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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 155i 




April 7, 1969 



U.S. POSITIONS AT EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 
OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

The President's Letter to UjS. Representative Gerard Smith £89 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT 

Statement by Waldemar A. Nielsen at the 10th Anni/uersary Meeting 
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa 292 

U.S. SUPPORTS U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON NAMIBIA 

Statement hy Am,iassador Yost and Text of Besolution 301 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

APR 18 1969 

DEPOSITORY 



For index see inside tach cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1554 
April 7, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovemment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 Issues, domestic $16, foreigri $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
rruide by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or nuty become a party 
and treaties of general interruxtional 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



U.S. Positions at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference 
Outlined by President Nixon 



The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Com- 
mittee on DUarmam^nt reconvened at Geneva 
on March 18. Following is the text of a letter 
from President Nixon to Gerard Smith, U.S. 
Representative to the conference, tvhich was 
read by Ambassador Smith at the opening ses- 
sion of the conference. 

White House press release dated March 18 

The White Hotjse, 
Washington, March 15, 1969. 

Dear Ambassador Smith, In view of tlie 
great importance which I attach to tlie work of 
the Eigliteen-Nation Disarmament Conference 
in Geneva, I wish to address directly to you, 
as the new Director of the Anns Control 
and Disarmament Agency and the head of our 
delegation, my instructions regarding the par- 
ticipation of the United States in this 
conference. 

The fundamental objective of the United 
States is a world of enduring peace and justice, 
in which the differences that separate nations 
can be resolved without resort to war. 

Our immediate objective is to leave behind 
the period of confrontation and to enter an era 
of negotiation. 

The task of the delegation of the United 
States to the disarmament conference is to serve 
these objectives by pursuing negotiations to 
achieve concrete measures which will enhance 
the security of our own country and all 
countries. 

The new Administration has now considered 
tlie policies which will help us to make progress 
in this endeavor. 

I have decided that the Delegation of the 
United States should take these positions at 
tlie Conference. 

First, in order to assure that the seabed, man's 
latest frontier remains free from the nuclear 
arms race, the United States delegation should 
indicate that the United States is interested in 
working out an international agreement that 
would prohibit the implacement or fixing of nu- 



clear weapons or other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion on the seabed. To this end, the United States 
delegation should seek discussion of the factors 
necessary for such an international agreement. 
Such an agreement would, like the Antarctic 
Treaty and tlie Treaty on Outer Space which 
are already in effect, prevent an anns race be- 
fore it had a chance to start. It would ensure 
that this potentially useful area of the world 
remained available for peaceful purposes. 

Second, the United States supports the con- 
clusion of a comprehensive test ban adequately 
verified. In view of the fact that differences re- 
garding verification have not pennitted achieve- 
ment of this key arms control measure, efforts 
must be made towards greater imderstanding of 
the verification issue. 

Third, the United States delegation will con- 
tinue to press for an agreement to cut off the 
production of fissionable materials for weapons 
purposes and to transfer such materials to peace- 
ful purposes. 

Fourth, while awaiting the United Nations 
Secretary General's study on the effects of chem- 
ical and biological warfare, the United States 
Delegation should join with other delegations 
in exploring any proposals or ideas that could 
contribute to sound and effective arms control 
relating to these weapons. 

Fifth, regarding more extensive measures of 
disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, 
the United States Delegation should be guided 
by tlie understanding that actual reduction of 
armaments, and not merely limiting their 
growth or spread, remains our goal. 

Sixth, regarding the question of talks between 
the United States and the Soviet Union on the 
limitation of strategic arms, the United States 
hopes that the international political situation 
will evolve in a way which will permit such 
talks to begin in the near future. 

In carrying out these instructions, the United 
States Delegation should keep in mind my view 
that efforts toward peace by all nations must be 
comprehensive. We cannot have realistic hopes 



APRIL 7, 1969 



289 



for significant progress in the control of arms if 
the policies of confrontation prevail throughout 
the world as the rule of international conduct. 
On the other hand, we must attempt to exploit 
every opportvmity to build a world of peace — 
to find areas of accord — to bind countries 
together in cooperative endeavors. 

A major part of the work of peace is done by 
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. 
I expect that all members of the United States 
Delegation will devote that extra measure of 
determination, skill, and judgment which this 
high task merits. 

I shall follow closely the progress that is made 
and give my personal consideration to any 
problems that arise whenever it would be help- 
ful for me to do so. 

Please convey to all your colleagues my sin- 
cere wishes for success in our common endeav- 
or. Over the years, their achievements at the 
Eiehteen-Nation Disarmament Conference have 
been outstanding. I am confident that in the 
future our efforts, in cooperation with theirs, 
will be equal to any challenge and will result 
in progress for the benefit of all. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 

Honorable Gerard Smith 

United States Representative 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference 
Geneva, Switzerland 



Ninth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Meets at Paris 

Following is tlie opening statement made hy 
Ambassador Henry Cahot Lodge, head of the 
n.S. delegation, at the ninth plenary session of 
the netv meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
March 20. 

Press release 57 dated March 20 

Ladies and gentlemen: Today I shall exam- 
ine the allegation repeatedly made in these 
meetings that your side's current military 
offensive is a response to the new U.S. adminis- 
tration's stepping up the war in Viet-Nam. 

It so happens that this allegation is not sup- 
ported by the facts. 

Indeed, it appears that your side planned its 
offensive long ago and that it made detailed 



and careful preparations. It is clear that the 
attacks which were launched starting on Feb- 
ruary 22 were not undertaken as a response to 
any recent Allied initiatives. Tliey were, in- 
stead, the long-heralded "winter-spring" cam- 
paign of 1969, a campaign of which your side 
warned in advance and of which it has boasted 
since. 

Let us look at the evidence. 

First, the offensive follows the pattern of 
"fall-winter" and "winter-spring" military 
campaigns established by North Viet-Nam 
since the early 1960's. 

Second, the relatively low level of North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong military activity 
during the period preceding their current 
military offensive resulted not from choice 
but from necessity. North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong forces needed that time to regroup, to re- 
supply, and to retrain after the serious losses 
suffered in three unsuccessful offensives in 1968. 

Third, the Government of Viet-Nam and its 
allies have in recent months discovered huge 
caches of war materiel and food throughout 
South Viet-Nam. These supplies, carefully pre- 
positioned to support offensive plans, could not 
have been emplaced overnight. They show care- 
ful planning and long preparation of several 
months' duration. 

Fourth, North Viet-Nam has infiltrated mili- 
tary personnel into South Viet-Nam at a high 
rate over the past months. 

Finally, public statements by your side, cap- 
tured documents, and testimony of prisoners 
of war are all witness to the fact that the cur- 
rent military offensive was planned far in ad- 
vance of January 20, 1969, and for purposes 
other than those your propaganda now pro- 
claims. 

For months your side has exhorted its troops 
to new offensive action. For example, on Janu- 
ary 3 a broadcast by the so-called "liberation 
radio" called for military attacks aimed at 
"fulfilling their role as a lever for political 
attacks . . . ." 

A document entitled "directive number four," 
by the Viet Cong Saigon City Committee, called 
for political operations coordinated with a mili- 
tary offensive in three phases. This directive was 
issued on January 21, only a few hours after 
President Nixon pledged himself to a search for 
peace in his inaugural address. 

The first phase was to mark the "opening of 
a great wave of political and military proselyt- 



290 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN 



ing." The second phase called for a concen- 
trated propaganda campaign among the urban 
population. In the third phase, slogans were to 
call for direct negotiations with the National 
Liberation Front, a change in the delegation of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam at the Paris meetings, 
and the formation of a "peace cabinet" — with 
"public opinion on peace issues to be raised to a 
fever pitch." 

The testimony of prisoners of war is also re- 
vealing. Typical is a North Vietnamese Army 
captain who was captured February 24 near 
Tam Ky city. He had been told by a superior 
on or about February 8 that a "general attack 
order" had already been issued. The objective 
of the attack, he said, was to influence the Paris 
peace talks and especially to obtain acceptance 
of a coalition government in South Viet-Nam. 

These are not the words or actions of response 
to alleged escalation of the war by this adminis- 
tration. They have other purposes and aims 
which involve the conquest of South Viet-Nam. 
Their latest unfortunate manifestation can be 
seen in the indiscriminate shelling of Hue on 
March 15, of Saigon on March 16, and of Da 
Nang on March 19. Reports of the latest indis- 
criminate attack indicate that three of the 
rockets hitting Da Nang yesterday landed in 
wholly civilian areas and caused at least six 
civilian dead while wounding 23. 

It is, of course, true, as I have said before, 
that the war goes on in South Viet-Nam. On our 
side. United States and Allied forces have nat- 
urally continued their military operations in the 
defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

But we have not escalated the war. United 
States forces have been operating in recent 
months at approximately the levels which pre- 
vailed throughout 1968. The United States has 
not increased the troop ceilings announced by 
President Johnson in March 1968. B-52 strikes 
against enemy base and staging areas, away 



from populated areas, have remained at the 
same levels since March 1968. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the fact is that the 
military offensive launched by your side is not 
a response to so-called "escalation of the war by 
the United States." It is a calculated part of a 
plan to take over South Viet-Nam by force. 

We call upon you once again to join us in the 
search for peace. 

If your side is seriously interested in bringing 
the fighting in Viet-Nam to an end, let us to- 
gether take constructive steps to that end. And 
let me reiterate here that no imdertaking of 
importance can be carried out with regard to 
South Viet-Nam without the approval of the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. That 
Government is the legal and legitimate govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam and nothing your side 
says or does can nullify this fact. You should, 
therefore, deal seriously with the Government 
of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

The United States and the Republic of Viet- 
Nam have made a number of specific concrete 
proposals that can lead to a peaceful settlement. 
The restoration of the demilitarized zone and 
the mutual withdrawal of external forces are 
steps designed to bring the war to an end. Let 
us begin to discuss these proposals in a serious 
way. 



Senate Confirms Henry Kearns 

as President of Export-Import Bank 

The Senate on March 17 confirmed the nom- 
ination of Henry Kearns to be President of the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States. 
(For biographic details, see White House press 
release dated March 7.) 



APRIL 7, 1969 



291 



The United States and the Challenge of Africa's Development 



Statement hy Waldemar A. Nielsen ^ 



Let me first express in behalf of the Amer- 
ican delegation our gratitude to His Imperial 
Majesty, the EtMopian Government, and the 
people of this splendid country for their warm 
hospitality, which has contributed so much to 
the constructive atmosphere of this lOth an- 
niversary meeting of the Economic Commis- 
sion for Africa. 

A decade may in some eras be an insignificant 
instant in the sweep of history. But the past 
decade in African history has been truly mo- 
mentous. It has witnessed the revolution of in- 
dependence and the emergence of new and 
dynamic approaches to economic and social 
development. If more new nations have 
acliieved their independence in this decade 
than in any other, so, too, have these new na- 
tions — their leaders and their peoples — begun 
to cope with more problems than in any other 
comparable period of time. Above all, this 
past decade has been one of intense challenge 
and vigorous response. 

In these crowded and busy years the Eco- 
nomic Commission for Africa — its distin- 
guished Executive Secretary, Robert K. A. 
Gardiner, its staff, and its collective member- 
ship present in these meetings — has made three 
great contributions to our common welfare. 
The Commission has brought a realistic ap- 
praisal to bear on what is happening in Africa. 
It has had the wisdom and understanding to 
point out the path that Africa must take if 
the expectations of independence are to be ful- 
filled. And it has more and more turned its 
abilities to the immediate issues of how the 
governments and peoples of this great conti- 
nent can take practical steps along the road to- 
ward self-reliance. I should like to note in this 
regard the way in whicli the Commission's 
program of work has come to reflect an in- 
creasingly realistic view of what it can do to 
assist in meeting Africa's deepest needs. 



This same decade has been a time of rapid 
evolution in American relationships with 
Africa. It is pertinent to recall that on the 
eve of this decade, in 1957, American policy to- 
ward Africa was given a decisive thrust 
through a major visit to this continent which 
led to an enduring interest on the part of an 
American leader. The visitor was Richard ]\I. 
Nixon, then Vice President of the United 
States. 

As President Nixon said in his message of 
greeting to this assembly : - 

I have seen at first hand Africa's remarkable po- 
tential. . . . 

As we look ahead to the next decade, all of us have 
high hopes for the future of the Continent. The United 
States is proud to be associated with the common quest 
for a better life. 

This past decade, of course, may mean dif- 
ferent things to different peoples, and I would 
not presume to interpret it for other nations. 
Speaking for my Government, however, this 
has been a period of intensive education and 
reeducation for us about Africa. We have had 
to discard old misconceptions and discover the 
new imperatives of African development in 
order to grasp what is essential for United 
States relations with this continent. 

It has been a period of sharing in the diffi- 
cult task of assisting young nations to build 
themselves and of recognizing the rewards of 
diversity in the different solutions you are find- 
ing to your economic and social problems. 

It has also been a time for us of growing 
recognition of the very special relationship 



^ Made on Feb. 6 before the 10th anniversary meet- 
ing of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, 
which was held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Feb. 3-14. 
Mr. Nielsen, who is president of the African-American 
Institute, New York, N.Y., was chairman of the U.S. 
observer delegation to the meeting. 

" For text, see Btn-LBTIN of Mar. 10, 1969, p. 211. 



292 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN 



between the United States and Africa, partly 
because of the histoiy of our national develop- 
ment and particularly because of the origin 
and links of our black population with Africa. 
In the United States we are in the midst of 
profound and sometimes stormy changes in our 
national life. We take pride in them because 
they are the evidence of work in progress in 
the building of a more truly democratic society. 
Out of the experience gained these past years, 
there have emerged five themes of American 
policy toward Africa, whicli are bound to grow 
in strength during the time ahead. These 
themes, moreover, are linked to firmly held 
principles of our domestic life and are set 
within the framework of our worldwide policies. 

Consolidation of Nationhood 

Having welcomed and encouraged the emer- 
gence of new countries in Africa, we strongly 
support their continued national development. 
This means that we do what we appropriately 
can to help the new governments effectively 
respond to the aspirations of their people. 

It means that we favor peaceful evolution 
over armed eruption. Conversely we are con- 
cerned, as Africa is concerned, when there is 
a breakdown in orderly progress. There is a 
long history of American sympathy and sup- 
port for the territorial integrity of African 
countries. The Congo is one illustration, and 
the present deep disquiet over the consequences 
of the hostilities in Nigeria is another. In 
Nigeria, we believe that the humanitarian issue 
of saving lives of innocent victims and the 
political issue of peaceful settlement both com- 
mand the utmost attention of all true friends 
of all Nigerians. The fact that efforts on both 
counts have fallen short of success becomes only 
a reason for trying harder. 

Economic and Social Development 

The United States has not only favored such 
development in Africa but is one of those sev- 
eral nations outside the continent which have 
provided significant resources in the form of 
economic and technical assistance to this end. 
To date, our contributions to the developing 
nations of Africa have amounted to more than 
$4 billion of public funds and over $1 billion 
of private investment. While the new adminis- 
tration in Washington has not yet completed 
its review of U.S. foreign policies, including 
foreign economic policy, I can assure you of 



continuing American interest in helping you 
in your development efforts. Many of you have 
met and talked with President Nixon when he 
served as Vice President, or in his subsequent 
travels, and you kiiow of his strong personal 
intei'est in your economic progress. 

Economic growth throughout the continent 
is essential to the welfare of each nation. It 
also has broad and important international 
implications. It is conducive to sound relations 
between Africa and the rest of the world. It, 
moreover, depends upon and contributes to 
cooperative relationships among African states 
themselves. 

In this regard, the EGA has played a most 
significant part in contributing to such regional 
and intra-African cooperation: in helping 
establish institutions such as the African De- 
velopment Bank; in searching out opportuni- 
ties for regional cooperation in industrial ex- 
pansion; in cooperative efforts to meet the 
desperate need for trained personnel, such as 
the Institute for Economic Development and 
Planning in Dakar; and in assisting multi- 
national projects such as the current effort to 
bring together other multilateral agencies and 
bilateral donors in developing a regional pro- 
gram in West Africa to improve rice produc- 
tion and marketing — a program which the 
United States as one of the sponsors enthusias- 
tically supports. 

In addition to EGA, of course, are the several 
other members of the U.N. family including 
the specialized agencies, the UNDP [United 
Nations Development Program], the IBRD 
[International I5ank for Reconstruction and 
Development] and IMF [International Mone- 
tary Fund], which are contributing to African 
development. We are pleased to note the evi- 
dence of closer cooperation between EGA and 
the other members of the U.N. family and the 
instruction to the Executive Secretary in the 
draft commemorative resolution to continue and 
intensify his efforts in this direction. 

African Self-Reliance 

Whatever resources are available from out- 
side the continent, African leaders recognize 
that the major burden must rest with Africans 
themselves. There is no substitute for African 
self-reliance. In the sphere of political rela- 
tions, self-reliance avoids a major pitfall — the 
danger of domination by others — and provides 
a sound general basis for mutually satisfac- 
tory relationships. In the economic sphere, it 



ArniL 7, 1969 



293 



means the best possible use of all kinds of re- 
sources — financial, material, and human. 

The EGA has opened up such paths to its 
members. It is therefore most appropriate that 
self-reliance, the theme of this session, become 
the goal for all of Africa. 

Self-Determination, Majority Rule, Equality 

Another goal for Africa — one which we also 
share and support — is the application of self- 
determination, majority rule, and human 
equality throughout the continent. Our con- 
viction on this matter stems from both our prac- 
tical experience and our practical idealism. 
We know from experience that failure to apply 
these principles fully within a society taints 
these principles and also cripples the potential 
of a country for economic and social advance- 
ment. This lesson, we believe, applies with 
equal validity in the southern portion of Africa. 

We have refused to condone abroad what we 
oppose at home. This is an enduring part of 
my Goverimient's policy toward these African 
problems. In this assembly, with its special con- 
cern for economic and social progress, it is 
appropriate to underscore the added handicap 
such systems impose on the welfare of the peo- 
ples involved. I am sure that no one under- 
estimates the difficulties involved in seeking 
to change the present situation or the insidious 
eifects of complacency in the face of blatant dis- 
crimination. Nor does anyone advocate the 
abandonment of principles just because they 
are difficult to achieve. 

Identity of Aspirations 

Perhaps the most important theme which 
guides our relations with Africa, but also one 
of the most intangible, is the identity of aspira- 
tions that knits the peoples of our two conti- 
nents together. I am convinced that this iden- 
tity springs fundamentally from a common 
experience in the struggle for freedom — yours 
in this decade has taken the particular form 
of national independence; ours has taken the 
form of individual human rights. But in 
essence they are the same. They are essential 
elements of life in the heart of Africa, as in 
the heart of America. 

When Vice President Nixon reported his 
initial views of Africa over a decade ago, he 



spoke of things all Africa had in common : the ' 
love of independence and the determination to 
protect it ; a search for economic progress and 
the means to achieve it; the quest for dignity 
and equality and the right to expect it from 
others. He spoke also of his belief that Africa 
could achieve these goals and that the result 
in years to come would have profound effects 
on the rest of the world. In his inaugural 
address of 2 weeks ago. President Nixon 
quoted a distinguished American poet, Archi- 
bald MacLeish, on the astronauts' view of the 
world as seen from outer space: "to see our- 
selves as riders on the earth together . . . 
brothers who know now they are truly 
brothers." 

Although these two statements by President 
Nixon span the years we are commemorating 
in this ceremony, they have an identity which 
we all can share. For independence, progress, 
and equality are the basis for the brotherhood 
so essential to our common future on this planet. 



Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Established by President Nixon 

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT 

White House press release dated March 20 

The President on March 20 issued an Exec- 
utive order establishing the President's For- 
eign Intelligence Advisory Board. The order J 
reorganizes and reconstitutes the President's ■ 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board originally 
established by President Eisenliower in 1956 
as the President's Board of Consultants on 
Foreign Intelligence Activities and continued 
by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board. 

Under the terms of the order the Board is 
charged with the responsibility of keeping the 
President advised with respect to the total for- 
eign intelligence effort and of reporting peri- 
odically to the President its findings, appraisals, 
and recommendations for achieving increased 
effectiveness of the United States foreign intel- 
ligence effort. The Board wiU make its reports 



294 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



after conducting an objective review and as- 
sessment of foreign intelligence and related 
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and other United States Government depart- 
ments and agencies. 

The members of the Board have been chosen 
by the President from qualified persons outside 
the Government. The members of the Board, in 
whose qualifications and integrity the Presi- 
dent has the fullest confidence, are as follows: 

Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman, president, Institute for 
Defense Analyses 

George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions 

WiUiam O. Baker, vice president, research, Bell Tele- 
phone Laboratories, Inc. 

Gordon Gray, former Special Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for National Security Affairs 

Edwin H. Land, president, Polaroid Corporation 

Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and 
Alexander 

Franklin D. Murphy, chairman of the board, Times- 
Mirror Corp. 

Robert D. Murphy, chairman of the board. Corning 
Glass International 

Frank Pace, Jr., president, International Executive 
Service Corps 

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York 

J. Patrick Coyne has been appointed by the 
President to serve as Executive Secretary of 
the Board. He has served in this capacity with 
similar Intelligence Advisory Boards utilized 
by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson. 



EXECUTIVE ORDER 11460' 

Establishing the Peesident's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisoby Board 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President 
of the United States, it is ordered as follows : 

Section 1. There is hereby established the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as "the Board". The Board shall : 

(1) advise the President concerning the objectives, 
conduct, management and coordination of the various 
activities making up the overall national intelligence 
effort ; 

(2) conduct a continuing review and assessment of 
foreign intelligence and related activities in which the 
Central Intelligence Agency and other Government de- 
partments and agencies are engaged ; 

(3) receive, consider and take appropriate action 
with respect to matters identified to the Board, by 



' 34 Fed. Reg. 5535. 



the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government 
departments and agencies of the intelligence com- 
munity, in which the support of the Board will further 
the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort; 
and 

(4) report to the President concerning the Board's 
findings and appraisals, and make appropriate recom- 
mendations for actions to achieve increased effective- 
ness of the Government's foreign intelligence effort In 
meeting national intelligence needs. 

Sec. 2. In order to facilitate performance of the 
Board's functions, the Director of Central Intelligence 
and the heads of all other departments and agencies 
shall make available to the Board all information with 
respect to foreign intelligence and related matters 
which the Board may require for the purpose of carry- 
ing out its responsibilities to the President in ac- 
cordance with the terms of this Order. Such informa- 
tion made available to the Board shall be given all 
necessary security protection in accordance with the 
terms and provisions of applicable laws and regula- 
tions. 

Sec. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed by 
the President from among persons outside the Govern- 
ment, qualified on the basis of knowledge and experi- 
ence in matters relating to the national defense and 
security, or possessing other knowledge and abilities 
which may be expected to contribute to the effective 
performance of the Board's duties. The members of 
the Board shall receive such compensation and allow- 
ances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed here- 
after. 

Sec. 4. The Board shall have a staff headed by an 
Executive Secretary, who shall be appointed by the 
President and shall receive such compensation and al- 
lowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed 
by the Board. The Executive Secretary shall be au- 
thorized, subject to the approval of the Board and 
consonant with law, to appoint and fix the compen- 
sation of such personnel as may be necessary for per- 
formance of the Board's duties. 

Sec. 5. Compensation and allowances of the Board, 
the Executive Secretary, and members of the staff, to- 
gether with other expenses arising in connection with 
the work of the Board, shall be paid from the appropri- 
ation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" 
in the Executive OflBce Appropriation Act, 1969, Public 
Law 90-350, 82 Stat. 195, and, to the extent permitted 
by law, from any corresponding appropriation which 
may be made for subsequent years. Such payments 
shall be made without regard to the provisions of 
section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of 
the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 
and 673). 

Sec. 6. Executive Order No. 10938 of May 4, 1961, la 
hereby revoked. 

The White House, 
March 20, 1969. 



APRIL 7, 1969 



•295 



IJC Asked To Study Pollution Risks 
From Lake Erie Oil Spills 

Press release 60 dated March 21 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

Identical letters were sent on March 21 from 
the U.S. and Canadian Goveriunents to the re- 
spective Chairmen of the International Joint 
Commission requesting the Commission as a 
matter of urgency to Investigate and make a 
special report on the risks of transboundary 
pollution that could result from oil and gas 
drilling and production operations on Lake 
Erie. Recent serious oil spills, such as that in 
the Santa Barbara Chamiel, have led the U.S. 
and Canadian Governments to seek to deal with 
any similar problem before it arises so as to 
minimize the possibility of such a disaster on 
the international Great Lakes. 



TEXT OF U.S. LETTER 

RLvRCH 21, 1969 
Honorable Matthew E. Welsh 
Chairman^ U.S. Section 
International Joint Oommission 
Washington, B.C. 20U0 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I refer to your letter 
of 11 April 1968 ' reporting the results of an ex- 
ploratory meeting convened by the Internation- 
al Joint Commission approximately a year ago 
to obtain infonnation about the programs for 
drilling for oil and gas in Lake Erie which are 
in eifect or are contemplated by the Province 
of Ontario and certain of the riparian States. 
In that letter you reported that the responsible 
State and Pro^dncial officials considered that 
there was minimal risk of pollution of the 
Lake's waters from drilling and production op- 
erations and that "with existing technology, 
any accidental escape of oil would be limited 
to a matter of minutes." 

The recent serious oil spill off the coast of 
California may cast some doubt on the proposi- 
tions that existing teclmology is adequate to 
confine the destnictive consequences of a run- 
away oil well or that the risks of serious pollu- 
tion can be described as minimal. The Cali- 
fornia experience suggests the necessity of a 



' Not printed. 



careful review of safety precautions and pro- 
cedures applicable in Lake Erie, particularly 
in view of the shallow and confined nature of 
this body of water. 

Accordingly the Commission is requested as 
a matter of urgency within the framework of 
the existing International Joint Commission 
pollution reference dated October 7, 1964, on 
Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International 
Section of the St. Lawrence River to investigate 
and to make a special report at the earliest pos- 
sible date on the following matters: 

(1) The adequacy of existing safety require- 
ments and procedures in Canada and in the 
United States applicable to drilling and produc- 
tion operations in Lake Erie to prevent oil from 
escaping into the Lake so as to produce serious 
transboundary oil pollution conditions; 

(2) The adequacy of existing mechanical, 
chemical and other methods of confining, remov- 
ing, dispersing and cleaning up any major oil 
spill that may occur in Lake Erie from any 
source, bearing in mind the damage that such 
metliods may cause to marine life, domestic 
water supplies or to other beneficial uses of the 
Lake in both countries ; and 

(3) The adequacy of existing contingency 
plans and the actions taken to implement them 
to confine and clean up transboundary pollution 
and to prevent or mitigate the destructive trans- „ 
boundary effects of any major oil spill from any I 
source that may occur in Lake Erie. 

If the Commission finds that any of the exist- 
ing safety requirements, methods or plans re- 
ferred to in clauses numbered (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively, are inadequate, the Commission is 
requested to make recommendations as to what 
action should be taken to correct any such 
inadequacy. 

Aforeover if after preliminary investigation 
tlie Commission is of the opinion that interim 
measures are necessary with resjDect to one or 
more of the matters being herein referred to it, 
the Commission is requested to make recom- 
mendations concerning any such measures in 
advance of submitting its main report and 
recommendations. 

The Governments of Canada and the United 
States are equally concerned about the risk of 
serious oil pollution in the Great Lakes from 
other sources, notably major oil spills from 
marine or industrial mishaps such as those re- 
ferred to in your letter of 11 April 1968. The 
discharge of oil from land-based sources and 



296 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



from normal vessel operations is already being 
studied by the Commission. The threat of major 
oil pollution as a result of a disaster to a vessel 
in the Great Lakes involves broader interna- 
tional considerations. This aspect of the over-all 
problem is under study by the two Governments 
through other appropriate channels. 

I am advised that a similar letter is being sent 
by the Under Secretai-y of State for External 
Affairs to the Canadian Co-Chairman of the 
Commission. 

Sincerely yours, 

Martin J. HrLLENBR.\ND 

Assistant Secretary of State 
for European Affairs 



World Trade Week, 1969 

A PROCLAMATION' 

There is a clear interrelationship between America's 
economic health and that of the rest of the world. It 
follows from this that the cause of stability and peace 
is served by the advancement of free-flowing world 
trade. 

The United States work.s closely with other nations 
to promote the expansion of trade on an equitable basis 
in the world market. Our national trade policy sup- 
ports the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 
other international institutions that seek new ways to 
facilitate the fair exchange of goods between nations. 
By reducing barriers to trade the United States and 
its trading partners have contributed to the growth 
of the world economy. 

As we work toward freer trade, we recognize that 
our greatest strength lies in the traditional competitive 
urge of American business and labor. As their interna- 
tional efforts increase their earnings, the nation bene- 
fits from a strengthened dollar position and an im- 
proved balance of payments. 

Exports of United States merchandise rose to a 
record $34 billion in 1968, $3 billion more than in 1967. 
Imports of foreign products into the United State.s, 
attracted by vigorous domestic economic activity and 
rising consumer income, reached almost $33 billion, an 
increase of $6 billion. 

Since imports advanced much faster than exports, 
our trade .surplus dropped $3 billion to a total of less 
than $1 billion. One lesson in this decline is especially 
important : We mu.st intensify our efforts to contain 
inflationary pressures at home, helping make our ex- 
ports more competitive ; as our exports expand, we will 
restore a healthy trade surplus. 

Additional outlets are needed for the diver.sity and 
abundance of our industrial and agricultural produc- 
tion. We also must find ways to help less developed 
countries participate more fully in world trade. 

Enlarged markets for our goods and services speed 



the pace of our economic progress and advance the 
well-being of all our people. New markets abroad 
create new jobs at home ; new avenues of world trade 
run parallel to new roads to world peace. 

Government in the past has helped American industry 
and agriculture to open up new markets abroad; to- 
day we are more willing and better prepared to help 
than ever before. 

Now, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NixoN, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week 
beginning May 18, 1969, as World Trade Week; and 
I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local 
officials to cooperate in the observance of that week. 

I iirge business, labor, agricultural, educational, pro- 
fessional, and civic groups, as well as the people of 
the United States generally, to observe World Trade 
Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, cere- 
monies, and other appropriate activities designed to 
promote continuing awareness of the importance of 
world trade to our economy and our relations with 
other nations. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this eighteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the one hundred 
and ninety-third. 



National Maritime Day, 1969 

A PROCLAMATION' 

The American Merchant Marine must project the 
Nation's economic strength throughout the world in 
peacetime and give mobility to our national defense in 
times of emergency. Its vessels must enable us to com- 
pete effectively in international trade and to trans- 
port and supply our Armed Forces in defense of 
freedom. 

Through the cooperation of business, labor, and 
Government, and with prudent use of advancing tech- 
nology, the American Merchant Marine must become 
capable of providing modern, productive service to 
the Nation's commerce as an integral part of 
transportation. 

A strong and profitable merchant fleet is vital to 
America's economic welfare and defense capability. The 
American flag on merchant vessels on the high seas and 
in foreign ports is a symbol of our Nation's dedication 
to peaceful trade throughout the world. 

To remind Americans of the Important role the 
Merchant Marine plays in our national life, the Con- 
gress in 1933 designated the anniversary of the first 
transatlantic voyage by a steamship, the SS Savannah, 
on May 22, 1819, as National Maritime Day, and re- 
quested the Pre.sident to issue a proclamation annually 
in observance of that day. 

Now, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NixoN, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby urge the people 



' No. 3901 ; 34 Fed. Reg. .5423. 



' No. 3902 ; 34 Fed. Reg. .5479. 



APRIL, 7, 1969 



297 



of the United States to honor our American Merchant 
Marine on May 22, 1969, by displaying the flag of the 
United States at their homes and other suitable places, 
and I request that all ships sailing under the American 
flag dress ship on that day in tribute to the American 
Merchant Marine. 

In witness whebeof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this eighteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the one 
hundred and ninety-third. 



Patent and Copyright Conventions 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, ( 1 ) a copy of 
the Convention Establishing the World Intel- 
lectual Property Organization, signed at Stock- 
holm on July 14, 1967, and (2) a copy of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus- 
trial Property, as revised at Stockholm on 
July 14, 1967. 1 transmit also, for the informa- 
tion of the Senate, the report of the Secretary 
of State with respect to the Conventions. 

The Conventions remained open for signature 
until January 13, 1968. During that period the 
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization was signed on behalf 
of 51 States, including the United States, and 
the Paris Convention was signed on behalf of 
46 States, including the United States. Both 
Conventions remain open for accession. 

(1) Convention Establishing a World Intel- 
lectual Property Organization. Two significant 
services will be rendered by the new organiza- 
tion. First, it will provide a coordinated admin- 



istration for the various intellectual property 
Unions presently administered by the Secre- 
tariat, the United International Bureaus for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property, and 
through such administration, render an econom- 
ical and efficient service to the Member States 
and the interests protected by the Unions. Sec- 
ond, it will promote the protection of intellec- 
tual property, not only for Member States of 
the intellectual property Unions, but also for 
the States which, while not members of the 
Unions, are parties to the World Intellectual 
Property Organization Convention. This is of 
particular importance since a forum will thus 
be provided for the advancement of industrial 
property and copyright protection on a world- 
wide basis. 

(2) Revision of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property. Adminis- 
trative and structural reforms in the Paris 
Convention have long been overdue, and the 
modernization of the Union which has been 
accomplished by the Stockholm revision will be 
of importance in expanding the protection of 
industrial property. 

A limited amendment to one substantive pro- 
vision of the Paris Convention was also effected 
at the Conference. This amendment would 
accord to applications for inventors' certificates 
of the Eastern European countries the right of 
priority presently accorded to patent applica- 
tions, provided that the Eastern European coun- 
tries maintain a dual system of both inventors' 
certificates and patents and that both are avail- 
able to foreign nationals. Inclusion of this 
provision is considered helpful to furthering 
industrial property relations with Eastern 
European countries. 

The Stockholm Act of the Paris Convention 
and the World Intellectual Property Organiza- 
tion Convention will make a significant con- 
tribution to the protection of the foreign 
intellectual property rights of American 
nationals. I recommend that the Senate give 
early and favorable consideration to the Con- 
ventions submitted herewith and give its advice 
and consent to their ratifications. 



'Transmitted on Mar. 12 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. A, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the texts of the conventions and the 
report of the Secretary of State. 



Richard Nixon 



The White House, 

March 12, 1968. 



298 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences ^ 



Scheduled April Through June 

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (resumed 

March 18). 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Governing 
f~ Council. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions on Transport 

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 3d Session 

Economic Commission for Europe: 24th Plenary Session 

6th ICAO Air Navigation Conference 

U.N. International Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Law of Treaties: 

2d Session. 

NATO Ministerial Council: 43d Meeting 

FAO Study Group on Hard Fibers and Consultative Subcommittee: 3d 

Session. 
BIRPI Council of Europe: Joint Ad Hoc Meeting on International 

Classification of Patents. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution 

IMCO Subcommittee on Marine Pollution: 6th Session 

Economic Commission for Latin America: 13th Session 

FAO Banana Study Group and Committee on Statistics 

Inter-American Children's Institute: 49th Session of the Directing Council 

IMCO Legal Committee: 5th Session 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 25th Plenary Session . 
FAO European Commission for Control of Foot and Mouth Disease: 

16th Session. 
BIRPI Paris Union Committee for International Cooperation in Informa- 
tion Retrieval Among Examining Patent Offices: 1st Session of the 

Technical Coordination Committee. 

FAO Committee on Fisheries: 4th Session 

WMO Executive Committee: Working Group of Experts on Antarctic 

Meteorology. 
Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 8th Annual Meeting of 

the Board of Directors, 3d Meeting Permanent Budget Committee, and 

14th Meeting of Technical Advisory Council. 
BIRPI Consultants on the Proposed Patent Cooperation Treaty .... 

ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination 

UNESCO Executive Board: 82d Session 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Ooeanographic Commission: Working Group 

on Restructuring IOC. 

U.N. Industrial Development Organization 

OECD Agriculture Committee 

ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 

UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences: 2d Session 

ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 9th Session 

GATT Working Party on Border Taxes 



Geneva . . 


Mar. 14, 1962— 


Rome . . . 


Apr. 1-2 


Geneva . . 
Geneva . . 
Geneva . . 
Montreal . . 
Vienna . . . 


Apr. 8-11 
Apr. 9-25 
Apr. 9-25 
Apr. 9-May 3 
Apr. 9- May 21 


Washington . 
Rome . . . 


Apr. 10-11 
Apr. 10-19 


Bern .... 


Apr. 14-16 


Geneva . . . 
London . . . 

Lima 

Pan ami . . . 
Montevideo . . 
London . . . 
Singapore . . . 
Rome . . . . 


Apr. 14-18 
Apr. 14-18 
Apr. 14-21 
Apr. 14-22 
Apr. 14-27 
Apr. 15-18 
Apr. 15-28 
Apr. 16-18 


Geneva . . . 


Apr. 17-18 


Rome . . . . 
Buenos Aires . 


Apr. 17-23 
Apr. 17-25 


Quito . . . . 


Apr. 20-27 


Geneva . . . 
New York . . 

Paris 

Paris 


Apr. 21-24 
Apr. 21-May 9 
Apr. 22-May 20 
Apr. 23-26 


Vienna . . . . 

Paris 

Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 
Geneva . . . 


Apr. 24-May 15 
Apr. 28-30 
Apr. 28-May 2 
Apr. 28-May 2 
Apr. 28-May 9 
April 



' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Mar. 19, 1969, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period March-June 
1969. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in those 
are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government? Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intel- 
lectual Property; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for 
Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council;* FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council; ICAO, In ternational; Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Com- 
mittee on European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organi- 
zation; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; 
U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations 
Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, 
United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 



APRIL 7, 1969 



299 



Calendar of International Conferences —Continued 

Scheduled April Through June — Continued 



Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission on 

Products Liability. 

IAEA Board of Governors: Special Meeting 

ICAO Panel on Study of Economics of Route Air Facilities 

ITU Administrative Council 

FAO Codex Committees 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program .... 
IMCO Working Group on IMCO Objectives and Methods: 2d Session . 

WMO Regional Association VI (Europe) : 5th Session 

ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety 

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 7th Annual Meeting .... 

OECD Energy Committee 

IMCO Council: 22d Session 

ICEM Council: 30th Session, and Executive Committee, 33d Session . . 

Economic and Social Council: 46th Session 

PAHO Conference of American Ministers of Agriculture on Hoof and 

Mouth Disease. 

FAO Study Group on Citrus Fruit: 4th Session 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 4th Session 

UNICEF Executive Board 

SEATO Council: 14th Meeting 

FAO Study Group on Grains: 12th Session 

PAIGH Directing Council: 12th Meeting 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Coordination 

Group on Southern Ocean. 

ILO Governing Body: 175th Session 

ICAO Statistics Panel 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 26th Session 

ITU Working Party of the International Radio Consultative Committee . 

WMO Executive Committee: 21st Session 

IMCO Conference on Tonnage Measurement 

Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 9th General Assembly. 
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 

19th Session. 
UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign to Save 

the Monuments of Nubia: 17th Meeting. 

International Coffee Organization Council 

International Coffee Organization Executive Board 

International Cotton Advisorj^ Committee 

International Cotton Institute: 4th General Assembly 

U.N. Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space. 
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 19th 

Meeting. 

ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 9th Session 

Inter-American Cultural Council: 6th Meeting 

ILO Conference: 53d Session 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group 

to Prepare Proposals on Expanded Scientific Programs for 6th IOC 

Meeting. 

FAO Council : 52d Session 

BIRPI Consultants on Patent Cooperation Treaty 

lA-ECOSOC Ministerial and Expert Level Meetings 

Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses 

UNESCO Working Group on Legal Aspects of Scientific Investigation . 

ICAO Passport Card Panel 

UNDP Governing Council: 8th Session 

International Whaling Commission 

UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group on Supplementary Financing . . . 

International Wheat Council 

ILO Governing Body: 176th Session 

UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences: 3d Session 

ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 17th Plenary Session .... 
FAO/WHO Joint Committee of Government Experts on the Code of 

Principles Concerning Milk and Milk Products: 12th Session. 
UNESCO International Hydrological Decade: 5th Session of the Coordi- 
nating Council. 

WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Committee 

IAEA Board of Governors 



The Hague . . April 


Vienna . . 


. . April 


Montreal . 


. . May 3-23 


Geneva . 


. . May 3-23 


Washington . . May 5-16 


Rome . 


. . May 5-13 


London 


. . May 6-8 


Varna, Bu 


garia May 6-20 


Geneva 


. . May 7-9 


London 


. . May 7-12 


Paris . . 


. . May 8-9 


London 


. . May 12-16 


Geneva 


. . May 12-20 


New York 


. . May 12- June 6 


Rio de Janeiro. May 14-17 


Rome . 


. . May 19-23 


Geneva 


. . May 19-30 


Santiago 


. . May 19-31 


Bangkok 


. . May 20-21 


Rome . 


. . May 21-28 


Washington . . May 26-27 


Paris . . . 


. . May 26-31 


Geneva 


. . May 26-31 


Montreal 


. . May 26-June 6 


New York 


. . May 26-June 13 


Geneva 


. . May 27-June 5 


Geneva 


. . May 27-June 13 


London 


. . May 27-June 23 


Washington . . May 28-June 19 


New York 


. . May 


Paris . . 


. . May 


London 


. . May 


London 


. . May 


Kampala 


. . May 


Kampala 


. . May 


Geneva 


. . May or June 


Warsaw . 


. . June 2-7 


Bangkok 


. . June 2-16 


Port-of-Spain . June 3-10 


Geneva 


. . June 4-26 


Paris . . 


. . June 9-12 


Rome . 


. . June 9-20 


Geneva 


. . June 14-15 


Port-of-Sp 


ain . June 14-23 


Paris . . 


. . June 1.5-22 


Paris . . 


. . June 16-19 


Montreal 


. . June 16-20 


Geneva 


. . June 16- July 3 


London 


. . June 23-28 


Geneva 


. . June 23-July 4 


London 


. . June 24-27 


Geneva 


. . June 27-July 4 


Geneva 


. . June 30- July 18 


Geneva 


. . June 


Rome . 


. . June 


Paris . . . 


. . June 


Washingto 


n . . June 


Vienna . 


. . June 



i 



300 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



I 



U.S. Supports U.N. Security Council Resolution on Namibia 



Folloimng is a statement tn-ade in the U.N. 
Security Cmoncil on March 20 hy U.S. Repre- 
sentative Charles W. Yost, together with the 
text of a resolution adopted hy the Council tluit 
day. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOST 

U.S. /U.N. press release 28 dated March 20 

Mr. President, the meeting of the Security 
Council today on Namibia at the request of 45 
members of the United Nations is truly of his- 
toric importance when we consider the train of 
events that has brought us here. 

Beginning in 1947, the question of Namibia, 
or South West Africa, has been repeatedly con- 
sidered by the General Assembly. Early and 
unsuccessful efforts were made to place this 
territory, along with other League of Nations 
mandates, within the United Nations trustee- 
ship system. The International Court of Justice 
in advisoiy opinions stated that the mandate 
under which South Africa administered the 
territory had not lapsed and that South Africa 
was under an obligation to account to the United 
Nations, which inherited the supervisory func- 
tions formerly executed by the League of Na- 
tions. Efforts were also made, by the adoption 
of re.solutions and the establishment of commis- 
sions, to make it possible for the people of 
Namibia to exercise their inherent right of self- 
determination as provided in chapters XI and 
XII of the charter. All of these efforts and 
appeals by the international community were re- 
buffed by the Govermnent of South Africa. 

In 1966 the General Assembly adopted Reso- 
lution 2145 (XXI), ^ in which the Assembly 
decided that by virtue of the breach of its ob- 



^ For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 5, 1966, p. 871. 



ligations and its disavowal of the mandate. 
South Africa had forfeited its mandate in 
Namibia. 

Having decided that this mandate had termi- 
nated, the General Assembly also decided that 
the territory came under the direct responsibil- 
ity of the United Nations. What is this respon- 
sibility ? First, we submit, it is to be informed 
and to keep the world fully aware of develop- 
ments affecting the vital interests of all Nami- 
bians; second, to promote those interests by all 
peacefid and practicable means; and third, to 
seek to assist the Namibians in the exercise of 
their right to self-detennination. It is a cause 
of deep regret that the LTnited Nations has to 
date been prevented from exercising its respon- 
sibilities in Namibia. 

Among other provisions, Resolution 2145 
(XXI) called on South Africa not to take any 
further steps which might tend to alter the in- 
ternational status of the territory. Under the 
guise of "steps to promote self-determination of 
the people," South Africa soon appeared to have 
embarked on what amounted to piecemeal an- 
nexation of the territory. 

In 1967 we learned that South Africa had en- 
acted the so-called Terrorism Act. This measure 
was soundly condemned by the international 
commmiity and its application to Namibia de- 
clared to be illegal. In 1968 the United Nations 
demanded the release and repatriation of Na- 
mibians held in connection with this act. Also 
in 1968 an additional step in the direction of 
annexation was taken when South Africa 
adopted the Self-Government for Native Na- 
tions of South West Africa Act. According to 
statements made by South Africa, the provisions 
of this act were ari'ived at through con.sultation 
with the people of Namibia and therefore repre- 
sented a valid form of self-determination. My 
Government in the past has been unable to ac- 
cept this assertion and is still imable to do so. 



APRIL 7, 1969 



301 



"We would like to know, for example, who were 
the people consulted, about what propositions, 
and by what means. 

More recently, we understand that still an- 
other bill has been passed by the South African 
Parliament concerning Namibia: the so-called 
South West Africa affairs bDl. This bill appears 
to be a further effort to consolidate South Af- 
rica's control over Namibia by giving the South 
African Parliament and central government de- 
partments wide powers over the affairs of 
Namibia. We have urged South Africa not to 
enact this legislation. 

These actions which I have briefly outlined 
show that South Africa is not only attempting 
to annex Namibia but is also extending its 
heinous policy of apartheid — a policy wliich has 
been condemned by all here present^to that ter- 
ritory. Mr. President, the United States voted 
in favor of Resolution 2145 (XXI). We believe 
that South Africa's actions which I have briefly 
summarized demonstrate that the General As- 
sembly was correct in determining that South 
Africa had forfeited the right to administer 
Namibia and in concluding that the U.N. should 
assume responsibility for the territory. The 
United States shares the objective of the mem- 
bers which have taken the initiative in bringing 
this matter to the Council. We, like them, are 
firmly dedicated to the achievement of freedom 
and independence by the people of Namibia. 
For our part, the United States is willing to 
take every peaceful and practical step under 
the charter which would assist, or would be 
likely to assist, in the achievement of this goal. 

Earlier I stated that this meeting of the 
Council was of historic significance. Although 
the Security Council met on two occasions in 
1968 to consider South Africa's actions in 
illegally arresting and bringing to trial 37 
Namibians, this is the first time that the Council 
has met to consider the situation created by 
South Africa's refusal to implement Resolution 
2145 (XXI). In this new setting, we will per- 
form the highest service to the Namibian people 
if we seek ways and means by which a peaceful 
solution to the problem may be possible. And 
the South African Government, for its part, 
must be prepared to reexamine its provocative 
behavior. If I may paraphrase President Nixon, 
the need now is to lower our voices all around 
so that we begin to understand each other. 

In this connection, Mr. President, I am happy 
to state that the United States supports the 



draft resolution which we have before us. I 
would like to pay special tribute to the states- 
manlike way in which consultations which led 
to the present text were conducted. As a result, 
we anticipate that the draft resolution now 
before us will command broad support within 
the Council, crossing regional and ideological 
lines. 

Mr. President, the United States is able to 
support the text of the draft resolution before 
us because it wisely does not commit the Coun- 
cil to the narrow path of mandatory sanctions 
under chapter VII of the charter. As we have 
repeatedly made clear, we believe it would be 
inappropriate in tliis situation to consider 
measures contained in chapter VII. In our judg- 
ment, this is not a situation which can sensibly 
and humanely be remedied by mandatory sanc- 
tions. Such measures would be likely to prove 
ineffective and hence to weaken rather than 
strengthen the prestige and authority of the 
United Nations. For the same reason they 
would, far from improving the lot of the Nami- 
bians, run the risk of making their situation 
even worse than it is today. With these consid- 
erations in mind, we wish again to make clear, 
despite our strong condemnation of South 
African behavior in this regard, the limits be- 
yond which we do not feel it would be either 
wise or feasible for this Council to go in present 
circumstances. 

Despite the fact that South Africa has no 
legal right in Namibia, my Government believes 
that South Africa remains accountable to the 
United Nations for all of its actions in the terri- 
tory and for the well-being of the people there 
so long as it remains in de facto control. We 
think it would help if the South African Gov- 
ernment, which has often protested that its 
actions in Namibia are misunderstood, would 
receive, without any conditions, a special repre- 
sentative of the Secretary General to discuss i 
Namibia or would make some other gesture \ 
which would have the effect of acknowledging 
its responsibilities to the international com- 
munity. In other words, the time has come for 
South Africa to make a fresh effort, in coopera- 
tion with the United Nations, to resolve the 
problem. My Government believes that a just 
and peaceful solution, insuring the rights and 
interests of all of the parties, is still possible; 
and to that end, Mr. President, I pledge the sup- 
port of the United States for all appropriate 
steps. 



302 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION^ 

The Security Council, 

Taking note of General Assembly resolutions 2248 
(S-V) of 19 May 1967; 2324 (XXII) and 2325 (XXII) 
of 16 December 1967; 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 
and 2403 (XXIII) of 16 December 1968, 

Taking into account General Assembly resolution 
2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 by which the General 
Assembly of the United Nations terminated the Man- 
date of South West Africa and assumed direct re- 
sponsibility for the territory until its independence, 

Recalling its resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January 
1968 and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the jwople of 
Namibia to freedom and independence in accordance 
with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 

Mindful of the grave consequences of South Africa's 
continued occupation of Namibia, 

Reaffirming its special responsibility toward the peo- 
ple and the territory of Namibia, 

1. Recognizes that the United Nations General As- 
sembly terminated the mandate of South Africa over 
Namibia and assumed direct responsibility for the ter- 
ritory until its independence ; 

2. Considers that the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia is illegal and contrary to the prin- 
ciples of the Charter and the previous decisions of the 
United Nations and is detrimental to the interests of 
the population of the territory and those of the inter- 
national community ; 

3. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to 
immediately withdraw its administration from the 
territory ; 

4. Declares that the actions of the Government of 
South Africa designed to destroy the national unity 
and territorial integrity of Namibia through the estab- 
lishment of Bantustans are contrary to the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter ; 

5. Declares that the Government of South Africa has 
no right to enact the "South West Africa Affairs Bill", 
as such an enactment would be a violation of the rele- 
vant resolutions of the General Assembly ; 

6. Condemns the refusal of South Africa to comply 
with General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) ; 2248 
(S-V); 2324 (XXII); 2325 (XXII); 2372 (XXII); 
and 2403 (XXIII) and Security Council resolutions 
245 and 246 of 1968 ; 

7. Invites aU States to exert their Influence in order 
to obtain compliance by the Government of South 
Africa with the provisions of the present resolution ; 

8. Decides that in the event of failure on the part of 
the Government of South Africa to comply with the 
provisions of the present resolution, the Security Coun- 
cil will meet immediately to determine upon necessary 
steps or measures in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely 
the implementation of the present resolution and to 
report to the Security Council as soon as possible ; 

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Iran of 
March 5, 1957, as amended (TIAS 4207, 6219), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna March 4, 1969. Enters Into force 
on the date on which the Director General shall have 
received written notification from each Government 
that it has compUed with the constitutional require- 
ments for entry into force. 

Signatures: Iran, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Sep- 
tember 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 
1955. TIAS 3324. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, February 1, 1969. 

Grains 

Memorandum of agreement on basic elements for the 
negotiation of a world grains arrangement. Done 
at Geneva June 30, 1967.' 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 5, 
1969. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization, Signed at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, February 25, 
1969. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered 
into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Adherence deposited: Bhutan (with reservations), 
March 7, 1969. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. 
Entered into force: January 4, 1969.' 

Trade 

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956, 



•U.N. doc. S/RES/264 (1969) ; adopted on Mar. 20 
by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions. 



' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



APRIL 7, 1969 



303 



with respect to the rectifications which relate to parts 
II and III of the General Agreement. TIAS 3677. 
Entry into force of rectifications which relate to part 
I of the General Agreement: February 7, 1969. 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 
1955. 
Entered into force: February 7, 1969. 

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957. 
Entered into fmce: February 7, 1969. 

Seventh protocol of rectifications and mwlifications to 
the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 
1957. 
Entered into force: February 7, 1969. 

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment 
of new schedule III — Brazil — to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (to which are annexed 
the schedules contained in the proc&s-verbaux of 
February 10, March 10, May 13, and May 23, 1959). 
Done at Geneva December 31, 1958. 
Entered into force: February 7, 1969. 

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 
1959. 
Entered into force: February 7, 1969. 

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 
1959. 
Entered into force: February 7, 1969. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 
1954.= 
Accession deposited: Laos, January 28, 1969. 



BILATERAL 



Bolivia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreements of January 16, 1968 (TIAS 
6571, 6573). Signed at La Paz March 7, 1969. En- 
tered into force March 7, 1969. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of January 16, 1968 (TIAS 
6571). Signed at La Paz March 7, 1969. Entered 
into force March 7, 1969. 

Indonesia 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au- 
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio op- 
erators of either country to operate their stations 
in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Djakarta December 10, 1968. Entered into force 
December 10, 1968. 

Iran 

Amendment to the agreement of March 5, 1957, as 
amended (TIAS 4207, 6219), for cooperation con- 
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Wash- 
ington March 18, 1969. Enters into force on the 
date each Government shall have received from the 
other written notification that it has complied with 
all statutory and constitutional requirements for 
entry into force. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on March 13 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Walter H. Annenberg to be Ambassador to Great 
Britain. (For biographic details, see White House press 
release dated February 20.) 

Jacob D. Beam to be Ambassador to the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. ( For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated February 20.) 

John S. D. Eisenhower to be Ambassador to Belgium. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated February 20.) 



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ent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
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The Battle Act Report, 1968. Twenty-first report to 
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General Foreign Policy Series 228. 93 pp. 45^. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Grenada. TIAS (5398. 
5 pp. 50. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the United 
Arab Republic. TIAS 6578. 3 pp. 10(f. 



304 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BCIXETIN 



INDEX Ajml 7, 1969 Vol. ZX, No. 165^ 



Africa. The United States and the Challenge of 
Africa's Development (Nielsen) 292 

Belgium. Eisenhower confirmed as Ambassador . 304 

Canada. IJC Asked To Study Pollution Bisks 
From Lake Erie Oil Spills (U.S. letter) . . 296 

Congress 

Confirmations (Annenberg, Beam, Eisenhower) . 301 

Patent and Copyright Conventions Transmitted 
to the Senate (message from President 
Nixon) 298 

Senate Confirms Henry Kearns as President of 
Export-Import Bank 291 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 

(Annenberg, Beam, Eisenhower) 304 

Disarmament. U.S. Positions at Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Conference Outlined by Presi- 
dent Nixon (letter to U.S. Eepresentative 
Gerard Smith) 289 

Economic Affairs 

IJC Asked To Study Pollution Bisks From Lake 

Erie Oil Spills (U.S. letter) 296 

Patent and Copyright Conventions Transmitted 

to the Senate (message from President 

Nixon) 298 

Senate Confirms Henry Kearns as President of 

Export-Import Bank 291 

World Trade Week, 1969 (proclamation) . . 297 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences . . . 299 
U.S. Positions at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Conference Outlined by President Nixon (letter 
to U.S. Eepresentative Gerard Smith) ... 289 

Namibia. U.S. Supports U.N. Security Council 
Eesolution on Namibia (Xost, text of resolu- 
Uon) 301 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Estab- 
lished by President Nixon 294 

National Maritime Day, 1969 297 

Patent and Copyright Conventions Transmitted 

to the Senate 298 

U.S. Positions at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 

Conference Outlined by President Nixon . . 289 

World Trade Week, 1969 297 

Publications. Eecent Releases 304 

South Africa. U.S. Supports U.N. Security Coun- 
cil Resolution on Namibia (Yost, text of reso- 
lution) 301 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 303 

Patent and Copyright Conventions Transmitted 
to the Senate (message from President 
Nixon) 298 

U.S.S.R. Beam confirmed as Ambassador . . . 304 

United Kingdom. Annenberg confirmed as Am- 
bassador 304 

United Nations 

The United States and the Challenge of Africa's 

Development (Nielsen) 292 

U.S. Supports U.N. Security Council Resolution 

on Namibia (Tost, text of resolution) . . . 301 

Viet-Nam. Ninth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Meets at Paris (Lodge) 290 

Name Index 

Annenberg, Walter H 304 

Beam, Jacob D 304 

Eisenhower, John S. D 304 

Kearns, Henry 291 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 290 

Nielsen, Waldemar A 292 

Nixon, President 289, 294, 297, 298 

Yost, Charles W 301 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20320. 

No. Date Subject 

57 3/20 Lodge: ninth plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 
*oS 3/20 Program for the visit of Prime Min- 
ister Trudeau of Canada. 
to9 3/21 U.S.-Canada agreements on Niagara 
Falls beautification. 
60 3/21 U.S. letter on Lake Erie oil and gas 
drilling. 



*Not printed. 

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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



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20 YEARS OF PEACE 



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•/ 1555 



(<in^ y-^^-^-^ 



TilE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1555 




April H, 1969 



PRESIDENT NIXON DISCUSSES THE VIETNAM PEACE TALKS 
AND THE ABM SAFEGUARD SYSTEM 

Excerpt From Remarks Before National Association of Broadcasters 313 

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE 

&y Ambassador Charles W. Yost 325 

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: SOME MAJOR ISSUES 

Statement by Secretary Rogers 

Before the Senate Gommdttee on Foreign Relations 306 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1555 
April 14, 1969 



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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

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Note: Contents of this pubUcation are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source wlU be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tveekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of tlie Department, as well as special 
articles on various piloses of interna- 
tioruil affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Infornuttion is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
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national relations are listed currently. 



1 



I 

I 



U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Major Issues 



Statement hy Secretary Rogers 



The role which the United States p]ays in the 
world today — the global nature of our interests 
and responsibilities — derives from our economic 
strength and the dynamics of our technology, 
from security considerations, and from the ded- 
ication of our people to hmnan freedom and 
humanitarian causes. It is clear that our involve- 
ments need constantly to be reviewed in the 
light of current conditions and the availability 
of our resources. The administration now is in 
the process of such a review, and in the months 
ahead we will be prepared to discuss with the 
committee the results of that review. This morn- 
ing — with your permission — I would like to 
turn to some of the major foreign policy issues 
with which we are presently faced. 

The Middle East 

One of the major problems we have today is 
how to find a way to bring about peace in the 
Middle East, a peace which has eluded man- 
kind for the last 20 years. Since the 6-day war 
in 1967, the Middle East has been in a state of 
suspended hostility. If the situation continues 
unabated, it could have the most serious conse- 
quences. That is why one of the first policy de- 
cisions made by the administration was to ap- 
prove in principle four-power discussions in 
support of Ambassador Jarring and the United 
Nations in its search for peace. 

It is increasingly clear that the situation in 
that area has deteriorated. In the last 20 years 
the Arabs and Israelis have engaged in major 
hostilities three times, and despite the repeated 
efforts of the United Nations, a stable peace has 
not been attained. Indeed, it is all too clear that 
if another war should break out, it carries with it 
the risk of outside involvement. It becomes, 
therefore, a direct interest of the United States 
to exercise whatever influence it has, in what- 



* Prepared for delivery before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on Mar. 27 (press release 64). 



ever way would be useful and effective, to help 
bring a lasting peace in that area. 

There fortunately exists a firm and equitable 
basis for that search : I refer to the unanimous 
decision of the Security Council of the United 
Nations recorded in its resolution of Novem- 
ber 22, 1967.= That resolution will be the bedrock 
of our policy. I can think of no better way to 
describe the results we would like to see in the 
Middle East than to examine the elements of the 
Security Council resolution. 

Firsts what is the goal? It is clearly and sim- 
ply defined as the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace. The thrust of our effort must 
therefore be to move forward from the condi- 
tions of armistice which have prevailed for 20 
years to a state of peace — mutually accepted if 
it is to be just, and juridically defined and con- 
tractually binding if it is to be lasting. 

Next, the principles and conditions of the 
peace. A just and lasting peace wUl require, as 
the Security Council's resolution states, with- 
drawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the 
termination of all claims or states of belliger- 
ency, and the acknowledgment of the sov- 
ereignty, territorial integrity, and political in- 
dependence of every state in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and recog- 
nized boundaries. Clearly, withdrawal should 
take place to establish boundaries which define 
the areas where Israel and its neighbors may live 
in peace and sovereign independence. Equally, 
there can be no secure and recognized boundaries 
without withdrawal. In our view rectifications 
from the preexisting lines should be confined to 
those required for mutual security and should 
not reflect the weight of conquest. 

The resolution also affirms that free naviga- 
tion through the area's international waterways 
must be guaranteed. The attempt to deny such 
freedom to Israel in one waterway — the Straits 

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 



APRIL 14, 1969 



305 



of Tiran — was an immediate cause of the 1967 
war. Denial of that freedom to Israel in another 
waterway — the Suez Canal— has been for 20 
years a symbol of the absence of a state of peace. 
We believe that the right of Israel, as of all 
other states, is to have the right to transit these 
waterways and that that right must be assured. 

The resolution affirms the need for a just set- 
tlement of the refugee problem. There can be no 
real peace without a genuine solution to that 
intractable problem, now made more tragic by 
the displacement of even more i^eople as a result 
of the 1967 war. The human dimension of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern 
to the United States for 20 years. Its just settle- 
ment can only be one which takes into account 
to the maximum possible extent the desires and 
aspirations of the individual hmnan beings 
concerned. 

As a last principle, the resolution affirms the 
necessity of guaranteeing the territorial inviola- 
bility and political independence of every state 
in the area through measures including the es- 
tablishment of demilitarized zones. Here again, 
as in the case of freedom of navigation, the 
resolution introduces the concept of guarantee- 
ing certain conditions of peace. Despite the im- 
perfections of the past, we believe that ways 
can be devised for international participation 
in guaranteeing the terms of settlement as they 
relate to physical arrangements on the ground, 
with particular reference to the rights of navi- 
gation and demilitarization of strategic areas. 

Finally, what is the mechanism for realizing 
the principles and provisions of the Security 
Council resolution? In its tliird paragraph, the 
resolution asks the Secretary General of the 
United Nations to designate a representative to 
promote agreement and assist in efforts to 
achieve a peaceful and acceptable settlement. 
That representative, to whose patient compe- 
tence I wish to pay special tribute this morning, 
is Ambassador Jarring of Sweden. His mission 
is to promote agreement — and this can only 
mean agreement between the parties and among 
the parties. We lay stress on this point because 
we do not believe that a peace settlement to 
which the parties did not agree would be just or 
lasting or, for that matter, attainable at all. We, 
for our part, are not interested in imposing a 
peace. 

Regrettably, in the 22 months since the war 
Ambassador Jarring and the parties have not 
made significant progress. In these circum- 
stances, we are convinced that the United States 



has a responsibility to help. Our interests would 
be ill served in the absence of a settlement. Fur- 
thermore, we and the other permanent members 
of the Security Council were instrumental in 
forging the 1967 resolution which created the 
mission of Ambassador Jarring. Historically, 
the United Nations has played a special role in 
helping shape the political evolution of the 
Middle East. 

For all these reasons, we have concluded that 
the United States should play an active role, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, in support of the 
United Nations effort. We are therefore actively 
engaged diplomatically with the other major 
powers and in particular with the other perma- 
nent members of the Security Council, as well 
as with the principal parties in the area, in ef- 
forts to help Ambassador Jarring accomplish 
his mission. If there is a genuine will to peace 
on the part of those directly concerned, we be- 
lieve that the just rights and legitimate security 
of all the states and peoples in the Middle East 
can be realized. In the interests of friendly rela- 
tions with all states in that area, we shall work 
to that end in the days ahead. 

Viet-Nam 

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to 
Viet-Nam. On Viet-Nam as on the Middle East, 
we will endeavor and are endeavoring to estab- 
lish a permanent solution in which North Viet- 
Nam and its neighbors live in peace and not 
simply in a state of suspended war. 

The President has already made clear our 
firm resolve to achieve an honorable peace in 
Viet-Nam. No other objective and no other 
problem is of greater importance. 

To achieve this will not be easy. We expect 
progress will come primarily through private 
discussions and negotiations — ^this has been the 
history of the negotiations in the past. The 
other side insists that private talks, when they 
are held, must be private ; that everything that 
transpires must be kept secret ; and that there be 
no public discussion of these talks. And I am 
sure the members of this committee will recog- 
nize that private talks must indeed remain pri- 
vate if they are to be effective. 

Our own position has been developed in full 
consultation with the Government of South 
Viet-Nam and on the basis of central principles 
endorsed by our allies having troops in South 
Viet-Nam. Consultation with the South Viet- 
namese and our other allies is a continumg proc- 
ess. So it will be carried further, particularly at 



306 



DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN' 



the late May meeting of the foreign ministers 
of the troop-contributing countries, which I 
shall attend in Bangkok. 

What is our position ? In essence, our position 
is as follows : 

— We are not seeking a military victory, nor 
do we want military escalation. 

— We believe that peace should give the South 
Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine 
their own future without any external 
interference. 

— In support of this policy of peace, we are 
seeking to achieve agreement with North Viet- 
Nam on mutual withdrawal of forces. We are 
prepared to begin withdrawal of our forces si- 
multaneously with those of North Viet-Nam. 
Withdrawals would reduce the scale of hostili- 
ties and would be tangible and visual evidence 
of the professed desire of both sides to negotiate 
a peace settlement. 

— As a military measure relatively simple to 
observe and because it has agreed status as an 
integral part of the Geneva accords of 1954, 
we are also seeking restoration of military re- 
spect for the demilitarized zone. This also would 
be a verifiable test of good faith and a confi- 
dence-building measure. 

— ^We will continue to press for an early 
mutual release of prisoners of war. Here again 
there would be a tangible evidence of good in- 
tentions on both sides, as well as a humanitarian 
measure. 

Basically, and as essential elements in an ulti- 
mate settlement, we envisage : 

— Eestoration of the provisional military de- 
marcation line at the I7th parallel, with reuni- 
fication to be resolved in the future by the free 
decision of the people of North Viet-Nam and 
of South Viet-Nam ; 

— Eestoration and full compliance with the 
principle of noninterference between the two 
Viet-Nams ; 

■ — Full compliance with the Laos accords of 
1962, including the ending of the use of Laos 
as a corridor and the withdrawal of the North 
Vietnamese troops now in Laos ; 

— Respect for the territorial integrity and 
neutrality of Cambodia ; 

— ^A cessation of hostilities ; 

— Adequate international inspection and su- 
pervision machinery to verify the implementa- 
tion of military agreements and to insure respect 
for and continued adherence to the military and 
political elements of a settlement. This is vital 



because the peace that will be achieved must be 
enduring. 

These are our objectives. We believe they are 
sound and reasonable, and we will work toward 
them. And particularly as we work on the pri- 
ority military areas of possible agreement, we 
recognize that there must be attention to the key 
issue of the future political structure of South 
Viet-Nam. 

On this issue, on the political structure of 
South Viet-Nam — we believe that this issue 
must be resolved among the South Vietnamese 
themselves. We shall respect whatever choice 
they make about their political future in a con- 
text free of compulsion and coercion by anyone. 

Two days ago President Thieu publicly con- 
firmed that the Government of South Viet-Nam 
is prepared to hold private meetings with the 
NLF [National Liberation Front]. President 
Thieu's announcement is an act of statesmanship 
which, if the other side is willing, makes the 
prospects for peace seem somewhat brighter. 
Furthermore, the South Vietnamese Govern- 
ment has in recent months further developed its 
own ideas about the kind of political solution 
that could be worked out. It has made clear its 
willingness that all political elements — all po- 
litical elements — who are prepared to renounce 
violence and put their views peacefully to the 
populace for a decision should be assured of 
their right to participate fully in the political 
process under the national Constitution. The 
South Vietnamese Government recognizes that 
means must be found which insure the fairness 
of such a process. 

The sum total of our combined positions on 
the military and the political matters is clear 
and compelling. Thus, we believe that the South 
Vietnamese, the United States, and our allies 
are offering a reasonable and honorable outcome. 
It is our fervent hope that the other side will 
soon put polemics aside and begin in good faith 
to negotiate an end to this tragic war. 

Disarmament 

I'd like now, Mr. Chairman, to turn to dis- 
armament. If the negotiations on Viet-Nam 
and the Middle East command world attention 
because of the inamediacy of the threats in- 
volved, negotiations on disarmament have their 
own drama because they may help avoid even 
greater danger. The accomplishments of the 
recent past — the Limited Test Ban Treaty and 
the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties — are 



APRIL 14, 1969 



307 



not inconsiderable. They have built a basis from 
which we can now approach further concrete 
measures to enhance the security of our nation 
and of all nations. 

As a first step the President sought and re- 
ceived Senate consent to ratification of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. I would like this morning 
to thank this committee for its very effective 
support of that treaty. The Senate's action 
should encourage other countries to adhere to 
the treaty, which is our best hope for avoiding a 
world in which dozens of states would be in a 
position to initiate a nuclear war. 

We have already begun our first negotiations 
on arms control and disarmament at the Eight- 
een-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was 
reconvened in Geneva on March 18. 

The President directed our delegation to pro- 
pose negotiation of an international agreement 
prohibiting the fixing of nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction on the sea- 
bed.^ The Soviet Union also tabled a draft treaty 
on the same subject. We are optimistic that our 
negotiators and theirs, with the help of other 
nations at the ENDC, can arrive at an agree- 
ment that is workable, prudent, and in the in- 
terest of all parties concerned. A successful 
conclusion of the negotiation would extend to 
the bed of the sea the nuclear-free status which 
has been achieved in these other treaties I've 
referred to. 

President Nixon has also made clear that the 
United States supports the conclusion of an 
adequately verified comprehensive ban on nu- 
clear testing. We shall assist in any reasonable 
effort to achieve greater understanding on the 
verification issue, which has blocked progress 
on this key measure in the past. The United 
States will also continue to press for an agree- 
ment to cut off the production of fissionable 
materials for weapons purposes and to transfer 
such materials to peaceful purposes. 

Preparations for possible talks with the 
Soviet Union on limiting strategic armaments 
are also underway. The President's consulta- 
tions with our allies on this subject during our 
European trip found them very favorable to the 
idea. We are now preparing and studying the 
complex set of issues which will be involved in 
these talks. We hope that such talks can begin 
within the next few months. 

I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that there has 
been some questioning and some criticism on 
disarmament groimds about the President's de- 
cision to proceed with the development of the 



Safeguard system.* Specifically, the concern has 
been expressed that the decision might escalate 
arms expenditures or so concern the Soviet 
Union that it would seriously undermine the 
prospects of talks. 

The foreign policy implications of such a de- 
cision—in particular the reaction of the Soviet 
Union and the impact of the decision on possible 
arms talks — were a central consideration in the 
National Security Council's deliberations which 
preceded the President's decision. We came to 
the conclusion that the decision would have no 
adverse effect on disarmament talks. 

The Soviet Union, as you know, had itself 
already constructed a limited system around 
Moscow; it had also agreed to strategic arms 
talks following the previous administration's 
decision on the Sentinel program. In fact, as 
you recall, when President Johnson announced 
his decision, a week later the Soviet Union 
agreed to strategic arms limitations talks. The 
Soviet press also quoted President Nixon's 
favorable references to arms talks when he an- 
nounced his decision on the Safeguard system, 
and Premier Kosygin recently referred afiirma- 
tively to limitations on strategic arms in his 
message to the ENDC. In other words, his mes- 
sage was after the President's decision was an- 
noimced, and there was no indication from 
Kosygin that it would interfere with the success 
of those talks. As you know, the Safeguard sys- 
tem will not really become operational until 
1973. It will be subject to an annual review and 
appraisal, in which, as the President said, one 
of the principal factors will be the status of talks 
on the limitation of strategic arms. 

As a matter of fact, in our discussions in the 
Security Council, I pressed this point and it was 
determined this would have no adverse effects 
upon these talks. In our talks with representa- 
tives of the Soviet Union there has been no dis- 
cussion or any suggestion that this decision 
would affect the initiation of talks or the suc- 
cessful outcome of talks. Negotiations, of course, 
on strategic arms have not yet started, and their 
outcome is, of course, uncertain. It should also 
be clear that both we and the Soviet Union ex- 
pect such talks to cover both defensive and offen- 
sive missiles. In other words, there has never 
been any intention to limit what kind of weap- 
ons we would discuss when we begin talks on 



' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 7, 1969, p. 289. 
' For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
Mar. 14, see Bulletin of Mar. 31, 1969, p. 273. 



308 



DEPABTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN 



oifensive and defensive weapons. The fact is 
that we cannot predicate our security decisions 
that have to be made now on the potential suc- 
cess of future endeavors in the disarmament 
field. 

Europe 

Disarmament is of course intimately linked 
to our relations with our closest allies, and in 
particular with those in NATO. The President's 
journey to Western Europe — made only 5 weeks 
after his inauguration — testified to the impor- 
tance the administration will attach to our 
Atlantic policy. 

We believe that the trip was a success. It has 
injected a new climate of confidence and trust 
into the alliance. Our European friends were 
impressed not only by the timing of the Presi- 
dent's trip but by its down-to-earth working 
nature, its wide-open agenda, and above all, by 
the spirit in which it was undertaken. 

The President made clear that we are pre- 
pared to listen with new attentiveness to the 
views of our allies and that we plan to consult 
with them on all matters of mutual concern. 
He particularly emphasized that there will be 
ample consultation and a full consideration of 
their interests before and during any negotia- 
tions we undertake with the Soviet Union. 

An important part of the President's purpose 
was to reaffirm our commitment to a strong and 
flexible NATO, the significance of which has 
been only too clearly brought home to Europe 
and to us by the rude invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 and the disturbing Soviet doctrine under 
which it purports to have the right to override 
the sovereignty of others. 

Speaking to the North Atlantic Council in 
Brussels, he said: "As NATO enters its third 
decade, I see for it an opportunity to be more 
than it ever has been before : a bulwark of peace, 
the architect of new means of partnership, and 
an invigorated forum for new ideas and new 
teclmologies . . . ." ^ He thus expressed our 
view, widely shared by NATO members, that 
the alliance must not only continue to maintain 
an alert and strong military posture but also 
develop its capabilities as a means of political 
consultation and progress. The foreign and de- 
fense ministers of NATO will be meeting here 
in Washington on April 10 and 11 to mark the 
20th anniversary of the signing of the North 



" BuiXETiN of Mar. 24, 1969, p. 250. 



Atlantic Treaty. They will, I am confident, 
chart NATO's course for the future. 

This administration's long-range sympathies 
remain with those Europeans who see their most 
hopeful future in an independent Europe in- 
creasingly united. It is neither appropriate nor 
feasible for us to chart a blueprint for Euro- 
pean union. This is Europe's concern. But the 
United States is at one with those Europeans 
who see the best future of their continent in a 
progressive release of those great energies which 
cannot reach their full potential within tradi- 
tional frontiers. 

The United States pledge of continuing sup- 
port to NATO and the other institutions of the 
Atlantic system, including the European Com- 
munities, does not, of course, preclude an active 
development of bilateral relations. Our rela- 
tions with France, troubled in the recent past, 
have already changed for the better. In his visit 
to Paris the President held candid and construc- 
tive talks with President de Gaulle. The im- 
proved atmosphere in Franco- American rela- 
tions should make outstanding differences 
between us easier to resolve. 

This administration will also seek wherever 
possible to develop normal and mutually bene- 
ficial relations with the Eastern European na- 
tions. We do not regard the sovereignty of the 
states of Eastern Europe to be under any restric- 
tions, and we will deal with each country as one 
sovereign nation to another. Progress will, of 
course, depend on the extent to which govern- 
ments are representative of the national will. 

Yugoslavia for long and Romania more re- 
cently have pursued courses of sovereign na- 
tional interest within the Communist world. 
Their example is important. Our relations with 
them are marked by growing understanding 
and cooperation in the economic, cultural, scien- 
tific, and other spheres. 

In Czechoslovakia also, in spite of the con- 
tinued presence of Soviet troops, the people and 
their leaders are striving amidst great difficul- 
ties and pressures to preserve what they can of 
the reforms which they had also started within 
their own system. We shall do what we can to 
be helpful mider the circumstances, including 
making efforts to solve bilateral problems such 
as the gold and claims issues. 

The continuing Soviet occupation of Czecho- 
slovakia after earlier promises of withdrawal 
cannot be condoned by world opinion. Never- 
theless, we are convinced that the currents of 
progress and national independence in the area 



309 



are running too deep to be very long denied. 
"We are confident that they will ultimately 
prevail. 

Latin America 

Closer to home, we look toward a renewed 
emphasis on our strong bonds of friendship and 
our unique relationship with Latin America, a 
relationship based not only on geographic prox- 
imity but also on long historic association and 
many similarities in origins. It will be the policy 
of the United States to place the highest priority 
on our close and friendly relations with our 
Latin American friends. 

In this relationship our policy will not be just 
to encourage increased regional cooperation but 
also to encourage Latin America's already in- 
creasing contribution to world affairs generally. 

As the committee is aware, Latin America 
has been going through profound technological 
and economic changes in the last two decades, 
affecting both its institutions and its values, 
much of the nature we ourselves had previously 
been through. The United States has the re- 
sources and experience to assist these countries 
in this process, and the Alliance for Progress 
has been the primary way through which we 
have sought to do so. 

This administration will continue to extend 
assistance through the Alliance, and we are now 
in the process of exploring with the nations of 
Latin America methods of making that assist- 
ance more effective. 

To help in this effort, the President has asked 
Governor Rockefeller to undertake a trip to 
the countries of the hemisphere, and he has 
agreed to do so. The purpose of his mission will 
be to listen to Latin American leaders and to 
consult with them concerning the development 
of coimnon goals and joint programs of action. 
Following his visit. Governor Rockefeller will 
refKjrt to the President on their views and make 
appropriate recommendations of his own. 

Problems and difficulties arise in all relation- 
ships, and our relations in the Americas are no 
exception. 

The most current dilEculty concerns two 
aspects of our relations with Peru : the expro- 
priation of certain properties of the Inter- 
national Petroleum Company, a Canadian- 
incorporated but American-owned company, 
and the right of American fishing vessels to 
operate off the west coast of South America. We 
are currently engaged in a diplomatic effort to 



310 



work out a mutually satisfactory solution to 
these problems through a special emissary, John 
Irwin, recently appointed by the President to 
undertake this task. Ambassador Irwin is now 
holding discussions with the Peruvians. 

On the fisheries dispute, we have been seek- 
ing to convene a conference with Peru, Ecuador, 
and Chile, the countries most directly involved, 
all of whom support a 200-mile claim of sov- 
ereignty over the seas adjacent to their coasts. 
In the light of our conflicting views on sover- 
eignty, however, we would like such a confer- 
ence to put aside the legal dispute and instead 
take up conservation, development of the fishing 
industry, and methods of permitting regulated 
fishing in the area by fishermen of all our coun- 
tries. Recent seizures have made it even more 
urgent that a practical solution be found. 

In the IPC dispute. Ambassador Irwin is 
seeking to work out appropriate steps toward a 
solution. His primary goal is to reach agree- 
ment on appropriate steps leading to effective 
compensation. There is a deadline, mandated by 
law, which faces us should Peru fail to take 
appropriate steps toward a solution. We are 
hopeful that the discussions will achieve results 
such that the law would not be activated and 
that a new and improved relationship with Peru 
will emerge. Inasmuch as discussions are cur- 
rently underway, I do not believe it would be 
prudent to say more at this time. 

Africa 

Our relations with that other great conti- 
nent — Africa — are as new as our relations with 
Latin America are old and established. In the 
space of two decades, Africa has been trans- 
formed from an externally dominated continent 
to one of over 40 free and independent states — 
states now playing an important role in the 
councils of nations. 

Yesterday the United States, in conformity 
with our belief in the self-determination of peo- 
ple, welcomed the emergence of Africa to in- 
dependence. Today Africa is engaged in consol- 
idating its nationhood and in struggling with 
the problems of economic development. The 
former administering authorities in Africa are 
currently making the largest external contribu- 
tions to help strengthen and develop the young 
institutions of these new nations. We have con- 
tributed as well, both in economic and social 
terms. Over 50,000 African students have 
studied in the United States in the postwar 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BDLLETIK 



I 



period; in a continent seriously deficient in 
highly trained professions, training here has 
made a major contribution to the building of 
their nations. 

We hope to continue to contribute toward that 
economic and social development. And in par- 
ticular we wish to encourage the increased re- 
gional political and economic cooperation which 
African leaders have seen as necessary for their 
growth and stability. 

Progress in the southern part of Africa also 
remains a vital goal of the new African states 
and one with which we basically sympathize. 
Self-determination, majority rule with minority 
rights, and human equality are the product of 
our own practical experience and our practical 
idealism ; it will be our policy to support them in 
Africa as well. Our dedication to these goals is 
the result of our history, a product of our 
search for basic answers to human aspirations. 
By the same token, Africa's effort to realize 
these goals throughout the continent is a prod- 
uct of its history and its aspirations. In this situ- 
ation, there exists a broad community of 
understanding between Africa and the United 
States, dramatized by the fact that some 22 
million Americans trace their origin to Africa. 
There will no doubt be differences between us 
and some of our African colleagues on methods 
and timing, but to the extent that they are com- 
mitted to the above goals there will be none on 
objective. 

Because of our interest in the peaceful de- 
velopment of the independent African nations, 
our concern is also deep when it is disrupted. 
It is now manifest over the crisis in Nigeria. 

The situation in that bitterly divided land is 
as complicated as it is tragic and — so far — as 
elusive of solution. Moderation and reason are 
having difficulty in overcoming the legacies of 
ancient tribal feuds and hatreds. 

The suspicions each side feels toward the other 
and their respective doubts about each other's 
objectives continue to block a negotiated 
settlement. 

The United States has honored the wishes of 
the African nations to settle the conflict under 
their own auspices and we intend to resist any 
temptation for United States political interven- 
tion. We are refusing to permit the sale of 
United States arms to either side. We continue 
to support the efforts of the Organization of 
African Unity and the Commonwealth Secre- 
tariat to bring the fighting to an end and would 



support a United Nations role should it become 
feasible. 

At the same time, the United States Govern- 
ment, reflecting the deep humanitarian concern 
of the American people, has made massive con- 
tributions to the relief effort and has exerted 
strenuous efforts to break the impasse hamper- 
ing deliveries of desperately needed food and 
medicine. More than $31 million has already 
been contributed for the relief of persons on 
both sides of the battleline. 

To improve our contribution in this regard I 
recently appointed Mr. Clyde Ferguson as Spe- 
cial Coordinator for relief in the Nigerian con- 
flict. He is now exploring means of expanding 
the flow of supplies to both sides. He has con- 
sulted with international relief officials, with 
goveriunents contributing to the relief effort, 
with the OAU, and with authorities in both 
Nigeria and the Biaf ran area. We hope that the 
international relief effort can be substantially 
increased as a result of his labors. 

United Nations 

Twenty-five years ago the United States took 
leadership in forging a framework of inter- 
national institutions to help maintain inter- 
national peace and security and to facilitate 
increasing teclinical, economic, and social re- 
lations among nations. To the maximum extent 
feasible this administration will continue to look 
to multilateral institutions — and particularly 
to the United Nations — to deal with threats to 
the security of weak and developing coimtries 
and to promote peaceful settlement of localized 
conflicts. 

As President Nixon told reporters in New 
York last December : 

The more the United States and the Soviet Union 
can conduct their policies in a way that those conflicts 
in the third world are channeled into the United Na- 
tions or another international organization, the better 
the chances are that we can avoid a confrontation which 
both powers, I think, want to avoid 

We also believe that the United Nations has a 
significant and constructive role to play in eco- 
nomic and social programs to help developing 
nations and in realizing the promise and coping 
with the perils of new technology. The fact that 
we are now exploring in the United Nations 
means of facilitating international cooperation 
in the exploration and use of the seabeds and 
are preparing for a world conference on the 
human environment is indicative of the degree 



APRIL 14, 1969 



311 



to which technological development will con- 
tinue to require institutionalized multilateral 
cooperation. Science and technology is an area 
in which the United States has a unique con- 
tribution to make, and we hope to continue to be 
an initiator in this field in the years to come. 

We will, of course, give general support to 
the United Nations and will join with others in 
strengthening its effectiveness. 

East-West Relations 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make 
a few remarks about our view toward the gen- 
eral status of East-West relations. One could 
hardly consider how to proceed on such funda- 
mental matters as the Middle East, Viet-Nam, 
and disarmament without careful contempla- 
tion of our relations with the other so-called 
superpower and with the potential power of 
Communist China. 

With respect to Communist China, we con- 
tinue to hope for a reduction of tensions. With 
its vast population, great potential, and devel- 
oping nuclear capability, China is, of course, 
a matter of major concern to us as well as to its 
neighbors, including the Soviet Union. 

Despite the attitude of hostility toward the 
United States and the outside world in general 
that has characterized Peking's policy, we have 
attempted to maintain and develop a dialogue 
with the Chinese Communists through our talks 
in Warsaw. This has not been easy, since the 
Chinese have declined to discuss matters with 
us or, in some cases, to acknowledge our initia- 
tive aimed at bringing about increased contacts 
and exchanges. 

Although the Chinese Communists con- 
sistently have attacked our administration from 
its first days in office, we nevertheless were dis- 
appointed that they canceled at the last minute 
the ambassadorial meeting scheduled for Febru- 
ary 20. We had hoped that their agreement last 
November to renew these talks might enable us 
to make some progress, and we had been pre- 
pared to present suggestions for an agreement 
looking toward better relations. 

The Chinese are still trying to emerge from 
the political and economic confusion created by 
the last 3 years of domestic turmoil. The ninth 
congress of the Chinese Communist Party, to be 
held this year, may result in the formulation of 
new policies setting the course for China's fu- 
ture development. Of course, we cannot predict 



what these will be. In any event, we must rec- 
ognize that changes in Peking's policy in the 
direction of better relations with its neighbors 
and with us will come slowly at best. We must 
recognize also that, while we will continue to 
seek ways in which we may be able to con- 
tribute to an improved atmosphere, our ability 
to influence the rate of improvement is very 
limited. 

We nevertheless continue to look forward to 
a time when we can make progress toward a 
useful dialogue to reduce tensions, resolve our 
differences, and move to a more constructive 
relationship. To this end, we would welcome a 
renewal of our meetings with the Chinese in 
which these goals could be pursued. 

With respect to the Soviet Union we liave 
also seen considerable progress since the death 
of Stalin and the depths of the cold- war period. 
This progress was set back, by what we may 
hope was an aberration, in the Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia last year. 

The political trends have, nevertheless, on the 
whole been in the direction of improved and 
more normal relations, including major agree- 
ments on matters acutely and peculiarly involv- 
ing our two countries such as the partial test ban 
and the Outer Space Treaty. It will be our en- 
deavor, in the spirit described by the President 
as one of negotiation rather than confi-ontation, 
to encourage the continuation of that process. 

At the same time, it would be unwise to be too 
sanguine about the speed or the extent to which 
improved relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union can move forward. We 
cannot expect the hostilities and suspicions built 
up over the last two decades to be suddenly 
stilled. Our interests will certainly continue to 
clash at many points. Nonetheless, the number 
of areas in which our interests are similar is 
growing, and each of us now acknowledges the 
existence of many practical areas amenable to 
negotiation. On our part I can assure this com- 
mittee we will do all we can to maximize, not 
minimize, these areas. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that the 
climate for negotiations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States seems somewhat 
warmer than in the recent past. It is not incon- M 
ceivable — not inconceivable — that a time has ar- ' 
rived when substantial progress is possible. 
That has to be our hope, and I will do my part 
in working to that end. Thank you very much, 
Mr. Chairman. 



312 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



President Nixon Discusses the Viet-Nam Peace Talks 
and the ABM Safeguard System 



Remarks iy President Nixon ^ 



It occurred to me that what might be useful 
for you in brief remarks of this type would be 
for me to share some of the problems that a 
President has in attempting to run what we call 
an open administration and in attempting to be 
candid and honest with regard to the great issues 
in which you are vitaDy interested. 

I think if we were to pick one issue of all 
the others that the American people have an 
interest in, it is Viet-Nam. On that issue, on 
television, on radio, and in the newspapers, day 
after day we hear speciilation. We read it about 
what is happening in Viet-Nam, what is hap- 
pening on the battlefield, but more important, 
what is happening at the negotiating tables. 

I want you to know what my belief is about 
the conduct of this war, about the negotiations, 
and about the prospects. Wliat I say will not 
give you, perhaps, as much hope as you might 
like to hear. But what I say, I believe, is in the 
best interests of the result; and the result is 
ending the war on a basis that will promote 
real peace in the Pacific. 

I could stand before you today and talk rather 
optimistically about the prospect of bringing 
boys home from Viet-Nam at a time when a 
Communist offensive is at a high peak. I can 
tell you that it will be the objective of tliis 
adnimistration to bring men home from Viet- 
Nam just as soon as the military situation, the 
diplomatic situation, and the training of the 
South Vietnamese forces will enable us to do so. 

But I can also tell you that I think it is not 
in the interests of the Nation for the President 
of the United States to stand before any audi- 

' Made before the National Association of Broad- 
casters at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 25 (White House 
press release). 



ence and to raise hopes and then disappoint 
them. So I will only tell you today what our 
objective is. 

I will tell you, looking toward the future, 
I think we are going to achieve that objective 
of a peace that will be one that will not be just 
for the year or 2 years but for the foreseeable 
future in the Pacific and in the world — ^that kind 
of peace. 

But in talking of what we do with regard to 
our troop strength there, I think all of you 
know that at this particular time, as an offensive 
is going on and as negotiations are beginning, 
it is vitally important that the United States 
maintain its position of strength until we have 
reason to believe that a reduction on our part 
would also have a major contribution in bring- 
ing about a reduction on their part. 

So while I would like to make news here, 
while I would like to leave impressions that 
would go flashing out across the country about 
what is going to happen in a hopeful way, I 
can only say — and I do not say this in any par- 
tisan sense, because I have been one that has 
supported, as you know, as a Republican, the 
efforts of our nation in Viet-Nam — that I believe 
there has been too much of a tendency to speak 
of peace being "just around the corner," "the 
boys may be coming home in a matter of a few 
months," and thereby raising those optimistic 
feelings in the minds of people without justifica- 
tion and then dashing them. 

We shall not do this in this administration. 
We may not make the headlines of today, but 
what we are interested in are the results of 
tomorrow. I believe that is what you are inter- 
ested in, and that is why we are going to follow 
this very candid and honest discussion insofar 
as our hopes are concerned. 



APRIL 14, 1969 



313 



Now, I realize that in this room are not the 
broadcasters and the reporters — I mean by that 
the commentators and the reporters and all of 
the rest — but you are the managers, the people 
on the business side of the great television and 
radio installations around the country. I think 
all of you will understand the next point that 
I will make particularly well. 

The (mportance of Private Peace Talks 

Two or three weeks ago, I noted considerable 
criticism of the administration because we had 
not, at the time that I was in Paris, announced 
that we were starting private talks with the 
enemy in order to negotiate those areas of differ- 
ence and bring the day of peace closer. 

Now, let me be quite candid. As far as any 
negotiated peace is concerned, it will come from 
private rather than public talks, because where 
both sides — and I am referring now particularly 
to the North Vietnamese and the South Viet- 
namese — have a problem of prestige and a prob- 
lem of face, among many others involved, that 
kind of negotiation cannot take place in a gold- 
fish bowl, with communiques every day, because 
there the tendency always is to speak to their 
people at home, but more than that to the people 
of the world, and to simply repeat the old 
rhetoric. 

Most of the progress that has been made today 
in bringing about talks in a public forum has 
come from private talks. So I can tell you that 
it is our conviction and our belief that it is 
through private talks with the North Viet- 
namese and others involved that real progress 
toward peace will be made. 

But if private talks are to be private, they 
must be private. Consequently, if I am asked — 
and this is true of the Secretary of State and it 
is true of the Secretary of Defense and my in- 
structions to everybody in this administration — • 
as to whether private talks have begun, as to 
when they will begin, we will say nothing. Be- 
cause the moment we tell you, any of you — and 
let me say the questions are always proper; 
sometimes the answers would not be appropriate 
on our part — but I can only say that if we are 
to make progress in private talks, they must be 
private. 

Therefore, to disclose when and where, and 
what and how in any degree would not serve 
the interests of peace. Now, again, I realize that 
it would raise hopes. It would make a good head- 
line, and a good first 2 minutes on the evening 



show, if I were to indicate that we were proceed- 
ing in private talks or what was going on. 

But let me say that that would not serve the 
long-range interests of bringing peace. I can 
only assure you that there is no objective of this 
administration that is higher — and let me say 
this was also true of the other administration, 
but we are proceeding in different ways — than 
to bring this war to a conclusion at the earliest 
possible time in a manner that will promote real 
peace. 

We think we are on the right track, but we are 
not going to raise false hopes. We are not going 
to tell you what is going on in private talks. 
What we are going to do is to do our job, and 
then, a few months from now, I think you will 
look back and say we did what was right. If we 
did what was wrong, then it doesn't make any 
difference — the headline that we have made 
today. So this will be our policy in that respect. 

Again, I think that you as negotiators will 
recognize the validity of that position. Much as 
we want an open administration, there are times 
when it is necessary to have those quiet conver- 
sations, without publicity, in which each side 
can explore the areas of difference and even- 
tually reach an agreement which then, of course, 
publicly will be announced. 

The ABM Safeguard System 

. . . I understand there has been some interest 
in the ABM Safeguard system which I have 
talked about.^ I am not here to twist your arms 
or to attempt to influence you one way or an- 
other. All of you, as far as that system, the de- 
fense of the country, in all of these matters, 
must examine the evidence and then make your 
own decisions with regard to what is in the best 
interests of the Nation. 

But I would like to share with you briefly the 
considerations that went into that decision — 
not an easy decision. In fact, the easy decision 
would have been not to make it. The easy de- 
cision would have been to put it off, to have re- 
search and development, or to indicate that 
there was no significant threat or that it 
wouldn't work or that it really didn't matter. 

But I can tell you that these were the factors 
that we were confronted with and which we 
had to deal with and which made it necessary 
for us to announce a hard decision rather than 



° For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
Mar. 14, see Bulletin of Mar. 31, 1969, p. 273. 



314 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



an easy one. We hope it is the right one. We 
think it is. That is for you to judge. It is for 
the American people to appraise. 

I found when I came to office that in 1962, 
when the Cuban confrontation occurred, the 
balance of power between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was approximately four or 
five to one in our favor. Because of that balance 
of power in our favor, the President of the 
United States in a very courageous decision was 
able to act in the best interests of the United 
States and avoid a missile installation 90 miles 
from our shore. 

If the United States had not had that kind 
of assurance — not only the assurance of our 
power but also a recognition that those who 
threatened our security at that time, the Soviet 
Union, had a recognition on their part that we 
had that kind of strength — if that had not been 
the case, that decision might not have been made 
or it would have been much more dangerous 
to make. 

Now, what has happened from 1962 to 1969? 
Since that time the Soviet Union has widened 
the gap in conventional weapons which they 
have always had in Western Europe. They have 
rapidly closed the gap in naval strength, par- 
ticularly in the Mediterranean, and they have 
substantially closed the gap in strategic weap- 
ons. So we look at that situation today. And in 
describing it, let me lay to rest one point of 
view that I saw expressed in some reaction to 
Secretary [of Defense Melvin R.] Laird's tes- 
timony. In describing this, this is no cause for 
fright. 

The United States is still infinitely strong 
and powerful. We are still able to meet any 
potential threat. But the problem that the Pres- 
ident of the United States faces as the Com- 
mander in Chief and as the one who has the 
responsibility to see that our defenses are ade- 
quate to make peaceful diplomacy possible — 
the responsibility that he has is to examine not 
only what the situation is now but what it will be 
4 or 5 years from now. And the decision that I 
made here and the decisions I will be making 
on all defense matters, I can assure you, will 
have one consideration only. 

I do not believe that the United States should 
threaten any other nation. We are not interested 
in aggression. I do believe, however, that with- 
out the power of the United States the great 
hundreds of millions of people who live in the 
free world would not have had the assurance 



of freedom that they have had. In other words, 
it is the power of the United States that has 
avoided a world war and a world confrontation. 

And whether it is in my administration or in 
the next, I never want the President of the 
United States, when he sits down at a confer- 
ence table, to be in a second-rate position as far 
as the strength of the United States is concerned. 

I am not suggesting that that means we em- 
bark on an arms race. I am not suggesting that 
that means that we go forward in order to re- 
gain the four or five to one superiority that we 
once had. That will not happen. But I am sug- 
gesting that when we look at those facts, there 
are some limited actions that the United States, 
I think, should take. 

Protection of Second-Strike Capability 

One involves the ABM Safeguard system. 
Wliat this system will do, first, is to provide 
some protection for our deterrent capability, our 
Minuteman sites. That means our second-strike 
capability. This was necessary because we found 
that the Soviet Union had developed new weap- 
ons with greater accuracy, the SS-9, that could 
take out our hardened Minuteman sites and 
thereby i-educe the credibility of our second- 
strike capability. 

The credibility of the American second strike 
is essential, diplomatically and also in the long 
range as far as preserving peace in the world. 
In addition to that, the ABM Safeguard system 
provides an area defense of the entire United 
States, for any attack by the Chinese Commu- 
nists within the next 10 years, or any other nu- 
clear power which might acquire such weapons 
in that period. 

Let me emphasize what Safeguard does not 
do. There is no way at this time that we can 
safeguard all of the American people through 
antiballistic missiles against an attack by a 
sophisticated major nuclear power like the So- 
viet Union. But we can increase the credibility 
of our second-strike force by defending our Min- 
uteman sites. 

On the other hand, when we look at a less 
developed nuclear power with fewer missiles, it 
is possible to develop the area defense which 
will be effective. So those were the two purposes 
of making that decision. 

Now, many questions arise. First, will it 
work? Those for whom I have great respect — 
including perhaps beyond others the Under Sec- 



APRIL 14, 1969 



315 



retary of Defense, Mr. Packard, an expert in 
this field — say that it will. And some indication 
that it must have some meaning is that the So- 
viet Union has deployed 66 of this type of de- 
fense around Moscow and are now covering not 
only the threat from the West but also from 
Communist China. 

But in order to guard against plunging into 
a program that would be a boondoggle, we have 
made the decision on a phase basis. 

Every year we will examine this new sys- 
tem — with the minimal appropriations for this 
year, which you are aware of — with three things 
in mind: 

One, progress that may be made on arms 
talks; 

Two, progress that may be made on the state 
of the art, whether or not it proves that it is 
something that we can do or that we cannot do ; 
and 

Finally, we shall always examine this sys- 
tem in terms of the overall capability of the 
United States and our responsibilities in the 
world which I have described up to this time. 

Balance Between Security and Freedom 

Let me conclude with this final thought : Any 
of you, and I know many of you have been ex- 
posed to briefings on the massive destructive 
power of nuclear weapons, must sometimes won- 
der why enough isn't enough. 

As some have put it, with regard to the po- 
tential of a Chinese threat, why should we be 
concerned — because assiuning 8 or 10 years 
from now they have 60 or 70 or 80 missiles and 
assuming that is the case, no rational man who 
was the leader of that country would launch an 
attack against the United States knowing that 
our immense retaliatory power would destroy 
half of the population of Communist China. 

I agree with that analysis. But when we ex- 
amine history, we find within the last third of a 
century that sometimes decisions by great pow- 
ers, as well as small, are not made by rational 
men. Hitler was not a particularly rational man 
in some of his military decisions. 

So it is the responsibility of the President 
of the United States not only to plan against 
the expected and against what normal and ra- 
tional men will do but, within a certain area of 
contingency, to plan against the possibility of an 
irrational attack. 

To do all this, having in mind maintaining 
the necessary balance between security and free- 



dom which is so essential — this we have tried to 
do. I think the decision was a correct one. 

In presenting it to you in this way today, as I 
have presented it previously, I can only say and 
repeat what I have said earlier : that all of us, 
whatever our partisan aflSliations, have one pri- 
mary goal in mind. That is peace in the world — 
peace in the world which is the real peace that 
comes from the kind of security that only the 
United States can provide. 

I have just met with the Canadian Prime 
Minister. I have just completed meetings with 
the heads of government of the major Euro- 
pean powers. And I have been reminded again 
of this fundamental fact: Without the power 
of the United States of America, the rest of 
the world would be, in effect, at the mercy of 
potential diplomatic aggression, and that is 
really what is at stake here. 

We have a responsibility. We have met it ever 
since World War II, and I believe that now it is 
our destiny to continue to meet it, while at the 
same time — and I can assure you we are explor- 
ing this other road — to pursue every path to- 
ward peace and to pursue every path toward 
arms limitations so that we can divert our re- 
sources to other areas than those of destruction. 



Tenth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made ty 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.S. delegation, at the 10th flenary session of 
the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
March 27. 

Press release 63 dated Marcb 27 

Ladies and gentlemen : Your side speaks fre- 
quently about so-called "United States aggres- 
sion against Viet-Nam," claiming that the cen- 
tral issue in a solution to the Viet-Nam conflict 
is how to end this so-called "American 
aggression." 

The United States Government has many 
times in the past produced the evidence which 
shows that the source of aggression in Viet- 
Nam — both clandestine and overt — is Hanoi. 
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
lias presented much of this evidence here in this 
room since these meetings began. The represen- 
tative of the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam has traced the origins of Hanoi's ag- 



316 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



gression against South Viet-Nam, citing the 
facts of massive troop infiltration and terror 
against the Soutli Vietnamese people. Thus, 
Hanoi's aggression against South Viet-Nam has 
been clearly documented on the public record, 
which is available to all. 

Although the responsibility for aggression 
against South Viet-Nam lies in Hanoi, your side 
demands that the United States withdraw its 
forces unilaterally. In sharp contrast, the 
United States, which is actually in Viet-Nam in 
response to your aggression, recognizes that so- 
lutions to such problems must be mutually 
reached and mutually carried out. 

All of us should therefore look at the truth, 
since — after all is said and done — it is the truth 
with which we must deal in these negotiations. 

Over the years, hundreds of thousands of mil- 
itary and subversive forces have illegally come 
down from Noi-th Viet-Nam into South Viet- 
Nam. Week after week, more arrive. These 
forces have come to South Viet-Nam in viola- 
tion of the 1954 Geneva accords, in violation of 
the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, and in 
violation of the United Nations Charter and 
general international law. 

The truth is that two-thirds of all combat 
forces facing the Eepublic of Viet-Nam and its 
allies in the South today are North Vietnamese. 
Eighty-five percent of the combat forces of your 
side in the five northern provinces of South 
Viet-Nam are North Vietnamese. In the high- 
lands and central coastal area, approximately 
60 percent of your combat forces are from North 
Viet-Nam. In the Saigon region. North Viet- 
namese personnel make up over 80 percent of 
all enemy combat forces. 

Virtually all the forces on your side are 
equipped with weapons and ammunition which 
have been infiltrated clandestinely and illegally 
into South Viet-Nam. Heavy machineguns, mor- 
tars, rockets, and other weapons and equipment 
of advanced types, even including tanks and 
bulldozers, have poured into the South from 
North Viet-Nam. The rockets which have been 
recently indiscriminately fired on Saigon, Hue, 
Da Nang, and other cities in South Viet-Nam 
were sent from the North. Even the clothing 
worn by the troops of your side has come from 
North Viet-Nam. 

The recent military attacks by your side have 
been carried out largely by North Vietnamese 
soldiers. The offensive that began on Febru- 
ary 22 was supplied with men and materiel from 
the North and directed by North Vietnamese 
officers. 



Let me cite just a few specific examples. 
The largest of the recent attacks launched by 
your side were in the vicinity of Bien Hoa, east 
of Saigon, in late February. Of a total of 109 
prisoners captured by our forces in that area 
during the attacks, 89 were North Vietnamese. 
These men were born in North Viet-Nam, had 
been inducted into the North Vietnamese Army, 
trained for infiltration, and sent to the South 
as members of infiltration groups with other 
North Vietnamese. 

The main attacks at Bien Hoa were carried 
out by the 275th Eegiment of the so-called 5th 
Viet Cong Division. Of the estimated 1,400 sol- 
diers in this regiment, more than 1,100 are 
North Vietnamese. From the same nominally 
Viet Cong Division, units of two other regi- 
ments were identified in combat in the area. 
Of the total of 2,800 men in these two regiments, 
more than 2,600 are North Vietnamese. In all, 
nine out of every 10 men in units known to have 
been committed at Bien Hoa were North 
Vietnamese. 

At our last meeting, a spokesman of your side 
referred to Operation Atlas Wedge being car- 
ried out by Allied forces northwest of Saigon. 
That operation — including the bombing in con- 
nection with the operation — was directed 
against the 7th North Vietnamese Division, 
which was attempting to get set for attacks in 
the Saigon area. South Vietnamese and U.S. 
forces have been taking the necessary action 
against military targets and military forces in 
that area to assure that the plans of the 7th 
North Vietnamese Division are frustrated. 

Spokesmen of your side have also mentioned 
the Ashau Valley. In February 1969, South 
Vietnamese and American forces operating 
there, adjacent to the Laotian border west of 
Hue, collected incontrovertible evidence of the 
continuing flow of materiel from North Viet- 
Nam. Allied forces captured 12 large-caliber 
artillery pieces, extensive stores of ammunition, 
nine tracked vehicles, numerous trucks, and 
other equipment. In all, on the order of 500 tons 
of weapons and ammunition were found in a 
relatively small area within 35 miles of the 
city of Hue. 

These are but a few examples of the extent 
of North Vietnamese presence and involvement 
in the war in South Viet-Nam. There are many 
others. We know that North Vietnamese troops 
continue to be present in the demilitarized zone. 
In addition to North Vietnamese forces moving 
through Laos to South Viet-Nam, at least 40,000 
North Vietnamese troops are deployed in Laos, 



APRIL 14, 1969 
338-052—69- 



317 



fighting and otherwise interfering in Lao inter- 
nal affairs. North Vietnamese forces daily vio- 
late the territorial integrity of Cambodia. 

Such, then, is the true situation. It should be 
evident, in looking at these facts, why the 
United States has proposed the mutual with- 
drawal of all external forces. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the goal of the United 
States remains the same : to assure for the people 
of South Viet-Nam the right to determine their 
own future in peace without external coercion 
or intimidation. We have made specific and con- 
crete proposals to achieve that objective and to 
bring the war in Viet-Nam to an end. We have 
proposed the restoration of the demilitarized 
zone. We have proposed the mutual withdrawal 
of external forces. We have proposed the prompt 
release of prisoners of war. We remain ready to 
discuss these proposals with your side at any 
time. 



The 20th Anniversary of NATO 



A PROCLAMATION' 

The Twentieth Annivebsakt 

OF THE NOBTH ATLANTIC TREATY OBQANIZATION 

Twenty years ago, on April 4, 1949, twelve sovereign 
nations, determined to safeguard the freedom, com- 
mon heritage, and civilization of their peoples, signed 
the North Atlantic Treaty. In later years, Greece, Tur- 
key, and the Federal Republic of Germany became par- 
ties to that agreement and members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established 
to effect the Treaty's goals. 

For twenty years, NATO has furthered the cause of 
Atlantic unity by achieving a spirit of solidarity on 
many common military, political, and economic prob- 
lems. By promoting international security through col- 
lective defense arrangements and by fostering coopera- 
tion in the political realm, NATO has contributed 
to unprecedented peace and prosperity for all the 
peoples of the Treaty area. It has provided a stabilizing 



' No. 3906 ; 34 Fed. Reg. 5897. 



influence during times of crisis and has been a vigilant 
guardian in the face of threats to world peace. At 
the same time, NATO has steadfastly pursued the 
quest for improved relations between East and West, 
dedicated always to a peaceful settlement of European 
differences and to effective measures for disarmament 
and arms control. 

Now, as NATO begins its third decade, committed 
still to a viable Atlantic community, to the resolution 
of differences between East and West, and to the sta- 
bility and tranquillity of our entire planet, America's 
commitment to NATO remains firm and vital. 

Therefore, I Richard Nixon, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby direct the atten- 
tion of the Nation to this twentieth anniversary of the 
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty ; and I call upon 
all agencies and officials of the Federal Government, 
upon the Governors of the States, and upon the oflBcers 
of local governments to encourage and facilitate the 
suitable observance of this notable event throughout 
this anniversary year with particular attention to 
April, the month which marks the historic signing 
ceremony. 

I also urge all citizens to participate in appropri- 
ate activities and ceremonies in recognition of the 
achievements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion and its contributions to America's security and 
well-being. 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
this twenty-eighth day of March in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the one 
hundred and ninety-third. 



Letters of Credence 

United Emgdom 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland, John Freeman, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Nixon on March 17. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Pres- 
ident's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated March 17. 



318 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada 
Hold Talks at Washington 



Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of 
Canada made an o-fficial visit to Washington 
March 2^-25. Following is an exchange of greet- 
ings between President Nixon and Prime Minis- 
ter Trudeau at a welcoming ceremony in the 
East Room of the White House on March 24, 
their exchange of toasts at a state dinner at the 
White House that evening, and their exchange 
of remarks at a departure ceremony in the 
Whits House Rose Garden on March 25, to- 
gether loith an announcement made at a Tiews 
briefing held by RoTiald L. Ziegler, Press Secre- 
tary to the President, and Romeo LeBlanc, Press 
Secretary to the Prime Minister, on March 25. 



EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

President Nixon 

White House press release dated March 24 

As most of you are aware, the Prime Minister 
is the first official visitor since the new adminis- 
tration assmned office. 

In welcoming him personally today and also 
in welcoming him representing his country, I 
do so saying first that it is altogether appropri- 
ate that he should be the first official Adsitor to 
this country. Because as we look at the relations 
between your country and my country, Mr. 
Prime Minister, we recognize many factors that 
are often spoken about in the classroom and in 
the press and on television : 

We share the longest common border of all 
nations. We share the common law. We share 
a common language. We share many common 
characteristics with regard to our history. And 
in addition to that, we share a very precious as- 
set, the asset of friendship. 

In describing that friendship, however, I 
would emphasize a characteristic about it that 
sometimes we forget. That characteristic is that 
the friendship that Canada and the United 
States have enjoyed for so many years is not 
characterized by that total unanimity of view 



which destroys creativity but it is characterized 
by a lively diversity, and through that diversity 
we have the hallmark of freedom. 

As the Prime Minister and I will be talking, 
and as his associates will be talking with the 
Secretary of State and their opposite numbers, 
we will find most areas in which we are in agree- 
ment. We will find other areas in which we find 
that we have differences. But those differences 
are ones that, between friends, we will be able 
to discuss and find, in most instances, a common 
ground which is perhaps superior to the position 
that either of us had before. 

This is the mark of true friendship. And it is 
why in speaking to you today, Mr. Prime Minis- 
ter, I welcome you in behalf of all of the Ameri- 
can people, so many of us who have known and 
enjoyed your country. 

I can only add this : I only hope we can make 
you feel as much at home here in the United 
States as my wife and I, and so many hundreds 
of thousands of Americans, have been welcomed 
in your coimtry when we have visited there as 
private citizens. 

Prime Minister Trudeau ^ 

On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I want 
to thank you for your very cordial welcome. 

I am very happy to be here. I feel very hon- 
ored that you should have extended your wel- 
come to me, sir, so early in the days of your new 
administration. 

We have, as you say, very many ties which 
link us — ties of friendship and ties of common 
interest. And especially, we have a common out- 
look on the world. We have the same values, and 
we tend to face the issues in a common way. 

It is because of this, Mr. President, that I am 
looking forward to our discussions, discussions 
of matters of mutual interest. And I am looking 
forward to listening to your views on world 



'Released at Washington on Mar. 24 by the Office 
of the Prime Minister and made available by the White 
House Press Office. 



APRIL 14, 1969 



319 



problems, on the information and on the wisdom 
that you will want to impart upon me in your 
talks. 

For these reasons, I am very glad to be here. 
Like so many Canadians, I always look forward 
to a visit to the United States with great pleas- 
ure. I have great pleasure in being here, and I 
am looking forward to my stay with great 
anticipation. 

Thank you very much, sir, for your welcome. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 
President Nixon 

White House press release dated March 24 

In any new administration, every moment 
becomes a historical moment when it occurs. 
And this, Mr. Prime Minister, is a historical 
moment in this room because this is the first state 
dinner that has been held in this room since the 
new administration came to office. 

We are veiy proud and honored that we can 
honor you and the people of Canada through 
this dinner. 

In speaking in that vein, I also would like to 
point out that we have a number of reasons that 
you have a special place in our hearts, not only 
your people but you personally. 

As I sat here in this room, I thought of the 
many moments that I have been here before, and 
I have heard on occasions President Eisenhower 
toast Wmston Churchill and President de 
Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, Prime Minister 
Nehru, the leaders of great nations all over the 
world. Each of those was a very special occasion, 
and each of those men and each of those nations 
had a special place in our hearts. 

But none has the really unique relationship 
that we have with our guests tonight. 

I was thinking, for example, of the fact that 
during the years I was Vice President, along 
with my wife I visited many countries on of- 
ficial visits— about 30 or 35. And I pointed out 
to the Prime Minister I had never made an 
official visit to Canada. The reason was that I 
was only sent to those countries where we had 
trouble. And at that time at least, we did not 
seem to have troubles that were so significant as 
to require my presence — or maybe they thought 
that if I went we would create troubles that were 
not ever there. 

But despite the fact that we have missed the 



official visit, going back over the years, as I 
imagine every person in this room from the 
United States will probably be able to say : "We 
recall the times we have been to Canada and 
the warm welcomes we have received in Van- 
couver, in Quebec, Montreal, St. John's, To- 
ronto, and Ottawa." And as we recall those 
moments and those associations, we realize how 
fortunate we are to have such good friends and 
neighbors along the longest boimdary in the 
world. 

I could speak more of the relationships of 
our two countries, but that will be covered in 
other speeches and communiques and the rest. 

I can only say that in this room tonight, Mr. 
Prime Minister, are people from all walks of 
life: from business and from labor, from the 
field of education, from the field of politics — 
Democrats and Republicans. But they are all 
as one in their affection for your country and 
in the respect for you. 

And now, if it will not be embarrassing to 
the Prime Minister, I would like to say a per- 
sonal word about him. And don't be worried — 
I can assure you that having sometimes been 
in this position myself of wondering what was 
coming up next, I will be careful with what I 
say. 

But I was thinking of those many accolades 
that as an American, and particularly as an 
American political leader, we could pass on to 
you. I can refer to the fact that you are a distin- 
guished political philosopher. I could refer to 
the fact that you are a distinguished member 
of the bar, eminently successf id. 

But since this is a room in which there are 
many from political life, what is the most im- 
pressive factor in your achievements to date is 
your political leadership. 

Wlien I think that the Prime Minister en- 
tered politics in 1965 and within 4 years became 
the head of government, believe me, for one for 
whom it took 22 long years to get here, we have, 
sir, for you the greatest respect for that political 
leadership which you have provided. 

I do not need to say — and I do not say this 
simply because you are here — that you have been 
for your own people a very exciting personality 
and you have been for the people of the United 
States. 

We are glad to get to know you better. We are 
happy to exchange views with you. We par- 
ticularly appreciate the opportunity to get the 
benefit of your thinking not only on the bilateral 



320 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIir 



problems which we usually work out effectively 
and successfully but on the great problems that 
will determine the future of all of us who live 
on this planet. 

I was delighted in the long talk that I had 
with the Prime Minister today to find that 
here was a man who had the vision to see beyond 
the next election and to see what kind of con- 
tinent we would have 25 years from now, 30 
years from now. And on that great issue there 
can be no difference, fundamentally, in the goals 
that we seek — the people of the United States 
and the people of your country. 

And so to all of our friends tonight, I would 
ask you to rise and to join me, as is the custom, 
in two toasts : first, Canada, as one of the strong 
members of the British Commonwealth, Her 
Majesty the Queen; and then to our honored 
guest this evening, the Prime Minister of 
Canada. 

Prime Minister Trudeau ^ 

You do me great honor, Mr. President, in 
drinking my health. And the kind words you 
have spoken about me are all the more welcome 
and moving that they come not only from the 
head of the country which is Canada's best 
friend and ally but they come from a man who 
has shown through his years in politics — 22, you 
said, Mr. President — that is about six times 
longer than myself, but then your country is 10 
times greater, so it probably works out — a man 
who has shown that he could occupy many of 
the elective offices of his land and who now 
holds the highest elective office in his country, 
your country, the greatest, the most powerful 
on earth, a man who has served his country well 
with devotion, with knowledge, with wisdom, 
with fortitude, with courage, a man who has 
been persistent, a man who has been sincere and 
faithful. 

For these reasons, sir, I thank you for your 
welcome. And I want to say that being one of 
Gallic descent, I have particular affinity for 
things American, as I think the Americans have 
for things Fi-ench and Gallic. 

There is a saying, I know, in your land that 
every good American when he dies goes to 
Paris. I would suggest, Mr. President, that 



' Released at Washington on Mar. 24 by the OflSce 
of the Prime Minister and made available by the White 
House Press Office. 



many of your fellow countrymen have not 
waited until they die nor until they be good 
to find Paris. But I would be remiss in my duty 
if I didn't suggest that there is a very easy and 
pleasant alternative much closer at hand — 
Montreal, which welcomes all Americans and 
which would welcome you, Mr. President. 

I hope you will be visiting our country as 
soon as your Office permits. I can assure you, 
you will be very welcome there. I can't guar- 
antee that there will be no trouble. I can't 
guarantee it for myself. But as one new politi- 
cian to a more mature one, I can tell you that' 
we will take our chances together. And I think 
that the Canadian people will show you how 
mucli they respect and admire the President of 
the United States of America. 

Every year many Americans come to Canada 
and the same number, more or less, of Canadians 
come to the United States — 70 million border 
crossings last year, Mr. President. 

We all come to the United States in pursuit 
of happiness of one kind or another. When I 
was a student and a younger man I pursued a 
different kind of happiness. 

We come here, though, also to seek knowl- 
edge, to learn from your greater technology, 
from your great advances in science, from your 
great universities, we learn also from the 
hospitality of your people and from the great 
ideals and institutions that the leaders of your 
country have set up as models for humanity 
over the years. 

We learn these things and we respect you for 
that. As one man who is a Harvard graduate 
and coming to Washington at the beginning of 
a new administration, I can promise that I will 
stay less long than some others. 

But I will say that many of the things that I 
learned in one of your great schools was about 
this fine sense of balance that the Americans 
had shown in their ideals and in their institu- 
tions and how from the very early days they 
tackled and solved this problem of eternal con- 
flict between liberty and the rule of law, be- 
tween the need for authority and the need for 
individual freedoms, how they tackled the prob- 
lem of the individual wanting to be alone and 
yet needing society, and how over the decades 
and over the years your country has been able 
to adapt and meet these changes. 

And I think all foreign students of your 
country come to admire most this great vitality, 
this toughness, this resilience of your great 



APRIL 14, 1969 



321 



society, and how rather than be too influenced 
by its mother country — of course, you had a 
rather violent parting with your mother coun- 
try, Mr. President. But we are perhaps in 
Canada a little bit too inclined to borrow from 
England and borrow from France. But you 
went out on your own and you invented this 
great institution of modern federalism, and you 
found this balance in your institutions between 
freedom and order. 

That is why today when we see the mighty 
upheavals in your society we know you will 
meet them. We know you will find solutions, 
and because you are so far ahead of other indus- 
trial societies we know that we will be able to 
learn from the lessons that you will give other 
nations who are trying to acquire this great 
industrial status. 

We will learn from your errors. We will learn 
from your successes. And we know we will 
always have a helping hand in the United 
States. 

There have been for so many years now, Mr. 
President, no tensions between our countries. It 
was your first President, George Washington, 
in his Farewell Address who said that passion- 
ate relationships between one country and 
another engendered a host of evils. 

Well, for a long time there have been no pas- 
sionate relationships between our countries. 
There have been relationships based on discus- 
sion, on reason, on — as you put it this morning, 
sir, in welcoming me — on the excitement of di- 
versity. But always we have solved these 
through discussion, through reasonable men 
getting together, and sometimes reasonable 
women getting together, asking ourselves about 
our problem and seeking the best solution for 
everyone concerned. 

And we know this will be the way of the 
future. I have learned in our discussions this 
morning, Mr. President, and this afternoon. 
I have seen how this will still be the pattern of 
relationship between our countries, a pattern 
based on wisdom rather than passion, a pattern 
based on a desire to understand rather than to 
dominate. 

It was a Frenchman, De Tocqueville, who first 
described I think in a very able way the kind 
of delicate balance that the United States ideals 
and institutions were able to put forward. And 
he had a phrase — si vous me permettez de 
traduire un peu libremente [if you will permit 
me to translate somewhat freely] — which went 



about like this: That you don't receive truth 
from your enemies and your friends are rarely 
willing to offer it. It is for this reason, he said, 
that I have written these books. 

Well, Mr. President, we are the kind of 
friends who do tell the truth to each other. We 
have told it this morning. 

I am sure we will tell it in the future. 

We find that this kind of relationship is the 
only basis on which nations of the world can live 
in peace together — in understanding. 

I want to say also how grateful I am to you, 
Mrs. Nixon, for your very gracious hospitality, 
for the wonderful food, the lovely flowers, and 
the exciting music. I feel almost as though I am 
among old friends. I hope we will become such. 

But I do want to, in thanking you, ask the 
ladies and gentlemen assembled to drink your 
continued good health, sir, to drink the health 
of not only Canada's closest neighbor, the head 
of state which is Canada's closest neighbor, our 
longstanding ally, but also the health of a 
friend : President Nixon of the United States. 



DEPARTURE CEREMONY 

White House press release dated March 25 

President Nixon 

We have just completed a series of meetings, 
first a private talk between the Prime Minister 
and myself, and also a number of meetings at 
other levels of Government between members of 
his party and members of the administration. 

I think it could be said without fear of con- 
tradiction that this is one of the most success- 
ful meetings of this type — successful in the sense 
of the number of subjects covered and the prog- 
ress which has been made in the solution of those 
subjects — ever held between the two countries. 

We have issued to the press a joint statement 
which will indicate the subjects that were dis- 
cussed and the positions that were taken and sev- 
eral future meetings that are planned. 

I have only two other brief things to add be- 
fore the Prime Minister will have a chance to 
indicate his reactions to some of the subjects we 
discussed. 

Your visit, Mr. Prime Minister, has provided 
us here an opportunity to know intimately the 
problems of your coiuitry, but also to know you. 
This we deeply appreciate. 

I have been impressed by the candor and also 



.322 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



by the restraint of the statements, the conversa- 
tions that we have had. 

As we work together in the years ahead, I am 
confident that the relationslup will be a close 
one ; it will be an honest one ; it will be one where 
we will find some areas of disagreement, but far 
more areas of agreement. 

We are so delighted that you came here so 
that we had the opportunity to know you in this 
way. 

Finally, the Prime Minister has invited me 
to pay a visit to Canada. Mrs. Nixon and I are 
delighted to accept that invitation. "We will ar- 
range a time convenient to both the Prime 
Minister and ourselves at some later time. 

But apart from that visit, I think that the 
members of the press should know that we have 
established several channels of communication — 
some existed before, new ones have been added 
at all Cabinet levels where there are common 
interests. 

We found several new areas in which com- 
munications could go forward. As far as the 
Prime Minister is concerned, we will not talk 
only on official visits of this type, or like the one 
I will pay to his country, we will be in communi- 
cation by telephone, of course, as well as through 
the diplomatic channels, because this is a new 
era of consultation and, we hope, cooperation 
between our countries who share so much 
together. 

Thank you. 



I find that we reached agreement, especially 
when we were looking outward to the kind of 
value in which we believe ; and I can only repeat 
what I said to you, sir, the admiration I have 
for the place you have put so early in your ad- 
ministration on consultation with your Euro- 
pean friends and then with us. That you should 
have taken such time so soon to state your 
points of views, to ask us questions, and to an- 
swer ours, is to us a guarantee, a symbol of the 
kind of warm relationships we will have. 

It is appropriate that yesterday was kind of 
a rainy day, in which we did a lot of work, and 
today it is warming up and we can now — we 
have, in French, an expression: L' important, 
c'est la rose. The important thing is that we 
should be saying this in a rose garden under the 
siui, and this augurs well, I am sure, for all 
future relationships between yourself and us 
Canadians. 

Wlien I arrived, I brought you the greetings 
of the Canadian people, and I am proud now to 
go back and report to Parliament the cordiality 
of your welcome, sir, and the candid and sincere 
quality which you brought into all discussions, 
whether bilateral or looking outward toward the 
world. 

I thank you very much for your hospitality. I 
will be looking forward to your visit and Mrs. 
Nixon's visit to Canada at a time when you can 
conveniently arrange it. 

Thank you again so much. 



Prime Minister Trudeau 

I essentially want to state my agreement with 
what you just said, Mr. President. This has been 
2 days of agreement in many areas, and I agree 
wholeheartedly with your summary of our 
meetings. 

We have laid the gi'oundwork, the founda- 
tions for consultation between our two coun- 
tries, as you put it, in many areas, in my 
meetings with yourself, sir, with the Vice Presi- 
dent, and with most ministers of your Cabinet. 

We have covered a great deal of groimd and 
we have established — I repeat your words — the 
channels through which very many of our bi- 
lateral problems can be tackled and solved. 

We discussed at great length the problems of 
wheat and problems of oil, which are very im- 
portant in our Canadian West. We discussed 
trade problems generally, and our approach to 
them in the world. 



ANNOUNCEMENT AT NEWS BRIEFING, 
MARCH 25 

The President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister 
of Canada exchanged views on a wide range of inter- 
national and bilateral matters. They seek a close, con- 
fident relationship between the two countries. The 
Prime Minister's visit has put the foundations in place 
for a continuing discussion on a number of questions. 

The President has stated that he values the views 
and the outlook which the Prime Minister has im- 
parted to him. The President said, "The viewpoint of 
the Canadian Government has always weighed heavily 
in the formation of United States policy. No other 
ally influences us more." The Prime Minister of Canada 
stressed that his Government is anxious to maintain 
and develop Canada's already close and friendly rela- 
tions with the United States. 

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the 
future of NATO. The President expressed the U.S. 
commitment to NATO. The President also emphasized 
the interest of the U.S.A. in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union rather than in confrontations. 



APRIL 14, 1969 



323 



The President of the United States and the Prime 
Minister of Canada have discussed the recent decision 
of the United States to proceed with the safeguard 
system ° and its possible implications for Canada. 

The President of the United States informed the 
Prime Minister of Canada of the reasons which led 
the United States to make this decision and of the 
United States' expectations as to its effects on East- 
West relations and on possible arms control measures. 

Over the years the United States has regularly in- 
formed Canada of plans and developments in the ABM 
field ; it has been agreed that this practice will be 
continued. 

The Prime Minister will report to his Cabinet col- 
leagues on his discussions with the United States Ad- 
ministration and a full assessment wUl be made of the 
implications for Canada of the safeguard system. 

The two countries share an intimate and valued trad- 
ing relationship, unique in amount and diversity. They 
also share a commitment to further the expansion and 
freeing-up of world trade for the benefit of developing 
and developed countries alike. 

As the next step in high-level consultation, a meeting 
of the Joint Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic 
Policy will be held on June 25-27. The meeting will 
provide an opportunity to discuss the fuU range of 
economic and financial questions, including balance of 
payments, investment, energy and trade. 

In the context of the common interest of the two 
countries in the expansion of cross-border movement 
of energy. United States-Canadian developments in 
the matter of oil were discussed at length. Senior of- 
ficials of the two Governments will, on April 2, initiate 
meetings to identify and study areas of common in- 
terest in energy matters and to work out constructive 
solutions to current problems against the background 
of long-standing arrangements. 

The President and the Prime Minister agreed to work 
closely together with other exporting and importing 
countries, to find positive solutions to the current prob- 
lems of tJie world wheat market within the framework 
of the International Grains Arrangement. Both coun- 
tries will be working to overcome the present market 
instability and to strengthen prices consistent with the 
provisions of the agreement. 

The two discussed Canada's plans for a domestic 
communications satellite, and the possibility of its 
launch by the U.S. The President stated that the U.S. 
is prepared, in principle, to provide launch services for 
this satellite, subject to appropriate arrangements 
which it is hoped will be worked out in the next few 
weeks. 



The Prime Minister's visit marks a first step in a new 
era of consultation between Canada and the United 
States. We have done much together in the past; 
we can do more. Problems between us can be settled 
in ways that promote the interests and the identities of 
both nations. 

The Prime Minister invited the President and Mrs. 
Nixon to visit Canada. The President has indicated that 
he wishes to accept the invitation. 



U.S. and Spain Confer on Extension 
of Defense Agreement 

Joint ComTnwnique ^ 

The Foreign Minister of Spain, Fernando 
Maria Castiella, and the Secretary of State, 
William P. Rogers, have conferred over the past 
two days on the conclusions to be drawn from 
the consultations that have been taking place 
regarding the jjossible extension for a further 
five-year period of the Defense Agreement be- 
tween Spain and the United States of America 
dated September 26, 1953.^ The period of con- 
sultations called for by Article V of t\\& Defense 
Agreement expires by its terms today 
[March 26]. 

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of 
State reached agreement in principle on the 
nature of the arrangements for the new five-year 
period of the Defense Agreement, which both 
Governments agree should take place, subject 
to the completion of the negotiation of the writ- 
ten documents that will express such arrange- 
ments. The Governments of Spain and the 
United States are confident this process can be 
accomplished shortly. 

Foreign Minister Castiella is departing for 
Madrid. He intends to return to Washington for 
the completion of the negotiations with the Sec- 
retary of State. 



' For a statement by President Nixon issued on Mar. 
14, see Bulletin of Mar. 31, 1969, p. 273. 



' Issued at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 26 (Department 
of State press release 62). 
° Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2850. 



324 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



The United Nations and the Cause of Peace 



by Charles W. Yost 

UJS. Representative to the United Nations ^ 



It is indeed a pleasure for me to meet with 
the conference of NGO [nongovernmental 
organization] representatives of the United 
Nations Association. I had hoped to meet with 
many of you as our guests at a U.S. Mission 
briefing the week before last; then that plan 
had to be canceled at the last minute. Now, in- 
stead, I am your guest. I greatly appreciate 
your patience as well as your hospitality. 

From my past service at the United Nations, 
I am well aware of the unique place which the 
NGO's occupy in the work of the United Na- 
tions community, both at the international and 
the national level. Before concluding I shall re- 
vert to that subject for a few minutes and dis- 
cuss some of the work that you in private life 
and we in public office can do together in the 
days ahead. 

But my main theme today is a broader one, 
and one which I think is appropriate in the 
early weeks of a new administration : the United 
Nations itself and the ways in which we hope 
it may serve the cause of peace in the j^ears 
ahead. 

You will recall that last December 17 Presi- 
dent-elect Nixon, as he then was, accompanied 
by his Secretary of State-designate, Mr. Rogers, 
paid a call on Secretary General Thant. His 
purpose, in his own words, was to indicate "our 
continuing support of the United Nations and 
our intention in these years ahead to do every- 
thing that we can to strengthen this organiza- 
tion as it works in the cause of peace throughout 
the world." 

This statement was much more than a mere 
rhetorical flourish. On that and other occasions, 



^Address made before the conference of United Na- 
tions representatives. United Nations Association- 
United States of America, at New Torli, N.T., on Mar. 
18 (U.S.AJ.N. press release 24). 



President Nixon has clearly identified certain 
particular kinds of work in which he looks to 
the United Nations as a valuable and necessary 
instrument of international peace. I should like 
to comment briefly on a few of these categories. 

Strengthening Peace in the Third World 

The first category is that of peacekeeping 
and peacemaking. This applies especially to con- 
flicts which arise in what the President has re- 
ferred to as the "third world," where the vital 
interests of the great powers are not, and we 
hope will not be, directly engaged. Again I 
quote Mr. Nixon's words : 

The more the United States and the Soviet Union 
can conduct their policies in a way that those conflicts 
in the third world are channeled into the United Na- 
tions or another international organization, the better 
the chances are that we can avoid a confrontation 
which both powers, I think, want to avoid. 

This function of promoting international 
peace and security is, of course, the heart of the 
United Nations Charter and has been the sub- 
ject of our most determined — and most frustrat- 
ing — efforts over the years. The record shows 
many failures but also a niunber of remarkable 
successes and innovations. The U.N. peace 
forces and observer groups in Kashmir, the Mid- 
dle East, the Congo, and Cyprus have been 
major factors in whatever stability and progress 
toward peace has been achieved in those volatile 
areas. Even when such operations have proved 
inadequate, it is fair to ask whether direct great- 
power intervention, or indeed any other practi- 
cable alternative, could have done better. As for 
their financial cost, to which so much argument 
has been devoted, surely every nation involved 
should ask itself whether that cost has not been 
trivial compared to the probable cost of the ma- 
jor wars that might otherwise have come to pass. 



APRIL 14, 1969 



325 



It follows that one of the principal ways in 
which the United Nations needs to be strength- 
ened in its work for peace is in this capability 
to conduct peacekeeping operations in danger 
areas. Despite the notorious difficulties sur- 
roundmg this problem, we now have some rea- 
son to be moderately hopeful about it. Last 
year, for the first time in the 4-year history of 
the Committee of 33, which deals with peace- 
keeping operations, the Soviet Union, as well 
as France, joined in supporting a meaningful 
action : in this case a study of peacekeeping op- 
erations of the military observer type to be fol- 
lowed by a further study of operations involv- 
ing organized forces. We hope these studies will 
provide the basis for a useful report by the 
Committee of 33 to the next session of the As- 
sembly. We should have no illusions about the 
difficulties that still lie ahead; but it does seem 
as if we may at last have begun to move off 
dead center in the longstanding controversy 
over United Nations peacekeeping. We intend to 
do whatever we can to maintain the momentum. 

In giving this emphasis to peacekeeping, 
which treats the symptoms of conflict, I do not 
at all underrate the importance of peacemaking, 
which treats their causes. In fact, as our cur- 
rent efforts on the Middle East remind us, one 
of the central purposes of the United Nations 
is, as article 1 of the charter says, "to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace." The old saw still holds : An 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 

Many of the issues that arise, perhaps the 
majority, are very complex, and neither side has 
a monopoly of the arguments. "^AHiat the U.N. 
can contribute in such situations is primarily 
an infinitely patient diplomacy to discourage 
violence and help the parties reach a frame of 
mind in which the inevitable compromise solu- 
tion finally becomes acceptable. Some situations, 
on the other hand, arise from a massive injus- 
tice by one side; and no solution is possible, 
consistent with the charter, xmtil the injustice 
is removed. Such is the case with the tragic 
racial difficulties in southern Africa, which are 
rightly a subject of great concern at the United 
Nations. There we have no alternative but to 
continue the search for peaceful means which 



326 



can command the necessary international sup- 
port and which will help to induce those who 
practice these injustices to change their policies. 

Cooperation for a Better Life 

A second category of United Nations activity 
in which President Nixon has expressed a keen 
interest is the vast range of programs for inter- 
national development and technical cooperation. 
All through the life of the United Nations these 
programs have steadily expanded in their va- 
riety and size. They now absorb more than 80 
percent of the money which the members con- 
tribute to the United Nations. They range from 
the killing of insect pests to the building of 
power dams, from teaching illiterate adults how 
to read to organizing the development of entire 
river basins. They draw on the resources and 
talents of the whole family of U.N. agencies, 
embracing virtually every teclinical specialty 
that exists. 

The President has called these U.N. programs 
"tremendously exciting," and indeed they are — 
not only because of the important purposes they 
serve but because of their proven effectiveness. 
I think there is very wide agreement, based on 
the experience of more than a decade, that mul- 
tilateral aid for develojDment is usually a better 
bargain for the United States than bilateral aid. 
It is better insulated against politics; it is freer 
of the resentments that arise between donor and 
recipient; it can draw on technical talent from 
many countries; and moreover, the United 
States contributes to most U.N. programs less 
than half — sometimes much less than half — of 
the funds expended. 

Historically, Congress has shown itself well 
aware of these advantages and has voted stead- 
ily increasing United States contributions to the 
United Nations Development Program. How- 
ever, last year was a bad year for all aid pro- 
grams in Washington, and for the first time our 
contribution to the UNDP was too small to meet 
our usual 40 percent matching formula. 

We are hopeful that the United States con- | 
tribution this year will resmne its upward trend. 
Last week the administration recommended to 
the Congress a substantial United States con- 
tribution to expand the lending power of the 
International Development Association. It is 
greatly to be hoped that Congress will show a 
favorable attitude not only on that proposal 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETrU' 



I 



but also on the much smaller increase that 
should be made this year in the U.N. Develop- 
ment Program. 

These decisions are pending at an important 
moment in the history of the U.N.'s develop- 
ment work. The Preparatory Committee on the 
next U.N. Development Decade has now begun 
its task of preparing a development strategy for 
the 1970's, a preliminary draft of which will 
come before the General Assembly this fall. 

The experience of the First Development 
Decade has been extremely disappointing, not 
to say alarming. Out of about 100 countries 
classified as "less developed," only a dozen have 
sustained through the 1960's the annual growth 
rate of 5 percent which was set as the goal of 
the Development Decade. Most low-income 
countries, after a period of great expectations, 
are growing at a rate so slow as to be imper- 
ceptible to the ordinary citizen. Many have 
found their hopes of a higher living standard 
buried under a runaway growth in population. 

Meanwhile, among about two dozen devel- 
oped countries, growth rates continue at high 
and in some cases phenomenal rates. Thus the 
wide gap between rich and poor countries re- 
mains and, indeed, continues to widen. If the 
low-income countries cannot soon begin to im- 
prove the lot of their peoples at a more rapid 
rate, massive and bitter frustrations and resent- 
ments are bound to build up imtil we find our- 
selves moving inexorably into a tragic era of 
North-South confrontation no less dangerous 
than that between East and West, 

The cure for this evil will of course be com- 
plex, involving capital investment, technical as- 
sistance, education and training, trade, foreign 
exchange, social development, and many other 
elements. One obvious and urgent need is to slow 
down the ominous growth in population. An- 
other, in which the main responsibility falls 
on the developed countries, is to increase the 
flow of their capital investment, both public and 
private, to the less developed countries. 

The General Assembly long ago decided, with 
the concurrence of the United States, that this 
capital flow ought to amount to 1 percent of the 
gross national product of the developed coun- 
tries. Unfortmiately that goal has very rarely 
been met, and most countries are farther from 
it now than they were at the beginning of the 
Decade. Aid from both the United States and 
Western Europe has declined during the period 



from a little more to a little less than one-half of 
1 percent of GNP. 

These tiny percentages show how very small 
the capital input of the rich nations into the 
development process is, compared to their total 
economy. And it is getting smaller still at the 
very time that the need is getting more urgent. 
In the next Decade we must make sure that the 
pace of development is not held back by a lack 
of ingredients which we can well afl'ord to con- 
tribute, including investment capital on accept- 
able terms. 

To get international development really roll- 
ing in the 1970's — as we have not done in the 
1960's — must be one of the top priority goals 
of the international commmiity. Its attainment 
will require extraordinary, imaginative, and 
persistent efforts by all concerned, through the 
United Nations and every other appropriate 
channel. If the efforts it will demand of us in 
the developed world seem somewhat inconven- 
ient at a time when we have many other con- 
cerns both at home and abroad, I submit that 
the inconvenience will be minor compared to 
the tragedy of a North-South confrontation 
wliich may otherwise become inevitable. 

Disarmament 

Finally, I want to say a word about disarma- 
ment and the role wHch the United Nations 
plays in that vitally important cause. It is not, 
as you know, the central role. The General As- 
sembly has traditionally looked to smaller bod- 
ies, such as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee, to do the detailed negotiating in 
matters involving arms control. And within 
those bodies the main burden necessarily falls 
on the major powers — above all, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

This approach has proved fruitful over the 
years. It gave us the Antarctic Treaty in 1958, 
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Out- 
er Space Treaty in 1966, and the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty in 1968. 

But the matter does not end there. Under 
the charter the General Assembly has the right 
to make recommendations concerning disarma- 
ment and the regulation of armaments. It has 
made full use of that right. It is not unusual for 
two-thirds of the time of the First Committee 
in a General Assembly session to be taken up 
with debate on disarmament. This is under- 



APRIIi 14, 1969 



327 



standable, because arras control agreements 
intimately affect the interests and security of 
all nations and, besides, require their active co- 
operation in many respects. This is particularly 
true in the case of the Nonprolif eration Treaty. 
It is hardly surprising that the treaty, when it 
came before the Assembly last spring, should 
have been debated for 7 weeks and amended 
in several respects. 

You can imagine the feelings of the able ne- 
gotiators who had spent 4 years of their lives 
working out the Nonproliferation Treaty in 
Geneva and then had to submit this precious, 
hard-won, delicately balanced document to the 
General Assembly for its endorsement. Yet the 
result justifies the process. The treaty won the 
Assembly's endorsement overwhelmingly, after 
amendments which did it no harm and some- 
what widened its appeal. That endorsement will 
undoubtedly help it in the ratification process 
which is now going on and which was power- 
fully advanced last week by the overwhelming 
vote of the United States Senate. 

Needless to say, we devoutly hope that this 
same process, in wluch the United Nations plays 
a significant part, will stand us in good stead 
as we endeavor to move further along the road 
of control and reduction of nuclear armaments. 

The U.S., the U.N., and the NGO's 

Such, then, are some of the highest priorities 
in the long list of United Nations questions to 
which we at the United States Mission expect 
to be devoting ourselves in the months and years 
ahead. We have great hopes of the United Na- 
tions and of its future contributions to a better 
world. I feel highly privileged to be able to play 
a part, at the President's request, in this crucial 
period in the U.N.'s history. 

Now, as I promised, before concluding I 
would like to comment briefly on the role of the 
NGO's. 

Among all the members of the United Na- 
tions, I am sure that none is more fortunate than 
the United States in the wealth of voluntary 
organizations which take a lively interest in the 
work of the U.N. and in American participation 
in it. You perform a most important function 
as two-way channels of communication and 
advice between your organizations and your 
governmental representatives here and in Wash- 
ington. In this way you help to make possible 
the orderly and effective conduct of foreign 
policy in our free society. 

Many of you, of course, also support the 



United Nations in other ways. Some of you 
have competence in specialized fields, in which 
you contribute your knowledge to U.N. pro- 
grams. Some of you, as citizens of the host 
country, help to provide friendly assistance and 
hospitality to U.N. delegations. Many of you 
encourage citizens to contribute their dollars to 
such U.N. programs as UNICEF [United Na- 
tions Children's Fund] and the U.N. educa- 
tional programs for southern Africa which are 
open to individual contributions. 

But of all these functions, none is more im- 
portant to our common cause than the work you 
do as channels of communication and interpre- 
tation between your members and your Govern- 
ment on all that pertains to the United Nations. 
It is my intention that the United States Mission 
shall be available to help you in performing that 
function as much as our limited resources per- 
mit, that we shall be accessible to your inquiries 
and your criticisms, and that the mutually bene- 
ficial relations that we already enjoy shall be 
maintained and strengthened. 

I would like to mention one particular matter 
in which your collaboration is going to be indis- 
pensable and that is the observance of the 25th 
anniversary of the United Nations in 1970. 
There will of course be an official obser\'ance by 
the member states, which we hope will focus 
not so much on elaborate ceremonial as on ways 
of improving and strengthening the U.N. for 
the decades ahead. A preparatory committee of 
member states is charged with planning that 
official phase, and it will report next fall to the 
General Assembly. 

But it is equally important that the 25th an- 
niversary be properly observed by private citi- 
zens, organizations, and communities, especially 
in this country. This will be a most valuable op- 
portunity for concerned Americans to look 
ahead and consider what kind of world we hope 
to live in over the next 25 years. The planning 
and coordination of activities in which many 
organizations will be involved across the nation 
is bound to be a demanding task, in which, I am 
sure, the UNA-USA and the organizations 
affiliated with it will play a leading role. We 
in the Government will be very much interested 
in learning of your plans as they develop and 
will do our best to work with you in every way 
we can. 

In these remarks I have sought to sketch some 
of the main possibilities for the growth and 
strengthening of the United Nations as the 
world's chief instrument of international order. 
These possibilities are all attended by immense 



328 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



difficulties. It is all too tempting to respond to 
difficulty by withdrawing into that comforting 
truism that "politics is the art of the possible" 
and thereby to excuse in advance the failures we 
anticipate. 

I suggest it may be wiser and healthier for us 
to think of politics — especially international 
politics in this dangerous time — as the art of 
the indispensable. What we know we must do 
for hmnan survival's sake, we can do. For us 
who have a responsibility for the future of the 
United Nations, that applies specifically to our 
need, in the President's words, "to strengthen 
this organization as it works in the cause of 
peace throughout the world." 



U.N. To Accept Private Assistance 
for Peoples of Southern Africa 

hy Charles W. Yost 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

Mr. Secretary General, Your Excellencies, 
ladies and gentlemen : As the Representative of 
the United States, I am very glad to participate 
in this opening of the registers for receipt of 
private American contributions to two worthy 
United Nations undertakings: the United Na- 
tions Trust Fund for South Africa and the 
United Nations Educational and Training 
Program for Southern Africans. Let me con- 
gratulate you, sir, and Ambassador Astrom 
[Sverker C. Astrom, Swedish Representative to 
the U.N.] and all who have made this step possi- 
ble — especially the two American organizations 
in charge of the registers, the Africa Fund and 
the United Nations Association of the USA. 

This step provides a practical and fitting ob- 
servance of a date, March 21, which is widely 
associated with the cause of human rights and 
especially the goal of ending racial discrimina- 
tion. Through the opening of these registers, 
concerned private citizens and groups may join 
with governments in supporting two United 
Nations programs which are giving aid to those 
in southern Africa who are the victims of laws 
and policies discriminating on grounds of race 
and color and who are in need of food, clothing, 
training, legal and other help. 



* Remarks made at U.N. Headquarters, New York, 
N.Y., on Mar. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 29). 



The day will surely come in southern Africa 
when fuller participation in national life will 
be open to all the people regardless of race. As 
we know from the history of the movements for 
racial equality and self-determination, formal 
education is one of the means by which the un- 
derprivileged and dispossessed can develop their 
latent abilities and thus prepare themselves for 
the legitimate and full participation in the life 
of their country. Education thus has a vitally 
important part to play in shaping the future 
of that great region, and it is highly desirable 
that wider educational opportunities be opened 
to its citizens, including those who are refugees 
from racial discrimination. Similarly, we must 
hope for the full restoration in southern Africa 
of important individual rights and freedoms 
that are the hallmark of respect for the rule 
of law. 

It is to be hoped, therefore, that many Ameri- 
cans, both as individuals and organizations, will 
use this means of demonstrating in a tangible 
and practical way their support for a better fu- 
ture for the peoples of southern Africa. This 
cause has already earned the moral support of 
a great many private citizens, and it is a welcome 
development that they are now being encour- 
aged to contribute to it — in addition to the con- 
tributions of governments — by means of these 
registers which you, Mr. Secretary General, will 
declare open. By so doing, they will join with 
many millions throughout the world whose gen- 
erous instincts are stirred by racial injustice in 
southern Africa and who wish to further in that 
region the principles of equality and personal 
dignity which the United Nations has pro- 
claimed for all members of the human family 
and for which we here in the United Nations 
labor. 



Arbitration Panel Issues 
Report on Soluble CofFee 

Press release 50 dated March 3 

The arbitration panel appointed to consider 
the complaint of the U.S. Goverrmient under 
article 44 of the International Coffee Agree- 
ment regarding measures of the Brazilian Gov- 
ernment affecting exports of soluble coffee is- 
sued a report of its conclusions at London 
March 3. Article 44 prohibits governmental 
measures affecting exports of coffee that 



APRIL 14, 1969 



329 



"amount to discriminatory treatment" in favor 
of processed coffee as compared with green 
coffee. 

A majority of the panel found that an un- 
desirable situation of the type contemplated by 
article 44 existed and also found that the United 
States is entitled to take appropriate action in 
the event that Brazil does not take corrective 
measures to remedy the situation. 

Under article 44(3), Brazil has 30 days to 
correct the situation in accordance with the con- 
clusions of the majority of the arbitration 
panel. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Broadcasting Agreements With Mexico 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States : 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit 
herewith two separate but related agreements 
between the United States of America and the 
United Mexican States signed at Mexico City 
on December 11, 1968, namely : 

(1) an agreement concerning radio broad- 
casting in the standard broadcasting band (535- 
1605 kHz), and 

(2) an agreement concerning the operation 
of broadcasting stations in the standard band 
(535-1605 kHz), during a limited period prior 
to sunrise ("pre-sunrise") and after sunset 
("post-sunset"). 

I transmit also, for the information of the 
Senate, the report of the Secretary of State 
with respect to the two agreements. 

Since the end of 1967, when the broadcasting 
agreement of January 29, 1957,^ ceased to be in 
force, there has been no agreement governing 
the relations between the United States and 
Mexico in the use of the standard broadcasting 
band. Eelations of the United States with other 
major countries in the North American Region 



in the broadcasting field continue to be governed 
by the North American Regional Broadcasting 
Agreement of November 15, 1950,^ to which 
Mexico is not a party. 

The two agreements with Mexico have been 
concluded after negotiations extending over a 
period of more than two years between United 
States and Mexican delegations, with repre- 
sentatives of the United States broadcasting in- 
dustry participating as advisers to the United 
States delegation. The Federal Communications 
Commission and the Department of State ex- 
press the opinion that the best interest of the 
United States would be served by ratification 
and entry into force of both agreements, the 
substance of which is understood to be generally 
satisfactoiy to broadcasting interests in the 
United States. 

The first-mentioned agreement, referred to 
as the broadcasting agreement, contains detailed 
provisions designed to resolve many engineering 
and allocation problems between the United 
States and Mexico, as explained more fully in 
the report of the Secretary of State. 

The other agi'eement, referred to as the pre- 
smirise/post-sunset agreement, is tied to the 
broadcasting agreement in the sense that it can 
be effective only so long as the broadcasting 
agreement remains in effect. The regulations 
therein for station operation with daytime facil- 
ities for limited periods of time before the sun- 
rise-to-sunset period heretofore prescribed will 
enable the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion to implement plans for pre-smirise opera- 
tion of United States daytime stations, so that, 
for the first time, it will be possible for a large 
number of such stations, now operating on seven 
clear (I-A) channels accorded to Mexico in the 
broadcasting agreement, to have uniform start- 
ing times throughout the year. Wliereas the 
United States would gain from the provisions 
for pre-sunrise operation, Mexico would gain 
from the post-sunset provisions. 

The two agreements would be brought into 
force by the exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion and would remain in effect for a term of 
five years and indefinitely thereafter unless re- 
placed by a new agreement or unless terminated 



' Transmitted on Mar. 25 (White House press 
release) ; also printed as S. Ex. B, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the texts of the agreements and the 
report of the Secretary of State. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4777. 

° Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4460. 



330 



DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



by a one-year written notice from either party 
to the other party. 

I recommend that the Senate give early and 
favorable consideration to the two agreements 
with Mexico. 



RiCHAED Nixon 



The White House, 
March 25, 1969. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 
1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959.* 
Accession deposited: Italy, January 31, 1969. 

Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
with annex, as amended. Done at New York Octo- 
ber 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 
3873, 5284. 
Acceptance deposited: Niger, March 27, 1969. 

Aviation 

Clonvention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963." 
Signature: Brazil, February 28, 1969. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes, as amended. Done at 
Washington April 8, 1959. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 30, 1959. TIAS 4397, 6591. 

Signature and acceptance: Barbados, March 19, 
1969. 

Hydrography 

Convention on the International Hydrographic Or- 
ganization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 
1967.' 
Ratification deposited: Norway, March 12, 1969. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination. Done at New York Decem- 
ber 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.' 
Ratifications deposited: Madagascar (with a reser- 
vation), February 7, 1969; Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics (with a declaration and a reserva- 
tion ), February 4, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at 
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967 ; for the United States November 1, 
1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Swaziland (with reservations 
and a declaration) , January 28, 1969. 



Slavery 

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, as 
amended (TIAS 3532). Concluded at Geneva Septem- 
ber 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927 ; for 
the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183. 
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, January 21, 1969. 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade and institutions and practices similar 
to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. En- 
tered into force April 30, 1957 ; for the United States 
December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, January 21, 1969. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 
1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. 
Ratification deposited at Washington: Argentina, 
March 26, 1969. 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Ratification deposited at Washington: Argentina, 
March 26, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered 
into force January 1, 1967; for the United States 
May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 

Ratifications deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, including Land Berlin, December 16, 1968 ; 
Luxembourg, December 31, 1968. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603), putting into 
effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service and related infor- 
mation, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966. 
Entered into force July 1, 1967; for the United 
States August 23, 1967, except the frequency allot- 
ment plan contained in appendix 27 shall enter into 
force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332. 
Notification of approval: Spain, December 13, 1968. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating 
to maritime mobile service, with annexes and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered 
into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 
Notifications of approval: Canada, December 6, 1968 ; 
China, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, December 19, 
1968. 

Trade 

Fourth proces-verbal extending the declaration on the 
provisional accession of the United Arab Republic 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 
November 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva 
November 19, 1968. 

Entered into force: February 27, 1969.' 
Acceptances: Canada, February 21. 1969; Cnha, 
February 26, 1969; Nigeria, February 19, 1969; 
United Arab Republic. February 27, 1969. 

Fifth proces-verbal extending the declaration on the 
provisional accession of Tunisia to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 

' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 



APRIL 14, 1969 



831 



(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva November 19, 1968. 
Entered Into force December 17, 1968.' 
Acceptances: Canada, February 21, 1969; Cuba, Feb- 
ruary 26, 1969 ; Malavri, February 5, 1969 ; Nigeria, 
February 19, 1969. 



BILATERAL 



Canada 

Agreement relating to the construction of a temporary 
cofferdam between Goat Island and the United States 
mainland above the American Falls at Niagara. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington March 21, 
1969. Entered into force March 21, 1969. 

Agreement authorizing temporary additional diversion 
for power purposes of water flowing over American 
Falls. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
March 21, 1969. Enters into force upon notification 
that it has been approved by the United States 
Senate. 

Ceylon 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of October 27, 1967 (TIAS 
6405). Signed at Colombo February 19, 1969. Entered 
into force February 19, 1969. 



arranged by country or other political entity, and the 
multilateral treaties and other agreements are ar- 
ranged by subject and show names of countries which 
have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry 
into force for the United States, and citations to texts 
are furnished for each agreement. This edition includes 
citations to volumes 1 and 2 of the new compilation 
entitled Treaties and Other International Agreements 
0/ the United States of America 1776-1949 (Bevans) 
which is now being published by the Department of 
State. Volume I was released in November 1968. 

Treaties in Force provides information concerning 
treaty relations with numerous newly independent 
states. Indicating wherever possible the provisions of 
their constitutions and independence arrangements re- 
garding assumption of treaty obligations. 

Information on current treaty actions, supplement- 
ing the information contained in Treaties in Force, is 
published weekly In the Department of State Bulletin. 

The 1969 edition of Treaties in Force (376 pp. ; De- 
partment of State publication 8432) is for sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $1.50. 



Recent Releases 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department Issues 1969 Edition 
of "Treaties in Force" 

Press release 37 dated February 18 

The Department of State on February 18 published 
Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Agreements of the United States in Force on 
January 1, 1969. 

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral relations 
of the United States with 152 countries or other politi- 
cal entities and the multilateral relations of the United 
States with other contracting parties to more than 370 
treaties and agreements on 78 subjects. The 1969 edi- 
tion lists some 300 new treaties and agreements, in- 
cluding the agreement on the rescue and return of 
astronauts, a new wheat convention, the protocol re- 
lating to the status of refugees, the income tax conven- 
tion with France, the consular convention with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the agreements 
on cultural exchanges with Romania and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the treaty of amity and 
economic relations with Thailand. 

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are 



' Not in force for the United States. 



For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Viet -Nam Information Notes. A series of Department 
of State publications, each of which siunmarizes a 
significant aspect of the situation In VIet-Nam : 

No. 13. The U.S. Assistance Program in Viet-Nam. 
Describes and explains the U.S. aid program in Viet- 
Nam — its operation, purpose, and future. Pub. 8419. 
East Asian and Pacific Series 177. 6 pp. 10^. 

Investment Gnaranties. Agreement with Antigua. 
TIAS 6567. 3 pp. 10!f. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Dominica 
TIAS 6568. 3 pp. 10<t. 

Earth Resources— Cooperative Research in Remote 
Sensing for Earth Surveys. Agreement with Brazil. 
TIAS 6569. 6 pp. lO^!. 

Cultural Relations — Exchanges in the Scientific, Tech- 
nical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1968- 
1969. Agreement with the U.S.S.B. TIAS 6570. 80 pp. 
35«i. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia. 
TIAS 6571. 39 pp. 20!*. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement vrith Nicaragua. 
TIAS 6572. 6 pp. 10(f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia. 
TIAS 6573. 11 pp. 10«i. 

Termination of Trade Agreement of January 9, 1936, 
and Related Agreements. Agreement with Switzerland. 
TIAS 6574. 4 pp. 10^'. 



332 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX April 14, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1555 



Africa 

U.X. To Afcept Private Assistance for Peoples 

of Southern Africa (Yost) 329 

U.S. Foreign Policy : Some Major Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Brazil. Arbitration Panel Issues Report on 

Soluble Coffee 329 

Canada. President Nixon and Prime Minister 
Trudeau of Canada Hold Talks at Washing- 
ton (Nixon, Trudeau, announcement at news 
briefing) 310 

China. U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Major Issues 

(Rogers) 30.j 

Communications. Broadcasting Agreements With 
Jlesico Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Nixon) 330 

Congress 

Broadcasting Agreements With Mexico Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 330 

U.S. Foreign Policy : Some Major Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Disarmament. U.S. Foreign Policy : Some Major 
Issues (Rogers) 30.J 

Economic Affairs. Arbitration Panel Issues Re- 
port on Soluble Coffee 329 

Europe. U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Major Issues 

(Rogers) 30.j 

Latin America. U.S. Foreign Policy : Some Major 
Issues (Rogers) 305 

Mexico. Broadcasting Agreements With Mexico 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 
President Nixon) :j:30 

Military Affairs. President Nixon Discusses the 
Viet-Nam Peace Talks and the ABM Safeguard 
System (Nixon) 313 

Near East. U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Major Is- 
sues (Rogers) 305 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 20th 

Anniversary of NATO (proclamation) . . . 31S 

Presidential Documents 

Broadcasting Agreements With Mexico Trans- 
mitted to the Senate 330 

President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau of 
Canada Hold Talks at Washington .... 319 

I'resident Nixon Discusses the Viet-Nam Peace 
Talks and the ABM Safeguard System . . . 313 

The 20th Anniversary of NATO 31S 

Publications 

Department Issues 19C9 Edition of "Treaties in 

Force" 332 

Recent Releases 332 

Spain. U.S. and Spain Confer on Extension of 
Defense Agreement (joint communique) . . 324 



Treaty Information 

Broadcasting Agreements With Mexico Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 330 

Current Actions 331 

Department Issues 1969 Edition of "Treaties in 
Force" 332 

U.S. and Spain Confer on Extension of Defense 
Agreement (joint communique) 324 

United Kingdom. Letters of Credence (Free- 
man) 318 

United Nations 

The United Nations and the Cause of Peace 

U'ost) 325 

U.N. To Accept Private Assistance for Peoples 

of Southern Africa (Yost) 329 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Major Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Viet-Nam 

President Nixon Discusses the Viet-Nam Peace 
Talks and the ABM Safeguard Svstem 
(^i^on) 313 

Tenth Plenary Session on A^et-Nam Held at 
Paris (Lodge) 316 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Major Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Name Index 

Freeman, John 3ig 

Lodge, Henry Cabot . . 31G 

Nixon. President 313, 318, 319, .-ISO 

Rogers, Secretary 3Q5 

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott . . • . ■ . .^^^ 
Yost, Charles W '. 325, 329 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 24-30 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D C 
20520. 6 . • 

Releases issued prior to March 24 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 37 of 
February 18 and 50 of March 3. 

No. Date Subject 

*61 3/26 Program for visit of Prime Minister 
Gorton of Australia. 

62 3/26 Secretary Rogers, Foreign Minister 

Castiella of Spain: joint com- 
munique. 

63 3/27 Lodge : 10th plenary session on Viet- 

Nam at Paris. 

64 3/27 Rogers: Senate Committee on For- 

eign Relations. 
*65 3/28 Rogers: death of former Pre.sident 
Eisenhower. 



*Not printed. 



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u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. zoaoz 



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>^ THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1556 




April 21, 1969 



AMBASSADOR SMITH PRESENTS U.S. VIEWS ON SEABED PROPOSAL 
AT EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 333 

U.N. SEABED COMMITTEE CONCLUDES SPRING SESSION 

Statement by David H. Popper 34'2 

U.S. EXPLAINS VOTE ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ISRAEL 

Statements hy Ambassador Yost and Text of Resolution 31fi 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent ol' 'itf- 

MAY 2 1969 
DEPOSITORY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1556 
April 21, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OfBce 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Pse of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tlie White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by tlie President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
natioTUil relations are listed currently. 



Ambassador Smith Presents U.S. Views on Seabed Proposal 
at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference 

Statement by Gerard Smith ^ 



Good will alone does not create results. All 
of us know only too well it is not enough to be 
for peace — we must also work for concrete 
measures that make for peace. Only through 
constant efforts of people determined to change 
the world will we move forward to our common 
goals. 

May I be permitted, Mr. Chairman, to make a 
personal comment. It was this kind of deter- 
mined effort by the men who have served before 
me in the United States Government that 
helped to make possible the achievements of 
the past few years. Bill Foster, my distinguished 
predecessor and longtime friend, and Adrian 
Fisher, whose able mind has contributed to the 
solution of so many problems, have helped 
members of this conference to turn hope into 
reality. I will seek to emulate them. 

Mr. Chairman, I wish at this time to make 
some general observations about our work and 
then to set forth the views of the United States 
on one of the items on our agenda. 

First there is the question of where we are and 
where and by what means we should go from 
here. Certain limited but still highly significant 
successes have been achieved in the past. I need 
not elaborate on these to this conference, but 
we must not forget that the first steps are some- 
times the most difficult. Moreover, our achieve- 
ments have significance beyond their direct ef- 
fects, for they have started the process of bring- 
ing the nuclear arms race imder control. Cer- 
tainly, the world is different today from what 
it would have been without these agreements. 

As for the future, progress on arms control 
and disarmament is a many-faceted under- 

' Made before the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Mar. 25. Am- 
bassador Smith is Director of the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delega- 
tion to the conference. 



taking. We need not and should not be forced 
into an arbitrary decision as to which area or 
measure should receive priority to the exclu- 
sion of others. We can, of course, determine 
which areas have a logical relationship to the 
foundations we have already laid and to our 
goals for the foreseeable future. My point, Mr. 
Chairman, is that we should not be rigid in our 
priorities. 

I think this Committee can and should explore 
various measures in a concurrent manner. In 
that way our understanding can be increased 
and our differences reduced. Hopefully, some 
agreements can be reached without delay. 

It is not fair or necessary to assume that the 
monopoly of the time of the Committee which 
the Nonproliferation Treaty negotiations pro- 
duced will be repeated in connection with some 
other arms control measure. There are few nego- 
tiations that are without complications, and I 
do not infer that our tasks in the future will 
be simple. However, it is important that we 
keep in mind that the nonproliferation nego- 
tiations were of a special kind. Some students 
of current history have said that those nego- 
tiations were, because of the variety of teclinical 
and political issues involved and the number of 
countries immediately affected, one of the most 
complicated and involved international nego- 
tiations since the end of World War II. 

Therefore, I believe we should not be too con- 
cerned that any one measure may monopolize 
the attention of this Committee. We must try 
to move forward in all relevant areas, while 
remaining alert to any opportunities to move 
forward more rapidly to the conclusion of a 
particular agreement. Any agreement we reach 
makes other possible accords less difficult and 
more probable. 

President Nixon, in his letter which I sub- 



APRH, 21, 1969 



333 



mitted on March 18, discussed areas which 
the United States believes merit particular 
attention.^ 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

There is, I believe, a common agreement that 
the prospects for progress in one particular area 
lie in bilateral discussions. 

A number of representatives here have quite 
rightly referred to the importance of prospec- 
tive strategic arms limitations talks. The criti- 
cal significance of such talks to the efforts to 
bring the nuclear arms race mider control is 
obvious. That the obligations of article VI of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty are relevant in this 
regard no one would dispute. But I think it is 
important that we keep in mind that it is not 
merely a question of obligations but rather the 
opportunity to control the nuclear arms race 
and thereby increase international security and 
reduce the burdens of the arms race that is of 
greatest relevancy. 

In this regard it should perhaps be pointed 
out that under the recent administration of 
President Johnson, the American Government 
had made preparations and last August was 
ready and willing to commence such negotia- 
tions on strategic arms limitations. 

Now, it is only prudent for the new adminis- 
tration of my country to prepare itself thor- 
oughly for negotiations that could be of a most 
sensitive nature, going to the heart of the 
strategic balance in the world and having a 
direct and central bearing on the mutual secu- 
rity of the United States, its allies, and, indeed, 
much of the world. In matters of this mag- 
nitude, careful preparation is the greatest con- 
tribution that a nation can make to fruitful 
negotiations. 

The question of timing is thus twofold. The 
passage of some time is needed for the new ad- 
ministration to make the necessary preparations. 
And the timing should be favorable in a political 
sense if even carefully prepared strategic arms 
limitations talks are to proceed with real 
promise of being productive. 

At this point, I would like to add one addi- 
tional thought which I would hope members of 
this Committee and their governments will keep 
in mind. My Government is fully aware of the 
responsibilities which it carries — along with 
others — to make every effort to halt the nuclear 
arms race. And therefore, in major national 

'For text, see Bui-tETiN of Apr. 7, 1969, p. 289. 



defense decisions taken in the present, and in 
the absence of relevant arms control agreements, 
every effort is taken to see that they are not 
provocative and that they will not make anns 
negotiations more difficult. This type of consid- 
eration, we believe, is also in the spirit of article 
"VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

ENDC Agenda Items 

Mr. Chairman, with respect to the questions 
on the agenda of this Committee, the United 
States, as I have indicated, will submit views 
during the course of this session which we hope 
will contribute to progress in our work. In par- 
ticular, I hope we can have profitable and realis- 
tic exchanges on a comprehensive test ban and 
on the longstanding proposal for a cutoff in the 
production of fissionable material for weapons 
purposes. My delegation will return to this mat- 
ter in later statements. 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

We have not failed to note the importance at- 
tached to progress toward a comprehensive test 
ban treaty. This general concern is evident not 
only in the joint memorandum of August 26, 
1968, submitted by eight members of tills con- 
ference and in a recent resolution of the U.N. 
General Assembly but also in the remarks of 
previous speakers during this session. 

My Government understands and shares the 
vital concern felt by others. President Nixon's 
message reaffirmed our commitment to the goal 
of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified. 
To achieve adequate verification, the principles 
and teclmiques of verification methods, their 
capabilities and limitations, must be understood 
and appropriately implemented in any compre- 
hensive test ban agreement. It is well known 
that we continue to believe that a certain num- 
ber of on-site inspections are essential for ade- 
quate verification. 

With respect to seismic research designed to 
improve seismic verification methods, I am 
gratified by the interest expressed so recently by J 
Ambassador Kolo of Nigeria and Ambassador 1 
Porter of the U.K. in the U.S. seismic investiga- 
tion proposal which was set forth last December 
5 by my predecessor. Ambassador Foster, in the 
First Committee of the U.N. General Assem- 
bly.' I can now say that in the course of this 
year there are two possible nuclear experiments 

• For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 20, 1969, p. 58. 



334 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BmLLETIN 



in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Plow- 
share program that could be used in implement- 
ing our seismic investigation proposal. These 
experiments are research and development tests 
in the field of commercial application, and they 
will depend upon the working out of necessary 
arrangements with the private concerns in- 
volved. Until such arrangements are final, data 
concerning them must be considered tentative. 

As currently programed, these two experi- 
ments are to take place in west-central Colorado. 
The first of these would be held in late May or 
June and the second toward the end of the year. 
The first experiment is conceived as a 40-kiloton 
explosion (with a possible upper limit of 60 
kilotons) which is to take place in a type of 
sandstone at a depth of a mile and a half. The 
second would be similar to the Gas Buggy ex- 
periment, with which I am sure you are famil- 
iar. Its yield would be about 26 kilotons, and 
it would be detonated at a depth of 3,300 feet — 
also in a form of sandstone. As final contract 
arrangements are completed, we will be in a 
position to make available more specific data on 
time, location, geological medimn, depth, and 
yield for these tests. 

I think all delegations here have also given 
attention to the 1968 report on seismic detection 
and identification of underground nuclear ex- 
plosions done under the auspices of the Inter- 
national Peace Research Institute at Stockholm. 
The advances in seismic science described in 
that report were the product of research con- 
ducted in a number of countries represented 
here. We hope that such research will continue 
to be pursued diligently and that the conclusions 
contained in the SIPRI report will be further 
refined. We believe this type of research will 
assist us in our task of achieving an adequately 
verified comprehensive test ban treaty. 

Seabed Arms Control 

Today, however, Mr. Chairman, I wish to set 
forth some substantive comments on another 
item on our agenda. I refer to the question of 
arms control for the seabed. I would like to use 
my remaining time to present observations on 
tliis subject for two reasons. 

First, it is appropriate that various views on 
this subject should be submitted for considera- 
tion at an early part of our session, because this 
is a relatively new item. There is a background 
of facts, positions, and views on several of the 
other items, but this item is not one where a full 



understanding of facts and attitudes of the 
various countries is presently available to form 
the basis for serious discussion. Therefore, it 
seems wise for the United States delegation at 
the outset to submit some comments on this sub- 
ject, as the Soviet delegation submitted some 
views on this subject in the form of a draft 
treaty — although my delegation does not believe 
we are quite at the stage where trying to agree 
on treaty language would be the best way to go 
about reaching an agreement. 

Secondly, it is appropriate to discuss the sea- 
bed item now because there is intrinsic merit in 
our seeking to prevent a nuclear arms race on 
the seabed while there is still time. This has 
been called preventive disarmament or preven- 
tive non-armament. The significance of action 
to preclude new types of arms races from be- 
ginning should never be underemphasized if we 
are to be successful in our efforts to halt the 
arms race. Our initial successes so far have been 
partial efforts to limit the arms race in some 
areas or to exclude other areas from arms com- 
petition. We have been trying with some success 
to fence in the arms race. 

This is true of the partial test ban treaty. It is 
true of the Antarctic Treaty and, in a more 
significant sense, of the Outer Space Treaty. 

If we ignore areas of potential arms develop- 
ment while exploring areas of present arms 
competition, we run the risk that the potentials 
for agreement in the areas where there is at 
present an arms competition may, as the moment 
of success draws nearer, be neutralized by a 
developing arms competition in a new area. 

There is a third and perhaps intangible rea- 
son why it would be important to reach agree- 
ment to prohibit nuclear weapons on the seabed. 
Even if such an agreement might not trench 
upon existing military competition, it could not 
help but have certain positive psychological and 
political effects upon the international scene. 

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, may I make some 
initial observations on the problem of prevent- 
ing the seabed from becoming an area for the 
nuclear arms race. 

We are all aware that in the past 2 years the 
international community has become increas- 
ingly interested in the possibilities of exploring 
and exploiting the vast resources of the seabed 
and ocean floor. The United Nations General 
Assembly responded to this interest by establish- 
ing first an ad hoc and then, ultimately, a per- 
manent Committee on Peaceful Uses of the 



APRIL 21, 1969 



335 



Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction. 

The United Nations has called upon the per- 
manent committee to, inter alia, "study further, 
within the context of the title of the item, and 
taking into account the studies and international 
negotiations being undertaken in the field of 
disarmament, the reservation exclusively for 
peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean 
floor without prejudice to the limits which may 
be agreed upon in this respect." * The request in 
this resolution that the Seabed Committee take 
into account international negotiations being im- 
dertaken in the field of disarmament is a clear in- 
dication that the committee, now concluding its 
first working session in New York, will closely 
watch what progress is made here on the ques- 
tion of seabed arms limitations. 

Technological advances are continually being 
made which increase the types and extent of 
operations on the seabed. At present, the high 
cost of operating in this difficult environment 
has effectively limited commercial exploitation 
to relatively shallow water. However, it seems 
clear that scientific and commercial activities 
will soon be moving into deeper waters. Like- 
wise, as technical capabilities are developed and 
improved, the possibility increases that the sea- 
bed could be used as a new environment for the 
emplacement of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction. 

The United States is interested in taking 
realistic steps to prevent an arms race on the 
seabed. We are pleased that other delegations 
share an interest in working out an effective 
and viable international agreement. In this re- 
gard, the draft treaty submitted to this Com- 
mittee by the Soviet Union is being studied 
with great interest in Washington, and we ex- 
pect to comment on it more fully at a future 
meeting. 

In examining the question of arms control on 
the seabed, we must consider that some seabed 
uses, such as communication and navigation 
aids, are utilized for both military and non- 
military purposes. The existence of submarine 
fleets requires states to take action in self- 
defense, such as warning systems that use the 
seabed. Moreover, much useful scientific research 
on the seabed is supported or carried out by mili- 
tary personnel using military nonweapons 
equipment. Therefore, we must point out that 
complete demilitarization of the seabed would 
be simply unworkable and probably harmful. 

* General Assembly Resolution 2467 ( XXIII ) . 



Moreover, the United States believes that it is 
completely impractical to try to prohibit con- 
ventional weapons on the seabed. Encumbering 
a seabed arms control measure with this type of 
prohibition would raise insuperable verification 
problems. Such considerations illustrate the 
need for a careful study of all the relevant 
factors in developing an acceptable agreement. 

Criteria for a Seabed Agreement 

The United States offers the following criteria 
for consideration of a seabed agreement and 
would welcome the views of other delegations 
on these or other relevant factors : 

First, the United States believes that the 
most urgent problem is the danger of the em- 
placement of weapons of mass destruction on the 
seabed. Such deployments, whether nuclear, 
chemical, biological, or radiological in nature, 
should be banned. In view of the possibility that 
some state might make advance preparation for 
the sudden abrogation of any treaty ban of this 
nature, consideration should be given to whether 
seabed-based laimching platforms and delivery 
vehicles for such weapons should be included 
under the ban. 

Second, the objective of the prohibition is to 
block deployment of specific weapons on, within, 
beneath, or to the seabed. To aclaieve this, care- 
ful consideration must be given to the exact defi- 
nition of the words "emplace or fix." We must 
consider whether they should apply only to 
permanent installations affixed to or emplanted 
in the seabed or should also apply to containers 
or carriers whose prmcipal mode of deployment 
or operation requires physical contact with the 
seabed. At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we 
should take care that the prohibition applies 
only to the seabed and not to the superjacent 
waters. The age-old docti'ine of freedom of navi- 
gation is the foundation of international mari- 
time law, and we must be certain that our agree- 
ment in no way infringes on that freedom. 

Third, in order to constitute a genuine and 
stable contribution to international peace and 
security, any arms control measure relating to 
the seabed should be of such a nature that the 
participating countries can feel confident that 
all participants are fulfilling their obligations. 
Verification of compliance could involve special 
problems in the geographically hostile environ- 
ment of the seabed. Nevertheless, the United 
States, which has consistently supported the 
principles of adequate verification of arms con- 
trol measures, believes that some appropriate 



336 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN 



provision must be included in the agreement in 
order to provide the needed reassurances that 
all the provisions are being complied with. 

In this respect, it may be desirable to draw 
on useful precedents of the Outer Space Treaty 
to establish a right of access and inspection. 
Such a right should be based on reciprocity and 
should not confer, or imply the existence of, any 
right or power to veto proposed visits. 

As in outer space, the difficulties of the en- 
vironment probably require that representatives 
give reasonable advance notice of a projected 
visit. This will permit maximum precautions to 
be taken to avoid dangers to personnel and the 
disruption of the normal operations of the 
equipment or the facility. 

Consideration of the verification question also 
demonstrates the need to restrict the scope of 
the prohibition to weapons of mass destruction, 
since otherwise the task of inspectmg the multi- 
tude of present and future facilities would be 
beyond capabilities. 

Fourth, one of the most difficult questions is 
the definition of the bomidaries beyond which 
the prohibition would apply. Regardless of the 
method which might be agreed, the United 
States believes that the goal should be to apply 
the arms control measure to as broad an area of 
the seabed as possible. Therefore, the prohibi- 
tion should apply to the seabed beyond a nar- 
row band along the coasts of states. To the ex- 
tent possible, the method chosen to define this 
band should provide ease of determination and 
uniformity of interpretation, and should be 
equitable in its application. For example, the 
zone could be defined by several methods, such 
as: 

(1) A specified horizontal distance from the 
coast ; 

(2) The use of a specified isobath or depth 
limit which would generally follow the con- 
tour of the seabed ; or 

(3) As some have suggested, a method based 
on the outer limits of national jurisdiction de- 
rived from either sovereignty or sovereign 
rights. This approach, at first glance, would 
appear feasible because it is based on existing 
boundary claims. However, the differences in 
the international community regarding the 
legitimate extent of such claims would result in 
gross inequities and would weaken the effect of 
the measure by excluding wide areas of the sea- 
bed from the zone of application. 

These are some of the considerations which 
will need to be discussed before an effective in- 
ternational agreement can be worked out, and 



we urge the Committee to imdertake such dis- 
cussions as soon as possible. In this way, we will 
be doing what the world community expects of 
us : seeking ways to prevent the spread of weap- 
ons of mass destruction to new environments 
and at the same time helping to insure that the 
potential for peaceful purposes of this great 
area of our planet will be enhanced. If we can 
do this much, Mr. Chairman, it will be no small 
accomplishment. In effect, we will have placed 
nearly 70 percent of the earth's surface off 
limits to the arms race and will have achieved 
a significant restraint on the deployment of 
weapons of mass destruction. 



Four Powers Begin Talks 
on Middle East 

Joint Gommunique ^ 

The Permanent Representatives to the United 
Nations of France, the USSR, the United King- 
dom and the United States met on April 3 at the 
residence of the Permanent Representative of 
France to the United Nations to begin consider- 
ation of how they can contribute to a peaceful 
political settlement in the Middle East. They 
based the approach to this problem on Security 
Council Resolution 242 (1967) which they fully 
accept and support.^ They reaffirmed their sup- 
port for Ambassador Jarring's mission. 

The Four Powers are agreed that the situa- 
tion in the Middle East is serious and urgent 
and must not be permitted to jeopardize inter- 
national peace and security. They have straight 
away entered into a discussion on matters of 
substance and have started defining areas of 
agreement. There is a common concern to mak;e 
urgent progress. The Secretary General of the 
United Nations will be kept fully informed. 

Active consultations will continue. These con- 
sultations will be private and confidential. All 
appropriate contacts with the parties primarily 
concerned will be maintained. 

The next meeting will take place on April 8th. 



' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 3 by Armand 
Berard, Representative of France to the United 
Nations. 

^ For text of the resolution, see Btilletin of Dee. 18, 
196T, p. 843. 



APRIL 21, 1969 



337 



Eleventh Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening state^nent made hy 
Lawrence Walsh, deputy head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, at the 11th plenxiry session of the new 
Tneetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on April 3. 

Press release 70 dated April 3 

Ladies and gentlemen : Last week Ambassador 
Lodge discussed the question of aggression in 
South Viet-Nam. He submitted that the central 
fact concerning this aggression is the presence 
of himdreds of thousands of subversive and 
military forces which have illegally come from 
North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. The help 
which United States and Allied forces have 
given the people and Government of South Viet- 
Nam in their defense against that aggression 
has thus been entirely in response to these in- 
cursions from the North. 

Today I propose to examine a related aspect 
of this problem. That is North Viet- Nam's long- 
standing use of the territory of Laos and Cam- 
bodia — as well as its continuing abuse of the 
demilitarized zone — to infiltrate men and sup- 
plies into South Viet-Nam. That activity is re- 
lated not only to the question of responsibility 
for aggression against South Viet-Nam. It re- 
lates also to the ultimate question which directly 
faces us in these Paris meetings : how to bring 
lasting peace to Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. 

On July 23, 1962, the Government of the 
United States, the Eepublic of Viet-Nam, and 
the Democratic Eepublic of Viet-Nam, along 
with 11 other signatories, entered into agree- 
ments for the settlement of tlie Laotian ques- 
tion.^ Those agreements contained undertakings 
for the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign 
troops and military personnel and prohibited 
the introduction into Laos of such personnel. 

In the 1962 agreements, the parties undertook 
not to "commit or participate in any way in any 
act which might directly or indirectly impair 
the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity 
or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos." 
They pledged themselves to "refrain from all 
direct or indirect interference in the internal 
affairs of the Kingdom of Laos." They agreed 
that they would not "use the territory of the 
Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries." 



^ For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962, 
p. 259. 



The facts show that unfortunately North 
Viet-Nam has never fulfilled these commitments 
which it undertook in 1962. At that time, there 
were about 10,000 North Vietnamese troops in 
Laos. Yet only 40 North Vietnamese were with- 
drawn through the checkpoints established by 
the International Commission for Supervision 
and Control. In contrast, the United States 
withdrew, under ICC supervision, all 666 
Ameiican military personnel in Laos. 

Not only did substantial numbers of North 
Vietnamese forces remain in Laos but — begin- 
ning in 1963 — increasing numbers of North 
Vietnamese soldiers began to move into Laos, 
and through Laos into South Viet-Nam. Today 
it is reliably estimated that there are over 40,000 
North Vietnamese soldiers in Laos, a fourfold 
increase since the 1962 agreements. 

North Vietnamese forces have built a network 
of highways, roads, and paths through the 
jimgles of Laos over which North Vietnamese 
troops and war materiel flow into South Viet- 
Nam — the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail. North 
Vietnamese forces have established elaborate 
storage areas and depots in Laos as part of this 
infiltration network. 

Military bases and camps have also been estab- 
lished along the eastern border regions of Laos. ; 
From these bases North Vietnamese troops at- ' 
tack South Viet-Nam across the international 
frontier. The same North Vietnamese forces 
then retreat to these bases to rest, regroup, re- 
supply, and retrain for further attacks against 
South Viet-Nam. 

In other parts of Laos, thousands of North 1 
Vietnamese troops attack towns, forces, and in- 
stallations of the Royal Government of Laos. 
They also supply the insurgent Pathet Lao with 
weapons and other war materiel. 

All of these activities by North Viet-Nam 
contradict the terms of the 1962 Geneva 
agreements. 

The evidence of these activities is voluminous. 
It is substantiated by reports of the Interna- 
tional Control Commission and tlie testimony of 
North Vietnamese soldiers. Most of these North 
Vietnamese soldiers were either captured by or 
surrendered to the Royal Lao Army. Some were 
picked up in South Viet-Nam after having in- 
filtrated through Laos. The evidence also con- 1 
sists of witnesses and observers, of photographs, 
of captured docmnents and diaries with names 
and unit numbers. It included extensive docu- 
mentation published by the Royal Lao 
Government. 



338 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BTJLLETIK 



Recently, His Royal Highness Prince Sou- 
vanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, 
sent a letter of protest to the cochainnan of the 
Geneva conference. 

Let me quote from that Iptter, dated March 3, 
1969: 

Beginning on the morning of March 1, 1969, the Post 
of Nakhang was savagely attacked by a combined force 
of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops. The North 
Vietnamese troops, which consisted of five battalions, 
belonged to the 148th regiment of the 316th division. 

After denouncing the Pathet Lao, Prince 
Souvanna Phouma's letter continues : 

But the responsibility of North Viet-Nam is even 
larger and more serious. Although it is a signatory of 
the Geneva Accords guaranteeing in the first place the 
sovereignty of the Kingdom, it has flouted every pro- 
vision of this international agreement, wantonly multi- 
plied its violations of the letter and spirit of the 
Agreement, and practiced a shameless and underhanded 
interference in the internal affairs of Laos. 

... It is painful for the Laotian people to remember 
that North Viet-Nam uses their territory to move its 
troops to different areas where it is engaged in South 
Viet-Nam, that more than 40,000 of its soldiers are 
sowing war and destruction in Laos, and that for more 
than one year its armed forces have been sustaining 
the Pathet Lao in order to attack Lao Ngam and Tha- 
teng, and to besiege Saravane and Attopen, in violation 
of all rules of international law and every principle of 
co-existence and friendly behavior between neighbors, 
and in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 
1962. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the evidence is incon- 
trovertible that North Viet-Nam has intervened 
in Laos. Your side has shown a similar disre- 
gard for the territorial integrity of another 
neighboring state, Cambodia. Without elaborat- 
ing on it today, the evidence is clear that the 
armed forces of your side continue to use the 
territory of Cambodia to infiltrate men and ma- 
teriel into South Viet-Nam and to establish base 
areas from which to attack South Viet-Nam. 
These infringements on Cambodia's territorial 
integrity and of the international frontier be- 
tween Cambodia and Viet-Nam violate the 
United Nations Charter, the 1954 Geneva ac- 
cords, and general international law. 

Similarly, North Viet-Nam continues to use 
the demilitarized zone as a route of infiltration 
into South Viet-Nam. Recent attacks against 
U.S. and Allied forces just south of that zone 
leave no doubt that the attacking forces have 
come from the DMZ and have crossed the inter- 
national demarcation line between North and 
South Viet-Nam. This conclusion is supported 



by captured documents, the testimony of cap- 
tured prisoners, and other evidence. 

Let me cite just one specific example. On Feb- 
ruary 25, forces of your side attacked two out- 
posts west of Con Thien immediately below the 
demilitarized zone. The circumstances of the 
attacks showed that the attackers came through 
the DMZ. After the attack, the Allied defenders 
found on the battlefield documents and uniform 
insignia identifying one attacking force as a 
unit of the 27th Regiment of the North Viet- 
namese Army. At the other outpost, defenders 
found a notebook written by a member of the 
246th North Vietnamese Regiment. The note- 
book's author described the route the unit had 
followed from North Viet-Nam through the 
demilitarized zone and its participation in oper- 
ations in South Viet-Nam just prior to the 
attack on the outpost. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the people of South 
Viet-Nam cannot hope for a lasting peace so 
long as North Viet-Nam continues to violate its 
international obligations — so long as this in- 
filtration from North Viet-Nam continues and 
so long as North Viet-Nam refuses to respect 
international demarcation lines and interna- 
tional boundaries. Nor can peace be assured in 
the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia im- 
less North Viet-Nam respects their sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity. 

As Ambassador Lodge said in the first plenary 
session of these Paris meetings, the United 
States seeks peace throughout Southeast Asia.^ 
To achieve peace, we believe that all external 
forces must be withdrawn from South Viet- 
Nam. We also believe that the Geneva agree- 
ments of 1962 on Laos must be observed. We 
also consider it necessary that the sovereignty, 
independence, unity, and territorial integrity of 
Cambodia be fully respected. We believe that 
the demilitarized zone must be fully respected. 
We have made specific and concrete proposals 
on all these matters. You have refused to discuss 
them, professing that the ftmdamental issue is 
the unconditional withdrawal of United States 
forces from South Viet-Nam. Your discussion 
cannot be regarded as serious until you recognize 
that there must be a mutual withdrawal of ex- 
ternal forces. We believe that our proposals are 
practical steps toward peace. We ask that you 
address yourself to them seriously. 



' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1969, 
p. 124. 



APRIL 21, 1969 



339 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Explains Vote on Security Council Resolution on Israel 



Following are statements made in the U.N. 
Security Council on March 27 and Afril 1 hy 
U.S. Representative Charles W. Tost, together 
vnth the text of a resolution adopted hy the 
Council on April 1. 



STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR YOST 
Statement of March 27 

U.S./D.N. press release 35 dated March 27 

Once again we have been summoned to a ses- 
sion of this Council because of the tragic re- 
sults of continued violence in the Middle East. 
We have heard grim descriptions of death and 
destruction and accusations against one side or 
the other for causing it all. 

The air attack that was carried out by Israeli 
Air Force planes yesterday in the area south of 
Salt caused the death, we are told, of 18 persons 
and the injury of 25 others — all unarmed civil- 
ians except for two local policemen. We deeply 
deplore this loss of life and the human suffering 
in this tragedy. In the face of this event, my 
Government wishes to make clear once again, 
as it has so often in the past, its firm opposition 
to attacks of this nature. We urge the Govern- 
ment of Israel once again to avoid such indis- 
criminate actions and all other violations of the 
cease-fire resolutions of this Council. This oc- 
currence was a flagrant violation of the cease- 
fire, and my delegation deeply deplores it. But 
we know all too well that this attack was not 
an isolated incident but must be seen in the total 
context of the continuing absence of peace in the 
Middle East. We know of other equally serious 
incidents as well. The hard, brutal, tragic reality 
is that violations of the cease-fire, from what- 
ever quarter, act to stimulate answering viola- 
tions of the cease-fire. Thus, Mr. President, 
while condemning yesterday's attack, we cannot 
refrain from condemning the other grave viola- 
tions from the other side which have taken place. 



The roster is a long and sad one. UNTSO 
[United Nations Truce Supervision Organiza- 
tion] has provided us with numerous reports in 
recent weeks, particularly concerning the all too 
frequent exchanges of fire across the Suez Canal 
which show the continued fragility of peace 
throughout the area. These, too, are serious vio- 
lations of the cease-fire which are to be greatly 
deplored and should likewise be renounced. 
There have been other incidents : bombs in mar- 
kets, attacks on civilian aircraft, an explosion 
in a university cafeteria. Arab Fedayeen organi- 
zations have proudly proclaimed their responsi- 
bility for these. My Government equally de- 
plores these actions, and the governments of 
Arab countries cannot completely escape respon- 
sibility for them. This violence must be stopped 
and all cease-fire violations brought to an end. 

The pattern that we see before us is all too 
clear, and of course, it is not new. As violence 
increases on one side, it is answered by greater 
or more frequent violence on the other. It would 
be tragic enough if only military personnel or 
others who have armed themselves and seek 
battle were involved. But tliis, as we all know, is 
not the case. Nor can we expect it to be other- 
wise when a pattern of violence such as we have 
witnessed develops. Innocent civilians inevitably 
suffer. Those who would claim to be acting on 
their behalf, to be protecting them, become in- 
stead the indirect instruments of their death and 
injury. Schoolchildren, women doing their daily 
marketing, quiet picnickers — these are the ones 
who suffer most. 

In spite of the gloomy situation on the 
ground, there are hopeful developments as well, 
which we must not lose sight of. The Secretary 
General's special representative is in the area 
actively consulting the parties, and we were 
encouraged to learn that he has addressed a 
series of substantive questions to the govern- 
ments concerned. We very much hope that the 
replies to his questions will be positive and that, 
as a result, his efforts pursuant to Resolution 



340 



DEPAKTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN 



242 will receive new impetus.^ In addition, con- 
sultations among certain permanent members of 
the Security Council are in train on ways and 
means whereby Ambassador Jarring's efforts 
can best be assisted. In the not too distant future, 
it is likely that the bilateral exchanges now tak- 
ing place will expand into four-power consulta- 
tions in support of Ambassador Jarring's 
efforts. 

On the other hand, the kind of incidents 
which occasioned this meeting today and which 
have all too frequently occurred in recent weeks, 
greatly hinder the achievement of the basic ob- 
jectives in Resolution 242. What is urgently 
required, in addition to cooperation with Am- 
bassador Jarring, is for the parties scrupulously 
to comply with the cease-fire arrangements. 
They must make every effort to see that all vio- 
lations of the cease-fire are prevented, and they 
must cooperate in strengthening the arrange- 
ments for the supervision of the cease-fire. 

Once again, we call upon all of the govern- 
ments concerned to stop this senseless waste of 
human life, to abide scrupulously by the cease- 
fire, and to devote themselves sincerely and 
wholeheartedly to the search for a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. The United 
States is determined to spare no effort in pursuit 
of this goal. 

Statement of April 1 

U.S./U.N. press release 39 dated April 1 

Tlie United States delegation would have cer- 
tainly wished to vote for a resolution condemn- 
ing the Israeli air attack of March 26. As we 
have repeatedly said, we condemn all violations 
of the cease-fire. We particularly and most 
strongly condemn air attacks, where, whatever 
the object of the attack may be, innocent lives 
are almost certain to be sacrificed. 

We do not think attacks of this kind, which 
are bound to be indiscriminate in their effects if 
not in their intent, can in any way be justified 
by describing them as "active defense." We con- 
sider them to be in the highest degree counter- 
productive even from this point of view. Not 
only do they almost inevitably result, as I have 
said, in the slaughter of innocent people, but in 
so doing, they aggravate even further bitter 
and uncompromising feelings toward Israel in 
the countries suffering these losses. The Israeli 



' For text of Security Council Resolution 242, see 
BtFiiETiN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 



Government has just called once again for "the 
advancement of negotiations between the Arab 
States and Israel for the establishment of a true 
peace in the Middle East." 

We do not believe that it is itself "advancing" 
such negotiations by a policy of "active de- 
fense"; that is, of necessarily indiscriminate air 
attacks on the people with whom it wishes to 
negotiate. We therefore most firmly condemn 
these attacks and call upon Israel, in the interest 
of all the efforts toward peace which are being 
made within the framework of this Council, to 
cease such attacks forthwith. 

On the other hand, as I have said in earlier 
statements, we consider it would be both unjust 
and unrealistic to treat these air attacks in iso- 
lation. There can be no question that they are 
provoked by equally undiscriminating attacks 
on innocent Israeli civilians in markets, in 
schools, in cinemas, in commercial aircraft. We 
condemn such attacks equally and just as 
strongly and call upon those in a position to do 
so to take all action possible to bring them to an 
end. The fact that one set of attacks is carried 
out by regular and the other by irregular forces 
is no consolation to the innocent victims, their 
relatives, and their compatriots. Death is just 
as final and as shocking if it comes from a bomb 
in a supermarket or from a bomb from the air. 
Nor is it justified by the fact that those who 
planted it are resisting occupation, any more 
than the air attacks are justified because their 
authors are seeking recognition of their national 
existence and a stable peace. 

Because the resolution before us concentrates 
in its operative paragraphs exclusively on one 
kind of violence and ignores the other kind of 
violence which provokes it, we find the resolu- 
tion unbalanced, unrealistic, and unlikely to 
move the parties to the conflict toward a peace- 
ful solution. 

The preamble observes that numerous pre- 
meditated violations of the cease-fire have 
occurred, but the operative paragraphs deal 
only with one particular type of violation and 
overlook all others. Had the sponsors of the 
resolution been willing to add a simple operative 
paragraph condemning or deploring all viola- 
tions of the cease-fire, we should have been able 
to support it. As it now stands we cannot. 

We reiterate, however, that our abstention 
should not be interpreted in any sense as con- 
doning the kind of violence which the resolu- 
tion condemns, any more than we condone any 



APRIL 21, 1969 



341 



other kinds of violence in the area or any vio- 
lations whatsoever of this Council's cease-fire 
resolutions. 

Finally, Mr. President, let me once again 
most earnestly urge all the parties to this con- 
flict to cooperate sincerely and effectively with 
Ambassador Jarring and with all others who 
are working for peace in the Middle East and 
at long last to act in the spirit of conciliation 
and compromise which is required from all sides 
if the peacemakers are to succeed. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION = 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the agenda contained in docn- 
ment S/Agenda/1466, 

Having heard the statements made before the 
Council, 

Recalling resolution 236 (1967) , 



Observing that numerous premeditated violations 
of the cease-fire have occurred, 

Viewing with deep concern that the recent air attacks 
on Jordanian villages and other populated areas were 
of a pre-planned nature, in violation of resolutions 
248 (1968) and 256 (1968), 

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situa- 
tion which endangers i)eace and security in the area, 

1. Reaffirms resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968) ; 

2. Deplores the loss of civilian life and damage to 
property ; 

3. Condemns the recent premeditated air attacks 
launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated 
areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations 
Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and warns once 
again that if such attacks were to be repeated the 
Council would have to meet to consider further more 
effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure 
against repetition of such attacks. 



2 U.N. doc. S/BES/265 (1969) ; adopted on Apr. 1 by 
a vote of 11 to 0, with 4 abstentions (U.S., Colombia, 
Paraguay, U.K.). 



U.N. Seabed Committee Concludes Spring Session 



Statement by David H. Popper ' 



During the last 3 weeks this committee and its 
subcommittees have ranged widely over the 
complex problems that confront us. As in the 
case of the ad hoc committee at its spring ses- 
sion in 1968, we are left with a multitude of 
issues posed, a volume of work unfinished, and 
a number of baffling questions for future 
consideration. 

My delegation will use the interval between 
now and our August session to review the record 
of our deliberations, to study the implications 
of the important statements that have been 
made, and to determine what in our view might 
usefully be expected when we next meet. 

It would be wrong to anticipate giant strides 
from this committee in 1969. But it is realistic to 



^ Made on Mar. 28 before the U.N. Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (U.S./U.N. 
press release 36). Mr. Popper is U.S. Representative to 
the committee. 



seek the beginnings of definite movement toward 
the ultimate objectives set out in the General 
Assembly resolutions which constitute our 
mandate. 

Although there will be no formal working 
group to carry on our efforts between now and 
next August, we will be open to informal con- 
sultations among interested delegations and 
groups of delegations. Perhaps in this way each 
of us can assist others in refining our coimnon 
thinking and in searching for broadly accept- 
able avenues looking toward general agree- 
ment — agreement on those first elements of our 
problem which can be conducive to further 
progress in ensuing years. 

Before this session of the committee adjourns, 
my delegation wishes to place on record its views 
regarding certain aspects of the question of the 
reservation of the seabed exclusively for peace- 
ful purposes and seabed arms control. We do 
this so that our comments may be considered in 



342 



DEPAKTMENT OP STATE BULJjETIN 



connection with the statements on the subject 
made by other delegations in the Legal 
Subcommittee. 

The United States has no difficulty in giving 
its support to the principle of the reservation 
of the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
It is important that the committee, and member 
states, be fully aware of the meaning of these 
general terms. Fortunately, we have an ex- 
ample — a guide to practice, if you will — in the 
United Nations discussions which led to the 
conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty and in the 
provisions of the treaty itself as these are by 
common agreement interpreted. In general, we 
understand the test of whether an activity is 
"peaceful" to be whether it is consistent with 
the United Nations Charter and with other 
obligations of international law. 

The Space Treaty carefully delineated what 
specific military activities are prohibited in 
order to insure that the moon and other celestial 
bodies will be utilized only for peaceful pur- 
poses. Other military activities are clearly not 
incompatible with the reservation of space for 
peaceful purposes. 

We envisage a similar approach in the area of 
the seabed. Our position was set out in a letter 
from President Nixon to the chairman of the 
U.S. delegation which was presented at the 
opening session of the Eighteen-Nation Dis- 
armament Conference on March 18. The 
President stated : ^ 

... in order to assure that the seabed, man's latest 
frontier, remains free from the nuclear arms race, the 
United States delegation should indicate that the 
United States is interested in working out an inter- 
national agreement that would prohibit the implace- 
ment or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of 
mass destruction on the seabed. To this end, the 
United States delegation should seek discussion of the 
factors necessary for such an international agree- 
ment. Such an agreement would, like the Antarctic 
Treaty and the Treaty on Outer Space which are al- 
ready in effect, prevent an arms race before it had a 
chance to start. It would ensure that this potentially 
useful area of the world remained available for peace- 
ful purposes. 

On March 25, the U.S. Representative to the 
ENDC, Ambassador Gerard Smith, further 
emphasized the United States interest in real- 
istic steps to prevent the extension of the anns 
race to the seabed.^ He stated that in working 
out an effective and viable international agree- 



= Bulletin of Apr. 7, 1969, p. 289. 
• See p. 333. 



ment, we must consider that for some purposes, 
such as communication and navigation aids, the 
seabed is utilized for both military and non- 
military ends. Furthermore, the existence of sub- 
marine forces requires states to take defensive 
measures against such forces through such 
means as warning systems that use the seabed. 
Moreover, much useful scientific research on 
the seabed is supported or carried out by mili- 
tary personnel using nonweapons military 
equipment. Accordingly, we believe that com- 
plete demilitarization would have the effect of 
prohibiting certain necessary and desirable 
activities and might well be harmful. That is 
why we do not believe complete demilitarization 
to be a useful means of moving toward effective 
seabed arms control. Nor do we believe that it is 
feasible to seek a blanket prohibition of con- 
ventional weapons on the seabed. To try to do 
this would be to raise verification problems 
which would be insuperable. 

We are seeking practical measures which will 
help us to meet the main danger with which the 
world is confronted in the seabed environment. 
Surely that danger is the possibility of a race to 
emplace weapons of mass destruction on the 
seabed. Surely such weapons, whether nuclear, 
biological, or chemical, should be prohibited 
if it is possible to achieve this end in a credibly 
effective way. This involves, inter alia, the pos- 
sibility that a ban on weapons of mass destruc- 
tion should be extended to cover launching plat- 
forms and delivery vehicles for such weapons. 

Since the objective of such a prohibition 
would be to prevent the deployment of specified 
weapons on, within, or beneath the seabed, care- 
ful consideration must be given to the exact 
definition of the words "emplace or fix." One 
of the factors to be considered is whether these 
words should apply only to permanent installa- 
tions affixed to or emplanted in the seabed or 
should also apply to containers or carriers whose 
principal mode of deployment or operation re- 
quires physical contact with the seabed. What- 
ever the precise agreement in this regard, it 
seems clear to us that the prohibition must apply 
to activities on or under the seabed and not in 
waters above the seabed, where the problem is 
complicated by already existing armament and 
by the need to avoid infringement of the tradi- 
tional freedom of navigation. 

In any arms control agreement, it is of course 
necessary to insure compliance by all parties 
through effective verification procedures. It 



APRIL 21, 1969 



343 



may be desirable to draw on the useful prece- 
dent of the Outer Space Treaty in this respect 
to establish a right of access and inspection; 
article XII of the Space Treaty is pertinent in 
this connection. Such a right would be based 
on reciprocity and would not be subject to veto. 
As in outer space, the difficulties of a hostile en- 
vironment probably require that reasonable 
advance notice be given of prospective visits in 
order to avoid dangers to personnel or disrup- 
tion of normal activity. The consideration of the 
verification question also demonstrates the need 
to restrict the scope of the prohibition to weap- 
ons of mass destruction, since otherwise the task 
of inspecting the multitude of present and 
future facilities on the seabed would be beyond 
all foreseeable capabilities. 

One of the most difficult questions in this 
realm relates to the definition of the boundaries 
beyond which the prohibition would apply. The 
United States believes the goal should be to 
apply any arms control measure to a broad area 
of the seabed. Therefore, in our view the pro- 
hibition should apply to the seabed beyond a 
narrow band along the coasts of states. To the 
extent possible, the method chosen to define this 
band should provide ease of determination and 
uniformity of interpretation and should be 
equitable in its application. We suggest the 
desirability of a study of the technical prob- 
lems involved in various depth and distance 
criteria, as a means of moving toward such a 
decision. 

I have made these remarks on the arms con- 
trol aspects of the seabed problem, Mr. Chair- 
man, so that the committee might be aware of 
the approach which the United States is taking 
toward this problem in the ENDC in Geneva. 
This is, as we all recognize, a higlily technical 
matter. We have always maintained that the 
ENDC is best qualified to work out the terms of 
acceptable agreements on arms control. Our 
Seabed Committee has an interest in the prob- 
lem as well. But at this juncture, we believe the 
laboring oar must be pulled by the experts in 
Geneva, while we here maintain a more general 
overview. 

Jjet me now conclude with a few more general 
observations about the work of the Seabed 
Committee. 

In the Legal Subcommittee, under the able 
chairmanship of Ambassador Galindo Pohl, 



the debates have helped clarify the issues and 
lay the groimdwork for agreement on a set of 
principles. I think we have reason to hope that 
agi'eement on at least some broad guidelines 
may soon be possible. As I have stated, progress 
might be made through discussions in an infor- 
mal working group or in inf onnal consultations 
between now and August. We would like to 
preserve the momentum gained at this session 
of the committee. 

Under the skilled guidance of its chairman, 
Mr. Denorme, the Economic and Technical Sub- 
committee has again prepared a valuable report 
on the technical aspects of the exploration and 
use of the seabed and its resources, on man's 
increasing capability to explore and exploit the 
seabed, and on some questions we must face in 
considering an international legal regime for 
the seabed. We look forward to the next phase 
of the subcommittee's activities. We are pleased 
that in August the subcommittee will take up 
the long-term program of oceanographic re- 
search, including the International Decade of 
Ocean Exploration, as well as start its discus- 
sion of possible regimes. 

In connection with the International Decade, 
we welcome the presence of Admiral Langeraar. 
His letter is most helpful.* The Intergovern- 
mental Oceanographic Conamission appears to 
be moving ahead expeditiously to prepare its 
proposals for the comprehensive outline of the 
scope of the long-term program of research and 
exploration. We hope there will be a full re- 
sponse to the invitation contained in General 
Assembly Resolution 2467 for members to sub- 
mit to the IOC their proposals for national and 
international oceanographic programs. We are 
ourselves preparing our response. We have asked 
the U.S. National Academies of Sciences and 
Engineering to draft recommendations on the 
scientific and engineering aspects of our input 
into the International Decade of Ocean Explo- 
ration. This study has just been completed and 
will be published early next month. It will of 
course be available to the committee. 

We look forward to having at the August 
meeting of this committee additional proposals. 



' For text of a letter dated Feb. 27, 1969, from Rear 
Adm. W. Langeraar, Chairman, International Oceano- 
graphic Commission, addressed to the Secretary Gen- 
eral, see U.N. doc. A/AC. 138/10. 



344 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



In particular, we await those which will be 
contained in the interim, report on the long- 
term program of oceanographic research to be 
prepared by the IOC working group which 
meets in June. Even though these proposals will 
not be put into final form until the IOC plenary 
session in September, they can very usefully be 
studied and discussed at our August session in 
their provisional form. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S., Canada Conclude Agreements 
on Niagara Falls Beautiflcation 



Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may 6e consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, 
United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 



Security Council 

Eeport of the committee established in pursuance of 
Resolution 253 of May 29, 1968, relating to Southern 
Rhodesia. S/8954. December 30, 1968. 103 pp. 



General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In- 
formation furnished by the United States on objects 
launched into orbit or beyond as of August 31. 
A/AC.105/INF.196. November 12, 1968. 3 pp. 

Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders to be held at 
Kyoto, Japan, August 17-26, 1970. Information note 
prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. A/CONF.43/INF.1. 
January 7, 1969. 3 pp. 



Economic and Social Gjuncil 

Commission on Human Rights : 

Status of multilateral treaties In the field of human 
rights. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. 
E/CN.4/907/Rev. 3. January 9, 1969. 5 pp. 

International Year for Human Rights : Action Aris- 
ing Out of the Resolutions of the International 
Conference on Human Rights. Note by the Secre- 
tary-General. E/CN.4/994. January 14, 1969. 7 pp. 

Periodic Reports on Human Rights. Note by the 
Secretary-General forwarding the report on civil 
and political rights covering the period July 1, 
1965-June 30, 1968, received from the Government 
of the United States. B/CN.4/973/Add. 7. Janu- 
ary 15, 1969. 16 pp. 
Commission on the Status of Women : 

Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value. Report by the 
International Labor Office. E/CN.6/519. Decem- 
ber 3, 1968. 45 pp. 

Information Concerning the Status of Women in 
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report 
by the Secretary-General. B/CN.6/509. January 7, 
1969. 39 pp. 



Press release 59 dated March 21 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

The Governments of the United States and 
Canada on March 21 concluded two exchanges 
of notes relating to the American Falls at Ni- 
agara. The exchanges took place at the Depart- 
ment of State between Canadian Ambassador 
A. E. Ritchie and Assistant Secretary for Euro- 
pean Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand. 

One of the two notes exchanged authorizes 
construction by or on behalf of the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers of a temporary 
cofferdam between the head of Goat Island and 
the United States mainland in the channel above 
the American Falls. Construction of the coffer- 
dam will divert the normal flow of water away 
from the American Falls, so as to permit on-site 
investigation to determine what measures may 
be feasible and desirable to preserve or enliance 
the beauty of the American Falls. Such an in- 
vestigation was proposed by the United States- 
Canadian International Joint Commission in 
November 1967. The Corps of Engineers con- 
templates that under current budgetary condi- 
tions it will be able to have the cofferdam 
installed during the current calendar year in 
sufficient time to conduct a thorough investiga- 
tion. If so, the on-site inspection will under the 
terms of the note have to be completed and the 
dam removed no later than December 31, 1969. 

The second note would authorize the tempo- 
rary utilization for power production purposes 
of the water diverted by the cofferdam. Power 
benefits deriving from this temporary arrange- 
ment under the terms of the note would be di- 
vided equally between the Power Authority of 
the State of New York and the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario, who have agreed 
in return to make a sizable contribution to the 
costs of the cofferdam and ensuing study. 



345 



The second agreement, which involves a de- 
parture from minimum flows specified in the 
Niagara Treaty of 1950, will require approval 
by the United States Senate. The cofferdam 
agreement is authorized by the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909 and does not require 
Senate approval. 



EXCHANGES OF NOTES 



U.S. Note on Niagara Diversion 

Maboh 21, 1969 
Excellency, I have the honor to refer to the Refer- 
ence from the Government of the United States and 
Canada to the International Joint Commission, dated 
March 31, 1967, requesting the Commission to investi- 
gate and report on measures that may be feasible and 
desirable to preserve or enhance the beauty of the 
American Falls at Niagara/ The Commission has con- 
vened an American Falls International Board consist- 
ing of experts from each country, has conducted initial 
hearings, and has In its letter of November 6, 1967," 
proposed that the two Governments arrange by the most 
expeditious procedure to authorize the construction of 
a temporary cofferdam to redirect to the Horseshoe 
Falls the normal flow over the American Falls, so as 
to permit the necessary on-site investigation and col- 
lection of data. 

Under Article III of the Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909, temporary or permanent obstructions or diver- 
sions of boundary waters on one side of the line, affect- 
ing the natural level or flow of boundary waters on the 
other side, may be authorized by special agreement 
between the two Parties. Accordingly, I have the honor 
to propose as follows : 

1. The United States Army Corps of Engineers shall 
be authorized to construct or to have constructed a 
temporary cofferdam between the head of Goat Island 
and the United States mainland in the channel above 
the American Falls at Niagara : if such authority is 
exercised, said cofferdam shall be installed during the 
calendar year 1969 in suflBcient time to carry out the 
necessary on-site investigation and collection of data 
and shall be removed by or at the direction of the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers no later than 
December 31, 1969. 

2. The costs incurred in such installation and re- 
moval, and in conducting on-site investigations while 
the temporary cofferdam is in place, shaU qualify for 
inclusion in the costs to be recommended for allocation 
as between the United States and Canada by the In- 
ternational Joint Commission pursuant to the Refer- 
ence of March 31, 1967. 

3. Neither the United States nor Canada shall be 
responsible for physical injury or damage to persons 
or property in the territory of the other which may 



' For text of the U.S. letter, see Bxjlletin of Apr. 17, 
1967, p. 634. 
' Not printed. 



be caused by any act authorized or provided for by 
this agreement. 

If the foregoing proposals are agreeable to the Gov- 
ernment of Canada, I have the honor further to pro- 
pose that your reply to that effect and the present 
Note shall constitute an agreement between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada, which will enter into force 
upon the date of your reply. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 
Maktin J. Hillenbrand 

His Excellency 
A. Edgab Ritchie 
Ambassador of Canada 

Canadian Note on Niagara Diversion 

Washington, D.C. 
March 21, 1969 

SiE, I have the honour to refer to your Note of March 
21, 1969, concerning the construction of a temporary 
cofferdam between Goat Island and the United States 
mainland. 

I wish to advise that the Government of Canada 
accepts the proposals set forth in your Note and agrees 
that your Note, together with this reply, which is au- 
thentic in English and French, shall constitute an 
agreement between our two Governments which wiU 
enter into force on the date of this Note. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 
consideration. 

A.E. Ritchie 
Ambassador 

The Honourable 

William P. Rogebs, 

Secretary of State, 

Washington, D.C. 

U.S. Note on Power Benefits 

Maech 21, 1969 
Excellency, I have the honor to refer to an ex- 
change of notes between the Government of Canada and 
the Government of the United States, dated March 21, 
1969, authorizing the construction of temporary 
cofferdam to divert water away from the American 
Falls at Niagara, so as to permit the on-site investi- 
gation of measures that might be taken to preserve or 
enhance the beauty of the American Falls. 

It appears advantageous to make use of the addi- 
tional energy resource thus made available, by author- 
izing the temporary additional diversion for power 
purposes of the water normally flowing over the Ameri- 
can Falls. 

Accordingly, I have the honor to propose that during 
the period in 1969 when the cofferdam is in place, the 
following arrangements shall be put into effect : 

1. The minimum flows over the Falls stipulated in 
Article IV of the Niagara River Treaty of 1950 shall 



346 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



be reduced from 100,000 c.f.s. and 50,000 c.f.s., respec- 
tively, to 92,000 c.f.s. and 41,000 c.f.s., respectively, 
during the tiours designated in that Article. Any water 
in excess of these new temporary minimums may be 
diverted for power purposes; provided that when the 
41,000 c.f.s. minimum applies at least 9,000 c.f.s. of the 
waters thus diverted shall be either passed through 
the low-head plants or released to the Horseshoe Falls 
so as to maintain a minimum flow of 50,000 c.f.s. into 
the Maid-of-the-Mist Pool at all times. 

2. Entitlement to the power benefits deriving from 
this temporary additional diversion shall be divided 
equally between the Power Authority of the State of 
New York and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission 
of Ontario, upon the agreement of each such power 
entity to : 

(A) contribute in cash or in services to the cost of 
the cofferdam and ensuing investigations, the value of 
$385,500 in its national currency, if the additional 
diversion is permitted during the entire period from 
April 30, 1969 to December 31, 1969. or a portion of 
said contribution corresponding to any shorter period 
during which the additional diversion is permitted, 
such portion to be determined on the same basis as was 
the $385,500 by the International Joint Commission in 
consultation with the power entities ; and 

(B) assume responsibility for the disposition of 
claims for physical injury or damage to persons or 
property occurring in the lower Niagara River on its 
side of the international boimdary line, caused by the 
resulting temporary alteration of water levels in the 
lower river below that normally experienced at flows 
of 100,000 cf.s. and 50,000 c.f.s., and for the satisfac- 
tion of any such claims that are valid. 

3. The temporary additional diversions permitted by 
these arrangements shall not be considered as creating 
any vested right or interest in the use of such addi- 
tional amounts of water. 

If the foregoing proposed arrangements are accept- 
able to the Government of Canada, I have the honor to 
propose that your reply to that effect and the present 
Note shall constitute an agreement between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and the Government of 
Canada which will enter into force upon notification 
that it has been approved by the Senate of the United 
States of America. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

For the Secretary of State: 
Martin J. Huxenbeand 

His Excellency 
A. Edgab Ritchie 
Ambassador of Canada 



Canadian Note on Power Benefits 

Washington, D.C. 
March SI, 1969 
Sir, I have the honour to refer to your Note of 
March 21, 1969, concerning the propo.sed temporary 
additional diversion of Niagara water for power 
purposes. 



I wish to advise that the Government of Canada 
accepts the proposals set forth in your Note and agrees 
that your Note, together with this reply, which Is 
authentic in English and French, shall constitute an 
agreement between our two Governments which will 
enter into force upon notification by you that it has 
been approved by the Senate of the United States. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 
consideration. 

A. E. Ritchie 
Amhassador 
The Honourable 
William P. Rogers, 
Secretary of State, 
Washington, D.C. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New 
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 
1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967. 
Accession deposited: France (with a declaration), 

February 19, 1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, February 14, 1969. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969." 

Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (with a reservation and a declaration). 
United Kingdom (with a reservation, statements, 
and declarations), March 7, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New 
York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 
1967 ; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 
6577. 
Accession deposited: Ecuador, March 6, 1969. 

Space 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Accession deposited at Washington: Gabon, April 2, 

1969. 
Ratification deposited at Washington: Republic of 

Korea (with a statement), April 4, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered 



'■ Applicable to the whole of the territory of the 
French Republic. 
" Not in force for the United States. 



APRIL 21, 1969 



347 



into force January 1, 1967; for the United States 
May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, January 31, 
1969; Austria, January 23, 1969; Hungary, Jan- 
uary 20, 1969 ; ' Malawi, Poland,' January 17, 1969 ; 
Nicaragua, January 30, 1969. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating 
to maritime mobile service, veith annexes and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered 
into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 
Notifications of approval: Argentina, January 7, 
1969 ; Vatican City State, January 4, 1969 ; Upper 
Volta, January 17, 1969. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603), putting into 
effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service and related infor- 
mation, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 
1966. Entered into force July 1, 1967 ; for the United 
States August 23, 1967, except the frequency allot- 
ment plan contained in appendix 27 shall enter into 
force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332. 
Notification of approval: Pakistan, January 23, 1969. 



BILATERAL 



Philippines 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 23, 1963, 
for financing certain educational exchange programs. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Decem- 
ber 11, 1968, January 31 and March 19, 1969. Entered 
into force March 19, 1969. 

United Kingdom 

Amendment to the agreement of July 3, 1958, as 
amended (TIAS 4078, 4276), for cooperation on the 
uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. 
Signed at Washington September 27, 1968. 
Entered into force: March 28, 1969. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department Releases 1966 Volume 
of Foreign Policy Documents 

Press release 54 dated Marcli 12 

The Department of State on March 12 published 
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, 
the latest in the series of annual one-volume collections 
of documents on U.S. foreign policy compiled by the 
Historical Ofiice, Bureau of Public Affairs. 

This volume, containing 632 documents in 1,201 
pages, constitutes a comprehensive but convenient sur- 



vey of the goals, problems, and processes of Ameri- 
can foreign policy in 1966, as revealed in all the im- 
portant public papers of that year. There is an index 
and a complete listing of all documents. 

The material is arranged under 14 headings, evenly 
divided between geographical and functional areas of 
American diplomacy. Special attention is given to the 
major topics of contemporary concern, such as the 
situation in Viet-Nam, French withdrawal from 
NATO, efforts to achieve agreements on nonprolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of outer 
space, imposition of sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, 
and the balance-of-payments problem. 

Copies of the volume (Department of State publica- 
tion 8423) may be obtained from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OflSce, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402, for $6.25 each. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



* With reservations and declarations contained in 
final protocol. 

* With declarations contained in final protocol. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on March 27 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

William B. Buffum to be the deputy representative 
of the United States to the United Nations. (For bio- 
graphic details, see White House press release dated 
March 11.) 

John A. Hannah to be Administrator of the Agency 
for International Development. (For biographic de- 
tails, see Department of State press release 69 dated 
April 2.) 

Charles A. Meyer to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State. ( For biographic details, see Department of State 
press release 66 dated April 2.) 

Christopher H. Phillips to be the deputy representa- 
tive of the United States in the Security Council of the 
United Nations. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated March 11.) 

Nathaniel Samuels to be a Deputy Under Secretary 
of State. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release 68 dated AprU 2.) 

The Senate on April 3 confirmed the nomination of 
Glenn A. Olds to be the representative of the United 
States on the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated March 11. ) 



Designations 

John Hugh Crimmins as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Inter- American Affairs, effective April 3. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press 
release dated April 3. ) 



348 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtrLLEXIN 



INDEX ■^'i-ml ^1, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1566 



Canada. U.S., Canada Conclude Agreements on 

Niagara Falls Beautification (texts of notes) . 345 

Congress. Confirmations (Buffum, Hannah, 
Meyer, Olds, PhilUps, Samuels) 348 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Buffum, Hannah, Meyer, Olds, 

Phillips, Samuels) 348 

Designations (Crimmins) 348 

Disarmament 

Ambassador Smith Presents U.S. Views on Sea- 
bed Proposal at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Conference (statement) 333 

U.N. Seabed Committee Concludes Spring Ses- 
sion (Popper) 342 

Economic Affairs 

Samuels confirmed as Deputy Under Secretary 
for Economic Affairs 348 

U.S., Canada Conclude Agreements on Niagara 
Falls Beautification (texts of notes) . . . 345 

Foreign Aid. Hannah confirmed as Administra- 
tor, Agency for International Development . 348 

Israel. U.S. Explains Vote on Security Council 
Resolution on Israel (Tost, text of resolu- 
tion) 340 

Latin America 

Orimmins designated Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for Inter-American Affairs 348 

Meyer confirmed as Assistant Secretary for 

Inter-American Affairs 348 

Marine Science 

Ambassador Smith Presents U.S. Views on Sea- 
bed Proposal at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Conference (statement) 333 

U.N. Seabed Committee Concludes Spring Ses- 
sion (Popper) 342 

Near East 

Four Powers Begin Talks on Middle East (joint 
communique) 337 

U.S. Explains Vote on Security Council Resolu- 
tion on Israel (Tost, text of resolution) . . 340 

Publications. Department Releases 1966 Volume 

of Foreign Policy Documents 348 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 347 

U.S., Canada Conclude Agreements on Niagara 
Falls Beautification (texts of notes) . . . 343 

United Nations 

Buffum confirmed as U.S. Deputy Representative 
to the United Nations 348 

Current U.N. Documents 345 

Olds confirmed as U.S. Representative on the 
Economic and Social Council 348 

PhilUps confirmed as U.S. Deputy Representa- 
tive in the Security Council 348 



U.N. Seabed Committee Concludes Spring Ses- 
sion (Popper) 342 

U.S. Explains Vote on Security Council Resolu- 
tion on Israel (Tost, text of resolution) . . 340 

Viet-Nam. Eleventh Plenary Session on Viet- 

Nam Held at Paris (Walsh) 338 

Name Index 

Buffum. William B 348 

Crimmins. John Hugh 348 

Hannah, John A 348 

Meyer, Charles A 348 

Olds, Glenn A 348 

Phillips, Christopher H 348 

Popper, David H 342 

Samuels, Nathaniel 348 

Smith, Gerard 333 

Walsh, Lawrence 338 

Yost, Charles W 340 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 29-April 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 29 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 54 of 
March 12 and 59 of March 21. 

No. Date Subject 

*66 4/2 Meyer sworn in as Assistant Secretary 
for luter-Ameriean Affairs and U.S. 
Coordinator for the Alliance for 
Progress (biographic details). 

*67 4/1 Regional foreign policy conference, 
Detroit, Mich., April 23. 

*68 4/2 Samuels sworn in as Deputy Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs (bio- 
graphic details). 

*G9 4/2 Hannah sworn in as Administrator, 
Agency for International Develop- 
ment (.biographic details). 
70 4/3 Walsh : 11th plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris. 

*71 4/4 NATO ministerial meeting, Washing- 
ton, April 10-11. 

*72 4/4 Program for visit of King Hussein I of 
Jordan, April S-10. 



*Not printed. 



Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFII 




IM AVT O 

20 YEARS OF PEACE 



557 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTIV8ENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1557 




April 28, 1969 



SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL 7 '§67^m Public Library 

' ' indent of Documents 
WORLD WEATHER PROGRAM— PLAN FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION : 

President Nixon's Letter of Transmittal and Excerpt MAY 16 1969 

From the Report to Congress 368 

DEPOSITORY 



MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY COUNCIL 

Address hy President Nixon and Opening Remarhs 

at Ceremonial Session Celebrating the 20th Annvoersary 

of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 3^9 

Text of Final Comnmnique 354- 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1557 
April 28, 1969 



Tor sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this pubUcation are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the .source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and tlie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



The annual spring ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council was held at Washington April 10-11. A special ceremonial 
session was held on April 10 in the Departmental Auditoriiim, the 
site of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 191^9. The 
principal address, delivered hy President Nixon, was preceded hy 
remarks made hy Secretary Rogers; Foreign Minister Willy Brandt 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Honorary President of the 
Cowncil; and Secretary General Manlio Brosio. 

Following are texts of the opening remarhs, President Nixon's 
address, and a final communiqioe issued on April 11 at the close of 
the ministerial meeting, together with a list of the members of the 
V.S. delegation . 



The North Atlantic Council Celebrates the 20th Anniversary 
of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 



OPENING REMARKS 

Secretary Rogers 

Press release 76 dated April 10 

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, distin- 
guished colleagues, honored guests, ladies and 
gentlemen: It gives me great pleasure to wel- 
come you here today. 

It is especially appropriate, I think, that we 
are gathered in this historic auditorium. 
Twenty years ago almost to the day, the rep- 
resentatives of 12 nations convened in this room 
to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. With the 
subsequent adherence of three additional signa- 
tories, this treaty became the cornerstone of the 
15-nation alliance which continues to bind us 
together. 

We are most fortunate in having in our midst 
five of the original signers of the treaty: 
the distinguished Prime Minister of Iceland, 
Mr. Benediktsson ; Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak; 
Mr. Dirk U. Stikker ; Mr. Halvard Lange ; and 
Mr. Dean Acheson. Gentlemen, we are deeply 
honored that you have joined us to commemo- 
rate that act of statesmanship in which you 
played so important a part. 

Also present in this room, ladies and gentle- 
men, are the men who are carrying on the 
complex day-to-day task of running the con- 
sultative and defense machinery of the alliance 
organization: our esteemed Secretary General, 
Mr. Manlio Brosio ; the permanent representa- 



tive of each allied government; the chairman 
and members of the military committee; and 
the Supreme Allied Commanders. Their untir- 
ing labors and high professional competence 
constitute the heartbeat of the alliance. 

Let me also extend a warm welcome to our 
other special guests, many of whom have jour- 
neyed from abroad. I am very pleased to see 
the representatives of the national councils of 
the Atlantic Treaty Association. Their activi- 
ties in the private sector on behalf of the alli- 
ance are a vital factor in broadening Atlantic 
understanding. 

We all are here today to mark the passing of 
a milestone in NATO's road, a road which all 
of us have traveled together. In meetings of the 
North Atlantic Council today and tomorrow, 
my colleagues and I will be addressing together 
the deep and difficult issues of our day. 

For our common task in NATO remains, so 
long as Europe is divided, so long as the use of 
force threatens, and so long as aggression must 
be deterred. At the same time, the alliance task 
is also to pursue the search for ways to reduce 
the tensions that divide East and West. And 
with this twofold objective, the alliance will 
move into its third decade. 

I am confident that the spirit of close co- 
operation — which is the hallmark of our com- 
mon endeavor in NATO — will pervade our 
deliberations at this meeting and guide our 
work in the days and years ahead. 

Ladies and gentlemen, may I now introduce 



APRIL 28, 1969 



349 



the Honorary President of the North Atlantic 
Council, His Excellency the Foreign Mmister 
of the Federal Eepublic of Germany. 

Foreign Minister Brandt 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen : Twenty 
yeai-s ago the North Atlantic Treaty was signed 
in this auditorium. 

Today the alliance can take inventory of what 
it has achieved : 

1. It has prevented armed conflicts between 
its members ; 

2. It has proved that, being a defensive alli- 
ance, it has threatened no country and no 
nation ; 

3. It has, above all, achieved its main goal: 
Peace has been preserved in our part of the 
world. 

Mr. President, it is a pleasure and an honor 
to me to welcome you and several of those 
statesmen who created this defense alliance and 
steered it through its first years of existence. 
We owe them thanks for an achievement of liis- 
toric importance. 

But one seat, alas, remains empty — it is that 
of General Eisenhower. He set our alliance the 
irreat task of demonstrating that an alliance for 
peace means so much more to mankind than an 
alliance in war. 

It is the German Foreign Minister's turn as 
President to address this meeting. This fortu- 
nate circumstance permits me to recall that the 
North Atlantic Treaty was the framework 
within which my own country was able to re- 
turn into the community of free nations. Our 
membership in this alliance is the mainstay of 
our foreign policy. It will remain so until one 
day the division of Europe will have been over- 
come by means of a peace order. 

As a German and not least as a Berliner, I 
am aware that only by joint efforts will our na- 
tions be able to safeguard their freedom and 
their way of life. 

The strength of our alliance rests upon the 
fact that the Uiuted States and Canada have 
joined forces across the Atlantic with the West- 
ern European nations. Its vigor springs from 
the partnership between states of unequal size 
but equal intrinsic value. 

The fact remains that we Europeans and our 
American friends continue to depend on each 
other. The 20th anniversary of NATO would 



lose its meaning were it not to confirm and 
manifest anew this relationship. 

The alliance had to limit itself. It has thus 
occasionally disai^pointed hopes. But it has pre- 
vented wars. Ill future, too, the alliance will 
threaten no one. It will continue to protect its 
members against any threat. It is on this proven 
basis that we can tackle the task of reducing the 
danger itself. 

You, air. President, said before the NATO 
Council that we must replace the unity of 
common fear with the community of shared 
purpose.^ 

Security is what the nations in West and 
East want. Today it is still a question of having 
security against each other. To find security 
with each other would be in keeping with the 
true aim of the Atlantic alliance. 

It is only together that we shall attain this 
aim. Today even the most powerful is too weak 
if he stands alone. Only when we join forces 
will we win the battle for removing tension 
and durably securing peace. 

Until then, as NATO's motto puts it, vigi- 
lance is the price of freedom. 

Secretary General Brosio 

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, ladies and 
gentlemen: In inviting the North Atlantic 
Comicil to celebrate the 20th anniversary of this 
alliance in its birthplace, the United States 
Government has given proof not only of its 
continuing attachment to our common ideal 
but also of its sense of history. 

For — let us take justifiable pride in it — this 
is an occasion unique in our times. Never since 
the dawn of our era has such a peacetime coali- 
tion looked back on 20 years' united effort in 
defense of a collective principle. Never has the 
spirit of willing cooperation among highly de- 
veloped nations been so effectively manifested. 
Never has so imminent a threat of world con- 
flict been so successfully averted. It is, by any 
standards, a remarkable story. 

In celebrating this unique achievement, we 
are very conscious of the role played in it by 
our hosts. Today, when the Western community 
stands as an established part of the world order, 
some of us are apt to overlook the revolution 
it represented in American thinking at its in- 
ception. Throughout their country's history, 

^ For President Nixon's remarks to the Council on 
Feb. 24, see Bui-letin of Mar. 24, 1969, p. 250. 



350 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN 



successive U.S. governments had remained 
faithful to George Washington's injunction to 
contract no tie with the Old World. In 1949 
this policy of a century and a half was suddenly, 
radically, modified. Let us honor the American 
nation and its leaders for having, 20 years ago, 
so decisively broken with their past in order to 
assure the free world of a future. 

In saying this I do not forget that on the 
other side of the Atlantic the men of that time 
were also equal to events. Tlie wisdom spring- 
ing from vision in North America, the wisdom 
prompted by past suffering in Europe, together 
forged this fraternity of peace. 

Many men had a hand in the making of that 
partnership. !Many more have been concerned 
with putting it to work. But, speaking as Sec- 
retary General, I hope you will allow me to 
mention the three men in particular to whom 
my thoughts turn on this occasion, conscious of 
the debt we all — and not least, I myself — owe 
them. 

Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, 
is, alas, no longer with us but with history. A 
man of great administrative talent, he first 
taught the infant to walk, and set its steps in 
the right direction. M. Paul-Henri Spaak 
brought political acumen and imagination of 
the highest order to the task of giving new 
scope and depth to its development. Dr. Stikker, 
who combined in unique form the great gifts of 
his predecessors, guided the growing prodigy 
with wisdom and firmness through a difficult 
adolescence. 

Today, on their ward's coming of age, we can 
assess with pride their joint achievement. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the past year has been 
a sobering one in the affairs of our alliance. 
The hopes of detente which illuminated our 
ministerial meeting last spring were soon over- 
cast by the events in Czechoslovakia. As ra- 
tional men, we are bound to hope that these 
clouds will eventually break. We meet this year 
as new perspectives open before us. The third 
decade of the alliance may afford us great op- 
portunities — and also present great risks. 

These uncertainties require more than ever 
that Europe and North America should stand 
together. Last week, the world assembled in this 
Capital to mourn one of the greatest servants 
the alliance ever had. No single man embodied 
better than Dwight Eisenhower the spirit of 
free and fraternal cooperation which animates 
our community. There could, I feel, be no fitter 



monument to his memory than tlie maintenance 
of that spirit unimpaired. Our message of 
peace will be the more heeded if, va. the future 
as m the past, we are seen to be inspired by the 
same common faith. 



ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

White House press release dated April 10 

Mr. Secretary, Mr. President, Mr. Secretary 
General, Your Excellencies, and our distin- 
guished guests: As we gather here today, we 
celebrate a momentous armiversary. 

We celebrate one of the great successes of the 
postwar world. 

Twenty years ago, as has already been men- 
tioned, a few dedicated men gathei-ed in Wash- 
ington to cement an Atlantic partnership be- 
tween the older nations of Europe and their 
offspring in the New World — and in this very 
room the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. 
Some of the men who were here then are here 
today — and I would like to suggest that those 
who were here then and who are here today 
stand for a moment. (Applause.) 

Gentlemen, with our hindsight, we now have 
saluted your foresight at that time. In referring 
to that event, I thought I should share with you 
the conversation that I had with some of the 
founders in the room prior to coming to this 
meeting. 

Secretary Acheson recalled that before the 
signing of the treaty the Marine Band played, 
"We've Got Plenty of NoUiing," and "It Ain't 
Necessarily So." 

Certainly what has happened in those 20 years 
pi-oved that as far as the music was concerned, 
it was not prophetic. 

As we sit here today we also look back on 
those 20 years, what has happened; and we 
think, as the previous speakers have indicated, 
of all of those who have contributed to the alli- 
ance, and particularly to the one who com- 
manded the armies that liberated Europe, the 
first Supreme Commander of the NATO forces, 
the American President who did so much to 
bring NATO to its strength and to give life to 
its principles — to Dwight David Eisenhower. 

His life demonstrated that there is a moral 
force in the world which can move men and 
nations. There is a spiritual force, lodged in the 
very roots of man's being. 

As for NATO, it is precisely because it has 



APRIL 28, 1969 



351 



always been more than a military alliance that 
its strength has been greater than the strength 
of arms. This alliance represents a moral force 
which, if we marshal it, will ennoble our efforts. 

Dwight Eisenhower was a great humanist. 
He was also a great realist. If he were with us 
today, he would have recognized that together, 
as men of the Old World and of the New World, 
we must find ways of living in the real world. 

As we know too well, that real world today 
includes men driven by suspicion, men who 
would take advantage of their neighbors, men 
who confuse the pursuit of happiness -with, the 
pursuit of power. 

It also is peopled with men of good will, with 
men of i^eace, and with men of hope and with 
men of vision. 

No nation, and no community of nations, is 
made up entirely of one group of men or an- 
other. No part of the world has a monopoly 
on wisdom or virtue. 

Those who think simply in terms of "good" 
nations and "bad" nations — of a world of 
stanch allies and sworn enemies — live in a 
world of their own. Imprisoned by stereotypes, 
they do not live in the real world. 

On the other hand, those who believe that all 
it takes to submerge national self-interest is a 
little better communication, those who think 
that all that stands in the way of international 
brotherhood is stubborn leadersliip — they, too, 
live in a world of their own. Misled by wishful 
thinkmg, they do not live in the real world. 

Two decades ago, the men who founded 
NATO faced the truth of their times ; as a re- 
sult, the Western World prospers today in free- 
dom. We must follow their example by once 
again facing the truth — not of earlier times but 
of our own times. 

Living in the real world of today means rec- 
ognizing the sometimes differing interests of 
the Western nations, while never losing sight 
of our great common purposes. 

Living in the real world of today means 
understanding old concepts of East versus 
West, understanding and unfreezing those con- 
cepts, but never losing sight of great ideologi- 
cal differences that still remain. 

We can afford neither to blind our eyes with 
hatred nor to distort our vision with rose- 
colored glasses. The real world is too much with 
us to permit either stereotyped reacting or wish- 
ful thinking to lay waste our jaowers. 

Let us then count ourselves today among the 
hopeful realists. 



In this same spirit of hopeful realism, let us 
look at NATO today. 

We find it strong but we find it challenged. 
We find disputes about its structure, political 
divisions among its members, and reluctance to 
meet prescribed force quotas. Many people on 
both sides of the Atlantic find NATO anach- 
ronistic, something quaint and familiar and 
even a bit old-fashioned. 

As the alliance begins its third decade, there- 
fore, there are certain fundamentals to be 
reaffirmed : 

First, NATO is needed; and the American 
commitment to NATO will remain in foi-ce and 
it will remain strong. We in America continue 
to consider Europe's security to be our own. 

Second, having succeeded in its original pur- 
pose, the alliance must adapt to the conditions 
of success. With less of the original cement of 
fear, we must forge new bonds to maintain 
our unity. 

Third, when NATO was founded, the mere 
fact of cooperation among the Western nations 
was of tremendous significance, both symboli- 
cally and substantively. Now the symbol is not 
enough ; we need substance. The alliance today 
will be judged by the content of its cooperation, 
not merely by its form. 

Fourth, the allies have learned to harmonize 
their military forces; now, in the light of the 
vast military, economic, and political changes of 
two decades, we must devise better means of 
harmonizing our policies. 

Fifth, by its nature, ours is more than a mili- 
tary alliance; and the time has come to turn a 
part of our attention to those nonmilitary areas 
in wliich we all could benefit from increased 
collaboration. 

Now, what does all this mean for the future 
of the Western alliance ? 

To deal with the real world, we cannot re- 
spond to changing conditions merely by chang- 
ing our words. We have to adapt our actions. 

It is not enough to talk of flexible response, 
if at the same time we reduce our flexibility by 
cutting back on conventional forces. 

It is not enough to talk of relaxing tension, 
unless we keep in mind the fact that 20 years 
of tension were not caused by superficial mis- 
understandings. A change of mood is useful 
only if it reflects some change of mind about 
political purpose. 

It is not enough to talk of European security 
in the abstract. We must know the elements of 



352 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLBTIIT 



insecurity and how to remove them. Confer- 
ences are useful if they deal with concrete is- 
sues, which means they must, of course, be care- 
fully prepared. 

It is not enough to talk of detente, unless at 
the same time we anticipate the need for giving 
it the genuine political content that would pre- 
vent detente from becoming delusion. 

To take one example, a number of America's 
Western partners have actively supported the 
idea of strategic arms control talks with the 
Soviet Union. I support that idea. Wlien such 
talks are held, we shall work diligently for their 
success. 

But within our alliance we must recognize 
that this would imply a military relationship 
far different from the one that existed when 
NATO was founded. Let's put it in plain words. 
The West does not today have the massive nu- 
clear predominance that it once had, and any 
sort of broad-based arms agreement with the 
Soviets would codify the present balance. 

How would progress toward arms control af- 
fect the nature of consultation within our 
alliance ? 

Up to now, our discussions have mainly had 
to do with tactics — ways and means of carrying 
out the provisions of a treaty drawn a genera- 
tion ago. We have discussed clauses in proposed 
treaties; in the negotiations to come, we must 
go beyond these to the processes which these 
future treaties will set in motion. We must 
shake off our preoccupation with formal struc- 
ture to bring into focus a common world view. 

Of course there is a diversity of policies and 
interests among the Western nations; and of 
course those differences must be respected. But 
in shaping the strategies of i^eace, these differ- 
ences need not block the way — not if we break 
through to a new and deeper form of political 
consultation. 

To be specific, the forthcoming arms talks 
will be a test of the ability of the Western na- 
tions to shape a common strategy. 

The United States fully intends to undertake 
deep and genuine consultation with its allies, 
both before and during any negotiations di- 
rectly affecting their interests. That is a pledge 
I shall honor — and I expect to consult at length 
on the implications of anything that might af- 
fect the pattern of East-West relations. 

In passing that test together, this alliance 
will give new meaning to the principle of 
mutual consultation. 

To seize the moment that this opportunity 



presents, we would do well to create new ma- 
chinery for Western political consultation, as 
well as to make greater use of the machinery 
that we have. 

First, I suggest that deputy foreign ministers 
meet periodically for a high-level review of 
major, long-range problems before the alliance. 

Second, I suggest creation of a special politi- 
cal planning group, not to duplicate the work 
now being done by the Council or by the senior 
political advisers but to address itself specifi- 
cally and continually to the longer range prob- 
lems we face. 

This would by no means preclude efforts to 
develop a fuller European cooperation. On the 
contrary, we in the United States Avould wel- 
come that cooperation. What ties us to Europe 
is not weakness or division among our partners 
but community of interest with them. 

Third, I strongly urge that we create a com- 
mittee on the challenges of modern society, re- 
sponsible to the deputy ministers, to explore 
ways in which the experience and resources of 
the Western nations could most effectively be 
marshaled toward improving the quality of life 
of our peoples. 

That new goal is provided for in article II 
of our treaty, but it has never been the center 
of our concerns. Let me put my proposal in 
concrete terms and in personal terms. On my 
recent trip to Europe I met with world leaders 
and private citizens alike. I was struck by the 
fact that our discussions were not limited to 
military or political matters. More often than 
not our talks turned to those matters deeply 
relevant to our societies: the legitimate unrest 
of young people, the frustration of the gap be- 
tween generations, the need for a new sense of 
idealism and purpose in coping with an 
automating world. 

These were not subjects apart from the 
concerns of NATO; indeed, they went to the 
very heart of the real world we live in. We are 
not allies because we are bound by treaty; we 
bind ourselves by treaty because we are allied 
in meeting common purposes and common 
concerns. 

For 20 years our nations have provided for 
the military defense of Western Europe. For 20 
years we have held political consultations. 

Now the alliance of the West needs a third 
dimension. 

It needs not only a strong military dimension 
to provide for the common defense and not only 
a more profound political dimension to shape 



APRIL 28, 1969 



353 



a strategy of i^eace, but it also needs a social 
dimension to deal with our concern for the qual- 
ity of life in this last third of the 20th century. 

This concern is manifested in many ways — 
culturally and technologically, through the 
humanities and the sciences. 

The Western nations share common ideals 
and a common heritage. We are all advanced 
societies, sharing the benefits and the gathering 
torments of a rapidly advancmg industrial 
technology. The industrial nations share no 
challenge more urgent than that of bringing 
20th century man and his environment to terms 
with one another — of making the world fit for 
man and helping man to learn how to remain 
in harmony with the rapidly changing world. 

We in the United States have much to learn 
from the experiences of our Atlantic allies in 
their handling of internal matters : for example, 
the care of infant children in West Germany, 
the "new towns" policy of Great Britain, the 
development of depressed areas programs in 
Italy, the great skill of the Dutch in dealing 
with high-density areas, the effectiveness of 
urban planning by local governments in Nor- 
way, the experience of the French in metro- 
politan plannmg. 

Having forged a working partnership, we all 
have a iinique opportunity to pool our skills, our 
intellects, and our inventiveness in finding new 
ways to use technology to enhance our environ- 
ments, and not to destroy them. 

The work of this committee would not be 
competitive with any now being carried on by 
other international agencies. Neither would it 
be our purpose to limit this cooperation and 
the benefits that flow from it to our own coun- 
tries. Quite the opposite— our purpose would 
be to share both ideas and benefits, recognizing 
that these problems have no national or regional 
boundaries. This could become the most positive 
dimension of the alliance, opening creative new 
channels to all the rest of the world. 

When I visited the North Atlantic Council 
in Brussels I posed the question: "In today's 
world what kind of an alliance shall we strive 
to build?" 

Today I have sketched out some of the ap- 
proaches that I believe the alliance should take. 

I believe we must build an alliance strong 
enough to deter those who might threaten war, 
close enough to provide for continuous and far- 
reaching consultation, trusting enough to accept 



the diversity of views, realistic enough to deal 
with the world as it is, and flexible enough to 
explore new channels of constructive co- 
operation. 

Ten years ago, addressing the North Atlantic 
Council in this same room, President Eisen- 
hower spoke of the need for unity. Listen to his 
words. There is not much strength in the finger 
of one hand, he said, but when five fingers are 
balled into a fist, you have a considerable 
instrument of defense. 

We need such an instrument of defense, and 
the United States will bear its fair share in 
keeping NATO strong. 

All of us are also ready, as conditions change, 
to turn that fist into a hand of friendship. 

NATO means more than arms, troop levels, 
consultative bodies, and treaty commitments. 
All of these are necessary. But what makes them 
relevant to the future is what the alliance stands 
for. To discover what this Western alliance 
means today, we have to reach back not across 
two decades but through the centuries to the 
very roots of the Western experience. 

When we do, we find that we touch a set of 
elemental ideals, eloquent in their simplicity, 
majestic in their humanity; ideals of decency 
and justice and liberty and respect for the 
rights of our fellow men. Simple, yes; and to 
us they seem obvious. But our forebears 
struggled for centuries to win them, and in our 
own lifetimes we have had to fight to defend 
them. 

These ideals are what NATO was created to 
protect. It is to these ideals, on this proud an- 
niversary, that we are privileged to consecrate 
the alliance anew. These ideals — and the firm- 
ness of our dedication to them — give NATO's 
concept its nobility, and NATO's backbone its 
steel. 



TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE 

Press release SI dated April 11 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
Session in Washington on 10th and 11th April, 1969. 
The Council commemorated the twentieth anniversary 
of the Treaty creating the Alliance and was addressed 
by the President of the United States. Ministers ex- 
pressed their deep satisfaction at the decisive con- 
tribution the Alliance had made to the maintenance of 
peace in Europe and to the security of all its members. 

2. The Alliance was established to safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilisation of its peo- 



354 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN 



pies, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law, and in response to a 
common fear that without an effective security system, 
another war might erupt in a divided Europe. The 
Alliance continues as the expression of common pur- 
poses and aspirations. 

3. In 1967 the Report on the Future Tasks of the 
Alliance emphasised the dual task of the latter : the 
defence of the West and the search for a stable peace 
with the East. In June 1968 Allied Jlinisters declared 
their readiness to seek, with the other States con- 
cerned, specific practical measures for disarmament 
and arms control, including possible measures for 
mutual and balanced force reductions." Notwithstand- 
ing the serious setback to hopes for improvement in 
East-West relations as a result of Soviet intervention 
in Czechoslovakia, Ministers in November 196S stated 
that secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations 
between East and West remained the political goal 
of the Allies.' They reaffirmed at this Session that the 
intention of their Governments was to continue the 
search for real progress towards this objective by con- 
tacts and to explore all appropriate openings for nego- 
tiations. 

4. Bearing especially in mind the situation in East- 
em Europe, member governments recall that any 
lasting improvement in international relations pre- 
supposes full respect for the principles of the inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity of States, non- 
interference in their domestic affairs, the right of each 
people to shape its own future, and the obligation to 
refrain from the threat or use of force. 

5. Ministers recalled that one of the essential aims 
of the Alliance is the establishment of a just and last- 
ing peace in Europe, based on stability, security and 
mutual confidence. The Allies propose, while remain- 
ing in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet 
Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe 
which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful 
negotiation and an early resolution. Consequently, they 
instructed the Council to draft a list of these issues 
and to study how a useful process of negotiation could 
best be initiated, in due course, and to draw up a 
report for the next meeting of Ministers. It is clear 
that any negotiations must be well prepared in ad- 
vance, and that all governments whose participation 
would be necessary to achieve a political settlement 
in Europe should take part. 

6. The Allies will also pursue their efforts and 
studies in the field of disarmament and practical arms 
control, including balanced force reductions and the ini- 
tiatives already undertaken for the renunciation of 
the use of force. 

7. The political solidarity of the Alliance constitutes 
an essential element while approaching a preriod of ex- 
panding East- West contacts and possible negotiations. 
This solidarity can best be maintained by strict ad- 
herence to the principle of full consultation in the 



' For text of a final communique and attachment 
Issued at Reykjavik on June 25, 1968, see Bitlletin 
of July 15, 1968, p. 75. 

• For text of a final communique issued at Brussels 
on Nov. 16, 1968, see Bulletin of Dee. 9, 1968, p. 595. 



Council both before and during any negotiations that 
might affect the interests of the AUiance or any of its 
members. On this understanding, the Allied Govern- 
ments welcome the intention of the United States to 
engage the USSR in discussion of limitations on of- 
fensive and defensive strategic arms. 

8. The Allies participating in the NATO integrated 
defence programme agreed that it was extremely im- 
portant that during an era of negotiation the defence 
posture of the Alliance should not be relaxed and that 
premature expectations of solutions to outstanding 
questions should not be generated. The maintenance of 
effective defence is a stabilising factor and a necessary 
condition for effective detente policies. 

9. Accordingly these members of the Alliance re- 
affirmed their continuing determination to make 
appropriate contributions to joint efforts for defence 
and deterrence at all levels both nuclear and conven- 
tional. They accepted the continuing need for the cur- 
rent NATO strategy based on a forward defence and 
appropriate response to any aggression, and for a 
credible conventional and nuclear deterrent including 
adequate overall and local force levels. The necessary 
military posture of the Alliance consists of the stra- 
tegic nuclear deterrent forces, the presence of sufficient 
substantial and effective North American and European 
conventional forces as well as supporting tactical 
nuclear forces in the European area and adequate 
ready reinforcements. 

10. Defence Ministers will meet on 28th May, 1969 
and will examine the more specific elements in the 
defence posture necessary to fulfil the above require- 
ments. They will also examine the possibility of 
improving the efficiency of the defence effort by in- 
tensifying mutual and co-operative approaches to, for 
example, the problems of arms production and arms 
standardisation either among all Allied nations or 
between some of them. 

11. Reviewing the situation in Berlin, the Ministers 
noted that obstacles have recently been placed on free- 
dom of access to Berlin. Such obstructions cannot be 
accepted. The Ministers supported the determination 
of the Three Powers to maintain free access to the 
city, and recalled the declaration of the North Atlantic 
Council of 16th December, 1958,* and the responsibili- 
ties which each member State assumed with regard 
to the security and welfare of Berlin. 

12. The Ministers consider that the achievement of a 
peaceful European settlement presupposes, among 
other things, progress towards eliminating existing 
sources of tension in the centre of Europe. They con- 
sider that concrete measures aimed at improving the 
situation in Berlin, safeguarding free access to the 
city, and removing restrictions which affect traffic and 
communications between the two parts of Germany 
would be a substantial contribution toward this objec- 
tive. They expressed their support for continued efforts 
by the Three Powers to explore, in the framework of 
their special responsibilities for Berlin and Germany 
as a whole, possibilities for ordered and negotiated 
progress in these important questions. 

13. A peaceful solution must be found for the Ger- 



*For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4. 



APRIL 28, 19G9 



355 



man question based on the free decision of the German 
people and on the interests of European security. 

14. The members of the Alliance are conscious that 
they share common environmental problems which, un- 
less squarely faced, could imperil the welfare and prog- 
ress of their societies. The Ministers recognise that 
important work on these problems is already being 
carried out within other international organizations. 
The Ministers instructed the Council in Permanent 
Session to examine how to improve, in every practical 
way, the exchange of views and experience among the 
Allied countries, whether by action in the appropriate 
international organizations or otherwise, in the task 
of creating a better environment for their societies. 

15. While concerned with these problems. Ministers 
are also mindful that the Allied countries are entering 
an era in which scientific, technical and economic re- 
sources should contribute to the peaceful progress 
and development of all nations. 

16. Apart from regular meetings at Ministerial 
level. Ministers agreed that the Council in Permanent 
Session should consider the proposal that high officials 
of their Foreign Ministries meet periodically for a 
review of major, long-range problems before the 
Alliance. 

17. The next Ministerial Session of the North At- 
lantic Council will be held in Brussels in December 
1969. 



U.S. DELEGATION 

Press release 75 dated April 9 

REPnESENTATIVES 

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State (chairman) 
Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense 

U.S. Repeesentative on the Noeth Atlantic Counoil 
Harlan Cleveland 

MEMBEBS of the DEI.EQATI0N 

Department of State 

William O. Boswell, Director, Office of International 

Conferences (setyretary o/ delegation) 
William I. Cargo, Deputy U.S. Representative on the 

North Atlantic Council 
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for Buro- 

I)ean Affairs 



Ralph J. McGuire, Director, Office of NATO and At- 
lantic Political-MUitary Affairs 

Richard F. Pedersen, Counselor of the Department 

Richard I. Phillips, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs 

George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs 

Edward J. Streator, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of 
NATO and Atlantic Political-MUitary Affairs 

Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., Minister for Political Affairs, 
U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 

Department of Defense 

Daniel Z. Henkin, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs 

Warren C. Nutter, Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Security Affairs 

Timothy W. Stanley, Defense Adviser, U.S. Mission to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff 

Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Security Affairs 



U.S., U.S.S.R. To Hold Technical Talks 
on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 

U.S. AnnounceTnent^ 

Agreement has been reached between the 
Governments of the U.S.S.E. and the United 
States to hold technical talks in Vienna, begin- 
ning April 14, concerning peaceful uses of nu- 
clear explosions. 

The Soviet delegation will be headed by 
Academician Yevgeny K. Fedorov; the U.S. 
delegation wUl be headed by AEC [Atomic 
Energy Conmaission] Commissioner Gerald F. 
Tape. 



^ Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Apr. 10. 



356 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIIf 



Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 



Press release 74 dated April 7 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to start by 
apologizing for being so slow in having a press 
conference. From now on I intend to have a 
press conference on a fairly regular basis, 
every two or three weeks or four. 

I have a few announcements to make, and 
then I will answer questions. 

First, as you know, the King of Jordan will 
be visiting here this week — tomorrow and Wed- 
nesday. The King has been a close friend of the 
United States for many years and has played a 
major and constructive role in the search for 
peace in the Middle East. The King's visit is 
most timely, coming as it does when discussions 
on the IVIiddle East by the four powers have 
started. We will be especially pleased to have 
the direct benefit of the King's personal views 
on the situation. 

Also, as you know, this week in Wasliington 
there will be a conference of historical signifi- 
cance: the NATO ministerial meeting. It was 
just 20 years ago today that the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed. On Thursday of this week 
the ministers will gather in the same place, 
the Departmental Auditorium, to mark the 
anniversary. As you know, President Nixon 
will address this meeting. Among those present 
we expect there will be a number of those who 
signed the treaty in 1949. 

Because it is the 20th anniversary and espe- 
cially because of recent events in Czechoslo- 
vakia, we believe that this NATO meeting will 
be of more than usual significance. 

Next month I will head the American dele- 
gations to several important international con- 
ferences. Toward the end of May, I will be in 
Bangkok for the 14th SEATO ministerial 
meeting. Thereafter in Bangkok, the foreign 
ministers of the Viet-Nam troop-contributing 
countries will meet to review the situation in 
Viet-Nam. I also intend during that trip to pay 



my first visit to Viet-Nam. I expect to spend 3 
or 4 days in the country. 

I will return through Tehran for this year's 
ministerial meeting of CENTO. The dates for 
that meeting are presently being scheduled and 
will be announced soon. Here again, I look for- 
ward to meeting with the other foreign min- 
isters for discussions on important problems of 
mutual interest. 

Finally, I have a statement on Peru. 

Ambassador Irwin has returned to Lima after 
3 days of consultation in the Department. While 
he was here he gave a full report on his meet- 
ings with President Velasco and members of his 
Cabinet. As you know, he also stopped at Key 
Biscayne to consult with President Nixon. 

Ambassador Irwin reported that the Govern- 
ment of Peru had advised him that under Peru- 
vian regulations IPC [International Petroleum 
Company] has an opportunity, through an ad- 
ministrative process, to contest the existence and 
amount of the debt asserted by the Peruvian 
Government to be owed by the company. After 
discussions with attorneys for IPC, the com- 
pany has informed us that it plans shortly to 
present a document to the Minister of Energy 
and Mines within the framework of this 
Peruvian administrative process. 

We have determined, therefore, that such a 
process, together with the current negotiations, 
constitutes appropriate steps within the mean- 
ing of the Hickenlooper amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act and of the amended 
Sugar Act. Therefore, it has been decided — and 
Ambassador Irwin has so informed the Peru- 
vian Government this morning — ^that sanctions 
foreseen in the amendments will be deferred 
pending the outcome of this process. 

In these circumstances, we believe that our 
determination offers the best hope that the dis- 
pute between IPC and the Government of Peru 
can be resolved without injury to the tradition 
of close and friendly relations between the 
United States and Peru. 



APRIL 28, I960 



367 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the last few weeJcs we 
have all heard quite a lot of talk about secret 
contact with the Cormmu/nists in Paris and about 
progress in those contacts. Can you tell us what 
is the — what is your assessment of the talks and 
any progress P 

A. Mr. Hightower [Jolin M. Hightower, As- 
sociated Press], I attempted to make it clear 
when I testified before the Senate Foreign Ke- 
lations Committee that the prospect for prog- 
ress in the peace negotiations turns to a con- 
siderable extent on private negotiations, and I 
explained that the other side — properly so, I 
believe— feels that the question of whether pri- 
vate talks are being held or not and whether 
progress is being made or not should not be dis- 
cussed.^ In other words, if either side uses the 
fact of talks or what is happening in the talks as 
a negotiating position or in order to get some 
benefit for its negotiating stance, then it would 
be very harmful to the prospect of progress in 
the talks. So, as far as I am concerned — and I 
think this is the attitude of the Govenunent; 
it certainly is the President's attitude — we are 
not going to talk about private talks at all. We 
are not going to discuss whether they have oc- 
curred, are being held, or will be held, nor 
will we make any reference to progress or lack 
of progress ; and I hope that you and the Ameri- 
can people will understand the necessity for 
trying to conduct whatever discussions we have 
of this character outside of the glare of 
publicity. 

Q. Would you care to comment on another 
aspect of the Viet-Nam situation, ivhich is the 
action announced hy President Thieu in his 
message concerning the establishment of polit- 
ical parties, his own and an opposition, and 
various things that he talked about with regard 
to admission of former Viet Cong to the Gov- 
ernment, if they laid down their arms and were 
peaceful. Have you any comments on that? 

A. Yes, I have. I think the statement by Pres- 
ident Thieu and his attitude has been — is most 
constructive, and I think that his willingness to 
be outspoken about his intentions in very major 
ways is most helpful. 

Now, obviously, if there are discussions about 



' For text of Secretary Rogers' statement of Mar. 27, 
see BxjiXETiN of Apr. 14, 1969, p. 305. 



the political aspects of a peace settlement, they 
will have to be negotiated. There are lots of 
points that will have to be negotiated. But the 
fact that he has expressed a willingness to have 
direct negotiations with the NLF [National 
Liberation Front], the fact that he has stated 
that everyone in South Viet-Nam will have a 
right to vote as long as he disavows any vio- 
lence, intentions of violence, and that he is look- 
ing for political stability in the future of South 
Viet-Nam- — all of those things, I think, are very 
helpful and constructive. 

U.S. Position on Mutual Troop Withdrawals 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Paris the Gomnvanists 
have been saying the question is not whether we 
have private talks or plenary sessions. The ques- 
tion is a matter of substance, and they say the 
key matter of substance is that the U.S. must 
withdraio its troops unconditionally. What is 
the position of this administration on the with- 
drawal of American troops from, South Viet- 
Nam? 

A. Well, as I understand their position — that 
we withdraw our troops unconditionally — that 
just means they don't want to negotiate. They 
just want us to leave. Our position is quit« clear. 
We are willing to withdraw our troops on a re- 
ciprocal basis, and we are willing to discuss 
what the reciprocal basis would be, the number 
of troops withdrawn, the scheduling of such 
withdrawals, and we also are willing to have 
at the same time or in the same meeting political 
discussions between the South Vietnamese and 
the NLF. 

Q. Does that mean, then., that the Manila 
formula of the Johnson administration has now 
been altered? As you describe it, it is quite con- *■ 
siderably different. ^ 

A. Well, I don't want to discuss the Manila 
formula in any detail in this conference, because 
there is some ambiguity about the Manila 
communique. I am perfectly willing to stand on 
the position of our Government. I think that 
the Manila formula may have talked about, in 
some respects, a unilateral withdrawal, first by 
the North and then a withdrawal at the comple- 
tion of that effort by the South ; but in any event, 
I don't want to get involved in the Manila for- 
mula. We have our own program. We are will- 
ing to discuss the matter with the North 
Vietnamese, and the Government of South Viet- 



358 



DEP.\KTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Nam is willing to discuss the political aspects 
with the NLF. And we are quite flexible about 
how we do it, but we want to make sui'e that at 
the end of the road the people in the South have 
a right to determine their own futux'e by the 
elective process. 

Policy on U.S. Overseas Bases 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some mernbers of the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Cormnittee are question- 
ing what they term automaticity of renewing 
the U.S. overseas military hoses. They are par- 
ticularly disturbed hy the Spanish ones. Could 
you give us, Mr. Secretary, your conception of 
the foreign policy implications of reneioing the 
Spanish hases and generally this administra- 
tion's policy on overseas hases? 

A. Yes. On the first question the administra- 
tion is reviewing all our commitments and our 
troops overseas, and at each time one of these 
matters comes up for renewal, we will consider 
it. So that we recognize that situations change; 
and the fact that 10 or 15 years ago certain 
things were necessary does not mean that they 
are necessary today. 

As far as the Spanish bases are concerned, 
the negotiations were fairly far along when we 
were sworn in. And as you know, the Spanish 
Government was asking at the time we started 
the negotiations for $700 million. Now, we do 
think the bases in Spain are important. We 
think it is important to maintain friendly rela- 
tions with Spain. We think that to change the 
situation as it now exists and as it has existed 
for a long time would be more expensive than 
the proposal that we have in mind. 

So we are proceeding with the negotiations, 
and we will have further negotiations sometime 
m the middle of the month. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States ex- 
pressed its concern to the Soviet Union over 
its recent clainpdowv. in Czechoslovakia, and 
have we in any way warned the Soviet Union 
that their actions there might endanger the start 
of strategic arms talks? 

A. Well, the answer to your first question is : 
I don't want to say we have warned them. We 
have expressed our concern about events in 
Czechoslovakia. It makes the relations between 
the East and A , ost very difficult when they have 
60,000 or 70,000 troops in Czechoslovakia and 
tanks in Czechoslovakia ; and the whole Brezh- 
nev doctrine is a very disconcerting and un- 



pleasant prospect for improving relations be- 
tween the two countries, and the Soviet Union 
knows that. 

Now, in answer to your second question, we 
do not think that that should, at the moment, 
interfere with our attempts to improve our 
relations with the Soviet Union. We detect what 
appears to be an interest on their part in im- 
proving our relations, and we are going to do 
everything we can to j)ursue that to see whether 
they are serious about it or not. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President has spoken 
about a peace plan for ending the war in Viet- 
Nam, and in recent days we have heard a lot of 
talk about this plan and read stories about it, 
and it would he helpful to many of us if you 
could give us at least the outline of this plan. 

A. Well, of course, you know in merely ask- 
ing that question that I am not going to set 
forth what our strategy is. We do have a plan 
which we think is a fair and reasonable one for 
ending this conflict. It isn't any magic formula, 
obviously. It is carefully thought through. We 
are going to proceed to apply it, and the Presi- 
dent is spending a great deal of time and 
thought and effort in bringing this war to a 
peaceful conclusion. And I have every hope that 
it will eventually result in a successful peace. 

Wlien that occurs is another matter. I don't 
want to make any statements about things that 
look encouraging or things that look dis- 
couraging, but we are going to proceed in every 
possible way to achieve a peace. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you home any realistic 
hope that troop ^oithdrawals can begin from 
Viet-Nam either as a result of some agreement 
with the North Vietnamese this year or perhaps 
u/nilaterally? 

A. Well, I would certainly hope that there 
would be some chance of mutual withdrawal of 
troops this year. And as I said in my testimony, 
we are prepared to do that at once if the other 
side is. You can't have mutual withdrawal of 
troops unless there is some mutuality. As far as 
the unilateral withdrawal of the troops is con- 
cerned, I don't want to say anything about that 
beyond what the President has said. We are 
considering all possibilities. We don't anticipate 
any immediate withdrawal of troops. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, I wonder if you have 
any areas in the State Department that you 
think should he reorganized? 



APRIL 28, 1969 



359 



A. There are things that I think should be — 
there are areas that should be reorganized. We 
are working on certain reorganizations. I think 
the State Department, generally speaking, is in 
excellent condition. 

I am tremendously impressed by the qualifi- 
cations and the dedication of the people in the 
State Department, so that nothing I say in this 
regard is intended to reflect on them or their 
ability or their dedication. I think there are 
areas where we could make some improvements, 
and we are working on those areas. We won't 
necessarily do it at once, but over the next 4 or 
5 or 6 months there will be some changes made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your emphasis today on 
reciprocal troop withdrawal, rmituul with- 
drawal^ runs into conflict with this rash of sto- 
ries over the last few days that the administra- 
tion is planning a imilateral withdrawal of 
perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 men. The stories all 
seem to say essentially the same thing, indi- 
cating there may have heen a hachground con- 
ference. I wonder whether you can give vs any 
hind of feel for this, whether they are on the 
right track or not. 

A. I don't really want to say anything more 
than I have just said on that subject. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us your views 
on the Okinawa issue in light of the talks you 
had with the Japanese former Prime Minister 
last week? 

A. Well, we consider the Okinawa question a 
very serious question. We recognize that it is a 
difficult problem for the Japanese Government. 
We recognize that changes have to be made with 
the passage of time. We are looking forward to 
our discussions with officials of the Japanese 
Government, including their Foreign Minister ; 
and as you know. Prime Minister Sato is going 
to visit the United States in the fall, and 
we hope that we can work something out on 
Okinawa that will be mutually satisfactory. 

The Military-Industrial Complex 

Q. Mr. Secretary, General Eisenhower''s 
death has revived the expression '■'■tnilitary- 
industrial complex^'' and General Shoup [Gen. 
David M. Shoup, form,er Commandant of the 
U.S. Marine Corps] has a piece out now that 
more or less says that we are at war because this 
complex wants us to he. In your experience so 
far in the State Department, do you put any 
credence in that at all? 



A. The question was about the military- 
industrial complex and whether I have any 
comments about it. 

I read General Shoup's article, and I think it 
is a matter that all Government officials have to 
keep in mind constantly. I haven't personally 
encountered any problems in connection with it. 

Mr. Laird [Secretary of Defense Melvin R. 
Laird] and I have gotten along very well. I 
don't notice any inflexibility on his part at all. 
On the other hand, as President Eisenhower 
said in his farewell message ^ and as this article 
suggests, it is always a danger. One of the great 
strengths of our Government is civilian control, 
and I think that I and all of us, the President 
certainly, have to keep in mind that this is a 
risk. We have to be sure that the strength of 
our Military Establishment and the natural 
tendency of industry to want to succeed, and so 
forth — those things do not really play an influ- 
ential part in the conduct of our foreign affairs. 
But as far as the State Department is con- 
cerned, since I have been here, I haven't noticed 
it and I haven't had any difficulty with it. But 
I am going to be quite alert to it. 

Four-Power Talks on the Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, two top leaders of the 
Israeli Government again yesterday attacked 
the lohole concept of the four-power talks in the 
Middle East. The new Prime Minister has done 
the same thing. Exactly how far do you think 
this four-power approach can go in view of 
Israeli total opposition to the whole approach? 

A. Well, I regret the fact that the Govern- 
ment of Israel is so strongly opposed to the idea 
of the four-power talks. We have made it per- 
fectly clear to the Government that we are not 
— we do not intend and will not seek to impose 
a settlement on Israel. On the other hand, we do 
think it is vitally important, particularly in 
view of the fact that so little progress has been 
made by the Jarring mission, that major coun- 
tries concerned in the area should play a part 
in attempting to get the parties to reconcile 
their differences, and we think that it may be 
that by this process we can influence the parties 
to come to some sort of a permanent settlement. 
Twenty years have gone by and there has not 
been a permanent settlement, and we think it is 
very important to make an effort to see if this 
can be resolved. We recognize the difficulties. 
We recognize the dangers that the Government 



' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 179. 



360 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLBTIN 



of Israel cites; but we do think it is important 
to proceed along this line, and we intend to 
do it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you analyze, flease, 
for us the Sino-Soviet dispute and what impli- 
cations that might have for U.S. foreign policy? 
There have heen suggestions that the U.S. 
should take advantage of this dispute for our 
own advantage. 



The Sino-Soviet Dispute 

A. You ask me to analyze it. I think it's a 
little too early to analyze it. I think there are 
certainly interesting aspects to it. The most in- 
teresting is that the Soviet Union has presented 
its case through embassies in Europe and to the 
State Department, which is quite unusual, in 
effect pointing out that the Eed Chinese are 
at fault and they are not. I think that very fact 
shows considerable concern on their part. They 
have gone to most of the governments in 
Europe and presented a paper which sets forth 
their side of the picture. 

In terms of the long-term effect, we don't 
know. It is going to take a little time to analyze 
what has happened, what is happening. 

In terms of the attitude of our Government, 
let me say this: We do not think it is wise to 
attempt to exploit it. We think it is the best 
posture for the United States to be in — our best 
posture is to attempt to have more friendly 
relations with both the Soviet Union and Com- 
munist China. Wliatever the quarrel is between 
them is their quarrel. We would like to have 
more friendly relations with Communist Cliina. 
We have indicated that. 

It is possible this Ninth Congress of the Com- 
munist Party in Peking will end up in some 
change of direction of their foreign policy. We 
don't know that yet. But in any event, we are 
willing to do what we can to have more friendly 
relations with Red China, but we're not going to 
do it in the spirit of exploiting it because we 
think it will give us some advantage against 
the Soviet Union. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything that 
stands in the way of strategic arms limitation 
talks with the Soviet Union, or could those go 
forward very soon? 

A. No, there is nothing that stands in the 
way, and they can go forward very soon. We are 



in the process of preparing for them now, and 
we expect they will begin in the late spring or 
early summer. 

Importance of NATO Meeting 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that you 
thought this NATO meeting will he more than 
usually significant. In the light of Canada's 
plan to reduce its forces in NATO, coidd you 
tell us precisely what you expect to come from 
this NATO meeting? 

A. No, I think it's a little early to tell pre- 
cisely what will come from it, but we think it's 
important for the reasons I mentioned: first, 
because it's the 20th anniversary and in that 
sense has a certain significance; secondly, we 
think the invasion of Czechoslovakia has given 
all the NATO countries an awareness of the 
importance of NATO, the importance of keep- 
ing NATO strong. 

We are pleased to see that Prime Minister 
Trudeau recognized the importance of NATO 
and Canada will continue to be an important 
member. On the question of their troop contri- 
bution, that will be a subject for discussion in 
the May meeting of the defense mmisters. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken repeat- 
edly, both here and on otJisr occasions, about the 
importance of self-determination for South 
Viet-Nam and an open political process there. 
I wonder how you would reconcile this with the 
recent jailing of the Buddhist monk and the 
continuing presence in prison of Truong Dinh 
Dzu, tlie presidential candidate. Have you dis- 
cussed this with the Government of South Viet- 
Nam? What is your position on it? 

A. Yes, we have discussed it. I don't think 
the two questions are particularly related. One 
involves civil liberties and the other involves 
votmg rights. As far as voting rights are con- 
cerned, these two cases you have mentioned 
wouldn't affect that. 

We are obviously concerned about civil lib- 
erties in South Viet-Nam. You have to keep in 
mind, though, their country is at war and they 
are imder more pressures than we are here in 
the United States. If you remember, the United 
States has done some things in wartime that 
we're not particularly proud of. If you will re- 
call, we moved the Japanese from the West 
Coast without any real justification. 

All I'm saying is we have expressed our con- 
cern to the Government of South Viet-Nam and 



APRIL 28, 1969 
839^35 — 6S- 



361 



we think that, generally speaking, they have 
been quite helpful and constructive in the area 
of civil liberties. 

Q. Mr. Secretaiy, there are reports that Willy 
Brandt [Foreign Minister of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany^ wants to discuss tlie recent 
Communist appeal for a European security con- 
ference when NATO meets here. I wonder if 
you share the concern about the Soviet appeal? 

A. Obviously, it vpill be a subject of discus- 
sion at the NATO ministerial meeting. The pro- 
posal that was made by the Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries is not significantly different in substance 
from previous proposals that were made. The 
tone of the proposal is somewhat friendlier, has 
less polemics in it, and I think it deserves our 
consideration. 

Obviously, there are a lot of questions that 
have to be answered, and that's one of the things 
we will discuss at the NATO meeting. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there were reports that 
prior to the opening of the big-four meeting 
there was an understanding or agreement 
reached between the United States and the 
Soviet Union to stay out of any fighting in the 
Middle East. Can you enlighten us on this, and 
if so, does it remove the powder keg atmosphere 
that is supposed to exist there? 

A. I'm soiTy, I didn't get the first part of 
your question. 

Q. There were reports of an agreement be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet Union 
that they would not get mixed up in any fight- 
ing in the Middle East. 

A. I don't know of any such agreement. Ob- 
viously, the Soviet Union and the United States 
are both anxious to avoid a confrontation in 
that area, and we have had discussions about 
that, the fact that it is an explosive situation. 
That is one of the reasons, of course, that we 
have engaged in the four-power talks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what are 
the facts about the use of Cambodia as a sanc- 
tuary? We have had some contradictory reports 
on that subject. 

A. You mean, is it being used as a sanctuary ? 

Q. Yes, sir, and what are the facts, and to 
what extent is it being \ised? 

A. Well, I think that is probably a subject 
that would be better discussed by Secretary 



Laird, but it is a fact that it has been used by 
North Vietnamese and is being used by the 
North Vietnamese now. The exact extent of it, 
I think, would be something we would probably 
not want to discuss at this time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, after a couple of months 
could you tell us what the American voter got 
for his vote, that is, the change in owr foreign 
policy maJcing process? As far as you can deter- 
mine, ichat differences are there now in the way 
this administration works as opposed to the 
last? 

A. Well, I think I will wait until I talk to the 
voter a little later on. (Laughter.) 

Q. Mr. Secretary, South Vietnamese officials 
have told some of us within the last week or so 
that if they were making the decisions in Hanoi, 
based on what they know about American public 
opinion and their own discussions with Ameri- 
can officials and tlieir knowledge of the situation 
in Viet-Nam, the course of action they would 
recommend to Ho Chi Minh would be to keep 
fighting. Do you have any — can you tell us if 
you have any knowledge that the attitude of the 
North Vietnamese leaders is in fact any different 
from that? 

A. Well, if I understand your question, the 
answer is "No." We assume, though, by their 
presence in Paris and by indirect reports that 
we have received, that there is some interest in 
a negotiated peace. 

Whether this is being done just to mislead us 
or not, there is no way of knowing until we 
proceed a little further down the road. 

Peaceful Resolution of Middle East Problems 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of hoping that 
the four-power meclianism in New York can 
influence the parties in the area. How do you 
expect to influence them without appearing to 
be imposing something on them? 

A. Well, I think the question answers itself. 
There are lots of ways to influence people with- 
out making them do it. I think that the force of 
reasoning and the force of public opinion has 
a lot to do with influencing nations. There is no 
doubt about that — even some of the situations 
here in the United States. So if the world com- 
munity should agree on a certain general for- 
mula for the settlement of the Middle East, 
then I think the governments in that area would 
want to think long and hard before they turned 
it down. 



362 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETTN' 



Now, if you notice in our proposals, we 
believe that somewhere down the road there will 
be — there will have to be some direct negotia- 
tions between the parties and we think that the 
only way you can get a settlement there is to 
have the parties agree on the terms. But I think 
it is pretty obvious that governments are 
influenced by public opmion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to these hig- 
four negotiations, there has been talk on our side 
about great-power guarantees for the bo^inda- 
ries, the access to the loater^vays, and so forth. 
Isn't that lohat toe had the last time? IsnH that 
what blew up in 1967? What makes us think it 
would be more successful now? 

A. Well, the fact that you have an analogy 
of that kind that didn't work doesn't necessarily 
mean that there aren't ways to improve it. When 
we talk about guarantees, obviously we are not — 
we don't have any particular thing in mind at 
the moment in precise terms. "Wliat we are 
thinking of principally are some guarantees, 
probably by the United Nations, which would 
be — which would be more satisfactory, more 
lasting than the previous ones. The fact it hasn't 
worked in the past doesn't mean we can't try 
again. 

Certainly they have worked pretty well in 
Cyprus and in the Congo the United Nations is 
helpful, and it may well be that if we could 
work out a peace settlement we could have some 
guarantees that would be successful. 

I might say in this connection that the most 
important factor in the Middle East and the 
most — the one factor that would guarantee a 
successful result would be a willingness on the 
part of all the nations to say, "We want to live 
in peace" and that "Israel is a nation and has 
a right to exist and will continue to exist and 
we recognize it." There is no reason why the 
problems in the Middle East can't be resolved 
peacefully if all the nations are willing to 
approach it in that spirit. 

Now, in the absence of that spirit, all it is is 
an armistice. If some nations say we want to 
destroy x nation as soon as we are able, that is 
not a peace. That is just an armistice. 

If we can find a way to get the parties to say, 
"Yes, it is to everybody's interest to have peace 
in this area, and we are willing to recognize 
everybody's right to exist, and we are going to 
provide for secure and recognized boundaries," 
then we think the guarantees would be a lot less 
important and necessary. 



Peruvian Claim Against IPC 

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to your state- 
ment on Peru, you said that the IPC has the 
opportunity to go through tJie administrative 
processes to contest the debt. Does this refer 
solely to the $690 million claim, or does this 
include remuneration as well? 

A. I think the process — I am not sure about 
that because this will be up to the lawyers for 
IPC, but I think principally the process will 
refer to the $690 million claim by the Govern- 
ment of Peru agaiast IPC. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this mean that Peru 
has dropped its insistence that IPC deposit the 
$690 million in order to gain the right to appeal 
the clahn? 

A. Well, I am not sure about that. I think 
that the administrative process that I have 
referred to can proceed — at least we think it 
can proceed, and we have been so informed by 
the officials of Peru. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are conflicting opin- 
ions about whether the Soviet Union is, or is not, 
trying for a first-strike capability. As we go 
into SALT [strategic arms limitation talks'] 
talks, what will be the attitude of our Govern- 
ment on that subject? 

A. I am not quite sure of the question. 

Q. Well, in your own mind, are tlie Soviets, 
or are they not, trying for first-strike capability? 

A. Well, let me put it this way. I think some 
of this is a matter of definition. I have difficulty 
in believing that the Soviet Union would initi- 
ate a first strike. I have difficulty believing that 
any nation would initiate a first nuclear strike, 
because any leader or leaders of sound mind 
would know that it probably would result in 
the destruction of mankind. 

On the question of how many missUes it takes 
for a particular capability, I think that is a 
matter for estimates by the experts. Certainly, 
it is difficult to understand why the Soviet 
Union is deploying SS-9's. It is a huge missile, 
25 megatons, and they are deploying them now. 
And I think when we enter the SALT talks, 
one of the first questions we want to raise with 
them is "Why. Why would you have a 25- 
megaton missile?" 

But insofar as whether they are domg it with 
the intention of actually having a first strike, 
I don't believe that. 

The press : Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 



APRIL 28, 1969 



363 



U.S. and Peru To Continue Talks 
on Existing Differences 

Department Statement ^ 

The President of Peru, Major General Juan 
Velasco Alvarado, and the special emissary of 
the President of the United States, John N. 
Irwin, have concluded one phase of their 
conversations. 

The Government of Peru announces that it 
has agreed with the Government of the United 
States to send a mission to Washington to con- 
tinue the conversations with the desire that a 
solution to the existing differences may be 
found. The composition of the Peruvian and 
U.S. teams will soon be announced by the respec- 
tive Governments, as will the date of departure 
of the Peruvian delegation to the United States. 



area. Tlie kind of leadership that is required I 
would describe as having three qualities: the 
quality of courage, tlie quality of wisdom, and 
the quality of moderation. 

And it is those tlu-ee qualities that we in this 
country have seen in you, Your Majesty, 
thi'ough the years. You have been a man of 
courage, and you have captured the imagination 
of our people because of that courage. You have 
been a man of wisdom and you have been a 
man of moderation. 

And for that reason, we look forward to the 
conversations we will have with you and with 
members of your Government in attempting to 
find new avenues that could lead to permanent 
peace in that troubled area of the world. 

We welcome you, then, today as an old friend. 
We welcome you, too, as one with whom we 
look forward to searcliing together for a new 
period of peace and understanding in the Mid- 
dle Eastern area of the world. 



King Hussein I of Jordan 
Visits Washington 

His Majesty Hussein /, King of the Ha-she- 
mite Kingdom of Jordan, made an official visit 
to Washington April 8-10. Folhioing is an 
exchange of greetings between: President Nixon 
and King Hussein at a welcoming ceremony on 
the South Lamn of the White House on April 8, 
together with the text of a joint statement issued 
on April 10. 



EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

White House press release dated April 8 

President Nixon 

As you can tell from the reception you have 
received today, you are among friends. We wel- 
come you again as one who has visited our coun- 
try before, and we say as you come again that 
we think you come at a very appropriate time. 

As we all know, the area of the world in 
which you rule is one that presently has some 
very explosive problems. 

And in order to solve those problems, leader- 
ship is required — leadership from within that 



' Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Apr. 9. 



King Hussein I 

I wish to thank you most sincerely for your 
kind and warm words of welcome. It is indeed 
a privilege for me to be here once again. And I 
know that I am amongst friends. 

Sir, it was on my first visit to the United 
States in 1959, during the term of office of one 
of the greatest men of our times. President 
Eisenhower, that I had the privilege of meeting 
you. And since then I have been proud of the 
fact that you are my friend. 

The relations between our two countries were 
never as strong as they were during that period, 
and it is our smcere hope and desire that they 
grow now stronger than they ever were in the 
past. 

The area from which I come, sir, is a troubled 
area. Thus, I feel the weight of responsibility 
even more as I come here to meet with you, sir, 
to discuss the problems of that area. For within 
the very near future we can either move toward 
our objective, a just and honorable peace in that 
area, or we might, indeed, lose the chance and 
the opportunity to establish peace, a just and 
lasting peace, there. 

I really hope that we will move in the direc- 
tion of peace, because the situation, as explosive 
as it is, holds many dangers, not only to those 
involved m the area but to the world as a whole. 

And what we have sought and what we are 
seeking always is the establishment of a just 
and durable peace in the area ; that all our ener- 



864 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUTJLETIN 



gies and resources be diverted toward building 
the better future that we seek and we feel is 
the right of all in that area. 

I thank you very, very much indeed, sir, for 
your kindness, and I am really so very proud 
and happy to he with you here again. 

Thank you, sir. 



TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT 



tegrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 

The discussions renewed and deepened the 
close and friendly relations which exist between 
the two coimtries. 

His Majesty the King extended an invitation 
to President Nixon to visit the Hashemite King- 
dom of Jordan. The President expressed his 
gratitude for the invitation and said he hoped 
to be able to make tliis visit at an appropriate 
time. 



White House press release dated April 10 

H. M. King Hussein, King of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, visited Washington at 
President Nixon's invitation April 8, 9 and 10. 
During tliis time. His Majesty and members of 
his delegation had friendly and constructive dis- 
cussions on matters of mutual interest and com- 
mon concern with the President, the Secretaries 
of State and Defense and other senior United 
States Government officials. 

The principal topic of the discussion was the 
common United States and Jordanian desire 
for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
The United States informed the Government 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of its 
efforts, bilateral and multilateral, to help bring 
about peace in the Middle East. 

H. M. the King explained that the explosive 
nature of the situation in the Middle East is 
caused by the continued occupation of Jor- 
danian and other Arab territories, and expressed 
his conviction that peace can only be achieved 
by the early withdrawal of the forces of occupa- 
tion in the context of the Security Coimcil Res- 
olution of November 22, 1967.^ 

For its part, the United States called to the 
attention of the Government of Jordan and 
reaffirmed the statement made by Secretary 
Kogers on this point and on other points before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
March 27.^ 

Both the United States and Jordan reaf- 
firmed their strong support for Ambassador 
Jarring's mission and for all the principles and 
provisions of the Security Council Resolution. 
Both Governments recognize the compelling 
need to seek actively a just and lasting peace in 
the area. 

The United States reaffirmed its support for 
the political independence and territorial in- 



' For text, see Bttlletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 
' Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1969, p. 305. 



Twelfth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made hy 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge^ Jiead of the 
U.S. delegation, at the 12th plenary session of 
the new rneetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
April 10. 

Press release 77 dated AprU 10 

Ladies and gentlemen: Your side has often 
said that a solution to the Viet-Nam problem 
must be based on reality. On that point, we 
agree. 

In the last two sessions of these Paris meet- 
ings. Ambassador Walsh and I have tried to 
show what that reality is. The crucial fact is 
that North Viet-Nam is using armed force 
against the Republic of Viet-Nam in order to 
try to take over South Viet-Nam. These North 
Vietnamese forces are invading the territory of 
neighboring states to further this purpose. 
North Vietnamese military forces continue to 
violate international borders and international 
demarcation lines. 

We have described the massive presence of 
North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam. 
We have shown how North Viet-Nam has 
infiltrated its military and subversive forces, 
as well as arms and equipment, through Laos 
and Cambodia and across the demilitarized zone 
into South Viet-Nam. 

Today we submit three representative case 
histories so as to illustrate graphically North 
Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam. 

The 95th Regiment of the North Vietnamese 
Army was one of the first regular North Viet- 
namese Army units to invade South Viet-Nam. 
Elements of that regiment started their move- 
ment south in the autumn of 1964. They infil- 
trated into South Viet-Nam through the western 



APRIL 28, 1969 



365 



demilitarized zone, crossed into Laos, and con- 
tinuing south, finally moved into Kontum 
Province in December 1964. It is noteworthy 
that at that time there were no American combat 
forces in South Viet-Nam. 

Duruig 1965, the 95th North Vietnamese Keg- 
iment operated in Pleiku Province, then in 
Darlac Province, and in Phu Yen Province, 
where it remained from late 1965 until the mid- 
dle of last year. In the summer of 1968, the 95th 
Regiment moved west into sanctuary in Cambo- 
dia to refit, retrain, and receive replacements. 
It then moved southward back into South Viet- 
Nam, where it participated in a series of engage- 
ments south of Due Lap in late September 
1968. Following another withdrawal into 
Cambodia, it moved in November 1968 into war 
zone D northeast of Saigon, where it joined ele- 
ments of the 5th Viet Cong Division. The 95th 
North Vietnamese Regiment has been active in 
your side's recent military offensive. 

Let me now take the case of the 101st Regi- 
ment of the North Vietnamese Army. Elements 
of that regiment began infiltration into South 
Viet-Nam in late 1964. They moved south 
through Laos, arriving in Kontum Province 
early in January 1965. Again, at that time there 
were no United States combat troops in South 
Viet-Nam. 

In November 1965, the 101st Regiment moved 
south from the Second Corps tactical zone 
through Cambodia into the Third Corps tacti- 
cal zone. It has seen action in numerous battles 
in South Viet-Nam. It participated in the 1966 
winter-spring campaign in Binh Long Prov- 
ince. In 1967, it fought repeatedly against 
Allied troops in northern Tay Ninh Province 
and, in early 1968, it moved to the Gia Dinh/ 
Binh Duong border area north of Saigon. 

The 101st Regiment has participated in a 
number of battles since mid-1968. The latest of 
these occurred in southeastern Tay Ninh Prov- 
ince on March 25, 1969. 

During their 4 years in South Viet-Nam, both 
the 95th and the 101st Regiments have suffered 
heavy casualties. To fiill their depleted ranks, 
these units have depended upon the continuing 
infiltration of soldiers from North Viet-Nam. 

The 9th so-called Viet Cong Division pro- 
vides another revealing case study of the ex- 
tent of North Vietnamese involvement in South 
Viet-Nam. In June 1965, the 9th Division was 
formed from Viet Cong units that had been 
under the supervision of North Vietnamese 
cadres for several years. 



Since 1965, the 9th Division has repeatedly 
suffered casualties so serious that North Viet- 
namese officers, noncommissioned officers, and 
foot soldiers were infiltrated to replace southern 
recruits. Accordingly, this so-called Viet Cong 
division became totally dependent on North 
Viet-Nam for its existence and survival as a 
combat unit. 

In the major engagements in the autumn of 
1966 and the spring of 1967, and in the attacks 
on Loc Ninh the following autumn, the 9th 
Division suffered heavy losses which were made 
up by newly infiltrated North Vietnamese 
troops. With many northern recruits, the divi- 
sion managed to participate in the 1968 Tet 
offensive and the attacks of May 1968. In mid- 
1968, the division withdrew to Cambodian 
sanctuaries, from where it has made occasional 
forays into South Viet-Nam. 

Today approximately 80 percent of all per- 
sonnel in the 9th so-called Viet Cong Division 
are North Vietnamese Regular Army soldiers. 

The cases I have just cited are only a small 
additional part of the storj^ We have captured 
documents, photographs, statements of North 
Vietnamese prisoners and defectors, testimony 
of eyewitnesses, diaries, captured weapons and 
equipment, and other evidence. These show with J 
absolute certainty the massive presence of North 1 
Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam — over 
two-thirds of your side's regular combat forces 
in South Viet-Nam are North Vietnamese. They 
show North Vietnamese use of the DMZ and the 
territory of neighboring Laos and Cambodia as 
infiltration routes and bases of operation 
against South Viet-Nam. 

A settlement which does not take these facts 
into account cannot be a settlement based on 
reality. Your side's demand for the withdrawal 
of United States forces from South Viet-Nam 
without any provision for the withdrawal of 
North Vietnamese forces is not realistic. A 
meaningful settlement must include the with- 
drawal from South Viet-Nam into North Viet- 
Nam of the military and subversive forces of 
North Viet-Nam who are in the South. For our 
part, we have made clear our willingness to 
begin the withdrawal of U.S. and Allied forces 
simultaneously with the withdrawal of North 
Vietnamese forces. 

A lasting settlement must also involve a will- 
ingness on the part of North Viet-Nam to re- 
spect the territorial integrity of its neighbors 
and to respect international frontiers and de- 
marcation lines. That is why the United States 



366 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETTN' 



has called for the restoration of the demili- 
tarized zone. That is why the United States has 
called upon North Viet-Nam to respect the 1962 
Geneva agreements on Laos and the territorial 
integrity of Cambodia. 

In addition, the United States has proposed 
that prisoners of war be released at the earliest 
possible date. 

These are specific and concrete proposals 
which are based firmly on the real facts of the 
situation. If you are truly interested in bringing 
the war in Viet-Nam to an early end, you should 
join us in a serious discussion of these proposals. 



Secretary Stans To Visit Europe, Asia 
To Discuss U.S. Trade Policies 

White House press release dated April 4 

The President announced on April 4 that he 
has requested Secretary of Commerce ^Maurice 
H. Stans to undertake a second international 
mission to continue discussion of American 
trade policies abroad. Secretary Stans will leave 
Washington on May 9 and travel to the Far 
East for talks with government and business 
leaders in Tokyo, Japan; Seoul, Korea; Taipei, 
Taiwan ; and the British Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong. He will return to the United States on 
May 18. 

Secretary Stans is currently making prepara- 
tions for a seven-nation Western European 
tour which begins April 11 and extends through 
April 26. While in Europe he will visit Brus- 
sels, Belgiimi ; The Hague, Netherlands ; Bonn, 
Gennany; Geneva, Switzerland; Milan and 
Rome, Italy; Paris, France; and London, 
England. 

The President has requested Secretary Stans 
to visit the Far East shortly after his return 
from Europe in order that he may convey to 
several of our trading partners there, as he will 
in Europe, the administration's conunitment to 
expansionary trade policies throughout the 
world, together with our concern over barriers 
to U.S. exports. His talks will cover the whole 
broad range of trade and investment issues 
and will include the textile problem. 

The Department of Commerce will announce 
the detailed itinerary of Secretary Stans' mis- 
sion to the Far East, together with the names 
of those who will travel with him in the official 
party, as soon as they are compiled. 



William W. Scranton To Head 
U.S. Delegation to Intelsat 

White House press release dated April 8 

The President on April 8 appointed former 
Governor William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania 
as U.S. Representative to the Intelsat Confer- 
ence (Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive 
Arrangements for the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Consortium) with the 
personal rank of Ambassador. Governor Scran- 
ton will serve as chairman of the United States 
delegation to the conference, replacing Ambas- 
sador Leonard H. Marks, who resigned at the 
close of the first session of the conference, 
March 21. 

Sixty-seven member nations of Intelsat were 
represented at the 4- week session; an addi- 
tional 29 countries participated as observers, 
among them the Soviet Union. The conference 
is now scheduled to reconvene in Washington 
next November 18 to complete the drafting of 
a definitive agreement for a single global com- 
mercial satellite system. During the interim 
period a committee of the conference will under- 
take preparatory work. 

Intelsat operates four communications satel- 
lites in synchronous orbits over the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans. Global coverage will be 
achieved with the launching of a satellite over 
the Indian Ocean scheduled for later this year. 
The member nations own the system in un- 
divided shares. The Communications Satellite 
Corporation serv&s as system manager on behalf 
of the consortium. 

"Intelsat is the first pioneering effort in the 
peaceful uses of outer space for all nations," 
Governor Scranton said. "Since 1964 it has been 
operating under an interim agreement between 
nations. Our task is to establish definitive ar- 
rangements for the organization, so that it can 
extend low-cost, high-quality communications 
to all parts of the world. One can only guess at 
the impact on man's future of truly universal 
world communications, but we know that its 
effect will be for the good and that it will be 
far-reaching. I am delighted to have this oppor- 
tunity to play a part in this important under- 
taking." 

Abbott Washburn has been appointed deputy 
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Intelsat 
Conference. He served as Deputy Director of 
the United States Information Agency fi'om 
1954 to 1960. 



APRIL 28, 1969 



367 



World Weather Program — Plan for U.S. Participation 



President Nixon transmitted to the Congress 
the first annvxil plan for U.8. participation in 
the World Weather Program on March 13. Fol- 
lowing is the text of the Presidenfs letter of 
transmittal, together with the preface and the 
first three sections of the five-section report} 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

To the Congress of the United States : 

I am pleased to transmit to you, in accordance 
with Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 
90th Congi-ess, the first annual plan for United 
States participation in the World Weather Pro- 
gram. This docimient describes the long-range 
goals of the World Weather Program and the 
activities in support of that program which 
have been planned by eight Federal agencies for 
Fiscal Year 1970. The budget figures shown in 
this report are consistent with those wliich ap- 
peared in the budget submitted to the Congress 
on January 15, 1969. 

I commend this report to you and hope you 
win give it your careful attention, for it de- 
scribes activities which can contribute in im- 
portant ways to the quality of American life. 
The World Weather Program promises, for ex- 
ample, to produce earlier and more accurate 
weather forecasts than we now receive. It is also 
exploring the feasibility of large-scale weather 
modifications. Because so much of our social and 
economic life is significantly influenced by 
weather conditions, it is important that we en- 
courage those advances in weather prediction 
and control which our scientists now foresee. 

Tliis project, and our role in it, also have great 
political significance. For the World Weather 



' A limited number of copies of the 26-page illustrated 
report, World Weather Program — Plan for Fiscal Year 
1970, are available upon request from International 
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520 ; the report also Is for 
sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (45 
cents). 



Program, growing out of the United Nations 
initiatives in the early 1960's, has developed into 
a most impressive example of international co- 
operation. On a scale never attempted until this 
decade, scientists and governments in many 
countries are joining hands across national 
boundaries to serve the entire human commu- 
nity. Their example should be instructive for all 
of us as we pursue lasting peace and order for 
our world. 

This report "talks about the weather," but it 
demonstrates that we can do far more about our 
weather than merely talk about it. I believe that 
the plans for American participation which are 
outlined here reflect the sense of both the Con- 
gress and the Executive Branch of our govern- 
ment that the United States should give its full 
support to the World Weather Program. 



Richard Nixon 



The White House, 
March IS, 1969. 



EXCERPTS FROM REPORT 



Preface 

On May 29, 1968, the 90th Congress, through Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 67, stated that the United States 
should participate in and give full support to the World 
Weather Program. The Congress found that: 

— unprecedented scientific opportunities and tech- 
nological possibilities exist to improve the weather 
services of the United States by increasing the accu- 
racy and extending the time range of weather 
predictions, 

— the improved weather services would yield social 
and economic benefits of great magnitude to the people 
of the United States through greater protection of 
life and property, and Increased efficiency in the many 
economic pursuits which are sensitive to weather, and 

— the global effort needed to bring about the im- 
proved weather services for the United States can be 
more effectively and economically carried out through 
a cooperative international effort. 

The Congress, by Section III, Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 67, requested that on or before March 1 
of each year the President transmit to it the intema- 



368 



department of state bulletin 



tional meteorological activities planned on the World 
Weather Program by the United States for the next 
fiscal year. 

In response to the Resolution, the President on 
July 5, 1968, Instructed the Federal agencies involved 
(Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, 
Department of Interior, Department of State, Depart- 
ment of Transportation, Atomic Energy Commission, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and 
National Science Foundation) to work with the De- 
partment of Commerce as lead agency in moving for- 
ward with the World Weather Program. 

This report Is in response to the request of Congress. 
It describes the planned efforts of the Federal agencies 
for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1970 (Section IV), together 
with the background (Section I), the goals (Section 
II), and the overall plan (Section III) of the program. 

1. INTRODUCTION 

The President, speaking of the World Weather Pro- 
gram on April 3, 1967, said : "For centuries man's 
Inability to predict weather far enough ahead hag 
caused incalculable hiunan suffering. . . . The proposed 
system will, through International cooperation, lead to 
improved weather forecasting and protection of life 
and property." ' 



Socio-Economic Impact 

Despite having one of the world's most advanced 
weather services, our nation each year suffers cata- 
strophic losses of life and property as a result of such 
weather calamities as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and 
blizzards. In 1966, for example, the United States lost 
approximately a thousand lives and over one biUion 
dollars to severe weather. This toll could have been 
substantially reduced by adequate warnings and proper 
precautions. 

The Impact of the normal day-to-day, week-to-week, 
and month-to-month variabilities of the weather on our 
economic pursuits is much more subtle but no less pro- 
found. In our commerce and industry, weather plays a 
role in the eflSciency and effectiveness of operations. Al- 
though weather is in some areas the primary factor 
affecting an operation, more commonly It is a secondary, 
yet significant, factor. 

The importance of a national weather service rests 
upon its overall Impact on the total spectrum of the 
Nation's socio-economic activities rather than Its over- 
whelming Importance to a single activity. 

In agriculture, the losses due to weather mount Into 
the billions of dollars annually. These losses stem from 
a wide range of conditions : frost or hall destroying the 
crops of orchards and truck farms; low temperatures 
and blizzards destroying livestock ; Improper timing of 
irrigation reducing the potential yield of thousands of 
acres ; unexpected rains during harvesting destroying 
the value of the crops ; excess or lack of rain necessitat- 
ing multiple plantings in the spring. These are only a 
few examples of situations in which the availability of 
more accurate and longer range forecasts would permit 
appropriate action to aUeviate substantially the 
enormous losses Involved. 



" For a statement by President Johnson, see Buii.ETirf 
of Apr. 24, 1967, p. 658. 



The construction industry loses over a billion dollars 
a year due to weather. Strong winds and heavy rains 
damage Incomplete structures. Material, such as con- 
crete, is spoOed by freezing temperatures or rain. Labor 
Is Inefficiently used and work schedules are disrupted. 
More accurate long-range forecasts would permit more 
useful planning. 

In addition to the many lives lost In accidents, the 
transportation industry loses hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually to weather. More accurate and longer 
range forecasts would permit substantial savings 
through optimum planning of routes of U.S. ships on 
the high seas ; more efficient scheduling of aircraft 
operations ; and safer highway operations. 

The power and energy Industries are affected by 
weather. Small errors in the forecast average tempera- 
ture for a large city 4 or 5 days In advance can cause 
the demand for gas to differ from the anticipated con- 
sumption by millions of cubic feet, creating excessive 
demands on the supporting pipelines. Similar problems 
are encountered by the producers and distributors of 
other forms of energy. More accurate and longer range 
forecasts could reduce the need for expensive storage 
facilities which are now required to accommodate 
unforeseen surges in demand. 

The fishing industry Is also affected by weather — 
both in safety and efficiency. More accurate and longer 
range predictions would provide information needed 
to identify areas where conditions for fishing are likely 
to be favorable. The fleets could then be directed to 
these locations. 

Retailing, water resources management, and recrea- 
tion are other examples of activities in which the safety 
and efficiency of operations can be increased by Im- 
proved weather predictions. 

The economies of other nations are similarly influ- 
enced by the weather. Among the developing nations, 
the weather exercises a profound influence on agricul- 
tural activities that are vital to economic survival. 

The provision of improved weather services to the 
people of the United States will require many actions 
such as improvement of short-range forecasts and storm 
warnings and improved dissemination of forecasts and 
warnings to the user. However, It Is clear that the Im- 
provement of medium- and long-range forecasts could 
contribute significantly to reduction of weather-related 
human misery and economic loss. This Improvement 
requires a deeper scientific understanding of the atmos- 
phere and the exploitation of recent advances in 
technology which is only possible through successful 
execution of the World Weather Program. 

Technological Breakthrough 

Two striking technological advances — the electronic 
computer and the meteorological satellite — have 
created major opportunities for a breakthrough in the 
quality of the weather services of the United States. 

The electronic computer permitted, for the first time, 
weather predictions to be made directly from the com- 
plex set of mathematical equations which describe the 
present and future states of the atmosphere. 

In the early 1950's, U.S. scientists formulated simpli- 
fied mathematical models of the atmosphere and vrith 
the aid of the computer prepared predictions of the 
wind and pressure field over the United States for one 
level (20,000 feet) in the atmosphere. These computer 
predictions, which extended only for periods of 24 to 36 



APRIL 28, 1969 



369 



hours, permitted a substantial increase in the accuracy 
of the forecasts for the United States. Today, many 
nations, large and small, use the computer to prepare 
basic weather predictions. 

As the capacity of the computer increased throughout 
the 1950's, mathematical models of the atmosphere be- 
came more sophisticated. Today a much improved 
model covering the entire Northern Hemisphere is being 
used for production of daily forecasts three days in 
advance. Extension to a 4th day in advance will be 
implemented soon. The results of this effort have sub- 
stantially improved forecasts for many users. In addi- 
tion, research models are being tested which deal simul- 
taneously with many levels in the atmosphere over the 
entire globe. 

These models were used by the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) to establish how far into the future 
weather predictions can be made. Their results indicate 
that with more sophisticated atmospheric models and 
a much improved global data network, weather fore- 
casts similar to today's forecast for 2 or 3 days could, 
in principle, be made for periods of up to 2 weeks. 
More general predictions of selected weather elements 
may be possible for considerably longer periods. 

THE SATELLITE 

The satellite provided a new and revolutionary tool 
with which to obtain many of the global observations 
which are essential to predict the future state of the 
atmosphere. The first TIROS meteorological satellite 
launched in 1960 was equipped to obtain cloud photo- 
graphs of only a portion of the earth. This capability 
was rapidly expanded with the successful launch by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration of 
Nimbus I in 1964 and TIROS IX in 1965, each of which 
provided global data. In 1965, the Environmental Sci- 
ence Services Administration established the TIROS 
Operational Satellite System to provide routine global 
coverage of cloud systems. Eight operational satellites 
have been launched to date. 



Program Rationale 

The largest single ohsfacle in applying fully our 
present scientific capaMlity and in seeking the scien- 
tific understanding required for long-range weather 
predictions is the lack of adequate global weather data. 
Available iceather data is barely adequate oi^er 20 
percent of the earth. The remaining SO percent, mostly 
over the oceans, remains inadequately observed. 

The technology to obtain these observations, e-ipe- 
cially over the oceans, presents formidable problems. 
However, with the use of buoys, ships, balloons, air- 
craft, and satellites, a weather system with the full 
potential to observe and collect daily comprehensive 
data about the atmosphere of the entire globe can be 
developed. 

The system cannot be implemented by any single 
nation. This fact has long been clearly recognized by 
the leaders of all natioiis; international cooperation in 
meteorology has thus been a tradition for a century. 

THE CALL FOR ACTION 

This, combined with the scientific and technological 
advances, prompted the President of the United States 
to include in his proposal before the United Nations 
in 1961 an international effort on the weather predic- 



tion problem. The United Nations responded with two 
resolutions, one in 1961 and one in 1962, in which it 
called upon the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU) to develop measures to improve 
weather forecasting capabilities and to advance our 
knowledge of the basic physical forces that determine 
climates. 

THE RESPONSE 

The WMO responded with the concept of the World 
Weather Watch ( W\VW), a system which would bring 
the global atmosphere under surveillance and provide 
for the rapid collection and exchange of the weather 
data as well as the dissemination of weather products 
from centralized processing centers. It recommended 
that the Watch rest on new technology, as well as the 
traditional technology used in meteorology. 

The WMO, along with the ICSU, recognized the need 
for an intensified research program concerned with 
the physical processes governing atmospheric motions 
and their formulation in mathematical models. The 
ICSU formulated such a program, now called the Global 
Atmospheric Research Program (GARP). 

The World Weather Watch and the Global Atmos- 
pheric Research Program together constitute the World 
Weather Program. 



Federal Agency Responsibilities 

The United States has vigorously participated in the 
study of and planning for the World Weather Program. J 
The NAS took the lead in bringing to bear the scien- I 
tific capabilities of the United States to specify more 
precisely the scientific opportunities that would be 
foreseen. Within the government, the plan for U.S. 
participation was developed through the joint efforts 
of the Federal agencies and is presently coordinated 
through the Federal Committee for Meteorological 
Services and Supporting Research and its Interagency 
Committee for the World Weather Program. 

Several Federal agencies are involved in this pro- 
gram. Their responsibilities are as follows : 

— The Department of Commerce : Provides a focal 
point (Office of World Weather Systems, ESSA) to 
coordinate our nation's efforts in this program, imple- 
ments those service improvements in the existing inter- 
national weather system for which the United States 
assumes responsibility, develops new technology as 
related to its responsibilities, and cooperates with the 
National Science Foundation to stimulate general cir- 
culation research. 

— The Department of State : Coordinates relations 
with the World Meteorological Organization, assists the 
less developed nations in improving their national 
weather services, and develops appropriate bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements to further international 
participation. 

— The National Science Foundation : Stimulates re- 
search on general circulation of the atmosphere among 
nongovernment scientists, and promotes the education 
and training of atmospheric scientists. 

— The National Aeronautics and Space Administra- 
tion : Develops the new technology required for an 
economical global weather system as related to its 
responsibilities. 



370 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETnf 



— The Department of Defense : Supports the World 
Weather Watch activities through its ongoing meteor- 
ological programs and, as appropriate, provides plan- 
ning information on meteorological assistance pro- 
grams. 

— The Department of Transportation : Develops 
ocean data buoys and conducts tests of the hazard of 
horizontal sounding balloon systems to aircraft. 

— The Atomic Energy Commission : Conducts re- 
search complementary to GARP data-gathering 
projects. 

— The Department of Interior : Conducts research 
complementary to GARP data-gathering projects. 

All of the above agencies a.ssist in the planning and 
provide operational and logistical support to GARP 
data-gathering projects. 



2. GOALS 

To meet the needs of the people of the United States 
for improved weather services and to capture the 
scientific and technological opportunities that now have 
been foreseen to improve these services, the U.S. goals 
for the World Weather Program are to : 

— increase the accuracy of weather predictions, 
— extend the time range of weather predictions, and 
— determine the degree to which large-scale weather 
modiiication and climate modification are possible. 

The successful execution of the World Weather Pro- 
gram will require a previously unparalleled degree of 
cooperation and collaboration among the nations of the 
world. It will demonstrate the extent to which benefits 
can be derived from a major cooperative international 
effort in an area where cooperation has been a tradi- 
tion for a century and will serve as another building 
block for establishing world order and peace. 



3. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 

To achieve the goals of the United States and other 
nations in the World Weather Program requires : 

— the e.stablishment of an operational global weather 
observing, communicating, and processing system — the 
World Weather Watch ; 

— the conduct of a comprehensive program of re- 
search focused on acquiring a better scientific under- 
standing of the physical and dynamic processes of the 
atmosphere to be incorporated into the mathematical 
models — the Global Atmospheric Research Program ; 
and 

— the development of new technology for observing 
the atmosphere and communicating and processing 
weather data and products. 

The present international weather observing system 
is inadequate to meet the needs of the U.S. weather 
services in predicting the future state of the atmos- 
phere. The area from which observations are needed 
increases with the time range of the forecast. Even for 
forecasts for periods of 1 or 2 days for the Central U.S. 
observations are needed in parts of the Atlantic Ocean 
and much of the Pacific. For predictions of more than 
a few days, observations over the entire Northern 
Hemisphere are required, and for a week or more in 
advance, global observations are essential. The obser- 



vations must not only be made at the surface of the 
earth but must extend far up into the atmosphere, even 
for short-range predictions. The atmospheric elements 
that must be observed include wind, temperature, hu- 
midity, and pressure at many levels. For longer range 
predictions, observations are required over the entire 
globe and from the upper parts of the oceans. 

Today in the Northern Hemisphere the observational 
network is adequate only over land surfaces. Over the 
oceans a sparse network, providing principally surface 
observations with only a very few observations above 
the surface and below the surface, is in existence. The 
present international communication system is also 
inadequate. The limited data available are frequently 
delayed and many errors occur in transmission to proc- 
essing centers. 

The GARP includes both theoretical studies and 
field observation projects all aimed at the develop- 
ment of a capability to make longer range weather pre- 
dictions. The theoretical research should focus upon the 
development of computer models which simulate at- 
mospheric motions with high fidelity, and can best be 
accomplished through a concerted and coordinated 
effort by the world's scientific community. The field 
projects will study atmospheric physical processes 
presently not understood adequately for incorporation 
into computer models. Some of the field projects can 
be done effectively by a single nation. Others will 
require the joint efforts of a number of nations. 

The most expensive part of any weather service is 
simply observing the weather. This is particularly true 
of global observations such as required for the WWW 
and for a global research experiment. A substantial in- 
vestment in new observing technology is necessary to 
the achievement of an adequate and economically fea- 
sible system, especially for the ocean areas. The new 
technology developmental effort focuses on remote sens- 
ing and data collection from meteorological satellites, 
ocean data buoys, horizontal sounding balloons, and 
improved equipment for taking observations from all 
types of ships. 

Some parts of the Program can only be achieved 
through the cooperative efforts of the nations of the 
world — a fact recognized by the leaders of all nations. 
For example, the WWW will require the installation 
and operation of compatible equipment by all of the 
participating countries. 

The U.S. activity in the World Weather Program ia 
structured so as to result in maximum benefit for the 
people of the United States. Practically all of the ac- 
tions envisaged under the World Weather Program 
would be necessary for improvement of our domestic 
weather services. However, by cooperating with other 
nations we have the potential for achieving re.sults 
far beyond those that would be within the capability of 
this country alone. 



World Weather Watch Implementation 

The WMO, a specialized agency of the United Na- 
tions with 132 Members, coordinates the planning and 
implementation of the WWW internationally. At the 
quadrennial meeting of the WMO Congress in 1967, 
a plan for the implementation of certain key aspects 
of the WWW for the period 1968-1971 was adopted. It 
will take approximately a decade to bring the WWW 
into full being. The implementation program will pro- 



APRIL 28, 1969 



371 



ceed in 4-year phases. The first phase extends through 
1971 and the second phase from 1972-1975. 

The first-phase WWW implementation plan is de- 
signed to remedy the most critical deficiencies in the 
uitemational weather system through the use of readily 
available, proven techniques, equipment, and proce- 
dures. Concurrently, during this period a concerted 
effort will be made to develop new technology, espe- 
cially for observing the atmosphere, for incorporation 
into the second phase. Careful consideration has been 
given to the nature of first-phase implementation to 
permit an orderly incorporation of new technology as 
it becomes available later. 

While the planning of an international system should 
be carried out internationally, it must be implemented 
by individual nations. Therefore, the WMO Congress 
agreed that those aspects for the implementation of the 
WWW which fall within national boundaries are the 
responsibility of the nation itself. Implementation over 
ocean areas and in outer space will be through the 
voluntary participation of the nations. 

VOLUNTABT ASSISTANCE PBOQBAM 

The success of the first-phase WWW plan depends 
on improving the observation and communication facil- 
ities in many less developed nations. Since these facili- 
ties will benefit all nations, it is important to provide 
requisite assistance to make improvements in these 
countries. The Members of the WMO accordingly estab- 
lished a Voluntary Assistance Program (VAP) to assist 
less developed countries to fulfill their obligations in 
their territories. This assistance will be provided only 
when bilateral programs, and such multilateral pro- 
grams as the United Nations Development Program, 
are not sufficient. The developing countries will be 
required to provide local costs. 

TKAININ8 

A program to train x)ersonnel for the WWW Is mov- 
ing forward internationally through the United Na- 
tions Development Program and the WMO and its 
VAP. Observers and technicians are being trained. 
Education programs are provided for forecasters and 
research scientists. These efforts are contributing sig- 
nificantly to the training and education of personnel 
to operate meteorological facilities. 

WOBLD WEATHER WATCH OBSEBVATIONS — FIBST PHASE 

The plan approved by the WlIO Congress for 1968 
through 1971 is to remedy the more critical deficiencies 
over land areas and the oceans through extension of 
conventional observation networks and the Increased 
use of observational satellites. It is planned to achieve 
an average minimum network spacing of 600 nautical 
miles for upper-air stations over all continental regions 
and ocean regions with suitably distributed islands ; 
over open oceans areas, average effective network spac- 
ing of approximately 1,000 nautical miles will be 
established. 

To meet the objectives over the land areas, the plan 
requires the establishment or upgrading of 131 stations. 
The network within the United States meets the mini- 
mum criteria, and only 3 stations in the Pacific Trust 



Territories must be established. To meet the objectives 
over the open oceans, 100 additional merchant ships 
must be equipped to acquire surface and upper-air 
observations. The United States has equipped 15 ships 
and plans to equip additional ships in accord with the 
WWW plans. In addition, the United States will im- 
prove its operational meteorological satellite system to 
obtain both day and night cloud photographs and the 
temperature at the surface of the earth or tops of clouds. 

WORLD WEATHER WATCH DATA PEOCESSING FIRST PHASE 

The processing of meteorological data under the 
WWW international plan will take place at three levels. . 
World Meteorological Centers will prepare weather i 
analyses and predictions on a global basis utilizing " 
modern facilities centering around high-speed elec- 
tronic computers. Regional Meteorological Centers will 
be established to prepare analyses and predictions for 
more limited regions of the earth. The third level of 
processing, the National Meteorological Centers, will 
prepare the predictions needed by the users of weather 
information within their own country. 

World Meteorological Centers are located at Wash- 
ington, Moscow, and Melbourne. These Centers are al- 
ready in operation and will only need to be upgraded 
to prepare the full range of global weather products 
specified in the international plan. The Centers will be 
staffed, operated, and funded by the host nation. The 
World Meteorological Center at Washington will need 
to expand its computer facilities to prepare global 
analyses and predictions instead of the hemispheric 
predictions now being made, and will continue to im- 
prove the predictions. The United States plans to use 
its Tropical Meteorological Center at Miami as one 
of the 22 Regional Meteorological Centers called for in 
the international plan. This Center is to upgrade its 
capabilities to provide analyses and predictions for the 
tropical ocean areas as well as to the nations in the 
Caribbean area and northern South America. 

WOBLD WEATHEE WATCH TELECOMMTJITICATIONS FIBST 

PHASE 

The present international communications system, 
largely based on HF radio teletype, Is inadequate. The 
International plan for 1968-1971 includes installation 
of a reliable global communications system intercon- 
necting all continents with sufficient capacity to ex- 
change meteorological data and products produced by 
the World Meteorological Centers. In addition, regional 
and national communications systems will be upgraded ■ 
to Insure the timely fiow of data to processing centers. I 

The global communications system will join the three 
World Meteorological Centers and at least one regional 
telecommunications facility on each continent. The 
WIMO has established the technical standards for im- 
plementation of the commtmication links and terminals. 
Funding for the links is shared by the nations at the 
terminals. The United States has joint responsibility 
for establishing and operating the links from Washing- 
ton to Brazil, Western Europe, and Japan. The link 
to Western Europe has already been established, a low- 
speed link to Brazil will be established early in 1969, 
and the link to Japan is planned in late 1969. 



372 



DEPARTMENT" OF STATE BULLETIN 



Global Atmospheric Research Program 

The GARP involves the study of those aspects of 
atmospheric motions and processes which must be bet- 
ter understood to make more accurate and longer range 
weather predictions. 

The program consists of two major efforts: (1) 
theoretical research on physical processes of the 
atmosphere and on the development of models which 
simulate atmospheric motions with greater fidelity; 
and (2) field observational projects aimed at provid- 
ing the requisite data needed for the theoretical re- 
search and the development of computer models. 

Internationally, a unique mechanism has been estab- 
lished to coordinate GARP, bringing together the 
ICSU — the nongovernmental scientific body — and the 
WMO — the intergovernmental coordinating body. A 
permanent joint planning staff and committee are 
charged with the coordination of the theoretical re- 
search required and the scientific design of field proj- 
ects. The implementation of the large-scale field activ- 
ities requiring the joint effort of many nations will be 
carried out through the WMO. 

The NAS of the United States ha.? been requested by 
the government to formulate and recommend the 
national scientific program which is required to meet 
the objectives of GARP. The Academy has established 
a committee for this purpose, as well as to provide 
advice to the government on the World Weather 
Program. 

ATMOSPHEBIC DYNAMICS AND MODEUNG 

Most of the research required to develop better com- 
puter models center around the manner in which energy 
is put into, taken out of, and redistributed within the 
atmosphere : 

— The interaction between atmosphere and the ocean 
and earth needs precise understanding, since much of 
the energy received from the sun is first absorbed at 
the surface and then released to the atmosphere. 

— The dissipation of the energy of the large-scale 
motions of the atmosphere needs more exploration. A 
familiar manifestation of this dissipation is the turbu- 
lence encountered by jet aircraft. 

— Thunderstorms and cumulus clouds carry heat up- 
ward in the atmosphere. A better understanding of the 
convective process is required both for computer model- 
ing of the energetics of the atmosphere and for im- 
proved forecasting of precipitation, tornadoes, and 
other severe weather. 

— Tropical circulations need careful exploration to 
permit more accurate modeling of the effects of the 
heat energy of the vast tropical regions on the world's 
weather and to improve forecasting of hurricanes and 
other tropical storms. 

The formulation of Improved atmospheric computer 
models is essential to the success of the World Weather 
Program. The effort must focus on the more precise 
incorporation of the physical processes that determine 
the evolution of the state of the atmosphere, on the 
further development of models which treat the ocean 
and the atmosphere as a single physical system, and 
on the further development of mathematical computa- 



tional procedures used in the many iterative calcula- 
tions made in preparing predictions for extended 
periods of time. To carry this effort forward effectively 
wiU require much larger and faster computers than 
presently available. 

HELD OBSEBVATIONAI. PEOQEAMS 

Field projects are presently being formulated, na- 
tionally and internationally. These projects are struc- 
tured so that, to the maximum extent possible, the 
efforts can be carried out by individual nations. How- 
ever, it is recognized that international efforts will be 
required for the larger experiments. 

The field experiments are divided into two categories : 
those which focus on specific physical processes on a 
local and regional basis, and those which are global. 

BOIUEX 

The current U.S. effort Is called the Barbados Ocean- 
ographic and Meteorological Experiment (BOMEX). 
BOMEX will take place during May, June, and July 
1969, immediately to the east of the island of Barbados. 
In addition to the observation of the exchange of 
momentum, heat, and moisture at the ocean-atmosphere 
interface, the experiment wiU also involve a prelimi- 
nary study of tropical circulations, the time and space 
variation of oceanographic parameters, exchange rates 
of radioactive nuclides between air and sea and certain 
characteristics of atmospheric radiation transfer. Ap- 
proximately 20 aircraft, 10 buoys, and 12 ships from 
various Federal agencies and universities will be used 
as the platforms from which to collect the observa- 
tions. ... It is the largest joint experiment ever con- 
ducted by the meteorological and oceanographic 
communities and could not be carried out by any single 
agency within the government. Participating agencies 
include the Departments of Commerce, Defense, In- 
terior, State, and Transportation, the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration, Atomic Energy 
Commission, and National Science Foundation. In addi- 
tion, nongovernment agencies participating in BOMEX 
Include the National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR) and over 10 universities. 

Tropical Projects 

Projects focusing on the manner in which tropical 
disturbances are formed and the role of cumulus con- 
vection in redistributing energy In the atmosphere are 
in an early planning stage. The international scientific 
committee has recommended that these experiments be 
carried out in the middle 1970's. They will involve ob- 
servations over the sizable areas of the tropics. 

Many of these experiments require very precise meas- 
urements of wind direction and speed, temperature, and 
moisture. Further development of improved sensor sys- 
tems is required for the proper conduct of these 
experiments. 

Olohal Experiments 

The global experiments are required to provide a set 
of data for research on and testing of improved mathe- 
matical models of the atmosphere. These are planned 
to last for finite periods, up to 1 year, and involve sub- 
stantial expansion of the observational network of the 



APRIL 28, 1969 



373 



www. A preliminary global experiment has been rec- 
ommended for sometime during the mid 1970's by the 
international planning group. The global experiment 
which meets the entire set of data requirements does 
not appear feasible until the later 1970's and requires 
extensive development of sensors operating from ships, 
buoys, and satellites. Therefore, for both experiments, 
an intensive program to develop improved sensors and 
the associated platforms for obtaining global observa- 
tions is planned for the early 1970's. 



System and Technology Development 

The World Weather Program calls for the implemen- 
tation of a total system in which many types of obser- 
vations from many types of platforms made by many 
nations combine systematically to meet the data re- 
quirements of global forecasting and of research to 
improve it. 

Present technology can, in principle, provide the ob- 
servations and communications required, but at pro- 
hibitive cost for equipment and staff. New technology, 
not yet developed for operational use, offers potentially 
greater precision in observations over the entire globe 
at significantly lower operating cost. Many of the new 
concepts center around the earth-orbiting satellite as 
a platform for remotely sensing the atmosphere and 
ocean, for global communications to exchange data 
and weather products, and for the collection of observa- 
tions from remote and automatic platforms floating on 
the oceans or in the atmosphere. In conjunction with 
the satellite system, the development of horizontal 
sounding balloons, ocean data buoys, and sensors for 
ships and aircraft will be pursued vigorously. 



COORDINATION 

Coordination of the technical developmental pro- 
grams of the nations of the world is handled by the 
WMO, assisted by the Joint ICSU/WMO Planning 
Group and Committee. Coordination of the space pro- 
grams of the nations is carried out through the ICSU 
Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). The WMO 
coordinates the system activities required for the design 
of the WWW, but relies very heavily upon Members for 
the execution of specific analyses and designs. 

Due to the advanced nature of the developments re- 
quired by the WWW and the research experiments, only 
a limited number of Member states are able to make 
substantial contributions. In addition to the United 
States, a number of other nations are puri?uing an 
extensive technology development program. Meteoro- 
logical satellites are being developed by both the USSR 
and France. Buoys are being developed in a number of 
countries, including USSR, Norway, and Germany. 
Remote sensing devices for operation on satellites or 
other platforms are being developed in the United 
Kingdom and USSR. Automatic weather stations are 
being developed in many nations. 

Because international development projects are 
somewhat difficult to manage and execute, bilateral 
arrangements are favored. The joint effort between the 
United States and France to test a satellite/horizontal 
sounding balloon system is a prime example of such an 
arrangement. 



SATELLITES 

The U.S. research and development on meteorological 
satellites is carried out primarily by the NASA and to 
a more limited extent by the Department of Commerce. 
In addition to producing operational satellites, the 
NASA has developed the Nimbus spacecraft for the 
testing of new sensors in polar orbits and uses the 
Application Technology Satellite (ATS), which was 
developed primarily to test new space application con- 
cepts and techniques, as a platform for testing meteoro- 
logical sensors from synchronous altitudes. Two 
Nimbus and two ATS spacecraft have already been 
successfully flown. Additional flights are planned in 
the coming years. 

Camera systems for observing cloud cover of the 
earth are already operational. Improved systems have 
been tested on Nimbus and ATS. The first satellite test 
of sensors operating in the infrared portion of the 
spectrum for determining the vertical profile of tem- 
perature and humidity in the atmosphere is scheduled 
for the flight of Nimbus B-2 in 1969. These sensor sys- 
tems will provide data in clear areas but are limited in 
cloudy regions. Advanced versions of these sensors will 
be tested on the Nimbus D spacecraft to be launched 
in 1970. Sensors operating in the microwave portion 
of the spectrum, and thus only partially affected by 
clouds, are now under development for flight test in 
the following Nimbus E spacecraft. 

Sequential cloud photos taken from ATS satellites 
show a remarkable potential for determining winds 
from the motion of clouds. Future satellites at syn- 
chronous altitudes, such as ATS, will carry infrared 
sensors for an improved capability of nighttime cloud 
detection. 

Communication equipment for the collection of ob- 
servations from remote platforms has also been flown 
on ATS and will be tested on Nimbus B-2. With this 
equipment, instrumented drifting balloons and buoys 
and itinerant ships can be interrogated and located, 
and their data relayed rapidly to processing centers for 
analyses. Development is actively being pursued. 

BUOYS 

The development of the ocean buoy for acquisition 
of oceanographic and meteorological observations has 
been proceeding in the United States for a number of 
years. Several buoys, such as the Navy's Nomad and 
Monster, have been developed, but further major 
developmental effort is required in order to provide 
suitable operational systems. Automatic data buoys 
may provide a cost effective means of collecting data 
within the oceans as well as on the surface, and thereby 
provide essential information in the air-sea interaction 
zone so important to more effective weather and ocean 
predictions. In addition, recent technological develop- 
ments indicate that observations up to 20,000 feet in 
the atmosphere may be possible from such buoys, thus 
covering the lower section of the atmosphere where 
satellite observations are of limited value. 

The Department of Transportation (Coast Guard) 
has been assigned lead agency responsibility for con- 
ducting research, development, testing and evaluation 
to permit the implementation of national data buoy 
systems responsive to broad national needs for marine 
atmospheric and oceanic data. The Coast Guard plans 



374 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



to undertake a research and development effort in FY 
1970 that is directed toward testing of a prototype data 
buoy network of some 35 buoys, with necessary support 
facilities, along the coasts of North America and in 
the deep oceans. 

HORIZONTAL SOUNDING BALLOONS 

Horizontal sounding balloons offer considerable 
promise for use in the WWW and the GARP. These 
super-pressure balloons fly with the winds at essentially 
constant height in the atmosphere. When equipped with 
temperature and humidity sensors, interrogated and 
located from a satellite, they are capable of providing 
data not otherwise obtainable. 

The NCAR has been flying super-pressure balloons in 
the Southern Hemisphere to determine expected life- 
time and to develop the overall technology to an opera- 
tional state. Some have lasted over 1 year and some 
have circled the earth many times. France has an ex- 
tensive program to develop a balloon and associated 
satellite system. France plans an experiment to test the 
balloon/satellite system and provide experimental data 
for research in the Southern Hemisphere with 500 bal- 
loons during 1971. 

An intensive development program is required to 
bring the balloon to an operational state. The effort 
should focus on balloon materials and fabrication 
techniques and the lightweight simple electronic and 
sensor packages. 

Formulation of a system design which incorporates 
an eflicient and effective array of the platforms de- 
scribed is a formidable problem. Design for the second 
phase of the WWW is now being prepared and must 
be completed before 1971 so that the implementation 
plan for the second phase can be approved at the 6th 
Quadrennial WMO Congress in the spring of 1971. An 
inten.sified U.S. effort on all of the platforms is planned 
through 1975 so that the future phases of the WWW 
and the global experiments can be carried out during 
the 1970's. 



U.S. Delegation to ECLA Session 

The Department of State announced on April 
11 (press release 80) that the following delega- 
tion would represent the United States at the 
13th session of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, held at Lima, Peru, April 
14-23: 

U.S. Representative 

Robert E. Culbertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Social and Civic Development, Bureau of Inter- 
American Affairs, Department of State 

Alternate U.S. Representative 

Ambassador Milton Barall, Head of Caribbean Study 
Group, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State 



Advisers 

Bernard J. Cahill, Deputy Director, American Repub- 
lics Division, Department of Commerce 

Paxton T. Dunn, Economic OflScer, American Embassy, 
Santiago, Chile 

Samuel D. Baton, Director, US-AID Mission, Peru 

Leighton Van Nort, Oflice of International Economic 
and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organi- 
zation Affairs, Department of State 

Robert S. Watson, Deputy Director, Oflice of Latin 
America, Department of the Treasury 

John E. Williams, General Commercial Policy Divi- 
sion, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of 
State 

The Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica is one of the four regional economic com- 
missions of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council. The biennial plenary meetings 
study the recent economic development of the 
area, review the activities of the Commission's 
committees and subgroups, and establish a pro- 
gram for future work. 

The principal agenda items this year deal 
with the strategy for regional development for 
the Second U.N. Development Decade and the 
related question of Latin American trade 
policy. 

Members of ECLA include all the independ- 
ent nations of the Western Hemisphere (in- 
cluding Cuba), plus France, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944 (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at 
Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force 
October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Signature: Panama, April 9, 1969. 

Fisheries 

International convention for the conservation of At- 
lantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966. 
Ratification deposited: Spain, March 21, 1969. 
Entered into force: March 21, 1969. 



APRIL 28, 1969 



375 



Grains 

International grains arrangement, 1967, witti annexes. 

Open for signature at Washington October 15 tlirougU 

November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. 

TIAS 6537. 

Ratifications to the Wheat Trade Convention deposit- 
ed: Federal Republic of Germany, April 10, 1969; * 
Greece, AprU 7, 1969. 

Ratification to the Food Aid Convention deposited: 
Federal KepubUc of Germany, April 10, 1969.' 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968.' 

Ratification deposited at Washington: Mauritius, 
AprU 8, 1969. 

Property 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967.' 

Ratifications deposited: Romania (with reservation 
and declaration ) , February 28, 1969 ; United King- 
dom, February 26, 1969. 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.' 
Ratifications deposited: Romania (with declaration), 
February 28, 1969; United Kingdom, February 
26, 1969. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969." 

Signature: Iraq (with declaration), February 18, 
1969. 



BILATERAL 



Afghanistan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of July 2, 1968 (TIAS 6523). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul February 
1 and March 15, 1969. Entered into force March 
15, 1969. 

Panama 

Agreement relating to cooperation and assistance to 
Panama in geologic studies along route 10 (Caimito- 
Palmas Bellas) for a canal site. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Panamd March 20, 1969. Entered into 
force March 20, 1969. 



PUBLICATIONS 



' Applicable to Land BerUn. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



Recent Releases 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders 
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation 
Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. TIAS 
6575. 1 p. 10«(. 

Tracking Station. Agreement, with Agreed Mlnnte, 
with Mauritius. TIAS 6576. 8 pp. 10(f. 

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. TIAS 
6577. 66 pp. 300. 

Education — Financing of Elxchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with Cyprus. TIAS 6579. 4 pp. lOif. 

Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Korea. TIAS 6581. 6 pp. 100. 

Status of United States Forces in Turkey — Duty Cer- 
tificates. Agreement with Turkey. TIAS 6582. 5 pp. 
100. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Brazil Cooperation Agree- 
ment. Agreement with Brazil and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 6583. 10 pp. 100. 

International Coffee Agreement, 1968. TIAS 6584. 869 
pp. $1.75. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guyana. 
TIAS 6585. 11 pp. 100. 

Surplus Property — Disposal of Excess Military Prop- 
erty in Viet-Nam. Agreement with Viet-Nam. TIAS 
6586. 5 pp. 100. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement vrith Norway 
amending annex to the agreement of January 27, 
1950. TIAS 6587. 3 pp. 100. 

Extension of Loan of Vessel — U.S.S. Bergall. Agree- 
ment with Turkey. TIAS 6588. 3 pp. 100. 

Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Agreement with 
AustraUa. TIAS 6589. 3 pp. 100. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement vrith Colombia 
amending the agreement of October 24, 1956. TIAS 
6593. 9 pp. 100. 



376 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETLN 



INDEX April 28, 1969 Vol. ZX, No. 1557 



Asia. Secretary Stans To Visit Europe, Asia To 
Discuss U.S. Trade Policies 

Atomic Energy. U.S., U.S.S.R. To Hold Tech- 
nical Talks on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions . 

China. Secretary Rogers' News Conference of 
April 7 

Communications. William W. Scranton To Head 
U.S. Delegation to Intelsat 

Congress. World Weather Program — Plan for 
U.S. Participation (Nixon, excerpts from 
report) 

Czechoslovakia. Secretary Rogers' News Con- 
ference of April 7 



Disarmament 

The North Atlantic Council Celebrates the 20th 
Anniver.sary of the Signing of the North At- 
lantic Treaty (address by President Nixon and 
opening remarks at ceremonial session; text 
of final communique) 

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 

Economic Affairs. Secretary Stans To Visit 
Europe, Asia To Discuss U.S. Trade Policies . 

Europe. Secretary Stans To Visit Europe, Asia 
To Discuss U.S. Trade Policies 

International Organizations and Conferences 

William W. Scranton To Head U.S. Delegation 

to Intelsat 

U.S. Delegation to ECLA Session 

Japan. Secretary Rogers' News Conference of 
April 7 

Jordan. King Hussein I of Jordan Visits Wash- 
ington (exchange of greetings with President 
Nixon and joint statement) 

Latin America. U.S. Delegation to ECLA Ses- 
sion 

Near East 

King Hussein I of Jordan Visits Washington 
(exchange of greetings with President Nixon 
and joint statement) 

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

The North Atlantic Council Celebrates the 20th 
Anniversary of the Signing of the North At- 
lantic Treaty ( address by President Nixon and 
opening remarks at ceremonial session; text 
of final communique) 

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 

Peru 

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 
U.S. and Peru To Continue Talks on Existing 
Differences (Department statement) . . 

Presidential Documents 

King Hussein I of Jordan Visits Washington 
The North Atlantic Council Celebrates the 20th 
Anniversary of the Signing of the North At- 
lantic Treaty 

World Weather Program — Plan for U.S. Par- 
ticipation 

Publications. Recent Releases 

Science. World Weather Program — Plan for 
U.S. Participation (Nixon, excerpts from re- 
port) 



307 
356 
357 
367 

368 
357 



349 
357 

.367 

367 



367 
375 

357 



364 
375 



364 
357 



349 
357 

357 
364 

364 

349 

368 
376 

368 



Spain. Secretary Rogers' News Conference of 

April 7 357 

Trade. Secretary Stans To Visit Europe, Asia To 

Discuss U.S. Trade Policies 367 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 375 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 . 357 
U.S., U.S.S.R. To Hold Technical Talks on Peace- 
ful Nuclear Explosions 356 

Viet-Nam 

Secretary Rogers' News Conference of April 7 . 357 
Twelfth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 

Paris (Lodge) 365 

Name Index 

Brandt, Willy 349 

Brosio, Manlio 349 

King Hussein I 364 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 365 

Nixon, President 349,364,368 

Rogers, Secretary 349,357 

Scranton, William W 367 

Stans, Maurice H 367 



Check List of Department of State 


Press Releases: April 7-13 


Press releases may be obtained from the Ofiice 


of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 


20520. 






No. 


Date 


Subject 


*73 


4/7 


Canada announces intention to 
amend Territorial Sea and Fish- 
ing Zones Act. 


*72A 


4/7 


Amendments to program for visit 
of King Hussein I of Jordan. 


74 


4/7 


Rogers : news conference of April 7. 


75 


4/9 


U.S. delegation to NATO ministe- 
rial meeting. 


76 


4/10 


Rogers : NATO ministerial meet- 
ing. 


77 


4/10 


Lodge : 12th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 


t78 


4/11 


Sisco : "The United States and the 
Arab-Israeli Dispute." 


t79 


4/11 


U.S.-Greece cotton textile agree- 
ment. 


SO 


4/11 


U.S. delegation to the 13th session 
of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (rewrite). 


81 


4/11 


North Atlantic Council final com- 
munique. 

ed. 


<'Not print 


tHeld for , 


a. later issue of the Buit.ktin. 



Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
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N AVT O 

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1558 




May 5, 1969 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL IS {ExcerpU) 377 

UNARMED U.S. RECONNAISSANCE PLANE IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACt: 

SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREA 

Defense Befartment Statement and U.S. Statement at Panmwnjom 382 

A NEW APPROACH TO PAN AMERICAN PROBLEMS 

RemMrks by President Nixon 384 

THE COMPLEXITY OF WORLD AFFAIRS 

Remarks by Secretary Rogers 387 
Boston Public Cil.rury 

Superintendent of Documents 

MAY 2 1 1969 
DEPOSITORY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1558 

May 5, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may bo 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested a gencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on imrious phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



I 

k 



I 



I 



President Nixon's News Conference of April 18 



Following are excerpts from the transcript of 
a news conference held hy President Nixon in 
the East Room of the White House on April 18. 

The President: Won't you be seated, please. 
Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated 
Press] ? 

Q. Mr. President., the question on all of our 
miruls is where do we go from here with the in- 
cident of the shooting down of the plane? What 
further action might you contemplate diplo- 
matically and militarily? 

The President: Mr. Cormier, first, I think a 
word with regard to the facts in this case: As 
was pointed out in the protest that was filed at 
Pamnunjom yesterday and also in the Defense 
Department statement, the plane involved was 
an unarmed Constellation, propeller-driven.^ 

The mission was a reconnaissance mission 
which at no time took the plane closer to the 
shores of North Korea than 40 miles. At the 
time the plane was shot down, all of the evidence 
that we have indicates that it was shot down 
approximately 90 miles from the shores of 
North Korea while it was moving outward, 
aborting the mission on orders that had been 
received. We knew this, based on our radar. 

Wliat is also even more important, the North 
Koreans knew it, based on their radar. There- 
fore, this attack was unprovoked. It was delib- 
erate. It was without warning. The protest 
has been fiJed. The North Koreans have not 
responded. 

Now a word with regard to why we have such 
missions in the Sea of Japan. As you ladies and 
gentlemen are aware, there are 56,000 American 
troops stationed in South Korea. Those 56,000 
men are the responsibility of the President of 
the United States as Commander in Chief. 

In recent weeks and months, in fact going 
back over the last 2 or 3 years, but particularly 
in recent weeks and months. North Korea has 
threatened military action against South Korea 

• See p. 382. 



and against our forces in South Korea. The 
nimiber of incidents has increased. 

It is the responsibility of the Commander in 
Chief to protect the security of those men. That 
is why, gomg back over 20 years and through- 
out the period of this administration being con- 
tinued, we have had a policy of reconnaissance 
flights in the Sea of Japan similar to this flight. 
This year we have had already 190 of these 
flights without incident, without threat, without 
warning at all. 

Now, the question is: Wliat do we do about 
these flights in the future? They were discon- 
tinued immediately after this incident occurred. 

I have today ordered that these flights be con- 
tinued. They will be protected. This is not a 
threat ; it is simply a statement of fact. 

As the Commander in Chief of our Armed 
Forces, I cannot and wUl not ask our men to 
serve in Korea, and I cannot and will not ask our 
men to take flights like this in imarmed planes 
without providing protection. That will be the 
case. 

Looking to the future, as far as what we do 
will depend upon the circumstances. It will de- 
pend upon what is done as far as North Korea 
is concerned, its reaction to the protest, and also 
any other developments that occur as we con- 
tinue these flights. 

Mr. Smith [Merriman Smith, United Press 
International] ? 

Outlook for Peace in Southeast Asia 

Q. Now that you have had about 3 months in 
a position of Presidential responsibility, do the 
chances of peace in Southeast Asia seem to come 
amy closer at all, or has the situation, the outlook 
for peace, improved or deteriorated since yov/r 
inauguration? 

The President: Mr. Smith, the chances for 
peace in Southeast Asia have significantly im- 
proved since this administration came into office. 
I do not claim that that has happened simply 
because of what we have done, although I think 



MAT 5, 1969 



377 



we have done some things that have improved 
those chances, and I am not trying to raise false 
hopes that peace is just aroimd the corner, this 
summer or this fall. 

But a number of developments clearly beyond 
the Paris peace talks have convinced me that the 
chances for bringing this war to a peaceful con- 
clusion have significantly improved. 

One factor that should be mentioned, that I 
note has not been covered perhaps as much as 
others, is the fact that South Korea has signifi- 
cantly improved its own capabilities. The way 
we can tell this has happened is that the South 
Korean President has taken an attitude with 
regard to the makeup of a government after 
peace comes that he wouldn't have even consid- 
ered 6 months ago, and he has done this because 
South Korea — I am sorry; South Vietnamese 
forces — it is natural that you transplant these 
two words, I find, in discussing these two sub- 
jects — South Vietnamese forces are far better 
able to handle themselves militarily, and that 
progi'am is going forward on a much more in- 
tensive basis than it was when this administra- 
tion came into oflSce. 

Second, political stability in South Viet-Nam 
has increased significantly since this adminis- 
tration came into office. The trend had begun 
before, but it has continued and escalated since 
that time. 

As a result of these two factors, it means that 
South Viet-Nam is able to make a peace which 
I think wUl give a better opportunity for nego- 
tiating room for their negotiators and ours at 
the Paris conference. That is one of the reasons 
for my feeling somewhat optimistic, although 
we still have some hard ground to plow. 

Q. To follow that up, then, are you consider- 
ing now the unilateral withdrawal of American 
troops from South Viet-Nam? 

The President: I am not. If we are to have 
a negotiating position at the Paris peace talks, 
it must be a position in which we can negotiate 
from strength ; and discussion about unilateral 
withdrawal does not help that position. I wUl 
not engage in it, although I realize it might be 
rather popular to do so. 

It is the aim of this administration to bring 
men home just as soon as our security will allow 
us to do so. As I have indicated previously, there 
are three factors that we are going to take into 
consideration: the training of the South Viet- 
namese, their ability to handle their own de- 



fense ; the level of fighting in South Viet-Nam, 
whether or not the offensive action of the enemy 
recedes; and progress in the Paris peace talks. 
Looking to the future, I would have to say 
that I think there are good prospects that Amer- 
ican forces can be reduced but as far as this 
time is concerned we have no plans to reduce 
our forces until there is more progress on one or 
all of the three fronts that I have mentioned. 

Q. Can I ask you whether you have ordered 
that the level of American combat activity in 
South Viet-Nam he reduced in order to reduce 
the casualties? 

The President: No, Mr. Lisagor [Peter 
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], the casualties 
have been reduced, as you have noted in your 
question, but the reason that American casual- 
ties are down is because the level of offensive 
action on the part of the enemy has receded. 

An analysis — and I have studied this quite 
carefully because I have noted the great interest 
in this country on this subject — as to whether 
or not our casualties are the result of our action ■£ 
or theirs : What we find is that the number of 1 
casualties substantially increased during the 
spring offensive. That spring offensive at this 
time either has run its course or is in a substan- 
tial lull. Because that offensive is in that status 
at this time, our level of casualties is down. 

I have not ordered and do not intend to order 
any reduction of our own activities. We will do M 
what is necessary to defend our position and to 1 
maintain the strength of our bargaining posi- 
tion in the Paris peace talks. 

• • • • • 

Mr. Tlieis [J. William Theis, United Press 
International] . 

The ABM Safeguard System 

Q. Mr. President, it has been suggested that 
you may go directly to the country on the ABM 
issue to further clarify and support your case. 
Can you tell iis of any plans you have in that 
direction, perhaps, today? 

The President: No, I have no plans at this 
time to go to the country, as you have suggested. 
As a matter of fact, I consider a press conference 
as going to the country. I find that these confer- 
rences are rather well covered by the country, 
both by television, as they are today, and also 
by the members of the press. 



378 



DEPAETMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN 



With regard to the ABM decision, however, I 
wish to emphasize agaia the point that I made 
when I announced that decision in this room 
a few weeks ago.^ 

I made that decision after I considered all 
the options that were before me with regard to 
what was necessary to maintain America's de- 
fenses, and particularly the credibility of our 
national security and our diplomacy throughout 
the world. 

I analyzed the nature of the threat. I found, 
for example, that even since the decision to de- 
ploy the ABM system called Sentinel in 1967, 
the intelligence estimates indicated that the So- 
viet capability with regard to their SS-9's, their 
nuclear missiles, was 60 percent higher than we 
thought then ; that their plans for nuclear sub- 
marines were 60 percent greater than we had 
thought then. 

Under these circumstances, I had to make 
basically a command decision as to what the 
United States should do if we were to avoid 
falling into a second-class or inferior position 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 

I had a number of options. We could have in- 
creased our offensive forces in various direc- 
tions. I determined that this limited defensive 
action — limited insofar as the Soviet Union is 
concerned — to defend our Minuteman missile 
sites was the best action that could be taken. 

I still believe that to be the case. I believe it 
is essential for the national security and it is 
essential to avoid putting an American Presi- 
dent, either this President or the next President, 
in the position where the United States would be 
second rather than first or at least equal to any 
potential enemy. 

The other reason, and I emphasize this 
strongly, is that the Chinese Communists, ac- 
cording to our intelligence, have not moved as 
fast recently as they had over the past 3 to 4 
years, but that, nevertheless, by 1973 or 1974 
they would have a significant nuclear capability, 
which would make our diplomacy not credible 
in the Pacific unless we could protect our coun- 
try against a Chinese attack aimed at our 
cities. 

The ABM system will do that, and the ABM 
Safeguard system, therefore, has been adopted 
for that reason. 



Q. Mr. President, has there been any cour 
sultation with our allies or with Japan on 
sending armed planes along to guard the 
reconnaissance craft? Is it necessary? 

The President: There has been no consulta- 
tion up to this point. I can only say in answer 
to that question that when I refer to protecting 
these flights, I am not going to go beyond that 
at this time. I am simply indicating that they 
will be protected. 

If we think that consultation is necessary, we 
will have consultation. 

Q. Mr. President, on the ABM issue, as you 
know, there are a number of Republican Sen- 
ators who oppose you/r views on the ABM. Do 
you think that they should support you because 
you are a Republican President, even though 
they oppose the principle? 

The President: I certainly do not. I want to 
make it crystal clear that my decision on ABM 
was not made on the basis of Republican versus 
Democrat. It was made on the basis of what I 
thought was best for the country. 

I talked, for example, just yesterday, with 
Senator Cooper. He is one of those who opposes 
me as a Republican. He honestly and sincerely 
believes that this is not the best step to taka 

I respect that belief, and I respect others who 
disagree with me on this. I also respect the be- 
liefs of Senator Jackson, Speaker McCormack, 
Senator Stennis, and Senator Russell, and a 
number of Democrats, who believe that this is 
the right step to take. 

This issue wUl be fought out, as it should be 
fought out, on the basis of what is best for the 
Nation. It wiU not be fought out on partisan 
lines. 

I am going to fight as hard as I can for it, 
because I believe it is absolutely essential to 
the security of the country. But it is going to 
be fought on the basis of asking each Senator 
and Congressman to make his own decision ; and 
I am confident, incidentally, that that decision 
will be in favor of the system when they know 
all the facts. 

* • • • • 

Q . Secretary Rogers said at a recent news conr 
ference ' that if and when we begin talks with 



' For transcript of President Nixon's news conference 
of Mar. 14, see Buixetin of Mar. 31, 1969, p. 275. 



' For transcript of Secretary Rogers' news conference 
of Apr. 7, see Bttlletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 357. 



HAY 5, 1969 



379 



the Soviets on missiles, one of the first questions 
to he asked them is why they find it necessary to 
'build ahlg missile with a 25-megaton warhead. 
Since the Russian decision to proceed to build 
su^h an enormous missile is one of the major 
factors in your going ahead toith the ABM, the 
question is: Why are we waiting to ask that 
question for the beginning of negotiations? 
Why don't we ask it now? 

Soviet Nuclear Capability 

The President: Mr. Scali [John Scali, ABC 
News], in a sense I think Secretary Eogers prob- 
ably asked the question, by stating it as he did 
in a press conference. As you know, because you 
have covered these diplomatic matters for many 
years, in dealing with the Soviet Union or any 
other nation, this type of question is not always 
asked simply on a formal basis in a diplomatic 
conference. 

Sometimes the best way to handle it is to 
state the position publicly. As far as Secretary 
Rogers' statement is concerned, I share his puz- 
zlement as to why the Soviet Union is moving 
so heavily in this direction. As far as the Soviet 
Union's intentions are concerned, and I want 
to clarify one point that is made, the question 
as to their mtentions is not something that I am 
going to comment upon. I don't know what their 
intentions are. 

But we have to base our policy on their capa- 
bilities ; and when we project their SS-9 plans 
to 1972 or 1973, if we allow those plans to go 
forward without taking any action on our part 
either offensively or defensively to counteract 
them, they will be substantially ahead of the 
United States in overall nuclear capability. We 
camiot allow that to happen. 

I would remind the members of this press 
corps, I am here at a time when the United 
States faces a threat, not of the magnitude that 
President Kennedy faced at the time of the 
Cuban missile crisis, but I would remind the 
members of this press corps that at that time 
all of the professional experts agreed that the 
U.S. superiority was at least four to one and 
maybe five to one over the Soviet Union in terms 
of overall nuclear capability. 

Now, we don't have that today. That gap 
has been closed. We shall never have it again, 
because it will not be necessary for us. Suffi- 
ciency, as I have indicated, is all that is neces- 
sary. But I do say this : I do not want to see an 



American President in the future, in the event 
of any crisis, have his diplomatic credibility be 
so imj)aired because the United States was in a 
second-class or inferior position. We saw what 
it meant to the Soviets when they were second. 
I don't want that position to be the United 
States' in the event of a future diplomatic 
crisis. 

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us what the 
Soviet role has been in the plane incident, and 
could you go beyond that and tell us what were 
some of the other elements that figured in, yov/r 
deliberations on how to properly respond to the 
downing of the plane? 

The President: The Soviet role in the plane 
incident, first, is one of being of assistance to the 
United States in recovering the debris and look- 
ing for survivors. We are most grateful to the 
Soviet Union for helping us in this respect. 

Our intelligence, and of course no one can be 
sure here, indicates that the Soviet Union was 
not aware that this attack was to be made. North 
Korea is not a nation that is predictal^le m terms 
of its actions. It is perhaps more than any other 
nation in the Communist bloc completely out 
of the control of either the Soviet Union or, for 
that matter, Communist China. That, at least, is 
our intelligence estimate at this time. 

Now, as far as other matters that entered into 
this interim decision, and I emphasize it as an 
interuTi decision, I have concluded that the 
United States must face up to the fact that 
intelligence gathering — intelligence gathering 
that does not involve overflights, that does not 
involve interdiction of another nation's air- 
space or moving into its waters — here, where in- 
telligence people are involved, we recognize that 
they are necessarily subject to whatever action 
can or should be taken by another nation to de- 
fend itself. 

But when planes of the United States, or ships 
of the United States, in intelligence gathering, 
are in international water or in international 
airspace, they are not fair game. They will not 
be in the future. I state that as a matter of fact, 
and that was the basis for this interim decision. 



Q. Mr. President, can you cormnent on the 
motives of the North Koreans in this attack, and 
do you see any pattern in this attack and also 
the one on the Pusblof 

The President: The Pueblo incident was quite 



380 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



different in two respects. One, there was some 
uncertainty for some time as to where the Puehlo 
was. Present indications are that the Pueblo was 
in international waters. But there was a more 
uncertain factor. 

There was no uncertainty whatever as to 
where this plane was, because we know what 
their radar showed. We, incidentally, know what 
the Russian radar showed. All three radars 
showed exactly the same thing. 

Let me also say that there is no question of 
what they claim as their airspace. Some of you, 
of course, know the confusion and, as a matter of 
fact, the confrontation we are having with Peru 
about the 200-mile limit. North Korea claims 
only 12 miles as its limit, so we were at least 28 
miles away at the very closest point. 

Also, with regard to the Puehlo, in the case of 
the Pueblo the North Koreans had warned and 
threatened the Pueblo for a period of several 
weeks before they seized it. In the case of these 
flights, they have been going on, as I have indi- 
cated, for years ; and during tliis administration, 
without incident, 190 of them have occurred this 
year. 

Under these circumstances, it was a com- 
pletely surprise attack in every sense of the word 
and, therefoi-e, did not give us the opportunity 
for protective action that I would have taken 
had it been threatened. 

Q. Mr. President, you have addressed your- 
self many times in the fast, sir, to the da/nger 
and the consequences of aggression against our 
country by a minor military fower. It seems to 
me what we have seen developed here is a Mnd 
of new rules of warfare which we certainly have 
not agreed to and obviously the Soviet Union 
hasn't. In your present circumstances, sir, can 
you tell us of some of the problems that you 
have faced in making a proper response? 



The President: The problems with regard to 
a proper response are quite obvious: the ques- 
tion as to what reaction we could expect not 
only from the party against whom we respond 
but other parties that might be involved and 
also, putting it in the larger context, how re- 
sponding in one area might affect a major in- 
terest of the United States in another area — 
an area like Viet-Nam, Viet-Nam being the top 
priority area for us. 

Now, in answering the question in that way, 
I do not want to leave the implication that the 
announcement of the renewal of and the con- 
tinuation of reconnaissance flights is the final 
action that can or will be taken here. Our action 
in this matter will be determined by what hap- 
pens in the future. 

Lookmg at the Soviet Union, it seems to me 
that, had it not been for this incident, the major 
story that I would have been asked about today 
was what happened in Czechoslovakia. I sup- 
pose that my reaction to that would be to con- 
denm the Soviet Union for what it did. 

The Soviet Union is aware of our disapproval 
of that action. All Americans, in fact all people 
in the free world, see this as perhaps the final 
chapter in the great tragedy of the Czechoslovak 
people under Communist rule. 

We hope it is not the final chapter. We hope 
that some vestiges of freedom will remain. Yet 
the Soviet Union has acted there and acted quite 
decisively. They have to consider now, in terms 
of any future action, how that might affect their 
relations with the United States and with the 
Western World. 

What I am trying to do in answering your 
question is to pose the problem that great powers 
confront when they take actions involving 
powers that are not in that league. We must al- 
ways measure our actions by that base. 

The press: Thank you, Mr, President. 



MAT 5, 1969 



381 



Unarmed U.S. Reconnaissance Plane in International Airspace 
Shot Down by North Korea 



Following are texts of a statement released hy 
the Defartment of Defence on A-pril 16 and a 
V.S. statement read by ^ij- Gen. James B. 
Knapp at the 290th meeting of the Military 
Armistice Commission at Panmv/njom, Korea, 
on April 17 {April 18, Korean time). 



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENT 

Department of Defense press release 281 dated April 16 

On Monday, April 14, at approximately 5 
p.m.,^ a four-engine, propeller-driven. Navy 
EC-121 aircraft took off from its base at Atsugi, 
Japan, for a reconnaissance mission over the Sea 
of Japan. The aircraft had 30 Navy personnel 
and one Marine enlisted man aboard. It was 
unarmed and its mission was a routine recon- 
naissance track over international waters. Dur- 
ing the first 3 months of 1969 there were 190 
flights similar in nature flown in this general 
area. Standing instructions for this kind of mis- 
sion were that the aircraft was not to approach 
closer than 40 nautical miles to the coast of 
North Korea. In this particular instance, the 
aircraft commander was under orders from 
CINCPACFLT [Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Fleet] to approach no closer than 50 nautical 
miles to the coast of North Korea. 

During its mission there were communications 
between the aircraft and its base. From a variety 
of sources, some of them sensitive, we are able 
to confirm that at aU times during its mission 
the aircraft was far outside any claimed terri- 
torial airspace of North Korea. 

All evidence now available to us, including 
North Korean claims and debris sightings, leads 
us to believe that the aircraft was shot down 
by North Korean aircraft. As of this hour, re- 

' All times mentioned are eastern standard time. 



gretfully, there has been no report of survivors. 

Shortly after the Department of Defense re- 
ceived its first report that this reconnaissance 
aircraft may have been downed over the Sea of 
Japan by North Korean aircraft, a USAF 
C-130 search and rescue aircraft departed 
Tachikawa Air Base, Japan. At 1:41 a.m. 
a flight of USAF F-106 aircraft departed Osan 
Air Base, Korea, for the area of the inci- 
dent to perform the mission of combat air sup- 
port for the search and rescue aircraft. A USAF 
KC-135 tanker aircraft from Kadena Air Base, 
Okinawa, was also launched to provide air re- 
fueling support for the F-106 aircraft. 

The HC-130 search and rescue aircraft was 
relieved by a U.S. Navy P-3 from Iwakuni 
Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, and another 
HC-130 from Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, 
which departed about 7 :30 a.m. The rescue air- 
craft ran search patterns in the area and 
dropped flares during the night. Crew mem- 
bers reported dim lights, but there was no con- 
firmation of any survivors. The aircraft were 
searching in an area approximately 95-100 
nautical miles southeast of Chongjin, North 
Korea. 

Other aircraft, including HC-97's, C-130's, 
and HU-16, HH-3 helicopters, another P-3, 
and additional HC-130's from Tachikawa Air 
Base, Japan; Anderson Air Force Base, Guam; 
Clark Air Base, Philippines; Naha Air Base, 
Okinawa; and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air 
Station in Japan joined the search. 

The U.S. Navy also dispatched the U.S.S. 
Dale and U.S.S. Henry W. Tucker at 8 :30 p.m. 
Tuesday night from Sasebo Naval Base, Japan, 
to assist in the search and rescue mission. They 
are in the search area now. 

At noon on Tuesday [April 15] Secretary of 
State Rogers talked with Ambassador Dobrynin 
of the Soviet Union and requested his Govern- 
ment's assistance in the search and rescue effort. 



382 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIK 



Subsequently on Tuesday, it was reported from 
the search area that two Soviet destroyer-type 
ships were operating in the immediate vicinity 
of the search area where a U.S. P-3 patrol air- 
craft had sighted debris in the water. U.S. air- 
craft assisted in directing the Soviet ships to the 
scene and in the recovery of some debris. 

Reconnaissance missions of this type have 
been flown for more than 20 years over the Sea 
of Japan. There was nothing unusual about this 
mission. In recent years, these missions have 
been approved by high Government authorities 
in the State and Defense Departments, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the White House. Each of 
these missions constitutes a lawful use of inter- 
national airspace. 



U.S. STATEMENT AT PANMUNJOM == 

Department of State press release 87 dated April 17 

Greneral Yi: Three days ago your armed 
forces committed an unprovoked attack on an 
unarmed U.S. aircraft. An EC-121, flying a 
routine reconnaissance track parallel to North 
Korea over the Sea of Japan, was reported miss- 
ing at around 1400 hours, Korean time, on 
April 15. About 2 hours later, at 1555 hours, 
April 15, your radio announced that North 
Korean military forces had shot down a "large- 
sized plane of the U.S." 

This aircraft was flying a routine reconnais- 
sance track similar to a large number of missions 
which have been flown over international waters 
in that area regularly since 1950. The aircraft 
commander was under orders to maintain a dis- 
tance of 50 nautical miles from the coast of 
North Korea. All evidence confirms that the 
plane remained far outside your claimed ter- 
ritorial airspace. 

When shot down, the aircraft was at point 
approximately 41 degrees 12 minutes North and 
131 degrees 48 minutes East. Debris from the 
aircraft was initially sighted and subsequently 
recovered in the vicinity of 41 degrees 14 min- 
utes North and 131 degrees 50 minutes East. 
These points are approximately 90 miles from 
North Korea. There appear to have been no sur- 
vivors from the 31 men on board the aircraft. 



* The text of the statement was conveyed to the Presi- 
dent of the United Nations Security Council by Charles 
W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, In 
a letter dated Apr. 18 (U.N. doe. S/9163). 



From the foregoing facts about your attack 
on U.S. aircraft it is clear that : 

1. At no time did our aircraft penetrate or 
even closely approach North Korean airspace. 
Since it was at all times clearly within inter- 
national airspace, you had no right to threaten 
or interfere with it, let alone shoot it down. 

2. Our aircraft was engaged in completely 
legitimate reconnaissance operations. These 
operations are made necessary by your repeated 
acts and threats of aggression. So long as such 
flights are conducted outside your territorial 
limits you have no right to interfere with them. 
I note that your authorities seem, in some re- 
spects, to share this view, since they felt com- 
pelled to allege falsely that the aircraft was 
within your airspace. 

3. No one can believe that a single unarmed 
propeller-driven aircraft can represent a threat 
to North Korea. It was not attacking you or 
preparing to attack you or supporting an attack 
on you. The shooting down of this U.S. plane 
was not an act of self-defense. It was a calcu- 
lated act of aggression. 

4. This act cannot be justified under inter- 
national law. On the contrary, the centuries-old 
tradition of freedom of the seas and the newer 
principle regarding freedom of the airspace 
over international waters clearly make your ac- 
tion illegal. International law and custom caU 
you to account for the consequences of your 
violation of these principles. 

This incident was not an isolated act. You 
have repeatedly regularly violated both the let- 
ter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreement 
and the rules of international law. I need only 
cite the attempt in January 1968 to assassinate 
President Pak, your lawless seizure of the 
U.S.S. Ptiehlo, your brutal mistreatment of her 
crew, your innumerable infiltrations into the 
Republic of Korea, and your other violations 
of the demilitarized zone. 

The peace of this area is constantly being dis- 
turbed by your actions. The proper course for 
you to take in this instance is to acknowledge 
the true facts of the case: that you shot down 
our aircraft over international waters at a point 
approximately 90 miles from your coast and 
that this plane at no time entered your airspace. 
We, of course, expect that you will take appro- 
priate measures to prevent similar incidents in 
the future. 

I have nothing further to say at this time. 



MAT 5, 1969 



383 



A New Approach to Pan American Problems 



Remarks by President Nixon^ 



Mr. President, Your Excellencies, my fellow 
Americans: I can use that term "my fellow 
Americans" and cover everybody in this room. 
And this is the only international group in which 
I can do so. 

As I speak to my fellow Americans today, I 
first want to thank the President of this or- 
ganization for his very warm and friendly com- 
ments. And in responding to those comments, 
I first want to establish a personal bond of com- 
munication with all of you here — or should I 
say reestablish it with you. 

As I came into this building today I recalled 
those many occasions when my wife and I were 
here and when you were gracious enough to al- 
low us to use your home as the Vice President's 
place to entertain distinguished visitors from 
abroad. 

My memory went back to not only many 
visits to this building but visits to every one of 
the countries in this hemisphere. 

Of all the international organizations that I 
have addressed, including the NATO ministers, 
this statement can only be made with regard to 
the Organization of American States. 

I am very fortunate to have had the oppor- 
tunity to know each of the countries represented 
here personally from having visited each of 
those coimtries. And I only hope that in the 
years that I am in office I shall have the oppor- 
tunity to return and to visit many — or, I hope, 
all — of those countries in the future. 

But as I speak to you today, I want, too, to 
speak from my heart with regard to the feeling 



' Made before the Organization of American States at 
the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., on Apr. 14 
(White House press release). President Nixon was 
Introduced by the President of the OAS Council, Am- 
bassador Carlos Holguin of Colombia. 



that I have personally insofar as our American 
family is concerned. 

I come from the State of California. I was 
bom in a little town of Yorba Linda. It had, 
of course, not only a Spanish name but a great 
Spanish tradition and background. 

My wife and I, in the year 1940 — as you see 
her now she must have been a child bride — we 
took our honeymoon in Mexico. And 25 years 
later we returned with our two daughters for 
our anniversary trip to Mexico. 

During the years that I have visited each of 
your countries, I have had some very interesting 
experiences. I know that the international press 
has tended to build up those experiences that 
have at times been difficult. But I can assure 
everyone in this room that my memories and the 
memories of my wife are not of those few who 
may have been unfriendly but of the thousands 
of friendly faces we saw; and that we shall 
always take with us and we shall always remem- 
ber as we attempt to develop our new policies 
for the future. 

But having spoken, as I have deliberately 
done so warmly, about my personal affection for 
the countries represented in this room and the 
people represented in the countries among our 
neighbors to the South, I now want to speak 
very candidly and very honestly about some of 
the problems with which we are presently 
confronted. 

I think there has been a tendency, in examin- 
ing the relations of the United States with our 
friends to the south, to smother the problems 
that we have with fine slogans, beautiful rhet- 
oric, and sometimes with abrazos. 

I think there is a place for a fine slogan, and 
always there is a place for eloquent language. 
And I would not underplay, certainly, the im- 



384 



DEPAETKBNT OF STATE BULLETIN 



portance of that kind of relationship on a 
dignified basis between nations and the loaders 
of nations. 

But at the present time, the problems we con- 
front in this hemisphere are too serious to be 
glossed over simply by the usual slogans and the 
words and the gestures of the past. What we 
need is a new policy. Wliat we need are new 
programs. Wliat we need are new approaches. 

I would like to describe those policies today, 
not with a new slogan, because I have none — 
none that I think would be appropriate to the 
challenge that we face. 

But I would like to describe our approach in 
this way: Sometimes the new administration 
has been described as an open administration. I 
hope we can live up to that particular descrip- 
tion. But if I were to set forth the objectives for 
our approach to the problems of this hemi- 
sphere, it would be in these words : I want our 
policies to be ones which are derived from open 
eyes, open ears, open minds, and open hearts. 

Let me be specific on each of those particular 
items. Wlien I speak of open eyes, I mean that 
it is necessary for us to look at our common 
problems without any of the prejudices that we 
may have had in the past and without being im- 
prisoned by the policies of the past or without 
perpetuating the mistakes of the past. 

The President of this organizaton has re- 
ferred to Governor Eockef eller and the trip that 
he will be taking — or several trips, I should 
say — in this hemisphere in the months ahead. 

On that trip, as Governor Eockefeller will tell 
each of the ambassadors assembled here today, 
he is going with open eyes and open eara. He 
is not going there to tell the people in the vari- 
ous countries that he will visit what the United 
States wants them to do. But he is going there 
to listen to them and to hear what they believe 
we can do together. 

I think there has been too much of a tendency 
in the past for the discussion to get down to this 
point: Wliat will the United States do for 
Latin America? 

The question, otherwise, I think should be 
put — and this is the approach of the Rocke- 
feller mission, it is the approach of the Secre- 
tary of State, the new Assistant Secretary of 
State, Charles Meyer — our approach is this : not 
what do we do for Latin America — what do we 
do with Latin America? What do we do 
together? 



We want, therefore, to have open eyes and we 
also have open ears. We want to hear from our 
friends in each of the countries represented 
what you think is wrong with our policy, but 
also what you think you can do with us to 
develop a better policy. 

And we, fortunately, approach this problem 
with no preconceived notions as to the policies 
of the past. 

One of the reasons that we must also have 
open minds is that there sometimes is a tendency 
to become wedded to a pi-ogram because it has 
a popular comiotation. I speak of the Alliance 
for Progress, a great concept. 

And as I examined the effect of the Alliance 
for Progress on my last trip to Latin America, 
in wliich I covered most of the countries in that 
continent in 1967, I saw many areas where the 
Alliance for Progress had done much good. 

On the other hand, when I looked at the over- 
all statistics as to what has happened to the rate 
of growth in Latin America during the period 
of the Alliance for Progress as compared with 
the period immediately preceding the Alliance 
and when I compared that rate of growth with 
the rates of growth in other areas of the world, 
I found a very disconcerting result. 

And it very simply is this : The rate of growth 
is not fast enough. It has been approximately 
the same during the period of the Alliance as it 
was before the Alliance. 

But even more significant, the rate of growth 
in Latin America overall — and of course there 
are some individual countries that are far 
ahead — but overall, the rate of gro\vth is less 
than the rate of growth in non-Communist 
Asia, and it is less even than the rate of growth 
in Communist Eastern Europe. 

This is a result which we cannot tolerate. We 
must do better. We must find the ways and the 
means whereby we can move forward together 
in a more effective way. 

And that is why I emphasize that we will 
have open eyes and open ears and open minds in 
attempting to find the answer. 

But I emphasize at the last the most impor- 
tant element : We shall have open hearts — open 
hearts, because no one can come here today, as 
my wife and I have, and to have sensed again 
the warm reception, the feeling that comes from 
the heart any time you come to an assemblage 
of this sort, no one can visit the countries of 
Latin America as we have on so many occasions 



MAT 5, 1969 

347-248—69- 



385 



without realizing how close our bonds are. 

AVe are all part of the New "World. We are 
all part of the American family. "We come from 
the same traditions. "We share the same 
concerns. 

Simon Bolivar said 150 years ago that the 
"freedom of the New "World is the hope of the 
universe." That was true then. I believe it is 
even more true today. 

But then we have to make this freedom in the 
New "World something which can be more mean- 
ingful to the millions of people, not only in 
America but in all the countries in this hemi- 
sphere, so that there will be hope where there 
is now despair, so that there will be opportunity 
where there is now no chance for millions who 
simply want a chance, a chance not to receive 
but a chance simply on their own to make their 
own contribution both to their own welfare 
and to their country's welfare. 

And as we think of this problem in that con- 
text, as we think how close our bonds are, I 
try to put it in the perspective of historj-. I 
think how long this organization has been in 
operation. And I look ahead just 3-3 years to 
the end of this century — less than that, 32 
years — and I think of what this hemisphere, 
the New "World, will be like at the end of this 
century. And I realize that if the present rates 
of growth that we have in the United States 
and in the balance of the hemisphere are not 
changed, at the end of this century the per 
capita income in the United States of America 
will be 15 times as high as that of the per capita 
income of our friends, our neighbors, the mem- 
bers of ovir family, in the balance of the 
hemisphere. 

This is something we cannot allow to happen. 
And it will require the best minds, it will re- 
quire the best ideas that all of us can produce 
together. 

So, Mr. President, as I come here today, let 
me say I was tempted simply to respond to your 
very gracious remarks with the response that I 
had in my heart, to express my appreciation 
for your welcome. 

But I want you to know that we do consider 
the problems of this hemisphere to be of the 
highest priority. "We do consider that whatever 
progress we have made has not been enough, 
and for that reason we come here today asking 
your assistance in working with us so that we 
can find better solutions for those problems that 
we mutually have throughout the hemisphere. 



Again, to all of you, my fellow Americans, 
our gratefulness for your warm reception, and 
I hope that this meeting may mark the begin- 
ning of a new era of cooperation, of consulta- 
tion, but most important, of progress for all the 
members of our great American family. 



Pan American Day 

and Pan American Week, 1969 

A PROCLAMATION' 

The Inter-American System is the oldest, most 
successful regional association in the world. On April 14, 
10G9, we celebrate the 79th Anniversary of its 
formation. 

The Americas are bound together by history, geogra- 
phy and, most important of all, common concerns and 
shared hopes. 

On this occasion, the United States reaffirms its 
dedication to : 

— Close consultation with its Hemisphere partners in 
all matters of common concern. 

— Furtherance of social and cultural ties that enhance 
human dignity and mutual respect. 

— Cooperation with each of our partners in economic 
development that will benefit the entire Hemisphere. 

Within this unity of purpose there is room for a 
diversity of viewpoint and approach. The United States 
seeks to cooperate, not to dominate; to participate 
fairly as a partner in the responsibilities that each 
nation shares within the System. 

Much has been accomplished by the nations of our 
continents ; the Organization of American States, focus 
of the Inter-American System, is stronger than ever, 
with a revised Charter soon coming into effect. 

We shall treat with high priority the tasks that lie 
ahead — to extend to all Americans the opportunity for 
lives of dignity in a climate of freedom. 

Now, THEBEFOEE, I, RiCHABD NixoN, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby proclaim Monday, 
April 14, 1969, as Pan American Day, and the week 
beginning April 13 and ending April 19 as Pan Ameri- 
can Week ; and I call upon the Governors of the fifty 
States of the Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, and the ofiicials of all other areas under 
the flag of the United States to issue similar 
proclamations. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this eleventh day of April, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the one 
hundred and ninety-third. 




• No. 3908 ; 34 Fed. Reg. 6467. 



386 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



The Complexity of World Affairs 



Remarks hy Secretary Rogers '■ 



Fortunately or unfortunately, many of the 
events in the world directly or indirectly affect 
us, and the attitude of the United States toward 
such events is of importance. A'^liether it is the 
fact that some lish are leaving the waters around 
Iceland, which adversely affects their economy, 
or the fact of an attempted coup in Equatorial 
Guinea — to some degree we are involved or our 
involvement is sought. The United States is the 
world's greatest military and economic and 
technological power; and there is no way to 
isolate ourselves from the responsibilities that 
go with that position. 

It is understandable that the weight of great 
responsibility gives rise to certain concerns. 
These concerns are likely to be expressed in 
demands for a clear, comprehensive, and con- 
sistent foreign policy that neatly defines and 
sensibly limits our national interests. 

The difficulty is that we have a great variety 
of national interests, that some situations are 
intractable and others are fluid, and that un- 
predictable events arise which refuse to fit 
neatly into any preconceived notions of how 
much or how little the United States should be 
involved. 

Let me illustrate the point by brief reference 
to five problems which have concerned this ad- 
ministration during our first 3 months in office. 

First, in Viet-Nam we are directlj' involved 
in military operations. We are seeking to nego- 
tiate a settlement which for the first time in 20 
years would establish peaceful conditions in 
Southeast Asia. We are trying to bring about a 
peace that will permit the people of South Viet- 
Nam to decide their own future. Such a de- 
velopment would permit us, in consultation 



with our allies and at the appropriate time, to 
end our military operations. No issue more con- 
cerns United States diplomacy at the present 
time than this one. 

Second, in Berlin we are involved both politi- 
cally and, through the presence of U.S. troops, 
militarily. Berlin has been a special respon- 
sibility since the end of the Second World War 
and has required the attention and action of 
every administration since. It — and a divided 
Germanjr — are at the heart of the problem of a 
divided Europe. Only last month there were 
harassments against free access to Berlin. And 
just last week the foreign and defense ministers 
of NATO urged continued efforts to explore the 
possibility of "ordered and negotiated progress" 
toward normalizing the situation surrounding 
that city." We cannot and do not seek to escape 
our present responsibility, which derives di- 
rectly from our role m World War II. 

Third, in the Middle East we are not involved 
militarily, but there is always a danger, as the 
President has pointed out, that we might be 
drawn into a renewed conflict. So the United 
States is actively engaged in a diplomatic effort 
to achieve not just a new armistice but a lasting 
peace. Our interests in friendly relations with 
all states in the area and our commitment to re- 
moving sources of world tension require us, we 
believe, to work in whatever way we can to 
bolster the United Nations efforts toward that 
end. 

Fourth, in Peru the United States is involved 
in one of those difficult economic problems 
which sometimes occur among neighbors and 
friends. The dynamic of the American indus- 
trial and economic sj'stem has generated exten- 
sive foreign investment. Such a development 



' Made before the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors at Washington, B.C., on Apr. 16 (press release 
84). 



' For text of a final communique issued at Washing- 
ton on Apr. 11, see Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 354. 



MAT 5, 1969 



387 



sometimes creates misunderstandings. When it 
does, we must seek to resolve them amicably and 
fairly with full respect for the rights of all con- 
cerned. The true involvement we and Latin 
Americans have with each other — and the only 
one we seek — is the involvement of constructive 
cooperation, and that is true in this matter. 

Fifth, in the civil war in Nigeria we are not 
militarily, politically, or economically involved, 
and we have resisted pressures to become so. 
However, we are deeply involved in a humani- 
tarian effort. Our Government has extended 
over $32 million worth of food and medical 
supplies to the needy in that area of the world. 
More recently, we have dispatched a special 
envoy to expedite aid to people who are starv- 
ing and break the log jams which have 
hampered the flow of the ample supplies which 
are available. We will continue to resist getting 
involved politically, but we will continue our 
humanitarian involvement and do all we can 
to prevent disease and starvation. 

So in its first 3 months this administration 
has been projected into affairs in all parts of 
the world — Southeast Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe, Latin America, and Africa — into old 
and new issues, issues that are local, regional, 
and global in character — into matters for which 
there is no exact formula for determining the 
proper measure of United States activity or 
responsibility. 

One lesson is quite clear. Great power does 
not mean great freedom of action and decision. 
On the contrary, it often means very narrow 
choices of action, and what we can do to in- 
fluence events in a given case well may be 
marginal. 

We can work for peaceful settlement in Viet- 
Nam ; but we cannot negotiate a peace without 
serious response from the other side. 

We can probe for formulas to reconcile issues 
in the Middle East; but no formula will work 
without the agreement of the principals. 

We can develop suggestions to ease relations 
with Communist China ; but little will happen 
if the Chinese Communists choose not to talk 
to us. 

We can reach the conclusion that it makes no 
sense to go on with a nuclear arms race; but 
an agreement to stop it requires reciprocal and 
reasonable decisions by both sides. 

We can send food to starving people; but a 
full stomach is no cure for ancient tribal 
animosities. 



So in international affairs the weak can be 
rash; the powerful must be restrained. Wliat 
complexity in world affairs should teach us is 
the need to act responsibly, to substitute co- 
operation for coercion, and to move from con- 
frontation to negotiation of the issues that 
divide nations. 

Now, I am ready to try to answer your ques- 
tions. But in case you forget to ask me what 
newspaper editors can do for the Secretary of 
State, let me answer by saying that you can 
continue to convey to the American people a 
clear sense of the complexity and unpredicta- 
bility of world affairs — that our involvement in- 
escapably flows from our position, our interests, 
and our responsibilities in the world — and that 
however discouraging it may seem at times, 
we must never despair in our constant search 
for peace. 



13th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made hy "^ 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.S. delegation, at the 13th plenary session of 
tlie new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
April 17. 

Press release 86 dated April 17 

Ladies and gentlemen : The representatives of 
the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
and of the United States have spoken here in. ■ 
detail about North Viet-Nam's aggression 
against South Viet-Nam. In the 10th plenary 
session I described the massive North Viet- 
namese presence and involvement in the war in 
South Viet-Nam. At the 11th session Am- 
bassador Walsh described the continuing large- M 
scale North Vietnamese infiltration through I 
Laos and Cambodia and across the demili- | 
tarized zone into South Viet-Nam. At our last 
meeting, the United States presented some rep- 
resentative case histories of North Vietnamese 
units and personnel in South Viet-Nam.^ 

Your side apparently no longer denies tlie 
presence of North Vietnamese military and sub- 



'For texts of U.S. statements at the 10th, 11th, and 
12th plenary sessions, see Bttixetin of Apr. 14, 1969, 
p. 316 ; Apr. 1, 1969, p. 338 ; and Apr. 28, 1969, p. 365. 



388 



DEPARTSrENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN 



versive forces in South Viet-Nam or the con- 
tinued flow of men and military supplies from 
North Viet-Nam into the South. Instead, you 
argue that North Vietnamese have a right to 
fight in South Viet-Nam. Your side seeks to 
justify North Viet-Nam's activities in the South 
by claiming that this is an internal Vietnamese 
affair and, therefore, of no concern to others. 
Even such a rationalization, fallacious though 
it is, does not exist for the presence of your 
troops in Laos and Cambodia. 

In the case of Viet-Nam, it is North Viet- 
Nara's use of armed force against South Viet- 
Nam which constitutes aggression. The United 
States is in Viet-Nam in response to the request 
for assistance by the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. 

Today we will examine the international law 
aspects of North Viet-Nam's use of force against 
South Viet-Nam. We will contend that North 
Viet-Nam's argiunent that it has a right to use 
force against South Viet-Nam is both unjusti- 
fied and dangerous and that North Viet-Nam's 
continued pursuit of its objectives through mili- 
tary means will not lead to a peaceful settlement. 

Let us look at the international law aspects 
first. A basic aim of modem international law 
is to inhibit countries using aimed force against 
one another as a means of achieving national ob- 
jectives. Consequently, international law, as em- 
bodied in the United Nations Charter, prohibits 
the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state. 
At the same time, international law preserves for 
states the right of individual or collective self- 
defense in the event of armed attack. 

The prohibition against the use of force in 
international relations applies to the use of 
force across international demarcation lines, as 
well as across international political boundaries. 

This was demonstrated dramatically in the 
case of Korea. In June 1950, when North Korea 
launched an armed attack across the temporary 
demarcation line at the 38th parallel, the United 
Nations Security Council condenmed that at- 
tack and organized collective action to defend 
South Korea. 

Similarly, North Viet-Nam's armed invasion 
of South Viet-Nam — across internationally 
agreed demarcation lines and international 
boundaries — is a clear violation of the basic 
principle of international law that armed force 
is not to be used to achieve political objectives. 

North Viet-Nam's use of armed force against 



South Viet-Nam also violates the explicit provi- 
sions of the 1954 Geneva accords.^ Those accords 
established a provisional military demarcation 
line and a demilitarized zone. They provided, in 
article 19, that the territory of North Viet-Nam 
was not to be used for the resumption of hostil- 
ities or to further an aggressive policy. In article 
24, North Viet-Nam undertook to respect the 
demilitarized zone and the territory of South 
Viet-Nam and to commit no act and undertake 
no operation against South Viet-Nam. 

North Viet-Nam's disregard for the territorial 
integrity of Laos and Cambodia and its use of 
force across their frontiers are equally contrary 
to specific international agreements and to the 
essential principles of law and order embodied 
in the United Nations Charter. Although you 
tell us that you respect the 1962 Laos agreements 
and the territorial integrity of Cambodia, it is 
unfortunately true that you violate them every 
day. 

North Viet-Nam's argument to justify its use 
of force against South Viet-Nam raises issues 
not only of international law. It also creates deep 
concern because of its implications for world 
peace and order. 

If all nations felt themselves entitled to use 
armed force across international boundaries and 
international demarcation lines, as North Viet- 
Nam has done, the world would be an extremely 
dangerous and disorderly place — and it is too 
dangerous and disorderly already. 

Ladies and gentlemen, North Viet-Nam's use 
of force across international boundaries and 
established demarcation lines is contrary to 
international law. It is inconsistent with the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
It is incompatible with any reasonable concept 
of an orderly international community. 

Continued resort to the use of force in dis- 
regard of international law is not the path to 
peace. Peace will not come to Viet-Nam as a 
result of military operations such as those you 
have been conducting since the end of February. 
Indeed, it must inevitably be hindered thereby. 
Your continued pursuit of military victory can 
lead only to further futile loss of life and 
destruction. 

Yet from all appearances, your side still pur- 
sues military victory. Apparently, this is the 



" For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents (Department of State publication 
6446), vol. I, p. 750. 



MAT 5, 1969 



389 



view of General Vo Nguyen Giap. In a recently 
published interview, read by millions of people 
around the world, General Giap scorned the 
negotiations in Paris and talked instead of giv- 
ing the United States a sound military beating. 
General Giap said he continues to be working 
for an American Dien Bien Phu. He admitted 
that North Viet-Nam had lost 500,000 men thus 
far in South Viet-Nam while trying to win a 
military victory. This terrible and futile sacri- 
fice of half a million human beings apparently 
does not deter Hanoi in its quest for victory. 
General Giap said emphatically that North Viet- 
Nam was determined to suffer and sacrifice as 
long as necessary, even as long as 50 years, to 
win complete military victory. 

Our side does not seek military victory in 
Viet-Nam. We and the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam have come to these Paris 
meetings to search for a negotiated settlement 
that will bring the war to an end. We have 
demonstrated, with specific and concrete pro- 
posals, our readiness to negotiate seriously. 

We have proposed the mutual withdrawal of 
all external forces from South Viet-Nam. That 
means that the military and subversive forces 
of North Viet-Nam would withdraw back to 
the North. We have said that we are prepared 
to begin the withdrawal of American and allied 
forces simultaneously with those of North Viet- 
Nam. 

We have called for full compliance with the 
1962 agreements on Laos and for respect for 
the territorial integrity of Cambodia. 

We have, in addition, proposed restoration 
of military respect for the demilitarized zone. 

We have also sought to discuss the question 
of early release of prisoners of war on both 
sides. 

If you are really interested in working out a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict in Viet- 
Nam, then you must enter into serious discus- 
sions of these central issues. The proposals we 
have made, we believe, will create in Viet-Nam 
and in Southeast Asia a situation in which the 
peoples and nations of that area can live in 
peace with one another. These proposals are 
consistent with international law and are de- 



signed to further the aim of an orderly inter- 
national community. 

We urge your side once again to examine 
these proposals with care and to enter into a 
serious discussion of them. 



Letters of Credence 

Botswana 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of Botswana, Chief Lenchwe Molefi 
Kgafela II, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Nixon on April 17. For texts of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
April 17. 

Lesodio 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho, Mothusi Thamsanqa 
Mashologu, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Nixon on April 17. For texts of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
April 17. 

Nepal 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Nepal, Kul Shekhar Sharma, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
April 17. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated AprU 17. 

Philippines 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of the Philippines, Ernesto V. Lagda- 
meo, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on April 17. For texts of the Ambas- 
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated 
April 17. 



390 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



The United States and the Arab-Israeli Dispute 



hy Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^ 



I am pleased to be with the American Acad- 
emy of Political and Social Science this evening 
to discuss the Arab-Israeli dispute. 

For 20 years peace, wliich is so sorely needed 
by all peoples in the area, has been elusive. One 
side sees in the creation of the State of Israel 
an act of aggression introducing outsiders into 
the Arab homeland. The other side sees the 
creation of the State of Israel as an act of 
destiny, an historic right, and a response to the 
world's conscience. 

Each side argues its case with firmness and 
passion. Israel has insisted upon direct nego- 
tiations and a peace treaty; the other side has 
adliered to the Khartoum formula of "no peace, 
no negotiations, and no recognition." Somehow 
ways must — and I believe can — be found to get 
around this impasse. If the climate of distrust 
can be replaced by an attitude of coexistence 
and live-and-let-live, enduring peace could in 
time become a reality. Such a fimdamental 
change is the goal of our efforts. As Secretary 
of State Kogers said the other day : ^ 

. . . the one factor that would guarantee a success- 
ful result would be a willingness on the part of all the 
nations to say, We want to live in peace. . . . 

It is a fair question to ask why instability in 
the Middle East need concern the United States. 

The most direct answer is that in a shrunken, 
interdependent world, areas of instability are 
too dangerous and could become the source of 
major-power conflict. In this connection, we are 
keenly aware that the expansion of Soviet in- 



' Address made before the annual meeting of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science at 
Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 11 (press release 78). 

'For Secretary Rogers' news conference of Apr. 7, 
see Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 357. 



fluence in the area in the past dozen years, and 
more particularly since the June war, has added 
a new dimension and complexity. Our own in- 
terests require an effective presence in the area. 
We have strategic interests arising from the 
simple fact that the Middle East is there — a 
crossroads of the world which the United States 
as a nation with global interests must take 
fully into account. 

We have long been involved in the area. We 
have roots in the Arab world which go back to 
early educational and missionary activities in 
the days before World War I, when the area was 
all part of the Ottoman Empire. Those roots 
were widened as American private enterprise 
acquired interests in developing the area's pe- 
troleum resources in the 1920's and 1930's. 

Our roots are also intertwined with the es- 
tablislmaent and development of Israel. The 
United States Government endorsed the Bal- 
four Declaration of 1917, was first to recognize 
the new State of Israel in 1948, and has sup- 
ported the security and well-being of Israel 
for two decades with a constancy rarely sur- 
passed in the history of relations between 
nations. 

The question therefore is not whether we 
should concern ourselves with the Middle East, 
but how. 

We have pursued our interests in four 
principal ways: 

First, we have constantly sought to prevent 
outright hostilities. To this end, we have looked 
primarily to the United Nations, and we have 
given full diplomatic and material support to 
its peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. 
Three outbreaks of war in the area in the last 
20 years, regrettably, reveal that we have had 



MAX 5, 1969 



391 



only limited success; nevertheless, in each in- 
stance it was possible to help localize the conflict 
before it broadened into more dangerous pro- 
jiortions. 

Second, we have sought to maintain free and 
mutually advantageous relations, to the extent 
possible, with all nations and peoples of the 
area and we have sought to encourage those 
nations to conduct tlieir mutual relations in ac- 
cordance with the principles of the U.N. 
Charter. Tliis attitude is consistent with our 
deep and abiding interest in Israel and our en- 
during interest in friendly relations with the 
Arab states and their himdred million people. 

Third, we have sought to slow the arms race, 
and we have hoped thereby to avoid becoming 
a major supplier of armaments. But we could 
not ignore large-scale deliveries of Soviet arms 
to some states in the area. Accordingly, from 
time to time, we have provided limited quan- 
tities of arms on a selected basis to such states 
as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, and 
Israel. At the same time, the United States has 
continued to explore possibilities for agreement 
on limitation of arms in the Middle East. Un- 
fortunately, the Soviets have shown no serious 
interest since the Jime war in discussing this 
matter with us. 

Finally, we have sought a stable peace— one 
which would help free the vast resources of the 
area, both material and human, for the good of 
the entire region. 

President Nixon's Steps To Encourage Peace 

Our immediate concern is that rather than 
making progress toward a peaceful settlement, 
the parties are gradually being drawn again to- 
ward a vortex of violence and recrimination. The 
present opportunity for settlement could slip 
away unless present trends in the area are 
reversed. 

In rec«nt days we have seen border incursions 
and raids by Arab commandos, terrorist bomb- 
ings in supermarkets and at a university, pro- 
longed artillery duels across the Suez, and re- 
taliatory strikes from the groimd and the air. 
Attacks on Israeli civil aircraft have posed 
grave risks to innocent people at international 
airports at Athens and Zurich. 

Both sides today seem to be seeking to justify 
their positions in more strident and menacing 



words; both stick tenaciously to strongly held 
positions. From the U.A.R. have come state- 
ments which indicate it does not feel bound by 
the U.N. cease-fire i-esolutions ; from Israel has 
come verbal and actual evidence of a policy of 
"active defense" against suspected Fedayeen 
bases. 

This is a somber picture, I know. It helps to 
explain why high priority has been given by 
President Nixon to the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
These are some of the principal steps taken by 
President Nixon since January 20 : 

There has been an intensive overall review of 
U.S. policy in the area, and a number of Na- 
tional Security Council meetings have been 
devoted to it. 

President Nixon made the Middle East con- 
flict a prime topic of discussions during liis 
recent European trip. , 

There have been serious exchanges of views I 
with the high-level representatives of the prin- 
cipal parties, including King Hussein of Jor- 
dan and Foreign Minister Eban of Israel. Nor 
has the lack of diplomatic relations impeded a 
free exchange with the U.A.R., including talks 
with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, President Nasser's J 
adviser for foreign affairs, who has been in 1 
Washington during the last 10 days. 

Intensive exploratory conversations are being 
pursued in Washington between representatives 
of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to see 
whether common or parallel views and actions 
can be agreed upon to promote a peaceful and 
accepted settlement in accordance with the 
Security Council resolution of November 1967.^ 
While it is too early to make a judgment regard- 
ing their prospective outcome, these talks and 
other bilateral diplomatic efforts are being car- 
ried forward in a serious vein, free of invective 
and propagandistic overtones, and have helped 
set the stage for four-power talks which are in 
train at the United Nations. 

And finally. President Nixon decided to 
pursue the new four-power approach in the 
belief that the present situation in the area has 
deteriorated, that the parties left to themselves 
have not been able to narrow their differences, 
and that the major powers have an interest and 
a responsibility in trying to do everything pos- 
sible to help bring calm to the area, to avoid 



' For the text of the resolution, see Bulletin of 
Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 



392 



DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN 



another general renewal of hostilities with all 
of the risks that would be involved, and to 
encourage steps toward peace. 

U.N. Resolution a Framework for Peace 

For the United States the framework for 
peace is contained in the U.N. Security Council 
resolution of November 22, 1967. If there is a 
short answer to what U.S. policy is, it is that 
resolution in all its provisions. I say "all its pro- 
visions" because each side likes to emphasize the 
parts it likes while deemphasizing or disregard- 
ing the provisions it dislikes. 

First: What is the objective? 

The resolution is very clear: The objective is 
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, not 
a fragile armistice arrangement. If a peace is to 
last, if it is to be just, it must be juridically 
defined and contractually binding. 

Second: What should be t/ie content of peace? 

I need only to repeat here precisely what 
Secretary Rogers said before the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee on March 27.* He 
said: 

A just and lasting peace will require, as the Security 
Council's resolution states, withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in the Arab- 
Israeli war of 1967, the termination of all claims or 
states of belligerency, and the acknowledgment of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political in- 
dependence of every state in the area and their right 
to live in peace within secure and recognized bound- 
aries. Clearly, withdrawal should take place to estab- 
lished boundaries which define the areas where Israel 
and its neighbors may live in peace and sovereign inde- 
pendence. Equally, there can be no secure and recog- 
nized boundaries without withdrawal. In our view 
rectifications from the preexisting lines should be 
confined to tho.se required for mutual security and 
should not reflect the weight of conquest. 

The Council's resolution also affirms the 
necessity for guaranteeing freedom of naviga- 
tion through international waterways in the 
area. It was the denial of such freedom to Israel 
through the Straits of Tiran which was the 
proximate cause of the 6-day war. For 20 years, 
Israel has been denied transit through the Suez 
Canal. A permanent peace must include the 
right for all states to traverse these waterways 
without discrimination. 

We deeply believe, too, that an overall settle- 



* Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1969, p. 305. 



ment must provide for a just solution of the 
refugee problem. Consistent with past U.N. 
resolutions, the refugees should be given a 
choice between repatriation and resettlement 
with compensation. Our hope is that a just set- 
tlement of the refugee problem can be achieved 
which takes into account the tragic human ele- 
ment and the concerns and requirements of both 
sides. There is need for a fundamental not an 
ephemeral solution. 

The Security Council resolution also affirms 
the need to guarantee the territorial inviola- 
bility and political independence of every 
state in the area through a variety of measures, 
including the establishment of demilitarized 
zones. We hope that practical arrangements can 
be made on the ground which will help guar- 
antee a peaceful settlement. We hope, too, it will 
prove possible for the U.N. to perform a useful 
function in this and other respects. We are fully 
aware of the limitations and imperfections of 
the world organization. But the fact of the mat- 
ter is that the U.N. Emergency Force helped 
maintain quiet along the demarcation lines for 
over a decade, and it may prove possible to have 
the U.N. involved in ways which will not make 
it possible for one party to eliminate its pres- 
ence unilaterally. 

Third: How can such elements of a settlement 
be put into effect m order to achieve a permanent 
peace? 

Operative paragraph 3 of the U.N. Security 
Council resolution calls on Ambassador Jarring 
"to establish and maintain contacts with the 
States concerned in order to promote agreement 
and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and 
accepted settlement." His job, therefore, is to 
promote agreement between the parties. We 
underscore this because we are convinced that 
if a peace is to be lasting, it will require the 
assent and full cooperation of the parties in 
the area. 

The Four-Power Talks 

Our hope is that the four-power talks which 
began last week will find ways to reinforce fu- 
ture efforts of the U.N. representative with the 
parties. This will be no easy task. We realize 
that common ground between the major parties 
cannot be achieved quickly — and indeed may not 
be realizable at all. We submitted some con- 
crete substantive ideas at the opening meeting. 



MAT 5, 1969 



as did some of the others. The early sessions in- 
dicate that all four powers agree the situation 
in the Middle East is serious and urgent and 
there appears to be considerable concern over 
the continuing wide gulf between the parties. 
Wliether this concern can be translated into com- 
mon or parallel positions which could be con- 
veyed to Ambassador Jarring and the parties 
for their consideration, only further time and 
explorations will tell. 

We do not conceive of the four-power ap- 
proach in lieu of Ambassador Jarrmg's efforts 
to achieve the objectives of the Security Council 
resolution. Our purpose is to help him buttress 
future efforts with the Arabs and the Israelis. 

We do not see four-power talks as a mecha- 
nism to impose peace. As President Nixon has 
said : ° 

The four powers . . . cannot dictate a settlement in 
the Middle East. The time has passed in which great 
nations can dictate to small nations their future where 
their vital interests are involved. 

We do not see a four-power solution as a sub- 
stitute for agreement between the parties. 

But common or parallel four-power views 
could influence the parties at least to narrow 
their differences and to make progress toward 
peace which ultimately could enliance the se- 
curity of both Israel and the Arab states. As 
Secretary Rogers said on April 7: "... the 
force of reasoning and the force of public 
opinion have a lot to do with influencing 
nations." 

We are determined to use all appropriate ap- 
proaches, bilateral and multilateral, to seek a 
rational and enduring settlement wliich wUl ad- 
vance U.S. national interests, insure Israel's 
survival, safeguard legitimate Arab interests, 
and take fully into account the interests of the 
world community. If there is to be a settlement, 
there must be compromises on both sides ; this is 
the essence of negotiated settlements. 

I cannot predict the results. We have no il- 
lusion about the difficulties ahead. But I am 
reminded of a remark of a great American 
when he said: "Optimism is to the diplomat 
what courage is to the soldier." We have no 
prescription for instant peace. I am certain, 
however, that no opportunity to achieve a fair 
settlement, so necessary and potentially bene- 
ficial to aU the peoples of the region, will be 
overlooked by the United States. 



THE CONGRESS 



' For President Nixon's news conference of Mar. 4, 
see BmxETiN of Mar. 24, 1969, p. 237. 



Department Discusses Air Transport 
Agreement With South Africa 

Statement hy Frank E. Loy ^ 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with 
you the way the State Department approached 
the question of the recent implementation of the 
1947 agreement granting South African Air- 
ways landing rights in New York.^ If I may, I 
would like to make a few general background 
remarks. 

It is the normal and traditional practice of 
the United States to encourage peaceful trade 
with other countries, even those with which we 
have serious differences. Historically, the United 
States has considered trade in peaceful goods a 
normal and desirable part of its relations with 
other countries. We normally do not base our 
economic relations with other coimtries on 
whether we approve or disapprove of their 
forms of goverimient or conduct. Exceptions 
have been rare and have generally been made 
where security interests were directly affected. 

In addition to trade, we have fostered the free 
exchange of persons and ideas and the expansion 
of cultural relations on a worldwide basis. Proud 
of our dynamic ideas, our convictions, and our 
aspirations, we have furthered contacts of all I 
kinds with peoples all over the globe, convinced 
that over time we can develop mutual under- 
standing and promote our democratic values. 

Turning from these general concepts to the 
case of South Africa, we find that our Govern- 
ment has taken every opportunity to express its 
abhorrence of the South African Government's 
efforts to give the force of law to repugnant dis- 
criminatory practices and to elevate racial dis- 
crimination to the dignity of an official ideology. 
Our own experience with racial discrimiaation, J 
and our Government's efforts to eliminate it, " 
have made us acutely aware of the tragic mis- 

•Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Apr. 2. Mr. Loy 
is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and 
Telecommmiications. 

• Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1639, 
2870, 6512. 



394 



DEPAETMaiNT OF STATE BTJLLETIK 



take being made by the South African Govern- 
ment and have made it impossible for us, as a 
Government, to refrain from taking a strong 
stand on apartheid in our bilateral relations 
with South Africa and at the United Nations. 
Considering the deprivation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms to be matters of in- 
ternational concern, we have made repeated 
representations to South Africa, and we have 
voted in the United Nations for resolutions con- 
demning apartheid. 

As concrete evidence of our determination not 
to contribute to the enforcement of apartheid or 
the further development of a white redoubt in 
Southern Africa, we do not send to South 
Africa any arms, ammunition, or military 
equipment or materials for their manufacture 
or maintenance. 

Despite the depth of our differences with 
South Africa, and in harmony with our general 
policy, we permit normal and lawful trade with 
South Africa and neither encourage nor dis- 
courage investment there. We do this because 
we believe it is important to keep open the lines 
of communication in order to continue to bring 
to bear a constructive influence and to keep in 
touch with the many people in South Africa, 
both white and nonwhite, who question the di- 
rection of apartheid policy. Moreover, we do not 
believe that the system of racial repression in 
South Africa would be changed for the better 
if we were to follow a policy of economic 
quarantine or isolation. 

It was in this framework that the United 
States considered the South African request 
to have routes for its carrier defined under our 
air transport agreement. Our decision to pro- 
ceed with negotiations was made with full un- 
derstanding that there were negative factors to 
be taken into account but was in keeping with 
our general policy on peaceful economic ex- 
changes and toward South Africa. 

Another consideration we could not ignore 
concerned the terms of our existing agreement. 
In 1947 we granted South Africa landing rights 
in New York, with the exact routes to be de- 
termined later. Wlien South Africa recently 
came forward to claim its side of the bargain, 
we were faced with a choice. We could either 
honor our commitment or we could put at risk 
continued air service between the two coimtries, 
with consequent damage to our economic in- 
terests as well as to our general trade policy. 
We concluded that we would gain nothing by 
reneging : In the absence of direct air service, 



the traffic between the two countries would 
be shifted to the many carriers of other coun- 
tries that serve South Africa; and in any case 
our action was not likely to improve racial con- 
ditions in South Africa. On the other hand, by 
honoring our conunitment we would also safe- 
guard our economic interests. I should add that 
our carrier has benefited from its rights for more 
than 20 years. 

Eegarding the United Nations General As- 
sembly resolution^ that requested member 
states to deny landing and passage facilities to 
South African aircraft, I would like to point 
out that that resolution is not mandatory in 
character and did not receive United States 
supjjort when it was passed. 

In response to a message from the Apartheid 
Committee, forwarded to the U.S. Government 
by the U.N. Secretary General, the United 
States made clear its view that it was in no way 
acting contrary to its obligations under the 
United Nations Charter in fulfilling its long- 
standing contractual obligation to South 
Africa.* 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the conven- 
tion on international civil aviation (Chicago, 1944) 
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at Buenos 
Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Acceptances: Niger, Togo, April 11, 1969. 
Signature: Ivory Coast, April 15, 1969. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968.' 

Signatures at Washington: Jamaica, April 14, 1969; 
Malta, AprU 18, 19G9. 



" U.N. doc. A/RES/1761 (XVII). 

* For text of the committee's letter dated Feb. 20, see 
U.N. doc. A/7516; for the U.S. reply dated Mar. 5, see 
U.N. doc. A/7524. 

' Not In force. 



MAT 5, 1969 



395 



Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination. Done at New York Decem- 
ber 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969." 
Ratiflcation deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (with reservation and declaration), 
April 8, 1969. 
Accession deposited: Swaziland, April 7, 1969. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington, London, and Moscow Janu- 
ary 27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. 
TIAS 6347. 

Notiftcation deposited at Wa^hinffton that it con- 
tinues to 6e hound: Mauritius, April 16, 1969. 
Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Accession deposited at Washington: Mauritius, 

April 16, 1969. 
Ratification deposited at Washington: Bulgaria, 
April 16, 1969. 

BILATERAL 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities un- 
der title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 
as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), with annex. 
Signed at Santo Domingo March 28, 1969. Entered 
into force March 28, 1969. 

Greece 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, as 
amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton July 17, 1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964. 
TIAS 5618, 6009, 6456. 
Terminated: January 1, 1968. 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with 
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens 
April 8, 1969. Entered into force April 8, 1969; ef- 
fective January 1, 1968. 

Japan 

Agreement relating to a program for the acquisition 



and production in Japan of the F-4EJ aircraft and 
related equipment and materials. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tokyo April 4, 1969. Entered into 
force AprU 4, 1969. 

Korea 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreements of March 25, 1967 (TIAS 
6272), and October 23, 1968 (TIAS 6595). Signed at 
Seoul April 8, 1969. Entered into force April 8, 1969. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the agreement of February 4, 
1966, relating to continuation of a cooperative mete- 
orological observation program in Mexico (TIAS 
5977). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and 
Tlatelolco April 2, 1969. Entered into force April 2, 
1969. 



' Not in force for the United States. 



Corrections 

Bulletin of April 14, 1969, page 305 

Secretary Rogers' March 27 statement before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations con- 
tains a printer's error. The third sentence in the 
third full paragraph in the second column should 
read : "Clearly, withdrawal should take place to 
established boundaries which define the areas 
where Israel and its neighbors may live in peace 
and sovereign Independence." 

Bulletin of March 24, 1969, page 266 

President Nixon's remarks on departure from 
Ciampino Airport, Rome, on February 28 should 
begin : "Mr. Prime Minister and Your Excel- 
lencies : As we leave Rome I want you to know 
how deeply grateful I am for the hospitality that 
has been extended to us on our visit and how 
reassured I am by our conversations with the 
President, vrith you, and with members of your 
Government with regard to the future relations 
between the United States and Italy. . . ." 

The remarks, appearing in the second column 
on page 266, incorrectly attributed to President 
Saragat, were made by Italian Prime Minister 
Mariano Rumor. 



396 



DEPABTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX May 5, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1558 



Asia. President Nixou's News Conference of 
April 18 (excerpts) 377 

Aviation. Department Discusses Air Transport 

Agreement Witli South Africa (Loy) ... .391 

Botswana. Letters of Credence (Leneliwe) . . 390 

Congress. Department Discusses Air Transport 

Agreement Witti Soutli Africa (Loy) . . . 394 

Diplomacy. Tlie Complexity of World Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Germany. The Complexity of World Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Korea 

President Nixou's News Conference of Ajjril 18 

(excerpts) 377 

Unarmed U.S. Reconnaissance Plane in Interna- 
tional Airspace Shot Down by North Korea 
(Defense Department statement and text of 
U.S. statement at Military Armistice Commis- 
sion) 382 

Latin America 

A New Approach to Pan American Problems 

(Nixon) 384 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week. 

1909 (proclamation) 3S6 

Lesotho. Letters of Credence (Mashologu) . . 390 

Military Affairs 

President Nixon's News Conference of April 18 

(excerpts) 377 

Unarmed U.S. Reconnaissance Plane in Interna- 
tional Airspace Shot Down by North Korea 
(Defense Department statement and text of 
U.S. statement at Military Armistice Commis- 
sion) 3.S2 

Near East 

The Complexity of World Affairs (Rogers) . . 3S7 

The United States and the Arab-Israeli Dispute 

(Sisco) 391 

NepaL Letters of Credence (Sharma) .... 390 

Nigeria. The Complexity of World Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Peru. The Complesit.y of World Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Philippines. Letters of Credence (Lagdameo) 390 

Presidential Documents 

A New Approach to Pan American Problems . 384 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week. 

1969 386 

President Nixon's News Conference of April 18 

(excerpts) 377 

South Africa. Department Discusses Air Trans- 
port Agreement With South Africa (Loy) 394 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 395 

Department Discusses Air Transiwrt Agreement 

With South Africa (Loy) 394 



U.S.S.R. President Nixon's News Conference of 

April 18 (excerpts) 377 

United Nations. The United States and the 

Arab-Israeli Dispute (Sisco) 391 

Viet-Nam 

The Complexity of World Affairs (Rogers) . . 387 
President Nixon's News Conference of April 18 

(excerpts) 377 

13th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 388 

Name Indew 

Knapp, Maj. Gen. James B 382 

Lagdameo, Ernesto V 390 

Chief Lenchwe Molefi Kgafela II 390 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 388 

Loy, Frank E 3W 

Mashologu, Mothusi Thamsanqa 390 

Nixon, President 377,384,386 

Rogers, Secretary 387 

Sharma, Kul Shekhar 390 

Sisco, Joseph J 391 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the OfiSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 

Release issued prior to April 20 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 78 of April 11. 

No. Date Subject 

*S2 4/14 Eisenhower sworn in as Ambassador 
to Belgium (biograpliic details). 

*S3 4/14 Annenberg sworn in as Ambassador 
to Great Britain (biographic de- 
tails). 
84 4/16 Rogers : American Society of News- 
paper Editors. 

185 4/17 Meyer : Subcommittee on AVestem 
Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 
<S6 4/17 I-odge : 13th plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris. 
87 4/1 7 Maj. Gen. James B. Knapp : State- 
ment at Military Armistice Com- 
mission, Panmunjom, Korea. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 2o402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 




N AVT O 

20YEARS OF PEACE 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1559 




May 12, 1969 



VIETNAM IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF EAST ASIA 

Address by Secretary Rogers 397 

CURRENT U.S.-PERUVIAN PROBLEMS 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Meyer lfi6 

U.S. VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPON MATERIAL CUTOFF AGREEMENT 
AND VERIFICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAJ^ 

Statement '^^y^^^'^gr^^S^ Fisher ]fi9 

Superintendent of Documents 

MAY 2 3 1969 
DEPOSITORY 
For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1559 
May 12, 1969 



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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
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Public Affairs, provides the public and 
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Viet-Nam in the Perspective of East Asia 



Address iy Secretary Rogers ^ 



The otJier night I had dinner with Dean 
Acheson and he noted that I was being cast in 
the role of a peacemaker. He said he thought I 
should know that one of our predecessors was 
Abel P. Upshur, who was Secretary of State 
in President Tyler's Cabinet. Shortly after his 
appointment Upsliur was asked to particii^ate 
in a naval ceremony involving a huge new iron 
cannon capable of delivering a 225-pound pro- 
jectile. The cannon had been named the "Peace- 
maker." Unfortunately, during the ceremony 
the Peacemaker was fired, it burst, and the Sec- 
retary of State was killed. Mr. Acheson sug- 
gested that, as we approached the arms control 
talks, I would do well to keep Abel P. Upshur 
in mind. 

With this admonition in mind, let me begin 
by saying that tliis administration is determined 
to work for a reduction of world armaments, for 
a general alleviation of world tensions, and for 
negotiations on whatever international issiies 
appear to offer reasonable hope of resolution. 

We hope, for example, that we shall be able 
to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union to 
avoid another spiral in the nuclear arms race. 
But at tlie same time we cannot predicate our 
security decisions now on the potential success 
of future endeavors. 

We would very much have preferred to avoid 
spending money on an anti-ballistic-missile sys- 
tem, but our analysis of Soviet forces and de- 
veloping Chinese capability convinced us that 
this decision could not be postponed. 

The Soviet Union is continuing to develop 
its own defensive missile system and to expand 
its inventory of powerful offensive missiles. The 
U.S.S.E. recently annoimced it intends to con- 
duct additional ICBM tests to the Pacific 
Ocean. Only last week one of these tests included 
firing of an SS-9 equipped with multiple re- 



^ Made on Apr. 21 at New York, N.Y., before the As- 
sociated Press annual luncheon (press release 88; 
advance test). 



entry vehicles. Since the Soviets indicated 
plans to use the range through June 15, we can 
only assume that testing of the SS-9 will pro- 
ceed at a steady pace. 

We believe that with the Safeguard system 
we are proceeding in a restrained and nonpro- 
vocative way to meet our minimum security 
needs. We have deliberately built into this deci- 
sion an annual review appraisal in which one 
of the principal factors will be the status of 
talks on the limitation of strategic arms. 

Arms limitation is one area in which negotia- 
tions may prove fruitful. We shall also be 
seeking to resolve deep political issues by nego- 
tiation, as well. You are aware of the delicate 
diplomatic efforts underway with respect to the 
Middle East. But today I should Uke to discuss 
with you the negotiations for a peaceful settle- 
ment in Viet-Nam in the broader context of 
East Asia as a whole. 



Trend Toward a Regional Community 

The tragedy of war below the l7th parallel 
in Southeast Asia has obscured the larger events 
and the longer trends in the vast area washed 
by the Pacific Ocean. 

Japan, for example, has become the third 
greatest industrial nation in the world and is 
now taking the lead in assisting less developed 
countries in Asia. 

The Republic of China has doubled the per 
capita income of its population in a single 
decade — and this country also is aiding others. 
It now provides technical assistance to more 
than 20 other nations. 

South Korea has recovered from the wreck- 
age of war and has become independent of eco- 
nomic aid from the outside. Her exports have 
jumped phenomenally in the past 5 years. 

Indonesia — after 20 years of blustering lead- 
ership and external adventure, of inflation and 
accumulation of debt, of bureaucratic strangula- 



MAT 12, 1969 



397 



tion and economic decline — has returned from 
the brink of Communist takeover and from the 
verge of economic collapse. Largely by their 
own efforts, the Indonesians have put their 
economic house in order and are launched into 
an ambitious economic and social development 
program. It is an extraordinary reversal of 
outlook from just a few years ago. 

Meanwhile Malaysia, Thailand, the Philip- 
pines, and Singapore have made rapid sus- 
tained economic progress. Several of the 
nations in East Asia are among the most 
rapidly developing countries in the world. 

As economic and social progress quickens, 
there is a growing sense of interdependence in 
East Asia. 

An institutional framework for regional co- 
operation for the common good is now emerg- 
ing. Australia and New Zealand, happily, are 
taking part in this ; increasingly they see their 
future in the Asian context and not as remote 
appendages of Europe. 

There is plentiful evidence of new horizons 
opening up in East Asia in development financ- 
ing, marketing arrangements, transportation 
projects, "miracle rice," rural progress, and the 
like. 

In this vast, diversified, populous part of the 
world, fatalism is dying and ferment prevails; 
there is a new vitality and self-confidence — a 
healthy inclination on the part of Asians to 
take charge of their own affairs, to depend less 
on other parts of the world, and to help each 
other in the process. There is an early but clear 
trend toward the evolution of a regional com- 
munity of peaceful, cooperative nations. 

Security, Political, and Development Problems 

I do not wish to gild the lily. There are secu- 
rity problems in the area — a point which was 
made brutally and tragically over the Sea of 
Japan just a few days ago. 

As you know, the unprovoked attack last 
week by Korean fighters on an unai-med Ameri- 
can reconnaissance plane flying in international 
airspace has led the President to provide armed 
escorts for such flights. 

There are political problems in East Asia, 
too — not least of them being the future of 
Okinawa, which we shall be discussing with the 
Japanese a bit later this year. 

Also, of course, there are immense economic 
development problems ahead, exacerbated in 
places by excessive rates of population growth. 



The future in East Asia will be neither 
smooth nor placid. Yet not many years ago it 
seemed all too likely that a militant, aggressive 
totalitarianism might well be the wave of the 
future in East Asia. There was a mood of fear 
and apprehension, a sense of the inevitable 
about new doctrines of revolutionary violence. 

Yet that seemingly irresistible tide turned 
out to be resistible, and a quite different future 
is now in prospect for the community of Pacific 
nations. 

Relations With Communist China 

One cannot speak of a future Pacific com- 
munity without reference to China. 

The United States Government understands 
perfectly well that the Republic of China on 
the island of Taiwan and Communist China on 
the mainland are both facts of life. 

We know that by virtue of its size, popula- 
tion, and the talents of its jjeople, mainland 
China is bound to play an important role in 
East Asian and Pacific affairs. 

We have attempted to maintain a dialogue 
with the leaders of Communist China through 
periodic meetings in Warsaw; and we were 
disappointed 2 months ago when those leaders 
saw fit to cancel at the last moment a continua- 
tion of those talks. 

We have made a number of specific sugges- 
tions — an exchange of journalists, a relaxation 
of travel restrictions, the sale of grain and 
pharmaceuticals — in the hope that such steps 
would lead to a better climate between us. We 
regret that these overtures have been rejected — 
and that the leaders of Communist China have 
elected instead to attack the Nixon administra- 
tion in public pronouncements. 

Of course we recognize and have treaty re- 
lations with the Republic of China, which plays 
a responsible and constructive role in the in- 
ternational community. Wliatever may be the 
ultimate resolution of the dispute between the 
Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China on the mainland, we believe 
strongly it must be brought about by peaceful 
means. 

As things stand now, Communist China is in 
trouble domestically and externally. The pres- 
ent leaders look with enmity or suspicion upon 
their neighbors. They are hostile toward the 
United Nations; hostile toward the United 
States; hostile toward the Soviet Union; and 
have shown little interest in normal diplomatic 



.^98 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULUrriX 



relations with other countries. They still preach 
violence as a jjermanent way of life. 

We can expect all this to change with time. 
Not even a nation as large as mainland China 
can live forever in isolation from a world of 
interdependent states. 

Meanwhile, we shall take initiatives to re- 
establish more normal relations with Commu- 
nist China and we shall remain responsive to 
anj' indications of less hostile attitudes from 
their side. 

I have referred to these broad developments 
in the Pacific world today partly because it is 
a generally encouraging story that has been 
largely obscured from view by the war in Viet- 
Nam and also because they serve as a backdrop 
for a brief discussion of Viet-Nam. 

Concrete Proposals for Peace in Viet-Nam 

The United States is committed to achieving 
a peace in Viet-Nam which will permit the peo- 
ple of South Viet-Nam to determine their own 
future, free from outside interference by 
anyone. 

That is our objective. It has been stated many 
times. It is known to all concerned. It is not 
subject to change. 

The South Vietnamese, together with the five 
allies who responded to their appeal for help, 
have denied the North Vietnamese Communists 
the military victory they were seeking. Together 
we have safeguarded the right of the people in 
the South to make their own decisions. 

The leaders in Hanoi know that they cannot 
win by military means. 

That is why there is a new sense of self-confi- 
dence in South Viet-Nam. 

And that is why we can now be deeply en- 
gaged, as we are, in an intensive program of 
upgrading the equipment and combat capabil- 
ity of the armed forces of the Eepublic of Viet- 
Nam so they are able to take over an ever larger 
measure of their own defense. 

I want to emphasize that this is something 
that the leaders of South Viet-Nam very much 
want — and have so stated publicly and 
privately. 

Tliis, of course, is what we want, too. 

The readiness of replacement forces, the level 
of oif ensive actions by the enemy, or progress in 
the Paris peace talks will determine the scope 
and timing of actual transfers of responsi- 
bility — and the consequent release of our forces. 

In Paris we have put forward concrete pro- 



posals for bringing an end to armed conflict in 
Viet-Nam. These proposals have been drawn up 
on the assumption that the leaders of North 
Viet-Nam are, in fact, now prepared to negoti- 
ate an end to the war. On this assimijition, we 
seek to negotiate the withdrawal of all outside 
combat forces from the territory of South Viet- 
Nam. This process of troop withdrawal cannot 
get started by postulating abstract propositions. 
It cannot get started by taking last things first. 
It must begin at the beginning. 

The obvious way to begin is to start a with- 
drawal of North Vietnamese and American 
armed forces simultaneously. The forces would 
have to be withdrawn on some fair and equitable 
basis. Departures would have to be phased over 
a period of time. Verification procedures would 
be needed. 

These are difficult but not insuperable prob- 
lems. We are not dogmatic about the details. 
They could be negotiated out if Hanoi has a 
serious desire for peace. 

A mutual withdrawal of external forces from 
Viet-Nam by reasonable stages would bring 
about deescalation of fighting. It could then 
lead to next steps : a total elimination of outside 
combat forces, cessation of hostilities, and a re- 
tiim to peace. We see no good reason why that 
process should not begin soon. 

There are other concrete steps that we are 
prepared to discuss and which we have tabled 
in Paris. 

We would like to talk about how to put an 
agreed end to all military activity in the demili- 
tarized zone established by the Geneva accords 
of 1951:. This, too, could contribute to a reduc- 
tion in hostilities. 

We also would like to discuss the release of 
prisoners. This is a matter of deep humanitar- 
ian concern to us and, in addition, could lead to 
an improvement in the general atmosphere. 

Here are three specific, practical, and man- 
ageable issues for negotiation. We are prepared 
to take them up one at a time or all together. 
They are all negotiable matters. 

What does the other side propose ? It proposes 
that United States forces leave imconditionally 
while the North Vietnamese forces stay to do 
as they please. Can any reasonable person sug- 
gest that this shows a present willingness to 
negotiate ? 

Why hasn't Hanoi come forward with realis- 
tic proposals for a practical start toward peace ? 
We have made our suggestions. What are their 
suggestions ? Obviously if they should continue 



MAT 12, 1969 



to say "You get out and we -will stay," there is 
nothing to negotiate. 

We have recognized right along that as we 
work toward these priority areas of military 
agreement, attention must also be given to the 
political area. It is clear that political matters 
will need to be discussed and that this is a ques- 
tion to be worked out by the South Vietnamese 
themselves. In point of fact, President Thieu 
has taken a constructive initiative on this aspect 
of the problem in declaring the readiness of 
South Viet-Nam to talk to the National Libera- 
tion Front. We see no reason why the military 
and political aspects of a settlement cannot be 
worked out at the same time. 

We shall continue to work hard at Paris to- 
ward this objective. We shall continue to pre- 
sent the most constructive suggestions possible. 
We are prepared at all times to hear what the 
other side has to offer. And we hope that the 
assumption behind our efforts in Paris — that 
the other side is now prepared to negotiate seri- 
ously for an end to the war — is the right 
assumption. 

We have not, however, placed all our eggs in 
one basket. We have to be prepared for the un- 
welcome contingency that the other side does 
not yet want to negotiate a peaceful settlement. 
We are not prepared to assume that the only 
alternative to early progress in the peace talks 
is an indefinite extension of our present role. 

This is why such high priority is being given 
to preparing South Vietnamese forces to assume 
a growing share of the combat burden and why 
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
is giving such high priority to developing the 
political luiity of the country. These efforts are 
well imderway. They wUl be carried out sys- 
tematically and urgently. 

But progress toward peace can be accelerated 
significantly if the other side is prepared to get 
down to practical negotiations on mutual force 
withdrawals in the near future. 

This is the present issue in Paris: whether 
peace comes more gradually or more rapidly to 
Viet-Nam. It is a decision for Hanoi, and we 
hope it will be positive. 

For our part, we have specific proposals on 
the table in Paris which we believe are sensible 
and practical. 

We are ready to listen to alternative pro- 
posals. 

We are also preparing for the unwelcome 
contingency that the other side does not yet 
want to negotiate a peaceful settlement. 



And we have a clear view of the contribution 
that a peaceful settlement in South Viet-Nam 
and Southeast Asia would make to the security 
and outlook of East Asia as a whole — to the 
emergence of a peaceful, prosperous community 
of nations bordering the Pacific. 

This is our hope for peace and security in 
Asia. 

We Americans have high stakes in this — not 
just because we have military power in the 
Pacific, but because we happen to be a member 
of the Pacific community of nations. History, 
geography, economics, and our national inter- 
ests make this a fact. So does our national | 
commitment to an orderly world and to the 
ways of peace. We must fulfiU that national 
commitment. 



U.S. and Peru Resume Talks 
on Outstanding Problems 

Department Statement ^ 

The meetings between the United States and 
Peru on outstanding problems will be resumed 
in Washington on Monday [April 28]. Agree- 
ment to continue the search for solutions on the 
issues was announced jointly in Lima April 7 
by President Velasco and Ambassador Irwin 
[John N. Irwin II, special emissary of Presi- 
dent Nixon] .^ 

These conversations are in addition to the 
administrative process now going on in Peru. 
Secretary Rogers in liis April 7 statement 
pointed out that this process and these conver- 
sations constitute appropriate steps toward 
compensation of the International Petroleum 
Co. within the meaning of the Hickenlooper 
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and 
of the amended Sugar Act.' We welcome this 
opportunity to continue these talks, because we 
believe that additional matters can be discussed 
which may not be developed in the administra- 
tive process and that constructive proposals 
can be considered by the two Governments for 
solving the outstanding differences. 



^ Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Apr. 25. 

' For a Department statement of Apr. 9, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 364. 

'For a statement made by Secretary Rogers at his 
news conference of Apr. 7, see ihid., p. 357. 



400 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



The Peruvian officials are due to arrive in 
"Washington today [April 25]. The Peruvian 
Government has announced that their group 
will be headed by Gen. Marco Fernandez Baca 
and -will include Col. Arturo Valdes, Dr. Al- 
berto Euiz Eldridge, and Ambassador Edwin 
Letts. 

The U.S. group to meet with them will con- 
sist of Ambassador Irwin as chairman ; Ambas- 
sador Douglas Henderson as deputy chairman ; 
and the following: Leonard C. Meeker, Legal 
Adviser of the Department; Mark B. Feld- 
man, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter- Ameri- 
can Affairs ; Ambassador Donald L. McKeman, 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; 
Walter Levy, Consultant to the Department; 
and William P. Stedman, Jr., Director of the 
Office of Ecuadorean- Peruvian Affairs. 



U.S., U.S.S.R. Conclude Technical Talks 
on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions 

Joint Communique ^ 

The Soviet-U.S. teclinical discussions on 
peaceful uses of nuclear explosions took place 
in Vienna from the 14th to the 16th of April 
1969. 

Soviet participants included Academician 
Federov, First Deputy Chairman of the State 
Committee on Atomic Energy Morokliov, 
Messrs. Kedrovskiy, Israel, Rodionov, Grinew- 
skiy, and Gudkov. 

U.S. participants included U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commissioner G. F. Tape, Messrs. 
R. E. Batzel, A. Holzer, J. S. Kelly, J. Rosen, 
H. Scoville, N. Sievering, and G. C. Werth. 

The parties were of the view that under- 
ground nuclear explosions may be successfully 
used in the not so far off future to stimulate oil 
and gas production and to create underground 
cavities. It may also be technically feasible to 
use them in earth-moving work for the construc- 
tion of water reservoirs in arid areas, to dig 
canals and in removing the upper earth layer 
in surface mining, etc. 

Although the economics will vary from proj- 
ect to project the use of nuclear explosions for 
these purposes is promising and would permit 
operations under conditions where conventional 



methods are either impossible or impracticable. 
Provided that certain requirements are met, the 
present state of technology wiU make it pos- 
sible to carry out underground explosions fully 
meeting national or generally accepted inter- 
national safety standards for the protection of 
the public from radiation. 

Both delegations concluded that the exchange 
of views on the status of this technology was 
very useful and the experts deem it desirable 
to have additional technical exchanges. Al- 
though these talks were not concerned with how 
peaceful nuclear explosion benefits are to be 
provided pursuant to Article V of the NPT 
[Nonproliferation Treaty],^ the parties con- 
sidered these talks very timely in light of this 
provision of the NPT which ensures that poten- 
tial benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to the 
non-nuclear weapon states adlaering to the 
Treaty. 



14th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Follo^oing is the opening statement made hy 
AmhassadoT Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.S. delegation, at the IJith plenary session of 
the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
April 24- 

Press release 91 dated April 24 

Ladies and gentlemen: We have contended 
over the past weeks that it is the presence of 
North Vietnamese military forces and subver- 
sive personnel in South Viet-Nam and elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia which is at the heart of the 
Viet-Nam problem. 

The United States, however, has not come to 
these Paris meetings to convince your side to 
accept our view of history. At the same time, 
your side cannot seriously expect us to accept 
your charge of American aggression when the 
facts point to the opposite conclusion. 

It is for tliis reason that in the first plenary 
session of these meetings, I urged your side to 
forgo the repetition of familiar charges and the 
recitation of the chronology which brought us 



■ Issued at Vienna on Apr. 16. 



' For text of the treaty, see Bulletin of July 1, 1968, 
p. 9. 



MAT 12, 1969 



401 



here. We have nonetheless spent 13 weeks listen- 
ing to your version of history. 

Nevertheless, the exchanges we have had 
around this table have been useful in helping us 
to understand one another's point of view and 
clarify our own viewpoints. Now we have both 
adequately set forth our views on the question 
of aggression and responsibility for the war. 

Let us, therefore, now get down to the task 
of bringing the war in Viet-Nam to an end. Let 
us seek practical solutions to practical problems. 

There is one key practical step which botli 
sides can take that would go a long way to bring 
the fighting to an end. That step is for the ex- 
ternal forces on both sides to begin the process 
of withdrawal from South Viet-Nam. 

Your demand for the total, unconditional, 
and unilateral withdrawal of all United States 
and allied forces from South Viet-Nam, without 
taking any account of the need for the with- 
drawal of North Vietnamese forces, is not a 
serious proposal for negotiation. This demand 
ignores the central issue of the war in Viet- 
Nam : the massive and illegal presence of North 
Vietnamese militaiy forces and subversive per- 
sonnel in South Viet-Nam. We can only inter- 
pret your proposal for unilateral withdrawal 
as meaning that North Viet-Nam wishes to con- 
tinue its unlawful military presence in South 
Viet-Nam in order to take over the South by 
force. 

The military and subversive forces illegally 
sent into South Viet-Nam from North Viet- 
Nam are "external" to South Viet-Nam and 
have no right to be there. No arguments that 
American and other allied forces are the only 
foreign forces in Viet-Nam will change this 
basic truth. 

As Secretary Kogers said on April 21 : ^ 

A mutual withdrawal of external forces from Viet- 
Nam by reasonable stages would bring about deescala- 
tion of fighting. It could then lead to next steps : a total 
elimination of outside combat forces, cessation of hos- 
tilities, and a return to peace. We see no good reason 
wh.v that process should not begin soon. 

The withdrawal of the external forces of your 
side back to North Viet-Nam is an essential 
step toward peace. For our part, we are pre- 
pared to begin the withdrawal of United States 
forces from South Viet-Nam simultaneously 
with the external forces on your side. 

It is equally evident that peace in South Viet- 
Nam and Southeast Asia cannot be insured so 



' See p. 397. 



long as North Viet-Nam continues to maintain 
its troops in Laos and Cambodia and to use the 
territory of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration 
into South Viet-Nam and as a base of operations 
against South Viet-Nam. That is why the 
United States has said that a lasting settlement 
must include full compliance with the 1962 
agreements on Laos and full respect for the 
territorial integrity of Cambodia. There must 
be a withdrawal of all North Vietnamese 
forces from Cambodia and Laos back to North 
Viet-Nam. 

North Viet-Nam attempts to deny the fact of 
its presence in Laos and Cambodia with asser- 
tions that it has always respected the 1962 
Geneva agreements on Laos and the territorial 
integrity of Cambodia. Yet the evidence to the 
contrary is known and accepted by the world 
at large. We must thus conclude from your state- 
ments on this subject that your side is not yet 
ready to deal with reality. 

We also believe that, pending reunification ■ 
of Viet-Nam through the free decision of the ' 
people of South Viet-Nam and the people of 
North Viet-Nam, respect for the status of the 
demilitarized zone is an important element of ^ 
a durable peace. We should put an agreed end 
to all military activity in the demilitarized zone 
established by the 1954 Geneva accords. 

We have also proposed the earliest possible 
release of prisoners of war by both sides. This 
is a matter of deep humanitarian concern to us. 

We, of course, also recognize the importance 
of political issues in any lasting settlement. 

We see no reason why the militaiy and politi- ■ 
cal aspects of a settlement cannot be worked out " 
at the same time. The United States believes 
that the political future of South Viet-Nam 
must be worked out by the South Vietnamese 
themselves. We shall respect whatever choice 
they make about their political future in a con- 
text free of compulsion or coercion by anyone. 
Your side must recognize that no undertaking 
of importance with regard to South Viet-Nam 
can be carried out without the approval of the 
legitimate government of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam. Therefore, you must be prepared, as the 
Government of the Eepublic of Viet-Nam is 
prepared, to begin the process of serious discus- 
sion among South Vietnamese of the elements 
of a political solution. 

Your side has charged that the United States 
wants to keep these Paris meetings at a stand- 
still in order to gain time in which to carry out 



402 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



a "Vietnamization" of the resistance to your 
attack on South Viet-Nam. The truth is that the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is in- 
creasing its capability to defend itself. The 
South Vietnamese forces are engaged in a 
systematic effort to enable them to assume a 
growing share of the combat burden in South 
Viet-Nam. The Government of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam is also giving high priority to 
developing political unity and administrative 
strength in the country. 

If your side continues its futile pursuit of 
military victory, then the people of South Viet- 
Nam, with the aid of their allies, will continue 
to defend themselves. But progress toward 
peace can be hastened significantly if your 
side is prepared in the near future to engage 
in practical negotiations on mutual force 
withdrawals. 



President Marks 21st Anniversary 
of the State of Israel 

Following is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Nixon to Zalman Shazar, President of the 
State of Israel. 

White House press release dated April 22 

Dear Mr. PREsroENT : My warmest congratu- 
lations go out to you and your people on the 
occasion of the twenty-first anniversary of the 
State of Israel. 

As so many of my fellow Americans, I deeply 
admire the accomplishments your country has 
realized in the course of its young life. Ad- 
versity has been your challenge as you have 
pressed forward in the face of overwhelming 
odds toward progress and well-being for your 
citizens. 

But as so many peace-loving men and women 
throughout the world, I, too, am deeply dis- 
turbed and saddened by the conflict that has 
marred the great success you have attained. 

So on this anniversary, as I share your satis- 
faction in the continuing achievements of your 
nation, I also join with you — and with all men 
of goodwill — in the fervent hope that peace 
may soon accompany the prosperity you enjoy. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 



The U.S. Balance of Payments 

Statement hy President Nixon ^ 

In my fiscal message to the Congress on 
March 26, 1 called for a strong budget surplus 
and monetary restraint to curb an inflation that 
has been allowed to run into its fourth year. 
This is fundamental economics, and I pointed 
out that we intend to deal with fundamentals. 

Similarly, the problem of regaining equi- 
librium in the U.S. balance of payments cannot 
be solved with expedients that postpone the 
problem to another year. We shall stop treating 
symptoms and start treating causes, and we 
shall find our solutions in the framework of 
freer trade and payments. 

Fundamental economics calls for: 

— creating the conditions that make it pos- 
sible to rebuild our trade surplus. 

— ultimate dismantling of the network of 
direct controls which may seem useful in the 
short run but are self-defeating in the long run. 

The U.S. balance of payments showed a sur- 
plus last year. But this surplus included an im- 
usually high and probably unsustainable capital 
inflow. Our trade surplus, which reached a peak 
of $6.5 billion in the midsixties, declined sharply 
and all but disappeared. 

That trade surplus must be rebuilt, and it can 
only be rebuilt by restoring stable and nonin- 
flationai-y economic growth to the U.S. econ- 
omy. Inflation has drawn in a flood of imports 
while it has diminished our competitiveness in 
world markets and thus dampened our export 
expansion. 

Tills is why our program of fiscal and mone- 
tary restraint is as necessary for our external 
trade as for restoring order in our domestic 
econom3\ 

Building on the solid base of a healthy, non- 
inflationary economy— a base that only the 
fundamentals of fiscal and monetary restraint 
now can restore — we are planning a sustained 
effort in several key areas: 

— In ex-port expansion, we have tentatively 
set an export goal of $50 billion to be achieved 
by 1973. This compares with 1968 exports of 
about $34 billion. This is primarily the task of 



^Issued at Key Biscayne, Fla., on Apr. 4 (White 
House press release). 



MAY 12, 1969 



403 



American private enterprise, but Government 
must help to coordinate the effort and offer as- 
sistance and encouragement. We must also call 
on the productivity and ingenuity of American 
industry to meet the competitive challenge of 
imported goods. 

— In trade policies, we will be working with 
our major trading partners abroad to insure that 
our products receive a fair competitive 
reception. 

— In defense activities, we will also work with 
our friends abroad to insure that the balance-of- 
payments burden of providing for the common 
defense is shared fairly. 

— In travel, we will encourage more foreign 
travel to the United States. Here, as in other 
areas, we will be relying heavily on the support 
of the private community. We seek no restric- 
tions on the American tourist's freedom to 
travel. 

— In international investment, we will review 
our own regulations and tax policy to assure 
that foreign investment in the United States is 
not discouraged ; for example, we move now to 
eliminate from our laws the prospective taxa- 
tion of interest on foreign-held bank deposits. 

— In the international financial area, we will 
be continuing to work with our friends abroad 
to strengthen and improve the international 
monetary system. An expanding world economy 
will require growing levels of trade with ade- 
quate levels of reserves and effective methods 
by which countries can adjust their payments 
imbalances. In particular, we look forward to 
ratification by the International Monetary Fund 
members of the special drawing rights plan and 
its early activation. 

I am confident that measures in these areas, 
coupled with the cooling of the economy through 
fiscal-monetary restraint, will move us in an or- 
derly manner toward true balance-of -payments 
equilibrium. Accordingly, I have begun, gradu- 
ally but purposefully, to dismantle the direct 
controls which only mask the underlying prob- 
lem. Specifically : 

First, I have today signed an Executive order 
reducing the effective rate of the interest equali- 
zation tax from V^ percent to % of 1 percent. 
This measure was designed to close a large 
gap — which has now narrowed — between for- 
eign and domestic interest rates. I shall, 
however, request the Congress to extend the 
President's discretionary authority under the 



interest equalization tax for 18 months beyond 
its scheduled expiration in July. 

Second, 1 have approved a recommendation 
to relax somewhat the foreign direct invest- 
ment program of the Department of Commerce. 
This means that most firms investing abroad 
will have substantially more freedom in plan- 
ning these investments. 

Third, I have been informed by Chairman 
[of the Federal Eeserve Board William Mc- 
Chesney] Martin of modifications in the Fed- 
eral Reserve program which will provide more 
flexibility for commercial banks, particularly 
smaller and medium-sized banks, to finance U.S. 
exports. 

These are prudent and limited steps that 
recognize the realities of our present balance-of - 
payments situation. 

The distortions created by more than 3 years 
of inflation cannot be corrected overnight. Nor 
can the dislocations resulting from a decade of 
balance-of-payments deficits be corrected in a 
short time. 

But the time for restoring the basis of our 
prosperity is long overdue. We shall continually 
direct America's economic policy, both foreign 
and domestic, at correcting the root causes of 
our problems, rather than covering them over 
with a patehwork quilt of controls. 

By facing up to fundamental economic needs, 
the inflationary tide and the trade tide can be 
turned and the U.S. dollar continued strong 
and secure. 



President Nixon Reduces Rates 
of Interest Equalization Tax 

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT 

White House press release (Key Biscay ne, Fla.) dated April 4 J 

The President on April 3 signed an Executive 
order fixing the rate of the interest equalization 
tax on acquisitions of foreign stock at 11.25 per- 
cent and the rates on acquisitions of foreign 
debt obligations at 0.79 percent to 11.25 percent 
depending upon the period remaining to ma- 
turity at the time of acquisition. These new low- 
er rates represent the api^roximate equivalent 
of an annual interest charge of 0.75 percent, 



404 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



a reduction in the annual interest charge equiva- 
lent previously applicable of 0.50 percentage 
point. The new rates are applicable to acquisi- 
tions (generally on a trade-date basis) made 
after April 4, 1969. 

These reduced rates are consistent with the 
purpose of the interest equalization tax to limit 
the acquisitions of foreign stocks and debt obli- 
gations within a range consistent with the bal- 
ance-of-payments objectives of the United 
States. Eeduction of the rates of interest equali- 
zation tax is appropriate in view of the increase 
in United States longer term interest rates rela- 
tive to those prevailing in important foreign 
markets. Such increases in United States longer 
term interest rates, as well as the expansion in 
the capacity of international long-term capital 
markets, have decreased the demands of foreign 
borrowers on United States capital markets. 



EXECUTIVE ORDER 11464' 

MoDiFTiNa Rates of Interest Equalization Tax 

Whebeas, I have determined that the rates of tax 
prescribed under section 1 of Executive Order No. 
11368, dated August 28, 1967,' with respect to acquisi- 
tions of stocks of foreign issuers and debt obligations of 
foreign obligors made after August 29, 1967, are 
higher than the rates of tax necessary to limit the 
acquisitions by United States persons of stocks of for- 
eign issuers and debt obligations of foreign obligors 
within a range consistent vrith the balance-of-payments 
objectives of the United States ; 

Now, thebefobe, by virtue of the authority vested 
in me by section 4911(b) (2) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 19.54, and as President of the United States, 
it is hereby ordered as follows : 

Section 1. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 11368, 
dated August 28, 1967, is hereby amended to read as 
follows : 

"Section 1. Rates of Tax. 

"(a) Rates applicable to acquisitions of stock. The 



tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 on the acquisition of stock shall be equal 
to 11.25 percent of the actual value of the stock. 

"(b) Rates applicable to acquisitions of debt obli- 
gations. The tax imposed by section 4911 of the Inter- 
nal Revenue Code of 1954 on the acquisition of a debt 
obligation shall be equal to a percentage of the actual 
value of the debt obligation measured by the period 
remaining to its maturity and determined in accord- 
ance with the following table : 

If the period remaining to maturity is : 

The tax, as a 

percentage of 

actual value, is: 

At least 1 year, but less than lYi years 0. 79 percent 

At least IVi years, but less than 1% years 0. 98 percent 

At least 1% years, but less than 1% years 1. 13 percent 

At least 1% years, but less than 2% years 1. 39 percent 

At least 2 J4 years, but less than 2% years 1. 73 percent 

At least 2% years, but less than '■>% years 2. 06 percent 

At least SVi years, but less than 4^ years 2. 66 percent 

At least 414 years, but less than 5V^ years 3. 26 percent 

At least 5Vi years, but less than 6M1 years 3. 83 percent 

At least 6V. years, but less than 7V> years 4. 35 percent 

At least 7% years, but less than 8V4 years 4. 88 percent 

At least 8% years, but less than 9% years 5. 33 percent 

At least 9% years, but less than 10% years 5. 78 percent 

At least 10% years, but less than 11% years 6. 23 percent 

At least 11% years, but less than 13% years 6. 83 percent 

At least 13% years, but less than 16% years 7. 73 percent 

At least 16% years, but less than 18% years 8. 51 percent 

At least 18% years, but less than 21% years 9. 19 percent 

At least 21% years, but less than 23% years 9. 79 percent 

At least 23% years, but less than 26% years 10. 31 percent 

At least 26% years, but less than 28% years 10. 76 percent 

28% years or more 11.25 percent" 

Sec. 2. With respect to acquisitions of stock of for- 
eign issuers and debt obligations of foreign obligors 
made under the rules of a national securities exchange 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion or under the rules of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc., this order shall be effective 
for acquisitions made after April 4, 1969, but only if 
the trade-date was after April 4, 1969. In the case of 
other acquisitions of stock of foreign issuers and debt 
obligations of foreign obligors, this order shall be effec- 
tive for acquisitions made after April 4, 1969. 

The White House, 
April S,lSeS. 



'34 Fed. Reg. 6233. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 25, 1967, p. 396. 



MAT 12, 1889 



348-007 — 69- 



405 



THE CONGRESS 



Current U.S.-Peruvian Problems 



Statement hy Charles A. Meyer 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ■ 



I am grateful for the opportunity to appear 
before you today during your hearings on Peru. 
You liave previously heard statements by dis- 
tinguished witnesses dealing with Peru. As you 
know, President Nixon's special emissary, Am- 
bassador John N. Irwin II, recently held con- 
versations in Lima with the highest levels of the 
Peruvian Government. His mission was to ex- 
plore means of arriving at a constructive solu- 
tion to the International Petroleum Company 
expropriation problem which will satisfy the 
requirements of the parties involved and if pos- 
sible avoid damaging our traditional relation- 
ship with Peru. His mission is delicate and has 
not ended. As a result of the conversation in 
Lima, President Nixon determined that the 
imposition of sanctions under relevant laws be 
temporarily deferred, pending the outcome of 
administrative procedures in Peru. Further, the 
Penivian Government will be sending a team to 
Washington in the near future to continue the 
conversations which were held in Lima. 

Because of the continuing and sensitive na- 
ture of the problems we face with Peru at the 
present time, I would have preferred that these 
hearings be held at a later time. Wlien I ex- 
pressed this view to you, Mr. Chairman, you 
explained that a hearing deferred is too often a 
hearing never heard. You very kindly offered 
to defer my appearance or to take my testimony 
in executive session. In considering this, I was 
mindful of the fact that other distinguished wit- 
nesses from university, business, and journalism 
would be testifying in open session. To defer 
my appearance seemed unfair to you. 



^ Made before the Subcommittee on Western Hemi- 
sphere Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations on Apr. 17 (press release 85). 



Nevertheless, I hope you will appreciate my 
inability to go into the details of some of the 
pertinent questions and problems today in open 
hearings. 

I understand the principal purpose of these 
hearings, Mr. Chairman, is to identify the man- 
ner in which the present problems with Peru 
developed, with a view to avoiding similar situa- 
tions elsewhere in the future. All of us are dedi- 
cated to the maximum of cooperation between 
the United States and Latin America — under 
law and within the framework of equality, real- 
ism, and mutual respect. We must understand 
the past to cope with the present and plan for 
the future. It would not be my puqjose to offer 
public conunentary which would be critical of 
previous decisions, nor does it fall to me to de- 
fend past decisions or actions. In pursuing a 
policy of the present and future, we will have 
our own ideas about previous policies and 
actions. 

As Professor Kantor [Prof. Harry Kantor, 
Political Science Department, Marquette Uni- 
versity] pointed out, some of the essential fac- 
tors in the Peruvian society are different than in 
ours. As one example, I would cite the takeover 
of government by the Pei-uv-ian military, both 
in 1962 and in 1968. Our experience on the road 
to economic, social, and political development 
is wholly one of the existence of representative 
institutions freely chosen by responsible citizens 
of a society. We believe this offers the most for 
the most. 

But despite popular misconceptions, the 
United States Government does not install or 
remove governments in Latin America, nor is 
there any single aspect of American policy 
which in its most exaggerated interpretation 
could be construed as the determining factor in 



406 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



what type or kind of government may be in 
power. I believe it is a mistake to assmne that 
the United States is responsible for every do- 
mestic political occurrence in any Latin Ameri- 
can country. 

Yesterday you and the committee heard testi- 
mony from the president of the International 
Petroleum Company and other witnesses re- 
garding the current problem over the expropria- 
tion of the major assets of the International 
Petroleum Company. 

I will not attempt to go into detail on the 
historical antecedents of tliis problem. Neverthe- 
less, as you know, the present military govern- 
ment of Pera rescinded contracts between the 
International Petroleum Company and the con- 
stitutionally elected government and a few days 
later seized the major assets of the company. 
This case is a complicated issue, ranging back 
into history 40 and even 100 years. It is, further- 
more, an issue that has generated the most fer- 
vent emotions in Peru. 

The United States Government has a policy, 
and that policy is codified in legislation in cases 
of this kind. The United States Government has 
declared a responsibility to i^i-otect the legiti- 
mate mterests of American investors overseas. 
The United States is one of the nations which 
export capital outside their own borders. The 
investors and the United States Government 
both recognize and accept the risks that may be 
attendant to overseas enterprises. Congress and 
the executive branch have adopted various 
means of minimizing these risks, but they of 
course can never be eliminated. It is the policy 
and desire of this Government to attempt to 
insure that American capital receives just, fair, 
and equitable treatment overseas. 

In the particular case of Peru the United 
States policy is one of reasonableness. We seek 
and indeed insist that the Government of Peru 
give prompt, adequate, and effective compensa- 
tion for the properties and assets which it has, 
in the exercise of its sovereign power, taken. 
Both the concept of expropriation and the re- 
quirement for compensation are recognized in 
international law. We ask no more than ad- 
herence to this common custom. 

Congress has provided legislation which 
complements or supplements traditional inter- 
national law in this regard. This legislation 
would suspend United States Government de- 
velopment assistance and would deny to Peru 
the sugar quota which allows the export of this 
conunodity to the United States at a premium 
price. 



The Department of State at the time this leg- 
islation was proposed disagreed with certain of 
its concepts and provisions. If I were a member 
of your subcommittee at the present time, I 
would ask the Assistant Secretary if he thought 
this law was a helpful tool to the Executive in 
conducting foreign policy under the circum- 
stances that I have outlined above. As Assistant 
Secretary, I would answer that the terms and 
utility of the legislation can and may be debated 
and the effectiveness of the legislation judged in 
the light of particular circumstances. These 
amendments may be a useful deterrent to ir- 
responsible action. Ideally, governments that 
expropriate property will take steps which obvi- 
ate the necessity to apply this legislation. When 
there is a dispute, however, it is our aim to find 
constructive solutions which will satisfy the re- 
quirements of the parties involved, without ap- 
plication of the sanctions. I would add, however, 
that the law exists and it will be implemented 
as necessary. 

In considering the existing situation between 
Peru and the United States, the problem of 
jurisdiction over territorial waters must be 
mentioned. This is a problem which involves not 
only Peru but Ecuador and Chile as well. The 
extension of jurisdiction by those countries 
some years ago to a breadth of 200 miles along 
the coast has given rise to repeated incidents in 
wliich the Governments of Ecuador and Peru 
have seized and fined United States fishing ves- 
sels on what are commonly regarded in the 
world as the high seas. Without minimizing the 
seriousness of this problem, I would like to say 
that the United States Government believes that 
there are practical solutions which will redound 
to our mutual benefit. We have for some time 
been attempting to convince Chile, Ecuador, 
and Peru to attend a formal conference with 
the United States in which the issue in its en- 
tirety can be explored, with the idea of evolving 
workable solutions under which neither juri- 
dical positions nor the legitimate rights of 
American fishermen are harmed. 

Unfortunately, it is difficult, at least in the 
case of Peru, to treat this problem in isolation. 
We assume, however, that it can be treated 
within the context of our overall difficulties with 
Peru, and we shall continue to press for a con- 
structive and amicable solution to this problem. 

What we see in Peruvian-United States re- 
lations at the present time in the broadest terms 
are differences between two longtime friends. It 
is partially a product of the changing aspira- 
tions of a developing country. It is by no means 



MAY 12, 1969 



407 



a unique phenomenon. The United States must 
expect to be involved in such problems and 
therefore to be involved in continuing negotia- 
tions over those problems. Whether we speak of 
territorial waters, arms, military assistance, de- 
velopment aid, private investment, or the simple 
application of domestic laws which conflict, we 
basically are talking about the same thing. The 
difference of viewpoint is between large and 
small sovereign countries, between countries 
which export capital and those which receive 
capital. 

These are difficult and important problems, 
and we will continue conscientiously to work 
for solutions. We will, nevertheless, seek an 
understanding of the United States viewpoint. 
We will, in short, be fair and reasonable within 
the context of United States law and the legiti- 
mate interests of our country. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
thank you for your courteous attention, and I 
am at your disposal within the limits that I 
mentioned earlier in my statement. 



Senate Approval Asked of Agreement 
for Diversions From Niagara River 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States : 

With a view to receiving the approval of the 
Senate, I transmit herewith the texts of two 
notes, signed and exchanged at Washington on 
March 21, 1969, constituting an agreement be- 
tween the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada, pro- 
viding for additional temporary diversions 
from the Niagara River for power production 
purposes. 



It is provided in the agreement that it will 
enter into force upon notification that the 
exchange of notes has been approved by the 
Senate of the United States. The agreement 
requires Senate advice and consent to approval 
because it would authorize a departure from 
the limitations prescribed in the Niagara River 
Treaty of February 27, 1950 ^ in regard to mini- 
miun flows. 

An agreement with Canada providing for the 
construction of a temporary cofferdam above 
the American Falls at Niagara was concluded 
by an exchange of notes on the same date. 
Copies of those notes are transmitted herewith 
for the information of the Senate. This coffer- 
dam agreement is deemed to be a "special agree- 
ment" of the kind expressly authorized by the 
Boundary Waters Treaty of January 11, 1909 
with Canada.^ It is stipulated in this agreement 
that it enters into force immediately upon the 
exchange of notes. 

I also transmit for the information of the 
Senate a report by the Secretary of State ex- 
plaining more fully the background and pur- 
poses of the two agreements. 

I urge that the Senate give early and favor- 
able consideration to the agreement authorizing 
additional temporary diversions from the 
Niagara River for power production purposes. 



Richard Nixon 



The White Hottse, 
April H, 1969. 



^ Transmitted on Apr. 14 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. C, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the texts of the two exchanges of notes 
on Mar. 21 and the report of the Secretary of State; 
for texts of the notes, see Btn-LETIN of Apr. 21, 1969, 
p. 346. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2130. 

' 36 Stat. 2448. 



408 



DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Views on Nuclear Weapon Material Cutoff Agreement 
and Verification of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 



Statenhent by Adrian S. Fisher ^ 



President Nixon, in his letter of instructions 
to Ambassador Smith, mentioned three specific 
measures on which he hoped there could be prog- 
ress at this conference.^ First, he indicated the 
interest of the United States in working out an 
international agreement that would prohibit the 
emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction on the sea- 
bed. Second, he set forth the support of the 
United States for the conclusion of a compre- 
hensive test ban adequately verified and indi- 
cated that efforts should be made toward greater 
imderstanding of the verification issue. Third, 
he stated that the United States would continue 
to press for an agreement to cut off the produc- 
tion of fissionable materials for use in nuclear 
weapons and for the transfer of such materials 
to peaceful purposes. 

In his intervention on March 25 of this year,' 
Ambassador Smith discussed in some detail the 
factors that the United States believes are rele- 
vant to the first of these measures, an interna- 
tional agreement that would prohibit the 
emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. 



^ Made before the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 8. Mr. 
Fisher is Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and U.S. Representative to the 
conference. 

- For text of a letter dated Mar. 15 from President 
Nixon to Ambassador Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. 
delegation to the conference, see Bulletin of Apr. 7, 
1969, p. 289. 

» Bulletin of Apr. 21, 1969, p. 333. 



Todaj' I would like to discuss the views of 
the United States on the other two. 

I think all the members of this Committee 
would agree that there is no more important job 
facing us than that of achieving the cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date. We have 
all said so many times, and we have incorporated 
statements to this effect in the Nonprolif eration 
Treaty, both in the preamble and in article VI.* 
Nevertheless, we have not yet been able to agree 
on the one agreement that would be thoroughly 
effective in preventing the growth of the stock- 
piles of nuclear weapons; that is, an agreement 
to halt the production for weapons purposes of 
the fissionable material which is the essential 
ingredient for a nuclear bomb. 

Our attempts to reach such an agreement go 
back quite a wliile, to a time when the stockpile 
of nuclear bombs was much smaller than it is 
now because there was then much less weapons- 
grade fissionable material, on both sides, with 
which to make them. President Eisenhower first 
proposed a cutoff of the production of fissionable 
materials for weapons well over a decade ago — 
in 1956.^ Subsequently, the United States has 
strongly advocated adoption of the "cutoff" on 
many occasions, both in the United Nations 
General Assembly and in this Committee. In 
1964 and 1966, we presented to the ENDC four 
working papers on verification of various 



* For text of the treaty, see BuijjrnN of July 1, 1968, 
p. 9. 

° For background, see Bulustin of Mar. 26, 1956, 
p. 514. 



irAT 12, 1969 



409 



aspects of a cutoff agreement. At this session of 
this Committee, the United States will continue 
to support such an agreement. 

Essential Elements of a Cutoff Agreement 

Tlie essential elements of a cutoff agreement 
would be : 

First. As of an agreed date, nuclear-weapon 
states would halt all production for use in 
nuclear weapons of fissionable materials 
(uranium enriched in U-235, and plutonium). 

Second. The production of fissionable ma- 
terials would be permitted to continue for pur- 
poses other than use in nuclear weapons, such 
as power and propulsion reactors and nuclear 
explosives for peaceful purposes. 

Third. In order to provide for compliance 
with the agreement, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency would be asked to safeguard the 
nuclear material in each state's peaceful nuclear 
activities and to verify the continued shutdown 
of any facilities for production of fissionable 
materials that are closed. 

This last element, that is, the provisions for 
IAEA safeguards, represents a change in the 
previous position of the United States. The 
United States previously proposed what we 
thought was a reasonable inspection system in 
order to safeguard against any significant di- 
version of fissionable materials. This system in- 
volved substantial elements of adversary 
inspection, particularly in the search for un- 
disclosed facilities. It is described in a working 
paper on the inspection of a fissionable material 
cutoff ( ENDC/134 ) , which was presented to this 
Committee on June 25, 1964. Since that time, 
however, a somewhat different approach to the 
verification problem, insofar as it is applicable 
to non-nuclear-weapon states, has been devel- 
oped in this Committee and has gained wide 
acceptance. This approach is contained in article 
III of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It involves 
reliance on the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and agreements to be worked out in 
accordance with the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safe- 
guards system as the means for preventing the 
diversion of nuclear materials to use in 
weapons. We would propose a similar approach 
to the verification of a cutoff agreement for the 
nuclear- weapon states. 

In indicating our continuing support for a 
cutoff, I should like to make clear that the 



United States reiterates its offer to add to the 
cutoff an agreement to transfer to peaceful pur- 
poses agreed amounts of fissionable materials. 
In the past, the United States has indicated its 
willingness to transfer 60,000 kilograms of U- 
235 to peaceful purposes provided the Soviet 
Union would transfer 40,000 kilograms of the 
same material. The amounts to be transferred 
would be, of course, the subject of negotiation ; 
and it may well be that some might think that it 
would be appropriate for the agreement to pro- 
vide for the transfer of equal quantities by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. 

Effect on the Nuclear Arms Race 

There are two aspects of the cutoff that seem 
particularly relevant to recent developments 
and discussions in the field of disarmament. I I 
intend to give special attention to these matters " 
in my intervention today : first, the value of the 
cutoff measure as a means of halting the nuclear 
arms race, and second, the importance of this 
measure as a prudent and necessary step toward 
establishing an equitable system of safeguards | 
on all production of fissionable materials. ^j 

The United States has for many years placed 
the cutoff high on our agenda because we con- 
sidered it a realistic measure that would place 
a limit once and for aU on the size of nuclear 
arsenals. It would do so by limiting definitively 
the amount of fissionable materials available 
for use in nuclear weapons. The economic, polit- 
ical, and military benefits that both the nu- 
clear and nonnuclear nations would derive from 
the adoption of tliis measui'e are obvious. 
Equally obvious is the important contribution 
of a cutoff in facilitating progress on other 
steps to halt the nuclear arms i-ace. 

We are all familiar with the argument 
against the value of a cutoff agreement that 
has been set forth whenever this measure has 
been discussed in the past. The essence of this 
argument is that a cutoff would not be worth 
while because it would not deal with the means 
that already exist for waging nuclear war. 
The lack of validity of such an assertion is 
clear, I believe, if we examine its logical corol- 
lary : that no steps toward Iialting the nuclear 
arms race are worth while if they do not com- | 
pletely eliminate existing nuclear arsenals. This 
is a thesis which this Committee cannot accept 
in its work. 

It is arguments such as this that have been 
used against a cutoff of the production of fis- 



410 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



sionable materials ever since a cutoff was first 
proposed in 1956, 13 years ago. Yet, I submit, 
no one can deny that the nuclear confrontation 
would be at a much lower level, and the world 
a much better place, if we had been able to ob- 
tain a cutoff when it was first proposed. I do 
not mention this in order to cry over spilt milk. 
I do so in the hope that 13 years from now we 
will not be in a position where — after 13 more 
years of a dangerous and costly arms race — we 
are regretting the failure of this effort to in- 
crease the security of all of us by obtaining such 
an agreement. 

We are all familiar as well with the argument 
that the system for verifying a cutoff, which 
the United States suggested on previous oc- 
casions, was designed, somehow, for the inter- 
national collection of intelligence on key sec- 
tors of state defense. Although this assertion 
did not accurately describe the reasonable in- 
spection system we had previously suggested, 
it clearly cannot be applied to the inspection 
system that we are now discussing; that is, 
IAEA safeguards on the nuclear material m 
peaceful nuclear activities and IAEA verifica- 
tion of shutdown facilities for production of 
fissionable materials. 

We emphasize this aspect of the cutoff be- 
cause of our belief that the nuclear-weapon 
powers should be prepared to accept, in the con- 
text of a cutoff agreement, the same safeguards 
on their fissionable material production facili- 
ties that are appropriate to verify nonprolifera- 
tion in the non-nuclear-weapon states. We do 
not propose any other inspection or verifica- 
tion for this agreement. The suitability of 
IAEA safeguards should be apparent to all of 
us who have called on other states to accept 
them. 

Over the past 3 years, while our efforts were 
directed primarily toward fashioning a broadly 
acceptable agreement to halt the spread of nu- 
clear weapons, several countries proposed that 
a nonproliferation treaty be linked to other 
measures of nuclear disarmament. As you know, 
the United States opposed these proposals. Our 
reason for doing so — and I believe the correct- 
ness of our assumption has been borne out — 
was that insistence on establishing such a link 
as a precondition for a nonproliferation treaty 
would result in achieving neither the nonprolif- 
eration treaty nor other measures. 

The United States is still of this view. We are 
urging a cutoff in the production of fissionable 
material for weapons purposes as a measure to 



follow the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, pursuant to article VI of 
that treaty. We would respectfully urge that 
no country use the fact that a cutoff agreement 
is now under discussion as a reason for delaying 
its decision with respect to the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty. We would respectfully urge that 
instead they become a party to the Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty and by such action be able to 
add an argument based on article VI of that 
treaty to the weight of their other arguments 
in support of a cutoff. 

Verification of Comprehensive Test Ban 

Mr. Chairman, I shall now turn to the sub- 
ject of the banning of underground nuclear 
weapons tests. All of the previous speakers have 
taken note of this topic; and most speakers, I 
believe, have described a ban on such tests as 
one of the most impoi-tant and pressing of arms 
control measures. The Swedish delegation has, 
in addition, tabled a paper entitled "Working 
Paper With Suggestions as to Possible Pro- 
visions of a Treaty Banning Underground Nu- 
clear Weapon Tests" (ENDC/242) . I have read 
and studied with care the statement of the dele- 
gates and the working paper tabled by the dele- 
gation of Sweden. 

The position of the United States can be stated 
quite simply. We support a comprehensive test 
ban treaty that is adequately verified. But we 
are convmced that adequate verification requires 
on-site inspections. Ambassador Smith made the 
position of the United States on this point quite 
clear in his statement of March 25. Moreover, in 
a series of statements over the last several years, 
we have set forth this position in detail — giving 
both the scientific and political reasons which 
support this position. I do not believe that scien- 
tifically and politically there is any basis for 
changing this position. 

Now, the distinguished representative of 
Sweden, in tabling a working paper that does 
not provide for obligatory on-site inspections, 
has expressed the view that the problem of what 
is adequate for verifying a comprehensive test 
ban is a political problem, not a technical one. 
The view was also expressed that what is re- 
quired is a political decision, not a technical 
assessment. 

One camiot quarrel with the sound observa- 
tion that any negotiated agreement requires 
political decision. But the political decision as to 
what constitutes adequate verification of a com- 



MAT 12, 1969 



411 



prehensive test ban is one which must be made 
on the basis of extensive scientific and teclinical 
considerations, as well as purely political ones. 

We in this Committee are all well aware of 
the findings of the SIPRI repoi-t on "Seismic 
Methods for Monitoring Underground Explo- 
sions," a summary of which is contained in 
ENDC/230. This report is the outcome of a 
meeting of seismologists last summer sponsored 
by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute. The drafters of this report took into 
account all the latest advances in seismic tech- 
niques and theory, including the statistical 
decision theory advanced by the Swedish dele- 
gation, and relied upon by the distinguished 
delegate of Sweden in support of the approach 
contained in the recent Swedish working paper, 
ENDC/242. Yet, taking all these considerations 
into accomit, the expressed assessment of the 
seismologists who participated in the SIPRI 
report is that a clear separation between earth- 
quakes and nuclear explosions could not be made 
by teleseismic means for underground nuclear 
test explosions up to tens of kilotons of explosive 
yield. This means that each year many seismic 
events will occur in the Soviet Union which are 
not susceptible to a determination — by seismic 
means— as to whether they are earthquakes or 
nuclear tests up to tens of kilotons of explosive 
yield. 

The United States cannot accept the state- 
ment advanced in support of ENDC/242, the 
recent working paper, that there will be less 
than one ambiguous event, or "false alarm," in 
the Soviet Union every 10 years. It is our assess- 
ment, consistent we believe with the SIPRI re- 
port, that there will be a large number of events 
each year which cannot be distinguished be- 
tween earthquakes or underground nuclear 
explosions. 

This is why it is not possible to verify a ban 
on undei'ground nuclear explosions by seismic 
means alone. Furthermore, nuclear test explo- 
sions in the yield range of up to tens of kilotons 
can have very important and significant mili- 
tary value. These are the reasons for our de- 
cision — a political decision based on scientific 
considerations — that adequate verification re- 
quires obligatory on-site inspections in ad- 
dition to seismic detection and identification 
techniques. 

Our delegation is aware of the fact that the 
SIPRI report called for further progress to be 
made in the field of seismic detection and identi- 
fication. But it is appropriate to point out that 



the estimates of potential seismic detection and 
identification capability which underlie the U.S. 
position have been made taking into account the 
reasonably anticipated improvements in seismic 
capability. 

Need for Obligatory On-Site Inspections 

Turning now to the political aspect of the 
question, I note that the distinguished delegate 
of Sweden has said that the purpose of control 
is not to provide "judicially conclusive evidence" 
of a violation but "rather the aim is to deter a 
prospective violator from concealing testing by 
presenting him with a sufficient probability of 
being detected." But in dealing with the con- 
cept of deterrence we should bear in mind that 
an inspection procedure will only serve as a 
deterrent if a potential violator realizes that it 
provides a macliinery under which the possi- 
bility of damage to its interests from a violation 
exceeds the possible gains to be obtained from 
such a violation. 

It is this test which we will have to use in 
analyzing the working paper contained in 
ENI)C/242 in order to determine whether it is 
an effective political instrument. And in apply- 
ing this test we cannot do so on the assumption 
that there has been no violation and one has 
only to be concerned about preventing false 
alarms from inducing unwarranted political ac- 
cusations of a treaty violation. We must look at 
the more pertinent and worrisome question of 
what would happen under this control machin- 
ery if there were to be a violation. That is the 
point that must be addressed if one is to talk of 
deterrence. 

Now, I believe that we must assume that a 
violator would take sophisticated precautions in 
an attempt to minimize any risk of disclosure. 
Here I would like to note that the SIPRI re- 
port indicates the possibility of taking such 
precautions does exist. But let us say that this 
clandestine underground nuclear explosion is 
detected and there is some seismic evidence — 
some probability — that this event may indeed 
have been an miderground nuclear explosion, 
and thus a violation. The violator would be 
presented with the evidence ; he would be ques- 
tioned. The evidence which would form the 
basis of the questioning would be highly tech- 
nical material, understandable only to highly 
trained seismologists — and in many cases am- 
biguous even to them. And what if one finds the 
explanation of the event imsatisf actory ? The 



412 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETXN 



violator has, according to the Swedish proposal, 
no further obligation. Those who may regard 
their security endangered may, of course, with- 
draw from the treaty. But the onus would be on 
them, not on the violator. This would give the 
agreement an inlierent instability. In fact, any 
nation that wanted to resume testing openly 
could just conceivably use such a scheme to 
force others to abrogate the treaty, rather than 
do so themselves. 

Obligatory on-site inspections would, we be- 
lieve, add a suiBciently binding constraint, so 
that not only would deterrence be greatly en- 
hanced, but a violator persisting in spite of this 
would himself have to denounce the treaty to 
avoid inspection — or be f oimd out. 

The aim and purpose of an aims control meas- 
ure, beyond its immediate area of applicability, 
is to lend additional political stability, through 
mutual trust, to the international scene. Mutual 



trust is simply not made up of verbal expres- 
sions of good will, however solemnly stated. 
It is attained by the acceptance of mutual ob- 
ligations the performance of which by the re- 
spective parties can be observed and judged. 
This is the way mutual trust will grow. 

In the instance of the ban on nuclear tests, 
the substantive obligation is a negative one, 
an obligation not to do something. The per- 
formance of this obligation by any one party 
is a matter of vital national security interest to 
all other parties. The complications of natural 
phenomena have made the verification of this 
obligation — the observation and judgment as to 
how it is being performed — impossible without 
on-site inspections. It is our firm conviction, 
therefore, that adequate verification of a treaty 
banning all nuclear tests must involve obligatory 
on-site inspections. 



U.N. Condemns Racial Policies of Southern Rhodesia 



Following are statements in the Special Com- 
tnittee on the Situation with regard to the Im- 
plementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, made on March £4- l>y Alternate U.S. 
Representative John Eaves and on March 26 iy 
U.S. Representative Seymour M. Finger, to- 
gether with the text of a resolution adopted iy 
the Special Committee on March 26. 



TEXTS OF U.S. STATEMENTS 



Statement by Mr. Eaves 

U.S. /U.N. press release 30 dated March 24 

It is a matter of deep regret to the United 
States that the illegal regime in Southern 
Khodesia continues its defiant position and 
continues to refuse to accept a settlement based 
on respect for the principles enshrined in the 
United Nations Charter and for the legitimate 
aspirations of the people of Southern Rhodesia 
as a whole. It remains the policy of the United 
States to seek a peaceful solution of the Rho- 
desian problem that will insure political justice 



and equal opportunity for all Rhodesians, re- 
gardless of race. To tliis end, we have given our 
full support to efforts of the United Kingdom 
and the United Nations directed toward such 
a solution. In pursuit of this policy, we have 
supported the efforts of the Security Coimcil, 
and we have fully complied with all of the 
mandatory provisions of the relevant Security 
Council resolutions; i.e.. Resolutions 232 and 
253.1 

Some of the delegations who have spoken 
thus far in our discussion of Southern Rhodesia 
have charged that the sanctions program em- 
bodied in the Security Council resolutions is 
inadequate and ineffective. In the view of my 
delegation such a conclusion is premature at this 
time. The program of comprehensive manda- 
tory sanctions was adopted by the Security 
Council only in late May of 1968, and complete 
worldwide trade figures upon which a mean- 
ingful analysis for the remainder of the year 
1968 can be based are not yet available. 

However, there are some indications from 



' For texts of Resolutions 232 and 253, see Bttlletin 
of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 77, and June 24, 196S, p. 847. 



MAT 12, 1969 



413 



Rhodesian sources that the sanctions program 
is having an eifect. In letters to the Rhodesia 
Herald, referred to in paragi-aphs 102 and 103 
of the Secretariat's working paper on Southern 
Rhodesia (A/AC.109/L.531/Add.l), a promi- 
nent Rhodesian industrialist and a prominent 
Rhodesian banker expressed serious concern 
over the effect which sanctions are having on 
the Rhodesian economy. The chairman of the 
Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation said in 
late November 1968 that the stage had been 
reached where continued sanctions would ruin 
the country's tobacco, chrome, asbestos, and 
ferroalloy industries and would insure that the 
nickel industry was stillborn. The Rhodesia 
Herald, in an accompanying editorial comment, 
said that it was common knowledge that many 
influential businessmen are saying privately 
what the chairman of the Rhodesian Iron and 
Steel Corporation has now said publicly. In 
addition, the chairman of the Standard Bank, 
who is also a director of a number of Rhodesia's 
largest industrial companies, said on Decem- 
ber 9, 1968, that sanctions had damaged the 
Rhodesian economy far more than many people 
were willing to acknowledge and that the even- 
tual outcome would be an almost bankrupt 
country. 

The president of the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of Rhodesia said in early December 
1968 that a settlement was essential for the pros- 
perity of the country, particularly to overcome 
the grave imemployment problem looming 
ahead. 

The Secretariat working paper also notes that 
in order to conserve its foreign exchange re- 
serves, the illegal regime has had to severely 
curtail foreign trade and that it reduced its 
imports by about 5 percent for the second half 
of 1968. In March 1969 further substantial cut- 
backs in import quotas were announced for the 
4-month quota period beginning April 1, and 
the allocation of currency for new building 
projects was also cut. 

"While it is not possible, unfortunately, to 
foresee whether the sanctions program will 
bring about the changes in the Southern Rho- 
desian situation which are essential for the 
realization of self-determination by and for all 
of the people of Southern Rhodesia, we believe 
this program continues to be the most realistic 
approach to this difficult problem and to offer 
more hope of results than any other approach 
which has been suggested. 

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, the United States 



Government continues to believe that effective 
implementation of the mandatory sanctions 
program by all member states would contribute 
to the achievement of a peaceful change in the 
policies of the illegal regime and the achieve- 
ment of full political rights for all of the Rho- 
desian people. In this connection, we note that 
many member states of the United Nations and 
its specialized agencies have not yet sujiplied the 
Secretary General with information on specific 
measures taken to implement Security Council 
Resolution 253. It appears that 39 members have 
not replied in any way to inquiries from the 
Secretary General. Of the 91 members who have 
replied, 29 have merely stated that they have 
no relations with Southern Rhodesia or that 
they condemn the illegal regime. None of these 
replies gives any definite indication of the action 
taken by the member. 

It is therefore difficult for the Security Coun- 
cil Sanctions Committee, of which the United 
States is a member, to have a fully accurate 
understanding of the implementation of Resolu- 
tion 253 or to properly perform its functions if 
it is not kept adequately informed by member 
states. In the view of the United States delega- 
tion the need is to insure that the sanctions pro- 
gram is made as effective as possible, and we 
believe the Sanctions Committee can contribute 
to this goal by working for a tightening of 
scrutiny and compliance. 

I would like to conclude this statement, Mr. 
Chairman, by expressing my delegation's deep 
regret over the continuing illegal detention and 
imprisonment of political opponents of the il- 
legal regime. The new constitutional proposals 
of the illegal regime, which represent a further 
entrenchment of white minority rule, are a 
further matter of deep regret to my delegation. 

Statement by Ambassador Finger 

U.S./D.N. press release 34 dated March 26 

The United States has given the most careful 
consideration to the draft resolution on the 
question of Southern Rhodesia in document 
L/542. We should like to express our apprecia- 
tion to the delegations which have joined in 
presenting this draft to the Committee. Frank- 
ly, we have some problems with certain of its 
provisions. Nevertheless, we shall vote in favor 
of this draft resolution in order to express the 
strong conviction of the United States that 
certain measures taken by the illegal Smith 
regime should be condemned by all nations. 



414 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTXLLETIN 



Specifically, the United States wishes to join 
wholeheartedly with other members of the Com- 
mittee in expressing indignation at the con- 
tinued illegal detention of national leaders by 
the Smith regime. Moreover, we are deeply con- 
cerned at the efforts of this illegal regime to 
further entrench its abhorrent racial policies 
through the device of an illegal constitution. 

We do have certain doubts about the wording 
of operative paragraph 3, which '■'■Calls wpon 
the administering Power to take immediate 
measures to secure the release of all political 
prisoners and to prevent the introduction of the 
so-called new constitution." We do not believe 
that it is realistic to expect the United Kingdom 
to be able to achieve "immediately" the objec- 
tives set forth in this paragraph, even though 
we share those objectives. We doubt, therefore, 
that this paragraph, taken literally, can have 
any effect. But, I repeat, we share the concern 
of other members with the objectives of this 
paragraph. Taking into account this joint con- 
cern and our strong conviction that certain 
measures taken by the illegal Smith regime 
should be condemned by all nations, the United 
States will vote in favor of the draft resolution 
before us. 

I believe this is the first time in some years 
that the United States has voted in favor of a 
resolution in the Committee of 24 concerning 
Southern Rhodesia. We have, of course, sup- 
ported all resolutions on this subject in the 
Security Council, where full consultation is 
customary. We hope this action today may be 
taken as an indication that the Committee in- 
tends to pursue a course of cooperation and con- 
sultation on important questions before it, thus 
enabling it to work with wide support and 
greater effect. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2 

The Special Committee, 

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) 
of 14 December 1960 and all the relevant resolutions 
adopted subsequently by the General Assembly, by the 
Security Council and by the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, concerning the ques- 
tion of Southern Rhodesia, 

Deeply concerned over the deteriorating situation in 
Southern Rhodesia resulting from the continued acts 
of repression practised against the African people, 



the introduction of new measures aimed at denying 
them their legitimate political rights and the continued 
presence of South African forces in the Territory, 

1. Expresses its profound indignation at the trial 
and conviction of the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and 
the continued detention, imprisonment and assassina- 
tion of other nationalist leaders by the illegal racist 
minority regime ; 

2. Expresses its concern at the steps being taken by 
the illegal regime to entrench, under the guise of a 
so-called new constitution, its policies of separate 
racial development in Southern Rhodesia, to the detri- 
ment of the legitimate rights of the African population ; 

3. Calls vpon the administering Power to take Im- 
mediate measures to secure the release of all political 
prisoners and to prevent the introduction of the 
so-called new constitution in the Territory ; 

4. Decides to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia 
under continuous review. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles 
and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty of Decem- 
ber 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Santiago 
November 18, 1966, at the Fourth Consultative 
Meeting. 

Entered into force: October 30, 1968, for IV-20 
through IV-28 in English. 

Measures in furtherance of the principles and purposes 
of the Antarctic Treaty of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 
4780). Adopted at Paris November 29, 1968, at the 
Fifth Consultative Meeting. Enters into force when 
approved by all contracting parties whose represent- 
atives were entitled to participate in meetings held 
to consider the measures. 

Notifications of approval: Argentina, March 14, 1969; 
France, April 3, 1969. 

Aviation 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, March 18, 1969. 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with 
annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. 
Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Signature: Luxembourg (with reservation), April 
24, 1969. 



= U.N. doe. A/AC.109/311 ; adopted unanimously by 
the Committee on Mar. 26. 



' Not in force. 



MAT 12, 1969 



415 



Labor 

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of 
the International Labor Organization. Done at Mon- 
treal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 
1948. TIAS 1868. 

Admission to membership: Southern Yemen, April 
15, 1969. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331. 
Acceptance deposited: Philippines, March 4, 1969. 

Property 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at The 
Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 
1928 ; for the United States March 6, 1931. 47 Stat 
1789. 

Convention of Paris for the protection of Industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Lis- 
bon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 
1962. TIAS 4931. 

Denunciation received: Laos, November 30, 1967; 
effective November 30, 1968. 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.' 
Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (with a declaration), March 19, 1969. 

Space 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Accession deposited at Washington: Botswana, 
April 18, 1969. 

Trade, Transit 

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states. Done 
at New York July 8, 1965. Entered into force June 9, 
1967 ; for the United States November 28, 1968. TIAS 
6592. 

Accessions deposited: Denmark, March 26, 1969 ; 
Turkey, March 25, 1969. 



BIUTERAL 



Dominican Republic 

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative pro- 
gram for meteorological observations. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Santo Domingo April 7 and 11, 
1969. Entered into force April 11, 1969; effective 
June 30, 1968. 

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative pro- 
gram for meteorological observations. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Santo Domingo June 17 and 
July 21, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1966. TIAS 
6167. 
Terminated: June 30, 1968. 

Indonesia 

Agreement relating to the provision by the United 
States of a basic pilot aircraft. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Djakarta April 9 and 17, 1969. Entered 
into force April 17, 1969. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of January 23, 1968 (TIAS 
6444) . Signed at Freetown April 8, 1969. Entered into 
force April 8, 1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on April 18 confirmed the nomination 
of John D. J. Moore to be Ambassador to Ireland. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated March 17.) 



416 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX May 12, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1569 



Asia. Viet-Nam in the Perspective of East Asia 

(Rogers) 397 

Atomic Energy 

U.S., UjS.S.R. Conclude Technical Talks on 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions (joint 
communique) 401 

UjS. Views on Nuclear Weapon Material Cutoff 
Agreement and Verification of Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban (Fisher) 409 

Canada. Senate Approval Asked of Agreement 
for Diversions From Niagara River (mwsage 
from Pre.sident Nixon) . . 408 

Congress 

Confirmations (Moore) 416 

Current UjS.-Peruvian Problems (Meyer) . . 406 
Senate Approval Asked of Agreement for Diver- 
sions From Niagara River (message from 
President Nixon) 408 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 

(Moore) 416 

Disarmament. U.S Views on Nuclear Weapon 
Material Cutoff Agreement and Verification of 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (Fisher) 409 

Economic Affairs 

Current U.S.-Peruvian Problems (Meyer) . . 406 

President Nixon Reduces Rates of Interest 
Equalization Tax (text of Executive order) . 404 

Senate Approval Asked of Agreement for Diver- 
sions From Niagara River (message from 
President Nixon) 408 

The U.S. Balance of Payments (Nixon) . . . 403 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. Views on Nuclear Weapon Material Cut- 
off Agreement and Verification of Comprehen- 
sive Nuclear Test Ban (Fisher) 409 

Ireland. Moore confirmed as Ambassador . . . 416 

Israel. President Marks 21st Anniversary of the 
iState of Israel (letter from President Nixon 
to President Shazar) 403 

Peru 

Current U.S.-Peruvian Problems (Meyer) . . 406 
U.S. and Peru Resume Talks on Outstanding 
Problems (Department statement) .... 400 

Presidential Documents 

President Marks 21st Anniversary of the State 
of Israel 403 

President Nixon Reduces Rates of Interest 
Equalization Tax 404 

(Senate Approval Asked of Agreement for Diver- 
sions From Niagara River 408 

The U.S. Balance of Payments 403 

Southern Rhodesia. U.N. Condemns Racial Pol- 
icies of Southern Rhodesia (Eaves, Finger, 
text of resolution) 413 

Trade. The U.S. Balance of Payments (Nixon) . 403 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 415 



Senate Approval Asked of Agreement for Diver- 
sions From Niagara River (message from 
President Nixon) 408 

U.S.S.R. 

U.S., U.,SjS.R. Conclude Technical Talks on 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions (joint 
communique) 401 

Viet-Nam in the Perspective of East Asia 

(Rogers) 397 

United Nations. U.N. Condemns Racial Policies 
of Southern Rhodesia (Eaves, Finger, text of 
resolution) 413 

Viet-Nam 

14th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 
(Lodge) 401 

Viet-Nam in the Perspective of East Asia 

(Rogers) 397 

Name Index 

Eaves, John 413 

Finger, Seymour M 413 

Fisher, Adrian iS 409 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 401 

Meyer, Charles A 406 

Moore, John D. J 416 

Nixon, President 403,404,408 

Rogers, Secretary 397 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
2«)20. 

Release issued prior to April 21 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 85 of April 17. 

No. Date Subject 

88 4/21 Rogers : Associated Press annual 
luncheon. New York, N.Y. 

t89 4/21 OAS programs for regional educa- 
tion, science, and technology 
(rewrite). 

t90 4/23 Sisco : American-Israel Public Affairs 

Committee, Washington, D.C. 
91 4/21 Lodge : 14th plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris. 

*92 4/24 Sullivan designated Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pa- 
cific Affairs (biographic details). 



* Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1560 




May 19, 1969 



UNDER SECRETARY RICHARDSON DISCUSSES VIET-NAM PEACE TALKS 

AJ^D U.S.-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS 
Transcript of Television Interview 4-17 

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: INITIATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT 

hy Assistant Secretary Meyer 4^1 

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
HOLDS lOTH ANNUAL MEETING AT GUATEMALA CITY 

Statement hy Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy J^6 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1560 
May 19, 1969 



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PRICE: 

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Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

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STATE BULLETIN as the source wUl be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Quide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the tcork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
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Under Secretary Richardson Discusses Viet-Nam Peace Talks 
and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations 



Following is the transcript of a fihned inter- 
view with Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson 
which was included on the National Educational 
Television Network program, ^'■The Nixon Ad- 
ministration — First 100 Days" on April 30. In- 
terviewing Mr. Richardson was Joseph Kraft, 
a syndicated columnist. 

Press release 94 dated April 30 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Nixon administration 
in the past 100 days has had a chance to define 
a Viet-Nam policy — indeed, there has been some 
reference to a '■''peace plan.''"' How would you say 
that Viet-Nam policy of the Nixon administra- 
tion differed from that of the Johnson 
adminis tra tion ? 

A. Well, Mr. Kraft, I think the first and most 
important thing to be said is that ours is a 
policy aimed at peace. We are not pursuing 
military victory. We've made this very clear. 
Ours is a policy of achieving an honorable nego- 
tiated settlement in Paris. This is our first ob- 
jective. And in order to bring this about, we've 
put our emphasis on the opportunities for 
mutual troop withdrawal. Coupled with this, 
we've been working with the Government of 
South Viet-Nam on the subject of a political 
settlement and the Government of South Viet- 
Nam has made it clear through its own public 
statements that it is prepared to enter into seri- 
ous negotiations on that subject with the NLF 
[National Liberation Front] . Now, you add all 
this up, and I think it comes out with a very 
different kind of emphasis than existed in the 
previous administration. 

Q. You''ve touched on many aspects of this 
plan, Mr. Secretary — mayie we ought to break 
it down a little bit. With respect to the talks in 
Paris, could you say that there has been much 
progress there? 

A. Well, I think the most important thing 
that could be said about the talks in Paris is that 
they ai'e, at least, addressed to the major issues 



of substance which now divide the parties. I 
would not say that the talks had achieved any 
real progress to date in dealing with these issues. 
On the other hand, experience of the past sug- 
gests that there has to be a certain period of 
skirmishing and statement and restatement of 
positions before there is to be movement. Cer- 
tainly, we are not discouraged or despairing in 
any sense as to the opportunities for real 
progress. 

Q. With respect to another feature of the 
plan — of unilateral xcithdrawals, that is, with- 
drawals from Viet-Nam — is that something 
that is definitely off? 

A. Well, the President has made very clear 
that we have no immediate intention to with- 
draw troops from South Viet-Nam. On the other 
hand, he has indicated that as the capability of 
the Goveriunent of South Viet-Nam to carry 
forward the war itself improves and in the light 
of the state of current offensives, in the light, 
also, of progress in Paris, we would make a 
decision on this subject or perhaps successive 
decisions in the months ahead. 

Q. Have you discovered, Mr. Secretary, that 
there is a large margin for improvement in the 
capacity of the South Vietnamese Army to per- 
foi'm? Can we expect that it will soon be doing 
much better than ifs done in the past? 

A. Well, I wouldn't put it in terms of its 
"soon doing much better." I think it has been a 
matter of steady improvement in their capa- 
bility over the past year and continuing cur- 
rently. And I think basically what we want to do 
is step up and give continually higher priority 
to what you might call the "Vietnamization" of 
the war. So as progress is made there, one might 
expect some withdrawals as a result of that 
progress. I think these two things are certainly 
interrelated and we have simply made clear 
that, as the Secretary put it the other day, we're 
not putting all our eggs in one basket. Even if 
we don't achieve significant progress toward a 



MAY 19, 1969 



417 



negotiated settlement in Paris, we still look 
forward to a period when the capability of the 
South Vietnamese Government to carry forward 
the war and maintain its own security will be 
great enough to justify withdrawals. 

Q. Let me touch on what I think would he 
perhaps the third leg of the Viet-Nam triangle; 
that is, political development in Saigon, par- 
ticularly with respect to the South Vietnamese 
Oovemtnent. I think some people might feel 
that has been the major area of progress during 
the past 100 days. Would you feel that was an 
important area of progress? 

A. Yes, I think in terms of the development 
by the Government of South Viet-Nam itself 
of the confidence that it is prepared to enter 
into a period of political competition with the 
people who now comprise the NLF. This, I 
think, is perhaps the most encouraging single 
development of this 100-day period. 

Q. Let me switch you around, if I can, to 
anotlier important aspect of American foreign 
policy; that is, relations with the Soviet Union. 
In the 100 days, what is the impression you've 
had, Mr. Secretary, of the Soviet Government? 
Is it that of a solid, stable regime that knows 
what ifs doing, or is it a crazy mixed-up bunch 
of apparatchiks that is just floundering through 
crisis to crisis? 

A. Well, I think simply looking at it in its 
aspect as we see it in the conduct of discussions 
of a whole range of subjects — including the 
Middle East, Berlin, and so on — I think we see it 
as a government of pretty solid, sensible people 
who are genumely concerned about the situa- 
tion in which a massive overkill capacity has 
been developed on both sides ; who are concerned 
about the consmner demands of their own peo- 
ple ; who are willing to deal with us in realistic 
terms in situations of tension, such as the situa- 
tion in the Middle East; and in short, I think 
we see them as people who are genuinely in- 
terested in exploring the opportunities offered 
by the era of negotiations referred to by Presi- 
dent Nixon. 

Q. You mentioned "overkilV^ And that, of 
course, means in the nuclear field. Is it your im- 
pression that theyVe eager to get on with stra- 
tegic arms lim,itation talks? 

A. Well, I don't know that I would use the 
word "eager." I certainly think that they appear 
to be ready to do this. They recognize its enor- 
mous importance in terms of East- West rela- 



tions and particularly in terms of the conse- 
quences of what could happen as a result of a 
confrontation anywhere in the world in which 
arms are used, and so I think we feel that they 
are prepared to enter into serious discussions on 
this subject. And certainly we, at the point 
when we do want to enter into them, will want 
to do so on a basis that has reflected our own 
seriousness and a really very deliberate and care- 
ful process of preparation. 

Q. How about a date on strategic arms limita- 
tion talks? Is that shaping up soon? 

A. No date has specifically been set. But — 
and we have had no direct conversations with 
the Soviet Union aimed at determining such a 
date — it has been our feeling that we would be 
prepared to go forward, at least assuming that 
the Soviet Union agrees to do so, at some time 
in late spring or early summer. 

Q. Let me ask you — how much time do you 
think the Nixon administration has with re- 
spect to American public opinion to begin de- 
livering something in the way of peace in 
Viet-Nam? 

A. Well, really, I can^t give a worthwhile 
prediction on this. I think we have a significant 
amount of time so long as we are able to com- 
municate to the people of the United States a 
credible position of sincerely seeking to get out 
of tliis war on an honorable basis. And so long 
as they feel we're doing everything we can, I 
think we've got quite a lot of time. 



15th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made by 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.S. delegation, at the 15th plenary session of 
the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
April 30. 

Press release 96 dated April 30 

Ladies and gentlemen : We have searched at 
these Paris meetings for evidence of your side's 
willingness to talk about mutual action; we 
have looked for indications that you are pre- 
pared by negotiation to work out steps which 
both sides can take to bring the war to an end. 
What we have learned is not encouraging. 

To avoid discussion of specific issues and mu- 



418 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN 



tual action, to present unreasonable unilateral 
demands, to refuse to talk in terms of reci- 
procity — these are not indications of a serious 
desire to negotiate. 

This attitude on your part at the Paris meet- 
ings, whose purpose, after all, is negotiation, is 
only one of the many contradictions in your 
position. These contradictions, and the double 
standard you apply in making your proposals, 
impede our efforts to move rapidly toward a 
settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. 
Let me cite some examples. 
On the fundamental issue of the withdrawal 
of external forces from South Viet-Nam, you 
agree with us that the South Vietnamese peo- 
ple should solve their own political ijrobleras 
without any external interference. Yet you in- 
sist on continuing the massive presence in South 
Viet-Nam of North Vietnamese military forces 
and subversive personnel. Adding to this con- 
tradiction is your demand that United States 
forces leave South Viet-Nam unilaterally while 
North Vietnamese forces remain there to do as 
they please. 

You say that Viet-Nam is one and that con- 
sequently Vietnamese have a right to fight 
anywhere on Vietnamese soil. You assert that 
North Vietnamese forces fighting in South 
Viet-Nam are not "foreign troops." But else- 
where you speak of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam as "an independent and sovereign 
state." Now, if North Viet-Nam is an independ- 
ent and sovereign state, what gives it the right 
to interfere in the affairs of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam? There is an apparent inconsistency 
between claiming that North Viet-Nam is an 
independent and sovereign state and at the 
same time claiming that Viet-Nam is one and the 
North Vietnamese have a right of armed inter- 
vention in South Viet-Nam. 

At the same time as your side demands the 
unilateral withdrawal of United States and al- 
lied forces from South Viet-Nam, you attack 
the ever-growing "Vietnamization" of the re- 
sistance to your armed attack. We find this a 
confusing and contradictoiy attitude. If you 
call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and con- 
demn the increasing assumption of responsi- 
bility by the Government and people of South 
Viet-Nam for their own defense, it can only 
mean that you wish to see South Viet-Nam sub- 
mit to your armed aggression. 

You say we should not raise the question of 
Laos and Cambodia in these meetings. At the 
same time, you say that the Geneva accords of 
1954 and 1962 must be respected. Why is it 



wrong to raise the questions of North Vietnam- 
ese violations of the territory of Cambodia and 
Laos when it is clear that your side uses the 
territory of Cambodia and Laos to carry out 
operations against South Viet-Nam in contra- 
vention of the 1954 and 1962 accords? How can 
there be a settlement of the Viet-Nam problem 
so long as North Viet-Nam continues to use its 
neighbors' territory for armed intervention in 
South Viet-Nam? 

Let me cite another example of the internal 
contradictions in your position. You call for 
self-determination for the South Vietnamese 
people. But at the same time, you insist that the 
political future of South Viet-Nam must be de- 
termined solely on tlie basis of a program 
created by your side, without regard to what 
the people of South Viet-Nam, as well as the 
government they have elected, want. 

You claim to support the position that the 
South Vietnamese shoidd be free to work out 
their own political future among themselves. 
Yet when the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam says it is ready immediately and with- 
out prior conditions to discuss political matters 
with the NLF, you call its proposals "insolent" 
and "ridiculous" and you call instead for the 
"liquidation" of that government, the over- 
throw of the National Assembly, and the 
abolishment of the Constitution. These, you 
claim, are "reasonable" and "just" demands. 

You allege that the National Liberation Front 
is the true representative of the people of South 
Viet-Nam and that the Government of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam could not survive without 
United States support. Yet you condemn the 
proposals put forward by our side advocating 
mutual withdrawal and the restoration of the 
demilitarized zone because, you say, they are 
designed "to isolate the struggle of the South 
Vietnamese people." 

That is a clear admission of the massive North 
Vietnamese presence in South Viet-Nam, with- 
out which tlie National Liberation Front could 
not maintain itself because it does not have 
sufficient popular support. Apparently you wish 
to continue illegally sending men and materiel 
to support the armed aggression agamst South 
Viet-Nam. 

Your side expresses its concern for the secu- 
rity and democratic liberties of the people of 
South Viet-Nam. And yet you assassinate vil- 
lage and handet officials who are duly elected by 
the people. Each day innocent civilians die be- 
cause of your side's tactics of terror and violence. 
Your side falsely charges the United States 



MAT 19, 1969 



419 



with seeking military victory and with esca- 
lating the war. You say the United States should 
not seek to negotiate from a "position of 
strength." On the other hand, as General Giap 
[Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese 
Minister of Defense] has publicly stated, your 
objective is one of military victory. Your side 
exaggerates and boasts of its increased military 
activities since Tet of this year. 

Moreover, captured documents and testimony 
of prisoners reveal orders from Hanoi to your 
forces and cadres in South Viet-Nam urging 
greater military efforts. They have been told 
that battlefield success will permit your side to 
negotiate from a position of strength in Paris. 
Evidently you want strength for yourself and 
weakness for others. 

These are a few examples of the double stand- 
ard you apply and the contradictions in the 
position your side takes at these Paris meetings. 
This attitude has not led to reasonable proposals 
for a negotiated solution. I hope it does not 
prevent your side from recognizing the need for 
mutual action to bring peace to Viet-Nam. 

If your side sincerely wants these negotiations 
to lead to a just and lasting peace in Viet-Nam 
and in Southeast Asia, you should be prepared, 
as we are, to negotiate on those issues which are 
at the heart of the conflict. 

Most important, j'ou should be willing to see 
the withdrawal of all external forces on some 
fair and equitable basis. As we have said, the 
withdrawal of North Vietnamese and American 
forces can begin simultaneously and could be 
phased over an agreed period of time. 

A mutual withdrawal of external forces by 
reasonable stages could lead to the total elim- 



ination of outside combat forces, cessation of 
hostilities, and a return to peace. Our side is 
ready to begin moving down this road right 
away. 

Of equal importance is the withdrawal of all 
external forces from Cambodia and Laos and 
an end to the use of the territory of those two 
states for the purpose of armed intervention in 
South Viet-Nam. 

Other areas where mutual action is necessary 
are the restoration of the status of the demil- 
itarized zone and the early release of prisoners 
of war. 

As we work toward these priority areas of 
military agreement, political matters will also 
need to be discussed. These political aspects of 
a settlement can be worked out at the same time 
as the military aspects. Both sides seem to agree 
that the political settlement is a matter to be 
worked out by the South Vietnamese themselves. 

Ladies and gentlemen, our side has made spe- 
cific and constructive proposals for action by 
both sides to bring about an equitable settlement 
of the Viet-Nam war. We believe our proposals 
are sensible and practical. We are ready to listen 
to alternative proposals and to negotiate on a 
basis of mutual action. 

For many people in the world — for some who 
are in this room — tomorrow is Labor Day. For 
us in the United States, it falls in September. 
But whatever the date, we Americans applaud 
constructive efforts in support of decent wages, 
hours, and working conditions for all. Indeed, 
the effort to achieve these things is an important 
part of our history. We accordingly extend best 
wishes to those here at this table who celebrate 
Labor Day tomorrow. 



420 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



The Central American Common Market: 
Initiative for Development 



hy Charles A. Meyer 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Afairs'^ 



I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss 
with you some observations on the Central 
American Common Market. My recent trip to 
Central America has served to reinforce views 
that I have had for some time that this remark- 
able experiment has large significance for the 
other developing nations to the south. 

What has happened in recent years in Cen- 
tral America has caused this region to be the 
bright spot in the sphere of inter-American 
relationships. The ideal of union has been a 
dream of Central Americans since the first at- 
tempts at federation more than a century ago. 
To give this dream reality, in the 1950's a small 
group of men took a very practical approach. 
Instead of concentrating on political union, 
they saw that there were large advantages to be 
gained for their peoples by unifying economi- 
cally, commercially, and financially. From this 
inspiration, and after nearly 10 years of pre- 
paratory study, the Common Market was 
formed in Managua in December 1960 and 
began operations the following June. 

Now we are a month away from the eighth 
anniversary of the Central American Conunon 
Market. It is a fitting point at which to review 
the achievements of this short period. In 8 
years, the Central American Conunon Market 
has increased intraregional trade eight times — 
from $32 million in 1960 to approximately $260 
million in 1968. I doubt if any multinational 
economic effort on record can match that rate 



'Address prepared for delivery before an Inter- 
American affairs seminar on the Central American 
Common Market sponsored by International House and 
the Pan American Life Insurance Co. at New Orleans, 
La., on Apr. 30 (press release 95) ; read by Oliver L. 
Sause, Director, Regional Office for Central America 
and Panama, Agency for International DeTelopment. 



of growth. This increased trade has in turn 
helped to sustain generally high rates of eco- 
nomic growth during this period. 

I have learned much recently about the ac- 
tions which the five countries have taken to 
create the multilateral institutions required to 
further this process. Both the concept and the 
working reality of regionalism have been 
worked out through such institutions as the 
Secretariat for the Common Market 
(SIECA), headed by the very able Secretary 
General, Dr. Carlos Manuel Castillo, who is 
present today ; and the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration (CABEI), which is 
now administering a portfolio valued at over 
$200 million primarily aimed at building a re- 
gional transportation and communications net- 
work. Dr. Enrique Ortez Colindres, who is also 
here today, is in large measure responsible for 
this progress. 

I have also learned of the considerable social 
advances that have been made. Combining 
forces on common problems through the Or- 
ganization of Central American States 
(ODECA), these countries have been able to 
make real progress in education, public health, 
labor, and social welfare. In this area I would 
single out for special mention the Central 
American-Panama textbook program, which in 
7 years has printed and distributed 10 million 
textbooks and 368,000 teachers guides for use 
in public elementary schools in Central 
America and Panama. Central Americans write, 
illustrate, and print their own books and have 
made these books available free of charge for 
the first time in history to all primary public 
school children. The regional malaria eradica- 
tion program, in which AID, the Pan American 
Health Organization, and the Central Ameri- 



MAT 19, 1969 



421 



can countries are working together, is another 
very fine example of regional cooperation. 

Throughout the 8-year period, tliese achieve- 
ments have become known to the world at large. 
This very considerable effort on the part of the 
Central Americans has attracted a large level of 
external public assistance as well as private 
foreign investment. During these 8 yeare, the 
United States has made available some $550 
million in development assistance to Central 
America, including $110 million to the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration. Last 
week in Guatemala City, I had the privilege of 
signing the most recent AID loan to CABEI : a 
$30 million loan for regional infrastructure that 
will be utilized for roads and telecommunica- 
tions. 

The foreign private investor has come to look 
upon Central America as an attractive place 
for investment which warrants his confidence. 
Annual levels of private direct foreign invest- 
ment during the period of integration have 
more than doubled over those of the late 1950's. 
This new priA'ate investment capital has come 
mainly from the United States but also, in im- 
portant instances, from Japan, Western Europe, 
Mexico, and Colombia. 

I was pleased to learn that AID gave early 
help to the stimulation of the private sector 
through loans to CABEI for industrial relend- 
ing as well as assistance to the development 
banks in each of the Central American countries. 

As the level of foreign private investment in 
Central America has increased, the character of 
that investment has changed. The expanded 
domestic market made possible by the elimina- 
tion of trade barriers within the Common 
Market has made new investments in manufac- 
turing attractive. This contrasts sharply with 
the situation of only a few yeai-s ago, when most 
foreign private investment in Central America 
was limited to a few large agricultural under- 
takings. 

Much of the first new investment went into 
import substitution, such as food processing 
and textiles. But now the emphasis is moving 
toward investments to exploit recent discoveries 
of local raw materials, such as nickel and sulfur 
in Guatemala and bauxite in Costa Eica, or to 
develop known resources which new research, 
new processes, or new demand in the world 
market have made economically workable, such 
as wood for a pulp and paper industry in Hon- 



duras and silicates and precious metals in 
Nicaragua. 

New or expanded industries in Central 
America have grown to include metal fabrica- 
tion, rubber products, petrochemicals, fertiliz- 
ers, herbicides and insecticides, and pharmaceu- 
tical products, among others. There has been 
diversification in the agricultural sector also» 
but at a slower pace. 

The problems facing Central America in ad- 
vancing and perfecting this unique experiment 
are as challenging as their achievements have 
been remarkable. I have been told how, follow- 
ing a period of intercountry difficulties, the min- 
isters of economy met recently in Tegucigalpa, 
to draft an agreement setting forth an agenda 
for the future which encompasses a series of ex- 
citing steps that include action to create a 
genuine customs union, to revise industrial in- 
centives policies, and to create a conunon 
market for the agricultural sector as it has been 
created for the industrial sector. 

Coupled with these are efforts now going on 
to create a Central American stabilization fund 
to deal with the balance-of-payments problems 
of the five countries and to serve as a first step 
on the road to eventual monetary union. These 
are truly ambitious goals — as ambitious as the 
first steps toward integration taken 8 years ago. 
They signal the determination of Central 
America's leaders to press forward and meet 
new problems head on. It seems to me that per- 
haps most important is the multinational de- 
cisiomnaking process which has been built up in 
Central America during this period and which 
has been developed and strengthened by the 
crises that have occurred. The fact that such a 
process exists, that not only is capable of deal- 
ing with periodic crises but also of grappling 
with the problems of the future, augui-s well 
indeed for the future of Central America. 

One problem that will require attention in the 
years immediately ahead is that of assuring 
more rapid development of the rural sector. The 
greatest gains from economic integration among 
the five countries will come as each of the five 
is able to integrate larger portions of its rural 
population more effectively into the money econ- 
omy. This is a problem that I judge to be difficult 
and one that will require much time. But it 
seems obvious that a market area the size of Cen- 
tral America can ill afford to have a large per- 
centage of its population imable to participate 



422 



DEP.VRTSrENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



actively in that market as consumer oi* pro- 
ducer. A breakthrough is needed here, and a 
greater stimulus to agricultural production, di- 
versification, and export seems at least part of 
the answer. 

Certainly the current efforts of the countries 
and regional institutions, particularly SIECA, 
CABEI, and ICAITE [Central American In- 
stitute of Research and Industrial Technology], 
to boost and diversify exports to countries out- 
side the market area are critical. Faced with a 
limited domestic market. Central America must 
seek future growth by expanding the oppor- 
tunities to sell competitively in the world 
market. In pursuing this objective it will be im- 
portant to review both protective tariff levels 
and levels of industrial incentives in order to 
prevent the buildup of inefficient noncompetitive 
industry. For it will be unquestionably true that 
the benefits of growing world trade will in- 
evitably go to those particular countries who 
have put themselves into the best position to 
compete in world markets. 

Finally, I have been impressed with the im- 
portance Central America has given to concrete 
actions designed to attract larger levels of 
capital inflow of both public and private capital 
to assure continued future progress. Large 
amounts of public investment will continue to 
be needed for the very difficult but critical prob- 
lem of developing the rural sector. Public re- 
sources are also needed for infrastructure and 
social services to provide the basis on which 
private enterprise can invest, employ, produce, 
and market. Much will depend on the willing- 
ness of the countries to prepare adequately for 
these programs and to share in the financing of 
them. Yet over and above these efforts, the great 
gains in economic progress, production, and 
employment will have to come from the efforts 
of the private sector. The Central American ex- 
perience demonstrates what can be achieved by 
a vigorous pace of private investment, both 
foreign and domestic, in promoting economic 
growth and employment. 

I cannot leave you today without sharing with 
you some thoughts concerning the significance 
of the Central American experience for the 
future course and direction of the United 
States-Latin America cooperative relationships. 
On the broadest level, our interest in Latin 
America is to help the countries of the hemi- 
sphere to prosper and make full use of their 



enormous intellectual and productive potential. 
The Central Americans have taken a very large 
step toward realizing their potential; nobody 
who knows the complexities of development will 
claim that the task is finished — much remains 
to be done. But the Central Americans have put 
into practice those two concepts so necessary if 
societies are to prosper : self-help and self-sacri- 
fice. They took their destiny into their own 
hands. They had a vision, they set the goals, 
they determined the pace. The pace has been 
rapid — so rapid, in fact, that the rest of the 
world has been astounded. In turn, U.S. finan- 
cial and technical assistance has responded to 
the pace and direction set by the Central Ameri- 
cans themselves. 

There are, I believe, many similar examples 
of this cooperative or supportive relationship in 
other parts of Latin America. It is my hope that 
the dialogue President Nixon has called for will 
result in a joint search for a new pattern of 
U.S.-Latin America relationships based on this 
principle, under which the initiatives and re- 
sponsibilities for the direction of the Latin 
American development effort will have to come 
increasingly from the Latin Americans 
themselves. 



U.S. Extends Condolences on Death 
of President Barrientos of Bolivia 

President Rene Barrientos Ortuno of Bolivia 
was killed in a helicopter accident on ApHl 27. 
Following are texts of messages sent by Presi- 
dent Nixon to Luis Adolf o Siles Salinas, Con- 
stitutional President of the Republic, and by 
Secretary Rogers to Victor Hoz de Vila, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Message from President Nixon 
to President Siles 

White House press release dated April 28 

April 2S, 1969 
Dear Mr. President : On behalf of my fellow 
countrymen, may I extend to you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, and to the people of Bolivia our deepest 
sympathy for the untimely death of President 
Barrientos. A tragic accident has silenced a 
dynamic leader, and his loss will be deeply 
mourned by all who knew him. But the example 



MAT 19, 1969 



423 



of his leadership and his accomplishments will 
remain as a lasting legacy for all of his fellow 
Americans, and especially for his countrymen 
for whom he worked so hard. All who knew 
him are the riclier for his memory, and Bolivia 
can be justly proud of his leadership and his 
life. 

Richard Nixon 



Message from Secretary Rogers 
to Foreign Minister Hoz de Vila 

April 28, 1969 
Please accept my profound sympathy on the 
death of President Barrientos. 

His loss will be deeply felt by all of us who 
were privileged to work with him, and his 
example will long be an inspiration to those who 
seek the fulfillment of the ideals for which he 
worked so diligently. 

We share the grief of the Bolivian people, but 
we also share your hope that more leaders of his 
stature will emerge to guide the destinies of 
our hemisphere — and that his legacy may help 
pave the way to the kind of society he so 
zealously worked to build. 



Interior Secretary Hickel To Visit 
Pacific Islands Trust Territory 

Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel 
announced on April 24 that he has been re- 
quested by President Nixon to undertake a fact- 
finding mission to Micronesia in the Western 
Pacific and that he will depart May 1. 

Among those accompanying the Secretary 
will be IMrs. Elizabeth R. Farrington, Director 
of the Office of Territories, and Edward E. 
Johnston, nominated on April 24 by the Presi- 
dent to be the new High Commissioner of the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.^ 

Purpose of the mission to Micronesia will be 
to ascertain for the administration the needs 
and desires of the native peoples toward their 
political and economic development. Tlie Secre- 
tary's report, together with plans currently 
being developed by the administration, will form 
the basis for legislative proposals to Congress 
on the future status of the trust islands. 



' The Senate confirmed the nomination of Mr. John- 
ston on May 1. 



It will be the first visit in 7 years by an In- 
terior Secretary to this strategic area, which has 
been administered by the Department since the 
trusteeship was created in 1947. 

"We plan to establish a close rapport with the 
Micronesian people, to seek their counsel, and 
to determine what they want for their political 
future, and their public works programs, in- 
vestment capital, and development of potential 
resources," the Secretary said. "Our special con- 
cern is to give the Micronesians a greater voice 
and representation in the administration of the 
islands. 

"The aim of the administration is to take 
positive action in this area. It is vital to the 
foreign relations, defense, communications, and 
research programs of the United States, and we 
intend to move ahead quickly on a progressive 
program for this vital area." 

Secretary Hickel will address the Guam Leg- 
islature, as well as the Congress of Micronesia 
at Saipan, during his 12,000-mile trip. 

The Secretary will travel from Honolulu to 
Guam and Saipan on May 2. He will spend 3 
days in Saipan, headquarters of the govern- 
ment of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is- 
lands, using this as his base for conferences and 
field trips in the area. He will return to Wash- 
ington, via Anchorage, Alaska, on May 7. 

Micronesia consists of more than 2,100 small 
islands scattered over an ocean expanse of 3 
million square miles in the Western Pacific, an 
area approximately the size of the continental 
United States. The total population is 94,000, 
inhabiting 100 of the islands and with differing 
cultures and speaking nine different dialects. 

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 
comprising the Marshall, Mariana, and Caro- 
line Islands, is divided into six major districts : 
Marianas, with the district center at Saipan; 
Yap (Colonia), Palau (Koror),Truk (Moen), 
Ponape (Kolonia), and Marshalls (Majuro 
Atoll). Guam, in the Marianas, is a U.S. 
Territory. 

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is 
administered by the United States under a 
Trusteeship Agreement with the United Na- 
tions Security Council, approved by the Presi- 
dent pursuant to authority granted by a joint 
resolution of the Congress. 

The terms of this unique "strategic trust" 
give the United States full authority over the 
territory, including the right to establish 
military bases. 

The terms require the United States to 



424 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



"promote the development of the inhabitants 
of the Trust Territory toward self-government 
or independence as may be appropriate to 
the particular circumstances of the Trust 
Territory and its j^eoples and the freely ex- 
pressed wishes of the peoples concerned . . . 
promote the economic advancement and self- 
sufficiency of the inhabitants . . . promote the 
social advancement of the inhabitants . . . 
and promote the educational advancement of 
the inhabitants . . . ." 



Senate Asked To Approve Convention 
on Conduct of North Atlantic Fishing 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit 
herewith a certified copy of the Convention on 
Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North 
Atlantic, done at London, June 1, 1967. The 
Convention has been signed on behalf of seven- 
teen govermnents, including the United States 
of America, which represent the great majority 
of vessels engaged in the fisheries in the area. 

For the information of the Senate, I also 
transmit the report by the Secretary of State 
with respect to the Convention. 

The Convention establishes a generally uni- 
form system of identification, marking, light 
signals, conduct, and enforcement for fishing 
vessels and support vessels in a large part of the 
North Atlantic. The Convention is sufficiently 
flexible that it might be extended to other areas 
of the Atlantic if developments in the fishery 
pattern make this desirable. 

Many European fishing vessels have followed 
a code of conduct laid down in the 1882 Con- 
vention for Eegulating the Police of the North 
Sea Fisheries, even though many of the Eu- 
ropean governments did not actually become 
party to the Convention. This code was grad- 
ually extended throughout the Northeast 
Atlantic as congestion on the fishing grounds 
gradually spread beyond the North Sea. Even- 



tually, the code extended to the Northwest 
Atlantic. 

Since foreign fishermen rarely operated close 
to our Atlantic coast, such a code was of little 
direct concern to our fishermen. This situation 
has changed dramatically during the past few 
years. Complaints of harassment or impaired 
operating freedom due to congestion on the 
fishing grounds have become frequent. As a re- 
sult, our fishermen have called for a modern 
code of conduct to assist them. Their needs in 
this respect were made known to our negotiators. 

I believe that the requirements of American 
fishermen in dealing with problems caused by 
the heavy concentration of vessels on the fishing 
grounds in the Convention area are substan- 
tially met by the terms of the Convention. The 
Convention will also assist us in our continuing 
effort to promote harmony in the international 
fisheries through agreements with other govern- 
ments. 

Proposed legislation to carry out the provi- 
sions of the Convention will be submitted. 

I recommend that the Senate give early and 
favorable consideration to the Convention. 



Richard Nixon 



TiiE White PIouse. 

April 16, 1969. 



'Transmitted on Apr. 16 (White House press re- 
lease) : also printed as S. Ex. D, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the text of the convention and the 
report of the Secretary of State. 



U.S. Pays Into Regional OAS Fund 
for Education, Science, Technology 

The Department of State announced on 
April 21 (press release 89) that Assistant Secre- 
tary for Inter-American Affairs Cliarles A. 
Meyer had on that day handed OAS Secretary 
General Galo Plaza a $2.7 million letter of credit 
to help support regional education, science, 
and technology programs now being launched 
by members of the Organization of American 
States. 

This transfer, together with earlier payments 
of $500,000, completes the first part of the U.S. 
pledge, made at the Inter-American Cultural 
Council meeting at Maracay, Venezuela, in 1968, 
to advance up to $3.2 million against the pledges 
of the other governments. Future payments by 
the U.S. Government will be made in response 
to payments by other member governments. 



MAT 19, 1969 



425 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank 
Holds 10th Annual Meeting at Guatemala City 



Statement by Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy ' 



I am delighted to meet with you today as the 
new United States Governor of the Inter- 
American Development Bank and as the repre- 
sentative of our recently inaugurated President, 
Richard M. Nixon. 

I am saddened — as are all of you — by the un- 
timely passing of Guatemala's Foreign Min- 
ister, the President of the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly, Dr. Emilio Arenales Catalan. 
Dr. Arenales was a distinguished leader of 
Guatemala, of our hemisphere, and of the entire 
world community. His death deprives everyone, 
everywhere, of a devoted and tireless worker in 
the cause of world peace. 

Just prior to leaving Washington, I received 
a letter from President Nixon, who has a deep 
personal interest in the work of the Inter- Amer- 
ican Bank. With your permission, I would like 
to read it to you. 

The forthcoming Guatemala City meeting of the 
Board of Governors of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank will be the first such meeting you will attend 
as United States Governor. It is also the first such 
meeting since I have become President of the United 
States. I would, accordingly, appreciate it if you would 
convey the following personal message to the Governors 
from me : 

It is a pleasure for me to send my greetings to this 
annual gathering of the Governors of the Inter-Ameri- 
can Development Bank. In its 10 years the Bank has 
come to play a highly constructive role in Latin Ameri- 
can development. 

The positive effects of the Bank's lending activities 
can be seen throughout Latin America. As the resources 



' Made before the 10th annual meeting of the Board 
of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank 
at Guatemala City, Guatemala, on Apr. 22. Secretary 
Kennedy is U.S. Governor of the Bank. 



available to the Bank grow, I am confident that the 
Bank will make an increasingly vigorous and effective 
contribution to the economic and social development of 
the hemisphere. 

The Inter-American Development Bank stands as an 
outstanding example of multilateral financial coopera- 
tion among the nations of the Americas. I want to 
convey to you my best wishes for continued success. 

I join wholeheartedly in the President's ex- 
pres-sion of confidence and support for the 
Bank. I am familiar with its important con- 
tributions to hemispheric de^■elopment and its 
great potential for the future. I look forward to 
assisting the officers of the Bank and my fellow 
Governors in guiding its progress. 

I would like to organize my remarks today 
around a relatively few points that seem im- 
portant to me as one who assumes liis duties as 
a member of this Board after an extended 
period as a commercial banker. In summary, 
these points are : 

— First, the multilateral banking approach to 
development, as exemplified by the Inter- 
American Bank, is sound and deserves further 
emphasis. I underscore hankhig here, with the 
emphasis on high standards and economic per- 
formance by borrowing countries that that term 
implies. 

— Second, the economic development that the 
Bank seeks to foster cannot be achieved in Latin 
America unless inflation is contained — nor can 
the United States attain its economic objectives 
if inflation is unchecked. 

— Third, a climate that permits private en- 
terprise to flourish, that encourages both domes- 
tic and foreign private investment, is essential 
for balanced economic growth. 

—And finally, development can succeed only 



426 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



within the framework of a smoothly function- 
ing world trade and payments system. Prompt 
action to put into effect the new special drawing 
rights facility of the International Monetary 
Fund is essential in this regard. 

Let me now expand on each of these points in 
turn. 

Multilateral Approach to Development 

The decade since the agreement establisliing 
the Bank was offered for signature has been 
marked by ever-closer cooperation among na- 
tions to help developing areas achieve their 
legitimate aspirations. The Inter-American 
Bank exemplifies this willingness of nations to 
work together to promote a better life for all of 
their citizens. The Bank not only has served 
well the mutual interests of the Americas; it 
has also been a model for institutions serving the 
needs of other developing regions. 

I returned only a few days ago from Sydney, 
Australia, where I was privileged to participate 
in the second annual meeting of the Asian De- 
velopment Bank, which has made significant 
progress since its founding in 1966. As you 
know, the progress of the Asian Bank has been 
aided by expertise and experience contributed 
by ofGcials and staff of the Inter-American 
Bank. 

The multilateral approach to development 
financing — both worldwide and through re- 
gional banks — offers great hope for the future. 
Through this approach, nations large and small, 
rich and poor, can work together effectively to 
overcome the poverty, hunger, and despair that 
afflicts too many of our fellow men. 

It follows, then, that my Government places 
a high value on multilateral assistance and en- 
courages its increased use by the economically 
advanced nations. 

At the same time, however, we recognize that 
in some cases there can be no substitute for bi- 
lateral assistance, which provides an important 
direct link between nations, thereby promoting 
a greater understanding of one another's prob- 
lems and a helpful exchange of mutually useful 
knowledge. 

In reviewing the progress of the Inter-Amer- 
ican Bank, including the accomplishments dis- 
cussed in the annual report for last year, I have 
been particularly impressed by two points : 

— First, the growing ability of the Bank to 
tap varied sources of capital ; 



— Second, the success of the Bank's efforts to 
attract funds from advanced nations other than 
the United States. 

Such diversification of the Bank's sources of 
funds is important in mobilizing the maximum 
possible resources for development. 

In addition — and I say this with complete 
candor — the Bank's capacity to tap funds from 
a variety of sources has reduced international 
demands on the hard-pressed United States 
capital markets at a time when my country is 
making a determined effort to solve its bal- 
ance-of-payments problem. I can assure you 
that this development is welcome indeed. 

The steady progress of the Bank since 1959 
is a tribute to its leadership. Dr. Felipe Herrera 
has served with distinction as President of the 
Bank since its inception. He has given gener- 
ously of his wisdom, energy, and talents; and 
the Bank, its member countries, and our en- 
tire hemisphere are indebted to him for his out- 
standing service. 

We all recognize that the popular concept of a 
financial institution is frequently distorted. Are 
we a cold impersonal entity ? Not at all ! I think 
the wisdom of the Bank's leadership is reflected 
in its deep-rooted concern for the most impoi-- 
tant element in the development of a nation: 
its people. Through carefully selected invest- 
ments in the economic and social fields, the Bank 
strengthens the ability of the peoples of the 
Americas to contribute more productively to the 
growth and prosperity of the hemisphere. Thus, 
it helps to build the essential human base on 
which economic progress depends. 

The continuing efforts by the Bank to 
strengthen its administrative procedures also 
demonstrate the foresight of its leadership. 
These timely moves — among which I include 
the procedure established last year for system- 
atic review and appraisal of all aspects of opera- 
tions — will increase both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations. 

Dangers of Inflation 

I would like at this point to suggest that the 
Bank would benefit by giving greater weight 
to the economic performance of borrowing 
countries. Borrowers would find it in their own 
best interest to seek the Bank's objective ap- 
praisal of their economic plans and progress. 

Similarly, I don't think it gratuitous to sug- 
gest that the Bank should regard such rigorous 



MAT 19, 1969 



427 



appraisals as one of its essential functions. 

I am certain that no one in this room today 
doubts that a very crucial question for the Bank 
is simply this : Are our member nations taking 
adequate steps to avoid or to curb inflation ? 

The countries of our hemisphere have learned 
the hard way that inflation, if left unchecked, is 
a vicious enemy of development and wildly dis- 
sipates its benefits. The other side of the coin is, 
of course, the fact that the achievement and 
maintenance of price stability promotes eco- 
nomic justice and sound and sustainable growth. 

In establisliing goals for our national 
economies, each of us must be concerned with 
the same essential elements, no matter what the 
size of our country or its stage of economic de- 
velopment. These key elements are, of course: 

—A satisfactory rate of economic growth ; 

— Reasonable price stability ; 

— Eeasonably full employment ; 

— Equilibrium in the balance of payments. 

And, gentlemen, lest you think that I'm seek- 
ing to lecture without regard for my own coun- 
try's problems, let me say that although the 
United States continues to enjoy rapid economic 
growth, we still face the critical problems of 
inflation and balance-of -payments deficits. 

I would be less than honest if I did not say 
that unless we in the United States overcome 
these problems, all of our otlier economic objec- 
tives will be endangered. However, let me assure 
you, my fellow Governors, that the United 
States is determined to solve the problem of 
inflation. And if we solve that vexing problem, 
we will also be well on the way to a solution of 
our international payments imbalance. 

Private Sector Vital to Development 

President Nixon and his entire administra- 
tion are firmly committed to taking effective 
action to check inflation and to return our 
economy to the path of reasonable price stabil- 
ity. We intend to achieve this goal through gen- 
eral economic restraints that are fully com- 
patible with the maintenance of a liigh level of 
employment and our system of free, competitive 
private enterprise. Here I want to add — perhaps 
gratuitously — that private enterprise is the 
dynamic element in our economy. Any actions 
that would weaken it would be as dangerous to 
our future as would be continued inflation. 



Historically, Latin American governments ] 
have wisely recognized that a flourishing private 
sector is vital to overall national development. 
Happily, foreign private investors are actively 
seeking to harmonize their objectives with the 
national goals and basic concepts of their host 
countries — particularly with respect to the fields 
they seek to enter, to active recruitment of local 
managerial skills, to association with local 
capital, and to good corporate citizenship in 
general. 

Latin America's industrial sector has been 
growing faster than Latin America's gross na- 
tional product as a whole. This reflects many 
factors : 

— Changed investor attitudes ; 

— New opportunities presented by economic 
integration arrangements ; 

— The relaxation of financial controls made 
possible by more stable conditions in a number 
of countries ; 

— The increased ability of private enterprise 
to draw on domestic sources of capital ; and 1 

— The provision by foreign investors of 1 
financial resources, advanced technology, and 
established organizations. 

Private enterprise, both domestic and for- 
eign, has demonstrated its ability to stimulate 
increased economic activity in Latin America. 

IMF Special Drawing Rights 

I believe that those Latin American officials 
who establish domestic policy should continu- 
ally seek to improve the climate for private 
enterprise so that it can add to its already sig- 
nificant accomplishments. 

May I add that this search for a better climate 
applies also to those officials who are concerned 
with the international flow of private capital. 

One very important way in which Latin 
American governments can help to facilitate in- 
ternational flows of capital for trade and in- 
vestment is by acting promptly to ratify the 
agreement on special drawing rights of the 
International Monetary Fund. The new special 
drawing rights facility — which should be ac- 
tivated this year — will serve the developing as 
well as the developed countries. It will directly 
add to monetary reserves in proportion to IMF 
quotas and will provide the liquidity needed 
for growing trade and investment. 



428 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



We should all be gratified that 11 of the mem- 
bers of the Inter-American Bank have taken 
the necessary steps to ratify the amendment. 
Some 45 countries, holding more than 60 percent 
of the votes in the Fund, have completed 
ratification. However, the amendment requires 
approval by 67 member countries, holding 80 
percent of the total voting power. Since the SDR 
facility cannot be activated until countries rep- 
resenting at least 75 percent of the Fund's quotas 
indicate their readiness to participate, I hope 
that those Latin American nations which have 
not yet completed both steps will do so promptly. 

In closing, let me assure my associates on the 
Board of Governors that the United States will 
continue to give its strong support to the ob- 
jectives of the Inter-American Development 
Bank. 

May I also say that we are prepared to listen, 
to look, and to learn. We want to hear your views 
as to what you want to do for yourselves — and 
your beliefs about what we can do together. We 
earnestly seek your advice and solicit your as- 
sistance in finding solutions for our mutual 
problems. 

As President Nixon has said, we seek "a new 
era of cooperation, of consultation, but most im- 
portant, of progress for all the members of our 
great American family."^ 

Thank you. 



Mr. Meyer Named U.S. Representative 
to lA-ECOSOC 

President Nixon on April 19 appointed 
Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs, to be the Repi-e- 
sentative of the United States on the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council of the 
Organization of American States. 

On the same day, the President also appointed 
Mr. Meyer to be a member of the United States 
National Commission in the Pan American 
Railway Congress Association. 



' For President Nixon's remarks at the Pan Ameri- 
can Union, Washington, D.C., on Apr. 14, see Bitlletin 
of Hay 5, 1969, p. 384. 



Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
listed below) may 6e consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may 
6e purchased from the Sales Section of the United, 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 



Security Council 

Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations 
operation in Cvprus for the period June 8-Decem- 
ber 2, 1968. S/8914. December 4, 1968. 32 pp. 

Special report of the Secretary General on the critical 
situation in the Suez Canal sector. S/9171. April 21, 
1969. 1 p. 



General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. concerning 
objects launched into orbit around the earth or 
into outer space. A/AC.105/INF.198, December 6, 
1968, 3 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.203, April 24, 1969; 
4 pp. 
Information furnished by the United States con- 
cerning objects launched into orbit or beyond. 
A/AC.105/INF.200, February 11, 1969, 2 pp.; 
A/AC.105/INF.201, March 6, 1969, 3 pp.; A/AC. 
105/INF.202, April 24, 1969, 2 pp. 
Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
SatelUtes. A/AC.105/51. February 26, 1969. 25 pp. 
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggres- 
sion. Report of the Special Committee. A/AC.134/5. 
April 7, 1969. 52 pp. 
Note addressed to the Secretary General from the rep- 
resentative of Hungary dated March 28, 1909, trans- 
mitting an appeal by the Warsaw Treaty nations to 
all European countries, adopted at Budapest on 
March 17, calling for an all-European conference. 
A/7536. April 22, 1969. 7 pp. 



Economic and Social Council 

Commission for Social Development : 

Report of the special rapporteurs appointed to under- 
take a review of technical cooperation activities in 
social development E/CN.5/432. December 12, 
1968. 44 pp. 

Five-year work program of the Commission for So- 
cial Development, 19G9-73. Note by the Secretary- 
General. E/CN.5/433. December 12, 1968. 27 pp. 

The Role of Education in Economic and Social De- 
velopment. Report of UNESCO. E/CN.5/435. 
December 12, 1968. 33 pp. 

Implementation of United Nations Social Develop- 
ment Programs During the Tear 1968. Report of 
the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/436. December 27, 
1968. 50 pp. 
United Nations Children's Fund : 

Digest of projects in Africa. E/ICEF/5S0. October 20, 
1968. 61 pp. 

Digest of Projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
E/ICEF/5S3. December 27, 1968. 27 pp. 

Digest of Projects in the Americas. E/ICEP/581. 
December 30, 1968. 54 pp. 



MAT 19, 1969 



429 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Unifed States and Greece Sign 
New Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 79 dated April 11 
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

A new cotton textile agreement between the 
United States and Greece was concluded by ex- 
change of notes at Athens on April 8. Eoswell 
D. McClelland, American Charge d'Affaires ad 
interim at Athens, and George Tsistopoulos, 
Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 
signed the respective notes. 

The new agreement runs through June 30, 
1971, and replaces an agreement of July 17, 
1964,^ which was due to exiDire on December 31, 
1970. The 1964 agreement had been amended 
several times, most recently on Febniary 23, 
1968. 

The new agreement, like the 1964 agreement, 
was negotiated in the context of the Long-Term 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade 
in Cotton Textiles (LTA) and sets forth the 
agreement of Greece to control exports of cot- 
ton textiles to the United States. 

In addition to extending the term, the new 
agreement differs from the old agi-eement prin- 
cipally in that various limits have been revised 
and a contingent allocation provision has been 
eliminated. 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT 



Athens, April 8, 1969. 



No. 66 

Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the Long- 
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in 
Cotton Textiles, hereinafter referred to as the LTA, 
done in Geneva on February 9, 1962, and to the Proto- 
col extending the LTA through September 30, 1970. 
I also refer to the agi-eement between our two Govern- 
ments concerning exports of cotton textiles from Greece 



to the United States, effected by an exchange of notes 
dated July 17, 1964, as amended, hereinafter referred 
to as the 1964 Agreement. On the basis of the recent 
discussions between our two Governments, I propose, 
on behalf of my Government, that the 1964 Agreement 
be replaced as of January 1, 1968, by a new Agreement 
as provided in the following numbered paragraphs : 

1. The Government of Greece shall limit exports to 
the United States in all categories of cotton textiles 
for the eighteen-month period beginning January 1, 
1968 and extending through June 30, 1969 (hereinafter 
called the "first agreement period") ; for the twelve- 
month period beginning July 1, 1969 and extending 
through June 30, 1970 (hereinafter called "the second 
agreement period") ; and for the twelve-month period 
beginning July 1, 1970 and extending through June 30, 
1971 (hereinafter called "the third agreement period") 
in accordance with the following : 





First 


Second 


Third 




Agreement 


Agreement 


Agreement 




Period 


Period 


Period 




1/1/6S- 


7/1/69- 


7/1/70- 




6/S0/69 


6/30/70 


6/30/71 


I. Yarn (cats. 


2,364,846 


1,668,962 


1,752,409 


1-4) 


lbs. 


lbs. 


lbs. 


). Fabrics and 


1,765,378 


1,254,893 


1,308,188 


made-up 


sq. yds. 


sq. yds. 


sq. yds. 


goods (oats. 


eq. 


eq. 


eq. 


,5-38, 64) 








. Apparel 


353,075 


249,179 


261,637 


(cats. 39-63) 


sq. yds. 


sq. yds. 


sq. yds. 




eq. 


eq. 


eq. 



'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5618, 
6009, 6456. 



2. The limitation on yarn may be exceeded in any 
agreement period by the amount by which exports of 
other cotton textiles from Greece to the United States 
are less than the sum of the limitations applicable to 
fabrics, made-up goods and apparel for that period. 

3. Within the ceiling for fabrics and made-up goods, 
exports in any one category shall not exceed 220,500 
square yards equivalent in any agreement period except 
by mutual agreement of the two Governments. 

4. The Government of Greece shall space exxxjrts in 
the yarn categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 as evenly as practi- 
cable within any agreement period, taking into con- 
sideration normal seasonal factors. 

5. In the event of undue concentration in exports 
from Greece to the United States of yarn in categories 
2, 3 or 4, the Government of the United States of 
America may request consultation with the Govern- 
ment of Greece in order to reach a mutually satisfac- 
tory solution to the problem. The Government of Greece 
shall enter into such consultations when requested. 
Until a mutually satisfactory solution is reached, the 
Government of Greece shall limit the exports from 
Greece to the United States of yam in the category in 
question starting with the twelve-month period be- 
ginning on the date of the request for consultation. 
This limit shall be one hundred five percent of the ex- 
ports from Greece to the United States of that category 
of yarn during the most recent twelve-month period 
preceding the request for consultation for which sta- 
tistics are available to our two Governments on the 
date of the request. 

6. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any 



430 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



available statistical data requested by the other Gov- 
ernment. In the implementation of this agreement, the 
system of categories and the factors for conversion 
into square yards equivalent set forth in the Annex " 
hereto shall apply. 

7. For the duration of this agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America shall not invoke 
the procedures of Article 3 of the LTA to request re- 
straint on the export of cotton textiles from Greece to 
the United States. The applicability of the LTA to 
trade in cotton textiles between Greece and the 
United States shall otherwise be unaffected by this 
agreement. 

S. The Governments agree to consult on any ques- 
tions arising in the implementation of this agreement. 

9. The agreement shall continue in force through 
June 30, 1971. Either Government may propose re- 
visions in the terms of the agreement, or may termi- 
nate the agreement at any time, giving notice of 
at least 30 days prior to that propo.sed revision or 
termination. 

10. If the Government of Greece considers that, as 
a result of limitations specified in this agreement, 
Greece is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a- 
vis a third country, the Government of Greece may re- 
quest consultation with the Government of the United 
States of America with a view to taking appropriate 
remedial action such as a reasonable modification of 
this agreement. 

11. (a) Beginning with shortfalls in the first agree- 
ment period, shortfalls may be carried over as follows : 

(i) For any agreement period immediately follow- 
ing a period of a shortfall (i.e., a period in which 
cotton textile exiwrts from Greece to the United 
States in any of the groups set out in paragraph 1 were 
below the limits specified therein), the Government 
of Greece may permit exports to exceed the appropri- 
ate limits by carry-over in an amount equal to either 
the amount of the shortfall or 5 percent of the group 
limit applicable in the period of the shortfall, which- 
ever is lower. The carryover shall be used in the 
same group in which the shortfall occurred, subject 
to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of this 
agreement. 

(ii) In determining the amount of shortfall in the 
fabric and/or apparel groups for the purpose of sub- 
paragraph (a)(i), the actual shortfall in this group 
or groups shall tie reduced by the square yard equiva- 
lent of those yam exports made during the period of 
the shortfall that were permitted under paragraph 2 
of this agreement. 

(b) For the purpose of determining shortfall, the 
limits referred to in subparagraph (a) are to be those 
established in accordance with paragraph 1, without 
the addition of any amount of carryover permitted 
under subparagraph (a). 

(c) The carryover shall be permitted in addition to 
the exports permitted under paragraph 2 of this 
agreement. 

12. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 



problems arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedure or 
operation. 

If the foregoing conforms with the understanding of 
your Government, this note and Your Excellency's note 
of confirmation on behalf of the Government of 
Greece ' shall constitute a new cotton textile agree- 
ment between our two Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

RoswELL D. McCleixano 

His Excellency 

Geobge Tsistopoulos, 

Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 

Athens. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Diplomatic Relations 

Convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna 
AprU 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 19&4.' 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplo- 
matic relations concerning the compulsory settlement 
of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered 
into force April 24, 1964.' 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplo- 
matic relations concerning acquisition of nationality. 
Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force 
April 24, 1964.' 
Accession deposited: Botswana, April 11, 1969. 

Disputes 

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 

Ratifications deposited: Federal Republic of Germany 
(including Land Berlin), April 18, 1969; Greece, 
AprU 21, 1969. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered 
into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5&S1. 
Accession deposited: Nauru (with reservations), 
April 17, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at 
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967 ; for the United States November 1, 
1968. TIAS 6.577. 
Accession deposited: Belgium, April 8, 1969. 



' Not printed here. 



' Not in force for the United States. 



MAT 19, 1969 



431 



Telecommunicafions 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States Jlay 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 

Ratifications deposited: Cuba, February 12, 1969; 
Iran, February 11, 1969; Thailand, February 28, 
1969.' 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603), putting into 
effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service and related infor- 
mation, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 
1966. Entered into force July 1, 1967 ; for the United 
States August 23, 1967, except the frequency allot- 
ment plan contained in appendix 27 shall enter 
Into force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332. 
Notification of approval: Senegal, February 11. 1969. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 

1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating 

to maritime mobile service, with annexes and final 

protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered 

into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 

Notifications of approval: Guinea, F-^brnary 7, 1969 ; 

Japan, February 12, 1969; Senegal, February 11, 

1969; Singapore, February 21, 1969;" Spain, 

March 4, 1969. 



BILATERAL 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of March 28, 1969. Signed at 
Santo Domingo April 15, 1969. Entered into force 
April 15, 1969. 

Japan 

Agreement relating to Japan's financial contributions 
for United States administrative and related expenses 
for Japanese fiscal year 1969 pursuant to the mutual 
defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 
(TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo 
April 15, 1969. Entered into force April 15, 1969. 

Jordan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of April 4, 1968 (TIAS 6475). 
Signed at Amman April 21, 1969. Entered Into force 
April 21, 1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on May 1 confirmed the following nomi- 
nations : 

Philip K. Crowe to be Ambassador to Norway. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
April 12. ) 

C. Burke Elbrick to be Ambassador to Brazil. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
April 5. ) 

Marshall Green to be an Assistant Secretary of State. 
( For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 100 dated May 5.) 

William J. Handley to be Ambassador to Turkey. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 99 dated May 5.) 

Robert C. Hill to be Ambassador to Spain. (For bio- 
graphic details, see Department of State press release 
98 dated May 2.) 

Kenneth B. Keating to be Ambassador to India. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
April 3, ) 

William Leonhart to be Ambassador to the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (For biographic de- 
tails, see Department of State i>ress release 109 dated 
May 7.) 

Val Peterson to be Ambassador to Finland. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
April 3.) 

Alfred Puhan to be Ambassador to Hungary. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 110 dated May 7.) 



Designations 



' With reservations contained in final protocol. 



William H. Sullivan as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, effective April 24. 
(For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 92.) 



482 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX May 19, 1969 Vol. ZX, No. 1660 



Asia 

Green confirmed as Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs 432 

Sullivan designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs .... 432 

Bolivia. U.S. Extends Condolences on Death 
of President Barrientos of Bolivia (Nixon, 
Rogers) 423 

Brazil. Elbrick confirmed as Ambassador . . 432 

Congress 

Confirmations (Crowe, Elbrick, Green, Handley, 
Hill, Keating, Leonhart, Peterson, Puhan) . 432 

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Con- 
duct of North Atlantic Fishing (message from 
President Nixon) 425 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Crowe, Elbrick, Green, Handley, 

Hill, Keating, Leonhart, Peterson, Puhan) 432 

Designations (Sullivan) 432 

Economic Affairs 

Board of Governors of the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank Holds 10th Annual Meeting 
at Guatemala City (Kennedy) 426 

The Central American Common Market: Initia- 
tive for Development (Meyer) 421 

Mr. Meyer Named U.S. Representative to lA- 
ECOSOC 429 

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Con- 
duct of North Atlantic Fishing (message from 
President Nixon) 425 

United States and Greece Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) .... 430 

Finland. Peterson confirmed as Ambassador . 432 

Foreign Aid. Board of Governors of the Inter- 
American Development Bank Holds 10th An- 
nual Meeting at Guatemala City (Kennedy) . 426 

Greece. United States and Greece Sign New 
Cotton Textile Agreement (text of U.S. 
note) 430 

Hungary. Puhan confirmed as Ambassador . . 432 

India. Keating confirmed as Ambassador . . 432 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Board of Governors of the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank Holds 10th Annual Meeting 
at Guatemala City (Kennedy) 426 

Mr. Meyer Named U.S. Representative to lA- 
ECOSOC 429 

Latin America 

Board of Governors of the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank Holds 10th Annual Meeting 
at Guatemala City (Kennedy) 426 

The Central American Common Market : Initia- 
tive for Development (Meyer) 421 

Mr. Meyer Named U.S. Representative to lA- 
ECOSOC 429 

U.S. Pays Into Regional OAS Fund for Educa- 
tion, Science, Technology 425 

Non-Self -Governing Territories. Interior Secre- 
tary Hickel To Visit Pacific Islands Trust 
Territory 424 

Norway. Crowe confirmed as Ambassador . . 432 

Presidential Documents 

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Con- 
duct of North Atlantic Fishing 425 

U.S. Extends Condolences on Death of President 
Barrientos of Bolivia 423 

Spain. Hill confirmed as Ambassador .... 432 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 431 

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Con- 
duct of North Atlantic Fishing (message from 

President Nixon) 425 

United States and Greece Sign New Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) .... 430 

Turkey. Handley confirmed as Ambassador . . 432 

U.S.S.R. Under Secretary Richardson Discusses 
Viet-Nam Peace Talks and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Re- 
lations (transcript of television interview) . 417 

United Nations. Current U.N. Documents . . 429 

Viet-Nam 

15th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 418 

Under Secretary Richardson Discusses Viet-Nam 
Peace Talks and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations 

(transcript of television interview) .... 417 

Yugoslavia. Leonhart confirmed as Ambassa- 
dor 432 

Name Index 

Crowe, Philip K 432 

Elbrick, C. Burke 432 

Green, Marshall 432 

Handley, William J 432 

Hickel, Walter J 424 

Hill, Robert C 432 

Keating, Kenneth B 432 

Kennedy, David M 426 

Leonhart, William 432 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 418 

Meyer, Charles A 421,429 

Nixon, President 423, 425 

Peterson, Val 432 

Puhan, Alfred 432 

Richardson, Elliot L 417 

Rogers, Secretary 423 

Sullivan, William H 432 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 28-May 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 28 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 79 of 
April 11 and 89 of April 21. 

Ko. Date Subject 

*93 4/28 Schedule for the visit of Prime Minis- 
( corrected) ter John G. Gorton of Australia. 

94 4/30 Richardson: interview for National 

Educational Television Network. 

95 4/30 Meyer: inter-American affairs semi- 

nar on the Central American Com- 
mon Market, New Orleans. 

96 4/30 Lodge : 15th plenary session on Viet- 

Nam at Paris. 
t97 4/30 U.S.-Brazil agreement on soluble 

coffee. 
*98 5/2 Hill sworn in as Ambassador to Spain 

(biographic details). 



*Xot printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletiw. 



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N AVT O 

20YEARS OF PEACE 



^I^^l 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN 1 1969 
DEPOSITORY 



Vol. LX, No. 1561 




May 26, 1969 



SECRETARY ROGERS TO CONFER WITH ASIAN LEADERS 
DURING 17-DAY TRIP 

Statement by Secretary Rogers lf33 

LATIN AMERICA: WHAT ARE YOUR PRIORITIES? 

by Assistant Secretary Meyer J^lfi 

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION— A CHALLENGE 
TO INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 

hy Assistant Secretary Sisco iliS 

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DYNAMISM 

AND OUR COMMON INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA 

Article hy Robert TT. Bamett 447 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1561 
May 26, 1969 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

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reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is Lndesed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
ivith information on developments in 
the field of foreign rela tions and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
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Secretary Rogers To Confer With Asian Leaders 
During 17-Day Trip 



Following 'is a statement issued hy Secretary 
Rogers on May 9, together with the details of 
his itinerary. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Press release 112 dated May 9 

The mission on wliich we will be leaving 
Monday [May 12] will cover a large part of 
southern Asia. The United States is deeply in- 
volved in Southeast Asia and has significant 
interests elsewhere in the continent. My trip will 
provide the first substantive opportunity for me 
to meet many of the leaders of the area and for 
us to hear from them about their own views. I 
intend to elicit their ideas on future prospects 
in Asia, in particular, and on the actions and 
initiatives they themselves plan to achieve their 
goals. 

I have purposely chosen Viet-Nam as the first 
country I will visit. I am glad that the oppor- 
tunity to do so comes this early in my tenure 
as Secretary of State. 

No other objective is of more compelling im- 
portance to this administration than the achieve- 
ment of a peace in Viet-Nam under which the 
people of South Viet-Nam will be able to deter- 
mine their own future free from outside in- 
terference by anyone. We believe that the right 
of self-determination for the people of South 
Viet-Nam must be respected unconditionally. 
This is the core of the issue in Viet-Nam. 

In Saigon it is my intention to consult with 
President Thieu and other officials, as well as 
with Ambassador Bunker, on our joint plans 
for achieving a peaceful settlement. I will also 
have an opportunity for a firsthand review of 
the situation in Viet-Nam. At the same time, I 
look forward to meeting and talking with repre- 
sentatives of the other countries which are help- 
ing to defend South Viet-Nam. 

With respect to the position taken by the 
other side in Paris on May 8, that will require 
careful study and clarification. It contains some 
clearly unacceptable proposals, but there are 



elements in it which may offer a possibility for 
exploration. We will examine this statement 
carefully in the hope that it represents a serious 
response to the proposals put forward by South 
Viet-Nam and the United States. I wOl, of 
course, be consulting very closely with the Viet- 
namese leaders on this matter. 

The consultations in Saigon will provide a 
solid basis for my talks in Bangkok at the 14th 
SEATO Council of Ministers meeting and at 
the seven-nation meeting of the countries con- 
tributing troops to the defense of South Viet- 
Nam. At both meetings our concern will be the 
closest possible meshing of our joint efforts to 
find a just and enduring peace. 

It is my hope that all of these constiltations 
win contribute to the success of the Paris ne- 
gotiations. With peace, the region can move on 
to the urgent tasks of social and economic 
development. 

It is also my intention to meet with the minis- 
ters who come to Bangkok not only in formal 
meetings but individually for a frank exchange 
of opinion. Wliile in Bangkok I will also con- 
sult with Thai leaders, including the King, on 
matters of mutual interest. 

As you know, I will also be visiting subse- 
quently with governmental leaders in India, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and attending 
CENTO in Iran. 

The stop in New Delhi, India, will give me an 
opportunity to become acquainted with the lead- 
ers of the most populous democracy in the world. 
I look forward to exchanging with them, at first 
hand, views on major international issues. 

A short flight away in Lahore, I expect to talk 
with Pakistan's leaders and become acquainted, 
if only briefly, with that major country. 

I am also very pleased to be stopping in Ka- 
bul, where I will be the first Secretaiy of State 
ever to visit Afghanistan. The visit will give 
me an occasion to express our friendsliip for 
that country. 

In Tehran I will join the representatives of 
Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United King- 
dom at my first meeting of the CENTO Coun- 



MAT 26, 1969 



433 



cil of Ministers. Over the years this organization 
has encouraged a sense of cohesion and coopera- 
tion among the three regional members and has 
promoted common economic and security 
interests. 

I also look forward in Tehran to meeting with 
the Shah of Iran, the esteemed leader of a coun- 
try whose friendship we higlily value. 



THE SECRETARY'S ITINERARY 

The Department of State announced on 
May 6 (press release 105) that Secretary Rogers 
would leave Washington on May 12 and would 
arrive in Saigon on May 14 for a 4-day visit. 

On May 19 he will proceed to Bangkok, Thai- 
land, where he will head the U.S. delegation to 
the 14th meeting of the SEATO Council of 
Ministers May 20-21 and will represent the 
United States at the seven-nation meeting 
May 22-23 of representatives of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam and of the nations contributing 
troops to its defense. 

After leaving Bangkok the Secretary will stop 
at New Dellii, India, May 23-24 ; Lahore, Paki- 
stan, May 24^25; and Kabul, Afghanistan, 
May 25. 

At Tehran, Iran, Secretary Rogers will head 
the U.S. observer delegation to the 16th meet- 
ing of the Council of Ministers of the Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO) May 26-27. 

He is scheduled to return to Washington on 
May 29. 



16th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made hy 
Arribassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.8. delegation, at the 16th plenary session of 
the new meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
May 8. 

Press release 107 dated Ma; 8 

Ladies and gentlemen : Last week your side 
accused the United States Government of inten- 
sifying the war in Viet-Nam rather than seeking 
to end it. You quoted from statements by Presi- 
dent Nixon and Secretary Rogers to support 



your charges. You have either mismiderstood 
the statements of President Nixon and Secretary 
Rogers, or you have consciously stated them 
erroneously — as I shall now try to show. 

The first objective of the U.S. Government 
with respect to the Viet-Nam conflict is a nego- 
tiated settlement in Paris. The aim of our policy 
is peace. It is the simple truth that we are not 
seeking a military victory in Viet-Nam. 

In order to bring about a negotiated peace we 
have made several concrete proposals. We have 
put primary emphasis at these meetings on the 
issue of a mutual withdrawal of external forces 
from South Viet-Nam. As Secretary Rogers said 
on April 21 : ^ 

A mutual withdrawal of external forces from Viet- 
Nam by reasonable stages would bring about deescala- 
tion of fighting. It could then lead to next steps: a 
total elimination of outside combat forces, cessation 
of hostilities, and a return to peace. We see no good 
reason why that process should not begin soon. 

We have made other proposals for the settle- 
ment of important military aspects of the Viet- 
Nam problem. 

Concurrently, the Government of the Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam has stated that it is prepared, 
without prior conditions, to enter into serious 
discussion concerning a political settlement with 
the National Liberation Front. We have said 
that the discussion of military and political mat- 
ters coidd take place at the same time. 

We shall continue our efforts here in Paris to 
bring about a negotiated settlement. We shall 
continue to present the most constructive sug- 
gestions possible. We are prepared at all times 
to hear what your side has to offer. And as Sec- 
retary Rogers said : ". . . we hope that the as- 
sumption behind our efforts in Paris — that the 
other side is now prepared to negotiate seriously 
for an end to the war — is the right assumption." 

But as has often been pointed out at these 
meetings, one cannot negotiate by oneself alone. 
And obviously one side cannot bring the fighting 
to an end and restore peace by itself alone. To 
date your side has merely proposed action by 
our side alone. As we have said, demands for 
unilateral action are not serious proposals for 
negotiation — nor, I suspect, are they intended to 
be. There must be a willingness to move toward 
a peace which is truly mutual. 

But we must be ready for the unwelcome con- 



^ For Secretary Rogers' address at New York, N.T., 
see Btn-LETIN of May 12, 1969, p. 397. 



434 



DEPAETMENT OF STATE BTJIiLETTN 



tingency that your side does not yet want to ne- 
gotiate a peaceful settlement. As Secretary 
Rogers said: "We are not prepared to assume 
that the only alternative to early progress in the 
peace talks is an indefinite extension of our 
present role." 

President Nixon spoke in his April 18 press 
conference ^ about the possibility of unilateral 
reduction of United States forces in Viet-Nam. 
He said there were certain factors which the 
U.S. would take into consideration regarding 
reduction of American forces : "the training of 
the South Vietnamese, their ability to handle 
their own defense ; the level of fighting in South 
Viet-Nam, whether or not the offensive action 
of the enemy recedes ; and progress in the Paris 
peace taUcs." 

You say you want U.S. forces out of Viet- 
Nam. You accuse us of dominating the South 
Vietnamese. Yet, paradoxically, you also object 
to the very factors listed by President Nixon as 
facilitating our withdrawal. 

Our Government has publicly stated that 
progress toward peace can be speeded signifi- 
cantly if you will join with us in a mutual troop 
withdrawal in the near future. Whether peace 
comes more gradually or more rapidly to Viet- 
Nam is thus a decision for Hanoi. We, of course, 
hope that you will join us in rapidly bringing 
peace to Viet-Nam. 

Your side still seems to pursue a military vic- 
tory. Your side tells its troops that their efforts 
will influence the course of these negotiations. 
Yet their recent offensive, although futile inso- 
far as these negotiations are concerned, brought 
further suffering and destruction to the people 
of Viet-Nam, including women and children. It 
resulted in heavy losses for your side. Yet it 
brought peace no nearer. 

Last week you gave some so-called statistics 
concerning the first 35 days of the recent offen- 
sive, including a claim that 104,000 men, 52,000 
of them Americans, had been killed or wounded. 
You said that 1,600 aircraft had been destroyed. 
These statistics, as well as the others you men- 
tioned, are without exception inaccurate. The 
truth about our losses is a matter of public rec- 
ord. It is also published regularly. 

I ask you to pay closer attention to the sta- 
tistics which our Government issues concerning 
its losses in Viet-Nam. We believe they are 
correct. It would be deplorable indeed if the 



' For excerpts, see Bulletin of May 5, 1969, p. 377. 



Government in North Viet-Nam were led by 
self-serving, exaggerated claims of local com- 
manders to such false hopes of military victory 
as those wliich Prime Minister Pham Van Dong 
recently expressed. 

The responsibility of any intensification of 
the fighting which has occurred, or which may 
occur in the future, must rest with the North 
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. If they persist in 
attacking the South Vietnamese people, their 
armed forces, and the armed forces of their free- 
world allies, then those attacks will be repulsed. 

Captured documents and defectors from your 
side reveal that more attacks are being planned 
which will cause more suffering and death to 
both South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese, 
A substantial body of evidence has already ac- 
cumulated concerning these plans. One docu- 
ment captured recently, for example, called for 
"greater victories at a faster tempo" and gave 
as a mission for the summer of 1969 an offensive 
that should be — and again I quote — "higher, 
stronger, and more painful than the spring of- 
fensive. It must succeed in destroying, wearing 
down, and distintegrating more U.S. potential, 
more main force and puppet personnel, and es- 
pecially more administrative personnel at the 
village and hamlet level." I would also draw 
your attention to that last phrase. It means that 
more hamlet and village officials — civilians and 
noncombatants — who are trying to do their 
duty for the people who have chosen them will 
be targets of terror and murder. 

That is the truth about the war in Viet- 
Nam today : Your side, not ours, seeks to impose 
its will by military means. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we repeat that we are 
prepared to deal with all questions concerned 
with a peaceful settlement. We still await a posi- 
tive response to our proposals. Meanwhile, we 
wiU continue to contend the following : 

— We are not seeking military victory. 

— We believe that peace should give the South 
Vietnamese people the opportunity to deter- 
mine their own future without external 
interference. 

— We are seeking a mutual withdrawal of ex- 
ternal forces from South Viet-Nam which could 
begin simultaneously with U.S. and North 
Vietnamese withdrawals. This would be tan- 
gible and visible evidence of the professed desire 
of both sides to negotiate a peace settlement. 



MAT 26, 1969 



4S5 



— We are seeking restoration of the demili- 
tarized zone. 

— We propose the early release of prisoners of 
war. 

— We will support the reunification of Viet- 
Nam in the future by the free decision of the 
people of the North and the people of the South. 

— We support the principle of noninterfer- 
ence between the two Viet-Nams, pending 
reunification. 

— We support full compliance with the Laos 



accords of 1962 and respect for the territorial 
integrity and neutrality of Cambodia. 

— We envisage a cessation of hostilities as an 
essential element in an ultimate settlement. 

— And, finally, we believe that adequate in- 
ternational arrangements to verify and super- 
vise the carrying out of military agreements and 
insure respect for and continued adherence to 
the military and political elements of a settle- 
ment are vital so that the peace that will be 
achieved may be enduring. 



Prime Minister Gorton of Australia Visits Washington 



Prime Minister John G. Gorton of Australia 
made an official visit to Washington May 5-8. 
Following is an exchange of toasts between 
President Nixon and the Prime Minister at a 
dinner at the White House on May 6, a state- 
ment by the President at the close of their talks 
on May 7, and am, exchange of remarks in the 
White House Rose Garden on May 7 upon the 
Prime Minister's departure. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 
President Nixon 

White House press release dated May 6 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Gorton, and our 
friends: Tonight is a very special evening for 
all of us in this room because, as I noted when 
you were passing tlu'ough the receiving line, at 
least two-thirds of the guests had been to Aus- 
tralia or personally knew the Prime Minister 
and Mrs. Gorton. 

As I was thinking of something that would 
be appropriate to say, I was reminded of what 
I think was one of the most eloquent greetings 
that a visitor can receive when he travels around 
the world, as has the Prime Minister, and as I 
have on occasion, and as will the Secretaiy of 
State be traveling in just a few days. In tliis 
country, at least in that part of the Midwest 
from which my mother and father came, the 
common expression is "Make yourself at home." 



In Latin America the expression is quite dif- 
ferent. It means tlie same thing. They say Estd 
usted en su casa, which means "You are in your 
own home." 

I was reminded of the fact, tonight, as we 
received the Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton 
and the members of their party, that of all the 
countries of the world that my wife and I have 
visited — and there are over 70 — there is no coun- 
try in the world when we thought we were in 
our own home more than Australia. 

I suppose part of this is due to the fact that 
we are from the West, from California, and we 
get the feeling when we are in Melbourne and 
in Sydney that north and south or south and 
north reverse, San Francisco versus Los An- 
geles, and also because as you see that great 
country, with all of its magnificent cities and yet 
the tremendous possibilities for development for 
the future, you realize that this is one of the 
great new frontiers — some would say last fron- 
tiers, geographically, at least. But there is an- 
other reason that has more to do than geography 
or size of cities or the like. It has to do with 
people. 

I have felt from the time we were first there 
in 1953 and through the years since then when 
we have been there — and I know many of you 
tonight have this same feeling — that we have a 
special kinship with our friends from Australia. 
We see the world as they see it. They are among 
those who understand, as I think most of us in 
this room understand, how much rides on what 



436 



DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



happens in the Pacific. They are a Pacific power, 
as we are ; and at a time when most of the world, 
whatever they may think privately, will not 
speak up publicly with regard to what the 
United States is doing in the Pacific, and as 
indicated in the very difficult war in Viet-Nam, 
our friends in Australia know why we are there 
and why they are there, and we know that they 
are there with us. 

They loiow why; and beyond that, they are 
willing to say why. At a time when we sometimes 
wonder if our policies are understood or appre- 
ciated, at such times we are most grateful to have 
such good friends, friends who have been friends 
of ours over the years and who remember those 
days we read about in World War I. Those of 
us who were in World War II — the Secretary 
and myself — in the Pacific, we served with Aus- 
tralians and we feel that they are so much like 
us or we are like they are. 

Now tonight, we have a man who represents 
this country, who has all of the vital energy that 
we think of when we think of Australia, who can 
see the tremendous possibilities of development 
there, wlio knows the great role that his counti-y 
can play, that ours must play, and who has that 
courage that we all admire so much — the cour- 
age to speak up when sometimes it might be per- 
haps more political to say nothing, or at least to 
say something else. 

So tonight, as I ask you to rise, I am going to 
do so not simply in tlie usual protocol way — we 
could toast his country, we could toast his of- 
fice — but I suggest we raise our glasses to a man 
and that great new country ; a new country with 
an old tradition but the covmtry of the future, 
and a man who stands for aU the hopes and 
aspirations that it represents. 

To the Prime Minister. 

Prime Minister Gorton 

White House press release dated May 6 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen : This is 
a speech, sir, to which it is very difficult easily 
to reply. I think it is true that there are between 
the {people of the United States and the people 
of my own country some particular bonds which 
are not of recent birth but wliich have matured 
over the years. 

True it is, that in our own country we reached 
self-government by means of evolution and you 
by revolution. But nevertheless, in some degree 
we think of you as being responsible for it. I 



know a lot of other countries do that, too. 
[Laughter.] Because it was only after the Dec- 
laration of Independence and a certain amount 
of unpleasantness which culminated at York- 
town following that, that Great Britain looked 
to another outlet, if I may put it that way. But 
it gave us the first impetus to the growth of 
Australia, and so perhaps in that indirect way, 
sir, you have helped us in our beginnings. 

But that was just at the beginning. Since then 
we have stood together in many struggles : the 
First World War, fought far away from our 
shores and yours but fought for the same rea- 
sons by our soldiers and yours; the Second 
World War ; the Korean war, where Australians 
were within the first week in action with the 
United States forces and the first country so 
to be in action ; and now the Viet-Nam war. 

I don't know why it is — or perhaps I do — but 
I am not sure why it is that when coimtries talk, 
as you and I are talking, of the bonds which 
unite and have united them, so often one turns 
to wars and to struggles in which one has been 
together. Because, after all, a successful war does 
not gain anything new. What it does do, if it is 
successful, is prevent the imposition of some- 
thing bad and obtain an opportunity for new 
building on a proper basis and a proper founda- 
tion of freedom and participation and peace. 

Perhaps it is because men have for so long 
had to struggle and probably always will have 
to struggle against the idea of absolute and 
arbitrary power; against the idea of the secret 
police and the hangman ; against the philosophy 
that in order to be free and live in peace one 
must subject one's self to the rule — without 
law — of dictatorship. Perhaps it is because the 
fainthearted all through the years have been 
prepared to say "If you wish to eat, you must 
sell your inmiortal soul. If you wish peace, you 
must submit to dictatorship." Perhaps it is 
because there is in the human spirit a refusal 
to accept this that one talks of nations standing 
together in war, not because it is in war but be- 
cause of the objectives sought by such struggles. 
You, sir, are bearing today a burden greater, 
I think, than that borne by any other man in the 
world I know. And ia a way here history is re- 
peating itself, because as I look up there and 
see a former Eepublican [indicating a portrait 
of Abraham Lincoln] — I hope no Democrats 
would be up there — I see a former Republican 
looking down upon us, my mind goes back to 



MAT 26, 1969 



437 



those times and that burden and the turmoil in 
this coimtry in that period. 

Too often do we now look back at Lincoln 
and tend to think the speeches he made were well 
received and tend to think the ideals he pro- 
fessed were accepted by all the people of the 
United States. But not enough do we look back 
and think of the burden for 5 long years he bore 
during a period when the United States lost 
more dead than it liad in any of the many wars 
since. And he bore the burden. 

During a period when Copperheads were in- 
citing riots in order to bring peace ; during the 
period when the Horace Greeleys and othei-s of 
the press were attacking not only his ideas but 
him personally; during the period when regi- 
ments from the Army of the Potomac had to be 
brought back to quell draft riots in New York — 
that was a burden. But it was one carried like a 
man. 

There would be no United States today. There 
would be — who knows ? There would have been, 
at any rate, a .slave autocracy of the South and 
what that, in conjunction with South America, 
could then have led to in the world, no one can 
tell. But there would have been no United 
States. 

So the bearing of these burdens and the suc- 
cessful consummation of these struggles is some- 
thing which is not for that time alone or for this 
time alone but which, having Ijeen successful in 
that time, led to the United States' being able 
to be what it is today, which, if it is successful 
in this time, will lead to there being able to be 
througliout the world an opportunity for us — 
when we next speak, when we next me«t or at 
least communicate or whatever it may be — to 
talk not of war but of the other progress which 
is the other part of which you spoke, sir, of 
which the United States and ourselves, you help- 
ing us economically, building us, helping us to 
build ourselves — the other part may be the real 
outcome of success in tliis situation. I think it 
will be. 

I think that we will stand together in the fu- 
ture as we have in the past, we the small, the ap- 
parently small, but fired by the same motives, 
resolute in the same way. 

I hope that this will be true. It has been true, 
and I believe it will be true. And for our part, 
speaking for Australians, wherever the United 
States is resisting aggression, wherever the 
United States or the United Kingdom or any 



other country is seeking to insure that there will 
be a chance for the free expression of the spirit 
of man — from himself and not from dictator- 
ship from above — wlierever there is a joint 
attempt to improve not only the material but 
the spiritual standards of life of the peoples of 
the world, then, sir, we will go "Waltzing Ma- 
tilda With You." 



STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON 

white House press release dated May 7 

It has been a great pleasure to welcome Prime 
Minister and Mrs. Gorton to Washington. Mrs. 
Gorton is, of course, returning to the land of 
her birth ; so we always have a special greeting 
for her. Prime Minister Gorton is no stranger 
to our shores eitlier, and he has come as the 
Head of Government of one of our closest 
friends and allies in the world. We will always 
be delighted to see them both. 

This visit has been most useful for me and, 
I think, for otlier ofBcers of this Government. 
It has given us a chance to get acquainted with 
an outstanding statesman with whom we expect 
to be working very closely in the future. 

Australia is a member of ANZUS and 
SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental 
to our strategy and position in Southeast Asia. 
As between us, ANZUS, with its provisions for 
mutual aid in developing our individual and col- 
lective capacity to resist armed attack and its 
declaration that "no potential aggressor should 
be under the illusion that any of them (Austra- 
lia, New Zealand, or the United States) stand 
alone in the Pacific area," is of great importance 
to both our countries. Australian troops are 
figliting beside ours and those of other free- 
world nations to help South Viet-Nam preserve 
its independence. Australian forces are stationed 
in Malaysia and Singapore as part of the Com- 
monwealth Strategic Reserve, and Prime Minis- 
ter Gorton has recently announced that these 
forces will remain after the British forces with- 
draw in 1971, to continue making their impor- 
tant contribution to the security of that area. 
This is a historic and far-seeing decision, and 
needless to say, it has our full understanding 
and the decision has our support. 

Australia is also making an outstanding con- 
tribution to peacefid cooperation and economic 
development in its part of the world. It partici- 



438 



DEPAKT3HENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



pates wholeheartedly in the Colombo Plan, the 
Asian Development Bank, and many other re- 
gional activities. In percentage of national in- 
come devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks 
second in the world. This is a record of which 
any nation can be proud. All things considered, 
I think Australia and the United States can both 
be proud of the contribution we are making, as 
partners, to the security and progress of the 
Pacific region to which we both belong. That 
partnership and that contribution will continue. 

These two days have provided opportunities 
for us to discuss a whole range of subjects, in- 
cluding of course Viet-Nam and regional secu- 
rity generally, but including also a number of 
topics outside the security field. Australia is 
geographically closer to some of these problems 
than we are, and Prime Minister Gorton has 
been in office a year longer than I have; so I 
have very much appreciated the opportunity to 
exchange views with him. I have obtained a 
number of new insights, but fundamentally, I 
find the perspective from "down under" is very 
much the same as it is from Washington. 

This visit has been both profitable and enjoy- 
able for us. I hope that you can say the same, 
Mr. Prime Minister, and that you and your 
charming wife will come and see us again. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS 

White Honse press release dated May 7 

President Nixon 

Mr. Prime Minister, as you leave the White 
House — and you are not leaving the coimtry 
yet, because we hope you will stay here for a 
few more days — I want you to know how grate- 
ful I am for your returning to the United States 
after having been here at the time of President 
Eisenhower's funeral and for giving us the op- 
portunity to have a very full discussion of the 
major issues that are not really between us so 



much as they involve our common interests for 
peace and security in the Pacific area. 

This talk has been most helpful, as far as I 
am concerned and as far as the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Defense are con- 
cerned. We have opened a line of communication 
which will be used very extensively in the 
months and years ahead in pursuing our mutual 
purposes and goals in the world. 

I want to say, finally, that as one who has 
been to your country on two occasions, I hope to 
visit there again. And, like all Americans, I have 
a very deep personal feeling of respect for your 
country, for your people, and for the leadership 
that you have provided for your people. 

We are very proud to have been your allies 
and friends in great struggles in the past and 
to be your allies and friends as we deal with the 
problems of the future. 

Prime Minister Gorton 

Thank you very much, Mr. President. 

I feel that the written statement which you 
have made, and which was agreed to between 
us, gives a clear indication of those matters of 
common concern which we were able to discuss 
in such depth. 

I think that we have reached an arrangement 
for close and constant consultation between our 
two selves on matters which may arise in the 
future and that this will be of great advantage 
to both our countries. 

I can only express gratitude to you for the 
hospitality that you have extended, for the com- 
plete openness of your talks with me, and a be- 
lief that not only the talks but the underlining 
of the importance of the ANZUS Treaty to both 
our countries which has evolved from the talks 
are of considerable significance to Australia and 
to Australia's future, and I believe that that, 
in turn, is of some significance to the United 
States and to the nations of the free world as a 
whole. 



MAY 26, 1969 



439 



Latin America: What Are Your Priorities? 



ty Charles A, Meyer 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ' 



I have no major policies to announce today. 
The forum is right, but the time is too early. 
President Nixon has made it clear that his ad- 
ministration plans to listen before proi^osing. 
As a public servant, I am obviously committed 
to this. As a person, I also happen to be on the 
same pliilosophical wavelength. But I can carry 
the President's intention a step further by giv- 
ing some details on what we are listening for. 
This is my topic today. 

When we get realistic proposals on objectives 
that appear feasible, I can promise you that we 
shall listen to the suggestions very carefully, 
attempt to reconcile them with our own possi- 
bilities, and build our policies on that basis. 
Having set our policies, we shall try veiy hard 
indeed to stick by them. I cannot promise, how- 
ever, that we shall be able to do much with pro- 
posals that conflict with the needs of balanced 
development or that favor one group at the 
expense of another. 

Let me state the i^remises of my request for 
Latm American priorities. 

The first premise is that all of us are agreed 
on basic long-range goals for Latin America. 
We want development, we want sound develop- 
ment, we want balanced development, and all 
of us want these things as quickly as possible. 
We have formed an alliance committed to these 
goals. History since the last World War shows 
that they are as much in the national interests 
of the United States as of our neighbors. 

The second premise is that the United States 
attaches the highest importance to the attain- 
ment of this goal. I hope that all present will 

' Address made before the Coxmeil for Latin America 
at Washington, D.C., on May 6 (press release 101, pre- 
pared text). 



accept President Nixon's assurances, and Sec- 
retary Rogers' and my own, on that score. 

The third is that even with agreement on 
where we want to get and on our commitment to 
getting there, there are some veiy hard de- 
cisions on how we go about getting there. The 
Americas — and I do not exclude North Amer- 
ica — have infinite problems. To these problems 
we must devote finite resources. Economists like 
to insist that resources are scarce by definition ; 
and our hemispheric resources are so scarce as 
to give this truth a sharp human meaning. 

My final premise is that most of the resources 
for Latin America's ultimate development 
should be generated within Latin America it- 
self. This seems to be inevitable economically; 
it is probably desirable politically ; and it tends 
to find confirmation in the history of the devel- 
oped countries. The United States does not wish 
to be involved in any case where involvement is 
not wanted, nor do we want to be involved in 
any one country so deeply that the sum of our 
presence becomes uncomfortable. But we also 
recognize that an important element of U.S. co- 
operation may be necessary, depending on each 
Latin American nation's definition of what it 
wants to do and how fast it wants to move. 
"Wlien cooperation is wanted, we in the United 
States should stand ready to furnish it in large 
amounts. 

There are five basic ways to mobilize the re- 
sources needed for hemispheric development, 
and foreign cooperation is of critical importance 
to at least tliree of these. With your permission, 
I shall mention all five and give an idea of 
where, imder each, we feel an urgent need for 
knowledge of Latin American priorities. "Pri- 
orities," I stress, is the name of the game. There 



440 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIXBTIN 



is always room for brilliant new proposals, but 
there is a more serious need for realistic de- 
cisions between options that are clear. 

Domestic Private and Public Sectors 

The first two sources of development capital 
are the domestic private sector and the domestic 
public sector. I suppose that most in this room 
would recommend policies aimed at strengthen- 
ing private businessmen at the expense of gov- 
ernment enterprises, which typically seem less 
efficient and less capable of rational economic 
decisions. (Again, I do not exclude the United 
States from the generality.) But in this de- 
cision, the United States probably cannot help 
very much — and is not likely to be asked. There 
are nevertheless opportunities for us to make a 
significant input in the domestic private or pub- 
lic sectors, usually as a consultant, broadly 
defined. 

Our public programs, for example, have 
sometimes been extremely useful in assisting 
Latin American governments to create modern 
financial institutions and improve tax systems. 
Now, as everyone here knows, tax reform can 
turn out to be real social reform in the broadest 
sense. That is saying a great deal, because social 
reform, like the weather, is usually the kind of 
thing that everyone talks about and no one 
does anything about. Here is a chance to "do 
something." It seems to me obvious that we 
should be prepared to continue our contribution 
when requested. 

On the private side, a counterpart might 
be the consulting service provided to Latin 
American businessmen who want whatever ben- 
efits U.S. skills can provide — without U.S. man- 
agement. Again, this service strikes me as ex- 
tremely useful, but I do not propose to lose 
much time preaching to the converted. 

Inputs From Trade and Foreign Assistance 

The third origin of development resources — 
and the first with a massive foreign input — is 
trade. There is no doubt in my mind but that 
resources derived from trade ought to be pro- 
viding more help to Latin America. In addi- 
tion, unfortunately, there is little doubt in my 
mind but that this is the least tractable of our 
problems. And if we could solve the entire prob- 
lem, we would still not be solving as many 
troubles as might be deduced from listening to 
some of the proponents of "trade, not aid." I 



fear that to pursue trade as a total substitute for 
aid is to pursue a chimera. 

One reason why the problem is difficult is 
that trade represents relations between peoples, 
not governments. A famiowner in the United 
States, for example, may well have gi-eater 
financial problems than the producer of a com- 
petitive product in Latin America. The U.S. 
farmer also has a Representative in the U.S. 
Congress, and that Representative is very likely 
to understand his obligations to constituents in 
a democratic system. This is not to excuse the 
U.S. Government from exercising leadership 
in an attempt to give Latin American exporters 
a better break. On the contrary, I believe that 
the break ought to be given and that in the long 
run the better break would also make sense for 
the United States. I do say that the rich-cousin- 
poor-cousin analogy, so often taken for 
granted by the press, is not very helpful. I also 
suggest that real improvements in tlae terms of 
trade will come as the result of long, hard work 
and not as grand breakthroughs. 

One reason why "trade, not aid" sounds at- 
tractive is that trade is thought to be less awk- 
ward politically for both developed and devel- 
oping countries. I can sympathize with that. 
Trading profits, earned in open competition, are 
bound to be more palatable than anything 
which implies a giver-receiver relationship. But 
this advantage of trade is greatest when gov- 
ernments are least involved in it. When govern- 
ments take steps to change trade patterns, then 
one must expect many of the same difficulties 
that characterize programs of direct assistance. 
International commodity agreements, for exam- 
ple, have not been entirely without political 
problems for all sides. The issues involved in 
concessional trade preferences sometimes be- 
come identical with the issues of bilateral aid. I 
could obviously furnish specific examples in 
both cases, and so could anyone who has been 
reading the newspapers carefully. 

Another consideration is that special trade 
preferences, if they are to have the intended 
long-term effects, need to be matched by the 
integration of Latin American economies and 
the enlarging of internal markets. This is not 
necessarily a disadvantage. Decisions to enlarge 
Latin American markets are desirable in any 
case. But they are not always easy. 

My point here is not to downplay the value of 
international commodity agreements or the 
desirability of certain temporary trade pref- 
erences. Quite the contrary : I believe the gov- 



MAT 26, 1069 

349-897 69 



441 



eriunents of the hemisphere should pursue these 
topics vigorously. Several important steps have 
already been taken. A few days ago, represent- 
atives of this council's parent organization — 
CICYP [Inter- American Council for Com- 
merce and Production] — gave me some very 
important recommendations on the subject of 
preferences. I am very grateful for this co- 
operation, and I firmly intend to repay it. I 
simply want to make clear that no amount of 
progress on hemispheric trade is likely to solve 
all of our problems miraculously. 

This being the case, I think it very unlikely 
that foreign assistance will go out of style — or 
that many developing countries will want to 
do without this fourth major input of develop- 
ment. I do not need to stress that aid is equally 
incapable of solving all outstanding problems; 
this truism has been rather amply aired in other 
forums. I do want to observe that assistance to 
Latin America under the Alliance for Progress 
has helped to account for some real success 
stories in economic growth. I would also sug- 
gest that these assistance programs have had an 
impact on social progress, which is both the 
most elusive component of development and 
its whole point. 

Bilateral assistance, in particular, is well 
adapted to those social programs that promise 
no measurable short-term financial return and 
no quick boost in GNP figures. Perhaps the 
multilateral lending agencies will be able to in- 
crease their own skills in these areas. To the 
extent that they can do so — and can find 
funding to match their skills — there would be 
much to recommend diverting more aid to 
multilateral channels. But the limitations on 
skills and funding are important restraints on 
the trend. 

Private Foreign Investment 

The fifth and last source of development capi- 
tal, of course, is private foreign investment. 
There is no more important component of mod- 
ernization. But again, each country must de- 
cide for itself how much is wanted, where it 
is wanted, and on what terms it is wanted. Those 
who wish to attract capital must recognize cer- 
tain of its fundamental characteristics. One is 
that it is volatile and flows where it is served 
best. Incentives to attract capital can be de- 
veloped by the importing country or the ex- 
porting country, or neither, or both. In the 
Department of State, I have asked for the de- 



velopment of a running competitive analysis of 
incentive treatments offered to capital exporters 
by other developed nations. 

Another fundamental fact about capital is 
tliat its many legal and social obligations are 
balanced by a few irreducible rights under in- 
ternational law. Finally, perhaps the key long- 
term consideration today is that capital wants 
to know the rules of the game, whatever the host 
coimtry decides they may be. 

Setting the rules is not a simple task. All in- 
vestors would like to expect stability; but in- 
vestment is intended to bring development, and 
development very commonly brings at least 
some instability. Wlien instability does not af- 
fect the conditions for further development, I 
would suggest that it is up to investors to adapt 
willmgly. 

Increasingly, the Latin American countries 
are irrging, even insisting on, cooperative ven- 
tures with local partners. I recognize the vir- 
tues and the appeal of this idea, but it is an 
example of the complexity of the rules-setting 
game. I believe that joint ventures are a natural 
outcome of local capital formation, and I think 
that we should constantly search for ways in 
which they can feasibly be developed. Some- 
times, however, they cannot be carried through 
in practice without greatly restricting the areas 
available to foreign capital or doing an injus- 
tice to local interests. Partnerslaip implies, se- 
mantically, connnon objectives and common ex- 
pectations between partners. These conditions 
do not always exist. It would be unfair to expect 
a small country, let alone a small local investor, 
to share the costs of an expensive and highly 
risky operation. Too often, I am afraid, foreign 
investment is criticized for being selfish and 
inimical to the interest of the host country once 
the investment has proved successful. It is easy 
to overlook the risk factor — yet more than 
12,000 U.S. businesses failed in 1967. 

Given the importance and complexity of set- 
ting the right rules, it seems clear that govern- 
ments should cooperate with each other in the 
task and that investors have an obligation to 
make thoughtful contributions to the process. 
The coordination between governments has be- 
gun. The Council for Latm America has been 
outstandingly helpful and is in a position to be 
increasingly so. I believe the Council members 
can be counted on to make their recommenda- 
tions as "Citizens First, Businessmen Second." 

Let me promise you that the U.S. Government 
can be counted on to listen. 



442 



DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULlLETIN 



The Arab-Israeli Confrontation — ^A Challenge to International Diplomacy 



hy Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^ 



I welcome this opportunity to speak to the 
annual policy conference of the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee about one of the most 
pressing and complex challenges to interna- 
tional diplomacy and American statecraft : the 
Arab-Israeli confrontation. 

President Nixon has launched a period of 
very active American diplomacy in the belief 
that the parties, left to themselves, have not 
been able to find common groimd, that the op- 
portunities vs'hich may exist for settlement could 
be lost if some progress cannot soon be made in 
narrowing deep-rooted differences between 
Israel and the Arab states. 

I regret to say that developments in the area 
seem to be moving in the opposite direction. 

The rhetoric on both sides has become in- 
flamed; suspicion and hatred have not abated. 
The cycle of attacks and reprisals continues. We 
need only recall the recent fedayeen commando 
rocket attack on Elath and the Israeli use of 
counter airstrikes as part of its policy of "active 
defense." And in turn, last week the Cairo news- 
paper Gomhouria spoke of Egj'ptian-initiated 
artillery duels across the canal as a policy of 
"preventive defense" to check Israeli concen- 
trations in Sinai. 

On the political front, Israel has insisted upon 
direct negotiations and a peace treaty, although 
it has engaged in substantive discussion imder 
Ambassador Jarring's [Gunnar Jarring, the 
U.N. Secretary General's special Middle East 
representative] auspices. The Arabs have not 
abandoned the Khartoum formula of "no peace 
treaty, no negotiations, and no recognition." 

A way needs to be found out of this political 
impasse. Somehow we must find a way to help 
change the climate of intransigence and suspi- 
cion to a willingness to coexist on a live-and-let- 
live basis; somehow a durable and equitable 
peace must emerge in this tension-weary area 



that has commanded far too many headlines of 
despair, destruction, and death. Such a change, 
I am sure, would be in everybody's interest. It is 
the achievement of this basic change that is the 
ultimate goal of our efforts. Secretary of State 
Rogers observed recently that the one factor 
which would guarantee a successful result of 
such efforts would be the willingness of all na- 
tions to say "We want to live in peace" and that 
"Israel is a nation and has a right to exist and 
will continue to exist and we recognize it." ^ 



The Keynote to Peace 

"What is needed, too, is a spirit of compromise 
and conciliation. Such a spirit would require 
exceptional courage and a remarkably high or- 
der of statesmanship. The alternative, a failure 
of statesmanship and courage, is grim. We rec- 
ognize that compromises are painful and that 
they encompass an acceptance of some degree 
of calculated risk. But compromise need not 
prejudice either side's legitimate interests. It 
is not only in the Middle East that we are faced 
with this reality. We seek a peace which would 
give security to both sides. Security in the Mid- 
dle East — as elsewhere — is relative, not abso- 
lute. The road to such security is embraced in 
the U.N. Security CoimcU resolution of Novem- 
ber 1967.' It meets requisite needs of both sides : 
(1) a just and lasting peace; (2) agreement 
between the parties; and (3) withdrawal of 
Israeli armed forces to agreed and secure 
boundaries. 



' Address made before the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 23 
(press release 90). 

' For transcript of Secretary Rogers' news conference 
of Apr. 7, see BrnxETiN of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 357. 

' For text, see Bttlletin of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843. 



MAY 26, 1969 



443 



It is both fair and important to set forth the 
reasons for United States concern for and in- 
terest in the area. 

The American Stake in the Middle East 

The most salient and direct response is that 
in a 20th-century jet-propulsion age of more 
than 120 interdependent nations, areas of con- 
flict and constant instability are potential sites 
for big-power confrontation and conflict. Ee- 
cent deployment into the Mediterranean of units 
of the Soviet North Atlantic Fleet brought the 
total of Russian naval units there to an all-time 
high of more than 50 ships. This is only one as- 
pect of the expansion of Soviet influence in the 
area in recent years and particularly since the 
third Arab-Israeli war, of June 1967. This So- 
viet presence and influence in the Mediterra- 
nean is yet another complicating dimension to 
the Middle East problem. For our part, we must 
and will mamtain an effective and positive pres- 
ence in the area. Our strategic interests emanate 
from the self-evident fact that the area is a 
crossroads and confluence of the world which 
the United States as a nation with global in- 
terests must take fully into account. 

Our direct involvement in the area is long 
standing. 

Our close relationship with Israel goes back 
to the very establishment of Israel and through- 
out its remarkable and creative development 
into a modem progressive state. The United 
States Government was the first to recognize 
the new State of Israel in 1948. With an un- 
precedented degree of constancy, we have sup- 
ported the security and well-being of Israel 
since it entered the community of nations. We 
have recognized the impoi'tance of preventing 
a military imbalance in the area, and as a con- 
sequence, we have provided Israel as well as 
Arab states with limited amoimts of arms. Our 
ties with Israel and our continuing dialosme 
with its people and leaders bear the special 
warmth and candor characteristic of democratic 
states who share the mutual aspirations of free 
societies. 

We also have close associations with the Arab 
world, which go back to early educational and 
missionary activities before the First World 
War. These associations were widened as Amer- 
ican entrepreneurs acquired interests in devel- 
oping the area's vast petroleum resources in the 
1920's and 1930's. Since World War II, the 
United States has contributed substantially to 



the economic, technological, and social develop- 
ment of Arab nations. 

The question therefore is not whether we 
should concern ourselves with Israel and the 
Arab nations, but the manner in which we do so. 

We have pursued our interests in four princi- 
pal ways : 

First, we have been persistent in our efforts 
to prevent hostilities by giving full diplomatic 
and material support to U.N. peacekeeping 
efforts in the Middle East. Three times in the 
last 20 years peacekeeping efforts admittedly 
failed, but the area of conflict was at least 
localized. 

Second, we have sought to maintain free and 
reciprocally beneficial relations with all nations 
and peoples of the area. 

Third, we have sought international agree- 
ment on arms limitation in the area; but the 
chief supplier of such arms — the U.S.S.R. — has 
so far indicated no wOlingness to discuss this 
matter until a political settlement has been 
achieved. This is important, because when 
Soviet objectives in the Middle East are an- 
alyzed many factors must be weighed : We wel- 
come their willingness to engage in serious talks 
on the Middle East, and we will make every 
reasonable effort to make progress; however, 
we must also keep in mind not only Soviet arms 
policy but its stepped-up activities in the area, 
the need for greater impartiality on its part on 
this issue in the political arena of the U.N., and 
its long-range objective of increasing its own 
influence in the area and reducing thereby that 
of the West, and the United States in particular. - 

Finally, we have sought an enduring and I 
equitable peace, one which would provide the I 
environment and stimulus for the development ' 
of the area's largely untapped human and 
material riches. 

Initiatives by President Nixon 

I know that the picture I paint of develop- 
ments in the area is in dark and somber hues. 
But it provides an insight into why President 
Nixon has given high priority to the Arab- 
Israeli confrontation. In searching for ways to 
assist Ambassador Jarring and the parties to 
achieve a durable and just peace, the President 
has taken a number of steps, among which are : 

— Prompt and exhaustive review of U.S. pol- 
icy in the Middle East and several National 
Security Council sessions on the subject. 



444 



DEPAHTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN 



— Discussion of the Middle East conflict with 
European leaders during his recent trip. 

— Frank and meaningful exchanges of views 
with high-level representatives of the contend- 
ing parties, including Jordan's King Hussein 
and Israel's Foreign Minister [Abba Eban]. 
Mr. Eban eloquently and determinedly pre- 
sented Israel's hopes for peace, the Israeli view 
on the essentials of a peace settlement, and his 
nation's apprehensions about current develop- 
ments. King Hussein, on his part, made a genu- 
ine contribution to an understanding of the 
Arab viewpoint and the perils of failure in the 
search for peace. We welcomed his reaffirmation 
of support for the November 1967 Security 
Council resolution. 

Intensive exploratory conversations are being 
pursued in Washington between representatives 
of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to see 
whether common or parallel views and actions 
can be agreed upon to promote a peaceful and 
accepted settlement in accordance with the Secu- 
rity Council resolution. Wliile it is too early to 
make a judgment regarding their outcome, these 
talks and other bilateral diplomatic efforts are 
being carried forward seriously, free of propa- 
gandistic overtones, and have helped set the 
stage for four-power talks being held at the 
United Nations. We have made a bit of prog- 
ress; our views are somewhat closer together, 
but there is a good distance to go. 

Finally, President Nixon decided to pursue 
the new four-power approach in the belief that 
the major powers have an interest and a respon- 
sibility in trying to do everything possible to 
encourage steps toward peace. Here, too, the 
discussions have focused on the relevant ele- 
ments of a permanent peace within the frame- 
work of the U.N. Security Council resolution of 
November 1967, and modest progress has been 
made. 

If there is a short answer to what U.S. policy 
is, it is the November 22, 1967, Security Council 
resolution in its entirety. I emphasize its en- 
tirety, because each side is inclined to 
emphasize the parts it approves and disregard 
the provisions it disapproves. 

The Security Council resolution of November 
1967 is clear : The objective is a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East, not a fragile armistice 
arrangement. If a peace is to last, if it is to be 
just, it must be juridically defined and contrac- 
tually binding based upon agreement reached 
by the parties in a spirit of compromise. 



The Elements of Peace 

Secretary Rogers outlined the elements of 
peace before the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee on March 27."' He said : 

A just aud lasting peace will require, as the Security 
Council's resohitlon states, withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war 
of 1967, the termination of all claims or states of bellig- 
erency, and the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence of 
every state in the area aud their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries. Clearly, with- 
drawal should take place to established boundaries 
which define the areas where Israel and its neighbors 
may live in peace and sovereign independence. Equally, 
there can be no secure and recognized boundaries with- 
out withdrawal. In our view rectifications from the 
preexisting lines should be confined to tho.se required 
for mutual security aud should not reflect the weight 
of conquest. 

The Council's resolution also affirms the 
necessity for guaranteeing freedom of naviga- 
tion through international waterways in the 
ai-ea. It was the denial of such freedom to Israel 
through the Straits of Tiran which was the 
proximate cause of the 6-day war. For 20 years, 
Israel has been denied transit through the Suez 
Canal. 

We believe, too, that an overall settlement 
must provide for a just solution of the refugee 
problem. Consistent with past U.N. resolutions, 
the refugees should be given a choice between 
repatriation and resettlement with compensa- 
tion. There is need for a fundamental solution 
which takes into account the human element 
and the concerns and requirements of both sides. 

The Security Council resolution also affirms 
the need to guarantee the territorial integrity 
and political independence of every state in the 
area through a variety of measures, including 
the establishment of demilitarized zones. We 
hope that practical arrangements can be made 
on the ground and political action taken which 
will help guarantee a peaceful settlement. 

The U.N. Security Council resolution calls on 
Ambassador Jarring "to establish and maintain 
contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve 
a peaceful and accepted settlement." His man- 
date, therefore, is to promote agreement between 
the parties. We underscore this because we are 
convinced that if a peace is to be lasting, it will 
require the assent and full cooperation of the 
parties in the area. 



' BuiiETiN of Apr. 14, 1969, p. 305. 



MAY 26, 1969 



445 



As I have indicated, our hope is that the four- 
power talks will find ways to strengthen future 
efforts of the Jarrmg mission. This is a delicate 
and difficult task. We realize that common 
ground between the major parties cannot be 
achieved overnight — and indeed may not be 
achievable at all. 

The Role of the Four-Power Talks 

We are under no illusions that a dispute 
which has proved intractable for over 20 years 
will suddenly be made more tractable because 
of maj 01'- power discussions. This group can 
probe formulas to reconcile issues, but no 
formula will work without the agreement and 
cooperation of the parties. Whether common 
positions which could be conveyed to Ambas- 
sador Jarring can be achieved, only time and 
patient discussions will tell. For our part, we 
feel that the need for a permanent peace in the 
Middle East is compelling. 

We do not conceive of the four-power ap- 
proach in lieu of Ambassador Jarring's efforts 
to achieve the objectives of the Security Council 
resolution. Our purpose is to help him buttress 
future efforts with the Arabs and the Israelis. 

We do not see four-power talks as a mech- 
anism to impose peace. As President Nixon has 
said : ^ 

The four powers . . . cannot dictate a settlement in 
the Middle East. The time has passed in which 
great nations can dictate to small nations their future 
where their vital interests are involved. 

We do not see four-power common ground as 
a substitute for agreement between the parties. 

But common or parallel four-power views 
could influence the parties at least to narrow 
their differences and to make progress toward 
peace which ultimately could enhance the secu- 
rity of both Israel and the Arab states. 

I know there are some who say we should not 
engage in these discussions with the other major 
powers. Let me make clear we are not there 
to bargain away the security of any state in the 
area. We must bear in mind that there is the 
ever-present risk that local disputes can mush- 
room into something bigger carrying the risk 

° For transcript of President Nixon's news conference 
of Mar. 4, see Bulletin of Mar. 24, 1969, p. 237. 



of involving the major powers. It becomes, 
therefore, a direct security interest of the 
United States to exercise whatever influence 
it has, in whatever way would be useful and 
effective, to help bring a lasting peace to the 
Middle East. 

Tliis is the principal reason why President 
Nixon has decided that our efforts should be 
chamieled through all appropriate avenues to 
peace, including bilateral and multilateral ex- 
changes. In our efforts, our purpose will be to 
insure Israel's security, safeguard legitimate 
Arab interests, and take fully into account our 
own and the world community's security and 
other interests. 

Much of what needs to be achieved depends 
on the spirit of compromise among the parties. 
Compromise is, in the final analysis, the hall- 
mark of productive negotiation. Compromise 
implies that neither side will gain all that it 
desires; on the other hand, neither side would 
be expected to surrender its vital interests. 

Much is still obscure about the future course 
of events, and I am unable to predict what 
those events might produce. We, for our part, 
will press ahead without illusory expectations 
of an instant peace. Because much remains to be 
done, no opportunity to achieve an equitable set- 
tlement will be overlooked by the United States. 



Letters of Credence 

Guinea 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Guinea, Fadiala Keita, presented 
his credentials to President Nixon on May 6. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated May 6. 

Kenya 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Kenya, Leonard Oliver Kibinge, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon on 
May 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated May 6. 



M6 



DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



'■'■Japan, though now third among loorld powers in GNP, has 
710 pretensions as a superpower. . . . Japan's outward thrust 
is economic, not political or military." In this article, based on 
an address he made before the League of Women Voters of 
Connecticut on March IS, Mr. Bamett discusses Japan's eco- 
nomic position in the world, as well as the United States-Japan 
relationship in the Pacific neighborhood which we share. 



Japan's Economic Dynamism and Our Common Interests in East Asia 



by Robert W. Bamett 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 



Two particularly interesting observations 
were made at a conference I attended in Eng- 
land last September. Of all the countries in the 
world, it was said, Japan is most likely to sur- 
pass the United States in per capita GNP by 
A.D. 2000. Coal, we were told, can be shipped 
from West Virginia to Yokohama today at no 
greater cost than to Chicago. Consider how this 
achievement of coutainerization and mammoth 
freighters affects the calculations by the eco- 
nomic geographer concerned with competitive 
advantage of location. 

Technology and its effect on our notions of 
time, place, and cost may be advancing so fast 
that what we regard as political realities can 
well be obsolete as soon as we believe them to 
be properly formulated. And it is not just tech- 
nology that affects reality. A very perceptive 
Japanese friend of mine, trying to identify 
probable future leadership in Japan, asserts 
that three distinct concepts of the world occupy 
the minds of his countrymen — one for those 
over 60, one for those under 40, and another 
for those under 20. This may not be true only 
of Japan. 

The central difference between the United 
States and Japan is not, I believe, race, location, 
or annual per capita GNP — about $4,000 and 
$1,300. It is, I propose, the fact that we spend 
about 9 percent of our GNP on defense ; Japan, 
about 1 percent — put in dollars, over $70 billion 
compared with about $1 bUlion. 

These are fascinating figures to reflect on. 



Implicit in them, I believe, is an explanation of 
what is largely involved in the several issues 
being discussed by United States and Japanese 
Government negotiators these days : 

—Extension of the Security Treaty. 
— The future of the Ryukyus. 
— Current imbalance in the bilateral U.S.- 
Japanese trade account. 
— ^The U.S. balance of payments. 

The United States appropriates and spends 
over $70 billion — more than half of Japan's 
total GNP — to maintain worldwide deterrent 
military capabilities, to fight a war in Viet- 
Nam, and to discharge otherwise what we con- 
sider to be our responsibilities as a superpower. 
The impact of United States power on the world 
is total and pervasive. 

Japan, though now third among world 
powers in GNP, has no pretensions as a super- 
power, is constitutionally denying itself a mili- 
tary role apart from defense, and relies wholly 
on the United States for safety from any 
strategic threat. Japan's outward thrust is 
economic, not political or military. 

In this situation some troubles can and do 
arise from a United States calculation that be- 
cause Japan benefits from our security invest- 
ment in Japanese and Ryukyu bases it should 
pay something, while many Japanese calculate 
that because we benefit--at great cost to 
Japan's amour-propre — from the bases they let 
us use, we should pay greater heed to Japan's 



MAT 26, 1969 



447 



sovereign sensitivities if we wish to stay on. 

Not all Japanese, perhaps not even a major- 
ity, share in this somewhat resentful attitude 
toward the United States military apparatus on 
Japanese soil. 

However, 1969 will be a tune of delicate con- 
sultation between our Governments to axrange: 

— Extension of a security treaty according 
the United States certain limited base rights, 
which many Japanese regard as a vital contri- 
bution to Japan "s own safety and which we re- 
gard as essential for efficient performance on 
our security commitments throughout the West- 
ern Pacific area ; 

— Some change, perhaps substantial, m ar- 
rangements on the Ryukyus, where we, while 
i-ecognizing Japan's residual sovereignty, have 
exercised total administrative control and have 
made free use of the base facilities located there. 
The Japanese will want assurance of early re- 
version to Tokyo of administrative authority 
over the islands. We will want arrangements 
that cause the least possible loss in our ability 
to meet the operational and strategic require- 
ments of the role we believe we must play in the 
Western Pacific. 

Consultations on Economic Issues 

1969 will see us talking security — Japan's and 
our's — but also economics. 

During 1968 Japan ran a $1 billion-plus trade 
surplus with the United States. It did so at a 
time when we suffered a dollar outflow attrib- 
utable to spending for East Asian security re- 
quirements of perhaps $2.5 billion and to mili- 
tary spending in Japan itself of about $600 
million. We will ask Japan to help neutralize 
some part of this heavy charge on our balance 
of payments ; and the Japanese, while wanting 
to help us defend the dollar, will avoid doing 
things that might be construed as blank-check 
endorsement of United States foreign policy. 
Foreign and financial policy, the differing 
responsibilities of surplus and deficit countries, 
and the scope and limitations of bilateral 
mutual assistance will be involved in these 
consultations. 

Both Washington and Tokyo will, in addi- 
tion, be forced to look hard at the problem of 
trade protectionism, as a present problem and 
as a future possibility. 

We will want much greater access to the 
growing Japanese market, both on trade ac- 



count and for direct investment. We will press 
hard to get it. The Japanese may be slow and 
grudging in giving it. Talk of a United States 
border tax in 1968 threw them into near panic; 
talk these days of moves to restrain their ex- 
ports of textiles, steel, and still other products 
alanns them. Their automobile industry, seem- 
ing not to recognize its great strength, fears 
American investment in Japan. Japan wants to 
have margins of safety against risks of United 
States and world trade protectionism and, I be- 
lieve very mistakenly, is nervous about the thing 
Servan-Schreiber has warned about. 

World Trade and Financial Situation 

Lying behind these anxieties are major ab- 
normalities in the world trade and financial sit- 
uation which do not lend themselves to effective 
solution by bilateral measures: the high cost 
of the United States war in Viet-Nam and con- 
tinuing price inflation in the United States 
which sucks in high levels of imports from all 
sources. 

Japan is keenly aware that its future depends 
vitally on the dollar. It would, I believe, gladly 
sacrifice some exports in return for price sta- 
bility in the United States and improvement of 
the U.S. balance of payments. Important as the 
U.S. market is to Japan, a worldwide nondis- 
criminatory trade system and the sanctity of 
the doctrine which should guide it are even 
more important. To appear viable to Japan, 
solutions of trade and payments difficulties must 
affect jointly and reciprocally all of the member 
countries of the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development, in the Pacific area 
and the Atlantic area alike. If the choice is 
between liberalizing trade and resorting to trade 
restriction to help the adjustment process along, 
Japan would, I am sure, prefer liberalizing; it 
is mortally fearful of the contagion of 
protectionism. 

Happily, our current economic and strategic 
preoccupations with Japan arise not from the 
mere exercise of great strength by us and by 
them but from Japan's wish to be firmly en- 
meshed in a world system, not set apart and 
treated as something different and special. 

I have mentioned how strong Japan is and 
may be expected to become. Let me elaborate 
with some figures : 

The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates 
Japan's GNP at about $140 billion, compared 



448 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



with oxir $825 billion. West Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom, and Italy each have a 
lower GNP. Perhaps more significant, however, 
is that in 1967 and 1968 Japan was growing at 
a real rate of over 12 percent, compared with 5 
percent for the United States and less than that 
for West Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
France. 

In the Kalm-Wiener book, "The Year 2000," 
a chart appears giving estimates of GNP in 
1985. The high variant for the United States 
shows a GNP of $2,020 billion ; for Japan, $471 
billion. I am startled to see that the figure for 
Japan is higher than that for West Germany 
and Italy combined. 

The dynamism of the Japanese economic sys- 
tem shows at the worker level. The Department 
of Commerce estimates that the annual growth 
rate of output per employee for Japan from 
1960 to 1965 was 9.8 percent, compared with 3.1 
percent for the United States and about 4.3 per- 
cent for West Germany and France. 

Well-trained brains harness the energies of 
Japan's work force. The Economist and For- 
tune have compared Japan with its American 
and Western European competitors in the field 
of education. Japan was devoting about 7.1 per- 
cent of national income in the mid-1960's to 
public expenditures for education, compared 
witli 6.3 percent in the United States and Italy, 
5.8 percent in the United Kingdom, 4.6 percent 
in France, and 4.2 percent in West Germany. 

In research and development, the United 
States stands in a class by itself, with about 70 
persons out of every 10,000 of its work force 
engaged in E&D activities. Looking at the rest 
of the competition, however, Japan does well. 
There about 19 out of every 10,000 are so em- 
ployed, compared with 16 in the United King- 
dom, 10.5 in West Germany, 8.5 in France, and 
3 in Italy. 

It is fair to say, I think, that Japan stands 
in a class by itself in the very high levels of 
private investment it maintains. In Japan fixed 
capital foi-mation as a percentage of GNP in 
1966 amounted to 31 percent, compared with 25 
percent in West Germany, 22 percent in France, 
18 percent in the United Kingdom and Italy, 
and 17 percent in the United States. 

There will be people who regard Japan as 
occupying a dominant position in today's world 
trading community. This is a mistaken notion. 
The United States exports three times as much 
as Japan, West Germany twice as much, and 



both France and the United Kingdom export 
substantially more than does Japan. 

Almost everyone is surprised when I point 
out, as I often must do, that Japan is substan- 
tially less trade dependent than its principal 
Western Europe competitors— if trade depend- 
ency is measurable in terms of exports of goods 
and services as a percentage of GNP. By this 
measurement Japan's degree of dependence is 
12 percent, compared with 19 percent for Italy, 
21 percent for West Germany, and 25 percent 
for the United Kingdom. In the United States, 
incidentally, exports amount to only 6 percent 
of GNP. 

These statistical indicators add up, I believe, 
to a portrait of a very strong Japan somewhat 
less vulnerable to minor fluctuations in world 
trade activity, perhaps, than either the Jap- 
anese or the world in general supposes it to be. 

Common Support of Asian Development 

It is good to have a strong Japan for pursuit 
of what is common in our interest in East Asia, 
both its non-Communist and Communist parts : 
economic and social development and explora- 
tion of paths toward peaceful coexistence. 

We do not ask Tokyo to do as we do. We be- 
lieve there are different patlis to the ultimate 
goals we share. 

Japan trades with Conmiunist Cliina ; we do 
not. 

Japan explores investment and greater trade 
possibilities in the U.S.S.R. ; we do not. 

Japan offers substantial aid to Burma and 
Cambodia ; we do not. 

However, our two nations do merge our re- 
sources in common support of new economic de- 
velopment possibilities in both Northeast and 
Southeast Asia. 

Japanese aid and investment in South Korea 
and Taiwan, coming after and on top of ours, 
goes far to explain recent economic triumphs 
there — and recent tendencies toward economic 
integration in Northeast Asia. 

Japan pledged $110 million of aid to Indo- 
nesia in 1968 ; so did we. 

Japan contributed $200 million to the capital 
of the Asian Development Bank, as did we, and 
has pledged a substantial contribution to its 
Special Fimds, as we may soon do, too. 

For different and compatible reasons, we and 
Japan favor progression to greater and greater 
reliance upon multinational agencies in the 
growth processes of developing countries. We 



MAT 26, 1969 



449 



both find ways to encourage regional coopera- 
tion in economic and other undertakings, and 
Japan has become an active participant. 

Japan is enjoying a truly remarkable expan- 
sion of economic links with Australia. This, no 
doubt, encourages Japan to explore possibilities 
for creating a five-power Pacific Basin com- 
munity made up of Japan, Australia, New Zea- 
land, Canada, and the United States. 

The United States-Japan relationship has 
proved to be mutally advantageous beyond any- 
thing foreseeable 20 years ago. Our problems 
arise, largely, from capabilities and achieve- 
ments that are good for our two countries and 
the Pacific neighborhood which we share. As 
must be the case between tnie partners, attempts 
by either partner to reform or improve the other 
can succeed only with greater awareness of its 
own need to reform or improve. 



rights is fully shared by this Administration. 
We wholeheartedly agree with your statement 
that our moral position in the world reflects 
our devotion to these fundamental principles. 

Our government and, I am confident, our peo- 
ple remain committed to continuing action for 
himian rights. I commend you for the many 
contributions you have made to this vital 
process. 

Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 

Honorable W. Averell, Harkiman 

Chairman 

The Presidenfs Com/mission for the 

Observance of Human Rights Tear 1968 
Department of State 
Washington, B.C. 20520 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 



Final Report Submitted on Observance 
of Human Rights Year 1968 

The f/nal report of the Presidenfs Commis- 
sion for tlie Observance of Human Rights Year 
1968 toas suhmitted to President Nixon on Jan- 
uary 30} Following is the Presidenfs letter of 
ackno^oledgm^nt, together with the letter of 
transmittal f7'om W. Averell Harriman, Chair- 
man of the Convmission. 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER 

White House press release dated April 29 

Dear Governor: I have received the Final 
Report of the President's Commission for the 
Observance of Human Rights Year 1968, and 
I thank j'ou for it. You, the other members of 
tlie Commission, and those who worked on its 
staff are to be commended for your diligent and 
consistent effort in response to the request of 
the United Nations General Assembly that its 
members commemorate the twentieth anniver- 
sary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 

Your concern that Americans speak as one 
when they seek to promote the cause of human 

' Copies of the 62-page report, entitled "To Continue 
Action for Human Rights," are available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (35 cents). 



January 30, 1969 

Dear IVIr. President : I have the honor to sub- 
mit the Final Report of the President's Com- 
mission for the Observance of Human Rights 
Year 1968. 

This Commission was established by Exec- 
utive Order No. 11394 on January 30, 1968, in 
response to a request by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations that all Member States 
commemorate the Twentieth Anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It 
was directed to "enlarge our people's under- 
standing of the principles of human rights, as 
expressed in the Universal Declaration and the 
Constitution and in the laws of the United 
States." As the Final Report relates, the Com- 
mission has endeavored to carry out that man- 
date through the activities of eight Special 
Committees and an extensive program of pub- 
lic information. 

The Commission viewed its task in the broad- 
est perspective. It sought to increase public 
awareness of the whole concept of human 
rights as a contribution to national progress and 
stability and thereby to international develop- 
ment and peace. At the same time it sought to 
leave through its publications a lasting contri- 
bution of scholarship and recommendations for 
the continuation of this work. 

In this Final Report, it is recommended that 
the work of the Commission be continued and 
broadened under the strong leadership of the 



450 



departbient of state bulletin 



Presidency. The whole of government must rec- 
ognize its conunitment to human rights and 
thereby seek to articulate its policies and pro- 
grams in human rights terms. A touchstone of 
our conunitment will be the ratification of addi- 
tional human rights conventions through action 
by the Administration and the Senate. In this 
manner, our moral position in the world will 
reflect our historic devotion to these principles 
of hiunan rights. 

I have been impressed by the variety and 
urgency of human rights problems, both nation- 
al and international. While this Commission 
sought to plant a few seeds, to reappraise, to 
appeal to every American to recall fundamental 
values, and to recommend future action, it rec- 
ognized that any sustained effort must be a 
government-wide effort. 

This Commission was established and carried 
on its deliberations in the Administration of 
your predecessor in office. It was supported by 
a broad spectrum of the public. Therefore, I 
believe that Americans speak as one when they 
seek to promote the cause of human rights at 
home and abroad. 

Respectfully yours, 

W. AVEEELL HaRKIMAN 

Chairman, The President'' s Commission for 
the Observance of Human Eights Year 1968 



Secretary Appoints Ne>v Members 
to Board of the Foreign Service 

Press release 106 dated May 7 

Secretai-y Rogers on May 7 announced the 
appointment of four new State Department 
members of the Board of the Foreign Service. 
The appointments were described as an initial 
step toward a major and comprehensive review 
by the new administration of the entire foreign 
affairs personnel structure. 

Named to the Board were : Elliot L. Richard- 
son, Under Secretary {Chairrnan) ; Idar Rime- 
stad. Deputy Under Secretary for Administra- 
tion; Philip Trezise, Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Affairs-designate; and Martin Hill- 
enbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Af- 
fairs. An official representing the Agency for 
International Development will be named 
shortly. 

Other agencies represented on the Board are 



USIA, the Departments of Commerce and 
Labor, and the Civil Service Commission. 

The Board of the Foreign Service, which was 
established by Presidential Executive Order 
11264 in December 1965,^ is charged with advis- 
ing the Secretary on policies relating to the 
functions, selection, assignment, rating, and 
promotion of professional foreign affairs of- 
ficers and the general personnel management of 
the foreign affairs establishment. 

In making the amiouncement. Secretary 
Rogers said: 

"The President is deeply interested in the 
processes by wliich foreign policy is determined 
and executed. The efficient operation of these 
processes is heavily dependent on well-organized 
and properly rationalized personnel systems in 
the foreign affairs agencies. 

"The systems in question have grown rapidly 
in the postwar years, and changing needs have 
imposed new tasks and burdens on them. We 
believe it is time to see what changes may be 
required in order to make sure that our unique 
personnel resources are being used in the most 
effective manner possible. 

"The examination will take place under the 
auspices of the Board of the Foreign Service 
and involve all of the foreign affairs agencies." 



H. I. Romnes Named Chairman 
of National U.N. Day for 1969 

The United States Mission to the United 
Nations announced on April 28 (U.S./U.N. 
press release 45) that President Nixon had ap- 
pointed H. I. Romnes as 1969 National United 
Nations Day Chairman. 

In a letter dated April 9 appointing Mr. 
Ronmes to head the annual national United Na- 
tions Day observances, President Nixon said: 

Our membership in and our support of the United 
Nations are important parts of our total foreign policy. 
Through the United Nations we seek to cooperate in 
building a world in which all nations feel secure. We 
seek to build a world in which all nations will have 
the opportunities and the skills and knowledge needed 
for economic development and social progress. We seek 
a world of freedom under law. It is to these ends that 
the United Nations is dedicated. 

Mr. Romnes, who is chairman of the board 
and chief executive officer of the American Tele- 



' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 144. 



MAT 26, 1969 



451 



phone and Telegraph Company, will lead a 
year-long effort by the United Nations Associa- 
tion of the U.S.A., supported by a prestigious 
cross section of American business and labor 
leaders, to demonstrate the United States com- 
mitment to the purposes of the United Nations 
Charter. 

National United Nations Day observances will 
take place in October. Each year the United Na- 
tions Day Chairman supervises, with the coop- 
eration of local and State United Nations Day 
chairmen appointed by their mayors and Gov- 
ernors, community programs in cities across the 
country. More than 1,500 communities will par- 
ticipate this year. 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND CONFERENCES 



United States Reviews Question 
of Colonial Territories and Peoples 

Statement hy Seymour M. Finger ^ 

As we look at the question of granting inde- 
pendence to colonial territories and peoples, it 
is important to see the situation in perspective. 

For more than a century prior to 1940, the 
number of people coming under foreign domi- 
nation increased substantially. The three dec- 
ades since that time have seen more than 97 
percent of the i^eople who were under colonial 
domination in 1940 achieve self-determination 
and independence. During the decade 1941-50, 
15 new countries, with almost 600 million peo- 
ple, attained independence. Meanwhile, in an 
anachronistic develoj^ment, three small coun- 
tries in Eastern Europe were deprived of their 
independence. 

In the following decade, 1951-60, 25 coun- 
tries, with 173 million people, acliieved inde- 
pendence. Unfortunately, this decade also 
witnessed loss of the autonomy guaranteed to 

" Made on Apr. 17 in the U.N. Preparatory Committee 
for the Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (U.S./U.N. press release 41). Ambassador 
Finger is U.S. Representative on the committee. 



the Tibetan people in a l7-point agreement of 
1951. Nevertheless, there was a great thrust for- 
ward in ending colonialism, climaxed by the 
admission of 18 new member nations to the 
United Nations in 1960. 

The current decade of 1961-70 corresponds 
to the period during which the Committee of 
24 [Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declara- 
tion on the Granting of Independence to Co- 
lonial Countries and Peoples] has been active. 
During that time, 25 countries, with 67 million 
people, have attained independence. 

Thus, in less than thi'ee decades 65 former de- 
pendent territories containing about one-third 
of the world's people have become new inde- 
pendent states. They now constitute more than 
half the membership of the United Nations. 

Meanwliile, the peoples of many other for- 
merly dependent territories have exercised self- 
determination by freely choosing self-govern- 
ment in association with other countries. 

In looking back over these three decades, the 
following conclusions emerge : 

First, this massive surge of independence took 
place largely without violence and essentially 
through voluntary action by the former admin- 
istering powers. There appeared to be a general 
recognition that colonialism had seen its day 
and that the independence of colonial territories 
was not only the right of the peoples of those 
territories but also was beneficial to the world 
in general, including the former administering 
powers. 

Second, the former administering powers — 
largely Western European countries and Japan 
— have enjoyed and are enjoying unprecedented 
prosperity since their former colonies became 
independent. Moreover, friendly and produc- 
tive relations have been the rule Ijetween former 
colonies and the metropolitan countries rather 
than the exception. 

I think these conclusions are important not 
only in evaluating the past three decades but 
also in looking toward the future. In light of 
this experience of the past three decades, no 
one — whether an administering power or an 
advocate of instant independence — should be- 
lieve any longer in the myth that colonies are 
an economic necessity for the administering 
power. 

Another myth which cannot be taken seriously 
in the light of experience is the false allegation 
that foreign economic investment is, in tliis day 



452 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIiLETIN 



and age, a significant prop to colonialism. The 
fact is that foreign economic investment in 
Africa and Asia has greatly expanded during 
the period shice independence has come to those 
two continents. In Africa, private investment 
from the United States alone in the newly in- 
dependent countries has amoimted to more than 
a billion dollars, and U.S. public aid to over 
$4 billion. It is true that private investment also 
continues in those areas of southern Africa 
which have not yet been able to exercise self- 
determination — Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, 
Angola, and Mozambique — but American in- 
vestment in those territories is but a tiny frac- 
tion of our total investment abroad; in fact, it 
is only about one-quarter of 1 percent. 

Another myth is that foreign military bases 
have been a serious impediment to independence. 
One has only to look at the long list of countries 
which have become independent in the last two 
decades to see that this allegation is false. The 
fact is that most overseas military bases and 
military forces of the world's major powers are 
located in mdependent countries, as a result of 
a mutuality of defense and security interests. 

With these perspectives in mind, let us look 
at the task ahead. Whereas in 1940 about one- 
third of the world's people lived in dependent 
territories, now the figure is less than 1 per- 
cent. But we cannot be complacent simply be- 
cause progress has been made. We cannot rest 
easy while the hard core of the problem remains. 
I refer, of course, to the absence of self-deter- 
mination for the peoples of southern Africa. 

In Namibia we see a South African regime 
which is continuing to administer the territory 
despite the fact that the United Nations General 
Assembly decided that South Africa had for- 
feited its mandate and that it has no other right 
to administer Namibia. Even worse, the South 
African authorities are extending to Namibia 
the odious practice of apartheid. 

In Southern Rhodesia it is not the metropoli- 
tan power — the United Kingdom — which is im- 
posing its will on an African people, but rather 
a narrowminded and arrogant minority settler 
group. 

In Angola and Mozambique we see the last 
remaining major areas of the Southern Hemi- 
sphere which are still dominated by a metro- 
politan power — Portugal. Let me say clearly 
and unequivocally that this is an anachronism 
in the modern world. The United States firmly 
supports the right of the peoples of Angola and 
Mozambique to self-determination. 



Our general debate began with a thoughtful 
statement by the distinguished Representative 
of Algeria. Although we do not agree with him 
on all points, we do feel that he endeavored to 
deal in a serious way with some of the major 
problems facing the United Nations in this area. 
He first questioned whether further patience, 
calm, and efforts at persuasion are in order. We 
can well understand why a representative as 
seriously interested in ending colonialism as is 
the Representative of Algeria would become 
impatient in the present circiunstances. This is 
particularly understandable in view of the fact 
that Algeria was one of the few countries that, 
like the United States, had to fight a major 
war of independence. 

Nevertheless, we believe that the problems of 
southern Africa do require more patience — 
patience, but not resignation. First of all, it is 
clear that countries outside southern Africa are 
in general not prepared to wage the major and 
probably catastrophic war which would be re- 
quired to dislodge the regimes now in power. 
Secondly, as odious as the denial of human 
rights and self-detennination in this area is, we 
do not believe that the situation in Namibia and 
the Portuguese territories represents a threat to 
international peace and security. Thirdly, we 
recall that most of the members of the United 
Nations became independent through peaceful 
means ; and wliile such peaceful change remains 
possible — however slow it may be — we are con- 
vinced that such peaceful means are in the best 
interest of everyone concerned. 

The distinguished Representative of Algeria 
also alleged that the strategic interests of cer- 
tain major trading nations are closely linked to 
the status quo, since they are "allied to colonial 
regimes." If he meant to include the United 
States, he is wrong. We have no strategic inter- 
est in seeing Southern Rhodesia dominated by a 
white minority nor in having an illegal South 
African occupation of Namibia. — none whatso- 
ever. Nor would it damage our strategic inter- 
ests in any way if the peoples of Angola and 
Mozambique were to achieve self-determination. 

The third principal point made by the dis- 
tinguished Representative of Algeria is one 
which we found particularly interesting. He 
emphasized that in the case of small territories, 
we should place particular stress on their right 
to self-determination, security, and well-being. 
It follows that the inliabitants of those terri- 
tories are those in the best position to judge 
whether their security and well-being can best 



MAT 26, 1969 



453 



be protected through association with another 
state or through other means. The smallest 
territories may indeed find the association vir- 
tually imperative in terms of insuring secu- 
rity and well-being. For those who do not choose 
some form of association with another power 
and are too small to assume the obligations of 
full membership in the United Nations, ways 
should be sought to associate them with the 
United Nations through a status short of full 
membership. This status should permit assist- 
ance from the various agencies of the United 
Nations system and perhaps some form of ob- 
server status. We note that this item is on the 
agenda of the Committee of 24, and we hope 
for a constructive discussion in that forum. 

Let me summarize briefly, Mr. Chairman, the 
views of the United States delegation at this 
stage of the committee's work. Clearly these 
views are preliminary, as we wish to hear the 
ideas of other delegations and wish to give fur- 
ther reflection before coming to more definitive 
conclusions. 

First, we believe that this occasion should 
be used to assess where we stand in the struggle 
to win freedom and self-determination for all 
peoples. We should evaluate our successes and 
our failures. 

Second, on the basis of this evaluation and 
analysis, we should plan the future work of the 
United Nations in this area — discarding what 
is not productive and seeking new and more 
effective approaches. 

Third, in working out our program, we 
should give special priorities to the problem 
of southern Africa, where the hard core of 
colonialism remains. 

Fourth, we must seek new ways to help the 
peoples of small dependent territories to achieve 
self-determination, security, and well-being. 

As we proceed with this review, I think we 
should bear in mind the history of the Bourbons, 
who, it is said, never learned anything and never 
forgot anything. Let us not be Bourbons. In- 
stead, let us analyze the history of the last few 
decades in a clearheaded and unprejudiced fash- 
ion, to determine what has worked and what 
has not worked. Let us not proceed obstinately 
with tactics of the past — of repeating year after 
year resolutions which are known to be ineffec- 
tual on the day they are adopted, of adopting 
resolutions based on myths such as the red her- 
rings of foreign military bases and foreign eco- 
nomic investment. Such outworn shibboleths 
cannot substitute for the hard thought we must 



all give to the solution of the remaining hard- 
core problems. Though it may appear elemen- 
tary to say so, it would also be wise not to 
slander those countries whose cooperation is 
considered important in achieving the objec- 
tives of resolutions to be adopted. Tlais does not 
mean that there cannot be legitimate and con- 
structive criticism; indeed, there must be. But 
it does mean that we should keep our eye on 
the real problems and act responsibly in terms 
of the real interests of dependent peoples. 

In saying this, Mr. Chairman, I direct my re- 
marks as much at the administering powers as 
to those who have criticized them. I believe this 
is the occasion for all administering powers, 
including the United States, to make a careful 
review of the territories for which they are re- 
sponsible, to reexamine past policies and prac- 
tices, and to seek solutions assuring self-determi- 
nation, security, and well-being. 



Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
listed below) may he consttlted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na~ 
tions. United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 



General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and 
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction. Proposals and Views Relating to the 
Adoption of Principles. Working paper prepared by 
the Secretariat A/AC.138/7. March 6, 1969. 50 pp. 



Economic and Social Council 

Commission on the Status of Women. Study on 
UNESCO Activities of Special Interest to Women. 
Report prepared by UNESCO. E/CN.6/520. Janu- 
ary 23, 1969. 57 pp. 

Fifth Report on Progress in Land Reform. Summary 
report prepared by the Secretary General in collab- 
oration with FAO and ILO. E/4617. February 24. 
1969. 42 pp. 

Development of Natural Resources: Water Desalina- 
tion. Report of the Secretary General with special 
reference to major developments in 1967-1968. 
E/4625. March 17, 1969. 16 pp. 

Development of Tourism. Implementation of the Rec- 
ommendations of the United Nations Conference on 
International Travel and Tourism. Periodic report 
of the Secretary General. E/4629. March 20, 1969. 
12 pp. 

Arrangements for the Transfer of Operative Technol- 
ogy to Developing Countries. Report of the Secretary 
General. B/4633. March 27, 1969. 19 pp. 



454 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Brazil Sign Agreement 
on Soluble Coffee 

Press release 97 dated April 30 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 



In the event that no agreement is reached on 
these further measures by March 1, 1970, the 
United States reserves its right to impose meas- 
ures it deems appropriate to correct the present 
undesirable situation. In the view of the United 
States Government, this would involve taking 
steps to insure that a total tax burden of 30 cents 
per pound is levied on Brazilian soluble coffee 
by May 1, 1970. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances 
of my highest consideration. 

William Belton 



The United States and Brazil exchanged 
diplomatic notes in Rio de Janeiro on April 30 
dealing with soluble coffee exports to the United 
States. The notes were signed by William Bel- 
ton, Charge d'Aff aires ad interim, for the United 
States and by Jose de Magalhaes Pinto, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, for Brazil. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES 



U.S. Note 



April 30, 1969 



No. 233 

Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the 
recent discussions between representatives of 
the Goverimients of the United States and Bra- 
zil concerning the results of the recent arbitra- 
tion on soluble coffee carried out under Article 
4A of the International Coffee Agreement, 1968. 

It is the understanding of the Government of 
the United States that the following steps are 
agreed to by the Government of Brazil : 

(A) As a first step, the Government of Bra- 
zil will impose by May 1, 1969 a tax of 13 
United States cents per pound on exports to the 
United States of soluble coffee whether such 
coffee is shipped directly or indirectly to the 
United States. 

(B) Both governments agree to meet on or 
about January 15, 1970, to consult on develop- 
ments in the soluble coffee markets and to seek 
agreement on further measures to be taken with 
respect to soluble coffee exports from Brazil. 
Such discussion will be concluded not later than 
March 1, 1970. 

(C) The Government of Brazil will not in- 
troduce new governmental measures or alter 
existing measures that would offset the effects 
of this new tax. 



Brazilian Note 

April 30, 1969 
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowl- 
edge receipt of your Excellency's note of 
April 30 as follows : 

[Textof U.S. note.] 

In reply, I transmit my agreement to the 
terms of the above note, except, however, that 
the Brazilian Government does not guarantee 
to the United States Government that the tax 
level mentioned in the above paragraph will 
be acceptable. The Brazilian Government is dis- 
posed to negotiate on the basis of the results 
which the measure now being taken will pro- 
duce in the course of the current year. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of 
my highest consideration. 

Jose de Magalhaes Pinto 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles 
and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at 
Paris November 29, 1968.' 
Notification of approval: South Africa, May 6, 1969. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
1964.' 
Accession deposited: Swaziland, April 25, 1969. 

Fisheries 

International convention for the conservation of Atlan- 



' Not in force. 

■ Not in force for the United States. 



may 26, 1969 



455 



tic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966. En- 
tered into force March 21, 1969. 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, April 1, 1969. 

Marriage 

Convention on consent to marriage, minimmn age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at New 
York December 10, 1962. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 9, 1964." 
Accession deposited: Spain, April 15, 1969. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 
1963. TIAS 5433. 
Notification of succession: Mauritius, May 7, 1969. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, January 16, 
1969 ; Cyprus, January 13, 1969. 

Space 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Ratification deposited at Washington: Denmark, 
May 6, 1969. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at 
New Yorli March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 
1954.' 

Ratification deposited: Austria (with a reservation), 
April 18, 1969. 



India 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreements of February 20, 1967 (TIAS 
6221), and June 24, 1967 (TIAS 6338). Signed at 
New Delhi April 25, 1969. Entered into force April 25, 
1969. 

Philippines 

Agreement relating to a cloud seeding project In the 
Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila 
AprU 23 and 24, 1969. Entered into force April 24, 
1969. 

Agreement relating to customs regulations governing 
cargo consigned to United States military authorities 
or armed forces personnel, with annexes. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Manila April 24, 1969. Entered 
into force AprU 24, 1969. 

Romania 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal abolition of cer- 
tain visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Bucharest April 25, 1969. Entered into force May 1, 
1969. 

Reciprocal agreement for the reduction of passport visa 
fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
August 25, 29, and 30, 1939. Entered into force 
September 1, 1939. 
Terminated: May 1, 1969. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 



BILATERAL 



Canada 

Agreement relating to the application of safeguards on 
smaU quantities of natural uranium transferred from 
Canada to the United States. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington January 28 and 30, 1969. Entered 
into force January 30, 1969. (Correction of entry in 
the Bulletin of Mar. 10, 1969, p. 216.) 

Chile 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities with 
exchange of notes, relating to the agreement of De- 
cember 29, 1967 (TIAS 6403). Signed at Santiago 
April 29, 1969. Entered into force AprU 29, 1969. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to Investment guaranties. Signed at 
San Salvador April 28, 1969. Enters into force on the 
date of a note whereby El Salvador notifies the 
United States that the agreement has been approved 
in conformity with El Salvador's constitutional pro- 
cedures. 



For sale it/ "^^ Superintendent of Documents, V.S. 
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, B.C. ZO402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. A Z5-percent discount is made on orders of 100 
or more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, and 
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some cases, a 
selected bibliography. (A complete set of all Back- 
ground Notes currently in stock (at least 125) — $6; 
1-year subscription service for approximately 75 up- 
dated or new Notes — $3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) 
Single copies of those listed below are available at 10^ 
each. 



2 Not in force for the United States. 



Laos 


Pub. 


8301 


8 pp. 


Malta 


Pub. 


8220 


4 pp. 


Nicaragua 


Pub. 


7772 


4 pp. 


Saudi Arabia 


Pub. 


7835 


4 pp. 


South West 


Pub. 


8168 


6 pp. 


Africa (Namibia) 








United Arab 


Pub. 


8152 


5 pp. 


Republic 









456 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX May £6, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1661 



Africa. United States Reviews Question of Co- 
lonial Territories and Peoples (Finger) . . 452 

Asia 

Japan's Economic Dynamism and Our Common 

Interests in East Asia (Barnett) 447 

Secretary Rogers To Confer With Asian Leaders 
During 17-Day Trip (statement and itiner- 
ary) 433 

Australia. Prime Minister Gorton of Australia 

Visits Washington (Nixon, Gorton) .... 436 

Brazil. U.S. and Brazil Sign Agreement on 
Soluble Coffee (exchange of notes) .... 455 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary Ap- 
points Nevr Members to Board of the Foreign 
Service 451 

Economic Affairs 

Japan's Economic Dynamism and Our Common 

Interests in East Asia (Barnett) 447 

Latin America: What Are Your Priorities? 

(Meyer) 440 

U.S. and Brazil Sign Agreement on Soluble 
Coffee (exchange of notes) 455 

Guinea. Letters of Credence (Keita) .... 446 

Human Rights. Final Report Submitted on Ob- 
servance of Human Rights Tear 1968 (Nixon, 
Harriman) 450 

Japan. Japan's Economic Dynamism and Our 

Common Interests in East Asia (Barnett) . 447 

Kenya. Letters of Credence (Kibinge) .... 446 

Latin America. Latin America : What Are Your 
Priorities? (Meyer) 440 

Near East. The Arab-Israeli Confrontation — A 
Challenge to International Diplomacy (Sis- 
co) 443 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. United States 
Reviews Question of Colonial Territories and 
Peoples (Finger) 452 

Presidential Documents 

Final Report Submitted on Observance of Hu- 
man Rights Year 1968 450 

Prime Minister Gorton of Australia Visits 

Washington 436 

Publications. Recent Releases 456 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 455 

U.S. and Brazil Sign Agreement on Soluble 
Coffee (exchange of notes) 455 

United Nations 

The Arab-Israeli Confrontation — A Challenge to 

International Diplomacy (Sisco) 443 

Current U.N. Documents 454 

H. I. Romnes Named Chairman of National 

U.N. Day for 1969 451 

United States Reviews Question of Colonial 

Territories and Peoples (Finger) 452 

Viet-Nam 

Secretary Rogers To Confer With Asian Leaders 
During 17-Day Trip (statement and itiner- 
ary) 433 

16th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 434 



Name Index 

Barnett, Robert W 447 

Finger, Seymour M 452 

Gorton, John G 436 

Harriman, W. Averell 450 

Hillenbrand, Martin 451 

Keita, Fadiala 446 

Kibinge, Leonard Oliver 446 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 434 

Meyer, Charles A 440 

Nixon, President 436, 450 

Richardson, Elliot L 451 

Rimestad, Idar 451 

Rogers, Secretary 433,451 

Romnes, H. I 451 

Sisco, Joseph J 443 

Trezise, Philip 451 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: May 5-1 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 

Releases issued prior to May 5 which appear in 
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 90 of April 23 
and 97 of April 30. 

No. Date Subject 

*99 5/5 Handley sworn in as Ambassador to 
Turkey (biographic details). 
*100 5/5 Green sworn in as Assistant Secre- 
tary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs (biographic details). 
101 5/6 Meyer : "Latin America : What Are 

Your Priorities?" 
tl02 5/6 U.S. delegation to 14th SEATO 

Council meeting. 
tl03 5/6 U.S. participants In seven-nation con- 
ference on Viet-Nam. 
tl04 5/6 U.S. observer delegation to 16th 
CENTO Council meeting. 
105 5/6 Secretary Rogers' itinerary, May 12- 

29 (rewrite). 
lOG 5/7 New members appointed to Board of 

the Foreign Service. 
107 5/8 Lodge : 15th plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris. 
tl08 5/8 Meyer: Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
*109 5/S Leonhart sworn in as Ambassador to 

Yugoslavia (biographic details). 
*110 5/8 Puhan sworn in as Ambassador to 

Hungary (biographic details). 
*111 5/9 Peterson sworn in as Ambassador to 
Finland (biographic details). 
112 5/9 Rogers : trip to Asia. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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washington, d.c. 20402 



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THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1562 




June 2, 1969 



PEACE IN VIETNAM 

Address by President Nixon 4^7 

SECRETARY ROGERS VISITS VIET-NAM i61 

AMBASSADOR LODGE DISCUSSES THE PARIS PEACE TALKS 

Transcript of News Conference at the White House 465 

SEVENTEENTH PLENARY SESSION ON VIETNAM HELD AT PARIS 

Statement by Ainbassadoi' Lodge 467 
Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN 19 1969 

DEPOSITORY 
For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1562 
June 2, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OP 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Quldg to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
tcith information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the tcork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Infornuition is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative nutterial in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



Peace inViet-Nam 



Address by President Nixon ^ 



I have asked for this television time tonight 
to report to you on our most difficult and urgent 
problem — the war in Viet-Nam. 

Since I took office 4 months ago nothing has 
commanded so much of my time and energy as 
the search for a way to bring lasting peace in 
Viet-Nam. I know that some believe I should 
have ended the war immediately after my inau- 
guration by simply withdrawing our forces 
from Viet-Nam. 

This would have been the easy thing to do, 
and it might have been a popular move. 

But I would have betrayed my solemn re- 
sponsibility as President of the United States 
had I done so. 

I want to end this war. The American people 
want to end this war. The South Vietnamese 
people want to end this war. But we want to end 
it permanently so that the younger brothers of 
our soldiers m Viet-Nam will not have to fight 
in the future in another Viet-Nam someplace 
in the world. 

The fact that there is no easy way to end the 
war does not mean that we have no choice but 
to let the war drag on with no end in sight. 

For more than 4 years American boys have 
been fighting and dying in Viet-Nam. For 12 
months our negotiators have been talking with 
the other side in Paris. Yet the fighting goes 
on. The destruction continues. Brave men still 
die. 

The time has come for some new initiatives. 
Kepeating the old formulas and the tired rhet- 
oric of the past is not enough. When Americans 
are risking their lives in war, it is the respon- 
sibility of their leaders to take some risks for 
peace. 

I would like to report to you tonight on some 
of the things we have been doing in the past 4 

^Made to the Nation on television and radio on 
May 14 (White House press release; text prepared for 
delivery). 



months to bring true peace, and then I would 
like to make some concrete proposals to speed 
that day. 

Review and Reassessment 

Our first step began before inauguration. This 
was to launch an intensive review of every as- 
pect of the Nation's Viet-Nam policy. We ac- 
cepted nothing on faith; we challenged every 
assumption and every statistic. We made a sys- 
tematic, serious examination of all the alterna- 
tives open to us. We carefully considered rec- 
ommendations offered both by critics and by 
supporters of past policies. 

From the review, it became clear at once that 
the new admiaistration faced a set of immediate 
operational problems. 

— The other side was preparing for a new 
offensive. 

— There was a wide gulf of distrust between 
Washington and Saigon which hindered co- 
operation. 

— In 8 months of talks in Paris there had been 
no negotiations directly concerned vnth a final 
settlement. 

We therefore moved on several fronts at once. 

We frustrated the attack which was lavmched 
in lat« February. As a result, the North Viet- 
namese and the Viet Cong failed to achieve their 
military objectives. 

We restored a close working relationship with 
Saigon. In the resulting atmosphere of mutual 
confidence, President Thieu and his government 
have taken important initiatives in the search 
for a settlement. 

We speeded up the strengthening of the South 
Vietnamese forces. As a result, General Abrams 
[Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, U.S. 
Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam] re- 
ported to me on Monday that progress in this 



JtTNB 2, 1969 



457 



training program has been excellent and that, 
apart from what will develop from the negotia- 
tions, the time is approaching when South Viet- 
namese forces will be able to take over some 
of the fighting fronts now being manned by 
Americans. 

Our deepest concern has been the development 
of a coherent peace policy so that our various 
moves would reinforce each other. As a result, 
we have been able to move the Paris talks to- 
ward the substantive issues essential to an 
agreement. 

In weighing alternative courses, we have had 
to recognize that the situation as it exists today 
is far different from what it was 2 years ago or 
4 years ago or 10 years ago. 

One difference is that we no longer have the 
choice of not intervening. We have crossed that 
bridge. There are now more than half a million 
American troops in Viet-Nam, and 35,000 Amer- 
icans have lost their lives there. 

We can have honest debate about whether we 
should have entered the war. We can have 
honest debate about the past conduct of the war. 
But the urgent question today is what to do now 
that we are there, not whether we should have 
entered on this course, but what is required of us 
today. 

Against that background, let me discuss, first, 
what we have rejected, and second, what we are 
prepared to accept. 

Essential Principles 

We have ruled out attempting to impose a 
purely military solution on the battlefield. 

We have also ruled out either a one-sided 
withdrawal from Viet-Nam or the acceptance 
in Paris of terms that would amount to a dis- 
guised defeat. 

When we assumed the burden of helping de- 
fend South Viet-Nam, millions of South Viet- 
namese men, women, and children placed their 
trust in us. To abandon them now would risk 
a massacre that would shock and dismay every- 
one in the world who values human life. 

Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, 
however, would jeopardize more than lives in 
South Viet-Nam. It would threaten our longer 
term hopes for peace in the world. A great na- 
tion caimot renege on its pledges. A great nation 
must be worthy of trust. 

When it comes to maintaining peace, "pres- 
tige" is not an empty word. I am not speaking 
of false pride or bravado — they should have no 



place in our policies. I speak rather of the re- 
spect that one nation has for another's integrity 
in defending its principles and meeting ite 
obligations. 

If we simply abandoned our effort in Viet- 
Nam, the cause of peace might not survive the 
damage that would be done to other nations' 
confidence in our reliability. 

Another reason stems from debates within 
the Communist world between those who argue 
for a policy of confrontation with the United 
States and those who argue against it. If Hanoi 
were to succeed in taking over South Viet-Nam 
by force — even after the power of the United 
States had been engaged — it would greatly 
strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiation, 
who advocate aggression, who minimize the 
risks of confrontation. It would bring peace 
now, but it would enormously increase the 
danger of a bigger war later. 

If we are to move successfully from an era 
of confrontation to an era of negotiation, then 
we have to demonstrate — at the point at which 
confrontation is being tested — that confronta- 
tion with the United States is costly and 
imrewarding. 

Almost without exception, the leaders of non- 
Communist Asia have told me that they would 
consider a one-sided American withdrawal from 
Viet-Nam to be a threat to the security of their 
own nations. 

In determining what choices would be ac- 
ceptable, we have to understand our essential 
objective: We seek the opportunity for the 
South Vietnamese people to determine their 
own jjolitical future without outside inter- 
ference. 

Let me put it plainly: What the United 
States wants for South Viet-Nam is not the im- 
portant thing. Wliat North Viet-Nam wants for^ 
South Viet-Nam is not the important thing.i 
Wliat is important is what the people of South' 
Viet-Nam want for themselves. 

The United States has suffered over 1 million 
casualties in four wars in this century. What- 
ever faults we may have as a nation, we have 
asked nothing for ourselves in return for these 
sacrifices. We have been generous toward those 
whom we have fought, helping former foes as 
well as friends in the task of reconstruction. 
We are proud of this record, and we bring the 
same attitude to our search for a settlement in 
Viet-Nam. 

In this spirit, let me be explicit about several 
points : 



458 



DEPABTMENT OF STATE BtnLLETIN 



— We seek no bases in Viet-Nam. 

— We insist on no military ties. 

— We are willing to agree to neutrality if that 
is what the South Vietnamese people freely 
choose. 

— We believe there should be an opportunity 
for full participation in the political life of 
South Viet-Nam by all political elements that 
are prepared to do so without the use of force 
or intimidation. 

— ^We are prepared to accept any government 
in South Viet-Nam that results from the free 
choice of the South Vietnamese people them- 
selves. 

— We have no intention of imposing any form 
of government upon the people of South Viet- 
Nam, nor will we be a party to such coercion. 

— We have no objection to reunification, if 
that turns out to be what the people of South 
Viet-Nam and the people of North Viet-Nam 
want ; we ask only that the decision reflect the 
free choice of the people concerned. 

At this point, I would like to add a personal 
word based on many visits to South Viet-Nam 
over the past 5 years. This is the most difficult 
war in America's history, fought against a 
ruthless enemy. I am proud of our men ^s^ho 
have carried the terrible burden of this war with 
dignity and courage despite the division and 
opposition to the war in the United States. 
History will record that never have America's 
fighting men fought more bravely for more un- 
selfish goals than our men in Viet-Nam. It is 
our responsibility to see that they will not have 
fought in vain. 

In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on 
no rigid diplomatic fonnula. Peace could be 
achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. 
Peace could be achieved by an informal under- 
standing, provided that the understanding is 
clear and that there were adequate assurances 
that it would be observed. Peace on paper is not 
as important as peace in fact. 

The Negotiations 

This brings us, then, to the matter of nego- 
tiations. 

We must recognize that peace in Viet-Nam 
cannot be achieved overnight. A war which has 
raged for so many years will require detailed 
negotiations and cannot be settled at a single 
stroke. 

What kind of a settlement will permit the 
South Vietnamese people to determine freely 



their own political future? Such a settlement 
will require the withdrawal of all non-South 
Vietnamese forces fi-om South Viet-Nam and 
procedures for political choice that give each 
significant group in South Viet-Nam a real op- 
portunity to participate in the political life of 
the nation. 

To implement these principles, I reaffirm now 
our willingness to withdraw our forces on a 
specified timetable. We ask only that North Viet- 
Nam withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia, and Laos into North Viet-Nam, also 
in accordance with a timetable. 

We include Cambodia and Laos to ensure that 
these countries would not be used as bases for 
a renewed war. The Cambodian border is only 
35 miles from Saigon; the Laotian border is 
only 25 miles from Hue. 

Our offer provides for a simultaneous start on 
withdrawal by both sides ; agreement on a mu- 
tually acceptable timetable; and for the with- 
drawal to be accomplished quickly. 

If North Viet-Nam wants to insist that it has 
no forces in South Viet-Nam, we will no longer 
debate the point — provided that its forces cease 
to be there and that we have reliable assurances 
that they will not return. 

The North Vietnamese delegates have been 
saying in Paris that political issues should be 
discussed along with military issues and that 
there must be a political settlement in the South. 
We do not dispute this, but the military with- 
drawal involves outside forces and can there- 
fore be properly negotiated by North Viet-Nam 
and the United States, with the concurrence of 
its allies. The political settlement is an internal 
matter which ought to be decided among the 
South Vietnamese themselves and not imposed 
by outside powers. However, if our presence at 
tliese political negotiations would be helpful, 
and if the South Vietnamese concerned agreed, 
we would be willing to participate, along with 
the representatives of Hanoi if that were also 
desired. 

Recent statements by President Thieu have 
gone far toward opening the way to a political 
settlement. He has publicly declared his govern- 
ment's willingness to discuss a political solution 
with tlie National Liberation Front and has 
offered free elections. This was a dramatic step 
forward, a reasonable offer that could lead to a 
settlement. The South Vietnamese Government 
has offered to talk without preconditions. I be- 
lieve that the other side should also be willing 
to talk without preconditions. 



JUNE 2, 1969 



459 



The South Vietnamese Government recog- 
nizes, as we do, that a settlement must permit all 
persons and gi'oups that are prepared to re- 
nounce the use of force to participate freely in 
the political life of South Viet-Nam. To be ef- 
fective, such a settlement would require two 
things: first, a process that would allow the 
South Vietnamese people to express their choice ; 
and second, a guarantee that this process would 
be a fair one. 

We do not insist on a particular form of guar- 
antee. The important thing is that the guaran- 
tees should have the confidence of the South 
Vietnamese people and that they should be 
broad enough and strong enough to pi'otect the 
interests of all major South Vietnamese groups. 

This, then, is the outline of the settlement 
that we seek to negotiate in Paris. Its basic 
terms are very simple: mutual withdrawal of 
non-South Vietnamese forces from South Viet- 
Nam and free choice for the people of South 
Viet-Nam. I believe that the long-term interests 
of peace require that we insist on no less and 
that the realities of the situation require that 
we seek no more. 



Programs and Alternatives 

To make very concrete what I have said, I 
propose the following measures, which seem to 
me consistent with the principles of all parties. 
These proposals are made on the basis of full 
consultation with President Thieu. 

— As soon as agreement can be reached, all 
non-South Vietnamese forces would begin with- 
drawals from South Viet-Nam. 

— Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon 
stages, the major portions of all U.S., Allied, 
and other non- South Vietnamese forces would 
be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month 
period, the remaining U.S., Allied, and other 
non-South Vietnamese forces would move into 
designated base areas and would not engage in 
combat operations. 

— The remaining U.S. and Allied forces 
would move to complete their withdrawals as 
the remaining North Vietnamese forces were 
withdrawn and returned to North Viet-Nam. 

— An international supervisory body, accepta- 
ble to both sides, would be created for the pur- 
pose of verifying withdrawals and for any other 
purposes agreed upon between the two sides. 

— This international body would begin oper- 
ating in accordance with an agreed timetable 



and would participate in arranging supervised 
cease-fires. 

— As soon as possible after the international 
body was fimctioning, elections would be held 
under agreed procedures and under the super- 
vision of the international body. 

— Arrangements would be made for the 
earliest possible release of prisoners of war on 
both sides. 

— All parties would agree to observe the 
Geneva accords of 1954 regarding Viet-Nam and 
Cambodia, and the Laos accords of 1962. 

I believe this proposal for peace is realistic 
and takes account of the legitimate interests of 
all concerned. It is consistent with President 
Thieu's six points. It can accommodate the vari- 
ous progi-ams put forth by the other side. We 
and the Government of South Viet-Nam are 
prepared to discuss its details with the other 
side. Secretary Rogers is now in Saigon and will 
be discussing with President Thieu how, to- 
gether, we may put forward these proposed 
measures most usefully in Paris. He will, as 
well, be consulting with our other Asian allies 
on these measures while on his Asian trip. How- 
ever, I would stress that these proposals are not 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We are 
quite willing to consider other approaches con- 
sistent with our principles. 

We are willing to talk about anybody's pro- 
gram — Hanoi's four points, the NLF's 10 
points — provided it can be made consistent with 
the few basic principles I have set forth here. 

Despite our disagreement with several of its 
points, we welcome the fact that the NLF has 
put forward its first comprehensive program. 
We are continuing to study it carefully. How- 
ever, we cannot ignore the fact that immediately 
after the offer, the scale of enemy attacks 
stepped up and American casualties increased. 

Let me make one point very clear. If the 
enemy wants peace with the United States, that 
is not the way to get it. 

I have set forth a peace program tonight 
which is generous in its terms. I have indicated 
our willingness to consider other proposals. No 
greater mistake could be made than to confuse 
flexibility with weakness or being reasonable 
with lack of resolution. I must make clear, in 
all candor, that if the needless suffering con- 
tinues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody 
has anything to gain by delay. 

Reports from Hanoi indicate that the enemy 
has given up hope for a military victory in 



I 



460 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



South Viet-Nam but is counting on a collapse 
of American will in the United States. They 
could make no gi-eater error in judgment. 

Let me be quite blunt. Our fighting men are 
not going to be worn down; our negotiators are 
not going to be talked down ; our allies are not 
going to be let down. 

I have seen the ugly face of war in Viet-Nam. 
I have visited the wounded in field hospitals — 
American boys, South Vietnamese boys, North 
Vietnamese boys. They were different in many 
ways — the color of their skins, their religions, 
their race. Some were enemies, some were 
friends. 

But the differences were small compared with 
how they were alike. They were brave men, and 
they were so young. Their lives — their dreams 
for the future had been shattered by a war over 
which they had no control. 

With all of the moral authority of the office 
which I hold, I say that America could have 
no greater and prouder role than to help to end 
this war in a way which will bring nearer that 
day in which we can have a world order in 
which young men can grow up in peace and 
friendship. 

I do not criticize those that disagree with me 
on the conduct of our peace negotiations. I do 
not ask unlimited patience from a people whose 
hopes for peace have too often been raised and 
cruelly dashed over the past 4 years. 

I have tried to present the facts about Viet- 
Nam with complete honesty, and I shall con- 
tinue to do so in my reports to the American 
people. 

Tonight, all I ask is that you consider these 
facts and, whatever our differences, that you 
support a program which can lead to a peace 
we can live with and a peace we can be proud 
of. Nothing could have a greater effect in con- 
vincing the enemy that he should negotiate in 
good faith than to see the American people 
united behind a generous and reasonable jDeace 
offer. 

In my campaign for the Presidency, I 
pledged to end this war in a way that would 
increase our chances to win true and lasting 
peace in Viet-Nam, in the Pacific, and in the 
world. I am determined to keep that pledge. If 
I fail to do so, I expect the American people 
to hold me accountable for that failure. 

But while I will never raise false expecta- 
tions, my deepest hope as I speak to you to- 
night is that we shall be able to look back on 
this day as that critical turning point when 



American initiative moved us off dead center 
and forward to the time when this war would 
be brought to an end and we could devote the 
unlimited energies and dedication of the Ameri- 
can people to the challenges of peace. 



Secretary Rogers Visits Viet-Nam 

Following is a statement made hy Secretary 
Rogers during a stopover at Los Angeles on 
May 12, together with the transcripts of news 
conferences he held at Tan Son Nhut Airport, 
Saigon, upon his arrival May H and upon de- 
parture May 19. 



STATEMENT AT LOS ANGELES, MAY 12 

Press release 117 dated May 13 

I am looking forward very much to my first 
official trip to an important part of the Pacific 
community. Californians are especially aware 
of our part in that community, and I want you 
to know that this administration intends to play 
an active and constructive part in the immediate 
and future growth of that community. That is 
why I am going to Asia now. 

As I go to each country and consult with the 
Asian leaders, I shall be listening to their ideas 
and their aspirations and their proposals. For 
what we seek in the Pacific community — as in 
the other regions of the world — is not to ex- 
ploit our immense national power but to serve 
our national interests in partnership and com- 
munity with others. 

That is the spirit in which I am approaching 
this trip. Where there is peace, our purpose is 
to cooperate constructively to build a more 
prosperous and progressive community of na- 
tions bordering the great Pacific Ocean. 

Where there is conflict — as there is in Viet- 
Nam — our purpose is to negotiate a peace. 

That purpose is not served by the kind of 
news we have all read in the newspapers for the 
last several days telling of new terrorist attacks 
against civilians in Saigon. 

For our part, we are engaged in a serious 
effort to halt the violence in Viet-Nam — to put 
an end to the war. We must continue to hope 
that North Viet-Nam is also serious about peace. 

Systematic acts of terrorism like those that 
took place in a number of cities in South Viet- 
Nam yesterday do not reinforce that hope. The 



JUNE 2. 1969 



461 



indiscriminate and senseless killing and wound- 
ing of civilians in their homes and in the streets 
can only raise questions about intentions of the 
other side. 

However difficult it may be to achieve, our 
true national interests lie in peace, in the 
growth of individual and national freedom, in 
social and economic progress for all peoples, 
in the steady evolution of international coopera- 
tion for all those many tasks that can be per- 
formed better by working together. My purpose 
on this trip, then, is to work together with our 
associates in the emerging Pacific community. 



NEWS CONFERENCE ON ARRIVAL, 
SAIGON, MAY 14 

Press release 118 dated May 14 

I am glad to have this opportunity to be in 
South Viet-Nam. I am here to learn and to 
work. 

Of course, we learn every morning in Wash- 
ington what happened overnight here in Viet- 
Nam and we work together continually with 
your representatives on our mutual problem of 
bringing a lasting peace to Viet-Nam and 
Southeast Asia, but there is a great value in 
being here and learning by direct observation. 

I have particularly admired the leadership 
and wisdom displayed by President Thieti dur- 
ing these difficult days. I am eager to talk with 
him and with your other able Vietnamese 
leaders about the important problems both our 
Governments face here and in Paris. 

Although we are in constant close touch with 
representatives of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
in Saigon, "Washington, and Paris, this visit 
will give me the occasion to describe the policies 
of the new administration in Washington in 
person to the top leaders of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam and to get their views first hand. 
This kind of personal exchange is a vital part 
of the relationship of close allies and should 
increase our mutual understanding and col- 
laboration in the weeks and months ahead. 

We are, of course, earnestly seeking a peace- 
ful solution to the war. We are in complete 
agreement — your Government and mine — about 
the puriDose of the peace we seek. We shall not 
compromise on our basic objective: the estab- 
lishment of conditions which assure that the 
people of South Viet-Nam can determine their 
future unconditionally. 

What is meant by "unconditionally"? It 



means that the decision must not be imposed, in 
whole or in part, by outside forces ; it must be 
made by a process which permits the people of 
South Viet-Nam their own free choice. If the 
other side were willing to accept this principle, 
then prospects for peace would be greatly 
improved. 

As you probably know, President Nixon will 
be making an important public address in a mat- 
ter of hours on the present prospects for peace 
in Viet-Nam. The President has directed me to 
explore in depth with President Thieu how we 
and our allies can most eilectively move forward 
from the present position further in the direc- 
tion of peace. 

The people of Viet-Nam have fought long and 
suffered much to establish the conditions for a 
return to peace. For this they have earned 
the admiration and respect of all who value 
national independence and the right of self- 
determination. 

May I express in closing to the people of 
South Viet-Nam my personal regard and ap- 
preciation for what they have done. We, and 
our allies, are determined that it will not have 
been in vain. 

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. 

Q. Mr. Rogers^! I wonder if you can tell us 
whether you can see any prospect in the near 
future of withdraioal or reduction in the num- 
ber of American troops in Viet-Nam? 

A. I don't want to make any comment on that 
particular question. As you know, President 
Nixon and I both have expressed in Washington 
the factors which he will take into consideration 
in making any such decision. First, it would 
have to be done in collaboration and close con- 
sultation with the leaders of South Viet-Nam 
and we would consider the factors that he men- 
tioned before any decision is made. The factors 
are the progress in the talks in Paris, the level 
of the offensive in South Viet-Nam, and the 
readiness of the forces of South Viet-Nam to 
replace our troops. So I have nothing to say 
on that subject at this time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that as a 
result of tlie 10-point plan put fonoard last week 
hy the National Liberation Front, the Com- 
munist side is now interested in serious talks 
to end this v;ar? 

A. I think it is too early to answer that 
question. I have already expressed in a state- 



462 



DEPARTJrENT OF STATE BTILLETIN 



ment I issued in Washington ^ that although 
many of the points listed there are unacceptable 
to us we think there are suggestions that require 
exploration and we are anxious to do that. We 
would hope that this is an indication of a wil- 
lingness to have a free discussion with them, 
a discussion which might move the peace talks 
forward. I think, however, it is too early to 
tell until we have had further chance to discuss 
the matter with the other side. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you call this latest 
rocket and shelling an offensive in your last 
corrvment? 

A. No, you mean the answer to the question 
before this last one? 

Q. Right. 

A. No, I did not. I didn't refer to that. I said 
that was one of the factors that President Nixon 
has enumerated for him to consider before any 
decision would be made on the subject of troop 
replacement. 

Q. This latest series of widespread attacks — 
Iww do you consider them in relation to the talks 
in Paris? How is this going to affect them? 

A. Well, I don't know whether yoii received 
it or not, but in Los Angeles I made the point 
that it was difficult for us to understand why 
these latest tactics were used— which result in 
senseless killing of civilians — if the other side 
wants seriously to discuss a peaceful solution to 
this combat and this war. It's very difficult to 
understand how that has any relationship to 
war — the killing of civilians and engaging in 
acts of terror — but I wouldn't want to suggest 
that it totally discourages us. Certainly it casts 
somewhat of a cloud over their intentions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you prepared, to discuss 
with the Government of South Viet-Nam, a po- 
litical role for the National Liberation Front in 
the South Vietnamese government or in a coali- 
tion government? 

A. Well, we intend to discuss with the officials 
of the Government of South Viet-Nam many of 
the problems that face us now. But, essentially, 
political matters are matters for decision by the 
Government and the people of South Viet-Nam. 
We have made that perfectly clear. 

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. 



' Bulletin of Jlay 26, 1969, p. 433. 



NEWS CONFERENCE ON DEPARTURE, 
SAIGON, MAY 19 

Press release 123 dated May 19 

This visit to South Viet-Nam has been a use- 
ful and timely visit for me. The talks that I have 
had here have given me the opportunity person- 
ally to assure the leaders of this country that the 
United States has no intention of changing its 
single fixed objective for Viet-Nam : that is that 
the people of South Viet-Nam must have the 
right to make their own decisions about their 
own future without interference from any out- 
side quarter of any kind. On other questions, we 
are openminded and flexible. 

As you know. President Thieu and other 
members of the Government, because of their in- 
creased strength and capability, have stated that 
they are determined to assume an increasing 
share of the burden of defending South Viet- 
Nam. 

We also had discussions about how to move 
forward in Paris on the proposals previously 
made by President Thieu and by President 
Nixon last week. 

We are united in our determination to press 
the cause of peace in the talks at Paris to see 
whether the other side is ready for serious ne- 
gotiations and looking for a peaceful solution. 

We are in agreement that the withdrawal of 
outside forces could begin at any time if Hanoi 
is ready to play its part in that process. Peace is 
up to Hanoi. It is for the leaders there to de- 
termine when the fighting stops. Meanwhile, we 
can depend on the valor and ability of our Allied 
soldiers in the field. My visits there during the 
last 2 days convinced me there is no doubt on 
that score. 

Let me say that I have been much impressed 
by the confidence shown by the leaders I have 
met these past few days. They are courageously 
building a nation while still at war. They are 
planning actively for the postwar development 
of their country. I found no doubts here that 
there is a future in freedom for this nation. 

I have during my visit in South Viet-Nam 
come away with a sense of great admiration and 
respect for its leaders and its people. If the war 
could be ended on some reasonable basis, some 
honorable basis, and a way found to devote the 
time, energy, money, and human resources here 
employed to the cause of peace, the world, I 
believe, might witness a near miracle of building 
and advancement for the betterment of man- 
kind. It is with that hope that I leave the 
Republic of Viet-Nam today. 



JUNE 2, 1969 



463 



Q, Mr. Secretary, can you tell us wTiether you 
thinh that the summit meeting hetween Presi- 
dent Thieu and President Nixon, suggested hy 
President Thieu the other day, would he useful 
or not? 

A. Yes, I think it will be useful. I don't know 
about this time. I think that's up to President 
Thieu and President Nixon to determine. I think 
a meeting between the two would be useful. 

Q. I wonder if, just elaborating on that, sir, 
you could suggest to us some of tTie points which 
might well be discussed at a su/m/mit meeting? 

A. No, I wouldn't want to do that. I think 
most of them are quite apparent: some of the 
things that I've talked about here, the whole 
negotiating position. There are many things 
they could discuss, but I wouldn't want to at- 
tempt to spell out an agenda. 

Q. {Vietnamese tran^slator) Mr. Secretary, 
he^s asking if you would comment on the re- 
duction of U.S. forces in Viet-Nam,. 

A. Well, I would not want to say much be- 
yond what President Nixon has said, and that 
is that this is one of the matters under con- 
sideration. It's clear that the forces of South 
Viet-Nam are getting stronger, more capable, 
are better trained ; and when the time is right, 
then this will be considered and decided. You 
probably know President Nixon has said that 
there are three factors to consider. One is the 
progress of the peace talks in Paris ; one is the 
level of the fighting, the offensive fighting by 
the enemy; and one is the capability and 
strength of the ARVN. And as I said in my 
statement just now, I've been very much im- 
pressed by the strength of the ARVN forces and 
their capability. 

Q. (Vietnamese translator) Mr. Secretary, he 
wishes to ask you about the int.e7mational agency 
which will control any future elections here. 
He asks what is your idea, what is your concept, 
on such an organisation. 

A. Well, of course, the international super- 
visory body that was referred to in the Presi- 
dent's talk the other night would not be for 
the purpose of controlling an election. The elec- 
tion would be controlled or run by the people 
of South Viet-Nam. The purpose of the inter- 
national supervisory body would be to make 
certain that the election was an honest election 
and that evei-yone had an opportunity to vote 
without coercion from any quarter. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, an optical question. Are i 
you beginning to see the light at the end of the 
twinel? 

A. Well, first, I've only been here 4 days. I 
think that's much too short a time to use as a 
basis for any judgments. Secondly, I thmk that 
experience has demonstrated that predictions of 
that kind are certainly not wise, and I don't 
intend to make any. 

' Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could 
clarify for us whether or not the United States 
loill accept the idea of an interim coalition gov- 
ernment before elections are held? 

A. Well, we haven't talked about a coalition 
government as such. Secondly, when you say, 
will the United States accept something, what 
we will accept is a system which will permit 
the people of South Viet-Nam to express their 
will through the elective process. How that is 
done is a subject for negotiation by the people 
in South Viet-Nam. So I think that the election 
is one thing and the government during the 
time the election is held is another thing. But 
we don't foresee any coalition government as 
such. 

Q. But you would not rule that out as a 
possibility? 

A. Well, I certainly wouldn't rule it in. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your talks with the South 
Vietnamese people, did you discuss at all with 
them {the arrest) of the South Vietnamese po- 
litical opponents of the government? 

A. No, we discussed in a general way the 
right of the press, freedom of the press, and 
we expressed the concern of our Government 
on that subject. We did not go into any particu- 
lar cases. We don't think it's appropriate to. 
Secondly, when there's a war on, situations 
are somewhat different. I think it would be 
unwise for us to attempt to spell out in detail 
our thoughts on that subject. Even in our own 
case during the war, if you recall, we did some 
things that were somewhat repressive, and I 
think it's understandable why there is a tempta- 
tion in that regard. I must say that there's been 
considerable improvement, I think, here in free- 
dom of the press, and I think the Government's 
quite conscious of the problem. But they are 
fighting a war, they are having their men killed. 
And the problem of freedom of press at a time 
when the nation is at war is not an easy one to 
decide. 



464 



DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Ambassador Lodge Discusses 
the Paris Peace Talks 

Folloioing are remarks made to the fress liy 
President Nixon arid Ambassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge on May 15 after a joint meeting of the 
Cabinet and the National Security Cov/ncil. 

White House press release dated May 15 

PRESIDENT NIXON 

Ladies and gentlemen: Ambassador Lodge, 
Ambassador [Lawrence] Walsh, and Mr. 
[Philip C] Habib were here for the meeting of 
the Cabinet and the Security Council, and 
helped to brief the Council on the situation in 
Viet- Nam and in Paris. 

They are the senior members of our negotiat- 
ing team in Paris and immediately after this 
meetmg will be flying to Paris for the plenary 
session of the Paris meeting, which will take 
place tomorrow. 

Ambassador Lodge does have time to answer a 
few questions before he leaves, and I will pre- 
sent him to you now. 

Mr. Ambassador. 



AMBASSADOR LODGE 

Thank you very much, Mr. President. 

Ladies and gentlemen : Last Thursday the Na- 
tional Liberation Front made a 10-point pro- 
posal which wo have been studying very care- 
fully. The President's speech of last night 
comes along at a providential time, because it 
means that on the table before us in Paris are 
two comprehensive j^roposals wliich deal with 
substantive issues, and if there is a desire on the 
other side to have solid negotiations, why, this 
provides the opportunity. 

So I think the speech that the President made 
last night, from the standpomt of our opera- 
tions in Paris, can be most helpful. It was con- 
structive, conciliatoi-y, flexible, and I think of- 
fered as much as one could possibly expect and 
was completely fair and just to the other side. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, the initial Viet Cong re- 
action has been that it is the same old package. 
What do you think ahout that? 

Ambassador Lodge: I don't think we take 
those statements of that kind at face value. I 
think the statement in the President's speech 



about troop withdrawal; I think the statement 
about political solution — I think those state- 
ments were new. 

Q. Mr. A?ni>assador, the President said in his 
speech that nothing would be gained by delay. 
From the point of view of tlie other side, tohy 
should they think they ivill not gain by delay? 

Ambassador Lodge: There are those who 
think they have an advantage in waiting us out. 
That involves a great big estimate, and a great 
big calculation about the American people and 
about American public opinion and about the 
extent to which the American people under- 
stand all that is at stake here. 

A lifetime in public life m this country has 
convinced me that when the American peoijle 
have the facts they usually make the right de- 
cision and that those who wait and hang back in 
the hopes that American public opinion is going 
to collapse and is going to crumble have usually 
been disappointed. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, in the past you have 
, spoken of the need for free elections to settle the 
political future of South Vict-Nam. Is it correct 
to infer from the Presidents remarks last night 
tliat if the southerners involved should now 
agree to negotiate a permanent political settle- 
ment this would be satisfactory to the United 
States — to have it negotiated rather than on the 
basis of an election? 

A7nbassador Lodge: I think one of the things 
that comes into a negotiation about a political 
settlement would be the holding of an election. I 
believe elections are a real probability. So I 
don't see negotiations as a substitute for 
elections. 

I think the negotiators will negotiate how and 
when elections will be held, what arrangements 
there will be for supervising the elections, 
whether there will be an international super- 
visory commission or whether there will be 
mixed commissions to take care of each election 
separately. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you think that talk 
of reducing American troops in Viet-Nam wider 
certain conditions encourages the other side to 
negotiate in Paris? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, I don't think it 
need necessarily discourage them. 

Q. If they wait it out, wouldn't we have 
unilaterally withdrawn a good proportion of 
our forces there? 



JUNE 2, 1969 

350-547—69- 



465 



Ambassador Lodge: Well, I am not prepared 
to assume that if you just wait long enough, 
there is sroino; to be a helter-skelter American 
withdrawal. I just don't assume that. 

Q. Mr. Amlassador, how do you think tJie 
negotiations are going? 

Ambassador Lodge: I have never charac- 
terized them since I have been there. I have 
been asked that every week, and I try to think 
of one adjective that will characterize them, 
and I have never been able to do it. 

If we are successful, then the historian of the 
future, looking back at those periods, will say, 
"Well, at that time they were clarifying things 
and making it easier to get a solution." 

If we are not successful, then, of course, what 
has been going on will not look very impressive. 
It is very hard to characterize these negotiations 
in one word. 

Q. Do you regard the other side as being 
serious about these negotiations? 

Ambassador Lodge : Well, I thought that this 
proposal last Thursday could be called serious, 
yes. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, what indications have 
you had from the other side that this would be 
a propitious time for the United States to offer 
its proposals? 

Ambassador Lodge: Well, after the National 
Liberation Front made its proposal last Thurs- 
day and I had time to take it back to the office 
and analyze it and study it, the tliought that 
came to me, and in fact I think I said it to 
Mr. Habib, I said, "The greatest thing would 
be if we had a really comprehensive statement 
of the American position of at least correspond- 
ing scope, because then we would have the two 
things and there would be a basis for real solid 
meat-and-potatoes discussion about the real mat- 
ters of substance." 

I think that was Friday night I said that to 
Mr. Habib. Then Smiday morning we got word 
that the President was going to make this 
speech. So it was not just being clever. That was 
what we really thought before we knew the 
President was going to make the speech. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, how will you proceed 
when you go back to Paris? 

Ambassador Lodge : I intend tomorrow morn- 



ing to present to the Paris meeting all those 
parts in the President's speech which are perti- 
nent to the negotiations. Then I intend to make 
a speech of my own which will be a paraphrase 
of what the President said. I will ask them not 
to make a quick judgment but to think it over. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, tJie Presidenfs p^roposal 
on mutual' withdraioal mentioned also the with- 
drawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos. 
How many American advisers are there in 
Laos, and would tlieir withdrawal be part of 
this mutual loithdratocd? 

Ambassador Lodge: I think the provision in 
the President's speech uses a new terminology. 
It talks about non-South Vietnamese troops. 
That, of course, obviously covers all Americans. 

Q. In Laos, also? 

Ambassador Lodge: I think the withdrawal 
as it is stated in the President's speech covers all 
non-South Vietnamese troops. 

Q. Would that apply to American forces in 
Thailand? 

Ambassador Lodge: I think the speech was 
about Viet-Nam. 

Q. I realize that, sir, but I wonder, the North 
has cx2)ressed some concern about U.S. forces in 
Tlmiland. 

Ambassador Lodge: I would think that is a 
separate proposition. 

Q. What is basically wrong with the NLF 
plan? 

Ambassador Lodge: We have not finished our 
analysis of it yet. It was 3i/^ months being pre- 
pared, so we were told, so we are taking a little 
time to analyze it and we will conxment on it very 
carefully as time goes on. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, your predecessor has 
mentioned the fact that there was an oppor- 
tunity for secret talks with the other side earlier 
than this icas taken advantage of. Would you 
care to refute or respond to it? 

Ambassador Lodge: I didn't hear the ques- 
tion. 

Q. Ambassador [W. Averell] Harri^nan in- 
dicated that there was an opportunity set up 
when he departed for secret talks with the other 



466 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTIUJSTIN 



aide and this opportunity was not availed of. 
Would you cominent on that, please? 

Ainbassador Lodge: We have a rule that we 
don't talk about secret talks, and I am not going 
to say whether we have had them or whether we 
have not; but certainly there is an opportunity 
to have them. 

Q. Mr. Ambassador, coidd we understand 
that this address is a counterproposal to the 
NLF 10-point plan? 

Ambassador Lodge: No, I don't think so. As I 
understand it, it has been in contemplation a 
long, long time. Obviously a full-dress presen- 
tation by the President of the United States, 30 
minutes prime time on television, is a major 
event in terms of jDublic education and a great 
many other purposes. But it just so happens that 
it came along at a time wliich I think ought to be 
helpful to our operations. 

No, it should not be considered as a counter- 
proposal. It is not a counterproposal, but I think 
it does come along at a time which could be ex- 
tremely helpful, assuming the other side really 
wants to do some serious talking. 

Q. We know that General \Creighton W.] 
Abrams was put under instructions in Novem- 
ber to heep tlie maxirmnn military pressure on 
the other side. Have his orders changed in that 
regard, the orders to General Abrams to keep the 
7naximum military pressure on the other side? 

Ambassador Lodge: I don't know what his 
orders are. 

Q. What are we doing to reduce the level of 
violence on the ground in South Viet-Nani? 

Ambassador Lodge: If you have troop with- 
drawal, it certainly ought to lead to a reduction 
of the level of violence, I should think. 

Q. Do I understand your previous answer to 
mean that our proposal of last night in the 
Presidents speech includes xoithdrawal of 
American advisers from Laos, if the agreement 
is accepted? 

Ambassador Lodge: No, I did not go into that 
in much detail. What I said was that with- 
drawal in the President's speech applies to non- 
South Vietnamese forces. That is a new phrase 
that I have never seen used before, and ob- 
viously that covers Americans. 

The press : Thank you. 



17th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made by 
Auibassador Henry Cabot Lodge at the 17th 
plenary session of the neio meetings at Paris on 
May 16. 

Press release 121 dated May 16 

Ladies and gentlemen: Last Wednesday 
evening the President of the United States 
made a proposal for peace — a proposal which 
can end the fighting in Viet-Nam and establish 
peace on a just and durable basis. 

President Nixon stated the essential objective 
of the United States in clear and simple terms. 
We seek the opiDortunity, he said, for the South 
Vietnamese people to detei'mine their own 
political future without outside interference. 

Several other points are clear. In the Presi- 
dent's words, and I quote : 

- — We seek no bases in Viet-Nam. 

— We Insist on no military ties. 

— We are willing to agree to neutrality if that is 
what the South Vietnamese people freely choose. 

— We believe there should be an opportunity for full 
participation in the political life of South Viet-Nam 
by all political elements that are prepared to do so 
without the use of force or intimidation. 

— We are prepared to accept any government in 
South Viet-Nam that results from the free choice of 
the South Vietnamese people themselves. 

— We have no intention of imposing any form of 
government upon the people of South Viet-Nam, nor 
will we be a party to such coercion. 

— We have no objection to reunification, if that 
turns out to be what the people of South Viet-Nam 
and the people of North Viet-Nam want ; we ask only 
that the decision reflect the free choice of the people 
concerned. 

Let me now smn up President Nixon's 
further words, as follows : 

In pursuing this limited objective, we insist 
on no rigid diplomatic formula. Peace can be 
achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. Or 
it could be achieved by an informal under- 
standing, provided that the understanding is 
clear and that there are adequate assurances 
that it would be observed. As the President 
said: "Peace on paper is not as important as 
peace in fact." 

A settlement that will permit the South 
Vietnamese people to determine freely their 
own political future must be based on certain 
princii^les. 



JUNE 2, 1969 



467 



First, such a settlement will require the with- 
drawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces 
from South Viet-Nam. Second, it will require 
procedures for political choice that give each 
significant groujj in South Viet-Nam a real op- 
portunity to participate in the political life of 
the nation. 

We recognize that political issues should be 
discussed along with the military issues and that 
there must be a political settlement in South 
Viet-Nam. 

President Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
has gone far, President Nixon said, toward 
opening the way to a political settlement. He 
has publicly declared liis government's willmg- 
ness to discuss a political solution with the 
National Liberation Front and has offered free 
elections. It was a reasonable offer that could 
lead to a settlement. As the South Vietnamese 
Government has offered to talk without precon- 
ditions, we believe that your side should also be 
willing to talk without prior conditions. 

The Government of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam recognizes, as we do, that a settlement 
must permit all persons and groups that are 
prepared to renounce the use of force to par- 
ticipate freely in the political life of South 
Viet-Nam. To be effective, such a settlement 
would require a process that would allow the 
South Vietnamese people to express their choice 
and a guarantee that this process would be fair. 

We do not insist on a particular form of 
guarantee. The important thing is that guaran- 
tees should have the confidence of the South 
Vietnamese people and that they should be 
broad enough and strong enough to protect the 
interests of all major South Vietnamese groups. 

This, then, is the outline of President Nixon's 
speech regarding the settlement we seek to nego- 
tiate at these Paris meetings. Its basic terms 
are simple: mutual withdrawal of non-South 
Vietnamese forces from South Viet-Nam and 
free choice for the people of South Viet-Nam. 

On the instructions of the President of the 
United States, I now present the following 
measures, which we believe are consistent with 
the principles of all the parties. These proposals 
are made on the basis of full consultation with 
the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

Proposals fob Peace 

— As soon as agreement can be reached, all non- 
South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals 
from South Viet-Nam. 

■ — Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, 



4G8 



the major portions of all U.S., Allied, and other non- 
South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the 
end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., Allied, 
and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move 
into designated base areas and would not engage in 
combat operations. 

— The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would move 
to complete their withdrawals as the remaining North 
Vietname.se forces were withdrawn and returned to 
North Viet-Nam. 

— An international supervisory body, acceptable to 
both sides, would be created for the purpose of verify- 
ing withdrawals and for any other purposes agreed 
upon between the two sides. 

— This international body would begin operating in 
accordance with an agreed timetable and would par- 
ticipate in arranging supervised cease-fires. 

— As soon as possible after the international body 
was functioning, elections would be held under agreed 
procedures and under the supervision of the inter- 
national body. 

— Arrangements would be made for the earliest pos- 
sible release of prisoners of war on both sides. 

— All parties would agree to observe the Geneva 
accords of 19.54 regarding Viet-Nam and Cambodia 
and the Laos accords of 1962. 

President Nixon further declared that we be- 
lieve this proposal for peace is realistic and 
takes account of the legitimate interests of all 
concerned. It is consistent with President 
Thieu's six points. It can accommodate various 
programs put forth by your side. We and the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam are 
prepared to discuss it in detail with your side. 

We are not offering these proposals on a take- 
it-or-leave-it basis. We are willing to consider 
other approaches consistent with our principles. 
We are willing to talk about anybody's pro- 
gram — Hanoi's four points, the NLF's 10 
points — provided it can be made consistent with 
the few basic principles we have set forth. 

The President stated in addition that, despite 
our disagreement with several of its points, we 
welcome the fact that the NLF has put forward 
its first comprehensive program. We are con- 
tinumg to study it closely, in full consultation 
with our allies. In future meetings, we expect 
to address the 10 points and to comment upon 
each individual issue, just as we hope you wUl 
address the elements of our position. With re- 
gard to the internal political issues raised in the 
10 i^oints, we suggest that you enter into close 
discussions with the delegation of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam, as President Thieu offered to do 
in March this year. 

But we cannot ignore the fact that imme- 
diately after your side made this offer, you 
stepped up the scale of your military attacks in 
South Viet-Nam. You carried out systematic 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIX 



I 



acts of terrorism in a number of cities, causing 
indiscriminate and senseless killing and woxind- 
ing of civilians; and as I pointed out at our 
16th plenary session, we have evidence that 
plans are laid and preparations underway for 
further increases in military and terrorist op- 
erations by your side. 

If your side wants peace, that is not the way 
to get it. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the 
United States has set forth proposals for peace 
which are generous in their terms. We have 
indicated our willingness to consider other 
proposals. 

We are being flexible and reasonable. But as 
President Nixon said on May 14: "No greater 
mistake could be made than to confuse flexibil- 
ity with weakness or being reasonable with lack 
of resolution." 

Ladies and gentlemen, delay serves no one's 
interest. Let us act now to bring the war in 
Viet-Nam to an end. 

We ask you not to answer hastily and to think 
over our proposal just as we are thinking about 
yours. 



U.S. Extends Condolences on Death 
of President Husain of India 

President Zakir Husain of India died May 3. 
Following are texts of messages from President 
Nixon to Acting President V. V. Giri and to 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and from Secre- 
tary Rogers to Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh. 

Message From President Nixon 
to Acting President Giri 

Mat 3, 1969 

V. V. Gmi 

Acting President of India 

Dear Mr. PREsroENT : All Americans join me 
in sending you and the people of India our deep 
sympathy for your great loss. We mourn with 
you on this sad occasion. Zakir Husain was a 
man of courage and integrity whose loss will be 
long felt. 

Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement 
on Leases on New Chancery Sites 

Department Statement ^ 

An agreement covering long-term leases on 
new chancery sites here and in Moscow was 
signed this morning [May 16] in Moscow. Am- 
bassador [Jacob D.] Beam signed for our side; 
Deputy Foreign Minister N. Firyubin for the 
Soviet side. The i^roperties will be leased free of 
charge for an 85-year period. Our property will 
consist of the land on which the Ambassador's 
l^resent residence — Spaso House — stands, plus a 
site bordering Konyushkovskaya Street, located 
between the present chancery and the Moscow 
River. We will continue to pay rent on Spaso 
House. In exchange, we will be leasing to the 
Soviets the area f onnerly occupied by the Moimt 
Alto Veterans Hospital. 



'Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Carl Bartcb on May 16. 



Message From President Nixon 
to Prime Minister Gandhi 

May 4, 1969 
India has lost a great statesman. We mourn 
the death of Zakir Husain, a man admired by 
all for his service to humanity. You and your 
people have my deepest sympathy in this time 
of sadness. 

Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 

Message From Secretary Rogers 
to Foreign Minister Singh 

Mat 3, 1969 

A great leader has been lost to India and to 
the world with the passing of Zakir Husain. The 
United States mourns the loss of a dear friend. 
My colleagues join me in sending our deep 
sympathy on this sad occasion. 
Sincerely, 

William P. Rogers 



JUNE 2, 1969 



469 



Nelson Rockefeller Begins Mission to Latin America 



Following are remarks made to news corres- 
pondents hy President Nixon and Governor Nel- 
son Rockefeller at Key Biscayne, Fla., on 
May 11, together with the names of the advisers 
accomjMnying Governor Rockefeller on his 
Presidential mission to Latin America. 



REMARKS TO NEWS CORRESPONDENTS 

White House press release (Key Biscayne, Fla.) dated May 11 

President Nixon 

Ladies and gentlemen : Governor Eockefeller 
and members of his party, Mrs. Rockefeller, and 
others have stopped here at Key Biscayne on the 
first leg of the continental tour they are taking 
through Latin America. 

They will be in Mexico for a late luncheon a 
few hours from now and then will go to all of 
the coimtries in Central America before return- 
ing to Washington and to New York. After that 
there will be several other trips to Latin 
America over the next 3 to 4 months, which the 
Governor will be glad to describe. 

As I have indicated previously, I consider 
this to be one of the most vitally important mis- 
sions ever undertaken by an independent group 
in behalf of the Govermnent of the United 
States.i 

If j'ou look at the members of the Governor's 
party, some of whom are standing here with 
us— Mr. Watson, Mr. Woods, and others — it is 
a group of experts which has never been equaled 
in terms of qualifications and the broad base 
of experience. It is a group which is going to 
Latin America not for the purpose of studying 
the problem — as the Governor was saying to me 
a few moments ago, and he is an expert in this 
field because he first visited Latin America 35 or 
40 years ago, Latin America has been studied 
over the years and all kinds of study recom- 



' For a st.atcment by Tresident Nixon on Feb. 17, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 10, 1069, p. 198. 



mendations have been made— but this has the 
unusual and, I think, very necessary purpose of 
listening to the leaders of Latin America and 
coming back to Washington and making recom- 
mendations for new directions and new policies. 

The group goes with no preconceived preju- 
dices against existing programs, but it has an 
open mind with regard to new approaches. 

The Governor now will be glad to answer any 
questions, insofar as he can, on the mission. I 
want to say that we are grateful that he could 
take the time to make this trip at this point. 
It will be vitally important to not only the new 
relations and better relationship between the 
United States and our friends in Latin America 
but toward developing new policy directions 
in this critical area of the world. 

Governor Rockefeller 

Thank you very much, Mr. President. 

I would just like to say that all of us in this 
mission are deeply indebted to you for the 
opportunity of going and listening and getting 
the benefit of experience and wisdom and 
sophisticated judgment of the leaders in gov- 
ernment and in private life in the Western 
Hemisphere as to how we can in this country 
more effectively assist in the achievement of our 
common goals. 

We are a group who are deeply devoted to the 
concept of Western Hemisphere solidarity — 
who have great respect and affection for the 
jieoples of the various countries — and who have 
had long association in one form or another. I 
think collectively we should be able to bring 
back and report the point of view, experience, 
and recommendations of the leaders through- 
out this hemisphere. 

Q. Governor, the State Department seems to 
have lieen reasonably well excluded from this 
whole mission. Is that purposeftil? What is the 
liaison with the State Department? 

Governor Rockefeller: The State Depart- 
ment has had, as you know — and I was in it 



470 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIJJITIN 



once— long years of association and contact. 
What the President was anxious to get is a 
fresh point of view not committed to any par- 
ticular position on any particular issue, but to 
get men and women who could go there and to 
whom the heads of state and the leaders in these 
countries could speak in utter frankness — not 
just pleasantries but the hard realities as they 
see them — and sometimes it is a little difficult if 
you are having to say to an ongoing associate 
things which may not be what he would like to 
hear. 

So I think this is a very constructive ap- 
proach. It is not trying to undermine the De- 
partment. We are working very closely with 
them. We have all been briefed by them. But 
it is just an opportunity for the heads of state 
and the leaders to speak their minds directly, 
in a sense, to the President of the United States. 

Q. Do you foresee any hind of changing of 
the Alliance for Progress as a result of your 
mission? 

Governor Rockefeller: I have absolutely no 
preconceived ideas on anything. Wliat all of us 
are trying to do in the different areas is to get 
the reactions of our friends, their analysis and 
their recommendations — the friends in the 
other countries. Then we will be reporters back 
to the President. 

Q. Governor^ what might they tell you that 
they wouldrCt tell our amhassadors in those 
countries? 

Governor Rockefeller : Well, I suppose the 
things they feel the Ambassador wouldn't like 
to hear and therefore haven't said to him in the 
past. 

Q. Governor, you have had a lot of experience 
in Latin America. As you say, you have teen 
there many times; you know what the problems 
are. Basically, what do you think is wrong with 
our Alliance for Progress and our whole ap- 
proach to Latin America that it has not been a 
success? 

Governor Rockefeller: I have not said I 
thought anything was wrong. I am just taking 
a mission from the President to listen to what 
the Latins feel and their reactions. They are a 
very able, intelligent, and sophisticated group. 
Believe me, to survive in one of those small 
countries you have to be able, because the eco- 
nomic conditions, the problems which they face. 



their dependency on the outside world is very 
great. Therefore, they live under diificult 
circumstances. 

We want to know how they see these prob- 
lems and what they feel and what suggestions 
they have, based on their experience. 

Q. Governor, you undertook a very similar 
trip 30 years ago — Kennedy, Stevenson, the 
President himself — do you kind of feel these 
trips are kind of futile ? 

Governor RockefelUr: I am not sure what you 
are referring to as 30 years ago. 

Q. 1939, lohsn you went on a mission and re- 
ported to President Roosevelt. 

Governor Rockefeller: I went on a private 
visit for 3 months, but it was not an official visit. 
I was so disturbed by what I saw that a group 
of us who had been traveling on this trip pre- 
pared a memorandum for the President. 

As a result of that memorandum, he created 
the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs. Failing anyone else to head it up, I 
ended up, which is often what happens if you 
make a suggestion about doing something. Then 
people come back and say, "Well, now, why 
don't you undertake it ?" 

Q. Does this foresee your coming into the 
Government? 

Governor Rockefeller: No, ma'am. This is a 
higher level. 

Q. Governor Rockefeller, one of ths criticisms 
raised in advance of your trip is that there loon't 
be time, there aren't procedures, for hearing 
from any Latins other than those in the estab- 
lishment, those high in government, those among 
the moneyed. Is that a fair criticism? 

Governor Rockefeller: No, I really don't 
think it is. I will say why. I am very fortunate 
that with us on this trip are about 20 men and 
women of outstanding ability and experience. 
For instance, right here with me at this reunion 
today is Mr. George Woods, who was President 
of the World Bank, appointed by President 
Kennedy, served under President Jolmson, re- 
signed 2 years ago. He has, probably, as inti- 
mate a knowledge of the fiscal problems of these 
countries and the possibilities for development 
through outside capital as anyone. He comes 
with an open mind to update his experience and 
to listen to the leaders in that field. 



JTDNE 2. 1969 



471 



Mr. Watson, Mr. Arthur Watson, is here, who 
is president of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. He has had a long association in the 
business field around the world, and he will be 
able to talk to the businessmen of the Western 
Hemisphere, as well as the American business- 
men down there, to get their point of view and 
their feelings on how there can be an accelerated 
flow of capital. Both fields are essential, public 
and private. 

Then in all fields, whether it is in housing, 
whether it is in education, whether it is in public 
healtli, we have people who are going, who will 
be going and talking. Let's say in the field of 
intellectuals, which is a very important factor 
in Latin America. We have a gentleman there, 
Dave Bronheim [director, Center for Inter- 
American Eelations, New York, N.Y.] , who will 
be visiting with leading intellectuals, leaders in 
various groups. 

I think that you will find that even tliough 
the time is short, by carefully planned program- 
ing in advance, meetings set up, that we are 
going to cover a very wide range. It is equivalent 
to about 20 days in each country, because we 
have 20 people in different areas who will be 
spending a full day visiting with covmterparts. 

Q. Governor, lohere does Cuba -fit into this 
survey of inter-American relations? 

Governor RocJiefeUer: As you know, they 
have taken actions which, according to the Or- 
ganization of American States — while Cuba is 
still a member — kept the present government 
from participation. Therefore, they are not part 
of the present structure. 

Q. Governor, you spent quite a hit of time 
with the President this morning. Can you give 
us an idea of what particular interests he had 
and what particular instrtictioTis he gave you 
regarding the trip? 

Governor Rockefeller: The President has 
been deeply interested in Latin America and the 
various countries. He is one of the few Presi- 
dents who has visited all of the countries once, 
and many of them two or three times, starting 
in 1940. So he has had a long association, a deep 
personal interest, an open mind, as to how there 
are things that may be changed that would make 
it possible for us to be more helpful and more 
effective in our search for common objectives, 
common goals. These are the questions we dis- 
cussed this morning. 



LIST OF ADVISERS 

White House press release (Key Biscay ne, Fla.) dated May 8 

Finance: George D. Woods, former President of the 
World Bank, now director and consultant to the 
First Boston Corp. ; and Claris Reynolds, professor 
of economics, Stanford University 

Economics: William Butler, vice president and econo- 
mist, Chase Manhattan Bank 

Business: Arthur K. Watson, president, IBM World 
Trade Corp., and president. International Chamber 
of Commerce 

Counselor of the mission: James M. Cannon, special 
assistant to the Governor 

Agriculture: Emil M. Mrak, chancellor, University of 
California at Davis; and Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., 
vice president of the Agricultural Development Coun- 
cil, Inc. 

Education: Samuel B. Gould, chancellor. State Univer- 
sity of New York; and Kenneth Holland, president, 
Institute of International Education 

Science and technology : Detlev W. Bronk, president 
emeritus. Rockefeller University, former President 
of the National Academy of Sciences 

Public health: Harold B. Gotaas, dean of the Techno- 
logical Institute of Northwestern University ; and 
Kenneth Riland, chief physician, U.S. Steel Corp. ; 
Public Health Council, State of New York 

Military affairs: Gen. Robert W. Porter, Jr., former 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command 

Cultural affairs: Thomas P. Hoving, director. Metro- 
politan Museum of Art, New York, N.Y. ; and Robert 
Goldwater, director, Museum of Primitive Art, New 
York, N.Y. 

Vrian affairs: Alan Miller, urbanist. Commissioner of 
Mental Hygiene for New York State; and Professor 
Walter Harris, Yale School of Art and Architecture 

Women's group: Mrs. Flo Kampmann, chief of proto- 
col for the world's fair, Texas, former Republican 
National Committeewoman from Texas 

Agency for International Development: Leroy S. 
Wehrle, former head of AID in Viet-Nam, currently 
with Harvard Development Center; and Kenneth 
Melvin Rabin, career AID oflScial 



United States and Peru Hold 
Round of Talks at Washington 

Department Statement ^ 

The talks between the Peruvian special com- 
mission, headed by Gen. Marco Fernandez Baca, 
and the United States team, headed by Ambas- 
sador John Irwin, recessed yesterday [May 14] .^ 
The talks may resume in Lima after the two 



' Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Carl Bartch on May 1.5. 

° For a Department statement of Apr. 25, see 
Bulletin of May 12, 1969, p. 400. 



472 



DEPARTMEN'T OF STATE BULIiETINr 



teams report the results of the talks to their 
respective Governments. 

The atmosphere of cordiality and frankness 
continued throughout the conversations. Al- 
though no substantive agreements liave been 
reached, issues have been clarified and ideas 
raised for consideration by the two Govern- 
ments. 

As the Peruvians did in Lima with Ambas- 
sador Irwin, Department of State officials, dur- 
ing talks here, had an opportunity to make a 
full presentation of the United States position 
on territorial waters and fishing. 

Therefore, in our opinion, the sessions have 
served a useful purpose. The timing of any 
resumption of the talks will, of course, be set 
by the two Governments through normal dip- 
lomatic channels. 

Ambassador Irwin has indicated his willing- 
ness to continue to lead the U.S. representatives 
in any further conversations with Peruvian 
authorities. The Peruvian team plans to depart 
from Washington this evening and return 
directly to Lima. 



Israel Pays Compensation Claimed 
for Men Injured on U.S.S. Liberty 

Press release 116 dated May 13 

On April 28, the United States Government 
received $3,566,457 from the Government of 
Israel in settlement of certain claims arising out 
of the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty on June 8, 
1967. The amount received represents payment 
in full of the following United States claims : 

A. 164 claims totaling $3,452,275 on behalf 
of the members of the crew of the U.S.S. Liberty 
who were injured in the attack ; 

B. A claim for $92,437 for expenses incurred 
by the United States Government in providing 
medical treatment to the injured men; 

C. A claim for $21,745 for expenses incurred 
by the United States Government in reimburs- 
ing members of the crew of the U.S.S. Liberty 
for personal property damaged or destroyed in 
the attack. 

Distribution to the injured men of funds re- 
ceived in settlement of their claims is now in 
process and will be completed in a few weeks. 

On May 31, 1968, the Government of Israel 



paid in full claims totaling $3,323,500 on behalf 
of the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. 
Tlie only imsettled claim arising out of the 
attack on the U.S.S. Liberty is the claim for 
damage to the ship, which remains under 
discussion. 



THE CONGRESS 



Future U.S. Relations 
With Latin America 

Statement by Charles A. Meyer 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs^ 

I am pleased to appear before you to share 
my thoughts about future United States rela- 
tions with our Latin American neighbors. As 
you know, the administration is, as is tliis com- 
mittee, assessing our experience and policies of 
the last decade, reexamining our assumptions, 
and developing the policy framework in which 
our relations and our cooperative efforts with 
the hemisphere will evolve in the decade ahead. 
I therefore am not yet able to give you what I 
know you would like and are anxiously await- 
ing ; that is, a clear definitive statement of the 
administration's policies and program priorities 
toward Latin America for the years ahead. This 
is now being worked out. To this end, and at 
the President's request. Governor Kockef eller is 
beginning discussions with our colleagues in 
Latin America as to how we and they can more 
effectively work together in our common interest 
over the years ahead. His report and recom- 
mendations will, of course, be given great 
weight by the President in charting the course 
of our future policies. 

I would like to concur in the views expressed 
before this committee that the past decade has 
seen many quite remarkable changes in the 
hemisphere and that within the framework of 
the Alliance for Progress our sister Republics 
have made notable gains in many areas. There 



' Made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
May 8 (press release 108) . 



JUNE 2, 1969 



473 



is now, for example, wide recognition that the 
energies, talents, and resources available to the 
hemisphere must be even more vigorously di- 
rected toward accelerated development. There 
are now a number of increasingly effective 
multilateral and bilateral mechanisms concen- 
trating and coordinating their efforts and re- 
sources upon development. Much has been done 
to create the climate, train the talent, and to 
tool up for the demands of the decade ahead. 
But much remains to be done; the greatest 
challenges — ^and opportunities — are still ahead. 
We and our Latin American friends know now 
that the dimensions of development are enor- 
mous and that the neglect of centuries cannot be 
solved within one or two decades. 

We must also recognize that Latin American 
countries, as proud independent sovereignties, 
will at times express and perceive certain of 
their interests in ways which do not coincide 
with our own. As the forces of change accelerate 
within the hemisphere, we can anticipate from 
time to time that differences will appear and 
at times may assume disturbing proportions. It 
is imperative that we and they recognize the 
likelihood of these divergencies, attempt to 
avoid them through mutually conciliatory ef- 
forts, and at all times place them in the per- 
spective of our overriding mutual interests in 
working together on the broad range of com- 
mon interests which bind us together. 

We must keep reminding ourselves that the 
future of Latin America is and must remain 
in Latin American hands. Our wealthy and 
powerful country cannot help but be a prom- 
inent force in the hemisphere simply in terms 
of what we buy from and sell to Latin America, 
how much we invest, the extent to which we 
share our technology, and the degree to which 
we assist in the hemisphere's development 
through our aid programs. At the heart of 
the matter for the future, however, is the vigor 
and courage with which the Latin American 
govei-nments themselves address their own prob- 
lems of development and regional cooperation. 
Because of our great size and power we must 
on our part be increasingly sensitive to assure 
that our weight falls — and is recognized in Latin 
America as falling — on the side of supporting 
their development aspirations and efforts. We 
can significantly assist these efforts and support 
their aspirations. We can not and will not, how- 



ever, presume to make the hard choices for our 
sister countries about the political systems they 
will follow or the priorities and resources which 
they themselves will assign to their development 
needs. Our willingness to help, where they seek 
it and can effectively use it in conjunction with 
their own efforts, should be clear. For the future, 
then, I look forward to United States constancy 
in supporting Latin American drives to develop- 
ment, as well as increased United States recog- 
nition of the right of the Latin countries to 
disagree with us where they feel their interests 
compel them to do so. Dissent among friends 
is not disaster, and tolerance of differences is no 
tragedy. 

We in the United States must temper our 
expectations about progress and development in 
the hemisphere with far more realism than we 
have exercised in the past. Unrealistic expecta- 
tions inevitably yield bitter disappointment. 
Thus, while the many solid achievements of the 
past decade have not measured up to the results 
anticipated by many, they cannot be said to 
have disappointed realistic expectations. Un- 
fortunately, and unreasonably, there appears to 
be a strong inclination in this country to meas- 
ure hemisphere performance to date against the 
unrealistic expectations of the past and gloomily 
to write off the future. This we must avoid, both 
in the interests of our neighbors to the south 
and in our own interests. A keynote of future 
LT.S. policies must be realism — not an attitude 
affected by frustration and pessimism, but one 
in which we firmly face the complex challenges 
of the future on the basis of a hardheaded assess- 
ment of the past. I am confident that both we 
and our Latin friends will face the common 
tasks of tomorrow with the candor, confidence, 
and cooperation indispensable to good 
neighbors. 

For example, considerable sophistication has 
evolved in our assistance programs, such that 
heavy future concentration can, as a practical 
matter, now be given to the key agriculture and 
education sectors. Although we and the Latin 
countries have learned a great deal in the last 
decade about how to cooperate in these very 
complicated sectors, the progress which we can 
reasonably anticipate will occur will be gradual 
and inevitably will be beset with difficulties. 
Rather than despairing because the race has not 
been won, however, it is important for us to 
recognize that it has barely begun to be run. 



474 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TtTTT.T.THTTV 



President Sends Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

The White House, May 6, 1969. 
To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit 
herewith a certified copy of the Vienna Conven- 
tion on Consular Relations and a certified copy 
of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Com- 
pulsoi-y Settlement of Disputes, signed at 
Vienna under date of April 24, 1963. The Con- 
vention and Protocol entered into foixje on 
March 19, 1967. 

I transmit also, for the mformation of the 
Senate, the report which the Secretary of State 
has addressed to me in regard to the matter, to- 
gether with the enclosures thereto. 

The convention is the first agreement envisag- 
ing the regulation of consular relations on a 
world-wide basis and represents the culmination 
of eight years of work. Based on a draft con- 
vention prepared by the International Law 
Commission, it was concluded at a United Na- 
tions Conference of 92 States, one of a series of 
Conferences having the aim, in the words of the 
United Nations Charter, of "encouraging the 
progressive development of international law 
and its codification". A previous United Na- 
tions Conference in the series formulated the 
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela- 
tions, which was approved by the Senate on 
September 14, 1965. 

Account has been taken of the interests and 
views of new and old nations and of nations with 
varied political and economic systems in the 
codification and development of consular law 
as contained in the present Convention, and the 
Convention is considered to be an important 
contribution to friendly relations between 
States. I recommend that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to the Convention 
and Protocol submitted herewith and give its 
advice and consent to their ratification. 

RiCHAKD NiXON 



TREATY INFORMATION 



'Transmitted on May 8 (White House press release 
dated May 5) ; also printed as S. Ex. E, 91st Cong., 1st 
sess., which includes the texts of the convention and 
optional protocol, as well as the report of the Secretary 
of State. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14. 1963.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 

1969. 
Signature: Niger, April 14, 1969. 

Convention on the international recognition of rights 
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered 
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847. 
Adherence deposited: Lebanon, April 11, 1969. 

Conservation 

Convention on nature protection and wildlife preserva- 
tion in the Western Hemisphere, with annex. Done 
at the Pan American Union October 12, 1940. Entered 
into force April 30, 1942, 56 Stat. 1354. 
Signature and ratification deposited: Trinidad and 
Tobago, April 24, 1969. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Sep- 
tember 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. 
TIAS 3324. 

Protocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright Con- 
vention concerning the application of that conven- 
tion to the works of stateless persons and refugees. 
Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into 
force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 

Protocol 2 annexed to the Universal Copyright Conven- 
tion concerning the application of that convention to 
the works of certain international organizations. 
Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into 
force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 

Protocol 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Conven- 
tion concerning the effective date of instruments of 
ratification or acceptance of or accession to that 
Convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. 
Entered into force August 19, 1954 ; for the United 
States, December 6, 1954. TIAS 3324. 
Accession deposited: Tunisia, March 19, 1969. 

Grains 

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. 
Open for signature at Washington October 15 
through November 30, 1967. Entered into force 
July 1, 1968. TIAS 6537. 

Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention deposited: 
Ecuador, May 14, 1969. 

Organization of American States 

Protocol of amendment to the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States (TIAS 2361). Signed at 
Buenos Aires February 27, 1967.' 
Ratification deposited: Panama, April 29, 1969. 



' Not in force. 



JUNE 2, 1969 



475 



Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 19&4. Entered 
Into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Cuba, February 27, 1969; 
Jamaica, November 8, 1968; Malaysia, Febru- 
ary 22, 1909. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969." 

Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic (with 
reservations), April 21, 1969. 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement authorizing temporary additional diversion 
for power purposes of water flowing over American 
FaUs at Niagara. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington March 21, 1969. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 13, 
1969. 

Japan 

Agreement concerning the trust territory of the Pacific 
Islands, with exchanges of notes. Signed at Tokyo 
April 18, 1969. Enters into force on the date of receipt 
by the United States of a note from Japan stating 
that Japan has approved the agreement in accord- 
ance with its legal procedures. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



' Not in force for the United States. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on May 12 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Shelby Davis to be Ambassador to Switzerland. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release 
dated April 17. ) 

Guilford Dudley, Jr., to be Ambassador to Denmark. 
( For biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 128 dated May 22.) 

Robert Ellsworth to be U.S. Permanent Representa- 
tive on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated April 12. ) 

Fred L. Hadsel to be Ambassador to the Somali 
Republic. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release 124 dated May 19.) 

Malcolm Toon to be Ambassador to the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated April 19. ) 



Designations 

Christopher Van HoUen as Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, effective 
May 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State 
press release dated May 8.) 



476 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX Jum 2, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1662 



Asia. Van HoUen designated Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs 476 

Congress 

Confirmations (Davis, Dudley, Ellsworth, Had- 
sel. Toon) 476 

Future U.S. Relations With Latin America 

(Meyer) 473 

President Sends Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 475 

Czechoslovakia. Toon confirmed as Ambassa- 
dor 476 

Denmark. Dudley confirmed as Ambassador . . 476 

Department and Foreign Service 
Confirmations (Davis, Dudley, Ellsworth, Had- 

sel. Toon) 476 

Designations (Van Hollen) 476 

India. U.S. Extends Condolences on Death of 
President Husain of India (Nixon, Rogers) . 469 

Israel. Israel Pays Compensation Claimed for 
Men Injured on U.S.S. Liberty 473 

Latin America 

Future U.S. Relations With Latin America 

(Meyer) 473 

Nelson Rockefeller Begins Mission to Latin 
America (Nixon, Rockefeller) 470 

Near East. Van Hollen designated Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs 476 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ellsworth 
confirmed as U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the NATO Council 476 

Peru. United States and Peru Hold Round of 
Talks at Washington (Department state- 
ment) 472 

Presidential Documents 

Ambassador Lodge Discusses the Paris Peace 

Talks 465 

Nelson Rockefeller Begins Mission to Latin 

America 470 

Peace in Viet-Nam 457 

President Sends Vienna Convention on Consular 

Relations to the Senate 475 

U.S. Extends Condolences on Death of President 

Husain of India 469 

Somali Republic. Iladsel confirmed as Am- 
bassador 476 

Switzerland. Davis confirmed as Ambassador . 476 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 475 

President Sends Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon) 475 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Leases on 
New Chancery Sites 469 



U.S.SJR. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on 

Leases on New Chancery Sites 469 

Viet-Nam 

Ambassador Lodge Discusses the Paris Peace 

Talks (Nixon, Lodge) 465 

Peace in Viet-Nam (Nixon) 457 

Secretary Rogers Visits Viet-Nam (transcripts 

of news conferences) 461 

17th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 467 

Name Index 

Davis, Shelby 470 

Dudley, Guilford. Jr 476 

Ellsworth, Robert 476 

Hadsel, Fred L 476 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 465,467 

Jleyer, Charles A 473 

Nixon, President 457, 465, 469, 470, 475 

Rockefeller, Nelson 470 

Rogers, Secretary 461,469 

Toon, Malcolm 476 

Van HoUen, Christopher 476 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: May 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 

Release issued prior to May 12 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 108 of May 8. 

Subject 

Crowe sworn in as Amba.ssador to 
Norway (biographic details). 

IJC report on survey of Red River 
pollution. 

DePalma: "The United Nations— 
Up, Down, or Sideways?" 

Payment of U.S.S. Liberty claims. 

Rogers : statement at Los Angeles, 
May 12. 

Rogers : news conference at Saigon, 
May 14. 

Access by researchers to foreign 
policy records for 1939-41. 

Johnson : "The Pacific Basin Poten- 
tial." 

Lodge: 17th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

Program for visit of King Baudouin 
I of Belgium. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



No. 


Date 


*113 


5/12 


tll4 


5/12 


tll5 


5/12 


116 

117 


5/13 
5/13 


118 


5/14 


tll9 


5/15 


tl20 


5/16 


121 


5/16 


*122 


5/16 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 



i 




AVT O 

20 YEARS OF PEACE 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1563 




June 9, 1969 



SEATO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS AT BANGKOK 

Statement by Secretary Rogers and Text of Communique lfl7 

SEVEN ASIAN AND PACIFIC NATIONS EXAMINE 

SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA 

Text of Com,muniqae 1^81 

THE PACIFIC BASIN POTENTIAL 

hy Under Secretary Johnson Ji88 

THE UNITED NATIONS— UP, DOWN, OR SIDEWAYS? 

iy Assistant Secretary DePalma A93 „ , „ . ,. , ., 
^ ^ -T- Boston Public Library 

Superintendent of Documents 



For index see inside back cover 



JUN 2 6 1969 
DEPOSITORY 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN I 



Vol. LX, No. 1563 
June 9, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Oovemment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

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Note: Contents of tbls publication are not 

copyrighted and Items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Ouide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tneekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
tcith information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as u>ell as special 
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States is or may become a party 
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national relations are listed currently. 



SEATO Council of Ministers Meets at Bangkok 



The Council of Ministers of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization tnet at Bangkok^ 
Thailand^ May W-21. Following is a statement 
made by Secretary Rogers at the opening ses- 
sion on May 20, together with the text of the 
final comrminique issued at the close of the meet- 
ing on May 21. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Press release 125 dated May 20 

I am glad for this opportunity to play a 
part in the 14th meeting of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization and to meet and exchange 
views with the members of this alliance. This 
is particularly so because it comes so soon after 
President Nixon took office. 

Let me begin by stressing that the interest of 
the United States in Asia is not secondary to 
our interest in any other areas of the world. By 
reason of geography, resources, and common in- 
terests, the United States is a member of the 
Pacific community. That is why the United 
States is a member and a strong supporter of 
SEATO. 

There have, of course, been profound changes 
in the trends of Asian affairs since the Pacific 
Charter was signed a decade and a half ago. 

Those were dark days. Some governments in 
the area were insecure and unstable. Most na- 
tional economies were beset by the problems of 
recovering from the Second "World War, of 
colonialism, of administrative inexperience. 
Traditional rivalries darkened relations be- 
tween neighboring states. The prospects seemed 
bleak; people were without much hope. 

Over it all hung a contagious fear that totali- 
tarian communism — thrusting outward from 
mainland China — would become an irresistible 
political force in Asia. 

Since SEATO was first established there has 
been an extraordinary reversal in outlook. 

Govenmients are more stable and more re- 
sponsive to the will and the needs of their peo- 



ple. Cooperation has increased, as narrow 
nationalism has yielded to an emerging spirit 
of regionalism. 

Some of the most rapidly developing coun- 
tries in the world today are foimd in East Asia. 
Industrialization is underway; rural reform is 
moving forward; communications are improv- 
ing; goods and ideas flow more freely across 
national frontiers. 

These developments are still in an early stage 
and will have to be nourished carefully. But 
these are the encouraging new trends. They are 
supported by the new organizations in which 
the nations of Asia are developing the habits 
of international cooperation for the common 
good. These trends are sustained by a new vital- 
ity which bespeaks the growing confidence of 
governments and peoples that they can, in fact, 
determme their own futures. 

Meanwhile, the once seemingly irreversible 
tide of Asian communism is being blocked by 
the rising will and courage of peoples to main- 
tain their national independence. 

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization can- 
not, of course, claim sole responsibility for these 
encouraging trends in Asian affairs. 

But we have seen again and again in the post- 
war world— not just in Asia but in Europe and 
elsewhere — that security comes first. If govern- 
ments are to sponsor ambitious programs for 
economic development and social reform, if 
citizens are to contribute the support such pro- 
grams require, the first requisite is a prevailing 
sense of national security. 

Surely SEATO, and the assistance provided 
in connection with it, have helped to provide a 
credible sense of security in Asia. In this in- 
direct but very real sense, the Pacific Charter 
can be considered as a precondition for the 
healthy developments now in progress. 

This, in the broadest sense, is why my Gov- 
ernment has so valued this organization over 
the years and why it will continue to value it 
in the future. Tliis is why we continue to adhere 
to the treaty and to regard the Rusk-Thanat 



JUNE 9, 1969 



477 



communique ^ as a valid restatement of the re- 
sponsibilities set forth in article IV (1) of the 
treaty.- 

Institutions, of course, adapt to new condi- 
tions and new opportunities, and SEATO is no 
exception. We believe it would be a good idea 
to have a look together at future tasks for 
SEATO. 

One suggestion is that we should concentrate 
on turning the assets of the organization toward 
countering subversion. We believe there may be 
merit in this, smce the threat of externally sup- 
ported subversion is still an urgent one and may 
be for years to come. 

Another suggestion is to consider the role of 
the organization in the closely related field of 
economic development. These suggestions de- 
serve our careful consideration. 

Meanwhile, SEATO is already well at work — 
as an Asian security organization, as a forum 
for political consultations among its members, 
as a sponsor of selected economic and technical 
and cultural projects. 

This is why the United States remains a loyal 
member and a steadfast supporter of SEATO. 

At the same time, I must point out that my 
Government faces difficult decisions about how 
to allocate available resources against many 
urgent claims. These competing interests — for 
both domestic and overseas purposes — must 
somehow be balanced and compromised and rec- 
onciled. But this does not alter the underlying 
goal. We are dedicated at home to expanding in- 
dividual freedoms, to better education, to equal- 
ity of opportunity, to racial harmony, to im- 
proving the quality of life for all our people — 
most urgently in our crowded cities, which suffer 
from the social and physical impacts of rapid 
urbanization and industrialization. These goals 
are enduring. 

My country also has enduring goals abroad. 
We are dedicated to the resolution of conflict 
by peaceful means, to the principle of national 
independence and the free choice by peoples of 
their own forms of government and their own 
leaders. 

Our allegiance to these goals in Asia is firm. 

Our interest in the prosperity and well-being 
of Asia and Asians is a permanent fijxture of 
our foreign policy. I hope my presence here 
today will be accepted as one symbol of that 
fact. 

Our current position in Viet-Nam under- 
scores this point. We want to achieve a peaceful 
settlement of a war that has cost everyone too 
much and lasted too long. 



But we believe that the people of South Viet- 
nam should have the right to make their own 
decisions about their own future without inter- 
ference or pressure from any outside quarter. 

For that reason President Nixon made it clear 
last week that in striving to achieve this goal : 
"Our fighting men are not going to be worn 
down ; our negotiators are not going to be talked 
down ; our allies are not going to be let down." ^ 

This is our position. It is intended not only 
to secure the right of the people of South Viet- 
Nam to determine their own future but to en- 
sure against another Viet-Nam — in Asia or else- 
where. It is intended to bring peace to Southeast 
Asia. 

Wlien the war stops, the immediate mission 
of our troops will be fulfilled. But our long-term 
goals, our collective missions, in Southeast Asia 
will remain. Our long-term goals are these : 

First is to make sure that the peace is not a 
lull between wars, but a lasting peace guaran- 
teed by collective security. Thus it is that we 
warmly welcome the f arsighted decision of our 
allies, Australia and New Zealand, to reinforce 
the security of Southeast Asia by maintaining 
peacekeeping forces in Singapore and Malaysia. 

Second, after peace has been restored, we will 
continue working together for a dynamic, pros- 
perous Southeast Asia — free at last to turn its 
resources and its energies to meeting the aspira- 
tions of its peoples. 

In conclusion, let me say that when our forces 
are no longer needed in South Viet-Nam we 
shall not abandon in peace what we have fought 
for in war : the peaceful evolution of Southeast 
Asia — playing its full and rightful part in an 
emerging cooperative Pacific community. 



TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE 

Press release 126 dated May 21 

The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Organi- 
zation held its Fourteenth Meeting In Bangkok from 
20 May to 21 May 1969, under the chairmanship of 
His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Thailand. 



General Observations 

The Council agreed that the most significant de- 
velopment during the past year has been the prospects 
for peace in the area opened up by the Paris Meetings 



' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498. 

' For text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty, see Bulletin of SepL 20, 1954, p. 393. 

' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on May 
14, see Bulletin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



478 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



and by the determined efforts of the United States and 
the Republic of Vietnam in close consultation with 
their allies to bring about a peaceful and just solution 
to the Vietnam conflict. 

The Council noted that economic and social prog- 
ress had continued during the past year within the 
Treaty Area. The Council agreed that this progress 
had been achieved mainly by the individual efforts of 
the countries in the region, and by the further strength- 
ening of regional co-operation which reflects a growing 
consciousness of mutual interests. The Council also 
noted that this achievement had been made without 
sacrifice of human liberty and fundamental freedoms. 

The Council noted that these political, economic and 
social advances would not have been possible without 
the shield which the Manila Treaty has helped to pro- 
vide over the past fourteen years. 

The Council agreed that aggression, both overt and 
by subversion, infiltration and terrorism, instigated or 
supported by external Communist movements, remains 
a major threat to the peace and security of the Area. 
The Council expressed its conviction that the threat 
in the Treaty Area cannot be considered in isolation 
from problems of international peace and security, and 
that the outcome of the struggle now going on against 
such aggression in South-East Asia will have profound 
effects throughout the world. The Council expressed 
its determination that this aggression must not be al- 
lowed to succeed. 

The Search for Peace 

The Council commended the determination of the Re- 
public of Vietnam, and the governments helping to 
defend it, to bring about a peace in Vietnam under 
which the people of South Vietnam will be assured of 
their right to determine their own future, free from 
outside interference and terrorism. 

The Council noted with approval the proposals which 
have been made by the Republic of Vietnam and the 
United States for the mutual withdrawal of external 
forces from South Vietnam, for respect for the de- 
militarized zone, for full implementation of the 1962 
Geneva Agreements on Laos, for respect for the sov- 
ereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial in- 
tegrity of Cambodia and for the release of all prisoners 
of war. The Council noted that these proposals not 
only recognize the realities of the situation in South- 
East Asia today, but are firmly based on the precedents 
of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements. The Council 
noted that the Paris Talks have been going on for a 
year and expressed the hope that the other side would 
now respond constructively to these proposals. 

The Council expressed its conviction that serious 
negotiations based on the above proposals would lead 
to an end of hostilities and to peace and reconciliation 
in Vietnam. The Council noted that the fundamental 
allied objective in Vietnam is to ensure the uncondi- 
tional right of self-determination for the people of 
South Vietnam. The Council agreed that, whatever the 
difficulties, the intensive search for a just and lasting 
peace must continue until this objective is attained 
and stability and security are assured. 

Vietnam 

The Council heard with deep Interest a statement by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet- 



nam. The Council expressed its concern and sympathy 
for the Vietnamese people who have suffered so long. 
It reaffirmed its admiration for the courage with which 
the Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam 
are defending their freedom. 

The Council noted the commendable progress being 
made by the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam 
in improving their ability to withstand the armed 
aggression and to counter subversive activity. The 
Council warmly welcomed the expressed determination 
of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam pro- 
gressively to assume responsibility for the defence of 
its territory. 

The Council also welcomed the continued progress 
that has been made by the Republic of Vietnam in the 
political, economic and social fields, in particular, the 
evolution and strengthening of democratic and repre- 
sentative government. 

The Council noted with deep concern North Viet- 
nam's continuing aggression by means of armed attack 
against the Republic of Vietnam. The Council deplored 
the conduct of North Vietnam, particularly while peace 
negotiations are in progress, in continuing indiscrim- 
inate attacks on the civilian population. The Council 
noted with regret that this aggression is sustained by 
a heavy flow of weapons and supplies from other 
Communist regimes. 

The Council noted with appreciation the increases 
during the past year in the military, economic and 
humanitarian assistance by Member Governments to 
the Republic of Vietnam, in fulfilment of or consistent 
with their obligations under the South-East Asia Col- 
lective Defence Treaty. The Council also noted with 
appreciation the substantial assistance which the Re- 
public of Vietnam has continued to receive from the 
Republic of Korea and other countries which are not 
members of SEATO. 

The Council stated its conviction that the effective 
defence of the Republic of Vietnam in its current 
struggle is essential to the security of South-East Asia 
and wiU demonstrate that Communist expansion 
through aggression of this kind will not be permitted. 

The Council noted that reconstruction In Vietnam, 
which awaits the achievement of peace, will open the 
way to a new era of development and progress for the 
peoples and nations of the entire region. The Council 
noted the intention of the member nations of SEATO 
to continue their aid to the Republic of Vietnam and to 
contribute to the work of reconstruction. The Council 
welcomed the expressions of intent by other nations 
around the world to participate in this urgent task. 

Laos 

The Council noted with grave concern that North 
Vietnam, in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, 
continues to maintain military forces, including large 
units of its regular Army, in Laos, to commit armed 
attacks on the forces of the Royal Government of Laos, 
and to use Laotian territory for infiltrating troops and 
supplies into the Republic of Vietnam and to support 
insurgency in Thailand. The Council reiterated its call 
for full implementation by all signatories of the 1962 
Geneva Agreements on Laos and expressed support for 
the earnest efforts of Prime Minister Souvanna 
Phouma and the Royal Government of Laos to secure 
peace and to preserve the sovereignty, independence, 
neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos. 



479 



Philippines 

The Council was pleased to note the recent successes 
achieved by Government forces against insurgents in 
Central Luzon and the vigorous efforts by all agencies 
of the Government of the Philippines, with support of 
member nations, to implement an integrated socio- 
economic programme designed to eliminate the root 
cause of the complex insurgency problem in Central 
Luzon. Since one of the causes of agrarian unrest 
among the masses is the land problem, the Council also 
noted with approval the efforts of the Philippine Gov- 
ernment to accelerate the implementation of the Land 
Reform Code. The Council further noted the achieve- 
ments of the Government of the Philippines in the 
development of its rural areas and expressed its grati- 
fication at the continuing high priority given to irriga- 
tion, feeder roads, health, electrification, credit, and 
agricultural productivity programmes. 

The Council noted proposals by the Philippines for a 
Youth Volunteer Corps, a Special Problem Oflice, a Uni- 
versity of South-East Asia, a Rural Health Training 
Centre, and Refugee Rehabilitation. 



Thailand 

The Council noted that the Royal Thai Government 
had increased during the year the major contribution it 
is making to the defence of the Republic of Vietnam. 
In addition to air and naval units already in Vietnam, 
it dispatched a division of ground forces to aid in the 
struggle. This was done despite the continued threat of 
Communist-inspired insurgency within Thailand itself. 

The Council was gratified by the determined endeav- 
ours of the Royal Thai Government and people to 
encourage economic and social development and to 
counter subversive activities directed from outside 
Thai borders. These efforts have continued under the 
newly formed Government following the national elec- 
tions held early this year. 

The Council expressed concern at the increase in 
Communist infiltration and terrorist activities particu- 
larly in remote areas of North and North-East Thai- 
land. The Council noted with satisfaction the intensive 
efforts of the Royal Thai Government to provide 
greater security and a higher standard of living for the 
rural population and the vigorous measures taken by 
Thai authorities to eliminate the threat of Communist 
insurgency. The Council reiterated its determination to 
continue to assist Thailand In meeting this threat. 



of those Governments. The Council also welcomed the 
proposed consultations in Canberra between the Gov- 
ernments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singa- 
pore and the United Kingdom. 



The Organization 

The Council reaflBrmed the importance which it 
attaches to the Organization as a deterrent to Com- 
munist aggression and as a source of support to mem- 
ber nations in the Area in countering Communist 
subversion. 

The Council was convinced that greater emphasis 
should be placed on political consultations, counter- 
insurgency, and economic and cultural co-operation, to 
make the Organization's role more effective and more 
responsive to the new Communist tactics being 
employed to undermine the stability and orderly 
progress of free societies. The Council expressed its 
support for co-operative endeavours to this effect. 

The Council noted the Report of the Military 
Advisers and commended the work of the Military 
Planning Office during the past year, in particular 
the excellent work done in keeping plans up-to-date 
and in designing military exercises. 

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the 
progress achieved by the Organization in programmes 
related to economic development, cultural affairs and 
medical research. It commended the efforts of the 
Organization to keep these programmes under review 
to ensure that they proved complementary to pro- 
grammes for counter-insurgency and civic action. The 
Council agreed that the value of these programmes has 
been fuUy demonstrated and that they deserve the 
active support of all Members. 



Pakistan 

The Pakistan Delegate wished it to be recorded that 
he did not participate in the drafting of the Communi- 
que and that the views expressed in it do not neces- 
sarily reflect the position of the Government of 
Pakistan. 



Next Meeting 

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation 
of the Government of the Philippines to bold its 
Fifteenth Meeting in the Philippines in 1970. 



Counter-Subversion 

The Council again affirmed its support for SEATO 
activities designed to aid member countries in the 
Treaty Area to counter Communist subversion. It noted 
the high degree of success achieved by the Secretary- 
General in the provision of such assistance and re- 
quested him to continue his efforts in this field. 



Auslralia-New Zealand Defence Arrangements 

The Council welcomed as a substantial contribution 
to the security of the area the decisions of the Govern- 
ments of Australia and New Zealand to maintain mili- 
tary forces in Malaysia and Singapore at the request 



Expression of Gratitude 

The Council expressed gratitude to the Royal Thai 
Government and the people of Thailand for their 
generous hospitality and warm welcome, and its 
appreciation for the excellent arrangements made for 
the Meeting. 



Leaders of Delegations 

All Member Governments, except France, partici- 
pated. The Republic of Vietnam, a protocol state, was 
represented by an observer. 

The leaders of the Delegations to the Fourteenth 
Council Meeting were : 



480 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Australia 
New Zealand 

Pakistan 
Philippines 
Thailand 
United Kingdom 

United States 

Republic of Vietnam 
(Observer) 



Hon. Gordon Freeth, M.P., 

Minister for External Affairs. 
Right Hon. Keith Holyoake, 

C.H., M.P., 
Prime Minister and Minister of 

External Affairs. 
H. E. Mr. M. Hayat Junejo, 

Ambassador to Thailand. 
H. E. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, 

Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 
H. E. Mr. Thanat Khoman, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Right Hon. Lord Shepherd, P.O., 

Minister of State, Foreign 

and Commonwealth Office. 
Hon. William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State. 
H. E, air. Tran Chanh Thanh, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



Seven Asian and Pacific Nations 
Examine Security Situation in Asia 

Following is the text of a communique issued 
at the close of the seven-nation meeting on Viet- 
Nam held at Bangkok May 22. 

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE 

Press release 132 dated May 22 

1. The Minister for External Affairs of Aus- 
tralia, Mr. Gordon Freeth ; the Minister of For- 
eign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Kyu 
Hah Choi ; the Prime Minister and Minister of 
External Affairs of New Zealand, Mr. Keith 
Holyoake; the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of 
the Philippines, Mr. Carlos P. Romulo; the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. 
Tlianat Khoman ; the Secretary of State of the 
United States of America, Mr. William P. 
Rogers ; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Tran Chanh 
Thanli, met in Bangkok, at the invitation of the 
Royal Thai Government, on 22 May 1969. 

Purposes 

2. Tlie meeting was held to permit the Minis- 
ters to continue their practice of regular con- 
sultations on important matters of mutual 
interest. Specifically, they wished (1) to review 
the current situation in Viet-Nam, (2) to con- 
sider the prospects for a peaceful settlement of 
the conflict, (3) to discuss ways in which their 



Governments might strengthen their efforts to 
help the people of Viet-Nam, (4) to examine 
the security situation in Asia. 

Situation in Viet-Nam 

3. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam described the important 
developments wliich had taken place in his coun- 
try over the past twelve months. He emphasized 
the broadly based representative nature of the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and 
noted the successful establishment of the new 
and elected institutions, such as the Supreme 
Court of Justice and the Inspectorate called for 
by the Vietnamese Constitution. He also de- 
scribed the current efforts of Vietnamese non- 
Communist political parties to unite to further 
their common goal. The Ministers expressed 
their gratification at the continued strengthen- 
ing of Vietnamese political institutions, in par- 
ticular the effective functioning of the elected 
National Assembly. 

4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam also outlined the efforts be- 
ing made to raise the standard of living of his 
countrymen and to bring them greater social 
well-being, making particular reference to his 
Government's new land reform program and 
rural development policy. He described the in- 
creased autonomy and financial resources given 
to local authorities to foster a functioning de- 
mocracy for the benefit of the people. He under- 
lined tlie achievements of the pacification pro- 
gram, which have made possible the election of 
additional village councils and hamlet chiefs. 

5. He described how urban housing projects 
had been put into effect to resettle the victims of 
Communist indiscriminate shellings. He pointed 
out that, in spite of the ravages of war, pri- 
mary, secondary, and higher education had 
progressed at a remarkable rate. 

6. Tlie Minister further indicated that the 
open arms policy had brought fruitful results 
with gi'owing numbers of enemy cadres and of- 
ficers rallying to the national community. 

7. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam stressed the strong desire 
for peace of his Government and of the people 
of Viet-Nam. The Ministers made it clear that 
the peoples of aU seven nations desired a just 
and lasting peace at the earliest possible time. 
They welcomed the willingness of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam to hold pri- 
vate talks with what the other side called the 



JUNE 9, 1969 



481 



NLF [National Liberation Front] as demon- 
strated by President Nguyen Van Thieu's 
statements of March 25, and April 7, 1969. 

8. The Ministers examined the military situa- 
tion and received a briefing from Vietnamese 
and American military commanders. They were 
encouraged at the progress being made by allied 
forces and the increasing difficulties encoun- 
tered by the other side. They agreed that the 
failure of the other side to achieve their objec- 
tives should convince them of their inability to 
gain a victory by military means. The Ministers 
noted the modernization and improvement of 
the Vietnamese Armed Forces, welcomed their 
determination to assume greater responsibilities 
for the defense of their homeland, and com- 
mended the progress they have already made in 
that direction. They noted with appreciation 
the substantial increase in the strength of tlie 
armed forces contributed by Thailand to the de- 
fense of the Kepublic of Viet-Nam. The Minis- 
ters expressed their admiration and gratitude 
for the courage and devotion of the allied sol- 
diers serving in Viet-Nam. 

9. The Ministers emphasized that their forces 
were in Viet-Nam to help the Vietnamese people 
defend themselves against outside aggression 
and to ensure that such aggression shall not be 
rewarded. They reaffirmed that their objective 
was to bring about a peace in wliich the people 
of South Viet-Nam are able to exercise their un- 
conditional right of self-determination free 
from external interference and terrorism. The 
Ministers of the seven nations reaffirmed their 
determination to help the Vietnamese people re- 
sist this aggression and accordingly to continue 
their support of the Eepublic of Viet-Nam. 
They recognized that this support will be related 
to the progress of the peace negotiations, the 
level of offensive actions by the enemy, and the 
relative strength of the Armed Forces of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam and their capability of 
taking over an even greater share of the 
fighting. 

10. The Ministers viewed with grave concern 
the continuing presence of a large number of 
North Vietnamese troops in Laos and their use 
of Laotian territory in violation of the 1962 
Geneva Agreements. 

Effort for Peace 

11. The Ministers also reviewed the develop- 
ments in the negotiations taking place in Paris 
and welcomed the proposals which had been 



made there by the Governments of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam and the United States concerning 
mutual troop withdrawals. They agreed that 
withdrawals could conunence simultaneously 
and proceed expeditiously on tlie basis of a 
mutually acceptable timetable; that all exter- 
nally introduced forces would have to be with- 
drawn not only from South Viet-Nam but also 
from Laos and Cambodia ; and that the further 
introduction of forces must be prohibited. Tliey 
also agreed that a clear need existed for ade- 
quate verification and supervision of compliance 
with both the withdrawal of forces and the pro- 
hibition against further introduction of forces. 

12. The Ministers also noted with approval 
the proposals put forward by the Republic of 
Viet-Nam and the United States for observance 
of the Demilitarized Zone, the release of pris- 
oners of war, and full compliance with exist- 
ing international agreements on Laos and 
Cambodia. 

13. The Ministers examined the positions the 
other side has taken in Paris. In contrast to the 
reasonable nature of the proposals put forward 
by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United 
States, the other side has demanded unilateral 
and unconditional withdrawal of the allied 
forces assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam and 
destruction of the democratic institutions and 
procedures which have been emerging there dur- 
ing the past several years. From these positions 
the Ministers concluded with regret that the 
other side was still intransigent and was seeking 
to wear down the resistance of the allied nations 
and to impose upon the Republic of Viet-Nam 
a totalitarian regime contrary to the wishes of 
its people. They reiterated their common resolve 
to reject any attempt to impose upon the Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam any system or program, includ- 
ing the spurious coalition govermnent de- 
manded by the other side, without regard to the 
will of the people of South Viet-Nam. 

14. The Ministers agreed that all possibilities 
leading to peace and national reconciliation 
should be thoroughly explored, and they en- 
dorsed the efforts in this direction of the Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam and the United States. They 
welcomed the comprehensive statements by the 
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam on April 
7, 1969, and the President of the United States 
on May 14, 1969, as important contributions to 
this effort.^ They agreed that all of the nations 
which are making available armed forces to 



'■ For President NLxon's address to the Nation on 
May 14, see Btjixetin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



482 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BIILLETIN 



help defend the Republic of Viet-Nam must 
participate in the settlement of the conflict. 

15. The Ministers discussed the need for in- 
ternational coopei'ation to support economic re- 
construction and development in Viet-Nam 
after the cessation of hostilities. They noted in 
this regard the gi-eat potential for economic and 
social progress revealed by the recently released 
joint development group report prepared at the 
request of the United States and the Republic 
of Viet-Nam. They agreed to consult closely on 
the important goal of assisting the people of 
South Viet-Nam to achieve the better future 
their sacrifices have earned. Tliey expressed the 
hope that North Viet-Nam will come to realize 
the advantages of living in peaceful coopera- 
tion and friendly harmony with its neighbors 
rather than in confrontation with them; and 
that North Viet-Nam will take advantage of 
arrangements for regional cooperation for the 
benefit of its own people and for the progress 
of Southeast Asia as a whole. 

16. The Ministers also agreed that a general 
settlement in Southeast Asia will require the 
participation by Asian powers in measm-es to as- 
sure peace and security for this part of the 
world. They considered it desirable that the 
Asian countries themselves should have the pri- 
mary responsibility for their own future well- 
being and peaceful development. They agreed 
that the Asian countries might in exercise of 
this responsibility assume certain duties in 
connection with a peace settlement for Viet- 
Nam, possibly under the aegis of the United 
Nations. Again, closest consultation among the 
interested parties could be beneficial in this 
coimection. 

17. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Korea gave an account of the con- 
tinuing and intensified acts of provocation and 
aggression against the Republic of Korea per- 
petrated by the North Korean Communists, as 
evidenced by the series of infiltrations by armed 
raiders into the Republic of Korea and the in- 
creased violation during the past year of the 
Armistice Agreement of 1953. The JNIinisters ex- 
pressed their indignation over these continuing 
and intensified acts of provocation and aggres- 
sion, and renewed their previous agreement that 
such acts by the North Korean Communists are 
a matter of grave concern and directly threaten 
the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula 
and the area surrounding it. 

18. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for 
the Republic of Korea in resisting such North 



Korean aggression. The Ministers welcomed the 
intention of the Republic of Korea to keep them 
and other interested governments informed of 
any future developments through ambassadors 
in Seoul. 

Constitutional Processes 

19. The Ministers noted that actions taken in 
pursuance of the policies herein stated should be 
in accordance with their respective constitu- 
tional processes. 

Conclusion 

20. The Ministers of the seven nations re- 
iterated their continued support to the Republic 
of Viet-Nam to preserve the unconditional right 
of the people of South Viet-Nam to decide their 
own destiny by democratic and peaceful means 
and without outside interference. The Ministers 
stated their determination to continiie their ef- 
forts towards this goal, while a just and peace- 
ful solution to the conflict is pursued through 
the Paris Meetings. Finally, in view of the situa- 
tion in Korea and Southeast Asia, the Alinisters 
reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration 
on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific 
promulgated at the Summit Conference in 
Manila in October 1966,^ and agreed to continue 
the close cooperation which has existed among 
the seven nations. 



Secretary Leaves Bangkok at Close 
of SEATO and Seven-Nation Meetings 

Following is a statement made hy Secretary 
Rogers upon his departure from Bangkok on 
May 23. 

Press release 134 dated May 23 

As you know, I have attended two meetings 
during the past 4 days in Bangkok: the 14th 
Council Meeting of SEATO and another in the 
series of meetmgs of the seven allies in Viet- 
Nam. Both were highly successful. I believe that 
the two communiques from these meetings are 
very clear on important points of agreement. 

First, the members of SEATO and of the 
troop-contributing countries are determined 

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 734. 



JUNE 9, 1969 



483 



that it is their policy to achieve a lasting peace 
in Southeast Asia so the peoples of this area can 
make their own decisions free from outside in- 
terference. We are agreed that such a peace 
could come soon if the leaders in Hanoi will ac- 
cept the right of the people of South Viet-Nam 
to exercise their self-determination without any 
conditions. The troop-contributing countries 
showed the way to a prompt reduction of hos- 
tilities by endorsing proposals made in Paris for 
mutual withdrawal of North Viet-Nam and 
United States and other forces. 

Second, we are agreed that a sense of security 
is the essential foundation for the economic 
progress and social reform that all non-Com- 
munist governments in this area are now foster- 
ing. It is also accepted that progressive pro- 
grams of rural development must go hand in 
hand with security measures in resisting the in- 
surgencies which the Communist countries are 
fostering. 

Third, it is agreed that regional cooperation, 
for both security and economic growth, is the 
essential and chosen course of action for the na- 
tions of Southeast Asia and the Pacific area. 
Such cooperation is on the rise and is seen by all 
as the way of the future. 

I should like to emphasize this last point be- 
cause it has come out so clearly in our private 
meetings and discussions. 

My Government is fidly aware that the secu- 
rity of Southeast Asia cannot be set apart from 
the broad problem of global security, and the 
nations of this area are fully aware that the 
threat to their security requires them to seek the 
support of non-Asian allies. Our common inter- 
ests are not in question. 

But some have feared that our association to- 
gether would lead to a loss of independence for 
the Asian allies. These fears are unfounded. 

Indeed, I find the nations of Southeast Asia 
increasingly determined to bear the main bur- 
den of area security on their own collective 
shoulders. I find them anxious to be the prime 
movers in promoting the welfare of their people 
through regional cooperation. 

We are the ally of our SEATO partners. We 
shall continue to cooperate in their peaceful 
development. 

At the same time we salute their determina- 
tion to be the responsible masters of their own 
aiYairs. That is the way it should be; that is the 
way we all want it to be; and I leave here sus- 
tained by the conviction that this is the way it 
is going to be. 



Secretary Laird Urges Hanoi 

To Release U.S. Prisoners of War 

Following is a statement made hy Secretary ^ 
of Defense Melvin R. Laird at a Department of 
Defense news hriefing on May 19. 

On numerous occasions I have expressed my 
deep concern for the welfare of our American 
servicemen who are prisoners of war or missing 
in action. In this regard, I have directed As- 
sistant Secretary of Defense (International Se- - 
curity Affairs) G. Warren Nutter, who has been 
named Chairman of the Department of Defense 
Prisoner-of-War Policy Committee, to ensure 
that the families of these servicemen are receiv- 
ing all assistance to which they are entitled. 

The North Vietnamese have claimed that they 
are treating our men humanely. I am distressed 
by the fact that there is clear evidence that this 
is not the case. 

The United States Government has urged that 
the enemy respect the requirements of the Ge- 
neva convention. This they have refused to do. 

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong 
have never identified the names of all the U.S. 
prisoners whom they hold. For the most part, 
information on some of these Americans has 
come in the form of scattered, and often dis- 
torted, propaganda films and photographs 
which the North Vietnamese have chosen to sell 
or release. 

We know that at least several U.S. prisoners 
were injured at the time of their capture, and 
we are concerned about the medical care they 
are receiving. 

The Geneva convention requires a free ex- 
change of mail between the prisoners and their 
families, and yet very little mail has been re- 
ceived from only a few prisoners in the past 
5 years. 

As of next month, more than 200 American 
servicemen will have been listed either as prison- 
ers of war or as missing in action for more than 
31/^ years. This period of time is longer than any 
U.S. serviceman was held prisoner during 
World War IT. 

The Department of Defense continues to hope 
for meaningful progress on the matter of pris- 
oner release in the Paris discussions. In the 
meantime, we appeal to North Viet-Nam and 
the Viet Cong to respect the humane rights of 
those whom they hold prisoners of war. 

Specifically, we call for adherence to the 
Geneva convention, which requires : 



484 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN 



1. Release of names of prisoners held. 

2. Immediate release of sick and wounded 
prisoners. 

3. Impartial inspections of prisoner-of-war 
facilities. 

4. Projoer treatment of all prisoners. 

5. Regular flow of mail. 

Most importantly, we seek the prompt release 
of all American prisoners. 



18th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Follotoing are the opening statement and ad- 
ditional remarlis made hy Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. delegation, at 
the 18th plenary session on Viet-Nam at Paris 
on May 22. 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Press release 129 dated May 22 

Ladies and gentlemen: At the last plenary 
meeting I presented proposals for peace made 
by the President of the United States.^ At the 
same meeting the representative of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam said that these proposals were con- 
sistent with the policy of his Government as 
embodied in President Thieu's six-point pro- 
gram. 

In the 16th jjlenary meeting your side pro- 
posed a 10-point program. 

Each side has now presented specific pro- 
posals, and we are therefore in a position to 
define the questions at issue. 

Perhaps by reviewing the issues we will cre- 
ate the basis for serious discussion and negotia- 
tion on the key questions which must be dealt 
with if there is to be a negotiated settlement. 

Let us look at the issues on which both sides 
seem to be taking a common approach. 

One issue on which there seems to be common 
ground is that of reunification. President Nixon, 
in his address of May 14, said: "We have no 
objection to reunification, if that turns out to be 
what the people of South Viet-Nam and the 
people of North Viet-Nam want; we ask only 
that the decision reflect the free choice of the 
people concerned." ^ Your point 7 states that the 
reunification of Viet-Nam will be achieved step 
by step, by peaceful means, through discussions 
and agreement between the two zones, without 



foreign interference. Similarly, the question of 
i-elations between North and South Viet-Nam 
pending reunification is a matter for North Viet- 
Nam and South Viet-Nam to decide. 

Another issue is restoration of the demili- 
tarized zone and respect for the provisional mili- 
tary demarcation line. Your point 7 states that 
the militarj' demarcation line is only provisional 
and does not constitute a permanent political 
boundaiy. "We agree to that. We also agree that 
precise arrangements should be worked out re- 
garding the status of the DMZ and movements 
across the provisional military demarcation 
line. 

The third issue on which there seems to be 
common ground is that of prisoners of war. 
President Nixon's proj^osals call for arrange- 
ments to be made for the earliest possible re- 
lease of prisoners of war on both sides. Your 
point 9 states that the parties will negotiate the 
release of prisoners captured in the war. 

I cannot leave this subject without protesting 
the attitude wliich you have expressed — most 
recently last Tuesday, May 20 — with respect to 
the prisoners held in North Viet-Nam. You 
have refused to provide a list of these prisoners 
so that their families might know whether they 
are living or dead. You have refused to discuss 
the repatriation of the sick and wounded, which 
is a long-established international practice. 
You should know that the attitude you have 
expressed with regard to these basic humani- 
tarian requirements cannot have a favorable 
effect on our negotiations here. 

President Nixon's proposals provide that all 
parties would agree to observe the Geneva 
accords of 1954 regarding Cambodia, and the 
Laos agreements of 1962. Your side's 10-point 
program calls for respect for the 1962 Geneva 
agreements on Laos and for Cambodia's inde- 
pendence, sovereignty, neutrality, and terri- 
torial integrity. While your program states 
that this is a policy which South Viet-Nam 
should carry out, we believe it is necessary that 
North Viet-Nam also follow the same policy. 
In fact. North Viet-Nam is already a party to 
the 1954 Geneva accords relating to Cambodia 
and to the 1962 Laos agreements. 

There seems to be common ground on a num- 
ber of other military questions. For example, 
President Nixon has stated that we seek no 
bases in Viet-Nam and that we insist on no mili- 



' For a statement made by Ambassador Lodge on 
May 16, see Bulletin of June 2, 1969, p. 467. 
" lUA., p. 457. 



JUNE 9, 1969 



351-333 — 69- 



4SS 



tary ties. We have also said in the past that we 
seek no permanent military establishment in 
Viet-Nam. Your program would prohibit 
foreign military bases, foreign troops, and 
foreign military alliances for North and South 
Viet-Nam. 

There are some other elements of your side's 
10-point program which are related to elements 
of our own position. For example, as President 
Nixon stated on May 14: "We have been gen- 
erous toward those whom we have fought, help- 
ing former foes as well as friends in the task of 
reconstruction. We are proud of this record, 
and we bring the same attitude to our search for 
a settlement in Viet-Nam." You speak of accept- 
ing economic and teclmical aid from any coun- 
try with no political conditions attached. 

We support the principles of independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. 
Your program also calls for respect for the 
Vietnamese people's fundamental national 
rights; i.e., independence, sovereignty, unity, 
and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 
1954 Geneva accords. 

Then there are other questions which are 
crucial to both sides and which must be 
answered if the fighting is to end and peace is 
to ensue. But the proposals of the two sides 
regarding these questions are different. It is 
therefore our responsibility in these negoti- 
ations to try to work out mutually satisfactory 
solutions to these problems. 

One such question is the withdrawal of non- 
South Vietnamese forces from South Viet- 
Nam. President Nixon said that a settlement 
which would permit the South Vietnamese 
people to determine freely their own political 
future would require the withdrawal of all non- 
South Vietnamese forces from South Viet-Nam. 
He reaffirmed our willingness to withdraw our 
forces on a specified timetable. "We ask only," 
President Nixon said, "that North Viet-Nam 
withdraw its forces fi'om South Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia, and Laos into North Viet-Nam, also 
in accordance with a timetable." 

Our offer provides for a simultaneous start 
on a withdrawal by both sides; agreement on a 
mutually acceptable timetable; and for the 
withdrawal to be accomplished quickly. At our 
last meeting, on the instructions of the Presi- 
dent, I proposed precise measures for carrying 
out our proposals on withdrawals. 

Points 2 and 3 of your proposals, dealing 
with the question of the withdrawal of outside 
forces, need clarification. You call for the un- 
conditional withdrawal of all United States 



and Allied forces. If there is to be a serious 
negotiation of this key question. North Viet- 
Nam must be prepared to withdraw its military 
forces and subversive personnel out of South 
Viet-Nam and neighboring Cambodia and Laos 
back to North Viet-Nam. 

Both sides have also stated tliat a political 
settlement is a key problem that must be solved 
if the war in Viet-Nam is to be brought to an 
end. Here, again, there are different views on 
how this central problem is to be solved. 

In his address of May 14 President Nixon 
stated the essential objective of the United 
States : "We seek the opportunity for the South 
Vietnamese people to determine their own 
political future without outside interference." 

The political settlement is an internal matter 
to be decided among tlie South Vietnamese 
themselves and not imposed by outside parties. 
However, as the President said: ". . . if our 
presence at these political negotiations would 
be helpful, and if the South Vietnamese con- 
cerned agreed, we would be willing to partici- 
pate, along with the representatives of Hanoi if 
that were also desired." 

We are guided as regards this question by the 
principle that a just and lasting settlement will 
require procedures for political choice that give 
each significant group in South Viet-Nam a real 
opportunity to participate in the political life 
of the nation. We believe there should be an 
oppoitunity for full participation in the politi- 
cal life of South Viet-Nam by all political ele- 
ments that are prepared to do so without the 
use of force or intimidation. We are prepared 
to accept any government in South Viet-Nam 
that results from the free choice of the South 
Vietnamese people. We have no intention of 
imposing any form of government on the people 
of South Viet-Nam, nor will we be a party to 
such coercion. 

The President of the Rej^ublic of Viet-Nam j 
has publicly declared liis government's willing- | 
ness to discuss a political solution with the 
National Liberation Front. He has offered free 
elections. He has offered to talk without pre- 
conditions. We urge your side to enter into dis- 
cussions on a political settlement with the 
representatives of the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam without prior conditions. 

Your side's 10-point program calls for a 
neutral South Viet-Nam. As President Nixon 
said : "We are willing to agree to neutrality if 
that is what the South Vietnamese people freely 
choose." Here, again, is an issue which the 
South Vietnamese must decide for themselves. 



486 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIK' 



Our two sides have spoken of the need for 
international supervision. Your program calls 
for international supervision of the withdrawal 
of United States and Allied forces. The pro- 
posals put forward by our side call for an inter- 
national supervisory body, acceptable to both 
sides, which would be created for the purpose 
of verifying the withdrawal of all non-South 
Vietnamese forces and for any other purposes 
agreed upon between the two sides. President 
Nixon has proposed that this international 
body begin operating in accordance with an 
agreed timetable in that it participate in 
arranging supervised cease-fires. Also, as soon 
as possible after the international body was 
functioning, elections would be held under 
agreed procedures and under the supervision 
of the international body. 

Finally, we of course reject your suggestion 
that the United States Government bear 
responsibility for the war losses and devasta- 
tion caused to the Vietnamese people. 

Ladies and gentlemen, it seems to us that we 
have reached a stage in these negotiations where 
the issues have become clear and that we can 
now get down to the serious discussion of them 
in specific detail. We believe, after examining 
the various proposals that have been made, that 
there are a large number on which there is suffi- 
cient common ground so that detailed and 
productive negotiations can begin immediately. 

There are other questions which both sides 
recognize as central to a settlement but on 
which we still need to search for agreement in 
principle. These questions relate primarily to 
withdrawal of outside forces and political set- 
tlement. We think the parties concerned should 
begin discussions of these questions in earnest 
and right away. 

We think a basis now exists for productive 
discussions of the key issues involved in a settle- 
ment. Our side is ready to engage in such 
discussions. 



ADDITIONAL REMARKS 

Press release 133 (corrected) dated May 22 

Ladies and gentlemen: I think you of the 
other side do not correctly understand the posi- 
tion of the United States if you say that we 
wish to prolong the presence of United States 
and Allied forces in Viet-Nam. Just so that 
you may have no misconceptions, I wish to 
repeat precisely what was said by President 
Nixon : 



— As soon as agreement can be reached, all non- 
South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals 
from South Viet-Nam. 

— Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, 
the major portions of all U.S., Allied, and other non- 
South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the 
end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., Allied, 
and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move 
into designated base areas and would not engage in 
combat operations. 

— The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would move 
to complete their withdrawals as the remaining North 
Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to 
North Viet-Nam. 

— An international supervisory body, acceptable to 
both sides, would be created for the purpose of verify- 
ing withdrawals, and for any other purpo.ses agreed 
upon between the two sides. 

You should not be concerned over the time 
between the end of the 12-month period and the 
completion of withdrawals. This can be agreed 
upon, and our position only calls for the re- 
maining North Vietnamese forces to complete 
their withdrawal within the same time period. 
If you would like to propose a time period for 
these remaining mutual actions, we are ready 
to listen. Further, we are ready to discuss any 
aspect of mutual withdrawal and to deal with 
all such details, provided that you are willing to 
enter into a meaningful discussion of the with- 
drawal of North Vietnamese forces as well. 

Ladies and gentlemen : Let me add one obser- 
vation about prisoners. It is difficult to under- 
stand how you can claim to be treating our pris- 
oners humanely when you refuse to identify the 
prisoners you hold so that their families can 
know the fate of their relatives. You refuse to 
permit regular mail exchanges. You reject im- 
partial international observation of conditions 
under which prisoners are held ; you refuse to 
discuss release of sick and wounded prisoners. 
Yet these are basic elements of humani- 
tarian treatment under established interna- 
tional standards. 

We do not see how you can be hurt by merely 
publishing the names of those who are alive 
so that the uncertainty which their families feel 
may be ended. 

To express myself for a moment in human 
terms instead of the language of diplomacy, 
what is involved here is the prisoner's wife, who 
does not know whether her husband is alive or 
whether he is dead. It is really hard to believe 
that the security of North Viet-Nam would be 
threatened if this wife were told the truth about 
her husband's fate. We hope you will recon- 
sider your attitude on these questions so that it 
will truly reflect the humane policy which you 
claim to follow. 



jrCTNE 9, 1969 



487 



The Pacific Basin Potential 



hy U. Alexis Johnson 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 



I welcome this opportunity to share with this 
distinguished group my own thoughts on the 
potential of the Pacific Basin as an economic 
and political entity. It is good to i-enew old 
friendships and make new ones with leaders 
such as yourselves who share a deep interest in 
the Pacific area. Thus it was not too difficult for 
me to agree to make the trip out here to meet 
with you. I Imow that many of you have come 
much greater distances, but distances no longer 
have the meaning they once had — particularly 
in the broad reaches of the Pacific, where one can 
fly with so little let or hindrance. As I will men- 
tion later, this is one aspect that gives reality 
to the concept of the Pacific Basin. 

Wliile I know that you represent business in- 
terests, I also well know that you represent what 
I like to call the growing ranks of the business- 
man-statesman. This is a most encouraging and 
heartening development for those of us who try 
to look at and deal with the overall relations 
between countries. While you, of course, have to 
be concerned with tomorrow's profit-and-loss 
statement, you are looking beyond that to the 
world of the future. While this is, of course, good 
and enlightened business, it also brings you into 
the fields of social trends, political and security 
questions — in short, into the whole world of 
diplomacy and foreign affairs. In turn, we diplo- 
mats are interested in and mixed up with your 
affairs as never before. 

The business decisions that you make, and 
what you do or do not do, can have a profound 
effect on relations between nations, just as I 
recognize that what we in diplomacy do or do 
not do has a profound effect on you. We thus 
need to communicate more and better with each 
other. 



'Address made before the Pacific Basin Economic 
Cooperation Committee at San Francisco, Calif., on 
May 16 (press release 120). 



For example, we can concoct economic 
schemes and institutions with respect to the 
Pacific Basin area, but these will for the most 
part only have reality if they are given sub- 
stance by the decisions of people such as your- 
selves. In turn — and this is my hope — groups 
such as this can increasingly get out ahead of 
us in government and, without waiting for gov- 
ernment action or inspiration, set up your own 
institutions and relationships. This is why I 
have been so pleased to see the increasing growth 
and vigor in this organization and have been 
so impressed with the time and energy so many 
of you have contributed to it. My own conviction 
is that if a more rational world order is ever 
to emerge, it will not come from grand political 
theories imposed from the top, but rather from 
growth of the web of interdependence in so 
many fields — private and government ; business, 
technical, scientific, economic, political, and 
security — that is being woven throughout the 
world. An effort such as yours here can be a 
strong cord in that web and augurs well for the 
Pacific. 

Going back to the Pacific area as I knew it in 
the prewar period, it would have been almost 
impossible to conceive of a group of Pacific 
Basin business leaders such as yourselves 
gathering together in a spontaneous effort of 
economic cooperation. The Pacific of that era 
was not a center of economic activity, but rather 
a waterway through which trade flowed from 
underdeveloped countries and colonies to de- 
veloped nations elsewhere, in large part Europe. 
Almost as unlikely would have been the estab- 
lishment of this group in the early postwar 
period when the peoples of the Pacific were 
recovering from the effects of the war — both 
physically and psychologically — and in some 
cases were also engaged in the struggle for 
national independence. 



488 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



What, then, have been the changes which lead 
so many of us to see a great potential for the 
Pacific Basin as a political and economic, as 
well as geographic, unit? 

To turn back a bit, traditionally when con- 
sidering a part of the world as a definable area, 
we have spoken of a landnaass such as Europe, 
Afi-ica, North America, or Latin America. In 
some cases we did consider an entity to be cen- 
tered around a body of water, but only a rela- 
tively limited, easily navigated one, such as 
the Mediterranean. However, today we have 
reason to speak of the Pacific, with its almost 
64 million square miles of ocean — more than 
double, incidentally, that of the North and 
South Atlantic combined and over 50 times 
that of the Mediterranean — as the center of an 
ai-ea having a political and economic potential 
of its own. 

Improved Transportation and Communications 

The phenomenon responsible in large part for 
this change is the relatively recent improvement 
in transportation and communications which 
makes it not only feasible but in many cases 
economically advantageous to operate across a 
large body of water. 'Wlien I first traveled to 
Japan in the 1930's, the trip was a matter of 
weeks via rail and slow steamship. When I re- 
turned right after the war, relatively slow prop 
planes had cut the transit time to a matter of 
days. Now it takes only a day or so to go any- 
where in the Pacific region, with voice com- 
munication a matter of minutes. 

The great increases in speed of air transporta- 
tion and conxmunications are, however, only a 
small part of the picture. Of gi'eater importance 
is the development of the bulk sea carrier, par- 
ticularly since the 1957 Suez crisis, which has 
radically altered the cost-distance factor for 
the transportation of raw materials. As an ex- 
treme example, Japan imports a large part of 
her coal needs from West Virginia through Nor- 
folk, and I am told that we can ship coal 
cheaper from Norfolk to Japan than we can 
ship it to Pittsburgh. The same thing is true 
of iron ore. This, then, means that Pacific Basin 
nations can, by locating heavy industries on 
tidewaters, as Japan is increasingly doing, en- 
joy very competitive production costs. Addi- 
tionally, possession of coal and iron ore, once 
considered vital for any industrial nation, no 
longer limits the prospects of what were once 
known as the "have-not" Pacific Basin nations. 



In fact, and in many ways, any nation with im- 
mediate access to the waters of the Pacific could 
now be considered a "have" nation. Corre- 
spondingly, we must increasingly think in terms 
of what is known as "foreign trade" as not being 
so very "foreign" and being the rule rather 
than the exception. 

Political and Economic Factors 

Taking into accomit the revolutionary 
changes in transportation and coromunications 
which should benefit all Pacific Basin nations, 
there are, I believe, also political and economic 
factors at work in the individual states which 
will lead the Pacific Basin to become more of a 
cohesive entity than ever before. 

First, let us take the political climate. There 
are now more than two dozen independent na- 
tions which border on the Pacific Ocean. Leav- 
ing aside for the moment the Middle and South 
American states, which still consider themselves 
primarily as a part of Latin America, there 
is a vast change in the political climate in the 
Pacific free- world states compared to that exist- 
ing a generation ago. Up until the war, many 
of the now-independent states in Asia were 
colonies or dependencies of European powers 
and as such looked to the mother countries for 
political and economic guidance. Now these 
states have become independent and have 
loosened their ties with their former "parents" 
or "stepparents." Today, despite the gi-eat di- 
versity of cultures and varying degrees of eco- 
nomic and political development, these countries 
share a growing sense of nationalism and are 
faced with similar problems of a rising level 
of expectation by their peoples. 

Another factor contributing to a climate fa- 
vorable to a Pacific Basin consciousness is the 
degree of political stability which most of the 
free-world states in Asia have achieved in the 
past years. Popularly chosen democratic gov- 
ernments having the support of the majority 
are now the rule rather than the exception. 

These, then, are the two major political fac- 
tors which I believe have prepared the Pacific 
Basin countries, particularly those in Asia, for 
greater participation in activities centered 
around the Pacific Ocean: first, the degree of 
political independence which has been achieved 
in the last 20 years, with parallel aspirations 
and problems this has brought ; and second, the 
degree of political stability which permits in- 
terests beyond the national borders. 



JUNE 9, 1969 



489 



Turning to the economic factors, we have, 
of course, discussed the great importance of the 
fact that the Pacific Ocean, despite its vast 
size, no longer acts as a barrier between states 
which are far apart, but rather as an inexpensive 
highway between such states. However, no mat- 
ter how good the highway may be, trade and 
economic activity will only take place when the 
person at each end of the road has the ability 
to produce something of value and the means 
to buy the products of others. Fortunately, 
statistics indicate that economic progress in the 
Pacific Basin countries is suflScient to give rise 
to expectations that the future holds a high de- 
gree of trade and investment among the 
countries. 

For example, Japan is now the third economic 
power in the world — behind only ourselves and 
the Soviet Union. Given present rates of pro- 
jections, in 10 more years it will have a per 
capita income equal to ours as of today and by 
1990, if you carry on with these projections, may 
well have the highest per capita income in the 
world. 

Korea has more than doubled its gross na- 
tional product in the last 10 years, and in just 
6 years its exports have gone from $25 million 
to over $500 million. 

Taiwan has more than doubled its gross na- 
tional product in the last 10 years, and our 
grant economic aid in that country was ter- 
minated in 1965. Further, the Republic of 
China is also helping others to help themselves 
with technical aid programs in Southeast Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. 

Far from being swept by a wave from main- 
land China, Southeast Asia is showing vigor 
and vitality. Next to Japan, Singapore and 
Malaysia have the highest per capita incomes 
in all of Asia. Thailand is growing economically 
at the rate of 8 percent per year. 

Indonesia, which in early 1965 seemed to be 
almost irretrievably lost to communism, has en- 
tirely by its own efforts crushed the Communist 
Party, made peace with its neighbors, and re- 
joined the U.N. and other international organi- 
zations. Now that Indonesia is well on the road 
toward political stability, that basically wealthy 
country can look forwai'd to economic develop- 
ment. Indeed, the process has already begun, 
but its pace can also heavily be determined by 
the business decisions made by many of you in 
this room. 

In contrast, at the time of the annoimcement 
of the "Great Leap Forward" in China in 1958, 
many predicted that the economy would grow 



between 65 and 85 percent in the next 5 years — 
the actual figure was minus 3. 

Looking to Viet-Nam and its future, I am 
sure that all of you know of the report on its 
economic future which David Lilienthal pre- 
sented yesterday to President Nixon. In that 
report, which was the result of an intensive 
study by a group of Vietnamese and American 
experts over a period of 3 years, Mr. Lilienthal 
proposed a broad development strategy designed 
to enable South Viet-Nam to stand on its own 
economically within 10 years after the cessation 
of hostilities. He pointed out that despite the 
war the economic wealth of South Viet-Nam 
in physical facilities and modem skills has in- 
creased. In many ways, South Viet-Nam is in a 
good economic position compared with other 
countries at the end of a war. 

Looking at the area of the Pacific Basin free- 
world coimtries as a group, including the United 
States and Canada on this side of the ocean, 
our best estimates are that the total GNP will 
about double between now and 1980. This esti- 
mate parallels that for the free world as a whole. 

Now, leaving out the United States, which as 
the most developed nation can expect a rela- 
tively moderate rate of growth, we find that 
the remaining free-world Pacific Basin states 
should, according to available projections, al- 
most triple their GNP between now and 1980. 
Looking at a few other interesting estimates, 
we find that United States exports to Pacific 
Basin coimtries should increase twofold to $25 
billion by 1980, while total Pacific Basin coun- 
tries' exports within the basin region should 
about quadruple in the same period. Of course, 
these estimates are based upon straight-line pro- 
jections of the present growth rates, and I would 
hope that the United States will share more 
fully in the increased economic actiAnty of the 
region than simple straight-line projections 
would now indicate. You here in PBECC will 
certainly be concerned with this in the future. 

One phenomenon of the past few years which 
may interest you is the development of an Aus- 
tralia-Japan-United States-Australia trade tri- 
angle. Trade in that direction increased 86 
percent from 1963 to 1967, while trade in the 
reverse, Australia-United States-Japan-Aus- 
tralia direction increased a more moderate 49 
percent. On the quantitative side, trade in the 
two triangulations was about equal in 1963; in 
1967 the difference between the two was over $1 
billion. While I wiU not attempt to analyze in 
depth this phenomenon, it is, of course, in part 
a function of the large surplus Japan has de- 



490 



DEPABTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN 



veloped in her trade with the United States 
in the past years, a surplus whose very size 
merits attention and concern. 



Growth of Regionalism 

Having touched on those factors which I be- 
lieve indicate that the Pacific Basin has the 
potential for considerable growth as an eco- 
nomic and political entity, I want to mention a 
few of the government-level regional organiza- 
tions which have already been developed and 
then, in conclusion, to state briefly United States 
policy toward the area in the light of the de- 
velopments I have described. 

To turn back a decade, when I went to Thai- 
land in 1958 to talk of regional organizations 
and regionalism among the countries of the 
area, it was just that — it was just talk. But 
developments in this field have moved much 
faster than I thought possible at that time. 

For example, in a small way, in spite of all 
the strife and the difficulties in the area, the 
four countries, riparian countries, of the Me- 
kong — Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, and 
Viet-Nam — are regularly sitting down together, 
working on the development of the Mekong 
Eiver Basin. This is one of the great possibili- 
ties, one of the great xmtapped resources of the 
world. This has been not just talk; it has been 
very practical. There are now about $115 million 
in projects on the Mekong already under devel- 
opment. As to the future, preliminary survey 
work has now been completed for the Pamong 
Dam on the Mekong — a $1 billion project that 
would produce twice as much power as the 
Aswan Dam. 

The Asian Development Bank indicates also 
a growth of regionalism, particularly in the 
economic field. We did not push nor promote 
this — frankly, we were somewhat reluctant part- 
ners in the Asian Development Bank. The Asian 
Development Bank has been established. Japan 
has contributed $200 million, we have contrib- 
uted $200 million, and the balance of its $978 
million capital has come from the countries of 
the area and Europe. 

The Asian Development Bank is now in the 
process of seeking special funds, that is, a soft- 
loan window to provide long-term, low-interest 
loans to the less developed members. Japan has 
already pledged $100 million, and we intend to 
seek legislation in this Congress to permit us 
also to participate. 

We also have the growth of other regional 
organizations. ASPAC, the Asian and Pacific 



Council, for example, is formed of the 10 states, 
free states of Asia, including New Zealand and 
Australia. We are not members, nor do we have 
any part in this. However, it is increasingly 
becoming involved in political problems and 
economic problems and is showing a cohesion 
and a common interest among the coimtries of 
the area that, again, I would have said would 
have been impossible 10 years ago. 

Other regional organizations include the As- 
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations, started 2 
years ago by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip- 
pines, Singapore, and Thailand; the Asian 
Parliamentarians Union, with nine member 
and three observer nations; the Japanese- 
sponsored Ministerial Council on Economic 
Development of Southeast Asia ; and the Japa- 
nese-sponsored Council on Agricultural Devel- 
opment in Southeast Asia. In none of these do 
we directly participate. 

Now, the point I am making is this : that thus 
far the growth of regionalism in the economic 
and the political fields in the Pacific shows very 
encouraging trends. I do not want to overstate 
it, but the trend is growing. 

Role of the United States 

What is the role of the United States in the 
developing pattern in the Pacific? Our basic 
political objective in the Pacific, as elsewhere 
in the world, is to contribute, as requested by 
the countries of the area, to the establislmient 
of a peaceful community of nations, each free 
to choose its own way of government and own 
way of life, to the development of its resources to 
the maximum, and to peaceful and productive 
relations with its neighbors. 

We recognize that to develop this kind of 
community of nations they have to have security. 
I am sure that we will honor our security com- 
mitments in conjunction with the efforts of the 
countries themselves, so that the productive 
work of economic development and social prog- 
ress can proceed with confidence. 

We recognize also that many of the countries 
of the region do not have adequate resources 
to enable them to carry out this development 
alone. We are prepared to contribute in appro- 
priate ways to this essential development 
process. 

This having been said, and while United 
States interests remain essentially the same and 
our commitments firm, we must recognize that 
there is undeniably a change in the mood of the 
American people. They will be cautious about 



JtrtiTB 9, 1969 



491 



undertaking new commitments. Tliey are be- 
coming somewhat impatient with carrying what 
many consider to be a disproportionate share of 
the burden of security and economic assistance 
abroad. They are asking more and more fre- 
quently what otlier countries are doing to help 
themselves and each other to share these bur- 
dens. It is a good and proper question. 

Thus, in the future, I believe the United States 
Government will encourage, but not foster 
directly, the growth of political and economic 
links among the Pacific Basin nations. The ideal 
would be a commvmity of the free states of Asia 
cooperating together in their common interests 
in the political and economic and security fields 
with which we are associated only to the degree 
that those states desire our association. 

As part of our policy of encouragement with- 
out paternalism, we look hopefully to the de- 
velopment of more nongovermental associations 
such as the PBECC. In this respect, I hope that 
in the future you will find it possible to expand 
your membership to include a larger number of 
Pacific Basin countries and that you will also 
maintain liaison with and give support to other 
cooperative initiatives within the region, sucli 
as the ADB and ECAFE [Economic Commis- 
sion for Asia and the Far East]. I hope also 
that you will extend the range of your activi- 
ties, as well as the size of your membership. Cer- 
tainly the possibilities are virtually unlimited 
for a group such as yours, concerned with an 
area of such vast potential. 

I hope that the members of the PBECC will 
serve the region by fostering increased invest- 
ment throughout the area and by working to- 



ward the removal of trade and investment bar- 
riers which impede progress. And it is only fair 
to say that the United States commitment to 
freer trade can flourish only if other nations 
share that commitment and act on it. 

Before closing, I would like to touch on one 
further area in which there are increasing signs 
of a Pacific consciousness. Apart from our own 
security relationship, we already have the fact 
that five countries of the area — Korea, Thailand, 
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand — are 
contributing to what they feel is a common cause 
in South Viet-Nam. Obviously, cooperation in 
the security field will come somewhat slower and 
with greater difficulty than it has already come 
in the political and economic fields. However, I 
feel that it will come, although it is not possible 
at this time to predict the forms and the way 
that it will take. 

These, then, are just a few thoughts of my own 
with respect to the great Pacific area, which I 
liope will make some contribution to your own 
discussions here, as well to the decisions each of 
you is being called upon to make with respect 
to the great enterprises you represent. May each 
of you continue to prosper and may the peoples 
of the Pacific Basin prosper with you. 

Senate Confirms Mr. Blatchford 
as Director of the Peace Corps 

The Senate on May 1 confirmed the nomina- 
tion of Joseph H. Blatchford to be Director of 
the Peace Corps, (For biographic details, see 
Wliite House press release dated March 18.) 



492 



DEPARTMETiTT OP STATE BTJLLETTN' 



". . . horn during a hot war, nurtured during a cold war, grow- 
ing up in a world of fantastic changes, the U.N., any way you 
look at it — up, down, or sideways — is a different kind of enter- 
prise today from what it started out to he in 19Jt6. Viewed 
against this hackground, it Juts worked rather well. . . ." 



The United Nations — Up, Down, or Sideways? 



hy Samu-el DePalma 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 



As we approach the 25th anniversary of the 
United Nations, it is useful to recall the words 
spoken by President Truman in San Francisco 
on June 26, 1945, just after agreement was 
reached on the United Nations Charter. In his 
customarily blunt style he said : 

You have created a great instrument for peace and 
security and human progress in the world. 

The world must now use it ! 

If we fail to use it, we shall betray all those who 
have died in order that we might meet here in freedom 
and safety to create it. 

The successful use of this instrument will require the 
united will and firm determination of the free peoples 
who have created it. 

The President spoke also of "economic and 
social cooperation"; of removing "artificial and 
uneconomic trade barriers"; and of "framing 
an international bill of rights." 

As President Truman spoke, the war against 
Grermany was barely over and the war against 
Japan was going full blast. The thoughtful men 
and women who drafted the U.N. Charter could 
hardly have been expected to foresee the begin- 
ning of the nuclear age even though it was only 
months away, let alone the other technological 
advances which followed in rapid succession 
and soon reinforced the ever-rising material 
expectations of less developed nations. They did 
foresee the rapid pace of decolonization, and 
they created an admirable political framework 
to support peaceful change — a framework 
based, of necessity, on the expectation of unity 



' Address made before the Council of Washington 
Representatives at Washington, D.C., on May 12 (press 
release 115). 



of purpose among tlie big powers. "With the 
ensuing cold war, however, this supposed bed- 
rock of cooperation soon turned into shifting 
sands of disunity and conflict. 

And so, born during a hot war, nurtured dur- 
ing a cold war, growing up in a world of fan- 
tastic changes, the U.N., any way you look at 
it — up, down, or sideways — is a different kind 
of enterprise today from what it started out to 
be in 1945. Viewed against this background, it 
has worked rather well, despite all the changes 
in assumptions and circumstances, despite 
disunity of the major powers on many issues, 
despite many attempts to weaken its structure. 

Up — Outer Space, Space Communications 

In fact there is solid evidence for the view 
that the U.N. is on the way up, and not only in 
respect to the number of members, size of budg- 
ets, or increases in personnel and programs. It 
is in a literal sense looking up, far into outer 
space. Here, as in other areas of U.N. concern, 
"invention is the mother of necessity," to twist 
the old saying a bit. Wlien nuclear weapons 
were invented, when ways were found to make 
artificial satellites circle the earth, when men 
began to fear that weapons of mass destruction 
might be placed in orbit — then these inventions 
mothered the necessity to do sometliing. Since 
the problems were the concern of all, the United 
Nations was a logical place to work ; and, hap- 
pily, the work has been successful. 

We are now protected against the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction being stationed in 
outer space. The credit goes to the U.N. Outer 
Space Committee, which negotiated the Outer 



JUNE 9, 1969 



493 



Space Treaty of 1966. The Astronaut Rescue 
and Return A^'eement of 1967 was also nego- 
tiated by this committee. Last year negotiations 
got underway on an outer space liability con- 
vention to provide a fair and expeditious way 
for determining damages and responsibility for 
any accidents caused by space objects. 

A new outer space interest of the U.N. is 
space commimications. The organization has 
begun to examine the implications of direct 
broadcasting from satellites to home receivers. 
Last October the Outer Space Committee set 
up a Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
Satellites. At its first meeting the working 
group concluded that direct-broadcast satellites 
will be able to reach community and village 
antennas witliin the next few years, reach aug- 
mented — that is, specially adapted — home re- 
ceivers in the mid-1970's, and reach unaug- 
mented home receivers in the 1980"s. 

A second session of the Direct Broadcast 
Working Group is scheduled to meet in July to 
consider legal, social, economic, and other inter- 
national ramifications of direct broadcasting. 
Some of the questions to be studied are : 

1. What existing international law is appli- 
cable to satellite direct broadcasting? 

2. Would satellite direct broadcasting, if its 
use were imregulated and left to the discretion 
of the space powers, have harmful political and 
cultural consequences ? 

3. Wliat kind of restrictions on direct broad- 
casting, if any, would be consonant with 
maintaining freedom of information? 

4. To what extent can it contribute to the 
strength and stability of developing countries 
by providing closer links between central gov- 
ernments and village authorities and by spread- 
ing information on agriculture, health, popula- 
tion control, and other basic problems? 

Down — Peaceful Uses of the Seabed 

A case can also be made for the allegation that 
the U.N. is on its way down. You are familiar 
with the charges : The organization is in debt ; 
the U.N. has done little besides talk about Viet- 
Nam and South West Africa; the sanctions 
voted by the Security Council against Southern 
Rhodesia have not forced that regime to change 
course; the U.N. has not brought peace to the 
Middle East or to Korea ; the organization has 
been taken over by the bloc voting of a lot of 
little countries which can, and often do, vote the 
big nations down. And so on, through a familiar 
litany of U.N. sins of omission and commission. 



All of this may have some truth. But it has not 
prevented the U.N. from engaging in many use- 
ful activities. The organization still maintains 
peacekeeping and observation forces. It still pro- 
vides a prime forum for diplomacy and for the 
mediation of disputes. Together with its family 
of specialized agencies, it carries on programs 
of agriculture, education, health, and economic 
development — programs which each year have 
grown in size and importance and reached more 
and more developing countries. 

But why go on? The allegation that the U.N. 
is so far down as to be almost out reminds one 
of the story about the bumblebee. This insect 
does not appear to have enough wing area to 
get off the ground; but the bee doesn't know 
this and goes ahead and flies anyhow. 

It is a fact, however, that the U.N. has also 
been going down in a constructive waj'. In the 
past few years the General Assembly has de- 
voted considerable attention to peaceful uses of 
the seabed, to ways to assure the harmonious 
exploitation of the potential riches to be found 
on ocean bottoms. The 23d General Assembly 
established a permanent Seabed Committee, 
which is presently trying to work out a list of 
basic principles to govern exploration and use 
of the seabed. This involves such diflicult ques- 
tions as deciding on the location of the bound- 
ary, or limit, of national jurisdiction and the 
kind of international arrangements that can be 
made to assure that exploitation of the area 
beyond national jurisdiction will be generally 
beneficial and harmonious. 

The committee is also considering questions 
relating to problems of marine pollution and a 
U.S.-sponsored proposal for an International 
Decade of Ocean Exploration. 

Next fall the General Assembly will be dis- 
cussing the results of the work of the Eighteen- 
Nation Disarmament Committee, which has 
"seabed disarmament" as a priority item on its 
agenda. President Nixon recognized the im- 
portance of this item in his letter of instructions 
to Mr. Gerard Smith, the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and head 
of our delegation to the Disarmament Com- 
mittee.- The letter included the following 
guidance : 

First, in order to assure that the seabed, man's latest 
frontier, remains free from the nuclear arms race, 
the United States delegation should indicate that the 
United States is interested in working out an inter- 
national agreement that would prohibit the implace- 
ment or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of 



' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 7, 1969, p. 289. 



494 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



mass destruction on the seabed. . . . Such an agreement 
would, like the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty on 
Outer Space which are already in effect, prevent an 
arms race before it had a chance to start. It would 
ensure that this potentially useful area of the world 
remained available for peaceful purposes. 



Sideways — Peacekeeping, Disarmament, and 
Development 

Having taken a look at some of its ups and 
downs, let us take a sideways look at where we 
can expect the U.N. to go from here. 

One overriding issue is peacekeeping. The 
subject is controversial — not that there is any 
controversy about the need for U.N. forces to 
keep the peace in the years ahead, only that there 
remain wide areas of disagreement on how 
peacekeeping operations should be authorized, 
administered, and financed. The Soviet Union is 
adamant that the Security Council alone should 
control all aspects of peacekeeping. This Soviet 
view, if adopted, would deprive the Secretary 
General of the flexibility he needs in carrying 
out the executive functions in support of peace- 
keeping operations. As for fijiancing, the Soviet 
refusal to pay the costs of most past peacekeep- 
ing operations has created uncertainty regard- 
ing future operations. 

Nonetheless, there are some signs of a grow- 
ing awareness on the part of the Soviet Union 
that U.N. peacekeeping or observation forces 
may be the most effective way of dealing with 
local disputes between smaller powers. It seems 
obvious that a world of independent sovereign 
nations, most of them armed ; a world of local 
enmities and regional tensions ; a world in which 
superpowers are asked to choose sides and help 
the small nations settle old scores against each 
other — this kind of world represents a vast 
tinderbox, requiring just one spark to set it off. 
A duel between small adversaries, with the su- 
perpowers acting as seconds, could provide that 
kind of spark. 

Secretary Rogers noted in his statement be- 
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Connnittee 
on March 27 that "To the maximum extent 
feasible this administration will continue to look 
to multilateral institutions — and particularly to 
the United Nations — to deal with threats to the 
security of weak and developing countries and 
to promote peaceful settlement of localized 
conflicts." ^ 

Recent studies, including the study on con- 
trolling international conflicts by a distin- 



• Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1969, p. 305. 



guished panel assembled by the UNA-USA, 
start from the premise that we and the Soviets 
share a conmion interest in using the U.N. to 
help stabilize local conflicts. These studies sug- 
gest that the time is ripe to seek an understand- 
ing on more reliable arrangements for U.N. 
peacekeeping. The possibility seems worth ex- 
ploring, though we await a clear signal from the 
Soviet side as to its readiness to cooperate. 

Three areas, in particular, are worth looking 
into. 

The first is how to satisfy the Security 
Council's legitimate interest in maintaining con- 
trol over an operation after it has been launched 
while, at the same time, protecting the Secretary 
General's executive flexibility to manage a 
peacekeeping operation. 

A second is how to assure reliable arrange- 
ments for supplying troops and facilities, in- 
cluding the possibility of agreements between 
member states and the Security CoimcU on 
terms and conditions for making troops avail- 
able. Suggestions have been made that various 
nations earmark certain contingents and keep 
them available on a standby basis for service 
with the U.N. when needed and authorized. It 
has also been suggested that the big powers, 
particularly the United States, maintain in a 
state of readiness certain kinds of logistic sup- 
port. The history of peacekeeping clearly shows 
how crucial such support is. To date, much of 
it has come from the United States. 

The third area of concern is financing. Many 
ideas have been advanced, including that of a 
vohmtary "peace fund," paid up in advance. 
This idea seems worth exploring. However, to 
be acceptable to the major powers, any arrange- 
ment designed to insure prompt and adequate 
financing would probably have to be tied to a 
special finance committee in which contributors, 
especially the major ones, would have a voice 
more commensurate with their contributions 
than is the case with the one-nation, one-vote 
formula which governs in the General 
Assembly. 

The key issue is not, of course, procedure but 
the extent of common political interest in U.N. 
peacekeeping. The U.S. stake in improving 
peacekeeping is manifest, but we cannot move 
forward alone. Tliere are few measures we can 
take by ourselves that will enhance the U.N. 
capability for peacekeeping. The central pre- 
requisites for reinforcing the peacekeeping sys- 
tem are: first, a greater measure of big-power 
cooperation; and second, the development of 
attitudes throughout the world that national 



JUNE 9, 1969 



495 



interests can be effectively pursued through the 
U.N. This will also involve the willingness of 
middle- and small-sized countries to contribute 
troops and other forms of support. 

Closely related to peacekeeping is the question 
of disarmament. The ultimate goal remains 
what it has been for many years: general and 
'complete disarmament. But there is not enough 
trust among nations and not enough experience 
with real disarmament to pursue this goal now. 
Trogi-ess is also retarded by the need to create 
mechanisms to guard against cheating where 
purely imilateral means are not deemed 
adequate. 

Therefore, we have looked for places, even 
small ones, where progress might be made. We 
have already banned weapons of mass destruc- 
tion from outer space. We have done the same 
for Antarctica. We have achieved a Limited 
Test Ban Treaty. We have negotiated a Non- 
proliferation Treaty. 

President Nixon has reaffirmed the U.S. inter- 
est in a verified ban on all testing of nuclear 
weapons as well as our desire for an agreement 
to cut off the production of fissionable materials 
for weapons purposes and to transfer such ma- 
terials to peaceful purposes. 

But there has been no progress in reducing 
existing stockpiles of either strategic or conven- 
tional arms, nor even in limiting the further 
buildup of strategic arms. That is why so much 
depends on the pending U.S.-Soviet talks on 
strategic arms limitations. 



Improving the Effectiveness of the U.N. 

There are areas, however, in which the U.N. 
has made rapid progress. The U.N. and the 
specialized agencies conduct an impressive series 
of economic and social development programs 
in many countries. We are getting ready to start 
the Second Development Decade, trying to 
build upon lessons learned from the First U.N. 
Development Decade. 

One lesson stands out: Economic progress 
must in the end be measured on the basis of in- 
come per capita — and population growth which 
matches or exceeds growth in production of 
goods and services can nullify progress, if not 
set it back. 

Rapid increases in population, and the fear 
that Malthus might be proved right, have 
caused individual nations and the U.N. itself to 
begin to act on programs of information and 
assistance in the field of family planning. Only 
recently have certain taboos been overcome. 



Only recently has the U.N. become involved 
with this delicate, vital, and complex field. To- 
day, however, in addition to the demographic 
activities of the U.N. Population Commission, 
both UNICEF and WHO are developing pro- 
gi'ams of assistance in family planning for vari- 
ous governments.* For the year 1969, the United 
States has given $2.5 million to the Secretary 
General's Population Trust Fund, in contrast 
with our contribution of only half a million 
dollars last year. 

I would like to mention one other item that 
needs attention. That is the whole U.N. admin- 
istrative system : progi-ams and plaiming, budg- 
ets, personnel, coordination of work. This may 
sound dull and prosaic, but some attention is 
necessary if we are to maintain reasonable effi- 
ciency in the administration of the U.N. devel- 
opment and assistance programs. 

Wlien the U.N. was smaller and its programs 
fewer, when everything needed to be done at 
once, then the problems of coordination had to 
be relegated to second place. There was room 
enough and work enough for all. But over the 
years total personnel in the U.N. and the spe- 
cialized agencies has increased from some 2,500 
in 1946 to some 30,000 as of December 31, 1968. 
Total expenditures of all U.N. agencies, exclud- 
ing the lending institutions, have increased from 
$24.7 million to $686.1 million over the same 
period. 

However, "bigger" does not equal "better." 
The answer to many problems is not necessarily 
"more." So we, along with other major contrib- 
utors, are taking a hard look at the whole U.N. 
administrative system, trying to weed out pro- 
grams whose effectiveness cannot be demon- 
strated and checking against wasteful duplica- 
tion and unnecessary overhead. Our objective 
is to see to it that available funds are used so 
as to achieve maxunum "through-put" in terms 
of results. 

As we get ready for the U.N.'s 25th anniver- 
sary, it is not enough just to be vaguely in favor 
of the organization. We must try to find ways 
and means to improve the effectiveness of the 
U.N. in all areas. This does not mean revising 
the charter or reorganizing the basic structure. 
It does mean taking hard looks at procedures 
and practices and making improvements wher- 
ever these are found to be needed and possible. 

We know the U.N. is good. Now is the time 
to make it better. 



♦ UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund ; WHO, 
World Health Organization. 



496 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND CONFERENCES 



U.N. Command in Korea Submits 
Report to the Security Council 

Following is the text of a letter to the Se- 
curity Council from Ambassador Charles W. 
Yost, U./S. Representative to the United Na- 
tions, transmitting the report of the United 
Nations Command in Korea covering North 
Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement 
during calendar year 1968. 



U.S./U.N. press release 46 dated May 8 

AMBASSADOR YOST'S LETTER 



Mat 8, 1969 



His Excellency 

Mr. Agha Shahi, 

President of the Security Council, 

United Nations, New York 

Excellency : I have the honor to convey, on 
behalf of the Unified Command established pur- 
suant to Security Council Resolution 84 of 
July 7, 1950, a report of the United Nations 
Command covering North Korean violations of 
the Armistice Agreement during calendar year 
1968. 

During the first four months of 1969, follow- 
ing the period covered by this report, the North 
Koreans have committed a number of additional 
violations, the most serious of which was an 
unprovoked attack upon a United Nations Com- 
mand work party within the Demilitarized 
Zone on March 15. A description of that incident 
is attached as a supplement to the United Na- 
tions Command report. 

These North Korean aggressive acts in vio- 
lation of the Armistice Agreement and the will- 
ful shooting down on April 15 of an unarmed 
reconnaissance aircraft of the United States, 
which was the subject of my letter to you of 
April 18, 1969 (UN Document S/9163),i are a 
source of grave concern. They demonstrate 
North Korea's intention to risk further escala- 
tion of the already high level of tension on the 
Korean peninsula. 

I request that this letter, together with the 



report of the United Nations Command and the 
supplemental statement on the March 15 inci- 
dent, transmitted herewith, be circulated as an 
official document of the Security Council.^ 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Charles W. Yost 



TEXT OF REPORT 

Report of the United Nations Command 
TO THE United Nations 

North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement 
of July 27, 1953, committed during the first eight months 
of 1968 and reported by the United Nations Command 
in its submission of October 3, 1968 (S/8839),' were 
exceeded both in frequency and magnitude during 
the final four months of the year. The United Nations 
Command considers these North Korean acts of in- 
filtration, terrorism and subversion to have been of 
such seriousness as to vrarrant a further report to the 
United Nations. 



North Korea's Record of Armistice Violations 
and Armed Incidents During 1968 

The year 1968 witnessed 761 serious incidents in the 
UNC half of the Demilitarized Zone and throughout 
the Republic of Korea as a result of North Korean in- 
filtrations, making it the most violent year since the 
signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953. (See 
Appendix. ) 

The attempted assassination of the President of the 
Republic of Korea in his Seoul residence on January 21 
by a 31-man commando team of the North Korean 124th 
Army Unit was documented and reported to the Se- 
curity Council in the United Nations Command Report 
of January 26, 1968 (S/SSee).' 

Continued North Korean acts of violence during the 
spring and summer months (through August) were 
documented and reported to the President of the Se- 
curity Council by the United Nations Command in its 
report of October 3, 1968 (S/8839). 

September witnessed a sharp increase in the number 
of North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement. 
During this single month, there were 88 incidents south 
of the Military Demai'cation Line. Fifty-five of these 
incidents resulted in exchanges of gunfire during which 
42 North Korean infiltrators were killed south of the 
Military Demarcation Line, making this the bloodiest 
month since 1953. During one such engagement, on 
September 24, seven North Korean intruders were 
killed, the largest number of casualties in any single in- 
cident in the Demilitarized Zone. 

In October, United Nations Command forces engaged 
North Korean infiltrators south of the Military Demar- 



' For background, see Buixetin of May 5, 1969, p. 383. 
' U.N. doc. S/9198. 

• For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 11, 1968, p. 512. 

* For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1968, p. 199. 



JUNE 9. 1969 



497 



cation Line on 41 occasions, as a result of which 29 
infiltrators were killed. During November and Decem- 
ber there were another 72 incidents of North Korean 
infiltration across the Military Demarcation Line in 
the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. Twenty-three of 
these incidents involved exchanges of gunfire, as a re- 
sult of which 14 more North Korean infiltrators were 
killed. 

The largest North Korean intrusion since the end 
of the Korean War occurred on October 30 and Novem- 
ber 1 and 2, when approximately 120 North Korean 
commandos crossed the seaward extension of the Mili- 
tary Demarcation Line and infiltrated into the Re- 
public of Korea in the vicinity of Ulchin and Samchok, 
two small villages on the east coast of the Republic of 
Korea, about 50 miles south of the Military Demarca- 
tion Line. According to the testimony of captured com- 
mandos, they had been ordered to : infiltrate and 
terrorize designated villages, liquidate "reactionary" 
Republic of Korea citizens, organize clandestine espi- 
onage networks, recruit or kidnap Republic of Korea 
citizens to be taken to North Korea either for intelli- 
gence exploitation or for training as intelligence agents, 
intimidate Republic of Korea citizens into executing 
oaths of allegiance to various North Korean communist 
organizations, and collect intelligence data and other 
information which would facilitate the planning of 
further operations against the Republic of Korea. 

The commandos were all members of the 124th North 
Korean Army Unit, the si^ecialized espionage and ter- 
rorist unit which had trained the infiltrators who had 
attempted to assassinate President Park in January, 
1968. They had received three months training for this 
specific mission in Sangwongun, near the North Korean 
capital of Pyongyang, and one month of guerrilla train- 
ing in Tongsam-ni, North Korea, before being sent on 
their illegal mission. They were heavily armed with 
submachine guns, hand grenades and explosives, and 
carried large quantities of equipment including prop- 
aganda material and Republic of Korea currency, both 
genuine and counterfeit. 

Their presence became known on November 3 when 
loyal Republic of Korea citizens reported their attempts 
to propagandize villagers and force them into cooper- 
ating through such terrorist tactics as beatings and 
murder. The Republic of Korea armed forces, national 
iwlice and militia reacted promptly and, with the active 
support and cooperation of the local citizenry, began 
a two-month-long pursuit of the infiltrators. In their 
anxiety to escape, these intruders committed acts more 
inhumane than any reported since the end of the Ko- 
rean War : on November 13, a Republic of Korea post- 
man was killed and his body savagely mutilated by 
bayonets; on November 17, a family of five, including 
two infants, was brutally slain, the children's brains 
having been beaten out by rocks or blunt instruments ; 
on November 25, another family was massacred ; and 
on December 2, a 58-year-old nun from a Buddhist 
Temple was stabbed 21 times, causing her death. 

Altogether, 122 Republic of Korea personnel were 
killed or wounded in defense of their country during 
the Ulchin-Samchok operation. These included 23 
civilians murdered and 4 wounded; 30 soldiers killed 
and 45 wounded ; one marine killed and 4 wounded ; 
8 members of the militia killed and 6 wounded; and 
one member of the national police killed. 



The North Korean aggression cost them 107 dead. 
Seven others, all oflicers of the North Korean Army, 2Lt 
Chong Tong-Ch'un, 2Lt Ko T'ung-Wun, 2Lt Kim 
Kwang-Chung, Jr., Lt Cho Ung-T'aek, 2Lt Yi Hyong- 
Su, Jr., Lt Kim Chong-Myong, and 2Lt Kim Ik-P'ung, 
were taken alive or surrendered. Their confessions have 
plainly revealed the North Korean regime's full respon- 
sibility for the operation, exposing as totally false 
North Korean propaganda claims that the commandos 
were "South Korean patriots." 



APPENDIX 



The Level of North Korean Subversive Activity 
Against the Repcblic op Korea 

ms me imr wes 
Significant Incidents: 

DMZ— South of the Military 

Demarcation Line 42 37 445 542 

Interior of ROK 17 13 121 219 

Exchanges of Fire: 

DMZ— South of the Military 

Demarcation Line... 23 19 122 236 

Interior of ROK 6 11 96 120 

North Koreans killed in ROK 4 43 228 321 

North Koreans captured in ROK.. 51 19 57 13 

UNO Military killed in ROK 21 35 131 162 

UNO MUitary wounded in ROK.. 6 29 294 294 
ROK National Police and other 

civilians killed in ROK. 19 4 22 35 

ROK National Police and other 

civilians wounded in ROK 13 5 53 16 



SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 

MnjTABT Demaeoation Line Incident 
OF Maech 15, 1969 

On March 15, 1969, a ten-man work party of the 
United Nations Command was fired upon by a North 
Korean guard post while replacing a Military Demarca- 
tion Line marker in the extreme western sector of the 
Demilitarized Zone. 

Paragraph 4 of the Armistice Agreement states in 
part : "The Military Armistice Commission shall super- 
vise the erection of all markers placed along the Mili- 
tary Demarcation Line. . ." Administrative agree- 
ments spelling out details for the implementation of 
this instruction were reached between the two sides on 
August 24, August 31, and September 17, 1954. The 
UN Command had, on March 12, informed the North 
Koreans that the marker in question would be re- 
placed on March 15. The work party involved wore 
proper identification and their activities were easily 
recognizable. Thirty-five minutes after they had begun 
to work, the North Korean guard post began firing 
across the MDL with small arms and machine guns, 
killing one UN Command soldier and wounding three 
more. 

At the March 26 and April 5 meetings of the Military 
Armistice Commission the UNO senior member pro- 
posed that joint observer teams be convened to observe 
future work along the Military Demarcation Line and 



498 



DEPAUTMENT OF STATE BULLETINi 



insisted on assurances from the North Koreans that 
they would not again interfere with this legitimate 
activity. The North Korean senior member failed to 
reply directly either to the proposal on joint observer 
teams or to the request for assurances. 



Charles F. Butler To Represent 
United States on iCAO Council 

President Nixon on May 2 (White House 
press release) announced the appointment of 
Charles F. Butler as the Eepresentative of the 
United States on the Council of the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization, with the 
personal rank of Minister.^ He will replace 
Robert P. Boyle, who is resigning. 

The Council has been established for the pur- 
pose of providing coordination for the member 
nations in all matters dealing with civil avia- 
tion. One himdred and sixteen nations are mem- 
bers of ICAO, and 27 serve on the Council. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with 
annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. 
Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Signature: Chad, May 21, 1969. 

Proc6s-verbal of rectification of the text of the proto- 
col of September 24, 1968 (TIAS 6605), on the 
authentic trilingual text of the convention of Decem- 
ber 7, 1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), on 
international civil aviation. Done at Washington 
April 8, 1969. Entered into force April 8, 1969. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement, 1968, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 



New York, March 18 through March 31, 1968. Entered 
into force December 30, 1968. TIAS 6584. 
Accession deposited: Spain (with a statement), 
April 28, 1969. 

Consular 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 
1967.' 
Accession deposited: Pakistan, April 14, 1969. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331. 

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, 
April 9, 1969.'' 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969.' 
Ratification deposited: Holy See, May 1, 1969. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 

1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into 

force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 

Acceptances deposited: Honduras, February 18, 
1969; Singapore, February 12, 1969. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London October 25, 1967.' 

Acceptance deposited: Israel, April 22, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relating 
to maritime mobile service, with annexes and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered 
into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 
Notifications of approval: Belgium, April 1, 1969; 
Finland, March 31, 1969; Korea, Yugoslavia', 
March 21, 1969; Malaysia, April 2, 1969.' 
International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Ratifications deposited: Jamaica,* Venezuela, April 2. 
1969. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement amending paragraphs 6 and 10 and extend- 
ing the agreement of May 9, 1961, as amended (TIAS 
4739, 5231, 6017, 6078, 6092), relaUng to sampling 
by means of balloons the radioactivity of the upper 
atmosphere. Effected by exchange of notes at Can- 
berra May 9, 1969. Entered into force May 9, 1969. 



' For biographic information, see VThite House press 
release dated May 2. 



' Not in force for the United States. 
' Applicable to Land Berlin. 

* Not in force. 

* With reservations contained in final protocol. 



JUNE 9, 1969 



499 



Burundi 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bujumbura May 6, 1969. 
Enters into force on tlie date of the note from 
Burundi indicating its approval in conformity with 
its constitutional procedures. 

Canada 

Agreement authorizing temporary additional diversion 
for power purposes of water flowing over American 
Falls at Niagara. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington March 21, 1969. 
Ratified by the President: May 19, 1969. 
Entered into force: May 20, 1969. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement on the reciprocal allocation for use free of 
charge of plots of land in Moscow and Washington, 
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Moscow May 16, 
1969 ; entered into force May 16, 1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on May 23 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Francis J. Galbraith to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Indonesia. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated April 24.) 

Kingdon Gould, Jr., to be Ambassador to Luxem- 
bourg. ( For biographic details, see White House press 
release dated May 5.) 

Spencer M. King to be Ambassador to Guyana. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release 
dated April 30. ) 

John Davis Lodge to be Ambassador to Argentina. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated April 30.) 

Matthew .T. Looram, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Dahomey. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated April 29.) 

Francis E. Meloy, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
Dominican Republic. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated April 25.) 

Armin H. Meyer to be Ambassador to Japan. (For 
biographic details, see White House press release dated 
AprU28.) 

David H. Popper to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Cyprus. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated May 5.) 

Oliver L. Troxel, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Repub- 
lic of Zambia. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated April 29. ) 

Sheldon B. Vance to be Ambassador to the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Congo. (For biographic details, 
see White House press release dated April 25.) 



Jack Hood Vaughn to be Ambassador to Colombia. 
(For biographic details, see White House press release 
dated May 1.) 



Appointments 

Daniel Szabo as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Inter- American Affairs (Economic Policy) effective 
May 19. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release dated May 19. ) 



Check List of Department of State 


Press Releases: May 19-25 


Press releases may be obtained from the Office 


of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 


20520 






Releases issued prior to May 19 which appear 


in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 115 of 


May 12 and 120 of May 16. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


123 


5/19 


Rogers : news conference on depar- 
ture from Saigon (printed in 
Bulletin of June 2). 


*124 


5/19 


Hadsel sworn in as Ambassador to 
Somali Republic (biographic de- 
tails). 


125 


5/20 


Rogers: SEATO Council of Minis- 
ters. 


126 


5/21 


SEATO final communique. 


»127 


5/21 


U.S. delegation to 1969 Moscow In- 
ternational Film Festival, July 
7-22. 


*128 


5/22 


Dudley sworn in as Ambassador to 
Denmark (biographic details). 


129 


5/22 


Lodge : opening statement, 18th 
plenary session on Viet-Nam at 
Paris. 


tl30 


5/22 


Additional U.S. contribution for Ni- 
gerian relief. 


*131 


5/22 


Program for visit of Prime Minis- 
ter Petrus J. S. de Jong of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. 


132 


5/22 


Seven-nation conference communi- 
que. 


133 


5/22 


Lodge: additional remarks at 18th 


(con-ected) plenary session on Viet-Nam. | 


134 


5/23 


Rogers : departure statement, Bang- 
kok. 


tl35 


5/23 


Rogers : arrival statement. New 
Delhi. 


tl36 


5/24 


Rogers: departure statement, New 
Delhi. 


tl37 


5/24 


Rogers : arrival statement, Lahore. 


tl38 


5/25 


Rogers : departure statement, La- 
hore. 


tl39 


5/25 


Rogers: arrival statement, Tehran. 

* 
ted. 


* Not prir 


t Held for a later Issue of the Bulletin. 



500 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



INDEX June 9, 1969 Vol. LX, No. 1563 



Argentina. Lodge confirmed as Ambassador . . 500 

Asia 

The Pacific Basin Potential (Johnson) . . . 488 

Secretary Leaves Bangltok at Close of SEATO 
and Seven-Nation Meetings (departure state- 
ment) 483 

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Examine Secu- 
rity Situation in Asia (communique) . . . 481 

SBATO Council of Ministers Meets at Bangkok 

(Rogers, communique) 477 

Aviation. Charles F. Butler To Represent United 

States on ICAO Council 499 

Colombia. Vaughn confirmed as Ambassador . . 500 

Communications. The United Nations — Up, 
Down, or Sideways? (DePalma) 493 

Congo (Kinshasa). Vance confirmed as 

Ambassador 500 

Congress 

Confirmations (Galbraith, Gould, King, Lodge, 
Looram, Meloy, Meyer, Popper, Troxel, Vance, 
Vaughn) 500 

Senate Confirms Mr. Blatchford as Director of 
the Peace Cordis 492 

Cyprus. Popper confirmed as Ambassador . . 500 

Dahomey. Looram confirmed as Ambassador . . 500 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Szabo) 500 

Confirmations (Galbraith, Gould, King, Lodge, 
Looram, Meloy, Meyer, Popper, Troxel, Vance, 
Vaughn) 500 

Disarmament. The United Nations — Up, Down, 

or Sideways? (DePalma) 493 

Dominican Republic. Meloy confirmed as 
Ambassador 500 

Economic ACFairs 

The Pacific Basin Potential (Johnson) . . . 488 

SEATO Council of Ministers Meets at Bangkok 

(Rogers, communique) 477 

Szabo appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Inter-American Affairs ( Economic Policy ) . . 500 
The United Nations — Up, Down, or Sideways? 

(DePalma) 493 

Foreign Aid. Senate Confirms Mr. Blatchford 
as Director of the Peace Corps 492 

Guyana. King confirmed as Ambassador . . . 500 

Indonesia. Galbraith confirmed as Ambassador . 500 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Charles F. Butler To Represent United States on 
ICAO Council 499 

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Examine Secu- 
rity Situation in Asia (communique) . . . 481 

SEATO Council of Ministers Meets at Bangkok 

(Rogers, communique) 477 

Japan. Meyer confirmed as Ambassador . . . 500 

Korea 

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Examine Secu- 
rity Situation in Asia (communique) . . . 481 



U.N. Command in Korea Submits Report to the 

Security Council (Yost, text of report) . . . 497 

Latin America. Szabo appointed Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Eco- 
nomic Policy) 500 

Luxembourg. Gould confirmed as Ambassador 500 

Marine Science. The United Nations — Up, Down, 
or Sideways? (DePalma) 493 

Military Affairs. Secretary Laird Urges Hanoi 

to Release U.S. Prisoners of War 484 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

Secretary Leaves Bangkok at Close of SEATO 
and Seven-Nation Meetings (departure 
statement) 483 

SBATO Council of Ministers Meets at Bangkok 

(Rogers, communique) 477 

Space. The United Nations — Up, Down, or Side- 
ways? (DePalma) 493 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 499 

United Nations 

The United Nations — Up, Down, or Sideways? 

(DePalma) 493 

U.N. Command in Korea Submits Report to the 

Security Council (Yost, text of report) . . . 497 

Viet-Nam 

18th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 485 

Secretary Laird Urges Hanoi To Release U.S. 
Prisoners of War 484 

Secretary Leaves Bangkok at Close of SEATO 
and Seven-Nation Meetings (departure state- 
ment) 483 

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Examine Secu- 
rity Situation in Asia (communique) .... 481 

SEATO Council of Ministers Meets at Bangkok 

(Rogers, communique) 477 

Zambia. Troxel confirmed as Ambassador . . 500 



'Name Index 

Blatchford, Jo.seph H 492 

Butler, Charles F 499 

DePalma, Samuel 493 

Galbraith, Francis J 500 

Gould, Kingdon, Jr 500 

Johnson, U. Alexis 488 

King, Spencer M 500 

Laird, Melvin R 484 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 485 

Lodge, John Davis 500 

Looram, Matthew J., Jr 500 

Meloy, Francis E., Jr 500 

Meyer, Armin H 500 

Popper, David H 500 

Rogers, Secretary 477,483 

Szabo, Daniel 500 

Troxel, Oliver L., Jr 500 

Vance, Sheldon B 500 

Vaughn, Jack Hood 500 

Yost, Charles W 497 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 156A 




June 16, 1969 



CENTO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS AT TEHRAN 

Statement by Secretary Rogers and Text of Cormrvanique 601 

THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 

Boston Public Library Jjy Arnbassador Robert Ellsworth 511 

Superintendent of Documents 
'^ U.S. SUBMITS DRAFT TREATY BANNING EMPLACEMENT 

jUl_ 1 1969 OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SEABED 

Statement by Adrian S. Fisher and Text of U.S. Draft Treaty 520 
DEPOSITORY 

THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970: 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN FOREIGN AID 

President Nixon's Message to the Congress 515 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LX, No. 1564 
June 16, 1969 



For sate by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and Items contained herein may be 

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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed In 

the Headers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN^ 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interestedagencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
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by the White House and the Depart- 
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agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
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CENTO Council of Ministers Meets at Tehran 



The 16th session of the Council of Ministers 
of the Central Treaty Organization was held 
at Tehran May 26-27. Following is a statement 
made hy Secretary Rogers at the opening session 
on May 86, together with the text of a com- 
rmxnique issued at the close of the meeting on 
May 27. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS 

Press release 140 dated Ma; 26 

It is a great pleasure to be able to participate 
in this year's CENTO Council session. I bring 
to my colleagues warm greetings from President 
Nixon. I join my distinguished colleagues in ex- 
pressing appreciation for the warm and gracious 
welcome that has been accorded to us by His 
Imperial Majesty and the Government and peo- 
ple of Iran. 

Some years ago, at a time when world affairs 
were dominated by a possible confrontation on 
a global scale, a system of alliances was put 
together for the collective defense of their mem- 
bers. Today we live in a more hopeful world. 
It could be that we may be moving out of an 
era of confrontation into an era of negotiations. 
We hope so — and we are doing our best to make 
it so. 

The United States intends to pursue all pru- 
dent efforts to improve our relations with the 
Soviet Union. 

We are preparing for discussions this summer 
on limiting the accumulation of strategic nu- 
clear weapons. 

We are searching with our European allies for 
ways to reduce tensions in Europe and ulti- 
mately to resolve the fundamental issues there. 

We are pursuing important talks with the 
Soviet Union on the Middle East. 

But this does not mean that the non-Com- 
munist world can relax its vigilance. 

We were reminded of this forcefully last year 
when the Soviet Union invaded and occupied 



Czechoslovakia to prevent the Conmiunist 
leaders of that country from carrying out in- 
ternal reforms which were clearly responsive to 
the wishes of the populace. We were reminded 
of this when the Brezhnev doctrine was pro- 
pounded, asserting a unilateral right to inter- 
vene in other Communist countries. We are 
reminded of it today in Southeast Asia, where 
North Viet-Nam continues its war against the 
South and where armed insurgencies are being 
promoted against Laos, Thailand, and else- 
where from outside. We see it in Northeast Asia, 
where the North Koreans have sharply stepped 
up their efforts at armed infiltration of the 
Republic of Korea. 

It is against such facts as these that collective 
defense alliances have been formed to promote 
a sense of security for their members. For a 
pervading sense of national security is a prior 
condition for the kind of national effort that 
must be made if governments are to respond 
adequately to the pressing needs of their peoples 
for economic progress and social reform. 

In CENTO, of course, we are primarily con- 
cerned with problems of the Middle East and 
South Asia. But events elsewhere in the world 
affect us all. None is more important than Viet- 
Nam, where my Govermnent is energetically 
pursuing a policy of a negotiated peace in which 
the people of South Viet-Nam will have the 
unconditional right to determine their own 
future. 

In Southeast Asia generally I found a grow- 
ing sense of confidence and of self-reliance. I 
believe that the source of their present con- 
fidence is quite clear and it is this : Their socie- 
ties are dynamic, and they are cooperating 
closely with each other. They are learning the 
habit of international cooperation, and a new 
spirit of regionalism has taken hold. 

I have sensed also in this region similar de- 
velopments — both in national progress and in 
regional cooperation. 

In the Middle East, which so vitally affects 
this area, the daily incidents are a cogent re- 



JXTNH 16, 1969 



501 



minder that active diplomacy on behalf of a 
permanent peace is necessary. The United States 
has been holding important talks with other 
major powers both in Washington and at the 
United Nations. These talks are reaching a more 
concrete stage; fimdamental differences remain, 
but some progress has been made. 

Equally as important to the development of 
healthy regional cooperation is economic 
growth. In modem society with its complex 
technology, many aspects of this growth must 
extend beyond national boundaries. 

In this important region of the world we have 
a long record of working together for our com- 
mon security and for economic and social de- 
velopment. CENTO complements and builds 
upon a wide range of close and active bilateral 
relationships. It is both a symbol of our mutual 
intent and a means for cooperation and 
consultation. 

Regional economic cooperation was one of 
cento's early purposes. Iran, Pakistan, and 
Turkey have been traveling along this road 
together for several years. We take some satis- 
faction that CENTO, and the United States, 
have been able to play a part in this achieve- 
ment. The efforts of the countries of this region, 
both in CENTO and in their own organiza- 
tion — the Regional Cooperation for Develop- 
ment — have our encouragement. 

The cumulative effects of the CENTO 
economic development program are very real. 
The program is a good example of what can be 
accomplished by an imaginative sharing of re- 
sources, and the accomplishments deserve more 
credit than they receive. 

It is fashionable these days to point out that 
the world has changed — and so it has. 

It is a more dynamic world than we knew 
until a few years ago — yet full of uncertainties, 
surprises, and dangers. 

I can think of no more stabilizing influence 
on the course of world affairs — no better sign 
of a hopeful future — than the remarkable 
growth of international cooperation, formal and 
informal, for security and development and or- 
derly change. We intend to honor all of our 
treaty obligations and our security arrange- 
ments. 

When nations meet to consult together and act 
together in their common interests, they con- 
tribute to a safer and a more progressive world. 
It is for this reason and in this spirit that the 
United States is participating in this meeting 
of the CENTO Council. 



I am confident that CENTO has an important 
role to play in the stability, security, and future 
of this area of the world. 



TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, MAY 27 



I 



Press release 141 dated May 28 

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Or- 
ganization (CENTO) held their Sixteenth Session in 
Tehran on May 26 and 27, 1969. Delegation leaders 
were: 

H.B. Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi (Iran) 

H.B. Mr. Shah Nawaz (Pakistan) 

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil (Turkey) 

The Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, M.P. (United Kingdom) 

The Hon. William P. Rogers (United States) 

A message from His Imperial Majesty the Shahan- 
shah Aryamehr welcoming the Delegations was read 
at the opening ceremony by His Excellency Mr. Amir 
Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister of Iran. Following 
the opening remarks by the Secretary General, the 
Delegation leaders, in their opening statements, ex- 
pressed their appreciation of the gracious message from 
His Imperial Majesty, and of the warm hospitality ex- 
tended to them by Iran. As host, the Chairman, the 
Foreign Minister of Iran, read his opening statement. 

The Council expressed regret at the death of former 
President Dwight D. Elsenhower of the United States, 
under whose leadership the United States began Its 
participation In all aspects of the work of the Organi- 
zation. 

In a broad exchange of views marked by cordiality 
and understanding the Council reviewed international 
developments since their last meeting in London. 

During the review statements were made to the 
Council regarding the following political problems : 

The Arab-Israeli dispute ; 

The efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the 
Vietnam problem ; 
The Cyprus problem ; 
The Kashmir and Farrakha disputes ; and 
The Shatt-al-Arab dispute. 

The Council expressed the hope that present tensions 
would ease and that the causes thereof would be