles of equality between our two 
nations. In the Treaty of Friendship, Com- 
merce, and Navigation of 1920, the United 
States was the first Western power to surrender 
all rights of extraterritoriality. The FCN treaty 
of 1937 " and the latest treaty have maintained 
the same spirit of mutual respect and friendship. 

In commenting on the Senate's advice and 
consent to ratification, Secretary Rusk empha- 
sized the value which the United States places 
on its close and historic ties with Thailand and 
referred to the remarks of Foreign Minister 
Thanat Khoman on the occasion of the signing 
of the treaty on May 29, 1966. The Foreign Min- 

^ For background, see Bulletin of June 20, 1966, p. 
' 53 United States Statutes at Large 1731. 

ister described the relationship between our two 
countries as a "partnership which will not 
smother or jeopardize the free existence of the 
smaller party, but rather enliance the latter's 
growth and development," and expressed the 
hope that this "close association between our 
two nations . . . will serve as a model to an 
orderly and peaceful development between the 
nations, large and small, in this part of the 
world, a relationship which will not entail sub- 
servience of one to the other but rather a 
mutually trustworthy and fruitful partnership 
and cooperation." The Secretary observed that 
Americans can justly take pride in the Foreign 
Minister's remarks, which epitomize the rela- 
tionship which the United States seeks with 
friendly nations everywhere. 

Current Actions 


Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 

Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 


Ratification deposited: Panama, August 28, 1967. 
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular 

relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 

disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered 

into force March 19, 1967.' 

Ratification deposited: Panama, August 28, 1967. 


Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem- 
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. 
TIAS 1.501. 

Signattire and acceptance: Gambia, September 21, 


Convention on the International Hydrographic Organi- 
zation, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967.^ 
Signature: United States (subject to ratification), 
September 13, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Adherence deposited: Lesotho (with reservation), 

September 6. 1967. 
Ratifications deposited: Kuwait, August 16, 1967; 

Sierra Leone, August 24, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
'■' Not in force. 

OCTOBER 9, 196T 



International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered 
into force January 1, 1967 ; as to the United States 
May 29, 1967. TIAS 6207. 

Ratifications deposited: Ethiopia, July 29, 1967 ; 
Togo, August 8, 1967. 

Partial revi.siou of tlie radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893. .5603), to put into 
effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service and related informa- 
tion, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29. 1966. 
Entered into force July 1, 1967; as to the United 
States August 23, 1967, except the frequency allot- 
ment plan contained in appendix 27 shall enter into 
force April 10. 1970. TIAS 6332. 
Notifications of approval: Belgium, Netherlands, 
July 20. 1967. 

William O. Hall to he Ambassador to Ethiopia. ( For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
August 17.) 

Martin J. Hillenbrand to be Ambassador to Hungary. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated July 25.) 

Geoffrey W. Lewis to be Ambassador to the Central 
African Republic. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated August 17.) 

Fredric R. Mann to be Ambassador to Barbados. 
( For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated August 17. ) 

Albert W. Sherer. Jr.. to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Togo. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated August 17.) 



Consular convention. Signed at Paris July 18, 1966.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 
18, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace 
corps program in Lesotho. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington September 22, 1967. Entered 
into force September 22, 1967. 

Upper Volta 

Arrangement relating to a geodetic survey along the 
12th parallel arc. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ouagadougou June 28 and August 21, 1967. Entered 
into force August 21, 1967. 



The Senate on September 13 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

William A. Costello to be Ambassador to Trinidad 
and Tobago. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated August 17.) 

' Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to September IS which 
appear in this issue of the Btxlletin are Nos. 195 
of September 13, 196 of September 12, 197 of 
September 15, 198 of September 13, and 199 and 
201 of September 15. 

No. Date Subject 

202 9/18 Department statement on Ashmore 
article on contacts with Hanoi. 

*203 9/18 Mann sworn in as Ambassador to 
Barbados (biographic details). 

t204 9/20 U.S. and Mexico amend route sched- 
ule to air transport agreement 
( rewrite ) . 

♦205 9/21 Program for vi.sit of Chief Leabua 
Jonathan, Prime Minister of 
206 9/21 U.S.-Mexican fishery talks. 

t207 9/23 Rusk : 12th meeting of consultation 
of OAS foreign ministers. 

t208 9/22 U.S.-PhUippine cotton textile ar- 

*209 9/22 Program for visit of President Diori 
Hamani of Niger. 

* Not printed. 

1' Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



NDEX Vol. LVII, No. U76 October 9, 1967 

of Nuclear Strategy (Mc- 

tomic Energy 
18 Dynamics 


embers of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference 

itrbados. Mann confirmed as Ambassador . . 

intral African Republic. Lewis confirmed as 

hina. The Dynamics 
(McNamara) . . . 

of Nuclear Strat^y 

'Confirmations (Costello, Hall, Hillenbrand, 

Lewis, Mann, Sherer) 

dembers of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference 


department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 
(Costello, Hall, Hillenbrand, Lewis, Mann, 

Economic Affairs 

Phe Business of Development (Oliver) . . . 
Jfesident Names U.S. Members to Investment 

isputes Panels 

ate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and 

Iconomic Relations 

and Mexico Discuss Fisheries in 12-Mile 


iopia. Hall confirmed as Ambassador . . . 

ingary. HUlenbrand confirmed as Ambas- 

ernational Organizations and Conferences 

ibers of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference 


isident Names U.S. Members to Investment 

isputes Panels 

ted States Collective Defense Arrangements 

U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to Iraq, 
lordan, and Yemen 


president Johnson Welcomes Japanese Cabinet 


-Japan Joint Economic Committee Holds 
Sixth Meeting (Rusk, Miki, communique) . 

rdan. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to Iraq, 
Jordan, and Yemen 

pin America. The Business of Development 
















Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Discuss Fisheries in 
12-Mile Zone 475 

Military Affairs. ITie Dynamics of Nuclear 
Strategy (McNamara) 443 

Near East. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to 
Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen 459 

Passports. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to 
Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen 459 

Presidential Documents. President Johnson Wel- 
comes Japanese Cabinet Ministers .... 453 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be 
Held at St. Louis 476 

Thailand. Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty of 
Amity and Economic Relations 477 

Togo. Sherer confirmed as Ambassador . . . 478 
Treaty Information 

Current Actions 477 

Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and 
Economic Relations 477 

Trinidad and Tobago. Costello confirmed as 
Ambassador 478 

U.S.S.R. The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy 

(McNamara) 443 

United Nations. Ambassador Lodge Discusses 
Viet-Nam in Interview on "Jleet the Press" . 464 


Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam in Inter- 
view on "Meet the Press" 464 

Department Gives Facts Regarding Ashmore- 
Baggs Contacts With Hanoi (Department 
statement) 462 

Yemen. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to Iraq, 
Jordan, and Yemen 459 

Name Index 

Costello, William A 478 

Hall, William O 478 

Hillenbrand, Martin J 478 

Johnson, President 453 

Lewis, Geoffrey W 478 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 464 

McNamara, Robert S 443 

Mann, Fredric R 478 

Mlki, Takeo 451 

Oliver, Covey T 470 

Rusk, Secretary 451 

Seaborg, Glenn T 476 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 478 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 












Statement hy Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 1^83 


President Johnson's Message to Congress 508 


by Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge 604- 


Statement by SecretOiry Rusk and Text of Final Act 
of Twelfth Meeting of Consultation ^90 


nrt/yf c/}/} inno'i/lc n/T/»t" /*f\1^/>r 



Vol. LVII, No. 1477 Publication 8300 
October 16, 1967 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Goverament Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $15.00 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget {.Tanuary 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed iu 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of tlie Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tioTuil affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

U.S. Viewpoint on Four Current World Problems 

Statement iy Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 


Today, as every year at this time, we open a 
new chapter in the history of the United Na- 
tions. We open on a hopeful note with your 
election as President, for you are not only 
Imown and respected by your colleagues 
throup'liout the world as an able and distin- 
guished diplomatist; you also have the distinc- 
tion of being the first representative of a countiy 
of Eastern Europe to be elected to this high 
office.^ We of the United States welcome this 
development as one further sign of the evolu- 
tion which has been taking place in the relations 
among the states of Eastern Europe and of 
other parts of the world. May all members take 
this new step as a reminder of the truth which 
a modern Danish sage has compressed into these 
words : "Coexistence — or no existence." 

We congratulate you, Mr. President, and 
pledge to you our cooperation in the discharge 
of your ditlicult and important office. 

I take this occasion also to pay tribute to 
your distinguished predecessor, the President of 
the 21st session. Ambassador [Abdul Rahman] 
Pazhwalv of Afghanistan. We share tlie admira- 
tion of all delegations for the resourcefulness 
and patience with which he guided us through 
'' . more meetings of the General Assembly than 
( have been presided over by any otlier man in the 
history of this organization. 

This annual general debate serves the impor- 
tant purpose of allowing each member to lay 
before the entire Assembly, at the outset of our 
session, its major concerns in the international 
sphere. I shall not attempt to touch on all the 

^ Made in plenary session of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on Sept. 21 (U.S. delegation press release 137). 

' Foreign Minister Corueliu Manescu of Romania was 
elected President of the 22d General Assembly at the 
opening session on Sept. 19. 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 

issues on the agenda to which my countiy at- 
taches importance. This statement will con- 
centrate on certain issues which in our view are 
of transcendent significance to world peace. 


First among these is the continued tragic 
conflict in Viet-Nam. For the entire community 
of nations the search for peace in Viet-Nam re- 
mains a matter of the first priority. Indeed, 
pursuant to its charter, the United Nations has 
the most explicit right and duty to concern it- 
self with this question, as it does with any 
breach of or threat to the peace anywhere in 
the world. 

Holding this conviction as we do, my Govern- 
ment continues to seek the active participation 
of the United Nations in the quest for peace in 
Viet-Nam. Every member and every organ of 
the United Nations, this Assembly included, 
shai'es the charter obligation of lending its 
weight and influence to help resolve disputes 
and conflicts between nations by peaceful means. 
Today, despite past disappointments, I reiterate 
our ajDpeal to all members of the United Na- 
tions, individually and collectively, to accept 
that obligation — ^to use their influence to help 
bring the Viet-Nam conflict to an end by peace- 
ful means. 

The distinguished delegates who particii^ate 
in this debate will undoubtedly make observa- 
tions and offer suggestions as to how this can be 
brought about. My delegation will listen to them 
with close attention and respect. 

As our contribution to the Assembly's discus- 
sion of this issue, let me state as precisely as 
possible the views and ideas of mj' Government. 

Our basic view is one which I am sure is 
shared by the gi-eat majority of the Assembly : 


that this conflict can and should be ended by a 
political solution at the earliest possible time. 
A military solution is not the answer. For our 
part, we do not seek to impose a military solu- 
tion on North Viet-Nam or on its adherents. 
By the same token, in fidelity to our commit- 
ment to a political solution, we will not permit 
North Viet-Nam and its adherents to impose a 
military solution upon South Viet-Nam. 

Tlie question then arises : By what procedure 
can a political solution be reached? One well- 
tested way is the conference table. We are pre- 
pared to follow this path at any time— to go 
to the conference table in Geneva or any other 
suitable place. 

There is a second way to pursue a political 
settlement : through private negotiations or dis- 
cussions. The United States stands ready to take 
this route also — and in so doing to give assur- 
ances that the confidence and privacy of such 
negotiations or discussions would be fully re- 
spected by our Government. 

It may be that negotiations or discussions 
might be preceded or facilitated by mutual mili- 
tary restraint, by the scaling down of the con- 
flict, either with or without a formal cease-fire. 
This route, too, we are prepared to follow. 

There is, on the other hand, the danger that 
the conflict may continue until one side finds the 
burden of war too exhausting or too costly and 
that the fighting will only gradually end, with- 
out negotiations and without an agreed settle- 
ment. Certainly this is a grim prospect, for it 
would mean prolonged conflict and tragedy. It 
is in essence a military solution, and it is not one 
we seek. We earnestly hope that it is not the 
course in which our adversaries will persist. In 
any event, there will be no slackening in our 
resolve to help South Viet-Nam defend its right 
to determine its own future by peaceful means 
and free from external force. 

Committed as we are to a political solution 
through discussions or negotiations, we regret 
that, despite many efforts. North Viet-Nam and 
its adherents have not yet agreed to this objec- 
tive. But we shall continue in our efforts; and 
we hope that what we say today may help to 
bring nearer the time when the two sides will 
sit down together. 

It is said by some that Hanoi will agree to 
begin negotiations if the United States ceases 
the bombing of North Viet-Nam — that this 
bombing is the sole obstacle to negotiations. I 
would note that in its public statements Hanoi 


has merely indicated that there "could" be 
negotiations if the bombing stopped. True, some 
governments — as well as our distinguished 
Secretary-General and other individuals — have 
expressed their belief or assumption that nego- 
tiations "would" begin, perhaps soon, if the 
bombmgs were stopped. We have given these 
expressions of belief our most careful attention. 
But no such third party — including those gov- 
ernments which are among Hanoi's closest 
friends — has conveyed to us any authoritative' 
message from Hanoi that there would in fact be 
negotiations if the bombing were stopped. We 
have sought such a message directly from Hanoi 
without success. 

On its part, the United States would be gladi 
to consider and discuss any proposal that would^ 
lead promptly to productive discussions that 
might bring about peace in the area. We do not, 
however, conceive it to be unreasonable for us 
to seek enlightenment on this question: Does 
North Viet-Nam conceive that the cessation of 
bombing w^ould or should lead to any other re- 
sults than meaningful negotiations or discus- 
sions under circmnstances which would not dis- 
advantage either side ? 

Moreover, we believe we also have a right to 
address ourselves to those governments which 
support Hanoi's cause and which have stated tO' 
us their beliefs about Hanoi's intentions and to 
put this question to them : If the United States 
were to take the first step and order a prior cessa- 
tion of the bombing, what would they then do 
or refrain from doing, and how would thej' then, 
use their influence and power, in order to move' 
the Viet-Nam conflict promptly toward a peace- 
ful resolution? 

Constructive answers to these questions 
would aid in the search for peace. 

Principles of an Honorable Settlement 

In the minds of some, there is a further neces- 
sity: namely, to articulate more precisely the 
principles of an honorable settlement. In the 
interest of meeting this viewpoint, let me set 
forth these principles envisaged by my Govern- 
ment in as precise a manner as is possible prior 
to negotiations — and without in any way pre- 
conditioning or prejudicing such negotiations. 

It is widely accepted that the Geneva agree- 
ments of 1954 and 1962 should constitute the 
basis for settlement We agree. In our view, this 
entails : 













1. A complete cease-fire and disengagement 
by all armed personnel in both North and South 
Viet-Nam on a specified date. Such action was 
called for by the Geneva agreements. 

2. No military forces, armed personnel, or 
bases to be maintained in North or South Viet- 
Nam except those under the control of the re- 
spective governments. This would mean with- 
drawing or demobilizing all other troops, 
withdrawing external military and related per- 
sonnel introduced from outside South Viet- 
Nam, and the evacuation of military bases, as 
soon as possible under an agreed time schedule. 
This, too, was contemplated under the Geneva 

3. Full respect for the international frontiers 
of the states bordering on North and South 
Viet-Nam, as well as for the demarcation line 
and demilitarized zone between North and 
South Viet-Nam. Tliis, too, was called for by 
the Geneva agreements. 

4. Peaceful settlement by the people in both 
North and South Viet-Nam of the question of 
reunification, without foreign interference. 
This, too, was called for by the Geneva 

0. Finally, supervision of all the foregoing 
hj agreed-upon international machinery. This, 
•too, was called for by the Geneva agreements. 

In thus summarizing the central elements of 
Ithe Geneva agreements, I note that, as evidenced 
lin the communique issued at Manila last Octo- 
Iber 25,^ the Government of South Viet-Nam 
Iholds similar views. 

We make this authoritative statement, Mr. 
(President, in the hope that a settlement can be 
reached by reaffirming the principles of the 
'Geneva agreements and by making use of the 
machinery created by those agreements, includ- 
ing in particular a reconvened Geneva confer- 
ence in which all concerned parties can 
appropriately participate. 

And we suggest that a further question is in 
order : Does North Viet-Nam agree that the fore- 
going points are a correct interpretation of the 
Geneva agreements, to which it professedly 
.subscribes ? 

To this question let me append this plain 
statement about the aims of the United States 
toward North Viet-Nam. The United States has 
no designs on the territory of North Viet-Nam : 
We do not seek to overthrow its government, 

I • For test, see BtntETi^f of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730. 

whatever its ideology; and we are fully pre- 
pared to respect its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and to enter into specific undertakings 
to that end. 

By the same token, it remains our view that 
the people of South Viet-Nam should have the 
right to work out their own political future by 
peaceful means, in accordance with the prin- 
ciple of self-determination, and without ex- 
ternal interference — and that this right, too, 
should be respected by all. 

Conflict Tragically Prolonged 

And it is our further view that all South 
Vietnamese who are willing to participate 
peacefully in the political life of South Viet- 
Nam should have an equal chance as first-class 
citizens with full rights in every sense. We do 
not conceive that any segment of the South Viet- 
namese people should be excluded from such 
peaceful participation. We would consider it 
altogether wise and proper, if this would remove 
an obstacle to peace, that appropriate assur- 
ances on this matter be considered in connection 
with a political settlement. 

It should be noted in this connection that the 
Government of South Viet-Nam has stated that 
it has "no desire to threaten or harm the people 
of the North"; that it seeks only to resolve its 
political problems without external interfer- 
ence; and that it is prepared for "reconciliation 
of all elements in the society." It is also note- 
worthy that the people of South Viet-Nam have 
just concluded a peaceful election under a new 
constitution and have made progress in the 
democratic process. 

Let me add that my Government remains will- 
ing, and indeed has already begun, to make a 
major commitment of resources in a multi- 
lateral cooperative effort to accelerate in all of 
Southeast Asia the benefits of economic develop- 
ment so sorely needed there. When the conflict 
is ended and peace is restored, we would hope to 
see North Viet-Nam included in that effort. 

In the interest of progress along this road to 
peace, we earnestly hope that constructive an- 
swers to the questions we have raised will soon 
be forthcoming. We are all too conscious that 
the present reality is one of grim and harsh 
conflict, already tragically and unduly pro- 
longed. Surely if there is any contribution that 
diplomacy, whether bilateral or multilateral, 
can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none 


OCTOBER 16. 1967 


in this Assembly can in good conscience spare 
any effort or any labor to make that contribu- 
tion—no matter how frustrating past efforts 
may have been or how many new begmnmgs 
may be required. 

We of the United States, for our part, stand 
ready to make that effort and to persist in tid- 
ing to overcome all obstacles to a settlement. 

The President of the United States, speakmg 
specifically of Viet-Nam, has said: ". . . we 
Americans know the nature of a fair bargain. 
No people ever need fear negotiating with 
Americans." * In the flexible spirit of that state- 
ment, and speaking for the United States Gov- 
ernment, I affirm without reservation the will- 
ingness of the United States to seek and find a 
political solution of the conflict in Viet-Nam. 

Middle East 

I turn now to the Middle East, a second area 
of conflict which is both tragic in itself and 
dangerous to the peace of the world. 

The views of the United States on the re- 
quirements of peace in the Middle East have 
been set forth by President Johnson, notably m 
his statement of June 19,^ which remains our 
policy. In that statement my Govermnent ap- 
pealed to all the parties to adopt no rigid view 
on the method of bringing peace to the area. 
Kather we have emphasized throughout that 
there is somethmg more basic than methods: 
the simple will to peace. There must be present 
on both sides an affirmative will to resolve the 
issues not through the dictation of terms by 
either side but through a process of mutual ac- 
commodation in which nobody's vital interests 
are injured. In short, both sides must have the 
will to work out a political solution; both must 
be committed to the peace ; and no appropriate 
method, such as good offices or mediation, should 
be excluded. 

In candor it must be said that such a will to 
peace was not manifest in the recent emergency 
session of the Assembly. It is greatly to be hoped 
that, after sober reflection by all concerned, a 
new and better mood will emerge — a mood of 
reconciliation and magnanimity. 

Surely the purposes of peace cannot be served 

•For an address by President Johnson at the Uni- 
versity of Denver on Aug. 26, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 19, 
1966, p. 406. 

" For text, see Hid., July 10, 1967, p. 31. 

if the right of a member state to its national 
life is not accepted and respected by its neigh- 
bors nor if military success blinds a member 
state to the fact that its neighbors have rights 
and interests of their own. 

In realism, it is perhaps not to be expected 
that reconciliation and magnanimity will appear 
overnight ; but surely emnity must at least give [ 
way to tolerance and to the will to live together ' 
in peace. Once that will is manifest, the terms 
of settlement can be evolved. 

The principles which my Government believes 
can bring peace to the region are these : 

—Each nation in the area must accept the 
right of others to live. The least that this re- 
quires is that all should renounce any state or 
claim of belligerency, which as long ago as 1951 
was found by the Security Council to be incon- 
sistent with peace. 

Troops must be withdrawn— and with- 
drawn in a context of peace. For some parties 
cannot be left free to assert the rights of war 
while others are called upon to abide by the rules 
of peace. 

—There must be justice for the refugees. The 
nations of the area must address themselves at 
last, with new energy and new determination 
to succeed, to the plight of those who have been 
rendered homeless or'displaced by wars and con- 
flicts of the past, both distant and recent. _ 

Free and imiocent passage through inter- 
national waterways must be assured for all 
nations. One of the lessons of the recent conflict 
is that maritime rights must be respected. 

—The wasteful and destructive arms race in 
the region must be curbed, thereby making more 
resources available for economic development. 

—The status of Jerusalem must not be de- 
cided unilaterally but in consultation with all 
concerned and in recognition of the historic in- 
terest of three great religions in the holy places 
— The political independence and teiTitoriall 
integrity of all states in the area must be 

—Boundaries must be accepted and other 
arrangements made, superseding temporary 
and often-violated annistice lines, so as to affprdi 
security to all parties against terror, destruction, 
and war. 

These are important general principles on 
which, we believe, rests the peace of the area. 
While the main responsibility lies with the par- 






ties, tlie United Nations and every member state, 
including my own countiy, must help in the 
search for peace. For it is in the highest inter- 
national interest, as well as in the national in- 
terests of the parties, that peace should be 
achieved as soon as possible. 

As for my own country, our most cherished 
wish for the Middle East has long been an age 
of peace in which we could enjoy good relations 
with every nation of that region. In such a 
climate of peace there is much that we could 
do, and would be glad to do, in cooperation 
with other members and with the gifted people 
of the region itself. Eegional economic develop- 
ment; the full rehabilitation of the refugees; 
the desalting of water and the restoration of the 
desert to human use — these, and not war or 
armaments, are tlie works to which my country, 
and I am sure many both in and outside the 
Middle East, would prefer to devote our 

Arms Control 

I turn now to a third momentous problem: 
the search for reliable programs of international 
disarmament and arms control, particularly in 
the field of nuclear weapons. 

Step-by-step progress in this field, which 
seemed out of reach for so many years, has 
more recently become a reality. Significant limi- 
tations regarding nuclear weapons have been 
accepted by the nuclear powers in the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959 ; in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963 ; and only last year in the Outer 
Space Treaty. 

These successive steps have encouraged us to 
continue to tackle one of the most basic aspects 
of the nuclear dilemma : the threat of the spread 
of nuclear weapons to more and more nations. 
This poses one of the gravest dangers to peace 
and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. The 
longer this problem remains, the graver the 
danger becomes. 

My Government has long been very much 
alive to this danger. In response to it we have 
given the highest priority in the 18-Nation 
Disarmament Committee to the objective of a 
nonproliferation treaty. 

Last month this long effort culminated in the 
simultaneous tabling by the United States and 
the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non- 
proliferation treaty, complete in all except its 

safeguard provisions.® The texts of these drafts 
will be available in document form to all mem- 
bers of the General Assembly. 

Complex problems still remain. But we are 
hopeful that a complete treaty draft, including 
a generally acceptable safeguard provision, will 
be presented to this session in time to allow for 
consideration and action by the Assembly, under 
whose general direction and guidance this treaty 
is being negotiated. 

The presentation of such a completed draft 
will, of course, not be the end of the process. 
There will remain the understandable desire 
of certain nonnuclear countries for assurances 
against nuclear blaclanail. The Assembly, in 
addition to endorsing the treaty as we hope it 
will, can make a significant contribution to the 
treaty's objective of nonproliferation by helping 
to develop a solution to this related problem. 

We fully understand that the drafts which 
have been tabled in Geneva are far too impor- 
tant to admit of hurried consideration by pro- 
spective signatories. But neither does this urgent 
matter admit of procrastination. All concerned 
powers, nuclear and noraiuclear alike, should 
press forward with all practical speed to the 
conclusion of a final treaty. Indeed, the General 
Assembly itself spoke to all of us last year when 
it declared in Kesolution 2149 (XXI) : ' 

First, that states take all necessaiy steps to 
facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible 
time the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty ; 

Second, that all states refrain from any ac- 
tions conducive to proliferation or which might 
hamper the conclusion of an agreement. 

U.S. Decision on Limited ABM Deployment 

Mr. President, our preoccupation with the 
nonproliferation treaty has not diminished my 
Government's concern over other major prob- 
lems in the arms control field. High on the list 
of these problems is the growing arsenal of stra- 
tegic offensive and defensive missiles. Some 
time ago we expressed to the Soviet Union our 
interest in an understanding which would limit 
the deployment of such missiles. 

In the interim, we in the United States have 

" For text of the U.S. draft, see aid-, Sept. 11, 1967, 
p. 319. 
' For text, see iUd., Dec. 12, 1966, p. 902. 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 


been obliged to review carefully our strategic 
position. Our conclusion from this review was 
that our security, including particularly se- 
curity against the threat of a missile attack by 
mainland China, required us to embark upon 
the construction of a limited anti-ballistic- 
missile system ^ — and I emphasize the word 

No nation, nuclear or nonnuclear, should feel 
that its security is endangered by this decision. 
On the contrary, to the extent that the United 
States will be better able to meet its interna- 
tional defensive responsibilities and to respond 
to appeals from states threatened by nuclear 
blackmail, the present safety of many other 
countries may in fact be enhanced. 

However, we have no illusions that the con- 
struction and deployment of missiles of any 
kind is the preferred road to security. It is not. 
The events which led to our decision simply 
underscore the urgent importance of pursuing 
negotiations on a limitation of strategic offen- 
sive and defensive missiles. Despite our lack of 
success thus far, the United States remains 
ready to open talks on this subject at any time. 

Mr. President, these developments once again 
demonstrate the urgent need not only for a non- 
proliferation treaty but for all the necessary 
steps toward general and complete disarma- 
ment. Let no one imagine that the building or 
acquisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap se- 
curity. True security for all powers, nuclear and 
nonnuclear alike, lies in progress on the entire 
range of arms control and disarmament meas- 
ures — including control of the strategic arms 
race, a verifiable comprehensive test ban, and a 
cutoff of production of fissionable materials for 
weapons purposes. The sum of such acts will 
help to build a more secure world for all. 

Colonial Issues 

Mr. President, the fourth great problem 
which I wish to discuss is that of assuring self- 
detenuination and full nationhood to all peoples 
who still live in colonial subjection. 

Our Assembly agenda reminds us that the 
work of ending the colonial age is far from fin- 

' For an address by Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. IS, see 
iUd., Oct. 9, 1967, p. 443. 



ished. In fact, the hardest problems have re 
mained until the last. This is true above all inj 
the southern portion of the African Continent, 
where white mmorities have become deeply en- 
trenched in their dominion over black majori- 
ties. In much of this area we see not one evil 
but two evils which, under one guise or another, 
go hand in hand: colonialism and that partic- 
iilarly cruel offense against human rights, 
racial discrimination. 

The opposition of the United States to these |ofe 
twin evils draws strength from two of the deep- 
est elements in our own national life : our his- 
toric stand as an anticolonial power and oui 
continuing struggle against racial injustice 
among our own people. 

My country, founded on the proposition that 
all men are created equal and have equal rights 
before the law and currently engaged in a 
vigorous nationwide program to make that 
equality real for all its citizens, cannot and will 
not adopt a double standard on what is hap- 
pening m the southern part of Africa. 

To those who are impatient for redress oJ: 
grievances we shall show that we sympathize 
with them and support their objectives, even 
though we may not always agree on the specific 
steps to be taken by the international 

To those who, on the other hand, resist all 
change we shall continue to insist that the way 
to preserve peace is not the submergence of 
legitimate grievances but their timely redress, 
And we shall unceasingly bring home to them 
America's pi'ofound conviction that apartheid — 
like every other form of white supremacy — is. 
as my predecessor, Adlai Stevenson, said, 
"racist in its origins, arrogant in its implemen^ 
tation, and, in its consequences, potentially dan^ 
gerous for all." " 

Mr. President, during the coming 3 months 
the General Assembly will address itself not 
only to the questions we have discussed in this 
statement but to a vast range of matters affect- 
ing the peace and welfare of mankind both now 
and in the long future. My delegation will seek 
to particijjate constructively in the Assembly's 
many concerns; and on a number of topics of 

" For a statement by Ambassador Stevenson in the 
U.N. Security Council on June 16, 1964, see iUd., July 6; 
1964, p. 29. 



particular interest we shall present proposals of 
our own. 

The United States turns to these tasks in a 
mood of sober determination. Our distin- 
guished Secretary-General, in the introduction 
to his amiual report,^" has made clear his view 
that tliis has not been a good year for the United 
Nations; and we agree with that assessment. 
The fault lies not in the organization itself but 
in ourselves, its members; and it is to our own 
policies that we must all look if we desire a bet- 
ter fviture. 

In serving the cause of a just and peaceful 
world, we are not permitted the luxury of being 
easily discouraged. Indeed, the most forbidding 
obstacles are precisely those which should call 
forth our most persistent efforts. Nor should we 
look for any alternative to the United Nations, 
for there is none. Year in and year out, through 
all the difnculties that may arise, we must strive 
», to be true, both in word and deed, to the perma- 
nent pledge of peace and justice which we, as 
members, have made to the United Nations and 
to one another. 

' U.N. doc. A/6701/Add. 1. 

As this 22d General Assembly opens, the 
United States once again solemnly reaffirms its 
devotion to that pledge. 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 22cl U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 22 confirmed the 
nominations of the following to be representa- 
tives and alternate representatives of the United 
States to the 22d session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations : 

Arthur J. Goldberg 
William B. Buffum 
L. H. Fountain, U.S. Representative from the State 

of North Carolina 
William S. Broomfield, U.S. Representative from 

the State of llichigan 
Adrian S. Fisher 

Alternate Representatives 
I. W. Abel 
Robert S. Benjamin 
Hector P. Garcia 
Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris 
Herbert R. O'Conor, Jr. 

OCTOBER 16, 1961 



OAS Foreign Mmisters Take Steps Against Cuban Subversion 

The -final flenary sessions of the Ttvelfth 
Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of For- 
eign Affairs of the Organizatio7i of American 
States were held at Washington September 23- 
^4- Following are statements made hy Secretary 
Rush on Sefteniber 23 and 24 and the text of the 
Final Act signed at the closing session on 
September 24- 

Statement of September 23 

Press release 207 (revised ; as delivered) dated September 23 

It is a great personal pleasure for me to meet 
again with my colleagues, my fellow Foreign 
Ministers. I have listened with great respect to 
the statements that have already been made here, 
especially those made by the distinguished For- 
eign Ministers of Venezuela and Bolivia. The 
presentation of the Bolivian Foreign Minister 
yesterday made clear the extent of Cuban sub- 
version and intervention in the internal affairs 
of his country. 

The task in front of us is a very simple one. 
It is to make it clear to Castro that these activi- 
ties must stop. Beginning with the Eiglith INIeet- 
ing of Foreign ^Ministers in January 1962,^ we 
have worked together to build up our national 
and international defenses against Castro's 
threat to our free institutions and peoples. 

We have thus recognized and acted upon the 
principle of solidarity and mutual security. 
This same principle of cooperation is inhei-ent 
in our efforts to develop the hemisphere eco- 
nomically and socially; it undergirds the Alli- 
ance for Progress; it was our basic guide at the 
meeting of our Presidents last April; it is em- 
bodied in the revisions of our charter. All of us 
accept the premise that each country has an 
obligation to help itself, but all of us have also 

' For background and texts of the resolutions adopted 
at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Jan. .31, 1962, see Bul- 
letin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 


accepted the obligation for mutual assistance 
to each other. 

Now Venezuela invokes the principle of 
mutual security to defend itself and the hemi- 
sphere against subversive aggression spawned 
and directed from Cuba. As the problem is a. 
common one to all of us, so must be our response. 

The steps we have already taken have not so 
far prevented Castro from continuing to pursue 
his objective. But they have been important 
measures in preventing him from achieving it. 
The Castro Communist record of the last years 
does not make pleasant reading : killings, burn- 
mgs, kidnapings, sabotage, urban terrorism, and 
guerrilla warfare. However, despite all of 
Castro's efforts at subversion, despite all his at- 
tempts to exploit every real or supposed politi- 
cal, economic, and social weakness in the hemi- 
sphere, and despite all of his maneuvering and 
opportunistic shifting of political alliances, he 
has not succeeded. The Castro Communists have 
failed to achieve the general public support they 
have sought ; they have failed to fire the imagi- 
nations or capture the allegiance of significant 
groups of our peoples; they have failed to dis- 
rupt tlie forward march of our economic and 
social development under the Alliance for Prog- 
ress : they have failed in their efforts to turn the 
Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the hemi- 
sphere; they have failed to come even close to 
achieving power outside of Cuba itself. 

There is no need, therefore, for us to exag- 
gerate the ability of the present Cuban regime 
to subvert our peoples or overthrow our institu- 

However, it would be imprudent not to recog- 
nize that tliese Cuba-directed efforts do consti- 
tute a problem of common concern to the hemi- 
sphere. It would be imprudent to be indifferent 
to the violence and disruption which such sub- 
versive activities can produce. It would be im- 
prudent not to stop these activities at tlie very 
beginning before any momentum is achieved. 

We are now confronted with tlie latest ex- 
amples of Castro's efforts. Venezuela has pre- 



sented to us a pervasive case of Cuban interven- 
tion and subversion, and we have before us the 
report of Committee I that provides additional 
information to corroborate the Venezuelan 
charges. Here we see once more the panorama of 
Cuban intervention : the training, arming, land- 
ing, and support of Venezuelan guerrillas and 
terrorists, with the assistance of the Cuban 
armed forces and intelligence services; the 
maintenance of clandestine networks for com- 
munications, travel, sabotage, and espionage; 
and the constant outpouring of propaganda to 
incite and encourage armed violence against 
the democratic government and people of 

The Committee concludes that the specific case 
of the landing of guerrillas in May 1967 was 
"planned and executed imder the direction of 
the Government of Cuba and with the partici- 
pation of members of the Cuban Armed Forces." 

If there were any question as to Cuban re- 
sponsibility, that question was obviated by the 
public admission of responsibility by the Cen- 
tral Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, 
of which Castro is chairman. 

And the comments of the report on the gen- 
eral policy of the present Government of Cuba 
are equally underscored by the repeated declara- 
tions by Castro and by the unhappy experience 
of other countries. 

Our distinguished colleague from Bolivia has 
given us detailed proof of men and equipment 
and attempts at armed subversion in his 

In an effort to provide greater international 
backing and structure for the whole subversive 
effort, the "Tricontinental Conference" was held 
in Havana in January 1966 and created the so- 
called Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples 
Solidarity Organization and the so-called Latin 
American Solidarity Oi'ganization, both with 
the same objective: the overthrow of existing 
governments. As the recent LASO conference 
in Havana revealed, that organization is a device 
for Castro to exert leadership over extremist 
elements and subversive jnovements in the hemi- 
sphere. Its participants, having endorsed 
Castro's advocacy of armed struggle, are now 
filtering back to their countries carrying that 

Castro and his LASO colleagues not only ad- 
vocate armed struggle throughout Latin Amer- 
ica but are now attempting to relate this thesis 
to the United States by claiming a kinship with 
the struggle for Negro rights and by advocating 

armed violence in our cities. All responsible 
American Negroes reject these efforts to cap- 
italize on their — and our — grave problems. They 
want nothing to do with Castro Communist 
guerrilla, terrorist, or other subversive move- 
ments. As in all our countries, the underprivi- 
leged peoples of the United States are deter- 
mined to achieve a better life but reject alien 
and repugnant ideologies. 

We must neither exaggerate nor underesti- 
mate the importance of LASO. It is not as 
"Latin American" as its sponsors claim, nor 
does it have the "solidarity" that its name im- 
plies. It is so far essentially an instrument of 
the Cuban regime, designed to carry out 
Llavana's program of guerrilla warfare and 
urban terrorism. The predominance of the vio- 
lent line at the conference was achieved at the 
expense of a deepening split between his ex- 
tremist Marxist adherents and some of the 
orthodox Moscow-line Communist parties who 
currently prefer the so-called via pacifica. 

Nevertheless, we must remember that these are 
differences over tactics, and sometimes over 
strategy, but not over final goals. Communist 
dictatorship remains the final Communist ob- 

Seeing these efforts in their true perspective, 
what measures should we now consider for 
joint action at this session — in addition, of 
course, to standing firm in our hemispheric 
policy of diplomatic, political, and economic 
isolation of the Cuban regime ? 

These actions and policies of the present gov- 
ernment of Cuba deserve condemnation and 
denunciation as flagrant violations of interna- 
tional treaties, of the principles of international 
law and the standards of conduct among na- 
tions. This is a matter which is of concern not 
only to the OAS but to the United Nations. 

We should also make clear to those govern- 
ments actively supporting the present govern- 
ment of Cuba our concern at their policy, par- 
ticularly as these same governments are actively 
seeking increased relations with the govern- 
ments aroimd this table. If they are interested 
in relaxing tensions or more normal relations, we 
may ask why they finance a government pub- 
licly committed to our destruction. It would be 
difficult to imagine that Castro could continue 
his efforts without the economic support he re- 
ceives from countries of the Communist world, 
which is currently estimated at approximately 
$1 million a day. 

We can also seek greater cooperation from our 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 


free-world friends in denying to Cuba resources 
which help it to carry out its subversive activi- 
ties. In 1964 we appealed to friendly nonmember 
countries to cooperate in the policy of the OAS, 
but there is still a substantial flow of free- world 
trade which helps Castro to release resources to 
finance subversive activity in Latin America. 

We ask our friends abroad to consider 
whether such assistance to the Cuban govern- 
ment is in their interest and consistent with the 
close and friendly relationsliips which ought to 
bind us to each other. We are not trying to im- 
pose our will on the internal affairs of a small 
country. The Castro regime, as we determined 
at Punta del Este in 1962, is repugnant to and 
incoinpatible with the inter-American system. 
It has imposed on the Cuban people a police 
state that tolerates no dissent, that permits no 
freedom, and whose witnesses are the '■'■faredon" 
the jails, and the hundreds of thousands 
of citizens who have fled and continue to flee 
their motherland. Nevertheless, the reason for 
our policy of isolating Cuba under its present 
government is not its internal system but 
Castro's policies of promoting and assisting sub- 
version and terrorism in the other countries of 
the hemisphere and of maintaining military ar- 
rangements with an estracontinental power — 
arrangements which at one time brought the 
world to the point of its highest crisis. Until 
Castro desists fi-om these policies, tlie OAS must 
maintain measures that isolate Cuba from the 
society of free men. 

And there is more we can and should do in- 
dividually and jointly to strengthen our own 
defenses and to take practical steps to imple- 
ment measures which have been recommended 
to us by competent OAS bodies. We can and 
should intensify our vigilance along our coasts 
and frontiers. We can and should intensify the 
cooperative efforts and arrangements among 
neighboring countries and especially among 
those countries most directly affected by the 
Castro Communist threat. 

There may be other threats. But these are rea- 
sonable steps tailored to the dimensions of the 
immediate threat. They are measures necessary 
for the safety and self-protection of our citizens. 

Let us also pause to look at the larger perspec- 
tive. Hemispheric security is fimdamental and 
requires constant vigilance, but it is only a small 
part of our overall effort. Let us keep in mind 
that the nations of Latin America are utilizing 
only 114 percent of their total resources for mat- 


ters of defense, with the remaining 981^ percent 
being invested in economic and social develop- 
ment and human welfare. While we take serious 
note of security threats, wlule we condemn the 
neighborhood delinquents who are responsible 
for these threats, we cannot permit this handful 
of i^eddlers of violence to distract us from our 
major task in this hemisphere. 

Our number-one purpose remains the realiza- 
tion of peaceful revolution through the Alliance 
for Progress. We seek not to destroy but through 
"a vast effort to bring a better life to all the 
people of the Continent." ^ 

If the first 6 years of the Alliance have not 
seen adequate solutions to many of the problems 
that still beset us, we now know that this is a 
good beginning. The Presidents of America in 
Punta del Este tliis year gave us new direc- 
tions and new stimulation. Our intensified ded- 
ication, our best talents, will be required. We 
know the way will not be quick nor easy; as 
President Johnson has said, and repeated yester- 
day at our luncheon,^ "We will persevere. There 
is no limit to our commitment. We are in this 
fight to stay all the way." 

In this gi-eat adventure of the Alliance for 
Progress we wish the Cuban people could join 
us, for it must be increasingly clear to them that 
under the present system there are no prospects 
for an improvement of living conditions or for 
greater personal freedom. The tragedy is that 
were it not for the militancy of Castro and those 
closest to him, Cuban problems would by no 
means be insoluble. Men of good will in Cuba 
and, indeed, in the United States and other 
coimtries supported the idea of democratic 
revolution and effective reforms in the spirit 
of the Alliance for Progress — reforms which, 
unlike those imposed by Castro, would give the 
Cuban people a better way of life and the free- 
dom denied to them under the corrupt and dic- 
tatorial governments of the past and the Com- 
mimist police state of the present. This was the 
orginal hope of many who supported that 
revolution in 1959 — that there would be brought 
about in Cuba a progressive, democratic re- 
public. We are confident that this genuine revo- 
lution will live again and that the martyred 
people of that oppressed island will be free from 
foreign Communist domination, free to choose 

' For text of tlie Declaration to the Peoples of 
America signed at Punta del Este on Aug. 17, 1061, see 
i&»f?., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462. 

' See p. 498. 



their own leaders, and free to join the rest of the 
peoples of the hemisphere in our common efforts 
to secure for each person the liberty, dignity, 
and the well-being which is the rightful heritage 
of all the citizens of this great hemisphere. 

Statement of September 24 

It seems to me that we have had a very good 
meeting indeed, demonstrating the solidarity 
and unity of the hemisphere. Of course, not 
every delegation has been able to agree on every 
point with every other delegation. I myself com- 
mented on the applicability of international law 
to paragraph 6 of the principal resolution. But 
I think tliat every delegation made a maximum 
effort to find a common ground ; and that com- 
mon ground was support and solidarity for 
Venezuela and Bolivia, the targets of guerrilla 
activity supiDorted by Castro. 

First, we have sent a message of support to the 
people of Venezuela and Bolivia. 

We have sent a message to Castro making it 
clear to him that he must — sooner rather than 
later — stop his subversive activities in the 

We have sent a message to the friendly coun- 
tries of the free world asking that they show 
solidarity with those countries that are trying 
to build a world where free men can live in peace. 

We have sent a message to those supporting 
Castro making it clear that we do not under- 
stand how they can pretend to be for peaceful 
coexistence at a time when they are providing 
Castro the means to continue his policy of ag- 
gression in this hemisphere. 

We have sent a message to the people of this 
hemisphere making it clear that we will persist 
in our efforts to attain the objectives set forth 
in the great decisions made by the Presidents of 
America at Punta del Este to effect social and 
economic development and to strengthen de- 
mocracy and the dignity of the individual. 

We have sent a message to the Cuban people 
letting them know that we all look forward to 
the time when a free Cuban people can return 
to this table and rejoin the family of the 

Looking back on the eventful episodes over the 
past several years, I would think that today the 
hemisphere is more united than ever, more de- 
termined than ever to assure the peace, security, 
tranquillity, and human liberty to which all of 
us aspire. 


Introductory Section 

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, convoked in accordance with the first 
part of Article 39 and with Article 40 of the Charter of 
the Organization of American States, was held at the 
Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., from June 19 
to September 24, 1967. 

The Meeting was convoked throucrh a resolution of the 
Council of the Organization of American States adopted 
on June 5, 1967, which read as follows : 

Whereas : 

On June 1, 1967, the Ambassador, Representative 
of "Venezuela, addressed a note to the Chairman of 
the Council, by which his government requested 
that a Meeting of Consultation be urgently con- 
voked, in accordance with the first part of Article 
39 and with Article 40 of the Charter of the Organ- 
ization of American States, to consider "the serious 
situation confronting the member states of this 
Organization as a consequence of the attitude of 
the present Government of Cuba, which is carrying 
out a policy of persistent intervention in their in- 
ternal affairs with violation of their sovereignty 
and integrity, by fostering and organizing subver- 
sive and terrorist activities in the territory of 
various states, with the deliberate aim of destroy- 
ing the principles of the inter-American system" ; 

The Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, 
has provided the infonnation on which that request 
was based ; and 

Article 39 of the Charter provides that "The 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems 
of an urgent nature and of common interest to the 
American States, . . ." 

The Council of the Oeganization of Amer- 
ican States 

Resolves : 

1. To convoke, in accordance with the first part 
of Article 39 and with Article 40 of the Charter of 
the Organization of American States, a Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
the American republics to consider the said 

2. To appoint a committee of nine members, to be 
designated by the Chairman of the Council, to make 
recommendations regarding the agenda, date, place, 
and regulations for that meeting. 

3. To inform the United Nations Security Coun- 
cil of the text of this resolution, in accordance with 
Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of 
the operative part of the resolution transcribed 
above, the Chairman of the Council, on that same day, 
appointed the delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Colom- 
bia, Guatemala, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, the United 
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela to make up that com- 
mittee, which later elected the Ambassador, Represent- 
ative of Venezuela, as its chairman. 

OCTOBEK 16, 19G7 


At the meeting of the Council of the Organization 
held on June 15, 1967, this committee submitted a re- 
port on the agenda, date, place, and regulations for 
the Meeting (Doc. 5), and a resolution was adopted in 
which the following agenda was proposed for the 
Meeting, which agenda was approved by the opening 
plenary session held on June 19, 1967 : 

1. The situation confronting the member states of 
the Organization of American States as a con- 
sequence of the attitude of the present Govern- 
ment of Cuba, which is carrying out a policy of 
persistent intervention in their internal affairs 
with violation of their sovereignty and integrity, 
by fostering and organizing subversive and 
terrorist activities in the territory of various 
states, with the deliberate aim of destroying the 
principles of the inter-American system. 

In the same resolution adopted on June 15, 1967, the 
Council set June 19, 1967, as the opening date for the 
Meeting and designated the Pan American Union as 
the place for it. 

The deliberations of the Meeting were governed by 
the Regulations of the Meeting of Consultation of Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs prepared by the Council of 
the Organization on March 1, 1951, and approved by 
the Meeting with certain transitory provisions appli- 
cable to it. 

The Meeting was attended, fr^ia June 19 through 
September 21, 1967, by special delegates of the Minis- 
ters of Foreign Affairs (Doc. 17), and beginning Sep- 
tember 22, 1967, the following members of the Meeting, 
listed in the order of precedence established by lot, 
participated : 


His Excellency Julio Prado Vallejo 

Mini-ster of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Gabriel Valdfe S. 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Nicanor Costa Mtodez 

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship 
Costa Rica 

His Excellency Fernando Lara Bustamante 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Germdn Zea Herndndez 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency H6ctor Luisi 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
The Dominican Republic 

His Excellency Fernando Amiama Ti6 

Secretary of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Ignacio Iribarren Borges 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Emilio Arenales Cataldn 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Edgardo Seoane Corrales 

Minister of State in the OflBce 
of Foreign Affairs 



His Excellency Antonio Carrillo Flores 

Secretary of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Fern D. Baguidy 

Ambassador, Representative of Haiti 
on the Council of the Organization 

His Excellency Walter Guevara Arze 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Fernando Eleta A. 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Raul Sapena Pastor 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Jos6 de Magalhaes Pinto 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Trinidad and Tobago 

His Excellency A. N. R. Robinson 

Minister of External Affairs 
The United States 

The Honorable Dean Rusk 

Secretary of State 
El Salvador 

His Excellency Alfredo Martinez Moreno 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Tiburcio Carias Castillo 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency Lorenzo Guerrero 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

His Excellency JosS A. Mora, Secretary General of 
the Organization of American States, also attended 
the Meeting. 

As established in the Regulations of the Meeting, the 
Secretary of the Council of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States, Dr. William Sanders, served as Secretary 
General of the Meeting, and the Secretary General of 
the Organization appointed Mr. Santiago Ortiz as As- 
sistant Secretary General of the Meeting. 

In accordance with the Regulations of the Meeting, 
the Secretary General of the Organization of American 
States installed the opening session on the afternoon 
of June 19, 1967. At this session. His Excellency 
Eduardo Ritter AisU'ui, Special Delegate to Panama, 
was elected President of the Meeting. Also, the agree- 
ments reached at the preliminary .session with respect 
to the Agenda and Regulations of the Meeting and the 
membership of the Committee on Credentials and the 
Coordinating and Drafting Committee were ratified. 

At the .same opening session, a resolution was 
adopted, authorizing appointment of a committee "to go 
to Venezuela to gather additional information and to 
make such verilication as it considers advLsable of the 
events that took place in Venezuela and that were de- 
nounced by the government of that country. . . ." 
Committee I was composed of the special delegates of 
Costa Rica (Chairman), Peru (Rapporteur), Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, and the United States. 

At the plenary session held on July 10, 1967, the 
Meeting resolved to establish an eight-member com- 
mittee (Committee II), to prepare a report on events 


related to the so-called Afro-Asian Latin American 
Peoples' Solidarity Conference tbat had occurred since 
the report of October 24, 1966, presented by the Speoial 
Committee to Study Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the 
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 

Committee II of the Meeting of Consultation was 
composed of the special delegates of Peru (Chairman), 
Trinidad and Tobago (Rapporteur), and Argentina, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate- 
mala, and the United States. 

Committee I, appointed at the opening session, was 
in Venezuela from June 23 to 27, and on July 26, 1967, 
at the third plenary session of the Meeting, it presented 
its report on the events that had occurred in that 

At the fourth plenary session, held on August 2, Com- 
mittee II, established by the resolution of July 10, pre- 
sented a report on events related to the so-called Afro- 
Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference 
that had occurred since the report of October 24, 1966, 
represented by the Special Committee of the Council 
of the Organization. 

In accordance with the Regulations, the Meeting 
appointed a Committee on Credentials, composed of 
Guatemala, Mexico, and Paraguay. It also appointed 
a Coordinating and Drafting Committee, made up of 
Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago. 

In accordance with the transitory provisions of the 
Regulations, a General Committee was established, 
made up of all the members. His Excellency Alfredo 
Vazquez Carrizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia, and 
His Excellency Ramon de Clairmont Dueilas, Special 
Delegate of El Salvador, were appointed Chairman and 
Rapporteur, respectively, of the General Committee. 
Later, when Mr. Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, Special 
Delegate of Colombia, ceased to represent his country 
at the Meeting, His Excellency Eduardo Roca, Special 
Delegate of Argentina, was elected Chairman of the 
General Committee. 

At the meeting of the General Committee held on 
August 3, there was general agreement that most of 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states 
would be willing to attend the Meeting personally be- 
ginning September 22, 1967. 

On that date, a new preliminary session was held, 
attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at which 
agreement was reached on the new officers of the 
Meeting. At the Fifth Plenary Session, held on the same 
day. His Excellency Hector Luisi, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Uruguay, was elected President of the 

At the tenth meeting of the General Committee, 
held on September 23, 1967. His Excellency Nicanor 
Costa M4ndez, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Wor- 
ship of Argentina, was elected Chairman of the Com- 
mittee, and His Excellency Alfredo Martinez Moreno, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, was 
elected Rapporteur. 

At the same meeting, the General Committee also 
formed a Working Group made up of the delegations 
of Costa Rica (Chairman), Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co- 
lombia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, the United 
States, and Venezuela, which undertook a study of 
the various drafts and resolutions presented and sub- 
mitted its conclusions to the General Committee. 

This Final Act of the Meeting was signed at the 
closing session, which took place on September 24, 
1967. This session was addressed by His Excellency 
Walter Guevara Arze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Bolivia, who spoke on behalf of the delegations, and 
His Excellency Hector Luisi, Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs of Uruguay, President of the Meeting. 

As a result of its discussions, the Twelfth Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
adopted the following resolutions : 

Resolution I 

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, 

Considering : 

The note dated June 1. 1967, addressed by the Rep- 
resentative of Venezuela to the Chairman of the Coun- 
cil of the Organization and in the statement made by 
the Special Delegate of Venezuela during the plenary 
se.ssion held today, 

Resolves : 

1. To authorize its President to appoint a commit- 
tee to go to Venezuela to gather additional informa- 
tion and to make such verification as it considers 
advisable of the events that took place in Venezuela 
and were denounced by the government of that coun- 
try in its note dated June 1, 1967, to the Chairman of 
the Council of the Organization of American States, 
which was considered at the special meeting held by 
that Organ on June 5. 

2. To request the American governments and the 
Secretary General of the Organization to cooperate 
with the Committee, which will begin to work as soon 
as it has been constituted. 

3. That the Committee .shall render a report to the 
Meeting of Consultation as soon as possible. 

4. To inform the Security Council of the United 
Nations of the text of the present resolution, in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

Resolution II 

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, 

Resolves : 

1. To establish an eight-member committee to pre- 
pare a report on events related to the so-called Afro- 
Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference 
that have occurred since the report of October 24, 
1966, presented by the Special Committee to Study 
Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 

2. To authorize the President of the Twelfth Meet- 
ing of Consultation to designate the states that should 
compose the aforementioned committee. 

3. To request the Secretary General of the Organi- 
zation to give the committee the assistance it needs to 
achieve the objective stated above. 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 


Resolution III 

Whereas : 

The report of Committee I of tbe Twelfth Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs states 
among its conclusions that "it is clear that the present 
Government oZ Cuba continues to give moral and mate- 
rial support to the Venezuelan guerrilla and terrorist 
movement and that the recent iSeries of aggressive acts 
against the Government of Venezuela is part of the 
Cuban Government's continuing policy of persistent in- 
tervention in the internal affairs of other American 
states by fostering and organizing subversive and ter- 
rorist activities in their territories" ; 

Committee II of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, responsible for prepar- 
ing a report on events related to the so-called First 
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Confer- 
ence, stated that the so-called First Latin American 
Solidarity Conference, held in Havana from July 31 
to August 8, 1967, "represents a further step in the ef- 
forts of communism and other subversive forces in the 
hemisphere to promote, support, and coordinate guer- 
rilla, terrorist, and other subversive activities directed 
against established governments" and gives "testimony 
once again to the efforts of the Government of Cuba 
to control and direct these subversive activities in our 
hemisphere" ; 

During the course of the Twelfth Meeting of Con- 
sultation the Government of Bolivia has presented evi- 
dence of intervention by the Government of Cuba in 
the preparation, financing, and organization of guerrilla 
activities in its territory ; 

The difficult social and economic conditions under 
which the peoples of Latin America live serve commu- 
nism as a means for arousing the internal subversion 
that distorts the legitimate longings of our countries for 
justice and for change ; 

The affirmation that the democratic system is the 
proper path for achieving the desires of the Latin 
American peoples must be supported by suitable actions 
and programs that will promote the structural changes 
necessary for progress and for the strengthening of the 
system ; 

Economic cooperation among the American states to 
speed up and harmonize development is essential to 
the stability of democracy and the consolidation of the 
inter-American system in the face of the subversive 
aims of international communism ; 

Respect for and observance of human rights con- 
stitute a basic universal as well as inter-American 
juridical principle essential to the effective security of 
the hemisphere ; and 

In spite of this, in practice events occur that are in- 
compatible with the system of protection and guarantee 
that all countries are obligated to establish in behalf of 
the individual. 

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs 

Resolves : 

1. To condemn forcefully the present Government of 
Cuba for its repeated acts of aggression and interven- 
tion against Venezuela and for its persistent policy 
of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and of 
other American states, through incitement and active 


and admitted support of armed bands and other sub- 
versive activities directed against the governments of 
those states. 

2. To request the states that are not members of the 
Organization of American States and that share the 
principles of the inter-American system to restrict their 
trade and financial operations with Cuba and sea and 
air transport to that country, especially transactions 
and transportation conducted through state agencies, 
until such time as the Cuban regime ceases its policy 
of intervention and aggression, and to indicate to them 
that the granting of state credits or credit guarantees 
to private firms conducting such transactions cannot 
be viewed as a friendly gesture by the member states 
of the Organization ; and to this end to recommend to 
the member states that, individually or collectively, 
they reiterate this position to the governments of those 

3. To request the governments that support establish- 
ment of the so-called Afro-Asian-Latin American 
Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) to with- 
draw their support or adherence from that organiza- 
tion, and also from the "Second Tricontinental Confer- 
ence," scheduled to be held in Cairo in January 1968; 
to denounce these activities as contrary to the sover- 
eignty, peaceful relations, and social and economic de- 
velopment of the peoples; and to declare that support 
by countries outside the hemisphere to activities con- 
ducive to subversion in Latin America jeopardizes 
solidarity among the developing countries, the increas- 
ing importance of which is particularly reflected in the 
efforts being made to reorganize international trade on 
more equitable bases. 

4. To express to the states that are not members of 
the Organization of American States that support the 
Government of Cuba the serious concern of the mem- 
ber states of the Organization, inasmuch as that sup- 
port tends to stimulate the interventionist and aggres- 
sive activities of the Cuban regime against the countries 
of the Western Hemisphere, and since the cause of 
peaceful relations will be jeopardized so long as those 
activities continue ; and to this end, to recommend to 
the governments of the member states of the Organiza- 
tion that they carry out joint or individual represen- 
tations directed to the states that support the Govern- 
ment of Cuba, to manifest this concern to them. 

5. To recommend to the governments of the member 
.states of the Organization of American States that they 
apply strictly the recommendations contained in the 
first report of the Special Committee to Study Resolu- 
tions II. 1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consulta- 
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of July 3, 1963, 
relative to the prevention of propaganda and of the 
movement of funds and arms from Cuba and other il- 
legal sources to other American countries, as well as 
to the strengthening of controls on travel to and from 
Cuba in order to prevent the movement of subversive 
persons, and that they coordinate more effectively their 
efforts aimed at preventing such movements and 

6. To recommend to the governments of the member 
states of the Organization that, in accordance with 
their domestic legislation, they adopt or intensify, as 
appropriate, measures of vigilance and control on their 
respective coasts and borders, in order to prevent the 
entry into their own territory, or the exit, of men, arms. 


or equipment coming from Cuba aud intended for pur- 
poses of subversion and aggression. 

7. To recommend to the member states of the Or- 
ganization that, in accordance with their constitutional 
and legal provisions, they maintain, within their ter- 
ritory, the most strict vigilance over the activities of 
the so-called Latin American Solidarity Organization 
(LASO) and its national committees. 

8. To recommend to the member states of the Or- 
ganization the application, where necessary, of all the 
recommendations contained in the Report of the Special 
Committee to Study Resolutions II. 1 and VIII of the 
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For- 
eign Affairs, on the so-called First Afro-Asian-Latin 
American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its 
Projections ( "Tricontinental Conference of Havana"), 
dated November 28, 1966. 

9. To recommend to the governments of the member 
states that they take such steps as they deem pertinent 
in order to coordinate, among neighboring countries, 
the measures of vigilance, security, and information set 
forth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above. 

10. To recommend to the governments of the member 
states that they decline to ship any governmental or 
government-financed cargo in any vessel that, follow- 
ing the date of this resolution, has engaged in the ship- 
ment of cargo to or from Cuba, and that, in addition, 
the governments of the member states take the neces- 
sary measures to prohibit the supply of fuel to any 
such vessel in their ports, with the exception of cases 
in which shipments are made for humanitarian 

11. To reaffirm that the maintenance of order and of 
internal and external security is the exclusive respon- 
sibility of the government of each member state, with- 
out prejudice to its reiterated adherence to the 
principle of collective and mutual security for the 
preservation of peace, In accordance with the treaties 
on this subject. 

12. To express concern that the growth rates of the 
developing countries of Latin America and the degree 
of their participation in international trade are not 
equal to the corresponding rates of growth and expan- 
sion of trade of the industrialized countries of the 
world, and that this situation could result in new and 
more acute social conflicts that Castro-communism 
could use to advantage to provoke or intensify sub- 
version and violence and to upset the course of develop- 
ment of the hemisphere. 

13. To reaffirm that the principal means of achieving 
security and pro.sperity in the hemisphere is develop- 
ment by peaceful and democratic methods, and that the 
subversion promoted by Cuba disturbs that process. 

14. To reiterate its conviction that economic and 
social development can and should be achieved only 
within a system that respects democracy and human 
rights, and on the basis of actions and programs that 
will coordinate domestic efforts with international co- 
operation, to satisfy the undeferrable aspirations and 
needs of the people of the Americas. 

1.5. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organi- 
zation of American States to transmit to the Security 
Council of the United Nations the texts of this resolu- 
tion and of the reports of Committees I and II of this 
Meeting of Consultation, in accordance with Article 54 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 

Resolution IV 


Article 34 and the first paragraph of Article 35 of 
the Charter of the United Nations read as follows : 

Article 34. The Security Council may investigate 
any dispute, or any situation which might lead to 
international friction or give rise to a dispute, 
in order to determine whether the continuance of 
the dispute or situation is lilvely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 

Article 35. Any Member of the United Nations 
may bring any dispute, or any situation of the 
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention 
of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. 

Resolution 2131 (XX) of the General Assembly states 
the following in paragraphs 1 and 2 of its declarative 

1. No State has the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the inter- 
nal or external affairs of any other State. Con- 
sequently, armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the 
per.sonality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements are condemned ; 

2. No State may use or encourage the use of 
economic, political or any other type of measures 
to coerce another State in order to obtain from it 
the subordination of the exercise of its .sovereign 
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind., no State shall organize, assist, foment, 
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or 
armed activities directed towards the violent over- 
throw of the regime of another State, or interfere 
in civil strife in another State ; 


Under auspices of the present Government of Cuba, 
the so-called Latin American Solidarity Organization 
(LASO), meeting recently in Havana, passed resolu- 
tions and adopted agreements to ijromote subversive 
movements in the Latin American countries. 

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs 

Resolves : 

1. To recommend to the member states of the Or- 
ganization of American States that they bring to the 
attention of the competent organ of the United Nations 
the acts of the present Government of Cuba that run 
counter to the provisions cited of Resolution 2131 (XX) 
of the General Assembly. 

2. To request, in like manner, of the countries of 
the Latin American group in the United Nations that 
are not members of the Organization of American 
States, that they cooperate in the implementation of 
this resolution. 

Resolution V 

The foreign ministers meeting here reaffirm the dedi- 
cation of their governments to the cause of economic 
and social development of their peoples, within a frame- 
work of freedom and democracy, and declare that their 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 


efforts in this direction will not be deterred by the aim 
of any state or organization to subvert their institu- 
tions — an aim that those meeting here unanimously 

Resolution VI 

Wheeeas : 

This Meeting of Consultation was convoked in ac- 
cordance with the first part of Article 39 and with 
Article 40 of the Charter of the Organization ; and 

The preparation of the Final Act of the Twelfth 
Meeting of Consultation in the four official languages 
requires careful coordination which cannot be accom- 
plished satisfactorily in the limited time available, 

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs 

Resolves : 

1. To prepare the Final Act to be signed in only one 
of the official languages of the Meeting. 

2. To recommend to the Council of the Organization 
of American States that it constitute a committee of 
four of its members who will represent the four official 
languages of the Organization to coordinate the texts of 
the Final Act in the other three official languages. 

3. To authorize the Council to approve those three 
texts, which shall be considered official texts of the 
Final Act and shall become integral parts of it as it is 
signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 

4. That all the official texts of the Final Act shall 
be equally authentic. 

President' Johnson Welcomes 
OAS Foreign Ministers 

Following is a toast hy President Johnson 
at a White House luncheon on 8epteniber 22 
honoring the Ministers attending the 12th Meet- 
ing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af- 
fairs of the Organization of American States. 

White House press release dated September 22 

To the distinguished Foreign Ministers I 
want to say that it is a very siDecial pleasure 
for me to be able to dine with you in the White 
House today. Even though the United States is 
not the formal host of this meeting, I did use 
my constitutional powers to persuade Secretary 
Rusk that I should be your informal host. 

You have come here to Washington to con- 
sider the problems of Communist subversion in 
our hemisphere. Your task is to determine what 
action the inter-American community should 
take to improve its defense against this form of 


I think we will all agree that our principal 
weapons in this connection are those we forged 1 
together at Punta del Este in August 1961 and 
when we returned there in April 1967 : the Al- 
liance for Progress and the Summit program. 

These are the long-term guarantors of free- 
dom that we cherish so much. 

But we know that governments have imme- 
diate responsibilities as well as long-term ones — 
that these governments must meet terrorism and 
sabotage and they must meet it with resolute 
force where it is necessary ; that mutual support 
by neighboring countries strengthens their abil- 
ity always to deal with indirect aggression. 

Though we of the Americas are now con- 
fronted with a virulent form of subversion that 
is directed from Havana, tliere is really nothing 
new about that strategy. 

In 1951, speaking to the Vietnamese Com- 
munists, Ho Chi Minh threw out a quote from 
Lenin which I think is quite appropriate, and I 
would like to repeat it. "Lenin," Ho reminded 
his listeners, "said that if a compromise with 
bandits was advantageous to the revolution, he 
would do it." 

Several of your countries are coping with pre- 
cisely this kind of ideological gangsterism — this 
united front between agents of Castro, local ele- 
ments who have been given a new license for 
crimes against their fellow citizens, and the 
genuinely discontented who have been genuinely 
misled by Communist abstractions. 

We must observe that this struggle is costing 
you energies and resources that would much 
better be invested in projects that benefit your 
immediate peoples. You carry this burden and 
you support these costs — in your own defense 
and really in defense of the rest of us in this 

Halfway around this world another little 
nation is fighting a two-front war against pov- 
erty and subversion. It is fighting for the same 
goals of political, economic, social development, 
for the same right of self-determination and 
nonintervention that is basic to our own cher- 
ished inter- American system. As Benito Juarez 
said, "Respect for the rights of others is peace." 
No one could define the objectives that the 
United States is pursuing today in Viet-Nam 
more accurately than that. 

Last month Dr. Mora [Jose A. Mora, Secre- 
tary General of the OAS] organized a very spe- 
cial ceremony to mark the sixth amiiversarj^ of 
the Alliance for Progress. It was built around 
the essaj's that young peoj^le fi'om your coun- 


tries wrote about the Alliance for Progress. I 
was delighted that I was able to briefly partici- 
pate in that ceremony. On that occasion I said :^ 

If what we do is to really last, we must make this 
commitment to ourselves and to all of Latin America : 
We will persevere. There is no time limit to our com- 
mitment. We are in this fight to stay all the way. 

As we meet here in the State Dining Room at 
the Wliite House this afternoon, I want to re- 
peat that pledge to you. 

As members of a community that is richly 
blessed in spiritual heritage and material po- 
tential — that is blessed with unity and blessed 
with strength — I invite you to join me in a 
toast to the security and to the welfare of our 
own hemisphere, as well as to the defense of 
freedom everywhere in the world. 

President Johnson Signs 
IDB Authorization Bill 

Bemarhs iy President Johnson 

White House press release dated September 22 

The presence of the Foreign Ministers here 
in Washington has coincided with the passage 
by the Congress of a bill which forms a very 
major element of the United States participa- 
tion in the Alliance for Progress, of which we 
are all so very proud. 

The bill that I shall shortly sign authorizes a 
United States contribution of some $900 million 
to the Inter- American Development Bank over 
the next 3 years.^ 

Some of you will remember at Punta del Este 
last April I told my fellow Presidents of the 
recommendations that I had already, at that 
time, made to our Congress for increased finan- 
cial assistance to the Alliance. I said then that 
these recommendations represent "my convic- 
tions and my policy . . . (and) the decisions 
which you take here — and the followup action 
we take in the months ahead — will enable me to 
pursue tliat policy." ^ 

' Bulletin of Sept. 4, 1967, p. 287. 

'As enacted, the bill (H.R. 9.547) is Public Law 

Tor a statement made by President Johnson at 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Apr. 12, see Bulixtin of 
May 8, 1967, p. 707. 

Wlien the Board of Governors of the Bank 
met to review the decisions of the Presidents, 
they decided not only to expand the resources 
of the Bank but also to change the ratio of the 
contributions of the Bank. They lowered the 
proportionate share of the United States from 
5 : 1 to 3 : 1. That act of self-help and mutual 
assistance played a very key role in the Con- 
gress' decision to increase the United States 
quota by $150 million. 

It gives me great pleasure to ask you to come 
here with me today — to join you in this brief 
ceremony to share my satisfaction in signing 
this bill into law. 

The Inter- American Development Bank has 
become a major instrument of the Alliance for 
Progress — and a model for the other regions of 
the world. In the brief span of 7 years the Bank 
has built a very solid record of accomplishment : 

— Through June of this year it had author- 
ized 414 loans that totaled $2.1 billion, of which 
224 loans, amoiuiting to $1.2 billion, have been 
approved just during the past 81/^ years that 
I have been President. 

— Almost half of the total amount authorized, 
some $915 million, is already at work in projects 
in every single country of Latin America. 

— With initiative and drive it has mobilized 
$205 million in Europe, Canada, and Japan that 
we are using in Latin America. 

A review of the Bank's portfolio shows that 
it is as much a neigliborhood bank serving the 
interests of the people as an international bank 
supporting great national and multinational 
enterprises. For its money : 

• — finances the village water supplies as well as 
hydroelectric power plants. 

— builds rural schools as well as modern fac- 

— constructs feeder roads as well as liighways. 

— provides credits for small crafts as well as 
large industries. 

— trains laborers and technicians as well as 
assists institutions of higher learning. 

— underwrites moderate-priced housing as 
well as major public works. 

The Bank is the vanguard of planning for the 
future of the hemisphere. The bill that I am 
about to sign, we think, advances tliis program 
and supports the expanded direction of it. We 
think it is a vote of confidence by the American 
Congress in the Bank and particularly of those 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 



who manage the Bank's affairs. It is an earnest 
of tlie commitment of the United States Con- 
gress and i^eople to the Alliance for Progress 
and to the Summit decisions. 

We are very proud, as I have said, of the 
progress that has been made and the resources 
that have been assembled, and particularly the 

fact that other nations of the world are lookmg 
with inquiry and checking the statements and 
trying to see how they can emulate what we have 
done here. 

I am so glad that we can move it a little step 
forward today and that you can share with me 
the pride that we all have in tliis joint venture. 

President Saragat of Italy Visits the United States 

Gu'isefpe Saragat, President of the Italian 
Repuhllc, visited the United States September 
18-21. He met with President Johnson and other 
Government officials in Washington September 
18-19. Folloiving are an exchange of rerrvarks 
hetioeen President Johnson and President Sara- 
gat at a welcoming ceremony on September IS, 
their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White 
House on September 19, and a joint statement 
issued September 19 at the conclusion of tlieir 


White House press release dated September 18 
President Johnson 

I am honored to extend America's wann wel- 
come to our friends from Italy. 

We know President Saragat as the leader of 
a very great and venerated nation. We know 
him also as a patriot who fought for freedom, 
who knew the bitterness of exile, and who now 
leads a free people to new prosperity. 

As we speak here today on the "V^Hiite House 
lawn, we are being seen and heard by the good 
people of Italy by means of communications 
satellite and a new station at Fucino. 

So I have the chance, Mr. President, not only 
to address our welcome to you but also to speak 
to your people. 

I want them to know of our affection and our 
esteem for Italy. Italy has enriched America 
beyond measure; it has earned a debt beyond 

A coimtry is no more than its people, and 
America has been blessed with millions of fami- 


lies who trace their ancestry back to Italy. They 
have given color, force, and vitality to our Amer- 
ican character. 

Our people are united both in blood and by 
a love of beauty. The genius of your people has 
made Italian art and literature, music, science, 
and architecture a treasure of our Western 

Last year when the floods came to Florence, it 
was not only Italy that felt the shock of loss; it 
was the entire world. It was not only the people 
of Italy who responded ; it was the people of the 
world. I am very proud that so many Americans 
played a part in helping to repair and restore' 
those works of man's spirit. 

Because we love Italy, Americans rejoice in 
your country's unprecedented prosperity and 
the well-being it is bringing to your people. The 
remarkable I'ecovery that has marked your econ- 
omy in the past few years has established Italy 
as a strong partner in the European community. 
It gives convincing evidence of the energy and 
skills that are characteristic of the Italian 

The interest our two peoples have in each 
other is very real. Last year 613,000 Americansi 
toured Italy and nearly 45,000 Italians visited 
America. I hope thousands more Italians will 
come to visit us in America. Each visit, by each 
person, is still another bond between us. Wliether 
W3 meet as lieads of state or just as vacationing 
tourists, we have much to learn from each other. 

For the past two decades, our nations have 
been joined in an intimate partnership and al- 
liance. Yon, Mr. President, were among the 
first to recognize the necessity of that partner- 
ship. You have always been its advocate and 


You have been, in the woi'ds of Dante, ". . . 
like a firm tower that never sways from the 
blowing of the winds." 

An Italian led the way to the New World. So 
has modern Italy led in the rebuilding of the 

Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that 
Mrs. Johnson, I, and other members of our offi- 
cial family, welcome you here to the White 
House this afternoon. 

We know that our talks will be most pleasant 
and most rewarding. Thank you for having 

iPresident Saragat 

I sincerely tliank you for the courteous words 
with which you have welcomed us; and I am 
happy to extend to you, and to the great nation 
that you guide, the greeting of Italy. 

The Italian people look to the United States 
as a friend and ally, to which they are bound by 
many common ties of civilization, a longstand- 
ing tradition of intense political, cultural, and 
economic relations, and by an ardent faith in 
the great ideals of liberty and human dignity. 

These ties, this tradition, and this faith con- 
stitute the foundations on which the solid edifice 
of friendship between our two nations has been 
built, a friendship which, while having its roots 
in the distant past, has always been renewing 
itself and which is, today more than ever, alive, 
vigorous, and rich in benefits for our people, 
furthering freedom, security, and peace for all 
and being therefore an element of progress for 
mankind as a whole. 

Great men in the history of our countries — 
men who have left an important imprint in all 
fields of human civilization — have taken part 
and are now taking part in the construction of 
this edifice of friendship. But foremost in my 
thoughts is the landing in this free country of 
millions of Italians who have found here a home 
and work, bringing with them the contribution 
of their untiring ingenuity. 

They are proud to be citizens of the free 
American Republic, as they are of their Italian 
heritage. They constitute a powerful bond of 
friendship between two peoples who have been 
brought close together by common ideals, his- 
torical events, and teclinological progress. I 
have mentioned teclinological progress also be- 
cause, as you yourself have recalled, an Ameri- 
can satellite and several very modem installa- 

OCTOBEK 16, 1967 

tions built in Italy are permitting Italians and 
Americans to see and hear us at this very 
moment on both sides of the Atlantic. 

The invitation that you, Mr. President, have 
kindly extended to me confirms the friendship 
which links our two countries, a friendship not 
only of Governments but also — which is more 
important — of peoples. In this way we are of- 
fered the possibility of having an open and 
frank exchange of views which will include the 
problems of common and direct interest as well 
as the more general problems whose solution is 
daily becoming more urgent and more necessary 
if mankind is to enjoy — as we fervidly wish — 
the benefits of peace, of justice and liberty for 
which it is striving to the utmost. 

Mr. President, I am very grateful to you for 
having offered me the opportimity to return 
once again to the hospitable soil of America. I 
am sure that I shall be able to look again at the 
gratifying reality of the friendly relations that 
bind our two countries and to contribute, with 
you, to their further strengthening. 


White House press release dated September 19 

President Johnson 

First, let me, on behalf of all the American 
people, Mr. President, wish you a very happy 
birthday. We are so glad that you could be here 
to celebrate it with us. 

Mr. President, I know that in your country it 
is the custom for a man to spend his birthday 
in the company of his family and friends. Here 
tonight are two members of your family, and 
everyone else in the room is your friend. We all 
wish you the good health, long life, and con- 
tinued success that you so richly deserve. 

When I greeted you yesterday I mentioned 
the great debt that our country owes to your 
country — that America owes to Italy — and to 
the millions of Italians who have helped to build 
America into what it is. 

In our Congress — and with us tonight — are 
Members who are proud to trace their ancestry 
to your land. Some of their names have the 
very sound of Italy in them : [John O.] Pastore 
and [Frank] Annunzio, [Emilio Q.] Daddario 
and [Peter W.] Rodino, [Josepli P.] Vigorito 
and [Frank J.] Brasco, [Silvio O.] Conte and 
[Joseph P.] Addabbo. And many, many more 
whom I do not have the time to list, including 


some who roam around the White House in the 
late hours of the evening named [Jack] Valenti 
and [Joseph A.] Califano. 

The roster of great Italian-Americans is far 
too long for me to recite to you tonight, but I 
will mention one, Enrico Fermi. As you once 
were, Mr. President, he was exiled from his 
country, and he found haven here. Twenty-five 
years ago this December, at our own University 
of Chicago, this brilliant physicist achieved 
mankind's first nuclear chain reaction. It 
ushered in a new age. Dr. Arthur Compton, in a 
very guarded telephone call to a colleague, said, 
"The Italian navigator has just landed in the 
New World." 

Our conversations, Mr. President, have dealt 
in part with how we may maintain the peace 
in this new nuclear world that your brilliant 
countryman has led us into. I believe our talks 
yesterday and again today have advanced the 
quest for peace that unites our nations. I know 
that they have strengthened the historic friend- 
ship that abides between us. 

Here tonight at the Wliite House, Mr. Presi- 
dent, I am going to ask the ladies and gentlemen 
who have come from throughout our land to be 
here with you this evening to join me as I offer 
a toast to a good friend and a great man : His 
Excellency the President of the Republic of 

President Saragat 

Mr. President, I wish first of all to thank you 
most deeply for the friendly and cordial wel- 
come extended to me, to Foreign Minister 
[Amintore] Fanfani, and to the members of our 

May I thank you also very much, Mr. Presi- 
dent, for the very kind wishes that you have 
extended to me on the occasion of my birthday. 

It appears that it is my destiny to have my 
birthday on the American Continent. Two years 
ago I had my birthday in the city of Santiago, 
in Chile; and this is probably due to the fact 
that, as you said, one has one's own birthday 
with friends and with one's own family. I feel 
that something pushes me to all the countries 
of this continent where there are very dear 

I have listened with the greatest attention to 
the words which you have just spoken. Our two 
countries have known and appreciated each 
other for a long time. 


Italy does not forget, as I had the occasio: ,f' 

to recall in the Campidoglio during the celt 
bration of the 10th anniversary of the Treat; 
of Rome, that twice in this century the Unitei stflj 
States has contributed decisively to the rescu Ife' 
of the liberty of Western Europe and, with it, th p!"' 
liberty of Italy. 

In the second of these occasions when Italj 
after a sad parenthesis, found the strength t 
rebel against those who had pushed her on th 
path alien to her tradition and went back t fc' 
aline herself on the side of democracy an 
liberty, it was again America that assisted he 
with an aid which was instrumental for he 
recovery, for the reconstruction of her shattere' 


cities, for the growing of a new enthusiasr 

forth a "secon( 
expression of a 

jj ar 



which enabled her to brin 
Risorgimento" — to use the 
American writer — and to further the solutio: 
of some of her centuries-old problems. 

I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that you wil 
soon visit my country and acquaint yoursel 
with the great progress that it has made in th Is, J 
last few decades. pnee 

Faithful to the ideal principles which hav 
accompanied their history and development, th 
United States and Italy cannot but find them 
selves side by side in their defense 

In fact, the Atlantic alliance was born almos 
20 years ago, having as its main goal the defenS' 
of the concept of life based upon the respect o 
liberty and on the dignity of the individual 

To this community of free nations, Italy ha 
given her firm and loyal support. My countr 
considers its participation in the alliance as i k 
fundamental hinge of its foreign policy. 

To multiply and to intensify in every field tin 
relations among the allies constitutes one of tht 
most important aims that must be pursued wit! 
tenacity and faith 

No attempt, no proposal which mighi 
strengthen the hope of a rapprochement among 
people, is overlooked by us; and Italy knows 
Mr. President, that your Government, and you 
personally, ardently pursue the same ends, 

In the search for an attainment of these goals 
your country and mine look always to the orga- 
nization of the United Nations in the trusting 
hope that, with the contribution of all, the 
organization could have at its disposal even 
more adequate and eifective instruments for the 
solution of the most important world problems. 

Peace is a precious asset which must be con- 
tinuously sought and defended with all means. 









f J ai 

powerful contribution can come from the solu- 

'A ion of the problems of economic and social na- 

are which still beset many countries that have 

ecently attained their national independence. 

This, Mr. President, is a particularly delicate 
loment on the international scene, a moment, 
tierefore, which requires an open and frank 
onsultation between the United States and her 
European allies. Our conversation of these 2 
ays bear witness to this. 

The spirit of firmness and conciliation which 

Tiides the United States is well known to us, 

nd Italy knows also that the United States is 

ully aware of the need to consult with her 

itieiliriends for the definition of the dialog between 

iKi[i|lf7est and East. 

Mr. President, with the wish that our com- 
lon action and in particular the action of your 
reat nation may promote the realization of a 
ust peace among nations, I propose a, toast to 
he prosperity of this noble and friendly coun- 
ry, to the personal well-being of yourself and 
ilrs. Johnson, to the warm and firm friendship 
letween our two peoples. 



of ill 







Wllte House press release dated September 19 

President Jolinson and President Saragat had two 
conversations at the White House on September 18 and 
19. Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister 
Fanfaui were present on both occasions. 

The two Presidents had a broad and thorough ex- 
change of views on the international situation. There 
was also a review of issues of bilateral concern, with 
a view to strengthening further the close relations 
between the two countries in accordance with the long- 
standing ties of friendship and alliance which exist 
between Italy and the United States. 

It was agreed that the common goal of both nations 
is the maintenance and the strengthening of peace. 
The two Presidents reaffirmed their confidence in the 

essential role played by the UN in achieving that 

There was complete agreement on the importance 
the North Atlantic Alliance, which from its inception 
has served both as an instrument of defense and as 
a vehicle for progress, continues to have for the secu- 
rity of its members and for world peace. By reinforc- 
ing international stability, it contributes to mutual 
understanding and confidence among peoples. It was 
also agreed that security and peace in the Atlantic 
area are based on a partnership between Western 
Europe and North America, founded on equality of 
rights and duties and on a balanced development which 
may be furthered through ever closer technological 
cooperation. The tw-o nations share a common desire 
to create an atmosphere of cooperation and to bring 
about the relaxation of tensions among all the nations 
of the European continent. 

The prospects for broadening the foundations of 
peace were examined. In this connection, it was agreed 
that a treaty to limit the dissemination of nuclear 
weapons, which talies into account the legitimate in- 
terests of all countries concerned would contribute to 
that end. 

It was agreed that the two countries, deeply con- 
cerned by recent events in the Middle East, share a 
particular interest in the reestablishment of peace and 
stability in that area. With respect to Southeast Asia, 
confidence was expressed that an equitable settlement 
of the present conflict will be reached on the basis of 
freedom so as to strengthen the fabric of peace 

The two Presidents welcomed the recent agreements 
reached in London on international monetary liquidity ' 
and agreed on the importance of achieving agreement 
on this matter at the meeting of the International 
Monetary Fund at Rio de Janeiro later this month. 
They expressed satisfaction at the successful conclu- 
sion of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations, and 
underlined the great importance which they attach to 
assisting the developing nations in obtaining a higher 
standard of living and greater economic growth. 

The two Presidents agreed on the great Importance 
of these consultations among close allies, which con- 
tribute to the strengthening of understanding and 
cooperation between the two countries, and thus to the 
achievement of the common objectives of progress and 
peace for all manldnd. 

^ For bacliground, see Bulletin of Sept. 25, 1967, 
p. 392. 


OCTOBER 16, 1967 


Patent Reform and International Commerce 

hy Alexander B. Trowbridge 
Secretary of Com/merce ^ 

It is my very real pleasure to be here with 
you today to discuss the improvement of our 
patent system — a system in which we as ad- 
ministrators and you as users have a common 

Efforts for improvement can be classified as 
long-range undertakings whose benefits will 
accrue for decades to come, just as tlie original 
constitutional provision for patent protection 
has served us for 180 years. Most of our time 
in this fast-moving world is taken up with short- 
range objectives. Obviously both are important : 
laying the foundation for progress in the years 
ahead by the improvement of overall systems 
and making short-run adjustments that meet 
the immediate needs of the day. 

An example of the latter is President John- 
son's recent proposal for a 10-percent surcharge 
on personal and corporate income taxes.^ This 
measure not only is necessary to meet the rising 
costs of our defense of freedom in Viet-Nam 
and to finance programs to help solve the prob- 
lems of our cities ; it also is required as a means 
of moderating high interest rates and of slowing 
inflationary pressures in our economy. 

It would perliaps be easier to gloss over the 
need to pay a price for such benefits. But fiscal 
responsibility has its costs, and we as responsi- 
ble Americans should be prepared to recognize 
them. I'm glad to see that your organization, in 
its congressional testimony, acknowledged the 
basic requirements facing our nation and sup- 

* Address made before the patents committee of the 
National Association of Manufacturers at New York, 
N.Y., on Sept. 8 (Department of Commerce press 

' For excerpts from President Johnson's message to 
the Congress on the state of the budget and the econ- 
omy, see BuLLEin^ of Aug. 28, 1967, p. 266. 


ported the Government's efforts to diminish the 
prospective deficit through reduced expendi- 
tures and increased revenues. Tliis is the position 
of many leading businessmen who have voiced 
support for this prudent tax measure. I'm sure 
that the majority of you are included in the 
ranks of the many who approve of this short- 
term remedy to a difficult problem. 

President Jolnnson's patent reform bill illus- 
trates this administration's concern with long- 
range improvements in our economic system. In 
transmitting the measure to Congress last Feb- 
ruary, the President noted that the patent sys- 
tem has "helped American businesses to trans- 
late 'the fire of genius' into the products and 
processes that have enriched the lives of all of' 
us." ^ But he also pointed out that "institutions 
must change to meet the demands of the times," 
and I think it is clear that modernization is long 

If the patent system is to continue to serve us 
well, it must be strengthened and streamlined 
to cope with the challenges of the decades ahead. 
It must keep pace with both expanded trade and 
new teclmology. Even more, it must create a 
better climate for expanded entry of American 
businessmen into international markets. And it 
must provide for prompt disclosure and use of 
new technology in this country. This will benefit 
not only American business but also the Ameri- 
can consumer. 

The NAM, under the leadership of your com- 
mittee chairman, Frederic O. Pless, has been 
among those most active in defining tlie prob- 
lems facing the patent system and in relating 
them to business interests. 

° For text of President Johnson's letter of transmit- 
tal dated Feb. 21, 1967, see WeeUly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of February 27, 1967, p. 294. 


One problem that illustrates the need for re- 
form is the unnecessary and burdensome dupli- 
cation of effort in protecting inventions inter- 
nationally. This duplication bears heavily on 
the patent ofBces of the world and on business- 
men engaged in world commerce. It creates an 
artificial barrier to world trade. 

Aji average of three patent applications is 
filed internationally on each invention patented. 
This means that of the estimated 650,000 patent 
applications filed worldwide each year, two- 
thirds are duplicates or multiple filings of other 
applications. Each is processed individually in 
each country. Moreover, companies and indi- 
viduals must plow through a complex maze of 
divergent laws and customs which have grown 
up over the years, involving even the size of 
paper which must be used or the number of type- 
written lines per page. 

In this country, dissemination of technologi- 
cal advances is often delayed by the very system 
designed to accelerate disclosure. U.S. patent 
applications are now kept secret until a patent 
is issued, and this can take up to 5 years or more. 
Because of built-in delays, businessmen, un- 
aware of a competitor's work, may invest sub- 
stantial sums reinventing something already 
patented by a competitor. I find it hard to be- 
lieve that knowledgeable American concerns 
actually search published foreign patents and 
applications to find out what other American 
companies are trying to patent right here in this 

As you know, this administration has moved 
on a number of fronts to update the patent sys- 
tem and gear it for more rapid and effective 
service to business and the public. 

You are all familiar, of course, with the rec- 
ommendations of the President's Commission 
and with the patent reform proposals he sent 
Congress in Febniary to unplement the Com- 
mission's work. This bill would bring about the 
first major revision of the patent system in more 
than a century. It is designed, as the President 

1. To raise the quality and reliability of U.S. patents. 

2. To reduce the time and expense of obtaining and 
protecting a patent. 

3. To speed public disclosure of scientific and tech- 
nological information. 

The President added that these changes would 
also bring our own system into closer harmony 
with those of other nations. 

Better international cooperation will lead 

OCTOBEK 10. 1967 

naturally to better protection of intellectual 
property. And this, of course, is the rationale 
behind our new bilateral information and search 
exchange agreements with Germany, Switzer- 
land, France, Japan, Austria, and other coim- 
tries. All of these pilot studies have not been 
completed. But so far we have leai-ned some 
valuable lessons from them, notably that the 
quickest way to end expensive, inefficient mas- 
sive duplication is through a multination system 
within the framework of existing international 
cooperative arrangements. 

Accordingly, the U.S. delegation asked the 
Paris Union last fall to have the International 
Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property (BIRPI) undertake an 
urgent study of the duplication problem. As you 
Icnow, the result was the proposed patent coop- 
eration treaty which is being considered by 
your committee here today. 

I do not propose to discuss in any length the 
President's patent reform bill, except to em- 
phasize my support for its provisions and their 
underlying objectives. We want the most effec- 
tive and efficient patent system to serve this 
country in the future. Enactment of the reform 
bill, I am convinced, will achieve the goals laid 
down by the President and will bring our patent 
system more fully in line with its constitutional 

Nor do I propose to discuss in any detail the 
patent cooperation treaty. We are encouraged 
by BIEPI's effort and initiative and anxious to 
see further development and refinement of its 

Export Expansion and Technological Progress 

But I would like to outline what I think are 
the broad objectives of a modern, efficient patent 
system and to relate them to our national and 
international goals. 

Simply stated, the patent system should pro- 
vide effective incentives for the greatest possible 
development and use of new technology in this 
country and in international markets. To the ex- 
tent that it is able to achieve this goal : 

— It will enhance our standard of living, 
which increasingly is founded upon a sophisti- 
cated technological base. 

— It will facilitate the transfer of new tech- 
nology across national borders to spur economic 
progress in all parts of the globe. 

—And finally, it will permit us to compete 


more effectively in international markets where 
new teclmology is at the very cutting edge of 

We are in a period of both continuing ex- 
pansion and keener competition in world trade. 
U.S. exports climbed to record levels last year 
and are now running at an annual rate of $31.2 
billion. Obviously there is the closest relation- 
ship between our exjiort expansion and our tech- 
nological progress. For example, we can now re- 
place reduced exports in low-technology 
products with increased exports in high-tech- 
nology products. 

Foreign Patent Systems 

Just as technological changes bear heavily on 
efforts to expand exports, so does the success 
of U.S. firms in penetrating high-technology 
foreign markets depend largely on their ability 
to obtain foreign patents to protect inventions 
and innovations. This interrelation will increase, 
of course, as our mix of export products becomes 
more sophisticated. Clearly, the trend is toward 
greater reliance on patent safeguards. The ex- 
port prospects for the future continue to be 
bright for highly technical products in which 
foreign patent protection could be a deciding 
factor in successful competition in foreign mar- 

The world market to which U.S. business 
looks for customers has widened to include many 
countries which were ignored or not even in 
existence 20 years ago. These are the so-called 
less developed countries — less developed in an 
industrial sense but in many cases with abundant 
natural resources. It is generally recognized 
that they must be brought into the international 
patent system to help speed their economic 
develoi^ment and their potential as trading 

BIKPI has been conducting a vigorous pro- 
gram in this regard, and we in this country 
heartily endorse it. One difficulty is that few of 
the developing coinitries have either the person- 
nel or the govermnent machinery for the 
complexities of a patent system. BIRPI has 
instituted training arrangements in which our 
Patent Office is cooperating. Useful seminars 
already have been held in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. BIEPI has also supervised the 
drafting of a legal model for a national patent 

In talking about international cooperation, a 


distinction is sometimes drawn between our na- 
tional or domestic interests and our international 
objectives. I can't see any difference between 
the two. For the patent system to be truly effec- 
tive, it must serve both to foster progress at 
home and to stimulate our international com- 

Both the patent reform bill and the proposed 
patent cooperation treaty envisage far-reaching 
changes in old and established customs and 
practices. For this reason, if for no other, they 
invite controversy and opposition. To the extent 
that this is constructive and in the national in- 
terest, we welcome it. To the extent that it is 
self-serving and designed to create roadblocks, 
we deplore it. Wlioever would oppose these 
measures because he is against change per se or 
for other purely subjective reasons, has a real 
obligation to review his position in light of the 
national interest — not to say that of his business 
or his profession. It is less than responsible to 
pretend that either the U.S. patent system or 
the international legal structures protecting in- 
ventions, as they exist today, camiot be im- 
proved upon. 

Reasonable men may differ over details; I 
camiot believe there is any question that basic 
reforms are needed — and soon. The world 
quickly leaves behind those who cannot adapt 
to the fact and the form of change. 

Proposed Patent Cooperation Treaty 

We are now in the process of studying the 
BIRPI draft. Your meeting and discussions 
here today and those of other interested parties 
will lielp us. We should not forget that this is 
a draft, the first of many which will be pre- 
pared even before formal international negotia- 
tions are begun. 

At a meeting of the [BIRPI] Committee of 
Experts scheduled for October in Geneva to 
consider the draft treaty, the views of 23 inter- 
ested governments on the treaty will be fully 
explored. To provide broad-gage representation 
at this meeting, private industrial and bar 
groups from this and other countries have been 
invited to participate. Following the October 
meeting, there will be ample opportunity for 
further consideration of a revised draft treaty. 

We favor harmonization of national patent 
laws, and we look to the ultimate goal of a true 
universal or multinational patent. Tlie proposed 
treaty is a major step toward this goal. Because 








of its importance, we should make it as attrac- 
tive as possible. For example, it may be that to 
ittract the widest possible international support 
this initial step should require as little change 
IS possible in the national laws of the member 
countries. It should require a minimum of ad- 
ministrative cost and effort. If proposals to im- 
prove the treaty in these and other areas will 
increase support for it, we are prepared to 
vigorously sponsor such proposals. 

All of these moves in the patent field, both 

in the international and domestic spheres, 

should illustrate our resolve that technological 

Drogress not become ensnared in technical red 


How ironic it would be for man's inventive 
genius to be stymied by our failure to devise 
ways to put the fruits of his genius to work ! 

We are characterized as an "innovative" 
lociety — which essentially means that we can 
:urn the ideas of man into effective and produc- 
:ive tools. It is clearly in our joint interest, as 
administrators and as users of the patent sys- 
;em, to see to it that such a description of our 
jconomic system is continually proven to be 

.etters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Greece, 
Christian Xanthopoulos-Palamas, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on September 
25. For texts of the Ambassador's i-emarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of State 
)ress release dated September 25. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Malawi, Nyemba Wales IMbekeani, 
presented his credentials to President Johnson 
on September 25. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated September 25. 

Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal 
Granted Organization Immunities 


Designating the Lake Ontakio Claims Tribunal as 
A Public Intebnational Organization Entitled To 
Enjoy Certain Privileges, Exemptions, and Im- 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 
of the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 
Stat. 609; 22 U.S.C. 288), and having found that the 
United States participates in the Lake Ontario Claims 
Tribunal pursuant to the Agreement with Canada Con- 
cerning the Establishment of an International Arbitral 
Tribunal to Dispose of United States Claims Relating 
to Gut Dam, March 25, 19G5, TIAS 6114, I hereby 
designate the Lalie Ontario Claims Tribunal as a pub- 
lic international organization entitled to enjoy the 
privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by 
the International Organizations Immunities Act. 

The White House, 
September IS, 1967. 

' No. 11372 ; 32 Fed. Reg. 13251. 

nCB OCTOBER 16, 1967 



Asian Development Bank 

Message From President Johnson to the Congress '■ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

This generation of Americans knows the im- 
jjortance of peace in Asia. 

Twice since 1950 we have fought for the 
right of small Asian nations to be free from 
coercion by their neighbors. In Vietnam this 
struggle continues. It will continue so long — 
and only so long — as aggression persists. 

Yet lasting peace in Asia requires much more 
than resistance to armed aggression. 

Peace will come to stay when despair gives 
way to hope . . . when insurrection gives way to 
peaceful opportunity . . . when himger gives 
way to harvests. 

Peace m Asia will rest on the citizen's trust — 
in his govenmient, in his nation's economy, and, 
most of all, in his ability to improve the condi- 
tions of his life. 

Asians must create this trust. Only they can 
decide to build the schools, the roads, the dams, 
and the clinics that provide the foundations of 
trust. Only they can decide to put aside their 
ancient differences and join in a common effort 
to improve the life of all. 

There is good reason to believe that Asia has 
made that choice. 

Hope is a living fact in the rugged hills of 
Korea, in the thriving cities of Thailand, and 
in the lush rice land of the Indonesian 

Free Asia has determined to break the vise of 
poverty which has killed and maimed many 
more Asians than all the wars ever fought. 

The nations of Asia are working together to 
jarovide more food, better housmg, and more 
education for their growing numbers. They 

^H. Doc. 171, 90th Cong., 1st sess. 
press release dated Sept. 26). 


(White House 

have given a clear signal to the world that they 
are ready to make the sacrifices progress 

And they have asked for help. 

These are the facts. They are established by 
the reports of Mr. Eugene Black, my Special 
Adviser on Asian Development. They are con- 
firmed by the many Senators and Congressmen 
of both parties who joined in the founding oi 
the Asian Bank. 

Mr. Black has traveled widely in Asia in the 
past 30 months. He has talked with nearly every 
Asian leader. His careful judgment is that the 
hopeful signs in Asia are real. 

With his hel]3, we have begun the transition 
from American programs to build Asia to world 
jjrograms to build Asia. 

The Asian Bank was bom out of the belief 
that international cooperation is not only pos- 
sible and desirable, but absolutely necessary to 
the growth of freedom and prosperity in Asia, 
It united tliirty-one nations, and distributed 
the financial burden of assisting Asia among 

After consultation with Mr. Black, with sen- 
ior officials of the United States Government and 
with many members of the Congress, I propose 
that we join with other nations to strengthen 
this international instrument of peace and 

/ propose that the Congress authorize a 
United States contribution of up to $200 million 
to new Special Funds of the Asian Development 

This authorization will not involve any budg- 
et expenditures in Fiscal 1968. 

Our contribution would be made over four 
years, and would constitute a minority share of 
total contributions to the Special Funds. 






This must not and will not be an American 
effort alone. The development of the most popu- 
lous region of the earth affects every nation. 
It must be supported by all who are able to 

Several leaders of the Congress and the Na- 
tion have urged that we transform the bulk of 
our foreign assistance from bilateral aid pro- 
grams to multilateral, cooperative efforts where 
all the wealthy nations of the world join to help 
the developing nations through the World Bank, 
regional development associations, and other 
multilateral arrangements. 

We look to the day when our foreign assist- 
ance can be handled under these arrangements. 

The proposal I make today is a step in this 
direction. It is an example of multilateral assist- 
ance that we fervently hope will be followed 
increasingly in the years ahead in Asia and 
throughout the developing world. 

The Peaceful Revolution in Asia 

Free Asia has done more in the last two years 
to create a true community of interest among 
its peoples than in all the long centuries that 
went before. Here is part of that extraordinary 
record : 

— Asian initiative founded the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank with assets of $1 billion, to finance 
development projects throughout the great arc 
from Afghanistan to Korea. 

— Nine nations jomed to fonn the Asian and 
Pacific Council, the first regular foriun for dis- 
cussion of the full range of Asian problems. 

— The nations of Southeast Asia and Indo- 
nesia formed a sub-regional association to foster 
better understandmg and economic cooperation. 

— The Jtlekong Coordinating Committee and 
other existing agencies moved with new energy 
and urgency, producing such important proj- 
ects as the Nam Ngmn Dam in Laos. 

Asians are gaining new insights into the needs 
of their region : 

— The Asian Development Bank is sponsoring 
a comprehensive study of Asian agriculture 
which will identify the specific projects neces- 
sary to meet the food crisis of the next decade. 

— The Southeast Asian Ministers of Educa- 
tion are plamiing regional centers of academic 
excellence, to open the way toward improved 
education, more broadly shared among their 

OCTOBER 16, 1967 

— Led by Malaysia, representatives of eight 
Asian nations met last week to plan the trans- 
portation and communications networks Asia 
needs to achieve trade, travel and economic in- 

These are the beginnings of a peaceful revo- 
lution in Asia — a constructive revolution which 
serves not just the interests of the United States, 
but of all humanity. 

It is a revolution which seeks to build, not 
to destroy ; to succor, not to subvert. 

But planning is only the first stage. Blue- 
prints must become bricks and mortar. 

Most of the money Asia needs must come 
from the Asians themselves. Some will come 
from the World Bank, from national aid pro- 
grams, and from private sources. Some will 
come from the ordinary capital of the Asian 
Bank. But there remains a gap, particularly for 
projects in the most critical areas — agriculture, 
education, transportation and development of 
the Mekong River Basin. 

It is that gap that I propose we help close. 

The Proposal 

Experience in the World Bank and with re- 
gional development banks suggests that develop- 
ment finance requires two different and separate 
funds : 

— Ordinary capital, largely to finance the for- 
eign exchange costs of projects which have a 
relatively rapid and direct return on investment, 

— Special Funds, for longer-term loans at 
lower interest rates, to finance the foreign ex- 
change costs of projects such as schools and 
roads which do not yield immediate financial re- 
turns, but which add powerfully to economic 

This is the investment structure of the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The 31 member nations of the Asian De- 
velopment Bank have determined that it should 
also be the stnicture of their organization. 

The Asian Bank now has subscriptions total- 
ling $1 billion in ordinary capital. This appears 
sufficient for the foreseeable future. 

Today's need is for Special Funds to comple- 
ment the ordinary capital. Development cannot 
be limited to projects which can be financed at 
commercial interest rates. Where there are fac- 
tories and power plants there must also be de- 


pendable all-weather roads, farm equipment, 
and clean water supplies. The Bank must be able 
to lend for these long-term, as well as for short- 
term, necessities. 

The Government of Japan has already an- 
nounced that it will contribute $100 million to 
these Special Funds, mainly to support projects 
in agriculture. The Govermnent of Canada in- 
dicated its willingness to contribute at the 
Asian Bank's inaugural meeting. Other govern- 
ments have contributions under consideration. 

I propose that the United States pledge up to 
$200 million to be iDrovided over four years, on 
the following conditions : 

— The United States contribution must com- 
prise less than one-half of the Special Funds. 
The Executive Branch would make every effort 
to assure that our share of total contributions 
is as modest as possible. 

— Because of our balance of payments prob- 
lem, our contributions must be available only 
for the purchase of United States goods and 
services for use in Asia. 

• — The Funds will be used only on the firm 
understanding that they will supplement, not 
supplant, the efl'orts of Asian nations to help 
themselves. Self-help loill he the watchword in 
these frograms^ just as it is for all our foreign 

This proposal would result in no cash dis- 
bursements during this fiscal year. Appropria- 
tions would be sought from the Congress as 
other contributors pledge their share to the Spe- 
cial Funds. 

I believe this proposal represents our fair 

I believe it protects our vital interests in Asia. 

I believe it provides the American taxpayer 
with the assurance he demands, and deserves, 
that his money will be put to careful and pro- 
ductive use. 

The Asian Future 

It is hard for any of us to visualize the face 
of Asia in the decades ahead. Caught up in the 
trials and frustrations of the day, many people 
assume that the poor will always be poor, and 
that this new wave of Asian determination will 
falter and dissolve. 

But Americans know what can be done with 
natural resources. We know that a single river 


can transform the lives of millions. Properly! 
developed, it can provide food, jobs, and 
transport. It can be an avenue to the bounty of j 
modern life. 

"Wliat has worked here will work in Asia. 

Flowing through Thailand, Laos, Vietnam| 
and Cambodia, the Mekong river drains an arei 
60% the size of the Missouri Basin. But only 
81/2 million people live in the Missouri Basin. 
Thirty million draw their sustenance from thei 
lands surrounding the Mekong. The INIekong's; 
flow is eight times greater than the Missouri's, 
and its hydroelectric potential is two to three . 
times as great. 

Ten solid years of work have already gone 
into careful and comprehensive planning for the 
Mekong area. The Mekong Coordinating Com- 
mittee, along with 23 donor nations and 18' 
Unitecl Nations agencies, have: 

is Me 








• — invested $30 million in the most detailed 
study of the area. 

— invested $70 million in three major projects! eopli 
which set the stage for full development of tha m 

— identified 34 potential tributary dam sites tiori 
and completed detailed studies on 11 of them. 

— conclucted feasibility studies on 3 of the 12 
potential mainstream dam sites. 

These are examples of the sound ideas and 
projects which will be financed by the Special 
Fmids I propose today. They are the Asian 
equivalents of the Erie Canal, the Transconti- 
nental Kailroad, and the land-grant college sys- 
tem which transformed our own society. 

These are the productive works which build 
nations. They carry with them social progress as 
well as economic gi'owth. Our decision to sup- 
port them is a test of faith in our own vision, 
Meeting that test is as important to us as it is|iiii( 
to Asia. 

More than two years ago, when I first an- 
nounced our willingness to respond to Asian; 
initiatives, I said : - 


I -svould hope that all other industrialized countries, 
including the Soviet Union, -will join in this effort to 
replace despair with hope, and terror -with progress. 
The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and 
the existence of more than a hundred million iieople. 
And there is much to be done. 

' For President Johnson's address at Baltimore, Md., 
on Apr. 7, 1965, see Buixetin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606, 



Much has been done since then — more than we 
ould reasonablj' have hoped. Thirty -one nations 
lare joined to build a Bank, and tlie nations of 
<^ree Asia liave joined to strengtlien a continent. 

The task now is to cajjitalize on the progress 
if the past 30 months. 

The Congress knows this record of progress, 
fe Members have been deeply involved ia the 
i)irth and growth of the Asian Development 

Now the question is whether the United States 
vill join other nations to provide the Bank with 

new dimension of productive effort m the 
lasic areas of human need. 

The United States laiows many needs in this 
ritical hour. Many worthy causes compete for 
>iur time, our attention, and our limited re- 
ources. In the last analysis, only the people's 
epresentatives in Congress can decide where 
ihe priorities lie. 

I offer this proposal because I believe what- 
iver we do to strengthen Asia, and to enable her 
leople to achieA'e security and growth in the 
ears ahead, is in our national interest — and 
hus deserves consideration among our national 
)riorities. In that spirit and with that under- 
tanding, I urge its consideration by the 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, September £6, 1967. 

Congressional Documents 
delating to Foreign Policy 

90th Congress, 1st Session 




ItlpThird Annual Report of the Atlantic-Pacific Inter- 
oceanic Canal Study Commission, 31 July 1967. H. 
Doc. 154. August 8, 1967. 66 pp. 

Inter-American Development Bank Act Amendments 
of 1967. Report, together with minority views, to 
accompany S. 1688. S. Rept. 501. August 11, 1967. 
15 pp. 

Illicit Practices Affecting the U.S. Economic Program 
in Vietnam (FoUowup Investigation). Fourth Re- 
port by the House Committee on Government Opera- 
tions. H. Rept. 609. August 25, 1967. 20 pp. 

The Commercial (Commodity) Import Program for 
Vietnam (FoUowup Investigation). Fifth Report by 
the House Committee on Government operations. H. 
Rept. 610. August 25, 1967. 16 pp. 

fThe Port Situation in Vietnam (FoUowup Investiga- 
tion). Sixth Report by the Committee on Govern- 
^ ment Operations. H. Rept. 610. August 25, 1967. 7 pp. 


U.S., Philippines Exchange Notes 
on Cotton Textile Arrangements 

Press release 20S dated September 22 


Two sets of notes were exchanged in Wash- 
mgton on September 21 which deal with ar- 
rangements on Philippine exports of cotton 
textiles to the United States. 

The first set of notes amends, for calendar 
year 1967, the U.S.-Philippine bilateral cotton 
textile agreement signed in Washington on Feb- 
laiary 24, 1964.^ The Philippine Govermnent 
agreed in this exchange that they would offset 
excess shipments of almost 1 million square 
yards in 1966 by a corresponding reduction in 
their shipments in calendar year 1967. It was 
also agreed that, within the reduced aggregate 
limit, new ceilings are established for three 
fabric and two ajjparel categories. 

The second set of notes deals with a new bilat- 
eral arrangement to replace the 1964 bilateral 
which expires on December 31, 1967. This will 
go into effect on January 1, 1968, and extend 
through December 31, 1970. It will generally 
continue the provisions of the 1964 agreement, 
but will also contain some revisions in its terms, 
notably : 

(1) The aggregate limit for 1968 for non- 
traditional categories will be 22.3 million square 
yards with group limits as follows : 17.8 million 
square yards for made-ups, nontraditional ap- 
parel, and miscellaneous ; and 4.5 million square 
yards for yarn and fabric. 

(2) The traditional categories total 34.7 mil- 
lion square yards. 

(3) Carryover of shortfalls of up to 5 per- 
cent will be permitted in 1969 and 1970. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5519, 
5886 ; for text, see Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1964, p. 383. 

OCTOBER 16, 196T 



First Note 

September 21, 1967 
Sib: I refer to recent discussions in Washington 
relating to the Bilateral Agreement on Trade in Cotton 
Textiles between the United States of America and 
the Philippines effected by an exchange of notes at 
Washington on February 24, 1964. 

Because of the special circumstances mentioned in 
these discussions, the Government of the United States 
of America proposes that during calendar year 1967 : 

1. To offset shipments in excess of the limits appli- 
cable for exports in the non-traditional categories dur- 
ing calendar year 1966, exports of cotton textiles in 
non-traditional categories from the Philippines to the 
United States shall be limited to a total of 16,989,666 
square yards, 953,522 yards below the level provided for 
in paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Agreement of February 24, 
1964. Insofar as possible, this reduction shall be made 
in exports in categories 9, 22, 26 and 62. 

2. Within the 1967 limit for non-traditional cate- 
gories provided for in paragraph 1 above, the exjwrts 
of cotton textiles from the Philippines to the United 
States shall not exceed the following amounts in the 
following categories : 




1,000,000 square yards 
1,000,000 square yards 
1,000,000 square yards 
(of which not more 

than 300,000 square 

yards may be in 

1,550,000 dozen 

100,000 dozen 

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of the Philippines, my Govern- 
ment will consider this note and your afiBrmative reply' 
as constituting an agreement between our two Govern- 
ments further amending the cotton textile agreement of 
February 24, 1964, as amended. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high 

For the Secretary of State: 
Anthony M. Solomon 

Dr. Jose F. Imperial 

Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Philippines 

Second Note 

September 21, 1967 

Sir : I refer to the recent discussions held in Wash- 
ington between representatives of our two Governments 
concerning exports of cotton textiles from the Philip- 
pines to the United States. In accordance with these 
discussions, I propose the following agreement : 

1. The Governments reiterate their recognition as 
set forth in the cotton textile agreement between them 
of February 24, 1964, that substantially all the exports 

of cotton textiles from the Philippines to the United 
States in categories 52, 53, 54, 59 and 63 consist of 
infants' wear produced by the Philippine cottage ia 
dustry and traditionally part of the special United 
States-Philippine cotton textile trade. The Govern- 
ments also recognize that Philippine exports to the 
United States in Category 62 consist of the same type 
of infants' wear, and agree that this category shall be 
included in this group of traditional categories, Group 
A. The two Governments agree that the annual trade 
in these traditional trade categories approximates the 
following pattern : 

Sqrtare Yarda 

Group A 




25, 000 

475, 000 

105, 000 

75, 000 

100, 000 

1, 020, 000 

1, SOO, 000 

363, 250 

21, 517, 500 

2, 625, 000 

1, 200, 000 

800, 400 
8, 164, 080 

34, 670, 230 

2. In the event that the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines desires to permit exports in the tra- 
ditional categories enumerated in paragraph 1 to ex- 
ceed in any calendar year 110 percent of the levels of 
traditional trade enumerated in paragraph 1 (as ad- 
ju.sted pursuant to paragrajih 8), it shall so notify the 
Government of the United States of America. Upon 
receipt of such notification, the Government of the 
United States of America may request con.sultations 
on the matter if, in its view, the proposed export levels 
would constitute an undue concentration of trade threat- 
ening to cause a disruption of the United States market 
in these categories. The Government of the United 
States of America shall accompany its request for 
consultations with detailed information on the con- 
dition of the United States market in the category or 
categories in question. The Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines shall agree to enter into such con- 
sultations, and during the course thereof the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of the Philippines shall limit its 
exports on an annual basis in the categories in question 
to 110 percent of the level of traditional trade 
enumerated in paragraph 1 (as adjusted pursuant to 
paragraph 8). 

3. During calendar year 1968, the first agreement 
year, the Government of the Republic of the Philip- 
pines shall limit its exports to the United States in all 
categories of cotton textiles, except those enumerated in 
paragraph 1, to an aggregate limit of 22.3 million 
square yards equivalent. 

4. Within the aggregate limit, the following group 
limits shall apply for the first agreement year : 

Group B. Made-ups, Non-traditional Apparel, and 
Miscellaneous, (Categories 28-51, 55-58, 
61 and 64) 17.8 million square yards 

Group C. Yarn and Fabric, Categories 1-27, 4.5 
million square yards equivalent. 

5. Within the aggregate limit specified in paragraph 
3 and the applicable Group limit specified in paragraph 
4, the following specific limits shall apply for the first 
agreement year : 



















' Not printed here. 





;2 (handkerchiefs) 

froup C 




Square Yards 



3, 000, 


4, 980, 


































1, 550, 


7, 362, 


Square Yards Equivalent 

1, 250, 000 

t, 500, 000 

I, 250, 000 

(of which not more 

than 300,000 square 

yards may be in 


6. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for Group B 
<nay be exceeded by not more than 5 percent, and the 
omit for Group C may be exceeded by not more than 
<.0 percent. Within the applicable group limits, as it may 
>e adjusted under this provision, specific limits may 
le exceeded by not more than 5 percent. 

7. (a) For any agreement year after the first agree- 
ment year and Immediately following a year of a short- 
'('all in non-traditional categories (i.e., a year in which 
iotton textile exports from the Philippines to the United 
iStates in the B and C groups were below the aggregate 
limit for the B and C groups and any group and specific 
limits applicable to the category concerned) the Gov- 
imment of the Republic of the Philippines may permit 
ixports to exceed the aggregate, group and specific 
dmits by carryover in the following amounts and 
(nanner : 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of the 
Shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any applicable 
group or specific limit and shall not exceed either 5 
percent of the aggregate limit or 5 percent of the ap- 
plicable group limit in the year of the shortfall, and 

(ii) in the case of shortfalls in the categories subject 
to specific limits the carryover shall not exceed 5 per- 
cent of the specific limit in the year of the shortfall, 
and shall be used in the same category in which the 
shortfall occurred, and 

(iii) in the case of shortfalls not attributable to 
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall 
be used in the same group in which the shortfall oc- 
curred, shall not be used to exceed any applicable 
specific limit except in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraph 6, and shall not be used to exceed the 
limits in paragraph 9. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph are without any adjustments under this 
paragraph or paragraph 6. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports 
permitted in paragraph 6. 

8. In the second and third agreement year the 
limitations on exports established by paragraphs 3, 4, 
5 and 9, and the levels of traditional trade categories 
enumerated in paragraph 1, shall be increased by 5 
percent of the corresponding level for the preceding 

ear, the latter level not to include any adjustment 
der paragraphs 6 or 7. 

9. (a) Within the group limit for the B and C groups 
the square yard equivalent of any shortfalls occurring 
in exports in the categories given specific limits may 
be used in any category not given a specific limit. 

(b) In the event the Government of the Philippines 
desires to permit exports during any agreement year 
of more than the level of the consultation limit in any 
category in Group B or in Group C not having a specific 
limit, the Government of the Philippines shall request 
consultation with the Government of the United States 
of America on this question. For the first agreement 
year the level of the consultation limit for each cate- 
gory in Group B not having a specific limit shall be 
350,000 square yards equivalent, and for each category 
in Group C not having a specific limit it shall be 
500,000 square yards equivalent. The Government of 
the United States of America shall enter into such 
consultations and, during the thereof, shall pro- 
vide the Government of the Philippines with informa- 
tion on the condition of the United States market in 
the category in question. Until agreement is reached, 
the Government of the Philippines shall continue to 
limit exports in that category for that agreement year 
to the consultation limit. 

(e) In the event concentration of exports from the 
Philippines to the United States of apparel items made 
of a particular fabric not of United States origin 
or threatens to cause market disruption in the United 
States, the Government of the United States of America 
may call for consultations with the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines in order to reach a mutually 
satisfactory solution to the problem. The Government 
of the Philippines shall agree to enter into such con- 
sultations, and, during the course thereof, shall limit 
its exports of the item in question to an annual level 
of 105 percent of its exports of that item during the 
12-month period immediately preceding the month in 
which consultations are requested. 

10. The Government of the Republic of the Philip- 
pines shall its best efforts to space exports to the 
United States within each category evenly throughout 
the agreement year taking into consideration normal 
seasonal factors. 

11. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any 
available statistical data requested by the other Gov- 
ernment. In the implementation of this Agreement, the 
system of categories and the factors for conversion into 
square yards equivalent set forth in the Annex hereto ' 
shall apply. In any situation where the determination 
of an article to be a cotton textile would be affected 
by whether a weight or value criterion is used, the 
chief value criterion applied by the Government of the 
United States of America shall apply. 

12. For the duration of this Agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America shall not limit 
the importation of cotton textiles from the Philippines 
to levels lower than those provided in this Agreement. 

13. The Governments agree to consult on any ques- 
tion arising in the implementation of this Agreement. 

14. The Governments agree that this Agreement, 
while governing trade in cotton textiles, does not preju- 
dice any interpretations by either Government of the 
Agreement between the United States of America and 
the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Trade and 

' Not printed here ; for text, see Department of State 
press release 208 dated September 22. 


OCTOBER 16, 1967 


Kelated Matters signed at Washington on Septem- 
ber 6, 1935.' 

15. This Agreement shall enter into force on Janu- 
ary 1, 1968, and continue in force through December 31, 
1970, provided that either Government may propose 
revisions in the terms of the Agreement no later than 
90 days prior to the beginning of a new 12-month period. 
Either Government may terminate this Agreement 
effective at the end of calendar years 1968 or 1969 by 
written notice to the other Government given at least 
90 days prior to the end of either calendar year ; pro- 
vided that such termination shall not operate to preju- 
dice the ability of the Philippines to export cotton 
textiles to the United States in amounts preserving its 
proportionate share of the United States market as 
represented by the level specified in this Agreement 
for the calendar year in which the Agreement is 

16. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 
problems arising in the implementation of this Agree- 
ment, including differences in points of procedure or 

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines, my Gov- 
ernment will consider this note and your affirmative 
reply,' as constituting an agreement between our two 
Governments on the matter. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my high 

For the Secretary of State: 
Anthony M. Solomon 

Dr. Jose F. Impeeial 

Charge d' Affaires ad interim of the Philippines 

Current Actions 


Automotive TrafRc 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Ratification deposited: Uruguay, September b, 1967. 


International convention for the conservation of At- 
lantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966. 
Ratification deposited: Japan, August 24, 1967. 


Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World 
Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended 
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 
Acceptance deposited: Cameroon, September 5, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington, London, and Moscow January 
27, 1967." 

Signatures: France, September 25, 1967; Trinidad 
and Tobago, September 28, 1967. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 

of war ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva. August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950 ; for the United States February 2, 
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively. 
Adherence deposited: Kuwait, September 2, 1967. 





J Co: 








Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, sup- 
plementary to the agreement of February 20, 1967 
(TIAS 6221), under title I of the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-173UD). 
Signed at New Delhi September 12, 1967. Entered 
into force September 12, 1967. 


Consular convention. Signed at Paris July 18, 1966.' 
Ratified by the United States: September 22, 1967. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348 
" Not printed here. 
' Not in force. 





IDEX Octoler 16, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. U77 

ica. U.S. Viewpoint on Four Current World 
oblems (Goldberg) 483 

ia. Asian Development Bank (President's mes- 
ge to Congress) 508 

lada. Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal Granted 
irganization Immunities (Executive order) . 507 


San Development Bank (President's message 

Congress) 508 

gressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

'ollcy 511 

ident Johnson Signs IDB Authorization Bill 

Johnson) 499 

late Confirms U.S. Delegation to 22d U.N. 
leneral Assembly 489 

la. OAS Foreign Ministers Take Steps 
gainst Cuban Subversion (Rusk, text of 
nal Act) 490 

larmament. U.S. Viewpoint on Four Current 
orld Problems (Goldberg) 483 

inomic Affairs 
slan Development Bank (President's message 

to Congress) 508 

Ktent Reform and International Commerce 

Trowbridge) 504 

ident Johnson Signs IDB Authorization BUI 
Johnson) 499 

lece. Letters of Credence (Palamas) . . . 507 

irnational Organizations and Conferences. 

AS Foreign Ministers Take Steps Against 
inban Subversion (Rusk, text of Final Act) . 490 

(y. President Saragat of Italy Visits the 
nited States (Johnson, Saragat, joint state- 
ment) 500 

latin America 

lAS Foreign Ministers Take Steps Against 
Cuban Subversion (Rusk, text of Final Act) 490 

lident Johnson Signs IDB Authorization Bill 

Johnson) 499 

isident Johnson Welcomes OAS Foreign Min- 
ers (Johnson) 498 

iwi. Letters of Credence (Mbekeani) . . 507 

ear East. U.S. Viewpoint on Four Current 
World Problems (Goldberg) 483 

'hilippines. U.S., Philippines Exchange Notes on 
Cotton Textile Arrangements (texts of U.S. 
notes) 511 

'residential Documents 

iSian Development Bank 508 

iake Ontario Claims Tribunal Granted Organi- 
zation Immunities 507 

•resident Johnson Signs IDB Authorization 
BiU 499 

'resident Johnson Welcomes OAS Foreign 
Ministers 498 

'resident Saragat of Italy Visits the United 
States 500 

'reaty Information 

■Snrrent Actions 514 

I.S., Philippines Exchange Notes on Cotton 
Textile Arrangements (texts of U.S. notes) . 511 

United Nations 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 22d U.N. 

General Assembly 489 

U.S. Viewpoint on Four Current World Prob- 
lems (Goldberg) 483 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Viewi)oint on Four Current 

World Problems (Goldberg) 483 

Tfame Index 

Abel, I. W 489 

Benjamin, Robert S 489 

Broomfleld, William S 489 

BufiEum, William B 489 

Fisher, Adrian S 489 

Fountain, L. H 489 

Garcia, Hector P 489 

Goldberg, Arthur J 483, 489 

Harris, Mrs. Patricia Roberts 489 

Johnson, President 498, 

499, 500, 507, 508 

JIbekeani, Nyemba Wales 507 

O'Conor, Herbert R., Jr 489 

Xanthopoulos-Palamas, Christian 507 

Rusk, Secretary 490 

Saragat, Guiseppe 5(K) 

Trowbridge, Alexander B 504 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 25-Oct. 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Deimrtment of State, Washington, D.C., 

Releases issued prior to September 25 which 
appear In this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 207 
of September 23 and 208 of September 22. 


Hillenbrand sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Hungary (biographic de- 

U.S. and Yugoslavia sign new cot- 
ton textile agreement 

Solomon : Peruvian Institute of 
Business Administration, Parac- 
as, Peru. 

Sherer sworn in as Ambassador to 
Togo (biographic details). 

Bunker: dedication of new U.S. 
Embassy at Saigon. 

Costello sworn in as Ambassador 
to Trinidad and Tobago (bio- 
graphic details). 

U.S. and Portugal amend cotton 
textile agreement. 

Katzenbach: New England Jaycee 
Convention, Hyannis, Mass. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 




















Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 










Address hy President Johnson 519 


Statement hy Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler 
and Text of IMF Resolution 523 


Address hy Under Secretary Katzenbach 530 


hy Assistant Secretary Solovion 53^ 

For index see inside back cover 

Gov^.T)ccurr]ent Co^ectb 
Delta Colkgii Librafy 



Vol. LVII, No. 1478 Publication 8304 

October 23, 1967 

For sale b; the Saperintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.O. 20402 


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Single copy 3D cents 

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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is Indexed In 
the Readers' Ouide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tveekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and tlie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
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r> / / 5 


/ y'^ 

Answering Aggression in Viet-Nam 

Address by President Johnson ^ 

This evening I came here to speak to you 
bout Viet-Nam. 

I do not have to tell you that our people are 
rofoundly concerned about that struggle. 

There are passionate convictions about the 
isest course for our nation to follow. There are 
lany sincere and patriotic Americans who har- 
or douljts about sustaining the commitment 
lat three Presidents and half a million of our 
nimg men have made. 

Doubt and debate are enlarged because the 
roblems of Viet-Nam are quite complex. They 
[■e a mixture of political turmoil — of poverty — 
f religious and factional strife — of ancient 
•rvitude and modern longing for freedom. 

iet-Nam is all of these things. 

Viet-Nam is also the scene of a powerful ag- 
ression that is spurred by an ajDpetite for con- 

It is the arena where Communist expansion- 
lu is most aggressively at work in the world to- 
;iy — where it is crossing international frontiers 
1 violation of international agreements; where 

is killing and kidnaping; where it is ruth- 

ssly attempting to bend free people to its will. 

Into this mixture of subversion and war, of 

rror and hoi^e, America has entered — with its 
laterial power and with its moral commitment. 


Why should three Presidents and the elected 
('present atives of our people have chosen to 
efend tliis Asian nation more than 10,000 miles 
rem American shores ? 

We cherish fi-eedom — yes. We cherish self- 
ietermination for all people — yes. We abhor the 
lolitical murder of any state by another and the 
lodily murder of any people by gangsters of 
whatever ideology. And for 27 years — since 
he days of lend-lease — we have sought to 

strengthen free people against domination by 
aggressive foreign powers. 

But the key to all we have done is really our 
own security. At times of crisis, before asking 
Americans to fight and die to resist aggression 
in a foreign land, every American President has 
finally had to answer this question : 

Is the aggression a threat not only to the im- 
mediate victim but to the United States of 
America and to the peace and security of the 
entire world of which we in America are a very 
vital part? 

That is the question which Dwight Eisen- 
hower and Jolin Kennedy and Lyndon Jolmson 
had to answer in facing the issue in Viet-Nam. 

Tliat is the question tliat the Senate of the 
United States answered by a vote of 82 to 1 
when it ratified and approved the SEATO 
treaty in 1955, and to which the members of 
the United States Congress responded in a 
resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 
504 to 2 : 2 

. . . tbe United States is, therefore, prepared, as the 
President determines, to talve all necessary steps, in- 
cluding the use of armed force, to assist any member 
or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its 

Those who tell us now that we should abandon 
our commitment, that securing South Viet-Nam 
from armed domination is not worth the price 
we are paying, must also answer this question. 
And the test they must meet is this : Wliat would 
be the consequence of letting armed aggression 
against South Viet-Nam succeed ? Wliat would 
follow in the time ahead ? What kind of world 
are they prepared to live in 5 months or 5 years 
from tonight ? 

For those who have borne the responsibility 

' Made before the National Legislative Conference at 
ian Antonio, Tex., on Sept. 29 (White House press 

= For text of H.J. Res. 1145 adopted on Aug. 7, 1964, 
see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268. 

ICTOBEE 2 3, 1967 


for decision during these past 10 years, the 
stakes to us have seemed clear — and have 
seemed high. 

President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959 : ^ 

Strategically South Viet-Nam's capture by the Com- 
munists would bring their power several hundred 
miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining coun- 
tries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great 
flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people 
would be lost immediately and that of 150 million in 
adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss 
of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling 
process that could, as it progressed, have grave conse- 
quences for us and for freedom. 

And President John F. Kennedy said in 

1962 : * 

. . . withdrawal in the case of Viet-Nam and in the 
case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire 

A year later,' he reaffirmed that : 

We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In 
my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would 
mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but 
Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there. 

Views of Asian Leaders 

This is not simply an American viewpoint, I 
would liave you legislative leaders know. I am 
going to call the roll now of those who live in 
that part of the world — in the great arc of Asian 
and Pacific nations — and who bear the respon- 
sibility for leading their people and the respon- 
sibility for the fate of their people. 

The President of the Philippines had this to 

Viet-Nam is the focus of attention now. ... It may 
happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, 
wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance. . . . For 
you to renounce your position of leader.ship in Asia is 
to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia. 

The Foreign Minister of Thailand said : 

(The American) deci.sion will go dovra in history as 
the move that prevented the world from having to face 
another major conflagration. 

The Prime Minister of Australia said : 

We are there because while Communi.«t aggression 
persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened. 

' For Presideat Eisenhower's address at Gettysburg, 
Pa., on Apr. 4, 1959, see ibid., Apr. 27, 19.59, p. 579. 
* At a news conference on June 14, 1962. 
" At a news conference on July 17, 1963. 


President Park of Korea said: 

For the first time in our history, we decided to dis 
patch our combat troops overseas . . . because in oui 
belief any aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nan 
represented a direct and grave menace against the se 
curity and peace of free Asia, and therefore directlj 
jeopardized the very security and freedom of our owi 

The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned hi; 
people that if the United States pulled out o; 
South Viet-Nam, it would go to the Commu 
nists, and after that, it would only be a mattei 
of time until they moved against neighboring 
states. i^ni I 

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said : T^'tnif 

We can thank God that America at least regard; 
aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regard; 
aggression in Europe — and is prepared to back up it 
concern with action. ^„ 

The Prime Minister of Singapore said: ^ - 

I feel the fate of Asia — South and Southeast Asia- 
will be decided in the next few years by what happen; jijissas 
out in Viet-Nam. ..^ 

I cannot tell you tonight as your President— 
with certainty — that a Communist conquest o; 
South Viet-Nam would be followed by a Com . 
munist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I dcitltir? 
know there are North Vietnamese troops ir »i'o 
Laos. I do know that there are North Vietnam :ffl|Ol 
ese-trained guerrillas tonight in northeasi iWHf 
Thailand. I do know that there are Commmiist .'Mai 
supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma i«iisib 
And a Communist coup was barely averted h 
Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world. ; 

So your American President cannot tell you— j 
with certainty— that a Southeast Asia domi- 
nated by Communist power would bring a thirc 
world war much closer to terrible reality. On( 
could hope that this would not be so. 

But all that we have learned in this tragic '»■ 
century strongly suggests to me that it woulc "toop 
be so. As President of the United States, I am «Wt 
not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is «%( 
not so. I am not prepared to risk the security— 
indeed, the survival— of this American NatioB Sjfe 
on mere hope and wishful thinking. I am con- 
vinced that by seeing this struggle through no-w »sp in 
we are greatly reducing the chances of a mucH fofti 
larger war — perhaps a nuclear war. I would "fe. 
rather stand in Viet-Nam in our time, and bj Sia 
meeting this danger now and facing up to it "'U 
thereby reduce tlie danger for our children and *tCo 
for our grandchildren. 


I want to turn now to the struggle in Viet- 

tiij,, Nam itself. 

: - There are questions about this difficult war 
that must trouble every really thoughtful per- 
son. I am gomg to put some of these questions. 
And I am going to give you the very best 
answers that I can give you. 

Progress of the Struggle in Viet-Nam 

First, are the Vietnamese, with our help and 
that of their other allies, really making any 
progress? Is there a forward movement? The 
reports I see make it clear that there is. Cer- 

' tamly there is a positive movement toward con- 
stitutional government. Thus far the Viet- 
namese have met the political schedule that they 
laid down in January 1966. 

The people wanted an elected, responsive 
government. They wanted it strongly enough to 

i brave a vicious campaign of Communist terror 
ind assassination to vote for it. It has been said 
ihat they killed more civilians in 4 weeks trying 
:o keep them from voting before the election 
han our American bombers have killed in the 
)ig cities of North Viet-Nam in bombing mili- 

1 , tary targets. 

■1 On November 1, subject to the action, of 
:ourse, of the constituent assembly, an elected 

;!,;: government will be inaugurated and an elected 

,v; Senate and Legislature will be installed. Their 
responsibility is clear : to answer the desires of 
the South Vietnamese people for self-determi- 
nation and for peace, for an attack on corrup- 
, Lion, for economic development, and for social 

There is progress in the war itself, steady 
progress considering the war that we are fight- 
ing; rather dramatic progress considering the 
situation that actually prevailed when we sent 
^uv troops there in 1965, when we intervened to 
prevent the dismemberment of the country by 
'he Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. 

The campaigns of the last year drove the 
memy from many of their major interior bases, 
riie military victory almost within Hanoi's 
^•asp in 1965 has now been denied them. The 
?rip of the Viet Cong on the people is being 

Since our commitment of major forces in July 
L965 the proportion of the population living 
mder Conmiunist control has been reduced to 
■veil under 20 percent. Tonight the secure pro- 

portion of the population has grown from about 
45 percent to 65 percent — and in the contested 
areas, the tide continues to run with us. 

But the struggle remains hard. The South 
Vietnamese have suffered severely, as have we — 
particularly in the First Corps area in the 
north, where the enemy has mounted his heav- 
iest attacks and where his lines of communica- 
tion to North Viet-Nam are shortest. Om* cas- 
ualties in the war have reached about 13,500 
killed in action and about 85,000 wounded. Of 
those 85,000 wounded, we thank God that 79,000 
of the 85,000 have been returned or will return 
to duty shortly, thanks to our great American 
medical science and the helicopter. 

U.S. Ready To Negotiate 

I know there are other questions on your 
minds and on the minds of many sincere, trou- 
bled Americans: "Wliy not negotiate now?" 
so many ask me. The answer is that we and our 
South Vietnamese allies are wholly prepared 
to negotiate tonight. 

I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minli, and 
other chiefs of state concerned, tomorrow. 

I am ready to have Secretary Eusk meet with 
their Foreign Minister tomorrow. 

I am ready to send a trusted representative of 
America to any spot on this earth to talk in 
public or private with a spokesman of Hanoi. 

We have twice sought to have the issue of 
Viet-Nam dealt with by the United Nations — 
and twice Hanoi has refused. 

Our desire to negotiate peace — through the 
United Nations or out — has been made very, 
very clear to Hanoi — directly and many times 
through third parties. 

As we have told Hanoi time and time and 
time again, the heart of the matter really is 
this: The United States is willing to stop all 
aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet- 
Nam when this will lead promptly to produc- 
tive discussions. We, of course, assume that 
while discussions proceed. North Viet-Nam 
would not take advantage of the bombing cessa- 
tion or limitation. 

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these 

So it is by Hanoi's choice, and not ours and 
not the rest of the world's, that the war con- 

Why, in the face of military and political 

CTOBER 23, 1967 


progress in the South, and the burden of our 
bombing in the North, do they insist and per- 
sist with the war ? 

From many sources the answer is the same. 
They still hope that the people of the United 
States will not see this struggle through to the 
very end. As one Western diplomat reported 
to me only this week — he had just been in 
Hanoi — "They believe their staying power is 
greater than ours and that they can't lose." A 
visitor from a Communist capital had this to 
say: "They expect the war to be long, and 
that the Americans in the end will be defeated by 
a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychologi- 
cal factors." The Premier of North Viet-Nam 
said as far back as 1962 : "Americans do not like 
long, inconclusive war . . . Thus we are sure to 
win in the end." 

Are the North Vietnamese right about us? 

I think not. No. I think they are wrong. I 
think it is the common failing of totalitarian 
regimes, that they cannot really understand the 
nature of our democracy : 

— They mistake dissent for disloyalty ; 

— They mistake restlessness for a rejection of 
policy ; 

— They mistake a few committees for a 
country ; 

— They misjudge individual speeches for pub- 
lic policy. 

They are no better suited to judge the strength 
and perseverance of America than the Nazi and 
the Stalinist propagandists were able to judge 
it. It is a tragedy that they must discover these 
qualities in the American people, and discover 
them through a bloody war. 

And, soon or late, they will discover them. 

In the meantime, it shall be our policy to con- 
tinue to seek negotiations, confident that reason 
will some day prevail, that Hanoi will realize 
that it just can never win, that it will turn away 
from fighting and start building for its ovm 

The True Peacekeepers 

Since World War II, this nation has met and 
has mastered many challenges — challenges in 
Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba. 

We met them because brave men were willing 
to risk their lives for their nation's security. 
And braver men have never lived than those who 
carry our colors in Viet-Nam at this very hour. 



The price of these efforts, of course, has bee, 
heavy. But the price of not having made them :, 
all, not having seen them through, in my jud;; 
ment would have been vastly greater. 

Our goal has been the same: in Europe, . 
Asia, in our own hemisphere. It has been — ar 
it is now — peace. 

And peace cannot be secured by wishes; peal 
camiot be preserved by noble words and pu 
intentions. Enduring peace — Franklin ] i 
Koosevelt said — cannot be bought at the cost < Mi 
other people's freedom. 

The late President Kennedy put it precisely ;{ *'* 
November 1961 when he said : * 

. . . we are neither "warmongers" nor "appea.sera 
neither "hard" nor "soft." We are Americans, deta 
mined to defend the frontiers of freedom by an honoi 
able peace if peace is possible, but by arms if arms ai 
used against us. 


The true peacekeepers in the world tonig]' 
are not those who urge us to retire from the fie 
in Viet-Nam, who tell us to try to find the quicll 
est, cheapest exit from that tormented land, v 
matter what the consequences to us may be. 

The true peacekeepers are those men wll '™''* 
stand out there on the DMZ at this very hon ^.^d,, 
taking the worst that the enemy can give. TB 
true peacekeepers are the soldiers who are breaJ 
ing the terrorist's grip around the villages 
Viet-Nam, the civilians who are bringing medi 
cal care and food and education to people wh 
have already suffered a generation of war. 

And so I report to you that we are going 1 
continue to press forward. Two things we mu; 
do. Two things we shall do. 

First, we must not mislead our enemy. Li 
him not think that debate and dissent will pn 
duce wavering and withdrawal. For I can assui 
you they won't. Let him not think that protesi 
will produce surrender. Because they won't. L* 
him not think that he will wait us out. For 1: 

Second, we will provide all that our brat 
men require to do the job that must be dom 
And that job is going to be done. 

These gallant men have our prayers — hav 
our thanks — have our heartfelt jDraise — and on 
deepest gratitude. 

Let the world know that the keepers of peac 
will endure through every trial — and that wit 
the full backing of their countrymen, they ar 
going to prevail. 

! im 



' For President Kennedy's address at Seattle, Wash 
on Nov. 16, 1961, see Builetin of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 91i 


ad tie 


m t( 







1 I 

Improving fhe Internationa! Monetary Mechanism 

The Boards of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Banh for 

selj: Reconstruction and Development and its afflli- 
utes, the hitemational Finance Corporation and 
ihe International Development Association, 
field their annual meetings at Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, September ^5-29. Follotoing is a state- 

wi ment made hy Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
1. Fotoler before the Board of Governors of the 
MF on September 26, together with the text of 
(resolution adopted by the Board of Governors 
m September £9. 




D wl 

IgfS ( 




'reasury Department press release dated September 26 

I take special pleasure in participating in 
ibis annual meeting in Rio de Janeiro. I am very 
[rateful to the Government and the people of 
'i Jrazil for their gracious hospitality on this 
•ccasion. The beauty of this city, the breath- 
taking potential of this huge vibrant country, 
brm a backdrop to the conference that can 
inspire us all. 

The personal experience of viewing at first- 
land the problems and potentialities of eco- 
tomic growth in Brazil and in her neighboring 
lations will, I trust, stimulate us all to assist in 
urther efforts to reinforce international coUab- 
ration to support economic development. 

I am very glad to see among us once again 
irovernors for Indonesia representing that large 
nd important nation, and to note that both the 
^und and Bank have been able, in the past year 
r so, to play a helpful, constractive role in 
ssisting Indonesia to deal with a most difficult 
nd ti-ying period of economic stabilization. I 
now that all of us wish the Indonesian author- 
;ies well in the courageous efforts they are 

It is also a pleasure to welcome to membership 

li our organizations The Gambia, which last 

f Wii ^eek completed the formalities to assume mem- 

U' ership, and Botswana, whose membership reso- 


lutions are before this meeting of Governors. 

The Fund and Bank have had another highly 
successful year, the highlights of which have 
been recorded in their excellent annual reports. 
Mr. Woods [George D. Woods, President of 
the IBRD] and Mr. Schweitzer [Pierre-Paul 
Schweitzer, Managing Director of the IMF] 
have smnmarized the activity of the past year 
in the Bank family and in the Fund, and I 
will not retrace the ground they have covered 
so well. 

But the events of the year in the usual pattern 
have been crowned by an miusual, indeed, 
unique achievement — the creation of a facility 
to meet the need, as and when it arises, for a 
supplement to existing reserve assets. This is to 
be established within the framework of the 
Fund and is embodied m the Outline Plan for 
a Special Drawing Rights Facility,' which is 
the principal business of this meeting. 

Last year we urged joint meetings of the 
Executive Directors representing all member 
countries of the Fund and the Deputies of the 
Group of Ten. It was our hope and trust that 
from these meetings a specific plan for delib- 
erate reserve creation would emerge to become 
the subject of action by the Fund Governors at 
this annual meeting. This hope and trust have 
been fulfilled. The joint meetings have produced 
I'esults which exceeded expectations and the 
United States is grateful to all the Ministers 
and Deputies of the Group of Ten and to the 
Executive Directors, Managing Director, and 
staff of the Fund. 

So at last we, at this meeting, come to the 
final and logical forum for an international 
monetary conference to consider what steps we 
might jointly take to secure substantial im- 
provements in international monetary arrange- 
ments looking to the creation of a facility to 
provide, as and when needed, a supplement to 
existing reserve assets. Despite 22 years of 

3T0BEK 23, 1967 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 25, 1967, p. 


steady progress since Bretton Woods, we need 
to assure a world monetary system conducive 
to a more rational and orderly expansion of 
global reserves. 

It would be a grave error, however, to assume 
that a strong, flexible, and adequate interna- 
tional monetary system begins and ends with 
the assurance of adequacy of global reserves. 
There are other essential elements which require 
both international cooperation and a responsi- 
ble approach of national monetary authorities. 
Two particularly deserve mention; and the as- 
surance to my fellow Governors is that the 
United States will play its full part. 

Tlie maintenance of convertibility of the dol- 
lar and gold for international monetary pur- 
poses is also essential to a regime of stable 
exchange rates, which is a primary objective of 
the Fund recalled to us yesterday by the Man- 
aging Director in his notable address. 

Nothing in the new arrangements on liquidity 
is designed to alter the present relationship be- 
tween gold and the dollar. The United States' 
commitment to the convertibility of the dollar 
into gold at $35 an ounce remains firm. This 
has been, and will continue to be, a central factor 
in the monetary system. 

Adjusting Payments Imbalances 

Another element deserving comment is the 
process of adjusting payments imbalances. In- 
ternational cooperation is important here also, 
for it is difficult without it to make this process 
work effectively in the complex world today. 
The continuing expansion of world trade and 
investment carries with it a corresponding tend- 
ency toward a higher absolute level of interna- 
tional unbalance. An improved adjustment 
process can serve to moderate this trend and 
especially to reduce or eliminate persistent or 
excessive deficits and persistent or excessive 

The Fund report calls attention to some of 
the difficulties encountered in improving the 
adjustment process. At the present moment, in 
my own country there is clear need to apply 
fiscal restraint to what may otherwise soon be- 
come an expansion so excessive as to create seri- 
ous inflationary strains and an increasing 
balance-of-payments deficit. Meanwhile, many 
countries of continental Europe are still in need 
of stimulus to restore more satisfactory rates of 

economic growth. This would also reduce their 
balance-of-payments surpluses and thereby 
promote the international adjustment process. 

A perfectly even rate of growth is not to be 
expected either in national economies or in 
world trade. The recent situation has been 
marred by sluggish advances in output — and in 
some instances, contractions — in a nimiber of 
key industrial nations. If this state of affairs 
were to continue or, worse still, to intensify, 
strains on the international payments mechan- 
ism would surely become severe. In particular, 
the world's primary producing nations would 
bear a heavy burden of adjustment. 

In many of the industrial nations, a slower 
advance in output was consciously sought by 
national policy in order to reduce inflationary 
pressure. With the adjustment completed, the 
basis for a more endurmg expansion has been 
laid. Essential as these adjustments in separate 
countries have been, policies of contraction in 
surplus coimtries must not be allowed to con- 
tinue so long as to prejudice the prospects for 
an expanding volume of world trade, severely 
aggravating imbalances in international pay- 
ments. A constantly expanding volume of trade, 
well distributed regionally, is essential if ac- 
ceptable levels of well-being are to be sustained 
in developed coimtries and promoted in the 
developing countries of the world. 

A common theme in the recent experience of 
many industrial nations has been the monetary 
strains that are the consequence of too rapid 
internal expansion and too sparing reliance on 
fiscal restraint. In general, this year has seen 
some easing of the most severe financial strains. 
But, in turn, the welcome moderate reduction in 
upward pressure on money markets internation- 
ally has only been achieved, in the main, along 
with a slowing in the growth of output in some 
major industrial nations below the rates that are 
desirable and feasible from a long-term point 
of view. Despite this, long-term interest rates 
have remained high. 

There will be a need to ha,rmonize national 
economic and financial policies in the interest 
not only of balanced expansion at home but 
also of a balanced expansion of trade inter- 
nationally. We are all aware that both deficit 
and surplus countries share the responsibility 
for continuous effoi-ts to improve the process of 
adjustment. Deficits and surpluses are after all 
two sides of the same coin. There should be no 




presumption that either the deficit or surplus 
country is the one that is delinquent. Coopera- 
tive action by both parties is essential. 

Let me turn now to the main subject of inter- 
est — on the Fund side — at this amiual meeting. 
This 22d annual meeting has a special meaning 
for all Fund members. After nearly a quarter- 
century of experience with the articles of agree- 
ment prepared at Bretton Woods in 1944, we are 
now asked to approve a procedure leading to the 
first amendment to those articles. 

The plan for special drawing rights is im- 
portant to all our member nations. There is no 
area of the world that does not have a vital in- 
terest in the expansion of international trade. 
Moreover, the flow of public and private capital 
across national boundaries is of the greatest 
concern to the developing world, and these 
flows can quickly feel the adverse effects of 
inadequate reserves. 

Since the war, gold and dollars have provided 
a flow of new reserves. But gold is not now 
adding to global reserves, nor can it confidently 
be assumed that it will do so to a very large 
extent in the future. Total monetary gold stocks, 
including those held by the Fund and other 
international financial institutions, are not 
significantly larger today than they were at the 
end of 1964. 

Dollars, sterling, and temporary reserves 
created by the Fund under existing procedures 
are for the time being carrying on growth of 
reserves. But it is clear that future reserve 
growth cannot rely, as in the past, on U.S. pay- 
ments deficits. 

It is against this background that the nego- 
tiations on the outline plan have proceeded. 
And the plan makes crystal clear that it is pos- 
sible to reach agreement on a specific course of 
action despite differences in approach to the 
problems of the monetary system and despite 
widely varying national reserve positions and 
policies. We have progressed toward agreement 
in a pragmatic spirit, recognizing that no one 
participating in these negotiations could expect 
the outcome to coincide in full with his own 
ideas. The judgment and good will of a large 
number of responsible officials of governments 
and central banks have combined to bring about 
this result after some years of intensive work. 

The outline plan is now before us. We have 
the responsibility — and the opportimity — to 
adopt a resolution to begin the process of giving 

it life. This is our unique opportunity, meeting 
as a body, to act on the outline plan, before it is 
committed to our Executive Directors for fibaal 
drafting, then to this Board for approval, and 
to governments for acceptance. 

Plan To Create Reserve Assets 

The outline plan has the full support of my 
country. It provides the framework for an ef- 
fective and workable structure for meeting fu- 
ture global needs for reserve assets. Wlaile there 
are many aspects of the plan that are note- 
worthy, I shall confine myself to a few 
observations : 

1. The outline plan is a universal plan. It is 
open to all members of the Fund, and I hope that 
all will wish to participate. 

2. The facility is intended to meet the need, 
as and when it arises, for a supplement to exist- 
ing reserve assets. While each country will make 
its own decision, it is expected that these special 
drawing rights will be treated as first-line re- 
serves. The United States intends to do so. 

3. The new reserve asset should provide in- 
surance against an excessive cumulative com- 
petitive pressure for restrictions on interna- 
tional finance and trade transactions. It can also 
act as a counter to such interacting national 
moves toward imduly high interest rates as are 
brought about by competitive actions of those 
countries that are protecting their reserves. At 
one and the same time, it will permit growth in 
world reserves and buttress confidence in the 
stability of the entire system of world finance. In 
a word, it should operate to relax appreciably 
some of the unnecessarily painful strictures on 
international finance that come from fears of 
actual or impending reserve shortage. 

4. Endorsement of this outline plan should in 
itself provide smoother sailing in the world's 
money and exchange markets. Anticipation of 
the future is a powerful present factor in all 
things financial. Gold and exchange markets 
should reflect a new sense of confidence in the 
adequacy of future reserve supplies. 

5. We are gratified that the outline^ plan 
recognizes that international liquidity is the 
business of the Fund and clearly provides that 
the Board of Governors, where every member of 
the Fund is represented, will have the final re- 
sponsibility for the vital decisions to create new 
special drawing rights. However, as to the role 



of the Fund in the use of special drawing rights, 
the outline plan wisely leaves scope for develop- 
ment through experience. The Fund's role may 
well become one of general guidance more than 
one of detailed operation. While some basic rules 
for use need to be maintained, they need not be 
numerous or complex. The essential part of the 
Fund's role would seem to lie less in the area of 
specific transactions than in the process of tak- 
ing decisions to create special drawing rights 
and in clarifying and maintaining the basic 
rules governing their use. 

6. A very considerable amount of reconsti- 
tution of special drawing rights may be expected 
to occur through the normal balance-of-pay- 
ments processes. Still it has been agreed that 
some explicit reconstitution provision was nec- 
essary. At the same time, it was important to 
avoid compromising the quality of the special 
drawing rights as a supplement to existing re- 
sei-ve assets. The principles for reconstitution 
that have been adopted for the first 5-year 
period assure that the special drawing rights 
will not be abused, yet do not interfere with 
their reserve asset status. 

In addition to the net average use provision 
adopted as the initial operating rule, it is also 
provided that "participants will pay due regard 
to the desirability of pursuing over time a bal- 
anced relationship between their holdings of 
special drawing rights and other reserves." This 
provision is intended to encourage a balanced 
use of all three assets over time and thus main- 
tain stability, in a general way, in relative hold- 
ings of the new asset and existing reserve assets, 
as well as to promote equivalence between the 
new asset and the traditional reserve assets. 

My country subscribes strongly to the view 
that the new facility is designed to assure a 
satisfactory rate of growth in global reserves. It 
is not designed to meet an individual country's 
balance-of-payments problems. 

Let me make it clear that the new facility 
should in no sense be regarded as a solution to 
the balance-of-payments problem of the United 
States or to the corresponding surplus problem 
of continental Europe. This is a matter that 
falls under the heading of the continuing effort 
to improve the adjustment process. As the 
Hague communique of the Group of Ten in 
July 1966 noted : 

The prerequisite for the actual creation of reserves 
should include the attainment of a better balance of 



payments equilibrium between members and the likeli- 
hood of a better working of the adjustment process in 
the future. 

Of course in determining his view as to global 
needs for reserves, presumably the Managing 
Director will take into consideration prospective 
future additions to reserves in the form of 
dollars or other foreign exchange, as well as a 
number of other factors and developments, both 
quantitative and qualitative. I doubt that an 
elaborate or detailed listing of criteria and rela- 
tive priorities can be established, because condi- 
tions change and the relative importance of 
criteria change. I believe it would not be useful 
to incorporate a fixed list of criteria in the 
agreement or the report. 

The United States delegation has great pleas- 
ure in giving its support to the resolution that 
calls on the Executive Directors to propose the' 
necessary amendments to the articles of agree- 
ment. It is my strong recommendation that the 
work of the Executive Directors to this end be 
completed with dispatch. We hope to propose 
legislation to the Congress of the United States 
in the early spring of 1968. 

The resolution before us also requests that a 
report be made on such other possible amend- 
ments as may be recommended at the same time. 
We are clearly at a much earlier stage of our 
consideration of other proposals for changes in 
the articles and by-laws. Nevertheless, my dele- 
gation concurs in proceeding to an examination 
of such proposals. 

The proposals will have to be judged on their 
own merits and accepted, altered, or rejected 
on this basis on the report to be submitted by 
the Executive Directors. Some suggestions may 
prove relatively easy either to accept or reject 
If, however, some suggestions are found to be 
complicated and/or controversial, the Executive 
Directors could not be expected to put forward 
next year specific proposals for change based on 
such suggestions. Adequate time should be al 
lowed to permit a mature, broad, and certain 
meeting of minds. This is the way we have ap 
proa,ched the question of special drawing riglits. 

For the above reasons, I believe tliat specific 
substantive decisions on all these matters 
should not be regarded as a precondition tc 
taking action on the special-drawing-rightf 

I turn now to matters relating to long-term 
economic development. The improvements we 
are now setting in motion in the international 


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monetary mechanism are, I believe, essential to 
the long-term well-being of the developing 
countries. Economic interdependence of the de- 
veloped and the developing countries is a fact 
of the present and of the future that must be a 
guiding principle in the direction we give to 
international economic policies. 

Assistance to Developing Countries 

It is a paradox that the problem of develop- 
ment, while infinitely complex in its economic, 
social, cultural and even moral ramifications, is 
also blindingly simple in its barest elements. 
These can be reduced to three in number : 

(a) Domestic self-help policies by the devel- 
oping country sufficient to 

(b) attract external resources, public and 
private, drawn from countries able to provide 
them, resulting in a 

(c) diligent application of the combined 
domestic and external resources along lines con- 
ducive to long-term development rather than 
exhausting immediate consumption. 

The major factor in the history of successful 
development lending by the World Bank may 
well be its devotion to these principles. The 
Bank outstandingly reflects them today. 

The subject of International Development 
Association replenislunent, while not formally 
on our agenda, is nevertheless the most im- 
portant business pending before the Governors 
of the Bank family of mstitutions. It should 
be evident from my remarks today that Presi- 
dent Johnson fully supports the efforts of the 
World Bank management to achieve a replen- 
ishment for IDA on a substantially enlarged 
scale. I am hopeful that in their statements 
here other Governors will share this attitude. 

We are mindful, of course, that external as- 
sistance such as IDA provides can only supple- 
ment sound national development efforts. Only 
in association with self-help efforts — coordi- 
nated and soundly applied domestic policies and 
actions — can the application of external assist- 
ance bring developing countries to sustained 

Further, domestic self-help policies, which 
need not be cataloged here, are of vital im- 
portance to creating a climate in the developing 
coimtries conducive to maximizing the flow of 
external resources — public and private. Wliere 
these measures are lacking, the task of com- 

manding the support of the electorates of high- 
income countries for continued assistance with 
public funds will be made far more difficult. 
^Vliere these are lacking, private resources will 
not flow in desired directions and amounts. 

Two developments of the past year are espe- 
cially noteworthy for us here in relation to the 
object of encouraging greater foreign and local 
private capital participation in the growth 

The initial use of the authority granted under 
earlier charter amendments was made by the 
Executive Directors approving a $100 million 
line of credit from the World Bank to the In- 
ternational Finance Corporation. As a residt, 
we may expect even more substantial increases 
in IFC financing of the private sector — and in 
the much larger volumes of foreign and local 
private capital that are associated with it. 

Second, the inauguration of a new and useful 
facility within the IBRD institutional struc- 
ture — the International Center for the Settle- 
ment of Investment Disputes — through arbitra- 
tion and conciliation services will contribute 
materially to an improvement of the climate in 
which international private investment takes 
place. In so doing, it will extend the area that 
can benefit from private investment. It merits 
the support of the entire membership of the 

I camiot overemphasize the importance of 
policies conducive to a strong and dynamic pri- 
vate sector offering opportunities to both for- 
eign and local capital and serving as the pace 
setter of the economy. 

Resources for Development 

In stressing the role of private finance, I am, 
of course, ever mindful of the need for effec- 
tively mobilized and effectively applied public 
finance. We heard in the opening addresses 
yesterday and will in the next days learn more 
of the urgent need for the developed countries 
to find the ways and means of promoting in- 
creases in the volume of real resources available 
for development. We have too long remained on 
the so-called aid "plateau." It is time to strike 
out for higher ground. The World Bank family, 
and with it the regional banks, offer a promising 
channel for doing just this. 

I would be taking an imrealistic view of the 
world if I were not to recognize, however, that, 
leaving aside the budgetary problem we all face. 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 


there are at least two other constraints that tend 
to hold back the steadily increasing availability 
of resources to these multilateral lending 

(a) Capital markets everywhere are under 
pressure from mushrooming domestic require- 
ments. The price of capital in many markets is 
touching historic highs. The World Bank 
should not be forced to place excessive reliance 
on any single market for its rising capital needs. 
A sustainable mechanism for providing devel- 
opment finance to the Bank through private 
markets requires an equitable sharing of the 
total efforts — and the concept of equity em- 
braces reasonable terms as well as adequate 
amounts. Certainly, surplus countries should 
contribute positively to the adjustment process 
through grantmg preferred and substantially 
increased access to their capital markets by the 
Bank and other multilateral lending agencies. 

(b) Balance-of-payments factors are the 
other special constraint. Rather than permit our 
serious and continuing balance-of-payments 
difficulties — made still more complex by the 
foreign exchange cost of our effort in Viet- 
Nam — we in the United States have found ways 
to maintain a high level of aid through the 
transfer of real resources to the developing 

We would prefer, in an ideal world, to make 
our assistance available in the form of financial 
resources. However, when balance-of-payments 
realities confront us. our choice is clear: We 
strive not to reduce the level of our assistance 
but instead to make our assistance available 
through transfer of real resources. This ap- 
proach requires that the real resources repre- 
sent an addition to, not a substitute for, goods 
and services moving in normal commercial 

If serious and continuing balance-of-pay- 
ments difficulties constitute a constraint on the 
ways the United States can provide assistance, 
persistent balance-of-payments surpluses con- 
stitute an imperative to countries enjoying such 
a position to expand their assistance in the form 
of finance. 

A sensible policy for such countries, and 
a policy which can make a contribution to 
the overall adjustment process in the interna- 
tional payments system, is one of increasing the 

volume, easing the terms, widening the geo- 
graphic scope, and eliminating procurement 
limitations on the flow of development funds. 

IDA Replenishment 

These thoughts are relevant to the miresolved 
question of IDA replenisliment. 

As of last March, I was authorized by Presi- 
dent Jolinson to support the IDA replenishment 
at a substantially increased level, provided that 
account should be taken of the balance-of-pay- 
ments problems of deficit donor countries in de- 
ciding how IDA's new resources would be made 
available. Such a feature will in fact speed 
agreement leading to transfer of resources to 
less developed countries through IDA. 

If the multilateral agencies themselves are to 
achieve our hopes for them, they must have in- 
creasing funds committed by the donors for a 
long-term period. Balance-of-payments safe- 
guards will help assure that long-term contribu- 
tions are made, since only with their protection 
will finance ministers be in a position to assure 
their legislatures that the imcertainties of the 
future have been taken into account. 

In thus referring briefly to IDA replenish- 
ment discussions I would like to make one fur- 
ther point very clear. Nothing in the United 
States plan would require IDA to make any 
changes in its present policies with respect to the 
allocation of its resources to comitries and proj- 
ects or with respect to international competition 
in procurement, and no such changes are con- 
templated in this proposal. 

The magnitude of the tasks ahead requires 
that we strive to improve the quality of the 
development efforts of both the advanced and 
the developing countries. In so doing, we must 
recognize that certain economic sectors demand 
greater concentration of these improved efforts. 
The twin problems of food and population 
should now occupy the forefront of our atten- 
tion. The United States is empha,sizing assist- 
ance in agricultural improvement — including 
land reform as well as direct production im- 
provements — in its own programs. The inter- 
national institutions are giving increased atten- 
tion on their part. Nothing less than the highest 
priority attention to these problems will provide 
the basis for averting the potential disaster that 
looms in the food-population race. 



In closing my remarks I -would like to quote 
to you tlie words of the Brazilian representative, 
Mr. Souza Costa, who in oifermg a resolution 
of thanks at the final session of the Bretton 
Woods Conference, said : 

As the knowledge of these results becomes more 
widespread, a corresponding increase will take place 
in the number of those who, realizing the greatness of 
the objectives sought, will wish to be counted among 
the supporters of this undertaking. 

How correct this prophesy has been with re- 
spect to the Fund and the Bank. Let us hope that 
our successors will say the same of the work 
that we have launched at this annual meeting. 


Whereas the functioning of the international mone- 
tary system and its improvement, including arrange- 
ments to meet the need, as and when it arises, for a 
supplement to existing reserve assets, have been the 
subject of extensive study and international discussion 
resulting in the Outline of a Facility Based on Special 
Drawing Rights in the International Monetary Fund, 
which Outline" is attached to this Resolution ; and 

Whereas studies are currently under way on possible 
improvements in the present rules and practices of 
the Fund ; 

Now, THEREFORE, the Board of Governors hereby 
Resolves : 

That the Executive Directors are requested to 

1. Proceed with their work relating to both 

(a) the establishment in the Fund of a new facility 
on the basis of the Outline in order to meet the need, 
as and when it arises, for a supplement to existing 
reserve assets, and 

(b) improvements in the present rules and practices 
of the Fund based on developments in world economic 
conditions and the experience of the Fund since the 
adoption of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund ; and 

2. Submit to the Board of Governors as soon as 
possible but not later than March 31, 1968 

(a) a report proposing amendments to the Articles 
of Agreement and the By-Laws for the purpose of 

' Adopted unanimously by the Board of Governors 
of the IMF on Sept. 29. 
' Not printed here. 

establishing a new facility on the basis of the Outline, 

(b) a report proposing such amendments to the 
Articles of Agreement and the By-Laws as would be 
required to give effect to those modifications in the 
present rules and practices of the l\ind that the Execu- 
tive Directors will recommend. 

Tariff Commission To Report on 
Textile and Apparel Industries 

Stateraent hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated October 4 

I have today [October 4] asked the United 
States Tariff Commission to report to me by 
Januai"y 15, 1968, in the fullest detail possible 
on the economic condition of the United States 
textile and apparel industries. In this report, I 
expect in particular an intensive analysis of the 
present and prospective impact of imports upon 
these industries. 

This administration has consistently acted in 
recognition of the fact that the textile and ap- 
parel industries are of great importance to our 
economy. In recent months representatives of 
these industries have expressed to me and to 
many others a deep concern over their future 
well-being in light of a number of factors, and 
especially import trends. A large number of the 
Members of the Congress in both the House and 
Senate, including Chairman [Wilbur D.] Mills 
of the Ways and Means Committee, have spon- 
sored bills which deal with the question of 

In considering this widespread concern, I 
have concluded that we must have all the facts 
possible to guide our future actions in this im- 
portant field, and I am pleased that Chairman 
Mills is joining my request. I hope that the 
Tariff Commission's report will permit all of us 
who are deeply interested in the welfare of the 
textile and apparel industries to take a course 
of action which will be both in their interest and 
the national interest. 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 


Foreign Aid: An Essential Element of U.S. Foreign Policy 

hy Under Secretary Katzenbach'^ 

About this time every year, along with foot- 
ball, the World Series, autumn f asliions, and the 
like, the subject of foreign aid surfaces in the 
news. And usually the news features massive 
cuts in the foreign aid budget. It seems that our 
aid program is perennially in trouble on Capitol 
Hill and that various people are ever eager to 
recount vividly its sins of commission and omis- 
sion and predict its early demise. 

And this year — with large budgetary de- 
mands for both Viet-Nam and important 
domestic programs — foreign aid is a seemingly 
attractive target. 

Let me say at the outset that foreign aid is 
not an optional accessory to Aiuerican foreign 
policy to be extended or withdrawn according 
to the pressures or pleasures of the moment. 

It is an integral part of our foreign policy. 
Indeed, in many of the developing countries 
economic development assistance is our foreign 

I would like to review with you several aspects 
of this complex and misunderstood subject and 
share with you my views on the directions our 
aid efforts may take in the years ahead. 

This country has been in the foreign aid busi- 
ness for about 20 years now. But the circum- 
stances, purposes, and content of aid have 
changed enormously since George Marshall 
made the speech at Cambridge in 1947 which led 
to the Marshall Plan. 

The Marshall Plan was a dramatic success. 
Winston Churchill called it "the most unsordid 
act in history." Over the 4 to 5 years of the 
Marshall Plan we spent 2 percent of our gross 
national jjroduct on foreign aid — and for the 

' Address made before the New England Jaycee Con- 
vention at Hyannis, Mass., on Sept. 30 (press release 


most part, everybody thought it a good idea. 
Europe was rebuilt with fantastic speed, com- 
munism was contained, and some equilibrium 
was restored to world trade. 

Our next adventure with foreign aid was 
triggered by the civil war in Greece and the 
Russian threat to take the Eastern provinces of 
Turkey. The Truman doctrine was born. Our 
objectives were specific and fairly limited: to 
strengthen the ability of Greece and Turkey to 
withstand Communist assault. And we 

In the fifties we started a number of aid pro- 
grams in the less developed world. The bulk of 
this aid was military hardware and security- 
related economic assistance to countries rim- 
ming the Iron Curtain. Foreign aid became a 
key tool in the effort to contain Communist ex- 
pansionism. Our objectives were easy to under- 
stand, and it was relatively easy to measure 

Today, we still have major programs of mili- 
tary aid in countries such as Iran and Turkey 
and in the Far East. But increasingly, over the 
past 6 years, the emphasis of American aid ef- 
forts — if not newspaper headlines — has turned 
to economic development. 

This change reflects basic changes in the 
political map of the world. Dozens of new na- 
tions have achieved independence. Many lack 
effective government and modern social institu- 
tions. Most are desperately poor. They are 
simply unable to stand on their own feet 
economically. So they have turned — often 
grudgingly and suspiciously — to the rich na- 
tions for help. 

Most poor nations are determined to change 
their lot. They are — with varying degrees of 
commitment — taking on the task of building a 
better life. The choices they make, their suc- 


aid I 

cesses and failures, will affect their future — and 
ours. Today, our various aid programs are 
designed to help them succeed in their task. 

It is in terms of this basic purpose that I 
would like to consider with you four aspects of 
foreign aid : 

(1) The variety and scope of aid programs; 

(2) the role of aid in achieving development ; 

(3) military assistance; and 

(4) some problems we face in the future. 

First, the variety and scope. 

The United States provides foreign assistance 
through a variety of institutions. The principal 
sources, and the amounts which each provided 
last year, include the following: 

— The Agency for International Development 
(AID) provided $2.5 billion in dollar-repayable 
loans and in grants. This amounts to about one- 
third of our aid program. 

— About $1.5 billion (or one-quarter of the 
aid pie) is in U.S. agricultural commodities 
which were sold or granted to less developed 
countries under the Food for Freedom program. 

— The Export-Import Bank loaned about 
$500 million on a long-term basis to finance U.S. 
exports and return a profit to the United States. 

— Another $500 million was provided to inter- 
national development banks such as the Inter- 
national Development Association (IDA, the 
soft loan window of the World Bank) for loans 
to less developed countries. 

— $1 billion was provided in the form of mili- 
tary assistance grants and credit sales (exclud- 
ing Viet-Nam). 

— $100 million financed Peace Corps 

I might note that the assistance provided is 
almost all in the form of commodities, equip- 
ment, construction projects, and human skills. 
Dollars are not presented to governments for use 
as they see fit. And 85 percent of all aid dollars 
are spent in the United States. 

The items I listed a minute ago totaled about 
$6 billion in assistance last year. That seems a 
lot of assistance — even if the bulk is repayable. 

But it is less than you might think. During the 
Marshall Plan we invested roughly 2 percent of 
our gross national product in foreign aid. The 
$6 billion I mentioned amounts to less than two- 
thirds of 1 percent of today's much larger GNP. 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 

Furthermore, other developed nations provide 
a larger proportion of their smaller gross na- 
tional products in assistance each year. They do 
so in part as the result of our urgmg. 

Achieving Economic Development 

Most of the time when you hear of foreign 
assistance debates in the Congress, discussion is 
centered around the programs carried on by the 
Agency for International Development. AID 
will operate a progi'am this year of less than $2.5 
billion. Tlie precise amount will not be known 
until the AID budget finishes its annual running 
the gauntlet of congressional consideration. 
AID, together with the Department of Agri- 
culture, also determines the use of agricultural 
commodities made available by the Food for 
Freedom Act. 

aid's chief objective is to help less developed 
countries achieve economic development. But 
economic development is only a shorthand term 
for a complex process of constructive social, 
political, and cultural changes combined with 
sustained economic growth. It requires develop- 
ment of institutions which can generate popular 
participation in the development process. It in- 
volves capital, development of technical skills, 
building of private enterprise, and development 
of effective, dedicated leadership. In this respect 
our current AID programs bear little relation- 
ship to the Marshall Plan. 

AID focuses its development programs in key 
countries which demonstrate the willingiiess 
and ability to make good use of aid resources. 
Nearly 90 percent of AID assistance is concen- 
trated in 16 countries — such as India, Pakistan, 
Korea, Brazil, and Chile. We are not trying to 
propel all underdeveloped countries dramat- 
ically to the income standards of the industrial- 
ized world. Instead, we seek to help recipient 
countries reach the point where they can move 
ahead on their own. 

There have been notable successes. 

First there were the recovery programs of 
Western Europe and Japan. 

Perhaps even more impressive — and more 
relevant to current problems — is the success 
story of Taiwan. We learned there that self-sus- 
taining economic growth can be achieved at a 
surprisingly low per capita income. American 
aid has not made the Taiwanese wealthy — their 
per capita income is less than $200 per year — 


but our aid and their own efforts have given 
Taiwan the power to achieve further economic 
growth without further extraordinary assist- 
ance from AID. 

Today, similar success is miderway in Korea 
and Turkey. Both of these nations have set for 
themselves the goal of ending AID programs 
by the early 1970's. 

These cases, and others like Israel and Mexico, 
do not prove that every underdeveloped country 
will succeed. But they do demonstrate that un- 
derdeveloped countries can succeed. 

It would be pleasant to promise a steady list 
of such success stories. There will be more; but 
the truth is that the job of development is a 
long-term one, and it is by no means likely that 
it can be completed fast enough to avoid con- 
tinued hunger, instability, and violence in the 
less developed world in the coming years. 

For Americans, the temptation is overwhelm- 
ing to ask for demonstrated results at the end of 
each fiscal year. And yet capital and technical 
help cannot change overnight social problems 
and practices which have been centuries in de- 
veloping. Our own growth began not far from 
here nearly 3.50 years ago. And we were blessed 
with rich natural resources and critical skills. 
The less developed countries are engaged, with 
our help, in compressmg decades into months 
and years. Under that pressure, there will inevi- 
tably be failures and setbacks. 

An essential part of our foreign aid is what 
we call human resources development. Each 
year AID provides training in the United States 
for about 10,000 foreign nationals. The training 
is designed to help those countries receiving as- 
sistance from us to develop the manpower, skills, 
and resources to iise most advantageously the 
economic assistance we give. 

Military Assistance Grants and Arms Sales 

In recent days one of the more controversial 
aspects of our foreign aid has been military as- 
sistance. Most of the public discussions have 
tended to make little distinction between mili- 
tary assistance grants and sales of arms. 

Our total program of grants and sales in re- 
cent years has been at an approximate rate of 
$3 billion per year. Ninety percent of our sales 
are to our NATO allies plus Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand. 

The remaining 10 percent of the sales go to 
various developing countries in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia. It is this 10 percent of the 


sales plus our military assistance grants and 
training which constitute the heart of the 
present controversy. 

One side of this issue says that we should have 
nothing to do with providing and selling 
arms — especially in the less developed countries. 
In the abstract that makes sense. In the real 
world it would be dangerous to our national 

If we, the United States, were the only arms 
manufacturers in the world, it would be marvel- 
ously simple to sit back and have nothing to do 
with the international arms traffic. But such is 
not the case. 

And to say that distribution of arms encour- 
ages conflict is a false oversimplification. It ig- 
nores, for example : 

1. The kinds of problems which arise when 
another country, such as the Soviet Union or 
Communist China, provides arms to a radically 
aggressive government, creating an imbalance 
of power in a particular region; 

2. Or when a country like Cuba exports revo- 
lutionaries into neighboring countries to create 
internal subversion with the hope of bringing 
down a neighboring government; 

3. Or a situation in which a government sim- 
ply lacks the trained manpower and equipment 
to maintam sufficient law and order to allow 
economic growth to take place in a stable politi- 
cal environment. 

Each of these kinds of situations merits 

The Middle East war and subsequent devel- 
opments are a good example of the first kind of 
problem. You are all familiar with President 
Jolmson's proposal to try to prevent a new arms 
race following the recent conflict — a proposal 
that all arms shipments to the area be regis- 
tered in the United Nations.^ The response from 
the Soviet Union was the swift replacement of 
much of the arms the Arab states had lost in the 

We have faced variations on this theme in 
many parts of the world over the last 20 years 
and have sought to use our military assistance 
and arms sales to correct the imbalance of power 
such moves generally create within a region. 

Then thei-e is the problem of countries which 
specialize in exporting insurgency among their 
neighbors. The OAS Foreign Ministers have 


' For President Johnson's address at Washington 
D.C., on June 19, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967, p. 31 


just met in Washington to try to cope with Cas- 
troism, whicli continues to export revolution and 
guerrilla warfare to Guatemala, Venezuela, Co- 
lombia, and Bolivia. We have sought to make 
avaihible to several countries carefully measured 
amounts of military equipment to enable them 
to cope with tliis kind of threat. To ignore or 
seek to rationalize away such thi-eats to the 
peace would, in my opinion, constitute an irre- 
sponsible intei'pretation of our long-range na- 
tional interests. 

The third type of problem is perhaps the 
most controversial, or at least the least under- 
stood. This is our effort to provide militaiy as- 
sistance to a number of govermnents to main- 
tain enough internal stability for economic 
growth to take place. 

We are convinced that without at least a 
minimum level of internal security, all our eco- 
nomic assistance to these countries is placed in 
jeopardy. In a sense, such military assistance 
buys time for those goverimients. It permits 
them to proceed with development, with mod- 
ernization, with social revolution, which will 
eventually lead to a better life for all their 

By carefully limiting the size and kind of 
military assistance, we can often help such 
governments lower their security costs and 
thereby free their own limited resources for 
other kinds of development. 

In the less developed countries, the military 
is often the only national institution. It fre- 
quently plays a pivotal role in the moderniza- 
tion process. U.S. foreign policy cannot ignore 
this fact. 

The objectives of our military assistance pro- 
grams are related directly to our goals of assist- 
ing in development of a stable world commu- 
nity of free and independent nations. Stability 
does not mean an absence of change. On the 
contrary, stability means orderly change; it 
means enough basic security for change to take 
place without widespread violence. 

Looking to the Future 

Wliat of the future? Where do we go from 
here ? "WHiat is our single most important prob- 

President Johnson addressed the issue square- 
ly in his state of the Union address last Janu- 
ary,^ when he said : 

Nest to the pursuit of peace, the really greatest 
challenge to the human family is the race between food 
supply and population increase. 

The recent repoit of the President's Science 
Advisory Conunittee on the World Food Prob- 
lem * spells out the nature of food and popula- 
tion problems which will face the world tomor- 
row. And it indicates the scope of food produc- 
tion and population control efforts needed to 
prevent mass starvation in less than 20 years. 

The aritlmietic of the problem is overwhelm- 
ing. Today 10,000 people will die of starvation 
or of malnutrition. Tomorrow will claim an- 
other 10,000. This week a million babies will be 
born throughout the world. Next week will 
bring another million. 

Since 1960, food production in the world has 
increased at a rate of approximately 1 percent 
per year; world population is increasing at a 
rate of roughly 3 percent per year. In 1966, 
for instance, the world population grew by 70 
million while food production stood still. 

In short, the world is in danger of losing the 
struggle to feed itself. 

I don't think it is necessary to give you a long 
list of such statistics. The report states its basic 
conclusions succinctly : 

1. The scale, severity, and duration of the world food 
problem are so great that a massive, long-range, Inno- 
vative effort unprecedented in human history will be 
required to master it. 

2. The solution of the problem that will exist after 
about 1985 demands that programs of population con- 
trol be initiated now. For the immediate future, the 
food supply is critical. 

3. Food supply is directly related to agricultural de- 
velopment and. in turn, agricultural development and 
overall economic development are critically interde- 
pendent in the hungry countries. 

4. A strategy for attacking the world food problem 
will, of necessity, encompass the entire foreign eco- 
nomic assi-stance effort of the United States in concert 
with other developed countries, voluntary institutions, 

Today our foreign assistance programs are 
more eifective and better managed than they 
have ever been. Real development progress is 
being made ; but more is needed at aii accelerated 

And, most importantly, we must understand 
what foreign aid is and what it is not. 

It should not, for instance, be thought of 
simply as a bribe or a carrot or a stick. It is 
rarely effective when given as a reward or with- 

' lUd., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158. 

' For a summary of the report, see iUd., July 17, 
1967, p. 76. 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 


held as a punishment. It should not be expected 
inevitably to procure gratitude — which, inci- 
dentally, is hard to define when applied to na- 
tions. It should not be expected to produce the 
same etlects in ditl'erent countries, and it should 
not be expected to "Americanize" everyone it 

It can and does provide the basic stability nec- 
essai-y for economic growth. It can be and is a 
deterrent to Communist expansionism. Most 
importantly, it can often provide the crucial 
margin of resources and skills needed to bring a 
nation's economy to the self-sustaining point. It 
can assist in the development of the institutions 
which make a free society function and grow. 

The circumstances and content of aid have 
changed dramatically in 20 years. The areas of 
defined need are now global rather than Euro- 
pean. The job still needs to be done, today and 

To quote George Marshall : "Continued peace 
is possible only in a relatively free and prosper- 
ous world." We can and must play a major role 
in making that peace possible. Our own security 
and the future of this nation depend upon it. 

The United States is the most powerful and 
wealthy nation in the world. From this material 
wealth — and from our moral strength — comes a 
leadership role. And it is the function of leaders 
to lead. 


The Economic Integration of Latin America 

hy Anthony M. Solomon 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

Five months ago at the Summit Meeting in 
Punta del Este, the Presidents of the Latin 
American Republics made a profound and his- 
toric commitment to create a Latin American 
Common Market and to do so witliin a fixed 
time period. In the words of the Presidential 
Declaration, they agreed "to create progres- 
sively, beginning in 1970, the Latin American 
Common Market, which shall be substantially 
in operation in a period of no more than fifteen 
years." ^ 

The means to this end are outlined in the 
Presidents' Action Program. They include the 
progressive programed reduction in trade re- 
strictions among the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) countries; the 
progressive convergence of the two existing in- 
tegration systems, the LAFTA and the Central 
American Common Market; the formation of 

'Address made before the Peruvian Institute of 
Business Administration at Paracas, Peru, on Sept. 
29 (press release 212 dated Sept 28). 

'For text of tlie Declaration of the Presidents of 
America signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Apr. 14, 
see Bulletin of May 8, 1967, p. 70C. 

subregional conunon markets and sectoral free 
trade arrangements where these would accel- 
erate the process of integration; and the estab- 
lisliment of a common external tariff for Latin 
America as a whole. 

The end product is to be a continental market 
which by 1985 will probably have more than 300 
million people, producing an amiual output of 
perhaps $200 billion — a market as large in dol- 
lar terms as that of Germany and France com- 
bined — with goods and services moving freely 
among them, unrestrained by tariffs, quotas, or 
other impediments to free and open exchange. 

This vision of a broad continental market is 
an exciting one. It is not a new vision that sud- 
denly gripped the Presidents of the hemisphere 
when they met in the spring of this year. It is a 
vision that has inspired Latin American leaders 
for many years and that led to the formation in 
1960 of the Central American Common Market 
and the Latin American Free Trade Associa- 

The rationale for a continental common mar- 
ket is simple and self-evident. The countries of 
Latin America want to industrialize and need 
to industrialize. Efficient modern industrial 



plants require markets of economic size, markets 
large enough to permit the economies of scale 
and the intraindustry specialization on which 
growth and efficiency depend. But the national 
markets in Latin America are small both in 
numbers and in effective purchasing power. 
Twelve countries have populations under 5 mil- 
lion. Tliree countries have populations of 5 to 
10 millions. And large parts of the population 
are in the hinterland, living on a subsistence 
basis, divorced from the money economy. 

In such narrow markets, small-scale enter- 
prises producing light consumer goods can 
operate with i-easonable effectiveness. But the 
small national market offers no scope for the 
development of larger-scale establishments to 
produce more complex consumer and capital 
goods. Wliere such enterprises have been estab- 
lished, they have tended to be high-cost in- 
efficient entities, hothouse plants shielded by 
high tariff walls, with little growth potential. 

To become effective entities operating on an 
economic scale, these enterprises need to produce 
for significantly larger markets. And they need 
the spur of competition to make them cost con- 
scious. The market should be large enough to 
accommodate many plants of economic size, 
each challenged to find new ways to reduce costs 
and increase productivity. 

The world market is open to these businesses, 
of course ; but in the world market they face the 
overwhelming competition of the mature, well- 
capitalized firms of the advanced countries. 
Within Latin America they can compete on 
more equal terms with their peers. If the coun- 
tries of Latin America join together and dis- 
mantle the trade barriers among them, existing 
enterprises can expand and new large-scale busi- 
nesses can be established to service the con- 
tinental market. Shielded for a time by tlieir 
outer tariff walls from the export competition 
of the advanced countries, enterprises in the 
common market would still be exposed to the 
spur of competition, but a more tolerable com- 
petition that would not swamp them before they 
had mastered the tecliniques of large-scale oper- 
ation. Tutored in the regional market, these 
businesses would reach a competitive position in 
international markets much earlier and more 

The rationale for the economic integration of 
the hemisphere is a powerful one. The Presi- 
dents found it so, and they made their historic 
commitment. "This great task," they said, "will 
reinforce historic bonds, will promote industrial 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 

development and the strengthening of Latin 
American industrial enterprises, as well as more 
efficient production and new opportunities for 
employment, and will permit the region to play 
its deservedly significant role in world affairs." 

In the glow of a Summit IMeeting, all things 
are possible. In the sober light of the morning 
after, doubts begin to arise. Questions are being 
asked whether the economic integration of Latin 
America, however devoutly to be wished, is a 
practical possibility. Is it not too ambitious ? Is 
Latin America really ready for so bold an ex- 
periment? Will not the obstacles overwhelm 
Latin America and set it back rather than move 
it forward? 

The undertaking will indeed be difficult. Wliat 
I should like to do today is to explore with you 
quite candidly the obstacles to an integrated 
Latin American market to get some feeling for 
their dimensions and for what can be done to 
overcome them. The enterprise is yours and 
you will have to make the decisions. All I can 
do is to give you the views of an outsider who 
sees Latin America from a somewhat different 

Physical and Psychological Obstacles 

What are the impediments to a Latin Ameri- 
can Common Market ? 

There is first the obvious physical obstacle: 
the poorly developed transportation and tele- 
communications network both within and be- 
tween the countries of Latin America. The 
arteries of Latin America lead to coastal ports, 
not to neighboring countries. The oceans con- 
nect the coimtries of Latin America with 
Europe and the United States, and the moun- 
tains divide them from each other. So, too, with 
conununications. It is easier to make a telephone 
call from Costa Kica to New York than to make 
a call to neighboring Managua, Nicaragua. 

The corollai-y of the physical division of the 
countries of Latin America is the unfamiliarity 
of busmessmen m one Latin country with 
economic developments and market possibili- 
ties in neighboring countries. I am confident that 
all of you here have traveled extensively in 
Europe and North America, but I am less con- 
fident that you have traveled as widely in South 
and Central America. I am confident that you 
see the New York Times and the London 
Economist but less confident that you subscribe 
to the periodicals of neighboring states. How 
can the businessmen and investors in Latin 


America service a continental market ■when 
transportation is slow and costly and contact 
and coaimunication infrequent? 

The i)hysical obstacle to integration may be 
less difficult to overcome than the psychological. 
Enterprises that have been sheltered in a pro- 
tected market are fearful of exposure to com- 
petition. This is true in all countries, in the ad- 
vanced as well as the developing countries. In 
this respect, it is easier for countries to integrate 
their economies when they are at an early stage 
of industrialization before powerful vested in- 
terests in protection have developed. In the Cen- 
tral American Common Market there was far 
less resistance to removing tariffs than in South 
America, because there was little industry to 

The success of the Central American Common 
Market points up another powerful deterrent to 
continental integration. The countries of the 
Central American Common Market are at 
roughly the same level of development. There 
are differences among them in market size and 
national product, but these differences are not 
vast. In Latin America as a whole, the spectrum 
ranges from per capita incomes of less than $200 
to more than $800, from countries at an early 
stage of development to relatively mature 
economies. This problem of the less, the lesser, 
and the least developed countries has plagued 
the Latin American Free Trade Association. 
The least developed countries fear that they will 
remain the hewers of wood and drawers of 
water, the colonial outposts of the integration 
movement, because industry will locate in the 
wealthier countries and pass them by. The same 
fear animates the countries of intermediate size. 

In some countries receipts from import duties 
comprise a large component of total government 
revenues. In such instances it is not the vested 
interest in protection but the loss of an impor- 
tant source of revenue that makes governments 
understandably reluctant to reduce or remove 
import duties. 

A serious deterrent to trade liberalization is 
the fear that imports may increase more rapidly 
than exports and compound balance-of-pay- 
ments problems. 

The requirement to harmonize external tariffs 
will be especially difficult. The guidance in the 
Presidents' Action Program is to put into effect 
over a period of 15 years "a system of tariff 
harmonization, in order to establish progres- 
sively a common external tariff that will pro- 


mote efficiency and productivity, as well as the 
expansion of trade." 

Both the level of protection and the means of 
protection vary widely in Latin America. In 
some countries, tariffs well over 100 percent are 
not uncommon, and a variety of special barriers 
such as surcharges and prior deposits raises 
the composite level of protection even higher. 
The problem of bringing tariffs into one com- 
mon schedule will require the most complex 
negotiations. These negotiations will be even 
more difficult if the full range of special barriers 
is to be harmonized, with the risk that the com- 
mon tariff would be set at excessively high 

In Europe the problem of reaching a common 
external tariff, while complicated, was much 
more manageable, since the general pattern of 
protection was more uniform and exchange 
rates were more realistic. 

It would appear in any case that those Latin 
countries with relatively modest protective sys- 
tems will have to raise their external walls, and 
their importers, manufacturers, and consumers 
will have to pay higher prices for their third- 
country imports. Countries whose tariffs are 
high will have to bring these down and expose 
entrenched interests to the outside world. 

Spirit of Entrepreneurship 

How can these impediments to Latin Ameri- 
can integration be overcome ? 

The physical disjunction of Latin America 
can be overcome m time with the development of 
road, rail, and plane connections and new means 
of telecommunications, including communica- 
tions by satellite. Within each of the countries 
of Latin America, efforts are being made to 
integrate the hinterland into the national econ- 
omy. Here in Peru, your President's great vision 
of a road network to bring the people of the 
eastern slopes of the Andes into more intimate 
connection with the cities and towns on the coast 
is part of this great effort. And, at the Summit 
Meeting, the Chiefs of State resolved to give 
high priority to multinational projects that 
would link the national markets of Latin Amer- 
ica with each other. Increased resources for this 
purpose will be made available to the Inter- 
American Development Bank. 

The lack of familiarity of businessmen with 
opportunities in neighboring states is even now 
beginning to change. Increased contacts and ex- 


change of views among government officials and 
businessmen have been encouraged by LAFTA, 
which has laid the groundwork for future closer 
cooperation. Aiid the Summit commitment will 
surely accelerate this process. 

Vested interests will continue to clamor for 
protection ; but in the Latin American business 
commmiity, progressive modern businessmen 
who want to take advantage of the opportu- 
nities of a continental market are growing in 
numbers. They are not ready to see the protec- 
tive walls come tiunbling down overnight, but 
they recognize that the movement to a coimnon 
market will be a gradual process, phased by an- 
nual steps over a 15-year period. They want to 
participate in the rapidly growing Latin Amer- 
ican market ; they want to invite foreign busi- 
nessmen to join them in applying new teclmol- 
ogy and capital to build modern enterprises; 
they want to profit from the opportunities that 
integration will open up. The spirit of entrepre- 
neurship is not a northern monopoly. 

In the European Common Market, vested 
interests resisted integration, fearing competi- 
tion, fearing the unknown. Faced with the fact 
of integration, they found it possible not only to 
survive but to gi-ow and prosper, and the move- 
ment was accelerated ahead of schedule. 

The resistance was assuaged in part by the 
knowledge that adjustment assistance would be 
available to firms and workers injured by inte- 
gration. In Latin America, adjustment as- 
sistance will be available to firms and workers as 
integration proceeds. The United States has 
pledged its support to an integration fund 
whose resources would be used in part for tliis 

The integration fund will also be used to tide 
countries over balance-of-payments difficulties 
arising from a disproportionate increase in im- 
ports as a result of trade liberalization. 

Disparity in Levels of Development 

The problem of the disparity in levels of 
development among countries is a very real one. 
Ideally integration should take place among 
countries at roughly the same level of develop- 
ment. It is for this reason that the Action Pro- 
gram contemplates subregional groupings, 
groupings among countries in Latin America 
whose incomes are not too disparate. 

It is encouraging, therefore, to see the emer- 
gence of the Andean grouping, which offers 

the countries on the western coast the prospects 
of a subregional coumion market of more than 
40 million people. I have read with interest and 
enthusiasm recent press reports of the plans 
underway for the Andean Common Market, 
reports of the proposed establislunent of an 
Andean Financial Corporation to promote 
multinational industries, services, and an in- 
frastructure within the Andean group, con- 
sideration of a jointly owned cargo airline and 
a consortium of shipping lines, plans for com- 
plementation agreements in important indus- 
trial sectors. Witliin this subregional market, 
businessmen can expand their operations and 
develop new joint enterprises. 

You will recall that in Western Europe, Bel- 
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg joined 
together in a common market some years before 
the merger of the Six. Subregional groupings 
like the Central American Common Market and 
the prospective Andean Common Market are 
important steppingstones to the full integration 
of the hemisphere. 

To some extent the fears of the poorer coim- 
tries that they wUl be bypassed in the integra- 
tion process may be exaggerated. With the de- 
velopment of modern technology, the location 
of manufacturing enterprises is becoming less 
dependent on the physical resources of coun- 
tries. A small and poor country that has open 
access to a truly large market may be as inviting 
to enterprise as a country more richly endowed, 
if it can build its infrastructure and develop its 

Tariff harmonization looking toward the de- 
velopment of a common external tariff will not 
be easy, even though the process will be phased 
over 15 years. The Presidents' Action Program 
gives little concrete guidance on this point. In 
treating the subject of internal trade liberaliza- 
tion, the Action Program differentiates among 
countries according to their level of industriali- 
zation and development and accelerates the 
liberalization process for the most developed 
while decelerating the process for tliose that are 
less or lesser developed. It does not offer analo- 
gous guidance in reaching a common external 
tariff. Wliat is clear is that the common sched- 
ule cannot be set too high if it is to promote 
"efficiency and productivity, as well as the ex- 
pansion of trade." 

It is sometimes said that Latin American 
countries cannot integrate because their econ- 
omies are not complementary, because they 

OCTOBEE 23, 1967 

uelta Coilegs I 



produce the same commodities for the world 
market. But this contention is a complete mis- 
reading of what integration is intended to 
achieve. Countries whose economies are com- 
plementary do not need to integrate. They trade 
freely with each other precisely because they 
complement each other. The purpose of inte- 
gration is to encourage the growth of manufac- 
turing enterprises that can compete with each 
other tecause the regional market is large 
enough to accommodate many finns of economic 
size. The countries of the European Economic 
Community were not complementary but com- 
peting economies when they joined together in 
a coimnon market. 

Balance-of-Payments Problems 

It is also said that the countries of Latin 
America caimot integrate because their curren- 
cies are not convertible. The countries of 
Europe, it is noted, did not integrate imtil their 
currencies became convertible. But the trade of 
Latin American countries with each other and 
with the outside world is carried on in the con- 
vertible currencies of the major trading coun- 
tries. The earnings of one Latin country from 
its sales to another are hard-currency earnings. 
The problem is not currency inconvertibility but 
overall balance-of-payments difficulties that the 
comitries of Latin America experience in the 
process of accelerated economic growth. 

It is this problem I would like to turn to 
now : the problem of balance-of-payments diiS- 
culties and the effect of such diificulties on the 
prospects for Latin American integration. 

Some observers are skeptical that integration 
can really succeed in Latin America given the 
continent's history of chronic inflation and per- 
sistent balance-of-payments difficulties. There is 
no question that the tendency of some Latin 
countries to spurts of inflation, indeed gallop- 
ing inflation, can be disruptive to their partners 
as well as to themselves and to the integration 

All countries have balance-of-payments diffi- 
culties from time to time. To cope with these 
difficulties they have a certain number of op- 
tions. They can draw down their reserves if 
these are ample. They can borrow resources 
from others to tide them over the period of 
trouble. They can curb imports by quota or 
other restrictions. They can devalue their 


It is certainly not a matter of indifference to 
their common market partners which route they 

'Wlien coimtries commit themselves to liber- 
alize trade and payments within the region, 
they are implicitly or explicitly reducing the 
options open to them to cope with their balance- 
of-payments difficulties. 

They cannot put up barriers to imports from 
their partners without reneging on solemn com- 
mitments they have made. It is true, of course, 
that free trade and common market arrange- 
ments customarily have escape clauses, but these 
are to be invoked only in the most serious cir- 
cumstances and then only with the concurrence 
of the partners. If resort to the escape clause 
becomes widespread and recurrent, then the 
common market will founder. 

It is possible for a free trade area or common 
market to withstand some shocks. Thus, the 
United Kingdom did curb its imports from its 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
partners. Italy in recent yeare did suffer a strong 
inflation followed by a grinding halt in eco- 
nomic activity. Germany and the Netherlands 
did revalue their exchange rates. And in the 
earlier days of the Coal and Steel Community, 
France did devalue its currency and upset cost- 
price relationships. The Coal and Steel Com- 
munity, the EEC, and the EFTA survived all 
these shocks. There are limits, however, to the 
strain that the integration movement in Latin 
America can take. Investors will not be en- 
couraged to enlarge the scale of their operations 
if they are thwarted time and again as markets 
they had anticipated serving are closed off to 

What is a country in balance-of-payments 
difficulties to do when imports are rapidly drain- 
ing its limited reserves? It can seek outside 
assistance to tide it over its difficulties while it 
takes the internal corrective measures called 
for in the circumstances. If the assistance is ade- 
quate and the corrective measures work quickly, 
the country may be able to weather the difficul- 
ties without invoking the escape clause against 
its common market partners. But because cor- 
rective fiscal and monetary measures often work 
slowly, imports may need to be checked for an 
interim period. 

One possibility when a country faces this 
dilemma might be to restrain imports from 
third countries while permitting imports from 



its partners to continue to enter its market un- 
impeded. "Wliether this would provide relief to 
the country would dej^end in part on the pro- 
portion of its total trade coming from its 
partners. If intra-common market trade M'ere 
substantial, not much would be gained from 
putting restraints on third-coimtry imports and 
permitting substantial intra-common market 
trade to move unchecked. If trade with its com- 
mon market partners were relatively modest, 
such action might be helpful as an interim 
device. For such a measure to be effective, how- 
ever, it would be necessary for the country in 
balance-of-payments difficulties to insure that 
its partners were not a conduit for third-coun- 
try imports. It would have to cope with this 
problem of transshipment by applying appro- 
priate rules of origin to imports from its 

Currency Devaluation 

Another option open to a country in serious 
balance-of-payments difficulties is to devalue 
its currency. Indeed, if the country is in the 
throes of a strong inflation it can hardly avoid 
devaluing its currency. Even if it succeeds in 
eliminating excess demand and bringing the 
inflation to a halt, its prices are likely to be 
thoroughly out of line. Given the downward 
inflexibility of costs, it will almost certainly 
need to devalue its exchange. But a sudden 
sharp devaluation is a shock to a country's 
trading partners, creating sudden and un- 
expected changes in relative costs and prices, as 
disruptive to them in its way as the imposition 
of trade restrictions against them. 

Can a common market survive frequent 
shocks of this kind as one counti-y after another 
goes into an inflationary tailspin? Indeed, is it 
reasonable to encourage comitries that are de- 
veloping their economies in an environment of 
monetary stability to increase their dependence 
on, and therewith their vulnerability to, volatile 
and less disciplined neighbors? In short, is it 
premature to move ahead with economic inte- 
gi'ation so long as the countries of Latin Amer- 
ica retain and exercise the "sovereign right to 

Let me make a few observations in this matter. 

First, it is not necessary that devaluations 
arising from inflation be sudden, sharp, and 
disruptive to a country's trading partners. It is 
possible, and indeed often quite desirable, that 

devaluations be modest, with the rate moving 
freely or by small periodic adjustments to com- 
pensate for domestic price increases. Thus Chile 
has been devaluing its exchange rate by a small 
but varying percent each month. The monthly 
devaluation is sufficiently modest so that it does 
not provoke perverse leads and lags, with im- 
porters accelerating payments and exporters de- 
laying i-eceipts. Colombia has allowed its ox- 
change rate to reflect demand and supply in the 
exchange market, with the result that there has 
been a modest gradual continuing devaluation 
since the new system was instituted earlier this 
year. The periodic adjustments in the rate offset 
the harmful effects of the inflation on the coun- 
try's balance of payments and cause little dis- 
turbance to the inflating comitry's trading 
partners. In short, while the inflation may play 
havoc in the offending country — encouraging 
capital flight, discouraging savings, distorting 
production patterns — the injury is not trans- 
mitted to its partners. 

In this connection let me refer to the practice 
of the International Monetary Fund. In provid- 
ing assistance to certain countries that are trying 
to decelerate domestic inflation, the Fund has 
made exchange-rate flexibility an essential part 
of the program, recognizing that without peri- 
odic adjustment in the exchange rate, domestic 
price increases would adversely affect export 
sales and shift demand into imports. In these 
programs, it is understood that the rate shall be 
adjusted from time to time to follow the basic 
trend of the market. Limits related to the net 
foreign exchange position of the banking system 
are set withm which the authorities may inter- 
vene in the market to support the rate. In some 
programs, movements in the exchange rate are 
directly linked to movements in a domestic price 
index, with the understanding that periodically 
the exchange rate is to be adjusted to the in- 
crease i:! prices. 

Secondly, the final responsibility for balance- 
of-payments equilibrium rests with each indi- 
vidual country. But by accepting the obligations 
of the common market, each member country 
accepts constraints on its freedom of action. It 
undertakes to consult with its trading partners 
and to consider the implications of its domestic 
actions on those with whom it is increasing its 
economic and commercial ties. As the integra- 
tion movement gathers momentum, consulta- 
tion and cooperation will increase, including co- 
operation among national monetary authorities. 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 


The common market can become a powerful 
force for regional discipline. 

Lastly, tlie potential bonetits of integration to 
the growth, prosperity, and political cohesion of 
Latin America are too important to let the skep- 
tics set the pace. It would be self-deceiving to 
believe that integration will come easily to Latm 
America. But it would be an act of abdication 
not to try. 

Can anyone imagine that the United States 
of America would be as rich and strong and 
j)rosperous as it is today if that cont mental 
country of 200 million people living in 50 states 
stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific were 
not one vast common market but were mstead 50 
nations, each walled off from its neighbors by 
tariff barriers? The question needs only to be 
posed to answer itself. 

Peru has been one of Latin America's success 
stories in the growth of its domestic economy 
and its foreign trade, and you, the modern, pro- 
gressive businessmen of Peru, have helped to 
make it so. The gross national product of Peru 
has grown at almost 7 percent a year in real 
terms, and the manufacturing sector has grown 
even faster than that — at a rate of almost 9 per- 
cent on the average since 1960. 

What will the economic integration of Latin 
America mean to you and to your sons? It will 
mean that the strong steady income growth you 
have enjoyed will not be checked because the 
national market is too narrow for expansion and 
the neighboring markets are closed to you. It 
will mean that in the years ahead, you and your 
sons will not be limited to a market of 12-15 
million people but can produce for a market of 
hundreds of millions. 

The second half of the 20th century is witness- 
ing a teclmological revolution of unprecedented 
dimensions. The economic integration of Latin 
America will enable you to participate in and to 
profit from that technological revolution, and 
the continent to play its full part in tlie modem 

I have talked about the obstacles to a Latin 
American common market because the obstacles 
need to be faced. They are real and hard, but 

they are manageable. The costs of failure are 
too great and the rewards of success too impor- 
tant to permit the integration movement to fail. 
From the vantage point of the United States 
looking at the Latin American economy, and at 
Peru in particular, I cannot believe that the re- 
ported concern of the Peruvian busmess com- 
munity about its competitive strength is weU 
founded. Here in Peru you have proved that you 
have the talent and the skill to make the most 
of your opportunities. If you consider your 
longer range interest, you cannot fail to give 
strong support to regional integration. You are 
the men who can encourage your Government to 
take a role of leadership in this great effort, who 
can make the vision of a continental market be- 
come a reality. And as you do so, you will have 
the good wishes and the sympathetic and mate- 
rial support of the people and Government of 
the United States. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree in Principle 
on Exchange of Chancery Sites 

Department Statement ^ 

It has been agreed that the United States 
Government will make available the Mount Alto 
site to the Soviet Goveniment as a site for the 
new Soviet Embassy in the proposed exchange of 
chancery sites in Washington and Moscow. The 
Soviet Government has conveyed its agree- 
ment in principle to the Moimt Alto site in 

Tlie Soviet Goverimient has offered the United 
States a site in Moscow for the location of a new 
U.S. Embassy. The United States has agreed in 
principle to this site. 

The two govermnents are proceeding to work 
out the formalities for the exchange of 

^ Read to news correspondents by the Department 

spokesman on October 4. 



President Johnson Meets With President of Niger 

President Diori Haraani of the Republic of 
Niger visited the United States Septernber 25- 
October 11. He met with President Johnson 
and other Government officials in Washington 
September 26-27. Follotoing are an exchange of 
greetings between President Johnson and Presi- 
dent Diori at a welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House on Septem- 
ber 26 and their exchange of toasts at a dinner 
at the White House that evening. 


White House press release dated September 26 

President Johnson 

Mr. President and Mrs. Diori, we are greatly 
honored today to welcome here to the Wliite 
House one of Africa's most distinguished states- 
men. President Diori Hamani of Niger is the 
first President of his nation. His strong and 
wise leadership has united farmer and herds- 
man, settler and nomad, into one people de- 
termined to win the blessings of prosperity and 

He has given liis people a deep faith in de- 
mocracy. In only 7 years, they have firmly set 
the roots of a democratic tradition. At the same 
time, they have rolled up their sleeves and they 
have gone to work to improve their economic 

But President Diori's good works transcend 
even the boundaries of his own beloved home- 
land. He is also President of a group of 14 
African nations who are joined together to 
provide for such basic needs as a postal and 
telecommunications system, a limited conunon 
market, and a shared airline. Our honored guest 
today is also President of a coiuicil of five "West 
African neighbors who help each other with the 
very heavy burdens of economic development. 

You liave said, Mr. President, that the for- 
mula for success in your country must be "hard 
work, prudence, and moderation." That is a 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 

proper creed for any people. And no experience 
better teaches us how valid it is than the short, 
bright history of the land that you lead. 

So it is with great pleasure, Mr. President, 
that Mrs. Joluison and I welcome you, your 
lovely lady, and your distinguished associates 
to our shores. We will enjoy being with you. 
We believe that the exchange between us will 
be of benefit to both of our comitries and, we 
trust, to peoples of the world. Welcome, again, 
to Washington. 

President Diori 

Mr. President, the cordial welcome you have 
given to me and my wife, the honors with which 
we have been received, the greetings which you 
have just spoken, confirm the feelings of warm 
sympathy and friendly hospitality character- 
istic of the Government and the people of the 
United States. 

You have already received eminent heads of 
states from Africa, and through their personali- 
ties you have seen the diversity of ethnic groups 
and peoples and many of the idiosyncracies of 
tlie African Continent. 

But from my plane I have seen your country 
for the first time, and it is a total confirmation 
of what I already knew about the wealth, the 
strength, and organization of your prodigious 

I say confirmation, because for the people of 
Niger the people of the United States have al- 
ways been well known. Long before we attained 
independence, the farmers, the nomads, and the 
urban population knew your missionaries, 
whose ideals, generosity, and devotion they 
could appreciate. Our soldiers have fought next 
to yours durmg two World Wars for democracy 
against the spirit of domination. And, lastly, 
Niger's leaders have learned at school the his- 
tory of your country, the obstacles that were 
overcome to win its independence and to main- 
tain its freedom. 

The accession of the Republic of Niger to 


international life has permitted to our peoples 
and our governments, by means of direct rela- 
tion, to better know each other, to better respect 
each other, and to better cooperate. 

We fully appreciate the efforts imdertaken 
by the United States in the field of cooperation, 
by granting scholarships, by sending highly 
qualified teclmicians and experts, by giving 
material and equipment of all kinds, by the 
financial assistance, and at last, by the dynamic 
action of the Peace Corps. 

Tlie people of Niger fully realize and appre- 
ciate this generous effort and in their name I 
want to sincerely thank you and the American 

I have the firm conviction that from our up- 
coming talks will derive a common desire to 
work freely in any circumstances, everywhere, at 
any time to attain a worldwide harmonization 
of the economic development in a world that is 
free and secure. 

The friendship between our two countries 
means that in greeting you I am greeting the 
American people in the name of the people of 
Niger. And allow me to associate in this homage 
Mrs. Johnson, the First Lady of the United 
States. Long live the friendship and cooperation 
between Niger and the United States of 


White House press release dated September 26 

President Johnson 

Tonight we are honored to greet not one but 
three Presidents. 

President Diori is first and foremost the Pres- 
ident of his country. He is also President of a 
group of 14 French-speaking nations that are 
cooperating for common progress. Finally, he is 
President of a council of five neighboring West 
African nations that are sharing natural assets 
and development goals. 

Your land, Mr. President, is larger than Texas 
and California together. It is equally vast in 

You have not spent your natural treasure on 
showy government mansions. Instead, you have 
doubled your cropland since 1955. That is solid 
progress, the kind of progress that Americans 
admire and encourage. 


But you have other equal priorities. You 
cherish political freedom. You have rejected the 
deceptive "convenience" of one-man rule for the 
more strenuous, but infinitely more satisfying, 
life of democracy. 

The force of your examples and beliefs, Mr. 
President, also make you a vital force for Af- 
rican unity. Your vision and practicality have 
inspired the firm fruits of partnership : the com- 
mon sugar market, the airline, the postal and 
telecommunications union, the mutual aid and 
guarantee fund, development plans for the two 
great water systems of West Africa. 

These are first and critical steps. They foretell 
a uniquely African fusion of independence and 
cooperation. They promise to transform the con- 
tinent and to establish our guest as the quiet 
man of destiny in the emergence of a new Africa. 

Join me now in a toast to that man and to that 
future. I am proud to pay tribute to a great 
leader and a great unifier. President Diori, to his 
lady, and to all the people of their beloved Re- 
public and continent. 

President Diori 

I am very much moved by the compliments 
you have just given and which I realize are 
equally sent through me to the people of Niger. 
I sincerely thank you. 

Allow me to express the honor and happiness 
I feel in finding myself next to you tonight in 
this select company, in this Wliite House full of 
historical remembrances, in this atmosphere of 
warm and cordial sympathy. 

Tonight marks the end of the second day of 
the visit I am making in your beautiful and 
great country. I can only repeat once more the 
strong impression I have of efficiency, power, 
and rational organization that this brief contact 
with American life and civilization has given 

Though informed of the rhythm of American 
life, I have realized, during these last 2 days, 
that the reality was much more than I have 
imagined, whether it is the material realities of 
the economical and even political conceptions 
and the means and the way in which they oper- 
ate — but which strikes the observer of good 
faith — or the immensity and the speed, essential 
characteristics of your world. 

Africa in general and my country in partic- 


ular are attempting an important effort to adopt 
and to utilize your techniques, to follow in your 
path, to reach the same standard of living. But 
we know in this particularly painful effort to 
come out of imderdevelopment we can rely on 
your lasting and generous help. 

Long live the United States of America. Long 
live the Republic of Niger. Long live the friend- 
ship between our two peoples. 

May I propose a toast to President Jolmson 
and the people of the United States of America 
and the friendship between our two peoples. 


U.S. Discusses Effect of ABM Deployment 
on Arms Control Efforts 

Statement iy Adrian S. Fisher ^ 

I should like today to discuss the character 
and purpose of the planned United States lim- 
ited anti-ballistic-missile deployment announced 
by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 
Mr. McNamara, on Monday, September 18, in 
his speech analyzing the status of the strategic 
arms race.^ I should particularly like to discuss 
the relationship between this deployment de- 
cision and the efforts on which all of us here are 
engaged to bring the arms race under control. 
By way of summary, I wish to stress at the out- 
set that it is my very strong belief that, while 
the United States anti-ballistic-missile deploy- 
ment in no way poses technical or political im- 
pediments to arms control, the fact that the 
United States found it necessary to make this 
decision emphasizes the importance and urgency 
of our work, especially in regard to nonpro- 
liferation and the control of strategic nuclear 

First of all, it is well to emphasize the very 

' Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Com- 
mittee on Disarmament at Geneva on Sept. 19. Mr. 
Fi.sher is Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and U.S. Conference to the Con- 

" For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1967, p. 443. 

limited nature of the proposed United States 
anti-ballistic-missile deployment, even upon its 
completion, and our intention to keep the de- 
ployment limited. The deployment will consist 
of an "area" defense of the United States and a 
"terminal" defense of some of our ]\Iinuteman 
sites. The United States deployment will com- 
prise no terminal defense of urban areas and 
will not attempt to provide defense for those 
areas against a large-scale strategic missile at- 
tack of the kind the Soviet Union is capable of 
launching. We do not believe that it is feasible 
for either the United States or the Soviet Union 
to provide real protection for our populated 
areas against the strategic striking power of the 

Wliat, then, is the purpose of the deploy- 
ment? Wliile the United States has demon- 
strated its reluctance to initiate anti-ballistic- 
missile deployment through long public debate 
and deferral of a decision, this decision was con- 
sidered to be the prudent course of action in the 
face of an emerging Communist Chinese inter- 
continental ballistic missile threat. Concur- 
rently, such a system will have the effect of pro- 
tecting our retaliatory forces against any threat 
which might result from a continued buildup of 

OCTOBER 23, 19^'t 


offensive missiles on the part of the Soviet 

The United States anti-ballistic-missile de- 
ployment will provide area protection of United 
States urban areas against unsophisticated bal- 
listic missile attacks, such as conceivably could 
be launched by Communist China in the next 
decade. It is clear that the Cliinese are placing a 
high priority on the development of an inter- 
continental missile force capable of delivering 
nuclear weapons. We now believe that China 
could have an initial intercontinental ballistic 
missile operational capability, albeit crude and 
vulnerable, by the early 1970's. Thus a signifi- 
cant purpose of the planned limited anti-ballis- 
tic-missile deployment is to provide some 
prudential protection of the United Stat:es 
population against Chinese nuclear missile 

For the foreseeable future we view a Chinese 
nuclear attack upon the United States or its 
allies and friends as highly unlikely indeed, 
particularly in face of our overwhelming stra- 
tegic retaliatory capabilities. Those capabilities 
should provide a deterrent to any such irra- 
tional move on their part. We believe it prudent, 
however, to invest in a system which will effec- 
tively neutralize that possibility. An important 
reason for our decision is the belief that our lim- 
ited anti-ballistic-missile deployment, designed 
against such a possible Chinese attack, will pro- 
vide an additional indication that we intend to 
make concerted efforts to deter nuclear black- 

Insofar as this decision has relation to the cur- 
rent Soviet buildup and any threat to our as- 
sured destruction deterrent capability, the 
United States limited anti-ballistic-missile sys- 
tem will also have the effect of providing added 
protection for United States retaliatory forces. 
In this mode, it is not different from the hard- 
ening and dispersion of the United States offen- 
sive missile forces. Indeed, of all the ways in 
which the United States could guard against a 
possible future threat to its deterrent capability, 
the deployment of a hard-point anti-ballistic- 
missile defense for the United States Minute- 
man must be considered to be among the least 
provocative moves the United States could take 
under the circumstances, since it permits re- 
straint in further United States offensive missile 

Those, then, are the main objectives of our 
anti-ballistic-missile deployment. I should like 
also to draw your attention to a result which 

will not be achieved by this deployment. That is 
the protection, in the event of nuclear war, of 
our population against a major sophisticated 
attack, such as could be launched by an ad- 
vanced nuclear-weapon state. The deployment 
will not have such capability but instead will 
help to deter nuclear war by affording addi- 
tional protection for our assured retaliatory 

We have not abstained from a decision to de- 
ploy large urban anti-ballistic-missile defenses 
in the United States because it is not good to 
protect one's people from nuclear missile at- 
tack. We have done so because it does not seem 
feasible to provide such defenses against a ma- 
jor sophisticated attack wliich could be 
launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon state 
such as the Soviet Union. Such a state has the 
teclmical and financial resources to offset any 
such defenses and would probably respond to 
any significant threat to its deterrent capabil- 
ity by increasing its offensive missile capabil- 
ity. As Secretary McNamara has said: 

If we in turn opt for heavy ABM deployment — at 
whatever price— we can be certain that the Soviets 
will react to offset the advantage we would hope to 

The countervailing offensive capabilities 
which would follow from such a deployment 
on our part, by thus driving the arms race to 
still higher plateaus, would have rendered in- 
effective the very defenses of our cities which 
we had sought to achieve. The deployment 
now being undertaken by the United States 
warrants no such response; and we have no 
plans which should have the result of stimulat- 
ing any further Soviet offensive force buildup. 

Despite the limited character and purpose 
of the proposed United States anti-ballistic- 
missile system, we may properly inquire con- 
cerning its effect on arms control efforts, both 
here and in other forums. Indeed, we must be 
alert that misconceptions about the nature of 
the United States anti-ballistic-missile deploy- 
ment, willful or otherwise, be not used to im- 
pede progress on important anns control 

As I indicated earlier, the limited United 
States anti-ballistic-missile deplojrment deci- 
sion does not represent an acceleration of the 
United States-Soviet strategic arms race. The 
Soviet Union, which has already mitiated an 
anti-ballistic-missile deployment, has never in- 
dicated that a limited United States anti-bal- 




listic-missile deployment would be provocative 
to it; and we would assume that that view re- 
mains unchanged. However, we think it has now 
become vital that the United States and the 
Soviet Union be able to assure each other of the 
limited purposes of both offensive and defensive 
forces and be able to reach some agreement on 
controlling the nuclear strategic arms race. 

Secretai-y McNamara made the position of 
the United States quite clear when he stated: 

Let me emphasize — and I cannot do so too strongly — 
that our decision to go ahead with a limited ABM de- 
ployment In no way Indicates that we feel that an 
agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of 
strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces Is any 
the less urgent or desirable. 

Mr. McNamara said more. He said; 

We do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet 
Union — primarily because the action-reaction phenom- 
enon makes it foolish and futile. But if the only way 
to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike 
capability over us is to engage in such a race, the 
United States possesses In ample abundance the re- 
sources, the technology, and the will to run faster in 
that race for whatever distance is required. 

But what we would much prefer to do is to come to 
a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the 
Soviet Union which would effectively prevent such an 
arms race. We both have strategic nuclear arsenals 
greatly in excess of a credible assured destruction ca- 
pability. These arsenals have reached that point of ex- 
cess in each case for precisely the same reason : We 
each have reacted to each other's build-up with very 
conservative calculations. We have, that is, each built 
a greater arsenal than either of us needed for a sec- 
ond-strike capability, simply because we each wanted 
to be able to cope with the "worst plausible case." 

But since we now each possess a deterrent In excess 
of our individual needs, both of our nations would 
benefit from a properly safeguarded agreement first to 
limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and de- 
fensive strategic naclear forces. 

I need hardly repeat that the United States is 
firmly committed to acliieving an equitable non- 
proliferation treaty and does not consider that 
this United States limited anti-ballistic-missile 
deployment decision should in any way decrease 
the desirability of a nonproliferation treaty to 
other nations. To the extent that our anti- 
ballistic-missile decision will affect the security 
considerations of other countries, I believe it 
will favor nonproliferation. The deployment 
will foreclose any possibility of a successful 
Chinese nuclear attack on the United States and 
will thereby provide further assurance of our 
determination to support our Asian friends 
against Chinese nuclear blackmail. 

Finally, my Government wishes me to em- 
phasize today that the United States limited 

anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision will 
in no way interfere with the continued United 
States adherence to existing arms control agree- 
ments, such as the limited test ban treaty and 
the outer space treaty; and it will in no way 
interfere with our efforts to acliieve progress on 
other important aims control objectives. We 
will continue to work toward the achievement 
of the measures which we have presented to this 

Agenda of the 22d Regular Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly ^ 

U.N. doc. A/6850 




Opening of the session by the Chairman of the dele- 
gation of Afghanistan. 
Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 
Credentials of representatives to the twenty-second 
session of the General Assembly : 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 
Election of the President. 

Constitution of the Main Committees and election 
of officers. 

Election of Vice-Presidents. 

Notification by the Secretary-General imder Article 
12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United 

8. Adoption of the agenda. 

9. General debate. 

10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the 


Report of the Security Council. 

Report of the Economic and Social Council. 

Report of the Trusteeship Coimcil. 

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Election of five non-permanent members of the 

Security Covmcil. 
16. Election of nine members of the Economic and 

Social Council. 

Election of fifteen members of the Industrial De- 
velopment Board. 

Election of the members of the Executive Board of 

the United Nations Capital Development Fund. 

Election of the members of the United Nations 

Commission on International Trade Law. 

20. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observa- 
tion Commission. 

21. United Nations Emergency Force : 

( a ) Report on the Force ; 

(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the 

22. Co-operation between the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity : report of the Sec- 

23. ImplementaHon of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples : 





'Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 23. 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 


report of the Special Committee on the Situation 
witli regard to the Implementation of the Declara- 
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 

24. Activities of foreign economic and other interests 
which are impeding the implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern 
Rhodesia, South West Africa and Territories under 
Portuguese domination and in all other Territories 
under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate 
colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in 
southern Africa. 

25. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report 
of the Secretary-General. 

26. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a 
conference for the purpose of reviewing the 

27. Question of holding further conferences on the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. 

28. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons : 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Na- 
tiou Committee on Disarmament ; 

(b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 
Conference of Non-Nuclear- Weapon States. 

29. Question of general and complete disarmament : 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Na- 
tion Committee on Di-sarmament ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the ef- 
fects of the possible use of nuclear weapons 
and on the security and economic implications 
for States of the acquisition and further de- 
velopment of these weapons. 

30. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo- 
nuclear tests: report of the Conference of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. 

31. Elimination of foreign military bases in the coun- 
tries of Asia, Africa and Latin America : report 
of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Commit- 
tee on Disarmament. 

32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space : report of the Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space. 

33. The Korean question : 

(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for 
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; 

(b) Withdrawal of United States and all other 
foreign forces occupying South Korea under 
the flag of the United Nations. 

34. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East. 

35. The policies of apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Poli- 
cies of Apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

36. Effects of atomic radiation : report of the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation. 

37. Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects : report 
of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Opera- 

38. United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment : report of the Trade and Development Board. 

39. United Nations Industrial Development Organiza- 
tion : report of the Industrial Development Board. 

40. United Nations Capital Development Fund : con- 
firmation of the appointment of the Managing 

41. United Nations Development Decade : report of the 

42. External financing of economic development of the 
developing countries : 

(a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical as- 
sistance to the developing countries : report of 
the Secretary-General ; 

(b) Outflow of capital from the developing coun- 
tries : report of the Secretary-General. 

43. Development of natural resources. 

44. The role of the United Nations in training national 
technical personnel for the accelerated industriali- 
zation of the developing countries. 

45. United Nations Institute for Training and Re- 
search : report of the Executive Director. 

46. Operational activities for development : 

(a) Activities of the United Nations Development 
Programme : reports of the Governing Cotincil ; 

(b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary- 

47. Multilateral food aid : 

( a ) Programme of studies on multilateral food aid : 
report of the Secretary-General ; 

(b) Review of the World Food Programme. 

48. General review of the programmes and activities in 
the economic, social, technical co-operation and 
related fields of the United Nations, the specialized 
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
the United Nations Children's Fund and all other 
Institutions and agencies related to the United 
Nations system : report of the enlarged Committee 
for Programme and Co-ordination. 

49. World social situation : report of the Secretary- 

50. OflBce of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees : 

( a ) Report of the High Commissioner ; 

(b) Question of the continuation of the Office of 
the High Commissioner. 

51. Housing, building and planning : report of the Sec- 

52. Town twinning as a means of international co- 
operation : report of the Economic and Social Coun- 

53. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimi- 
nation against Women. 

54. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance : 

(a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Religious Intolerance ; 

(b) Draft International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Religious Intolerance. 

55. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination : 

(a) Implementation of the United Nations Declara- 
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination : report of the Secretary- 
General ; 

(b) Status of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi- 
nation : report of the Secretary-General ; 

(c) Measures to be taken against nazism and racial 
intolerance ; 

(d) Measures for the speedy Implementation of 



international instruments against racial dis- 

56. Question of the violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial 
discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, 
in all countries, with particular reference to colo- 
nial and other dependent countries and territories : 
report of the Secretary-General. 

57. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights : report of the Secre- 

58. International Year for Human Rights : 

(a) Programme of measures and activities to be 
undertaken in connexion with the Interna- 
tional Year for Human Rights : report of the 
Secretary-General ; 

(b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 
International Conference on Human Rights. 

59. Freedom of information : 

(a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information ; 

(b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information. 

60. Question of the punishment of war criminals and 
of persons who have committed crimes against 

61. Creation of the post of United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Human Rights. 

62. Capital punishment : report of the Secretary-Gen- 

63. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 
transmitted under Article 73 e of the Ch' rter of 
the United Nations : 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General ; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

Question of South West Africa : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Indeijendence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples ; 

(b) Report of the United Nations Council for South 
West Africa ; 

(c) ApiJointment of the United Nations Commis- 
sioner for South West Africa. 

65. Special educational and training programmes for 
South West Africa : report of the Secretary- 

66. Question of Territories under Portuguese adminis- 
tration : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

67. Special training programme for Territories under 
Portuguese administration : report of the Secretary- 

68. Question of the consolidation and integration of 
the special educational and training programmes 
for South West Africa, the special training pro- 
gramme for Territories under Portuguese adminis- 
tration and the educational and training programme 
for South Africans : report of the Secretary- 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 



















Question of Fiji : report of the Special Committee 
on the Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
Question of Oman : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples ; 
Report of the Secretary -General. 
Offers by Member States of study and training 
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Goveming 
Territories : report of the Secretary-General. 
Financial reports and accounts for the financial 
year ended 31 December 1966 and reports of the 
Board of Auditors : 
(a) United Nations; 

United Nations Development Programme; 
United Nations Children's Fund ; 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East ; 
Voluntary funds administered by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Supplementary estimates for the financial year 

Budget estimates for the financial year 1968. 
Pattern of conferences : 

( a ) Report of the Committee on Conferences ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 
Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of 
subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly : 

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and 

Budgetary Questions ; 

Committee on Contributions ; 

Board of Auditors; 
(d) Investments Committee: coniirmation of the 

appointments made by the Secretary-General ; 

United Nations Administrative Tribunal ; 

United Nations Staff Pension Committee. 
Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the 
expenses of the United Nations : report of the Com- 
mittee on Contributions. 

Audit reports relating to expenditure by special- 
ized agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency : 

(a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations 
from the Technical Assistance Account of the 

the United Nations Development Programme. 

(b) Allocations from the Special Fund Account of 
the United Nations Development Programme. 

Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the 
United Nations with the specialized agencies and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency : report 
of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions. 

Implementation of the recommendations made by 
the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the 
Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized 
Agencies: reports of the Secretary-General. 
Publications and documentation of the United Na- 
tions : report of the Secretary-General. 
Personnel questions : 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the 
Secretary-General ; 

(b) Other personnel questions. 

Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension 




84. United Nations International School : report of the 

85. Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its nineteenth session. 

86. Law of treaties. 

87. Consideration of principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations : report of the Special Committee 
on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. 

88. Question of methods of fact-finding. 

89. Draft Declaration on Territorial Asylum. 

90. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the 
Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appre- 
ciation of International Law : report of the Secre- 

91. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America. 

92. Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation 
exclusively for peaceful i)urposes of the sea-bed and 
of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the 
limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use 
of their resources in the interests of mankind. 

93. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's 
Republic of China in the United Nations. 

94. The situation in the Middle East. 


United States and Portugal Amend 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 216 dated September 30 


Notes were exchanged in Lisbon September 29 
amending the bilateral cotton textile agreement 
between Portugal and the United States signed 
on March 23, 1967.^ The amendment is based on 
an understanding that the protocol extending 
the Long-Term Arrangements on International 
Trade in Cotton Textiles through September 30, 
1970, will enter into force for Portugal and the 
United States on October 1, 1967. 

Tlie amended agreement differs from the orig- 
inal version primarily in the following respects : 

endar year 1967) the limit on yarn (Group I) is 
increased by approximately 24,500 pounds, with 
a corresponding increase in the aggregate limit. 
Category limits have been eliminated for 
yarn, subject to consultation m the event of 
undue concentration in any of the four yarn 


New provisions are 
carryover of shortfalls. 

added concerning the 


September 29, 1967 
ExcELLENCT : I refer to the decision of the Cotton 
Textiles Committee of the General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade approving a Protocol to extend through 
September 30, 1970, the Long-Term Arrangement Re- 
garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done in 
Geneva on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Long-Term Arrangement"). I also refer to recent 
discussions between representatives of our two Govern- 
ments and to the Agreement between our two Govern- 
ments concerning exports of cotton textiles from 
Portugal to the United States effected by an exchange 
of notes dated March 23, 1967 (hereinafter referred to 
as the Agreement). I confirm, on behalf of my Govern- 
ment, the understanding that the Agreement is amended 
as provided in the following numbered paragraphs. 
This amendment is based on our understanding that 
the above-mentioned Protocol will enter into force for 
our two Governments on October 1, 1967. 

1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are amended to read as 
follows : 

"2. The aggregate limit for the first agreement year, 
calendar year 1967, shall be 103,425,000 square yards 
equivalent ; for the second agreement year, it shall be 
108,990,000 square yards equivalent. It is noted that the 
aggregate limit and the limit for Group I reflect a 
special adjustment for the first agreement year. All 
levels set forth for the second agreement year are 5 
percent higher than the limits for the preceding year 
without this special adjustment ; thus the growth factor 
provided for in paragraph 9 has already been applied in 
arriving at these levels for the second agreement year." 

"3. Within the aggregate limit the following group 
limits shall apply : 





Group I 
Group II 

For the first year of the agreement (the cal- Group III 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6237. 

(Square Yards Equivalent) 

Yarn ( Categor- 67, 225, 000 70, 980, 000 
ies 1-4) 

Fabrics, made- 27, 000, 000 28, 350, 000 
up goods and 
( Categories 5- 
38 and 64) 

Apparel (Cate- 
gories 39-64 ) 9, 200, 000 9, 660, 000" 

2. In paragraph 4, all specific limits on yarn cate- 
gories are deleted. 



3. Paragraph 7 is amended to read as follows : 

"7. (a). In the event of undue concentration in ex- 
ports from Portugal to the United States of cotton tex- 
tiles in any category in Group I, the United States 
Government may request consultation with the Portu- 
guese Government to determine an appropriate course 
of action. During the course of such consultation, the 
Portuguese Government shall limit exports in the cate- 
gory in question from Portugal to the United States 
starting with the 12-month period beginning on the date 
of the request for consultation. This limit shall be 105 
percent of the exports of such products from Portugal 
to the United States during the most recent 12-month 
period preceding the request for consultation and for 
which statistics are available to the two Governments." 

"(b). In the event that Portugal plans to export dur- 
ing any agreement year more than 350,000 square yards 
equivalent in any category in Group III not given a 
specific limit, or more than 500,000 square yards equiv- 
alent in any category in Group II not given a specific 
limit, the Government of Portugal shall inform the 
Government of the United States of America of this 
intention. The Government of the United States of 
America will notify the Government of Portugal 
promptly, and, in any event, within 30 days after receipt 
of the information from the Government of Portugal, 
whether it wishes to consult on this question. During 
this 30-day period, the Government of Portugal agrees 
not to permit agreement year exports to exceed the 
limit applicable under this paragraph to the category in 
question. If the Government of the United States of 
America requests consultations, it shall provide the 
Government of Portugal with information on conditions 
of the United States market in this category. Dxiring 
the course of such consultations, the Government of 
Portugal shall continue to limit exiwrts in this category 
to an annual level not to exceed the limit applicable to 
such category under this paragraph." 

4. Paragraph 9 is amended to read as follows : 

"9. In the succeeding twelve-month periods for which 
any limitation is in force under this Agreement, the 
level of exports permitted under such limitation shall be 
increased by 5 percent of the corresponding level for 
the preceding 12-month period, the latter level not to 
Include any adjustments under paragraphs 5 or 18." 

5. New paragraphs, numbered 18 and 19, are added 
to the Agreement to read as follows : 

"18. (a). For any agreement year subsequent to the 
first agreement year and immediately following a year 
of a shortfall (i.e., a year in which cotton textile ex- 
ports from Portugal to the United States were below 
the aggregate limit and any group and specific limits 
applicable to the category concerned) the Government 
of Portugal may permit exports to exceed these limits 
by carryover in the following amounts and manner : 

( i ) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of tlie 
shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any applicable 
group or specific limit and shall not exceed either 5 
percent of the aggregate limit or 5 percent of the appli- 
cable group limit in the year of the shortfall, and 

( ii ) in the case of shortfalls in the categories subject 
to specific limits the carryover shall be used in the same 

OCTOBER 23, 1967 

category in which the shortfall occurred and shall not 
exceed 5 percent of the specific limit in the year of the 
shortfall, and 

(iii) in the of shortfalls not attributable to 
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall 
be used in the same group in which the shortfall oc- 
curred, shall not be used to exceed any applicable spe- 
cific limit except in accordance with the provisions in 
paragraph 5 and shall be subject to the provisions of 
paragraph 7 of the agreement. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph are without any adjustments under 
this paragraph or paragraph 5. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports 
permitted in paragraph 5." 

"19. The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica shaU continue to assist in the implementation of 
the Agreement by the use of import controls." 

If the above conforms with the understanding of 
your Government, this note and your note of confirma- 
tion^ on behalf of the Government of Portugal shall 
constitute an amendment to the cotton textile agree- 
ment of March 23, 1967, between our two Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

W. Taplet Bennett, Je. 
American Ambassador 

His Excellency, 

Prof. Dr. AiBEETO Goejao Franco Nogueira, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, I/isbon 

Current Actions 



Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done at 
Washington March IS, 1965. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Signature: Switzerland, September 22, 1967. 


Convention for the establishment of an Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission, with exchange of notes 
March 3, 1950. Signed at Washington May 31, 1949. 
Entered into force March 3, 1950. TIAS 2014. 
Adherence deposited: Canada, October 3, 1967, effec- 
tive April 1, 1968. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollution 
of the sea by oil. with annexes, as amended (TIAS 
6109). Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into 
force for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, August 21, 1967. 

' Not printed here. 


Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly December 21, 1965.' 
Signatures: Guatemala, September 8, 1967; Morocco 

(with a reservation), September IS, 1967. 
Ratification deposited: Philippines, September 15, 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to chapter II of the international con- 
vention for the safety of life at sea. 1960. Adopted by 
the IMCO Assembly at London November 30, 190(5.' 
Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, September 
13, 1967. 


Protocol for the further prolongation of the Interna- 
tional Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Done 
at London November 14, 1966. Open for signature at 
London November 14 to December 30, 1966, inclu.sive. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967.' 
Ratifications deposited: Ireland, June 30, 1967; 
Netherlands, July 26, 1967 ; Tunisia, April 8, 1967. 
Accessimi deposited: Barbados, SeiJtember 6, 1967. 


Protocol for the accession of Poland to the General 
Agreement ou Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
June ;;0, 1967. Enters into force October 18, 1967. 
Signature: Poland, September 18, 1967. 



Agreement amending the agreement of February 24, 
19G4, as amended (TIAS 5519, 5886), concerning 
trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington September 21, 1967. Entered into force 
Septemljer 21, 1967. 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

by exchange of notes at Washington September 21, 
1967. Enters into force January 1, 1968. 


Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of author- 
izations to permit licensed amateur radio operators 
of either country to operate their stations in the other 
country. Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas 
September IS, 1967. Entered into force October 3, 


Department Releases 1964 Volume 
of Foreign Policy Documents 

The Department of State recently released American 
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 (Ixxi, 1,406 
pp.), the latest in the series of annual one-volume col- 
lections of public papers covering the scope, goals, and 
implementation of the foreign policy of the United 

The volume, compiled in the Historical Office, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, contains a list of documents and a 
comprehensive index. The material is arranged under 
14 headings, which cover the seven geographical and 
seven functional areas of American diplomacy. Included 
are documents relating to major topics of international 
concern, such as the United Nations financial crisis, 
negotiations on disarmament, efforts to establish a 
multilateral force with NATO, the Panama crisis, hos- 
tilities in Cyprus, the international rescue mission in 
the Congo, and the development of U.S. policy in 

Copies of the 1964 volume (Department of State pub- 
lication 8253) may be obtained from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402, for .f4.75 each. 



INDEX Octoler 23, 1967 Vol. LYII, No. U78 


^omic Energy. U.S. 
* Deployment on 
(Fisher) . . . . 

Discusses Effect of ABM 
Arms Control Efforts 

Developing Countries. Foreign Aid: An Essen- 
tial Element of U.S. Foreign Policy (Katzen- 

Disarmament. U.S. Discusses Effect of ABM 
Deployment on Arms Control Efforts 

Economic Affairs 

The Economic Integration of Latin America 

Foreign Aid: An Essential Element of U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Katzenbach) 

Improving the International Monetary Mech- 
anism (Fowler, text of IMF resolution) . . 

Tariff Commission To Report on TextUe and 
Apparel Industries (Johnson) 

Foreign Aid. Foreign Aid : An Essential Element 
of U.S. Foreign Policy (Katzenbach) . . . 

International Organizations and Conferences 

'Improving the International Monetary Mech- 
anism (Fowler, text of IMF resolution) . . 
»S. Discusses Effect of ABM Deployment on 
Arms Control Efforts (Fisher) 

Latin America. The Economic Integration of 
Latin America (Solomon) 

Niger. President Johnson Meets With President 
of Niger (Johnson, Diori) 

fortugal. United States and Portugal Amend 
Cotton Textile Agreement (text of U.S. 

Presidential Documents 

Answering Aggression in Viet-Nam 

President Johnson Meets With President of 


Tariff Commission To Report on TextUe and 

Apparel Industries 

Publications. Department Releases 1964 Volume 
of Foreign Policy Documents 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 

United States and Portugal Amend Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) .... 

U.S.SJI. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree in Principle 
on Exchange of Chancery Sites 















United Nations. Agenda of the 22d Regular Ses- 
sion of the U.N. General Assembly .... 545 

Viet-Nam. Answering Aggression in Viet-Nam 

(Johnson) 519 

name Index 

Diori Hamani 541 

Fisher, Adrian S 543 

Fowler, Henry H 523 

Johnson, President 519, 529, 541 

Katzenbach, Nicholas deE 530 

Solomon, Anthony M 534 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to October 2 which appear 
in this issue of the BtnxETiN are Nos. 212 of 
September 28 and 216 and 217 of September 30. 








t221 10/6 






Lewjs sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Central African Re- 
public (biographic details). 

Hall sworn in as Ambassador to 
Ethiopia (biographic details). 

U.S. and Jamaica sign new cot- 
ton textile agreement. 

Foreign policy conference, Bos- 
ton, Mass., Nov. 9. 

Revision to program for visit of 
President Diori of Niger. 

Program for visit of Lt. Gen. 
Joseph A. Ankrah, Chairman, 
National Liberation Council 
of the Republic of Ghana. 

Exchange of notes with Ecua- 
dor relating to recall of U.S. 

*Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 




Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 





^ov*t: o-r. 











Address iy President Johnson 569 



hy William M. Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 571t 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1479 Publication 8307 
October 30, 1967 

For sale by the Superintendent of Doctunents 

U.S. Ooverament Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


62 Issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $1S.00 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (.Tanuary 11, 19C6). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source wlU be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to i'orlodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a vceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the tvork of the Department of State 
and t/ie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of October 12 

Press release 227 dated October 12 


I should like to begin with a brief comment 
on the current public discussion of Viet-Nam. 

I find no significant body of American opin- 
ion which would have us withdraw from Viet- 
Nam and abandon Southeast Asia to the fate 
which Asian communism has planned for it. 
Similarly, I find no serious opmion among us 
which wishes to transform this struggle into a 
general war. 

We Americans are therefore debating varia- 
tions on a theme— but the theme is a central 
position resting upon : (a) the need to meet our 
commitments and defend our vital national 
interests; (b) the pursuit of our limited objec- 
tives by limited means; and (c) our earnest 
desire to bring this conflict to a peaceful conclu- 
sion as soon as possible. Hanoi particularly 
should not misunderstand the character of this 

Our commitment is clear, and our national 
interest is real. The SEATO treaty, approved 
with only one dissenting vote by our Senate, 
declares that "Each Party recognizes that ag- 
gression by means of armed attack in the treaty 
area . . . would endanger its own peace and 
safety, and agrees that it will in that event act 
to meet the common danger . . ." ^ The treaty 
says "each party" will act. The fidelity of the 
United States is not subject to the veto of some 
other signatory — ^and five signatories have en- 
gaged their forces alongside Korean and South 
Vietnamese troops. Indeed, the proportion of 
non-U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam is greater 
than non-U.S. forces in Korea. 

In August 1964 the Congress by joint resolu- 
tion declared, with only two dissenting votes, 
that "The United States regards as vital to its 
national interest and to world peace the main- 
tenance of international peace and security in 

southeast Asia." ^ This was not a new idea in 
1964. It was the basis for the SEATO treaty a 
decade earlier. It is no less valid in 1967. Our 
several alliances in the Pacific reflect our pro- 
foimd interest in peace in the Pacific and in 
Asia, where two-thirds of the world's people 
live, no less vital to us as a nation than is peace 
in our own hemisphere or in the NATO area. 

I have heard the word "credibility" injected 
into our domestic debate. Let me say, as solemn- 
ly as I .can, that those who would place in ques- 
tion the credibility of the pledged word of the 
United States under our mutual security treat- 
ies would subject this nation to mortal danger. 
If any who would be our adversary should sup- 
pose that our treaties are a bluif, or will be aban- 
doned if the going gets tough, the result could 
be catastrophe for all mankind. 

It is not easy for our people to wage a strug- 
gle by limited means for limited objectives. We 
Americans are an impatient people, a quality 
which has helped to build a gi-eat nation. The 
present impatience about Viet-Nam is thor- 
oughly understandable and is shared by those 
who carry official responsibility. But our over- 
riding object is — and must be in this modem 
world — the establishment of a reliable peace. It 
is easy to rush into total catastrophe. It requires 
courage and determination to act with both 
firmness and restraint in the interest of peace. 
An examination of all the crises in which we 
have been involved since 1945 will show, I think, 
the supremacy of the objective of a reliable 

President Jolinson has emphasized time and 
time again his interest in a prompt and peaceful 
settlement of the present struggles in Southeast 
Asia. Just 2 weeks ago, in San Antonio, he 
said : ' 

The United States is willing to stop all aerial and 
naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will 

'For text of the treaty, see Bulletin of Sept. 20, 
1954, p. 393. 

' For text of H.J. Res. 1145 adopted on Aug. 7, 1964, 
see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268. 

' For President Johnson's address at San Antonio, 
Tex., on Sept. 29, see ihid., Oct. 23, 1967, p. 519. 

OCTOBER 30, 19 67 


lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, 
assume tliat while discussions proceed. North Viet-Nam 
would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or 

Can there be a more reasonable proposal ? Is 
there anything unfair about such a simple prop- 
osition ? Is it not clear that if Hanoi is interested 
in peace it could say "Yes," publicly or pri- 
vately, to the President's offer? 

A rejection, or a refusal even to discuss such 
a formula for peace, requires that we face some 
sober conclusions. It would mean that Hanoi 
has not abandoned its effort to seize South Viet- 
Nam by force. It would give reality and credi- 
bility to captured documents which describe a 
"fight and negotiate" strategy by Viet Cong and 
the North Vietnamese forces. It would reflect 
a view in Hanoi that they can gamble upon the 
character of the American people and of our 
allies in the Pacific. 

Earlier I referred to variations on a theme. 
The debate in which we are now involved is 
essentially a debate about detail — this or that 
military move, this or that diplomatic step, this 
or that formulation of what is in fact a com- 
mon middle position. If that be true, precision 
is important. People at least should make it clear 
whether they are argviing with Washington or 
with Hanoi. 

"V^Hien people talk about a pause in the bomb- 
ing, they should know that Hanoi calls a pause 
an "ultimatum." Wlien a Senator says that he 
wants to stop the bombing but of course wishes 
to continue to bomb in support of our INIarines 
south of the DMZ [demilitarized zone], he 
should know that Hanoi categorically rejects 
any such notion. Wlien people say "Negotiate 
now" they should know that the President 
would meet with Ho Chi Minh and other chiefs 
of state concerned tomorrow — and that I would 
depart today for any mutually convenient spot 
if I could meet a representative of North Viet- 
Nam with whom I could discuss peace in South- 
east Asia. 

Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky have 
repeatedly offered to meet with the authorities 
of Hanoi to arrange a cease-fire and a peaceful 
settlement. They and we both responded affirm- 
atively to U Thant's proposals of last March." 
Had there been a similar response from Hanoi, 

* For U.N. Secretary-General U Thant's aide mem- 
oire dated Mar. 14 and the U.S. interim reply of Alar. 
15 and definitive reply of Mar. 28, see iiid., Apr. 17, 
1967, p. 624. 

there would have been discussions to arrange a 
military standstill, preliminary conversations, 
and a convening of the Geneva conference. Lit- 
erally dozens of proposals made by ourselves, 
other governments, or gi'oups of governments 
have been rejected by Hanoi. 

I cannot tell you when peace will come. I am 
encouraged by progress toward peace in South 
Viet-Nam, but I cannot name a date. But we 
shall continue our effort both by resisting those 
who would impose their solutions by brute force 
and by an tmremitting exploration of every 
path which could lead to peace. 

I am ready for your questions. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard specifically to 
President TTiieiCs offer, reported offer, to meet 
toith Hanoi and then arrange a weeTc's pause in 
homhing if they agreed to talks: (1) Was the 
United States consulted on this offer first, and 
did it agree; and (2) do you think such a limited 
offer has any chance of success? 

A. My undertanding is that a press officer re- 
peated what President-elect Thieu had said dur- 
ing his campaign, I think in August. Aiid that 
this was not itself a new development. Of course, 
we would be very much interested in Hanoi's 
response to such a suggestion. 

The problem is that dozens and dozens of sug- 
gestions have been made to Hanoi through all 
sorts of chaimels, with all sorts of formulae, 
and that Hanoi has categorically rejected all of 

Now, this is the sort of an idea which is no 
problem for Washington. What is needed is 
some response from Hanoi to this or any one of 
a dozen other ideas with which Hanoi is thor- 
ouglily familiar. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some question has arisen 
in connection with the report from, Saigon to- 
day as to whether the United States was con- 
sulted about President Thieii's proposed move 
and how President Thieu can make a iomhing 
offer when he is not doing the iomhing. 

A. Oh, I think there is no problem between 
ourselves and the Government of South Viet- 
Nam on that. We have had at least five substan- 
tial cessations of the bombings. Everything 
turns on what Hanoi's attitude is. We and the 
Government of South Viet-Nam keep in close 



touch on these matters, but the answer does not 
come just from Saigon and Wasliington. The 
answer must come from Hanoi as welL 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you talked in your state- 
ment about tlie importance of precision, and 
loith that in mind, sir, I wonder if you could 
help us understand whether the United States 
now still requires a military sign of deescalation 
from Hanoi in exchange for cessation of the 
hombing or whether the Presidents statement 
about assuming Hanoi will not take advantage 
of a hombing pause represents a change. 

A. Well, I think we ought to be clear that as 
far as the United States is concerned we would 
engage in negotiations without any conditions 
whatever at the earliest possible moment. I have 
frequently said we will do that today. 

Now, the other side has raised a major condi- 
tion. That condition is a permanent and uncon- 
ditional cessation of the bombing. And they 
have also indicated tliat they will take no cor- 
responding military action on their side but 
would expect to go ahead with their part of the 
war with complete intensity, with all of the 
effort that they can mobilize. 

Now, President Johnson in San Antonio 
stated an assumption. This is an assumption 
with respect to the condition imposed by Hanoi. 
The assumption would be that if we stopped 
the bombing there would not be military ad- 
vantage taken by that cessation of the bomb- 
ing by Hanoi. 

Now, Hanoi knows what this means, and 
we have had not the slightest indication that 
Hanoi is prepared for those prompt and pro- 
ductive talks to which the President alluded 
in his San Antonio reference. 

South Viet-Nam Moving Ahead 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said you were encour- 
aged about the prospects of peace in Viet-Nam. 
Why are you encouraged in view of the loch of 
reaction from Hanoi? 

A. Well, there are many things. I Imow that 
some reporter in Saigon invented the word 
"stalemate." Our military authorities do not 
believe there is a stalemate. Ambassador [Ells- 
worth] Bimker doesn't believe there is a stale- 
mate. We see defections from the Viet Cong 
double what they were last year. We see the re- 
cruitment of southerners to the Viet Cong 

dropped by approximately a half. We see de- 
sertions from tlie South Vietnamese forces 
sharply reduced over last year. 

You have heard General Larsen's [Lt. Gen. 
Stanley Larsen] report on what is happening 
in the II Corps area, which is half the land area 
of South Viet-Nam — the opening up of roads, 
the opening up of railways, the areas under 
Government control, the sharp reduction of 
areas under Viet Cong control. There are many 
indicators that the Government and allied 
forces are getting on with the job on the mili- 
tary side. 

Beyond that, despite all the tongues in cheek, 
despite all the skepticism, the South Vietnamese 
liave come through with what really ought to 
be considered almost a miracle in politics. 

In the midst of a dirty, tough, mean guerrilla 
war, they have elected a constituent assembly; 
they have adopted a Constitution; they have 
had hamlet and village elections throughout the 
country; they have elected a President and a 
Vice President and a Senate ; they will shortly 
elect a lower house of the Legislature — in a 
situation where the Viet Cong in most areas 
has said "If you vote you die" — and they are 
getting on with it. 

Now, it is not easy, and we can sit back here 
comfortably and be skeptical about details, 
worry about this or that particular point, but 
the overriding fact is that in the midst of this 
kind of struggle the South Vietnamese have 
been moving steadily toward a constitutional 

Now, these elections were held in areas repre- 
senting some 75 percent of the population. A 
very high percentage of those who registered 
voted — favorably compared with our own 
elections in this country. The economic situa- 
tion has been improving. In other words, the 
Viet Cong have not achieved their objective. 
The country is moving ahead. And I see no 
reason for us to be gloomy simply because it is 
not over yet. We have had our combat forces 
there for approximately 2 years, and other allies 
have put forces in there, and the situation is 

Now, one can find individual incidents here 
and there that would throw doubt on it, and 
the skeptic can always find some basis for his 
story, but there are at least a thousand stories 
a day that could be filed from Saigon, many of 
them of success, many of them reflecting close 

OCTOBER 30, 1007 


cooperation, friendship, and acts of kindness 
among South Vietnamese and Americans. 

When you look at the total situation, it's mov- 
ing; and I have no reason myself whatever to 
subscribe to this notion of a stalemate. It is 
not a stalemate at all. 

Hanoi Refuses To Use Geneva Machinery 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the motive of the 
Soviet Government to reject the reconvening of 
the Geneva conference? Did you explore this 
with Mr. Gromyho [Andrei A. Gromyho, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.B.} in New 

A. I find it difficult to get into motives. I 
would suppose that Hanoi categorically refuses 
a Geneva conference and therefore the Soviet 
Union is unwilling to step out in front and join 
with the British cochairman to convene a con- 
ference to which Hanoi and Peking both strenu- 
ously object. We ourselves will be very glad to 
have such a conference convened, about Viet- 
Nam, about Laos, about Cambodia, or about any 
subject related to Southeast Asia. 

A Senator the other day in the course of a 
Senate debate was asked what his alternative 
was for Viet-Nam, and he said, "Well, I would 
like to see a Geneva conference.*' Well, he is 
not arguing with Washington. We have tried 
over and over again to use the Geneva ma- 
chinery for the purposes for which it was 
established. We will be glad to see the two co- 
chairmen, say, go to Geneva and put themselves 
in touch with elements or parties in the dispute. 
We would be glad to have the three ICC [Inter- 
national Control Commission] countries do the 
same thing or to make arrangements for the de- 
militarization of the DMZ or to assure Prince 
Sihanouk that Cambodia's neutrality will not 
be abused. 

So there is no problem with us on that. The 
problem is that Hanoi says "No." 

Q. Mr. Secretary., what do you thinh of the 
thesis of turning negotiations upside down and 
heginning instead between Washington and 
Hanoi at some lower level xoithin the countries, 
specifically between the Government of Saigon 
and the NLF [National Liberation Front] 
or elements of it? 

A. Well, we, as you know, draw no major 
distinction between what is called the NLF and 
Hanoi. I think that the United States view is 
affected by the fact that as far as peace is con- 

cerned, our problem is with Hanoi. We did not 
put our combat forces into South Viet-Nam be- 
cause of dissident elements in South Viet-Nam. 
We put our combat forces in there because 
North Vietnamese forces moved into South 
Viet-Nam. So that our problem of peace is with 

Further than that, we know from captured 
docimients, testimony of prisoners, and other 
sources of information that the NLF is directed 
from Hanoi on a daily basis. 

Now, we have no objections to exploring the 
possibilities of contacts with the NLF, nor do 
we have any objections to the Government in 
Saigon doing so. But I would not want to mis- 
lead you by thinking that in my judgment that 
is going to solve the problem of North Vietnam- 
ese regiments in South Viet-Nam for the pur- 
pose of imposing a solution on that country by 
force. Hanoi has a major role to play in peace in 
this situation, and until there is some indica- 
tion from Hanoi that they are prepared to make 
peace, then I don't think that lesser formulae are 
likely to solve the problem. 

Constructive Developments in 1967 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the same day the Rus- 
sians ratified the Outer Space Treaty and an- 
nounced their biggest-ever rise in their arms 
budget. Would you please appraise the relative 
weight of these two events in U.S.-Soviet rela- 

A. Well, as far as the arms budget is con- 
cerned, I believe that the defense budget as they 
announced it is about the same proportion of 
their new budget as it was in the previous 
budget. In any event, it indicates some increase. 
Just what direction that increase will take we 
have no way of knowing. There was some indi- 
cation that it related to the need for more mili- 
tary assistance to other countries. And we know 
that they are increasing their military assist- 
ance to North Viet-Nam. 

But it is true that we signed the Spac« Treaty, 
and I think it is worth pausing to reflect a little 
on 1967, despite Viet-Nam. It turns out to be a 
most constructive year. The Kennedy Round 
negotiations were successfully concluded. The 
International Monetary Fund took a major step 
in the field of international liquidity. The Space 
Treaty was ratified unanimously by our Senate. 
We concluded the Consular Treaty with the So- 
viet Union. We and the Soviet Union filed a 



joint draft of a nonproliferation treaty in Ge- 
neva. The Presidents of the Western Hemi- 
sphere decided to go for a Latin American 
Common Market in this next decade. The Asian 
Development Bank became a going institution 
this year. Even though there was a distressing 
and sharp war in the Middle East, the fighting 
was ended in 4 days without the intervention of 
the great powers. 

In other words, there have been some very 
constructive developments this year looking 
toward a general peace and a general solution 
of problems despite the pain and the tragedy of 
Viet-Nam. We should not be negligent of those 
important developments. 

U.S. View of U.N. Role 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a speech in the Senate 
yesterday. Senator [J. TF.] Fulhright asserted 
that the United Nations is being deterred from 
action concerning Viet-Nam more hy the failure 
of the United States to encourage it to act tlian 
hy the opj)osition of the Soviet Union. What are 
your views on that, sir, and what role do you 
think the United Nations can flay? 

A. Well, I don't have his statement in front 
of me. I — relying upon the way you stated it — 

Q. Would you like for me to get it verbatim? 

A. — would say that it is not true. The United 
States would be glad to have the United Nations 
take up this question and deal with it responsi- 
bly. We have pending in the Security Coimcil 
a resolution which the Security Council does 
not wish to act upon. 

I think the general attitude in the United 
Nations seems to be that since Hanoi and Peking 
and Moscow are saymg that this is not appro- 
priate for the United Nations, that an effort by 
the United Nations to resolve this problem 
might get in the way of the use of other ma- 
chinery, such as the Geneva machinery or quiet 
bilateral diplomatic exploration. 

Now, I have said many times that we our- 
selves do not share this view, because we believe 
that the United Nations has a responsibility 
for general peace and security in the world, and 
we'd be glad to see them take it up. But on the 
other hand, there are some problems about going 
through an exercise of futility, if that is what it 
appears to be, to satisfy some critics among our 
own people. 

We can't say to you that a resolution will 

come out of the Security Council, because of 
the Soviet veto; and the Soviets have made it 
perfectly clear they will veto. 

And we have no reason to think that the 
General Assembly will address itself to this 
matter in the same way in which the U.N. is 
addressing itself to the Middle East. In the 
case of the Middle East, they have had a long 
association with these problems. They played 
the crucial role in establishing the State of 
Israel. They have had peacekeeping forces out 
there, and tliey have had armistice machinery 
out there; and this matter has been before the 
United Nations year after year. They have the 
United Nations machinery for refugees in the 
area. But this is not the attitude in the United 
Nations about South Viet-Nam. I think that 
they are somehow hoping that other means and 
other procedures will find the key that will 
unlock this problem, when they are on notice 
by most of the parties concerned — that the 
United Nations will not be permitted to find 
that key and not be permitted by Hanoi, Peking, 
and Moscow. 

Q. Mr. Secretary 

Q. Mr. Secretary 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask, in vieio of a 
widely published report, whether in your non- 
public appearances around the country you are 
denouncing the intellectual critics of the war, 
inluding Arthur Schlesinger, and whether as 
reported you have dismissed Roger Hilsman? 

A. No ; I am not going to comment on third- 
hand reports on what I was alleged to have said 
in a private meeting. These tilings get out of 
context very quickly. 

It is not true that I have any generic attitude 
toward all those people who call themselves or 
are called intellectuals. 

I've been around them a good deal in my 

I do recall once in a while — perhaps you will 
forgive me for this — as friends used to say of 
Einstein, that he was a genius in mathematical 
physics, an amateur in music, and a baby in 

Now, I think that an idea stands or falls on its 
own merits and the fact that a man knows every- 
thing there is to know about enzymes doesn't 
mean that he knows very much about Viet-Nam 
or how to organize a peace or the life and death 
of nations. 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 


So I liave great respect for intellectuals, but 
I don't feel that I'm intimidated by them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary— 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your opening 
statement that essentially toe are engaged in a 
debate about detail, but the record would indi- 
cate that there has been increasing defection 
in the ranks of administration supporters in the 
Congress. Do you contemplate, sir, a further se- 
quence of public appearances in the Congress to 
try to clarify, amplify this position? 

A. Well, I'm not sure that as far as the Con- 
gress is concerned the way to clarifj^ and achieve 
accord is through public appearances. I myself 
greatly enjoy serious, responsible, candid con- 
sultation with the great committees of Congress 
in circumstances in which such discourse can 
take place. I do not think such discourse can 
take place always in open session. As far as I'm 
concerned, a public hearing has some of the 
same problems as does a press conference. There 
are very few secrets, if Americans can discuss 
these matters among themselves without the 
rest of the world listening in. But when our 
allies and the nonalined world and the Com- 
munists are listening in, there are some inhibi- 
tions, at least upon the Secretary of State, be- 
cause what I say in my official capacity does 
have repercussions in other j^laces. 

Now, these repercussions don't occur when 
there can be private consultations in executive 

Now, that doesn't mean that I'm opposed to 
public discussion. I have taken part in a good 
many of them and made a good many public 
appearances in the Congress. But in terms of 
exercising the great constitutional responsi- 
bilities of the President and of the Congress in 
the national interest, I think myself that close 
consultation behind closed doors is one of the 
better ways to do it. 

We do have men engaged in combat. We do 
have some very serious and delicate problems in 
front of us. And these are not problems that can 
always be fully explored or resolved with the 
klieg lights and the rest of the world all looking 
on and listening in. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Pm not clear yet on your 
explanation of the President's statement in San 

Antonio. Is that intended to modify, reduce, or 
leave ambiguoxis our terms, our conditions for a 
bombing pause in North Viet-NaTnf 

A Reasonable and Fair Proposal 

A. Well, I think we ought to just read the 
statement for what it says and reflect upon the 
absence of a response from Hanoi. 

Now, you may wonder about the details of 
this expi-ession that they will not take advan- 
tage of a bombing halt. There's no point, as I 
have said before in these conferences, no point 
in my negotiating the details of that with you, 
because you can't stop the bombing. We are 
prepared to discuss the details of that with Ha- 
noi. They loiow it^ — they know it. But the point 
I was making is this : It seems to me that tliis is 
an essentially reasonable and fair proposal for 
anyone who is interested in peace. And it seems 
to me that it is hard for anyone to reject this 
proposal without confessing at the same time 
that they are not interested in peace and that 
they propose to continue their effort to move in 
on Southeast Asia. 

This is not, by the way, just a question of 
Viet-Nam. I have never subscribed to the 
domino theory ; it's much too esoteric. There are 
North Vietnamese regiments today fighting in 
South Viet-Nam. There are North Vietnamese 
armed forces in Laos being opposed by Laotian 
forces. There are North Vietnamese-trained 
guerrillas operating in northeast Thailand. 
There are Communist dissident elements in 
Bunna who are being aided, encouraged, and 
helped from outside Burma across the Cliinese 

There was a major Commimist effort in 1965 
to pull off a coup d'etat against Indonesia. You 
don't need the domino theory. Look at their 
proclaimed doctrine, and look at what they're 
doLug about it. 

Now, we would like to see peace in South 
Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia just as quickly 
as possible. It takes two to make a peace ; and we 
would like to see some indication from the other 
side that they accept the notion that all coun- 
tries, large and small, as the U.N. Charter puts 
it, have a right to live in jieace without molesta- 
tion from across their frontiers. 

When that moment comes, there can be peace 
very quickly indeed ; and the United States will 
be no obstacle whatever in making a peace on 
that basis. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, do you foresee a greater 
effort or greater participation hy some of the 
Asian allies in Viet-Nam, and what are the pros- 
pects for a meeting of the seven nations con- 
tributing troops there? 

A. On tlie question of a meeting, the seven 
nations do keep in touch with each other by 
various means. Tliere is no present time or date 
for such a meeting. We would expect that one 
miglit well occur, but that does not mean that 
we're not in continuing contact with each other. 

As far as forces are concerned, this will be 
for each country to determine for itself; and 
each country would make its own announce- 
ments on that subject. 

Of course, we would be glad to see additional 
forces from other comitries involved in South 

I do want to emphasize that the present ef- 
fort is not negligible. South Viet-Nam has 
something like 700,000 men mider arms. I think 
the comparable figure for vis would be some- 
where in the range of 9 million, comj^ared to 
their population or any other measure you want 
to put on it. 

The Laotian forces are engaged in Laos. The 
Thais are engaged in northeast Thailand, in 
addition to what they have been putting into 
South Viet-Nam. 

So that there is a significant effort by the 
countries of Southeast Asia to fend off this pres- 
sure from the North. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Pd like to ask you on an- 
other subject for a second — lohMher you have 
satisfied yourself that the m,an killed in Bolivia, 
within the week iua.s indeed [Ernesto'] "CAe" 

A. Well, I have no — when you say have I 
satisfied myself — I have no personal inde- 
pendent proof. But on the other hand, I have 
no reason whatever to doubt the reports which 
have come in from the Bolivian Government. 
And I am proceeding on the basis that it was 
"Che" Guevara and without any reason what- 
ever to doubt it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, xoould you assess for us the 
stand of Soviet arms delivery to the Arab na- 
tions, especially in view of the conflicting esti- 

A. Well, I think I wouldn't want to get into 
figures. I've seen some estimates that appear to 
me to be too high. There was some significant 
resupply of certain of the Arab forces by the 
Soviet Union following the events of last June. 
We have, as you know, publicly as well as pri- 
vately proposed that the principal arms-supply- 
ing countries get together with the countries in 
the area and try to find some ceiling on the 
arms race in that area. It is the one point on 
which we have been, I think, most disappointed 
up to this point; but I woulcbi't want to try to 
straighten out figures, as between 60 percent 
or 80 percent and figures of that sort. 

Situation in the Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the diplomatic front in 
the Middle East, there have been several U.S.- 
Soviet meetings on the subject lately. Does this 
diplomatic activity indicate that yoiCre making 
any progress within the present framework on 
this subject? Can you report anything to us 
on that? 

A. Well, in our business we work at such ques- 
tions vei-y hard, on the basis that progress is 
possible and that a good result can be achieved. 
We have not yet reached that result. It is, there- 
fore, a little hazardous to indicate whether we 
feel that real progress is being made. 

What is happening is private consultation 
among the coimtries in the area, or with coun- 
tries in the area and among certain of the coim- 
tries outside the larger powers, to see if we 
could fuid a basis on which there can be a per- 
manent peace in the area. 

Now, this turns critically upon the attitude 
of the countries in the area. At the present time 
I do not think that it turns upon major differ- 
ences or conflicts among the great powers, but 
nevertheless it is not easy for the great powers 
to agree among themselves unless they know 
what the attitudes of the countries in the area 
will be. 

Now, I think this process is likely to continue. 
I don't thmk that time is working now on the 
side of a peaceful settlement. I thmk it is impor- 
tant for some movement to get started and that 
the United Nations has both a responsibility 
and an opportunity here in this situation. 

So these discussions go on. They go on m great 
detail, with many governments. And I would 

OCTOBER 30, 19 G7 


hope that before too long we could find a for- 
mula which would move this situation toward 
that permanent peace which we desperately 
hope for and which I think the ordinary peoples 
of the area would welcome if it could be ob- 

Proposals To Stop the Bombing 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the elements in the 
jniblic discussion over stopping the iomhing, 
particularly in Congress, seems to he senatorial 
worries about how the United States is regarded 
abroad. Senators have heard the opening debate 
in the General Assembly, where foreign minis- 
ter after foreign minister has urged the United 
States to stop the bomhing. "When you are con- 
fronted with a concern like that — / think ahnost 
30 foreign ministers asked for a pause in the 
bombing — how do you reply to that concern? 
And linked with that is Senator [John SJier- 
man^ Gooper^s proposal to stop bombing except 
on the infiltration routes above the DMZ. 

A. Well, on tlie last point, a proposal to stop 
the bombing except on the infiltration routes 
would be categorically rejected by Hanoi ; and 
not move us one inch toward peace, unless 
Hanoi makes a major change in its position. 
Your comit on foreign ministers is a little high- 
er than mine, in terms of stopping the bombing. 

You know, I haven't found anyone in the 
world — private citizen or public official, in this 
or otlier governments — who has come to me and 
said, "If you stop the bombing and there is no 
response from Hanoi, then our attitude would 

I liad a group of private citizens in not long 
ago to talk about this, and they wanted us to 
stop the bombing. I said, "All right, if we stop 
the bombing" — we have stopped it on a number 
of occasions — "If we stop tlie bombing and 
Hanoi does not respond, will you then change 
your view?" Tliey said, "No, of course not." 

I could only say "Well, if we can't influence 
you by stopping the bombing, how do you ex- 
pect us to influence Hanoi by stopping the 

Now, I would be glad to hear from any of 
these foreign ministers what their governments 
will do if we stop the bombing and there is no re- 
sponse from Hanoi. And I want to hear that. I 
haven't heard it from anybody. 

I do know what the British cochairman would 
do if we stopped the bombing : make a maximimi 
effort to get this matter moved toward peace. 

But if Hanoi is saying "No" all the time, then 
he has very little chance. And if the other co- 
chairman won't coopei'ate, there is very little 

So I would like to hear somebody tell me what 
they would do if we stopped the bombing. It 
is not just Hanoi who is not saying that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, is it not cor- 
rect that this Government was informed by tlie 
Soviet Government, on the^ authorization of 
Hanoi, that if the bombing was stopped there 
would be a conference between the United States 
and North Viet-Nam within 3 or i weeks? 

A. No, we were not informed that. We were 
not informed of that. There was a public state- 
ment by Mr. Kosygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.R.], in London. But Hanoi has not said 
that, to our knowledge. Anyhow, just in case 
they should say it, why 3 or 4 weeks, why not 
the next morning? 

Q. Is that a material difference? 

A. Well, I don't know. But I don't know what 
waiting for 3 or 4 weeks means. 

But what we need — ^there is no one in the 
world who has been able to tell us what Hanoi 
woidd do if we stopped the bombing. 

Now, we don't have to speculate about this; 
we checked tliis out with Hanoi. We don't have 
to speculate and engage in wishfiil thinking and 
proceed on a hypothetical basis and think that 
maybe the atmosphere would be improved. Of 
course, the atmospliere would be improved over 
North Viet-Nam. But what we want to know is 
"What would happen?" and Hanoi is not will- 
ing to tell us what would happen, and no one 
else is able to tell us what would liappen. So, 
we want to hear sometliing. 

For us to say, "We will stop, you go rig'ht 
ahead vtdth your war ; you live there safely and 
comfortably witliout being disturbed while you 
send your men and arms into South Viet-Nam 
for the next 50 years," where would be the in- 
centive for peace? 

Now, we are interested in peace; we are not 
interested in a sanctuary which will let them 
carry on thase operations against South Viet- 



Nam and Laos for eternity, while they sit there 
in a sanctuary taking their own time, paying no 
price, ti-ying to seize their neighbors by force. 
Now, let's not be children. 

U.S. Stake in Peace in Asia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions — hasic 
questions — that seems to he emerging in this 
Senate debate is tohether our national security 
is really at stake in Viet-Nam and whether Viet- 
Nam represents an integral fart of our defense 
perimeter in the Pacific. Tour earlier statement 
indicates that you thinh our security is at stake 
in Vi-et-Nam. I think it would help in this de- 
hate if you loould perhaps elaborate and explain 
why you think our security is at stake in Viet- 

A. Within the next decade or two, there will 
be a billion Chinese on the mainland, armed 
with nuclear weapons, with no certainty about 
what their attitude toward the rest of Asia 
will be. 

Now, the free nations of Asia will make up at 
least a billion people. They don't want China to 
overrun them on the basis of a doctrine of the 
world revolution. The militancy of China has 
isolated China, even within the Communist 
world, but they have not drawn back from it. 
They have reaffirmed it, as recently as their re- 
ception of their great and good friend, Albania, 
2 days ago. 

Now, we believe that the free nations of Asia 
must brace themselves, get themselves set, with 
secure, progressive, stable institutions of their 
own, with cooperation among the free nations of 
Asia stretching from Korea and .Taiwan right 
around to the sulicontinent, if there is to be peace 
in Asia over the next 10 or 20 years. We would 
hope that in China there would emerge a gen- 
eration of leadership that woiUd think seriously 
about what is called "peaceful coexistence," that 
would recognize the pragmatic necessity for 
human beings to live together in peace rather 
than on a basis of continuing warfare. 

Now, from a strategic point of view, it is not 
very attractive to think of the world cut in two 
by Asian conmiunism reaching out through 
Southeast Asia and Indonesia, which we know 
has been their objective, and that these hundreds 
of millions of people in the free nations of Asia 
should be under the deadly and constant pres- 

sure of the authorities in Peking, so that their 
future is circumscribed by fear. 

Now, these are vitally important matters to 
us, who are both a Pacific and an Atlantic 
power. After all. World War II hit us from the 
Pacific, and Asia is where two-thirds of the 
world's people live. So we have a tremendous 
stake in the ability of the free nations of Asia 
to live in peace; and to turn the interests of 
people in mainland China to the pragmatic re- 
quirements of their own people and away from 
a doctrinaire and ideological adventurism 

Q. Could I ash just one followup question 
on that, sir: Do you think you can fulfill this 
very large commitTnent of contaimnent and still 
meet the commitment of the Manila confer- 
ence — to loithdraw within 6 months after a 
peace agreement has been readied? 

A. Oh, yes, I think so. 

That does not mean that we ourselves have 
nominated ourselves to be the policemen for all 
of Asia. We have, for good reasons, formed alli- 
ances with Korea and Japan, the Philippines, 
the Eepublic of China, Thailand, Australia, 
and New Zealand; and South Viet-Nam is cov- 
ered by the Southeast Asia Treaty. 

That doesn't mean that we are the general 
policemen. Today, the Laotian forces are carry- 
ing the burden in Laos on the ground ; the Thais 
are carrying the burden in Thailand ; the Bur- 
mese are carrying the burden in Burma ; the In- 
dians are carrying the burden upon their north- 
eastern frontier — the Sikkim border — and what 
ever other threat there might be in that direc- 

But we have our part; we have accepted a 
share, and we have accepted that share as a part 
of the vital national interest of the United 

Now, what I don't understand is that Sena- 
tors would declare in August 1964: that the 
United States considers it a vital national in- 
terest of this country that there be international 
peace and security of Southeast Asia, and then 
2 years later, some of them seem to brush that 
aside as having no validity. Now, that wasn't 
a Tonkin Bay reaction. Paragraph 1 was Ton- 
kin Bay. Paragraph 2 was Southeast Asia— was 
Southeast Asia. 

Now, if people change their minds, then it is 
fair to ask the question, "On which occasion 
were they right?" 

OCTOBEK 30, 1967 


Now, I personally believe they were right in 
Aug:ust 1964. And perhaps they will be right 
again if they come back to that position — 1968 
or '69. 

But these are not matters that change with 
the wind. These have to do with the possibility 
of organizing a peace on a planet on which hu- 
man beings can destroy each other. Now, per- 
haps we could at least agree that that is the 
central question, even tliough there could be 
some debate about how you do it. 

And I believe that those who think that you 
can have peace by letting one small country 
after the other be overrun have got a tremen- 
dous burden of proof in the light of the history 
of the past four decades; and they have not 
sustained that burden of proof. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you desonbe the net 
objective here then as the containment of Chi- 
nese Communist militancy? 

A. No. The central objective is an organized 
and reliable peace. 

Now, if China pushes out against those with 
whom we have alliances, then we have a prob- 
lem; but so does China. If China pushes out 
against the Soviet Union, both Qiina and the 
Soviet Union have a problem. 

We are not picking out ourselves — we ai-e not 

picking out Peking as some sort of special 
enemy. Peking has nominated itself by pro- 
claiming a militant doctrine of the world revo- 
lution and doing something about it. This is not 
a theoretical debate; they are doing something 
about it. 

Now, we can live at peace — we have not had 
a war with the Soviet Union in 50 years of co- 
existence since their revolution. We are not 
ourselves embarked upon an ideological cam- 
paign to destroy anybody who calls themselves 
Communist. But we are interested in the kind 
of world structure sketched in articles I and II 
of the United Nations Charter, in whicli all na- 
tions, large and small, have a right to live in 
peace. And the aggressors nominate them- 
selves — we don't choose them — the aggressors 
nominate themselves by what they say and do. 
And when they do, then those who are genuine- 
ly interested in peace have a problem on their 
hands, and sometimes it gets tough; and some- 
times we are tested and we find out what kind 
of people we are. And I think one of the most 
important historical facts in this postwar period 
has been that the almost unbelievable power of 
the United States has been harnessed to the 
simple notion of organizing a peace in the 

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 



white House Ceremony Marks Entry Into Force 
of Outer Space Treaty 

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Ac- 
tivities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies^ entered into force October 10. 
Representatives of 13 nations signed the proto- 
col of deposit at a ceremony held at the White 
House that day. Following are statements, in 
the order in which they were delivered at the 
ceremony, hy Anatoliy Dohrynin, Soviet Am- 
bassador to the United States; Sir Patrich 
Dean, British Anibassador to the United States; 
Secretary Rush; and President Johnson. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 


It is my pleasure, on behalf of the Soviet 
Union, to deposit today the instruments of rati- 
fication of the first, in history, international 
treaty of principles governing tlie activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 

For this occasion has special significance, 
since it coincides with the 10th anniversary of 
the historic experiment of the launching of the 
first Sputnik. 

Only 10 years have passed since the first ex- 
periment which has opened for the men a way 
to the outer space, and less than 7 years since 
the first flight of the man in space. 

However, within the spirit of time, extremely 
short compared with the history of civilization, 
the mankind has acquired hands which are able 
to stretch out millions of miles from this cradle 
and has learned to work with his hands; has 
acquired new eyes able to see what has always 
been hidden from man ; and has acquired a new 
idea capable of uniting the thoughts of people 
all over the earth. 

There is no doubt that in the not so distant 
future the world will see new breathtaking suc- 
cesses of space for us in the discovery of mys- 
teries of the universe and in penetrating deeper 

and deeper into the infinite spaces of the solar 

Ever-increasing efforts by the various coun- 
tries in the field of exploration in the use of 
outer space made it practically necessary to 
work out appropriate international legal 

These principles, now embodied in the pres- 
ent treaty, for the preparation and conclusion 
of which my country took active part, are aimed 
at insuring peaceful activities of states in outer 
space for tlie benefit of all mankmd. 

This treaty, which was unanimously endorsed 
by the United Nations General Assembly, rep- 
resents a substantial step toward greater coop- 
eration and understanding among states and 

We hope that it will contribute to the settle- 
ment of major international problems still fac- 
ing the mankind on our planet. 

Thank you very much. 


I have the honor today to deposit the instru- 
ment of ratification of the Government of the 
United Kingdom. 

With this ceremony today, and with the 
parallel ceremonies takmg place in London and 
Moscow, the Outer Space Treaty, which was 
opened for signature on the 27th of January 
this year, enters into force. 

It is not, as so many other treaties have been, 
about the settlement of a dispute or the appor- 
tionment of territory, nor about mutual defense 
against the threat of attack. 

It is a treaty about something more positive 
and more important: the rule of law and the 
extension of that field within which interna- 
tional law is to regulate the conflicts of interests 
which arise between men and nations. 

My country has always attached a peculiar 

^ For text, see Bulletin of Dee. 26, 1966. p. 266. 

OCTOBER 3 0, 19 07 


importance to the rule of law in international 

We have sought by every means to secure its 
acceptance, in order that disputes which 
threaten international harmony shall be 
averted and that, if disputes must arise, they 
shall be settled by peaceful means. 

We welcome this treaty, therefore, especially 
because it serves directly an aim which has been 
the constant goal of the United Kingdom. 

We welcome it all the more because the treaty 
removes outer space from the effect of the 
rivalry and dissension between nations which 
have plagued us here on earth. 

The treaty provides that the exploration of 
outer space is to be "the province of all man- 
kind" and those who explore it are to be the 
"envoys of mankind." 

These are indeed high-sounding terms, but 
this treaty insures that they shall not be empty 

If it also persuades us all that they should be 
given some greater meaning in our own world, 
that will be the most impressive achievement 
of all. 

Mr. President, I am confident that this treaty 
will mark only one of the many steps which will 
be taken to apply equally high principles to the 
regulation everywhere of all the relations be- 
tween the states of the world. 

Thank you, Mr. President. 


We know, Mr. President, how much personal 
satisfaction you must derive from what we do 
here today. As Senator, some 9 years ago, you 
carried the message of the peaceful use of outer 
space to the United Nations on behalf of Presi- 
dent Eisenhower ; ^ as Vice President and Chair- 
man of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Council you pressed vigorously for peaceful co- 
operation in outer space; and as President you 
directed and followed intently the negotiation 
of tliis Space Treaty in which Ambassador 
Goldberg [Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations] so ably repre- 
sented us. 

We are happy to have joining with us in sign- 

' For background, see Bxjlletin of Dee. 15, 1958, p. 


ing the protocol of deposit the Ambassadors of 
Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Niger, 
Sierra Leone, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. 

We are confident that the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the members of the international com- 
munity will ratify the Space Treaty, which has 
now been signed by 84 countries. 

The treaty calls for cooperation in : 

— the conduct of scientific studies ; 

— consultation concerning experiments that 
may have potentially harmful effects; 

— assisting and returning astronauts and 
space vehicles ; 

— opening installations on the moon and other 
celestial bodies to visits by astronauts of all 
countries ; 

— reporting to the United Nations on the na- 
ture, conduct, location, and results of space 

The treaty also takes steps to limit and reduce 
the competition in armaments, a terrible bur- 
den on peoples everywhere. It prohibits orbiting 
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction 
around the earth, and forbids the installing of 
such weapons on the moon or other celestial 
bodies. It raises a permanent bar against estab- 
lishing on any celestial body military bases, in- 
stallations, or fortifications, testing any type of 
weapons, or holding military maneuvers. 

Our meeting here today signals an important 
and constructive development at a time when 
many world problems still await resolution. It 
is evidence that men and nations can, in fact, 
acliieve the maturity necessary to embody in 
binding form their points of agreement, des- 
pite political differences in other areas. It is evi- 
dence of the vitality of the United Nations sys- 
tem. The Space Treaty is testimony to the fact 
that nations can anticipate, negotiate, and agree 
upon a system of law to regulate their activities 
in the new environment of space beyond the 

Ambassador Dobrynin, we observe this year 
the 10th anniversary of the launching of the 
first Sputnik into outer space. What better way 
to celebrate this momentous occasion than to 
bring within tlie regime of law the activities of 
all mankind in the heavens above. 

Mr. President, the Space Treaty is ready to 
be proclaimed as in force between the United 



States and those who Iiave deposited ratifica- 
tions. I now present the proclamation to you for 
your signature. 


The age of space began just 10 years ago last 
Wednesday. I am sure Ambassador Dobrynin 
does not have to be reminded of that date — 
nor do any of us. 

The world will never forget the intelligence, 
the determination, and the courage that placed 
Sputnik into orbit and launched man's great 
adventure into space. 

That adventure has imfolded during the past 
decade with miraculous speed and scope. Man 
has probed the moon; he has reached out to 
other planets in the solar system. And he has 
done all of this in the spirit of peaceful 

We are here today in the East Eoom to pro- 
claim the intention of 84 nations that this ex- 
ploration shall remain peaceful. By adding this 
treaty to the law of nations, we are forging a 
permanent disarmament agreement for outer 

— It outlaws the weapons of mass destruction 
from man's newest frontier. 

— It forl)ids military bases and fortifications 
on the moon and other celestial bodies. 

— It prohibits the testing of weapons in space. 

— It means that when man reaches the moon, 
he will land in a field of peace — not a new the- 
ater of war. 

The spirit of international cooperation that 
has achieved this agreement is a beacon of hope 
for the future. It is a credit to all peoples. If 
we had sought for excuses to postpone agree- 
ment, we could have found them, I assure you, 
with the greatest of ease. Instead, we expended 
our efforts in achieving agreement — and we 
have succeeded. 

The treaty was negotiated in less than 6 short 
months. For this, I gratefully thank our dis- 
tinguished Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, who 
represented our country, and all the wise and 
constructive statesmen of the other lands who 
shared in that accomplishment. 

The Senate of the United States gave its 
unanimous consent — and I can assure all of our 
distinguished friends from abroad that this is 

not something that happens here every day. 

That unanimous action testifies to the depth 
and sincei-ity of the American people's support 
for the purposes outlined in this treaty. 

This unity is not new. As the Secretary of 
State remarked, it was 9 years ago, when I was 
serving in the Senate, I appeared at the request 
of our very able then President, President 
Eisenhower, before the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. Upon that occasion, among 
other things, I had this to say : 

Until now our strivings toward peace have been 
heavily burdened by legacies of distrust and fear and 
ignorance and injury. 

Those legacies do not exist in space. They will not 
appear there unless we send them on ahead. 

To keep space as man has found it and to harvest 
the yield of peace which it promises, we of the United 
States see one course — and only one — which the na- 
tions of earth may intelligently pursue. That is the 
course of full and complete and immediate cooperation 
to make the exploration of outer space a joint 

That was our position 9 years ago. It is our 
position now. I want to renew, therefore, today, 
America's offer to cooj^erate fully with any 
nation that may wish to join forces in this last — 
and greatest — journey of human exploration. 
Space is a frontier common to all mankind and 
it should be explored and conquered by human- 
ity acting in concert. 

We have urged cooperation : 

— in exploring the planets or any portion of 
the solar system; 

— in the use of tracking facilities so that our 
brave astronauts and cosmonauts may fly with 
much greater safety ; 

— in mapiDing the earth ; 

— in exchanging bioscientific information; 

—in international satellite communications. 

We again renew these offers today. They are 
only the beginnings of what should be a long, 
cooperative endeavor in exploring the heavens 

Wliatever our disagreements here on earth, 
however long it may take to resolve our conflicts 
whose roots are buried centuries-deep in history, 
let us try to agree on this. Let us determine that 
the great space aimadas of the future will go 
forth on voyages of j^eace — and go forth in a 
spirit not of national rivalry but of peaceful 
cooperation and understanding. 

The first decade of the space age has wit- 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 



nessed a kind of contest. We have been engaged 
in competitive spacemanship. We have accom- 
plished much, but we have also wasted much 
energy and resources in duplicated or overlap- 
ping effort. 

The next decade should increasingly become 
a partnership — not only between the Soviet 
Union and America but among all nations 
under the sun and stars. I have directed the 
disting-iiished Secretary of State and the distin- 
guished Director of NASA to bear this in mind 
every day in connection with their labors. 

The hard business of foreign relations re- 
quires a certain optimism. One must be con- 
vinced that, in time, men and nations can direct 
their affairs toward constructive ends. 

And it is with this optunism this morning 
that, here with you, I greet this treaty. I see it 
as a hopeful sign that mankind is learning, how- 
ever slowly, that wars are not inevitable; that 
national rivalry is not a permanent barrier to 
international understanding; and that a world 
of hostility and hate need not be the abiding 
condition of mankind. 

Thank you very much. 

Prime Minister of Lesotho 
Visits the United States 

Chief Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister of 
the Kingdom of Lesotho, was in Washington 
September 22-23 for informal meetings with 
President Johnson and other Government offi- 
cials. The program for the Prime Minister's visit 
was announced by the Department of State on 
September 20 (press release 205). 

Prior to his departure for London on Septem- 
ber 30, Prime Minister Jonathan addressed the 

United Nations General Assembly September 
25, visited a Peace Corps training center in 
San Diego, Calif., September 27-28, and met 
with Secretary Rusk at the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations at New York September 29. 

President Johnson Expresses Sorrow 
at Death of Lord Attlee 

Statement hy President Johnson 

White House press release dated October 8 

I have learned with deep sorrow of the death 
of Lord Attlee, one of the great leaders of the 
United Kingdom. His passing is a loss not only 
to his own countrymen but to all men moved by 
democratic ideals and the spirit of freedom. 

In a career of great distinction, he devoted his 
life to his country's service. As Deputy Prime 
Minister in the wartime national government 
he powerfully contributed to the winning of the 
war. Afterwards, as Prime Minister of the post- 
war government, he made memorable contribu- 
tions to the difficult task of reconstruction. 
"WTien new perils required not only rebuilding 
but reaiTning as well, he did not flinch at the 
prospect or at the sacrifices entailed. He was one 
of the pillars of the Western alliance. 

Lord Attlee was a strong defender and 
champion of democracy and freedom. As a 
political leader and a creative humanitarian, he 
earned the admiration and respect of the entire 

We join in paying homage to a British states- 
man who was also a warm and valued friend of 
the United States. To his family, and to the 
British people, we extend our sympathy and 



Education: The Revolution Which Never Stops 

Address by President Johnson ^ 

I know that all of you share with me the 
feeling that we are all deeply in the debt of Dr. 
Perkins [James Perkins, pi'esident of Cornell 
University] for his leadership and this memo- 
rable conference which you have launched here. 
I think in the years to come it will be remem- 
bered as one of our most necessary and desir- 
able movements of this period. 

It was in this town almost two centuries ago 
that a revolution began which swept around the 
world. And it was here that Thomas Jefferson 
submitted to the Virginia Legislature a "plan 
for the diffusion of knowledge." 

The men who founded this country were 
very passionate believers in the revolutionary 
power of ideas. 

They knew that when a people commit them- 
selves to learning, a revolution begins which 
will never stop. 

Now, here once again, the winds of change 
seem to be blowing. And once again we have 
come here together to consider plans for spread- 
ing knowledge. 

I am no historian. Certainly I am no prophet. 

But for a good many yeai's I have been an ob- 
server and a participant in some of the affairs 
of the world. I have watched man at work; I 
have seen his creative power — and I have seen 
his awesome talent for destruction. 

In this century, during my lifetime, man has 
spent literally trillions of dollars on the ma- 
chinery of death and war. The cost of World 
War II alone has been estimated at $1 trillion 
154 billion — taking no accomit whatever of any 
property damage. 

In those years, nearly 100 million people have 
died in the maiming and disease and starvation 
which came with war. 

' Made before the International Conference on the 
World Crisis in Education at Williamsburg, Va., on 
Oct. 8 (White House press release). 

Yes, we can take no pride in the fact that we 
have fought each other like animals. And that 
is really an insult to the animals who live to- 
gether in more harmony than human beings 
seem to be able to do. 

There are other facts that trouble me, too, to- 

In the world in which we live today, four 
adults in 10 cannot read and write. That is one 
of the reasons you are here. There are whole 
regions in this world in which we live where 
eight out of 10 people are illiterate. Even now, 
most people end their lives unable to write "cat" 
or "dog." 

These are most disturbing facts in the 20th 
century, in this the richest age that man has 
ever known. They are facts which I think cry 
out "Shame on the world, and shame on its 

A sarcastic writer once gave this definition 
of history : "the accomit, mostly false, of events, 
mostly unimportant, which were brought about 
by rulers, mostly knaves." 

Naturally, I do not agree with all of that 

If future historians, as I said the other day, 
should seek a name for this period in America, 
I hope that they will give consideration to call- 
ing it the age of education. 

If our children's children want to measure 
what we tried to achieve, I hope they will re- 
member one thing : 

The American Government in only 3 years 
multiplied its commitment to education and to 
health four times over. Congress passed more 
laws and committed more fimds to education 
and health in the last 3 years than in all pre- 
vious history. 

The Federal commitment for education and 
training alone has risen from $4 billion 700 
million in the United States in 1964 to $12 bil- 
lion 300 million in the United States in 1967. 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 


We plan to emulate this commitment in the 
American program to help others fight these 
age-old enemies of ignorance and disease. 

In 19C6, about one-third of oiir entire eco- 
nomic aid program was directed toward agri- 
culture, health, and education. This amounted 
to more than $800 million in 1 year. 

This year our budget calls for $1 billion 300 
million for these three objectives. That is about 
half of the entire United States aid program 
for agriculture, for health, and for education. 

We may be wrong; but as a former school- 
teacher of a small rural school, I have had the 
feeling that if we could help the people of the 
world to maintain a good sound body and if 
we could provide them with appropriate, proper 
education, with a good mind and a good body 
they could build their own steelmills. 

We have been ti-ying to concentrate our 
energies in that direction — in the direction of 
educating the mind, improving the body, and 
providing food for their sustenance. 

When other forms of United States assistance 
are added to America's program for foreign aid 
to agriculture, education, and health, namely, 
our food program, that exceeds some $3 billion 
this year. 

But when it comes to education, every na- 
tion — including this one, I think — is .still very 
much a developing country. 

We have so much to learn from others. That 
is one of the primary reasons you are here : to 
help us sort, what there is to do and to make 
an agenda for it. We firmly believe that the 
knowledge of our citizens is one treasure which 
grows only when that treasure is shared. So 
we must find ways to extend the treasure to 
lands where learning is still the luxury of the 

One lesson of our exjierience in econoinic and 
social development is quite clear: Education is 
the greatest single bottleneck. Development 
means that men and women can put to use in 
their own societies, in their own lives, in their 
own time, what modern science and teclmology 
can provide to help them. But that requires 

At the level of basic education the truth of 
the matter is that we may be falling far behind. 
It takes so long these days to train a teacher, 
and yet it is so relatively easy to produce a 
student, that we are not even holding our own 
in basic literacy. 

At higher levels of education we are making 
progress. This year there will be 1 million 

young American boj'S and girls in the colleges 
of this country who will be there because of the 
legislation that we have passed providing for 
scholarships, grants, and loans during tlie last 
few years. 

But we have only just begun to exploit fully 
the possibilities that modern technology opens 
to us. 

I can see no reason in the world why modern 
technology camiot, for example, permit the best 
professor in the world to teach students all over 
the world in a field where the vocabulaiy and 
the concepts and the standards are uniform; 
and this is true of many fields, I think — science, 
natural and social. 

Moreover, our capacity to produce microfilm 
and distribute information should make it pos- 
sible for a young scholar or researcher at any 
place in the world to have the same basic library 
facilities that are available in the British Mu- 
seum, the Library of Congress, or at one of the 
great university libraries. 

Therefore, I would like to suggest to you this 
evening some consideration be given to some of 
these challenges : 

How can we use what we already know about 
educational television to accelerate the pace of 
basic education for all the children of the 
world ? 

How can we use modern technology to econo- 
mize on that most essential and that most 
needed educational resource: the good teacher? 

How can we make the good teacher available 
to the maximum number of students in the 
world through tele\asion? 

How can we make the best scholars and 
teachers in the world available to all imiversi- 
ties — wherever they may be — through satellite 
communications ? 

So often have I thought of the wonders 
that could have been brought to those young, 
stniggling minds with warped bodies that I 
taught buck when I was in that little rural 
school on the United States-Mexican border if 
wo had had satellite communications and the 
best scholars and best teachers had been able 
to invade those classrooms and expose those 
Mexican children to tlie English language. 

How can we use, too, the latest methods of 
communications and microfilming to provide 
those who are doing scholarship and research 
everv'where the best library facilities that are 
anywhere ? 

We seem to need more facts. We seem to need 
to put a program together. 



I was quite impressed with a statement in 
your conference document ■which said : 

If the world's financial systems were forced to 
function with no better fiicts than those which edu- 
cational systems live by, a financial panic would 
swiftly seize all capitals of the world. 

We could liave that in the ofliiig anyway. 

That is one of the reasons 1 tiiouylit it would 
be very desirable that we have this conference 
this year. It gives me a great deal of satisfac- 
tion, as Dr. Perkins observed, to know that you 
have come here upon our invitation and that 
you have come here to chart an education 
strategy for the future. 

I should not be piesumptuous enough to try 
to outline that strategy'. I content myself with 
observing a contribution here and there. 

If I may suggest another idea, you might con- 
sider calling on the United Nations to set :i 
target time for reviewing our goals and plan- 
ning new progress and make an international 
education year for the world. 

Don't limit your efforts. Here, and when you 
leave this place, I hope that you will take these 
plans and really face up to the tough questions : 

The real tough question of all is. How can we 
persuade the governments of 131 other nations 
to make it their primary objective to give 
every boy and girl born iii the world — any- 
Avhere — all the education he or she can take? 

How can we get the world's leaders to con- 
vert man's tragic will to destroy into a deter- 
mination to build ? 

How can we shape a world in which men em- 
ploy their minds in projects of peace instead of 
sacrificing their all, their bodies, their lives, on 
a field of battle? 

Can we train a young man's eyes to absorb 
learning — as eagerly as we train his finger to 
pull a trigger? 

Xo gathering that has ever assembled has a 
subject that I think is more urgent than yours — 
more compelling, more necessary, and more 

Here tonight you leaders of educational 
thought from more than 50 nations, almost half 
of all the nations of the world, must realize that 
you arc dealing with the dynamite of our times. 

Thomas Jefferson said that we should spread 
the disease of liberty around the world when 
this nation was very young. The men of Jef- 
ferson's day associated this place where you arc 
meeting tonight with liberty and also with 

Tonight in Williamsburg, I am pleased to ob- 
serve that you apparently have the same con- 
cern. I hope our commitment will be as great as 
theirs — and I hope that your achievements will 
be as worthy of remembering. 

One more word, if I may be personal: A 
President must call upon many persons — some 
to man the ramparts and to watch the faraway, 
distant posts; others to lead us in science, medi- 
cine, education, and social progress here at 
home. I especially want to commend this great 
educational leader — Dr. Perkins — for havmg 
answered every call that his country has made 
and having apparently done it quite well here. 

Thank you. 

Genera! Ankrah of Ghana 
Visits the United States 

Lt. Gen. Joneqyh A. Ankrah, Cliairman of the 
National Liberation Council of the Repuhlic of 
Ghana, visited the United States October 9-14. 
Ue met with President Johnson October 10. 
Following is an exchange of toasts between 
President Johnson and Lt. Gen. Ankrah I't a 
luncheon at the White House that day. 

white House press release dated Octohor 10 


Walt Whitman once described America as 
"not merely a nation, but a nation teeming with 

The genius of the United States, he said, "is 
not best or most in its executives or legislatures, 
nor in its Ambassadors or authors or colleges or 
churches, nor even in its newspapers or in- 
\entors . . . but always most in the conunon 

The "common people" of America include 
Afro- Americans — whose ancestors came to us in 

But bondage did not break their spirit. Dis- 
crimination did not dwarf their genius. They 
overcame. Today, they enrich our national life 
and the quality of our civilization. 

Descendants of slaves, they have taught the 
world much that it knows about freedom. In 
song and poem — as writers, athletes, soldiers, 
and diplomats — in the arts, the sciences, in com- 

OCTOBER 30, 19 67 

279-3no— 67 


merce — in our Supreme Coui-t, our Congress, 
our Cabinet — every year tlie seeds of their new 
achievements are sown and the harvest of our 
good fortune grows. 

As Afro-Americans expanded the idea of 
freedom in America, Ghanaians helped to bring 
freedom to modern Africa. 

A decade ago, the Gold Coast became the in- 
dependent nation of Ghana. Followmg her lead, 
r.O other nations in Africa have since come to 

The new independence of Africa has echoed 
around the world — and because of it men today 
walk straighter in more than a hundred lands. 
This is nowhere truer than in this land, where 
Americans of every race watch the African 
resurgence with pride and interest. 

Freedom brings responsibilities, as well as 
hopes. General Ankrah and the National Lib- 
eration Council liave fearlessly faced up to these 

They found a people that were weary in 
spirit, impoverished by tyramiy, disillusioned 
by many broken promises. History demonstrates 
that this is the moment of truth for a nation's 
leaders — for it is always tempting to deal wiih 
the ruins of one tyranny by imposmg another. 

But General Ankrah and the National Lib- 
eration Council rejected tyrtimiy. Like our own 
forefathers, they dedicated their lives, their 
hopes, and their sacred honor to the proposition 
that the only legitimate government is self- 

They brought together a representative group 
of outstanding citizens and asked tliem to write 
a democratic constitution. They announced firm 
plans for free elections. They imposed the 
austerity measures required to settle their debts 
and restore their financial self-respect in the 
communitj' of trading nations. 

These are not easy steps for any nation. Nor 
are they always popular. But they were right 
and they were necessary, and General Ankrah 
is taking them — and retaining the firm support 
of his people while doing so. 

Mr. Chairman, America's interest in Africa 
is very simple. Our interest is in seeing a com- 
munity of prosperous and free nations come 
into being — proud of its unique heritage and 
proud to be a partner in world progress. We 
shall help you wherever we can — and only 
where you wish. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we honor freedom and 
responsibility in this house today. I ask all of 
vou who have come hei'e fi-om throughout tliis 

land to join me in a toast to freedom in Africa, 
to freedom m Ghana, and to a champion of free- 
dom and his gracious lady. General and Mrs. 
Jose]3li Ankrah. 


I will be very brief, because whatever I want 
to say, in fact, has already been said by my host. 

Mrs. Ankrah and I, and the rest of my party, 
have been in your great country for less than 
a day, but we are already feeling at home. We 
have found the hospitality of the Government 
and people of the United States overwhelming, 
and we very much look forward to enjoying 
our stay in this country. 

Mr. President, we are very grateful to you 
for the pleasant things you have said about us, 
especially about our country, and for the won- 
derful arrangements that have been made for 
our comfort. We also deeply appreciate the help 
of the Government and people of the United 
States of America which was given us in our 
time of need. 

The various forms of assistance we have re- 
ceived from this country have been an im- 
portant element in the reconstruction of our 
country's economy. We are making steady 
progress in our efforts to bring our economy 
back on its feet once more, and we are en- 
couraged to know that your Government and 
the people of the United States appreciate this 
and wish us well. 

We hope that our meeting today will open 
up for us wider and greater horizons for a free 
collaboration and cooperation in the interest of 
our two countries. The great ideals of liberty, 
freedom, and equality on which your great 
country has been founded are our own guiding 
principles in our efforts to establish a prosper- 
ous, progressive, and democratic society in 
Ghana. Our country may be small in size and 
population, but we have great confidence that 
it nevertheless has tremendous potential for 
achieving these objectives. 

We are currently engaged in actively explor- 
ing some of the ways in which we can cooperate 
with our neighbors in West Africa and in 
Africa as a whole to develop the many resources 
that nature has richly endowed our continent. 
Here again we are encouraged to note that we 
have had ready and willing support of the Gov- 
ernment and people of the United States. With 
this support — which we already have — and the 



good will of other friendly nations, we are con- 
fident that we shall ultimately succeed in our 
present endeavors. 

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you to join 
me in a toast to the President of the United 
States of America and to Mrs. Johnson. 

President Johnson Reaffirms 
Suppcrt for Free Flow of Trade 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press relense Uated October 12 

Yesterday evening [October 11] I acted on 
four cases involving imports which have been 
subject to higher tariffs under the escape clause 
provisions of trade legislation. These tariffs 
were subject to expiration at midnight last 
night in the absence of Presidential action. In 
taking action on these cases, I considered the 
I'ecoramendations of the Tariff Commission, the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Labor, the Special Eepresentative for Trade 
Negotiations, and the other affected Govern- 
ment departments and agencies. 

In my view, it is in our self-interest to use our 
predominant position in world trade to promote 
the expansion of international trade. I wish to 
reaffirm the administration's basic support for a 
program to eliminate any unnecessary barriers 
to the freer flow of trade. 

I therefore have permitted the escape clause 
tariff on typewriter ribbon cloth and stainless 
steel fli;tware to terminate. However, I have 
asked the responsible Federal departments to 
maintain surveillance over these industries to 
determine if other assistance is appropriate at 
a later date. 

I have signed proclamations extending the 
existing escape clause tariffs on sheet glass ^ and 
Wilton and velvet carpets ^ until January 1, 
1970. I have reluctantlv concluded that a tem- 

l)orary extension of these cases is warranted. 
The evidence shows that a substantial increase 
in imports of these products would result, in the 
absence of this action. This would cause severe 
job dislocation in the domestic industry. Many 
of the plants are located in regions of large un- 
employment with limited opportunities for re- 
employment in other industries. In the opinion 
of the Departments of Labor and Commerce, 
the adjustment assistance provisions of the 
Trade Expansion Act are at this time not an 
adequate remedy for these dislocations. 

I am appointing a task force of representa- 
tives of the Departments of Commerce, Labor, 
the Small Business Administration, and other 
appropriate agencies to make a comprehensive 
study of the industries involved and of the 
small communities in which many of their 
plants are located. The mission of the task force 
will l)e to inventory the Government assistance 
programs availalile to these areas, to search for 
alternate employment, and to take other steps 
which will work out long-term solutions to the 
problems created by job dislocation. 

I believe that the task force can develop solu- 
tions which will enable the industries to make 
the necessary adjustments to the domestic and 
world market conditions within the time pro- 
vided by the extension of this tariff. 

The United States, like all trading nations, 
must be wiUing to buy the products of other 
countries if we expect them to buy ours. So we 
are keenly aware of the importance of expand- 
ing trade. At the same time, we — like other 
nations — maintain a fair and just concern for 
the well-being of those industries and their em- 
ployees who suffer unusual hardship from 

I believe the disposition of these four cases — • 
includmg the temporary relief of limited dura- 
tion granted to two industries — is consistent 
with these trade objectives and in our nation's 
best interests. 

' Proclamation 3816 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg. 14107. 
' Proclamation 3815 ; for text, st- e 32 Fed. licg. 1419.5. 




Completing the Work of the Kennedy Round 

by William, M. Roth 

Special Repi'esentative for Trade Negotkt.fions ^ 

I am not going to take your time today to 
describe the results of the Kennedy Round. 
Most of you have learned enough about those 
results to be able to agree that it was by far 
the most successful international negotiation in 
the trade field. 

I am sure you also know that tlie Kennedy 
Round negotiations were punctuated by a suc- 
cession of crises that threatened to destroy all 
the work that had been done in 4 years of con- 
centi'ated bargaining. Some of the most serious 
of these occurred during the final days of the 
negotiations in Geneva and, as you know, were 
overcome only after the negotiators realized 
that they were on the brink of failure. 

"What you may not have noticed, however, is 
that we are faced right now with a new crisis. 
This time it is one in which American labor 
and business are going to have to be directly 
iiivolved. If they stand aside there is as much 
danger as at any time during the negotiations 
that the Kennedy Round will prove to have 
been a failure — an agreement that was success- 
ful on paper but that was nullified even before 
its provisions could take effect. 

Almost as soon as the Kemiedy Round agree- 
ment was signed, a campaign was begun in the 
United States on many fronts that, if successfid 
on many of them, would not only turn the clock 
back to the situation that existed in 1962, when 
the Trade Expansion Act was passed, but would 
almost certainly not stop there and cordd carry 
us all the way back to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act of 1930. 

There is now before Congress a spate of pro- 
tectionist bills. For the most part, they are not 
shadow bills that are likely to fade away with- 

' Address made before the world affairs committee 
and exiiort-import committee of tiie Greater Detroit 
Board of Commerce at Detroit, Mich., on Oct. 5. 

out coming to a vote. In the aggregate they have 
already received impressive congressional sup- 
port. One of them passed the House last week 
by an overwhelming vote. Hearings on many 
others have been scheduled by the Senate 
Finance Committee to begin 2 weeks from now. 
To those of you who welcomed the results of the 
Kennedy Roimd as a step forward in our trade 
relations and in our export opportunities, this 
is not a dark cloud in the distance but an 
immediate threat. 

There are now bills pending before one or 
both houses that would: restrict imports — in 
most cases by quotas — of textiles, watches, pe- 
troleum, meat, dairy products, lead and zinc, 
and even minlv furs. I imderstand also that a bill 
imposing quotas on imports of steel will be in- 
troduced before the Senate hearings are held. 
And bills affecting individual products and in- 
dustries are only part of the threat. The Dent 
bill,= wliich passed the House last week, sets up 
machinery to permit the President to restrict 
imports of any product which is produced 
abroad under labor standards below those ap- 
jilied in the United States. I leave it to you to 
imagine what competitive foreign product 
would be able to meet such standards. 

That isn't the end of across-the-board protec- 
tionist legislation. Twenty Senators liave co- 
sponsored a bill that would establish mandatory 
quotas if imports contribute to the economic 
problems of domestic producers, and the same 
number of Senators have already endorsed an- 
other bill that would make it mandatory for the 
President to increase tariffs or impose quotas in 
cases that would not comply with the criteria 
that must be met before the use of his discre- 
tionary powei' under tlie existing escape clause 

= H.R. 478. 



of the Trade Expansion Act. Finally, 40 Sena- 
tors have sponsored a bill designed to increase 
the number of cases in which the United States 
applies antidumping duties. 

There are other bills I have not mentioned, but 
these will give you an idea of the extent to which 
"new protectionism" has already snowballed. 

Effect of Import Restrictions 

If it sounds overdramatic to say that this pro- 
tectionism tlireatens the Kemiedy Round and 
even the foundation of American commerical 
policy, let me cite a few figures. There is no 
way to calculate the amount of trade that could 
be affected by such legislation as the Dent bill 
or the various so-called orderly marketmg bills 
or the proposed revisions of the criteria for the 
escape clause. But, limiting our estimate to those 
where some statistical appraisal is possible, the 
value of U.S. imports wliich would be drastical- 
ly cut back or cut out if pending bills were en- 
acted comes to $3.6 billion. And this is a very 
crude estimate, definitely a minimum, not a 

$3.6 billion, our rockbottom estimate, is ex- 
actly 144 times $25 million. And $25 million is 
just about the total value of the imports into 
Germany that were involved in the so-called 
"chicken war." These things do not go in arith- 
metic progression, to be sure, but the hard feel- 
ings, ill will, and, for some, adverse economic 
impact stirred up by chickens in 1963 would 
surely be many, many times more if we were 
to take the course that many are now plotting 
for us. 

Or compare $3.6 billion with the results of the 
Kennedy Round. It is two-thirds larger than 
United States imports fi-om the EEC [Euro- 
pean Economic Commimity] of all items on 
which we gi-anted tariff reductions in the Ken- 
nedy Round and nearly half as large as United 
States imports of those items from the entire 

It also approaches one-third of our dutiable 
imports and is nearly one-third of the value of 
our exports which face duties when landed 
abroad. It is this latter figure which is par- 
ticularly significant. For every restriction we 
impose on imports, an equivalent limitation on 
our exports can be imposed by other countries 
on some U.S. industry. This is their right mider 
the international rules to which we have sub- 
scribed — a right that has been invoked in the 
past by us and by them. In short, some United 

States business must pay whenever we take 
restrictive action in order to insulate some 
sector of our industry from competition. 

A question that must be asked in deadly 
earnest about each protectionist bill: "If it is 
passed, who is going to pay ?" In the long run 
all of American business will have to pay. But 
I am talking about the more direct and immedi- 
ate effect. When we increased duties to com- 
pensate for our loss of a profitable Gennan 
market for American chickens, it was the 
exporter of Volkswagen buses and the producer 
of French Cognac who paid most of the bill. If 
the United States shuts out imports of Euro- 
pean textiles or glass or steel, don't assume that 
it will be the American textile or glass or steel 
exporters who will necessarily pay. It may be 
you — or one of your best customers. 

Perhaps I have said enough on this subject 
to convince you that tlie work of the Kennedy 
Roimd is not yet finished. Wliat may be the 
hardest job of all is still to be done: to make 
the results stick. And this is a fight in which 
American business must be involved if it is to 
be won. 

The American Selling Price Package 

But there is affirmative as well as defensive 
action that is needed to complete that work. 
This brings me to the new legislation that is 
bemg prepared in the administration for sub- 
mission to Congress, one section of which would 
provide the necessary congressional approval of 
the so-called "ASP package" that would supple- 
ment the definitive tariff agreement reached in 
the Kennedy Round. 

Those definitive results will come into effect 
automatically, unless we should take some fool- 
ish action to prevent it. But some of the most 
important concessions negotiated at Geneva 
were provisional and contained in what is gen- 
erally referred to as the ASP — that is, Amer- 
ican Selling Price — package. These can only 
come into effect when the United States Con- 
gress has accepted that separate agreement. 

Wliat does the ASP package consist of? First, 
so far as chemicals are concerned, it provides 
that the United States would eliminate the ASP 
system of customs valuation, applied to ben- 
zenoid chemicals — which represent about 8 per- 
cent of all chemicals produced in the United 
States. In working out tliis package, rates for 
those chemicals were established on a normal 
valuation basis but so as to provide the same 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 


level of protection as would be the case without 
the ASP agreement. Then a number of reduc- 
tions Avere made in various chemical duties, in- 
cluding the converted benzenoid rates, with the 
effect that the weighted average reductions in 
all U.S. chemical duties resulting from the 
Kennedy Round would be 47 jjercent instead of 
the 43 percent reduction brought about by the 
Kennedy Eound without the ASP package. 

In exchange for these further concessions, the 
EEC would increase its average chemical tariff 
reduction from 20 i^ercent to 46 j^ercent. In 
other words, the American chemical industry 
alone would be exchanging an additional 4 per- 
cent tariff reduction in the U.S. market for an 
additional 26 percent reduction in the European 
market. The chemical tariffs of the United 
Kingdom would be i-educed by an additional 18 

In judging the value of this package to the 
American chemical industry, there are two other 
points to remember. First, when the ASP pack- 
age comes into effect, the average benzenoid 
chemical duties of both the EEC and the U.K. 
will be much lower than that of the United 
States. Secondly, the United States industry 
has more than demonstrated its ability to com- 
pete with the industries of Europe and the rest 
of the world by maintaining a very substantial 
export balance. 

But it is not only the chemical industry that 
will benefit from the ASP package. The EEC 
would modify its road taxes so as to eliminate 
existing discrimination against the type of car 
produced in the United States. The U.K., for 
its part, would reduce by 25 percent the margin 
of preference it now grants to Commonwealth 
producers of tobacco. 

I believe that the ASP package is a good deal, 
not only for tlie United States and the cause of 
liberal world trade but, more specifically, for 
the United States chemical industry as a whole. 
"Wliy, then, should the spokesmen for that indus- 
try — and not just the producers of benzenoid 
chemicals — have come out in opposition to it? 
I cannot help feeling that this position has been 
taken hastily and without due consideration of 
the interests of almost every stockholder who 
owns a share in the great American chemical 
industry — and this in order to attempt to pre- 
serve an antiquated and unjustifiable system of 
customs valuation that was adopted in 1922 for 
the protection of what was then considered to 
be an infant industry. 

Favorable action by the Congress on the ASP 


package is not only the first order of post- 
Kennedy Round business but is essential if that 
round is to be complete. On it may depend not 
only the concrete benefits contained in the ASP 
package but the ability of the United States to 
continue its role of leadership in international 
organizations dealing with trade. 

Other Facets of New Legislation 

There are two other pressing matters that 
need to be dealt with in interim legislation be- 
fore another major attack on trade barriers. The 
first of these is a simple one to accomplish and, 
I should hope, would not be controversial. The 
lapse of the negotiating authority in the Trade 
Expansion Act has left the United States Gov- 
ernment without the power to negotiate even 
minor tai'iff adjustments necessary during its 
contmued participation in the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] . If we should 
have to change a U.S. tariff rate that has been 
bound in GATT negotiations — either as the re- 
sult of an escape-clause action or for any other 
reason — we would have no authority with which 
to gi-ant compensation to the countries affected. 
Their only recourse, under these circumstances, 
would be to take retaliatory action against 
United States exports. 

So that the President will have the freedom 
of action to permit him to make the most advan- 
tageous settlement for the United States, the 
administration's bill will ask for a restoration 
of the unused part of the authority in the TEA 
to reduce tariffs by 50 percent. There is no in- 
tention of using this extended authority as a 
basis for any major tariff negotiation. 

The third facet of the new legislation relates 
to adjustment assistance. When the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act was passed it was widely believed 
that it had made a m.ajor step toward the mod- 
ernization of the concept of tariff negotiations 
by providing an alternative to escape-clause ac- 
tion when a firm or group of workers was in- 
jured by imports resulting from a tariff con- 
cession. But the criteria of the act were written 
so tightly that no applicant for adjustment as- 
sistance has been able to qualify. The adminis- 
tration's bill will remedy this defect by liber- 
alizing those criteria. 

Thus, the first affirmative action that must be 
taken by the United States is the passage of 
legislation that will complete the Kennedy 
Round, revive the unused negotiating authority 
in the Trade Expansion Act, and liberalize the 


criteria for granting adjustment assistance. 

Now, let me look a bit further into the future. 
One of the most important benefits of the Ken- 
nedy Eoimd was to bring more clearly into focus 
the distance we still have to go in reducing exist- 
ing trade barriers and preventing the erection 
of new trade barriers that will frustrate the 
most eifective use of our resources and those of 
other countries. 

There are still tariffs here and abroad which 
are clearly so high as to prevent or severely re- 
strict trade. There are other tariffs that, al- 
though nominally low, provide prohibitive pro- 
tection to certain stages of processing and 

There were nontariff barriers that were not 
touched in the Kennedy Eound and that may 
in the future take the place of tariffs as the prin- 
cipal roadblocks to our exjDort trade: such de- 
vices as state trading, border taxes, arbitrary 
customs valuation, "buy national" laws and 
practices, discriminatory internal taxes, and a 
host of others. 

Ill the agricultural sector, we have barely 
come to grips with the complex of internal and 
externa] policies that prevent the market 
mechanism from operating as the regulator of 
world trade. 

Finally, while the Kennedy Round did more 
to open up market opportunities for the exports 
of less developed countries than most of them 
seem willing to admit, the ground that remains 
to be covered both by the developed countries 
and by the less developed comitries themselves 
is formidable. 

When the time is ripe for another major 
round of international negotiations, there will 
be no lack of jobs to do. But the administration 
has no intention of plunging blindly into nego- 
tiations on these many difficult problems. Presi- 
dent Jolinson has charged the Special Repre- 
sentative for Trade Negotiations with the task 
of conducting within the Executive Branch a 
study in depth of the entire range of issues that 
relate to our future trade, the policies that 
should guide us, and the kind of negotiations 
we should engage in. 

Tliis study will occupy much of the time of 
Government agencies over the coming months. 
It will not be conducted in a vacuum but will 
make use of what we know and are able to learn 
about the problems and the attitudes of other 
countries. It will draw on parallel studies that 
are planned within the GATT, and at an appro- 
priate time the views of American labor and 

business groups will be sought. It will also 
make maximum use of the papers that will be 
submitted to the Senate Finance Committee, 
and the hearings planned by that committee, in 
connection with the oversight hearings tliat 
have been announced by Senator [Russell B.] 
Long, the committee chairman. 

Now, I hope you will permit me to say some 
things that may sound too elementary. But I 
find that I need to remind myself of them from 
time to time. The same may be true of you. 
Foreign trade has become so much a part of our 
economy and for so long that we are in danger 
of forgetting the role it has played in making 
this country prosperous. 

Wliat is the magic in international trade that 
makes it worth the effort to preserve — that 
makes it worth our while to create an environ- 
ment in which it can continue to grow? If I 
reword the question and ask "What is the value 
of any trade?" the question answers itself. Any 
schoolboy knows, for example, that the ability 
of citizens in one State to sell their products in 
whatever State they can do so most profitably 
and to buy the kind of goods they need where 
they can get them at the best price — has brought 
the United States the greatest prosperity the 
world has ever known. 

No one wants to turn that clock back. No one 
seriously suggests that the 50 States be per- 
mitted to protect their producers against com- 
petition from other States. It would be much 
too clear that everyone would lose. Consumers 
would be forced to purchase inferior goods at 
astronomical prices. A few producers, protected 
against competition from outside the State, 
might be able to survive instead of being forced 
to develop the production of some other product 
for which they, and the resources of their State, 
are better fitted. But even these producers 
would be lucky if they were able to earn more 
than a bare subsistence. 

I could go on with this nightmare, but you can 
fill in the rest of it yourself. Just let me under- 
line one more point. It is not only tlie general 
welfare that would suffer if trade among the 
States were restricted. No State would be as well 
off — not the State with the greatest resources nor 
the State with the least, not the State with the 
lowest wage rates nor that with the highest. 

Now, if these simple elementary facts are 
clear so far as trade among the States is con- 
cerned, why do they not also apply to trade 
among countries? The most common argument 
made by protectionists is the difference in wage 

OCTOBER 3 0, 19 67 


levels here and abroad. But as a generality, this 
difference provides no better justification for 
preventing international trade than for pre- 
venting domestic trade. In spite of the freedom 
of trade among the 50 States, those States with 
the lowest wages do not drive the higher-wage 
States out of business. Similarly, on the inter- 
national scene, the United Sta/tes, with by far 
the highest wage rates in the world, exports 
more than it imports. You all know the reason. 
High wages are the result of greater productiv- 
ity, which in turn is due in large part to the 
amount of capital available per worker. A com- 
I^arison of wage rates without taking produc- 
tivity into account is meaningless. 

These facts are so obvious that even protec- 
tionists are in the habit of saying that they are 
in favor of "fair" international trade. But, too 
often, what is meant by unfair trade is simply 
the kind of competition that, when it exists 
within the United States, is considered a fact of 
life — and an indispensable fact at that. 

I think it would be a serious mistake to as- 
sume that the majority of American business- 
men, the general public, or the Congress have 
turned their backs on these truths or have re- 
jected the trade policy we have followed pretty 
consistently and successfully since the early 
1930's. Where I am afraid they are in danger of 
making a serious miscalculation is to believe 
that it is possible to have a liberal trade policy 
in general while we abandon it in case after case. 

The protectionist bills I have mentioned un- 
derline this danger. The position that has been 
taken by the chemical industry on ASP is even 
more disturbing. But I believe that the explana- 
tion in both cases is the same: For some rea- 
son only those who see an immediate threat to 
their short-term interests make their views 
known. The much greater, but less immediate, 
threat to our export markets tliat must follow 
new import restrictions somehow just doesn't get 
across to those who will l^e liurt. The even more 
general tlireat to the standard of living of the 
country as a whole finds no articulate spokes- 
man. And the protectionist takes the game by de- 
fault. The wheel that squeaks loudest gets the 
grease. Your job, if you believe we are going 
down a dangerous road, is to see that the squeaks 
come not only from the wheel that feels a tem- 
porary pinch but from the passengers who can 
see that the whole wagon is headed for a 

Malaysian Finance Minister 
Calls on President Johnson 

White House Statement 

White House press release dated October 10 

The Malaysian Minister of Finance, Tun Tan 
Siew Sin, called on President Johnson today 
[October 10] as a special emissary of Prime 
Minister Timku Abdul Rahman to discuss mat- 
ters of common interest. 

The President and the Minister agreed that 
in the recent past there had been welcome ad- 
vances made by countries of Southeast Asia in 
regional cooperation. They agi-eed that the mul- 
tilateral approach offered promise of accelerat- 
ing orderly growth within the economies of 
these countries. The Minister expressed great 
satisfaction tliat the United States was giving 
support to the Asian Development Banik and 
that the President had requested Congress to 
authorize vitally needed resources for the 
Bank's Special Fimds. 

The Minister expressed appreciation for the 
personal interest sliown by the President in 
world rubber prices and for the two decisions 
as to levels of stockpile disposals made during 
the past year with the intent of helping to 
stabilize rubber prices. The Minister stated that 
the Government of Malaysia understood fully 
that the basic problems relating to rubber prices 
were complex and involved many factors. 

The President and the Minister were gratified 
that the Minister and his colleagues had ex- 
plained to United States Government officials 
the problems with which rubber producers are 
faced, had outlined some possibilities for allevi- 
ating these problems, and had obtained the 
views of United States officials on them. They 
look forward to further consultations of this 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Ghana, Ebenezer Moses Debrah, 
presented his credentials to President Johnson 
on October 9. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated October 9. 



New Opportunities in Asia 

ty WUliam S. Gaud 

Administrator, Agency for International Development ^ 

It is no exaggeration to say that in the United 
States today, the Far East and Asia are con- 
stantly in our minds. But many of us take too 
myopic a view of that part of the world. We 
tend to see the Far East largely in terms of con- 
flict in Viet-Nam. We tend to equate the prob- 
lems of Viet-Nam with the problems of Asia. 
They are related, yes, but they are clearly not 

I do not mean to downgrade the importance 
of the struggle in Viet-Nam. But it is only part 
of the Asian picture. And we must not let it 
blind us to new developments in Asia which are 
creating new opportunities for Asians and 
Americans alike: opportmiities for better vm- 
derstanding, for liigher living standards, for 
continued economic progress, for more trade 
and investment. Indeed, one can hope, opportu- 
nities that will bring closer our dream of a 
peaceful future. 

These new opportunities arise out of three 
separate but related ti-ends. One is the trend 
toward regionalism — the growing ability of 
Asians to work together. The second is the 
growing strength of many of the region's na- 
tional economies. The third is a better imder- 
standing of the food and population problem 
which threatens Asia's future, an increased 
willingness to deal with that problem, and a 
growing ability to do so. 

In the past, the colonial presence tended to 
direct Asians not toward each other but out 
toward colonial parents. Today, colonialism is 
dead and the attitudes of colonialism are fast 
disappearing. The distances of culture and 
space which have divided the region are closing. 
Asians are becoming more aware of each other 
and more used to each other. 

' Address made before the 1967 conference on Asia of 
the Far East-America Council at New York, N.Y., on 
Oct. 4. 

Young people studying in each other's coun- 
tries show this new consciousness and are 
strengthening it. More than 2,300 non- Japanese 
Asian students — Taiwanese, Indonesians, Thais, 
and Malaysians — were studying in Japan a year 
or so ago. On Taiwan, there were about 2,000 
foreign Asian students — overseas Chinese, Viet- 
namese, Koreans, Japanese, Thais, and Malay- 
sians. In Australia, Americans were studying 
next to 4,000 Malaysians, Indonesians, Thais, 
and Vietnamese. 

Asians today grow up knowing more about 
their neighbors and their region. One of the 
byproducts of this knowledge is what we bu- 
reaucrats call regionalism. This is as much an 
attitude — a knowledge of neighbors and a sense 
of commmiity — as it is pacts and meetings. 

But in the Far East today regionalism also 
means formal cooperation between nations. 
ECAFE, the United Nations Economic Com- 
mission for Asia and the Far East, has been a 
leader in this direction. These days, ECAFE 
has a lot of company. A continuing stream of 
meetings and associations now focuses on Asia 
and the Far East as a region. For example : 

— ASPAC, the Asian and Pacific Council, 
joins nine nations with varying views in coop- 
eration on practical problems. 

—ASEAN, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, is a new five-countiy combma- 
tion with an economic orientation. 

— Agreements on trade and for joint export 
promotion are multiplying. 

— Recent meetings have drawn together 
Asian and Pacific foreign ministers, labor min- 
isters, and development, banking, and planning 
officials— all focusing on the Far East as a 
region or one of its subregions. 

All this is only a beginning. There is still a 
long way to go in terms of both economic and 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 


political cooperation. But cooperation requires 
a starting point — a way to get off dead center. 
As Macaulay pointed out, "there cannot be effi- 
cient cooperation if men proceed on the prin- 
ciple that they must not cooperate for one 
object unless they agree about other objects." 
In the Far East, Asians are following this pre- 
cept, taking an empirical and practical road 
that is leading them steadily on to closer 

Moving Spirit Within Asia 

Tlie United States is deeply interested in this 
trend toward regionalism. The peace and sta- 
bility of Asia and the Pacific are inseparable 
from world peace. And regional cooperation 
and regional strength offer the best chance of 
peace and stability in the Far East. It is United 
States policy to support regional development 
by backing cooperative Asian initiatives. We 
also encourage international organizations and 
other developed nations to support such efforts. 
But the initiative, the moving spirit, the drive, 
the real urge to get on with it — these can only 
come from within the region. 

And they are. For example, seven nations in 
the region have already joined together in 
SEAMES, the Southeast Asian Ministers of 
Education Secretariat. Their purpose: to 
strengthen education in fields closely related to 
the development of the region. They have 
planned a number of regional projects which 
are beyond the capacities of the individual 
countries of the Far East. Among them : 

— A regional center for education in science 
and mathematics, to be inaugurated in Penang, 
Malaysia, this coming January. 

— An Asian institute of technology in Bang- 
kok, Thailand, to raise the level of Asian 

— A regional English language center, due 
to open in Singapore next summer. (English 
continues to be the international language — 
and the language of business — in much of the 
Far East.) 

— A regional center for graduate study and 
research in agriculture at Los Banos in the 

The United States has informed the edu- 
cation ministers that it is prepared to join in 
supporting these projects, provided others con- 
tribute their fair share. Here is an excellent 

example of Asian enterprise that deserves sup 
port from non- Asian sources. 

Perhaps the outstanding example of regional 
initiative in the Far East to date is the Asian 
Development Bank. Regional members sub- 
scribed 60 percent of the Bank's capital. Non- 
Asian nations subscribed the other 40 percent. 
The United States subscribed 20 percent— the 
same amount as Japan. 

The Bank is moving ahead. It is almost fully 
staffed. It is considering loan projects. It is al- 
ready furnishing technical assistance to some 
of the countries of the region. 

The main purpose of the Bank's ordinary cap- 
ital is to finance the foreign exchange costs of 
projects that will return investment quickly 
and directly. In its regular lending operations, 
the Bank must remain a hard money institution. 
Only by using conventional banking standards 
can it preserve its credit standing and procure 
funds from conventional market sources. 

However, the foreign exchange resources of 
the Bank's prospective borrowers are limited. 
Some projects — though they may be wortliwhile 
and sound — would necessarily be ineligible for 
financing by the Bank if they had to proceed on 
hard loan terms. This means that the Asian De- 
velopment Bank, like the World Bank, must be 
in a position to make some development loans on 
easy terms. The Asian Bank needs a soft loan 
window to fulfill its whole purpose in the region 

Asian Development Bank Special Funds 

It is planned to carry out this soft loan func- 
tion by providing the Bank with Special Funds 
to meet critical needs in the region. The Bank 
has already agreed to administer a Special Fund 
for Agriculture. Other Funds have been dis- 
cussed informally — one for development of the 
Mekong River Valley, another for regional 
transportation and communications. 

The Fund for Agriculture is the result of 
Japanese initiative, specifically, the initiative 
of Foreign Minister Takeo Miki. Japan has an- 
nounced she will contribute $100 million to this 
fund, subject to matching contributions. Other 
countries — Canada, for one — have also indicated 
they plan to contribute to this Fund. 

There are also hopes for a Special Fund to 
develop the Mekong Valley. The valley is as 
large as the combined area of California and 
New York. Its population — 30 million — is ex- 
pected to double around the turn of the century. 




Much of the area is undeveloped and poor — 
drought ridden and choked with dust half the 
year, threatened by floods the other half. But 
the Mekong could generate two or three times 
as much power as our Missouri. With irrigation 
and flood control, agriculture in the valley 
could support a substantial export trade as well 
as twice the present population. 

The Mekong Development Program is an ex- 
cellent example of international cooperation in 
the region. Over 25 nations, 13 international 
agencies, and four foundations have been in- 
volved to date. Contributions from all these 
sources have totalled some $113 million, much 
of it for construction. The United States con- 
tributed $26 million of this, roughly one- 

As many of you know, the Mekong Develop- 
ment Program long ago passed the talking 
stage. Extensive work and planning have gone 
forward in the fields of irrigation, power, flood 
control, soil conditions, and the like. Two small 
dams in northeast Thailand are already pro- 
ducing electric power. Engineering has begun 
for a dam on the Nam Ngum, a tributary of the 
Mekong in Laos, about 40 miles north of Vien- 
tiane. Seven nations from outside Southeast 
Asia are involved in the Nam Ngum project — 
plus Laos, Thailand, and the World Banlc act- 
ing as administrator. Laos will sell power from 
the dam to Thailand. Thailand is to supply 
cement and power to build it. 

Plans for a third Special Fund — to finance 
regional transportation and communications — 
were discussed last month in Kuala Lumpur. 
The historical routes in Asia and the Pacific 
lead out instead of binding the countries of the 
region together. Development of the area will 
require improved transportation and commu- 
nications between countries as well as within 
countries. The Kuala Lumpur meeting proposed 
a survey of regional needs. In time, it is hoped, 
the Asian Development Bank will provide some 
of the financing to meet those needs. 

Last week the President sent to the Congress 
a proposal for a $200 million United States con- 
tribution to the three Special Funds of the 
Asian Development Bank.= His proposal en- 
visaged that this contribution would be less 
than half the total amount of these fimds, 
which, as I have said, will be loaned on conces- 
sional terms to finance priority projects. I hope 

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1967, p. 508. 

the Congress will act favorably on the Presi- 
dent's proposal. The Asian Development Bank 
is in a position to play a most important part 
in the development of the region, and it is very 
much in our interest to support it. 

Economic Progress 

There are no doubt many factors which ac- 
count for the growing spirit of cooperation and 
neighborliness in the Far East. But one of the 
most important, it seems to me, is the new 
assurance — the new self-confidence — which has 
come with the growth and success of one na- 
tional economy in the region after another. 

Japan is of course the outstanding case in 
point. The United States today knows Japan 
not only as the strongest free nation in Asia — 
indeed, one of the fastest growing nations in 
the world — but as a trader setting new stand- 
ards of commercial competition. The growth 
of Japanese exports has been breathtaking. We 
also know that the peace and stability of the 
Far East will require close cooperation between 
the Governments of Japan and the United 

Japan has joined the ranks of the aid donors. 
We expect to see a steady increase in her con- 
tributions to the development of her neighbors. 
She is beginning to share the skills which have 
made Japanese agriculture a model for much 
of the Far East. As I have already said, the 
Special Fund for Agriculture was a Japanese 

Many of Japan's neighbors are also well on 
their way to self-sufficiency. Exports are up 
throughout most of the region. In 1966 Korea's 
reached $250 million — seven times the level of 
1960. Taiwan's exports, which are on a rela- 
tively higher level, rose 17 percent last year 
alone. Taiwan and Korea are both outstanding 
examples of the progress that is possible when 
a strong, knowledgeable government combines 
effective self-help measures with adequate out- 
side aid. 

Many Asian nations are enjoying high 
growth rates. In 1966 the economy of Korea 
showed a growth rate of 13 percent. Thailand 
was next with 9 percent. Japan, Taiwan, Ma- 
laysia, and Pakistan also all made substantial 
progress in the past year. 

One of the denominators common to all coun- 
tries high on the growth list is a vigorous and 
growing private sector. On Taiwan, the private 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 


sector now accounts for over two-thirds of 
total industrial production. Thailand, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore — all these nations show 
wliat can be done by stimulating private enter- 
prise and private investment. 

Recent events in Indonesia offer new hope 
not only for the Indonesians themselves but for 
Asia as a whole. Two years ago the Indonesian 
economy was headed for total collapse — the re- 
sult of yeai-s of mismanagement. Today, Indo- 
nesia is headed in the direction of progress and 
growth. A new government is realining her 
foreign relations and working resolutely and 
intelligently to solve her economic problems. 

Tlie United States, togetlier with Japan and 
a number of European nations, recently re- 
sumed aid to Indonesia. Indonesia has taken 
the self-help measures prescribed by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. The World Bank is 
taking a more active part in planning her 
development. We hope and expect that Indo- 
nesia will continue to follow a course that will 
justify and encourage continued aid from the 
nations of the free world and from the World 
Bank. Indonesia already is joining the trend 
toward regional cooperation. She is now a 
member of both the Asian Bank and the 
SEAMES. She has rejoined the IMF and the 
World Bank. Quite a change from the position 
she occupied not very long ago. 

There are already indications that foreign 
private investment is ready to move into Indo- 
nesia. This is a reflection of Indonesia's enor- 
mous wealth of natural resources and of the 
efforts the Indonesian Government is making to 
attract foreign investment and create a climate 
favorable to private enterprise. But it seems to 
me this new interest in Indonesia also reflects 
increased confidence in Asia as a whole. Tlie 
improvement in the business and investment 
climate throughout Asia works to the advantage 
of Indonesia as it does to that of the other na- 
tions of the region. 

Agricultural Development 

Let me now say a few words about the third 
area of opportunity in Asia: the opportunity 
wliich exists in the fields of agricultural devel- 
opment and family planning. 

In many parts of Asia the outstanding prob- 
lem is to secure food for a fast-growing popula- 
tion. Some say the problem is insurmountable — 
that Asia faces a Malthusian catastrophe of 
enormous proportions. This year, a popular 

book by two brothers, William and Paul Pad- 
dock, came out, predicting just that — "Famine 
1975!"— in its title. 

The Cassandras say there is now no way to 
avoid the food-population squeeze. Time is 
against us, they say — the issue is closed. I dis- 
agree. It is not too late to meet this problem and 
bring it under control — provided that Asia pre- 
laares today to meet her needs 10 and 15 years 
from now. 

We do have some leeway. The United States, 
Canada, Australia, and a few other countries 
with surplus food capacities should be able to 
meet the Asian food problem for the next 10, 
12, or 15 years. But the time will come when 
this will no longer be true. The demand for food 
will ultimately rise to the point where it can 
only be met if the nations of Asia and the de- 
veloping nations in other parts of the world 
move to increase substantially their own agri- 
cultural production. 

There is, in fact, real movement in this di- 
rection. Through the greater use of fertilizers 
and pesticides, increased attention to research, 
more effective use of water and irrigation, more 
adequate provision for agricultural credit, 
wiser price policies, improved distribution sys- 
tems, more equitable land tenure j^rograms — in 
these and many other ways, the nations of Asia 
are beginning to tackle this immense problem. 

Tliere is the new "miracle rice," for example, 
developed at the International Rice Research 
Institute at Los Baiios in the Philippines. With 
proper irrigation, fertilization, and care, this 
short-stemmed variety can produce several times 
the yield of conventional strains. Pakistan, the 
Philippines, India, and others are already put- 
ting it and other improved seeds into wide use. 
In July, Philippine Vice President [Fernando] 
Loi>ez said that "miracle rice" would solve the 
Philippines' food shortage by 1969. 

There are also the new varieties of wheat de- 
veloped in Mexico primarily through the efforts 
of the Rockefeller Foundation. These, too, are 
now beginning to be widely used in India, Pakis- 
tan, and Tui'key, and will greatly multiply the 
yield per acre. 

Let me cite a few of the additional positive 
developments in agriculture in the Far East in 
recent years. In Korea since 1960, fertilizer, ir- 
rigation, and reclamation have increased grain 
production by more than one-third. The 
Koreans are looking to end their dependence on 
grain imports under P.L.-480 by 1971. 

On Taiwan, only a quarter of the land is 



arable, but half the people are agi-icultural. 
Eaising farm income by 90 percent between 
1955 and 1965 was an extraordinary achieve- 
ment. Extensive land reform and farmers as- 
sociations helped. Farm incomes on Taiwan are 
now close to the national average. 

In Thailand, agricultural output has been 
going up 41/^ percent yearly since 1960. This is 
well ahead of Thailand's population increase; 
she is gaining in the war on hunger. Last year, 
Thailand helped to meet food deficits in India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Viet-Nam. 

In five recent years, Pakistan tripled her use 
of fertilizer. The water supply in West Paki- 
stan was expanded by 15 percent. In 1966 
droughts and war interrupted 5 years of 
healthy production gains. But this spring, 
another bumper wheat crop came in. Tlie Paki- 
stanis are shooting for grain self-sufficiency by 

This sort of progress is essential if we are to 
avoid the catastrophe which the Paddock 
brothers foresee. It is far too early to predict 
success. But it is also much too early to pro- 
claim failure. 

Population Trends 

Improvements in agriculture, however, are 
not the whole stoiy. Unless population curves 
turn downward, well below the levels predicted 
by the Paddock brothers, the food-population 
squeeze will become acute in many parts of 

Japan is a nation which conquered its prob- 
lem in a decade. After the war, Japan had one 
of the world's highest birth rates. Today, she 
has one of the lowest. But the Paddocks, stress- 
ing Japan's special characteristics, put her to 
one side as an exception. They write : "no gov- 
ernment in any one of the hungry, soon to be 
starving nations is jDhysically capable or 
psychologically prepared to duplicate . . . 
Japan's success." Rather, they say that "India 
is the bellwether that shows the path which the 
others, like sheep going to slaughter, are 

The fact is that more than half the people 
in the world now live imder governments that 
have policies of reducing birth rates. Eleven 
of these goverimients are in East and South 

Since 1963, the Koreans have cut their rate 
of population increase from about 3 percent to 
^Vz percent. They expect to reach their target 

of 2 percent by 1970. On Taiwan, the govern- 
ment program has been steadily lowering the 
birth rate for 10 years. The Government of 
Pakistan is thoroughly committed to a well- 
administered program that relies heavily on 
incentives to promote the distribution of con- 
traceptives. Singapore and Hong Kong are 
beginning to get their problems under control. 

The Paddocks make a special point of ruling 
out hope for India. They write that "Indian 
agriculture is too antiquated. Its present gov- 
ernment is too inefficient to inaugurate long- 
range agricultural development programs." 

Again, I do not agree. India is now tackling 
her agricultural problem as she has never done 
before. The two worst monsoons of the century 
have prevented her from reaping the benefits 
of new policies. This year, nearly 16 million 
acres are being planted with new high-yielding 
wheat and rice. This year's Indian grain crop, 
with a good monsoon, now seems almost certain 
to be the largest in her history. 

Another conclusion by the Paddocks is tliat 
the Indian Government has not only failed to 
do anything on its own to increase the fertilizer 
supply, it has also prevented private industry 
from doing the job. Here the charge is out of 
date. The Indian Government has opened up 
the fertilizer industry to private enterprise. It 
did not act as soon as we had hoped. However, 
one new privately operated plant is producing 
fertilizer, another is vinder construction, five 
more have been licensed and are in various 
stages of negotiation, and still others are under 

Indian agriculture is on the move. Our 
Ambassador in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, re- 
ports that "many American and Indian econo- 
mists are persuaded that with normal rains and 
continuing foreign aid, India may become self- 
sufficient in food grain by 1972." 

The Paddock brothers also assert, "the 
Indian population tidal wave is too overwhelm- 
ing . . ." — i.e., hopeless, uncontrollable. The 
facts do not support them. It is true that the 
problem is not yet being met adequately. Also, 
it may well not be under substantial control by 

But it is also true that there is now strong 
Indian leadership for cutting the birth rate. 
Dr. [S.] Chandrasekhar, the Minister of Health 
and Family Planning, keenly understands the 
need for education and promotion. 

The Paddocks see the ascending curve in 
India. We see it, too. But we also see growing 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 


Indian action to deflect it: A major program 
usina; education, advertising, the lUD, pills, 
and conventional contracej^tive devices is build- 
ing momentum. 

The Paddocks say India is beyond redemp- 
tion: famine — 1975. We say the issue is still 
open. Tliere is still time and opportunity to beat 
tlie problem if India shows the necessary will. 
We stand ready to continue to give what help 
we can. 

In summary, I repeat that regional aware- 
ness and cooperation hold new possibilities for 
peace, stability, and security — for Asians and 
Americans alike. Regionalism is also opening 
new possibilities of greatly expanded trade and 
investment. Also, the growth of national econ- 
omies means that the nations of the Far East 
are not destined to semipermanent economic 
dependence. Finally, as these nations increase 
their determination and ability to grow their 
own food and reduce their birth rates, the possi- 
bility of world famine recedes. 

The Far East is by no means out of the woods. 
The region faces some difficult, worrisome years. 
However, Asians are overcoming the obstacles 
that have held them back so long and steadily 
strengthening their ability to handle their own 

Ambassador Bunker Dedicates 
New U.S. Embassy at Saigon 

Press release 214 dated September 29 

Following are remarks made hy Ellsxoorth 
Bunker, American Ambassador to Viet-Nam, at 
the dedication of the nev) United States Em- 
bassy at Saigon on Septeinber 29. 

Vfh&Ti I arrived in Saigon a little over 5 
months ago, I brought with me President John- 
son's renewed pledge of our nation's commitment 
to support the great work of nation-building in 
Viet-Nam. That pledge has been made clear 
at Honolulu, Manila, and Guam. Today, as we 
dedicate tliis new Embassy of the United States 
of America, it is fitting tliat we should again 
dedicate our lives and the efforts of every Ameri- 
can in Viet-Nain to the goals we share with the 
leaders and people of Viet-Nam: a permanent 
end to aggression, a just and durable peace. 

regional security, order, and expanding eco- 
nomic progress. 

I can think of no other time in history when 
two nations have come together in such a short 
time to work so closely in so many different 
ways — fighting together, building together, 
teaching together, and planning together for the 
future. Our nations have had to get to know 
each other while embroiled in war, endangered 
by terrorism, and challenged by the economic 
and political strains of nation-building. Out of 
this travail there have grown many bonds that 
have kept us side by side throughout the long 
and costly struggle. 

From the first, ours has been an alliance of 
two sovereign peoples. We have learned much 
from each other. We know that the success of 
the true revolution in Viet-Nam — the conquest 
of hunger, disease, illiteracy and the attaimnent 
of social justice — depends upon Vietnamese 
solutions to Vietnamese problems. We have 
learned both tlie demands and the boundaries 
of cooperation between our two nations in the 
great work of nation-building. 

The cooperation has taken many forms. From 
Saigon to the villages and hamlets of the Viet- 
namese countryside — on jungle trails and 
through muddy fields, in province headquar- 
ters and village council rooms, in television 
studios, classrooms, and hospitals — Americans 
and Vietnamese are working side by side to 
meet the needs and aspirations of the people of 
this brave country. Wliat they accomplish each 
day is rarely spectacular and always hard 
earned. But out of their efforts, and the efforts 
of the free-world nations who stand beside us in 
Viet-Nam, is coming steady, lasting progress to- 
ward a better standard of living, freedom from 
the aggressors' violence and threat of violence, 
and the chance to choose and influence a govern- 
ment responsive to the people. 

Today we dedicate this building to the cause 
of peace. That cause, as the Vietnamese people 
can well testify, has never been a simple or easy 
choice. Each day, it demands new resolution to 
persevere through both the fire of battle and 
the ordeal of change that must come on the path 
to economic and social justice. 

Let it be clear. This building in Saigon stands 
as a symbol of our commitment to the Viet- 
namese people. But no less impressive are hun- 
dreds of smaller buildings scattered throughout 
every part of this nation. From schoolliouses in 
the Mekong Delta to hospitals in the central 



highlands, there are many buildings which, like 
this one, have been built in time of war and 
dedicated to the cause of peace. 

President Jolinson speaks often of the "foot- 
prints of America" in Viet-Nam, and there are 
no better examples of his meaning than these 

Moreover, our commitment need not be meas- 
ured only by the tangible products of our pres- 
ence. Personal sacrifices are also a standard of a 
people's dedication to their work, and it is fit- 
ting that today we dedicate this new Embassy 
in memory of all those who have served their 
nation in Viet-Nam. That is a noble band of 
Americans, men and women of whom our nation 
can be proud indeed. 

Nearly a million fighting men and more than 
10,000 civilians have served the United States in 
Viet-Nam since 1954. Many of them have given 
their lives in the service of their coimtry and 
the cause of freedom. Many of them have vol- 
imteered to return to Viet-Nam, some for the 
third and even fourth time. All have accepted 
the hazards of a war in which there are no front 
lines. All have accepted the hardships of being 
far from their own homes and their own fam- 
ilies. These are very special Americans, who 
justly deserve to be remembered by their comi- 
trymen. In their names today we shall dedicate 
this new Embassy of the United States of 

We are honored today with the presence of 
many of Viet-Nam's leading citizens. We are 
grateful to all of you for coming. 

U.S. Scientific Team Visits 
Republic of China 

White House Aimounceinent 

White House press release dated October 5 

The President met on October 5 with his 
Special Assistant for Science and Technology, 
Donald F. Hornig, and the team of experts that 
had accompanied him to Taiwan last month to 
survey scientific and technological assets and 
needs in the Republic of China. The President 
had arranged for the mission during the visit 
of Vice President Yen Chia-kan of the Republic 
of China last May.^ 

The team included : 

James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories, 
Murray Hill, N.J. 

Bruce S. Old, senior vice president, A. D. Little, Inc., 
Cambridge, Mass. 

Albert H. Moseman, associate, the Agricultural Devel- 
opment Council, New York, N.Y. 

Raymond Bowers, professor of jihysics, Cornell Univer- 
sity, Ithaca, N.Y. 

Daniel F. Margolies, a Foreign Service officer presently 
on the staff of the Office of Science and Technology 

Dr. Hornig and the members of his party 
reported to the President that both industry and 
agriculture have been expanding remarkably m 
Taiwan and commented in particular on the 
rapid growth of such teclinologically advanced 
industries as electronics. They noted that the 
Chmese Government has taken steps to create 
a favorable investment climate for foreign 

They found that to sustain this progress 
greater opportunities would have to be afforded 
for the employment in Taiwan of talented Chi- 
nese students now in the United States and in 
Europe and expanded trammg would be re- 
quired in Taiwan for students in engmeering, 
science, economics, and business management. 
They pointed out the need for continued U.S. 
cooperation in developing the capacity in Tai- 
wan to carry out industrial research and to pro- 
vide advanced education. They noted the im- 
portant role plaj'ed by American industry in 
introducing new teclmology, business methods, 
and modern industrial plants. 

They reported that energetic new programs 
are going forward in many areas concerned with 
science and technology but that greater efforts 
were needed if the bright prospects for rapid 
industrial growth along healthy lines in Taiwan 
are to be realized. They stated that the visit of 
the group had been well timed and had strength- 
ened the conviction on the part of the Chinese 
Government that a greater allocation of re- 
sources to higher education, research, and busi- 
ness training would be a sound investment in the 
future of Taiwan. 

They discussed with the President measures 
that might be taken to stimulate further co- 
operative efforts between the two countries in 
this area which might be of mutual benefit in 
achieving our common goals. 

The President said : "I am delighted with the 
cordial reception given Dr. Hornig and his col- 
leagues by the Chinese Government and by the 

' For background, see Bulletin of June 5, 1967, p. 846. 

OCTOBER 3 0, 19 67 


interest shown in their mission. American expe- 
rience in expanding industry should be a vahi- 
able resource to draw upon in strengthening 
science and teclmology as a basis for social and 
economic progress in Taiwan. I look forward to 
new cooperative efforts which will make use of 
American experience in improving higher edu- 
cation, industrial research, and business man- 

The President said that he would give careful 
consideration to the proposals of Dr. Hornig 
and his team. 

Foreign Policy Conference 
To Be Held at Boston 

The Department of State amiounced on Oc- 
tober 6 (press release 221) that Secretary Rusk 
would be the principal speaker at a regional for- 
eign policy conference to be held in Boston on 
November 9. The conference is cosponsored by 
the World Affairs Coimcil of Boston and the 
Department of State. Invitations are being sent 
to civic and commimity leaders, educators, and 
representatives of the news media, in New 

The program features a luncheon address by 
Secretary Rusk. Discussions on various aspects 
of foreign policy will be led by other senior 
State Department officers during the day. All 
sessions will be on the record and will include 
question and answer periods. 

In addition to the Secretary, the following 
senior State Department officers are now sched- 
uled to participate : Anthony M. Solomon, As- 
sistant Secretary for Economic Affaii-s ; Sol M. 
Linowitz, U.S. Ambassador to the Council of 
the Organization of American States ; Robert W. 
Barnett, Deputy Assista,nt Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs; Charlotte Moton 
Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Pub- 
lic Affairs; and Robert S. Smith, Deputy As- 
sistant Administrator (AID) for Africa. 

This is one of a series of regional conferences 
on foreign policy conducted by the Department 
of State at tlie request of and in cooperation 
with local organizations. The series is designed 
to bring together senior State Department offi- 
cers for discussions with community leaders and 
rejiresentatives of the news media. 

Concurrently there will be a foreign policy 
conference for New England youth held at the 

Reading Memorial High School, Reading, 
Mass., under the same sponsorship, at which 
some of the senior State Department officers 
from the adult conference will discuss foreign 
policy with students and their faculty advisers. 


President Names Dr. McHugh to 
International Whaling Commission 

President Jolinson announced on September 
19 (Wliite House press release) his intention to 
appoint J. Laurence McHugh to be U.S. Com- 
missioner on the International Wlialing Com- 
mission. He will succeed Arthur Remington 
Kellogg, who has resigned. Dr. McHugh has 
served as Deputy U.S. Commissioner of the 
International Wlialing Commission since 1961. 

U.S. and Yugoslavia Exchange Notes 
on Cotton Textile Arrangements 

Press release 211 dated September 26 


Notes were exchanged in Belgi'ade Septem- 
ber 26 constituting a new comprehensive bilat- 
eral cotton textile agreement and amending the 
existing agreement between the United States 
and Yugoslavia. The American Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, C. Burke Elbrick, and Rudolf 
Cacinovic, Comiselor of the State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, signed on behalf 
of their respective governments. 

The agreements concluded today amend the 
agreement signed October 5, 1964, as amended,^ 
and provide a new agreement for the period 
following its expiration on December 31, 1967. 
The amendment of the existing agreement pro- 
vides for certain adjustments of import ceilings 
for several textile categories within the aggre- 
gate limit for calendar year 1967, the last year 
of the agreement. The new agreement will be- 



come eflFective on January 1, 1968 and will run 
through December 31, 1970. 

The major features of the new agreement are 
as follows : 

(1) the establishment of an overall ceiling 
of 18,750,000 square yards equivalent for the 
first agreement year; 

(2) the establishment of a group ceiling of 
1,736,438 square yards equivalent for apparel 
for the first agreement year; 

(3) the establishment of specific ceilings for 
5 fabric categories, 5 categories of made-up 
articles, and 6 apparel categories, and ; 

(4) the inclusion of provisions for swing, 
growth, consultation, spacing, exchange of sta- 
tistics, conversion factors, definition of cotton 
textile articles, equity, and carryover. 


New Agreement 

September 26, 1967 
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to recent dis- 
cussions held in Belgrade and Washington between 
representatives of the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Socialist Fed- 
eral Republic of Yugoslavia concerning exports of cotton 
textiles from Yugoslavia to the United States. I con- 
firm, on behalf of my Government, the understanding 
that the present agreement covering this trade, signed 
on October 5, 1964, amended today, and expiring on 
December 31, 1967, will be succeeded by the following 
new agreement : 

1. The term of this agreement shall be from Jan- 
uary 1, 19C8 to December 31, 1970. During the term of 
this agreement, the Government of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia shall limit annual exports of 
cotton textiles from Yugoslavia to the United States 
to aggregate, group and specific limits at the levels 
specified in the following paragraphs. 

2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12- 
month period beginning January 1, 1968, the aggregate 
limit shall be 18,750,000 square yards equivalent. 

3. Within the aggregate limit, the following specific 
limits shall apply : 

Category Level 

9 7.0 million square yards 

18-19 1.0 million square yards 

22 1.6 million square yards 

26 (duck) 2.0 million square yards 

26 (other) 1.5 million square yards 

28-29 0.55 million square yards equiv- 

31 474,150 pieces 

34-35 322,580 pieces 

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5667, 

OCTOBER 30, 1967 

4. Within the aggregate limit, exports of apparel 
(Categories 39-63) shall not exceed 1,736,438 square 
yards equivalent. Within this group limit on apparel 
exports, the following specific limits shall apply : 

Category Level 



500,000 square yards equivalent 
(of which not more than 
405,169 square yards shall be 
in any one of these cate- 

3,416 dozen 

15,384 dozen 

5. Within the aggregate limit, the apparel group 
limit specified in paragraph 4 above may be exceeded 
by 5 percent Within the aggregate limit and, if appli- 
cable, within the apparel group limit established in 
paragraph 4, as it may be adjusted under this provision, 
specific limits may be exceeded by 5 percent. 

6. In the second and succeeding 12-month periods 
for which any limitation is in force under this agree- 
ment, the level of exports permitted under such limi- 
tation shall be increased by 5 percent of the correspond- 
ing level for the preceding 12-month period, the latter 
level not to include any adjustments under paragraphs 
5 or 15. 

7. Within the aggregate limit and, if applicable the 
apparel group limit, the square yard equivalent of any 
shortfalls occurring in exports in the categories given 
specific limits may be used in any category not given 
a specific limit. 

8. In the event Yugoslavia desires to export during 
any agreement year more than the consultation level 
established herein in any category not given a specific 
limit, the Government of the Socialist Federal Re- 
public of Yugoslavia shall request consultations with 
the Government of the United States of America on 
this question. The Government of the United States of 
America shall agree to enter into such consultations 
and during the course thereof, shall provide the Gov- 
ernment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia with information on the condition of the United 
States market in the category in question. Until agree- 
ment is reached, the Government of the Socialist Fed- 
eral Republic of Yugoslavia .shall limit its exports in 
the category in question to the consultation level. Dur- 
ing the first agreement year, the consultation level for 
each apparel category not given a specific limit shall 
be 405,169 square yards equivalent, and for each other 
category not given a specific limit shall be 500,000 
square yards equivalent. 

9. The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia shall use its best efforts to space exports 
from Yugoslavia to the United States within each 
category evenly throughout the agreement year, taking 
into consideration normal seasonal factors. 

10. The two Governments recognize that the suc- 
cessful implementation of this agreement depends in 
large part upon mutual cooperation on statistical ques- 
tions. The Government of the United States of America 
shall promptly supply the Government of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with data on monthly 
imports of cotton textiles from Yugoslavia. The Gov- 
ernment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
shall promptly supply the Government of the United 
States of America with data on monthly exports of 
cotton textiles to the United States. Each Government 


agrees to supply promptly any other available relevant 
statistical data requested by the other Government. 

11. In the implementation of this agreement, the sys- 
tem of categories and the rates of conversion into 
square yard equivalents listed in the Annex hereto ^ 
shall apply. In any situation where the determination of 
an article to be a cotton textile would bo affected by 
whether the criterion provided for in Article 9 of the 
Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International 
Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 
1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Long-Term Ar- 
rangement) is used or the criterion provided for in 
paragraph 2 of Annex E of the Long-Term Arrange- 
ment is used, the chief value criterion used by the 
Government of the United States of America in accord- 
ance with paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply.' 

12. The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia agree to consult on any question arising 
in the implementation of the agreement. In particular, 
in the event that, of a return to normalcy of 
market conditions in the United States, the Govern- 
ment of the United States relaxes measures it has taken 
under the Long-Term Arrangement with respect to 
categories given ceilings herein, consultation may be 
requested by the Government of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to negotiate removal or modi- 
fication of those ceilings. 

1.3. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 
problems arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedure or 

14. If the Government of the Socialist Federal Repub- 
lic of Yugoslavia considers that as a result of limita- 
tions specified in this agreement, Yugoslavia is being 
placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third coun- 
try, the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia may request consultation with the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America with the view to 
taking appropriate remedial action such as a reasonable 
modification of this agreement. 

15. (a) For any agreement year immediately follow- 
ing a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year in which cotton 
textile exports from Yugoslavia to the United States 
were below the aggregate limit and any group and 
specific limits applicable to the category concerned) the 
Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia may permit exports to exceed these limits by 
carryover in the following amounts and manner. 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of 
the shortfall in either the aggregate limit or, if appli- 
cable, the apparel group or any applicable specific 
limit and shall not exceed either 5 percent of the 
aggregate limit or, if applicable, 5 percent of the 
apparel group limit in the year of the shortfall, and 

(ii) In the case of shortfalls in the categories sub- 
ject to specific limits the carryover shall not exceed 5 

"Not printed here; for text, see Department of State 
press release 211 dated September 26. 

' For text of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange- 
ment, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 


percent of the specific limit in the year of the shortfall, 
and shall be used in the same category in which the 
shortfall occurred, and 

(iii) In the case of shortfalls not attributable to 
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall 
be used in the apparel group if the shortfall occurred 
therein, shall not be used to exceed any applicable 
specific limit except in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraph 5, and shall be subject to the provisions 
of paragraph 7 of the agreement. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph are without any adjustments under this 
paragraph or paragraph 5. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports 
permitted in paragraph 5. 

16. During the term of this agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America will not request 
restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Yugo- 
slavia to the United States under the procedures of Ar- 
ticles 3 and 6(c) of the Long-Term Arrangement. 

17. The Government of the United States of America 
may assist the Government of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in implementing the provisions 
of this agreement by controlling imports of cotton 

18. Either Government may terminate this agreement 
effective at the end of an agreement year, by written 
notice to the other Government to be given at least 90 
days prior to the end of such agreement year. Either 
Government may at any time propose revisions in the 
terms of the agreement and the Government receiving 
such a request will reply to the proposal within 60 days. 

If the foregoing conforms with the understanding 
of your Government, this note and your Excellency's 
note ' confirming that understanding on behalf of the 
Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia shall constitute an agreement between our 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

C. Burke Elbeick 

His Excellency 

Marko Nikezic, 

Secrefarp of State for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

Amendment to 1964 Agreement 

September 26, 1967 
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the discus- 
sions between representatives of our two Governments 
concerning exports of cotton textiles from Yugoslavia 
to the United States and to the Cotton Textile Agree- 
ment between our two Governments effected by an 
exchange of notes dated October 5, 1964. 

In view of discussions, I am pleased to inform 
you that the Government of the United States of 
America agrees that, during calendar year 1967 only 
and notwithstanding the limits establi.shed by para- 
graphs 2, 6, and 7 of the Agreement, exports of cotton 
textiles from Yugoslavia to the United States may 


amount to 1,703,998 square yards in Category 22, 771,750 
square yards equivalent in Categories 28 and 29 com- 
bined, and 2,106,000 square yards equivalent in Cate- 
gory 34, provided tliat the aggregate limit applicable 
to calendar year 1967 is not exceeded. 

I further propose that the agreement be modified 
effective for calendar year 1967 by addition of the 
following paragraph : 

"14. Slutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 
problems arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedure or 

If this proposal is acceptable to your Government, 
this note and your Excellency's reply ' accepting these 
proposals on behalf of the Government of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall constitute an 
amendment to the 1964 Cotton TextUe Agreement 
between our Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

C. BuEKE Elbrigk 

His Excellency 

Marko Nikezic, 

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

Route Schedule to U.S.-Mexican 
Air Transport Agreement Amended! 

The Depcartment of State announced on Sep- 
tember 20 (press release 204) that the American 
Ambassador to Mexico, Fulton Freeman, and 
the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
Antonio Carrillo Flores, concluded an exchange 
of diplomatic notes in Mexico City on Sep- 
tember 19 amending tlie Eoute Schedule to the 
Air Transport Services Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Goverimient of the United Mexican 

The substantive portion of the exchange of 
notes is as follows : 

Paragraph 1 will be revised to include the following 
additional routes for the United States : 

"M. Phoenix, Tucson-Puerto Vallarta via Guaymas, 
La Paz, Mazatlan. 

"N. Albuquerque-Puerto Vallarta via Guaymas, La 
La Paz, Mazatlan. 

Paragraph 2 will be revised to include the following 
additional routes for Mexico : 

"K. Puerto Vallarta, Mazatlan, La Paz, Guaymas- 
Phoenix via Tucson. 

"L. Puerto Vallarta. Mazatlan, La Paz, Guaymas- 

Paragraph 3 will be amended to read, in its entirety, 
"Points on any of the specified routes may, at the op- 
tion of the designated airlines, be omitted on any or 
all flights with the exception of the following: a) on 
United States Route J, the designated airline is re- 
quired to make an intermediate stop at Merida ; b) on 
United States Routes M and N, the designated air- 
lines are required to make intermediate stops in the 
proper order at Guaymas, La Paz, and Mazatlan, on 
all flights with the exception of the following: a) on 
K the designated airline is required to make an inter- 
mediate stop at Tucson on all flights in both 

Current Actions 

' Not printed here. 

'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5897. 


Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination. Adopted by the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly December 21, 1965.^ 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 2, 1967. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 

force August 20. 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Accession deposited: Kenya, October 11, 1967. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Signature: East African External Telecommunica- 
tion Co., Ltd., for Kenya, October 11, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig- 
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 
27, 1967. 

Ratifications deposited: Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Japan, October 10, 1967 ; Korea, October 13, 1967 ; 
Sweden, October 11, 1967 ; Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, 
October 10, 1967. 
Entered into force: October 10, 1967. 


Protocol of Rectification to the French Text of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 
1956. TIAS 3677. 

' Not in force. 

OCTOBER 30, 196T 


Acquisition of rights and obligations previously ex- 
tended by the United Kingdotn: Barbados, Novem- 
ber 30, 1966. 


Amendments to paragraphs 6 ( 3 ) , 6(4), 8(a), 9(a), and 
9(b) to the schedule to the international whaling 
convention, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at London 
June 30, 1967. Entered into force October 6, 1967. 


1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1, 
1967, inclusive. Entered into force July 16, 1967. 
TIAS 6315. 
Acceptance deposited: Pern, October 5, 1967. 



Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed 
at Djakarta September 15, 1967. Entered into force 
September 15, 1967. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington September 29, 
1967. Entered into force September 29, 1967. 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed 
at Mbabane September 29, 1967. Entered into force 
September 29, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, sup- 
plementary to the agreement of March 13, 1967, as 
amended (TIAS 6271, 6.319), under Title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as amended; 
7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D). Signed at Saigon Septem- 
ber 21, 1967. Entered into force September 21, 1967. 


Recent Releases 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, and 
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, 
a list of principal government oiEcials and U.S. diplo- 
matic and consular officers, and, in .some cases, a se- 
lected bibliography. Those listed below are available at 
50 each, unless otherwise indicated. 

Angola. Pub. 7962. 5 pp. 

Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville). Pub. 7896. 4 pp. 

Costa Rica. Pub. 7768. 4 pp. 

Finland. Pub. 8262. 7 pp. 

Germany, Federal Republic of. Pub. 7S34. 8 pp. 

Iceland. Pub. 8227. 4 pp. 

Italy. Pub. 7861. 7 pp. 

Japan. Pub. 7770. 12 pp. 10«J. 

Liberia. Pub. 7991. 4 pp. 

Mozambique. Pub. 7965. 5 pp. 

Netherlands Antilles. Pub. 8223. 4 pp. 

Niger. Pub. 8293. 4 pp. 

Nigeria. Pub. 7953. 4 pp. 

Portuguese Guinea. Pub. 7966. 4 pp. 

Rwanda. Pub. 7916. 4 pp. 

Senegal. Pub. 7820. 5 pp. 

Surinam. Pub. 8268. 3 pp. 

U.S.S.R. Pub. 7.S42. 13 pp. IQi. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Afghanistan — Signed at Kabul De- 
cember 22, 1966. Entered into force December 22, 1966. 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 6161. 6 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Ecuador, amending the agreement of 
June 25, 196-5. Exchange of notes — Signed at Quito Oc- 
tober 24, 1966. Entered into force October 24, 1966. 
TIAS 6168. 4 pp. 5«f. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Rabat April 21, 1966. Entered into force April 21, 
1966. With related notes. TIAS 6172. 13 pp. 10<}. 



NDEX OctoUr 30, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. lJf.79 


New Opportunities in Asia (Gaud) 579 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Octo- 
ber 12 555 

Aviation. Route Schedule to U.S.-Mexican Air 

Transport Agreement Amended 589 

China. U.S. Scientific Team Visits Republic of 
China 585 

Economic Affairs 

Completing the Work of the Kennedy Round 

(Roth) 574 

Malaysian Finance Minister Calls on President 

Johnson 578 

New Opportunities in Asia (Gaud) 579 

President Johnson ReaflSrms Support for Free 

Flow of Trade (Johnson) 573 

President Names Dr. McHugh to International 

Whaling Commission 586 

U.S. Scientific Team Visits Republic of China . 585 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Education : 
The Revolution Which Never Stops (John- 
son) 569 


General Ankrah of Ghana Visits the United 

States (Ankrah, Johnson) 571 

Letters of Credence (Debrah) 578 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

President Names Dr. McHugh to International 
Whaling Commission 586 

Lesotho. Prime Minister of Lesotho Visits the 
United States 568 

Malaysia. Malaysian Finance Minister Calls on 

President Johnson 578 

Mexico. Route Schedule to US.-Mexican Air 

Transport Agreement Amended 589 

Near East. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 

of October 12 555 

Population. New Opportunities in Asia (Gaud) . 579 

Presidential Documents 

Education : The Revolution Which Never Stops . 569 
General Ankrah of Ghana Visits the United 

States 571 

President Johnson Expresses Sorrow at Death 

of Lord Attlee 568 

President Johnson ReaflSrms Support for Free 

Flow of Trade 573 

U.S. Scientific Team Visits Republic of China . 585 
White House Ceremony Marks Entry Into Force 

of Outer Space Treaty 565 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To 
Be Held at Boston 586 

Publications. Recent Releases 590 

Science. U.S. Scientific Team Visits Republic 
of China 585 


Completing the Work of the Kennedy Round 

(Roth) 574 

President Johnson Reaffirms Support for Free 
Flow of Trade (Johnson) 573 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 589 

Route Schedule to U.S.-Mexican Air Transxwrt 

Agreement Amended 589 

U.S. and Yugoslavia Exchange Notes on Cotton 

Textile Arrangements (texts of U.S. notes) . 586 

White House Ceremony Marks Entry Into Force 
of Outer Space Treaty (Johnson, Dean, Do- 
brynin, Rusk) 565 

U.S.S.R. White House Ceremony Marks Entry 
Into Force of Outer Space Treaty (Johnson, 
Dean, Dobrynin, Rusk) 565 

United Kingdom 

President Johnson Expresses Sorrow at Death 

of Lord Attlee (Johnson) 568 

White House Ceremony Marks Entry Into Force 
of Outer Space Treaty (Johnson, Dean, Do- 
brynin, Rusk) 565 


Ambassador Bunker Dedicates New U.S. Em- 
bassy at Saigon (Bunker) 584 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Octo- 
ber 12 555 

Yugoslavia. U.S. and Yugoslavia Exchange Notes 
on Cotton Textile Arrangements (texts of U.S. 
notes) 586 

Name Index 

Ankrah, Lt. Gen. Joseph A 571 

Bunker, Ellsworth 584 

Dean, Sir Patrick 565 

Debrah, Ebenezer Moses 578 

Dobrynin, Anatoliy 565 

Gaud, William S 579 

Johnson, President 505, 568, 

569, 571, 573, 585 

Jonathan, Leabua 568 

McHugh, J. Laurence 586 

Roth, William M 574 

Rusk, Secretary 555, 565 

Check Lisf of Deparfment of State 
Press Releases: October 9-15 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to October 9 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 204 
of September 20, 211 of September 26, 214 of 
September 29, and 221 of October 6. 

No. Date Subject 

'-224 10/9 Korry sworn in as Ambassador to 
Chile (biographic details). 

*226 10/11 Program for visit of Prime Min- 
ister Hugh Lawson Shearer of 
227 10/12 Rusk : news conference. 

*22S 10/12 Passport Ofiice moves to new loca- 

t229 10/13 U.S. and Republic of China sign 
agreements on cotton textiles. 

t230 10/13 U.S. and Spain sign new cotton 
textile agreement. 

*231 10/13 Program for visit of Prime Minis- 
ter Lee Kuan Yew of the Repub- 
lic of Singapore. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 











hy Amhassador Sol M. Linowitz 616 


hy Under Secretary Rostow 605 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1480 Publication 8312 
November 6, 1967 

Tor sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovemment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed In 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the pubUc and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam 
in Interview for Foreign Television 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
lolth Secretary Rush videotaped at VSIA stu- 
dios in Washington Octoier 16 and later broad- 
cast ahroad. 

Press release 241 dated October 21 

Mr. Nieinoenhuis: Mr. Secretary, we are very 
honored to have you in the studio with us today 
to discuss the Viet-Nam issue. If I may, I would 
like to introduce my four colleagues. 

Secretary Busk : Thank you very much. 

Mr. Nieutoenhuls: Mr. Gerd Ruge, the Wash- 
ington correspondent of West German tele- 
vision; jNIr. Girolamo Modesti, Washington 
correspondent for La Nazione of Florence and 
II Resto del Carlino of Bologna, Italy; Mr. 
Peter Barnett, Washington correspondent for 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission ; and 
Mr. Adalbert de Segonzac, North American 
Bureau chief of France-Soir of Paris. My name 
is Willebrord Nieuwenhuis ; I am the American 
correspondent of KRO-TV in the Netherlands. 

Now, sir, if I may, I would like to address 
to you my first question. Wliy is it wliile so 
many allies like Denmark, Norway, the Par- 
liament of the Netherlands, and France, and 
major Asian countries like India, Indonesia, 
and Pakistan, are asking you to stop the bomb- 
ing, why can the bombing of North Viet-Nam 
not be stopped today? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, first, let me say, Mr. 
Nieuwenhuis, and gentlemen, I'm very glad to 
be with you on this discussion. 

Let mo point out that for us the bombing 
of North Viet-Nam is a part of a serious mili- 
tary engagement. It is not a part of a game of 
chess. We have men committed in the field who 
are engaged in a fight. Now, I can assure you 
that if 20 regiments of hostile forces were oper- 
ating in Venezia Giulia, or in Denmark, or in 
Bavaria or in Sussex or in Lorraine, that we 
would be bombing somebody. And I think with 
the full cooperation of our friends in Europe. 

Now, we have said on many occasions that 

we can stop the bombing as a step toward peace. 
President Johnson very recently has said that 
we can stojD the bombing if it would lead to 
prompt and constructive discussions with 
Hanoi, and he stated the assumption that of 
course neither side would take advantage of this 
cessation of the bombing.^ 

One of the problems is that Hanoi rejects the 
idea of a suspension of the bombing, or what 
is called a pause. They call that an ultimatum. 
They exi^ect us to make a commitment to a per- 
manent and unconditional cessation of the 
bombing without any indications from their 
side as to what they would do. And so we must 
give serious thought to serious matters; and 
for us this is a serious matter. 

I have frequently pointed out that if we were 
to say that we would negotiate only if North 
Viet-Nam stopped all of its violence in the 
South while we continued to bomb North Viet- 
Nam, everyone would say that we are crazy. We 
find it a little hard to understand why, when 
Hanoi makes exactly the same proposal in the 
other direction, there are many who say that's 
a reasonable proposal; we should accept it. 

But, finally, let me say that we have not been 
able to find anyone in the world who can tell us 
what would happen if we stopped the bombing. 
Hanoi will not tell us — and we're in touch with 
them — and no one else can tell us. So we are in- 
terested in a peaceful settlement just as soon as 
a peaceful settlement is i^ossible. But we need to 
know what would happen if we are asked to take 
a major step such as a permanent and uncondi- 
tional stoppage of the bombing. And no one is 
able to tell us. 

Mr. Ruge: But, Mr. Secretary, if you did not 
stop the bombing pei-manently and uncondi- 
tionally, but for a fairly long interval m which 
timed possibilities for negotiations could be 
checkecl up and in view of the fact that the 

'For President Johnson's address at San Antonio, 
Tex., on Sept. 29, see Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1967, p. 519. 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


bombing must hurt the North but does not seem 
to have stopped infiltration very effectively, 
isn't there a point in having this pause? Isn't 
it worthwhile to have it and see whether any- 
thing could come out of it? 

Secretary Rush: Well, I want to point out 
that when you speak of a pause, immediately 
you're not in business with Hanoi, because 
Hanoi rejects that as an ultimatum. Now, it 
has been suggested that we ought to stop the 
bombing, without saying anytliing at all about 
whether it was permanent or temporary. The 
difficulty with that is that Hanoi would ask us 
immediately, "Is this permanent or is it tempo- 
rary?" and unless we say it is permanent, they 
will say, "Then, it's an ultimatum." 

Further than that, you and several hundred 
colleagues here in Washington would ask this 
as the first question if we stopped the bombing: 
"Is it permanent or is it temporary?" Now, we 
can't avoid that question. And as soon as we 
refuse to say tliat it is permanent, then Hanoi 
will say it is an ultimatum. So this is not simfjle. 

Mr. Modesti: Mr. Secretary, you made just 
a reference to Venezia Giulia. And I notice that 
in San Antonio, President Johnson spoke about 
the danger of Communist expansionism in 
global terms. But in your last press conference,- 
whicli I attended, you seemed to point your 
finger toward a Chinese Communist expansion- 
ism. Now, since we know that Hanoi is getting 
the least part of its military aid from Peking 
and is getting the larger part from Moscow, 
can you assess the position, the role of Moscow, 
in this war? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I believe that the 
Soviet Union is supporting Hanoi, at least with 
respect to any action which we ourselves are 
taking against North Viet-Nam. I think this 
is, perhaps, not so clear about what is happening 
in South Viet-Nam. 

But in my press conference I pointed the 
finger at what I called Asian communism be- 
cause the doctrine of communism as announced 
and declared in Peking has a special quality 
of militancy, a militancy which has largely 
isolated Peking within the Communist world, 
quite apart from the problems it has created 
with many other countries. So, I would suppose 
that if Asian communism, that is Hanoi-Peking, 
were prepared to move this Viet-Nam problem 
toward a peaceful settlement it could in fact 

^ For Secretary Rusk's news conference of Oct. 12, see 
ma., Oct. 30, 1967, p. 555. 

move toward a peaceful settlement very quickly. 
The Soviet Union is one of the two cochairmen 
of the Geneva machinery. We have not seen 
them willing to join with Britain to convene 
a Geneva conference. But my guess is that if 
Hanoi were willing to come to a Geneva con- 
ference that Moscow would probably say then 
we might have one. 

Mr. Bamett: Mr. Secretary, since your last 
press conference, some of your critics have 
accused you of using the threat of "yellow peril" 
to justify the allied forces' presence in South 
Viet-Nam. And, related to that also is the fact 
that many people have seen what they consider 
a shade different emphasis in your approach to 
this, that at one time American forces were there 
to justify the self-determination of South Viet- 
Nam, and now you're talking more in terms of 
giving strength to the non-Communist nations 
in Asia as a defense against Peking. Could you 
clarify this? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes. In the first place, I put 
out a statement [on October 16] in which I 
rejected categorically any effort to put into my 
mouth the concept of "the yellow peril," which 
was a racial concept of 60 or 70 years ago 
fostered by extreme journalism of those days. 
This is not in my mind. 

I pointed out that other Asian nations, rang- 
ing from Korea and Japan on the one side 
aroimd to the subcontinent of India on the other, 
are concerned about their own safety over 
against the things which are being said and 
done in Peking and by Peking. These free na- 
tions of Asia also are of Asian races. So that to 
me, this has nothing whatever to do with the 
sense of "yellow peril" that was built upon a 
racial fear and hostility 60 or 70 years ago in 
which the hordes of Asia wei'e going to overrun 
the white race as a racial matter. 

Now, as far as the difference in emphasis is 
concerned, one of our problems is that people 
tend to listen to what we say on only one point 
at a time. We have spoken about our treaty com- 
mitments to Viet-Nam. We've talked about our 
interest in organizing a peace in the Pacific, be- 
cause of our other alliances in the Pacific as with 
Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the 
Philippines, the SEATO Treaty, and our 
ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New 

So we have a great stake in the integrity of 
the alliances which we have in the Pacific Ocean 

Now, we have also talked about our own 



national interest, our own security interests in 
Southeast Asia, and in these alliances. Now, we 
haven't shifted from one to the other; we speak 
about all of these things and have for 6 or 7 
years. At times people seem to tliink we em- 
phasize one, some the other. I think this is more 
based u^Don the way people listen, rather than 
the way in which we state these underlying 
elements in our policy. 

No Response From Hanoi 

Mr. De Segonzac : Mr. Secretary, the domino 
theory seems to have worked in your favor. 
Indonesia has become neutral when it was nearly 
falling into conununism. Thailand seems to be 
very solid. Saigon seems to be developing quite 
a new strength. Don't you think that in that 
frame of situation that the moment may have 
come for the United States, also taking into 
consideration the fact that it is the most power- 
ful country in the world, to make some gesture, 
if not stopping the bombing, slowing up the 
fighting in some way or another, to indicate its 
good will? 

Secretary Rusk: We would be very glad to 
take any step in that direction. We have stopped 
the bombing for various periods of at least five 
occasions without any response from Hanoi. We 
have proposed to Hanoi that we demilitarize the 
demilitarized zone between North and South 
Viet-Nam and let the International Control 
Commission put observers in there and 
guarantee its demilitarization. 

We've agreed with Prince Sihanouk's request 
that there be a consultation among the Geneva 
agreement powers to reinforce the neutrality of 
Cambodia and to assist him in keeping out of 
this conflict. We have said to Hanoi, "If you will 
put on the table the schedule of the withdrawal 
of North Vietnamese forces we will put on the 
table a schedule of withdrawal of United States 

We have taken other steps from time to time, 
such as suspending the bombing in certain areas 
for certain periods of time to see whether or 
not there could be any response. 

The problem here is that we can't find any 
formula or any action on the ground that seems 
to elicit any response from Hanoi. And that 
seems to be still our problem. 

Mr. De Segonzac: But by injecting the Chi- 
nese question in the whole affair of Viet-Nam 
as you have in your last press conference, aren't 
you making it more difficult to come to some 

form of solution, because you're giving the im- 
pression now that the whole question of Viet- 
Nam is not so much to help a small power, as 
was explained previously, to come to its self- 
decisions, but now you're putting it as a prob- 
lem of China and the dangers of China in the 
Far East? 

Secretary Rush: Well, this is not something 
that is an opinion solely of my own. There are 
many countries in Asia who are concerned about 
Peking and their attitude. I have no doubt that 
if Peking were strongly to support the recon- 
vening of a Geneva conference that there might 
well be a Geneva conference, for example. At 
the present time, they bitterly oppose such a 

This is a question that affects many countries. 
There are more than 20 regiments of North 
Vietnamese in South Viet-Nam. There are North 
Vietnamese regiments in Laos, opposed there 
by Laotian forces. There are North Vietnamese- 
trained guerrillas now operating in the north- 
east of Thailand. We hear reports of Chinese 
assistance going to the guerrillas in Burma. The 
Indonesians charge that the Chinese were 
deeply involved in that attempted coup d'etat in 
1965. We know the shooting that occurred re- 
cently along the Sikkim border between Indian 
and Chinese forces. 

So that these are — and we also have heard 
from Prince Sihanouk in the last 2 or 3 weeks 
that he himself is not very happy about what 
he thinks the Chinese are doing in Cambodia. 
The Chinese are even quarreling with Switzer- 
land. They reach out to places like Kenya and 
Ceylon and other places. 

It's not just their difficulties with the Soviet 
Union, India, the United States, United King- 
dom. They find it difficult to get along with 
almost anyone, except their great and good 
friend Albania. 

So I don't tliink that we can pretend that the 
policies of China and some of the actions being 
taken by China are a contribution toward peace 
in Asia. At least our Asian friends don't think 

Mr. Nieuwenhuis: And yet, Mr. Secretary, 
countries like India and Indonesia are asking 
for a stop of the bombing and are not support- 
ing the United States in Viet-Nam. 

Secretary Rush: Well, I think that they 
would have some very serious misgivings if we 
were to withdraw from Viet-Nam. Now, we, of 
course, asked them, as we do everyone else, 
whether they have any direct information from 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


Hanoi about what would happen if we stopped 
the bombing, and their reply is that they do not 
have specific and direct information from Hanoi 
on such a point. We're interested m hearing 
from anybody on the subject of what would 
happen if we stopped the bombing. And thus far 
we have not Iieard from any bod}' on that subject. 

Many people express a wish and a hope and 
an impression and a confidence or say, "In any 
event, you should take the risk." But when we 
stop the bombing in the terms in which Hanoi is 
demanding that we stop the bombing, we have 
to say to our marines in the northern part of 
South Viet-Nam, "Now, men, wait until those 
fellows are within 2 miles of you before you 
strike them. Don't strike them when they are 7 
miles away ; that is across the I7th parallel, that 
would not be permitted." 

Now, we need to know what will happen. As 
I've said over and over again, we can stoj) the 
bombing if it is in fact a step toward peace, and 
if someone can tell us that it is a step toward 
peace, we'll give it very serious consideration. 

U.S. System of Alliances 

Mr. Ruge : Mr. Secretary, if the aim of U.S. 
policy is now mainly containment of China, how 
do you envision the future of Asia ? Do you ex- 
pect to have all the other Asian countries armed 
to the point where they're strong enough to 
resist China, or is that a permanent role for the 
United States in the Pacific as the gendarmes 
for a couple of billions? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I myself have not used 
that term "containment of China." It is true 
that at the present time we have an alliance 
with Korea, Japan, the Republic of China on 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, 
and New Zealand. Now, does that system of alli- 
ances add up to containment ? That is something 
one can judge. 

Would the determination of India not to per- 
mit Chinese intrusions across its long frontier 
be containment? That is to judge. My guess is 
that none of the comitries of free Asia want to 
see themselves overrun by mainland China, and 
in the case of some of those countries we have 
an alliance. Now, we have not ourselves under- 
taken to be the world's i:)oliceman, for all pur- 
poses, all around the globe. But we do have some 
alliances and those alliances are very serious to 
us and unless we take them seriously, my guess 
is that some very serious dangers will erupt not 
only in Asia but in other places. 

For example, in the case of NATO, despite 

the fact that we have 500,000 men actively en- 
gaged today in Southeast Asia we have main- 
tained our NATO forces. And we have done 
that because in the judgment of NATO it is 
important that those NATO forces be sustained 
in order not to create misunderstandings or 
miscalculations further east in Europe. 

So we take our full share in NATO as well. 

Mr. Modesti: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to get 
back to my first question and your answer, 
which has been very interesting. You said that 
if Hanoi would like to get peace negotiations 
Soviet Russia will support the stand of Hanoi. 
But how can Hanoi get to the peace table while 
Russia is continuing giving Hanoi all the mili- 
tary aid it is giving to it? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, I think that I perhaps 
would not quite agree that the bulk of the as- 
sistance going to Hanoi is coming from Moscow. 
In terms of the weapons that we see, the bulk 
of the arms which are used in South Viet-Nam, 
the small anns, the ammunition, the mortars, 
things of that sort, are of Chinese origin. And 
that most of the daily supplies come across from 
China. The more sophisticated weapons, the sur- 
face-to-air missiles, certain MIG aircraft, cer- 
tain rockets, seem to come from the Soviet 

But in terms of the struggle that is going on 
in South Viet-Nam, the overwhelming quantity 
of the supply comes from China. The weapons 
that they use in North Viet-Nam, primarily 
against our aircraft, do come from the Soviet 

Now, when I made my remark about what 
Moscow might do, this was speculation on my 
part, that if Hanoi were to express agreement 
about a Geneva conference that the two cochair- 
men — this would mean Britain and the Soviet 
Union — would probably agree to call one. But 
that is speculation. I have no direct word from 
Moscow on that subject. 

Mr. De Segonzac: Coming back to the point 
of containment or not containment, the name 
doesn't matter very much, you made the point 
that in fact you have alliances all along from 
Korea practically all the way down to Viet- 
Nam, Viet-Nam not being included. Senator 
[Everett McKinley] Dirksen the other day 
made the point that American security, national 
security, needed a defense line which included 
North Viet-Nam. Does that mean that in the 
context of your new views on China, or the 
newly expressed views on China, that now North 
Viet-Nam should be included in your line of 



defense and that therefore the possibility of 
America pulling its troops out if there's an 
agi'eement is in question? 

Secretary Rusk: Back in 1964, in August 
196-4, our Congress with only two dissenting 
votes, declared that it was in the vital interest 
of the United States and of world peace that 
there be peace in Southeast Asia. Ten years 
earlier the Senate had approved our SEATO 
Treaty with only one dissenting vote in the 

Now, the basis for these alliances that we 
made in the Pacific was that the security of those 
areas was vital to the security of the United 
States. We did not go into these alliances as a 
matter of altruism, to do someone else a favor. 
We went into them because we felt that the 
security of Australia and the United States, 
New Zealand and the United States, was so 
interlinked that we and they ought to have an 
alliance with each other, and similarly with 
the other alliances we have in the Pacific, as 
with the alliance in NATO. So that these 
alliances themselves rest upon a sense of the 
national security interests of the United States 
and not just on a fellow feeling for friends in 
some other part of the world. 

Mr. Barnett: Mr. Secretary, within the 
United States over the past few weeks there's 
been mounting criticism about the Asian allies, 
that they're not pulling their weight in Viet- 
Nam. I wonder, if, to be specific, sir, what you 
considered the Australian contribution to be at 
the moment and also whether you expected and 
wanted more from Australia? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, as far as Australia is 
concerned, their contribution in Viet-Nam, 
which now is several thousand men, is a very 
valuable one. It's considerably larger than the 
Australian contribution in Korea, for example, 
and it reflects the keen interest of Australia in 
the security of Southeast Asia. The Southeast 
Asia treaty provides that, under certain circum- 
stances, each party shall act to meet the common 
danger. It is for each government to make that 
decision for itself. 

I would suppose that the question of the level 
of its troops in Viet-Nam is a matter that the 
Australian Government does consider and that 
any action it takes on that will be an- 
nounced by that Government, so I wouldn't 
want to speculate on that. 

I can say that the Australian forces there are 
doing a supei'b job and tliat we would welcome 
any Aussies alongside of us in that struggle. 

Mr. Nieuwenhuis : Mr. Secretary, why is it 
that you say that the Viet-Nam war is basic to 
tlie security of the West? Wliy is it that only a 
few NATO countries are agreeing with you ? 

Secretai-y Rusk: Well, I think I emphasized 
that it was a vital national security interest of 
the United States. That was the basis in which 
we entered the SEATO treaty. It is not true 
that most of the NATO countries are signatories 
to that treaty. But what I said was that, on one 
particular point, NATO countries do have an 
interest in the fidelity of the United States in a 
mutual security arrangement. I think I indi- 
cated that we cannot be loyal to our alliances in 
the Atlantic and unfaithful to our alliances in 
the Pacific. This is impossible for us. We can't 
draw that distinction. 

Mr. NievAJoenkms: Can the other NATO 

Secretary Rusk: Well, that's for them to de- 
cide; that's for them to decide. Most of the 
NATO allies are not members of any alliance 
involving Southeast Asia and have undertaken 
no obligations or commitments there. So that 
they're in a somewhat different situation than 
are we. 

U.S. Prepared To Negotiate 

Mr. Ruge : Mr. Secretary, the American posi- 
tion on the bombing seems to be that North 
Viet-Nam would have, as a counter matter, to 
stop infiltration into South Viet-Nam. Wliile 
the North Vietnamese obviously feel that if they 
do that because you stop the bombing, they sac- 
rifice their troops and their political friends. 
These positions seem to be unreconcilable to me. 
Do you think there's any chance to get negotia- 
tions, any kmd of possibility for that ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I can see why these 
positions seem irreconcilable. That's why they're 
shooting. So long as Nortli Viet-Nam seems de- 
termined to seize South Viet-Nam by force there 
will be shooting. This is the point which camaot 
be accepted by those of us who have forces in 
South Viet-Nam. Now, if there ever comes a 
time when Hanoi is prepared to say or to think 
that it will stop trying to seize South Viet-Nam 
by force, peace can come very quickly. 

But, again, we have not insisted upon par- 
ticular details publicly on this matter. President 
Johnson said very recently that we assume that 
if tliere's a stop in the bombing and there are 
prompt and constructive talks that neither side 
would take advantage of that situation. I think 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


Hanoi knows approximately what that means. 
If they do not, this is a matter that we and they 
can discuss. We're prepared to discuss any of 
these problems. 

We can talk today with Hanoi without any 
conditions whatever. Now they've raised a very 
important condition, a permanent and uncon- 
ditional cessation of the bombing. So we've said, 
"All right. We'll sit down with you and talk 
about conditions. Let's have some preliminary 
talks about the conditions which would make 
negotiations possible." But they won't do that. 

We're prepared to talk without conditions, 
which they won't do. We're prepared to talk 
about conditions, which tliey have refused to do. 

So we still have a problem on our hands. 

Relations With Eastern Europe 

Mr. Modest L- Talking about NATO, Mr. Sec- 
retary, and the situation in Asia, now it is very 
fashionable these days to say that the cold war 
came to an end and there is detente between 
East and West. Do you agree, first, on the fact 
that the cold war came to an end ; and, two, is it 
safe to assume that the Viet-Nam war is just 
an act of this cold war going on ? 

Secretary Bu-'tk: Well, this question of the 
present status of the cold war or of detente is a 
question which is now under review in NATO, 
in some studies which were initiated by Foreign 
Minister [Pierre] Harmel of Belgium. I do not 
myself believe that we should exaggerate pre- 
maturely the idea of detente. There are formid- 
able forces of Eastern Europe deployed today 
in East Germany. There are hundreds upon 
hundreds of rockets m the Soviet Union tar- 
geted upon Western Europe. 

We have a major unresolved problem in Cen- 
tral Europe in the continued division of Ger- 
many and Berlin. Now, we have been glad to 
see that there's been some easing of tension, that 
NATO countries have increased their contacts 
with and their cooperation with various coun- 
tries in Eastern Eui-ope, including the Soviet 
Union. We ourselves have tried to contribute to 
that. We have concluded a consular agreement 
with the Soviet Union. We think the space 
treaty, nonproliferation treaty are part of this 
general discussion. We proposed to our Congress 
that they permit us to negotiate certain trade 
agreements with Eastern Europe. That legisla- 
tion has not been enacted as yet. 

We've increased tourism to Eastern Europe. 
We've been following along in tlie wake, in the 

trail, of a good many countries in Western Eu- 
rope in these efforts. We've noticed the new 
moves by the Federal Kepublic of Germany to 
improve its relations with Eastern Europe. 
These are all constructive developments, but I 
think it would be premature for us to suppose 
that what is called the cold war is finished, be- 
cause basically the cold war reflects a contest 
between two quite different notions about the 
international community. 

Most states are committed to the kind of 
world order that is reflected in the Charter of 
the United Nations. But I think the Communist 
countries by doctrine, even though they vary in 
tactics, the Conmiunist countries are committed 
to a world revolution which would substitute 
something else for that United Nations kind of 

Now, fortunately in some parts of the Com- 
munist world, and in the West, there is at the 
present time a measure of prudence, but we're 
only 4 or 5 years away from some very severe 
crises between the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the countries of NATO. So I think we need 
to work at it, work toward detente, but not con- 
clude prematurely that the problems have all 

Mr. Bamett: Mr. Secretary, at your last press 
conference you mentioned the American impa- 
tience about the Viet-Nam war. Well, President 
Ho Chi Minh has said that the war is going to 
be won by the pressures from the home front 
within the United States, and I see where Gen. 
Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister of 
North Viet-Nam] said the other day that Amer- 
ican morale was as low as the grass. Does this 
American impatience mean the same thing as a 
lackof will to win? 

Secretary/ Rush : No, I think not. I said in my 
press conference the other day that I know of no 
significant opinion in this country supporting a 
withdrawal and an abandonment of Viet-Nam 
and of Southeast Asia. 

Many of the debates in this country turn on 
such things as : Do you pause in the bombing ; if 
so, for how long; what kind of proposal do you 
make to Hanoi; should you send your troops 
here rather than there; should you fire on this 
place rather than the other — basically, what I 
call matters of detail, even though we debate 
them very fiercely. I would think that Gen. Giap 
and Ho Chi Minh would make a very great mis- 
take if they would suppose that the United 
States is going to abandon South Viet-Nam. 
This will not occur. 



Mr. Be Segonzac : Mi\ Secretary, coming back 
to the European point, NATO is limited, as you 
know, of course, to European problems, but the 
world has become so small that now whatever 
happens in the Far East is of great importance 
to the European countries also. You're giving to 
a certain extent a new dimension to the war in 
Viet-Nam by adding the Chinese problem. It 
makes it therefore more dangerous still in the 
possibility of this war becoming wider, extend- 
ing to China, eventually to Russia, and there- 
fore to the European powers and NATO allies, 
is getting greater. What say do you think at 
this stage — as it's getting better — the European 
powers should have in this war? Shouldn't they 
have some say, some participation, some way of 
expressing their views of something which can 
drag them into very serious danger? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, first, let me say that 
my remarks in the press conference the other 
day did not themselves draw China into this sit- 
uation. China has been sending support, both 
political and practical, to Hanoi all through this 
affair and has been a major obstacle toward the 
convening of conferences or the use of diplo- 
matic machinery to bring it to a peaceful settle- 
ment ; so that China has nominated itself to be 
active and to take an important part in this 

Now, as far as the NATO countries are con- 
cerned, of course we are ready and glad to hear 
their views on this matter, but I would suppose 
this is not something that would be taken up in 
NATO as a NATO matter. That would require 
NATO to accept a responsibility in the matter, 
and I do not believe NATO is inclined to do 

Mr. Ruge: Mr. Secretary, do you have any 
hope that the Viet-Nam war will end within the 
next year, and, if not, do you think it will be 
fought the next year with the same limited 
goals and the same limited methods, or do you 
think there might be a basic change in strategy, 
from the invasion of North Viet-Nam to more 
extensive bombing ? 

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to put any 
time on this problem. As far as we're concerned, 
we could bring it to a conclusion very promptly 
indeed if there is any interest in Hanoi in get- 
ting a peaceful settlement, based upon the ac- 
ceptance of the 1954 and 1962 agreements on 
Southeast Asia and the ability of the South 
Vietnamese to decide their own future in their 
own way. 

Now, looking ahead, I can't be a prophet. I 

see no change whatever in the limitations on 
our own objectives in the war, and I have no 
doubt whatever we shall continue to use limited 
means. But if you ask me for a month in which 
this matter is going to end, I can't possibly tell 

Mr. Nieuwenhuis : Do you see a role for the 
Viet Cong in the future of South Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, this is something that 
the South Vietnamese will have to consider 
among themselves. It is not easy to impose such 
a role on South Viet-Nam from the outside. See, 
people's memories are very short in matters of 
this sort. 

In 1962, we went to a Geneva conference on 
Laos. We accepted the neutralist nominee as the 
Prime Minister of Laos. We accepted a coalition 
government in Laos, with three factions — the 
right-wing faction, the neutralist faction, the 
Commmiist faction. We got our military per- 
sonnel out of Laos immediately upon the sign- 
ing of that agreement. 

There was no performance on that by Hanoi ; 
they did not take their troops out of Laos as 
they were expected to ; they did not stop using 
Laos as an infiltration route into South Viet- 
Nam as they were expected to under the agree- 
ment; they did not permit that coalition 
government to operate at all in the Communist- 
held areas of Laos; and they did not permit the 
International Control Commission to operate in 
the Communist-held areas of Laos. 

So there's a recent laboratory experience in a 
neutralized coimti-y, in a coalition government, 
in a solution which everyone had signed includ- 
ing Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, everybody, and 
there was no performance. 

Mr. Modesti: Mr. Secretary, I want just to 
make sure I got correctly your answer to my last 
question. So, it is safe to assume that the Viet- 
Nam war is just part of the general picture of 
the cold war. Am I correct on that ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to put 
everybody in the Communist world in the same 
bloc, with the same point of view, with the 
same attitude toward the issues that we call, have 
called, the cold war. There are important dif- 
ferences within the Communist world, between 
Moscow and Peking, and among some of the 
lesser Commimist countries. So that I would 
not— I would want to be careful about saying 
that Viet-Nam is just an episode in what we 
generally call the cold war. 

Precisely, North Viet-Nam is sending its 
armed forces into South Viet-Nam. This cuts 

NOVEMBER 6, 196 7 


across the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and also 
runs into a mutual security treaty of the United 
States. And so when they do that we have a 
problem, and there's one question we cannot 
avoid : 

Here comes a North Vietnamese regiment 
down the road. Now somebody must decide do 
we shoot at it or do we get out of its way. Now, 
we would like for it to go home; we would like 

for it not to come ; but if it comes down the road 
we must shoot at it. 

Mr. Nieuioenhuis: Mr. Secretary, unfortu- 
nately, our time is up. I would like to thank you 
on behalf of my four colleagues for being here 
with us. 

Now, for the Secretary of State of the United 
States, ilr. Dean Eusk, and for my four col- 
leagues, I want to say goodby from Washington. 

The Complex and Difficult Problems in Viet-Nam 

hy Under Secretary Katzenbach'^ 

The problems in Viet-Nam are every bit as 
complex and every bit as difficult as our prob- 
lems of race and poverty at home. We are seek- 
ing to helj] the South Vietnamese to build a free 
nation under the incredibly difficult circum- 
stances of aggression from the North supported 
by subversion within. And we face in that 
troubled land a tough, cunning, and determined 
adversary who is counting on wearmg us down, 
who is depending on a failure of will and deter- 
mination on our part and on our allies. 

This is not just conjecture. We have it on the 
authority of no less a figure than General [Vo 
Nguyen] Giap, North Viet-Nam's Minister of 
Defense. He used the same strategy against the 
French. This month he reasserted it once again 
in a long article in his army's newspaper. The 
best strategy, he said, was to break down Amer- 
ican morale, patience, and determination 
through a tiring and protracted war. 

I do not think his strategy will succeed. For 
I do not believe Americans abandon what is 
right just because the going gets tough. I do 
not believe we are ready to abandon the people 
of South Viet-Nam in their struggle for free- 
dom any more than we are ready to abandon 

' Excerpt from an address made before the Fairfield 
University progress dinner at Fairfield, Conn., on 
Oct. 17. (For full text, see press release 234.) 

our fight for freedom at home, because the going 
is tough here, too. 

Little elaboration is needed on our aims and 
purposes in Viet-Nam. They have been stated 
clearly and often. 

Our objective is to protect the independence 
of South Viet-Nam from external interference 
and force. We do not seek to destroy North Viet- 
Nam or to threaten its regime. It is not we or 
the South Vietnamese who are unwilling to 
coexist. It is the North Vietnamese who are 
unwilling. It is they who are relentless in their 
efforts to take over the government of their 

There are some who complain that the United 
States has become involved in a civil war in 
Viet-Nam. In Viet-Nam one part of a divided 
country is indeed fighting another. But the fact 
that it is Vietnamese who have attacked Viet- 
namese does not make armed aggression any 
more acceptable. Certainly it is no more accept- 
able for the North Vietnamese to attempt to 
unite Viet-Nam by force than it would be for one 
part of divided Germany, or China, or Korea, to 
unite those countries by force. 

We have said since April of 1965 that we are 
prepared for unconditional discussions or nego- 
tiations. Since that time we have ui'gently and 
ceaselessly sought every opening and followed 
every lead, no matter how threadbare, that could 
bring North Viet-Nam to the conference table. 



And we will continue to do so. But as long as 
the North Vietnamese refuse to talk peace, we 
will pursue the struggle, making their aggres- 
sion as difficult for them as we can without risk- 
ing the wider war we do not want. 

No one pretends this is an easy road to travel. 
It is arduous and dangerous. But ponder for a 
moment the alternatives: on the one hand, a 
wider war which could easily slide down the 
slippery chute of nuclear catastrophe; on the 
other, withdrawal and the abandonment of both 
our legitimate interests and our ties and com- 
mitments to the non-Commmiist peoples of 
Southeast Asia. 

These commitments — both legal and moral — 
are so solidly founded that I cannot see how 
anj'one can rightly argue that we should renege 
on them. 

They are rooted in the Geneva Accords of 
1954, at the conclusion of which the United 
States formally stated that we "would view any 
renewal of the aggression . . . with grave con- 
cern and as seriously threatening international 
peace and security" ; - rooted in the SEATO 
treaty, which applies to South Viet-Nam 
througli a protocol annexed to it ; ^ and rooted 
in nmnerous other assurances, mcluding Presi- 
dent Kemiedy's statement of August 2, 1961, 
that "the United States is determined that the 
Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the 
Communists for lack of any support which the 
United States Goverimient can render." * 

Our commitments to South Viet-Nam are far 
better grounded than were those to South Korea 
at the time of the aggression there. For this 
reason, I am puzzled as to why so many liberals 
who su2>ported President Truman in a policy of 
limited war in Korea now oppose a parallel 
policy in Viet-Nam. The objectives of such a 
policy have seldom been as clearly and precisely 
stated as they were by Eichard Rovere and 
Arthur Schlesinger ("The General and the 
President," Farrar, Straus & Young) in 1951. 
They said : 

The objective is not to destroy communism every- 
where, a goal which would Involve an unlimited 
ideological crusade, or even to destroy the Soviet 

" For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162. 
" For texts of the treaty and protocol, see ibid., 
Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393. 
* Ibid., Aug. 28, 1961, p. 372. 

Union, a goal which could not be briefly attained with- 
out an atomic holocaust, the objective is to punish 
aggression by lowering the boom on individual experi- 
ments in aggression, while at the same time refusing 
to generalize from the individual case to the total war. 
Korea had to remain a limited war: limited in its 
investment of American forces, limited in its goal. 

Wliat Rovere and Schlesinger wrote about 
Korea in 1951, it seems to me, is no less valid 
for Viet-Nam today. Much of the current de- 
bate, in fact, is almost interchangeable with 
that of the early fifties. It was complained tlien 
that the Korean Government of that time was 
not really representative. Today — despite an 
election — the same complaints are heard about 
the Government of General Thieu. It was com- 
plained then that the Koreans were not doing 
enough for themselves. The same comjjlaint is 
heard now about the South Vietnamese. 

In both cases we were aiding an independent 
and sovereign government to govern itself — not 
seeking to govern it ourselves. As in every coim- 
try, especially in nations which suffered long 
hardships under colonial rule, there are some 
good leaders and some bad, some who are cor- 
rupt and some who are scrupulously honest. 

Certainly in South Viet-Nam there are both 
good leaders and poor ones, efficient and ineffi- 
cient. Many units of the South Vietnamese army 
fight superbly, others are less well led. Finding 
enough sound leadership has been a problem 
for the South Vietnamese. Miracles will not 
take place overnight. 

None of these facts, however, alters the valid- 
ity of our basic objectives in Viet-Nam. Rela- 
tively few Americans oppose those objectives. 
The large majority of persons who quarrel with 
our pursuit of the war do so over the means and 
mechanics rather than its underlying purpose. 

In a recent survey (October 8) of views of 
Governors and Members of Congress on the 
war, the New York Times, for instance, found 
that "Many of the replies . . . reflected dis- 
couragement that this investment of men and 
money (in Viet-Nam) did not seem to be 
achieving visible progress rather than any basic 
quarrel with the aims of the investment." 

I am convinced that much of the current 
wave of uneasiness over the war, much of the 
edginess, weariness, and impatience, really 
stems from the realization that easy alterna- 
tives do not readily present themselves. That is 
why so much of the debate on Viet-Nam has 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


wandered up so many starkly blind alleys. That 
is why it has explored so many irrelevancies 
and pursued so many pipedreams. 

One such irrelevancy — one of the sillier 
ones — has been the assertion made in the press 
in the last few days that the administration 
was evoking "the yellow peril." In discussing 
our interests in Southeast Asia at his press con- 
ference last week, ^ Secretary Rusk pointed out 
that the free nations of the area fully share our 
determination to prevent aggression. He said 
Mhat everyone knows, that these nations — which 
are also oriental — are deeply concerned about 
their long-term security in the face of a militant, 
hostile, and rigidly ideological Communist 

By some mysterious alchemy, some commen- 
tators managed to transform these remarks into 
an evocation of "the yellow peril." Any fair 
reading of the Secretary's words demonstrates 
that such an interpretation is sheer fantasy. His 
statement had nothing to do with race — yellow, 
brown, or any other. They were addressed to 
the unquestioned need to help the free nations 
of Asia build strong, stable, and progressive 
institutions if peace is to be maintained in that 
part of the world. And they are doing so. 

Perhaps the most fruitless irrelevancies of all 
are the endless questionings of the wisdom of 
decisions long past. Countless words have been 
expended as to whether or not President Eisen- 
hower should have done this or Secretary Dulles 

'For Secretary Rusk's news conference of Oct. 12, 
see ihid., Oct. 30, 1907, p. 555. 

should have done that or President Kennedy 
should have done the other. I personally doubt 
whether it is ever possible adequately to assess 
the correctness of any historical decision with- 
out the benefit of at least 20 years of hindsight 

On all the things that happened regarding 
Viet-Nam in the past, on all the decisions that 
were taken, there may be room for arginnent by 
historians. But to say we should not be where 
we are^a position I do not agree with — is not 
in any event to solve the problems of the here 
and now. 

Now is our starting point. Now is from where 
we must go on. But while our current action is 
delimited by responsibilities and decisions car- 
ried over from the past, it also gains by past 
experience. Significant to that experience, the 
experience of all of us who lived through the 
period between World Wars I and 11, is the find- 
ing that armed aggression cannot be met simply 
by appeals to reason and virtue. Armed aggres- 
sion is not deterred by rhetoric or wishful 

One final thought : It is a grievous and dan- 
gerous delusion to believe all our problems 
would be solved if we withdrew from Viet-Nam 
or from Asia or from anywhere else. On this 
shrinking planet the strongest nation in the 
world cannot so easily escape its responsibilities. 

We are involved in this world, whether we 
want to be or not, as individuals and as a nation. 
There is little use in reviling fate — or men — for 
the difficulties that beset us. The work of build- 
ing peace has never been easy and it is not easy 
now. But its success depends on each of us. 




Another Round in the Great Debate: 
American Security in an Unstable World 

hy Eugene V. Rostoio 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

My topic today is the great debate which is 
going on over every breakfast table of the na- 
tion. Viet-Nam is the focal point of the contro- 
versy. But the issue is broader. For many who 
disagree with the Government about Viet-Nam, 
the real question is whether the United States 
should abandon its whole postwar foreign pol- 
icy — a policy which four Presidents of both 
parties and a bij^artisan majority in Congress 
have believed vital to our national security. 

The basic issue in the debate has been posed 
often and well by high-minded and sincere 
critics of our Viet-Nam policy. 

Their arguments follow this approximate 
pattern: They start with the premise that the 
main purpose of our foreign policy is to foster 
a world envirormaent in which we can with rea- 
sonable security devote our main energies to 
building a good society for our own citizens at 
home. No one disputes this premise. It has al- 
ways described the goal of our foreign policy 
since the war. In this period, confronting new 
conditions, we have sought with others to orga- 
nize a reliable peace — -to help build a peaceful 
world of wide horizons in which we can live 
with assurance as a free and democratic com- 
munity and not as an autarchic fortress or a 
garrison state. 

But the critics proceed from this universally 
accepted premise to the startling conclusion 
that the main contribution the United States 
should make to the stability of the world en- 
vironment is the service of her own domestic 
example. They often recall a comment by John 
Quincy Adams, one of our greatest Secretaries 
of State. At a time when the immediate neigh- 

' Address made before the regional forei^ policy 
conference at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, 
Kans., on Oct. 17 (as delivered; for advance text, see 
press release 233 dated Oct. 16). 

borhood of the United States was measured by 
the speed of sailing vessels and patrolled by the 
British Navy, Adams said that America should 
be "the well-wisher of the freedom and inde- 
pendence of all" but "the champion and vindi- 
cator only of her own." 

In marching as they do from a universally 
accepted premise to a higlily debatable conclu- 
sion, the critics of our foreign policy evade the 
really difficult question in the middle: how to 
maintain a world environment in which Ameri- 
can democracy can continue to be safe. The 
answer to this question must face up to condi- 
tions in the world as it is, not as we would wish 
it to be. We live today not in the age of John 
Quincy Adams but in a world of interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles, one-third occuj^ied by 
ambitious and energetic Communist regimes; 
a world in which another third of the people 
live in developing countries, groping their way 
toward modernity under conditions of weakness 
which tempt aggression ; and a world in which 
Europe and Japan have not yet fully joined 
us as stabilizing influences in world politics. 

It is of course true that our primary national 
mission is the improvement of our own society. 
But it is equally true that a responsible govern- 
ment must protect the safety of the nation. 
We cannot expect to be allowed to pursue our 
domestic goals, vital as they are, in a world that 
is not reasonably safe for our democracy. 

The challenge to our four postwar Presi- 
dents has been something completely new in 
American history — and a challenge for which 
we have not been particularly well prepared, 
intellectually or psychologically, by our earlier 
experience as a nation. The essence of that chal- 
lenge can be summed up in this way: 

In the small, unstable, nuclear world in which 
we live, the security of the United States de- 

NOVEMBER 6, 19 67 


pends on maintaining a tolerably stable balance 
of power not merelj' in the Western Atlantic or 
the Hemisphere but in the world as a whole. If 
we do not take the lead in maintaining tliat bal- 
ance, no one else will. We have had to take an 
active part in world politics since the war only 
because those who used to undertake the vital 
tasks of maintaining an international equilib- 
rium of power have lost the capacity to do so. 
This is the fact which the critics of our foreign 
policy ignore or evade. It is the key to our secu- 
rity problem today. 

It is important for us all to realize the impli- 
cations of this debate — both in terms of its 
consequences for the future and their rela- 
tion to our own history and culture as a nation. 

The Goal of a Stable World Peace 

It is not a new debate. We went through one 
round of it in 1919 and 1920, when we decided 
not to join the League of Nations and tried to 
retreat into the comfortable cocoon of 19th- 
century isolation. There was another during the 
thirties, as we sought to determine whether 
German and Japanese militarism were in fact a 
threat to our security. In this part of the world 
you will recall the leadershijD of William Allen 
White of Emporia in that stage of the debate. 

After the war, eager to atone for our repudi- 
ation of President Wilson, we took an active 
part in building the United Nations. Some 
hoped the United Nations would become a new 
world system in which peace and our own se- 
curity would be guarded through the collective 
action of the great powers and of the world 
community at large. But within a few hesitant 
months we all began to realize that the United 
Nations could not supersede our own responsi- 
bilities for the safety of the nation. The United 
Nations is not a separate power or sovereignty — 
an independent force in the world, an authority 
to which issues can be remitted for solution. It 
is an invaluable forum, a meeting place in which 
diplomatic business can sometimes be done and 
world opinion can be crystallized and brought to 
bear on the policies of the individual nations. It 
is not, however, a substitute for national respon- 
sibility but a means through which national 
responsibility can be expressed. 

When the Soviet Union breached the Yalta 
and Potsdam agreements calling for free elec- 
tions in Eastern Europe and Germany and be- 
gan to push outward toward Iran, Turkey, and 

Greece, our instinct for self-preservation was 
stirred. Our response, in 1947, was the Trmnan 
doctrine and the Marshall Plan, expressing the 
two key issues of our i^ostwar foreign policy. 

The essence of the Truman doctrine has been 
a simple rule designed to minimize risks and 
miscalculations: that there be no unilateral 
change in the relevant frontiers of the Commu- 
nist and free-world systems, no change that is 
achieved by force directly or indirectly applied. 

This rule does not make us and our allies the 
universal gendarmes of the world. There are, 
and will doubtless continue to be, local conflicts 
that do not threaten the general peace and can 
therefore safely be left to run their course. But 
in areas of significance to political geography, 
major conflicts and extensions of the Communist 
sphere achieved by force do carry with them a 
threat to the world equilibrium and the possi- 
bility of escalation into general war. Such acts 
would therefore directly concern the national 
interests of the United States and other free 

Since President Truman's decision, the 
United States has followed what few democra- 
cies have been able to maintain: a measured, 
flexible policy combining firmness and restraint. 

Tlie goal of that policy is nothing less than a 
stable world peace. We have a national interest 
in world peace because wide disturbance in 
world politics inevitably threatens us. To 
achieve that goal, our foreign policy has em- 
ployed four basic means to the end of stability : 
resistance to aggression which threatens our par- 
ticular interests or the general peace; respect 
for the vital interests of the other side ; zeal in 
searching for common areas of agreement and 
cooperation ; and support for national and inter- 
national programs that could lead to a more 
stable and decent world. 

The elements of conciliation in this policy 
should not be overlooked. The correlative of the 
Truman doctrine, as I have just remarked, was 
the Marshall Plan — and you will recall that it 
was open not only to the West of Europe but to 
the East as well. 

We have persisted for 20 years in a foreign 
policy which has served the nation well. That 
it has continued in its essentials these 20 years 
is something of a political miracle. According 
to most of the classical writers on government, 
a democracy is supposed never to be able to sus- 
tain a measured course in foreign affairs. Its 
policy, they claim, is at the mercy of every gust 



of sentiment. Democracies, the pundits say, are 
fated to oscillate between belligerence and 
appeasement. Once aroused, democracies are 
miglity in war; but dictatorships, using carrot 
and stick, can always defeat them in peace. 

These melancholy reflections have ample sup- 
port in history. 

But for 20 years, the United States has defied 
the wisdom of the ancients. We have maintained 
an active, rational, and reasonably consistent 
foreign policy. It has rested in the end on the 
understanding and good sense of the American 
people and the leadership of Presidents Tru- 
man, Eisenhower, Kemiedy, and Johnson. 

The mamtenance of this steady policy has not 
been easy for our Presidents. Every one of 
them has had to face thi-eats to the stability of 
our policy stemming from swings of public 
opinion toward belligerence or indifference. 
The challenges come along regularly. Some 
Presidents have been luckier than others. Presi- 
dent Truman had to face the full brunt of 
Stalinist pressure abroad. At home, he also had 
to fight off Henry Wallace on one side and Sen- 
ator McCarthy on the other. The Truman doc- 
trine and the Marshall Plan touched off an 
attack from the left that continued throughout 
the Korean war and the elections of 1952. At 
the same time, President Truman's policy of 
restraint also provoked a disquiet on the right 
that fed McCarthyism. 

Today, all shades of opinion join in recog- 
nizing that President Truman's stanch policy 
was right. His Presidency is recalled with uni- 
versal respect and admiration. At the time, how- 
ever, with the casualties rising and polls falling, 
it was a different story. But President Truman 
had the character that permits a man to stand 
firm in a storm. The motto for his Presidency, 
you will recall, was "The buck stops here." 

President Truman's firmness and restraint in 
Korea acliieved nearly 12 years of relative peace. 
But the forces and ideas that swarmed against 
President Truman remain in our society. In 
periods of stress, leaders and arguments come 
forward to rally them. 

Today, we are caught up in a new challenge, 
a new time of strain, and a new attack on our 
foreign policy at home recalling that led by 
Henry Wallace. Americans are being told not 
only that it is wrong for us to be in Viet-Nam, 
but also that we ought not to be anywhere; that 
the threat of Communist expansion has van- 
ished, and that we are already living in a world 
of peaceful coexistence; that our postwar pol- 

icy, so dramatically challenged in Viet-Nara, 
should now be qualified, shrunken, or aban- 
doned. Many of the same leaders who attack our 
policy in Viet-Nam also urge substantial cuts 
m our NATO forces, even as the Soviet Union 
maintains its force levels in Central Europe and 
continues to make massive arms shipments to 
the Near East. 

Viet-Nam and the U.S. National Interest 

Let me take up first the more specific argu- 
ments about Viet-Nam before returning to the 
broader problem. 

In the view of our Government, the war in 
Viet-Nam is like the attack on South Korea and 
earlier threats to Greece, Iran, and Berlin. It 
constitutes a clear aggression by a Conununist 
regime supported both by China and the Soviet 
Union — attempting to take over another coun- 
try by force. Wliatever view one takes of the 
origins of the war — whether it is considei-ed an 
insurrection against the authority of the South 
Vietnamese state aided by North Viet-Nam or, 
as we believe, an infiltration and invasion from 
North Viet-Nam — the issue in international law 
and politics is the same. In either view, North 
Viet-Nam is waging war against South Viet- 
Nam. And South Viet-Nam has the right to ask 
for the help of the international community in 
resisting an attack mounted from beyond its 

Neither South Viet-Nam nor the United 
States wants to conquer North Viet-Nam or to 
overturn its Communist regime. The central 
issue of the war is whether Nortli Viet-Nam will 
be allowed to conquer South Viet-Nam. 

Wliat is America's national interest in South 
Viet-Nam ? Why are we there ? 

There are several answers. 

We are in Viet-Nam because we are obliged to 
be there specifically by the SEATO treaty and 
generally by the U.N. Charter itself. 

The obligations of the United Nations 
Charter are not suspended when permanent 
members of the Security Council disagree or the 
Assembly cannot act. The principles of the char- 
ter condemn the attack of North Viet-Nam on 
South Viet-Nam and authorize the members of 
the organization to offer South Viet-Nam as- 
sistance in its efforts of self-defense. 

Honoring these commitments is dictated by 
the most hardheaded assessment of our national 
interest. Three Presidents have concluded that 
the fate of Southeast Asia as a whole is directly 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


related to the preservation of South Viet-Nam's 
independence. And Congress has repeatedly af- 
firmed their judgment. If South Viet-Nam were 
to be taken over, the expansionist forces of Com- 
munist China and North Viet-Nam would be 
encouraged, and resistance to them and to ag- 
gression generally throughout the world would 
be seriously weakened. 

The United States is no less a Pacific than an 
Atlantic power. Our security demands an 
equilibrium of power in the Far East as much 
as it does in Europe and in the Middle East. 
That equilibrium depends on Viet-Nam and the 
system of alliances it symbolizes. 

Responsible opinion throughout Southeast 
Asia believes that the outcome in Viet-Nam will 
determine the future alinement of the whole 
region. Present events in Laos, Thailand, and 
Burma confirm this widespread judgment. 

Viet-Nam is the test for a new technique of 
revolution. As nuclear warfare is unthinkable 
and massed frontal attacks of the Korean type 
are too dangerous to be tried, Communist leaders 
are drawn to "wars of national liberation." In- 
deed, they have developed an elaborate doctrine 
explaining the place of these ventures in their 
overall strategy. On their present scale, the 
hostilities in Viet-Nam could hardly continue 
for any length of time without large-scale aid 
from Cliina and the Soviet Union. Deescalation 
of the fighting should follow logically if that aid 
were to be reduced. 

But the Soviet Union has not so far responded 
to proposals of this kind. Indeed, the Soviet 
Union still declines to join with the United 
Kingdom in reconvening the Control Commis- 
sions either for Laos or for Viet-Nam. 

In summary, we are bound to Viet-Nam by 
specific and general commitments and by our 
own national interest. 

Above all, at tliis stage, whether one believes 
we were right or wrong in getting into Viet- 
Nam in the first place, the hostilities in Viet- 
Nam have been made the test of America's 
resolve to maintain that network of security ar- 
rangements upon which the equilibrimn of 
world power has come to depend. There would 
be little security to protect our interests any- 
where in the world if America's promise faltered 
or failed when the going got rough. As Presi- 
dent Kennedy once said : ^ 

' For President Kennedy's radio-TV address of Oct. 
22, 1962, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715. 

Tlie 1930's taught us a clear lesson : Aggressive con- 
duct, if alloveed to go unctieclsed and unctiallenged, 
ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to 
war. We are also true to our word. 

It is sometimes contended that it is hopeless 
to intervene in these explosive situations — that 
Asia, South America, and Africa are doomed to 
go through revolutionary turmoil of many 
kinds, and that nothing can be done to stem the 

The simplest answer to this counsel of despair 
lies in the accomplislunents of many developing 
states, often achieved in the face of threats both 
from within and without: Iran, for example, 
and Thailand, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Malaysia. Others, like Indonesia, have turned 
sharply from adventurism to policies of peace 
and economic development. All over the world, 
countries are seeking to apply for themselves, 
and in their own ways, the economic and social 
methods of that enlightened capitalism which 
has permitted the United States and the other 
free advanced nations to accomplish the most 
successful social revolution of the 20th century. 

Persistence of Isolationism 

Now allow me to turn from the particular 
question of Viet-Nam to a deeper issue raised 
by the current challenge to our foreign policy. 
Some contemporary partisans of the foreign 
policy of Jolm Quincy Adams contend, in es- 
sence, that the acceptance by America of world- 
wide responsibilities violates traditional Ameri- 
can values and is therefore morally incompatible 
with freedom and social justice at home. There 
is a dichotomy, they claim, between power and 
goodness. The American role in the world is con- 
cerned with power ; but power politics, they as- 
sert, is evil and un-American. Therefore, the 
United States should withdraw its concern with 
power abroad and concentrate on building a 
model society at home. 

Of course we should keep in mind the dangers 
raised by the critics of this school. It is right 
for Americans to worry about the corruptions 
of power. It is right that we should remain care- 
ful not to pollute the springs of our own moral 
strength as a nation. And it is right to remember 
that few exhortations are as convincing as a 
good example. 

But I cannot discover a process of thought 
that would permit us to move from these valid 
concerns to the proposition that it is wrong, in- 



deed immoral, for America to continue in her 
present world role because that role supposedly 
violates the principles of our domestic political 
health. My belief is to the contrary. My belief is 
that America's international role and her domes- 
tic excellence not only are compatible but are 
mutually dependent. 

"Wliat principle of ethics makes it immoral to 
protect the safety of the nation through methods 
which have the sanction of international law 
and the United Nations Charter ? Is it wrong to 
oppose aggression and to uphold the principles 
of the United Nations Charter? In what way do 
we lessen our capacity to seek social justice at 
home by defending the cause of peace, stability, 
and social progress abroad ? 

On the contrary, I should contend that we 
cannot have a truly good society at home if we 
practice irresponsibility abroad. How is it possi- 
ble to believe that there can be any security for a 
rich, isolated America if the world descends to 
chaos and disorder? Can anyone really believe, 
in a nuclear world, that maintaining the balance 
of power upon which world order depends is a 
sordid business for which Americans are too 
pure ? 

It is quite true, of course, that such isolationist 
beliefs are among America's oldest political 
traditions. But they form a part of our past, like 
the tradition of racial discrimination, that 
should be banished. 

Isolationism, and the view that a concern for 
the control of power is immoral, bespeak a naive 
utopianism which is the dark side of our ideal- 
ism. I do not suggest that all the critics of our 
Viet-Nam policy are dominated by these tradi- 
tions, but their arguments serve to rouse them 
throughout the land. Stirring these nostalgic 
yearnings for the past constitutes a real and 
present danger. To understand the persistence 
of these traditions, it is important to remind our- 
selves of their place in our national history. 

Isolationism in general was nourished by the 
peculiar position of the United States in the last 
century. Thanks to our remoteness from Europe 
and the absence of a threat from Asia, we were 
able to enjoy the fruits of a world equilibrium 
without having to take an active role in main- 
taining it. This was a comfortable position that 
allowed us to get on with the immense tasks of 
domesticating a wild continent and defining 
ourselves as a nation. It even allowed us the 
moral luxury of complaining about the sordid- 
ness of power politics and classic diplomacy. 

We were allowed the luxury of these views 
only because the task we found so sordid — the 
balanced containment of power in the world — 
was handled by the Europeans. We lived in 
peace within a world order assured by the Con- 
cert of Europe, that basic arrangement among 
the great states of Europe that followed the 
defeat of Napoleon. That system kept power 
imder reasonable control between 1815 and 1914. 
It has long been fashionable to criticize the old 
diplomats and their methods-^but theirs is a 
record we had better surpass before we dismiss 

That particular system of order is gone for- 
ever. It might have been adapted and preserved 
had the New World really entered the main- 
stream of world politics in time to "redress the 
balance of the old"; but twice in this century 
America has moved too late. Some of our critics, 
it is interesting to note, refer to Munich as an 
example of the failure of the old diplomacy. But 
how different Munich might have been if the 
United States of America had been there ! 

The Utopian Dream 

Not only do today's critics draw their atti- 
tudes from the isolationist experience of the last 
century but from that American Utopian dream, 
sometimes ascribed to the young Jefferson, that 
looked for a world that was naturally harmoni- 
ous, a world where the freedom of every man 
to do as he pleased led to a naturally peaceful 
order. Jefferson had the good sense to believe 
that this state of affairs was not possible every- 
where but only in the abundant and uncorrupted 
American wilderness. But even before television 
we knew that the reality of the American 
frontier was quite different. There it was quickly 
learned that freedom without organized power 
to maintain the law was a moral and practical 
contradiction. The arts of civilization can flour- 
ish only in an environment where force has been 
brought under rational and agreed control. 

The lessons of history, philosophy, and psy- 
chology all teach that such peace is not the natu- 
ral state of human affairs. Civilizations— above 
all, free civilizations— are built and maintained 
by struggle — by patience, work, courage, and 
firmness. They do not just happen. 

If there was ever a country whose wealth and 
liberty have been built by struggle, it is this 
one. Struggle was the lot of the early colonists 
and of the later settlers who braved the perils 

NOVEMBEK 6, 1967 


of the frontier. Struggle has been no less the 
fate of the waves of later immigrants who came 
to build a better life in a strange and competi- 
tive New World. And struggle is still our lot in 
seeking at long last to make good the equality 
of our Negi'o fellow citizens. 

In short, the Utopian view that everything 
will be all right if you just go away and leave 
it has never been true of domestic American 
society, neither in the past nor today. Why 
should we assume it to be true of international 
politics? It is not. 

In foreign policy, the Utopian often tells us 
that if we can only escape from the "traditional 
methods of foreign policy" the problems of the 
world will somehow vanish. There is no sub- 
stance to the argument. There is nothing wrong 
with the traditional methods of diplomacy. 
There is in fact no alternative to them in a 
world of nation-states. These methods fail only 
when men pursue them with inadequate energy, 
insight, and optimism. The supposed alternative 
between the bad old diplomacy and some hypo- 
thetical good new diplomacy is an illusion — 
especially when the implacable dimension of 
power is ignored. 

Is a foreign policy, because it is concerned 
with the balance of power, therefore devoid of 
idealism and higher ends? If the Utopians mean 
to exclude from higher ends anytliing short of 
a visionary world where there will be no strug- 
gles, where the lion will lie down with the lamb, 
then it must be confessed that our foreign pol- 
icy laclvS vision. But surely it is not a contempti- 
ble goal to preserve peace in our lifetimes and 
pass on to our children some reasonable pros- 
pects for a peaceful future. 

Order Essential to Progress 

Nor should anyone say that the United States 
seeks a sterile and static system of order for its 
own sake. We have viewed order not as a 
reactionary goal, good in itself, but as the in- 
dispensable condition of progress. From the 
Marshall Plan and Point 4 to our current pro- 
grams of aid to the developing world, we have 
sought, and we are seeking, to link order with 
progress in every human sense — with educa- 
tion and economic welfare, with health and cul- 
tural advance, and with political development 
toward the goal of self-government. 

Under the umbrella provided by American 
power, vitality and creative energy have, in 
fact, gradually returned to many parts of the 

world once demoralized by war, communism, 
and the general disruption of the times. The 
revival of Western Europe has encouraged 
great democratic nations to resiune an active 
role in the world. In the Pacific, Japan has ac- 
quired splendid prosperity and stable democ- 
racy. These developments among old and new 
allies open up a new vista of possibilities for 
the creation of a broadly based cooperative 
world system. We may hope to see our efforts 
joined around the world, as they have been 
for many years in Europe, by a concert of 
peace-loving powers conscious of a common in- 
terest in keeping force under rational control 
and in protecting the progress of the developing 
nations. In the future, the burdens that consti- 
tute our interests will not disappear, but we 
can expect more help in carrying them. 

The Russians, their aggressive impulses so 
often thwarted, have begim, we can hope, a slow 
evolution to peaceableness. Eastern Europe 
seems to enjoy a greater measure of freedom. 
There has been gradual j^rogress in the third 
world toward economic growth and responsi- 
bility not only because of aid from vis and other 
developed countries but through imaginative 
new institutions for international and regional 
cooperation and the impressive efforts of many 
of the developing nations themselves. Behind 
the protection of American power, numerous 
international bodies haA^e made genuine prog- 
ress toward a more rational organization of the 
free world's economy. 

We have made progress, but we are not at the 
brink of utopia. The revival of Europe and the 
apparent mellowing of some Communist na- 
tions pose dangers as well as opportunities. 
Some Europeans, like some Americans, are 
tempted by irresponsibility. Isolationism on one 
side of the ocean has reciprocal effects on the 
other. Aggressive propensities still lurk among 
the Russians, as the Near Eastern crisis amply 
illustrates. The simultaneous progress of Red 
China toward nuclear weapons and political 
turmoil is hardly a comforting harbinger for 
the future. 

Above all, we should have no illusions about 
the gravest problem of our time: the gap be- 
tween rich and poor countries. It will not be 
easy to close ; and in any event, even if success- 
ful, development does not necessarily promise 
peace. The social transformation involved in 
economic development, at best, is a cruel and 
unsettling process — particularly for tradition- 
alist societies for whom modern technology is 



an alien and often an unwelcome intrusion. The 
history of the 20th century does not suggest 
that prosperity leads automatically to peace. 
There will be plenty of occasions for conflict in 
the third world, apart from deliberate Com- 
munist cultivation of instability, racism, and 
"wars of national liberation." 

No Magic Solutions Abroad or at Home 

In short, we shall bo living in a troubled 
world for a long time. There will be no magic 
solutions abroad, as there are none at home. 
New ideas are always needed, but not facile 
panaceas and irresponsibility masquerading as 

One of the dangerous tendencies of the Uto- 
pian is his inclination to look for scapegoats. 
The world ought naturally to be perfect ; if it 
is not, he assumes someone must be to blame. 
This tendency is inherent in the Utopian view 
of domestic as well as international politics. 

But there are no quick solutions for the prob- 
lems of poverty, cities, and the incorporation of 
NeOToes into the mainstream of our culture. As 
we all know, these are all painfid and complex 
historical processes. They need inexhaustible 
idealism, dedication, patience, firmness, and 
hard work. All this is frustrating to the utopian 
mentality. If he cannot have his instant Great 
Society, he looks for a scapegoat. 

At the moment, his favorite scajjegoat is Viet- 
nam. In his rush to remove this one obstacle 
to perfection, he seems willing to abandon what 
20 years of patient labor has built into a struc- 
ture that gives reasonable promise of develop- 
ing into a tolerably successful world order. 

The answer to America's domestic problems 
lies in America and not in Viet-Nam. If it is 

true that we cannot have a world role and a 
good society together, then we shall not have 
either one. It is no good building model cities if 
they are to be bombed in 20 years' time. 

But we need make no such choice. We have 
the wealth both to build a better America at 
home and to protect ourselves abroad. The 
question is whether we have the will. 

There is, in short, an imending task ahead of 
us, in America and in the world, in the next 
generation as in all the generations of the past. 
We are often told that the present younger gen- 
eration bridles at the responsibility and at the 
labor that lies before them. I am suspicious of 
those who claim to speak for the young. As a 
professor, I think I have as good a right as 
anyone else to an opinion on the subject. As I 
recall my own student days, most of us were 
deeply and rightly disturbed by the idea of 
war. We felt then, I believe, very much as 
young people feel now. 

The problem, however, is not feelings alone 
but thought — and whether in the end reflection 
will dominate feeling in the formation of policy. 
I have been a professor too long not to have 
unshakeable respect for the good sense of the 
young. They are fully the equals of their prede- 
cessors — probably better educated and certainly 
not lacking in independence of mind. The 
young of today know, I am certain, that the 
"freedom and wealth they are about to inherit 
could not have been built without persistent 
effort and cannot survive without it either. I 
have no doubt that the great majority will 
reject irresponsibility and face reality. I believe 
that young Americans accept, in this generation 
as in others, the basic rule of the social contract : 
that as the privileges of democracy are always 
great, so, too, are its duties sometimes stern. 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


Prime Minister of Singapore Visits the United States 

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of the Repub- 
lic of Singapore visited the United States 
October 16-27. While in Washington Octo- 
ber 17-19 he met with President Johnson and 
other U.S. officials. Following are an exchange 
of greetings between President Johnson and 
Prime Minister Lee at a welcoming ceremony 
at the White House on October 17., President 
Johnson's toast at a dinner at the White House 
that evening, and a joint statement issued on 
October 18. 


White House press release dated October 17 

President Johnson 

This morning, America welcomes a patriot, a 
brilliant political leader, and a statesman of the 
new Asia. 

You come to us, Mr. Prime Minister, from a 
continent free of colonialism, eager to build 
independent nations, anxious to give all of its 
people a better life. 

You come from a great and fabulous city — 
now a free nation — that has long been the cross- 
roads of the Orient. Through Singapore, the 
tide of empire once flowed, and has now ebbed. 
Singapore has seen war and now wants peace. 
Singapore has known bitter poverty and now 
builds toward pi-osperity. 

Under your leadership, sir : 

— The people of Singapore now enjoy the 
second highest per capita income in all of Asia. 

— Tlie children of Singapore are all assured 
of virtually free education through high school. 

— The residents of Singapore — not only its 
citizens but all the people who live there — have 
free medical care available to them. 

— In Singapore, nearly one out of three people 
now live in government-built housing, a pro- 
gram without peer in the entire world. By 1972 

half the population there will live at rents that 
are well within their means. 

So Singapore is a very bright example of 
what can be accomplished not only in Asia but 
in Africa and Latin America — wherever men 
work for a life of freedom and dignity. 

Your people have wisely followed the road of 
regionalism. They are taking part in the co- 
operative organizations that promise so much 
for the future of Southeast Asia. You have 
found — in fruitful cooperation with your neigh- 
bors — the key to your nation's progress in the 
modern world. 

I know that you are looking ahead, beyond the 
Asia of today, to the Asia of the 1970's. You 
want and deserve to know what will be Amer- 
ica's interest in the new Asia. 

I trust that your visit here will give you these 
answers. You will find an America that looks 
beyond the conflict of today to an Asia that 
realizes its promise, that lives at peace with it- 
self and with others. 

All that we have done, and all that we shall 
do, is intended to help bring that Asia into 

Because you have spoken for that new Asia — 
and even more, because you have so brilliantly 
labored to achieve it — we are so glad to have 
you in this country. We welcome you here to our 
White House this morning. I look forward 
eagerly to the conversations we will have with 
each other in the time ahead. We are so pleased 
that you could have your lady with you here 
at this time. 

Prime Minister Lee 

My wife and I thank you for your warm 
words of welcome. 

I am almost embarrassed by the lavish words 
of praise that you have showered upon my col- 
leagues and me in our modest efforts to build a 
more just and more equal society in a very dif- 
ficult corner in Southeast Asia. 



I am told, ]\Ir. President, that the North 
American fall is the most beautiful time of year, 
and so I am looking forward to enjoying the 
rich hues of the reds, russets, golds, and greens 
of which I caught glimpses as we were carried 
by air to Williamsburg yesterday and to Wash- 
ington this morning. 

However, I have been told that perhaps this 
fall may not be the best fall of the late sixties to 
have a quiet, relaxed dialog in order to appreci- 
ate your immense and diverse country. But I was 
also informed, on expert authority, that next 
year would be too busy a Washington — if, in- 
deed, I could find anyone in it at all ready and 
able to discuss dispassionately the so many old 
and undoubtedly the several new problems that 
are likely to be added to the anxieties of the 
world between now and then. 

I had therefore considered the possibility of 
making this journey in the fall of 1969. But by 
then discussion on aspects of the few subjects 
of crucial interest to the world — and in par- 
ticular to my corner of it- — may be somewhat 
late. Worse, what can be said then by me will 
get scant attention from a President and an ad- 
ministration starting a new term after having 
gone through fire and brimstone over issues of 
life and death for many young Americans — all 
in the cause of a strange and faraway place 
called South Viet-Nara. 

So because the relevance of the stability of this 
corner of Asia to the peace, security, and the 
future not only of South and Southeast Asia, 
not only of the Pacific community, but, indeed, 
of many coinitries far beyond, I am compelled 
because of too direct and too immediate an in- 
terest to abjure the choice of a more congenial 
political season in America — and so it is I am 
here today, the fall of 1967. 

I hope, despite the cooing noises from the 
dovecote or the squawks of hawkish impatience, 
to find enough equanimity to have a dialog 
with you and your principal advisers and ex- 
ecutives for better or for worse. 

We in Singapore must hope that they will be 
for the better. The decisions of the American 
people next fall will strengthen the capacity and 
the already known resolve of their Government 
to create the peaceful and stable conditions in 
which alone trade, industry, and construction 
would be possible. 

But experts who do political weather fore- 
casting have put out a spate of predictions. My 
preference would be for those who forecast not 
bright and sunny periods but those who go on 

to say that patience and prudence, resolution 
and restraint, will see the world through to a 
better and a more secure feature. 

We in Singapore, like others, want to build 
this brave new world of modern science and 
technology, and the great life that they can 
provide when these disciplines are applied to 

Most other countries in Asia also want this^ 
to find equal excitement and fulfillment in build- 
ing instead of destroying. 

But some find it difficult to be brave all by 
themselves, particularly when old friends from 
Western Europe are leaving and no new and 
strong patrons are willing to take over. A few 
have even suggested that they would give up — 
and immediately — rather than put up a futile 
fight against big and massive intruders. 

In the end, Mr. President, historians will ac- 
claim and applaud the superpowers, if after all 
the harsh trials they demonstrate that not only 
they, the leaders, but more important, the 
people, can show that patience and persever- 
ance and prudence can demonstrate that firm- 
ness for a fair peace which can make the world 
a safer and a better place for all — Asians, 
Africans, Americans, Europeans. 

My temperament makes me want to say these 
things before the event, when tlie great heart- 
searching and a baring of the breast have not 
yet brought a broad consensus. That Americans 
are powerful, all the world is too painfully 
aware of. The fact that they are brave — or per- 
haps a better word, courageous — morally no one 

But they do see it in their interests that this 
courage and this powe,.' should be controlled. 
For in a world full of bears and dragons, that is 
the best way to insure that a peaceful future is 
not unduly threatened. 

Do enough Americans believe that their 
progeny will inherit this brave new world that 
they have built, unless they make the effort now? 

Tliat, Mr. President, is what I have come to 
find out. I hope I will leave reassured of the 
future of mankind; of their progress to a better 
life in a better world. 

We in Singapore, like others, want to build 
this brave new world of modern science and 
technology and have the great life they can pro- 
vide, when these disciplines are applied. 

I hope we will not be disajDpointed in finding 
American generosity and charity equal to the 
challenge of a more just and equal world. 

Thank you, Mr. President. 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 



Our guest this evening represents a very small 
nation whose influence in the world belies its 

He represents a new nation whose people are 
endowed with 4,000 years of Chinese civilization. 

Ho is, as you observe, a young man. But he 
has already earned a formidable reputation as a 
lawyer, thinker, legislator, and party leader, as 
the ai'chitect of his nation's future, as a spokes- 
man for his new generation in a new Asia. 

He also has earned another reputation. He 
presently is rated as the best golfer among all 
the Prime Ministers and Presidents of the world. 
It takes nothing from his skill if I add — by way 
of personal testimony — that the competition in 
that league leaves something to be desired. 

In short. Prime Minister Lee is what Asian 
philosophy would call a "superior man" — a man 
who is not confined to an ivory tower — who 
combines thought and action in a full and 
devoted life of public service. 

Confucius himself set that pattern. He was 
once asked to define wisdom, and he answered, 
"It is to attend to the welfare of the people." 

Our guest has attended to his people's wel- 
fare. It was not easy. In so doing, he fought the 
people's battles for 12 long, hard years and 
brought them the only victories worth taking 
from any battlefield. 

So Singapore tonight enjoys the second high- 
est living standard in all of Asia. 

A new housing unit is built every 45 minutes. 

An ambitious welfare program embraces new 
schools and community centers. 

A pioneering educational television system 
has just been launched. From that we expect to 
learn much ourselves. 

The different races of Singapore have found 
brotherhood and nationhood in shared achieve- 
ment. They are proud of themselves; and most 
of all, they are proud of their government. And 
they should be. 

Prime Minister Lee's administration is one 
of the most honest, eiScient, and successful in 
Asia. "Wliat Singapore has accomplished can be 
done, we think, by almost any nation on earth — 
that is, if its people have the will to achieve 
what their dreams demand. 

Singapore has yet to realize all of its dreams. 
But it has put nightmare behind. Our guest 
summed it up just a few weeks ago in a speech 
he made in England when he said: 

We are one of a few places in Asia where there are 
no beggars, where nobody, old or young, dies of neglect 
or starvation. They are modest achievements but none- 
theless precious to us. 

Then the Prime Minister looked a little far- 
ther into "the different world of the 1970's," 
as he expressed it. He voiced the central hope — 
and I quote from him now — that "American 
patience and prudence in Viet-Nam could leave 
us in peace, to unprove on the small advances 
we have made to civilized living in a turbulent 
part of the world." 

This mornmg, here on the "White House lawn, 
after we had greeted him, he repeated his con- 
victions and his hopes. He said — and I quote — 
that only "patience and prudence, resolution 
and restraint, will see the world through." And 
he put a question then to our people in America. 
He said, "Do enough Americans believe that 
their progeny will inherit this brave new world 
that they have built, unless they make the effort 

Well, that is the vital question that concerns 
us. Part of the answer is being given tonight by 
our brave men in Viet-Nam. Another part lies 
in the hearts of our people here at home. 

I believe I know the answer, and I think I 
can tell you that answer is "Yes." America has 
the resolution — I believe — and it has the re- 
straint — to see this struggle through in 

I cannot put it more clearly or with more 
confidence. Mr. Prime Minister, you have a 
phrase in your part of the world that puts our 
determination very well, I think. You call it 
"riding the tiger." You rode the tiger. We shall. 

Mr. Prime Minister, we are friends of today's 
free Asia. We so much want it to flourish. We 
offer it the hand of friendship, of partnershii^, 
and — we hope — of peace. 

We are fighting tonight to secure the future 
of the new Asia. For its future — free, independ- 
ent, increasingly prosperous — will play a very 
large part in our own future. Our interest and 
our friendship in Asia will remain long after 
the ginis have fallen silent. That is our promise 
to you; that is our promise to ourselves. No 
aggressor is ever going to break it. No near- 
sighted critic can obscure it. 

We rest our welcome to you tonight, sir, on 
that i^ledge of our enduring purpose and 

So to those few guests here this evening, I 
ask you to join me in a toast to a bright symbol 



of the common future — His Excellency, the 
Prime Minister of tJie Republic of Singapore 
and his gracious wife. 


White House press release dated October 18 

The Prime Minister and tlie President had a 
frank and useful exchange of views covering a 
broad range of topics of common interest. Their 
talks reflected the cordial relations existing be- 
tween Singapore and the United States and 
were directed toward enhancing mutual under- 

The President and the Prime Minister agreed 
that the security and welfare of the entire 
Pacific community is dependent upon the coun- 
tries of Southeast Asia being able to maintain 
their independence and accelerate their economic 
growth m an atmosphere of self-reliance and 
mutual cooperation. The President expressed 
the hope that Singapore would continue to make 
her contribution to the growth of regional co- 
operation in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister 
expressed Suigapore's readiness to play her part 
in constructing a regional f ramewoi'k for com- 
mon prosperity and mutual security. 

The President and the Prime Minister agreed 
that mutual respect, noninterference and 
equality among all nations are essential princi- 

ples underlying the creation of a stable, peace- 
ful, international order. The leaders agreed that 
every nation should have the right to select its 
own political, economic and social system and its 
own way of life free from any outside interfer- 
ence or pressure. 

The two leaders reviewed recent developments 
in East Asia in the context of the miiversal de- 
sire of all peoples of the world to achieve a peace 
that respects liberty, human dignity and pro- 
vides more equal opportunities for all peoples 
to achieve better and higher standards of life 
which the application of science and teclinology 
to industry has now made possible. 

The President expressed his deep and abiding 
interest in the achievement of peace and 
stability in East Asia which would permit the 
countries of the area to devote all of their ener- 
gies to economic develojament and the enrich- 
ment of the lives of their peoples. The Prime 
Minister expressed his hope that a settlement 
would be reached in Vietnam which would en- 
hance the prospects of peace and security for 
the rest of Soutli and Southeast Asia. 

The two leaders expressed the support of their 
countries for the United Nations and stressed 
the need for it to develop into an increasingly 
effective instrument of international peace and 
security, and for the promotion of friendly rela- 
tions and cooperation among nations and peo- 
ples for their economic and social advancement. 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


Hemisphere Cooperation Through the Alliance for Progress 

hy Sol M. Linowitz 

U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States ^ 

I welcome this opportunity to report to you on 
the state of affairs in the neighborhood in which 
we live. I make no claim to reportorial objectiv- 
ity; and if any bias shows, it will be one that 
favors the policy clearly enunciated in the Char- 
ter of the Organization of American States — a 
policy that seeks "an order of peace and justice" 
in our hemisphere. 

Indeed, I can think of no better way of sum- 
ming up President Johnson's entire Latin 
American policy than to stand here and read to 
you the Charter of the OAS. Its goals, its hopes 
for the present, its aspirations for the future 
express fully all that we strive for today in our 
relations with our sister republics in the 

For the United States seeks, in short, what the 
OAS seeks: a hemisphere in which all people 
respect their neighbors and share in the blessing 
of plenty that is the heritage of the New World. 

Obviously, the OAS will not in and of itself 
guarantee such a future for the hemisphere. But 
it does point the way. And because it does, the 
United States commitment to it is deep and 
irrevocable. It is a commitment, moreover, that 
bespeaks our belief in international coopera- 
tion — peaceful cooperation and change — among 
all men and nations no matter what their 

For the overall international aim of the 
United States is a world in which want is re- 
placed by sufficiency, in which aggression is re- 
jected by respect for one's neighbors, in which 
belligerency has been overtaken by understand- 
ing, in which inequality and discrimination — • 
economic and social — finally give way to the 
dignity of the individual. 

'Address made before the annual meeting of the 
Inter-American Press Association at Dorado Beach, 
Puerto Rico, on Oct. 19 (press release 238). 

The OAS is the instrument of this interna- 
tional aid in the "Western Hemisphere, and as 
such our membership in it well serves our na- 
tional interest, even as our membership in the 
United Nations serves our national interest 

And whatever the shortcomings of either body 
may be, they are those of the members and not 
of the organizations, which are but creations of 
fallible men with all their problems and all their 
diversity. Indeed, this very diversity is the 
source of the OAS's greatest strength — the 
independence of its members. 

It is my belief that skepticism about the OAS 
stems from nothing less than a lack of informa- 
tion about the work it has done and the work 
that it is even now doing — work that is deeply 
interwoven in the fabric of America. 

It is work that does not stop with the defense 
of the Americas and the efforts to strengthen the 
peace. It is work that advances also the economic 
and social well-being of its members — work that 
runs the gamut from industrial planning to 
farming, from education to public health, from 
child welfare to Indian affairs, from culture to 
human rights, from science and teclmology to 

Twenty-two members of the OAS are today 
cooperating to build a better hemisphere. One 
country is not. We cannot ignore that one coun- 
try; its threat is too real. 

But we must give far greater attention to the 
constructive efforts and the creative woi'k of the 
22 who will not permit the problem of Castro 
subversion to interfere with such OAS programs 
as eradication of yellow fever or development 
of a hemisphere-wide system of educational 
television. For they are convinced that these are 
indispensable works of peace, work that will 
be remembered long after Castro has been 



This creative spirit of the OAS was clearly 
evident in the recent meeting of Foreign Min- 
isters^ that dealt with the problem of Cuban 
subversion. The result was a measured response, 
calm but keenly aware of the nature of the 
threat, flexible but resolved that the pursuit 
of intervention and the support of subversion 
will not be tolerated in this hemisphere. 

The OAS policy — a policy of respect for the 
individual and the freedom of each nation — will 
be the policy of the United States; for we also 
believe that the most effective response to any 
despot — of the right or left- — is a response of 
hemispheric unity that inspires the confidence 
of all the people of the Americas. 

Failure of Extremism 

This, I would note, is in sharp contrast to the 
sporadic, discordant, and dissident voices of the 
LASO extremists when they met at the confer- 
ence of their Latin American Solidarity Orga- 
nization in Havana. 

And even Castro must realize by now that 
extremism is not the way of the future for the 
rest of the hemisphere. The plain fact is that 
the people of Latin America have not responded 
to tlie strident call for violence. Those who 
advocate such a sterile course have failed — 
failed to capture the imagination or support of 
the people, failed to achieve any political power 
outside of Cuba, failed to stop the steady for- 
ward movement of the Alliance, failed — above 
all — to identify with the real, the legitimate 
aspirations of the Latin American people. 

It would therefore be a grave mistake to focus 
on the Cul^an problem to the exclusion of all 
others in Latin America or to equate tlie chal- 
lenge of Latin America with that of stopping 
Castro. I am convinced that the Cuban people 
will one day stand free again. Then theirs will 
be the job of determining their own destiny. 

Our main job in Latin America now, how- 
ever, is to stop poverty, to stop inequality, to 
stop hunger, to stop illiteracy — to stop all 
things that create a climate of despair in which 
a Castro, or a Batista, can flourish. 

Our main job in Latin America — indeed, our 
policy in Latin America — is a constructive one, 
a job of building, a job of hope, one that does 
not believe in the force of arms but in the force 
of mutual cooperation. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1967, 
p. 490. 

The Alliance for Progress gives voice and 
form to that policy. It is not aimed against any 
people or regime but it reaches out to all the 
people of the Americas. It seeks not to dominate 
but to sliare ; indeed, the willingness to share is 
its only qualification. 

We hope that someday soon there will be a 
change that will permit the Cuban people to 
share in the Alliance for Progress, too ; for the 
development of the hemisphere is a vast pro- 
gram in which every nation lias its own part to 
play, the Cuban nation along with all the others. 

Our quarrel is not with the people of Cuba 
but with an extremism that pursues a calculated 
policy of intervention in the affairs of other 
nations, preaching hatred and seeking to turn 
count i-ymen against countrymen, and which 
serves as an arm of Soviet force in the 

It is only the posture of the Castro regime 
which has resulted in the isolation of Cuba. We 
would prefer to see the people of Cuba clasp 
the hand of friendship and hemispheric progress 
inherent in the OAS and the Alliance. 

Yearnings for Economic and Social Justice 

For it is progress that should be the overriding 
concern of all of us — progress that will meet the 
just yearnings of the great majority of the peo- 
ple of Latin America. It is in these yearnings for 
economic and social justice that the Alliance 
has its roots. 

In assessing the progress made by the Alli- 
ance, we must therefore imderstand that the 
average citizen — the man who will ultimately 
decide the future of the Alliance and of the con- 
tment — will not be won over by the statistics of 
monthly carloadings or of rising figures on a 
graph. Wliat he wants to see is improvement in 
his life and in his neighborhood. 

He will not be won over by a common market 
with its modernized economies and increased 
business opportunities unless he feels he will 
somehow share in the gains they make possible. 

He will not be inspired or won over by shiny 
new farm equipment and modern agricultural 
methods unless he has a stake in the land they 

He will not be won over by modern schools or 
efforts to wipe out illiteracy unless his education 
permits him to live in a society in which ability 
is the criterion for advancement. 

In short, economic progress alone cannot be 
the key to the future of Latin America. Eco- 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


nomic progress may be the body and muscle of 
the Alliance, but social progress must be its 
heart and its soul. 

Simon Bolivar once said that the goal of the 
Americas was to be the greatest region on earth 
"greatest not so much by virtue of her area or 
her wealth, as by her freedom and her glory." 
That "freedom and glory" must be made possible 
in a continent of social justice and equity. 

Wliat the people of Latin America today seek 
is what we have sought and still seek for our- 
selves in the United States. For we are also try- 
ing to wipe out i^overty in the United States and 
to give each of our citizens his birthright of 
equality and dignity. We are seeking to insure 
the legal right of all of our people to particij^ate 
in the democratic process; and we are trying, 
through great social efforts in medical care, 
education, and job training, to maximize dignity 
for our old and opportunity for our young. 

"We are doing these things through peaceful, 
democratic change, in fulfillment of our own 
revolutionary heritage. Indeed, through our 
own efforts of self-help, we have shown our com- 
mitment to the revolutionary ideology of the 
Alliance for Progress. 

And as the j^eople of Latin America — espe- 
cially the young people — search for an alterna- 
tive to communism, it is appropriate for us to 
remind them that Western democracy — to which 
their culture has contributed so much — stands 
not merely as that alternative but as a way of 
life that offers fulfillment for their aspirations, 
even as it does for ours. 

All in all, the people of the Americas — North 
and South — must concern themselves with 
building societies better able to cope with the 
rising expectations that are the hallmark of the 
20th century. Basically, many of our problems 
are the same — such problems as urban stagna- 
tion, lack of educational facilities, inadequate 
housing, insuflicient public health services, and 
others. And basically, too, the people of Latin 
America want the same as the people of the 
United States — homes, food, jobs, decent 
clothes, an education for tlieir children, the 
opportunity to live a life of dignity in freedom. 
How can they get these? Through land reform, 
urban development, community development, 
low-cost housing, more schools, nutrition, sani- 
tation, hygiene, recreation, and welfare — all the 
things that go into giving people a stake in what 
they are doing and in their countries. In short, 
what they want is a combination of economic 

and human aspirations — a society that under- 
stands it can succeed only if it utilizes the goals 
of economic improvement to provide a better 
life for its people. 

Acceleration of Progress 

And in helping to provide it, the Alliance is 
moving ahead faster in a nvunber of ways than 
we had any right to expect. Yet with all that is 
being done, the monumental nature of the task 
and the scope of the existing problems make 
forward movement of the Alliance appear 

However, we must look not only at the speed 
but also at the rate of acceleration. Only thus 
can we see the distance already traveled. And 
the facts are impressive : There have been more 
tax reforms, more land reforms, more schools 
built, more students trained, more roads built, 
more new mstitutions created in Latin America 
in the past 6 years mider the Alliance for 
Progress than during any previous decade. In 
land tenure, tax reform, and administrative 
reform there has been greater progress during 
the past 6 years than in the previous 25. 

There is no question, however, that the 
Alliance has a long way to go before it accom- 
plishes its goals. Potential for violent revolution 
still exists in every sordid slum in Latin Amer- 
ica, in every backward village where the 
heritage of centuries of neglect remains greater 
than the effort to overcome it. It is this effort 
that the Alliance must now mspire with ever- 
increasmg urgency. 

I believe that, on balance, it is doing so. We 
can see this certainly in the steps being taken to 
implement the decision of the American Presi- 
dents to integrate the economy of Latin 

We can see it, for example, in the establish- 
ment of a coordinating committee of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association and the Cen- 
tral American Common Market to speed the 
process of merging the two into an eventual 
continent-wide common market. 

We can see it in the realistic and creative 
manner in which the population question is now 
being approached. 

We can see it in the spirit of cooperation 
among hemisphere experts who are even now 
studying ways and means of utilizing science 
and technology to improve the life of all the 
American people. 



We can see it in the study now underway to 
establish an educational television network on 
the continent. 

We can see it, above all perhaps, in the will to 
develop ; and this, I believe, dramatically under- 
scores what is taking place. For the very signifi- 
cant fact is that the development of Latin 
America is greater than its growth. 

Actually, the 2.5 percent average annual per 
capita growth rate stipulated in the Charter of 
Punta del Este^ is an abstraction that in and 
of itself tells little. Indeed, to use growth rate 
as an overall yardstick for the success or failure 
of the Alliance can be highly misleading and 
deceptive. For it does not reflect the new convic- 
tion in Latin America that development is today 
a national task which must depend on the gen- 
eration of internal energies and resources. 

This new awareness, which was impressively 
manifested at the Summit Meeting of American 
Presidents, perliaps more than any other factor 
shows that Latin America is developing and 
that the Alliance for Progress is making lasting 

Of course there is much that needs improve- 
ment and reappraisal. But the fact remains that 
with the Alliance we are in the right place at 
the right time with the right program. 

Military Expenditures 

The problems of Latin America camiot be 
filed for some future time or future convenience. 
They are with us now, and their ramifications 
are as great as any in the world today, including 
Viet-Nam ; and we will not serve the future if 
we think otherwise. 

Quite the contrary, we know Latin America 
is a continent in ferment — in re\'olt, if you 
will — against the evils of the past. Vast social 
changes are going on, and more must be stimu- 
lated. The question at issue, therefore, is 
whether the revolution will be a peaceful one — • 
a revolution of international cooperation and 
peaceful change — or whether it will be a violent 
one in which the only ones who stand to gain 
are those who prefer tyranny to freedom. 

This question has particular timeliness today 
when our headlines are filled with reports of an 
alleged arms race in Latin America. It is en- 
tirely right that we should view with deep con- 
cern any move which seems to suggest this 

danger in the hemisphere. Yet when viewed in 
proper perspective, the facts hardly suggest 
that the Latin American nations have embarked 
on such a course. The essential facts are these: 

Latin America spends less on arms than any 
other part of the world. Approximately 90 per- 
cent of its military expenditures is for upkeep 
of militaiy and defense establislunents, and 
only 10 percent is for acquisition of new mili- 
tary equipment. In fact, in the past 20 years 
defense budgets as a proportion of total ex- 
penditures have dropped 50 percent. The cur- 
rent headlined effort on the part of one or two 
Latin American countries to acquire more so- 
phisticated equipment arises from the desire to 
replace outmoded and obsolete equipment which 
is both uneconomical and ineffective. 

The other side of the coin, however, is that 
the limited resources of Latin America are pre- 
cious. At the meeting of Presidents in Punta 
del Este last April * the Presidents determined 
that unnecessary military expenditures should 
be eliminated so that available resources might 
be devoted to the prior social and economic 
needs of the continent. It is in this context that 
the effort to purchase new advanced military 
equipment must be evaluated by the countries 
of Latin America in the light of their own needs 
and aspirations. 

The commitment of the Latin American Pres- 
idents to eliminate unnecessary militai-y ex- 
penditures is a solemn one, and it is right and 
fitting, therefore, we find ways within the inter- 
American system to carry it out. The Inter- 
American Committee of the Alliance for 
Progress, known as CIAP, on which I serve as 
the United States Eepresentative, is charged 
with the responsibility for annual country re- 
views of Alliance programs for each Latin 
American coimtry. Such reviews involve an 
analysis of the plans of each nation and the 
need for additional external resources to cari-y 
forward the country programs. 

Under the terms of an amendment sponsored 
by Senator William Fulbright, the Congress of 
the United States has made a commitment that 
the expenditure of Alliance funds in Latin 
America would be consistent with the recom- 
mendations of CIAP. This gives testimony to 
the United States belief that development is of 
necessity a multinational undertaking. 

It would appear reasonable that in its country 

' For text, see Hid., Sept. 11, 19G1, p. 463. 

' For background, see ihid., May 8. 1967, p. 706. 

NOVEMBER 0, 1967 


reviews CIAP might undertake careful con- 
sideration of proposed defense budgets — a 
review of the allocation of resources devoted to 
defense purposes as compared to the allocation 
of resources for development purposes — in 
order to see whether there are in fact unneces- 
sary military expenditures being contemplated 
which can and should be eliminated in accord- 
ance with the Declaration of Presidents. 

In and of itself the Alliance cannot, of course, 
assure the future of democracy in Latin Amer- 
ica. Democracy cannot be imported from the 
outside ; it must be nurtured and defended from 
the inside. 

The Alliance, if it is to succeed, must be 
guided by men and women who believe in 
courageous and progressive political leadership. 
President Johnson has made unequivocally 
clear our own support for constitutional 
representative democracies in this hemisphere. 
He has said : ° 

In the Latin American countries we are on the side 
of those who want constitutional governments. We are 
not on the side of those who say that dictatorships are 
necessary for efficient economic development or as a 
bulwarli against communism. 

The charter of the Alliance for Progress states 
that it is established "on the basic principle that 
free men working through the institution of 
representative democracy can best satisfy man's 
aspirations." It is not going too far to say that 
the future of the Alliance will to a large extent 
depend on the capacity of progressive demo- 
cratic governments and their leaders. 

But we must walk a careful line between as- 
sertion of principle and intervention in the 
affairs of sovereign countries. This latter course 
was an all too familiar phenomenon of our past 
relationships with Latin America a few decades 
ago. We do, however, have both the respon- 
sibility and the commitment to encourage the 
growth of constitutional representative govern- 
ments in the hemisphere and to make clear our 
hopes for the secure future of political democ- 
racy. For, in the words of the President, ". . . 
we shall have — and deserve — the respect of the 
people of other countries only as they know 
what side America is on." 

President Kennedy was reported as having 
said that the struggle for democracy and free- 
dom is going to be won or lost right here in 
Latin America. 

^ For President Johnson's address at Denver, Colo., 
on Aug. 26, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 19, 1966, p. 406. 

What he meant, I think, is that if we cannot, 
through the Alliance for Progress, win the 
battle for men's hearts and minds in the coun- 
tries of this hemisphere, where we share com- 
mon ties of history, geography, and tradition, 
then it is unlikely that democracy can serve 
better in other parts of the world. 

But all the indications are that we can win, 
and that we will win. If we reject the recipes 
offered by the do-nothings — if our actions are 
guided by our faith in democracy and in the 
power of international cooperation — then I am 
confident that we can move forward toward a 
brighter tomorrow in a hemisphere and in a 
world free from war and free from want. 

Dominican Republic-Puerto Rican 
Economic Commission Announced 

Joint Statement 

White House press release dated October 18 

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dr. Joaquin 
Balaguer, President of the Dominican Republic, 
and Dr. Roberto Sanchez-Vilella, Governor of 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, announced 
today [October 18] that a Joint Dominican Re- 
public-Puerto Rican Economic Commission 
would be appointed and would meet during the 
first week of November in Santo Domingo to 
begin technical plamiing to develop closer and 
mutually beneficial economic relations between 
their peoples. 

The Commission, whose functions have been 
under study for several months, will operate 
through the auspices of the Technical Secre- 
tariat of the Presidency of the Dominican Re- 
public and the Cooperacion Desarrollo Econom- 
ico del Caribe in Puerto Rico, and will be 
composed of representatives from those govern- 
ment agencies directly concerned with the de- 
velopment and coordination of economic affairs. 

In making the announcement, they expressed 
the conviction that strengthened economic coop- 
eration between the governments and peoples 
would contribute not only to the economic and 
social development of the Dominican Republic 
and Puerto Rico but also to the progress of the 
entire Caribbean area, within tlie framework of 
tlie ideals envisioned by the Alliance for Prog- 
ress. The work of the Joint Commission will in 



no way replace or duplicate the activities in 
which various international organizations or 
agencies of the United States Government are 
now carrying on in the Dominican Republic. 
The President of the United States, the Presi- 
dent of the Dominican Republic and the Gover- 
nor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ex- 
pressed their desire that those organizations and 
agencies would cooperate and assist, as appro- 
priate, in this joint effort. 

Ecuador Asks Recall 
of U.S. Ambassador 

Following are the texts of notes exchanged 
between the United States and Ecuador. 

Press release 225 dated October 8 


October 8, 1967 

Excellency: I refer to your Excellency's 
note, delivered by messenger at 5 : 35 p.m., Sat- 
urday, October 7. This note requests the recall 
within forty-eight hours of the United States 
Ambassador to Ecuador, the Honorable Wym- 
berley DeR. Coerr, allegedly for ". . . his atti- 
tude of public, open criticism of the Constitu- 
tional President of the Republic of Ecuador, 
Dr. Otto Arosemena Gomez, in statements made 
on the sixth of the month at a ceremony held at 
the Colegio Americano (American School) in 

In response, I have the honor to assure jovlt 
Excellency that Ambassador Coerr will dej^art 
Quito within the time period requested. 

To your request there can be no other response 
under traditional diplomatic practice. 

Nevertheless, I feel that I must express the 
genuine sorrow with which my Government 
views this manifestation of lack of understand- 
ing and of confidence in the Alliance for 
Progress within the present Government of 

Ambassador Coerr's talk has been received 
and carefully analyzed here. We find it a rea- 
soned, non-polemical discussion on widely held 
points of view about the Alliance for Progress. 
To convert Ambassador Coerr's words on this 
occasion into ". . . public, open criticism of 
the . . . President of Ecuador . . ." is an 

unexpected reaction to a matter about which 
heretofore there has been friendly discussion on 
a number of occasions in many of the capitals 
of the sister Republics of this Hemisphere. The 
issues that Ambassador Coerr discussed are of 
transcendental importance to all members of the 
Alliance for Progress and to their peoples. No 
member's opinion should be immune from 
respectful and friendly examination by others. 

In contemporary diplomacy, especially in 
that of the Western Hemisphere, action of the 
sort that your Excellency has initiated on 
instructions from the Government of Ecuador 
is as serious as it is rare. Hence I must express 
surprise at the mamier in which so important 
a matter, with a very short time limit for action 
by my Government, was brought to the atten- 
tion of the Department of State. 

I join your Excellency most sincerely in wish- 
ing to work toward firmer and more effective 
collaboration between our countries, especially 
in regard to the achievement of the social and 
economic goals of the Alliance for Progress. To 
that end, the Government of the United States 
of America does not expect to reciprocate as to 
the Mission of Your Excellency, even though it 
considers that request of the Government of 
Ecuador to be unjustified by the circumstances. 

For the Secretary of State : 
Covet T. Oltver 
Assistant Secretary of State 

His Excellency 
Carlos Mantilla, 
Ambassador of Ecuador 


No. 4-2-148 
Washington, October 7, IBBH 
Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to 
state to Your Excellency that I have received 
express instructions to inform you that the Gov- 
ernment of Ecuador regrets to find itself in the 
situation of requesting Your Excellency's Gov- 
ernment to recall the Ambassador of the United 
States of America in Quito, Mr. Wimberley 
Coerr, in view of his attitude of public, open 
criticism of the Constitutional President of the 
Republic of Ecuador, Dr. Otto Arosemena 
Gomez, in statements made on the sixth of this 
month at a ceremony held at the Colegio Amer- 
icano [American School] in Quito. 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


2. This unusual demeanor on the part of Am- 
bassador Coerr, which does not conform to 
diplomatic practice and respect for the highest 
authority of the State, would be an impediment 
to him in the future in acting to strengthen the 
cordial and friendly relations which Ecuador 
maintains and desires to make even closer with 
the Government of the United States of 

3. Consequently, I request of Your Excellency 
that Ambassador Coerr be recalled M-ithin forty- 
eight hours. 

4. I wish to say to Your Excellency, in the 
name of the Government of Ecuador and in my 
own name, that this stejj will not aifect Ecua- 
dor's firm decision to strengthen the bonds of 
understanding and cooperation between our two 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew 
to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest 
and most distinguished consideration. 

Carlos Mantilla Ortega 

His Excellency 
Dean Rusk 
Secretary of State, 
Washington, D.O. 


United States and Jamaica Sign 
New Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 220 dated October 3 


Notes were exchanged in Washington Septem- 
ber 29, 1967, which constitute a new compre- 
hensive U.S.-Jamaican bilateral cotton textile 
agreement retroactive to October 1, 1966. George 
R. Jacobs, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs, and V. C. Smith, 
Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Jamaican 
Embassy, signed on behalf of their respective 

The new agreement, which will expire on Sep- 

tember 30, 1970, replaces an agreement signed 
October 1, 1963, and amended the following 
year.^ It was negotiated in the context of the 
Long-Term Arrangements Regarding Interna- 
tional Trade in Cotton Textiles.^ 

A supplemental note permits the exportation 
to the United States of 2 million pounds of cot- 
ton yarn (category 1) outside the agreement 
during the year ending September 30, 1967. 

The major features of the new agreement are : 

(a) Au overall ceiling of 21,416,063 square 
yards equivalent for the first agreement year 
(i.e., October 1, 1966-September 30, 1967) ; 

(b) Specific ceilings on 11 apparel categories ; 

(c) Provisions, similar to those in other U.S. 
bilateral agreements, for flexibility, growth, 
consultation, spacing, exchange of statistics, 
categoiy designations and conversion factors, 
definition of cotton textile articles, equity, and 


First U.S. Note 

September 29, 1967 
Sik: I refer to the decision of the Cotton Textiles 
Committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade approving a Protocol to extend through Septem- 
ber 30, 1970, the Long-Term Arrangements regarding 
International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva 
on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Long-Term Arrangements" ) . I also refer to recent dis- 
cussions between representatives of our two Govern- 
ments and to the agreement between our two 
Governments concerning exports of cotton textiles from 
Jamaica to the United States effected by an exchange 
of notes dated October 1, 1963, as amended. I confirm, 
on behalf of my Government, the understanding that 
this agreement is replaced by a new agreement as pro- 
vided in the following numbered paragraphs. This new 
agreement is based on our understanding that the 
above-mentioned Protocol will enter into force for our 
two Governments on October 1, 1967. 

1. The term of this agreement shall be from October 1, 
1966, through September 30, 1970. During the term 
of this agreement, the Government of Jamaica shall 
limit annual exports of cotton textiles from Jamaica 
to the United States to aggregate and specific limits at 
the levels specified in the following paragraphs. 

2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12- 
month period beginning October 1, 1966 : 


" Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
&13.5, 5.560. 
° For text, see Bui-letin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 



(a) The aggregate limit shall be 21,416,063 square 
yards equivalent. 

(h) Within this aggregate limit, the following 
specific limits shall apply : 




20,000 dozen 


450,000 dozen 


22,000 dozen 


9,261 dozen 


182,905 dozen (of which not more 

than 81,034 dozen shall be 

in Category 50 and not 

more than 127,334 dozen 

Shall be in Category 51) 


92,610 dozen 


30,000 dozen 


30,000 dozen 


100,000 dozen 


460,000 dozen 

3. In the second and succeeding 12-month periods 
for which any limitation is in force under this agree- 
ment, the level of exports isermitted under such limita- 
tion shall he increased by 5 percent of the correspond- 
ing level for the preceding 12-month period, the latter 
level not to include any adjustments iinder paragraphs 

4 or 5. The phrase "level of exports" in the preceding 
sentence refers to the aggregate and specific limits set 
out in paragraph 2 and to the limits set out in para- 
graph 8 of this agreement. 

4. Within the aggregate limit, specific limits may be 
exceeded by not more than 5 percent. 

5. (a) For any agreement year immediately follow- 
ing a year of shortfall (i.e., a year in which cotton 
textile exijorts from Jamaica to the United States were 
below the aggregate limit and any specific limit appli- 
cable to the categoi-y concerned) the Government of 
Jamaica may permit exports to exceed these limits by 
carryover m the following amounts and manner : 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of 
the shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any 
applicable specific limit and shall not exceed 5 percent 
of the aggregate limit applicable to the year of the 
shortfall ; 

(ii) In the case ot shortfalls In the categories sub- 
ject to specific limits, the carryover shall not exceed 

5 percent of the specific limit in the year of the short- 
fall and shall be used in the same category in which 
the shortfall occurred ; and 

(iii) In the case of shortfalls not attributable to 
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall 
not be used to exceed any applicable .specific limit 
except in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
4 and shall not be used to exceed the limits in para- 
graph 8. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph are without any adjustments under 
this paragraph or paragraph 4. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports 
permitted by paragraph 4. 

6. In the implementation of this agreement, the 
system of categories and the rates of conversion into 
square yard equivalents listed in Annex A ' hereto 

' Not printed here ; for text, see Department of State 
press release 220 dated Oct. 3. 

shall apply. In any situation where the determination 
of an article to be a cotton textile is affected by whether 
the criterion provided for in Article 9 of the Long- 
Term Arrangements is used or the criterion provided 
for in paragraph 2 of Annex B of the Long-Term 
Arrangements is used, the chief value criterion used 
by the Government of the United States of America in 
accordance with jiaragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply. 

7. Categories not given a specific limit in paragraph 
2 shall be subject to the aggregate limit, and to the 
relevant consultation and concentration provisions of 
paragraph 8. 

8. (a) The square yard equivalent of any shortfalls 
occurring in exports in the categories given specific 
limits may be used in any category not given a specific 

(b) In the event the Government of Jamaica desires 
to permit exports during any agreement year of more 
than the level of the consultation limit in any category 
not having a specific limit, the Government of Jamaica 
shall request consultation with the Government of the 
United States of America on this question. For the 
first agreement year the level of the consultation limit 
for each category not having a specific limit shall be 
405,169 square yards equivalent. The Government of 
the United States of America shall enter into such 
consultations and, during the course thereof, shall 
provide the Government of Jamaica with infonnation 
on the condition of the United States market in the 
category in question. Until agreement is reaebed, the 
Government of Jamaica shall continue to limit exports 
in that category for that agreement year to the con- 
sultation limit. 

(c) In the event concentration of exports from Ja- 
maica to the United States of apparel items made of a 
particular fabric or threatens to cause market 
disruption in the United States, the Government of the 
United States of America may call for consultations 
with the Government of Jamaica in order to reach a 
mutually satisfactory solution to the problem. The 
Government of Jamaica shall agree to enter into such 
consultations, and, during the course thereof, shall limit 
its exports of the item in question to an annual level of 
105 percent of its exports of that item during the 12- 
month period immediately preceding the month in which 
eon.sultations are requested. 

9. The Government of Jamaica shall use its best ef- 
forts to space exports from Jamaica to the United 
States within each category evenly throughout the 
agreement year, taking into consideration normal 
seasonal factors. 

10. The two Governments recognize that the success- 
ful implementation of this agreement depends in large 
part upon mutual cooperation on statistical questions. 
The Government of the United States of America .shall 
promptly supply the Government of Jamaica with data 
on monthly imports of cotton textiles from Jamaica. The 
Government of Jamaica shall promptly supply the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America with data on 
monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United States. 
Each Government agrees to supply promptly any other 
available relevant statistical data requested by the 
other Government. 

11. The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Jamaica agree to consult on any 
question arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 


ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 
problems arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedure or 

12. If the Government of Jamaica considers that as a 
result of limitations specified In this agreement, Ja- 
maica is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a- 
vis a third country, the Government of Jamaica may 
request consultation with the Government of the United 
States of America with the view to talking appropriate 
remedial action such as a reasonable modification of 
this agreement. 

13. During the term of this agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America will not request 
restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Jamaica 
to the United States under the procedures of Article 3 
of the Long-Term Arrangements. The applicability of 
the Long-Term Arrangements to trade in cotton tex- 
tiles between Jamaica and the United States shall 
otherwise be unaffected by this agreement. 

14. Either Government may terminate this agreement 
effective at the end of an agreement year by written 
notice to the other Government to be given at least 90 
days prior to the end of such agreement year. Either 
Government may at any time propose revisions in the 
terms of this agreement. 

If these proposals are acceptable to your Govern- 
ment, this note and your note of acceptance on behalf 
of the Government of Jamaica shall constitute an agree- 
ment between our Governments. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high 

For the Secretary of State : 
Geobge R. Jacobs 

The Honorable 

Vivian Courtney Smith, 

Charge d' Affaires ad interim of Jamaica 

Second U.S. Note 

September 29, 1967 

Sm : I refer to notes exchanged today constituting an 
agreement between our two Governments concerning ex- 
ports of cotton textiles from Jamaica to the United 
States during the four year period from October 1, 
19G6, through September 30, 1070, inclusive, and to the 
decision of the Cotton Textiles Committee of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade referred to 

Any provisions of the Agreement between our two 
Governments to the contrary notwithstanding, exports 
of 2,000,000 pounds of cotton yarn in Category 1 from 
Jamaica to the United States during the agreement year 
beginning October 1, 1960, only will not he charged 
against limitations in the agreement applicable to that 
agreement year. 

Furthermore, the Government of the United States 
of America will consider any request made by the Gov- 
ernment of Jamaica for i)ermission to allow specified 
quantities of cotton yarn in Category 1 to be exported 
from Jamaica to tue United States during agreement 
years beginning in 1067 and thereafter without being 
charged against the limitations of the agreement. The 

United States Government will inform the Govern- 
ment of Jamaica of the result of such consideration by 
the beginning of the agreement year for which the re- 
quest has been made or within 30 days after the date 
of the request, whichever is later. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high 

For the Secretary of State : 
Geobge R. Jacobs 
The Honorable 
Vivian Coubtnet Smith 
Charge d' Affaires ad interim of Jamaica 

Current Actions 



Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into 
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Gambia, October 18, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 

traflic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 

Entered into force March 5, 1967 ; for the United 

States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands (including Suri- 
nam and the Netherlands Antilles), September 21, 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Botswana, October 16, 1967. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 

force Augu,st 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Accession deposited: Panama, October 20, 1967. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Signature: Intercontinental de Comunicaciones 
For Sat«ite, S.A. of Panama, October 20, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig- 
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 
27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: United Arab Republic, Oc- 
tober 10, 1067. 


Protocol extending the arrangement regarding Interna- 



tional trade in cotton textiles of October 1, 1962 

(TIAS 5240). Done at Geneva May 1, 1967. Entered 

into force October 1, 196T. 

Acceptances: Australia, September 30, 1967 ; ' Austria, 
September 11, 1967 ; Belgium, September 29, 1967 ; 
Canada, August 3, 1967 ; - China. September 28, 
1967; Colombia, September 22, 1967; Denmark, 
August 1, 1967 ; Finland and France, September 29, 
1907 ; Germany, Federal Republic, September 29, 
1967 ; ' Greece, September 4, 1967 ; India, Septem- 
ber 20, 19G7 ; ' Israel, August 3, 1967 ; Italy, Sep- 
tember 29. 1967 ; ^ Jamaica, October 2, 1967; Japan, 
September 30, 1967 ; Korea, September 1, 1967 ; 
Luxembourg, September 29, 1967 ; Mexico, Septem- 
ber 28, 1967; Netherlands (for European territory 
only), September 29, 1967; Norway and Portugal, 
September 11, 1967 ; Spain, October 3, 1967 ; Sweden 
September 26, 1967; United Arab Republic, Sep- 
tember 21, 1967 ; United Kingdom (including Hong 
Kong) , September 15, 1967.^ 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Adopted at New York December 20, 1965.' 
Ratification deposited: Philippines, October 2, 1967. 



Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 
amended; 7 U.S.C. ]G;!1-1736D), with annex. Signed 
at Rio de Janeiro October 5, 1967. Entered into force 
October 5, 1967. 


Agreement amending the agreement of April 13, 1967 
(TIAS 6252), governing the coordination of pilotage 
services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence 
Seaway. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
October 6, 1967. 


Agreement concerning exports of cotton textiles from 
the Republic of China to the United States, with 
related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington October 12, 1967. Entered into force October 
12, 1967. 


Agreement amending the air transport agreement of 
August 15, 1960, as extended and supplemented 
(TIAS 4675, 5513, 5047, 5648, 5853, 5897). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Mexico September 19, 1967. 
Entered into force provisionally September 19, 1967. 

' With a statement. 

" Subject to maintenance of the protocol relating to 
the reservation attached by Canada to its acceptance 
of the original arran-;ement of October 1, 1962. 

^ Subject to ratification. 

* With understandings. 

° Subject to maintenance of the protocol relating to 
the U.K. reservation attached to the original arrange- 
ment of October 1, 1962. 

' Not in force. 


Agreement amending the agreement of March 23, 1967 
(TIAS 6237), relating to trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon September 
29, 1967. Entered into force September 29, 1967. 


Agreement concerning exports of cotton textiles from 
Spain to the United States. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington October 13, 1967. Entered into 
force October 13, 1967. 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement extending the agreement of December 4, 
1963 (TIAS 5500), concerning trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
September 29 and 30, 1967, between the United 
States and the Embassy of India, representing the 
interests of the United Arab Republic. Entered into 
force September 30, 1967. 


Agreement amending the agreement of October 5, 1964, 
as amended (TIAS 5667, 5926), concerning trade in 
cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Belgrade September 26, 1967. Entered into force 
September 26, 1967. 

Agreement concerning exports of cotton textiles from 
Yugoslavia to the United States. Effected by an ex- 
change of notes at Belgrade September 26, 1967. 
Enters into force January 1, 1968. 



The Senate on October 18 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

L. Dean Brown to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Senegal, and to serve concurrently as Ambassador 
to The Gambia. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated October 6.) 

George J. Feldman to be Ambassador to Luxembourg. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated August 17.) 

Hugh H. Smythe to be Ambassador to Malta. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
September 29.) 

Harrison M. Symmes to be Ambassador to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. (For biographic 
details, see White House press release dated Septem- 
ber 29.) 

Roger W. Tubby to be U.S. representative to the 
European Office of the United Nations, with the rank 
of Ambassador. (For biographic details, see Wliite 
House press release dated September 19.) 

NOVEMBER 6, 1967 



Recent Releases 

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Educational and Cultural Exchange Opportunities 

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to Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 
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Viet-Nam Information Notes. Latest pamphlets in the 
Department's new series of Viet-Nam studies, each of 
which summarizes the most significant available mate- 
rial on one important aspect of the Viet-Nam situation. 

No. 7. Viet Cong Terror Tactics in South Viet-Nam 
describes the use of terror by the Viet Cong as a delib- 
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civilians assassinated and kidnaped. Pub. 8259. Bast 
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No. 8. National Reconciliation in South Viet-Nam 
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No. 9. Prisoners of War. While the U.S. and South 
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enemy forces, the North Vietnamese so far have 
ignored them almost completely, despite continued U.S. 
efforts to obtain compliance. Pub. 8275. East Asian and 
Pacific Series 164. 8 pp. illus. 50. 

No. 10. Legal Basis for U.S. Military Aid to South 
Viet-Nam summarizes the essential points of interna- 
tional law by which the U.S. is justified and in fact 
obligated to participate in the defense of South Viet- 
Nam. This pamphlet is based on a broader study "The 
Legality of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Viet- 
Nam," issued as a reprint from the Department of 
State Bulletin in March 1966. Pub. 8285. East Asian 
and Pacific Series 16,5. 4 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Turkey — 
Signed at Ankara April 2, 1966. Entered into force 
April 2, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6173. 9 pp. 

Telecommunication Convention and Final Protocol. 

Convention, with Annexes, and Final Protocol between 
the United States of America and Other Governments — 
Signed at Montreux November 12, 1965 — Signed on be- 
half of the United States of America, subject to certain 

declarations, November 12, 1965. Entered into force 
with respect to the United States of America May 29, 
1967. And additional protocols I-IV. TIAS 6267. 626 pp. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Hong Kong, 
amending the agreement of August 26, 1966. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Hong Kong May 31, 1967. Entered 
into force May 31, 1967. Effective October 1, 1965. TIAS 
6290. 8 pp. 10«S 

Settlement of Veterans Claims. Agreement with the 
Philippines — Signed at Manila June 29, 1967. Entered 
into force June 29, 1967. TIAS 6295. 2 pp. 50. 

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. With other 
governments — Done at New York, March 30, 1961. En- 
tered into force with respect to the United States of 
America June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 184 pp. 65^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel — 
Signed at Washington August 4, 1967. Entered into 
force August 4, 1967. TIAS 6314. 15 pp. 10«!. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the OfBce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to October 16 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 220 
of October 3 and 225 of October 8. 


















•240 10/20 




Advisory panel on interna- 
tional law. 

Ro-stow : "Another Round in 
the Great Debate : American 
Security in an Unstable 
World" (advance text). 

Katzenbach : Fairfield Uni- 
versity, Fairfield, Conn. 

Rusk : Senate Finance Com- 

Program for visit of Prince 
Souvanna Phouma, Prime 
Minister of Laos. 

Program for visit of Prime 
Minister of Singapore (re- 

Linowitz : Inter-A m e r i c a n 
Press Association, Dorado 
Beach, Puerto Rico. 

Program for visit of El Hadj 
Ahmadou Ahidjo, Presi- 
dent of the Federal Republic 
of Cameroon. 

Program for visit of Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz, President of the 
United Mexican States. 

Rusk: Interview for foreign 
television taped Oct. 16. 

Palmer : "America's Under- 
standing of Africa." 

♦Not i)rinted. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 




November 6,1967 Vol. LVII, No. 1^80 

nerican Principles. Another Round in the 
Great Debate : American Security in an Un- 
stable World (Rostow) 605 

Asia. Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in 
Interview for Foreign Television • . . . . 595 

liina. Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in 
Interview for Foreign Television 595 

Congress. (Confirmations (Brown, Feldman, 

Smythe, Synunes, Tubby) 625 

department and Foreig^n Service. Onfirmatioiis 
(Brown, Feldman, Smythe, Syuimes, Tubby) . 625 

Dominican Republic. Dominican Republic-Puerto 
Rican Economic Ck>mmission Announced . . 620 

Economic Affairs. Dominican Republic-Puerto 
Rican Ek;onomic Commission Announced . . 620 

Ecuador. Ecuador Asks Recall of U.S. Ambassa- 
dor (exchange of notes) 621 

Europe. Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in 
Interview for Foreign Television 595 

Gambia, The. Brown confirmed as Amba.ssador . 62.j 

Jamaica. United States and Jamaica Sign New 

• CJotton Textile Agreement (texts of U.S. 
notes) 622 

Jordan, Symmes confirmed as Ambassador . . 625 

Latin America. Hemisphere Cooperation Through 

the Alliance for Progress (Linowitz) . . . 616 

Luxembourg. Feldman confirmed as Ambassa- 
dor 625 

Malta. Smythe confirmed as Ambassador . . . 625 

Presidential Documents. Prime Minister of 
Singapore Visits the United States .... 612 

Publications. Recent Releases 626 

Senegal. Brown confirmed as Ambassador . 625 

Singapore. Prime Minister of Singapore Visits 
the United States (Johnson, Lee, joint state- 
ment) 612 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 624 

United States and Jamaica Sign New Cotton 
Textile Agreement (texts of U.S. notes) . . 622 

United Nations. Tubby confirmed as U.S. repre- 
sentative to European OflSce of the United 
Nations C25 


Another Round iu the Great Debate : American 

Security in an Unstable World (Rostow) . . 605 
The Complex and Difficult Problems in Viet-Nam 

(Katzenbach) ■ . . . . 602 

Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in Interview 

for Foreign Television 59-"> 

Name Index 

Brown, L. Dean . . . ■ 625 

Feldman, George J 625 

Johnson, President • 612 

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 602 

Lee Kuan Tew 612 

Linowitz, Sol M 616 

Rostow, Eugene V . • 605 

Rusk, Secretary 595 

Smythe, Hugh H 625 

Symmes, Harrison M 625 

Tubby, Roger W 625 


■il 120 SbVW NOiSOa 

iN3WiilVd3Q 33N3I0S IV 1 DOS 

9 Oia-q-O 

Superintendent of Documents 
i.s. government printing office 













Address hy President Johnson 631 


^. -. ^Or/hyi Assistant Secretary Palmer 656 


Statements Before the Senate Finance Convmittee, October 18 

Secretary Rush 634 

Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall 638 

Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman 642 

Secretary of Gorwmerce Alexander B. Trowbridge 645 

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations William M. Roth 648 

Secretary of the Treasury Hem^ H. Foioler 650 

For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1481 Publication 8323 
November 13, 1967 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovemment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Ouide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
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Progress in a Generation of Peril 

Address hy President Johnson ^ 

It is a very great pleasure for me to welcome 
you here for your first conference in this hemi- 
spliere. I have been familiar with your work, 
your good work, for many years. In 1961, I 
took one of the most rewarding and exciting 
trips of my life with your president, Jim Suf- 
fridge. Together we visited a number of your 
countries on a mission for President Kennedy. It 
was on that journey, with INIr. Suff ridge as my 
guide, that I saw some of the worldwide acti\d- 
ties of FIET. 

I saw then in other lands what I knew well 
in my own : working people building better lives 
for themselves and better futures for their fam- 
ilies through their labor organizations. I saw 
schools, new housing and health clinics, credit 
unions and cooperatives which had been created 
largely with the help of trade unions. 

As you meet to study the problems and the 
promise of tomorrow, I join you as one who 
shares your vision of the good life. I come as a 
representative of 200 million people who want 
very much to see a world : 

— in which all the guns of war are stilled ; 

— in which every nation is free to mark its own 
course ; 

— in which every man is able to build through 
his own effort fulfillment for himself and op- 
portunity for his children. 

We can agree quickly, I think, that this is 
the goal we all seek — because we are not the 
first to actually put it into words. In this gener- 
ation, many men from many lands have talked 
hopefully of a stable world of growing prom- 
ise — because for the first time in man's history 

^ Made before the International Federation of Com- 
mercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees at Wash- 
ington, D.C., on Oct. 23 (White House press release). 

it is realistic to think in global terms about 
improving man's condition. 

The fact that mankind now can rid this 
planet of ignorance and hunger is one of the 
most awesome bits of knowledge we live with. 

It is history's cruel paradox that man should 
finally acquire this ability, after all his years 
of struggle, just as he also gains the power to 
destroy his race. 

The rest of his story will be told, if it is told 
at all, in terms of which power he actually 

He can use his atomic might to make the 
deserts of the world bloom — or to incinerate 
his planet. 

We can use our science to develop weapons 
that dwarf the mind — or to expand men's minds 
with learning. 

We can commit our sons to a new generation 
of peril — or leave them the foundation stones 
for a new civilization. 

The will to live is the strongest human im- 
pulse. It generates a stubborn optimism which 
runs deep in the human spirit. 

An eloquent American writer has given it 
voice in our time when he said : 

I believe that man will not merely endure : he will 
prevail. He is immortal, not because he alone among 
creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he 
has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice 
and endurance. 

William Faulkner spoke those words almost 
two decades ago. It is a measure of how far we 
have come that they sounded braver when they 
were spoken than they do as we meet here today. 

The great victories of reason and agreement, 
which can assure the survival of the human 
race, still are in front of us. 

The ones behind us are modest and small. 
But they are victories nonetheless. 

NOVEMBER 13, 190 


We have not yet passed safely through the 
danger we have created. But we have walked 
f ai' enough to dare to hope that we will make it. 

Aggression in Viet-Nam 

The fact that war itself has not yet dis- 
ai^peared is a matter of infinite tragedy. 

Many thousands of our coimtrymen are today 
involved in a bitter conflict in a land far away 
because armed invaders try to impose their will 
on their neighbor. 

In every way we can, we search for peace in 
Viet-Nam. But we appear to be searching alone. 
Those who began the war are not willing to sit 
down and with us explore the ways to end it. 
They cling stubbornly to the belief that their 
aggression will be rewarded — by our frustra- 
tion, our impatience, our unwillingness to stay 
the course. 

It will not be so. 

Peace and stability will come to Asia only 
when the aggressors know that they cannot take 
another people's land by force. 

Our Asian allies fighting beside us believe 

And so do the leaders and the peoples of those 
free nations that are standing there in the path 
of conquest. 

But to end the threat of war we must do even 
more than keep aggression in check. 

As all of you know, most wars are bred in 
conditions of human misery. Aggressors are 
boldest when they can exploit a people's 

This discontent chums in a world where il- 
literacy cripples two-fifths of the adult popu- 
lation and where disease stUl dooms millions 
of children to an early death. 

The experience of the last decade proves that 
violence erupts most often in the nations which 
are the poorest. 

The great work of our day, therefore, is to 
change the conditions that encourage war — to 
do something about the old tyrannies of hunger, 
disease, ignorance, and poverty which still en- 
slave two-thirds of the human race. 

That work has well started. 

I am very proud of the role my own country 
has played in the beginning of this worthy 
adventure. A leading public figure of a free 
Asian country recently said about the United 
States, and I quote him : ". . . this is perhaps 
the first time in history that a world power 

has consciously used its strength and wealth 
to promote the interests of weak and poor 

So, on behalf of our people, I believe that 
tribute is well deserved. The American people 
have used their resources in a constructive and 
compassionate way — because we have had to 
learn quickly the lessons which history forced 
upon us overnight. 

Constructive Change Through Regionalism 

Today, history teaches us all a new lesson. 

A concept of world order already is quietly 
emerging which, we believe, offers the world 
its best chance for constructive change. 

It is a new sense of community. It links to- 
getlier states that share a common geography. 

Tlaere is no word which can adequately de- 
scribe it and convey the excitement and the 
hope it generates. But, for want of a better term, 
we all have started calling it regionalism. 

It is built on an idea which has grown rapidly 
in the minds of many men. It is simply this: 
Despite the spirit of nationalism, the problems 
of an area respect no national borders. There is 
a belief that action can be more effective when 
it is taken in unison. There is a determination 
to work together in shaping a common destiny 
through economic development. 

Tlie logic of this idea first became evident in 
Europe. The chaos of war had forced the leaders 
of Western Europe to look with new insight 
into the old patterns of rivalry. They reached a 
significant conclusion. They saw that the more 
they could travel together, the faster they could 
move to a prosperous future. Going it alone, 
perhaps they would never make it. So the Euro- 
pean Common Market was a result of this 

In Latin America economic integration is 
clearly seen as the key which can unlock the 
strength dreamed of for centuries. 

In Asia the same idea has now begun — for the 
very first time — to persuade separate nations of 
their common purpose. 

Africa, too, is feeling the stirrings of this re- 
gional spirit. 

Only in the Middle East do ancient rivalries 
and frustrations still seem to inhibit the pros- 
pects of cooperation. But in our search for new 
solutions to old challenges there is hope even 
here that men will look together at the problems 
they share. 




Nowhere is the road easy, and nowhere has 
tliat road yet been fully traveled. But men and 
nations are today moving ahead together. 

In my years of public life no development in 
world affairs has given me more encouragement. 
Because behind the headlines of crisis, a new 
spirit of progress has been quietly at work. 

The United States of America will continue 
to encourage its development and continue to 
support its growth. 

But the world itself remains man's first com- 
munity. And problems still must be met on a 
global basis — weather control, for example, and 
the spread of nuclear weapons, and interna- 
tional monetary reform. 

World Trade and the World Community 

And then world trade is another. 

It was just 5 years ago — I know you will 
remember — that the major trading countries be- 
gan the most ambitious round of trade negotia- 
tions that had ever been imdertaken. Because 
these talks were initiated by a great American 
President, they took his name and became 
known as the Kennedy Eound. 

This past summer, the Kemiedy Roimd was 
successfully concluded. It brought tariff reduc- 
tions greater than any known in our history. It 
moved the world closer to the healthy trading 
conditions on which the prosperity of many 
nations depends. 

It was an historic landmark in the efforts of 
all of us to create a sounder world community. 

Preserving the gains won in the Kennedy 
Roimd is now essential to the harmony and well- 
being of all of us. 

It will not be easy. Freer trade often causes 
temporary but painful dislocations. And today, 
once again, we hear protectionist voices rising 
out of the past. 

But larger interests just must prevail. We 
must consider our common interests : 

— to protect our consumers; 

— to promote healthy and competitive inclus- 
ti"y and agriculture; 

— to raise the productivity and wages of our 

We have an enormous stake in keeping and 
extending the benefits of 30 years of construc- 
tive trade policy. 

And our overall interest lies in working to- 
gether to establish new conditions for a peace- 
ful and more prosperous world order. 

To the developing countries, striving to 
reach the 20th-century industrial world, trade 
is the lifeline of hope. 

The leading nations of the free world are 
together studying ways to improve the trading 
position of those emerging nations. In the mean- 
time, the Kennedy Round increases the trading- 
opportunities that are so badly needed. 

That increase in strength is not enough to 
assure their industrial success, it is true. But 
it is a long step forward. 

Yes, as we meet here this morning, the world 
is moving fast. Developnients measured a step 
at a time may not stir the mind as forcefully as 
the headlong rush of crisis does. 

And through a generation of peril, progress 
has often moved forward by short steps. Yet 
those steps now add up to many, many miles. 

So I think it is good for all of vis, when we 
are burdened by the awareness of how far we 
must still go, to look back and reflect on how 
far we have come. 

I am very grateful for this opportunity to try 
to — in my own humble way — point out some of 
the things that we have yet to do and some of the 
things that we already have done. 

I thank you very much. 

NOVEMBER 13, 1967 


The Price of Protectionism 

The Senate Flruince Cormnittee opened hear- 
ings October 18 on varioios import quota hills. 
Following are statements made before the com- 
mittee on that day by Secretary Rush, Secretary 
of the Interior Stewart L. Vdall, Secretary of 
Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of 
Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge, and Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations Wil- 
liajii M. Roth, together with the text of a letter 
submitted by Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
H. Fowler to Senator Russell B. Long, chair- 
inan of the committee. 


Press release 235 dated October 18 

I am grateful to you for this opportunity to 
comment on the international economic and 
political implications of a unilateral retreat to 
protectionism a.ffecting large sectors of our na- 
tional economy. I am sure that all of us here 
realize that the matter before us is of funda- 
mental importance. For 33 years it has been 
the policy of the United States to lower, on the 
basis of reciprocity, barriers to international 
trade. This policy has served our nation well. 
It has contributed, I believe — especially since 
the Second World War — to the remarkable rise 
in our national prosperity and in the standard 
of living of our people. At the same time it has 
served our vital interest in promoting world 
peace, by helping to make it possible for other 
nations to obtain the goods which they need 
from abroad through trade. 

Recently, another major advance in freeing 
world trade was achieved: the successful con- 
clusion of the Kennedy Round negotiations.^ 
Your committee now has before it proposals 
which, if adopted, would not only destroy the 

* For background, see Bulletin of July 24, 
p. 95. 



advance made in the Kennedy Round but re- 
verse a longstanding national policy. The con- 
sequences of such a repudiation would be criti- 
cally detrimental to our basic national interests. 

We live in an age wlien nation-states can no 
longer afford the luxury of indulging in sudden 
actions which affect others without the most 
careful scrutiny of the probable rejiercussions. 
If we glance back a few decades, we find the in- 
terdependence of the world economy had even 
then reached a point where unilateral actions on 
a grand scale were self-defeating. Thus, an ef- 
fort by this country to isolate itself from the 
world economy through the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff led to offsetting actions by others, result- 
ing in a spiral of trade restrictions whose 
invidious effects are only now — 37 years later — • 
on the verge of Iseing eliminated as a major 
force in world affairs. 

The name of one of my distinguished prede- 
cessors, Cordell Hull, immediately comes to 
mind when one reviews the recent tariff history 
of this country and our championship of the 
cause of lowering barriers to trade. I in no way 
minimize his tremendous contribution if I ob- 
serve he has had lots of company. Democratic 
and Republican administrations alike — from 
Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson — and the Con- 
gress, too, have consistently supported the broad 
thrust of the same foreign trade policy. This has 
been so whether or not the majority in Con- 
gress has been of one party or another and 
whether or not that majority has been of the 
same party as the President. 

The reasons for this consistency are not, I 
believe, very difficult to find. First, there is the 
fact that a policy of trade restrictionism had 
been tried and found to be a failure. Secondly, 
the extraordmary growth of science and tech- 
nology gives an entirely different dimension to 
the old, respected, and sound theoiy of compara- 
tive advantage. Modern industrial society is 
built around the concei^t of productivity : liigh 


output at low unit costs. Our comparative tech- 
nological lead, plus our higher labor costs, has 
made it more and more to our advantage to have 
the access to world markets made possible by 
a liberal trade policy. For, in the familiar 
phrase, "Trade is a two-way street." I don't 
apologize for using that cliche, because it ex- 
presses a basic truth — a reality which is vital in 
maintainmg the prosperity of this coimtry and 
the entire fabric of international cooperation 
we have constructed so carefully over the years. 

Programs To Promote Export Expansion 

Let me emphasize that the Department of 
State's approach to international trade is not 
theoretical. We are deeply concerned with the 
practical problems of American busmess — its 
owners, managers, and workers. A strong na- 
tional economy is the indispensable foundation 
for our national security and for our efforts to 
organize a reliable peace. Promotion of our na- 
tional economic growth has been an objective 
of our foreign policy since Benjamin Franklin 
went abroad as our first Ambassador. 

Five years ago I iiistructed our Chiefs of Mis- 
sion abroad to take an active personal role in 
assisting American firms to expand export mar- 
kets.- Where our products have been subjected 
to unwarranted restrictions, we have negotiated 
to remove such restrictions. I myself made a 
trip to Bonn to discuss chickens with the Chan- 
cellor of the Federal Eepublic of Germany. 

We have greatly expanded our programs to 
assist American businessmen to do more busi- 
ness abroad. Over 10,000 trade opportunities a 
year are generated hj the United States Foreign 
Service and disseminated to the U.S. business 
community through Department of Commerce 

All dynamic businessmen want more busi- 
ness — for them, there is no such thing as enough. 
This quality has had a lot to do with the growth 
and performance of our economy. We under- 
stand the desires of business concerns to obtain 
further increments in sales. But resort to politi- 
cal action to obtain governmental intervention 
in behalf of a particular industry raises serious 
problems when one of the consequences would 
be damage to some other American producers. 
If, as a nation, we wish to sell, we must buy. 

"For Secretary Rusk's letter of Oct. 19, 1962, sent 
to American ambassadors abroad, see iUd., Nov. 5, 
1962, p. 682. 

Realistically, we cannot talk about chipping 
away half of the Kennedy Round without talk- 
ing about losing the benefits of the other half. 

Compensatory Action Under GATT 

Let us suppose that all or most of the restric- 
tions on hnports currently being considered 
were put into effect. Wliat would other countries 
do? Would they issue protests, make nasty 
speeches, and criticize us ? They would do a great 
deal more than that. They would undoubtedly 
strike back. Nor would this be an unfriendly act 
on their part. Indeed, a number of our leading 
trading partners, with all of whom we have the 
closest political ties, have already submitted 
formal diplomatic notes to the Department of 
State expressing their very great concern about 
the possible impairment of trade concessions ne- 
gotiated with us if the bills under consideration 
were to become law. Australia, for example, 
drew our attention to its estimate that 60 per- 
cent of Australia's exports to the United States 
would be affected if these restrictive measures 
were applied. 

Retaliation would simply be what is pei'mitted 
by the rules of the game as that game is now 
practiced by some 70 countries accounting for 
about 85 percent of world trade. I refer, of 
course, to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade— the GATT. 

The GATT is essentially a code of conduct 
for fair play in international trade. The United 
States played a major role in its negotiation in 
1947. Like many of the great initiatives of the 
early post- World War II days, it reflected a 
conviction that there must surely be a better 
way to organize man's affairs than had been the 
case in the preceding decades of self-centered 
nationalism. In the area of international trade 
policy, the GATT represents an attempt to pre- 
vent a repetition of some of the economic blun- 
ders of the 1930's. 

The GATT does this by establishing a legal 
framework for the stability of trade concessions 
negotiated in good faith among sovereign coun- 
tries. We accord others access to our market 
in return for the right of our exporters to sell 
in their markets. If we impair the access we 
have agreed to give others, two courses of action 
are available under the GATT. We can offer re- 
ductions of our import barriers on other prod- 
ucts equivalent in trade value to the impaired 
concession. Or the foreign coimtry can with- 

NOVEMBER 13, 1967 


draw concessions affecting an equivalent trade 
value for American exports in the foreign mar- 
ket. This may sound a bit complicated — the 
legal language of the GATT is much more 
complicated — but the idea is clear. It is retalia- 
tion — by agreement among all parties in ad- 
vance that restrictive action by one party 
entitles the aggrieved party, as a matter of legal 
right, to compensatory action. 

As this committee knows, the administration's 
authority to negotiate reductions of our trade 
barriers expired on June 30 of this year. What 
would happen today if we were to impose new 
trade barriers or tighter quotas affecting about 
$6.3 billion or more of our imports? The pros- 
pects would be nothing short of appalling. 

As we would be unable to offer compensatory 
reductions of other trade barriers, foreign coun- 
tries would automatically and promptly remove 
an equivalent value of ti'ade concessions granted 
to the United States either in the Kennedy 
Round or in earlier negotiations. Moreover — 
and I would like to stress this jjoint because I 
fear it is not well understood in this country — 
we could not choose the sectors which foreign 
governments might select for increased barriers 
against our exports. Many foreign governments 
would be likely to make it as painful as possible 
for us, hox^ing thereby to bring us to our senses. 

Costs of Import Restrictions 

We have the sovereign right to impose re- 
strictions to protect particular sectors of our 
economy, but we have no control over who will 
]iay the costs. Thus a congressional decision to 
isolate our steel industry from foreign competi- 
tion might be paid for not just by higher prices 
for steel in this country but by reduced foreign 
sales opportunities for our farmers, our pro- 
ducers of machine tools, computers, canned 
fruit, automobiles, and who knows what else. 
And reduced sales opportunities for our export 
industries mean reduced production, employ- 
ment, and profit in these industries. 

We cannot act in isolation in trade policy, 
any more than we can in political and military 
policies. A way of giving this inescapable fact 
of modern life the attention it deserves would 
ho to include a separate section on who should 
\K\y the price for proposed legislation which 
aims at restricting foreign access to our market. 
Such a section or title might express the sense of 
Congress that if foreign countries do not con- 
sider the United States has inflicted sufficient 

punishment upon itself by requiring its citizens 
to pay higher prices for the particular product, 
then it is hoped that retaliation will be focused 
on certain specified United States export items 
which the Congress feels are best able to suffer 
the consequences. Of course, foreign interests 
probably would not resj^ect such advice — in- 
deed, would no doubt deliberately select other 
more vulnerable targets. But by including some 
such provision in the bill or the legislative 
record, Congress would face up to the fact 
that there are penalties for restrictive trade 

Let's examine for a moment what some of 
those costs might be. It is a very complicated 
statistical task to match up domestic produc- 
tion, exports, imports, and employment. There- 
fore our statistical compilations for these inter- 
relationships have a long leadtime. The figures 
I will give in a moment are a bit dated (1964) — 
but that has the effect of mmimizing rather 
than exaggerating the possible consequences. 
We exported computers valued at $369 million 
in 1964 — this was 18 percent of our total 
domestic output in an industry of 160,000 work- 
ers. Exports of tractors valued at $188 mil- 
lion accounted for 20 percent of the output of 
our farm machinery industry of 147,000 em- 
ployees. Fourteen percent of our domestic out- 
put of commercial refrigeration equipment 
amounting to $83 million was exported that 
year from an industry with 70,000 employees. 
There are innumerable other examples in the 
industrial sector. For agricultural products, 
more up-to-date figures are available : U.S. com- 
niercial sales abroad, not food aid, in fiscal year 
1966 included feed grains valued at $923 mil- 
lion, oils and seeds valued at $825 million, fruits 
and vegetables $371 million, wheat and flour at 
$344 million, tobacco $264 million, cotton $246 
million, rice $127 million, and many others. 
These are, I repeat, commercial sales. 

"\^niich of these sectors of our economy do you 
think is prepared to have a smaller market, re- 
duced sales, lower prices, lower profits, and a 
shorter workweek in exchange for insulating 
other sectors of our economy fi'om unport com- 
petition ? 

If we keep out imports, foreigners will keep 
out our exports, wliicli means reduced employ- 
ment for Americans. As trade barriers rise, 
there will be an increased incentive for our own 
entrepreneurs to establish or buy up subsidiaries 
abroad in order to get inside the barriers erected 
against our direct exports. Again, this would 



mean fewer jobs for Americans. Our farmers 
don't have this option ; they simply have smaller 
sales and lower prices. Thus, trade i-estrictions 
do not help keep jobs here; they do just the 

Reversal of Policy 

Our domestic economy, our trade policy, and 
our foreign relations can and do survive occa- 
sional departures from the objective we have 
pursued for so many years. We have had what 
is called escape-clause actions over the years — 
not many but not insignificant in trade terms. 
These exceptional procedures provide additional 
time for industries to adjust to import competi- 
tion. Other countries also do things from time 
to time which adversely ailect our trade and 
give rise to diplomatic complaints. But as I in- 
dicated, these have been actions which attract 
attention because they have been genuinely ex- 
ceptional. We are currently confronted with an 
array of protectionist appeals which, if the 
Congress were to succumb, would constitute not 
an exception to but a reversal of policy. It would 
be beyond the bounds of plausibility for us to 
argue internationally that United States trade 
restrictions affecting $6 billion or more of our 
imports were just an exception. That is the im- 
mense volume we think might be involved if we 
were to further restrict all forms of textiles, 
steel, petroleum, watches, meat, dairy products, 
and lead and zinc. All of our trading partners — 
and virtually all of them would be affected — 
would interpret such a move, correctly I believe, 
as a fundamental shift in American trade 

The particular form of protection being 
sought by most of the special interest groups is 
that of quotas. Quotas are illegal under the 
GATT except under certain carefully prescribed 
circumstances, which do not cover the kind of 
sweeping protection currently pending in the 
Congress. The general GATT prohibition 
against quotas was adopted largely at Amer- 
ican insistence — it has always been regarded as 
one of the GATT's greatest achievements. This 
is because the absolute limitations imposed by 
quotas are a far more drastic interference with 
market forces than even high tariffs, which can 
be overcome by increasing efSciency, reducing 
costs, or offering a jiroduct with special design, 
quality, or other features. However, no amount 
of efficiency or ingenuity can overcome a quota, 
and the resulting monopoly position of domes- 

tic producers reduces the incentive for cost re- 
duction and product improvement. In addition 
to these disadvantages, quotas are difficult and 
costly to administer. 

I should like to offer an observation as to the 
international negotiability of some of the pro- 
posals now pending before the Senate. Some of 
them would give the administration a few 
months to negotiate so-called "voluntary" re- 
straints with foreign governments, failing 
which the quotas would be imposed by the 
United States — and in a more restrictive form. 
It is difficult for me to visualize a "negotiation" 
on this basis. In relations between friendly coun- 
tries, there is always a reluctance to negotiate 
under threat. Thus, while there is an aura of 
reasonableness in some of these bills, it is in my 
opinion a false one. 

International Political Ramifications 

I have commented on some of the economic 
costs of trade restrictions. There would be other 
costs which are equally important to me, as Sec- 
retary of State. They would tear at the fabric of 
international cooperation and economic devel- 
opment we have so carefully nurtured over the 
years in our efforts to build a more peaceful 
world for future generations. 

A reversion to a protectionist policy would 
nullify 20 years of our efforts in Western Eu- 
rope to build up a healthy partner able to defend 
itself and join us in meeting the vast needs in 
other parts of the world. A massive outbreak 
of trade restrictions in the United States would 
turn Western Europe inward and against us be- 
cause they would have no realistic alternative. 
Tills would have incalculable consequences for 
our political and military positions. Economi- 
cally, it would destroy the great initiative of 
Jolin F. Kennedy embodied in the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962 and tlie multilateral 
achievement which bears his name: the Ken- 
nedy Round. My colleague. Bill Roth, will speak 
to this point in more detail. 

To many poor nations of other continents, an 
outbreak of trade restrictions in America would 
occasion more than just despair. They, too, 
would retaliate with such weapons as they pos- 
sess, economic as well as political. 

The international political ramifications of 
our trade policy are a weighty factor in the daily 
conduct of foreign relations. A very large num- 
ber of foreign ministers expressed their great 
anxiety to me in New York just a few weeks 

NOVEMBER 13, 1967 


ago about where this country is gomg on trade 
policy. The subject of trade policy was one of 
the focal points of tlie Joint U.S.-Japan Cabi- 
net Committee meeting in Washington last 
month.'^ Earlier in the year, when I accompanied 
the President to the meeting of Chiefs of State 
of the inter- American system at Punta del Este,* 
trade policy was again a major topic of discus- 
sion and, on the part of our Latin American 
friends, a matter of gravest concern. This is so 
because we in this country, with our continental 
market and vast indigenous natural resources, 
could get by without foreign trade if — and it's a 
very big if — we were willing to foi'go the bene- 
fits of competition and pay the costs of substi- 
tutes, fewer choices, higher prices, lower profits, 
and reduced employment. We would have a 
poorer life. Perhaps it would be endurable — 
although we cannot lightly dismiss the danger 
of precipitating a serious depression. In any 
event, most other countries are more dependent 
on foreign trade than we are. For many of them, 
it is a life-or-death matter. Therefore, they 
watch the trend of opinion in this country with 
an anxious eye for signs of a shift in trade policy 
which could be disastrous for them. 

I have tried to assure my foreign colleagues 
that America will not repudiate its liberal trade 
policy. I have told them that it is only human 
that those who benefit from our liberal trade 
policy remain rather satisfied but unfortunately 
also rather quiet, while those who feel them- 
selves under some pressure, real or imagined, 
speak with a loud voice and try to enlist action 
by Congress to revise our basic policy. I have 
assui'ed them as forcefully as I know how that 
this administration thinks this would be a great 

It is my earnest hope that these hearings will 
help clear the air in this country and abroad 
as to where the United States stands on trade 
policy. This administration is opposed to a re- 
treat into protectionism because it will harm our 
domestic economy, injure rather than help our 
labor force, contribute to inflationary pressures, 
and undermine our foreig:i policy by bi-eeding 
hostility and discontent when we need peace 
and cooperation. That would be far, far too 
high a price to pay. Instead of tearing down 
the trade policy that has helped so much to in- 

'For background, see ihid., Oct. 9, 1967, p. 4.^1. 
' For background, see ibid.. M:iy 8, 19C7, p. TOG. 

crease our annual exports from the very low 
level during the depression to over $30 billion 
last year and helped provide new job opportuni- 
ties for our industry and farmers, we—tlie ex- 
ecutive branch and the Congress — should be 
working together to strengthen that policy and 
improve it to meet the new tasks of the coming 


It is a privilege to appear here today to 
testify with respect to various import quota 
measures under consideration in the Senate. I 
have listened with considerable interest to the 
testimony which has been presented to you this 
morning. I, too, am greatly concerned with the 
political and economic impact some of these 
measures would have on our nation as well as 
the nations with whom we trade. 

As for matters under my authority, I am 
particularly concerned that action to erect more 
barriers at this time would incite retaliation 
from abroad with respect to commodities which 
we export. Coal is a good case in point. We have 
ample reserves of coal which can compete ef- 
fectively in the world marketplace, provided 
artificial trade barriers are not erected. But if 
we are in the process of placing impediments in 
the path of international tracle, are we not in- 
viting — indeed insuring — similar action by 
other countries? 

Exports of U.S. coal earn about $1/2 billion 
annually as a credit toward the U.S. balance of 
payments. During the past 5 years coal exports 
have stabilized at approximately 50 million tons 
annually — an unprecedented level in a non- 
emergency period. This remarkable record has 
been achieved despite the existence of coal trade 
barriers in sevei-al of the major importing coun- 
tries. To most nations in which barriers do not 
exist or have been relaxed, U.S. coal has regis- 
tered significant gains, and there are positive 
indications of further relaxation in the next few 

Eecent studies of foreign market potentials 
for U.S. coal indicate possibilities for increasing 
exports to 80 million tons or more annually, 
provided we are not prevented from competing. 
Kestriction of imports of other commodities and 
products to this country would tend to create 
more restrictive coal import policies in those 



countries whicli now have them ; but more im- 
portantly, such action would probably encour- 
age the adoption of restrictiYe policies by 
countries which are now increasing their im- 
ports of U.S. coal. 

Similarly, we are opposed to the enactment of 
such measures as S. 289, which would provide 
for the imposition of quotas on imports of lead 
and zinc. Our reasons are set out in some detail 
in a separate statement ^ which, with your per- 
mission. I would like to oiler for the record. 

Trade restrictions have been covered in gen- 
eral. However, there is one point which has 
been mentioned only briefly upon which I should 
expand. I am speaking of one exception under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Quotas are illegal under GATT except for cer- 
tain specified circumstances. One of these ex- 
ceptions is the national security of the nation 
involved ; oil falls under this exception. Imports 
of oil from abroad are controlled — ancl are 
permitted entry only within a quantitative 

Oil Supply and National Security 

I would like to state here my finn view that 
in the present world petroleum situation, oil 
imports should be controlled in the interests of 
our national security. That is the paramount — 
the only — reason why such imports are con- 
trolled. In no sense does this position alter my 
views with respect to opposing trade barriers 
generally. But in the case of oil, our security 
would be jeopardized unless we have a strong, 
healthy domestic oil industry capable of 
meeting any demand. This we could not do if 
low-cost oil from petroleum exporting countries 
were to flood this country, with consequent dam- 
age to our own energy producing industries. 

The relationship between our national secu- 
rity and adequate supplies of oil is clear. On this 
score, it sufhces to point out that oil is practically 
the sole source of energy for transportation — 
both civilian ancl military. 

Adequate domestic supplies depend upon ex- 
ploration and discoveries, and these activities 
will not be carried on in the absence of an ade- 
quate market for domestic production. 

It was with these circumstances in mind that 
in 1957 the President's Special Committee To 
Investigate Crude Oil Imports reported to Pres- 
ident Eisenhower as follows : 

' Not printed here. 

Your committee recognizes that there are important 
foreign policy aspects to the problem of limiting iietro- 
leum imports. The oil reserves ancl production capac- 
ities of other free nations, as well as our own, are 
important to our national security. A number of coun- 
tries inevitably depend in varying degree ujion access 
to our domestic market for their petroleum exports and 
it must be recognized that it is also in the interest of 
our national security that our allies and friends have 
healthy and expanding economies. It is believed, how- 
ever, that taking all factors into consideration, our 
national security requires the maintenance of some 
reasonable balance between imports and domestic pro- 
duction at this time. In light of the foregoing con- 
siderations, our recommendations are framed with the 
objective of limiting imports in order to maintain 
such a balance and yet to allow other nations to partici- 
pate in the growth of our domestic demand to a degree 
consistent with our national security. 

An attempt was made to attain a reasonable 
balance through the voluntary program recom- 
mended by the Committee. The attempt failed. 
The President was advised by the Director of 
the Office of Civil Defense and Defense Mobili- 
zation that in his opinion "crude oil and the 
principal crude oil derivatives and byproducts 
are being imported in such quantities and under 
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security," and mandatoi-y controls were 
imposed under the authority of the Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 19.58. 

In my judgment, the recent Mideast crisis had 
no harmful impact on our economy or on our 
ability to carry on the conflict in Viet-Xam 
largely because the United States was not de- 
pendent upon foreign oil. Our oil industry was 
healthy and capable of meeting the increased 
demands placed on it, including assistance to 
Canada and Western Europe. 

Oil Import Control Program 

Mr. Chairman, I understand this committee 
has asked me to furnish the background of the 
oil import jirogram. I have here what started 
out to )3e a "brief history,'' but even a brief his- 
tory of such a complicated subject is rather long. 
I request, therefore, that this "history" be in- 
serted in the record at this point, and I will sum- 
marize the high points before I mention some 
further details on oil in general with specific 
reference to the oil import control program. 

Briefly summarizing the past, after World 
War ll was over, there was a rush of drilling 
activity not only in the United States but 
throughout the world. Huge reserves were dis- 



covered, particularly in Venezuela and the Mid- 
dle East, and later in North and West Africa. 
The United States became a net importer of oil 
in 1918. From that point on, imports continued 
to increase -with mterruptions during the 
Korean war and Suez crisis of 1956-57. The 
concern over these rapidly increasing imports 
resulted in efforts by the Government to restrict 
imports through voluntary action. 

A formal voluntary oil import program was 
instituted in 1957, but it failed. I see no par- 
ticular point in going into the reasons why this 
failed. It is enough to say that it did fail and 
this failure was recognized by all concerned. 
The result was that the mandatory oil import 
program was placed in effect on March 10, 1959. 

The level of imports in districts I-IV (the 
area east of the Eocky Mountains) was orig- 
inally set at 9 percent of demand. In the fall 
of 19C2 the i:)roclamation was amended to pro- 
vide that the imports into districts I-IV would 
be limited to 12.2 percent of domestic produc- 
tion. This became effective for the year 1963, 
and in the following year this was changed to 
12.2 percent of estimated production. 

The level of imports into district V (the west 
coast and Arizona, Nevada, Alaska, and Ha- 
waii), a crude deficit area, was set at the dif- 
ference between domestic supply and total 
demand, with overland oil from Canada count- 
ing as a part of the supply. In other words, 
offshore imports were to be used to fill the 
supply-demand gap. 

Overland Imports 

Now a brief word on overland imports: 
Shortly after the mandatory program began, 
it was felt that the national security aspects of 
the program made it necessary to recognize the 
relative security of Western Hemisphere oil 
production which could be delivered directly to 
the United States by land. Recognizing this 
fact of life, the proclamation was almost imme- 
diately amended to exempt from the licensing 
requirements of the program oil imported over- 
land from the country of origin. Oil imported 
from Mexico imder this exemption is limited 
to 30,000 barrels per day by agreement with the 
official Mexican oil agency, PEMEX. 

Oil is imported overland from Canada to dis- 
trict V via Trans-Mountain Pipeline and to 
districts I-IV mainly via the Interprovincial- 
Lakehead Pipeline System. This oil supplies 
refineries along the northern border in Puget 

Sound (district V) and in St. Paul, Minn.; 
Superior, Wis. ; Ahna and Detroit, Mich. ; To- 
ledo, Ohio; and Buffalo, N.Y., for districts 

The charts " which I will show you will indi- 
cate the extent of increased imports from 
Canada, virtually all of which, it might be 
pointed out, is delivered by pipelines, the same 
as the majority of oil is delivered from U.S. 
oil fields to refining centers. I might add that 
as far as the east coast is concerned, the I'efming 
centers there are mainly dependent on cnide oil 
received by tanker from the gulf coast or from 

The level of imports into Puerto Rico is set 
to provide for the demand on the island, exports 
to foreign areas, and limited shipments to the 
United States. 

Growth of Oil Production 

This, in brief, is a thumbnail sketch of the oil 
import program and its development over the 
years. Now, if I may, I would like to show some- 
thing of the impact of the program. 

I have here a number of charts that I believe 
will put the progi'am in perspective. Since 
World War II the growth of oil production 
outside the United States has been tremendous. 
As shown in tliis first chart, free foreign pro- 
duction has increased from 2 million barrels 
per day in 1946 to more than 18 million b/d 
in 1966; and more than one-half of this pro- 
duction has resulted from activities of U.S.- 
owned companies. This growth in production 
has had tremendous effect upon international 
trade and has exerted intense pressure for in- 
creased imports into the United States. Oil 
production in many of these areas is prolific 
compared to the United States. For example, 
it is not uncommon for a well in the Middle 
East to produce more than 5,000 b/d, while the 
average production per well in the United 
States is about 12 b/d, and any well capable 
of producing as much as 400 b/d in the United 
States is considered to be extremely good. Im- 
ports into the United States have remained 
almost constant in relation to domestic produc- 
tion since the inaugiiration of the mandatory 
oil import program in 1959. 

Our second cliart shows the international flow 
of petroleum in 1966. Oil is by far the largest 
commodity in international trade ; and as shown 

' Not printed here. 



by the arrows on this chart, by far the largest 
flow of oil is from the Middle East to Europe 
and to Far Eastern areas. As you can see from 
the chart, most of the oil moving into the United 
States comes from our neighbors in the Western 

The third chart shows U.S. oil imports in 
1966; what they were, where they came from, 
and where they entered the United States. Total 
imports into the United States in 1966 were 
2,316,000 b/d. Of this quantity, the most im- 
portant segment was crude oil and unfinished 
oils, which amounted to 1,335,000 b/d. Residual 
fuel oil imjjorts were 882,000 b/d, and other 
petroleum products constituted 98,000 b/d. 

The origin of our imports during 1966 is 
shown in the last portion of the chart, which 
indicates that our largest source of imports, 
1,208,000 b/d, or almost one-half, came from 
Venezuela. Imports from the IMiddle East were 
318,000 b/d, or about 3 percent of total U.S. 
consumption. Imports from Canada were 387,- 
000 b/d, nearly all of which came in by pipeline. 
From other AVestern Hemisphere countries, such 
as Colombia and Mexico, we received 235,000 
b/d, and from other Eastern Hemispliere coun- 
tries, such as Libya, Nigeria, and Indonesia, 
168,000 b/d were received. Most of the oil from 
overseas areas was imported into the east coast. 

This fourth chart shows that our source of 
imports into districts I-IV has shifted during 
the 8 years we have had an import program. Im- 
ports from the Middle East have not changed 
appreciably, while imports from Canada have 
grown rapidly. Imports from the new producing 
fields in Africa have grown in recent years, 
while crude oil imports from Venezuela have 
declined. However, while not shown on this 
chart, the decline in crude imports from Vene- 
zuela has been offset by increased residual fuel 
oil imports from that country. 

The fifth chart illustrates the operation of the 
oil import program in district V, which is the 
west coast area and inchides Alaska, Hawaii, 
Nevada, and Arizona. Domestic production on 
the west coast remained static through 1964, but 
in the last few years has increased significantly 
while imports from overseas areas have de- 
creased. The future of domestic production also 
looks promising due to extensive exploration in 
west coast offshore areas and with production 
in Alaska increasing rapidly. 

Our last chart shows production and imi^orts 
in districts I-IV, the area east of the Eocky 
Mountains. During the life of the oil import pi'o- 

gram from 1959 through last year, domestic pro- 
duction has increased fi'om about 7 million b/d 
to over 81^ million b/d. Imports in the same 
period increased from 873,000 b/d to 1,027,000 
b/d. As this chart illustrates, for the whole pe- 
riod, the oil import program has restricted con- 
trolled imports to an average of about 12.2 per- 
cent of domestic production. If we exclude the 
first year of the jirogram, which we should be- 
cause controls did not apply for the first part of 
that year, the average for the period is 12.18 
percent. We believe that maintenance of a 12.2 
percent ratio of imports to production in dis- 
tricts I-IV demonstrates that there is no need 
for such legislation as is proposed by S. 2332. 

Maintaining a Healthy Petroleum Industry 

One of the main provisions of S. 2332 would 
change the basic authority for controllLng im- 
ports to a rigid public law instead of by a Presi- 
dential proclamation which allows flexible ac- 
tion under administrative tecluiiques that have 
worked extremely well for nearly a decade. I 
submit that experience under three Presidents 
shows clearly that the flexibility inlierent in the 
present program has enabled us to achieve the 
national security objectives of the program. 

I pointed out earlier that the national security 
foundation of the mandatory oil import con- 
trol program requires that we "preserve to the 
greatest extent possible a vigorous, healthy 
petroleum industry in the United States," while 
we, at the same time, prevent serious disloca- 
tions "in oil industries elsewhere which also have 
an impact bearing on our own security. . . ." 
Our security also includes the security of 
other areas. This philosophy, most recently, was 
the basis for activating the voluntary agreement 
xmder the Defense Production Act to assure ade- 
quate petroleum supplies to Westei'n Europe 
and other free comitries of the world. 

Other oil producing areas, particularly those 
in the Westei'n Hemisphere, are our good cus- 
tomers for exports of all products. We are con- 
vinced and emphasize therefore that imposi- 
tion of rigid controls pursuant to fixed formula 
would not only result in serious repercussions in 
our foreign relations but would adversely affect 
continued growth of our exports by inviting 
retaJiatory action on the pai-t of our major 
trading countries. 

Since we have maintained imports adminis- 
tratively over the whole period of the program 
at about 12.2 percent of domestic production. 

NOVEMBER 13, 19G7 


which is the principal aun of S. 2332, we find 
no need for such legislation. Our principal con- 
cern in Interior is a, means of increasing our 
reserves and maintaining our productive and 
refining capacity, looking toward tlie future 
ever-increasing demand ^pr petroleum energy. 
A review of the past indicates we have suc- 
ceeded in maintaining a healthy petroleum in- 
dustry which within t)ie past 3 months has dem- 
onstrated its ability to meet an international pe- 
troleum emergency. This has been done under 
the existing program. We believe that enact- 
ment of S. 2332 would serve no beneficial pur- 
pose but would only make it more difficult to 
meet unexpected contingencies. 


Thank you for the opportunity to talk with 
your committee on this vital matter of foreign 
"trade. I use the term "foreign trade" deliber- 
ately. We cannot talk about further restricting 
imports without talking about restricting ex- 
ports. Moreover, we cannot talk about indus- 
trial trade and agricultural trade separately. 
In this context, they are not separable. Wliat 
happens in one sector too often has a direct 
impact on the other. 

From where I sit, I see this regularly. Just the 
other day we were reminded by another govern- 
ment that what the United States does on watch 
imports will have a direct impact on whether we 
will be able to export poultry parts. It gets that 
specific. And the United States does some re- 
minding of this kind also, in its fight to keep 
U.S. exports high. 

That's why I have always taken a keen inter- 
est in all our trade actions, across the board. 
Tliat's why I'm alarmed at the quota proposals 
before us. We seem to be losing sight of the im- 
portance of our exports. 

For 7 years now, I've worked hard to expand 
our agricultural exports, and I've had the satis- 
faction of seeing them gi'ow from $4.5 billion in 
fiscal year 1960 — the year before I took office— 
to a new record of $6.8 billion in tlie 1067 fiscal 
year that ended last June. Exports for dollars 
climbed from $3.2 billion to $5.4 billion in that 

These agricultural dollar export earnings are 
important : 

—to the country as a whole. Only a few 
months ago, when we were talking about the 

U.S. balance of payments, Secretary Fowler 
told me that we would long since have faced a 
national economic crisis of grave proportions — 
that the value of the dollar would have been 
seriously undermined — were it not for the sub- 
stantial flow of dollars into our accounts from 
agricultural exports. 

— to industry and commerce. Without them, 
farmers would not have maintained mdustrial 
farm inputs at their high levels: transport, 
banking, msurance, and port activities would 
have been at lower levels. 

— and to farmers most especially. Without 
these export dollars, farm income would have 
suffei'ed severely. 

The export facts should by now be well known 
by all farmers. But let me repeat them. 

Production of 1 out of every 4 cropland acres 
harvested is exported. 

Exports provide employment for one out of 
every eight fann workers; they account for 17 
cents out of the farmer's market dollar. 

Farm exports have been increasing at a rate 
substantially higlier than domestic consump- 
tion of farm products. An increasing percentage 
of many farm products is being exported. For 
five major farm products, exports exceed 40 
percent of the value of farm sales. 

And when commercial farm exports for dol- 
lars are compared to farm imports, the farmer 
clearly comes out ahead. Out of our total agri- 
cultural exports, well over $5 billion are com- 
mercial sales. These are dollars earned. Against 
this we have aromid $2.5 billion of agricultural 
imports that are more or less directly competi- 
tive with our agriculture (meat, wool, dairy 
products, sugar, and so on) . We could say these 
are doUai-s spent. Thus, for every $2.50 im- 
ported, we export $5 commercially. We have a 
good business. And a lot to lose. 

Exports Importont fo Agriculture 

A continuing climb in U.S. exports is more 
important to American farmers than to any 
other major segment of our economy. If farm- 
ers support protectionism, they are making a 
serious mistake, because they are endangering 
their own export market. 

These facts have been repeated over and over. 
Perhaps that is the trouble. Perhaps we've said 
them too often — have talked ourselves into be- 
lieving that ever-increasing exports will come 
to us as a matter of course. 



Well, they won't. 

Exports haven't just grown. We have worked 
at it — hard. We have invested money and time 
in market development, in product promotion, 
and in reducing foreign barriers to trade so 
that we can seU more. We continue to work hard 
on all fronts to export more and more. The level 
of effort on these fronts is up — up and up. 

We mustn't be fooled by the idea tliat coun- 
tries buy from us, and will keep buyiiig from 
us, simply because they need our products. 
That's bad reasoning. There are very few of our 
export products that other countries can't pro- 
duce for themselves, or buy elsewhere, or do 
without if they really want to. We fight a daily 
battle against restrictionist forces in these coun- 
tries all the time. Sometimes progress is slow, 
but we are making j^rogress — witness the steady 
climb in agricultural exports. 

If other nations conclude that we are acting 
in an unreasonable and protectionist manner, 
that we are shutting them out of our markets 
luif airly and without justification, they are not 
only perfectly willing and capable of shutting 
us out from theirs, they are likely to do so. 

I've spoken at some length on the problem of 
exports and the need for expandmg trade, be- 
cause it is absolutely crucial for us in agricul- 
tui'e. We must never overlook the impact on 
exports when we consider imposing import 

Agriculture everywhere has special problems. 
Generally speaking, all over the world farm in- 
comes are only half those in other sectors of the 
country's economy. To help meet such problems, 
virtually every government has stepped in with 
price and income and other support programs. 
These in turn can have severe repercussions on 
trade. To deal with these repercussions, the U.S. 
sometimes has to control imports. 

But we should be certain before we act to put 
on controls : 

— that there is a clear and present need for 
additional protection ; 

— that the protective instrument chosen fits 
the need ; 

— and that the dollars-and-cents cost of our 
action in lost exports will not be way out of pro- 
portion to the benefit it confers on some of our 

These are sensible, pragmatic tests. 

Let me turn specifically to the question of the 
need for additional protection on dairy prod- 
ucts. At the outset, it should be made clear that 

we have experienced unique circumstances in 
dairy as a result of the efforts of foreign coun- 
tries to protect their dairy farmers' income. 

Dairy Imports 

The subject of daiiy imports is of great con- 
cern to me. It is a part of the U.S. dairy in- 
come and price picture. No problem I have had 
as Secretary has been more difficult and more 
unyielding than that of trying to achieve a 
stable and health}^ dairy economy. The dairy 
problem is also intimately related to the De- 
partment's budget — in the cost of the dairy 
price support progi'am and the operations of 
the Commodity Credit Corporation. 

Dairy imports rose rapidly and very substan- 
tially beginning in early 1966. We had become a 
target for comitries whose dairy policies had 
resulted in surpluses. These were flooded into 
the United States, circumventing our import 
control system. 

As background to this problem, let me pomt 
out that because of systems of high daii-y sup- 
port prices, protected by strict import controls, 
production of dairy products in some foreign 
countries had increased to the point that heavy 
surpluses were a glut on their markets. Under 
such circumstances in the EEC [European Eco- 
nomic Community], for example, an export pro- 
gram operates almost automatically to move 
these surpluses out of the EEC at distress prices. 
Because of this surplus world situation, increas- 
ing quantities of butter were entering the United 
States as a butterfat/sugar mixture in circum- 
vention of then existing U.S. controls. This but- 
terfat could not have gone to other potential 
markets such as Japan or the U.K. or Canada. 
These all have tight controls on imports. It came 
to the United States. 

Because our domestic milk production was 
down, about a year passed before prices dropped 
and the CCC started to buy heavily. 

As soon as it was clear that our inventory ac- 
quisitions and expenditures were going to con- 
tinue to be sizable, we moved to bring dairy 
imports under full control — specifically, to halt 
evasions of the import quotas established under 
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
as amended. 

In March, I recommended to the President 
that he initiate section 22 action looking toward 
these objectives. In this move, we had the full 
support and leadership of President Johnson, 
who directed the Tariff Commission to carry out 

NOVEMBER 13, 19G7 


the required investigation promptly and ex- 
peditiously — which it did. 

The result, to be brief, was to stop the flood 
of imports. Presidential Proclamation 3790, is- 
sued June 30, 19G7, put import quotas on those 
items which had accounted for virtually all of 
the import upsurge. Our purpose was to pre- 
vent these imports from interfering with our 
income programs by bringing total dairy- 
products imports back to the level which had 
prevailed from the establishment of import 
controls under section 22 in 1953 until 1966. 
During that period, dairy imports, taken all 
together, were equal to something less than 
1 percent of our domestic dairy pi-oduction. 

Domestic dairy production this year is ex- 
pected to be about 120 billion jjomids, milk 
equivalent. In establishing tlie new dairy im- 
port quotas, the administration has aimed at 
holding the dairy import total (quota items 
and nonquota items combined) to approxi- 
mately 1.0 billion pounds, milk equivalent. 

No Need for Blanket Import Ban 

Wliile our section 22 action was being taken, 
we heard a lot of sharp criticism — both of the 
law and the mamier in which it was being car- 
ried out. We were told that section 22 was too 
slow, too cumbersome, to provide an effective 
remedy. Wliat has been demonstrated is that 
this is just not so. We faced a difficult and very 
complex problem, both domestically and inter- 
nationally; we acted mider the legislation; all 
concerned had the opportunity for a fair hear- 
ing; and we have achieved a solution. 

In brief, section 22 has stood the test. It en- 
ables us to deal with special agricultural prob- 
lems as and when they arise — flexibly, selec- 
tively, and successfully. 

Our critics say that we can't really control 
imports — that the smart boys will always be 
able to fuid loopholes. My point is that the situa- 
tion can be kept under control usuig the legisla- 
tion which we now have and that the recent 
section 22 action has demonstrated this. 

Tlie Congress has before it numerous bills, 
most of them identical, to require across-the- 
board import restrictions on all dairy prod- 
ucts — including items containing butterfat or 
nonfat milk solids which are not usually thought 
of as dairy products. I tluiik we all recognize 
that a blai'iket import ban would seriously hurt 
our foreign trade. Almost surely it would pro- 

voke foreign retaliation against our farm 

As I judge the situation now, there is no need 
to pay this price. Imports have been cut back to 
a tolerable level. We expect to keep them there. 
Our foreign trading partners did not like the 
new controls which were applied under Presi- 
dential proclamation, but they recognized the 
fact of evasion and they have long ago accepted 
our use of section 22 to protect our farm pro- 
grams from serious injury. This is important. It 
means that our foreign suppliers ai-e much less 
likely to retaliate against our exports to them 
when controls go on. As I see the situation today, 
we have faced the dairy import problem, and 
we have already overcome it. 

Meat Imports 

Let me now turn to the question of beef im- 
ports, where we also had a special problem. In 
the early 1960's, our only market protection was 
a modest duty. We have no domestic support 
system. Other countries' systems, however, were 
becoming more heavily supported and protec- 
tive. The EEC was perfecting its variable levies ; 
the U.K. had a domestic support system which 
made it increasmgly less profitable for expoilers 
to sell there than in the United States. Japan 
had strict quotas. Thus, quantities of fresh, 
chilled, and frozen beef and veal were flowing 
to the United States from exporters who found 
it impossible or much less profitable to sell else- 
where. The heaviest imports of these products 
occurred in 1963 and led to the enactment of the 
meat import law of 1964 (Public Law 88^82). 

The meat unport law does not actually im- 
pose quotas. It sets a target which imports can- 
not exceed in any year without triggering 
quotas. If quotas ai'e imposed, they will hold 
unports to a level based on average imports in 
the 1959-63 period, adjusted to take account of 
change m U.S. production. 

The limit on imports imder the law would be 
approximately 6.7 percent of domestic produc- 
tion. Actually, imports in 1966 were 5.6 percent 
of production, and we expect them not to exceed 
5.8 percent this year. By contrast, unports 
amounted to 8.6 percent of production in 1963. 

What our importers bring in, by and large, 
is beef for manufacturing. The price effect of 
this is small and falls largely dn domestic cow 
beef, which is used for the same purposes. It is 
instructive to note that although imports have 



risen slightly since 1965, U.S. cow prices have 
also increased — from $13.40 per hundredweight 
in 1965 to $16.60 to farmers in 1966 and $16.90 
during the first 9 montlis of 1967. We do not 
expect imports of tliis meat, at the levels per- 
mitted under the law, to place any appreciable 
downward pressure on domestic cow prices in 
the years to come. The demand for manufactur- 
ing beef is expanding rapidly. Total cow num- 
bers on farms in the United States have changed 
little since the midfifties; and dairy cow num- 
bers, the main domestic source of this kind of 
beef in the past, have dropped one- third over 
this period. 

We don't believe that these imports are having 
an}!- appreciable impact on fed beef prices. Tliey 
rise and fall m relation to the supply of fed 
cattle marketed in this countiy. I would expect 
fed beef prices to continue their upturn this 
winter as marketings continue to drop off. 

Currently, there are many bills pending to 
amend our meat import law. These bills would 
impose mandatory and more restrictive annual 
import quotas on such meats. They would base 
average annual imjiorts on the years 1958 
through 1962 rather than the years 1959 through 
1963, as now provided. They would divide an- 
nual quotas into quarterly quotas, the imfilled 
portion of which may not be carried over into 
the following quarter. If the most restrictive 
features of the legislation pi-esently before Con- 
gress were implemented, it is our estimate that 
the pi'ice rise on domestic cutter and camier 
cows would be less than 2 percent, and on fed 
cattle, less than 1 percent.-^^'J .i^<'ni:iHvu'f\ i;.)) : 

Accordingly, I don't see the need for these 
changes in legislation. Imports are at moderate 
levels and are meeting manufacturing beef 
needs without disturbing prices. The present 
law will keep them at moderate levels. The 
equal quarterly distribution of these mandatory 
quotas would tend to disrupt trade patterns im- 
necessarily without really helping domestic 

The import controls we have now seem fully 
adequate to their task. They have been accepted 
by our svipjiliers — although reluctantly. I em- 
phasize — reluctantly. Other countries don't care 
to see their exports cut back. But they recog- 
nized the special situation facing us. 

Mr. Chaii-man, earlier I said that before we 
used controls we should be sure there is a clear 
and present need for them and that their dollars- 
and-cents costs in loss of exjiorts are not out of 

proportion to their benefit to some of our pro- 
ducers. In the case of quota legislation for dairy 
products and meat, I do not see a present need ; 
the situation is under control; and the cost of 
more restrictive controls on these products, in 
my judgment, would be far greater than we 
should pay. Farmers producing for export 
would be hurt and dairy and beef producers 
won't really benefit. 

Wliere imports of other agricultural com- 
modities may be concerned, we must apply the 
same down-to-earth, jiragmatic tests: Are the 
restrictions in the best interest of the American 
farmer and the United States? We should not 
hesitate to decide against restrictions if the an- 
swer is clearly that they are not. 


Just 5 years ago last Wednesday the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 became law. This coun- 
try then embarked on a major international 
trade negotiation which culminated in the Ken- 
nedy Round agreements signed in Geneva on 
June 30. Those agreements represent the free 
world's most successful effort to reduce the bar- 
riers which impede the exchange of goods be- 
tween people. Our national interest, in terms of 
the extra jobs created by our foreign trade as 
well as positive contributions to our balance 
of payments, will be well served by these 

Now, 31/^ months after the Kennedy Round, 
we have before us a number of bills which are 
so all encompassing that they bring into ques- 
tion the entire direction of the foreign trade 
policy which this nation has followed for more 
than 30 years. 

In my considered opinion, our trading rela- 
tions with the rest of the world would undergo 
a serious setback if these proposed measures 
were approved. Certainly enactment of these 
bills, which provide restrictions on a wholesale 
basis, will provoke very serious countermoves 
against our exports. These countermoves would 
come at a time when we will be ti'ying to elimi- 
nate the many nontariff barriers to our exports, 
and when so many American businesses are co- 
operating with their Government in extensive 
programs to promote exports and to resolve our 
balance-of -payments problem in a constructive 

To be sure, import quotas — as opposed to em- 

NO^'EMBER 13, 196'; 


bargoes or high tariffs — do preserve some 
portion of tlie domestic market for foreign 
goods. However, no one is naive enough to think 
tliat this difference will avoid retaliatory 
measures by other countries against our exports. 
Moreover, quota protection can do harm to our 
domestic economy and consumers in that local 
industries become isolated from technological 
changes abroad and artificial price and market 
conditions are created. It may be, of course, that 
unusual local circumstances can make a good 
case for some form of protection in selected 

Criteria for Impori Relief 

I-Iowever, the issue cannot be viewed only in 
the context of imports. It is important to re- 
member that our exports become imports when 
they reach foreign shores. Smce we must buy 
if we are to sell to the rest of the world, it is 
clear that we should impose restrictions on im- 
ports only in the exceptional cases. When we 
handle these problems in a fair and objective 
manner, we are able in the vast majority of cases 
to renegotiate our international obligations and 
avoid retaliation against our exports. We can do 
this because all countries confront such difficul- 
ties and accordingly have agreed to provisions 
in the GATT for handling these situations 
through the negotiating process. 

The Congress has generally agreed with this 
approacli, and over the years it has tried to de- 
velop a fair set of criteria for use by the Tariff 
Commission in its investigations of injury due 
to imports. The present criteria may not neces- 
sarily be the best that can be developed, but I 
think it is a completely sound concept that 
tariff or other forms of relief from imports 
should be provided only after an objective, 
thorough, factual analysis and investigation. 
Only one of the broad industry groups now pro- 
posed for import relief has taken the oppor- 
tunity provided by law to put its case before the 
Tariff Commission. In that instance, the lead 
and zinc industry obtained import, quota relief 
which was not terminated until 1965 when the 
President determined, after a long and compre- 
hensive review, that the situation in the mdustry 
had improved to the point where the extra relief 
was no longer essential. Even in that case, the 
President went to considerable length in his 
1965 statement to request the Tariff Commission 
to streamline its procedures and redouble its 
efforts to expedite proceedings in any case where 

delay might bar effective relief.' Obviously in 
this statement the President was expressing his 
wish that prompt attention be given to any 
further application for relief by this or any 
other industry. 

Generally, however, what has happened is 
that over the last few years industries desiring 
restrictions on imports have claimed that they 
cannot obtain the relief they need from the 
Commission through the legal procedures es- 
tablished by the Congress. Instead of askmg 
Congi'css to change these procedures, which one 
would expect in the circumstances, the appeal 
is for protection through legislative action. 

With respect to the individual bills, I defer 
to the Secretary of Agriculture for comment on 
meat and dairy products. I also defer to the 
Secretary of Interior for commentary on the 
bills to set import quotas on petrolemn as well 
as lead and zinc. 

Textile and Apparel Industries 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make several 
points with regard to textiles. It is well known 
that this administration has long been com- 
mitted to the maintenance of strong domestic 
textile and apparel industries. We have con- 
sistently recognized the major contribution 
made by these industries to the American 
economy. The seven-pomt textile program of 
May 1961 represented concrete action to back 
up this commitment.'* Implementation of that 
program has mcluded enactment of one-price 
cotton legislation, establishment of revised de- 
preciation allowances on machinery, expanded 
research for the development of new products, 
and the negotiation and implementation of the 
Geneva Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange- 
ments (LTA).^ All of these have played an 
important role in substantially improving the 
conditions of the textile and apparel industries 
over those which prevailed during the late 1950's 
and early 1960's. The textile industry, including 
leaders of the union movement, is the first to 
recognize the value of this program. 

We, of course, have continued to pay close 
attention to the textile import situation. We 
have uicrcased our efforts to apply the provi- 

'For a statement made by President Johnson on 
Oct. 22, 1965, and text of Proclamation No. 36.S3, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 15, 19C5, p. 795. 

^ For background, see ibid.. May 29, 1961, p. 825. 

" For text, see ibid.. Mar. 12, 1962. p. 431. 



sious of the LTA and at present approximately 
85 jjercent of our cotton textile imports are con- 
trolled pursuant to the LTA. 

During the past year we completed exten- 
sive negotiations which led to the extension of 
the LTA from September 30, 1967, to Septem- 
ber 30, 1970. In my view, Mr. Chairmaai, despite 
occasional difficulties in its enforcement, the 
LTA has been effective and is a program with 
which all concerned have learned to live reason- 
ably well. 

As this committee may be aware, we have on 
several occasions attempted to negotiate inter- 
national agreements on wool textiles. These at- 
tempts have not been successful. In the field of 
mamnade fiber textiles substantial mcreases in 
imports have developed during the past several 
years along witli the shift in the domestic market 
to an increasing use of mamnade fiber textiles 
aaid blends. 

The concern of many in the textile and ap- 
parel industries, and their representatives in the 
Congress, about the increase in overall U.S. tex- 
tile impoi'ts is well known to us. Our textile ad- 
visory committees meet frequently to advise the 
Government of the views of industry, labor, and 
the trade generally on existmg market and ui- 
dustry conditions. Recognizing the widespread 
concern in the industry and the Congress about 
conditions in the textile industry and the need 
for having as much information as can be ob- 
tained promptly from all the rasources avail- 
able to him, the President on October 4 asked 
the Tariff Commission to report on "the eco- 
nomic condition of the United States textile and 
apparel industries," especially "tlie present and 
prospective impact of imports upon those in- 
dustries." " Chairman [Wilbur D.] Mills of the 
House Ways and ileans Committee joined in 
that request. Public hearings have been called 
by the Commission, and its report is to be fur- 
nished to the President by January 15, 1968. I 
trust that it will be a valuable report, and as the 
President said "will permit all of us who are 
deeply interested in the welfare of tlie textile 
aaid apparel industries to take a course of action 
which will be both m their interest and the 
national interest." In light of this request, Mr. 
Chairman, I believe that further discussion of 
the textile situation can most profitably be de- 
ferred until the Commission's report, plus other 
information that will be developed within the 

^° For a statement by President Johnson on Oct. 4, 
see ibid., Oct. 23, 1967, p. 529. 

administration during this period, has been 
made available to the President for review and 

Steel Import Restrictions Unnecessary 

The committee also has before it a bill to 
regulate the importation of pig iron and steel- 
mill products at a level of 9.6 percent of recent 
domestic consmnption. The steel industry has 
an impressive record of self-help in adjusting to 
the increased volume of imports and at the 
same time growing steadily witliin the economic 
expansion of the last 5 years. In 1966 production 
was at an alltime higli; shipments were close 
to the record levels of 1965 ; employment in 1965 
and 1966 was higher than in any year since 
1957; assets of the industry were at an alltime 
high in 1966; so was revenue; and net income 
in 1965 and 1966 matched the peak level of 1957 
though the ratio of net income to sales was 
down a point or so. Capital expenditures in 
1966 were $2 billion and axe projected at around 
$2.4 billion this year, mostly for more efficient 
and competitive production and distribution fa- 
cilities. Dividends last year approached half a 
billion dollars, whicli exceeded the 3 previous 
years but were somewhat below 1962 and previ- 
ous years. 

Imports, at 10.9 percent of domestic consump- 
tion in 1966, were also at an alltime high, while 
exports declined back to the level of 1959, in 
part because of a decline in shipments financed 
by AID. The year 1959, Mr. Chainnan, was the 
year of the long steel strike and is, I think, a 
key year. Many users of steel began importing 
foreign products for the first time, and interna- 
tional competition has increased each yea.r since 
tlien. xilso in that year, as well as in 1958, our 
exports dropped sharply and have not recovered 
since. What we have had over the last few years 
is a heavy demand for steel accompanied by 
more diverse purchasing by some large users 
who, fearing a domestic shortage or looking 
for price advantages, meet their needs by buy- 
ing both foreign and domestic steel. Thus we 
end up with a high ratio of steel imports to con- 
sumption, which by and of itself is not a suffi- 
cient case for import quotas. Though industry 
shipments and profits have declined in 1967 be- 
cause of a drop in construction and a.uto pro- 
duction, steel imports have increased at a slower 
pace than during the 1962-66 period. I thinlc it 
fair to say that the steel industry appears now 


to have passed through its slack period and, 
through heavy investments, it certainly is be- 
coming more efficient as it modernizes. On the 
basis of these facts, I find it difficult at this 
time to see that there is a need for import 

In short, I believe we should provide relief 
from imports only in the exceptional cases m 
which it is demonstrated that such a remedy is 
necessary. We have existing procedures which 
are available to accomplish this. As the Presi- 
dent said last week, our approach should be to 
"maintain a fair and just concern for the well- 
being of those industries and their employees 
who suffer unusual hardship from imports." ^^ 

All of the six bills now before this connnittee, 
taken together, would provide new or more re- 
strictive quotas on close to $6 billion, or about 
one-third of our dutiable imports. If enacted 
we can expect that countermoves will result to 
the detriment of our most efficient industries, 
those that are providing the most mtense com- 
petition abroad. These industries will be the 
first targets for counter action by other coun- 
tries. If we take action affecting some $6 billion 
of our imports, then we must be prepared to 
have our trading partners retaliate. But let us 
realize that once we have taken the first big 
step, we will have very little to say about which 
of our exports will be affected. Nor can we esti- 
mate in advance what value foreign countries 
will attach to these restrictions. Here I believe 
we have the ingredients of a very large trade 

But even worse, I feel these bills in the aggre- 
gate, and those surely to follow if these become 
law, would be in fact a major and highly un- 
fortunate turnabout in U.S. foreign trade pol- 
icy, which, once made, could probably not be 
reversed in our generation. 


I appreciate the opportunity you have given 
me to testify today. 

As you know, it is one of my responsibilities 
to assist the President in carrymg out the pro- 
visions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
Although the negotiating authority expired on 
July 1 of this year, the rest of the act is still 
in force, and I hope that its stated purposes 

" For a statoment by President Johuson on Oct. 12, 
see ibid., Oct. 30, 1967, p. .573. 

remain an expression of the intent of the Con- 
gress. Two of these purposes were stated in the 
act m precisely the language in which they 
were approved by this committee a little over 
5 years ago : 

1. to stimulate the economic growth of the United 
States and maintain and enlarge foreign markets for 
the products of United States agriculture, industry, 
mining, and commerce; (and) 

2. to strengthen economic relations with foreign 
countries through the development of open and non- 
discriminatory trading in the free world. 

The Trade Expansion Act won the approval 
of overwhelmmg majorities of both Houses of 
Congress. Comprehensive trade negotiations, 
spontaneously and universally known as the 
Kennedy Round, were carried out mider the 
authority of the act. 

Under the agreement that resulted, tariff 
concessions were exchanged covering about $40 
billion of world trade. For example, the ex- 
ternal tariff of the Common IVIarket was reduced 
on over $10 billion of its import trade, includ- 
ing tariff reductions on 87 percent of its duti- 
able imports from the United States. The 
largest share of the duty reductions we obtained 
from the EEC was in the field of industrial 
products, but tariffs were reduced on more tlian 
a quarter of their dutiable agricultural imports 
from us. In addition, $82 million of their agri- 
cultural imports from us is accounted for by 
wheat, which was included in a new World 
Grains Agreement negotiated as part of the 
Kennedy Round. 

It is just as important to the United States 
now as it was in 1962 to maintain and widen 
its access to world markets — particularly as re- 
gional trading blocs like the European Eco- 
nomic Community grow in significance. 

The big gain for American producers, as 
they confront the evolving patterns of world 
trade, is that much lower tariffs against our 
exports in Europe, in Canada, and in Japan 
will come into effect in stages over the next 
4 years — unless we put our trade policy into 
reverse and throw them away. 

I don't think it is possible to exaggerate the 
gravity of the decisions that this committee has 
been asked to make by the authors of the quota 
bills that are the subject of these hearings. I 
predict that, if they were to be enacted, not 
only would these most recent gains from the 
trade agreements program be sacrificed, but all 
the progress made by the United States since 
1934 toward establishing fair and orderly in- 



ternational trade relations would be put in 
serious jeopardy. 

These bills, if enacted, would run contrary 
to international commitments undertaken under 
authority expressly conferred by the Congress. 
United States imports of the products covered 
by bills to impose new quotas or make existing 
ones more restrictive amoimted last year to over 
$6 billion. If the general quota bill that has 
been described in the press were to be added to 
these specific product bills, the figure would not 
be $6 billion but more than $12 billion, or nearly 
50 percent of our total imports m 1966. 

Countries that take by far the largest part 
of our exports have already put the U.S. Gov- 
ermnent on notice that they are watching 
closely the fate of these bills. We can be sure 
they are already studying the measures they 
could take in retaliation. The prime candidates 
for such retaliation would almost certainly be 
those in which American exports are now con- 
tributing heavily to our export earnings or have 
the greatest potential for growth: chemicals, 
farm equipment, industrial machinery, wheat, 
feed grains, soybeans, fruits and vegetables, 
electronic equipment, and tobacco, to take a few 
examples. The effect on our balance of payments 
would be incalculable. 

But the sacrifice of the hard-won gains of 
the Kennedy Round and the likely disruption 
of a large portion of our export trade are only 
two of the costs we will have to pay for the 
passage of these bills. Another is the direct 
impact on our domestic economy of the curtail- 
ment of imports. 

Consumers will be hit both by higlier prices 
and restrictions on their freedom of choice. This 
will be a heavy burden upon households and 
upon all Americans whose incomes are low and 
fixed — notably our senior citizens. Many of the 
small businesses they patronize will suffer as 

Producers will find the costs of the supplies 
they need going up — and their ability to compete 
in export markets will necessarily be impaired. 

Farmers will suffer from a cost-pric« squeeze. 
The costs of the things they buy will increase at 
the very moment their exports are drastically 
reduced by the retaliation our own quotas are 
certain to provoke. 

Perhaps even more frightening is the almost 
inevitable effect on the position of the United 
States as the principal advocate and defender 
of the free enterprise sj'stem. Quantitative re- 
strictions are the negation of the market mech- 

anism. They are the antithesis of the concepts 
on which our free enterprise system is based. 

The bills before this committee represent a 
drastic reversal of the trade policy the United 
States has pursued and of the foundation upon 
which the whole stiiicture of our international 
commercial relations is built. I don't see how 
these relations, or the international organiza- 
tions we have nurtured to support them, could 
survive such a reversal. 

One might be able to understand, if not to 
sympathize with, the rationale of these bills if 
the United States were in a depression, or even 
a recession. The contrary is true. Our gross 
national product, in constant dollars, is up 27 
percent since 1962. Corporate profits, after taxes, 
have gone up 38 percent in the same period. Un- 
employment has gone down from 5.5 percent 
to 4.1 percent. 

I do not say that particular finns or groups of 
workers — or possibly even specific industries — 
are not experiencing difficulty because of im- 
ports. I do say that if they are being adversely 
affected by imports, tliey should seek relief 
through the procedures provided under exist- 
ing legislation, rather than attempting to bypass 
them. These procedures — with one exception — 
are available and can provide relief wliich is 
meaningful as well as consistent with our liberal 
trade policy. I have in mind, for example, tlie 
escape-clause provision of the Ti-ade Expansion 
Act, which has not yet been thoroughly tested, 
as well as the Antidumping Act, the counter- 
vailing duty provision, the unfair trade prac- 
tices statute, and section 22 of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. The one exception is the ad- 
justments assistance provision of the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act, which we hope will be liber