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Vw. S 









Vol. LVIII, No. 1488 

January 1, 1968 

Address l)y President Johnson 6 


Statement hy William M. Roth, Special Representati/ve for Trade Negotiations 13 


Statement hy Congressman L. H. Fountain 
in the U.N. Special Political Committee 20 

Address hy Secretary Rusk 1 

For index see inside hack cover 





Vol. LVIII No. 1488 
January 1, 1968 

For sale by the SuperiDtendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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1967— A Progrress Report 

Address ty Secretary Bush ^ 

^r. yc\-, ifitf? 

It is a privilege to address this great organi- 
zation which rejH-esents the management of so 
mucli of the tremendous productive capacity of 
the United States. In Wasliington we are keenly 
aware that both the living standards of our peo- 
ple and our security as a nation depend crucial- 
ly on American industry. 

I think that the most useful thing I can do 
on this occasion is to review some of the inter- 
national developments of 1967. This has been 
a year of considerable pam and violence. I don't 
need to call the unhappy events to your atten- 
tion — the news media have reported them hour 
by hour. 

But 1967 has also been another kind of year : 
one of constructive developments, some of them 
momentous, others highly promising. 

These include : 

—The successful conclusion of the Kennedy 
Eound negotiations, the most far-reaching as- 
sault ever made on barriers to international 

—Adoption by tlie International Monetary 
Fund of a plan for special drawing rights, an 
important step toward assuring adequate mone- 
tary reserves to support continuing expansion 
of international trade. 

—The IMF loan to Britain in connection 
with the devaluation of sterlmg; and the gold 
pool, through which leading Western Powers 
helped to maintain orderly markets for gold 
and foreig-n exchange following sterlino- 
devaluation. "^ 

—Agreement by the Presidents of the Latin 
American Republics to move toward economic 
integration in the next decade, one of the most 

'Made before the National Association of Manufac- 
turers at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 6 (press release 281). 

unportant collective decisions our friends to the 
south have ever made. 

—Modernization of the Charter of the Or- 
ganization of American States. 

—An agreement on the principles of tempo- 
rary tariff advantages for developing countries, 
reached by the 21 members of the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 

—Agreement on the principles of an Interna- 
tional Cocoa Agreement. 

—The other 14 members of NATO dealt suc- 
cessfully with the problems arising from the 
French withdrawal : 

a. We and our allies met the French request 
to close all foreign military installations in 
France by April 1. SHAPE and other key mili- 
tary headquarters were efficiently transferred to 
new sites in Belgium, the Netherlands, and 

b. The North Atlantic Council and the Mili- 
tary Committee were located m Brussels in 

—NATO made significant advances in 
planning : 

a. The Fourteen agreed on a new strategic 
concept which incorporates a flexible response 
and thus better reflects a policy of credible de- 
terrence, the current threat, and Allied 

b. Two new bodies were established to ct or- 
dinate nuclear planning within NATO. 

c. The NATO Defense Planning Committee 
completed work on an agreed force plan for 
1968-72, a plan which we expect will be adopted 
at the NATO ministerial meeting next week. 

d. We and our allies examined some basic 
questions about the North Atlantic alliance. 

JAJiUART 1 1968 

particularly future political tasks, including 
relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern 

—The threat of war between Greece and 
Turkey over Cyprus was relieved, with the 
help of mediation by the Secretary General o± 
NATO, a representative of the Secretary-Gen- 
eral of the United Nations, and a personal repre- 
sentative of our President. T. I n • A 
—The war in the Near East was halted in 4 
days without the intervention of great powers. 
—An agreement on the Yemen was reached 
between Saudi Arabia and the Umted Arab 
Eepublic after 5 years of strife which threat- 
ened to embroil them and other nations m war. 
—Voices of moderation gained ascendancy 
in the councils of the Organization for African 

—The African Development Bank made its 

first loan. . i • i 

—There was further progress m subregional 
cooperation in Africa— for example, by the cre- 
ation of the new East African Commimity. 

—Castro's efforts to promote guerrilla war- 
fare and subversion in the Western Hemi- 
sphere suffered sharp reverses m Bolivia, Vene- 
zuela, and elsewhere. 

—The space treaty was ratified and went mto 
effect— bringing under a regime of law the 
marvelous enterprises of man m reaching out 
from his eartHy home, attempting to assure 
that these activities will be peaceful and not 
become a deadly threat to the human race. 

—The Soviet Union and the United States 
made substantial progress toward an agreed 
draft of a nonproliferation treaty. 

—In our bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union : 

a. We ratified the Consular Convention; the 
Soviet Union has not yet done so. _ 

b Prooress was made in arranging tor tlie 
inauguration of commercial air service be- 
tween Moscow and New York. 

c. Agreement was reached on new embassy 
sites in Moscow and Wasliington. 

- -We made some progress in improving re- 
lations with a few of the smaller East Euro- 
pean nations. , 
—A major Water for Peace Conference, held 
in Washington, gave new impetus to impor- 
tant cooperative imdertakings which cut across 
ideological and national frontiers to serve 
fundamental needs of man as man. 

—The war on hunger gained momentum as 
various developing nations became more 
sharply aware that they must greatly intensity 
their efforts to increase food production and 
must also come to grips with the population 
side of the equation. . 

—The Chamizal agreement between Mexico 
and the United States approved changes m 
boundaries, thus ending a century-old dispute. 
—Our economic aid program to Iran 
was terminated because, after 15 years, it had 
achieved its goal: to help Iran to attain seit- 
sustaining growth. Indeed, the econoinic and 
social progress of Iran under the Shah's "white 
revolution" is one of the great success stories o± 
our time. 

Building a Structure of Peace 

I have cited more than 25 important con- 
structive developments in 1967. And I have not 
yet mentioned any in East Asia and the Pacifac. 
I'll come to those in a moment. 

But first I would emphasize that these prom- 
ising developments were only a part of what 
was accomplished during 1967 to further the 
interests and security of the United States, to 
facilitate the affairs of mankind which require 
international arrangements, and to build a 
prosperous, stable, and peaceful world. 

We participate in more than 50 international 
institutions and programs. We belong to sev- 
eral reo-ional associations and institutions. We 
have more than 40 allies. During 1967 we took 
part in some 600 multilateral international con- 
ferences concerned with promotmg economic, 
social, and cultural cooperation. Durmg the 
year we signed new international agreements 
dealing with such diverse subjects as atomic 
eneroy, telecommunications, aviation, avoid- 
ance^of double taxation, investment guarantees, 
claims, fisheries, defense, cultural exchanges, 
and the Peace Corps. During the year the 
Senate has given its advice and consent to 25 
treaties, including amendments to the Satety 
of Life at Sea Convention, which provide tor 
better fire protection of ships, and a conven- 
tion consolidating and strengthening nine 
existing treaties regarding narcotic drugs. 

Constructive tasks— most of them li^le no- 
ticed in the general news— comprise the bulk ot 
the work of ^the Department of State. They ac- 
count for the great majority of the 1,000 tele- 
grams we receive daily and the equal number 
we send out and for most of the much larger 


volume of official communications that go by 

Bit by bit, we are building a structure of 
peace. That is our goal : a lasthig peace that is 
safe for ourselves and all others who believe 
in freedom. 

Indeed, the consequences of another great 
war would be so catastrophic that the first ques- 
tion that we must ask about everything that 
we do or consider in the intei'national ai'ena is : 
Will it contribute to, or diminish, the prospects 
of achieving a lasting peace ? 

The Pacific and East Asia 

I turn now to major developments of 1967 in 
the Pacific and East Asia. 

Naturally, our attention has been centered on 
Viet-Nam. But there were important develop- 
ments elsewhere in East Asia and the Pacific. 
These included : 

— Political, economic, and social progress in 
most of the non-Communist countries — in some, 
with dramatic speed. 

— Further easmg of some longstanding inter- 
national tensions: for example, between Indo- 
nesia and its neighbors and between Japan and 
the Kepublic of Korea. 

— Further advances m regional and subre- 
gional cooperation. 

— Further strengthening of our relations 
with all but one of the non-Communist nations 
of the area. 

— Contmuing difficulties within Conununist 

- — Rising confidence m the future in the non- 
Communist nations. 

That the new Japan has made remarkable 
economic progress is well known. But I doubt 
that its full dimensions are widely realized. 

In 17 years Japan's gross national product 
has grown from $11 billion to more than $100 
billion — which is more than that of Communist 
China, with more than seven times Japan's 
population. At present relative rates of growth, 
Japan will soon be third in the world in GNP, 
trailing only the United States and the Soviet 

In 1950 per capita income in Japan was $113. 
In 1960 it was $360. This year it is tentatively 
estimated at $818. 

The economic growth of Japan has had a 
major impact on our trade. In 1960 our trade 
with Japan amounted to $2.5 billion; in 1966 

it was nearly $5.5 billion. Japan has become our 
largest customer for agricultural products. Its 
economic growth has also enabled it to enlarge 
its assistance to developing nations. Last year 
this assistance amounted to about $550 million ; 
and increasingly we find Japan matching our 
contributions to major aid programs in Asia. 

It is especially gratifying that Japan's rise to 
new heights of productivity has been achieved 
by peaceful means under democratic institu- 
tions and a system of free enterprise. The rise 
of this thriving democracy from the ashes of 
the Second World War is a triumph for the in- 
telligence and industriousness of the Japanese 
people and for their "wise choice of leaders. It 
also reflects some fundamental decisions by the 
United States — first of all, the decision to seek 
a peace of reconciliation, made by President 
Truman in 1950 and canied out in its initial 
stages by two of my distinguished predecessors. 
Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles. 

The policy of reconciliation and cooperation 
has been carried forward imder Presidents 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Our work- 
ing relations with Japan have been steadily 
strengthened and broadened. This year the 
Joint Cabinet Committee of our two nations 
held its sixth meeting. And the distmguished 
Prime Minister of Japan, Eisaku Sato, has just 
paid us another visit. We are proud to have the 
great Japanese democracy as a friend and a 
partner on a basis of equality and mutual 

Economic Progress 

Looking at some of the other non-Com- 
munist countries in East Asia and the Pacific, 
we see : 

The Republic of Korea — another success 
.story. After growing at about 5 percent an- 
nually over most of the decade, its GNP rose 
by over 8 percent annually for 2 years and by 
12 percent last year. Since 1963 a rise in indus- 
trial production of 43 percent, and in exports 
from $87 million to $250 million. 

The Eepublic of Korea has not forgotten 
that when it was the victim of a Communist 
aggression, the United States and other free- 
world countries sent militaiy forces to assist it. 
It is now a major contributor to the security of 
free Asia. Its troops stand shoulder to shoulder 
with ours on the north Asian rampart of the 
free world. And it has sent to South Viet-Nam 
two Army divisions and a Marine brigade 

JANUARY 1, 1968 

49,000 superb troops. As President Park has 
said Korea "knows how to requite an obliga- 
tion'" And, as he has said also, it is fightmg in 
Viet-Nam "because m our belief any aggression 
a-ainst the Eepublic of Viet-Nam represented 
a'direct and grave menace against the security 
and peace of Free Asia and, therefore, directly 
jeopardized the very security and freedom ot 
our own people." 

The Re'fmblic of China: Since 1956 its agri- 
cultural sector, although already highly de- 
veloped, has increased by about 4.5 percent 
annually ; while its industrial production has in- 
creased by an average of 12 percent a year and 
its exports by an average of 17 percent In 1965, 
on the judgment that the economy of laiwan 
had attained self-sustaining growth, we ter- 
minated our 15-year-old economic aid program. 
More and more observers from other countries 
are going to Taiwan to learn how its remark- 
able advances have been achieved. And it is 
now providing technical assistance to 23 devel- 
oping countries in Asia, Africa, and Latm 
America. Its own progress contrasts sharply 
with mainland China, where the standard ot 
living has declined over the past decade. 

The Revublic of the Philippi'ms: 1 he 
arowth rate eased off in the early 1960's, but the 
Marcos administration is making noteworthy 
progress with a program concentrating on rice 
production and roadbuildmg. 

New rice strains are coming into use. ihey 
were developed at the International ^ice E«- 
search Institute at Los Banos, organized m 1960 
bv the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations m 
cooperation with the Government of the Philip- 
pines. These new strains, combined with new 
teclmiques, including proper use of fertilizers 
and pesticides, are increasing production 

dramatically. i j . +1, „„ 

The Philippines has responded to tne re- 
quest for help from the Republic of Viet-Nam 
by sending a 2,000-man military engmeermg 
unit and other assistance. 

Thailand— ?in annual economic growth rate 
of more than 8 percent; exports up from ^477 
million in 1961 to $688 million m 1966. 

Politically, Thailand is moving toward adop- 
tion of a new constitution to be followed by 
elections. Its diplomatic leadership has made 
Bangkok a major center of regional mterna- 
tional activity. 

Thailand is a major contributor also to the 
military security of Southeast Asia. Several 
American air units engaged in the war m Viet- 

Nam are based in Thailand. Thai mihtary and 
police forces are dealing energetically with an 
organized campaign of subversion and ter- 
rorism directed from Hanoi and Peking, both 
of which have operated schools for trammg 
Communist Thai since 1962 or earlier. Thai- 
land has also sent combat forces to Viet-Nam: 
a regiment, 2,600 men, in addition to some air 
and naval personnel. And it has announced that 
it will send 10,000 more combat troops. 

Malaysia^ivom 1961 to 1966, a gam of 39 
percent in GNP. It has the third highest per 
capita income in East Asia (approximately 

^^^Singapore-^ rise in GNP from $707 million 
in 1960 to $949 million in 1965 (latest available 
figures), an increase of 34 percent. Its per ca- 
pita income, $520, is second only to Japan m 

East Asia. 

Both Malaysia and Singapore are tunction- 
ing democracies. And both have been makmg 
large investments in education, public housmg, 
rural and industrial development, and social 
services, with noteworthy rises m literacy and 
health standards. , . -i. 

Laos— the non-Communist part has kept its 
economy going and made progress despite ob- 
structions and military harassments by the 
Communists. Construction of the first major 
Mekong Valley project-the Nam Ngiun Dam 
is now^beginning through combined efforts o± 
several organizations and nations, mcludmg 
the United States. 

l7idonesia— long strides since thwarting the 
Commimist coup in October 1965. The slide into 
economic chaos of the late Sukarno years has 
been arrested, the budget rationalized, the infla- 
tion rate reduced, debts rescheduled. Incentives 
have been given for exports, various foreign 
properties returned to owners, foreign invest- 
ment invited. Thus, with courage and tenacity, 
the present government of Indonesia has laid 
the groundwork for sound development m the 
world's fifth or sixth most populous nation— 
and potentially a very prosperous nation 

Aiistralia and Neio Zealand^^dv&nced coun- 
tries by any test. Australia is enjoying rapid 
economic growth. Both Australia and New Zea- 
land are assuming growing roles m the East 
Asian and Pacific community. Both have mili- 
tary contingents in Viet-Nam. And we look to 
them to take on greater responsibilities when 
the British withdraw from Malaysia and Singa- 
pore sometime in the 1970's. 
RepuUic of Yiet-Nain-m2i]ov progress smce 


the summer of 1965 — dramatic on the military 
side, and politically in adopting a Constitu- 
tion and holding free elections. Also significant 
gains for much of the civilian population in edu- 
cation, health, roads, agriculture, and curbs on 

Confidence in the Future 

This remarkable economic and social progress 
of most of the non-Communist nations of East 
Asia and the "Western Pacific reflects political 
stability and confidence in the future. That sta- 
bility and that confidence stem from the convic- 
tion in these countries that they are going to 
have the chance to develop in their own way 
under governments of their own choice. And 
that conviction is rooted in two developments : 
the internal failures of Communist China and 
the firm stand against aggression which we and 
our allies have taken in Viet-Nam. The non- 
Communist governments of East Asia know that 
commiuiism is not the wave of the future. Most 
of them know that, economically and socially, 
they can far outstrip the Asian Communist 
states. And they know that the militant leaders 
of Peking and their disciples will not be per- 
mitted to destroy and take over their non-Com- 
munist neighbors in that part of the world. 

During 1967, the free nations of East Asia 
and the Pacific also continued to make notable 
progress in regional cooperation : 

— -Tlie Asian Development Bank began op- 
erating and announced its willingness to admm- 
ister a special fund for agricultural 

—Indonesia joined four of its neighbors in 
the _ new Association of Southeast Asian 

—The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), 
consisting of nine members and one observer, 
held its second annual ministerial conference. 

—Older regional organizations continued to 
function constructively. 

If anyone doubts that our stand in Viet-Nam 
has been a major contribution to these highly 

favorable developments over a vast area, let 
him go there and talk with responsible govern- 
ment officials. 

I cannot tell you how much longer it may 
take to achieve peace in Viet-Nam. Wlienever 
anyone can produce anybody willing and able 
to discuss peace on behalf of Hanoi, I shall be 
there within hours. Meanwhile, the situation in 
South Viet-Nam is not a stalemate. And what 
has been done by the splendid Americans who 
are there has already yielded dividends of his- 
toric significance. Behind the shield which we 
have helped to provide, a new Asia is arising. 

U.S. Extends Sympathy on Death 
of President Gestido of Uruguay 

Statement l>y President Johnson 

White House press release dated December 6 

In the death of President Oscar Gestido, 
Uruguay has lost its great leader, and the hem- 
isphere a distinguished statesman. 

His long record of public service to his coim- 
try earned him a special place in the hearts of 
his fellow citizens. In the hours of fundamental 
change in the structure of the Uruguayan Gov- 
ermnent, they turned to him to direct their 

Those of us who had the privilege to work 
with liim at the Meeting of Presidents at Punta 
del Este last April appreciated the way he con- 
ducted that historic conference. His leadership 
helped to assure its success as a milestone in 
inter- American relations. 

On behalf of the United States Government 
and people I extend deepest sympathy to the 
family of the late President and the Uruguayan 

At the same time I express my best wishes to 
President Jorge Pacheco Areco for success in 
carrying forward the objectives which he and 
President Gestido shared. 

JANUARY 1, 1968 

World Trade and Finance and U.S. Prosperity 

Address hy President Johnson ^ 

If we wanted to celebrate the triumphs of our 
economy tonight, we would have cause enough. 
We are now in the 82d month of the American 
economic miracle. This sustained prosperity is 
unparalleled in our history. 

But it is not celebration which summons us. 
We are here, rather, to look at the other side of 
the ledger— to assess some of the challenges that 
now threaten our prosperity. 

America's role in world trade and finance is 
crucial to our prosperity and that of ail fi"ee 

World trade has quadrupled since World War 
II. We have helped to create that trade — and 
we have shared fully in its benefits. 

In the world network of trade, Ainerica's role 
is doubly important. Our dollar stands at its 
center — the medium of exchange for most inter- 
national transactions. 

The recent devaluation of the British pound — 
with the tremors of uncertainty it stirred — 
makes it even more imperative that we maintain 
confidence in the dollar. In the wake of devalua- 
tion, we witnessed a I'emarkable display of inter- 
national financial cooperation. A speculative 
attack on the system was decisively repelled. 

It was repelled because we stood firmly behind 
our pledge — which I reaffirm today — to convert 
the dollar to gold at $35 an ounce. 

It was repelled because the leading govern- 
ments of the Western World joined with us in 
that successful defense, at a relatively small cost 
in reserves. 

But we cannot rest on this victory. We must 

look ahead. As world trade expands, so must the 
liquidity required to finance it. That liquidity 
need not rest on the uncertainties of gold 
production, consumption, and speculation. Nor 
can its supply be the responsibility of any one 

So, even as we reaffirm our pledge to keep our 
dollar strong — and every ounce of our gold 
stock stands behind that pledge — we must look 
beyond gold. 

We will press the case for other reserves 
wliich can strengthen the international 
monetary system of tomorrow. We are joined 
with other nations in this venture. Already we 
have laid out a blueprint. The agreement 
reached at the International Monetary Fund 
meeting in Eio = is a first important step. It 
pomts the way to the creation of supjilementary 
reserves backed by the full faith and credit of 
the participating nations. 

Balance of Payments 

A healthy balance of payments is essential to 
a sound dollar. 

After a decade of deficits, our balance-of-pay- 
ments problem still challenges the best efforts 
of government and business. 

In recent years we have made some very real 
progress. But we find some of that progress off- 
set by the cost of our defense efforts in South- 
east Asia and by events surrounding the 
devaluation of the pound. 

This calls for special effort — by both govem- 

" Made before the Business Council at Washington, 
D.C., on Dec. 6 (White House press release). 

' For background, see Bttlxetin of Oct. 23, 1967, p. 


ment and business — to press even harder for 

Our investments in defense and foreign aid 
are vital to tlie security of every American. But, 
for our part in government, we are reducing to 
the barest mininuim the drain of these essential 
activities on our balance of payments. 

Business, too, has responded to the challenge. 
In the voluntary balance-of -payments program, 
we have seen one of the finest examples of co- 
operative effort with government. Many firms 
have helped to reduce tlie deficit. They have bor- 
rowed funds overseas to finance foreign invest- 
ments rather than borrow here and exjDort our 
dollars abroad. Others have chosen to defer or 
scale down their investments. 

We ask for even greater voluntary coopera- 
tion in 1968. 

Before j'our dollars flow abroad to another 
industrial nation, ask yourself: Is this for an 
essential project ? If it is, why can't you finance 
it overeeas? 

I know that borrowing overseas may cost an 
extra point or so in interest. But it is a necessary 
investment. It will strengthen the economy in 
which we all have a share. 

Expanding Our Exports 

The best way to strengthen our balance of 
payments is to expand our exports. 

"We used to talk of the world market in terms 
of billions of dollars— and more recently 
hundreds of billions. Now the economists tell 
us those measures no longer suffice. The size of 
the economy outside the United States today 
exceeds $1 trillion. 

American business has only begun to fight for 
this market. I hope you will take this message 
back to the board rooms of America : Get going 
on exports. 

We in government have helped you to 
promote and finance your sales to other markets 
abroad. We hope to do even more in the future. 

But I ask business to remember this : Trade 
must be a two-way street. Trade must be a fair 
and competitive race. 

You cannot win tliis race confined by the 
quotas or high tariff walls the protectionists 
demand. Those walls have always been barriers 
to profits. You will win the race with time- 
tested American business methods: efficiency, 
better products, lower costs and prices. 

Even though we know that a key to balance 
of payments is to export more, we also know 
this : If our prices rise faster than those of our 
overseas competitors, our exports will suffer and 
our imports will grow. 

A growing export surplus demands that we 
maintain a higher degree of price stability than 
our competitors. We have done that over the 
past 7 years. 

Responsibility of Business and Labor 

The challenge to business and labor is no less 
compelling than the challenge to government. 

We know that wage and price changes are 
inevitable — and desirable — in a free enterprise 
system. But those changes must be restrained 
by a recognition of the fundamental national 
interest in maintaining a stable level of overall 

If strong labor unions insist on a wage rise 
twice the nationwide increase in output per 
man-hour — even where there is no real labor 
shortage — we are bound to have rising prices. 

If members of an industry attempt to raise 
prices and profit margins — even when they 
clearly have excess capacity — we are bound to 
have rising prices. 

Nobody benefits from a wage-i^rice spiral. 
Labor knows that it does not. You know that 
business does not. And surely the American 
people do not. 

Yet business says it is labor's responsibility 
to break the spiral, and labor says it is yours. 
I say it is everyone's responsibility. It is the 
responsibility of govermnent, of labor, and of 

I intend to urge labor to restrain its demands 
for excessive wage increases. 

I am urging business tonight to refrain from 
avoidable price increases and to intensify its 
competitive efforts. 

To both I say : It is your economy — your jobs 
and profits we need to protect. It is your dollar 
whose strength we must maintain. 

For the first time, America is fighting for 
freedom abroad without resorting to wage and 
price controls at home. 

"Voluntary restraint has made involuntary 
curbs unnecessary. 

This is the way it should be done. This is the 
way it can be done — if business and labor meet 
their responsibilities. 

JANU.\KY 1, 1968 

The Contours of Change 
in the Home Hemisphere 

l>y Covey T. Oliver'^ 

In 1961, with the signing of the Charter of 
Punta del Este, the member nations of the Alli- 
ance for Progress formally dedicated them- 
selves to replace fear with hope. We promised 
to work together to reform old habits of societal 
neglect. The Latin American countries would 
reform the structures of societies that had hand- 
somely benefited the few without giving oppor- 
tunities for a decent life to the great majority. 
All peoples of this hemisphere would be enlisted 
in this common task to achieve development. We 
would help, not only with tecluiical assistance 
but also with ideas and money. 

The promise of Punta del Este has touched all 
our lives in some way. I am sure many of you 
have taken active roles, either through your 
business or your church or in "people-to-people 
programs," to help in some part of this develop- 
ment eifort. Some of you may have sons or 
daughters working in the Peace Corps or as 
AID or foundation men in the remote high 
Andes or rain forest hinterlands. And all of 
us, subject to the will of our elected representa- 
tives while in office, help a little with our taxes, 
the taxes that are the price — not too dear — -that 
we pay for civilization. 

But, as is natural, the impact of the Alliance 
is felt much more strongly in Latin America. 
There both wise men and humble people sense it 
may be the last best hope against chaos, violence, 
the herd state. There ordinary villagers come 
alive with ideas and energy when they begin 
to see that they can, often with very little help 
other than from the concept of self-help itself, 
do things themselves to improve their village 
lives, such as building a schoolroom or piping 
good water down from the mountain. There 
brilliant, dedicated — but still too few — young 
administrators go at the challenges of modern- 
izing government agencies and business enter- 
prises. There the promise of better gains from 
greater consumer purchasmg power spurs en- 
trepreneurs, many of these rising in status to 

broaden the middle class. There men of innate 
scholarly bent begin to hope that they may 
sometime expect to be paid enough to be full- 
time teachers in vivid contact with students 
and to add by research to the world's body of 

There is in our home hemisphere a new pride 
and a new hope for a better future. New leaders 
have come forward, dedicated to development 
and with vision and political courage second to 
none. They were among the Presidents at Punta 
del Este last April who pledged themselves and 
their nations to even greater efforts and greater 
sacrifices to hasten and intensify the develop- 
ment process. These leadei-s have promised their 
peoples that change would be achieved by due 
process of law and without recourse to tyranny. 
Your Government supports such leadership. 
As President Jolinson once said : ^ 

... we are on the side of those who want constitu- 
tional governments. We are not on the side of those 
who say that dictatorships are necessary for eflScient 
economic development or as a bulwark against com- 

But in human affairs change is never without 
its tramuas for some. Wise and humane govern- 
ments recognize that it is not always easy for 
men to adapt, that frequently politics must in- 
clude doses of social therapy. We call this lead- 
ership. There is only one kind of government 
that treats change in these ways and provides 
for adjustments when mistakes are made. It is 
a democratic government. Think about this 
point: How many totalitarian governments 
have permitted any significant variations from 
the dictator's original premises? And of the 
very few authoritarian regimes that have, at 
what cost? 

But I have no time here to deal with the old- 
fashioned, highly privileged few who have 
narrowly and selfishly set themselves against 
the whole idea of the Alliance because to them 
it is "radical" or "communistic." Like the 
dinosaurs, they have gone — or at least are going, 
fast. They vanish because they are not intel- 
ligent enough socially to survive in modernizing 

A far more important challenge of change is 
to those literate, privileged, intelligent people 
in Latin America who consider themselves in- 
dividually to be modern, who generally support 

^ Excerpt from an address made at New Orleans, La., 
on Dec. 7 upon accepting the Thomas F. Cunningham 
award (for full test, .see press relea.=e 285), Mr. Oliver 
is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 

- For an address by President Johnson made at 
Denver, Colo., on Aug, 26, 1966, see Bulletin of Sept. 
19, 1966, p. 406. 


the goals of the Alliance, either from idealism 
or from fear of the alternative, but who are 
afraid that they will be required to carry a 
greater share of the development burden or that 
their societies simply cannot achieve effective 
change. Tliis type of person should be no 
stranger to those of us who have lived politics 
in this comitry over the last 40 years. But just 
as we of that age are not always well understood 
by our affluent youth of today, the Latin Ameri- 
cans I am talking about here do not find much 
toleration from the impatient, poor young in 
Latin America. Demographically, Latin Ameri- 
cans are very young. This observation presents 
a related second challenge : that of the urgency 
of change. 

Now, we in this country have gone through 
many periods of massive change : the depression, 
the war years, and various technological revo- 
lutions. We not only have grown to accept the 
temporary disequilibrium brought by change, 
we ahuost seem to regard it as the very stuff of 
survival. We are inclined to forget that in coun- 
tries that have not changed enough for centuries, 
change is psychologically difficult. 

It is in this area that we in government need 
your help. 

We who work in the Alliance every day have 
tried to foresee the dislocations and temporary 
inequalities — the personal sacrifices — that are 
and will be required if our hemisphere is to 
succeed in its grand design for progress. We 
have made plans, whenever possible, to soften 
the individual blows that some sectors must 
suffer. But you and I know that there can be 
no panacea for all traumas of change. 

The people of New Orleans and Louisiana 
have always played a imique role in the history 
of this country's relations with Latin America. 
Thousands of Latin Americans come here every 
year to trade their goods, to enjoy your city, to 
use your fine medical centers, or to study in 
your schools and universities. The beauty of 
this city has done much to counter the wide- 
spread belief in the countries to the south that 
we are a materialistic and uncouth people. You 
are one of our great cultural bridges. 

With your traditional ties of friendship and 
understanding, you can do much to imbue j-our 
Latin American friends and acquaintances with 
your own belief in the Alliance and to offer them 
the benefit of your own experiences m meeting 
the demands of a rapidly changing world. 

Many of you have had to face and resolve the 

problems inherent in our changing society. Wliat 
was your experience? How did you do it? What 
were some of the bad effects you could have 
avoided and which might be avoided by those 
in Latin America who, for the first time, may 
face sunilar problems ? 

Some of you have had invaluable experience 
as to world trade and the European Economic 
Community. How much of what you learned 
there can be applied in Latin America as that 
common market comes into being ? 

Others of you have gone through the throes 
of modernization required by the changing 
markets and changing tastes in our own coun- 
try. How did you meet tliis challenge? 

Improving relations between the Latin 
American private sector and Latin American 
education is just one of the areas in which you 
have much to offer. It is axiomatic in this coun- 
try that private citizens such as Thomas F. 
Cunningham take an active and leading role to 
insure that our schools produce the trained 
manpower needed by our society. Our relatively 
new schools of business, economics, and public 
administration are examples of how our educa- 
tional systems change to meet our changing 
needs. In law, so vital to democratic society, our 
great law schools, including those of Tulane and 
LSU, have been in the forefront of change. And 
I wish to recall that the Tulane Law School has 
long led in our legal associations with Latin 
America. American business has contributed 
much to the founding of such schools. Some of 
you have donated scholarships in fields partic- 
ularly important to your work. 

And this is only one example of the work 
private citizens such as you can do so much 
better than we in government. We can help 
identify the needs. You can do much to generate 
the imaginative answers to them. You all have 
experience and knowledge which neither we nor 
the governments of Latin America can buy. We 
depend on your good will and dynamism to 
make this experience available. I ask all of you 
to make the extra effort — to go to your counter- 
part in the hemisphere not as teacher to pupil 
iDut rather as fellow businessman, fellow 
teacher, or fellow church leader to identify the 
problem and, fi'om your experience, suggest a 
solution or open a dialog. 

We are all in this together — not because the 
Alliance Charter or the Presidents' Declaration 
say we should be, but because we have recog- 
nized that our well-being depends on the well- 

JANUART 1. 1968 

being of our neighbors; that if they suffer, so, 
sooner or later, shall we. Or in Secretary [of De- 
fense Eobert S.] McNamara's words : "Security 
is development. Without development, there 
can be no security." ^ 

Twenty-six years ago today, we suffered the 
bitter consequences of isolationism. Isolationism 
was blind tradition, fear, even selfishness and 
cynicism. In our home hemisphere, especially 
in the past 6 years, we have done much to make 
certain that another kind of Pearl Harbor does 
not take place in our doorstep. We have already 
given the lie to those whose loyalties are to dic- 
tatorial political systems alien to this hemi- 
sphere and our common tradition of liberty. We 
have shown here that great changes can be 
achieved without recourse to violence and ty- 
ramiy. We have begun a true revolution in peace. 
We must jealously guard what we have gained 
as we work together for even more rapid 

And, with your help, ladies and gentlemen, 
we and other like-minded peoples in the home 
hemisphere will prevail — prevail for peace, for 
justice, for social virtue. 

Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee 
Holds Third Meeting 

Joint Commmriiqibe 

Press release 290 dated December 9 

The Joint Mexican-United States Trade 
Committee held its third annual meeting from 
December 6 to 8, 1967, in Washington to discuss 
matters related to U.S.-Mexican trade. The 
Delegation of Mexico was headed by His Ex- 
cellency Hugo Margain, the Mexican Ambas- 
sador to the United States, and the United 
States Delegation by Mr. Joseph A. Greenwald, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
national Trade Policy. Previous meetings of 
the Committee have been held alternately in 
Mexico City and Washmgton.^ 

This Committee provides a fonun for the 
regular exchange of views between the two gov- 

' For an address by Secretary McNamara made at 
Montreal, Canada, on May IS, 1966, see xbiA., June 6, 

^ For texts of communiques issued at the close of 
the meetings, see Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 738, 
and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 70. 

ernments on trade issues and other matters 
closely related to trade between Mexico and 
the United States. 

This year's meeting, as in previous years, was 
held in an atmosphere characterized by cor- 
diality and frankness. The United States Dele- 
gation informed the Mexican Delegation of the 
benefits which would accrue to Mexico from 
U.S. trade concessions in the Kemiedy Round 
of tariff negotiations. The Mexican Delegation 
told the U.S. Delegation that during the past 
year the Mexican Government had created over 
one thousand new sub-items in the Mexican 
tariff schedule on which tariff charges were 
reduced, most of these being of interest to U.S. 

The two delegations reviewed recent trade 
performance, particularly over the past year, 
and discussed several factors influencing trade 
flows, including trade barriers. Suggestions 
were made on both sides respecting measures 
which might be taken to remove or reduce the 
impact of these barriers upon trade. The dele- 
gations agreed to keep these matters under 
close review over the forthcoming year and to 
continue their search for mutually beneficial 
solutions to the problems identified. They also 
agreed to develop further information in cer- 
tain areas of agi-iculture production. 

The Committee recommended expanded 
programs of trade promotion on the part of 
both countries designed to identify new trade 
potentials in both markets. It was noted that 
exchanges of trade missions composed of busi- 
nessmen from each country would be an es- 
pecially valuable means of accomplishing this 

Among other matters related to trade, the 
Committee discussed the Mexican progi-ams re- 
lated to industrialization of the border areas. 
In this coimection, it was agreed that the two 
delegations would recommend to their govern- 
ments the fullest possible exchange of informa- 
tioia on the progress of the programs and their 
economic and social effects on both sides of the 

The two delegations agreed that it would be 
useful to exchange mutual visits by experts to 
supplement the normal diplomatic channels by 
wliich tlie two governments follow up on mat- 
ters discussed at the annual meetings. 

It was agreed that the next meeting would 
take place in Mexico City during the fall of 



U.S. and Philippines Begin Talks 
on Future Economic Relations 

Statement by Eugene M. Braderman ^ 

The talks that we are beginning here today 
mark another major milestone in the evolving 
relationship between the United States and the 

The Philippine and U.S. teams have been 
charged by our Presidents with the task of iden- 
tifying the concepts which should underlie a 
new instrument to replace the Laurel -Langley 
Trade Agreement - after its scheduled expira- 
tion in 1074. 

I am delighted to participate in this endeavor 
for many reasons. First, because it is always a 
source of satisfaction to be engaged in an im- 
portant and constnictive task. But there are 
additional personal reasons for my pleasure in 
undertaking this assignment. 

I have been interested in and concerned with 
U.S.-Philippine relations for more than 17 
years. I first visited your country in 1951 and 
have been back many times. I have many friends 
here. I served as a member of the U.S. delega- 
tion that negotiated the Laurel-Langley Ti-ade 
Agreement and remember with gratitude the 
warm reception I received from President 
Magsaysay and the other members of the Philip- 
pine community on that occasion. I traveled to 
all parts of your country in 1960 as head of the 
first U.S. trade and development mission to visit 
the Philippines. Most recently, I was here as a 
participant in the Philippine- American Assem- 
bly that met in Davao. I hope you will pardon 
these personal references, but I cannot be with 
you without expressing the warmth and, I can 
assure you, the understanding with which I ap- 
proach our forthcoming discussions. 

The subject of economic relations between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United 
States of America is, in our judgment, one of 
major importance and one which has many ram- 
ifications. Some are fairly clear, and others are 
involved and complex. That is why, in their 

'Made at the first joint meeting of the U.S. and 
Philippine teams to discuss future economic relations 
held at Manila on Nov. 20 (press release 266 dated 
Nov. 18). Mr. Braderman, who is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activ- 
ities, is chairman of the U.S. team. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 467. 

wisdom, our Presidents suggested an early be- 
ginning of intergovermnental discussions. 

This beginning which is taking place today in 
your great Capital City of Manila will give us 
the opportunity to exchange views on the whole 
range of issues that govern our economic rela- 
tions. Following this exchange of views we will 
have a better idea of the concepts which should 
underlie oiu* economic relationships in the 
future. We may find that our views are so 
much alike that we will be able to recommend to 
our Governments the early negotiation of a new 
agreement. Or we may wish to reflect more fully 
on the ideas and concepts that we have ex- 
changed and decide to hold further discussions 
at a later date. One thing is clear : We must have 
a true and genuine meeting of the minds if we 
are to develop a solid base for the negotiation of 
treaty arrangements to govern our future 
economic relations. 

It is our considered view that the Laurel- 
Langley Trade Agreement has been of mutual 
benefit to both the Philippines and the United 
States. For botli coiuitries it offered opportuni- 
ties for trade and for investment — opportunities 
which were utilized in some instances and 
ignored in others. 

On the trade side, the 20-year period between 
1954 and 1974, during wliich there were to be 
declining preferential tariff rates and duty-free 
quotas, was meant to provide a reasonable 
period in which trade adjustments could be 
made. Both the U.S. and Philippine delegations 
were agreed on this point when the agreement 
was negotiated in 1954. 

Tlie trade preferences pro\aded by that agree- 
ment are not in fact equal. They are actually 
unequal in favor of the Philippines. Special con- 
cessions were made by the United States because 
of its friendship for the Philippines and its 
recognition at the time that as a developing 
country, Philippine exports might require 
larger preferences for a longer period than 
would U.S. exports. Wliile U.S. exports to the 
Philippines have declined because of the more 
rapid reduction in preferences on U.S. articles, 
Philippine exports to the United States have 
increased substantially. 

During the negotiation of the Laurel-Langley 
Agreement, it was stated many times that the 
Philippines would use the 20 years until 1974 
to diversify its exports both by product and by 
market. The facts indicate that thus far there 
have been appreciable increases in trade with 

JANUARY 1, 1968 


Japan and the European Economic Community, 
and to a lesser extent with other areas, but there 
has been little product diversification. 

In tliis connection, we have noted with interest 
the announcement made last month by President 
Marcos that the Philippines will renew its ef- 
forts to promote Pliilippine exports. 

I believe you are all aware that the United 
States has supported a worldwide liberal trade 
policy based on the principle of most-favored- 
nation treatment. The preferential trading ar- 
rangement with the Philippines was an excep- 
tion. In April of this year at Punta del Este, 
President Jolmson indicated that we had been 
examining the kind of trade initiatives that the 
United States should propose in the years 
ahead.^ He noted our conviction that future 
trade policy must pay special attention to the 
needs of the developing comitries. Since com- 
parable tariff treatment may not always permit 
developing countries to advance as rapidly as 
desired, our President suggested that temporary 
tariff advantages for all developing countries 
by all industrialized countries might be one way 
to deal with this. 

As promised by President Jolmson at Punta 
del Este, the United States has been exploring 
this idea with other industrialized comitries 
and we hope to have a proposal to put forward 
at the second United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, which will be held at 
New Delhi next February. We look forward to 
discussing these trade concepts with you. 

The pro\'isions in the Laurel-Langley Agree- 
ment governing investment relations between 
our two countries were designed to benefit both 
the Philippines and the United States. The op- 
portunities provided Filipinos in the United 
States are the same as those provided Americans 
in the Philippines. While we recognize the equal 
legal status of citizen investors of both coun- 
tries, we are all well aware that this equality 
does not necessarily lead to equal utilization of 
investment opportunities. This is simply because 

" For background, see ibid., May 8, 1967, p. 706. 

capital availabilities in the United States are 
much greater than those in the Philippines — 
and U.S. capital has been invested not only at 
home but also in countries around the world 
where it is welcomed. Wliile some Philippine 
capital has been invested overseas, your Govern- 
ment has recognized that the great bulk of it 
has been needed at home for the development 
of the Pliilippine economy. 

Because of tliis differing use of investment 
opportunities, the subject of investment has de- 
veloped strong nationalistic overtones in the 
Philippines. This is not true in the United 
States, where the welcome mat is out for foreign 

For us, this has been a continuing policy. As 
a young nation we actively sought foreign in- 
vestment, aware of the significant contribution 
that it could make to our economic development. 
Today, we and most other developed coimtries 
still seek to attract foreign investment, recog- 
nizing that new investments, whatever their 
source, are important to continued growth. In 
whatever stage of development a nation may be, 
the development process never ceases. In this 
sense we are all developing countries. 

In this part of the world, countries in vary- 
ing stages of development, such as Australia, the 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Thailand, are all actively bid- 
ding for foreign investment. 

The economic development goals that you set 
for the Philippmes are for you to determine, 
just as my country's goals will be determined 
by our citizens. We are eager to learn from the 
Philippine team as much as possible about your 
investment goals, how they will be met, and the 
role you wish foreign investment capital to play 
in your economic develojDment effort. 

We welcome this opportunity to discuss and 
explore together the many facets of our eco- 
nomic relationships. We are certain that these 
discussions can lead only in one direction : to 
increased understanding which will further 
solidify a friendly and enduring relationship 
between our two countries. 



The Future Work Program of GATT 

Statement &y WilHam M. Both 

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ^ 

Five months after the completion of the 
Kennedy Koimd, it seems strange to be here in 
Geneva again discussing our mutual problems 
in trade. But perhaps it is not so strange when 
we appreciate the twofold nature of our i^il- 
grunage. We are here first to celebrate the past 
and secondly to map the future. 

The past is the expanding flow of trade 
throughout the world under the aegis of the 
GATT. The past is a series of trade negotiations 
which has immeasurably reduced the barriers 
to world commerce. But above all else, the past 
is the leadership of Eric Wyndham White, the 
Director General of this great institution. 

A great deal has already been said both in this 
room and others about the achievements and 
contributions of the Director General. Let me 
add as simply and shortly that I would like to 
record the deep gratitude of the United States 
Government to Eric Wyndham "White for all 
that he has done both for our country and for 
the world over the period of his devoted service. 
Let me say on a personal basis — as many of my 
colleagues here could do as well — that without 
his firm hand, his intuitive sense of timing, and 
his magical compromises, the Kennedy Eound 
in those last desperate days and hours could have 
failed — and failed miserably. 

So much for the past. The Director General 
would be the first, I believe, to say, Leave off 
praising our history, let us discuss the present 
and more pai-ticularly the future — both im- 
mediate and in the longer run. GATT after all 
should be the place to work. What, therefore, is 
our future ? 

First, we must take all practical measures to 

' Made before the special ministerial meeting at the 
24th session of the Contracting Parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on Nov. 23. 

implement fully the results of the Kennedy 
Roxmd.^ In this respect I can report that the 
United States administration intends, within 
the near future, to send the American Selling 
Price package to the Congress for its considera- 
tion. We have now signed the International 
Grains Arrangement and are this week readying 
that for consideration by the United States 

On July 1 we expect to implement new regu- 
lations consonant with the recently negotiated 
antidiunping code. Finally, this coming Janu- 
ary 1, we expect to imj^lement the first stage of 
the Kennedy Eound concessions and to imple- 
ment without staging concessions on a number 
of products of interest to the developing 

It is essential that all our negotiating partners 
also move ahead to full implementation as 
rapidly as possible. 

But there is another aspect to implementation 
— the negative side. This is the need for all con- 
tractmg parties firmly to resist the internal 
pressures each of us face for restrictive trade 
measures. These pressures exist in the United 
States, as you know full well ; but it is, as I hope 
you also know, the firm policy of the President 
and his administration to oppose these efforts 
strenuously, firmly, and continually. As you 
probably have noted in the press within recent 
weeks, enlightened and influential industrial 
and agricultural groups are already mobilizing 
strongly in support of our position. But I would 
mislead you if I did not acknowledge that we 
shall continue to face a difficult period in coming 
months and indeed throughout 1968. 

I am convinced that we can win this battle 

' For a summary of the Kennedy Round agreements, 
see Bulletin of July 24, 1967, p. 95. 

JANUARY 1, 1968 


for expanding world trade. We believe that the 
American people will not permit the destruction 
of a trade policy which has benefited them so 
well for so many years. But we are not alone in 
facing such internal pressures. Protectionism is 
endemic in all countries. All governments must 
be equally firm in resisting the demands of 
special interests. The trade of my country has 
suffered in recent months from restrictive de- 
vices in other countries. Trade protectionism, 
like many sicknesses, is highly contagious. 

Now for the longer future : We all recognize, 
I believe, that no major country is prepared so 
shortly after the Kennedy Round to embark on 
a major trade initiative. Neither do we believe, 
however, that we can cease the pursuit of ex- 
panding world commerce. In my covmtry, there- 
fore, we have already initiated a trade policy 
study to gain better understanding of the 
remaining problems we face. Others are un- 
doubtedly doing the same. Our work in the 
GATT in the months ahead accordingly should 
be directed toward complementing and phasing 
together these individual national efforts. We 
need a live and active forum in which our in- 
dividual trade concerns can be examined in their 
global context. 

The questions we all must study are varied 
and complex. Let me mention a few. First : non- 
tariff barriers. As tariffs are reduced, these 
barriers take on an increasing significance. 
Indeed, they are already a matter of sharp 
cxjncern to most of us. 

We think the first need is for an inventory 
of these restrictions. We do not yet have suffi- 
cient understanding of their scope, their sig- 
nificance, and their intricate workings. But a 
useful examination will require positive effort 
by all nations, because many of these restric- 
tions relate to basic national policies and prac- 
tices. "Wlien tliis inventory is complete, the 
Contracting Parties should analyze their trade 
effects and examine various possible negotiat- 
ing teclmiques which might be applied to 
them. In the United States preparation of such 
an inventory is already underway. 

Agriculture is another area of major and in- 
creasing concern to us. It is vridely recognized 
that trade liberalization in agriculture has 
lagged behind that in industry and that the 
problems we face are complex and have deep 
social and political content. In most countries 
farm incomes are only half tliose received by 
workers in other economic sectors. To boost in- 
comes, governments intervene with price and 

income support policies, and this in turn has a 
serious impact on trade. We know it will not be 
easy to deal with problems involving sensitive 
elements of national policy. Nevertheless, they 
must be tackled. We therefore support the idea 
of establishing an agriculture committee. 

But there are also immediate and specific 
problems before us. The Governments of New 
Zealand, Australia, and Denmark have men- 
tioned one of them ; ^ and there are others as 
well. These critical matters pose a challenge 
which the GATT camiot ignore. We must find 
new ways and perhaps more flexible means of 
dealing with them as they occur. But I also be- 
lieve that solutions to individual problems must 
be sought in the light of our longer range goals. 

In placing the emphasis I have on nontarifl 
barriers and on agriculture, I do not mean to 
imply that import duties on industrial products 
are no longer a problem. That is definitely not 
the case. There are still many products on which 
tariffs are serious obstacles to trade. Before the 
next step forward, we must analyze the level 
and structure of tariffs which will remain after 
the Kennedy Round. But we shall also explore 
new techniques with energy and imagination, in- 
cluding the possibility of dismantling tariff and 
other trade barriers within individual indus- 
trial sectors on a worldwide basis. 

Another serious problem area is the relation- 
ship of coimtervailing duties and subsidies. The 
United States has already raised this question 
in the plenary under agenda item 16. At that 
time, we emphasized that it was essential to 
undertake a broad-ranging examination of all 
aids to exports along with countervailing 
duties, since one could not be considered in iso- 
lation from the other. We are very much con- 
cerned about the consequences of conflicting 
policies and practices in this area, both in agri- 
culture and industry. This broad and complex 
area of fiscal adjustment is filled with danger 
for all of us where practices conflict. If order 
is to be brought into this field, we must have a 
clear idea of the nature and effects of these 
rapidly expanding practices, their relation to 
one another and to the rules by which we carry 
on our trade. 

Finally, GATT must now work — and work 
hard — to find new ways to help the developing 
countries expand their export earnings. The de- 
veloping countries will, of course, realize sub- 
stantial benefits from the Kennedy Romid, 

' Trade in dairy products. 



especially as their exports of semimanufactures 
and manufactures begin to expand. But, their 
main problem at this time, and for several years 
ahead, must be in the area of exports of primary 
products. Difficult as it may be, the developed 
countries must work, must work to provide ex- 
panded opportunities in their markets. 

In this connection, we must also recognize 
that the problem of expanding exports of the 
developing countries is by no means only a prob- 
lem of eliminating barriers to trade. Equally as 
important is the need for developing countries 
to produce at competitive prices the kind of 
products for which there is a demand in world 
markets and to market these products effec- 
tively. The GATT International Trade Center, 
working with UNCTAD [United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development], can play 
a very constructive role in the marketing area, 
and we strongly support the work of the Center. 

Later, after further broad discussions in other 
forums among interested comitries, the GATT 
will be called upon to deal with the possibility 
of a general system of preferential access to de- 
veloped countries for the exports of developing 
countries. My nation has joined with a nimiber 
of others to explore the feasibility of such a 
preference system and of some of the principles 
which might be embodied in it. Eventual con- 
sideration of such a system of general prefer- 
ences by the GATT will be one of the important 
tasks before us. 

The work of the GATT will not, however, be 
confined only to the issues we can now foresee. 
New problems will undoubtedly arise from time 
to time, and we shall have to work together on 
them. One possible difficulty may arise out of the 
plan of some of the important trading coun- 
tries in Europe to make significant changes in 
their tax systems. These will increase their bor- 
der tax adjustments. We are seriously concerned, 
as we have indicated before, that these adjust- 
ments in certain cases adversely affect our ex- 
ports. Should these fears prove in fact to be 
justified, we would expect to take up this mat- 
ter in accordance with normal GATT proce- 
dure. If it becomes evident in the coming months 
that there is a general multilateral problem 
here, it might then become advisable for the 
Contracting Parties to give this kind of prob- 
lem their attention. 

Tliere are of course basic continuing questions 
which require perhaps an even broader outlook 
than we have traditionally taken in the GATT. 
For example, the expansion of world trade must 

be accompanied by continuing improvement in 
the income of workers and in the working 
conditions of labor. We must recognize that 
imreasonable labor conditions, particularly in 
production for exports, create serious difficul- 
ties in international trade. This is an area 
which the Contractmg Parties might wish to 
explore jointly with the International Labor 

So much then for the future work of GATT. 
If there is iserhaps an imderlying theme that 
may be developing in our consultations over the 
last several days, it is that the trading nations 
of the world must press ahead patiently and 
imaginatively into an even broader expansion 
of world commerce. To do this, we need, both 
within our individual countries and within the 
GATT, to analyze in general and in specific 
terms the complex and deeply rooted barriers 
to trade that still exist. We must not use the 
words "general studies" to mask a failure to 
grapple with immediate and specific problems. 
Neither, however, can we forget that underlying 
the various complexities of trade there lie basic 
questions of policies that must be understood to 
be improved. 

We learned, I think, in the Kennedy Roimd 
how much intensive work was necessary before 
those final months of negotiations. Let us build 
then on that experience and do our work 
thoroughly and well in a positive and construc- 
tive spirit, so that the world may hold what it 
has now gained and move forward with new 
vigor in the years ahead. 

U.S. and Japan Hold Talks 
on Softwood Log Trade 

Joint Statement 

Press release 294 dated December 14 

In accordance with the understanding 
reached during the Sixth Meeting of the Joint 
United States-Japan Committee on Trade and 
Economic Affairs in September 1967,^ repre- 
sentatives of the two Governments met Decem- 
ber 11-13 to examine the current problem of 
reconciling conservation and trade interests 
involved in the use of timber resources of the 
Pacific Northwest and Alaska. 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1067, p. 451. 

JANUARY 1, 1968 


The Japanese delegation was headed by 
Shinsnke Hori, Economic Counselor of the 
Japanese Embassy, and included representa- 
tives of the Mmistry of Agriculture and Forest- 
ry and the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry. The United States delegation was 
headed by Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Trade Policy, and included representatives of 
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Interior, Labor, and Treasury and the Office of 
the Special Representative for Trade Negotia- 
tions, the Council of Economic Advisers, and 
the Small Business Administration. 

They jointly examined the demand, supply 
and price situation in forest products, the 
organization and employment of the forest 
products industries, and the impact of the log 
trade on the timber consuming and processing 

It was agreed that the importance of the log 
trade problem required a continuation of dis- 
cussions which would contribute to mutually 
acceptable solutions to deal with the problem in 
the Pacific Northwest. The next meeting will be 
held in Tokyo in early 1968. 

U.S. Protests Soviet Failure 

To Give Notice of Scientific Tests 

Press release 28S dated December 9 

Following is the text of a note delivered to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs hy tJie 
American Embassy in Moscow on Decernber 8. 

The Embassy refers to an announcement by 
the official Soviet news agency TASS on Decem- 
ber 2 that Soviet research vessels intend to carry 
out hydroacoustic research involving under- 
water explosions in an area near the Aleutian 
Islands from December 3 to December 15. The 
United States Government regrets the Soviet 

Government did not find it possible to inform 
the United States directly well in advance of 
the begmning of these experiments which will 
take place in close proximity to United States 
territorial waters. This failure to provide ade- 
quate advance notification could have jeopard- 
ized United States marine craft in the area, 
which were obliged to take urgent measures to 
leave the zone specified in the TASS announce- 
ment. Beyond this, the United States Govern- 
ment would appreciate being informed as to 
what precautions the Soviet Govermnent will 
take in order to minimize the possibility of 
damage to fish and other natural resources 
including marine mammals in the area. 

The Soviet Government should recall that 
when the United States Government made 
plans to conduct a similar seismological field 
experiment in the North Pacific in October 
1966, it infoi-med the Soviet Government of 
this fact by note (No. 313, dated August 19, 
1966) several weeks in advance. The United 
States Government outlined in detail prepara- 
tions for the experiment and invited the Soviet 
Government to provide an observer to be a mem- 
ber of the scientific party of the vessel carrying 
out the experiment. Further information on 
the United States experiment was provided to 
the Soviet Government in notes dated October 
18, 1966, and February 8, 1967. Moreover, when 
the Soviet news agency TASS on October 19, 
1966, expressed the Soviet desire that no explo- 
sions be conducted in certain areas, the United 
States Government responded to this appeal by 
instructing United States scientists not to con- 
duct explosions in the areas specified. On May 
24, 1967, the United States Government m its 
Note No. 1716 informed the Soviet Government 
of plans to conduct another seismological field 
experiment off the Aleutian Islands. 

The United States Government believes that 
such experiments are of general interest and 
hopes the Soviet Government will share the 
knowledge derived from its current series with 
the world scientific community. 




Recent International Developments 
Concerning the Ocean and Ocean Floor 

Statement hy Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for Interrmtional Organization Affairs '■ 

I am happy to appear before this committee 
to discuss some recent international develop- 
ments concerning the ocean and ocean floor and, 
in that light, the joint resolutions being con- 
sidered by this committee. Leonard Meeker, the 
Department's Legal Adviser, and Herman Pol- 
lack, the Department's Director of Literna- 
tional Scientific and Technological Affairs, are 
accompanying me to provide any information 
you may desire within their fields of activity. 

In recent years we have seen an upsurge of 
interest, both here and abroad, in marine prob- 
lems, especially those having to do with the 
ocean depths and the seabed and subsoil of the 
outer oceans. In the United States, the Congress 
passed the Marine Resources and Engineering- 
Development Act, which became law on June 17, 
1966. The Marine Council and the Marine 
Commission established pursuant to that act 
are engaging in an active program of planning, 
study, and coordination looking toward the 
adoption of soimd national policy for the ex- 
ploration and exploitation of the oceans in years 
to come. 

Litemationally, a similar interest in marine 
affairs has been apparent. The Intergovern- 
mental Oceanographic Commission, an orga- 
nization of UNESCO [United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization], 
has carried on invaluable scientific activities in 
oceanography; the Food and Agriculture 
Organization is closely concerned with fisheries; 
the World Meteorological Organization is 
concerned with the effect of the oceans on cli- 
mate ; the International Maritime Consultative 
Organization is interested in shipping problems 
and safety of lives at sea ; and the International 

Telecommunication Union is concerned with 
communications over the ocean. 

In this sense a large number of international 
organizations are exploring marine problems as 
seen from their own particular points of view. 
We run the risk of confusion, duplication, and 
chaos unless something is done to relate all these 
activities more purposefully. Under strong 
U.S. leadership, the Economic and Social Coun- 
cil of the United Nations asked the U.N. Secre- 
tary-General in mid-1966 to begin a study of 
what might briefly be described as "who does 
what" in international marine activities, exclud- 
ing fisheries. Specifically, the Council's resolu- 
tion called for a study of the current state of 
knowledge of marine resources and techniques 
for their exploitation. 

Building on this foundation, the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly a year ago asked the Secretary- 
General in effect to broaden this study so as to 
review the current state of knowledge as regards 
ocean sciences and to improve international 
cooperation.- This study is also going forward. 
The Secretary-General has been directed to 
report to the next U.N. General Assembly, just 
a year from now. 

Meanwhile, more and more people have rec- 
ognized that we stand at the threshold of what 
may be a very exciting period in scientific devel- 
opment in the marine field. We are already able 
to put a man down to the bottom of the deepest 
ocean trench, just as we are able to put a man 
above the earth's atmosphere into outer space. 
Soon we shall be able to perform a variety of 
tasks in what Senator [Claiborne] Pell calls 
"ocean space," just as we are learning to do more 
and more useful tasks in outer space. As 

' Made before the Senate Committee on roreign 
Relations on Nov. 29. 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/2172 (XXI). 

JANUARY 1, 1968 


recently as 1958, we thouglit it sufficient to pro- 
vide for exploitation of the continental shelf in 
a convention prepared under U.N. auspices by 
the Conference on the Law of the Sea.^ That 
convention provided for the exercise of sover- 
eign rights over adjacent ocean floor to areas 
to a depth of 200 meters and beyond to the limit 
of exploitability. 

What we must ask ourselves now is whether 
we do not need new legal arrangements for the 
exploitation of the outer oceans and the deep 
seabed and whether we do not need a concerted 
international effort to stimulate and coordinate 
scientific exploration there. Essentially, that is 
what the discussion in the United Nations today 
is all about. 

Our objectives with respect to a legal regime 
concerning exploitation of the deep ocean floor 
are readily identifiable. We desire a legal regime 
that will encourage the development and use 
of the deep ocean floor, that will avoid danger- 
ous conflicts among the nations that will be 
exploiting the floor's resources, and that will be 
broadly acceptable to the nations of the world. 

The focal point of international discussion 
is the proposal made by Ambassador Arvid 
Pardo, the representative of Malta, in the cur- 
rent U.N. General Assembly. Ambassador 
Pardo has proposed that the Assembly look 
toward a new international treaty which in 
brief would reserve the ocean floor beyond the 
limit of national jurisdiction exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and establish an interna- 
tional agency to assume jurisdiction over the 
deep ocean floor and its resources. In the origi- 
nal Pardo proposal the financial benefits from 
the exploitation of these resources were to be 
allocated primarily to the less developed 

This is an interesting and suggestive pro- 
posal, but it obviously raises a great many diffi- 
culties and problems to which the answers are 
not easily found. The plain fact is that no one 
has yet had the time or the opportunity to think 
through completely the implications of the 
Pardo proposal and of other proposals calling 
for radical action on the subject of the oceans. 

Specifically, we have little knowledge of the 
economic factors involved in exploiting the deep 
seabed resources presumed to exist but not ac- 
tually located. No one has considered seriously 
the question of how to induce enterprise to 

' For text of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
see Bulletin of June 3, 1958, p. 1121. 

undertake the risks of deep sea exploration and 
exploitation if the financial benefits are to go 
to others. We are far from ready to establish a 
new international organization to preside over 
this amalgam of uncertainties. Nor is there 
yet broad agreement on the general legal princi- 
ples which ought to govern activities in the 
deep ocean floor. We must be concerned with 
these economic and legal factors, as well as the 
very important security considerations involved. 

The discussion of the Pardo proposal in the 
General Assembly thus far has surfaced these 
problems and a great many more besides. As 
delegates have come to realize how little they 
actually know about these matters, many of 
them have been imderstandably cautious about 
moving too far or too quickly. The Soviet bloc, 
notably, has taken a most restrictive attitude, 
even doubting the advisability of setting up a 
General Assembly committee on the subject. 
And others, while agi-eeing to a temporary 
conunittee, would give it only a highly restric- 
tive mandate for the time being. 

Our own position, as set forth by Ambassador 
Goldberg on November 8,* was, we think, a 
balanced and judicious presentation of both the 
possibilities and the problems of international 
cooperation as regards the oceans, and I would 
like to submit that statement for the record. 
The Ambassador stressed the importance we 
attach to a comprehensive and responsible study, 
to the growth of international cooperation in 
exploration of the ocean floor, and to the devel- 
opment of general principles to guide the ac- 
tivities undertaken in this field. 

Ambassador Goldberg maintained that the 
deep ocean floor should not become a stage for 
competing national sovereignties. Eather, it 
should be open to exploration and use by all 
states without discrimination. Recognizing that 
the first issue before the Assembly was how to 
organize itself to implement the objectives it 
considered desirable, the Ambassador recom- 
mended the establishment of a committee on the 
oceans which would act for the General Assem- 
bly in considering all marine questions brought 
before the Assembly. Such a committee would 
assist the General Assembly in promoting long- 
term international cooperation in the marine 
sciences and in particular assist the Assembly 
on questions of law, arms control, and problems 
of iJollution. 

' Ibid., Nov. 27, 1967, p. 723. 



Ambassador Goldberg pointed to the impor- 
tance of beginning now to tackle the legal issues 
involved by developing general principles to 
govern states in their activities on the deep ocean 
floor. He emphasized the complexity of the is- 
sues and noted that treaties already exist which 
bear on the subject. The ^Vnibassador affirmed 
the willingness of the United States to partici- 
pate fully in whatever studies are necessary in 
determining the future legal regime of the deep 
ocean floor. 

Some 47 countries have spoken in the debate 
on this subject in the political committee of the 
General Assembly. An informal working group 
is now engaged in an effort to arrive at a broadly 
acceptable resolution. The working group 
should reach its conclusions within a very few 
days. I cannot foresee precisely wliat action it 
would recommend; but I can say that on the 
basis of the information we now have, it is prob- 
able that a committee will be established, with 
an initial life of 1 year, to carry out on behalf 
of the General Assembly a review of some of 
the issues involved. We would expect to partici- 
pate actively in such a committee, together with 
a representative selection of other countries 
drawn from all regions and including states 
with important maritime interests. 

In our consultations with the Members of 
Congress, we in the executive branch have 
stressed the complexity of the problems con- 
fronting us and the time it would take to reach 
satisfactory solutions of these problems. We 
have made it clear that we are only at the begin- 
ning of what will certainly be a lengthy process 
of national and international deliberation. In 
such a situation we see great advantages in keep- 
ing open every desirable option. We are, more- 
over, fully sensitive to the rights, claims, and 
interests of American citizens and American 
enterprises in the various aspects of maritime, 
fisheries, and other marine activities; and of 

course, we are always guided in the first instance 
by national security considerations. 

In these circmnstances we do not believe it 
would be desirable or helpful for the Congress 
at this time to go on record with any of the 
resolutions introduced in the two Houses. With 
specific reference to the two resolutions before 
the Senate, I believe that the proposal presented 
by Senator [Norris] Cotton, stressing the im- 
portance of caution, has already been reflected 
in the position we have taken in the General 
Assembly. I do not believe that the General 
Assembly will be taking the kind of action 
against which Senator Cotton's resolution was 
designed to guard. I would therefore suggest 
that no action need be taken on this proposal. 

Senator Pell has introduced two resolutions. 
The first would express the sense of the Senate 
on six broad propositions concerning the use of 
ocean resources, conservation, freedom of ex- 
ploration, arms control, the limits of the conti- 
nental shelf, and criminal jurisdiction. Senator 
Pell's second resolution expands on these propo- 
sitions and sets out in great detail a number of 
legal principles that might be adopted by the 
General Assembly. A great deal of value has 
been accomplished by the mere introduction of 
these resolutions. They provide a useful focus 
for thought and planning. The Department is 
directing serious attention to the broad range 
of problems enumerated in these resolutions. 
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is 
studymg the practicability and national security 
implications of nuclear arms control measures 
applicable to the deep ocean floor. This activity 
is being coordinated with the Department of 
Defense and other branches of the Govermnent 

Let me assure the committee that we intend to 
continue our consultations with interested com- 
mittees and Members of the Senate and House 
of Representatives as the international discus- 
sion on this subject moves forward. 

JANUARY 1, 1968 



United States Urges Renewed Dedication 
to U.N. Peace and Security Activities 

Statement hy Congressman L. H. Fountain 
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

At the very outset, let me state on behalf of 
my Government that the United States assigns 
particularly high priority to the peace and 
security activities of the United Nations. The 
United States has supported United Nations 
peacekeeping in the past. We shall continue 
to do so. But we must also emphasize that we 
believe in collective action, in shared responsi- 
bilities for peace. 

Within recent weeks, the United States 
Congress, of which I have the honor to be a 
Member, passed an amendment to the Foreign 
Aid Act expressing the sense of the Congress 
that the cause of international order and peace 
can be enhanced by the establislmient within the 
United Nations of improved arrangements for 
standby forces. The amendment requested the 
President, through the United States Represen- 
tative to the United Nations and in cooperation 
with other members of the United Nations and 
the United Nations Secretariat, to explore both 
the means and the prospects of establishing such 
peacekeeping arrangements. 

We believe that the United Nations can suc- 
ceed as peacekeeper only to the extent that sov- 
ereign states are willing to make the necessary 
political commitments and provide the required 
financial support. Eesponsibility for peace can- 
not rest with the great powers alone — although 
peace is a vain hope without their support. No 
one power or group of powers can or should 
assert such responsibility. 

Mr. Chairman, with each passing year it 
becomes clearer that the key test of this or- 

" Made in the Special Political Committee on Nov. 
28 (U.S./U.N. press release 214). 

ganization is its will and ability to respond, 
rapidly and effectively, to peacekeepmg emer- 
gencies. For much of mankind, this is what the 
United Nations is all about. Nations should be 
able to put their trust in this organization as 
an impartial and effective guardian of peace. 
To merit tliis trust, the United Nations must 
demonstrate its readiness and its capacity to 
respond to appeals for help when peace is threat- 
ened or when violence menaces the sovereignty 
or political indei)endence of member states. 

Preserving U.N.'s Peacekeeping Capacity 

In all candor it must be said — in fact we all 
know — that skepticism and pessimism about the 
prospects for effective United Nations peace- 
keeping have mounted since this matter was 
considered by the special General Assembly 6 
months ago." The Special Committee on Peace- 
keeping Operations has remained deadlocked in 
its search for acceptable guidelines for the suc- 
cessful conduct of future peacekeeping opera- 
tions. The precipitate withdrawal of UNEF 
[United Nations Emergency Force] 6 months 
ago also stirred serious doubts about the prac- 
ticality and reliability of the United Nations 
in emergencies. Let us not minimize the effect 
of these events on the calculations and attitude 
of many govermnents. 

Despite these doubts, however, we should not 
forget that UNEF helped keep the peace in a 
troubled area for 10 years — and that fighting 
was brought to a halt by the intervention of the 

' For a U.S. statement made In the fifth special ses- 
sion of the Assembly on May 22, see Bulletin of 
June 12, 1967, p. 894. 



U.N., which was able to move impartial truce ob- 
servers acceptable to both sides to the cease- 
fire lines. 

The lesson to be learned from these events is 
that a new dedication is needed to tlie work of 
building a stronger foundation for United 
Nations peacekeeping. 

Mr. Chairman, our purpose here today is to 
consider how to provide the United Nations 
with the tools and support it needs to enable 
it to keep and make peace in the family of 
nations. It is in this spirit that I wish to address 
myself to the item under consideration. 

Through the Committee of 33, various work- 
ing groups that antedate that committee, infor- 
mal consultations, and discussions in the 
General Assembly, we have for many years been 
wrestling with this question. We have faced the 
double task of defining acceptable guidelines 
for future peacekeeping and of improving the 
capacity and reliability of the United Nations 
to undertake peacekeeping operations. 

Unfortunately, despite very broad support 
both in the General Assembly and in the Special 
Committee on the procedures which should be 
followed in authorizing, financing, conducting, 
and manning such operations, there has been no 
agreement thus far on guidelines for the future. 

Imaginative and constructive suggestions for 
strengthening peacekeeping have been made by 
member states, but the Assembly has been re- 
luctant to implement these suggestions because 
of the stubboin opposition of a few recalcitrant 

Despite these disagreements, the capacity of 
the United Nations, limited though it may be, to 
send peacekeeping forces promptly to a troubled 
spot must be preserved. If precise and agreed 
"principles"' cannot be arrived at to govern 
United Nations peacekeeping in the future, 
there is all the more need to persevere in eiforts 
to meet the United Nations' practical require- 
ments for successful peacekeeping. 

Practical Requirements 

I should like to summarize the position of 
I the United States on three pi-actical require- 
ments for a workable and durable system of col- 
lective action for peacekeeping. I will also point 
out the direction in which I believe we should 
move to help meet these requirements. 

First and foremost, we must persevere in 
efforts to devise reliable and equitable methods 
of financmg peacekeeping operations. 

There are many obstacles that must be over- 
come before these efforts can bear fruit. The 
most immediate obstacle is the substantial 
unliquidated deficit. 

Members are reluctant to assume new finan- 
cial burdens so long as this deficit — caused by 
the failure of certain countries to pay their 
apportioned share of the costs of particular 
operations — hangs over the organization. More- 
over, this unliquidated debt places an unfair 
burden on members to whom bills are owing for 
past services. There is great danger that failure 
to honor long-overdue bills could discourage 
participation in future operations, particularly 
by smaller and less affluent members. 

For example, the United Nations owes gov- 
ernments almost $12 million for unpaid bills 
on the Congo account. A large part of this is 
owed to developing countries. Let me mention 
some: $1,879,000 is still owed to India; $1,200,- 
000 to Ghana ; $955,000 to Nigeria ; $244,000 to 
Liberia ; $105,000 to Senegal. The honor and the 
credit of the United Nations are involved in 
this matter. 

In all honesty, Mr. Chairman, is it not dis- 
maying that more than 2 years have passed since 
the consensus of AugTist 1965 which ended the 
imj^asse over article 19 — and yet the long- 
promised substantial voluntary contributions 
to overcome this deficit have not yet been 
received from the Soviet Union or France? 

In adopting the formula that broke the dead- 
lock over article 19, this organization (and cer- 
tainly the United States, which considered this 
a matter of principle) yielded a critical point 
on the applicability of collective financing. This 
point was yielded in order to get the General 
Assembly moving, with the clear understanding 
that substantial voluntary contributions would 
be forthcommg. Yet they have not appeared; 
and once again, early this year, indications that 
these countries would tender volimtary contri- 
butions proved illusory and new conditions were 

Let us clear up this deficit once and for all 
and restore the United Nations to solvency. 
Financial implications of political decisions 
should be recognized and honored. It is irre- 
sponsible and in the end self-defeating to call 
on the United Nations to undertake an activity 
and then turn one's back when the bills are 

I should like to stress that this remains a 
matter of deep concern to the people of the 

JANTTAKY 1, 1968 


United States and to our Congress, where I have 
had the honor of serving for 15 years. The con- 
tinued generous support of the people of the 
United States and the Congress cannot be taken 
for granted if others who benefit from United 
Nations peacekeeping do not lend their own 

Mr. Chairman, in addition to overcoming the 
liabilities of the past, my delegation believes the 
following considerations for future methods of 
financing must be clearly established. 

Expenses should, insofar as possible, be the 
collective responsibility of all. If peacekeeping 
is to be a truly collective effort, its costs must 
be both widely and equitably shared. 

At the same time, flexibility must be main- 
tained. A variety of ways to finance an opera- 
tion should be considered: regular budget 
apportionment, sharing of costs by beneficiaries, 
voluntary contributions, and various formulas 
for fair-shares allocation. All practical meth- 
ods for any given operation should be carefully 
considered and the most appropriate methods 

Also, Mr. Chairman, a renewed effort should 
be made to devise a fair-shares scale for opera- 
tions involving heavy expenditures. Any such 
scale should take into account capacity to pay 
and other relevant considerations. My Govern- 
ment's views on this matter are clear. We sup- 
port the principle of a special scale. We hold 
that a practical and equitable approach would 
be to draw up such a scale to serve as a model 
or guideline for allocation of shares to be 
adapted case by case. 

We continue to believe that in applying a 
special scale the United Nations must take steps 
to make sure financial support will be forth- 
coming by assuring the larger contributors an 
approj)riate voice in financing decisions. One 
way to do this is through a finance committee — 
an idea put forward in various forms by dele- 
gations of Nigeria, France, the United States, 
and others. My Government urges a renewed 
examination of the possibilities of such a finance 
committee especially for operations involving 
heavy expenditures. 

The second requirement for efficient peace- 
keeping is that the Secretary-General must have 
the latitude and staff" and tools he needs to ad- 
minister operations effectively. 

United Nations peacekeeping, like any other 
complex operation, requires a single executive. 
There is no substitute, in practice, for the Sec- 
retary-General and the Secretariat as the 

administrative center for implementing peace- 
keeping assigiunents. Responsibility and author- 
ity must be given if the United Nations is to 
act efficiently in the collective interest of us all. 
The Secretary-General must, of course, operate 
within the scope of this authoritj', remaining 
fully responsible to the authorizing body. But 
under the United Nations Charter and notably 
chapter XV thereof, the administering author- 
ity and responsibility are his. There is no viable 
substitute. It is sophistry to suggest that peace- 
keeping operations can be administered under 
the committee system. 

The third practical requirement for effective 
peacekeeping operations is that the necessary 
forces and facilities must be in readiness — 
skilled, mobile, and equipped. 

The most practical way to accomplish this 
is to encourage and aid countries to earmark 
standby forces, including police units and serv- 
ice units and facilities, to be made available to 
the U.N. in event of emergency. 

Out of our deliberations over the years — and 
particularly discussions in the Coimnittee of 
33 — have come many constructive suggestions 
for steps to improve the readiness and compe- 
tence of volunteer standby forces. My Govern- 
ment supports the provision, adopted by this 
committee last year, that members inform the 
U.N. about forces and facilities which they are 
prepared to place at its disposal. This would 
provide the Secretariat with useful information 
on which to draw when a new peacekeeping 
operation is authorized. 

Mr. Chairman, these three requirements are 
not new, although we believe the_v need continu- 
ing reemphasis. They are needs long recognized 
and pointed up by actual peacekeeping opera- 
tions. Let us concentrate our energies on how 
best to meet these practical requirements. 

Support for a Peacekeeping Study 

At this stage my delegation believes that the 
most constructive step would be to support the 
suggestion in the Secretary-General's introduc- 
tion to his annual report for a study of standby 
forces, the relationship of the U.N. to govern- 
ments providing such forces, and the constitu- 
tional and financial aspects of employing them. 

Such a study would assist the development 
of peacekeeping concepts and techniques. Al- 
though the members would not be committed 
to any of its conclusions, the study could point 
up the lessons of experience and provide useful 



practical ideas. It could examine measures that 
the U.N. and member states might take to im- 
prove their readiness to respond to a U.N. call. 
As part of this work, it could consider what 
agreements betwe<^n govermnents and the Sec- 
retary-General might contribute to the stability 
of future peacekeeping operations. 

We are all aware of the great practical diffi- 
culties involved in carrying out eti'ective peace- 
keeping operations in situations in which the 
host country may witlich-aw its consent, or the 
troop contributors withdraw their troops, with- 
out advance notice or consultation. 

Obviously, peacekeeping operations rest upon 
the consent of the host country. Nonetheless, my 
Government believes that it should be possible 
to draw up arrangements which would give 
greater stability to U.N. peacekeeping opera- 
tions without infringing in any way on the 
sovereign rights of member nations. 

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Ire- 
hind [Franlc Aiken] last Friday made several 
valuable suggestions for the drawing up of a 
standard arrangement between the U.N. and 
countries to which U.N. peacekeeping forces 
were sent. My delegation believes these pro- 
posals deserve serious consideration. This sub- 
ject could be approached either tlirough the 
study of peacekeeping operations recommended 
by the Secretary-General or in other ways. 

We believe that the U.N. might also explore 
the possibility of arrangements whereby a suit- 
able waiting period, during which consultations 
could take place, would elapse between the time 
host countrj' consent is withdrawn and the time 
U.N. peacekeepers depart. 

Such arrangements could be entered into on 
an ad Iwc and voluntary basis. But if a country 
desires a U.N. presence — if it desires the U.N. 
to commit its resources and its prestige to keep- 
ing the peace on its borders or between hostile 
factions within its own country — it seems only 
reasonable that the U.N. should in turn receive 
the cooperation it needs to make its operations 

It is equally difficult for the Secretary-Gen- 
eral to plan peacekeeping operations satisfac- 
torily when the troops or facilities which have 
been conttmitted to the U.N. can be withdrawn 
by the contributor comitry without advance 
notice or consultation. 

Peacekeeping operations would be stabilized— 
and the etfectiveness and ability of the U.N. 
to keep the peace would be enhanced — if ad- 
vance notice were required for withdrawal of 

troops or facilities. Exception could be made in 
the event of national emergency in the contrib- 
uting coxmtry. Such arrangements would in 
practice require very little additional obligation 
on the part of the contributing country than 
under present arrangements. But the added sta- 
bility would contribute gi-eatly to the effective- 
ness of United Nations peacekeeping and to the 
ability of the U.N. to carry out its charter pur- 
pose of maintaining international peace and 

Some members have suggested that the study 
of peacekeepmg operations be entrusted to a 
committee, and, true enough, the Secretary-Gen- 
eral himself suggested the alternative of a com- 
mittee especially authorized by the General As- 
sembly for this purpose. 

My delegation believes, however, that this 
would head us down the wrong path. No inter- 
national committee suddenly seized of a problem 
of such complexity and in which it has had no 
exj^erience — no matter how able its members — 
could make this study as effectively as the Secre- 
tary-General. The Secretary-General and his 
staff can draw on the experience and expertise 
of 20 years and on studies of individual cases 
already undertaken by the Secretariat. Apart 
from other considerations, the Secretary-Gen- 
eral and his staff would be able to complete such 
a study expeditiously. 

We do not believe that the Militaiy Staff 
Committee should be expected to undertake this 
task. The IMilitai-y Staff Committee has never 
been concerned with consent-type peacekeeping. 
Its realm is enforcement action. The provision 
for consent-type peacekeeping is another mat- 
ter. We must be sure that no steps taken will in 
any way impair the availabilitj^ of volunteer 
standby imits. Countries which have indicated 
a readiness to do so might be discouraged from 
proceeding with plans to train and equip con- 
tingents for peacekeeping if we bring into this 
effort the Military Staff Committee, which was 
set up under the charter to provide backstop- 
ping for enforcement action. 

Of course, progress in strengthening peace- 
keepuig arrangements need not and should not 
await completion of the study. Numerous in- 
terim steps can be taken by the U.N. and by 
members to improve readiness to respond to 
peacekeeping needs. 

One such step is to support and cooperate 
with the U.N. in the peacekeeping operations 
now mider way, particularly in Cyprus and in 
meeting the expanded responsibilities of 

JANUARY 1. 196S 


UNTSO [United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization] . It is unconscionable that the Sec- 
retary-General should be faced month after 
month with a running deficit for the Cyprus 
force and that as a consequence the continuance 
in service of some contingents remains in doubt. 
Only 49 members have made contributions, and 
the burden falls inequitably. 

Another step is for each of us to consider how 
best we can provide U.N. peacekeeping opera- 
tions with the teclmical skills and services that 
may be needed. This is apart from earmarking 
and training regular troop contingents and mili- 
tary observers. In almost every operation the 
U.N. needs specialists in supply, in transporta- 
tion, and in communications imder crisis condi- 
tions. The U.N. may at times need skilled engi- 
neers to build and repair roads and bridges. It 
may need medical personnel and equipment for 
mobile medical miits. Each of us should be tak- 
ing a good look at what we can best do. 

The United States is prepared to aid and co- 
operate in two ways. 

First, my Government reaffirms its readiness 
to cooperate in practical plans to aid countries 
which earmark troop contingents for U.N. 

Second, the United States will continue to 
consider various actions we might take to assist 
in sustaining U.N. peacekeepers and to assure 
that an operation will not be hampered for lack 
of ready logistical support. Our nation is deeply 
concerned with insuring the adequacy of proce- 
dures and arrangements for effective U.N. 
peacekeeping. We are prepared to do our fuU 
share in advancing this objective. 

The Irish Proposal 

Mr. Chairman, at this point let me say a word 
about tlie proposal for a special scale of assess- 
ments for costly peacekeeping operations sub- 
mitted by the distinguished Foreign Minister of 
Ireland on behalf of Ceylon, Costa Rica, Ghana, 
Ireland, Ivory Coast, Liberia, the Philippines, 
Togo, and Upper Volta." 

My delegation wishes to reaffirm what Ambas- 
sador Goldberg and Senator [Clifford P.] Case 
have said on this proposal in the past 2 years : 
that we consider Foreign Minister Aiken's ap- 
proach a constructive contribution to U.N. 
thinking on the complex problem of peacekeep- 
ing. Special credit is due to Mr. Aiken for his 

' U.N. doc. A/SPC/L. 148. 

perseverance and the leading role he has played 
in stimulating a meaningful discussion on the 
need for reliable and equitable means of financ- 
ing. We agree with his thought that we need to 
find a more equitable distribution of the burden 
of peacekeeping. 

However, we continue to liave reservations 
about the specific proposal. We are unable to 
subscribe to a plan which could require the 
United States either to pay up to 50 percent of 
the cost of any operation that it supported or to 
opt out entirely. 

Among other problems, under existing legis- 
lation we could not vote for any assessment for 
which the United States share would be more 
than one-third— although, as members know, 
the United States, including assessed and volun- 
tary contributions, has paid 40 percent and 
more toward the cost of larger peacekeeping op- 
erations in the past. Therefore, the United 
States will abstain on the Irish proposal. 

Peacemaking — Integral Part of Peacekeeping 

Air. Chairman, one dimension of the peace- 
keeping problem has been neglected. I refer to 
peacemaking: the development of procedures 
for coping with underlying causes of conflict 
and achieving a settlement. 

The United Nations has often intervened suc- 
cessfully to stop fighting, but too often it has 
been unable to go to the root of the trouble and 
proceed from peacekeeping to peacemaking. The 
point was made in the Secretary-General's in- 
troduction to the annual report that "The ca- 
pacity of the United Nations to settle disputes 
or promote constructive and peaceful solutions 
to disputes is as much in need of study as the 
problems of peace-keeping — perhaps more so." 

Mr. Chairman, there are several ways in 
which we can make further progress in develop- 
ing the U.N.'s capacity for peacemaking. 

First of all, we need to underscore again the 
charter obligations of member states to resort 
to peaceful settlement of disputes. The conflict 
in the Middle East points up forcefully that the 
primary requirement of a peaceful resolution 
of conflict is the readiness of the parties con- 
cerned to make the necessary accommodations 
and to use whatever processes are available to 
them for moving toward a just and lasting 

Second, while the primary responsibility 
rests on the parties to a conflict, others can 



help. Wo can improve our methods and ma- 
chinery for peaceful settlement and make 
greater use of the machinery which we already 
have. I grant you that methods or machinerj' 
have limited utility without the underlying 
l^olitical will to resolve an item. But they can 
play a significant part in encouraging recourse 
to peaceful processes and in achieving an 
acceptable settlement. 

We need to take a fresh and imaginative look 
at existing institutions both inside and outside 
the U.N. system and at various new proposals 
for improved methods of arbitration and fact- 
finding, such as the proposals now being dis- 
cussed by the Sixth Committee as a result of 
the initiative of the Netherlands. Future con- 
sideration of these proposals might also be 
aided by studies by UNITAE [United Nations 
Institute of Training and Research]. 

I should also like to suggest, as an interim 
measure, that the Assembly give serious consid- 
eration to revivmg tlie Panel for Inquiry and 
Conciliation. A regularly constituted panel of 
experts might advise the Secretary-General on 
ways in which the officials of the United 
Nations, as well as special representatives, 
might be more widely used to promote the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 

The panel might include as members ex officio 
the Presidents of each of the five preceding Gen- 
eral Assemblies. It should meet frequently with 
the Secretary-General to examine current activ- 
ities by the U.N. for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and to consider measures for im- 
proving these activities. The members of this 
panel could also be available for specific U.N. 
assignments whenever their services were 

Finally, our concern with peacekeeping is 
inadequate unless we recognize that the peace- 
ful settlement of disputes is an integral part of 
the process of maintaining or restoring peace 
and security. As Ambassador Goldberg pointed 
out in this committee 2 years ago : * 

Clearly peacekeeping operations should not be a sofa 
to provide a comfortable respite from efforts at peace- 
ful settlement — they should be a springboard for ac- 
celerated efforts to eliminate the root causes of conflict. 
And no less clearly, we must develop the same sense 
of urgency in dealing with the causes of conflict that 
we have demonstrated in the containment of conflict. 

We have learned from the harsh lessons of 
Kashmir, of Cyprus, and of the Middle East 
that we cannot be content merely to keep the lid 
on trouble, to live with unresolved issues that 
fester and then erupt periodically into war. Our 
first concern should of course be to stop the 
fighting. Beyond this, we need to examine each 
situation which calls for a peacekeeping opera- 
tion to determine how the U.N. can best move 
the conflict to a settlement. 

In some cases this may mean the appoint- 
ment of a mediator as part of the U.N. peace- 
keeping presence. In others U.N. involvement 
in peacemaking may more profitably be imder- 
taken as a separate activity. My delegation 
urges that wherever possible, specific actions for 
peacemaking be made an integral part of the 
mandate of future peacekeeping operations. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States is proud of 
its record over the years as one of the stanch 
supporters of U.N. peacekeeping efforts. 

We are pledged to cooperate in imiiroving the 
effectiveness of the U.N.'s peacekeeping ar- 
rangements and will continue to support them. 

The U.N.'s future depends on its success in 
involving itself actively in tlie cause of peace. 

Much has been made in Assembly discussions 
of the limitations in the charter — limitations on 
the U.N. and on members. Some have tended to 
emphasize the don'ts in the charter — what is 
prohibited, stressing noninterference and non- 

Of course, we must operate within the limits 
of the charter. But in most instances the perils 
of inaction outweigh the perils of action. Our 
preference should be to act to carry out the pur- 
poses of the charter. 

Let me conclude by saying that, important 
as adequate machinery is, the key problem is 
not machinery but political will. 

Improvements in peacekeeping machinery 
will not serve the cause of peace without the 
readiness of all of us to back U.N. peacekeepers 
both with our political commitment and with 
our financial support. We must reject negativ- 
ism and resignation. We must choose renewed 
dedication to the hard work of keeping the 

* For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4748 dated 
Dec. 14, 1965. 

JAXrARY 1, 196S 


U.S. Gives Views on Soviet Proposal for Convention 
on "Nonuse" of Nuclear Weapons 

Statement hy Adrian S. Fisher 

U.S. Representative to the General Assemhly ^ 

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union 
has 131'oposed for tlie consideration of this Gen- 
eral Assembly an item entitled "Conclusion of 
a convention on the prohibition of the use of 
nuclear weapons." - Moreover, when he in- 
scribed this item on our agenda he offered a 
draft of such a convention.^ We are now debat- 
ing the issues which this draft- convention raises. 

By way of preface I would like to point out 
that no nation lias tried harder than the United 
States to deal with the threat to us all posed 
by the development of the atomic bomb and 
the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In- 
deed, when there was only one nuclear power 
and that power was the United States, we tried 
to remove nuclear weapons wholly from the 
military arena. Thus it was that the United 
States introduced the Baruch plan to the United 
Nations in 1946.* To the great misfortune of 
all mankind this proposal was not accepted, 
for reasons which I am sure are known or re- 
membered by all of us here today. 

Following the initiative of the United States, 
first reflected in the Baruch plan, the United 
Nations has continued to study various measures 
by which man can use his mind to jjrevent the 
nuclear holocaust which his weaponry has made 
possible. But it is clear that man's development 
of nuclear weapons has thus far outpaced his 
ability to reach agreement on such measures. 

^Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on 
Nov. 20 (U.S./U.N. press release 198). 

" Item 96 was included in the agenda by the General 
Assembly on Sept. 26. 

' U.N. doc. A/6S34. 

* Bulletin of June 23, 1946, p. 1057. 

The United States therefore continues earn- 
estly to seek meaningful measures which will 
subject these weapons of mass destruction to the 
kind of effective control that will prevent their 
use. It is in this spirit that my delegation offers 
the following comments on the Soviet proposal. 

The concept of an miqualified agreement not 
to use nuclear weapons is not new to this Com- 
mittee. We have discussed it mtermittently here 
for about 20 years. Last year, as I am sure you 
well remember, the General Assembly approved 
a resolution requesting the then jDroposed World 
Disarmament Conference to give serious con- 
sideration to this subject.^ Before that time, in 
1963, the question of the convening of a special 
conference to conclude a convention of nonuse 
of nuclear weapons had been referred to the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for 
study. Still earlier the Secretary-General had 
been requested to poll member governments as 
to their attitude toward the conclusion of such 
a convention. We must note that no agreements 
have evolved from these efforts. 

It is not surprismg that m'c appear unable to 
make any progress on an unqualified agreement 
not to use nuclear weapons, since throughout 
the history of the consideration of this concept 
the basic issues have remained substantially un- 
altered. And these are most contentious issues, 
Mr. Chairman. The United States position on 
these issues has been set forth many times. 
Secretary Rusk explained the views of the 
United States in his letter to the Secretary- 
General dated June 30, 1962, and Mr. [William 

= n.N. doc. A/RES/2164 (XXI). 



C] Foster restated them at the 82d meeting of 
the UNDC [United Nations Disarmament 
Commission] in 1965. 

A review of these issues is essential in con- 
sidering the Soviet draft. There are two sub- 
stantive articles in the proposed draft conven- 
tion contained in the attaclmient to the letter 
inscribing the Soviet item now under considera- 
tion. The first involves as its principal pai-t an 
undertaking by eivch party to the convention not 
to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. 

At first glance this seems like a direct and 
sensible approach to the problem. Any nation 
whose leadersliip retains its sanity wants to 
avoid nuclear war. It is therefore understand- 
able that there should be a certain attraction to 
a draft convention which gives the impression 
that it will prevent nuclear war by the simple 
expedient of requiring the parties to it to agree 
not to use nuclear weapons if they should become 
involved in military conflict. 

But merely- wantmg to avoid nuclear war — 
seeking an agreement to outlaw it — is not 
enough. Instead what we must do is to embark 
on a course of conduct which decreases the pos- 
sibilities of such a nuclear war ever happening. 
We must do so in the light of the realities of 
the dangerous age in which we live, an age in 
wliich there already exist enormous nuclear 
weapons stockpiles and rapid means of delivery. 

The Hard Test of Reality 

It is against the hard test of reality that we 
should examine the first article in the Soviet 
draft convention. 

This article involves an imqualified under- 
taking by the parties to the convention not to 
use nuclear wea25ons under any circumstances. 

Such an obligation would be applicable 
whether or not all the states involved in a con- 
flict had accepted the same obligation ; it would 
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against a 
nuclear-weapon state which had itself expressly 
refused to accept such an obligation and which 
was itself threatening a nuclear attack. 

Its protection would extend to a non-nuclear- 
weapon state even if it were engaged in an act 
of aggression in which it was supported by a 
nuclear- weapon state. 

Such an obligation would be applicable to 
prevent nuclear-weapon states signatory to the 
convention from usmg their nuclear power to 

assist any state that has forsworn nuclear 
weapons and which was the victim of nuclear 
aggression by a state not party to the convention. 

Such an obligation would be applicable to a 
conflict between nuclear-weapon states, regard- 
less of the circumstances surrounding tlie initia- 
tion of the conflict. Its terms would prohibit the 
use of nuclear weapons in self-defense against 
the forces of another nuclear-weapon state en- 
gaged in an act of aggression. This would be 
the case even if the use of those weapons in self- 
defense was confined to their use on or over the 
territory of the state using them or the terri- 
tory of non-nuclear-weapon states that it was 

Mr. Chairman, in considering this item we 
must consider the role that the present nuclear 
forces play in the relatively stable strategic 
balance which now exists between the major 
nuclear powers in the world and the effect on 
that balance of an obligation not to use nuclear 
weapons under any circumstances. So long as a 
situation exists under which these major nuclear 
powers have massive stockpiles of nuclear arma- 
ments arrayed against each other as well as 
massive conventional forces, so long as there is 
the possibility that a massive attack might 
threaten a country's national survival or the 
integi'ity of all or a substantial part of its effec- 
tive armed forces, the most effective way of 
minimizing the risk of nuclear war will be 
through the maintenance of tliis mtitual de- 
terrence. Inherent in the preservation of this 
deterrence is the existence of offsetting postures 
of deterrence under which a nation, even after 
absorbing a surprise nuclear first strike, would 
have a reliable ability to inflict in turn an un- 
acceptable degree of damage on the aggressor. 
It is this retaliatory capability which deters ag- 

Credibility of Mutual Deterrence 

As long as such a posture continues, an agree- 
ment not to use nuclear weapons, even in self- 
defense or in retaliation, would be, at worst, 
deceptive and therefore dangerous and, at best, 

In the worst case, it would be deceptive and 
therefore dangerous if potential aggressors were 
to believe that nuclear stockpiles would not be 
used for their designed purpose of deterrence or 
defense. Such a deception would be dangerous 

JANUARY 1, 1968 


if it were to lead to a miscalculation by one 
power concerning another's deterrent posture, a 
type of miscalculation which represents the 
greatest danger of nuclear war ever occurring. 

Such deception would be equally dangerous 
if it were to lead a nuclear-weapon state not 
party to the treaty to believe that it could engage 
in acts or threats of nuclear aggression against a 
state which had f oisworn nuclear weapons with- 
out other nuclear-weapon states using their nu- 
clear power to coimter any such blackmail or 

Almost as unsatisfactory is the case in which 
states would regard as unrealistic a convention 
under which it was agreed that powerful nu- 
clear forces created and maintained for deter- 
rence and defense were not to be used for the 
purposes for which they were created. The pres- 
entation of a treaty which was artificial and 
lacking in credibility would be to debase the cur- 
rency of international treaty making and to 
create a sense of false security among nations 
regarding the risks of nuclear war. 

In the present balance which now maintains 
the peace, we cannot aiford either deception or 
imreality. The emphasis must be on credibility 
of intentions and capabilities; each major nu- 
clear power must have no doubt as to precisely 
where the others stand. It is this growing credi- 
bility of effective mutual deterrence and matur- 
ing sense of responsibility on the part of the 
major powers in recent years which tends to 
reduce the risk of a nuclear holocaust. 

Elimination of Nuclear Stockpiles 

If we are to reduce further this risk, rather 
than increase it, we must find some way to work 
out^ properly safeguarded agreements first to 
limit, and later to reduce, and finally, in the 
context of general and complete disannament, to 
eliminate these weapons from national arsenals. 

With this in mind the United States noted 
with interest the second article of the draft con- 
vention offered by the Soviet Union. Under this 
article each party would undertake "to make 
every effort to arrive as soon as possible at 
agreement on the cessation of the production 
and destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons in confoi-mity with a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament imder effective inter- 
national control." 

In putting forth this language, the U.S.S.R. 

appears to have tacitly recognized at least two 
important points : first, that its nonuse proposal 
would not be a meaningful document unless 
something were done about nuclear stockpiles; 
second, that the elimination of nuclear weapons 
from national arsenals could only be accom- 
plished in the context of general and complete 
disarmament under effective international 

As is apparent from these remarks, the United 
States disagrees with the priority which the 
Soviet text assigns to these two tasks. We be- 
lieve that prohibitmg the use of nuclear weap- 
ons and then doing something about nuclear 
stockpiles in the context of general and com- 
plete disarmament puts the cart before the 
horse, so to speak. But the fact that there ap- 
pears to be agreement tliat the two subjects are 
related does afford a foundation upon which 
something must be built. 

I would thei'efore like to dwell for a moment 
on the second point of the Soviet draft conven- 
tion: that the elimination of nuclear weapons 
from national arsenals should be accomplished 
pursuant to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict international control. 
This is a point with which we are familiar. It 
has been explicit in both the U.S. Outline of 
Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and 
Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World ® 
and the Soviet Draft Treaty on General and 
Complete Disarmament under Strict Interna- 
tional Control, as amended by the provision for 
retention of a limited number of strategic de- 
livery vehicles. 

Let me speak first of the U.S. draft treaty 
outline. It provided that in the first stage 
the parties to the treaty would halt the produc- 
tion of fissionable materials for use in nuclear 
weapons and would transfer agreed quantities 
of weapons-grade fissionable material from 
weapons use to peaceful purposes. During the 
first stage the parties woidd also examine ques- 
tions relating to the means of accomplishing, 
during stages II and III, the reduction and 
eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from 
national stockpiles. This elimination would not 
take place until the end of stage III. 

Let me now discuss the Soviet draft, treaty on 
general and complete disarmament. The initial 
Soviet draft provided for the destroying of the 

° For text, see Bulletin of May 7, 1962, p. 747. 



means of delivery of nuclear weapons during 
the tii-st stage of disarmament and the destroy- 
ing of the nuclear weapons themselves during 
the second stage. Later, tlie Soviet Union indi- 
cated its willingness to amend its treaty and 
finally offered a formal amendment providing 
for the retention, until the completion of the 
process of general and complete disarmament, 
of an "umbrella" of intercontinental missiles, 
antimissile missiles, and ground-to-air antiair- 
craft missiles, together with the nuclear war- 
head launching devices and guidance systems 
for these various missile systems. 

I do not now propose to deal with the diffi- 
culties which the United States has had with 
the Soviet-proposed strategic umbrella. In 
brief, it is based on our feeling that it was not 
consistent with paragraph 5 of the Joint State- 
ment of Agreed Principles for Disarmament 
Negotiations ' that all measures of general and 
complete disarmament should be balanced so 
that at no stage could any state or group of 
states gain military advantage and that security 
must be insured equally for all. 

I do propose to point out, however, that even 
the Soviet proposal recognizes that the elimi- 
nation of nuclear warheads could take place 
realistically only in the context of general and 
complete disannament and then only at the 
completion of that process. If we were to agree 
that nuclear forces were to remain in existence 
until the completion of the disarmament proc- 
ess, whether as proposed by the United States 
or as proposed in the Soviet-proposed strategic 
umbrella, we would be doing so in recognition 
that these forces have come to serve an indis- 
pensable fimction — the function of mutual de- 
terrence. No one would believe us — and we 
would have debased the currencj^ of interna- 
tional negotiations — if we were at the same time 
to agree that they would never be used even for 
this purpose. 

The reason for the fact that under both dis- 
armament plans nuclear weapons are not elimi- 
nated from national arsenals until the end of 
the disarmament process is not hard to find. It 
is due to the problem of verification. A nuclear 
weapon need not be very large, and a great 
many have been produced by the nuclear- 
weapon powers ; it would be very hard to satisfy 

'For text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of 
Sept 20, 1961, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 

all countries to a disarmament agreement that 
they have all been destroyed. 

And the possibilities of successful evasion 
are substantial. It would not take many nuclear 
weapons secreted m the caves of an evading 
country to threaten completely the security of 
another country which had destroyed its nu- 
clear stockpiles. A covert nuclear stockpile 
coupled with adequate delivery means which 
might seem insignificant in relation to the pres- 
ent nuclear arsenals could threaten the world 
if all other nuclear countries had destroyed 
their own stockpiles. As the epigrammist once 
put it : "In the world of the blind, the one-eyed 
man is king." I need not labor further the point 
that verified elimination of all nuclear stock- 
piles by all nuclear states is a sine qua non for 
a world free of the threat of nuclear holocaust. 

Realistic Measures 

The United States has presented to the ENDC 
realistic measures for the reduction of the na- 
tional arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, 
measui'es which can be put into effect before the 
completion of the processes of general and com- 
plete disarmament. 

With si^ecific reference to the cutoff of the 
production of fissionable material for weapons 
purposes, Mr. Foster made a comprehensive 
statement to the ENDC on February 13, 1964, 
in which he indicated that the United States 
was prepared to agree either to a complete halt 
in the production of fissionable materials for 
use in nuclear weapons or to a reciprocal plant- 
by-plant shutdown. In addition, the United 
States has stated that it is prepared to transfer 
G0,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 to 
peaceful uses if the U.S.S.R. would agree to 
transfer of 40,000 kilograms for such purposes. 
This material would be obtained by the demon- 
strated destruction of nuclear weapons by each 

The United States has also put forth work- 
able measures dealing with the reduction of 
delivery systems for nuclear weapons. President 
Johnson proposed in his message to the ENDC 
in January 1964 ^ that "the United States, the 
Soviet Union and their respective allies should 
agree to explore a verified freeze of the number 
and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive 

"ma., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 225. 

JAXUAET 1. 1968 


and defensive vehicles," thereby opening the 
path to reductions in all types of forces. More re- 
cently, the President last March reconfirmed 
our willingness to discuss with the Soviet Gov- 
ernment means of limiting the arms race in 
such missiles." And as recently as September of 
this year Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] 
McNamara reiterated our willingness to enter 
into safeguarded agreements first to limit, and 
later to reduce, both offensive and defensive 
strategic nuclear forces.^" As Assistant Secre- 
tary of Defense Mr. [Paul C] Warnke has 
pointed out : ^^ 

We believe a number of possibilities for parallel ac- 
tion and even for formal agreement with the Soviets 
would permit our reliance on unilateral means of veri- 
fication. Other more far-reaching agreements, particu- 
larly any involving substantial reductions, would 
require agreed International inspection. 

Agreement on these various proposals dealing 
with the material to make nuclear weapons, the 
weapons themselves, and the means of their 
delivery is, we believe, the way to start the 
process toward the eventual elimination of nu- 
clear weapons and the means of their delivery 
pursuant to general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control. 
When we reach this point, we will have reached 
a stage where we will have provided mankind 
with lasting security against the threat of a 
nuclear holocaust. 

However, it seems premature to speak of a 
sweeping and unqualified agreement not to use 
nuclear weapons that is not a part of a com- 
prehensive program leading to general and 
complete disarmament mider effective inter- 
national control. I have raised the issues con- 
nected with the Soviet draft convention now 
not in any contentious spirit but because the 
problems that are associated with them are mat- 
ters of vital concern to the security of all of us. 

The United States believes that the best ways 
to get on with the work of disarmament — all 
aspects of disarmament — is to continue, through 
the ENDC, to discuss and arrive at agreements 
on the serious measures that have been proposed 

there and elsewhere to limit and later reduce 
and eliminate our nuclear forces. 

These are the considerations my delegation 
will have in mind in considering any proposal 
which may come forward in this debate.^^ 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed, or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed puhlications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Report of the Special Committee on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States. A/6799. September 
26, 1967. 216 pp. 

Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. A/6804. September 27, 1967. 101 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementa- 
tion of paragraphs S and 9 of General Assembly 
Resolution 2252 (ES-V) concerning contributions to 
humanitarian assistance in the Middle East. A/6847. 
October 4, 1967. 8 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the Effects of the 
Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and on the Secu- 
rity and Economic Implications for States of the 
Acquisition and Further Development of These 
Weapons. A/6858. October 10, 1967. 102 pp. 

United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 
Report of the Executive Director. A/6875. October 
25, 1967. 109 pp. 

United Nations Program of Assistance in the Teaching, 
Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of 
International Law. Report of the Secretary-General. 
A/6816. October 28, 1967. 35 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Population Commission : 

Promotion of Improvement in Demographic Sta- 
tistics ; Progress Report on Improvement of 
Demographic Statistics. Note by the Secretary- 
General. E/CN.9/215. September 8, 1967. 34 pp. 

World Demographic Survey : Urban and Rural 
Population, 1920-1980. Summary Report of the 
Secretary-General. E/CN.9/209. September 22, 
1967. 24 pp. 

" For a statement by President Johnson on Mar. 2, 
see ibid.. Mar. 20, 1967, p. 445. 

"For Secretary McNamara's address at San Fran- 
cisco, Calif., on Sept. IS, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1967, p. 443. 

" In an address made before the Advocates Club of 
Detroit on Oct. 6. 

^ On Dec. 4, by a vote of 56 to none, with 33 absten- 
tions (U.S., France, and U.K.), Committee I adopted a 
draft resolution (A/C.1/L.409) urging all states "to 
examine . . . the question of the prohibition of the use 
of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons." The committee's draft 
resolution was adopted on Dec. 8 by the General As- 
sembly (A/RES/2289 (XXII) ) by a vote of 77 to none, 
with 29 abstentions (U.S., France, and U.K.). 




Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Indonesia 
of June S, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4557, 6124), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna June 19, 1967. 
Entered into force: December 6, 1967. 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Iran of 
March 5. 1957, as amended (TIAS 4207, 6219), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna December 4, 1964. 
Entered into force: December 4, 1967. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
Xew York. September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, November 2, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment to article 28 of the convention on the Inter- 
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at Paris September 28, 1965. 
Enters into force November 3, 1968. 
Senate advice and consent to acceptance: December 
11, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered 
into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Iraq (with a declaration), 
September 22, 1967 ; Senegal, September 26, 1967. 
Adherence deposited: Barbados (with reservations), 
November 11, 1967. 


International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 196.5. Entered 
into force January 1, 1967 ; as to the United States 
May 29. 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, November 2, 1967. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, .5603), to put into 
effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service and related infor- 
mation, with annexe.';. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966. 
Entered into force July 1, 1967; as to the United 
States August 23, 1967, except the frequency allot- 

ment plan contained in appendix 27 shall enter into 
force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332. 

Notification of approval: Bulgaria (with statement), 
August 29, 1967. 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations (TS 993). Adopted at New York December 
20, 1965.' 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, November 9, 1967. 



Consular convention, with protocol and exchanges of 

notes. Signed at Paris July 18, 1966. Enters into force 

January 7, 1968. 

Proclaimed liij the President: December 11, 1967. 
Consular convention. Signed at Washington February 

23, 1853. 

Terminated: January 7, 1968 (replaced by conven- 
tion of July 18, 1966, supra) . 


Second Volume in Foreign Relations 
Series for 1 945 Released 

The Department of State on December 13 released 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic 
Papers, 19^5, Volume II, General: Political and Eco- 
nomic Matters (Iviii, 1,611 pp.). 

This volume covers a wide variety of the most sig- 
nificant developments in U.S. multilateral diplomacy 
both in the ijolitical and economic spheres. Among the 
subjects covered by the documentation are the first 
session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London ; 
the meeting of the American, British, and Soviet For- 
eign Ministers at Mo.scow; the efforts of the United 
States to rescue .Tews and other refugees in Germany 
and German-occupied territory ; and measures taken by 
the United States to provide relief for the peoples of 
the occupied and devastated areas of Europe. Docu- 
mentation is also included on American efforts to estab- 
lish a system of international control of atomic energy. 

Copies of this volume (Department of State publica- 
tion 8314) may be obtained from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402, for $5.25 each. 

' Not in force. 

JAinjARY 1, 1968 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 
or more copies of any one puUication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and. in some 
cases a selected bibliography. Those listed below are 
available at 5 cents each. 

Bulgaria. Pub. 7882. 6 pp. 
Cameroon. Pub. 8010. 5 pp. 
Haiti. Pub. 8287. 4 pp. 
Iraq. Pub. 7975. 4 pp. 
Laos. Pub. 8301. 8 pp. 
Libya. Pub. 7815. 5 pp. 
Mauritania. Pub. 8169. 5 pp. 
Mexico. Pub. 7865. 6 pp. 
Pakistan. Pub. 7748. S pp. 
El Salvador. Pub. 7794. 5 pp. 

Sample Questions from the Written Examination for 
Foreign Service Officer (revised). A description of the 
written examination and samples of the kinds of ques- 
tions asked in the several parts of the test. Pub. 7640. 
Department and Foreign Service Series 123. 88 pp. 
Limited distribution. 

Your Department of State (revised). Pamphlet giving 
concise information on the history, organization, and 
activities of the Department (including basic facts 
about the Department of State building). Pub. 7644. 
Department and Foreign Service Series 124. 16 pp. 15^. 

Answering Aggression in Viet-Nam. Text of remarks 
by President Johnson on Sept. 29, 1967, before the Na- 
tional Legislative Conference at San Antonio, Texas. 
Pub. 8305. East Asian and Pacific Series 167. 12 pp. 15^. 

Foreign Aid: An Essential Element of United States 
Foreign Policy. Address by Under Secretary of State 
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach before the New England 
Jaycee Convention at Hyannis, Mass., Sept. 30, 1967. 
Pub. 8309. General Foreign Policy Series 221. 12 pp. 15(f. 

U.S. Viewpoint on Four Current World Problems. 

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative 
to the United Nations, made in plenary session of the 
U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 21, 1967. Reprinted 
from Department of State Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1967. 
Pub. 8310. International Organization and Conference 
Series 78. 8 pp. 5(J. 

The Central Issue in Viet-Nam: Secretary Rusk Dis- 
cusses U.S. National Interests in Asia. Text of a news 
conference held by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 
Oct. 12, 1967, relating principally to Viet-Nam (ex- 
cerpts). Preprinted from full text which was pub- 
lished in Department of State Bulletin of Oct. 30, 1967. 
Pub. 8313. East Asian and Pacific Series 168. 9 pp. 15«(. 

Concert and Conciliation: The Next Stage of the At- 
lantic Alliance. Address by Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow before the At- 
lantic Treaty As.sociation at Luxembourg on Sept. 11, 
1967. Reprinted from Department of State Bulletin of 
Oct. 2, 1967. Pub. 8315. International Organization and 
Conference Series 79. 9 pp. IS?!. 

Load Lines. Convention, with Regulations, between the 
United States of America and Other Governments — 
Done at London April 5, 1966. Date of entry into force 
July 21, 19C8. TIAS 6331. 234 pp. $1.25. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Venezuela. Exchange of notes — Signed at Caracas Sep- 
tember 18, 1967. Entered into force October 3, 1967. 
TIAS 6348. 4 pp. 5<t. 



INDEX January 1, 1968 Vol. LVIII, No. I4S8 

Africa. 1967 — A Progress Report (Rusk) ... 1 

Asia. 1967 — A Progress Report (Rusk) ... 1 

Congress. Recent International Developments 
Concerning the Ocean and Ocean Floor 
(Sisco) 17 

Developing Conntries. The Future Work Pro- 
gram of GATT (Roth) 13 

Disarmament. U.S. Gives Views on Soviet Pro- 
posal for Convention on "Nonuse" of Nuclear 
Weapons (Fisher) 26 

Economic Affairs 

The Future Work Program of GATT (Roth) 13 

1967 — A Progress Report (Rusk) 1 

U.S. and Japan Hold Talks on Softwood Log 

Trade (joint statement) 15 

U.S. and Philippines Begin Talks on Future Eco- 
nomic Relation* (Braderman) 11 

World Trade and Finance and U.S. Prosperity 

(Johnson) ". q 

Europe. 1967 — A Progress Report (Rusk) . . 1 

Foreign Aid. 1967 — A Progress Report (Rusk) 1 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
The Future Work Program of GATT (Roth) . 13 

Japan. U.S. and Japan Hold Talks on Softwood 
Log Trade (joint statement) 15 

Latin America 

The Contours of Change in the Home Hemi- 
sphere (Oliver) 8 

1967— A Progress Report (Rusk) 1 

Mexico. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds 
Third Meeting (joint communique) .... 10 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1967 — A 
Progress Report (Rusk) 1 

Philippines. U.S. and Philippines Begin Talks on 
Future Economic Relations (Braderman) 11 

Presidential Documents 

U.S. Extends Sympathy on Death of President 

Gestido of Uruguay 5 

World Trade and Finance and U.S. Prosperity . 6 


Recent Releases 32 

Second Volume in Foreign Relations Series for 

1945 Released 31 


Recent International Developments Concerning 

the Ocean and Ocean Floor (Sisco) .... 17 
U.S. Protests Soviet Failure To Give Notice of 

Scientific Tests (text of note) 16 


The Future Work Program of GATT (Roth) 13 

Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds Third 

Meeting (joint communique) 10 

U.S. and Japan Hold Talks on Softwood Log 

Trade (joint statement) 15 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 31 

1967— A Progress Report (Rusk) . . . . . 1 

U.S.S.R. U.S. Protests Soviet Failure To Give 
Notice of Scientific Tests (text of note) . . 16 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 30 

Recent International Developments Concerning 
the Ocean and Ocean Floor (Sisco) .... 17 

U.S. Gives Views on Soviet Proposal for Con- 
vention on "Nonuse" of Nuclear Weapons 
(Fisher) 26 

United States Urges Renewed Dedication to U.N. 
Peace and Security Activities (Fountain) . . 20 

Uruguay. U.S. Extends Sympathy on Death of 
President Gestido of Uruguay (Johnson) . . 5 

Name Index 

Braderman, Eugene M n 

Fisher, Adrian S .'.'.'. 26 

Fountain, L. H . . 20 

Johnson, President . . . . 5 6 

Oliver, Covey T ' ' g 

Roth, William M \ [ 13 

Rusk, Secretary \ 1 

Sisco, Joseph J .'..'. 17 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 11 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 266 
of November 18, 281 of December 6, 285 of 
December 7, and 288 and 290 of December 9. 

Ko. Date Subject 

t291 12/11 Transmittal letter and text of pro- 
posed bill concerning travel to 
restricted areas. 

t292 12/11 U.S.-Korean cotton textile agree- 

*293 12/13 U.S. Government establishes 
award for civilian employees in 
294 12/14 U.S.-Japanese meeting on soft- 
wood log trade : joint statement. 

t295 12/15 1967 NATO ministerial meeting: 
final communique. 

*Not printed. 

tHeJd for a later issue of the Bxjlletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 









Vol. LVIII, No. 11^89 

January 8, 1968 

Excerpts From Television Interview 33 


Address hy President Johnson {Excerpt) 39 


Text of Final Communique Jfi 

hy Under Secretary Rostow H 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVIII No. 1489 
January 8, 1968 

For sale by the Superintendent o( Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washingten, D.C. 20402 


62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1906). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation ofthe DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
ap|)reciatcd. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with infornuition on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
tnent, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
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agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
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"A Conversation With the President" 

Following are excerpts from an interview 
with President Johnson wTxicli was taped in the 
Presidents office on December 18 and broadcast 
on nationwide television and radio on Decemher 
19. Interviewing the President were Dan Ra.tlier 
of the Columhia Broadcasting System, Frank 
Reynolds of the Amencan Broadcasting Oom- 
fany, and Ray Scherer of the National Broad- 
casting Company. The transcript of the 
intervieio ivas released by the White House on 
December 19. 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President, I think any 
American seated in this chair tonight tcould 
want to ask you about peace. Do you have any 
fresh, new ideas about getting peace in Viet- 
Nam, or are we stuck with, as I think Secretary 
Rusk has put it, ^hoaiting for some sign from 
the other side"? 

The President: Peace is the number-one sub- 
ject in the mind of every leader in the Govern- 
ment. We are searching for it a jjart of every 

There are four or five specific things that we 
think should be agreed upon. We think tliat the 
war now going on at the DMZ, at the 17th 
parallel, should stop. We think that infiltration 
of Laos sliould stop. They have previously 
agreed to that. 

We thinlv tliat the people of South Viet-Nam 
have demonstrated that they want to be gov- 
erned on the basis of one-man one-vote, and 
people who are prepared to live under that kind 
of an arrangement could live under that kind 
of arrangement. 

The thing that we must recognize about 
peace is that it is much more than just wishing 
for it. You can't get it just because you want it. 
If that were true, we would have had it a long 
time ago, because there are no people in the 
world who want peace more than the President, 
the Cabinet, and the people of the United 

But if we are to find the solution of uniting 
the people of South Viet-Nam and solving the 
problems in South Viet-Nam, it must be done 
not by some Senator or Congressman Kyan, or 
Senator Hartke, or Senator Fulbright, or some 
of our best-intentioned people who want peace. 
Tliis peace is going to be found by the leader- 
shiji of South Viet-Nam, the people of South 
Viet-Nam, in South Viet-Nam. 

We are encouraging that. We are going to 
continue to do our dead-level best to see this 
constitutional government, where 70 percent of 
their people registered and 60 percent of their 
people voted, develop some kind of a plan that 
we think will ultunately unite South Viet-Nam 
and bring peace to that area. 

This will take time. This will take patience. 
This will take understanding. 

The great problem we have is not misleading 
the enemy and letting him think — because of 
some of the statements he hears coming from 
us — that the way is cheap, that it is easy, or 
that we are going to falter. 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President, there seems to be 
a growing impression throughout the world 
that the United States will settle for nothing 
less than military victory in Viet-Nam. What is 
your view on that? 

The President: I have just explained what I 
thought would be a fair solution. I will repeat it 
as briefly and as succinctly as I can. 

The demilitarized zone must be respected as 
the 1954 agreements require. The unity of Viet- 
Nam as a whole must be a matter for peaceful 
adjustment and negotiation. 

The North Vietnamese forces must get out of 
Laos and stop infiltrating Laos. That is what 
the 1962 agreement required, and it must be 

The overwhelming majority of the people of 
South Viet-Nam want a one-man-one-vote con- 
stitutional government. 

JANUARY 8. 1968 


About 70 percent of all the citizens who might 
have voted in South Viet-Nam registered in the 
election, and 60 percent of them voted. 

The 20 percent or so of the population now 
under Viet Cong control must live under a one- 
man-one-vote constitutional system if there is 
to be peace. 

President Thieu has said that the South Viet- 
namese Government is not prepared to recog- 
nize the NLF as a government, and it knows 
well that NLF's control is by Hanoi. And so 
do we. But he also has said that he is prepared 
for informal talks with members of the NLF, 
and these could bring good results. 

I think that is a statesmanlike position. And 
I hope the other side will respond. That is why 
our statement in early December said we believe 
that the South Vietnamese must work out their 
own future, acting through electoral processes 
of the kind carried forward in the last 2 years.^ 

The political future of South Viet-Nam, Mr. 
Scherer, must be worked out in South Viet-Nam 
by the people of South Viet-Nam. 

It is our judgment that this war could be 
ended in a matter of weeks if the other side 
would face these five simple facts and if some 
of our own people here in this country would 
encourage that that be done instead of broad- 
casting alarms that may give false signals both 
to Hanoi and to the Viet Cong. 

South Vietnamese Self-Determination 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President., are we willing to 
accept Communists in a coalition government 
if the South Vietnamese Government and the 
NLF got together to negotiate? Are we loilUng 
to accept Communists in a coalition govern- 

The President: I think we must bear in mind 
that what happens in South Viet-Nam is up to 
the people of South Viet-Nam, not to North 
Viet-Nam, not to China, the Soviet Union, or 
the people of the United States— but the people 
of South Viet-Nam. 

We are prepared to have every man in South 
Viet-Nam under their constitutional govern- 
ment, one-man one-vote^for those people them- 
selves to determine the kind of government they 
want. We think we know what that determina- 
tion would be from the 70 percent who are regis- 

* For text of a statement by the Department spokes- 
man on Pee. R, see Bulletin of Dec. 2.5, 1967, p. 854. 

tered and the 60 percent who have voted. It is 
a matter for them to determine, not for me to 

I think that we might add one other thing 
here: "Wlien Mr. Reynolds says what are the 
minimum conditions for this or that, we don't 
want to get sparring with each other. 

But I can say that so far as the United States 
is concerned, we are ready to stop fighting to- 
night if they are ready to stop fighting. But we 
are not ready to stop our side of the war, only 
to encourage them to escalate their side of the 

We will reciprocate and meet any move that 
they make, but we are not going to be so soft- 
headed and puddingheaded as to say that we 
will stop our half of the war and hope and pray 
that they stop theirs. 

Now, we have tried that in some instances. 
We have leaned over backward. Every time we 
have, they have escalated their efforts and they 
have killed our soldiers. We have got no result 
from it. A burnt child dreads the fire. 

But if you want us to stop our bombing, you 
have to ask them to stop their bombing, stop 
their hand grenades, stop their mortars. 

At San Antonio I laid out the formula, and I 
said we will stop bombing immediately provided 
you will have prompt and productive 

Now, that is about as far as anyone can go. 
That is as far as anyone should go. That is as 
far as we are going. 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President., is it your feeling 
that you have now inade our proposition and the 
next move is up to them,? 

The President: Well, it is my feeling that 
our position in the world is very clearly known. 
If it is not, I have tried to repeat it enough 
tonight that the people can understand it. 

Hanoi's Attitude 

Mr. Reynolds: Mr. President., what is your 
assessment of Hanoi's attitude at this point in 
the. war? Do you, helieve they are counting, sir, 
on your defeat next Novemher? 

The President : I think that Hanoi feels that 
if they can hold out long enough, that they will g 
not win a military victory against General \ 
Westmoreland. They haven't done that. They 

'/&/(?., Oct. 23, 1967, p. 519. 



can't point to one single victory (hey won from 
our Marines or from our Air, from our Navy or 
from our Ai-niy. 

Tliey tliink. though, that they can repeat what 
liajijicnod to tliom with the French: that if their 
will is strong and they continue to remain tirm, 
that they will develop enough sympathy and 
understanding in this country, and hatred for 
war in this counti-j-, that their will will outlast 
our will. 

Now, I don't think that is true. I think in due 
time, if our people will understand and recog- 
nize what is happening, I think they will help 
me prove it is not true. 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President, just to make this 
ahundantly clear., what you seem to be saying 
here tonight is: (a) that peace in Viet-Nam. is 
principally up to the Saigon Govenvtnent rather 
than the United States, and (J) that tlie Saigon 
Goreimment can have useful talks ivith the Viet 
Cong without recognizing them. 

The President: Yes, I have said that I think 
the war could be stopped in a matter of days if 
President Thieu's suggestions tliat he inform- 
ally talk with members of the NLF are carried 
out and if they would agree to what they have 
already agreed to in the 1954 accords and the 
1962 accords and the other points that I men- 
tioned this morning, like one-man one-vote 
under the present constitutional government. 

I think that would be a useful starting point. 
And I think the result could be that we could 
find a way to stop the war. 

Question of Recognition of Viet Cong and NLF 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President, I think what 
bothers some people, though, is that President 
Thieu and the South Vietnamese Government, 
as it is now constituted, say that they do not 
recognize the Viet Cong, they do not recognize 
the NLF. Haw are they going to have negotia- 
tions with them if they don't recognize them? 

I The President: They could have informal 
talks with them, Dan. I said that the President 
had made clear that he would not recognize 
KXiF, but we have made clear for many, many 
months that their views can be heard and we can 
respond to them: their recommendations can be 
received and we can react to them. 

President Tliieu, himself, in a very statesman- 
like manner, has said that he would be agreeable 

to having informal talks with their representa- 
tives. We would hope that out of that some 
understanding could be reached. I believe if it 
could be reached, the war could be brought to a 

Support of Asian Effort in South Viet-Nam 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President, much has been 
made of your 196 Jf. campaign statement about 
not sending American hoys to fight in an Asian 
war. As you look bajck on that now, was that a 
pledge, a hope, or was it simply a statement of 
jyrinciple in a larger context? 

The President: Well, it was one of many 
statements, if you will look back upon it, as a 
part of a policy; namely, our policy then and 
now was to keep our hand out for negotiations 
and for discussions, and for peace, and our 
guard up that would support the South Viet- 
namese to keep them from being enveloped. 

We made clear all through that campaign — 
and in this speech which you have extracted one 
little single sentence out of — that we felt that 
the South Vietnamese ought to iiledge every 
rasource they had, their men, their materials, 
all of their resources, to defending themselves; 
that we would never supplant them. But we 
would supplement them to the extent that it was 

We did not plan to go intxj Asia and t« fight 
an Asian war that Asians ought to be fighting 
for themselves. But if Asians were fighting it for 
themselves and were using all the resources that 
they had in South Viet-Nam, there was no 
pledge, no commitment, or no implication that 
we would not supplement them and support 
them as we are doing, and as we agreed to do 
many years before in the SEATO Treaty, and as 
we had agreed to do m the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution before tliat statement. 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President, if the South — 

T/ie President: That has just been a part 
of the politicians' gambit of picking out one 
sentence before you get to the "but" m it, and 
say, "We are not going to take over all the fight- 
ing and do it ourselves. We are not going to do 
what Asian boys in South Viet-Nam should do." 

They are doing it. They have over 700,000 men 
there, out of 17 million population, and they 
are raising another 65,000 compared to the ad- 
ditional 40,000-odd that we are sending. 

So we don't plan to supplant them at all. But 

JAXT7ART 8, 1968 


we do plan to supplement tliem to whatever is 
necessary to keep the Communist conspiracy 
from gobbling up that nation. 

Performance of Soufh Vietnamese Army 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President, if the South 
Vietnamese are as dedicated to freedom as you 
say, and as many who have ieen there say, why 
is it that they dorCt fight as well motivated, or 
at least seemingly, as the Viet Cong and flie 
ComTTvunist North Vietnamese? To put it more 
bluntly, why donH our South Vietnamese fight 
as well as theirs? 

The President: I don't think that all people 
do everything alike. I know some television 
broadcasters are Ijetter than others. I know some 
Presidents that can perform in a conversation 
better than others. 

General Abrams [Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, 
Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance 
Command, Viet-Nam], who is giving leadership 
to the South Vietnamese people, thinks that 
their army is developing veiy well. 

Now, that is not to say that they are equal 
to the best troops of every other nation, but 
they have made great improvements. They are 
working at their job. They still have some prob- 
lems to correct in leadership. That is what really 
determines what kind of a fighting force you 
have. But they are getting at it, and they are 
getting results. 

It is mighty easy to blame someone else. That 
is what we do. I don't think we get much out 
of blaming our allies or talking about how much 
better we are than they. 

Most of the people out there tell us that they 
believe that the South Vietnamese Army at this 
time is equal to the Korean troops in 1954. If 
they are, I don't think we will have to apologize 
too much for them. They are taking up their 
positions on the DMZ now. 

They have been giving very good results from 
their actions. General Abrams thmks they are 
doing all right. I would prefer his judgment to 
anybody's judgment that I know. 

Mr. Reynolds: Mr. President, you hme al- 
ways credited the Russians with a sincere desire 
for peace in Viet-Nam. Do you still hold to that 
vievy? If they really want peace, why don't 
they stop supplying the North Vietnamese? 

The President: "Without going into your 
statements as to my views, I would say this : We 
are not sure just at this point of all that moti- 

vates the Chinese or the Eussians or any of the 
other Communists who are supporting the 
North Vietnamese. 

I don't think I could honestly tell you just 
what their motivations are. We have always 
hoped that they would like to see this war 
brought to an end. That has been their indica- 
tion to us. Whether that would work out in the 
long run, I don't know. 

Glassboro Conference; the MicJdIe East Crisis 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President, that brings us 
hack to Glassboro and your conversations this 
surmner.^ How much of a factor in the restraint 
that we and the Russians seem to show in the 
Middle East crisis was a product of the dia- 
log that you established with Mr. Kosygin at 

The President: I think that the Glassboro 
conference was a very useful conference. I 
am not sure that it really solved any of the 
problems of the Middle East. I think the situ- 
ation in the Middle East is a very dangerous 

I think we have made clear our viewpoint in 
my statement of June 19th,* the five conditions 
that ought to enter into bringing about peace 
in that area. We stressed those to Mr. Kosygin 
at Glassboro. He understands them. He did not 
agree with them. But I think that the Soviet 
Union understands that we feel very strongly 
about this matter, that we do have definite 

I think Ambassador Goldberg, at the United 
Nations, has made our position vei-y clear. As 
a result of the action of the United Nations in 
sending Ambassador Gunnar Jarring there as 
a mediator,^ we are hopeful that the conditions 
I outlined on June 19th can be worked out and 
that a permanent solution can be found to that 
very difficult problem. 

I would say it is one of our most dangerous 
situations and one that is going to require the 
best tact, judgment, patience, and willingness 
on the part of all to fiind a solution. 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President, do you consider 
that this country has the same kind of umwaver- 
ing commitment to defend Israel against in- 
vasion as we have in South Viet-Nam? 

The President: We don't have a SEATO 

" For background, see iUd., July 10, 1967, p. 35. 

* For text, see ihid., p. 31. 

" For background, see tfitd., Dec. 18, 1967, p. 834. 



treaty, if that is what you are asking. We have 
made clear our very definite interest in Israel 
and our desire to preserve peace in that area of 
the world by many means. But we do not have 
a mutual security treaty with them, as we do in 
Southeast Asia. 

Mr. Reynolds: Mr. President, if we might 
come hack for just a moment to the question of 
our relations with the Soviet Union, it has often 
heen said that one of the tragic consequences of 
the war in South Viet-Nam is the setbach in 
American- Soviet relations. Do you agree with 
that? Do you think we are making progress 
in getting along? 

The President: There are a good many things 
said, Mr. Rej-nolds, that people have to take 
with a grain of salt. First, they ought to look 
at the sources of these statements. I have tried 
to analyze our position in the world with other 
nations. "We do regret that we don't see every- 
thing alike with the Soviet Union or other na- 
tions. We hope that there wouldn't be this ten- 
sion and these strains that frequently are in 
evidence. Now, we don't say that everything is 
100 percent all right, because we have very 
definite and very strong differences of opinion 
and philosophy. 

But if you are asking me if the tension exists 
today that existed when the Berlin wall went 
up, the answer is no. 

Now, we can understand the Soviet Union's 
inhibitions and the problems they have as long 
as Viet-Nam is taking place. They are called 
upon to support their Communist brother, and 
they are supporting him in a limited way with 
some equipment. We wish that were not so. 

We would hope that they would exercise their 
duties and their responsibilities as cochairmen 
and take some leadership and try to bring this 
war to an end. 

But we don't think that things arc as tense 
or as serious or as dangerous as they were when 
the Berlin wall went up, in the Cuban missile 
crisis, or following Mr. Kennedy's visit with 
Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna. 

Headway Made on Agenda for Europe 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President, moving now to 
Europe, what about the complaint of Europe 
that our preocc^ipation with Viet-Nam has 
caused United States relations with Europe to 
take a hack seat? 

in Europe. I find it in Georgetown among a 
few columnists, generally. 

The European leaders — we are having very 
frequent exchanges with them, generally. Prime 
Minister Wilson will be here early in February. 
He has been here several times. We have been 
to Germany, and Mr. Kiesinger and ahead of 
him Mr. Erhard and ahead of him Mr. Ade- 
nauer have been here. Many of the Scandina- 
vian leaders have come here. The Dutch leaders 
have come here. 

This year in Europe we have had a very long 
agenda that has produced what we think are 
very excellent results. We have just concluded 
an agreement on the Kennedy Eound, which 
involved very far-reaching trade concessions. 
We think it will stand as a monument to the 
relationship of the people of Europe and the 
people of the United States and vei-y much to 
both of their advantages. 

We had a challenge of NATO, and General 
de Gaulle asked us to get out of France. We 
sat down with the other 14 members of NATO, 
the other European nations, and we looked at 
our problem. We decided that we would go to 
Belgium. Thirteen of those nations joined the 
United States, and 14 of us went there. 

NATO is now intact, as solid as it can be, 
unified. Secretary Rusk has just returned from 
very successful meetings with them.^ 

So the challenge to NATO has been rebuffed. 
The difficulties of the Kennedy Round have 
been solved. The frequent predictions that the 
Germans would reduce their troop strength 60,- 
000 and we would bring our divisions back 
from Europe— those matters have been worked 

We are working feverishly every day trying 
to bring about a nonproliferation agreement, 
and we are making headway. 

So I think, if you take the results of this 
year's efforts in Europe, that most European 
statesmen who have engaged in those efforts 
would think we have been quite successful and 
probably more successful than any other period. 
And I do not see that we have either ignored 
them or neglected them. 

Mr. Rather: Mr. President, French President 
de Gaulle, in light of his picking at NATO, his 
attacks on the dollar, and now even training 
of Russian troops, do you consider him a 
friend or an enemy of this country? 

The President : I don't find that complaint • For text of a NATO communique, see p. 40. 

JANUARY 8, 1968 


The President: I believe that the French 
people have an understanding, an interest and 
affection for the American people, and I think 
it is greatly reciprocated. 

I am sorry that the relationship between the 
President and Mr. de Gaulle is not a closer one 
and that we don't see matters alike any more 
often than we do. We have tried to do every- 
thing that we know to do to minimize the 
differences that exist in the leadership of the 
two Governments. "We strongly feel that the 
peoples of the two countries have a long history 
of friendship, and we are determined to pre- 
serve that. 

We are also determined to minimize our 
differences and, from my part, to do nothing 
to unjustly or vmduly provoke the French 

Mr. Rather: To get precisely to the point 
ahout General de Gaulle as apart from the 
French people — 

The President: I got precisely to the point. 
I don't want to do anything to accentuate, aggra- 
vate, or contribute to emphasizing the differ- 
ences that we have and straining the relations. I 
think basically our people are friendly, and I am 
going to do all I can to keep them friendly. 

The World of the Future 

Mr. Sclierer: As you look ahead to the tvorld 
that your grandson is going to grow up in, what 
kind of a tvorld would you like that to be? 

The President : I would hope that it would be 
a more knowledgeable world and a better edu- 
cated world. There are four people out of even,' 
10 today who cannot read "cat," who cannot 
spell "dog," who cannot recognize the printed 
word "mother." I would like to se« every boy and 
girl wlio is born in the world have all the edu- 
cation that he or she can take. 

We are making great gains in that direction 
in this country. I would like to see other nations 
make gi-eat gains. I would like to see an enlight- 
ened program of family planning available to 
all the peoples of the world. 

I would like to see the problem of food produc- 
tion faced up to and nations take the necessary 
steps to try to provide the food that they are go- 
ing to need to support their populations. 

I would like to see the miracles of health 
extended to all the peoples of the world as they 

were to the fellow who was operated on with the 
heart change the other day. 

I know that the infant mortality rate is going 
dowTi. I should like to see it reflected in all the 
110 nations. 

In short, I believe that our ancient enemies 
are ignorance and illiteracy, are disease and 
bigotry. I would like to see my descendants gi-ow 
up in a world that is as educated as possible, as 
healthy as science will permit, as prepared to 
feed itself, and which certainly has sufficient 
conservation forces to permit enjoyable leisure 
for the people who work long and late. 

And I think we are moving to that end. 

Communist China 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. President, what about 
China? Many people, as they peer off into the 
midst of the futuTe, see our future problem with 
China. If you could sit down with the rulers of 
China, what would yoti- tell them about Amer- 
ica's intentions toward them? 

The President: I have said to them in several 
public statements that we hope that they can 
conduct themselves in such a way as will per- 
mit them to join the family of nations and that 
we can learn to live in hannony with each other. 

We have no desire to be enemies of any nation 
in the world. I believe that it is possible, over 
the years, for them to develop a better imder- 
standing of the world in which they live. 

We think there are some very important 
things taking place right in Cliina today that 
will contribute to, we hope, a better undei"stand- 
ing and a, more moderate approach to their 
neighbors in the world. 

We have obsei"\'ed their failures in Africa and 
in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where 
they have undertaken aggressive steps that have 
resulted in failure for them. And we hope that 
they will profit by their experiences. We believe 
they will. 

We don't know all that we would like to know 
about what is going on in China. It is a rather 
closed society, and we don't have all the informa- 
tion that we would like to have. But we are hope- 
ful and we believe that over a period of time 
that the opportunity exists for them to gam a 
better understanding of the other peoples of the 
world and thus be able to live more harmo- 
niously with them. 



America Will Stand Firm 
in Viet-Nam 

FaUowing is tlie closing portion of President 
Johnson's address before the AFL-CIO Con- 
vention, at Bal Harhour, Fla., on December 12 
{White House press release). 

I cannot close without sharing a few thoughts 
with Tou on a matter that I think troubles all 
of our hearts — that is the tragic but the vital 
struggle in Viet-Nam that is going on there 

You have long stood in the front ranks of 
this fight for freedom. But here in Florida this 
winter you have added bright new testimony 
to your resolve, and you have given new heart 
to all who stand with you in search of peace. 

I am very proud and very grateful, Mr. 
Meany [George Meany, president of the AFL- 
CIO] , for the resolution that you all have passed 
here in support of freedom's cause. It is a ring- 
ing declaration of your firm resistance to ag- 
gression. That stanch spirit is constantly per- 
sonified by that great, courageous leader — "Mr. 
Labor" — George Meany. I thank him, and I 
tliank all of you from the bottom of my heart. 

I thank you, too, for another man. 

He does not live in the Wliite House. He does 
not guide the destiny of the Nation, and he 
doesn't have the responsibilities throughout the 
world on his shoulders alone. But he is face 
down tonight in the mud of the DMZ. Or he 
is out there storming a liill near Da Nang, or 
crouched in a rice paddy in the Mekong Delta. 

The American soldier thanks you from the 
bottom of his heart. He knows, even if some 
otliers don't, that your expressions of support 
are not just so many flag-waving words. 

"WTioever thinks that has never heard the 
question that comes to me so often from the fox- 
holes in my letters every day. He has never 
felt the ache of a soldier who writes his Com- 
mander in Chief and asks him — and this comes 
in letter after letter: "We are doing okay — but 
are the folks back home really behind us?" 

American labor has answered that question 
with a resomiding "Yes," and a firm "Yes, sir." 
You have said it before, and you have repeated 
it here — so strongly that even Hanoi cannot 
mistake its meaning or misinterpret what it 

I know that many of labor's sons have left 
their parents and their homes to risk their lives 

for liberty and freedom in Viet-Nam. I know 
that is torture for you, as it is for me. I know 
that you regret every single dollar that we spend 
on war — dollars that we want to sjDend on the 
works of peace here at home. 

But you and I know that we must persevere. 
The torture we feel cannot beg the truth. It is 
only our unswerving will. It is only our un- 
shakable determination that can ever bring us 
peace in the world. 

It is very easy to agonize over the television 
or to moralize or to pin your heart on your sleeve 
or a placard on your back — and think to your- 
self that you are helping somebody stop a war. 

But I only wish that those who bewail war 
would bring me just one workable solution to end 
the war. 

The peacemakers are out there m the field. 
The soldier and the statesman need and welcome 
the sincere and responsible assistance of con- 
cerned Americans. But they need reason much 
more than they need emotion. They must have a 
practical solution and not a concoction of wish- 
ful thinking and false hopes, however well in- 
tent ioned and well meaning they may be. 

— It must be a solution that does not call for 
surrender or for cuttiuir and runninjj now. Those 
fantasies hold the nightmare of world war III 
and a much larger war tomorrow. 

— It must be a solution that does not call for 
stepping up our military efforts to a flashpoint 
where we risk a much larger war today. 

The easiest tiling in the world for the Presi- 
dent to do is to get in a larger war. It is very 
difficult to continue day after day to pressure 
the enemy without involving yourself in addi- 
tional problems. 

I, for one, would be glad and grateful for 
any help that any citizen can give me. Thou- 
sands of our soldier sons would also thank any- 
one who has a plan or a program or a solu- 
tion. I cannot help but feel that we would be 
joined in our gratitude and our gladness by all 
of our allies and by millions of thoughful Ameri- 
cans. They are really the concerned Americans 
who recognize the responsibilities that accom- 
pany their rights and the duties that accompany 
their freedom and liberty and who see it as a 
duty of citizenship to try to be constructive in 
word and constructive in deed. 

For as long as I have borne the responsibility 
of conducting our foreign policy, I have known 
what I want you to know : I want all America 
to know that it is easier to protest a policy than 
to conceive one. 

JANUARY 8, 196 8 


And so your President has foUowed a rather 
simple practice : 

—If someone has a plan, I listen to it. 

—If it seems worth pursuing, I ask the best 
Americans I can find to give me their lodgment 
on it. I have asked your president many times 
for his judgment on these matters. 

—If they like it and it seems wise to the Fiesi- 
dent, then I try to put it into operation. 

I can promise all who shout their opposition, 
as well as any who have quieter doubts-and no 
political aspirations-that I will continue this 
practice. I will always be ready and anxious to 
hear and to act on any constructive proposal 

they offer. , , ^ 

But in the meantime, I want you to know, 
and I want all America to know, that 1 am 
not going to be deterred. I am not going to be 
influenced. I am not gomg to be inflamed by a 
bunch of political, selfish men who want to ad- 
vance their own interests. I am going to continue 
down the center of the road, doing my duty as 
I see it for the best of all my country, re- 
gardless of my polls and regardless of the 

—I will devote my days and my nights to 
supporting and to supplying half a million ot 
the bravest men who ever wore the American 
uniform and who ever left these shores to fight 
to protect us. 

—I will honor and respect our sworn conamit- 
ments to protect the security of Southeast Asia, 
because in protectmg their security I protect 
your security, your home, and your family, too. 
We will not now betray the troubled leaders 
and the hopeful people of that region who have 
relied on Uncle Sam's word to shield them from 
aggression— not after other Presidents who pre- 
ceded me gave their solemn word. I am going to 
see that that word is carried out. 

—We will hold the line against aggression as 
it has been drawn so often by the Congress and 
by the President. We will not now nullify the 
word of the Congress or the people, as expressed 
in the SEATO Treaty, that we would come and 
take our stand in the face of common danger— 
that treaty was ratified by a vote in the Senate 
of 82 to 1— or the Tonkin Gulf resolution, where 
there were only two votes against it, when they 
said they would support the President in what- 
ever means it was necessary to take to deter ag- 

.rression. I call on all of them to support him 


now. 1 • 1 11 

—At all times and m all ways and with all pa- 
tience and all hope, your President and your 
country will strive for peace. 

Let no man, friend or foe, American or Asian, 
mistake our meaning. 

I remind all of you again tonight, and my 
fellow Americans who may be viewmg this 
proceeding, of our exchange of correspondence 
with Ho Chi Minh.^ The North Vietnamese 
themselves released my letter on March 21st. In 
it, the President of the United States, on behalf 
of the United States, made what we thought 
was a fair and a firm offer. I said : 

There is one good way to overcome this problem and 
to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. 
That is for us to arrange for direct talks between 
trusted representatives in a secure setting and away 
from the glare of publicity. . . . 

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, 
there are several possibilities. We could, for example, 
have our representatives meet in Moscow where con- 
tacts have already occurred. They could meet in some 
other countrv such as Burma. You may have other . . . 
sites in mind, and I would try to meet your 
suggestions. . . . 

Can we be any more specific? Hanoi has 
spumed that olive branch. They answered with 
a rude "No," and they have repeated it time 
after disappomting time. Until they relent, mitil 
they see room for compromise and area for 
agreement, we must stand firm and we must 
stand unafraid. And we will. 

Peace will come— I am convinced of that. But 
until peace does come, I will continue, with the 
support of our loyal, determined people, to hold 
the line that we have drawn against aggres- 
sion—and to hold it firm and to hold it steady. 
In all that I do I will be strengthened by the 
powerful testimony for freedom that you sons 
of labor have given here in this hall. You 
courageous men of labor have supported our 
fighting men every time they needed you. You 
have spoken as free men under fire must speak. 
May all the world hear you. And may God bless 
you for what you have said and what you have 
done. May God keep those men mitil we can 
bring them back home in honor and m victory. 
Thank you very much. 

' BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1967, p. 595. 



". . . the Middle East is like much of the rest of what is called 
tlie Hhird world.'' It is a region of "pronnise and yet of instability. 
There are many divisive forces native to the region which fro- 
mote v/nrest and intermittent turbulence. . . . Turmoil of this 
kind prevents the economic and social progress that might 
in the end remaJce the whole environ/ment. If we turn away from 
these developments in the third world, the result would be 
serious: harm to our friends and to our vital interests.'''' 

The Middle East Crisis and Beyond 

by Eugene V. Rostow 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

I thought tonight I should follow the custom 
of law schools and discuss the Middle Eastern 
crisis with you as a case study in modern Ameri- 
can foreign policy. The problems we face in the 
IMiddle East are unique in one sense : No region 
of the world, no peoples, and no combination of 
events can ever be exactly like any others. But 
the basic processes of world politics which are 
at work m the Middle East are closely related to 
those with which we have to deal elsewhere. And 
the national interests we are defending there 
are those we are defending also in Europe and 
in the Far East. 

This is hardly the first time we have been 
involved in the Mediterranean. Some of the 
earliest episodes of our diplomatic and military 
history took place in the Mediterranean. Part of 
our undeclared war with France in Jolm 
Adams' time involved maritime hostilities in 
that area. And in the early 19th century we 
engaged in a series of undeclared wars with the 
rulers of some of the North African states. The 
memorj' of those efforts is enshrined, as you all 
know, in the song of the Marine Corps, which 
recalls our landings on the shores of Tripoli. 

But these dramas were at the periphery of 
world affairs. We stoutly defended our mari- 

' Address made before the Lamar Society of the Uni- 
versity of Mississippi Law School at Oxford, Miss., on 
Dec. 8 (as-delivered text; for advance text, see press 
release 289 dated Dec. 9) . 

time rights in the Atlantic and the Mediter- 
ranean against blockades and piracy. But other 
nations, the leading powers of Europe, were en- 
gaged in the central struggles of world politics. 
The Napoleonic wars led to the Concert of 
Europe — an arrangement for managing the 
balance of power which kept the general peace 
for a century and organized a world environ- 
ment in which we and other small nations could 
develop in safety without the need to be actively 
concerned in world politics at all, save occa- 
sionally to msist on respect for the flag, as we 
did in the Mediterranean at the turn of the 19th 

Since 1945, however, we live in a new world. 
The map of jiower and politics beare little re- 
semblance to that of 1900, or even of 1940. The 
Concert of Europe has gone the way of 
Humpty-Dumpty. The traditional leaders of 
European diplomacy were exhausted by two 
wars and by the tragedies and follies of the 
years between the wars. Step by step, they have 
withdrawn from their military positions in 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, leaving 
vacuums behind. Vast new powers and new po- 
litical forces have emerged. The Soviet Union, 
China, Japan, and the United States are coun- 
tries on a new scale. The nuclear weapon is a 
fact. The developing countries are moving along 
the uncertain road toward political and eco- 
nomic maturity. Many of them have achieved 
freedom from imperial tutelage since 1945. They 

JANTJART 8, 1968 


are all groping their way toward modernity un- 
der conditions of weakness which tempt aggres- 
sion. The Commmiist movement achieved new 
strength in the aftermath of defeat both in 1917 
and in 1919. The Communist countries are no 
longer united in a common discipline. But on 
some issues they still cooperate. They have 
power, energy, and ambition. Separately and as 
a group, they thrust outward, probing our de- 
fences and testing our will. 

Time has transformed the problem of the 
balance of power. Equilibrium is now altogether 
beyond the reach of the old entente. 

We have come to understand, but not quite to 
accept, the fact that in the small unstable nu- 
clear world in which we have no choice but to 
live, the security of the United States depends 
on maintaining a tolerably stable balance of 
power not merely in the Western Atlantic, in 
Europe, and in the hemisphere but in the world 
as a whole. And we perceive as well that if the 
security of the United States is to be protected, 
we are going to have to undertake the major 
part of the job ourselves. There is no one else to 
take the lead in organizing coalitions for order 
and progress. In President Truman's phrase, 
"The buck stops here." 

This reality has determined both the tasks we 
have had to undertake abroad since the war 
and the recurrent spasms of domestic political 
conflict we have experienced in facing them. 

The process of entering the mainstream of 
world politics has imposed a crisis of self- 
searching on the people of the United States. 
The fever comes in cycles. There was a revolt 
against the League of Nations after the First 
War; resistance to any involvement in the 
thirties; political protest against Korea and the 
Tnnnan doctrine 20 years ago; and now our 
inner conflict over Viet- Nam. 

We have been forced to redefine the responsi- 
bilities our national security requires us to 
undertake in world politics. The effort demands 
a confrontation between reality and cherished 
concepts of self built up over generations. In 
essence, it is a struggle to accept the 20th cen- 
tury. In the nature of things, it is a debate be- 
tween the present and the past, between facts 
and hopes, between reason and feeling. It is a 
slow and painful effort, difficult to resolve. All 
of us would prefer it if we could to escape into 
the past and leave the task of national security 
to someone else. But there is no one else. 

Tlie Middle Eastern crisis should be viewed 

in this perspective — as one among many prob- 
lems we have inherited as the consequence of the 
withdrawal of Europe, the weakness of many 
parts of the third world, and the fervent 
ambitions of many schools and sects of 

The Root of the Trouble in the Middle East 

The root of trouble in the southern part, of 
the Mediterranean basin is endemic political 
and social instability. It is typical of similar 
problems in many other parts of the third world. 
But in the Middle East and North Africa it is 
complicated — and made more dangerous as a 
burden to world peace — by special factors of 
history, geography, and proximity to Europe. 

For centuries the region has not had a stable 
and independent political life sustained by its 
own inherent strength. Tlie proud ]ieoples of 
the area, who have made great contributions to 
our common civilization, have been governed by 
a succession of imperial regimes. The rise and 
fall of alien governments — Turkish, British, or 
French — have complicated the effort of the peo- 
ples of the Middle East and North Africa to 
establish communities which could actively par- 
ticipate in the common educational, economic, 
and political life of the modern world. The 
struggle of the people of the area to achieve 
independence has strengthened the spirit of 
their nationalism. But their nationalism has 
sometimes taken extreme forms and resulted in 
jjolitical fragmentation, tempting outside inter- 
vention. The temptation to intervene has been 
reinforced by the fundamental human, eco- 
nomic, and strategic importance of the region. 

The United States and nations of Europe have 
had close and friendly relations with the peo- 
ples and goveinments of the Middle East for 
generations. The Middle East linlts three con- 
tinents. Its airspace and waterways are vital to 
communication between Asia, Europe, and 
Africa. And they have fmidamental strategic 
significance. The oil resources of the region are 
a major factor in world commerce. The power 
to deny access to the Middle East and its re- 
sources would be a matter of grave concern to 
the United States and its allies in Eui'ope and 

The reciprocal relationship between inherent 
weakness and the force of real interests led to the 
European presence in the region. Until the end 
of the Second World War, Britain and France 
sought to protect their many interests in the 



area through a system of protectorates and other 
devices of control. 

Tlie split between America and her allies in 
1956 marked our unwillingness to support an 
imperialist policy for today's world. In our 
view, imperialism is inadmissible in an era 
which accepts the principle of national self-de- 
termination and independence. In the 20th cen- 
tury, imperialism would lead not to stability but 
to endless, brutalizing civil war. It would defeat 
the goal of order it seeks to fulfill. 

U.S. Goal: To Promote a System of Peace 

Our policy, on the contrary, has been to pro- 
tect our national interest in stability by other 
means. We have used our influence in the Middle 
East, as we do in other regions of the world, to 
promote a system of peace, achieved in collabo- 
ration with other nations and sustained with 
their consent and support — a system of diver- 
sity, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, 
"based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples" — 
above all, a si'stem of peace. We believe in reach- 
ing that goal through political means and on 
the indispensable basis of the responsible deci- 
sions of the people of the region themselves. 

Therefore we have sought to foster an en- 
vironment in which the countries of the region 
would come to terms with each other and turn 
their attention toward cooperative efl'orts neces- 
sary for developing their own immense re- 
sources. Only such a stable order, rooted in the 
region itself and at the same time an integral 
part of the world's economy and society, could 
deter intervention from without. To assist that 
process, we have repeatedly announced our pur- 
pose to support the territorial integrity and po- 
litical independence of all the states of the Mid- 
dle East, with sympatliy and understanding 
for all and special favor for none. 

Obstacles to Stability and Progress 

In recent years there have been three main 
obstacles to achieving such conditions of sta- 
bility and progress. First, there are bitter di- 
visions among the Muslim peoples of the Middle 
East; secondly, some Arab states have refused 
to accept the creation of Israel and have insisted 
on their right to attack its existence ; and finally, 
since 19.55 there has been an increasing Soviet 
presence in the area, as a military, political, 
and economic influence and, above all, as a source 
of arms. 

I should like to discuss each of these three 
factors briefly. 

1. Some of the divisions among the peoples 
of the Middle East derive from their history. 
During the long, slow decline of the Ottoman 
Empire, many of the pex)ples of the area lived 
under conditions of stagnation, isolated from 
the modern world. The drama of Arab libera- 
tion during World War I left a legacy of fervent 
misunderstandings, haphazard boundaries, and 
disappointed expectations. After the First 
World War, Ottoman rule was replaced in many 
areas by the British and the French, both long 
active in the region. 

The era of European control came to an 
end after the Second World War. The French 
lost Syria and the Lebanon and gave up Mo- 
rocco, Tunisia, and Algeria as well. Britain's 
postwar withdrawal from empire ended her 
presence in Cyprus, Aden, Egypt, Jordan, 
Palestine, and Iraq. 

But the political and military departure of the 
Western Powers did little to resolve the divi- 
sions among the peoples and governments of 
the Middle East and North Africa. They had 
had differing experiences under foreign tute- 
lage : different levels of education and different 
patterns of participation in the work of mod- 
ern societies. The movements against foreign 
control gave rise to strong nationalist move- 
ments throughout the area. But those movements 
took many forms. It soon became clear that 
the peoples and go\ernments of the region had 
different views about how to organize their po- 
litical, socia', and economic life. 

In Egypt a revolutionary government led by 
President Nasser looked to a new pan-Arab 
state uniting the whole region. For a time at 
least, revolutions in Syria and Iraq and strong 
popular support, in other countries made this 
prospect seem likely to succeed. 

At present, the states of the area represent a 
wide spectrum of political forms: There is an 
extremist revolutionary government in Syria 
and a traditionalist monarchy in Saudi Arabia. 
Meanwhile, Iran and Turkey, to the north, are 
becoming vigorous modem communities with 
close ties to the West. Thus the Middle East has 
remained divided, and some parts of the area 
are in turmoil. 

This state of affairs is hardly surprising. In a 
world where the naost advanced teclmological 
facilities exist side by side with medieval social 
customs and appalling poverty, it is no wonder 

JANUARY 8. 1008 


that there is widespread social and spiritual 
dislocation. Moreover, there is a notable lack 
of balance between population and resources 
among the various Arab countries. The princi- 
pal country of the region, Egypt, has a. popula- 
tion of 30 million but has up to now developed 
almost none of the great oil wealth character- 
istic of sparsely settled Saudi Arabia or the tiny 
Shiekhdom of Kuwait. Indeed, Egypt, for all 
its efforts at economic development, today has 
a national income of $150 per capita and difficult 
prospects for the future. Even the benefits of so 
massive a project as the Aswan Dam are ex- 
pected to be absorbed by the rapid growth of 

In short, it is not difficult to explain a high 
degree of friction and frustration among the 
peoples of the region as they struggle to adapt 
themselves and their rich traditions to a new 

But the inherent difficulties of the task of 
modernization are only one dimension of the 
troubles of the region; another is the history 
of Israel. 

2. The modern State of Israel stands as a 
tribute to the power of an ideal, the ancient 
Zionist dream of a return of the Jews from 
their dispersal, revived in modern times by 
Theodor Herzl. 

Herzl's movement appealed to many Western 
Europeaon and American Jews and to many 
other Europeans and Americans as well. Start- 
ing in the late 19th century, support and sym- 
pathy rallied steadily to the Zionist cause. 
Waves of East European Jewish refugees, flee- 
ing the Russian pogroms of the late 19th and 
early 20th century, swelled the Zionist move- 
ment and became the backbone of the early 
Jewish settlements in Palestine. 

In 1917 Great Britain issued the Balfour 
declaration. That famous document promised 
the Jews a "national home" in Palestine at the 
end of the war. The development of this com- 
munity, according to the declaration, should not 
prejudice the rights of "existing communities 
in Palestine." With the British mandate over 
Palestine at the end of World War I, Jewish 
immigration expanded. Wliile some Arab 
leaders welcomed the Jews to Palestine, tension 
developed between the two commimities. A new 
wave of immigration followed the Second 
World War, as the survivors of Hitlerism fled 
from Central Europe. The British authorities 
struggled to control the flood of immigrants in 

the interests of peace between the Arab and 
Jewish communities. In 1947, however, the 
British Govenunent found the task impossible 
and yielded its mandate to the United Nations. 
The U.N. tried to mediate ; but in 1947 the Arabs 
rejected its partition plan. The result was a war 
between the Arabs and the newly created State 
of Israel. 

Armistice agreements finally concluded the 
fighting in 1949, but few people expected these 
interim arrangements to become the basis for 
stable relations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. Many questions remained unsettled, 
including a final definition of some borders. A 
peace settlement was expected to follow soon 
after the armistice. In the early 1950's the U.N.'s 
Palestine Conciliation Commission brought the 
Arabs and Israelis together for negotiations, but 
the positions of the two sides gradually became 

Many Arab spokesmen profess the view 
that the establishment of Israel was an injustice 
that can never be accepted. They insist that the 
Arab states are at war with Israel and that they 
have the right, at an appropriate moment, to 
join in a holy war to destroy it. The Arab states 
do not recognize Israel, exchange ambassadors, 
or allow normal trade with it. 

On the other hand, many other nations, in- 
cluding the United States, have taken a sym- 
pathetic interest in the remarkable development 
of Israel as a progressive and democratic so- 
ciety. They have steadily insisted that, while 
they agree with the Arabs on some important 
aspects of the Middle Eastern conflict, Israel 
has a right to live, and no member of the 
United Nations can claim the right to destroy 

3. The Russian interest in the Middle East 
has many antecedents. After the Second World 
War the Soviet Union attempted to gain con- 
trol of Greece and Iran and sought the Italian 
mandate in Tripolitania. It began to give active 
support to Egypt as early as 1955, both in arms 
and in economic assistance, notably in connec- 
tion with the Aswan Dam project. Through its 
arms sales and through its association with 
revolutionary parties, it became deeply involved 
in the internal politics of Syria, Algeria, and 
the other states of the area. 

Increasingly massive arms shipments to Arab 
states complemented another aspect of Soviet 
policy in the Middle East : a growing hostility 
toward Israel. Wliile the Soviet Union had 



supported the establishment of Israel in 1948, 
it changed its course during the early 1950's 
wlien it undertook its ambitious campaign to 
gain influence througliout the area. As a matter 
of political doctrine at least, hostility to Israel 
is a policy in which most Arab states concur. By 
siding with the Arabs against Israel, the So- 
viet Union allied itself with these passionate 
feelings. At the same time and as a result, the 
"Western Powers could be identified with Israel, 
depicted as a tool of "Western imperialism." 
Such a posture could strengthen the radical 
leaders, parties, and revolutionary groups of 
the region, who hoped to displace moderate 
regimes oriented to the West. 

Events Leading to the 1967 Crisis 

Given these trends, it is hardly surprising 
that peace is not the natural state of affairs in 
the iliddle East. The process of decolonization 
led to the British and French intervention in 
Suez, the protracted war in Algeria, and to the 
wars still in progress in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Among the Arabs, there has been a long history 
of a continuing covert struggle, resulting from 
time to time in attempted coups and revolu- 
tions, as in Syria and Iraq, or in open civil war 
and invasion, as in the Yemen. Meanwhile, since 
the armistice agreements of 1949, there has been 
a smoldering guerrilla war with Israel, a con- 
flict that in 1956 and now in 1967 erupted into 
full-scale hostilities. 

By the middle of 1966 it was becoming clear 
that the situation around Israel was heading 
for another explosion. Organized bands of ter- 
rorists, trained in Syria, were penetrating Is- 
rael at an increasing pace, directly and through 
Jordan. Their raids caused damage, anxiety, 
and major Israeli retaliation. The issue came be- 
fore the Security Council twice in the fall of 
1966.^ There was no argument about the facts on 
either occasion. In the first episode, the Gov- 
ernment of Syria boasted of its responsibility. 
But even a mild and ambiguous condemnation 
of Syria was defeated by a Soviet veto. In 
the second case, that of the Israeli retaliatory 
raid against Sam'u in Jordan, Israel was rightly 

In the spring of 1967 terrorist penetration of 
Israel from Syria increased. Rumors spread 
that Israel was mobilizing against Syria. Arab 
spokesmen began to taunt President Nasser for 

' For background, see Btilletin of Dec. 26, 1966, 
p. 969 and p. 974. 

his inactivity in the face of the supposed threat 
to Syria. President Nasser responded by moving 
troops into the Sinai Peninsula and asked the 
United Nations to remove the forces that had 
patrolled the border between Israel and Egypt 
since 1957. The Secretary-General responded at 
once, without going through the type of con- 
sultations Ms predecessor had indicated he 
would midertake before withdrawing the 
troops. The United Nations Emergency Force 
was suddenly removed, not only from the bor- 
der but from the Gaza Strip and Shann-al- 
Sheikli as well. Egyptian troops promptly re- 
placed them, and President Nasser announced 
that the Strait of Tiran would be closed to 
Israeli shipping. 

At that moment the situation became one of 
full crisis. Sharm-al-Sheikh controls access 
through the Strait of Tiran to the Israeli port 
of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba. Since Egypt has 
kept the Suez Canal closed to Israeli shipping 
in the teeth of two Security Council resolu- 
tions, the Strait of Tiran was Israel's only di- 
rect opening to Africa and Asia and its most 
important source of oil. Closing the strait was 
in effect an act of blockade. 

Egypt's announcement that it would use 
force to close the strait had another set of con- 
sequences. In 1957 the United States had taken 
the lead in negotiating the withdrawal of Is- 
raeli troops from Sharm-al-Sheikh and the 
Sinai as a whole. At that time Israel made it 
clear that if force were used to close the strait, 
it would regard itself justified in responding 
with force as an act of self-defense authorized 
under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
This carefully considered formal statement was 
noted at the time as part of the process of set- 
tlement. The international understanding was 
that the Strait of Tiran would be kept open as 
an international waterway. The United Arab 
Republic, it is true, never took formal responsi- 
bility for this understanding, as it refused to 
recognize Israel or to deal directly with her. 
But in every other sense Egypt was a party to 
and beneficiary of this arrangement, through 
which Israeli withdrawals had been secured. 

As President Johnson remarked later : ^ "If 
a single act of folly was more responsible for 
this explosion than any other, I think it was 
the arbitrary and dangerous announced deci- 
sion that the Strait of Tiran would be closed." 

' For an address made by President .Johnson on 
June 19, 1967, see ibid., July 10, 1967, p. 31. 

JANTTABT 8, 1968 


Throughout this period, President Johnson 
directed an active diplomatic effort, Avhich had 
started as a matter of urgency many months 
before the events of May and June. The goal ot 
our policy was to prevent the outbreak o± hos- 
tilities and to help deal with the underlymg 
cause of tension in the Middle East. 

U.S. Diplomatic Efforts 

The President's strategy had several essen- 
tial elements. . 

First, all the parties were urged to retrain 
from using force in any way. We attempted to 
mobilize world opinion in behalf of peace. Our 
views on the nature of the crisis and the dangers 
of the use of force were communicated to other 
crovernments and made public in a Presidential 
statement on May 23.^ We invited Great Britain, 
France, and other interested nations to ]Oin 
with us in a concerted diplomatic effort to pre- 
vent war and then to make peace. 

Second, we urgently sought a Security Coun- 
cil resolution calling on the parties to heed the 
Secretary-General's appeal to exercise restramt, 
foro-o belligerence, and avoid all actions which 
coutd increase tension.^ But several key nations 
refused to take responsibility for a resolution 
which might have helped to prevent war. 

Third, we tried to initiate a series of talks 
with the United Arab Republic in the interest of 
finding a basis for a fair and peaceful settle- 
ment. The Vice President of that Government, 
Mr Zachariah Moheiddin, was scheduled to 
come to Washington on June 7th, 2 days after 
hostilities broke out. 

Meanwhile, as a fourth element in President 
Johnson's strategy, we and the British pro- 
posed to the leading maritime nations a draft 
declaration reaffirming the view that the Strait 
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba were interna- 
tional waters, through which iimocent passage 
could not be denied. The maritime nations had 
taken this position in 1947, and it had been up- 
held in 1»58 in the International Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. The declaration was to 
be issued publicly during what turned out to 
be the week of hostilities. 

While these efforts and others were being 
urgently pursued, the situation in the area 

*For text, see ihid., June 12, 1967, p. 870. 

"For U.S. statements in tlie U.N. Security Council 
on May 29, 30, and 31, 1967, see ibid., June 19, 1967, 
p. 920. 

changed radically. Mobilization and counter- 
mobiTization had replaced the closing of the 
strait as a threat to the peace. A menacing array 
of force was approaching the borders of Israel 
from every side. Jordan put her forces under 
Egyptian command, and troops from Iraq, 
Algeria, and Kuwait joined the Egyptians and 
Syrians. President Nasser openly proclaimed 
the day of the holy war. 

The air grew dry with menace. 

The explosion occurred on the morning of 
June 5th.® 

Principles for Peace in Middle East 

President Jolmson immediately^ aimoimced 
the policy we have pursued ever since: to end 
hostilities as soon as possible and at the same 
time to begm the process of seeking to establish 
true peace in the area— a condition of peace that 
could replace the precarious armistice agree- 
ments whose inadequacy has been proved so 
often since 1949. . 

Our policy of peace to replace the armistice 
regime— a true peace based on the responsible 
assent of the nations directly concerned— has 
far-reaching implications for all the issues be- 
tween Israel and her neighbors : for the achieve- 
ment of stable and agreed borders, for security 
arrangements, and, above all, for the tragic 
plight of the Arab refugees, who have been 
hoSages to politics for nearly 20 years. 

The United States sought an immediate 
cease-fire resolution in the Security Council on 
the first day of hostilities. But the Soviets and 
Arabs did not favor such a proposal. Therefore 
the Security Council was imable to agree on 
terms. On Tuesday, June 6th, it was at least 
possible to obtain cease-fire resolutions from the 
Security Council. Further resolutions, demand- 
ing compliance with the earlier call for an end 
to\ostilities, were adopted on June 7th and 

9th.' . 

The final acceptance of these resolutions, at 
least by Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, 
opened a period of intense discussions, which 
have yet to reach a conclusion. The Soviet Union 
transferred the problem to the General As- 
sembly, a maneuver which delayed the quest for 

• For background, see ibid., June 26, 1967, p. 949. 
' For U.S. statements and texts of the resolutions, 
see ibid., p. 934. 



peace for several months.^ Despite the unceasing 
eH'orts of the United States and other govern- 
ments to get peace negotiations started, it took 
more than 5 months to achieve a Security 
Coimcil resolution under which negotiations 
might begin. According to the British resolu- 
tion, whicli was finally passed, a representative 
of the Secretary-General is to start talks with 
the parties on the basis of certain agreed princi- 
ples stated in the resolution itself.'' 

These principles follow rather closely those 
stated by President Jolmson in his speech of 
June lOtli. That address has been generally 
recognized as a fair and e\en-handed statement 
of the issues and a proper guide to a just and 
permanent solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

The essential idea of the President's statement 
is that the continuation of claims of a right to 
wage war against Israel has become a burden 
to world jjeace. It is therefore a world responsi- 
bility and a responsibility of the parties to 
achieve an end to such claims — a condition of 
peace in the area. It should be a fair and 
dignified peace reached by the parties, not one 
imposed by conquest or by the great powei-s. It 
should recognize each nation's right to live and 
to live in security. And it should rest on the 
principle of the territorial integrity and politi- 
cal independence of all the nations of the ai'ea. 

On the basis of such a peace, the other princi- 
pal features of the Arab-Israeli controversy 
should be resolved bj' tlie parties through any 
procedure on which they can agree. Israeli 
forces should of course withdraw to agreed and 
secure boundaries, which should replace the 
fragile armistice lines of 1948 and 1949. Those 
armistice agreements expressly contemplated 
agreed boundary adjustments when they were 
superseded by arrangements of peace. The 
tragic problem of the Palestinian refugees 
should at least be solved and solved justly. Guar- 
antees should be provided for the use of inter- 
national waterways by all nations on equal 
terms. The special interest of three great world 
religions in the holy places of Jerusalem should 

' For U.S. statements in the Security Council and 
in the fifth emergency special session of the U.N. 
General Assembly, together with texts of resolutions 
adopted in the two bodie.s, see ibid., July .3, 1907, p. 3; 
July 10, 1967. p. 47 ; July 24, 1967, p. 108 "; July .31, 1967, 
p. 14S; and Aug. 14, 1967, p. 216. 

' For U.S. statements and text of the resolution 
adopted in the Seciirity Council on Nov. 22, see ibid., 
Dec. 18. lt)67, p. 834. 

be recognized and protected. Mo unilateral solu- 
tion of the problem of Jerusalem can be ac- 
cepted. The international interests in this sacred 
city are too important to be set aside. Failure to 
resolve this crucial problem to the general satis- 
faction could well prevent a lasting settlement 
in the region. And a start should be made on 
agreements of arms limitation for the area, 
wliich could protect the world and the peoples 
of the region from the risk of another war. An 
arms race is a tragic waste of resources for any 
country but above all for countries with urgent 
economic problems. Moreover, the constant need 
for armaments causes nations to compromise the 
very independence they have fought so fiercely 
to gain and hold. It makes the whole region a 
cockj^it for the external rivalries of the great 
powers, runs the risk of involving its people in 
alien quarrels, and postpones indefinitely the 
achievement of internal stability in the region 
based on the determination and strength of its 
own societies. 

Tlie United States has made it unmistakably 
clear that it is unalterably opposed to any re- 
sumption of hostilities and that its full support 
will be given to any procedure which gives 
promise of fulfilling the principles of the Presi- 
dent's statement of June 19th. 

The efl'ort to translate those principles into a 
program of negotiation took many months in 
the Security Council, the General Assembly, 
and the foreign offices of the entire world. Some 
of the Arab states and other governments 
fought tenaciously in the United Nations for a 
resolution that would seek to restore the situa- 
tion as it was on June 4th before any negotia- 
tions could begin. As the President remarked on 
.Tune 19tli, such a policy "is not a prescription 
for peace but for renewed hostilities." 

On the other hand, the movement from armi- 
stice to peace could not condone expansionism. 
As President -Johnson said on June 19: 

... no nation would be true to the United Nations 
Charter or to its own true interests if it should permit 
military .success to blind it to the fact that its neigh- 
bors have rights and its neighbors have interests of 
their own. Each nation, therefore, must accept the 
right of others to live. 

The Security Council resolution of November 
22, 1967, should permit discussions among the 
parties for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli war 
at long last to begin. It is 5 months late, but it is 
nonetheless a welcome and constructive step. 
The United States will of course actively sup- 

JANUART 8, 196 8 


port the negotiating process under that 

But peace between Israel and its neighbors is 
only a beginning, though an indispensable be- 
ginning, to the task of acliieving a stable and 
progressive order in the area — an order resting 
on internal stability not external force. The 
bitter heritage of the past will not vanish over- 
night. The risk of war cannot be exercised until 
the environment is transformed by fundamental 
changes in the relations of the states and peoples 
of the region. Such transformations are occur- 
ring m Europe, under the powerful influence of 
the ideas and arrangements of the European 
Community. Similar efforts have been launched 
in other areas of the world — in Central America 
and in Southeast Asia, for example. 

Like efforts are needed to help the peoples of 
the Middle East adapt their societies and econ- 
omies to the level of their aspirations. The 
Arabs of the area must themselves find the 
means to restore the fertile gardens of their 
past. In such an area effort they could have no 
better partners than the Israelis, their ancient 
cousins, who have struggled for centuries to pre- 
serve their culture and adapt it to the tasks 
of modem life. What a tragedy it would be if 
the opportunity for so fruitful a partnership 
should be lost in fratricide. 

Our Government will persevere in the search 
for peace. As President Johnson has said : ^° 

If the nations of the Middle East tcIU turn toward 
the works of peace, they can count with confidence upon 
the friendship and the help of all the people of the 
United States of America. 

In a climate of peace we here will do our full share 
to help with a solution for the refugees. We here will 
do our full share in support of regional cooperation. We 
here will do our share — and do more — to see that the 
peaceful promise of nuclear energy is applied to the 
critical problem of desalting water. . . . 

But success in such efforts to achieve regional 
cooperation — and cooperation between the 
region and the rest of the world — can hardly be 
taken for granted. It will not be easy for the 
Middle East to become a stable and progressive 
region, open to the world but free from outside 

Success in that effort cannot be imposed from 
without, either by the United States or by any- 
one else. We and other friendly nations can dis- 
courage the coercive designs of others. We can 
and will encourage progressive forces and 

"76iU, July 10, 1967, p. 31. 

initiatives originating withm the region. We 
can hope to see a gradual transformation of the 
environment that will turn people away from 
the quarrels of the past to the promise of the 

The Paradox of Interdependence 

In these respects, the Middle East is like 
much of the rest of what is called the "third 
world." It is a region of promise and yet of 
instability. There are many divisive forces na- 
tive to the region which promote unrest and 
intermittent turbulence. But these internal divi- 
sions are frequently fueled from without and 
thus prolonged. Tiu-moil of this kind prevents 
the economic and social progress that might 
in the end remake the whole environment. If 
we turn away from these develojiments in the 
third world, the result could be serious : harm 
to our friends and to our vital interests. 

Wliat the world faces, not only in the Middle 
East but in the Far East, Latin America, and 
Africa as well, is a race between the forces of 
order and rational progress and the forces of 
discord and retrogression. The problems of 
building a stable world order will not go away. 
For reasons of security — and reasons of hu- 
manity — we must help these troubled peoples 
to solve their problems of order and develop- 
ment. If we and they fail, we could ourselves 
be embroiled in the i-esulting turmoil. 

We cannot solve these problems alone. We do 
not have the wealth, the power, the wisdom, 
or the imperial will to build a world after the 
manner of the Romans. Ours is a better vision. 
But it requires, above all, that other people 
take the principal responsibility for solving 
their own problems. We cannot ourselves build 
a new order throughout the third world, but 
we shall suffer along with the rest of mankind 
if that order is not achieved. That is the para- 
dox of interdependence in our nuclear world. 
If we cannot command an end to the world's 
problems, neither can we refuse to do our part 
in solving them. 

That lesson is hard for Utopians, who wish 
to solve all problems immediately or else retreat 
in disgust. But it is a lesson that should be 
easier for lawyers. None of us should be sur- 
prised that nature yields reluctantly to improve- 
ment or that the world can be changed for the 
better only by the slow, patient advance of 
good sense and good habits. 



North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg 

The North Atlantic CouTwil held its regular 
ministerial meeting at Luxembourg December 
12-H. Following are texts of the final com- 
munique and annex tohich were released hy the 
Council at the close of the meeting on December 

Press release 293 dated December 15 


The first Ministerial Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council to be held at the new Brussels 
headquarters ended on 14th December, 1967. 

2. Ministers approved tlie report on the Fu- 
ture Tasks of the Alliance, prepared in con- 
formity with the decisions taken on 16th 
December, 1966 on the initiative of the Belgian 
Foreign Minister.^ The report is annexed to 
this communique. 

3. The Council examined developments in 
the mternational situation since their last meet- 
ing. Ministers reviewed the efi'orts made by 
their governments to improve East/West re- 
lations and noted tlic extensive bilateral con- 
tacts made in recent months. They expressed 
the hope that these eiYorts might lead to prog- 
ress in the settlement of outstanding European 
problems. Ministers also discussed long-range 
policy questions, especially those covered in the 
report on Future Tasks of the Alliance. 

4. The Council discussed proposals presented 
by the "North Atlantic Assembly" of Parlia- 
mentarians at their recent meeting for closer 
co-operation between themselves and the Coun- 
cil. The Secretary General was authorised to 
study ways and means for this purpose and to 
submit suggestions to the Coimcil. 

5. Ministers empliasised the importance of 

' For text of a communique and annexes issued at 
Paris on Dee. IG. 1966, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, 
p. 49. 

promoting progress in disarmament and arms 
control, including concrete measures to pre- 
vent tlie proliferation of nuclear weapons. The}' 
reaffirmed their view that, if conditions permit, 
a balanced reduction of forces on both sides 
could constitute a significant step towards 
security in Europe. 

6. The Comicil recalled the views expressed 
in tlie declaration on Germany issued on 16th 
December, 1966. Ministers emphasised that the 
peaceful settlement of the German question on 
a basis which would take account of the Ger- 
man peoi)le's fundamental right to re-unifica- 
tion was an essential factor for a just and last- 
ing peaceful order in Europe. In reviewing the 
present state of the Geiinan question, INIinisters 
were informed by their German colleague 
about his Government's increased efforts to im- 
prove relations with Eastern European coun- 
tries and to promote East/West detente. He 
emphasised that it was m tliis spirit that his 
Government was also trying to handle the 
problems arising from the division of Ger- 
many. Considering the difficulties cf reaching 
an early solution. Ministers agreed that at 
present the only realistic possibility for progress 
remained the step-by-step approach advocated 
and applied by the Federal Government. With 
regard to Berlin, the Ministers confirmed their 
declaration of 16th December, 1958.^ 

7. Ministers noted the Secretary General's 
report on his "Watching Brief" and invited 
him to continue his activities in this sphere. 
They expressed tlieir appreciation of the im- 
portant role played by the Secretary General in 
reducing the recent crisis concerning Cyprus 
and Greek-Turkish relations. They expressed 
satisfaction with the agreement between Tur- 
key and Greece on the steps being taken to re- 
solve the crisis, taking advantage, as appro- 
priate, of the actions of the United Nations. 

' For text, see ihid., Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4. 

JANTJART 8, 1968 


They reaffirmed their conviction that Turkey 
and Greece should, in the spirit of the solidarity 
of the Alliance, continue their efforts to facili- 
tate a peaceful and rapid solution of the Cyprus 

8. Ministers considered the report on Teclmo- 
logical Co-operation prepared in response to 
the Resolution adopted on 14th June, 1967 ^ 
on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of 
Italy. They invited the Council in Permanent 
Session assisted by competent organs of the 
Alliance to continue its studies on the Alliance's 
role in the field of technology, mcluding the 
possibilities for applying defence teclmology to 
civil needs. The aim is to encourage co-opera- 
tion between member countries and to contrib- 
ute towards narrowing the teclmological dis- 
parities which may exist between these 
countries. Ministers also invited the Council in 
Permanent Session to develop the most effi- 
cient and economical ways for co-ordinating 
the various activities of the Alliance in the field 
of defence technology. 

9. Ministers considered and approved a re- 
port on Civil Emergency Planning. Stressing 
the vital importance of such planning, they 
noted the progress which had been achieved 
and the tasks which remained to be 

10. Ministers met as the Defence Planning 
Committee on 12th December 1967, to review the 
work accomplished since their previous meeting 
on 9th May 1967, and to give directions for fu- 
ture work. 

11. They agreed that one of the foundations 
for achieving an improvement in East/West re- 
lations and a peaceful settlement in Europe must 
be NATO's contuiumg military strength and 
capability to deter aggression. In this connection 
they noted that the Soviet Union continues to 
expend increasing resources upon its powerful 
military forces and is developing types of forces 
designed to enable it to achieve a significant 
military presence in other parts of the world. 
They also observed that during the past year 
there has been a marked expansion in Soviet 
forces in the Mediterranean. 

12. Ministers recalled that at their previous 
meeting they had given political, strategic, and 
economic guidance to the NATO Military Au- 
thorities for the development of an up-to-date 
strategic concept and an up-to-date five-year 
force plan covering the period up to the end of 

' For text, see iUd., July 3, 1967, p. 15. 

1972. They adopted the revised strategic con- 
cept submitted by the INIilitary Committee fol- 
lowing the first comprehensive review of 
NATO's strategy since 1956. This concept, 
which adapts NATO's strategy to current po- 
litical, military, and teclmological develop- 
ments, is based upon a flexible and balanced 
range of appropriate responses, conventional 
and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or 
threats of aggression. These responses, subject 
to appropriate political control, are designed, 
first to deter aggression and thus preserve peace ; 
but, should aggression unhappily occur, to 
maintain the security and integi'ity of the North 
Atlantic Treaty area within the concept of for- 
ward defence. 

13. Ministers also noted the force commit- 
ments imdertaken by member nations for the 
year 1968, and for the first time adopted a five- 
year NATO force plan, covering the period 
1968-1972. They gave directions for the develop- 
ment in 1968 of a force plan for the period 1969- 
1973 in accordance with the procedures for five- 
year rolling planning adopted in December 

14. Ministers devoted particular attention to 
the security of the flank regions of Allied Com- 
mand Europe. 

15. They decided to transform the "Match- 
maker" Naval Training Squadron into a Stand- 
ing Naval Force Atlantic of destroyer-type 
ships. This force, continuously operational, 
will enhance existmg co-operation between the 
naval forces of member countries. 

16. France did not take part in the discus- 
sions referred to in paragraphs 10 to 15 and did 
not associate herself with the corresponding 

17. The regular Spring Ministerial Meeting 
for 1968 will be held in Eeykjavik. 


Future Tasks of the Alliance 
Report of the Council 

A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Min- 
ister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations 
of the Alliance resolved to "study the future tasks 
which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling 
them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor 
for durable peace". The present report sets forth the 
general tenor and main principles emerging from this 
examination of the future tasks of the Alliance. 

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schiitz, 



Watson, Siiaak. Kohler and Patijn. The Council 
wishes to express its appreciation and tbanlis to tliese 
eminent personalities for their efTorts and for the 
analyses they produced. 

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a 
dynamic and vigorous organization which is con- 
stantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It 
has shown that its future tasks can be handled within 
the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and 
procedures which have proved their value over many 

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 
1949 the international situation has changed signifi- 
cantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have 
assumed a new dimension. Amongst other develop- 
ments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping 
Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has 
become one of tlie two \\()rld super jtowers but the 
Communist world is no longer monolithic ; the Soviet 
doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" has changed the 
nature of the confrontation with the West but not the 
basic problems. Although the disparity between the 
power of the United States and that of the European 
states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its 
way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has 
transformed European relations with the rest of the 
world; at the same time, major problems have arisen 
in the relations between developed and developing 

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its 
lirst function is to maintain adequate military strength 
and political solidarity to deter aggression and other 
forms of pressure and to defend the territory of mem- 
ber countries if aggression should occur. Since its in- 
ception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this 
task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded 
as long as the central political issues in Eurojie, first 
and foremost the German question, remain unsolved. 
Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty 
still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. 
Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as 
necessary, a .suitable militar.v capability to assure the 
balance of forces, ths'reb.v creating a climate of sta- 
bility, security and confidence. 

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second 
function, to pursue the search for progress towards 
a more stable relationship in which the underlying 
political issues can be solved. Militar.v securit.v and a 
policy of detente are not contradictory but comple- 
mentary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in 
world politics. It is the neces.sar.y condition for effec- 
tive policies directed towards a greater relaxation of 
tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe 
rests in particular on the use of the Alliance construc- 
tively in the interest of detente. The participation of 
the USSR and the ISA will be necessary to achieve a 
settlement of the political problems in Europe. 

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been 
a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same 
ideals and with a high degree of common interest. 
Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of 
stability within the Atlantic area. 

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to 
subordinate their policies to collective decision. The 
Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house 
for the exchange of information and views ; thus, each 
of the Allies can decide his policy in the light of close 

knowledge of each others' problems and objectives. 
To this end the practice of frank and timely consulta- 
tions needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally 
should play its full part in promoting an improvement 
in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries 
of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of 
detente must not be allowed to spUt the Alliance. 
The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the 
Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters 
of close concern to them all ; their actions will thus 
be all the more effective. 

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a 
major effort by all concerned. The evoluticm of Soviet 
and East European policies gives ground for hope that 
those governments may eventually come to recognise 
the advantages to them of collaborating in working 
towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable 
settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of 
the German question which lies at the heart of present 
tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the 
unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western 
Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested 
in the division of Germany. 

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their 
energies to this by realistic measures designed 
to further a detente in East- West relations. The relaxa- 
tion of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a 
long-term process to promote better relations and to 
foster a European settlement. The ultimate political 
purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting 
peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate 
security guarantee.s. 

10. Currently, the development of contacts between 
the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is now 
mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of 
course, require by their very nature, a multilateral 

11. The problem of German reunification and its 
relationship to a European settlement has normally 
been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union 
and the three Western powers having special respon- 
sibilities in this field. In the preparation of such 
exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regu- 
larly joined the three Western powers in order to 
reach a common position. The other Allies will con- 
tinue to have their views considered in timely dis- 
cussions among the Allies about Western policy on 
this subject, without in any way impairing the special 
responsibilities in question. 

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable 
policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in 
Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to 
fo.ster European .security. This will be part of a proc- 
ess of active and constant preparation for the time 
when fruitful discussions of these complex questions 
may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between 
Eastern and Western nations. 

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and prac- 
tical arms control measures, including the possibility 
of balanced force reductions. These studies will be 
intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the 
Allies to work for an effective detente with the East. 

14. The Allies will examine with particular atten- 
tion the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. 
the South-Eastern flank. In this respect the current 
situation in the Mediterranean presents special prob- 
lems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the 

JANUARY 8, 1968 


Middle-East falls within the responsibilities of the 
United Nations. 

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated 
in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and con- 
flicts arising outside the area may impair its security 
either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied 
countries contribute individually within the United 
Nations and other international organisations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and 
to the solution of important international problems. In 
accordance with established usage the Allies or such 
of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult 
on such problems without commitment and as the case 
may demand. 

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers 
directed the Council in permanent ses.sion to carry out, 
in the .years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting 
from this study. This will be done either by intensifying 
work already in hand or by activating highly special- 
ized studies by more systematic use of experts and 
officials sent from capitals. 

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special 
Group confirmed the importance of the role which the 
Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years 
in the promotion of detente and the strengthening of 
peace. Since significant problems have not yet been 
examined in all their aspects, and other problems of 
no less significance which have arisen from the latest 
political and strategic developments have still to be 
examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent 
Representatives to put in hand the study of these 
problems without delay, following such procedures as 
shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in 
permanent session, in order to enable further reports 
to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Minis- 
terial Session. 

President Asks Senate Approval 
of U.S. Membership in BEE 

Letter of Transmittal'^ 

To the Senate of the United States : 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to accession, I transmit here- 
witli a certified copy, in the antlientic French 
text with an English translation, of the conven- 
tion relating to international exhibitions signed 
at Paris on November 22, 1928, together with 
two protocols, signed on May 10, 1948 and No- 
vember 16, 1966, modifying the convention. The 
convention and protocols were signed in behalf 
of certain States but not the United States of 

The convention established the Bureau of In- 

' President Johnson's letter of transmittal and the 
accompan.ving documents are printed in S. Exec. P, 
90th Cong., 1st sess. 


ternational Expositions, the "BIE", the purpose 
of which is to provide basic rules regarding 
international expositions. 

The United States has never become a mem- 
ber of the BIE mainly because of a concept that 
international expositions, or "world fairs" as 
they are popularly termed in this country, 
should be left to the initiative of private groups 
with the principal suppoi-t coming from city 
and state governments, and more limited sup- 
port and endorsement l)y the Federal Govern- 
ment. However, the more the organization of 
these complex undertakings is studied the more 
the responsibility of the Federal Government 
to play an active role in scheduling their ap- 
pearance and in defining their basic character 
is appreciated. 

The subject of international expositions and 
the role of the BIE is one that has been care- 
fully reviewed in recent years. In 1959 the Sen- 
ate Foreign Eelations Committee sponsored a 
resolution (SR 169) seeking a study to deter- 
mine, among other things, whether the United 
States should consider membership in the BIE. 
This was at a time when several cities in this 
country were contemplating a major exposition 
in the mid 1960's. 

In May, 1963, the President directed the Sec- 
retary of Commerce to develop criteria for an 
expositions policy in view of the fact that the 
number of cities in the United States with ex- 
position plans under consideration had gi'own 
to sixteen. 

In May, 1964, as a result of interdepartmental 
study, the President sent letters to the Secre- 
taries of Commerce and State in which he em- 
phasized the need to leave 1975-76 open for a 
possible Bicentemiial Exposition to commemo- 
rate American Independence. In these letters he 
instructed the Secretary of State, in attempting 
to protect the 1975-76 dates with the BIE, to 
determine whether a reali.stic framework 
existed for United States participation in that 

In October, 1964, the Department of Com- 
merce published in the Federal Register rules 
governing official United States assistance to 
sponsors of international expositions in the 
United States. These rules were designed as a 
further means of clearing the horizon for the 
Bicentennial. They also clearly identified the 
role of the BIE, and the importance of its sanc- 
tion, in the organization of international 

During the past three years, discussions have 



been held with representatives of the BIE on 
all aspects of the 1928 Convention and the role 
of the Bureau. These discussions indicate quite 
clearly that there are no barriei-s to effective 
United States participation in the BIE. In addi- 
tion, senior BIE officials visited Washington in 
September, 1966, for informal discussions with 
officials of the Executive Branch and several 
Members of Congress. 

Following careful review of this matter since 
1963 and for the reasons expressed by the Secre- 
tary of State, it has been concluded that mem- 
bership in the BIE would be in the best inter- 
ests of the United States. That conclusion is 
confiiTned by the example of Canada, a BIE 
member, in staging Montreal's magnificent 
Expo 67. 

I, therefore, recommend that the Senate give 
early and favorable consideration to the conven- 
tion, and the two protocols. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House 
November 28, 1967. 

Department Seeks Criminal Penalties 
on Travel to Restricted Areas 

Press release 291 dated December 11 


December 11, 1967 

Honorable John W. McCormack 

Speaker of tlie House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 

De^vr Mr. Speaker : I have the honor to trans- 
mit a bill authorizing the Secretary of State to 
determine that travel to certain foreign countries 
by United States citizens should te prohibited 
and prescribing criminal penalties for those 
who travel in violation of such a prohibition. 

This proposed legislation is intended to fill a 
gap in existing law. More than two years ago, in 
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court 
sustained the authority exercised by the Secre- 
tary of State for over fifty years to endorse 
passports as invalid for travel to specified coun- 
tries or areas when travel to those regions would 
seriously impair our foreign policy. Recognizing 
that such a restriction might effectively prevent 

travel by American citizens to the area, the 
Court found nonetheless that an inhibition on 
travel was a constitutionally permissible means 
of implementing policies justified by "the 
weightiest considerations of national security." 

Such considerations of national security are 
clearly illustrated by two current examples. At 
a time when our military forces are engaged in 
protecting South Viet-Nam against aggression 
from the North, it would be plainly self-defeat- 
ing to authorize imrestricted travel of our 
citizens to Xorth Viet-Nam. Travel in these cir- 
cimistances provides assistance and support in 
derogation of the military effort to which the 
nation has turned its energies. 

The recent situation in the Middle East is 
another illustration of the importance of effec- 
tive limitations upon travel of American citizens 
in times of extraordinary crisis. Wlien emer- 
gency evacuation of American citizens from an 
area is required by heightened tensions or armed 
combat in that region — as was true of countries 
in the Middle East — steps must be taken to keep 
other Americans from the crisis area. Experi- 
ence has demonstrated that the mere presence 
of Americans in a country where passions have 
been inflamed against the United States may 
result in unintended incidents, and these may 
have severe consequences to our foreign policy 
and to the safety of the nation. 

Until recently it was assumed that the pro- 
visions of Section 215 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 and the criminal penal- 
ties provided therein applied to knowing viola- 
tions of geographical passport restrictions in 
times of national emergency. In January of this 
3'ear, however, the Supreme Court determined 
unanimously that Section 215 did not apply to 
such conduct {United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 
475; Travis v. United States, 385 U.S. 491). 

The Secretary of State has, pursuant to pub- 
lished regulations been exercising the authority 
to revoke passports of individual violators in 
order to prevent repeated violations of area 
restrictions. This administrative measure has, 
however, proved inadequate to secure the for- 
eign policy interests which are at stake. Our law 
presently contains no effective and practical 
deterrent for violations of travel restraints 
deemed necessary in the implementation of our 
foreign policy. 

The proposed bill accomplishes five objectives : 

1. It explicitly grants authority to the Secre- 
tary of State, acting pursuant to such policies 
as the President may prescribe, to specify for- 

JANTJARY 8, 1968 


eign countries or areas where travel by United 
Statas citizens or nationals is prohibited ; 

2. It defines tlie limits of that authority ; 

3. It establishes a procedure whereby geo- 
graphical restrictions are subject to contmuing 

4. It grants authority to the Secretary to 
permit travel to restricted areas by those whose 
travel is deemed to be in the national interest; 

5. It prescribes an enforceable and fair 
criminal penalty for violations of geographical 

Legislation affecting the travel abroad of 
American citizens must, of course, take account 
of the established constitutional principle that 
travel is a "liberty" secured by the Fifth Amend- 
ment to the United States Constitution. The 
Supreme Court recently sustained a restriction 
upon travel to Cuba, however, recognizing that 
"the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited 
without due process of law does not mean that 
it can imder no circumstances be inhibited." The 
proposed bill accords full respect to the constitu- 
tionally protected liberty to travel abroad; it 
authorizes official restraints on such travel only 
in the most compelling circumstances and after 
a public announcement of the basis for the 
restriction. And by requiring annual re-exami- 
nations of the countries to which travel is re- 
stricted, the bill ensures that the announced 
limitations will be in keeping with current 

It is the Secretary of State's present practice 
to authorize certain categories of citizens, such 
as professional journalists, scholars or doctors, 
to travel to restricted areas notwithstanding 
the passport limitations. The proposed bill per- 
mits continuation of this practice by specifically 
empowering the Secretary to grant exceptions 
to the general prohibition for travel which is 
"in the national interest." 

Finally, the bill imposes a criminal sanction 
for unauthorized travel by a citizen to a re- 
stricted area irrespective of whether the traveler 
uses or possesses a passport, and whether or not 
limitations are endorsed in the travel document 
he is carrying. The heart of the offense is not 
the violation of a passport condition; the 
citizen's entry to a restricted area is the act 
which jeopardizes our foreign policy. It is 
appropriate, therefore, that the statute define 
the proscribed conduct directly and not to 
relate it to passport restrictions. 

I urge the Congress to give prompt and favor- 
able consideration to this important legislation. 

The Bureau of the Budget advises that enact- 
ment of this legislation would be in accord with 
the program of the President. 
Sincerely yours, 

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 

Acting Secretary 

Enclosure ; A BUI 



To promote the foreign policy of the United States by 
authorizing the Secretary of State to restrict the travel 
of citizens and nationals of the United States where 
unrestricted travel would seriously impair the conduct 
of foreign affairs, etc. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represent- 
atives of the United States of America in- the Congress 
assemhled, That, 

(a) Chapter 45 of title 18 of the United States Code, 
relating to foreign relations, is amended by adding at 
the end thereof the following new section : 

"§ 970. Travel in violation of area restrictions. 

(a) Subject to such policy or policies as the Presi- 
dent may prescribe for carrying out the authority 
granted to the Secretary of State by this section, 
the Secretary may restrict travel to a foreign country 
or area by citizens and nationals of the United States 
If he determines that the country or area is 

(1) a country or area which is at war, 

(2) a country or area where insurrection or armed 
hostilities are in progress, 

(3) a country or area whose military forces are 
engaged in armed conflict with forces of the United 
States, or 

(4) a country or area to which travel must be re- 
stricted in the national interest because such travel 
would seriously impair the conduct of United States 
foreign policy. 

(b) Such restriction shall be announced by public 
notice which shall be published in the Federal Register 
and shall state the grounds for imposing the restric- 
tion. The restriction shall expire at the end of one 
year from the date of publication unless sooner re- 
voked by public notice issued by the Secretary. Any 
such restriction may be extended by public notice by 
the Secretary for periods not to exceed one year at a 

(c) The Secretary may authorize travel to a re- 
stricted country or area by any person when the Secre- 
tary deems such travel to be in the national interest. 
The authorization shall take such form as the Secretary 
shall by regulation prescribe. 

(d) Any citizen or national of the United States 
who willfully enters or travels in or through any 
country or area to which travel is restricted pursuant 



to this section without having received the Secretary's 
authorization for such travel shall be imnished by 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year 
or by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both." 

{b) The analysis of such chapter 45, Immediately 
preceding section 951, is amended by adding at the 
end thereof the following new item : 

"970. Travel in violation of area restrictions." 

Foreign Area Research 
Guidelines Adopted 

Press release 297 dated December 19 


The follo^Ying sidelines have been adopted 
by the Foreign Area Research Coordination 
Group (FAR) to provide general guidance to 
the FAR agencies. These agencies of the United 
States Government — 21 in number — seek 
through their voluntary association in FAR 
"the systematic coordination of government- 
sponsored foreign area and cross-cultural re- 
search in the social sciences." 

These guidelines deal witli two sets of j^rob- 
lems: (A) those that arise when a Government 
agency contracts with an academic institution 
for beha\noral and social science research deal- 
ing with foreign areas and international re- 
lations and (B) those that arise when such con- 
tracts call for the conduct by academic person- 
nel of some or all of the research in foreign 

It should be recognized that these guidelines 
have been formulated and adopted by Govern- 
ment departments and agencies that have a va- 
I riety of missions and a great diversity of pro- 
grams for supporting research. Thus not every 
guideline will have equal applicability to all 
research programs of every member agency. 
The guidelines are meant to deal with what, 
from the point of view of governmen<^-academic 
relations, are usually perceived to be the most 
troublesome cases of foreign area and foreign 
affairs research involving the social and be- 
havioral sciences. Typically, those cases involve 
a contractual relationship between a policy or 
operating department or agency of Govern- 
ment and an academic institution in which the 
latter undertakes to conduct research which the 

former lias determined is pertinent to its policy 
or action responsibilities in the foreign affairs 
field. Though they may have some applicability, 
tlie guidelines were not designed to deal with 
consultant relations between an individual 
scholar and a Government agency or with non- 
contracttuil research grants made by a founda- 
tion-like Government agency to academic in- 
stitutions or individuals. 

In formulating the first set of guidelines 
(section A below), FAR members recognized 
the importance in an open society of strong, 
independent universities. FAR members worked 
from the premise that the Government, in 
carrying out various foreign affairs mi.ssions 
on behalf of an open society, needs to seek con- 
tributions from all sectors of American society, 
including the resources of knowledge, analysis, 
and insight available on university campuses. 
The problem — in which the Government, the 
universities, and society at large all have a 
stake — is for Government agencies to arrange 
to draw upon university resources for this pur- 
pose without diminishing either those resources 
or the status of the universities as centers of in- 
dependent teaching and research. This problem 
takes on added dimensions when scholars asso- 
ciated with American universities go to foreign 
countries to carry out government-supported 
contract research. Thus the second set of guide- 
lines (section B below) is designed to reflect the 
desire of Government agencies to avoid adverse 
effects on foreign relations as well as concern 
with restrictions on the access of American 
scholars overseas and increased difficulties in 
carrying out many types of 

Many of the factors behind these latter re- 
strictions and difficulties are not amenable to 
government action, and certain of them should 
not be. Some stem from the cultural and politi- 
cal sensitivities of other nations, especially 
newly independent ones. Others derive from the 
relative scope, size, sophistication, and affluence 
of American social science research, which have 
resulted in high concentration in certain coun- 
tries and in high visibility of research person- 
nel. Still others result from the inadequate 
preparation of the researcher himself or from 
his personal characteristics. Insofar as 
problems lend themselves to solution, responsi- 
bility must ordinarily lie with the academic 
profession itself. Thus the Government looks 
to the academic community to formulate its 

foreign area 

JANTJART 8, 1968 


own standards of conduct in performinfr re- 
search overseas and welcomes the initiatives 
which have already been taken in this regard. 
However, the Government recognizes that its 
own research programs can sometimes affect not 
only official U.S. foreign relations but also the 
overseas relationships and access of private 
scholars. The role of the Government is there- 
fore significant and carries an obligation to in- 
sure that government-supported foreign area 
research is conducted in ways that reflect favor- 
ably on the United States and on the integrity 
of American scholarship. 

FAR members hope through the promulga- 
tion of these guidelines to alleviate some of the 
difficulties encountered in government-sup- 
ported foreign area research and to participate 
with the academic community in constructive 
and clarifying interaction. Through the FAR 
and similar mechanisms, Government agencies 
concerned with foreign area research will try 
to strengthen their liaison with the scholarly 
community. Wliile the guidelines will neither 
solve every problem of relations between gov- 
ernment and the academic world nor be appli- 
cable to every situation, the process of applica- 
tion by individual agencies and discussion with 
the academic community should help to illumi- 
nate the interests and obligations of the parties 


A. Guidelines for Research Contract Relations 
Between Government and University 

Al. The government has the responsibility 
for avoiding actions that would call into ques- 
tion the integrity of American academic insti- 
tutions as centers of independent teaching and 
research. A large portion of government-sup- 
ported contract research carried out by Ameri- 
can universities is long-range, unclassified and 
of academic interest to the faculties concerned ; 
it poses no more serious challenges to academic 
integrity than do public and private research 
grants. The issues of acknowledgment and 
classification may pose problems and are dealt 
with below in paragraphs A2 and A3. In addi- 
tion, there are certain specialized research 
needs — sometimes involving foreign sensitivi- 
ties — for which government agencies should 
continue to use or develop their own capabilities 
or those of nonacademic institutions in order, 

among other things, to avoid possible embar- 
rassment to academic research personnel and 

A2. The fact of government research support 
should always he aclcnowledged hy sponsor, 
university, and researcher. Covert support to 
institutions of higher education is contrary to 
national policy,^ on the broad and vital principle 
that it runs contraiy to the spirit of our mstitu- 
tions, and on the pragmatic basis that it may 
reduce the reliability and credibility of the re- 
search project's conclusions and eventually re- 
sult in damage to the reputation of our scholarly 

A3. Government-supported contract re- 
search should in process and results ideally he 
unclassified, hut the practical needs of the na- 
tion in the modern world may require that some 
portion he subject to classification; the halance 
hetween making work public or classified 
should incline lohenever possible toward mak- 
ing it public. The free flow of ideas is basic to 
our system of democracy and to academic free- 
dom. There are other reasons why the govern- 
ment should make generally available the re- 
sults of its contract research ; to do so not only 
results in the advancement of learning and pub- 
lic enlightenment, but also subjects government- 
supported research to the closest possible pro- 
fessional scrutiny. 

Nevertheless, other responsibilities of the 
government sometimes must prevail. Material 
which cannot be declassified must sometimes be 
used in research required for important pur- 
poses. There are other reasons why the use of 
confidential limitations is as legitimate a prac- 
tice in the government as it is in the private 
sector, where the substance of information is 
sometimes withheld even when its existence is 
known. In exploring alternative courses of ac- 
tion, the government often needs research-based 
analysis and reflection which, if made public, 
could produce serious misunderstandings and 
misapprehensions abroad about U.S. intentions. 
To abandon restrictions of these sorts alto- 
gether would impose serious limitations on the 
agencies' use of contract research. 

However, to the maximum extent feasible, 
agencies should design projects in such ways 
that only those poiiions requiring restrictive 

' As stated in the report of the committee chaired by 
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach which was ac- 
cepted by the President on Mar. 20, 1967 (Depnrtnimt 
of State BtTLLETiN of Apr. 24, 1967. p. 665). [Footnote 
in original.] 




treatment are so treated. If classification is 
necessaiy, tlie university is its own judge of 
whether or not it wishes to contract for re- 
search in this category. In any case, the re- 
searclier should always be notified in advance 
of entering into the contract if the project is 
to be classified or if the results will need to 
undergo final review for possible security 
classification or administrative control. 

A4. As a general rule, agencies should en- 
courage open publication of contract research 
rew?f.^. Subject to the ordinary canons of con- 
fidentiality and good taste which pertain in 
I. sponsible privately-supported academic re- 
st'urch, and subject to paragraph 3 above, open 
publication of research results in government 
or private media serves the greatest general 
good, both at home and abroad. The best guar- 
antee that government-supported research will 
be of high quality is to have its results exposed 
to peer-group judgment ; open publication is the 
most effective means for this purpose. To assure 
maximum feasible publication of research re- 
sults and to minimize the risk that research 
publications will be misconstrued as statements 
or indicators of public policy, government agen- 
cies should give careful attention to the lan- 
guage and places in which their support is 
acknowledged and their responsibility for ac- 
curacy, findings, intei-pretations, and conclu- 
sions asserted or disclaimed. The researcher 
should be given a clear understanding of the 
agency's position on these matters before enter- 
ing into the contract. 

A5. Government agencies that contract with 
university researchers should consider designing 
fJie/r projects so as to advance Jcnoiuledge as 
II-, 11 as to meet the immediate needs of policy or 
action. Few agencies have as their central mis- 
sion the advancement of knowledge for its own 
sake or for its general utility. Most agencies that 
contract for research look to research — and 
rightfully so — for assistance in carrying out 
specific missions or tasks in policy or action, in 
short, for applications of scholarly knowledge. 
It is therefore often assumed that these agencies 
consume a tailored product and do not con- 
tribute to the nation's intellectual capital. 
Consumers they certainly are; however, schol- 
ars, as they work on applied problems, may also 
collect new data and gain new insights into the 
theoretical and methodological strengths and 
weaknesses of their scholarly fields; thus they 
generate as well as apply scholarly knowledge. 

Agencies should entertain research proposals 
and encourage research designs which permit 
such contributions to basic knowledge to the 
maximum degree consistent with the project's 
sensitivity and mission-related purpose. 

A6. The government agency has the obliga- 
tion of informing the potential researcher of 
the needs which the research should help meet, 
of any special conditions associated with the 
research contract, and generally of the agency^s 
expectations concerning the research and the 
researcher. The researcher has a right to prior 
knowledge of the use to which the agency ex- 
pects to put his research even though, as in the 
case of privately-supported research, no assur- 
ances can be given that it will in fact be used or 
that other uses will not also be made of it, by 
either the supporting agency or others. 

Nothing is more conducive to bad relations 
between researcher and government agency than 
failure to establish mutual understanding in 
advance concerning a research project. The best 
research designs are often those that emerge 
from extensive discussion between potential 
contractor and supporting agency; if elements 
of the design cannot or should not be completed 
until the project is under way, this prospect 
should be explicitly acknowledged and pro- 
vided for. 

A7. The government should continue to seeh 
research of the highest possible quality in its 
contract programs. As scholars have much to 
contribute in assessing the quality of research 
designs and the capabilities of colleagues, their 
advice should be sought at key stages in the 
formulation of projects. Advice can be obtained 
through consultants, advisory panels, inde- 
pendent review, or utilization of staff scientists. 

B. Guidelines for the Conduct of Foreign Area 
Research Under Government Contract 

Bl. The government should take special steps 
to ensure that the parties with which it contracts 
have highest qualification'i for candying out 
research overseas. Some of the points to be con- 
sidered in assessing qualifications are profes- 
sional competence, area experience, language 
competence, and personal alertness to problems 
of foreign sensitivity. Scholars in the same field 
or discipline are usually in the best position to 
judge the qualifications of a given researcher. 
Whenever feasible, consultation with academic 
experts should be a part of the process of con- 
tracting for foreign area research. 

JAKUART 8, 1968 


B2. The government should work to avert or 
minimize adverse foreign reactions to its con- 
tract research frograms conducted overseas. All 
other things being equal, government-supported 
projects are more likely than private ones to be 
misinterpreted by both government and non- 
government institutions in foreign countries. 
Sponsoring agencies should keep in mind that 
ordinarily research supported by government 
will be held abroad to ha\'e a very practical pur- 
pose — often a purpose more immediate and di- 
rect than the agency intended, or even imagined. 
Thus, some combinations of topic, jilace, time, 
and agency support result in sensitivity so great 
as to make pursuit of some research projects ac- 
tually harmful. Wliile the existing procedures 
for review of government-supported foreign 
area research projects in the social and behav- 
ioral sciences have clarified and alleviated many 
of the problems, the supporting agency should 
always be on the watch to ensure that its re- 
search projects do not adversely affect either 
U.S. foreign relations or the position of the 
private American scholar. 

B3. When a project involves research abroad 
it is particularly/ important that both the sup- 
porting agency and, the researcher openly ac- 
knowledge the auspices and financing of re- 
search projects. (SeeparagraphAQ above.) One 
source of difficulty for the scholar overseas is 
the unfounded suspicion that all American re- 
searchers are covertly supported by the U.S. 
Government. A policy of full disclosure of sup- 
port will help to eliminate the suspicion of all 
American research — whether private or govern- 
ment, classified or unclassified— and will allow 
that which is supported by the government to 
be judged on its own merits. If the research is 
of such a character, as in opinion sampling, that 
the objectivity of its research techniques is sub- 
stantially destroyed when respondents know of 
the project's auspices, then it is doubly impor- 
tant that either the host government or col- 
laborating local researchers, or both, be fully 
infoi-med about the nature of the project. 

B4. The govem.ment should under certain 
circumMances ascertain that the research is ac- 
ceptable to the host government. In most cases 
the open acknowledgment of auspices and fi- 
nancing discussed in paragraph B3 is sufficient 
to satisfy the interest of the host government in 
the research. In some cases it is desirable to take 
specific steps to inform the host government. For 
example, when the U.S. Government supports a 
classified research project involving substantial 

field work abroad by scholars associated with 
American universities, sufficient infonnation 
about the project should be communicated to the 
host government to convey a true picture of the 
character and purpose of the project. Similar 
steps may often be desirable for imclassified 
projects which either deal with very sensitive 
matters or easily lend themselves to misunder- 
standing and misrepresentation. 

B5. The government should encourage coop- 
eration with foreign scholars in its contract re- 
search programs. Cooperation with local schol- 
ars not only adds valuable viewpoints to 
a foreign area research project, but also goes far 
to remove antagonisms and suspicions. This 
cooperation must, in large part, be the re- 
sponsibility of the American scholars who 
carry on the projects, but the government 
should, where legislation permits, look favor- 
ably upon research proposals that contain pro- 
visions for cooperative ventures and should 
otherwise seek to facilitate and encourage these 
ventures within the limits imposed by local 
resources and needs. The supporting agency 
should encourage and assist American research- 
ers to distribute to those foreign colleagues who 
have cooperated in the research copies of open 
publications arising fi-om the project. The sup- 
porting agency should also consider distribution 
of such publications to other interested persons 
and institutions in the host country, either di- 
rectly through appropriate sections of the U.S. 
Embassy or by submitting co])ies to the FAR 
Secretariat for transmittal to the Embassy. 

B6. Government agencies should cont'vmie to 
coordinate their foreign area research programs 
to eliminate duplication and overloading of any 
one geographic area. Agencies planning projects 
will continue to make use of the various FAR 
facilities for information exchange and con- 
sultation in order to ascertain whether similar 
projects have already been completed or are 
underway and in order to coordinate with other 
agency plans where feasible. Since the prolifera- 
tion of American researchers overseas has been 
one source of irritation, government agencies 
should continue to ensure that their programs 
do not arouse foreign sensitivities Ijy concen- 
trating too many researchers and research proj- 
ects in any one overseas area. 

B7. Government agencies should collaborate 
toith academic associations on problems of for- 
eign area research. Professional scholarly asso- 
ciations, both American and international, and 
especially those related to specific areas, have 



much experience witli the problems of research 
abroad, and they liave an interest like that of the 
government in ensuring that research relation- 
ships across national boundaries flow smoothly. 
Government agencies, thiough such mechanisms 
as the FAR, should consult with these associa- 
tions on the problems involved to arrive at 
mutually agreeable procedures and solutions. 


Press release 29" (Annex) 

Agency for International Development 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

International Security Affairs 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

Department of the Air Force 

Department of the Army 

Department of the Navy 

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 

Department of Labor 

Department of State 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

National Endowment for the Humanities 

National Science Foundation 

U.S. Information Agency 

Executive Office of the President 

National Academy of Sciences (Observer) 

Peace Corps (Observer) 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. 
During 1966 

Following is the text of a letter from, Presi- 
dent John-son transmitting to the Congress the 
annual report on U.S. participation in the 
United Xatian-s for the calendar year 1966.^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit the annual report on 
United States participation in the United Na- 
tions for the calendar year 1966. 

This report documents our continuing sup- 
port for the United Nations, and our efforts to 
help it move toward the lofty goals set forth in 
its Charter. 

Its pages reflect encouraging progress in the 
effort to further international peace and secu- 
rity, economic and social progress, human 

rights, and the rule of law among nations. They 
also reveal some discouraging setbacks. 

One outstanding accomplishment during 
1966 was the succe,ssful negotiation of the Outer 
Space Treaty,^ which bans weapons of mass 
destruction from space and calls for peaceful 
cooperation in its exploration and use. By unani- 
mous vote, the General Assembly commended 
the Treaty and urged all nations to adhere to 

Not all progress made by the United Nations 
was dramatic, or widely reported. Within the 
U.N. system — as elsewhere — disputes and crises 
make headlines, while the quiet works of peace 
go largely imnoted. Yet, day by day, in the capi- 
tals of more than a hundred nations and in thou- 
sands of villages around the world. U.N. rep- 
resentatives work with governments and peoples 
to carry on man's endless struggle against ig- 
norance, hunger and disease. About 80 percent 
of the U.N. resources — not including those of 
international financing institutions — are used 
to promote economic and social development. 

To improve these efforts, two particular U.N. 
activities during 1966 deserve special attention : 

— The United Nations Development Program 
completed its first year of operation. Merging 
two previously separate agencies, the new or- 
ganization is designed to provide a more uni- 
form and effective U.N. program of economic 
assistance. It is becoming one of the key orga- 
nizations for multilateral assistance. 

— The General Assembly approved the 
charter of the U.N. Industrial Development 
Organization, which will help new nations 
create industries best suited to their develop- 
ment needs. 

The General Assembly adopted two covenants 
to protect basic rights of mankind. One per- 
tained to civil and political rights, the other to 
economic, social and cultural rights.^ Their 
passage completed a task which the United 
Nations set for itself in 1948 with its Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

In addition. Ambassador Goldberg signed, 

^ U.S. Participation in the UN: Report iy the Presi- 
dent to the Congress for the Year 19GG (H. Doc. 180, 
90th Cong., 1st sess.) ; Department of State publica- 
tion 8276, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402, price $1.50. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953. 

'For background and text of A/RES/2222(XXI) 
adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 19. 1966, see ibid., 
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78. 

* For background and texts of the covenant!!, see 
ibid., Jan. 16, 1967, p. 104. 

JANUARY 8, 196 8 


on behalf of the United States, the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis- 
crimination.^ Our signature reflects this Gov- 
ernment's commitment to promote the cause of 
human rights and the end of racial discrim- 

Race repression still exists, however ; and dur- 
ing 1966 the United Nations was intensively 
concerned with its manifestation in southern 

The United States proposed and supported 
measures designed to deal with the problem 
realistically, peacefully and with concern for 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
We endorsed the limited economic sanctions 
invoked by the Security Council against the 
rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia.^ This was 
an effort to deal in moderate but responsible 
fashion with an emerging threat to the peace in 
the region. It is this Government's hope that the 
cumulative effect of the sanctions — and of the 
aroused international opinion which produced 
them — will persuade the Rhodesian regime to 
return to constitutional rule. 

The United States also supported responsible 
efforts to enable the people of the former Man- 
dated Territory of South- West Africa to ad- 
vance toward self-determination and freedom 
from race discrimination.' 

We did not, however, join in extreme pro- 
posals which we considered unrealistic and con- 
sequently harmful to the United Nations and 
the achievement of its human rights goals. 

One great disappointment during the year 
was the failure to find a peaceful solution to the 
war in Viet-Nam. 

The United States sought unsuccessfully to 
obtain action on the problem in the Security 
Council.^ It persistently encouraged the Secre- 
tary-General and member states to do what they 
could to bring about negotiations. 

Those efforts have never abated. This nation 
continues to search for an honorable settlement 
in Viet-Nam. It continues to hope that the 
United Nations will make its contribution 
toward such a settlement. 

Another setback was the failure to prevent 
the violence which later broke out in the Middle 

Throughout 1966 there was evidence of in- 
creased tension in that part of the world. The 
Security Council met three times to consider 
terrorism and reprisal raids on Israel's borders.^ 
The United States maintained the position that 
the parties concerned should refram from the 
use of violence, and instead use U.N. peace- 

keeping machinery to seek redress. 

As the world was to learn later to its sorrow, 
counsels of moderation did not prevail. 

Deep differences over the organization and 
financing of future peacekeeping operations 
continue. The constitutional and financial dead- 
lock which had severely hampered the Orga- 
nization during 1964 and 1965 no longer stood in 
the way of day-to-day operations, but little 
headway was made in settling financial prob- 
lems for the future. The United States endeav- 
ored to seek agreement — and will continue to, 
for fundamental issues of peace are clearly 

On other financial matters, the United 
Nations made greater progress. In March, I 
directed the Secretary of State to help the 
Organization achieve the greatest possible 
efficiency in the planning and operation of its 
programs. Pointing out that the United States 
is the largest single contributor to U.N. pro- 
grams, I said in that directive : ^^ 

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping 
to strengthen the international agencies so they can 
meet essential new needs, we must apply to them the 
same rigorous standards of program performance and 
budget review that we do to our own Federal programs. 

In line with this objective, the General As- 
sembly approved recommendations to introduce 
a more effective use of funds and better coordi- 
nation into its operation. 

Our national interest and the high ideals of 
our tradition combine in American support of 
the United Nations. 

Like other U.N. members, we seek to advance 
our own interests in this international forum. 

But using the processes of persuasion, we also 
seek to foster that wide community of interest 
among nations which is man's best hope of 
establishing peace with honor and jDrogress with 

We shall continue that search in the years 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, November 15, 1967. 

° For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on Sept 
28, 1966, see ihid., Oct. 24, 1066, p. 6.53. 

"For background and text of S/RES/232 (1966) 
adopted by the Council on Dec. 16, 1966, see ibid., Jan. 
9, 1967, p. 73. 

' For background, see Hid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690, and 
Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870. 

' For background, see i'bid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229. 

' For background, see iUd., Aug. 29, 1966, p. 313. and 
Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969 and p. 974. 

" For text, see iUd., Apr. 11, 1966. 




Calendar of Internationa! Conferences ^ 

Scheduled January Through March 1968 

Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (to be Geneva Mar. 14, 1962- 

resiimed Jan. 18, 196S). 

International Conference on Input and Output Techniques Geneva Jan. 8-13 

ECAFE Seminar on the Development of Building Materials Bangkok Jan. 8-15 

International Coffee Council: 12th Session London Jan. 8-17 

ECE Working Group on Acti\-ity and Commodity Classifications . . . Geneva Jan. 8-19 

ICAO Panel on Economics of Route Navigation Montreal Jan. 8-19 

ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 22d Session Geneva Jan. 8-26 

OAS Symposium on Nuclear Energy and Agricultural Productivity . . Vina del Mar . . . Jan. 9-12 

OECD Science Policy Committee Paris Jan. 9-12 

UNDP Governing Council: 5th Session New York .... Jan. 9-26 

ECE Inland Transport Committee: 27th Session Geneva Jan. 15-18 

ECE Preparatory Group for Meeting of Senior Economic Advisers . . Geneva Jan. 15-20 

Inter- American Committee on the Alliance for Progress: Working Group Washington .... Jan. 15-26 

of Government Experts on Financing of Integration. 

OECD Special Committee for Oil Paris Jan. 16-17 

IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment London Jan. 16-19 

IC.\0 Panel on Obstacle Clearance Montreal Jan. 16-31 

ECAFE Trade Committee: 11th Session Bangkok Jan. 18-26 

OECD Program Committee of Conference on Thermoionic Electrical Paris Jan. 23-24 

Power Generation. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Automation Geneva Jan. 23-26 

OECD Fiscal Committee Paris Jan. 23-26 

FAO Consultative Subcommittee of Study Group on Hard Fibers . . . Rome Jan. 23-26 

IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution: 4th Session London Jan. 23-26 

WHO Executive Board: 41st Session Geneva Jan. 23-Feb. 2 

OECD Industry Committee Paris Jan. 24-26 

FAO Consultative Committee of Study Group on Jute, Kenaf, and Rome Jan. 29-31 

AUied Fibers. 

ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 16th Bangkok Jan. 29-Feb. 5 


ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women Geneva Jan. 29-Feb. 19 

U.X. Commission on International Trade Law New York .... Jan. 29-Feb. 23 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Standing London Jan. 30-Feb. 1 

Committee on Regulatory Measures. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Bulk Cargoes London Jan. 30-Feb. 2 

ECE Experts on the Study of Market Trends and Prospects for Chemical Geneva Jan. 30-Feb. 2 

Products: 3d Meeting. 

U.N. Legal Subcommittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Geneva January 

BIRPI Working Group on a Patent Cooperation Treaty: 1st Session . Geneva January 

Ad Hoc Meeting of Food Aid Convention Signatories London January 

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 2d Session . . New Delhi .... Feb. 1-Mar. 25 

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 9th Session London Feb. 5-9 

' This schedule, which was prepared m the Office of International Conferences on Dec. 15, 1967, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period January-March 
1968. The list does not include nmnerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in those 
are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washin^on, D.C. 20102. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property; CCITT. International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central 
Treaty Organization; ECAFE. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission 
for Europe ; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America ; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council ; FAO, Food 
and Agriculture Organization ; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council : IBE. International Bureau of Education ; ICAO, International Civil Aviation 
Organization ; ILO, International Labor Organization ; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi- 
zation; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N.. United 
Nations ; UN'DP. United Nations Development Program ; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientifie and 
Cultural Organization ; WHO. World Health Organization ; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

JAXUART 8, 1968 61 

Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

Scheduled January Through March 1968 — Continued 

ECE Working Group on Population Censuses 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Provisions 

ECOSOC Commission for Social Development 

ECOSOC Human Rights Commission 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Special 
Subcommittee on Finance and Administration. 

ILO Governing Body: 171st Session 

ECE Working Group on Housing Censuses 

ECE Symposium on Factors Influencing the Consumption of Wood- 
Based Panel Products. 

ECAFE Asian Industrial Development Council: 4th Session 

ICAO Limited European and Mediterranean Conference on Rules of the 
Air and Air Traffic Control and Communications. 

Inter-American Cultural Council 

13th International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Affecting Transport . 
FAO Conference on Pig Production and Diseases in the Far East .... 

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 5th Session 

ECE Committee on Gas 

IMCO Fire Protection Subcommittee: 7th Session 

IAEA Board of Governors 

ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 20th Session . 

ECOSOC Statistical Commission 

CENTO Countersubvcrsion Committee 

UNESCO Special Committee of Government Experts to Prepare Draft 

Recommendation on Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered 

by Public and Private Works. 

IBE Executive Committee: 4.5th Meeting 

IAEA Scientific Advisory Committee 

8th Inter-American Conference on Social Security 

SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee 

General Assembly of the International Institute for the Unification of 

Private Law. 
ICAO Joint Frequency Conference on North Atlantic Ocean Station . . 
ECE Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Air and Water Pollution Arising in the 

Steel Industry. 

OECD Ministers of Science 

ECLA Committee of the Whole 

ECOSOC Council Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . . . 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 17th Session 

ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles 

ITU/CCITT Working Party on Reviewing ITU Teletype Regulations . 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 5th Session 

U.N. International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: lat Meeting 

of Coordinating Group for the International Tsunami Warning System 

of the Pacific. 
OAS Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: Seminar on Container- 


North Pacific Fur Seal Commission and Standing Committee 

ICAO Legal Committee 

IMCO Legal Committee 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 6th Session 

WMO Commission for Hydrometeorology: .3d Session 

BIRPI Working Group on a Patent Cooperation Treaty: 2d Session . . 
6th Annual lA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Ministerial and Expert Level . 

Inter-AmericanSpecialCommitteeonLabor Affairs: 4th Meeting . . . 

Geneva Feb. 5-9 j 

Geneva Feb. .5-9 I 

New York .... Feb. .5-Mar. 1 ( 

New York .... Feb. 5-Mar. 8 

Dartmouth, Feb. 7-8 j 

Nova Scotia. i 

Geneva Feb. 7-Mar. 1 | 

Geneva Feb. 12-16 j 

Geneva Feb. 12-16 , 

Bangkok Feb. 12-19 ! 

Paris Feb. 12-Mar. 2 j 

Maracay, Feb. 15-22 

Brussels Feb. 18-26 

Geneva Feb. 19-23 

Bangkok Feb. 19-24 

Rome Feb. 19-Mar. 

Geneva Feb. 20-23 

London Feb. 20-23 

Vienna Feb. 20-23 

Bangkok Feb. 20-27 

New York .... Feb. 26-Mar. 

Washington .... Feb. 28-Mar. 

Paris February 


Geneva February 

Vienna February 

Panama City . . . February 

Bangkok February 

Rome February 

Paris . . 

Mar. 5-22 
Mar. 11-12 

Paris Mar. 11-12 

Santiago Mar. 11-13 

New York .... Mar. 11-15 

London Mar. 11-15 

Geneva Mar. 18-22 

Geneva Mar. 18-29 

London Mar. 19-22 

Vienna Mar. 24-May 28 


Mar. 25-28 

Bogotd Mar. 25-30 

Moscow Mar. 25-Apr. 11 

Montreal Mar. 25-Apr. 11 

Montreal Mar. 26-29 

Geneva Mar. 26-30 

Geneva Mar. 26-Apr. 5 

Geneva March 

Trinidad and March or April 


Trinidad and March or April 




United States Reviews Problems of Control 
of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 

Statement by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

Within the last few days we have passed the 
25th anniversary of the first atomic cliain reac- 
tion, an event which placed in man's hands the 
awesome power of the universe and the awesome 
responsibility of using this power for the bene- 
fit of all mankind. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency 
has played an important part in the contin- 
uing development of the power of the atom 
for peaceful purposes. The United States ex- 
presses its appreciation to Dr. Eklund [Sigvard 
Eklund, Director General of the IAEA] for 
the statement he has made to us today and for 
the able leadership he has exercised in the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. The United 
States supports the draft resolution submitted 
by Argentina, Bulgaria, and Indonesia.^ 

The history of man is in many ways the 
history of his search for the energy he needs 
to build a better life. Today he stands close to 
realizing his age-old dream of having at his 
service all the energy he can use. Already, the 
atom is being used by man : 

— to produce the energy which illuminates 
our cities, drives the machines of industry, and 
may increasingly be used to convert sea water 
into fresh water ; 

I 'Made in the U.N. General A.^sembly on Dec. .5 

I (U.S./U.X. press release 228) . 

*The draft resolution (D.N. doc. A/L..534), taking 
note of the report of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to the General Assembly for the year 106&- 
67 (t7.N. doc. A/6679), was adopted without objec- 
tion by the Assembly on Dec. 5 (U.N. doa A/RES/2284 

—to improve and increase the supply of food 
through new methods of processing and preserv- 
ing food, of combating plant and animal disease, 
and of carrying out research on the more effec- 
tive use of fertilizer and the use of conserva- 
tion of water. 

— to guard and improve human health 
through the use of radiation and radioisotopes 
and tecliniques for the diagnosis and treatment 
of disease. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency 
has contributed to the practical application of 
knowledge in each of these areas. It has carried 
out important programs for the exchange of in- 
formation and has provided technical assistance 
and training to scientists and teclinicians from 
all parts of the world. The United States con- 
gratulates the IAEA on the continuing work 
it has done in these fields during the past year. 

In response to man's increasing knowledge of 
the peaceful iises of atomic energy, nuclear 
reactoi-s are today being built in almost all 
parts of the world. More than 70 additional 
nuclear powerplants are planned or under con- 
struction in the United States alone. The total 
electric output of these plants will equal about 
20 percent of all electrical power produced in 
the United States today — enough to meet the 
requirements of 45 million people. Other nuclear 
reactors are being planned and built on almost 
every continent of the earth. Although the pur- 
pose of these plants is peaceful, the fact remains 
that if only a small part of the plutonium they 
create was diverted to the making of weapons. 

iJANUART S, 1968 


the dangers of a new arms race throughout the 
world would be greatly increased. 

By 1970 about a dozen covmtries will be pro- 
ducing quantities of plutonium which could 
be used by them for nuclear weapons. 

As has been noted by Dr. Eklimd, by 1980 the 
world will be producing plutonium at a rate of 
several hundred kilograms a day — enough to 
produce thousands of bombs per year. 

The original drafters of the statute of the 
IAEA had the wisdom and foresight to couple 
two objectives: The first was to promote and 
enlarge the peaceful uses of atomic energy ; the 
second was to assure that the nuclear materials 
mider its safeguards system are used only for 
peaceful purposes. One of the greatest achieve- 
ments of the Agency has been its progress in 
developing the means to fulfill this mandate. 

During the past year, the Agency's program 
for the development of safegTiards has con- 
tinued to shift from theoretical studies to the 
development of practical equipment and 

Tlie Agency has also extended its system by 
development of practical procedures for the ap- 
plication of safeguards to chemical reprocessing 
plants. The first inspection of a chemical reproc- 
essing plant was carried out during Augi;st and 
September of this year at the Nuclear Fuel 
Services plant near Buffalo, New York. The in- 
spection demonstrated that the procedures de- 
veloped are fully satisfactory and that the 
Agency can safeguard fuel reprocessing 
facilities effectively. 

We note with satisfaction that the Board of 
the IAEA approved last September our re- 
quest to apply Agency safeguards to bilateral 
transfer agreements between the United States 
and Colombia, Korea, and Venezuela. There are 
now 29 countries which have nuclear facilities 
under Agency safeguards. As the Agency's I'e- 
port indicates, all existing peaceful nuclear 
facilities in Agency member states in Latin 
America, the Far East, Southeast Asia, and 
the Pacific are or will soon come under Agency 

For its part the United States strongly 
favors the application of international safe- 
guards to all nuclear activities dedicated to 
peaceful purposes. This would be a meaningful 
contribution to the security of the world and to 
the continued development of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes. 

As a country with nuclear projects imder 

IAEA safeguards, the United States can testify 
that these safeguards are fairly and competently 
administered, with no interference with the nor- 
mal operation of the facility, and that the safe- 
guards do not involve undue bm-dens or risks 
to the host country. 

In a speech last Saturday, on the 25th an- 
niversaiy of the first atomic reaction, Presi- 
dent Jolmson spoke of the promise of the atom 
and of the importance that the United States 
places on the successful conclusion of an effec- 
tive nonproliferation treaty for nuclear 
weapons. On that occasion President Johnson 
said : ^ 

We are trying so hard to assure that the peaceful 
benefits of the atom will be shared by all mankind— 
without increasing, at the same time, the threat of 
nuclear destruction. 

We do not believe that the safeguards we propose 
in that treaty will interfere with the peaceful ac- 
tivities of any country. 

And I want to make it clear, very clear, to all the 
world that we in the United States are not asking any 
country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to 
accept ourselves. 

My own country's experience with the IAEA 
safeguards has involved both our own nuclear 
facilities and our bilateral programs for the j 
supply of nuclear fuel to other countries for j 
peaceful purposes. The most tangible evidence j 
of our satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards 
have not hindered our peaceful nuclear pro- 
grams is indicated by President Jolmson's an- 
nouncement last week. The President announced 
that the United States will permit the IAEA to 
apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in 
the United States, excluding only those with 
direct national security significance, when safe- 
guards are applied under an effective nonpro- 
liferation treaty. 

The plants opened to IAEA inspection and 
safeg-uards under this offer will cover a broad 
range of United States nuclear activities, both i 
governmental and private, including the fuel in ' 
nuclear-power reactors owned by utilities for 
generating electricity, and the fabrication and 
chemical reprocessing of such fuel. The facili- 
ties opened to inspection will include many 
which are among the most advanced and com- 
plex of their kind in the world. 

Mr. President, there is no greater challenge 
faced by our generation than the challenge to 

' BULLETIN of Dec. 25, 1967, p. 862. 



devote the power of the atom to the benefit of 
man and not to his destrnction. The Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, through its sys- 
tem of safeguards, has developed valuable 
means to help insure that the atom will indeed 
be a blessing and not a curse — and that the new 
plants which are now being designed and built 
for the peaceful use of the atom will not be 
diverted from the purposes of peace for which 
they are intended. 

I reaffirm here today the determination of the 
United States that the power of the atom will 
be dedicated not to death but to life. 

And — as President Johnson has said — we in- 
vite the world's nations to join with us. 

Southern Yemen Admitted 
to United Nations 

, Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

\ UjS. Representative in the Security Council ^ 

ilr. President, in turning to the item on the 
agenda, my Govermnent cordially welcomes the 
application of the People's Republic of South- 
em Yemen to become a member of the United 

We are particularly pleased that the distin- 
guished Foreign Minister of Southern Yemen 
[Saif al-Dhalai] is with us in this Council 
chamber as we perform our very important duty 
of passing to the Assembly the credentials of a 
new nation. I have had the pleasure of meeting 
and talking with the distinguished Foreign 
Minister: and I should like to say to him here 
publicly in the Council what I have said to him 
privately : In our capacity as the host govern- 
ment to the United Nations, we extend to you, 
Mr. Foreign Minister, the hand of friendship ; 
and we of the United States are anxious to do 
everything in our power to make your sojourn 
in New York and that of your countrymen as 
comfortable and enjoyable as possible. 

Mr. President, in its application the Govern- 
ment of Southern Yemen has declared its inten- 
tion to accept the obligations of membership 
contained in the United Nations Charter. My 
Government, believing that Southern Yemen is 
both willing and able to carry out these obliga- 

'Made in the Security Cotmcil on Dec. 12 (TJ.S./TJ.N. 
press release 235). 

tions, will be happy to vote in favor of the 
draft resolution which has been tabled. 

Like so many of the present members of the 
United Nations, now probably a majority, 
Southern Yemen has achieved independence in 
the course of the worldwide independence move- 
ment which is one of the great and hopeful 
political phenomena of our age. The birth of 
this new nation, like the birth of all new nations, 
has not been easy. The fact that it has now been 
fully accomplished is a credit to all concerned — 
to the people and leaders of the new state, who 
have shown their courage and their determina- 
tion to be free ; to the United Nations, which has 
concerned itself with the problems of this new 
state ; and also to the United Kingdom, whose 
statesmanship has contributed much to this 
historic development. 

Like every independent state. Southern 
Yemen will face many pi'oblems in the years 
ahead. But it has a most substantial asset, 
among others, which it brings and will bring to 
the solution of these problems. Now, that most 
substantial asset is the people of the country. No 
asset can be greater than this. Its people, be- 
cause of their location on a historic crossroads 
of international commerce and travel, have long 
been a part of the wide community of nations, in 
touch with the cultures and civilizations of Asia, 
Africa, and Europe. And they include able and 
experienced people in the civil service, in the 
educational system, in the military and police 
services, in the labor unions, and in the business 
community. And this is a very substantial asset 
indeed for any new country or old coimtry. And 
these people have already made clear their com- 
mitment to popular self-government, as indi- 
cated in the stated intention of the new govern- 
ment of Southern Yemen to draw up a new 
constitution based on this great principle. 

The United States has longstanding ties with 
the people of Southern Yemen, having had offi- 
cial representation in the area for over 80 years. 
And my Government now looks forward to 
developing friendly and mutually beneficial 
relations with the sovereign People's Republic 
of Southern Yemen. And we wish its people and 
its Government godspeed in their new 

'The Council on Dee. 12 unanimously recommended 
that the People's Republic of Southern Yemen be ad- 
mitted to the United Nations, and on Dec. 14 the 
General Assembly adopted that recommendation by 

JAXUAEY 8. 1968 



Income Tax Conventions 
Enter Into Force 


Press release 300 dated December 20 

On December 20 the American Ambassador 
at Ottawa and the Canadian Secretary of State 
for External Affairs exchanged mstraments of 
ratification with respect to the supplementary 
convention between the United States and Can- 
ada,, sifrned at Washino;ton on October 25, 1966, 
modifying and supplementing the convention 
of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion m 
the case of income taxes, as modified by supple^ 
mentary conventions of June 12, 1950, and 
August 8, 1956.^ 

The supplementary convention of October 25, 
1966, was brought into force by the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 

Paragraph 1 of article XI of the 1942 con- 
vention'^as modified by the 1950 and 1956 con- 
ventions provided : 

1 The rate of income tax imposed by one of the con- 
tracUng States, in respect of income (other than earned 
income) derived from sources therein, upon individ- 
uals residing in, or coriwrations organized under the 
laws of, the other contracting States, and not having 
a permanent establishment in the former State, shall 
not exceed 15 percent for each taxable year. 

The supplementary convention of October 25, 
1966, modifies paragraph 1 by adding paragraph 
6 as follows : 

6. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply in re- 
spect of income derived from sources in one of the Con- 
tracting States and paid to a corporation organized 
under the laws of the other Contracting State if such 
corporation is not subjec't to tax by the last-mentioned 
Contracting State on that income because it is not a 
resident of the last-mentioned Contracting State for 
purposes of its income tax. 

^ 56 Stat. 1399 and Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2347. 3916. 


Press release 301 dated December 21 

On December 19 the American Ambassador 
at Port of Spain and the Permanent Secretary 
of the Ministry of External Affairs of Trini- 
dad and Tobago exchanged mstruments of rati- 
fication with respect to the convention between 
the United States and Trinidad and Tobago, 
signed at Port, of Spain on December 22, 1966, 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income and the encouragement of interna- 
tional trade and investment. 

The convention was brought into force by the 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 

Limited in scope, the convention is designed 
primarily as an interim measure, pending the 
negotiation of a more comprehensive convention, 
to pennit corporations of one of the coimtries to 
receive dividends from their subsidiary corpora- 
tions operating in the other coimtry at a reduced 
rate of withholding tax. (A subsidiai7 for this 
purpose is a corporation at least 10 percent of 
the outstanding shares of voting stock of which 
is o\vned by the recipient corporation.) Under 
existing internal law of each coimtry, dividends 
paid by a corporation of one country to a resi- 
dent of the other country are subject to a 30- 
percent withholding tax. Subject to prescribed 
conditions, the convention will have the effect 
of reducing this withholding rate to 5 percent 
with respect to such dividends. 

In addition to its corporation tax which is 
imposed at a rate of 44 percent, Trinidad and 
Tobago imposes, under its Finance Act of 1966, 
a tax of 30 percent on profits (after payment of 
the corporation tax) derived in Trinidad and 
Tobago by a permanent establishment of a for- 
eign corporation unless such profits are invested 
within Trinidad and Tobago. Subject to pre- 
scribed conditions, the convention will have the 
effect of reducing the rate of this "branch prof- 
its" tax to 5 percent in the case of a permanent 
establishment of a United States corporation. 

In general, therefore, the convention pre- 
scribes a 5-percent rate limitation on the tax 
that can be imposed by the source country on 
dividends derived from sources within that 
country to certain corporations of the other 
country. It prescribes a 25-percent rate limita- 
tion on the tax that can be imposed by the source 
country on dividends derived from sources 



within that countiy to other corporations and 
individual residents of the other countiy. 

In article 5(3) of the convention it is provided 
in effect that the convention shall tenuinate on 
December 31, 1967, unl&ss the two contractmg 
states, on or before that date, agree by notes 
exchanged through diplomatic channels to con- 
tinue the convention in effect for the following 
year. Immediately following the above-men- 
tioned exchange of instruments of ratification, 
the American Ambassador and the Minister of 
External Affaii-s of Trinidad and Tobago ex- 
changed notes whereby the two contracting 
states agree that the convention of December 22, 
1966, shall continue to be effective during the 
year 196S. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Extend 
Fisheries Agreements 

The Department of State announced on De- 
cember 19 (press release 298) that the United 
States and the Soviet Union on December 18 
concluded an agreement extending for 1 year 
the pro-visions of two fishery agreements be- 
tween the two countries in the northeastern 
Pacific Ocean. Delegations of the two countries 
liad reviewed the operation of the agreements 
in talks in Washington, D.C., beginning Decem- 
ber 7. 

The first of these agreements, signed Decem- 
l)er 14, 1964,^ established certain areas near Ko- 
diak Island, Alaska, in which fishing with 
mobile gear would not take place during certain 
months of the year in order to reduce incidents 
of damage to fixed fishing gear. The second 
1 agreement, signed in February of this year,^ 
established a number of areas of the high seas 
off "Washington and Oregon in which Soviet 
fishing does not take place in order to permit 
laccess of U.S. vessels to certain key fishing 
grounds for ocean perch. It also established 
areas of substantial total size within the U.S. 
(Contiguous fishery zone, particularly near the 
Aleutian Islands, in which Soviet vessels are 
permitted to fish and/or conduct cargo transfer 

In considering the agi-eements each side felt 
that some modifications were desirable. The 
U.S. delegation wanted some expansion of and 

additions to the high seas areas in which Soviet 
fishing does not take place off Oregon and 
Washington, since certain areas important to 
the U.S. trawl fisheries are not covered. The 
U.S. side also desired, in view of the growing 
king crab fisheries in Alaska in areas other than 
Kodiak, to add to the agreement some seasonal 
protective measures to minimize gear conflicts 
in these areas. Also, in view of developments 
in the Kodiak crab fishery, the United States 
wished to obtain further protection through 
both some expansion of the areas closed and 
extension of the period of closure. 

On the other hand, the Soviet delegation 
took the position that tlie concessions the 
U.S.S.R. had made had been inadequately com- 
jiensated. They therefore wanted certain ad- 
ditional areas within the U.S. contiguous fish- 
eiT zone in which they could fish and/or con- 
duct cargo loading operations. 

During the discussions the various viewpoints 
were explored at some lengtli but inconclusively. 
Consequently, it was decided that the agree- 
ments should be continued unchanged for an- 
other year. It was understood that since the 
king crab quota agreement in the Eastern Ber- 
ing Sea would be coming up at the same time, 
all three of these agreements would necessarily 
be considered together. 

The new agreement was signed for the United 
States by Donald L. McKernan, Special As- 
sistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secre- 
tary of State, and for the Soviet Union by 
M. N. Sukhonichenko, Deputy Minister of Fish- 
eries of the U.S.S.R.^ 

Current Actions 



Customs convention on containers, with annexes and 
protocol of signature. Done at Geneva May 18, IO.'jG. 
Entered into force August 4. 10.59.' 
Accessions deposited: Israel, November 14, 1967 ; 

Romania (with declarations and statements), 

November 1, 1967. 

'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5703. 
= TIAS 621S. 

'For names of members of the U.S. delegation, see 
Dep.artment press release 298. 
*Not in force for the United States. 

rAJTCTART 8, 1968 


Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
1964 ^ 
Accession deposited: Spain, November 21, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of exe- 
cution. Done at Vienna July 10. 1964. Entered into 
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Liechtenstein, October 5, 
1967 ; San Marino, October 11, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig- 
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow January 
27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Morocco, December 22, 1967. 


Protocol for the further prolongation of the Interna- 
tional Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). Done 
at London November 14, l!;t66. Open for signature at 
London November 14 to December 30, 1966, inclusive. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967.^ 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: December 
6, 1967. 

Trade, Transit 

Convention on transit trade of landlocked states. Done 
at New Tork July 8, 1965. Entered into force June 9, 

Ratification deposited: Hungary (with a reservation 
and a declaration), September 20, 1967. 

Ratifications exchanged: December 20, 1967. 
Entered into force: December 20, 1967. 


Convention and supplementary protocol relating to the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, signed 
by the United States and the United Kingdom at 
Washington April 16, 1945 (TIAS 1546), modified by 
supplementary protocols of May 25, 1954, and August 
19, 1957 (TIAS 3165, 4124), and extended to Cyprus. 
Entered into force for Cyprus July 28, 19.59. 
Termination: As respects U.S. tax, for the taxable 
years beginning on or after January 1, 1968 ; as 
respects Cyprus income tax, for any year of assess- 
ment beginning on or after January 1, 1968. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income and the encouragement of international trade 
and investment. Signed at Port of Spain December 
22, 1966. 

Ratifications exchanged: December 19, 1967. 
Entered into force: December 19, 1967. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending the agreement of February 13, 
1967, on certain fishery problems in the northeastern 
part of the Pacific Ocean ofC the coast of the United 
States (TIAS 6218). Signed at Washington Decem- 
ber 18, 1967. Entered into force December 18, 1967. 

Agreement extending the agreement of December 14, 
1964, relating to fishing operations in the north- 
eastern Pacific Ocean (TIAS 5703). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington December 18, 1967. 
Entered into force December 18, 1967. 



Supplementary convention further modifying and sup- 
plementing the convention and accompanying proto- 
col of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the prevention of fl.scal evasion in the 
case of income taxes, as modified by supplementary 
conventions of June 12, 1950, and August 8, 1956 (56 
Stat. 1399, TIAS 2347, and 3916) . Signed at Washing- 
ton October 25, 1966. 


' Not in force for the United States. 


The Senate on December 15 confirmed the nomina- 
tion of Charles E. Bohlen to be a Deputy Under Secre- 
tary of State. 



INDEX January 8, 1968 Vol. LVIII, No. U89 

Atomic Energy. United States Reviews Prob- 
lems of Control of Peiicoful Uses of Atomic- 
Energy (Sisco) 63 

Canada. Income Tax Conventions Enter Into 

Force (Canada, Trinidad and Tobago) ... (iC 

China. "A Conversation With the President" 

(excerpts from television interview) ... 33 


Confirmations (Bohlen) 68 

Department Seeks Criminal Penalties on Travel 
lo Restricted Areas (text of letter and pro- 
posed bill) 53 

President Asks Senate Approval of U.S. Mem- 
bership in BIE 52 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1966 

(Johnson) 59 

Department and Foreign Service. Bohlen con- 
firmed as Deputy Under Secretary .... 68 

Economic Affairs 

Income Tax Conventions Enter Into Force (Can- 
ada, Trinidad and Tobago) 66 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Extend Fisheries Agree- 
ments 67 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Foreign Area Research Guidelines Adopted 

(text) 55 

President Asks Senate Approval of U.S. Mem- 
bership in BIE 52 

Europe. "A Conversation With the President" 
(excerpts from television interview) ... 33 

France. "A Conversation With the President" 
(excerpts from television interview) ... 33 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences . . 61 

Israel. "A Conversation With the President" 

(excerpts from television interview) ... 33 

Near East 

"A Conversation With the President" (excerpts 

from television interview.) 33 

The Middle East Crisis and Beyond (Rostow) . 41 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

"A Conversation With the President" (excerpts 
from television interview) 33 

North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg 
(final communique and annex) 49 

Passports. Department Seeks Criminal Penal- 
ties on Travel to Restricted Areas (text of 
letter and proposed bill) 53 

Presidential Documents 

.\iiierica Will Stand Firm in Viet-Nam ... 35 

"A Conversation With the President" (excerpts 
from television interview) 33 

President Asks Senate Approval of U.S. Mem- 
bership in BIE 52 

L'.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1966 . . .j9 

Southern Yemen. Southern Yemen Admitted to 
United Nations (Goldberg) 65 

Treaty Information 

Jnrrent Actions 67 

income Tax Conventions Enter Into Force (Can- 
ada. Trinidad and Tobago) 66 

'resident Asks Senate Approval of U.S. Mem- 
bership in BIE 52 

■.S. and U.S.S.R. Extend Fisheries Agree- 
ments 67 

Trinidad and Tobago. Income Tax Conventions 
Enter Into Force (Canada, Trinidad and 
Tobago) 66 


•'A Conversation With the President" (excerpts 
from television interview) 33 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Extend Fisheries Agree- 
ments 67 

United Nations 

The Middle East Crisis and Beyond (Rostow) . 41 
Southern Yemen Admitted lo United Nations 

(Goldberg) 65 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1966 

(Johnson) 59 

United States Reviews Problems of Control of 

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Sisco) . . 63 


America Will Stand Firm in Viet-Nam (John- 
son) 35 

"A Conversation With the President" (excerpts 
from television interview) 33 

Name Index 

Bohlen, Charles E 68 

Goldberg, Arthur J 65 

Johnson, President 33, 35, 52, 59 

Rostow, Eugene V 41 

Sisco, Joseph J 63 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to December 18. which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 289 
of December 10, 291 of December 11, and 295 of 
December 15. 

No. Date Subject 

*296 12/18 Martin appointed Special Assistant 
for Refugee and Migration Af- 
fairs to the Secretary of State 
(biographic details). 
297 12/19 Foreign Area Research Guidelines. 

297 12/19 List of agencies participating in 
(Annex) Foreign Area Research Coordi- 
nation Group. 

298 12/19 U.S. and U.S.S.R. extend fisheries 

agreement (rewrite). 
t299 12/20 Termination of U.S.-Cyprus in- 
come tax convention. 

300 12/20 Entry into force of supplementary 

income tax convention with 

301 12/21 Entry into force of income tax 

convention with Trinidad and 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 









Vol. LVIII, No. im 

January 15, 1968 




U.S. /Statements and Texts of Resolution and Agreement 80 

Statement by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 92 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVIII No. 1490 
January 15, 1968 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 Issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various pluises of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

President Johnson Visits Australia, Thailand, South Viet-Nam, 
Pakistan, and Italy in 4y2-Day Round-the-World Journey 

President Johnson left Washington on December 19 to attend 
memorial services for the late Australian Prime Minister Uarold 
Holt at Melbourne, Australia. After stopovers at Honolulu and Pago 
Pago, the President arrived at Canberra, Australia, on December £1, 
lohere he was met by Prime Minister John McEwen and where later 
that day he met with the Australian ministers, with President Pah 
Chung Hee of Korea, and with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South 
Viet-Nam. President Johnson was in Melbourne for the memorial 
services on December 22. On December 23 the President made four 
stops: at Khorat, Thailand, and Cam Ranh Bay, South Viet-Nam, 
where he talked with U.S. servicemsn; at Karachi, Pakistan, where 
he met with President Mohaimned Ayub Khan; and at Rome, where 
he met with President Giuseppe Saragat and other Italian Govern- 
ment officials, and with His Holiness Pope Paul VI. President 
Johnson returned to Washington on December 24- Following in 
chronological order is the documentation of the Presidents trip. 


Arrival Remarks, Honolulu International 

Airport, Hawaii, December 19 

White Honse press release (Honoluln, Hawaii) dated Decem- 
ber 19 

I am glad you have come out here in this 
inclement weather to greet us on our way down 

Geographically, you are the closest American 
State to Australia. You understand, as Aus- 
tralians imderstand, the web of ties that makes 
the Pacific nations one family. 

You knew, before most of your fellow 
countrymen knew, that the Pacific is an avenue, 
not a barrier. 

Long ago you knew how important it was 
to have brave friends in the Pacific, friends who 
would share the burdens and the opportunities 
of freedom. 

America had such friends in Australia in 

1941 when the clouds of war rose over Pearl 
Harbor. We have such friends in Australia 
now when a new threat to peace looms over all 
of Asia. 

Tragically, one of our best Australian friends 
has fallen. A leader in the prime of his life has 
been taken from his countrymen and from us, 
his friends and partners. Harold Holt was a 
statesman who believed that Australia's destiny 
was bound up with that of her neighbors in the 

In the tradition of his great predecessor. Sir 
Robert Menzies, Harold Holt called on his 
people to meet the responsibilities that freedom 
always brings. He asked them to join with the 
people of South Viet-Nam, with the people of 
the United States, and with five other nations 
to turn back the new aggressor in Asia. His 
people responded as Australians always have 
responded in the hour of need. Their men are 
with us in battle at this hour, standing shoulder 
to shoulder and side by side with ours. 

JANtJAKY 15, 1968 

Harold Holt's vision of Asia — and of Aus- 
tralia's role there — was not limited to the bat- 
tlefield. The end he sought was not military 
conquest. It was the building of a new Asia, 
where nations with a common interest in peace 
might help one another build the foundations 
of peace: better lives for their people. 

We mourn the loss of this good man, this 
brother in arms, this friend in the works of 
peace. "What he was cannot be replaced, though 
what he built will always endure. 

I am going many thousands of miles to join 
his countrymen, and leaders from all over Asia 
and the Commonwealth, to pay tribute to 
Harold Holt. I carry with me the affection and 
admiration of the American people for the 
people of Australia. And I know that I carry 
your deep regret that your fellow citizen of the 
Pacific has been taken from us at a critical 
hour when the work he shared with us is begin- 
ning to bear fruit. 

Arrival Remarks, International Airport, 
Pago Pago, American Samoa, December 20 

White House press release (Pago Pago, American Samoa) 
dated December 20 

We have enjoyed very much your entertain- 
ment this evening. We thank all of you for com- 
ing here and giving us this very warm greeting. 

We ijrize very highly the friends that we 
have here. We recall very vividly when Mrs. 
Jolmson and I dedicated the school you had 
been generous enough to name in her honor. 

I remember many months ago first hearing 
of the great success you had made with your 
educational TV and how it excited the interest 
of many of our people in our counti-y and in 
the Congress. I am glad to tell you now that 
we are trying to follow in your footsteps. Very 
shortly we will set up a public TV of our own. 

"Wliat you are doing here in the way of 
schools and education is something we are very 
proud of, as we are proud of the new hospital 
that you will shortly be dedicating. 

Governor [Owen S.] Aspinall referred to the 
contribution that your men are making in our 
armed services. We salute them, and we thank 

Our concern always will be with your 
health, with your education, and with your 

We want each of you to know that we do 
care, that we are happy that you are makmg 
progress. We trust that the good Lord will give 
us the strength and the leadership to permit 
us to continue to move ahead. 

Thank you so much for your wonderful en- 
tertainment. I have enjoyed it. I appreciate 
your interest in coming here at this late hour. 
I thank you all very much. 


Exchange of Arrival Remarks, Fairbairn RAAF 
Base, Canberra, December 21 

White House press release (Canberra, Australia) dated De- 
cember 31 

Prime Minister John McEwen 

It is with great sadness in all our hearts that 
you come to Australia. But it is for me, sir, 
speaking for my government and for the Aus- 
tralian people, to say what a tremendous trib- 
ute you pay to our colleague Harold Holt, your 
friend Harold Holt, your associate Harold Holt, 
in making this tremendous journey across the 
world to come to Australia to pay your tribute 
to Harold Holt. 

For this, sir, I thank you for myself, for my 
government, and for every Australian. 

President Johnson 

It is most gracious of all of you to meet us 
at this hour, and I thank you veiy much. 

I come in sadness on a sorrowful mission — to 
pay my personal respects to a man who was my 
cherislied friend and who led a nation which is 
the trusted friend of the United States. 

I bring with me to all the people of Australia 
the sympathy of my countrymen, who wish you 
to know that your loss is not a loss you bear 

The gathering together, here in Australia, of 
leaders from north and east and west tells much 
of the kind of man Harold Holt was, of the kind 
of leadershijo he brought so freshly and so force- 
fully to the community of free nations, and to 
the kind of world he was helping to shape. 

He was steady. He was courageous. In deed, 
as in word, he embodied the resoluteness of the 
people he led. He was there when he said he 



would be there. He did not move across the stage 
of world atl'airs seeking a way out or a way back 
from difficult and demanding duty. Harold Holt 
moved among us seeking to find and to open the 
way ahead toward a saner and safer world. 

AVhile his days were cruelly short, his vision 
was long. He saw that we had to begm, we had to 
begin now, to build a new community in Asia 
and in all the Pacific- — a community of nations 
dedicated together to the works of security, the 
works of progress, and the fulfillment of all 
their peoples. 

A sense of that community already is coming 
into being among us. In the years and genera- 
tions ahead, that community will grow and 
flourish as common purpose and common en- 
deavor become the common cause of the Pacific's 
peoples. Other men, other leaders, will carry 
that cause forward in this and all the other 
lands that rim this great ocean. But history is 
going to reserve a very honored place in its 
memory for the name and the role of Harold 
Holt. At a critical time, it was he who saw the 
vision, assumed the leadership, and imbued us 
all with a new spirit and a fuller faith. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you have lost a leader. 
My country and I have lost a friend. The world 
has lost a very great man, but we have not lost 
and we shall not lose his vision and his 

This morning, the hearts of my people in 

America go especially to Mrs. Holt and to the 

members of the family in their hours of sorrow. 

I! We wanted very much to be with you during 

this trial. 

President Johnson's Meetings With Leaders 
of Other Governments, Canberra, December 21 

U.S.- Australian Joint Annmmcement 

White House press release (Canberra, Australia) dated De- 
cember 21 

Tlie President and the Prime Minister took 
the opportunity this morning, both in the Prime 
Minister's office and m a wider meeting in the 
Cabinet room, to exchange views on a range of 
current matters. As was made clear in advance, 
the meeting took the foi-m of conversations 
about these matters rather than a formal 

President Johnson Mourns Death 
of Prime Minister Holt of Australia 

statement by the President 

White House press release Oated December 18 

The American people are proud of the friend- 
ship that they enjoyed with Prime Minister 
Harold Holt. We moum him with all the grief 
that Australians feel. 

It is a cruel tragedy that he has been taken 
from us by this terrible accident. For so many 
of his days were devoted to guarding a nation 
and a world against hazards. His dream was to 
bring order and de.sign to man's brightest hopes. 
He fought with rare courage, great tenacity, 
and always enlightened vision to assure that 
men would live safe from peril in the promise of 

My personal loss is heavy. Harold Holt was 
generous with the gift of a warm and a wise 
heart. I found comfort in his friendship and 
strength in his partnership. He and the i)eople 
for whom he spoke were always dependable and 
always unshakable. Those blessings of his ex- 
ample cannot be removed. They are as eternal 
as the sea that has taken this good and gallant 
champion away. 

Mrs. Johnson and I — and all the American 
people — moum his death. 

Those present in the Cabinet room included 
the United States Ambassador (Mr. [Edward 
A.] Clark), Mr. William Bundy and Mr. Walt 
Rostow, and on the Australian side the Treas- 
urer (Mr. [William] McMahon), the Minister 
for External Affairs (Mr. [Paul] Hasluck), the 
Minister for Defense (Mr. [Allen] Fairhall) 
and the Leader of the Government in the Sen- 
ate (Senator [Jolm Grey] Gorton). 

The principal topic touched on by the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister and his colleagues 
was Vietnam. Tlie President presented for the 
information of the Australian Ministers an ac- 
count of the present military situation and polit- 
ical and economic development programme in 
Vietnam. The Prime Minister assured the Presi- 
dent, as he had yesterday assured the Austra- 
lian people, that there will be no change in 
Australia's commitment to stay steadfast with 
the Republic of Vietnam and the United States 
and with other Allies in Vietnam until a just 
peace is won. 

JANtTART 15, 1968 


V.S.-Korea Joint Statement 

White House press release (Canberra. AustraUa) dated 
December 21 

President Pak Chung Hee of the Republic of 
Korea and President Lyndon B. Johnson of the 
U S A. met for informal private discussions at 
lunch today. Members of their governments and 

staffs were present. j c„u„ 

President Pak described the agent and sabo- 
tage activities being conducted against his coun- 
try by the regime in North Korea and the 
iSasures being taken to ensure that this threat 
continued to be dealt with effectively. 

President Pak also conveyed the thanksot 
his government for U.S. emergency food assist- 
ance to meet the drought crisis of recent months 
in Korea, and for the continuing economic de- 
velopment assistance being provided. He de- 
scribed the economic gains that the Republic of 
Korea continued to make at high growth rates 
The two Presidents exchanged views on all 
aspects of the Vietnam situation, reaffirming 
their respective policies of strong and unswerv- 
in<r support for the independence of South Viet- 
nam and the freedom of its people to determme 
their futui-e without external interference. 

U.S.-South Viet-Nam Joint Statement 

White Honse press release (Canberra. Australia) dated 
December 21 

President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic 
of Vietnam and President Lyndon B. Johnson 
of the United States held an informal working 
dinner this evening, both being present m Can- 
berra for the memorial service for the late Prime 
Minister Harold Holt. 

There was a full exchange of views on all as- 
pects of South Vietnam's struggle to defend its 
freedom from external force. _ 

The military situation was reviewed and 
found to show good progress. 

Progress was also noted in the work of pacib- 
cation and of economic reconstruction with the 
intention that this could be speeded up m the 
coming months. 

President Johnson congratulated President 
Thieu on the completion of a constitution, the 
holding of successful national elections, and the 
installation of a constitutional government. 

It was recognized that many problems re- 
mained to be overcome and President Thieu out- 
Imed the plans of his government to deal with 

these problems along the lines of his maugural | 
speech and the later program presented to the I 
people of South Vietnam by Prime Mmister 
[Nguyen Van] Loc. . , . .• 

Both Presidents agreed that their objective 
remained an honorable and secure peace in ac- j 
cordance with the basic statement of the South [ 
Vietnamese position contained in the Manila , 
commvmique of October 1966 ^ and supported | 
by the other participants. They regretted that | 
there was no sign that North Vietnam was pre- \ 
pared to take any of the many avenues to peace j 
that had been opened. They agreed that in these i 
circumstances there was no alternative to con- 
tinuing appropriate military actions. _ j 
President Thieu once again explained his gov- | 
ernment's policy of reconciliation enunciateci at i 
Honolulu in February 1966.== In the light of elec- 
tions which subsequently have taken place, he 
noted that the Government of Vietnam is now ; 
prepared to grant fuU rights of citizenship to | 
those now fighting against the government who j 
are prepared to accept constitutional processes > 
and to live at peace under the constitutionally 
elected government. i 

President Thieu likewise reaffirmed a willing- 
ness to discuss relevant matters with any m- I 
dividuals now associated with the so-called I 
National Liberation Front while making clear , 
that his government could not regard the Front I 
as an independent organization in any sense. 
He noted that it was not useful to attempt 
constructive discussions with any elements , 
in South Vietnam committed to violent 
methods to obtain their political ends. Not- 
ino- press comment on President Johnsons 
fiv^'e points as stated in his television broadcast 
of December 20,^ President Thieu affirmed that 
they were fully consistent with a policy on 
which the Government of Vietnam and the Gov- 
ernment of the United States have long a^eed. 
President Johnson stated the intent of the 
United States to continue its support for this 
policy of national reconciliation. _ . 

Both Presidents agreed that the basic prmci- 
ple involved was the right of the South Viet- 
namese people to determine their own future 
throu<^h democratic and constitutional processes 
noted'in the principle of one man-one vote. 

' BuixETiN of No V. 14, 1966, p. 730. 

•For background, see iUA., Feb. 26, 1966, p. 302. 

' lUd., Jan. 8, 1968, p. 33. 



They further agreed that the removal of ex- 
t«mal interference and the acceptance of this 
principle by all citizens of South Vietnam were 
fundamental elements in an enduring and hon- 
orable peace in South Vietnam. They agreed 
that these elements were totally consistent with 
the spirit and essential terms of the Geneva 
Agreements of 1954 and the Geneva Agi'eements 
of 1962 respecting Laos. 


Remarks to U.S. Combat Pilots, Royal Thai Air 
Force Base, Khorat, December 23 

White House press release (Khorat, Thailand) dated Decem- 
ber 23 

Gentlemen, I apologize for coming so early. 
I am deeply moved by your welcome, and I 
thank you very much. 

On yesterday, it was my sad duty to cross the 
Pacific to the capital of a great and faithful 
ally to pay my last respects to a man who was 
my friend and your friend, too — the late Prime 
Minister of Australia Harold Holt. As I said 
to his countrymen, Harold Holt was courageous 
and he was steadfast, he was there when he said 
he would be there — and that is the kind of leader 
the cause of freedom requires. 

On tomorrow, I will return to Washington, 
but I could not come so near without coming on 
here to be witli all of you, even for a very short 
time. I know that, at this season of the year espe- 
cially, I bring with me the love of your families 
and the affection of your friends, who are think- 
ing of you, who are all praying for your safe- 
keeping every waking hour. I bring with me, 
also, the gratitude of the Nation you serve so 
honorably, so loyally, and so well. 

But I come to this American Air Force 
Base — on the soil of a gallant and independent 
nation — to express to each of you the respect, 
the admiration, and the abiding affection held 
for you by your Commander in Chief. Our na- 
tion has never been more ably or honorably 
served than by all the men who are serving 

I especially want to tell you of the very great 
importance of what all of you are doing to 
shorten the war. 

In the history of air power no such difficult 

set of tasks has ever been assigned as those as- 
signed to you and those assigned to your com- 
rades in the Army, the Navy, and the Marines. 
Guerrilla combat provides no easy targets. That 
is why aggressors, here as elsewhere, have been 
tempted to choose guerrilla tactics as the means 
of their aggression. Yet here, for the first time, 
airpower is actually depriving the aggressor of 
his advantage. 

Through the use of airpower, a mere hand- 
ful of you men — as military forces are really 
reckoned — are pinning down several hundred 
thousand — more than half a million — North 
Vietnamese. You are increasing the cost of in- 
filtration. You are imposing a very high rate of 
attrition when the enemy is engaged, and you 
are giving him no rest when he withdraws. Air- 
power is providing the mobility which meets 
and matches the stealth of an enemy whose tac- 
tics are based on sudden hit-and-run attacks. 

Woi'king with the Vietnamese and our other 
fighting allies, we are defeating this aggression. 
We are doing it with a proportion of forces at 
least half that usually required to cope with a 
guerrilla enemy of such size. The use we are 
making of airpower in all its forms is a major 
reason the plans of the enemy are now doomed 
to complete failure. 

It is a factor of utmost importance to the fu- 
ture of the peace of Asia — and for that matter, 
the peace of the world — that aggressors never 
again will be able to assume that aggression 
through brutal and sadistic "wars of national 
liberation" will ever be either economic or suc- 

Airpower is denying aggression access to 
cheap success or to ultimate victory. 

Whether men fly B-52"s, light spotter planes, 
fighter bombers, helicopters, sea-and-air rescue, 
the tankers, or the reconnaissance — whether 
they serve in the cockpit or on the ground, in 
communications or in supply — whether in the 
Air Force, the Army, the Navy, or the 
Marines — your Commander in Chief salutes 
you, each of you, one and all. You are manifest- 
ing a courage and skill, a discipline and a re- 
straint, an imagination and a patriotism which 
adds to our admiration and our esteem every 
day. I know, as I am sure you know, that your 
missions are bringing closer every week the 
time of peace for which we and all of your 
coimtrymen pray each day. 

JANUARY 15, 1968 


I am glad I can be with you early this morn- 
ing, as I am with you every single day of every 
month in spirit. 

I cannot promise — and you above all others 
know that no man rightly could promise — that 
the way ahead will be easier or that our tasks 
we may soon lay down. 

To this generation of Americans, much has 
been given. Of us all much is asked. We shall 
know other great trials. We shall be faced by 
other great tasks. The life of free men is never 
again going to be a life of ease. It is not ease, 
though, that we Americans seek. It is justice 
and peace in a world where aggression is denied 
its victory and oppression is deprived of its 

Let no man in any other land misread the 
spirit of America. The spirit of America is not 
to be read on the placards or the posters. It is a 
spirit that is manifest in the steadfastness and 
the resolve of a nation that is holding firmly and 
faithfully to its course. 

No man can come here for even a short period 
and shake your hand or look you in the eye and 
l\ave the slightest bit of doubt for a moment 
that America is going to hold firm and that 
America is going to stay faithful throughout 
the course until an honorable peace is secured. 

From our course, none of us shall ever turn. 

So as I meet you and greet you and leave you 
this morning, I say on behalf of your families 
and your friends, on behalf of all the American 
people and our allies and freedom- and liberty- 
loving peoples everywhere, God bless you, God 
keep you, every one of you. 

We shall always be deeply in your debt. Thank 
you and good morning. 

Remarks to U.S. Senior Unit Commanders, 
Cam Ranh Bay, December 23 

White House press release (Cam Ranh Bay, South VIet-Nam) 
dated December 2.S 

Gentlemen, I don't want to take too much of 
your time. 

I came here this morning to tell you what 
your families and your loved ones would like 
to tell you; that is, we want you home for 
Christmas. We wish you could be there. 

We are very proud that you are doing the job 
that you are doing. We know that no military 
force is any better than the man at the top. 
Everybody in our countiy, and the world, has 
great respect and confidence in General [Wil- 

liam C] Westmoreland. He has assembled here 
this morning the men that make him what he 
is — the men who support him and the men who 
give him the substance and sustenance that per- 
mits him to do the job that he does. We are so 
very proud of you. 

The leadership you have given has been un- 
equaled. General Westmoreland tells me that 
the men who you have produced and the men 
who you lead have never been excelled. That in 
itself ought to give you great satisfaction. 

Your cause is just. Your objective is peace. 
The day is not far away when you will succeed. 
I wish I had things in as good shape at home 
as you have them here. 

All I can say is we have set our course. We are 
not going to yield. We are not going to shimmy. 
We are going to wind up with a peace with 
honor which all Americans seek. Then we will 
come home and spend a happy Christmas again 
with our loved ones. 

My wish is that you could be with us. Your 
Commander in Chief is veiy, very proud of 
you. I wish I could personally show you that 
admiration and that affection I feel for the 
gallant men who lead the best military force 
ever put on the battlefield. But please know that 
we are with you. We are for you. We will be 
there until the end. 

Thank you very much. 

Remarks to U.S. Service Personnel, 
Cam Ranh Bay, December 23 

White House press release (Cam Sanh Bay, South Vlet-Nam) 
dated December 23 

I hope that all of you will stand at ease. 

This week I traveled halfway aroimd the 
world to come to this section of the world to pay 
tribute to an old friend — the late Prime Minis- 
ter Harold Holt of Australia. 

I made that long trip for deeply personal 
reasons. Prime Minister Harold Holt was a 
close and a trusted friend. 

I made that trip also for our country — and 
for you. For it was Harold Holt who led 
Australia into the fight for freedom that is 
taking place here in South Viet-Nam. It was he 
who asked his people to live up to their re- 
sponsibilities and to meet them in Asia — ex- 
actly as you are meeting ours : with blood, with 
sweat, and with bravery. 

Last night I sat and talked until after mid- 
night with our gallant airmen in Thailand. 



TIlis is not the shortest route back to the Wliite 
IIou^:e from Australia — through Viet-Nam. But 
it is ahnost Cliristmas and because my spirit 
would be here with you anyway, I had to come 
over here this morning. 

I wish I could have brought you something 
more than just myself. 

I wisli I could have brought you some tangi- 
ble symbol of the great pride that the American 
people feel in you, back home. 

I wish I could have brought you some gift 
that would wrap up the care and the concern 
of your families and your loved ones. 

All the debate that you read about can never 
obscure that pride. The slogans, the placards, 
and the signs cannot diminish the jjower of that 

You Mill all know that personally when you 
put your feet back on America's shores — all of 
you, God willing. 

I wish I could have brought you, too, some 
sign that the struggle that you are in will soon 
be over — some indication from the other side 
that he might be willing to let this suffering 
land finally heal its wounds. 

I can bring you the assurance of what you 
have fought to achieve : The enemy cannot win, 
now, in Viet-Xam. He can harass, he can ter- 
rorize, he can inflict casualties — while taking 
far greater losses himself. But he just cannot 

I can bring you something more: news of a 
victoiy that is being won not on a battlefield 
but in the cities and the villages all over Asia. 
I was stimulated and glad to hear what dis- 
tinguished Vice President [Nguyen Cao] Ky 
told me of the progress that they are making, 
and in the days ahead what they expect as a 
result of the planning and the efforts that the 
new government is making. 

It is a victory of confidence. Because of what 
you and our gallant allies are doing, men 
throughout Asia are also beginning to feel con- 
fident that the future belongs to them — the fu- 
ture belongs to those who love peace. 

The greater that confidence, the more seciire 
this vast region of the world will become, and 
the greater will be our children's chances to live 
in peace and to live in security. 

Because of what you men are doing here to- 
day, you may very well prevent a wider war, a 
greater war, a world war III. 

You have come a long way from your homes 
to fight for a decent world. 

There must have been times when you wished 
that this cup might pass from you — that it 
might have come in some other place, at some 
other time, or to some other generation. 

But it didn't. It came here, and it is with us 

You have taken it with your chins up and 
your chests out. You have taken it with courage 
that makes all of your countrymen proud of 

This Christmas, like many Christmases that 
we have known, comes at a time of great testing 
for our nation. This time it is a test of will : 
whether we have the vision and the steady hand 
to see us through a grave challenge to our free- 
dom and our liberty. You have met that test. 
There is no doubt about it. 

The last thing that I can bring to you is the 
promise that your fellow Americans are going 
to meet that test, too. They may need your help. 
Sometimes we seem almost frail and weak com- 
pared to you sturdy, strong men who are mak- 
ing the sacrifices here. But I can tell you we 
shall not fail you. What you have done will not 
have been done in vain. 

I pray that you will be strengthened, this 
Christmas day in wartime, by the love of your 
loved ones and your people, by the great confi- 
dence that you are inspiring in other people, 
and by your own great steadfast courage. 

I know that just being here among you, walk- 
ing down your hospital corridors, riding on the 
back of your jeep — I know that gives me 
strength — and I need all I can get. For that 
strength that you have given me, I am very 
grateful to each of you. 

Now may God bless you and may God keep 
each of you. 

Each of you, when you return, will wear the 
badge of honor that the greatest Republic in 
the world can confer. 

This morning, as I went along the hospital 
beds and distributed the Purple Heart, to dozens 
who had given their limbs and their bodies in 
line of battle, as I marched down the rows with 
the Distinguished Sersnce Crosses and the Sil- 
ver Stars and passed them out to your leaders, 
I remembered so vividly what General West- 
moreland had told me when I was here the last 

He said, "Mr. President, there are here in 
Viet-Nam assembled the best armed forces that 

JAXUARY 15, 19G8 


any commander in chief ever commanded in 
all the history of the world." 

This is clearly supported by the results that 
have been achieved since the dark days of 1965. 

The distinguished Vice President this morn- 
ing reminded me, notwithstanding all the com- 
plaints we hear, just how far we had come from 
the valleys and the depths of despondency to 
the heights and the cliffs, where we know now 
that the enemy can never win. 

But the oldest and most firmly grounded 
military maxim is tliis : A military force is only 
as good as the quality of its leadership at the 

Now that I have walked among you, in the 
hospitals and out on that concrete, I am going 
to ask you to indulge me a moment while I pay 
tribute to that leadership. 

Our leaders have had to meet an enemy that 
is hardened by experience of over 20 years 
of fighting — an enemy using his knowledge of 
the terrain to strike, to move, and to strike again. 
We have come from way behind. 

All the challenges have been met. The enemy 
is not beaten, but he knows that he has met his 
master in the field. He is holding desperately — 
he is trying to buy time — hoping that our na- 
tion's will does not match his will. 

For what you and your team have done. Gen- 
eral Westmoreland, I award you today an Oak 
Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service 
Medal you have already proudly earned. 

But leadership in modern war requires a 
team, not just one man of great quality. 

The military team that your Commander in 
Chief has selected and has dispatched to Viet- 
Nam represents the best I can find in the entire 
United States. 

Now I take the greatest pride in awarding 
also to General Creighton Abrams the Distin- 
guished Service Medal. General Abrams, the 
quality of your service has rarely been equaled 
and never excelled. 

Now the Distinguished Service Medal 

— To General Bruce Palmer, who has served 
us honorably and with great efficiency; 

—To that leader in the skies, General Wil- 
liam Momyer, who paves the way and saves 
you fellows a lot of problems; 

— To Admiral Kenneth Veth ; 

—To Admiral "Bush" Bringle. 

I shall present to you later your individual 

citations; for the contribution of each of you 
has been unique as well as distinguished. 

I am very proud — as all Americans can be 
proud — of the very complete and intimate col- 
laboration. General Westmoreland and your 
team, between the military and the civil arms 
of policy here at the front. Even as the enemy 
is being met, a nation is also being built — a new, 
modern nation is emerging. Of this, we are very 
proud. For this, we are grateful. 

In the civilian team now in Viet-Nam we 
have men who fully match the quality of our 
military leaders. These men have demonstrated 
wisdom and dedication, tougliness and compas- 
sion, imagination and efficiency. 

Tlierefore, to you. Ambassador [Ellsworth] 
Bunker — for the second time in your most dis- 
tinguished career — your President awards you 
the Medal of Freedom. 

I award the Medal of Freedom to Ambassa- 
dor Eugene Locke, your loyal and energetic 
deputy, who is unavoidably not here today. 

I award the Medal of Freedom also to your 
able Ambassador Robert Komer, who has pio- 
neered a unique experiment in serving under a 
military commander to unify all our civil assets 
in the task of pacification — which is simply 
another name for nationbuilding. 

These citations will be presented to you per- 
sonally at an appropriate time. 

Now to all of this marvelous team of Ameri- 
cans, military and civilian alike, and to every 
gallant man who is out here this morning and 
to all those who are not privileged to be here — 
I want you to carry to them a message. 

Say to them: You and they have the grati- 
tude of your nation and the pride and apprecia- 
tion of your President. 

God bless each of you. 

God keep you all. 

Tliank you. 


White House press release (Karachi, Pakistan) dated Decem- 
ber 23 

On the occasion of President Johnson's re- 
fueling stop at Karachi, President Ayub joined 
him for a discussion which covered both bi- 
lateral matters and issues of common concern 
on the world scene. 



President xVyub outlined the rapid progress 
beinjr made in agricultural as well as industrial 
development in Pakistan. The two Presidents 
discussed Pakistan's additional needs of wheat 
and vegetable oils and agreed to ask a staff 
study to be made available at an early date. 

President Johnson congratulated President 
Ayub on Pakistan's continuing progress, and 
especially for the success of Pakistan in intro- 
ducing new wheat strains, expanding human 
consumption of maize, and expanding both ir- 
rigation and chemical fertilizer application. 

President Jolmson expressed gratification at 
the inauguration of the Jlangla Dam and the 
prospects for other such projects. 

The two Presidents then reviewed the world 
situation with special emphasis on the possi- 
bility of moving toward peace in Vietnam. 

President Johnson conveyed his impression 
of discussions earlier that day in Vietnam and 
earlier in Australia with several Asian leaders. 

Both Presidents shared the deep hope that 
peace would soon be achieved in Vietnam, and 
agreed that every avenue should continue to be 

Arrival Remarks 

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated December 23 

It is a miracle of the age that within the space 
of 414 days I will have circumnavigated the 
globe. But it is a tragedy of the time that sad- 
ness is swifter than flight. 

In Australia I listened in grief to the cathe- 
dral hymn that sang the memory of a brave 
friend and ally. 

In Viet-Nam, I saw the strong, clear faces 
of young Americans who must spend a part of 
their youth in battle to find a peace for us. 

But now I am in Italy at Christmastime. 
Here the Italian people, whose blood runs in 
the veins of so many Americans, feel the theme 
of Christmas because so much of what it means 
and exalts resides in the ageless courage of the 

Saint Paul taught us that we walk by faith 
and not by sight. 

And Pope Paul inspires us to believe that 
man's faith will prevail in the darkest hours. 

The Pope and I will talk of peace, of how 
it might be achieved and preserved. Peace is 

his mission and constant concern, as it is of the 
hundreds of millions of people throughout the 
world who call him Holy Father. 

He has reemphasized to aU of us quite re- 
cently his deep and passionate desire to do what- 
ever he can, whenever he can, "towards the re- 
establishment of peace." Not only the Church 
he heads but the moral force he exerts are assets 
which should be employed in constructing a 
future without war. 

This is a task that must also be undertaken 
in the councils of government, in the churches, 
in the neighborhood, and in the privacy of our 
faith, so that one day the morning will come 
when "no war or battle's sound will be heard the 
world around." 

If we can put away violence and greed and 
ungoverned ambitions, then we can be about 
the work that urgently needs to be done — to 
feed the hungry, to teach the ignorant, and heal 
the sick. 

Statement After Meeting With Pope Paul 

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated December 23 

I have come around the world to call on His 
Holiness Pope Paul in the spirit of his offer of 
"unarmed cooperation . . . towards the re-estab- 
lishment of true peace." 

No man can avoid being moved to try harder 
for peace at Christmastime. 

We discussed possible paths to peace and the 
efforts that have been made in recent years, so 
far without success. 

We agree with His Holiness that "an honor- 
able settlement of the painful and threatening 
dispute is still possible." I received his judg- 
ment to this end, and I deeply appreciate the 
full and free manner in which it was given. 

His Holiness has suggested a principle of 
mutual restraint. If this principle was accepted 
by both sides, there would be rapid and solid 
progress toward peace. 

We would be willmg to stop the bombing 
and proceed promptly to serious and productive 

A total end to the violence would be our ur- 
gent objective. 

We support informal talks with the South. 

We are ready for formal talks with the North. 

We will agree to any proposal that would 
substitute the word and the vote for the knife 
and the grenade in bringing honorable peace 
to Viet-Nam. 

JANUARY 15, 1968 


We shall keep closely in touch with His Holi- 
ness in the clays ahead, as we shall with others 
who are searching to lift the scourge of war 
from Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. 

Departure Statement 

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated December 23 

I am leaving Italy after a visit which has been 
very brief but, I believe, very useful and con- 
structive. I have been able to greet and consult 
with President Saragat, Prime Minister [Aldo] 
Moro, and Foreign Minister [Amintore] Fan- 
f ani and I have had a memorable audience with 
His Holiness Pope Paul VI. 

Once again, these beneficial exchanges have 
brought home to me how greatly the conduct of 
relations between nations has been changed by 
this new age of rapid communications and 
travel. While our meetings were necessarily on 
short notice, we were able to meet as friends 
who have been able to confer together with rela- 
tive frequency in recent years — and we were 
able to discuss current matters on a current 
basis. This is a new age for statecraft, and I 
believe we can all hope that such closeness be- 
tween leadei's of nations will hasten the day of 
understanding and cooperation in peace for all 

The President, the Premier, Foreign Minis- 
ter, and I reviewed some of the problems con- 
fronting the great Atlantic alliance to which 
our two countries belong. I was especially grati- 
fied by the mutual confidence among us regard- 
ing the prospects for the alliance's future. We 
also talked about the problem of achieving 
peace in Southeast Asia, and I reviewed with 
them the continuing determination of the 
United States to seek every opportunity to bring 
peace and justice to the people of Viet-Nam. 

In my meeting with His Holiness, we dis- 
cussed the vital necessity of taking new steps to 
bring peace to Viet-Nam and to maintain peace 
among all nations of the earth. I discussed with 
His Holiness the plight of the American 
prisoners being held by the North Vietnamese 
and being denied the rights required by inter- 
national standards. I have reviewed in another 
statement more fully these valued discussions 
with His Holiness. 

I am returning home now to observe Christ- 
mas with my family. I do so encouraged by these 
brief talks in Europe, as by all the talks of this 
mission. As I leave Italy, I would like to extend 
to all the people of the great Republic of Italy 
the greetings of this season and the warmest of 
good wishes for the yesir ahead. 



President Johnson's Christmas Message to the Nation ' 

Not many hours ago I stood among some of 
your sons in Viet-Nam. 

I had come back to Asia, 14 months after my 
hxst visit there, to say farewell to a friend, the 
late Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia. I 
had joined with the leaders of Asia and the 
Commonwealth in ceremonies and meetings that 
spoke not only of our personal loss but of our 
common bonds. The spirit of Harold Holt, the 
spirit of the new Asia, was powerfully alive 
among those who gathered to pay tribute to his 

I had traveled then to Thailand, to the air- 
base at Khorat; and in tiie darkness before 
dawn I spoke to our pilots and ground crews, 
the brave and skillful airmen who are helping 
to relieve the enemy's pressure on our soldiers 
and marines in South Viet-Nam. 

Now, on the airstrip at Cam Ranh Bay, your 
sons and I exchanged "Merry Christmas" and 
"Happy New Year." I told them that I wished 
I could bring them something more, some part 
of the pride you feel in them, some tangible 
symbol of your love and concern for them. 

But I knew that they could feel your pride. 
I knew that they were confident of your love. 
Their faces were smiling, and they had that 
enthusiasm, that brave generosity of si^irit, that 
the world associates with young Americans in 

I decorated 20 of them for gallantry in action. 
Their faces seemed more grave than the others — 
preoccupied, I thought, with the savage ex- 
perience of battle they had endured. 

In the hospital, I spoke with those who bore 
tlie wounds of war. You cannot be in such a 
place, among such men, without feeling grief 
well up in your throat, without feeling grateful 
that there is such courage among your 

That was Christmastime in Viet-Nam, a time 
of war, of suffering, of endurance, of bravery 
and devotion to country. 

A few hours later, I sat with His Holiness 
Pope Paul in his Vatican study. I had flown 
thousands of miles from Viet-Nam to Rome so 
that I might receive the counsel of this good 
man, tliis friend of peace. 

' Recorded at the White House on Dec. 24 for broad- 
cast nationally (White House press release). 

I wanted to tell him that the United States 
had been actively seeking an end to the war in 
Viet-Nam, that we had traveled dozens of roads 
in search of peace but that, thus far, these had 
proved fruitless journeys. 

I wanted to promise him — as I have promised 
you, my fellow Americans — that the disappoint- 
ments we had known in the past would not deter 
us from trying any reasonable route to 

These things I said, and I listened as His 
Holiness told me of his eagerness to help bring 
peace to Viet-Nam. We talked of what might 
be done to help the people of Viet-Nam become 
reconciled to one another in a nation at peace. 
I felt, once more, what all the world knows : the 
human sympathy, the passion for peace, that 
fills the heart of the Pope. 

I told His Holiness that America welcomed 
his efforts to bring an end to the strife and sor- 
row. And I told him of a matter that weighs 
on our hearts this Christmas, and every day of 
the year: the treatment of American prisoners 
of war in North Viet-Nam. 

I told him how we hoped he would intercede 
on their behalf, seeking to gain for them more 
humane living conditions and the elemental 
right to communicate with their loved ones. I 
assured him that his representatives would be 
welcomed wherever prisoners were held in 
South Viet-Nam. 

That was Christmastime in Rome, a time of 
quiet, of understanding, of communication 
without any barrier. 

Now that the holy day itself has come, I wish 
each of you a full measure of happiness. I hope 
that all of you may remember, this Christmas, 
the brave young men who celebrate the holy sea- 
son far from their homes, serving their country, 
serving their loved ones, serving each of us. 

I hope, too, that your hearts may be filled with 
peace within, as your country seeks peace in the 

Our country has known many wartime 
Christmases. It may seem difficult, at such times, 
to say "Merry Christmas." But when you think 
of the bravery of the human spirit and the 
compassion of the human heart and the power 
of life to triumph over pain and darkness, you 
are thankful. Your own spirits are lifted high; 
and you say it — and mean it — as I do now. 
Merry Christmas. 

JAJTCART 15, 19G8 

United Nations Endorses Text of Agreement on Rescue 
and Return of Astronauts and Space Vehicles 

Folloioing are a statement by Herbert lieis, 
U.S. Representative in the Legal Subcommittee 
of the United Nations Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space, made in the subco?n- 
mittee on December H and a statement by 
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the 
General Assembly, made in plenary session on 
December 10, together urdh the texts of a resolu- 
tion adopted by the Assembly on December 19 
and a/n annex to that resolution, which contains 
the text of the Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the 
Return of Objects Launclied Into Outer Space. 


U.S./U.N. press release 240 

The United States delegation wishes to state 
our thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, for making 
possible this special session of the Outer Space 
Legal Subcommittee. We recognize that many 
demands and difficulties face delegations during 
this last full week of the 22d session of the 
General Assembly. At the same time, sufficient 
progress has been made on a draft agreement on 
assistance to and return of astronauts and space 
vehicles to justify this meeting and the oppor- 
tunity it provides to record for members of the 
United Nations the advances thus far made. 

Just a year ago, on December 19, 1966, the 
General Assembly commended the Outer Space 
Treaty.^ The Assembly also requested the Outer 
Space Committee to continue its work on a con- 
vention on liability for damage caused by the 
launching of objects into outer space and on an 
agreement on assistance to and return of astro- 
nauts and space vehicles. It may be noted that 
since 1963— shortly after the Outer Space Com- 
mittee as currently constituted began its work — 

' For background and text of Resolution 2222 (XXI) , 
see BuixETiN of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78 ; for text of the Outer 
Space Treaty, see Hid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953. 

the General Assembly has regularly called for 
work on these two agreements. It has considered 
them as paired agreements and has called an- 
nually for their elaboration. 

During the debate in the General Assembly's 
First Committee on the outer space item in 
October of this year, many complaints were 
voiced concerning our lack of progress. As a 
result, the General Assembly on November 3 
adopted Resolution 2260 (XXII) calling for 
urgent work on these twin agreements. Para- 
graph 9 of General Assembly Resolution 2260 
(XXII) : 

Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, in the further progressive development 
of the law of outer space, to continue with a sense of 
urgency its work on the elaboration of an agreement 
on liability for damage caused by the launching of ob- 
jects into outer space and an agreement on assistance 
to and return of astronauts and space vehicles, and to 
pursue actively its work on questions relative to the 
definition of outer space and the utilization of outer 
space and celestial bodies, including the various impli- 
cations of space communications. 

The purpose of this special session of the Le- 
gal Subcommittee is to report progress on the 
elaboration of an assistance-and-return agree- 
ment. We seek to act promptly and without de- 
lay in responding affirmatively to the mandate 
that the General Assembly has given us. 

It is, as I said earlier, very late in the General 
Assembly session. But we would be unwise to let 
our proper preoccupations with matters before 
the Assembly prevent seizing an opportunity to 
make real progress. Even at the risk of impa- 
tience and annoyance, we would want to proceed 
with a serious and expeditious review of the 
progress that has been made, rather than later to 
regret an opportunity lost because of failure to 
recognize and take hold of it. 

Before turning to the assistance-and-return 
agreement, my delegation would like to take this 
occasion to stress once again the continuing im- 
portance we attached to the prompt conclusion 



of a satisfactory liability convention. It may not 
be improper to recall that the United States 
originally took the initiative in calling attention 
to the need for a liability convention. That was 
in May of 1959 during the session of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

In a tii-st survey of the field, dated July 1959, 
the Ad Hoc Committee asserted that the con- 
clusion of a liability convention was a task re- 
quiring prompt attention. In June of 1962 the 
United States placed before the United Nations 
the first concrete draft of a liability convention. 
Since 1963 the delegation of Belgium has acted 
as a co-initiator in drafting and proposing treaty 
texts, as has the delegation of Hungary. At our 
last session from June 19 tlirougli July 14, the 
United States, Belgium, and Hungary jointly 
introduced a number of texts recording points of 
agreement. The subcommittee subsequently ap- 
proved these texts. While still far from the text 
of a convention, we are finally making progress 
in that direction. 

We understand that the Legal Subcommittee 
members without exception intend to make the 
most rapid possible progress toward a liability 
convention. The United States and a number of 
other delegations have committed tliemselves to 
undertake meaningful negotiations to this end. 

Mr. Chairman, one further point is worth 
stressing with regard to the assistance and lia- 
bility agreements. It is sometimes asserted that 
only the space powers are interested m the 
assistance-and-retum agreement; and it is 
urged, further, that the liability convention is 
the proper interest of the nonspace powers ex- 

We believe these assertions to be incorrect. The 
United States, as a first proponent of the notion 
of a liability convention, does not accept them, 
and the actions of my Government underscore 
this. We consider that a liability convention will 
further the interests of all. It will further the 
interests of the space powers since, by conclud- 
ing such a convention, they will not only demon- 
strate their responsibility in the conduct of 
space activities but also provide for the orderly 
resolution of disputes which might arise and 
which, if not promptly resolved, could adversely 
affect the exploration and use of outer space. 

Nor, to cite the other case, does the assistance- 
and-retum agreement the Legal Subcommittee 
is now considering relate solely to concerns of 
space powers. To take but two instances, the 
provisions of article 5 on recovery and return of 
space objects and of article 6 on international 
organizations are of interest to all who today 

conduct or may in the future conduct space 

The United States delegation has sought 
agreement in these negotiations on an assistance- 
and-retum instrument that will contain to the 
maximimi possible degree obligations fair for 
present and future individual space powers, for 
near-space powers, for collective space powers, 
as well as for those who are interested in space 
activities ; that is, the entire membership of the 
United Nations. 

The agreement before us is very much a prod- 
uct of the United Nations and its Outer Space 
Committee. Its principal provisions are based 
upon the Outer Space Treaty, article V of which 
calls upon parties to "regard astronauts as en- 
voys of mankind in outer space." The treaty also 
requires parties to render astronauts "all possi- 
ble assistance in the event of accident, distress, 
or emergency landing on the territory of another 
State Party or on the high seas." Article V fur- 
ther requires that "When astronauts make such 
a landing, they shall be safely and promptly re- 
turned to the State of registry of their space ve- 
hicle." And article VIII of the treaty lays down 
the rule that ownership of object^s laimched 
into outer space is unaffected by transit and re- 
turn to earth; it states that "Such objects or 
component parts foimd beyond the limits of the 
State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they 
are cariied shall be returned to that State, which 
shall, upon request, furnish identifying data 
prior to their return." 

We have also sought in these negotiations to 
make good use of the work accomplished by the 
Outer Space Committee in its 1964 session, the 
high-water mark of progress on assistance and 
return. At the first part of the 1964 session, held 
in Geneva in March, preliminary agreement was 
reached on a number of provisions relating to re- 
covery and return of space vehicles. One of these 
provisions — to which many nonspace powers 
have attributed particular importance — would 
entitle a party on whose territory an apparently 
dangerous space vehicle has landed to require 
the launching authority to take all necessary 
steps to remove any danger of harm. 

Mr. Chairman, I turn now to the proposed 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Re- 
turn of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects 
Launched Into Outer Space. The text of the 
agreement appears in document A/AC.105/ 
L.28, which our chairman has introduced earlier 
this afternoon. 

The preamble of the agreement notes the im- 
portance of the Space Treaty, which entered 

JANUARY 15, 1968 


into force only 2 months ago on October 10. The 
preamble further draws attention to the general 
assistance-and-return obligations contained in 
the treaty, already signed by more than 80 coun- 
tries and ratified by more than 15. 

Article 1 deals with notifications. It would 
require a contracting party that learns of an 
accident or emergency suffered by an astronaut 
to notify immediately the launching authority ; 
that is, the state or international organization 
responsible for launching. Under the terms of 
article 1, if the discovering party were unsure of 
the identity of the launching authority, it would 
make an appropriate public amiouncement. In 
either event, it would also notify the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations who would "dis- 
seminate the information without delay by all 
appropriate means of communication at his dis- 
posal." Tlie Secretary-General would thus play 
a role parallel to his role under article 11 of the 
Outer Space Treaty, whereby he disseminates 
information submitted by parties on the nature, 
conduct, locations, and results of their space 

By way of clarification, I would like to note 
that article 1 uses the phrase "in any other 
place not under the jurisdiction of any State." 
The same phrase is used in article 3 concerning 
nonterritorial assistance. This phrase relates to 
such ai-eas as the high seas and to outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 

Article 2 concerns measures of assistance to 
an astronaut within the territory of a contract- 
ing party. The first sentence of article 2 is drawn 
from the Outer Space Treaty. It parallels the 
more general requirement of the Outer Space 
Treaty to render an astronaut in such circum- 
stances "all possible assistance." 

Tlie third and fourth sentences of article 2 
deal with assistance by the launching authority 
in searching for and rescuing an astronaut 
who has met with an accident and who has come 
down on the territory of another party to the 
agreement. Assistance by the launching author- 
ity in these rare and infrequent cases of emer- 
gency could be ci-ucial in saving the life of an 
astronaut. The launching authority wiU have 
advanced competence and experience in locating 
space vehicles. It may have aircraft or ships 
available to join in a search for a downed astro- 

_We think it clearly correct to expect that the 
views of the territorial party and the launching 
authority will coincide on the question whether, 

in a particular case, launchmg authority assist- 
ance would, in the words of article 2, "help to 
effect a prompt rescue or would contribute sub- 
stantially to the effectiveness of search and res- 
cue operations." In the unlikely event they do 
not agree, the territorial party would of course 
have the fhial say in this matter. 

A fuial word on article 2, Mr. Chairman. The 
last sentence of article 2 calls for operations in 
which the launching authority assists to be con- 
ducted "under the direction and control" of the 
territorial sovereign. This provision is entirely 
appropriate in view of the fact that it is na- 
tional teiTitory that is involved. On the other 
hand, it also seems fair to ask that the territorial 
sovereign shall, m these cases, "act in close and 
continuing consultation with the launching au- 
thority," and it is with these words that article 
2 closes. We believe that article 2 repi-esents 
a just balancmg of the interests of the terri- 
torial sovereign and the launcliing authority. 

Article 3 concerns the duty to rescue in the 
case where an astronaut in distress comes down 
on the high seas or elsewhere beyond national 
jurisdiction. In this event a contracting party 
which is in a position to do so is obliged to 
"extend assistance in search and rescue opera- 
tions for such personnel to assure their speedy 

Article 4 is a full rendering of the legal obli- 
gation of article V of the Space Treaty to safely 
and promptly return an astronaut who has 
landed elsewhere than planned. The text also 
incorjwrates a suggestion advanced by the dele- 
gation of France that a party should be obliged 
to return an astronaut to representatives of the 
launching authority rather than to the launch- 
ing authority itself. 

Article 5 deals at some length with recovery 
and return of objects lamached into space tliat 
subsequently reenter the atmosphere and land 
on the surface of the earth. As noted earlier, 
the text builds on provisions agreed in prelim- 
inary fashion in 1964. These have been brought 
into line with the Outer Space Treaty. 

Paragraph 1 thus calls for notifications to the 
laimching authority and the Secretary-Genei*al 
that a space object has returned to earth. In the 
event of a request by the launching authority, 
paragraph 2 asks the party on whose territory 
the object lands to "take such steps as it finds 
practicable to recover the object or component 
parts." Under paragraph 3, if the launching 
authority seeks the return of the object and fur- 



nishes identifying data upon request by the 
territorial party, the territorial party becomes 
obliged to return tlie object to the representa- 
tives of the launching authority. Paragraph 4 
states that, in the event an object of a hazardous 
or deleterious nature returns to earth, the terri- 
torial party may, at ibs discretion, ask the 
launclung authority to eliminate any possible 
danger of harm by conductmg operations to that 
end ''under the direction and control" of the 
territorial party. Finally, paragraph 5 calls for 
reimbursement of expenses incurred by the terri- 
torial party when the launching authority re- 
quests recovery, or recovery and return, of an 

My delegation has sought, in negotiating 
article 6, to insure that the views and interests 
of those countries which participate in inter- 
national organizations that conduct space activi- 
ties liave been accurately and fully reflected. We 
hope that this has in fact been the case. While 
the language of article 6 is not yet fully agreed, 
there is general agreement that what is required 
is a straightforward definition of the term 
"launching authority." That definition should 
make clear that the tenn refers to the state 
responsible for launching or, where an inter- 
national intergovenunental organization is 
responsible for the launching in question, to the 
international organization. 

The remaining provisions of the proposed 
assistance-and-return agreement — articles 7 
through 10 — contain final or protocolary provi- 
sions identical to those of the Outer Space 
Treaty. Article 7 names the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union as de- 
positary governments and specifies that the 
agreement shall be open to all states for signa- 
ture and ratification. The United States sup- 
ports the accession clause now included in the 
draft agreement, because of the special and ex- 
ceptional character of this agreement. The 
General Assembly has earlier cliaracterized 
astronauts as "envoys of mankind." An agree- 
ment for the rescue of astronauts is thus an 
exceptional instrument of a special character. 
The fact that the "all states" clause has been 
emplo3-ed in this instance does not indicate that 
it is suitable in other circumstances. 

Adoption of this accession clause — urged be- 
cause of exceptional circumstances favoring a 
very broad geograpliical coverage for the assist- 
ance-and-return agreement — does not, of course, 
affect the recognition or status of an unrecog- 

nized regime or entity which may elect to file an 
instnunent of accession to the assistance-and- 
return agreement. Under international law and 
practice, recognition of a government or ac- 
knowledgment of the existence of a state is 
brought about as the result of a deliberate deci- 
sion and course of conduct on the part of a 
govei'nment intending to accord recognition. 
Ilecognition of a regime or acknowledgment of 
an entity cannot be inferred from signature, 
ratification, or accession to a multilateral agree- 
ment. The United States believes that this view- 
point is genei'ally accepted and shared, and it is 
on this basis that we join in supporting the pres- 
ent text of the assistance-and-return agreement. 
Mr. Chainnan, these are the principal features 
and the background of the proposed assistance- 
and-return agreement. We hope the members of 
the Legal Subcommittee will welcome the agree- 
ment, and we hope that the subcommittee will 
shortly be in a position to forward the agree- 
ment to our parent Outer Space Committee. 
This action will speed the work of the Outer 
Space Legal Subcommittee on the liability con- 
vention and the other items on our agenda. It 
will also, in our view, constitute a positive con- 
tribution to international cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of outer space.^ 


U.S./U.N. press release 252 

Less than 2 months ago the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution asking the Outer Space 
Committee to continue its work with a sense of 
urgency on an agreement on assistance and re- 
turn of astronauts and space vehicles. Today 
the General Assembly has unanimously ap- 
proved a consensus text of the agreement 
forwarded, also unanimously, for its considera- 
tion by the Outer Space Committee. The Com- 
mittee has thus complied with the Assembly's 
mandate to proceed urgently. But it would be 
a mistake to assume that the draft has not been 
carefully prepared. It is a good and sound treaty 

' The text of the draft agreement, as amended by 
the Legal Subcommittee In the course of its special 
session Dec. 14-15, was transmitted to the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the subcommit- 
tee's report (A/AC.105/43). On Dec. 16 the Outer Space 
Committee decided unanimously to submit the draft 
agreement to the General Assembly for consideration. 

JANUARY 15, 196S 


and will stand the test of time and experience. 

The United States regards the action of the 
Assembly in endorsing tliis treaty to be a his- 
toric action. The treaty text represents agree- 
ment on implementing that famous phrase from 
the Outer Space Treaty: that astronauts are 
"envoys of mankmd." My delegation believes 
that endorsement of this treaty by the General 
Assembly constitutes one of the major achieve- 
ments of this Assembly. 

Mr. President, the United States considers 
that the assistance-and-return agreement which 
we have adopted represents a just balancing of 
the interests of all members of the United 
Nations — the space powers, the near-space pow- 
ers, the cooperative space powers, and all who 
are interested in outer space, which, indeed, 
means the entire membership of our organiza- 
tion. This agreement bears witness to the fact 
that the United Nations can make a real con- 
tribution to extending the rule of law to new 
areas and to insuring the positive and peaceful 
ordermg of man's efforts in science and the 
building of a better world. It is, not last of all, 
a tribute to those who venture forward in the 
new world of outer space. We hope and we will 
work to make that venture one to benefit all. 

It is clear that although all nations, as 
I have just said, have a great interest in space 
activities, this particular agreement is of spe- 
cial interest and concern to the two major space 
powers, whose astronauts are engaging in the 
hazardous enterprise of exploring the imiverse 
for the benefit of all mankind. What is signifi- 
cant to us is that countries that may not be 
launching their own astronauts for years to 
come or, indeed, never launching them, have 
made it clear that they consider the safety of 
astronauts from whatever country they may 
come to be a shared responsibility of the world 
community. This is in the great humanitarian 
tradition of the United Nations and its mem- 
ber states. And my Government deeply appre- 
ciates the cooperation of the nonspace powers. 
Indeed, we have noted this attitude in nearly 
all of our negotiations on outer space matters. 
It may be that only by venturing beyond earth's 
limits shall we learn that the bonds of human- 
ity are stronger than the bonds of nationality. 

In our statements before the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal 
Subcommittee, my delegation recognized, as 

several speakers have pointed out, that other 
problems remain to be solved and particularly 
problems of acute interest to nonspace powers. 
Therefore, I would like to reiterate the point 
which my Government made in the Committee 
and that is that we attach a high degree of im- 
portance to the prompt conclusion of a satis- 
factory convention on liability for damage 
caused by the launching of objects into outer 
space. We intend to participate actively and 
constructively in the drafting of that agree- 
ment. The resolution we have just adopted caUs 
on the Outer Space Committee to complete an 
agreement on liability by the next session of 
the Assembly. I pledge the full and unstinting 
efforts of the United States to this end. 

My delegation would like also to draw the 
attention of members to article 7, which names 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union as depositary governments 
and specifies that the agreement shall be open 
to all states for signature and ratification. The 
United States supports the accession clause now 
included in the draft agreement, because of the 
special and exceptional character of this agree- 
ment. An agreement for the rescue of astronauts 
is an exceptional instrument of a special char- 
acter. The fact that the "all states" clause has 
been employed in this instance does not indicate 
that it is suitable in other circumstances. 

Adoption of the accession clause — urged be- 
cause of exceptional circumstances favoring a 
very broad geographical coverage for the as- 
sistance-and-return agreement — does not, of 
course, affect the recognition or status of an un- 
recognized regime or entity which may elect to 
file an instrument of accession to the assistance- 
and-return agreement. Under international law 
and practice, recognition of a government or 
acknowledgment of the existence of a state is 
brought about as a result of a deliberate deci- 
sion and course of conduct on the part of a gov- 
ernment intending to accord recognition. Recog- 
nition of a regime or aclniowledgmeut of an 
entity cannot be inferred from signature, rati- 
fication, or accession to a multilateral agree- 
ment. This, of course, is something which all 
of us shai'e in recognizing. 

Mr. President, the United States delegation 
wishes to thank Ambassador [Kurt] Waldheim, 
the distinguished chairman of the Outer Space 
Committee, and the members of that committee, 



President Johnson Gratified by U.N. Endorsement of Agreement 
on Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects 

Following is a statement made hy President John- 
son on December 19 which was released 6j/ the 
White House that day at Honolulu, Hawaii. 

I am gratified that the United Nations General 
Assembly has just endorsed an Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Eetum of Astronauts, and 
the Return of Objects Lavmched Into Outer Space. 

The subject of assistance and return has been 
discussed at meetings of the U.N. Outer Space Com- 
mittee since 1962. The agreement would implement 
rights and obligations of the Outer Space Treaty. 
The proposed new agreement would require that 
parties to the treaty shall : 

— Immediately notify the appropriate authorities 
Lf they receive information that astronauts have 
accidentally landed or are In distress, 

— Immediately take all possible steps to rescue 
astronauts who have accidentally landed on their 
territory and render them all necessary assistance. 

— If necessary and if they are in a position to do 
so, extend assistance in search and rescue operations 
for astronauts who have alighted on the high seas, 

— Safely and promptly return astronauts who 
have landed either on their territory or on the high 
seas, and 

— Notify the appropriate authorities of space ob- 
jects which have come down on their territory or 
on the high seas and, upon request, take steps to re- 
cover and return such objects. 

I hope that this agreement will help to insure that 
nations will assist astronauts in the event of acci- 
dent or emergency. The agreement would carry for- 
ward the purpose of this administration to promote 
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space. On the occasion of the entry into force 
of the Outer Space Treaty on October 10, I said : ^ 

"Whatever our disagreements here on earth, how- 
ever long it may take to resolve our conflicts whose 
roots are buried centuries-deep in history, let us try 
to agree on this. Let us determine that the great 
space armadas of the future will go forth on voyages 
of peace — and go forth in a spirit, not of national 
rivalry, but of peaceful cooperation and understand- 
ing. . . . 

"The next decade should increasingly become a 
partnership — not only between the Soviet Union and 
America, but among all nations under the sun and 

' Bulletin of Oct. 30, 1067, p. 565. 

Mr. [Eugeniusz] Wyzner, the distinguished 
chairman of the Legal Subcommittee, and the 
members of the Ivegal Subcommittee, our col- 
league the other major space power, and the 
many delegates and officials of the Secretariat 
of the United Nations, -who have made possible 
the drafting of this agreement. Compromise be- 
tween the space powers and between the space 
powers and the nonspace powers was essential 
for an agreement such as this to be presented to 
the Assembly. Mr. President, we also thank you 
for your help in obtaining a consensus that this 
item should be placed on the agenda for consid- 
eration on the last day of our proceedings. 

Mr. President, we believe that this agreement 
will help assure that every possible assistance is 
rendered to astronauts in distress or emer- 
gency, and we believe all of the people of the 
world who follow the exploits of astronauts 
with such great interest will applaud and wel- 
come this agreement as we do. Let us hope that 
these agreements on outer space can inspire us 
to make similar agreements on our political 

problems on earth. After all, the charter enjoins 
us to harmonize our actions, and surely this ap- 
plies not only in space but very much here on 


Resolution 2345 ^ 

The General Assembly, 

Bearing in mind its resolution 2260 (XXII) of 3 
November 1967, which calls upon the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue with a 
sense of urgency its work on the elaboration of an 
agreement on liability for damage caused by the launch- 
ing of objects into outer space and an agreement on 
assistance to and return of astronauts and space 

Referring to the addendum to the report of the Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 

Desiring to give further concrete expression to the 

"Adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 19 by a 
vote of 115 to 0. 

JANTTARY 15, 1968 
285-914 — 68 3 


rights and obligatious contalued iu the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 

1. Commends the Agreement on Rescue of Astro- 
nauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched Into Outer Space, which is annexed 
to this resolution ; 

2. Requests the Depositary Governments to open the 
Agreement for signature and ratification at the earli- 
est possible date ; 

3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible adher- 
ence to this Agreement ; 

4. Calls upon the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space to complete the preparation of the 
draft agreement on liability for damage caused by the 
launching of objects into outer space urgently and, iu 
auy event, not later than at tie beginning of the 
twenty-third .session of tlie General Assembly, and to 
submit it to the Assembly at that session. 

Annex to Resolution 

Agebement on the Rescue of Astbonauts, the Re- 

Launched Into Outer Space 

The Contrartino Parties, 

Noting the great importance of the Treaty on Prin- 
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Explora- 
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodie.s, which calls for the rendering 
of all possible assistance to astronauts in the event of 
accident, distress or emergency landing, the prompt 
and safe return of astronauts, and the return of ob- 
jects launched into outer space, 

Desiring to develop and give further concrete expres- 
sion to these duties, 

Wishing to promote international co-operation in the 
Ijeaceful exploration and use of outer space, 

Prompted by sentiments of humanity, 

Have agreed on the following : 

Article 1 

Each Contracting Party which receives information 
or discovers that the personnel of a spacecraft have 
suffered accident or are experiencing conditions of dis- 
tress or have made an emergency or unintendefl land- 
ing in territory under its jurisdiction or on the high 
seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction 
of any State shall immediately : 

(a) Notify the launching authority or, if it cannot 
identify and immediately communicate with the launch- 
ing authority, immediately make a public announce- 
ment by all appropriate means of communication at Its 
disposal : and 

(b) Notify the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions who should disseminate the information vrithont 
delay by all appropriate means of communication at 
his disposal. 

Article 2 

If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unin- 
tended landing, the personnel of a spacecraft land in 
territory under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, 

it shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue 
them and render them all necessary assistance. It shall 
inform the laimching authority and also the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations of the steps it is taking 
and of their progress. If assistance by the launching 
authority would help to effect a prompt rescue or 
would contribute sub.'stantiaUy to the effectiveness of 
search and rescue operations, the laimching authority 
shall co-operate with the Contracting Party with a 
view to the effective conduct of search and rescue oper- 
ations. Such operations shall be subject to the direction 
and control of the Contracting Party, which shall act 
in close and continuing consultation with the launching 

Article 3 

It information is received or it is discovered that the 
per.sonnel of a spacecraft have alighte<l on the high 
seas or in auy other place not under the jurisdiction of 
any State, those Contracting Parties which are in a 
position to do so .shall, if necessary, extend assistance 
in search and rescue operations for such personnel to 
assure their speedy rescue. They shall inform the 
launching authority and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of the steps they are taking and of 
their progress. 

Article 4 

If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unin- 
tended lauding, the personnel of a spacecraft land in 
territory under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party 
or have been found on the high seas or in any other 
place not under the jurisdiction of any State, they shall 
be safely and promptly returned to representatives of 
the launching authority. 

Article 5 

1. Each Contracting Party which receives informa- 
tion or discovers that a siwee object or its component 
parts has returned to Earth in territory under its 
jurisdiction or on the high seas or in any other place 
not under the jurisdiction of any State, shall notify the 
launching authority and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 

2. Each Contracting Party having jurisdiction over 
the territory on which a space object or its component 
parts has been discovered shall, upon the request of 
the launching authority and with assistance from that 
authority if requested, take .such steps as it flnds 
practicable to recover the object or component parts. 

3. Upon request of the launching authority, objects 
launched into outer space or their component parts 
found beyond the territorial limits of the launching au- 
thority shall be returned to or held at the disposal 
of representatives of the launching authority, which 
shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to 
their return. 

4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of this arti- 
cle, a Contracting Party which has reason to believe 
that a space object or its component parts discovered 
in territory under its jurisdiction, or recovered by it 
elsewhere, is of a hazardous or deleterious nature may 
so notify the launching authority which shall imme- 
diately take effective steps, under the direction and 



control of tbe said Contracting Party to eliminate pos- 
sible daxiger or harm. 

5. Esi)enses incurred in fulfilling obligations to re- 
cover and return a space object or its component iwrts 
under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be 
borne by the launching authority. 

Article G 

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term 
"launching authority" shall refer to the State respon- 
sible for launching, or, where an international inter- 
governmental organization is responsible for launching, 
that organization provided that that organization de- 
clares its acceptance of the rights and obligations 
provided for m this Agreement and a majority of the 
States members of that organization are Contracting 
Parties to this Agreement and to the Treaty on Prin- 
ciples Governing the Activities of States In the Ex- 
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies. 

Article 7 

1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for 
signature. Any State vehieh does not sign this Agree- 
ment before its entry into force in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any 

2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification 
by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and 
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Governments of the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 

3. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the 
deposit of instruments of ratification by five Govern- 
ments including the Governments designated as De- 
positary Governments under this Agreement 

4. For States whose Instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry Into 

force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on 
the date of the deposit of their instnmients of ratifi- 
cation or accession. 

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly in- 
form all signatory and acceding States of the date of 
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument 
of ratification of and accession to this Agreement, the 
date of its entry Into force and other notices. 

6. This Agreement shall be registered by the De- 
positary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

Article 8 

Any State Party to the Agreement may propose 
amendments to this Agreement Amendments shall 
enter into force for each State Party to the Agreement 
accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by 
a majority of the States Parties to the Agreement and 
thereafter for each remaining State Party to the 
Agreement on the date of acceptance by it. 

Article 9 

Any State Party to the Agreement may give notice 
of its withdrawal from the Agreement one year after 
its entry into force by written notification to the 
Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall 
take effect one year from the date of receipt of this 

Article 10 

This Agreement, of which the English, Russian, 
French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally au- 
thentic, shall be deposited In the archives of the De- 
positary Governments. Duly certified copies of this 
Agreement shall be transmitted by the Depositary 
Governments to the Governments of the signatory and 
acceding States. 

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly au- 
thorized, have signed this Agreement 
Done In copies at 

JANUARY 15, 19C8 


President Johnson Signs Proclamation To Carry Out 
the Kennedy Round TariflF Agreements 


White House press release dated December 16 

The large enterprises that really shape history 
take a great deal of time and much hard work. 

As our team of negotiators know so well, the 
Kennedy Round has been just such an enter- 

It was 5 years ago that the Congress passed 
the Trade Expansion Act, but that act only pro- 
vided us with some authority. It did not provide 
us with any guarantee of results. 

It took 5 years of very careful and very dif- 
ficult negotiations to reach the agreements that 
were signed in Geneva on Jmie 30th of this year. 
We are indebted to many people for the conduct 
of those negotiations. This morning we come 
here to the Cabinet Room to celebrate the first 
concrete results of this long effort. 

Beginning January 1st our tariffs on many 
of the products that we import will drop in the 
first of what will be five annual reductions. This 
will mean lowering the prices to our consumers 
and lowering the cost to our manufacturers. 

Our trading partners will take equivalent ac- 
tion on their tariffs, too. This will mean bigger 
export sales, we hope, for American business- 
men and American farmers. 

Those who negotiated at Geneva drove a 
hard bargain, but we believe it was a fair bar- 
gain. We gave, we think, as much as we re- 
ceived. It was the kind of bargain from which 
all will gain. They will gain in higher wages 
for the workers, in more efficient factories, in 
rismg incomes for us all and for our trading 
partners throughout the world. 

Now, these negotiations were on a world 
scale; but they had a very special significance 
for our relations with Western Europe, because 
for the first time we negotiated directly with the 
European Common Market as an institution. 

We were dealing with the power of the world's 
largest trading bloc. 

The negotiations demonstrated what we have 
very long believed: The more that Western 
Europe acts together, the more effectively we 
and other coimtries can work together. This 
was a subject I explored with a great deal of 
interest this last week with Mr. [Jean] Monnet, 
who was here from Europe and who insisted 
on talking about it at great length. 

This was CAddent, we think, in a number of 
very constructive steps that were taken during 
this year in a very wide variety of activities with 
our European neighbors. Contrary to what a 
good many have thought or said or, if you 
please, written, our thoughts were not constantly 
and exclusively on Viet-Nam. There were other 
parts of the world that did receive consideration 
and attention, as must be obvious. 

NATO, from which Secretary Rusk has just 
returned this morning, continues to be the 
strongest integrated alliance in history — it is 
not just a mere collection of allies — even while 
we had to move its nerve center from France to 
Belgium. There was a question of what would 
happen to the 15 nations in connection with some 
of the decisions made concerning our move and 
the continuance of the alliance. 

During this year we had some very important 
activities in connection with our German and 
our British allies, when we reached a trilateral 
agreement mider Secretary Rusk's and Mr. 
[John J.] McCloy's leadership, that enabled us 
to maintain our commitments, our troop com- 
mitments, to NATO's central fund, and which 
helped us also to materially ease our balance of 

' For a U.S. statement released on May 2 upon con- 
clusion of the trilateral discussions, see Buxlettn of 
May 22, 1967, p. 788. 



There was a time with many resolutions in our 
own Congress to bring our men home, and when 
it was being reported that the Germans them- 
selves would take substantial reductions in 
troops — I think 60,000 — that there was alarm 
in the world. 

But tlie fait accompli did not come out that 

Also, together with the other members of the 
International Monetary Fund, we achieved an 
agreement which lays the foundation for the 
supplementary international reserves needed by 
the world economy, which resulted in many 
discussions in London and subsequently con- 
firmed at Rio.- 

We are making progress, we believe, toward 
an accord to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons — while at the same time insuring that 
all nations will be able to benefit from the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

We have worked with our NATO allies and 
with the U.N. to forestall a tragic war between 
Greece and Turkey and to open the way to a 
peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. 

TVe are working with other industrial coun- 
tries to provide very special trade advantages 
to the developing coimtries which could help 
to speed up the growth of their exports and to 
accelerate their economic progress. 

These achievements, I think, demonstrate the 
basic principle of interdependence in interna- 
tional policy. By moving together we all move 
forward. By moving separately we may end 
up by just not moving at all, if we try to go 

Trade will be a critical test of our cooperation. 
The reduced tariffs of the Kennedy Round will 
give rise to many demands for protection here 
and abroad. We must all stand firm against 
shortsighted protectionism. 

Now, we have shown that we can work 
together witli united allies in many fields. I 
have listed four or five of them. If we can do 
it in these four or five, we have a land of oppor- 
tunity out there where we can do it in others. 

We all have problems of the cities, urban 
problems, and many of theirs are as serious if 
not more so than ours — older cities. But if we 
can do it on trade, if we can do it on troops, if 
we can do it on the NATO alliance, if we can do 
it on money, why can't we do it on cities? 

The problem of all the world is a problem of 

' For background, see Hid., Oct. 23, 1967, p. 523. 

what are we going to do about the developing 
nations. Four out of every 10 people can't read 
"dog," and can't write "mama," and can't spell 
"cat." There are the education problems, the 
health problems, the developing nations' prob- 
lems, per se. 

If we can work out these things together, why 
can't we work together on aid for developing 
nations ? 

Why can't we work together on aid for re- 
building the cities of the world ? 

So I take great pride not only in what the 
Kennedy Round does just within itself but what 
it portends and what may flow from the knowl- 
edge that if we can do it in connection with all 
these things that we buy and sell, which reach 
pretty close to home in some of these places, we 
can do it on others. 

We know that to sell abroad we must be will- 
ing to buy abroad. If we cannot buy, then we 
cannot sell. 

Above all, we in the United States should 
have the confidence in our own ability to com- 
pete in the world — although as the protectionists 
talk to me day after day, I think sometimes we 
are losing confidence in our own ability. 

We started on the road to expanding trade 
about 30 years ago, under the policies of a great 
Secretary of State and President. Its advances, 
I think, are pretty evident to us all. To retreat 
from it would, I think, set a chain reaction of 
counterprotection and retaliation that would 
put in jeopardy our ability to work together 
and to prosper together. 

What captain of industry or what union 
leader in this country really yearns and is eager 
to return to the days of Smoot-Hawley ? For 
the world of higher tariffs and quotas and com- 
petitive currency depreciation was also the 
world of you-Imow-what — deep depressions, 
rampant unemployment, low profits, if any, and, 
generally, losses; corporation losses instead of 
corporation profits. 

So this day of declining trade barriers in a 
world of unprecedented prosperity and growth 
is something we want to continue. 

We must and we will, I hope, keep it that way. 

Almost every pei-son in this room this morn- 
ing had a share in this legislation and made a 
contribution to the soul-searching decisions and 
the difficult negotiations that lay behind the 
great accomplishments that we know as the 
Kermedy Round. I want to thank each of you 
present for the help you gave and the role j'ou 

JANUARY 15, 1968 


played. I know that we share the faith and the 
confidence to continue on that long road. 

I want to say a special thanks to Mrs. Herter 
and her family for the great contribution that 
that noble, enliglitened statesman made to this 
endeavor — Christian Herter. I want to express- 
ly give my personal thanks on behalf of the 
people I can speak for — that is this nation. I 
believe the whole world feels it. 

To Ambassador Roth [William M. Eoth, Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations], 
Ambassador Blumenthal [W. Michael Blumen- 
thal, Deputy Special Representative], and to 
Secretary Rusk and the Members of Congress 
who contributed so much so long under such 
adverse conditions, I want to say "Thank you" 
and hope that it will, in some degree, compensate 
you for the criticisms that you have endured 
throughout this journey. 


Proclamation to Carey Out Geneva (i967) 
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tarifes and 
Trade and Other Agreements 

1. Whereas, pursuant to Section 350 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, the President, on October 30. 1947, entered 
Into, and by Proclamation No. 2761A of December 16, 
1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), proclaimed, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred 
to as the "General Agreement"), containing a schedule 
of United States concessions designated as Schedule 
XX, which General Agreement, schedule, and procla- 
mation have been supplemented by other agreements, 
schedules, and proclamations ; 

2. WHEREXis, after compliance with the require- 
ments of Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 
1962 (76 Stat. 73), the President by Proclamation No. 
3548 of August 21, 1963 (77 Stat. 1017), proclaimed, 
effective on and after August 31, 1963, the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States, which reflected, with 
modifications, and, in effect, superseded. Proclamation 
No. 2761A and proclamations supplementary thereto 
insofar as they relate to Schedule XX to the General 
Agreement ; 

3. Whereas, pursuant to Sections 221 and 224 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1841 and 
1844), the President, by a notice dated October 21, 1963, 
published and furnished to the United States Tariff 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as tlie "Tariff 
Commission"), lists of articles which might be consi- 
dered for modification or continuance of dlities or other 
import restrictions, including reductions in duties be- 
low the 50 percent limitation specified in Section 201 (b) 
(1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1821 
(b) (1), or continuance of duty-free or excise treat- 

'32 Fed. Reg. 19002. 

ment in the negotiation of trade agreements (48 CFR 
Part 180), which lists were supplemented by lists 
published by the President and furnished by him to 
the Tariff Commission by the notices dated Febru- 
ary 18, 1965 (48 CI'"R Part 181), August 16, 1966 (48 
CFR Part 182), and April 22, 1967 (32 F.R. 6429), and 
the Tariff Commission, after holding public hearings, 
advised the President with respect to each such article 
of its judgment as to the probable economic effect of 
such modifications ; 

4. Whereas, pursuant to Sections 223 and 224 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1843 and 1844) 
and in accordance with Section 3(g) of Executive 
Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963 (48 CFR 1.3(g) ), 
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, ap- 
pointed by the President pursuant to Section 241(a) of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1871(a)), 
designated, on April 23, 1963, the Trade Information 
Committee to afford an opjwrtunity, through public 
hearings and other means, for any interested person 
to present his views concerning any article on the 
lists identified In the third recital of this proclamation 
or any other matter relevant to the negotiation of trade 
agreements (48 CFR 202.3), and the Trade Information 
Committee, after holding public hearings, furnished the 
President with a summary of its hearings ; 

5. Wheeei&s, pursuant to Section 222 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1842), the President 
received information and advice with resi)ect to the 
trade agreement identified in the seventh recital of 
this proclamation, from the Departments of Agricul- 
ture, Commerce, Defense, the Interior, Labor, State, 
and the Treasury, and from such other sources as he 
deemed appropriate, and pursuant to Section 241(b) of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1871(b) ), 
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations re- 
ceived information and advice with respect to that 
agreement from representatives of industry, agricul- 
ture, and labor, and from such agencies as he deemed 
appropriate ; 

6. Whereas, pursuant to Section 201 (a) of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1821(a)), the Pres- 
ident determined that certain existing duties or other 
import restrictions of the United States, of foreign 
countries which were contracting parties to the General 
Agi"eement, or of foreign countries which sought to 
accede to the General Agreement, were unduly burden- 
ing and restricting the foreign trade of the United 
States and that one or more of the purposes stated in 
Section 102 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 
U.S.C. 1801) would be promoted by entering into the 
trade agreement identified in the seventh recital of 
this proclamation ; 

7. Whereas, pursuant to Section 201(a)(1) of the 
Trade Exp.ansion Act of 1962, on June 30, 1967, the 
President, through his duly empowered representative, 
entered into a trade agreement with other contracting 
parties to the General Agreement and with countries 
seeking to accede to the General Agreement, which 
trade agreement consists of the Geneva (1967) Protocol 
to the General Agreement, including a schedule of 
United States concessions annexed thereto (hereinafter 
referred to as "Schedule XX ( Geneva— 1967 )") , to- 
gether with the Final Act Authenticating the Results of 
the 1964-67 Trade Conference Held under the Auspices 
of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement (a 



copy of which Protocol, including Schedule XX an- 
nexed thereto, and a copy of which Final Act being 
annexed to this proclamation as Annex I) ;' 

8. Whereas each modification of existing duty pro- 
claimed in this proclamation which i)rovides with re- 
spect to an article for a decrease in duty below the 
limitation specified in Section i;01(b) (1) or 2ri3 of the 
Trade Exiiansiou Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. lS21(b) (1) 
or 1SS3) is authorized by one or more of the following 
provisions : 

(a) Section 202 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(19 U.S.C. 1S22), by virtue of the fact that the rate 
of duty existing on July 1. 1962. applicable to the 
article was not more than 5 percent ad valorem (or 
ad valorem equivalent) ; 

(b) Section 213 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(19 U.S.C. 1833), by virtue of the fact that, after being 
advised by the Tariff Commission pursuant to that sec- 
tion, the President, prior to entering into the trade 
agreement identified in the seventh recital of this proc- 
lamation, determined, pursuant to that section, that 
the article was a tropical agricultural or forestry com- 
modity, that the like article was not produced in sig- 
nificant quantities in the United States, and that the 
European Economic Community made a commitment 
with respect to duties or other import restrictions ap- 
plicable to such article which is likely to assure access 
to its markets under the conditions set forth in that 
section : 

(c) Section 254 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(19 U.S.C. 1SS4), by virtue of the fact that the Presi- 
dent determined, pursuant to that section, that the 
decrease authorized by that section wiU .s-implify the 
computation of the amount of duty imposed with re- 
spect to the article ; and 

(d) Section 203 of the Tariff Classification Act of 
1962, as amended (76 Stat. 882), Section 2(b) of Public 
Law 89-204 (79 Stat. 839), Section 3(a) of the Tariff 
Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 
933), Section 4 of Public Law 89-388 (SO Stat. 110), and 
Section 1 of Public Law 90-14 (81 Stat. 14) ; 

9. 'Wherelis, in the case of each decrease in duty 
of the type specified in clause (a) or (c) of the eighth 
recital of this proclamation which involves the deter- 
mination of the ad valorem equivalent of a specific rate 
of duty, and in the case of each modification in the form 
of an import duty, the Tariff Commission determined, 
pursuant to Section 256(7) of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1886(7)) and in accordance with 
Section 5(a) of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 
15. 1963 (48 CFR 1.5(a)), and at the direction of the 
President, the ad valorem equivalent of the specific rate 
or the sjiecific equivalent of the ad valorem rate, as the may be, on the basis of the value of imports of 

the article concerned during a period determined by 
it to be representative, utilizing, to the maximum extent 
practicable, the standards of valuation contained in 
Section 402 or 402a of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
1401a or 1402) applicable to such article during such 
representative period ; 

10. Wheeeas, pursuant to Section 201(a)(2) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I determine that the 
modification or continuance of existing duties or other 
import restrictions and the continuance of existing 
duty-free or excise treatment hereinafter proclaimed 
are required or appropriate to carry out the trade agree- 
ment identified in the seventh recital of this proclama- 
tion and related parts of other agreements ; and 

IL Whereas, pursuant to Section 304(a) (3) (J) of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1304(a) 
(3) (J) and Section 258 of the Trade Expan- 
sion Act of 1962 (19 U.S,C. 1888), I find that the 
susjiension of the effectiveness of the proviso to Section 
304(a) (3) (J), with respect to the marking of the arti- 
cles provided for in headnote 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 2 
of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (added 
thereto by Section A of Annex II to this proclamation)," 
is required to carry out the trade agreement identified 
in the seventh recital of this proclamation : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JoHNsoN, President of 
the United States of America, acting under the author- 
ity vested in me by the Constitution and the .statutes, 
including but not limited to Sections 201, 202, 213, and 
254 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do proclaim 

(1) Subject to the applicable provisions of the Gen- 
eral Agreement, the Geneva (1967) Protocol, and other 
agreements supplemental to the General Agreement, the 
modification or continuance of existing duties or other 
import restrictions and the continuance of existing 
duty-free or excise treatment, provided for In Schedule 
XX (Geneva — 1967), shall be effective on and after 
January 1, 1968, as provided for therein ; and 

(2) To this end and to give effect to related parts of 
other agreements, the Tariff Schedules of the United 
States are modified, effective on and after January 1, 
1968, as provided for in Annexes II and III to this 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
this 16th day of December in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the one hundred 
and ninety-second. 

The White House 
Washinffton, D.C. 

' Annex I was filed with the OflJce of the Federal 
Register but was not published. 

' Annexes II and III are published in part II of the 
Federal Register of Dec. 19, 1967. 

JANUAKY 15, 196 8 



U.N. Condemns South Africa's Violation 
of Rights of South West Africans 

Following is a statement made in the V.N. 
General AssemUy by U.S. Representative 
Arthur J. Goldberg on December U, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by tlie 
Assembly on December 16. 


U.S./D.N. press release 243 dated December 14 

The position of the United Nations regard- 
ing the relationship between South Africa and 
South West Africa is clear. It was expressed in 
the overwhelming approval of the General As- 
sembly's resolution on this question more than 
a year ago.^ That resolution, which the United 
States fully supported was, as I said at the time, 
intrinsically somid.^ South Africa's own actions 
in breach of its obligations, its disavowal of the 
mandate, and its disregard of the advisory opin- 
ions of the International Court of Justice pro- 
vided the basis for the General Assembly's de- 
cision that South Africa's mandate for South 
"West Africa was terminated and that hence- 
forth South West Africa came under the direct 
responsibility of the United Nations. It is on the 
basis of this decision that the United Nations 
has subsequently acted. Members of the United 
Nations have not always agreed with unanimity 
on courses of action, but uppermost in our 
minds have always been the rights of the mhab- 
itants of South West Africa and the obligation 
of the international community not only to pre- 
serve those rights, but also to seek their full en- 
joyment, for the inhabitants. 

Now, Mr. President, if South Africa's own 
actions led to the forfeit of her rights in South 

• For text of Resolution 2145 (XXI) adopted on Oct. 
27, 1966, see Bulletin of Dec. 5. 1966, p. 870. 

' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg made in 
the General Assembly on Oct. 12, 1966, see ihid., Oct. 
31, 1966, p. 690. 

West Africa and formed the basis of the United 
Nations decision to terminate South Africa's 
mandate, what have been South Africa's sub- 
sequent actions ? Unquestionably, the actions of 
the South African Government since October 
27, 1966, reaffirm the wisdom of the General 
Assembly's decision and constitute the best refu- 
tation of South Africa's hollow and unconvinc- 
ing contention that it administers South West 
Afi-ica "in the spirit of the Mandate entrusted 
to it by the League of Nations, and has no in- 
tention of abdicating its responsibilities toward 
the people of South West Africa." 

South African proposals earlier this year to 
impose and promote the fragmentation of the 
territory under the guise of self-determination 
and to acliieve piecemeal annexation under the 
guise of administrative efficiency must be 
opposed because of their potential long-term 
harmful etfect. South Africa's imposition in 
South West Africa of its universally con- 
demned policy of apartheid should be a matter 
of deep concern for all of us. Moreover, these 
proposals represent clear defiance of the Gen- 
eral Assembly's wise injunction that South 
Africa refrain and desist from any action — 
constitutional, administrative, political, or 
otherwise — which will in any manner whatso- 
ever alter or tend to alter the present inter- 
national status of South West Africa. 

I would like to analyze in some detail the 
atrocious Terrorism Act, under which 37 South 
West Africans were charged and brought to 
trial under conditions which are repugnant to 
all who believe in justice under law. This act is 
significant because of its immediate implication 
in terms of human lives and its longrun effect 
in terms of an attempt to break the will of South 
West Africans to achieve tlieir right of self- 
determination. The act, promulgated after 
South Africa's lawful authority for the terri- 
tory had terminated, represents not only South 
African defiance of the United Nations but 



also further proof of South Africa's determina- 
tion to flout tlie spirit and terms of the League 
of Nations mandate. 

Three months ago, on September 12, the 
Special Committee of this Assembly called upon 
the South African Government to release the 
accused inmiediately.^ That Government has 
ignored that call. At that time, the United 
States Representative, noting that neither law- 
lessness nor the absence of a lawfully function- 
ing independent judiciary could be contem- 
plated, succinctly stated the reasons that the 
application of the Terrorism Act to South "West 
Africa was inadmissible. It is still inadmissible. 

jNIr. President, in the 20-year discussion of 
apartheid in the United Nations, United States 
Representatives frequently have had occasion 
to comment on legislation passed to implement 
apartheid. Surely the Terrorism Act rivals the 
worst of the legislation and, as long as it exists, 
constitutes a self-repudiation of South Africa's 
claim to a tradition of respect for the rule of 
law. Lest some say that this judgment is too 
harsh, let the terms of the act speak for 
themselves : 

1. It is retroactive to so-called "offenses" per- 
formed 5 years ago. 

2. It places upon the accused the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he did 
not perform acts, harmless in themselves, with 
the intent to commit a crime. 

3. It subjects persons found guilty of what 
South Africa calls "terroristic activities" to the 
penalty provided for treason — death by hang- 
ing — or, in any case, imprisonment for life or 
for not less than 5 years. 

4. It authorizes any conamissioned police 
officer to arrest without warrant persons he be- 
lieves may have violated the act or who might 
be useful as potential witnesses and to detain 
them indefinitely without bail, without recourse 
to the courts or counsel, and without the right 
to receive visits from family or friends. 

5. It allows the government to try jointly per- 
sons accused of separate violations, thereby per- 
mittmg the guilt of the accused to be adjudged 
in a mass trial. 

6. It permits a person acquitted of one charge 
to be tried again on other charges arising out 
of the same acts. 

7. Finally, it defines offenses with such 
vagueness as to approach absurdity. For ex- 
ample, any person who intentionally "embar- 

' U.N. doc. A/6700. 

rass(es)" the administration of the affairs of 
the "State" or who encourages "feelings of hos- 
tility between the White and other inhabitants 
of the Republic" is a "terrorist." Other offenses 
which might otherwise be misdemeanors, for 
example, obstructing traffic, are likewise made 
subject to a hanging sentence. 

Wlio are the defendants presently being tried 
imder this act? Why were they held without 
charge, incommunicado, and in solitary con- 
finement for up to 400 days? What is the sig- 
nificance of their trial 1,000 miles away from 
their homes in a court guarded by sten-gun- 
armed policemen and ijolice dogs? In the 
answers to these questions are the principal ele- 
ments of the tragedy of South West Africa. 
They illuminate the whole range of the problem 
before the General Assembly today. 

The defendants are not well known like Nel- 
son Mandela or the Nobel Peace Prize winner, 
the late Chief Albert Luthuli. However, they, 
too, are men who have sought a future for their 
homeland in which they and the overwhelming 
majority who are nonwhite may participate in 
governing their own affairs free from the re- 
strictions and the discrimination of apartheid. 
In most democratic societies they would be able 
to pursue their goals through speeches and pub- 
lications and would not be subject to hanging 
under the absurd charge of embarrassing the 
government or promoting a spirit of hostility. 

But to seek the goals of free men in the inter- 
national territory of South West Africa is to 
be subjected to increasing restrictions, culminat- 
ing in this declaration of terror by the South 
African Parliament on June 12, 1967. Out of 
these restrictions grows desperation, and in that 
desperation some have found no alternative to 
violence as an expression of this determination 
to be free. 

The United States does not condone violence. 
The United States does condemn the brutality 
of a government whose official policies have bred 
violence by closing avenues of peaceful dissent 
in South West Africa, thereby generating the 
very behavior it seeks to punish. 

Most disconcerting of all is the possibility 
that the full story has not been told. How many 
South West Africans who have committed the 
"crime" of desiring to attain elementary himian 
rights are being held without charge in solitary 
or other confinement without knowledge of 
family, without access to counsel, with no hope 
of fair trial except under conditions of spu- 

JANUART 15, 1968 


rious legality? How many others, if finally 
brought to trial, will find that serious sugges- 
tions of assault during detention are ignoi-ed on 
the basis of a bald denial by a prosecution 
witness ? 

As a member of this international community, 
however, we have a right and a responsibility, 
expressed in our cosponsorship and support of 
the resolution before us contained in document 
A/L.536, to call upon the South African Gov- 
ernment to provide us with complete and 
straightforward answers. We liave a right and 
a responsibility to call upon the South African 
Government to halt these prosecutions, to re- 
lease and repatriate these South West Africans, 
and to cease the application of this act. This we 
do with all the vigor at our command. 

Mr. Chairman, I would not wish to conclude 
my statement tonight without referring to the 
extreme and ridiculous allegations which we 
have heard in the past several days with regard 
to the implementation by the United States of 
the United Nations embargo of the supply of 
arms and military equipment to South Africa. 
My country has adhered scrupulously to the 
terms of this embargo. Despite this unequivocal 
position on the implementation of the Security 
Council's resolution on the shipment of arms 
and military materiel,^ the United States has 
been cited by two delegations during this debate 
for alleged violations in this field. I would like 
to cite these allegations and insinuations briefly 
and refute them categorically. 

The distinguished delegate of the Soviet 
Union stated that the United States and certain 
other countries "continue to deliver bombers to 
the South African racists, as well as their mis- 
siles and various types of small arms." It is 
significant that the Soviet delegation did not 
provide any details on this sweeping allegation, 
either in the statement from whicli I have quot- 
ed or in its earlier statement on South West 
Africa. On earlier occasions when similar state- 
ments have been made, we have directly chal- 
lenged the Soviet delegate to furnish details, 
details which the Soviet delegation has been 
unable to provide. These charges were fabri- 
cated out of thin air. It is impossible to provide 
details because they do not exist. 

Faced with this fact, other delegations have 
resorted to inference and insinuation rather 
than direct statements such as the one I have 
quoted. The distinguished delegate of Hungary, 
speaking at the 1624th meeting on December 11, 
1967, said that "according to press reports in 

March 1967, the South African Army and Air 
Force were interested in an American executive 
aircraft." Mr. President, I cannot confirm or 
deny exactly what possible purchases interest 
South African military authorities, but I can 
deny categorically the suggestion, wliich the 
distinguished delegate of Hungary obviously 
sought to get across, that the United States is 
furnishing such aircraft. 

Mr. President, these citations will serve to 
illustrate the extent to which the delegation of 
the Soviet Union and other delegations with 
similar intentions go in their frantic efforts 
to use the debate on South West Africa as one 
more device for launching attacks on the United 
States together with other Western countries. 

Now, Mr. President, while the United States 
and other countries continue to strictly enforce 
an embargo on the sale of arms and military 
equipment to South Africa, that countrj' does 
continue to receive large quantities of modern 
and sophisticated weapons. The real sources of 
these weapons are seldom mentioned. Those 
who criticized the United States, which scrupu- 
lously enforces the embargo, might better direct 
themselves to those countries which do not do 
so and to ways by which the embargo might be 
made more effective. 

Mr. Chainnan, the Assembly's action on 
South West Africa last fall was historic, ending 
a longstanding mandate for just cause. The 
United States will do its utmost, by all ap- 
propriate and peaceful means, to help carry 
through to fruition the aims which are so 
broadly shared and which are embodied in the 
Assembly's Resolution 2145. We will provide 
full and faithful support to the people of South 
West Africa in the peaceful pursuit of their 
goals, in their efforts to assert and to exercise 
fully the rights to which all men everywhere 


Question of South West Afeica 

The General AssemMy, 

Recalling its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 
1966, by which it terminated the Mandate for South 
West Africa and decided, inter alia, that South Africa 
has no other right to administer the Territory and that 

* For text of Resolution S/5386 adopted on Aug. 7, 
1963, see Buxletin of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 338. 

' U.N. doc. A/RES/2,324 (XXII) ; adopted on 
Dee. 16 by a vote of 110 (U.S.) to 2, with 1 abstention. 



henceforth South West Africa conies under the direct 
responsibility of the United Nations, 

Gravely concerned about the arrest, deportation and 
trial at Pretoria of thirty-seven South West Africans 
by the South African authorities in flagrant viola- 
tion of their rights and of the aforementioned 

Recalling further the resolution adopted on 12 Sep- 
tember 1907 by the Special Committee on the Situation 
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples and also the consensus adopted by the 
United Nations Council for South West Africa on 
27 November 1067, 

Conscious of the special responsibilities of the 
United Nations towards the people and Territory of 
South West Africa. 

1. Condemns the Illegal arrest, deportation and trial 
at Pretoria of the thirty-seven South West Africans as 
a flagrant violation by the Government of South 

Africa of their rights, of the international status of 
the Territory and of General Assembly resolution 
2145 (XXI) ; 

2. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to 
discontinue forthwith this illegal trial and to release 
and repatriate the South West Africans concerned ; 

3. Appeals to all States and international organiza- 
tions to use their influence with the Government of 
South Africa in order to obtain its compliance with the 
provisions of paragraph 2 above ; 

4. Draws the attention of the Security Council to 
the present resolution ; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report as soon 
as pos.sible to the Security Council, the General As- 
sembly, the United Nations Council for South West 
Africa and the Special Committee on the Situation 
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples on the implementation of the present 

U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Extended Through March 1968 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
Arthur J. Goldberg on December 22, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 


U.S./U.N. press release 257 dated December 22 

The United States was pleased to support the 
resolution extending the life of the United Na- 
tions Force in Cyprus for 3 months, and we are 
gratified that it was adopted imanimously by 
the Security Council. Like all resolutions 
adopted by the Council, no single member can 
give it an authoritative interpretation. The 
resolution speaks for itself. 

The world has only recently watched with 
great concern as violence increased in Cyprus 
itself and the danger of hostilities rapidly 
mounted. It was only due to strenuous efforts by 
many, including the Secretary-General and his 
representative, Mr. [Jose] Eolz-Bennett, and 
the ultimate cooperation of Greece, Turkey, and 
Cyprus, that the comer was turned. 

It was, of course, the appeal of the Secretary- 
General of December 3 that was the critical ele- 

ment in making this favorable turn of events 
possible. Two critical factors were involved: 
first, the withdrawal of Greek and Turkish ex- 
cess troops and an abatement of military meas- 
ures as a first step following the appeal of the 
Secretary-General and, second, the extension of 
the good offices of the Secretary-General, as 
proffered by him. 

We are gratified that all three governments 
welcomed the appeal of December 3 and that 
prompt action was undertaken by Greece and 
Turkey in response to the first part of the 
appeal. We are also gratified with the favorable 
attitude shown toward the Secretary-General's 
offer of good offices and, in particular, with the 
prospect that those good offices can now — in 
light of the Secretary-General's statement 
today, which we welcomed and listened to with 
great interest^ — be expected to go forward with 
the support of the Council in the resolution we 
have just adopted and without the time pres- 
sures which the extension of the life of the 
Force have relieved. 

We believe this process will be a highly im- 
portant one and we urge those concerned to 
approach it with the greatest determination to 
reach an understanding exactly in the spirit of 
the Secretary-General's statement here today. 

JANUARY 15, 1968 


For our part, we will continue to support the 
work of UNFICYP both politically and 
financially. And parenthetically, my Govern- 
ment has contributed since the inception of the 
Force in excess of $30 million to the Force. 

We also believe we must look beyond the im- 
mediate issues toward a permanent solution, as 
the risks from the recurrent crises can be seen 
to be becoming progressively larger. The prog- 
ress of the resolution to this effect is thei'efore 
of great unportance, and we hope early atten- 
tion can be given to the methods by which this 
aspect of the problem can be best approached, 
none of which methods we have excluded in 
adopting the resolution. 

Mr. President, I regi-et that at this meeting 
of the Council, which hopefully will be the last 
one before the holiday season — that on the 
tlireshold of unanimous agreement around this 
table, we were once again subjected to the fa- 
miliar and platitudinous Soviet theme of an 
imperialist conspiracy to extinguish the inde- 
pendence of Cyprus. It was precisely those 
countries, described in such heavyhanded and 
entirely mendacious terms, which Ambassador 
[Nikolai] Fedorenko accuses of this plot, which 
had been in the forefront of efforts to uphold 
the independence of Cyprus. It is those coun- 
tries, both directly and in suj^port of the United 
Nations, which have given tangible evidence 
of their willingness and anxiety to contribute 
to peace and security in that troubled island. 
Surely, the intensive efforts, for example, of our 
own emissary, Sir. Cyrus Vance, can hardly be 
considered as anything but a sincere and vital 
commitment to insure the maintenance of 
peace and security and to create opportunities 
to find a solution. And it is entirely pertinent 
to note that those efforts have been applauded by 
all of the parties concerned. 

Nor can I let this occasion pass by permitting 
UNFICYP to be described as a foreign force. 
It is an agent of the world organization, estab- 
lished by the Security Council at the request of 
the Government of Cyprus. And we are all 
deeply indebted to those nations which have 
contributed their soldiers to the U.N. Force and 
to the cause of peacekeeping. 

Now, if the Soviet Union were to chanse its 

policy and show a willingness to contribute to 
the efforts of this organization and UNFICYP 
to mamtain peace in Cyprus — if, to use an 
American slang word, it would "put up" in 
support of peacekeeping — I am sure we would 
all listen with much closer attention to the 
Soviet comments on this subject. 


The Security Council, 

Noting the appeals addressed by the Secretary- 
General to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus on 22 November, 24 November and 3 December 
and the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 
1967 (S/8286), 

Noting the replies of the three Governments con- 
cerned to the appeal of the Secretary-General of 3 
December in which the Secretary-General proffered his 
good offices, and their replies to his previous appeals, 

Noting from the said report of the Secretary-General 
that circumstances continue to require the presence 
of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
for a further period. 

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed 
that it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 
December 1967, 

1. Reaffirms its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 
1964 and its subsequent resolutions as well as its ex- 
pressions of consensus on this question ; 

2. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United 
Nations Peace-keeping Force established under the 
Council's resolution 186, for a period of three months 
ending on 26 March 1968 : 

3. Invites the parties promptly to avail themselves 
of the good ofiBces proffered by the Secretary-General 
and requests the Secretary-General to report on the 
results to the Council as appropriate ; 

4. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to 
show the utmost moderation and restraint and refrain 
from any act which might aggravate the situation ; 

5. Urges the parties concerned to undertake a new 
determined effort to achieve the objectives of the Secu- 
rity Council with a view, as requested in the Council's 
consensus of 24/25 November 1967, to keeping the peace 
and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance 
with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 

6. Decides to remain seized of this question and to 
reconvene for its further consideration as soon as cir- 
cumstances and developments so require. 

1 U.N. doc. S/KES/244 (1967) ; adopted unanimously 
on Dec. 22. 



United States Presents Views on the Question 
of General and Complete Disarmament 

Statement hy Adrian S. Fisher 

V.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assernbly ^ 

I would like today to present to tliis com- 
mittee the United States views on tlie question 
of general and complete disarmament. These 
views represent an altogether different ap- 
proach to the subject than those we have heard 
from several previous speakers, and notably 
tliose incorporated in the statement by the dis- 
tinguished First Deputy Foreign Minister of 

Before elaborating on the differences in these 
views I would like to take this opportunity to 
comment on certain allegations which have been 
made that the Federal Republic of Germany is 
the main obstacle to the acceptance by the West- 
ern alliance of the disarmament proposals pre- 
sented by the Soviet Union and its Socialist 
allies and that this Govermnent is furthermore 
opposed to all disarmament measures. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
Federal Republic of Germany is the first 
European nation which through solemn treaty 
obligations has renounced the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons. It is the only nation of a 
major alliance that has committed all of its 
forces to the military command of that alli- 
ance — and as a result has no military forces 
under its own independent command. It is now 
a nation which is actively seeking to build 
bridges between Eastern and "Western Europe 
and being rebuffed in this effort by those very 
nations in the Eastern bloc which impugn her 

Contrary to the allegations, Mr. Chairman, 
the difficulty is not with the Federal Republic 
and its Western allies, who act together in these 
matters. As I hope to make clear in my remarks, 

'Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on 
Dee. 12 (D.S./U.N. press release 234). 

the difficulty lies in the faulty nature of the 
disarmament proposals put forth by the Soviet 

False allegations made in this body will serve 
no useful purpose but will make more difficult 
the achievement of a lasting European security 
arrangement based on mutual accord. The 
United States delegation believes it is its duty 
to speak on behalf of its ally which has no rep- 
resentation in this body. 

The difference between the approach of the 
United States to the question of general and 
complete disarmament and that of the Soviet 
Union can be ascertained by comparing the 
United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a 
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament 
in a Peaceful World ^ and the Soviet Draft 
Treaty on General and Complete Disarma- 
ment Under Strict International Control. Both 
provide for the process of general and complete 
disarmament to take place in three stages. 

The United States program for general and 
complete disarmament provides for a freezing 
of levels of armed forces and amnaments at an 
agreed time and then progressively over the 
three stages for the reduction of national mili- 
tary establishments to levels required for the 
maintenance of internal order and for support- 
ing a United Nations peace force. Provisions 
are made in the United States proposal for the 
creation during the process of disarmament of 
adequate machinery for v^erification, to insure 
that the terms of an agreement are being car- 
ried out, as well as for the strengthening of 
peacekeeping forces to maintain peace and 
security for all. 

• For text, see Buu-EnN of May 7, 1962, p. 747. 

JAXUARY 15, 1968 


The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, em- 
phasizes almost total reductions of selected cat- 
egories of armaments at the very outset of the 
disarmament process. It seeks drastic reduc- 
tions of nuclear-weapon carriers at the_ very 
beginning of the disarmament process — in its 
first stage — before it provides for the establish- 
ment of adequate machinery for verification. 
That proposal, in the first stage of the disarma- 
ment process, not only fails to inspire the con- 
fidence and trust upon which subsequent phases 
can and must be built but would materially 
alter the existing military balance in favor of 
the Soviet Union. 

I might point out that at no time has the 
Soviet Govenmient ever indicated how^ — by 
what progressive steps — such reductions woidd 
take place. This presents us with a difficulty 
which is not new to us. The Soviet proposals 
dealing with general and complete disarma- 
ment do not really deal with the steps which 
can actually be taken now to halt the arms race 
and begin the process of disarmament. They 
appear to require agi-eement on how to proceed 
almost to the end of the road to general and com- 
plete disarmament before any action is taken. 

This difference in approach — the United 
States believing we should take the steps we 
can take now to get us moving down the road 
to general and complete disarmament, the Soviet 
Union apparently believmg that we should not 
do so until we have agreement as to how to pro- 
ceed to the end of the road, or almost to the 
end of the road — has been reflected in the atti- 
tude of our disarmament negotiators both at 
the ENDC [Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee] and elsewhere. 

The United States has proposed a cutoff of 
the production of fissionable material for weap- 
ons purposes. This proposal was rejected as 
not involving disarmament. The United States 
indicated that it was prepared to transfer 60,000 
kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 to peaceful 
uses if the U.S.S.E. would agree to a transfer 
of 40,000 kilograms for this purpose. This pro- 
posal was rejected as not involving the destruc- 
tion of a single nuclear weapon. The United 
States indicated that it would obtain the mate- 
rial by the demonstrated destruction of nuclear 
weapons. This proposal was ignored. 

The United States has made similar propos- 
als for workable measures dealing with the 
reduction of the delivery systems for nuclear 
weapons. In January 1964 the United States 
proposed that we explore a verified freeze on 

the number and characteristics of strategic nu- 
clear offensive and defensive vehicles, an agree- 
ment which would open the path to reductions 
in all types of arms. This proposal was charac- 
terized by the Soviets as one involving inspec- 
tion without disarmament. As recently as Sep- 
tember of this year, Secretary [of Defense 
Robert S.] McNamara reiterated our willingness 
to enter into agreement not only to limit, but 
later to reduce, both offensive and defensive 
strategic nuclear forces.^ In coimection with a 
possible agreement leveling off or reducing stra- 
tegic offensive and defensive systems. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke pointed out 
that, although agreements involving substantial 
reductions would require agreed international 
inspection, "a number of possibilities for paral- 
lel action and even for formal agreement . . . 
would permit our reliance on tmilateral means 
of verification." * These statements would ap- 
pear to take care of the point of inspection with- 
out disarmament. These statements have gone 

Here, too — it .seems — we have been continu- 
ally faced with an approach which requires 
agreement on how to proceed almost to the end 
of the road to general and complete disarma- 
ment before any first steps can be taken. This is 
quite contrary to the philosophy which moti- 
vates our efforts to obtain a nonproliferation 
treaty which recognizes the need for step-by- 
step progress even in the absence of agreement 
on the final elimination of nuclear weapons. 

In this connection, it is fortunate that the 
Soviet position on immediately practical par- 
tial measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear 
weapons has not been reflected in our efforts to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new 
countries and new enviromnents. If it had we 
would not today have the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and be on the 
threshold of a nonprolifei-ation treaty. 

Mr. Chairman, it is in this context that I 
would like to refer to the report of the Secre- 
tary-General on the effects of the possible use 
of nuclear weapons and on tlie security and eco- 
nomic implications for states of the acquisition 
and further development of those weapons.' 

'For an address by Secretary McNamara made at 
San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 18, 19G7, see ibid., Oct. 9, 
1967, p. 443. 

' In an address made before the Advocates Club of 
Detroit on Oct. 6, 1967. 

" U.N. doc. A/6858 and Corr. 1. 



Mr. Chairman, iny delegation commends the 
Secretai y-Gcneral for his eil'orts in tlie prepara- 
tion of a most useful and timely document. My 
delegation also commends the consultant ex- 
perts, wlio were able, through cooperation and 
mutual understanding, to agree on a umxni- 
mous report dealing with many sensitive and 
controversial issues. 

This report contains many conclusions which 
will be helpful to us in our consideration of the 
nonpi-oliferation of nuclear weapons. 

It clearly dissipates the illusion that a non- 
proliferation treaty is something which pri- 
marily benefits the nuclear powers at the ex- 
pense of the nonnuclear powers. It makes it 
quite clear that new nuclear powers would en- 
danger themselves — or the remaining non- 
nuclear powers^far more than they would 
endanger the existing nuclear-weapon powers. 

It points up the imavoidable economic costs 
involved, which are a curse to any nuclear- 
weapon state, and notes that no nuclear- weap- 
ons program coidd be undertaken unless the 
states so doing reallocate "a major portion of 
their technical resources from constructive 

It also indicates that time is running out for 
mankind if it is to control and eventually abol- 
ish the threat or risk of nuclear war. The fact, 
as the report indicates, that the widespread in- 
stallation of nuclear power stations will by 1980 
yield plutonium sufficient for the construction 
of thousands of nuclear weapons each year must 
be recognized as an imperative for immediate 
action. The prospect of the widespread distri- 
bution of even primitive nuclear devices, with 
a consequent probability that present exacting 
procedures for command and control of these 
weapons could not be maintained under such 
conditions, presents a threat many times 
greater than that which exists today. 

But this report also deals with the subject 
on which the United States and the U.S.S.E. 
have differed in their approach to general and 
complete disarmament. It deals, insofar as nu- 
clear weapons are concerned, with the issue of 
what we can agree to now that will put us in 
motion on the road to general and complete 
disarmament. I think it is fair to say that the 
report rejects the Soviet approach that we must 
have agi'eement on how to proceed to the end 
of the road before we can agree to any steps on 
how to start down that road. 

It does conclude that the elimination of all 

stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning 
of their use should be by way of general and 
complete disarmament. But it also recommends 
consideration of a range of immediate initial 
measures of arms limitations — measures which 
could lead to the reduction of the level of nuclear 
armaments and the lessening of tension in the 
world and, I quote, "the eventual elimination 
of nuclear armaments." 

In its concluding paragraphs this report 
points out that the problem of reversing the 
trend of a rapidly worsening world situation 
calls for a basic reappraisal of all interrelated 
factors. It mentions a variety of measures of 
arms limitation which could immediately be 
considered and which, taken together or in 
coml)ination, could help to inhibit the further 
multiplication of nuclear weapons or the further 
elaboration of nuclear arsenals, and so help 
insure national and world security. 

Among the measures that it mentions are an 
agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons, an agreement on the reduction of 
nuclear arsenals, a comprehensive test ban 
treaty, measures safeguarding the security of 
nonnuclear countries, and nuclear-free zones. 

The report recommends consideration of these 
measures of arms limitations in full recognition 
of the fact that they cannot of themselves elim- 
inate the threat of nuclear conflict. It recom- 
mends that they be taken, not as ends in 
themselves but as measures which would facil- 
itate further steps and could lead to the reduc- 
tion of the level of nuclear arsenals and the 
lessening of tensions in the world and the 
eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals. 

This report lends no support to a position that 
we should not now take one or a combination of 
the various immediate measures until we have 
come to an agreement on the eventual elimina- 
tion of nuclear arsenals. 

Mr. Chairman, in considering the approaches 
of the various countries to the problem of gen- 
eral and complete disarmament, this committee 
should have in mind that for almost 4 years the 
United States has had on the table workable 
measures first to prevent increase in, and later 
tx> reduce, the material used to make nuclear 
weapons, the weapons themselves, and the means 
of their delivery. It is the Soviet Union which 
has rejected these measures. It has done so on 
the ground that we must first agree to their 
proposal for the drastic reduction of nuclear- 
weapons carriers in the first stage of disarma- 

JAXCARY 15. 19G8 


ment — before adequate machinery has been 
established for verification. In the absence of 
agreement on tliis point, they have been imwill- 
ing to agree to these workable measures to 
prevent the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems from growing ever and ever 

Because of this position, the nuclear arsenals 
have grown ever and ever larger. They have 
grown on both sides. The United States does not 
believe that this course of conduct, which has 
been forced upon us by the attitude of the Soviet 
Union, is a wise one. The Secretary-General's 
report speaks out concerning the dangers of 
such a course far more eloquently than could 
I. I shall conclude these remarks by quoting it. 
It says: "And the longer the world waits, the 
more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and 
more diificult becomes the eventual task.' 

Outer Space Treaty Registered 
With U.N. Secretary-General 

States in the negotiations that began shortly 
after President Johnson's statement of May 7, 
1966, calling attention to the need for a treaty 
in view of the prospect of manned lunar land- 
ings.^ The Outer Space Treaty was approved by 
the General Assembly on December 19, 1966, " 
and signed in Washington, London, and Mos- 
cow on the following January 27. The Senate 
gave its advice and consent on April 25 and 
President Johnson ratified the treaty on May 
24. On October 10 of this year — 18 months after 
the President's proposal — the treaty entered 
into force with the deposit of the necessary in- 
struments of ratification.* Of the 84 countries 
that have signed the treaty in Washington, 17 
have already deposited their ratifications. 

The treaty is a remarkable accomplishment, 
considering the complex and imique character 
of the issues with which it deals. It stands as a 
symbol of the way in which the members of 
the United Nations, working together in fields 
of shared interests, can reach mutually bene- 
ficial agreements. The treaty also bears witness 
to the fact that law need not lag behind the 
the accomplishments of science and technology. 

U.S. /U.N. presa release 217 dated November 30 


The United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union on November 30 registered 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 ^ with the Sec- 
retary-General of the United Nations. A three- 
power note signed by Ambassadors Arthur J. 
Goldberg, Lord Caradon, and Nikolai Fedo- 
renko informed Secretary-General U Thant of 
their desire to register the treaty. 

The three depositary Governments thus ful- 
filled their duties under article XIV of the 
treaty to register it in accordance with article 
102 of the United Nations Charter. Article 102 
requires that international agreements be 
promptly registered with the Secretary-General. 
The Secretariat publishes these agreements in 
the United Nations Treaty Series. Registration 
by the United Nations Representatives of the 
three Governments is the final step following 
negotiation. General Assembly approval, signa- 
ture, and entry into force of the Outer Space 

Ambassador Goldberg represented the United 

' For test of the treaty, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, 
p. 953. 


His Excellency 

U Thant 

Secretary General of the United Nations 

Deab Mr. Seceetabt General : Expressing our 
highest esteem, we have the honor on behalf of the 
Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America 
to transmit for registration in accordance with Article 
102 of the Charter, the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, which was opened for signature at London, 
Moscow and Washington on January 27, 1967, and en- 
tered into force on October 10, 1967. 

Article XIV of that Treaty designates the Govern- 
ments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 
land, and the United States of America Depositary 
Governments and provides that the Treaty shall be 
registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

We transmit to you herewith certified copies of the 
three originals of the aforementioned Treaty, in the 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish lan- 
guages, and request that you consider that Treaty as 
registered m the United Nations Secretariat by joint 

' Ibid., June 6, 1966. p. 900. 

' IMd., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78. 

* For background, see Hid., Oct. 30, 1967, p. 565. 



representation of the Governments of the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics, the ITnited Kingdom of 

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 

States of America. 

Accept, Mr. Secretary General, assurances of our 

highest consideration. 

Abthtjr J. 

Permanent Fepre- 
acntaHve of the 
United States of 
America to the 
United Nations 

Permanent Repre- 
sentative o] the 
Union of Soviet 
Socialist Repub- 
lics to the Unit- 
ed Nations 

Permanent Repre- 
sentative of the 
United Kingdom 
of Great Britain 
and Northern 
Ireland to the 
United Nations 


United States and Korea Sign 
New Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 292 dated December 11 


Notes -were exchanged in Washington on 
December 11, 1967, constituting a new bilateral 
agreement governing exports of cotton textiles 
from the Republic of Korea to the United 
States. Assistant Secretary of State Anthony 
M. Solomon signed on behalf of the United 
States Government ; Ambassador Dong Jo Kim 
signed on behalf of the Eepublic of Korea. 

The new agreement, which supersedes the 
agreement signed January 26, 1965,^ is retro- 
active to January 1, 1967, and will expire on 
December 31, 1970. For the first agreement year 
(1967), Korea may export to the United States 
a total of 32,216,250 square yards of cotton tex- 
tiles. Of this total, exports of approximately 23 
million square yards may be of yams and fab- 
rics, and approximately 9 million square yards 
may be of apparel. Other provisions in the 
agreement are similar to those contained in 
other U.S. cotton textile bilateral agreements; 
these include provision for growth, flexibility, 
carryover, equity, and consultation. 


Decembek 11, 1907 
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the deci- 
sion of the Cotton Textiles Committee of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade approving a Protocol 
to extend through September 30, 1970 the Long-Term 
Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton 
Textiles, done in Geneva on February 9, 1962 (herein- 
after referred to as "the Long-Term Arrangement")." 
I also refer to recent discussions between representa- 
tives of our two Governments and to the agreement 
between our two Governments concerning exports of 
cotton textiles from the Republic of Korea to the United 
States effected by an exchange of notes dated January 
26, 1965, as amended. I confirm on behalf of my Gov- 
ernment, the understanding that, as of January 1, 
1967, the following agreement supersedes the 1965 
agreement, as amended, except for the exchange of 
letters dated November 22, 1966' concerning amounts 
of cotton textiles exported between January 1, 1966 
and April 1, 1967 that are not charged against the limi- 
tations in the agreement. This agreement is based on 
our understanding that the above-mentioned Protocol 
entered into force for our two Governments on October 
1, 1967. 

1. The purpose of this agreement is to provide for 
the orderly development of trade in cotton textiles 
between the Republic of Korea and the United States 
of America. 

2. The agreement shall extend through December 31, 
1970. During the term of the agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Korea shall limit annual 
exports of cotton textiles to the United States to 
aggregate, group and specific limits at the levels specified 
in the following paragraphs. It is noted that these levels 
reflect a special adjustment for the first agreement year. 
The levels set forth in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 for the 
second agreement year are 5 percent higher than 
the limits for the preceding year without this special 
adjustment; thus the growth factor provided for 
in paragraph 10 has already been applied in arriving 
at these levels for the second agreement year. 

3. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12- 
month period beginning January 1, 1967, the aggregate 
limit shall be 32,216,250 square yards equivalent. 
For the second agreement year, the aggregate limit 
shall be 35,070,000 square yards equivalent. 

4. Within the aggregate limit, the following group 
limits shall apply for the first and second agreement 
years, respectively: 

Square Yards EquivaXent 

First Secmd 

Agreement Year Agreement Year 

Group I 

(Categories 1-38 
and 64) 
Group II 

(Categories 39-63) 

22, 882, 500 24, 896, 812 

9, 333, 750 10, 173, 188 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 22, 1965, p. 275. 

' For text of the Long-Term Arrangement, see iUd., 
Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 

' For texts of U.S. note and letter dated Nov. 22, 
1966, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 983. 

JANUART 15, 1968 


5. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable group 
limits, the following specific limits shall apply for the 
first and second agreement years: 

Group I 


FirH Agreement Year 

Second Agreement Year 


500, 000 syds. 

525, 000 syds. 


2,426,250 syds. 

2,625,000 syds. 


1, 838, 438 syds. 

1, 995, 000 syds. 


743, 001 svds. 

840, 000 syds. 

26 (other than 

919, 219 syds. 

997, 500 syds. 


26 (duck) 

10, 937, 344 syds. 

11, 550, 000 syds. 

31 (wiping 

950, 866 pes. 

998, 550 pes. 


(330, 901 syds.) 

(347, 495 syds.) 


88, 977 pes. 

93, 450 pes. 

(551, 657 syds.) 

(579, 390 syds.) 

64A (Table- 

443, 353 lbs. 

479, 850 lbs. 

cloths and 

(2, 039, 424 syds.) (2, 207, 310 syds.) 


64B (Zipper 

55, 781 lbs. 

58, 800 lbs. 


(256, 592 syds.) 

(270, 480 syds.) 

Group II 


Firtl Agreement Year Second Agreement Year 




29,804 doz. 

31,500 doz. 

(661,232 syds.) 

(698,859 syds.) 


23,788 doz. 

25,200 doz. 

(581,783 syds.) 

(616,316 syds.) 


22,885 doz. 

26,250 doz. 

(743,763 syds.) 

(853,125 syds.) 


41,974 doz. 

44,100 doz. 

(747,011 syds.) 

(784,848 syds.) 


56,807 doz. 

59,850 doz. 

(1,010,994 svds.) 

(1,065,150 syds.) 


29,391 doz. 

31,500 doz. 

(427,051 syds.) 

(457,695 syds.) 


42,019 doz. 

47,250 doz. 

(1,050,475 syds.) 

(1,181,250 syds.) 


25,013 doz. 

27,300 doz. 

(1,299,675 syds.) 

(1,418,508 syds.) 

6. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable 
group limits, the foUowing specific limits shall apply 
for the second agreement year only. In agreement 
years other than the second agreement year, the pro- 
cedures of paragraph 8(b) shall apply: 



625,000 syds. 


25,000 doz. 

(554,650 syds.) 


10,000 doz. 

(500,000 syds.) 


10,000 doz. 

(453,000 syds.) 


10,000 doz. 

(510,000 syds.) 

7. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for Group I 
may be exceeded by not more than 10 percent and the 
limit for Group II may be exceeded by not more than 5 
percent. Within the applicable Group limit, as it may 
be adjusted vmder this provision, specific limits may be 
exceeded by 5 percent. 

8. (a) Within the applicable group limits for each 
group, the square yard equivalent of any shortfalls 
occurring In exports in the categories given specific 
limits may be used in any category not given a specific 

(b) In the event the Government of the Republic 
of Korea desires to export in any agreement year more 
than the consultation level specified in this agreement 
in any category not given a specific limit, it shall re- 
quest consultations with the Government of the United 
States of America on this question. The Government of 
the United States of America shall agree to enter into 
such consultations and, during the course thereof, shall 
provide the Government of the Republic of Korea with 
information on the condition of the United States mar- 
ket in the category in question. Until agreement is 
reached, the Government of the Republic of Korea 
shall maintain its exports in the category in question 
at a level for the agreement year not in excess of the 
consultation level. For the first agreement year, the 
consultation level shall be 525,000 .square yards equiva- 
lent for categories in Group I, and 385,875 square yards 
equivalent for categories in Group II. 

9. The Government of the Republic of Korea shall 
limit exports of items of chief value corduroy in 
Categories 46, 50, 51, 5.3, 54 and 63 during each agree- 
ment year. For the first agreement year the level of 
this limit shall be 2,094,750 square yards equivalent. 
In the event excessive concentration in exports from 
the Republic of Korea to the United States of items 
of apparel of a particular fabric causes or threatens to 
cause market disruption in the United States, the 
Government of the United States may request in writ- 
ing consultations with the Government of the Republic 
of Korea to determine an appropriate course of action. 
Such a request shall be accompanied by a detailed fac- 
tual statement of the reasons and justifications for the 
request, including relevant data on imports from third 
countries. During the course of such consultation the 
Government of the Republic of Korea shall maintain 
exports in the categories in question at an annual level 
not in excess of 105 percent of the exports in such 
categories during the first twelve months of the fifteen 
month period immediately preceding the month in 
which consultations are requested, or at an annual 
level not in excess of 90 percent of the ex^jorts in such 
categories during the twelve-month period immediately 
preceding the month in which consultations are re- 
quested, whichever is higher. 

10. In the succeeding twelve-month periods for which 
any limitation is in force under this agreement, the- 
level of exports permitted under such limitation shall 
be increased by five percent of the corresponding level 
for the preceding twelve-month period, the latter level 
not to include any adjustments under paragraphs 7 
or 17. 

11. Exports in all categories of cotton textiles shall 
be spaced as evenly as possible, taking into account 
seasonal factors. 

12. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any 
available statistical data requested by the other Gov- 
ernment. In particular the Governments agree to ex- 
change monthly data on exports of cotton textile.s from 
the Republic of Korea into the United States. In the 
implementation of this agreement the system of cate- 
gories and factors for conversion into square yards 
equivalent set forth in the annex to this agreement ; 
shall appl.v. In any situation where the determination 
of an article to be a cotton textile would be affected by } 
whether the criterion provided for in Article 9 of the-,) 
Long-Term Arrangement is used or the criterion pro- j 
vided for in paragraph 2 of Annex E of the Long-Term- ' 



Arrangement is used, the obief value criterion used by 
the Government of tbe Unite<l States of America in 
accordance witli ])arasrai)h 2 of Annex E shall apply. 

13. During the term of this agreement the United 
States shall not invoke Article 3 of the Long-Term 
Arrangement to limit imports of cotton textiles from 
the Republic of Korea into the I'nited States. The 
applicability of the Long-Term Arrangement to trade 
in cotton textiles betvreen the Republic of Korea and 
the United States shall otherwise be unaffected by this 

14. The Governments agree to consult on any ques- 
tion arising in the Implementation of this agreement. 
In particular, if, in the event of a return to normal 
market conditions in the United States, the Govern- 
ment of the United States relaxes measures it has 
taken under the Long-Term Arrangement for any of the 
categories, the Government of the Republic of Korea 
may request and the Government of the United States 
of America agrees to enter into consultations concern- 
ing the possible removal or modification of the limits 
established for such categories by the present 

15. Mutually satisfactory adminiirtrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 
problems arising in the implementation of the agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedure or 

16. If the Government of the Republic of Korea con- 
siders that as a result of limitations specified in this 
agreement, the Republic of Korea is being placed in an 
inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea may request consulta- 
tion with the Government of the United States of 
America with the view to taking appropriate remedial 
action such as a reasonable modification of this 

17. (a) For any agreement year immediately fol- 
lowing a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year in which cot- 
ton textile exports from the Republic of Korea were 
below the aggregate limit and any group and si)ecifie 
limit applicable to the category concerned) the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Korea may permit exports to 
exceed the aggregate, group and specific limits by 
carryover in the following amounts and manner : 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of 
shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any applica- 
ble group or specific limit and shall not exceed either 
five percent of the aggregate limit or five percent of 
the applicable group limit in the year of the shortfall, 

(il) in the case of shortfalls in the categories sub- 
ject to specific limits the carryover shall not exceed 
9ve percent of the specific limit in the year of the short- 
fall, and shall be used in the same category in which 
:he shortfall occurred, and 

(iii) in the case of shortfalls not attributable to 
ategories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall 
s )e used in the same gronp in which the shortfall oc- 
I' "urred, shall not be used to exceed any applicable 
It ipecific limit except in accordance vi'ith the provisions 
»• 'f paragraph 7, and shall not be used to exceed the 
imits in paragraph 8 of this agreement. 

Ih) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
ills paragraph are without any adjustments under 
ais paragraph or paragraph 7. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports 
permitted in paragraph 7. 

18. The Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the United States of America may 
at any time propose revisions in the terms of this 
agreement. Each Government agrees to consult 
promptly with the other Government about such pro- 
posals with a view to making such revisions to the 
present agreement, or taking such other appropriate 
action, as may be mutually agreed upon. 

19. Either Government may terminate this agree- 
ment effective at the beginning of a new agreement 
year by written notice to the other Government to be 
given at least ninety days prior to the beginning of 
such new agreement year. 

If the foregoing conforms with the understanding 
of your Government, this note and Tour Excellency's 
note of confirmation * on behalf of the Government of 
the Republic of Korea shall constitute an agreement 
between our two Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my 
highest consideration. 

For the Acting Secretary of State : 
ANTHONr M. Solomon 

His Excellency 

Dong Jo Kim, 

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea 

Current Actions 



Convention on nature protection and wildlife preserva- 
tion in the Western Hemisphere, with annex. Done at 
the Pan American Union October 12, 1&40. Entered 
into force for the United States April 30, 19i2. 56 
Stat. 13.54. 
Ratification deposited: Chile, December 4, 1967. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extra- 
judicial documents in civil or commercial matters. 
Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.^ 
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, November 
17, 1967. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load Unes, 196C. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Enters into force July 21, 1968. 
TIAS 6331. 
Accession deposited: Mauritania, December 4, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force for the United States May 16, 1967. 
TIAS 6251. 
Acceptance deposited: France, November 29, 1967. 

' Not printed here. 
' Not in force. 

ANTART 1"), 196 8 



Sunnlementary convention on the aboUtion of slavery, 
the sCe tride and institutions and Practices similar 
to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. En- 
tered Into force for the united States December 6, 

Accession deposited: Spain, November 21, 1967. 


Lone-term arrangement regarding international trade 
i?f cotton textills, as amended and extended. Done at 
^neva February 9, 1962. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 1 1962. TIAS 5240, 6289. .,, ^^ 
Territorial application: Netherlands Antilles, Novem- 
ber 17, 1967. 

United Nations 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Inter- 
national court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco 
June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 

Admfsst^^lo mem-bersMp: Southern Yemen, Decem- 

her 14 1967 
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Adopted at New York December 20, 1965.i 
Ratification deposited: Italy, December 4, 1967. 


1067 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter- 
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115) Open 
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1, 
1967, inclusive. Entered into force July 10, 19b7. 

TIAS 6315. . ^ u OT iQflT. 

Ratifications deposited: Mexico, December 27, 19fo7 , 
Portugal, December 16, 1967. 



Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with 
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
December 11, 1967. Entered into force December 11, 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Agreement extending the convention of December 22, 
1966 for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income and the encouragement of international trade 
and investment. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Port of Spain December 19, 1967. Entered into force 
December 19, 1967. 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 28, 
1967 between the United States and the Embassy of 
India, representing the interests of the United Arab 
Republic. Entered into force January 1, 1968. 



Graham Martin as Special Assistant for Refugee and 
Migration Affairs to the Secretary of State, effective 
December 18. (For biographic details, see Department 
of State press release 296 dated December 18.) 


Agreement extending the supplementary income tax 
protocol signed at Brussels May 21, 1965 (TIAS 
6073). Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels De- 
cember 11, 1967. Entered into force December 11, 

Congo (Kinshasa) 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D). Signed at Kinshasa 
December 11, 1967. Entered into force December 11, 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of March 3, 1967, as amended 
(TIAS 6245). Effected by exchange of notes at Accra 
December 18, 1967. Entered into force December 18, 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D). Signed at Djakarta 
November 22, 1967. Entered into force November 22, 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. , ^. , 

Release issued prior to December 25 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 292 
of December 11. 


t302 12/26 

' Not in force. 






t307 12/29 


Agreement with Belgium pro- 
longing the income tax 
protocol of May 21, 1965. 

Foreign policy conference, Mi- 
ami, Fla., Jan. 16. 

Extension of U.S.-Mexican 
radio broadcasting agree- 

U.S. note of Dec. 29 to U.S.S.R. 

U.S. note of Dec. 4 to Royal 
Cambodian Government. 

Implementation of Katzenbach 

* Not printed. 

tHeld for a later Issue of the Bulletin. 



INDEX January 15, 1968 Vol. LVII, No. llfiO 

Atomic Energy. United States Presents Views on 
the Question of General and Complete Dis- 
armament (Fisher) 97 


President Johnson Mourns Death of Prime 
Minister Holt of Australia (Johnson) ... 71 

President Johnson Visits Australia, Thailand, 
South Viet-Nam, Paljistan, and Italy in 4%- 
Day Round-the-World Journey (Johnson, 
McEwen, texts of joint statements) .... 69 

Cyprus. U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Extended 
Through March 1968 (Goldberg, text of res- 
olution) 95 

Department and Foreign Service. Designations 

(Martin) 104 

Disarmament. United States Presents Views on 
the Question of General and Complete Dis- 
armament (Fisher) 97 

Economic Affairs 

President Johnson Signs Proclamation To Carry 
Out the Kennedy Round Tariff Agreements 
(Johnson, text of proclamation) 88 

United States and Korea Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) 101 

Italy. President Johnson Visits Australia, Thai- 
land, South Viet-Nam, Pakistan, and Italy in 
414-Day Round-the-World Journey (Johnson, 
McEwen, tests of joint statements) .... 69 


President Johnson Visits Australia, Thailand, 
South Viet-Nam, Palcistan, and Italy in 4%- 
Day Round-the-World Journey (Johnson, Mc- 
Ewen, texts of joint statements) 69 

United States and Korea Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (test of U.S. note) .... loi 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. President John- 
son Visits Australia, Thailand, South Viet- 

• Nam, Paljistan, and Italy in 4%-Day Round- 
the-World Journey (Johnson, McEwen, texts 
of joint statements) 69 

Pakistan. President Johnson Visits Australia 
Thailand, South Viet-Nam, Paliistan, and Italy 
in 4%-Day Round-the-World Journey (John- 
son, McEwen, texts of Joint statements) . . 69 

Presidential Documents 

President Johnson's Christmas Message to the 
Nation 79 

President Johnson Gratified by U.N. Endorse- 
ment of Agreement on Rescue and Return of 
Astronauts and Space Objects 85 

President Johnson Mourns Death of Prime Min- 
ister Holt of Australia 71 

President Johnson Signs Proclamation To Carry 
Out the Kennedy Round Tariff Agreements . 88 

President Johnson Visits Australia, Thailand, 
South Viet-Nam, Pakistan, and Italy in 414- 
Day Round-the-World Journey 69 

Refugees. Designations (Martin) 101 

South Africa. U.N. Condemns South Africa's 
Violation of Rights of South West Africans 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 92 

South West Africa. U.N. Condemns South Af- 
rica's Violation of Rights of South West 
Africans (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 92 


Outer Space Treaty Registered With U.N. Secre- 
tary-General (text of three-power note) . . 100 

President Johnson Gratified by U.N. Endorse- 
ment of Agreement on Rescue and Return of 
Astronauts and Space Objects (Johnson) . . 85 

United Nations Endorses Text of Agreement on 
Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space 
Vehicles (Goldberg, Reis, texts of resolution 
and agreement) SO 

Thailand. President Johnson Visits Australia, 
Thailand, South Viet-Nam, Pakistan, and Italy 
in 4%-Day Round-the-World Journey (John- 
son, McEwen, texts of joint statements) ... 69 

Trade. President Johnson Signs Proclamation To 
Carry Out the Kennedy Round Tariff Agree- 
ments (Johnson, text of proclamation) ... 88 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 103 

Outer Space Treaty Registered With U.N. Sec- 
retary-General (textof three-power note) . . 100 

President Johnson Gratified by U.N. Endorse- 
ment of Agreement on Rescue and Return of 
Astronauts and Space Objects (Johnson) . . 85 

United Nations Endorses Text of Agreement on 
Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space 
Vehicles (Goldberg, Reis, texts of resolution 
and agreement) 80 

United States and Korea Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . . . 101 

United Nations 

Outer Space Treaty Registered With U.N. Secre- 
tary-General (text of three-power note) . . . 100 

U.N. Condemns South Africa's Violation of 
Rights of South West Africans (Goldberg, text 
of resolution) 92 

United Nations Endorses Text of Agreement' on 
Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space 
Vehicles (Goldberg, Reis, texts of resolution 
and agreement) 80 

U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Extended Through 
March 1968 (Goldberg, text of resolution) . . 95 

United States Presents Views on the Question of 
General and Complete Disarmament (Fisher) . 97 


President Johnson's Christmas Message to the 
Nation 79 

President Johnson Visits Australia, Thailand, 
South Viet-Nam, Pakistan, and Italy in 4%- 
Day Round-the-World Journey (Johnson, Mc- 
Ewen, texts of joint statements) 69 

Name Index 

Fisher, Adrian S 97 

Goldberg, Arthur J '' 80 92 95 

Johnson. President '. W, 71, 79, 85, 88 

Martin, Graham 104 

McEwen, John ..'..'' 69 

Reis, Herbert . . . 80 













Statement hy Ambassador Artlmr J. Goldberg and Text of Resolution 125 


Statement by President Johnson 110 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVIII No. 1491 
January 22, 1968 

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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
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President Johnson's News Conference of January 1 

Following are excerpts from a neios confer- 
ence held by President Johnson at the LBJ 
Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on January 1. 

The President: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. I hope all of you had a good Christ- 
mas. I wish for each of you a happy new year. 

I have asked you to come here today for a 
brief amiouncement, the details of which will 
be carried in a more lengthy statement ^ which 
will be available to you later. 

The statement that I will make here concerns 
a firm and decisive step that the United States 
Government has taken today to impi'ove our 
balance-of -payments situation. 

I am taking a series of actions that are de- 
signed to reduce our balance-of-payments defi- 
cit by $3 billion as a target in the year ahead, 

There are a good many details comiected with 
each of these five specific actions. I counsel you 
to follow those details in the more formal state- 

But to roughly outline for you now those five 
decisive steps, I will say that the first is an 
Executive order ^ that I signed at 10:45 this 
morning that will give to the Secretary of Com- 
merce, delegate to him, authority the President 
presently has to regulate foreign investment. 

We anticipate that foreign investment 
abroad, which was in the neighborhood of some 
$5 billion this past year, as a result of the re- 
straints eiiected by this mandatory program, 
contrasted to the voluntary program which we 
have just had — our target is to improve our 
balance-of-payments situation by an additional 
SI billion as a result of tightening up on for- 
eign investment abroad. The specific areas of 
the world which will be affected can come in 
the detailed statement. 

Second, the Federal Eeserve Board will exer- 

' See p. 110. 
' See p. 114. 

JANUARY 22, 1968 

cise authority in connection with loans to be 
made abroad, some $9 billion last year. 

We have, as a target to improve our balance- 
of-payments situation, as a result of the au- 
thority I delegate to the Federal Reserve Board, 
and the authority it already has — the regula- 
tion will follow that authority — to save an ad- 
ditional half billion dollars by tightening up on 
the loans made abroad. That will be $1^^ billion. 

I am directing the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate 
members of my Cabinet to make a thorough, 
detailed study to effectuate every possible re- 
straint we can in aid and in defense expendi- 
tures abroad, with a target goal of $500 million 
of improvement from our present defense, aid, 
and other expenditures abroad. 

That would make $2 billion. 

In addition, we now have a deficit of about 
$2 billion each year in our tourist account. We 
have appointed a committee headed by Mr. 
Robert McKinney, of Santa Fe, New Mexico, 
and I am asking him for a report on tourism 
in the next 90 days. 

In the meantime, the President is appealing 
to all American citizens to help their country 
in this situation by deferring any travel outside 
the Western Hemisphere that is possible to 

As I say, we have a net deficit of $2 billion in 
our travel-tourism account. We hope that our 
target of saving $500 million in tourism will be 
a realistic one. That will depend on the coopera- 
tion we get from the citizens themselves, and 
from the Congress, which will be asked to enact 
certain legislation in that field. 

That makes $2.5 billion. 

We have sent repi-esentatives of the President 
to various countries today to exchange views 
with our friends in the world about our trade 
situation, our imports into this country, and our 
exports out of this country. We expect to formu- 
late a program. Our target is to im.prove our 
trade balance by a minimum of $500 million to 


$750 million. The details of that program will 
be announced following these consultations. 

If it is necessary, as a result of the nature and 
scope of the program we feel desirable, we will 
ask the Congress to act in that field. 

In the last two fields — tourism and trade — we 
may and very likely will have a message later 
to the Congress in that connection. 

So, in summary, through this series of five 
direct actions, we are determined to improve our 
balance-of-payments situation in the neighbor- 
hood of $3 billion, and to bring it as closely into 
balance as is possible in the year 1968. 

I will be glad to take some limited questions 
from you on this or on other matters. 

I have staif here to give you a detailed back- 
gi-ounding on all the problems relating to these 
five specific steps — Mr. [W. W.] Rostow, Mr. 
[Joseph A.] Califano, and Mr. [Ernest] Gold- 
stein from my Washington office, who have 
come here this morning. 

Wliile I don't want to cut off questioning, I 
am very anxious for this very important story 
to go out, and I am very anxious for you to have 
all the information you need in connection with 

If Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goldstein, and Mr. Cali- 
fano will come up here now, I will take ques- 
tions on this or any other subject for a period 
of a very few minutes and then yield to them. 

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press 
International] ? 

Q. Do you see any prospects for peace or the 
end of the Viet-Nam war this year, the new 

The President: We are very hopeful that we 
can make advances toward peace. We are pur- 
suing every possible objective. We feel that the 
enemy knows that he can no longer win a mili- 
tary victory in South Viet-Nam. But when he 
will reach the point where he is willing to give 
us evidence that would justify my predicting 
peace this year— I am unable to do so — that is 
largely up to him. 

Mr. Horner [Garnett D. Horner, Washington 
Evening Star] ? 

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us what type of 
legislation you are considering in the- tourism 
field? For instance, cutting off customs exemp- 
tions, or what type of things? 

The President: I think we had better wait 
until we have that program completely formu- 

lated. I think that there are several items that 
are still under consideration. We believe that 
the most effective action that could be taken 
would be for the citizens themselves to realize 
that their traveling abroad and spending their 
dollars abroad is damaging their country. If 
they just have a trip in them that must be made, 
if they could make it in this hemisphere or see 
their own country, it would be very helpful. 

We are going to try to make that appeal to 
them. But we are going to support it to what- 
ever extent is necessary to try to reach our target 
goal of $500 million improvement in the tourism 

Q. Mr. President, do you plan to ask Con- 
gress to remove the gold cover on domestic cur- 

The President: We have made no recommen- 
dation on that in this message at all. 

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily 
News] ? 

Q. Mr. President, Secretary [of Labor W. 
Willard} Wij'ts said the other day that if you 
don't have a tax increase, then you will have to 
face up to the question of wage and price con- 
trols. How serious do you regard that prospect? 

The President: I think we are going to have 
a tax increase. In this statement this morning, I 
ask both the employers and employees to exer- 
cise the utmost restraint in connection with their 
negotiations. I do not hold to the view that wage 
or price controls are imminent at all. And I 
might say that statement was made without my 
knowledge. I don't know how accurately he is 
quoted. But the Government has not given con- 
sideration at this time to action of that type. 

Q. Mr. President, when you were in Rome, 
did you and the Pope discuss his sending a peace 
mission to Hanoi? 

The President: The answer is "No," although 
I don't want to get into the process of elimi- 
nating what we discussed and what we didn't 

But we did not discuss specifically his sending 
any mission. We discussed a number of subjects 
where, if he decided, if His Holiness decided, he 
wanted to act in that area, that could call for 
such action. But we did not specifically discuss it. 

Q. May I follow that up a hit? The Foreign 
Minister of North Viet-Nam according to some 



The President : We ai'e familiar with those re- 
ports. As of now, they are just reports. "We are 
evahiating them. Tliey come from a newspaper- 
man who has written in tliis fiekl lieretofore. We 
liave found it advisable to carefully check the 
statements in the report. We are doing that now. 

Q. Mr. President, does your statement con- 
tain, and if not we xvould like to have it in your 
own words, just why 

The President: My statement is my own 
words, Mr. Frankel [Max Frankel, New York 

Q. No; that is not what I meant. If it does not 
say, could you tell us exactly what makes these 
more stringent measures necessary and why you 
think the voluntary program of restraints 

Mr. President: Generally speaking, our bal- 
ance of payments has had a deficit for the last 
17 out of the last 18 years. In 17 of the last 18 
years we have had a deficit. The first three quar- 
ters of this year, that deficit was within bounds. 
In tlie last quarter, it goes much further than we 
would like to see it go. It makes it very evident 
to me that those who are determined to preserve 
the soundness of the dollar and our entire fiscal 
situation — that direct additional actions are nec- 
essary in this field where we have, as I say, had 
a deficit in 17 of the last 18 years. 

For that reason, we have promulgated this 
program and we are placing it into effect. We be- 
lieve that these actions will result in a reason- 
able balance in the coming year. 

Mr. Davis [Sid Davis, Westinghouse Broad- 
casting Co.]? 

Q. Mr. President, the Camiodian Prince 
Sihanouk is quoted as saying he would like to 
meet with an envoy from the United States to 
discuss -possible U.S. military action against the 
North Vietnamese seeking sanctuary in Cam- 
bodia. Can you tell us anything official regard- 
ing this newspaper report? 

The President: I can say that we have read 
with a great deal of interest — and I might say 
pleasure — the quoted statements by Prince 
Sihanouk. We are studying those statements 
ver^' carefully, and confirming them. 

Wlien we have anything to announce on it, 
I will be in touch with you. I would say that 
we are quite encouraged by the reactions of 

Prince Sihanouk as reflected by the newspaper 
story. Any further announcement will be made 
after we have gone into it more thoroughly 
and more definite statements can be made. 

Mr. Davis? And then I believe Dan Rather 
[CBS News] asked a question. 

Dan, do you want yours, and then I will go to 
Mr. Davis? 

Q. Thank you very much. Mr. President, 
Newsweek magazine has described, as I read it, 
your meeting with the Pope as somewhat less 
than cordial. Coxdd you clear us up on that 
without getting into specifics of what you and 
the Pope discussed? 

The President: I tried to clear Newsweek up 
on it, but I just couldn't do it. It is just made out 
of the whole cloth. It just didn't happen. The 
people who participated in the conference from 
our side were startled and shocked at their in- 
formation. We told them it was just completely 
untrue. So that is our version. You can take 
Newsweek's or ours, whichever you want. 

Mr. Davis [Saville Davis, Christian Science 
Monitor] ? 

Q. Mr. President, since one of the leading 
factors in the foreign confidence in the dollar 
is the degree of the control of inflation in this 
country, do you anticipate that the tax increase 
and other measitres of the sort will keep the ris- 
ing of prices in this country suffldently stable 
in the coming year? 

The President: We are very concerned with 
that, Mr. Davis. Prices have risen more than 
we would like to see them rise. We still have 
the best record of any industrial country in the 
world. But we are not happy witli the record 
we have ourselves. 

This statement, in some degree, deals with it. 
We have asked the Government officials respon- 
sible for supervision in this field to exert re- 
newed eiforts in an attempt to ask employers 
and employees to keep their negotiating agree- 
ments within the ball park so far as increased 
productivity is concerned and not let the in- 
creases in one field go above increased produc- 
tivity in the other. We are hopeful that that 
action will be successful. 

Q. Mr. President, you spoke about the bal- 
ance-of -payments deficit in the last quarter. 
What is your estimate of that for the year 
as a whole? 

JANUARY 2 2, 1068 


The President: I have that statement in the 
detailed statement, but I think it wiU be some- 
there in the neighborhood of $3^2 bilhon to 
$4 billion. 

Q. That is for the year as a whole f 

The President. -Th^t IS coTvect. 

Let's not prolong tliis thing if /^^^^f ^^/^^ 
get this story. There are a lot of details just 
as I have repeated here, that these men are wait- 
?n. here to tell you. I want U> answer any ques- 
fei you have that is really important to you; 
otherwise, let's go on with the purpose of the 

Mr. President, you are urging emvloyers 
and employees to keep within the hall park. Is 
Zere anyspeciiic iigure, such as a gmdeUne 
estimate, specifically? 

The President: I would refer you to my state- 
ment in the lengthy statement which you will 
see as soon as you get a chance to get to it We 
want very much to try to emphasize the neces- 
sity of following guidelines. The guideline is 
the increased productivity. We feel that you can 
justify only the increased productivity. 

Sir, I was just wondenng if you have any 
idea now a.s to what the likely deficit in your 
fiscal 1969 budget might he since th^ could have 
an impact? 

The President: No. A lot of things could 
have impacts. But I think we have covered m 
this detailed statement about as much as we can 
If you have any further questions after you get 
that and file your story, submit them to Mr. 
Christian [George Christian, Press Secretary to 
the President] , and we will try to work it out. 
Thank you very much. 
The Press: Thank you, Mr. President. 
[During a briefing subsequent to the news confer- 
encrthe following exchanges between the President 
and reporters took place.] 

Q. You are asking people not to travel, and 
you are considering legislation toward that end. 
The President: We will have legislation in 
that direction. We would also like to have vol- 
untary action upon the part of all of our citi- 
zens. We believe we can have both. We think 
that we can amiounce, number one, that it is 
important to the country that every citizen re- 
assess his travel plans and not travel outside 
of this hemisphere except under the most im- 
portant, urgent, and necessary conditions. 

Second, we think that we can develop certam 
lecrislation that will insure and guarantee our 
reaching our goal of a half-billion dollars to 
three-quarter billion dollars of the reduction 
from the $2 billion deficit we already have. 

It must be obvious that our people are travel- 
inc a good deal when you consider all the travel 
that comes here and deduct it from what we 
travel abroad, and we still have a $2 billion 

deficit. , . ,1,1 

Now we have a target of reducing that by a 
half to three-quarters of a billion dollars We 
don't mean to threaten anybody with anything. 
W^e do expect that it will be necessary to have 
certain adjustments made in our present travel 
policy, and we will ask the Congress to do it 

But we want to do that in concert with the 
Congress, after discussing_ it with them, and 
after reacliing agreement with them. 

Q Mr. President, I am just curious as to 
whether the nature of this legislation imll affect 
travel itself or the amount spent on travel. 

The President: I wonder if you can wait 
until we talk to the Congress about that. I think 
it will affect both. But let's don't tie it down and 
get hard on it, fixed, right here on January 1st, 
when Congress doesn't come back until Janu- 
ary 15th. We would like to explore with them, 
eive them our views of the most effective way ot 
achieving this target, get their views, and try 
to get something that would be acceptable to 
both the executive and the legislative branches. 
But we don't want to imply a threat to any- 
one on anything. We are too happy this New 
Year's, Max, to get into that field. 
Q. Thank you, Mr. President. 
The President: You can be sure, though, that 
we will ask Congress for legislation primarily to 
do with tourism and trade. 

The other three— direct investment, banJj 
loans, and reducing our own defense expendi- 
tures and aid expenditures abroad— the Presi- 
dent can do ; and he has done it. That is that. 

One thing that is positive I would like to 
leave with all of you. This President, this ad- 
ministration, and we think the Congress, m- 
cludino- Democrats and Republicans, are deter- 
mined to achieve our goal of trying to bring our 
balance of payments in better equilibrium. We 
have outlined it here to the extent of some '^ 

billion. . , c 

It is pretty difficult to estimate a quarter ot 

a billion here where we may fall short and a 



quarter of a billion we might exceed. But we 
have a target and we are going to put all the 
muscle tliat this leadership, this government, 
has in the executive branch and the legislative 
branch bcliind the dollar, keeping our financial 
house in order. 

[At this point the President responded to a question 
relating to discussions to be held with NATO allies on 
minimizing foreign exchange costs.] 

The President: They have made arrange- 
ments to offset our expenditures to the extent 
that we could work them out witli tlie British 
and the Germans as a result of the McCloy mis- 
sion.' That is not included here. 

Tliese steps have been under consideration 
for some time. Before they are effectuated, we 
want to exchange views with all the leaders of 
the world. I have been in communication with 
them myself. 

In addition, I will have representatives com- 
municate with them in various parts of the 

I have this balance-of -payments program an- 
nouncement behind me now. We will be working 
in the days ahead on the budget. Mr. Schultze 
[Charles L. Schultze, Director, Bureau of the 
Budget] will be here tomorrow. He will be ac- 
companied by Mr. Cater [Douglass Cater, Spe- 

' For background, see Bulletin of May 22, 1967, p. 

cial Assistant to the President], Mr. Gardner 
[John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Edu- 
cation, and Welfare], and some other jseople. I 
will ask George to give you the announcement. 

Li addition, we will be working all the time 
we are here on appointments, on budget reduc- 
tions, and on the budget for next year. 

As all of you know, because of the late ad- 
journment date we are behind on the reductions 
on wliicli they resoluted in the last few days, as 
well as getting to work on the new budget. 

I am naming Mr. Gardner Acldey, the pres- 
ent Chairman of the President's Council of Eco- 
nomic Advisers, as the new Ambassador to Italy. 
We have received word from the Italian Gov- 
ernment this morning clearing the agrement. 
When the Congress resumes its deliberations, 
his name will go forward to the Senate. 

I consider Mr. Ackley one of my most trusted 
and closest friends and advisers. While he has 
been on the Economic Council now for several 
years, he agreed to stay on an extra year, which 
ends in January. I have asked him to take this 
post to Italy. Because of his interest in that 
field and his Icnowledge of the political and eco- 
nomic conditions in Italy, and his interest in 
that area, he has agreed to accept. The Senate 
willing, he will be going to that post as soon as 
he is confirmed. 

Thank you very much. 

The Press: Thanh you, Mr. President. 

JANtTART 2 2, 1968 


Action Program on the Balance of Payments 

Statement ly President Johnson ^ 

Where We Stand Today 

I want to discuss with tlie American people a 

subject of vital concern to the economic health 

and well-being of this nation and the free world. 

It is our international balance-of-payments 


The strength of our dollar depends on the 
strength of that position. 

The soundness of the free-world monetary 
system, which rests largely on the dollar, also 
depends on the strength of that position. 

To the average citizen, the balance of pay- 
ments, and the strength of the dollar and of the 
international monetary system, are meaningless 
phrases. They seem to have little relevance to our 
daily lives. Yet their consequences touch us all — 
consumer and captain of industry, worker, 
farmer, and financier. 

More than ever before, the economy of each 
nation is today deeply intertwined with that of 
every other. A vast network of world trade and 
financial transactions ties us all together. The 
prosperity of every economy rests on that of 
every other. 

More than ever before, this is one world — in 
economic affairs as in every other way. 

Your job, the prosperity of your farm or busi- 
ness, depends directly or indirectly on what hap- 
pens in Europe, Asia, Latin America, or Africa. 
The health of the international economic sys- 
tem rests on a sound international money in the 
same way as the health of our domestic money. 
Today, our domestic money — the U.S. dollar — is 
also the money most used in international trans- 
actions. That money can be sound at home — as it 
surely is — yet can be in trouble abroad — as it 
now threatens to become. 

' Issued at Johnson City, Tex., on Jan. 4 (White 
House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) ). 

In the final analysis its strength abroad de- 
pends on our earning abroad about as many 
dollars as we send abroad. 

U.S. dollars flow from these shores for many 
reasons — to pay for imports and travel, to fi- 
nance loans and investments, and to maintain 
our lines of defense around the world. 

When that outflow is greater than our earn- 
ings and credits from foreign nations, a deficit 
results in our international accounts. 

For 17 of the last 18 years we have had such 
deficits. For a time those deficits were needed to 
help the world recover from the ravages of ! 
World War II. They could be tolerated by the 
United States and welcomed by the rest of the 
world. They distributed more equitably the 
world's monetary gold reserves and supple- 
mented them with dollars. 

Once recovery was assured, however, large 
deficits were no "longer needed and indeed began , 
to tlireaten the strength of the dollar. Since i 
1961, your Government has worked to reduce 
that deficit. 

By the middle of the decade, we could see j 
signs of success. Our annual deficit had been re- j 
duced two-thirds— from $3.9 billion in 1960 to j 
$1.3 billion in 1965. 

In 1966, because of our increased respond- \ 
hility to arm and supply our men in Southeast j 
Asia, progress was interrupted, with the deficit , 
remaining at the same level as 1965 — ahout $1.5 \ 
billion. I 

In 1967, progress was reversed for a number i 

of reasons : 

—Our costs for Viet-Nam increased further, j 

— Private loans and investments abroad in-j 
creased. 1 

—Our trade surplus, although larger than 
1966, did not rise as much as we had expected. 

— Americans spent more on travel abroad. 



Added to these factors was the uncertainty 
and unrest surrounding the devaluation of the 
British pound. This event strained the interna- 
tional monetary system. It sharply increased 
our I lalance-of -payments deficit and our gold 
sales in the last quarter of 1967. 

The Problem 

Preliminary reports indicated that these con- 
ditions may result in a 19G7 balance-of-pay- 
ments deficit in the area of $3.5 to $4 billion — 
the highest since 1960. Although some factors 
affecting our deficit will be more favorable in 
1968, my advisere and I are convinced that we 
must act to bring about a decisive improvement. 

We caimot tolerate a deficit that could 
threaten the stability of the international mone- 
tary system — of which the U.S. dollar is the 

AVe cannot tolerate a deficit that could en- 
danger the strength of the entire free-world 
economy and thereby threaten our unprece- 
dented prosperity at home. 

A Time for Action 

The time lias now come for decisive action 
designed to bring our balance of payments to — 
or close to — equilibrium in the year ahead. 

The need for action is a national and inter- 
national responsibility of the highest priority. 

I am proposing a program which will meet 
this critical need and at the same time satisfy 
four essential conditions : 

— Sustain the growth, strength, and prosper- 
ity of our own economy. 

— Allow us to continue to meet our interna- 
tional responsibilities in defense of freedom, in 
promoting world trade, and in encouraging eco- 
nomic growth in the developing countries. 

— Engage the cooperation of other free na- 
tions, whose stake in a sound international mon- 
etary system is no less compelling than our own. 

— Recognize the special obligation of those 
nations with balance-of-payments surpluses to 
bring their payments into equilibrium. 

The First Order of Business 

The first line of defense of the dollar is the 
strength of the American economy. 

No business before the returning Congress 
will be more urgent than this : to enact the anti- 
inflation tax which I have sought for almost a 
year. Coupled with our expenditure controls 

and appropriate monetary policy, this will help 
to stem the inflationary pressures which now 
threaten our economic prosperity and our trade 

No challenge before business and labor is 
more urgent than this: to exercise the utmost 
responsibility in their wage-price decisions, 
which afi'ect so directly our competitive posi- 
tion at home and in world markets. 

/ have directed the Secretaries of Commerce 
and Lahor and the Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers to work with leaders of 
business and l^bor to make more effective our 
voluntary program of wage-price restraint. 

I have also instructed the Secretaries of Com- 
merce and Labor to work with unions and com- 
panies to prevent our exports from being re- 
duced or our imports increased by crippling 
work stoppages in the year ahead. 

A sure way to instill confidence in our dol- 
lar — both here and abroad — is through these 

The New Program 

But we must go beyond this and take addi- 
tional action to deal with the balance-of-pay- 
ments deficit. 

Some of the elements in the program I pro- 
pose will have a temporary but immediate effect. 
Others will be of longer range. 

All are necessary to assure confidence in the 
American dollar. 

Temporary Measures 

1. Direct Investment 

Over the past 3 years, American business has 
cooperated with the Government in a voluntary 
program to moderate the flow of U.S. dollars 
into foreign investments. Business leaders who 
have participated so wholeheartedly deserve the 
appreciation of their country. 

But the savings now required in foreign in- 
vestment outlays are clearly beyond the reach 
of any voluntary program. This is the unani- 
mous view of all my economic and financial 
advisers and the Chairman of the Federal Re- 
serve Board. 

To reduce our balance-of-paytnents deficit by 
at least $1 billion in 1968 from the estimated 
1967 level, I am invoking my authority tinder 
the banking laws to establish a mandatory pro- 
gram that will restrain direct investment 

JANUARY 2 2, 1968 


This program will be effective immediately. 
It will insure success and guarantee fairness 
among American business firms with overseas 

The program will be administered by the De- 
partment of Commerce and will operate as fol- 
lows : ^ 

— As in the voluntary program, overall and 
individual company targets will be set. Authori- 
zations to exceed these targets will be issued 
only in exceptional circumstances. 

— New direct investment outflows to coun- 
tries in continental Western Europe and other 
developed nations not heavily dependent on our 
capital will be stopped in 1968. Problems aris- 
ing from work already in process or commit- 
ments under binding contracts will receive spe- 
cial consideration. 

— New net investments in other developed 
countries will be limited to 65 percent of the 
1965-66 average. 

— New net investments in the developing 
countries will be limited to 110 percent of the 
1965-66 average. 

This program also requires businesses to con- 
tinue to bring back foreign earnings to the 
United States in line with their own 1964r-66 

In addition, I have directed the Secretary of 
the Treasury to explore toith the chairmen of 
the House Ways and Means Committee and 
Senate Finance Committee legislative proposals 
to induce or encourage the repatriation of ac- 
cumulated earnings hy TJ.S -owned foreign 

2. Lending by Financial Institutions 

To reduce the halance-of-payments deficit hy 
at least another $500 million, I have requested 
and authorized the Federal Reserve Board to 
tighten its program restraining foreign lending 
hy hanks and other financial institutions. 

Chairman [William McChesney] Martin has 
assured me that this reduction can be achieved : 

— Without harming the financing of our ex- 
ports ; 

— Primarily out of credits to developed coun- 
tries without jeopardizing the availability of 
funds to the rest of the world. 

' For regulations issued by the Department of Com- 
merce on Jan. 1, see 33 Fed. Reg. 49. 

Chairman Martin believes that this objective 
can be met through continued cooperation by 
the financial community. At the request of the 
Chairman, however, I have given the Federal 
Reserve Board standby authority to invoke 
mandatory controls, should such controls be- 
come desirable or necessary. 

3. Travel Abroad 

Our travel deficit tliis year will exceed $2 bil- 
lion. To reduce tliis deficit by $500 million : 

— / am asking the Amencan people to defer 
for the next 2 years all nonessential travel out- 
side the Western Hemisphere. 

— / am asking the Secretary of the Treasury 
to explore with the appropriate congressional 
co7nmittees legislation to help achieve this ob- 

4. Government Expenditures Overseas 

We cannot forgo our essential commitments 
abroad, on which America's security and sur- 
vival depend. 

Nevertheless, we must take every step to re- 
duce their impact on our balance of payments 
without endangering our security. 

Recently, we have reached important agree- 
ments with some of our NATO partners to 
lessen the balance-of-payments cost of deploy- 
ing American forces on the continent — troops 
necessarily stationed there for the common de- 
fense of all. 

Over the past 3 years, a stringent program 
has saved billions of dollars in foreign exchange. 

I am convinced that much more can be done. 
/ believe we should set as our target avoiding 
a drain of another $500 million on our balance 
of payments. 

To this end, I am taking three steps. 

First, I have directed the Secretary of State 
to initiate prompt negotiations with our NATO 
allies to minimize the foreign exchange costs of 
keeping our troops in Europe. Our allies can 
help in a number of ways, including : 

— The purchase in the United States of more 
of their defense needs. 

— Investments in long-term United States 

/ have also directed the Secretaries of State, 
Treasury, and Defense to find similar ways of 
dealing with this problem in other parts of the 



Second, I have instructed the Director of the 
Budget to find ways of reducing the numher 
of American civilians working overseas. 

Third, I have Instructed the Secretary/ of De- 
fcme to find ways to reduce further the foreign 
exchange impact of personal spending hy U.S. 
forces and their dependents in Europe. 

Long-Term Measures 

5. Export Increases 

American exports provide an important 
source of earnings for our businessmen and jobs 
for our workers. 

They are the cornerstone of our balance-of- 
payments position. 

Last year we sold abroad $oO billion worth 
of American goods. 

"\Yliat we now need is a long-range systematic 
program to stimulate the flow of the products 
of our factories and farms into overseas mar- 

"We must begin now. 

Some of the steps require legislation : 

/ shall ash the Congress to support an inten- 
sified 5-year, $200 miUion Commerce Depart- 
ment program to promote the sale of American 
goods overseas. 

I slicdl also ask the Congress to earmark $500 
million of the Export-Import Bank authoriza- 
tion to: 

— Provide better export insurance. 
— Expand guarantees for export financing. 
— Broaden the scope of Government financing 
• of our exports. 

' Other measures require no legislation. 

I have today directed the Secretary of Com- 
merce to begin a Joint Export Association Pro- 
gram. Through these associations, we will pro- 

' vide direct financial support to American cor- 
porations joining together to sell abroad. 

And finally, the Export-Import Bank — 
through a more liberal rediscount system — will 
encourage banks across the Nation to help firms 
increase their exports. 

6. Nontariff Barriers 

In the Kennedy Round, we climaxed three 
decades of intensive effort to achieve the 
greatest reduction in tariff barriers in all the 
history of trade negotiations. Trade liberaliza- 

tion remains the basic policy of the United 

We must now look beyond the great success 
of the Kemiedy Eound to the problems of non- 
tarill barriers that pose a continued threat to 
the growth of world trade and to our competi- 
tive position. 

American commerce is at a disadvantage be- 
cause of the tax systems of some of our trading 
partners. Some nations give across-the-board 
tax rebates on exports which leave their ports 
and impose special border-tax charges on our 
goods entering their country. 

International rules govern these special taxes 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. These rules must be adjusted to expand 
international trade further. 

In keeping with the principles of cooperation 
and consultation on common problems, I have 
initiated discussions at a high level with our 
friends abroad on these critical matters — par- 
ticularly those nations with balance-of-pay- 
ments surpluses. 

These discussions will examine proposals for 
prompt cooperative action among all parties to 
minimize the disadvantages to our trade which 
arise from differences among national tax sys- 

We are also preparing legislative measures in 
this area whose scope and nature will depend 
upon the outcome of these consultations. 

Through these means we are determined to 
achieve a. substantial improvement in our trade 
surplus over the coming years. In the year im- 
mediately ahead, we expect to realize an im- 
provement of $500 million. 

7. Foreign Investment and Travel in U.S. 

We can encourage the flow of foreign funds 
to our shores in two other ways: 

— First, by an intensified program to attract 
greater foreign investment in V.S. corporate se- 
curities, carrying out the principles of the For- 
eign Investors Tax Act of 1966. 

— Second, by a program to attract more vis- 
itors to this land. A special task force, headed 
by Robert McKinney of Santa Fe, New Mexico, 
is already at work on measui^es to accomplish 
this. I have directed the task force to report 
within 1^5 days on the immediate measures that 
can be taken and to make its long-term recom- 
mendations within 90 days. 

JANUARY 22, 1908 
286-491—68 2 


Meeting the World's Reserve Needs 

Our movement toward balance will curb the 
flow of dollars into international reserves. It 
will therefoi-e be vital to speed up plans for the 
creation of new reserves — the special drawing 
rights — in the International Monetary Fund. 
These new reserves will be a welcome compan- 
ion to gold and dollars and will strengthen the 
gold exchange standard. The dollar will remain 
convertible into gold at $35 an ounce, and our 
full gold stock will back that commitment. 

A Time for Responsibility 

The program I have outlined is a program of 

It is a program which will preserve confi- 
dence in the dollar, both at home and abroad. 

The U.S. dollar has wrought the greatest eco- 
nomic miracles of modern times. 

It stimulated the resurgence of a war-ruined 

It has helped to bring new strength and life 
to the developing world. 

It has underwritten unprecedented prosperity 
for the American people, who are now in the 
83d month of sustained economic growth. 

A strong dollar protects and pi-eserves the 
prosperity of businessman and banker, worker 
and farmer — here and overseas. 

The action program I have outlined in this 
message will keep the dollar strong. It will ful- 
fill our responsibilities to the American people 
and to the free woi'ld. 

I appeal to all of our citizens to join me in 
this very necessary and laudable effort to pre- 
serve our country's financial strength. 

President Signs Executive Order 
on Capital Transfers Abroad 

GovEENiNo Certain Capital Transfers Abroad 

By virtue of the autliority vested in the President by 
section 5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, as amended 
(12 U.S.C. O'la), and in view of the continued existence 
of the national emergency declared by Proclamation No. 
2914 of December 1(5, 1950, and the Importance of 
strengthening the balance of payments position of the 
United States during this national emergency, it is 
hereby ordered : 

' No. 11387 ; 33 Fed. Reg. 47. 

1. (a) Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States who, alone or together with one or more 
affiliated persons, owns or acquires as much as a 10% 
interest in the voting securities, capital or earnings of 
a foreign business venture is prohibited on or after the 
effective date of this Order, except as expressly author- 
ized by the Secretary of Commerce, from engaging in 
any transaction involving a direct or indirect transfer 
of capital to or within any foreign country or to any 
national thereof outside the United States. 

(b) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to re- 
quire, as he determines to be necessary or appropriate 
to strengthen the balance of payments position of the 
United States, that any person subject to the jurisdic- 
tion of the United States who, alone or together with 
one or more affiliated persons, owns or acquires as much 
as a 10% interest in the voting securities, capital or 
earnings of one or more foreign business ventures shall 
cause to be repatriated to tbe United States such part 
as the Secretary of Commerce may specify of (1) the 
earnings of such foreign business ventures which are 
attributable to such person's investments therein and 
(2) bank deposits and other short term financial as- 
sets which are held in foreign countries by or for the 
account of such person. Any person subject to the jur- 
isdiction of the United States is required on or after 
the effective date of this Order, to comply with any 
such requirement of the Secretary of Commerce. 

(c) The Secretary of Commerce shall exempt from 
the provisions of this section 1, to the extent delineated 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem (hereinafter referred to as the Board), banks or 
financial institutions certified by the Board as being 
subject to the Federal Reserve Foreign Credit Restraint 
Programs, or to any program instituted by the Board 
under section 2 of this Order. 

2. The Board is authorized In the event that it deter- 
mines such action to be necessary or desirable to 
strengthen the balance of payments position of the 
United States: 

(a) to investigate, regulate or prohibit any transac- 
tion by any bank or other financial institution subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States involving a di- 
rect or indirect transfer of capital to or within any for- 
eign country or to any national thereof outside the 
United States ; and 

(b) to require that any bank or financial institution 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
cause to be repatriated to the United States such part 
as the Board may specify of the bank deposits and other 
short term financial assets which are held in foreign 
countries by or for the account of such bank or finan- 
cial institution. Any bank or financial institution sub- 
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall com- 
ply with any such requirement of the Board on and 
after its effective date. 

.3. The Secretary of Commerce and the Board are 
respectively authorized, under authority delegated to 
each of them under this Order or otherwise available 
to them, to carry out the provisions of this Order, and 
to prescribe such definitions for any terms used herein, 
to issue such rules and regulations, orders, rulings, 
licenses and instructions, and to take such other ac- 
tions, as each of them determines to be necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Order 
and their respective responsibilities hereunder. The Sec- 



retary of Commerce and the Board may each redelegate 
to any agency, instrumentality or otficial of the United 
States any authority under this Order, and may, in 
administering this Order, utilize the services of any 
other agencies. Federal or State, which are available 
and appropriate. 

4. The Secretary of State shall advise the Secretary 
of Commerce and the Board with respect to matters 
under this Order involving foreign policy. The Secre- 
tary of Commerce and the Board shall consult as neces- 
sary and appropriate with each other and with the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 

5. The delegations of authority in this Order shall 
not affect the authority of any agency or official pur- 
suant to any other delegation of presidential authority, 
presently in effect or hereafter made, under section 5 
(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, as amended (12 U.S.C. 


The White House 
10:4.ja.m.. Jan. 1, 1968, 
L.B.J. Ranch. 

U.S.-Japan Economic Talks 
To Be Held at Honolulu 

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated 
December 2S 

The "White House announced on December 28 
the first meeting of the Subcommittee of the 
Joint United Stcates-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Economic Affairs will be held in Honolulu, 
Hawaii, January 25-26. The Subcommittee was 
established during the Xovember 14—15 meet- 
ings between President Lyndon B. Johnson and 
Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.^ 

At the first meeting, the Japanese delegation 
will be headed by HaruM Mori, Deputy Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The United States 
delegation will be headed by Anthony M. Solo- 
mon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 

The agenda of the meeting includes a review 

of the economic situation in Japan and the 
United States, balance of payments cooperation, 
and a review of the international economic 

Hearings To Begin March 25 
on Future U.S. Trade Policy 

Public hearings on future U.S. trade policy 
are to begin in Washington March 25, it was 
announced on Dex;ember 14 by William M. Roth, 
the President's Special Eepresentative for 
Trade Negotiations. The hearings will be held 
in connection with a study of future U.S. ti-ade 
policy whicli, at the direction of the President, 
the Office of the Special Representative is 

In annomicing the hearings. Ambassador 
Roth declared: "Our foreign trade is of great 
importance to all Americans, and we want as 
many as possible to have the opportunity to 
subinit their recommendations and suggestions 
for U.S. policy in this field." 

The topics on which testimony is invited in- 
clude the competitive position of the United 
States in world trade; foreign trade and foreign 
investment; trade and employment; trade in 
agricultural products; East- West trade; non- 
tariff measures, stich as boi'der taxes and vari- 
able import levies; the trade interests of the 
developing countries; the impact of imports; 
and export promotion. A notice appearing in 
tlie Federal Register contains a fuller list of 
the topics.^ 

The hearings will be conducted by the Trade 
Information Committee of the Office of the Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations and 
will be chaired by Louis C. Krauthoff II of the 
Office. The other members of the Committee are 
from the Departments of Agriculture, Com- 
merce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and 

^ For background, .see Bulletin of Dec. 4, 1967 


' 32 Fed. Reg. 17997. 

JANUARY 22, 1968 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 4 

Press release 1 dated January 4 

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen I 
mi-ht not be able to meet today the high staiid- 
ard of controversy which some of you found in 
my last press conference in October,^ but I am 
glad to have a chance to meet with you briefly to 
look over some of the developments of 67 and 
some of the agenda for '68. 

I want to thank you for the reception you 
kindly gave me last week and to wish each o± 

you a good 1968. ^ , ■ i . n 

During the month of December, I tried to call 
attention to some of the constractive develop- 
ments during 1967 despite the P^i^ a^<l,J^f 
violence in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
It was a productive year. President Johnson was 
able to hold an unparalleled number of talks 
with chiefs of state, chiefs of governments from 
all over the world— perhaps through a combi- 
nation of coincidence involving his normal 
schedule and EXPO 67, the Punta del Este 
Summit with the inter-American Presidents, 
and the Manila Summit— but it was a very busy 
year, with the conclusion of the Kennedy Eound 
knd the decisions of the Monetary Fund on li- 
quidity, the conclusion of the Space Treaty, the 
great decisions taken at Punta del Este by the 
Presidents of the hemisphere on the Common 
Market in Latin America, a new impetus for 
the Alliance for Progi-ess, dramatic develop- 
ments in Asia, including the establisliment as a 
growing concern of the Asian Development 
Bank, a much more active regional cooperation 
among the free nations of Asia— and a clear, 
I think, turn of events on the ground, as far as 
Viet-Nam is concerned. 

And 1968 will be, indeed, a very busy year. 
I would not want to spell out the agenda in any 
detail, because by omission I might cause of- 
fense to someone. 

Obviously, our great preoccupation will be 

peace in Southeast Asia. We maintain the posi- 
tion that peace must be established on a durable 
basis there— on a basis in which all nations, in- 
cluding the small nations of Southeast Asia, can 
live secure from harassment and violence 
thrown against them from outside their borders 
I know that you're interested in the recent 
statement by the North Vietnamese Foreign 
Minister [Nguyen Duy Trinh] ; and m any such 
statement of that sort there are two questions : 
First, what did he say? And secondly, what did 

The first is fairly clear in terms of the text 
of what he said. I've seen a good deal of specu- 
lation about what he meant and some clarihca- 
tion by Hanoi correcting some of that specula- 
tion: but to determine what he meant is a more 
complicated business and has to be pursued by 
means other than public declarations on both 
sides, and that clarification will be sought 

As far as the United States is concerned, i 
would call your attention once again to what 
the President said in San Antonio. He said 

The United States is willing to stop all aerial and 
naval boml.ardment of North Viet-Nam when this will 
lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, 
assume (he continued) that while discussions proceed. 
North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bomb- 
ing cessation or limitation. 

And that remains the position of the United 
States, and what we need to do is find out 
whether there's any increasing compatibility be- 
tween the statements made by the two sides. 

We will keep in very close touch with the 
Government of South Viet-Nam and with the 
other allies who have forces engaged in the 
conflict and we will pursue as skillfully as we 
can the other question of finding out whether 
there's been any change in the situation. 
I cannot tell you today whether there's been 

'■ Bulletin of Oct. 30, 1967, p. 555. 

= For President Johnson's address at San Antonio, 
Tex., on Sept. 29, 1967, see ibid., Oct. 23, 1967, p. 519. 



a change or not. Some of these statements have 
ret'erred back to the statement made by Hanoi 
in January. 

We know that they have issued orders for an 
intensLfied offensive during the winter season. 
We can't help but take note of the fact that 
there was an intolerable violation of the recent 
New Year's cease-fire with a two-battalion at- 
tack on a base camp of American forces while 
that cease-fire was supposed to be effective, lead- 
ing to the loss of life of American soldiers and 
a large loss of life on the part of the enemy, 
and that a similar large-scale attack was de- 
livered on Vietnamese forces during the same 

These all have some bearing on the situation. 
However, the determined policy of the United 
States is to find a means to move toward peace 
in Southeast Asia, if possible; and that will be 
explored fully. If there's a desire for peace, the 
United States, as President Johnson has said 
more than once, will go more than halfway to 
find peace. 

Rut this is more complicated than it sounds 
at first blush, and it would be necessary to find, 
learn in detail, what the other side has in mind. 

We shall also be working very hard on peace 
in the Middle East. At the present time, we are 
backing completely the efforts of Ambassador 
[Giinnar] Jarring, who's representing the 
United Nations in that area as a result of a 
unanimous Security Council resolution in late 
November.^ Our own position will be based 
upon President Johnson's five points of last 
June ; ■* but we will use our influence, publicly 
and privateh% to help Ambassador Jarring's 
mission achieve success. 

We want very much to see the basis for a 
durable and permanent peace in that troubled 
part of tlie world. 

The President's Balance-of-Payments Program 

We shall, of course, be giving great attention 
to the carrying out of the President's balance- 
of-payments program announced on January 
lst.° That was a far-reaching, decisive, coura- 
ireous program to bring our balance-of- 
payments situation nearer to equilibrium. 

Now, we had in mind, when that program was 
developed, the hope that we could take measureii 
which would not concentrate just on one or two 
elements of our society but would broadly share 
the burdens, which would get the job done, 
without Intruding into three important inter- 

ests : one, the effort of the developing countries 
to generate momentum in their own economic 
and social development ; secondly, the necessity 
for maintaining the security arrangements over- 
seas which are required for the peace and sta- 
bility of the free world; and third, to avoid 
measures which might start a descending spiral 
in limitation of trade, because in that direction 
would come costs for everyone; and even if 
equilibrium were established at some point, it 
might be at a much lower level of trade for 
everybody. And we think this program is de- 
signed to do that. 

The Travel Deficit 

I would like to support, strongly and per- 
sonally, the call which the President made on 
American citizens to forgo unnecessary travel 
outside the Western Hemisphere in the next 2 
years. There are good reasons for that, even 
though no one likes to ask people to change 
their personal plans. But in 1967, Americans 
will have spent $4 billion on tourism outside the 
country ; visitors to the United States will have 
spent some $2 billion, leaving a gap there of 
about $2 billion. 

Now, this is a dramatic increase in the sit- 
uation even since 1966. I think the sharp in- 
crease in American tourism abroad reflects the 
continuing prosperity of the American econ- 
omy and the American people, but we feel that 
when we're talking about $4 billion of expen- 
ditures by tourists abroad that we're entitled 
to ask people to forgo unessential travel so that 
we can save something like $500 million of that 
in our balance-of-payments account. 

I cannot speculate with you today about what 
particular measures might be considered by the 
Congress when they come back. The Secretary 
of the Treasury has the responsibility for con- 
sidering what action Congress might take in 
this field. But we very much hope that just as 
there was a dramatic and somewhat unexpected 
rapid increase in tourism in 1967, personal deci- 
sions can lead to a reduction so that by a com- 
bination of reduced American travel and in- 
creased foreign travel in the United States, we 
can achieve the balance-of-payments objective. 

We will continue to work on such subjects as 

' For text, seo ihid., Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 

* For Prosidont .Johnson's address at Washington, 
D.C., on June 19, 1967, see ibid., July 10, 1967, p. 

' See p. 110. 

JANU.4RY 22, 1968 


the nonproliferation treaty. We would ike very 
much to bring that to an early conclusion, i 
am not too pessimistic about that at the moment, 
but we ought to move on from there into other 
elements of disarmament-not only the arms 
race between the largest powers but neighbor- 
hood arms races which also are a burden upon 
the peoples of these other areas and are sources 
of tension and potential danger. 

We have the decisions of the inter- American 
Presidents about this hemisphere m which we 
will be much hivolved, and the Alliance for 
Progress, the decision to move toward a common 

market. „ , , . , • , 

So that these are just some of the high points 
m a very busy agenda for 1968. And we can 
hope, as we b^gin the new year, that somehow 
we can move closer toward a stable and reliable 
peace in the world. 

I am ready for your questions. 

Talks With Cambodian Government 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will Ambassador [Chester'] 
Bowles he making any contacts with the North 
Vietnamese or the Viet Cong in connection loith 
Mr. TrinK's statement? 

A. We don't expect him to. 

As you know, Ambassador Bowles is gomg 
to Phnom Penh in a few days to talk with 
Prince Sihanouk and members of his Govern- 
ment about the problem of maintaining the m- 
dependence and territorial integrity and neu- 
trality of Cambodia. 

Prince Sihanouk, rightly, is deeply concerned 
about not being engaged in the situation of 
violence across his borders. We strongly support 
him in that desire. We have no desire whatever 
to see Cambodia involved in the conflict m Viet- 

Nam, in Laos. ■ i ■ j. 

We would hope very much that his desire to 
strengthen the ICC [International Control 
Commission] in order to give better assurance 
to Cambodia that its neutrality will be respected 
can in fact meet response from all sides. 

We hope that those involved with the ICC 
will agree to do so, and we hope that the North 
Vietnamese, the Viet Cong forces who have vio- 
lated Cambodian neutrality, will realize that 
this is beyond the rules and that they should 

stay out of Cambodia and not involve that 

country in the present conflict. 
We will be doing our best on that, and we 

have been glad to see that Prince Sihanouk is 

willincr to discuss these matters seriously with 
us. He can be assured of our fullest cooperation 
in mamtaining the peace and neutrality ot 

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the Prime's un- 
expected swing-about in his recent statement, 
have you any feeling on who he thinks is win- 
ning in South Viet-Nam at the mo7nent? 

A No. I wouldn't want to speculate on that 
point. I think that his principal preoccupation 
is Cambodia. I think he wants to keep Cam- 
bodia out of this struggle, and we are ready to 
cooperate with him fully on our side and we 
hope that others would do the same. But I would 
not want to try to speculate about what might 
be m his mind on other questions. 

North Vietnamese Statement Needs Clarifying 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you point out tJiat one part 
of Trinh's statement is the question of what he 
said, and one is what he meant. I assurne that 
you are not going to tell us what you think he 
meant, hut with regard to what he said, do you 
consider that formulation of their position to be 
a more flexible on.e than you have heard from 
them before? 

A Well, I think that the use of the word 
"will" instead of "could" or "would" seems to 
be a new formulation of that particular point, 
but that leaves a great many questions still open. 
And we need to clarify what else goes along 
with it and what that word in fact means. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection, do you 
have the impression, sir, as a result of this 
Tnnh statement that in fact the negotiating^ 
positions of both sides, Washington ami Hanoi 
in this case, are becoming someiohat closer and- 
that this means that negotiations are closerf 

A. I wouldn't want to make that iudgment 
now because we need to explore fully what is 
behind this statement, what it means m its con- 
text how it relates to President Johnson's state- 
ment at San Antonio, and how it relates to their 
intentions on the ground. 

Mr. Secretary, the Trinh statement refers 
again to the willingness under those circum- 
stances to discuss what he calls ^'relevant ques- 
tions:' From your standpoint, what would be 
the relevant questions to discuss with North 
A. Well, I think I would prefer not to spell 



that out in any detail, because one of the 
things that we want to know is what they con- 
sider relevant questions to be. 

If it has solely to do with what is happening 
in Xortli Viet-Xam, that is one thing. If it has 
to do with makmg peace in Southeast Asia, that 
is something else. 

But these are matters that need clarification 
and this is not the way to clarify them, by 
making public statements. 

Q. Do you mean by that if it has only to do 
with matters in North Viet-Nam, that is not 

A. I don't mean anything myself yet. I am 
trying to find out what they mean. I am just 
pointing that out as an example of a jwint that 
needs clarification. 

Q. How do you get out of the Gaston- 
Alphonse act? 

A. Well, that is more a problem for public 
speculation and for the reporters than it is for 
us who are in the business. We have ways and 
means of clarifying these things. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States yet 
begun its explorations to clarify these questions, 
or does that await further consultation with 
Allied nations? 

A. Well, I am a little hesitant to comment on 
that. I tliink that you can assume that if you 
were in my position you would try to clarify 
these matters without delay. 

But I have noticed already that about six dif- 
ferent capitals have been involved in specula- 
tion in this matter. I expect at least six addi- 
tional capitals to be involved in speculation be- 
fore your colleagues overseas get through with 
it. I would not object to that. I think that if 
you're not careful, you will hurt someone's feel- 
ings if you don't include them in this party. 

But nevertheless, we will have our means to 
clarify these matters, and I'd like to preserve 
those means by not discussing them here. 

Q. Well, just to folloio up an that, sir, it 
wa'iu't entirely clear to me from your earlier re- 
sponse whether or not you do foreclose the pos- 
sibility tJiat the explorations that Amia'^sador 
Boivles will be conducting in Phnom Penh may 
or may not interweave in the discussions about 
Minister Trinh. 

Ambassador Bowles Designated 
for Mission to Cambodia 

White House Announcement, January If 

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated 
January 4 

The United States Government is sending a 
representative to Cambodia in response to tlie in- 
dication given by His Highness Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk. Chief of State of Cambodia, that he 
would agree to receive an emissary of President 
Johnson. Ambassador Chester Bowles [U.S. Am- 
bassador to India] has been selected for this mis- 
sion, and the Governments of Cambodia and the 
United States are in agreement that Mr. Bowles 
should arrive in Phnom Penh within the next 
few day.s. 

you gentlemen raised it today. The arrange- 
ments were made for him to go to Plmom Penh 
to talk to Prince Sihanouk. He has no other 
appointments, and we have no indication that 
anyone else is asking to see him. So, if I were 
you, I'd concentrate on the Cambodian problem 
as far as xlmbassador Bowles is concerned. 

Question of Cambodian Frontiers 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you thinJc there is a 
possibility of getting another Geneva conference 
or some kind of an internationalization of the 
question of Cambodian frontiers? 

A. We have been ready for years to go to a 
conference on Cambodia, and to take the steps 
that are necessary to assure the territorial in- 
tegrity and the neutrality of Cambodia. We 
have been disappointed that even that limited 
step has been denied the Geneva machinery thus 

We would hope that if a conference is not 
possible, the ICC itself, within the existing ar- 
rangements, could take action that would be of 
assistance in this field. 

Yes, we are ready for a Geneva conference 
oil Cambodia, on Laos, on South Viet-Nam, 
North Viet-Nam, on any part of the Southeast 
Asian jiroblem or all of it. And that has been 
our position for a long time, as you know. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question was: do you 
have any more optimism at the present that 
such a conference is possible? 

A. The question hadn't even come up until A. No, I think the question of the particular 

JANUARY 22, 1908 


maclimery is still open. Our view is that the 
existing machinery on tlic ground is able to deal 
with this problem more effectively if the mem- 
ber governments are prepared to act in that di- 
rection and if Prince Sihanouk is prepared for 
it to happen in his country, as he seems to be. 

Now, the three members of the ICC are India, 
Canada, and Poland. If all three of them took a 
fully cooperative attitude on this matter, we 
thiiik they could accomplish a good deal ; and we 
think some of them will take a very cooperative 
attitude. But Prince Sihanouk indicated that he 
did not have the impression that there was full 
cooperation from Poland on this particular 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prince SihanottJc's public 
message indicated that the door was open for 
hot pursuit into his territory providing it came 
under certain circximMances. What is the U.S. 
reaction to that? 

A. Well, I think that should be treated as a 
hypothetical question at the present time. 

Wliat we want to do is to eliminate that ques- 
tion by eliminating the conditions that even 
bring up the question. If the Cambodian Gov- 
ernment with the assistance of the ICC can 
assure its own neutrality and its own territorial 
integrity, then the question you refer to does not 

Now, that, we much prefer. And it is not our 
desire to involve other countries or other areas 
in this struggle. It is not our desire in any sense 
of the word. So we are concentrating at the 
present time on the question of removing the 
causes of the problem, rather than trying to find 
an answer to that particular question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have the — 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. This is something that is totally with- 
in the purview of your Department, and I think 
that we can get some clarification. For about 
3 years now your Department has been in- 
volved in an investigation involving illegal 
wiretapping and eavesdropping, and I would 
like to find out now if you could tell us who was 
responsible for the illegal wiretapping and 
eavesdropping initially, and also, who had cus- 
tody of the recordings on that illegal wiretap- 
ping, and who authorized the destruction of the 
recordings, which were rather important evi- 

A. Well, I am not familiar with the details of 
your question. 

Q. This is the Otepha case it came off of. 

A. Well, it is one of the questions that I feel 
more suitable to the House of Conuuons, m 
which I need notice. Because, quite frankly, I 
don't have the answer in my head at the jjres- 

Q. Well, it happened 3 years ago, Mr. Sec- 
retary, and you said at that time it was under 
study, and I thought now after 3 years it was 
about time enough to make the determination. 

A. Well, since you related this to the Otepka 
case, I would have to say that since that matter 
is now under appeal I am not going to get into 
it in any way. 

Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, this is unrelated to 
the Otepka case itself. This matter deals with 
the handling of personnel matters within your 
Department. Do you condone or approve illegal 
wiretapping and eavesdropping? That is the 

A. I don't condone anythmg that is illegal, 
I assure you. 

Q. Do you condone these specific acts, and 
have you, done anything about the people in- 

A. I don't know what specific acts you are 
talking about. If you are talking about some- 
thing 3 years ago and you are talking about 
something mvolved in the Otepka case, I am 
not going to comment on it. 

Q. A complete secrecy curtain then. Is that it? 

A. No. I am just not going to comment on a 
case that is pending on appeal before the Civil 
Service Commission. 

Tourism and the Balance of Payments 

Q. On balance of payments, sir, you were talk- 
ing about persuading fewer Americans to travel 
and to get more foreigners to travel. Two ques- 
tions : Do you think that you can persuade more 
foreigners to come here lohen fewer Americans 
are going overseas? And, second, isnH this an 
extremely dangerous principle to try and bal- 
ance the amount of tourists going in and out 
of the United States — which is a principle 
lohich, if applied to the rest of American for- 
eign trade, would take us straight back to pre- 
Cordell Hull isolationism, wouldnH it? 

A. I think during 1967 an unusual number of 
Americans made decisions to go abroad. We 



would like to see, in 1908, those decisions cut 
back to something more near normal in these 
more recent years; and if so, that would achieve 
the targets that we are talking about. 

No, we don't particularly like the necessity 
of asking American citizens to defer foreign 
travel. There is a good deal of foreign travel 
that is essential, and of course that will be 
taken fully into account in anything that is 
done in this field. 

But we are faced with the fact that there are 
some things that we can't afford in the imme- 
diate future. One of them is the rate of mvest- 
ment, private investments, one of them is the 
level of the extension of bank credit. Another 
is the amomit of tourism. We have got to make 
adjustments at a number of points here if we 
are to meet our balance-of-payments objectives. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you encourage /Senator 
[J. TF.] Fulhright to go ahead with his jwo- 
jccted investigation of the Tonkin Gulf inci- 
dent; and if so, why? 

A. Oh, I have no objection to his inquiring 
into that. I have no doubt about what the 
answers will be. But I have no objection to it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes, sir. 

U.S. Position on Viet-Nam Cease-Fire 

Q. Mr. Sec?'ctaj-y, over the years we have had 
a variety of statejnents from yourself, the Pres- 
ident, Mr. Goldherg [Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations'], and 
others about the conditions under which we 
might stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam, 
xchich has always left m.e a little confused about 
your position, as well as Hanoi's. Noio, today, 
you have referred to the Presidenfs San An- 
j tonio speech, in which he wants productive talks 
and assumes that the enemy loill not take ad- 
vantage of the cease-fire. This would seem to 
imply that the United States is requiring a com- 
plete cessation of the enemy military activity 
if ice stop the bombing. Is this correct? And, 
if it is not correct, would you straighten me out? 

A. "Well, I have to go back to a point that I 
made frequently before; and that is that when 
you get into detailed interpretations of language 
that affects war and peace you need to clarify 
those and touch with those that can stop the 
shooting. That is, make those a matter of dis- 
cussion with representatives of the other side, 

or intermediaries. It would not be, I think, ap- 
propriate for me to try to spell out what that 
assumption means. I have no doubt at all that 
Hanoi understands a good deal about what that 
assumption means. And we would be interested, 
if they are interested, in discussing what it 

But these are matters that are for discussion 
and negotiation, matters on which we are in 
touch with our allies. It is not something which 
can be, I think, usefully spelled out by one side 
in the absence of effective contact and discus- 
sion with the other side engaged in the conflict. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the 
Eshkol [Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel] 
visit and in vieio of the Soviet arms shipment to 
the Arabs, do you think it is justified to ask for 
a request for Ainerican arins to Israel and are 
you tvilling to give them? 

A. Well, I would not want to give an answer 
to that question today. Prime Minister Eshkol 
is to be here on a visit. I think the general situa- 
tion in the Middle East will be discussed, in- 
cluding the security situation and the possi- 
bilities of moving toward a peaceful settlement 
there. I would not want to anticipate a question 
of that sort just at this stage. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, frmn our point of view, 
would we be willing — as we did in Korea — to 
talk as loe fght? In other words, can you con- 
ceive of the possibility of truce talks while the 
fighting continues? 

A. I would have to simply take you back to 
the President's San Antonio formula on that 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in relation to this current 
diplomatic exploration, is it your impression 
that Moscoio and Peiping are now prepared to 
use their influence to bring this tear to a nego- 
tiated end? 

A. No, we have no impressions of their atti- 
tude at this point. We may get some more firm 
information on that. It is my impression that 
Moscow has simply repeated the statement as it 
was made in Hanoi. I haven't myself noticed 
anything that Peiping has said about it. I 
wouldn't want to speculate on what either one 
of those steps might have meant. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with both the 
President'' s San A ntonio statement and Foreign 
Minister Trinh's statement, are we not com- 

JANTJART 22, 1968 


mitted to test Hanoi's intentions hy stopping the 
homhing and seeing whether or not there would 
he talks promptly and productively? 

A. Well, let's find out what they mean. Let's 
find out what this statement means, as well as 
what it says. And then we will consider that in 
relation to the President's San Antonio state- 
ment and then see whether any conclusion can be 
drawn from it. 

Q. Are you satisfied with verhal assurances 
from them that they intenxled to go into prompt 
and productive discussion? 

A. Tliis is not the place for me to answer that 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes, sir? 

Q. Why has the Department failed to ash for 
prosecution for perjury of the three people who 
were involved in giving misleading and false 
testimony under oath on this illegal wiretap- 

A. I believe that is a matter for the 

Q. And each of the things / have spoken of 
there are well thought out and if you want to go 
into any of the terms of illegality and so forth, 
I would be delighted to discu^ss those with you. 
Why haven'' t you taken action in 4 years? 

A. I think this is a decision for the Depart- 
ment of Justice, based on the record. 

Q. Well, it has not been sent to the Depart- 
ment of Justice, and they were informed, the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
Criminal Division in the last week or two has 
informed a Member of Congress that it has not 
been referred to the Department of Justice. 

A. Well, this is not my recollection of it 4 
years ago. But nevertheless 

Q. Do you intend to do something about that, 
or let the statute of limitations run out, which 
I understand is a 5-year statute? 

A. I will have to take that under advisement. 
I don't know. 

Q. Will we get an amioer on this later or not? 

A. I don't know whether you will or not. 

Q. Can you evaluate for us the 

Q. The Jordanian Government has had before 
this Government for some time a request for re- 
placement parts for airplanes and arms lost in 

the June war. The Department says if a under 
study. Is it still under study, sir, and can you 
talk about the reasons for that? 

A. It's still under study, yes. 

Efforts Toward Peace in Middle East 

Q. Can you evaluate for us the role of the 
Soviet Union in the Middle East today? 

A. The question was evaluating the role of 
the Soviet Union in the Middle East today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary 

A. I'm not going to say very much about 
that. You gentlemen asked me a good many 
questions today about the future and about the 
evaluations that I should not get into. We hope 
that they will give their full support to the 
Security Council's resolution of late November. 
We believe that their own interests would lead 
them to want peace in the Middle East, as our 
interests would lead us to want peace in the 
Middle East. 

We know that there are some differences 
about the order in which one proceeds from one 
question to the next. As yoti know, they have 
felt in the past that f\ill withdrawal by Israeli 
forces to the pre-.Tune 5 position was a prerequi- 
site for action on other questions. 

The Security Council resolution found, I 
think, a better and more comprehensive answer 
to that question, and they voted for that resolu- 

We would hope that they would work with- 
in the framework of the Security Council and 
in support of Ambassador Jarring to help find 
the basis for a permanent settlement there. And 
I think that there is some possibility that their 
influence can be in the direction of moderation. 

We also would hope that they would become 
more interested in finding some means of lim- 
iting the arms race in that area. Because none 
of these countries can feel secure unless there 
is some sense of limit on the arms or the build- 
up in one or another coimtry. And on that they 
can make a very substantial contribution. 

But the real answer to your question is we 
will just have to see as we move in the weeks 
ahead to support Ambassador Jai-ring's efforts. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there were a number of 
stories in recent weeks about consideration be- 
ing given within the administration to the pol- 



icy of hot pursuit across the Cambodian bor- 
der. I xconder, in the context of those reports 
that are before us, if you would comment on 
how well founded they were and whether there 
is some hind of feeling of urgency — or time lim- 
itation on the discussion with the Cainhodians 
and the ICC on this matter? 

A. No. I indicated earlier that our major 
objective in this situation is to find a way to 
remove the presence of Nortli Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong elements on Cambodian territory and 
therefore eliminate the problem, rather than to 
have to pose and face that question. 

"We think this is also Prince Sihanouk's great 
concern — it is to remove the problem, rather 
than trying to find one or another kind of 
answer to it, in the event the North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong forces remain on Cambodian 
territory. So this will be our principal preoccu- 

There was a question ? 

Q. Yes, sir. I wonder if you feel that Ho Chi 
Minh is making peace feelers? 

A. I don't know yet. I don't know yet. 

Q. Mr. Secretary 

A. Yes, sir? 

Q. A number of administration officials have 
said that toe have been making significant prog- 
ress militarily in Viet-Nam but none has, as far 
as I know, suggested that North Yiet-Nam is in 
dire straits or near collapse. I v)ondered tohether 
there is any feeling here that Hanoi anight be 
trying to set up the President for a ivorldioide 
propaganda attack on his credibility as a seeker 
of peace in this latest business? 

A. That's always a possibility, but I wouldn't 
want to make a judgment on that until we have 
explored more fully just what is behind this 
statement and what it means. I think it would 
be premature for me to brush this aside as 
purely a propaganda play. 

Now, one has to be careful and watchful about 
these things if it does represent a movement. 
And we are interested in movements toward a 
peaceful settlement. If it is not that, then we 
will have to face that and draw the consequences 
from it. But I wouldn't want to characterize 
this statement today as either a peace feeler, as 
indicated by tlie earlier question, or as purely a 
propaganda move. 

Q. Mr. Secretary 

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to Laos 

A. Yes? 

Q. How do you read the recent enemy attacks 
in Laos? Is this an annual dry-season search for 
food, or does it indicate some more aggressive- 
ness on the part of North Vietnamese troops? 

North Vietnamese Attacks in Laos 

A. Some of it seems to be seasonal in charac- 
ter. Our friends in Laos feel that it is somewhat 
more than seasonal. We have been watching it 
very carefully and trying to keep up with it. We 
have noticed continued movements through 
Laos and the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and 
operations seem to be associated with that. 

There have been additional operations against 
elements loyal to the govermnent that are in 
scattered positions up in the northeast. And 
we have seen some increase in traffic, truck traf- 
fic, from North Viet-Nam over in that direc- 
tion. There, again, is a point where a desire 
for peace could be registered very quickly. 

Those who look upon Ho Chi Minh simply 
as a nationalist have difficulty in explaining 
why he is causing so much trouble in Laos, 
which is not Vietnamese at all or, indeed, caus- 
ing so much trouble in Thailand. We would be 
very glad to see the Geneva machinery moved 
promptly to bring about a 1,000-percent com- 
pliance with the Laos accords of 1962 by all 
parties. And that would be a giant step to- 
ward peace in Southeast Asia. 

So we feel the Laotians have a claim upon 
all of us for full compliance with those agree- 
ments. They are recent. They were based upon 
coalition arrangements inside Laos, the neutral- 
ization of Laos; and these agreements were 
signed by all the parties now engaged in this 
affair. So we would be very much impressed if 
all the signatories to the Laos accord would 
move to let these Laotian people at least take 
care of their own affairs, without being inter- 
fered with from the outside, and would give it 
our maximum cooperation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Europe, the balance-of- 
payments situation, do you expect a fresh round 
of talks witli the West German Government and 
others on this problem? 

A. Well, we will be talking to the Federal 
Republic of Germany and others about the prob- 

JANUART 22, 1968 


lem of neutralizing the foreign exchange costs 
of American troops stationed abroad. I must say 
that we have been very appreciative and much 
encouraged by the initial responses which we 
have had from other governments about the 
President's balance-of -payments program. 

Mr. [Nicholas deB.] Katzenbach is in Europe. 
Mr. Eugene Rostow is in Asia. And we have had 
very good first talks with governments in de- 
tail about the program and have been very much 
encouraged by the attitude that they have taken. 
I think they understand that they themselves 
have a considerable interest in this issue, partly 
because of the importance to them of the Ameri- 
can economy; partly because of their common 
interest in the dollar as a vehicle of interna- 
tional exchange ; and partly because of a neces- 
sity for close cooperation among those of us 
whose futures are interlinked to the extent that 
they are between us and our friends in Western 

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 

A. You're much obliged. 

U.S. Releases Note to Cambodia 
on Violations of Its Territory 

Press release 306 dated December 27 

Following is the text of the U.S. Government 
note to the Royal Camhodian Government 
trammitted ly tlie Emhassy of Australia at 
Phnom Penh on December If.. 

The United States has regretted the impair- 
ment of its relations with Cambodia. Despite 
differences, however, the United States con- 
tinues to respect the neutrality, sovereignty, in- 
dependence and territorial integrity of Cam- 

A particularly distressing problem dividing 
the United States and Cambodia arises out of 
incidents in the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam 
border area. The United States wishes to em- 
phasize that American forces operating in 
South Viet-Nam are engaged in conflict with 
"Viet Cong-North Vietnamese forces committing 
aggression against South Viet-Nam. The Amer- 
ican forces have no hostile intentions toward 
Cambodia or Cambodian territory. The root 
cause of incidents affecting Cambodian territory 

is the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese presence 
in the frontier region, and their use of Cam- 
bodian territory in violation of the neutrality of 

The United States has offered to cooperate in 
seeking a solution to this problem. Following 
the suggestion of His Eoyal Highness Prince 
Sihanouk for more effective action by the Inter- 
national Control Commission, made most nota- 
bly in December of 1965, the United States has 
consistently supported such action and has in- 
dicated its willingness to consider sjanpathet- 
ically any request for specific assistance to this 

At the time, the Royal Cambodian Govern- 
ment suggested that the International Control 
Commission might undertake continuing and 
effective review of activities in the Port of 
Sihanoukville, and it was further suggested that 
the Commission might be expanded so that it 
could more effectively monitor the border areas 
between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. 

In addition, the United Stat-es has supported 
an International Conference on Cambodia, and 
it has also suggested direct, informal talks with 
Cambodian officials in order to seek an alterna- 
tive remedy. 

The United States is deeply concerned over 
the critical issue of Viet Cong-North Viet- 
namese use of Cambodian territory and it wishes 
to emphasize once more its willingness to co- 
operate on any reasonable method of control- 
ling this problem. 

The Eoyal Cambodian Government may not 
be aware of the extent of Viet Cong-North 
Vietnamese use of its territory, and the United 
States therefore wishes to provide it with the 
attached summary ^ of some of the evidence 
available. The documents and interrogations 
from which this evidence has been compiled are 
fully available if desired. Additional evidence 
received in more recent periods is being assessed, 
and may be presented to the Koyal Cambodian 
Government at a later time. 

The United States believes that the Royal 
Cambodian Government will share its concern 
over Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of neu- 
tral Cambodian territory. It is in the spirit of 
assisting the Royal Cambodian Government in 
its efforts to prevent violations of its neutral 
territory that this evidence is presented. 

' The summary was not made public. 




U.N. Establishes Ad Hoc Committee 
To Study Use of Ocean Floor 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
General Assembly hy U.S. Representative 
Arthur J. Goldberg on December IS, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Assembly that day. 


D.S./U.X. press release 250 dated December IS 

Mr. President, the resolution before us marks 
the first major step by the United Nations in a 
reahn of great significance to all members of 
this organization. I would like to take this op- 
portunity to reemphasize the jiosition of my 
country on this very unportant matter.^ 

First, we believe that the prospects of rich 
harvest and mineral wealth both in the deep 
oceans and on the deep ocean floors must not be 
allowed to create a new form of competition 
among marine nations. 

Second, my nation believes that the nations of 
the world should take steps to assure that there 
will be no race among nations to grab and hold 
the lands under the high seas. The deep ocean 
floor should not be allowed to become a stage 
for competing claims of national sovereignty. 

Third, we must insure that the oceans and the 
deep ocean bottoms remain, as they are, the 
legacy of all human beings and that the deep 
ocean floor will be open to exploration and use 
by all states, without discrimination. 

Fourth, my nation stands ready to join with 
all other nations to achieve these objectives in 
peace and under law. 

My country supports the resolution to estab- 
lish an ad hoc committee as a first step in this 

We believe that the study which the commit- 

' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg made in 
Committee I on Nov. 8, see Bulletin- of Nov. 27, 19(57, 
p. 723. 

tee is asked to prepare will constitute a most 
useful basis for future decisions of the General 
Assembly. We particularly hope that the 23d 
General Assembly, as the result of the work of 
this ad hoc committee, will be in a position to 
establish a Committee on the Oceans with a 
broad mandate to develop law and to promote 
international cooperation with respect to the 
ocean and ocean floor. 

There is no question that there are many 
complex and difficult problems — political, legal, 
scientific, and economic — which are involved in 
this matter. But I want to make it clear to the 
General Assembly that I believe the members 
of the United Nations, working together, can 
overcome these problems, just as they have over- 
come equally complex problems in sunilar areas 
in the past. 

"Wlien we made our first proposal for an Outer 
Space Committee in 1958, there were also many 
complexities involved. But we now have an im- 
portant treaty in this area, the Outer Space 
Treaty, which is the result of the work of the 
Outer Space Committee. And we now have be- 
fore us the report of this committee recommend- 
ing a second important agreement to this 
Assembly for approval : the Agreement on As- 
sistance to and Return of Astronauts and Space 
Vehicles. This agreement is another major ac- 
complishment and a testimonial to what the 
members of the United Nations can achieve, 
working together, on even the most difficult 

In reviewing the debate leading to the draft 
resolution callmg for an ad hoc committee to 
study matters relating to the seabed and ocean 
floor, I should like to note several points which 
emerged from the extensive discussions of the 
matter in the First Committee. 

There is a common appreciation of the com- 
plexity of this question and of the importance 
of the General Assembly proceeding with care 
in addressing the scientific, technical, legal, eco- 
nomic, and anns control issues involved. There 
is also a general appreciation of the importance 
of advancing international cooperation in the 
exploration and use of the ocean and ocean floor. 
These realizations should permit us to move 
ahead, carefully but with all deliberate speed — 
just as we moved ahead carefully but surely in 
our consideration of outer space. 

Finally, because it marks the first step by the 
General Assembly in a highly complex field and 
because the question of the future regime of the 

JANUARY 22, 19G8 


ocean floor is a matter of great concern to all 
nations, we believe it is generally agreed that 
the principle of consensus be established from 
the outset. I am sure all members will recall 
that this was the procedure followed by the 
Outer Space Committee — and that this proce- 
dure has not precluded steady progi-ess, impor- 
tant agreements, and beneficial results. 

In mentioning the achievements of the Outer 
Space Committee, I would not wish to imply 
that the problems and opportunities of the 
oceans and of outer space are perfectly analo- 
gous. Obviously they are not. The oceans are 
close at hand ; outer space extends beyond us to 
infinity. Man has traveled and fished on the 
surface of the oceans since the earliest days of 
history; outer space, until recently, has re- 
mained totally unexplored. And the oceans, 
which are already being used commercially by 
man, with rich prospects of food and mineral 
wealth awaiting further exploration and devel- 
opment, are far more valuable economically 
than outer space. 

Yet both outer space and the sea, through 
science and technology, promise much to man- 
kind; and both require, for the fulfillment of 
that promise, that we the nations of this world, 
through this organization, address ourselves to 
our tasks in cooperation and not in conflict. 

For this reason my delegation strongly sup- 
ports the resolution to establish this ad hoc 
committee, as the first major step by the United 
Nations, a step of historical importance, to help 
mankind develop and make full use of the great 
benefits which lie in and imder the great oceans 
of the earth. 

In closing, my delegation would like to pay 
tribute to the Government of Malta and to its 
distinguislied representative, whose initiative 
brought this important matter to the attention 
of the Assembly. 


The General Assemhly, 

Having considered the item entitled "Examination 
of the question of the reservation exclusively for peace- 
ful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and 
the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond 
the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the uses 
of their resources in the interests of mankind". 

Noting that developing technology is making the sea- 
bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, accessi- 
ble and exploitable for scientific, economic, military 
and other purposes, 

Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the 

sea-bed and the ocean floor, which constitute the major 
portion of the area of this planet. 

Recognizing further that the exploration and use of 
the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
as contemplated in the title of the item, should be con- 
ducted in accordance with the principles and purposes 
of the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and for 
the benefit of all mankind. 

Mindful of the provisions and practice of the law of 
the sea relating to this question, 

Mindful also of the Importance of preserving the 
sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
as contemplated in the title of the item, from actions 
and uses which might be detrimental to the common 
interests of mankind, 

Desiring to foster greater international co-operation 
and co-ordination in the further peaceful exploration 
and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub- 
soil thereof, as contemplated in the title of the item. 

Recalling the past and continuing valuable work on 
questions relating to this matter carried out by the 
competent organs of the United Nations, the specialized 
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
other Intergovernmental organizations. 

Recalling further that surveys are being prepared 
by the Secretary-General in response to General Assem- 
bly resolution 2172 (XXI) of 6 December 1966 and 
Economic and Social Council resolution 1112 (XL) of 
7 March 1966, 

1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to study 
the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, composed of 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bul- 
garia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, France, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, 
Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malta, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Poland, Eomania, Senegal, Somalia, Thailand, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab 
Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the 
United States of America and Yugoslavia, to study 
the scope and various aspects of this item ; 

2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in co-operation 
with the Secretary-General, to prepare, for considera- 
tion by the General Assembly at its twenty-third ses- 
sion, a study which would include : 

(a) A survey of the past and present activities of 
the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency and other intergov- 
ernmental bodies with regard to the sea-bed and the 
ocean floor, and of existing international agreements 
concerning areas ; 

(6) An account of the scientific, technical, economic, 
legal and other aspects of this item ; 

(c) An indication regarding practical means to pro- 
mote international co-operation in the exploration, con- 
servation and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, 
and the subsoil thereof, as contemplated in the title of 
the item, and of their resources, having regard to the 
views expressed and the suggestions put forward by 
Member States during the consideration of this item 
at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly ; 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/2340 (XXII); adopted by the 
Assembly on Dec. 18 by a vote of 99 (U.S.) to 0. 



3. Requests the Secretary-General : 

(a) To transmit the text of the prosent resolution 
to the GovtTuments of all Moinber States in order to 
seelv thoir views on the subject ; 

(&) To transmit to the Ad Hoc Committee the rec- 
ords of the First Committee relating to the discussion 
of this item ; 

(c) To render all appropriate assistance to the Ad 
Hoc Committee, including the submission thereto of 
the results of the studies being undertaken in pursu- 
ance of General Assembly resolution 2172 (XXI) and 
Economic and Social Council resolution 1112 (XL), 
and such documentation pertinent to this item as may 
be provided by the United Nations Educational, Scien- 
tific and Cultural Organization and its Inter-govern- 
mental Oceauographie Commission, the Inter-Govern- 
mental Maritime Consultative Organization, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
the World Meteorological Organization, the World 
Health Organization, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and other intergovernmental bodies ; 

4. Invites the specialized agencies, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and other intergovernmental 
bodies to co-operate fully with the Ad Hoc Committee 
in the implementation of the present resolution. 

The convention of April 16, 1945, for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the preven- 
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income, as modified by the 1946, 1954, and 1957 
supplementary protocols, was extended in its 
application to Cyprus as of January 1, 1959, 
pursuant to the procedure prescribed in article 
XXII of that convention. The convention as 
modified continued in force between the United 
States and Cyprus on and after August 16, 1960, 
the date on which Cyprus became an independ- 
ent nation. The notice of termination given by 
the Government of Cyprus is in accordance with 
the provisions of article XXIV of the 

Current Actions 



U.S.-Cyprus Income Tax 
Convention Terminated 

Press release 299 dated December 20 

As a result of a notice given by the Govern- 
ment of Cyprus to the Government of the United 
States on June 6, 1967, the income tax convention 
of April 16, 1945, between the United States and 
the United Kingdom, as modified by supple- 
mentary protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954, 
and August 19, 1957,^ will cease to be in force 
between tlie United States and Cyprus as 
follows : 

(a) as respects United States tax, for the tax- 
able years beginning on or after January 1, 

(b) as respects Cyprus income tax, for any 
year of assessment beginning on or after Jan- 
uary 1, 1968. 

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1546, 
3165, and 4124. 


Agreement relating to cereals, with annex and sched- 
ule. Done at London June 30, 19G7.' 
Signatures: Argentina, Australia (ad referendum), 
Canada, United Kingdom, United States. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
li>GO. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into 
force May 26, 196.5. TIAS 5780. 
Acceptances deposited: Mauritania, December 4, 
1967 ; South Africa, December 13, 1967. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 

force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Accession deposited: Uganda, January 5, 1968. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 


Signature: East African External Telecommunica- 
tions Co., Ltd., for Uganda, January 5, 1968. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and de- 
velopment, and to amend Annex I. Done at Geneva 
February 8, 1965. Entered into force June 27, 1966. 
TIAS 6139. 

Acceptances: Dominican Republic, November 28, 
1967 ; Malaysia, November 20, 1967. 

Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Ge- 
neva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 
1966. TIAS 6065. 
Acceptance: Malawi, November 24, 1967. 

' Not in force. 

JANTJAET 22, 1968 


Protocol for the accession of Tugoslayia to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tarifts and Trade. Done at Ge- 
neva JuT/^O 1966. Entered into force August 25, 

1966. TIAS 6185. v. „ i^ iqfi7- India, 

Acceptances: Denmark, November l-*' f |7 \^^^'''' 
November 7, 1967; Malawi, November 24, 1J*>'- 
SecondTocL-verbal extending ^^^^^f^^^ZTl^^^^ 
provisional accession of t^ie Umtea Ardu ^ i 

January 18, 1967. TIAS 6225. 
Acceptance: Malawi, November 24 1967 
Protocol for the accession of Korea to tlie •jenerai 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. D^n^at Geneva 
March 2, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967. 

lltcp^aUcs: Denmark, November 14, 1967; Malawi, 

Prot^crt^the'a^cJssion of Argentina to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Ge- 
neva June 30, 1967. Entered into force October 11, 

Acceptances: Denmark, November 14, WSJ ! Malawi, 

November 24, 1967 ; Netherlands October 27, 1967 , 

United Kingdom, October 25, 1967. 

Protocol for the accession of Iceland to the General 

igreement on Tariffs and Trade^ Done at Geneva 

Tune 30 1967. Entered into force November 15, 1967. 

Tceptunces: Denmark. November 14, 196J; Malawi, 

November 24, 1967 ; Netherlands, October 27, 1967. 

Protocolfor the accession of Ireland to the General 

"^ Agreement on TarifCs and Jrade^Done at Geneva 

June 30, 1967. Entered into force »/,t'7„^/„'-. f' J^^^^' 

Acceptances: Denmark, November 14, 19f3 ' J"^™, 

November 22, 1967 ; Malawi, November 24, 1967 , 

Netherlands, October 27, 1967. 



Agreement amending the agreement of August 3 and 8, 
iQfifi (TIAS 6086), relating to the status of the trade 
Sreement^f October 14, 1941 (56 Stat. 1685), and 
jSyT*! 1963 (TIAS 5402). Effected by exchange of 

notes at Buenos Aires December 18 and 27, 1967. En- 
tered into force December 27, 1967. 


SuDDlementary convention further modifying and sup- 
plemSg the convention and accompanying pro- 
tocS of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion m the 
case of income taxes, as modified by supplementary 
conventions of June 12, 1950, and August 8 19ob (56 
Stat 1399, TIAS 2347, 3916). Signed at Washington 
October 25, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 

^Proclaimed by the President: December 27, 1967. 


A-reement for sales of agricultural commodities un- 
^"derTme I of the Agricultural Trade Development 
and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 
^54 as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex 
fnd related agreement. Signed at Taipei December 
12, 1967. Entered into force December 12, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Pfce 
Corps program in Grenada. EfEected by exchange of 
notes at Bridgetown and Grenada December 19, 1966, 
and olcembef 16, 1967. Entered into force December 
16, 1067. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
florpement of September 15, 1967 (llAfe 0910 >• ^^ 
f?cteTby exchange of notes at Djakarta November 
6? 1967. Entered into force November 6, 1967. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Convention for the avoidance of do«bte taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income and the encouragement of international 
tnadeTd investment. Signed at Port of Spam De- 
cember 22, 1966. Entered into force December 19. 

Proclaimed hy the President: December 28, 1967. 



INDEX January ^2, 1968 Vol. LVIII, No. llfil 

Asia. Secretary Rusk's New5 Conference of 
January 4 IIC 


Ambassador Bowles Designated for Mission lo 

Cambodia (Wbite Plouse announcement) . . 119 

President Jobnson's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 1 (excerpts) 105 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 4 116 

I'.S. Releases Note to Cambodia on Violations 
of Its Territory (text of note) 124 

Cyprus. U.S.-Cyprus Income Tax Convention 
Terminated 127 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 

Rusk's News Conference of January 4 . . . 116 

Economic Affairs 

Action Program on the Balance of Payments 

(Johnson) 110 

Hearings To Begin March 25 on Future U.S. 
Trade Policy 115 

President Johnson's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 1 (excerpts) 105 

President Signs Executive Order on Capital 
Transfers Abroad (text of Executive order) . 114 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 4 116 

U.S.-Cyprus Income Tax Convention Termi- 
nated 12T 

U.S.-Japan Economic Talks To Be Held at 
Honolulu 115 

Europe. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
January 4 116 

Italy. President Jobnson's News Conference of 
January 1 (excerpts) 105 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Economic Talks To Be Held 
at Honolulu 115 

Laos. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
January 4 116 

Near East. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
January 4 116 

Presidential Documents 

Action Program on the Balance of Payments . 110 

President Johnson's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 1 (excerpts) 105 

President Signs Executive Order on Capital 
Transfers Abroad 114 

Science. U.N. Establishes Ad Hoc Committee To 
Study Use of Ocean Floor (Goldberg, text of 
resolution) 125 

Trade. Hearings To Begin JMarch 25 on Future 
U.S. Trade Policy 115 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 127 

U.S.-Cyprus Income Tax Convention Termi- 
nated 127 

United Nations. U.N. Establishes Ad Hoc Com- 
mittee To Study Use of Ocean Floor (Go.ld- 
berg, text of resolution) 125 


President Johnson's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 1 (excerpts) 105 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Jan- 
uary 4 116 

U.S. Releases Note to Cambodia on Violations 
of Its Territory (text of note) 124 

Name Index 

Bowles, Chester 119 

Goldberg, Arthur J 125 

.Tohnson, President 105, 110, 114 

Rusk, Secretary 116 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 1-7 

Press may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to January 1 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 299 
of December 20 and 306 of December 27. 






i3 1/6 
t4 1/6 


Rusk : news conference. 

Program for visit of Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol of Israel. 

Report on discussions of future U.S.- 
Philippine economic relations. 

U.S. note to U.S.S.R., January 5. 

*Not printed. 

tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 





AZfe?t/' \Mx: 







Vol. LVIII, No. n92 

January 29, 1968 

Address by Vice President Humphrey 129 


Text of Joint Gomnw/nique 13S 


Text of Commiittee Report llfi 



Transcript of News Briefing 135 

For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LVIII No. 1492 
January 29, 1968 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Washington, D.O. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
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Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
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Message to Africa 

Address by Vice President Humphrey ^ 

Today I want to talk with you about tlie 
people of Africa, the people of the United 
St-txtes, and the conunon problems, aspirations, 
and opportunities which we both share with 
the wider family of man. 

This is my first real visit to Africa. As any 
newcomer, I am deeply impressed by the friend- 
liness and exuberance of your people, by the 
natural beauty and resources of your continent, 
and by your determination to secure freedom, 
justice, and human dignity for every African. 

Indeed, I feel as though my heart has always 
been here, as liave the hearts of most Americans 
who share the dream of a just and peaceful 

In America we know that freedom, justice, 
and human dignity must still be secured for 
some of our citizens. And in parts of Africa — 
in even greater proportion — we know that the 
same is tnic. The conditions we seek to over- 
come — ^those of injustice, exploitation, poverty, 
and servitude — did not begin yesterday. Nor 
will they be overcome tomorrow. 

The important question for today is this: In 
what direction are we moving? 

Are we moving toward a future where all men 
have the opportunity to share fully in the 
bounty of their land and to participate fully in 
the governing of their nations? 

Or are we moving backward toward the time 
when the few prospered at the expense of the 
many, when dignity and freedom were the 
chosen preserve of a self-appointed elite? 

' Made at Africa Hall, Addis Al)aba, Ethiopia, on 
.Ian. C. Ethiopia was one of nine nations visited by Vice 
President Humphre.v during his i;!-day trip to Africa 
Dec. 2D-.Ian. 11. The others were: Congo (Kinshasa), 
Ohana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liheria, Somali Republic, 
Tunisia, and Zambia. 

As Franklin Roosevelt said more than 30 
years ago: 

The test of our progress is not whether we add to 
the abundance of those who have much : it is whether 
we provide enough for those who have too little. 

Let it be clear where America stands. 

Segregation : We opjjose it. 

Discrimination : We oppose it. 

Exploitation : We oppose it. 

Social injustice: We oppose it. 

Self-determination : We support it. 

Territorial integrity : We support it. 

National independence : We sup^jort it. 

Majority rule — one man, one vote: We sup- 
port it. 

Iliunan brotherhood and equality of oppor- 
tunity for every man, woman, and child : We are 
conmiitted to it^ — in America, m Africa, and 
around the world. 

And we in America and you in Africa know 
that the conditions which stand in our way shall 
be overcome. 

I bring this message to Africa as a representa- 
tive of a nation and a people who feel they are 
your natural partners, who have no colonial 
memories or ambitions, and who shai'e your pur- 
poses and goals. 

The time is not long past when the fate of 
this continent was decided in distant places. 
There were those, both in Africa and abroad, 
who said that Africans were not capable of 
charting tJieir own destiny. But the facts betell 
the lie. Those doubts have been dramatically dis- 

The future of independent Africa is in your 
hands. Aiid Africa Hall is where much of this 
history will be written. 

JANUARY 2 9, 1968 


To those who even today try to preserve the 
colonial past, I say : You tragically misread the 
will and determination of Africans everywliere. 
You misread history and fail to understand the 

To those who still believe that small minor- 
ities can indefinitely hold domination over large 
majorities, I say : You ignore the most vital and 
inevitable movement of our time — ^self-determi- 

I have seen freedom, pride, and self-confi- 
dence in the faces of the ordinary men and 
women in every African counti-y I have visited. 

I have met with determined leaders who 
know that social and economic progress will 
come slowly but who are nevertheless ready to 
sacrifice for it — to bring to their coimtries pro- 
grams of health, of education, of rural develop- 
ment, to build with such practical things as 
rural roads and water systems. 

And I have yet to meet one African who 
would surrender his country's independence for 
mere economic assistance. 

Africa and America are committed to three 
essentials of freedom and liuman progi-ess : 

1. Independence with a full acceptance of 
interdependence ; 

2. National security with a firm commitment 
to international cooperation for peace ; 

3. National development witliin the frame- 
work of regional cooperation. 

Africa's Priceless Assets 

You face many grave problems. But you also 
possess many priceless assets. 

Africa can remain insulated from much of 
the turmoil and controversy elsewhere in the 
world, as we in America did for the first century 
and a half of independent nationhood. You can 
make your choices, set your priorities, and de- 
termme your true interests. 

Most parts of Africa are not yet caught up in 
the population explosion that holds back prog- 
ress in other parts of the world. You still have 
time to bring your food supply and human re- 
sources into balance. 

Beyond this, Africa has potential for enor- 
mous agricultural productivity. With foresight 
and management, with research and modern 
teclmiques, you can both lift your own people 
and help fill the desperate food shortage that 
threatens others aroimd the world. 

Africa, perliaps more than any other conti- 
nent, can find a bright future in agi'iculture. 

African nations need not turn, for the sake of 
vanity, to grandiose industries which drain re- 
sources without being competitive in world 

This does not mean, of course, that Africans 
should remain "hewers of wood and drawers of 
water." The right industrial opportunities also 
lie open to you. 

You have raw materials, hydroelectric power, 
and growing niunbers of trained engineers, 
technicians, and workers. With careful plan- 
ning, and with the creation of large-scale mar- 
kets through regional cooperation, you can look 
forward to healthy growth in industry and 
trade. But havmg witnessed the tragic expe- 
rience of others in rushing heedlessly into un- 
economic industrial development, I know you 
will choose both your industry and your mar- 
kets realistically. 

For our part, we in the developed nations 
must be ready to do far more than we have 
done to reduce barriers which restrict tlie ex- 
ports of African and other developing nations. 
It is not oiily in our enliglitened self-interest to 
do so, but it must also be done because it is right 
and just. 

The United States intends to take the leader- 
shi}) in reducing these barriers to trade and com- 

You are also reaching outward toward new 
regional cooperation. We enthusiastically sup- 
port these efforts. 

One of the lessons of recent liistory has been 
that both markets and economic units must be 
large enough to permit economic diversifica- 
tion, competitiveness, and full employment. 

In America we are fortimate to have such a 
readymade large-scale economic unit. Others 
in Europe, in Asia, and in Latin America are 
building them just as j'ou are here. 

For those wlio fear some loss of national 
sovereignty in regional cooperation, I would 
point out that the greatest loss of sovereignty 
comes when a nation's people ai'e impoverished, 
miable to find work, and unable to generate the 
economic power which must lie at the heart 
of independent nationliood. 

We support the Economic Commission for 

We are encouraged by the work of the young, 
vital African Development Bank, and we are 
looking for new ways to help the Bank's special 

We are heartened by tlie East African Com- 
munity and its promise of growth. 



We see real potential in ev'olving e<:onomic 
organizations in the Maghreb and in West 
Africa, in negotiating for joint development of 
river projects, m developing joint economic 
plans among any group of like-minded coim- 

We firmly support, too, the Organization of 
African Unity. 

If tliere are those who doubt the value of 
the OAU, I direct them to the results of the 
Kinshasa meeting in September. I believe it 
■will prove to be a lanchnark in the growth of 
African solidarity, a time when the world saw 
the OAU's determination to come to grips re- 
sponsibly with tangible problems and not just 
to function as a convenient debating society. 

Concept of African Solidarity 

The concept of African solidarity deserves 
and will receive the support of the American 

It is a concept which strives toward human 
and social betterment, replacing violence and 
dissension with brotherhood and peace. It is a 
concept which binds men together rather than 
driving tliem apart, a concept which respects 
individual Iniman rights, as well as the unique 
cultural and etlmic traditions of Africa's many 

It is this concept which has been at work 
in ameliorating relations among Kenya, Ethi- 
opia, and Somalia. 

It is a concept that will be further tested this 
spring in West Africa. 

It is present whenever African nations work 
together on development of transport, river 
basins, or common markets — or when they con- 
sider the problem of refugees, as you recently 
did in this hall. 

Tlie concept of African unity is surely the 
only sane path toward peace and justice in a 
world where mankind possesses the capacity for 

I will not tell you all that America has done 
to help Africa. We have done a good deal — but 
it is still not enough. 

Both the President and I deeply regret that 
our requests for foreign assistance have been 
reduced tliis year. We do not intend to retreat 
in the face of these reductions — or fall back be- 
fore those in America who call for a new 

We intend to take our case before the Ameri- 
can people. We intend to let them decide the 

course we shall follow in the outside world. 
I know my countrymen. They will not turn 
away from their responsibility to others, in- 
cluding Africa. 

Human Riglits and Self-Determination 

Yet, despite any amount of economic assist- 
ance to Africa, we can never rest until human 
as well as economic rights are fully realized. 

On the third anniversary of the OAU, Presi- 
dent Johnson set forth our position : * 

The foreign policy of the United States (the Presi- 
dent said) is rooted in its life at home. We will not 
permit human rights to be restricted in our own coun- 
try. And we will not support policies abroad which are 
based on the rule of minorities or the discredited no- 
tion that men are unequal before the law. 

Nowhere are these rights more challenged 
than today in southern Africa. 

The case of South West Africa is but one case 
in point. But it contains all the elements of 
tragedy which characterize this situation. 

My Government, through all legal and prac- 
tical means, has tried — both alone and together 
with other members of the United Nations— to 
persuade South Africa to change her policies 
and practices with respect to South West 
Africa. We shall persist in these efforts. 

In 1966 we joined the majority of the United 
Nations General Assembly in declaring that 
South Africa had failed to carry out the terms 
of the mandate over South West Africa and 
that the U.N. henceforth should assume respon- 
sibility for the territory.* 

Tlie South African Government is now trying 
32 citizens of South West Africa — originally 
37 — on charges of terrorism. 

This trial is being conducted in Pretoria, over 
1,000 miles from the homes of the accused. The 
charges, made mider a South African law 
enacted as much as a year after the alleged 
crime, could lead to sentences of death. 

That trial is a farce. It is based on a law that 
provided for the retroactive political persecu- 
tion of wards of the international community. 
It raises fundamental questions regarding inter- 
national norms of behavior. Great legal and 
human issues are involved here. We believe that 

" For an address made by President Johnson on 
May 26, 1966, see Bulletin of June 13, 19G6, p. 914. 

' For background and text of a U.N. General Assem- 
bly resolution of Oct. 27, 1966, see iMd., Dec. 5, 1966, 
p. 870. 

JANUARY 29, 1968 


the rights and well-being of the 32 are the 
legitimate concern of all the international 

As Thomas Jefferson wrote in the early days 
of xVnierican independence: "All eyes are 
opened or opening to the rights of man . . . the 
mass of mankind has not been born with saddles 
on their backs, nor a favored few booted and 
spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the 
grace of God." 

We have supported majority rule, human 
rights, and self-determination throughout tlie 
world. We will not abandon them in the south- 
ern sixth of Africa. That commitment dictated 
our response when a white minority regime 
seized power in Rhodesia. We strongly con- 
demned that action, refused to recognize the 
regime, and joined with others in the imposition 
of voluntary economic sanctions. 

Wlien stronger measures were required, we 
gave full support to the U.N. policy of manda- 
tory economic sanctions against the illegal 
regime in Salisbury.* 

No country in the world has recognized the 
small minority which denies to the great major- 
ity of the Rhodesian population effective par- 
ticipation in the governing process. In the long 
run, such reactionary behavior cannot succeed, 
neither in Southern Rliodesia nor in other parts 
of southern Africa where self-determination is 
still denied. 

President Jolinson said 18 months ago : 

A nation in the 20th century cannot expect to 
achieve order and sustain growth unless it moves — 
not just steadily but rapidly — in the direction of full 
political rights for all its peoples. 

The Promise of America 

I said at the beginning that we in America 
see ourselves as yoiu- natural partners. We feel 
this, most of all, because we see within ourselves 
the vision which challenges you, the principles 
which gtiide you, and the creativity which moti- 
vates you. 

We, too, were favored with abimdant natural 
resources and with the detennination and imag- 
ination to use them productively. 

We also profited from a flow of investment 
from more developed countries. Our canals, our 

'For background, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1067, p. 73, and 
Jan. 23, 1067, p. 14.5. 

railroads, and much of our early industry were 
financed in large measure with foreign capital. 

We, like you, have always sought a world of 
peace in which we could develop and mature in 
our own way. We borrowed freely from the ex- 
perience of other nations- We resented inter- 
ference and resisted alien doctrines long before 
thej' were served up under the now tattered and 
discredited banner of "wars of national 

To this very day we are determined to fulfill 
for every American the promises of our Decla- 
ration of Independence: the inalienable rights 
of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi- 
ness." Our revolution is a continuing one. 

There are some Americans who do not enjoy a 
full measure of opportunity in education, in 
housing, in employment, in social justice. AVe 
shall not rest until full opportunity for all is 
an accomplished fact. 

We are very much part of the world revolu- 
tion of rising expectations, and we have 
experienced the frustrations and violence 
resulting from legitimate expectations too long 

Yes, we live in a rapidly changing world : 

— a world in which colonialism has given way 
to national independence and self-determina- 

— where men are no longer divided as ex- 
ploiters and exploited but are being given the 
chance to prove themselves on their own merit 
and merit alone; 

— where artificial social delineations are fall- 
ing away in the face of the inescapable and 
clear reality that all men are created equal. 

We, now, in our time and generation, have 
the power to make this change more rapid, to 
bring the world closer to its vision of peace 
and freedom. 

We in America are with you, materially and 
with our liearts, in your efi'ort to build a new 
and better continent. We may at times make 
mistakes. Our own shortcomings may be paui- 
fully clear. We may, in confusion, sometimes 
obscure our real purposes and goals. But you 
should know nonetheless that our pledge is firm 
and will not be withdrawn. 

One of my favorite authors — one which I 
wish more Africans could Icnow — is the Ameri- 
can writer of the 1930's, Thomas Wolfe. 



Tliomas "Wolfe spoke out on behalf of all 
Americans — he spoke our thoughts and dreams 
— at a time when our America was filled with 
poverty, liopelessness, discrimination, and 

To every man bis chance (he wrote), to every man 
resardless of his birth, his shining golden opportunity. 
To everj" man the right to live, to work, to be him- 
self. And to become whatever things his manhood and 
his vi.sion can combine to make him. This ... is the 
promise of America. 

Yes, this is the promise of America; and I 
believe it is the promise and the cause of all 

It is a promise which one day will come ti'ue, 
not only in my own country but here on this 
continent where riches lie beneath your feet — 
and in every farm and village where people are 
determined to lift themselves. 

It will come true if we determine to make it 


I think we can and shall. 

United States and Cambodia Hold Talks at Phnom Penh 

Chester Bowlex. American Ambassador to 
India, tccus in Cainbodia January 8-12 as a spe- 
cial representative of President Johnson. Fol^ 
lowing is the text of a joint communique at 
Phnom Penh released at 7 :30 p.m. on Janu- 
•iry 12 Cambodian titne, together tcith a state- 
itwnt made by Ambassador Boivles upon his 
return to New Delhi that day. 


Pri'ss release 15 dated January 12 

The Honorable Cliester Bowles, Special Rep- 
lesentative of the President of the United 
.•States, accompanied by other officials of the 
United States Government, visited Phnom 
Penh from January 5 to January li^, infiS to 
discuss matters of mutual interest with the 
Royal Cambodian Government. 

During his visit Amba.s.sador Bowles was re- 
ceived by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, the Chief of State of Cambodia, and 
participated in several working meetings with 
Ilis Excellency il. Son Sann, Prime Minister, 
assisted by higli officials of the Royal Cambo- 
dian Government. 

During the discussions, Ambassador Bowles 
renewed American assurances of respect for 
Cambodian .sovereignty, neutrality and terri- 
torial integrity. He expres.sed the hope that the 
effective functioning of the International Con- 

trol Commission would avert violations of 
Cambodia's territory and neutrality by forces 
operating in Vietnam. Moreover, he declared 
that the Government of the United States of 
America is prepared to provide material as- 
sistance to the International Control Commis- 
sion to enable it to increase its ability to per- 
form its mission. 

His Royal Higlmess Prince Sihanouk clearly 
expressed his Government's desire to keep the 
war in Vietnam away from his borders. He 
stressed Cambodia's desire that its territory 
and its neutrality be respected by all countries, 
including the belligerents in Vietnam. The 
Royal Government is determined to prevent 
all violations of the present borders of Cam- 
bodia. For this reason, the Royal Government 
is exerting every effort to have the present fron- 
tiers of the Kingdom recognized and respected. 

Ambassador Bowles, convmced of Cambo- 
dia's good faith, emphasized that the United 
States of America has no desire or intention to 
violate Cambodian territory. He assured the 
Royal Cambodian Govermnent that the United 
States will do everything possible to avoid acts 
of aggression against Cambodia, as well as in- 
cidents and accidents which may cause losses 
and- damage to the inhabitants of Cambodia. 

His Royal Higlmess Prince Norodom Siha- 
nouk recalled that the Royal Government has 
since 19G1 proposed the strengthening of the 
International Control Commission by the pro- 
vision of additional means, by the creation of 

jjU JANUARY 20, 1968 


mobile teams, and by tlie establishment of fixed 
posts at various points in the country, and that 
this proposal still remains valid. The Royal 
Government is prepared to confirm anew to the 
International Control Commission that it still 
favors the strengthening of that organization 
so that it may be able, within the framework of 
its competence as defined by the Geneva Agree- 
ments of 1954, to investigate, confirm, and re- 
port all incidents as well as all foreign infiltra- 
tions on Cambodian territory. 

In the course of these conversations, there 
was also a frank exchange of views on the gen- 
eral situation in Southeast Asia and on other 
subjects of mutual interest. 

The working sessions took place in an atmos- 
phere of reciprocal respect, comprehension, and 
good faith. The two sides expressed their satis- 
faction as well as their willingness to partici- 
pate in similar meetings in the future. 

At the end of his visit, Ambassador Bowles 
expressed for himself and the members of the 
American delegation the deepest gratitude for 
the cordial reception and warm hospitality ac- 
corded by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk of Cambodia and the Royal Govern- 

Son- Sankt 

Chester Bowles 


I am pleased to be able to say that the con- 
versations between Cambodia and the United 
States have gone well. On the one hand, we 
were able to assure Prince Sihanouk of my 
country's continumg respect for Cambodia's 
sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integ- 
rity. On the other, the Cambodian Govern- 
ment reaffirmed its determination to have its 
territory respected by the North Vietnamese, 
the Viet Cong, and, indeed, by all countries 
engaged in the fighting in Viet-Nam. To help 
achieve this goal, the Cambodians expressed 
their firm desire for a stronger and better 
equipped ICC. The meetings were most cordial, 
and each side made a determined effort to un- 
derstand and see each other's pomts of view 
whenever possible. I believe we have made an 
important step toward safeguarding Cambo- 
dia's neutrality and, in a significant degree, the 
furtherance of peace in Southeast Asia. 

U.S. OfFers Helicopters for ICC 
Surveillance Work in Cambodia 

Press release 5 dated January 10 

Following is the text of a U.S. message con- 
veyed to the Royal Cambodian Government hy 
the Australian Emhassy at Phnom Penh on 
December 25. 

The deep concern of the Government of the 
United States of America over Viet Cong and 
North Vietnamese use of Cambodia was con- 
veyed by note to the Royal Cambodian Govern- 
ment on December 4, 1967.^ The United States 
Government is disappointed to note that the 
Royal Cambodian Government, in its reply,^ 
does not share this concern. Nonetheless, the 
problem remains grave and the Government of 
the United States of America remains anxious 
to assist in its amelioration. Accordingly, it 
wishes to put forward tlie following proposal: 

The United States Government is prepared to 
offer material assistance to the International 
Control Conmiission (ICC) so as to provide the 
means of more effectively monitoring violations 
of Cambodian neutrality. The United States 
Government's intention is to enable the ICC to 
have a greater mobility and the consequent ca- 
pability of conducting independent and random 
surveillance activities which would render sig- 
nificant assistance to the Royal Cambodian Gov- 
ernment's attempts to maintain its neutrality. 
The United States Government believes this of- 
fer is responsive to the suggestion made at a 
press conference on November 26 by the Cam- 
bodian Chief of State, His Royal Highness, 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. 

Tlie delivery of the material assistance would 
be made to the ICC under arrangements on 
which the Royal Cambodian Government would 
be consulted. The kind of assistance to be pro- 
vided is a matter to be arranged. Our thinking 
is to make available for an agreed period two 
helicopters with which at least French, Cana- 
dian or Indian crews are familiar. Also, the 
United States Government would cover the costs 
of the maintenance and operation of these two 
helicopters. Delivery would be made at Siha- 
noukville or any other point in Cambodia. 

' Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1968, p. 124. 
' Not printed here. 



United States Officials Report on Overseas Reactions 
to President Johnson's Balance-of-Payments Program 

Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. 
Katzenbach^ Under Secretary of the Treasury 
Frederick L. Deining, and William M. Roth, 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 
discussed President Johnson's balance-of-pay- 
ments program xvith government leaders in the 
six Common Market countries and Switzerland 
January 2-6; Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow undertook a 
similar mission to Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand during the sa7ne period. Following is 
the transcript of a news iriefing they held at the 
Department of State on January 8. 


Mr. Kaizenbach 

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Deming and Mr. 
Roth and I have just completed a trip to Europe 
to describe the President's balance-of -payments 
program ^ and to seek the ideas and thoughts of 
the various European leaders on the subject. 

Mr. Rostow has just completed a similar trip 
into East Asia for the same purpose. 

In general, it was our experience in Europe 
that the action taken by President Jolinson was 
recognized as necessary and essential, as coura- 
geous, and as absolutely unavoidable, given the 
balance-of -payments situation the United States 
was in. 

The various countries were, of course, inter- 
ested in detail, interested in estiniates, mterested 
in figures. They had done some of their own 
work on this. They had concern about what the 
impact of the proposals that the President — the 
action the President had taken- — the proposals 
he had taken might be upon them, a natural 

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1068, p. 

enough concern; but at the same time without 
exception they endorsed at least the general 
principles of the action that he was taking and 
the steps already undertaken. 

That is it in very brief summary as far as 
Europe is concerned. 

Perhaps you'd like to add a word as far as 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were 

Mr. Rostow 

Yes. The action taken was very much the 
same. There was universal feeling that the 
President had acted decisively and with great 
courage in the face of the financial disturbance 
that had followed upon the devaluation of ster- 
ling in November, that he had laid out a pro- 
gram that was balanced and adequate and, with 
the passage of the tax bill and restraint at home 
in wages and prices, assured the world econ- 
omy a very firm and durable base. 

There was universal recognition that a strong 
dollar is the keystone of the world economy, and 
there was an offer on the part of all three gov- 
ernments that we saw of full cooperation in 
every way to make this program a success; the 
recognition that success in protecting the dollar 
meant also success in protecting their own cur- 
rencies and their own economies. 

At the same time, there was concern about 
two possibilities : 

One, the possibility that there might be finan- 
cial stringency and a shortage of money in the 
reserves and of credits in the wake of this 
drastic cutdown in the outflow of dollars from 
the United States. 

In the second place, vei-y great concern that 
any actions at tliis time might trigger a revival 
of protectionism and a loss of all that had been 
gained in opening up with the world economy 
through the Kennedy Round negotiations. 

JANTJART 29, 1968 


So it was accepted on the part of all thi-ee 
governments that I saw that this trip was not 
merely informative but the beginning of the con- 
tinual consultations through tliis period so that 
our cooperation — the cooperation of all the mam 
trading countries — should be effective, so that 
tliey could reach harmonized and concerted po- 
sitions not only to manage the process of bal- 
ance-of-payments adjustment so that the deficit 
countries and the surplus countries could move 
together toward balance-of-payments equilib- 
rium but to manage all other aspects of policy 
involved in the adjustment process — the mili- 
tary side and the trade side — so that we could 
reach solutions which were expansionist and 
not restrictionist. 

Mr. Katzenbach 

Let me ask Mr. Deming, who talked with a 
number of the central bankers in Euroi^e, if he 
would like to add a word. 

Mr. Deming 

Nothing mucli. I think all of them had the 
same feeling that Secretary Katzenbach and 
Secretary Kostow have described : that the pro- 
gram was necessary, showed great courage on 
the part of the President, and that it was higlily 
important not only for our purpose to preserve 
the strength of the dollar but to preserve the 
strength of the international monetary system, 
of which the dollar is of major import. 

Mr. Katzenbach 

We'll be happy to take any questions you 
might have. 


Q. Mr. Katzenbach, what was the waction to 
the travel curi on the part of some European 
countrks as to what the nature of the travel 
curb might be, and how did you ex plains- 
Mr. Katzenbach: The reaction — there was 
concern on the part of some European countries 
as to what the natui-e of the travel curbs might 
be and how they might be affected by them. 

I explained to them that the President did not 
have in mind any absolute prohibitions on 
travel, he did not have in mind an exchange- 
control system, that we were in the proceas of 

consulting the Congi-ess in this regard, tJiat the 
reason for taking action with respect to tourism 
is that we ran last year a $2 billion deficit and, 
with that big a deficit on the tourist account, it 
seemed necessary to do something that would 
create a savings on the balance-of-payments side 
with respect to tourism. 

We then discussed a number of possible ap- 
proaches, on which I simply sought their views. 
You got different reactions. This was of concern 
in at least three or four of the countries that we 
visited and de^Dendent somewhat on respect to 
what their own tourist account was, what prob- 
lems the devaluation of the pound and the de- 
valuation of some other currencies followmg the 
pomid had given them with respect to compe- 
tition within the sort of tourism account. 

Q. Did you. assure them students and busi- 
nessmen would be exempt from these travel re- 
strictions, as Secretary [of Commerce Alex- 
ander B.] Trowbridge apparently did the other 

Mr. Katzenbach: No, I did not assure 
them of that. I said, with respect to students, 
we had an interest in students going abroad, 
particularly if they were going abroad for 
study, and that was one possible exemption that 
the Congress might propose. 

I don't believe that I said anything about 
exemptions for businessmen. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a fear that has 
been expressed by some critics that any move 
toward restricting travel of Americans abroad 
might, togetJier with otlier faxitors, accelerate 
a. process perhaps toward some kind of isola- 
tionism. Do you feel that this Is a legitimate 

Mr. Katzenha-ch : I think that all of us, Mr. 
Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS News], have an in- 
terest of extending travel rather than restrict- 
ing it, that we want people to know more about 
other countries in the world — Americans to 
know more about other countries in the world, 
and we want people who live abi'oad to know 
more about the United States. So I thinJv there 
is a major and valuable interest that we have 
in preserving freedom of travel. 

Now, right at the moment, what we would 
like to see is people who live abroad learn more 
about the United States, because this would 
help on the balance of payments. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect West Ger- 



many to of set fully the Tnilitary dollar loss in 

Mr. Katzenhach: I don't know what they 
will do in tliis respect. I think it's extremely im- 
portant that the balance-of-payments cost of 
maintaining American troops abroad in a com- 
mon interest be dealt with as a common prob- 
lem and that in that reccard that action be taken 
to offset the balance-of-payments losses which 
can occur from almost an accident of geogra- 
phy, if j'ou will, in a common alliance system. 

Q. Did you get any assurances on this? 

Mr. Rostow: May I add a little on that per- 

If you will recall the background of this prob- 
lem, with the trilateral talks last year in the 
spring,- those negotiations which were highly 
successful from our point of view have estab- 
lished several new principles in handling the 
lialance-of -payments consequences of the ac- 
cident that Mr. Katzenhach sees — the geo- 
iriaphic accident — that British and American 
and other Allied troops stationed in Germany — 
and the essence of the idea was that, beyond 
offsets and beyond purchases and military pro- 
curements and so on, the residual balance-of- 
payments consequences of the military presence 
in Europe would be dealt with through measures 
of cooperation in the management of monetary 

That is an extremely important princi{>lc, 
and it's the basis of negotiations with other 
idinitries where our troops are stationed; and 
we expect to use it as the foundation of our ef- 
forts to build, hopefully, a multilateral system 
for dealing with these problems and more per- 
nument on-going system for handling the issue. 

Q. Secretary Rostow^ ivould you say. sir, that 
definite support of the U.S. program, is condi- 
tioned to the Congress not passing any protec- 
tire legislation, ar how wouhl you expand that? 
Windd you expand on protectionism? 

Mr. Rostoin: Prime Minister [of Japan 
Eisaku] Sato made a very eloquent and moving 
statement about the political meaning of the 
President's plan. He said that every thoughtful 
person in the world would appreciate and 
understand the fact that the Government of the 
United States is imdertaking to deal with the 
balance-of-payments problem through the ad- 

- For text of a t'.S. statement issued on May 2, 1!M)7. 
see ihld.. May 22, 19C7, p. 78S. 

justment of ordinary biisiness activities in tour- 
ism and trade without touching its security 
commitments, its overseas troop presence, or its 
aid program. 

He said this was an extraordinary political 
fact, and he paid very high compliments to the 
courage of the President in proceeding along 
this line. And he said every political leader in 
the world would have to give very careful 
thought to this, which he regarded as the es- 
sence of the President's program as annotmced 
on January 1st. 

Now, he expressed concern about the avail- 
ability of credit under the credit program as 
far as Japan was concerned and the risk, as I 
said before, of protectionism arising out of 
trade measures that might be taken. 

But what he proposed simply was that we 
remain in very close touch on these problems, 
that we discuss them together and try to reach 
agreed solutions which would be expansionary 
and not contractionist in their impact. So that 
he was not making any threats or qualifying 
his support of cooperation in any sense what- 
ever. He was simply recognizing a common 

Q. Mr. SecretaTy, you have heen talking 
ahmit the revival of protectionism: How can 
you increase exports and decrease invports 
without protectionism measures? 

Mr. Katzenhach : If your question is whether 
or not you can increase exports in relation to 
imports, you can do it by a little bit more 
aggressive sales policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, shortly after the Labor 
Party took office in England in 'ff^, they had a 
run on the pofund. Tlie government resorted to 
prcc'/sely the same measures you have just re- 
sorted to here: They slapped a lower tourist 
allowance on tourists, and they put on a 15- 
perccnt import tax to keep the pound at home. 
These measures have proved singularly in- 
effective, and, the pound was devalued. Is there 
any reason that the sa7ne measures to try to save 
the dollar would he any less ineffective? 

Mr. Katzenhach: Yes, there is. They are not 
the same measures and doii't even bear a remote 
relationship to those measures. 

Q. Go ahead — why? 

Mr. Katzenhach: Because I just explained 
we were not imposing exchange controls with 
respect to tourism. So you say "If we are going 

JANUARY 2 9. 19 68 


to put on exchange controls, why do we expect 
them to be effective" after I just said we were 
not going to do this. And then you talk about 
a "15-percent tax." Nothing we are talking 
about is a 15-percent tax. 

Q. But the device dijfers slightly, l>ut still 
they are hoth devices for keeping the currency 
at home. 

Mr. Eatzenhach: They differ in a very major 

Ml'. Rostmo: The underlying reserve posi- 
tion of the dollar is totally different, and the 
role of the pound in world trade and the role 
of the dollar in world trade and finance are 
totally different. 

A Problem for Surplus and Deficit Nations 

Q. Could we put it this way: On the basis 
of this initial survey that you have made, do 
you feel that the Presidents program can, given. 
any time period that you might care to suggest, 
take care of this problem? 

Mr. Katzenbach: Yes, I think it can take 
care of the problem. I don't think anybody con- 
templates the measures as being in any sense 
permanent kinds of measures. A good deal will 
depend on the response of other countries. 

I put forward the thesis — and I am sure Mr. 
Rostow did as well — that, while countries in 
deficit on the balance of payments have obliga- 
tions to take steps to move toward equilibrium 
or close to it, countries that are in surplus have 
obligations to deal with the other side of the 

The simple fact of the matter is that you 
cannot get rid of a deficit without getting rid of 
a surplus. Unless we adopt a new system of 
keeping accounts, it can't be done. 

Mr. Rostow : The principle has been accepted 
by the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development]. I think if you 
will look at the background of the problem since 
the war, you will see the prospective of it. For 
many years we have been running a deficit — for 
about 17 years. For most of that period, this 
was a deliberate act which was the fuel of re- 
covery in Europe and Japan, and it was 
heartily approved by all the leaders— countries 
of the world— as a means of redistributing the 
world reserves which accumulated in the United 
States during the thirties and during the war. 

It has become a problem for monetary man- 

agers only in the last few years. And at the meet- 
ing of the OECD as recently as the 1st of De- 
cember it was agreed unanimously that there 
was a common problem that had to be handled 
by both surplus and deficit countries together.^ 

Q. Secretary Rostow, you referred a moment 
ago to using the technique of the trilaterals. 
Which other countries do you have in mind? 
Isn't that a principle amounting to perpetuat- 
ing the surplus, postponing the deluge? 

Mr. Rostow : Well, it remains to be seen what 
devices of cooperation are developed and in 
what time frame. 

Q. Well, if other countries are stockpiling 
American Treasury paper, in what sense is that 
reducing our deficit? 

Mr. Rostow: Well, all forms of cooperation 
in the management of reserves don't have to 
take the form of purchasing Treasury bonds. 

Q. This is the technique you are referring to, 
isn't it? 

Mr. Rostow: That was the principle. But we 
can, hopefully, develop new techniques through 
NATO and otherwise that will broaden and di- 
versify our means of cooperation in this field. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I v/nderstand a consider- 
able dollar drain has gone into private funding 
for Israeli bonds. Are we asking Israel to call 
off its bond campaigns in this country? 

Mr. Katzenbach: No. 

Mr. Deming, correct me if I am wrong. I 
think a good deal of that money came back to 
the United States in one form or another. 

Mr. Deming: And we are not going to ask 
Israel to call off that loan. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is going to be done 
about American tourists who go either to 
Canada or Mexico and go overseas from there? 
How do you control that in any way? Do you 
propose to establish any controls at the frontier? 

Mr. Katzenbach: I would think it would be 
very difficult to establish any controls at the 
frontier with respect to Canada and Mexico. 
But, if they proceed to go overseas from there, 
then I would expect them to comply with what- 
ever law that we have. I don't think, in any 
event, that would constitute a major drain, for 

" For background, see ilid., Dec. 2.5, 1967, p. 876. 




the rather simple reason that I thuilc most 
American citizens are law-abiding and that if 
they have a tax, they ■will pay it. 

U.S. Tax Increase an Important Element 

I Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports 
that the French Finance Minister, Mr. [Michell 
Debrc, has some very grave reservations about 
the administration's entire program and he has 
conditioned French support — and I would 
think, by indirection, this might also mean the 
Common Market support — upon the passage of 
tJie tax increase. What happens if the tax in- 
crease is not passed? 

Mr. Katzenbach: It is perfectly correct to say 
that Mr. Debre felt that it was essential that the 
noninflation tax be passed by the United States. 
"We didn't express any disagreement with that. 
"We think that is important, too. President 
Jolinson has made that quite clear. He thinks 
that is an essential part of this program. So, in 
that respect, there certainly was no difference of 
opinion between us and Mr. Debre. I don't think 
he conditioned support on that, but I think he 
said "That is a primary element in the solution 
of your problems, and, without the tax increase, 
I don't think your other measures will solve 
them." This is the essence of the message that he 

Mr. Deming : Can I say a word on that ? 

Mr. Rostow: I got the same message in the 
Far East. Eveiyone in the Far East felt that 
the passage of the tax bill and other measures 
of restraining inflation at home were essential to 
make this program effective and credible. 

Mr. Katzenbach: Mr. Deming had a word. 

Mr. Deming: Just a word on this point, be- 
cause I think there are two important aspects 
of it that need to be understood. 

Everywhere we were in Europe — and I have 
heard tliis elsewhere, also — there was consider- 
able regard for the necessity of keeping the 
United States economy growing but in a stable 
fashion, if that doesn't sound paradoxical to 
you. No one wanted the United States to adopt 
sharp deflationary measures which would have 
a greater impact on the world economy. Con- 
tainment of inflation, yes — deflation, no. 

In this context, the fiscal part of the tax pro- 
gram, expenditure control, not too much genera- 
tion of new money — all of these were regarded 
as important for the maintenance of world eco- 
nomic health. And, in that context, everybody 
has told us, as Mr. Katzenbach has just told you. 

the tax bill is a necessity to make the whole thing 
work. I don't think anybody represented their 
acceptance of the other measures as being ab- 
solutely contingent on the tax bill. They just 
said, as Mr. Katzenbach has said, that the other 
measures wouldn't work very well unless we 
were able to contain the American economy. 
And it is in that framework that you have to 
look at their attitude with respect to the tax bill. 

Q. Mr. Katzenbach, why was Greece ex- 
empted from, the — 

Japan's Cooperation and Understanding 

Q. Was your mission the first time that the 
principle of cooperative management of mone- 
tary reserves was brought to the Far East and, 
in particular, to Japan? And what was their 

Mr. Rostow : No, it was not. We have been co- 
operating very closely with Japan in handling 
balauce-of -payments and reserve problems now 
for several years. It has been one of the prin- 
cipal contributions of the Joint Cabinet Com- 
mittees which have been meeting ; and their re- 
action was one of understandmg and of full 
cooperation within the limits of their capacity. 
The specific issues to be discussed for the coming 
year will come up at a meeting in Honolulu at 
the end of this month. The meetings we had in 
Tokj'o, as I have said, were not negotiating ses- 
sions but exploratory sessions and sessions of 
consultation to prepare the way for the meetings 
in Honohilu. But this is not a new principle in 
our relationship with Japan. 

Q. Just about the principle of military offset 
— is that new? 

Mr. Rostow : That's what I meant. I thought 
that was the question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard that the 
Japanese Foreign Minister lauded the Presi- 
dent for not sacrificing security commitments in 
this area. Did anyone on the way talk about the 
best ivay to hasten the balance-of-payments 
problem would be to hasten an end to the war 
in Viet-Nam? 

Mr. Rostow : No. Well, the Australians talked 
about it ; but, of course, their views are pretty 

Q. To what extent could you — 

Mr. Katzenbach: I understand — Mr. Fan- 
fani [Ammtore Fanfani, Italian Foreign 

JANUARY 29, 1968 


Minister] in Italy inquired of me the impact 
in that regard. I responded to him privately, as 
I responded publicly on this, that if Viet-Nam 
did not exist, ^Ye would still have a balance-ot- 
payments problem and we would still have to 
deal with it. 

Q. Secretary Rostow, with the capital hivcst- 
ments, the Groii.]) B cotmtries-^vhlch have heen 
cut to 65 percent^would that apply to them, m- 
dividimlly, or the 1965-1966 average, or as a 

Mr. Rostoxo: As a group. The regiilation 
deals with individual companies, in the first in- 
stance; and their investment decisions withm 
this group of countries, as a group— so tliat it 
is impossible at this moment to tell any particu- 
lar country, until company decisions have been 
indicated exactly, what cut in the investment 
outflow from the United States is involved for 
that country. 

Q. Mr. Katzenhach, did any of the European 
coimtries suggest toe ought to cut down on 
troops in Europe instead of cutting doion on 
investments in Europe? 

Mr. Katzenbach: No; quite the contrary. 

Q. They were all for keepijig all the forces 
we had tJiere? 

Mr. Katzenbach: Yes. And I would say, with- 
out exception, they recognized their obligation 
to deal in one way or another with the balance- 
of -payments problems that were caused thereby. 

Reaction to Possible Travel Restrictions 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned there are 
seceral possible approaches that were discussed 
on tra.vel. What were tliese approaches? And 
what reaction did you, get to them? 

Mr. Katzenbach: The approaches we dis- 
cussed were simply a variety of possible tax 
measures — 

Q. What, for example? 

Mr. Katzenhacli: — and, with respect to the 
reactions to them, I would say a good deal of 
relief that this was not going to be an exchange- 
control measure ; some concern as to how much 
this would aifect travel; in some countries a 
concern that it might affect travel to them more 
than others. For example, countries such as 
Italy, which felt that many of the Americans 

commg to Italy were of Italo-American origin 
and of modest means, felt that we ought to do 
something to distinguish them from the jet set- 
that kind of consideration. 

We simply put forward a whole variety of 
ways in which this might be controlled, ways 
that you can tliink of as well as I, simply to see 
whether they had any reactions to one method 
rather than another. 

Q. Could you give u.s a few examples? 

Mr. Katzenbach: Oh, the possibility of a head 
tax, increase in passport fees, tax on the days out 
of the country, and maybe three or four other 
measures of that kind. 

Q. Well, how does that help Grandma against 
the jet set? [Lavghter.] 

Mr. Kiifzenhach: They pointed out that there 
might have to be some exemptions or changes, 
that this might fall inequitably on the — 

Q. What did you say? 

Mr. Katzenbach: I said I tliought that was 
something very much woi+h considering. 

Q. You msntioned some kind of exemption 
for relatives, people with ethnic origin. 

Mr. Katzenbach : Oh, it could be that. It could 
be an exemption for people who hadn't traveled 
abroad over a certain period of years. You 
could have, oh, a variety of ways of dealing with 
this. The legislative process is one that gives 
room for various ingenuities in terms of trymg 
to make it equitable. 

Q. Could you explain, Mr. Katzenbach, why 
Greece toas exem,pted from the investment re- 

Mr. Deming: It's a part of the interest equali- 
zation tax list. It's in Category A. So is Fmland. 

Q. Where is that list, by the way? Is there 
such a list? 

Mr. Oh, of course. 

Q. Isn't it all others who aren't in Category 
B or Category C? 

Mr. Deming: No. If you look at the interest 
equalization tax list, you have a list of what is 
classified there as "developed countries," and 
every other country is a less developed country. 

Q. There's no list of "■less developed'' as such. 



Mr. Deming: Just all the other countries in 
the world, yes; there is such a list. As a matter 
of fact, I think it's in the record of the hearings 
of the Interest Equalization Act. 

Q. There H no Government document of such 
a list. 

Mr. Katzenhach : No; but if j'ou subtract the 
other countries from the developed countries — 
and you have, you know, a National Geogi-aphic 
globe in front of you — you probably could 
work it out. [Laughter.] 

Q. Secretary Katzenhach, you talk about a 
list in that Executive order. There's no such I'tst; 
ifs all the others left off. 

Mr. Katzenbach: That's a list, isn't it? 

Q. Well, where is there a list^ 

Mr. Deming: There's a list on the interest 
equalization tax — published in 1965, I believe 
it is. 

Q. Tlianks a lot. 

Mr. Deming: If you're really interested in 
that, I am sure we can get you a copy. 

Q. Mr. Katzenhach. you said earlier there''s 
nothing like a 15-percent tax on imports. 

Mr. Katzenhach: Yes. 

Q. Does this indicate there will he some sort 
of tax on imports., even a teeny-weeny one? 

Mr. Katzenhach: That is a possible measure. 
It would be related to what countries are per- 
mitted to do within the rules of GATT [General 
Agreement on Tarifl's and Trade]. 

Q. In that connection., Mr. Secretary — 

Discussions With Common Market Countries 

Q. Mr. Secretai'y, did you a'sk tlie Common 
Market countries to modify their contemplated 
rneasures on their turnover tax and, if so, what 
reaction did you get? 

Mr. Katzenhach: We discussed that. We un- 
derstood the reasons for their value-added tax 
measures in their efforts to equalize the tax 
system among the Six. We contended that this 
liad some impact on those who were outside the 
Six, some advei-se impact. Thex'e wasn't a great 
deal of argument with the efl'ect that this might 
have, although there might be disasreement as 

to how much it was; so we did discuss that prob- 
lem. It's a problem that Mr. Roth discussed 
within the Kennedy Eoiuid, I believe, and which 
is capable of further discussion ; isn't that right? 
Mr. Roth: Tliat's right. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q . D Id yo ugct amy Indication that they might 
be prepared to modify tlhelr system so as to do 
away with any adverse impact on the United 

Mr. Katzenhach : I think it would be fair to 
say they'd be willing to consider whatever ad- 
justments were necessary. I'm not sure that 
would necessarily be a modification of their sys- 
tem. It might be in two steps. They might pro- 
ceed to do what they're doing and then see what 
mode of adjustment one could make to the out- 
side. And I tliink that would require some quite 
teclmical discussions multilaterally, probably 
within the GATT, before you could really ar- 
rive at that kind of a figure. But it doesn't neces- 
sarily require their changing that system if 
there's another way of taking account of the 
external effects of it. 

Q. What Is the possibility of us giving a re- 
hate to our exporters of taxes paid here? 

Mr. Katzenhach: I should think that would 
be considered to the extent that it could be done 
within the rules of GATT. 

Q. This means a direct tax as opposed to — 
wait a minute- — a nonincome tax? 

Mr, Katezenhach: Yes. GATT permits an ad- 
justment for indirect taxes passed on to the con- 
smner. I should think that would be something 
that at least should be considered. 

Q. Wouldn't that he an export subsidy? I 
th might that loas illegal under GATT. 

Mr. Katzenhach: You can take — many Euro- 
pean countries have had border taxes based upon 
indirect taxes. It's the theory of GATT that you 
are not involved in a subsidy if all you are dohig 
is compensating for the internal taxation sys- 
tem. The theoiy of GATT is that all indirect 
taxes are passed forward and no direct taxes are 
passed forward. It's an economic theory that I 
tliink a good many economists would question 
todaj-, but that's the— I tliink I'm right, Bill, 
am I not ? 

Mr. Roth: Yes. 

Mr. Katzenhach: That's the basis for it. 

JANXTAEY 29, 1968 


Q. Mr. Secretary, on the relation of Viet- 
Nam — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the specific measures 
which the Japanese Government are going to 
take in order to assist the dollar specifically, do 
they agree with you to purchase some of the 
Treasury bonds, especially intermediate-term 
Treasury ionds? 

Mr. Rostmo: No. As I said before, this was 
not a negotiating session, and we reached no 
agreements on specific measures. The Japanese 
Government did offer very fully to cooperate 
■with the United States Government and with 
other governments in seeking solutions to this 
common problem of the world economy through 
measures that would be expanionist, if possible. 
We discussed in a preluninary way various pro- 
posals of financial cooperation which will come 
up for action at Honolulu later this month, but 
it made no — the Government of Japan made no 
commitments ; nor did I seek any commitments 
with respect to its purchase of bonds at this 

Viet-Nam and the Balance-of-Payments Problem 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before that we 
wo^dd still have a balance-of-payments prob- 
lem even if we didn't have Viet-Nam. Could you 
give us your judgjnent of the effect that Viet- 
Nam has had upon this problem? 

Mr. Katzenbach : I think that as far as I could 
make out from the figures — and Mr. Demmg 
can correct me if I'm wrong about this — that we 
probably have, overall, a balance-of-payments 
deficit on Viet-Nam of perhaps a billion and a 
half and we have overall within the NATO area 
a deficit to the extent not offset of about a billion 
and a half. That's roughly right. 

The increase in 1967 of our balance-of- 
payments costs on Viet-Nam ran about $500 mil- 
lion, whereas the increase in our deficit ran— two 
and a half ? 

Mr. Deming : Two billion or more. 

Mr. Katzenbach : Two billion plus. 

Mr. Deming: Those are essentially right. 
To put it in a little different way, the overall 
deficit this year will be between three and a half 
and four billion. The Viet-Nam deficit would be 
less than half of that, a billion and a half out 
of the total. So either on a straight military ac- 
count or on an overall account, you could not 

attribute the American deficit in 1967 to 

Q. It would account then for 30 or Ifi percent 
of the total, is that right? 

Mr. Deming: Yes, but you can't really account 
for it. We've got pluses in some areas and 
minuses in other areas. What Mr. Katzenbach 
was saying, which I thoroughly agree to, is if 
you eliminate Viet-Nam, you would still have 
a deficit in the balance of payments, and a 
substantial one. 

Mr. Katzenbach: A substantial one. 

Q. But a 30 percent less problem, roughly 

Mr. Deming: Perhaps. 

Q. But some of the NATO area deficit is due 
to the Viet-Nam tvar, isn't it? 

Mr. Deming: No. 

Q. Surely — because Europe is selling us goods 
which ive would otherwise manufacture our- 
selves if our own manufacturers weren't busy 
supplying the war, is that correct? 

Mr. Katzenbach: I don't think so, no. 

Q. Did you say one and a lialf billion for the 
NATO area — one and a half billion? 

Mr. Katzenbach: I think, roughly, yes. 

Q. For the NATO area the same figure? 

Mr. Deming : It's roughly one and a half bil- 
lion for all the rest of the world outside of Viet- 
Nam, most of wliich is in the NATO area. 

Q. Last summer at a press conference. Secre- 
tary Fowler said that without Viet-Nam there 
would be no trouble. Has the situation deteri- 
orated since? 

Mr. Katzenbach: Yes. The situation deteri- 
orated considerably in 1967, especially in the 
last quarter of 1967. 

Q. Mr. Katzenbach, did you get any inquiries 
about the Joint Export Association that the 
President referred to in his remarks — in his 
message or statement — especially if this would 
be an American cartel arrangement? 

Mr. Katzenbach: No, I had no — it never 
came up in the discussion. 

Q. Thanh you, Mr. Secretary. 



Development Aid: the National 
Interest and International Stability 

Following are excerpts from an address made 
ty William S. Gattd, Administrator of the 
Agency for International Development, hefore 
the Economic Club of Detroit at Detroit, Mich., 
071 December 4. 

I propose to talk to you today not about for- 
eign aid in general, nor about military assist- 
ance, but about that part of our foreign aid 
program which is designed to promote eco- 
nomic and social development in the emerging 
nations. And let me make no bones about it: 
I want to enlist your active support for this 
part of our program. Foreign aid today badly 
needs domestic help. 

"When the Congress passes a foreign aid ap- 
propriation bill for this fiscal year, there is 
every likelihood that it will be the smallest aid 
liill ever.^ In the opinion of the President, in 
the opinion of the Secretary of State and in 
my own opinion it will be too small to serve 
our interests adequately. For example: 

— "We will have to reduce sharply our pro- 
grams in India, in Pakistan, and in Africa. 

— We will not be able to carry out our part of 
the plans made last spring at the Punta del Este 
conference to increase efforts in agriculture, 
education, and health under the Alliance for 

— We will have to shortchange our security- 
oriented and military aid programs in East 
Asia and elsewhere. 

The decline in the fortunes of foreign aid is 
not a phenomenon which has come upon us over- 
night. President George Woods of the World 
Bank has repeatedly stated that the needs of 
the developing world for outside assistance are 
not })eing met. Yet, while our gross national 
product has increased nearly 150 percent over 
the past 15 years, the share of our gross na- 
tional product which we are devoting to foreign 
aid has shrunk by roughly 50 percent. In short, 

'The .$2.29.5,635,000 economic and military a.s.sist- 
anee bill cleared by Congress on Dec. 15 was .$9.30,- 
785,000 below the administration and 
$407,706,750 under the previous low appropriation. 
[Footnote furni.shed by author.] 

as we have been able to afford more, we have 
done less. 

There is a tendency to blame the difficulties 
of foreign aid on the Congress. Or, if one looks 
beyond the Congress, to blame them on Viet- 
Nam, summer violence in our cities, the budget 
deficit, the tax bill, or our balance-of -payments 

These are easy explanations, but I think the 
real explanation lies elsewhere. In my view, it 
lies with the American people. Too few Ameri- 
cans understand the purposes of the foreign aid 
program and how it serves their interests. Too 
many are asking : Wliat has this got to do with 
us? How does this help the United States? Why 
should we have foreign aid? 

Our interests in the world, as well as the ob- 
jectives of our aid program, have changed 
gi-eatly since the days of the Marshall Plan 
and also since the early days of the cold war 
when our aid program was preponderantly 
security-oriented and extended military assist- 
ance. Many people fail to recognize these differ- 
ences. They judge the new by the standards of 
the old. As a result, they often expect the wrong 
things from today's aid program and are dis- 
satisfied when their expectations are not real- 

The earlier programs, which helped to re- 
build Europe and which built up the defenses 
of Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea, had 
deep f eai-s behind them : fear for the future of 
the Western alliance, fear of Communist ag- 
gression, fear that the cold war would go 
against us. The Western alliance was designed 
to contain the causes of our fear. The aid pro- 
grams which supported that alliance clearly 
served the national interest. The connection be- 
tween our assistance progi'am and our interests 
abroad was crystal clear. 

Today, many of the fears of the early cold 
war have waned, and the tie between our for- 
eign aid and our foreign policy is more com- 

There is a second key difference between for- 
eign aid 20 years ago and today. It is in our 
relations with the nations which receive our 
assistance. In the aftermath of the war, much 
of our aid program was an extension of war- 
time relations with intimate allies. Aid went 
largely to old friends, to nations with whom 
Americans felt strong common bonds. In 1948, 

JANTJART 29, 196S 


when Senator Vandenberg introduced the Eu- 
ropean Recovery Program in the Senate, he 
pointed out that Europe was "the stock which 
has largely made America." As he put it, the 
Marshall Plan was essential because "Western 
civilization" depended on European inde- 

Today, outside Latin America, the nations re- 
ceiving development aid from the United States 
are not, by and large, this coimtry's old friends. 
They are our new neighbors. Many are new to 
nationhood. They have emerged from the wave 
of decolonization which, since the war, has more 
than doubled the number of sovereign states. In 
the past most of their people had little to do with 
the United States. Our present relations with 
them lack the historical ties and political and 
military intimacy that supported the Western 
alliance after the war. In short., where fear for 
our security helped to motivate aid, we are now 
less afraid. Where we gave aid to old friends, we 
now help new nations. "Wliere aid supported key 
alliances, it is now extended outside the old de- 
fense framework. 

These differences are gromided in changes in 
the world and in changes in our interests in the 
world. The focus of United States foreign policy 
has widened since the years immediately fol- 
lowing World War II. The challenges to that 
policy have also changed. But today's challenges 
are no less real, no less compelling, than the chal- 
lenge of 15 and 20 years ago. 

The dominant interest of the nations of moi'e 
than half the free world has switched in recent 
years from traditional political goals to devel- 
opment. National progress now overshadows all 
other goals in the less developed world. This 
drive for national progress has become a para- 
mount fact of world affairs. Nothing is more 
characteristic of the world today, nothing will 
do more to shape the world tomorrow, than the 
determination of the new nations to realize 
goals which are still far beyond their reach. 

How can a strong program to assist develop- 
ment serve our national interests in today's 

First, let me say that Americans should dis- 
abuse themselves of the notion that the purpose 
of such a program is to win friends, earn grati- 
tude, or gain votes in the United Nations. 
Development aid is a poor tool for the attain- 
ment of any of these goals. Development aid 
serves our foreign policy in ways which go far 
beyond these. 

The critical fact for our relations with the 

developing nations is that their new goals are 
beyond their reach. They cannot attain them 
alone. They need help, and they look to us 
and other developed nations to provide it. 

To conduct meaningful relations with the 
backward half of the world, the United States 
must recognize the urgency of its need for 
progress. As a major power, we have the 
strength to force our way on issues that con- 
cern us. But political relations involve more 
than the threat of force; our own sensibilities 
tend to curb the use of force. So long as national 
progress is the overwhelming concern of the 
new nations, we must work with them to achieve 
their goals. Our aid programs offer a way to 
meet both our national uiterests in the world 
and the aspirations of the developing nations. 

Foreign aid is also right. As citizens of the 
richest and most powerful nation on earth, it 
would be wrong for us to shrug our shoulders 
at the conditions in which the people of the 
developing countries now live. 

Finally, development is necessary for the 
achievement of a stable peace. The underdevel- 
oped nations are dependent and vulnerable; 
their wealuiess leads to instability in the world ; 
their increased independence can help to keep 
the peace. Aid for development will not guar- 
antee stability or peace. But when we neglect 
development, we invite instability and collisions 
between nations. 

In neglecting development, we also encour- 
age unrest, racism, and hostility within the 
new nations. The target, inevitably, is the de- 
veloped half of the world. "Wlien we neglect 
development, we jeopardize the possibility of 

In half the world, there is tremendous and 
unprecedented pressure for development. There 
has never been anytliing like it. We do not have 
pat solutions to all the problems this pressure 
raises. Indeed, the main response must come 
from the emerging iiations themselves. But we 
can play an important role, and we have al- 
ready done so. We have made key contributions 
to development success in some countries, and 
we have promising work imderway in many 
others. Development aid does work. 

Development aid does not meet all the for- 
eign policy objectives of the United States. 
Indeed, day to day, our assistance efforts can 
raise problems while we are meeting problems 
that run from decade to decade. 

But for the rest of this century, the phenom- 
ena of development will be a large part of the 



raw material of Aniprican forpijn^ relations. 
This is certain. "We must accept it. It means 
that foreifrn aid for development will be in- 
tesfral to our foreign policj' and essential to our 

Twenty years ago, when tlie war ended, tlie 
United States did not enter the world in order 
to police it or to expand our influence or even 
to play Santa Claus and give away our share. 
The new compactness of the world put us in 
the world and has kept us in it. There is no 
getting out. Our size and wealth endow us with 
a large role on this planet. We cannot hide 
from our own dimensions and power. 

These, it seems to me, are facts of life, just 
as the drive for development is a fact of life. 
Are we now to ignore tliese facts, turn our backs 
on the world, and tell other nations to solve 
their problems without our help? Could we do 
this even if we wished? Do we care about in- 
ternational stability, about peace, about the 
kind of world we will leave to our children? 

These questions answer themselves. The 
choice is clear. It lies between investing in in- 
ternational stability and surrendering to the 
frustrations of living in a difficult and imper- 
fect world. 

U.S. Replies to Soviet Charges 
of Damage to Ship at Haiphong 

Press release 4 dated January G 

Following is the text of a United States Gov- 
ernment note handed to the Soviet Ambassador 
on January 5. 

The Government of the United States of 
America refers to the note of the Government 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Kepublics 
dated January 4, 1968, which alleges that the 
Sovdet motor vessel "Pereyaslavl-Zalesskdy" 
was damaged on January 4 by a bomb explosion 
during the course of an attack hy United States 
aircraft on the port of Haiphong. 

Initial investigation by United States au- 
thorities of the chai'ges contained in the Soviet 
note has neither substantiated nor ruled out the 
Soviet claim that anj- damage inflicted on the 
"Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy"' was caused by ord- 
nance from United States aircraft. 

If any damage to international shipping in 

the Haiphong area was produced by ordnance 
dropped by United States aircraft, it was in- 
advertent and is regi'etted by the United States 
Government, which will continue to take care- 
ful precautions to avoid damage to non-hostile 
shipping. Unfortmiately, it is impossible to 
eliminate completely the risk that foreign ves- 
sels entering or remaining in an area of active 
hostilities may sustain unintentional damage as 
a result of actions by one or the other side. 

Xevertheless, the Soviet Government may 
be assured that United States authorities will 
continue to make every effort to avoid recur- 
rence of such incidents. 

Implementation of Katzenbach Report 

Press release 307 dated December 29 

The Katzenbach Committee recommended 
that no Federal agency provide any covert fi- 
nancial assistance of support, direct or indirect, 
to any of the Nation's educational or private 
voluntai-y organizations.^ "Where such support 
had been given, the committee said that it should 
be tenninated as quickly as possible, without 
destroying valuable private organizations be- 
fore they could seek new means of support.. The 
committee envisaged that the process of termi- 
nation could be largely — perhaps entirely — 
completed by December 31, 1967. 

In fact, this target has been met; covert fi- 
nancial support will in every instance be dis- 
continued prior to December 31, 1967. At the 
time of termination of support, some of the or- 
ganizations received contributions to tide them 
over the period required to develop new sources 
of funds. xVlso, as recommended by the Katzen- 
bach Committee, the Government is continu- 
ing to study j^ossibilities for providing public 
funds openly for the overseas activities of or- 
ganizations which are adjudged deserving, in 
the national interest, of public support. 

The particular organizations wliich have re- 
ceived covert fuiancial support in the past are 
not being identified because to do so would not 
be in the national interest and might jeopard- 
ize their chances of developing new means of 

' For text of the committee'.s report, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 2-t, 1967, p. 665. 

JAXUART 2 9, 1968 

287-157— 68 3 


U.S.-Philippine Committee Holds Talks on Future Economic Relations 

The Philippines and United States Joint 
Preparatory Committee for Discussion of Con- 
cepts Underlying a Neio Instrument To Replace 
the Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement ^ met at 
Manila and Baguio City, the Philippines, No- 
vember 20-30, 1967. Following is the text of the 
Committee's report, which was made public at 
Manila and Washington on January 6. 

Press release 3 dated January 6 



In accordance with the agreement contained 
in the Joint Communique issued by President 
Marcos and President Jolinson following talks 
in Washington, D. C, September 14 and 15, 
1966,^ intergovernmental discussions were held 
in the Philippines from November 20-30, 1967 
on the concepts underlying a new instrument 
to replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement after 
its scheduled expiration in 1974. 

These discussions were carried on by a Philip- 
pine panel designated by President Marcos and 
a United States team designated by President 

The Philippine panel was composed of : Cesar 
Virata, Undersecretary of Industry, as Chair- 
man; Wilfredo Vega, Acting Assistant Secre- 
tary of Economic Affairs, Department of 
Foreign Affairs, as Vice-Chairman ; Montano 
Tejam, Tariff Commissioner; Bernardmo Ban- 
tegui, Director of Statistical Coordination, 
National Economic Council; Efren I. Plana, 
Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, Department of 
Justice; Ricardo M. Tan, Technical Assistant, 
Central Bank; and Antonio Ayala, Attache, 
Philippine Embassy, Washington, D. C., as 

Members ; and Jose Ira Plana, Executive Officer 
for Legal Affairs ; Pacifico Castro, Special As- 
sistant of the Undersecretary for Policy ; both 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs ; Urbano 
Zafra, Executive Director, Technical Staff, De- 
partment of Commerce and Industry; Felipe 
Mabilangan, Jr., Second Secretary, Pliilippine 
Mission to the United Nations, Geneva ; Tomas 
Toledo, Chief of Assessment Department, Bu- 
reau of Internal Revenue; Ramon Katigbak, 
Special Assistant to the Director General, Pres- 
idential Economic Staff'; as Ad^^sers. 

The United States team was composed of 
Eugene M. Braderman, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary of State, Chairman ; ^ Eugene J. Kaplan, 
Director, Far Eastern Division, Bureau of In- 
ternational Commerce, Department of Com- 
merce; C. Hoyt Price, Pliilippine Country 
Director, Department of State ; George H. Aid- 
rich, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of 
State; and Dawson S. Wilson, International 
Economist, Philippine Affairs, Department of 
State. The supporting staff for the United 
States team was composed of William E. 
Knight, Counselor for Economic Affairs, Ed- 
ward G. Misey, Legal Adviser, and William S. 
Diedrich, Second Secretary, of the United 
States Embassy in Manila. 

The following are the Committee's findings 
and recommendations as a result of these 
discussions : 

I. General Observations 

1. The subject of economic relations between 
the Philippines and the United States is one of 
major importance and one which has many 

2. It is agreed that an expansion and diversi- 
fication of trade between the Philippines and 
the United States would contribute to the at- 

' For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 
19.0.5, p. 463. 

' For text of the communique, see ibid., Oct. 11, 1966, 
p. 531. 

' For a statement by Mr. Braderman at the opening 
session of the meeting on Nov. 20, 1967, see iiid., Jan. 1, 
1968, p. 11. 



tainmcnt of development goals. (See Appendix 
I on the investment and foreign exchange re- 
quirements of the current Philippine plan.) 

3. It is recognized that Filipino-American 
economic relations are burdened unnecessarily 
with certain pending questions which should be 
resolved to the satisfaction of both countries. 

4. There is manifested in both countries a 
fund of goodwill, mutual respect, sincerity of 
purpose and sense of responsibility in resolving 
these pending economic issues, as well as a seri- 
ous concern for the future of their economic 
relations, whicli the people of both countries 
value and seek to strengthen and expand in 
ways which satisfy their national aspirations. 
There is a consensus favoring the exploration 
and pursuit of new opportimities for coopera- 
tion between the two coimtries, consistent with 
such aspirations and goals. 

5. Filipino-American economic collaboration 
should be responsive to the needs of the Philip- 
pines and the United States and, at the same 
time, should be consistent with developments 
in the international commimity. 

6. There are many views shared in common, 
but there still remain a number of important 
issues to be resolved. 

II. Trade Relations 
A. General 

7. The United States team asked whether the 
Philippines desired to continue a special trade 
relationship with the United States. The Phil- 
ippine panel stated that, while recognizing that 
the primary responsibility for Philippine eco- 
nomic development and trade expansion rests 
with the Philippines, it believes that a preferen- 
tial trade relationship with the United States 
on a non-reciprocal basis will be advantageous 
to tlie Philijipines and will not be inimical to its 
national interest. In fact, the Philippine panel 
conveyed the view of the Philippine Govern- 
ment that such preferential treatment for Phil- 
ippine articles in the U. S. market should be 
continued beyond 1974 even if, as it hopes, a 
system of non-reciprocal temporary generalized 
preferences by all developed countries for all 
developing countries is established. The Philip- 
pine panel stated that such arrangements would 
provide the Philippines a further, needed oppor- 
tunity to expand its exports and thereby to 
develop more rapidly its economy, as contem- 
plated by both governments at the time the 

Laurel-Langley Agreement and the Bell Trade 
Act * were concluded. 

8. The Philippine panel stated that Philip- 
pine exporters have not been able to utilize fully 
the trade preferences accorded by the Laurel- 
Langley Agreement because of a number of 
factors, the most important of which has been 
inadequate financial resources, aggravated by 
the orientation of domestic capital to invest in 
real estate ventures and import substitution in- 
dustries ; another factor has been limited prod- 
uct diversification. Only in the last few years 
have these preferences been availed of, and dur- 
ing this i^eriod the margins of preference have 
been diminishing. The Philippine panel ex- 
pressed the view that the twenty-year period 
of diminishing preferences provided by the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement as a reasonable 
period of adjustment now appears too brief. 

9. The United States team stated that, be- 
cause the Government of the Philippines had 
raised many tariff rates and had, over extended 
periods, established non-tariff barriers which 
have affected U.S. articles, it was the general 
feeling in the United States tliat the trade bene- 
fits granted U.S. articles under the terms of the 
Laui-el-Langley Agreement had in the main 
been nullified; the reciprocity originally in- 
tended had not been obtained. Thus, the ques- 
tion remained as to how these difficulties could 
be resolved in the context of a new agreement. 

10. The Philippine panel, noting that the ten 
percent margin of tariff preference currently 
accorded U.S. articles in the Philippine market 
by virtue of the Laurel-Langley Agreement is 
no longer of significant value to U.S. exporters, 
proposed that the United States relinquish such 
preference. The United States team stated that 
this question could only be considered within 
the context of a satisfactory new agreement. 

11. The two groups noted that both govern- 
ments were prepared to support the establish- 
ment of a system of generalized preferences, 
under the terms of which all developed coun- 
tries, with certain safeguards, would grant 
temporary, non-reciprocal, generalized tariff 
preferences to imports of raw materials, semi- 
processed and processed goods, and semi-manu- 
factured and manufactured goods from the 
developmg countries. This question will be con- 
sidered at the forthcoming United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). The Philippine panel urged, and 

' Public Law 371, 79th Congress. 

JANUARY 2 9, 1968 


the U.S. Team agreed to recommend that, under 
such a system, important Philippine exports be 
assured continued entry into the U.S. market. 

12. Without prejudice to the Philippine posi- 
tion stated in paragraph 13 below, the two 
groups agreed that, with respect to the entry 
of Philippine articles into the U.S. market, any 
general system of preferences should be modi- 
fied by the preferences provided until 1974 
under the Laurel-Langley Agreement. Such 
modification would ensure that these articles 
obtain a larger margin of preference than that 
granted to other developing countries in the 
United States market. 

13. The Philippine panel stated that the gen- 
eralized preference scheme shoidd include the 
following additional elements: (a) a system of 
enlarged preference treatment for Philippine 
exports in the U.S. market for a ten-year period 
extending beyond 1974; (b) ensuring at least 
equivalent advantages to developing coimtries 
enjoying preference in certain developed coun- 
tries which will share their preferred position 
with other developing countries; (c) a mecha- 
nism for the continuing automatic redress of 
any adverse situation created for any develop- 
ing country enjoying existing preferences 
which may suffer in its fonner protected market 
as a result of the institution and operation of 
the generalized system of preferences; and (d) 
the cooperation of the developed countries in 
not reducing their aid to the developing coun- 
tries as a result of the generalized system of 
preferences, or otherwise nullifying or impair- 
ing the benefits of the system. 

14. The United States team noted that such a 
proposal for enlarged preferential treatment 
raises questions as to how such special prefer- 
ences could be justified to other friendly de- 
veloping countries. It noted further that the 
United States is seeking the phasing out by all 
countries of existing special prefei-ential tariff 
systems, and Philippine proposals to extend 
the period of preferential treatment for Philip- 
pine articles beyond 1974 would seriously 
undercut its effort to achieve the phasing out of 
discriminatory trade preferences extended by 
other developed countries. 

15. In the event that efforts to create a gen- 
eralized system of preferences fail, the two 
groups will be prepared at that time to explore 
and examine further future United States and 

Philippine trade relationships. The Philippine 
panel stated its hope that this relationship could 
be based on non-reciprocal preferences for 
Philippine articles. The United States Team 
indicated that it could not at this time take a 
position on this question. 

16. In the meantime, it was agreed that there 
should be continuing consultation and full ex- 
change of information between the two Govern- 
ments on these matters, through the American 
Embassy in Manila and the Philippine Em- 
bassy in Washington and later at the UNCTAD 
meeting in New Delhi. 

B. Specifi-c 

17. Sugar — The Philippine panel said that, 
on a basis separate from tlie general preference 
scheme, the Philippine Government was seek- 
ing arrangements within the context of a new 
agreement for ten years beyond 1974 which 
woidd provide for Philippine exports of sugar 
to the U.S. : 

a) a new higher floor of 1,126,000 short tons 
as the basic annual quota; 

b) assurance of a share in the growth of the 
U.S. market amounting to no less than the 
current 10.86% participation; 

c) assurance of participation in any pro- 
ration of deficits ; and 

d) maintenance of the same price system for 

The United States team noted that any pro- 
posal calling for continuation or expansion of 
the special IJ.S.-Philippine agreement on sugar 
beyond 1974 entailed special difhculties particu- 
larly in view of the manner m which the sugar 
allocations are decided upon by the United 
States Government. Nevertheless, the U.S. team 
agreed that consideration would be given to this 
proposal within the context of a new agreement. 

18. Coconut Oil, Inedible Talloxo^ Soy Beans, 
and Liiiseed Oil — The Philippine panel said 
that Philippine coconut oil is estimated to be 
competitive with that of other foreign suppliers 
ui the U.S. market and would consider re- 
linquishing the preferential Pliilippine exemp- 
tion from the processing tax if the U.S. 1-ceut 
duty per pound were completely removed at the 
same time and if coconut oil is included in the 
generalized scheme, and not in the exemption 



list. Thp T'nited Stutcw teiun undertook to con- 
sider tills ([uestion ;ind to conunent further on 
the proposal independently of the new agree- 
ment. The United States team inquired whether 
the Government of the I'hiiippines had con- 
sidered lowering its <luties on inedible tallow, 
so_y beans, and linseed oil. The Philippine panel 
undertooiv to consider this question and to 
conunent further on the proposal independ- 
ently of the new agreement. 

19. The Philippine panel proposed that, if 
a generalized system of preferences does not 
come into effect. United States tariff rates on 
Philippine wood and otiier products be reduced 
so that reductions made during the Kemiedy 
Round with respect to similar products from 
other countries would also be accorded Philip- 
pine products. The United States team took 
note of this proposal. 

20. American Products — The United States 
team noted tliat the following types of actions 
taken h\ the Philippines tended to nullify bene- 
fits granted American exportere under the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement : 

a) Successive tariff increases have been in- 
troduced since 1955; 

b) Non-tariff barriers, for tobacco and rem- 
nants in particular, have cut sharply into tra- 
ditional U.S. exports to the Philipi^ines; 

c) Customs administration, particularly 
with regard to documentation requirements, 
has been so cumbersome and burdensome as to 
discourage many existing and potential U.S. 
exports to the Philippines; and 

d) American businessmen have encountered 
visa and residence pennit difficulties notwith- 
standing the treaty-trader guarantees of the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement. 

The United States team noted that the appli- 
cable provisions of the Laurel-Langley Agree- 
ment had not proWded an effective mechanism 
for expeditiously resolving trade problems. The 
two groups agreed that any new trade agree- 
f' ment shoidd provide an orderly and effective 
mechanism for expeditiously resolving trade 
problems. The United States team, m response 
to a request by the Pliilippine panel, presented 
a statement (Appendix II) concerning certain 
specific actions by the Philippines that had 
adversely affected U.S. exj^orters. The com- 

ments of the Philippine panel on these issues 
are contained in Appendix III. 

21. The Philippine panel informed the 
United States team that the Philippines, to- 
gether with Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Singapore are moving toward the creation of 
a free trade area. The United States team indi- 
cated that it would recommend the inclusion 
in any future agreement of a waiver of most- 
favored-nation rights with respect to a free 
trade area that meets the requirements of the 
General Ao-reement on Tariff's and Trade. 

ill. Investment Concepts 

A. PKili'pfine Investment Goals 
and Hotv They Can Be Met 

22. The two groups agreed that the trade and 
in\'estment goals of the Philippines are closely 
I'elated. The Philippine Panel stated that for- 
eign exchange earnings, from increased trade, 
as well as investment and other sources, will be 
needed to support the Philippine economic de- 
velopment program. The aim of this program 
is the overall development of the natural re- 
sources and industry of the Philippines. The 
Govei'nment's immediate efforts will be concen- 
trated on increasing food production, making 
greater public investment in infrastructure for 
which increased tax revenues will be needed, and 
examining existing laws to determine what re- 
visions may be desirable. 

23. The Philippine Panel pointed out that the 
foreign exchange needs of the current develop- 
ment program are great. It is anticipated that, 
in addition to export earnings, these needs will 
be met from the following sources: (a) supplier 
credits, (b) development loans, (c) direct in- 
vestment, (d) Japanese reparations payments, 
(e) payments from the Special Fund for Edu- 
cation, (f) veterans payments, and (g) grants 
from friendly countries. The Philippine Panel 
indicated that substantial foreign investment 
will be required if sufficient foreign exchange 
for the economic development program is to be 

24. Both groups agreed that only the Govern- 
ment of the Philippines can decide the extent 
to which it desires foreign investment and the 
inducements it is prepared to offer. The Philip- 
pine Panel stated that the Philippines needs and 

JANtJART 29, 1968 


desires substantial foreign investment, particu- 
larly in selected areas, but it stressed that for- 
eign investment is welcome especially on a joint 
venture basis as a means of supplementing Fili- 
pino capital. The Philippines is determined to 
give fair and equitable treatment to existing 
investment and to assure such treatment to 
future investment. 

25. The United States team outlined the ad- 
vantages it believes can result from foreign 
investment and stated its view that foreign 
capital, which has many alternative opportuni- 
ties, will not come to the Philippines in any 
significant amount unless the investment climate 
in the Philippines is one in which it is clearly 
welcome. It set forth examples of the legisla- 
tive, administrative, and judicial actions of 
Philippine Government agencies which have 
had the effect in a number of cases of making 
investors feel not welcome in the Philippines. 

The Philippine Panel replied that foreign 
firms, who may have felt unwelcome during the 
period that the Philippine Government was in 
the process of determining its foreign and do- 
mestic investment policy, were tlie exception 
rather than the rule, and these firms were gener- 
ally in areas where their financial, tecluiological 
and marketing advantages prevented any local 
firm from entering the field or remaining com- 
petitive. As a matter of fact, foreign investment 
is welcome in the Philippines and the new In- 
vestment Incentives Law encourages, with vari- 
ous incentives such as income tax and tariif 
exemptions, foreign investment in pioneer areas 
of investment. 

26. The United States team noted that the 
general practice in most of the world has been 
for countries, on a basis of reciprocity, to accord 
foreigii investment in most fields of activity 
treatment equal to that accorded local invest- 
ment. In the agreements providing for national 
treatment certain areas of investment are usu- 
ally excluded to meet the interests of either gov- 
ernment, but the general rule for other areas is 
tliat of equal treatment for the nationals of 
both countries. Both groups agi-eed that recipro- 
cal national treatment should be included to the 
maximum extent possible in any future agree- 
ment on economic relations between the two 
countries, and the Philippine Panel stated that 
it would give further consideration to this ques- 
tion with a view to determining the extent to 
which exceptions to national treatment would 

be required by the Philippines. With the excep- 
tion of certain areas, such as natural resources, 
public utilities, and retail trade, where most 
favored nation treatment should be accorded, 
the two groups believe that a provision accord- 
ing national treatment can be worked out. 

B. The Investment Incentives Law 

27. The Philippine Panel stated that the new 
Investment Incentives Law is a central feature 
of the Philippine private mvestment jjrogram, 
both domestic and foreign. After describing the 
economic planning machinery and the incen- 
tives provided by the law, the Philippine Panel 
pointed out that, in non-pioneer areas, if a cor- 
poration wished to avail itself of the incentives, 
it would normally have to have sixty percent 
Pliilippine ownership of the voting equity in- 
terest and sixty percent Philippine membersliip 
on the board of directors. The Philippine Panel 
noted, however, that foreign investors could, in 
fact, provide more than forty percent of the 
investment funds and reap more than forty 
percent of the profits through such arrange- 
ments as non-voting shares or bonds. Manage- 
ment contracts would also generally be possible 
where the companies concerned deemed them 

28. The Philippine Panel stated its view that 
United States citizens and United States cor- 
porations would not be entitled, by virtue of 
Article VII of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, 
to enjoy the same advantages under the Invest- 
ment Incentives Law as Philippine citizens and 
corporations. In the view of the Philippine 
Panel the non-discrimination requirement of 
that article entitles U.S. citizens and corpora- 
tions controlled by U.S. citizens to national 
treatment except with respect to special tax 
benefits. Under this view, for example, corpora- 
tions controlled by U.S. citizens that wish to 
enter a preferred area without benefit of incen- 
tives could do so at any time, whereas corpora- 
tions controlled by citizens of third countries 
would have to observe the three year waiting 
period contained in Section 20 of the Act. On 
the other hand, corporations controlled by U.S. 
citizens would not be entitled to equal treatment 
with Philippine controlled corporations with re- 
spect to oljtaining the tax benefits provided for 
by the Act. The United States team disagreed 
with this view and stated its opinion that dis- 
crimination between United States and Philip- 




pine nationals and corporations with respect to 
tax benefits would be discrimination prohibited 
hv Article VII of the Laurel -Langley Agree- 
ment. It was agreed tliat further consideration 
would be given to this issue. 

C. Problems of Eoeisting U.S. Investment in 
the Philippines 

29. Aside from any difficulties that could be 
caused U.S. investore by decisions concerning 
national treatment and the implementation of 
the Investment Incentives Law, the two groups 
agreed that particular care should be taken to 
ensure fair and equitable treatment to existing 
U.S. investment in the so-called parity field, 
i.e., natural resources and public utilities. 
Rights accorded in this field to U.S. enterprises 
by Article \T of the Laurel-Langley Agree- 
ment and the Parity Ordinance of the Philip- 
pine Constitution will expire on July 4, 1974, 
unless terminated earlier by mutual agreement, 
and many transitional problems are emerging. 
The Philippine Panel stated that the Philip- 
pine Government is aware of these problems 
and has taken some actions and will take others 
before 1974 to facilitate this transition. 

30. It was agreed that U.S. investment made 
prior to July 4, 1946 raises few problems in 
view of the fact that Article XVII (1) of the 
Philippine Constitution protects the full en- 
joyment of property rights, which would in- 
clude leases and franchises in the parity area, 
acquired prior to that date. Thus, such leases 
and franchises would continue valid through- 
out their term. 

31. With respect to real estate, leases, and 
franchises acquired subsequent to July 4, 1946, 
the situation is more complex. The Philippine 
Panel stated the view that leases of private 
agricultural land would remain valid tlirough- 
out their term but that development, exploita- 
tion, and utilization of natural resources and 
operation of public utilities by U.S. nationals 
and by corporations less than sixty percent 
Philippine owned must cease on July 4, 1974. 
The United States team welcomed the state- 
ment concerning leases of private agricultural 
land. With respect to natural resources and 
public utilities, the United States team stressed 
its concern that the view of the Philippine 
Panel, if carried forward by the Philippine 
Government, would give rise to serious differ- 

ences between the two governments, unfore- 
seen difficulties for U.S. investors, and serious 
economic dislocations. The two groups agreed 
that settlement of these problems requires the 
resolution of legal issues. They agreed that 
both governments should take whatever meas- 
ures may be appropriate to facilitate such 
resolution at an early date through judicial 
process, perhaps by means of declaratory 

32. With respect to ownership of private 
agricultural land acquired by U.S. citizens 
or corporations subsequent to July 4, 1946, the 
United States team expressed the view that, 
under the terms of the Philippine Constitu- 
tion, such ownership would not be affected by 
the termination of parity rights in 1974. A more 
detailed exposition of the views of the United 
States team on this question is contained in 
the memorandum in Appendix IV. The Phil- 
ippine Panel expressed the view that such 
ownership would not continue beyond 1974 but 
undertook to consider the memorandum of the 
United States team. 

33. The Philippine Panel emphasized its 
view that tennination of parity rights at the 
earliest possible date prior to 1974 would be in 
the best interests of both countries. The United 
States team stated that only in the context of 
a satisfactory new agi'eement could the United 
States Government seriously consider includ- 
ing a provision terminating new rights of ac- 
cess in the parity field. 

34. The United States team stated that un- 
intended and undesirable difficulties have oc- 
casionally been caused U.S. public stock cor- 
porations in the Philippines by requirements 
to prove certain percentages of U.S. citizen 
ownership or reciprocity with the particular 
states within the United States of which the 
shareholders are residents. The two groups 
agreed that any new agreement should contain 
appropriate provisions to eliminate or mini- 
mize this problem in the future. 

IV. Form of Possible Agreemenf 

35. The two groups examined typical pro- 
visions of a Friendship, Commerce, and Navi- 
gation Treaty and discussed the principles of 
national treatment and most favored nation 
treatment on which such a treaty is generally 

JANUARY 29. 1968 


36. The two groups agreed that, if the prin- 
cipal substantive issues were resolved satis- 
factorily, the new treaty instrument should 
be modeled along the lines of an FCN treaty, 
modified appropriately to include whatever 
provisions may be agreed upon concerning 
trade preferences, investment and related 

37. Both groups recognized that any new 
instrument would require action by the respec- 
tive legislatures of both Governments to be- 
come effective. 

V. Other Matters 

38. The Philippine Panel indicated its de- 
sire to raise certain other questions which it con- 
sidered important to its future economic de- 
velopment. The U.S. team said it was not 
authorized to discuss such issues, but suggested 
that they be taken up through diplomatic 

VI. Procedures 

39. The Joint Committee should be regarded 
as a continuing consultative body. If the re- 
maining substantive issues are not resolved by 
other means, the Committee should be recon- 
vened at tlie earliest practicable date, hope- 
fully in April or May 1968, for tlie purpose of 
resolving them and thereby making possible 
the negotiation of a new instrument to replace 
the Laurel-Langley Agreement. 

40. In that event, negotiations, if desirable, 
could follow shortly thereafter. 

Eugene M. Braderman 


United States Team 

November 30, 1967 

Cesar Virata 

Phil i p pine Panel 


Appendix I 

A Note oi^f the Investment and Foreign Exchange 
Requirements of the Current Philippine Plan 

Targets. The current Plan covers the period fiscal 
1967 to fiscal 1970, and has entered its second year. A 
printed summary, published September 1966, is now 
being revised, mainly because very recent improvements 
in the estimation of national accounts have enabled a 
more realistic estimate to be made of the investment 
required to support the program. Since the revision is 
still in progress, the figures in this note must be re- 
garded as tentative. The basic objective of the cur- 
rent Plan is to increase income per head by about 2.5 
per cent annually. This means that gross national prod- 
uct must increase at the fast average of 6.1 per cent 
annually over the four years of the Plan : The target 
growth rates increase progressively from 5.8 per cent 
the first year to 6.3 per cent in the fourth year. 

Attaining growth targets as high as these means 
heavy costs in terms both of investment and imports. 
The average rate of savings, already a high 19.8 per 
cent of income in fiscal 1967, is expected to increase 
slightly to an average 20.3 i)er cent of gross national 
product over the program period. But investment re- 
quirements will be very large, both because the growth 
targets are high and increasing, and because so much 
of the investment must be in public worlis and manu- 
facturing, both highly capital-intensive sectors. Sav- 
ings are, therefore, expected to fall short of investment 
by a total of P2.-1 billion over the Plan period. Though 
imports of consumer goods are expected to remain 
steady at an annual level of about P450 million, about 
half of the capital goods and a substantial proportion 
of industrial raw materials must still be imported, so 
that the growth targets also imply a large increase in 
imports. The rate of growth of exports, however, is 
expected to drop slightly from the rate over the last 
five years. (The initial impetus given to exports by ex- 
change decontrol and by the temporary increase in 
world market prices of sugar seems to have slackened 
considerably ; and neither of these unusual circum- 
stances is expected to recur during the Plan period.) 
The balance of foreign trade is expected to be in deficit 
by a total, over the four years of the Plan, of scjme 
P3.3 billion. 

The table below gives details : 

Targets and Requirements of the Philippine Plan — Fiscal Years 1967-1970 

(MiUion pesos at constant fiscal 1967 prwes) 

1967 i 1963 1969 1970 Four 

1. Gross National Product 23,391 24,752 26,294 27,948 

2. Capital Account 

Gross Investment 4,988 .5,444 6,168 6,617 

Gross Savings 4628 4,985 5,492 5,705 

Kesources Gap _360 -459 -676 -912 

3. External Accoiuit 

Exports 3 128 3,338 3,561 3,799 

imports.... 3_70y 4 ^g^ 445Q 4575 

Gross Foreign Trade Gap » -581 -726 -889 -1,076 

^Preliminary estimate, based on partial data. [Footnote in original.] 
Not including non-trade receipts. [Footnote in original.] 

Year Total 
102, 385 

23, 217 

20, 810 


13, 826 
17, 098 


department of state bulletin 

Itcsourrc KniuircmcnlK. The fisnrcs on avnilahle ro- 
soiirces are siKuitlcant. Tlicy indicato that tlio foreign 
exchange problem is ex'iieeted to be more serious over 
the long term than the savings problem. A long term 
projection indicates that althougli investment reqiiire- 
ments. even for the ambitious development tiirgets just 
stated, can Iv tinaneed entirely from domestic sources 
after nine years, a trade gap will remain and will in 
fact he the controlling factor. Even takinginto account, 
be.sides the value of traditional exports projected on 
the liasis of recent trends, and net additional foreign 
exchange savings and earnings from new exports and 
import substitution forthcoming from priority projects 
li.sted in the I'lan. new exports not taken into accomit 
by the Plan must still l>e raised in the amount of .f4(J0 

Hcmainrlcr of the Plan. The first year of the IMan has 
IKissed, and an assessment of performance is still in 
progress. For the remainder of the Plan i>eriod. over 
the fiscal .years IDGJS to 1070, domestic .savings are 
estimated to fall short of the investment required to 
support the Plan's target by a total of P2,047 million or 
$.j14 million. 

Appendix II 

Problems Excounteked by American Exporters 
IN THE Philippines 

The t'nited States team noted the following types of 
problems encountered by American exporters in the 
Philippine market, which tend to nullify the trade 
benefits granted to the Iiuited States under the Lanrel- 
Langley Agreement. 

1. Philippine imjiort duties have been rai.sed sub- 
stantially since ll).5-j. 

2. In addition to an increase in tariff barriers, serious 
non-tariff barriers have been imposed. Two illustrative 
examples of these are the obstacles placed on the im- 
port of American tobacco and remnants. 

A. Tolacco — This problem originated in the early 
lO.oO'.s when a program to develop the growing of 
Virginia-type toliacco in the Philippines was l)egun. 
Since that time, the Philippine Government has taken 
various measures to reduce the importation of t'nited 
States tobacco. Most recently, the Philii>pine Govern- 
ment has required that a Philippine importer of United 
States tobacco and export four kilos of Philip- 
pine-grown Virginia-type tobacco for each kilo of 
llnited States tobacco he imports. This requirement has 
greatly reduced fnited States tobacco exports to the 

B. Remnants — Under normal conditions the United 
States exjKirts .?20 million worth of textile remnants to 
the I'hilippines annually. However, through a series 
of decrees estalilishing unrealisticall.v high fixed values 
for these remnants for the purpose of assessing 
cu.stoms tax and duty, the Philii»pine Government has 
in re<ent years greatly reduced the flow of United 
States exiM)rt.s of remnants to the Philippines. 
The latest such dwree, that issued on .July 31, 1907, 
sets values that are, for most categories of remnants, 
ten times higher than their true values. Consequently, 
tax and duty assessments for remnant shipments on 
the basis of the July 31 decree are .so high as to render 
uneionomic the acceptance of these remnants by the 

Philippine importers who ordered them. As a result, 
there are now large quantities of remnants in 
Philippine Customs custody, many of which were 
shipped from the United States before the July 31 
decree. Further United States exports have ceased. 

3. The manner in which certain aspects of the 
Philippine customs system have been administered has 
also proven to be a barrier. Documentation require- 
ments, particularly, are so cumbersome and liurdensome 
as to discourage many existing and potential U.S. ex- 
ports to the Philippines. These include: a) the require- 
ment for a manufacturer's or supplier's Exiwrt Price 
List (often completely unavailable) : b) the require- 
ment that consular Invoices be certified at particular 
I'hilippine Consulates (sometimes more than one) 
which are often far from the point or points of ship- 
ments; c) the requirement that air freight shipments 
be certified before departure of the carrier ( in contrast 
to the rule applied to surface shipments) ; and d) 
special requirements for notarized declarations on 
textile and remnants shipments. While these require- 
ments may have been imposed on all other supplying 
countries as well, the.v naturally are of the greatest 
Imrden to the United States exports, given the volume 
of these exports to the Philippines. 

4. Despite the provision of Article V of the Agree- 
ment providing for reciprocit.v in the treatment of one 
another's businessmen. Philippine treatment of 
American businessmen is non-reciprocal. A memo- 
randum describing the problem in detail is attached. 

November 2.S, 1967 

AttachvieTit : 

Memorandum — Visa Problems of American Businessmen. 


Visa Problems of American Businessmen 

Article V of the Uaurel-Langle.v treaty provides for 
certain categories of American and Philippine 
nessmen to enter one another's territories as treaty 
traders or treaty investors under reciprocal conditions. 

However. Philippine are issued to American 
businessmen valid for a maximum of .59 days, after 
which they are subject to various fees and charges 
amounting to some $53 in the course of a year's time. 
Filipino businessmen, under current American 
regulations, obtain visas gratis and pay no fees to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service for extensions 
of their visas, which are grante<l almost without 

Additionally, Philippine administrative criteria such 
as the limitation of issuance to top executive personnel 
only and the diversion of requests for treaty trader 
visas to that for pre-arranged employment visas have 
at times been establishe<l for the issuance of Philippine 
treaty trader and treaty investor visas, while a two 
peso fee to finance a law library was added to fees for 
all transactions of the Bureau of Immigration in 1964. 
Moreover, all treaty trader and investor visa applica- 
tions liy Americans require referral to Manila before 
ap[)roval. On the other hand, American consular 
otRcials have been instructed to interpret liberally the 
provisions covering treat.v traders and have consist- 
ently issued .such visas, without referral to Wash- 
ington, to anyone who could remotely qualify under the 
law for such classification. 

JAXUARY 2 9, 1968 


Appendix III 

1. In regard to paragraph 20 a) , the Philippine Panel 
replied that over the period 1949-19G2, exchange and 
import controls rather than tariffs were the oiierative 
import-restriction mechanism, and their imposition was 
fully justified in view of the acute foreign exchange 
situation of the Philippines. Since the dismantling of 
exchange and import controls in early 1962, the Philip- 
pines has had to rely on the tariff mechanism in order 
to discourage unessential imports, and tariff rates on 
such imports were therefore raised in order to ensure 
the success of the decontrol program and to maintain 
the viability of infant industries in key sectors of the 
Philippine economy. 

The Philippine Panel emphasized that, over the pe- 
riod under discussion, many essential imports of raw 
materials and capital equipment were facilitated 
through generous allocations of foreign exchange dur- 
ing the period of controls and, during the post-control 
I>eriod, through import duty and tax exemption privi- 
leges through such laws as the Basic Industries Act 
(R.A. 3137 as amended). Moreover, the Philippine 
Panel pointed out that despite the tariff increases which 
were applicable to imports from all third countries, the 
bulk of essential imports by the Phi!ipi)ines originated 
from the United States. 

2. In regard to paragraph 20 b) , the Philippine Panel 
replied that: 

A. The measures taken by the Philippine Government 
were necessary to protect its foreign exchange position 
and to promote the growth of the tobacco industry. 

B. Large quantities of textile remnants entered into 
this country had unrealistic valuations for customs 
dut.v purposes, thus depriving the Government of rev- 
enue and creating a situation wherein such textile rem- 
nants dominated the domestic market and threatened 
the extinction of the textile industry in the Philippines. 
The imposition of fixed values was intended to ensure 
the appropriate collection of customs revenues on the 
textile goods actually exported to the Philippines. 

3. In regard to paragraph 20 c) , the Philippine Panel 
replied that positive steps are being taken to simplify 
documentation requirements. 

4. In regard to paragraph 20 d ) , the Philippine Panel 
replied : 

1. That there are two kinds of visas under Section 
9(a) (temporary visitor's visa) of the Philippine Immi- 
gration Act of 1940 available to American businessmen 
depending upon the duration of the trip in the Philip- 
pines as stated in their applications, namely : a gratis 
single entry visa for a period of .59 days and a multiple 
entry visa valid for one year. The fees for visas or 
services rendered for their extension are prescribed by 
law and have remained at the same rates since 1940 ; 

2. That the apparently strict interpretation of the 
treaty trader's and treaty investor's visa requirements 
has been dictated by the indiscriminate practice of 
large American firms in the Philippines of applying 
for these types of visas to circumvent immigration 
requirements for pre-arranged employment for their 
personnel who do not possess the requisite qualifica- 

Appendix iV 


NOVEMBEE 25, 1967 

Subject: Ovsmership of Private Agricultural Land by 
US Nationals after July 3, 1974 

Article XIII, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution 
provides : 

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private 
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned 
except to individuals, corporations, or associa- 
tions qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public 
domain in the Philippines. 

Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution allows 
alienation of public agricultural land but restricts the 
"disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization" 
of those lands, as well as timber and mineral lands and 
other natural resources to Philippine citizens and cor- 
porations in which at least sixty percent of the capital 
is owned by Philippine citizens. The so-called "Parity 
Ordinance" to the constitution modified this restriction, 
however, by specifying that, notwithstanding the pro- 
visions of Article XIII, section 1, the "disposition, ex- 
ploitation, development, and utilization" of these public 
lands and natural resources "shall, if open to any per- 
son, be open to" US citizens and corporations in the 
same manner and under the same conditions as Philip- 
pine citizens and corporations. This ordinance also 
provided that it would in no case extend beyond July 
3, 1974. Therefore, during that period, US citizens and 
corporations are able to hold land in the public domain 
and, for that reason, private agricultural land may 
lawfully be transferred or assigned to US citizens and 

Unlike Article XIII, section 1, there is no provi.sion 
in the constitution prohibiting dispo.sition, utilization, 
development, or exploitation of private agricultural 
land by aliens ; all that is prohibited is transfer or 
assignment to aliens. It seems apparent, therefore, that, 
in the absence of any law to the contrary, lawful 
transfers or assignments of private agricultural land 
to US citizens or corporations on or before July 3, 1974 
remain effective after that date in accordance with 
the terms of such transfers or assignments. Except 
through hereditary succession, however, these lands 
could not thereafter be transferred or assigned to other 
US citizens or corporations. 

Even with respect to leases and franchises concern- 
ing natural resources and public utilities, it has not 
been suggested that US citizens cannot continue to own 
these leases or franchises after July 3, 1974 tf the 
terms of the lease or franchise extend beyond that date ; 
it is merely the rights to develop, exploit, and operate 
that have been questioned. 

As this analysis demonstrates, the que.stion of private 
agricultural land is separate and distinct from the 
question of leases or franchises relating to natural re- 
sources or jiublic utilities. Neither the constitution nor 
any other law of the Philippines, so far as I am aware, 
purports to terminate on July 4, 1974 lawfully acquired 
rights of ownership or possession of private agricultural 
land. I conclude that the right of US citizens to acquire 
such land terminates on that date but not the rights 
created by previous, lawful transfers or assignments. 

Geobqe H. Aldeich, Memher, U.S. Panel 



U.S. Calls Soviet Allegations 
Against Germany Unfounded 

Follmcing is the text of a note delivered to 
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs hy the 
American Evibassy in Moscoio on December 

Press release 305 dated December 29 

The Government of the United States refers 
to the declaration of the Government of the 
U.S.S.E., dated December 8, 1967.^ 

Tlie liistory of American policy on Germany 
since World War II makes clear the importance 
which the American Government attaches to 
the oblications it assumed with the Soviet 
Union, France and the United Kingdom for 
the future of Germany. In dealing with the 
German problem, including the Federal Ee- 
public and Berlin, this Government has con- 
I sistently adhered to these obligations and acted 
I in a way consistent with U.S. special responsi- 
bilities as one of the Four Powers. 

The enduring opposition of this Government 
to totalitarianism of any form is a matter of 
public record, and does not need repeating. The 
United States, adhering to this position, must 
\ reject the accusations against the Government 
of the Federal Kepublic as completely un- 
founded. The Government of the Federal Ee- 
public is the only freely elected and representa- 
tive government in Germany. There is no evi- 
dence whatsoever that the Government of the 
I Federal Eepublic of Germany has supported 
" or now supports totalitarian ideas in any way. 
Indeed, the present government, which repre- 
sents the free choice of the great majority of 
the German people, is a coalition of parties 
which, both in philosophy and m practice, are 
dedicated to democratic principles. This is true 
as well of the opposition party in the Bundestag. 
The Soviet allegation that the Federal Ee- 
public has threatened its neighbors is entirely 
without foundation. In fact, as the Soviet Gov- 
ermnent is aware, the Government of the Fed- 
eral Eepublic seeks to improve rslations with 
its neighbors and is prepared to conclude agree- 
ments for reciprocal renunciation of the use of 
force. The Federal Eepublic, as long as 13 
years ago, renounced the manufacture of nu- 
clear weapons and has repeatedly made clear 
it has no intention to acquire them. The armed 

' Not printed here. 

forces of the Federal Eepublic are within the 
framework and imder the command of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and are defensive 
in nature and in purpose. They are not a threat 
to anyone. 

The Government of the United States en- 
dorses the efforts of the Federal Eepublic to 
reduce tension between itself and the countries 
of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, 
and to obtain a more humane life for all Ger- 
mans. This Government hopes that, as a result 
of these efforts, as well as those of the powers 
having special responsibilities for Germany as 
a whole, it will eventually be possbile to agree 
on a just and peaceful solution of the German 
problem which will satisfy the legitimate inter- 
ests of all people, including the people of Ger- 
many, and will strengthen the peace of Europe. 

Congressional Documents 
Relaf^ing to Foreign Policy 

90th Congress, 1st Session 

United States Contributions to International Organiza- 
tions. Letter from the Secretary of State transmit- 
ting the 15th Report on the Extent and Disposition 
of U.S. Contributions to International Organizations 
for the Fiscal Year 1066. H. Doc. 140. July 12, 1967. 
171 pp. and charts. 

Message from the President of the United States trans- 
mitting Eleventh Annual Report of the President on 
the Trade Agreements Program for 1966. H. Doc. 177. 
October 25, 1967. 67 pp. 

World Newsprint Supply-Demand Outloolj Through 
1969. Report of the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce. H. Rept. 970. November 17, 
1967. 40 pp. 

National Commitments. Report to accompany S. Res. 
187. S. Rept. 797. November 20, 1967. 29 pp. 

Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to the United Na- 
tions. Report to accompany S. Res. 180. S. Rept. 798. 
November 21, 1967. 7 pp. 

International Claims. Report to accompany H.R. 9063. 
S. Rept. 836. December 4, 1967. 24 pp. 

Interim Report on the United Nations and the I-ssue 
of Deep Ocean Resources together with hearings by 
the Subcommittee on International Organizations 
and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. H. Rept. 999. December 7, 1967. 311 pp. 

Naval Vessel Loans. Conference Report to accompany 
H.R. 6167. H. Rept. 1016. December 8, 1967. 5 pp. 

Construction of Nuclear Desalting Plants in the Middle 
East. Report to accompany S. Res. 155. S. Rept. 920. 
December 11, 1967. 4 pp. 

Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act 
of 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 1.3273. S. Rept. 
939. December 13. 1967. 10 pp. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropria- 
tions, 1968. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 
13893. H. Rept. 1044. December 13, 1967. 6 pp. 

JANUARY 29, 1968 



U.S. Proposes International Education Year 

Following is a statement hy Arthur J. Gold- 
herg, U.S. Representative to the General As- 
sembly .^ made in Committee II {Economic and 
Social) on Deceinher 7, togetlier with the text 
of a resolution ivhich uuvs approved hy the com- 
mittee on December 8 and adopted hy the 
General Assembly on December 13. 


U.S. /D.N. press release 231 dated December 7 

My Government has joined with Argentina, 
Austria, Ceylon, Colombia, Dahomey, Ghana, 
Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, 
United Arab Republic, and Venezuela in tabling 
a draft resolution ' by which the General As- 
sembly would de.signate the year 1970 as Inter- 
national Education Year. It is with great 
pleasure, Mr. Chairman, that I also advise you, 
sir, and the members of this committee that 
India and Iran this moniing have likewise 
indicated a desire to join as cosponsors of this 

Mr. Chairman, we propose this step in the 
conviction that human history, as H. G. Wells 
wrote long ago, is "a race between education 
and catastrophe" — and as of this moment there 
can be no assurance that education is winning. 
But education can win the race— if we, the 
nations of the world, sufficiently mobilize our 
educational resources to meet the pressing needs 
of the better world all of us are ti-ying to create. 

We believe that a well-conceived and carefully 
planned International Education Year can give 
a powerful stimulus to this cause. 

Today, throughout the world, both rich and 
poor countries are devoting more resources to 
education than ever before. Yet, despite often 
heroic efforts under veiy great odds, there is 
still a glaring inadequacy of educational results. 
Forty percent of the world's people — and in 
some regions 80 percent — cannot read or write 
the simplest word. Many schools and univer- 
sities, maintained at great cost, are becoming 
obsolete in both method and subject matter and 
largely irrelevant to the concepts and skills 
which developing nations desperately need. 
Many millions of children and young people 
who must live and produce and provide leader- 
ship in the 21st century are still being educated 
for the 19tli century — if indeed they are being 
educated at all. 

It is true, of coui'se, that these problems have 
been recognized for years. Indeed, in 1962 the 
Secretary-General wrote in his proposals for 
action for the Development Decade : ^ 

Educated and trained pet>ple are always the chief, 
and in the longer run the only, agents of development. 
The unutilized talents of their people constitute the 
chief present waste, and the chief future hope, of the 
developing countries. 

Proceeding from this premise, the Secretary- 
General went on to propose ambitious educa- 
tional targets. To help developing nations meet 
these targets, various U.N. agencies createtl new 
educational projects and facilities. For example, 
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scien- 
tific and Cultural Organization] and the World 
Bank created the International Institute for 
Educational Planning in Paris. The Inter- 
national Labor Organization established an In- 
ternational Center for Advanced Technical and 

' U.X. doc. A/C.2/L. 992. 

' U.N. doc. E/3613. 



Vocational Traiiiinir in Turin. The General As- 
sembly created tiie I'nited Nations Institute for 
Training and liesearch. The World Bank not 
only indicated an interest but began to invest 
in etlucational facilities. The increasing: re- 
souri'es of the U.N. Development Program have, 
as the members of this committee know, gone 
into educational projects. 

In addition, contributions to international 
education have continued to flow fi'om many 
other sources. My own Government created over 
'2 years ago a task force to recommend a long- 
range jilan of worldwide educational endeavor 
and particularly to assist the educational etforts 
of the developing nations. I trust, Mr. Chair- 
man, you will forgive me if I point out that I 
personally took a great interest in this task 
force because m\' wife was one of the members 
of this task force. 

But despite all such steps, we, the nations of 
the world, are still a long way from having fully 
mobilized our resources in the worldwide war 
on ignorance. There exists among the educators 
of the world a vast unexploited wealth of expe- 
rience and ideas about etfective education. This 
wealth has yet to be put fully to work where it 
is most needed. There is still a wide gap between 
the best educational work that we have at- 
tained — or that new research will engender — 
and (he worst that we still tolerate. 

In the awareness of these worldwide needs, 
there was convened this past October in my own 
country, at Williamsburg, Virginia, an Inter- 
national Conference on the World Crisis in 
Education.^ This conference ai'ose from a pro- 
posal by President Johnson, who urged that it 
"take a fresh look at the world's new educational 
needs.'' * It brought together under i^rivate 
auspices 170 distinguished educational leaders 
from 52 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and 
the Americas. Among its prime movers and 
leading particiixmts was the distinguished 
Director General of UNESCO, Mr. Kene 

It was from this conference in AVilliamsburg 
that tJie suggestion ai'ose whicli we have laid 
before this committee. I should like to quote 
from the working group report on this subject : 

We propose that tbe .vear 1970 should be designated 
a.s the International Education Year, to draw atten- 
tion ... to the long-term importance of education in 
the balanced development and modernization of the 

This jn-oposal was endorsed in the final report 
of (he conference, which stated the belief that 
such an observance in 1970 "could mobilize ener- 
gies and inspire world-wide initiatives that 
would give this subject the priority it deserves." 

I turn now to the pending draft resolution by 
which we seek to give effect to this proposal. 
Wlien I say "we," I mean our country and our 

The major step which this resolution proposes 
is that the Assembly act now to designate the 
year 1970 as the International Education Year. 
It then proposes that the details should be 
worked out and the necessary jjlanning set in 
motion by our distinguished Secretary -General 
in consultation with UNESCO and other appro- 
priate entities of the United Nations family. The 
Secretary-General's recommendations, after re- 
view by the Economic and Social Council, would 
then come before the General Assembly in time 
for the International Education Year to be 
formally proclaimed at its 24th regular session 
in 1969. 

Among the major issues to which the Inter- 
national Education Year should appropriately, 
m our view, address itself will certainly be such 
important and widespread questions as these: 

— How can teaching be made more efficient 
and productive through better management and 
tlirough new technology such as television and 
communications satellites? 

— How can new technology also be put to 
work to spe«d the growth of literacy, without 
which democracy itself is virtually impossible? 

— How can schools work with conmiimity 
development programs to improve the quality 
of both rural and urban life? 

— How can severely limited educational re- 
sources be opened to gifted students on the most 
appropriate and democratic basis, without re- 
gard to wealth, class, sex, or race? 

— What kinds of international cooperation 
are most critically needed in the educational 

— And perhaps most crucial of all : How can 
each nation's educational system give the most 
vigorous support to that nation's development? 

' For an address by President Johnson made before 
the conference on Oct. 8, 1967, see Bulletin of Oct 30 
1967. p. .569. 

* For an address b.v President Johnson made at Hono- 
lulu, Hawaii, on Oct. 17, 1966, see ibid., Nov. 28 1966 
p. 812. 

JAXCART 2 9, 10G8 


To deal most effectively with such questions, 
my Government believes that the International 
Education Year should be planned and executed 
on the broadest scale — by educators, national 
leaders, economic development officials, man- 
power experts, employers, labor unions, and 
many others. A program so developed could 
have a most beneficial effect, particularly in ce- 
menting a closer understanding between educa- 
tors and national developers and the broad fab- 
ric of the whole society of every nation. 

The need for such an understanding is great. 
Without education, a nation cannot properly 
heal the sick, feed the hungry, or house the 
homeless. And — equally obviously — sick, hun- 
gry, and homeless children cannot be educated. 
Close cooperation between educators and devel- 
opers is thus essential to tlie success of national 
development programs on which the future of 
himianity itself largely depends. 

Mr. Chainnan, in this statement I have dis- 
cussed education primarily in the context of the 
development of nations. But I would not want to 
leave the impression that we in the United 
States view education solely in this light. Far 
from it — the values of education are as many- 
sided and many-faceted as human nature. True 
education illuminates the mind and the soul of 
the individual and imparts meaning and in- 
spiration to his life. It is essential to a free, just, 
and democratic society. It nourishes the arts and 
sciences. It builds understanding, toleration, and 
friendship among all groups and creeds and na- 
tionalities. It is a messenger of peace on earth. 

Especially in this great organization of the 
United Nations, it is fitting that we should re- 
member the enlightening jjower of education in 
the service of peace. Perhaps the International 
Education Year can help the schools of tomor- 
row to fulfill this vital function — not only by 
teachmg the truth about the human family but 
also by helping to build societies which will be 
more prosperous, more just, and thus more re- 
sistant to hatred and violence. 

We all know that this, not war and prepara- 
tion for war, is the road that mankind must 
travel, however difficult that road may be. In- 
deed, the greater the difficulties, the greater must 
be our efforts. For this is our common cause. In 
our need for education and for all tlie works of 
peace, we are truly one human family, tran- 
scending any difference in political or economic 

In this spirit, Mr. Chairman, the United 
States joins with its cosponsors in commending 
to this committee the pending resolution to de- 
clare the year 1970 the International Education 
Year, and we urge its adoption.^ 


International Education Yeab 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling the Secretary-General's appraisal of the 
United Nations Development Decade at mid-point,' and 
in particular his emphasis on the development of human 
resources as the greatest potential resource of any 

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 
1274 (XLIII) of 4 August 1967 on the development and 
utilization of human resources. 

Recognizing the urgent need for a more effective mo- 
bilization of efforts in education and training as an es- 
sential element of a successful strategy of international 

Recognising further the fundamental importance of 
education as a means of widening man's horizons, im- 
proving mutual understanding and strengthening inter- 
national peace. 

Convinced that an international education year on 
the basis of appropriate planning would serve through- 
out the world to mobilize energies and inspire initia- 
tives in education and training, 

1. Decides to observe an International Education 
Year and provisionally designates the year 1970 for 
this purpose, subject to review at the twenty-fourth 
session of the General Assembly, in the light of the 
preparatory work ; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization and other interested specialized agencies 
in preparing a programme of activities to be undertaken 
or initiated by Member States, by the United Nations 
and by the specialized agencies, particularly the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion, and by other interested intergovernmental bodies, 
in order to initiate those world-wide activities in edu- 
cation which constitute the purpose of the International 
Education Year ; 

3. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit 
a progress report to the General Assembly at its twenty- 
third session through the Economic and Social Council 
at its forty-fifth session, so that the Assembly may de- 
cide, on the basis of those preparations, on the procla- 
mation of International Education Year. 

" Draft resolution A/C.2/L. 092/Rev. 1 was approved 
by the committee on Dec. 8 by a vote of 76 (U.S.) to 0, 
with 6 abstentions. 

' U.N. doc. A/RES/2306 (XXII) ; adopted by the As- 
sembly on Dec. 13 by a vote of 102 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 

' United Nations publication, Sales No. : 
[Footnote in original.] 



U.S. Asks Security Council Study 
of Criteria for U.N. Membership 

Letter From Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations 

U.S./D.N. press release 236 dated December 13 

Decembek 13, 1967 

His Excellency 
Chief S. O. Adebo, CM.G. 
President of the Security Council 
United Nations, New York 

Excellency: My Government has given 
careful attention to the considerations expressed 
by the Secretaiy General in the "Introduction of 
the Annual Keport of the Secretary General on 
the "VYork of the Organization" 22nd Session of 
the General Assembly, Supplement No. lA 
(A/6701/Add. 1), with respect to those states 
"which have been referred to as 'micro-States', 
entities which are especially small in area, popu- 
lation, and human and economic resources, and 
which are now emerging as independent States." 

The Secretary General suggested in this In- 
troduction that it might "be opportune for the 
competent organs to undertake a thorough and 
comprehensive study of tlie criteria for mem- 
bership in the United Nations with a view to 
laying dovm the necessary limitations on full 
membership while also defining other forms of 
association which would benefit both the 'micro- 
States' and the United Nations." In so doing 
he also referred to the provision of the Charter 
with respect to membership (Article 4) under 
which each applicant must, in the judgment of 
the Organization, be able and willing to carry 
out the obligations contained in the Charter. 

It is our belief that examination of the con- 
siderations presented by the Secretary General 
is most likely to be fruitful if it is made in 
terms of general principles and procedures. 
Inasmuch as no applications for membership 
are now pending in the Security Council, we 
believe the time may be appropriate for con- 
sidering the suggestions that have been put 

As have other Council members, the United 
States has for some time had under consider- 
ation the sort of issues elucidated by the Secre- 
tary General in his Introduction. As early as 
September 20, 1965, the United States Eepre- 

JANTjARY 29, 1968 

sentative in the Council had occasion to refer 
to the mattei".^ Representatives of other states 
have done likewise on various occasions. 

Members of the Council will recall that Rule 
59 requires that in the absence of a contrary de- 
cision by the Security Council, applications for 
membership be referred by the President to the 
Committee on the Admission of New Members. 
Although the Committee on Membership has in 
fact been inactive for some time, it is a stand- 
ing committee under the Rules, on which all 
members of the Council are represented. 

The United States believes that the Security 
Council could usefully and appropriately seek 
the assistance and advice of this Committee in 
examining the issues outlined by the Secretary 
General with a view to providing the members 
and the Security Council with appropriate in- 
formation and advice. We would accordingly 
request that as President of the Council you 
consult the members about the possibility of re- 
convening the Committee for such a purpose. 

I would appreciate it if you would circulate 
this letter as a document of the Security 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my 
liighest consideration. 

Akthur J. Goldberg 


United States and Mexico Extend 
Radio Broadcasting Agreement 

Press release 304 dated December 26 

On December 21 a protocol between the 
United States and Mexico further extending 
until December 31, 1968, the agreement of Jan- 
uary 29, 1957,^ concerning radio broadcasting in 
the standard broadcast band was signed at 
Mexico City. 

' For a statement made in the Security Council on 
Sept 20, 1965, by Ambassador Charles W. Tost, see 
U.S./U.N. press release 4643. 

= U.N. doc. S/S296. 

° Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4777. 


The 1957 ag^reement entered into force on 
June 9, 1961, efTective for 5 j'ears. It expired by 
its own terms on June 9, 1966. A protocol signed 
on April 13, 1066, and brought into force by 
the exchange of instruments of ratification on 
January 12. 1967, had the effect of reviving and 
continuing in force the 1957 agreement through 
the year 1967. 

Discussions between United States and Mexi- 
can officials with a view to a new compi-ehensive 
agreement on the subject are continuing. 

The new protocol will be sent to the Senate 
for advice and consent to ratification. 

Current Actions 



International Labor Ckinvention (No. 58) fixing the 
minimum age for the admission of children to em- 
ployment at sea (revised 1936). Adopted b.v the In- 
ternational Labor Conference at its 122d session, 
Geneva, October 24, 1930. Entered into force April 
11, 1939; for the United States October 29, 1939. 
TS 952. 

Territorial application,: Bermuda (with modifica- 
tions), October 4, 196T. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment to article 28 of the Convention on the In- 
tergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza- 
tion (TIAS 4(K14). Adopted at Paris September 28, 
1965. Enters into force November 3, 1968. 
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, December 6, 1967. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force De- 
cember 13, 1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967. 
TIAS 6298. 

HalifieatioDfi deposited: Australia' and Guatemala, 
December 1, 1967. 



Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 

amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed 
at Colombo October 27, 1967. Entered into force 
October 27, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
A.ssi.stance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 
as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1 736D). with agreement 
and annex. Effected by exchange of notes at San- 
tiago December 29, 1967. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 29, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the loan of a naval vessel to 
China. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei 
December 7 and 15, 1967. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 15, 1967. 

Congo (Kinshasa) 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of March 15. 1967, as amended 
(TIAS 6329). Effected by exchange of notes at Kin- 
.shasa December 15 and 21, 1967. Entered into force 
December 21, 1967. 


Agreement amending the agreement of December 18, 
lf)48, as amended, for financing certain educational 
exchange programs (TIAS 1864, 3148, 3278, 4254, 
6179). Effected by exchange of notes at Rome Octo- 
ber 12 and December 6, 1967. Entered Into force 
December 6, 1967. 

Malagasy Republic 

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of 
October 7, 1963, as amended, providing for the es- 
tablishment and operation of a space vehicle track- 
ing and comuuinication station in Madagascar 
(TIAS 5473, 6024). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tananarive December 11 and 21, 1967. Entered 
into force December 21, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.54, as 
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D). with annex. Signed 
at Asuncion December 22, 1967. Entered into force 
I^ecember 22, 1967. 

' With a declaration. 


The Editor of the Bulletin regrets an error in 
the is.sue of January 8, 1968, p. 49. The title ap- 
pearing on that page and on the cover should 
have read ; "North Atlantic Council Meets at 
Bnissels." Also, in the second line of the italic 
paragraph on p. 49, "Brussels" should be sub- 
stituted for "Luxembourg." 



INDEX January 29, 1968 Vol. LVIII, No. H92 

Africa. Message to Africa (Humphrey) . . . 129 

Asia. United States OflJcials Report on Overseas 
Reactions to President Johnson's Balance-of- 
Payments Program (transcript of news brief- 
ing) 135 


United States and Cambodia Hold Talks at 
Phnom Penh (Bowles, joint communique) . 133 

U.S. Offers Helicopters for ICC Surveillance 
Work in Cambodia (text of U.S. message to 
Cambodia) 134 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreign Policy 155 

Economic Affairs 

Message to Africa (Humphrey) 129 

United States Officials Report on Overseas Re- 
actions to President Johnson's Balance-of- 
Payments Program (transcript of news brief- 
ing) 135 

U.S.-Phillppine Committee Holds Talks on Fu- 
ture Economic Relations (text of Committee 
report) 146 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Implementation of Katzenbach Report . . . 145 

U.S. Proposes International Education Year 

(Goldberg, text of resolution) 156 

Europe. United States Officials Report on Over- 
seas Reactions to President Johnson's Balance- 
of-Payments Program (transcript of news 
briefing) 135 

Foreign Aid. Development Aid : the National 
Interest and International Stability (Gaud) . 143 

Germany. U.S. Calls Soviet Allegations Against 
Germany Unfounded (text of U.S. note) . . 155 

HumanRights. Message to Africa (Humphrey) . 129 

Mexico. United States and Mexico Extend 
Radio Broadcasting Agreement 159 

Philippines. U.S.-Philippine Committee Holds 
Talks on Future Economic Relations (text of 
Committee report) 146 

Trade. U.S.-Philippine Committee Holds Talks 
on Future Economic Relations (text of Com- 
mittee report) 146 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 160 

United States and Mexico Extend Radio Broad- 
casting Agreement 159 


U.S. Calls Soviet Allegations Against Germany 
Unfounded (text of U.S. note) 165 

r.S. Replies to Soviet Charges of Damage to 
Ship at Haiphong (text of U.S. note) ... 145 

United Nations 

U.S. Asks Security Council Study of Criteria for 

U.N. Membership (Goldberg) 159 

U.S. Proposes International Education Year 

(Goldberg, text of resolution) 156 


United States and Cambodia Hold Talks at 
Phnom Penh (Bowles, joint communique) . 133 

U.S. Offers Helicopters for ICC Surveillance 
Work in Cambodia (text of U.S. message to 
Cambodia) 134 

United States Officials Report on Overseas Reac- 
tions to President Johnson's Balance-of-Pay- 
ments Program (transcript of news briefing) . 135 

U.S. Replies to Soviet Charges of Damage to 
Ship at Haiphong (text of U.S. note) ... 145 

Name Index 

Bowles, Chester 133 

Deming, Frederick L 135 

Gaud, William S 143 

Goldberg, Arthur J 156, 159 

Humphrey, Vice President 129 

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 135 

Rostow, Eugene V 135 

Roth, William M 135 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 8-14 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 8 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 304 
of December 26, 305 and 307 of December 29, 
and 3 and 4 of January 6. 

No. Date Subject 

5 1/10 U.S. message of December 25 to Royal 
Cambodian Government. 

t6 1/13 Katzenbach: Adlal E. Stevenson In- 
stitute, Chicago. 

t" 1/13 U.S.-Japan cotton textile arrange- 
ment (rewrite). 

15 1/12 U.S.-Cambodia joint communique. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 










Vol. LVJII, No. H9S 

February 5, 1968 


Address of President Johnson to the Congress (Excerpts) 161 

iy Under Secretary Katzenbaoh 168 

by Assistant Secretary Bvmdy 176 


Statements by President Johnson amd Adrian S. Fisher 
and Text of Draft Treaty 16^. 

For indew see inside back cover 



Vol. LVIII, No. 1493 
February 5, 1968 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qoverament Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign rela tions and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
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ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
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Department. Information is included 
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agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
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national relations are listed currently. 

The State of the Union 


Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the 
Congress, and my fellow Americans: 

I was thinking, as I was walking down the 
aisle tonight, of what Sam Eaj'burn told me 
years ago : The Congress always extends a very 
warm welcome to the President — as he comes 
in. I thank all of you very, very much. 

I have come once again to this Chamber, the 
home of our democracy, to give you, as the 
Constitution requires, "Information of the 
State of the Union." 

I report to you that our country is challenged 
at home and abroad : 

— that it is our will that is being tried, not our 
strength ; our sense of purpose, not our ability 
to achieve a better America ; 

— that we have the strength to meet our every 
cliallenge: the physical strength to hold the 
course of decency and compassion at home and 
the moral strength to support the cause of peace 
in the world. 

And I report to you that I believe, with abid- 
ing conviction, that this people — nurtured by 
their deep faith, tutored by their hard lessons, 
moved by their high aspirations — have the will 
to meet the trials that these times impose. 

Since I reported to you last January, three 
elections have been held in Vietnam — in the 
midst of war and under the constant threat of 
violence. A President, a Vice President, a House 
and Senate, and village officials have been 
chosen by popular, contested ballot. The enemy 
has been defeated in battle after battle. The 
number of South Vietnamese living in areas 
under government protection tonight has grown 
by more than a million since January of last 
VL'ar. These are all marks of progress. 

Yet the enemy continues to pour men and 

material across frontiers and into battle despite 
his continuous heavy losses. He continues to 
hope that America's will to persevere can be 
broken. Well, he is wrong. Ainerica will per- 
severe. Our patience and our perseverance 
will match our power. Aggression will never 
prevail. But our goal is peace — and peace at the 
earliest possible moment. 

Right now we are exploring the meaning of 
Hanoi's recent statement. There is no mystery 
about tlie questions which must be answered 
before the bombing is stopped. 

We believe that any talks should follow the 
San Antonio formula that I stated last Septem- 
ber,- which said the bombmg would stop im- 
mediately if talks would take place promptly 
and with reasonable hopes that they would be 
productive and the other side must not take 
advantage of our restraint, as they have in the 
past. This nation simply cannot accept anything 
less without jeopardizing the lives of our men 
and of our allies. 

If a basis for peace talks can be established 
on the San Antonio foundations — and it is my 
hope and my prayer that they can — we would 
consult with our allies and with the other side 
to see if a complete cessation of hostilities, a 
really true cease-fire, could be made the first 
order of business. I will report at the earliest 
possible moment the results of these explora- 
tions to the American people. 

I have just recently returned from a very 
fi-uitful visit and talks with His Holiness the 
Pope, and I share his hope, as he expressed it 
earlier today, that both sides will extend them- 
selves in an effort to bring an end to the war 
in Vietnam. I have today assured him that we 
and our allies will do our full part to bring this 

'Delivered on .Jan. 17 (White House press release). 

' Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1967, p. 519. 

FEBRtJART 5, 1968 


Since I spoke to you last January, other 
events have occurred that have major conse- 
quences for world peace. 

— The Kennedy Round achieved the greatest 
reduction in tariff barriers m all the history of 
trade negotiations. 

— The nations of Latin America at Punta del 
Este resolved to move toward economic integra- 

— In Asia, the nations from Korea and Japan 
to Indonesia and Singapore worked behind 
America's shield to strengthen their economies 
and to broaden their political cooperation. 

— In Africa, from which the distinguished 
Vice President has returned, he reports to me 
there is a spirit of regional cooperation that is 
beginning to take hold in very practical ways. 

These events we all welcomed. Yet, since I 
last reported to you, we and the world have 
been confronted by a number of crises : 

During the Arab-Israeli war last June, the 
hot line between Washington and Moscow was 
used for the first tune in our liistory. A cease- 
fire was achieved without a major-power con- 

Now the nations of the IMiddle East have the 
opportunity to cooperate with Ambassador 
[Gumiar] Jarring's U.N. mission ^ and they 
have the responsibility to find the terms of liv- 
ing together in stable peace and dignity, and 
we shall do all in our power to lielp them 
achieve that result. 

Not far from this scene of conflict, a crisis 
flared on Cyprus involving two peoples who 
are America's f liends : Greece and Turkey. Our 
very able representative, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and 
others helped to ease this tension. 

Turmoil continues on the mainland of China 
after a year of violent disruption. The radical 
extremism of their govermnent has isolated the 
Chinese people behind their own borders. The 
United States, however, remains willing to per- 
mit the travel of journalists to both our coun- 
tries; to undertake cultural and educational 
exchanges; and to talk about the exchange of 
basic food crop materials. 

Since I spoke to you last, the United States 
and the Soviet Union have taken several im- 
portant steps toward the goal of international 

For background and text of a Security Council reso- 
lution adopted on Nov. 22, 1967, see Md., Dec. 18, 1967, 
p. 834. 

As you remember, I met with Chairman [of 
the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union 
Aleksei N.] Kosygin at Glassboro for 2 days, 
achieving, if not accord, at least a clearer under- 
standing of our respective positions. 

Because we believe the nuclear danger must 
be narrowed, we have worked with the Soviet 
Union and other nations to reach an agreement 
that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 
On the basis of conmnunications from Ambas- 
sador Fisher [Adrian S. Fisher, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the Conference of the 18-Nation 
Disarmament Committee] in Geneva this after- 
noon, I am encouraged to believe that a draft 
treaty can be laid before tlie conference in 
Geneva in the near future.* I hope to be able to 
present that treaty to the Senate this year for 
the Senate's approval. 

"We achieved in 1967 a consular treaty with 
the Soviets, the first conmiercial air agreement 
between the two countries, and a treaty banning 
weapons in outer space. We shall sign and sub- 
mit to the Senate shortly a new treaty witli the 
Soviets and with others for the protection of 

Serious differences still i-emain between us, 
yet in these relations we have made some prog- 
ress since Vienna, tlie Berlin wall, and the 
Cuban missile crisis. 

Yet, despite this progress, we must maintain 
a military force that is capable of deterring 
any threat to this nation's security, whatever 
the mode of aggression. Our choices must not be 
confined to total war or total acquiescence. 

We have such a military force today. We 
shall maintain it. 

I wish with all of my heart that the expendi- 
tures that are necessary to build and to protect 
our power could all be devoted to the programs 
of peace. But until world conditions permit, 
and until peace is assured, America's might and 
America's bravest sons who wear our nation's 
uniform must continue to stand guard for all 
of us, as they gallantly do tonight in Vietnam 
and other places in the world. 

Yet neither great weapons nor individual 
courage can provide the conditions of peace. 

For two decades America has committed itself 
against the tyranny of want and ignorance in 
the world that threatens the peace. We shall 
sustain that commitment. 

This year I shall propose : 

* See p. 164. 




— tliiit we launch, with other nations, an ex- 
ploration of tlie ocean doptlis to tap its wealth 
and its energy suid its abundance; 

— that we contribute our fair share to a major 
expansion of the International Development 
Association and to increase the resources of 
the Asian Development Banl^; 

— that we adopt a prudent aid program rooted 
in the principle of self-help ; 

— that we renew and extend the Food for 
Freedom program. 

Our food programs have already helped mil- 
lions avoid the horrors of famine. But unless 
the rapid growth of population in developing 
countries is slowed, the gap between rich and 
poor will widen steadily. 

Governments in the developing countries 
must take such facts into consideration. We in 
the United States are prepared to help assist 
them in those efforts. 

But we must also improve the lives of chil- 
dren already born in the villages and towns 
and cities already on this earth. They can be 
taught by great teachers through space com- 
munications and the miracle of satellite tele- 
vision, and we shall bring to bear every resource 
of mind and technology to help make this dream 
come true. 

Next month we begin our eighth year of 
uninterrupted prosperity. The economic out- 
look for this year is one of steady growth — if we 
are vigilant. 

On January 1st, I outlined a program to re- 
duce our balance-of-payments deficit sharply 
this year.= We will ask the Congress to help 
carry out those parts of the program which re- 
quire legislation. We must restore equilibrium 
to our balance of payments. 

We must also strengthen the international 
monetary system. We have assured the world 
that America's full gold stock stands behind our 

"Bulletin of Jan. 22, IOCS, p. 110. 

commitment to maintain the price of gold at $35 
an oimce. We must back this commitment by 
legislating now to free our gold reserves. 

Americans, traveling more than any other 
people in history, took $4 billion out of their 
country last year in travel costs. We must try to 
reduce the travel deficit that we have of more 
than $2 billion. We are hoping tliat we can 
reduce it by $500 million — without unduly 
penalizing the travel of students or teachers or 
busmess people who have essential, necessary 
travel or people who have relatives abroad 
whom they need to see. Even with the reduction 
of $500 million, the American people will still be 
traveling more overseas than they did in 1967, 
1966, or 1965 or any other year in their histoiy. 

If we act together as I hope we can, I believe 
we can continue our economic expansion which 
has already broken all past records. 

Tonight I have spoken of some of the goals I 
should like to see America reach. Many of them 
ca,n be achieved this year — others by the time 
we celebrate our nation's 200th birthday — the 
bicenteimial of our independence. 

Several of these goals will be very hard to 
reach. But the state of our Union will be nuich 
stronger 8 years from now on our 200th birth- 
day if we resolve to reach these goals now. They 
are more important — much more important — 
than the identity of the party or the President 
who will then be in office. 

These goals are what the fighting and our 
alliances are really meant to protect. 

Can we achieve these goals ? 

Of course we can — if we will. 

If ever there was a people who sought more 
than mere abundance, it is our people. 

If ever there was a nation that is capable of 
solving its problems, it is this nation. 

If ever there M-as a time to know the pride 
and the excitement and the hope of being an 
i\jnerican, it is this time. 

So this, my friends, is the state of our Union : 
seeking, building, tested many times in this past 
year — and always equal to the test. 

Thank you and good night. 

FEBRUARY 5, 1968 


U.S. and U.S.S.R. Submit Complete Draft Treaty on Non proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons to the Geneva Disarmament Conference 

The Conference of the Eighteen-N ation Com- 
mittee on Disarmam,ent resumed its session at 
Geneva on January 18. The White House an- 
nounced on January J8 that it had been in- 
formed at Ji.:25 that morning that the U.S.S.R. 
and the United States, as cochairmen of the 
Committee, would that day submit to the Con- 
ference a comflete draft of the treaty to stop 
the spread of nuclear weapons. Following is 
the text of the draft treaty, together tcith state- 
ments hy President Johnson and iy Adrian S. 
Fisher, head of the U.S. delegation at Geneva. 


Wbite House press release dated January 18 

I am most heartened to learn that the Soviet 
Union will join the United States, as cochair- 
men of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee, to submit a complete text of a treaty 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that 
this draft treaty will be submitted today to the 
Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes 
an agreed safeguards article and other revisions 
that will make the treaty widely acceptable.^ 

We have worked long and hard in an effort 
to draft a text that reflects the views of other 
nations. I believe the draft presented today 
represents a major accomplishment in meeting 
these legitimate interests. 

The text submitted today must now be con- 
sidered further by all govermnents. Following 
its review by the Conference in Geneva, it will 
be considered by the General Assembly in the 
spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able 
to submit it to the Senate of the United States 
for its advice and consent this year. 

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly 
demonstrates an important fact. In the face 
of the differences that exist in the world, the 

'For background and text of a draft treaty sub- 
mitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 
Aug. 24, 1967, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1967, p. 315. 

two nations which carry the heaviest responsi- 
bility for averting the catastrophe of nuclear 
war can, with sufficient patience and determina- 
tion, move forward. They can move forward 
toward the goal which all men of good will seek : 
a reversal of the arms race and a more secure 
peace based on our many common interests on 
this one small planet. 

I believe history will look on this treaty as a 
lancbnark in the effort of mankind to avoid nu- 
clear disaster, while insuring that all will bene- 
fit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith 
in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all. 


As chairman I would like to say a few words 
about the importance of the session of the Con- 
ference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament which we are beginning with our 
meeting today. I would like to do so against 
the background of United Nations General As- 
sembly Eesolution 2346 (XXII), which was 
adopted on December 19, 1967, by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, with only one 
dissenting vote. 

In that resolution the General Assembly 
called upon this Committee urgently to con- 

^ Made at the opening session of the Conference of 
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at 
Geneva on Jan. 18. Mr. Fisher served as U.S. Repre- 
sentative and head of the U.S. delegation to the Con- 
ference in the absence of William C. Foster, Director 
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
who had been unable to return to Geneva because of 
Illness. On behalf of the U.S. delegation Mr. Fisher 
sent the following message to Mr. Foster on Jan. 18: 
"We are about to table complete identical texts this 
afternoon. Our only regret is that you are not here 
and you are not tabling it, because it represents the 
results of so many months and years of hard work and 
leadership on your part. We hope that you will soon 
be here to finish up the job. The entire delegation 
joins me in this expression." 



tiniie its work in preparing a draft inter- 
national treaty to prevent tlie pi'oliferation of 
nuclear weapons. It requested this Committee 
to submit to the General Assembly on or before 
March 15 of this year a full report on the nego- 
tiations on such a draft treaty. It recommended 
that, upon receipt of such report, appropriate 
consultations be instituted in accordance with 
the rules and procedures of the General Assem- 
bly on the setting of an early date after March 
15 for tiie resumption of the 22d session of the 
General Assembly to consider item 28(a) "Non- 
proliferation of nuclear weapons: Report of 
the Conference of the Eighteen-National Com- 
mittee on Disarmament." 

In other resolutions the General Assembly 
called upon this Committee to consider various 
subjects, but only in connection with a treaty 
on the proliferation of nuclear weapons has the 
General Assembly requested us to submit a 
report by an early date and only in connection 
with tliis treaty did the General Assembly indi- 
Ciite that it was prepared to consider a resumed 
session to consider the results of our work. This 
indicates the high importance the United Na- 
tions has placed on the work of the Committee 
in drafting an international treaty to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

I am particularly pleased, therefore, to be 
able to inform the Committee that the cochair- 
men have today submitted revised draft texts 
of the treaty for the Committee's consideration. 
These texts, appearing in document ENDC/ 
192/Rev. 1 and ENDC/193/Rev. 1, contain an 
article III on safeguards, as well as several new 
articles and amendments to existing articles. 

I know I speak for all of us when I express 
tlie hope that this Committee can nov,' act defi- 
nitely and expeditiously in responding to the 
recommendation of the General Assembly. The 
time has now arrived for decisive action to stop 
the spread of nuclear weapons, and the woi"ld 
will expect us to respond accordingly. 


Januaby 18, 1968 

Draft Tbeatt on the Non-Peoliferation 
OF Nuclear Weapons 

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", 

Considering the devastation that would be visited 
upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent 
need to make every effort to avert the danger of such 

a war and to take measures to safeguard the security 
of peoples, 

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. 

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an 
agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination 
of nuclear weapons, 

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the applica- 
tion of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
on peaceful nuclear activities, 

EJxpressing their support for research, development 
and other efforts to further the application, within the 
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding 
effectively the flow of source and special fissionable 
materials by use of instruments and other techniques 
at certain strategic points, 

AtHrming the principle that the benefits of peaceful 
applications of nuclear technology, including any 
technological by-products which may be derived by 
nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear 
explosive devices, should be available for peaceful 
purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, w-hether nuclear- 
weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, 

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all 
Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, 
and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other 
States to, the further development of the applications 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest 
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, 

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attain- 
ment of this objective. 

Desiring to further the easing of international ten- 
sion and the strengthening of trust between States in 
order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing 
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals 
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery 
pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarma- 
ment under strict and effective international control, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly ; and not in any way to assist, encourage, 
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufac- 
ture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices. 

Article II 

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any trans- 
feror whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly ; not to manu- 
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices ; and not to seek or receive 
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. 

FEBRUARY 5, 1968 


Article III 
1 Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth 
in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance 
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system for the 
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of 
its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view 
to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful 
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by 
this Article shall be followed with respect to source or 
special fissionable material whether it is being pro- 
duced processed or used in any principal nuclear 
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards 
required by this Article shall be applied on aU source 
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
activities within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not 
to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, 
or (b) equipment or material especially designed or 
prepared for the processing, use or production of spe- 
cial fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or spe- 
cial fissionable material shall be subject to the safe- 
guards required by this Article. 

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be 
implemented in a manner designed to comply with 
Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the 
economic or technological development of the Parties 
or international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
nuclear activities, including the international exchange 
of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, 
use or production of nuclear material for peaceful 
Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this 
Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in 
the Preamble. 

4. Non-nuclear-weapon Stales Party to the Treaty 
.shall conclude agreements with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this 
Article either individually or together with other 
States in accordance with the Statute of the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such 
agreements shall commence within ISO days from the 
original entry into force of this Treaty. For States 
depositing their instruments of ratification after the 
180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall 
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such 
agreements shall enter into force not later than 
eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotia- 

Article IV 

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as 
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to 
the Treaty to develop re.^earch, production and use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without dis- 
crimination and in conformity with Articles I and II 
of this Treaty. 

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scien- 
tific and technological information for the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a 
position to do so .shall also cooperate in contributing 

alone or together with other States or international 
organizations to the further development of the appU- 
cations of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty. 

Article V 
Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate 
to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful 
applications of nuclear explosions will be made avail- 
able through appropriate international procedures to 
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a 
non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such 
Parties for the explosive devices used vnll be as low 
as possible and exclude any charge for research and 
development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant 
to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such 
benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate 
international body with adequate representation of 
non-nuclear-weai)on States. 

Article VI 

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and dis- 
armament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international 

Article VII \ 

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group i 
of States to conclude regional treaties in order to as- 
sure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their 
respective territories. 

Article VIII 
1 Any Party to this Treaty may propose amend- 
ments to this Treaty. The test of any proposed amend- 
ment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments 
which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. 
Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more 
of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Govern- 
ments shall convene a conference, to which they shall ■ 
invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such 
an amendment. 

•> Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved 
by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the 
Treaty including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States : 
Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on 
the date the amendment is circulated, are members of 
the Board of Governors of the InternaUonal Atomic 
Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force 
for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratifica- 
tion of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments 
of ratificaUon by a majority of all the Parties, includ- , 
ing the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon , 
States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, 
on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force 
for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification of the amendment. 

3. Five years after the entry into force of this 
Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be 
held in Geneva, Switzerland, In order to review the 



operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that 
*•>" .«^.~o „„A „..^„!o;,.„o Qf ^ij^ Treaty are being 

the purposes and provisions 

Article IX 

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signa- 
ture. Auy State which does not sign the Treaty before 
its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
this Article may accede to it at any time. 

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and 
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Governments of , which are hereby desig- 
nated the Depositary Governments. 

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratifi- 
cation by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to tiis 
Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty 
and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For 
the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is 
one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to Janu- 
ary 1, 1967. 

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into 
force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date 
of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 

."). The Depositary Governments shall promptly in- 
form all signatory and acceding States of the date of 
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument 
of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into 
force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any 
requests for convening a conference or other notices. 

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 

Article X 

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sov- 
ereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty 
if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of 
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and 
to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the 
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized 
its supreme interests. 

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide wheth- 
er the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or 
shall be extended for an additional fixed period or 
periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of 
the Parties to the Treaty. 

Article XI 

This Treaty, the English, Russian. French, Spanish 
and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall 
be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Govern- 
ments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 

transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly author- 
ized, have signed this Treaty. 

Done in at this 


Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Barba- 
dos, Hilton Augustus Vaughan, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on January 19. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated January 19. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of Gabon, Leonard Antoine Badinga, 
presented his credentials to President Johnson 
on January 19. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated January 19. 

Maldive Islands 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Mal- 
dive Islands, Abdul Sattar, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Johnson on January 19. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated January 19. 

Sierra Leone 

The newl}' appointed Ambassador of Sierra 
Leone, Adesanya Iv. Hyde, presented his creden- 
tials to President Johnson on January 19. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated January 19. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Thai- 
land, Bmichana Atthakor, presented his creden- 
tials to President Jolinson on January 19. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated January 19. 

FEBRTJARY 5, 1968 


The Challenges of Our Changing Atlantic Partnership 

l>y Under Secretary Katzenbach ' 

As a lawyer who wandered into tlie diplo- 
matic world a little over a year ago, I have 
sometimes been forced to remind President 
Johnson of Heniy Clay's advice to a nervous 
client : "I cannot, at this juncture, clearly fore- 
tell the outcome, but I counsel you to cultivate 
calmness of mind and prepare for the worst." 

But, despite some current problems, I have 
never felt this way about the United States and 

We have behind us a 20-year record of 
astonishing success in first building the Atlantic 
relationship out of the chaos of the Second 
World War and then adapting it progressively 
to present-day needs. Our past achievements 
give us every reason to believe that we can deal 
successfully with the challenges ahead. 

I want to talk today about some of those 

France, long a keystone of our Atlantic secu- 
rity system, is now no more than a part-time 
participant in the NATO system of collective 
defense. Britain has taken the historic decision 
to become a full partner in continental Europe. 
But her application for entry into the Common 
Market has, for a time, been frustrated. And 
now the United States faces a balance-of-pay- 
ments deficit which can only be reduced to liv- 
able proportions through the understanding and 
cooperation of the great trading nations of 
Western Europe. 

If we were to look at present difficulties with- 
out perspective, Henry Clay's counsel might be 
well taken. But to do so would be to overlook 
the basic strengths of our Atlantic alliance. 
There is still a great fund of good will on both 
sides of the Atlantic; the areas of common 

' Address made before the Adlai E. Stevenson Insti- 
tute, Chicago, 111., on Jan. 13 (press release 6). 

interest and purpose still greatly exceed those of 

Any doubts I might have had about this 
were quickly dispelled by the trip I made to 
Europe last week at the President's behest. 

Despite the physical strains involved in visit- 
ing seven countries in 6 days — which, by the 
way, is about as effective a way to discourage 
tourism as any I can think of — I returned en- 
couraged by the reception we received. Without 
exception, Europe's political and economic 
leaders accepted the necessity of the President's 
action ; without exception, they recognized that 
the economic well-being of the Western World 
depends on the health and vigor of the 
American economy. 

In short, I returned from Europe with a re- 
newed conviction that the ties that bind our 
two continents to a common purpose will out- 
last the strains the atavists among us are placing 
upon them. 

Yet I also returned with another feeling, a 
feeling that we are now in the midst of what 
after-dinner speakers like to call "a turning 
point in history."' I am convinced that when we 
emerge from this period, however long it may 
take, relationships between the United States 
and Europe will have changed substantially — 
and for the better. 

It is a truism, though one easily overlooked, 
that in the 3'ears since World War II the inter- 
dependence that has grown up between Europe 
and America has almost totally transformed the 
traditional relationships between nation-states. 
We have become so interdependent, so enmeshed 
in the same economic-teclinological-political 
system, that conditions on one side of the At- 
lantic have a profound and immediate effect on 
the other side. It may once have been true that 
when the United States sneezed Western 



Europe caught cold. Now Europe and America 
must work in tlie closest harmony if both are 
to keep from coming down with pneumonia. 
Great as the strength of the United States is, 
overwhelming as our economic power may be, 
we are no longer able to effect a cure by our- 

That was the essence of my message to 
Western Europe last week. I told them of the 
President's plan to move our balance of pay- 
ments toward equilibrium.- And I asked them to 
avoid actions that would negate the effective- 
ness of our program. Without the sympathetic 
cooperation of our European friends, our meas- 
ures can be, at best, only partially effective. 

The International Adjustment Process 

The vei-y success we have achieved in building 
an international economic system which has per- 
mitted history's gi-eatest expansion of world 
trade has brought with it a whole new range 
of problems. Dealing with them eff'ectively will 
require the closest possible consultation and con- 
tinuing cooperation between governments. This, 
in turn, must inevitably lead to the further de- 
velopment of existing institutional arrange- 
ments within which the coordination of policy 
can be accomplished. This necessary task has 
already begim, but much still remains to be 

Let me cite a specific example which is before 
us very much these days. You have all heard, no 
doubt, of what we now refer to as the "adjust- 
ment process." You will be hearing the phrase 
often in the months to come. OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] discussions have already indicated that 
the free exchange of goods, tourists, and capital 
caimot continue indefinitely if large imbalances 
persist for long periods of time. 

A principal conclusion of the OECD experts 
who examined the adjustment process is that the 
responsibility of maintaining equilibrium and 
growth must be shared by deficit and surplus 
countries alike. The United States, as a deficit 
country, has a clear responsibility, a responsi- 
bilitv which the President has demonstrated we 

' For a statement by President Johnson on Jan. 4 
regarding the action program on the balance of pay- 
ments, see Bulletin of Jan. 22. 196S, p. 110 : for tran- 
script of a news briefing held by Mr. Katzenbach and 
other U.S. officials on Jan. 8, see ibid., Jan. 29, 1968, 
p. 13.^. 

intend to meet. Our first priority must be 
passage of a tax bill which can help check 
inflationary pressures. We can hardly expect 
our trading partners to accept our balance-of- 
payments measures — nor would they work well 
— unless we demonstrate that we can continue 
to run our internal economy responsibly. 

But it is equally clear that the responsibility 
for returning the balance of payments to equi- 
librium should not rest solely with the deficit 
partner. If we are forced to move in that direc- 
tion, our only option is to take restrictive action. 
To avoid a return to a protectionism reminiscent 
of the thirties, the surplus countries must accept 
a part of the responsibility. They must share 
with us the search for ways to expand trade 
which also further movement toward balance- 
of-payments equilibrium. 

Let me cite the kind of action that surplus 
countries might take in the adjustment jjrocess. 

We have long been concerned about tlie border 
effects of certain taxes in the Common IMarket 
countries. To reach an adjustment at a higher 
level of equilibrium, the Europeans might see 
their way clear to reduce or elhninate these 
border efl'ects. 

They could also help the movement toward 
international equilibrium by following expan- 
sionary policies that will mcrease their rate of 

economic growth while maintaininar 



The direction in which we must move is clear. 
Most of us have learned the lessons of the "new 
economics" as they aj^ply to our domestic econo- 
mies. We must now extend those lessons to the 
international sphere so that the progress we 
have made domestically is not undone by our 
failure to run our international economy in a 
sensible fashion. 

There is at least some evidence that we are 
learning. The recent London and Rio Agree- 
ments to meet future international liquidity 
needs through the creation in the IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund] of Special Drawing 
Eights ^ are more significant than they may ap- 
pear to some. Unless we invent a new mathe- 
matics, the elimination of our deficit would 
ahnost certainly lower European surpluses and 
limit future liquidity in our international pay- 
ments system. Tlie SDR agreement at least 
begins to deal with this situation. We hope that 
go'-ernments will now proceed to approve the 

' For background, see ibid., Oct. 23, 1967, p. 523. 

FEBRUARY 5, 1968 


SDR agreement so that it will be available next 

Yet, despite our growing interdependence, 
our partnership still remains an unequal one. 
For, no matter how much we strengthen exist- 
ing consultative institutions and no matter how- 
many new institutions we create, the basic 
power relationship will remain unchanged. The 
United States — a nation of 200 million people 
with an $800 billion GNP— still must deal with 
more than a dozen individual Western Euro- 
pean countries whose power and wealth — no 
matter how creative and productive they may 
be — can never, except in the aggregate, match 

Toward an Equal Partnership 

This is, I believe, the cause of some of the 
vexations which crop up to mar relations be- 
tween us. For Western Europe is not prepared 
to accept indefinitely the role of junior partner 
in the transatlantic relationship. 

ISTor, if I read the mind of America at all 
accurately, is this what we want. The exercise 
of power may, to some extent, have become a 
habit. It may also be a habit not easily shed. 
But I doubt that we have ever really been 
happy with our lonely position as the free 
world's dominant power. As a nation, we have 
always felt more at ease with the give-and-take 
of competition and compromise. Most of us 
would far prefer the role of equal partner to 
that of father confessor. 

Together we have come far since the gi'im 
days of the late forties. If we are to come out of 
the next two decades as successfully as we did 
the last two, both Europe and America must 
accommodate to the changing times. Europe 
must be prepared to assume a gi-eater share of 
the responsibilities and costs of world leader- 
ship. America must be willing to accept a less 
dominant role within the alliance. 

The greater share of the task must, at this 
point, be Europe's. There must emerge a Euro- 
pean entity unified enough to create the condi- 
tions for its own development and strong enough 
to deal with America as an equal. 

The technological gap we have been hearing 
so mucli about in the past year or two is a case in 
point. Many Europeans are, quite legitimately, 
concerned over the fact that Europe is falling 
behind the United States in a broad range of 
scientific, technological, and managerial fields. 

Various suggestions on what can be done to 
close the "gap" have been made, including pro- 
posals for a technological Marshall Plan. 

I personally doubt that we can do much more 
than provide some marginal help in closing the 
"gap." The real outcome depends on what 
Europe can do to change its economic and 
industrial structure— not what we give away. 

Teclmology cannot be transferred from one 
hand to another like money or commodities. An 
industrial or scientific process given by the cre- 
ator to another for his use is secondhand by 
definition. A leading position on the frontiers 
of teclmology is a measure of the creativity of 
the society. Technological creativity today also 
requires the mobilization of human and mate- 
rial resources on a scale beyond the individual 
capacity of smaller industrial states. It requires 
research and development on a comparably 
large scale. It also requires a modern, well- 
supported system of education and modern 
management techniques to use resources 

If the technological gap is to be closed, 
Europe must coordinate and pool its creative 
energies more effectively. 

Providing for Our Common Defense 

A balanced partnership also means an equal 
sharing of responsibilities. 

Certainly this is true in the area of providing 
for our common defense. Developments in weap- 
onry, in commimications, and in the strategic 
mobility of combat forces have drastically 
changed the working hypotheses of our defense 
planners. Increasing capabilities in intelligence, 
and the mobility of reserves, broaden the options 
of those who will do our strategic planning for 
the 1970's. NATO has adopted a strategic con- 
cept designed to achieA'e a posture of deterrence 
to aggression at any level. Western Europe's 
security must continue to be based on a system 
of collective defense, with the United States 
playing its part. Yet it is increasingly feasible 
for Western Europe to assume a role in the com- 
mon effort cormnensurate with its true potential. 
An assumption of greater responsibility for the 
planning and direction of the defense of Europe 
by the Europeans themselves would be a healthy 
evolution in the structure of our Atlantic alli- 
ance. As Secretary Rusk indicated last Decem- 
ber, we would welcome some form of European 
defense organization permitting Western Eu- 



rope to deal with us as a full NATO partner.^ 

Meanwhile, we must see that the costs of main- 
taining American forces in Europe are not a 
negative factor in the balance of payments, 
while at the same time insuring that our com- 
mon security interests are not endangered. Col- 
lective defense requires a collective resolution of 
the problem. 

Over the past few years we have negotiated a 
series of bilateral arrangements for partially 
offsetting these costs. Now that our payments 
position has become more serious we and our 
European allies must — in our common inter- 
est — seek to exjjand these arrangements. We 
must also begin to explore together the possibili- 
ties for finding multilateral means of neutraliz- 
ing these balance-of-payments effects. 

And what about Eastern Europe and the task 
of healing what President Jolmson has called 
"the woimd in Europe which now cuts East 
from "West and brother from brotlier"' ? ^ There 
are some, both here and in Europe, who argue 
that if Europe is ever to be made whole again it 
can best be done by reducmg American militai-y 
strength on the continent and by slowing down 
the pace of European integi-ation. 

This is a view that neither we nor most of our 
NATO allies can accept. We see no inconsist- 
ency between moves to unify Europe and 
strengthen NATO's defensive system and 
moves to improve East-West relations. Cer- 
tainly our experience with the Soviet Union 
since the war has taught us that it can best be 
dealt with from a position of strength. 

We are not, of course, opposed to bilateral 
dealings with the U.S.S.E. We have stressed 
that we welcome them. We fully support, for 
example, the German Federal Republic in its 
efforts to improve relations with its Eastern 
European neighbors. 

But we do believe there should be constant 
consultation — both within NATO and through 
normal diplomatic channels — to insure that all 
our efforts are coordinated. Without such co- 
ordination the security interests of the West 
might imwittingly be undermined in the race 
to secure competitive advantage in dealing with 
the Soviets. 

' For an address made by Secretary Rusk on Dec. 2, 
1967, .see ibid., Dec. 25, 1967, p. 8.5.5. 

' For an address by President Johnson made at New 
York, X.T., on Oct. 7, 1966, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, 
p. 622. 

Other — perhaps less jialatable — responsibili- 
ties must also accompany equality. 

It will come as a surprise to no one to hear 
that the United States is deeply involved in 
areas other than the European Continent. De- 
spite the protestations of a vocal few, most 
Americans accept this condition as one of the 
responsibilities of jiower. But it is a responsi- 
bility we are fully prepared to share with our 
European friends. 

Aid to Developing Nations 

There is, first of all, our common obligation to 
the world's poor. 

If there is any certainty in this world, it is 
that we must give hope to the poor that they, 
or their children, will some day see the last of 
tlieir age-old companions : hunger, poverty, and 
disease. But the have-nots of this world will 
not wait forever. 

Europe and America have moved far in re- 
cent years in dealing with this problem. There 
is an increasing willingness to consiilt and co- 
ordinate our aid to the developmg nations. But 
we have really done little more than scratch the 

The next few years will be critical. Both Eu- 
rope and the United States must increase their 
efforts to insure that progress in the developing 
countries continues. We must find new solutions 
to the transfer of technical and managerial 
skills and knowledge. Private enterjirise and 
multilateral aid mechanisms must be more ef- 
fectively engaged in fostering development. We 
must find new techniques for transferring capi- 
tal without adding to the growing debt-service 
burden of the developing nations. And we must 
find new ways to improve their trade prospects. 

The United States has made every effort, in 
dealing with its balance-of-payments deficit, to 
avoid actions which would adversely affect the 
economies of the less developed. We thought it 
only right that the developed countries, particu- 
larly tliose in surplus, be called upon to make 
the principal adjustments. 

There is, as well, the difficult task of safe- 
guarding the free world's security at points on 
the globe far removed from both Europe and 
America. It is here that Europeans seem, to 
many Americans, to be insufficiently concerned. 

The United States has no desire to police the 
world or to be the only bulwark against aggres- 
sion. It is terribly expensive and distracts us 

FEBRUARY 5, 19 68 


from other pressing domestic and international 
problems. But the task of helping free nations 
preserve their independence must be performed 
if we are to build a stable and lasting peace. 
It is a task we are fully prepared to share. We 
hope Western Europe will be prepared to accept 
a larger role in the future. 

Eoles within the alliance are changing, and 
with any cliange there is bound to be uncertainty 
and discomfort. At the same time we are wit- 
nessing the fruition of 20 years of devotion to 
a principle and a belief: a principle which 
holds that we have a common obligation and 
responsibility to provide for the common de- 
fense, a belief that by acting together we can 
preserve the peace and better the lot of all man- 
kind. In President Johnson's words : 

Americans and all Europeans share a connection 
which transcends political differences. We are a single 
civilization ; we share a common destiny ; our future is 
a common challenge. 

Twenty years ago the United States acted 
decisively on the common destiny we had long 
since shared with the nations of the Atlantic 
community. Behind our shield and with the 
help of our resources, a shattered Europe built 
anew a freedom and vitality unrivaled in its 

We have shared sacrifice. We have shared 
hojie and fulfillment. I believe we share a com- 
mon vision of the future. But it is together — and 
only together — that we have the potential to 
make that vision a reality. In the end, this is 
what we are about in Europe. This is the mean- 
ing of our irrevocable commitment. 

U.S. and Israel Reaffirm Dedication to Peace in the Middle East 

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel visited 
President Johnson at the LB J Ranch at John- 
son City, Tex., January 7-8. Following are an 
exchange of greetings ietween the President and 
the Prime Minister upon the latter's arrival at 
Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Tex.. 
on JanuaTy 7, their exchange of toasts at a 
dinner at the ranch that evening, and a joint 
statement issued at the close of their meetings 
on January 8. 


White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated 
January 7 

President Johnson 

Shalom. The traditional greeting of Israel 
has very special meaning for all of us who have 
come here today. 

We meet here in peace, and we will talk in 
peace. And we will try to extend the peace that 
is m our hearts— extend it to all men who are 
willing to share our partnership of good faith 
and good purpose. 

Mr. Prime Minister, we will be together for 
only 2 short days. But they will be long days 

full of friendship and full of happiness because 
you have come here to be with us. 

These, too, will be hopeful days, because this 
land was born in that spirit — that spirit of 
promise and opportunity. 

Here in this land our neighbors work hand 
in hand for the common good. 

So, Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Eshkol, we 
extend to you this afternoon the hand of wel- 
come to this land. We hope its spirit refreshes 
you after the long journey that you have taken. 

I know that its hospitality will lift your 

Mr. Prime Minister, we hope that you find 
that peace, which all Americans are proud to 
seek with you. 

We are delighted to have you, sir. 

Prime Minister Eshkol 

Mrs. Eshkol and I are very happy to be here 
as your guests. 

Since 1964 we have with us fond memories 
of our first meeting. We come to you in friend- 
ship, and we know that friendship awaits us. 

My central concern is peace — peace for my 
country and for the area of the world in which 
we live. 



It was there in ancient days that men first 
expressed a striving for peace on earth. 

I will not ever give up the hope that this will 
come to pass. We in our country are working 
toward this end. 

I know how much America is doing under 
your leadership, Mr. President, to help the cause 
of peace and justice in the world. 

In the Biblical phrase: ShaJo7)i Vrachoh 
y'Jekarov, which means: Peace be to him that 
is far, and to him that is near. 

Mr. President, it is a great pleasure to be 
with you. 

President Johnson 

I know you people would want to meet Mrs. 
Eslikol and Mi-s. Johnson. 

Mr. Mayor [W. W. McAllister, Mayor of San 
Antonio], Congressman [Henry B.] Gonzalez, 
Congressman [Abraham] Kazen, and other dis- 
tinguished public officials, all you ladies and 
gentlemen, boys and girls : It is a cold afternoon, 
but it is a warm welcome. 

We are very proud of San Antonio and South 
Texas for the wannth of j'our welcome. 

Thank all of you so much. 

President Johnson 

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated 
January 7 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Eshkol: Welcome 
to our family table. We are honored and happy 
to have you here in our home. 

Here, we ask only that you enjoy the warm 
ties of friendship and partnership that mean 
so much to each of us and both our peoples. 

Our peoples, Mr. Prime Minister, share many 
qualities of mind and heart. We both rise to 
challenge. We both admire the courage and 
resourcefulness of the citizen-soldier. We each 
draw strength and purpose for today from our 
heroes of yesterday. We both know the thrill of 
bringing life from a hard but rewarding land. 

But all Americans — and all Israelis — also 
Icnow that prosperity is not enough, that none 
of our restless generation can ever live by bread 
alone. For we are equally nations in search of 
a dream. We share a vision and purpose far 
brighter than our abilities to make deserts 

We have been born and raised to seek and 
find peace. In that common spirit of our hopes, 
I respect our hope that a just and lasting peace 
will prevail between Israel and her neighbors. 

This past year has been a busy one for Amer- 
ica's peacemakers — in the Middle East, in Cy- 
prus, in Viet-Nam. Wherever conscience and 
faith have carried them, they have found a 
stubborn truth confirmed. Making peace is pun- 
ishing work. It demands enormous courage, 
flexibility, and imagination. It is ill served by 
hasty slogans or half -solutions. I know you un- 
derstand this, sir, better than most men. One 
of your ancestors said it for all men almost 
two thousand years ago: "Other precepts are 
performed when the occasion arises . . . but 
for peace it is written, 'pursue it.' " 

That is our intention in the Middle East and 
throughout our world. To pursue peace. To find 
peace. To keep peace forever among men. If we 
are wise, if we are fortunate, if we work to- 
gether — perhaps our nation and all nations may 
know the joys of that promise God once made 
about the children of Israel: "I will make a 
covenant of peace with them ... it shall be an 
everlasting covenant." 

Let that be our toast to each othei- — our gov- 
ernments and our peoples — as this new year be- 
gins. Its days are brighter, Mr. Prime Minister, 
because you lighten them with your presence 
here and the spirit you will leave behind. 

To our friends. Prime Minister and Mrs. 
Eshkol, and to the people of Israel: Shalorn. 

Prime Minister Eshkol 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson : For Mrs. 
Eshkol and myself this has been a wonderful 
exjierience to be here as your guests at your 
home in Texas. On our way here today we 
saw again the vastness and variety of America. 
But from the moment we met you we were 
made to feel once more the warmth of your 
friendship and the depth of your own view that 
in terms of rights and duties all peoples are 
equal: that they have equal right to be them- 
selves and to be left in peace. I remember our 
first meeting in 1964. I have carried the 
memory of that with me. In the days of peril 
I thought often of your friendship. 

This great land of Texas reminds me very 
much of parts of mj^ own country, though there 
is, of course, no comparison in size. I can see 
here the results of pioneering and dedication — 

FEBRCART 5, 1968 
2S7-972 — 6S 


the beauty men can create when they are free. 
The broadness of this place is matched by the 
breadth of your miderstanding and the depth 
of your friendship and the determination of 
America, which you symbolize, to buttress 
peace, to block its disruption by aggression, 
and to enlarge the horizons of man's oppor- 

On a personal note, Mr. President, in the 
nearly 4 years which have passed since I last 
had the pleasure of meeting you, threefold 
congratulations have been in order. Twice you 
have ]3layed the role of father of the bride, and 
now Mrs. Johnson and yourself have the joy 
of your first grandson. 

In drinking to your health I wish for Mrs. 
Johnson and yourself all personal joy in the 
years ahead and for your country the realiza- 
tion of your dream of peace and human dignity. 

Ladies and gentlemen: the President of the 
United States. 


white House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated 
January 8 

President Jolinson invited Prime Minister 
Eshkol to be his guest at the Texas AVhite House 
on January 7 and 8, during the Prime Minister's 
visit to the United States. 

The President and the Prime Minister held 
several meetings during which they discussed 
recent developments in the Middle East as well 
as a number of questions of mutual interest in 
the bilateral relations between their two coun- 

Tlae President and the Prime Minister con- 
sidered the implications of the pace of rearma- 
ment in the Middle East and the ways and means 
of coping with this situation. The President 
agreed to keep Israel's military defense capabil- 
ity mider active and sympathetic examination 

and review in the light of all relevant factors, in- 
cluding the shipment of military equipment by 
others to the area. 

The President and the Prime Minister re- 
stated their dedication to the establishment of a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East in ac- 
cordance with the spirit of the Security Council 
resolution of November 22, 1967.^ They also 
noted that the i^rinciples set forth by President 
Johnson on Jmie 19 ' constituted an equitable 
basis for such a settlement. 

The President and the Prime Minister noted 
that under that Security Council resolution the 
Secretai-y General of the United Nations has 
designated Ambassador [Gumiar] Jarring as 
his Special Representative. They also noted with 
satisfaction that Ambassador Jarring is already 
engaged in discussions with the govermnents 
concerned and affirmed their full support of liis 

The President and the Pi'ime Minister re- 
viewed with satisfaction developments in the re- 
lations between the United States and Israel 
since their last meeting in 1964 and expressed 
their firm iiitention to continue the traditionally 
close, friendly and cooperative ties which link 
the peoples of Israel and the United States. 

Noting the mutual dedication of their gov- 
ernments and people to the value of peace, re- 
sistance to aggression wherever it occurs, indi- 
vidual freedom, human dignity and the advance- 
ment of man through the elimination of poverty, 
ignorance, and disease, the President and the 
Prime Minister declared their firm determina- 
tion to make every effort to increase the broad 
area of understanding which already exists be- 
tween Israel and the United States and agreed 
that the Prime Minister's visit advanced this 

' For text, see Bulleti:^ of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 
' /fij(?., July 10, 1967, p. 31. 



Viet-Nam and the Future of East Asia 

hy WiZliain P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ' 

The situation in South Viet-Nam is central 
to the concerns of responsible men everywhere. 
It is a situation behind which lies a complex 
history of Communist covert subversion, overt 
terrorism, and direct armed attack. It is a situa- 
tion in which many interrelated factors — polit- 
ical, military, economic, social — must be taken 
into account, assessed, and acted ujDOn. As Am- 
bassador Bunker put it 2 months ago in New 
York : = 

The problems in Viet-Xam are difficult. Viet-Xam is 
many things : a combination of major military actions 
and isolated incidents of terrorism, a mixture of polit- 
ical subversion and the creation of representative 
institutions, a blend of apathy and proud nationalism, 
and a confrontation between the burgeoning aspira- 
tions of a new nation and the stresses and strains 
associated with its development. 

In short, Viet-Nam i-epresents in an extraor- 
dinarily acute and ditEcult form problems that 
are common to Asia as a whole. I suppose none 
of the re-emergent or new nations of the 
woi'ld — and Viet-Nam is in the former cate- 
gory — has had a more tragic history of colonial 
rule and political failure in its early postcolonial 
days. These factors have enormously com- 
pounded the task to its present proportions. 

Yet Viet-Nam — and the significance of our 
stand there — must be seen in the wider context 
of history and of Asia as a whole. 

By virtue of geography the United States is 
a Pacific power. While our traditions and cul- 
tural underpinnings tie us closely to Europe, 
we can no longer ailord to be less concerned 
about developments in the Pacific than in the 
Atlantic. At this point in history, nowhere are 

' Address made before a foreign policy conference at 
Miami. Fla., on Jan. 16 (press release 9). 

' For an address made by Ellsworth Bunker, Amer- 
ican Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam, on 
Nov. 17. 1967, see Buixetin of Dec. 11, 1967, p. 781. 

the stakes higher than in Asia. The nations of 
the area comprise two-thirds of the world's 
population and are rich in natural resources. 
Not long ago this point was luiderscored by 14 
distinguished scholars of Asia, speaking, of 
course, wholly for themselves. At a meeting in 
Tuxedo, New York, A. Doak Barnett, Edwm 
Reischauer, Robert Scalapino, Lucian W. Pye, 
and 10 scholars of equal standing declared : 

. . . the critical importance of the Asia-Pacific 
region to the world as a whole, and the United States 
specifically, must be recognized. Asia contains more 
than one-half of our global population and encompasses 
most of the major nations of today and tomorrow. 
Socio-economic development or decay in this region will 
have a decisive influence upon the peace and prcsperity 
of the world. Equally important are basic questions 
of a political character. Will a political equilibrium be 
achieved in the Asia-Pacific region? Will peaceful co- 
existence be accepted among states having different 
political systems? Or shall we witness a rising cycle of 
aggression, externally directed subversion, and thrusts 
for hegemony within the region by individual powers 
or power blocs? These questions bear heavily upon the 
pro.spect for peace or war in our times. 

Asia Today in the Historic Setting 

Asia today is a tremendously exciting place 
where historic change is taking place at a pace 
and on a scale almost without precedent. The 
essence of that story is, quite simply, that the 
people of the area — always as innately talented 
as any in the world — are finding themselves. 

But a vital part of the story, too, is the influ- 
ence in Asia of certain values and ways of 
thinking that can properly be described as 
Western and that in the eyes of Asians are 
associated with particular force with the United 
States. This is not primarily a matter of our 
own policies, much less of anj'thing resembling 
what is caricatured by some writers as a pax 

Rather, it is a broad historical process, on 

FEBRUARY 5. 1968 


■which I have frankly cribbed from the master- 
ful "A World History" and "The Rise of the 
West" of Professor William McNeill of Chi- 
cago. The key conclusion he reaches is that the 
interaction between the heirs of the historical 
civilizations in Asia "on the one hand, and the 
spate of Western innovations on the other, has 
been and in the foreseeable future promises to 
remain, a central axis, and perhaps the central 
axis of mankind's history." 

Professor McNeill finds four Western (and 
American) values deeply at work in Asia : 

First, there is nationalism itself — the cohesion 
that comes with the emergence of an effective 
national unit with which people can identify. 
This propelling sense of nationhood has its 
roots in the individual's realization that his 
nation is a distinctive entity, unique and sep- 
arate from other nations, and that the future 
of his nation impinges directly upon his own 
well-being. We have now gone a bit beyond that 
in Eui-ope, as we seek to go beyond it through 
the United Nations in a wider sense. But 
nationalism was a key value in our own evolu- 
tion and is certainly a key value in East Asia 

Second, there is the aspiration for, and 
growth of, real popular participation and influ- 
ence in government. This is a trend line — not 
instant democracy or instant constitutions on 
our or any other model. It is a trend line toward 
the people having a voice in their government. 
The evolution of political institutions that ac- 
commodate broad-based political participation 
tends to be a halting and uneven process. Yet 
this should hardly surprise us if we reflect that 
our own evolution toward democratic institu- 
tions is still less than perfect after more than 
700 years of struggle. And as we look at what 
has happened in Asia in the historically minute 
space of a generation or two, we can see both 
the depth of the aspiration and a remarkable 
degree of progress. 

Third, there is an awareness of the possibility 
of economic progress and a sense of the im- 
portance of the sharing of the benefits of this 
progress.^ Fundamentally, this is a belief that 
progress is possible through pragmatic planning 
and earnest endeavor and that progress whose 
fruits are confined to the few is no enduring 
progress at all. 

And fourth, there is the application of scien- 
tific invention to all pursuits, particularly to 
the longrun welfare of the people. This keen in- 
terest in devising ways of applying technology 

ranges from the direct application of scientific 
knowledge to the handling of complex enter- 
prises and the planning of economic develop- 
ment. In Asia today this is generally in the 
embryonic and formative stage, with Japan as 
a notable separate case. 

I think these values are very deeply at work 
in Asia today. The revolution — the real revolu- 
tion — is a revolution heavily derived from the 
West. And it is very much in our national in- 
terest to assist that revolution to realize itself. 
This is more than a sophisticated presentation 
of the balance-of-power point of view. We are 
in fact associated with something that the peo- 
ple of Asia care about. In essence our national 
mterest in a peaceful and progressive Asia is in 
accord with Asian aspirations and hopes. 

A decade ago we heard it argued that the 
quickest route to economic development was by 
firm central control in what amounted basically 
to totalitarianism. The value of popular partici- 
pation was to be sacrificed for that of economic 
progress. Communist China was held up as the 
example, but as we look back today we see that 
something went wrong with this scheme. Wlien 
the people of East Asia look at the state of af- 
fairs in Commimist China today— its agricul- 
tural difficulties and its internal dissent — they 
find little to impress them. On the other hand, as 
imperfect as the non-Communist nations of 
Asia are politically and economically, their rec- 
ord in the past 10 years has seemed to offer more 
than has a system such as that enforced on the 
mainland. And this is a very critical fact. 

In terms of our national interest then, what I 
am saying is that our deepest national interest 
is to further Asia's own revolution — which is in 
large part ours — and prevent its being aborted, 
distorted, or taken over in the literal physical 
sense by what is essentially a counterrevolution 
that is not in tune with the trends of the times 
or the aspirations of the people of East Asia. 

Preventive and Positive Aspects of Our Action 

It is in this very basic sense that our current 
course in Viet-Nam is both preventive and posi- 
tive. We act in Viet-Nam to prevent the North 
from taking over the South by force, but we do 
so with an awareness of what we are making 
possible and with a vision of what Southeast 
Asia left to itself can become. This is what wars 
are about : to prevent disaster and to make pos- 
sible constructive and progressive trends that 
we would not otherwise see. War is in itself 



sterile and brutal — as none know better than 
those holding the ground in Viet-Nam today. It 
can be justified morally and politically only in- 
sofar as it serves a major purpose in either the 
preventive or the positive direction, and pref- 
erably both. 

On the preventive side, our presence in Viet- 
Nam derives from four basic judgments that 
have been shared by successive Presidents. 
I The first is that Southeast Asia matters. Its 

250 million people are entitled to develop as 
free and independent nations in whatever inter- 
national posture they wish, and this is the only 
kuid of Southeast Asia that is compatible with 
a peaceful future for Asia as a whole and for 
wider areas. 

Second, the nations of Southeast Asia are 
individually threatened by the parallel and mu- 
tually reinforcing ambitions of North Viet-Nam 
and Commimist China. A North Vietnamese 
takeover of the South by force would stimulate 
these expanionist ambitions and weaken the will 
and ability of the nations of Southeast Asia, 
and indeed beyond, to resist pressure and sub- 

Tlurd, if South Viet-Nam were to be lost 
through a failure on our part to fulfill the na- 
tional commitment embodied in our whole 
course of conduct since 1954 — including 
SEATO — the effect on confidence in our com- 
mitments in Asia and elsewhere could only be 
very serious. 

And fourth, a success of the Communist tech- 
nique of "people's wars" or "wars of national 
liberation" would undoubtedly have the effect 
of encouraging the extremist line of thought 
among Communist nations. It might thus undo 
the more promising trends that have developed 
in recent years in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, and this could seriously affect the 
Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and even 

On the positive side of our effort in Viet- 
Nam, we act to encourage the many signs of 
stability, security, and development that are ap- 
pearing in East Asia today. We act to help se- 
cure an enviroimient in which these trends can 
continue unimpeded by the threat of interfer- 
ence by expansionist powers. 

One need only look at the progress being 
made by the nations of Northeast Asia in the 
economic field to get a glimpse of what can lie 
ahead for all of East Asia. Economic growth, 
spurred by capable and realistic planning, has 
been accelerating at a faster pace than could 

have been predicted only a few years ago. The 
economic success stories in the North Pacific 
area are numerous and impressive. Japan, South 
Korea, and the Republic of China have shown 
what can be done in a climate of confidence. 

Japan is now the third economic power in the 
world. Reachuig out into Asia and beyond, 
Japan has achieved one of the highest growth 
rates in the world in terms of both GNP and 
international balance of payments. And Japan 
is playing an impressive and gi-owing role in 
economic assistance to the rest of Asia and in 
its participation in regional initiatives. 

South Korea, devastated by conflict to a de- 
gree far beyond anything that has happened in 
Viet-Nam, had great difficulty for many years. 
But from the early 1960's on, it has taken hold 
of its affairs, carried through genuine elections, 
and begim to make dramatic economic progress. 
Today, South Korea has worked out its prob- 
lems with Japan — one of the deepest historic 
antagonisms in the area — is proudly contribu- 
ting nearly 50,000 men to the defense of South 
Viet-Nam, and was the host to the initial meet- 
ing of the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council] 
grouping of 10 Asian nations. 

Tlie Republic of China, on Taiwan, beat back 
a Communist threat to the offshore islands in 
1958 and on the economic side carried out sound 
and effective policies, including land reform, 
making possible the termination of U.S. eco- 
nomic assistance programs. By 1961 the Repub- 
lic of China began a small but still very signifi- 
cant program of technical assistance in agricul- 
ture to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. So the 
Republic of China, too, is reaching out to jslay 
a constructive role. 

Developments in Northeast Asia have demon- 
strated what can be achieved when security is 
assured. In Southeast Asia, the situation is more 
difficult: the nations are less developed and the 
threat from North Viet-Nam and Commimist 
China is more imminent. Yet one can already 
see that our presence there is helping to secure a 
setting in which the people of the area can begin 
to develop their own vast potential. 

Three of the more promising cases in South- 
east Asia are Thailand, IMalaysia, and Singa- 
pore, Thailand's annual growth rate has 
averaged 7 percent annually over the past 10 
years, and projections indicate that rate will be 
sustained. While the problem of insurgency in 
the northeast is disturbing, it is receiving the 
alert and effective attention of the Thais 




Singapore and IMala3'sia, next to Japan, enjoy 
the higliest per capita, incomes in Asia. They are 
attempting to diversify their economies and at 
the same time trying to create a true multina- 
tional society tlirough democratic processes. 

Beyond these three cases, one must look at the 
recent turn of events in Indonesia. Just a few 
years ago it appeared that Indonesia was surely 
headed down the Communist path: Sukarno's 
nationalism was becoming more and more ex- 
treme and hostile and had led Indonesia into a 
dangerous confrontation with Malaysia. Then 
in October 1965 an ill-timed and poorly executed 
coup attempt by the Communists backfired and 
brought into being the current strongly nation- 
alist and non-Communist government. 

"VVliat happened in Indonesia was, above all, 
the work of heroic and dedicated non-Com- 
munist nationalists. I am quite sure that had we 
not stood firm in Viet-Nam in 1965 — and had 
Viet-Nam thus been rapidly on the way to a 
takeover by force from Hanoi, as would surely 
have been the case — Aidit and company would 
not have needed to force their luck and the 
morale of the non-Communists would not have 
been equal to the very tight struggle for power 
that ensued for the next 6 months. Hence, it is 
the widely accepted judgment in the area — 
which I share — that the dramatic change in 
Indonesia would have been far less likely, if not 
impossible, without the stand that we and others 
took in Viet-Nam. 

Accompanying these developments in East 
Asia, is the trend toward regional cooperation 
that is emerging. One can cite the Asian De- 
velopment Bank, the Asian and Pacific Council 
of 10 nations, the Mekong River Committee, 
and the creation in Indonesia of a new multi- 
lateral framework for aid that could have im- 
mense future significance. 

Symptomatic of these trends in East Asia to- 
day is the demise of neocolonialism as an ideo- 
logical peg upon which new nations can pin 
tlieir hopes and justify their frustrations. Two 
or three years ago the idea still had active ap- 
peal ; today it is virtually dead. This new will- 
ingness to accept partnership in a working 
relationsliip with others is a lugldy significant 
development in the long nm. And such partner- 
ship is the only relationship that we and others 
see that makes sense. 

In short, the people of East Asia are on the 
move as never before. It is in our fundamental 

national interest to prevent a miscarriage of j 
this trend and to help provide the setting in 
which a true revolutionary trend can be realized. I 

A Climate of Confidence [ 

Let me conclude by noting that this whole i 
tie between security and progress comes down i 
to the factor of confidence : confidence that one's I 
nation-state will retain its own integrity, con- | 
fidence that any active voice may make itself | 
heard somewhere in the governmental process, \ 
confidence that economic progress can be i 
achieved and will not be confined to the few, 
and confidence that available technology will be 
applied to the well-being of all. 

This is the key to the future of East Asia. By 
our presence in Viet-Nam and our concern for 
the security of Southeast Asia — as of Northeast 
Asia over the years — time has been bought for 
Asia. Asian leaders from Tokyo to Tehran are 
generally in sympathy with our policies in Asia. 
Only recently Prime Minister Sato of Japan 
made an extensive tour of the area. He reported 
on it m a speech before the National Press Club 
at Washington on November 14 : 

I was deeply impressed during my recent trip that the 
United States efforts in Viet-Nam were well understood 
and appreciated by the governments and peoples of the 
Asian countries. I found that they clearly understood 
that, if the United States loses interest in Asia at the 
present time, not only the peace and security of Asia 
but also the future of the world would be in serious 

An imderstanding of the interrelationship be- 
tween security and jDrogi-ess is crucial to an ap- 
preciation of our stand in Viet-Nam today and 
its bearing upon the future of all Asia. To quote 
the 14 scholars again : 

Let us cease defining and defending American foreign 
policies in grossly oversimplified terms. Our people can 
cope with complexity if given the chance. Let us also 
desist from the excessive spirit of mea culpa which per- 
meates certain quarters of American society. On bal- 
ance, our record in the world, and in Asia since World 
War II, has been a remarkably good one, worthy of 

Virtually without exception, leaders and re- 
sponsible opinion in East Asia share our view 
that the struggle in Viet-Nam is crucial to the 
independence of each individual nation and to 
its ability to work for the welfare of its own 
people. The climate of confidence in Asia to- 
day — to which all objective observers attest — 



derives in large part from the progress tliat 
Asian nations themselves have demonstrated. 
Yet crucial to that climate has been the sense 
of security. And I would add that only an honor- 
able and secure peace in South Viet-Nam can 
preserve that climate. 

Our objective in Viet-Nam is deceptively 
simple. President Jolinson stated it at Jolms 
Hopkins on April 7, 1965 : ^ 

Our objective is ttie independenre of South Viet-Nam 
and its freedom from attack. We want notliing for 
ourselves — only that the people of South Viet-Nam 
be allowed to guide their own country iu their own 

The stakes are grave indeed. But behind this 
objective lies the hard calculation that our 
national interest is very much on the line and 
that that national interest is at one with the 
desires and hopes of the people of the area 

National Review Board Appointed 
for East-West Center 

Press release 12 dated January 19 

The Secretarj- of State announced on Jan- 
uary 19 the apjx)intment of the 15 members of 
the National Review Board for the Center for 
Cidtural and Technical Interchange Between 
East and West. 

Reappointed to the National Review Board 

Governor John A. Burns of Hawaii, the Board's first 

• IMd., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

Father Laurence J. McGinley, vice president, Saint 

Peter'.s College, Jersey City, N.J. 
Hung Wo Ching, chairman of the board of directors, 

Aloha Airlines 
Roy E. Larsen, chairman of the executive committee, 

Time, Inc. 
Mary W. Lasker, president, Albert and Mary Lasker 

Otto N. Miller, chairman of the board, Standard Oil 

Company of California 
Logan Wil.son, president, American Council on 


New appointments mcluded : 

C. C. Cadagan, former chairman of the board of re- 
gents. University of Hawaii 

James H. McCrocklin, president, Southwest Texas 
State College 

Paul A. Miller, Assistant Secretary for Education, 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 

Edward Nakamura, chairman of the hoard of regents. 
University of Hawaii 

William S. Richardson, Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii 

John D. Rockefeller III 

Ambassador William Matson Roth, Special Repre- 
sentative for Trade Negotiations 

Joseph R. Smiley, president, University of Colorado 

The National Review Board was established 
in February 1965 to represent the national in- 
terest in reviewmg the programs and operations 
of the East- West Center and advising the Secre- 
tary of State with regard to this program of the 
Government in the field of international 

The East- West Center, which is located on 
the campus of the University of Hawaii in 
Honolulu, was established by congressional 
legislation in 1960 to promote better relations 
and understanding between the United States 
and the nations of Asia and the Pacific through 
cooj^erative study, training, and research. The 
Center provides grants, mainly to graduate stu- 
dents, to implement these expressed purposes 
and objectives. 

FEBRUARY 5. 1968 


The Work of the United Nations During the 22d General Assembly 

Tlve 2£d session of the United Nations General Assembly adjourned 
on December 20. On December 22 the United States Mission to the 
United Nations issued the follotoing summary of develoj)ments dur- 
ing the session, both in the Assembly and in the Security Council, 
which are significant from, the U.S. viewpoint. To introduce the 
summary, the Mission included a statement made by U.S. Representa- 
tive to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg at the opening of a 
news confe7'ence on December 20. 

U.S./T-i.N. press release 256 dated December 22 


Looking back on the year 1967 at the United 
Nations, inchiding the General Assembly ses- 
sion just adjourned, certain salient impressions 
emerge — some encouraging and others discour- 

On the encouraging side, despite disappoint- 
ing delays we strongly hope that a complete 
treaty against proliferation of nuclear weapons 
will be ready for consideration by the Assembly 
at a resumed session early next year. This is the 
number-one priority in the arms control field. 

Also, the General Assembly has taken im- 
portant actions to extend the rule of law in 
the unfamiliar realms of outer space and the 
ocean beds. These steps help to assure that our 
rapid technological progress is ruled by law, 
not ruined by anarchy. 

In addition, many important nonpolitical 
programs and projects of the United Nations- 
economic, social, humanitarian, legal, and tech- 
nical — continue and have been further devel- 
oped. These, too, are a major part of the fabric 
of peace, one whose importance to the world 
must never be underestimated. 

But all these efforts must be seen within the 
critical context of the United Nations per- 
formance in the realm of peace and security. 
In that all-important field, the year 1967 shows 
both major achievements and grave short- 

There is increasing evidence, particularly in 

the U.N.'s actions in dangerous areas of conflict 
such as the Middle East and Cyprus, that it still 
has the vital capacity to achieve cease-fires and 
other devices against large-scale violence. But 
it has yet to show the capacity to deal with the 
underlying grievances and pressures from 
which these conflicts erupt. 

The world community must make real peace 
settlements to relieve these pressures. This is 
the major future challenge to the United 
Nations — and hence to us, its members, who 
hold the U.N.'s fate in our hands. 

We cannot be content simply to "keep" what 
peace we have and restore it when it is broken. 
We must devote our highest statesmanship to 
building the peace which we do not yet have. 
The United Nations this year has again 
demonstrated its capacity for peacekeeping. It 
has still to show equal capacity for peacemak- 
ing. Failing this, the world coimiiunity and all 
its members, strong and weak alike, will remain 
dangerously insecure. 


Security Council 

Middle East 

Probably the most important single United 
Nations action during this period was the 
Security Coiuicil's unanimous Kesolution 242 of 
November 22 setting in motion steps toward "a 



just and lastinf^ peace"' in the Middle East.^ 
Although the situation in the Middle East was 
on the General Assembly's agenda, it was again 
the Security Council that dealt with it, as it had 
done during the critical weeks in May and June. 
Resolution 242 asked the Secretary-General 
to appoint a Special Representative, whose task 
would be to assist the parties to achieve a peace- 
ful settlement in accordance with the following 
principles: the withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from territories occupied in the June conflict; 
the tennination of claims or states of bellig- 
erency; respect for and acknowledgment of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and politi- 
cal independence of every state m the area, as 
well as their right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries; guarantees of 
freedom of navigation through the area's 
international waterways and of the territorial 
inviolability of every state in the area, through 
measures including the establishment of demili- 
tarized zones; and a jnst settlement of the 
refugee problem. The resolution, sponsored by 
the United Kingdom, was the end product of 
lengthy and delicate negotiations among the 
members of the Council and the parties to the 

Acting pursuant to this resolution, the 
Secretaiy-General has appointed as Special 
Representative a distinguished Swedish diplo- 
mat, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, who has now 
I begun his work in the Middle East. 
I This resolution may be a major step toward 
' the long-sought goal of real peace in the Middle 
East, the kind of step for which the United 
States has labored incessantly since the cease- 
fire in June. Although the text is not perfect — 
notably in ignoring the need to limit the arms 
race in the area — the mandate it gives to the 
Special Representative is sound and is without 
, prejudice to any party. It is sufficiently respon- 
' sive to the interests of all parties so that they 
should 1)6 able to receive and cooperate with 
him. The United States was happy to join in the 
imanimous vote for this resolution ancl to pledge 
our diplomatic and political influence in support 
of the Special Representative's efforts. 

A month earlier, on October 25, the Secuinty 
Council met in response to two serious violations 
of the cease-fire — the sinking of an Israeli 
destroyer and the bombardment of U.A.R. oil 

facilities. It impartially condemned both viola.- 
tions and strongly reaffirmed its previous cease- 
fire demands.- Shortly thereafter the Secretary- 
General took action, which the United States 
supported, toward more effective U.N. observa- 
tion of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. 


xVgainst the United Nations important 
achievements for peace in the Middle East dur- 
ing 1967 must be set its continued inability to act 
for peace in Viet-Nam. 

Speaking for the United States in the Assem- 
bly's general debate in September, Ambassador 
Goldberg reiterated this country's strong belief 
that the United Nations must, under the charter, 
actively participate in the quest for peace in 
Viet-Nam.^ He appealed once again to all mem- 
bers to use their influence to that end. He also 
made clear our unchanging commitment to a 
political rather than an imposed military 

Although deep anxiety over Viet-Nam wiis 
widely expressed in the general debate, the 
United Nations proved still unable to give sub- 
stantive consideration to the matter, which was 
inscribed at United States initiative on the 
agenda of the Security Council in February 

This failure has been deeply disappointing to 
the United States. In fairness to the United 
Nations, it must be accounted a failure not of 
the organization but of certain key members and 
govermnents, particularly two permanent mem- 
bers of the Security Council, the Soviet Union 
and France, which, together with North Viet- 
Nam, have repeatedly and flatly opposed United 
Nations involvement in the matter. Some other 
Security Council members have proved reluc- 
tant to see the Council take up Viet-Nam in tlie 
face of this adamant attitude. 

On several occasions before and during the 
General Assembly, the United States again con- 
sulted with other members on a possible renewal 
of Secvirity Council consideration of Viet-Nam. 
Such consultations were held during the Tet 
bombing pause in January 1967; shortly before 
the Assembly met for its regular session ; and in 
December, following the Senate's passage of the 

* For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, see 
Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 834. 

' For U.S. statements and text of a re.solution adopted 
by the Security Council on Oct. 25, 1067, see ibid., Nov. 

20, 1967, p. 690. 

' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on Sept. 

21, 1967, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1967, p. 483. 

FEBRUARY 5, 1968 


Mansfield resolution/ On none of these occasions 
did we find any change of attitude by those op- 
posing United Nations involvement. 


During the crisis over Cyprus in November 
and December, the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General, with the active support of 
the United States, played an important part in 
helping to avert a major conflict in that area and 
in opening new possibilities for progress toward 
a long-overdue settlement of the underlying 

The serious incidents on Cyprus in mid- 
November brought Greece and Turkey close to 
armed conflict. This dangerous sitiuxtion was 
de-fused by diplomatic steps which included 
two appeals to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus by 
Secretary- General U Thant; a consensus by the 
Security Council strongly supporting these ap- 
peals; and the diplomatic initiatives by Presi- 
dent Jolmson, Secretary-General Thant, and 
the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio. 

The resulting efforts, particularly those of 
Cyrus Vance, the President's personal repre- 
sentative, produced agreement on steps by 
Greece and Turkey to move back from the 
brink of war. These steps, in turn, were greatly 
facilitated by a third appeal from the Secre- 
tary-General on December 3, requesting Greece 
and Turkey to end all threats to the security of 
each other as well as of Cypras and to withdi-aw 
expeditiously all forces in excess of their respec- 
tive contingents in Cyprus. The Secretary- 
General also offered his good offices for the 
future role and fmiction of the United Nations 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) . 

In the current consideration of Cyprus in the 
Security Council, we hope to see the Coimcil 
not only extend the life of UNFICYP for 
another 3 months but also support the offer of 
good offices made by the Secretary-General.^ 

The Congo 

In mid-November the Security Council, con- 
fronted with a new incursion of armed mer- 

cenaries into Congolese territory, was again ap- 
parently instnmiental in halting this practice. 
The Congolese Government charged that armed 
mercenaries had entered its Province of Ka- 
tanga from Angola in an attempt to overthrow 
the established order in the Congo. 

The United States joined m a consensus of the 
Council on the text of a draft resolution — 
adopted without objection on November 15 — 
which condemned Portugal's failure, in viola- 
tion of previous Council resolutions, to prevent 
mercenaries from using Aiigola as a base of 
operations for armed attacks against the Congo, 
and called on all countries receiving merce- 
naries to i^revent them from renewing their 
activities against any state.^ 

No incursions of mercenaries into the Congo 
have been reported since the adoption of this 


Late in the year the United States took action 
to focus the attention of the Security Council 
on a problem related to the great strides made 
in decolonization in recent years — that of the 
relation to the United Nations of "micro-states" 
which are too small to be able to meet the obliga- 
tions of membership or to contribute effectively 
to the work of the United Nations. 

The Secretary-General, in his introduction to 
his 1967 annual repoi't, had suggested that the 
time might "be opportune for the competent 
organs to midertake a thorough and comprehen- 
sive study of the criteria for membership in the 
United Nations with a view to laying down the 
necessary limitations on full membership while 
also defining other forms of association which 
would benefit both the 'micro-States' and the 
United Nations." 

In a letter dated December 13,' Ambassador 
Goldberg requested the President of the Secu- 
rity Council to consult members about recon- 
venmg the Council's long-dormant Committee 
on the Admission of New Members to consider 
this matter and to provide the members and the 
Council with appropriate information and 

* S. Res. 180, 90th Cong., 1st sess. 

"For a U.S. statement and test of a resolution 
adopted by the Security Council on Dec. 22, 1967, see 
Bulletin of Jan. 8, 1068, p. 95. 

' For test of the resolution, see ibid., Dec. 11, 1967, 
p. 808. 

' For test, see iUd., Jan. 29, 1968, p. 159. 




items Considered Directly by Plenary 

Chinese Representation 

The General Assembly once again rejected 
the perennial Albanian resolution to expel the 
Eepublic of China and to seat representatives 
of Conmnmist China in the United Nations. The 
vote was 58 to 45, a wider margin than in 1966. 
The Assembly also reaffirmed by 69 to 48^ — again 
a wider margin than last year — the validity of 
its 1961 decision that any proposal to change the 
representation of China in the United Nations 
is an important question requiring a two-thirds 
vote for adoption.* 

The United States again supported, as we did 
last year, an Italian resolution calling for a 
study committee to examme the problem of 
Chinese representation in the U.N. This resolu- 
tion was not adopted. 

Admission of New Member 

With the coming to independence on Novem- 
ber 30 of the People's Eepublic of Southern 
Yemen, fonnerly mider British sovereignty, the 
General Assemblj* removed from its agenda a 
longstanding colonial problem, the Aden ques- 
tion. On December 14 the General Assembly 
admitted Southern Yemen as the 123d member 
of the United Nations.^ 

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee I 

Agreement on Astronauts and Space Vehicles 

An important supplement to the Outer Space 
Treaty — the Agreement on the Rescue of Astro- 
nauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Retui-n 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space — was 
completed in mid-December by the United Na- 
tions Conuuittee on Outer Space and was 
promptly approved by the General Assembly.'" 

'For ii r.S. statement and texts of a resolution 
adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 28, 1067, and a draft 
resolution rejected by the Assembly that day, see ihid., 
Dec. IS. 196T, p. 829. 

"For a U.S. statement in the Security Council on 
Dec. 12 on the application of Southern Yemen for U.N. 
membership, see ihid., Jan. 8, 1968, p. 6.5. 

'° For text of the agreement, see ihid., Jan. 15, 1968, 
p. 87. 

This humanitarian agreement resulted from 
5 years of work in the Outer Space Committee, 
culminating in intensive negotiations at the 
United Nations this past autumn. It provides, 
among other things, for notification to a launch- 
ing authority if one of its astronauts lands 
under emergency conditions; all possible steps 
to rescue astronauts who have landed elsewhere 
than planned; assistance in rescue eflorts on the 
high seas; safe and prompt return of astro- 
nauts; and notifications and return of objects 
launched into outer space which reentered the 
earth's atmosphere. 

The agreement will enter into force upon the 
deposit of instruments of ratification by five 
govermnents, mcluding the United States, the 
U.S.S.E., and the United Kingdom. 

As Ambassador Goldberg said in the General 
Assembly on December 19 : ^^ 

This agreement bears witness to the fact that the 
United Nations can make a real contribution to extend- 
ing the rule of law to new areas and to insuring the 
positive and peaceful ordering of man's efforts in sci- 
ence and the building of a better world. 

The Deep Ocean and Its Floor 

The General Assembly tliis year took an im- 
portant step concerning the exploration and use 
of the deep ocean and its floor — a realm of great 
and growing significance to man. 

The Assembly's action took the form of a 
resolution creating an ad hoc committee to study 
the scientific, technical, economic, legal, and 
other problems involved in U.N. action on the 
seabeds and directing tliis committee to submit 
its report to the 23d General Assembly next 
year.^- We hope this report will lead to the 
establishment by the Assembly of a committee 
on the oceans with a broad mandate to develop 
international law and promote international co- 
operation with respect to the ocean and the 
ocean floor. 

The United States strongly supported this 
step. We believe that the prospects of rich har- 
vest and of mineral wealth in the deep ocean 
and on its floor must not be allowed to create a 
new form of colonial competition among marine 
nations; that the nations of the world should 
take steps to assure that there will be no race 

" Ihid., p. 83. 

" For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution 
adopted on Dec. 18, 1967, .«ee ihid., Jan. 22, 1068, p. 125. 

FEBRUART 5, 1968 


among: nations to grab and hold lands under the 
high seas; and that the deep ocean floor should 
be open to exploration and use by all states, 
without discrimination. The United States 
stands ready to join with all other nations to 
achieve these objectives in peace and under law. 

Nowproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

Disappointing delays in the Geneva negotia- 
tions for a treaty against proliferation of nu- 
clear weapons — the current number-one priority 
in the arms control field — made it impossible 
for the negotiating powers to present, as had 
been hoped, a complete treaty text to the Gen- 
eral Assembly for its approval before ad- 
journment in December. Because of the great 
importance of this project, the Assembly there- 
fore asked the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee to report on its negotiations as soon 
as possible and not later than March 15, 1968, in 
the hope that a complete treaty may be ready 
for consideration at a resimied session of the 
22d General Assembly. 

At the same time, the General Assembly also 
wisely decided that the planned conference of 
non-nuclear-weapon states should be postponed 
until August 1968 in order not to interfere with 
the Assembly's consideration of the nonproMf- 
eration treaty. 

We strongly hope that the ENDC will 
quickly conclude its work on the nonprolifera- 
tion treaty and that the General Assembly will 
thus be enabled to meet in resumed session after 
the report of the ENDC has been received to 
consider and approve this extremely important 

Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone 

The General Assembly noted with satisfac- 
tion that 21 Latin American nations had signed 
a treaty making their continent a nuclear-free 
zone, and called upon all states to help insure 
its observance. The United States hopes that 
this nuclear-free zone will soon become effective 
and that all nuclear powers will respect it. 


Again this year, the General Assembly deci- 
sively turned back an attempt led by the Soviet 
Union to end the U.N.'s responsibilities in 

Resolutions were introduced, and supported 

with propaganda efforts of unusual vigor, call- 
ing for the dissolution of the United Nations 
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilita- 
tion of Korea (UNCURK) and for the with- 
drawal of all United Nations forces from Korea. 
In Committee I the move to dissolve UNCURK 
was defeated by a vote of 60 to 24 ; and the pro- 
posal to withdraw U.N. forces, by a vote of 59 
to 24. 

In addition to successfully opposing these 
moves, the United States and 14 other countries 
offered a resolution reafRrming United Nations 
objectives and responsibilities in Korea.^^ The 
Assembly adopted this proposal by a vote of 08 
to 23. 

Agenda Items Allocated to Special 
Political Committee 

U.N. Peaceheefing Operatioiis 

The vitally important problem of strength- 
ening the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity was re- 
manded by the General Assembly this year to 
the Committee of 33. Some promise of progi'ess 
is discernible in that the Secretariat will assist 
in studying ways to improve the readiness of 
members to provide the U.N. with men, facili- 
ties, and services for peacekeeping. We are 
hopeful that this may provide the needed trac- 
tion to move ahead in this area. Meanwhile, 
peacekeeping possibilities must be tested case 
by case and will continue to require the acquies- 
cence of all big powers and the necessary politi- 
cal and financial backing. 

A major disappointment was the continued 
failure of the Soviet Union and France, both 
of which have refused to jiay past peacekeeping 
assessments, to make the substantial voluntary 
contributions which were expected on the basis 
of the consensus reached in 1965. Without these 
promised contributions, the financial health of 
the U.N. remains precarious and its ability to 
imdertake further peacekeeping operations is 
seriously weakened. 

XJNRWA and Middle East Refugees 

As in previous years, a resolution dealing with 
the work of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency 

"For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution 
adopted b.v tlie As.seaibly on Nov. 16, 1967, see ihid.. 
Dee. IS, 19G7, p. 844. 



for Palestine Kefugoes in tlie Near East 
(UNKWA) and aj^pealing for its continued 
sui)port was introduced b}- the United States 
and passed by the Assembly. The Assembly also 
approved, again with the support of the United 
States, a Swedish resolution calling for con- 
tinued humanitarian assistance to the new refu- 
gees uprooted by last summer's conflict and 
again calling upon Israel to facilitate the re- 
turn of those inhabitants who had fled the areas 
under its control since the outbreak of hostilities. 
A resolution calling on the U.N. to appoint a 
custodian to administer and receive income on 
beJialf of Arab refugees on projserty they left 
behind in Israel barely obtained a simple ma- 
jority in the Special Political Committee. It 
clearly did not have enough support for adop- 
tion in the General Assembly and was not put 
to a final vote. The United States had opposed 
this resolution, believing that it raised serious 
problems relating to state sovereignty and the 
authority of the U.N. and that its adoption 
could jeopardize the success of the peacemaking 
mission of Ambassador Jarring in the Middle 

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee II 

I nteimational Education Year 

Acthig on a United States proposal cospon- 
sored by 24 membei's, the Assembly i^rovision- 
ally designated 1970 as International Education 
Year and requested the Secretary-General, in 
consultation with the United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and other specialized agencies, to 
develop plans looking toward its observance." 
In taking this action the Assembly recognized 
the close relationship between education and 
development and the desirability of emphasiz- 
ing education as the international community 
moves into the period after the present Develop- 
ment Decade. 

The resolution followed upon President 
Jolmson's call for such a year at the Interna- 
tional Conference on the World Crisis in Edu- 
cation held at Williamsbui-g, Va., in October 

" For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution 
adopted on Dec. 1.3. 1967, see ihid.. Jan. 29, 1968, p. 1.56. 
■^ Ihid., Oct. 30, 1967, p. 569. 

Multilateral Food Aid; Protein Program 

The Assembly adopted a constructive resolu- 
tion on food aid. The resolution, of which the 
United States was a prmcipal sponsor, stressed 
the need for coordination of food aid programs 
and called for a review to determine whether ex- 
isting multilateral arrangements could handle 
an increased volume of food aid. 

In a related action, the Assembly took account 
of a serious deficiency not only in the quantity 
of food available to developing countries but 
also in its quality. It accepted the conclusion 
of the Committee on the Application of Science 
and Technology to Development that there is 
a protein deficiency of alarmmg proportions in 
the developing countries, that this protein de- 
ficiency is becoming greater, and that it will 
have increasingly adverse effects on the physical 
and mental development of children in many 
countries. The Assembly welcomed the commit- 
tee's proposals to deal with this problem and 
referred them to governments and appropriate 
international agencies for implementation. 

Capital Developmsnt Fund 

There was only minimal response to the 
appeal for contributions to a U.N. Capital De- 
velopment Fimd, which was voted last year over 
the opposition of major capital-exporting 
countries including the United States; only 
about $1.5 million, mostly in nonconvertible 
funds, was pledged. The Assembly asked the 
Administrator of the U.N. Development Pro- 
gram to administer the Fund, an action opposed 
as unsound by the United States and many other 
capital-exportmg countries. 

Agenda Item Allocated to Committee III 

Human Rights 

A major accomplishment of this year's Gen- 
eral Assembly in the field of human rights was 
the imanimous adoption of the Declaration on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women. The United States considers this a 
satisfactory declaration which should encourage 
freedom and opportunity for women in many 
parts of the world. 

Unfortunately, little other progress was made 
in the human rights field, chiefly because of 
lengthy and acrimonious debate on the draft 
Convention on the Elimination of Religious In- 

FEBRUART 5, 19 68 


tolerance. Although anti-Semitism was specifi- 
cally condemned in draft article VI of this con- 
vention as recommended by the Human Rights 
Commission, the Social Committee decided 
against mentioning any specific example of re- 
ligious intolerance in the convention. Of the 
entire text it voted approval of only the pre- 
amble and article I. The preamble, which sets 
the framework for the drafting of subsequent 
articles, was so changed by the committee from 
its original emphasis on the protection of re- 
ligious freedom that the United States was no 
longer able to support it. 

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee IV 

Colonial and Racial Issues in Southern Africa 

Regrettably, again this year the Assembly, in 
attempting to deal with colonial and racial 
problems in southern Africa, adopted several 
resolutions which, however sound in purpose, 
were unsound in method and which the United 
States accordingly could not support. This 
applies specifically to the major resolutions on 
South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the 
Portuguese territories, and apartheid. All called 
for sweeping measures within the sphere of the 
Security Council — measures which have little 
prospect of implementation. Such impractical 
demands only serve to diminish the prestige of 
the General Assembly. 

The United States again made clear its un- 
swerving opposition to colonialism and racial 
discrimination in southern Africa in all its 
forms. We remain convinced, however, that the 
best hope for progress against these evils lies 
in action which is intrinsically sound, widely 
supported, and within the capacity of the 
United Nations to carry out. 

The United States emphatically supported 
and cosponsored a related resolution ^'^ dealing 
with an important aspect of the South West 
Africa problem: the current trial in Pretoria 
of 37 South West Africans under the Terrorism 
Act. The resolution rightly condemns the appli- 
cation of this South African statute to South 
West Africa as a violation of the international 

" For a U.S. statement and text of Resolution 2324 
(XXII) adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 16, 1967 see 
ibid., Jan. 15, 1008, p. 92. 

status of the territory and calls on South Africa 
to release the prisoners. 


By its resolution on the Trust Territory of 
Nauru m the South Pacific, the 22d General 
Assembly decided to end one of the three re- 
maining United Nations trusteeships estab- 
lished in the organization's first years. (The two 
still remaining are New Guinea, under Aus- 
tralian administration, and the Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands, under U.S. administra- 

The resolution notes that the administering 
authority of Nauru (the Governments of 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United King- 
dom) had agreed to meet the request of the 
representatives of the people of Nauru for 
independence. It further provides that the 
trusteeship agreement will be terminated in 
order to permit Nauru's accession to independ- 
ence on January 31, 1968. 

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee V 

Improved U.N. Financial Management 

A major accomplishment of the General 
Assembly this year was the adoption of a United 
States proposal, cosponsored by the four major 
contributing powers (the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., 
and France) , to introduce a "planning estimate" 
procedure in the budgetary process of the 
United Nations. 

This procedure will give the Secretary-Gen- 
eral financial guidance for planning his budget 
for the year following the annual budget which 
the Assembly approves each year. It will thus 
permit the Assembly to give the Secretary- 
General an advance indication of the budgetai-y 
level that the members of the U.N. are prepared 
to support. It is not intended to set a ceiling or 
fix a rate of growth for the U.N. ; it is, however, 
designed to assure that the U.N. will make the 
most efficient use of the resources available to 

U.N. Personnel Questions 

The General Assembly adopted a proposal by 
France and other French-speaking states to 
provide a bonus for staif members using more 
than one of the U.N.'s working languages. 

"\\^lile the United States is not opposed to 




increasing language skills in the Secretariat, we 
and other members were obliged to oppose this 
proposal on grounds both of cost and of doubt- 
fid efl'ectiveness. As a result of this opposition, 
the operation of the bonus proposal was delayed 
until 19C9, providing time for further study and 
for the development of a sounder and less costly 

Agenda Items Allocated to Committee VI 

Territorial Asylum 

The General Assembly, on the recommenda- 
tion of the Legal Committee, adopted a hu- 
manitarian declaration on territorial asylum, 
which will enhance the abilitj^ of those fleeing 
from persecution to find safe haven. 

Diplomaiic Privileges and Immunifies 

The United States was instrumental in bring- 
ing about the discussion of an item on respect 
for diplomatic privileges and immunities. The 
Assembly adopted a resolution expressing its 
strong concern over departures from the rules 
of international law governing diplomatic 
status — of which there have been a growing 
number of serious instances in recent years. The 
resolution urged states to take every measure 
necessary to insure respect for the diplomatic 
privileges and immunities, and to adhere to 
the relevant treaties in the field, the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations. 

Definition of Aggression 

A Soviet-initiated item on the "Definition of 
Aggression" served only to prove that the cold 
war is not yet dead. After several days of 
propaganda in plenary by supporters of this 
item, the question was sent for further consid- 
eration to the Legal Committee, which proposed 
that the General Assembly establish a special 
committee to consider the question. This pro- 
posal was adopted by the Assembly with the 
L^nited States among those abstaining. 

The United States stated its willingness to 
support the creation of a committee with a 
responsible and businesslike mandate. "We felt 
obliged to abstain in the voting because the 
mandate given to the committee was ambiguous 
and unsatisfactory. 


United States and Japan Sign 
New Cotton Textile Arrangement 

The Department of State announced on Jan- 
uary 13 (press release 7) that two sets of notes 
were exchanged in Washington on January 12 
constituting a new bilateral arrangement gov- 
erning exports of cotton textiles from Japan 
to the United States. Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon signed 
on behalf of the U.S. Government; Ambassador 
Takeso Shimoda signed on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment of Japan. The exchanges of notes cover 
exports of cotton textiles from Japan to the 
United States during 1967 and for the 3-year 
period beginning January 1, 1968.^ 

For 1968, Japan may export a total of 373,- 
077,000 square yards equivalent of cotton tex- 
tiles under the arrangement. This total includes 
162,856,000 square yards of fabrics; 53,204,000 
square yards equivalent of madeup goods; 
144,040,000 square yards equivalent of apparel ; 
12,977,000 square yards equivalent of other 
cotton textiles. 

The levels for 1967 are as follows: aggregate 
limit, 355,311,146 square yards equivalent: 
fabrics, 155,101,040 square yards; madeup 
goods, 50,670,459 square yards equivalent; ap- 
jjarel, 137,180,998 square yards equivalent ; and 
other cotton textiles, 12,358,649 square yards 

Other provisions in the arrangement for the 
period beginning January 1, 1968, are similar 
to those contained in other U.S. cotton textile 
agreements. These include 5 percent annual 
growth in export volumes, flexibility between 
different groups and categories of cotton tex- 
tiles, and carryover of certain shortfalls in 
agreement limits. The arrangement of cate- 
gories established in the 1963 U.S.-Japan agree- 
ment^ remains unchanged. 

' For texts of the arrangement and related notes, see 
Department press release 7 dated Jan. 13. 

' For background and text of the arrangement con- 
eluded Aug. 27, 1963, see Bulletin of Sept. 16, 1963, 
p. 440. 

FEBRUARY 5, 1968 


U.S. and Belgium Extend 
Income Tax Protocol 

Press release S02 dated December 26 

On December 11 the American Embassy at 
Biiissels and the Belgian Foreign Mmistry ex- 
changed notes wherein it was agreed by the 
United States and Belgian Governments that 
the protocol of May 21, 1965,^ modifying and 
supplementing the convention of October 2H, 
1948 for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income, as amended by supplementary 
conventions of September 9, 1952, and August 
22 1957,'' shall continue in effect with respect to 
income of calendar years or taxable years be- 
ginning (or, in the case of taxes payable at the 
source, payments made) prior to January 1, 

1971. , ^, . , 

The 1965 protocol, which was brought into 
force on August 29, 1966, by the exchange of 
instruments of ratification, provides m para- 
graph (5) of article II: 

" (5) This protocol shall remain in effect with 
respect to income of calendar years or taxable 
years beginning (or in the case of taxes payable 
at the source, payments made) prior to January 
1, 1968, or such subsequent date, not later than 
January 1, 1971, which may be agreed to by the 
Contracting States through an exchange of 
diplomatic notes." 

Current Actions 

(TIAS 4044). Adopted at Paris September 28, 1965. 
Enters into force November 3, 1068. 
Ratified by the President: January 8, 19b8. 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations (59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at New \ork De- 
cember 20, 1965.' ^ , io 
Ratifications deposited: Luxembourg, December lA 
1967 ; Syria, December 8, 1967. 



Protocol of amendment to the agreement of January 
29, 1957, as amended (TIAS 4777, 6210 ) concerning 
radio broadcasting in the standard band. Signed at 
Mexico December 21, 1967. Enters into force on the 
date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 


Agreement amending the agreement of September 21, 
1967 (TIAS 6344), relating to trade m cotton tex- 
tiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
December 26, 1967. Entered into force December 20, 
1967. TIAS 6416. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re^ 
lating to the agreement of ^arch 13 1^7 (TIAS 
6271). Signed at Saigon January 6, 196s. Ji,nterea 
into force January 6, 1968. 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Korea of 
February 3, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3490, 4030. 
5957) , for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy. Signed at Vienna January 5, 1968. Entered 
into force January 5, 196s. 

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Korea, United States. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment to article 28 of the convention on the Inter- 
governmental Jlaritime Consultative Organization 


Final Volume in Foreign Relations 
Series for 1944 Released 

The Department of State on January 16 released 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic 
Papers, 19U, Volume VII, The American RcptibUcs (x, 

'This volume covers the relations of the United States 
with all the Latin American Republics and documents 
a wide variety of policies and i.-sues, particularly the 
problems resulting from the approaching end of the 
war In addition to compilations on hemisphere defense 
and economic cooperation, the volume includes papers 
relating to lend-lease programs, control of financial 
transactions with the Axis, and questions of recogni- 
tion, strategic materials, highway projects, and public 

health. , -.^ ^ ^i- „ 

Copies of this volume (Department of State publica- 
tion 8333) may be obtained from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402, for $5.50 each. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 0073. 
"TIAS 2833, 4280. 

' Not in force. 



INDEX February 5, 1968 Vol. LVIII, No. H93 

Africa. The State of the Union (cxicrpts from 
President Johnson's address) 161 


The State of the Union (excerpts from President 

Johnson's address) 161 

Viet-Nam and the Future of East Asia (Bundy) . 175 

Barbados. Letters of Credence (Vaughan) . . 167 

Belgium. U.S. and Belgivmi Extend Income Tax 

Protocol 18S 

Congress. The State of the Union (excerpts from 
President Johnson's address) 161 

Disarmament. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Submit Com- 
plfto Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nu- 
clear Weapons to Geneva Disarmament Confer- 
ence (Johnson, Fisher, text of draft treaty) . 161 

Economic Affairs 

The Challenges of Our Changing Atlantic Part- 
nership (Katzenbach) 16S 

The State of the Union ( excerpts from President 
Johnson's address) 161 

U.S. and Belgium Extend Income Tax Protocol . 188 

United States and Japan Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Arrangement 187 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. National Re- 
view Board Appointed for East- West Center . 179 

Europe. The Challenges of Our Changing Atlan- 
tic Partnership (Katzenbach) 168 

Gabon. Letters of Credence (Badinga) .... 167 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Submit Complete Draft 
Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weap- 
ons to Geneva Disarmament Conference (John- 
son, Fisher, text of draft treaty ) 164 

Israel. U.S. and Israel Reaffirm Dedication to 
Peace in the Middle East (Johnson, Eshkol, 
joint statement) 172 

Japan. United States and Japan Sign New Cotton 
Textile Arrangement 187 

Maldive Islands. Letters of Credence (Sattar) . 167 

Near East 

The State of the Union (excerpts from President 
Johnson's address) 161 

U.S. and Israel Keafflrm Dedication to Peace in 
the Middle East (Johnson, Eshkol, joint state- 
ment) 172 

Presidential Documents 

The State of the Union (excerpts) 161 

U.S. and Israel Reaffirm Dedication to Peace in 

the Middle East 172 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Submit Complete Draft Treaty 
on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to 
Geneva Disarmament Conference 164 

Publications. Final Volume in Foreign Relations 
Series for 1944 Released 188 

Sierra Leone. Letters of Credence (Hyde) . . 167 

Thailand. Letters of Credence (Atthakor) . . 167 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 188 

U.S. and Belgium Extend Income Tax Protocol . 188 
United States and Japan Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Arrangement 187 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Submit Complete Draft Treaty 
on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to 
Geneva Disarmament Conference (Johnson, 
Fisher, text of draft treaty) 164 

U.S.S.R. The State of the Union (excerpts from 
President Johnson's address) 161 

United Nations. The Work of the United Nations 
During the 22d General Assembly (Goldberg, 
summary) 180 


The State of the Union (excerpts from President 

Johnson's address) 161 

Viet-Nam and the Future of Bast Asia 

(Bundy) 175 

Name Index 

Atthakor, Bunchana 167 

Badinga, Leonard .\ntoine 167 

Bundy, William P 175 

Eshkol, Levi 172 

Fi.sher, Adrian S 164 

Goldberg, Arthur J igo 

Hyde, Adesanya K 167 

Johnson, President 161, 164, 172 

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB I68 

Sattar, Abdul 167 

Vaughan, Hilton Augustus 167 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 15 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 302 
of December 26 and 6 and 7 of January 13. 

No. Date Subject 

t8 1/15 U.S.-Indonesia air transport agree- 
9 1/16 Bundy : "Viet-Nam and the Future 
of East Asia." 
*10 1/17 Linowitz : Roosevelt University, 

Chicago, 111. (excerpts) 
til 1/19 Dedication of bridge on Rama Road, 
12 1/19 National Review Board for East- 
West Center. 
tl3 1/19 Katzenbach: Oklahoma Press As- 
sociation, Oklahoma City. 
*14 1/19 "Book of Friendship" presented to 
Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 











hy Under Secretarvj Katzenbach 201 


by Herman Pollack 211 


Address by President Johnson and Other U.S. Government Statements 189 

Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg in the U.N. Security Council 193 

Text of Special Report of the U.N. Command in Korea 199 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVIII, No. 1494 
February 12, 1968 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


B2 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15 
Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of tliis publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Eeadere' Quide to Periodical Literature. 

r/ie Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

The Crisis in Korea 

Following is an address to the Nation l>y Pres- 
ident Johnson on January 36, together with 
other U.S. Government statements made Janu- 
ary 2o-£6 on the Korean crisis. 


White House press release dated January 26 

My fellow Americans: Over the past 15 
months the North Koreans have pursued a 
stepped-up campaign of violence agamst South 
Korean and the American troops in the area 
of the demilitarized zone. 

Armed raider teams in very large numbers 
have been sent into South Korea to engage in 
sabotage and assassination. 

On January- 19, a 31-man team of North Ko- 
rean raiders invaded Seoul with the object of 
murdering the President of the Republic of 

In many of these aggressive actions Korean 
and American soldiers have been killed and 
wounded. The North Koreans are apparently 
attempting to intimidate the South Koreans 
and are tiding to interrupt the growing spirit 
of confidence and progress in the Republic of 

These attacks may also be an attempt by the 
Communists to divert South Korean and United 
States military resources which together are 
now successfully resisting aggression in Viet- 

This week the North Koreans committed yet 
another wanton and aggressive act by seizing 
an ^Ajnerican ship and its crew in international 
waters. Clearly, this cannot be accepted. 

We are doing two things : First, we are very 
shortly today taking the question before the 
Security Council of the United Nations.^ The 
best result would be for the whole world com- 
munity to persuade North Korea to return our 
ship and our men and to stop the dangerous 
course of aggression against South Korea. 

We have been making other diplomatic efforts 

' See p. 193. 

as well. We shall continue to use every means 
available to find a prompt and a peaceful solu- 
tion to the problem. 

Second, we liave taken and we are taking 
certain precautionary measures to make sure 
that our military forces are prepared for any 
contingency that might arise in this area. 

These actions do not involve in any way a 
reduction of our forces in Viet-Nam. 

I hope that the North Koreans will recognize 
the gravity of the situation which they have 
created. I am confident that the American peo- 
ple will exhibit in this crisis — as they have in 
other crises — determination and unity. 

Thank you very much. 

Defense Department Statement, January 23 

Department of Defense press release dated January 23 

The U.S.S. Pueblo, a Navy intelligence col- 
lection auxiliary ship, was surromided by North 
Korean patrol boats and boarded by an armed 
party in international waters in the Sea of Ja- 
pan shortly before midnight e.s.t. last night 
[January 22] . 

The United States Government acted imme- 
diately to establish contact with North Korea 
through the Soviet Union. 

When the Puehlo was boarded, its reported 
position was approximately 25 miles from the 
mainland of North Korea. 

The sliip reported the boarding took place 
at 127 degrees, 54.3 minutes east longitude; 39 
degrees, 25 minutes north latitude. The time 
was 11 :45 p.m. e.s.t. 

The ship's complement consists of 83, includ- 
ing six officers and 75 enlisted men and two 

At approximately 10 p.m. e.s.t., a North Ko- 
rean patrol boat aj)proached the Pueblo. Using 
international signals, it requested the Pueblo's 
nationality. The Pueblo identified herself as a 
U.S. ship. Continuing to use flag signals, the 
patrol boat said : "Heave to or I will open fire 
on you." The Pueblo replied : "I am in intema- 

PEBEUART 12, 1068 


tional waters." The patrol boat circled the 

Approximately 1 hour later, three additional 
patrol craft appeared. One of them ordered: 
"Follow in my wake; I have a pilot aboard." 
The four ships closed in on the Pueblo, taking 
different positions on her bow, beam, and quar- 
ter. Two MIG aircraft were also sighted by 
the Pueblo circling off the starboard bow. 

One of the patrol craft began backing to- 
ward the bow of the Pueblo, with fenders 
rigged. An armed boarding party was stand- 
ing on the bow. 

The Pueblo radioed at 11:45 p.m. that she 
was being boarded by North Koreans. 

At 12:10 a.m. e.s.t. today [January 23] the 
Pvsblo reported that she had been requested to 
follow the North Korean ships into Wonsan 
and that she had not used any weapons. 

The final message from the Pueblo was sent 
at 12 :32 a.m. It reported that it had come to "all 
stop" and that it was "going off the air." 

The Pueblo is designated the AGER-2. It is 
a modified auxiliary light cargo ship (AKL). 

The Pueblo is 179 feet long and 33 feet wide, 
with a displacement of 906 tons. It has a 10.2- 
foot draft. Its maximum speed is 12.2 knots.^ 

Statement by the Department of State 
Spokesman, January 23 

You've all seen or had the statement by the 
Department of Defense this morning about the 
boarding in international waters of a U.S. naval 
vessel by North Koreans. I'm authorized to state 
that the United States Government views this 
action by North Korea with utmost gravity. We 
have asked the Soviet Union to convey to the 
North Koreans our urgent request for the im- 
mediate release of the vessel and crew. 

The matter will also be raised directly with 
the North Koreans in a meeting of the Military 
Armistice Commission. We will, of course, use 
any other channels which might be helpful. 

I wish to reemphasize the seriousness with 
which we view this flagrant North Korean ac- 
tion against the United States naval vessel on 
the high seas. 

' Later on Jan. 23, the Department of Defense issued 
the following statement to the press : 

Press reports which imply that the captain of the 
Pueblo made a number of calls for help are wrong. 

The facts are that the only time the Pueblo requested 
assistance was when she was actually boarded. There 
were no earlier requests for assistance of any kind. 

Time and distance factors made it impossiijle to re- 
spond to the call that was made when the ship was be- 
ing boarded. 

Statement by the Department of State 
Spokesman, January 24 

At the meeting of the Military Armistice 
Commission in Panmimjom, the reaction of the 
North Korean side was cynical, denunciatory 
of the United States, and a distortion of the 
facts in the case. 

Secretary Rusk's News Briefing January 24 ^ 

This is my first meeting with the committee 
since the new session convened. We roamed 
rather widely over international affairs. We dis- 
cussed the recent Korean ship incident and, of 
course, the B-52 accident in Greenland, dis- 
armament questions, Viet-Nam, Middle East. 
We ranged rather widely over the entire spec- 
trum. I may be back again before too long to 
continue the discussion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have asked the North 
Koreans to give the Pueblo back. They have said 
"yVo." Where do we go from here? 

A. Well, most of the questions I get from you 
fellows have to do with the future. Let's wait 
and see. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we did yesterday irmke an 
approach to the Russians — 

A. Yes. 

Q. — to secure their assistance. Can you tell 
vs anything at all about the nature of their 

A. No, not at this point. 

Q. Is the United States determined to get the 
Pueblo back — 

A. Yes. 

Q. — by whatever means it taJees. 

A. Yes indeed. This is a very grave and seri- 
ous matter. The seizure of a U.S. naval ship in 
international waters is one of the most serious 
kinds of action that can be taken, and I can 
assure that there is no light view of that here in 
the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have shown measured 
restraint so far. Could you explain the reason 
behind this restraint and continue along that 

' Held after appearing before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. 



A. No, I don't want to pliilosopliizo about it. 
"\'\'Tien wo heaifl what had liappened, we im- 
mediately got in touch with the — almost literally 
in a matter of minutes getting off messages to 
be in touch with North Korea to get this ship 
back and get tlie men back. Now, that has not 
yet occurred; so we will have to see where we 
go from here. 

Q. You are not ruling out military force, are 

A. I am not discussing the future in any way, 
shape, or form at this point. 

Q. Could you discuss the role of the Enter- 
prise, presently off North Korea? 

A. No. It is there in the Sea of Japan, and it 
will be there imtil it is ordered to move. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is about an hour, ac- 
cording to the accounts, when tlie ship was going 
back. Why was there no attempt to stop the 
Koreans from bringing the boat into port? 

A. I have no answer on that. We need to dis- 
cuss questions of that sort with tlie skipper — the 
skipper is not available to us — to see what actu- 
ally happened during that period and what his 
judgments and assessments were. 

Q. Why were there no American planes? 
There are air-bases in that area. 

A. I gather this has to do with what tlie 
skipper thought the situation was and what he 
might have asked for and what his assessment of 
the situation was. You see, there are acts of 
harassment that go on all the time — in the Med- 
iterranean, in the Black Sea, in the Sea of 
Japan. We just don't know how the skipper saw 
tliis when the first motor torpedo boat came 
alongside and accosted him in the way that they 

Q. Have we 
hack for us? 

the Russians to get this ship 

A. Well, we would like to see the Russians 
give us some help in this matter and get this 
ship out of there, but we can't anticipate yet 
what the result might be. 

Q. Do we see any conn£ction, sir, between 
these events in Korea and our commitment in 
Viet-Nam — our extension there? 

A. I don't see any organic connection. It is 
possible that the North Koreans, with their in- 
creased infiltration of agents across the 38th 

parallel, think they might create some pressures 
or create some problems in that respect, but it 
won't have the slightest effect in that matter. 

Q. Do you see it as part of activity in Laos, 
North Viet-Nam, and so on, as kind of orches- 
tration of pressure on us? 

A. I wouldn't comiect Korea with Laos and 
South Viet-Nam at the present time. I do think 
that Laos and South Viet-Nam fit together. 
North Vietnamese forces are in both places, 
where tliey have no right to be. In Laos they 
are there directly contrary to the specific re- 
quirements of the Laos accords of 1962. We 
would like to see those accords carried out by 
everybody, which would mean that North Viet- 
namese forces would leave Laos. But I think this 
is orchestrated as a matter of North Vietnam- 
ese pressure on its neighbors. They not only 
have many regiments in South Viet-Nam ; they 
have regiments in Laos, and they are helping to 
organize agents and guerrillas over in Thai- 
land ; so there is no question about some orches- 
tration there. And those who think that Ho Chi 
Minh is just a nationalist ought to ponder on 
why, then, he is tinkermg with Laos and Thai- 
land, because those people are not Vietnamese. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us any prog- 
ress report on the exploration into the negotia- 
tion overtures by North Viet-Nam? 

A. No, not at this point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator [Richard 5.] 
Russell said yesterday that this teas a breach of 
international law, amounting to an act of war. 
Do you see if in the same way? 

A. Well, it is certainly a major breach of in- 
ternational law and lends itself to that interpre- 
tation. Of course the seizure of an official naval 
vessel of another coimtry in international 
waters and taken into your port is a very harsh 
act, and I would not object to designating it as 
an act of war in terms of the category of acts 
wliich could so be construed. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a series 
of actions and statements from North Korea 
recently, of which this is only th-e latest — guer- 
rilla raids, talk of another war. Has the danger 
increased of a new outbreak of fighting there? 

A. That is up in part to North Korea. My 
strong advice to North Korea is to cool it, that 
there have been enough of these incidents, and 
they have been coming out of North Korea. 

FEBRTJART 12, 1968 


This incident in Seoul the other day was very 
serious. The pretense by North Korea that some- 
how these are merely South Koreans who are 
objecting to their government is nonsense. We 
know where these people come from and how 
they come; so I think North Korea would be 
well advised to pull back here and start living 
at peace with South Korea and stopping this 
kind of activity. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, h there any plan to take 
this matter to the United Nations or— 

A I wouldn't want to discuss the future or 
next steps or what might be done following 
the representations we have made thus tar. 
Thank you, gentlemen; I have to go. 

White House Statement, January 25* 

The President has directed Secretary of De- 
fense McNamara to recall to active duty certain 
air squadrons and support units of the Air 
Force and the Navy.= The Air Force Reserve, 
Air National Guard, and Naval Eeserve planes 
involved will total 372 fighter and transport 

The reservists are being recalled immediately 
under congi-essional authority provided in the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 
1967. This act provides that : 

Until June 30, 1968, the President may, when he 
deems it necessary, order to active duty any unit of 
the Ready Reserve of an armed force for a period 
of not to exceed 24 months. 

Wlien and if decisions are made on the callup 
of Army or Marine Corps reservists, appro- 
priate announcements will be made promptly. 

White House Statement, January 25* 

The President this afternoon, after intensive 
consultations with his senior advisers, in- 
structed Ambassador Goldberg [U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations Arthur J. 
Goldberg] to request an urgent meeting of the 
Security Comicil of the United Nations to con- 
sider the grave situation which has arisen in 
Korea by reason of North Korean aggressive 
actions against the Republic of Korea and the 
illegal and wanton seizure of a United States 
vessel and crew in international waters. 

' Read to news correspondents by George Chrietian, 
Press Secretary to the President. 

' For text of Executive Order 11392, see 33 Fed. Reg. 

This action by the President reflects his 
earnest desire to settle this matter promptly 
and, if at all possible, by diplomatic means. 

Ambassador Goldberg will be leaving with- 
in the hour to present an appropriate letter 
requesting such a meetmg to the President of 
the Security Council. 

Ambassador Goldberg has already advised 
by telephone the President of the Security 
Council and the Secretary-General of this pro- j 
posed action by the United States. | 

Excerpt From an Address by Secretary Rusk, 
Cathedral Club, Brooklyn, N.Y., January 25 j 

I know you would be concerned tonight to i 
hear me say something new about the present 
moment in Korea. We've said a good deal m 
the course of today, and I recall in Ecclesiastes 
3 it is said that "To everything there is a sea- 
son ... a time to keep silence, and a time to 
speak." Today we have taken precautionary 
measures with respect to our Armed Forces, 
and the President has instructed Ambassador 
Goldberg to present this matter before the 
Security Council of the United Nations tomor- 
row, and there will be a full exposition there 
of the issues involved. 

I can say very simply tonight, without gomg 
into detail, that the seizure of a U.S. naval 
vessel in international waters is without prece- 
dent and is intolerable. And there can be no 
satisfactory result, short of the prompt, may I 
say, immediate release of that ship and its offi- 
cers and crew. 

This incident reminds us that when the great 
issues are at stake, it is important that we think 
just as clearly as possible, without illusions, 
without false hope. . . . 

Statement by the Department of State 
Spokesman, January 26 

Assistant Secretary [for International Or- 
ganization Affairs Joseph J.] Sisco and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Samuel D.] Berger met this morning 
with other members of the Group of 16— that 
is, those governments which provided forces 
imder the U.N. Command during the Korean 
war. The group was briefed fully on current 
diplomatic and other steps being taken by the 
United States to secure the prompt release of 
the PueUo and its crew, including our referral 



of the matter to the United Nations Security 

During the briefing, attention was focused 
on repeated North Korean vioUxtions of the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. 

Representatives of the following countries 
were present : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Co- 
lombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United 

Mr. Sisco also met in a separate session with 
the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, and 
that included a full exchange of information 
on the current situation. 

We have taken note of a North Korean broad- 
cast of an editorial in a North Korean 

Now, the purport of this editorial is to de- 
clare the crew of the Pueblo as criminals. Here 
is a direct quote : 

The criminals who have violated the sovereignty of 
another country and perpetrated a provocative act 
must receive due punishment. These criminals must 
be dealt with by law. 

Now, in our view, this statement is a flagrant 
travesty of the facts. It is the action of North 
Korea which is and has been illegal from the 

I am authorized to say that the United States 
Government would consider any such move by 
North Korea to be a deliberate aggravation of 
an already serious situation. 

The United States Government has asked the 
International Committee of the Ked Cross to 
intercede on behalf of the personnel of the 
Pvshlo. We asked the ICRC to inquire about 
the welfare and physical condition of the men, 
to request their early release, and to offer ICRC 
assistance in arrangements for their release. We 
most urgently asked the ICRC to attempt to 
arrange the repatriation of seriously injured 

U.N. Security Council Begins Debate on Korea 

Following is the text of a letter from Arthur 
J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, to Agha Shahi, President of the V.N. 
Security Council, together with statements 
iruule hy Ambassador Goldberg in the Council 
on January 26 and 27. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 6 

January 25, 1968 

Dear Mr. President: I request an urgent 
meeting of the Security Coimcil to consider the 
grave threat to peace which has been brought 
about by a series of increasingly dangerous and 
aggressive military actions by North Korean 
authorities in violation of the Armistice Agree- 
ment and of international law and of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

The armistice regime established by the Ar- 
mistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 has been re- 
peatedly \nolated by North Korean authorities. 
These violations have become increasingly se- 
rious during the past year and a half, during 

which armed personnel on many occasions have 
been dispatched from North Korea across the 
demilitarized zone into the Republic of Korea 
on missions of terrorism and political assassi- 
nation. A particularly grave incident occurred 
this month, when a band of armed terrorists 
was dispatched into the Republic of Korea on 
a mission whose apparent goal was the assassi- 
nation of President Park. 

More recently. North Korea has wilfully com- 
mitted an act of wanton lawlessness against a 
naval vessel of the United States operating on 
the high seas. On January 23, the USS Pueblo, 
while operating in international waters, was 
illegally seized by armed North Korean vessels, 
and the ship and crew are still under forcible 
detention by North Korean authorities. 

This North Korean action against a United 
States naval vessel on the high seas, and the 
serious North Korean armed raids across the 
demilitarized zone into the Republic of Korea, 
have created a situation of such gravity and 
danger as to require the urgent consideration of 
the Security Council which we are accordingly 

FEBRUARY 12. 1968 



U.S. /U.N. press release 7 

The United States has requested this meeting, 
as I stated in my letter to you, to consider the 
grave tlireat to peace which the authorities of 
North Korea have brought about by tlieir in- 
creasingly dangerous and aggressive military 
actions in violation of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement of 1953, of the United Nations Char- 
ter, and of international law. 

We have asked that the Council be convened 
at an hour when peace is in serious and immi- 
nent danger — when firm and forthwith action is 
required to avert that danger and preserve 

A virtually unarmed vessel of the United 
States Navy, sailing on the high seas, has been 
wantonly and lawlessly seized by armed North 
Korean patrol boats and her crew forcibly de- 
tained. This warlike action carries a danger to 
peace which should be obvious to all. 

A party of armed raiders, infiltrated from 
North Korea, has been intercepted in the act of 
invading the South Korean Capital City of 
Seoul with the admitted assignment of assassi- 
nating the President of the Kepublic of Korea. 
This event marks the climax of a campaign by 
the North Korean authorities, over the past 18 
months, of steadily growing infiltration, sabo- 
tage, and terrorism in flagrant violation of the 
Korean Armistice Agreement. 

Mr. President, these two lines of action are 
manifestly parallel. Both stem from North Ko- 
rea. Both are completely imwarranted and un- 
justified. Both are aimed against peace and 
security in Korea. Both violate the United Na- 
tions Charter, solemn international agreements, 
and time-honored international law. And both 
pose a grave threat to peace in a country whose 
long search for peace and remiification in free- 
dom has been an historic concern to the United 
Nations and my country. 

We bring these grave developments to the 
attention of the Security Council in the sincere 
hope that the Council will act promptly to re- 
move the danger to international peace and se- 
curity. For, Mr. President, it must be removed, 
and without delay. And it will be removed only 
if action is taken forthwith to secure the release 
of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its 83-mun crew and to 
bring to an end the pattern of armed transgres- 
sions by North Korea against the Repul)lic of 
Korea. My Government has stated at the highest 

level our earnest desire to settle this matter 
promptly and peacefully and, if at all possible, 
by dijjlomatic means. 

It is testimony to this desire that, in fidelity to 
the charter, my Government has brought this 
matter to the Security Council, which has the 
primary responsibility for the mamtenance of 
international peace and security and which, to- 
gether with other organs of the United Nations, 
has a special and historic concern for peace and 
security in Korea. 

It is imperative, therefore, that the Security 
Council act with the greatest urgency and de- 
cisiveness. The existing situation cannot be al- 
lowed to stand. It must be corrected, and the 
Council must face up to its responsibility to 
see it corrected. This course is far more prefer- 
able to other remedies which tlie charter re- 
serves to member states. 

Let me now turn to the facts concerning 
these two aspects of North Korean aggressive 
conduct on which the Council's action is ur- 
gently required. 

Seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo 

At 12 noon on January 23, Korean time, the 
United States ship Puehlo, manned by a crew of 
six officers, 75 enlisted men, and two civilians, 
and sailing in international waters off the North 
Korean coast, was confronted by a heavily 
armed North Korean patrol boat identified as 
submarine chaser No. 35. 

The strict instructions tmder which the 
Pueblo was operating required it to stay at 
least 13 nautical miles from the North Korean 
coast. Wliile my country adheres to the 3-mile 
rule of international law concerning territorial 
waters, nevertheless the ship was mider orders 
whose efl'ect was to stay well clear of the 12-mile 
limit which the North Korean authorities have 
by long practice followed. 

The U.S.S. Puchlo reported this encounter 
and its location at the time in the following 
words — and I wish to quote exactly what was 
reported by radio at the time of the encounter — 
"U.S.S. Pueblo encountered one SO-1 class 
North Korean patrol craft at 0300Z"— that is, 
at 12 noon Korean time— and then — I am re- 
peating its broadcast — "Position 39-25.2 NL 
127-55.0 EL DIW." I might explain that DIW 
means "Dead in Water," the standard terminol- 
ogy meaning that all engines are stopped and 
the vessel is stationary. 



Now, with your permission, Mr. President, I 
should like to refer to this map ^ provided for 
the convenience of the Coimcil and show the 
exact location of the Pnehlo as given in these 
coordinates. If the members of the Council will 
look at the map, you will see a number 3 blue. 
Number 3 blue is approximately 25 nautical 
miles from the port of Wonsan. It is 16.3 nauti- 
cal miles from the nearest point of the North 
Korean mainland, on the Peninsula of Hodo- 
Pando, and 15.3 nautical miles from the Island 
of Ung-Do. 

Now, at exactly the same time, the North Ko- 
rean submarine chaser No. 35, which intercepted 
the Pueblo, reported its own location in the 
number 3 red — and this is a report now from 
the North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 
monitored by us — and that location was 39 de- 
grees 25 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 
56 minutes east longitude. You will note the po- 
sitions. In other words, these two reported posi- 
tions are within a mile of one another and show 
conclusively that according to the North Ko- 
rean report, as well as our own, the Pueblo was 
in international waters. 

The report of its location by the North Ko- 
rean craft, made by international Morse code, 
was followed 10 minutes later by the following 
oral message from the North Korean craft to its 
base, and I quote it : "We have approached the 
target here, the name of the target is GER 

Now, we talk about the Pueblo, and that is the 
name by which the ship is, of course, known. 
But the technical name for this ship is GER-2, 
and this name was painted on the side of the 

The message continued, and I again quote 
the Korean radio message in Korean words: 
"Get it? GER 1-2 : did you get it? So our con- 
trol target is GER 1-2. 1 will send it again. Our 
control target is GER 1-2." 

Inasmuch as the location of the Pueblo is, of 
course, a matter of vital importance, it is im- 
portant to the Council to know that the in- 
formation available to the United States as re- 
ported by our vessel to our authorities and to 
the North Korean authorities as reported by its 
vessel and transmitted by its own ship was 
virtually identical, with only this small margin 
of difference. And interestingly enough, the 
North Korean ship reported the Pueblo to be 

' Not printed here. 

about a mile farther away from the shoreline 
than the United States fix of its position. That 
distance between the blue and the red is about 
a mile. So you see, the North Korean broadcast 
monitored was reporting what I have stated to 
this Council. 

Mr. President, we have numerous other re- 
ports during this encounter consistent with the 
location I have described. And information 
other than coordinates corroborative of what I 
have said is by voice monitor; information on 
coordinates, as I said, was by international 
Morse code. 

The North Korean patrol boat, having made 
its approach, used international flag signals to 
request the Pueblo^s nationality. The Pueblo, 
replying with the same signal system, identified 
herself as a United States vessel. The North 
Korean vessel then signaled : "Heave to or I wiU 
open fire on you." The Pueblo replied : "I am in 
international waters." 

The reply was not challenged by the North 
Korean vessel, which, under international law, 
if there had been an intrusion — which there was 
not — should have escorted the vessel from the 
area in which it was. However, that vessel then 
proceeded for approximately an hour to circle 
the Pueblo, which maintained its course and 
kejjt its distance from the shore. At that point 
three additional North Korean armed vessels 
appeared, one of which ordered the Pusblo: 
"Follow in my wake." As this order was issued, 
the four North Korean vessels closed in on the 
Pueblo and surrounded it. At the same time two 
MIG aircraft appeared overhead and circled 
the Pueblo. The Pueblo attempted peacefully to 
withdraw from this encirclement but was 
forcibly prevented from doing so and brought 
to a dead stop. It was then seized by an armed 
boarding party and forced into the North 
Korean port of Wonsan. 

Now, reports from the North Korean naval 
vessels on their location and on their seizure of 
the Pueblo at this point show that the Pueblo 
was constantly in international waters. 

At 1 :50 p.m. Korean time, within a few 
minutes of the reported boarding of the Pueblo, 
North Korean vessels reported their position at 
39-26 NL 128-02 EL, or about 21.3 miles from 
the nearest North Korean land. This is the point 
on tlie map here. And we would be very glad, 
Mr. President, to make this map available for 
the records of the Security Council. 

Now, Mr. President, I want to lay to rest — 

FEBRUARY 12, 1968 


completely to rest — some intimations that the 
Pueblo had intruded upon the territorial waters 
and was sailing away from territorial waters 
and that the North Korean ships were in hot 
pursuit. This is not the case at all, and I shall 
demonstrate it by this map. 

Now, we will show by times and the course 
of the vessel exactly what occurred, and you 
will see from this that the location of the Pueblo 
was constantly far away from Korean shores, 
always away from the 12-mile limit until it was 
taken into Wonsan by the North Korean vessels. 
The locations of the Pueblo are shown on the 
blue line, and the location of the SO-1 35, the 
first North Korean vessel, on the red line. 

Now, the Pueblo, far from having sailed from 
inside territorial waters to outside territorial 
waters, was cruising in an area — in this area — 
and this will be demonstrated by the time 
sequence — and when I say, "this area," I mean 
the area that is east and south of any approach 
to the 12-mile limit. 

At 0830 Korean local time, the Pueblo was 
at the location I now point to on the map. It 
had come to that point from the southeast, not 
from anywhere in this vicinity. And that is 
point 1 on the map, so that our recoi'd will be 
complete. Point 2 on the map shows the posi- 
tion of the North Korean submarine chaser No. 
35 as reported by her at 10 :55, and you will see 
that she is close to — the North Korean vessel, 
not the Pueblo — the 12-mile limit. 

Point No. 3 is the position reported by the 
Pueblo at 12 o'clock noon, and you will see that 
she is a considerable distance from the 12-mile 
limit, which is the dotted line. 

Red point No. 3 is the position reported by the 
North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 at 12 
o'clock noon when it signaled the Pueblo to 
stop. In other words, this is the position of the 
North Korean vessel, this is the position of the 
Pueblo ; and the position of the North Korean 
vessel that I point to, the red line, the position 
reported audibly by the North Korean vessel. 
There is very little difference in these two 

Point No. 4 is the position reported by the 
North Korean vessel at 1350 — 1 :50 p.m.— when 
she reported boarding the Pueblo. And you will 
recall that I just told the Council that the 
Pueblo, seeking to escape the encirclement, did 
not move in the direction which would laave 
transgressed the 12-mile limit. 

Now, all of this is verified not by reports 
solely from the Pueblo ; all of this is verified by 

reports from the North Korean vessels which 
were monitored; and I think it is a very clear 
picture of exactly what transpired. 

Here, too, Mr. President, with your permis- 
sion, we will make this available. 

Mr. President, it is incontrovertible from tliis 
type of evidence, which is physical evidence of 
international Morse code signals and voice re- 
ports, that the Pueblo when first approached 
and when seized was in international watei"S 
well beyond the 12-mile limit and that the North 
Koreans knew this. 

Offense Against International Law 

Further compounding this ofl'ense against in- 
ternational law, and the gravity of this warlike 
act, is the fact that the North Koreans clearly 
intended to capture the Pueblo, Imowing that it 
was in international waters, and force it to sail 
into the port of Wonsan. This aim is made clear 
by messages exchanged among the North Ko- 
rean vessels themselves wliich we monitored, 
including the following : "By talking this way, 
it will be enough to understand according to 
present instructions we will close down the 
radio, tie up the personnel, tow it, and enter 
port at Wonsan. At present we are on our way to 
boarding. We are coming in." This is an exact 
voice broadcast from the ship which acknowl- 
edges the instructions that it was following. 

Now, Mr. President, m light of this, this was 
no mere incident, no case of mistaken identity, 
no case of mistaken location. It was nothing less 
than a deliberate, premeditated armed attack 
on a United States naval vessel on the high seas, 
an attack whose gravity is underlined by these 
simple facts which I should now like to sum up. 

The location of the Pueblo in international 
waters was fully known to the North Korean 
authorities since the broadcasts were not only 
between its own ships but were directed to its 
shore installations. 

The Pueblo was so lightly armed that the 
North Koreans in one of the conversations which 
we have monitored even reported it as unarmed. 

The Pueblo was therefore in no position to 
engage in a hostile, warlike act toward the 
territory or vessels of Nortli Korea; and the 
North Koreans knew this. 

Nevertheless, the Pueblo, clearly on the high 
seas, was forcilily stopped, boarded, and seized 
by North Korean armed vessels. This is a know- 
ing and willful aggressive act — part of a 
deliberate series of actions in contravention of 



international law and of solenm international 
arrangements designed to keep peace in the area, 
which apply not only to land forces but to naval 
forces as well. It is an action which no member 
of the United Nations could tolerate. 

I might add, in light of the comments of the 
distinguished Soviet representative on the 
adoption of the agenda, that Soviet ships en- 
gage in exactly the same activities as the Ptveblo 
and sail much closer to the shores of other states. 
And one such Soviet ship right now is to be 
found in the Sea of Japan and currently is not 
far from South Korean shores. 

Terrorist Campaign Against South Korea 

I turn now to the other grave categoi-y of 
aggressive actions taken by the North Korean 
authorities: their systematic campaign of in- 
filtration, sabotage, and terrorism across the 
armistice demarcation line, in gross violation 
of the armistice agreement — not only in the vi- 
cinity of the demilitarized zone but also in many 
cases deep in the territory of the Republic of 
Korea — culminating in the recent raid against 
the Capital City of Seoul, the Presidential 
Palace, and the person of the President of the 

The gravity of this campaign has already 
been made known to the Security Council. Last 
November 2 I conveyed to the Council a rei^ort 
from the United Nations Command in Korea," 
summing up the evidence of a drastic increase in 
violations by North Korea of the Korean Ar- 
mistice Agreement and subsequent agreements 
pertaining thereto. This report, Security Coun- 
cil Document S/8217, noted that the number of 
incidents involving armed infiltrators from 
North Korea had increased from 50 in 1966 to 
543 in the first 10 months of 1967 and that the 
number of soldiers and civilians killed by these 
infiltrators had increased from 39 in 1966 to 
144 in the same period of 1967. 

The further report of the United Nations 
Command for the whole year 1967, filed today ,^ 
shows a total of 566 incidents for 1967 and a 
total of 153 individuals killed by the North 
Korean infiltrators. The United Nations Com- 
mand in its report has further pointed out that, 
although North Korea had refused all requests 
by the United Nations Command for investiga- 
tion of these incidents by joint observer teams 

= For text, see Bot-leti?.- of Nov. 20. 1967, p. 692. 
' r.\. doc. S/8366 ; for text, see p. 199. 

pursuant to the armistice agreement, the evi- 
c^nce that the attacks had been mounted from 
North Korea is incontestable. Tliis evidence is 
subject to verification by these reports which are 
on file with the Security CouucU. 

The terrorist campaign, Mr. President, has 
now reached a new level of outrage. Last Sun- 
day, January 21, security forces of the Republic 
of Korea made contact with a group of some 30 
armed North Koreans near the Presidential 
Palace in Seoul. In a series of engagements both 
in Seoul and between Seoul and the demilita- 
rized zone, lasting through January 24, about 
half of this group were killed and two captured. 
It has now been ascertained that the infiltration 
team totaled 31 agents, all with the rank of 
lieutenant or higher, dispatched from the 124th 
North Korean Army Unit; that these agents 
had received 2 years' training, including 2 weeks 
of training for the jaresent mission, in special 
camps established in North Korea for this pur- 
pose; and that their assigned mission included 
the assassination of the President of the Repub- 
lic of Korea. 

I might add, Mr. President, that the North 
Korean authorities make no secret of the politi- 
cal strategy and motivation behind these at- 
tacks. Their daily propaganda vilifies the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea and denies 
its very right to exist. Yet, Mr. President, this 
same Government of the Republic of Korea is 
recognized by 77 governments, is a member of 
numerous specialized agencies of the United 
Nations, and enjoys observer status at the 
United Nations headquarters. 

Mr. President, it is obvious that this long 
series of attacks by North Korean infiltrators 
across the demilitarized zone — and by other 
groups of North Korean armed personnel 
which, traveling by sea, have penetrated into 
even the southern portions of South Korea — has 
steadily increased in its tempo and its scope 
until it threatens to undermine the whole struc- 
ture of the armistice regime under which peace 
has been preserved in a divided Korea for 14 

In the interest of international peace and se- 
curity, this deterioration cannot be allowed to 
continue. It must be reversed promptly. The 
armistice agreements must be restored to their 
full vigor, and the weight of the influence of 
the Security Council must be exerted to tliis 
vitally important end. 

ilr. President, these are the facts of the threat 
to peace created by North Korea's aggressive 

FEBRUARY 12, 1968 


actions on sea and land. With all earnestness I 
ask the Security Council to act firmly and 
swiftly to rectify this dangerous situation and 
eliminate this threat to peace. Despite the most 
serious provocation — a provocation which every 
nation would recognize as serious and danger- 
ous — my Government is exercising great re- 
straint in this matter. We seek to give the proc- 
esses of peaceful action all possible scope. We 
believe those processes can work swiftly and ef- 
fectively, if the international community — in- 
cluding the members of this Council, individu- 
ally and collectively — so wills it. 

But, Mr. President, these peaceful processes 
must work. The present situation is not accept- 
able, and it cannot be left to drift. This great 
and potent organization of peace must not let 
the cause of peace in Korea be lost by default to 
the highhanded tactics of a lawless regime. Such 
a course would be an invitation to catastrophe. 

Therefore, let tlie Security Council, with its 
great influence, promptly and effectively help 
to secure forthwith the safe return of the 
Puehlo and her crew and to restore to full 
vigor and effectiveness the Korean Armistice 

Fellow members of the Security Council, we 
have a clear and urgent responsibility imder 
the charter to help keep the peace. I trust the 
Council will discharge this responsibility. 


U.S./n.N. press release 11 

Now, Mr. President, the Hungarian represent- 
ative, our colleague. Ambassador [Karoly] 
Csatorday, has reverted to the information- 
gathering mission to which the U.S.S. Puehlo 
was assigned when it was illegally seized on 
the high seas in violation of all international 
law. He did so and said that there was some- 
thing illegal and heinous and improper about 
this type of activity. 

It is a very strange double standard that the 
distinguished representative of Hungary finds 
that the mission of the United States ship to be 
improper while he is entirely silent about the 
activities of the Soviet Union, which maintains 
exactly such ships in close proximity to the 
United States and many other countries of the 
world. Soviet information ships performing 

precisely the same functions are currently lo- 
cated at numerous places in the Pacific and At- 
lantic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea and 
near the shores of a number of countries. And 
the activities of the Soviet Union in the Sea of 
Japan are by no means novel. They are of long 
standing. For the last 8 years, Soviet intelli- 
gence-gathering ships have patrolled the seas 
and coastal areas of the Sea of Japan collecting 
electronic and other information from a wide 
variety of sources and places. 

Today, this very day, a Soviet vessel is op- 
erating in this area, as I indicated yesterday. 
And for the information of the Hungarian rep- 
resentative, the vessel is the T-48 class sub- 
marine ship Gidrolog. Ambassador Morozov 
[Platon D. Morozov, representative of the So- 
viet Union] will correct me if my pronunciation 
is wrong. Now, this ship is roughly the same size 
as the Pueblo. It is even larger than the standard 
Soviet trawler used for these purposes. It is an 
840-ton, 220-feet overall length, 30-foot beam, 
20-knot speed, diesel engine, twin-screw ship. 
It may be of interest to members of the Council 
to know that such ships of the Soviet Navy in 
the Sea of Japan frequently sail closer than 12 
miles to the shore of neighboring states in the 

Now, Lord Caradon [representative of the 
United Kingdom], I think, has helped us very 
much in this area by pointing up the fact that 
all members of the Council should support the 
strict enforcement of the armistice agreement. 
And it is precisely because the North Korean 
authorities are not respecting the armistice 
agreement but are violating the armistice agree- 
ment that a very grave threat to the peace has 

Now, part of the difficulty has been that the 
machinery set up by the Korean Armistice 
Agreement and related agreements, to which the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a 
party, includes joint observer teams to investi- 
gate complaints of violation of the armistice. 
Unfortunately, owing to the adamant refusal of 
the North Korean side, this observer team ma- 
chinery has been almost completely blocked 
from the beginning. And much can be said of the 
Military Armistice Commission which meets at 
Panmunjom. Specifically, and in line with their 
past performance, the North Korean side at 


DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIK nieetiiifrs continues to refuse to act in any 
way on complaints which are made to it, to 
agree to investigations by the joint observer 
teams — the best way to determine the accuracy 
of these complaints that are lodged before the 
Armistice Commission — or indeed to make any 
use of the Panmunjom meetings except for the 
most violent and intemperate propaganda 

It is our hope, our very sincere hope, that 
out of this current meeting of the Council will 
come a strong reafBrmation of what I am sure 
is the will of the membership of the United Na- 
tions manifested by General Assembly decisions 
throughout the years : that the armistice agree- 
ments be scnipulouslj' adhered to and that the 
machinery of the armistice agreement be uti- 
lized in order to preserve peace in the area. 

U.N. Command in Korea 
Submits Special Report 

D.S./U.N. press release 10 dated January 27 

FoUoxoing is tlm text of a letter to the Security 
Council from, Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations, transmitting 
the report of the United Nations Command in 
Korea on additional incidents which have oc- 
curred since tlie report of Novemher 2, 1967., 
on violations iy North Korea of the Military 
Armistice Agreement of 1953. 


Janttakt 26, 1968 

His Excellency 

Mr. Agiia Siiahi 

The President of the Security Council 

United Nations 

New York 

De.\r Me. President : I have the honor to con- 
vey, on behalf of the United States Government 
as the Unified Command, established by Se- 
curity Council Kesolution 84 — 7 July 1950 
(S/1588), the enclosed report from the United 
Nations Command regarding serious violations 
by North Korea of the Militarj- Armistice 
Agreement of July 27, 1953 which have oc- 

curred since the issuance of the last report of the 
United Nations Connnand on November 2, 1967 

I request that this report be circulated as an 
official document of the Security Council.^ 
Sincerely yours, 

Arthtte J. Goldberg 


Report of the United Nations CJommand to the 
United Nations 

The Governmeut of the United States, representing 
the United Nations Command in Korea, deems it neces- 
sary to submit this special report of the United Nations 
Command to call the attention of the Security Council 
to the recent grave and serious violations by North 
Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 
1953 and subsequent agreements. Far from having made 
any attempt to stop serious violations since the last 
United Nations Command report issued on November 2, 
1967, North Korea has continued to infiltrate armed 
agents into the Republic of Korea for the purpose of 
setting ambushes and performing raids in and near 
the demilitarized zone and engaging in subversive ac- 
tivities tliroughout the country. The most recent inci- 
dents, however, are of such magnitude as to create 
a grave threat to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 

Attempted Assassination of the President 
of the Republic of Korea 

On 18 January of this year the North Korean regime 
dispatched a specially trained team of 31 agents armed 
with submachine guns, grenades and through 
the demilitarized zone into the Republic of Korea with 
orders to attack the residence of the President of the 
Republic of Korea in Seoul and to assassinate President 
Chuug-Hee Park. This team of commando-trained as- 
sassins penetrated to the very outskirts of the city of 
Seoul before the warnings of local citizens and the 
actions of the national police thwarted their attempt 
on the President's life. The team had reached within 
800 meters of the President's residence when halted. 

During their progress south through the territory 
of the Republic of Korea, the North Korean agents held 
four civilians prisoner for five hours. During this time, 
the North Koreans interrogated the civilians and 
threatened their lives and their village, should they in- 
form the authorities of the presence of armed North 
Korean agents. Despite these threats, the four civilians 
promptly reported the encounter to the authorities of 
the Republic of Korea. 

Through interrogation of a captured agent it was 

"■ For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1967, p. 692. 
' U.N. doc. S/8366. 

FEBRUARY 12, 19G8 


learned that the members of this team had been espe- 
cially recruited from units of the North Korean army 
and trained for two years for missions of this type 
and for two weeks for this specific mission of assas- 
sination and terror. This single agent also had knowl- 
edge of 2.400 similar agents being trained in eight 
specialized camps throughout North Korea to deliber- 
ately attack the Republic of Korea. 

On January 22 a loudspeaker broadcast by the North 
Koreans in the DMZ boasted that "the North Korean 
combat unit advanced from Kwung-Bok to Sudae-Mun. 
The unit killed a Korean national policeman and the 
Chief of Police and destroyed four military trucks . . . 
The combat unit escaped from Park's clique and con- 
tinued their mission." However, by January 24th North 
Koreans had noticed their mistake and re-established 
their usual, improbable story that "the South Korean 
armed guerrillas attacked the desperately resisting 
enemies in Seoul." 

As a result of this initial attack, and other attacks 
by armed aggressors from North Korea, 18 military 
and civilian persons were killed and 39 wounded by 
North Korean infiltrators, as shown by the following 
table of incidents and casualties : 

Incidents and Casualties 

Jan. 1- 

0600. Jan. 26, 


Significant Incidents, 

DMZ Area 19 

Significant Incidents, 

Interior of ROK 22 

Exchanges of Fire, 

DMZ Area 8 

Exchanges of Fire, 

Interior of ROK 17 

Casualties, North Korean 

Killed Within ROK 21 

Casualties, North Korean 

Captured Within ROK 1 

UNC Military Casualties, 

Killed Within ROK 11 

UNC Military Casualties, 

Wounded Within ROK 35 

ROK National Police 

and Other Civilians 

Killed Within ROK 7 

Oct. 18, 1967- 
Dec. SI, 1967 


Jan. l~ 

0600, Jan. 


Oct. 18, 1SS7- 
Dec. m, 1967 

OK National Police 

and Other Civilians 

Wounded Within ROK 



The above figures, taken together with those con- 
tained in the last Report of the United Nations Com- 
mand issued November 2, 1967, show that in the entire 
year 1967 North Korea caused 566 significant incidents 
in which 153 individuals were kUled by North Korean 


The fact that this type of "porous war" has been 
planned and directed from the highest level of the 
North Korean regime has been illustrated on many 
occasions by constant reference to these aggressive 
policies by leaders of the regime. The most recent, and 
blatantly open statement of this intentional aggression 
was in the December 16, 1967 speech by the regime 
Premier, U-Sung Kim, who said "the northern half 
of the Republic is the revolutionary base for accom- 
plishing the cause of national liberation on a nation- 
wide scale" and who expects his people to "accomplish 
the revolutionary cause of unification of the country 
at all costs." 

When the United Nations Command, in an attempt to 
negotiate this serious problem as prescribed by the 
Military Armistice Agreement and to restore peace and 
security to the area, raised the issue at the 261st meet- 
ing of the Military Armistice Commission on January 
24, 1968, the Representative of the North Korean side 
refused to address the incident in a serious and respon- 
sible manner. Concrete evidence, including a filmed 
interview of the captured North Korean agent and 
large quantities of North Korean arms and munitions, 
was dismissed by the Representative of North Korea 
who claimed the attack on Seoul was perpetrated by 
South Korean citizens. In actual fact, the success of 
defensive measures taken by the Government of the 
Republic of Korea was in large part due to the whole- 
hearted cooperation and participation of private South 
Korean citizens. This report clearly shows that North 
Korea is carrying out a program in deliberate viola- 
tion of the Armistice Agreement. The North Koreans 
have continued to refuse to cooperate in using the 
machinery established by the Armistice Agreement for 
the purpose of supervising the Armistice Agreement, 
making efforts to effect redress through this machinery 
so far futile. 



Viet-Nam and the Independence of Southeast Asia 

hy Zander Secretary Katzenbach ^ 

It is a pleasure to be in Oklahoma, and it is 
always a pleasure to talk to gentlemen of the 

Wlien it comes to the press I share the lucid 
sentiment of Winston Churchill when he said : 
''I am always in favor of the free press but 
sometimes they say quite nasty things." 

I would like to address myself today to a 
controversy on both sides of which many loyal 
Americans — not just the press — are too often 
tempted to say "quite nasty things."' That 
controversy, of course, concerns Viet-Nam. 

One does not have to be an epidemiologist to 
be aware that there is now abroad in the land 
a virus more easily diagnosed than treated. Its 
nontechnical name is Southeast Asian flu. Its 
symptoms, while they vary somewhat with in- 
dividuals, normally include restricted vision, 
loss of balance, overactive vocal cords, disturb- 
ances of the sympathetic nervous system, and 
an inflated body temperature, that is to say, 
a loss of cool. 

The typical victim indulges in compulsive, 
lengthy, and heated debate with anyone at hand. 
It is a very tough thing for the victim, this form 
of flu. But the disease may be even tougher for 
the country. 

The causes of the disease are not difficult to 
trace. We are fighting in Viet-Nam a difficult, 
bloody, costly, and often heartbreaking war. 
Thousands of American men have died in it, 
and many other thousands have been injured. 

It would be unthinkable that there should not, 
in this democratic society, be debate and discus- 
sion on the war and how it is being fought, for 
it deeply touches all of us. 

It is a difficult subject to discuss simply be- 
cause it is a complex one. The Viet-Nam war 
is a limited conflict being fought in a limited 
way for limited objectives. It is a war in support 

^ Address made before the Oklahoma Pres.s Associa- 
tion at Oklahoma City on Jan. 19 (press release 13). 

of a sovereign Asian nation with its own views 
and objectives, all of which do not always coin- 
cide with our own. And the tortured roots of 
the conflict stretch back to the murky days of 
Japanese-occupied French Indochina. 

It is, in short, a war in which the courses of 
action are sharply limited, a war beclouded by 
an ambiguous history. Fighting such a war, 
with circumscribed goals and limited weapon- 
ry, is admittedly a frustrating business calling 
for a good deal of patience and forbearance. It 
upsets people who like to see issues in terms 
of simple black and white. And it holds little 
appeal for those who like neat and quick 

It is also correct that those of us who formu- 
late or carry out Govermnent policy should 
be held to account and criticized when criticism 
is thought deserved. We do not claim to have 
a monopoly of wisdom, nor do we claim to 
have all the answers. 

If debate and discussion are to be useful, 
however, there must be listeners as well as 
speakers. Any real dialog is two-way. Wliat 
concerns me about the present debate on Viet- 
Nam is that people on all sides are more eager 
to talk than to listen. Wliat concerns me also is 
that the heat, passion, intensity, intolerance, 
and even irrationality generated have produced 
divisions where none exist and have drawn 
hard lines where none need be drawn. 

There has been debate about the way the war 
is being fought — what kind of firepower we 
should use and whether there should be more 
or less of it. Even more impassioned has been 
the dispute on the fundamental issue of 
whether we should be in Viet-Nam at all. The 
latter question is the one that I would like to 
take up today. I hope to provide evidence that 
we in the administration have been listening to 
the dissenters as well as speaking, even if we 
do not always take their advice. But, far more 

FEBRUARY 12. 1968 


important, I would like to state the basic issues 
as they appear to me. In so doing we can, per- 
haps, sort out the strengths and weaknesses of 
differing views on the wisdom and justice of 
our involvement. 

I shall begin by reminding you of the major 
reasons why we are in Viet-Nam; then I wDl 
turn to the three main grounds of dissent. 

Approaches to U.S. Asian Policy 

The starting place of understanding in this — 
as in almost every aspect of foreign policy — is 
history. The decade following the Second 
World War saw two events of surjjassing 
importance to Asia : the death of Japanese, 
French, and Dutch colonial empires and the 
birth of Communist China. The former left a 
vacuum of power and influence; the latter 
brought an eager but, from our point of view, 
unfriendly contender to fill that vacuum. The 
victory of Mao had brought a militant revolu- 
tionary philosophy to the most populated coun- 
try in the world, a country which felt keenly 
that it had for a century been denied its right- 
ful place as a major world power and a dominaf* 
ing influence in Asia. Moreover, Communist 
China's militancy was shared by its neighbor 
and ally. North Viet-Nam. 

To our policymakers these events presented a 
far from happy choice among three approaches : 
First, we might have gambled that Com- 
munist China and North Viet-Nam would show 
restraint. Or we might have gambled that the 
military and political strength of the relatively 
small and weak states of Southeast Asia would 
be sufficient to hold back the Communists. 
Second, we could have concluded that this was 
a bad gamble but still consciously written off 
the area as not worth the risks and costs of U.S. 
involvement. Or, finally, we could have decided 
that the independence of the area was worth 
preserving even at the price and risks of provid- 
ing a temporary umbrella of U.S. power — such 
as we had provided in Europe — until the area's 
independent nations could grow strong enough 
to fend for themselves. 

We decided that the nations of Southeast 
Asia would in time develop resilience and 
strength, that the area could be woven into a 
system of independent, mutually supporting 
nations which could fulfill their enormous latent 
economic and social promise; and for a period 
of ahnost 20 years we have acted on the basis of 
this judgment. Has this decision been correct? 

Promising developments throughout East Asia 
in such diverse countries as Thailand, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, and Singa- 
pore have given us good reason to believe it has 

During this period South Viet-Nam has be- 
come the testing ground of our willingness to 
provide the great-power support which we have 
believed is essential to the independence of 
Southeast Asia. We did not choose it as a battle- 
field. We would have far preferred never to have 
had to defend the independence of any part of 
the area. It is an unfortunate fact of life that 
the aggressor can often choose the battlefield. 
We have, however, chosen to stand fast in sup- 
port of South Viet-Nam, not only because we 
place a great value on the independence of its 
15 million inhabitants but also because we have 
felt that the fate of South Viet-Nam was in- 
extricably intertwined with the fate of much of 
Southeast Asia. 

U.S. Commitment In Southeast Asia 

In brief outline, this is why we are in Viet- 
Nam. I think it is enlightening to see where the 
views of the three major groups of dissenters 
depart from those of the administration in 
terms of this outline. 

Some, including no less a spokesman than 
Walter Lippmann, have argued that the inde- 
pendence of Southeast Asia is not worth the 
great price of American involvement in Viet- 
Nam. But, surely, Southeast Asia cannot be so 
readily dismissed. In its 10 nations live almost 
250 million people, more than the combined 
population of Latin America and almost that of 
Western Europe. It is not as close to us as Latin 
America nor as powerful as Western Europe, 
but it remains a great and strategic area rich 
in both himian and natural resources. Its people 
deserve a right to develop in independence as 
much as do any other people. If it were swal- 
lowed by unfriendly powers, there would result 
a significant measure of damage to the position 
of the United States and its allies. 

In short, I think few of us are either prepared 
to write off the independence of a quarter of a 
billion people or prepared to see this part of the 
world's population turned into enemies of the 
United States. Certainly this was the conclusion 
the Senate reached in 1955 when it ratified the 
SEATO Treaty. The Congress as a whole re- 
affirmed this conclusion nearly 10 years later 
when it said: "The United States regards as 



vital to its national interest and to world peace 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security in southeast Asia." - 

A second group of dissenters would agree that 
Southeast Asia cannot be written off but con- 
t«nd that the internal problems and self-im- 
posed restraint of Communist China and North 
Viet-Nam, plus the defensive capabilities of 
their smaller neighbors, combine to assure the 
safety and independence of such countries as 
Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Singapore without a United States 

The argument is that Ho's appetite is only for 
South Viet-Nam and that Mao isn't hungry so 
there is no reason to fear that the independence 
of Southeast Asia will be swallowed up. 

I am afraid that I cannot satisfy myself that 
American policy should be formulated on the 
basis of so hopeful an assumption. The facts 
will simply not fit the assumption unless we 
ignore North Vietnamese occupation of much of 
Laos, a Communist effort to take over Indo- 
nesia, Hanoi-sponsored revolution in northeast 
Thailand, a Chinese invasion of India, and a 
dozen or so other instances of contrary intent. 
Even if we were prepared to believe that North 
Vietnamese and Communist Chinese adventures 
would end if we left Southeast Asia, our own 
faith would not assure the independence of 
Southeast Asia if it were not shared by the 
countries that would be called upon to face the 
consequences of aggression. 

For independence can be compromised by 
fear of a mighty neighbor as well as by armed 
invasion, by threat as well as by assault. The 
influence of an aggressive and far stronger 
neighbor can and does precede its armies — and 
has in far too many cases made the use of force 

The testimony of the neighbors of Communist 
China and North Viet-Nam is thus doubly rele- 
vant. It bears not only upon the actual risk but 
also upon the perceived threat of aggression 
which can erode independence slowly, but just 
as surely as actual aggression. "With very few 
exceptions, indeed, the leaders of these neigh- 
boring countries testify to the threat that Amer- 
ican withdrawal would mean to them. 

Among them are the leaders of countries such 
as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the 
Philippines who back the American stand in 

' For text of H.J. Res. 1145, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 
1964, p. 268. 

Viet-Nam. Even the most independent and non- 
aligned of these leaders, such as Singapore's 
brilliant Lee Kuan Yew, believe that an aban- 
donment of the U.S. role in Viet-Nam would 
have disastrous consequences for all of South- 
east Asia. 

In short, the people of Southeast Asia them- 
selves fear for their freedom and independence. 
It is they who seek protection from Coimnunist 
subversion, and it is they who look with dread 
at the militant revolutionary giant of Eed 
China to their north. Whether China is truly 
an expansionist coimtry, or whether it is too con- 
sumed in its own domestic problems, harangues, 
and intrigues to follow its aggressive words 
with aggressive deeds, is a debatable matter. 
But the nervousness of its neighbors is not de- 
batable at all. It is a very palpable thing. 

Interestingly enough, the fear of an expan- 
sionist China is not restricted to some of its 
small Asian neighbors. Without endorsing the 
following in any way — for I think it is much 
exaggerated — let me read you some brief ex- 
cerpts from a recent magazine article : 

There can now be no doubt that behind the slogan 
proclaimed in Peking to the effect that the wind is 
blowing from the East is concealed a concrete plan, 
which took shape in the minds of Mao Tse-tung and 
his associates apparently back in the 1950's. . . . 

. . . the main idea . . . amounts to the setting up 
of a sort of superstate embracing not only eastern and 
central, but later even western Asia. . . . 

Mao proposes to include in his "Reich", apart from 
China itself, Korea, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Burma, and sev- 
eral other countries in that region. In the second stage 
of the "Storm From the East" it is planned to expand 
in the direction of the Indian subcontinent, Soviet Cen- 
tral Asia and the Soviet Far East. . . . 

Without a global atomic conflict, in the course of 
which, as Mao has admitted, a "third" or a "half" of 
mankind may perish, Maoist diplomacy cannot con- 
ceive of the basic plan being carried out. . . . The mil- 
itarists in Peking are obviously dreaming of another 
Chinese empire, operating formally under the red flag 
of socialism, but in fact copying the militarist policy 
of the Chinese emperors— the conquerors and manda- 
rins of long-forgotten centuries. 

Does this hair-raising stuff come from some 
harebrained organ of far right anti-Commu- 
nist polemics? No, it comes from the Literary 
Gazette of Moscow and was written by an influ- 
ential Russian commentator named Rostovsky, 
who uses the pen name Ernst Henri. 

We are in Southeast Asia, then, not out of 
ambitions for imperial power or because we 
seek to establish a permanent presence. We are 
there to help provide enough support to make it 

FEBRUARY 12, 1968 


possible for the nations of the area to develop 
unmolested. The assistance we are able to 
furnish allows its people to build their own 
institutions. We are interested in staying only 
until they are strong enough on their own so 
they no longer need our presence. 

There is, of course, a third group of dissenters 
who object to our support of South Viet-Nam 
on far narrower grounds. Wliile recognizing our 
security interests in Asia and the necessity for 
our maintaining a presence there, these critics 
are disturbed with the place in which we are 
making our stand. Their objections may be 
worded in terms of geography, history, or the 
problems of the South Vietnamese Government, 
but they add up to a single point : Viet-Nam is 
not the place to fight. 

This group of people have a good point. Had 
the choice been ours, perhaps we would not 
have picked Viet-Nam either. The terrain 
favors guerrillas in their mountain and swamp 
bases; Viet-Nam '9 tortured history has left it 
with a partial leadership vacuum which is only 
now beginning to be filled ; the enemy is experi- 
enced and determined, well led and highly 
motivated, carrying on a struggle which began 
20 years ago ; the enemy has land lines of sup- 
port back to sanctuaries outside the area in 
which we can use our ground forces ; and so on. 
But these factors — naturally disadvantageous 
to us — are the very reasons the fight was joined 
in Viet-Nam. Since the enemy possessed the ini- 
tiative at all times to choose the timing and the 
nature of the assault, he naturally chose those 
in which he felt he enjoyed the greatest advan- 
tage. If our overall strategy was to succeed in 
Asia, we really had no choice but to meet the 
offensive where it occurred, even on ground on 
which we have to jump some difficult hurdles. 

Furthermore — and this is really the basic 
point on January 19, 1968 — the decision to fight 
in Viet-Nam was the product of many decisions 
by many people over many years. Right or 
wrong — and I happen to think it was right — 
it is now too late to look for a nicer, neater 
battlefield. History and circumstances have 
given us Viet-Nam as the battlefield— and that 
is where we must make the decisions which may 
well determine the future shape of Asia and our 
role in the future of Asia. 

During the administrations of our last three 
Presidents, decisions and commitments have 
been made and policies have been formulated. 
Wliether or not every decision was correct, 
events have turned our willingness to stand by 

these decisions into the test of our entire stance 
in Asia. It is too late to attempt to unravel the 
strands of our policy. We simply cannot cancel 
at this date our specific commitment in Viet- 
Nam without undermining our general commit- 
ments in Southeast Asia. Nor could we back 
down at this time without betraying those 
South Vietnamese — numbering in the millions 
— who have made it clear that they do not wish 
to have their destinies determined by military 
force directed from Hanoi. 

Dramatic Transformation in Free Asia 

A final question remains. In making our 
commitments to Southeast Asia, we of course 
hoped to deter armed aggression in this area 
as it had been deterred before in Europe. We 
were prepared to bear the cost of war, but we 
hoped there would be no war. 

Much of the dissent from our Viet-Nam 
policy seems to me to reflect above all else the 
fact that the bills are now arriving. The costs 
in Ajnericans dead and wounded and Vietnam- 
ese killed, in dollars, and even in criticism at 
home and from some friends abroad are just 
coming in. If, as I believe, the issue has always 
been the risks to all of Southeast Asia, and the 
stake the independence of 250 million people, it 
is fair to ask whether the gains have been worth 
the price. 

One way of approaching this question is to 
compare the costs we are incurring with those 
we might expect had we been unwilling to meet 
the challenge in Viet-Nam. Even a limited war 
with its loss of life is a very great tragedy. But 
if it avoids a future choice between world war 
III and the loss of Southeast Asia — if that 
proves to be the ultimate payoff of our actions — 
the tragedy will have been far more than 

Only the future can answer that question. 
But we can learn from the past. 

I do know that a policy of containment 
of the Soviet Union over a period of years has 
transferred some Soviet attention from external 
conquest to internal development. It has led to 
some easing of tension with the United States 
and the beginnings of a possible rapprochement 
which, although cautious and limited, is dra- 
matic when viewed from a perspective of 20 
years ago. 

I cannot present to you today any clear evi- 
dence that Communist China and North 
Viet-Nam have yet begim to moderate their 



aggressive external policies or their repressive 
internal behavior, altliough — if such events take 
place — future historians may well discern their 
roots in the events of the late 1960"s. But I can 
present to you today clear and unmistakable 
evidence that outside the Communist sphere in 
Asia a dramatic transfonnation is taking place. 

The record speaks for itself. 

Let us first look at economic growth. In Thai- 
land it has averaged about 7 percent annually 
in recent years. In Malaysia gross national 
product has gained some 40 percent over a 
recent 5-year period ; it now has the third high- 
est per capita income in East Asia. In the Phil- 
ippmes, a new rice strain developed at the 
International Rice Eesearch Institute at Los 
Banos promises to increase productivity dramat- 
ically. Adapted to local conditions in other 
countries, this advance promises to revolutionize 
Southeast Asia's rice culture as did the intro- 
duction of new hybrid corns in the case of Thai- 
land's agriculture some years ago. 

But it is not only in the economic sphere that 
progress has been made. Malaysia is a woi-king 
democracy despite its ethnically diverse popu- 
lation of Malay, Chinese, and Indian stock. 
Singapore, with one of the world's largest over- 
seas-Chinese communities, not only is a thriving 
commercial center but also is firmly anti-Com- 
munist. Thailand is moving toward adoption 
of a new constitution, to be followed by free 
elections. Indonesia, after a long slide under 
Sukarno toward economic bankruptcy and 
Communist takeover, in a dramatic reversal of 
political fortunes has begun to lay the ground- 
work for economic and political reconstruction. 

These governments have also begun to create 
institutions for increased economic, cultural, 

and political cooperation. They have had the 
support of other countries in East Asia, notably 
Japan and Australia. There is now the new 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in 
which Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand participate. There is 
also the larger Asian and Pacific Council con- 
sisting of nine East Asian member countries 
and one observer. There is the new Asian De- 
velopment Bank, with headquarters in Manila, 
designed to bring new development capital and 
spur the economic growth of the area. There are 
other regional organizations, notably the 
Mekong Coordinating Committee, and the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East, where constructive work on problems of 
the region has gone forward for many years. 

All of these are Asian institutions working 
effectively toward the development of a free, 
prosperous, independent Asia. 

In short. Southeast Asia is today a region of 
growing confidence in its future, and I put it 
to you that this confidence is rooted in the spec- 
tacle of failure in Communist China and the 
firm stand against aggression we and our allies 
have taken in Viet-Nam. 

Are these gains worth the cost, in the final 
analysis ? 

Like all basic questions of value and history, 
the answer is not subject to scientific analysis. 
The answer depends upon the kind of people 
we are, the values we hold, the kind of world we 
want to live in, how large an effort we are will- 
ing to make to achieve that world. 

No administration or Congress can decide 
such fundamental issues in any final way. In 
the end, the American people will have to decide 
what kind of world we want to live in and what 
our role in building peace should be. 

FEBRUARY 12. 19G8 


Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in Canadian Magazine Interview 

Following is the text of an interview with 
Secretary Rusk hy Blair Fraser^ whi^h af pears 
in the February issue of Maclean^s, a Canadian 
monthly rnagazine. 

Press release 16 dated January 22 

Maclean'' s: "What is your personal prediction 
of the way the war will end in Viet-Nam ? 

Rusk: It is difficult to make a prediction, be- 
cause it takes two sides to make peace. The 
United States, along with many other govern- 
ments, has long sought to end the bloodshed and 
to bring the conflict to the conference table — 
thus far without success. However, the conflict 
could end quickly if the Hanoi Government 
simply decides to close out its attempt to take 
over South Viet-Nam by force. 

Maclean^: "What would you consider to be 
reasonable peace terms? 

Riisk: What is required to make peace can 
be derived from the causes of the present hos- 
tilities. U.S. combat forces were introduced into 
South Viet-Nam because of the men and arms 
sent into the South by Hanoi. We believe that 
the special problems of such divided countries 
as Germany, Korea, and Viet-Nam must be set- 
tled by peaceful means and not by force. We 
have treaty commitments in all three instances. 
Canada is a member of NATO and participated 
with U.N. forces in Korea. 

Our view on peace terms can be found in our 
Fourteen Points,^ in the seven-nation Manila 
communique of October 1966,^ and in the prin- 
ciples of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. 
We are prepared to discuss details with those 
who can stop the shooting. We will meet with 
them at any time without conditions or will 
meet to discuss conditions prior to formal 

Maclean's: Would it be correct to say these 
terms define the war aims of the United States ? 

Rush: Yes, since the war aim of the United 
States is peace. 

^ Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1967, p. 284. 

' For text, see iUd., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730. 

Maclean's: How long would it be, in your 
opinion, before these aims can be achieved ? 

Rusk: I cannot guess how long. The fighting 
itself can end as soon as Hanoi decides it is more 
in its interest to negotiate a mutually acceptable 
settlement than it is to keep on trying to take 
over South Viet-Nam by force. Until Hanoi 
makes this decision we are obligated to continue 
to assist South Viet-Nam to defend itself with 
armed force. 

In partnership with our Vietnamese allies and 
the otiier nations assisting in South Viet-Nam's 
defense, we have made significant progress. Re- 
peated enemy assaults have been thrown back, at 
heavy loss to the other side. Protection against 
Viet Cong terror has been steadily extended to 
wider segments of the population. Five elections 
have been held in the past 18 months for local 
officials, the Presidency, and the two legislative 
chambers, and institutions for representative 
government have thus been established in the 
midst of a cruel war. I expect further steady 
progress over the coming months. 

Maclean^ s : Do you believe the government of 
South Viet-Nam would then become self- 
sustaining militarily, or would an American 
garrison be needed for a longer time ? 

Rusk: We have pledged to withdraw our 
forces from Viet-Nam wlien the external aggres- 
sion against South Viet-Nam ceases. North Viet- 
namese personnel and support are withdrawn, 
and the level of violence tluis subsides. Under 
those circumstances, the Vietnamese Govern- 
ment should be able to deal with its own self- 
defense requirements. 

Maclean's: Do you envisage a united or a per- 
manently divided Viet-Nam ? If united, by what 
means? If divided, how will peace be kept? 

Rxisk : We consider the question of the reuni- 
fication of Viet-Nam to be one for the free de- 
cision of the Vietnamese people. We would 
accept unity through free elections under inter- 
national supervision and oppose unity by force. 

Realistically, we recognize that there are 
great obstacles to reunification. The two parts of 



Viet-Nam have developed different political and 
social systems. However, we do not believe re- 
uuiiication is an impossible goal and are fully 
prepared to support the free decision of the 
Vietnamese people. 

Maclean's : Would the United States tolerate 
an elected Communist government in Saigon? 
An elected neutralist government i 

Rusk: We have long supported the idea of 
genuinely free elections in South Viet-Nam to 
give the South Vietnamese a government of 
their own choice, and we are committed to re- 
spect their decision. 

We support the development of broadly ba.sed 
democratic institutions in South Viet-Nam. We 
do not seek the exclusion of any segment of the 
South Vietnamese people from peaceful par- 
ticipation in their counti-j-'s future. Nor do we 
seek to determine the South Vietnamese Govern- 
ment's political outlook and orientation. 

In the face of the steadfast refusal of the 
Viet Cong to engage in peaceful participation, 
and their massive efforts to disrupt the recent 
series of elections, the success of the South Viet- 
namese people in establishing a constitutional, 
representative government is truly remarkable. 

Ma^leari's: Many Canadians (like many 
Americans), who accept the sincerity of Ameri- 
can intentions in general in Viet-Nam, are dis- 
turbed by the use of antipersonnel weapons such 
as fragmentation bombs, napalm, et cetera. 
TVliat is the explanation of this policy? 

Eu.ik: The weapons you mention are used 
to achieve specific and limited military pur- 
poses. In this war, as in any other, civilian cas- 
ualties are inevitable. They are deeply regretted, 
but the most stringent efforts are made to mini- 
mize civilian casualties where inflicted by these 
or any other weapons at our disposal. Frag- 
mentation bombs are used against antiaircraft 
weapons sites; napalm is rarely used in North 
Viet-Nam ; it has been used in the immediate 
battlefield area in and around tlie DMZ. The 
real point is, however, that all of the fighting 
could stop within hours if Hanoi will help make 

Macleaii's : Do these problems keep you awake 
at night, literally ? Or are you able to put them 
aside at the end of the working day ? Aside from 
your own personal experience, how important 
is the problem of sheer physical and intellectual 
fatigue among men who have to carry these ter- 
rible responsibilities ? 

Rusk: A government servant accepts the 
burden of responsibility in the knowledge that 

he must be prepared to accept, and overcome, 
any fatigue which arises. No reasonable human 
being contemplates with equanimity the tragedy 
of war and the horror and sadness it begets. 
But the cost of human freedom is always high, 
and most of us believe the price must be paid. 

Maclean's: In the internal politics of the 
United States, are you confident that the people 
will continue to support a war without victory 
over a period of years ? 

Rusk: I am confident that the people of the 
United States will continue to support the ob- 
jectives for which we are fighting in Viet-Nam 
and the policies that have been framed and de- 
veloped mider four Presidents to carry out 
these objectives. 

Macleans: In our parliamentary syst«m, the 
government would be forced to make peace (or 
to resign) if it lost the support of a majority 
in Parliament. What happens in the American 
system if the support for the war in Congress 
and among the general public drops below the 
50-percent mark — or if the disaffection becomes 
clearly apparent in other, practical ways? In 
other words, how far can a United States ad- 
ministration pursue a policy when the people 
have turned against it? 

Rusk: The American people conduct their 
public business, at the Federal level, through 
the President and the Congress. I see no indica- 
tion that a majority of our Congress will not 
support our effort in Viet-Nam. Indeed, there 
is no responsible opinion that we should with- 
draw from Viet-Nam. In any event, these mat- 
ters are not decided by public opinion polls. If 
someone were to ask me "Are you happy about 
Viet-Nam?" my answer would be "No." In the 
most literal sense no one wants peace in South- 
east Asia more than President Joluison. How 
to get it is a most complicated question, and 
withdrawal is not a way to get it. This is very 
broadly understood among the American 

MaclearCs: In Canada, discussions of the 
Viet-Nam war often include references to our 
dependence on a friendly administration in 
Washington, and some published reports have 
alleged that the present administration resented 
the recent suggestion of Honorable Paul Martin 
that bombing of North Viet-Nam should be 
suspended. Are these reports correct? 

Rusk: Relations between governments, es- 
pecially friendly governments, have nothing to 
do with resentment. Mr. Martin and I see each 
other frequently and discuss all of our problems 

FEBRUART 12, 1968 


with each other in some detail. The suggestion 
of a "bombing suspension" is not one which 
offends the United States. The trouble is that 
Hanoi calls a pause an "ultimatum." The point 
is that no one in the world can tell us what 
would happen if we stopped the bombing. 
Hanoi refuses to do so and no one else is able 
to do so. But we shall not abandon the effort to 
find a peaceful settlement to the problems of 
Southeast Asia. 

Maclean's: How do you feel about Canada's 
willingness to admit American draftdodgers as 
immigrants ? 

Rush: Canada is fully capable of deciding 
for itself which immigrants it wishes to receive. 
So far as I know this matter has not been dis- 
cussed between our two Governments. 

Maclean's: In general, what is the effect of 
public criticism by foreign, but normally 
friendly, countries ? Is it better to express these 
views openly or only in private ? Or not at all ? 

Rusk: Canada and the United States have 
different responsibilities in the South Pacific. 
The United States has alliances with Korea, 
Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. South 
Viet-Nam is covered by the SEATO Treaty. 
Canada is not a party to any of these treaties 
but is a member of the International Control 
Commission under the Geneva arrangements. 
We would hope that our Canadian friends would 
understand that we have a vital stake in the 
integrity of our alliances in the Pacific Ocean 
area. We might believe that Canada's own na- 
tional interests are related to these alliances, 
whose purpose is to preserve peace in the 
Pacific — but that is a matter for Canada to 
decide. On our part, we understand the special 
responsibilities which Canada bears as a mem- 
ber of the International Control Commission. 
These are onerous duties and Canada carries 
them with integrity. We cannot ask that other 
democracies take steps to restrain public 
criticism which we ourselves would not take 
in our free society. We do solicit imderstand- 
ing — but beyond that we cannot properly go. 

Maclean^s: When people mention the so- 
called "domino theory" in talking about Viet- 
Nam, the usual assumption is that all the 
dominoes are standing on end in Southeast Asia 
and its immediate neighborhood. Would it be 
fair to suggest that some other dominoes seem 
to be tottering in other areas — Europe, Latin 
America, the United States itself? How do you 

strike a balance in appraising these elements of 
support and opposition ? 

Rusk : I have never talked about the "domino 
theory," because it is much too simplistic and 
suggests that somehow we are playing games. 
The problem is that there are North Vietnamese 
regiments today fighting in South Viet-Nam. 
There are North Vietnamese armed forces in 
Laos being opposed by Laotian forces. There 
are North Vietnamese-trained guerrillas operat- 
ing in northeast Thailand. 

It takes two to make a peace ; and we would 
like to see some indication from the other side 
that they accept the notion that all countries, 
large and small, as the United Nations Charter 
puts it, have a right to live in peace without 
molestation from across their frontiers. 

Wlien that moment comes, there can be peace 
veiy quickly indeed; and the United States 
will be no obstacle whatever in making a peace 
on that basis. As to the situation in other areas, 
my own judgment would be that Europe and 
Latin America are both making steady progress 
in key respects, although there are, of course, 
difficulties that may attract disproportionate 
attention. I have already commented on the 
situation within the United States, as it relates 
to the Viet-Nam issue. 

Maclean's: Do you regard China as the real 
enemy in the Viet-Nam war? 

Rusk: No. The aggressor nominates himself 
by his own action. U.S. combat forces are in 
South Viet-Nam because North Viet-Nam has 
been sending men and arms, including regi- 
ments of its Regular Army, into South Viet- 
Nam. But Chinese attitudes and positions are 
not unrelated to Hanoi's policies. What we are 
seeking in Asia is an organized and reliable 
peace. We are not picking out Peking as some 
sort of special enemy. By advocating and abet- 
ting the violent overthrow of legally constituted 
governments, there is little doubt that Peking 
has in practical terms designated itself as a state 
antagonistic to what we and virtually every 
other state in the world see as the rule of law 
and order in international relations. In simple 
terms we believe, and have believed throughout 
my term of office and before, that if Hanoi were 
to take over South Viet-Nam by force, the 
effect would be to stimulate the expansionist 
ambitions of Commimist China and greatly to 
weaken the will and capacity of the independent 
nations of Southeast Asia to resist. Thus the 
Vietnamese situation has a direct bearing on 



freedom throughout Southeast Asia, and par- 
ticuhirly freedom of the area from Communist 
Cliinese pressure and subversion. This connec- 
tion is not a new point at all. It has bulked large 
in the thinking and expression of President 
Johnson, President Kennedy, and their pred- 
ecessors, and it plays a major part in the 
sympathetic views of the great body of respon- 
sible opinion in Southeast Asia toward the 
Allied effort in support of South Viet-Nam. 

Maclean's: Is there any possibility of im- 
proving United States' relations with China 
while Mao Tse-tung is alive and ruling the 
country ? 

Rusk : We would be glad to find some way of 
improving our relations with the people of 
mainland China, once Peking indicates its will- 
ingness to live at peace with other countries in 
Asia and with us. We have expressed our hope 
for reconciliation. We have sought some sign 
from Peking that it is interested in either in- 
creasing contacts with the United States or dis- 
cussing on a bilateral or multilateral basis such 
major problems of peace and security as dis- 
armament and an easing of tension in Asia. 
Thus far Peking has given us no hint of interest. 
It seems to be saying that there is nothing to 
discuss between us unless we surrender Taiwan. 

Maclean'' s : What is your appraisal of the dan- 
ger that the hostility between the United States 
and Mao's China may lead to all-out war ? 

RvrsJc: We have no hostile intent toward Com- 
munist China. We wish to avoid a conflict with 
Peking, and we have taken every measure to 
avoid such a conflict. We believe Peking knows 
this. We think the Chinese also wish to avoid 
such a conflict, and I would see no reason to be- 
lieve there is any fatal inevitability that it will 

Maclean's: Are you convinced that Mao's 
China has adopted a firm policy of military 
expansion ? 

Ribsh: The Chinese have given ample evidence 
in the past that they are not reluctant to use 
direct military force across their borders. I 
would prefer, however, to emphasize that Pe- 
king, by its physical size, its population, its 
large army, its developing nuclear capability, 
and the policies it espouses, poses a threat which 
is real in the minds of other Asians. Peking has 
made completely clear its view that the doctrine 
and policies which it advocates are the proper 
and only appropriate guide for the behavior and 
development of all other states, particularly 

those in Asia. It shelters the leaders of insur- 
rectionary movements from a number of Asian 
states and provides them with funds. It helps 
to arm and tram their supporters. It publicly 
calls for the overthrow of the legitimate gov- 
ernments of these states. Wliether the Chinese 
themselves physically intend to occupy the coun- 
tries around them is less to the point than that 
they seem determined, at least at this point in 
time, to see the present governments of these 
states violently replaced by regimes which ac- 
cept Pekmg's main policies. 

President Johnson Urges 3-Year 
Extension of ACDA Authorization 

The White House on January 24- made jmblio 
the folloxolng letter from President Johnson to 
Huhert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate. 
The President sent an identical letter to John 
W. McCormack, Speaker of the Hcnise of 

White House press release dated January 24 

Jantjart 24, 1968 

Dear Mr. President: In August 1965, I 
said : ^ 

President Eisenhower and President Kennedy sought, 
as I seek now, the pathway to a world in wliich serenity 
may one day endure. There is no sane description of a 
nuclear war. There is only the blinding light of man's 
failure to reason with his fellow man, and then silence. 

Now as then arms control is the most urgent 
business of our time. 

If men can join together with their neighbors 
to harness the power of nuclear energy for 
peaceful progress, they can transform the world. 
If not, they may well destroy the world. 

This is the ultimate test of our century. On 
our response rests the very survival of this na- 
tion and the fate of every living creature on 
this planet. 

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
speaks for the United States in this critical area. 

/ urge the Congress to extend its life for 
three years and to authorize the necessary 

Just over five years ago the world looked over 

' BCLLETIN of Sept. 20, 1965, p. 466. 

FEBRUARY 12. 1968 


the brink of nuclear holocaust. The Cuban mis- 
sile crisis brought home to every man and woman 
the unspeakable personal horror of nuclear war. 
It posed the problem, not in terms of megatons 
and megadeaths, but in terms of a man s home 
destroyed and his family wiped off the face of 

the earth. , 

One year later, the world took the first great 
step toward nuclear sanity-the Limited Test 

Ban Treaty. . . 

From that treaty was bom a common spirit 
and a common trust. National agendas were re- 
vised Priorities were rearranged. Nations 
around the world joined in the quest for free- 
dom from nuclear terror. 

The United Nations passed a resolution 
against bombs in orbit. The United States and 
the Soviet Union installed a "hot line" between 
Washington and Moscow which has already 
been used to protect the peace. Last year a new 
treaty went into effect to preserve outer space 
for the works of peace. 

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
played a central role in all these important ad- 
vances. Now the energy and perseverance of 
Director William Foster and his colleagues 
have brought us close to the next great step 
forward : a treaty banning the spread of nuclear 

The United States and the Soviet Union have 
agreed to a complete draft Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and submitted it to the Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Committee in Geneva for consid- 
eration by other nations.^ This draft already 
reflects many of the interests and views of the 
nations which do not now have nuclear weapons. 
We believe such a treaty represents the most 
constructive way to avoid the terrible dangers 
and the criminal waste which all men recognize 
would flow from the further spread of nuclear 

For at least twenty-five years, this treaty 

would : 

—Prohibit any nuclear weapon state from 
transferring to any recipient, either directly 
or indirectfy, any nuclear explosive device or 
the control of any such device ; 

—Prohibit any nuclear weapon state from 

2 For background and text, see ihid., Feb. 5, 1968, 
p. 164. 

helping non-nuclear weapon nations to develop 
their own nuclear weapons ; 

—Prohibit any non-nuclear weapon state 
from receiving nuclear weapons and from man- 
ufacturing its own weapons ; 

—Provide for verification that no nuclear ma- 
terials are diverted by non-nuclear weapon 
states to produce explosive devices ; 

—Encourage cooperation between nuclear 
and non-nuclear nations to insure that all will 
benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

This treaty will not end tensions between na- 
tions nor will it eliminate the shadow of nu- 
clear war which now menaces all mankind. But 
it will reduce the chances of nuclear disaster 
arising from local disputes. 

It will avoid the tragic waste of resources 
on nuclear weapon technology by countries 
whose first and overriding concern must be eco- 
nomic growth and social progress. 

And^it will, we hope, bring world-wide ac- 
ceptance of nuclear safeguards inspection as 
the basic protection which every nation must 
afford itself and its neighbors. 

This treaty looks to the day when a final an- 
swer to the nuclear weapons problem will be 
possible. It does not limit the right or capacity 
of any present nuclear power to produce nu- 
clear weapons. It does call for further negoti- 
ations to end the nuclear arms race and to move 
down the road to general and complete disar- 
mament. . , ^ ,, . ^. 
The lesson of the nuclear era is that this most 
sacred of human hopes will not be realized 
through intimidation of one nation by another 
nor by a single stroke of diplomacy. It will 
follow months and years of steady, patient 
effort. It will come step by step as men grow m 
wisdom and nations grow in responsibility. 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a crea- 
tion of the United States. It is not a creation of 
the United States and the Soviet Union It is 
the creation of all nations, large and small, who 
share the knowledge and the determination that 
man can and must and will control these cosmic 
forces he has unleashed. _ 

Wlien this Treaty comes into force, it will be 
for all the world the brightest light at the end 
of the tunnel since 1945. 

Ltitoon B. Johnson 



In this paper, which was presented before the Marine Science 
Panel on December 27 during the annual meeting of the Ameri- 
can Association for the Advancement of Science at New York, 
N.Y., Mr. Pollack discusses the coinponents of the Departmenfs 
task in formulating U.S. foreign policy objectives with respect 
to the exploration of the oceans and the peaceful exploitation of 
their resources. 

National Interest, Foreign Affairs, and the Marine Sciences 

by RerTnan Pollack 

Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs 

The problems of exploring and using the 
deep oceans are not confined to those of a scien- 
tific or technical nature. There are opportimities 
and risl^s, and there are purposes and tasks, 
wliich aU'ect our international relationships and 
our foreign policy objectives. The successful 
exploration of the world's oceans and the peace- 
fid exploitation of their resources will occur 
only if based on clear international understand- 
ing and agreement. 

The relationships between and among nations 
inherent to this exploitation are one of the many 
areas m which much creative work needs to be 
done before the nations of the world can effec- 
tively apply today's considerable technological 
resources to the search for ocean treasure. The 
pattern for international cooperation in the 
marine sciences has developed largely in re- 
sponse to varying immediate needs or interests. 
We believe that we must now look to the creation 
of more coherent and comprehensive interna- 
tional agreements and understandings if we are 
to accommodate expanding interest and oppor- 
tunities in this field. 

To this end, we will seek to engage the atten- 
tion and cooperation of other nations in support 
of two basic and clear objectives: to promote 
both the study and the use of the world's oceans 
and their resources; and to avoid conflict in the 
process and, indeed, advance international 
amity. In today's world we must seek to do so 
without compromising our military security, 
while enhancing our commercial and industrial 
capabilities. This should be possible. 

Since some of vou mav not be familiar with 

the interest of the Department of State in the 
marine sciences, I shall begin by reviewing that 
subject. Then I shall open a discussion of the 
major issues in this field of particular concern 
to our relationships with other nations. 

Let me first point out that the Department 
of State is not an operating agency in the field 
of oceanography. We conduct no scientific re- 
search projects. We do not operate any research 
vessels or submersibles. We run no laboratories. 
Nor do we conduct any operating programs hav- 
ing to do with the exploration of the oceans or 
the use of their resources. 

Rather, it is our task to formulate United 
States foreign policy objectives with respect to 
the oceans. As related parts of this task, we must 
identify the opportunities and needs for inter- 
national arrangements, consider them in rela- 
tion to our foreign policy objectives, study the 
problems which are foreseen, and finally serve 
as a catalyst for appropriate action. 

This necessitates relating the diverse inter- 
national programs of many Government agen- 
cies to clear, attainable national objectives. 

This means the negotiation of arrangements 
abroail to meet our own needs in the field — 
negotiations which cover a broad spectrum ex- 
tending from arrangements for specific research 
projects to the complexities of the international 
law of the sea. 

This requires expert assistance in identifying 
those opportunities in this field which can sup- 
port our foreign policy objectives — and some of 
the experts are sitting here today. 

It requires an understanding of the interests 

FEBRUARY 12, 1968 


and capabilities of other nations in this field. 

It concerns international ground rules for 
scientific investigation of the oceans and for ex- 
ploitation of their resources. 

We have historically been deeply involved in 
the negotiation of international agreements on 
ocean fisheries. The Department of State is 
charged with the implementation of United 
States international fishery policies. This is ac- 
complished through participation in eight dif- 
ferent international fisheries commissions, and 
through such international organizations as the 
FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]. 
The focus of these efforts is the rational use of 
the living resources of the sea in consonance 
with the principles of conservation. 

The Department is also responsible for 
United States participation in international 
govermnental organizations whose interests re- 
late directly to marine matters or impinge on 
these matters; for example, the Intergovern- 
mental Oceanographic Commission in its con- 
sideration of scientific activities in oceanog- 
raphy, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
in its concern with fisheries, the World Meteor- 
ological Organization in its arrangements to 
study the effect of the oceans on climate and 
weather, the International Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization with respect to shipping 
problems and the safety of lives at sea, and the 
International Telecommunication Union in 
connection with overseas communications. 

We also help arrange, or support, bilateral 
and multilateral cooperative projects with 
foreign governments and foreign scientists in 
this field; for example, the recent worldwide 
cruise of the Oceanographer and such research 
undertakings as the Indian Ocean expedition. 

Finally, we seek the development of a co- 
herent body of objectives and a comprehensive 
plan for their achievement — in short, policy 
planning. This is the central task, and it goes 
hand in hand with the development of a na- 
tional oceanographic program. 

Incidentally, we follow closely the views of 
nongovernmental scientific organizations such 
as ICSU [International Council of Scientific 
Unions] and its member committee, SCOE 
[Special Committee on Oceanographic Re- 
search], in developing national positions. We 
support the establishment of relationships be- 
tween such groups and related governmental 
organizations so that the views of the world 
scientific community may be brought to bear 


continuously on developing policies and pro- 

In all of these tasks the Department works 
closely with other departments and agencies. 
The Secretary of State is a member of the 
National Council on Marine Resources and 
Engineering Development, and the Department 
is represented on the four conmaittees of the 

In addition, nearly a year ago the Depart- 
ment of State established an Interdej^artmental 
Committee on International Policy in the Ma- 
rine Sciences. The scope of the Committee's in- 
terests is iiidicated by the subjects it assigned to 
the temporary interagency panels it estab- 
lished; for example, scientific cooperation, the 
living resources of oceans, and regional cooper- 
ation in South America and Europe. 

The Committee was originally established on 
a temporary basis, and the Secretary of State is 
now converting it into a permanent Committee 
on International Policy in the Marine Environ- 
ment. I anticipate that the principal tasks of 
this Committee in the future will relate to 
international programs for the exploration of 
the oceans and their floors and to the question 
of a regime for the floors which lie beyond 
present national jurisdictions. 

U.N. Debate on Ocean Floor Issues 

Let me now open the discussion of some of 
the issues relating to the deep ocean floor by 
considering briefly the debate in the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly last fall which focused on the 
resolution introduced by Ambassador [Arvid] 
Pardo of Malta. That resolution and the reac- 
tions to it have involved, at an early state in 
their development, many of the major policy 
issues which will confront us in the future. 

Ambassador Pardo proposed that the Assem- 
bly look toward a new international treaty which 
would reserve the ocean floor beyond the limit 
of national jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and establish an international agency 
to assume jurisdiction over the deep ocean floor 
and its resources. It was his suggestion that the 
financial benefits from the exploitation of these 
resources be allocated primarily to the less de- 
veloped countries. 

In debating this resolution the Assembly has 
started a dialog on complex and difficult ques- 
tions affecting law ; arms control ; international 
cooperation, management, and regulation ; and 



economic development. Yet we are still without 
clear understanding of the full implications 
of the proposals contained in the Maltese 

The United States view, as set forth by Am- 
bassador [Arthur J.] Goldber<r in the course of 
tlie debate, stressed the importance of compre- 
hensive and responsible study, the need for in- 
ternational cooperation in exploration of the 
ocean floor, and the need for general principles 
to guide activities undertaken in this field.^ He 
pointed out that the deep ocean floor should not 
become a stage for competing national sover- 
eignties but should be open to exploration and 
use by all states, without discrimination. He em- 
phasized the complexity of these issues and 
noted the considerable body of existing inter- 
national law and treaty rights and obligations 
which bear on the subject. He further affirmed 
the willingness of the United States to partici- 
pate fully in whatever studies are necessary in 
determining the future legal regime of the deep 
ocean floor. 

Some four dozen countries have spoken in the 
debate on this subject in the Political Committee 
of the General Assembly, representing a wide 
range of attitudes and imcertainties. Their 
views run all the way from an apparent willing- 
ness by some to act now to adopt several of the 
principles suggested by Ambassador Pardo to a 
reluctance on the part of others to have the 
General Assembly involve itself in these issues 
or to create a special committee to consider them 
seriously. There is lo common view as to the 
limits of national jurisdiction over coastal 
waters or the adjacent ocean floor. Some advo- 
cate, nonetheless, a freeze on the extension of 
sovereignty or sovereign rights. There was 
throughout the debate a sensitivity on the part 
of developing countries to this new manifesta- 
tion of the technological gap, evidenced, for ex- 
ample, by suggestions that there be no unilateral 
exploitation of the resources of the deep ocean 

There is, in short, no consensus among the 
U.N. members on the issues or on comprehen- 
sive, long-range approaches. 

Any conclusions which might be reached as 
a result of these discussions should relate as 
much to science and technology as to national 
political interest. It is what is possible, as well 

as desirable, which will govern the activities of 
nations in the deep oceans. The political dis- 
cussions must have the benefit of the best scien- 
tific and technical information available if they 
are to be truly meaningful. I agree with the sage 
who said : "It is unwise to pursue political goals 
sharply at odds with technical realities." It will 
be useful to keep this admonition in mind as we 
look at the marine issues of particular interest 
to future foreign policy. 

Alternative to the "Treasure Syndrome" 

Tlie nations of the present world stand en- 
tranced in much the same frame of mind with 
which the nations of Europe viewed the New 
World in the 16th century — with the rumors of 
immense treasure and riches to be found on the 
ocean floor. These estimates are as yet based 
more on speculation than on hard fact. Further- 
more, one must keep in mind that it will not 
suffice to establish the existence of resources in 
the seabed and on the ocean floor. It must also 
be established that they are recoverable on an 
industrial basis and at a competitive price. It 
can be safely predicted that the capital invest- 
ments required will be huge. But the selling 
job has been done — not only in this coimtry but 
in others — and international interest is now 

Today, as the world turns its attention to the 
ocean floor beyond the continental shelf, there 
is a genuine searcli on the part of many for 
internationally agreed guidelines to the develop- 
ment and use of ocean floor resources as an 
alternative to the preemptive approaches his- 
torically spawned by the treasure syndrome. 
President Johnson made a contribution on be- 
half of the United States to this discussion when 
he said : ^ 

. . . under no circumstances, we believe, must we 
ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral 
wealth to create a new form of colonial competition 
among the maritime nations. We must be careful to 
avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the 
high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the 
ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human 

Some of the factors which will underlie our 
approach to these matters are already clear. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1967, p. 
723, and Jan. 22, 1968, p. 125. 

- For remarks by President Johnson made at the 
commissioning of the 0< canographcr at Washington. 
D.C., on July 13, 1966, see Public Papers of the Presi- 
dents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 722. 

FEBRUAET 12, 1968 


First, the United States enjoys a significant 
capability in oceanology, both in research and 
applications. In some respects we enjoy a sig- 
nificant lead, and our continued commitment to 
leadership is essential. 

Second, the deep interest, both here and 
abroad, in the resources of the ocean floor and 
its subsoil compels a response. 

Third, we are already confronted with special 
pleading and special points of view, such as 
those of the landlocked nations, those who would 
use revenues primarily for the developing na- 
tions, and those who would vest control or man- 
agement of the deep seabed in the United 

Fourth, in the search for meaningful areas for 
international cooperation and bridgebuilding 
between East and West, North and South, the 
attention will increasingly fall on the deep 
oceans. Interest is whetted by the attractive 
analogy between the possibilities for agreement 
on the exploration and use of the resources of 
the deep oceans on one hand and agreements 
concerning the use of the Antarctic and outer 
space on the other — an analogy which is by no 
means entirely relevant. 

Unknowns in the Equation 

Some important factors, then, are known — 
it is the unknowns in the equation which con- 
tinue to trouble us. There is an old saying that 
one requires 60 percent of tlie answer in order 
to ask an intelligent question ; and for tlois rea- 
son we cannot now pose those questions which 
we need to ask if we are going to have the kind 
of information on which policy judgments can 
be based and which can resolve the political is- 
sues which will face us in the near future. 

But even if we don't know the questions we do 
know some of the characteristics which the an- 
swers must have. They must be able to stand 
the test of time and accommodate advancing 
technology. Provision should be made for sub- 
stantive changes as we match our capabilities to 
the challenge, but the broad principles should 
be durable. We must have answers which will 
provide hospitably for major capital invest- 
ments while at the same time providing meas- 
ures for the resolution of economic and juris- 
dictional issues which could lead to conflict. We 
must have answers which provide for national 
security considerations within the larger con- 
text of the broad national interest. In all these 

aspects, the answers must be generally accept- 
able to other nations. 

But first and foremost we will be in no posi- 
tion to define wisely international guidelines for 
the development and use of the ocean floor 
irntil we learn more than we now know about 
the deep ocean environment and man's ability 
to work in it. 

There are several problems which will have 
to be taken into account in the work which lies 
ahead. For example, the present Convention on 
the Continental Shelf ^ defines that shelf as "the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adja- 
cent to the coast ... to a depth of 200 meters 
or, beyond that limit to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of 
the natural resources of the said areas. . . ." 
In this instance, an increasingly important legal 
definition, which determines the extent of na- 
tional sovereign rights, rests in part on a chang- 
ing technological capability. Yet we do not 
know what the practical effect of those changes 
will be. 

The Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas * per- 
mits any coastal state to adopt "unilateral meas- 
ures of conservation appropriate to any stock 
of fish or other marine resources in any area of 
the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea," 
provided, in part, that "the measures adopted 
are based on appropriate scientific findings." In 
this instance the law defers to science, but we 
have relatively little in the way of "appropriate 
scientific findings." 

And so we need now to intensify the ground- 
work and our homework if we are to have ef- 
fective international arrangements in this field. 
Scientific knowledge, technical readiness, and 
national interest are all parts of the whole — and 
there can be no sum of the parts. Each must 
make its contribution wholeheartedly; a guess- 
ing game in any one of the three could be dis- 

Further, in formulating these guidelines our 
response will necessarily be conditioned in part 
by military requirements. This aspect of our 
national security as it relates to the oceans is 
but one, albeit a critical, element in assessing 
our total national interest. We shall have to 
take into account the considerable attention that 

' For text, see Bui,letin of June 30, 1958, p. 1121. 
' For text, see ibid., p. 1118. 



has been given over the centuries by tlie nations 
of the world to the military uses of the sea. 

In conclusion, there is no possibility that the 
extending of the sea frontier will be purelj' an 
Aniericaia effort. There are other nations with 
strong programs in being. We must work within 
an international framework in opening the sea 
to profitable enterprise. We need to agree on the 
obligations and benefits which will accrue to 
participating nations. The interests of other na- 
tions not now ready to participate must be con- 
sidered, including those of landlocked nations. 

Above all, we need to have a sense of urgency 
in coming to grips with these problems before 
conflict arises. To be profitable, ocean exploita- 
tion must be peaceful, and I can make it no 
plainer than that. Leadership and enduring 
solutions, in this age of teclinology, require 
active collaboration among scientists, engineers, 
and political experts. 

President Directs Agencies To Cut 
Overseas Personnel and Travel 


White Hoase press release dated January 18 

Jant7aky 18, 1968 
Subject : Eeduction in U.S. employees 
and official travel overseas. 

As a part of my program for dealing with 
our balance of paj'ments problem, announced on 
New Year's day,' I would like you jointl)' to 
take the specific measures to reduce U.S. em- 
plojTnent and curtail official travel abroad, as 
outlined herein. Within the Department of 
State, the Senior Interdepartmental Group, 
chaired by Under Secretary' [Nicholas deB.] 
Katzenbach, shall serve as the focal point for 
carrying out this directive. 

You should make these reductions in a way 
which maintains the effectiveness of our inter- 
national programs. I would like you to give 
particular attention to personnel reductions 
which can be made through relocation and re- 

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1968, p. 

grouping of functions, the elimination of over- 
lappmg and duplication, the discontinuance of 
outdated and marginal activities, and a general 
streamlining of operations. 

I. Reduction in U.S. personnel overseas 

This directive applies to all employees under 
the jurisdiction of U.S. diplomatic missions and 
includes the representatives of all U.S. civilian 
agencies which have programs or activities 
overseas. It also includes military attaches. 
Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and other 
military personnel serving under the Ambas- 
sadors. It does not apply to U.S. personnel in 

The Secretary of Defense has already ini- 
tiated measures to reduce staffing of the mili- 
tary assistance program. I am asking the 
Secretary to complete these studies in time to 
support the goals outlined below. 

You are directed to take the following 
actions : 

1. As a first step, you should proceed, with 
appropriate participation hy U.S. Ambassadors 
and agencies, to reduce the total number of 
American personnel overseas by 10 percent, with 
reductions of at least this magnitude applied to 
all missions of over 100. Similar reductions 
should be made in employment of foreign na- 
tionals and contract persomiel. Your decisions 
on this first phase, which shall be final, shall be 
completed by April 1. 

2. You should also initiate a special intensive 
review of our activities and staffing in 10 coun- 
tries with very large U.S. missions. Your ob- 
jective, in this second step, should be to reduce 
U.S. employment by substantially more than the 
10 percent immediate reduction taken in the 
first step. Your final decisions should be made 
on this phase by August 1. 

3. As a third step, you should proceed to ex- 
tend these intensive reviews of U.S. activities 
to other countries beyond the first 10 as rapidly 
as feasible. 

4. Sim.ultaneously, you should initiate special 
studies from Washington of functional areas 
aimed at reducing instructions, assignments, 
and activities which unnecessarily create the 
need for maintaining or increasmg overseas 
staff, e.g., reporting requirements, consular 
work, and administrative support. 

Clearly, reductions of this magnitude will 
involve major changes in agency staffing and 

FEBRUARY 12, 1968 


personnel plans. I am asking Chairman [John 
W.] Macy of the Civil Service Commission to 
assist agencies in solving attendant personnel 
problems and in facilitating the reassignment 
of employees returning to the United States. 

II. Curtailment in official travel 

I am requesting all Department and agency 
heads to reduce official travel outside the U.S. to 
the minimum consistent with orderly conduct 
of the Government's business. I would like you 
to give special attention to measures to minimize 
travel to international conferences. 

By April 1, 1 would like you to report on the 
actions taken in this regard and to recommend 
any additional steps required. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 


White House press release dated January IS 

January 18, 1968 
Subject : Reduction of Overseas Personnel 
and Official Travel 

Today I sent the attached memorandum to the 
Secretary of State and the Director of the Bu- 
reau of the Budget directing them to undertake 
a four-part program to reduce United States 
personnel overseas. I expect each Department 
and agency to cooperate fully in this endeavor. 

In addition, I hereby direct the head of each 
Department and agency to take steps to reduce 
U.S. official travel overseas to the minimum con- 
sistent with the orderly conduct of the Govern- 
ment's business abroad. I have asked private 
U.S. citizens to curtail their own travel outside 
the Western Hemisphere in the interest of re- 
ducing our balance of payments deficit. Federal 
agencies should participate in this effort. 

The policy applies particularly to travel to 
international conferences held overseas. Heads 
of Departments and agencies will take immedi- 
ate measures to 

—reduce the nmnber of such conferences 

— hold our attendance to a minimum and use 
U.S. personnel located at or near conference 
site to the extent possible. 

— schedule conferences, where possible, in the 
U.S. or countries in which excess currencies can 
be used. 

You should present your plans for travel to 
international conferences held overseas to the 
Secretary of State, who, with the Director of 
the Budget, will undertake a special review of 
this matter. 

This directive shall not apply to 

— travel necessary for permanent change-of- 
station for U.S. employees, for their home leave, 
and for medical and rest and recuperative leave. 

— travel made necessary by measures to re- 
duce U.S. employment overseas outlined in the 
attached memorandum. 

— travel financed from available excess for- 
eign currencies. 

You are requested to submit to the Director 
of the Budget, not later than March 15, a state- 
ment on the actions you have taken to reduce 
all types of overseas travel, the results expected 
from such actions, and your recommendations as 
to any additional measures that might be taken. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

President Asks AID To Reduce 
Balance of Payments Costs 

Following is the text of a memorandum from 
President JoTinjion to William S. Gaud, Admin- 
istrator of the Agency for International De- 

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated Janu- 
ary 11 

Jantjaky 11, 1968 
Subject: Additional steps to reduce balance 
of payments costs 

Your agency has made notable progress over 
the past few years in reducing expenditures 
made outside of the United States tmder the 
economic assistance program. Expenditures for 
goods and services purcliased abroad declined 
from 27 percent of total AID expenditures in 
1963 to 10 percent in 1967. At present, all devel- 
opment loans are used exclusively for procure- 
ment in the U.S. Eighty percent of grants for 
technical and supporting assistance and other 
expenses are used to pay for U.S. goods and 

In the current situation, however, we cannot 
rest on this record. I recently outlined a broad 
program to correct the balance of payments 


department of state bulletin 

deficit.' As a part of the government actions 
under this program, we must take even more 
stringent steps to minimize the balance of pay- 
ments costs of our AID programs. I therefore 
request tliat you take steps to reduce your 
expenditures overseas in calendar 1968 by a 
minimum of $100 million below what they 
were in 1967. 

To achieve this reduction you should take 
steps to : 

— reduce offshore expenditures for commodi- 
ties, cash payments, teclmicians and other serv- 
ices to the bare minimum; 

— increase the use of U.S.-owned local cur- 
rencies that are excess or near-excess to our 
needs ; 

— increase the contributions of aid receiving 
countries in the financing of our technicians and 
related costs ; 

— carefully review the requirements for per- 
sonnel stationed abroad financed with U.S. 

In addition, I would like you to review and 
improve the effectiveness of our arrangements 
with individual countries to assure that AID- 
financed goods are additional to U.S. commer- 
cial exports. 

I know that the additional measures called 
for will be difficult, coming on top of the very 
substantial efforts of the last few years. I am 
confident, however, that with ingenuity and 
resolve we can put into effect the arrangements 
necessary to carry on the economic aid program, 
which is vital to our interests and to the well- 
being of so many people in developing coim- 
tries, wit