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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  155i 


April  7, 1969 


U.S.  POSITIONS  AT  EIGHTEEN-NATION  DISARMAMENT  CONFERENCE 
OUTLINED  BY  PRESIDENT  NIXON 

The  President's  Letter  to  UjS.  Representative  Gerard  Smith     £89 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  CHALLENGE  OF  AFRICA'S  DEVELOPMENT 

Statement  by  Waldemar  A.  Nielsen  at  the  10th  Anni/uersary  Meeting 
of  the  U.N.  Economic  Commission  for  Africa     292 

U.S.  SUPPORTS  U.N.  SECURITY  COUNCIL  RESOLUTION  ON  NAMIBIA 

Statement  hy  Am,iassador  Yost  and  Text  of  Besolution     301 

Boston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

APR  18  1969 

DEPOSITORY 


For  index  see  inside  tach  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1554 
April  7,  1969 


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Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

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STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
rruide  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  nuty  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  interruxtional 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


U.S.  Positions  at  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament  Conference 
Outlined  by  President  Nixon 


The  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Com- 
mittee on  DUarmam^nt  reconvened  at  Geneva 
on  March  18.  Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter 
from  President  Nixon  to  Gerard  Smith,  U.S. 
Representative  to  the  conference,  tvhich  was 
read  by  Ambassador  Smith  at  the  opening  ses- 
sion of  the  conference. 

White  House  press  release  dated  March  18 

The  White  Hotjse, 
Washington,  March  15, 1969. 

Dear  Ambassador  Smith,  In  view  of  tlie 
great  importance  which  I  attach  to  tlie  work  of 
the  Eigliteen-Nation  Disarmament  Conference 
in  Geneva,  I  wish  to  address  directly  to  you, 
as  the  new  Director  of  the  Anns  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency  and  the  head  of  our 
delegation,  my  instructions  regarding  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  United  States  in  this 
conference. 

The  fundamental  objective  of  the  United 
States  is  a  world  of  enduring  peace  and  justice, 
in  which  the  differences  that  separate  nations 
can  be  resolved  without  resort  to  war. 

Our  immediate  objective  is  to  leave  behind 
the  period  of  confrontation  and  to  enter  an  era 
of  negotiation. 

The  task  of  the  delegation  of  the  United 
States  to  the  disarmament  conference  is  to  serve 
these  objectives  by  pursuing  negotiations  to 
achieve  concrete  measures  which  will  enhance 
the  security  of  our  own  country  and  all 
countries. 

The  new  Administration  has  now  considered 
tlie  policies  which  will  help  us  to  make  progress 
in  this  endeavor. 

I  have  decided  that  the  Delegation  of  the 
United  States  should  take  these  positions  at 
tlie  Conference. 

First,  in  order  to  assure  that  the  seabed,  man's 
latest  frontier  remains  free  from  the  nuclear 
arms  race,  the  United  States  delegation  should 
indicate  that  the  United  States  is  interested  in 
working  out  an  international  agreement  that 
would  prohibit  the  implacement  or  fixing  of  nu- 


clear weapons  or  other  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion on  the  seabed.  To  this  end,  the  United  States 
delegation  should  seek  discussion  of  the  factors 
necessary  for  such  an  international  agreement. 
Such  an  agreement  would,  like  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  and  tlie  Treaty  on  Outer  Space  which 
are  already  in  effect,  prevent  an  anns  race  be- 
fore it  had  a  chance  to  start.  It  would  ensure 
that  this  potentially  useful  area  of  the  world 
remained  available  for  peaceful  purposes. 

Second,  the  United  States  supports  the  con- 
clusion of  a  comprehensive  test  ban  adequately 
verified.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  differences  re- 
garding verification  have  not  pennitted  achieve- 
ment of  this  key  arms  control  measure,  efforts 
must  be  made  towards  greater  imderstanding  of 
the  verification  issue. 

Third,  the  United  States  delegation  will  con- 
tinue to  press  for  an  agreement  to  cut  off  the 
production  of  fissionable  materials  for  weapons 
purposes  and  to  transfer  such  materials  to  peace- 
ful purposes. 

Fourth,  while  awaiting  the  United  Nations 
Secretary  General's  study  on  the  effects  of  chem- 
ical and  biological  warfare,  the  United  States 
Delegation  should  join  with  other  delegations 
in  exploring  any  proposals  or  ideas  that  could 
contribute  to  sound  and  effective  arms  control 
relating  to  these  weapons. 

Fifth,  regarding  more  extensive  measures  of 
disarmament,  both  nuclear  and  conventional, 
the  United  States  Delegation  should  be  guided 
by  tlie  understanding  that  actual  reduction  of 
armaments,  and  not  merely  limiting  their 
growth  or  spread,  remains  our  goal. 

Sixth,  regarding  the  question  of  talks  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  on  the 
limitation  of  strategic  arms,  the  United  States 
hopes  that  the  international  political  situation 
will  evolve  in  a  way  which  will  permit  such 
talks  to  begin  in  the  near  future. 

In  carrying  out  these  instructions,  the  United 
States  Delegation  should  keep  in  mind  my  view 
that  efforts  toward  peace  by  all  nations  must  be 
comprehensive.  We  cannot  have  realistic  hopes 


APRIL    7,    1969 


289 


for  significant  progress  in  the  control  of  arms  if 
the  policies  of  confrontation  prevail  throughout 
the  world  as  the  rule  of  international  conduct. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  must  attempt  to  exploit 
every  opportvmity  to  build  a  world  of  peace — 
to  find  areas  of  accord — to  bind  countries 
together  in  cooperative  endeavors. 

A  major  part  of  the  work  of  peace  is  done  by 
the  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament  Committee. 
I  expect  that  all  members  of  the  United  States 
Delegation  will  devote  that  extra  measure  of 
determination,  skill,  and  judgment  which  this 
high  task  merits. 

I  shall  follow  closely  the  progress  that  is  made 
and  give  my  personal  consideration  to  any 
problems  that  arise  whenever  it  would  be  help- 
ful for  me  to  do  so. 

Please  convey  to  all  your  colleagues  my  sin- 
cere wishes  for  success  in  our  common  endeav- 
or. Over  the  years,  their  achievements  at  the 
Eiehteen-Nation  Disarmament  Conference  have 
been  outstanding.  I  am  confident  that  in  the 
future  our  efforts,  in  cooperation  with  theirs, 
will  be  equal  to  any  challenge  and  will  result 
in  progress  for  the  benefit  of  all. 
Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 

Honorable  Gerard  Smith 

United  States  Representative 
Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament  Conference 
Geneva,  Switzerland 


Ninth  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Meets  at  Paris 

Following  is  tlie  opening  statement  made  hy 
Ambassador  Henry  Cahot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
n.S.  delegation,  at  the  ninth  plenary  session  of 
the  netv  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
March  20. 

Press  release  57  dated  March  20 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  Today  I  shall  exam- 
ine the  allegation  repeatedly  made  in  these 
meetings  that  your  side's  current  military 
offensive  is  a  response  to  the  new  U.S.  adminis- 
tration's stepping  up  the  war  in  Viet-Nam. 

It  so  happens  that  this  allegation  is  not  sup- 
ported by  the  facts. 

Indeed,  it  appears  that  your  side  planned  its 
offensive  long  ago  and  that  it  made  detailed 


and  careful  preparations.  It  is  clear  that  the 
attacks  which  were  launched  starting  on  Feb- 
ruary 22  were  not  undertaken  as  a  response  to 
any  recent  Allied  initiatives.  Tliey  were,  in- 
stead, the  long-heralded  "winter-spring"  cam- 
paign of  1969,  a  campaign  of  which  your  side 
warned  in  advance  and  of  which  it  has  boasted 
since. 

Let  us  look  at  the  evidence. 

First,  the  offensive  follows  the  pattern  of 
"fall-winter"  and  "winter-spring"  military 
campaigns  established  by  North  Viet-Nam 
since  the  early  1960's. 

Second,  the  relatively  low  level  of  North 
Vietnamese  and  Viet  Cong  military  activity 
during  the  period  preceding  their  current 
military  offensive  resulted  not  from  choice 
but  from  necessity.  North  Vietnamese  and  Viet 
Cong  forces  needed  that  time  to  regroup,  to  re- 
supply,  and  to  retrain  after  the  serious  losses 
suffered  in  three  unsuccessful  offensives  in  1968. 

Third,  the  Government  of  Viet-Nam  and  its 
allies  have  in  recent  months  discovered  huge 
caches  of  war  materiel  and  food  throughout 
South  Viet-Nam.  These  supplies,  carefully  pre- 
positioned  to  support  offensive  plans,  could  not 
have  been  emplaced  overnight.  They  show  care- 
ful planning  and  long  preparation  of  several 
months'  duration. 

Fourth,  North  Viet-Nam  has  infiltrated  mili- 
tary personnel  into  South  Viet-Nam  at  a  high 
rate  over  the  past  months. 

Finally,  public  statements  by  your  side,  cap- 
tured documents,  and  testimony  of  prisoners 
of  war  are  all  witness  to  the  fact  that  the  cur- 
rent military  offensive  was  planned  far  in  ad- 
vance of  January  20,  1969,  and  for  purposes 
other  than  those  your  propaganda  now  pro- 
claims. 

For  months  your  side  has  exhorted  its  troops 
to  new  offensive  action.  For  example,  on  Janu- 
ary 3  a  broadcast  by  the  so-called  "liberation 
radio"  called  for  military  attacks  aimed  at 
"fulfilling  their  role  as  a  lever  for  political 
attacks  .  .  .  ." 

A  document  entitled  "directive  number  four," 
by  the  Viet  Cong  Saigon  City  Committee,  called 
for  political  operations  coordinated  with  a  mili- 
tary offensive  in  three  phases.  This  directive  was 
issued  on  January  21,  only  a  few  hours  after 
President  Nixon  pledged  himself  to  a  search  for 
peace  in  his  inaugural  address. 

The  first  phase  was  to  mark  the  "opening  of 
a  great  wave  of  political  and  military  proselyt- 


290 


DEPARTMENT  OP  STATE  BULLETIN 


ing."  The  second  phase  called  for  a  concen- 
trated propaganda  campaign  among  the  urban 
population.  In  the  third  phase,  slogans  were  to 
call  for  direct  negotiations  with  the  National 
Liberation  Front,  a  change  in  the  delegation  of 
the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  at  the  Paris  meetings, 
and  the  formation  of  a  "peace  cabinet" — with 
"public  opinion  on  peace  issues  to  be  raised  to  a 
fever  pitch." 

The  testimony  of  prisoners  of  war  is  also  re- 
vealing. Typical  is  a  North  Vietnamese  Army 
captain  who  was  captured  February  24  near 
Tam  Ky  city.  He  had  been  told  by  a  superior 
on  or  about  February  8  that  a  "general  attack 
order"  had  already  been  issued.  The  objective 
of  the  attack,  he  said,  was  to  influence  the  Paris 
peace  talks  and  especially  to  obtain  acceptance 
of  a  coalition  government  in  South  Viet-Nam. 

These  are  not  the  words  or  actions  of  response 
to  alleged  escalation  of  the  war  by  this  adminis- 
tration. They  have  other  purposes  and  aims 
which  involve  the  conquest  of  South  Viet-Nam. 
Their  latest  unfortunate  manifestation  can  be 
seen  in  the  indiscriminate  shelling  of  Hue  on 
March  15,  of  Saigon  on  March  16,  and  of  Da 
Nang  on  March  19.  Reports  of  the  latest  indis- 
criminate attack  indicate  that  three  of  the 
rockets  hitting  Da  Nang  yesterday  landed  in 
wholly  civilian  areas  and  caused  at  least  six 
civilian  dead  while  wounding  23. 

It  is,  of  course,  true,  as  I  have  said  before, 
that  the  war  goes  on  in  South  Viet-Nam.  On  our 
side.  United  States  and  Allied  forces  have  nat- 
urally continued  their  military  operations  in  the 
defense  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

But  we  have  not  escalated  the  war.  United 
States  forces  have  been  operating  in  recent 
months  at  approximately  the  levels  which  pre- 
vailed throughout  1968.  The  United  States  has 
not  increased  the  troop  ceilings  announced  by 
President  Johnson  in  March  1968.  B-52  strikes 
against  enemy  base  and  staging  areas,  away 


from  populated  areas,  have  remained  at  the 
same  levels  since  March  1968. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  fact  is  that  the 
military  offensive  launched  by  your  side  is  not 
a  response  to  so-called  "escalation  of  the  war  by 
the  United  States."  It  is  a  calculated  part  of  a 
plan  to  take  over  South  Viet-Nam  by  force. 

We  call  upon  you  once  again  to  join  us  in  the 
search  for  peace. 

If  your  side  is  seriously  interested  in  bringing 
the  fighting  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  end,  let  us  to- 
gether take  constructive  steps  to  that  end.  And 
let  me  reiterate  here  that  no  imdertaking  of 
importance  can  be  carried  out  with  regard  to 
South  Viet-Nam  without  the  approval  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam.  That 
Government  is  the  legal  and  legitimate  govern- 
ment of  South  Viet-Nam  and  nothing  your  side 
says  or  does  can  nullify  this  fact.  You  should, 
therefore,  deal  seriously  with  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

The  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  have  made  a  number  of  specific  concrete 
proposals  that  can  lead  to  a  peaceful  settlement. 
The  restoration  of  the  demilitarized  zone  and 
the  mutual  withdrawal  of  external  forces  are 
steps  designed  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end.  Let 
us  begin  to  discuss  these  proposals  in  a  serious 
way. 


Senate  Confirms  Henry  Kearns 

as  President  of  Export-Import  Bank 

The  Senate  on  March  17  confirmed  the  nom- 
ination of  Henry  Kearns  to  be  President  of  the 
Export-Import  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press 
release  dated  March  7.) 


APRIL    7,    1969 


291 


The  United  States  and  the  Challenge  of  Africa's  Development 


Statement  hy  Waldemar  A.  Nielsen  ^ 


Let  me  first  express  in  behalf  of  the  Amer- 
ican delegation  our  gratitude  to  His  Imperial 
Majesty,  the  EtMopian  Government,  and  the 
people  of  this  splendid  country  for  their  warm 
hospitality,  which  has  contributed  so  much  to 
the  constructive  atmosphere  of  this  lOth  an- 
niversary meeting  of  the  Economic  Commis- 
sion for  Africa. 

A  decade  may  in  some  eras  be  an  insignificant 
instant  in  the  sweep  of  history.  But  the  past 
decade  in  African  history  has  been  truly  mo- 
mentous. It  has  witnessed  the  revolution  of  in- 
dependence and  the  emergence  of  new  and 
dynamic  approaches  to  economic  and  social 
development.  If  more  new  nations  have 
acliieved  their  independence  in  this  decade 
than  in  any  other,  so,  too,  have  these  new  na- 
tions— their  leaders  and  their  peoples — begun 
to  cope  with  more  problems  than  in  any  other 
comparable  period  of  time.  Above  all,  this 
past  decade  has  been  one  of  intense  challenge 
and  vigorous  response. 

In  these  crowded  and  busy  years  the  Eco- 
nomic Commission  for  Africa — its  distin- 
guished Executive  Secretary,  Robert  K.  A. 
Gardiner,  its  staff,  and  its  collective  member- 
ship present  in  these  meetings — has  made  three 
great  contributions  to  our  common  welfare. 
The  Commission  has  brought  a  realistic  ap- 
praisal to  bear  on  what  is  happening  in  Africa. 
It  has  had  the  wisdom  and  understanding  to 
point  out  the  path  that  Africa  must  take  if 
the  expectations  of  independence  are  to  be  ful- 
filled. And  it  has  more  and  more  turned  its 
abilities  to  the  immediate  issues  of  how  the 
governments  and  peoples  of  this  great  conti- 
nent can  take  practical  steps  along  the  road  to- 
ward self-reliance.  I  should  like  to  note  in  this 
regard  the  way  in  whicli  the  Commission's 
program  of  work  has  come  to  reflect  an  in- 
creasingly realistic  view  of  what  it  can  do  to 
assist  in  meeting  Africa's  deepest  needs. 


This  same  decade  has  been  a  time  of  rapid 
evolution  in  American  relationships  with 
Africa.  It  is  pertinent  to  recall  that  on  the 
eve  of  this  decade,  in  1957,  American  policy  to- 
ward Africa  was  given  a  decisive  thrust 
through  a  major  visit  to  this  continent  which 
led  to  an  enduring  interest  on  the  part  of  an 
American  leader.  The  visitor  was  Richard  ]\I. 
Nixon,  then  Vice  President  of  the  United 
States. 

As  President  Nixon  said  in  his  message  of 
greeting  to  this  assembly :  - 

I  have  seen  at  first  hand  Africa's  remarkable  po- 
tential. .  .  . 

As  we  look  ahead  to  the  next  decade,  all  of  us  have 
high  hopes  for  the  future  of  the  Continent.  The  United 
States  is  proud  to  be  associated  with  the  common  quest 
for  a  better  life. 

This  past  decade,  of  course,  may  mean  dif- 
ferent things  to  different  peoples,  and  I  would 
not  presume  to  interpret  it  for  other  nations. 
Speaking  for  my  Government,  however,  this 
has  been  a  period  of  intensive  education  and 
reeducation  for  us  about  Africa.  We  have  had 
to  discard  old  misconceptions  and  discover  the 
new  imperatives  of  African  development  in 
order  to  grasp  what  is  essential  for  United 
States  relations  with  this  continent. 

It  has  been  a  period  of  sharing  in  the  diffi- 
cult task  of  assisting  young  nations  to  build 
themselves  and  of  recognizing  the  rewards  of 
diversity  in  the  different  solutions  you  are  find- 
ing to  your  economic  and  social  problems. 

It  has  also  been  a  time  for  us  of  growing 
recognition   of   the   very   special   relationship 


^  Made  on  Feb.  6  before  the  10th  anniversary  meet- 
ing of  the  U.N.  Economic  Commission  for  Africa, 
which  was  held  at  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia,  Feb.  3-14. 
Mr.  Nielsen,  who  is  president  of  the  African-American 
Institute,  New  York,  N.Y.,  was  chairman  of  the  U.S. 
observer  delegation  to  the  meeting. 

"  For  text,  see  Btn-LBTIN  of  Mar.  10,  1969,  p.  211. 


292 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BTILLETIN 


between  the  United  States  and  Africa,  partly 
because  of  the  histoiy  of  our  national  develop- 
ment and  particularly  because  of  the  origin 
and  links  of  our  black  population  with  Africa. 
In  the  United  States  we  are  in  the  midst  of 
profound  and  sometimes  stormy  changes  in  our 
national  life.  We  take  pride  in  them  because 
they  are  the  evidence  of  work  in  progress  in 
the  building  of  a  more  truly  democratic  society. 
Out  of  the  experience  gained  these  past  years, 
there  have  emerged  five  themes  of  American 
policy  toward  Africa,  whicli  are  bound  to  grow 
in  strength  during  the  time  ahead.  These 
themes,  moreover,  are  linked  to  firmly  held 
principles  of  our  domestic  life  and  are  set 
within  the  framework  of  our  worldwide  policies. 

Consolidation  of  Nationhood 

Having  welcomed  and  encouraged  the  emer- 
gence of  new  countries  in  Africa,  we  strongly 
support  their  continued  national  development. 
This  means  that  we  do  what  we  appropriately 
can  to  help  the  new  governments  effectively 
respond  to  the  aspirations  of  their  people. 

It  means  that  we  favor  peaceful  evolution 
over  armed  eruption.  Conversely  we  are  con- 
cerned, as  Africa  is  concerned,  when  there  is 
a  breakdown  in  orderly  progress.  There  is  a 
long  history  of  American  sympathy  and  sup- 
port for  the  territorial  integrity  of  African 
countries.  The  Congo  is  one  illustration,  and 
the  present  deep  disquiet  over  the  consequences 
of  the  hostilities  in  Nigeria  is  another.  In 
Nigeria,  we  believe  that  the  humanitarian  issue 
of  saving  lives  of  innocent  victims  and  the 
political  issue  of  peaceful  settlement  both  com- 
mand the  utmost  attention  of  all  true  friends 
of  all  Nigerians.  The  fact  that  efforts  on  both 
counts  have  fallen  short  of  success  becomes  only 
a  reason  for  trying  harder. 

Economic  and  Social   Development 

The  United  States  has  not  only  favored  such 
development  in  Africa  but  is  one  of  those  sev- 
eral nations  outside  the  continent  which  have 
provided  significant  resources  in  the  form  of 
economic  and  technical  assistance  to  this  end. 
To  date,  our  contributions  to  the  developing 
nations  of  Africa  have  amounted  to  more  than 
$4  billion  of  public  funds  and  over  $1  billion 
of  private  investment.  While  the  new  adminis- 
tration in  Washington  has  not  yet  completed 
its  review  of  U.S.  foreign  policies,  including 
foreign  economic  policy,  I  can  assure  you  of 


continuing  American  interest  in  helping  you 
in  your  development  efforts.  Many  of  you  have 
met  and  talked  with  President  Nixon  when  he 
served  as  Vice  President,  or  in  his  subsequent 
travels,  and  you  kiiow  of  his  strong  personal 
intei'est  in  your  economic  progress. 

Economic  growth  throughout  the  continent 
is  essential  to  the  welfare  of  each  nation.  It 
also  has  broad  and  important  international 
implications.  It  is  conducive  to  sound  relations 
between  Africa  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  It, 
moreover,  depends  upon  and  contributes  to 
cooperative  relationships  among  African  states 
themselves. 

In  this  regard,  the  EGA  has  played  a  most 
significant  part  in  contributing  to  such  regional 
and  intra-African  cooperation:  in  helping 
establish  institutions  such  as  the  African  De- 
velopment Bank;  in  searching  out  opportuni- 
ties for  regional  cooperation  in  industrial  ex- 
pansion; in  cooperative  efforts  to  meet  the 
desperate  need  for  trained  personnel,  such  as 
the  Institute  for  Economic  Development  and 
Planning  in  Dakar;  and  in  assisting  multi- 
national projects  such  as  the  current  effort  to 
bring  together  other  multilateral  agencies  and 
bilateral  donors  in  developing  a  regional  pro- 
gram in  West  Africa  to  improve  rice  produc- 
tion and  marketing — a  program  which  the 
United  States  as  one  of  the  sponsors  enthusias- 
tically supports. 

In  addition  to  EGA,  of  course,  are  the  several 
other  members  of  the  U.N.  family  including 
the  specialized  agencies,  the  UNDP  [United 
Nations  Development  Program],  the  IBRD 
[International  I5ank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development]  and  IMF  [International  Mone- 
tary Fund],  which  are  contributing  to  African 
development.  We  are  pleased  to  note  the  evi- 
dence of  closer  cooperation  between  EGA  and 
the  other  members  of  the  U.N.  family  and  the 
instruction  to  the  Executive  Secretary  in  the 
draft  commemorative  resolution  to  continue  and 
intensify  his  efforts  in  this  direction. 

African  Self-Reliance 

Whatever  resources  are  available  from  out- 
side the  continent,  African  leaders  recognize 
that  the  major  burden  must  rest  with  Africans 
themselves.  There  is  no  substitute  for  African 
self-reliance.  In  the  sphere  of  political  rela- 
tions, self-reliance  avoids  a  major  pitfall — the 
danger  of  domination  by  others — and  provides 
a  sound  general  basis  for  mutually  satisfac- 
tory relationships.  In  the  economic  sphere,  it 


ArniL    7,    1969 


293 


means  the  best  possible  use  of  all  kinds  of  re- 
sources— financial,  material,  and  human. 

The  EGA  has  opened  up  such  paths  to  its 
members.  It  is  therefore  most  appropriate  that 
self-reliance,  the  theme  of  this  session,  become 
the  goal  for  all  of  Africa. 

Self-Determination,  Majority  Rule,  Equality 

Another  goal  for  Africa — one  which  we  also 
share  and  support — is  the  application  of  self- 
determination,  majority  rule,  and  human 
equality  throughout  the  continent.  Our  con- 
viction on  this  matter  stems  from  both  our  prac- 
tical experience  and  our  practical  idealism. 
We  know  from  experience  that  failure  to  apply 
these  principles  fully  within  a  society  taints 
these  principles  and  also  cripples  the  potential 
of  a  country  for  economic  and  social  advance- 
ment. This  lesson,  we  believe,  applies  with 
equal  validity  in  the  southern  portion  of  Africa. 

We  have  refused  to  condone  abroad  what  we 
oppose  at  home.  This  is  an  enduring  part  of 
my  Goverimient's  policy  toward  these  African 
problems.  In  this  assembly,  with  its  special  con- 
cern for  economic  and  social  progress,  it  is 
appropriate  to  underscore  the  added  handicap 
such  systems  impose  on  the  welfare  of  the  peo- 
ples involved.  I  am  sure  that  no  one  under- 
estimates the  difficulties  involved  in  seeking 
to  change  the  present  situation  or  the  insidious 
eifects  of  complacency  in  the  face  of  blatant  dis- 
crimination. Nor  does  anyone  advocate  the 
abandonment  of  principles  just  because  they 
are  difficult  to  achieve. 

Identity  of  Aspirations 

Perhaps  the  most  important  theme  which 
guides  our  relations  with  Africa,  but  also  one 
of  the  most  intangible,  is  the  identity  of  aspira- 
tions that  knits  the  peoples  of  our  two  conti- 
nents together.  I  am  convinced  that  this  iden- 
tity springs  fundamentally  from  a  common 
experience  in  the  struggle  for  freedom — yours 
in  this  decade  has  taken  the  particular  form 
of  national  independence;  ours  has  taken  the 
form  of  individual  human  rights.  But  in 
essence  they  are  the  same.  They  are  essential 
elements  of  life  in  the  heart  of  Africa,  as  in 
the  heart  of  America. 

When  Vice  President  Nixon  reported  his 
initial  views  of  Africa  over  a  decade  ago,  he 


spoke  of  things  all  Africa  had  in  common :  the  ' 
love  of  independence  and  the  determination  to 
protect  it ;  a  search  for  economic  progress  and 
the  means  to  achieve  it;  the  quest  for  dignity 
and  equality  and  the  right  to  expect  it  from 
others.  He  spoke  also  of  his  belief  that  Africa 
could  achieve  these  goals  and  that  the  result 
in  years  to  come  would  have  profound  effects 
on  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  his  inaugural 
address  of  2  weeks  ago.  President  Nixon 
quoted  a  distinguished  American  poet,  Archi- 
bald MacLeish,  on  the  astronauts'  view  of  the 
world  as  seen  from  outer  space:  "to  see  our- 
selves as  riders  on  the  earth  together  .  .  . 
brothers  who  know  now  they  are  truly 
brothers." 

Although  these  two  statements  by  President 
Nixon  span  the  years  we  are  commemorating 
in  this  ceremony,  they  have  an  identity  which 
we  all  can  share.  For  independence,  progress, 
and  equality  are  the  basis  for  the  brotherhood 
so  essential  to  our  common  future  on  this  planet. 


Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board 
Established  by  President  Nixon 

WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 

White  House  press  release  dated  March  20 

The  President  on  March  20  issued  an  Exec- 
utive order  establishing  the  President's  For- 
eign Intelligence  Advisory  Board.  The  order  J 
reorganizes  and  reconstitutes  the  President's  ■ 
Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  originally 
established  by  President  Eisenliower  in  1956 
as  the  President's  Board  of  Consultants  on 
Foreign  Intelligence  Activities  and  continued 
by  Presidents  Kennedy  and  Johnson  as  the 
President's  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory 
Board. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  order  the  Board  is 
charged  with  the  responsibility  of  keeping  the 
President  advised  with  respect  to  the  total  for- 
eign intelligence  effort  and  of  reporting  peri- 
odically to  the  President  its  findings,  appraisals, 
and  recommendations  for  achieving  increased 
effectiveness  of  the  United  States  foreign  intel- 
ligence effort.  The  Board  wiU  make  its  reports 


294 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


after  conducting  an  objective  review  and  as- 
sessment of  foreign  intelligence  and  related 
activities  of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency 
and  other  United  States  Government  depart- 
ments and  agencies. 

The  members  of  the  Board  have  been  chosen 
by  the  President  from  qualified  persons  outside 
the  Government.  The  members  of  the  Board,  in 
whose  qualifications  and  integrity  the  Presi- 
dent has  the  fullest  confidence,  are  as  follows: 

Maxwell  D.  Taylor,  chairman,  president,  Institute  for 
Defense  Analyses 

George  W.  Anderson,  former  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions 

WiUiam  O.  Baker,  vice  president,  research,  Bell  Tele- 
phone Laboratories,  Inc. 

Gordon  Gray,  former  Special  Assistant  to  the  Presi- 
dent for  National  Security  Affairs 

Edwin  H.  Land,  president,  Polaroid  Corporation 

Franklin  B.  Lincoln,  Jr.,  Mudge,  Rose,  Guthrie  and 
Alexander 

Franklin  D.  Murphy,  chairman  of  the  board,  Times- 
Mirror  Corp. 

Robert  D.  Murphy,  chairman  of  the  board.  Corning 
Glass  International 

Frank  Pace,  Jr.,  president,  International  Executive 
Service  Corps 

Nelson  A.  Rockefeller,  Governor  of  New  York 

J.  Patrick  Coyne  has  been  appointed  by  the 
President  to  serve  as  Executive  Secretary  of 
the  Board.  He  has  served  in  this  capacity  with 
similar  Intelligence  Advisory  Boards  utilized 
by  Presidents  Eisenhower,  Kennedy,  and 
Johnson. 


EXECUTIVE  ORDER  11460' 

Establishing  the  Peesident's 
Foreign  Intelligence  Advisoby  Board 

By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
of  the  United  States,  it  is  ordered  as  follows : 

Section  1.  There  is  hereby  established  the  President's 
Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board,  hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  as  "the  Board".  The  Board  shall : 

(1)  advise  the  President  concerning  the  objectives, 
conduct,  management  and  coordination  of  the  various 
activities  making  up  the  overall  national  intelligence 
effort ; 

(2)  conduct  a  continuing  review  and  assessment  of 
foreign  intelligence  and  related  activities  in  which  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  other  Government  de- 
partments and  agencies  are  engaged ; 

(3)  receive,  consider  and  take  appropriate  action 
with  respect  to  matters  identified  to  the  Board,  by 


'  34  Fed.  Reg.  5535. 


the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  other  Government 
departments  and  agencies  of  the  intelligence  com- 
munity, in  which  the  support  of  the  Board  will  further 
the  effectiveness  of  the  national  intelligence  effort; 
and 

(4)  report  to  the  President  concerning  the  Board's 
findings  and  appraisals,  and  make  appropriate  recom- 
mendations for  actions  to  achieve  increased  effective- 
ness of  the  Government's  foreign  intelligence  effort  In 
meeting  national  intelligence  needs. 

Sec.  2.  In  order  to  facilitate  performance  of  the 
Board's  functions,  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
and  the  heads  of  all  other  departments  and  agencies 
shall  make  available  to  the  Board  all  information  with 
respect  to  foreign  intelligence  and  related  matters 
which  the  Board  may  require  for  the  purpose  of  carry- 
ing out  its  responsibilities  to  the  President  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  of  this  Order.  Such  informa- 
tion made  available  to  the  Board  shall  be  given  all 
necessary  security  protection  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  and  provisions  of  applicable  laws  and  regula- 
tions. 

Sec.  3.  Members  of  the  Board  shall  be  appointed  by 
the  President  from  among  persons  outside  the  Govern- 
ment, qualified  on  the  basis  of  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence in  matters  relating  to  the  national  defense  and 
security,  or  possessing  other  knowledge  and  abilities 
which  may  be  expected  to  contribute  to  the  effective 
performance  of  the  Board's  duties.  The  members  of 
the  Board  shall  receive  such  compensation  and  allow- 
ances, consonant  with  law,  as  may  be  prescribed  here- 
after. 

Sec.  4.  The  Board  shall  have  a  staff  headed  by  an 
Executive  Secretary,  who  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
President  and  shall  receive  such  compensation  and  al- 
lowances, consonant  with  law,  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  Board.  The  Executive  Secretary  shall  be  au- 
thorized, subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Board  and 
consonant  with  law,  to  appoint  and  fix  the  compen- 
sation of  such  personnel  as  may  be  necessary  for  per- 
formance of  the  Board's  duties. 

Sec.  5.  Compensation  and  allowances  of  the  Board, 
the  Executive  Secretary,  and  members  of  the  staff,  to- 
gether with  other  expenses  arising  in  connection  with 
the  work  of  the  Board,  shall  be  paid  from  the  appropri- 
ation appearing  under  the  heading  "Special  Projects" 
in  the  Executive  OflBce  Appropriation  Act,  1969,  Public 
Law  90-350,  82  Stat.  195,  and,  to  the  extent  permitted 
by  law,  from  any  corresponding  appropriation  which 
may  be  made  for  subsequent  years.  Such  payments 
shall  be  made  without  regard  to  the  provisions  of 
section  3681  of  the  Revised  Statutes  and  section  9  of 
the  Act  of  March  4,  1909,  35  Stat.  1027  (31  U.S.C.  672 
and  673). 

Sec.  6.  Executive  Order  No.  10938  of  May  4,  1961,  la 
hereby  revoked. 

The  White  House, 
March  20, 1969. 


APRIL    7,    1969 


•295 


IJC  Asked  To  Study  Pollution  Risks 
From  Lake  Erie  Oil  Spills 

Press  release  60  dated  March  21 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

Identical  letters  were  sent  on  March  21  from 
the  U.S.  and  Canadian  Goveriunents  to  the  re- 
spective Chairmen  of  the  International  Joint 
Commission  requesting  the  Commission  as  a 
matter  of  urgency  to  Investigate  and  make  a 
special  report  on  the  risks  of  transboundary 
pollution  that  could  result  from  oil  and  gas 
drilling  and  production  operations  on  Lake 
Erie.  Recent  serious  oil  spills,  such  as  that  in 
the  Santa  Barbara  Chamiel,  have  led  the  U.S. 
and  Canadian  Governments  to  seek  to  deal  with 
any  similar  problem  before  it  arises  so  as  to 
minimize  the  possibility  of  such  a  disaster  on 
the  international  Great  Lakes. 


TEXT  OF  U.S.   LETTER 

RLvRCH  21, 1969 
Honorable  Matthew  E.  Welsh 
Chairman^  U.S.  Section 
International  Joint  Oommission 
Washington,  B.C.  20U0 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman:  I  refer  to  your  letter 
of  11  April  1968  '  reporting  the  results  of  an  ex- 
ploratory meeting  convened  by  the  Internation- 
al Joint  Commission  approximately  a  year  ago 
to  obtain  infonnation  about  the  programs  for 
drilling  for  oil  and  gas  in  Lake  Erie  which  are 
in  eifect  or  are  contemplated  by  the  Province 
of  Ontario  and  certain  of  the  riparian  States. 
In  that  letter  you  reported  that  the  responsible 
State  and  Pro^dncial  officials  considered  that 
there  was  minimal  risk  of  pollution  of  the 
Lake's  waters  from  drilling  and  production  op- 
erations and  that  "with  existing  technology, 
any  accidental  escape  of  oil  would  be  limited 
to  a  matter  of  minutes." 

The  recent  serious  oil  spill  off  the  coast  of 
California  may  cast  some  doubt  on  the  proposi- 
tions that  existing  teclmology  is  adequate  to 
confine  the  destnictive  consequences  of  a  run- 
away oil  well  or  that  the  risks  of  serious  pollu- 
tion can  be  described  as  minimal.  The  Cali- 
fornia experience  suggests  the  necessity  of  a 


'  Not  printed. 


careful  review  of  safety  precautions  and  pro- 
cedures applicable  in  Lake  Erie,  particularly 
in  view  of  the  shallow  and  confined  nature  of 
this  body  of  water. 

Accordingly  the  Commission  is  requested  as 
a  matter  of  urgency  within  the  framework  of 
the  existing  International  Joint  Commission 
pollution  reference  dated  October  7,  1964,  on 
Lake  Erie,  Lake  Ontario  and  the  International 
Section  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  investigate 
and  to  make  a  special  report  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible date  on  the  following  matters: 

(1)  The  adequacy  of  existing  safety  require- 
ments and  procedures  in  Canada  and  in  the 
United  States  applicable  to  drilling  and  produc- 
tion operations  in  Lake  Erie  to  prevent  oil  from 
escaping  into  the  Lake  so  as  to  produce  serious 
transboundary  oil  pollution  conditions; 

(2)  The  adequacy  of  existing  mechanical, 
chemical  and  other  methods  of  confining,  remov- 
ing, dispersing  and  cleaning  up  any  major  oil 
spill  that  may  occur  in  Lake  Erie  from  any 
source,  bearing  in  mind  the  damage  that  such 
metliods  may  cause  to  marine  life,  domestic 
water  supplies  or  to  other  beneficial  uses  of  the 
Lake  in  both  countries ;  and 

(3)  The  adequacy  of  existing  contingency 
plans  and  the  actions  taken  to  implement  them 
to  confine  and  clean  up  transboundary  pollution 
and  to  prevent  or  mitigate  the  destructive  trans-      „ 
boundary  effects  of  any  major  oil  spill  from  any     I 
source  that  may  occur  in  Lake  Erie. 

If  the  Commission  finds  that  any  of  the  exist- 
ing safety  requirements,  methods  or  plans  re- 
ferred to  in  clauses  numbered  (1),  (2)  and  (3), 
respectively,  are  inadequate,  the  Commission  is 
requested  to  make  recommendations  as  to  what 
action  should  be  taken  to  correct  any  such 
inadequacy. 

Aforeover  if  after  preliminary  investigation 
tlie  Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  interim 
measures  are  necessary  with  resjDect  to  one  or 
more  of  the  matters  being  herein  referred  to  it, 
the  Commission  is  requested  to  make  recom- 
mendations concerning  any  such  measures  in 
advance  of  submitting  its  main  report  and 
recommendations. 

The  Governments  of  Canada  and  the  United 
States  are  equally  concerned  about  the  risk  of 
serious  oil  pollution  in  the  Great  Lakes  from 
other  sources,  notably  major  oil  spills  from 
marine  or  industrial  mishaps  such  as  those  re- 
ferred to  in  your  letter  of  11  April  1968.  The 
discharge  of  oil  from  land-based  sources  and 


296 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


from  normal  vessel  operations  is  already  being 
studied  by  the  Commission.  The  threat  of  major 
oil  pollution  as  a  result  of  a  disaster  to  a  vessel 
in  the  Great  Lakes  involves  broader  interna- 
tional considerations.  This  aspect  of  the  over-all 
problem  is  under  study  by  the  two  Governments 
through  other  appropriate  channels. 

I  am  advised  that  a  similar  letter  is  being  sent 
by  the  Under  Secretai-y  of  State  for  External 
Affairs  to  the  Canadian  Co-Chairman  of  the 
Commission. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Martin  J.  HrLLENBR.\ND 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  European  Affairs 


World  Trade  Week,  1969 

A    PROCLAMATION' 

There  is  a  clear  interrelationship  between  America's 
economic  health  and  that  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  It 
follows  from  this  that  the  cause  of  stability  and  peace 
is  served  by  the  advancement  of  free-flowing  world 
trade. 

The  United  States  work.s  closely  with  other  nations 
to  promote  the  expansion  of  trade  on  an  equitable  basis 
in  the  world  market.  Our  national  trade  policy  sup- 
ports the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  and 
other  international  institutions  that  seek  new  ways  to 
facilitate  the  fair  exchange  of  goods  between  nations. 
By  reducing  barriers  to  trade  the  United  States  and 
its  trading  partners  have  contributed  to  the  growth 
of  the  world  economy. 

As  we  work  toward  freer  trade,  we  recognize  that 
our  greatest  strength  lies  in  the  traditional  competitive 
urge  of  American  business  and  labor.  As  their  interna- 
tional efforts  increase  their  earnings,  the  nation  bene- 
fits from  a  strengthened  dollar  position  and  an  im- 
proved balance  of  payments. 

Exports  of  United  States  merchandise  rose  to  a 
record  $34  billion  in  1968,  $3  billion  more  than  in  1967. 
Imports  of  foreign  products  into  the  United  State.s, 
attracted  by  vigorous  domestic  economic  activity  and 
rising  consumer  income,  reached  almost  $33  billion,  an 
increase  of  $6  billion. 

Since  imports  advanced  much  faster  than  exports, 
our  trade  .surplus  dropped  $3  billion  to  a  total  of  less 
than  $1  billion.  One  lesson  in  this  decline  is  especially 
important :  We  mu.st  intensify  our  efforts  to  contain 
inflationary  pressures  at  home,  helping  make  our  ex- 
ports more  competitive ;  as  our  exports  expand,  we  will 
restore  a  healthy  trade  surplus. 

Additional  outlets  are  needed  for  the  diver.sity  and 
abundance  of  our  industrial  and  agricultural  produc- 
tion. We  also  must  find  ways  to  help  less  developed 
countries  participate  more  fully  in  world  trade. 

Enlarged  markets  for  our  goods  and  services  speed 


the  pace  of  our  economic  progress  and  advance  the 
well-being  of  all  our  people.  New  markets  abroad 
create  new  jobs  at  home ;  new  avenues  of  world  trade 
run  parallel  to  new  roads  to  world  peace. 

Government  in  the  past  has  helped  American  industry 
and  agriculture  to  open  up  new  markets  abroad;  to- 
day we  are  more  willing  and  better  prepared  to  help 
than  ever  before. 

Now,  THEREFORE,  I,  RICHARD  NixoN,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  the  week 
beginning  May  18,  1969,  as  World  Trade  Week;  and 
I  request  the  appropriate  Federal,  State,  and  local 
officials  to  cooperate  in  the  observance  of  that  week. 

I  iirge  business,  labor,  agricultural,  educational,  pro- 
fessional, and  civic  groups,  as  well  as  the  people  of 
the  United  States  generally,  to  observe  World  Trade 
Week  with  gatherings,  discussions,  exhibits,  cere- 
monies, and  other  appropriate  activities  designed  to 
promote  continuing  awareness  of  the  importance  of 
world  trade  to  our  economy  and  our  relations  with 
other  nations. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
this  eighteenth  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
nineteen  hundred  and  sixty-nine,  and  of  the  Independ- 
ence of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one  hundred 
and  ninety-third. 


National  Maritime  Day,  1969 

A    PROCLAMATION' 

The  American  Merchant  Marine  must  project  the 
Nation's  economic  strength  throughout  the  world  in 
peacetime  and  give  mobility  to  our  national  defense  in 
times  of  emergency.  Its  vessels  must  enable  us  to  com- 
pete effectively  in  international  trade  and  to  trans- 
port and  supply  our  Armed  Forces  in  defense  of 
freedom. 

Through  the  cooperation  of  business,  labor,  and 
Government,  and  with  prudent  use  of  advancing  tech- 
nology, the  American  Merchant  Marine  must  become 
capable  of  providing  modern,  productive  service  to 
the  Nation's  commerce  as  an  integral  part  of 
transportation. 

A  strong  and  profitable  merchant  fleet  is  vital  to 
America's  economic  welfare  and  defense  capability.  The 
American  flag  on  merchant  vessels  on  the  high  seas  and 
in  foreign  ports  is  a  symbol  of  our  Nation's  dedication 
to  peaceful  trade  throughout  the  world. 

To  remind  Americans  of  the  Important  role  the 
Merchant  Marine  plays  in  our  national  life,  the  Con- 
gress in  1933  designated  the  anniversary  of  the  first 
transatlantic  voyage  by  a  steamship,  the  SS  Savannah, 
on  May  22,  1819,  as  National  Maritime  Day,  and  re- 
quested the  Pre.sident  to  issue  a  proclamation  annually 
in  observance  of  that  day. 

Now,  THEREFORE,  I,  RICHARD  NixoN,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  urge  the  people 


'  No.  3901 ;  34  Fed.  Reg.  .5423. 


'  No.  3902 ;  34  Fed.  Reg.  .5479. 


APRIL,    7,    1969 


297 


of  the  United  States  to  honor  our  American  Merchant 
Marine  on  May  22,  1969,  by  displaying  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  at  their  homes  and  other  suitable  places, 
and  I  request  that  all  ships  sailing  under  the  American 
flag  dress  ship  on  that  day  in  tribute  to  the  American 
Merchant  Marine. 

In  witness  whebeof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
this  eighteenth  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
nineteen  hundred  and  sixty-nine,  and  of  the  Inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one 
hundred  and  ninety-third. 


Patent  and  Copyright  Conventions 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Message  From  President  Nixon  ^ 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

I  transmit  herewith,  for  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  ( 1 )  a  copy  of 
the  Convention  Establishing  the  World  Intel- 
lectual Property  Organization,  signed  at  Stock- 
holm on  July  14,  1967,  and  (2)  a  copy  of  the 
Paris  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Indus- 
trial Property,  as  revised  at  Stockholm  on 
July  14,  1967. 1  transmit  also,  for  the  informa- 
tion of  the  Senate,  the  report  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  with  respect  to  the  Conventions. 

The  Conventions  remained  open  for  signature 
until  January  13,  1968.  During  that  period  the 
Convention  Establishing  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization  was  signed  on  behalf 
of  51  States,  including  the  United  States,  and 
the  Paris  Convention  was  signed  on  behalf  of 
46  States,  including  the  United  States.  Both 
Conventions  remain  open  for  accession. 

(1)  Convention  Establishing  a  World  Intel- 
lectual Property  Organization.  Two  significant 
services  will  be  rendered  by  the  new  organiza- 
tion. First,  it  will  provide  a  coordinated  admin- 


istration for  the  various  intellectual  property 
Unions  presently  administered  by  the  Secre- 
tariat, the  United  International  Bureaus  for  the 
Protection  of  Intellectual  Property,  and 
through  such  administration,  render  an  econom- 
ical and  efficient  service  to  the  Member  States 
and  the  interests  protected  by  the  Unions.  Sec- 
ond, it  will  promote  the  protection  of  intellec- 
tual property,  not  only  for  Member  States  of 
the  intellectual  property  Unions,  but  also  for 
the  States  which,  while  not  members  of  the 
Unions,  are  parties  to  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization  Convention.  This  is  of 
particular  importance  since  a  forum  will  thus 
be  provided  for  the  advancement  of  industrial 
property  and  copyright  protection  on  a  world- 
wide basis. 

(2)  Revision  of  the  Paris  Convention  for  the 
Protection  of  Industrial  Property.  Adminis- 
trative and  structural  reforms  in  the  Paris 
Convention  have  long  been  overdue,  and  the 
modernization  of  the  Union  which  has  been 
accomplished  by  the  Stockholm  revision  will  be 
of  importance  in  expanding  the  protection  of 
industrial  property. 

A  limited  amendment  to  one  substantive  pro- 
vision of  the  Paris  Convention  was  also  effected 
at  the  Conference.  This  amendment  would 
accord  to  applications  for  inventors'  certificates 
of  the  Eastern  European  countries  the  right  of 
priority  presently  accorded  to  patent  applica- 
tions, provided  that  the  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries maintain  a  dual  system  of  both  inventors' 
certificates  and  patents  and  that  both  are  avail- 
able to  foreign  nationals.  Inclusion  of  this 
provision  is  considered  helpful  to  furthering 
industrial  property  relations  with  Eastern 
European  countries. 

The  Stockholm  Act  of  the  Paris  Convention 
and  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organiza- 
tion Convention  will  make  a  significant  con- 
tribution to  the  protection  of  the  foreign 
intellectual  property  rights  of  American 
nationals.  I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give 
early  and  favorable  consideration  to  the  Con- 
ventions submitted  herewith  and  give  its  advice 
and  consent  to  their  ratifications. 


'Transmitted  on  Mar.  12  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  A,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
which  includes  the  texts  of  the  conventions  and  the 
report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 


Richard  Nixon 


The  White  House, 

March  12,  1968. 


298 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  ^ 


Scheduled  April  Through  June 

Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Committee  on  Disarmament  (resumed 

March  18). 
International  Institute  for  the  Unification  of  Private  Law:   Governing 
f~  Council. 

ECE  Group  of  Rapporteurs  on  Customs  Questions  on  Transport 

UNCTAD  Committee  on  Shipping:  3d  Session 

Economic  Commission  for  Europe:  24th  Plenary  Session 

6th  ICAO  Air  Navigation  Conference 

U.N.  International  Conference  of  Plenipotentiaries  on  the  Law  of  Treaties: 

2d  Session. 

NATO  Ministerial  Council:  43d  Meeting 

FAO  Study  Group  on  Hard  Fibers  and  Consultative  Subcommittee:  3d 

Session. 
BIRPI   Council   of   Europe:  Joint  Ad  Hoc   Meeting   on   International 

Classification  of  Patents. 

ECE  Group  of  Rapporteurs  on  Air  Pollution 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Marine  Pollution:  6th  Session 

Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America:  13th  Session 

FAO  Banana  Study  Group  and  Committee  on  Statistics 

Inter-American  Children's  Institute:  49th  Session  of  the  Directing  Council 

IMCO  Legal  Committee:  5th  Session 

Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East:  25th  Plenary  Session  . 
FAO  European   Commission  for  Control  of  Foot  and   Mouth   Disease: 

16th  Session. 
BIRPI  Paris  Union  Committee  for  International  Cooperation  in  Informa- 
tion Retrieval  Among  Examining  Patent  Offices:    1st   Session   of  the 

Technical  Coordination  Committee. 

FAO  Committee  on  Fisheries:  4th  Session 

WMO  Executive  Committee:  Working  Group  of  Experts  on  Antarctic 

Meteorology. 
Inter- American  Institute  of  Agricultural  Sciences:  8th  Annual  Meeting  of 

the  Board  of  Directors,  3d  Meeting  Permanent  Budget  Committee,  and 

14th  Meeting  of  Technical  Advisory  Council. 
BIRPI  Consultants  on  the  Proposed  Patent  Cooperation  Treaty  .... 

ECOSOC  Committee  for  Program  and  Coordination 

UNESCO  Executive  Board:  82d  Session 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Ooeanographic  Commission:  Working  Group 

on  Restructuring  IOC. 

U.N.  Industrial  Development  Organization 

OECD  Agriculture  Committee 

ECE  Working  Party  on  the  Transport  of  Dangerous  Goods 

UNCTAD  Special  Committee  on  Preferences:  2d  Session 

ILO  Chemical  Industries  Committee:  9th  Session 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Border  Taxes 


Geneva     .    . 

Mar.  14,  1962— 

Rome    .    .    . 

Apr.  1-2 

Geneva     .    . 
Geneva     .    . 
Geneva     .    . 
Montreal  .    . 
Vienna  .    .    . 

Apr.  8-11 
Apr.  9-25 
Apr.  9-25 
Apr.  9-May  3 
Apr.  9- May  21 

Washington . 
Rome    .    .    . 

Apr.  10-11 
Apr.  10-19 

Bern  .... 

Apr.  14-16 

Geneva     .    .    . 
London     .    .    . 

Lima 

Pan  ami    .    .    . 
Montevideo .    . 
London     .    .    . 
Singapore .    .    . 
Rome    .    .    .    . 

Apr.  14-18 
Apr.  14-18 
Apr.  14-21 
Apr.  14-22 
Apr.  14-27 
Apr.  15-18 
Apr.  15-28 
Apr.  16-18 

Geneva     .    .    . 

Apr.  17-18 

Rome    .    .    .    . 
Buenos  Aires    . 

Apr.  17-23 
Apr.  17-25 

Quito     .    .    .    . 

Apr.  20-27 

Geneva     .    .    . 
New  York    .    . 

Paris 

Paris 

Apr.  21-24 
Apr.  21-May  9 
Apr.  22-May  20 
Apr.  23-26 

Vienna  .    .    .    . 

Paris 

Geneva     .    .    . 
Geneva     .    .    . 
Geneva     .    .    . 
Geneva     .    .    . 

Apr.  24-May  15 
Apr.  28-30 
Apr.  28-May  2 
Apr.  28-May  2 
Apr.  28-May  9 
April 

'  This  schedule,  which  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences  on  Mar.  19,  1969,  lists  inter- 
national conferences  in  which  the  U.S.  Government  expects  to  participate  officially  in  the  period  March-June 
1969.  The  list  does  not  include  numerous  nongovernmental  conferences  and  meetings.  Persons  interested  in  those 
are  referred  to  the  World  List  of  Future  International  Meetings,  compiled  by  the  Library  of  Congress  and  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government?  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

Following  is  a  key  to  the  abbreviations:  BIRPI,  United  International  Bureaux  for  the  Protection  of  Intel- 
lectual Property;  ECAFE,  Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far  East;  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for 
Europe;  ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social  Council;* FAO,  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  GATT,  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  IAEA,  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency;  lA-ECOSOC,  Inter-American 
Economic  and  Social  Council;  ICAO,  In ternational; Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ICEM,  Intergovernmental  Com- 
mittee on  European  Migration;  ILO,  International  Labor  Organization;  IMCO,  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization;  ITU,  International  Telecommunication  Union;  NATO,  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Orga- 
nization; OECD,  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development;  PAHO,  Pan  American  Health  Organi- 
zation; PAIGH,  Pan  American  Institute  of  Geography  and  History;  SEATO,  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organization; 
U.N.,  United  Nations;  UNCTAD  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development;  UNDP,  United  Nations 
Development  Program;  UNESCO,  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization;  UNICEF, 
United  Nations  Children's  Fund;  WHO,  World  Health  Organization;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 


APRIL    7,    1969 


299 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences —Continued 

Scheduled  April  Through  June — Continued 


Hague  Conference  on  Private  International  Law:  Special  Commission  on 

Products  Liability. 

IAEA  Board  of  Governors:  Special  Meeting 

ICAO  Panel  on  Study  of  Economics  of  Route  Air  Facilities 

ITU  Administrative  Council 

FAO  Codex  Committees 

FAO  Intergovernmental  Committee  of  the  World  Food  Program  .... 
IMCO  Working  Group  on  IMCO  Objectives  and  Methods:  2d  Session    . 

WMO  Regional  Association  VI  (Europe) :  5th  Session 

ECE  Working  Party  on  Road  Traffic  Safety 

Northeast  Atlantic  Fisheries  Commission:  7th  Annual  Meeting     .... 

OECD  Energy  Committee 

IMCO  Council:  22d  Session 

ICEM  Council:  30th  Session,  and  Executive  Committee,  33d  Session  .    . 

Economic  and  Social  Council:  46th  Session 

PAHO   Conference  of  American  Ministers  of  Agriculture  on  Hoof  and 

Mouth  Disease. 

FAO  Study  Group  on  Citrus  Fruit:  4th  Session 

UNCTAD  Committee  on  Commodities:  4th  Session 

UNICEF  Executive  Board 

SEATO  Council:  14th  Meeting 

FAO  Study  Group  on  Grains:  12th  Session 

PAIGH  Directing  Council:  12th  Meeting 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  Commission:  Coordination 

Group  on  Southern  Ocean. 

ILO  Governing  Body:  175th  Session 

ICAO  Statistics  Panel 

U.N.  Trusteeship  Council:  26th  Session 

ITU  Working  Party  of  the  International  Radio  Consultative  Committee  . 

WMO  Executive  Committee:  21st  Session 

IMCO  Conference  on  Tonnage  Measurement 

Pan  American  Institute  of  Geography  and  History:  9th  General  Assembly. 
U.N.  Scientific  Advisory  Committee  on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation: 

19th  Session. 
UNESCO  Executive  Committee  of  the  International  Campaign  to  Save 

the  Monuments  of  Nubia:  17th  Meeting. 

International  Coffee  Organization  Council 

International  Coffee  Organization  Executive  Board 

International  Cotton  Advisorj^  Committee 

International  Cotton  Institute:  4th  General  Assembly 

U.N.  Legal  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer 

Space. 
International    Commission  for  the   Northwest   Atlantic   Fisheries:    19th 

Meeting. 

ECAFE  Conference  of  Asian  Statisticians:  9th  Session 

Inter-American  Cultural  Council:  6th  Meeting 

ILO  Conference:  53d  Session 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  Commission:  Working  Group 

to  Prepare  Proposals  on  Expanded  Scientific  Programs  for  6th  IOC 

Meeting. 

FAO  Council :  52d  Session 

BIRPI  Consultants  on  Patent  Cooperation  Treaty 

lA-ECOSOC  Ministerial  and  Expert  Level  Meetings 

Permanent  International  Association  of  Navigation  Congresses 

UNESCO  Working  Group  on  Legal  Aspects  of  Scientific  Investigation    . 

ICAO  Passport  Card  Panel 

UNDP  Governing  Council:  8th  Session 

International  Whaling  Commission 

UNCTAD  Intergovernmental  Group  on  Supplementary  Financing  .    .    . 

International  Wheat  Council 

ILO  Governing  Body:  176th  Session 

UNCTAD  Special  Committee  on  Preferences:  3d  Session 

ECE  Conference  of  European  Statisticians:  17th  Plenary  Session  .... 
FAO/WHO  Joint  Committee  of   Government  Experts  on  the  Code  of 

Principles  Concerning  Milk  and  Milk  Products:  12th  Session. 
UNESCO  International  Hydrological  Decade:  5th  Session  of  the  Coordi- 
nating Council. 

WHO/FAO  Codex  Alimentarius  Committee 

IAEA  Board  of  Governors 


The  Hague  .    .      April 

Vienna  .    . 

.    .      April 

Montreal  . 

.    .      May  3-23 

Geneva     . 

.    .      May  3-23 

Washington  .    .      May  5-16 

Rome    . 

.    .      May  5-13 

London 

.    .      May  6-8 

Varna,  Bu 

garia     May  6-20 

Geneva 

.    .      May  7-9 

London 

.    .      May  7-12 

Paris  .    . 

.    .      May  8-9 

London 

.    .      May  12-16 

Geneva 

.    .      May  12-20 

New  York 

.    .      May  12- June  6 

Rio  de  Janeiro.      May  14-17 

Rome    . 

.    .      May  19-23 

Geneva 

.    .      May  19-30 

Santiago 

.    .      May  19-31 

Bangkok 

.    .      May  20-21 

Rome    . 

.    .      May  21-28 

Washington  .    .      May  26-27 

Paris .    .    . 

.    .      May  26-31 

Geneva 

.    .      May  26-31 

Montreal 

.    .      May  26-June  6 

New  York 

.    .      May  26-June  13 

Geneva 

.    .      May  27-June  5 

Geneva 

.    .      May  27-June  13 

London 

.    .      May  27-June  23 

Washington  .    .      May  28-June  19 

New  York 

.    .      May 

Paris  .    . 

.    .      May 

London 

.    .      May 

London 

.    .      May 

Kampala 

.    .      May 

Kampala 

.    .      May 

Geneva 

.    .      May  or  June 

Warsaw    . 

.    .      June  2-7 

Bangkok 

.    .      June  2-16 

Port-of-Spain   .      June  3-10 

Geneva 

.    .      June  4-26 

Paris  .    . 

.    .      June  9-12 

Rome    . 

.    .      June  9-20 

Geneva 

.    .      June  14-15 

Port-of-Sp 

ain   .      June  14-23 

Paris  .    . 

.    .      June  1.5-22 

Paris  .    . 

.    .      June  16-19 

Montreal 

.    .      June  16-20 

Geneva 

.    .      June  16- July  3 

London 

.    .      June  23-28 

Geneva 

.    .      June  23-July  4 

London 

.    .      June  24-27 

Geneva 

.    .      June  27-July  4 

Geneva 

.    .      June  30- July  18 

Geneva 

.    .      June 

Rome    . 

.    .      June 

Paris .    .    . 

.    .      June 

Washingto 

n .    .      June 

Vienna  . 

.    .      June 

i 


300 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE    BULLETIN 


I 


U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution  on  Namibia 


Folloimng  is  a  statement  tn-ade  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Cmoncil  on  March  20  hy  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative Charles  W.  Yost,  together  with  the 
text  of  a  resolution  adopted  hy  the  Council  tluit 
day. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  YOST 

U.S. /U.N.  press  release  28  dated  March  20 

Mr.  President,  the  meeting  of  the  Security 
Council  today  on  Namibia  at  the  request  of  45 
members  of  the  United  Nations  is  truly  of  his- 
toric importance  when  we  consider  the  train  of 
events  that  has  brought  us  here. 

Beginning  in  1947,  the  question  of  Namibia, 
or  South  West  Africa,  has  been  repeatedly  con- 
sidered by  the  General  Assembly.  Early  and 
unsuccessful  efforts  were  made  to  place  this 
territory,  along  with  other  League  of  Nations 
mandates,  within  the  United  Nations  trustee- 
ship system.  The  International  Court  of  Justice 
in  advisoiy  opinions  stated  that  the  mandate 
under  which  South  Africa  administered  the 
territory  had  not  lapsed  and  that  South  Africa 
was  under  an  obligation  to  account  to  the  United 
Nations,  which  inherited  the  supervisory  func- 
tions formerly  executed  by  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. Efforts  were  also  made,  by  the  adoption 
of  re.solutions  and  the  establishment  of  commis- 
sions, to  make  it  possible  for  the  people  of 
Namibia  to  exercise  their  inherent  right  of  self- 
determination  as  provided  in  chapters  XI  and 
XII  of  the  charter.  All  of  these  efforts  and 
appeals  by  the  international  community  were  re- 
buffed by  the  Govermnent  of  South  Africa. 

In  1966  the  General  Assembly  adopted  Reso- 
lution 2145  (XXI), ^  in  which  the  Assembly 
decided  that  by  virtue  of  the  breach  of  its  ob- 


^  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  5, 1966,  p.  871. 


ligations  and  its  disavowal  of  the  mandate. 
South  Africa  had  forfeited  its  mandate  in 
Namibia. 

Having  decided  that  this  mandate  had  termi- 
nated, the  General  Assembly  also  decided  that 
the  territory  came  under  the  direct  responsibil- 
ity of  the  United  Nations.  What  is  this  respon- 
sibility ?  First,  we  submit,  it  is  to  be  informed 
and  to  keep  the  world  fully  aware  of  develop- 
ments affecting  the  vital  interests  of  all  Nami- 
bians;  second,  to  promote  those  interests  by  all 
peacefid  and  practicable  means;  and  third,  to 
seek  to  assist  the  Namibians  in  the  exercise  of 
their  right  to  self-detennination.  It  is  a  cause 
of  deep  regret  that  the  LTnited  Nations  has  to 
date  been  prevented  from  exercising  its  respon- 
sibilities in  Namibia. 

Among  other  provisions,  Resolution  2145 
(XXI)  called  on  South  Africa  not  to  take  any 
further  steps  which  might  tend  to  alter  the  in- 
ternational status  of  the  territory.  Under  the 
guise  of  "steps  to  promote  self-determination  of 
the  people,"  South  Africa  soon  appeared  to  have 
embarked  on  what  amounted  to  piecemeal  an- 
nexation of  the  territory. 

In  1967  we  learned  that  South  Africa  had  en- 
acted the  so-called  Terrorism  Act.  This  measure 
was  soundly  condemned  by  the  international 
commmiity  and  its  application  to  Namibia  de- 
clared to  be  illegal.  In  1968  the  United  Nations 
demanded  the  release  and  repatriation  of  Na- 
mibians held  in  connection  with  this  act.  Also 
in  1968  an  additional  step  in  the  direction  of 
annexation  was  taken  when  South  Africa 
adopted  the  Self-Government  for  Native  Na- 
tions of  South  West  Africa  Act.  According  to 
statements  made  by  South  Africa,  the  provisions 
of  this  act  were  ari'ived  at  through  con.sultation 
with  the  people  of  Namibia  and  therefore  repre- 
sented a  valid  form  of  self-determination.  My 
Government  in  the  past  has  been  unable  to  ac- 
cept this  assertion  and  is  still  imable  to  do  so. 


APRIL    7,    1969 


301 


"We  would  like  to  know,  for  example,  who  were 
the  people  consulted,  about  what  propositions, 
and  by  what  means. 

More  recently,  we  understand  that  still  an- 
other bill  has  been  passed  by  the  South  African 
Parliament  concerning  Namibia:  the  so-called 
South  West  Africa  affairs  bDl.  This  bill  appears 
to  be  a  further  effort  to  consolidate  South  Af- 
rica's control  over  Namibia  by  giving  the  South 
African  Parliament  and  central  government  de- 
partments wide  powers  over  the  affairs  of 
Namibia.  We  have  urged  South  Africa  not  to 
enact  this  legislation. 

These  actions  which  I  have  briefly  outlined 
show  that  South  Africa  is  not  only  attempting 
to  annex  Namibia  but  is  also  extending  its 
heinous  policy  of  apartheid — a  policy  wliich  has 
been  condemned  by  all  here  present^to  that  ter- 
ritory. Mr.  President,  the  United  States  voted 
in  favor  of  Resolution  2145  (XXI).  We  believe 
that  South  Africa's  actions  which  I  have  briefly 
summarized  demonstrate  that  the  General  As- 
sembly was  correct  in  determining  that  South 
Africa  had  forfeited  the  right  to  administer 
Namibia  and  in  concluding  that  the  U.N.  should 
assume  responsibility  for  the  territory.  The 
United  States  shares  the  objective  of  the  mem- 
bers which  have  taken  the  initiative  in  bringing 
this  matter  to  the  Council.  We,  like  them,  are 
firmly  dedicated  to  the  achievement  of  freedom 
and  independence  by  the  people  of  Namibia. 
For  our  part,  the  United  States  is  willing  to 
take  every  peaceful  and  practical  step  under 
the  charter  which  would  assist,  or  would  be 
likely  to  assist,  in  the  achievement  of  this  goal. 

Earlier  I  stated  that  this  meeting  of  the 
Council  was  of  historic  significance.  Although 
the  Security  Council  met  on  two  occasions  in 
1968  to  consider  South  Africa's  actions  in 
illegally  arresting  and  bringing  to  trial  37 
Namibians,  this  is  the  first  time  that  the  Council 
has  met  to  consider  the  situation  created  by 
South  Africa's  refusal  to  implement  Resolution 
2145  (XXI).  In  this  new  setting,  we  will  per- 
form the  highest  service  to  the  Namibian  people 
if  we  seek  ways  and  means  by  which  a  peaceful 
solution  to  the  problem  may  be  possible.  And 
the  South  African  Government,  for  its  part, 
must  be  prepared  to  reexamine  its  provocative 
behavior.  If  I  may  paraphrase  President  Nixon, 
the  need  now  is  to  lower  our  voices  all  around 
so  that  we  begin  to  understand  each  other. 

In  this  connection,  Mr.  President,  I  am  happy 
to  state  that  the  United  States  supports  the 


draft  resolution  which  we  have  before  us.  I 
would  like  to  pay  special  tribute  to  the  states- 
manlike way  in  which  consultations  which  led 
to  the  present  text  were  conducted.  As  a  result, 
we  anticipate  that  the  draft  resolution  now 
before  us  will  command  broad  support  within 
the  Council,  crossing  regional  and  ideological 
lines. 

Mr.  President,  the  United  States  is  able  to 
support  the  text  of  the  draft  resolution  before 
us  because  it  wisely  does  not  commit  the  Coun- 
cil to  the  narrow  path  of  mandatory  sanctions 
under  chapter  VII  of  the  charter.  As  we  have 
repeatedly  made  clear,  we  believe  it  would  be 
inappropriate  in  tliis  situation  to  consider 
measures  contained  in  chapter  VII.  In  our  judg- 
ment, this  is  not  a  situation  which  can  sensibly 
and  humanely  be  remedied  by  mandatory  sanc- 
tions. Such  measures  would  be  likely  to  prove 
ineffective  and  hence  to  weaken  rather  than 
strengthen  the  prestige  and  authority  of  the 
United  Nations.  For  the  same  reason  they 
would,  far  from  improving  the  lot  of  the  Nami- 
bians, run  the  risk  of  making  their  situation 
even  worse  than  it  is  today.  With  these  consid- 
erations in  mind,  we  wish  again  to  make  clear, 
despite  our  strong  condemnation  of  South 
African  behavior  in  this  regard,  the  limits  be- 
yond which  we  do  not  feel  it  would  be  either 
wise  or  feasible  for  this  Council  to  go  in  present 
circumstances. 

Despite  the  fact  that  South  Africa  has  no 
legal  right  in  Namibia,  my  Government  believes 
that  South  Africa  remains  accountable  to  the 
United  Nations  for  all  of  its  actions  in  the  terri- 
tory and  for  the  well-being  of  the  people  there 
so  long  as  it  remains  in  de  facto  control.  We 
think  it  would  help  if  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment, which  has  often  protested  that  its 
actions  in  Namibia  are  misunderstood,  would 
receive,  without  any  conditions,  a  special  repre- 
sentative of  the  Secretary  General  to  discuss  i 
Namibia  or  would  make  some  other  gesture  \ 
which  would  have  the  effect  of  acknowledging 
its  responsibilities  to  the  international  com- 
munity. In  other  words,  the  time  has  come  for 
South  Africa  to  make  a  fresh  effort,  in  coopera- 
tion with  the  United  Nations,  to  resolve  the 
problem.  My  Government  believes  that  a  just 
and  peaceful  solution,  insuring  the  rights  and 
interests  of  all  of  the  parties,  is  still  possible; 
and  to  that  end,  Mr.  President,  I  pledge  the  sup- 
port of  the  United  States  for  all  appropriate 
steps. 


302 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


TEXT  OF   RESOLUTION^ 

The  Security  Council, 

Taking  note  of  General  Assembly  resolutions  2248 
(S-V)  of  19  May  1967;  2324  (XXII)  and  2325  (XXII) 
of  16  December  1967;  2372  (XXII)  of  12  June  1968 
and  2403  (XXIII)  of  16  December  1968, 

Taking  into  account  General  Assembly  resolution 
2145  (XXI)  of  27  October  1966  by  which  the  General 
Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  terminated  the  Man- 
date of  South  West  Africa  and  assumed  direct  re- 
sponsibility for  the  territory  until  its  independence, 

Recalling  its  resolution  245  (1968)  of  25  January 
1968  and  246  (1968)  of  14  March  1968, 

Reaffirming  the  inalienable  right  of  the  jwople  of 
Namibia  to  freedom  and  independence  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  General  Assembly  resolution 
1514  (XV)  of  14  December  1960, 

Mindful  of  the  grave  consequences  of  South  Africa's 
continued  occupation  of  Namibia, 

Reaffirming  its  special  responsibility  toward  the  peo- 
ple and  the  territory  of  Namibia, 

1.  Recognizes  that  the  United  Nations  General  As- 
sembly terminated  the  mandate  of  South  Africa  over 
Namibia  and  assumed  direct  responsibility  for  the  ter- 
ritory until  its  independence ; 

2.  Considers  that  the  continued  presence  of  South 
Africa  in  Namibia  is  illegal  and  contrary  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Charter  and  the  previous  decisions  of  the 
United  Nations  and  is  detrimental  to  the  interests  of 
the  population  of  the  territory  and  those  of  the  inter- 
national community ; 

3.  Calls  upon  the  Government  of  South  Africa  to 
immediately  withdraw  its  administration  from  the 
territory ; 

4.  Declares  that  the  actions  of  the  Government  of 
South  Africa  designed  to  destroy  the  national  unity 
and  territorial  integrity  of  Namibia  through  the  estab- 
lishment of  Bantustans  are  contrary  to  the  provisions 
of  the  United  Nations  Charter ; 

5.  Declares  that  the  Government  of  South  Africa  has 
no  right  to  enact  the  "South  West  Africa  Affairs  Bill", 
as  such  an  enactment  would  be  a  violation  of  the  rele- 
vant resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly ; 

6.  Condemns  the  refusal  of  South  Africa  to  comply 
with  General  Assembly  resolutions  2145  (XXI)  ;  2248 
(S-V);  2324  (XXII);  2325  (XXII);  2372  (XXII); 
and  2403  (XXIII)  and  Security  Council  resolutions 
245  and  246  of  1968 ; 

7.  Invites  aU  States  to  exert  their  Influence  in  order 
to  obtain  compliance  by  the  Government  of  South 
Africa  with  the  provisions  of  the  present  resolution ; 

8.  Decides  that  in  the  event  of  failure  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  of  South  Africa  to  comply  with  the 
provisions  of  the  present  resolution,  the  Security  Coun- 
cil will  meet  immediately  to  determine  upon  necessary 
steps  or  measures  in  accordance  with  the  relevant 
provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations; 

9.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  follow  closely 
the  implementation  of  the  present  resolution  and  to 
report  to  the  Security  Council  as  soon  as  possible ; 

10.  Decides  to  remain  actively  seized  of  the  matter. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  for  the  application  of  safeguards  by  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  the  bilateral 
agreement  between  the  United  States  and  Iran  of 
March  5,  1957,  as  amended  (TIAS  4207,  6219),  for 
cooperation  concerning  civil  uses  of  atomic  energy. 
Signed  at  Vienna  March  4,  1969.  Enters  Into  force 
on  the  date  on  which  the  Director  General  shall  have 
received  written  notification  from  each  Government 
that  it  has  compUed  with  the  constitutional  require- 
ments for  entry  into  force. 

Signatures:    Iran,     International    Atomic     Energy 
Agency,  United  States. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention.  Done  at  Geneva  Sep- 
tember 6,  1952.  Entered  into  force  September  16, 
1955.  TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Australia,  February  1, 1969. 

Grains 

Memorandum  of  agreement  on  basic  elements  for  the 
negotiation  of  a  world  grains  arrangement.  Done 
at  Geneva  June  30, 1967.' 

Ratification    deposited:    Netherlands,    February    5, 
1969. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization,  Signed  at  Geneva  March  6, 
1948.  Entered  into  force  March  17,  1958.  TIAS  4044. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  February  25, 
1969. 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of 
execution.  Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered 
into  force  January  1, 1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Adherence  deposited:  Bhutan  (with  reservations), 
March  7,  1969. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International   convention   on   the   elimination   of  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December  21,  1965. 
Entered  into  force:  January  4, 1969.' 

Trade 

Protocol  of  rectification  to  the  French  text  of  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
June  15,  1955.  Entered  into  force  October  24,  1956, 


•U.N.  doc.  S/RES/264  (1969)  ;  adopted  on  Mar.  20 
by  a  vote  of  13  (U.S.)  to  0,  with  2  abstentions. 


'  Not  in  force. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


APRIL    7,    1969 


303 


with  respect  to  the  rectifications  which  relate  to  parts 
II  and  III  of  the  General  Agreement.  TIAS  3677. 
Entry  into  force  of  rectifications  which  relate  to  part 
I  of  the  General  Agreement:  February  7,  1969. 

Fifth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  December  3, 
1955. 
Entered  into  force:  February  7,  1969. 

Sixth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to  the 
texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  April  11,  1957. 
Entered  into  fmce:  February  7,  1969. 

Seventh  protocol  of  rectifications  and  mwlifications  to 
the  texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  November  30, 
1957. 
Entered  into  force:  February  7,  1969. 

Protocol  relating  to  negotiations  for  the  establishment 
of  new  schedule  III — Brazil — to  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (to  which  are  annexed 
the  schedules  contained  in  the  proc&s-verbaux  of 
February  10,  March  10,  May  13,  and  May  23,  1959). 
Done  at  Geneva  December  31, 1958. 
Entered  into  force:  February  7, 1969. 

Eighth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to 
the  texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  February  18, 
1959. 
Entered  into  force:  February  7, 1969. 

Ninth  protocol  of  rectifications  and  modifications  to 
the  texts  of  the  schedules  to  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  August  17, 
1959. 
Entered  into  force:  February  7, 1969. 

Women — Political  Rights 

Convention  on  the  political  rights  of  women.  Done  at 
New  York  March  31,  1953.  Entered  into  force  July  7, 
1954.= 
Accession  deposited:  Laos,  January  28,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


Bolivia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreements  of  January  16,  1968  (TIAS 
6571,  6573).  Signed  at  La  Paz  March  7,  1969.  En- 
tered into  force  March  7, 1969. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  January  16,  1968  (TIAS 
6571).  Signed  at  La  Paz  March  7,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  March  7, 1969. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting  of  au- 
thorizations to  permit  licensed  amateur  radio  op- 
erators of  either  country  to  operate  their  stations 
in  the  other  country.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Djakarta  December  10,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
December  10,  1968. 

Iran 

Amendment  to  the  agreement  of  March  5,  1957,  as 
amended  (TIAS  4207,  6219),  for  cooperation  con- 
cerning civil  uses  of  atomic  energy.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington March  18,  1969.  Enters  into  force  on  the 
date  each  Government  shall  have  received  from  the 
other  written  notification  that  it  has  complied  with 
all  statutory  and  constitutional  requirements  for 
entry  into  force. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN   SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  March  13  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Walter  H.  Annenberg  to  be  Ambassador  to  Great 
Britain.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press 
release  dated  February  20.) 

Jacob  D.  Beam  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics.  ( For  biographic  details,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  February  20.) 

John  S.  D.  Eisenhower  to  be  Ambassador  to  Belgium. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  February  20.) 


PUBLICATIONS 


Recent  Releases 

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ernment Printing  Office,  Washington,  B.C.  20402.  Ad- 
dress requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
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or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
satrve  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Background  Notes.  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  and,  in  some 
cases,  a  selected  bibliography.  (A  complete  set  of  all 
Background  Notes  currently  in  stock  (at  least  125)  — 
$6 ;  1-year  subscription  service  for  approximately  75 
updated  or  new  Notes — $3.50 ;  plastic  binder — $1.50. ) 
Single  copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  10^ 
each. 


Bermuda 

Pub. 

7907 

4  pp. 

Czechoslovakia 

Pub. 

7758 

7  pp. 

Ecuador 

Pub. 

7771 

6  pp. 

El  Salvador 

Pub. 

7794 

5  pp. 

Maldive  Islands 

Pub. 

8026 

4  pp. 

Trinidad  and 

Pub. 

8306 

4  pp. 

Tobago 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


The  Battle  Act  Report,  1968.  Twenty-first  report  to 
Congress  on  operations  under  the  Mutual  Defense 
Assistance  Control  Act  of  1951  (Battle  Act) .  Pub.  8426. 
General  Foreign  Policy  Series  228.  93  pp.  45^. 

Peace  Corps.  Agreement  with  Grenada.  TIAS  (5398. 
5  pp.  50. 

Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  United 
Arab  Republic.  TIAS  6578.  3  pp.  10(f. 


304 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE  BCIXETIN 


INDEX     Ajml  7,  1969     Vol.  ZX,  No.  165^ 


Africa.  The  United  States  and  the  Challenge  of 
Africa's  Development  (Nielsen) 292 

Belgium.  Eisenhower  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .      304 

Canada.  IJC  Asked  To  Study  Pollution  Bisks 
From  Lake  Erie  Oil  Spills  (U.S.  letter)     .    .      296 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Annenberg,  Beam,  Eisenhower)  .      301 

Patent  and  Copyright  Conventions  Transmitted 
to  the  Senate  (message  from  President 
Nixon)       298 

Senate  Confirms  Henry  Kearns  as  President  of 
Export-Import  Bank 291 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirmations 

(Annenberg,  Beam,  Eisenhower) 304 

Disarmament.  U.S.  Positions  at  Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament  Conference  Outlined  by  Presi- 
dent Nixon  (letter  to  U.S.  Eepresentative 
Gerard    Smith)       289 

Economic  Affairs 

IJC  Asked  To  Study  Pollution  Bisks  From  Lake 

Erie  Oil   Spills    (U.S.  letter) 296 

Patent  and  Copyright  Conventions  Transmitted 

to     the     Senate     (message     from     President 

Nixon)       298 

Senate  Confirms  Henry  Kearns  as  President  of 

Export-Import   Bank 291 

World  Trade  Week,  1969   (proclamation)     .    .      297 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Calendar  of  International   Conferences     .     .     .      299 
U.S.  Positions  at  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament 
Conference  Outlined  by  President  Nixon  (letter 
to  U.S.  Eepresentative  Gerard  Smith)     ...      289 

Namibia.  U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Security  Council 
Eesolution  on  Namibia  (Xost,  text  of  resolu- 
Uon) 301 

Presidential  Documents 

Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  Estab- 
lished by  President  Nixon 294 

National  Maritime  Day,  1969 297 

Patent  and  Copyright  Conventions  Transmitted 

to  the  Senate 298 

U.S.  Positions  at  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament 

Conference  Outlined  by  President  Nixon     .     .      289 

World  Trade  Week,   1969 297 

Publications.  Eecent  Releases 304 

South  Africa.  U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Security  Coun- 
cil Resolution  on  Namibia  (Yost,  text  of  reso- 
lution)        301 


Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 303 

Patent  and  Copyright  Conventions  Transmitted 
to  the  Senate  (message  from  President 
Nixon)        298 

U.S.S.R.  Beam  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .     .     .      304 

United  Kingdom.  Annenberg  confirmed  as  Am- 
bassador     304 

United  Nations 

The  United  States  and  the  Challenge  of  Africa's 

Development    (Nielsen) 292 

U.S.  Supports  U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution 

on  Namibia  (Tost,  text  of  resolution)     .     .     .      301 

Viet-Nam.  Ninth  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Meets  at  Paris  (Lodge) 290 

Name  Index 

Annenberg,  Walter  H 304 

Beam,  Jacob  D 304 

Eisenhower,  John  S.  D 304 

Kearns,   Henry 291 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 290 

Nielsen,  Waldemar  A 292 

Nixon,  President 289, 294, 297,  298 

Yost,  Charles  W 301 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  March  17-23 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflSce 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20320. 

No.       Date  Subject 

57     3/20     Lodge:    ninth    plenary    session    on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 
*oS    3/20     Program  for  the  visit  of  Prime  Min- 
ister Trudeau  of  Canada. 
to9    3/21     U.S.-Canada  agreements  on  Niagara 
Falls  beautification. 
60    3/21     U.S.  letter  on  Lake  Erie  oil  and  gas 
drilling. 


*Not  printed. 

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THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1555 


April  H,  1969 


PRESIDENT  NIXON  DISCUSSES  THE  VIETNAM  PEACE  TALKS 
AND  THE  ABM  SAFEGUARD  SYSTEM 

Excerpt  From  Remarks  Before  National  Association  of  Broadcasters       313 

THE  UNITED  NATIONS  AND  THE  CAUSE  OF  PEACE 

&y  Ambassador  Charles  W.  Yost     325 

U.S.  FOREIGN  POLICY:  SOME  MAJOR  ISSUES 

Statement  by  Secretary  Rogers 

Before  the  Senate  Gommdttee  on  Foreign  Relations     306 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1555 
April  14,  1969 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  tveekly  publication  issued  by  the 
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Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
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and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
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by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
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1 


I 

I 


U.S.  Foreign  Policy:  Some  Major  Issues 


Statement  hy  Secretary  Rogers 


The  role  which  the  United  States  p]ays  in  the 
world  today — the  global  nature  of  our  interests 
and  responsibilities — derives  from  our  economic 
strength  and  the  dynamics  of  our  technology, 
from  security  considerations,  and  from  the  ded- 
ication of  our  people  to  hmnan  freedom  and 
humanitarian  causes.  It  is  clear  that  our  involve- 
ments need  constantly  to  be  reviewed  in  the 
light  of  current  conditions  and  the  availability 
of  our  resources.  The  administration  now  is  in 
the  process  of  such  a  review,  and  in  the  months 
ahead  we  will  be  prepared  to  discuss  with  the 
committee  the  results  of  that  review.  This  morn- 
ing— with  your  permission — I  would  like  to 
turn  to  some  of  the  major  foreign  policy  issues 
with  which  we  are  presently  faced. 

The  Middle   East 

One  of  the  major  problems  we  have  today  is 
how  to  find  a  way  to  bring  about  peace  in  the 
Middle  East,  a  peace  which  has  eluded  man- 
kind for  the  last  20  years.  Since  the  6-day  war 
in  1967,  the  Middle  East  has  been  in  a  state  of 
suspended  hostility.  If  the  situation  continues 
unabated,  it  could  have  the  most  serious  conse- 
quences. That  is  why  one  of  the  first  policy  de- 
cisions made  by  the  administration  was  to  ap- 
prove in  principle  four-power  discussions  in 
support  of  Ambassador  Jarring  and  the  United 
Nations  in  its  search  for  peace. 

It  is  increasingly  clear  that  the  situation  in 
that  area  has  deteriorated.  In  the  last  20  years 
the  Arabs  and  Israelis  have  engaged  in  major 
hostilities  three  times,  and  despite  the  repeated 
efforts  of  the  United  Nations,  a  stable  peace  has 
not  been  attained.  Indeed,  it  is  all  too  clear  that 
if  another  war  should  break  out,  it  carries  with  it 
the  risk  of  outside  involvement.  It  becomes, 
therefore,  a  direct  interest  of  the  United  States 
to  exercise  whatever  influence  it  has,  in  what- 


*  Prepared  for  delivery  before  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  on  Mar.  27  (press  release  64). 


ever  way  would  be  useful  and  effective,  to  help 
bring  a  lasting  peace  in  that  area. 

There  fortunately  exists  a  firm  and  equitable 
basis  for  that  search :  I  refer  to  the  unanimous 
decision  of  the  Security  Council  of  the  United 
Nations  recorded  in  its  resolution  of  Novem- 
ber 22, 1967.=  That  resolution  will  be  the  bedrock 
of  our  policy.  I  can  think  of  no  better  way  to 
describe  the  results  we  would  like  to  see  in  the 
Middle  East  than  to  examine  the  elements  of  the 
Security  Council  resolution. 

Firsts  what  is  the  goal?  It  is  clearly  and  sim- 
ply defined  as  the  establishment  of  a  just  and 
lasting  peace.  The  thrust  of  our  effort  must 
therefore  be  to  move  forward  from  the  condi- 
tions of  armistice  which  have  prevailed  for  20 
years  to  a  state  of  peace — mutually  accepted  if 
it  is  to  be  just,  and  juridically  defined  and  con- 
tractually binding  if  it  is  to  be  lasting. 

Next,  the  principles  and  conditions  of  the 
peace.  A  just  and  lasting  peace  wUl  require,  as 
the  Security  Council's  resolution  states,  with- 
drawal of  Israeli  armed  forces  from  territories 
occupied  in  the  Arab-Israeli  war  of  1967,  the 
termination  of  all  claims  or  states  of  belliger- 
ency, and  the  acknowledgment  of  the  sov- 
ereignty, territorial  integrity,  and  political  in- 
dependence of  every  state  in  the  area  and  their 
right  to  live  in  peace  within  secure  and  recog- 
nized boundaries.  Clearly,  withdrawal  should 
take  place  to  establish  boundaries  which  define 
the  areas  where  Israel  and  its  neighbors  may  live 
in  peace  and  sovereign  independence.  Equally, 
there  can  be  no  secure  and  recognized  boundaries 
without  withdrawal.  In  our  view  rectifications 
from  the  preexisting  lines  should  be  confined  to 
those  required  for  mutual  security  and  should 
not  reflect  the  weight  of  conquest. 

The  resolution  also  affirms  that  free  naviga- 
tion through  the  area's  international  waterways 
must  be  guaranteed.  The  attempt  to  deny  such 
freedom  to  Israel  in  one  waterway — the  Straits 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  18,  1967,  p.  843. 


APRIL    14,    1969 


305 


of  Tiran — was  an  immediate  cause  of  the  1967 
war.  Denial  of  that  freedom  to  Israel  in  another 
waterway — the  Suez  Canal— has  been  for  20 
years  a  symbol  of  the  absence  of  a  state  of  peace. 
We  believe  that  the  right  of  Israel,  as  of  all 
other  states,  is  to  have  the  right  to  transit  these 
waterways  and  that  that  right  must  be  assured. 

The  resolution  affirms  the  need  for  a  just  set- 
tlement of  the  refugee  problem.  There  can  be  no 
real  peace  without  a  genuine  solution  to  that 
intractable  problem,  now  made  more  tragic  by 
the  displacement  of  even  more  i^eople  as  a  result 
of  the  1967  war.  The  human  dimension  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  has  been  of  special  concern 
to  the  United  States  for  20  years.  Its  just  settle- 
ment can  only  be  one  which  takes  into  account 
to  the  maximum  possible  extent  the  desires  and 
aspirations  of  the  individual  hmnan  beings 
concerned. 

As  a  last  principle,  the  resolution  affirms  the 
necessity  of  guaranteeing  the  territorial  inviola- 
bility and  political  independence  of  every  state 
in  the  area  through  measures  including  the  es- 
tablishment of  demilitarized  zones.  Here  again, 
as  in  the  case  of  freedom  of  navigation,  the 
resolution  introduces  the  concept  of  guarantee- 
ing certain  conditions  of  peace.  Despite  the  im- 
perfections of  the  past,  we  believe  that  ways 
can  be  devised  for  international  participation 
in  guaranteeing  the  terms  of  settlement  as  they 
relate  to  physical  arrangements  on  the  ground, 
with  particular  reference  to  the  rights  of  navi- 
gation and  demilitarization  of  strategic  areas. 

Finally,  what  is  the  mechanism  for  realizing 
the  principles  and  provisions  of  the  Security 
Council  resolution?  In  its  tliird  paragraph,  the 
resolution  asks  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations  to  designate  a  representative  to 
promote  agreement  and  assist  in  efforts  to 
achieve  a  peaceful  and  acceptable  settlement. 
That  representative,  to  whose  patient  compe- 
tence I  wish  to  pay  special  tribute  this  morning, 
is  Ambassador  Jarring  of  Sweden.  His  mission 
is  to  promote  agreement — and  this  can  only 
mean  agreement  between  the  parties  and  among 
the  parties.  We  lay  stress  on  this  point  because 
we  do  not  believe  that  a  peace  settlement  to 
which  the  parties  did  not  agree  would  be  just  or 
lasting  or,  for  that  matter,  attainable  at  all.  We, 
for  our  part,  are  not  interested  in  imposing  a 
peace. 

Regrettably,  in  the  22  months  since  the  war 
Ambassador  Jarring  and  the  parties  have  not 
made  significant  progress.  In  these  circum- 
stances, we  are  convinced  that  the  United  States 


has  a  responsibility  to  help.  Our  interests  would 
be  ill  served  in  the  absence  of  a  settlement.  Fur- 
thermore, we  and  the  other  permanent  members 
of  the  Security  Council  were  instrumental  in 
forging  the  1967  resolution  which  created  the 
mission  of  Ambassador  Jarring.  Historically, 
the  United  Nations  has  played  a  special  role  in 
helping  shape  the  political  evolution  of  the 
Middle  East. 

For  all  these  reasons,  we  have  concluded  that 
the  United  States  should  play  an  active  role, 
bilaterally  and  multilaterally,  in  support  of  the 
United  Nations  effort.  We  are  therefore  actively 
engaged  diplomatically  with  the  other  major 
powers  and  in  particular  with  the  other  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council,  as  well 
as  with  the  principal  parties  in  the  area,  in  ef- 
forts to  help  Ambassador  Jarring  accomplish 
his  mission.  If  there  is  a  genuine  will  to  peace 
on  the  part  of  those  directly  concerned,  we  be- 
lieve that  the  just  rights  and  legitimate  security 
of  all  the  states  and  peoples  in  the  Middle  East 
can  be  realized.  In  the  interests  of  friendly  rela- 
tions with  all  states  in  that  area,  we  shall  work 
to  that  end  in  the  days  ahead. 

Viet-Nam 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  turn  to 
Viet-Nam.  On  Viet-Nam  as  on  the  Middle  East, 
we  will  endeavor  and  are  endeavoring  to  estab- 
lish a  permanent  solution  in  which  North  Viet- 
Nam  and  its  neighbors  live  in  peace  and  not 
simply  in  a  state  of  suspended  war. 

The  President  has  already  made  clear  our 
firm  resolve  to  achieve  an  honorable  peace  in 
Viet-Nam.  No  other  objective  and  no  other 
problem  is  of  greater  importance. 

To  achieve  this  will  not  be  easy.  We  expect 
progress  will  come  primarily  through  private 
discussions  and  negotiations — ^this  has  been  the 
history  of  the  negotiations  in  the  past.  The 
other  side  insists  that  private  talks,  when  they 
are  held,  must  be  private ;  that  everything  that 
transpires  must  be  kept  secret ;  and  that  there  be 
no  public  discussion  of  these  talks.  And  I  am 
sure  the  members  of  this  committee  will  recog- 
nize that  private  talks  must  indeed  remain  pri- 
vate if  they  are  to  be  effective. 

Our  own  position  has  been  developed  in  full 
consultation  with  the  Government  of  South 
Viet-Nam  and  on  the  basis  of  central  principles 
endorsed  by  our  allies  having  troops  in  South 
Viet-Nam.  Consultation  with  the  South  Viet- 
namese and  our  other  allies  is  a  continumg  proc- 
ess. So  it  will  be  carried  further,  particularly  at 


306 


DEPAETMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN' 


the  late  May  meeting  of  the  foreign  ministers 
of  the  troop-contributing  countries,  which  I 
shall  attend  in  Bangkok. 

What  is  our  position  ?  In  essence,  our  position 
is  as  follows : 

— We  are  not  seeking  a  military  victory,  nor 
do  we  want  military  escalation. 

— We  believe  that  peace  should  give  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  the  opportunity  to  determine 
their  own  future  without  any  external 
interference. 

— In  support  of  this  policy  of  peace,  we  are 
seeking  to  achieve  agreement  with  North  Viet- 
Nam  on  mutual  withdrawal  of  forces.  We  are 
prepared  to  begin  withdrawal  of  our  forces  si- 
multaneously with  those  of  North  Viet-Nam. 
Withdrawals  would  reduce  the  scale  of  hostili- 
ties and  would  be  tangible  and  visual  evidence 
of  the  professed  desire  of  both  sides  to  negotiate 
a  peace  settlement. 

— As  a  military  measure  relatively  simple  to 
observe  and  because  it  has  agreed  status  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  Geneva  accords  of  1954, 
we  are  also  seeking  restoration  of  military  re- 
spect for  the  demilitarized  zone.  This  also  would 
be  a  verifiable  test  of  good  faith  and  a  confi- 
dence-building measure. 

— ^We  will  continue  to  press  for  an  early 
mutual  release  of  prisoners  of  war.  Here  again 
there  would  be  a  tangible  evidence  of  good  in- 
tentions on  both  sides,  as  well  as  a  humanitarian 
measure. 

Basically,  and  as  essential  elements  in  an  ulti- 
mate settlement,  we  envisage : 

— Eestoration  of  the  provisional  military  de- 
marcation line  at  the  I7th  parallel,  with  reuni- 
fication to  be  resolved  in  the  future  by  the  free 
decision  of  the  people  of  North  Viet-Nam  and 
of  South  Viet-Nam ; 

— Eestoration  and  full  compliance  with  the 
principle  of  noninterference  between  the  two 
Viet-Nams ; 

■ — Full  compliance  with  the  Laos  accords  of 
1962,  including  the  ending  of  the  use  of  Laos 
as  a  corridor  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  North 
Vietnamese  troops  now  in  Laos ; 

— Respect  for  the  territorial  integrity  and 
neutrality  of  Cambodia ; 

— ^A  cessation  of  hostilities ; 

— Adequate  international  inspection  and  su- 
pervision machinery  to  verify  the  implementa- 
tion of  military  agreements  and  to  insure  respect 
for  and  continued  adherence  to  the  military  and 
political  elements  of  a  settlement.  This  is  vital 


because  the  peace  that  will  be  achieved  must  be 
enduring. 

These  are  our  objectives.  We  believe  they  are 
sound  and  reasonable,  and  we  will  work  toward 
them.  And  particularly  as  we  work  on  the  pri- 
ority military  areas  of  possible  agreement,  we 
recognize  that  there  must  be  attention  to  the  key 
issue  of  the  future  political  structure  of  South 
Viet-Nam. 

On  this  issue,  on  the  political  structure  of 
South  Viet-Nam — we  believe  that  this  issue 
must  be  resolved  among  the  South  Vietnamese 
themselves.  We  shall  respect  whatever  choice 
they  make  about  their  political  future  in  a  con- 
text free  of  compulsion  and  coercion  by  anyone. 

Two  days  ago  President  Thieu  publicly  con- 
firmed that  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam 
is  prepared  to  hold  private  meetings  with  the 
NLF  [National  Liberation  Front].  President 
Thieu's  announcement  is  an  act  of  statesmanship 
which,  if  the  other  side  is  willing,  makes  the 
prospects  for  peace  seem  somewhat  brighter. 
Furthermore,  the  South  Vietnamese  Govern- 
ment has  in  recent  months  further  developed  its 
own  ideas  about  the  kind  of  political  solution 
that  could  be  worked  out.  It  has  made  clear  its 
willingness  that  all  political  elements — all  po- 
litical elements — who  are  prepared  to  renounce 
violence  and  put  their  views  peacefully  to  the 
populace  for  a  decision  should  be  assured  of 
their  right  to  participate  fully  in  the  political 
process  under  the  national  Constitution.  The 
South  Vietnamese  Government  recognizes  that 
means  must  be  found  which  insure  the  fairness 
of  such  a  process. 

The  sum  total  of  our  combined  positions  on 
the  military  and  the  political  matters  is  clear 
and  compelling.  Thus,  we  believe  that  the  South 
Vietnamese,  the  United  States,  and  our  allies 
are  offering  a  reasonable  and  honorable  outcome. 
It  is  our  fervent  hope  that  the  other  side  will 
soon  put  polemics  aside  and  begin  in  good  faith 
to  negotiate  an  end  to  this  tragic  war. 

Disarmament 

I'd  like  now,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  turn  to  dis- 
armament. If  the  negotiations  on  Viet-Nam 
and  the  Middle  East  command  world  attention 
because  of  the  inamediacy  of  the  threats  in- 
volved, negotiations  on  disarmament  have  their 
own  drama  because  they  may  help  avoid  even 
greater  danger.  The  accomplishments  of  the 
recent  past — the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  and 
the  Antarctic  and  Outer  Space  Treaties — are 


APRIL    14,    1969 


307 


not  inconsiderable.  They  have  built  a  basis  from 
which  we  can  now  approach  further  concrete 
measures  to  enhance  the  security  of  our  nation 
and  of  all  nations. 

As  a  first  step  the  President  sought  and  re- 
ceived Senate  consent  to  ratification  of  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty.  I  would  like  this  morning 
to  thank  this  committee  for  its  very  effective 
support  of  that  treaty.  The  Senate's  action 
should  encourage  other  countries  to  adhere  to 
the  treaty,  which  is  our  best  hope  for  avoiding  a 
world  in  which  dozens  of  states  would  be  in  a 
position  to  initiate  a  nuclear  war. 

We  have  already  begun  our  first  negotiations 
on  arms  control  and  disarmament  at  the  Eight- 
een-Nation  Disarmament  Committee,  which  was 
reconvened  in  Geneva  on  March  18. 

The  President  directed  our  delegation  to  pro- 
pose negotiation  of  an  international  agreement 
prohibiting  the  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  or 
other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  sea- 
bed.^ The  Soviet  Union  also  tabled  a  draft  treaty 
on  the  same  subject.  We  are  optimistic  that  our 
negotiators  and  theirs,  with  the  help  of  other 
nations  at  the  ENDC,  can  arrive  at  an  agree- 
ment that  is  workable,  prudent,  and  in  the  in- 
terest of  all  parties  concerned.  A  successful 
conclusion  of  the  negotiation  would  extend  to 
the  bed  of  the  sea  the  nuclear-free  status  which 
has  been  achieved  in  these  other  treaties  I've 
referred  to. 

President  Nixon  has  also  made  clear  that  the 
United  States  supports  the  conclusion  of  an 
adequately  verified  comprehensive  ban  on  nu- 
clear testing.  We  shall  assist  in  any  reasonable 
effort  to  achieve  greater  understanding  on  the 
verification  issue,  which  has  blocked  progress 
on  this  key  measure  in  the  past.  The  United 
States  will  also  continue  to  press  for  an  agree- 
ment to  cut  off  the  production  of  fissionable 
materials  for  weapons  purposes  and  to  transfer 
such  materials  to  peaceful  purposes. 

Preparations  for  possible  talks  with  the 
Soviet  Union  on  limiting  strategic  armaments 
are  also  underway.  The  President's  consulta- 
tions with  our  allies  on  this  subject  during  our 
European  trip  found  them  very  favorable  to  the 
idea.  We  are  now  preparing  and  studying  the 
complex  set  of  issues  which  will  be  involved  in 
these  talks.  We  hope  that  such  talks  can  begin 
within  the  next  few  months. 

I  am  aware,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  there  has 
been  some  questioning  and  some  criticism  on 
disarmament  groimds  about  the  President's  de- 
cision to  proceed  with  the  development  of  the 


Safeguard  system.*  Specifically,  the  concern  has 
been  expressed  that  the  decision  might  escalate 
arms  expenditures  or  so  concern  the  Soviet 
Union  that  it  would  seriously  undermine  the 
prospects  of  talks. 

The  foreign  policy  implications  of  such  a  de- 
cision—in particular  the  reaction  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  impact  of  the  decision  on  possible 
arms  talks — were  a  central  consideration  in  the 
National  Security  Council's  deliberations  which 
preceded  the  President's  decision.  We  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  decision  would  have  no 
adverse  effect  on  disarmament  talks. 

The  Soviet  Union,  as  you  know,  had  itself 
already  constructed  a  limited  system  around 
Moscow;  it  had  also  agreed  to  strategic  arms 
talks  following  the  previous  administration's 
decision  on  the  Sentinel  program.  In  fact,  as 
you  recall,  when  President  Johnson  announced 
his  decision,  a  week  later  the  Soviet  Union 
agreed  to  strategic  arms  limitations  talks.  The 
Soviet  press  also  quoted  President  Nixon's 
favorable  references  to  arms  talks  when  he  an- 
nounced his  decision  on  the  Safeguard  system, 
and  Premier  Kosygin  recently  referred  afiirma- 
tively  to  limitations  on  strategic  arms  in  his 
message  to  the  ENDC.  In  other  words,  his  mes- 
sage was  after  the  President's  decision  was  an- 
noimced,  and  there  was  no  indication  from 
Kosygin  that  it  would  interfere  with  the  success 
of  those  talks.  As  you  know,  the  Safeguard  sys- 
tem will  not  really  become  operational  until 
1973.  It  will  be  subject  to  an  annual  review  and 
appraisal,  in  which,  as  the  President  said,  one 
of  the  principal  factors  will  be  the  status  of  talks 
on  the  limitation  of  strategic  arms. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  our  discussions  in  the 
Security  Council,  I  pressed  this  point  and  it  was 
determined  this  would  have  no  adverse  effects 
upon  these  talks.  In  our  talks  with  representa- 
tives of  the  Soviet  Union  there  has  been  no  dis- 
cussion or  any  suggestion  that  this  decision 
would  affect  the  initiation  of  talks  or  the  suc- 
cessful outcome  of  talks.  Negotiations,  of  course, 
on  strategic  arms  have  not  yet  started,  and  their 
outcome  is,  of  course,  uncertain.  It  should  also 
be  clear  that  both  we  and  the  Soviet  Union  ex- 
pect such  talks  to  cover  both  defensive  and  offen- 
sive missiles.  In  other  words,  there  has  never 
been  any  intention  to  limit  what  kind  of  weap- 
ons we  would  discuss  when  we  begin  talks  on 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  7, 1969,  p.  289. 
'  For   a   statement   by   President   Nixon   issued   on 
Mar.  14,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  31, 1969,  p.  273. 


308 


DEPABTMENT  OP  STATE  BULLETIN 


oifensive  and  defensive  weapons.  The  fact  is 
that  we  cannot  predicate  our  security  decisions 
that  have  to  be  made  now  on  the  potential  suc- 
cess of  future  endeavors  in  the  disarmament 
field. 

Europe 

Disarmament  is  of  course  intimately  linked 
to  our  relations  with  our  closest  allies,  and  in 
particular  with  those  in  NATO.  The  President's 
journey  to  Western  Europe — made  only  5  weeks 
after  his  inauguration — testified  to  the  impor- 
tance the  administration  will  attach  to  our 
Atlantic  policy. 

We  believe  that  the  trip  was  a  success.  It  has 
injected  a  new  climate  of  confidence  and  trust 
into  the  alliance.  Our  European  friends  were 
impressed  not  only  by  the  timing  of  the  Presi- 
dent's trip  but  by  its  down-to-earth  working 
nature,  its  wide-open  agenda,  and  above  all,  by 
the  spirit  in  which  it  was  undertaken. 

The  President  made  clear  that  we  are  pre- 
pared to  listen  with  new  attentiveness  to  the 
views  of  our  allies  and  that  we  plan  to  consult 
with  them  on  all  matters  of  mutual  concern. 
He  particularly  emphasized  that  there  will  be 
ample  consultation  and  a  full  consideration  of 
their  interests  before  and  during  any  negotia- 
tions we  undertake  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

An  important  part  of  the  President's  purpose 
was  to  reaffirm  our  commitment  to  a  strong  and 
flexible  NATO,  the  significance  of  which  has 
been  only  too  clearly  brought  home  to  Europe 
and  to  us  by  the  rude  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 
in  1968  and  the  disturbing  Soviet  doctrine  under 
which  it  purports  to  have  the  right  to  override 
the  sovereignty  of  others. 

Speaking  to  the  North  Atlantic  Council  in 
Brussels,  he  said:  "As  NATO  enters  its  third 
decade,  I  see  for  it  an  opportunity  to  be  more 
than  it  ever  has  been  before :  a  bulwark  of  peace, 
the  architect  of  new  means  of  partnership,  and 
an  invigorated  forum  for  new  ideas  and  new 
teclmologies  .  .  .  ."  ^  He  thus  expressed  our 
view,  widely  shared  by  NATO  members,  that 
the  alliance  must  not  only  continue  to  maintain 
an  alert  and  strong  military  posture  but  also 
develop  its  capabilities  as  a  means  of  political 
consultation  and  progress.  The  foreign  and  de- 
fense ministers  of  NATO  will  be  meeting  here 
in  Washington  on  April  10  and  11  to  mark  the 
20th  anniversary  of  the  signing  of  the  North 


"  BuiXETiN  of  Mar.  24, 1969,  p.  250. 


Atlantic  Treaty.  They  will,  I  am  confident, 
chart  NATO's  course  for  the  future. 

This  administration's  long-range  sympathies 
remain  with  those  Europeans  who  see  their  most 
hopeful  future  in  an  independent  Europe  in- 
creasingly united.  It  is  neither  appropriate  nor 
feasible  for  us  to  chart  a  blueprint  for  Euro- 
pean union.  This  is  Europe's  concern.  But  the 
United  States  is  at  one  with  those  Europeans 
who  see  the  best  future  of  their  continent  in  a 
progressive  release  of  those  great  energies  which 
cannot  reach  their  full  potential  within  tradi- 
tional frontiers. 

The  United  States  pledge  of  continuing  sup- 
port to  NATO  and  the  other  institutions  of  the 
Atlantic  system,  including  the  European  Com- 
munities, does  not,  of  course,  preclude  an  active 
development  of  bilateral  relations.  Our  rela- 
tions with  France,  troubled  in  the  recent  past, 
have  already  changed  for  the  better.  In  his  visit 
to  Paris  the  President  held  candid  and  construc- 
tive talks  with  President  de  Gaulle.  The  im- 
proved atmosphere  in  Franco- American  rela- 
tions should  make  outstanding  differences 
between  us  easier  to  resolve. 

This  administration  will  also  seek  wherever 
possible  to  develop  normal  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial relations  with  the  Eastern  European  na- 
tions. We  do  not  regard  the  sovereignty  of  the 
states  of  Eastern  Europe  to  be  under  any  restric- 
tions, and  we  will  deal  with  each  country  as  one 
sovereign  nation  to  another.  Progress  will,  of 
course,  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  govern- 
ments are  representative  of  the  national  will. 

Yugoslavia  for  long  and  Romania  more  re- 
cently have  pursued  courses  of  sovereign  na- 
tional interest  within  the  Communist  world. 
Their  example  is  important.  Our  relations  with 
them  are  marked  by  growing  understanding 
and  cooperation  in  the  economic,  cultural,  scien- 
tific, and  other  spheres. 

In  Czechoslovakia  also,  in  spite  of  the  con- 
tinued presence  of  Soviet  troops,  the  people  and 
their  leaders  are  striving  amidst  great  difficul- 
ties and  pressures  to  preserve  what  they  can  of 
the  reforms  which  they  had  also  started  within 
their  own  system.  We  shall  do  what  we  can  to 
be  helpful  mider  the  circumstances,  including 
making  efforts  to  solve  bilateral  problems  such 
as  the  gold  and  claims  issues. 

The  continuing  Soviet  occupation  of  Czecho- 
slovakia after  earlier  promises  of  withdrawal 
cannot  be  condoned  by  world  opinion.  Never- 
theless, we  are  convinced  that  the  currents  of 
progress  and  national  independence  in  the  area 


309 


are  running  too  deep  to  be  very  long  denied. 
"We  are  confident  that  they  will  ultimately 
prevail. 

Latin  America 

Closer  to  home,  we  look  toward  a  renewed 
emphasis  on  our  strong  bonds  of  friendship  and 
our  unique  relationship  with  Latin  America,  a 
relationship  based  not  only  on  geographic  prox- 
imity but  also  on  long  historic  association  and 
many  similarities  in  origins.  It  will  be  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  to  place  the  highest  priority 
on  our  close  and  friendly  relations  with  our 
Latin  American  friends. 

In  this  relationship  our  policy  will  not  be  just 
to  encourage  increased  regional  cooperation  but 
also  to  encourage  Latin  America's  already  in- 
creasing contribution  to  world  affairs  generally. 

As  the  committee  is  aware,  Latin  America 
has  been  going  through  profound  technological 
and  economic  changes  in  the  last  two  decades, 
affecting  both  its  institutions  and  its  values, 
much  of  the  nature  we  ourselves  had  previously 
been  through.  The  United  States  has  the  re- 
sources and  experience  to  assist  these  countries 
in  this  process,  and  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
has  been  the  primary  way  through  which  we 
have  sought  to  do  so. 

This  administration  will  continue  to  extend 
assistance  through  the  Alliance,  and  we  are  now 
in  the  process  of  exploring  with  the  nations  of 
Latin  America  methods  of  making  that  assist- 
ance more  effective. 

To  help  in  this  effort,  the  President  has  asked 
Governor  Rockefeller  to  undertake  a  trip  to 
the  countries  of  the  hemisphere,  and  he  has 
agreed  to  do  so.  The  purpose  of  his  mission  will 
be  to  listen  to  Latin  American  leaders  and  to 
consult  with  them  concerning  the  development 
of  coimnon  goals  and  joint  programs  of  action. 
Following  his  visit.  Governor  Rockefeller  will 
refKjrt  to  the  President  on  their  views  and  make 
appropriate  recommendations  of  his  own. 

Problems  and  difficulties  arise  in  all  relation- 
ships, and  our  relations  in  the  Americas  are  no 
exception. 

The  most  current  dilEculty  concerns  two 
aspects  of  our  relations  with  Peru :  the  expro- 
priation of  certain  properties  of  the  Inter- 
national Petroleum  Company,  a  Canadian- 
incorporated  but  American-owned  company, 
and  the  right  of  American  fishing  vessels  to 
operate  off  the  west  coast  of  South  America.  We 
are  currently  engaged  in  a  diplomatic  effort  to 


310 


work  out  a  mutually  satisfactory  solution  to 
these  problems  through  a  special  emissary,  John 
Irwin,  recently  appointed  by  the  President  to 
undertake  this  task.  Ambassador  Irwin  is  now 
holding  discussions  with  the  Peruvians. 

On  the  fisheries  dispute,  we  have  been  seek- 
ing to  convene  a  conference  with  Peru,  Ecuador, 
and  Chile,  the  countries  most  directly  involved, 
all  of  whom  support  a  200-mile  claim  of  sov- 
ereignty over  the  seas  adjacent  to  their  coasts. 
In  the  light  of  our  conflicting  views  on  sover- 
eignty, however,  we  would  like  such  a  confer- 
ence to  put  aside  the  legal  dispute  and  instead 
take  up  conservation,  development  of  the  fishing 
industry,  and  methods  of  permitting  regulated 
fishing  in  the  area  by  fishermen  of  all  our  coun- 
tries. Recent  seizures  have  made  it  even  more 
urgent  that  a  practical  solution  be  found. 

In  the  IPC  dispute.  Ambassador  Irwin  is 
seeking  to  work  out  appropriate  steps  toward  a 
solution.  His  primary  goal  is  to  reach  agree- 
ment on  appropriate  steps  leading  to  effective 
compensation.  There  is  a  deadline,  mandated  by 
law,  which  faces  us  should  Peru  fail  to  take 
appropriate  steps  toward  a  solution.  We  are 
hopeful  that  the  discussions  will  achieve  results 
such  that  the  law  would  not  be  activated  and 
that  a  new  and  improved  relationship  with  Peru 
will  emerge.  Inasmuch  as  discussions  are  cur- 
rently underway,  I  do  not  believe  it  would  be 
prudent  to  say  more  at  this  time. 

Africa 

Our  relations  with  that  other  great  conti- 
nent— Africa — are  as  new  as  our  relations  with 
Latin  America  are  old  and  established.  In  the 
space  of  two  decades,  Africa  has  been  trans- 
formed from  an  externally  dominated  continent 
to  one  of  over  40  free  and  independent  states — 
states  now  playing  an  important  role  in  the 
councils  of  nations. 

Yesterday  the  United  States,  in  conformity 
with  our  belief  in  the  self-determination  of  peo- 
ple, welcomed  the  emergence  of  Africa  to  in- 
dependence. Today  Africa  is  engaged  in  consol- 
idating its  nationhood  and  in  struggling  with 
the  problems  of  economic  development.  The 
former  administering  authorities  in  Africa  are 
currently  making  the  largest  external  contribu- 
tions to  help  strengthen  and  develop  the  young 
institutions  of  these  new  nations.  We  have  con- 
tributed as  well,  both  in  economic  and  social 
terms.  Over  50,000  African  students  have 
studied  in  the  United  States  in  the  postwar 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BDLLETIK 


I 


period;  in  a  continent  seriously  deficient  in 
highly  trained  professions,  training  here  has 
made  a  major  contribution  to  the  building  of 
their  nations. 

We  hope  to  continue  to  contribute  toward  that 
economic  and  social  development.  And  in  par- 
ticular we  wish  to  encourage  the  increased  re- 
gional political  and  economic  cooperation  which 
African  leaders  have  seen  as  necessary  for  their 
growth  and  stability. 

Progress  in  the  southern  part  of  Africa  also 
remains  a  vital  goal  of  the  new  African  states 
and  one  with  which  we  basically  sympathize. 
Self-determination,  majority  rule  with  minority 
rights,  and  human  equality  are  the  product  of 
our  own  practical  experience  and  our  practical 
idealism ;  it  will  be  our  policy  to  support  them  in 
Africa  as  well.  Our  dedication  to  these  goals  is 
the  result  of  our  history,  a  product  of  our 
search  for  basic  answers  to  human  aspirations. 
By  the  same  token,  Africa's  effort  to  realize 
these  goals  throughout  the  continent  is  a  prod- 
uct of  its  history  and  its  aspirations.  In  this  situ- 
ation, there  exists  a  broad  community  of 
understanding  between  Africa  and  the  United 
States,  dramatized  by  the  fact  that  some  22 
million  Americans  trace  their  origin  to  Africa. 
There  will  no  doubt  be  differences  between  us 
and  some  of  our  African  colleagues  on  methods 
and  timing,  but  to  the  extent  that  they  are  com- 
mitted to  the  above  goals  there  will  be  none  on 
objective. 

Because  of  our  interest  in  the  peaceful  de- 
velopment of  the  independent  African  nations, 
our  concern  is  also  deep  when  it  is  disrupted. 
It  is  now  manifest  over  the  crisis  in  Nigeria. 

The  situation  in  that  bitterly  divided  land  is 
as  complicated  as  it  is  tragic  and — so  far — as 
elusive  of  solution.  Moderation  and  reason  are 
having  difficulty  in  overcoming  the  legacies  of 
ancient  tribal  feuds  and  hatreds. 

The  suspicions  each  side  feels  toward  the  other 
and  their  respective  doubts  about  each  other's 
objectives  continue  to  block  a  negotiated 
settlement. 

The  United  States  has  honored  the  wishes  of 
the  African  nations  to  settle  the  conflict  under 
their  own  auspices  and  we  intend  to  resist  any 
temptation  for  United  States  political  interven- 
tion. We  are  refusing  to  permit  the  sale  of 
United  States  arms  to  either  side.  We  continue 
to  support  the  efforts  of  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  and  the  Commonwealth  Secre- 
tariat to  bring  the  fighting  to  an  end  and  would 


support  a  United  Nations  role  should  it  become 
feasible. 

At  the  same  time,  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, reflecting  the  deep  humanitarian  concern 
of  the  American  people,  has  made  massive  con- 
tributions to  the  relief  effort  and  has  exerted 
strenuous  efforts  to  break  the  impasse  hamper- 
ing deliveries  of  desperately  needed  food  and 
medicine.  More  than  $31  million  has  already 
been  contributed  for  the  relief  of  persons  on 
both  sides  of  the  battleline. 

To  improve  our  contribution  in  this  regard  I 
recently  appointed  Mr.  Clyde  Ferguson  as  Spe- 
cial Coordinator  for  relief  in  the  Nigerian  con- 
flict. He  is  now  exploring  means  of  expanding 
the  flow  of  supplies  to  both  sides.  He  has  con- 
sulted with  international  relief  officials,  with 
goveriunents  contributing  to  the  relief  effort, 
with  the  OAU,  and  with  authorities  in  both 
Nigeria  and  the  Biaf  ran  area.  We  hope  that  the 
international  relief  effort  can  be  substantially 
increased  as  a  result  of  his  labors. 

United  Nations 

Twenty-five  years  ago  the  United  States  took 
leadership  in  forging  a  framework  of  inter- 
national institutions  to  help  maintain  inter- 
national peace  and  security  and  to  facilitate 
increasing  teclinical,  economic,  and  social  re- 
lations among  nations.  To  the  maximum  extent 
feasible  this  administration  will  continue  to  look 
to  multilateral  institutions — and  particularly 
to  the  United  Nations — to  deal  with  threats  to 
the  security  of  weak  and  developing  coimtries 
and  to  promote  peaceful  settlement  of  localized 
conflicts. 

As  President  Nixon  told  reporters  in  New 
York  last  December : 

The  more  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
can  conduct  their  policies  in  a  way  that  those  conflicts 
in  the  third  world  are  channeled  into  the  United  Na- 
tions or  another  international  organization,  the  better 
the  chances  are  that  we  can  avoid  a  confrontation  which 
both  powers,  I  think,  want  to  avoid 

We  also  believe  that  the  United  Nations  has  a 
significant  and  constructive  role  to  play  in  eco- 
nomic and  social  programs  to  help  developing 
nations  and  in  realizing  the  promise  and  coping 
with  the  perils  of  new  technology.  The  fact  that 
we  are  now  exploring  in  the  United  Nations 
means  of  facilitating  international  cooperation 
in  the  exploration  and  use  of  the  seabeds  and 
are  preparing  for  a  world  conference  on  the 
human  environment  is  indicative  of  the  degree 


APRIL    14,    1969 


311 


to  which  technological  development  will  con- 
tinue to  require  institutionalized  multilateral 
cooperation.  Science  and  technology  is  an  area 
in  which  the  United  States  has  a  unique  con- 
tribution to  make,  and  we  hope  to  continue  to  be 
an  initiator  in  this  field  in  the  years  to  come. 

We  will,  of  course,  give  general  support  to 
the  United  Nations  and  will  join  with  others  in 
strengthening  its  effectiveness. 

East-West  Relations 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  wish  to  make 
a  few  remarks  about  our  view  toward  the  gen- 
eral status  of  East-West  relations.  One  could 
hardly  consider  how  to  proceed  on  such  funda- 
mental matters  as  the  Middle  East,  Viet-Nam, 
and  disarmament  without  careful  contempla- 
tion of  our  relations  with  the  other  so-called 
superpower  and  with  the  potential  power  of 
Communist  China. 

With  respect  to  Communist  China,  we  con- 
tinue to  hope  for  a  reduction  of  tensions.  With 
its  vast  population,  great  potential,  and  devel- 
oping nuclear  capability,  China  is,  of  course, 
a  matter  of  major  concern  to  us  as  well  as  to  its 
neighbors,  including  the  Soviet  Union. 

Despite  the  attitude  of  hostility  toward  the 
United  States  and  the  outside  world  in  general 
that  has  characterized  Peking's  policy,  we  have 
attempted  to  maintain  and  develop  a  dialogue 
with  the  Chinese  Communists  through  our  talks 
in  Warsaw.  This  has  not  been  easy,  since  the 
Chinese  have  declined  to  discuss  matters  with 
us  or,  in  some  cases,  to  acknowledge  our  initia- 
tive aimed  at  bringing  about  increased  contacts 
and  exchanges. 

Although  the  Chinese  Communists  con- 
sistently have  attacked  our  administration  from 
its  first  days  in  office,  we  nevertheless  were  dis- 
appointed that  they  canceled  at  the  last  minute 
the  ambassadorial  meeting  scheduled  for  Febru- 
ary 20.  We  had  hoped  that  their  agreement  last 
November  to  renew  these  talks  might  enable  us 
to  make  some  progress,  and  we  had  been  pre- 
pared to  present  suggestions  for  an  agreement 
looking  toward  better  relations. 

The  Chinese  are  still  trying  to  emerge  from 
the  political  and  economic  confusion  created  by 
the  last  3  years  of  domestic  turmoil.  The  ninth 
congress  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party,  to  be 
held  this  year,  may  result  in  the  formulation  of 
new  policies  setting  the  course  for  China's  fu- 
ture development.  Of  course,  we  cannot  predict 


what  these  will  be.  In  any  event,  we  must  rec- 
ognize that  changes  in  Peking's  policy  in  the 
direction  of  better  relations  with  its  neighbors 
and  with  us  will  come  slowly  at  best.  We  must 
recognize  also  that,  while  we  will  continue  to 
seek  ways  in  which  we  may  be  able  to  con- 
tribute to  an  improved  atmosphere,  our  ability 
to  influence  the  rate  of  improvement  is  very 
limited. 

We  nevertheless  continue  to  look  forward  to 
a  time  when  we  can  make  progress  toward  a 
useful  dialogue  to  reduce  tensions,  resolve  our 
differences,  and  move  to  a  more  constructive 
relationship.  To  this  end,  we  would  welcome  a 
renewal  of  our  meetings  with  the  Chinese  in 
which  these  goals  could  be  pursued. 

With  respect  to  the  Soviet  Union  we  liave 
also  seen  considerable  progress  since  the  death 
of  Stalin  and  the  depths  of  the  cold- war  period. 
This  progress  was  set  back,  by  what  we  may 
hope  was  an  aberration,  in  the  Soviet  invasion 
of  Czechoslovakia  last  year. 

The  political  trends  have,  nevertheless,  on  the 
whole  been  in  the  direction  of  improved  and 
more  normal  relations,  including  major  agree- 
ments on  matters  acutely  and  peculiarly  involv- 
ing our  two  countries  such  as  the  partial  test  ban 
and  the  Outer  Space  Treaty.  It  will  be  our  en- 
deavor, in  the  spirit  described  by  the  President 
as  one  of  negotiation  rather  than  confi-ontation, 
to  encourage  the  continuation  of  that  process. 

At  the  same  time,  it  would  be  unwise  to  be  too 
sanguine  about  the  speed  or  the  extent  to  which 
improved  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  can  move  forward.  We 
cannot  expect  the  hostilities  and  suspicions  built 
up  over  the  last  two  decades  to  be  suddenly 
stilled.  Our  interests  will  certainly  continue  to 
clash  at  many  points.  Nonetheless,  the  number 
of  areas  in  which  our  interests  are  similar  is 
growing,  and  each  of  us  now  acknowledges  the 
existence  of  many  practical  areas  amenable  to 
negotiation.  On  our  part  I  can  assure  this  com- 
mittee we  will  do  all  we  can  to  maximize,  not 
minimize,  these  areas. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  closing,  let  me  say  that  the 
climate  for  negotiations  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  seems  somewhat 
warmer  than  in  the  recent  past.  It  is  not  incon-  M 
ceivable — not  inconceivable — that  a  time  has  ar-  ' 
rived  when  substantial  progress  is  possible. 
That  has  to  be  our  hope,  and  I  will  do  my  part 
in  working  to  that  end.  Thank  you  very  much, 
Mr.  Chairman. 


312 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


President  Nixon  Discusses  the  Viet-Nam  Peace  Talks 
and  the  ABM  Safeguard  System 


Remarks  iy  President  Nixon  ^ 


It  occurred  to  me  that  what  might  be  useful 
for  you  in  brief  remarks  of  this  type  would  be 
for  me  to  share  some  of  the  problems  that  a 
President  has  in  attempting  to  run  what  we  call 
an  open  administration  and  in  attempting  to  be 
candid  and  honest  with  regard  to  the  great  issues 
in  which  you  are  vitaDy  interested. 

I  think  if  we  were  to  pick  one  issue  of  all 
the  others  that  the  American  people  have  an 
interest  in,  it  is  Viet-Nam.  On  that  issue,  on 
television,  on  radio,  and  in  the  newspapers,  day 
after  day  we  hear  speciilation.  We  read  it  about 
what  is  happening  in  Viet-Nam,  what  is  hap- 
pening on  the  battlefield,  but  more  important, 
what  is  happening  at  the  negotiating  tables. 

I  want  you  to  know  what  my  belief  is  about 
the  conduct  of  this  war,  about  the  negotiations, 
and  about  the  prospects.  Wliat  I  say  will  not 
give  you,  perhaps,  as  much  hope  as  you  might 
like  to  hear.  But  what  I  say,  I  believe,  is  in  the 
best  interests  of  the  result;  and  the  result  is 
ending  the  war  on  a  basis  that  will  promote 
real  peace  in  the  Pacific. 

I  could  stand  before  you  today  and  talk  rather 
optimistically  about  the  prospect  of  bringing 
boys  home  from  Viet-Nam  at  a  time  when  a 
Communist  offensive  is  at  a  high  peak.  I  can 
tell  you  that  it  will  be  the  objective  of  tliis 
adnimistration  to  bring  men  home  from  Viet- 
Nam  just  as  soon  as  the  military  situation,  the 
diplomatic  situation,  and  the  training  of  the 
South  Vietnamese  forces  will  enable  us  to  do  so. 

But  I  can  also  tell  you  that  I  think  it  is  not 
in  the  interests  of  the  Nation  for  the  President 
of  the  United  States  to  stand  before  any  audi- 

'  Made  before  the  National  Association  of  Broad- 
casters at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Mar.  25  (White  House 
press  release). 


ence  and  to  raise  hopes  and  then  disappoint 
them.  So  I  will  only  tell  you  today  what  our 
objective  is. 

I  will  tell  you,  looking  toward  the  future, 
I  think  we  are  going  to  achieve  that  objective 
of  a  peace  that  will  be  one  that  will  not  be  just 
for  the  year  or  2  years  but  for  the  foreseeable 
future  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  world — ^that  kind 
of  peace. 

But  in  talking  of  what  we  do  with  regard  to 
our  troop  strength  there,  I  think  all  of  you 
know  that  at  this  particular  time,  as  an  offensive 
is  going  on  and  as  negotiations  are  beginning, 
it  is  vitally  important  that  the  United  States 
maintain  its  position  of  strength  until  we  have 
reason  to  believe  that  a  reduction  on  our  part 
would  also  have  a  major  contribution  in  bring- 
ing about  a  reduction  on  their  part. 

So  while  I  would  like  to  make  news  here, 
while  I  would  like  to  leave  impressions  that 
would  go  flashing  out  across  the  country  about 
what  is  going  to  happen  in  a  hopeful  way,  I 
can  only  say — and  I  do  not  say  this  in  any  par- 
tisan sense,  because  I  have  been  one  that  has 
supported,  as  you  know,  as  a  Republican,  the 
efforts  of  our  nation  in  Viet-Nam — that  I  believe 
there  has  been  too  much  of  a  tendency  to  speak 
of  peace  being  "just  around  the  corner,"  "the 
boys  may  be  coming  home  in  a  matter  of  a  few 
months,"  and  thereby  raising  those  optimistic 
feelings  in  the  minds  of  people  without  justifica- 
tion and  then  dashing  them. 

We  shall  not  do  this  in  this  administration. 
We  may  not  make  the  headlines  of  today,  but 
what  we  are  interested  in  are  the  results  of 
tomorrow.  I  believe  that  is  what  you  are  inter- 
ested in,  and  that  is  why  we  are  going  to  follow 
this  very  candid  and  honest  discussion  insofar 
as  our  hopes  are  concerned. 


APRIL    14,    1969 


313 


Now,  I  realize  that  in  this  room  are  not  the 
broadcasters  and  the  reporters — I  mean  by  that 
the  commentators  and  the  reporters  and  all  of 
the  rest — but  you  are  the  managers,  the  people 
on  the  business  side  of  the  great  television  and 
radio  installations  around  the  country.  I  think 
all  of  you  will  understand  the  next  point  that 
I  will  make  particularly  well. 

The  (mportance  of  Private  Peace  Talks 

Two  or  three  weeks  ago,  I  noted  considerable 
criticism  of  the  administration  because  we  had 
not,  at  the  time  that  I  was  in  Paris,  announced 
that  we  were  starting  private  talks  with  the 
enemy  in  order  to  negotiate  those  areas  of  differ- 
ence and  bring  the  day  of  peace  closer. 

Now,  let  me  be  quite  candid.  As  far  as  any 
negotiated  peace  is  concerned,  it  will  come  from 
private  rather  than  public  talks,  because  where 
both  sides — and  I  am  referring  now  particularly 
to  the  North  Vietnamese  and  the  South  Viet- 
namese— have  a  problem  of  prestige  and  a  prob- 
lem of  face,  among  many  others  involved,  that 
kind  of  negotiation  cannot  take  place  in  a  gold- 
fish bowl,  with  communiques  every  day,  because 
there  the  tendency  always  is  to  speak  to  their 
people  at  home,  but  more  than  that  to  the  people 
of  the  world,  and  to  simply  repeat  the  old 
rhetoric. 

Most  of  the  progress  that  has  been  made  today 
in  bringing  about  talks  in  a  public  forum  has 
come  from  private  talks.  So  I  can  tell  you  that 
it  is  our  conviction  and  our  belief  that  it  is 
through  private  talks  with  the  North  Viet- 
namese and  others  involved  that  real  progress 
toward  peace  will  be  made. 

But  if  private  talks  are  to  be  private,  they 
must  be  private.  Consequently,  if  I  am  asked — 
and  this  is  true  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  it 
is  true  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  my  in- 
structions to  everybody  in  this  administration — • 
as  to  whether  private  talks  have  begun,  as  to 
when  they  will  begin,  we  will  say  nothing.  Be- 
cause the  moment  we  tell  you,  any  of  you — and 
let  me  say  the  questions  are  always  proper; 
sometimes  the  answers  would  not  be  appropriate 
on  our  part — but  I  can  only  say  that  if  we  are 
to  make  progress  in  private  talks,  they  must  be 
private. 

Therefore,  to  disclose  when  and  where,  and 
what  and  how  in  any  degree  would  not  serve 
the  interests  of  peace.  Now,  again,  I  realize  that 
it  would  raise  hopes.  It  would  make  a  good  head- 
line, and  a  good  first  2  minutes  on  the  evening 


show,  if  I  were  to  indicate  that  we  were  proceed- 
ing in  private  talks  or  what  was  going  on. 

But  let  me  say  that  that  would  not  serve  the 
long-range  interests  of  bringing  peace.  I  can 
only  assure  you  that  there  is  no  objective  of  this 
administration  that  is  higher — and  let  me  say 
this  was  also  true  of  the  other  administration, 
but  we  are  proceeding  in  different  ways — than 
to  bring  this  war  to  a  conclusion  at  the  earliest 
possible  time  in  a  manner  that  will  promote  real 
peace. 

We  think  we  are  on  the  right  track,  but  we  are 
not  going  to  raise  false  hopes.  We  are  not  going 
to  tell  you  what  is  going  on  in  private  talks. 
What  we  are  going  to  do  is  to  do  our  job,  and 
then,  a  few  months  from  now,  I  think  you  will 
look  back  and  say  we  did  what  was  right.  If  we 
did  what  was  wrong,  then  it  doesn't  make  any 
difference — the  headline  that  we  have  made 
today.  So  this  will  be  our  policy  in  that  respect. 

Again,  I  think  that  you  as  negotiators  will 
recognize  the  validity  of  that  position.  Much  as 
we  want  an  open  administration,  there  are  times 
when  it  is  necessary  to  have  those  quiet  conver- 
sations, without  publicity,  in  which  each  side 
can  explore  the  areas  of  difference  and  even- 
tually reach  an  agreement  which  then,  of  course, 
publicly  will  be  announced. 

The  ABM   Safeguard  System 

.  .  .  I  understand  there  has  been  some  interest 
in  the  ABM  Safeguard  system  which  I  have 
talked  about.^  I  am  not  here  to  twist  your  arms 
or  to  attempt  to  influence  you  one  way  or  an- 
other. All  of  you,  as  far  as  that  system,  the  de- 
fense of  the  country,  in  all  of  these  matters, 
must  examine  the  evidence  and  then  make  your 
own  decisions  with  regard  to  what  is  in  the  best 
interests  of  the  Nation. 

But  I  would  like  to  share  with  you  briefly  the 
considerations  that  went  into  that  decision — 
not  an  easy  decision.  In  fact,  the  easy  decision 
would  have  been  not  to  make  it.  The  easy  de- 
cision would  have  been  to  put  it  off,  to  have  re- 
search and  development,  or  to  indicate  that 
there  was  no  significant  threat  or  that  it 
wouldn't  work  or  that  it  really  didn't  matter. 

But  I  can  tell  you  that  these  were  the  factors 
that  we  were  confronted  with  and  which  we 
had  to  deal  with  and  which  made  it  necessary 
for  us  to  announce  a  hard  decision  rather  than 


°  For   a    statement   by   President   Nixon   issued   on 
Mar.  14,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  31,  1969,  p.  273. 


314 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


an  easy  one.  We  hope  it  is  the  right  one.  We 
think  it  is.  That  is  for  you  to  judge.  It  is  for 
the  American  people  to  appraise. 

I  found  when  I  came  to  office  that  in  1962, 
when  the  Cuban  confrontation  occurred,  the 
balance  of  power  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  was  approximately  four  or 
five  to  one  in  our  favor.  Because  of  that  balance 
of  power  in  our  favor,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  in  a  very  courageous  decision  was 
able  to  act  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States  and  avoid  a  missile  installation  90  miles 
from  our  shore. 

If  the  United  States  had  not  had  that  kind 
of  assurance — not  only  the  assurance  of  our 
power  but  also  a  recognition  that  those  who 
threatened  our  security  at  that  time,  the  Soviet 
Union,  had  a  recognition  on  their  part  that  we 
had  that  kind  of  strength — if  that  had  not  been 
the  case,  that  decision  might  not  have  been  made 
or  it  would  have  been  much  more  dangerous 
to  make. 

Now,  what  has  happened  from  1962  to  1969? 
Since  that  time  the  Soviet  Union  has  widened 
the  gap  in  conventional  weapons  which  they 
have  always  had  in  Western  Europe.  They  have 
rapidly  closed  the  gap  in  naval  strength,  par- 
ticularly in  the  Mediterranean,  and  they  have 
substantially  closed  the  gap  in  strategic  weap- 
ons. So  we  look  at  that  situation  today.  And  in 
describing  it,  let  me  lay  to  rest  one  point  of 
view  that  I  saw  expressed  in  some  reaction  to 
Secretary  [of  Defense  Melvin  R.]  Laird's  tes- 
timony. In  describing  this,  this  is  no  cause  for 
fright. 

The  United  States  is  still  infinitely  strong 
and  powerful.  We  are  still  able  to  meet  any 
potential  threat.  But  the  problem  that  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  faces  as  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  and  as  the  one  who  has  the 
responsibility  to  see  that  our  defenses  are  ade- 
quate to  make  peaceful  diplomacy  possible — 
the  responsibility  that  he  has  is  to  examine  not 
only  what  the  situation  is  now  but  what  it  will  be 
4  or  5  years  from  now.  And  the  decision  that  I 
made  here  and  the  decisions  I  will  be  making 
on  all  defense  matters,  I  can  assure  you,  will 
have  one  consideration  only. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  United  States  should 
threaten  any  other  nation.  We  are  not  interested 
in  aggression.  I  do  believe,  however,  that  with- 
out the  power  of  the  United  States  the  great 
hundreds  of  millions  of  people  who  live  in  the 
free  world  would  not  have  had  the  assurance 


of  freedom  that  they  have  had.  In  other  words, 
it  is  the  power  of  the  United  States  that  has 
avoided  a  world  war  and  a  world  confrontation. 

And  whether  it  is  in  my  administration  or  in 
the  next,  I  never  want  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  when  he  sits  down  at  a  confer- 
ence table,  to  be  in  a  second-rate  position  as  far 
as  the  strength  of  the  United  States  is  concerned. 

I  am  not  suggesting  that  that  means  we  em- 
bark on  an  arms  race.  I  am  not  suggesting  that 
that  means  that  we  go  forward  in  order  to  re- 
gain the  four  or  five  to  one  superiority  that  we 
once  had.  That  will  not  happen.  But  I  am  sug- 
gesting that  when  we  look  at  those  facts,  there 
are  some  limited  actions  that  the  United  States, 
I  think,  should  take. 

Protection  of  Second-Strike  Capability 

One  involves  the  ABM  Safeguard  system. 
Wliat  this  system  will  do,  first,  is  to  provide 
some  protection  for  our  deterrent  capability,  our 
Minuteman  sites.  That  means  our  second-strike 
capability.  This  was  necessary  because  we  found 
that  the  Soviet  Union  had  developed  new  weap- 
ons with  greater  accuracy,  the  SS-9,  that  could 
take  out  our  hardened  Minuteman  sites  and 
thereby  i-educe  the  credibility  of  our  second- 
strike  capability. 

The  credibility  of  the  American  second  strike 
is  essential,  diplomatically  and  also  in  the  long 
range  as  far  as  preserving  peace  in  the  world. 
In  addition  to  that,  the  ABM  Safeguard  system 
provides  an  area  defense  of  the  entire  United 
States,  for  any  attack  by  the  Chinese  Commu- 
nists within  the  next  10  years,  or  any  other  nu- 
clear power  which  might  acquire  such  weapons 
in  that  period. 

Let  me  emphasize  what  Safeguard  does  not 
do.  There  is  no  way  at  this  time  that  we  can 
safeguard  all  of  the  American  people  through 
antiballistic  missiles  against  an  attack  by  a 
sophisticated  major  nuclear  power  like  the  So- 
viet Union.  But  we  can  increase  the  credibility 
of  our  second-strike  force  by  defending  our  Min- 
uteman sites. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  we  look  at  a  less 
developed  nuclear  power  with  fewer  missiles,  it 
is  possible  to  develop  the  area  defense  which 
will  be  effective.  So  those  were  the  two  purposes 
of  making  that  decision. 

Now,  many  questions  arise.  First,  will  it 
work?  Those  for  whom  I  have  great  respect — 
including  perhaps  beyond  others  the  Under  Sec- 


APRIL    14,    1969 


315 


retary  of  Defense,  Mr.  Packard,  an  expert  in 
this  field — say  that  it  will.  And  some  indication 
that  it  must  have  some  meaning  is  that  the  So- 
viet Union  has  deployed  66  of  this  type  of  de- 
fense around  Moscow  and  are  now  covering  not 
only  the  threat  from  the  West  but  also  from 
Communist  China. 

But  in  order  to  guard  against  plunging  into 
a  program  that  would  be  a  boondoggle,  we  have 
made  the  decision  on  a  phase  basis. 

Every  year  we  will  examine  this  new  sys- 
tem— with  the  minimal  appropriations  for  this 
year,  which  you  are  aware  of — with  three  things 
in  mind: 

One,  progress  that  may  be  made  on  arms 
talks; 

Two,  progress  that  may  be  made  on  the  state 
of  the  art,  whether  or  not  it  proves  that  it  is 
something  that  we  can  do  or  that  we  cannot  do ; 
and 

Finally,  we  shall  always  examine  this  sys- 
tem in  terms  of  the  overall  capability  of  the 
United  States  and  our  responsibilities  in  the 
world  which  I  have  described  up  to  this  time. 

Balance   Between   Security  and   Freedom 

Let  me  conclude  with  this  final  thought :  Any 
of  you,  and  I  know  many  of  you  have  been  ex- 
posed to  briefings  on  the  massive  destructive 
power  of  nuclear  weapons,  must  sometimes  won- 
der why  enough  isn't  enough. 

As  some  have  put  it,  with  regard  to  the  po- 
tential of  a  Chinese  threat,  why  should  we  be 
concerned — because  assiuning  8  or  10  years 
from  now  they  have  60  or  70  or  80  missiles  and 
assuming  that  is  the  case,  no  rational  man  who 
was  the  leader  of  that  country  would  launch  an 
attack  against  the  United  States  knowing  that 
our  immense  retaliatory  power  would  destroy 
half  of  the  population  of  Communist  China. 

I  agree  with  that  analysis.  But  when  we  ex- 
amine history,  we  find  within  the  last  third  of  a 
century  that  sometimes  decisions  by  great  pow- 
ers, as  well  as  small,  are  not  made  by  rational 
men.  Hitler  was  not  a  particularly  rational  man 
in  some  of  his  military  decisions. 

So  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  not  only  to  plan  against 
the  expected  and  against  what  normal  and  ra- 
tional men  will  do  but,  within  a  certain  area  of 
contingency,  to  plan  against  the  possibility  of  an 
irrational  attack. 

To  do  all  this,  having  in  mind  maintaining 
the  necessary  balance  between  security  and  free- 


dom which  is  so  essential — this  we  have  tried  to 
do.  I  think  the  decision  was  a  correct  one. 

In  presenting  it  to  you  in  this  way  today,  as  I 
have  presented  it  previously,  I  can  only  say  and 
repeat  what  I  have  said  earlier :  that  all  of  us, 
whatever  our  partisan  aflSliations,  have  one  pri- 
mary goal  in  mind.  That  is  peace  in  the  world — 
peace  in  the  world  which  is  the  real  peace  that 
comes  from  the  kind  of  security  that  only  the 
United  States  can  provide. 

I  have  just  met  with  the  Canadian  Prime 
Minister.  I  have  just  completed  meetings  with 
the  heads  of  government  of  the  major  Euro- 
pean powers.  And  I  have  been  reminded  again 
of  this  fundamental  fact:  Without  the  power 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  rest  of 
the  world  would  be,  in  effect,  at  the  mercy  of 
potential  diplomatic  aggression,  and  that  is 
really  what  is  at  stake  here. 

We  have  a  responsibility.  We  have  met  it  ever 
since  World  War  II,  and  I  believe  that  now  it  is 
our  destiny  to  continue  to  meet  it,  while  at  the 
same  time — and  I  can  assure  you  we  are  explor- 
ing this  other  road — to  pursue  every  path  to- 
ward peace  and  to  pursue  every  path  toward 
arms  limitations  so  that  we  can  divert  our  re- 
sources to  other  areas  than  those  of  destruction. 


Tenth  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  ty 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  10th  flenary  session  of 
the  new  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
March  27. 

Press  release  63  dated  Marcb  27 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Your  side  speaks  fre- 
quently about  so-called  "United  States  aggres- 
sion against  Viet-Nam,"  claiming  that  the  cen- 
tral issue  in  a  solution  to  the  Viet-Nam  conflict 
is  how  to  end  this  so-called  "American 
aggression." 

The  United  States  Government  has  many 
times  in  the  past  produced  the  evidence  which 
shows  that  the  source  of  aggression  in  Viet- 
Nam — both  clandestine  and  overt — is  Hanoi. 
The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
lias  presented  much  of  this  evidence  here  in  this 
room  since  these  meetings  began.  The  represen- 
tative of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  has  traced  the  origins  of  Hanoi's  ag- 


316 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


gression  against  South  Viet-Nam,  citing  the 
facts  of  massive  troop  infiltration  and  terror 
against  the  Soutli  Vietnamese  people.  Thus, 
Hanoi's  aggression  against  South  Viet-Nam  has 
been  clearly  documented  on  the  public  record, 
which  is  available  to  all. 

Although  the  responsibility  for  aggression 
against  South  Viet-Nam  lies  in  Hanoi,  your  side 
demands  that  the  United  States  withdraw  its 
forces  unilaterally.  In  sharp  contrast,  the 
United  States,  which  is  actually  in  Viet-Nam  in 
response  to  your  aggression,  recognizes  that  so- 
lutions to  such  problems  must  be  mutually 
reached  and  mutually  carried  out. 

All  of  us  should  therefore  look  at  the  truth, 
since — after  all  is  said  and  done — it  is  the  truth 
with  which  we  must  deal  in  these  negotiations. 

Over  the  years,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  mil- 
itary and  subversive  forces  have  illegally  come 
down  from  Noi-th  Viet-Nam  into  South  Viet- 
Nam.  Week  after  week,  more  arrive.  These 
forces  have  come  to  South  Viet-Nam  in  viola- 
tion of  the  1954  Geneva  accords,  in  violation  of 
the  1962  Geneva  agreements  on  Laos,  and  in 
violation  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  and 
general  international  law. 

The  truth  is  that  two-thirds  of  all  combat 
forces  facing  the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam  and  its 
allies  in  the  South  today  are  North  Vietnamese. 
Eighty-five  percent  of  the  combat  forces  of  your 
side  in  the  five  northern  provinces  of  South 
Viet-Nam  are  North  Vietnamese.  In  the  high- 
lands and  central  coastal  area,  approximately 
60  percent  of  your  combat  forces  are  from  North 
Viet-Nam.  In  the  Saigon  region.  North  Viet- 
namese personnel  make  up  over  80  percent  of 
all  enemy  combat  forces. 

Virtually  all  the  forces  on  your  side  are 
equipped  with  weapons  and  ammunition  which 
have  been  infiltrated  clandestinely  and  illegally 
into  South  Viet-Nam.  Heavy  machineguns,  mor- 
tars, rockets,  and  other  weapons  and  equipment 
of  advanced  types,  even  including  tanks  and 
bulldozers,  have  poured  into  the  South  from 
North  Viet-Nam.  The  rockets  which  have  been 
recently  indiscriminately  fired  on  Saigon,  Hue, 
Da  Nang,  and  other  cities  in  South  Viet-Nam 
were  sent  from  the  North.  Even  the  clothing 
worn  by  the  troops  of  your  side  has  come  from 
North  Viet-Nam. 

The  recent  military  attacks  by  your  side  have 
been  carried  out  largely  by  North  Vietnamese 
soldiers.  The  offensive  that  began  on  Febru- 
ary 22  was  supplied  with  men  and  materiel  from 
the  North  and  directed  by  North  Vietnamese 
officers. 


Let  me  cite  just  a  few  specific  examples. 
The  largest  of  the  recent  attacks  launched  by 
your  side  were  in  the  vicinity  of  Bien  Hoa,  east 
of  Saigon,  in  late  February.  Of  a  total  of  109 
prisoners  captured  by  our  forces  in  that  area 
during  the  attacks,  89  were  North  Vietnamese. 
These  men  were  born  in  North  Viet-Nam,  had 
been  inducted  into  the  North  Vietnamese  Army, 
trained  for  infiltration,  and  sent  to  the  South 
as  members  of  infiltration  groups  with  other 
North  Vietnamese. 

The  main  attacks  at  Bien  Hoa  were  carried 
out  by  the  275th  Eegiment  of  the  so-called  5th 
Viet  Cong  Division.  Of  the  estimated  1,400  sol- 
diers in  this  regiment,  more  than  1,100  are 
North  Vietnamese.  From  the  same  nominally 
Viet  Cong  Division,  units  of  two  other  regi- 
ments were  identified  in  combat  in  the  area. 
Of  the  total  of  2,800  men  in  these  two  regiments, 
more  than  2,600  are  North  Vietnamese.  In  all, 
nine  out  of  every  10  men  in  units  known  to  have 
been  committed  at  Bien  Hoa  were  North 
Vietnamese. 

At  our  last  meeting,  a  spokesman  of  your  side 
referred  to  Operation  Atlas  Wedge  being  car- 
ried out  by  Allied  forces  northwest  of  Saigon. 
That  operation — including  the  bombing  in  con- 
nection with  the  operation — was  directed 
against  the  7th  North  Vietnamese  Division, 
which  was  attempting  to  get  set  for  attacks  in 
the  Saigon  area.  South  Vietnamese  and  U.S. 
forces  have  been  taking  the  necessary  action 
against  military  targets  and  military  forces  in 
that  area  to  assure  that  the  plans  of  the  7th 
North  Vietnamese  Division  are  frustrated. 

Spokesmen  of  your  side  have  also  mentioned 
the  Ashau  Valley.  In  February  1969,  South 
Vietnamese  and  American  forces  operating 
there,  adjacent  to  the  Laotian  border  west  of 
Hue,  collected  incontrovertible  evidence  of  the 
continuing  flow  of  materiel  from  North  Viet- 
Nam.  Allied  forces  captured  12  large-caliber 
artillery  pieces,  extensive  stores  of  ammunition, 
nine  tracked  vehicles,  numerous  trucks,  and 
other  equipment.  In  all,  on  the  order  of  500  tons 
of  weapons  and  ammunition  were  found  in  a 
relatively  small  area  within  35  miles  of  the 
city  of  Hue. 

These  are  but  a  few  examples  of  the  extent 
of  North  Vietnamese  presence  and  involvement 
in  the  war  in  South  Viet-Nam.  There  are  many 
others.  We  know  that  North  Vietnamese  troops 
continue  to  be  present  in  the  demilitarized  zone. 
In  addition  to  North  Vietnamese  forces  moving 
through  Laos  to  South  Viet-Nam,  at  least  40,000 
North  Vietnamese  troops  are  deployed  in  Laos, 


APRIL    14,    1969 
338-052—69- 


317 


fighting  and  otherwise  interfering  in  Lao  inter- 
nal affairs.  North  Vietnamese  forces  daily  vio- 
late the  territorial  integrity  of  Cambodia. 

Such,  then,  is  the  true  situation.  It  should  be 
evident,  in  looking  at  these  facts,  why  the 
United  States  has  proposed  the  mutual  with- 
drawal of  all  external  forces. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  goal  of  the  United 
States  remains  the  same :  to  assure  for  the  people 
of  South  Viet-Nam  the  right  to  determine  their 
own  future  in  peace  without  external  coercion 
or  intimidation.  We  have  made  specific  and  con- 
crete proposals  to  achieve  that  objective  and  to 
bring  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  end.  We  have 
proposed  the  restoration  of  the  demilitarized 
zone.  We  have  proposed  the  mutual  withdrawal 
of  external  forces.  We  have  proposed  the  prompt 
release  of  prisoners  of  war.  We  remain  ready  to 
discuss  these  proposals  with  your  side  at  any 
time. 


The  20th  Anniversary  of  NATO 


A     PROCLAMATION' 

The  Twentieth  Annivebsakt 

OF  THE  NOBTH  ATLANTIC  TREATY  OBQANIZATION 

Twenty  years  ago,  on  April  4,  1949,  twelve  sovereign 
nations,  determined  to  safeguard  the  freedom,  com- 
mon heritage,  and  civilization  of  their  peoples,  signed 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty.  In  later  years,  Greece,  Tur- 
key, and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  became  par- 
ties to  that  agreement  and  members  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  which  was  established 
to  effect  the  Treaty's  goals. 

For  twenty  years,  NATO  has  furthered  the  cause  of 
Atlantic  unity  by  achieving  a  spirit  of  solidarity  on 
many  common  military,  political,  and  economic  prob- 
lems. By  promoting  international  security  through  col- 
lective defense  arrangements  and  by  fostering  coopera- 
tion in  the  political  realm,  NATO  has  contributed 
to  unprecedented  peace  and  prosperity  for  all  the 
peoples  of  the  Treaty  area.  It  has  provided  a  stabilizing 


'  No.  3906 ;  34  Fed.  Reg.  5897. 


influence  during  times  of  crisis  and  has  been  a  vigilant 
guardian  in  the  face  of  threats  to  world  peace.  At 
the  same  time,  NATO  has  steadfastly  pursued  the 
quest  for  improved  relations  between  East  and  West, 
dedicated  always  to  a  peaceful  settlement  of  European 
differences  and  to  effective  measures  for  disarmament 
and  arms  control. 

Now,  as  NATO  begins  its  third  decade,  committed 
still  to  a  viable  Atlantic  community,  to  the  resolution 
of  differences  between  East  and  West,  and  to  the  sta- 
bility and  tranquillity  of  our  entire  planet,  America's 
commitment  to  NATO  remains  firm  and  vital. 

Therefore,  I  Richard  Nixon,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  direct  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Nation  to  this  twentieth  anniversary  of  the 
signing  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty ;  and  I  call  upon 
all  agencies  and  officials  of  the  Federal  Government, 
upon  the  Governors  of  the  States,  and  upon  the  oflBcers 
of  local  governments  to  encourage  and  facilitate  the 
suitable  observance  of  this  notable  event  throughout 
this  anniversary  year  with  particular  attention  to 
April,  the  month  which  marks  the  historic  signing 
ceremony. 

I  also  urge  all  citizens  to  participate  in  appropri- 
ate activities  and  ceremonies  in  recognition  of  the 
achievements  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organiza- 
tion and  its  contributions  to  America's  security  and 
well-being. 

In  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
this  twenty-eighth  day  of  March  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  sixty-nine,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one 
hundred  and  ninety-third. 


Letters  of  Credence 

United  Emgdom 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  North- 
ern Ireland,  John  Freeman,  presented  his  cre- 
dentials to  President  Nixon  on  March  17.  For 
texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  Pres- 
ident's reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  March  17. 


318 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  of  Canada 
Hold  Talks  at  Washington 


Prime  Minister  Pierre  Elliott  Trudeau  of 
Canada  made  an  o-fficial  visit  to  Washington 
March  2^-25.  Following  is  an  exchange  of  greet- 
ings between  President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minis- 
ter Trudeau  at  a  welcoming  ceremony  in  the 
East  Room  of  the  White  House  on  March  24, 
their  exchange  of  toasts  at  a  state  dinner  at  the 
White  House  that  evening,  and  their  exchange 
of  remarks  at  a  departure  ceremony  in  the 
Whits  House  Rose  Garden  on  March  25,  to- 
gether loith  an  announcement  made  at  a  Tiews 
briefing  held  by  RoTiald  L.  Ziegler,  Press  Secre- 
tary to  the  President,  and  Romeo  LeBlanc,  Press 
Secretary  to  the  Prime  Minister,  on  March  25. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS 

President  Nixon 

White  House  press  release  dated  March  24 

As  most  of  you  are  aware,  the  Prime  Minister 
is  the  first  official  visitor  since  the  new  adminis- 
tration assmned  office. 

In  welcoming  him  personally  today  and  also 
in  welcoming  him  representing  his  country,  I 
do  so  saying  first  that  it  is  altogether  appropri- 
ate that  he  should  be  the  first  official  Adsitor  to 
this  country.  Because  as  we  look  at  the  relations 
between  your  country  and  my  country,  Mr. 
Prime  Minister,  we  recognize  many  factors  that 
are  often  spoken  about  in  the  classroom  and  in 
the  press  and  on  television : 

We  share  the  longest  common  border  of  all 
nations.  We  share  the  common  law.  We  share 
a  common  language.  We  share  many  common 
characteristics  with  regard  to  our  history.  And 
in  addition  to  that,  we  share  a  very  precious  as- 
set, the  asset  of  friendship. 

In  describing  that  friendship,  however,  I 
would  emphasize  a  characteristic  about  it  that 
sometimes  we  forget.  That  characteristic  is  that 
the  friendship  that  Canada  and  the  United 
States  have  enjoyed  for  so  many  years  is  not 
characterized  by  that  total  unanimity  of  view 


which  destroys  creativity  but  it  is  characterized 
by  a  lively  diversity,  and  through  that  diversity 
we  have  the  hallmark  of  freedom. 

As  the  Prime  Minister  and  I  will  be  talking, 
and  as  his  associates  will  be  talking  with  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  their  opposite  numbers, 
we  will  find  most  areas  in  which  we  are  in  agree- 
ment. We  will  find  other  areas  in  which  we  find 
that  we  have  differences.  But  those  differences 
are  ones  that,  between  friends,  we  will  be  able 
to  discuss  and  find,  in  most  instances,  a  common 
ground  which  is  perhaps  superior  to  the  position 
that  either  of  us  had  before. 

This  is  the  mark  of  true  friendship.  And  it  is 
why  in  speaking  to  you  today,  Mr.  Prime  Minis- 
ter, I  welcome  you  in  behalf  of  all  of  the  Ameri- 
can people,  so  many  of  us  who  have  known  and 
enjoyed  your  country. 

I  can  only  add  this :  I  only  hope  we  can  make 
you  feel  as  much  at  home  here  in  the  United 
States  as  my  wife  and  I,  and  so  many  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Americans,  have  been  welcomed 
in  your  coimtry  when  we  have  visited  there  as 
private  citizens. 

Prime   Minister  Trudeau  ^ 

On  behalf  of  my  colleagues  and  myself,  I  want 
to  thank  you  for  your  very  cordial  welcome. 

I  am  very  happy  to  be  here.  I  feel  very  hon- 
ored that  you  should  have  extended  your  wel- 
come to  me,  sir,  so  early  in  the  days  of  your  new 
administration. 

We  have,  as  you  say,  very  many  ties  which 
link  us — ties  of  friendship  and  ties  of  common 
interest.  And  especially,  we  have  a  common  out- 
look on  the  world.  We  have  the  same  values,  and 
we  tend  to  face  the  issues  in  a  common  way. 

It  is  because  of  this,  Mr.  President,  that  I  am 
looking  forward  to  our  discussions,  discussions 
of  matters  of  mutual  interest.  And  I  am  looking 
forward  to  listening  to  your  views  on  world 


'Released  at  Washington  on  Mar.  24  by  the  Office 
of  the  Prime  Minister  and  made  available  by  the  White 
House  Press  Office. 


APRIL    14,    1969 


319 


problems,  on  the  information  and  on  the  wisdom 
that  you  will  want  to  impart  upon  me  in  your 
talks. 

For  these  reasons,  I  am  very  glad  to  be  here. 
Like  so  many  Canadians,  I  always  look  forward 
to  a  visit  to  the  United  States  with  great  pleas- 
ure. I  have  great  pleasure  in  being  here,  and  I 
am  looking  forward  to  my  stay  with  great 
anticipation. 

Thank  you  very  much,  sir,  for  your  welcome. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS 
President  Nixon 

White  House  press  release  dated  March  24 

In  any  new  administration,  every  moment 
becomes  a  historical  moment  when  it  occurs. 
And  this,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  is  a  historical 
moment  in  this  room  because  this  is  the  first  state 
dinner  that  has  been  held  in  this  room  since  the 
new  administration  came  to  office. 

We  are  veiy  proud  and  honored  that  we  can 
honor  you  and  the  people  of  Canada  through 
this  dinner. 

In  speaking  in  that  vein,  I  also  would  like  to 
point  out  that  we  have  a  number  of  reasons  that 
you  have  a  special  place  in  our  hearts,  not  only 
your  people  but  you  personally. 

As  I  sat  here  in  this  room,  I  thought  of  the 
many  moments  that  I  have  been  here  before,  and 
I  have  heard  on  occasions  President  Eisenhower 
toast  Wmston  Churchill  and  President  de 
Gaulle,  Konrad  Adenauer,  Prime  Minister 
Nehru,  the  leaders  of  great  nations  all  over  the 
world.  Each  of  those  was  a  very  special  occasion, 
and  each  of  those  men  and  each  of  those  nations 
had  a  special  place  in  our  hearts. 

But  none  has  the  really  unique  relationship 
that  we  have  with  our  guests  tonight. 

I  was  thinking,  for  example,  of  the  fact  that 
during  the  years  I  was  Vice  President,  along 
with  my  wife  I  visited  many  countries  on  of- 
ficial visits— about  30  or  35.  And  I  pointed  out 
to  the  Prime  Minister  I  had  never  made  an 
official  visit  to  Canada.  The  reason  was  that  I 
was  only  sent  to  those  countries  where  we  had 
trouble.  And  at  that  time  at  least,  we  did  not 
seem  to  have  troubles  that  were  so  significant  as 
to  require  my  presence — or  maybe  they  thought 
that  if  I  went  we  would  create  troubles  that  were 
not  ever  there. 

But  despite  the  fact  that  we  have  missed  the 


official  visit,  going  back  over  the  years,  as  I 
imagine  every  person  in  this  room  from  the 
United  States  will  probably  be  able  to  say :  "We 
recall  the  times  we  have  been  to  Canada  and 
the  warm  welcomes  we  have  received  in  Van- 
couver, in  Quebec,  Montreal,  St.  John's,  To- 
ronto, and  Ottawa."  And  as  we  recall  those 
moments  and  those  associations,  we  realize  how 
fortunate  we  are  to  have  such  good  friends  and 
neighbors  along  the  longest  boimdary  in  the 
world. 

I  could  speak  more  of  the  relationships  of 
our  two  countries,  but  that  will  be  covered  in 
other  speeches  and  communiques  and  the  rest. 

I  can  only  say  that  in  this  room  tonight,  Mr. 
Prime  Minister,  are  people  from  all  walks  of 
life:  from  business  and  from  labor,  from  the 
field  of  education,  from  the  field  of  politics — 
Democrats  and  Republicans.  But  they  are  all 
as  one  in  their  affection  for  your  country  and 
in  the  respect  for  you. 

And  now,  if  it  will  not  be  embarrassing  to 
the  Prime  Minister,  I  would  like  to  say  a  per- 
sonal word  about  him.  And  don't  be  worried — 
I  can  assure  you  that  having  sometimes  been 
in  this  position  myself  of  wondering  what  was 
coming  up  next,  I  will  be  careful  with  what  I 
say. 

But  I  was  thinking  of  those  many  accolades 
that  as  an  American,  and  particularly  as  an 
American  political  leader,  we  could  pass  on  to 
you.  I  can  refer  to  the  fact  that  you  are  a  distin- 
guished political  philosopher.  I  could  refer  to 
the  fact  that  you  are  a  distinguished  member 
of  the  bar,  eminently  successf  id. 

But  since  this  is  a  room  in  which  there  are 
many  from  political  life,  what  is  the  most  im- 
pressive factor  in  your  achievements  to  date  is 
your  political  leadership. 

Wlien  I  think  that  the  Prime  Minister  en- 
tered politics  in  1965  and  within  4  years  became 
the  head  of  government,  believe  me,  for  one  for 
whom  it  took  22  long  years  to  get  here,  we  have, 
sir,  for  you  the  greatest  respect  for  that  political 
leadership  which  you  have  provided. 

I  do  not  need  to  say — and  I  do  not  say  this 
simply  because  you  are  here — that  you  have  been 
for  your  own  people  a  very  exciting  personality 
and  you  have  been  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States. 

We  are  glad  to  get  to  know  you  better.  We  are 
happy  to  exchange  views  with  you.  We  par- 
ticularly appreciate  the  opportunity  to  get  the 
benefit  of  your  thinking  not  only  on  the  bilateral 


320 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BTJLLETIir 


problems  which  we  usually  work  out  effectively 
and  successfully  but  on  the  great  problems  that 
will  determine  the  future  of  all  of  us  who  live 
on  this  planet. 

I  was  delighted  in  the  long  talk  that  I  had 
with  the  Prime  Minister  today  to  find  that 
here  was  a  man  who  had  the  vision  to  see  beyond 
the  next  election  and  to  see  what  kind  of  con- 
tinent we  would  have  25  years  from  now,  30 
years  from  now.  And  on  that  great  issue  there 
can  be  no  difference,  fundamentally,  in  the  goals 
that  we  seek — the  people  of  the  United  States 
and  the  people  of  your  country. 

And  so  to  all  of  our  friends  tonight,  I  would 
ask  you  to  rise  and  to  join  me,  as  is  the  custom, 
in  two  toasts :  first,  Canada,  as  one  of  the  strong 
members  of  the  British  Commonwealth,  Her 
Majesty  the  Queen;  and  then  to  our  honored 
guest  this  evening,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Canada. 

Prime   Minister  Trudeau  ^ 

You  do  me  great  honor,  Mr.  President,  in 
drinking  my  health.  And  the  kind  words  you 
have  spoken  about  me  are  all  the  more  welcome 
and  moving  that  they  come  not  only  from  the 
head  of  the  country  which  is  Canada's  best 
friend  and  ally  but  they  come  from  a  man  who 
has  shown  through  his  years  in  politics — 22,  you 
said,  Mr.  President — that  is  about  six  times 
longer  than  myself,  but  then  your  country  is  10 
times  greater,  so  it  probably  works  out — a  man 
who  has  shown  that  he  could  occupy  many  of 
the  elective  offices  of  his  land  and  who  now 
holds  the  highest  elective  office  in  his  country, 
your  country,  the  greatest,  the  most  powerful 
on  earth,  a  man  who  has  served  his  country  well 
with  devotion,  with  knowledge,  with  wisdom, 
with  fortitude,  with  courage,  a  man  who  has 
been  persistent,  a  man  who  has  been  sincere  and 
faithful. 

For  these  reasons,  sir,  I  thank  you  for  your 
welcome.  And  I  want  to  say  that  being  one  of 
Gallic  descent,  I  have  particular  affinity  for 
things  American,  as  I  think  the  Americans  have 
for  things  Fi-ench  and  Gallic. 

There  is  a  saying,  I  know,  in  your  land  that 
every  good  American  when  he  dies  goes  to 
Paris.   I   would  suggest,  Mr.   President,  that 


'  Released  at  Washington  on  Mar.  24  by  the  OflSce 
of  the  Prime  Minister  and  made  available  by  the  White 
House  Press  Office. 


many  of  your  fellow  countrymen  have  not 
waited  until  they  die  nor  until  they  be  good 
to  find  Paris.  But  I  would  be  remiss  in  my  duty 
if  I  didn't  suggest  that  there  is  a  very  easy  and 
pleasant  alternative  much  closer  at  hand — 
Montreal,  which  welcomes  all  Americans  and 
which  would  welcome  you,  Mr.  President. 

I  hope  you  will  be  visiting  our  country  as 
soon  as  your  Office  permits.  I  can  assure  you, 
you  will  be  very  welcome  there.  I  can't  guar- 
antee that  there  will  be  no  trouble.  I  can't 
guarantee  it  for  myself.  But  as  one  new  politi- 
cian to  a  more  mature  one,  I  can  tell  you  that' 
we  will  take  our  chances  together.  And  I  think 
that  the  Canadian  people  will  show  you  how 
mucli  they  respect  and  admire  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America. 

Every  year  many  Americans  come  to  Canada 
and  the  same  number,  more  or  less,  of  Canadians 
come  to  the  United  States — 70  million  border 
crossings  last  year,  Mr.  President. 

We  all  come  to  the  United  States  in  pursuit 
of  happiness  of  one  kind  or  another.  When  I 
was  a  student  and  a  younger  man  I  pursued  a 
different  kind  of  happiness. 

We  come  here,  though,  also  to  seek  knowl- 
edge, to  learn  from  your  greater  technology, 
from  your  great  advances  in  science,  from  your 
great  universities,  we  learn  also  from  the 
hospitality  of  your  people  and  from  the  great 
ideals  and  institutions  that  the  leaders  of  your 
country  have  set  up  as  models  for  humanity 
over  the  years. 

We  learn  these  things  and  we  respect  you  for 
that.  As  one  man  who  is  a  Harvard  graduate 
and  coming  to  Washington  at  the  beginning  of 
a  new  administration,  I  can  promise  that  I  will 
stay  less  long  than  some  others. 

But  I  will  say  that  many  of  the  things  that  I 
learned  in  one  of  your  great  schools  was  about 
this  fine  sense  of  balance  that  the  Americans 
had  shown  in  their  ideals  and  in  their  institu- 
tions and  how  from  the  very  early  days  they 
tackled  and  solved  this  problem  of  eternal  con- 
flict between  liberty  and  the  rule  of  law,  be- 
tween the  need  for  authority  and  the  need  for 
individual  freedoms,  how  they  tackled  the  prob- 
lem of  the  individual  wanting  to  be  alone  and 
yet  needing  society,  and  how  over  the  decades 
and  over  the  years  your  country  has  been  able 
to  adapt  and  meet  these  changes. 

And  I  think  all  foreign  students  of  your 
country  come  to  admire  most  this  great  vitality, 
this  toughness,  this  resilience  of  your  great 


APRIL    14,    1969 


321 


society,  and  how  rather  than  be  too  influenced 
by  its  mother  country — of  course,  you  had  a 
rather  violent  parting  with  your  mother  coun- 
try, Mr.  President.  But  we  are  perhaps  in 
Canada  a  little  bit  too  inclined  to  borrow  from 
England  and  borrow  from  France.  But  you 
went  out  on  your  own  and  you  invented  this 
great  institution  of  modern  federalism,  and  you 
found  this  balance  in  your  institutions  between 
freedom  and  order. 

That  is  why  today  when  we  see  the  mighty 
upheavals  in  your  society  we  know  you  will 
meet  them.  We  know  you  will  find  solutions, 
and  because  you  are  so  far  ahead  of  other  indus- 
trial societies  we  know  that  we  will  be  able  to 
learn  from  the  lessons  that  you  will  give  other 
nations  who  are  trying  to  acquire  this  great 
industrial  status. 

We  will  learn  from  your  errors.  We  will  learn 
from  your  successes.  And  we  know  we  will 
always  have  a  helping  hand  in  the  United 
States. 

There  have  been  for  so  many  years  now,  Mr. 
President,  no  tensions  between  our  countries.  It 
was  your  first  President,  George  Washington, 
in  his  Farewell  Address  who  said  that  passion- 
ate relationships  between  one  country  and 
another  engendered  a  host  of  evils. 

Well,  for  a  long  time  there  have  been  no  pas- 
sionate relationships  between  our  countries. 
There  have  been  relationships  based  on  discus- 
sion, on  reason,  on — as  you  put  it  this  morning, 
sir,  in  welcoming  me — on  the  excitement  of  di- 
versity. But  always  we  have  solved  these 
through  discussion,  through  reasonable  men 
getting  together,  and  sometimes  reasonable 
women  getting  together,  asking  ourselves  about 
our  problem  and  seeking  the  best  solution  for 
everyone  concerned. 

And  we  know  this  will  be  the  way  of  the 
future.  I  have  learned  in  our  discussions  this 
morning,  Mr.  President,  and  this  afternoon. 
I  have  seen  how  this  will  still  be  the  pattern  of 
relationship  between  our  countries,  a  pattern 
based  on  wisdom  rather  than  passion,  a  pattern 
based  on  a  desire  to  understand  rather  than  to 
dominate. 

It  was  a  Frenchman,  De  Tocqueville,  who  first 
described  I  think  in  a  very  able  way  the  kind 
of  delicate  balance  that  the  United  States  ideals 
and  institutions  were  able  to  put  forward.  And 
he  had  a  phrase — si  vous  me  permettez  de 
traduire  un  peu  libremente  [if  you  will  permit 
me  to  translate  somewhat  freely] — which  went 


about  like  this:  That  you  don't  receive  truth 
from  your  enemies  and  your  friends  are  rarely 
willing  to  offer  it.  It  is  for  this  reason,  he  said, 
that  I  have  written  these  books. 

Well,  Mr.  President,  we  are  the  kind  of 
friends  who  do  tell  the  truth  to  each  other.  We 
have  told  it  this  morning. 

I  am  sure  we  will  tell  it  in  the  future. 

We  find  that  this  kind  of  relationship  is  the 
only  basis  on  which  nations  of  the  world  can  live 
in  peace  together — in  understanding. 

I  want  to  say  also  how  grateful  I  am  to  you, 
Mrs.  Nixon,  for  your  very  gracious  hospitality, 
for  the  wonderful  food,  the  lovely  flowers,  and 
the  exciting  music.  I  feel  almost  as  though  I  am 
among  old  friends.  I  hope  we  will  become  such. 

But  I  do  want  to,  in  thanking  you,  ask  the 
ladies  and  gentlemen  assembled  to  drink  your 
continued  good  health,  sir,  to  drink  the  health 
of  not  only  Canada's  closest  neighbor,  the  head 
of  state  which  is  Canada's  closest  neighbor,  our 
longstanding  ally,  but  also  the  health  of  a 
friend :  President  Nixon  of  the  United  States. 


DEPARTURE  CEREMONY 

White  House  press  release  dated  March  25 

President  Nixon 

We  have  just  completed  a  series  of  meetings, 
first  a  private  talk  between  the  Prime  Minister 
and  myself,  and  also  a  number  of  meetings  at 
other  levels  of  Government  between  members  of 
his  party  and  members  of  the  administration. 

I  think  it  could  be  said  without  fear  of  con- 
tradiction that  this  is  one  of  the  most  success- 
ful meetings  of  this  type — successful  in  the  sense 
of  the  number  of  subjects  covered  and  the  prog- 
ress which  has  been  made  in  the  solution  of  those 
subjects — ever  held  between  the  two  countries. 

We  have  issued  to  the  press  a  joint  statement 
which  will  indicate  the  subjects  that  were  dis- 
cussed and  the  positions  that  were  taken  and  sev- 
eral future  meetings  that  are  planned. 

I  have  only  two  other  brief  things  to  add  be- 
fore the  Prime  Minister  will  have  a  chance  to 
indicate  his  reactions  to  some  of  the  subjects  we 
discussed. 

Your  visit,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  has  provided 
us  here  an  opportunity  to  know  intimately  the 
problems  of  your  coiuitry,  but  also  to  know  you. 
This  we  deeply  appreciate. 

I  have  been  impressed  by  the  candor  and  also 


.322 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


by  the  restraint  of  the  statements,  the  conversa- 
tions that  we  have  had. 

As  we  work  together  in  the  years  ahead,  I  am 
confident  that  the  relationslup  will  be  a  close 
one ;  it  will  be  an  honest  one ;  it  will  be  one  where 
we  will  find  some  areas  of  disagreement,  but  far 
more  areas  of  agreement. 

We  are  so  delighted  that  you  came  here  so 
that  we  had  the  opportunity  to  know  you  in  this 
way. 

Finally,  the  Prime  Minister  has  invited  me 
to  pay  a  visit  to  Canada.  Mrs.  Nixon  and  I  are 
delighted  to  accept  that  invitation.  "We  will  ar- 
range a  time  convenient  to  both  the  Prime 
Minister  and  ourselves  at  some  later  time. 

But  apart  from  that  visit,  I  think  that  the 
members  of  the  press  should  know  that  we  have 
established  several  channels  of  communication — 
some  existed  before,  new  ones  have  been  added 
at  all  Cabinet  levels  where  there  are  common 
interests. 

We  found  several  new  areas  in  which  com- 
munications could  go  forward.  As  far  as  the 
Prime  Minister  is  concerned,  we  will  not  talk 
only  on  official  visits  of  this  type,  or  like  the  one 
I  will  pay  to  his  country,  we  will  be  in  communi- 
cation by  telephone,  of  course,  as  well  as  through 
the  diplomatic  channels,  because  this  is  a  new 
era  of  consultation  and,  we  hope,  cooperation 
between  our  countries  who  share  so  much 
together. 

Thank  you. 


I  find  that  we  reached  agreement,  especially 
when  we  were  looking  outward  to  the  kind  of 
value  in  which  we  believe ;  and  I  can  only  repeat 
what  I  said  to  you,  sir,  the  admiration  I  have 
for  the  place  you  have  put  so  early  in  your  ad- 
ministration on  consultation  with  your  Euro- 
pean friends  and  then  with  us.  That  you  should 
have  taken  such  time  so  soon  to  state  your 
points  of  views,  to  ask  us  questions,  and  to  an- 
swer ours,  is  to  us  a  guarantee,  a  symbol  of  the 
kind  of  warm  relationships  we  will  have. 

It  is  appropriate  that  yesterday  was  kind  of 
a  rainy  day,  in  which  we  did  a  lot  of  work,  and 
today  it  is  warming  up  and  we  can  now — we 
have,  in  French,  an  expression:  L' important, 
c'est  la  rose.  The  important  thing  is  that  we 
should  be  saying  this  in  a  rose  garden  under  the 
siui,  and  this  augurs  well,  I  am  sure,  for  all 
future  relationships  between  yourself  and  us 
Canadians. 

Wlien  I  arrived,  I  brought  you  the  greetings 
of  the  Canadian  people,  and  I  am  proud  now  to 
go  back  and  report  to  Parliament  the  cordiality 
of  your  welcome,  sir,  and  the  candid  and  sincere 
quality  which  you  brought  into  all  discussions, 
whether  bilateral  or  looking  outward  toward  the 
world. 

I  thank  you  very  much  for  your  hospitality.  I 
will  be  looking  forward  to  your  visit  and  Mrs. 
Nixon's  visit  to  Canada  at  a  time  when  you  can 
conveniently  arrange  it. 

Thank  you  again  so  much. 


Prime  Minister  Trudeau 

I  essentially  want  to  state  my  agreement  with 
what  you  just  said,  Mr.  President.  This  has  been 
2  days  of  agreement  in  many  areas,  and  I  agree 
wholeheartedly  with  your  summary  of  our 
meetings. 

We  have  laid  the  gi'oundwork,  the  founda- 
tions for  consultation  between  our  two  coun- 
tries, as  you  put  it,  in  many  areas,  in  my 
meetings  with  yourself,  sir,  with  the  Vice  Presi- 
dent, and  with  most  ministers  of  your  Cabinet. 

We  have  covered  a  great  deal  of  groimd  and 
we  have  established — I  repeat  your  words — the 
channels  through  which  very  many  of  our  bi- 
lateral problems  can  be  tackled  and  solved. 

We  discussed  at  great  length  the  problems  of 
wheat  and  problems  of  oil,  which  are  very  im- 
portant in  our  Canadian  West.  We  discussed 
trade  problems  generally,  and  our  approach  to 
them  in  the  world. 


ANNOUNCEMENT  AT  NEWS   BRIEFING, 
MARCH   25 

The  President  of  the  U.S.A.  and  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Canada  exchanged  views  on  a  wide  range  of  inter- 
national and  bilateral  matters.  They  seek  a  close,  con- 
fident relationship  between  the  two  countries.  The 
Prime  Minister's  visit  has  put  the  foundations  in  place 
for  a  continuing  discussion  on  a  number  of  questions. 

The  President  has  stated  that  he  values  the  views 
and  the  outlook  which  the  Prime  Minister  has  im- 
parted to  him.  The  President  said,  "The  viewpoint  of 
the  Canadian  Government  has  always  weighed  heavily 
in  the  formation  of  United  States  policy.  No  other 
ally  influences  us  more."  The  Prime  Minister  of  Canada 
stressed  that  his  Government  is  anxious  to  maintain 
and  develop  Canada's  already  close  and  friendly  rela- 
tions with  the  United  States. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  discussed  the 
future  of  NATO.  The  President  expressed  the  U.S. 
commitment  to  NATO.  The  President  also  emphasized 
the  interest  of  the  U.S.A.  in  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  rather  than  in  confrontations. 


APRIL    14,    1969 


323 


The  President  of  the  United  States  and  the  Prime 
Minister  of  Canada  have  discussed  the  recent  decision 
of  the  United  States  to  proceed  with  the  safeguard 
system  °  and  its  possible  implications  for  Canada. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  informed  the 
Prime  Minister  of  Canada  of  the  reasons  which  led 
the  United  States  to  make  this  decision  and  of  the 
United  States'  expectations  as  to  its  effects  on  East- 
West  relations  and  on  possible  arms  control  measures. 

Over  the  years  the  United  States  has  regularly  in- 
formed Canada  of  plans  and  developments  in  the  ABM 
field ;  it  has  been  agreed  that  this  practice  will  be 
continued. 

The  Prime  Minister  will  report  to  his  Cabinet  col- 
leagues on  his  discussions  with  the  United  States  Ad- 
ministration and  a  full  assessment  wUl  be  made  of  the 
implications  for  Canada  of  the  safeguard  system. 

The  two  countries  share  an  intimate  and  valued  trad- 
ing relationship,  unique  in  amount  and  diversity.  They 
also  share  a  commitment  to  further  the  expansion  and 
freeing-up  of  world  trade  for  the  benefit  of  developing 
and  developed  countries  alike. 

As  the  next  step  in  high-level  consultation,  a  meeting 
of  the  Joint  Cabinet  Committee  on  Trade  and  Economic 
Policy  will  be  held  on  June  25-27.  The  meeting  will 
provide  an  opportunity  to  discuss  the  fuU  range  of 
economic  and  financial  questions,  including  balance  of 
payments,  investment,  energy  and  trade. 

In  the  context  of  the  common  interest  of  the  two 
countries  in  the  expansion  of  cross-border  movement 
of  energy.  United  States-Canadian  developments  in 
the  matter  of  oil  were  discussed  at  length.  Senior  of- 
ficials of  the  two  Governments  will,  on  April  2,  initiate 
meetings  to  identify  and  study  areas  of  common  in- 
terest in  energy  matters  and  to  work  out  constructive 
solutions  to  current  problems  against  the  background 
of  long-standing  arrangements. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed  to  work 
closely  together  with  other  exporting  and  importing 
countries,  to  find  positive  solutions  to  the  current  prob- 
lems of  tJie  world  wheat  market  within  the  framework 
of  the  International  Grains  Arrangement.  Both  coun- 
tries will  be  working  to  overcome  the  present  market 
instability  and  to  strengthen  prices  consistent  with  the 
provisions  of  the  agreement. 

The  two  discussed  Canada's  plans  for  a  domestic 
communications  satellite,  and  the  possibility  of  its 
launch  by  the  U.S.  The  President  stated  that  the  U.S. 
is  prepared,  in  principle,  to  provide  launch  services  for 
this  satellite,  subject  to  appropriate  arrangements 
which  it  is  hoped  will  be  worked  out  in  the  next  few 
weeks. 


The  Prime  Minister's  visit  marks  a  first  step  in  a  new 
era  of  consultation  between  Canada  and  the  United 
States.  We  have  done  much  together  in  the  past; 
we  can  do  more.  Problems  between  us  can  be  settled 
in  ways  that  promote  the  interests  and  the  identities  of 
both  nations. 

The  Prime  Minister  invited  the  President  and  Mrs. 
Nixon  to  visit  Canada.  The  President  has  indicated  that 
he  wishes  to  accept  the  invitation. 


U.S.  and  Spain  Confer  on  Extension 
of  Defense  Agreement 

Joint  ComTnwnique  ^ 

The  Foreign  Minister  of  Spain,  Fernando 
Maria  Castiella,  and  the  Secretary  of  State, 
William  P.  Rogers,  have  conferred  over  the  past 
two  days  on  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from 
the  consultations  that  have  been  taking  place 
regarding  the  jjossible  extension  for  a  further 
five-year  period  of  the  Defense  Agreement  be- 
tween Spain  and  the  United  States  of  America 
dated  September  26,  1953.^  The  period  of  con- 
sultations called  for  by  Article  V  of  t\\&  Defense 
Agreement  expires  by  its  terms  today 
[March  26]. 

The  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  reached  agreement  in  principle  on  the 
nature  of  the  arrangements  for  the  new  five-year 
period  of  the  Defense  Agreement,  which  both 
Governments  agree  should  take  place,  subject 
to  the  completion  of  the  negotiation  of  the  writ- 
ten documents  that  will  express  such  arrange- 
ments. The  Governments  of  Spain  and  the 
United  States  are  confident  this  process  can  be 
accomplished  shortly. 

Foreign  Minister  Castiella  is  departing  for 
Madrid.  He  intends  to  return  to  Washington  for 
the  completion  of  the  negotiations  with  the  Sec- 
retary of  State. 


'  For  a  statement  by  President  Nixon  issued  on  Mar. 
14,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  31, 1969,  p.  273. 


'  Issued  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Mar.  26  (Department 
of  State  press  release  62). 
°  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  2850. 


324 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


The  United  Nations  and  the  Cause  of  Peace 


by  Charles  W.  Yost 

UJS.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  ^ 


It  is  indeed  a  pleasure  for  me  to  meet  with 
the  conference  of  NGO  [nongovernmental 
organization]  representatives  of  the  United 
Nations  Association.  I  had  hoped  to  meet  with 
many  of  you  as  our  guests  at  a  U.S.  Mission 
briefing  the  week  before  last;  then  that  plan 
had  to  be  canceled  at  the  last  minute.  Now,  in- 
stead, I  am  your  guest.  I  greatly  appreciate 
your  patience  as  well  as  your  hospitality. 

From  my  past  service  at  the  United  Nations, 
I  am  well  aware  of  the  unique  place  which  the 
NGO's  occupy  in  the  work  of  the  United  Na- 
tions community,  both  at  the  international  and 
the  national  level.  Before  concluding  I  shall  re- 
vert to  that  subject  for  a  few  minutes  and  dis- 
cuss some  of  the  work  that  you  in  private  life 
and  we  in  public  office  can  do  together  in  the 
days  ahead. 

But  my  main  theme  today  is  a  broader  one, 
and  one  which  I  think  is  appropriate  in  the 
early  weeks  of  a  new  administration :  the  United 
Nations  itself  and  the  ways  in  which  we  hope 
it  may  serve  the  cause  of  peace  in  the  j^ears 
ahead. 

You  will  recall  that  last  December  17  Presi- 
dent-elect Nixon,  as  he  then  was,  accompanied 
by  his  Secretary  of  State-designate,  Mr.  Rogers, 
paid  a  call  on  Secretary  General  Thant.  His 
purpose,  in  his  own  words,  was  to  indicate  "our 
continuing  support  of  the  United  Nations  and 
our  intention  in  these  years  ahead  to  do  every- 
thing that  we  can  to  strengthen  this  organiza- 
tion as  it  works  in  the  cause  of  peace  throughout 
the  world." 

This  statement  was  much  more  than  a  mere 
rhetorical  flourish.  On  that  and  other  occasions, 


^Address  made  before  the  conference  of  United  Na- 
tions representatives.  United  Nations  Association- 
United  States  of  America,  at  New  Torli,  N.T.,  on  Mar. 
18  (U.S.AJ.N.  press  release  24). 


President  Nixon  has  clearly  identified  certain 
particular  kinds  of  work  in  which  he  looks  to 
the  United  Nations  as  a  valuable  and  necessary 
instrument  of  international  peace.  I  should  like 
to  comment  briefly  on  a  few  of  these  categories. 

Strengthening  Peace  in  the  Third  World 

The  first  category  is  that  of  peacekeeping 
and  peacemaking.  This  applies  especially  to  con- 
flicts which  arise  in  what  the  President  has  re- 
ferred to  as  the  "third  world,"  where  the  vital 
interests  of  the  great  powers  are  not,  and  we 
hope  will  not  be,  directly  engaged.  Again  I 
quote  Mr.  Nixon's  words : 

The  more  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
can  conduct  their  policies  in  a  way  that  those  conflicts 
in  the  third  world  are  channeled  into  the  United  Na- 
tions or  another  international  organization,  the  better 
the  chances  are  that  we  can  avoid  a  confrontation 
which  both  powers,  I  think,  want  to  avoid. 

This  function  of  promoting  international 
peace  and  security  is,  of  course,  the  heart  of  the 
United  Nations  Charter  and  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  our  most  determined — and  most  frustrat- 
ing— efforts  over  the  years.  The  record  shows 
many  failures  but  also  a  niunber  of  remarkable 
successes  and  innovations.  The  U.N.  peace 
forces  and  observer  groups  in  Kashmir,  the  Mid- 
dle East,  the  Congo,  and  Cyprus  have  been 
major  factors  in  whatever  stability  and  progress 
toward  peace  has  been  achieved  in  those  volatile 
areas.  Even  when  such  operations  have  proved 
inadequate,  it  is  fair  to  ask  whether  direct  great- 
power  intervention,  or  indeed  any  other  practi- 
cable alternative,  could  have  done  better.  As  for 
their  financial  cost,  to  which  so  much  argument 
has  been  devoted,  surely  every  nation  involved 
should  ask  itself  whether  that  cost  has  not  been 
trivial  compared  to  the  probable  cost  of  the  ma- 
jor wars  that  might  otherwise  have  come  to  pass. 


APRIL    14,    1969 


325 


It  follows  that  one  of  the  principal  ways  in 
which  the  United  Nations  needs  to  be  strength- 
ened in  its  work  for  peace  is  in  this  capability 
to  conduct  peacekeeping  operations  in  danger 
areas.  Despite  the  notorious  difficulties  sur- 
roundmg  this  problem,  we  now  have  some  rea- 
son to  be  moderately  hopeful  about  it.  Last 
year,  for  the  first  time  in  the  4-year  history  of 
the  Committee  of  33,  which  deals  with  peace- 
keeping operations,  the  Soviet  Union,  as  well 
as  France,  joined  in  supporting  a  meaningful 
action :  in  this  case  a  study  of  peacekeeping  op- 
erations of  the  military  observer  type  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  a  further  study  of  operations  involv- 
ing organized  forces.  We  hope  these  studies  will 
provide  the  basis  for  a  useful  report  by  the 
Committee  of  33  to  the  next  session  of  the  As- 
sembly. We  should  have  no  illusions  about  the 
difficulties  that  still  lie  ahead;  but  it  does  seem 
as  if  we  may  at  last  have  begun  to  move  off 
dead  center  in  the  longstanding  controversy 
over  United  Nations  peacekeeping.  We  intend  to 
do  whatever  we  can  to  maintain  the  momentum. 

In  giving  this  emphasis  to  peacekeeping, 
which  treats  the  symptoms  of  conflict,  I  do  not 
at  all  underrate  the  importance  of  peacemaking, 
which  treats  their  causes.  In  fact,  as  our  cur- 
rent efforts  on  the  Middle  East  remind  us,  one 
of  the  central  purposes  of  the  United  Nations 
is,  as  article  1  of  the  charter  says,  "to  bring 
about  by  peaceful  means,  and  in  conformity 
with  the  principles  of  justice  and  international 
law,  adjustment  or  settlement  of  international 
disputes  or  situations  which  might  lead  to  a 
breach  of  the  peace."  The  old  saw  still  holds :  An 
ounce  of  prevention  is  worth  a  pound  of  cure. 

Many  of  the  issues  that  arise,  perhaps  the 
majority,  are  very  complex,  and  neither  side  has 
a  monopoly  of  the  arguments.  "^AHiat  the  U.N. 
can  contribute  in  such  situations  is  primarily 
an  infinitely  patient  diplomacy  to  discourage 
violence  and  help  the  parties  reach  a  frame  of 
mind  in  which  the  inevitable  compromise  solu- 
tion finally  becomes  acceptable.  Some  situations, 
on  the  other  hand,  arise  from  a  massive  injus- 
tice by  one  side;  and  no  solution  is  possible, 
consistent  with  the  charter,  xmtil  the  injustice 
is  removed.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  tragic 
racial  difficulties  in  southern  Africa,  which  are 
rightly  a  subject  of  great  concern  at  the  United 
Nations.  There  we  have  no  alternative  but  to 
continue  the  search  for  peaceful  means  which 


326 


can  command  the  necessary  international  sup- 
port and  which  will  help  to  induce  those  who 
practice  these  injustices  to  change  their  policies. 

Cooperation  for  a  Better  Life 

A  second  category  of  United  Nations  activity 
in  which  President  Nixon  has  expressed  a  keen 
interest  is  the  vast  range  of  programs  for  inter- 
national development  and  technical  cooperation. 
All  through  the  life  of  the  United  Nations  these 
programs  have  steadily  expanded  in  their  va- 
riety and  size.  They  now  absorb  more  than  80 
percent  of  the  money  which  the  members  con- 
tribute to  the  United  Nations.  They  range  from 
the  killing  of  insect  pests  to  the  building  of 
power  dams,  from  teaching  illiterate  adults  how 
to  read  to  organizing  the  development  of  entire 
river  basins.  They  draw  on  the  resources  and 
talents  of  the  whole  family  of  U.N.  agencies, 
embracing  virtually  every  teclinical  specialty 
that  exists. 

The  President  has  called  these  U.N.  programs 
"tremendously  exciting,"  and  indeed  they  are — 
not  only  because  of  the  important  purposes  they 
serve  but  because  of  their  proven  effectiveness. 
I  think  there  is  very  wide  agreement,  based  on 
the  experience  of  more  than  a  decade,  that  mul- 
tilateral aid  for  develojDment  is  usually  a  better 
bargain  for  the  United  States  than  bilateral  aid. 
It  is  better  insulated  against  politics;  it  is  freer 
of  the  resentments  that  arise  between  donor  and 
recipient;  it  can  draw  on  technical  talent  from 
many  countries;  and  moreover,  the  United 
States  contributes  to  most  U.N.  programs  less 
than  half — sometimes  much  less  than  half — of 
the  funds  expended. 

Historically,  Congress  has  shown  itself  well 
aware  of  these  advantages  and  has  voted  stead- 
ily increasing  United  States  contributions  to  the 
United  Nations  Development  Program.  How- 
ever, last  year  was  a  bad  year  for  all  aid  pro- 
grams in  Washington,  and  for  the  first  time  our 
contribution  to  the  UNDP  was  too  small  to  meet 
our  usual  40  percent  matching  formula. 

We  are  hopeful  that  the  United  States  con-  | 
tribution  this  year  will  resmne  its  upward  trend. 
Last  week  the  administration  recommended  to 
the  Congress  a  substantial  United  States  con- 
tribution to  expand  the  lending  power  of  the 
International  Development  Association.  It  is 
greatly  to  be  hoped  that  Congress  will  show  a 
favorable  attitude  not  only  on  that  proposal 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BtTLLETrU' 


I 


but  also  on  the  much  smaller  increase  that 
should  be  made  this  year  in  the  U.N.  Develop- 
ment Program. 

These  decisions  are  pending  at  an  important 
moment  in  the  history  of  the  U.N.'s  develop- 
ment work.  The  Preparatory  Committee  on  the 
next  U.N.  Development  Decade  has  now  begun 
its  task  of  preparing  a  development  strategy  for 
the  1970's,  a  preliminary  draft  of  which  will 
come  before  the  General  Assembly  this  fall. 

The  experience  of  the  First  Development 
Decade  has  been  extremely  disappointing,  not 
to  say  alarming.  Out  of  about  100  countries 
classified  as  "less  developed,"  only  a  dozen  have 
sustained  through  the  1960's  the  annual  growth 
rate  of  5  percent  which  was  set  as  the  goal  of 
the  Development  Decade.  Most  low-income 
countries,  after  a  period  of  great  expectations, 
are  growing  at  a  rate  so  slow  as  to  be  imper- 
ceptible to  the  ordinary  citizen.  Many  have 
found  their  hopes  of  a  higher  living  standard 
buried  under  a  runaway  growth  in  population. 

Meanwhile,  among  about  two  dozen  devel- 
oped countries,  growth  rates  continue  at  high 
and  in  some  cases  phenomenal  rates.  Thus  the 
wide  gap  between  rich  and  poor  countries  re- 
mains and,  indeed,  continues  to  widen.  If  the 
low-income  countries  cannot  soon  begin  to  im- 
prove the  lot  of  their  peoples  at  a  more  rapid 
rate,  massive  and  bitter  frustrations  and  resent- 
ments are  bound  to  build  up  imtil  we  find  our- 
selves moving  inexorably  into  a  tragic  era  of 
North-South  confrontation  no  less  dangerous 
than  that  between  East  and  West, 

The  cure  for  this  evil  will  of  course  be  com- 
plex, involving  capital  investment,  technical  as- 
sistance, education  and  training,  trade,  foreign 
exchange,  social  development,  and  many  other 
elements.  One  obvious  and  urgent  need  is  to  slow 
down  the  ominous  growth  in  population.  An- 
other, in  which  the  main  responsibility  falls 
on  the  developed  countries,  is  to  increase  the 
flow  of  their  capital  investment,  both  public  and 
private,  to  the  less  developed  countries. 

The  General  Assembly  long  ago  decided,  with 
the  concurrence  of  the  United  States,  that  this 
capital  flow  ought  to  amount  to  1  percent  of  the 
gross  national  product  of  the  developed  coun- 
tries. Unfortmiately  that  goal  has  very  rarely 
been  met,  and  most  countries  are  farther  from 
it  now  than  they  were  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Decade.  Aid  from  both  the  United  States  and 
Western  Europe  has  declined  during  the  period 


from  a  little  more  to  a  little  less  than  one-half  of 
1  percent  of  GNP. 

These  tiny  percentages  show  how  very  small 
the  capital  input  of  the  rich  nations  into  the 
development  process  is,  compared  to  their  total 
economy.  And  it  is  getting  smaller  still  at  the 
very  time  that  the  need  is  getting  more  urgent. 
In  the  next  Decade  we  must  make  sure  that  the 
pace  of  development  is  not  held  back  by  a  lack 
of  ingredients  which  we  can  well  afl'ord  to  con- 
tribute, including  investment  capital  on  accept- 
able terms. 

To  get  international  development  really  roll- 
ing in  the  1970's — as  we  have  not  done  in  the 
1960's — must  be  one  of  the  top  priority  goals 
of  the  international  commmiity.  Its  attainment 
will  require  extraordinary,  imaginative,  and 
persistent  efforts  by  all  concerned,  through  the 
United  Nations  and  every  other  appropriate 
channel.  If  the  efforts  it  will  demand  of  us  in 
the  developed  world  seem  somewhat  inconven- 
ient at  a  time  when  we  have  many  other  con- 
cerns both  at  home  and  abroad,  I  submit  that 
the  inconvenience  will  be  minor  compared  to 
the  tragedy  of  a  North-South  confrontation 
wliich  may  otherwise  become  inevitable. 

Disarmament 

Finally,  I  want  to  say  a  word  about  disarma- 
ment and  the  role  wHch  the  United  Nations 
plays  in  that  vitally  important  cause.  It  is  not, 
as  you  know,  the  central  role.  The  General  As- 
sembly has  traditionally  looked  to  smaller  bod- 
ies, such  as  the  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament 
Committee,  to  do  the  detailed  negotiating  in 
matters  involving  arms  control.  And  within 
those  bodies  the  main  burden  necessarily  falls 
on  the  major  powers — above  all,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  approach  has  proved  fruitful  over  the 
years.  It  gave  us  the  Antarctic  Treaty  in  1958, 
the  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty  in  1963,  the  Out- 
er Space  Treaty  in  1966,  and  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Treaty  in  1968. 

But  the  matter  does  not  end  there.  Under 
the  charter  the  General  Assembly  has  the  right 
to  make  recommendations  concerning  disarma- 
ment and  the  regulation  of  armaments.  It  has 
made  full  use  of  that  right.  It  is  not  unusual  for 
two-thirds  of  the  time  of  the  First  Committee 
in  a  General  Assembly  session  to  be  taken  up 
with  debate  on  disarmament.  This  is  under- 


APRIIi    14,    1969 


327 


standable,  because  arras  control  agreements 
intimately  affect  the  interests  and  security  of 
all  nations  and,  besides,  require  their  active  co- 
operation in  many  respects.  This  is  particularly 
true  in  the  case  of  the  Nonprolif  eration  Treaty. 
It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  treaty,  when  it 
came  before  the  Assembly  last  spring,  should 
have  been  debated  for  7  weeks  and  amended 
in  several  respects. 

You  can  imagine  the  feelings  of  the  able  ne- 
gotiators who  had  spent  4  years  of  their  lives 
working  out  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  in 
Geneva  and  then  had  to  submit  this  precious, 
hard-won,  delicately  balanced  document  to  the 
General  Assembly  for  its  endorsement.  Yet  the 
result  justifies  the  process.  The  treaty  won  the 
Assembly's  endorsement  overwhelmingly,  after 
amendments  which  did  it  no  harm  and  some- 
what widened  its  appeal.  That  endorsement  will 
undoubtedly  help  it  in  the  ratification  process 
which  is  now  going  on  and  which  was  power- 
fully advanced  last  week  by  the  overwhelming 
vote  of  the  United  States  Senate. 

Needless  to  say,  we  devoutly  hope  that  this 
same  process,  in  wluch  the  United  Nations  plays 
a  significant  part,  will  stand  us  in  good  stead 
as  we  endeavor  to  move  further  along  the  road 
of  control  and  reduction  of  nuclear  armaments. 

The  U.S.,  the  U.N.,  and  the  NGO's 

Such,  then,  are  some  of  the  highest  priorities 
in  the  long  list  of  United  Nations  questions  to 
which  we  at  the  United  States  Mission  expect 
to  be  devoting  ourselves  in  the  months  and  years 
ahead.  We  have  great  hopes  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  of  its  future  contributions  to  a  better 
world.  I  feel  highly  privileged  to  be  able  to  play 
a  part,  at  the  President's  request,  in  this  crucial 
period  in  the  U.N.'s  history. 

Now,  as  I  promised,  before  concluding  I 
would  like  to  comment  briefly  on  the  role  of  the 
NGO's. 

Among  all  the  members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, I  am  sure  that  none  is  more  fortunate  than 
the  United  States  in  the  wealth  of  voluntary 
organizations  which  take  a  lively  interest  in  the 
work  of  the  U.N.  and  in  American  participation 
in  it.  You  perform  a  most  important  function 
as  two-way  channels  of  communication  and 
advice  between  your  organizations  and  your 
governmental  representatives  here  and  in  Wash- 
ington. In  this  way  you  help  to  make  possible 
the  orderly  and  effective  conduct  of  foreign 
policy  in  our  free  society. 

Many  of  you,  of  course,  also  support  the 


United  Nations  in  other  ways.  Some  of  you 
have  competence  in  specialized  fields,  in  which 
you  contribute  your  knowledge  to  U.N.  pro- 
grams. Some  of  you,  as  citizens  of  the  host 
country,  help  to  provide  friendly  assistance  and 
hospitality  to  U.N.  delegations.  Many  of  you 
encourage  citizens  to  contribute  their  dollars  to 
such  U.N.  programs  as  UNICEF  [United  Na- 
tions Children's  Fund]  and  the  U.N.  educa- 
tional programs  for  southern  Africa  which  are 
open  to  individual  contributions. 

But  of  all  these  functions,  none  is  more  im- 
portant to  our  common  cause  than  the  work  you 
do  as  channels  of  communication  and  interpre- 
tation between  your  members  and  your  Govern- 
ment on  all  that  pertains  to  the  United  Nations. 
It  is  my  intention  that  the  United  States  Mission 
shall  be  available  to  help  you  in  performing  that 
function  as  much  as  our  limited  resources  per- 
mit, that  we  shall  be  accessible  to  your  inquiries 
and  your  criticisms,  and  that  the  mutually  bene- 
ficial relations  that  we  already  enjoy  shall  be 
maintained  and  strengthened. 

I  would  like  to  mention  one  particular  matter 
in  which  your  collaboration  is  going  to  be  indis- 
pensable and  that  is  the  observance  of  the  25th 
anniversary  of  the  United  Nations  in  1970. 
There  will  of  course  be  an  official  obser\'ance  by 
the  member  states,  which  we  hope  will  focus 
not  so  much  on  elaborate  ceremonial  as  on  ways 
of  improving  and  strengthening  the  U.N.  for 
the  decades  ahead.  A  preparatory  committee  of 
member  states  is  charged  with  planning  that 
official  phase,  and  it  will  report  next  fall  to  the 
General  Assembly. 

But  it  is  equally  important  that  the  25th  an- 
niversary be  properly  observed  by  private  citi- 
zens, organizations,  and  communities,  especially 
in  this  country.  This  will  be  a  most  valuable  op- 
portunity for  concerned  Americans  to  look 
ahead  and  consider  what  kind  of  world  we  hope 
to  live  in  over  the  next  25  years.  The  planning 
and  coordination  of  activities  in  which  many 
organizations  will  be  involved  across  the  nation 
is  bound  to  be  a  demanding  task,  in  which,  I  am 
sure,  the  UNA-USA  and  the  organizations 
affiliated  with  it  will  play  a  leading  role.  We 
in  the  Government  will  be  very  much  interested 
in  learning  of  your  plans  as  they  develop  and 
will  do  our  best  to  work  with  you  in  every  way 
we  can. 

In  these  remarks  I  have  sought  to  sketch  some 
of  the  main  possibilities  for  the  growth  and 
strengthening  of  the  United  Nations  as  the 
world's  chief  instrument  of  international  order. 
These  possibilities  are  all  attended  by  immense 


328 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


difficulties.  It  is  all  too  tempting  to  respond  to 
difficulty  by  withdrawing  into  that  comforting 
truism  that  "politics  is  the  art  of  the  possible" 
and  thereby  to  excuse  in  advance  the  failures  we 
anticipate. 

I  suggest  it  may  be  wiser  and  healthier  for  us 
to  think  of  politics — especially  international 
politics  in  this  dangerous  time — as  the  art  of 
the  indispensable.  What  we  know  we  must  do 
for  hmnan  survival's  sake,  we  can  do.  For  us 
who  have  a  responsibility  for  the  future  of  the 
United  Nations,  that  applies  specifically  to  our 
need,  in  the  President's  words,  "to  strengthen 
this  organization  as  it  works  in  the  cause  of 
peace  throughout  the  world." 


U.N.  To  Accept  Private  Assistance 
for  Peoples  of  Southern  Africa 

hy  Charles  W.  Yost 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  ^ 

Mr.  Secretary  General,  Your  Excellencies, 
ladies  and  gentlemen :  As  the  Representative  of 
the  United  States,  I  am  very  glad  to  participate 
in  this  opening  of  the  registers  for  receipt  of 
private  American  contributions  to  two  worthy 
United  Nations  undertakings:  the  United  Na- 
tions Trust  Fund  for  South  Africa  and  the 
United  Nations  Educational  and  Training 
Program  for  Southern  Africans.  Let  me  con- 
gratulate you,  sir,  and  Ambassador  Astrom 
[Sverker  C.  Astrom,  Swedish  Representative  to 
the  U.N.]  and  all  who  have  made  this  step  possi- 
ble— especially  the  two  American  organizations 
in  charge  of  the  registers,  the  Africa  Fund  and 
the  United  Nations  Association  of  the  USA. 

This  step  provides  a  practical  and  fitting  ob- 
servance of  a  date,  March  21,  which  is  widely 
associated  with  the  cause  of  human  rights  and 
especially  the  goal  of  ending  racial  discrimina- 
tion. Through  the  opening  of  these  registers, 
concerned  private  citizens  and  groups  may  join 
with  governments  in  supporting  two  United 
Nations  programs  which  are  giving  aid  to  those 
in  southern  Africa  who  are  the  victims  of  laws 
and  policies  discriminating  on  grounds  of  race 
and  color  and  who  are  in  need  of  food,  clothing, 
training,  legal  and  other  help. 


*  Remarks  made  at  U.N.  Headquarters,  New  York, 
N.Y.,  on  Mar.  21  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  29). 


The  day  will  surely  come  in  southern  Africa 
when  fuller  participation  in  national  life  will 
be  open  to  all  the  people  regardless  of  race.  As 
we  know  from  the  history  of  the  movements  for 
racial  equality  and  self-determination,  formal 
education  is  one  of  the  means  by  which  the  un- 
derprivileged and  dispossessed  can  develop  their 
latent  abilities  and  thus  prepare  themselves  for 
the  legitimate  and  full  participation  in  the  life 
of  their  country.  Education  thus  has  a  vitally 
important  part  to  play  in  shaping  the  future 
of  that  great  region,  and  it  is  highly  desirable 
that  wider  educational  opportunities  be  opened 
to  its  citizens,  including  those  who  are  refugees 
from  racial  discrimination.  Similarly,  we  must 
hope  for  the  full  restoration  in  southern  Africa 
of  important  individual  rights  and  freedoms 
that  are  the  hallmark  of  respect  for  the  rule 
of  law. 

It  is  to  be  hoped,  therefore,  that  many  Ameri- 
cans, both  as  individuals  and  organizations,  will 
use  this  means  of  demonstrating  in  a  tangible 
and  practical  way  their  support  for  a  better  fu- 
ture for  the  peoples  of  southern  Africa.  This 
cause  has  already  earned  the  moral  support  of 
a  great  many  private  citizens,  and  it  is  a  welcome 
development  that  they  are  now  being  encour- 
aged to  contribute  to  it — in  addition  to  the  con- 
tributions of  governments — by  means  of  these 
registers  which  you,  Mr.  Secretary  General,  will 
declare  open.  By  so  doing,  they  will  join  with 
many  millions  throughout  the  world  whose  gen- 
erous instincts  are  stirred  by  racial  injustice  in 
southern  Africa  and  who  wish  to  further  in  that 
region  the  principles  of  equality  and  personal 
dignity  which  the  United  Nations  has  pro- 
claimed for  all  members  of  the  human  family 
and  for  which  we  here  in  the  United  Nations 
labor. 


Arbitration  Panel  Issues 
Report  on  Soluble  CofFee 

Press  release  50  dated  March  3 

The  arbitration  panel  appointed  to  consider 
the  complaint  of  the  U.S.  Goverrmient  under 
article  44  of  the  International  Coffee  Agree- 
ment regarding  measures  of  the  Brazilian  Gov- 
ernment affecting  exports  of  soluble  coffee  is- 
sued a  report  of  its  conclusions  at  London 
March  3.  Article  44  prohibits  governmental 
measures    affecting    exports    of    coffee    that 


APRIL    14,    1969 


329 


"amount  to  discriminatory  treatment"  in  favor 
of  processed  coffee  as  compared  with  green 
coffee. 

A  majority  of  the  panel  found  that  an  un- 
desirable situation  of  the  type  contemplated  by 
article  44  existed  and  also  found  that  the  United 
States  is  entitled  to  take  appropriate  action  in 
the  event  that  Brazil  does  not  take  corrective 
measures  to  remedy  the  situation. 

Under  article  44(3),  Brazil  has  30  days  to 
correct  the  situation  in  accordance  with  the  con- 
clusions of  the  majority  of  the  arbitration 
panel. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Broadcasting  Agreements  With  Mexico 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Message  From  President  Nixon  ^ 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  : 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I  transmit 
herewith  two  separate  but  related  agreements 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
United  Mexican  States  signed  at  Mexico  City 
on  December  11, 1968,  namely : 

(1)  an  agreement  concerning  radio  broad- 
casting in  the  standard  broadcasting  band  (535- 
1605  kHz),  and 

(2)  an  agreement  concerning  the  operation 
of  broadcasting  stations  in  the  standard  band 
(535-1605  kHz),  during  a  limited  period  prior 
to  sunrise  ("pre-sunrise")  and  after  sunset 
("post-sunset"). 

I  transmit  also,  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate,  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
with  respect  to  the  two  agreements. 

Since  the  end  of  1967,  when  the  broadcasting 
agreement  of  January  29,  1957,^  ceased  to  be  in 
force,  there  has  been  no  agreement  governing 
the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  in  the  use  of  the  standard  broadcasting 
band.  Eelations  of  the  United  States  with  other 
major  countries  in  the  North  American  Region 


in  the  broadcasting  field  continue  to  be  governed 
by  the  North  American  Regional  Broadcasting 
Agreement  of  November  15,  1950,^  to  which 
Mexico  is  not  a  party. 

The  two  agreements  with  Mexico  have  been 
concluded  after  negotiations  extending  over  a 
period  of  more  than  two  years  between  United 
States  and  Mexican  delegations,  with  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States  broadcasting  in- 
dustry participating  as  advisers  to  the  United 
States  delegation.  The  Federal  Communications 
Commission  and  the  Department  of  State  ex- 
press the  opinion  that  the  best  interest  of  the 
United  States  would  be  served  by  ratification 
and  entry  into  force  of  both  agreements,  the 
substance  of  which  is  understood  to  be  generally 
satisfactoiy  to  broadcasting  interests  in  the 
United  States. 

The  first-mentioned  agreement,  referred  to 
as  the  broadcasting  agreement,  contains  detailed 
provisions  designed  to  resolve  many  engineering 
and  allocation  problems  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  as  explained  more  fully  in 
the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 

The  other  agi'eement,  referred  to  as  the  pre- 
smirise/post-sunset  agreement,  is  tied  to  the 
broadcasting  agreement  in  the  sense  that  it  can 
be  effective  only  so  long  as  the  broadcasting 
agreement  remains  in  effect.  The  regulations 
therein  for  station  operation  with  daytime  facil- 
ities for  limited  periods  of  time  before  the  sun- 
rise-to-sunset period  heretofore  prescribed  will 
enable  the  Federal  Communications  Commis- 
sion to  implement  plans  for  pre-smirise  opera- 
tion of  United  States  daytime  stations,  so  that, 
for  the  first  time,  it  will  be  possible  for  a  large 
number  of  such  stations,  now  operating  on  seven 
clear  (I-A)  channels  accorded  to  Mexico  in  the 
broadcasting  agreement,  to  have  uniform  start- 
ing times  throughout  the  year.  Wliereas  the 
United  States  would  gain  from  the  provisions 
for  pre-sunrise  operation,  Mexico  would  gain 
from  the  post-sunset  provisions. 

The  two  agreements  would  be  brought  into 
force  by  the  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion and  would  remain  in  effect  for  a  term  of 
five  years  and  indefinitely  thereafter  unless  re- 
placed by  a  new  agreement  or  unless  terminated 


'  Transmitted  on  Mar.  25  (White  House  press 
release)  ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  B,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
which  includes  the  texts  of  the  agreements  and  the 
report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 

'  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  4777. 

°  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  4460. 


330 


DEPAKTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


by  a  one-year  written  notice  from  either  party 
to  the  other  party. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early  and 
favorable  consideration  to  the  two  agreements 
with  Mexico. 


RiCHAED  Nixon 


The  White  House, 
March  25, 1969. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention   on   the   recognition  and   enforcement  of 
foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New  York  June  10, 
1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7,  1959.* 
Accession  deposited:  Italy,  January  31, 1969. 

Atomic  Energy 

Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
with  annex,  as  amended.  Done  at  New  York  Octo- 
ber 26,  1956.  Entered  into  force  July  29,  1957.  TIAS 
3873,  5284. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Niger,  March  27,  1969. 

Aviation 

Clonvention  on  offenses  and   certain  other  acts  com- 
mitted on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  Septem- 
ber 14, 1963." 
Signature:  Brazil,  February  28, 1969. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Bank,  with  annexes,  as  amended.  Done  at 
Washington  April  8,  1959.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 30,  1959.  TIAS  4397,  6591. 

Signature    and    acceptance:   Barbados,    March    19, 
1969. 

Hydrography 

Convention   on   the    International   Hydrographic   Or- 
ganization, with  annexes.  Done  at  Monaco  May  3, 
1967.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  March  12,  1969. 

Racial   Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms 
of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York  Decem- 
ber 21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4,  1969.' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Madagascar   (with  a  reser- 
vation), February  7,  1969;  Union  of  Soviet  Social- 
ist Republics   (with  a  declaration  and  a  reserva- 
tion),  February  4, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at 
New  York  January  31,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
October  4,  1967 ;  for  the  United  States  November  1, 
1968.  TIAS  6577. 

Accession  deposited:  Swaziland   (with  reservations 
and  a  declaration) ,  January  28, 1969. 


Slavery 

Convention  to  suppress  the  slave  trade  and  slavery,  as 
amended  (TIAS  3532).  Concluded  at  Geneva  Septem- 
ber 25,  1926.  Entered  into  force  March  9,  1927 ;  for 
the  United  States  March  21,  1929.  46  Stat.  2183. 
Ratification  deposited:  Ethiopia,  January  21,  1969. 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
the  slave  trade  and  institutions  and  practices  similar 
to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva  September  7,  1956.  En- 
tered into  force  April  30,  1957 ;  for  the  United  States 
December  6,  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Accession  deposited:  Ethiopia,  January  21, 1969. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of  states 
in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space,  including 
the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies.  Opened  for  signa- 
ture at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  January  27, 
1967.  Entered  into  force  October  10, 1967.  TIAS  6347. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Argentina, 
March  26,  1969. 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3, 1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Argentina, 
March  26, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Montreux  November  12,  1965.  Entered 
into  force  January  1,  1967;  for  the  United  States 
May  29, 1967.  TIAS  6267. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, including  Land  Berlin,  December  16,  1968 ; 
Luxembourg,  December  31, 1968. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations  (Geneva, 
1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603),  putting  into 
effect  a  revised  frequency  allotment  plan  for  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service  and  related  infor- 
mation, with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  April  29, 1966. 
Entered  into  force  July  1,  1967;  for  the  United 
States  August  23,  1967,  except  the  frequency  allot- 
ment plan  contained  in  appendix  27  shall  enter  into 
force  April  10, 1970.  TIAS  6332. 
Notification  of  approval:  Spain,  December  13,  1968. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations  (Geneva, 
1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332),  relating 
to  maritime  mobile  service,  with  annexes  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  November  3,  1967.  Entered 
into  force  April  1,  1969.  TIAS  6590. 
Notifications  of  approval:  Canada,  December  6,  1968 ; 
China,  Kenya,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  December  19, 
1968. 

Trade 

Fourth  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional  accession  of  the  United  Arab  Republic 
to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  of 
November  13,  1962  (TIAS  5309).  Done  at  Geneva 
November  19, 1968. 

Entered  into  force:  February  27, 1969.' 
Acceptances:    Canada,    February    21.    1969;    Cnha, 
February  26,   1969;  Nigeria,  February  19,  1969; 
United  Arab  Republic.  February  27,  1969. 

Fifth  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional  accession  of  Tunisia  to  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  of  November  12, 1959 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  Not  in  force. 


APRIL    14,    1969 


831 


(TIAS  4498).  Done  at  Geneva  November  19,  1968. 
Entered  Into  force  December  17,  1968.' 
Acceptances:  Canada,  February  21,  1969;  Cuba,  Feb- 
ruary 26, 1969 ;  Malavri,  February  5,  1969 ;  Nigeria, 
February  19,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  the  construction  of  a  temporary 
cofferdam  between  Goat  Island  and  the  United  States 
mainland  above  the  American  Falls  at  Niagara.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  March  21, 
1969.  Entered  into  force  March  21,  1969. 

Agreement  authorizing  temporary  additional  diversion 
for  power  purposes  of  water  flowing  over  American 
Falls.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
March  21,  1969.  Enters  into  force  upon  notification 
that  it  has  been  approved  by  the  United  States 
Senate. 

Ceylon 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  October  27,  1967  (TIAS 
6405).  Signed  at  Colombo  February  19, 1969.  Entered 
into  force  February  19, 1969. 


arranged  by  country  or  other  political  entity,  and  the 
multilateral  treaties  and  other  agreements  are  ar- 
ranged by  subject  and  show  names  of  countries  which 
have  become  parties.  Date  of  signature,  date  of  entry 
into  force  for  the  United  States,  and  citations  to  texts 
are  furnished  for  each  agreement.  This  edition  includes 
citations  to  volumes  1  and  2  of  the  new  compilation 
entitled  Treaties  and  Other  International  Agreements 
0/  the  United  States  of  America  1776-1949  (Bevans) 
which  is  now  being  published  by  the  Department  of 
State.  Volume  I  was  released  in  November  1968. 

Treaties  in  Force  provides  information  concerning 
treaty  relations  with  numerous  newly  independent 
states.  Indicating  wherever  possible  the  provisions  of 
their  constitutions  and  independence  arrangements  re- 
garding assumption  of  treaty  obligations. 

Information  on  current  treaty  actions,  supplement- 
ing the  information  contained  in  Treaties  in  Force,  is 
published  weekly  In  the  Department  of  State  Bulletin. 

The  1969  edition  of  Treaties  in  Force  (376  pp. ;  De- 
partment of  State  publication  8432)  is  for  sale  by  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402,  for  $1.50. 


Recent  Releases 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  Issues   1969  Edition 
of  "Treaties  in  Force" 

Press  release  37  dated  February  18 

The  Department  of  State  on  February  18  published 
Treaties  in  Force:  A  List  of  Treaties  and  Other  Inter- 
national Agreements  of  the  United  States  in  Force  on 
January  1,  1969. 

This  is  a  collection  reflecting  the  bilateral  relations 
of  the  United  States  with  152  countries  or  other  politi- 
cal entities  and  the  multilateral  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  other  contracting  parties  to  more  than  370 
treaties  and  agreements  on  78  subjects.  The  1969  edi- 
tion lists  some  300  new  treaties  and  agreements,  in- 
cluding the  agreement  on  the  rescue  and  return  of 
astronauts,  a  new  wheat  convention,  the  protocol  re- 
lating to  the  status  of  refugees,  the  income  tax  conven- 
tion with  France,  the  consular  convention  with  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  the  agreements 
on  cultural  exchanges  with  Romania  and  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  and  the  treaty  of  amity  and 
economic  relations  with  Thailand. 

The   bilateral    treaties   and    other   agreements    are 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


For  sale  hy  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20^02. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Viet -Nam  Information  Notes.  A  series  of  Department 
of  State  publications,  each  of  which  siunmarizes  a 
significant  aspect  of  the  situation  In  VIet-Nam : 

No.  13.  The  U.S.  Assistance  Program  in  Viet-Nam. 
Describes  and  explains  the  U.S.  aid  program  in  Viet- 
Nam — its  operation,  purpose,  and  future.  Pub.  8419. 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Series  177.  6  pp.  10^. 

Investment  Gnaranties.  Agreement  with  Antigua. 
TIAS  6567.  3  pp.  10!f. 

Investment  Guaranties.  Agreement  with  Dominica 
TIAS  6568.  3  pp.  10<t. 

Earth  Resources— Cooperative  Research  in  Remote 
Sensing  for  Earth  Surveys.  Agreement  with  Brazil. 
TIAS  6569.  6  pp.  lO^!. 

Cultural  Relations — Exchanges  in  the  Scientific,  Tech- 
nical, Educational,  Cultural  and  Other  Fields  in  1968- 
1969.  Agreement  with  the  U.S.S.B.  TIAS  6570.  80  pp. 
35«i. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Bolivia. 
TIAS  6571.  39  pp.  20!*. 

Investment  Guaranties.  Agreement  vrith  Nicaragua. 
TIAS  6572.  6  pp.  10(f. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Bolivia. 
TIAS  6573.  11  pp.  10«i. 

Termination  of  Trade  Agreement  of  January  9,  1936, 
and  Related  Agreements.  Agreement  with  Switzerland. 
TIAS  6574.  4  pp.  10^'. 


332 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX     April  14,  1969      Vol.  LX,  No.  1555 


Africa 

U.X.  To  Afcept  Private  Assistance  for  Peoples 

of  Southern  Africa   (Yost) 329 

U.S.     Foreign     Policy :     Some     Major     Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Brazil.    Arbitration    Panel    Issues    Report    on 

Soluble  Coffee 329 

Canada.  President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister 
Trudeau  of  Canada  Hold  Talks  at  Washing- 
ton (Nixon,  Trudeau,  announcement  at  news 
briefing) 310 

China.  U.S.  Foreign  Policy:  Some  Major  Issues 

(Rogers) 30.j 

Communications.  Broadcasting  Agreements  With 
Jlesico  Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message 
from    President    Nixon) 330 

Congress 

Broadcasting  Agreements  With  Mexico  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Senate  (message  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon) 330 

U.S.     Foreign    Policy :     Some    Major     Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Disarmament.  U.S.  Foreign  Policy :  Some  Major 
Issues    (Rogers) 30.J 

Economic  Affairs.  Arbitration  Panel  Issues  Re- 
port on  Soluble  Coffee 329 

Europe.  U.S.  Foreign  Policy:  Some  Major  Issues 

(Rogers) 30.j 

Latin  America.  U.S.  Foreign  Policy :  Some  Major 
Issues    (Rogers) 305 

Mexico.  Broadcasting  Agreements  With  Mexico 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message  from 
President  Nixon) :j:30 

Military  Affairs.  President  Nixon  Discusses  the 
Viet-Nam  Peace  Talks  and  the  ABM  Safeguard 
System    (Nixon) 313 

Near  East.  U.S.  Foreign  Policy:  Some  Major  Is- 
sues (Rogers) 305 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  The  20th 

Anniversary  of  NATO  (proclamation)     .     .     .      31S 

Presidential  Documents 

Broadcasting  Agreements  With  Mexico  Trans- 
mitted to   the   Senate 330 

President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  of 
Canada  Hold  Talks  at  Washington     ....       319 

I'resident  Nixon  Discusses  the  Viet-Nam  Peace 
Talks  and  the  ABM  Safeguard  System     .     .     .       313 

The  20th  Anniversary  of  NATO 31S 

Publications 

Department  Issues  19C9  Edition  of  "Treaties  in 

Force" 332 

Recent  Releases 332 

Spain.  U.S.  and  Spain  Confer  on  Extension  of 
Defense  Agreement  (joint  communique)     .     .      324 


Treaty  Information 

Broadcasting  Agreements  With  Mexico  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Senate  (message  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon) 330 

Current  Actions 331 

Department  Issues  1969  Edition  of  "Treaties  in 
Force" 332 

U.S.  and  Spain  Confer  on  Extension  of  Defense 
Agreement    (joint  communique) 324 

United  Kingdom.  Letters  of  Credence  (Free- 
man)       318 

United  Nations 

The   United   Nations   and   the   Cause  of  Peace 

U'ost) 325 

U.N.  To  Accept  Private  Assistance  for  Peoples 

of  Southern  Africa   (Yost) 329 

U.S.     Foreign     Policy:     Some     Major     Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Viet-Nam 

President  Nixon  Discusses  the  Viet-Nam  Peace 
Talks  and  the  ABM  Safeguard  Svstem 
(^i^on) 313 

Tenth  Plenary  Session  on  A^et-Nam  Held  at 
Paris  (Lodge) 316 

U.S.     Foreign     Policy:     Some     Major     Issues 

(Rogers) 305 

Name  Index 

Freeman,  John 3ig 

Lodge,    Henry    Cabot .     .      31G 

Nixon.     President 313,  318,  319,  .-ISO 

Rogers,    Secretary 3Q5 

Trudeau,  Pierre  Elliott     .     .                   •     .     ■     .      .^^^ 
Yost,  Charles  W '.    325, 329 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  March  24-30 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D  C 
20520.  6       .         • 

Releases  issued  prior  to  March  24  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  37  of 
February  18  and  50  of  March  3. 

No.    Date  Subject 

*61     3/26    Program  for  visit  of  Prime  Minister 
Gorton  of  Australia. 

62  3/26     Secretary  Rogers,   Foreign  Minister 

Castiella    of    Spain:    joint    com- 
munique. 

63  3/27    Lodge :  10th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 

Nam  at  Paris. 

64  3/27     Rogers:    Senate  Committee  on  For- 

eign Relations. 
*65    3/28     Rogers:   death  of  former  Pre.sident 
Eisenhower. 


*Not  printed. 


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THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1556 


April  21, 1969 


AMBASSADOR  SMITH  PRESENTS  U.S.  VIEWS  ON  SEABED  PROPOSAL 
AT  EIGHTEEN-NATION  DISARMAMENT  CONFERENCE    333 

U.N.  SEABED  COMMITTEE  CONCLUDES  SPRING  SESSION 

Statement  by  David  H.  Popper    34'2 

U.S.  EXPLAINS  VOTE  ON  SECURITY  COUNCIL  RESOLUTION  ON  ISRAEL 

Statements  hy  Ambassador  Yost  and  Text  of  Resolution    31fi 

Boston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  ol'  'itf- 

MAY     2  1969 
DEPOSITORY 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1556 
April  21,  1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  OfBce 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

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the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Note:     Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  tlie  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  tlie  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
natioTUil  relations  are  listed  currently. 


Ambassador  Smith  Presents  U.S.  Views  on  Seabed  Proposal 
at  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament  Conference 

Statement  by  Gerard  Smith  ^ 


Good  will  alone  does  not  create  results.  All 
of  us  know  only  too  well  it  is  not  enough  to  be 
for  peace — we  must  also  work  for  concrete 
measures  that  make  for  peace.  Only  through 
constant  efforts  of  people  determined  to  change 
the  world  will  we  move  forward  to  our  common 
goals. 

May  I  be  permitted,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  make  a 
personal  comment.  It  was  this  kind  of  deter- 
mined effort  by  the  men  who  have  served  before 
me  in  the  United  States  Government  that 
helped  to  make  possible  the  achievements  of 
the  past  few  years.  Bill  Foster,  my  distinguished 
predecessor  and  longtime  friend,  and  Adrian 
Fisher,  whose  able  mind  has  contributed  to  the 
solution  of  so  many  problems,  have  helped 
members  of  this  conference  to  turn  hope  into 
reality.  I  will  seek  to  emulate  them. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  wish  at  this  time  to  make 
some  general  observations  about  our  work  and 
then  to  set  forth  the  views  of  the  United  States 
on  one  of  the  items  on  our  agenda. 

First  there  is  the  question  of  where  we  are  and 
where  and  by  what  means  we  should  go  from 
here.  Certain  limited  but  still  highly  significant 
successes  have  been  achieved  in  the  past.  I  need 
not  elaborate  on  these  to  this  conference,  but 
we  must  not  forget  that  the  first  steps  are  some- 
times the  most  difficult.  Moreover,  our  achieve- 
ments have  significance  beyond  their  direct  ef- 
fects, for  they  have  started  the  process  of  bring- 
ing the  nuclear  arms  race  imder  control.  Cer- 
tainly, the  world  is  different  today  from  what 
it  would  have  been  without  these  agreements. 

As  for  the  future,  progress  on  arms  control 
and   disarmament   is   a   many-faceted   under- 

'  Made  before  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation 
Committee  on  Disarmament  at  Geneva  on  Mar.  25.  Am- 
bassador Smith  is  Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency  and  head  of  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  the  conference. 


taking.  We  need  not  and  should  not  be  forced 
into  an  arbitrary  decision  as  to  which  area  or 
measure  should  receive  priority  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  others.  We  can,  of  course,  determine 
which  areas  have  a  logical  relationship  to  the 
foundations  we  have  already  laid  and  to  our 
goals  for  the  foreseeable  future.  My  point,  Mr. 
Chairman,  is  that  we  should  not  be  rigid  in  our 
priorities. 

I  think  this  Committee  can  and  should  explore 
various  measures  in  a  concurrent  manner.  In 
that  way  our  understanding  can  be  increased 
and  our  differences  reduced.  Hopefully,  some 
agreements  can  be  reached  without  delay. 

It  is  not  fair  or  necessary  to  assume  that  the 
monopoly  of  the  time  of  the  Committee  which 
the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  negotiations  pro- 
duced will  be  repeated  in  connection  with  some 
other  arms  control  measure.  There  are  few  nego- 
tiations that  are  without  complications,  and  I 
do  not  infer  that  our  tasks  in  the  future  will 
be  simple.  However,  it  is  important  that  we 
keep  in  mind  that  the  nonproliferation  nego- 
tiations were  of  a  special  kind.  Some  students 
of  current  history  have  said  that  those  nego- 
tiations were,  because  of  the  variety  of  teclinical 
and  political  issues  involved  and  the  number  of 
countries  immediately  affected,  one  of  the  most 
complicated  and  involved  international  nego- 
tiations since  the  end  of  World  War  II. 

Therefore,  I  believe  we  should  not  be  too  con- 
cerned that  any  one  measure  may  monopolize 
the  attention  of  this  Committee.  We  must  try 
to  move  forward  in  all  relevant  areas,  while 
remaining  alert  to  any  opportunities  to  move 
forward  more  rapidly  to  the  conclusion  of  a 
particular  agreement.  Any  agreement  we  reach 
makes  other  possible  accords  less  difficult  and 
more  probable. 

President  Nixon,  in  his  letter  which  I  sub- 


APRH,    21,    1969 


333 


mitted  on  March  18,  discussed  areas  which 
the  United  States  believes  merit  particular 
attention.^ 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

There  is,  I  believe,  a  common  agreement  that 
the  prospects  for  progress  in  one  particular  area 
lie  in  bilateral  discussions. 

A  number  of  representatives  here  have  quite 
rightly  referred  to  the  importance  of  prospec- 
tive strategic  arms  limitations  talks.  The  criti- 
cal significance  of  such  talks  to  the  efforts  to 
bring  the  nuclear  arms  race  mider  control  is 
obvious.  That  the  obligations  of  article  VI  of 
the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  are  relevant  in  this 
regard  no  one  would  dispute.  But  I  think  it  is 
important  that  we  keep  in  mind  that  it  is  not 
merely  a  question  of  obligations  but  rather  the 
opportunity  to  control  the  nuclear  arms  race 
and  thereby  increase  international  security  and 
reduce  the  burdens  of  the  arms  race  that  is  of 
greatest  relevancy. 

In  this  regard  it  should  perhaps  be  pointed 
out  that  under  the  recent  administration  of 
President  Johnson,  the  American  Government 
had  made  preparations  and  last  August  was 
ready  and  willing  to  commence  such  negotia- 
tions on  strategic  arms  limitations. 

Now,  it  is  only  prudent  for  the  new  adminis- 
tration of  my  country  to  prepare  itself  thor- 
oughly for  negotiations  that  could  be  of  a  most 
sensitive  nature,  going  to  the  heart  of  the 
strategic  balance  in  the  world  and  having  a 
direct  and  central  bearing  on  the  mutual  secu- 
rity of  the  United  States,  its  allies,  and,  indeed, 
much  of  the  world.  In  matters  of  this  mag- 
nitude, careful  preparation  is  the  greatest  con- 
tribution that  a  nation  can  make  to  fruitful 
negotiations. 

The  question  of  timing  is  thus  twofold.  The 
passage  of  some  time  is  needed  for  the  new  ad- 
ministration to  make  the  necessary  preparations. 
And  the  timing  should  be  favorable  in  a  political 
sense  if  even  carefully  prepared  strategic  arms 
limitations  talks  are  to  proceed  with  real 
promise  of  being  productive. 

At  this  point,  I  would  like  to  add  one  addi- 
tional thought  which  I  would  hope  members  of 
this  Committee  and  their  governments  will  keep 
in  mind.  My  Government  is  fully  aware  of  the 
responsibilities  which  it  carries — along  with 
others — to  make  every  effort  to  halt  the  nuclear 
arms  race.  And  therefore,  in  major  national 

'For  text,  see  Bui-tETiN  of  Apr.  7,  1969,  p.  289. 


defense  decisions  taken  in  the  present,  and  in 
the  absence  of  relevant  arms  control  agreements, 
every  effort  is  taken  to  see  that  they  are  not 
provocative  and  that  they  will  not  make  anns 
negotiations  more  difficult.  This  type  of  consid- 
eration, we  believe,  is  also  in  the  spirit  of  article 
"VI  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty. 

ENDC  Agenda  Items 

Mr.  Chairman,  with  respect  to  the  questions 
on  the  agenda  of  this  Committee,  the  United 
States,  as  I  have  indicated,  will  submit  views 
during  the  course  of  this  session  which  we  hope 
will  contribute  to  progress  in  our  work.  In  par- 
ticular, I  hope  we  can  have  profitable  and  realis- 
tic exchanges  on  a  comprehensive  test  ban  and 
on  the  longstanding  proposal  for  a  cutoff  in  the 
production  of  fissionable  material  for  weapons 
purposes.  My  delegation  will  return  to  this  mat- 
ter in  later  statements. 

Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

We  have  not  failed  to  note  the  importance  at- 
tached to  progress  toward  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  treaty.  This  general  concern  is  evident  not 
only  in  the  joint  memorandum  of  August  26, 
1968,  submitted  by  eight  members  of  tills  con- 
ference and  in  a  recent  resolution  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  but  also  in  the  remarks  of 
previous  speakers  during  this  session. 

My  Government  understands  and  shares  the 
vital  concern  felt  by  others.  President  Nixon's 
message  reaffirmed  our  commitment  to  the  goal 
of  a  comprehensive  test  ban  adequately  verified. 
To  achieve  adequate  verification,  the  principles 
and  teclmiques  of  verification  methods,  their 
capabilities  and  limitations,  must  be  understood 
and  appropriately  implemented  in  any  compre- 
hensive test  ban  agreement.  It  is  well  known 
that  we  continue  to  believe  that  a  certain  num- 
ber of  on-site  inspections  are  essential  for  ade- 
quate verification. 

With  respect  to  seismic  research  designed  to 
improve  seismic  verification  methods,  I  am 
gratified  by  the  interest  expressed  so  recently  by  J 
Ambassador  Kolo  of  Nigeria  and  Ambassador  1 
Porter  of  the  U.K.  in  the  U.S.  seismic  investiga- 
tion proposal  which  was  set  forth  last  December 
5  by  my  predecessor.  Ambassador  Foster,  in  the 
First  Committee  of  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly.' I  can  now  say  that  in  the  course  of  this 
year  there  are  two  possible  nuclear  experiments 

•  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  20, 1969,  p.  58. 


334 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BmLLETIN 


in  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission's  Plow- 
share program  that  could  be  used  in  implement- 
ing our  seismic  investigation  proposal.  These 
experiments  are  research  and  development  tests 
in  the  field  of  commercial  application,  and  they 
will  depend  upon  the  working  out  of  necessary 
arrangements  with  the  private  concerns  in- 
volved. Until  such  arrangements  are  final,  data 
concerning  them  must  be  considered  tentative. 

As  currently  programed,  these  two  experi- 
ments are  to  take  place  in  west-central  Colorado. 
The  first  of  these  would  be  held  in  late  May  or 
June  and  the  second  toward  the  end  of  the  year. 
The  first  experiment  is  conceived  as  a  40-kiloton 
explosion  (with  a  possible  upper  limit  of  60 
kilotons)  which  is  to  take  place  in  a  type  of 
sandstone  at  a  depth  of  a  mile  and  a  half.  The 
second  would  be  similar  to  the  Gas  Buggy  ex- 
periment, with  which  I  am  sure  you  are  famil- 
iar. Its  yield  would  be  about  26  kilotons,  and 
it  would  be  detonated  at  a  depth  of  3,300  feet — 
also  in  a  form  of  sandstone.  As  final  contract 
arrangements  are  completed,  we  will  be  in  a 
position  to  make  available  more  specific  data  on 
time,  location,  geological  medimn,  depth,  and 
yield  for  these  tests. 

I  think  all  delegations  here  have  also  given 
attention  to  the  1968  report  on  seismic  detection 
and  identification  of  underground  nuclear  ex- 
plosions done  under  the  auspices  of  the  Inter- 
national Peace  Research  Institute  at  Stockholm. 
The  advances  in  seismic  science  described  in 
that  report  were  the  product  of  research  con- 
ducted in  a  number  of  countries  represented 
here.  We  hope  that  such  research  will  continue 
to  be  pursued  diligently  and  that  the  conclusions 
contained  in  the  SIPRI  report  will  be  further 
refined.  We  believe  this  type  of  research  will 
assist  us  in  our  task  of  achieving  an  adequately 
verified  comprehensive  test  ban  treaty. 

Seabed  Arms  Control 

Today,  however,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  wish  to  set 
forth  some  substantive  comments  on  another 
item  on  our  agenda.  I  refer  to  the  question  of 
arms  control  for  the  seabed.  I  would  like  to  use 
my  remaining  time  to  present  observations  on 
tliis  subject  for  two  reasons. 

First,  it  is  appropriate  that  various  views  on 
this  subject  should  be  submitted  for  considera- 
tion at  an  early  part  of  our  session,  because  this 
is  a  relatively  new  item.  There  is  a  background 
of  facts,  positions,  and  views  on  several  of  the 
other  items,  but  this  item  is  not  one  where  a  full 


understanding  of  facts  and  attitudes  of  the 
various  countries  is  presently  available  to  form 
the  basis  for  serious  discussion.  Therefore,  it 
seems  wise  for  the  United  States  delegation  at 
the  outset  to  submit  some  comments  on  this  sub- 
ject, as  the  Soviet  delegation  submitted  some 
views  on  this  subject  in  the  form  of  a  draft 
treaty — although  my  delegation  does  not  believe 
we  are  quite  at  the  stage  where  trying  to  agree 
on  treaty  language  would  be  the  best  way  to  go 
about  reaching  an  agreement. 

Secondly,  it  is  appropriate  to  discuss  the  sea- 
bed item  now  because  there  is  intrinsic  merit  in 
our  seeking  to  prevent  a  nuclear  arms  race  on 
the  seabed  while  there  is  still  time.  This  has 
been  called  preventive  disarmament  or  preven- 
tive non-armament.  The  significance  of  action 
to  preclude  new  types  of  arms  races  from  be- 
ginning should  never  be  underemphasized  if  we 
are  to  be  successful  in  our  efforts  to  halt  the 
arms  race.  Our  initial  successes  so  far  have  been 
partial  efforts  to  limit  the  arms  race  in  some 
areas  or  to  exclude  other  areas  from  arms  com- 
petition. We  have  been  trying  with  some  success 
to  fence  in  the  arms  race. 

This  is  true  of  the  partial  test  ban  treaty.  It  is 
true  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  and,  in  a  more 
significant  sense,  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty. 

If  we  ignore  areas  of  potential  arms  develop- 
ment while  exploring  areas  of  present  arms 
competition,  we  run  the  risk  that  the  potentials 
for  agreement  in  the  areas  where  there  is  at 
present  an  arms  competition  may,  as  the  moment 
of  success  draws  nearer,  be  neutralized  by  a 
developing  arms  competition  in  a  new  area. 

There  is  a  third  and  perhaps  intangible  rea- 
son why  it  would  be  important  to  reach  agree- 
ment to  prohibit  nuclear  weapons  on  the  seabed. 
Even  if  such  an  agreement  might  not  trench 
upon  existing  military  competition,  it  could  not 
help  but  have  certain  positive  psychological  and 
political  effects  upon  the  international  scene. 

Therefore,  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  make  some 
initial  observations  on  the  problem  of  prevent- 
ing the  seabed  from  becoming  an  area  for  the 
nuclear  arms  race. 

We  are  all  aware  that  in  the  past  2  years  the 
international  community  has  become  increas- 
ingly interested  in  the  possibilities  of  exploring 
and  exploiting  the  vast  resources  of  the  seabed 
and  ocean  floor.  The  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  responded  to  this  interest  by  establish- 
ing first  an  ad  hoc  and  then,  ultimately,  a  per- 
manent Committee  on  Peaceful  Uses  of  the 


APRIL   21,    1969 


335 


Seabed  and  Ocean  Floor  Beyond  the  Limits  of 
National  Jurisdiction. 

The  United  Nations  has  called  upon  the  per- 
manent committee  to,  inter  alia,  "study  further, 
within  the  context  of  the  title  of  the  item,  and 
taking  into  account  the  studies  and  international 
negotiations  being  undertaken  in  the  field  of 
disarmament,  the  reservation  exclusively  for 
peaceful  purposes  of  the  sea-bed  and  the  ocean 
floor  without  prejudice  to  the  limits  which  may 
be  agreed  upon  in  this  respect."  *  The  request  in 
this  resolution  that  the  Seabed  Committee  take 
into  account  international  negotiations  being  im- 
dertaken  in  the  field  of  disarmament  is  a  clear  in- 
dication that  the  committee,  now  concluding  its 
first  working  session  in  New  York,  will  closely 
watch  what  progress  is  made  here  on  the  ques- 
tion of  seabed  arms  limitations. 

Technological  advances  are  continually  being 
made  which  increase  the  types  and  extent  of 
operations  on  the  seabed.  At  present,  the  high 
cost  of  operating  in  this  difficult  environment 
has  effectively  limited  commercial  exploitation 
to  relatively  shallow  water.  However,  it  seems 
clear  that  scientific  and  commercial  activities 
will  soon  be  moving  into  deeper  waters.  Like- 
wise, as  technical  capabilities  are  developed  and 
improved,  the  possibility  increases  that  the  sea- 
bed could  be  used  as  a  new  environment  for  the 
emplacement  of  nuclear  weapons  and  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction. 

The  United  States  is  interested  in  taking 
realistic  steps  to  prevent  an  arms  race  on  the 
seabed.  We  are  pleased  that  other  delegations 
share  an  interest  in  working  out  an  effective 
and  viable  international  agreement.  In  this  re- 
gard, the  draft  treaty  submitted  to  this  Com- 
mittee by  the  Soviet  Union  is  being  studied 
with  great  interest  in  Washington,  and  we  ex- 
pect to  comment  on  it  more  fully  at  a  future 
meeting. 

In  examining  the  question  of  arms  control  on 
the  seabed,  we  must  consider  that  some  seabed 
uses,  such  as  communication  and  navigation 
aids,  are  utilized  for  both  military  and  non- 
military  purposes.  The  existence  of  submarine 
fleets  requires  states  to  take  action  in  self- 
defense,  such  as  warning  systems  that  use  the 
seabed.  Moreover,  much  useful  scientific  research 
on  the  seabed  is  supported  or  carried  out  by  mili- 
tary personnel  using  military  nonweapons 
equipment.  Therefore,  we  must  point  out  that 
complete  demilitarization  of  the  seabed  would 
be  simply  unworkable  and  probably  harmful. 

*  General  Assembly  Resolution  2467  ( XXIII ) . 


Moreover,  the  United  States  believes  that  it  is 
completely  impractical  to  try  to  prohibit  con- 
ventional weapons  on  the  seabed.  Encumbering 
a  seabed  arms  control  measure  with  this  type  of 
prohibition  would  raise  insuperable  verification 
problems.  Such  considerations  illustrate  the 
need  for  a  careful  study  of  all  the  relevant 
factors  in  developing  an  acceptable  agreement. 

Criteria  for  a  Seabed  Agreement 

The  United  States  offers  the  following  criteria 
for  consideration  of  a  seabed  agreement  and 
would  welcome  the  views  of  other  delegations 
on  these  or  other  relevant  factors : 

First,  the  United  States  believes  that  the 
most  urgent  problem  is  the  danger  of  the  em- 
placement of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the 
seabed.  Such  deployments,  whether  nuclear, 
chemical,  biological,  or  radiological  in  nature, 
should  be  banned.  In  view  of  the  possibility  that 
some  state  might  make  advance  preparation  for 
the  sudden  abrogation  of  any  treaty  ban  of  this 
nature,  consideration  should  be  given  to  whether 
seabed-based  laimching  platforms  and  delivery 
vehicles  for  such  weapons  should  be  included 
under  the  ban. 

Second,  the  objective  of  the  prohibition  is  to 
block  deployment  of  specific  weapons  on,  within, 
beneath,  or  to  the  seabed.  To  aclaieve  this,  care- 
ful consideration  must  be  given  to  the  exact  defi- 
nition of  the  words  "emplace  or  fix."  We  must 
consider  whether  they  should  apply  only  to 
permanent  installations  affixed  to  or  emplanted 
in  the  seabed  or  should  also  apply  to  containers 
or  carriers  whose  prmcipal  mode  of  deployment 
or  operation  requires  physical  contact  with  the 
seabed.  At  the  same  time,  Mr.  Chairman,  we 
should  take  care  that  the  prohibition  applies 
only  to  the  seabed  and  not  to  the  superjacent 
waters.  The  age-old  docti'ine  of  freedom  of  navi- 
gation is  the  foundation  of  international  mari- 
time law,  and  we  must  be  certain  that  our  agree- 
ment in  no  way  infringes  on  that  freedom. 

Third,  in  order  to  constitute  a  genuine  and 
stable  contribution  to  international  peace  and 
security,  any  arms  control  measure  relating  to 
the  seabed  should  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the 
participating  countries  can  feel  confident  that 
all  participants  are  fulfilling  their  obligations. 
Verification  of  compliance  could  involve  special 
problems  in  the  geographically  hostile  environ- 
ment of  the  seabed.  Nevertheless,  the  United 
States,  which  has  consistently  supported  the 
principles  of  adequate  verification  of  arms  con- 
trol measures,  believes  that  some  appropriate 


336 


DEPARTMENT   OP   STATE   BULLETIN 


provision  must  be  included  in  the  agreement  in 
order  to  provide  the  needed  reassurances  that 
all  the  provisions  are  being  complied  with. 

In  this  respect,  it  may  be  desirable  to  draw 
on  useful  precedents  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty 
to  establish  a  right  of  access  and  inspection. 
Such  a  right  should  be  based  on  reciprocity  and 
should  not  confer,  or  imply  the  existence  of,  any 
right  or  power  to  veto  proposed  visits. 

As  in  outer  space,  the  difficulties  of  the  en- 
vironment probably  require  that  representatives 
give  reasonable  advance  notice  of  a  projected 
visit.  This  will  permit  maximum  precautions  to 
be  taken  to  avoid  dangers  to  personnel  and  the 
disruption  of  the  normal  operations  of  the 
equipment  or  the  facility. 

Consideration  of  the  verification  question  also 
demonstrates  the  need  to  restrict  the  scope  of 
the  prohibition  to  weapons  of  mass  destruction, 
since  otherwise  the  task  of  inspectmg  the  multi- 
tude of  present  and  future  facilities  would  be 
beyond  capabilities. 

Fourth,  one  of  the  most  difficult  questions  is 
the  definition  of  the  bomidaries  beyond  which 
the  prohibition  would  apply.  Regardless  of  the 
method  which  might  be  agreed,  the  United 
States  believes  that  the  goal  should  be  to  apply 
the  arms  control  measure  to  as  broad  an  area  of 
the  seabed  as  possible.  Therefore,  the  prohibi- 
tion should  apply  to  the  seabed  beyond  a  nar- 
row band  along  the  coasts  of  states.  To  the  ex- 
tent possible,  the  method  chosen  to  define  this 
band  should  provide  ease  of  determination  and 
uniformity  of  interpretation,  and  should  be 
equitable  in  its  application.  For  example,  the 
zone  could  be  defined  by  several  methods,  such 
as: 

(1)  A  specified  horizontal  distance  from  the 
coast ; 

(2)  The  use  of  a  specified  isobath  or  depth 
limit  which  would  generally  follow  the  con- 
tour of  the  seabed ;  or 

(3)  As  some  have  suggested,  a  method  based 
on  the  outer  limits  of  national  jurisdiction  de- 
rived from  either  sovereignty  or  sovereign 
rights.  This  approach,  at  first  glance,  would 
appear  feasible  because  it  is  based  on  existing 
boundary  claims.  However,  the  differences  in 
the  international  community  regarding  the 
legitimate  extent  of  such  claims  would  result  in 
gross  inequities  and  would  weaken  the  effect  of 
the  measure  by  excluding  wide  areas  of  the  sea- 
bed from  the  zone  of  application. 

These  are  some  of  the  considerations  which 
will  need  to  be  discussed  before  an  effective  in- 
ternational agreement  can  be  worked  out,  and 


we  urge  the  Committee  to  imdertake  such  dis- 
cussions as  soon  as  possible.  In  this  way,  we  will 
be  doing  what  the  world  community  expects  of 
us :  seeking  ways  to  prevent  the  spread  of  weap- 
ons of  mass  destruction  to  new  environments 
and  at  the  same  time  helping  to  insure  that  the 
potential  for  peaceful  purposes  of  this  great 
area  of  our  planet  will  be  enhanced.  If  we  can 
do  this  much,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  will  be  no  small 
accomplishment.  In  effect,  we  will  have  placed 
nearly  70  percent  of  the  earth's  surface  off 
limits  to  the  arms  race  and  will  have  achieved 
a  significant  restraint  on  the  deployment  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction. 


Four  Powers  Begin  Talks 
on  Middle  East 

Joint  Gommunique  ^ 

The  Permanent  Representatives  to  the  United 
Nations  of  France,  the  USSR,  the  United  King- 
dom and  the  United  States  met  on  April  3  at  the 
residence  of  the  Permanent  Representative  of 
France  to  the  United  Nations  to  begin  consider- 
ation of  how  they  can  contribute  to  a  peaceful 
political  settlement  in  the  Middle  East.  They 
based  the  approach  to  this  problem  on  Security 
Council  Resolution  242  (1967)  which  they  fully 
accept  and  support.^  They  reaffirmed  their  sup- 
port for  Ambassador  Jarring's  mission. 

The  Four  Powers  are  agreed  that  the  situa- 
tion in  the  Middle  East  is  serious  and  urgent 
and  must  not  be  permitted  to  jeopardize  inter- 
national peace  and  security.  They  have  straight 
away  entered  into  a  discussion  on  matters  of 
substance  and  have  started  defining  areas  of 
agreement.  There  is  a  common  concern  to  mak;e 
urgent  progress.  The  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations  will  be  kept  fully  informed. 

Active  consultations  will  continue.  These  con- 
sultations will  be  private  and  confidential.  All 
appropriate  contacts  with  the  parties  primarily 
concerned  will  be  maintained. 

The  next  meeting  will  take  place  on  April  8th. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  on  Apr.  3  by  Armand 
Berard,  Representative  of  France  to  the  United 
Nations. 

^  For  text  of  the  resolution,  see  Btilletin  of  Dee.  18, 
196T,  p.  843. 


APRIL    21,    1969 


337 


Eleventh  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  state^nent  made  hy 
Lawrence  Walsh,  deputy  head  of  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation, at  the  11th  plenxiry  session  of  the  new 
Tneetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  April  3. 

Press  release  70  dated  April  3 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Last  week  Ambassador 
Lodge  discussed  the  question  of  aggression  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  He  submitted  that  the  central 
fact  concerning  this  aggression  is  the  presence 
of  himdreds  of  thousands  of  subversive  and 
military  forces  which  have  illegally  come  from 
North  Viet-Nam  into  South  Viet-Nam.  The  help 
which  United  States  and  Allied  forces  have 
given  the  people  and  Government  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  in  their  defense  against  that  aggression 
has  thus  been  entirely  in  response  to  these  in- 
cursions from  the  North. 

Today  I  propose  to  examine  a  related  aspect 
of  this  problem.  That  is  North  Viet- Nam's  long- 
standing use  of  the  territory  of  Laos  and  Cam- 
bodia— as  well  as  its  continuing  abuse  of  the 
demilitarized  zone — to  infiltrate  men  and  sup- 
plies into  South  Viet-Nam.  That  activity  is  re- 
lated not  only  to  the  question  of  responsibility 
for  aggression  against  South  Viet-Nam.  It  re- 
lates also  to  the  ultimate  question  which  directly 
faces  us  in  these  Paris  meetings :  how  to  bring 
lasting  peace  to  Viet-Nam  and  Southeast  Asia. 

On  July  23,  1962,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam,  and 
the  Democratic  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam,  along 
with  11  other  signatories,  entered  into  agree- 
ments for  the  settlement  of  tlie  Laotian  ques- 
tion.^ Those  agreements  contained  undertakings 
for  the  withdrawal  from  Laos  of  all  foreign 
troops  and  military  personnel  and  prohibited 
the  introduction  into  Laos  of  such  personnel. 

In  the  1962  agreements,  the  parties  undertook 
not  to  "commit  or  participate  in  any  way  in  any 
act  which  might  directly  or  indirectly  impair 
the  sovereignty,  independence,  neutrality,  unity 
or  territorial  integrity  of  the  Kingdom  of  Laos." 
They  pledged  themselves  to  "refrain  from  all 
direct  or  indirect  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  Kingdom  of  Laos."  They  agreed 
that  they  would  not  "use  the  territory  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Laos  for  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  other  countries." 


^  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.   13,  1962, 
p.  259. 


The  facts  show  that  unfortunately  North 
Viet-Nam  has  never  fulfilled  these  commitments 
which  it  undertook  in  1962.  At  that  time,  there 
were  about  10,000  North  Vietnamese  troops  in 
Laos.  Yet  only  40  North  Vietnamese  were  with- 
drawn through  the  checkpoints  established  by 
the  International  Commission  for  Supervision 
and  Control.  In  contrast,  the  United  States 
withdrew,  under  ICC  supervision,  all  666 
Ameiican  military  personnel  in  Laos. 

Not  only  did  substantial  numbers  of  North 
Vietnamese  forces  remain  in  Laos  but — begin- 
ning in  1963 — increasing  numbers  of  North 
Vietnamese  soldiers  began  to  move  into  Laos, 
and  through  Laos  into  South  Viet-Nam.  Today 
it  is  reliably  estimated  that  there  are  over  40,000 
North  Vietnamese  soldiers  in  Laos,  a  fourfold 
increase  since  the  1962  agreements. 

North  Vietnamese  forces  have  built  a  network 
of  highways,  roads,  and  paths  through  the 
jimgles  of  Laos  over  which  North  Vietnamese 
troops  and  war  materiel  flow  into  South  Viet- 
Nam — the  so-called  Ho  Chi  Minh  Trail.  North 
Vietnamese  forces  have  established  elaborate 
storage  areas  and  depots  in  Laos  as  part  of  this 
infiltration  network. 

Military  bases  and  camps  have  also  been  estab- 
lished along  the  eastern  border  regions  of  Laos.  ; 
From  these  bases  North  Vietnamese  troops  at-  ' 
tack  South  Viet-Nam  across  the  international 
frontier.  The  same  North  Vietnamese  forces 
then  retreat  to  these  bases  to  rest,  regroup,  re- 
supply,  and  retrain  for  further  attacks  against 
South  Viet-Nam. 

In  other  parts  of  Laos,  thousands  of  North     1 
Vietnamese  troops  attack  towns,  forces,  and  in- 
stallations of  the  Royal  Government  of  Laos. 
They  also  supply  the  insurgent  Pathet  Lao  with 
weapons  and  other  war  materiel. 

All  of  these  activities  by  North  Viet-Nam 
contradict  the  terms  of  the  1962  Geneva 
agreements. 

The  evidence  of  these  activities  is  voluminous. 
It  is  substantiated  by  reports  of  the  Interna- 
tional Control  Commission  and  tlie  testimony  of 
North  Vietnamese  soldiers.  Most  of  these  North 
Vietnamese  soldiers  were  either  captured  by  or 
surrendered  to  the  Royal  Lao  Army.  Some  were 
picked  up  in  South  Viet-Nam  after  having  in- 
filtrated through  Laos.  The  evidence  also  con-  1 
sists  of  witnesses  and  observers,  of  photographs, 
of  captured  docmnents  and  diaries  with  names 
and  unit  numbers.  It  included  extensive  docu- 
mentation published  by  the  Royal  Lao 
Government. 


338 


DEPARTMENT   OP   STATE   BTJLLETIK 


Recently,  His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Sou- 
vanna  Phouma,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Laos, 
sent  a  letter  of  protest  to  the  cochainnan  of  the 
Geneva  conference. 

Let  me  quote  from  that  Iptter,  dated  March  3, 
1969: 

Beginning  on  the  morning  of  March  1,  1969,  the  Post 
of  Nakhang  was  savagely  attacked  by  a  combined  force 
of  Pathet  Lao  and  North  Vietnamese  troops.  The  North 
Vietnamese  troops,  which  consisted  of  five  battalions, 
belonged  to  the  148th  regiment  of  the  316th  division. 

After  denouncing  the  Pathet  Lao,  Prince 
Souvanna  Phouma's  letter  continues : 

But  the  responsibility  of  North  Viet-Nam  is  even 
larger  and  more  serious.  Although  it  is  a  signatory  of 
the  Geneva  Accords  guaranteeing  in  the  first  place  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Kingdom,  it  has  flouted  every  pro- 
vision of  this  international  agreement,  wantonly  multi- 
plied its  violations  of  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
Agreement,  and  practiced  a  shameless  and  underhanded 
interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Laos. 

...  It  is  painful  for  the  Laotian  people  to  remember 
that  North  Viet-Nam  uses  their  territory  to  move  its 
troops  to  different  areas  where  it  is  engaged  in  South 
Viet-Nam,  that  more  than  40,000  of  its  soldiers  are 
sowing  war  and  destruction  in  Laos,  and  that  for  more 
than  one  year  its  armed  forces  have  been  sustaining 
the  Pathet  Lao  in  order  to  attack  Lao  Ngam  and  Tha- 
teng,  and  to  besiege  Saravane  and  Attopen,  in  violation 
of  all  rules  of  international  law  and  every  principle  of 
co-existence  and  friendly  behavior  between  neighbors, 
and  in  violation  of  the  Geneva  Accords  of  1954  and 
1962. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  evidence  is  incon- 
trovertible that  North  Viet-Nam  has  intervened 
in  Laos.  Your  side  has  shown  a  similar  disre- 
gard for  the  territorial  integrity  of  another 
neighboring  state,  Cambodia.  Without  elaborat- 
ing on  it  today,  the  evidence  is  clear  that  the 
armed  forces  of  your  side  continue  to  use  the 
territory  of  Cambodia  to  infiltrate  men  and  ma- 
teriel into  South  Viet-Nam  and  to  establish  base 
areas  from  which  to  attack  South  Viet-Nam. 
These  infringements  on  Cambodia's  territorial 
integrity  and  of  the  international  frontier  be- 
tween Cambodia  and  Viet-Nam  violate  the 
United  Nations  Charter,  the  1954  Geneva  ac- 
cords, and  general  international  law. 

Similarly,  North  Viet-Nam  continues  to  use 
the  demilitarized  zone  as  a  route  of  infiltration 
into  South  Viet-Nam.  Recent  attacks  against 
U.S.  and  Allied  forces  just  south  of  that  zone 
leave  no  doubt  that  the  attacking  forces  have 
come  from  the  DMZ  and  have  crossed  the  inter- 
national demarcation  line  between  North  and 
South  Viet-Nam.  This  conclusion  is  supported 


by  captured  documents,  the  testimony  of  cap- 
tured prisoners,  and  other  evidence. 

Let  me  cite  just  one  specific  example.  On  Feb- 
ruary 25,  forces  of  your  side  attacked  two  out- 
posts west  of  Con  Thien  immediately  below  the 
demilitarized  zone.  The  circumstances  of  the 
attacks  showed  that  the  attackers  came  through 
the  DMZ.  After  the  attack,  the  Allied  defenders 
found  on  the  battlefield  documents  and  uniform 
insignia  identifying  one  attacking  force  as  a 
unit  of  the  27th  Regiment  of  the  North  Viet- 
namese Army.  At  the  other  outpost,  defenders 
found  a  notebook  written  by  a  member  of  the 
246th  North  Vietnamese  Regiment.  The  note- 
book's author  described  the  route  the  unit  had 
followed  from  North  Viet-Nam  through  the 
demilitarized  zone  and  its  participation  in  oper- 
ations in  South  Viet-Nam  just  prior  to  the 
attack  on  the  outpost. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam  cannot  hope  for  a  lasting  peace  so 
long  as  North  Viet-Nam  continues  to  violate  its 
international  obligations — so  long  as  this  in- 
filtration from  North  Viet-Nam  continues  and 
so  long  as  North  Viet-Nam  refuses  to  respect 
international  demarcation  lines  and  interna- 
tional boundaries.  Nor  can  peace  be  assured  in 
the  neighboring  countries  of  Southeast  Asia  im- 
less  North  Viet-Nam  respects  their  sovereignty, 
independence,  and  territorial  integrity. 

As  Ambassador  Lodge  said  in  the  first  plenary 
session  of  these  Paris  meetings,  the  United 
States  seeks  peace  throughout  Southeast  Asia.^ 
To  achieve  peace,  we  believe  that  all  external 
forces  must  be  withdrawn  from  South  Viet- 
Nam.  We  also  believe  that  the  Geneva  agree- 
ments of  1962  on  Laos  must  be  observed.  We 
also  consider  it  necessary  that  the  sovereignty, 
independence,  unity,  and  territorial  integrity  of 
Cambodia  be  fully  respected.  We  believe  that 
the  demilitarized  zone  must  be  fully  respected. 
We  have  made  specific  and  concrete  proposals 
on  all  these  matters.  You  have  refused  to  discuss 
them,  professing  that  the  ftmdamental  issue  is 
the  unconditional  withdrawal  of  United  States 
forces  from  South  Viet-Nam.  Your  discussion 
cannot  be  regarded  as  serious  until  you  recognize 
that  there  must  be  a  mutual  withdrawal  of  ex- 
ternal forces.  We  believe  that  our  proposals  are 
practical  steps  toward  peace.  We  ask  that  you 
address  yourself  to  them  seriously. 


'  For  background,   see  Bulletin   of  Feb.   10,   1969, 
p.  124. 


APRIL    21,    1969 


339 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Explains  Vote  on  Security  Council  Resolution  on  Israel 


Following  are  statements  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  on  March  27  and  Afril  1  hy 
U.S.  Representative  Charles  W.  Tost,  together 
vnth  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  hy  the 
Council  on  April  1. 


STATEMENTS  BY  AMBASSADOR   YOST 
Statement  of  March  27 

U.S./D.N.  press  release  35  dated  March  27 

Once  again  we  have  been  summoned  to  a  ses- 
sion of  this  Council  because  of  the  tragic  re- 
sults of  continued  violence  in  the  Middle  East. 
We  have  heard  grim  descriptions  of  death  and 
destruction  and  accusations  against  one  side  or 
the  other  for  causing  it  all. 

The  air  attack  that  was  carried  out  by  Israeli 
Air  Force  planes  yesterday  in  the  area  south  of 
Salt  caused  the  death,  we  are  told,  of  18  persons 
and  the  injury  of  25  others — all  unarmed  civil- 
ians except  for  two  local  policemen.  We  deeply 
deplore  this  loss  of  life  and  the  human  suffering 
in  this  tragedy.  In  the  face  of  this  event,  my 
Government  wishes  to  make  clear  once  again, 
as  it  has  so  often  in  the  past,  its  firm  opposition 
to  attacks  of  this  nature.  We  urge  the  Govern- 
ment of  Israel  once  again  to  avoid  such  indis- 
criminate actions  and  all  other  violations  of  the 
cease-fire  resolutions  of  this  Council.  This  oc- 
currence was  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  cease- 
fire, and  my  delegation  deeply  deplores  it.  But 
we  know  all  too  well  that  this  attack  was  not 
an  isolated  incident  but  must  be  seen  in  the  total 
context  of  the  continuing  absence  of  peace  in  the 
Middle  East.  We  know  of  other  equally  serious 
incidents  as  well.  The  hard,  brutal,  tragic  reality 
is  that  violations  of  the  cease-fire,  from  what- 
ever quarter,  act  to  stimulate  answering  viola- 
tions of  the  cease-fire.  Thus,  Mr.  President, 
while  condemning  yesterday's  attack,  we  cannot 
refrain  from  condemning  the  other  grave  viola- 
tions from  the  other  side  which  have  taken  place. 


The  roster  is  a  long  and  sad  one.  UNTSO 
[United  Nations  Truce  Supervision  Organiza- 
tion] has  provided  us  with  numerous  reports  in 
recent  weeks,  particularly  concerning  the  all  too 
frequent  exchanges  of  fire  across  the  Suez  Canal 
which  show  the  continued  fragility  of  peace 
throughout  the  area.  These,  too,  are  serious  vio- 
lations of  the  cease-fire  which  are  to  be  greatly 
deplored  and  should  likewise  be  renounced. 
There  have  been  other  incidents :  bombs  in  mar- 
kets, attacks  on  civilian  aircraft,  an  explosion 
in  a  university  cafeteria.  Arab  Fedayeen  organi- 
zations have  proudly  proclaimed  their  responsi- 
bility for  these.  My  Government  equally  de- 
plores these  actions,  and  the  governments  of 
Arab  countries  cannot  completely  escape  respon- 
sibility for  them.  This  violence  must  be  stopped 
and  all  cease-fire  violations  brought  to  an  end. 

The  pattern  that  we  see  before  us  is  all  too 
clear,  and  of  course,  it  is  not  new.  As  violence 
increases  on  one  side,  it  is  answered  by  greater 
or  more  frequent  violence  on  the  other.  It  would 
be  tragic  enough  if  only  military  personnel  or 
others  who  have  armed  themselves  and  seek 
battle  were  involved.  But  tliis,  as  we  all  know,  is 
not  the  case.  Nor  can  we  expect  it  to  be  other- 
wise when  a  pattern  of  violence  such  as  we  have 
witnessed  develops.  Innocent  civilians  inevitably 
suffer.  Those  who  would  claim  to  be  acting  on 
their  behalf,  to  be  protecting  them,  become  in- 
stead the  indirect  instruments  of  their  death  and 
injury.  Schoolchildren,  women  doing  their  daily 
marketing,  quiet  picnickers — these  are  the  ones 
who  suffer  most. 

In  spite  of  the  gloomy  situation  on  the 
ground,  there  are  hopeful  developments  as  well, 
which  we  must  not  lose  sight  of.  The  Secretary 
General's  special  representative  is  in  the  area 
actively  consulting  the  parties,  and  we  were 
encouraged  to  learn  that  he  has  addressed  a 
series  of  substantive  questions  to  the  govern- 
ments concerned.  We  very  much  hope  that  the 
replies  to  his  questions  will  be  positive  and  that, 
as  a  result,  his  efforts  pursuant  to  Resolution 


340 


DEPAKTMENT   OP   STATE   BULLETIN 


242  will  receive  new  impetus.^  In  addition,  con- 
sultations among  certain  permanent  members  of 
the  Security  Council  are  in  train  on  ways  and 
means  whereby  Ambassador  Jarring's  efforts 
can  best  be  assisted.  In  the  not  too  distant  future, 
it  is  likely  that  the  bilateral  exchanges  now  tak- 
ing place  will  expand  into  four-power  consulta- 
tions in  support  of  Ambassador  Jarring's 
efforts. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  kind  of  incidents 
which  occasioned  this  meeting  today  and  which 
have  all  too  frequently  occurred  in  recent  weeks, 
greatly  hinder  the  achievement  of  the  basic  ob- 
jectives in  Resolution  242.  What  is  urgently 
required,  in  addition  to  cooperation  with  Am- 
bassador Jarring,  is  for  the  parties  scrupulously 
to  comply  with  the  cease-fire  arrangements. 
They  must  make  every  effort  to  see  that  all  vio- 
lations of  the  cease-fire  are  prevented,  and  they 
must  cooperate  in  strengthening  the  arrange- 
ments for  the  supervision  of  the  cease-fire. 

Once  again,  we  call  upon  all  of  the  govern- 
ments concerned  to  stop  this  senseless  waste  of 
human  life,  to  abide  scrupulously  by  the  cease- 
fire, and  to  devote  themselves  sincerely  and 
wholeheartedly  to  the  search  for  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  The  United 
States  is  determined  to  spare  no  effort  in  pursuit 
of  this  goal. 

Statement  of  April   1 

U.S./U.N.  press  release  39  dated  April  1 

Tlie  United  States  delegation  would  have  cer- 
tainly wished  to  vote  for  a  resolution  condemn- 
ing the  Israeli  air  attack  of  March  26.  As  we 
have  repeatedly  said,  we  condemn  all  violations 
of  the  cease-fire.  We  particularly  and  most 
strongly  condemn  air  attacks,  where,  whatever 
the  object  of  the  attack  may  be,  innocent  lives 
are  almost  certain  to  be  sacrificed. 

We  do  not  think  attacks  of  this  kind,  which 
are  bound  to  be  indiscriminate  in  their  effects  if 
not  in  their  intent,  can  in  any  way  be  justified 
by  describing  them  as  "active  defense."  We  con- 
sider them  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  counter- 
productive even  from  this  point  of  view.  Not 
only  do  they  almost  inevitably  result,  as  I  have 
said,  in  the  slaughter  of  innocent  people,  but  in 
so  doing,  they  aggravate  even  further  bitter 
and  uncompromising  feelings  toward  Israel  in 
the  countries  suffering  these  losses.  The  Israeli 


'  For  text  of  Security  Council  Resolution  242,  see 
BtFiiETiN  of  Dec.  18, 1967,  p.  843. 


Government  has  just  called  once  again  for  "the 
advancement  of  negotiations  between  the  Arab 
States  and  Israel  for  the  establishment  of  a  true 
peace  in  the  Middle  East." 

We  do  not  believe  that  it  is  itself  "advancing" 
such  negotiations  by  a  policy  of  "active  de- 
fense"; that  is,  of  necessarily  indiscriminate  air 
attacks  on  the  people  with  whom  it  wishes  to 
negotiate.  We  therefore  most  firmly  condemn 
these  attacks  and  call  upon  Israel,  in  the  interest 
of  all  the  efforts  toward  peace  which  are  being 
made  within  the  framework  of  this  Council,  to 
cease  such  attacks  forthwith. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  I  have  said  in  earlier 
statements,  we  consider  it  would  be  both  unjust 
and  unrealistic  to  treat  these  air  attacks  in  iso- 
lation. There  can  be  no  question  that  they  are 
provoked  by  equally  undiscriminating  attacks 
on  innocent  Israeli  civilians  in  markets,  in 
schools,  in  cinemas,  in  commercial  aircraft.  We 
condemn  such  attacks  equally  and  just  as 
strongly  and  call  upon  those  in  a  position  to  do 
so  to  take  all  action  possible  to  bring  them  to  an 
end.  The  fact  that  one  set  of  attacks  is  carried 
out  by  regular  and  the  other  by  irregular  forces 
is  no  consolation  to  the  innocent  victims,  their 
relatives,  and  their  compatriots.  Death  is  just 
as  final  and  as  shocking  if  it  comes  from  a  bomb 
in  a  supermarket  or  from  a  bomb  from  the  air. 
Nor  is  it  justified  by  the  fact  that  those  who 
planted  it  are  resisting  occupation,  any  more 
than  the  air  attacks  are  justified  because  their 
authors  are  seeking  recognition  of  their  national 
existence  and  a  stable  peace. 

Because  the  resolution  before  us  concentrates 
in  its  operative  paragraphs  exclusively  on  one 
kind  of  violence  and  ignores  the  other  kind  of 
violence  which  provokes  it,  we  find  the  resolu- 
tion unbalanced,  unrealistic,  and  unlikely  to 
move  the  parties  to  the  conflict  toward  a  peace- 
ful solution. 

The  preamble  observes  that  numerous  pre- 
meditated violations  of  the  cease-fire  have 
occurred,  but  the  operative  paragraphs  deal 
only  with  one  particular  type  of  violation  and 
overlook  all  others.  Had  the  sponsors  of  the 
resolution  been  willing  to  add  a  simple  operative 
paragraph  condemning  or  deploring  all  viola- 
tions of  the  cease-fire,  we  should  have  been  able 
to  support  it.  As  it  now  stands  we  cannot. 

We  reiterate,  however,  that  our  abstention 
should  not  be  interpreted  in  any  sense  as  con- 
doning the  kind  of  violence  which  the  resolu- 
tion condemns,  any  more  than  we  condone  any 


APRIL    21,    1969 


341 


other  kinds  of  violence  in  the  area  or  any  vio- 
lations whatsoever  of  this  Council's  cease-fire 
resolutions. 

Finally,  Mr.  President,  let  me  once  again 
most  earnestly  urge  all  the  parties  to  this  con- 
flict to  cooperate  sincerely  and  effectively  with 
Ambassador  Jarring  and  with  all  others  who 
are  working  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East  and 
at  long  last  to  act  in  the  spirit  of  conciliation 
and  compromise  which  is  required  from  all  sides 
if  the  peacemakers  are  to  succeed. 

TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  = 

The  Security  Council, 

Having  considered  the  agenda  contained  in  docn- 
ment  S/Agenda/1466, 

Having  heard  the  statements  made  before  the 
Council, 

Recalling  resolution  236  (1967) , 


Observing  that  numerous  premeditated  violations 
of  the  cease-fire  have  occurred, 

Viewing  with  deep  concern  that  the  recent  air  attacks 
on  Jordanian  villages  and  other  populated  areas  were 
of  a  pre-planned  nature,  in  violation  of  resolutions 
248  (1968)  and  256  (1968), 

Gravely  concerned  about  the  deteriorating  situa- 
tion which  endangers  i)eace  and  security  in  the  area, 

1.  Reaffirms  resolutions  248  (1968)  and  256  (1968)  ; 

2.  Deplores  the  loss  of  civilian  life  and  damage  to 
property ; 

3.  Condemns  the  recent  premeditated  air  attacks 
launched  by  Israel  on  Jordanian  villages  and  populated 
areas  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter  and  the  cease-fire  resolutions  and  warns  once 
again  that  if  such  attacks  were  to  be  repeated  the 
Council  would  have  to  meet  to  consider  further  more 
effective  steps  as  envisaged  in  the  Charter  to  ensure 
against  repetition  of  such  attacks. 


2  U.N.  doc.  S/BES/265  (1969)  ;  adopted  on  Apr.  1  by 
a  vote  of  11  to  0,  with  4  abstentions  (U.S.,  Colombia, 
Paraguay,  U.K.). 


U.N.  Seabed  Committee  Concludes  Spring  Session 


Statement  by  David  H.  Popper ' 


During  the  last  3  weeks  this  committee  and  its 
subcommittees  have  ranged  widely  over  the 
complex  problems  that  confront  us.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  ad  hoc  committee  at  its  spring  ses- 
sion in  1968,  we  are  left  with  a  multitude  of 
issues  posed,  a  volume  of  work  unfinished,  and 
a  number  of  baffling  questions  for  future 
consideration. 

My  delegation  will  use  the  interval  between 
now  and  our  August  session  to  review  the  record 
of  our  deliberations,  to  study  the  implications 
of  the  important  statements  that  have  been 
made,  and  to  determine  what  in  our  view  might 
usefully  be  expected  when  we  next  meet. 

It  would  be  wrong  to  anticipate  giant  strides 
from  this  committee  in  1969.  But  it  is  realistic  to 


^  Made  on  Mar.  28  before  the  U.N.  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  the  Seabed  and  the  Ocean  Floor 
Beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jurisdiction  (U.S./U.N. 
press  release  36).  Mr.  Popper  is  U.S.  Representative  to 
the  committee. 


seek  the  beginnings  of  definite  movement  toward 
the  ultimate  objectives  set  out  in  the  General 
Assembly  resolutions  which  constitute  our 
mandate. 

Although  there  will  be  no  formal  working 
group  to  carry  on  our  efforts  between  now  and 
next  August,  we  will  be  open  to  informal  con- 
sultations among  interested  delegations  and 
groups  of  delegations.  Perhaps  in  this  way  each 
of  us  can  assist  others  in  refining  our  coimnon 
thinking  and  in  searching  for  broadly  accept- 
able avenues  looking  toward  general  agree- 
ment— agreement  on  those  first  elements  of  our 
problem  which  can  be  conducive  to  further 
progress  in  ensuing  years. 

Before  this  session  of  the  committee  adjourns, 
my  delegation  wishes  to  place  on  record  its  views 
regarding  certain  aspects  of  the  question  of  the 
reservation  of  the  seabed  exclusively  for  peace- 
ful purposes  and  seabed  arms  control.  We  do 
this  so  that  our  comments  may  be  considered  in 


342 


DEPAKTMENT   OP   STATE   BULJjETIN 


connection  with  the  statements  on  the  subject 
made  by  other  delegations  in  the  Legal 
Subcommittee. 

The  United  States  has  no  difficulty  in  giving 
its  support  to  the  principle  of  the  reservation 
of  the  seabed  exclusively  for  peaceful  purposes. 
It  is  important  that  the  committee,  and  member 
states,  be  fully  aware  of  the  meaning  of  these 
general  terms.  Fortunately,  we  have  an  ex- 
ample— a  guide  to  practice,  if  you  will — in  the 
United  Nations  discussions  which  led  to  the 
conclusion  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty  and  in  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  itself  as  these  are  by 
common  agreement  interpreted.  In  general,  we 
understand  the  test  of  whether  an  activity  is 
"peaceful"  to  be  whether  it  is  consistent  with 
the  United  Nations  Charter  and  with  other 
obligations  of  international  law. 

The  Space  Treaty  carefully  delineated  what 
specific  military  activities  are  prohibited  in 
order  to  insure  that  the  moon  and  other  celestial 
bodies  will  be  utilized  only  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses. Other  military  activities  are  clearly  not 
incompatible  with  the  reservation  of  space  for 
peaceful  purposes. 

We  envisage  a  similar  approach  in  the  area  of 
the  seabed.  Our  position  was  set  out  in  a  letter 
from  President  Nixon  to  the  chairman  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  which  was  presented  at  the 
opening  session  of  the  Eighteen-Nation  Dis- 
armament Conference  on  March  18.  The 
President  stated :  ^ 

...  in  order  to  assure  that  the  seabed,  man's  latest 
frontier,  remains  free  from  the  nuclear  arms  race,  the 
United  States  delegation  should  indicate  that  the 
United  States  is  interested  in  working  out  an  inter- 
national agreement  that  would  prohibit  the  implace- 
ment  or  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  or  other  weapons  of 
mass  destruction  on  the  seabed.  To  this  end,  the 
United  States  delegation  should  seek  discussion  of  the 
factors  necessary  for  such  an  international  agree- 
ment. Such  an  agreement  would,  like  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  and  the  Treaty  on  Outer  Space  which  are  al- 
ready in  effect,  prevent  an  arms  race  before  it  had  a 
chance  to  start.  It  would  ensure  that  this  potentially 
useful  area  of  the  world  remained  available  for  peace- 
ful purposes. 

On  March  25,  the  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
ENDC,  Ambassador  Gerard  Smith,  further 
emphasized  the  United  States  interest  in  real- 
istic steps  to  prevent  the  extension  of  the  anns 
race  to  the  seabed.^  He  stated  that  in  working 
out  an  effective  and  viable  international  agree- 


=  Bulletin  of  Apr.  7, 1969,  p.  289. 
•  See  p.  333. 


ment,  we  must  consider  that  for  some  purposes, 
such  as  communication  and  navigation  aids,  the 
seabed  is  utilized  for  both  military  and  non- 
military  ends.  Furthermore,  the  existence  of  sub- 
marine forces  requires  states  to  take  defensive 
measures  against  such  forces  through  such 
means  as  warning  systems  that  use  the  seabed. 
Moreover,  much  useful  scientific  research  on 
the  seabed  is  supported  or  carried  out  by  mili- 
tary personnel  using  nonweapons  military 
equipment.  Accordingly,  we  believe  that  com- 
plete demilitarization  would  have  the  effect  of 
prohibiting  certain  necessary  and  desirable 
activities  and  might  well  be  harmful.  That  is 
why  we  do  not  believe  complete  demilitarization 
to  be  a  useful  means  of  moving  toward  effective 
seabed  arms  control.  Nor  do  we  believe  that  it  is 
feasible  to  seek  a  blanket  prohibition  of  con- 
ventional weapons  on  the  seabed.  To  try  to  do 
this  would  be  to  raise  verification  problems 
which  would  be  insuperable. 

We  are  seeking  practical  measures  which  will 
help  us  to  meet  the  main  danger  with  which  the 
world  is  confronted  in  the  seabed  environment. 
Surely  that  danger  is  the  possibility  of  a  race  to 
emplace  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the 
seabed.  Surely  such  weapons,  whether  nuclear, 
biological,  or  chemical,  should  be  prohibited 
if  it  is  possible  to  achieve  this  end  in  a  credibly 
effective  way.  This  involves,  inter  alia,  the  pos- 
sibility that  a  ban  on  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion should  be  extended  to  cover  launching  plat- 
forms and  delivery  vehicles  for  such  weapons. 

Since  the  objective  of  such  a  prohibition 
would  be  to  prevent  the  deployment  of  specified 
weapons  on,  within,  or  beneath  the  seabed,  care- 
ful consideration  must  be  given  to  the  exact 
definition  of  the  words  "emplace  or  fix."  One 
of  the  factors  to  be  considered  is  whether  these 
words  should  apply  only  to  permanent  installa- 
tions affixed  to  or  emplanted  in  the  seabed  or 
should  also  apply  to  containers  or  carriers  whose 
principal  mode  of  deployment  or  operation  re- 
quires physical  contact  with  the  seabed.  What- 
ever the  precise  agreement  in  this  regard,  it 
seems  clear  to  us  that  the  prohibition  must  apply 
to  activities  on  or  under  the  seabed  and  not  in 
waters  above  the  seabed,  where  the  problem  is 
complicated  by  already  existing  armament  and 
by  the  need  to  avoid  infringement  of  the  tradi- 
tional freedom  of  navigation. 

In  any  arms  control  agreement,  it  is  of  course 
necessary  to  insure  compliance  by  all  parties 
through    effective   verification    procedures.    It 


APRIL    21,    1969 


343 


may  be  desirable  to  draw  on  the  useful  prece- 
dent of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty  in  this  respect 
to  establish  a  right  of  access  and  inspection; 
article  XII  of  the  Space  Treaty  is  pertinent  in 
this  connection.  Such  a  right  would  be  based 
on  reciprocity  and  would  not  be  subject  to  veto. 
As  in  outer  space,  the  difficulties  of  a  hostile  en- 
vironment probably  require  that  reasonable 
advance  notice  be  given  of  prospective  visits  in 
order  to  avoid  dangers  to  personnel  or  disrup- 
tion of  normal  activity.  The  consideration  of  the 
verification  question  also  demonstrates  the  need 
to  restrict  the  scope  of  the  prohibition  to  weap- 
ons of  mass  destruction,  since  otherwise  the  task 
of  inspecting  the  multitude  of  present  and 
future  facilities  on  the  seabed  would  be  beyond 
all  foreseeable  capabilities. 

One  of  the  most  difficult  questions  in  this 
realm  relates  to  the  definition  of  the  boundaries 
beyond  which  the  prohibition  would  apply.  The 
United  States  believes  the  goal  should  be  to 
apply  any  arms  control  measure  to  a  broad  area 
of  the  seabed.  Therefore,  in  our  view  the  pro- 
hibition should  apply  to  the  seabed  beyond  a 
narrow  band  along  the  coasts  of  states.  To  the 
extent  possible,  the  method  chosen  to  define  this 
band  should  provide  ease  of  determination  and 
uniformity  of  interpretation  and  should  be 
equitable  in  its  application.  We  suggest  the 
desirability  of  a  study  of  the  technical  prob- 
lems involved  in  various  depth  and  distance 
criteria,  as  a  means  of  moving  toward  such  a 
decision. 

I  have  made  these  remarks  on  the  arms  con- 
trol aspects  of  the  seabed  problem,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, so  that  the  committee  might  be  aware  of 
the  approach  which  the  United  States  is  taking 
toward  this  problem  in  the  ENDC  in  Geneva. 
This  is,  as  we  all  recognize,  a  higlily  technical 
matter.  We  have  always  maintained  that  the 
ENDC  is  best  qualified  to  work  out  the  terms  of 
acceptable  agreements  on  arms  control.  Our 
Seabed  Committee  has  an  interest  in  the  prob- 
lem as  well.  But  at  this  juncture,  we  believe  the 
laboring  oar  must  be  pulled  by  the  experts  in 
Geneva,  while  we  here  maintain  a  more  general 
overview. 

Jjet  me  now  conclude  with  a  few  more  general 
observations  about  the  work  of  the  Seabed 
Committee. 

In  the  Legal  Subcommittee,  under  the  able 
chairmanship  of  Ambassador  Galindo  Pohl, 


the  debates  have  helped  clarify  the  issues  and 
lay  the  groimdwork  for  agreement  on  a  set  of 
principles.  I  think  we  have  reason  to  hope  that 
agi'eement  on  at  least  some  broad  guidelines 
may  soon  be  possible.  As  I  have  stated,  progress 
might  be  made  through  discussions  in  an  infor- 
mal working  group  or  in  inf  onnal  consultations 
between  now  and  August.  We  would  like  to 
preserve  the  momentum  gained  at  this  session 
of  the  committee. 

Under  the  skilled  guidance  of  its  chairman, 
Mr.  Denorme,  the  Economic  and  Technical  Sub- 
committee has  again  prepared  a  valuable  report 
on  the  technical  aspects  of  the  exploration  and 
use  of  the  seabed  and  its  resources,  on  man's 
increasing  capability  to  explore  and  exploit  the 
seabed,  and  on  some  questions  we  must  face  in 
considering  an  international  legal  regime  for 
the  seabed.  We  look  forward  to  the  next  phase 
of  the  subcommittee's  activities.  We  are  pleased 
that  in  August  the  subcommittee  will  take  up 
the  long-term  program  of  oceanographic  re- 
search, including  the  International  Decade  of 
Ocean  Exploration,  as  well  as  start  its  discus- 
sion of  possible  regimes. 

In  connection  with  the  International  Decade, 
we  welcome  the  presence  of  Admiral  Langeraar. 
His  letter  is  most  helpful.*  The  Intergovern- 
mental Oceanographic  Conamission  appears  to 
be  moving  ahead  expeditiously  to  prepare  its 
proposals  for  the  comprehensive  outline  of  the 
scope  of  the  long-term  program  of  research  and 
exploration.  We  hope  there  will  be  a  full  re- 
sponse to  the  invitation  contained  in  General 
Assembly  Resolution  2467  for  members  to  sub- 
mit to  the  IOC  their  proposals  for  national  and 
international  oceanographic  programs.  We  are 
ourselves  preparing  our  response.  We  have  asked 
the  U.S.  National  Academies  of  Sciences  and 
Engineering  to  draft  recommendations  on  the 
scientific  and  engineering  aspects  of  our  input 
into  the  International  Decade  of  Ocean  Explo- 
ration. This  study  has  just  been  completed  and 
will  be  published  early  next  month.  It  will  of 
course  be  available  to  the  committee. 

We  look  forward  to  having  at  the  August 
meeting  of  this  committee  additional  proposals. 


'  For  text  of  a  letter  dated  Feb.  27,  1969,  from  Rear 
Adm.  W.  Langeraar,  Chairman,  International  Oceano- 
graphic Commission,  addressed  to  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral, see  U.N.  doc.  A/AC.  138/10. 


344 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


In  particular,  we  await  those  which  will  be 
contained  in  the  interim,  report  on  the  long- 
term  program  of  oceanographic  research  to  be 
prepared  by  the  IOC  working  group  which 
meets  in  June.  Even  though  these  proposals  will 
not  be  put  into  final  form  until  the  IOC  plenary 
session  in  September,  they  can  very  usefully  be 
studied  and  discussed  at  our  August  session  in 
their  provisional  form. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.,  Canada  Conclude  Agreements 
on  Niagara  Falls  Beautiflcation 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 


Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  6e  consulted  at  depository  libraries 
in  the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publications  may  be 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Nations, 
United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 


Security  Council 

Eeport  of  the  committee  established  in  pursuance  of 
Resolution  253  of  May  29,  1968,  relating  to  Southern 
Rhodesia.  S/8954.  December  30,  1968.  103  pp. 


General  Assembly 

Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space.  In- 
formation furnished  by  the  United  States  on  objects 
launched  into  orbit  or  beyond  as  of  August  31. 
A/AC.105/INF.196.  November  12,  1968.  3  pp. 

Fourth  United  Nations  Congress  on  the  Prevention  of 
Crime  and  the  Treatment  of  Offenders  to  be  held  at 
Kyoto,  Japan,  August  17-26,  1970.  Information  note 
prepared  by  the  U.N.  Secretariat.  A/CONF.43/INF.1. 
January  7, 1969.  3  pp. 


Economic  and  Social  Gjuncil 

Commission  on  Human  Rights : 

Status  of  multilateral  treaties  In  the  field  of  human 
rights.  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary-General. 
E/CN.4/907/Rev.  3.  January  9,  1969.  5  pp. 

International  Year  for  Human  Rights :  Action  Aris- 
ing Out  of  the  Resolutions  of  the  International 
Conference  on  Human  Rights.  Note  by  the  Secre- 
tary-General. E/CN.4/994.  January  14,  1969.  7  pp. 

Periodic  Reports  on  Human  Rights.  Note  by  the 
Secretary-General  forwarding  the  report  on  civil 
and  political  rights  covering  the  period  July  1, 
1965-June  30,  1968,  received  from  the  Government 
of  the  United  States.  B/CN.4/973/Add.  7.  Janu- 
ary 15,  1969.  16  pp. 
Commission  on  the  Status  of  Women  : 

Equal  Pay  for  Work  of  Equal  Value.  Report  by  the 
International  Labor  Office.  E/CN.6/519.  Decem- 
ber 3, 1968.  45  pp. 

Information  Concerning  the  Status  of  Women  in 
Trust  and  Non-Self-Governing  Territories.  Report 
by  the  Secretary-General.  B/CN.6/509.  January  7, 
1969.  39  pp. 


Press  release  59  dated  March  21 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada  on  March  21  concluded  two  exchanges 
of  notes  relating  to  the  American  Falls  at  Ni- 
agara. The  exchanges  took  place  at  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  between  Canadian  Ambassador 
A.  E.  Ritchie  and  Assistant  Secretary  for  Euro- 
pean Affairs  Martin  J.  Hillenbrand. 

One  of  the  two  notes  exchanged  authorizes 
construction  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  Army  Corps  of  Engineers  of  a  temporary 
cofferdam  between  the  head  of  Goat  Island  and 
the  United  States  mainland  in  the  channel  above 
the  American  Falls.  Construction  of  the  coffer- 
dam will  divert  the  normal  flow  of  water  away 
from  the  American  Falls,  so  as  to  permit  on-site 
investigation  to  determine  what  measures  may 
be  feasible  and  desirable  to  preserve  or  enliance 
the  beauty  of  the  American  Falls.  Such  an  in- 
vestigation was  proposed  by  the  United  States- 
Canadian  International  Joint  Commission  in 
November  1967.  The  Corps  of  Engineers  con- 
templates that  under  current  budgetary  condi- 
tions it  will  be  able  to  have  the  cofferdam 
installed  during  the  current  calendar  year  in 
sufficient  time  to  conduct  a  thorough  investiga- 
tion. If  so,  the  on-site  inspection  will  under  the 
terms  of  the  note  have  to  be  completed  and  the 
dam  removed  no  later  than  December  31,  1969. 

The  second  note  would  authorize  the  tempo- 
rary utilization  for  power  production  purposes 
of  the  water  diverted  by  the  cofferdam.  Power 
benefits  deriving  from  this  temporary  arrange- 
ment under  the  terms  of  the  note  would  be  di- 
vided equally  between  the  Power  Authority  of 
the  State  of  New  York  and  the  Hydro-Electric 
Power  Commission  of  Ontario,  who  have  agreed 
in  return  to  make  a  sizable  contribution  to  the 
costs  of  the  cofferdam  and  ensuing  study. 


345 


The  second  agreement,  which  involves  a  de- 
parture from  minimum  flows  specified  in  the 
Niagara  Treaty  of  1950,  will  require  approval 
by  the  United  States  Senate.  The  cofferdam 
agreement  is  authorized  by  the  Boundary 
Waters  Treaty  of  1909  and  does  not  require 
Senate  approval. 


EXCHANGES  OF  NOTES 


U.S.  Note  on  Niagara  Diversion 

Maboh  21, 1969 
Excellency,  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  Refer- 
ence from  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada  to  the  International  Joint  Commission,  dated 
March  31,  1967,  requesting  the  Commission  to  investi- 
gate and  report  on  measures  that  may  be  feasible  and 
desirable  to  preserve  or  enhance  the  beauty  of  the 
American  Falls  at  Niagara/  The  Commission  has  con- 
vened an  American  Falls  International  Board  consist- 
ing of  experts  from  each  country,  has  conducted  initial 
hearings,  and  has  In  its  letter  of  November  6,  1967," 
proposed  that  the  two  Governments  arrange  by  the  most 
expeditious  procedure  to  authorize  the  construction  of 
a  temporary  cofferdam  to  redirect  to  the  Horseshoe 
Falls  the  normal  flow  over  the  American  Falls,  so  as 
to  permit  the  necessary  on-site  investigation  and  col- 
lection of  data. 

Under  Article  III  of  the  Boundary  Waters  Treaty 
of  1909,  temporary  or  permanent  obstructions  or  diver- 
sions of  boundary  waters  on  one  side  of  the  line,  affect- 
ing the  natural  level  or  flow  of  boundary  waters  on  the 
other  side,  may  be  authorized  by  special  agreement 
between  the  two  Parties.  Accordingly,  I  have  the  honor 
to  propose  as  follows : 

1.  The  United  States  Army  Corps  of  Engineers  shall 
be  authorized  to  construct  or  to  have  constructed  a 
temporary  cofferdam  between  the  head  of  Goat  Island 
and  the  United  States  mainland  in  the  channel  above 
the  American  Falls  at  Niagara  :  if  such  authority  is 
exercised,  said  cofferdam  shall  be  installed  during  the 
calendar  year  1969  in  suflBcient  time  to  carry  out  the 
necessary  on-site  investigation  and  collection  of  data 
and  shall  be  removed  by  or  at  the  direction  of  the 
United  States  Army  Corps  of  Engineers  no  later  than 
December  31,  1969. 

2.  The  costs  incurred  in  such  installation  and  re- 
moval, and  in  conducting  on-site  investigations  while 
the  temporary  cofferdam  is  in  place,  shaU  qualify  for 
inclusion  in  the  costs  to  be  recommended  for  allocation 
as  between  the  United  States  and  Canada  by  the  In- 
ternational Joint  Commission  pursuant  to  the  Refer- 
ence of  March  31, 1967. 

3.  Neither  the  United  States  nor  Canada  shall  be 
responsible  for  physical  injury  or  damage  to  persons 
or  property  in  the  territory  of  the  other  which  may 


'  For  text  of  the  U.S.  letter,  see  Bxjlletin  of  Apr.  17, 
1967,  p.  634. 
'  Not  printed. 


be  caused  by  any  act  authorized  or  provided  for  by 
this  agreement. 

If  the  foregoing  proposals  are  agreeable  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Canada,  I  have  the  honor  further  to  pro- 
pose that  your  reply  to  that  effect  and  the  present 
Note  shall  constitute  an  agreement  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  Canada,  which  will  enter  into  force 
upon  the  date  of  your  reply. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

For  the  Secretary  of  State : 
Maktin  J.  Hillenbrand 

His  Excellency 
A.  Edgab  Ritchie 
Ambassador  of  Canada 

Canadian  Note  on  Niagara  Diversion 

Washington,  D.C. 
March  21, 1969 

SiE,  I  have  the  honour  to  refer  to  your  Note  of  March 
21,  1969,  concerning  the  construction  of  a  temporary 
cofferdam  between  Goat  Island  and  the  United  States 
mainland. 

I  wish  to  advise  that  the  Government  of  Canada 
accepts  the  proposals  set  forth  in  your  Note  and  agrees 
that  your  Note,  together  with  this  reply,  which  is  au- 
thentic in  English  and  French,  shall  constitute  an 
agreement  between  our  two  Governments  which  wiU 
enter  into  force  on  the  date  of  this  Note. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

A.E.  Ritchie 
Ambassador 

The  Honourable 

William  P.  Rogebs, 

Secretary  of  State, 

Washington,  D.C. 

U.S.  Note  on   Power  Benefits 

Maech  21,  1969 
Excellency,  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  an  ex- 
change of  notes  between  the  Government  of  Canada  and 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  dated  March  21, 
1969,  authorizing  the  construction  of  temporary 
cofferdam  to  divert  water  away  from  the  American 
Falls  at  Niagara,  so  as  to  permit  the  on-site  investi- 
gation of  measures  that  might  be  taken  to  preserve  or 
enhance  the  beauty  of  the  American  Falls. 

It  appears  advantageous  to  make  use  of  the  addi- 
tional energy  resource  thus  made  available,  by  author- 
izing the  temporary  additional  diversion  for  power 
purposes  of  the  water  normally  flowing  over  the  Ameri- 
can Falls. 

Accordingly,  I  have  the  honor  to  propose  that  during 
the  period  in  1969  when  the  cofferdam  is  in  place,  the 
following  arrangements  shall  be  put  into  effect : 

1.  The  minimum  flows  over  the  Falls  stipulated  in 
Article  IV  of  the  Niagara  River  Treaty  of  1950  shall 


346 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


be  reduced  from  100,000  c.f.s.  and  50,000  c.f.s.,  respec- 
tively, to  92,000  c.f.s.  and  41,000  c.f.s.,  respectively, 
during  the  tiours  designated  in  that  Article.  Any  water 
in  excess  of  these  new  temporary  minimums  may  be 
diverted  for  power  purposes;  provided  that  when  the 
41,000  c.f.s.  minimum  applies  at  least  9,000  c.f.s.  of  the 
waters  thus  diverted  shall  be  either  passed  through 
the  low-head  plants  or  released  to  the  Horseshoe  Falls 
so  as  to  maintain  a  minimum  flow  of  50,000  c.f.s.  into 
the  Maid-of-the-Mist  Pool  at  all  times. 

2.  Entitlement  to  the  power  benefits  deriving  from 
this  temporary  additional  diversion  shall  be  divided 
equally  between  the  Power  Authority  of  the  State  of 
New  York  and  the  Hydro-Electric  Power  Commission 
of  Ontario,  upon  the  agreement  of  each  such  power 
entity  to : 

(A)  contribute  in  cash  or  in  services  to  the  cost  of 
the  cofferdam  and  ensuing  investigations,  the  value  of 
$385,500  in  its  national  currency,  if  the  additional 
diversion  is  permitted  during  the  entire  period  from 
April  30,  1969  to  December  31,  1969.  or  a  portion  of 
said  contribution  corresponding  to  any  shorter  period 
during  which  the  additional  diversion  is  permitted, 
such  portion  to  be  determined  on  the  same  basis  as  was 
the  $385,500  by  the  International  Joint  Commission  in 
consultation  with  the  power  entities ;  and 

(B)  assume  responsibility  for  the  disposition  of 
claims  for  physical  injury  or  damage  to  persons  or 
property  occurring  in  the  lower  Niagara  River  on  its 
side  of  the  international  boimdary  line,  caused  by  the 
resulting  temporary  alteration  of  water  levels  in  the 
lower  river  below  that  normally  experienced  at  flows 
of  100,000  cf.s.  and  50,000  c.f.s.,  and  for  the  satisfac- 
tion of  any  such  claims  that  are  valid. 

3.  The  temporary  additional  diversions  permitted  by 
these  arrangements  shall  not  be  considered  as  creating 
any  vested  right  or  interest  in  the  use  of  such  addi- 
tional amounts  of  water. 

If  the  foregoing  proposed  arrangements  are  accept- 
able to  the  Government  of  Canada,  I  have  the  honor  to 
propose  that  your  reply  to  that  effect  and  the  present 
Note  shall  constitute  an  agreement  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  and  the  Government  of 
Canada  which  will  enter  into  force  upon  notification 
that  it  has  been  approved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  of  America. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

For  the  Secretary  of  State: 
Martin  J.  Huxenbeand 

His  Excellency 
A.  Edgab  Ritchie 
Ambassador  of  Canada 


Canadian  Note  on  Power  Benefits 

Washington,  D.C. 
March  SI,  1969 
Sir,  I  have  the  honour  to  refer  to  your  Note  of 
March  21,  1969,   concerning  the  propo.sed  temporary 
additional    diversion    of    Niagara    water    for    power 
purposes. 


I  wish  to  advise  that  the  Government  of  Canada 
accepts  the  proposals  set  forth  in  your  Note  and  agrees 
that  your  Note,  together  with  this  reply,  which  Is 
authentic  in  English  and  French,  shall  constitute  an 
agreement  between  our  two  Governments  which  will 
enter  into  force  upon  notification  by  you  that  it  has 
been  approved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

A.  E.  Ritchie 
Amhassador 
The  Honourable 
William  P.  Rogers, 
Secretary  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  New 
York  March  30, 1961.  Entered  into  force  December  13, 
1964 ;  for  the  United  States  June  24,  1967. 
Accession  deposited:  France   (with  a  declaration), 

February  19,  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  February  14, 1969. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4, 
1969." 

Ratifications  deposited:  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist 
Republic  (with  a  reservation  and  a  declaration). 
United  Kingdom  (with  a  reservation,  statements, 
and  declarations),  March  7, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at  New 
York  January  31, 1967.  Entered  into  force  October  4, 
1967 ;  for  the  United  States  November  1, 1968.  TIAS 
6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Ecuador,  March  6,  1969. 

Space 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3, 1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession  deposited  at  Washington:  Gabon,  April  2, 

1969. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Republic  of 

Korea  (with  a  statement),  April  4,  1969. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Montreux  November  12, 1965.  Entered 


'■  Applicable  to   the   whole  of  the   territory  of   the 
French  Republic. 
"  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


APRIL    21,    1969 


347 


into  force  January  1,  1967;  for  the  United  States 
May  29,  1967.  TIAS  6267. 

Ratifications   deposited:   Afghanistan,   January   31, 
1969;  Austria,  January  23,  1969;  Hungary,  Jan- 
uary 20, 1969 ; '  Malawi,  Poland,'  January  17, 1969 ; 
Nicaragua,  January  30,  1969. 
Partial    revision    of   the   radio    regulations    (Geneva, 
1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332),  relating 
to  maritime  mobile  service,  veith  annexes  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  November  3,  1967.  Entered 
into  force  April  1, 1969.  TIAS  6590. 
Notifications    of    approval:   Argentina,    January    7, 
1969 ;  Vatican  City  State,  January  4,  1969 ;  Upper 
Volta,  January  17, 1969. 
Partial    revision    of   the    radio   regulations    (Geneva, 
1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603),  putting  into 
effect  a   revised  frequency  allotment  plan  for  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service  and  related  infor- 
mation,  with   annexes.   Done   at   Geneva   April  29, 
1966.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1967  ;  for  the  United 
States  August  23,  1967,  except  the  frequency  allot- 
ment plan  contained  in  appendix  27  shall  enter  into 
force  April  10, 1970.  TIAS  6332. 
Notification  of  approval:  Pakistan,  January  23,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  March  23,  1963, 
for  financing  certain  educational  exchange  programs. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila  Decem- 
ber 11, 1968,  January  31  and  March  19, 1969.  Entered 
into  force  March  19,  1969. 

United  Kingdom 

Amendment   to    the   agreement   of   July   3,    1958,    as 
amended  (TIAS  4078,  4276),  for  cooperation  on  the 
uses  of  atomic  energy  for  mutual  defense  purposes. 
Signed  at  Washington  September  27,  1968. 
Entered  into  force:  March  28,  1969. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  Releases  1966  Volume 
of  Foreign  Policy  Documents 

Press  release  54  dated  Marcli  12 

The  Department  of  State  on  March  12  published 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Documents,  1966, 
the  latest  in  the  series  of  annual  one-volume  collections 
of  documents  on  U.S.  foreign  policy  compiled  by  the 
Historical  Ofiice,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs. 

This  volume,  containing  632  documents  in  1,201 
pages,  constitutes  a  comprehensive  but  convenient  sur- 


vey of  the  goals,  problems,  and  processes  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy  in  1966,  as  revealed  in  all  the  im- 
portant public  papers  of  that  year.  There  is  an  index 
and  a  complete  listing  of  all  documents. 

The  material  is  arranged  under  14  headings,  evenly 
divided  between  geographical  and  functional  areas  of 
American  diplomacy.  Special  attention  is  given  to  the 
major  topics  of  contemporary  concern,  such  as  the 
situation  in  Viet-Nam,  French  withdrawal  from 
NATO,  efforts  to  achieve  agreements  on  nonprolifera- 
tion  of  nuclear  weapons  and  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer 
space,  imposition  of  sanctions  on  Southern  Rhodesia, 
and  the  balance-of-payments  problem. 

Copies  of  the  volume  (Department  of  State  publica- 
tion 8423)  may  be  obtained  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  OflSce,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20402,  for  $6.25  each. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


*  With  reservations  and  declarations  contained  in 
final  protocol. 

*  With  declarations  contained  in  final  protocol. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  March  27  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

William  B.  Buffum  to  be  the  deputy  representative 
of  the  United  States  to  the  United  Nations.  (For  bio- 
graphic details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
March  11.) 

John  A.  Hannah  to  be  Administrator  of  the  Agency 
for  International  Development.  (For  biographic  de- 
tails, see  Department  of  State  press  release  69  dated 
April  2.) 

Charles  A.  Meyer  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State.  ( For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  66  dated  April  2.) 

Christopher  H.  Phillips  to  be  the  deputy  representa- 
tive of  the  United  States  in  the  Security  Council  of  the 
United  Nations.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  March  11.) 

Nathaniel  Samuels  to  be  a  Deputy  Under  Secretary 
of  State.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  68  dated  AprU  2.) 

The  Senate  on  April  3  confirmed  the  nomination  of 
Glenn  A.  Olds  to  be  the  representative  of  the  United 
States  on  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  of  the 
United  Nations.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  March  11. ) 


Designations 

John  Hugh  Crimmins  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter- American  Affairs,  effective  April  3.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  April  3. ) 


348 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BtrLLEXIN 


INDEX     ■^'i-ml  ^1,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1566 


Canada.  U.S.,  Canada  Conclude  Agreements  on 

Niagara  Falls  Beautification  (texts  of  notes)    .      345 

Congress.  Confirmations  (Buffum,  Hannah, 
Meyer,  Olds,  PhilUps,  Samuels) 348 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Confirmations   (Buffum,  Hannah,  Meyer,  Olds, 

Phillips,   Samuels) 348 

Designations    (Crimmins) 348 

Disarmament 

Ambassador  Smith  Presents  U.S.  Views  on  Sea- 
bed Proposal  at  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament 
Conference  (statement) 333 

U.N.  Seabed  Committee  Concludes  Spring  Ses- 
sion (Popper) 342 

Economic  Affairs 

Samuels  confirmed  as  Deputy  Under  Secretary 
for  Economic  Affairs 348 

U.S.,  Canada  Conclude  Agreements  on  Niagara 
Falls  Beautification  (texts  of  notes)     .    .    .      345 

Foreign  Aid.  Hannah  confirmed  as  Administra- 
tor, Agency  for  International  Development     .      348 

Israel.  U.S.  Explains  Vote  on  Security  Council 
Resolution  on  Israel  (Tost,  text  of  resolu- 
tion)       340 

Latin  America 

Orimmins  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Inter-American  Affairs 348 

Meyer   confirmed    as    Assistant    Secretary    for 

Inter-American   Affairs 348 

Marine  Science 

Ambassador  Smith  Presents  U.S.  Views  on  Sea- 
bed Proposal  at  Eighteen-Nation  Disarmament 
Conference   (statement) 333 

U.N.  Seabed  Committee  Concludes  Spring  Ses- 
sion (Popper) 342 

Near  East 

Four  Powers  Begin  Talks  on  Middle  East  (joint 
communique) 337 

U.S.  Explains  Vote  on  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion on  Israel  (Tost,  text  of  resolution)     .     .       340 

Publications.  Department  Releases  1966  Volume 

of  Foreign  Policy  Documents 348 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 347 

U.S.,  Canada  Conclude  Agreements  on  Niagara 
Falls  Beautification  (texts  of  notes)     .    .    .      343 

United  Nations 

Buffum  confirmed  as  U.S.  Deputy  Representative 
to  the  United  Nations 348 

Current  U.N.  Documents 345 

Olds  confirmed  as  U.S.  Representative  on  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council 348 

PhilUps  confirmed  as  U.S.  Deputy  Representa- 
tive in  the  Security  Council 348 


U.N.  Seabed  Committee  Concludes  Spring  Ses- 
sion (Popper) 342 

U.S.  Explains  Vote  on  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion on  Israel  (Tost,  text  of  resolution)     .     .  340 

Viet-Nam.  Eleventh  Plenary  Session  on  Viet- 

Nam  Held  at  Paris  (Walsh) 338 

Name  Index 

Buffum.  William  B 348 

Crimmins.  John  Hugh 348 

Hannah,  John  A 348 

Meyer,    Charles  A 348 

Olds,  Glenn  A 348 

Phillips,  Christopher  H 348 

Popper,  David  H 342 

Samuels,  Nathaniel 348 

Smith,  Gerard 333 

Walsh,  Lawrence 338 

Yost,  Charles  W 340 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  March  29-April  6 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  March  29  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  54  of 
March  12  and  59  of  March  21. 

No.    Date  Subject 

*66  4/2  Meyer  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  luter-Ameriean  Affairs  and  U.S. 
Coordinator  for  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  (biographic  details). 

*67  4/1  Regional  foreign  policy  conference, 
Detroit,  Mich.,  April  23. 

*68  4/2  Samuels  sworn  in  as  Deputy  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  (bio- 
graphic details). 

*G9    4/2     Hannah  sworn  in  as  Administrator, 
Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment (.biographic  details). 
70    4/3    Walsh :  11th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris. 

*71  4/4  NATO  ministerial  meeting,  Washing- 
ton, April  10-11. 

*72  4/4  Program  for  visit  of  King  Hussein  I  of 
Jordan,  April  S-10. 


*Not  printed. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON.  D.C.     20402 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


POSTAGE   AND    FEES    PAID 
U.S.  GOVERNMENT   PRINTING   OFFII 


IM   AVT    O 

20  YEARS  OF  PEACE 


557 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTIV8ENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1557 


April  28, 1969 


SECRETARY  ROGERS'  NEWS  CONFERENCE  OF  APRIL  7    '§67^m  Public  Library 

'    '       indent  of  Documents 
WORLD  WEATHER  PROGRAM— PLAN  FOR  U.S.  PARTICIPATION    : 

President  Nixon's  Letter  of  Transmittal  and  Excerpt  MAY   16  1969 

From  the  Report  to  Congress     368 

DEPOSITORY 


MINISTERIAL  MEETING  OF  THE  NORTH  ATLANTIC  TREATY  COUNCIL 

Address  hy  President  Nixon  and  Opening  Remarhs 

at  Ceremonial  Session  Celebrating  the  20th  Annvoersary 

of  the  Signing  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty     3^9 

Text  of  Final  Comnmnique     354- 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1557 
April  28,  1969 


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The  annual  spring  ministerial  meeting  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  was  held  at  Washington  April  10-11.  A  special  ceremonial 
session  was  held  on  April  10  in  the  Departmental  Auditoriiim,  the 
site  of  the  signing  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  on  April  4, 191^9.  The 
principal  address,  delivered  hy  President  Nixon,  was  preceded  hy 
remarks  made  hy  Secretary  Rogers;  Foreign  Minister  Willy  Brandt 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  Honorary  President  of  the 
Cowncil;  and  Secretary  General  Manlio  Brosio. 

Following  are  texts  of  the  opening  remarhs,  President  Nixon's 
address,  and  a  final  communiqioe  issued  on  April  11  at  the  close  of 
the  ministerial  meeting,  together  with  a  list  of  the  members  of  the 
V.S.  delegation . 


The  North  Atlantic  Council  Celebrates  the  20th  Anniversary 
of  the  Signing  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 


OPENING  REMARKS 

Secretary  Rogers 

Press  release  76  dated  April  10 

Mr.  President,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  distin- 
guished colleagues,  honored  guests,  ladies  and 
gentlemen:  It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  wel- 
come you  here  today. 

It  is  especially  appropriate,  I  think,  that  we 
are  gathered  in  this  historic  auditorium. 
Twenty  years  ago  almost  to  the  day,  the  rep- 
resentatives of  12  nations  convened  in  this  room 
to  sign  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty.  With  the 
subsequent  adherence  of  three  additional  signa- 
tories, this  treaty  became  the  cornerstone  of  the 
15-nation  alliance  which  continues  to  bind  us 
together. 

We  are  most  fortunate  in  having  in  our  midst 
five  of  the  original  signers  of  the  treaty: 
the  distinguished  Prime  Minister  of  Iceland, 
Mr.  Benediktsson ;  Mr.  Paul-Henri  Spaak; 
Mr.  Dirk  U.  Stikker ;  Mr.  Halvard  Lange ;  and 
Mr.  Dean  Acheson.  Gentlemen,  we  are  deeply 
honored  that  you  have  joined  us  to  commemo- 
rate that  act  of  statesmanship  in  which  you 
played  so  important  a  part. 

Also  present  in  this  room,  ladies  and  gentle- 
men, are  the  men  who  are  carrying  on  the 
complex  day-to-day  task  of  running  the  con- 
sultative and  defense  machinery  of  the  alliance 
organization:  our  esteemed  Secretary  General, 
Mr.  Manlio  Brosio ;  the  permanent  representa- 


tive of  each  allied  government;  the  chairman 
and  members  of  the  military  committee;  and 
the  Supreme  Allied  Commanders.  Their  untir- 
ing labors  and  high  professional  competence 
constitute  the  heartbeat  of  the  alliance. 

Let  me  also  extend  a  warm  welcome  to  our 
other  special  guests,  many  of  whom  have  jour- 
neyed from  abroad.  I  am  very  pleased  to  see 
the  representatives  of  the  national  councils  of 
the  Atlantic  Treaty  Association.  Their  activi- 
ties in  the  private  sector  on  behalf  of  the  alli- 
ance are  a  vital  factor  in  broadening  Atlantic 
understanding. 

We  all  are  here  today  to  mark  the  passing  of 
a  milestone  in  NATO's  road,  a  road  which  all 
of  us  have  traveled  together.  In  meetings  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Council  today  and  tomorrow, 
my  colleagues  and  I  will  be  addressing  together 
the  deep  and  difficult  issues  of  our  day. 

For  our  common  task  in  NATO  remains,  so 
long  as  Europe  is  divided,  so  long  as  the  use  of 
force  threatens,  and  so  long  as  aggression  must 
be  deterred.  At  the  same  time,  the  alliance  task 
is  also  to  pursue  the  search  for  ways  to  reduce 
the  tensions  that  divide  East  and  West.  And 
with  this  twofold  objective,  the  alliance  will 
move  into  its  third  decade. 

I  am  confident  that  the  spirit  of  close  co- 
operation— which  is  the  hallmark  of  our  com- 
mon endeavor  in  NATO — will  pervade  our 
deliberations  at  this  meeting  and  guide  our 
work  in  the  days  and  years  ahead. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  may  I  now  introduce 


APRIL    28,    1969 


349 


the  Honorary  President  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Council,  His  Excellency  the  Foreign  Mmister 
of  the  Federal  Eepublic  of  Germany. 

Foreign   Minister  Brandt 

Mr.  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen :  Twenty 
yeai-s  ago  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  was  signed 
in  this  auditorium. 

Today  the  alliance  can  take  inventory  of  what 
it  has  achieved : 

1.  It  has  prevented  armed  conflicts  between 
its  members ; 

2.  It  has  proved  that,  being  a  defensive  alli- 
ance, it  has  threatened  no  country  and  no 
nation ; 

3.  It  has,  above  all,  achieved  its  main  goal: 
Peace  has  been  preserved  in  our  part  of  the 
world. 

Mr.  President,  it  is  a  pleasure  and  an  honor 
to  me  to  welcome  you  and  several  of  those 
statesmen  who  created  this  defense  alliance  and 
steered  it  through  its  first  years  of  existence. 
We  owe  them  thanks  for  an  achievement  of  liis- 
toric  importance. 

But  one  seat,  alas,  remains  empty — it  is  that 
of  General  Eisenhower.  He  set  our  alliance  the 
irreat  task  of  demonstrating  that  an  alliance  for 
peace  means  so  much  more  to  mankind  than  an 
alliance  in  war. 

It  is  the  German  Foreign  Minister's  turn  as 
President  to  address  this  meeting.  This  fortu- 
nate circumstance  permits  me  to  recall  that  the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  was  the  framework 
within  which  my  own  country  was  able  to  re- 
turn into  the  community  of  free  nations.  Our 
membership  in  this  alliance  is  the  mainstay  of 
our  foreign  policy.  It  will  remain  so  until  one 
day  the  division  of  Europe  will  have  been  over- 
come by  means  of  a  peace  order. 

As  a  German  and  not  least  as  a  Berliner,  I 
am  aware  that  only  by  joint  efforts  will  our  na- 
tions be  able  to  safeguard  their  freedom  and 
their  way  of  life. 

The  strength  of  our  alliance  rests  upon  the 
fact  that  the  Uiuted  States  and  Canada  have 
joined  forces  across  the  Atlantic  with  the  West- 
ern European  nations.  Its  vigor  springs  from 
the  partnership  between  states  of  unequal  size 
but  equal  intrinsic  value. 

The  fact  remains  that  we  Europeans  and  our 
American  friends  continue  to  depend  on  each 
other.  The  20th  anniversary  of  NATO  would 


lose  its  meaning  were  it  not  to  confirm  and 
manifest  anew  this  relationship. 

The  alliance  had  to  limit  itself.  It  has  thus 
occasionally  disai^pointed  hopes.  But  it  has  pre- 
vented wars.  Ill  future,  too,  the  alliance  will 
threaten  no  one.  It  will  continue  to  protect  its 
members  against  any  threat.  It  is  on  this  proven 
basis  that  we  can  tackle  the  task  of  reducing  the 
danger  itself. 

You,  air.  President,  said  before  the  NATO 
Council  that  we  must  replace  the  unity  of 
common  fear  with  the  community  of  shared 
purpose.^ 

Security  is  what  the  nations  in  West  and 
East  want.  Today  it  is  still  a  question  of  having 
security  against  each  other.  To  find  security 
with  each  other  would  be  in  keeping  with  the 
true  aim  of  the  Atlantic  alliance. 

It  is  only  together  that  we  shall  attain  this 
aim.  Today  even  the  most  powerful  is  too  weak 
if  he  stands  alone.  Only  when  we  join  forces 
will  we  win  the  battle  for  removing  tension 
and  durably  securing  peace. 

Until  then,  as  NATO's  motto  puts  it,  vigi- 
lance is  the  price  of  freedom. 

Secretary  General   Brosio 

Mr.  President,  Your  Excellencies,  ladies  and 
gentlemen:  In  inviting  the  North  Atlantic 
Comicil  to  celebrate  the  20th  anniversary  of  this 
alliance  in  its  birthplace,  the  United  States 
Government  has  given  proof  not  only  of  its 
continuing  attachment  to  our  common  ideal 
but  also  of  its  sense  of  history. 

For — let  us  take  justifiable  pride  in  it — this 
is  an  occasion  unique  in  our  times.  Never  since 
the  dawn  of  our  era  has  such  a  peacetime  coali- 
tion looked  back  on  20  years'  united  effort  in 
defense  of  a  collective  principle.  Never  has  the 
spirit  of  willing  cooperation  among  highly  de- 
veloped nations  been  so  effectively  manifested. 
Never  has  so  imminent  a  threat  of  world  con- 
flict been  so  successfully  averted.  It  is,  by  any 
standards,  a  remarkable  story. 

In  celebrating  this  unique  achievement,  we 
are  very  conscious  of  the  role  played  in  it  by 
our  hosts.  Today,  when  the  Western  community 
stands  as  an  established  part  of  the  world  order, 
some  of  us  are  apt  to  overlook  the  revolution 
it  represented  in  American  thinking  at  its  in- 
ception.  Throughout   their   country's  history, 

^  For  President  Nixon's  remarks  to  the  Council  on 
Feb.  24,  see  Bui-letin  of  Mar.  24,  1969,  p.  250. 


350 


DEPARTMENT   OP   STATE   BULLETIN 


successive  U.S.  governments  had  remained 
faithful  to  George  Washington's  injunction  to 
contract  no  tie  with  the  Old  World.  In  1949 
this  policy  of  a  century  and  a  half  was  suddenly, 
radically,  modified.  Let  us  honor  the  American 
nation  and  its  leaders  for  having,  20  years  ago, 
so  decisively  broken  with  their  past  in  order  to 
assure  the  free  world  of  a  future. 

In  saying  this  I  do  not  forget  that  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Atlantic  the  men  of  that  time 
were  also  equal  to  events.  Tlie  wisdom  spring- 
ing from  vision  in  North  America,  the  wisdom 
prompted  by  past  suffering  in  Europe,  together 
forged  this  fraternity  of  peace. 

Many  men  had  a  hand  in  the  making  of  that 
partnership.  !Many  more  have  been  concerned 
with  putting  it  to  work.  But,  speaking  as  Sec- 
retary General,  I  hope  you  will  allow  me  to 
mention  the  three  men  in  particular  to  whom 
my  thoughts  turn  on  this  occasion,  conscious  of 
the  debt  we  all — and  not  least,  I  myself — owe 
them. 

Lord  Ismay,  NATO's  first  Secretary  General, 
is,  alas,  no  longer  with  us  but  with  history.  A 
man  of  great  administrative  talent,  he  first 
taught  the  infant  to  walk,  and  set  its  steps  in 
the  right  direction.  M.  Paul-Henri  Spaak 
brought  political  acumen  and  imagination  of 
the  highest  order  to  the  task  of  giving  new 
scope  and  depth  to  its  development.  Dr.  Stikker, 
who  combined  in  unique  form  the  great  gifts  of 
his  predecessors,  guided  the  growing  prodigy 
with  wisdom  and  firmness  through  a  difficult 
adolescence. 

Today,  on  their  ward's  coming  of  age,  we  can 
assess  with  pride  their  joint  achievement. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  past  year  has  been 
a  sobering  one  in  the  affairs  of  our  alliance. 
The  hopes  of  detente  which  illuminated  our 
ministerial  meeting  last  spring  were  soon  over- 
cast by  the  events  in  Czechoslovakia.  As  ra- 
tional men,  we  are  bound  to  hope  that  these 
clouds  will  eventually  break.  We  meet  this  year 
as  new  perspectives  open  before  us.  The  third 
decade  of  the  alliance  may  afford  us  great  op- 
portunities— and  also  present  great  risks. 

These  uncertainties  require  more  than  ever 
that  Europe  and  North  America  should  stand 
together.  Last  week,  the  world  assembled  in  this 
Capital  to  mourn  one  of  the  greatest  servants 
the  alliance  ever  had.  No  single  man  embodied 
better  than  Dwight  Eisenhower  the  spirit  of 
free  and  fraternal  cooperation  which  animates 
our  community.  There  could,  I  feel,  be  no  fitter 


monument  to  his  memory  than  tlie  maintenance 
of  that  spirit  unimpaired.  Our  message  of 
peace  will  be  the  more  heeded  if,  va.  the  future 
as  m  the  past,  we  are  seen  to  be  inspired  by  the 
same  common  faith. 


ADDRESS  BY   PRESIDENT  NIXON 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  10 

Mr.  Secretary,  Mr.  President,  Mr.  Secretary 
General,  Your  Excellencies,  and  our  distin- 
guished guests:  As  we  gather  here  today,  we 
celebrate  a  momentous  armiversary. 

We  celebrate  one  of  the  great  successes  of  the 
postwar  world. 

Twenty  years  ago,  as  has  already  been  men- 
tioned, a  few  dedicated  men  gathei-ed  in  Wash- 
ington to  cement  an  Atlantic  partnership  be- 
tween the  older  nations  of  Europe  and  their 
offspring  in  the  New  World — and  in  this  very 
room  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  was  signed. 
Some  of  the  men  who  were  here  then  are  here 
today — and  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  those 
who  were  here  then  and  who  are  here  today 
stand  for  a  moment.  (Applause.) 

Gentlemen,  with  our  hindsight,  we  now  have 
saluted  your  foresight  at  that  time.  In  referring 
to  that  event,  I  thought  I  should  share  with  you 
the  conversation  that  I  had  with  some  of  the 
founders  in  the  room  prior  to  coming  to  this 
meeting. 

Secretary  Acheson  recalled  that  before  the 
signing  of  the  treaty  the  Marine  Band  played, 
"We've  Got  Plenty  of  NoUiing,"  and  "It  Ain't 
Necessarily  So." 

Certainly  what  has  happened  in  those  20  years 
pi-oved  that  as  far  as  the  music  was  concerned, 
it  was  not  prophetic. 

As  we  sit  here  today  we  also  look  back  on 
those  20  years,  what  has  happened;  and  we 
think,  as  the  previous  speakers  have  indicated, 
of  all  of  those  who  have  contributed  to  the  alli- 
ance, and  particularly  to  the  one  who  com- 
manded the  armies  that  liberated  Europe,  the 
first  Supreme  Commander  of  the  NATO  forces, 
the  American  President  who  did  so  much  to 
bring  NATO  to  its  strength  and  to  give  life  to 
its  principles — to  Dwight  David  Eisenhower. 

His  life  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  moral 
force  in  the  world  which  can  move  men  and 
nations.  There  is  a  spiritual  force,  lodged  in  the 
very  roots  of  man's  being. 

As  for  NATO,  it  is  precisely  because  it  has 


APRIL    28,    1969 


351 


always  been  more  than  a  military  alliance  that 
its  strength  has  been  greater  than  the  strength 
of  arms.  This  alliance  represents  a  moral  force 
which,  if  we  marshal  it,  will  ennoble  our  efforts. 

Dwight  Eisenhower  was  a  great  humanist. 
He  was  also  a  great  realist.  If  he  were  with  us 
today,  he  would  have  recognized  that  together, 
as  men  of  the  Old  World  and  of  the  New  World, 
we  must  find  ways  of  living  in  the  real  world. 

As  we  know  too  well,  that  real  world  today 
includes  men  driven  by  suspicion,  men  who 
would  take  advantage  of  their  neighbors,  men 
who  confuse  the  pursuit  of  happiness  -with,  the 
pursuit  of  power. 

It  also  is  peopled  with  men  of  good  will,  with 
men  of  i^eace,  and  with  men  of  hope  and  with 
men  of  vision. 

No  nation,  and  no  community  of  nations,  is 
made  up  entirely  of  one  group  of  men  or  an- 
other. No  part  of  the  world  has  a  monopoly 
on  wisdom  or  virtue. 

Those  who  think  simply  in  terms  of  "good" 
nations  and  "bad"  nations — of  a  world  of 
stanch  allies  and  sworn  enemies — live  in  a 
world  of  their  own.  Imprisoned  by  stereotypes, 
they  do  not  live  in  the  real  world. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  who  believe  that  all 
it  takes  to  submerge  national  self-interest  is  a 
little  better  communication,  those  who  think 
that  all  that  stands  in  the  way  of  international 
brotherhood  is  stubborn  leadersliip — they,  too, 
live  in  a  world  of  their  own.  Misled  by  wishful 
thinkmg,  they  do  not  live  in  the  real  world. 

Two  decades  ago,  the  men  who  founded 
NATO  faced  the  truth  of  their  times ;  as  a  re- 
sult, the  Western  World  prospers  today  in  free- 
dom. We  must  follow  their  example  by  once 
again  facing  the  truth — not  of  earlier  times  but 
of  our  own  times. 

Living  in  the  real  world  of  today  means  rec- 
ognizing the  sometimes  differing  interests  of 
the  Western  nations,  while  never  losing  sight 
of  our  great  common  purposes. 

Living  in  the  real  world  of  today  means 
understanding  old  concepts  of  East  versus 
West,  understanding  and  unfreezing  those  con- 
cepts, but  never  losing  sight  of  great  ideologi- 
cal differences  that  still  remain. 

We  can  afford  neither  to  blind  our  eyes  with 
hatred  nor  to  distort  our  vision  with  rose- 
colored  glasses.  The  real  world  is  too  much  with 
us  to  permit  either  stereotyped  reacting  or  wish- 
ful thinking  to  lay  waste  our  jaowers. 

Let  us  then  count  ourselves  today  among  the 
hopeful  realists. 


In  this  same  spirit  of  hopeful  realism,  let  us 
look  at  NATO  today. 

We  find  it  strong  but  we  find  it  challenged. 
We  find  disputes  about  its  structure,  political 
divisions  among  its  members,  and  reluctance  to 
meet  prescribed  force  quotas.  Many  people  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  find  NATO  anach- 
ronistic, something  quaint  and  familiar  and 
even  a  bit  old-fashioned. 

As  the  alliance  begins  its  third  decade,  there- 
fore, there  are  certain  fundamentals  to  be 
reaffirmed : 

First,  NATO  is  needed;  and  the  American 
commitment  to  NATO  will  remain  in  foi-ce  and 
it  will  remain  strong.  We  in  America  continue 
to  consider  Europe's  security  to  be  our  own. 

Second,  having  succeeded  in  its  original  pur- 
pose, the  alliance  must  adapt  to  the  conditions 
of  success.  With  less  of  the  original  cement  of 
fear,  we  must  forge  new  bonds  to  maintain 
our  unity. 

Third,  when  NATO  was  founded,  the  mere 
fact  of  cooperation  among  the  Western  nations 
was  of  tremendous  significance,  both  symboli- 
cally and  substantively.  Now  the  symbol  is  not 
enough ;  we  need  substance.  The  alliance  today 
will  be  judged  by  the  content  of  its  cooperation, 
not  merely  by  its  form. 

Fourth,  the  allies  have  learned  to  harmonize 
their  military  forces;  now,  in  the  light  of  the 
vast  military,  economic,  and  political  changes  of 
two  decades,  we  must  devise  better  means  of 
harmonizing  our  policies. 

Fifth,  by  its  nature,  ours  is  more  than  a  mili- 
tary alliance;  and  the  time  has  come  to  turn  a 
part  of  our  attention  to  those  nonmilitary  areas 
in  wliich  we  all  could  benefit  from  increased 
collaboration. 

Now,  what  does  all  this  mean  for  the  future 
of  the  Western  alliance  ? 

To  deal  with  the  real  world,  we  cannot  re- 
spond to  changing  conditions  merely  by  chang- 
ing our  words.  We  have  to  adapt  our  actions. 

It  is  not  enough  to  talk  of  flexible  response, 
if  at  the  same  time  we  reduce  our  flexibility  by 
cutting  back  on  conventional  forces. 

It  is  not  enough  to  talk  of  relaxing  tension, 
unless  we  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  20  years 
of  tension  were  not  caused  by  superficial  mis- 
understandings. A  change  of  mood  is  useful 
only  if  it  reflects  some  change  of  mind  about 
political  purpose. 

It  is  not  enough  to  talk  of  European  security 
in  the  abstract.  We  must  know  the  elements  of 


352 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLBTIIT 


insecurity  and  how  to  remove  them.  Confer- 
ences are  useful  if  they  deal  with  concrete  is- 
sues, which  means  they  must,  of  course,  be  care- 
fully prepared. 

It  is  not  enough  to  talk  of  detente,  unless  at 
the  same  time  we  anticipate  the  need  for  giving 
it  the  genuine  political  content  that  would  pre- 
vent detente  from  becoming  delusion. 

To  take  one  example,  a  number  of  America's 
Western  partners  have  actively  supported  the 
idea  of  strategic  arms  control  talks  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  I  support  that  idea.  Wlien  such 
talks  are  held,  we  shall  work  diligently  for  their 
success. 

But  within  our  alliance  we  must  recognize 
that  this  would  imply  a  military  relationship 
far  different  from  the  one  that  existed  when 
NATO  was  founded.  Let's  put  it  in  plain  words. 
The  West  does  not  today  have  the  massive  nu- 
clear predominance  that  it  once  had,  and  any 
sort  of  broad-based  arms  agreement  with  the 
Soviets  would  codify  the  present  balance. 

How  would  progress  toward  arms  control  af- 
fect the  nature  of  consultation  within  our 
alliance  ? 

Up  to  now,  our  discussions  have  mainly  had 
to  do  with  tactics — ways  and  means  of  carrying 
out  the  provisions  of  a  treaty  drawn  a  genera- 
tion ago.  We  have  discussed  clauses  in  proposed 
treaties;  in  the  negotiations  to  come,  we  must 
go  beyond  these  to  the  processes  which  these 
future  treaties  will  set  in  motion.  We  must 
shake  off  our  preoccupation  with  formal  struc- 
ture to  bring  into  focus  a  common  world  view. 

Of  course  there  is  a  diversity  of  policies  and 
interests  among  the  Western  nations;  and  of 
course  those  differences  must  be  respected.  But 
in  shaping  the  strategies  of  i^eace,  these  differ- 
ences need  not  block  the  way — not  if  we  break 
through  to  a  new  and  deeper  form  of  political 
consultation. 

To  be  specific,  the  forthcoming  arms  talks 
will  be  a  test  of  the  ability  of  the  Western  na- 
tions to  shape  a  common  strategy. 

The  United  States  fully  intends  to  undertake 
deep  and  genuine  consultation  with  its  allies, 
both  before  and  during  any  negotiations  di- 
rectly affecting  their  interests.  That  is  a  pledge 
I  shall  honor — and  I  expect  to  consult  at  length 
on  the  implications  of  anything  that  might  af- 
fect the  pattern  of  East-West  relations. 

In  passing  that  test  together,  this  alliance 
will  give  new  meaning  to  the  principle  of 
mutual  consultation. 

To  seize  the  moment  that  this  opportunity 


presents,  we  would  do  well  to  create  new  ma- 
chinery for  Western  political  consultation,  as 
well  as  to  make  greater  use  of  the  machinery 
that  we  have. 

First,  I  suggest  that  deputy  foreign  ministers 
meet  periodically  for  a  high-level  review  of 
major,  long-range  problems  before  the  alliance. 

Second,  I  suggest  creation  of  a  special  politi- 
cal planning  group,  not  to  duplicate  the  work 
now  being  done  by  the  Council  or  by  the  senior 
political  advisers  but  to  address  itself  specifi- 
cally and  continually  to  the  longer  range  prob- 
lems we  face. 

This  would  by  no  means  preclude  efforts  to 
develop  a  fuller  European  cooperation.  On  the 
contrary,  we  in  the  United  States  Avould  wel- 
come that  cooperation.  What  ties  us  to  Europe 
is  not  weakness  or  division  among  our  partners 
but  community  of  interest  with  them. 

Third,  I  strongly  urge  that  we  create  a  com- 
mittee on  the  challenges  of  modern  society,  re- 
sponsible to  the  deputy  ministers,  to  explore 
ways  in  which  the  experience  and  resources  of 
the  Western  nations  could  most  effectively  be 
marshaled  toward  improving  the  quality  of  life 
of  our  peoples. 

That  new  goal  is  provided  for  in  article  II 
of  our  treaty,  but  it  has  never  been  the  center 
of  our  concerns.  Let  me  put  my  proposal  in 
concrete  terms  and  in  personal  terms.  On  my 
recent  trip  to  Europe  I  met  with  world  leaders 
and  private  citizens  alike.  I  was  struck  by  the 
fact  that  our  discussions  were  not  limited  to 
military  or  political  matters.  More  often  than 
not  our  talks  turned  to  those  matters  deeply 
relevant  to  our  societies:  the  legitimate  unrest 
of  young  people,  the  frustration  of  the  gap  be- 
tween generations,  the  need  for  a  new  sense  of 
idealism  and  purpose  in  coping  with  an 
automating  world. 

These  were  not  subjects  apart  from  the 
concerns  of  NATO;  indeed,  they  went  to  the 
very  heart  of  the  real  world  we  live  in.  We  are 
not  allies  because  we  are  bound  by  treaty;  we 
bind  ourselves  by  treaty  because  we  are  allied 
in  meeting  common  purposes  and  common 
concerns. 

For  20  years  our  nations  have  provided  for 
the  military  defense  of  Western  Europe.  For  20 
years  we  have  held  political  consultations. 

Now  the  alliance  of  the  West  needs  a  third 
dimension. 

It  needs  not  only  a  strong  military  dimension 
to  provide  for  the  common  defense  and  not  only 
a  more  profound  political  dimension  to  shape 


APRIL    28,    1969 


353 


a  strategy  of  i^eace,  but  it  also  needs  a  social 
dimension  to  deal  with  our  concern  for  the  qual- 
ity of  life  in  this  last  third  of  the  20th  century. 

This  concern  is  manifested  in  many  ways — 
culturally  and  technologically,  through  the 
humanities  and  the  sciences. 

The  Western  nations  share  common  ideals 
and  a  common  heritage.  We  are  all  advanced 
societies,  sharing  the  benefits  and  the  gathering 
torments  of  a  rapidly  advancmg  industrial 
technology.  The  industrial  nations  share  no 
challenge  more  urgent  than  that  of  bringing 
20th  century  man  and  his  environment  to  terms 
with  one  another — of  making  the  world  fit  for 
man  and  helping  man  to  learn  how  to  remain 
in  harmony  with  the  rapidly  changing  world. 

We  in  the  United  States  have  much  to  learn 
from  the  experiences  of  our  Atlantic  allies  in 
their  handling  of  internal  matters :  for  example, 
the  care  of  infant  children  in  West  Germany, 
the  "new  towns"  policy  of  Great  Britain,  the 
development  of  depressed  areas  programs  in 
Italy,  the  great  skill  of  the  Dutch  in  dealing 
with  high-density  areas,  the  effectiveness  of 
urban  planning  by  local  governments  in  Nor- 
way, the  experience  of  the  French  in  metro- 
politan plannmg. 

Having  forged  a  working  partnership,  we  all 
have  a  iinique  opportunity  to  pool  our  skills,  our 
intellects,  and  our  inventiveness  in  finding  new 
ways  to  use  technology  to  enhance  our  environ- 
ments, and  not  to  destroy  them. 

The  work  of  this  committee  would  not  be 
competitive  with  any  now  being  carried  on  by 
other  international  agencies.  Neither  would  it 
be  our  purpose  to  limit  this  cooperation  and 
the  benefits  that  flow  from  it  to  our  own  coun- 
tries. Quite  the  opposite— our  purpose  would 
be  to  share  both  ideas  and  benefits,  recognizing 
that  these  problems  have  no  national  or  regional 
boundaries.  This  could  become  the  most  positive 
dimension  of  the  alliance,  opening  creative  new 
channels  to  all  the  rest  of  the  world. 

When  I  visited  the  North  Atlantic  Council 
in  Brussels  I  posed  the  question:  "In  today's 
world  what  kind  of  an  alliance  shall  we  strive 
to  build?" 

Today  I  have  sketched  out  some  of  the  ap- 
proaches that  I  believe  the  alliance  should  take. 

I  believe  we  must  build  an  alliance  strong 
enough  to  deter  those  who  might  threaten  war, 
close  enough  to  provide  for  continuous  and  far- 
reaching  consultation,  trusting  enough  to  accept 


the  diversity  of  views,  realistic  enough  to  deal 
with  the  world  as  it  is,  and  flexible  enough  to 
explore  new  channels  of  constructive  co- 
operation. 

Ten  years  ago,  addressing  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  in  this  same  room,  President  Eisen- 
hower spoke  of  the  need  for  unity.  Listen  to  his 
words.  There  is  not  much  strength  in  the  finger 
of  one  hand,  he  said,  but  when  five  fingers  are 
balled  into  a  fist,  you  have  a  considerable 
instrument  of  defense. 

We  need  such  an  instrument  of  defense,  and 
the  United  States  will  bear  its  fair  share  in 
keeping  NATO  strong. 

All  of  us  are  also  ready,  as  conditions  change, 
to  turn  that  fist  into  a  hand  of  friendship. 

NATO  means  more  than  arms,  troop  levels, 
consultative  bodies,  and  treaty  commitments. 
All  of  these  are  necessary.  But  what  makes  them 
relevant  to  the  future  is  what  the  alliance  stands 
for.  To  discover  what  this  Western  alliance 
means  today,  we  have  to  reach  back  not  across 
two  decades  but  through  the  centuries  to  the 
very  roots  of  the  Western  experience. 

When  we  do,  we  find  that  we  touch  a  set  of 
elemental  ideals,  eloquent  in  their  simplicity, 
majestic  in  their  humanity;  ideals  of  decency 
and  justice  and  liberty  and  respect  for  the 
rights  of  our  fellow  men.  Simple,  yes;  and  to 
us  they  seem  obvious.  But  our  forebears 
struggled  for  centuries  to  win  them,  and  in  our 
own  lifetimes  we  have  had  to  fight  to  defend 
them. 

These  ideals  are  what  NATO  was  created  to 
protect.  It  is  to  these  ideals,  on  this  proud  an- 
niversary, that  we  are  privileged  to  consecrate 
the  alliance  anew.  These  ideals — and  the  firm- 
ness of  our  dedication  to  them — give  NATO's 
concept  its  nobility,  and  NATO's  backbone  its 
steel. 


TEXT  OF  FINAL  COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  SI  dated  April  11 

1.  The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in  Ministerial 
Session  in  Washington  on  10th  and  11th  April,  1969. 
The  Council  commemorated  the  twentieth  anniversary 
of  the  Treaty  creating  the  Alliance  and  was  addressed 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States.  Ministers  ex- 
pressed their  deep  satisfaction  at  the  decisive  con- 
tribution the  Alliance  had  made  to  the  maintenance  of 
peace  in  Europe  and  to  the  security  of  all  its  members. 

2.  The  Alliance  was  established  to  safeguard  the 
freedom,  common  heritage  and  civilisation  of  its  peo- 


354 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BtTLLETIN 


pies,  founded  on  the  principles  of  democracy,  individual 
liberty  and  the  rule  of  law,  and  in  response  to  a 
common  fear  that  without  an  effective  security  system, 
another  war  might  erupt  in  a  divided  Europe.  The 
Alliance  continues  as  the  expression  of  common  pur- 
poses and  aspirations. 

3.  In  1967  the  Report  on  the  Future  Tasks  of  the 
Alliance  emphasised  the  dual  task  of  the  latter :  the 
defence  of  the  West  and  the  search  for  a  stable  peace 
with  the  East.  In  June  1968  Allied  Jlinisters  declared 
their  readiness  to  seek,  with  the  other  States  con- 
cerned, specific  practical  measures  for  disarmament 
and  arms  control,  including  possible  measures  for 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions."  Notwithstand- 
ing the  serious  setback  to  hopes  for  improvement  in 
East-West  relations  as  a  result  of  Soviet  intervention 
in  Czechoslovakia,  Ministers  in  November  196S  stated 
that  secure,  peaceful  and  mutually  beneficial  relations 
between  East  and  West  remained  the  political  goal 
of  the  Allies.'  They  reaffirmed  at  this  Session  that  the 
intention  of  their  Governments  was  to  continue  the 
search  for  real  progress  towards  this  objective  by  con- 
tacts and  to  explore  all  appropriate  openings  for  nego- 
tiations. 

4.  Bearing  especially  in  mind  the  situation  in  East- 
em  Europe,  member  governments  recall  that  any 
lasting  improvement  in  international  relations  pre- 
supposes full  respect  for  the  principles  of  the  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity  of  States,  non- 
interference in  their  domestic  affairs,  the  right  of  each 
people  to  shape  its  own  future,  and  the  obligation  to 
refrain  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force. 

5.  Ministers  recalled  that  one  of  the  essential  aims 
of  the  Alliance  is  the  establishment  of  a  just  and  last- 
ing peace  in  Europe,  based  on  stability,  security  and 
mutual  confidence.  The  Allies  propose,  while  remain- 
ing in  close  consultation,  to  explore  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  other  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
which  concrete  issues  best  lend  themselves  to  fruitful 
negotiation  and  an  early  resolution.  Consequently,  they 
instructed  the  Council  to  draft  a  list  of  these  issues 
and  to  study  how  a  useful  process  of  negotiation  could 
best  be  initiated,  in  due  course,  and  to  draw  up  a 
report  for  the  next  meeting  of  Ministers.  It  is  clear 
that  any  negotiations  must  be  well  prepared  in  ad- 
vance, and  that  all  governments  whose  participation 
would  be  necessary  to  achieve  a  political  settlement 
in  Europe  should  take  part. 

6.  The  Allies  will  also  pursue  their  efforts  and 
studies  in  the  field  of  disarmament  and  practical  arms 
control,  including  balanced  force  reductions  and  the  ini- 
tiatives already  undertaken  for  the  renunciation  of 
the  use  of  force. 

7.  The  political  solidarity  of  the  Alliance  constitutes 
an  essential  element  while  approaching  a  preriod  of  ex- 
panding East- West  contacts  and  possible  negotiations. 
This  solidarity  can  best  be  maintained  by  strict  ad- 
herence to   the  principle  of  full  consultation  in  the 


'  For  text  of  a  final  communique  and  attachment 
Issued  at  Reykjavik  on  June  25,  1968,  see  Bitlletin 
of  July  15, 1968,  p.  75. 

•  For  text  of  a  final  communique  issued  at  Brussels 
on  Nov.  16,  1968,  see  Bulletin  of  Dee.  9,  1968,  p.  595. 


Council  both  before  and  during  any  negotiations  that 
might  affect  the  interests  of  the  AUiance  or  any  of  its 
members.  On  this  understanding,  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments welcome  the  intention  of  the  United  States  to 
engage  the  USSR  in  discussion  of  limitations  on  of- 
fensive and  defensive  strategic  arms. 

8.  The  Allies  participating  in  the  NATO  integrated 
defence  programme  agreed  that  it  was  extremely  im- 
portant that  during  an  era  of  negotiation  the  defence 
posture  of  the  Alliance  should  not  be  relaxed  and  that 
premature  expectations  of  solutions  to  outstanding 
questions  should  not  be  generated.  The  maintenance  of 
effective  defence  is  a  stabilising  factor  and  a  necessary 
condition  for  effective  detente  policies. 

9.  Accordingly  these  members  of  the  Alliance  re- 
affirmed their  continuing  determination  to  make 
appropriate  contributions  to  joint  efforts  for  defence 
and  deterrence  at  all  levels  both  nuclear  and  conven- 
tional. They  accepted  the  continuing  need  for  the  cur- 
rent NATO  strategy  based  on  a  forward  defence  and 
appropriate  response  to  any  aggression,  and  for  a 
credible  conventional  and  nuclear  deterrent  including 
adequate  overall  and  local  force  levels.  The  necessary 
military  posture  of  the  Alliance  consists  of  the  stra- 
tegic nuclear  deterrent  forces,  the  presence  of  sufficient 
substantial  and  effective  North  American  and  European 
conventional  forces  as  well  as  supporting  tactical 
nuclear  forces  in  the  European  area  and  adequate 
ready  reinforcements. 

10.  Defence  Ministers  will  meet  on  28th  May,  1969 
and  will  examine  the  more  specific  elements  in  the 
defence  posture  necessary  to  fulfil  the  above  require- 
ments. They  will  also  examine  the  possibility  of 
improving  the  efficiency  of  the  defence  effort  by  in- 
tensifying mutual  and  co-operative  approaches  to,  for 
example,  the  problems  of  arms  production  and  arms 
standardisation  either  among  all  Allied  nations  or 
between  some  of  them. 

11.  Reviewing  the  situation  in  Berlin,  the  Ministers 
noted  that  obstacles  have  recently  been  placed  on  free- 
dom of  access  to  Berlin.  Such  obstructions  cannot  be 
accepted.  The  Ministers  supported  the  determination 
of  the  Three  Powers  to  maintain  free  access  to  the 
city,  and  recalled  the  declaration  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  of  16th  December,  1958,*  and  the  responsibili- 
ties which  each  member  State  assumed  with  regard 
to  the  security  and  welfare  of  Berlin. 

12.  The  Ministers  consider  that  the  achievement  of  a 
peaceful  European  settlement  presupposes,  among 
other  things,  progress  towards  eliminating  existing 
sources  of  tension  in  the  centre  of  Europe.  They  con- 
sider that  concrete  measures  aimed  at  improving  the 
situation  in  Berlin,  safeguarding  free  access  to  the 
city,  and  removing  restrictions  which  affect  traffic  and 
communications  between  the  two  parts  of  Germany 
would  be  a  substantial  contribution  toward  this  objec- 
tive. They  expressed  their  support  for  continued  efforts 
by  the  Three  Powers  to  explore,  in  the  framework  of 
their  special  responsibilities  for  Berlin  and  Germany 
as  a  whole,  possibilities  for  ordered  and  negotiated 
progress  in  these  important  questions. 

13.  A  peaceful  solution  must  be  found  for  the  Ger- 


*For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  5,  1959,  p.  4. 


APRIL    28,    19G9 


355 


man  question  based  on  the  free  decision  of  the  German 
people  and  on  the  interests  of  European  security. 

14.  The  members  of  the  Alliance  are  conscious  that 
they  share  common  environmental  problems  which,  un- 
less squarely  faced,  could  imperil  the  welfare  and  prog- 
ress of  their  societies.  The  Ministers  recognise  that 
important  work  on  these  problems  is  already  being 
carried  out  within  other  international  organizations. 
The  Ministers  instructed  the  Council  in  Permanent 
Session  to  examine  how  to  improve,  in  every  practical 
way,  the  exchange  of  views  and  experience  among  the 
Allied  countries,  whether  by  action  in  the  appropriate 
international  organizations  or  otherwise,  in  the  task 
of  creating  a  better  environment  for  their  societies. 

15.  While  concerned  with  these  problems.  Ministers 
are  also  mindful  that  the  Allied  countries  are  entering 
an  era  in  which  scientific,  technical  and  economic  re- 
sources should  contribute  to  the  peaceful  progress 
and  development  of  all  nations. 

16.  Apart  from  regular  meetings  at  Ministerial 
level.  Ministers  agreed  that  the  Council  in  Permanent 
Session  should  consider  the  proposal  that  high  officials 
of  their  Foreign  Ministries  meet  periodically  for  a 
review  of  major,  long-range  problems  before  the 
Alliance. 

17.  The  next  Ministerial  Session  of  the  North  At- 
lantic Council  will  be  held  in  Brussels  in  December 
1969. 


U.S.  DELEGATION 

Press  release  75  dated  April  9 

REPnESENTATIVES 

William  P.  Rogers,  Secretary  of  State  (chairman) 
Melvin  R.  Laird,  Secretary  of  Defense 

U.S.  Repeesentative  on  the  Noeth  Atlantic  Counoil 
Harlan  Cleveland 

MEMBEBS  of  the  DEI.EQATI0N 

Department  of  State 

William  O.  Boswell,  Director,  Office  of  International 

Conferences  (setyretary  o/  delegation) 
William  I.  Cargo,  Deputy  U.S.  Representative  on  the 

North  Atlantic  Council 
Martin  J.  Hillenbrand,  Assistant  Secretary  for  Buro- 

I)ean  Affairs 


Ralph  J.  McGuire,  Director,  Office  of  NATO  and  At- 
lantic Political-MUitary  Affairs 

Richard  F.  Pedersen,  Counselor  of  the  Department 

Richard  I.  Phillips,  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Public  Affairs 

George  S.  Springsteen,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  Affairs 

Edward  J.  Streator,  Jr.,  Deputy  Director,  Office  of 
NATO  and  Atlantic  Political-MUitary  Affairs 

Thomas  W.  Wilson,  Jr.,  Minister  for  Political  Affairs, 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization 

Department  of  Defense 

Daniel  Z.  Henkin,  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Public  Affairs 

Warren  C.  Nutter,  Assistant  Secretary  for  Interna- 
tional Security  Affairs 

Timothy  W.  Stanley,  Defense  Adviser,  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

Gen.  Earle  G.  Wheeler,  USA,  Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff 

Frederick  S.  Wyle,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
International  Security  Affairs 


U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  To  Hold  Technical  Talks 
on  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 

U.S.  AnnounceTnent^ 

Agreement  has  been  reached  between  the 
Governments  of  the  U.S.S.E.  and  the  United 
States  to  hold  technical  talks  in  Vienna,  begin- 
ning April  14,  concerning  peaceful  uses  of  nu- 
clear explosions. 

The  Soviet  delegation  will  be  headed  by 
Academician  Yevgeny  K.  Fedorov;  the  U.S. 
delegation  wUl  be  headed  by  AEC  [Atomic 
Energy  Conmaission]  Commissioner  Gerald  F. 
Tape. 


^  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Robert  J.  McCloskey  on  Apr.  10. 


356 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BTJLLETIIf 


Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7 


Press  release  74  dated  April  7 

OPENING  STATEMENT 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  want  to  start  by 
apologizing  for  being  so  slow  in  having  a  press 
conference.  From  now  on  I  intend  to  have  a 
press  conference  on  a  fairly  regular  basis, 
every  two  or  three  weeks  or  four. 

I  have  a  few  announcements  to  make,  and 
then  I  will  answer  questions. 

First,  as  you  know,  the  King  of  Jordan  will 
be  visiting  here  this  week — tomorrow  and  Wed- 
nesday. The  King  has  been  a  close  friend  of  the 
United  States  for  many  years  and  has  played  a 
major  and  constructive  role  in  the  search  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  The  King's  visit  is 
most  timely,  coming  as  it  does  when  discussions 
on  the  IVIiddle  East  by  the  four  powers  have 
started.  We  will  be  especially  pleased  to  have 
the  direct  benefit  of  the  King's  personal  views 
on  the  situation. 

Also,  as  you  know,  this  week  in  Wasliington 
there  will  be  a  conference  of  historical  signifi- 
cance: the  NATO  ministerial  meeting.  It  was 
just  20  years  ago  today  that  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  was  signed.  On  Thursday  of  this  week 
the  ministers  will  gather  in  the  same  place, 
the  Departmental  Auditorium,  to  mark  the 
anniversary.  As  you  know,  President  Nixon 
will  address  this  meeting.  Among  those  present 
we  expect  there  will  be  a  number  of  those  who 
signed  the  treaty  in  1949. 

Because  it  is  the  20th  anniversary  and  espe- 
cially because  of  recent  events  in  Czechoslo- 
vakia, we  believe  that  this  NATO  meeting  will 
be  of  more  than  usual  significance. 

Next  month  I  will  head  the  American  dele- 
gations to  several  important  international  con- 
ferences. Toward  the  end  of  May,  I  will  be  in 
Bangkok  for  the  14th  SEATO  ministerial 
meeting.  Thereafter  in  Bangkok,  the  foreign 
ministers  of  the  Viet-Nam  troop-contributing 
countries  will  meet  to  review  the  situation  in 
Viet-Nam.  I  also  intend  during  that  trip  to  pay 


my  first  visit  to  Viet-Nam.  I  expect  to  spend  3 
or  4  days  in  the  country. 

I  will  return  through  Tehran  for  this  year's 
ministerial  meeting  of  CENTO.  The  dates  for 
that  meeting  are  presently  being  scheduled  and 
will  be  announced  soon.  Here  again,  I  look  for- 
ward to  meeting  with  the  other  foreign  min- 
isters for  discussions  on  important  problems  of 
mutual  interest. 

Finally,  I  have  a  statement  on  Peru. 

Ambassador  Irwin  has  returned  to  Lima  after 
3  days  of  consultation  in  the  Department.  While 
he  was  here  he  gave  a  full  report  on  his  meet- 
ings with  President  Velasco  and  members  of  his 
Cabinet.  As  you  know,  he  also  stopped  at  Key 
Biscayne  to  consult  with  President  Nixon. 

Ambassador  Irwin  reported  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Peru  had  advised  him  that  under  Peru- 
vian regulations  IPC  [International  Petroleum 
Company]  has  an  opportunity,  through  an  ad- 
ministrative process,  to  contest  the  existence  and 
amount  of  the  debt  asserted  by  the  Peruvian 
Government  to  be  owed  by  the  company.  After 
discussions  with  attorneys  for  IPC,  the  com- 
pany has  informed  us  that  it  plans  shortly  to 
present  a  document  to  the  Minister  of  Energy 
and  Mines  within  the  framework  of  this 
Peruvian  administrative  process. 

We  have  determined,  therefore,  that  such  a 
process,  together  with  the  current  negotiations, 
constitutes  appropriate  steps  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  Hickenlooper  amendment  to  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  and  of  the  amended 
Sugar  Act.  Therefore,  it  has  been  decided — and 
Ambassador  Irwin  has  so  informed  the  Peru- 
vian Government  this  morning — ^that  sanctions 
foreseen  in  the  amendments  will  be  deferred 
pending  the  outcome  of  this  process. 

In  these  circumstances,  we  believe  that  our 
determination  offers  the  best  hope  that  the  dis- 
pute between  IPC  and  the  Government  of  Peru 
can  be  resolved  without  injury  to  the  tradition 
of  close  and  friendly  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Peru. 


APRIL    28,    I960 


367 


QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  the  last  few  weeJcs  we 
have  all  heard  quite  a  lot  of  talk  about  secret 
contact  with  the  Cormmu/nists  in  Paris  and  about 
progress  in  those  contacts.  Can  you  tell  us  what 
is  the — what  is  your  assessment  of  the  talks  and 
any  progress  P 

A.  Mr.  Hightower  [Jolin  M.  Hightower,  As- 
sociated Press],  I  attempted  to  make  it  clear 
when  I  testified  before  the  Senate  Foreign  Ke- 
lations  Committee  that  the  prospect  for  prog- 
ress in  the  peace  negotiations  turns  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  on  private  negotiations,  and  I 
explained  that  the  other  side — properly  so,  I 
believe— feels  that  the  question  of  whether  pri- 
vate talks  are  being  held  or  not  and  whether 
progress  is  being  made  or  not  should  not  be  dis- 
cussed.^ In  other  words,  if  either  side  uses  the 
fact  of  talks  or  what  is  happening  in  the  talks  as 
a  negotiating  position  or  in  order  to  get  some 
benefit  for  its  negotiating  stance,  then  it  would 
be  very  harmful  to  the  prospect  of  progress  in 
the  talks.  So,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned — and  I 
think  this  is  the  attitude  of  the  Govenunent; 
it  certainly  is  the  President's  attitude — we  are 
not  going  to  talk  about  private  talks  at  all.  We 
are  not  going  to  discuss  whether  they  have  oc- 
curred, are  being  held,  or  will  be  held,  nor 
will  we  make  any  reference  to  progress  or  lack 
of  progress ;  and  I  hope  that  you  and  the  Ameri- 
can people  will  understand  the  necessity  for 
trying  to  conduct  whatever  discussions  we  have 
of  this  character  outside  of  the  glare  of 
publicity. 

Q.  Would  you  care  to  comment  on  another 
aspect  of  the  Viet-Nam  situation,  ivhich  is  the 
action  announced  hy  President  Thieu  in  his 
message  concerning  the  establishment  of  polit- 
ical parties,  his  own  and  an  opposition,  and 
various  things  that  he  talked  about  with  regard 
to  admission  of  former  Viet  Cong  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, if  they  laid  down  their  arms  and  were 
peaceful.  Have  you  any  comments  on  that? 

A.  Yes,  I  have.  I  think  the  statement  by  Pres- 
ident Thieu  and  his  attitude  has  been — is  most 
constructive,  and  I  think  that  his  willingness  to 
be  outspoken  about  his  intentions  in  very  major 
ways  is  most  helpful. 

Now,  obviously,  if  there  are  discussions  about 


'  For  text  of  Secretary  Rogers'  statement  of  Mar.  27, 
see  BxjiXETiN  of  Apr.  14, 1969,  p.  305. 


the  political  aspects  of  a  peace  settlement,  they 
will  have  to  be  negotiated.  There  are  lots  of 
points  that  will  have  to  be  negotiated.  But  the 
fact  that  he  has  expressed  a  willingness  to  have 
direct  negotiations  with  the  NLF  [National 
Liberation  Front],  the  fact  that  he  has  stated 
that  everyone  in  South  Viet-Nam  will  have  a 
right  to  vote  as  long  as  he  disavows  any  vio- 
lence, intentions  of  violence,  and  that  he  is  look- 
ing for  political  stability  in  the  future  of  South 
Viet-Nam- — all  of  those  things,  I  think,  are  very 
helpful  and  constructive. 

U.S.  Position  on  Mutual  Troop  Withdrawals 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  Paris  the  Gomnvanists 
have  been  saying  the  question  is  not  whether  we 
have  private  talks  or  plenary  sessions.  The  ques- 
tion is  a  matter  of  substance,  and  they  say  the 
key  matter  of  substance  is  that  the  U.S.  must 
withdraio  its  troops  unconditionally.  What  is 
the  position  of  this  administration  on  the  with- 
drawal of  American  troops  from,  South  Viet- 
Nam? 

A.  Well,  as  I  understand  their  position — that 
we  withdraw  our  troops  unconditionally — that 
just  means  they  don't  want  to  negotiate.  They 
just  want  us  to  leave.  Our  position  is  quit«  clear. 
We  are  willing  to  withdraw  our  troops  on  a  re- 
ciprocal basis,  and  we  are  willing  to  discuss 
what  the  reciprocal  basis  would  be,  the  number 
of  troops  withdrawn,  the  scheduling  of  such 
withdrawals,  and  we  also  are  willing  to  have 
at  the  same  time  or  in  the  same  meeting  political 
discussions  between  the  South  Vietnamese  and 
the  NLF. 

Q.  Does  that  mean,  then.,  that  the  Manila 
formula  of  the  Johnson  administration  has  now 
been  altered?  As  you  describe  it,  it  is  quite  con-  *■ 
siderably  different.  ^ 

A.  Well,  I  don't  want  to  discuss  the  Manila 
formula  in  any  detail  in  this  conference,  because 
there  is  some  ambiguity  about  the  Manila 
communique.  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  stand  on 
the  position  of  our  Government.  I  think  that 
the  Manila  formula  may  have  talked  about,  in 
some  respects,  a  unilateral  withdrawal,  first  by 
the  North  and  then  a  withdrawal  at  the  comple- 
tion of  that  effort  by  the  South ;  but  in  any  event, 
I  don't  want  to  get  involved  in  the  Manila  for- 
mula. We  have  our  own  program.  We  are  will- 
ing to  discuss  the  matter  with  the  North 
Vietnamese,  and  the  Government  of  South  Viet- 


358 


DEP.\KTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Nam  is  willing  to  discuss  the  political  aspects 
with  the  NLF.  And  we  are  quite  flexible  about 
how  we  do  it,  but  we  want  to  make  sui'e  that  at 
the  end  of  the  road  the  people  in  the  South  have 
a  right  to  determine  their  own  futux'e  by  the 
elective  process. 

Policy  on  U.S.  Overseas  Bases 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  some  mernbers  of  the  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Cormnittee  are  question- 
ing what  they  term  automaticity  of  renewing 
the  U.S.  overseas  military  hoses.  They  are  par- 
ticularly disturbed  hy  the  Spanish  ones.  Could 
you  give  us,  Mr.  Secretary,  your  conception  of 
the  foreign  policy  implications  of  reneioing  the 
Spanish  hases  and  generally  this  administra- 
tion's policy  on  overseas  hases? 

A.  Yes.  On  the  first  question  the  administra- 
tion is  reviewing  all  our  commitments  and  our 
troops  overseas,  and  at  each  time  one  of  these 
matters  comes  up  for  renewal,  we  will  consider 
it.  So  that  we  recognize  that  situations  change; 
and  the  fact  that  10  or  15  years  ago  certain 
things  were  necessary  does  not  mean  that  they 
are  necessary  today. 

As  far  as  the  Spanish  bases  are  concerned, 
the  negotiations  were  fairly  far  along  when  we 
were  sworn  in.  And  as  you  know,  the  Spanish 
Government  was  asking  at  the  time  we  started 
the  negotiations  for  $700  million.  Now,  we  do 
think  the  bases  in  Spain  are  important.  We 
think  it  is  important  to  maintain  friendly  rela- 
tions with  Spain.  We  think  that  to  change  the 
situation  as  it  now  exists  and  as  it  has  existed 
for  a  long  time  would  be  more  expensive  than 
the  proposal  that  we  have  in  mind. 

So  we  are  proceeding  with  the  negotiations, 
and  we  will  have  further  negotiations  sometime 
m  the  middle  of  the  month. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  has  the  United  States  ex- 
pressed its  concern  to  the  Soviet  Union  over 
its  recent  clainpdowv.  in  Czechoslovakia,  and 
have  we  in  any  way  warned  the  Soviet  Union 
that  their  actions  there  might  endanger  the  start 
of  strategic  arms  talks? 

A.  Well,  the  answer  to  your  first  question  is : 
I  don't  want  to  say  we  have  warned  them.  We 
have  expressed  our  concern  about  events  in 
Czechoslovakia.  It  makes  the  relations  between 
the  East  and  A ,  ost  very  difficult  when  they  have 
60,000  or  70,000  troops  in  Czechoslovakia  and 
tanks  in  Czechoslovakia ;  and  the  whole  Brezh- 
nev doctrine  is  a  very  disconcerting  and  un- 


pleasant prospect  for  improving  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  and  the  Soviet  Union 
knows  that. 

Now,  in  answer  to  your  second  question,  we 
do  not  think  that  that  should,  at  the  moment, 
interfere  with  our  attempts  to  improve  our 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  detect  what 
appears  to  be  an  interest  on  their  part  in  im- 
proving our  relations,  and  we  are  going  to  do 
everything  we  can  to  j)ursue  that  to  see  whether 
they  are  serious  about  it  or  not. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  President  has  spoken 
about  a  peace  plan  for  ending  the  war  in  Viet- 
Nam,  and  in  recent  days  we  have  heard  a  lot  of 
talk  about  this  plan  and  read  stories  about  it, 
and  it  would  he  helpful  to  many  of  us  if  you 
could  give  us  at  least  the  outline  of  this  plan. 

A.  Well,  of  course,  you  know  in  merely  ask- 
ing that  question  that  I  am  not  going  to  set 
forth  what  our  strategy  is.  We  do  have  a  plan 
which  we  think  is  a  fair  and  reasonable  one  for 
ending  this  conflict.  It  isn't  any  magic  formula, 
obviously.  It  is  carefully  thought  through.  We 
are  going  to  proceed  to  apply  it,  and  the  Presi- 
dent is  spending  a  great  deal  of  time  and 
thought  and  effort  in  bringing  this  war  to  a 
peaceful  conclusion.  And  I  have  every  hope  that 
it  will  eventually  result  in  a  successful  peace. 

Wlien  that  occurs  is  another  matter.  I  don't 
want  to  make  any  statements  about  things  that 
look  encouraging  or  things  that  look  dis- 
couraging, but  we  are  going  to  proceed  in  every 
possible  way  to  achieve  a  peace. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  home  any  realistic 
hope  that  troop  ^oithdrawals  can  begin  from 
Viet-Nam  either  as  a  result  of  some  agreement 
with  the  North  Vietnamese  this  year  or  perhaps 
u/nilaterally? 

A.  Well,  I  would  certainly  hope  that  there 
would  be  some  chance  of  mutual  withdrawal  of 
troops  this  year.  And  as  I  said  in  my  testimony, 
we  are  prepared  to  do  that  at  once  if  the  other 
side  is.  You  can't  have  mutual  withdrawal  of 
troops  unless  there  is  some  mutuality.  As  far  as 
the  unilateral  withdrawal  of  the  troops  is  con- 
cerned, I  don't  want  to  say  anything  about  that 
beyond  what  the  President  has  said.  We  are 
considering  all  possibilities.  We  don't  anticipate 
any  immediate  withdrawal  of  troops. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  sir,  I  wonder  if  you  have 
any  areas  in  the  State  Department  that  you 
think  should  he  reorganized? 


APRIL    28,    1969 


359 


A.  There  are  things  that  I  think  should  be — 
there  are  areas  that  should  be  reorganized.  We 
are  working  on  certain  reorganizations.  I  think 
the  State  Department,  generally  speaking,  is  in 
excellent  condition. 

I  am  tremendously  impressed  by  the  qualifi- 
cations and  the  dedication  of  the  people  in  the 
State  Department,  so  that  nothing  I  say  in  this 
regard  is  intended  to  reflect  on  them  or  their 
ability  or  their  dedication.  I  think  there  are 
areas  where  we  could  make  some  improvements, 
and  we  are  working  on  those  areas.  We  won't 
necessarily  do  it  at  once,  but  over  the  next  4  or 
5  or  6  months  there  will  be  some  changes  made. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  your  emphasis  today  on 
reciprocal  troop  withdrawal,  rmituul  with- 
drawal^ runs  into  conflict  with  this  rash  of  sto- 
ries over  the  last  few  days  that  the  administra- 
tion is  planning  a  imilateral  withdrawal  of 
perhaps  50,000  to  100,000  men.  The  stories  all 
seem  to  say  essentially  the  same  thing,  indi- 
cating there  may  have  heen  a  hachground  con- 
ference. I  wonder  whether  you  can  give  vs  any 
hind  of  feel  for  this,  whether  they  are  on  the 
right  track  or  not. 

A.  I  don't  really  want  to  say  anything  more 
than  I  have  just  said  on  that  subject. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us  your  views 
on  the  Okinawa  issue  in  light  of  the  talks  you 
had  with  the  Japanese  former  Prime  Minister 
last  week? 

A.  Well,  we  consider  the  Okinawa  question  a 
very  serious  question.  We  recognize  that  it  is  a 
difficult  problem  for  the  Japanese  Government. 
We  recognize  that  changes  have  to  be  made  with 
the  passage  of  time.  We  are  looking  forward  to 
our  discussions  with  officials  of  the  Japanese 
Government,  including  their  Foreign  Minister ; 
and  as  you  know.  Prime  Minister  Sato  is  going 
to  visit  the  United  States  in  the  fall,  and 
we  hope  that  we  can  work  something  out  on 
Okinawa  that  will  be  mutually  satisfactory. 

The  Military-Industrial  Complex 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  General  Eisenhower''s 
death  has  revived  the  expression  '■'■tnilitary- 
industrial  complex^''  and  General  Shoup  [Gen. 
David  M.  Shoup,  form,er  Commandant  of  the 
U.S.  Marine  Corps]  has  a  piece  out  now  that 
more  or  less  says  that  we  are  at  war  because  this 
complex  wants  us  to  he.  In  your  experience  so 
far  in  the  State  Department,  do  you  put  any 
credence  in  that  at  all? 


A.  The  question  was  about  the  military- 
industrial  complex  and  whether  I  have  any 
comments  about  it. 

I  read  General  Shoup's  article,  and  I  think  it 
is  a  matter  that  all  Government  officials  have  to 
keep  in  mind  constantly.  I  haven't  personally 
encountered  any  problems  in  connection  with  it. 

Mr.  Laird  [Secretary  of  Defense  Melvin  R. 
Laird]  and  I  have  gotten  along  very  well.  I 
don't  notice  any  inflexibility  on  his  part  at  all. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  President  Eisenhower 
said  in  his  farewell  message  ^  and  as  this  article 
suggests,  it  is  always  a  danger.  One  of  the  great 
strengths  of  our  Government  is  civilian  control, 
and  I  think  that  I  and  all  of  us,  the  President 
certainly,  have  to  keep  in  mind  that  this  is  a 
risk.  We  have  to  be  sure  that  the  strength  of 
our  Military  Establishment  and  the  natural 
tendency  of  industry  to  want  to  succeed,  and  so 
forth — those  things  do  not  really  play  an  influ- 
ential part  in  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  affairs. 
But  as  far  as  the  State  Department  is  con- 
cerned, since  I  have  been  here,  I  haven't  noticed 
it  and  I  haven't  had  any  difficulty  with  it.  But 
I  am  going  to  be  quite  alert  to  it. 

Four-Power  Talks  on  the  Middle  East 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  two  top  leaders  of  the 
Israeli  Government  again  yesterday  attacked 
the  lohole  concept  of  the  four-power  talks  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  new  Prime  Minister  has  done 
the  same  thing.  Exactly  how  far  do  you  think 
this  four-power  approach  can  go  in  view  of 
Israeli  total  opposition  to  the  whole  approach? 

A.  Well,  I  regret  the  fact  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Israel  is  so  strongly  opposed  to  the  idea 
of  the  four-power  talks.  We  have  made  it  per- 
fectly clear  to  the  Government  that  we  are  not 
— we  do  not  intend  and  will  not  seek  to  impose 
a  settlement  on  Israel.  On  the  other  hand,  we  do 
think  it  is  vitally  important,  particularly  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  so  little  progress  has  been 
made  by  the  Jarring  mission,  that  major  coun- 
tries concerned  in  the  area  should  play  a  part 
in  attempting  to  get  the  parties  to  reconcile 
their  differences,  and  we  think  that  it  may  be 
that  by  this  process  we  can  influence  the  parties 
to  come  to  some  sort  of  a  permanent  settlement. 
Twenty  years  have  gone  by  and  there  has  not 
been  a  permanent  settlement,  and  we  think  it  is 
very  important  to  make  an  effort  to  see  if  this 
can  be  resolved.  We  recognize  the  difficulties. 
We  recognize  the  dangers  that  the  Government 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  6, 1961,  p.  179. 


360 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BtTLLBTIN 


of  Israel  cites;  but  we  do  think  it  is  important 
to  proceed  along  this  line,  and  we  intend  to 
do  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  would  you  analyze,  flease, 
for  us  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute  and  what  impli- 
cations that  might  have  for  U.S.  foreign  policy? 
There  have  heen  suggestions  that  the  U.S. 
should  take  advantage  of  this  dispute  for  our 
own  advantage. 


The  Sino-Soviet  Dispute 

A.  You  ask  me  to  analyze  it.  I  think  it's  a 
little  too  early  to  analyze  it.  I  think  there  are 
certainly  interesting  aspects  to  it.  The  most  in- 
teresting is  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  presented 
its  case  through  embassies  in  Europe  and  to  the 
State  Department,  which  is  quite  unusual,  in 
effect  pointing  out  that  the  Eed  Chinese  are 
at  fault  and  they  are  not.  I  think  that  very  fact 
shows  considerable  concern  on  their  part.  They 
have  gone  to  most  of  the  governments  in 
Europe  and  presented  a  paper  which  sets  forth 
their  side  of  the  picture. 

In  terms  of  the  long-term  effect,  we  don't 
know.  It  is  going  to  take  a  little  time  to  analyze 
what  has  happened,  what  is  happening. 

In  terms  of  the  attitude  of  our  Government, 
let  me  say  this:  We  do  not  think  it  is  wise  to 
attempt  to  exploit  it.  We  think  it  is  the  best 
posture  for  the  United  States  to  be  in — our  best 
posture  is  to  attempt  to  have  more  friendly 
relations  with  both  the  Soviet  Union  and  Com- 
munist China.  Wliatever  the  quarrel  is  between 
them  is  their  quarrel.  We  would  like  to  have 
more  friendly  relations  with  Communist  Cliina. 
We  have  indicated  that. 

It  is  possible  this  Ninth  Congress  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  in  Peking  will  end  up  in  some 
change  of  direction  of  their  foreign  policy.  We 
don't  know  that  yet.  But  in  any  event,  we  are 
willing  to  do  what  we  can  to  have  more  friendly 
relations  with  Red  China,  but  we're  not  going  to 
do  it  in  the  spirit  of  exploiting  it  because  we 
think  it  will  give  us  some  advantage  against 
the  Soviet  Union. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  there  anything  that 
stands  in  the  way  of  strategic  arms  limitation 
talks  with  the  Soviet  Union,  or  could  those  go 
forward  very  soon? 

A.  No,  there  is  nothing  that  stands  in  the 
way,  and  they  can  go  forward  very  soon.  We  are 


in  the  process  of  preparing  for  them  now,  and 
we  expect  they  will  begin  in  the  late  spring  or 
early  summer. 

Importance  of  NATO  Meeting 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  earlier  that  you 
thought  this  NATO  meeting  will  he  more  than 
usually  significant.  In  the  light  of  Canada's 
plan  to  reduce  its  forces  in  NATO,  coidd  you 
tell  us  precisely  what  you  expect  to  come  from 
this  NATO  meeting? 

A.  No,  I  think  it's  a  little  early  to  tell  pre- 
cisely what  will  come  from  it,  but  we  think  it's 
important  for  the  reasons  I  mentioned:  first, 
because  it's  the  20th  anniversary  and  in  that 
sense  has  a  certain  significance;  secondly,  we 
think  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  has  given 
all  the  NATO  countries  an  awareness  of  the 
importance  of  NATO,  the  importance  of  keep- 
ing NATO  strong. 

We  are  pleased  to  see  that  Prime  Minister 
Trudeau  recognized  the  importance  of  NATO 
and  Canada  will  continue  to  be  an  important 
member.  On  the  question  of  their  troop  contri- 
bution, that  will  be  a  subject  for  discussion  in 
the  May  meeting  of  the  defense  mmisters. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  spoken  repeat- 
edly, both  here  and  on  otJisr  occasions,  about  the 
importance  of  self-determination  for  South 
Viet-Nam  and  an  open  political  process  there. 
I  wonder  how  you  would  reconcile  this  with  the 
recent  jailing  of  the  Buddhist  monk  and  the 
continuing  presence  in  prison  of  Truong  Dinh 
Dzu,  tlie  presidential  candidate.  Have  you  dis- 
cussed this  with  the  Government  of  South  Viet- 
Nam?  What  is  your  position  on  it? 

A.  Yes,  we  have  discussed  it.  I  don't  think 
the  two  questions  are  particularly  related.  One 
involves  civil  liberties  and  the  other  involves 
votmg  rights.  As  far  as  voting  rights  are  con- 
cerned, these  two  cases  you  have  mentioned 
wouldn't  affect  that. 

We  are  obviously  concerned  about  civil  lib- 
erties in  South  Viet-Nam.  You  have  to  keep  in 
mind,  though,  their  country  is  at  war  and  they 
are  imder  more  pressures  than  we  are  here  in 
the  United  States.  If  you  remember,  the  United 
States  has  done  some  things  in  wartime  that 
we're  not  particularly  proud  of.  If  you  will  re- 
call, we  moved  the  Japanese  from  the  West 
Coast  without  any  real  justification. 

All  I'm  saying  is  we  have  expressed  our  con- 
cern to  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam  and 


APRIL    28,    1969 
839^35 — 6S- 


361 


we  think  that,  generally  speaking,  they  have 
been  quite  helpful  and  constructive  in  the  area 
of  civil  liberties. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretaiy,  there  are  reports  that  Willy 
Brandt  [Foreign  Minister  of  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany^  wants  to  discuss  tlie  recent 
Communist  appeal  for  a  European  security  con- 
ference when  NATO  meets  here.  I  wonder  if 
you  share  the  concern  about  the  Soviet  appeal? 

A.  Obviously,  it  vpill  be  a  subject  of  discus- 
sion at  the  NATO  ministerial  meeting.  The  pro- 
posal that  was  made  by  the  Warsaw  Pact  coun- 
tries is  not  significantly  different  in  substance 
from  previous  proposals  that  were  made.  The 
tone  of  the  proposal  is  somewhat  friendlier,  has 
less  polemics  in  it,  and  I  think  it  deserves  our 
consideration. 

Obviously,  there  are  a  lot  of  questions  that 
have  to  be  answered,  and  that's  one  of  the  things 
we  will  discuss  at  the  NATO  meeting. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  were  reports  that 
prior  to  the  opening  of  the  big-four  meeting 
there  was  an  understanding  or  agreement 
reached  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  to  stay  out  of  any  fighting  in  the 
Middle  East.  Can  you  enlighten  us  on  this,  and 
if  so,  does  it  remove  the  powder  keg  atmosphere 
that  is  supposed  to  exist  there? 

A.  I'm  soiTy,  I  didn't  get  the  first  part  of 
your  question. 

Q.  There  were  reports  of  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
that  they  would  not  get  mixed  up  in  any  fight- 
ing in  the  Middle  East. 

A.  I  don't  know  of  any  such  agreement.  Ob- 
viously, the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
are  both  anxious  to  avoid  a  confrontation  in 
that  area,  and  we  have  had  discussions  about 
that,  the  fact  that  it  is  an  explosive  situation. 
That  is  one  of  the  reasons,  of  course,  that  we 
have  engaged  in  the  four-power  talks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us  what  are 
the  facts  about  the  use  of  Cambodia  as  a  sanc- 
tuary? We  have  had  some  contradictory  reports 
on  that  subject. 

A.  You  mean,  is  it  being  used  as  a  sanctuary  ? 

Q.  Yes,  sir,  and  what  are  the  facts,  and  to 
what  extent  is  it  being  \ised? 

A.  Well,  I  think  that  is  probably  a  subject 
that  would  be  better  discussed  by  Secretary 


Laird,  but  it  is  a  fact  that  it  has  been  used  by 
North  Vietnamese  and  is  being  used  by  the 
North  Vietnamese  now.  The  exact  extent  of  it, 
I  think,  would  be  something  we  would  probably 
not  want  to  discuss  at  this  time. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  after  a  couple  of  months 
could  you  tell  us  what  the  American  voter  got 
for  his  vote,  that  is,  the  change  in  owr  foreign 
policy  maJcing  process?  As  far  as  you  can  deter- 
mine, ichat  differences  are  there  now  in  the  way 
this  administration  works  as  opposed  to  the 
last? 

A.  Well,  I  think  I  will  wait  until  I  talk  to  the 
voter  a  little  later  on.  (Laughter.) 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  South  Vietnamese  officials 
have  told  some  of  us  within  the  last  week  or  so 
that  if  they  were  making  the  decisions  in  Hanoi, 
based  on  what  they  know  about  American  public 
opinion  and  their  own  discussions  with  Ameri- 
can officials  and  tlieir  knowledge  of  the  situation 
in  Viet-Nam,  the  course  of  action  they  would 
recommend  to  Ho  Chi  Minh  would  be  to  keep 
fighting.  Do  you  have  any — can  you  tell  us  if 
you  have  any  knowledge  that  the  attitude  of  the 
North  Vietnamese  leaders  is  in  fact  any  different 
from  that? 

A.  Well,  if  I  understand  your  question,  the 
answer  is  "No."  We  assume,  though,  by  their 
presence  in  Paris  and  by  indirect  reports  that 
we  have  received,  that  there  is  some  interest  in 
a  negotiated  peace. 

Whether  this  is  being  done  just  to  mislead  us 
or  not,  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  until  we 
proceed  a  little  further  down  the  road. 

Peaceful  Resolution  of  Middle  East  Problems 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  spoke  of  hoping  that 
the  four-power  meclianism  in  New  York  can 
influence  the  parties  in  the  area.  How  do  you 
expect  to  influence  them  without  appearing  to 
be  imposing  something  on  them? 

A.  Well,  I  think  the  question  answers  itself. 
There  are  lots  of  ways  to  influence  people  with- 
out making  them  do  it.  I  think  that  the  force  of 
reasoning  and  the  force  of  public  opinion  has 
a  lot  to  do  with  influencing  nations.  There  is  no 
doubt  about  that — even  some  of  the  situations 
here  in  the  United  States.  So  if  the  world  com- 
munity should  agree  on  a  certain  general  for- 
mula for  the  settlement  of  the  Middle  East, 
then  I  think  the  governments  in  that  area  would 
want  to  think  long  and  hard  before  they  turned 
it  down. 


362 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BTJLLETTN' 


Now,  if  you  notice  in  our  proposals,  we 
believe  that  somewhere  down  the  road  there  will 
be — there  will  have  to  be  some  direct  negotia- 
tions between  the  parties  and  we  think  that  the 
only  way  you  can  get  a  settlement  there  is  to 
have  the  parties  agree  on  the  terms.  But  I  think 
it  is  pretty  obvious  that  governments  are 
influenced  by  public  opmion. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  with  regard  to  these  hig- 
four  negotiations,  there  has  been  talk  on  our  side 
about  great-power  guarantees  for  the  bo^inda- 
ries,  the  access  to  the  loater^vays,  and  so  forth. 
Isn't  that  lohat  toe  had  the  last  time?  IsnH  that 
what  blew  up  in  1967?  What  makes  us  think  it 
would  be  more  successful  now? 

A.  Well,  the  fact  that  you  have  an  analogy 
of  that  kind  that  didn't  work  doesn't  necessarily 
mean  that  there  aren't  ways  to  improve  it.  When 
we  talk  about  guarantees,  obviously  we  are  not — 
we  don't  have  any  particular  thing  in  mind  at 
the  moment  in  precise  terms.  "Wliat  we  are 
thinking  of  principally  are  some  guarantees, 
probably  by  the  United  Nations,  which  would 
be — which  would  be  more  satisfactory,  more 
lasting  than  the  previous  ones.  The  fact  it  hasn't 
worked  in  the  past  doesn't  mean  we  can't  try 
again. 

Certainly  they  have  worked  pretty  well  in 
Cyprus  and  in  the  Congo  the  United  Nations  is 
helpful,  and  it  may  well  be  that  if  we  could 
work  out  a  peace  settlement  we  could  have  some 
guarantees  that  would  be  successful. 

I  might  say  in  this  connection  that  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  Middle  East  and  the 
most — the  one  factor  that  would  guarantee  a 
successful  result  would  be  a  willingness  on  the 
part  of  all  the  nations  to  say,  "We  want  to  live 
in  peace"  and  that  "Israel  is  a  nation  and  has 
a  right  to  exist  and  will  continue  to  exist  and 
we  recognize  it."  There  is  no  reason  why  the 
problems  in  the  Middle  East  can't  be  resolved 
peacefully  if  all  the  nations  are  willing  to 
approach  it  in  that  spirit. 

Now,  in  the  absence  of  that  spirit,  all  it  is  is 
an  armistice.  If  some  nations  say  we  want  to 
destroy  x  nation  as  soon  as  we  are  able,  that  is 
not  a  peace.  That  is  just  an  armistice. 

If  we  can  find  a  way  to  get  the  parties  to  say, 
"Yes,  it  is  to  everybody's  interest  to  have  peace 
in  this  area,  and  we  are  willing  to  recognize 
everybody's  right  to  exist,  and  we  are  going  to 
provide  for  secure  and  recognized  boundaries," 
then  we  think  the  guarantees  would  be  a  lot  less 
important  and  necessary. 


Peruvian  Claim  Against  IPC 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  going  back  to  your  state- 
ment on  Peru,  you  said  that  the  IPC  has  the 
opportunity  to  go  through  tJie  administrative 
processes  to  contest  the  debt.  Does  this  refer 
solely  to  the  $690  million  claim,  or  does  this 
include  remuneration  as  well? 

A.  I  think  the  process — I  am  not  sure  about 
that  because  this  will  be  up  to  the  lawyers  for 
IPC,  but  I  think  principally  the  process  will 
refer  to  the  $690  million  claim  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Peru  agaiast  IPC. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  does  this  mean  that  Peru 
has  dropped  its  insistence  that  IPC  deposit  the 
$690  million  in  order  to  gain  the  right  to  appeal 
the  clahn? 

A.  Well,  I  am  not  sure  about  that.  I  think 
that  the  administrative  process  that  I  have 
referred  to  can  proceed — at  least  we  think  it 
can  proceed,  and  we  have  been  so  informed  by 
the  officials  of  Peru. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  are  conflicting  opin- 
ions about  whether  the  Soviet  Union  is,  or  is  not, 
trying  for  a  first-strike  capability.  As  we  go 
into  SALT  [strategic  arms  limitation  talks'] 
talks,  what  will  be  the  attitude  of  our  Govern- 
ment on  that  subject? 

A.  I  am  not  quite  sure  of  the  question. 

Q.  Well,  in  your  own  mind,  are  tlie  Soviets, 
or  are  they  not,  trying  for  first-strike  capability? 

A.  Well,  let  me  put  it  this  way.  I  think  some 
of  this  is  a  matter  of  definition.  I  have  difficulty 
in  believing  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  initi- 
ate a  first  strike.  I  have  difficulty  believing  that 
any  nation  would  initiate  a  first  nuclear  strike, 
because  any  leader  or  leaders  of  sound  mind 
would  know  that  it  probably  would  result  in 
the  destruction  of  mankind. 

On  the  question  of  how  many  missUes  it  takes 
for  a  particular  capability,  I  think  that  is  a 
matter  for  estimates  by  the  experts.  Certainly, 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  the  Soviet 
Union  is  deploying  SS-9's.  It  is  a  huge  missile, 
25  megatons,  and  they  are  deploying  them  now. 
And  I  think  when  we  enter  the  SALT  talks, 
one  of  the  first  questions  we  want  to  raise  with 
them  is  "Why.  Why  would  you  have  a  25- 
megaton  missile?" 

But  insofar  as  whether  they  are  domg  it  with 
the  intention  of  actually  having  a  first  strike, 
I  don't  believe  that. 

The  press :  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 


APRIL    28,    1969 


363 


U.S.  and  Peru  To  Continue  Talks 
on  Existing  Differences 

Department  Statement  ^ 

The  President  of  Peru,  Major  General  Juan 
Velasco  Alvarado,  and  the  special  emissary  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  John  N. 
Irwin,  have  concluded  one  phase  of  their 
conversations. 

The  Government  of  Peru  announces  that  it 
has  agreed  with  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  send  a  mission  to  Washington  to  con- 
tinue the  conversations  with  the  desire  that  a 
solution  to  the  existing  differences  may  be 
found.  The  composition  of  the  Peruvian  and 
U.S.  teams  will  soon  be  announced  by  the  respec- 
tive Governments,  as  will  the  date  of  departure 
of  the  Peruvian  delegation  to  the  United  States. 


area.  Tlie  kind  of  leadership  that  is  required  I 
would  describe  as  having  three  qualities:  the 
quality  of  courage,  tlie  quality  of  wisdom,  and 
the  quality  of  moderation. 

And  it  is  those  tlu-ee  qualities  that  we  in  this 
country  have  seen  in  you,  Your  Majesty, 
thi'ough  the  years.  You  have  been  a  man  of 
courage,  and  you  have  captured  the  imagination 
of  our  people  because  of  that  courage.  You  have 
been  a  man  of  wisdom  and  you  have  been  a 
man  of  moderation. 

And  for  that  reason,  we  look  forward  to  the 
conversations  we  will  have  with  you  and  with 
members  of  your  Government  in  attempting  to 
find  new  avenues  that  could  lead  to  permanent 
peace  in  that  troubled  area  of  the  world. 

We  welcome  you,  then,  today  as  an  old  friend. 
We  welcome  you,  too,  as  one  with  whom  we 
look  forward  to  searcliing  together  for  a  new 
period  of  peace  and  understanding  in  the  Mid- 
dle Eastern  area  of  the  world. 


King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan 
Visits  Washington 

His  Majesty  Hussein  /,  King  of  the  Ha-she- 
mite  Kingdom  of  Jordan,  made  an  official  visit 
to  Washington  April  8-10.  Folhioing  is  an 
exchange  of  greetings  between:  President  Nixon 
and  King  Hussein  at  a  welcoming  ceremony  on 
the  South  Lamn  of  the  White  House  on  April  8, 
together  with  the  text  of  a  joint  statement  issued 
on  April  10. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  8 

President  Nixon 

As  you  can  tell  from  the  reception  you  have 
received  today,  you  are  among  friends.  We  wel- 
come you  again  as  one  who  has  visited  our  coun- 
try before,  and  we  say  as  you  come  again  that 
we  think  you  come  at  a  very  appropriate  time. 

As  we  all  know,  the  area  of  the  world  in 
which  you  rule  is  one  that  presently  has  some 
very  explosive  problems. 

And  in  order  to  solve  those  problems,  leader- 
ship is  required — leadership  from  within  that 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Robert  J.  McCloskey  on  Apr.  9. 


King   Hussein   I 

I  wish  to  thank  you  most  sincerely  for  your 
kind  and  warm  words  of  welcome.  It  is  indeed 
a  privilege  for  me  to  be  here  once  again.  And  I 
know  that  I  am  amongst  friends. 

Sir,  it  was  on  my  first  visit  to  the  United 
States  in  1959,  during  the  term  of  office  of  one 
of  the  greatest  men  of  our  times.  President 
Eisenhower,  that  I  had  the  privilege  of  meeting 
you.  And  since  then  I  have  been  proud  of  the 
fact  that  you  are  my  friend. 

The  relations  between  our  two  countries  were 
never  as  strong  as  they  were  during  that  period, 
and  it  is  our  smcere  hope  and  desire  that  they 
grow  now  stronger  than  they  ever  were  in  the 
past. 

The  area  from  which  I  come,  sir,  is  a  troubled 
area.  Thus,  I  feel  the  weight  of  responsibility 
even  more  as  I  come  here  to  meet  with  you,  sir, 
to  discuss  the  problems  of  that  area.  For  within 
the  very  near  future  we  can  either  move  toward 
our  objective,  a  just  and  honorable  peace  in  that 
area,  or  we  might,  indeed,  lose  the  chance  and 
the  opportunity  to  establish  peace,  a  just  and 
lasting  peace,  there. 

I  really  hope  that  we  will  move  in  the  direc- 
tion of  peace,  because  the  situation,  as  explosive 
as  it  is,  holds  many  dangers,  not  only  to  those 
involved  m  the  area  but  to  the  world  as  a  whole. 

And  what  we  have  sought  and  what  we  are 
seeking  always  is  the  establishment  of  a  just 
and  durable  peace  in  the  area ;  that  all  our  ener- 


864 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BUTJLETIN 


gies  and  resources  be  diverted  toward  building 
the  better  future  that  we  seek  and  we  feel  is 
the  right  of  all  in  that  area. 

I  thank  you  very,  very  much  indeed,  sir,  for 
your  kindness,  and  I  am  really  so  very  proud 
and  happy  to  he  with  you  here  again. 

Thank  you,  sir. 


TEXT  OF  JOINT  STATEMENT 


tegrity  of  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan. 

The  discussions  renewed  and  deepened  the 
close  and  friendly  relations  which  exist  between 
the  two  coimtries. 

His  Majesty  the  King  extended  an  invitation 
to  President  Nixon  to  visit  the  Hashemite  King- 
dom of  Jordan.  The  President  expressed  his 
gratitude  for  the  invitation  and  said  he  hoped 
to  be  able  to  make  tliis  visit  at  an  appropriate 
time. 


White  House  press  release  dated  April  10 

H.  M.  King  Hussein,  King  of  the  Hashemite 
Kingdom  of  Jordan,  visited  Washington  at 
President  Nixon's  invitation  April  8,  9  and  10. 
During  tliis  time.  His  Majesty  and  members  of 
his  delegation  had  friendly  and  constructive  dis- 
cussions on  matters  of  mutual  interest  and  com- 
mon concern  with  the  President,  the  Secretaries 
of  State  and  Defense  and  other  senior  United 
States  Government  officials. 

The  principal  topic  of  the  discussion  was  the 
common  United  States  and  Jordanian  desire 
for  a  just  and  durable  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
The  United  States  informed  the  Government 
of  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  of  its 
efforts,  bilateral  and  multilateral,  to  help  bring 
about  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

H.  M.  the  King  explained  that  the  explosive 
nature  of  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East  is 
caused  by  the  continued  occupation  of  Jor- 
danian and  other  Arab  territories,  and  expressed 
his  conviction  that  peace  can  only  be  achieved 
by  the  early  withdrawal  of  the  forces  of  occupa- 
tion in  the  context  of  the  Security  Coimcil  Res- 
olution of  November  22,  1967.^ 

For  its  part,  the  United  States  called  to  the 
attention  of  the  Government  of  Jordan  and 
reaffirmed  the  statement  made  by  Secretary 
Kogers  on  this  point  and  on  other  points  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
March  27.^ 

Both  the  United  States  and  Jordan  reaf- 
firmed their  strong  support  for  Ambassador 
Jarring's  mission  and  for  all  the  principles  and 
provisions  of  the  Security  Council  Resolution. 
Both  Governments  recognize  the  compelling 
need  to  seek  actively  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in 
the  area. 

The  United  States  reaffirmed  its  support  for 
the  political  independence  and  territorial  in- 


'  For  text,  see  Bttlletin  of  Dec.  18,  1967,  p.  843. 
'  Bulletin  of  Apr.  14,  1969,  p.  305. 


Twelfth  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  hy 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge^  Jiead  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  12th  plenary  session  of 
the  new  rneetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
April  10. 

Press  release  77  dated  AprU  10 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  Your  side  has  often 
said  that  a  solution  to  the  Viet-Nam  problem 
must  be  based  on  reality.  On  that  point,  we 
agree. 

In  the  last  two  sessions  of  these  Paris  meet- 
ings. Ambassador  Walsh  and  I  have  tried  to 
show  what  that  reality  is.  The  crucial  fact  is 
that  North  Viet-Nam  is  using  armed  force 
against  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  in  order  to 
try  to  take  over  South  Viet-Nam.  These  North 
Vietnamese  forces  are  invading  the  territory  of 
neighboring  states  to  further  this  purpose. 
North  Vietnamese  military  forces  continue  to 
violate  international  borders  and  international 
demarcation  lines. 

We  have  described  the  massive  presence  of 
North  Vietnamese  troops  in  South  Viet-Nam. 
We  have  shown  how  North  Viet-Nam  has 
infiltrated  its  military  and  subversive  forces, 
as  well  as  arms  and  equipment,  through  Laos 
and  Cambodia  and  across  the  demilitarized  zone 
into  South  Viet-Nam. 

Today  we  submit  three  representative  case 
histories  so  as  to  illustrate  graphically  North 
Vietnamese  aggression  against  South  Viet-Nam. 

The  95th  Regiment  of  the  North  Vietnamese 
Army  was  one  of  the  first  regular  North  Viet- 
namese Army  units  to  invade  South  Viet-Nam. 
Elements  of  that  regiment  started  their  move- 
ment south  in  the  autumn  of  1964.  They  infil- 
trated into  South  Viet-Nam  through  the  western 


APRIL    28,    1969 


365 


demilitarized  zone,  crossed  into  Laos,  and  con- 
tinuing south,  finally  moved  into  Kontum 
Province  in  December  1964.  It  is  noteworthy 
that  at  that  time  there  were  no  American  combat 
forces  in  South  Viet-Nam. 

Duruig  1965,  the  95th  North  Vietnamese  Keg- 
iment  operated  in  Pleiku  Province,  then  in 
Darlac  Province,  and  in  Phu  Yen  Province, 
where  it  remained  from  late  1965  until  the  mid- 
dle of  last  year.  In  the  summer  of  1968,  the  95th 
Regiment  moved  west  into  sanctuary  in  Cambo- 
dia to  refit,  retrain,  and  receive  replacements. 
It  then  moved  southward  back  into  South  Viet- 
Nam,  where  it  participated  in  a  series  of  engage- 
ments south  of  Due  Lap  in  late  September 
1968.  Following  another  withdrawal  into 
Cambodia,  it  moved  in  November  1968  into  war 
zone  D  northeast  of  Saigon,  where  it  joined  ele- 
ments of  the  5th  Viet  Cong  Division.  The  95th 
North  Vietnamese  Regiment  has  been  active  in 
your  side's  recent  military  offensive. 

Let  me  now  take  the  case  of  the  101st  Regi- 
ment of  the  North  Vietnamese  Army.  Elements 
of  that  regiment  began  infiltration  into  South 
Viet-Nam  in  late  1964.  They  moved  south 
through  Laos,  arriving  in  Kontum  Province 
early  in  January  1965.  Again,  at  that  time  there 
were  no  United  States  combat  troops  in  South 
Viet-Nam. 

In  November  1965,  the  101st  Regiment  moved 
south  from  the  Second  Corps  tactical  zone 
through  Cambodia  into  the  Third  Corps  tacti- 
cal zone.  It  has  seen  action  in  numerous  battles 
in  South  Viet-Nam.  It  participated  in  the  1966 
winter-spring  campaign  in  Binh  Long  Prov- 
ince. In  1967,  it  fought  repeatedly  against 
Allied  troops  in  northern  Tay  Ninh  Province 
and,  in  early  1968,  it  moved  to  the  Gia  Dinh/ 
Binh  Duong  border  area  north  of  Saigon. 

The  101st  Regiment  has  participated  in  a 
number  of  battles  since  mid-1968.  The  latest  of 
these  occurred  in  southeastern  Tay  Ninh  Prov- 
ince on  March  25, 1969. 

During  their  4  years  in  South  Viet-Nam,  both 
the  95th  and  the  101st  Regiments  have  suffered 
heavy  casualties.  To  fiill  their  depleted  ranks, 
these  units  have  depended  upon  the  continuing 
infiltration  of  soldiers  from  North  Viet-Nam. 

The  9th  so-called  Viet  Cong  Division  pro- 
vides another  revealing  case  study  of  the  ex- 
tent of  North  Vietnamese  involvement  in  South 
Viet-Nam.  In  June  1965,  the  9th  Division  was 
formed  from  Viet  Cong  units  that  had  been 
under  the  supervision  of  North  Vietnamese 
cadres  for  several  years. 


Since  1965,  the  9th  Division  has  repeatedly 
suffered  casualties  so  serious  that  North  Viet- 
namese officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and 
foot  soldiers  were  infiltrated  to  replace  southern 
recruits.  Accordingly,  this  so-called  Viet  Cong 
division  became  totally  dependent  on  North 
Viet-Nam  for  its  existence  and  survival  as  a 
combat  unit. 

In  the  major  engagements  in  the  autumn  of 
1966  and  the  spring  of  1967,  and  in  the  attacks 
on  Loc  Ninh  the  following  autumn,  the  9th 
Division  suffered  heavy  losses  which  were  made 
up  by  newly  infiltrated  North  Vietnamese 
troops.  With  many  northern  recruits,  the  divi- 
sion managed  to  participate  in  the  1968  Tet 
offensive  and  the  attacks  of  May  1968.  In  mid- 
1968,  the  division  withdrew  to  Cambodian 
sanctuaries,  from  where  it  has  made  occasional 
forays  into  South  Viet-Nam. 

Today  approximately  80  percent  of  all  per- 
sonnel in  the  9th  so-called  Viet  Cong  Division 
are  North  Vietnamese  Regular  Army  soldiers. 

The  cases  I  have  just  cited  are  only  a  small 
additional  part  of  the  storj^  We  have  captured 
documents,  photographs,  statements  of  North 
Vietnamese  prisoners  and  defectors,  testimony 
of  eyewitnesses,  diaries,  captured  weapons  and 
equipment,  and  other  evidence.  These  show  with  J 
absolute  certainty  the  massive  presence  of  North  1 
Vietnamese  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam — over 
two-thirds  of  your  side's  regular  combat  forces 
in  South  Viet-Nam  are  North  Vietnamese.  They 
show  North  Vietnamese  use  of  the  DMZ  and  the 
territory  of  neighboring  Laos  and  Cambodia  as 
infiltration  routes  and  bases  of  operation 
against  South  Viet-Nam. 

A  settlement  which  does  not  take  these  facts 
into  account  cannot  be  a  settlement  based  on 
reality.  Your  side's  demand  for  the  withdrawal 
of  United  States  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam 
without  any  provision  for  the  withdrawal  of 
North  Vietnamese  forces  is  not  realistic.  A 
meaningful  settlement  must  include  the  with- 
drawal from  South  Viet-Nam  into  North  Viet- 
Nam  of  the  military  and  subversive  forces  of 
North  Viet-Nam  who  are  in  the  South.  For  our 
part,  we  have  made  clear  our  willingness  to 
begin  the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  and  Allied  forces 
simultaneously  with  the  withdrawal  of  North 
Vietnamese  forces. 

A  lasting  settlement  must  also  involve  a  will- 
ingness on  the  part  of  North  Viet-Nam  to  re- 
spect the  territorial  integrity  of  its  neighbors 
and  to  respect  international  frontiers  and  de- 
marcation lines.  That  is  why  the  United  States 


366 


DEPARTMENT   OP   STATE   BULLETTN' 


has  called  for  the  restoration  of  the  demili- 
tarized zone.  That  is  why  the  United  States  has 
called  upon  North  Viet-Nam  to  respect  the  1962 
Geneva  agreements  on  Laos  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Cambodia. 

In  addition,  the  United  States  has  proposed 
that  prisoners  of  war  be  released  at  the  earliest 
possible  date. 

These  are  specific  and  concrete  proposals 
which  are  based  firmly  on  the  real  facts  of  the 
situation.  If  you  are  truly  interested  in  bringing 
the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  early  end,  you  should 
join  us  in  a  serious  discussion  of  these  proposals. 


Secretary  Stans  To  Visit  Europe,  Asia 
To  Discuss  U.S.  Trade  Policies 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  4 

The  President  announced  on  April  4  that  he 
has  requested  Secretary  of  Commerce  ^Maurice 
H.  Stans  to  undertake  a  second  international 
mission  to  continue  discussion  of  American 
trade  policies  abroad.  Secretary  Stans  will  leave 
Washington  on  May  9  and  travel  to  the  Far 
East  for  talks  with  government  and  business 
leaders  in  Tokyo,  Japan;  Seoul,  Korea;  Taipei, 
Taiwan ;  and  the  British  Crown  Colony  of  Hong 
Kong.  He  will  return  to  the  United  States  on 
May  18. 

Secretary  Stans  is  currently  making  prepara- 
tions for  a  seven-nation  Western  European 
tour  which  begins  April  11  and  extends  through 
April  26.  While  in  Europe  he  will  visit  Brus- 
sels, Belgiimi ;  The  Hague,  Netherlands ;  Bonn, 
Gennany;  Geneva,  Switzerland;  Milan  and 
Rome,  Italy;  Paris,  France;  and  London, 
England. 

The  President  has  requested  Secretary  Stans 
to  visit  the  Far  East  shortly  after  his  return 
from  Europe  in  order  that  he  may  convey  to 
several  of  our  trading  partners  there,  as  he  will 
in  Europe,  the  administration's  conunitment  to 
expansionary  trade  policies  throughout  the 
world,  together  with  our  concern  over  barriers 
to  U.S.  exports.  His  talks  will  cover  the  whole 
broad  range  of  trade  and  investment  issues 
and  will  include  the  textile  problem. 

The  Department  of  Commerce  will  announce 
the  detailed  itinerary  of  Secretary  Stans'  mis- 
sion to  the  Far  East,  together  with  the  names 
of  those  who  will  travel  with  him  in  the  official 
party,  as  soon  as  they  are  compiled. 


William  W.  Scranton  To  Head 
U.S.  Delegation  to  Intelsat 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  8 

The  President  on  April  8  appointed  former 
Governor  William  W.  Scranton  of  Pennsylvania 
as  U.S.  Representative  to  the  Intelsat  Confer- 
ence (Plenipotentiary  Conference  on  Definitive 
Arrangements  for  the  International  Telecom- 
munications Satellite  Consortium)  with  the 
personal  rank  of  Ambassador.  Governor  Scran- 
ton will  serve  as  chairman  of  the  United  States 
delegation  to  the  conference,  replacing  Ambas- 
sador Leonard  H.  Marks,  who  resigned  at  the 
close  of  the  first  session  of  the  conference, 
March  21. 

Sixty-seven  member  nations  of  Intelsat  were 
represented  at  the  4- week  session;  an  addi- 
tional 29  countries  participated  as  observers, 
among  them  the  Soviet  Union.  The  conference 
is  now  scheduled  to  reconvene  in  Washington 
next  November  18  to  complete  the  drafting  of 
a  definitive  agreement  for  a  single  global  com- 
mercial satellite  system.  During  the  interim 
period  a  committee  of  the  conference  will  under- 
take preparatory  work. 

Intelsat  operates  four  communications  satel- 
lites in  synchronous  orbits  over  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  Oceans.  Global  coverage  will  be 
achieved  with  the  launching  of  a  satellite  over 
the  Indian  Ocean  scheduled  for  later  this  year. 
The  member  nations  own  the  system  in  un- 
divided shares.  The  Communications  Satellite 
Corporation  serv&s  as  system  manager  on  behalf 
of  the  consortium. 

"Intelsat  is  the  first  pioneering  effort  in  the 
peaceful  uses  of  outer  space  for  all  nations," 
Governor  Scranton  said.  "Since  1964  it  has  been 
operating  under  an  interim  agreement  between 
nations.  Our  task  is  to  establish  definitive  ar- 
rangements for  the  organization,  so  that  it  can 
extend  low-cost,  high-quality  communications 
to  all  parts  of  the  world.  One  can  only  guess  at 
the  impact  on  man's  future  of  truly  universal 
world  communications,  but  we  know  that  its 
effect  will  be  for  the  good  and  that  it  will  be 
far-reaching.  I  am  delighted  to  have  this  oppor- 
tunity to  play  a  part  in  this  important  under- 
taking." 

Abbott  Washburn  has  been  appointed  deputy 
chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Intelsat 
Conference.  He  served  as  Deputy  Director  of 
the  United  States  Information  Agency  fi'om 
1954  to  1960. 


APRIL    28,    1969 


367 


World  Weather  Program — Plan  for  U.S.  Participation 


President  Nixon  transmitted  to  the  Congress 
the  first  annvxil  plan  for  U.8.  participation  in 
the  World  Weather  Program  on  March  13.  Fol- 
lowing is  the  text  of  the  Presidenfs  letter  of 
transmittal,  together  with  the  preface  and  the 
first  three  sections  of  the  five-section  report} 


LETTER  OF  TRANSMITTAL 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  : 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  to  you,  in  accordance 
with  Senate  Concurrent  Resolution  67  of  the 
90th  Congi-ess,  the  first  annual  plan  for  United 
States  participation  in  the  World  Weather  Pro- 
gram. This  docimient  describes  the  long-range 
goals  of  the  World  Weather  Program  and  the 
activities  in  support  of  that  program  which 
have  been  planned  by  eight  Federal  agencies  for 
Fiscal  Year  1970.  The  budget  figures  shown  in 
this  report  are  consistent  with  those  wliich  ap- 
peared in  the  budget  submitted  to  the  Congress 
on  January  15, 1969. 

I  commend  this  report  to  you  and  hope  you 
win  give  it  your  careful  attention,  for  it  de- 
scribes activities  which  can  contribute  in  im- 
portant ways  to  the  quality  of  American  life. 
The  World  Weather  Program  promises,  for  ex- 
ample, to  produce  earlier  and  more  accurate 
weather  forecasts  than  we  now  receive.  It  is  also 
exploring  the  feasibility  of  large-scale  weather 
modifications.  Because  so  much  of  our  social  and 
economic  life  is  significantly  influenced  by 
weather  conditions,  it  is  important  that  we  en- 
courage those  advances  in  weather  prediction 
and  control  which  our  scientists  now  foresee. 

Tliis  project,  and  our  role  in  it,  also  have  great 
political  significance.  For  the  World  Weather 


'  A  limited  number  of  copies  of  the  26-page  illustrated 
report,  World  Weather  Program — Plan  for  Fiscal  Year 
1970,  are  available  upon  request  from  International 
Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520 ;  the  report  also  Is  for 
sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402  (45 
cents). 


Program,  growing  out  of  the  United  Nations 
initiatives  in  the  early  1960's,  has  developed  into 
a  most  impressive  example  of  international  co- 
operation. On  a  scale  never  attempted  until  this 
decade,  scientists  and  governments  in  many 
countries  are  joining  hands  across  national 
boundaries  to  serve  the  entire  human  commu- 
nity. Their  example  should  be  instructive  for  all 
of  us  as  we  pursue  lasting  peace  and  order  for 
our  world. 

This  report  "talks  about  the  weather,"  but  it 
demonstrates  that  we  can  do  far  more  about  our 
weather  than  merely  talk  about  it.  I  believe  that 
the  plans  for  American  participation  which  are 
outlined  here  reflect  the  sense  of  both  the  Con- 
gress and  the  Executive  Branch  of  our  govern- 
ment that  the  United  States  should  give  its  full 
support  to  the  World  Weather  Program. 


Richard  Nixon 


The  White  House, 
March  IS,  1969. 


EXCERPTS  FROM  REPORT 


Preface 

On  May  29,  1968,  the  90th  Congress,  through  Senate 
Concurrent  Resolution  67,  stated  that  the  United  States 
should  participate  in  and  give  full  support  to  the  World 
Weather  Program.  The  Congress  found  that: 

— unprecedented  scientific  opportunities  and  tech- 
nological possibilities  exist  to  improve  the  weather 
services  of  the  United  States  by  increasing  the  accu- 
racy and  extending  the  time  range  of  weather 
predictions, 

— the  improved  weather  services  would  yield  social 
and  economic  benefits  of  great  magnitude  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States  through  greater  protection  of 
life  and  property,  and  Increased  efficiency  in  the  many 
economic  pursuits  which  are  sensitive  to  weather,  and 

— the  global  effort  needed  to  bring  about  the  im- 
proved weather  services  for  the  United  States  can  be 
more  effectively  and  economically  carried  out  through 
a  cooperative  international  effort. 

The  Congress,  by  Section  III,  Senate  Concurrent 
Resolution  67,  requested  that  on  or  before  March  1 
of  each  year  the  President  transmit  to  it  the  intema- 


368 


department  of  state  bulletin 


tional  meteorological  activities  planned  on  the  World 
Weather  Program  by  the  United  States  for  the  next 
fiscal  year. 

In  response  to  the  Resolution,  the  President  on 
July  5,  1968,  Instructed  the  Federal  agencies  involved 
(Department  of  Commerce,  Department  of  Defense, 
Department  of  Interior,  Department  of  State,  Depart- 
ment of  Transportation,  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration,  and 
National  Science  Foundation)  to  work  with  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  as  lead  agency  in  moving  for- 
ward with  the  World  Weather  Program. 

This  report  Is  in  response  to  the  request  of  Congress. 
It  describes  the  planned  efforts  of  the  Federal  agencies 
for  the  Fiscal  Year  (FY)  1970  (Section  IV),  together 
with  the  background  (Section  I),  the  goals  (Section 
II),  and  the  overall  plan  (Section  III)  of  the  program. 

1.  INTRODUCTION 

The  President,  speaking  of  the  World  Weather  Pro- 
gram on  April  3,  1967,  said :  "For  centuries  man's 
Inability  to  predict  weather  far  enough  ahead  hag 
caused  incalculable  hiunan  suffering.  .  .  .  The  proposed 
system  will,  through  International  cooperation,  lead  to 
improved  weather  forecasting  and  protection  of  life 
and  property."  ' 


Socio-Economic  Impact 

Despite  having  one  of  the  world's  most  advanced 
weather  services,  our  nation  each  year  suffers  cata- 
strophic losses  of  life  and  property  as  a  result  of  such 
weather  calamities  as  hurricanes,  tornadoes,  floods,  and 
blizzards.  In  1966,  for  example,  the  United  States  lost 
approximately  a  thousand  lives  and  over  one  biUion 
dollars  to  severe  weather.  This  toll  could  have  been 
substantially  reduced  by  adequate  warnings  and  proper 
precautions. 

The  Impact  of  the  normal  day-to-day,  week-to-week, 
and  month-to-month  variabilities  of  the  weather  on  our 
economic  pursuits  is  much  more  subtle  but  no  less  pro- 
found. In  our  commerce  and  industry,  weather  plays  a 
role  in  the  eflSciency  and  effectiveness  of  operations.  Al- 
though weather  is  in  some  areas  the  primary  factor 
affecting  an  operation,  more  commonly  It  is  a  secondary, 
yet  significant,  factor. 

The  importance  of  a  national  weather  service  rests 
upon  its  overall  Impact  on  the  total  spectrum  of  the 
Nation's  socio-economic  activities  rather  than  Its  over- 
whelming Importance  to  a  single  activity. 

In  agriculture,  the  losses  due  to  weather  mount  Into 
the  billions  of  dollars  annually.  These  losses  stem  from 
a  wide  range  of  conditions :  frost  or  hall  destroying  the 
crops  of  orchards  and  truck  farms;  low  temperatures 
and  blizzards  destroying  livestock ;  Improper  timing  of 
irrigation  reducing  the  potential  yield  of  thousands  of 
acres ;  unexpected  rains  during  harvesting  destroying 
the  value  of  the  crops ;  excess  or  lack  of  rain  necessitat- 
ing multiple  plantings  in  the  spring.  These  are  only  a 
few  examples  of  situations  in  which  the  availability  of 
more  accurate  and  longer  range  forecasts  would  permit 
appropriate  action  to  aUeviate  substantially  the 
enormous  losses  Involved. 


"  For  a  statement  by  President  Johnson,  see  Buii.ETirf 
of  Apr.  24, 1967,  p.  658. 


The  construction  industry  loses  over  a  billion  dollars 
a  year  due  to  weather.  Strong  winds  and  heavy  rains 
damage  Incomplete  structures.  Material,  such  as  con- 
crete, is  spoOed  by  freezing  temperatures  or  rain.  Labor 
Is  Inefficiently  used  and  work  schedules  are  disrupted. 
More  accurate  long-range  forecasts  would  permit  more 
useful  planning. 

In  addition  to  the  many  lives  lost  In  accidents,  the 
transportation  industry  loses  hundreds  of  millions  of 
dollars  annually  to  weather.  More  accurate  and  longer 
range  forecasts  would  permit  substantial  savings 
through  optimum  planning  of  routes  of  U.S.  ships  on 
the  high  seas ;  more  efficient  scheduling  of  aircraft 
operations  ;  and  safer  highway  operations. 

The  power  and  energy  Industries  are  affected  by 
weather.  Small  errors  in  the  forecast  average  tempera- 
ture for  a  large  city  4  or  5  days  In  advance  can  cause 
the  demand  for  gas  to  differ  from  the  anticipated  con- 
sumption by  millions  of  cubic  feet,  creating  excessive 
demands  on  the  supporting  pipelines.  Similar  problems 
are  encountered  by  the  producers  and  distributors  of 
other  forms  of  energy.  More  accurate  and  longer  range 
forecasts  could  reduce  the  need  for  expensive  storage 
facilities  which  are  now  required  to  accommodate 
unforeseen  surges  in  demand. 

The  fishing  industry  Is  also  affected  by  weather — 
both  in  safety  and  efficiency.  More  accurate  and  longer 
range  predictions  would  provide  information  needed 
to  identify  areas  where  conditions  for  fishing  are  likely 
to  be  favorable.  The  fleets  could  then  be  directed  to 
these  locations. 

Retailing,  water  resources  management,  and  recrea- 
tion are  other  examples  of  activities  in  which  the  safety 
and  efficiency  of  operations  can  be  increased  by  Im- 
proved weather  predictions. 

The  economies  of  other  nations  are  similarly  influ- 
enced by  the  weather.  Among  the  developing  nations, 
the  weather  exercises  a  profound  influence  on  agricul- 
tural activities  that  are  vital  to  economic  survival. 

The  provision  of  improved  weather  services  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States  will  require  many  actions 
such  as  improvement  of  short-range  forecasts  and  storm 
warnings  and  improved  dissemination  of  forecasts  and 
warnings  to  the  user.  However,  It  Is  clear  that  the  Im- 
provement of  medium-  and  long-range  forecasts  could 
contribute  significantly  to  reduction  of  weather-related 
human  misery  and  economic  loss.  This  Improvement 
requires  a  deeper  scientific  understanding  of  the  atmos- 
phere and  the  exploitation  of  recent  advances  in 
technology  which  is  only  possible  through  successful 
execution  of  the  World  Weather  Program. 

Technological   Breakthrough 

Two  striking  technological  advances — the  electronic 
computer  and  the  meteorological  satellite — have 
created  major  opportunities  for  a  breakthrough  in  the 
quality  of  the  weather  services  of  the  United  States. 

The  electronic  computer  permitted,  for  the  first  time, 
weather  predictions  to  be  made  directly  from  the  com- 
plex set  of  mathematical  equations  which  describe  the 
present  and  future  states  of  the  atmosphere. 

In  the  early  1950's,  U.S.  scientists  formulated  simpli- 
fied mathematical  models  of  the  atmosphere  and  vrith 
the  aid  of  the  computer  prepared  predictions  of  the 
wind  and  pressure  field  over  the  United  States  for  one 
level  (20,000  feet)  in  the  atmosphere.  These  computer 
predictions,  which  extended  only  for  periods  of  24  to  36 


APRIL    28,    1969 


369 


hours,  permitted  a  substantial  increase  in  the  accuracy 
of  the  forecasts  for  the  United  States.  Today,  many 
nations,  large  and  small,  use  the  computer  to  prepare 
basic  weather  predictions. 

As  the  capacity  of  the  computer  increased  throughout 
the  1950's,  mathematical  models  of  the  atmosphere  be- 
came more  sophisticated.  Today  a  much  improved 
model  covering  the  entire  Northern  Hemisphere  is  being 
used  for  production  of  daily  forecasts  three  days  in 
advance.  Extension  to  a  4th  day  in  advance  will  be 
implemented  soon.  The  results  of  this  effort  have  sub- 
stantially improved  forecasts  for  many  users.  In  addi- 
tion, research  models  are  being  tested  which  deal  simul- 
taneously with  many  levels  in  the  atmosphere  over  the 
entire  globe. 

These  models  were  used  by  the  National  Academy 
of  Sciences  (NAS)  to  establish  how  far  into  the  future 
weather  predictions  can  be  made.  Their  results  indicate 
that  with  more  sophisticated  atmospheric  models  and 
a  much  improved  global  data  network,  weather  fore- 
casts similar  to  today's  forecast  for  2  or  3  days  could, 
in  principle,  be  made  for  periods  of  up  to  2  weeks. 
More  general  predictions  of  selected  weather  elements 
may  be  possible  for  considerably  longer  periods. 

THE    SATELLITE 

The  satellite  provided  a  new  and  revolutionary  tool 
with  which  to  obtain  many  of  the  global  observations 
which  are  essential  to  predict  the  future  state  of  the 
atmosphere.  The  first  TIROS  meteorological  satellite 
launched  in  1960  was  equipped  to  obtain  cloud  photo- 
graphs of  only  a  portion  of  the  earth.  This  capability 
was  rapidly  expanded  with  the  successful  launch  by  the 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  of 
Nimbus  I  in  1964  and  TIROS  IX  in  1965,  each  of  which 
provided  global  data.  In  1965,  the  Environmental  Sci- 
ence Services  Administration  established  the  TIROS 
Operational  Satellite  System  to  provide  routine  global 
coverage  of  cloud  systems.  Eight  operational  satellites 
have  been  launched  to  date. 


Program   Rationale 

The  largest  single  ohsfacle  in  applying  fully  our 
present  scientific  capaMlity  and  in  seeking  the  scien- 
tific understanding  required  for  long-range  weather 
predictions  is  the  lack  of  adequate  global  weather  data. 
Available  iceather  data  is  barely  adequate  oi^er  20 
percent  of  the  earth.  The  remaining  SO  percent,  mostly 
over  the  oceans,  remains  inadequately  observed. 

The  technology  to  obtain  these  observations,  e-ipe- 
cially  over  the  oceans,  presents  formidable  problems. 
However,  with  the  use  of  buoys,  ships,  balloons,  air- 
craft, and  satellites,  a  weather  system  with  the  full 
potential  to  observe  and  collect  daily  comprehensive 
data  about  the  atmosphere  of  the  entire  globe  can  be 
developed. 

The  system  cannot  be  implemented  by  any  single 
nation.  This  fact  has  long  been  clearly  recognized  by 
the  leaders  of  all  natioiis;  international  cooperation  in 
meteorology  has  thus  been  a  tradition  for  a  century. 

THE  CALL  FOR  ACTION 

This,  combined  with  the  scientific  and  technological 
advances,  prompted  the  President  of  the  United  States 
to  include  in  his  proposal  before  the  United  Nations 
in  1961  an  international  effort  on  the  weather  predic- 


tion problem.  The  United  Nations  responded  with  two 
resolutions,  one  in  1961  and  one  in  1962,  in  which  it 
called  upon  the  World  Meteorological  Organization 
(WMO)  and  the  International  Council  of  Scientific 
Unions  (ICSU)  to  develop  measures  to  improve 
weather  forecasting  capabilities  and  to  advance  our 
knowledge  of  the  basic  physical  forces  that  determine 
climates. 

THE  RESPONSE 

The  WMO  responded  with  the  concept  of  the  World 
Weather  Watch  ( W\VW),  a  system  which  would  bring 
the  global  atmosphere  under  surveillance  and  provide 
for  the  rapid  collection  and  exchange  of  the  weather 
data  as  well  as  the  dissemination  of  weather  products 
from  centralized  processing  centers.  It  recommended 
that  the  Watch  rest  on  new  technology,  as  well  as  the 
traditional  technology  used  in  meteorology. 

The  WMO,  along  with  the  ICSU,  recognized  the  need 
for  an  intensified  research  program  concerned  with 
the  physical  processes  governing  atmospheric  motions 
and  their  formulation  in  mathematical  models.  The 
ICSU  formulated  such  a  program,  now  called  the  Global 
Atmospheric  Research  Program  (GARP). 

The  World  Weather  Watch  and  the  Global  Atmos- 
pheric Research  Program  together  constitute  the  World 
Weather  Program. 


Federal  Agency  Responsibilities 

The  United  States  has  vigorously  participated  in  the 
study  of  and  planning  for  the  World  Weather  Program.  J 
The  NAS  took  the  lead  in  bringing  to  bear  the  scien-  I 
tific  capabilities  of  the  United  States  to  specify  more 
precisely  the  scientific  opportunities  that  would  be 
foreseen.  Within  the  government,  the  plan  for  U.S. 
participation  was  developed  through  the  joint  efforts 
of  the  Federal  agencies  and  is  presently  coordinated 
through  the  Federal  Committee  for  Meteorological 
Services  and  Supporting  Research  and  its  Interagency 
Committee  for  the  World  Weather  Program. 

Several  Federal  agencies  are  involved  in  this  pro- 
gram. Their  responsibilities  are  as  follows : 

— The  Department  of  Commerce :  Provides  a  focal 
point  (Office  of  World  Weather  Systems,  ESSA)  to 
coordinate  our  nation's  efforts  in  this  program,  imple- 
ments those  service  improvements  in  the  existing  inter- 
national weather  system  for  which  the  United  States 
assumes  responsibility,  develops  new  technology  as 
related  to  its  responsibilities,  and  cooperates  with  the 
National  Science  Foundation  to  stimulate  general  cir- 
culation research. 

— The  Department  of  State :  Coordinates  relations 
with  the  World  Meteorological  Organization,  assists  the 
less  developed  nations  in  improving  their  national 
weather  services,  and  develops  appropriate  bilateral 
and  multilateral  arrangements  to  further  international 
participation. 

— The  National  Science  Foundation :  Stimulates  re- 
search on  general  circulation  of  the  atmosphere  among 
nongovernment  scientists,  and  promotes  the  education 
and  training  of  atmospheric  scientists. 

— The  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administra- 
tion :  Develops  the  new  technology  required  for  an 
economical  global  weather  system  as  related  to  its 
responsibilities. 


370 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BUIiLETnf 


— The  Department  of  Defense :  Supports  the  World 
Weather  Watch  activities  through  its  ongoing  meteor- 
ological programs  and,  as  appropriate,  provides  plan- 
ning information  on  meteorological  assistance  pro- 
grams. 

— The  Department  of  Transportation :  Develops 
ocean  data  buoys  and  conducts  tests  of  the  hazard  of 
horizontal  sounding  balloon  systems  to  aircraft. 

— The  Atomic  Energy  Commission :  Conducts  re- 
search complementary  to  GARP  data-gathering 
projects. 

— The  Department  of  Interior :  Conducts  research 
complementary  to  GARP  data-gathering  projects. 

All  of  the  above  agencies  a.ssist  in  the  planning  and 
provide  operational  and  logistical  support  to  GARP 
data-gathering  projects. 


2.  GOALS 

To  meet  the  needs  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
for  improved  weather  services  and  to  capture  the 
scientific  and  technological  opportunities  that  now  have 
been  foreseen  to  improve  these  services,  the  U.S.  goals 
for  the  World  Weather  Program  are  to  : 

— increase  the  accuracy  of  weather  predictions, 
— extend  the  time  range  of  weather  predictions,  and 
— determine  the  degree  to  which  large-scale  weather 
modiiication  and  climate  modification  are  possible. 

The  successful  execution  of  the  World  Weather  Pro- 
gram will  require  a  previously  unparalleled  degree  of 
cooperation  and  collaboration  among  the  nations  of  the 
world.  It  will  demonstrate  the  extent  to  which  benefits 
can  be  derived  from  a  major  cooperative  international 
effort  in  an  area  where  cooperation  has  been  a  tradi- 
tion for  a  century  and  will  serve  as  another  building 
block  for  establishing  world  order  and  peace. 


3.  PROGRAM  DESCRIPTION 

To  achieve  the  goals  of  the  United  States  and  other 
nations  in  the  World  Weather  Program  requires : 

— the  e.stablishment  of  an  operational  global  weather 
observing,  communicating,  and  processing  system — the 
World  Weather  Watch ; 

— the  conduct  of  a  comprehensive  program  of  re- 
search focused  on  acquiring  a  better  scientific  under- 
standing of  the  physical  and  dynamic  processes  of  the 
atmosphere  to  be  incorporated  into  the  mathematical 
models — the  Global  Atmospheric  Research  Program ; 
and 

— the  development  of  new  technology  for  observing 
the  atmosphere  and  communicating  and  processing 
weather  data  and  products. 

The  present  international  weather  observing  system 
is  inadequate  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  U.S.  weather 
services  in  predicting  the  future  state  of  the  atmos- 
phere. The  area  from  which  observations  are  needed 
increases  with  the  time  range  of  the  forecast.  Even  for 
forecasts  for  periods  of  1  or  2  days  for  the  Central  U.S. 
observations  are  needed  in  parts  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean 
and  much  of  the  Pacific.  For  predictions  of  more  than 
a  few  days,  observations  over  the  entire  Northern 
Hemisphere  are  required,  and  for  a  week  or  more  in 
advance,  global  observations  are  essential.  The  obser- 


vations must  not  only  be  made  at  the  surface  of  the 
earth  but  must  extend  far  up  into  the  atmosphere,  even 
for  short-range  predictions.  The  atmospheric  elements 
that  must  be  observed  include  wind,  temperature,  hu- 
midity, and  pressure  at  many  levels.  For  longer  range 
predictions,  observations  are  required  over  the  entire 
globe  and  from  the  upper  parts  of  the  oceans. 

Today  in  the  Northern  Hemisphere  the  observational 
network  is  adequate  only  over  land  surfaces.  Over  the 
oceans  a  sparse  network,  providing  principally  surface 
observations  with  only  a  very  few  observations  above 
the  surface  and  below  the  surface,  is  in  existence.  The 
present  international  communication  system  is  also 
inadequate.  The  limited  data  available  are  frequently 
delayed  and  many  errors  occur  in  transmission  to  proc- 
essing centers. 

The  GARP  includes  both  theoretical  studies  and 
field  observation  projects  all  aimed  at  the  develop- 
ment of  a  capability  to  make  longer  range  weather  pre- 
dictions. The  theoretical  research  should  focus  upon  the 
development  of  computer  models  which  simulate  at- 
mospheric motions  with  high  fidelity,  and  can  best  be 
accomplished  through  a  concerted  and  coordinated 
effort  by  the  world's  scientific  community.  The  field 
projects  will  study  atmospheric  physical  processes 
presently  not  understood  adequately  for  incorporation 
into  computer  models.  Some  of  the  field  projects  can 
be  done  effectively  by  a  single  nation.  Others  will 
require  the  joint  efforts  of  a  number  of  nations. 

The  most  expensive  part  of  any  weather  service  is 
simply  observing  the  weather.  This  is  particularly  true 
of  global  observations  such  as  required  for  the  WWW 
and  for  a  global  research  experiment.  A  substantial  in- 
vestment in  new  observing  technology  is  necessary  to 
the  achievement  of  an  adequate  and  economically  fea- 
sible system,  especially  for  the  ocean  areas.  The  new 
technology  developmental  effort  focuses  on  remote  sens- 
ing and  data  collection  from  meteorological  satellites, 
ocean  data  buoys,  horizontal  sounding  balloons,  and 
improved  equipment  for  taking  observations  from  all 
types  of  ships. 

Some  parts  of  the  Program  can  only  be  achieved 
through  the  cooperative  efforts  of  the  nations  of  the 
world — a  fact  recognized  by  the  leaders  of  all  nations. 
For  example,  the  WWW  will  require  the  installation 
and  operation  of  compatible  equipment  by  all  of  the 
participating  countries. 

The  U.S.  activity  in  the  World  Weather  Program  ia 
structured  so  as  to  result  in  maximum  benefit  for  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  Practically  all  of  the  ac- 
tions envisaged  under  the  World  Weather  Program 
would  be  necessary  for  improvement  of  our  domestic 
weather  services.  However,  by  cooperating  with  other 
nations  we  have  the  potential  for  achieving  re.sults 
far  beyond  those  that  would  be  within  the  capability  of 
this  country  alone. 


World  Weather  Watch   Implementation 

The  WMO,  a  specialized  agency  of  the  United  Na- 
tions with  132  Members,  coordinates  the  planning  and 
implementation  of  the  WWW  internationally.  At  the 
quadrennial  meeting  of  the  WMO  Congress  in  1967, 
a  plan  for  the  implementation  of  certain  key  aspects 
of  the  WWW  for  the  period  1968-1971  was  adopted.  It 
will  take  approximately  a  decade  to  bring  the  WWW 
into  full  being.  The  implementation  program  will  pro- 


APRIL    28,    1969 


371 


ceed  in  4-year  phases.  The  first  phase  extends  through 
1971  and  the  second  phase  from  1972-1975. 

The  first-phase  WWW  implementation  plan  is  de- 
signed to  remedy  the  most  critical  deficiencies  in  the 
uitemational  weather  system  through  the  use  of  readily 
available,  proven  techniques,  equipment,  and  proce- 
dures. Concurrently,  during  this  period  a  concerted 
effort  will  be  made  to  develop  new  technology,  espe- 
cially for  observing  the  atmosphere,  for  incorporation 
into  the  second  phase.  Careful  consideration  has  been 
given  to  the  nature  of  first-phase  implementation  to 
permit  an  orderly  incorporation  of  new  technology  as 
it  becomes  available  later. 

While  the  planning  of  an  international  system  should 
be  carried  out  internationally,  it  must  be  implemented 
by  individual  nations.  Therefore,  the  WMO  Congress 
agreed  that  those  aspects  for  the  implementation  of  the 
WWW  which  fall  within  national  boundaries  are  the 
responsibility  of  the  nation  itself.  Implementation  over 
ocean  areas  and  in  outer  space  will  be  through  the 
voluntary  participation  of  the  nations. 

VOLUNTABT   ASSISTANCE   PBOQBAM 

The  success  of  the  first-phase  WWW  plan  depends 
on  improving  the  observation  and  communication  facil- 
ities in  many  less  developed  nations.  Since  these  facili- 
ties will  benefit  all  nations,  it  is  important  to  provide 
requisite  assistance  to  make  improvements  in  these 
countries.  The  Members  of  the  WMO  accordingly  estab- 
lished a  Voluntary  Assistance  Program  (VAP)  to  assist 
less  developed  countries  to  fulfill  their  obligations  in 
their  territories.  This  assistance  will  be  provided  only 
when  bilateral  programs,  and  such  multilateral  pro- 
grams as  the  United  Nations  Development  Program, 
are  not  sufficient.  The  developing  countries  will  be 
required  to  provide  local  costs. 

TKAININ8 

A  program  to  train  x)ersonnel  for  the  WWW  Is  mov- 
ing forward  internationally  through  the  United  Na- 
tions Development  Program  and  the  WMO  and  its 
VAP.  Observers  and  technicians  are  being  trained. 
Education  programs  are  provided  for  forecasters  and 
research  scientists.  These  efforts  are  contributing  sig- 
nificantly to  the  training  and  education  of  personnel 
to  operate  meteorological  facilities. 

WOBLD   WEATHER   WATCH   OBSEBVATIONS — FIBST  PHASE 

The  plan  approved  by  the  WlIO  Congress  for  1968 
through  1971  is  to  remedy  the  more  critical  deficiencies 
over  land  areas  and  the  oceans  through  extension  of 
conventional  observation  networks  and  the  Increased 
use  of  observational  satellites.  It  is  planned  to  achieve 
an  average  minimum  network  spacing  of  600  nautical 
miles  for  upper-air  stations  over  all  continental  regions 
and  ocean  regions  with  suitably  distributed  islands ; 
over  open  oceans  areas,  average  effective  network  spac- 
ing of  approximately  1,000  nautical  miles  will  be 
established. 

To  meet  the  objectives  over  the  land  areas,  the  plan 
requires  the  establishment  or  upgrading  of  131  stations. 
The  network  within  the  United  States  meets  the  mini- 
mum criteria,  and  only  3  stations  in  the  Pacific  Trust 


Territories  must  be  established.  To  meet  the  objectives 
over  the  open  oceans,  100  additional  merchant  ships 
must  be  equipped  to  acquire  surface  and  upper-air 
observations.  The  United  States  has  equipped  15  ships 
and  plans  to  equip  additional  ships  in  accord  with  the 
WWW  plans.  In  addition,  the  United  States  will  im- 
prove its  operational  meteorological  satellite  system  to 
obtain  both  day  and  night  cloud  photographs  and  the 
temperature  at  the  surface  of  the  earth  or  tops  of  clouds. 

WORLD  WEATHER  WATCH  DATA  PEOCESSING FIRST  PHASE 

The  processing  of  meteorological  data  under  the 
WWW  international  plan  will  take  place  at  three  levels.       . 
World  Meteorological   Centers  will  prepare  weather      i 
analyses  and  predictions  on  a  global  basis  utilizing       " 
modern    facilities   centering   around   high-speed    elec- 
tronic computers.  Regional  Meteorological  Centers  will 
be  established  to  prepare  analyses  and  predictions  for 
more  limited  regions  of  the  earth.  The  third  level  of 
processing,  the  National  Meteorological  Centers,  will 
prepare  the  predictions  needed  by  the  users  of  weather 
information  within  their  own  country. 

World  Meteorological  Centers  are  located  at  Wash- 
ington, Moscow,  and  Melbourne.  These  Centers  are  al- 
ready in  operation  and  will  only  need  to  be  upgraded 
to  prepare  the  full  range  of  global  weather  products 
specified  in  the  international  plan.  The  Centers  will  be 
staffed,  operated,  and  funded  by  the  host  nation.  The 
World  Meteorological  Center  at  Washington  will  need 
to  expand  its  computer  facilities  to  prepare  global 
analyses  and  predictions  instead  of  the  hemispheric 
predictions  now  being  made,  and  will  continue  to  im- 
prove the  predictions.  The  United  States  plans  to  use 
its  Tropical  Meteorological  Center  at  Miami  as  one 
of  the  22  Regional  Meteorological  Centers  called  for  in 
the  international  plan.  This  Center  is  to  upgrade  its 
capabilities  to  provide  analyses  and  predictions  for  the 
tropical  ocean  areas  as  well  as  to  the  nations  in  the 
Caribbean  area  and  northern  South  America. 

WOBLD     WEATHEE    WATCH     TELECOMMTJITICATIONS FIBST 

PHASE 

The  present  international  communications  system, 
largely  based  on  HF  radio  teletype,  Is  inadequate.  The 
International  plan  for  1968-1971  includes  installation 
of  a  reliable  global  communications  system  intercon- 
necting all  continents  with  sufficient  capacity  to  ex- 
change meteorological  data  and  products  produced  by 
the  World  Meteorological  Centers.  In  addition,  regional 
and  national  communications  systems  will  be  upgraded  ■ 
to  Insure  the  timely  fiow  of  data  to  processing  centers.     I 

The  global  communications  system  will  join  the  three 
World  Meteorological  Centers  and  at  least  one  regional 
telecommunications  facility  on  each  continent.  The 
WIMO  has  established  the  technical  standards  for  im- 
plementation of  the  commtmication  links  and  terminals. 
Funding  for  the  links  is  shared  by  the  nations  at  the 
terminals.  The  United  States  has  joint  responsibility 
for  establishing  and  operating  the  links  from  Washing- 
ton to  Brazil,  Western  Europe,  and  Japan.  The  link 
to  Western  Europe  has  already  been  established,  a  low- 
speed  link  to  Brazil  will  be  established  early  in  1969, 
and  the  link  to  Japan  is  planned  in  late  1969. 


372 


DEPARTMENT"  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


Global  Atmospheric  Research  Program 

The  GARP  involves  the  study  of  those  aspects  of 
atmospheric  motions  and  processes  which  must  be  bet- 
ter understood  to  make  more  accurate  and  longer  range 
weather  predictions. 

The  program  consists  of  two  major  efforts:  (1) 
theoretical  research  on  physical  processes  of  the 
atmosphere  and  on  the  development  of  models  which 
simulate  atmospheric  motions  with  greater  fidelity; 
and  (2)  field  observational  projects  aimed  at  provid- 
ing the  requisite  data  needed  for  the  theoretical  re- 
search and  the  development  of  computer  models. 

Internationally,  a  unique  mechanism  has  been  estab- 
lished to  coordinate  GARP,  bringing  together  the 
ICSU — the  nongovernmental  scientific  body — and  the 
WMO — the  intergovernmental  coordinating  body.  A 
permanent  joint  planning  staff  and  committee  are 
charged  with  the  coordination  of  the  theoretical  re- 
search required  and  the  scientific  design  of  field  proj- 
ects. The  implementation  of  the  large-scale  field  activ- 
ities requiring  the  joint  effort  of  many  nations  will  be 
carried  out  through  the  WMO. 

The  NAS  of  the  United  States  ha.?  been  requested  by 
the  government  to  formulate  and  recommend  the 
national  scientific  program  which  is  required  to  meet 
the  objectives  of  GARP.  The  Academy  has  established 
a  committee  for  this  purpose,  as  well  as  to  provide 
advice  to  the  government  on  the  World  Weather 
Program. 

ATMOSPHEBIC  DYNAMICS  AND  MODEUNG 

Most  of  the  research  required  to  develop  better  com- 
puter models  center  around  the  manner  in  which  energy 
is  put  into,  taken  out  of,  and  redistributed  within  the 
atmosphere : 

— The  interaction  between  atmosphere  and  the  ocean 
and  earth  needs  precise  understanding,  since  much  of 
the  energy  received  from  the  sun  is  first  absorbed  at 
the  surface  and  then  released  to  the  atmosphere. 

— The  dissipation  of  the  energy  of  the  large-scale 
motions  of  the  atmosphere  needs  more  exploration.  A 
familiar  manifestation  of  this  dissipation  is  the  turbu- 
lence encountered  by  jet  aircraft. 

— Thunderstorms  and  cumulus  clouds  carry  heat  up- 
ward in  the  atmosphere.  A  better  understanding  of  the 
convective  process  is  required  both  for  computer  model- 
ing of  the  energetics  of  the  atmosphere  and  for  im- 
proved forecasting  of  precipitation,  tornadoes,  and 
other  severe  weather. 

— Tropical  circulations  need  careful  exploration  to 
permit  more  accurate  modeling  of  the  effects  of  the 
heat  energy  of  the  vast  tropical  regions  on  the  world's 
weather  and  to  improve  forecasting  of  hurricanes  and 
other  tropical  storms. 

The  formulation  of  Improved  atmospheric  computer 
models  is  essential  to  the  success  of  the  World  Weather 
Program.  The  effort  must  focus  on  the  more  precise 
incorporation  of  the  physical  processes  that  determine 
the  evolution  of  the  state  of  the  atmosphere,  on  the 
further  development  of  models  which  treat  the  ocean 
and  the  atmosphere  as  a  single  physical  system,  and 
on  the  further  development  of  mathematical  computa- 


tional procedures  used  in  the  many  iterative  calcula- 
tions made  in  preparing  predictions  for  extended 
periods  of  time.  To  carry  this  effort  forward  effectively 
wiU  require  much  larger  and  faster  computers  than 
presently  available. 

HELD  OBSEBVATIONAI.  PEOQEAMS 

Field  projects  are  presently  being  formulated,  na- 
tionally and  internationally.  These  projects  are  struc- 
tured so  that,  to  the  maximum  extent  possible,  the 
efforts  can  be  carried  out  by  individual  nations.  How- 
ever, it  is  recognized  that  international  efforts  will  be 
required  for  the  larger  experiments. 

The  field  experiments  are  divided  into  two  categories : 
those  which  focus  on  specific  physical  processes  on  a 
local  and  regional  basis,  and  those  which  are  global. 

BOIUEX 

The  current  U.S.  effort  Is  called  the  Barbados  Ocean- 
ographic  and  Meteorological  Experiment  (BOMEX). 
BOMEX  will  take  place  during  May,  June,  and  July 
1969,  immediately  to  the  east  of  the  island  of  Barbados. 
In  addition  to  the  observation  of  the  exchange  of 
momentum,  heat,  and  moisture  at  the  ocean-atmosphere 
interface,  the  experiment  wiU  also  involve  a  prelimi- 
nary study  of  tropical  circulations,  the  time  and  space 
variation  of  oceanographic  parameters,  exchange  rates 
of  radioactive  nuclides  between  air  and  sea  and  certain 
characteristics  of  atmospheric  radiation  transfer.  Ap- 
proximately 20  aircraft,  10  buoys,  and  12  ships  from 
various  Federal  agencies  and  universities  will  be  used 
as  the  platforms  from  which  to  collect  the  observa- 
tions. ...  It  is  the  largest  joint  experiment  ever  con- 
ducted by  the  meteorological  and  oceanographic 
communities  and  could  not  be  carried  out  by  any  single 
agency  within  the  government.  Participating  agencies 
include  the  Departments  of  Commerce,  Defense,  In- 
terior, State,  and  Transportation,  the  National  Aero- 
nautics and  Space  Administration,  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  and  National  Science  Foundation.  In  addi- 
tion, nongovernment  agencies  participating  in  BOMEX 
Include  the  National  Center  for  Atmospheric  Research 
(NCAR)  and  over  10  universities. 

Tropical  Projects 

Projects  focusing  on  the  manner  in  which  tropical 
disturbances  are  formed  and  the  role  of  cumulus  con- 
vection in  redistributing  energy  In  the  atmosphere  are 
in  an  early  planning  stage.  The  international  scientific 
committee  has  recommended  that  these  experiments  be 
carried  out  in  the  middle  1970's.  They  will  involve  ob- 
servations over  the  sizable  areas  of  the  tropics. 

Many  of  these  experiments  require  very  precise  meas- 
urements of  wind  direction  and  speed,  temperature,  and 
moisture.  Further  development  of  improved  sensor  sys- 
tems is  required  for  the  proper  conduct  of  these 
experiments. 

Olohal  Experiments 

The  global  experiments  are  required  to  provide  a  set 
of  data  for  research  on  and  testing  of  improved  mathe- 
matical models  of  the  atmosphere.  These  are  planned 
to  last  for  finite  periods,  up  to  1  year,  and  involve  sub- 
stantial expansion  of  the  observational  network  of  the 


APRIL    28,    1969 


373 


www.  A  preliminary  global  experiment  has  been  rec- 
ommended for  sometime  during  the  mid  1970's  by  the 
international  planning  group.  The  global  experiment 
which  meets  the  entire  set  of  data  requirements  does 
not  appear  feasible  until  the  later  1970's  and  requires 
extensive  development  of  sensors  operating  from  ships, 
buoys,  and  satellites.  Therefore,  for  both  experiments, 
an  intensive  program  to  develop  improved  sensors  and 
the  associated  platforms  for  obtaining  global  observa- 
tions is  planned  for  the  early  1970's. 


System   and  Technology   Development 

The  World  Weather  Program  calls  for  the  implemen- 
tation of  a  total  system  in  which  many  types  of  obser- 
vations from  many  types  of  platforms  made  by  many 
nations  combine  systematically  to  meet  the  data  re- 
quirements of  global  forecasting  and  of  research  to 
improve  it. 

Present  technology  can,  in  principle,  provide  the  ob- 
servations and  communications  required,  but  at  pro- 
hibitive cost  for  equipment  and  staff.  New  technology, 
not  yet  developed  for  operational  use,  offers  potentially 
greater  precision  in  observations  over  the  entire  globe 
at  significantly  lower  operating  cost.  Many  of  the  new 
concepts  center  around  the  earth-orbiting  satellite  as 
a  platform  for  remotely  sensing  the  atmosphere  and 
ocean,  for  global  communications  to  exchange  data 
and  weather  products,  and  for  the  collection  of  observa- 
tions from  remote  and  automatic  platforms  floating  on 
the  oceans  or  in  the  atmosphere.  In  conjunction  with 
the  satellite  system,  the  development  of  horizontal 
sounding  balloons,  ocean  data  buoys,  and  sensors  for 
ships  and  aircraft  will  be  pursued  vigorously. 


COORDINATION 

Coordination  of  the  technical  developmental  pro- 
grams of  the  nations  of  the  world  is  handled  by  the 
WMO,  assisted  by  the  Joint  ICSU/WMO  Planning 
Group  and  Committee.  Coordination  of  the  space  pro- 
grams of  the  nations  is  carried  out  through  the  ICSU 
Committee  on  Space  Research  (COSPAR).  The  WMO 
coordinates  the  system  activities  required  for  the  design 
of  the  WWW,  but  relies  very  heavily  upon  Members  for 
the  execution  of  specific  analyses  and  designs. 

Due  to  the  advanced  nature  of  the  developments  re- 
quired by  the  WWW  and  the  research  experiments,  only 
a  limited  number  of  Member  states  are  able  to  make 
substantial  contributions.  In  addition  to  the  United 
States,  a  number  of  other  nations  are  puri?uing  an 
extensive  technology  development  program.  Meteoro- 
logical satellites  are  being  developed  by  both  the  USSR 
and  France.  Buoys  are  being  developed  in  a  number  of 
countries,  including  USSR,  Norway,  and  Germany. 
Remote  sensing  devices  for  operation  on  satellites  or 
other  platforms  are  being  developed  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  USSR.  Automatic  weather  stations  are 
being  developed  in  many  nations. 

Because  international  development  projects  are 
somewhat  difficult  to  manage  and  execute,  bilateral 
arrangements  are  favored.  The  joint  effort  between  the 
United  States  and  France  to  test  a  satellite/horizontal 
sounding  balloon  system  is  a  prime  example  of  such  an 
arrangement. 


SATELLITES 

The  U.S.  research  and  development  on  meteorological 
satellites  is  carried  out  primarily  by  the  NASA  and  to 
a  more  limited  extent  by  the  Department  of  Commerce. 
In  addition  to  producing  operational  satellites,  the 
NASA  has  developed  the  Nimbus  spacecraft  for  the 
testing  of  new  sensors  in  polar  orbits  and  uses  the 
Application  Technology  Satellite  (ATS),  which  was 
developed  primarily  to  test  new  space  application  con- 
cepts and  techniques,  as  a  platform  for  testing  meteoro- 
logical sensors  from  synchronous  altitudes.  Two 
Nimbus  and  two  ATS  spacecraft  have  already  been 
successfully  flown.  Additional  flights  are  planned  in 
the  coming  years. 

Camera  systems  for  observing  cloud  cover  of  the 
earth  are  already  operational.  Improved  systems  have 
been  tested  on  Nimbus  and  ATS.  The  first  satellite  test 
of  sensors  operating  in  the  infrared  portion  of  the 
spectrum  for  determining  the  vertical  profile  of  tem- 
perature and  humidity  in  the  atmosphere  is  scheduled 
for  the  flight  of  Nimbus  B-2  in  1969.  These  sensor  sys- 
tems will  provide  data  in  clear  areas  but  are  limited  in 
cloudy  regions.  Advanced  versions  of  these  sensors  will 
be  tested  on  the  Nimbus  D  spacecraft  to  be  launched 
in  1970.  Sensors  operating  in  the  microwave  portion 
of  the  spectrum,  and  thus  only  partially  affected  by 
clouds,  are  now  under  development  for  flight  test  in 
the  following  Nimbus  E  spacecraft. 

Sequential  cloud  photos  taken  from  ATS  satellites 
show  a  remarkable  potential  for  determining  winds 
from  the  motion  of  clouds.  Future  satellites  at  syn- 
chronous altitudes,  such  as  ATS,  will  carry  infrared 
sensors  for  an  improved  capability  of  nighttime  cloud 
detection. 

Communication  equipment  for  the  collection  of  ob- 
servations from  remote  platforms  has  also  been  flown 
on  ATS  and  will  be  tested  on  Nimbus  B-2.  With  this 
equipment,  instrumented  drifting  balloons  and  buoys 
and  itinerant  ships  can  be  interrogated  and  located, 
and  their  data  relayed  rapidly  to  processing  centers  for 
analyses.  Development  is  actively  being  pursued. 

BUOYS 

The  development  of  the  ocean  buoy  for  acquisition 
of  oceanographic  and  meteorological  observations  has 
been  proceeding  in  the  United  States  for  a  number  of 
years.  Several  buoys,  such  as  the  Navy's  Nomad  and 
Monster,  have  been  developed,  but  further  major 
developmental  effort  is  required  in  order  to  provide 
suitable  operational  systems.  Automatic  data  buoys 
may  provide  a  cost  effective  means  of  collecting  data 
within  the  oceans  as  well  as  on  the  surface,  and  thereby 
provide  essential  information  in  the  air-sea  interaction 
zone  so  important  to  more  effective  weather  and  ocean 
predictions.  In  addition,  recent  technological  develop- 
ments indicate  that  observations  up  to  20,000  feet  in 
the  atmosphere  may  be  possible  from  such  buoys,  thus 
covering  the  lower  section  of  the  atmosphere  where 
satellite  observations  are  of  limited  value. 

The  Department  of  Transportation  (Coast  Guard) 
has  been  assigned  lead  agency  responsibility  for  con- 
ducting research,  development,  testing  and  evaluation 
to  permit  the  implementation  of  national  data  buoy 
systems  responsive  to  broad  national  needs  for  marine 
atmospheric  and  oceanic  data.  The  Coast  Guard  plans 


374 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


to  undertake  a  research  and  development  effort  in  FY 
1970  that  is  directed  toward  testing  of  a  prototype  data 
buoy  network  of  some  35  buoys,  with  necessary  support 
facilities,  along  the  coasts  of  North  America  and  in 
the  deep  oceans. 

HORIZONTAL   SOUNDING  BALLOONS 

Horizontal  sounding  balloons  offer  considerable 
promise  for  use  in  the  WWW  and  the  GARP.  These 
super-pressure  balloons  fly  with  the  winds  at  essentially 
constant  height  in  the  atmosphere.  When  equipped  with 
temperature  and  humidity  sensors,  interrogated  and 
located  from  a  satellite,  they  are  capable  of  providing 
data  not  otherwise  obtainable. 

The  NCAR  has  been  flying  super-pressure  balloons  in 
the  Southern  Hemisphere  to  determine  expected  life- 
time and  to  develop  the  overall  technology  to  an  opera- 
tional state.  Some  have  lasted  over  1  year  and  some 
have  circled  the  earth  many  times.  France  has  an  ex- 
tensive program  to  develop  a  balloon  and  associated 
satellite  system.  France  plans  an  experiment  to  test  the 
balloon/satellite  system  and  provide  experimental  data 
for  research  in  the  Southern  Hemisphere  with  500  bal- 
loons during  1971. 

An  intensive  development  program  is  required  to 
bring  the  balloon  to  an  operational  state.  The  effort 
should  focus  on  balloon  materials  and  fabrication 
techniques  and  the  lightweight  simple  electronic  and 
sensor  packages. 

Formulation  of  a  system  design  which  incorporates 
an  eflicient  and  effective  array  of  the  platforms  de- 
scribed is  a  formidable  problem.  Design  for  the  second 
phase  of  the  WWW  is  now  being  prepared  and  must 
be  completed  before  1971  so  that  the  implementation 
plan  for  the  second  phase  can  be  approved  at  the  6th 
Quadrennial  WMO  Congress  in  the  spring  of  1971.  An 
inten.sified  U.S.  effort  on  all  of  the  platforms  is  planned 
through  1975  so  that  the  future  phases  of  the  WWW 
and  the  global  experiments  can  be  carried  out  during 
the  1970's. 


U.S.  Delegation  to  ECLA  Session 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  April 
11  (press  release  80)  that  the  following  delega- 
tion would  represent  the  United  States  at  the 
13th  session  of  the  Economic  Commission  for 
Latin  America,  held  at  Lima,  Peru,  April 
14-23: 

U.S.  Representative 

Robert  E.  Culbertson,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Social  and  Civic  Development,  Bureau  of  Inter- 
American  Affairs,  Department  of  State 

Alternate  U.S.  Representative 

Ambassador  Milton  Barall,  Head  of  Caribbean  Study 
Group,  Bureau  of  Inter-American  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  State 


Advisers 

Bernard  J.  Cahill,  Deputy  Director,  American  Repub- 
lics  Division,    Department   of   Commerce 

Paxton  T.  Dunn,  Economic  OflScer,  American  Embassy, 
Santiago,  Chile 

Samuel  D.  Baton,  Director,  US-AID  Mission,  Peru 

Leighton  Van  Nort,  Oflice  of  International  Economic 
and  Social  Affairs,  Bureau  of  International  Organi- 
zation Affairs,  Department  of  State 

Robert  S.  Watson,  Deputy  Director,  Oflice  of  Latin 
America,  Department  of  the  Treasury 

John  E.  Williams,  General  Commercial  Policy  Divi- 
sion, Bureau  of  Economic  Affairs,  Department  of 
State 

The  Economic  Commission  for  Latin  Amer- 
ica is  one  of  the  four  regional  economic  com- 
missions of  the  United  Nations  Economic  and 
Social  Council.  The  biennial  plenary  meetings 
study  the  recent  economic  development  of  the 
area,  review  the  activities  of  the  Commission's 
committees  and  subgroups,  and  establish  a  pro- 
gram for  future  work. 

The  principal  agenda  items  this  year  deal 
with  the  strategy  for  regional  development  for 
the  Second  U.N.  Development  Decade  and  the 
related  question  of  Latin  American  trade 
policy. 

Members  of  ECLA  include  all  the  independ- 
ent nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  (in- 
cluding Cuba),  plus  France,  the  Netherlands, 
and  the  United  Kingdom. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago, 
1944  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with  annex.  Done  at 
Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
October  24, 1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Signature:  Panama,  April  9, 1969. 

Fisheries 

International  convention  for  the  conservation  of  At- 
lantic tunas.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  May  14,  1966. 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  March  21,  1969. 
Entered  into  force:  March  21,  1969. 


APRIL    28,    1969 


375 


Grains 

International  grains  arrangement,  1967,  witti  annexes. 

Open  for  signature  at  Washington  October  15  tlirougU 

November  30,  1967.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1968. 

TIAS  6537. 

Ratifications  to  the  Wheat  Trade  Convention  deposit- 
ed: Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  April  10, 1969;  * 
Greece,  AprU  7,  1969. 

Ratification  to  the  Food  Aid  Convention  deposited: 
Federal  KepubUc  of  Germany,  April  10,  1969.' 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 
1968.' 

Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Mauritius, 
AprU  8,  1969. 

Property 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  industrial 
property  of  March  20,  1883,  as  revised.  Done  at 
Stockholm  July  14,  1967.' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Romania  (with  reservation 
and  declaration ) ,  February  28,  1969 ;  United  King- 
dom, February  26,  1969. 
Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization.  Done  at  Stockholm  July  14,  1967.' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Romania  (with  declaration), 
February   28,   1969;    United   Kingdom,   February 
26,  1969. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4, 
1969." 

Signature:  Iraq  (with  declaration),  February  18, 
1969. 


BILATERAL 


Afghanistan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities  of  July  2,  1968  (TIAS  6523). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kabul  February 
1  and  March  15,  1969.  Entered  into  force  March 
15,  1969. 

Panama 

Agreement  relating  to  cooperation  and  assistance  to 
Panama  in  geologic  studies  along  route  10  (Caimito- 
Palmas  Bellas)  for  a  canal  site.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Panamd  March  20,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  March  20,  1969. 


PUBLICATIONS 


'  Applicable  to  Land  BerUn. 

'  Not  in  force. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


Recent  Releases 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  B.C.  20402. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders 
for  100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed 
to  the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Su- 
perintendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Aviation — Joint  Financing  of  Certain  Air  Navigation 
Services  in  Greenland  and  the  Faroe  Islands.  TIAS 
6575. 1  p.  10«(. 

Tracking  Station.  Agreement,  with  Agreed  Mlnnte, 
with  Mauritius.  TIAS  6576.  8  pp.  10(f. 

Protocol  Relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees.  TIAS 
6577.  66  pp.  300. 

Education — Financing  of  Elxchange  Programs.  Agree- 
ment with  Cyprus.  TIAS  6579.  4  pp.  lOif. 

Extension  of  Loan  of  Vessels.  Agreement  with  the  Re- 
public of  Korea.  TIAS  6581.  6  pp.  100. 

Status  of  United  States  Forces  in  Turkey — Duty  Cer- 
tificates. Agreement  with  Turkey.  TIAS  6582.  5  pp. 
100. 

Atomic  Energy — Application  of  Safeguards  by  the 
IAEA  to  the  United  States-Brazil  Cooperation  Agree- 
ment. Agreement  with  Brazil  and  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency.  TIAS  6583.  10  pp.  100. 

International  Coffee  Agreement,  1968.  TIAS  6584.  869 
pp.  $1.75. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Guyana. 
TIAS  6585. 11  pp.  100. 

Surplus  Property — Disposal  of  Excess  Military  Prop- 
erty in  Viet-Nam.  Agreement  with  Viet-Nam.  TIAS 
6586.  5  pp.  100. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.  Agreement  vrith  Norway 
amending  annex  0  to  the  agreement  of  January  27, 
1950.  TIAS  6587. 3  pp.  100. 

Extension  of  Loan  of  Vessel — U.S.S.  Bergall.  Agree- 
ment with  Turkey.  TIAS  6588.  3  pp.  100. 

Scientific  and  Technical  Cooperation.  Agreement  with 
AustraUa.  TIAS  6589.  3  pp.  100. 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  vrith  Colombia 
amending  the  agreement  of  October  24,  1956.  TIAS 
6593. 9  pp.  100. 


376 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BULLETLN 


INDEX     April  28,  1969     Vol.  ZX,  No.  1557 


Asia.  Secretary  Stans  To  Visit  Europe,  Asia  To 
Discuss  U.S.  Trade  Policies 

Atomic  Energy.  U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  To  Hold  Tech- 
nical Talks  on  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions    . 

China.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of 
April   7 

Communications.  William  W.  Scranton  To  Head 
U.S.  Delegation  to  Intelsat 

Congress.  World  Weather  Program — Plan  for 
U.S.  Participation  (Nixon,  excerpts  from 
report)       

Czechoslovakia.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Con- 
ference of  April  7 


Disarmament 

The  North  Atlantic  Council  Celebrates  the  20th 
Anniver.sary  of  the  Signing  of  the  North  At- 
lantic Treaty  (address  by  President  Nixon  and 
opening  remarks  at  ceremonial  session;  text 
of  final  communique) 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7 

Economic  Affairs.  Secretary  Stans  To  Visit 
Europe,  Asia  To  Discuss  U.S.  Trade  Policies    . 

Europe.  Secretary  Stans  To  Visit  Europe,  Asia 
To  Discuss  U.S.  Trade  Policies 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

William  W.  Scranton  To  Head  U.S.  Delegation 

to  Intelsat 

U.S.  Delegation  to  ECLA  Session 

Japan.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of 
April   7 

Jordan.  King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan  Visits  Wash- 
ington (exchange  of  greetings  with  President 
Nixon   and  joint  statement) 

Latin  America.  U.S.  Delegation  to  ECLA  Ses- 
sion       

Near  East 

King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan  Visits  Washington 
(exchange  of  greetings  with  President  Nixon 
and  joint  statement) 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

The  North  Atlantic  Council  Celebrates  the  20th 
Anniversary  of  the  Signing  of  the  North  At- 
lantic Treaty  ( address  by  President  Nixon  and 
opening  remarks  at  ceremonial  session;  text 
of  final  communique) 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7 

Peru 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7 
U.S.  and  Peru  To  Continue  Talks  on  Existing 
Differences    (Department   statement)     .     . 

Presidential  Documents 

King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan  Visits  Washington 
The  North  Atlantic  Council  Celebrates  the  20th 
Anniversary  of  the  Signing  of  the  North  At- 
lantic Treaty 

World  Weather  Program — Plan  for  U.S.  Par- 
ticipation   

Publications.  Recent  Releases 

Science.  World  Weather  Program — Plan  for 
U.S.  Participation  (Nixon,  excerpts  from  re- 
port)       


307 
356 
357 
367 

368 
357 


349 
357 

.367 

367 


367 
375 

357 


364 
375 


364 
357 


349 
357 

357 
364 

364 

349 

368 
376 

368 


Spain.   Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of 

April   7 357 

Trade.  Secretary  Stans  To  Visit  Europe,  Asia  To 

Discuss  U.S.  Trade  Policies 367 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions    ....  375 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7    .  357 
U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  To  Hold  Technical  Talks  on  Peace- 
ful Nuclear  Explosions 356 

Viet-Nam 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  April  7    .  357 
Twelfth  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at 

Paris  (Lodge) 365 

Name  Index 

Brandt,  Willy 349 

Brosio,   Manlio 349 

King  Hussein  I 364 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 365 

Nixon,    President 349,364,368 

Rogers,  Secretary 349,357 

Scranton,  William  W 367 

Stans,  Maurice  H 367 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 

Press  Releases:  April  7-13 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Ofiice 

of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 

20520. 

No. 

Date 

Subject 

*73 

4/7 

Canada    announces    intention    to 
amend  Territorial  Sea  and  Fish- 
ing Zones  Act. 

*72A 

4/7 

Amendments  to  program  for  visit 
of  King  Hussein  I  of  Jordan. 

74 

4/7 

Rogers :  news  conference  of  April  7. 

75 

4/9 

U.S.  delegation  to  NATO  ministe- 
rial meeting. 

76 

4/10 

Rogers :    NATO    ministerial   meet- 
ing. 

77 

4/10 

Lodge :    12th    plenary    session    on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

t78 

4/11 

Sisco :  "The  United  States  and  the 
Arab-Israeli  Dispute." 

t79 

4/11 

U.S.-Greece   cotton   textile   agree- 
ment. 

SO 

4/11 

U.S.  delegation  to  the  13th  session 
of  the  Economic  Commission  for 
Latin  America  (rewrite). 

81 

4/11 

North  Atlantic  Council  final  com- 
munique. 

ed. 

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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1558 


May  5,  1969 


PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE  OF  APRIL  IS  {ExcerpU)      377 

UNARMED  U.S.  RECONNAISSANCE  PLANE  IN  INTERNATIONAL  AIRSPACt: 

SHOT  DOWN  BY  NORTH  KOREA 

Defense  Befartment  Statement  and  U.S.  Statement  at  Panmwnjom     382 

A  NEW  APPROACH  TO  PAN  AMERICAN  PROBLEMS 

RemMrks  by  President  Nixon     384 

THE  COMPLEXITY  OF  WORLD  AFFAIRS 

Remarks  by  Secretary  Rogers     387 
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THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


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May  5,  1969 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
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The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
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I 

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I 


I 


President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  April  18 


Following  are  excerpts  from  the  transcript  of 
a  news  conference  held  hy  President  Nixon  in 
the  East  Room  of  the  White  House  on  April  18. 

The  President:  Won't  you  be  seated,  please. 
Mr.   Cormier    [Frank   Cormier,  Associated 
Press]  ? 

Q.  Mr.  President.,  the  question  on  all  of  our 
miruls  is  where  do  we  go  from  here  with  the  in- 
cident of  the  shooting  down  of  the  plane?  What 
further  action  might  you  contemplate  diplo- 
matically and  militarily? 

The  President:  Mr.  Cormier,  first,  I  think  a 
word  with  regard  to  the  facts  in  this  case:  As 
was  pointed  out  in  the  protest  that  was  filed  at 
Pamnunjom  yesterday  and  also  in  the  Defense 
Department  statement,  the  plane  involved  was 
an   unarmed   Constellation,   propeller-driven.^ 

The  mission  was  a  reconnaissance  mission 
which  at  no  time  took  the  plane  closer  to  the 
shores  of  North  Korea  than  40  miles.  At  the 
time  the  plane  was  shot  down,  all  of  the  evidence 
that  we  have  indicates  that  it  was  shot  down 
approximately  90  miles  from  the  shores  of 
North  Korea  while  it  was  moving  outward, 
aborting  the  mission  on  orders  that  had  been 
received.  We  knew  this,  based  on  our  radar. 

Wliat  is  also  even  more  important,  the  North 
Koreans  knew  it,  based  on  their  radar.  There- 
fore, this  attack  was  unprovoked.  It  was  delib- 
erate. It  was  without  warning.  The  protest 
has  been  fiJed.  The  North  Koreans  have  not 
responded. 

Now  a  word  with  regard  to  why  we  have  such 
missions  in  the  Sea  of  Japan.  As  you  ladies  and 
gentlemen  are  aware,  there  are  56,000  American 
troops  stationed  in  South  Korea.  Those  56,000 
men  are  the  responsibility  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  as  Commander  in  Chief. 

In  recent  weeks  and  months,  in  fact  going 
back  over  the  last  2  or  3  years,  but  particularly 
in  recent  weeks  and  months.  North  Korea  has 
threatened  military  action  against  South  Korea 

•  See  p.  382. 


and  against  our  forces  in  South  Korea.  The 
nimiber  of  incidents  has  increased. 

It  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Commander  in 
Chief  to  protect  the  security  of  those  men.  That 
is  why,  gomg  back  over  20  years  and  through- 
out the  period  of  this  administration  being  con- 
tinued, we  have  had  a  policy  of  reconnaissance 
flights  in  the  Sea  of  Japan  similar  to  this  flight. 
This  year  we  have  had  already  190  of  these 
flights  without  incident,  without  threat,  without 
warning  at  all. 

Now,  the  question  is:  Wliat  do  we  do  about 
these  flights  in  the  future?  They  were  discon- 
tinued immediately  after  this  incident  occurred. 

I  have  today  ordered  that  these  flights  be  con- 
tinued. They  will  be  protected.  This  is  not  a 
threat ;  it  is  simply  a  statement  of  fact. 

As  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  our  Armed 
Forces,  I  cannot  and  wUl  not  ask  our  men  to 
serve  in  Korea,  and  I  cannot  and  will  not  ask  our 
men  to  take  flights  like  this  in  imarmed  planes 
without  providing  protection.  That  will  be  the 
case. 

Looking  to  the  future,  as  far  as  what  we  do 
will  depend  upon  the  circumstances.  It  will  de- 
pend upon  what  is  done  as  far  as  North  Korea 
is  concerned,  its  reaction  to  the  protest,  and  also 
any  other  developments  that  occur  as  we  con- 
tinue these  flights. 

Mr.  Smith  [Merriman  Smith,  United  Press 
International]  ? 

Outlook  for  Peace  in  Southeast  Asia 

Q.  Now  that  you  have  had  about  3  months  in 
a  position  of  Presidential  responsibility,  do  the 
chances  of  peace  in  Southeast  Asia  seem  to  come 
amy  closer  at  all,  or  has  the  situation,  the  outlook 
for  peace,  improved  or  deteriorated  since  yov/r 
inauguration? 

The  President:  Mr.  Smith,  the  chances  for 
peace  in  Southeast  Asia  have  significantly  im- 
proved since  this  administration  came  into  office. 
I  do  not  claim  that  that  has  happened  simply 
because  of  what  we  have  done,  although  I  think 


MAT    5,    1969 


377 


we  have  done  some  things  that  have  improved 
those  chances,  and  I  am  not  trying  to  raise  false 
hopes  that  peace  is  just  aroimd  the  corner,  this 
summer  or  this  fall. 

But  a  number  of  developments  clearly  beyond 
the  Paris  peace  talks  have  convinced  me  that  the 
chances  for  bringing  this  war  to  a  peaceful  con- 
clusion have  significantly  improved. 

One  factor  that  should  be  mentioned,  that  I 
note  has  not  been  covered  perhaps  as  much  as 
others,  is  the  fact  that  South  Korea  has  signifi- 
cantly improved  its  own  capabilities.  The  way 
we  can  tell  this  has  happened  is  that  the  South 
Korean  President  has  taken  an  attitude  with 
regard  to  the  makeup  of  a  government  after 
peace  comes  that  he  wouldn't  have  even  consid- 
ered 6  months  ago,  and  he  has  done  this  because 
South  Korea — I  am  sorry;  South  Vietnamese 
forces — it  is  natural  that  you  transplant  these 
two  words,  I  find,  in  discussing  these  two  sub- 
jects— South  Vietnamese  forces  are  far  better 
able  to  handle  themselves  militarily,  and  that 
progi'am  is  going  forward  on  a  much  more  in- 
tensive basis  than  it  was  when  this  administra- 
tion came  into  oflSce. 

Second,  political  stability  in  South  Viet-Nam 
has  increased  significantly  since  this  adminis- 
tration came  into  office.  The  trend  had  begun 
before,  but  it  has  continued  and  escalated  since 
that  time. 

As  a  result  of  these  two  factors,  it  means  that 
South  Viet-Nam  is  able  to  make  a  peace  which 
I  think  wUl  give  a  better  opportunity  for  nego- 
tiating room  for  their  negotiators  and  ours  at 
the  Paris  conference.  That  is  one  of  the  reasons 
for  my  feeling  somewhat  optimistic,  although 
we  still  have  some  hard  ground  to  plow. 

Q.  To  follow  that  up,  then,  are  you  consider- 
ing now  the  unilateral  withdrawal  of  American 
troops  from  South  Viet-Nam? 

The  President:  I  am  not.  If  we  are  to  have 
a  negotiating  position  at  the  Paris  peace  talks, 
it  must  be  a  position  in  which  we  can  negotiate 
from  strength ;  and  discussion  about  unilateral 
withdrawal  does  not  help  that  position.  I  wUl 
not  engage  in  it,  although  I  realize  it  might  be 
rather  popular  to  do  so. 

It  is  the  aim  of  this  administration  to  bring 
men  home  just  as  soon  as  our  security  will  allow 
us  to  do  so.  As  I  have  indicated  previously,  there 
are  three  factors  that  we  are  going  to  take  into 
consideration:  the  training  of  the  South  Viet- 
namese, their  ability  to  handle  their  own  de- 


fense ;  the  level  of  fighting  in  South  Viet-Nam, 
whether  or  not  the  offensive  action  of  the  enemy 
recedes;  and  progress  in  the  Paris  peace  talks. 
Looking  to  the  future,  I  would  have  to  say 
that  I  think  there  are  good  prospects  that  Amer- 
ican forces  can  be  reduced  but  as  far  as  this 
time  is  concerned  we  have  no  plans  to  reduce 
our  forces  until  there  is  more  progress  on  one  or 
all  of  the  three  fronts  that  I  have  mentioned. 

Q.  Can  I  ask  you  whether  you  have  ordered 
that  the  level  of  American  combat  activity  in 
South  Viet-Nam  he  reduced  in  order  to  reduce 
the  casualties? 

The  President:  No,  Mr.  Lisagor  [Peter 
Lisagor,  Chicago  Daily  News],  the  casualties 
have  been  reduced,  as  you  have  noted  in  your 
question,  but  the  reason  that  American  casual- 
ties are  down  is  because  the  level  of  offensive 
action  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  has  receded. 

An  analysis — and  I  have  studied  this  quite 
carefully  because  I  have  noted  the  great  interest 
in  this  country  on  this  subject — as  to  whether 
or  not  our  casualties  are  the  result  of  our  action  ■£ 
or  theirs :  What  we  find  is  that  the  number  of  1 
casualties  substantially  increased  during  the 
spring  offensive.  That  spring  offensive  at  this 
time  either  has  run  its  course  or  is  in  a  substan- 
tial lull.  Because  that  offensive  is  in  that  status 
at  this  time,  our  level  of  casualties  is  down. 

I  have  not  ordered  and  do  not  intend  to  order 
any  reduction  of  our  own  activities.  We  will  do     M 
what  is  necessary  to  defend  our  position  and  to     1 
maintain  the  strength  of  our  bargaining  posi- 
tion in  the  Paris  peace  talks. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Mr.  Tlieis  [J.  William  Theis,  United  Press 
International] . 

The  ABM  Safeguard  System 

Q.  Mr.  President,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
you  may  go  directly  to  the  country  on  the  ABM 
issue  to  further  clarify  and  support  your  case. 
Can  you  tell  iis  of  any  plans  you  have  in  that 
direction,  perhaps,  today? 

The  President:  No,  I  have  no  plans  at  this 
time  to  go  to  the  country,  as  you  have  suggested. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  consider  a  press  conference 
as  going  to  the  country.  I  find  that  these  confer- 
rences  are  rather  well  covered  by  the  country, 
both  by  television,  as  they  are  today,  and  also 
by  the  members  of  the  press. 


378 


DEPAETMBNT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


With  regard  to  the  ABM  decision,  however,  I 
wish  to  emphasize  agaia  the  point  that  I  made 
when  I  announced  that  decision  in  this  room 
a  few  weeks  ago.^ 

I  made  that  decision  after  I  considered  all 
the  options  that  were  before  me  with  regard  to 
what  was  necessary  to  maintain  America's  de- 
fenses, and  particularly  the  credibility  of  our 
national  security  and  our  diplomacy  throughout 
the  world. 

I  analyzed  the  nature  of  the  threat.  I  found, 
for  example,  that  even  since  the  decision  to  de- 
ploy the  ABM  system  called  Sentinel  in  1967, 
the  intelligence  estimates  indicated  that  the  So- 
viet capability  with  regard  to  their  SS-9's,  their 
nuclear  missiles,  was  60  percent  higher  than  we 
thought  then ;  that  their  plans  for  nuclear  sub- 
marines were  60  percent  greater  than  we  had 
thought  then. 

Under  these  circumstances,  I  had  to  make 
basically  a  command  decision  as  to  what  the 
United  States  should  do  if  we  were  to  avoid 
falling  into  a  second-class  or  inferior  position 
vis-a-vis  the  Soviet  Union. 

I  had  a  number  of  options.  We  could  have  in- 
creased our  offensive  forces  in  various  direc- 
tions. I  determined  that  this  limited  defensive 
action — limited  insofar  as  the  Soviet  Union  is 
concerned — to  defend  our  Minuteman  missile 
sites  was  the  best  action  that  could  be  taken. 

I  still  believe  that  to  be  the  case.  I  believe  it 
is  essential  for  the  national  security  and  it  is 
essential  to  avoid  putting  an  American  Presi- 
dent, either  this  President  or  the  next  President, 
in  the  position  where  the  United  States  would  be 
second  rather  than  first  or  at  least  equal  to  any 
potential  enemy. 

The  other  reason,  and  I  emphasize  this 
strongly,  is  that  the  Chinese  Communists,  ac- 
cording to  our  intelligence,  have  not  moved  as 
fast  recently  as  they  had  over  the  past  3  to  4 
years,  but  that,  nevertheless,  by  1973  or  1974 
they  would  have  a  significant  nuclear  capability, 
which  would  make  our  diplomacy  not  credible 
in  the  Pacific  unless  we  could  protect  our  coun- 
try against  a  Chinese  attack  aimed  at  our 
cities. 

The  ABM  system  will  do  that,  and  the  ABM 
Safeguard  system,  therefore,  has  been  adopted 
for  that  reason. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  has  there  been  any  cour 
sultation  with  our  allies  or  with  Japan  on 
sending  armed  planes  along  to  guard  the 
reconnaissance  craft?  Is  it  necessary? 

The  President:  There  has  been  no  consulta- 
tion up  to  this  point.  I  can  only  say  in  answer 
to  that  question  that  when  I  refer  to  protecting 
these  flights,  I  am  not  going  to  go  beyond  that 
at  this  time.  I  am  simply  indicating  that  they 
will  be  protected. 

If  we  think  that  consultation  is  necessary,  we 
will  have  consultation. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  on  the  ABM  issue,  as  you 
know,  there  are  a  number  of  Republican  Sen- 
ators who  oppose  you/r  views  on  the  ABM.  Do 
you  think  that  they  should  support  you  because 
you  are  a  Republican  President,  even  though 
they  oppose  the  principle? 

The  President:  I  certainly  do  not.  I  want  to 
make  it  crystal  clear  that  my  decision  on  ABM 
was  not  made  on  the  basis  of  Republican  versus 
Democrat.  It  was  made  on  the  basis  of  what  I 
thought  was  best  for  the  country. 

I  talked,  for  example,  just  yesterday,  with 
Senator  Cooper.  He  is  one  of  those  who  opposes 
me  as  a  Republican.  He  honestly  and  sincerely 
believes  that  this  is  not  the  best  step  to  taka 

I  respect  that  belief,  and  I  respect  others  who 
disagree  with  me  on  this.  I  also  respect  the  be- 
liefs of  Senator  Jackson,  Speaker  McCormack, 
Senator  Stennis,  and  Senator  Russell,  and  a 
number  of  Democrats,  who  believe  that  this  is 
the  right  step  to  take. 

This  issue  wUl  be  fought  out,  as  it  should  be 
fought  out,  on  the  basis  of  what  is  best  for  the 
Nation.  It  wiU  not  be  fought  out  on  partisan 
lines. 

I  am  going  to  fight  as  hard  as  I  can  for  it, 
because  I  believe  it  is  absolutely  essential  to 
the  security  of  the  country.  But  it  is  going  to 
be  fought  on  the  basis  of  asking  each  Senator 
and  Congressman  to  make  his  own  decision ;  and 
I  am  confident,  incidentally,  that  that  decision 
will  be  in  favor  of  the  system  when  they  know 
all  the  facts. 

*  •  •  •  • 

Q .  Secretary  Rogers  said  at  a  recent  news  conr 
ference '  that  if  and  when  we  begin  talks  with 


'  For  transcript  of  President  Nixon's  news  conference 
of  Mar.  14,  see  Buixetin  of  Mar.  31,  1969,  p.  275. 


'  For  transcript  of  Secretary  Rogers'  news  conference 
of  Apr.  7,  see  Bttlletin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  357. 


HAY  5,  1969 


379 


the  Soviets  on  missiles,  one  of  the  first  questions 
to  he  asked  them  is  why  they  find  it  necessary  to 
'build  ahlg  missile  with  a  25-megaton  warhead. 
Since  the  Russian  decision  to  proceed  to  build 
su^h  an  enormous  missile  is  one  of  the  major 
factors  in  your  going  ahead  toith  the  ABM,  the 
question  is:  Why  are  we  waiting  to  ask  that 
question  for  the  beginning  of  negotiations? 
Why  don't  we  ask  it  now? 

Soviet  Nuclear  Capability 

The  President:  Mr.  Scali  [John  Scali,  ABC 
News],  in  a  sense  I  think  Secretary  Eogers  prob- 
ably asked  the  question,  by  stating  it  as  he  did 
in  a  press  conference.  As  you  know,  because  you 
have  covered  these  diplomatic  matters  for  many 
years,  in  dealing  with  the  Soviet  Union  or  any 
other  nation,  this  type  of  question  is  not  always 
asked  simply  on  a  formal  basis  in  a  diplomatic 
conference. 

Sometimes  the  best  way  to  handle  it  is  to 
state  the  position  publicly.  As  far  as  Secretary 
Rogers'  statement  is  concerned,  I  share  his  puz- 
zlement as  to  why  the  Soviet  Union  is  moving 
so  heavily  in  this  direction.  As  far  as  the  Soviet 
Union's  intentions  are  concerned,  and  I  want 
to  clarify  one  point  that  is  made,  the  question 
as  to  their  mtentions  is  not  something  that  I  am 
going  to  comment  upon.  I  don't  know  what  their 
intentions  are. 

But  we  have  to  base  our  policy  on  their  capa- 
bilities ;  and  when  we  project  their  SS-9  plans 
to  1972  or  1973,  if  we  allow  those  plans  to  go 
forward  without  taking  any  action  on  our  part 
either  offensively  or  defensively  to  counteract 
them,  they  will  be  substantially  ahead  of  the 
United  States  in  overall  nuclear  capability.  We 
camiot  allow  that  to  happen. 

I  would  remind  the  members  of  this  press 
corps,  I  am  here  at  a  time  when  the  United 
States  faces  a  threat,  not  of  the  magnitude  that 
President  Kennedy  faced  at  the  time  of  the 
Cuban  missile  crisis,  but  I  would  remind  the 
members  of  this  press  corps  that  at  that  time 
all  of  the  professional  experts  agreed  that  the 
U.S.  superiority  was  at  least  four  to  one  and 
maybe  five  to  one  over  the  Soviet  Union  in  terms 
of  overall  nuclear  capability. 

Now,  we  don't  have  that  today.  That  gap 
has  been  closed.  We  shall  never  have  it  again, 
because  it  will  not  be  necessary  for  us.  Suffi- 
ciency, as  I  have  indicated,  is  all  that  is  neces- 
sary. But  I  do  say  this :  I  do  not  want  to  see  an 


American  President  in  the  future,  in  the  event 
of  any  crisis,  have  his  diplomatic  credibility  be 
so  imj)aired  because  the  United  States  was  in  a 
second-class  or  inferior  position.  We  saw  what 
it  meant  to  the  Soviets  when  they  were  second. 
I  don't  want  that  position  to  be  the  United 
States'  in  the  event  of  a  future  diplomatic 
crisis. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  can  you  tell  us  what  the 
Soviet  role  has  been  in  the  plane  incident,  and 
could  you  go  beyond  that  and  tell  us  what  were 
some  of  the  other  elements  that  figured  in,  yov/r 
deliberations  on  how  to  properly  respond  to  the 
downing  of  the  plane? 

The  President:  The  Soviet  role  in  the  plane 
incident,  first,  is  one  of  being  of  assistance  to  the 
United  States  in  recovering  the  debris  and  look- 
ing for  survivors.  We  are  most  grateful  to  the 
Soviet  Union  for  helping  us  in  this  respect. 

Our  intelligence,  and  of  course  no  one  can  be 
sure  here,  indicates  that  the  Soviet  Union  was 
not  aware  that  this  attack  was  to  be  made.  North 
Korea  is  not  a  nation  that  is  predictal^le  m  terms 
of  its  actions.  It  is  perhaps  more  than  any  other 
nation  in  the  Communist  bloc  completely  out 
of  the  control  of  either  the  Soviet  Union  or,  for 
that  matter,  Communist  China.  That,  at  least,  is 
our  intelligence  estimate  at  this  time. 

Now,  as  far  as  other  matters  that  entered  into 
this  interim  decision,  and  I  emphasize  it  as  an 
interuTi  decision,  I  have  concluded  that  the 
United  States  must  face  up  to  the  fact  that 
intelligence  gathering — intelligence  gathering 
that  does  not  involve  overflights,  that  does  not 
involve  interdiction  of  another  nation's  air- 
space or  moving  into  its  waters — here,  where  in- 
telligence people  are  involved,  we  recognize  that 
they  are  necessarily  subject  to  whatever  action 
can  or  should  be  taken  by  another  nation  to  de- 
fend itself. 

But  when  planes  of  the  United  States,  or  ships 
of  the  United  States,  in  intelligence  gathering, 
are  in  international  water  or  in  international 
airspace,  they  are  not  fair  game.  They  will  not 
be  in  the  future.  I  state  that  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
and  that  was  the  basis  for  this  interim  decision. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  can  you  cormnent  on  the 
motives  of  the  North  Koreans  in  this  attack,  and 
do  you  see  any  pattern  in  this  attack  and  also 
the  one  on  the  Pusblof 

The  President:  The  Pueblo  incident  was  quite 


380 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


different  in  two  respects.  One,  there  was  some 
uncertainty  for  some  time  as  to  where  the  Puehlo 
was.  Present  indications  are  that  the  Pueblo  was 
in  international  waters.  But  there  was  a  more 
uncertain  factor. 

There  was  no  uncertainty  whatever  as  to 
where  this  plane  was,  because  we  know  what 
their  radar  showed.  We,  incidentally,  know  what 
the  Russian  radar  showed.  All  three  radars 
showed  exactly  the  same  thing. 

Let  me  also  say  that  there  is  no  question  of 
what  they  claim  as  their  airspace.  Some  of  you, 
of  course,  know  the  confusion  and,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  confrontation  we  are  having  with  Peru 
about  the  200-mile  limit.  North  Korea  claims 
only  12  miles  as  its  limit,  so  we  were  at  least  28 
miles  away  at  the  very  closest  point. 

Also,  with  regard  to  the  Puehlo,  in  the  case  of 
the  Pueblo  the  North  Koreans  had  warned  and 
threatened  the  Pueblo  for  a  period  of  several 
weeks  before  they  seized  it.  In  the  case  of  these 
flights,  they  have  been  going  on,  as  I  have  indi- 
cated, for  years ;  and  during  tliis  administration, 
without  incident,  190  of  them  have  occurred  this 
year. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  a  com- 
pletely surprise  attack  in  every  sense  of  the  word 
and,  therefoi-e,  did  not  give  us  the  opportunity 
for  protective  action  that  I  would  have  taken 
had  it  been  threatened. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  you  have  addressed  your- 
self many  times  in  the  fast,  sir,  to  the  da/nger 
and  the  consequences  of  aggression  against  our 
country  by  a  minor  military  fower.  It  seems  to 
me  what  we  have  seen  developed  here  is  a  Mnd 
of  new  rules  of  warfare  which  we  certainly  have 
not  agreed  to  and  obviously  the  Soviet  Union 
hasn't.  In  your  present  circumstances,  sir,  can 
you  tell  us  of  some  of  the  problems  that  you 
have  faced  in  making  a  proper  response? 


The  President:  The  problems  with  regard  to 
a  proper  response  are  quite  obvious:  the  ques- 
tion as  to  what  reaction  we  could  expect  not 
only  from  the  party  against  whom  we  respond 
but  other  parties  that  might  be  involved  and 
also,  putting  it  in  the  larger  context,  how  re- 
sponding in  one  area  might  affect  a  major  in- 
terest of  the  United  States  in  another  area — 
an  area  like  Viet-Nam,  Viet-Nam  being  the  top 
priority  area  for  us. 

Now,  in  answering  the  question  in  that  way, 
I  do  not  want  to  leave  the  implication  that  the 
announcement  of  the  renewal  of  and  the  con- 
tinuation of  reconnaissance  flights  is  the  final 
action  that  can  or  will  be  taken  here.  Our  action 
in  this  matter  will  be  determined  by  what  hap- 
pens in  the  future. 

Lookmg  at  the  Soviet  Union,  it  seems  to  me 
that,  had  it  not  been  for  this  incident,  the  major 
story  that  I  would  have  been  asked  about  today 
was  what  happened  in  Czechoslovakia.  I  sup- 
pose that  my  reaction  to  that  would  be  to  con- 
denm  the  Soviet  Union  for  what  it  did. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  aware  of  our  disapproval 
of  that  action.  All  Americans,  in  fact  all  people 
in  the  free  world,  see  this  as  perhaps  the  final 
chapter  in  the  great  tragedy  of  the  Czechoslovak 
people  under  Communist  rule. 

We  hope  it  is  not  the  final  chapter.  We  hope 
that  some  vestiges  of  freedom  will  remain.  Yet 
the  Soviet  Union  has  acted  there  and  acted  quite 
decisively.  They  have  to  consider  now,  in  terms 
of  any  future  action,  how  that  might  affect  their 
relations  with  the  United  States  and  with  the 
Western  World. 

What  I  am  trying  to  do  in  answering  your 
question  is  to  pose  the  problem  that  great  powers 
confront  when  they  take  actions  involving 
powers  that  are  not  in  that  league.  We  must  al- 
ways measure  our  actions  by  that  base. 

The  press:  Thank  you,  Mr,  President. 


MAT    5,    1969 


381 


Unarmed  U.S.  Reconnaissance  Plane  in  International  Airspace 
Shot  Down  by  North  Korea 


Following  are  texts  of  a  statement  released  hy 
the  Defartment  of  Defence  on  A-pril  16  and  a 
V.S.  statement  read  by  ^ij-  Gen.  James  B. 
Knapp  at  the  290th  meeting  of  the  Military 
Armistice  Commission  at  Panmv/njom,  Korea, 
on  April  17  {April  18,  Korean  time). 


DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE  STATEMENT 

Department  of  Defense  press  release  281  dated  April  16 

On  Monday,  April  14,  at  approximately  5 
p.m.,^  a  four-engine,  propeller-driven.  Navy 
EC-121  aircraft  took  off  from  its  base  at  Atsugi, 
Japan,  for  a  reconnaissance  mission  over  the  Sea 
of  Japan.  The  aircraft  had  30  Navy  personnel 
and  one  Marine  enlisted  man  aboard.  It  was 
unarmed  and  its  mission  was  a  routine  recon- 
naissance track  over  international  waters.  Dur- 
ing the  first  3  months  of  1969  there  were  190 
flights  similar  in  nature  flown  in  this  general 
area.  Standing  instructions  for  this  kind  of  mis- 
sion were  that  the  aircraft  was  not  to  approach 
closer  than  40  nautical  miles  to  the  coast  of 
North  Korea.  In  this  particular  instance,  the 
aircraft  commander  was  under  orders  from 
CINCPACFLT  [Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific 
Fleet]  to  approach  no  closer  than  50  nautical 
miles  to  the  coast  of  North  Korea. 

During  its  mission  there  were  communications 
between  the  aircraft  and  its  base.  From  a  variety 
of  sources,  some  of  them  sensitive,  we  are  able 
to  confirm  that  at  aU  times  during  its  mission 
the  aircraft  was  far  outside  any  claimed  terri- 
torial airspace  of  North  Korea. 

All  evidence  now  available  to  us,  including 
North  Korean  claims  and  debris  sightings,  leads 
us  to  believe  that  the  aircraft  was  shot  down 
by  North  Korean  aircraft.  As  of  this  hour,  re- 

'  All  times  mentioned  are  eastern  standard  time. 


gretfully,  there  has  been  no  report  of  survivors. 

Shortly  after  the  Department  of  Defense  re- 
ceived its  first  report  that  this  reconnaissance 
aircraft  may  have  been  downed  over  the  Sea  of 
Japan  by  North  Korean  aircraft,  a  USAF 
C-130  search  and  rescue  aircraft  departed 
Tachikawa  Air  Base,  Japan.  At  1:41  a.m. 
a  flight  of  USAF  F-106  aircraft  departed  Osan 
Air  Base,  Korea,  for  the  area  of  the  inci- 
dent to  perform  the  mission  of  combat  air  sup- 
port for  the  search  and  rescue  aircraft.  A  USAF 
KC-135  tanker  aircraft  from  Kadena  Air  Base, 
Okinawa,  was  also  launched  to  provide  air  re- 
fueling support  for  the  F-106  aircraft. 

The  HC-130  search  and  rescue  aircraft  was 
relieved  by  a  U.S.  Navy  P-3  from  Iwakuni 
Marine  Corps  Air  Station,  Japan,  and  another 
HC-130  from  Tachikawa  Air  Base,  Japan, 
which  departed  about  7 :30  a.m.  The  rescue  air- 
craft ran  search  patterns  in  the  area  and 
dropped  flares  during  the  night.  Crew  mem- 
bers reported  dim  lights,  but  there  was  no  con- 
firmation of  any  survivors.  The  aircraft  were 
searching  in  an  area  approximately  95-100 
nautical  miles  southeast  of  Chongjin,  North 
Korea. 

Other  aircraft,  including  HC-97's,  C-130's, 
and  HU-16,  HH-3  helicopters,  another  P-3, 
and  additional  HC-130's  from  Tachikawa  Air 
Base,  Japan;  Anderson  Air  Force  Base,  Guam; 
Clark  Air  Base,  Philippines;  Naha  Air  Base, 
Okinawa;  and  Iwakuni  Marine  Corps  Air 
Station  in  Japan  joined  the  search. 

The  U.S.  Navy  also  dispatched  the  U.S.S. 
Dale  and  U.S.S.  Henry  W.  Tucker  at  8 :30  p.m. 
Tuesday  night  from  Sasebo  Naval  Base,  Japan, 
to  assist  in  the  search  and  rescue  mission.  They 
are  in  the  search  area  now. 

At  noon  on  Tuesday  [April  15]  Secretary  of 
State  Rogers  talked  with  Ambassador  Dobrynin 
of  the  Soviet  Union  and  requested  his  Govern- 
ment's assistance  in  the  search  and  rescue  effort. 


382 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BTJLLETIK 


Subsequently  on  Tuesday,  it  was  reported  from 
the  search  area  that  two  Soviet  destroyer-type 
ships  were  operating  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  search  area  where  a  U.S.  P-3  patrol  air- 
craft had  sighted  debris  in  the  water.  U.S.  air- 
craft assisted  in  directing  the  Soviet  ships  to  the 
scene  and  in  the  recovery  of  some  debris. 

Reconnaissance  missions  of  this  type  have 
been  flown  for  more  than  20  years  over  the  Sea 
of  Japan.  There  was  nothing  unusual  about  this 
mission.  In  recent  years,  these  missions  have 
been  approved  by  high  Government  authorities 
in  the  State  and  Defense  Departments,  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  the  White  House.  Each  of 
these  missions  constitutes  a  lawful  use  of  inter- 
national airspace. 


U.S.  STATEMENT  AT  PANMUNJOM  == 

Department  of  State  press  release  87  dated  April  17 

Greneral  Yi:  Three  days  ago  your  armed 
forces  committed  an  unprovoked  attack  on  an 
unarmed  U.S.  aircraft.  An  EC-121,  flying  a 
routine  reconnaissance  track  parallel  to  North 
Korea  over  the  Sea  of  Japan,  was  reported  miss- 
ing at  around  1400  hours,  Korean  time,  on 
April  15.  About  2  hours  later,  at  1555  hours, 
April  15,  your  radio  announced  that  North 
Korean  military  forces  had  shot  down  a  "large- 
sized  plane  of  the  U.S." 

This  aircraft  was  flying  a  routine  reconnais- 
sance track  similar  to  a  large  number  of  missions 
which  have  been  flown  over  international  waters 
in  that  area  regularly  since  1950.  The  aircraft 
commander  was  under  orders  to  maintain  a  dis- 
tance of  50  nautical  miles  from  the  coast  of 
North  Korea.  All  evidence  confirms  that  the 
plane  remained  far  outside  your  claimed  ter- 
ritorial airspace. 

When  shot  down,  the  aircraft  was  at  point 
approximately  41  degrees  12  minutes  North  and 
131  degrees  48  minutes  East.  Debris  from  the 
aircraft  was  initially  sighted  and  subsequently 
recovered  in  the  vicinity  of  41  degrees  14  min- 
utes North  and  131  degrees  50  minutes  East. 
These  points  are  approximately  90  miles  from 
North  Korea.  There  appear  to  have  been  no  sur- 
vivors from  the  31  men  on  board  the  aircraft. 


*  The  text  of  the  statement  was  conveyed  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  by  Charles 
W.  Yost,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations,  In 
a  letter  dated  Apr.  18  (U.N.  doe.  S/9163). 


From  the  foregoing  facts  about  your  attack 
on  U.S.  aircraft  it  is  clear  that : 

1.  At  no  time  did  our  aircraft  penetrate  or 
even  closely  approach  North  Korean  airspace. 
Since  it  was  at  all  times  clearly  within  inter- 
national airspace,  you  had  no  right  to  threaten 
or  interfere  with  it,  let  alone  shoot  it  down. 

2.  Our  aircraft  was  engaged  in  completely 
legitimate  reconnaissance  operations.  These 
operations  are  made  necessary  by  your  repeated 
acts  and  threats  of  aggression.  So  long  as  such 
flights  are  conducted  outside  your  territorial 
limits  you  have  no  right  to  interfere  with  them. 
I  note  that  your  authorities  seem,  in  some  re- 
spects, to  share  this  view,  since  they  felt  com- 
pelled to  allege  falsely  that  the  aircraft  was 
within  your  airspace. 

3.  No  one  can  believe  that  a  single  unarmed 
propeller-driven  aircraft  can  represent  a  threat 
to  North  Korea.  It  was  not  attacking  you  or 
preparing  to  attack  you  or  supporting  an  attack 
on  you.  The  shooting  down  of  this  U.S.  plane 
was  not  an  act  of  self-defense.  It  was  a  calcu- 
lated act  of  aggression. 

4.  This  act  cannot  be  justified  under  inter- 
national law.  On  the  contrary,  the  centuries-old 
tradition  of  freedom  of  the  seas  and  the  newer 
principle  regarding  freedom  of  the  airspace 
over  international  waters  clearly  make  your  ac- 
tion illegal.  International  law  and  custom  caU 
you  to  account  for  the  consequences  of  your 
violation  of  these  principles. 

This  incident  was  not  an  isolated  act.  You 
have  repeatedly  regularly  violated  both  the  let- 
ter and  the  spirit  of  the  Armistice  Agreement 
and  the  rules  of  international  law.  I  need  only 
cite  the  attempt  in  January  1968  to  assassinate 
President  Pak,  your  lawless  seizure  of  the 
U.S.S.  Ptiehlo,  your  brutal  mistreatment  of  her 
crew,  your  innumerable  infiltrations  into  the 
Republic  of  Korea,  and  your  other  violations 
of  the  demilitarized  zone. 

The  peace  of  this  area  is  constantly  being  dis- 
turbed by  your  actions.  The  proper  course  for 
you  to  take  in  this  instance  is  to  acknowledge 
the  true  facts  of  the  case:  that  you  shot  down 
our  aircraft  over  international  waters  at  a  point 
approximately  90  miles  from  your  coast  and 
that  this  plane  at  no  time  entered  your  airspace. 
We,  of  course,  expect  that  you  will  take  appro- 
priate measures  to  prevent  similar  incidents  in 
the  future. 

I  have  nothing  further  to  say  at  this  time. 


MAT    5,    1969 


383 


A  New  Approach  to  Pan  American  Problems 


Remarks  by  President  Nixon^ 


Mr.  President,  Your  Excellencies,  my  fellow 
Americans:  I  can  use  that  term  "my  fellow 
Americans"  and  cover  everybody  in  this  room. 
And  this  is  the  only  international  group  in  which 
I  can  do  so. 

As  I  speak  to  my  fellow  Americans  today,  I 
first  want  to  thank  the  President  of  this  or- 
ganization for  his  very  warm  and  friendly  com- 
ments. And  in  responding  to  those  comments, 
I  first  want  to  establish  a  personal  bond  of  com- 
munication with  all  of  you  here — or  should  I 
say  reestablish  it  with  you. 

As  I  came  into  this  building  today  I  recalled 
those  many  occasions  when  my  wife  and  I  were 
here  and  when  you  were  gracious  enough  to  al- 
low us  to  use  your  home  as  the  Vice  President's 
place  to  entertain  distinguished  visitors  from 
abroad. 

My  memory  went  back  to  not  only  many 
visits  to  this  building  but  visits  to  every  one  of 
the  countries  in  this  hemisphere. 

Of  all  the  international  organizations  that  I 
have  addressed,  including  the  NATO  ministers, 
this  statement  can  only  be  made  with  regard  to 
the  Organization  of  American  States. 

I  am  very  fortunate  to  have  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  know  each  of  the  countries  represented 
here  personally  from  having  visited  each  of 
those  coimtries.  And  I  only  hope  that  in  the 
years  that  I  am  in  office  I  shall  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  return  and  to  visit  many — or,  I  hope, 
all — of  those  countries  in  the  future. 

But  as  I  speak  to  you  today,  I  want,  too,  to 
speak  from  my  heart  with  regard  to  the  feeling 


'  Made  before  the  Organization  of  American  States  at 
the  Pan  American  Union,  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Apr.  14 
(White  House  press  release).  President  Nixon  was 
Introduced  by  the  President  of  the  OAS  Council,  Am- 
bassador Carlos  Holguin  of  Colombia. 


that  I  have  personally  insofar  as  our  American 
family  is  concerned. 

I  come  from  the  State  of  California.  I  was 
bom  in  a  little  town  of  Yorba  Linda.  It  had, 
of  course,  not  only  a  Spanish  name  but  a  great 
Spanish  tradition  and  background. 

My  wife  and  I,  in  the  year  1940 — as  you  see 
her  now  she  must  have  been  a  child  bride — we 
took  our  honeymoon  in  Mexico.  And  25  years 
later  we  returned  with  our  two  daughters  for 
our  anniversary  trip  to  Mexico. 

During  the  years  that  I  have  visited  each  of 
your  countries,  I  have  had  some  very  interesting 
experiences.  I  know  that  the  international  press 
has  tended  to  build  up  those  experiences  that 
have  at  times  been  difficult.  But  I  can  assure 
everyone  in  this  room  that  my  memories  and  the 
memories  of  my  wife  are  not  of  those  few  who 
may  have  been  unfriendly  but  of  the  thousands 
of  friendly  faces  we  saw;  and  that  we  shall 
always  take  with  us  and  we  shall  always  remem- 
ber as  we  attempt  to  develop  our  new  policies 
for  the  future. 

But  having  spoken,  as  I  have  deliberately 
done  so  warmly,  about  my  personal  affection  for 
the  countries  represented  in  this  room  and  the 
people  represented  in  the  countries  among  our 
neighbors  to  the  South,  I  now  want  to  speak 
very  candidly  and  very  honestly  about  some  of 
the  problems  with  which  we  are  presently 
confronted. 

I  think  there  has  been  a  tendency,  in  examin- 
ing the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  our 
friends  to  the  south,  to  smother  the  problems 
that  we  have  with  fine  slogans,  beautiful  rhet- 
oric, and  sometimes  with  abrazos. 

I  think  there  is  a  place  for  a  fine  slogan,  and 
always  there  is  a  place  for  eloquent  language. 
And  I  would  not  underplay,  certainly,  the  im- 


384 


DEPAETKBNT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


portance  of  that  kind  of  relationship  on  a 
dignified  basis  between  nations  and  the  loaders 
of  nations. 

But  at  the  present  time,  the  problems  we  con- 
front in  this  hemisphere  are  too  serious  to  be 
glossed  over  simply  by  the  usual  slogans  and  the 
words  and  the  gestures  of  the  past.  What  we 
need  is  a  new  policy.  Wliat  we  need  are  new 
programs.  Wliat  we  need  are  new  approaches. 

I  would  like  to  describe  those  policies  today, 
not  with  a  new  slogan,  because  I  have  none — 
none  that  I  think  would  be  appropriate  to  the 
challenge  that  we  face. 

But  I  would  like  to  describe  our  approach  in 
this  way:  Sometimes  the  new  administration 
has  been  described  as  an  open  administration.  I 
hope  we  can  live  up  to  that  particular  descrip- 
tion. But  if  I  were  to  set  forth  the  objectives  for 
our  approach  to  the  problems  of  this  hemi- 
sphere, it  would  be  in  these  words :  I  want  our 
policies  to  be  ones  which  are  derived  from  open 
eyes,  open  ears,  open  minds,  and  open  hearts. 

Let  me  be  specific  on  each  of  those  particular 
items.  Wlien  I  speak  of  open  eyes,  I  mean  that 
it  is  necessary  for  us  to  look  at  our  common 
problems  without  any  of  the  prejudices  that  we 
may  have  had  in  the  past  and  without  being  im- 
prisoned by  the  policies  of  the  past  or  without 
perpetuating  the  mistakes  of  the  past. 

The  President  of  this  organizaton  has  re- 
ferred to  Governor  Eockef eller  and  the  trip  that 
he  will  be  taking — or  several  trips,  I  should 
say — in  this  hemisphere  in  the  months  ahead. 

On  that  trip,  as  Governor  Eockefeller  will  tell 
each  of  the  ambassadors  assembled  here  today, 
he  is  going  with  open  eyes  and  open  eara.  He 
is  not  going  there  to  tell  the  people  in  the  vari- 
ous countries  that  he  will  visit  what  the  United 
States  wants  them  to  do.  But  he  is  going  there 
to  listen  to  them  and  to  hear  what  they  believe 
we  can  do  together. 

I  think  there  has  been  too  much  of  a  tendency 
in  the  past  for  the  discussion  to  get  down  to  this 
point:  Wliat  will  the  United  States  do  for 
Latin  America? 

The  question,  otherwise,  I  think  should  be 
put — and  this  is  the  approach  of  the  Rocke- 
feller mission,  it  is  the  approach  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  the  new  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State,  Charles  Meyer — our  approach  is  this :  not 
what  do  we  do  for  Latin  America — what  do  we 
do  with  Latin  America?  What  do  we  do 
together? 


We  want,  therefore,  to  have  open  eyes  and  we 
also  have  open  ears.  We  want  to  hear  from  our 
friends  in  each  of  the  countries  represented 
what  you  think  is  wrong  with  our  policy,  but 
also  what  you  think  you  can  do  with  us  to 
develop  a  better  policy. 

And  we,  fortunately,  approach  this  problem 
with  no  preconceived  notions  as  to  the  policies 
of  the  past. 

One  of  the  reasons  that  we  must  also  have 
open  minds  is  that  there  sometimes  is  a  tendency 
to  become  wedded  to  a  pi-ogram  because  it  has 
a  popular  comiotation.  I  speak  of  the  Alliance 
for  Progress,  a  great  concept. 

And  as  I  examined  the  effect  of  the  Alliance 
for  Progress  on  my  last  trip  to  Latin  America, 
in  wliich  I  covered  most  of  the  countries  in  that 
continent  in  1967,  I  saw  many  areas  where  the 
Alliance  for  Progress  had  done  much  good. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  I  looked  at  the  over- 
all statistics  as  to  what  has  happened  to  the  rate 
of  growth  in  Latin  America  during  the  period 
of  the  Alliance  for  Progress  as  compared  with 
the  period  immediately  preceding  the  Alliance 
and  when  I  compared  that  rate  of  growth  with 
the  rates  of  growth  in  other  areas  of  the  world, 
I  found  a  very  disconcerting  result. 

And  it  very  simply  is  this :  The  rate  of  growth 
is  not  fast  enough.  It  has  been  approximately 
the  same  during  the  period  of  the  Alliance  as  it 
was  before  the  Alliance. 

But  even  more  significant,  the  rate  of  growth 
in  Latin  America  overall — and  of  course  there 
are  some  individual  countries  that  are  far 
ahead — but  overall,  the  rate  of  gro\vth  is  less 
than  the  rate  of  growth  in  non-Communist 
Asia,  and  it  is  less  even  than  the  rate  of  growth 
in  Communist  Eastern  Europe. 

This  is  a  result  which  we  cannot  tolerate.  We 
must  do  better.  We  must  find  the  ways  and  the 
means  whereby  we  can  move  forward  together 
in  a  more  effective  way. 

And  that  is  why  I  emphasize  that  we  will 
have  open  eyes  and  open  ears  and  open  minds  in 
attempting  to  find  the  answer. 

But  I  emphasize  at  the  last  the  most  impor- 
tant element :  We  shall  have  open  hearts — open 
hearts,  because  no  one  can  come  here  today,  as 
my  wife  and  I  have,  and  to  have  sensed  again 
the  warm  reception,  the  feeling  that  comes  from 
the  heart  any  time  you  come  to  an  assemblage 
of  this  sort,  no  one  can  visit  the  countries  of 
Latin  America  as  we  have  on  so  many  occasions 


MAT   5,    1969 

347-248—69- 


385 


without  realizing  how  close  our  bonds  are. 

AVe  are  all  part  of  the  New  "World.  We  are 
all  part  of  the  American  family.  "We  come  from 
the  same  traditions.  "We  share  the  same 
concerns. 

Simon  Bolivar  said  150  years  ago  that  the 
"freedom  of  the  New  "World  is  the  hope  of  the 
universe."  That  was  true  then.  I  believe  it  is 
even  more  true  today. 

But  then  we  have  to  make  this  freedom  in  the 
New  "World  something  which  can  be  more  mean- 
ingful to  the  millions  of  people,  not  only  in 
America  but  in  all  the  countries  in  this  hemi- 
sphere, so  that  there  will  be  hope  where  there 
is  now  despair,  so  that  there  will  be  opportunity 
where  there  is  now  no  chance  for  millions  who 
simply  want  a  chance,  a  chance  not  to  receive 
but  a  chance  simply  on  their  own  to  make  their 
own  contribution  both  to  their  own  welfare 
and  to  their  country's  welfare. 

And  as  we  think  of  this  problem  in  that  con- 
text, as  we  think  how  close  our  bonds  are,  I 
try  to  put  it  in  the  perspective  of  historj-.  I 
think  how  long  this  organization  has  been  in 
operation.  And  I  look  ahead  just  3-3  years  to 
the  end  of  this  century — less  than  that,  32 
years — and  I  think  of  what  this  hemisphere, 
the  New  "World,  will  be  like  at  the  end  of  this 
century.  And  I  realize  that  if  the  present  rates 
of  growth  that  we  have  in  the  United  States 
and  in  the  balance  of  the  hemisphere  are  not 
changed,  at  the  end  of  this  century  the  per 
capita  income  in  the  United  States  of  America 
will  be  15  times  as  high  as  that  of  the  per  capita 
income  of  our  friends,  our  neighbors,  the  mem- 
bers of  ovir  family,  in  the  balance  of  the 
hemisphere. 

This  is  something  we  cannot  allow  to  happen. 
And  it  will  require  the  best  minds,  it  will  re- 
quire the  best  ideas  that  all  of  us  can  produce 
together. 

So,  Mr.  President,  as  I  come  here  today,  let 
me  say  I  was  tempted  simply  to  respond  to  your 
very  gracious  remarks  with  the  response  that  I 
had  in  my  heart,  to  express  my  appreciation 
for  your  welcome. 

But  I  want  you  to  know  that  we  do  consider 
the  problems  of  this  hemisphere  to  be  of  the 
highest  priority.  "We  do  consider  that  whatever 
progress  we  have  made  has  not  been  enough, 
and  for  that  reason  we  come  here  today  asking 
your  assistance  in  working  with  us  so  that  we 
can  find  better  solutions  for  those  problems  that 
we  mutually  have  throughout  the  hemisphere. 


Again,  to  all  of  you,  my  fellow  Americans, 
our  gratefulness  for  your  warm  reception,  and 
I  hope  that  this  meeting  may  mark  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  era  of  cooperation,  of  consulta- 
tion, but  most  important,  of  progress  for  all  the 
members  of  our  great  American  family. 


Pan  American  Day 

and  Pan  American  Week,   1969 

A     PROCLAMATION' 

The  Inter-American  System  is  the  oldest,  most 
successful  regional  association  in  the  world.  On  April  14, 
10G9,  we  celebrate  the  79th  Anniversary  of  its 
formation. 

The  Americas  are  bound  together  by  history,  geogra- 
phy and,  most  important  of  all,  common  concerns  and 
shared  hopes. 

On  this  occasion,  the  United  States  reaffirms  its 
dedication  to : 

— Close  consultation  with  its  Hemisphere  partners  in 
all  matters  of  common  concern. 

— Furtherance  of  social  and  cultural  ties  that  enhance 
human  dignity  and  mutual  respect. 

— Cooperation  with  each  of  our  partners  in  economic 
development  that  will  benefit  the  entire  Hemisphere. 

Within  this  unity  of  purpose  there  is  room  for  a 
diversity  of  viewpoint  and  approach.  The  United  States 
seeks  to  cooperate,  not  to  dominate;  to  participate 
fairly  as  a  partner  in  the  responsibilities  that  each 
nation  shares  within  the  System. 

Much  has  been  accomplished  by  the  nations  of  our 
continents ;  the  Organization  of  American  States,  focus 
of  the  Inter-American  System,  is  stronger  than  ever, 
with  a  revised  Charter  soon  coming  into  effect. 

We  shall  treat  with  high  priority  the  tasks  that  lie 
ahead — to  extend  to  all  Americans  the  opportunity  for 
lives  of  dignity  in  a  climate  of  freedom. 

Now,  THEBEFOEE,  I,  RiCHABD  NixoN,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  Monday, 
April  14,  1969,  as  Pan  American  Day,  and  the  week 
beginning  April  13  and  ending  April  19  as  Pan  Ameri- 
can Week ;  and  I  call  upon  the  Governors  of  the  fifty 
States  of  the  Union,  the  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth 
of  Puerto  Rico,  and  the  ofiicials  of  all  other  areas  under 
the  flag  of  the  United  States  to  issue  similar 
proclamations. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
this  eleventh  day  of  April,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
nineteen  hundred  and  sixty-nine,  and  of  the  Inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one 
hundred  and  ninety-third. 


•  No.  3908 ;  34  Fed.  Reg.  6467. 


386 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


The  Complexity  of  World  Affairs 


Remarks  hy  Secretary  Rogers  '■ 


Fortunately  or  unfortunately,  many  of  the 
events  in  the  world  directly  or  indirectly  affect 
us,  and  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward 
such  events  is  of  importance.  A'^liether  it  is  the 
fact  that  some  lish  are  leaving  the  waters  around 
Iceland,  which  adversely  affects  their  economy, 
or  the  fact  of  an  attempted  coup  in  Equatorial 
Guinea — to  some  degree  we  are  involved  or  our 
involvement  is  sought.  The  United  States  is  the 
world's  greatest  military  and  economic  and 
technological  power;  and  there  is  no  way  to 
isolate  ourselves  from  the  responsibilities  that 
go  with  that  position. 

It  is  understandable  that  the  weight  of  great 
responsibility  gives  rise  to  certain  concerns. 
These  concerns  are  likely  to  be  expressed  in 
demands  for  a  clear,  comprehensive,  and  con- 
sistent foreign  policy  that  neatly  defines  and 
sensibly  limits  our  national  interests. 

The  difficulty  is  that  we  have  a  great  variety 
of  national  interests,  that  some  situations  are 
intractable  and  others  are  fluid,  and  that  un- 
predictable events  arise  which  refuse  to  fit 
neatly  into  any  preconceived  notions  of  how 
much  or  how  little  the  United  States  should  be 
involved. 

Let  me  illustrate  the  point  by  brief  reference 
to  five  problems  which  have  concerned  this  ad- 
ministration during  our  first  3  months  in  office. 

First,  in  Viet-Nam  we  are  directlj'  involved 
in  military  operations.  We  are  seeking  to  nego- 
tiate a  settlement  which  for  the  first  time  in  20 
years  would  establish  peaceful  conditions  in 
Southeast  Asia.  We  are  trying  to  bring  about  a 
peace  that  will  permit  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  to  decide  their  own  future.  Such  a  de- 
velopment  would  permit  us,  in  consultation 


with  our  allies  and  at  the  appropriate  time,  to 
end  our  military  operations.  No  issue  more  con- 
cerns United  States  diplomacy  at  the  present 
time  than  this  one. 

Second,  in  Berlin  we  are  involved  both  politi- 
cally and,  through  the  presence  of  U.S.  troops, 
militarily.  Berlin  has  been  a  special  respon- 
sibility since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War 
and  has  required  the  attention  and  action  of 
every  administration  since.  It — and  a  divided 
Germanjr — are  at  the  heart  of  the  problem  of  a 
divided  Europe.  Only  last  month  there  were 
harassments  against  free  access  to  Berlin.  And 
just  last  week  the  foreign  and  defense  ministers 
of  NATO  urged  continued  efforts  to  explore  the 
possibility  of  "ordered  and  negotiated  progress" 
toward  normalizing  the  situation  surrounding 
that  city."  We  cannot  and  do  not  seek  to  escape 
our  present  responsibility,  which  derives  di- 
rectly from  our  role  m  World  War  II. 

Third,  in  the  Middle  East  we  are  not  involved 
militarily,  but  there  is  always  a  danger,  as  the 
President  has  pointed  out,  that  we  might  be 
drawn  into  a  renewed  conflict.  So  the  United 
States  is  actively  engaged  in  a  diplomatic  effort 
to  achieve  not  just  a  new  armistice  but  a  lasting 
peace.  Our  interests  in  friendly  relations  with 
all  states  in  the  area  and  our  commitment  to  re- 
moving sources  of  world  tension  require  us,  we 
believe,  to  work  in  whatever  way  we  can  to 
bolster  the  United  Nations  efforts  toward  that 
end. 

Fourth,  in  Peru  the  United  States  is  involved 
in  one  of  those  difficult  economic  problems 
which  sometimes  occur  among  neighbors  and 
friends.  The  dynamic  of  the  American  indus- 
trial and  economic  sj'stem  has  generated  exten- 
sive foreign  investment.  Such  a  development 


'  Made  before  the  American  Society  of  Newspaper 
Editors  at  Washington,  B.C.,  on  Apr.  16  (press  release 
84). 


'  For  text  of  a  final  communique  issued  at  Washing- 
ton on  Apr.  11,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  354. 


MAT   5,   1969 


387 


sometimes  creates  misunderstandings.  When  it 
does,  we  must  seek  to  resolve  them  amicably  and 
fairly  with  full  respect  for  the  rights  of  all  con- 
cerned. The  true  involvement  we  and  Latin 
Americans  have  with  each  other — and  the  only 
one  we  seek — is  the  involvement  of  constructive 
cooperation,  and  that  is  true  in  this  matter. 

Fifth,  in  the  civil  war  in  Nigeria  we  are  not 
militarily,  politically,  or  economically  involved, 
and  we  have  resisted  pressures  to  become  so. 
However,  we  are  deeply  involved  in  a  humani- 
tarian effort.  Our  Government  has  extended 
over  $32  million  worth  of  food  and  medical 
supplies  to  the  needy  in  that  area  of  the  world. 
More  recently,  we  have  dispatched  a  special 
envoy  to  expedite  aid  to  people  who  are  starv- 
ing and  break  the  log  jams  which  have 
hampered  the  flow  of  the  ample  supplies  which 
are  available.  We  will  continue  to  resist  getting 
involved  politically,  but  we  will  continue  our 
humanitarian  involvement  and  do  all  we  can 
to  prevent  disease  and  starvation. 

So  in  its  first  3  months  this  administration 
has  been  projected  into  affairs  in  all  parts  of 
the  world — Southeast  Asia,  the  Middle  East, 
Europe,  Latin  America,  and  Africa — into  old 
and  new  issues,  issues  that  are  local,  regional, 
and  global  in  character — into  matters  for  which 
there  is  no  exact  formula  for  determining  the 
proper  measure  of  United  States  activity  or 
responsibility. 

One  lesson  is  quite  clear.  Great  power  does 
not  mean  great  freedom  of  action  and  decision. 
On  the  contrary,  it  often  means  very  narrow 
choices  of  action,  and  what  we  can  do  to  in- 
fluence events  in  a  given  case  well  may  be 
marginal. 

We  can  work  for  peaceful  settlement  in  Viet- 
Nam ;  but  we  cannot  negotiate  a  peace  without 
serious  response  from  the  other  side. 

We  can  probe  for  formulas  to  reconcile  issues 
in  the  Middle  East;  but  no  formula  will  work 
without  the  agreement  of  the  principals. 

We  can  develop  suggestions  to  ease  relations 
with  Communist  China ;  but  little  will  happen 
if  the  Chinese  Communists  choose  not  to  talk 
to  us. 

We  can  reach  the  conclusion  that  it  makes  no 
sense  to  go  on  with  a  nuclear  arms  race;  but 
an  agreement  to  stop  it  requires  reciprocal  and 
reasonable  decisions  by  both  sides. 

We  can  send  food  to  starving  people;  but  a 
full  stomach  is  no  cure  for  ancient  tribal 
animosities. 


So  in  international  affairs  the  weak  can  be 
rash;  the  powerful  must  be  restrained.  Wliat 
complexity  in  world  affairs  should  teach  us  is 
the  need  to  act  responsibly,  to  substitute  co- 
operation for  coercion,  and  to  move  from  con- 
frontation to  negotiation  of  the  issues  that 
divide  nations. 

Now,  I  am  ready  to  try  to  answer  your  ques- 
tions. But  in  case  you  forget  to  ask  me  what 
newspaper  editors  can  do  for  the  Secretary  of 
State,  let  me  answer  by  saying  that  you  can 
continue  to  convey  to  the  American  people  a 
clear  sense  of  the  complexity  and  unpredicta- 
bility of  world  affairs — that  our  involvement  in- 
escapably flows  from  our  position,  our  interests, 
and  our  responsibilities  in  the  world — and  that 
however  discouraging  it  may  seem  at  times, 
we  must  never  despair  in  our  constant  search 
for  peace. 


13th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  hy  "^ 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  13th  plenary  session  of 
tlie  new  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
April  17. 

Press  release  86  dated  April  17 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  The  representatives  of 
the  Governments  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
and  of  the  United  States  have  spoken  here  in.  ■ 
detail    about    North    Viet-Nam's    aggression 
against  South  Viet-Nam.  In  the  10th  plenary 
session  I  described  the  massive  North  Viet- 
namese presence  and  involvement  in  the  war  in 
South   Viet-Nam.   At  the   11th   session  Am- 
bassador Walsh  described  the  continuing  large-  M 
scale   North   Vietnamese   infiltration   through  I 
Laos  and   Cambodia  and   across  the  demili-  | 
tarized  zone  into  South  Viet-Nam.  At  our  last 
meeting,  the  United  States  presented  some  rep- 
resentative case  histories  of  North  Vietnamese 
units  and  personnel  in  South  Viet-Nam.^ 

Your  side  apparently  no  longer  denies  tlie 
presence  of  North  Vietnamese  military  and  sub- 


'For  texts  of  U.S.  statements  at  the  10th,  11th,  and 
12th  plenary  sessions,  see  Bttixetin  of  Apr.  14,  1969, 
p.  316 ;  Apr.  1,  1969,  p.  338 ;  and  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  365. 


388 


DEPARTSrENT   OF  STATE   BtTLLETIN 


versive  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam  or  the  con- 
tinued flow  of  men  and  military  supplies  from 
North  Viet-Nam  into  the  South.  Instead,  you 
argue  that  North  Vietnamese  have  a  right  to 
fight  in  South  Viet-Nam.  Your  side  seeks  to 
justify  North  Viet-Nam's  activities  in  the  South 
by  claiming  that  this  is  an  internal  Vietnamese 
affair  and,  therefore,  of  no  concern  to  others. 
Even  such  a  rationalization,  fallacious  though 
it  is,  does  not  exist  for  the  presence  of  your 
troops  in  Laos  and  Cambodia. 

In  the  case  of  Viet-Nam,  it  is  North  Viet- 
Nara's  use  of  armed  force  against  South  Viet- 
Nam  which  constitutes  aggression.  The  United 
States  is  in  Viet-Nam  in  response  to  the  request 
for  assistance  by  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam. 

Today  we  will  examine  the  international  law 
aspects  of  North  Viet-Nam's  use  of  force  against 
South  Viet-Nam.  We  will  contend  that  North 
Viet-Nam's  argiunent  that  it  has  a  right  to  use 
force  against  South  Viet-Nam  is  both  unjusti- 
fied and  dangerous  and  that  North  Viet-Nam's 
continued  pursuit  of  its  objectives  through  mili- 
tary means  will  not  lead  to  a  peaceful  settlement. 

Let  us  look  at  the  international  law  aspects 
first.  A  basic  aim  of  modem  international  law 
is  to  inhibit  countries  using  aimed  force  against 
one  another  as  a  means  of  achieving  national  ob- 
jectives. Consequently,  international  law,  as  em- 
bodied in  the  United  Nations  Charter,  prohibits 
the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial 
integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state. 
At  the  same  time,  international  law  preserves  for 
states  the  right  of  individual  or  collective  self- 
defense  in  the  event  of  armed  attack. 

The  prohibition  against  the  use  of  force  in 
international  relations  applies  to  the  use  of 
force  across  international  demarcation  lines,  as 
well  as  across  international  political  boundaries. 

This  was  demonstrated  dramatically  in  the 
case  of  Korea.  In  June  1950,  when  North  Korea 
launched  an  armed  attack  across  the  temporary 
demarcation  line  at  the  38th  parallel,  the  United 
Nations  Security  Council  condenmed  that  at- 
tack and  organized  collective  action  to  defend 
South  Korea. 

Similarly,  North  Viet-Nam's  armed  invasion 
of  South  Viet-Nam — across  internationally 
agreed  demarcation  lines  and  international 
boundaries — is  a  clear  violation  of  the  basic 
principle  of  international  law  that  armed  force 
is  not  to  be  used  to  achieve  political  objectives. 

North  Viet-Nam's  use  of  armed  force  against 


South  Viet-Nam  also  violates  the  explicit  provi- 
sions of  the  1954  Geneva  accords.^  Those  accords 
established  a  provisional  military  demarcation 
line  and  a  demilitarized  zone.  They  provided,  in 
article  19,  that  the  territory  of  North  Viet-Nam 
was  not  to  be  used  for  the  resumption  of  hostil- 
ities or  to  further  an  aggressive  policy.  In  article 
24,  North  Viet-Nam  undertook  to  respect  the 
demilitarized  zone  and  the  territory  of  South 
Viet-Nam  and  to  commit  no  act  and  undertake 
no  operation  against  South  Viet-Nam. 

North  Viet-Nam's  disregard  for  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Laos  and  Cambodia  and  its  use  of 
force  across  their  frontiers  are  equally  contrary 
to  specific  international  agreements  and  to  the 
essential  principles  of  law  and  order  embodied 
in  the  United  Nations  Charter.  Although  you 
tell  us  that  you  respect  the  1962  Laos  agreements 
and  the  territorial  integrity  of  Cambodia,  it  is 
unfortunately  true  that  you  violate  them  every 
day. 

North  Viet-Nam's  argument  to  justify  its  use 
of  force  against  South  Viet-Nam  raises  issues 
not  only  of  international  law.  It  also  creates  deep 
concern  because  of  its  implications  for  world 
peace  and  order. 

If  all  nations  felt  themselves  entitled  to  use 
armed  force  across  international  boundaries  and 
international  demarcation  lines,  as  North  Viet- 
Nam  has  done,  the  world  would  be  an  extremely 
dangerous  and  disorderly  place — and  it  is  too 
dangerous  and  disorderly  already. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  North  Viet-Nam's  use 
of  force  across  international  boundaries  and 
established  demarcation  lines  is  contrary  to 
international  law.  It  is  inconsistent  with  the 
maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security. 
It  is  incompatible  with  any  reasonable  concept 
of  an  orderly  international  community. 

Continued  resort  to  the  use  of  force  in  dis- 
regard of  international  law  is  not  the  path  to 
peace.  Peace  will  not  come  to  Viet-Nam  as  a 
result  of  military  operations  such  as  those  you 
have  been  conducting  since  the  end  of  February. 
Indeed,  it  must  inevitably  be  hindered  thereby. 
Your  continued  pursuit  of  military  victory  can 
lead  only  to  further  futile  loss  of  life  and 
destruction. 

Yet  from  all  appearances,  your  side  still  pur- 
sues military  victory.  Apparently,  this  is  the 


"  For  text,  see  American  Foreign  Policy,  1950-1955: 
Basic  Documents  (Department  of  State  publication 
6446),  vol.  I,  p.  750. 


MAT    5,    1969 


389 


view  of  General  Vo  Nguyen  Giap.  In  a  recently 
published  interview,  read  by  millions  of  people 
around  the  world,  General  Giap  scorned  the 
negotiations  in  Paris  and  talked  instead  of  giv- 
ing the  United  States  a  sound  military  beating. 
General  Giap  said  he  continues  to  be  working 
for  an  American  Dien  Bien  Phu.  He  admitted 
that  North  Viet-Nam  had  lost  500,000  men  thus 
far  in  South  Viet-Nam  while  trying  to  win  a 
military  victory.  This  terrible  and  futile  sacri- 
fice of  half  a  million  human  beings  apparently 
does  not  deter  Hanoi  in  its  quest  for  victory. 
General  Giap  said  emphatically  that  North  Viet- 
Nam  was  determined  to  suffer  and  sacrifice  as 
long  as  necessary,  even  as  long  as  50  years,  to 
win  complete  military  victory. 

Our  side  does  not  seek  military  victory  in 
Viet-Nam.  We  and  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  have  come  to  these  Paris 
meetings  to  search  for  a  negotiated  settlement 
that  will  bring  the  war  to  an  end.  We  have 
demonstrated,  with  specific  and  concrete  pro- 
posals, our  readiness  to  negotiate  seriously. 

We  have  proposed  the  mutual  withdrawal  of 
all  external  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam.  That 
means  that  the  military  and  subversive  forces 
of  North  Viet-Nam  would  withdraw  back  to 
the  North.  We  have  said  that  we  are  prepared 
to  begin  the  withdrawal  of  American  and  allied 
forces  simultaneously  with  those  of  North  Viet- 
Nam. 

We  have  called  for  full  compliance  with  the 
1962  agreements  on  Laos  and  for  respect  for 
the  territorial  integrity  of  Cambodia. 

We  have,  in  addition,  proposed  restoration 
of  military  respect  for  the  demilitarized  zone. 

We  have  also  sought  to  discuss  the  question 
of  early  release  of  prisoners  of  war  on  both 
sides. 

If  you  are  really  interested  in  working  out  a 
negotiated  settlement  of  the  conflict  in  Viet- 
Nam,  then  you  must  enter  into  serious  discus- 
sions of  these  central  issues.  The  proposals  we 
have  made,  we  believe,  will  create  in  Viet-Nam 
and  in  Southeast  Asia  a  situation  in  which  the 
peoples  and  nations  of  that  area  can  live  in 
peace  with  one  another.  These  proposals  are 
consistent  with  international  law  and  are  de- 


signed to  further  the  aim  of  an  orderly  inter- 
national community. 

We  urge  your  side  once  again  to  examine 
these  proposals  with  care  and  to  enter  into  a 
serious  discussion  of  them. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Botswana 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Re- 
public of  Botswana,  Chief  Lenchwe  Molefi 
Kgafela  II,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Nixon  on  April  17.  For  texts  of  the  Am- 
bassador's remarks  and  the  President's  reply, 
see  Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
April  17. 

Lesodio 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Lesotho,  Mothusi  Thamsanqa 
Mashologu,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Nixon  on  April  17.  For  texts  of  the  Am- 
bassador's remarks  and  the  President's  reply, 
see  Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
April  17. 

Nepal 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Nepal,  Kul  Shekhar  Sharma,  pre- 
sented his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on 
April  17.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  re- 
marks and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  dated  AprU  17. 

Philippines 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Re- 
public of  the  Philippines,  Ernesto  V.  Lagda- 
meo,  presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Nixon  on  April  17.  For  texts  of  the  Ambas- 
sador's remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
April  17. 


390 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


The  United  States  and  the  Arab-Israeli  Dispute 


hy  Joseph  J.  Sisco 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs  ^ 


I  am  pleased  to  be  with  the  American  Acad- 
emy of  Political  and  Social  Science  this  evening 
to  discuss  the  Arab-Israeli  dispute. 

For  20  years  peace,  wliich  is  so  sorely  needed 
by  all  peoples  in  the  area,  has  been  elusive.  One 
side  sees  in  the  creation  of  the  State  of  Israel 
an  act  of  aggression  introducing  outsiders  into 
the  Arab  homeland.  The  other  side  sees  the 
creation  of  the  State  of  Israel  as  an  act  of 
destiny,  an  historic  right,  and  a  response  to  the 
world's  conscience. 

Each  side  argues  its  case  with  firmness  and 
passion.  Israel  has  insisted  upon  direct  nego- 
tiations and  a  peace  treaty;  the  other  side  has 
adliered  to  the  Khartoum  formula  of  "no  peace, 
no  negotiations,  and  no  recognition."  Somehow 
ways  must — and  I  believe  can — be  found  to  get 
around  this  impasse.  If  the  climate  of  distrust 
can  be  replaced  by  an  attitude  of  coexistence 
and  live-and-let-live,  enduring  peace  could  in 
time  become  a  reality.  Such  a  fimdamental 
change  is  the  goal  of  our  efforts.  As  Secretary 
of  State  Kogers  said  the  other  day :  ^ 

.  .  .  the  one  factor  that  would  guarantee  a  success- 
ful result  would  be  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  all  the 
nations  to  say,  We  want  to  live  in  peace.  .  .  . 

It  is  a  fair  question  to  ask  why  instability  in 
the  Middle  East  need  concern  the  United  States. 

The  most  direct  answer  is  that  in  a  shrunken, 
interdependent  world,  areas  of  instability  are 
too  dangerous  and  could  become  the  source  of 
major-power  conflict.  In  this  connection,  we  are 
keenly  aware  that  the  expansion  of  Soviet  in- 


'  Address  made  before  the  annual  meeting  of  the 
American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science  at 
Philadelphia,  Pa.,  on  Apr.  11  (press  release  78). 

'For  Secretary  Rogers'  news  conference  of  Apr.  7, 
see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  357. 


fluence  in  the  area  in  the  past  dozen  years,  and 
more  particularly  since  the  June  war,  has  added 
a  new  dimension  and  complexity.  Our  own  in- 
terests require  an  effective  presence  in  the  area. 
We  have  strategic  interests  arising  from  the 
simple  fact  that  the  Middle  East  is  there — a 
crossroads  of  the  world  which  the  United  States 
as  a  nation  with  global  interests  must  take 
fully  into  account. 

We  have  long  been  involved  in  the  area.  We 
have  roots  in  the  Arab  world  which  go  back  to 
early  educational  and  missionary  activities  in 
the  days  before  World  War  I,  when  the  area  was 
all  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Those  roots 
were  widened  as  American  private  enterprise 
acquired  interests  in  developing  the  area's  pe- 
troleum resources  in  the  1920's  and  1930's. 

Our  roots  are  also  intertwined  with  the  es- 
tablislmaent  and  development  of  Israel.  The 
United  States  Government  endorsed  the  Bal- 
four Declaration  of  1917,  was  first  to  recognize 
the  new  State  of  Israel  in  1948,  and  has  sup- 
ported the  security  and  well-being  of  Israel 
for  two  decades  with  a  constancy  rarely  sur- 
passed in  the  history  of  relations  between 
nations. 

The  question  therefore  is  not  whether  we 
should  concern  ourselves  with  the  Middle  East, 
but  how. 

We  have  pursued  our  interests  in  four 
principal  ways: 

First,  we  have  constantly  sought  to  prevent 
outright  hostilities.  To  this  end,  we  have  looked 
primarily  to  the  United  Nations,  and  we  have 
given  full  diplomatic  and  material  support  to 
its  peacekeeping  efforts  in  the  Middle  East. 
Three  outbreaks  of  war  in  the  area  in  the  last 
20  years,  regrettably,  reveal  that  we  have  had 


MAX    5,    1969 


391 


only  limited  success;  nevertheless,  in  each  in- 
stance it  was  possible  to  help  localize  the  conflict 
before  it  broadened  into  more  dangerous  pro- 
jiortions. 

Second,  we  have  sought  to  maintain  free  and 
mutually  advantageous  relations,  to  the  extent 
possible,  with  all  nations  and  peoples  of  the 
area  and  we  have  sought  to  encourage  those 
nations  to  conduct  tlieir  mutual  relations  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  of  the  U.N. 
Charter.  Tliis  attitude  is  consistent  with  our 
deep  and  abiding  interest  in  Israel  and  our  en- 
during interest  in  friendly  relations  with  the 
Arab  states  and  their  himdred  million  people. 

Third,  we  have  sought  to  slow  the  arms  race, 
and  we  have  hoped  thereby  to  avoid  becoming 
a  major  supplier  of  armaments.  But  we  could 
not  ignore  large-scale  deliveries  of  Soviet  arms 
to  some  states  in  the  area.  Accordingly,  from 
time  to  time,  we  have  provided  limited  quan- 
tities of  arms  on  a  selected  basis  to  such  states 
as  Jordan,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  Lebanon,  and 
Israel.  At  the  same  time,  the  United  States  has 
continued  to  explore  possibilities  for  agreement 
on  limitation  of  arms  in  the  Middle  East.  Un- 
fortunately, the  Soviets  have  shown  no  serious 
interest  since  the  Jime  war  in  discussing  this 
matter  with  us. 

Finally,  we  have  sought  a  stable  peace— one 
which  would  help  free  the  vast  resources  of  the 
area,  both  material  and  human,  for  the  good  of 
the  entire  region. 

President  Nixon's  Steps  To  Encourage  Peace 

Our  immediate  concern  is  that  rather  than 
making  progress  toward  a  peaceful  settlement, 
the  parties  are  gradually  being  drawn  again  to- 
ward a  vortex  of  violence  and  recrimination.  The 
present  opportunity  for  settlement  could  slip 
away  unless  present  trends  in  the  area  are 
reversed. 

In  rec«nt  days  we  have  seen  border  incursions 
and  raids  by  Arab  commandos,  terrorist  bomb- 
ings in  supermarkets  and  at  a  university,  pro- 
longed artillery  duels  across  the  Suez,  and  re- 
taliatory strikes  from  the  groimd  and  the  air. 
Attacks  on  Israeli  civil  aircraft  have  posed 
grave  risks  to  innocent  people  at  international 
airports  at  Athens  and  Zurich. 

Both  sides  today  seem  to  be  seeking  to  justify 
their  positions  in  more  strident  and  menacing 


words;  both  stick  tenaciously  to  strongly  held 
positions.  From  the  U.A.R.  have  come  state- 
ments which  indicate  it  does  not  feel  bound  by 
the  U.N.  cease-fire  i-esolutions ;  from  Israel  has 
come  verbal  and  actual  evidence  of  a  policy  of 
"active  defense"  against  suspected  Fedayeen 
bases. 

This  is  a  somber  picture,  I  know.  It  helps  to 
explain  why  high  priority  has  been  given  by 
President  Nixon  to  the  Arab-Israeli  dispute. 
These  are  some  of  the  principal  steps  taken  by 
President  Nixon  since  January  20 : 

There  has  been  an  intensive  overall  review  of 
U.S.  policy  in  the  area,  and  a  number  of  Na- 
tional Security  Council  meetings  have  been 
devoted  to  it. 

President  Nixon  made  the  Middle  East  con- 
flict a  prime  topic  of  discussions  during  liis 
recent  European  trip.  , 

There  have  been  serious  exchanges  of  views     I 
with  the  high-level  representatives  of  the  prin- 
cipal parties,  including  King  Hussein  of  Jor- 
dan and  Foreign  Minister  Eban  of  Israel.  Nor 
has  the  lack  of  diplomatic  relations  impeded  a 
free  exchange  with  the  U.A.R.,  including  talks 
with  Dr.  Mahmoud  Fawzi,  President  Nasser's    J 
adviser  for  foreign  affairs,  who  has  been  in     1 
Washington  during  the  last  10  days. 

Intensive  exploratory  conversations  are  being 
pursued  in  Washington  between  representatives 
of  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  see 
whether  common  or  parallel  views  and  actions 
can  be  agreed  upon  to  promote  a  peaceful  and 
accepted  settlement  in  accordance  with  the 
Security  Council  resolution  of  November  1967.^ 
While  it  is  too  early  to  make  a  judgment  regard- 
ing their  prospective  outcome,  these  talks  and 
other  bilateral  diplomatic  efforts  are  being  car- 
ried forward  in  a  serious  vein,  free  of  invective 
and  propagandistic  overtones,  and  have  helped 
set  the  stage  for  four-power  talks  which  are  in 
train  at  the  United  Nations. 

And  finally.  President  Nixon  decided  to 
pursue  the  new  four-power  approach  in  the 
belief  that  the  present  situation  in  the  area  has 
deteriorated,  that  the  parties  left  to  themselves 
have  not  been  able  to  narrow  their  differences, 
and  that  the  major  powers  have  an  interest  and 
a  responsibility  in  trying  to  do  everything  pos- 
sible to  help  bring  calm  to  the  area,  to  avoid 


'  For  the  text  of  the  resolution,  see  Bulletin  of 
Dec.  18,  1967,  p.  843. 


392 


DEPAKTMBNT   OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


another  general  renewal  of  hostilities  with  all 
of  the  risks  that  would  be  involved,  and  to 
encourage  steps  toward  peace. 

U.N.  Resolution  a  Framework  for  Peace 

For  the  United  States  the  framework  for 
peace  is  contained  in  the  U.N.  Security  Council 
resolution  of  November  22,  1967.  If  there  is  a 
short  answer  to  what  U.S.  policy  is,  it  is  that 
resolution  in  all  its  provisions.  I  say  "all  its  pro- 
visions" because  each  side  likes  to  emphasize  the 
parts  it  likes  while  deemphasizing  or  disregard- 
ing the  provisions  it  dislikes. 

First:  What  is  the  objective? 

The  resolution  is  very  clear:  The  objective  is 
a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East,  not 
a  fragile  armistice  arrangement.  If  a  peace  is  to 
last,  if  it  is  to  be  just,  it  must  be  juridically 
defined  and  contractually  binding. 

Second:  What  should  be  t/ie  content  of  peace? 

I  need  only  to  repeat  here  precisely  what 
Secretary  Rogers  said  before  the  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee  on  March  27.*  He 
said: 

A  just  and  lasting  peace  will  require,  as  the  Security 
Council's  resolution  states,  withdrawal  of  Israeli 
armed  forces  from  territories  occupied  in  the  Arab- 
Israeli  war  of  1967,  the  termination  of  all  claims  or 
states  of  belligerency,  and  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
sovereignty,  territorial  integrity,  and  political  in- 
dependence of  every  state  in  the  area  and  their  right 
to  live  in  peace  within  secure  and  recognized  bound- 
aries. Clearly,  withdrawal  should  take  place  to  estab- 
lished boundaries  which  define  the  areas  where  Israel 
and  its  neighbors  may  live  in  peace  and  sovereign  inde- 
pendence. Equally,  there  can  be  no  secure  and  recog- 
nized boundaries  without  withdrawal.  In  our  view 
rectifications  from  the  preexisting  lines  should  be 
confined  to  tho.se  required  for  mutual  security  and 
should  not  reflect  the  weight  of  conquest. 

The  Council's  resolution  also  affirms  the 
necessity  for  guaranteeing  freedom  of  naviga- 
tion through  international  waterways  in  the 
area.  It  was  the  denial  of  such  freedom  to  Israel 
through  the  Straits  of  Tiran  which  was  the 
proximate  cause  of  the  6-day  war.  For  20  years, 
Israel  has  been  denied  transit  through  the  Suez 
Canal.  A  permanent  peace  must  include  the 
right  for  all  states  to  traverse  these  waterways 
without  discrimination. 

We  deeply  believe,  too,  that  an  overall  settle- 


*  Bulletin  of  Apr.  14,  1969,  p.  305. 


ment  must  provide  for  a  just  solution  of  the 
refugee  problem.  Consistent  with  past  U.N. 
resolutions,  the  refugees  should  be  given  a 
choice  between  repatriation  and  resettlement 
with  compensation.  Our  hope  is  that  a  just  set- 
tlement of  the  refugee  problem  can  be  achieved 
which  takes  into  account  the  tragic  human  ele- 
ment and  the  concerns  and  requirements  of  both 
sides.  There  is  need  for  a  fundamental  not  an 
ephemeral  solution. 

The  Security  Council  resolution  also  affirms 
the  need  to  guarantee  the  territorial  inviola- 
bility and  political  independence  of  every 
state  in  the  area  through  a  variety  of  measures, 
including  the  establishment  of  demilitarized 
zones.  We  hope  that  practical  arrangements  can 
be  made  on  the  ground  which  will  help  guar- 
antee a  peaceful  settlement.  We  hope,  too,  it  will 
prove  possible  for  the  U.N.  to  perform  a  useful 
function  in  this  and  other  respects.  We  are  fully 
aware  of  the  limitations  and  imperfections  of 
the  world  organization.  But  the  fact  of  the  mat- 
ter is  that  the  U.N.  Emergency  Force  helped 
maintain  quiet  along  the  demarcation  lines  for 
over  a  decade,  and  it  may  prove  possible  to  have 
the  U.N.  involved  in  ways  which  will  not  make 
it  possible  for  one  party  to  eliminate  its  pres- 
ence unilaterally. 

Third:  How  can  such  elements  of  a  settlement 
be  put  into  effect  m  order  to  achieve  a  permanent 
peace? 

Operative  paragraph  3  of  the  U.N.  Security 
Council  resolution  calls  on  Ambassador  Jarring 
"to  establish  and  maintain  contacts  with  the 
States  concerned  in  order  to  promote  agreement 
and  assist  efforts  to  achieve  a  peaceful  and 
accepted  settlement."  His  job,  therefore,  is  to 
promote  agreement  between  the  parties.  We 
underscore  this  because  we  are  convinced  that 
if  a  peace  is  to  be  lasting,  it  will  require  the 
assent  and  full  cooperation  of  the  parties  in 
the  area. 

The  Four-Power  Talks 

Our  hope  is  that  the  four-power  talks  which 
began  last  week  will  find  ways  to  reinforce  fu- 
ture efforts  of  the  U.N.  representative  with  the 
parties.  This  will  be  no  easy  task.  We  realize 
that  common  ground  between  the  major  parties 
cannot  be  achieved  quickly — and  indeed  may  not 
be  realizable  at  all.  We  submitted  some  con- 
crete substantive  ideas  at  the  opening  meeting. 


MAT   5,    1969 


as  did  some  of  the  others.  The  early  sessions  in- 
dicate that  all  four  powers  agree  the  situation 
in  the  Middle  East  is  serious  and  urgent  and 
there  appears  to  be  considerable  concern  over 
the  continuing  wide  gulf  between  the  parties. 
Wliether  this  concern  can  be  translated  into  com- 
mon or  parallel  positions  which  could  be  con- 
veyed to  Ambassador  Jarring  and  the  parties 
for  their  consideration,  only  further  time  and 
explorations  will  tell. 

We  do  not  conceive  of  the  four-power  ap- 
proach in  lieu  of  Ambassador  Jarrmg's  efforts 
to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  Security  Council 
resolution.  Our  purpose  is  to  help  him  buttress 
future  efforts  with  the  Arabs  and  the  Israelis. 

We  do  not  see  four-power  talks  as  a  mecha- 
nism to  impose  peace.  As  President  Nixon  has 
said :  ° 

The  four  powers  .  .  .  cannot  dictate  a  settlement  in 
the  Middle  East.  The  time  has  passed  in  which  great 
nations  can  dictate  to  small  nations  their  future  where 
their  vital  interests  are  involved. 

We  do  not  see  a  four-power  solution  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  agreement  between  the  parties. 

But  common  or  parallel  four-power  views 
could  influence  the  parties  at  least  to  narrow 
their  differences  and  to  make  progress  toward 
peace  which  ultimately  could  enliance  the  se- 
curity of  both  Israel  and  the  Arab  states.  As 
Secretary  Rogers  said  on  April  7:  "...  the 
force  of  reasoning  and  the  force  of  public 
opinion  have  a  lot  to  do  with  influencing 
nations." 

We  are  determined  to  use  all  appropriate  ap- 
proaches, bilateral  and  multilateral,  to  seek  a 
rational  and  enduring  settlement  wliich  wUl  ad- 
vance U.S.  national  interests,  insure  Israel's 
survival,  safeguard  legitimate  Arab  interests, 
and  take  fully  into  account  the  interests  of  the 
world  community.  If  there  is  to  be  a  settlement, 
there  must  be  compromises  on  both  sides ;  this  is 
the  essence  of  negotiated  settlements. 

I  cannot  predict  the  results.  We  have  no  il- 
lusion about  the  difficulties  ahead.  But  I  am 
reminded  of  a  remark  of  a  great  American 
when  he  said:  "Optimism  is  to  the  diplomat 
what  courage  is  to  the  soldier."  We  have  no 
prescription  for  instant  peace.  I  am  certain, 
however,  that  no  opportunity  to  achieve  a  fair 
settlement,  so  necessary  and  potentially  bene- 
ficial to  aU  the  peoples  of  the  region,  will  be 
overlooked  by  the  United  States. 


THE  CONGRESS 


'  For  President  Nixon's  news  conference  of  Mar.  4, 
see  BmxETiN  of  Mar.  24,  1969,  p.  237. 


Department  Discusses  Air  Transport 
Agreement  With  South  Africa 

Statement  hy  Frank  E.  Loy  ^ 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss  with 
you  the  way  the  State  Department  approached 
the  question  of  the  recent  implementation  of  the 
1947  agreement  granting  South  African  Air- 
ways landing  rights  in  New  York.^  If  I  may,  I 
would  like  to  make  a  few  general  background 
remarks. 

It  is  the  normal  and  traditional  practice  of 
the  United  States  to  encourage  peaceful  trade 
with  other  countries,  even  those  with  which  we 
have  serious  differences.  Historically,  the  United 
States  has  considered  trade  in  peaceful  goods  a 
normal  and  desirable  part  of  its  relations  with 
other  countries.  We  normally  do  not  base  our 
economic  relations  with  other  coimtries  on 
whether  we  approve  or  disapprove  of  their 
forms  of  goverimient  or  conduct.  Exceptions 
have  been  rare  and  have  generally  been  made 
where  security  interests  were  directly  affected. 

In  addition  to  trade,  we  have  fostered  the  free 
exchange  of  persons  and  ideas  and  the  expansion 
of  cultural  relations  on  a  worldwide  basis.  Proud 
of  our  dynamic  ideas,  our  convictions,  and  our 
aspirations,  we  have  furthered  contacts  of  all  I 
kinds  with  peoples  all  over  the  globe,  convinced 
that  over  time  we  can  develop  mutual  under- 
standing and  promote  our  democratic  values. 

Turning  from  these  general  concepts  to  the 
case  of  South  Africa,  we  find  that  our  Govern- 
ment has  taken  every  opportunity  to  express  its 
abhorrence  of  the  South  African  Government's 
efforts  to  give  the  force  of  law  to  repugnant  dis- 
criminatory practices  and  to  elevate  racial  dis- 
crimination to  the  dignity  of  an  official  ideology. 
Our  own  experience  with  racial  discrimiaation,  J 
and  our  Government's  efforts  to  eliminate  it,  " 
have  made  us  acutely  aware  of  the  tragic  mis- 

•Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Africa  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on  Apr.  2.  Mr.  Loy 
is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Transportation  and 
Telecommmiications. 

•  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  1639, 
2870, 6512. 


394 


DEPAETMaiNT  OF  STATE  BTJLLETIK 


take  being  made  by  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment and  have  made  it  impossible  for  us,  as  a 
Government,  to  refrain  from  taking  a  strong 
stand  on  apartheid  in  our  bilateral  relations 
with  South  Africa  and  at  the  United  Nations. 
Considering  the  deprivation  of  human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms  to  be  matters  of  in- 
ternational concern,  we  have  made  repeated 
representations  to  South  Africa,  and  we  have 
voted  in  the  United  Nations  for  resolutions  con- 
demning apartheid. 

As  concrete  evidence  of  our  determination  not 
to  contribute  to  the  enforcement  of  apartheid  or 
the  further  development  of  a  white  redoubt  in 
Southern  Africa,  we  do  not  send  to  South 
Africa  any  arms,  ammunition,  or  military 
equipment  or  materials  for  their  manufacture 
or  maintenance. 

Despite  the  depth  of  our  differences  with 
South  Africa,  and  in  harmony  with  our  general 
policy,  we  permit  normal  and  lawful  trade  with 
South  Africa  and  neither  encourage  nor  dis- 
courage investment  there.  We  do  this  because 
we  believe  it  is  important  to  keep  open  the  lines 
of  communication  in  order  to  continue  to  bring 
to  bear  a  constructive  influence  and  to  keep  in 
touch  with  the  many  people  in  South  Africa, 
both  white  and  nonwhite,  who  question  the  di- 
rection of  apartheid  policy.  Moreover,  we  do  not 
believe  that  the  system  of  racial  repression  in 
South  Africa  would  be  changed  for  the  better 
if  we  were  to  follow  a  policy  of  economic 
quarantine  or  isolation. 

It  was  in  this  framework  that  the  United 
States  considered  the  South  African  request 
to  have  routes  for  its  carrier  defined  under  our 
air  transport  agreement.  Our  decision  to  pro- 
ceed with  negotiations  was  made  with  full  un- 
derstanding that  there  were  negative  factors  to 
be  taken  into  account  but  was  in  keeping  with 
our  general  policy  on  peaceful  economic  ex- 
changes and  toward  South  Africa. 

Another  consideration  we  could  not  ignore 
concerned  the  terms  of  our  existing  agreement. 
In  1947  we  granted  South  Africa  landing  rights 
in  New  York,  with  the  exact  routes  to  be  de- 
termined later.  Wlien  South  Africa  recently 
came  forward  to  claim  its  side  of  the  bargain, 
we  were  faced  with  a  choice.  We  could  either 
honor  our  commitment  or  we  could  put  at  risk 
continued  air  service  between  the  two  coimtries, 
with  consequent  damage  to  our  economic  in- 
terests as  well  as  to  our  general  trade  policy. 
We  concluded  that  we  would  gain  nothing  by 
reneging :  In  the  absence  of  direct  air  service, 


the  traffic  between  the  two  countries  would 
be  shifted  to  the  many  carriers  of  other  coun- 
tries that  serve  South  Africa;  and  in  any  case 
our  action  was  not  likely  to  improve  racial  con- 
ditions in  South  Africa.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
honoring  our  conunitment  we  would  also  safe- 
guard our  economic  interests.  I  should  add  that 
our  carrier  has  benefited  from  its  rights  for  more 
than  20  years. 

Eegarding  the  United  Nations  General  As- 
sembly resolution^  that  requested  member 
states  to  deny  landing  and  passage  facilities  to 
South  African  aircraft,  I  would  like  to  point 
out  that  that  resolution  is  not  mandatory  in 
character  and  did  not  receive  United  States 
supjjort  when  it  was  passed. 

In  response  to  a  message  from  the  Apartheid 
Committee,  forwarded  to  the  U.S.  Government 
by  the  U.N.  Secretary  General,  the  United 
States  made  clear  its  view  that  it  was  in  no  way 
acting  contrary  to  its  obligations  under  the 
United  Nations  Charter  in  fulfilling  its  long- 
standing contractual  obligation  to  South 
Africa.* 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  conven- 
tion on  international  civil  aviation  (Chicago,  1944) 
(TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with  annex.  Done  at  Buenos 
Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Acceptances:  Niger,  Togo,  April  11,  1969. 
Signature:  Ivory  Coast,  April  15, 1969. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 
1968.' 

Signatures  at  Washington:  Jamaica,  April  14,  1969; 
Malta,  AprU  18,  19G9. 


"  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/1761  (XVII). 

*  For  text  of  the  committee's  letter  dated  Feb.  20,  see 
U.N.  doc.  A/7516;  for  the  U.S.  reply  dated  Mar.  5,  see 
U.N.  doc.  A/7524. 

'  Not  In  force. 


MAT   5,    1969 


395 


Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms 
of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York  Decem- 
ber 21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4,  1969." 
Ratiflcation  deposited:  Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist 
Republic  (with  reservation  and  declaration), 
April  8, 1969. 
Accession  deposited:  Swaziland,  April  7,  1969. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of  states 
in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space,  including 
the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies.  Opened  for  signa- 
ture at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Janu- 
ary 27,  1967.  Entered  into  force  October  10,  1967. 
TIAS  6347. 

Notiftcation  deposited  at  Wa^hinffton  that  it  con- 
tinues to  6e  hound:  Mauritius,  April  16, 1969. 
Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3, 1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession    deposited    at    Washington:    Mauritius, 

April  16, 1969. 
Ratification    deposited    at    Washington:    Bulgaria, 
April  16,  1969. 

BILATERAL 

Dominican   Republic 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities  un- 
der title  I  of  the  Agricultural  Trade  Development  and 
Assistance  Act  of  1954,  as  amended  (68  Stat.  454, 
as  amended;  7  U.S.C.  1691-1736D),  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  March  28,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  March  28, 1969. 

Greece 

Agreement   concerning  trade   in   cotton   textiles,   as 
amended.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washing- 
ton July  17,  1964.  Entered  into  force  July  17,  1964. 
TIAS  5618,  6009, 6456. 
Terminated:  January  1,  1968. 

Agreement  concerning  trade  in  cotton  textiles,  with 
annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Athens 
April  8,  1969.  Entered  into  force  April  8,  1969;  ef- 
fective January  1,  1968. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  a  program  for  the  acquisition 


and  production  in  Japan  of  the  F-4EJ  aircraft  and 
related  equipment  and  materials.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Tokyo  April  4,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  AprU  4, 1969. 

Korea 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreements  of  March  25,  1967  (TIAS 
6272),  and  October  23,  1968  (TIAS  6595).  Signed  at 
Seoul  April  8,  1969.  Entered  into  force  April  8,  1969. 

Mexico 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  February  4, 
1966,  relating  to  continuation  of  a  cooperative  mete- 
orological observation  program  in  Mexico  (TIAS 
5977).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico  and 
Tlatelolco  April  2,  1969.  Entered  into  force  April  2, 
1969. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


Corrections 

Bulletin  of  April    14,    1969,   page  305 

Secretary  Rogers'  March  27  statement  before 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  con- 
tains a  printer's  error.  The  third  sentence  in  the 
third  full  paragraph  in  the  second  column  should 
read :  "Clearly,  withdrawal  should  take  place  to 
established  boundaries  which  define  the  areas 
where  Israel  and  its  neighbors  may  live  in  peace 
and  sovereign  Independence." 

Bulletin  of  March  24,   1969,  page  266 

President  Nixon's  remarks  on  departure  from 
Ciampino  Airport,  Rome,  on  February  28  should 
begin :  "Mr.  Prime  Minister  and  Your  Excel- 
lencies :  As  we  leave  Rome  I  want  you  to  know 
how  deeply  grateful  I  am  for  the  hospitality  that 
has  been  extended  to  us  on  our  visit  and  how 
reassured  I  am  by  our  conversations  with  the 
President,  vrith  you,  and  with  members  of  your 
Government  with  regard  to  the  future  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Italy.  .  .  ." 

The  remarks,  appearing  in  the  second  column 
on  page  266,  incorrectly  attributed  to  President 
Saragat,  were  made  by  Italian  Prime  Minister 
Mariano  Rumor. 


396 


DEPABTMBNT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX     May  5,  1969      Vol.  LX,  No.  1558 


Asia.  President  Nixou's  News  Conference  of 
April  18  (excerpts) 377 

Aviation.  Department  Discusses  Air  Transport 

Agreement  Witli  South  Africa   (Loy)     ...      .391 

Botswana.  Letters  of  Credence  (Leneliwe)     .     .      390 

Congress.  Department  Discusses  Air  Transport 

Agreement  Witti  Soutli  Africa   (Loy)     .     .     .      394 

Diplomacy.  Tlie  Complexity   of  World   Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Germany.    The    Complexity  of    World    Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Korea 

President  Nixou's  News  Conference  of  Ajjril  18 

(excerpts) 377 

Unarmed  U.S.  Reconnaissance  Plane  in  Interna- 
tional Airspace  Shot  Down  by  North  Korea 
(Defense  Department  statement  and  text  of 
U.S.  statement  at  Military  Armistice  Commis- 
sion)       382 

Latin  America 

A   New  Approach  to   Pan  American   Problems 

(Nixon) 384 

Pan  American  Day  and  Pan  American  Week. 

1909    (proclamation) 3S6 

Lesotho.  Letters  of  Credence  (Mashologu)     .     .       390 

Military  Affairs 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  April  18 

(excerpts) 377 

Unarmed  U.S.  Reconnaissance  Plane  in  Interna- 
tional Airspace  Shot  Down  by  North  Korea 
(Defense  Department  statement  and  text  of 
U.S.  statement  at  Military  Armistice  Commis- 
sion)       3.S2 

Near  East 

The  Complexity  of  World  Affairs  (Rogers)     .     .      3S7 

The  United  States  and  the  Arab-Israeli  Dispute 

(Sisco)       391 

NepaL  Letters  of  Credence  (Sharma)     ....      390 

Nigeria.    The    Complexity    of    World    Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Peru.      The      Complesit.y   of      World      Affairs 

(Rogers) 387 

Philippines.  Letters  of  Credence  (Lagdameo)  390 

Presidential  Documents 

A  New  Approach  to  Pan  American  Problems     .      384 

Pan  American  Day  and  Pan  American  Week. 

1969 386 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  April  18 

(excerpts) 377 

South  Africa.  Department  Discusses  Air  Trans- 
port Agreement  With  South  Africa  (Loy)  394 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 395 

Department  Discusses  Air  Transiwrt  Agreement 

With   South  Africa    (Loy) 394 


U.S.S.R.  President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of 

April  18  (excerpts) 377 

United   Nations.   The   United    States   and  the 

Arab-Israeli  Dispute   (Sisco) 391 

Viet-Nam 

The  Complexity  of  World  Affairs  (Rogers)  .  .  387 
President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  April  18 

(excerpts) 377 

13th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 388 

Name  Indew 

Knapp,  Maj.  Gen.  James  B 382 

Lagdameo,  Ernesto  V 390 

Chief  Lenchwe  Molefi  Kgafela  II 390 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 388 

Loy,  Frank  E 3W 

Mashologu,  Mothusi  Thamsanqa 390 

Nixon,    President 377,384,386 

Rogers,   Secretary 387 

Sharma,  Kul  Shekhar 390 

Sisco,  Joseph  J 391 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  April   14-20 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OfiSce 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  April  20  which  appears 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  78  of  April  11. 

No.     Date  Subject 

*S2    4/14     Eisenhower  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to    Belgium    (biograpliic   details). 

*S3    4/14     Annenberg  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to   Great  Britain    (biographic  de- 
tails). 
84    4/16     Rogers :  American  Society  of  News- 
paper Editors. 

185  4/17  Meyer :  Subcommittee  on  AVestem 
Hemisphere  Affairs  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 
<S6  4/17  I-odge :  13th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris. 
87  4/1 7  Maj.  Gen.  James  B.  Knapp :  State- 
ment at  Military  Armistice  Com- 
mission, Panmunjom,  Korea. 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 

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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1559 


May  12, 1969 


VIETNAM  IN  THE  PERSPECTIVE  OF  EAST  ASIA 

Address  by  Secretary  Rogers     397 

CURRENT  U.S.-PERUVIAN  PROBLEMS 

Statement  by  Assistant  Secretary  Meyer    lfi6 

U.S.  VIEWS  ON  NUCLEAR  WEAPON  MATERIAL  CUTOFF  AGREEMENT 
AND  VERIFICATION  OF  COMPREHENSIVE  NUCLEAR  TEST  BAJ^ 

Statement  '^^y^^^'^gr^^S^  Fisher     ]fi9 

Superintendent  of  Documents 

MAY  2  3  1969 
DEPOSITORY 
For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1559 
May  12,  1969 


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Viet-Nam  in  the  Perspective  of  East  Asia 


Address  iy  Secretary  Rogers  ^ 


The  otJier  night  I  had  dinner  with  Dean 
Acheson  and  he  noted  that  I  was  being  cast  in 
the  role  of  a  peacemaker.  He  said  he  thought  I 
should  know  that  one  of  our  predecessors  was 
Abel  P.  Upshur,  who  was  Secretary  of  State 
in  President  Tyler's  Cabinet.  Shortly  after  his 
appointment  Upsliur  was  asked  to  particii^ate 
in  a  naval  ceremony  involving  a  huge  new  iron 
cannon  capable  of  delivering  a  225-pound  pro- 
jectile. The  cannon  had  been  named  the  "Peace- 
maker." Unfortunately,  during  the  ceremony 
the  Peacemaker  was  fired,  it  burst,  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  was  killed.  Mr.  Acheson  sug- 
gested that,  as  we  approached  the  arms  control 
talks,  I  would  do  well  to  keep  Abel  P.  Upshur 
in  mind. 

With  this  admonition  in  mind,  let  me  begin 
by  saying  that  tliis  administration  is  determined 
to  work  for  a  reduction  of  world  armaments,  for 
a  general  alleviation  of  world  tensions,  and  for 
negotiations  on  whatever  international  issiies 
appear  to  offer  reasonable  hope  of  resolution. 

We  hope,  for  example,  that  we  shall  be  able 
to  reach  an  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  to 
avoid  another  spiral  in  the  nuclear  arms  race. 
But  at  tlie  same  time  we  cannot  predicate  our 
security  decisions  now  on  the  potential  success 
of  future  endeavors. 

We  would  very  much  have  preferred  to  avoid 
spending  money  on  an  anti-ballistic-missile  sys- 
tem, but  our  analysis  of  Soviet  forces  and  de- 
veloping Chinese  capability  convinced  us  that 
this  decision  could  not  be  postponed. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  continuing  to  develop 
its  own  defensive  missile  system  and  to  expand 
its  inventory  of  powerful  offensive  missiles.  The 
U.S.S.E.  recently  annoimced  it  intends  to  con- 
duct additional  ICBM  tests  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  Only  last  week  one  of  these  tests  included 
firing  of  an  SS-9  equipped  with  multiple  re- 


^  Made  on  Apr.  21  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  before  the  As- 
sociated Press  annual  luncheon  (press  release  88; 
advance  test). 


entry  vehicles.  Since  the  Soviets  indicated 
plans  to  use  the  range  through  June  15,  we  can 
only  assume  that  testing  of  the  SS-9  will  pro- 
ceed at  a  steady  pace. 

We  believe  that  with  the  Safeguard  system 
we  are  proceeding  in  a  restrained  and  nonpro- 
vocative  way  to  meet  our  minimum  security 
needs.  We  have  deliberately  built  into  this  deci- 
sion an  annual  review  appraisal  in  which  one 
of  the  principal  factors  will  be  the  status  of 
talks  on  the  limitation  of  strategic  arms. 

Arms  limitation  is  one  area  in  which  negotia- 
tions may  prove  fruitful.  We  shall  also  be 
seeking  to  resolve  deep  political  issues  by  nego- 
tiation, as  well.  You  are  aware  of  the  delicate 
diplomatic  efforts  underway  with  respect  to  the 
Middle  East.  But  today  I  should  Uke  to  discuss 
with  you  the  negotiations  for  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment in  Viet-Nam  in  the  broader  context  of 
East  Asia  as  a  whole. 


Trend  Toward  a  Regional  Community 

The  tragedy  of  war  below  the  l7th  parallel 
in  Southeast  Asia  has  obscured  the  larger  events 
and  the  longer  trends  in  the  vast  area  washed 
by  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Japan,  for  example,  has  become  the  third 
greatest  industrial  nation  in  the  world  and  is 
now  taking  the  lead  in  assisting  less  developed 
countries  in  Asia. 

The  Republic  of  China  has  doubled  the  per 
capita  income  of  its  population  in  a  single 
decade — and  this  country  also  is  aiding  others. 
It  now  provides  technical  assistance  to  more 
than  20  other  nations. 

South  Korea  has  recovered  from  the  wreck- 
age of  war  and  has  become  independent  of  eco- 
nomic aid  from  the  outside.  Her  exports  have 
jumped  phenomenally  in  the  past  5  years. 

Indonesia — after  20  years  of  blustering  lead- 
ership and  external  adventure,  of  inflation  and 
accumulation  of  debt,  of  bureaucratic  strangula- 


MAT    12,    1969 


397 


tion  and  economic  decline — has  returned  from 
the  brink  of  Communist  takeover  and  from  the 
verge  of  economic  collapse.  Largely  by  their 
own  efforts,  the  Indonesians  have  put  their 
economic  house  in  order  and  are  launched  into 
an  ambitious  economic  and  social  development 
program.  It  is  an  extraordinary  reversal  of 
outlook  from  just  a  few  years  ago. 

Meanwhile  Malaysia,  Thailand,  the  Philip- 
pines, and  Singapore  have  made  rapid  sus- 
tained economic  progress.  Several  of  the 
nations  in  East  Asia  are  among  the  most 
rapidly  developing  countries  in  the  world. 

As  economic  and  social  progress  quickens, 
there  is  a  growing  sense  of  interdependence  in 
East  Asia. 

An  institutional  framework  for  regional  co- 
operation for  the  common  good  is  now  emerg- 
ing. Australia  and  New  Zealand,  happily,  are 
taking  part  in  this ;  increasingly  they  see  their 
future  in  the  Asian  context  and  not  as  remote 
appendages  of  Europe. 

There  is  plentiful  evidence  of  new  horizons 
opening  up  in  East  Asia  in  development  financ- 
ing, marketing  arrangements,  transportation 
projects,  "miracle  rice,"  rural  progress,  and  the 
like. 

In  this  vast,  diversified,  populous  part  of  the 
world,  fatalism  is  dying  and  ferment  prevails; 
there  is  a  new  vitality  and  self-confidence — a 
healthy  inclination  on  the  part  of  Asians  to 
take  charge  of  their  own  affairs,  to  depend  less 
on  other  parts  of  the  world,  and  to  help  each 
other  in  the  process.  There  is  an  early  but  clear 
trend  toward  the  evolution  of  a  regional  com- 
munity of  peaceful,  cooperative  nations. 

Security,  Political,  and  Development  Problems 

I  do  not  wish  to  gild  the  lily.  There  are  secu- 
rity problems  in  the  area — a  point  which  was 
made  brutally  and  tragically  over  the  Sea  of 
Japan  just  a  few  days  ago. 

As  you  know,  the  unprovoked  attack  last 
week  by  Korean  fighters  on  an  unai-med  Ameri- 
can reconnaissance  plane  flying  in  international 
airspace  has  led  the  President  to  provide  armed 
escorts  for  such  flights. 

There  are  political  problems  in  East  Asia, 
too — not  least  of  them  being  the  future  of 
Okinawa,  which  we  shall  be  discussing  with  the 
Japanese  a  bit  later  this  year. 

Also,  of  course,  there  are  immense  economic 
development  problems  ahead,  exacerbated  in 
places  by  excessive  rates  of  population  growth. 


The  future  in  East  Asia  will  be  neither 
smooth  nor  placid.  Yet  not  many  years  ago  it 
seemed  all  too  likely  that  a  militant,  aggressive 
totalitarianism  might  well  be  the  wave  of  the 
future  in  East  Asia.  There  was  a  mood  of  fear 
and  apprehension,  a  sense  of  the  inevitable 
about  new  doctrines  of  revolutionary  violence. 

Yet  that  seemingly  irresistible  tide  turned 
out  to  be  resistible,  and  a  quite  different  future 
is  now  in  prospect  for  the  community  of  Pacific 
nations. 

Relations  With  Communist  China 

One  cannot  speak  of  a  future  Pacific  com- 
munity without  reference  to  China. 

The  United  States  Government  understands 
perfectly  well  that  the  Republic  of  China  on 
the  island  of  Taiwan  and  Communist  China  on 
the  mainland  are  both  facts  of  life. 

We  know  that  by  virtue  of  its  size,  popula- 
tion, and  the  talents  of  its  jjeople,  mainland 
China  is  bound  to  play  an  important  role  in 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  affairs. 

We  have  attempted  to  maintain  a  dialogue 
with  the  leaders  of  Communist  China  through 
periodic  meetings  in  Warsaw;  and  we  were 
disappointed  2  months  ago  when  those  leaders 
saw  fit  to  cancel  at  the  last  moment  a  continua- 
tion of  those  talks. 

We  have  made  a  number  of  specific  sugges- 
tions— an  exchange  of  journalists,  a  relaxation 
of  travel  restrictions,  the  sale  of  grain  and 
pharmaceuticals — in  the  hope  that  such  steps 
would  lead  to  a  better  climate  between  us.  We 
regret  that  these  overtures  have  been  rejected — 
and  that  the  leaders  of  Communist  China  have 
elected  instead  to  attack  the  Nixon  administra- 
tion in  public  pronouncements. 

Of  course  we  recognize  and  have  treaty  re- 
lations with  the  Republic  of  China,  which  plays 
a  responsible  and  constructive  role  in  the  in- 
ternational community.  Wliatever  may  be  the 
ultimate  resolution  of  the  dispute  between  the 
Republic  of  China  on  Taiwan  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  on  the  mainland,  we  believe 
strongly  it  must  be  brought  about  by  peaceful 
means. 

As  things  stand  now,  Communist  China  is  in 
trouble  domestically  and  externally.  The  pres- 
ent leaders  look  with  enmity  or  suspicion  upon 
their  neighbors.  They  are  hostile  toward  the 
United  Nations;  hostile  toward  the  United 
States;  hostile  toward  the  Soviet  Union;  and 
have  shown  little  interest  in  normal  diplomatic 


.^98 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BULUrriX 


relations  with  other  countries.  They  still  preach 
violence  as  a  jjermanent  way  of  life. 

We  can  expect  all  this  to  change  with  time. 
Not  even  a  nation  as  large  as  mainland  China 
can  live  forever  in  isolation  from  a  world  of 
interdependent  states. 

Meanwhile,  we  shall  take  initiatives  to  re- 
establish more  normal  relations  with  Commu- 
nist China  and  we  shall  remain  responsive  to 
anj'  indications  of  less  hostile  attitudes  from 
their  side. 

I  have  referred  to  these  broad  developments 
in  the  Pacific  world  today  partly  because  it  is 
a  generally  encouraging  story  that  has  been 
largely  obscured  from  view  by  the  war  in  Viet- 
Nam  and  also  because  they  serve  as  a  backdrop 
for  a  brief  discussion  of  Viet-Nam. 

Concrete  Proposals  for  Peace  in  Viet-Nam 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  achieving 
a  peace  in  Viet-Nam  which  will  permit  the  peo- 
ple of  South  Viet-Nam  to  determine  their  own 
future,  free  from  outside  interference  by 
anyone. 

That  is  our  objective.  It  has  been  stated  many 
times.  It  is  known  to  all  concerned.  It  is  not 
subject  to  change. 

The  South  Vietnamese,  together  with  the  five 
allies  who  responded  to  their  appeal  for  help, 
have  denied  the  North  Vietnamese  Communists 
the  military  victory  they  were  seeking.  Together 
we  have  safeguarded  the  right  of  the  people  in 
the  South  to  make  their  own  decisions. 

The  leaders  in  Hanoi  know  that  they  cannot 
win  by  military  means. 

That  is  why  there  is  a  new  sense  of  self-confi- 
dence in  South  Viet-Nam. 

And  that  is  why  we  can  now  be  deeply  en- 
gaged, as  we  are,  in  an  intensive  program  of 
upgrading  the  equipment  and  combat  capabil- 
ity of  the  armed  forces  of  the  Eepublic  of  Viet- 
Nam  so  they  are  able  to  take  over  an  ever  larger 
measure  of  their  own  defense. 

I  want  to  emphasize  that  this  is  something 
that  the  leaders  of  South  Viet-Nam  very  much 
want — and  have  so  stated  publicly  and 
privately. 

Tliis,  of  course,  is  what  we  want,  too. 

The  readiness  of  replacement  forces,  the  level 
of  oif ensive  actions  by  the  enemy,  or  progress  in 
the  Paris  peace  talks  will  determine  the  scope 
and  timing  of  actual  transfers  of  responsi- 
bility— and  the  consequent  release  of  our  forces. 

In  Paris  we  have  put  forward  concrete  pro- 


posals for  bringing  an  end  to  armed  conflict  in 
Viet-Nam.  These  proposals  have  been  drawn  up 
on  the  assumption  that  the  leaders  of  North 
Viet-Nam  are,  in  fact,  now  prepared  to  negoti- 
ate an  end  to  the  war.  On  this  assimijition,  we 
seek  to  negotiate  the  withdrawal  of  all  outside 
combat  forces  from  the  territory  of  South  Viet- 
Nam.  This  process  of  troop  withdrawal  cannot 
get  started  by  postulating  abstract  propositions. 
It  cannot  get  started  by  taking  last  things  first. 
It  must  begin  at  the  beginning. 

The  obvious  way  to  begin  is  to  start  a  with- 
drawal of  North  Vietnamese  and  American 
armed  forces  simultaneously.  The  forces  would 
have  to  be  withdrawn  on  some  fair  and  equitable 
basis.  Departures  would  have  to  be  phased  over 
a  period  of  time.  Verification  procedures  would 
be  needed. 

These  are  difficult  but  not  insuperable  prob- 
lems. We  are  not  dogmatic  about  the  details. 
They  could  be  negotiated  out  if  Hanoi  has  a 
serious  desire  for  peace. 

A  mutual  withdrawal  of  external  forces  from 
Viet-Nam  by  reasonable  stages  would  bring 
about  deescalation  of  fighting.  It  could  then 
lead  to  next  steps :  a  total  elimination  of  outside 
combat  forces,  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  a  re- 
tiim  to  peace.  We  see  no  good  reason  why  that 
process  should  not  begin  soon. 

There  are  other  concrete  steps  that  we  are 
prepared  to  discuss  and  which  we  have  tabled 
in  Paris. 

We  would  like  to  talk  about  how  to  put  an 
agreed  end  to  all  military  activity  in  the  demili- 
tarized zone  established  by  the  Geneva  accords 
of  1951:.  This,  too,  could  contribute  to  a  reduc- 
tion in  hostilities. 

We  also  would  like  to  discuss  the  release  of 
prisoners.  This  is  a  matter  of  deep  humanitar- 
ian concern  to  us  and,  in  addition,  could  lead  to 
an  improvement  in  the  general  atmosphere. 

Here  are  three  specific,  practical,  and  man- 
ageable issues  for  negotiation.  We  are  prepared 
to  take  them  up  one  at  a  time  or  all  together. 
They  are  all  negotiable  matters. 

What  does  the  other  side  propose  ?  It  proposes 
that  United  States  forces  leave  imconditionally 
while  the  North  Vietnamese  forces  stay  to  do 
as  they  please.  Can  any  reasonable  person  sug- 
gest that  this  shows  a  present  willingness  to 
negotiate  ? 

Why  hasn't  Hanoi  come  forward  with  realis- 
tic proposals  for  a  practical  start  toward  peace  ? 
We  have  made  our  suggestions.  What  are  their 
suggestions  ?  Obviously  if  they  should  continue 


MAT    12,    1969 


to  say  "You  get  out  and  we  -will  stay,"  there  is 
nothing  to  negotiate. 

We  have  recognized  right  along  that  as  we 
work  toward  these  priority  areas  of  military 
agreement,  attention  must  also  be  given  to  the 
political  area.  It  is  clear  that  political  matters 
will  need  to  be  discussed  and  that  this  is  a  ques- 
tion to  be  worked  out  by  the  South  Vietnamese 
themselves.  In  point  of  fact,  President  Thieu 
has  taken  a  constructive  initiative  on  this  aspect 
of  the  problem  in  declaring  the  readiness  of 
South  Viet-Nam  to  talk  to  the  National  Libera- 
tion Front.  We  see  no  reason  why  the  military 
and  political  aspects  of  a  settlement  cannot  be 
worked  out  at  the  same  time. 

We  shall  continue  to  work  hard  at  Paris  to- 
ward this  objective.  We  shall  continue  to  pre- 
sent the  most  constructive  suggestions  possible. 
We  are  prepared  at  all  times  to  hear  what  the 
other  side  has  to  offer.  And  we  hope  that  the 
assumption  behind  our  efforts  in  Paris — that 
the  other  side  is  now  prepared  to  negotiate  seri- 
ously for  an  end  to  the  war — is  the  right 
assumption. 

We  have  not,  however,  placed  all  our  eggs  in 
one  basket.  We  have  to  be  prepared  for  the  un- 
welcome contingency  that  the  other  side  does 
not  yet  want  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  settlement. 
We  are  not  prepared  to  assume  that  the  only 
alternative  to  early  progress  in  the  peace  talks 
is  an  indefinite  extension  of  our  present  role. 

This  is  why  such  high  priority  is  being  given 
to  preparing  South  Vietnamese  forces  to  assume 
a  growing  share  of  the  combat  burden  and  why 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
is  giving  such  high  priority  to  developing  the 
political  luiity  of  the  country.  These  efforts  are 
well  imderway.  They  wUl  be  carried  out  sys- 
tematically and  urgently. 

But  progress  toward  peace  can  be  accelerated 
significantly  if  the  other  side  is  prepared  to  get 
down  to  practical  negotiations  on  mutual  force 
withdrawals  in  the  near  future. 

This  is  the  present  issue  in  Paris:  whether 
peace  comes  more  gradually  or  more  rapidly  to 
Viet-Nam.  It  is  a  decision  for  Hanoi,  and  we 
hope  it  will  be  positive. 

For  our  part,  we  have  specific  proposals  on 
the  table  in  Paris  which  we  believe  are  sensible 
and  practical. 

We  are  ready  to  listen  to  alternative  pro- 
posals. 

We  are  also  preparing  for  the  unwelcome 
contingency  that  the  other  side  does  not  yet 
want  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  settlement. 


And  we  have  a  clear  view  of  the  contribution 
that  a  peaceful  settlement  in  South  Viet-Nam 
and  Southeast  Asia  would  make  to  the  security 
and  outlook  of  East  Asia  as  a  whole — to  the 
emergence  of  a  peaceful,  prosperous  community 
of  nations  bordering  the  Pacific. 

This  is  our  hope  for  peace  and  security  in 
Asia. 

We  Americans  have  high  stakes  in  this — not 
just  because  we  have  military  power  in  the 
Pacific,  but  because  we  happen  to  be  a  member 
of  the  Pacific  community  of  nations.  History, 
geography,  economics,  and  our  national  inter- 
ests  make  this  a  fact.  So  does  our  national  | 
commitment  to  an  orderly  world  and  to  the 
ways  of  peace.  We  must  fulfiU  that  national 
commitment. 


U.S.  and  Peru  Resume  Talks 
on  Outstanding  Problems 

Department  Statement  ^ 

The  meetings  between  the  United  States  and 
Peru  on  outstanding  problems  will  be  resumed 
in  Washington  on  Monday  [April  28].  Agree- 
ment to  continue  the  search  for  solutions  on  the 
issues  was  announced  jointly  in  Lima  April  7 
by  President  Velasco  and  Ambassador  Irwin 
[John  N.  Irwin  II,  special  emissary  of  Presi- 
dent Nixon]  .^ 

These  conversations  are  in  addition  to  the 
administrative  process  now  going  on  in  Peru. 
Secretary  Rogers  in  liis  April  7  statement 
pointed  out  that  this  process  and  these  conver- 
sations constitute  appropriate  steps  toward 
compensation  of  the  International  Petroleum 
Co.  within  the  meaning  of  the  Hickenlooper 
amendment  to  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  and 
of  the  amended  Sugar  Act.'  We  welcome  this 
opportunity  to  continue  these  talks,  because  we 
believe  that  additional  matters  can  be  discussed 
which  may  not  be  developed  in  the  administra- 
tive process  and  that  constructive  proposals 
can  be  considered  by  the  two  Governments  for 
solving  the  outstanding  differences. 


^  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Robert  J.  McCloskey  on  Apr.  25. 

'  For  a  Department  statement  of  Apr.  9,  see  Bulletin 
of  Apr.  28, 1969,  p.  364. 

'For  a  statement  made  by  Secretary  Rogers  at  his 
news  conference  of  Apr.  7,  see  ihid.,  p.  357. 


400 


DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE   BULLETIN 


The  Peruvian  officials  are  due  to  arrive  in 
"Washington  today  [April  25].  The  Peruvian 
Government  has  announced  that  their  group 
will  be  headed  by  Gen.  Marco  Fernandez  Baca 
and  -will  include  Col.  Arturo  Valdes,  Dr.  Al- 
berto Euiz  Eldridge,  and  Ambassador  Edwin 
Letts. 

The  U.S.  group  to  meet  with  them  will  con- 
sist of  Ambassador  Irwin  as  chairman ;  Ambas- 
sador Douglas  Henderson  as  deputy  chairman ; 
and  the  following:  Leonard  C.  Meeker,  Legal 
Adviser  of  the  Department;  Mark  B.  Feld- 
man,  Assistant  Legal  Adviser  for  Inter- Ameri- 
can Affairs ;  Ambassador  Donald  L.  McKeman, 
Special  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  State; 
Walter  Levy,  Consultant  to  the  Department; 
and  William  P.  Stedman,  Jr.,  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Ecuadorean- Peruvian  Affairs. 


U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Conclude  Technical  Talks 
on  Peaceful  Uses  of  Nuclear  Explosions 

Joint  Communique  ^ 

The  Soviet-U.S.  teclinical  discussions  on 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  explosions  took  place 
in  Vienna  from  the  14th  to  the  16th  of  April 
1969. 

Soviet  participants  included  Academician 
Federov,  First  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  State 
Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  Morokliov, 
Messrs.  Kedrovskiy,  Israel,  Rodionov,  Grinew- 
skiy,  and  Gudkov. 

U.S.  participants  included  U.S.  Atomic 
Energy  Commissioner  G.  F.  Tape,  Messrs. 
R.  E.  Batzel,  A.  Holzer,  J.  S.  Kelly,  J.  Rosen, 
H.  Scoville,  N.  Sievering,  and  G.  C.  Werth. 

The  parties  were  of  the  view  that  under- 
ground nuclear  explosions  may  be  successfully 
used  in  the  not  so  far  off  future  to  stimulate  oil 
and  gas  production  and  to  create  underground 
cavities.  It  may  also  be  technically  feasible  to 
use  them  in  earth-moving  work  for  the  construc- 
tion of  water  reservoirs  in  arid  areas,  to  dig 
canals  and  in  removing  the  upper  earth  layer 
in  surface  mining,  etc. 

Although  the  economics  will  vary  from  proj- 
ect to  project  the  use  of  nuclear  explosions  for 
these  purposes  is  promising  and  would  permit 
operations  under  conditions  where  conventional 


methods  are  either  impossible  or  impracticable. 
Provided  that  certain  requirements  are  met,  the 
present  state  of  technology  wiU  make  it  pos- 
sible to  carry  out  underground  explosions  fully 
meeting  national  or  generally  accepted  inter- 
national safety  standards  for  the  protection  of 
the  public  from  radiation. 

Both  delegations  concluded  that  the  exchange 
of  views  on  the  status  of  this  technology  was 
very  useful  and  the  experts  deem  it  desirable 
to  have  additional  technical  exchanges.  Al- 
though these  talks  were  not  concerned  with  how 
peaceful  nuclear  explosion  benefits  are  to  be 
provided  pursuant  to  Article  V  of  the  NPT 
[Nonproliferation  Treaty],^  the  parties  con- 
sidered these  talks  very  timely  in  light  of  this 
provision  of  the  NPT  which  ensures  that  poten- 
tial benefits  from  any  peaceful  applications  of 
nuclear  explosions  will  be  made  available  to  the 
non-nuclear  weapon  states  adlaering  to  the 
Treaty. 


14th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Follo^oing  is  the  opening  statement  made  hy 
AmhassadoT  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  IJith  plenary  session  of 
the  new  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
April  24- 

Press  release  91  dated  April  24 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  We  have  contended 
over  the  past  weeks  that  it  is  the  presence  of 
North  Vietnamese  military  forces  and  subver- 
sive personnel  in  South  Viet-Nam  and  elsewhere 
in  Southeast  Asia  which  is  at  the  heart  of  the 
Viet-Nam  problem. 

The  United  States,  however,  has  not  come  to 
these  Paris  meetings  to  convince  your  side  to 
accept  our  view  of  history.  At  the  same  time, 
your  side  cannot  seriously  expect  us  to  accept 
your  charge  of  American  aggression  when  the 
facts  point  to  the  opposite  conclusion. 

It  is  for  tliis  reason  that  in  the  first  plenary 
session  of  these  meetings,  I  urged  your  side  to 
forgo  the  repetition  of  familiar  charges  and  the 
recitation  of  the  chronology  which  brought  us 


■  Issued  at  Vienna  on  Apr.  16. 


'  For  text  of  the  treaty,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1, 1968, 
p.  9. 


MAT    12,    1969 


401 


here.  We  have  nonetheless  spent  13  weeks  listen- 
ing to  your  version  of  history. 

Nevertheless,  the  exchanges  we  have  had 
around  this  table  have  been  useful  in  helping  us 
to  understand  one  another's  point  of  view  and 
clarify  our  own  viewpoints.  Now  we  have  both 
adequately  set  forth  our  views  on  the  question 
of  aggression  and  responsibility  for  the  war. 

Let  us,  therefore,  now  get  down  to  the  task 
of  bringing  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  end.  Let 
us  seek  practical  solutions  to  practical  problems. 

There  is  one  key  practical  step  which  botli 
sides  can  take  that  would  go  a  long  way  to  bring 
the  fighting  to  an  end.  That  step  is  for  the  ex- 
ternal forces  on  both  sides  to  begin  the  process 
of  withdrawal  from  South  Viet-Nam. 

Your  demand  for  the  total,  unconditional, 
and  unilateral  withdrawal  of  all  United  States 
and  allied  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam,  without 
taking  any  account  of  the  need  for  the  with- 
drawal of  North  Vietnamese  forces,  is  not  a 
serious  proposal  for  negotiation.  This  demand 
ignores  the  central  issue  of  the  war  in  Viet- 
Nam  :  the  massive  and  illegal  presence  of  North 
Vietnamese  militaiy  forces  and  subversive  per- 
sonnel in  South  Viet-Nam.  We  can  only  inter- 
pret your  proposal  for  unilateral  withdrawal 
as  meaning  that  North  Viet-Nam  wishes  to  con- 
tinue its  unlawful  military  presence  in  South 
Viet-Nam  in  order  to  take  over  the  South  by 
force. 

The  military  and  subversive  forces  illegally 
sent  into  South  Viet-Nam  from  North  Viet- 
Nam  are  "external"  to  South  Viet-Nam  and 
have  no  right  to  be  there.  No  arguments  that 
American  and  other  allied  forces  are  the  only 
foreign  forces  in  Viet-Nam  will  change  this 
basic  truth. 

As  Secretary  Kogers  said  on  April  21 :  ^ 

A  mutual  withdrawal  of  external  forces  from  Viet- 
Nam  by  reasonable  stages  would  bring  about  deescala- 
tion  of  fighting.  It  could  then  lead  to  next  steps :  a  total 
elimination  of  outside  combat  forces,  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities, and  a  return  to  peace.  We  see  no  good  reason 
wh.v  that  process  should  not  begin  soon. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  external  forces  of  your 
side  back  to  North  Viet-Nam  is  an  essential 
step  toward  peace.  For  our  part,  we  are  pre- 
pared to  begin  the  withdrawal  of  United  States 
forces  from  South  Viet-Nam  simultaneously 
with  the  external  forces  on  your  side. 

It  is  equally  evident  that  peace  in  South  Viet- 
Nam  and  Southeast  Asia  cannot  be  insured  so 


'  See  p.  397. 


long  as  North  Viet-Nam  continues  to  maintain 
its  troops  in  Laos  and  Cambodia  and  to  use  the 
territory  of  Laos  and  Cambodia  for  infiltration 
into  South  Viet-Nam  and  as  a  base  of  operations 
against  South  Viet-Nam.  That  is  why  the 
United  States  has  said  that  a  lasting  settlement 
must  include  full  compliance  with  the  1962 
agreements  on  Laos  and  full  respect  for  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Cambodia.  There  must 
be  a  withdrawal  of  all  North  Vietnamese 
forces  from  Cambodia  and  Laos  back  to  North 
Viet-Nam. 

North  Viet-Nam  attempts  to  deny  the  fact  of 
its  presence  in  Laos  and  Cambodia  with  asser- 
tions that  it  has  always  respected  the  1962 
Geneva  agreements  on  Laos  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Cambodia.  Yet  the  evidence  to  the 
contrary  is  known  and  accepted  by  the  world 
at  large.  We  must  thus  conclude  from  your  state- 
ments on  this  subject  that  your  side  is  not  yet 
ready  to  deal  with  reality. 

We  also  believe  that,  pending  reunification     ■ 
of  Viet-Nam  through  the  free  decision  of  the    ' 
people  of  South  Viet-Nam  and  the  people  of 
North  Viet-Nam,  respect  for  the  status  of  the 
demilitarized  zone  is  an  important  element  of     ^ 
a  durable  peace.  We  should  put  an  agreed  end 
to  all  military  activity  in  the  demilitarized  zone 
established  by  the  1954  Geneva  accords. 

We  have  also  proposed  the  earliest  possible 
release  of  prisoners  of  war  by  both  sides.  This 
is  a  matter  of  deep  humanitarian  concern  to  us. 

We,  of  course,  also  recognize  the  importance 
of  political  issues  in  any  lasting  settlement. 

We  see  no  reason  why  the  militaiy  and  politi-  ■ 
cal  aspects  of  a  settlement  cannot  be  worked  out  " 
at  the  same  time.  The  United  States  believes 
that  the  political  future  of  South  Viet-Nam 
must  be  worked  out  by  the  South  Vietnamese 
themselves.  We  shall  respect  whatever  choice 
they  make  about  their  political  future  in  a  con- 
text free  of  compulsion  or  coercion  by  anyone. 
Your  side  must  recognize  that  no  undertaking 
of  importance  with  regard  to  South  Viet-Nam 
can  be  carried  out  without  the  approval  of  the 
legitimate  government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam.  Therefore,  you  must  be  prepared,  as  the 
Government  of  the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam  is 
prepared,  to  begin  the  process  of  serious  discus- 
sion among  South  Vietnamese  of  the  elements 
of  a  political  solution. 

Your  side  has  charged  that  the  United  States 
wants  to  keep  these  Paris  meetings  at  a  stand- 
still in  order  to  gain  time  in  which  to  carry  out 


402 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


a  "Vietnamization"  of  the  resistance  to  your 
attack  on  South  Viet-Nam.  The  truth  is  that  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  is  in- 
creasing its  capability  to  defend  itself.  The 
South  Vietnamese  forces  are  engaged  in  a 
systematic  effort  to  enable  them  to  assume  a 
growing  share  of  the  combat  burden  in  South 
Viet-Nam.  The  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  is  also  giving  high  priority  to 
developing  political  unity  and  administrative 
strength  in  the  country. 

If  your  side  continues  its  futile  pursuit  of 
military  victory,  then  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam,  with  the  aid  of  their  allies,  will  continue 
to  defend  themselves.  But  progress  toward 
peace  can  be  hastened  significantly  if  your 
side  is  prepared  in  the  near  future  to  engage 
in  practical  negotiations  on  mutual  force 
withdrawals. 


President  Marks  21st  Anniversary 
of  the  State  of  Israel 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon  to  Zalman  Shazar,  President  of  the 
State  of  Israel. 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  22 

Dear  Mr.  PREsroENT :  My  warmest  congratu- 
lations go  out  to  you  and  your  people  on  the 
occasion  of  the  twenty-first  anniversary  of  the 
State  of  Israel. 

As  so  many  of  my  fellow  Americans,  I  deeply 
admire  the  accomplishments  your  country  has 
realized  in  the  course  of  its  young  life.  Ad- 
versity has  been  your  challenge  as  you  have 
pressed  forward  in  the  face  of  overwhelming 
odds  toward  progress  and  well-being  for  your 
citizens. 

But  as  so  many  peace-loving  men  and  women 
throughout  the  world,  I,  too,  am  deeply  dis- 
turbed and  saddened  by  the  conflict  that  has 
marred  the  great  success  you  have  attained. 

So  on  this  anniversary,  as  I  share  your  satis- 
faction in  the  continuing  achievements  of  your 
nation,  I  also  join  with  you — and  with  all  men 
of  goodwill — in  the  fervent  hope  that  peace 
may  soon  accompany  the  prosperity  you  enjoy. 
Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 


The  U.S.  Balance  of  Payments 

Statement  hy  President  Nixon  ^ 

In  my  fiscal  message  to  the  Congress  on 
March  26, 1  called  for  a  strong  budget  surplus 
and  monetary  restraint  to  curb  an  inflation  that 
has  been  allowed  to  run  into  its  fourth  year. 
This  is  fundamental  economics,  and  I  pointed 
out  that  we  intend  to  deal  with  fundamentals. 

Similarly,  the  problem  of  regaining  equi- 
librium in  the  U.S.  balance  of  payments  cannot 
be  solved  with  expedients  that  postpone  the 
problem  to  another  year.  We  shall  stop  treating 
symptoms  and  start  treating  causes,  and  we 
shall  find  our  solutions  in  the  framework  of 
freer  trade  and  payments. 

Fundamental  economics  calls  for: 

— creating  the  conditions  that  make  it  pos- 
sible to  rebuild  our  trade  surplus. 

— ultimate  dismantling  of  the  network  of 
direct  controls  which  may  seem  useful  in  the 
short  run  but  are  self-defeating  in  the  long  run. 

The  U.S.  balance  of  payments  showed  a  sur- 
plus last  year.  But  this  surplus  included  an  im- 
usually  high  and  probably  unsustainable  capital 
inflow.  Our  trade  surplus,  which  reached  a  peak 
of  $6.5  billion  in  the  midsixties,  declined  sharply 
and  all  but  disappeared. 

That  trade  surplus  must  be  rebuilt,  and  it  can 
only  be  rebuilt  by  restoring  stable  and  nonin- 
flationai-y  economic  growth  to  the  U.S.  econ- 
omy. Inflation  has  drawn  in  a  flood  of  imports 
while  it  has  diminished  our  competitiveness  in 
world  markets  and  thus  dampened  our  export 
expansion. 

Tills  is  why  our  program  of  fiscal  and  mone- 
tary restraint  is  as  necessary  for  our  external 
trade  as  for  restoring  order  in  our  domestic 
econom3\ 

Building  on  the  solid  base  of  a  healthy,  non- 
inflationary  economy— a  base  that  only  the 
fundamentals  of  fiscal  and  monetary  restraint 
now  can  restore — we  are  planning  a  sustained 
effort  in  several  key  areas: 

— In  ex-port  expansion,  we  have  tentatively 
set  an  export  goal  of  $50  billion  to  be  achieved 
by  1973.  This  compares  with  1968  exports  of 
about  $34  billion.  This  is  primarily  the  task  of 


^Issued  at  Key  Biscayne,   Fla.,  on  Apr.  4    (White 
House  press  release). 


MAY    12,    1969 


403 


American  private  enterprise,  but  Government 
must  help  to  coordinate  the  effort  and  offer  as- 
sistance and  encouragement.  We  must  also  call 
on  the  productivity  and  ingenuity  of  American 
industry  to  meet  the  competitive  challenge  of 
imported  goods. 

— In  trade  policies,  we  will  be  working  with 
our  major  trading  partners  abroad  to  insure  that 
our  products  receive  a  fair  competitive 
reception. 

— In  defense  activities,  we  will  also  work  with 
our  friends  abroad  to  insure  that  the  balance-of- 
payments  burden  of  providing  for  the  common 
defense  is  shared  fairly. 

— In  travel,  we  will  encourage  more  foreign 
travel  to  the  United  States.  Here,  as  in  other 
areas,  we  will  be  relying  heavily  on  the  support 
of  the  private  community.  We  seek  no  restric- 
tions on  the  American  tourist's  freedom  to 
travel. 

— In  international  investment,  we  will  review 
our  own  regulations  and  tax  policy  to  assure 
that  foreign  investment  in  the  United  States  is 
not  discouraged ;  for  example,  we  move  now  to 
eliminate  from  our  laws  the  prospective  taxa- 
tion of  interest  on  foreign-held  bank  deposits. 

— In  the  international  financial  area,  we  will 
be  continuing  to  work  with  our  friends  abroad 
to  strengthen  and  improve  the  international 
monetary  system.  An  expanding  world  economy 
will  require  growing  levels  of  trade  with  ade- 
quate levels  of  reserves  and  effective  methods 
by  which  countries  can  adjust  their  payments 
imbalances.  In  particular,  we  look  forward  to 
ratification  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
members  of  the  special  drawing  rights  plan  and 
its  early  activation. 

I  am  confident  that  measures  in  these  areas, 
coupled  with  the  cooling  of  the  economy  through 
fiscal-monetary  restraint,  will  move  us  in  an  or- 
derly manner  toward  true  balance-of -payments 
equilibrium.  Accordingly,  I  have  begun,  gradu- 
ally but  purposefully,  to  dismantle  the  direct 
controls  which  only  mask  the  underlying  prob- 
lem. Specifically : 

First,  I  have  today  signed  an  Executive  order 
reducing  the  effective  rate  of  the  interest  equali- 
zation tax  from  V^  percent  to  %  of  1  percent. 
This  measure  was  designed  to  close  a  large 
gap — which  has  now  narrowed — between  for- 
eign and  domestic  interest  rates.  I  shall, 
however,  request  the  Congress  to  extend  the 
President's  discretionary  authority  under  the 


interest  equalization  tax  for  18  months  beyond 
its  scheduled  expiration  in  July. 

Second,  1  have  approved  a  recommendation 
to  relax  somewhat  the  foreign  direct  invest- 
ment program  of  the  Department  of  Commerce. 
This  means  that  most  firms  investing  abroad 
will  have  substantially  more  freedom  in  plan- 
ning these  investments. 

Third,  I  have  been  informed  by  Chairman 
[of  the  Federal  Eeserve  Board  William  Mc- 
Chesney]  Martin  of  modifications  in  the  Fed- 
eral Reserve  program  which  will  provide  more 
flexibility  for  commercial  banks,  particularly 
smaller  and  medium-sized  banks,  to  finance  U.S. 
exports. 

These  are  prudent  and  limited  steps  that 
recognize  the  realities  of  our  present  balance-of - 
payments  situation. 

The  distortions  created  by  more  than  3  years 
of  inflation  cannot  be  corrected  overnight.  Nor 
can  the  dislocations  resulting  from  a  decade  of 
balance-of-payments  deficits  be  corrected  in  a 
short  time. 

But  the  time  for  restoring  the  basis  of  our 
prosperity  is  long  overdue.  We  shall  continually 
direct  America's  economic  policy,  both  foreign 
and  domestic,  at  correcting  the  root  causes  of 
our  problems,  rather  than  covering  them  over 
with  a  patehwork  quilt  of  controls. 

By  facing  up  to  fundamental  economic  needs, 
the  inflationary  tide  and  the  trade  tide  can  be 
turned  and  the  U.S.  dollar  continued  strong 
and  secure. 


President  Nixon  Reduces  Rates 
of  Interest  Equalization  Tax 

WHITE  HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 

White  House  press  release  (Key  Biscay ne,  Fla.)  dated  April  4        J 

The  President  on  April  3  signed  an  Executive 
order  fixing  the  rate  of  the  interest  equalization 
tax  on  acquisitions  of  foreign  stock  at  11.25  per- 
cent and  the  rates  on  acquisitions  of  foreign 
debt  obligations  at  0.79  percent  to  11.25  percent 
depending  upon  the  period  remaining  to  ma- 
turity at  the  time  of  acquisition.  These  new  low- 
er rates  represent  the  api^roximate  equivalent 
of  an  annual  interest  charge  of  0.75  percent, 


404 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


a  reduction  in  the  annual  interest  charge  equiva- 
lent previously  applicable  of  0.50  percentage 
point.  The  new  rates  are  applicable  to  acquisi- 
tions (generally  on  a  trade-date  basis)  made 
after  April  4, 1969. 

These  reduced  rates  are  consistent  with  the 
purpose  of  the  interest  equalization  tax  to  limit 
the  acquisitions  of  foreign  stocks  and  debt  obli- 
gations within  a  range  consistent  with  the  bal- 
ance-of-payments  objectives  of  the  United 
States.  Eeduction  of  the  rates  of  interest  equali- 
zation tax  is  appropriate  in  view  of  the  increase 
in  United  States  longer  term  interest  rates  rela- 
tive to  those  prevailing  in  important  foreign 
markets.  Such  increases  in  United  States  longer 
term  interest  rates,  as  well  as  the  expansion  in 
the  capacity  of  international  long-term  capital 
markets,  have  decreased  the  demands  of  foreign 
borrowers  on  United  States  capital  markets. 


EXECUTIVE  ORDER   11464' 

MoDiFTiNa  Rates  of  Interest  Equalization  Tax 

Whebeas,  I  have  determined  that  the  rates  of  tax 
prescribed  under  section  1  of  Executive  Order  No. 
11368,  dated  August  28,  1967,'  with  respect  to  acquisi- 
tions of  stocks  of  foreign  issuers  and  debt  obligations  of 
foreign  obligors  made  after  August  29,  1967,  are 
higher  than  the  rates  of  tax  necessary  to  limit  the 
acquisitions  by  United  States  persons  of  stocks  of  for- 
eign issuers  and  debt  obligations  of  foreign  obligors 
within  a  range  consistent  vrith  the  balance-of-payments 
objectives  of  the  United  States ; 

Now,  thebefobe,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested 
in  me  by  section  4911(b)  (2)  of  the  Internal  Revenue 
Code  of  19.54,  and  as  President  of  the  United  States, 
it  is  hereby  ordered  as  follows : 

Section  1.  Section  1  of  Executive  Order  No.  11368, 
dated  August  28,  1967,  is  hereby  amended  to  read  as 
follows : 

"Section  1.  Rates  of  Tax. 

"(a)  Rates  applicable  to  acquisitions  of  stock.  The 


tax  imposed  by  section  4911  of  the  Internal  Revenue 
Code  of  1954  on  the  acquisition  of  stock  shall  be  equal 
to  11.25  percent  of  the  actual  value  of  the  stock. 

"(b)  Rates  applicable  to  acquisitions  of  debt  obli- 
gations. The  tax  imposed  by  section  4911  of  the  Inter- 
nal Revenue  Code  of  1954  on  the  acquisition  of  a  debt 
obligation  shall  be  equal  to  a  percentage  of  the  actual 
value  of  the  debt  obligation  measured  by  the  period 
remaining  to  its  maturity  and  determined  in  accord- 
ance with  the  following  table : 

If  the  period  remaining  to  maturity  is : 

The  tax,  as  a 

percentage  of 

actual  value,  is: 

At  least  1  year,  but  less  than  lYi  years 0.  79  percent 

At  least  IVi  years,  but  less  than  1%  years 0.  98  percent 

At  least  1%  years,  but  less  than  1%  years 1.  13  percent 

At  least  1%  years,  but  less  than  2%  years 1.  39  percent 

At  least  2  J4  years,  but  less  than  2%  years 1.  73  percent 

At  least  2%  years,  but  less  than  '■>%  years 2.  06  percent 

At  least  SVi  years,  but  less  than  4^  years 2.  66  percent 

At  least  414  years,  but  less  than  5V^  years 3.  26  percent 

At  least  5Vi  years,  but  less  than  6M1  years 3.  83  percent 

At  least  6V.  years,  but  less  than  7V>  years 4.  35  percent 

At  least  7%  years,  but  less  than  8V4  years 4.  88  percent 

At  least  8%  years,  but  less  than  9%  years 5.  33  percent 

At  least  9%  years,  but  less  than  10%  years 5.  78  percent 

At  least  10%  years,  but  less  than  11%  years 6.  23  percent 

At  least  11%  years,  but  less  than  13%  years 6.  83  percent 

At  least  13%  years,  but  less  than  16%  years 7.  73  percent 

At  least  16%  years,  but  less  than  18%  years 8.  51  percent 

At  least  18%  years,  but  less  than  21%  years 9. 19  percent 

At  least  21%  years,  but  less  than  23%  years 9.  79  percent 

At  least  23%  years,  but  less  than  26%  years 10.  31  percent 

At  least  26%  years,  but  less  than  28%  years 10.  76  percent 

28%  years  or  more 11.25  percent" 

Sec.  2.  With  respect  to  acquisitions  of  stock  of  for- 
eign issuers  and  debt  obligations  of  foreign  obligors 
made  under  the  rules  of  a  national  securities  exchange 
registered  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commis- 
sion or  under  the  rules  of  the  National  Association  of 
Securities  Dealers,  Inc.,  this  order  shall  be  effective 
for  acquisitions  made  after  April  4,  1969,  but  only  if 
the  trade-date  was  after  April  4,  1969.  In  the  case  of 
other  acquisitions  of  stock  of  foreign  issuers  and  debt 
obligations  of  foreign  obligors,  this  order  shall  be  effec- 
tive for  acquisitions  made  after  April  4, 1969. 

The  White  House, 
April  S,lSeS. 


'34  Fed.  Reg.  6233. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  25,  1967,  p.  396. 


MAT    12,    1889 


348-007 — 69- 


405 


THE  CONGRESS 


Current  U.S.-Peruvian  Problems 


Statement  hy  Charles  A.  Meyer 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs  ■ 


I  am  grateful  for  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  you  today  during  your  hearings  on  Peru. 
You  liave  previously  heard  statements  by  dis- 
tinguished witnesses  dealing  with  Peru.  As  you 
know,  President  Nixon's  special  emissary,  Am- 
bassador John  N.  Irwin  II,  recently  held  con- 
versations in  Lima  with  the  highest  levels  of  the 
Peruvian  Government.  His  mission  was  to  ex- 
plore means  of  arriving  at  a  constructive  solu- 
tion to  the  International  Petroleum  Company 
expropriation  problem  which  will  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  the  parties  involved  and  if  pos- 
sible avoid  damaging  our  traditional  relation- 
ship with  Peru.  His  mission  is  delicate  and  has 
not  ended.  As  a  result  of  the  conversation  in 
Lima,  President  Nixon  determined  that  the 
imposition  of  sanctions  under  relevant  laws  be 
temporarily  deferred,  pending  the  outcome  of 
administrative  procedures  in  Peru.  Further,  the 
Penivian  Government  will  be  sending  a  team  to 
Washington  in  the  near  future  to  continue  the 
conversations  which  were  held  in  Lima. 

Because  of  the  continuing  and  sensitive  na- 
ture of  the  problems  we  face  with  Peru  at  the 
present  time,  I  would  have  preferred  that  these 
hearings  be  held  at  a  later  time.  Wlien  I  ex- 
pressed this  view  to  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  you 
explained  that  a  hearing  deferred  is  too  often  a 
hearing  never  heard.  You  very  kindly  offered 
to  defer  my  appearance  or  to  take  my  testimony 
in  executive  session.  In  considering  this,  I  was 
mindful  of  the  fact  that  other  distinguished  wit- 
nesses from  university,  business,  and  journalism 
would  be  testifying  in  open  session.  To  defer 
my  appearance  seemed  unfair  to  you. 


^  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Western  Hemi- 
sphere Affairs  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Re- 
lations on  Apr.  17  (press  release 85). 


Nevertheless,  I  hope  you  will  appreciate  my 
inability  to  go  into  the  details  of  some  of  the 
pertinent  questions  and  problems  today  in  open 
hearings. 

I  understand  the  principal  purpose  of  these 
hearings,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  to  identify  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  present  problems  with  Peru 
developed,  with  a  view  to  avoiding  similar  situa- 
tions elsewhere  in  the  future.  All  of  us  are  dedi- 
cated to  the  maximum  of  cooperation  between 
the  United  States  and  Latin  America — under 
law  and  within  the  framework  of  equality,  real- 
ism, and  mutual  respect.  We  must  understand 
the  past  to  cope  with  the  present  and  plan  for 
the  future.  It  would  not  be  my  puqjose  to  offer 
public  conunentary  which  would  be  critical  of 
previous  decisions,  nor  does  it  fall  to  me  to  de- 
fend past  decisions  or  actions.  In  pursuing  a 
policy  of  the  present  and  future,  we  will  have 
our  own  ideas  about  previous  policies  and 
actions. 

As  Professor  Kantor  [Prof.  Harry  Kantor, 
Political  Science  Department,  Marquette  Uni- 
versity] pointed  out,  some  of  the  essential  fac- 
tors in  the  Peruvian  society  are  different  than  in 
ours.  As  one  example,  I  would  cite  the  takeover 
of  government  by  the  Pei-uv-ian  military,  both 
in  1962  and  in  1968.  Our  experience  on  the  road 
to  economic,  social,  and  political  development 
is  wholly  one  of  the  existence  of  representative 
institutions  freely  chosen  by  responsible  citizens 
of  a  society.  We  believe  this  offers  the  most  for 
the  most. 

But  despite  popular  misconceptions,  the 
United  States  Government  does  not  install  or 
remove  governments  in  Latin  America,  nor  is 
there  any  single  aspect  of  American  policy 
which  in  its  most  exaggerated  interpretation 
could  be  construed  as  the  determining  factor  in 


406 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


what  type  or  kind  of  government  may  be  in 
power.  I  believe  it  is  a  mistake  to  assmne  that 
the  United  States  is  responsible  for  every  do- 
mestic political  occurrence  in  any  Latin  Ameri- 
can country. 

Yesterday  you  and  the  committee  heard  testi- 
mony from  the  president  of  the  International 
Petroleum  Company  and  other  witnesses  re- 
garding the  current  problem  over  the  expropria- 
tion of  the  major  assets  of  the  International 
Petroleum  Company. 

I  will  not  attempt  to  go  into  detail  on  the 
historical  antecedents  of  tliis  problem.  Neverthe- 
less, as  you  know,  the  present  military  govern- 
ment of  Pera  rescinded  contracts  between  the 
International  Petroleum  Company  and  the  con- 
stitutionally elected  government  and  a  few  days 
later  seized  the  major  assets  of  the  company. 
This  case  is  a  complicated  issue,  ranging  back 
into  history  40  and  even  100  years.  It  is,  further- 
more, an  issue  that  has  generated  the  most  fer- 
vent emotions  in  Peru. 

The  United  States  Government  has  a  policy, 
and  that  policy  is  codified  in  legislation  in  cases 
of  this  kind.  The  United  States  Government  has 
declared  a  responsibility  to  i^i-otect  the  legiti- 
mate mterests  of  American  investors  overseas. 
The  United  States  is  one  of  the  nations  which 
export  capital  outside  their  own  borders.  The 
investors  and  the  United  States  Government 
both  recognize  and  accept  the  risks  that  may  be 
attendant  to  overseas  enterprises.  Congress  and 
the  executive  branch  have  adopted  various 
means  of  minimizing  these  risks,  but  they  of 
course  can  never  be  eliminated.  It  is  the  policy 
and  desire  of  this  Government  to  attempt  to 
insure  that  American  capital  receives  just,  fair, 
and  equitable  treatment  overseas. 

In  the  particular  case  of  Peru  the  United 
States  policy  is  one  of  reasonableness.  We  seek 
and  indeed  insist  that  the  Government  of  Peru 
give  prompt,  adequate,  and  effective  compensa- 
tion for  the  properties  and  assets  which  it  has, 
in  the  exercise  of  its  sovereign  power,  taken. 
Both  the  concept  of  expropriation  and  the  re- 
quirement for  compensation  are  recognized  in 
international  law.  We  ask  no  more  than  ad- 
herence to  this  common  custom. 

Congress  has  provided  legislation  which 
complements  or  supplements  traditional  inter- 
national law  in  this  regard.  This  legislation 
would  suspend  United  States  Government  de- 
velopment assistance  and  would  deny  to  Peru 
the  sugar  quota  which  allows  the  export  of  this 
conunodity  to  the  United  States  at  a  premium 
price. 


The  Department  of  State  at  the  time  this  leg- 
islation was  proposed  disagreed  with  certain  of 
its  concepts  and  provisions.  If  I  were  a  member 
of  your  subcommittee  at  the  present  time,  I 
would  ask  the  Assistant  Secretary  if  he  thought 
this  law  was  a  helpful  tool  to  the  Executive  in 
conducting  foreign  policy  under  the  circum- 
stances that  I  have  outlined  above.  As  Assistant 
Secretary,  I  would  answer  that  the  terms  and 
utility  of  the  legislation  can  and  may  be  debated 
and  the  effectiveness  of  the  legislation  judged  in 
the  light  of  particular  circumstances.  These 
amendments  may  be  a  useful  deterrent  to  ir- 
responsible action.  Ideally,  governments  that 
expropriate  property  will  take  steps  which  obvi- 
ate the  necessity  to  apply  this  legislation.  When 
there  is  a  dispute,  however,  it  is  our  aim  to  find 
constructive  solutions  which  will  satisfy  the  re- 
quirements of  the  parties  involved,  without  ap- 
plication of  the  sanctions.  I  would  add,  however, 
that  the  law  exists  and  it  will  be  implemented 
as  necessary. 

In  considering  the  existing  situation  between 
Peru  and  the  United  States,  the  problem  of 
jurisdiction  over  territorial  waters  must  be 
mentioned.  This  is  a  problem  which  involves  not 
only  Peru  but  Ecuador  and  Chile  as  well.  The 
extension  of  jurisdiction  by  those  countries 
some  years  ago  to  a  breadth  of  200  miles  along 
the  coast  has  given  rise  to  repeated  incidents  in 
wliich  the  Governments  of  Ecuador  and  Peru 
have  seized  and  fined  United  States  fishing  ves- 
sels on  what  are  commonly  regarded  in  the 
world  as  the  high  seas.  Without  minimizing  the 
seriousness  of  this  problem,  I  would  like  to  say 
that  the  United  States  Government  believes  that 
there  are  practical  solutions  which  will  redound 
to  our  mutual  benefit.  We  have  for  some  time 
been  attempting  to  convince  Chile,  Ecuador, 
and  Peru  to  attend  a  formal  conference  with 
the  United  States  in  which  the  issue  in  its  en- 
tirety can  be  explored,  with  the  idea  of  evolving 
workable  solutions  under  which  neither  juri- 
dical positions  nor  the  legitimate  rights  of 
American  fishermen  are  harmed. 

Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult,  at  least  in  the 
case  of  Peru,  to  treat  this  problem  in  isolation. 
We  assume,  however,  that  it  can  be  treated 
within  the  context  of  our  overall  difficulties  with 
Peru,  and  we  shall  continue  to  press  for  a  con- 
structive and  amicable  solution  to  this  problem. 

What  we  see  in  Peruvian-United  States  re- 
lations at  the  present  time  in  the  broadest  terms 
are  differences  between  two  longtime  friends.  It 
is  partially  a  product  of  the  changing  aspira- 
tions of  a  developing  country.  It  is  by  no  means 


MAY    12,    1969 


407 


a  unique  phenomenon.  The  United  States  must 
expect  to  be  involved  in  such  problems  and 
therefore  to  be  involved  in  continuing  negotia- 
tions over  those  problems.  Whether  we  speak  of 
territorial  waters,  arms,  military  assistance,  de- 
velopment aid,  private  investment,  or  the  simple 
application  of  domestic  laws  which  conflict,  we 
basically  are  talking  about  the  same  thing.  The 
difference  of  viewpoint  is  between  large  and 
small  sovereign  countries,  between  countries 
which  export  capital  and  those  which  receive 
capital. 

These  are  difficult  and  important  problems, 
and  we  will  continue  conscientiously  to  work 
for  solutions.  We  will,  nevertheless,  seek  an 
understanding  of  the  United  States  viewpoint. 
We  will,  in  short,  be  fair  and  reasonable  within 
the  context  of  United  States  law  and  the  legiti- 
mate interests  of  our  country. 

Once  again,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to 
thank  you  for  your  courteous  attention,  and  I 
am  at  your  disposal  within  the  limits  that  I 
mentioned  earlier  in  my  statement. 


Senate  Approval  Asked  of  Agreement 
for  Diversions  From  Niagara  River 

Message  From  President  Nixon  ^ 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  : 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  approval  of  the 
Senate,  I  transmit  herewith  the  texts  of  two 
notes,  signed  and  exchanged  at  Washington  on 
March  21,  1969,  constituting  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  Canada,  pro- 
viding for  additional  temporary  diversions 
from  the  Niagara  River  for  power  production 
purposes. 


It  is  provided  in  the  agreement  that  it  will 
enter  into  force  upon  notification  that  the 
exchange  of  notes  has  been  approved  by  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States.  The  agreement 
requires  Senate  advice  and  consent  to  approval 
because  it  would  authorize  a  departure  from 
the  limitations  prescribed  in  the  Niagara  River 
Treaty  of  February  27, 1950  ^  in  regard  to  mini- 
miun  flows. 

An  agreement  with  Canada  providing  for  the 
construction  of  a  temporary  cofferdam  above 
the  American  Falls  at  Niagara  was  concluded 
by  an  exchange  of  notes  on  the  same  date. 
Copies  of  those  notes  are  transmitted  herewith 
for  the  information  of  the  Senate.  This  coffer- 
dam agreement  is  deemed  to  be  a  "special  agree- 
ment" of  the  kind  expressly  authorized  by  the 
Boundary  Waters  Treaty  of  January  11,  1909 
with  Canada.^  It  is  stipulated  in  this  agreement 
that  it  enters  into  force  immediately  upon  the 
exchange  of  notes. 

I  also  transmit  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate  a  report  by  the  Secretary  of  State  ex- 
plaining more  fully  the  background  and  pur- 
poses of  the  two  agreements. 

I  urge  that  the  Senate  give  early  and  favor- 
able consideration  to  the  agreement  authorizing 
additional  temporary  diversions  from  the 
Niagara  River  for  power  production  purposes. 


Richard  Nixon 


The  White  Hottse, 
April  H,  1969. 


^  Transmitted  on  Apr.  14  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  C,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
which  includes  the  texts  of  the  two  exchanges  of  notes 
on  Mar.  21  and  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State; 
for  texts  of  the  notes,  see  Btn-LETIN  of  Apr.  21,  1969, 
p.  346. 

'  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  2130. 

'  36  Stat.  2448. 


408 


DEPAKTMBNT   OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Views  on  Nuclear  Weapon  Material  Cutoff  Agreement 
and  Verification  of  Comprehensive  Nuclear  Test  Ban 


Statenhent  by  Adrian  S.  Fisher  ^ 


President  Nixon,  in  his  letter  of  instructions 
to  Ambassador  Smith,  mentioned  three  specific 
measures  on  which  he  hoped  there  could  be  prog- 
ress at  this  conference.^  First,  he  indicated  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  working  out  an 
international  agreement  that  would  prohibit  the 
emplacement  or  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  or 
other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  sea- 
bed. Second,  he  set  forth  the  support  of  the 
United  States  for  the  conclusion  of  a  compre- 
hensive test  ban  adequately  verified  and  indi- 
cated that  efforts  should  be  made  toward  greater 
imderstanding  of  the  verification  issue.  Third, 
he  stated  that  the  United  States  would  continue 
to  press  for  an  agreement  to  cut  off  the  produc- 
tion of  fissionable  materials  for  use  in  nuclear 
weapons  and  for  the  transfer  of  such  materials 
to  peaceful  purposes. 

In  his  intervention  on  March  25  of  this  year,' 
Ambassador  Smith  discussed  in  some  detail  the 
factors  that  the  United  States  believes  are  rele- 
vant to  the  first  of  these  measures,  an  interna- 
tional agreement  that  would  prohibit  the 
emplacement  or  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  or 
other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed. 


^  Made  before  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen-Nation 
Committee  on  Disarmament  at  Geneva  on  Apr.  8.  Mr. 
Fisher  is  Deputy  Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament  Agency  and  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
conference. 

-  For  text  of  a  letter  dated  Mar.  15  from  President 
Nixon  to  Ambassador  Gerard  Smith,  head  of  the  U.S. 
delegation  to  the  conference,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  7, 
1969,  p.  289. 

»  Bulletin  of  Apr.  21, 1969,  p.  333. 


Todaj'  I  would  like  to  discuss  the  views  of 
the  United  States  on  the  other  two. 

I  think  all  the  members  of  this  Committee 
would  agree  that  there  is  no  more  important  job 
facing  us  than  that  of  achieving  the  cessation  of 
the  nuclear  arms  race  at  an  early  date.  We  have 
all  said  so  many  times,  and  we  have  incorporated 
statements  to  this  effect  in  the  Nonprolif eration 
Treaty,  both  in  the  preamble  and  in  article  VI.* 
Nevertheless,  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to  agree 
on  the  one  agreement  that  would  be  thoroughly 
effective  in  preventing  the  growth  of  the  stock- 
piles of  nuclear  weapons;  that  is,  an  agreement 
to  halt  the  production  for  weapons  purposes  of 
the  fissionable  material  which  is  the  essential 
ingredient  for  a  nuclear  bomb. 

Our  attempts  to  reach  such  an  agreement  go 
back  quite  a  wliile,  to  a  time  when  the  stockpile 
of  nuclear  bombs  was  much  smaller  than  it  is 
now  because  there  was  then  much  less  weapons- 
grade  fissionable  material,  on  both  sides,  with 
which  to  make  them.  President  Eisenhower  first 
proposed  a  cutoff  of  the  production  of  fissionable 
materials  for  weapons  well  over  a  decade  ago — 
in  1956.^  Subsequently,  the  United  States  has 
strongly  advocated  adoption  of  the  "cutoff"  on 
many  occasions,  both  in  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  and  in  this  Committee.  In 
1964  and  1966,  we  presented  to  the  ENDC  four 
working    papers    on    verification    of    various 


*  For  text  of  the  treaty,  see  BuijjrnN  of  July  1, 1968, 
p.  9. 

°  For  background,  see  Bulustin  of  Mar.  26,  1956, 
p.  514. 


irAT    12,    1969 


409 


aspects  of  a  cutoff  agreement.  At  this  session  of 
this  Committee,  the  United  States  will  continue 
to  support  such  an  agreement. 

Essential  Elements  of  a  Cutoff  Agreement 

Tlie  essential  elements  of  a  cutoff  agreement 
would  be : 

First.  As  of  an  agreed  date,  nuclear-weapon 
states  would  halt  all  production  for  use  in 
nuclear  weapons  of  fissionable  materials 
(uranium  enriched  in  U-235,  and  plutonium). 

Second.  The  production  of  fissionable  ma- 
terials would  be  permitted  to  continue  for  pur- 
poses other  than  use  in  nuclear  weapons,  such 
as  power  and  propulsion  reactors  and  nuclear 
explosives  for  peaceful  purposes. 

Third.  In  order  to  provide  for  compliance 
with  the  agreement,  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  would  be  asked  to  safeguard  the 
nuclear  material  in  each  state's  peaceful  nuclear 
activities  and  to  verify  the  continued  shutdown 
of  any  facilities  for  production  of  fissionable 
materials  that  are  closed. 

This  last  element,  that  is,  the  provisions  for 
IAEA  safeguards,  represents  a  change  in  the 
previous  position  of  the  United  States.  The 
United  States  previously  proposed  what  we 
thought  was  a  reasonable  inspection  system  in 
order  to  safeguard  against  any  significant  di- 
version of  fissionable  materials.  This  system  in- 
volved substantial  elements  of  adversary 
inspection,  particularly  in  the  search  for  un- 
disclosed facilities.  It  is  described  in  a  working 
paper  on  the  inspection  of  a  fissionable  material 
cutoff  ( ENDC/134 ) ,  which  was  presented  to  this 
Committee  on  June  25,  1964.  Since  that  time, 
however,  a  somewhat  different  approach  to  the 
verification  problem,  insofar  as  it  is  applicable 
to  non-nuclear-weapon  states,  has  been  devel- 
oped in  this  Committee  and  has  gained  wide 
acceptance.  This  approach  is  contained  in  article 
III  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.  It  involves 
reliance  on  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  and  agreements  to  be  worked  out  in 
accordance  with  the  Statute  of  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency  and  the  Agency's  safe- 
guards system  as  the  means  for  preventing  the 
diversion  of  nuclear  materials  to  use  in 
weapons.  We  would  propose  a  similar  approach 
to  the  verification  of  a  cutoff  agreement  for  the 
nuclear- weapon  states. 

In  indicating  our  continuing  support  for  a 
cutoff,  I  should  like  to  make  clear  that  the 


United  States  reiterates  its  offer  to  add  to  the 
cutoff  an  agreement  to  transfer  to  peaceful  pur- 
poses agreed  amounts  of  fissionable  materials. 
In  the  past,  the  United  States  has  indicated  its 
willingness  to  transfer  60,000  kilograms  of  U- 
235  to  peaceful  purposes  provided  the  Soviet 
Union  would  transfer  40,000  kilograms  of  the 
same  material.  The  amounts  to  be  transferred 
would  be,  of  course,  the  subject  of  negotiation ; 
and  it  may  well  be  that  some  might  think  that  it 
would  be  appropriate  for  the  agreement  to  pro- 
vide for  the  transfer  of  equal  quantities  by 
both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

Effect  on  the  Nuclear  Arms  Race 

There  are  two  aspects  of  the  cutoff  that  seem 
particularly   relevant  to   recent  developments 
and  discussions  in  the  field  of  disarmament.  I    I 
intend  to  give  special  attention  to  these  matters    " 
in  my  intervention  today :  first,  the  value  of  the 
cutoff  measure  as  a  means  of  halting  the  nuclear 
arms  race,  and  second,  the  importance  of  this 
measure  as  a  prudent  and  necessary  step  toward 
establishing  an  equitable  system  of  safeguards    | 
on  all  production  of  fissionable  materials.  ^j 

The  United  States  has  for  many  years  placed 
the  cutoff  high  on  our  agenda  because  we  con- 
sidered it  a  realistic  measure  that  would  place 
a  limit  once  and  for  aU  on  the  size  of  nuclear 
arsenals.  It  would  do  so  by  limiting  definitively 
the  amount  of  fissionable  materials  available 
for  use  in  nuclear  weapons.  The  economic,  polit- 
ical, and  military  benefits  that  both  the  nu- 
clear and  nonnuclear  nations  would  derive  from 
the  adoption  of  tliis  measui'e  are  obvious. 
Equally  obvious  is  the  important  contribution 
of  a  cutoff  in  facilitating  progress  on  other 
steps  to  halt  the  nuclear  arms  i-ace. 

We  are  all  familiar  with  the  argument 
against  the  value  of  a  cutoff  agreement  that 
has  been  set  forth  whenever  this  measure  has 
been  discussed  in  the  past.  The  essence  of  this 
argument  is  that  a  cutoff  would  not  be  worth 
while  because  it  would  not  deal  with  the  means 
that  already  exist  for  waging  nuclear  war. 
The  lack  of  validity  of  such  an  assertion  is 
clear,  I  believe,  if  we  examine  its  logical  corol- 
lary :  that  no  steps  toward  Iialting  the  nuclear 
arms  race  are  worth  while  if  they  do  not  com-  | 
pletely  eliminate  existing  nuclear  arsenals.  This 
is  a  thesis  which  this  Committee  cannot  accept 
in  its  work. 

It  is  arguments  such  as  this  that  have  been 
used  against  a  cutoff  of  the  production  of  fis- 


410 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


sionable  materials  ever  since  a  cutoff  was  first 
proposed  in  1956,  13  years  ago.  Yet,  I  submit, 
no  one  can  deny  that  the  nuclear  confrontation 
would  be  at  a  much  lower  level,  and  the  world 
a  much  better  place,  if  we  had  been  able  to  ob- 
tain a  cutoff  when  it  was  first  proposed.  I  do 
not  mention  this  in  order  to  cry  over  spilt  milk. 
I  do  so  in  the  hope  that  13  years  from  now  we 
will  not  be  in  a  position  where — after  13  more 
years  of  a  dangerous  and  costly  arms  race — we 
are  regretting  the  failure  of  this  effort  to  in- 
crease the  security  of  all  of  us  by  obtaining  such 
an  agreement. 

We  are  all  familiar  as  well  with  the  argument 
that  the  system  for  verifying  a  cutoff,  which 
the  United  States  suggested  on  previous  oc- 
casions, was  designed,  somehow,  for  the  inter- 
national collection  of  intelligence  on  key  sec- 
tors of  state  defense.  Although  this  assertion 
did  not  accurately  describe  the  reasonable  in- 
spection system  we  had  previously  suggested, 
it  clearly  cannot  be  applied  to  the  inspection 
system  that  we  are  now  discussing;  that  is, 
IAEA  safeguards  on  the  nuclear  material  m 
peaceful  nuclear  activities  and  IAEA  verifica- 
tion of  shutdown  facilities  for  production  of 
fissionable  materials. 

We  emphasize  this  aspect  of  the  cutoff  be- 
cause of  our  belief  that  the  nuclear-weapon 
powers  should  be  prepared  to  accept,  in  the  con- 
text of  a  cutoff  agreement,  the  same  safeguards 
on  their  fissionable  material  production  facili- 
ties that  are  appropriate  to  verify  nonprolifera- 
tion  in  the  non-nuclear-weapon  states.  We  do 
not  propose  any  other  inspection  or  verifica- 
tion for  this  agreement.  The  suitability  of 
IAEA  safeguards  should  be  apparent  to  all  of 
us  who  have  called  on  other  states  to  accept 
them. 

Over  the  past  3  years,  while  our  efforts  were 
directed  primarily  toward  fashioning  a  broadly 
acceptable  agreement  to  halt  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear weapons,  several  countries  proposed  that 
a  nonproliferation  treaty  be  linked  to  other 
measures  of  nuclear  disarmament.  As  you  know, 
the  United  States  opposed  these  proposals.  Our 
reason  for  doing  so — and  I  believe  the  correct- 
ness of  our  assumption  has  been  borne  out — 
was  that  insistence  on  establishing  such  a  link 
as  a  precondition  for  a  nonproliferation  treaty 
would  result  in  achieving  neither  the  nonprolif- 
eration treaty  nor  other  measures. 

The  United  States  is  still  of  this  view.  We  are 
urging  a  cutoff  in  the  production  of  fissionable 
material  for  weapons  purposes  as  a  measure  to 


follow  the  Treaty  on  the  Nonproliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons,  pursuant  to  article  VI  of 
that  treaty.  We  would  respectfully  urge  that 
no  country  use  the  fact  that  a  cutoff  agreement 
is  now  under  discussion  as  a  reason  for  delaying 
its  decision  with  respect  to  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty.  We  would  respectfully  urge  that 
instead  they  become  a  party  to  the  Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty  and  by  such  action  be  able  to 
add  an  argument  based  on  article  VI  of  that 
treaty  to  the  weight  of  their  other  arguments 
in  support  of  a  cutoff. 

Verification   of  Comprehensive  Test  Ban 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  shall  now  turn  to  the  sub- 
ject of  the  banning  of  underground  nuclear 
weapons  tests.  All  of  the  previous  speakers  have 
taken  note  of  this  topic;  and  most  speakers,  I 
believe,  have  described  a  ban  on  such  tests  as 
one  of  the  most  impoi-tant  and  pressing  of  arms 
control  measures.  The  Swedish  delegation  has, 
in  addition,  tabled  a  paper  entitled  "Working 
Paper  With  Suggestions  as  to  Possible  Pro- 
visions of  a  Treaty  Banning  Underground  Nu- 
clear Weapon  Tests"  (ENDC/242) .  I  have  read 
and  studied  with  care  the  statement  of  the  dele- 
gates and  the  working  paper  tabled  by  the  dele- 
gation of  Sweden. 

The  position  of  the  United  States  can  be  stated 
quite  simply.  We  support  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  treaty  that  is  adequately  verified.  But  we 
are  convmced  that  adequate  verification  requires 
on-site  inspections.  Ambassador  Smith  made  the 
position  of  the  United  States  on  this  point  quite 
clear  in  his  statement  of  March  25.  Moreover,  in 
a  series  of  statements  over  the  last  several  years, 
we  have  set  forth  this  position  in  detail — giving 
both  the  scientific  and  political  reasons  which 
support  this  position.  I  do  not  believe  that  scien- 
tifically and  politically  there  is  any  basis  for 
changing  this  position. 

Now,  the  distinguished  representative  of 
Sweden,  in  tabling  a  working  paper  that  does 
not  provide  for  obligatory  on-site  inspections, 
has  expressed  the  view  that  the  problem  of  what 
is  adequate  for  verifying  a  comprehensive  test 
ban  is  a  political  problem,  not  a  technical  one. 
The  view  was  also  expressed  that  what  is  re- 
quired is  a  political  decision,  not  a  technical 
assessment. 

One  camiot  quarrel  with  the  sound  observa- 
tion that  any  negotiated  agreement  requires 
political  decision.  But  the  political  decision  as  to 
what  constitutes  adequate  verification  of  a  com- 


MAT    12,    1969 


411 


prehensive  test  ban  is  one  which  must  be  made 
on  the  basis  of  extensive  scientific  and  teclinical 
considerations,  as  well  as  purely  political  ones. 

We  in  this  Committee  are  all  well  aware  of 
the  findings  of  the  SIPRI  repoi-t  on  "Seismic 
Methods  for  Monitoring  Underground  Explo- 
sions," a  summary  of  which  is  contained  in 
ENDC/230.  This  report  is  the  outcome  of  a 
meeting  of  seismologists  last  summer  sponsored 
by  the  Stockholm  International  Peace  Research 
Institute.  The  drafters  of  this  report  took  into 
account  all  the  latest  advances  in  seismic  tech- 
niques and  theory,  including  the  statistical 
decision  theory  advanced  by  the  Swedish  dele- 
gation, and  relied  upon  by  the  distinguished 
delegate  of  Sweden  in  support  of  the  approach 
contained  in  the  recent  Swedish  working  paper, 
ENDC/242.  Yet,  taking  all  these  considerations 
into  accomit,  the  expressed  assessment  of  the 
seismologists  who  participated  in  the  SIPRI 
report  is  that  a  clear  separation  between  earth- 
quakes and  nuclear  explosions  could  not  be  made 
by  teleseismic  means  for  underground  nuclear 
test  explosions  up  to  tens  of  kilotons  of  explosive 
yield.  This  means  that  each  year  many  seismic 
events  will  occur  in  the  Soviet  Union  which  are 
not  susceptible  to  a  determination — by  seismic 
means— as  to  whether  they  are  earthquakes  or 
nuclear  tests  up  to  tens  of  kilotons  of  explosive 
yield. 

The  United  States  cannot  accept  the  state- 
ment advanced  in  support  of  ENDC/242,  the 
recent  working  paper,  that  there  will  be  less 
than  one  ambiguous  event,  or  "false  alarm,"  in 
the  Soviet  Union  every  10  years.  It  is  our  assess- 
ment, consistent  we  believe  with  the  SIPRI  re- 
port, that  there  will  be  a  large  number  of  events 
each  year  which  cannot  be  distinguished  be- 
tween earthquakes  or  underground  nuclear 
explosions. 

This  is  why  it  is  not  possible  to  verify  a  ban 
on  undei'ground  nuclear  explosions  by  seismic 
means  alone.  Furthermore,  nuclear  test  explo- 
sions in  the  yield  range  of  up  to  tens  of  kilotons 
can  have  very  important  and  significant  mili- 
tary value.  These  are  the  reasons  for  our  de- 
cision— a  political  decision  based  on  scientific 
considerations — that  adequate  verification  re- 
quires obligatory  on-site  inspections  in  ad- 
dition to  seismic  detection  and  identification 
techniques. 

Our  delegation  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
SIPRI  report  called  for  further  progress  to  be 
made  in  the  field  of  seismic  detection  and  identi- 
fication. But  it  is  appropriate  to  point  out  that 


the  estimates  of  potential  seismic  detection  and 
identification  capability  which  underlie  the  U.S. 
position  have  been  made  taking  into  account  the 
reasonably  anticipated  improvements  in  seismic 
capability. 

Need  for  Obligatory  On-Site  Inspections 

Turning  now  to  the  political  aspect  of  the 
question,  I  note  that  the  distinguished  delegate 
of  Sweden  has  said  that  the  purpose  of  control 
is  not  to  provide  "judicially  conclusive  evidence" 
of  a  violation  but  "rather  the  aim  is  to  deter  a 
prospective  violator  from  concealing  testing  by 
presenting  him  with  a  sufficient  probability  of 
being  detected."  But  in  dealing  with  the  con- 
cept of  deterrence  we  should  bear  in  mind  that 
an  inspection  procedure  will  only  serve  as  a 
deterrent  if  a  potential  violator  realizes  that  it 
provides  a  macliinery  under  which  the  possi- 
bility of  damage  to  its  interests  from  a  violation 
exceeds  the  possible  gains  to  be  obtained  from 
such  a  violation. 

It  is  this  test  which  we  will  have  to  use  in 
analyzing  the  working  paper  contained  in 
ENI)C/242  in  order  to  determine  whether  it  is 
an  effective  political  instrument.  And  in  apply- 
ing this  test  we  cannot  do  so  on  the  assumption 
that  there  has  been  no  violation  and  one  has 
only  to  be  concerned  about  preventing  false 
alarms  from  inducing  unwarranted  political  ac- 
cusations of  a  treaty  violation.  We  must  look  at 
the  more  pertinent  and  worrisome  question  of 
what  would  happen  under  this  control  machin- 
ery if  there  were  to  be  a  violation.  That  is  the 
point  that  must  be  addressed  if  one  is  to  talk  of 
deterrence. 

Now,  I  believe  that  we  must  assume  that  a 
violator  would  take  sophisticated  precautions  in 
an  attempt  to  minimize  any  risk  of  disclosure. 
Here  I  would  like  to  note  that  the  SIPRI  re- 
port indicates  the  possibility  of  taking  such 
precautions  does  exist.  But  let  us  say  that  this 
clandestine  underground  nuclear  explosion  is 
detected  and  there  is  some  seismic  evidence — 
some  probability — that  this  event  may  indeed 
have  been  an  miderground  nuclear  explosion, 
and  thus  a  violation.  The  violator  would  be 
presented  with  the  evidence ;  he  would  be  ques- 
tioned. The  evidence  which  would  form  the 
basis  of  the  questioning  would  be  highly  tech- 
nical material,  understandable  only  to  highly 
trained  seismologists — and  in  many  cases  am- 
biguous even  to  them.  And  what  if  one  finds  the 
explanation  of  the  event  imsatisf actory  ?  The 


412 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BTJLLETXN 


violator  has,  according  to  the  Swedish  proposal, 
no  further  obligation.  Those  who  may  regard 
their  security  endangered  may,  of  course,  with- 
draw from  the  treaty.  But  the  onus  would  be  on 
them,  not  on  the  violator.  This  would  give  the 
agreement  an  inlierent  instability.  In  fact,  any 
nation  that  wanted  to  resume  testing  openly 
could  just  conceivably  use  such  a  scheme  to 
force  others  to  abrogate  the  treaty,  rather  than 
do  so  themselves. 

Obligatory  on-site  inspections  would,  we  be- 
lieve, add  a  suiBciently  binding  constraint,  so 
that  not  only  would  deterrence  be  greatly  en- 
hanced, but  a  violator  persisting  in  spite  of  this 
would  himself  have  to  denounce  the  treaty  to 
avoid  inspection — or  be  f  oimd  out. 

The  aim  and  purpose  of  an  aims  control  meas- 
ure, beyond  its  immediate  area  of  applicability, 
is  to  lend  additional  political  stability,  through 
mutual  trust,  to  the  international  scene.  Mutual 


trust  is  simply  not  made  up  of  verbal  expres- 
sions of  good  will,  however  solemnly  stated. 
It  is  attained  by  the  acceptance  of  mutual  ob- 
ligations the  performance  of  which  by  the  re- 
spective parties  can  be  observed  and  judged. 
This  is  the  way  mutual  trust  will  grow. 

In  the  instance  of  the  ban  on  nuclear  tests, 
the  substantive  obligation  is  a  negative  one, 
an  obligation  not  to  do  something.  The  per- 
formance of  this  obligation  by  any  one  party 
is  a  matter  of  vital  national  security  interest  to 
all  other  parties.  The  complications  of  natural 
phenomena  have  made  the  verification  of  this 
obligation — the  observation  and  judgment  as  to 
how  it  is  being  performed — impossible  without 
on-site  inspections.  It  is  our  firm  conviction, 
therefore,  that  adequate  verification  of  a  treaty 
banning  all  nuclear  tests  must  involve  obligatory 
on-site  inspections. 


U.N.  Condemns  Racial  Policies  of  Southern  Rhodesia 


Following  are  statements  in  the  Special  Com- 
tnittee  on  the  Situation  with  regard  to  the  Im- 
plementation of  the  Declaration  on  the  Grant- 
ing of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and 
Peoples,  made  on  March  £4-  l>y  Alternate  U.S. 
Representative  John  Eaves  and  on  March  26  iy 
U.S.  Representative  Seymour  M.  Finger,  to- 
gether with  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  iy 
the  Special  Committee  on  March  26. 


TEXTS  OF  U.S.  STATEMENTS 


Statement  by  Mr.  Eaves 

U.S. /U.N.  press  release  30  dated  March  24 

It  is  a  matter  of  deep  regret  to  the  United 
States  that  the  illegal  regime  in  Southern 
Khodesia  continues  its  defiant  position  and 
continues  to  refuse  to  accept  a  settlement  based 
on  respect  for  the  principles  enshrined  in  the 
United  Nations  Charter  and  for  the  legitimate 
aspirations  of  the  people  of  Southern  Rhodesia 
as  a  whole.  It  remains  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  seek  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  Rho- 
desian  problem  that  will  insure  political  justice 


and  equal  opportunity  for  all  Rhodesians,  re- 
gardless of  race.  To  tliis  end,  we  have  given  our 
full  support  to  efforts  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  Nations  directed  toward  such 
a  solution.  In  pursuit  of  this  policy,  we  have 
supported  the  efforts  of  the  Security  Coimcil, 
and  we  have  fully  complied  with  all  of  the 
mandatory  provisions  of  the  relevant  Security 
Council  resolutions;  i.e..  Resolutions  232  and 
253.1 

Some  of  the  delegations  who  have  spoken 
thus  far  in  our  discussion  of  Southern  Rhodesia 
have  charged  that  the  sanctions  program  em- 
bodied in  the  Security  Council  resolutions  is 
inadequate  and  ineffective.  In  the  view  of  my 
delegation  such  a  conclusion  is  premature  at  this 
time.  The  program  of  comprehensive  manda- 
tory sanctions  was  adopted  by  the  Security 
Council  only  in  late  May  of  1968,  and  complete 
worldwide  trade  figures  upon  which  a  mean- 
ingful analysis  for  the  remainder  of  the  year 
1968  can  be  based  are  not  yet  available. 

However,  there  are  some  indications  from 


'  For  texts  of  Resolutions  232  and  253,  see  Bttlletin 
of  Jan.  9,  1967,  p.  77,  and  June  24,  196S,  p.  847. 


MAT    12,    1969 


413 


Rhodesian  sources  that  the  sanctions  program 
is  having  an  eifect.  In  letters  to  the  Rhodesia 
Herald,  referred  to  in  paragi-aphs  102  and  103 
of  the  Secretariat's  working  paper  on  Southern 
Rhodesia  (A/AC.109/L.531/Add.l),  a  promi- 
nent Rhodesian  industrialist  and  a  prominent 
Rhodesian  banker  expressed  serious  concern 
over  the  effect  which  sanctions  are  having  on 
the  Rhodesian  economy.  The  chairman  of  the 
Rhodesian  Iron  and  Steel  Corporation  said  in 
late  November  1968  that  the  stage  had  been 
reached  where  continued  sanctions  would  ruin 
the  country's  tobacco,  chrome,  asbestos,  and 
ferroalloy  industries  and  would  insure  that  the 
nickel  industry  was  stillborn.  The  Rhodesia 
Herald,  in  an  accompanying  editorial  comment, 
said  that  it  was  common  knowledge  that  many 
influential  businessmen  are  saying  privately 
what  the  chairman  of  the  Rhodesian  Iron  and 
Steel  Corporation  has  now  said  publicly.  In 
addition,  the  chairman  of  the  Standard  Bank, 
who  is  also  a  director  of  a  number  of  Rhodesia's 
largest  industrial  companies,  said  on  Decem- 
ber 9,  1968,  that  sanctions  had  damaged  the 
Rhodesian  economy  far  more  than  many  people 
were  willing  to  acknowledge  and  that  the  even- 
tual outcome  would  be  an  almost  bankrupt 
country. 

The  president  of  the  Associated  Chambers  of 
Commerce  of  Rhodesia  said  in  early  December 
1968  that  a  settlement  was  essential  for  the  pros- 
perity of  the  country,  particularly  to  overcome 
the  grave  imemployment  problem  looming 
ahead. 

The  Secretariat  working  paper  also  notes  that 
in  order  to  conserve  its  foreign  exchange  re- 
serves, the  illegal  regime  has  had  to  severely 
curtail  foreign  trade  and  that  it  reduced  its 
imports  by  about  5  percent  for  the  second  half 
of  1968.  In  March  1969  further  substantial  cut- 
backs in  import  quotas  were  announced  for  the 
4-month  quota  period  beginning  April  1,  and 
the  allocation  of  currency  for  new  building 
projects  was  also  cut. 

"While  it  is  not  possible,  unfortunately,  to 
foresee  whether  the  sanctions  program  will 
bring  about  the  changes  in  the  Southern  Rho- 
desian situation  which  are  essential  for  the 
realization  of  self-determination  by  and  for  all 
of  the  people  of  Southern  Rhodesia,  we  believe 
this  program  continues  to  be  the  most  realistic 
approach  to  this  difficult  problem  and  to  offer 
more  hope  of  results  than  any  other  approach 
which  has  been  suggested. 

Indeed,  Mr.   Chairman,  the  United  States 


Government  continues  to  believe  that  effective 
implementation  of  the  mandatory  sanctions 
program  by  all  member  states  would  contribute 
to  the  achievement  of  a  peaceful  change  in  the 
policies  of  the  illegal  regime  and  the  achieve- 
ment of  full  political  rights  for  all  of  the  Rho- 
desian people.  In  this  connection,  we  note  that 
many  member  states  of  the  United  Nations  and 
its  specialized  agencies  have  not  yet  sujiplied  the 
Secretary  General  with  information  on  specific 
measures  taken  to  implement  Security  Council 
Resolution  253.  It  appears  that  39  members  have 
not  replied  in  any  way  to  inquiries  from  the 
Secretary  General.  Of  the  91  members  who  have 
replied,  29  have  merely  stated  that  they  have 
no  relations  with  Southern  Rhodesia  or  that 
they  condemn  the  illegal  regime.  None  of  these 
replies  gives  any  definite  indication  of  the  action 
taken  by  the  member. 

It  is  therefore  difficult  for  the  Security  Coun- 
cil Sanctions  Committee,  of  which  the  United 
States  is  a  member,  to  have  a  fully  accurate 
understanding  of  the  implementation  of  Resolu- 
tion 253  or  to  properly  perform  its  functions  if 
it  is  not  kept  adequately  informed  by  member 
states.  In  the  view  of  the  United  States  delega- 
tion the  need  is  to  insure  that  the  sanctions  pro- 
gram is  made  as  effective  as  possible,  and  we 
believe  the  Sanctions  Committee  can  contribute 
to  this  goal  by  working  for  a  tightening  of 
scrutiny  and  compliance. 

I  would  like  to  conclude  this  statement,  Mr. 
Chairman,  by  expressing  my  delegation's  deep 
regret  over  the  continuing  illegal  detention  and 
imprisonment  of  political  opponents  of  the  il- 
legal regime.  The  new  constitutional  proposals 
of  the  illegal  regime,  which  represent  a  further 
entrenchment  of  white  minority  rule,  are  a 
further  matter  of  deep  regret  to  my  delegation. 

Statement  by  Ambassador  Finger 

U.S./D.N.  press  release  34  dated  March  26 

The  United  States  has  given  the  most  careful 
consideration  to  the  draft  resolution  on  the 
question  of  Southern  Rhodesia  in  document 
L/542.  We  should  like  to  express  our  apprecia- 
tion to  the  delegations  which  have  joined  in 
presenting  this  draft  to  the  Committee.  Frank- 
ly, we  have  some  problems  with  certain  of  its 
provisions.  Nevertheless,  we  shall  vote  in  favor 
of  this  draft  resolution  in  order  to  express  the 
strong  conviction  of  the  United  States  that 
certain  measures  taken  by  the  illegal  Smith 
regime  should  be  condemned  by  all  nations. 


414 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BTXLLETIN 


Specifically,  the  United  States  wishes  to  join 
wholeheartedly  with  other  members  of  the  Com- 
mittee in  expressing  indignation  at  the  con- 
tinued illegal  detention  of  national  leaders  by 
the  Smith  regime.  Moreover,  we  are  deeply  con- 
cerned at  the  efforts  of  this  illegal  regime  to 
further  entrench  its  abhorrent  racial  policies 
through  the  device  of  an  illegal  constitution. 

We  do  have  certain  doubts  about  the  wording 
of  operative  paragraph  3,  which  '■'■Calls  wpon 
the  administering  Power  to  take  immediate 
measures  to  secure  the  release  of  all  political 
prisoners  and  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  the 
so-called  new  constitution."  We  do  not  believe 
that  it  is  realistic  to  expect  the  United  Kingdom 
to  be  able  to  achieve  "immediately"  the  objec- 
tives set  forth  in  this  paragraph,  even  though 
we  share  those  objectives.  We  doubt,  therefore, 
that  this  paragraph,  taken  literally,  can  have 
any  effect.  But,  I  repeat,  we  share  the  concern 
of  other  members  with  the  objectives  of  this 
paragraph.  Taking  into  account  this  joint  con- 
cern and  our  strong  conviction  that  certain 
measures  taken  by  the  illegal  Smith  regime 
should  be  condemned  by  all  nations,  the  United 
States  will  vote  in  favor  of  the  draft  resolution 
before  us. 

I  believe  this  is  the  first  time  in  some  years 
that  the  United  States  has  voted  in  favor  of  a 
resolution  in  the  Committee  of  24  concerning 
Southern  Rhodesia.  We  have,  of  course,  sup- 
ported all  resolutions  on  this  subject  in  the 
Security  Council,  where  full  consultation  is 
customary.  We  hope  this  action  today  may  be 
taken  as  an  indication  that  the  Committee  in- 
tends to  pursue  a  course  of  cooperation  and  con- 
sultation on  important  questions  before  it,  thus 
enabling  it  to  work  with  wide  support  and 
greater  effect. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  2 

The  Special  Committee, 

Recalling  General  Assembly  resolution  1514  (XV) 
of  14  December  1960  and  all  the  relevant  resolutions 
adopted  subsequently  by  the  General  Assembly,  by  the 
Security  Council  and  by  the  Special  Committee  on  the 
Situation  with  regard  to  the  Implementation  of  the 
Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  Independence  to 
Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples,  concerning  the  ques- 
tion of  Southern  Rhodesia, 

Deeply  concerned  over  the  deteriorating  situation  in 
Southern  Rhodesia  resulting  from  the  continued  acts 
of  repression   practised  against  the  African  people, 


the  introduction  of  new  measures  aimed  at  denying 
them  their  legitimate  political  rights  and  the  continued 
presence  of  South  African  forces  in  the  Territory, 

1.  Expresses  its  profound  indignation  at  the  trial 
and  conviction  of  the  Reverend  Ndabaningi  Sithole  and 
the  continued  detention,  imprisonment  and  assassina- 
tion of  other  nationalist  leaders  by  the  illegal  racist 
minority  regime ; 

2.  Expresses  its  concern  at  the  steps  being  taken  by 
the  illegal  regime  to  entrench,  under  the  guise  of  a 
so-called  new  constitution,  its  policies  of  separate 
racial  development  in  Southern  Rhodesia,  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  African  population ; 

3.  Calls  vpon  the  administering  Power  to  take  Im- 
mediate measures  to  secure  the  release  of  all  political 
prisoners  and  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  the 
so-called  new  constitution  in  the  Territory ; 

4.  Decides  to  keep  the  question  of  Southern  Rhodesia 
under  continuous  review. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the  principles 
and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  of  Decem- 
ber 1,  1959  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Santiago 
November  18,  1966,  at  the  Fourth  Consultative 
Meeting. 

Entered   into   force:   October   30,   1968,   for   IV-20 
through  IV-28  in  English. 

Measures  in  furtherance  of  the  principles  and  purposes 
of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  of  December  1,  1959  (TIAS 
4780).  Adopted  at  Paris  November  29,  1968,  at  the 
Fifth  Consultative  Meeting.  Enters  into  force  when 
approved  by  all  contracting  parties  whose  represent- 
atives were  entitled  to  participate  in  meetings  held 
to  consider  the  measures. 

Notifications  of  approval:  Argentina,  March  14, 1969; 
France,  April  3, 1969. 

Aviation 

Convention   on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts  com- 
mitted on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  Septem- 
ber 14,  1963.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Mexico,  March  18,  1969. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago, 
1944,  as  amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with 
annex.  Done  at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  October  24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Signature:  Luxembourg  (with  reservation),  April 
24,  1969. 


=  U.N.  doe.  A/AC.109/311 ;  adopted  unanimously  by 
the  Committee  on  Mar.  26. 


'  Not  in  force. 


MAT    12,    1969 


415 


Labor 

Instrument  for  the  amendment  of  the  constitution  of 
the  International  Labor  Organization.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal October  9,  1946.  Entered  into  force  April  20, 
1948.  TIAS  1868. 

Admission  to  membership:  Southern  Yemen,  April 
15,  1969. 

Load   Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  1966.  Done  at 
London  April  5,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  21, 
1968.  TIAS  6331. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Philippines,  March  4,  1969. 

Property 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  industrial 
property  of  March  20,  1883,  as  revised.  Done  at  The 
Hague  November  6,  1925.  Entered  into  force  June  1, 
1928 ;  for  the  United  States  March  6,  1931.  47  Stat 
1789. 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  Industrial 
property  of  March  20,  1883,  as  revised.  Done  at  Lis- 
bon October  31,  1958.  Entered  into  force  January  4, 
1962.  TIAS  4931. 

Denunciation  received:  Laos,  November  30,  1967; 
effective  November  30, 1968. 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization.  Done  at  Stockholm  July  14,  1967.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist 
Republic  (with  a  declaration),  March  19,  1969. 

Space 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3, 1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession  deposited  at  Washington:  Botswana, 
April  18, 1969. 

Trade,  Transit 

Convention  on  transit  trade  of  land-locked  states.  Done 
at  New  York  July  8,  1965.  Entered  into  force  June  9, 
1967 ;  for  the  United  States  November  28, 1968.  TIAS 
6592. 

Accessions   deposited:   Denmark,    March   26,    1969 ; 
Turkey,  March  25, 1969. 


BIUTERAL 


Dominican   Republic 

Agreement  for  the  continuation  of  a  cooperative  pro- 
gram for  meteorological  observations.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Santo  Domingo  April  7  and  11, 
1969.  Entered  into  force  April  11,  1969;  effective 
June  30, 1968. 

Agreement  for  the  continuation  of  a  cooperative  pro- 
gram for  meteorological  observations.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Santo  Domingo  June  17  and 
July  21,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  21,  1966.  TIAS 
6167. 
Terminated:  June  30, 1968. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  provision  by  the  United 
States  of  a  basic  pilot  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Djakarta  April  9  and  17,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  April  17, 1969. 

Sierra   Leone 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  January  23,  1968  (TIAS 
6444) .  Signed  at  Freetown  April  8, 1969.  Entered  into 
force  April  8, 1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  April  18  confirmed  the  nomination 
of  John  D.  J.  Moore  to  be  Ambassador  to  Ireland. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  March  17.) 


416 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX     May  12,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1569 


Asia.  Viet-Nam  in  the  Perspective  of  East  Asia 

(Rogers) 397 

Atomic  Energy 

U.S.,  UjS.S.R.  Conclude  Technical  Talks  on 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Nuclear  Explosions  (joint 
communique) 401 

UjS.  Views  on  Nuclear  Weapon  Material  Cutoff 
Agreement  and  Verification  of  Comprehensive 
Nuclear  Test  Ban  (Fisher) 409 

Canada.  Senate  Approval  Asked  of  Agreement 
for  Diversions  From  Niagara  River  (mwsage 
from    Pre.sident   Nixon) .     .      408 

Congress 

Confirmations     (Moore) 416 

Current  UjS.-Peruvian  Problems  (Meyer)     .     .      406 
Senate  Approval  Asked  of  Agreement  for  Diver- 
sions  From   Niagara   River    (message  from 
President  Nixon) 408 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirmations 

(Moore) 416 

Disarmament.  U.S  Views  on  Nuclear  Weapon 
Material  Cutoff  Agreement  and  Verification  of 
Comprehensive  Nuclear  Test  Ban  (Fisher)  409 

Economic  Affairs 

Current  U.S.-Peruvian  Problems  (Meyer)     .    .      406 

President  Nixon  Reduces  Rates  of  Interest 
Equalization  Tax  (text  of  Executive  order)     .      404 

Senate  Approval  Asked  of  Agreement  for  Diver- 
sions From  Niagara  River  (message  from 
President  Nixon) 408 

The  U.S.  Balance  of  Payments  (Nixon)     .    .    .      403 

International    Organizations   and   Conferences. 

U.S.  Views  on  Nuclear  Weapon  Material  Cut- 
off Agreement  and  Verification  of  Comprehen- 
sive Nuclear  Test  Ban  (Fisher) 409 

Ireland.  Moore  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .    .      416 

Israel.  President  Marks  21st  Anniversary  of  the 
iState  of  Israel  (letter  from  President  Nixon 
to  President  Shazar) 403 

Peru 

Current  U.S.-Peruvian  Problems  (Meyer)     .     .      406 
U.S.  and  Peru  Resume  Talks  on  Outstanding 
Problems  (Department  statement)     ....      400 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Marks  21st  Anniversary  of  the  State 
of  Israel 403 

President  Nixon  Reduces  Rates  of  Interest 
Equalization  Tax 404 

(Senate  Approval  Asked  of  Agreement  for  Diver- 
sions From  Niagara  River 408 

The  U.S.  Balance  of  Payments 403 

Southern  Rhodesia.  U.N.  Condemns  Racial  Pol- 
icies of  Southern  Rhodesia  (Eaves,  Finger, 
text  of  resolution) 413 

Trade.  The  U.S.  Balance  of  Payments  (Nixon)    .      403 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 415 


Senate  Approval  Asked  of  Agreement  for  Diver- 
sions From  Niagara  River  (message  from 
President  Nixon) 408 

U.S.S.R. 

U.S.,  U.,SjS.R.  Conclude  Technical  Talks  on 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Nuclear  Explosions  (joint 
communique) 401 

Viet-Nam    in    the    Perspective    of    East    Asia 

(Rogers) 397 

United  Nations.  U.N.  Condemns  Racial  Policies 
of  Southern  Rhodesia  (Eaves,  Finger,  text  of 
resolution) 413 

Viet-Nam 

14th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 
(Lodge) 401 

Viet-Nam    in    the    Perspective    of    East    Asia 

(Rogers) 397 

Name  Index 

Eaves,  John 413 

Finger,  Seymour  M 413 

Fisher,  Adrian  iS 409 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 401 

Meyer,  Charles  A 406 

Moore,  John  D.  J 416 

Nixon,  President 403,404,408 

Rogers,    Secretary 397 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  April  21-27 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflBce 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
2«)20. 

Release  issued  prior  to  April  21  which  appears 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  85  of  April  17. 

No.     Date  Subject 

88    4/21    Rogers :    Associated    Press    annual 
luncheon.  New  York,  N.Y. 

t89  4/21  OAS  programs  for  regional  educa- 
tion, science,  and  technology 
(rewrite). 

t90    4/23     Sisco :  American-Israel  Public  Affairs 

Committee,  Washington,  D.C. 
91     4/21     Lodge :  14th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris. 

*92  4/24  Sullivan  designated  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pa- 
cific Affairs   (biographic  details). 


*  Not  printed. 

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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1560 


May  19, 1969 


UNDER  SECRETARY  RICHARDSON  DISCUSSES  VIET-NAM  PEACE  TALKS 

AJ^D  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  RELATIONS 
Transcript  of  Television  Interview     4-17 

THE  CENTRAL  AMERICAN  COMMON  MARKET:    INITIATIVE  FOR  DEVELOPMENT 

hy  Assistant  Secretary  Meyer     4^1 

BOARD  OF  GOVERNORS  OF  THE  INTER-AMERICAN  DEVELOPMENT  BANK 
HOLDS  lOTH  ANNUAL  MEETING  AT  GUATEMALA  CITY 

Statement  hy  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Kennedy     J^6 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1560 
May  19,  1969 


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PRICE: 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

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Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

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reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  wUl  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 

the  Readers'  Quide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


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The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
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Under  Secretary  Richardson  Discusses  Viet-Nam  Peace  Talks 
and  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Relations 


Following  is  the  transcript  of  a  fihned  inter- 
view with  Under  Secretary  Elliot  L.  Richardson 
which  was  included  on  the  National  Educational 
Television  Network  program,  ^'■The  Nixon  Ad- 
ministration— First  100  Days"  on  April  30.  In- 
terviewing Mr.  Richardson  was  Joseph  Kraft, 
a  syndicated  columnist. 

Press  release  94  dated  April  30 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  Nixon  administration 
in  the  past  100  days  has  had  a  chance  to  define 
a  Viet-Nam  policy — indeed,  there  has  been  some 
reference  to  a  '■''peace  plan.''"'  How  would  you  say 
that  Viet-Nam  policy  of  the  Nixon  administra- 
tion differed  from  that  of  the  Johnson 
adminis  tra  tion  ? 

A.  Well,  Mr.  Kraft,  I  think  the  first  and  most 
important  thing  to  be  said  is  that  ours  is  a 
policy  aimed  at  peace.  We  are  not  pursuing 
military  victory.  We've  made  this  very  clear. 
Ours  is  a  policy  of  achieving  an  honorable  nego- 
tiated settlement  in  Paris.  This  is  our  first  ob- 
jective. And  in  order  to  bring  this  about,  we've 
put  our  emphasis  on  the  opportunities  for 
mutual  troop  withdrawal.  Coupled  with  this, 
we've  been  working  with  the  Government  of 
South  Viet-Nam  on  the  subject  of  a  political 
settlement  and  the  Government  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  has  made  it  clear  through  its  own  public 
statements  that  it  is  prepared  to  enter  into  seri- 
ous negotiations  on  that  subject  with  the  NLF 
[National  Liberation  Front] .  Now,  you  add  all 
this  up,  and  I  think  it  comes  out  with  a  very 
different  kind  of  emphasis  than  existed  in  the 
previous  administration. 

Q.  You''ve  touched  on  many  aspects  of  this 
plan,  Mr.  Secretary — mayie  we  ought  to  break 
it  down  a  little  bit.  With  respect  to  the  talks  in 
Paris,  could  you  say  that  there  has  been  much 
progress  there? 

A.  Well,  I  think  the  most  important  thing 
that  could  be  said  about  the  talks  in  Paris  is  that 
they  ai'e,  at  least,  addressed  to  the  major  issues 


of  substance  which  now  divide  the  parties.  I 
would  not  say  that  the  talks  had  achieved  any 
real  progress  to  date  in  dealing  with  these  issues. 
On  the  other  hand,  experience  of  the  past  sug- 
gests that  there  has  to  be  a  certain  period  of 
skirmishing  and  statement  and  restatement  of 
positions  before  there  is  to  be  movement.  Cer- 
tainly, we  are  not  discouraged  or  despairing  in 
any  sense  as  to  the  opportunities  for  real 
progress. 

Q.  With  respect  to  another  feature  of  the 
plan — of  unilateral  xcithdrawals,  that  is,  with- 
drawals  from  Viet-Nam — is  that  something 
that  is  definitely  off? 

A.  Well,  the  President  has  made  very  clear 
that  we  have  no  immediate  intention  to  with- 
draw troops  from  South  Viet-Nam.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  has  indicated  that  as  the  capability  of 
the  Goveriunent  of  South  Viet-Nam  to  carry 
forward  the  war  itself  improves  and  in  the  light 
of  the  state  of  current  offensives,  in  the  light, 
also,  of  progress  in  Paris,  we  would  make  a 
decision  on  this  subject  or  perhaps  successive 
decisions  in  the  months  ahead. 

Q.  Have  you  discovered,  Mr.  Secretary,  that 
there  is  a  large  margin  for  improvement  in  the 
capacity  of  the  South  Vietnamese  Army  to  per- 
foi'm?  Can  we  expect  that  it  will  soon  be  doing 
much  better  than  ifs  done  in  the  past? 

A.  Well,  I  wouldn't  put  it  in  terms  of  its 
"soon  doing  much  better."  I  think  it  has  been  a 
matter  of  steady  improvement  in  their  capa- 
bility over  the  past  year  and  continuing  cur- 
rently. And  I  think  basically  what  we  want  to  do 
is  step  up  and  give  continually  higher  priority 
to  what  you  might  call  the  "Vietnamization"  of 
the  war.  So  as  progress  is  made  there,  one  might 
expect  some  withdrawals  as  a  result  of  that 
progress.  I  think  these  two  things  are  certainly 
interrelated  and  we  have  simply  made  clear 
that,  as  the  Secretary  put  it  the  other  day,  we're 
not  putting  all  our  eggs  in  one  basket.  Even  if 
we  don't  achieve  significant  progress  toward  a 


MAY    19,    1969 


417 


negotiated  settlement  in  Paris,  we  still  look 
forward  to  a  period  when  the  capability  of  the 
South  Vietnamese  Government  to  carry  forward 
the  war  and  maintain  its  own  security  will  be 
great  enough  to  justify  withdrawals. 

Q.  Let  me  touch  on  what  I  think  would  he 
perhaps  the  third  leg  of  the  Viet-Nam  triangle; 
that  is,  political  development  in  Saigon,  par- 
ticularly with  respect  to  the  South  Vietnamese 
Oovemtnent.  I  think  some  people  might  feel 
that  has  been  the  major  area  of  progress  during 
the  past  100  days.  Would  you  feel  that  was  an 
important  area  of  progress? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  in  terms  of  the  development 
by  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam  itself 
of  the  confidence  that  it  is  prepared  to  enter 
into  a  period  of  political  competition  with  the 
people  who  now  comprise  the  NLF.  This,  I 
think,  is  perhaps  the  most  encouraging  single 
development  of  this  100-day  period. 

Q.  Let  me  switch  you  around,  if  I  can,  to 
anotlier  important  aspect  of  American  foreign 
policy;  that  is,  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
In  the  100  days,  what  is  the  impression  you've 
had,  Mr.  Secretary,  of  the  Soviet  Government? 
Is  it  that  of  a  solid,  stable  regime  that  knows 
what  ifs  doing,  or  is  it  a  crazy  mixed-up  bunch 
of  apparatchiks  that  is  just  floundering  through 
crisis  to  crisis? 

A.  Well,  I  think  simply  looking  at  it  in  its 
aspect  as  we  see  it  in  the  conduct  of  discussions 
of  a  whole  range  of  subjects — including  the 
Middle  East,  Berlin,  and  so  on — I  think  we  see  it 
as  a  government  of  pretty  solid,  sensible  people 
who  are  genumely  concerned  about  the  situa- 
tion in  which  a  massive  overkill  capacity  has 
been  developed  on  both  sides ;  who  are  concerned 
about  the  consmner  demands  of  their  own  peo- 
ple ;  who  are  willing  to  deal  with  us  in  realistic 
terms  in  situations  of  tension,  such  as  the  situa- 
tion in  the  Middle  East;  and  in  short,  I  think 
we  see  them  as  people  who  are  genuinely  in- 
terested in  exploring  the  opportunities  offered 
by  the  era  of  negotiations  referred  to  by  Presi- 
dent Nixon. 

Q.  You  mentioned  "overkilV^  And  that,  of 
course,  means  in  the  nuclear  field.  Is  it  your  im- 
pression that  theyVe  eager  to  get  on  with  stra- 
tegic arms  lim,itation  talks? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  that  I  would  use  the 
word  "eager."  I  certainly  think  that  they  appear 
to  be  ready  to  do  this.  They  recognize  its  enor- 
mous importance  in  terms  of  East- West  rela- 


tions and  particularly  in  terms  of  the  conse- 
quences of  what  could  happen  as  a  result  of  a 
confrontation  anywhere  in  the  world  in  which 
arms  are  used,  and  so  I  think  we  feel  that  they 
are  prepared  to  enter  into  serious  discussions  on 
this  subject.  And  certainly  we,  at  the  point 
when  we  do  want  to  enter  into  them,  will  want 
to  do  so  on  a  basis  that  has  reflected  our  own 
seriousness  and  a  really  very  deliberate  and  care- 
ful process  of  preparation. 

Q.  How  about  a  date  on  strategic  arms  limita- 
tion talks?  Is  that  shaping  up  soon? 

A.  No  date  has  specifically  been  set.  But — 
and  we  have  had  no  direct  conversations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  aimed  at  determining  such  a 
date — it  has  been  our  feeling  that  we  would  be 
prepared  to  go  forward,  at  least  assuming  that 
the  Soviet  Union  agrees  to  do  so,  at  some  time 
in  late  spring  or  early  summer. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you — how  much  time  do  you 
think  the  Nixon  administration  has  with  re- 
spect to  American  public  opinion  to  begin  de- 
livering something  in  the  way  of  peace  in 
Viet-Nam? 

A.  Well,  really,  I  can^t  give  a  worthwhile 
prediction  on  this.  I  think  we  have  a  significant 
amount  of  time  so  long  as  we  are  able  to  com- 
municate to  the  people  of  the  United  States  a 
credible  position  of  sincerely  seeking  to  get  out 
of  tliis  war  on  an  honorable  basis.  And  so  long 
as  they  feel  we're  doing  everything  we  can,  I 
think  we've  got  quite  a  lot  of  time. 


15th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  by 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  15th  plenary  session  of 
the  new  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
April  30. 

Press  release  96  dated  April  30 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  We  have  searched  at 
these  Paris  meetings  for  evidence  of  your  side's 
willingness  to  talk  about  mutual  action;  we 
have  looked  for  indications  that  you  are  pre- 
pared by  negotiation  to  work  out  steps  which 
both  sides  can  take  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 
What  we  have  learned  is  not  encouraging. 

To  avoid  discussion  of  specific  issues  and  mu- 


418 


DEPARTMENT   OP  STATE   BULLETIN 


tual  action,  to  present  unreasonable  unilateral 
demands,  to  refuse  to  talk  in  terms  of  reci- 
procity— these  are  not  indications  of  a  serious 
desire  to  negotiate. 

This  attitude  on  your  part  at  the  Paris  meet- 
ings, whose  purpose,  after  all,  is  negotiation,  is 
only  one  of  the  many  contradictions  in  your 
position.  These  contradictions,  and  the  double 
standard  you  apply  in  making  your  proposals, 
impede  our  efforts  to  move  rapidly  toward  a 
settlement  of  the  war  in  Viet-Nam. 
Let  me  cite  some  examples. 
On  the  fundamental  issue  of  the  withdrawal 
of  external  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam,  you 
agree  with  us  that  the  South  Vietnamese  peo- 
ple should  solve  their  own  political  ijrobleras 
without  any  external  interference.  Yet  you  in- 
sist on  continuing  the  massive  presence  in  South 
Viet-Nam  of  North  Vietnamese  military  forces 
and  subversive  personnel.  Adding  to  this  con- 
tradiction is  your  demand  that  United  States 
forces  leave  South  Viet-Nam  unilaterally  while 
North  Vietnamese  forces  remain  there  to  do  as 
they  please. 

You  say  that  Viet-Nam  is  one  and  that  con- 
sequently Vietnamese  have  a  right  to  fight 
anywhere  on  Vietnamese  soil.  You  assert  that 
North  Vietnamese  forces  fighting  in  South 
Viet-Nam  are  not  "foreign  troops."  But  else- 
where you  speak  of  the  Democratic  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  as  "an  independent  and  sovereign 
state."  Now,  if  North  Viet-Nam  is  an  independ- 
ent and  sovereign  state,  what  gives  it  the  right 
to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam?  There  is  an  apparent  inconsistency 
between  claiming  that  North  Viet-Nam  is  an 
independent  and  sovereign  state  and  at  the 
same  time  claiming  that  Viet-Nam  is  one  and  the 
North  Vietnamese  have  a  right  of  armed  inter- 
vention in  South  Viet-Nam. 

At  the  same  time  as  your  side  demands  the 
unilateral  withdrawal  of  United  States  and  al- 
lied forces  from  South  Viet-Nam,  you  attack 
the  ever-growing  "Vietnamization"  of  the  re- 
sistance to  your  armed  attack.  We  find  this  a 
confusing  and  contradictoiy  attitude.  If  you 
call  for  the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  forces  and  con- 
demn the  increasing  assumption  of  responsi- 
bility by  the  Government  and  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam  for  their  own  defense,  it  can  only 
mean  that  you  wish  to  see  South  Viet-Nam  sub- 
mit to  your  armed  aggression. 

You  say  we  should  not  raise  the  question  of 
Laos  and  Cambodia  in  these  meetings.  At  the 
same  time,  you  say  that  the  Geneva  accords  of 
1954  and  1962  must  be  respected.  Why  is  it 


wrong  to  raise  the  questions  of  North  Vietnam- 
ese violations  of  the  territory  of  Cambodia  and 
Laos  when  it  is  clear  that  your  side  uses  the 
territory  of  Cambodia  and  Laos  to  carry  out 
operations  against  South  Viet-Nam  in  contra- 
vention of  the  1954  and  1962  accords?  How  can 
there  be  a  settlement  of  the  Viet-Nam  problem 
so  long  as  North  Viet-Nam  continues  to  use  its 
neighbors'  territory  for  armed  intervention  in 
South  Viet-Nam? 

Let  me  cite  another  example  of  the  internal 
contradictions  in  your  position.  You  call  for 
self-determination  for  the  South  Vietnamese 
people.  But  at  the  same  time,  you  insist  that  the 
political  future  of  South  Viet-Nam  must  be  de- 
termined solely  on  tlie  basis  of  a  program 
created  by  your  side,  without  regard  to  what 
the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam,  as  well  as  the 
government  they  have  elected,  want. 

You  claim  to  support  the  position  that  the 
South  Vietnamese  shoidd  be  free  to  work  out 
their  own  political  future  among  themselves. 
Yet  when  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  says  it  is  ready  immediately  and  with- 
out prior  conditions  to  discuss  political  matters 
with  the  NLF,  you  call  its  proposals  "insolent" 
and  "ridiculous"  and  you  call  instead  for  the 
"liquidation"  of  that  government,  the  over- 
throw of  the  National  Assembly,  and  the 
abolishment  of  the  Constitution.  These,  you 
claim,  are  "reasonable"  and  "just"  demands. 

You  allege  that  the  National  Liberation  Front 
is  the  true  representative  of  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam  and  that  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  could  not  survive  without 
United  States  support.  Yet  you  condemn  the 
proposals  put  forward  by  our  side  advocating 
mutual  withdrawal  and  the  restoration  of  the 
demilitarized  zone  because,  you  say,  they  are 
designed  "to  isolate  the  struggle  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  people." 

That  is  a  clear  admission  of  the  massive  North 
Vietnamese  presence  in  South  Viet-Nam,  with- 
out which  tlie  National  Liberation  Front  could 
not  maintain  itself  because  it  does  not  have 
sufficient  popular  support.  Apparently  you  wish 
to  continue  illegally  sending  men  and  materiel 
to  support  the  armed  aggression  agamst  South 
Viet-Nam. 

Your  side  expresses  its  concern  for  the  secu- 
rity and  democratic  liberties  of  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam.  And  yet  you  assassinate  vil- 
lage and  handet  officials  who  are  duly  elected  by 
the  people.  Each  day  innocent  civilians  die  be- 
cause of  your  side's  tactics  of  terror  and  violence. 
Your  side  falsely  charges  the  United  States 


MAT    19,   1969 


419 


with  seeking  military  victory  and  with  esca- 
lating the  war.  You  say  the  United  States  should 
not  seek  to  negotiate  from  a  "position  of 
strength."  On  the  other  hand,  as  General  Giap 
[Gen.  Vo  Nguyen  Giap,  North  Vietnamese 
Minister  of  Defense]  has  publicly  stated,  your 
objective  is  one  of  military  victory.  Your  side 
exaggerates  and  boasts  of  its  increased  military 
activities  since  Tet  of  this  year. 

Moreover,  captured  documents  and  testimony 
of  prisoners  reveal  orders  from  Hanoi  to  your 
forces  and  cadres  in  South  Viet-Nam  urging 
greater  military  efforts.  They  have  been  told 
that  battlefield  success  will  permit  your  side  to 
negotiate  from  a  position  of  strength  in  Paris. 
Evidently  you  want  strength  for  yourself  and 
weakness  for  others. 

These  are  a  few  examples  of  the  double  stand- 
ard you  apply  and  the  contradictions  in  the 
position  your  side  takes  at  these  Paris  meetings. 
This  attitude  has  not  led  to  reasonable  proposals 
for  a  negotiated  solution.  I  hope  it  does  not 
prevent  your  side  from  recognizing  the  need  for 
mutual  action  to  bring  peace  to  Viet-Nam. 

If  your  side  sincerely  wants  these  negotiations 
to  lead  to  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  Viet-Nam 
and  in  Southeast  Asia,  you  should  be  prepared, 
as  we  are,  to  negotiate  on  those  issues  which  are 
at  the  heart  of  the  conflict. 

Most  important,  j'ou  should  be  willing  to  see 
the  withdrawal  of  all  external  forces  on  some 
fair  and  equitable  basis.  As  we  have  said,  the 
withdrawal  of  North  Vietnamese  and  American 
forces  can  begin  simultaneously  and  could  be 
phased  over  an  agreed  period  of  time. 

A  mutual  withdrawal  of  external  forces  by 
reasonable  stages  could  lead  to  the  total  elim- 


ination of  outside  combat  forces,  cessation  of 
hostilities,  and  a  return  to  peace.  Our  side  is 
ready  to  begin  moving  down  this  road  right 
away. 

Of  equal  importance  is  the  withdrawal  of  all 
external  forces  from  Cambodia  and  Laos  and 
an  end  to  the  use  of  the  territory  of  those  two 
states  for  the  purpose  of  armed  intervention  in 
South  Viet-Nam. 

Other  areas  where  mutual  action  is  necessary 
are  the  restoration  of  the  status  of  the  demil- 
itarized zone  and  the  early  release  of  prisoners 
of  war. 

As  we  work  toward  these  priority  areas  of 
military  agreement,  political  matters  will  also 
need  to  be  discussed.  These  political  aspects  of 
a  settlement  can  be  worked  out  at  the  same  time 
as  the  military  aspects.  Both  sides  seem  to  agree 
that  the  political  settlement  is  a  matter  to  be 
worked  out  by  the  South  Vietnamese  themselves. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  our  side  has  made  spe- 
cific and  constructive  proposals  for  action  by 
both  sides  to  bring  about  an  equitable  settlement 
of  the  Viet-Nam  war.  We  believe  our  proposals 
are  sensible  and  practical.  We  are  ready  to  listen 
to  alternative  proposals  and  to  negotiate  on  a 
basis  of  mutual  action. 

For  many  people  in  the  world — for  some  who 
are  in  this  room — tomorrow  is  Labor  Day.  For 
us  in  the  United  States,  it  falls  in  September. 
But  whatever  the  date,  we  Americans  applaud 
constructive  efforts  in  support  of  decent  wages, 
hours,  and  working  conditions  for  all.  Indeed, 
the  effort  to  achieve  these  things  is  an  important 
part  of  our  history.  We  accordingly  extend  best 
wishes  to  those  here  at  this  table  who  celebrate 
Labor  Day  tomorrow. 


420 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


The  Central  American  Common  Market: 
Initiative  for  Development 


hy  Charles  A.  Meyer 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- American  Afairs'^ 


I  am  grateful  for  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  you  some  observations  on  the  Central 
American  Common  Market.  My  recent  trip  to 
Central  America  has  served  to  reinforce  views 
that  I  have  had  for  some  time  that  this  remark- 
able experiment  has  large  significance  for  the 
other  developing  nations  to  the  south. 

What  has  happened  in  recent  years  in  Cen- 
tral America  has  caused  this  region  to  be  the 
bright  spot  in  the  sphere  of  inter-American 
relationships.  The  ideal  of  union  has  been  a 
dream  of  Central  Americans  since  the  first  at- 
tempts at  federation  more  than  a  century  ago. 
To  give  this  dream  reality,  in  the  1950's  a  small 
group  of  men  took  a  very  practical  approach. 
Instead  of  concentrating  on  political  union, 
they  saw  that  there  were  large  advantages  to  be 
gained  for  their  peoples  by  unifying  economi- 
cally, commercially,  and  financially.  From  this 
inspiration,  and  after  nearly  10  years  of  pre- 
paratory study,  the  Common  Market  was 
formed  in  Managua  in  December  1960  and 
began  operations  the  following  June. 

Now  we  are  a  month  away  from  the  eighth 
anniversary  of  the  Central  American  Conunon 
Market.  It  is  a  fitting  point  at  which  to  review 
the  achievements  of  this  short  period.  In  8 
years,  the  Central  American  Conunon  Market 
has  increased  intraregional  trade  eight  times — 
from  $32  million  in  1960  to  approximately  $260 
million  in  1968.  I  doubt  if  any  multinational 
economic  effort  on  record  can  match  that  rate 


'Address  prepared  for  delivery  before  an  Inter- 
American  affairs  seminar  on  the  Central  American 
Common  Market  sponsored  by  International  House  and 
the  Pan  American  Life  Insurance  Co.  at  New  Orleans, 
La.,  on  Apr.  30  (press  release  95)  ;  read  by  Oliver  L. 
Sause,  Director,  Regional  Office  for  Central  America 
and  Panama,  Agency  for  International  DeTelopment. 


of  growth.  This  increased  trade  has  in  turn 
helped  to  sustain  generally  high  rates  of  eco- 
nomic growth  during  this  period. 

I  have  learned  much  recently  about  the  ac- 
tions which  the  five  countries  have  taken  to 
create  the  multilateral  institutions  required  to 
further  this  process.  Both  the  concept  and  the 
working  reality  of  regionalism  have  been 
worked  out  through  such  institutions  as  the 
Secretariat  for  the  Common  Market 
(SIECA),  headed  by  the  very  able  Secretary 
General,  Dr.  Carlos  Manuel  Castillo,  who  is 
present  today ;  and  the  Central  American  Bank 
for  Economic  Integration  (CABEI),  which  is 
now  administering  a  portfolio  valued  at  over 
$200  million  primarily  aimed  at  building  a  re- 
gional transportation  and  communications  net- 
work. Dr.  Enrique  Ortez  Colindres,  who  is  also 
here  today,  is  in  large  measure  responsible  for 
this  progress. 

I  have  also  learned  of  the  considerable  social 
advances  that  have  been  made.  Combining 
forces  on  common  problems  through  the  Or- 
ganization of  Central  American  States 
(ODECA),  these  countries  have  been  able  to 
make  real  progress  in  education,  public  health, 
labor,  and  social  welfare.  In  this  area  I  would 
single  out  for  special  mention  the  Central 
American-Panama  textbook  program,  which  in 
7  years  has  printed  and  distributed  10  million 
textbooks  and  368,000  teachers  guides  for  use 
in  public  elementary  schools  in  Central 
America  and  Panama.  Central  Americans  write, 
illustrate,  and  print  their  own  books  and  have 
made  these  books  available  free  of  charge  for 
the  first  time  in  history  to  all  primary  public 
school  children.  The  regional  malaria  eradica- 
tion program,  in  which  AID,  the  Pan  American 
Health  Organization,  and  the  Central  Ameri- 


MAT    19,    1969 


421 


can  countries  are  working  together,  is  another 
very  fine  example  of  regional  cooperation. 

Throughout  the  8-year  period,  tliese  achieve- 
ments have  become  known  to  the  world  at  large. 
This  very  considerable  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
Central  Americans  has  attracted  a  large  level  of 
external  public  assistance  as  well  as  private 
foreign  investment.  During  these  8  yeare,  the 
United  States  has  made  available  some  $550 
million  in  development  assistance  to  Central 
America,  including  $110  million  to  the  Central 
American  Bank  for  Economic  Integration.  Last 
week  in  Guatemala  City,  I  had  the  privilege  of 
signing  the  most  recent  AID  loan  to  CABEI :  a 
$30  million  loan  for  regional  infrastructure  that 
will  be  utilized  for  roads  and  telecommunica- 
tions. 

The  foreign  private  investor  has  come  to  look 
upon  Central  America  as  an  attractive  place 
for  investment  which  warrants  his  confidence. 
Annual  levels  of  private  direct  foreign  invest- 
ment during  the  period  of  integration  have 
more  than  doubled  over  those  of  the  late  1950's. 
This  new  priA'ate  investment  capital  has  come 
mainly  from  the  United  States  but  also,  in  im- 
portant instances,  from  Japan,  Western  Europe, 
Mexico,  and  Colombia. 

I  was  pleased  to  learn  that  AID  gave  early 
help  to  the  stimulation  of  the  private  sector 
through  loans  to  CABEI  for  industrial  relend- 
ing  as  well  as  assistance  to  the  development 
banks  in  each  of  the  Central  American  countries. 

As  the  level  of  foreign  private  investment  in 
Central  America  has  increased,  the  character  of 
that  investment  has  changed.  The  expanded 
domestic  market  made  possible  by  the  elimina- 
tion of  trade  barriers  within  the  Common 
Market  has  made  new  investments  in  manufac- 
turing attractive.  This  contrasts  sharply  with 
the  situation  of  only  a  few  yeai-s  ago,  when  most 
foreign  private  investment  in  Central  America 
was  limited  to  a  few  large  agricultural  under- 
takings. 

Much  of  the  first  new  investment  went  into 
import  substitution,  such  as  food  processing 
and  textiles.  But  now  the  emphasis  is  moving 
toward  investments  to  exploit  recent  discoveries 
of  local  raw  materials,  such  as  nickel  and  sulfur 
in  Guatemala  and  bauxite  in  Costa  Eica,  or  to 
develop  known  resources  which  new  research, 
new  processes,  or  new  demand  in  the  world 
market  have  made  economically  workable,  such 
as  wood  for  a  pulp  and  paper  industry  in  Hon- 


duras and  silicates  and  precious  metals  in 
Nicaragua. 

New  or  expanded  industries  in  Central 
America  have  grown  to  include  metal  fabrica- 
tion, rubber  products,  petrochemicals,  fertiliz- 
ers, herbicides  and  insecticides,  and  pharmaceu- 
tical products,  among  others.  There  has  been 
diversification  in  the  agricultural  sector  also» 
but  at  a  slower  pace. 

The  problems  facing  Central  America  in  ad- 
vancing and  perfecting  this  unique  experiment 
are  as  challenging  as  their  achievements  have 
been  remarkable.  I  have  been  told  how,  follow- 
ing a  period  of  intercountry  difficulties,  the  min- 
isters of  economy  met  recently  in  Tegucigalpa, 
to  draft  an  agreement  setting  forth  an  agenda 
for  the  future  which  encompasses  a  series  of  ex- 
citing steps  that  include  action  to  create  a 
genuine  customs  union,  to  revise  industrial  in- 
centives policies,  and  to  create  a  conunon 
market  for  the  agricultural  sector  as  it  has  been 
created  for  the  industrial  sector. 

Coupled  with  these  are  efforts  now  going  on 
to  create  a  Central  American  stabilization  fund 
to  deal  with  the  balance-of-payments  problems 
of  the  five  countries  and  to  serve  as  a  first  step 
on  the  road  to  eventual  monetary  union.  These 
are  truly  ambitious  goals — as  ambitious  as  the 
first  steps  toward  integration  taken  8  years  ago. 
They  signal  the  determination  of  Central 
America's  leaders  to  press  forward  and  meet 
new  problems  head  on.  It  seems  to  me  that  per- 
haps most  important  is  the  multinational  de- 
cisiomnaking  process  which  has  been  built  up  in 
Central  America  during  this  period  and  which 
has  been  developed  and  strengthened  by  the 
crises  that  have  occurred.  The  fact  that  such  a 
process  exists,  that  not  only  is  capable  of  deal- 
ing with  periodic  crises  but  also  of  grappling 
with  the  problems  of  the  future,  augui-s  well 
indeed  for  the  future  of  Central  America. 

One  problem  that  will  require  attention  in  the 
years  immediately  ahead  is  that  of  assuring 
more  rapid  development  of  the  rural  sector.  The 
greatest  gains  from  economic  integration  among 
the  five  countries  will  come  as  each  of  the  five 
is  able  to  integrate  larger  portions  of  its  rural 
population  more  effectively  into  the  money  econ- 
omy. This  is  a  problem  that  I  judge  to  be  difficult 
and  one  that  will  require  much  time.  But  it 
seems  obvious  that  a  market  area  the  size  of  Cen- 
tral America  can  ill  afford  to  have  a  large  per- 
centage of  its  population  imable  to  participate 


422 


DEP.VRTSrENT  OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


actively  in  that  market  as  consumer  oi*  pro- 
ducer. A  breakthrough  is  needed  here,  and  a 
greater  stimulus  to  agricultural  production,  di- 
versification, and  export  seems  at  least  part  of 
the  answer. 

Certainly  the  current  efforts  of  the  countries 
and  regional  institutions,  particularly  SIECA, 
CABEI,  and  ICAITE  [Central  American  In- 
stitute of  Research  and  Industrial  Technology], 
to  boost  and  diversify  exports  to  countries  out- 
side the  market  area  are  critical.  Faced  with  a 
limited  domestic  market.  Central  America  must 
seek  future  growth  by  expanding  the  oppor- 
tunities to  sell  competitively  in  the  world 
market.  In  pursuing  this  objective  it  will  be  im- 
portant to  review  both  protective  tariff  levels 
and  levels  of  industrial  incentives  in  order  to 
prevent  the  buildup  of  inefficient  noncompetitive 
industry.  For  it  will  be  unquestionably  true  that 
the  benefits  of  growing  world  trade  will  in- 
evitably go  to  those  particular  countries  who 
have  put  themselves  into  the  best  position  to 
compete  in  world  markets. 

Finally,  I  have  been  impressed  with  the  im- 
portance Central  America  has  given  to  concrete 
actions  designed  to  attract  larger  levels  of 
capital  inflow  of  both  public  and  private  capital 
to  assure  continued  future  progress.  Large 
amounts  of  public  investment  will  continue  to 
be  needed  for  the  very  difficult  but  critical  prob- 
lem of  developing  the  rural  sector.  Public  re- 
sources are  also  needed  for  infrastructure  and 
social  services  to  provide  the  basis  on  which 
private  enterprise  can  invest,  employ,  produce, 
and  market.  Much  will  depend  on  the  willing- 
ness of  the  countries  to  prepare  adequately  for 
these  programs  and  to  share  in  the  financing  of 
them.  Yet  over  and  above  these  efforts,  the  great 
gains  in  economic  progress,  production,  and 
employment  will  have  to  come  from  the  efforts 
of  the  private  sector.  The  Central  American  ex- 
perience demonstrates  what  can  be  achieved  by 
a  vigorous  pace  of  private  investment,  both 
foreign  and  domestic,  in  promoting  economic 
growth  and  employment. 

I  cannot  leave  you  today  without  sharing  with 
you  some  thoughts  concerning  the  significance 
of  the  Central  American  experience  for  the 
future  course  and  direction  of  the  United 
States-Latin  America  cooperative  relationships. 
On  the  broadest  level,  our  interest  in  Latin 
America  is  to  help  the  countries  of  the  hemi- 
sphere to  prosper  and  make  full  use  of  their 


enormous  intellectual  and  productive  potential. 
The  Central  Americans  have  taken  a  very  large 
step  toward  realizing  their  potential;  nobody 
who  knows  the  complexities  of  development  will 
claim  that  the  task  is  finished — much  remains 
to  be  done.  But  the  Central  Americans  have  put 
into  practice  those  two  concepts  so  necessary  if 
societies  are  to  prosper :  self-help  and  self-sacri- 
fice. They  took  their  destiny  into  their  own 
hands.  They  had  a  vision,  they  set  the  goals, 
they  determined  the  pace.  The  pace  has  been 
rapid — so  rapid,  in  fact,  that  the  rest  of  the 
world  has  been  astounded.  In  turn,  U.S.  finan- 
cial and  technical  assistance  has  responded  to 
the  pace  and  direction  set  by  the  Central  Ameri- 
cans themselves. 

There  are,  I  believe,  many  similar  examples 
of  this  cooperative  or  supportive  relationship  in 
other  parts  of  Latin  America.  It  is  my  hope  that 
the  dialogue  President  Nixon  has  called  for  will 
result  in  a  joint  search  for  a  new  pattern  of 
U.S.-Latin  America  relationships  based  on  this 
principle,  under  which  the  initiatives  and  re- 
sponsibilities for  the  direction  of  the  Latin 
American  development  effort  will  have  to  come 
increasingly  from  the  Latin  Americans 
themselves. 


U.S.  Extends  Condolences  on  Death 
of  President  Barrientos  of  Bolivia 

President  Rene  Barrientos  Ortuno  of  Bolivia 
was  killed  in  a  helicopter  accident  on  ApHl  27. 
Following  are  texts  of  messages  sent  by  Presi- 
dent Nixon  to  Luis  Adolf o  Siles  Salinas,  Con- 
stitutional President  of  the  Republic,  and  by 
Secretary  Rogers  to  Victor  Hoz  de  Vila, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Message  from  President  Nixon 
to  President  Siles 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  28 

April  2S,  1969 
Dear  Mr.  President  :  On  behalf  of  my  fellow 
countrymen,  may  I  extend  to  you,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, and  to  the  people  of  Bolivia  our  deepest 
sympathy  for  the  untimely  death  of  President 
Barrientos.  A  tragic  accident  has  silenced  a 
dynamic  leader,  and  his  loss  will  be  deeply 
mourned  by  all  who  knew  him.  But  the  example 


MAT    19,    1969 


423 


of  his  leadership  and  his  accomplishments  will 
remain  as  a  lasting  legacy  for  all  of  his  fellow 
Americans,  and  especially  for  his  countrymen 
for  whom  he  worked  so  hard.  All  who  knew 
him  are  the  riclier  for  his  memory,  and  Bolivia 
can  be  justly  proud  of  his  leadership  and  his 
life. 

Richard  Nixon 


Message  from  Secretary  Rogers 
to  Foreign  Minister  Hoz  de  Vila 

April  28,  1969 
Please  accept  my  profound  sympathy  on  the 
death  of  President  Barrientos. 

His  loss  will  be  deeply  felt  by  all  of  us  who 
were  privileged  to  work  with  him,  and  his 
example  will  long  be  an  inspiration  to  those  who 
seek  the  fulfillment  of  the  ideals  for  which  he 
worked  so  diligently. 

We  share  the  grief  of  the  Bolivian  people,  but 
we  also  share  your  hope  that  more  leaders  of  his 
stature  will  emerge  to  guide  the  destinies  of 
our  hemisphere — and  that  his  legacy  may  help 
pave  the  way  to  the  kind  of  society  he  so 
zealously  worked  to  build. 


Interior  Secretary  Hickel  To  Visit 
Pacific  Islands  Trust  Territory 

Secretary  of  the  Interior  Walter  J.  Hickel 
announced  on  April  24  that  he  has  been  re- 
quested by  President  Nixon  to  undertake  a  fact- 
finding mission  to  Micronesia  in  the  Western 
Pacific  and  that  he  will  depart  May  1. 

Among  those  accompanying  the  Secretary 
will  be  IMrs.  Elizabeth  R.  Farrington,  Director 
of  the  Office  of  Territories,  and  Edward  E. 
Johnston,  nominated  on  April  24  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  be  the  new  High  Commissioner  of  the 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands.^ 

Purpose  of  the  mission  to  Micronesia  will  be 
to  ascertain  for  the  administration  the  needs 
and  desires  of  the  native  peoples  toward  their 
political  and  economic  development.  Tlie  Secre- 
tary's report,  together  with  plans  currently 
being  developed  by  the  administration,  will  form 
the  basis  for  legislative  proposals  to  Congress 
on  the  future  status  of  the  trust  islands. 


'  The  Senate  confirmed  the  nomination  of  Mr.  John- 
ston on  May  1. 


It  will  be  the  first  visit  in  7  years  by  an  In- 
terior Secretary  to  this  strategic  area,  which  has 
been  administered  by  the  Department  since  the 
trusteeship  was  created  in  1947. 

"We  plan  to  establish  a  close  rapport  with  the 
Micronesian  people,  to  seek  their  counsel,  and 
to  determine  what  they  want  for  their  political 
future,  and  their  public  works  programs,  in- 
vestment capital,  and  development  of  potential 
resources,"  the  Secretary  said.  "Our  special  con- 
cern is  to  give  the  Micronesians  a  greater  voice 
and  representation  in  the  administration  of  the 
islands. 

"The  aim  of  the  administration  is  to  take 
positive  action  in  this  area.  It  is  vital  to  the 
foreign  relations,  defense,  communications,  and 
research  programs  of  the  United  States,  and  we 
intend  to  move  ahead  quickly  on  a  progressive 
program  for  this  vital  area." 

Secretary  Hickel  will  address  the  Guam  Leg- 
islature, as  well  as  the  Congress  of  Micronesia 
at  Saipan,  during  his  12,000-mile  trip. 

The  Secretary  will  travel  from  Honolulu  to 
Guam  and  Saipan  on  May  2.  He  will  spend  3 
days  in  Saipan,  headquarters  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Is- 
lands, using  this  as  his  base  for  conferences  and 
field  trips  in  the  area.  He  will  return  to  Wash- 
ington, via  Anchorage,  Alaska,  on  May  7. 

Micronesia  consists  of  more  than  2,100  small 
islands  scattered  over  an  ocean  expanse  of  3 
million  square  miles  in  the  Western  Pacific,  an 
area  approximately  the  size  of  the  continental 
United  States.  The  total  population  is  94,000, 
inhabiting  100  of  the  islands  and  with  differing 
cultures  and  speaking  nine  different  dialects. 

The  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands, 
comprising  the  Marshall,  Mariana,  and  Caro- 
line Islands,  is  divided  into  six  major  districts : 
Marianas,  with  the  district  center  at  Saipan; 
Yap  (Colonia),  Palau  (Koror),Truk  (Moen), 
Ponape  (Kolonia),  and  Marshalls  (Majuro 
Atoll).  Guam,  in  the  Marianas,  is  a  U.S. 
Territory. 

The  Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands  is 
administered  by  the  United  States  under  a 
Trusteeship  Agreement  with  the  United  Na- 
tions Security  Council,  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent pursuant  to  authority  granted  by  a  joint 
resolution  of  the  Congress. 

The  terms  of  this  unique  "strategic  trust" 
give  the  United  States  full  authority  over  the 
territory,  including  the  right  to  establish 
military  bases. 

The   terms   require   the   United    States   to 


424 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


"promote  the  development  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Trust  Territory  toward  self-government 
or  independence  as  may  be  appropriate  to 
the  particular  circumstances  of  the  Trust 
Territory  and  its  j^eoples  and  the  freely  ex- 
pressed wishes  of  the  peoples  concerned  .  .  . 
promote  the  economic  advancement  and  self- 
sufficiency  of  the  inhabitants  .  .  .  promote  the 
social  advancement  of  the  inhabitants  .  .  . 
and  promote  the  educational  advancement  of 
the  inhabitants  .  .  .  ." 


Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention 
on  Conduct  of  North  Atlantic  Fishing 

Message  From  President  Nixon  ^ 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I  transmit 
herewith  a  certified  copy  of  the  Convention  on 
Conduct  of  Fishing  Operations  in  the  North 
Atlantic,  done  at  London,  June  1,  1967.  The 
Convention  has  been  signed  on  behalf  of  seven- 
teen govermnents,  including  the  United  States 
of  America,  which  represent  the  great  majority 
of  vessels  engaged  in  the  fisheries  in  the  area. 

For  the  information  of  the  Senate,  I  also 
transmit  the  report  by  the  Secretary  of  State 
with  respect  to  the  Convention. 

The  Convention  establishes  a  generally  uni- 
form system  of  identification,  marking,  light 
signals,  conduct,  and  enforcement  for  fishing 
vessels  and  support  vessels  in  a  large  part  of  the 
North  Atlantic.  The  Convention  is  sufficiently 
flexible  that  it  might  be  extended  to  other  areas 
of  the  Atlantic  if  developments  in  the  fishery 
pattern  make  this  desirable. 

Many  European  fishing  vessels  have  followed 
a  code  of  conduct  laid  down  in  the  1882  Con- 
vention for  Eegulating  the  Police  of  the  North 
Sea  Fisheries,  even  though  many  of  the  Eu- 
ropean governments  did  not  actually  become 
party  to  the  Convention.  This  code  was  grad- 
ually extended  throughout  the  Northeast 
Atlantic  as  congestion  on  the  fishing  grounds 
gradually  spread  beyond  the  North  Sea.  Even- 


tually, the  code  extended  to  the  Northwest 
Atlantic. 

Since  foreign  fishermen  rarely  operated  close 
to  our  Atlantic  coast,  such  a  code  was  of  little 
direct  concern  to  our  fishermen.  This  situation 
has  changed  dramatically  during  the  past  few 
years.  Complaints  of  harassment  or  impaired 
operating  freedom  due  to  congestion  on  the 
fishing  grounds  have  become  frequent.  As  a  re- 
sult, our  fishermen  have  called  for  a  modern 
code  of  conduct  to  assist  them.  Their  needs  in 
this  respect  were  made  known  to  our  negotiators. 

I  believe  that  the  requirements  of  American 
fishermen  in  dealing  with  problems  caused  by 
the  heavy  concentration  of  vessels  on  the  fishing 
grounds  in  the  Convention  area  are  substan- 
tially met  by  the  terms  of  the  Convention.  The 
Convention  will  also  assist  us  in  our  continuing 
effort  to  promote  harmony  in  the  international 
fisheries  through  agreements  with  other  govern- 
ments. 

Proposed  legislation  to  carry  out  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Convention  will  be  submitted. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early  and 
favorable  consideration  to  the  Convention. 


Richard  Nixon 


TiiE  White  PIouse. 

April  16, 1969. 


'Transmitted  on  Apr.  16  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) :  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  D,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
which  includes  the  text  of  the  convention  and  the 
report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 


U.S.  Pays  Into  Regional  OAS  Fund 
for  Education,  Science,  Technology 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
April  21  (press  release  89)  that  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Inter-American  Affairs  Cliarles  A. 
Meyer  had  on  that  day  handed  OAS  Secretary 
General  Galo  Plaza  a  $2.7  million  letter  of  credit 
to  help  support  regional  education,  science, 
and  technology  programs  now  being  launched 
by  members  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States. 

This  transfer,  together  with  earlier  payments 
of  $500,000,  completes  the  first  part  of  the  U.S. 
pledge,  made  at  the  Inter-American  Cultural 
Council  meeting  at  Maracay,  Venezuela,  in  1968, 
to  advance  up  to  $3.2  million  against  the  pledges 
of  the  other  governments.  Future  payments  by 
the  U.S.  Government  will  be  made  in  response 
to  payments  by  other  member  governments. 


MAT    19,    1969 


425 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank 
Holds  10th  Annual  Meeting   at  Guatemala  City 


Statement  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  David  M.  Kennedy  ' 


I  am  delighted  to  meet  with  you  today  as  the 
new  United  States  Governor  of  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  and  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  our  recently  inaugurated  President, 
Richard  M.  Nixon. 

I  am  saddened — as  are  all  of  you — by  the  un- 
timely passing  of  Guatemala's  Foreign  Min- 
ister, the  President  of  the  United  Nations  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  Dr.  Emilio  Arenales  Catalan. 
Dr.  Arenales  was  a  distinguished  leader  of 
Guatemala,  of  our  hemisphere,  and  of  the  entire 
world  community.  His  death  deprives  everyone, 
everywhere,  of  a  devoted  and  tireless  worker  in 
the  cause  of  world  peace. 

Just  prior  to  leaving  Washington,  I  received 
a  letter  from  President  Nixon,  who  has  a  deep 
personal  interest  in  the  work  of  the  Inter- Amer- 
ican Bank.  With  your  permission,  I  would  like 
to  read  it  to  you. 

The  forthcoming  Guatemala  City  meeting  of  the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Bank  will  be  the  first  such  meeting  you  will  attend 
as  United  States  Governor.  It  is  also  the  first  such 
meeting  since  I  have  become  President  of  the  United 
States.  I  would,  accordingly,  appreciate  it  if  you  would 
convey  the  following  personal  message  to  the  Governors 
from  me : 

It  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to  send  my  greetings  to  this 
annual  gathering  of  the  Governors  of  the  Inter-Ameri- 
can Development  Bank.  In  its  10  years  the  Bank  has 
come  to  play  a  highly  constructive  role  in  Latin  Ameri- 
can development. 

The  positive  effects  of  the  Bank's  lending  activities 
can  be  seen  throughout  Latin  America.  As  the  resources 


'  Made  before  the  10th  annual  meeting  of  the  Board 
of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank 
at  Guatemala  City,  Guatemala,  on  Apr.  22.  Secretary 
Kennedy  is  U.S.  Governor  of  the  Bank. 


available  to  the  Bank  grow,  I  am  confident  that  the 
Bank  will  make  an  increasingly  vigorous  and  effective 
contribution  to  the  economic  and  social  development  of 
the  hemisphere. 

The  Inter-American  Development  Bank  stands  as  an 
outstanding  example  of  multilateral  financial  coopera- 
tion among  the  nations  of  the  Americas.  I  want  to 
convey  to  you  my  best  wishes  for  continued  success. 

I  join  wholeheartedly  in  the  President's  ex- 
pres-sion  of  confidence  and  support  for  the 
Bank.  I  am  familiar  with  its  important  con- 
tributions to  hemispheric  de^■elopment  and  its 
great  potential  for  the  future.  I  look  forward  to 
assisting  the  officers  of  the  Bank  and  my  fellow 
Governors  in  guiding  its  progress. 

I  would  like  to  organize  my  remarks  today 
around  a  relatively  few  points  that  seem  im- 
portant to  me  as  one  who  assumes  liis  duties  as 
a  member  of  this  Board  after  an  extended 
period  as  a  commercial  banker.  In  summary, 
these  points  are : 

— First,  the  multilateral  banking  approach  to 
development,  as  exemplified  by  the  Inter- 
American  Bank,  is  sound  and  deserves  further 
emphasis.  I  underscore  hankhig  here,  with  the 
emphasis  on  high  standards  and  economic  per- 
formance by  borrowing  countries  that  that  term 
implies. 

— Second,  the  economic  development  that  the 
Bank  seeks  to  foster  cannot  be  achieved  in  Latin 
America  unless  inflation  is  contained — nor  can 
the  United  States  attain  its  economic  objectives 
if  inflation  is  unchecked. 

— Third,  a  climate  that  permits  private  en- 
terprise to  flourish,  that  encourages  both  domes- 
tic and  foreign  private  investment,  is  essential 
for  balanced  economic  growth. 

—And  finally,  development  can  succeed  only 


426 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


within  the  framework  of  a  smoothly  function- 
ing world  trade  and  payments  system.  Prompt 
action  to  put  into  effect  the  new  special  drawing 
rights  facility  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  is  essential  in  this  regard. 

Let  me  now  expand  on  each  of  these  points  in 
turn. 

Multilateral  Approach  to   Development 

The  decade  since  the  agreement  establisliing 
the  Bank  was  offered  for  signature  has  been 
marked  by  ever-closer  cooperation  among  na- 
tions to  help  developing  areas  achieve  their 
legitimate  aspirations.  The  Inter-American 
Bank  exemplifies  this  willingness  of  nations  to 
work  together  to  promote  a  better  life  for  all  of 
their  citizens.  The  Bank  not  only  has  served 
well  the  mutual  interests  of  the  Americas;  it 
has  also  been  a  model  for  institutions  serving  the 
needs  of  other  developing  regions. 

I  returned  only  a  few  days  ago  from  Sydney, 
Australia,  where  I  was  privileged  to  participate 
in  the  second  annual  meeting  of  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank,  which  has  made  significant 
progress  since  its  founding  in  1966.  As  you 
know,  the  progress  of  the  Asian  Bank  has  been 
aided  by  expertise  and  experience  contributed 
by  ofGcials  and  staff  of  the  Inter-American 
Bank. 

The  multilateral  approach  to  development 
financing — both  worldwide  and  through  re- 
gional banks — offers  great  hope  for  the  future. 
Through  this  approach,  nations  large  and  small, 
rich  and  poor,  can  work  together  effectively  to 
overcome  the  poverty,  hunger,  and  despair  that 
afflicts  too  many  of  our  fellow  men. 

It  follows,  then,  that  my  Government  places 
a  high  value  on  multilateral  assistance  and  en- 
courages its  increased  use  by  the  economically 
advanced  nations. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  we  recognize  that 
in  some  cases  there  can  be  no  substitute  for  bi- 
lateral assistance,  which  provides  an  important 
direct  link  between  nations,  thereby  promoting 
a  greater  understanding  of  one  another's  prob- 
lems and  a  helpful  exchange  of  mutually  useful 
knowledge. 

In  reviewing  the  progress  of  the  Inter-Amer- 
ican Bank,  including  the  accomplishments  dis- 
cussed in  the  annual  report  for  last  year,  I  have 
been  particularly  impressed  by  two  points : 

— First,  the  growing  ability  of  the  Bank  to 
tap  varied  sources  of  capital ; 


— Second,  the  success  of  the  Bank's  efforts  to 
attract  funds  from  advanced  nations  other  than 
the  United  States. 

Such  diversification  of  the  Bank's  sources  of 
funds  is  important  in  mobilizing  the  maximum 
possible  resources  for  development. 

In  addition — and  I  say  this  with  complete 
candor — the  Bank's  capacity  to  tap  funds  from 
a  variety  of  sources  has  reduced  international 
demands  on  the  hard-pressed  United  States 
capital  markets  at  a  time  when  my  country  is 
making  a  determined  effort  to  solve  its  bal- 
ance-of-payments  problem.  I  can  assure  you 
that  this  development  is  welcome  indeed. 

The  steady  progress  of  the  Bank  since  1959 
is  a  tribute  to  its  leadership.  Dr.  Felipe  Herrera 
has  served  with  distinction  as  President  of  the 
Bank  since  its  inception.  He  has  given  gener- 
ously of  his  wisdom,  energy,  and  talents;  and 
the  Bank,  its  member  countries,  and  our  en- 
tire hemisphere  are  indebted  to  him  for  his  out- 
standing service. 

We  all  recognize  that  the  popular  concept  of  a 
financial  institution  is  frequently  distorted.  Are 
we  a  cold  impersonal  entity  ?  Not  at  all !  I  think 
the  wisdom  of  the  Bank's  leadership  is  reflected 
in  its  deep-rooted  concern  for  the  most  impoi-- 
tant  element  in  the  development  of  a  nation: 
its  people.  Through  carefully  selected  invest- 
ments in  the  economic  and  social  fields,  the  Bank 
strengthens  the  ability  of  the  peoples  of  the 
Americas  to  contribute  more  productively  to  the 
growth  and  prosperity  of  the  hemisphere.  Thus, 
it  helps  to  build  the  essential  human  base  on 
which  economic  progress  depends. 

The  continuing  efforts  by  the  Bank  to 
strengthen  its  administrative  procedures  also 
demonstrate  the  foresight  of  its  leadership. 
These  timely  moves — among  which  I  include 
the  procedure  established  last  year  for  system- 
atic review  and  appraisal  of  all  aspects  of  opera- 
tions— will  increase  both  the  effectiveness  and 
efficiency  of  operations. 

Dangers  of  Inflation 

I  would  like  at  this  point  to  suggest  that  the 
Bank  would  benefit  by  giving  greater  weight 
to  the  economic  performance  of  borrowing 
countries.  Borrowers  would  find  it  in  their  own 
best  interest  to  seek  the  Bank's  objective  ap- 
praisal of  their  economic  plans  and  progress. 

Similarly,  I  don't  think  it  gratuitous  to  sug- 
gest that  the  Bank  should  regard  such  rigorous 


MAT    19,    1969 


427 


appraisals  as  one  of  its  essential  functions. 

I  am  certain  that  no  one  in  this  room  today 
doubts  that  a  very  crucial  question  for  the  Bank 
is  simply  this :  Are  our  member  nations  taking 
adequate  steps  to  avoid  or  to  curb  inflation  ? 

The  countries  of  our  hemisphere  have  learned 
the  hard  way  that  inflation,  if  left  unchecked,  is 
a  vicious  enemy  of  development  and  wildly  dis- 
sipates its  benefits.  The  other  side  of  the  coin  is, 
of  course,  the  fact  that  the  achievement  and 
maintenance  of  price  stability  promotes  eco- 
nomic justice  and  sound  and  sustainable  growth. 

In  establisliing  goals  for  our  national 
economies,  each  of  us  must  be  concerned  with 
the  same  essential  elements,  no  matter  what  the 
size  of  our  country  or  its  stage  of  economic  de- 
velopment. These  key  elements  are,  of  course: 

—A  satisfactory  rate  of  economic  growth ; 

— Reasonable  price  stability ; 

— Eeasonably  full  employment ; 

— Equilibrium  in  the  balance  of  payments. 

And,  gentlemen,  lest  you  think  that  I'm  seek- 
ing to  lecture  without  regard  for  my  own  coun- 
try's problems,  let  me  say  that  although  the 
United  States  continues  to  enjoy  rapid  economic 
growth,  we  still  face  the  critical  problems  of 
inflation  and  balance-of -payments  deficits. 

I  would  be  less  than  honest  if  I  did  not  say 
that  unless  we  in  the  United  States  overcome 
these  problems,  all  of  our  otlier  economic  objec- 
tives will  be  endangered.  However,  let  me  assure 
you,  my  fellow  Governors,  that  the  United 
States  is  determined  to  solve  the  problem  of 
inflation.  And  if  we  solve  that  vexing  problem, 
we  will  also  be  well  on  the  way  to  a  solution  of 
our  international  payments  imbalance. 

Private  Sector  Vital  to   Development 

President  Nixon  and  his  entire  administra- 
tion are  firmly  committed  to  taking  effective 
action  to  check  inflation  and  to  return  our 
economy  to  the  path  of  reasonable  price  stabil- 
ity. We  intend  to  achieve  this  goal  through  gen- 
eral economic  restraints  that  are  fully  com- 
patible with  the  maintenance  of  a  liigh  level  of 
employment  and  our  system  of  free,  competitive 
private  enterprise.  Here  I  want  to  add — perhaps 
gratuitously — that  private  enterprise  is  the 
dynamic  element  in  our  economy.  Any  actions 
that  would  weaken  it  would  be  as  dangerous  to 
our  future  as  would  be  continued  inflation. 


Historically,  Latin  American  governments  ] 
have  wisely  recognized  that  a  flourishing  private 
sector  is  vital  to  overall  national  development. 
Happily,  foreign  private  investors  are  actively 
seeking  to  harmonize  their  objectives  with  the 
national  goals  and  basic  concepts  of  their  host 
countries — particularly  with  respect  to  the  fields 
they  seek  to  enter,  to  active  recruitment  of  local 
managerial  skills,  to  association  with  local 
capital,  and  to  good  corporate  citizenship  in 
general. 

Latin  America's  industrial  sector  has  been 
growing  faster  than  Latin  America's  gross  na- 
tional product  as  a  whole.  This  reflects  many 
factors : 

— Changed  investor  attitudes ; 

— New  opportunities  presented  by  economic 
integration  arrangements ; 

— The  relaxation  of  financial  controls  made 
possible  by  more  stable  conditions  in  a  number 
of  countries ; 

— The  increased  ability  of  private  enterprise 
to  draw  on  domestic  sources  of  capital ;  and  1 

— The    provision    by    foreign    investors    of      1 
financial  resources,  advanced  technology,  and 
established  organizations. 

Private  enterprise,  both  domestic  and  for- 
eign, has  demonstrated  its  ability  to  stimulate 
increased  economic  activity  in  Latin  America. 

IMF  Special  Drawing  Rights 

I  believe  that  those  Latin  American  officials 
who  establish  domestic  policy  should  continu- 
ally seek  to  improve  the  climate  for  private 
enterprise  so  that  it  can  add  to  its  already  sig- 
nificant accomplishments. 

May  I  add  that  this  search  for  a  better  climate 
applies  also  to  those  officials  who  are  concerned 
with  the  international  flow  of  private  capital. 

One  very  important  way  in  which  Latin 
American  governments  can  help  to  facilitate  in- 
ternational flows  of  capital  for  trade  and  in- 
vestment is  by  acting  promptly  to  ratify  the 
agreement  on  special  drawing  rights  of  the 
International  Monetary  Fund.  The  new  special 
drawing  rights  facility — which  should  be  ac- 
tivated this  year — will  serve  the  developing  as 
well  as  the  developed  countries.  It  will  directly 
add  to  monetary  reserves  in  proportion  to  IMF 
quotas  and  will  provide  the  liquidity  needed 
for  growing  trade  and  investment. 


428 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


We  should  all  be  gratified  that  11  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Inter-American  Bank  have  taken 
the  necessary  steps  to  ratify  the  amendment. 
Some  45  countries,  holding  more  than  60  percent 
of  the  votes  in  the  Fund,  have  completed 
ratification.  However,  the  amendment  requires 
approval  by  67  member  countries,  holding  80 
percent  of  the  total  voting  power.  Since  the  SDR 
facility  cannot  be  activated  until  countries  rep- 
resenting at  least  75  percent  of  the  Fund's  quotas 
indicate  their  readiness  to  participate,  I  hope 
that  those  Latin  American  nations  which  have 
not  yet  completed  both  steps  will  do  so  promptly. 

In  closing,  let  me  assure  my  associates  on  the 
Board  of  Governors  that  the  United  States  will 
continue  to  give  its  strong  support  to  the  ob- 
jectives of  the  Inter-American  Development 
Bank. 

May  I  also  say  that  we  are  prepared  to  listen, 
to  look,  and  to  learn.  We  want  to  hear  your  views 
as  to  what  you  want  to  do  for  yourselves — and 
your  beliefs  about  what  we  can  do  together.  We 
earnestly  seek  your  advice  and  solicit  your  as- 
sistance in  finding  solutions  for  our  mutual 
problems. 

As  President  Nixon  has  said,  we  seek  "a  new 
era  of  cooperation,  of  consultation,  but  most  im- 
portant, of  progress  for  all  the  members  of  our 
great  American  family."^ 

Thank  you. 


Mr.  Meyer  Named  U.S.  Representative 
to  lA-ECOSOC 

President  Nixon  on  April  19  appointed 
Charles  A.  Meyer,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Inter-American  Affairs,  to  be  the  Repi-e- 
sentative  of  the  United  States  on  the  Inter- 
American  Economic  and  Social  Council  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States. 

On  the  same  day,  the  President  also  appointed 
Mr.  Meyer  to  be  a  member  of  the  United  States 
National  Commission  in  the  Pan  American 
Railway  Congress  Association. 


'  For  President  Nixon's  remarks  at  the  Pan  Ameri- 
can Union,  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Apr.  14,  see  Bitlletin 
of  Hay  5, 1969,  p.  384. 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 


Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  {such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  6e  consulted  at  depository  libraries 
in  the  United  States.  V.N.  printed  publications  may 
6e  purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United, 
Nations,  United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 


Security  Council 

Report  by  the  Secretary  General  on  the  United  Nations 
operation  in  Cvprus  for  the  period  June  8-Decem- 
ber  2,  1968.  S/8914.  December  4,  1968.  32  pp. 

Special  report  of  the  Secretary  General  on  the  critical 
situation  in  the  Suez  Canal  sector.  S/9171.  April  21, 
1969.  1  p. 


General  Assembly 

Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space: 
Information  furnished  by   the  U.S.S.R.  concerning 
objects  launched  into  orbit  around  the  earth  or 
into  outer  space.  A/AC.105/INF.198,  December  6, 
1968,  3  pp.;   A/AC.105/INF.203,  April  24,  1969; 
4  pp. 
Information   furnished  by   the   United   States  con- 
cerning objects  launched   into  orbit  or  beyond. 
A/AC.105/INF.200,    February    11,    1969,    2    pp.; 
A/AC.105/INF.201,  March  6,  1969,  3  pp.;   A/AC. 
105/INF.202,  April  24, 1969,  2  pp. 
Report  of  the  Working  Group  on  Direct  Broadcast 
SatelUtes.  A/AC.105/51.  February  26,  1969.  25  pp. 
Special  Committee  on  the  Question  of  Defining  Aggres- 
sion. Report  of  the  Special  Committee.  A/AC.134/5. 
April  7, 1969.  52  pp. 
Note  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General  from  the  rep- 
resentative of  Hungary  dated  March  28,  1909,  trans- 
mitting an  appeal  by  the  Warsaw  Treaty  nations  to 
all   European   countries,   adopted   at  Budapest  on 
March  17,  calling  for  an  all-European  conference. 
A/7536.  April  22, 1969.  7  pp. 


Economic  and   Social   Council 

Commission  for  Social  Development : 

Report  of  the  special  rapporteurs  appointed  to  under- 
take a  review  of  technical  cooperation  activities  in 
social  development  E/CN.5/432.  December  12, 
1968.  44  pp. 

Five-year  work  program  of  the  Commission  for  So- 
cial Development,  19G9-73.  Note  by  the  Secretary- 
General.  E/CN.5/433.  December  12,  1968.  27  pp. 

The  Role  of  Education  in  Economic  and  Social  De- 
velopment. Report  of  UNESCO.  E/CN.5/435. 
December  12, 1968.  33  pp. 

Implementation  of  United  Nations  Social  Develop- 
ment Programs  During  the  Tear  1968.  Report  of 
the  Secretary-General.  E/CN.5/436.  December  27, 
1968.  50  pp. 
United  Nations  Children's  Fund : 

Digest  of  projects  in  Africa.  E/ICEF/5S0.  October  20, 
1968.  61  pp. 

Digest  of  Projects  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
E/ICEF/5S3.  December  27,  1968.  27  pp. 

Digest  of  Projects  in  the  Americas.  E/ICEP/581. 
December  30, 1968.  54  pp. 


MAT    19,   1969 


429 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Unifed  States  and  Greece  Sign 
New  Cotton  Textile  Agreement 

Press  release  79  dated  April  11 
DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

A  new  cotton  textile  agreement  between  the 
United  States  and  Greece  was  concluded  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Athens  on  April  8.  Eoswell 
D.  McClelland,  American  Charge  d'Affaires  ad 
interim  at  Athens,  and  George  Tsistopoulos, 
Under  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Greece, 
signed  the  respective  notes. 

The  new  agreement  runs  through  June  30, 
1971,  and  replaces  an  agreement  of  July  17, 
1964,^  which  was  due  to  exiDire  on  December  31, 
1970.  The  1964  agreement  had  been  amended 
several  times,  most  recently  on  Febniary  23, 
1968. 

The  new  agreement,  like  the  1964  agreement, 
was  negotiated  in  the  context  of  the  Long-Term 
Arrangement  Regarding  International  Trade 
in  Cotton  Textiles  (LTA)  and  sets  forth  the 
agreement  of  Greece  to  control  exports  of  cot- 
ton textiles  to  the  United  States. 

In  addition  to  extending  the  term,  the  new 
agreement  differs  from  the  old  agi-eement  prin- 
cipally in  that  various  limits  have  been  revised 
and  a  contingent  allocation  provision  has  been 
eliminated. 


TEXT  OF  AGREEMENT 


Athens,  April  8,  1969. 


No.  66 

Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  Long- 
Term  Arrangement  Regarding  International  Trade  in 
Cotton  Textiles,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  LTA, 
done  in  Geneva  on  February  9,  1962,  and  to  the  Proto- 
col extending  the  LTA  through  September  30,  1970. 
I  also  refer  to  the  agi-eement  between  our  two  Govern- 
ments concerning  exports  of  cotton  textiles  from  Greece 


to  the  United  States,  effected  by  an  exchange  of  notes 
dated  July  17,  1964,  as  amended,  hereinafter  referred 
to  as  the  1964  Agreement.  On  the  basis  of  the  recent 
discussions  between  our  two  Governments,  I  propose, 
on  behalf  of  my  Government,  that  the  1964  Agreement 
be  replaced  as  of  January  1,  1968,  by  a  new  Agreement 
as  provided  in  the  following  numbered  paragraphs : 

1.  The  Government  of  Greece  shall  limit  exports  to 
the  United  States  in  all  categories  of  cotton  textiles 
for  the  eighteen-month  period  beginning  January  1, 
1968  and  extending  through  June  30,  1969  (hereinafter 
called  the  "first  agreement  period")  ;  for  the  twelve- 
month period  beginning  July  1,  1969  and  extending 
through  June  30,  1970  (hereinafter  called  "the  second 
agreement  period")  ;  and  for  the  twelve-month  period 
beginning  July  1,  1970  and  extending  through  June  30, 
1971  (hereinafter  called  "the  third  agreement  period") 
in  accordance  with  the  following : 


First 

Second 

Third 

Agreement 

Agreement 

Agreement 

Period 

Period 

Period 

1/1/6S- 

7/1/69- 

7/1/70- 

6/S0/69 

6/30/70 

6/30/71 

I.   Yarn  (cats. 

2,364,846 

1,668,962 

1,752,409 

1-4) 

lbs. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

).  Fabrics  and 

1,765,378 

1,254,893 

1,308,188 

made-up 

sq.  yds. 

sq.  yds. 

sq.  yds. 

goods  (oats. 

eq. 

eq. 

eq. 

,5-38,  64) 

.   Apparel 

353,075 

249,179 

261,637 

(cats.  39-63) 

sq.  yds. 

sq.  yds. 

sq.  yds. 

eq. 

eq. 

eq. 

'Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  5618, 
6009,  6456. 


2.  The  limitation  on  yarn  may  be  exceeded  in  any 
agreement  period  by  the  amount  by  which  exports  of 
other  cotton  textiles  from  Greece  to  the  United  States 
are  less  than  the  sum  of  the  limitations  applicable  to 
fabrics,  made-up  goods  and  apparel  for  that  period. 

3.  Within  the  ceiling  for  fabrics  and  made-up  goods, 
exports  in  any  one  category  shall  not  exceed  220,500 
square  yards  equivalent  in  any  agreement  period  except 
by  mutual  agreement  of  the  two  Governments. 

4.  The  Government  of  Greece  shall  space  exxxjrts  in 
the  yarn  categories  1,  2,  3  and  4  as  evenly  as  practi- 
cable within  any  agreement  period,  taking  into  con- 
sideration normal  seasonal  factors. 

5.  In  the  event  of  undue  concentration  in  exports 
from  Greece  to  the  United  States  of  yarn  in  categories 
2,  3  or  4,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  may  request  consultation  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Greece  in  order  to  reach  a  mutually  satisfac- 
tory solution  to  the  problem.  The  Government  of  Greece 
shall  enter  into  such  consultations  when  requested. 
Until  a  mutually  satisfactory  solution  is  reached,  the 
Government  of  Greece  shall  limit  the  exports  from 
Greece  to  the  United  States  of  yam  in  the  category  in 
question  starting  with  the  twelve-month  period  be- 
ginning on  the  date  of  the  request  for  consultation. 
This  limit  shall  be  one  hundred  five  percent  of  the  ex- 
ports from  Greece  to  the  United  States  of  that  category 
of  yarn  during  the  most  recent  twelve-month  period 
preceding  the  request  for  consultation  for  which  sta- 
tistics are  available  to  our  two  Governments  on  the 
date  of  the  request. 

6.  Each  Government  agrees  to  supply  promptly  any 


430 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


available  statistical  data  requested  by  the  other  Gov- 
ernment. In  the  implementation  of  this  agreement,  the 
system  of  categories  and  the  factors  for  conversion 
into  square  yards  equivalent  set  forth  in  the  Annex " 
hereto  shall  apply. 

7.  For  the  duration  of  this  agreement,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  shall  not  invoke 
the  procedures  of  Article  3  of  the  LTA  to  request  re- 
straint on  the  export  of  cotton  textiles  from  Greece  to 
the  United  States.  The  applicability  of  the  LTA  to 
trade  in  cotton  textiles  between  Greece  and  the 
United  States  shall  otherwise  be  unaffected  by  this 
agreement. 

S.  The  Governments  agree  to  consult  on  any  ques- 
tions arising  in  the  implementation  of  this  agreement. 

9.  The  agreement  shall  continue  in  force  through 
June  30,  1971.  Either  Government  may  propose  re- 
visions in  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  or  may  termi- 
nate the  agreement  at  any  time,  giving  notice  of 
at  least  30  days  prior  to  that  propo.sed  revision  or 
termination. 

10.  If  the  Government  of  Greece  considers  that,  as 
a  result  of  limitations  specified  in  this  agreement, 
Greece  is  being  placed  in  an  inequitable  position  vis-a- 
vis a  third  country,  the  Government  of  Greece  may  re- 
quest consultation  with  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  with  a  view  to  taking  appropriate 
remedial  action  such  as  a  reasonable  modification  of 
this  agreement. 

11.  (a)  Beginning  with  shortfalls  in  the  first  agree- 
ment period,  shortfalls  may  be  carried  over  as  follows : 

(i)  For  any  agreement  period  immediately  follow- 
ing a  period  of  a  shortfall  (i.e.,  a  period  in  which 
cotton  textile  exiwrts  from  Greece  to  the  United 
States  in  any  of  the  groups  set  out  in  paragraph  1  were 
below  the  limits  specified  therein),  the  Government 
of  Greece  may  permit  exports  to  exceed  the  appropri- 
ate limits  by  carry-over  in  an  amount  equal  to  either 
the  amount  of  the  shortfall  or  5  percent  of  the  group 
limit  applicable  in  the  period  of  the  shortfall,  which- 
ever is  lower.  The  carryover  shall  be  used  in  the 
same  group  in  which  the  shortfall  occurred,  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  2,  3  and  5  of  this 
agreement. 

(ii)  In  determining  the  amount  of  shortfall  in  the 
fabric  and/or  apparel  groups  for  the  purpose  of  sub- 
paragraph (a)(i),  the  actual  shortfall  in  this  group 
or  groups  shall  tie  reduced  by  the  square  yard  equiva- 
lent of  those  yam  exports  made  during  the  period  of 
the  shortfall  that  were  permitted  under  paragraph  2 
of  this  agreement. 

(b)  For  the  purpose  of  determining  shortfall,  the 
limits  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (a)  are  to  be  those 
established  in  accordance  with  paragraph  1,  without 
the  addition  of  any  amount  of  carryover  permitted 
under  subparagraph  (a). 

(c)  The  carryover  shall  be  permitted  in  addition  to 
the  exports  permitted  under  paragraph  2  of  this 
agreement. 

12.  Mutually  satisfactory  administrative  arrange- 
ments or  adjustments  may  be  made  to  resolve  minor 


problems  arising  in  the  implementation  of  this  agree- 
ment including  differences  in  points  of  procedure  or 
operation. 

If  the  foregoing  conforms  with  the  understanding  of 
your  Government,  this  note  and  Your  Excellency's  note 
of  confirmation  on  behalf  of  the  Government  of 
Greece '  shall  constitute  a  new  cotton  textile  agree- 
ment between  our  two  Governments. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

RoswELL  D.  McCleixano 

His  Excellency 

Geobge  Tsistopoulos, 

Under  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 

Athens. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Diplomatic  Relations 

Convention  on  diplomatic  relations.  Done  at  Vienna 
AprU  18,  1961.  Entered  into  force  April  24,  19&4.' 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  diplo- 
matic relations  concerning  the  compulsory  settlement 
of  disputes.  Done  at  Vienna  April  18,  1961.  Entered 
into  force  April  24, 1964.' 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  diplo- 
matic relations  concerning  acquisition  of  nationality. 
Done  at  Vienna  April  18,  1961.  Entered  into  force 
April  24,  1964.' 
Accession  deposited:  Botswana,  April  11, 1969. 

Disputes 

Convention  on  the  settlement  of  investment  disputes 
between  states  and  nationals  of  other  states.  Done 
at  Washington  March  18,  1965.  Entered  into  force 
October  14, 1966.  TIAS  6090. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
(including  Land  Berlin),  April  18,  1969;  Greece, 
AprU  21, 1969. 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of 
execution.  Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered 
into  force  January  1, 1966.  TIAS  5&S1. 
Accession  deposited:  Nauru  (with  reservations), 
April  17, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at 
New   York   January   31,    1967.    Entered   into   force 
October  4,  1967 ;  for  the  United  States  November  1, 
1968.  TIAS  6.577. 
Accession  deposited:  Belgium,  April  8, 1969. 


'  Not  printed  here. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


MAT    19,    1969 


431 


Telecommunicafions 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Montreux  November  12,  1965.  En- 
tered into  force  January  1,  1967;  for  the  United 
States  Jlay  29, 1967.  TIAS  6267. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Cuba,  February  12,  1969; 
Iran,  February  11,  1969;  Thailand,  February  28, 
1969.' 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations  (Geneva, 
1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603),  putting  into 
effect  a  revised  frequency  allotment  plan  for  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service  and  related  infor- 
mation, with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  April  29, 
1966.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1967 ;  for  the  United 
States  August  23,  1967,  except  the  frequency  allot- 
ment plan  contained  in  appendix  27  shall  enter 
Into  force  April  10, 1970.  TIAS  6332. 
Notification  of  approval:  Senegal,  February  11. 1969. 

Partial   revision   of   the   radio   regulations    (Geneva, 

1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332),  relating 

to  maritime  mobile  service,  with  annexes  and  final 

protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  November  3,  1967.  Entered 

into  force  April  1, 1969.  TIAS  6590. 

Notifications  of  approval:  Guinea,  F-^brnary  7,  1969 ; 

Japan,  February  12,  1969;  Senegal,  February  11, 

1969;    Singapore,    February    21,    1969;"    Spain, 

March  4, 1969. 


BILATERAL 

Dominican   Republic 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities  of  March  28,  1969.  Signed  at 
Santo  Domingo  April  15,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
April  15,  1969. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  Japan's  financial  contributions 
for  United  States  administrative  and  related  expenses 
for  Japanese  fiscal  year  1969  pursuant  to  the  mutual 
defense  assistance  agreement  of  March  8,  1954 
(TIAS  2957).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo 
April  15,  1969.  Entered  into  force  April  15,  1969. 

Jordan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  April  4,  1968  (TIAS  6475). 
Signed  at  Amman  April  21,  1969.  Entered  Into  force 
April  21,  1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  May  1  confirmed  the  following  nomi- 
nations : 

Philip  K.  Crowe  to  be  Ambassador  to  Norway.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
April  12. ) 

C.  Burke  Elbrick  to  be  Ambassador  to  Brazil.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
April  5. ) 

Marshall  Green  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary  of  State. 
( For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  100  dated  May  5.) 

William  J.  Handley  to  be  Ambassador  to  Turkey. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  99  dated  May  5.) 

Robert  C.  Hill  to  be  Ambassador  to  Spain.  (For  bio- 
graphic details,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
98  dated  May  2.) 

Kenneth  B.  Keating  to  be  Ambassador  to  India.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
April  3, ) 

William  Leonhart  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Socialist 
Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia.  (For  biographic  de- 
tails, see  Department  of  State  i>ress  release  109  dated 
May  7.) 

Val  Peterson  to  be  Ambassador  to  Finland.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
April  3.) 

Alfred  Puhan  to  be  Ambassador  to  Hungary.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  110  dated  May  7.) 


Designations 


'  With  reservations  contained  in  final  protocol. 


William  H.  Sullivan  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  effective  April  24. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  92.) 


482 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX     May  19,  1969     Vol.  ZX,  No.  1660 


Asia 

Green  confirmed  as  Assistant  Secretary  for  East 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 432 

Sullivan  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs    ....      432 

Bolivia.  U.S.  Extends  Condolences  on  Death 
of  President  Barrientos  of  Bolivia  (Nixon, 
Rogers) 423 

Brazil.  Elbrick  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      432 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Crowe,  Elbrick,  Green,  Handley, 
Hill,  Keating,  Leonhart,  Peterson,  Puhan)     .      432 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Con- 
duct of  North  Atlantic  Fishing  (message  from 
President  Nixon) 425 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Confirmations  (Crowe,  Elbrick,  Green,  Handley, 

Hill,  Keating,  Leonhart,  Peterson,  Puhan)  432 

Designations  (Sullivan) 432 

Economic  Affairs 

Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  De- 
velopment Bank  Holds  10th  Annual  Meeting 
at  Guatemala  City    (Kennedy) 426 

The  Central  American  Common  Market:  Initia- 
tive for  Development  (Meyer) 421 

Mr.  Meyer  Named  U.S.  Representative  to  lA- 
ECOSOC 429 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Con- 
duct of  North  Atlantic  Fishing  (message  from 
President   Nixon)       425 

United  States  and  Greece  Sign  New  Cotton  Tex- 
tile Agreement  (text  of  U.S.  note)     ....      430 

Finland.  Peterson  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .      432 

Foreign  Aid.  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  Holds  10th  An- 
nual Meeting  at  Guatemala  City  (Kennedy)    .      426 

Greece.  United  States  and  Greece  Sign  New 
Cotton  Textile  Agreement  (text  of  U.S. 
note) 430 

Hungary.  Puhan  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      432 

India.  Keating  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      432 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  De- 
velopment Bank  Holds  10th  Annual  Meeting 
at  Guatemala  City  (Kennedy) 426 

Mr.  Meyer  Named  U.S.  Representative  to  lA- 
ECOSOC 429 

Latin  America 

Board  of  Governors  of  the  Inter-American  De- 
velopment Bank  Holds  10th  Annual  Meeting 
at  Guatemala  City  (Kennedy) 426 

The  Central  American  Common  Market :  Initia- 
tive for  Development    (Meyer) 421 

Mr.  Meyer  Named  U.S.  Representative  to  lA- 
ECOSOC 429 

U.S.  Pays  Into  Regional  OAS  Fund  for  Educa- 
tion, Science,  Technology 425 

Non-Self -Governing  Territories.  Interior  Secre- 
tary Hickel  To  Visit  Pacific  Islands  Trust 
Territory 424 

Norway.  Crowe  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      432 

Presidential  Documents 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Con- 
duct of  North  Atlantic  Fishing 425 

U.S.  Extends  Condolences  on  Death  of  President 
Barrientos  of  Bolivia 423 

Spain.  Hill  confirmed  as  Ambassador    ....      432 


Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 431 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Con- 
duct of  North  Atlantic  Fishing  (message  from 

President  Nixon) 425 

United  States  and  Greece  Sign  New  Cotton  Tex- 
tile Agreement  (text  of  U.S.  note)     ....  430 

Turkey.  Handley  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .  432 

U.S.S.R.  Under  Secretary  Richardson  Discusses 
Viet-Nam  Peace  Talks  and  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Re- 
lations (transcript  of  television  interview)     .  417 

United  Nations.  Current  U.N.  Documents    .     .  429 

Viet-Nam 

15th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 418 

Under  Secretary  Richardson  Discusses  Viet-Nam 
Peace    Talks    and    U.S.-U.S.S.R.    Relations 

(transcript  of  television  interview)     ....  417 

Yugoslavia.  Leonhart  confirmed  as  Ambassa- 
dor      432 

Name  Index 

Crowe,  Philip  K 432 

Elbrick,  C.  Burke 432 

Green,  Marshall 432 

Handley,   William   J 432 

Hickel,   Walter  J 424 

Hill,    Robert    C 432 

Keating,  Kenneth  B 432 

Kennedy,  David  M 426 

Leonhart,  William 432 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 418 

Meyer,  Charles  A 421,429 

Nixon,  President 423, 425 

Peterson,  Val 432 

Puhan,  Alfred 432 

Richardson,  Elliot  L 417 

Rogers,  Secretary 423 

Sullivan,  William  H 432 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  April  28-May  5 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflSce 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  April  28  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  79  of 
April  11  and  89  of  April  21. 

Ko.       Date  Subject 

*93    4/28    Schedule  for  the  visit  of  Prime  Minis- 
( corrected)     ter  John  G.  Gorton  of  Australia. 

94  4/30    Richardson:  interview  for  National 

Educational  Television  Network. 

95  4/30    Meyer:  inter-American  affairs  semi- 

nar on  the  Central  American  Com- 
mon Market,  New  Orleans. 

96  4/30    Lodge :  15th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 

Nam  at  Paris. 
t97    4/30    U.S.-Brazil    agreement    on    soluble 

coffee. 
*98    5/2      Hill  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to  Spain 

(biographic  details). 


*Xot  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletiw. 


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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Boston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

JUN  1  0  1969 
DEPOSITORY 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1561 


May  26,  1969 


SECRETARY  ROGERS  TO  CONFER  WITH  ASIAN  LEADERS 
DURING  17-DAY  TRIP 

Statement  by  Secretary  Rogers     lf33 

LATIN  AMERICA:  WHAT  ARE  YOUR  PRIORITIES? 

by  Assistant  Secretary  Meyer     J^lfi 

THE  ARAB-ISRAELI  CONFRONTATION— A  CHALLENGE 
TO  INTERNATIONAL  DIPLOMACY 

hy  Assistant  Secretary  Sisco     iliS 

JAPAN'S  ECONOMIC  DYNAMISM 

AND  OUR  COMMON  INTERESTS  IN  EAST  ASIA 

Article  hy  Robert  TT.  Bamett     447 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1561 
May  26, 1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publication 

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the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  Lndesed  in 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
ivith  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  rela  tions  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative rrujterial  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


Secretary  Rogers  To  Confer  With  Asian  Leaders 
During   17-Day  Trip 


Following  'is  a  statement  issued  hy  Secretary 
Rogers  on  May  9,  together  with  the  details  of 
his  itinerary. 


STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  ROGERS 

Press  release  112  dated  May  9 

The  mission  on  wliich  we  will  be  leaving 
Monday  [May  12]  will  cover  a  large  part  of 
southern  Asia.  The  United  States  is  deeply  in- 
volved in  Southeast  Asia  and  has  significant 
interests  elsewhere  in  the  continent.  My  trip  will 
provide  the  first  substantive  opportunity  for  me 
to  meet  many  of  the  leaders  of  the  area  and  for 
us  to  hear  from  them  about  their  own  views.  I 
intend  to  elicit  their  ideas  on  future  prospects 
in  Asia,  in  particular,  and  on  the  actions  and 
initiatives  they  themselves  plan  to  achieve  their 
goals. 

I  have  purposely  chosen  Viet-Nam  as  the  first 
country  I  will  visit.  I  am  glad  that  the  oppor- 
tunity to  do  so  comes  this  early  in  my  tenure 
as  Secretary  of  State. 

No  other  objective  is  of  more  compelling  im- 
portance to  this  administration  than  the  achieve- 
ment of  a  peace  in  Viet-Nam  under  which  the 
people  of  South  Viet-Nam  will  be  able  to  deter- 
mine their  own  future  free  from  outside  in- 
terference by  anyone.  We  believe  that  the  right 
of  self-determination  for  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam  must  be  respected  unconditionally. 
This  is  the  core  of  the  issue  in  Viet-Nam. 

In  Saigon  it  is  my  intention  to  consult  with 
President  Thieu  and  other  officials,  as  well  as 
with  Ambassador  Bunker,  on  our  joint  plans 
for  achieving  a  peaceful  settlement.  I  will  also 
have  an  opportunity  for  a  firsthand  review  of 
the  situation  in  Viet-Nam.  At  the  same  time,  I 
look  forward  to  meeting  and  talking  with  repre- 
sentatives of  the  other  countries  which  are  help- 
ing to  defend  South  Viet-Nam. 

With  respect  to  the  position  taken  by  the 
other  side  in  Paris  on  May  8,  that  will  require 
careful  study  and  clarification.  It  contains  some 
clearly  unacceptable  proposals,  but  there  are 


elements  in  it  which  may  offer  a  possibility  for 
exploration.  We  will  examine  this  statement 
carefully  in  the  hope  that  it  represents  a  serious 
response  to  the  proposals  put  forward  by  South 
Viet-Nam  and  the  United  States.  I  wOl,  of 
course,  be  consulting  very  closely  with  the  Viet- 
namese leaders  on  this  matter. 

The  consultations  in  Saigon  will  provide  a 
solid  basis  for  my  talks  in  Bangkok  at  the  14th 
SEATO  Council  of  Ministers  meeting  and  at 
the  seven-nation  meeting  of  the  countries  con- 
tributing troops  to  the  defense  of  South  Viet- 
Nam.  At  both  meetings  our  concern  will  be  the 
closest  possible  meshing  of  our  joint  efforts  to 
find  a  just  and  enduring  peace. 

It  is  my  hope  that  all  of  these  constiltations 
win  contribute  to  the  success  of  the  Paris  ne- 
gotiations. With  peace,  the  region  can  move  on 
to  the  urgent  tasks  of  social  and  economic 
development. 

It  is  also  my  intention  to  meet  with  the  minis- 
ters who  come  to  Bangkok  not  only  in  formal 
meetings  but  individually  for  a  frank  exchange 
of  opinion.  Wliile  in  Bangkok  I  will  also  con- 
sult with  Thai  leaders,  including  the  King,  on 
matters  of  mutual  interest. 

As  you  know,  I  will  also  be  visiting  subse- 
quently with  governmental  leaders  in  India, 
Pakistan,  and  Afghanistan,  and  attending 
CENTO  in  Iran. 

The  stop  in  New  Delhi,  India,  will  give  me  an 
opportunity  to  become  acquainted  with  the  lead- 
ers of  the  most  populous  democracy  in  the  world. 
I  look  forward  to  exchanging  with  them,  at  first 
hand,  views  on  major  international  issues. 

A  short  flight  away  in  Lahore,  I  expect  to  talk 
with  Pakistan's  leaders  and  become  acquainted, 
if  only  briefly,  with  that  major  country. 

I  am  also  very  pleased  to  be  stopping  in  Ka- 
bul, where  I  will  be  the  first  Secretaiy  of  State 
ever  to  visit  Afghanistan.  The  visit  will  give 
me  an  occasion  to  express  our  friendsliip  for 
that  country. 

In  Tehran  I  will  join  the  representatives  of 
Iran,  Turkey,  Pakistan,  and  the  United  King- 
dom at  my  first  meeting  of  the  CENTO  Coun- 


MAT   26,    1969 


433 


cil  of  Ministers.  Over  the  years  this  organization 
has  encouraged  a  sense  of  cohesion  and  coopera- 
tion among  the  three  regional  members  and  has 
promoted  common  economic  and  security 
interests. 

I  also  look  forward  in  Tehran  to  meeting  with 
the  Shah  of  Iran,  the  esteemed  leader  of  a  coun- 
try whose  friendship  we  higlily  value. 


THE  SECRETARY'S   ITINERARY 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
May  6  (press  release  105)  that  Secretary  Rogers 
would  leave  Washington  on  May  12  and  would 
arrive  in  Saigon  on  May  14  for  a  4-day  visit. 

On  May  19  he  will  proceed  to  Bangkok,  Thai- 
land, where  he  will  head  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
the  14th  meeting  of  the  SEATO  Council  of 
Ministers  May  20-21  and  will  represent  the 
United  States  at  the  seven-nation  meeting 
May  22-23  of  representatives  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  and  of  the  nations  contributing 
troops  to  its  defense. 

After  leaving  Bangkok  the  Secretary  will  stop 
at  New  Dellii,  India,  May  23-24 ;  Lahore,  Paki- 
stan, May  24^25;  and  Kabul,  Afghanistan, 
May  25. 

At  Tehran,  Iran,  Secretary  Rogers  will  head 
the  U.S.  observer  delegation  to  the  16th  meet- 
ing of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Central 
Treaty  Organization   (CENTO)    May  26-27. 

He  is  scheduled  to  return  to  Washington  on 
May  29. 


16th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  hy 
Arribassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.8.  delegation,  at  the  16th  plenary  session  of 
the  new  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
May  8. 

Press  release  107  dated  Ma;  8 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Last  week  your  side 
accused  the  United  States  Government  of  inten- 
sifying the  war  in  Viet-Nam  rather  than  seeking 
to  end  it.  You  quoted  from  statements  by  Presi- 
dent Nixon  and  Secretary  Rogers  to  support 


your  charges.  You  have  either  mismiderstood 
the  statements  of  President  Nixon  and  Secretary 
Rogers,  or  you  have  consciously  stated  them 
erroneously — as  I  shall  now  try  to  show. 

The  first  objective  of  the  U.S.  Government 
with  respect  to  the  Viet-Nam  conflict  is  a  nego- 
tiated settlement  in  Paris.  The  aim  of  our  policy 
is  peace.  It  is  the  simple  truth  that  we  are  not 
seeking  a  military  victory  in  Viet-Nam. 

In  order  to  bring  about  a  negotiated  peace  we 
have  made  several  concrete  proposals.  We  have 
put  primary  emphasis  at  these  meetings  on  the 
issue  of  a  mutual  withdrawal  of  external  forces 
from  South  Viet-Nam.  As  Secretary  Rogers  said 
on  April  21 :  ^ 

A  mutual  withdrawal  of  external  forces  from  Viet- 
Nam  by  reasonable  stages  would  bring  about  deescala- 
tion  of  fighting.  It  could  then  lead  to  next  steps:  a 
total  elimination  of  outside  combat  forces,  cessation 
of  hostilities,  and  a  return  to  peace.  We  see  no  good 
reason  why  that  process  should  not  begin  soon. 

We  have  made  other  proposals  for  the  settle- 
ment of  important  military  aspects  of  the  Viet- 
Nam  problem. 

Concurrently,  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Viet-Nam  has  stated  that  it  is  prepared, 
without  prior  conditions,  to  enter  into  serious 
discussion  concerning  a  political  settlement  with 
the  National  Liberation  Front.  We  have  said 
that  the  discussion  of  military  and  political  mat- 
ters coidd  take  place  at  the  same  time. 

We  shall  continue  our  efforts  here  in  Paris  to 
bring  about  a  negotiated  settlement.  We  shall 
continue  to  present  the  most  constructive  sug- 
gestions possible.  We  are  prepared  at  all  times 
to  hear  what  your  side  has  to  offer.  And  as  Sec- 
retary Rogers  said :  ".  .  .  we  hope  that  the  as- 
sumption behind  our  efforts  in  Paris — that  the 
other  side  is  now  prepared  to  negotiate  seriously 
for  an  end  to  the  war — is  the  right  assumption." 

But  as  has  often  been  pointed  out  at  these 
meetings,  one  cannot  negotiate  by  oneself  alone. 
And  obviously  one  side  cannot  bring  the  fighting 
to  an  end  and  restore  peace  by  itself  alone.  To 
date  your  side  has  merely  proposed  action  by 
our  side  alone.  As  we  have  said,  demands  for 
unilateral  action  are  not  serious  proposals  for 
negotiation — nor,  I  suspect,  are  they  intended  to 
be.  There  must  be  a  willingness  to  move  toward 
a  peace  which  is  truly  mutual. 

But  we  must  be  ready  for  the  unwelcome  con- 


^  For  Secretary  Rogers'  address  at  New  York,  N.T., 
see  Btn-LETIN  of  May  12,  1969,  p.  397. 


434 


DEPAETMENT   OF   STATE  BTJIiLETTN 


tingency  that  your  side  does  not  yet  want  to  ne- 
gotiate a  peaceful  settlement.  As  Secretary 
Rogers  said:  "We  are  not  prepared  to  assume 
that  the  only  alternative  to  early  progress  in  the 
peace  talks  is  an  indefinite  extension  of  our 
present  role." 

President  Nixon  spoke  in  his  April  18  press 
conference  ^  about  the  possibility  of  unilateral 
reduction  of  United  States  forces  in  Viet-Nam. 
He  said  there  were  certain  factors  which  the 
U.S.  would  take  into  consideration  regarding 
reduction  of  American  forces :  "the  training  of 
the  South  Vietnamese,  their  ability  to  handle 
their  own  defense ;  the  level  of  fighting  in  South 
Viet-Nam,  whether  or  not  the  offensive  action 
of  the  enemy  recedes ;  and  progress  in  the  Paris 
peace  taUcs." 

You  say  you  want  U.S.  forces  out  of  Viet- 
Nam.  You  accuse  us  of  dominating  the  South 
Vietnamese.  Yet,  paradoxically,  you  also  object 
to  the  very  factors  listed  by  President  Nixon  as 
facilitating  our  withdrawal. 

Our  Government  has  publicly  stated  that 
progress  toward  peace  can  be  speeded  signifi- 
cantly if  you  will  join  with  us  in  a  mutual  troop 
withdrawal  in  the  near  future.  Whether  peace 
comes  more  gradually  or  more  rapidly  to  Viet- 
Nam  is  thus  a  decision  for  Hanoi.  We,  of  course, 
hope  that  you  will  join  us  in  rapidly  bringing 
peace  to  Viet-Nam. 

Your  side  still  seems  to  pursue  a  military  vic- 
tory. Your  side  tells  its  troops  that  their  efforts 
will  influence  the  course  of  these  negotiations. 
Yet  their  recent  offensive,  although  futile  inso- 
far as  these  negotiations  are  concerned,  brought 
further  suffering  and  destruction  to  the  people 
of  Viet-Nam,  including  women  and  children.  It 
resulted  in  heavy  losses  for  your  side.  Yet  it 
brought  peace  no  nearer. 

Last  week  you  gave  some  so-called  statistics 
concerning  the  first  35  days  of  the  recent  offen- 
sive, including  a  claim  that  104,000  men,  52,000 
of  them  Americans,  had  been  killed  or  wounded. 
You  said  that  1,600  aircraft  had  been  destroyed. 
These  statistics,  as  well  as  the  others  you  men- 
tioned, are  without  exception  inaccurate.  The 
truth  about  our  losses  is  a  matter  of  public  rec- 
ord. It  is  also  published  regularly. 

I  ask  you  to  pay  closer  attention  to  the  sta- 
tistics which  our  Government  issues  concerning 
its  losses  in  Viet-Nam.  We  believe  they  are 
correct.  It  would  be  deplorable  indeed  if  the 


'  For  excerpts,  see  Bulletin  of  May  5, 1969,  p.  377. 


Government  in  North  Viet-Nam  were  led  by 
self-serving,  exaggerated  claims  of  local  com- 
manders to  such  false  hopes  of  military  victory 
as  those  wliich  Prime  Minister  Pham  Van  Dong 
recently  expressed. 

The  responsibility  of  any  intensification  of 
the  fighting  which  has  occurred,  or  which  may 
occur  in  the  future,  must  rest  with  the  North 
Vietnamese  and  the  Viet  Cong.  If  they  persist  in 
attacking  the  South  Vietnamese  people,  their 
armed  forces,  and  the  armed  forces  of  their  free- 
world  allies,  then  those  attacks  will  be  repulsed. 

Captured  documents  and  defectors  from  your 
side  reveal  that  more  attacks  are  being  planned 
which  will  cause  more  suffering  and  death  to 
both  South  Vietnamese  and  North  Vietnamese, 
A  substantial  body  of  evidence  has  already  ac- 
cumulated concerning  these  plans.  One  docu- 
ment captured  recently,  for  example,  called  for 
"greater  victories  at  a  faster  tempo"  and  gave 
as  a  mission  for  the  summer  of  1969  an  offensive 
that  should  be — and  again  I  quote — "higher, 
stronger,  and  more  painful  than  the  spring  of- 
fensive. It  must  succeed  in  destroying,  wearing 
down,  and  distintegrating  more  U.S.  potential, 
more  main  force  and  puppet  personnel,  and  es- 
pecially more  administrative  personnel  at  the 
village  and  hamlet  level."  I  would  also  draw 
your  attention  to  that  last  phrase.  It  means  that 
more  hamlet  and  village  officials — civilians  and 
noncombatants — who  are  trying  to  do  their 
duty  for  the  people  who  have  chosen  them  will 
be  targets  of  terror  and  murder. 

That  is  the  truth  about  the  war  in  Viet- 
Nam  today :  Your  side,  not  ours,  seeks  to  impose 
its  will  by  military  means. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  we  repeat  that  we  are 
prepared  to  deal  with  all  questions  concerned 
with  a  peaceful  settlement.  We  still  await  a  posi- 
tive response  to  our  proposals.  Meanwhile,  we 
wiU  continue  to  contend  the  following : 

— We  are  not  seeking  military  victory. 

— We  believe  that  peace  should  give  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  the  opportunity  to  deter- 
mine their  own  future  without  external 
interference. 

— We  are  seeking  a  mutual  withdrawal  of  ex- 
ternal forces  from  South  Viet-Nam  which  could 
begin  simultaneously  with  U.S.  and  North 
Vietnamese  withdrawals.  This  would  be  tan- 
gible and  visible  evidence  of  the  professed  desire 
of  both  sides  to  negotiate  a  peace  settlement. 


MAT    26,    1969 


4S5 


— We  are  seeking  restoration  of  the  demili- 
tarized zone. 

— We  propose  the  early  release  of  prisoners  of 
war. 

— We  will  support  the  reunification  of  Viet- 
Nam  in  the  future  by  the  free  decision  of  the 
people  of  the  North  and  the  people  of  the  South. 

— We  support  the  principle  of  noninterfer- 
ence between  the  two  Viet-Nams,  pending 
reunification. 

— We  support  full  compliance  with  the  Laos 


accords  of  1962  and  respect  for  the  territorial 
integrity  and  neutrality  of  Cambodia. 

— We  envisage  a  cessation  of  hostilities  as  an 
essential  element  in  an  ultimate  settlement. 

— And,  finally,  we  believe  that  adequate  in- 
ternational arrangements  to  verify  and  super- 
vise the  carrying  out  of  military  agreements  and 
insure  respect  for  and  continued  adherence  to 
the  military  and  political  elements  of  a  settle- 
ment are  vital  so  that  the  peace  that  will  be 
achieved  may  be  enduring. 


Prime  Minister  Gorton  of  Australia  Visits  Washington 


Prime  Minister  John  G.  Gorton  of  Australia 
made  an  official  visit  to  Washington  May  5-8. 
Following  is  an  exchange  of  toasts  between 
President  Nixon  and  the  Prime  Minister  at  a 
dinner  at  the  White  House  on  May  6,  a  state- 
ment by  the  President  at  the  close  of  their  talks 
on  May  7,  and  am,  exchange  of  remarks  in  the 
White  House  Rose  Garden  on  May  7  upon  the 
Prime  Minister's  departure. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS 
President  Nixon 

White  House  press  release  dated  May  6 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  Mrs.  Gorton,  and  our 
friends:  Tonight  is  a  very  special  evening  for 
all  of  us  in  this  room  because,  as  I  noted  when 
you  were  passing  tlu'ough  the  receiving  line,  at 
least  two-thirds  of  the  guests  had  been  to  Aus- 
tralia or  personally  knew  the  Prime  Minister 
and  Mrs.  Gorton. 

As  I  was  thinking  of  something  that  would 
be  appropriate  to  say,  I  was  reminded  of  what 
I  think  was  one  of  the  most  eloquent  greetings 
that  a  visitor  can  receive  when  he  travels  around 
the  world,  as  has  the  Prime  Minister,  and  as  I 
have  on  occasion,  and  as  will  the  Secretaiy  of 
State  be  traveling  in  just  a  few  days.  In  tliis 
country,  at  least  in  that  part  of  the  Midwest 
from  which  my  mother  and  father  came,  the 
common  expression  is  "Make  yourself  at  home." 


In  Latin  America  the  expression  is  quite  dif- 
ferent. It  means  tlie  same  thing.  They  say  Estd 
usted  en  su  casa,  which  means  "You  are  in  your 
own  home." 

I  was  reminded  of  the  fact,  tonight,  as  we 
received  the  Prime  Minister  and  Mrs.  Gorton 
and  the  members  of  their  party,  that  of  all  the 
countries  of  the  world  that  my  wife  and  I  have 
visited — and  there  are  over  70 — there  is  no  coun- 
try in  the  world  when  we  thought  we  were  in 
our  own  home  more  than  Australia. 

I  suppose  part  of  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
we  are  from  the  West,  from  California,  and  we 
get  the  feeling  when  we  are  in  Melbourne  and 
in  Sydney  that  north  and  south  or  south  and 
north  reverse,  San  Francisco  versus  Los  An- 
geles, and  also  because  as  you  see  that  great 
country,  with  all  of  its  magnificent  cities  and  yet 
the  tremendous  possibilities  for  development  for 
the  future,  you  realize  that  this  is  one  of  the 
great  new  frontiers — some  would  say  last  fron- 
tiers, geographically,  at  least.  But  there  is  an- 
other reason  that  has  more  to  do  than  geography 
or  size  of  cities  or  the  like.  It  has  to  do  with 
people. 

I  have  felt  from  the  time  we  were  first  there 
in  1953  and  through  the  years  since  then  when 
we  have  been  there — and  I  know  many  of  you 
tonight  have  this  same  feeling — that  we  have  a 
special  kinship  with  our  friends  from  Australia. 
We  see  the  world  as  they  see  it.  They  are  among 
those  who  understand,  as  I  think  most  of  us  in 
this  room  understand,  how  much  rides  on  what 


436 


DEPAETMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


happens  in  the  Pacific.  They  are  a  Pacific  power, 
as  we  are ;  and  at  a  time  when  most  of  the  world, 
whatever  they  may  think  privately,  will  not 
speak  up  publicly  with  regard  to  what  the 
United  States  is  doing  in  the  Pacific,  and  as 
indicated  in  the  very  difficult  war  in  Viet-Nam, 
our  friends  in  Australia  know  why  we  are  there 
and  why  they  are  there,  and  we  know  that  they 
are  there  with  us. 

They  loiow  why;  and  beyond  that,  they  are 
willing  to  say  why.  At  a  time  when  we  sometimes 
wonder  if  our  policies  are  understood  or  appre- 
ciated, at  such  times  we  are  most  grateful  to  have 
such  good  friends,  friends  who  have  been  friends 
of  ours  over  the  years  and  who  remember  those 
days  we  read  about  in  World  War  I.  Those  of 
us  who  were  in  World  War  II — the  Secretary 
and  myself — in  the  Pacific,  we  served  with  Aus- 
tralians and  we  feel  that  they  are  so  much  like 
us  or  we  are  like  they  are. 

Now  tonight,  we  have  a  man  who  represents 
this  country,  who  has  all  of  the  vital  energy  that 
we  think  of  when  we  think  of  Australia,  who  can 
see  the  tremendous  possibilities  of  development 
there,  wlio  knows  the  great  role  that  his  counti-y 
can  play,  that  ours  must  play,  and  who  has  that 
courage  that  we  all  admire  so  much — the  cour- 
age to  speak  up  when  sometimes  it  might  be  per- 
haps more  political  to  say  nothing,  or  at  least  to 
say  something  else. 

So  tonight,  as  I  ask  you  to  rise,  I  am  going  to 
do  so  not  simply  in  tlie  usual  protocol  way — we 
could  toast  his  country,  we  could  toast  his  of- 
fice— but  I  suggest  we  raise  our  glasses  to  a  man 
and  that  great  new  country ;  a  new  country  with 
an  old  tradition  but  the  covmtry  of  the  future, 
and  a  man  who  stands  for  aU  the  hopes  and 
aspirations  that  it  represents. 

To  the  Prime  Minister. 

Prime  Minister  Gorton 

White  House  press  release  dated  May  6 

Mr.  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen :  This  is 
a  speech,  sir,  to  which  it  is  very  difficult  easily 
to  reply.  I  think  it  is  true  that  there  are  between 
the  {people  of  the  United  States  and  the  people 
of  my  own  country  some  particular  bonds  which 
are  not  of  recent  birth  but  wliich  have  matured 
over  the  years. 

True  it  is,  that  in  our  own  country  we  reached 
self-government  by  means  of  evolution  and  you 
by  revolution.  But  nevertheless,  in  some  degree 
we  think  of  you  as  being  responsible  for  it.  I 


know  a  lot  of  other  countries  do  that,  too. 
[Laughter.]  Because  it  was  only  after  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence  and  a  certain  amount 
of  unpleasantness  which  culminated  at  York- 
town  following  that,  that  Great  Britain  looked 
to  another  outlet,  if  I  may  put  it  that  way.  But 
it  gave  us  the  first  impetus  to  the  growth  of 
Australia,  and  so  perhaps  in  that  indirect  way, 
sir,  you  have  helped  us  in  our  beginnings. 

But  that  was  just  at  the  beginning.  Since  then 
we  have  stood  together  in  many  struggles :  the 
First  World  War,  fought  far  away  from  our 
shores  and  yours  but  fought  for  the  same  rea- 
sons by  our  soldiers  and  yours;  the  Second 
World  War ;  the  Korean  war,  where  Australians 
were  within  the  first  week  in  action  with  the 
United  States  forces  and  the  first  country  so 
to  be  in  action ;  and  now  the  Viet-Nam  war. 

I  don't  know  why  it  is — or  perhaps  I  do — but 
I  am  not  sure  why  it  is  that  when  coimtries  talk, 
as  you  and  I  are  talking,  of  the  bonds  which 
unite  and  have  united  them,  so  often  one  turns 
to  wars  and  to  struggles  in  which  one  has  been 
together.  Because,  after  all,  a  successful  war  does 
not  gain  anything  new.  What  it  does  do,  if  it  is 
successful,  is  prevent  the  imposition  of  some- 
thing bad  and  obtain  an  opportunity  for  new 
building  on  a  proper  basis  and  a  proper  founda- 
tion of  freedom  and  participation  and  peace. 

Perhaps  it  is  because  men  have  for  so  long 
had  to  struggle  and  probably  always  will  have 
to  struggle  against  the  idea  of  absolute  and 
arbitrary  power;  against  the  idea  of  the  secret 
police  and  the  hangman ;  against  the  philosophy 
that  in  order  to  be  free  and  live  in  peace  one 
must  subject  one's  self  to  the  rule — without 
law — of  dictatorship.  Perhaps  it  is  because  the 
fainthearted  all  through  the  years  have  been 
prepared  to  say  "If  you  wish  to  eat,  you  must 
sell  your  inmiortal  soul.  If  you  wish  peace,  you 
must  submit  to  dictatorship."  Perhaps  it  is 
because  there  is  in  the  human  spirit  a  refusal 
to  accept  this  that  one  talks  of  nations  standing 
together  in  war,  not  because  it  is  in  war  but  be- 
cause of  the  objectives  sought  by  such  struggles. 
You,  sir,  are  bearing  today  a  burden  greater, 
I  think,  than  that  borne  by  any  other  man  in  the 
world  I  know.  And  ia  a  way  here  history  is  re- 
peating itself,  because  as  I  look  up  there  and 
see  a  former  Eepublican  [indicating  a  portrait 
of  Abraham  Lincoln] — I  hope  no  Democrats 
would  be  up  there — I  see  a  former  Republican 
looking  down  upon  us,  my  mind  goes  back  to 


MAT    26,    1969 


437 


those  times  and  that  burden  and  the  turmoil  in 
this  coimtry  in  that  period. 

Too  often  do  we  now  look  back  at  Lincoln 
and  tend  to  think  the  speeches  he  made  were  well 
received  and  tend  to  think  the  ideals  he  pro- 
fessed were  accepted  by  all  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  But  not  enough  do  we  look  back 
and  think  of  the  burden  for  5  long  years  he  bore 
during  a  period  when  the  United  States  lost 
more  dead  than  it  liad  in  any  of  the  many  wars 
since.  And  he  bore  the  burden. 

During  a  period  when  Copperheads  were  in- 
citing riots  in  order  to  bring  peace ;  during  the 
period  when  the  Horace  Greeleys  and  othei-s  of 
the  press  were  attacking  not  only  his  ideas  but 
him  personally;  during  the  period  when  regi- 
ments from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  to  be 
brought  back  to  quell  draft  riots  in  New  York — 
that  was  a  burden.  But  it  was  one  carried  like  a 
man. 

There  would  be  no  United  States  today.  There 
would  be — who  knows  ?  There  would  have  been, 
at  any  rate,  a  .slave  autocracy  of  the  South  and 
what  that,  in  conjunction  with  South  America, 
could  then  have  led  to  in  the  world,  no  one  can 
tell.  But  there  would  have  been  no  United 
States. 

So  the  bearing  of  these  burdens  and  the  suc- 
cessful consummation  of  these  struggles  is  some- 
thing which  is  not  for  that  time  alone  or  for  this 
time  alone  but  which,  having  Ijeen  successful  in 
that  time,  led  to  the  United  States'  being  able 
to  be  what  it  is  today,  which,  if  it  is  successful 
in  this  time,  will  lead  to  there  being  able  to  be 
througliout  the  world  an  opportunity  for  us — 
when  we  next  speak,  when  we  next  me«t  or  at 
least  communicate  or  whatever  it  may  be — to 
talk  not  of  war  but  of  the  other  progress  which 
is  the  other  part  of  which  you  spoke,  sir,  of 
which  the  United  States  and  ourselves,  you  help- 
ing us  economically,  building  us,  helping  us  to 
build  ourselves — the  other  part  may  be  the  real 
outcome  of  success  in  tliis  situation.  I  think  it 
will  be. 

I  think  that  we  will  stand  together  in  the  fu- 
ture as  we  have  in  the  past,  we  the  small,  the  ap- 
parently small,  but  fired  by  the  same  motives, 
resolute  in  the  same  way. 

I  hope  that  this  will  be  true.  It  has  been  true, 
and  I  believe  it  will  be  true.  And  for  our  part, 
speaking  for  Australians,  wherever  the  United 
States  is  resisting  aggression,  wherever  the 
United  States  or  the  United  Kingdom  or  any 


other  country  is  seeking  to  insure  that  there  will 
be  a  chance  for  the  free  expression  of  the  spirit 
of  man — from  himself  and  not  from  dictator- 
ship from  above — wlierever  there  is  a  joint 
attempt  to  improve  not  only  the  material  but 
the  spiritual  standards  of  life  of  the  peoples  of 
the  world,  then,  sir,  we  will  go  "Waltzing  Ma- 
tilda With  You." 


STATEMENT  BY   PRESIDENT  NIXON 

white  House  press  release  dated  May  7 

It  has  been  a  great  pleasure  to  welcome  Prime 
Minister  and  Mrs.  Gorton  to  Washington.  Mrs. 
Gorton  is,  of  course,  returning  to  the  land  of 
her  birth ;  so  we  always  have  a  special  greeting 
for  her.  Prime  Minister  Gorton  is  no  stranger 
to  our  shores  eitlier,  and  he  has  come  as  the 
Head  of  Government  of  one  of  our  closest 
friends  and  allies  in  the  world.  We  will  always 
be  delighted  to  see  them  both. 

This  visit  has  been  most  useful  for  me  and, 
I  think,  for  otlier  ofBcers  of  this  Government. 
It  has  given  us  a  chance  to  get  acquainted  with 
an  outstanding  statesman  with  whom  we  expect 
to  be  working  very  closely  in  the  future. 

Australia  is  a  member  of  ANZUS  and 
SEATO,  two  alliances  which  are  fundamental 
to  our  strategy  and  position  in  Southeast  Asia. 
As  between  us,  ANZUS,  with  its  provisions  for 
mutual  aid  in  developing  our  individual  and  col- 
lective capacity  to  resist  armed  attack  and  its 
declaration  that  "no  potential  aggressor  should 
be  under  the  illusion  that  any  of  them  (Austra- 
lia, New  Zealand,  or  the  United  States)  stand 
alone  in  the  Pacific  area,"  is  of  great  importance 
to  both  our  countries.  Australian  troops  are 
figliting  beside  ours  and  those  of  other  free- 
world  nations  to  help  South  Viet-Nam  preserve 
its  independence.  Australian  forces  are  stationed 
in  Malaysia  and  Singapore  as  part  of  the  Com- 
monwealth Strategic  Reserve,  and  Prime  Minis- 
ter Gorton  has  recently  announced  that  these 
forces  will  remain  after  the  British  forces  with- 
draw in  1971,  to  continue  making  their  impor- 
tant contribution  to  the  security  of  that  area. 
This  is  a  historic  and  far-seeing  decision,  and 
needless  to  say,  it  has  our  full  understanding 
and  the  decision  has  our  support. 

Australia  is  also  making  an  outstanding  con- 
tribution to  peacefid  cooperation  and  economic 
development  in  its  part  of  the  world.  It  partici- 


438 


DEPAKT3HENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


pates  wholeheartedly  in  the  Colombo  Plan,  the 
Asian  Development  Bank,  and  many  other  re- 
gional activities.  In  percentage  of  national  in- 
come devoted  to  foreign  aid,  Australia  ranks 
second  in  the  world.  This  is  a  record  of  which 
any  nation  can  be  proud.  All  things  considered, 
I  think  Australia  and  the  United  States  can  both 
be  proud  of  the  contribution  we  are  making,  as 
partners,  to  the  security  and  progress  of  the 
Pacific  region  to  which  we  both  belong.  That 
partnership  and  that  contribution  will  continue. 

These  two  days  have  provided  opportunities 
for  us  to  discuss  a  whole  range  of  subjects,  in- 
cluding of  course  Viet-Nam  and  regional  secu- 
rity generally,  but  including  also  a  number  of 
topics  outside  the  security  field.  Australia  is 
geographically  closer  to  some  of  these  problems 
than  we  are,  and  Prime  Minister  Gorton  has 
been  in  office  a  year  longer  than  I  have;  so  I 
have  very  much  appreciated  the  opportunity  to 
exchange  views  with  him.  I  have  obtained  a 
number  of  new  insights,  but  fundamentally,  I 
find  the  perspective  from  "down  under"  is  very 
much  the  same  as  it  is  from  Washington. 

This  visit  has  been  both  profitable  and  enjoy- 
able for  us.  I  hope  that  you  can  say  the  same, 
Mr.  Prime  Minister,  and  that  you  and  your 
charming  wife  will  come  and  see  us  again. 


EXCHANGE   OF   REMARKS 

White  Honse  press  release  dated  May  7 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  as  you  leave  the  White 
House — and  you  are  not  leaving  the  coimtry 
yet,  because  we  hope  you  will  stay  here  for  a 
few  more  days — I  want  you  to  know  how  grate- 
ful I  am  for  your  returning  to  the  United  States 
after  having  been  here  at  the  time  of  President 
Eisenhower's  funeral  and  for  giving  us  the  op- 
portunity to  have  a  very  full  discussion  of  the 
major  issues  that  are  not  really  between  us  so 


much  as  they  involve  our  common  interests  for 
peace  and  security  in  the  Pacific  area. 

This  talk  has  been  most  helpful,  as  far  as  I 
am  concerned  and  as  far  as  the  Secretary  of 
State  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  are  con- 
cerned. We  have  opened  a  line  of  communication 
which  will  be  used  very  extensively  in  the 
months  and  years  ahead  in  pursuing  our  mutual 
purposes  and  goals  in  the  world. 

I  want  to  say,  finally,  that  as  one  who  has 
been  to  your  country  on  two  occasions,  I  hope  to 
visit  there  again.  And,  like  all  Americans,  I  have 
a  very  deep  personal  feeling  of  respect  for  your 
country,  for  your  people,  and  for  the  leadership 
that  you  have  provided  for  your  people. 

We  are  very  proud  to  have  been  your  allies 
and  friends  in  great  struggles  in  the  past  and 
to  be  your  allies  and  friends  as  we  deal  with  the 
problems  of  the  future. 

Prime  Minister  Gorton 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  President. 

I  feel  that  the  written  statement  which  you 
have  made,  and  which  was  agreed  to  between 
us,  gives  a  clear  indication  of  those  matters  of 
common  concern  which  we  were  able  to  discuss 
in  such  depth. 

I  think  that  we  have  reached  an  arrangement 
for  close  and  constant  consultation  between  our 
two  selves  on  matters  which  may  arise  in  the 
future  and  that  this  will  be  of  great  advantage 
to  both  our  countries. 

I  can  only  express  gratitude  to  you  for  the 
hospitality  that  you  have  extended,  for  the  com- 
plete openness  of  your  talks  with  me,  and  a  be- 
lief that  not  only  the  talks  but  the  underlining 
of  the  importance  of  the  ANZUS  Treaty  to  both 
our  countries  which  has  evolved  from  the  talks 
are  of  considerable  significance  to  Australia  and 
to  Australia's  future,  and  I  believe  that  that, 
in  turn,  is  of  some  significance  to  the  United 
States  and  to  the  nations  of  the  free  world  as  a 
whole. 


MAY    26,    1969 


439 


Latin  America:  What  Are  Your  Priorities? 


ty  Charles  A,  Meyer 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- American  Affairs  ' 


I  have  no  major  policies  to  announce  today. 
The  forum  is  right,  but  the  time  is  too  early. 
President  Nixon  has  made  it  clear  that  his  ad- 
ministration plans  to  listen  before  proi^osing. 
As  a  public  servant,  I  am  obviously  committed 
to  this.  As  a  person,  I  also  happen  to  be  on  the 
same  pliilosophical  wavelength.  But  I  can  carry 
the  President's  intention  a  step  further  by  giv- 
ing some  details  on  what  we  are  listening  for. 
This  is  my  topic  today. 

When  we  get  realistic  proposals  on  objectives 
that  appear  feasible,  I  can  promise  you  that  we 
shall  listen  to  the  suggestions  very  carefully, 
attempt  to  reconcile  them  with  our  own  possi- 
bilities, and  build  our  policies  on  that  basis. 
Having  set  our  policies,  we  shall  try  veiy  hard 
indeed  to  stick  by  them.  I  cannot  promise,  how- 
ever, that  we  shall  be  able  to  do  much  with  pro- 
posals that  conflict  with  the  needs  of  balanced 
development  or  that  favor  one  group  at  the 
expense  of  another. 

Let  me  state  the  i^remises  of  my  request  for 
Latm  American  priorities. 

The  first  premise  is  that  all  of  us  are  agreed 
on  basic  long-range  goals  for  Latin  America. 
We  want  development,  we  want  sound  develop- 
ment, we  want  balanced  development,  and  all 
of  us  want  these  things  as  quickly  as  possible. 
We  have  formed  an  alliance  committed  to  these 
goals.  History  since  the  last  World  War  shows 
that  they  are  as  much  in  the  national  interests 
of  the  United  States  as  of  our  neighbors. 

The  second  premise  is  that  the  United  States 
attaches  the  highest  importance  to  the  attain- 
ment of  this  goal.  I  hope  that  all  present  will 

'  Address  made  before  the  Coxmeil  for  Latin  America 
at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  May  6  (press  release  101,  pre- 
pared text). 


accept  President  Nixon's  assurances,  and  Sec- 
retary Rogers'  and  my  own,  on  that  score. 

The  third  is  that  even  with  agreement  on 
where  we  want  to  get  and  on  our  commitment  to 
getting  there,  there  are  some  veiy  hard  de- 
cisions on  how  we  go  about  getting  there.  The 
Americas — and  I  do  not  exclude  North  Amer- 
ica— have  infinite  problems.  To  these  problems 
we  must  devote  finite  resources.  Economists  like 
to  insist  that  resources  are  scarce  by  definition ; 
and  our  hemispheric  resources  are  so  scarce  as 
to  give  this  truth  a  sharp  human  meaning. 

My  final  premise  is  that  most  of  the  resources 
for  Latin  America's  ultimate  development 
should  be  generated  within  Latin  America  it- 
self. This  seems  to  be  inevitable  economically; 
it  is  probably  desirable  politically ;  and  it  tends 
to  find  confirmation  in  the  history  of  the  devel- 
oped countries.  The  United  States  does  not  wish 
to  be  involved  in  any  case  where  involvement  is 
not  wanted,  nor  do  we  want  to  be  involved  in 
any  one  country  so  deeply  that  the  sum  of  our 
presence  becomes  uncomfortable.  But  we  also 
recognize  that  an  important  element  of  U.S.  co- 
operation may  be  necessary,  depending  on  each 
Latin  American  nation's  definition  of  what  it 
wants  to  do  and  how  fast  it  wants  to  move. 
"Wlien  cooperation  is  wanted,  we  in  the  United 
States  should  stand  ready  to  furnish  it  in  large 
amounts. 

There  are  five  basic  ways  to  mobilize  the  re- 
sources needed  for  hemispheric  development, 
and  foreign  cooperation  is  of  critical  importance 
to  at  least  tliree  of  these.  With  your  permission, 
I  shall  mention  all  five  and  give  an  idea  of 
where,  imder  each,  we  feel  an  urgent  need  for 
knowledge  of  Latin  American  priorities.  "Pri- 
orities," I  stress,  is  the  name  of  the  game.  There 


440 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BTJIXBTIN 


is  always  room  for  brilliant  new  proposals,  but 
there  is  a  more  serious  need  for  realistic  de- 
cisions between  options  that  are  clear. 

Domestic  Private  and  Public  Sectors 

The  first  two  sources  of  development  capital 
are  the  domestic  private  sector  and  the  domestic 
public  sector.  I  suppose  that  most  in  this  room 
would  recommend  policies  aimed  at  strengthen- 
ing private  businessmen  at  the  expense  of  gov- 
ernment enterprises,  which  typically  seem  less 
efficient  and  less  capable  of  rational  economic 
decisions.  (Again,  I  do  not  exclude  the  United 
States  from  the  generality.)  But  in  this  de- 
cision, the  United  States  probably  cannot  help 
very  much — and  is  not  likely  to  be  asked.  There 
are  nevertheless  opportunities  for  us  to  make  a 
significant  input  in  the  domestic  private  or  pub- 
lic sectors,  usually  as  a  consultant,  broadly 
defined. 

Our  public  programs,  for  example,  have 
sometimes  been  extremely  useful  in  assisting 
Latin  American  governments  to  create  modern 
financial  institutions  and  improve  tax  systems. 
Now,  as  everyone  here  knows,  tax  reform  can 
turn  out  to  be  real  social  reform  in  the  broadest 
sense.  That  is  saying  a  great  deal,  because  social 
reform,  like  the  weather,  is  usually  the  kind  of 
thing  that  everyone  talks  about  and  no  one 
does  anything  about.  Here  is  a  chance  to  "do 
something."  It  seems  to  me  obvious  that  we 
should  be  prepared  to  continue  our  contribution 
when  requested. 

On  the  private  side,  a  counterpart  might 
be  the  consulting  service  provided  to  Latin 
American  businessmen  who  want  whatever  ben- 
efits U.S.  skills  can  provide — without  U.S.  man- 
agement. Again,  this  service  strikes  me  as  ex- 
tremely useful,  but  I  do  not  propose  to  lose 
much  time  preaching  to  the  converted. 

Inputs  From  Trade  and  Foreign  Assistance 

The  third  origin  of  development  resources — 
and  the  first  with  a  massive  foreign  input — is 
trade.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  but  that 
resources  derived  from  trade  ought  to  be  pro- 
viding more  help  to  Latin  America.  In  addi- 
tion, unfortunately,  there  is  little  doubt  in  my 
mind  but  that  this  is  the  least  tractable  of  our 
problems.  And  if  we  could  solve  the  entire  prob- 
lem, we  would  still  not  be  solving  as  many 
troubles  as  might  be  deduced  from  listening  to 
some  of  the  proponents  of  "trade,  not  aid."  I 


fear  that  to  pursue  trade  as  a  total  substitute  for 
aid  is  to  pursue  a  chimera. 

One  reason  why  the  problem  is  difficult  is 
that  trade  represents  relations  between  peoples, 
not  governments.  A  famiowner  in  the  United 
States,  for  example,  may  well  have  gi-eater 
financial  problems  than  the  producer  of  a  com- 
petitive product  in  Latin  America.  The  U.S. 
farmer  also  has  a  Representative  in  the  U.S. 
Congress,  and  that  Representative  is  very  likely 
to  understand  his  obligations  to  constituents  in 
a  democratic  system.  This  is  not  to  excuse  the 
U.S.  Government  from  exercising  leadership 
in  an  attempt  to  give  Latin  American  exporters 
a  better  break.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  that 
the  break  ought  to  be  given  and  that  in  the  long 
run  the  better  break  would  also  make  sense  for 
the  United  States.  I  do  say  that  the  rich-cousin- 
poor-cousin  analogy,  so  often  taken  for 
granted  by  the  press,  is  not  very  helpful.  I  also 
suggest  that  real  improvements  in  tlae  terms  of 
trade  will  come  as  the  result  of  long,  hard  work 
and  not  as  grand  breakthroughs. 

One  reason  why  "trade,  not  aid"  sounds  at- 
tractive is  that  trade  is  thought  to  be  less  awk- 
ward politically  for  both  developed  and  devel- 
oping countries.  I  can  sympathize  with  that. 
Trading  profits,  earned  in  open  competition,  are 
bound  to  be  more  palatable  than  anything 
which  implies  a  giver-receiver  relationship.  But 
this  advantage  of  trade  is  greatest  when  gov- 
ernments are  least  involved  in  it.  When  govern- 
ments take  steps  to  change  trade  patterns,  then 
one  must  expect  many  of  the  same  difficulties 
that  characterize  programs  of  direct  assistance. 
International  commodity  agreements,  for  exam- 
ple, have  not  been  entirely  without  political 
problems  for  all  sides.  The  issues  involved  in 
concessional  trade  preferences  sometimes  be- 
come identical  with  the  issues  of  bilateral  aid.  I 
could  obviously  furnish  specific  examples  in 
both  cases,  and  so  could  anyone  who  has  been 
reading  the  newspapers  carefully. 

Another  consideration  is  that  special  trade 
preferences,  if  they  are  to  have  the  intended 
long-term  effects,  need  to  be  matched  by  the 
integration  of  Latin  American  economies  and 
the  enlarging  of  internal  markets.  This  is  not 
necessarily  a  disadvantage.  Decisions  to  enlarge 
Latin  American  markets  are  desirable  in  any 
case.  But  they  are  not  always  easy. 

My  point  here  is  not  to  downplay  the  value  of 
international  commodity  agreements  or  the 
desirability  of  certain  temporary  trade  pref- 
erences. Quite  the  contrary :  I  believe  the  gov- 


MAT    26,    1069 

349-897 69 


441 


eriunents  of  the  hemisphere  should  pursue  these 
topics  vigorously.  Several  important  steps  have 
already  been  taken.  A  few  days  ago,  represent- 
atives of  this  council's  parent  organization — 
CICYP  [Inter- American  Council  for  Com- 
merce and  Production] — gave  me  some  very 
important  recommendations  on  the  subject  of 
preferences.  I  am  very  grateful  for  this  co- 
operation, and  I  firmly  intend  to  repay  it.  I 
simply  want  to  make  clear  that  no  amount  of 
progress  on  hemispheric  trade  is  likely  to  solve 
all  of  our  problems  miraculously. 

This  being  the  case,  I  think  it  very  unlikely 
that  foreign  assistance  will  go  out  of  style — or 
that  many  developing  countries  will  want  to 
do  without  this  fourth  major  input  of  develop- 
ment. I  do  not  need  to  stress  that  aid  is  equally 
incapable  of  solving  all  outstanding  problems; 
this  truism  has  been  rather  amply  aired  in  other 
forums.  I  do  want  to  observe  that  assistance  to 
Latin  America  under  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
has  helped  to  account  for  some  real  success 
stories  in  economic  growth.  I  would  also  sug- 
gest that  these  assistance  programs  have  had  an 
impact  on  social  progress,  which  is  both  the 
most  elusive  component  of  development  and 
its  whole  point. 

Bilateral  assistance,  in  particular,  is  well 
adapted  to  those  social  programs  that  promise 
no  measurable  short-term  financial  return  and 
no  quick  boost  in  GNP  figures.  Perhaps  the 
multilateral  lending  agencies  will  be  able  to  in- 
crease their  own  skills  in  these  areas.  To  the 
extent  that  they  can  do  so — and  can  find 
funding  to  match  their  skills — there  would  be 
much  to  recommend  diverting  more  aid  to 
multilateral  channels.  But  the  limitations  on 
skills  and  funding  are  important  restraints  on 
the  trend. 

Private  Foreign  Investment 

The  fifth  and  last  source  of  development  capi- 
tal, of  course,  is  private  foreign  investment. 
There  is  no  more  important  component  of  mod- 
ernization. But  again,  each  country  must  de- 
cide for  itself  how  much  is  wanted,  where  it 
is  wanted,  and  on  what  terms  it  is  wanted.  Those 
who  wish  to  attract  capital  must  recognize  cer- 
tain of  its  fundamental  characteristics.  One  is 
that  it  is  volatile  and  flows  where  it  is  served 
best.  Incentives  to  attract  capital  can  be  de- 
veloped by  the  importing  country  or  the  ex- 
porting country,  or  neither,  or  both.  In  the 
Department  of  State,  I  have  asked  for  the  de- 


velopment of  a  running  competitive  analysis  of 
incentive  treatments  offered  to  capital  exporters 
by  other  developed  nations. 

Another  fundamental  fact  about  capital  is 
tliat  its  many  legal  and  social  obligations  are 
balanced  by  a  few  irreducible  rights  under  in- 
ternational law.  Finally,  perhaps  the  key  long- 
term  consideration  today  is  that  capital  wants 
to  know  the  rules  of  the  game,  whatever  the  host 
coimtry  decides  they  may  be. 

Setting  the  rules  is  not  a  simple  task.  All  in- 
vestors would  like  to  expect  stability;  but  in- 
vestment is  intended  to  bring  development,  and 
development  very  commonly  brings  at  least 
some  instability.  Wlien  instability  does  not  af- 
fect the  conditions  for  further  development,  I 
would  suggest  that  it  is  up  to  investors  to  adapt 
willmgly. 

Increasingly,  the  Latin  American  countries 
are  irrging,  even  insisting  on,  cooperative  ven- 
tures with  local  partners.  I  recognize  the  vir- 
tues and  the  appeal  of  this  idea,  but  it  is  an 
example  of  the  complexity  of  the  rules-setting 
game.  I  believe  that  joint  ventures  are  a  natural 
outcome  of  local  capital  formation,  and  I  think 
that  we  should  constantly  search  for  ways  in 
which  they  can  feasibly  be  developed.  Some- 
times, however,  they  cannot  be  carried  through 
in  practice  without  greatly  restricting  the  areas 
available  to  foreign  capital  or  doing  an  injus- 
tice to  local  interests.  Partnerslaip  implies,  se- 
mantically,  connnon  objectives  and  common  ex- 
pectations between  partners.  These  conditions 
do  not  always  exist.  It  would  be  unfair  to  expect 
a  small  country,  let  alone  a  small  local  investor, 
to  share  the  costs  of  an  expensive  and  highly 
risky  operation.  Too  often,  I  am  afraid,  foreign 
investment  is  criticized  for  being  selfish  and 
inimical  to  the  interest  of  the  host  country  once 
the  investment  has  proved  successful.  It  is  easy 
to  overlook  the  risk  factor — yet  more  than 
12,000  U.S.  businesses  failed  in  1967. 

Given  the  importance  and  complexity  of  set- 
ting the  right  rules,  it  seems  clear  that  govern- 
ments should  cooperate  with  each  other  in  the 
task  and  that  investors  have  an  obligation  to 
make  thoughtful  contributions  to  the  process. 
The  coordination  between  governments  has  be- 
gun. The  Council  for  Latm  America  has  been 
outstandingly  helpful  and  is  in  a  position  to  be 
increasingly  so.  I  believe  the  Council  members 
can  be  counted  on  to  make  their  recommenda- 
tions as  "Citizens  First,  Businessmen  Second." 

Let  me  promise  you  that  the  U.S.  Government 
can  be  counted  on  to  listen. 


442 


DEPARTMENT  OP   STATE  BULlLETIN 


The  Arab-Israeli  Confrontation — ^A  Challenge  to  International  Diplomacy 


hy  Joseph  J.  Sisco 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs  ^ 


I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  speak  to  the 
annual  policy  conference  of  the  American  Israel 
Public  Affairs  Committee  about  one  of  the  most 
pressing  and  complex  challenges  to  interna- 
tional diplomacy  and  American  statecraft :  the 
Arab-Israeli  confrontation. 

President  Nixon  has  launched  a  period  of 
very  active  American  diplomacy  in  the  belief 
that  the  parties,  left  to  themselves,  have  not 
been  able  to  find  common  groimd,  that  the  op- 
portunities vs'hich  may  exist  for  settlement  could 
be  lost  if  some  progress  cannot  soon  be  made  in 
narrowing  deep-rooted  differences  between 
Israel  and  the  Arab  states. 

I  regret  to  say  that  developments  in  the  area 
seem  to  be  moving  in  the  opposite  direction. 

The  rhetoric  on  both  sides  has  become  in- 
flamed; suspicion  and  hatred  have  not  abated. 
The  cycle  of  attacks  and  reprisals  continues.  We 
need  only  recall  the  recent  fedayeen  commando 
rocket  attack  on  Elath  and  the  Israeli  use  of 
counter  airstrikes  as  part  of  its  policy  of  "active 
defense."  And  in  turn,  last  week  the  Cairo  news- 
paper Gomhouria  spoke  of  Egj'ptian-initiated 
artillery  duels  across  the  canal  as  a  policy  of 
"preventive  defense"  to  check  Israeli  concen- 
trations in  Sinai. 

On  the  political  front,  Israel  has  insisted  upon 
direct  negotiations  and  a  peace  treaty,  although 
it  has  engaged  in  substantive  discussion  imder 
Ambassador  Jarring's  [Gunnar  Jarring,  the 
U.N.  Secretary  General's  special  Middle  East 
representative]  auspices.  The  Arabs  have  not 
abandoned  the  Khartoum  formula  of  "no  peace 
treaty,  no  negotiations,  and  no  recognition." 

A  way  needs  to  be  found  out  of  this  political 
impasse.  Somehow  we  must  find  a  way  to  help 
change  the  climate  of  intransigence  and  suspi- 
cion to  a  willingness  to  coexist  on  a  live-and-let- 
live  basis;  somehow  a  durable  and  equitable 
peace  must  emerge  in  this  tension-weary  area 


that  has  commanded  far  too  many  headlines  of 
despair,  destruction,  and  death.  Such  a  change, 
I  am  sure,  would  be  in  everybody's  interest.  It  is 
the  achievement  of  this  basic  change  that  is  the 
ultimate  goal  of  our  efforts.  Secretary  of  State 
Rogers  observed  recently  that  the  one  factor 
which  would  guarantee  a  successful  result  of 
such  efforts  would  be  the  willingness  of  all  na- 
tions to  say  "We  want  to  live  in  peace"  and  that 
"Israel  is  a  nation  and  has  a  right  to  exist  and 
will  continue  to  exist  and  we  recognize  it."  ^ 


The  Keynote  to  Peace 

"What  is  needed,  too,  is  a  spirit  of  compromise 
and  conciliation.  Such  a  spirit  would  require 
exceptional  courage  and  a  remarkably  high  or- 
der of  statesmanship.  The  alternative,  a  failure 
of  statesmanship  and  courage,  is  grim.  We  rec- 
ognize that  compromises  are  painful  and  that 
they  encompass  an  acceptance  of  some  degree 
of  calculated  risk.  But  compromise  need  not 
prejudice  either  side's  legitimate  interests.  It 
is  not  only  in  the  Middle  East  that  we  are  faced 
with  this  reality.  We  seek  a  peace  which  would 
give  security  to  both  sides.  Security  in  the  Mid- 
dle East — as  elsewhere — is  relative,  not  abso- 
lute. The  road  to  such  security  is  embraced  in 
the  U.N.  Security  CoimcU  resolution  of  Novem- 
ber 1967.'  It  meets  requisite  needs  of  both  sides : 
(1)  a  just  and  lasting  peace;  (2)  agreement 
between  the  parties;  and  (3)  withdrawal  of 
Israeli  armed  forces  to  agreed  and  secure 
boundaries. 


'  Address  made  before  the  American  Israel  Public 
Affairs  Committee  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Apr.  23 
(press  release  90). 

'  For  transcript  of  Secretary  Rogers'  news  conference 
of  Apr.  7,  see  BrnxETiN  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  357. 

'  For  text,  see  Bttlletin  of  Dec.  18, 1967,  p.  843. 


MAY    26,    1969 


443 


It  is  both  fair  and  important  to  set  forth  the 
reasons  for  United  States  concern  for  and  in- 
terest in  the  area. 

The  American  Stake  in  the  Middle  East 

The  most  salient  and  direct  response  is  that 
in  a  20th-century  jet-propulsion  age  of  more 
than  120  interdependent  nations,  areas  of  con- 
flict and  constant  instability  are  potential  sites 
for  big-power  confrontation  and  conflict.  Ee- 
cent  deployment  into  the  Mediterranean  of  units 
of  the  Soviet  North  Atlantic  Fleet  brought  the 
total  of  Russian  naval  units  there  to  an  all-time 
high  of  more  than  50  ships.  This  is  only  one  as- 
pect of  the  expansion  of  Soviet  influence  in  the 
area  in  recent  years  and  particularly  since  the 
third  Arab-Israeli  war,  of  June  1967.  This  So- 
viet presence  and  influence  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean is  yet  another  complicating  dimension  to 
the  Middle  East  problem.  For  our  part,  we  must 
and  will  mamtain  an  effective  and  positive  pres- 
ence in  the  area.  Our  strategic  interests  emanate 
from  the  self-evident  fact  that  the  area  is  a 
crossroads  and  confluence  of  the  world  which 
the  United  States  as  a  nation  with  global  in- 
terests must  take  fully  into  account. 

Our  direct  involvement  in  the  area  is  long 
standing. 

Our  close  relationship  with  Israel  goes  back 
to  the  very  establishment  of  Israel  and  through- 
out its  remarkable  and  creative  development 
into  a  modem  progressive  state.  The  United 
States  Government  was  the  first  to  recognize 
the  new  State  of  Israel  in  1948.  With  an  un- 
precedented degree  of  constancy,  we  have  sup- 
ported the  security  and  well-being  of  Israel 
since  it  entered  the  community  of  nations.  We 
have  recognized  the  impoi'tance  of  preventing 
a  military  imbalance  in  the  area,  and  as  a  con- 
sequence, we  have  provided  Israel  as  well  as 
Arab  states  with  limited  amoimts  of  arms.  Our 
ties  with  Israel  and  our  continuing  dialosme 
with  its  people  and  leaders  bear  the  special 
warmth  and  candor  characteristic  of  democratic 
states  who  share  the  mutual  aspirations  of  free 
societies. 

We  also  have  close  associations  with  the  Arab 
world,  which  go  back  to  early  educational  and 
missionary  activities  before  the  First  World 
War.  These  associations  were  widened  as  Amer- 
ican entrepreneurs  acquired  interests  in  devel- 
oping the  area's  vast  petroleum  resources  in  the 
1920's  and  1930's.  Since  World  War  II,  the 
United  States  has  contributed  substantially  to 


the  economic,  technological,  and  social  develop- 
ment of  Arab  nations. 

The  question  therefore  is  not  whether  we 
should  concern  ourselves  with  Israel  and  the 
Arab  nations,  but  the  manner  in  which  we  do  so. 

We  have  pursued  our  interests  in  four  princi- 
pal ways : 

First,  we  have  been  persistent  in  our  efforts 
to  prevent  hostilities  by  giving  full  diplomatic 
and  material  support  to  U.N.  peacekeeping 
efforts  in  the  Middle  East.  Three  times  in  the 
last  20  years  peacekeeping  efforts  admittedly 
failed,  but  the  area  of  conflict  was  at  least 
localized. 

Second,  we  have  sought  to  maintain  free  and 
reciprocally  beneficial  relations  with  all  nations 
and  peoples  of  the  area. 

Third,  we  have  sought  international  agree- 
ment on  arms  limitation  in  the  area;  but  the 
chief  supplier  of  such  arms — the  U.S.S.R. — has 
so  far  indicated  no  wOlingness  to  discuss  this 
matter  until  a  political  settlement  has  been 
achieved.  This  is  important,  because  when 
Soviet  objectives  in  the  Middle  East  are  an- 
alyzed many  factors  must  be  weighed :  We  wel- 
come their  willingness  to  engage  in  serious  talks 
on  the  Middle  East,  and  we  will  make  every 
reasonable  effort  to  make  progress;  however, 
we  must  also  keep  in  mind  not  only  Soviet  arms 
policy  but  its  stepped-up  activities  in  the  area, 
the  need  for  greater  impartiality  on  its  part  on 
this  issue  in  the  political  arena  of  the  U.N.,  and 
its  long-range  objective  of  increasing  its  own 
influence  in  the  area  and  reducing  thereby  that 
of  the  West,  and  the  United  States  in  particular.      - 

Finally,  we  have  sought  an  enduring  and     I 
equitable  peace,  one  which  would  provide  the     I 
environment  and  stimulus  for  the  development     ' 
of   the   area's   largely   untapped   human   and 
material  riches. 

Initiatives  by  President  Nixon 

I  know  that  the  picture  I  paint  of  develop- 
ments in  the  area  is  in  dark  and  somber  hues. 
But  it  provides  an  insight  into  why  President 
Nixon  has  given  high  priority  to  the  Arab- 
Israeli  confrontation.  In  searching  for  ways  to 
assist  Ambassador  Jarring  and  the  parties  to 
achieve  a  durable  and  just  peace,  the  President 
has  taken  a  number  of  steps,  among  which  are : 

— Prompt  and  exhaustive  review  of  U.S.  pol- 
icy in  the  Middle  East  and  several  National 
Security  Council  sessions  on  the  subject. 


444 


DEPAHTMENT   OF   STATE   BtTLLETIN 


— Discussion  of  the  Middle  East  conflict  with 
European  leaders  during  his  recent  trip. 

— Frank  and  meaningful  exchanges  of  views 
with  high-level  representatives  of  the  contend- 
ing parties,  including  Jordan's  King  Hussein 
and  Israel's  Foreign  Minister  [Abba  Eban]. 
Mr.  Eban  eloquently  and  determinedly  pre- 
sented Israel's  hopes  for  peace,  the  Israeli  view 
on  the  essentials  of  a  peace  settlement,  and  his 
nation's  apprehensions  about  current  develop- 
ments. King  Hussein,  on  his  part,  made  a  genu- 
ine contribution  to  an  understanding  of  the 
Arab  viewpoint  and  the  perils  of  failure  in  the 
search  for  peace.  We  welcomed  his  reaffirmation 
of  support  for  the  November  1967  Security 
Council  resolution. 

Intensive  exploratory  conversations  are  being 
pursued  in  Washington  between  representatives 
of  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  see 
whether  common  or  parallel  views  and  actions 
can  be  agreed  upon  to  promote  a  peaceful  and 
accepted  settlement  in  accordance  with  the  Secu- 
rity Council  resolution.  Wliile  it  is  too  early  to 
make  a  judgment  regarding  their  outcome,  these 
talks  and  other  bilateral  diplomatic  efforts  are 
being  carried  forward  seriously,  free  of  propa- 
gandistic  overtones,  and  have  helped  set  the 
stage  for  four-power  talks  being  held  at  the 
United  Nations.  We  have  made  a  bit  of  prog- 
ress; our  views  are  somewhat  closer  together, 
but  there  is  a  good  distance  to  go. 

Finally,  President  Nixon  decided  to  pursue 
the  new  four-power  approach  in  the  belief  that 
the  major  powers  have  an  interest  and  a  respon- 
sibility in  trying  to  do  everything  possible  to 
encourage  steps  toward  peace.  Here,  too,  the 
discussions  have  focused  on  the  relevant  ele- 
ments of  a  permanent  peace  within  the  frame- 
work of  the  U.N.  Security  Council  resolution  of 
November  1967,  and  modest  progress  has  been 
made. 

If  there  is  a  short  answer  to  what  U.S.  policy 
is,  it  is  the  November  22, 1967,  Security  Council 
resolution  in  its  entirety.  I  emphasize  its  en- 
tirety, because  each  side  is  inclined  to 
emphasize  the  parts  it  approves  and  disregard 
the  provisions  it  disapproves. 

The  Security  Council  resolution  of  November 
1967  is  clear :  The  objective  is  a  just  and  lasting 
peace  in  the  Middle  East,  not  a  fragile  armistice 
arrangement.  If  a  peace  is  to  last,  if  it  is  to  be 
just,  it  must  be  juridically  defined  and  contrac- 
tually binding  based  upon  agreement  reached 
by  the  parties  in  a  spirit  of  compromise. 


The  Elements  of  Peace 

Secretary  Rogers  outlined  the  elements  of 
peace  before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee on  March  27."'  He  said : 

A  just  aud  lasting  peace  will  require,  as  the  Security 
Council's  resohitlon  states,  withdrawal  of  Israeli  armed 
forces  from  territories  occupied  in  the  Arab-Israeli  war 
of  1967,  the  termination  of  all  claims  or  states  of  bellig- 
erency, and  the  acknowledgment  of  the  sovereignty, 
territorial  integrity,  and  political  independence  of 
every  state  in  the  area  aud  their  right  to  live  in  peace 
within  secure  and  recognized  boundaries.  Clearly,  with- 
drawal should  take  place  to  established  boundaries 
which  define  the  areas  where  Israel  and  its  neighbors 
may  live  in  peace  and  sovereign  independence.  Equally, 
there  can  be  no  secure  and  recognized  boundaries  with- 
out withdrawal.  In  our  view  rectifications  from  the 
preexisting  lines  should  be  confined  to  tho.se  required 
for  mutual  security  aud  should  not  reflect  the  weight 
of  conquest. 

The  Council's  resolution  also  affirms  the 
necessity  for  guaranteeing  freedom  of  naviga- 
tion through  international  waterways  in  the 
ai-ea.  It  was  the  denial  of  such  freedom  to  Israel 
through  the  Straits  of  Tiran  which  was  the 
proximate  cause  of  the  6-day  war.  For  20  years, 
Israel  has  been  denied  transit  through  the  Suez 
Canal. 

We  believe,  too,  that  an  overall  settlement 
must  provide  for  a  just  solution  of  the  refugee 
problem.  Consistent  with  past  U.N.  resolutions, 
the  refugees  should  be  given  a  choice  between 
repatriation  and  resettlement  with  compensa- 
tion. There  is  need  for  a  fundamental  solution 
which  takes  into  account  the  human  element 
and  the  concerns  and  requirements  of  both  sides. 

The  Security  Council  resolution  also  affirms 
the  need  to  guarantee  the  territorial  integrity 
and  political  independence  of  every  state  in  the 
area  through  a  variety  of  measures,  including 
the  establishment  of  demilitarized  zones.  We 
hope  that  practical  arrangements  can  be  made 
on  the  ground  and  political  action  taken  which 
will  help  guarantee  a  peaceful  settlement. 

The  U.N.  Security  Council  resolution  calls  on 
Ambassador  Jarring  "to  establish  and  maintain 
contacts  with  the  States  concerned  in  order  to 
promote  agreement  and  assist  efforts  to  achieve 
a  peaceful  and  accepted  settlement."  His  man- 
date, therefore,  is  to  promote  agreement  between 
the  parties.  We  underscore  this  because  we  are 
convinced  that  if  a  peace  is  to  be  lasting,  it  will 
require  the  assent  and  full  cooperation  of  the 
parties  in  the  area. 


'  BuiiETiN  of  Apr.  14,  1969,  p.  305. 


MAY    26,    1969 


445 


As  I  have  indicated,  our  hope  is  that  the  four- 
power  talks  will  find  ways  to  strengthen  future 
efforts  of  the  Jarrmg  mission.  This  is  a  delicate 
and  difficult  task.  We  realize  that  common 
ground  between  the  major  parties  cannot  be 
achieved  overnight — and  indeed  may  not  be 
achievable  at  all. 

The  Role  of  the  Four-Power  Talks 

We  are  under  no  illusions  that  a  dispute 
which  has  proved  intractable  for  over  20  years 
will  suddenly  be  made  more  tractable  because 
of  maj  01'- power  discussions.  This  group  can 
probe  formulas  to  reconcile  issues,  but  no 
formula  will  work  without  the  agreement  and 
cooperation  of  the  parties.  Whether  common 
positions  which  could  be  conveyed  to  Ambas- 
sador Jarring  can  be  achieved,  only  time  and 
patient  discussions  will  tell.  For  our  part,  we 
feel  that  the  need  for  a  permanent  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  is  compelling. 

We  do  not  conceive  of  the  four-power  ap- 
proach in  lieu  of  Ambassador  Jarring's  efforts 
to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  Security  Council 
resolution.  Our  purpose  is  to  help  him  buttress 
future  efforts  with  the  Arabs  and  the  Israelis. 

We  do  not  see  four-power  talks  as  a  mech- 
anism to  impose  peace.  As  President  Nixon  has 
said :  ^ 

The  four  powers  .  .  .  cannot  dictate  a  settlement  in 
the  Middle  East.  The  time  has  passed  in  which 
great  nations  can  dictate  to  small  nations  their  future 
where  their  vital  interests  are  involved. 

We  do  not  see  four-power  common  ground  as 
a  substitute  for  agreement  between  the  parties. 

But  common  or  parallel  four-power  views 
could  influence  the  parties  at  least  to  narrow 
their  differences  and  to  make  progress  toward 
peace  which  ultimately  could  enhance  the  secu- 
rity of  both  Israel  and  the  Arab  states. 

I  know  there  are  some  who  say  we  should  not 
engage  in  these  discussions  with  the  other  major 
powers.  Let  me  make  clear  we  are  not  there 
to  bargain  away  the  security  of  any  state  in  the 
area.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  there  is  the 
ever-present  risk  that  local  disputes  can  mush- 
room into  something  bigger  carrying  the  risk 

°  For  transcript  of  President  Nixon's  news  conference 
of  Mar.  4,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  24,  1969,  p.  237. 


of  involving  the  major  powers.  It  becomes, 
therefore,  a  direct  security  interest  of  the 
United  States  to  exercise  whatever  influence 
it  has,  in  whatever  way  would  be  useful  and 
effective,  to  help  bring  a  lasting  peace  to  the 
Middle  East. 

Tliis  is  the  principal  reason  why  President 
Nixon  has  decided  that  our  efforts  should  be 
chamieled  through  all  appropriate  avenues  to 
peace,  including  bilateral  and  multilateral  ex- 
changes. In  our  efforts,  our  purpose  will  be  to 
insure  Israel's  security,  safeguard  legitimate 
Arab  interests,  and  take  fully  into  account  our 
own  and  the  world  community's  security  and 
other  interests. 

Much  of  what  needs  to  be  achieved  depends 
on  the  spirit  of  compromise  among  the  parties. 
Compromise  is,  in  the  final  analysis,  the  hall- 
mark of  productive  negotiation.  Compromise 
implies  that  neither  side  will  gain  all  that  it 
desires;  on  the  other  hand,  neither  side  would 
be  expected  to  surrender  its  vital  interests. 

Much  is  still  obscure  about  the  future  course 
of  events,  and  I  am  unable  to  predict  what 
those  events  might  produce.  We,  for  our  part, 
will  press  ahead  without  illusory  expectations 
of  an  instant  peace.  Because  much  remains  to  be 
done,  no  opportunity  to  achieve  an  equitable  set- 
tlement will  be  overlooked  by  the  United  States. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Guinea 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Guinea,  Fadiala  Keita,  presented 
his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on  May  6. 
For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  May  6. 

Kenya 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Kenya,  Leonard  Oliver  Kibinge, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on 
May  6.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks 
and  the  President's  reply,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  dated  May  6. 


M6 


DEPAETMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


'■'■Japan,  though  now  third  among  loorld  powers  in  GNP,  has 
710  pretensions  as  a  superpower.  .  .  .  Japan's  outward  thrust 
is  economic,  not  political  or  military."  In  this  article,  based  on 
an  address  he  made  before  the  League  of  Women  Voters  of 
Connecticut  on  March  IS,  Mr.  Bamett  discusses  Japan's  eco- 
nomic position  in  the  world,  as  well  as  the  United  States-Japan 
relationship  in  the  Pacific  neighborhood  which  we  share. 


Japan's  Economic  Dynamism  and  Our  Common  Interests  in  East  Asia 


by  Robert  W.  Bamett 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 


Two  particularly  interesting  observations 
were  made  at  a  conference  I  attended  in  Eng- 
land last  September.  Of  all  the  countries  in  the 
world,  it  was  said,  Japan  is  most  likely  to  sur- 
pass the  United  States  in  per  capita  GNP  by 
A.D.  2000.  Coal,  we  were  told,  can  be  shipped 
from  West  Virginia  to  Yokohama  today  at  no 
greater  cost  than  to  Chicago.  Consider  how  this 
achievement  of  coutainerization  and  mammoth 
freighters  affects  the  calculations  by  the  eco- 
nomic geographer  concerned  with  competitive 
advantage  of  location. 

Technology  and  its  effect  on  our  notions  of 
time,  place,  and  cost  may  be  advancing  so  fast 
that  what  we  regard  as  political  realities  can 
well  be  obsolete  as  soon  as  we  believe  them  to 
be  properly  formulated.  And  it  is  not  just  tech- 
nology that  affects  reality.  A  very  perceptive 
Japanese  friend  of  mine,  trying  to  identify 
probable  future  leadership  in  Japan,  asserts 
that  three  distinct  concepts  of  the  world  occupy 
the  minds  of  his  countrymen — one  for  those 
over  60,  one  for  those  under  40,  and  another 
for  those  under  20.  This  may  not  be  true  only 
of  Japan. 

The  central  difference  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan  is  not,  I  believe,  race,  location, 
or  annual  per  capita  GNP — about  $4,000  and 
$1,300.  It  is,  I  propose,  the  fact  that  we  spend 
about  9  percent  of  our  GNP  on  defense ;  Japan, 
about  1  percent — put  in  dollars,  over  $70  billion 
compared  with  about  $1  bUlion. 

These  are  fascinating  figures  to  reflect  on. 


Implicit  in  them,  I  believe,  is  an  explanation  of 
what  is  largely  involved  in  the  several  issues 
being  discussed  by  United  States  and  Japanese 
Government  negotiators  these  days : 

—Extension  of  the  Security  Treaty. 
— The  future  of  the  Ryukyus. 
— Current  imbalance  in  the  bilateral  U.S.- 
Japanese trade  account. 
— ^The  U.S.  balance  of  payments. 

The  United  States  appropriates  and  spends 
over  $70  billion — more  than  half  of  Japan's 
total  GNP — to  maintain  worldwide  deterrent 
military  capabilities,  to  fight  a  war  in  Viet- 
Nam,  and  to  discharge  otherwise  what  we  con- 
sider to  be  our  responsibilities  as  a  superpower. 
The  impact  of  United  States  power  on  the  world 
is  total  and  pervasive. 

Japan,  though  now  third  among  world 
powers  in  GNP,  has  no  pretensions  as  a  super- 
power, is  constitutionally  denying  itself  a  mili- 
tary role  apart  from  defense,  and  relies  wholly 
on  the  United  States  for  safety  from  any 
strategic  threat.  Japan's  outward  thrust  is 
economic,  not  political  or  military. 

In  this  situation  some  troubles  can  and  do 
arise  from  a  United  States  calculation  that  be- 
cause Japan  benefits  from  our  security  invest- 
ment in  Japanese  and  Ryukyu  bases  it  should 
pay  something,  while  many  Japanese  calculate 
that  because  we  benefit--at  great  cost  to 
Japan's  amour-propre — from  the  bases  they  let 
us  use,  we  should  pay  greater  heed  to  Japan's 


MAT    26,    1969 


447 


sovereign  sensitivities  if  we  wish  to  stay  on. 

Not  all  Japanese,  perhaps  not  even  a  major- 
ity, share  in  this  somewhat  resentful  attitude 
toward  the  United  States  military  apparatus  on 
Japanese  soil. 

However,  1969  will  be  a  tune  of  delicate  con- 
sultation between  our  Governments  to  axrange: 

— Extension  of  a  security  treaty  according 
the  United  States  certain  limited  base  rights, 
which  many  Japanese  regard  as  a  vital  contri- 
bution to  Japan "s  own  safety  and  which  we  re- 
gard as  essential  for  efficient  performance  on 
our  security  commitments  throughout  the  West- 
ern Pacific  area ; 

— Some  change,  perhaps  substantial,  m  ar- 
rangements on  the  Ryukyus,  where  we,  while 
i-ecognizing  Japan's  residual  sovereignty,  have 
exercised  total  administrative  control  and  have 
made  free  use  of  the  base  facilities  located  there. 
The  Japanese  will  want  assurance  of  early  re- 
version to  Tokyo  of  administrative  authority 
over  the  islands.  We  will  want  arrangements 
that  cause  the  least  possible  loss  in  our  ability 
to  meet  the  operational  and  strategic  require- 
ments of  the  role  we  believe  we  must  play  in  the 
Western  Pacific. 

Consultations  on  Economic  Issues 

1969  will  see  us  talking  security — Japan's  and 
our's — but  also  economics. 

During  1968  Japan  ran  a  $1  billion-plus  trade 
surplus  with  the  United  States.  It  did  so  at  a 
time  when  we  suffered  a  dollar  outflow  attrib- 
utable to  spending  for  East  Asian  security  re- 
quirements of  perhaps  $2.5  billion  and  to  mili- 
tary spending  in  Japan  itself  of  about  $600 
million.  We  will  ask  Japan  to  help  neutralize 
some  part  of  this  heavy  charge  on  our  balance 
of  payments ;  and  the  Japanese,  while  wanting 
to  help  us  defend  the  dollar,  will  avoid  doing 
things  that  might  be  construed  as  blank-check 
endorsement  of  United  States  foreign  policy. 
Foreign  and  financial  policy,  the  differing 
responsibilities  of  surplus  and  deficit  countries, 
and  the  scope  and  limitations  of  bilateral 
mutual  assistance  will  be  involved  in  these 
consultations. 

Both  Washington  and  Tokyo  will,  in  addi- 
tion, be  forced  to  look  hard  at  the  problem  of 
trade  protectionism,  as  a  present  problem  and 
as  a  future  possibility. 

We  will  want  much  greater  access  to  the 
growing  Japanese  market,  both  on  trade  ac- 


count and  for  direct  investment.  We  will  press 
hard  to  get  it.  The  Japanese  may  be  slow  and 
grudging  in  giving  it.  Talk  of  a  United  States 
border  tax  in  1968  threw  them  into  near  panic; 
talk  these  days  of  moves  to  restrain  their  ex- 
ports of  textiles,  steel,  and  still  other  products 
alanns  them.  Their  automobile  industry,  seem- 
ing not  to  recognize  its  great  strength,  fears 
American  investment  in  Japan.  Japan  wants  to 
have  margins  of  safety  against  risks  of  United 
States  and  world  trade  protectionism  and,  I  be- 
lieve very  mistakenly,  is  nervous  about  the  thing 
Servan-Schreiber  has  warned  about. 

World  Trade  and  Financial  Situation 

Lying  behind  these  anxieties  are  major  ab- 
normalities in  the  world  trade  and  financial  sit- 
uation which  do  not  lend  themselves  to  effective 
solution  by  bilateral  measures:  the  high  cost 
of  the  United  States  war  in  Viet-Nam  and  con- 
tinuing price  inflation  in  the  United  States 
which  sucks  in  high  levels  of  imports  from  all 
sources. 

Japan  is  keenly  aware  that  its  future  depends 
vitally  on  the  dollar.  It  would,  I  believe,  gladly 
sacrifice  some  exports  in  return  for  price  sta- 
bility in  the  United  States  and  improvement  of 
the  U.S.  balance  of  payments.  Important  as  the 
U.S.  market  is  to  Japan,  a  worldwide  nondis- 
criminatory trade  system  and  the  sanctity  of 
the  doctrine  which  should  guide  it  are  even 
more  important.  To  appear  viable  to  Japan, 
solutions  of  trade  and  payments  difficulties  must 
affect  jointly  and  reciprocally  all  of  the  member 
countries  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development,  in  the  Pacific  area 
and  the  Atlantic  area  alike.  If  the  choice  is 
between  liberalizing  trade  and  resorting  to  trade 
restriction  to  help  the  adjustment  process  along, 
Japan  would,  I  am  sure,  prefer  liberalizing;  it 
is  mortally  fearful  of  the  contagion  of 
protectionism. 

Happily,  our  current  economic  and  strategic 
preoccupations  with  Japan  arise  not  from  the 
mere  exercise  of  great  strength  by  us  and  by 
them  but  from  Japan's  wish  to  be  firmly  en- 
meshed in  a  world  system,  not  set  apart  and 
treated  as  something  different  and  special. 

I  have  mentioned  how  strong  Japan  is  and 
may  be  expected  to  become.  Let  me  elaborate 
with  some  figures : 

The  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  estimates 
Japan's  GNP  at  about  $140  billion,  compared 


448 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


with  oxir  $825  billion.  West  Germany,  France, 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  Italy  each  have  a 
lower  GNP.  Perhaps  more  significant,  however, 
is  that  in  1967  and  1968  Japan  was  growing  at 
a  real  rate  of  over  12  percent,  compared  with  5 
percent  for  the  United  States  and  less  than  that 
for  West  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
France. 

In  the  Kalm-Wiener  book,  "The  Year  2000," 
a  chart  appears  giving  estimates  of  GNP  in 
1985.  The  high  variant  for  the  United  States 
shows  a  GNP  of  $2,020  billion ;  for  Japan,  $471 
billion.  I  am  startled  to  see  that  the  figure  for 
Japan  is  higher  than  that  for  West  Germany 
and  Italy  combined. 

The  dynamism  of  the  Japanese  economic  sys- 
tem shows  at  the  worker  level.  The  Department 
of  Commerce  estimates  that  the  annual  growth 
rate  of  output  per  employee  for  Japan  from 
1960  to  1965  was  9.8  percent,  compared  with  3.1 
percent  for  the  United  States  and  about  4.3  per- 
cent for  West  Germany  and  France. 

Well-trained  brains  harness  the  energies  of 
Japan's  work  force.  The  Economist  and  For- 
tune have  compared  Japan  with  its  American 
and  Western  European  competitors  in  the  field 
of  education.  Japan  was  devoting  about  7.1  per- 
cent of  national  income  in  the  mid-1960's  to 
public  expenditures  for  education,  compared 
witli  6.3  percent  in  the  United  States  and  Italy, 
5.8  percent  in  the  United  Kingdom,  4.6  percent 
in  France,  and  4.2  percent  in  West  Germany. 

In  research  and  development,  the  United 
States  stands  in  a  class  by  itself,  with  about  70 
persons  out  of  every  10,000  of  its  work  force 
engaged  in  E&D  activities.  Looking  at  the  rest 
of  the  competition,  however,  Japan  does  well. 
There  about  19  out  of  every  10,000  are  so  em- 
ployed, compared  with  16  in  the  United  King- 
dom, 10.5  in  West  Germany,  8.5  in  France,  and 
3  in  Italy. 

It  is  fair  to  say,  I  think,  that  Japan  stands 
in  a  class  by  itself  in  the  very  high  levels  of 
private  investment  it  maintains.  In  Japan  fixed 
capital  foi-mation  as  a  percentage  of  GNP  in 
1966  amounted  to  31  percent,  compared  with  25 
percent  in  West  Germany,  22  percent  in  France, 
18  percent  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Italy, 
and  17  percent  in  the  United  States. 

There  will  be  people  who  regard  Japan  as 
occupying  a  dominant  position  in  today's  world 
trading  community.  This  is  a  mistaken  notion. 
The  United  States  exports  three  times  as  much 
as  Japan,  West  Germany  twice  as  much,  and 


both  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  export 
substantially  more  than  does  Japan. 

Almost  everyone  is  surprised  when  I  point 
out,  as  I  often  must  do,  that  Japan  is  substan- 
tially less  trade  dependent  than  its  principal 
Western  Europe  competitors— if  trade  depend- 
ency is  measurable  in  terms  of  exports  of  goods 
and  services  as  a  percentage  of  GNP.  By  this 
measurement  Japan's  degree  of  dependence  is 
12  percent,  compared  with  19  percent  for  Italy, 
21  percent  for  West  Germany,  and  25  percent 
for  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  United  States, 
incidentally,  exports  amount  to  only  6  percent 
of  GNP. 

These  statistical  indicators  add  up,  I  believe, 
to  a  portrait  of  a  very  strong  Japan  somewhat 
less  vulnerable  to  minor  fluctuations  in  world 
trade  activity,  perhaps,  than  either  the  Jap- 
anese or  the  world  in  general  supposes  it  to  be. 

Common  Support  of  Asian   Development 

It  is  good  to  have  a  strong  Japan  for  pursuit 
of  what  is  common  in  our  interest  in  East  Asia, 
both  its  non-Communist  and  Communist  parts : 
economic  and  social  development  and  explora- 
tion of  paths  toward  peaceful  coexistence. 

We  do  not  ask  Tokyo  to  do  as  we  do.  We  be- 
lieve there  are  different  patlis  to  the  ultimate 
goals  we  share. 

Japan  trades  with  Conmiunist  Cliina ;  we  do 
not. 

Japan  explores  investment  and  greater  trade 
possibilities  in  the  U.S.S.R. ;  we  do  not. 

Japan  offers  substantial  aid  to  Burma  and 
Cambodia ;  we  do  not. 

However,  our  two  nations  do  merge  our  re- 
sources in  common  support  of  new  economic  de- 
velopment possibilities  in  both  Northeast  and 
Southeast  Asia. 

Japanese  aid  and  investment  in  South  Korea 
and  Taiwan,  coming  after  and  on  top  of  ours, 
goes  far  to  explain  recent  economic  triumphs 
there — and  recent  tendencies  toward  economic 
integration  in  Northeast  Asia. 

Japan  pledged  $110  million  of  aid  to  Indo- 
nesia in  1968 ;  so  did  we. 

Japan  contributed  $200  million  to  the  capital 
of  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  as  did  we,  and 
has  pledged  a  substantial  contribution  to  its 
Special  Fimds,  as  we  may  soon  do,  too. 

For  different  and  compatible  reasons,  we  and 
Japan  favor  progression  to  greater  and  greater 
reliance  upon  multinational  agencies  in  the 
growth  processes  of  developing  countries.  We 


MAT    26,    1969 


449 


both  find  ways  to  encourage  regional  coopera- 
tion in  economic  and  other  undertakings,  and 
Japan  has  become  an  active  participant. 

Japan  is  enjoying  a  truly  remarkable  expan- 
sion of  economic  links  with  Australia.  This,  no 
doubt,  encourages  Japan  to  explore  possibilities 
for  creating  a  five-power  Pacific  Basin  com- 
munity made  up  of  Japan,  Australia,  New  Zea- 
land, Canada,  and  the  United  States. 

The  United  States-Japan  relationship  has 
proved  to  be  mutally  advantageous  beyond  any- 
thing foreseeable  20  years  ago.  Our  problems 
arise,  largely,  from  capabilities  and  achieve- 
ments that  are  good  for  our  two  countries  and 
the  Pacific  neighborhood  which  we  share.  As 
must  be  the  case  between  tnie  partners,  attempts 
by  either  partner  to  reform  or  improve  the  other 
can  succeed  only  with  greater  awareness  of  its 
own  need  to  reform  or  improve. 


rights  is  fully  shared  by  this  Administration. 
We  wholeheartedly  agree  with  your  statement 
that  our  moral  position  in  the  world  reflects 
our  devotion  to  these  fundamental  principles. 

Our  government  and,  I  am  confident,  our  peo- 
ple remain  committed  to  continuing  action  for 
himian  rights.  I  commend  you  for  the  many 
contributions  you  have  made  to  this  vital 
process. 

Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 

Honorable  W.  Averell,  Harkiman 

Chairman 

The  Presidenfs  Com/mission  for  the 

Observance  of  Human  Rights  Tear  1968 
Department  of  State 
Washington,  B.C.  20520 


LETTER  OF  TRANSMITTAL 


Final  Report  Submitted  on  Observance 
of  Human  Rights  Year  1968 

The  f/nal  report  of  the  Presidenfs  Commis- 
sion for  tlie  Observance  of  Human  Rights  Year 
1968  toas  suhmitted  to  President  Nixon  on  Jan- 
uary 30}  Following  is  the  Presidenfs  letter  of 
ackno^oledgm^nt,  together  with  the  letter  of 
transmittal  f7'om  W.  Averell  Harriman,  Chair- 
man of  the  Convmission. 


PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  LETTER 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  29 

Dear  Governor:  I  have  received  the  Final 
Report  of  the  President's  Commission  for  the 
Observance  of  Human  Rights  Year  1968,  and 
I  thank  j'ou  for  it.  You,  the  other  members  of 
tlie  Commission,  and  those  who  worked  on  its 
staff  are  to  be  commended  for  your  diligent  and 
consistent  effort  in  response  to  the  request  of 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  that  its 
members  commemorate  the  twentieth  anniver- 
sary of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights. 

Your  concern  that  Americans  speak  as  one 
when  they  seek  to  promote  the  cause  of  human 

'  Copies  of  the  62-page  report,  entitled  "To  Continue 
Action  for  Human  Rights,"  are  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.  S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402  (35  cents). 


January  30, 1969 

Dear  IVIr.  President  :  I  have  the  honor  to  sub- 
mit the  Final  Report  of  the  President's  Com- 
mission for  the  Observance  of  Human  Rights 
Year  1968. 

This  Commission  was  established  by  Exec- 
utive Order  No.  11394  on  January  30,  1968,  in 
response  to  a  request  by  the  General  Assembly 
of  the  United  Nations  that  all  Member  States 
commemorate  the  Twentieth  Anniversary  of 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  It 
was  directed  to  "enlarge  our  people's  under- 
standing of  the  principles  of  human  rights,  as 
expressed  in  the  Universal  Declaration  and  the 
Constitution  and  in  the  laws  of  the  United 
States."  As  the  Final  Report  relates,  the  Com- 
mission has  endeavored  to  carry  out  that  man- 
date through  the  activities  of  eight  Special 
Committees  and  an  extensive  program  of  pub- 
lic information. 

The  Commission  viewed  its  task  in  the  broad- 
est perspective.  It  sought  to  increase  public 
awareness  of  the  whole  concept  of  human 
rights  as  a  contribution  to  national  progress  and 
stability  and  thereby  to  international  develop- 
ment and  peace.  At  the  same  time  it  sought  to 
leave  through  its  publications  a  lasting  contri- 
bution of  scholarship  and  recommendations  for 
the  continuation  of  this  work. 

In  this  Final  Report,  it  is  recommended  that 
the  work  of  the  Commission  be  continued  and 
broadened  under  the  strong  leadership  of  the 


450 


departbient  of  state  bulletin 


Presidency.  The  whole  of  government  must  rec- 
ognize its  conunitment  to  human  rights  and 
thereby  seek  to  articulate  its  policies  and  pro- 
grams in  human  rights  terms.  A  touchstone  of 
our  conunitment  will  be  the  ratification  of  addi- 
tional human  rights  conventions  through  action 
by  the  Administration  and  the  Senate.  In  this 
manner,  our  moral  position  in  the  world  will 
reflect  our  historic  devotion  to  these  principles 
of  hiunan  rights. 

I  have  been  impressed  by  the  variety  and 
urgency  of  human  rights  problems,  both  nation- 
al and  international.  While  this  Commission 
sought  to  plant  a  few  seeds,  to  reappraise,  to 
appeal  to  every  American  to  recall  fundamental 
values,  and  to  recommend  future  action,  it  rec- 
ognized that  any  sustained  effort  must  be  a 
government-wide  effort. 

This  Commission  was  established  and  carried 
on  its  deliberations  in  the  Administration  of 
your  predecessor  in  office.  It  was  supported  by 
a  broad  spectrum  of  the  public.  Therefore,  I 
believe  that  Americans  speak  as  one  when  they 
seek  to  promote  the  cause  of  human  rights  at 
home  and  abroad. 

Respectfully  yours, 

W.   AVEEELL   HaRKIMAN 

Chairman,  The  President'' s  Commission  for 
the  Observance  of  Human  Eights  Year  1968 


Secretary  Appoints  Ne>v  Members 
to  Board  of  the  Foreign  Service 

Press  release  106  dated  May  7 

Secretai-y  Rogers  on  May  7  announced  the 
appointment  of  four  new  State  Department 
members  of  the  Board  of  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  appointments  were  described  as  an  initial 
step  toward  a  major  and  comprehensive  review 
by  the  new  administration  of  the  entire  foreign 
affairs  personnel  structure. 

Named  to  the  Board  were :  Elliot  L.  Richard- 
son, Under  Secretary  {Chairrnan) ;  Idar  Rime- 
stad.  Deputy  Under  Secretary  for  Administra- 
tion; Philip  Trezise,  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Economic  Affairs-designate;  and  Martin  Hill- 
enbrand, Assistant  Secretary  for  European  Af- 
fairs. An  official  representing  the  Agency  for 
International  Development  will  be  named 
shortly. 

Other  agencies  represented  on  the  Board  are 


USIA,  the  Departments  of  Commerce  and 
Labor,  and  the  Civil  Service  Commission. 

The  Board  of  the  Foreign  Service,  which  was 
established  by  Presidential  Executive  Order 
11264  in  December  1965,^  is  charged  with  advis- 
ing the  Secretary  on  policies  relating  to  the 
functions,  selection,  assignment,  rating,  and 
promotion  of  professional  foreign  affairs  of- 
ficers and  the  general  personnel  management  of 
the  foreign  affairs  establishment. 

In  making  the  amiouncement.  Secretary 
Rogers  said: 

"The  President  is  deeply  interested  in  the 
processes  by  wliich  foreign  policy  is  determined 
and  executed.  The  efficient  operation  of  these 
processes  is  heavily  dependent  on  well-organized 
and  properly  rationalized  personnel  systems  in 
the  foreign  affairs  agencies. 

"The  systems  in  question  have  grown  rapidly 
in  the  postwar  years,  and  changing  needs  have 
imposed  new  tasks  and  burdens  on  them.  We 
believe  it  is  time  to  see  what  changes  may  be 
required  in  order  to  make  sure  that  our  unique 
personnel  resources  are  being  used  in  the  most 
effective  manner  possible. 

"The  examination  will  take  place  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Board  of  the  Foreign  Service 
and  involve  all  of  the  foreign  affairs  agencies." 


H.  I.  Romnes  Named  Chairman 
of  National  U.N.  Day  for  1969 

The  United  States  Mission  to  the  United 
Nations  announced  on  April  28  (U.S./U.N. 
press  release  45)  that  President  Nixon  had  ap- 
pointed H.  I.  Romnes  as  1969  National  United 
Nations  Day  Chairman. 

In  a  letter  dated  April  9  appointing  Mr. 
Ronmes  to  head  the  annual  national  United  Na- 
tions Day  observances,  President  Nixon  said: 

Our  membership  in  and  our  support  of  the  United 
Nations  are  important  parts  of  our  total  foreign  policy. 
Through  the  United  Nations  we  seek  to  cooperate  in 
building  a  world  in  which  all  nations  feel  secure.  We 
seek  to  build  a  world  in  which  all  nations  will  have 
the  opportunities  and  the  skills  and  knowledge  needed 
for  economic  development  and  social  progress.  We  seek 
a  world  of  freedom  under  law.  It  is  to  these  ends  that 
the  United  Nations  is  dedicated. 

Mr.  Romnes,  who  is  chairman  of  the  board 
and  chief  executive  officer  of  the  American  Tele- 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  24, 1966,  p.  144. 


MAT    26,    1969 


451 


phone  and  Telegraph  Company,  will  lead  a 
year-long  effort  by  the  United  Nations  Associa- 
tion of  the  U.S.A.,  supported  by  a  prestigious 
cross  section  of  American  business  and  labor 
leaders,  to  demonstrate  the  United  States  com- 
mitment to  the  purposes  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter. 

National  United  Nations  Day  observances  will 
take  place  in  October.  Each  year  the  United  Na- 
tions Day  Chairman  supervises,  with  the  coop- 
eration of  local  and  State  United  Nations  Day 
chairmen  appointed  by  their  mayors  and  Gov- 
ernors, community  programs  in  cities  across  the 
country.  More  than  1,500  communities  will  par- 
ticipate this  year. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
AND   CONFERENCES 


United  States  Reviews  Question 
of  Colonial  Territories  and  Peoples 

Statement  hy  Seymour  M.  Finger  ^ 

As  we  look  at  the  question  of  granting  inde- 
pendence to  colonial  territories  and  peoples,  it 
is  important  to  see  the  situation  in  perspective. 

For  more  than  a  century  prior  to  1940,  the 
number  of  people  coming  under  foreign  domi- 
nation increased  substantially.  The  three  dec- 
ades since  that  time  have  seen  more  than  97 
percent  of  the  i^eople  who  were  under  colonial 
domination  in  1940  achieve  self-determination 
and  independence.  During  the  decade  1941-50, 
15  new  countries,  with  almost  600  million  peo- 
ple, attained  independence.  Meanwhile,  in  an 
anachronistic  develoj^ment,  three  small  coun- 
tries in  Eastern  Europe  were  deprived  of  their 
independence. 

In  the  following  decade,  1951-60,  25  coun- 
tries, with  173  million  people,  acliieved  inde- 
pendence. Unfortunately,  this  decade  also 
witnessed  loss  of  the  autonomy  guaranteed  to 

"  Made  on  Apr.  17  in  the  U.N.  Preparatory  Committee 
for  the  Tenth  Anniversary  of  the  Declaration  on  the 
Granting  of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and 
Peoples  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  41).  Ambassador 
Finger  is  U.S.  Representative  on  the  committee. 


the  Tibetan  people  in  a  l7-point  agreement  of 
1951.  Nevertheless,  there  was  a  great  thrust  for- 
ward in  ending  colonialism,  climaxed  by  the 
admission  of  18  new  member  nations  to  the 
United  Nations  in  1960. 

The  current  decade  of  1961-70  corresponds 
to  the  period  during  which  the  Committee  of 
24  [Special  Committee  on  the  Situation  with 
regard  to  the  Implementation  of  the  Declara- 
tion on  the  Granting  of  Independence  to  Co- 
lonial Countries  and  Peoples]  has  been  active. 
During  that  time,  25  countries,  with  67  million 
people,  have  attained  independence. 

Thus,  in  less  than  thi'ee  decades  65  former  de- 
pendent territories  containing  about  one-third 
of  the  world's  people  have  become  new  inde- 
pendent states.  They  now  constitute  more  than 
half  the  membership  of  the  United  Nations. 

Meanwliile,  the  peoples  of  many  other  for- 
merly dependent  territories  have  exercised  self- 
determination  by  freely  choosing  self-govern- 
ment in  association  with  other  countries. 

In  looking  back  over  these  three  decades,  the 
following  conclusions  emerge : 

First,  this  massive  surge  of  independence  took 
place  largely  without  violence  and  essentially 
through  voluntary  action  by  the  former  admin- 
istering powers.  There  appeared  to  be  a  general 
recognition  that  colonialism  had  seen  its  day 
and  that  the  independence  of  colonial  territories 
was  not  only  the  right  of  the  peoples  of  those 
territories  but  also  was  beneficial  to  the  world 
in  general,  including  the  former  administering 
powers. 

Second,  the  former  administering  powers — 
largely  Western  European  countries  and  Japan 
— have  enjoyed  and  are  enjoying  unprecedented 
prosperity  since  their  former  colonies  became 
independent.  Moreover,  friendly  and  produc- 
tive relations  have  been  the  rule  Ijetween  former 
colonies  and  the  metropolitan  countries  rather 
than  the  exception. 

I  think  these  conclusions  are  important  not 
only  in  evaluating  the  past  three  decades  but 
also  in  looking  toward  the  future.  In  light  of 
this  experience  of  the  past  three  decades,  no 
one — whether  an  administering  power  or  an 
advocate  of  instant  independence — should  be- 
lieve any  longer  in  the  myth  that  colonies  are 
an  economic  necessity  for  the  administering 
power. 

Another  myth  which  cannot  be  taken  seriously 
in  the  light  of  experience  is  the  false  allegation 
that  foreign  economic  investment  is,  in  tliis  day 


452 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BUIiLETIN 


and  age,  a  significant  prop  to  colonialism.  The 
fact  is  that  foreign  economic  investment  in 
Africa  and  Asia  has  greatly  expanded  during 
the  period  shice  independence  has  come  to  those 
two  continents.  In  Africa,  private  investment 
from  the  United  States  alone  in  the  newly  in- 
dependent countries  has  amoimted  to  more  than 
a  billion  dollars,  and  U.S.  public  aid  to  over 
$4  billion.  It  is  true  that  private  investment  also 
continues  in  those  areas  of  southern  Africa 
which  have  not  yet  been  able  to  exercise  self- 
determination — Namibia,  Southern  Rhodesia, 
Angola,  and  Mozambique — but  American  in- 
vestment in  those  territories  is  but  a  tiny  frac- 
tion of  our  total  investment  abroad;  in  fact,  it 
is  only  about  one-quarter  of  1  percent. 

Another  myth  is  that  foreign  military  bases 
have  been  a  serious  impediment  to  independence. 
One  has  only  to  look  at  the  long  list  of  countries 
which  have  become  independent  in  the  last  two 
decades  to  see  that  this  allegation  is  false.  The 
fact  is  that  most  overseas  military  bases  and 
military  forces  of  the  world's  major  powers  are 
located  in  mdependent  countries,  as  a  result  of 
a  mutuality  of  defense  and  security  interests. 

With  these  perspectives  in  mind,  let  us  look 
at  the  task  ahead.  Whereas  in  1940  about  one- 
third  of  the  world's  people  lived  in  dependent 
territories,  now  the  figure  is  less  than  1  per- 
cent. But  we  cannot  be  complacent  simply  be- 
cause progress  has  been  made.  We  cannot  rest 
easy  while  the  hard  core  of  the  problem  remains. 
I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  absence  of  self-deter- 
mination for  the  peoples  of  southern  Africa. 

In  Namibia  we  see  a  South  African  regime 
which  is  continuing  to  administer  the  territory 
despite  the  fact  that  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  decided  that  South  Africa  had  for- 
feited its  mandate  and  that  it  has  no  other  right 
to  administer  Namibia.  Even  worse,  the  South 
African  authorities  are  extending  to  Namibia 
the  odious  practice  of  apartheid. 

In  Southern  Rhodesia  it  is  not  the  metropoli- 
tan power — the  United  Kingdom — which  is  im- 
posing its  will  on  an  African  people,  but  rather 
a  narrowminded  and  arrogant  minority  settler 
group. 

In  Angola  and  Mozambique  we  see  the  last 
remaining  major  areas  of  the  Southern  Hemi- 
sphere which  are  still  dominated  by  a  metro- 
politan power — Portugal.  Let  me  say  clearly 
and  unequivocally  that  this  is  an  anachronism 
in  the  modern  world.  The  United  States  firmly 
supports  the  right  of  the  peoples  of  Angola  and 
Mozambique  to  self-determination. 


Our  general  debate  began  with  a  thoughtful 
statement  by  the  distinguished  Representative 
of  Algeria.  Although  we  do  not  agree  with  him 
on  all  points,  we  do  feel  that  he  endeavored  to 
deal  in  a  serious  way  with  some  of  the  major 
problems  facing  the  United  Nations  in  this  area. 
He  first  questioned  whether  further  patience, 
calm,  and  efforts  at  persuasion  are  in  order.  We 
can  well  understand  why  a  representative  as 
seriously  interested  in  ending  colonialism  as  is 
the  Representative  of  Algeria  would  become 
impatient  in  the  present  circiunstances.  This  is 
particularly  understandable  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  Algeria  was  one  of  the  few  countries  that, 
like  the  United  States,  had  to  fight  a  major 
war  of  independence. 

Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  the  problems  of 
southern  Africa  do  require  more  patience — 
patience,  but  not  resignation.  First  of  all,  it  is 
clear  that  countries  outside  southern  Africa  are 
in  general  not  prepared  to  wage  the  major  and 
probably  catastrophic  war  which  would  be  re- 
quired to  dislodge  the  regimes  now  in  power. 
Secondly,  as  odious  as  the  denial  of  human 
rights  and  self-detennination  in  this  area  is,  we 
do  not  believe  that  the  situation  in  Namibia  and 
the  Portuguese  territories  represents  a  threat  to 
international  peace  and  security.  Thirdly,  we 
recall  that  most  of  the  members  of  the  United 
Nations  became  independent  through  peaceful 
means ;  and  wliile  such  peaceful  change  remains 
possible — however  slow  it  may  be — we  are  con- 
vinced that  such  peaceful  means  are  in  the  best 
interest  of  everyone  concerned. 

The  distinguished  Representative  of  Algeria 
also  alleged  that  the  strategic  interests  of  cer- 
tain major  trading  nations  are  closely  linked  to 
the  status  quo,  since  they  are  "allied  to  colonial 
regimes."  If  he  meant  to  include  the  United 
States,  he  is  wrong.  We  have  no  strategic  inter- 
est in  seeing  Southern  Rhodesia  dominated  by  a 
white  minority  nor  in  having  an  illegal  South 
African  occupation  of  Namibia. — none  whatso- 
ever. Nor  would  it  damage  our  strategic  inter- 
ests in  any  way  if  the  peoples  of  Angola  and 
Mozambique  were  to  achieve  self-determination. 

The  third  principal  point  made  by  the  dis- 
tinguished Representative  of  Algeria  is  one 
which  we  found  particularly  interesting.  He 
emphasized  that  in  the  case  of  small  territories, 
we  should  place  particular  stress  on  their  right 
to  self-determination,  security,  and  well-being. 
It  follows  that  the  inliabitants  of  those  terri- 
tories are  those  in  the  best  position  to  judge 
whether  their  security  and  well-being  can  best 


MAT    26,    1969 


453 


be  protected  through  association  with  another 
state  or  through  other  means.  The  smallest 
territories  may  indeed  find  the  association  vir- 
tually imperative  in  terms  of  insuring  secu- 
rity and  well-being.  For  those  who  do  not  choose 
some  form  of  association  with  another  power 
and  are  too  small  to  assume  the  obligations  of 
full  membership  in  the  United  Nations,  ways 
should  be  sought  to  associate  them  with  the 
United  Nations  through  a  status  short  of  full 
membership.  This  status  should  permit  assist- 
ance from  the  various  agencies  of  the  United 
Nations  system  and  perhaps  some  form  of  ob- 
server status.  We  note  that  this  item  is  on  the 
agenda  of  the  Committee  of  24,  and  we  hope 
for  a  constructive  discussion  in  that  forum. 

Let  me  summarize  briefly,  Mr.  Chairman,  the 
views  of  the  United  States  delegation  at  this 
stage  of  the  committee's  work.  Clearly  these 
views  are  preliminary,  as  we  wish  to  hear  the 
ideas  of  other  delegations  and  wish  to  give  fur- 
ther reflection  before  coming  to  more  definitive 
conclusions. 

First,  we  believe  that  this  occasion  should 
be  used  to  assess  where  we  stand  in  the  struggle 
to  win  freedom  and  self-determination  for  all 
peoples.  We  should  evaluate  our  successes  and 
our  failures. 

Second,  on  the  basis  of  this  evaluation  and 
analysis,  we  should  plan  the  future  work  of  the 
United  Nations  in  this  area — discarding  what 
is  not  productive  and  seeking  new  and  more 
effective  approaches. 

Third,  in  working  out  our  program,  we 
should  give  special  priorities  to  the  problem 
of  southern  Africa,  where  the  hard  core  of 
colonialism  remains. 

Fourth,  we  must  seek  new  ways  to  help  the 
peoples  of  small  dependent  territories  to  achieve 
self-determination,  security,  and  well-being. 

As  we  proceed  with  this  review,  I  think  we 
should  bear  in  mind  the  history  of  the  Bourbons, 
who,  it  is  said,  never  learned  anything  and  never 
forgot  anything.  Let  us  not  be  Bourbons.  In- 
stead, let  us  analyze  the  history  of  the  last  few 
decades  in  a  clearheaded  and  unprejudiced  fash- 
ion, to  determine  what  has  worked  and  what 
has  not  worked.  Let  us  not  proceed  obstinately 
with  tactics  of  the  past — of  repeating  year  after 
year  resolutions  which  are  known  to  be  ineffec- 
tual on  the  day  they  are  adopted,  of  adopting 
resolutions  based  on  myths  such  as  the  red  her- 
rings of  foreign  military  bases  and  foreign  eco- 
nomic investment.  Such  outworn  shibboleths 
cannot  substitute  for  the  hard  thought  we  must 


all  give  to  the  solution  of  the  remaining  hard- 
core problems.  Though  it  may  appear  elemen- 
tary to  say  so,  it  would  also  be  wise  not  to 
slander  those  countries  whose  cooperation  is 
considered  important  in  achieving  the  objec- 
tives of  resolutions  to  be  adopted.  Tlais  does  not 
mean  that  there  cannot  be  legitimate  and  con- 
structive criticism;  indeed,  there  must  be.  But 
it  does  mean  that  we  should  keep  our  eye  on 
the  real  problems  and  act  responsibly  in  terms 
of  the  real  interests  of  dependent  peoples. 

In  saying  this,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  direct  my  re- 
marks as  much  at  the  administering  powers  as 
to  those  who  have  criticized  them.  I  believe  this 
is  the  occasion  for  all  administering  powers, 
including  the  United  States,  to  make  a  careful 
review  of  the  territories  for  which  they  are  re- 
sponsible, to  reexamine  past  policies  and  prac- 
tices, and  to  seek  solutions  assuring  self-determi- 
nation, security,  and  well-being. 


Current  U.N.  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 

Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  {such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  he  consttlted  at  depository  libraries 
in  the  United  States.  V.N.  printed  publications  may  be 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Na~ 
tions.  United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 


General  Assembly 

Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  the  Sea-Bed  and 
the  Ocean  Floor  Beyond  the  Limits  of  National 
Jurisdiction.  Proposals  and  Views  Relating  to  the 
Adoption  of  Principles.  Working  paper  prepared  by 
the  Secretariat  A/AC.138/7.  March  6,  1969.  50  pp. 


Economic  and  Social  Council 

Commission  on  the  Status  of  Women.  Study  on 
UNESCO  Activities  of  Special  Interest  to  Women. 
Report  prepared  by  UNESCO.  E/CN.6/520.  Janu- 
ary 23, 1969.  57  pp. 

Fifth  Report  on  Progress  in  Land  Reform.  Summary 
report  prepared  by  the  Secretary  General  in  collab- 
oration with  FAO  and  ILO.  E/4617.  February  24. 
1969.  42  pp. 

Development  of  Natural  Resources:  Water  Desalina- 
tion. Report  of  the  Secretary  General  with  special 
reference  to  major  developments  in  1967-1968. 
E/4625.  March  17,  1969.  16  pp. 

Development  of  Tourism.  Implementation  of  the  Rec- 
ommendations of  the  United  Nations  Conference  on 
International  Travel  and  Tourism.  Periodic  report 
of  the  Secretary  General.  E/4629.  March  20,  1969. 
12  pp. 

Arrangements  for  the  Transfer  of  Operative  Technol- 
ogy to  Developing  Countries.  Report  of  the  Secretary 
General.  B/4633.  March  27,  1969.  19  pp. 


454 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


U.S.  and  Brazil  Sign  Agreement 
on  Soluble  Coffee 

Press  release  97  dated  April  30 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 


In  the  event  that  no  agreement  is  reached  on 
these  further  measures  by  March  1,  1970,  the 
United  States  reserves  its  right  to  impose  meas- 
ures it  deems  appropriate  to  correct  the  present 
undesirable  situation.  In  the  view  of  the  United 
States  Government,  this  would  involve  taking 
steps  to  insure  that  a  total  tax  burden  of  30  cents 
per  pound  is  levied  on  Brazilian  soluble  coffee 
by  May  1, 1970. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances 
of  my  highest  consideration. 

William  Belton 


The  United  States  and  Brazil  exchanged 
diplomatic  notes  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  on  April  30 
dealing  with  soluble  coffee  exports  to  the  United 
States.  The  notes  were  signed  by  William  Bel- 
ton,  Charge  d'Aff aires  ad  interim,  for  the  United 
States  and  by  Jose  de  Magalhaes  Pinto,  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  for  Brazil. 

EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES 


U.S.  Note 


April  30, 1969 


No.  233 

Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the 
recent  discussions  between  representatives  of 
the  Goverimients  of  the  United  States  and  Bra- 
zil concerning  the  results  of  the  recent  arbitra- 
tion on  soluble  coffee  carried  out  under  Article 
4A  of  the  International  Coffee  Agreement,  1968. 

It  is  the  understanding  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  that  the  following  steps  are 
agreed  to  by  the  Government  of  Brazil : 

(A)  As  a  first  step,  the  Government  of  Bra- 
zil will  impose  by  May  1,  1969  a  tax  of  13 
United  States  cents  per  pound  on  exports  to  the 
United  States  of  soluble  coffee  whether  such 
coffee  is  shipped  directly  or  indirectly  to  the 
United  States. 

(B)  Both  governments  agree  to  meet  on  or 
about  January  15,  1970,  to  consult  on  develop- 
ments in  the  soluble  coffee  markets  and  to  seek 
agreement  on  further  measures  to  be  taken  with 
respect  to  soluble  coffee  exports  from  Brazil. 
Such  discussion  will  be  concluded  not  later  than 
March  1, 1970. 

(C)  The  Government  of  Brazil  will  not  in- 
troduce new  governmental  measures  or  alter 
existing  measures  that  would  offset  the  effects 
of  this  new  tax. 


Brazilian   Note 

April  30, 1969 
Excellency:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowl- 
edge   receipt    of    your    Excellency's    note    of 
April  30  as  follows : 

[Textof  U.S.  note.] 

In  reply,  I  transmit  my  agreement  to  the 
terms  of  the  above  note,  except,  however,  that 
the  Brazilian  Government  does  not  guarantee 
to  the  United  States  Government  that  the  tax 
level  mentioned  in  the  above  paragraph  will 
be  acceptable.  The  Brazilian  Government  is  dis- 
posed to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  the  results 
which  the  measure  now  being  taken  will  pro- 
duce in  the  course  of  the  current  year. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of 
my  highest  consideration. 

Jose  de  Magalhaes  Pinto 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the  principles 
and  purposes  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty.  Adopted  at 
Paris  November  29,  1968.' 
Notification  of  approval:  South  Africa,  May  6,  1969. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations.   Done  at 
Vienna  April  18,  1961.  Entered  into  force  April  24, 
1964.' 
Accession  deposited:  Swaziland,  April  25, 1969. 

Fisheries 

International  convention  for  the  conservation  of  Atlan- 


'  Not  in  force. 

■  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


may    26,    1969 


455 


tic  tunas.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  May  14,  1966.  En- 
tered into  force  March  21,  1969. 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  April  1,  1969. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimmn  age  for 
marriage,  and  registration  of  marriages.  Done  at  New 
York  December  10,  1962.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 9, 1964." 
Accession  deposited:  Spain,  April  15,  1969. 

Nuclear  Test  Ban 

Treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests   in   the  atmos- 
phere,  in   outer   space  and  under  water.   Done  at 
Moscow  August  5, 1963.  Entered  into  force  October  10, 
1963.  TIAS  5433. 
Notification  of  succession:  Mauritius,  May  7, 1969. 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of 
execution.  Done  at  Vienna  July  10, 1964.  Entered  into 
force  January  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Afghanistan,  January  16, 
1969 ;  Cyprus,  January  13, 1969. 

Space 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Denmark, 
May  6,  1969. 

Women — Political  Rights 

Convention  on  the  political  rights  of  women.  Done  at 
New  Yorli  March  31,  1953.  Entered  into  force  July  7, 
1954.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria  (with  a  reservation), 
April  18,  1969. 


India 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreements  of  February  20,  1967  (TIAS 
6221),  and  June  24,  1967  (TIAS  6338).  Signed  at 
New  Delhi  April  25, 1969.  Entered  into  force  April  25, 
1969. 

Philippines 

Agreement  relating  to  a  cloud  seeding  project  In  the 
Philippines.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila 
AprU  23  and  24,  1969.  Entered  into  force  April  24, 
1969. 

Agreement  relating  to  customs  regulations  governing 
cargo  consigned  to  United  States  military  authorities 
or  armed  forces  personnel,  with  annexes.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Manila  April  24,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  AprU  24,  1969. 

Romania 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  abolition  of  cer- 
tain visa  fees.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Bucharest  April  25,  1969.  Entered  into  force  May  1, 
1969. 

Reciprocal  agreement  for  the  reduction  of  passport  visa 
fees.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
August   25,   29,   and   30,   1939.    Entered   into   force 
September  1, 1939. 
Terminated:  May  1, 1969. 


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Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  the  application  of  safeguards  on 
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Canada  to  the  United  States.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  January  28  and  30, 1969.  Entered 
into  force  January  30,  1969.  (Correction  of  entry  in 
the  Bulletin  of  Mar.  10, 1969,  p.  216.) 

Chile 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities  with 
exchange  of  notes,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  De- 
cember 29,  1967  (TIAS  6403).  Signed  at  Santiago 
April  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  AprU  29,  1969. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  relating  to  Investment  guaranties.  Signed  at 
San  Salvador  April  28, 1969.  Enters  into  force  on  the 
date  of  a  note  whereby  El  Salvador  notifies  the 
United  States  that  the  agreement  has  been  approved 
in  conformity  with  El  Salvador's  constitutional  pro- 
cedures. 


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describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy,  and 
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Laos 

Pub. 

8301 

8  pp. 

Malta 

Pub. 

8220 

4  pp. 

Nicaragua 

Pub. 

7772 

4  pp. 

Saudi  Arabia 

Pub. 

7835 

4  pp. 

South  West 

Pub. 

8168 

6  pp. 

Africa  (Namibia) 

United  Arab 

Pub. 

8152 

5  pp. 

Republic 

456 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


INDEX     May  £6,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1661 


Africa.  United  States  Reviews  Question  of  Co- 
lonial Territories  and  Peoples  (Finger)     .    .      452 

Asia 

Japan's  Economic  Dynamism  and  Our  Common 

Interests  in  East  Asia  (Barnett) 447 

Secretary  Rogers  To  Confer  With  Asian  Leaders 
During  17-Day  Trip  (statement  and  itiner- 
ary)        433 

Australia.  Prime  Minister  Gorton  of  Australia 

Visits  Washington  (Nixon,  Gorton)     ....      436 

Brazil.  U.S.  and  Brazil  Sign  Agreement  on 
Soluble  Coffee  (exchange  of  notes)     ....      455 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Secretary  Ap- 
points Nevr  Members  to  Board  of  the  Foreign 
Service 451 

Economic  Affairs 

Japan's  Economic  Dynamism  and  Our  Common 

Interests  in  East  Asia  (Barnett) 447 

Latin    America:    What   Are    Your    Priorities? 

(Meyer) 440 

U.S.  and  Brazil  Sign  Agreement  on  Soluble 
Coffee  (exchange  of  notes) 455 

Guinea.  Letters  of  Credence  (Keita)     ....      446 

Human  Rights.  Final  Report  Submitted  on  Ob- 
servance of  Human  Rights  Tear  1968  (Nixon, 
Harriman) 450 

Japan.  Japan's  Economic  Dynamism  and  Our 

Common  Interests  in  East  Asia  (Barnett)     .      447 

Kenya.  Letters  of  Credence  (Kibinge)     ....      446 

Latin  America.  Latin  America :  What  Are  Your 
Priorities?  (Meyer) 440 

Near  East.  The  Arab-Israeli  Confrontation — A 
Challenge  to  International  Diplomacy  (Sis- 
co) 443 

Non-Self-Governing  Territories.  United  States 
Reviews  Question  of  Colonial  Territories  and 
Peoples  (Finger) 452 

Presidential  Documents 

Final  Report  Submitted  on  Observance  of  Hu- 
man Rights  Year  1968 450 

Prime    Minister    Gorton    of    Australia    Visits 

Washington       436 

Publications.  Recent  Releases 456 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 455 

U.S.  and  Brazil  Sign  Agreement  on  Soluble 
Coffee  (exchange  of  notes) 455 

United  Nations 

The  Arab-Israeli  Confrontation — A  Challenge  to 

International  Diplomacy  (Sisco) 443 

Current  U.N.  Documents 454 

H.   I.   Romnes  Named   Chairman   of   National 

U.N.  Day  for  1969 451 

United    States   Reviews   Question   of    Colonial 

Territories  and  Peoples  (Finger) 452 

Viet-Nam 

Secretary  Rogers  To  Confer  With  Asian  Leaders 
During  17-Day  Trip  (statement  and  itiner- 
ary)        433 

16th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 434 


Name  Index 

Barnett,  Robert  W 447 

Finger,    Seymour    M 452 

Gorton,  John  G 436 

Harriman,    W.    Averell 450 

Hillenbrand,  Martin 451 

Keita,   Fadiala 446 

Kibinge,  Leonard  Oliver 446 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 434 

Meyer,  Charles  A 440 

Nixon,  President 436, 450 

Richardson,  Elliot  L 451 

Rimestad,  Idar 451 

Rogers,  Secretary 433,451 

Romnes,  H.  I 451 

Sisco,  Joseph  J 443 

Trezise,   Philip 451 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  May  5-1 1 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  May  5  which  appear  in 
this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  90  of  April  23 
and  97  of  April  30. 

No.     Date  Subject 

*99    5/5    Handley  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Turkey  (biographic details). 
*100    5/5    Green  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs  (biographic details). 
101    5/6    Meyer :  "Latin  America :  What  Are 

Your  Priorities?" 
tl02    5/6     U.S.     delegation     to    14th     SEATO 

Council  meeting. 
tl03    5/6    U.S.  participants  In  seven-nation  con- 
ference on  Viet-Nam. 
tl04    5/6     U.S.     observer    delegation    to    16th 
CENTO  Council  meeting. 
105    5/6     Secretary  Rogers'  itinerary,  May  12- 

29  (rewrite). 
lOG    5/7    New  members  appointed  to  Board  of 

the  Foreign  Service. 
107     5/8     Lodge :  15th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris. 
tl08    5/8    Meyer:     Subcommittee     on     Inter- 
American    Affairs    of    the    House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs. 
*109    5/S     Leonhart  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Yugoslavia  (biographic  details). 
*110    5/8    Puhan  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Hungary  (biographic details). 
*111    5/9    Peterson  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Finland  (biographic details). 
112     5/9    Rogers :  trip  to  Asia. 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1562 


June  2,  1969 


PEACE  IN  VIETNAM 

Address  by  President  Nixon     4^7 

SECRETARY  ROGERS  VISITS  VIET-NAM     i61 

AMBASSADOR  LODGE  DISCUSSES  THE  PARIS  PEACE  TALKS 

Transcript  of  News  Conference  at  the  White  House     465 

SEVENTEENTH  PLENARY  SESSION  ON  VIETNAM  HELD  AT  PARIS 

Statement  by  Ainbassadoi'  Lodge     467 
Boston  Public  Library 
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JUN  19  1969 

DEPOSITORY 
For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1562 
June  2,  1969 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
tcith  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  tcork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy ,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
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States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
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Publications  of  the  Department, 
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national relations  are  listed  currently. 


Peace  inViet-Nam 


Address  by  President  Nixon  ^ 


I  have  asked  for  this  television  time  tonight 
to  report  to  you  on  our  most  difficult  and  urgent 
problem — the  war  in  Viet-Nam. 

Since  I  took  office  4  months  ago  nothing  has 
commanded  so  much  of  my  time  and  energy  as 
the  search  for  a  way  to  bring  lasting  peace  in 
Viet-Nam.  I  know  that  some  believe  I  should 
have  ended  the  war  immediately  after  my  inau- 
guration by  simply  withdrawing  our  forces 
from  Viet-Nam. 

This  would  have  been  the  easy  thing  to  do, 
and  it  might  have  been  a  popular  move. 

But  I  would  have  betrayed  my  solemn  re- 
sponsibility as  President  of  the  United  States 
had  I  done  so. 

I  want  to  end  this  war.  The  American  people 
want  to  end  this  war.  The  South  Vietnamese 
people  want  to  end  this  war.  But  we  want  to  end 
it  permanently  so  that  the  younger  brothers  of 
our  soldiers  m  Viet-Nam  will  not  have  to  fight 
in  the  future  in  another  Viet-Nam  someplace 
in  the  world. 

The  fact  that  there  is  no  easy  way  to  end  the 
war  does  not  mean  that  we  have  no  choice  but 
to  let  the  war  drag  on  with  no  end  in  sight. 

For  more  than  4  years  American  boys  have 
been  fighting  and  dying  in  Viet-Nam.  For  12 
months  our  negotiators  have  been  talking  with 
the  other  side  in  Paris.  Yet  the  fighting  goes 
on.  The  destruction  continues.  Brave  men  still 
die. 

The  time  has  come  for  some  new  initiatives. 
Kepeating  the  old  formulas  and  the  tired  rhet- 
oric of  the  past  is  not  enough.  When  Americans 
are  risking  their  lives  in  war,  it  is  the  respon- 
sibility of  their  leaders  to  take  some  risks  for 
peace. 

I  would  like  to  report  to  you  tonight  on  some 
of  the  things  we  have  been  doing  in  the  past  4 

^Made  to  the  Nation  on  television  and  radio  on 
May  14  (White  House  press  release;  text  prepared  for 
delivery). 


months  to  bring  true  peace,  and  then  I  would 
like  to  make  some  concrete  proposals  to  speed 
that  day. 

Review  and  Reassessment 

Our  first  step  began  before  inauguration.  This 
was  to  launch  an  intensive  review  of  every  as- 
pect of  the  Nation's  Viet-Nam  policy.  We  ac- 
cepted nothing  on  faith;  we  challenged  every 
assumption  and  every  statistic.  We  made  a  sys- 
tematic, serious  examination  of  all  the  alterna- 
tives open  to  us.  We  carefully  considered  rec- 
ommendations offered  both  by  critics  and  by 
supporters  of  past  policies. 

From  the  review,  it  became  clear  at  once  that 
the  new  admiaistration  faced  a  set  of  immediate 
operational  problems. 

— The  other  side  was  preparing  for  a  new 
offensive. 

— There  was  a  wide  gulf  of  distrust  between 
Washington  and  Saigon  which  hindered  co- 
operation. 

— In  8  months  of  talks  in  Paris  there  had  been 
no  negotiations  directly  concerned  vnth  a  final 
settlement. 

We  therefore  moved  on  several  fronts  at  once. 

We  frustrated  the  attack  which  was  lavmched 
in  lat«  February.  As  a  result,  the  North  Viet- 
namese and  the  Viet  Cong  failed  to  achieve  their 
military  objectives. 

We  restored  a  close  working  relationship  with 
Saigon.  In  the  resulting  atmosphere  of  mutual 
confidence,  President  Thieu  and  his  government 
have  taken  important  initiatives  in  the  search 
for  a  settlement. 

We  speeded  up  the  strengthening  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  forces.  As  a  result,  General  Abrams 
[Gen.  Creighton  W.  Abrams,  Commander,  U.S. 
Military  Assistance  Command,  Viet-Nam]  re- 
ported to  me  on  Monday  that  progress  in  this 


JtTNB   2,    1969 


457 


training  program  has  been  excellent  and  that, 
apart  from  what  will  develop  from  the  negotia- 
tions, the  time  is  approaching  when  South  Viet- 
namese forces  will  be  able  to  take  over  some 
of  the  fighting  fronts  now  being  manned  by 
Americans. 

Our  deepest  concern  has  been  the  development 
of  a  coherent  peace  policy  so  that  our  various 
moves  would  reinforce  each  other.  As  a  result, 
we  have  been  able  to  move  the  Paris  talks  to- 
ward the  substantive  issues  essential  to  an 
agreement. 

In  weighing  alternative  courses,  we  have  had 
to  recognize  that  the  situation  as  it  exists  today 
is  far  different  from  what  it  was  2  years  ago  or 
4  years  ago  or  10  years  ago. 

One  difference  is  that  we  no  longer  have  the 
choice  of  not  intervening.  We  have  crossed  that 
bridge.  There  are  now  more  than  half  a  million 
American  troops  in  Viet-Nam,  and  35,000  Amer- 
icans have  lost  their  lives  there. 

We  can  have  honest  debate  about  whether  we 
should  have  entered  the  war.  We  can  have 
honest  debate  about  the  past  conduct  of  the  war. 
But  the  urgent  question  today  is  what  to  do  now 
that  we  are  there,  not  whether  we  should  have 
entered  on  this  course,  but  what  is  required  of  us 
today. 

Against  that  background,  let  me  discuss,  first, 
what  we  have  rejected,  and  second,  what  we  are 
prepared  to  accept. 

Essential   Principles 

We  have  ruled  out  attempting  to  impose  a 
purely  military  solution  on  the  battlefield. 

We  have  also  ruled  out  either  a  one-sided 
withdrawal  from  Viet-Nam  or  the  acceptance 
in  Paris  of  terms  that  would  amount  to  a  dis- 
guised defeat. 

When  we  assumed  the  burden  of  helping  de- 
fend South  Viet-Nam,  millions  of  South  Viet- 
namese men,  women,  and  children  placed  their 
trust  in  us.  To  abandon  them  now  would  risk 
a  massacre  that  would  shock  and  dismay  every- 
one in  the  world  who  values  human  life. 

Abandoning  the  South  Vietnamese  people, 
however,  would  jeopardize  more  than  lives  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  It  would  threaten  our  longer 
term  hopes  for  peace  in  the  world.  A  great  na- 
tion caimot  renege  on  its  pledges.  A  great  nation 
must  be  worthy  of  trust. 

When  it  comes  to  maintaining  peace,  "pres- 
tige" is  not  an  empty  word.  I  am  not  speaking 
of  false  pride  or  bravado — they  should  have  no 


place  in  our  policies.  I  speak  rather  of  the  re- 
spect that  one  nation  has  for  another's  integrity 
in  defending  its  principles  and  meeting  ite 
obligations. 

If  we  simply  abandoned  our  effort  in  Viet- 
Nam,  the  cause  of  peace  might  not  survive  the 
damage  that  would  be  done  to  other  nations' 
confidence  in  our  reliability. 

Another  reason  stems  from  debates  within 
the  Communist  world  between  those  who  argue 
for  a  policy  of  confrontation  with  the  United 
States  and  those  who  argue  against  it.  If  Hanoi 
were  to  succeed  in  taking  over  South  Viet-Nam 
by  force — even  after  the  power  of  the  United 
States  had  been  engaged — it  would  greatly 
strengthen  those  leaders  who  scorn  negotiation, 
who  advocate  aggression,  who  minimize  the 
risks  of  confrontation.  It  would  bring  peace 
now,  but  it  would  enormously  increase  the 
danger  of  a  bigger  war  later. 

If  we  are  to  move  successfully  from  an  era 
of  confrontation  to  an  era  of  negotiation,  then 
we  have  to  demonstrate — at  the  point  at  which 
confrontation  is  being  tested — that  confronta- 
tion with  the  United  States  is  costly  and 
imrewarding. 

Almost  without  exception,  the  leaders  of  non- 
Communist  Asia  have  told  me  that  they  would 
consider  a  one-sided  American  withdrawal  from 
Viet-Nam  to  be  a  threat  to  the  security  of  their 
own  nations. 

In  determining  what  choices  would  be  ac- 
ceptable, we  have  to  understand  our  essential 
objective:  We  seek  the  opportunity  for  the 
South  Vietnamese  people  to  determine  their 
own  jjolitical  future  without  outside  inter- 
ference. 

Let  me  put  it  plainly:  What  the  United 
States  wants  for  South  Viet-Nam  is  not  the  im- 
portant thing.  Wliat  North  Viet-Nam  wants  for^ 
South  Viet-Nam  is  not  the  important  thing.i 
Wliat  is  important  is  what  the  people  of  South' 
Viet-Nam  want  for  themselves. 

The  United  States  has  suffered  over  1  million 
casualties  in  four  wars  in  this  century.  What- 
ever faults  we  may  have  as  a  nation,  we  have 
asked  nothing  for  ourselves  in  return  for  these 
sacrifices.  We  have  been  generous  toward  those 
whom  we  have  fought,  helping  former  foes  as 
well  as  friends  in  the  task  of  reconstruction. 
We  are  proud  of  this  record,  and  we  bring  the 
same  attitude  to  our  search  for  a  settlement  in 
Viet-Nam. 

In  this  spirit,  let  me  be  explicit  about  several 
points : 


458 


DEPABTMENT   OF   STATE   BtnLLETIN 


— We  seek  no  bases  in  Viet-Nam. 

— We  insist  on  no  military  ties. 

— We  are  willing  to  agree  to  neutrality  if  that 
is  what  the  South  Vietnamese  people  freely 
choose. 

— We  believe  there  should  be  an  opportunity 
for  full  participation  in  the  political  life  of 
South  Viet-Nam  by  all  political  elements  that 
are  prepared  to  do  so  without  the  use  of  force 
or  intimidation. 

— ^We  are  prepared  to  accept  any  government 
in  South  Viet-Nam  that  results  from  the  free 
choice  of  the  South  Vietnamese  people  them- 
selves. 

— We  have  no  intention  of  imposing  any  form 
of  government  upon  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam,  nor  will  we  be  a  party  to  such  coercion. 

— We  have  no  objection  to  reunification,  if 
that  turns  out  to  be  what  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam  and  the  people  of  North  Viet-Nam 
want ;  we  ask  only  that  the  decision  reflect  the 
free  choice  of  the  people  concerned. 

At  this  point,  I  would  like  to  add  a  personal 
word  based  on  many  visits  to  South  Viet-Nam 
over  the  past  5  years.  This  is  the  most  difficult 
war  in  America's  history,  fought  against  a 
ruthless  enemy.  I  am  proud  of  our  men  ^s^ho 
have  carried  the  terrible  burden  of  this  war  with 
dignity  and  courage  despite  the  division  and 
opposition  to  the  war  in  the  United  States. 
History  will  record  that  never  have  America's 
fighting  men  fought  more  bravely  for  more  un- 
selfish goals  than  our  men  in  Viet-Nam.  It  is 
our  responsibility  to  see  that  they  will  not  have 
fought  in  vain. 

In  pursuing  our  limited  objective,  we  insist  on 
no  rigid  diplomatic  fonnula.  Peace  could  be 
achieved  by  a  formal  negotiated  settlement. 
Peace  could  be  achieved  by  an  informal  under- 
standing, provided  that  the  understanding  is 
clear  and  that  there  were  adequate  assurances 
that  it  would  be  observed.  Peace  on  paper  is  not 
as  important  as  peace  in  fact. 

The  Negotiations 

This  brings  us,  then,  to  the  matter  of  nego- 
tiations. 

We  must  recognize  that  peace  in  Viet-Nam 
cannot  be  achieved  overnight.  A  war  which  has 
raged  for  so  many  years  will  require  detailed 
negotiations  and  cannot  be  settled  at  a  single 
stroke. 

What  kind  of  a  settlement  will  permit  the 
South  Vietnamese  people  to  determine  freely 


their  own  political  future?  Such  a  settlement 
will  require  the  withdrawal  of  all  non-South 
Vietnamese  forces  fi-om  South  Viet-Nam  and 
procedures  for  political  choice  that  give  each 
significant  group  in  South  Viet-Nam  a  real  op- 
portunity to  participate  in  the  political  life  of 
the  nation. 

To  implement  these  principles,  I  reaffirm  now 
our  willingness  to  withdraw  our  forces  on  a 
specified  timetable.  We  ask  only  that  North  Viet- 
Nam  withdraw  its  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia,  and  Laos  into  North  Viet-Nam,  also 
in  accordance  with  a  timetable. 

We  include  Cambodia  and  Laos  to  ensure  that 
these  countries  would  not  be  used  as  bases  for 
a  renewed  war.  The  Cambodian  border  is  only 
35  miles  from  Saigon;  the  Laotian  border  is 
only  25  miles  from  Hue. 

Our  offer  provides  for  a  simultaneous  start  on 
withdrawal  by  both  sides ;  agreement  on  a  mu- 
tually acceptable  timetable;  and  for  the  with- 
drawal to  be  accomplished  quickly. 

If  North  Viet-Nam  wants  to  insist  that  it  has 
no  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam,  we  will  no  longer 
debate  the  point — provided  that  its  forces  cease 
to  be  there  and  that  we  have  reliable  assurances 
that  they  will  not  return. 

The  North  Vietnamese  delegates  have  been 
saying  in  Paris  that  political  issues  should  be 
discussed  along  with  military  issues  and  that 
there  must  be  a  political  settlement  in  the  South. 
We  do  not  dispute  this,  but  the  military  with- 
drawal involves  outside  forces  and  can  there- 
fore be  properly  negotiated  by  North  Viet-Nam 
and  the  United  States,  with  the  concurrence  of 
its  allies.  The  political  settlement  is  an  internal 
matter  which  ought  to  be  decided  among  the 
South  Vietnamese  themselves  and  not  imposed 
by  outside  powers.  However,  if  our  presence  at 
tliese  political  negotiations  would  be  helpful, 
and  if  the  South  Vietnamese  concerned  agreed, 
we  would  be  willing  to  participate,  along  with 
the  representatives  of  Hanoi  if  that  were  also 
desired. 

Recent  statements  by  President  Thieu  have 
gone  far  toward  opening  the  way  to  a  political 
settlement.  He  has  publicly  declared  his  govern- 
ment's willingness  to  discuss  a  political  solution 
with  tlie  National  Liberation  Front  and  has 
offered  free  elections.  This  was  a  dramatic  step 
forward,  a  reasonable  offer  that  could  lead  to  a 
settlement.  The  South  Vietnamese  Government 
has  offered  to  talk  without  preconditions.  I  be- 
lieve that  the  other  side  should  also  be  willing 
to  talk  without  preconditions. 


JUNE    2,    1969 


459 


The  South  Vietnamese  Government  recog- 
nizes, as  we  do,  that  a  settlement  must  permit  all 
persons  and  gi'oups  that  are  prepared  to  re- 
nounce the  use  of  force  to  participate  freely  in 
the  political  life  of  South  Viet-Nam.  To  be  ef- 
fective, such  a  settlement  would  require  two 
things:  first,  a  process  that  would  allow  the 
South  Vietnamese  people  to  express  their  choice ; 
and  second,  a  guarantee  that  this  process  would 
be  a  fair  one. 

We  do  not  insist  on  a  particular  form  of  guar- 
antee. The  important  thing  is  that  the  guaran- 
tees should  have  the  confidence  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  and  that  they  should  be 
broad  enough  and  strong  enough  to  pi'otect  the 
interests  of  all  major  South  Vietnamese  groups. 

This,  then,  is  the  outline  of  the  settlement 
that  we  seek  to  negotiate  in  Paris.  Its  basic 
terms  are  very  simple:  mutual  withdrawal  of 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  from  South  Viet- 
Nam  and  free  choice  for  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam.  I  believe  that  the  long-term  interests 
of  peace  require  that  we  insist  on  no  less  and 
that  the  realities  of  the  situation  require  that 
we  seek  no  more. 


Programs  and  Alternatives 

To  make  very  concrete  what  I  have  said,  I 
propose  the  following  measures,  which  seem  to 
me  consistent  with  the  principles  of  all  parties. 
These  proposals  are  made  on  the  basis  of  full 
consultation  with  President  Thieu. 

— As  soon  as  agreement  can  be  reached,  all 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  begin  with- 
drawals from  South  Viet-Nam. 

— Over  a  period  of  12  months,  by  agreed-upon 
stages,  the  major  portions  of  all  U.S.,  Allied, 
and  other  non- South  Vietnamese  forces  would 
be  withdrawn.  At  the  end  of  this  12-month 
period,  the  remaining  U.S.,  Allied,  and  other 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  move  into 
designated  base  areas  and  would  not  engage  in 
combat  operations. 

— The  remaining  U.S.  and  Allied  forces 
would  move  to  complete  their  withdrawals  as 
the  remaining  North  Vietnamese  forces  were 
withdrawn  and  returned  to  North  Viet-Nam. 

— An  international  supervisory  body,  accepta- 
ble to  both  sides,  would  be  created  for  the  pur- 
pose of  verifying  withdrawals  and  for  any  other 
purposes  agreed  upon  between  the  two  sides. 

— This  international  body  would  begin  oper- 
ating in  accordance  with  an  agreed  timetable 


and  would  participate  in  arranging  supervised 
cease-fires. 

— As  soon  as  possible  after  the  international 
body  was  fimctioning,  elections  would  be  held 
under  agreed  procedures  and  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  international  body. 

— Arrangements  would  be  made  for  the 
earliest  possible  release  of  prisoners  of  war  on 
both  sides. 

— All  parties  would  agree  to  observe  the 
Geneva  accords  of  1954  regarding  Viet-Nam  and 
Cambodia,  and  the  Laos  accords  of  1962. 

I  believe  this  proposal  for  peace  is  realistic 
and  takes  account  of  the  legitimate  interests  of 
all  concerned.  It  is  consistent  with  President 
Thieu's  six  points.  It  can  accommodate  the  vari- 
ous progi-ams  put  forth  by  the  other  side.  We 
and  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam  are 
prepared  to  discuss  its  details  with  the  other 
side.  Secretary  Rogers  is  now  in  Saigon  and  will 
be  discussing  with  President  Thieu  how,  to- 
gether, we  may  put  forward  these  proposed 
measures  most  usefully  in  Paris.  He  will,  as 
well,  be  consulting  with  our  other  Asian  allies 
on  these  measures  while  on  his  Asian  trip.  How- 
ever, I  would  stress  that  these  proposals  are  not 
offered  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it  basis.  We  are 
quite  willing  to  consider  other  approaches  con- 
sistent with  our  principles. 

We  are  willing  to  talk  about  anybody's  pro- 
gram— Hanoi's  four  points,  the  NLF's  10 
points — provided  it  can  be  made  consistent  with 
the  few  basic  principles  I  have  set  forth  here. 

Despite  our  disagreement  with  several  of  its 
points,  we  welcome  the  fact  that  the  NLF  has 
put  forward  its  first  comprehensive  program. 
We  are  continuing  to  study  it  carefully.  How- 
ever, we  cannot  ignore  the  fact  that  immediately 
after  the  offer,  the  scale  of  enemy  attacks 
stepped  up  and  American  casualties  increased. 

Let  me  make  one  point  very  clear.  If  the 
enemy  wants  peace  with  the  United  States,  that 
is  not  the  way  to  get  it. 

I  have  set  forth  a  peace  program  tonight 
which  is  generous  in  its  terms.  I  have  indicated 
our  willingness  to  consider  other  proposals.  No 
greater  mistake  could  be  made  than  to  confuse 
flexibility  with  weakness  or  being  reasonable 
with  lack  of  resolution.  I  must  make  clear,  in 
all  candor,  that  if  the  needless  suffering  con- 
tinues, this  will  affect  other  decisions.  Nobody 
has  anything  to  gain  by  delay. 

Reports  from  Hanoi  indicate  that  the  enemy 
has  given  up  hope  for  a  military  victory  in 


I 


460 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


South  Viet-Nam  but  is  counting  on  a  collapse 
of  American  will  in  the  United  States.  They 
could  make  no  gi-eater  error  in  judgment. 

Let  me  be  quite  blunt.  Our  fighting  men  are 
not  going  to  be  worn  down;  our  negotiators  are 
not  going  to  be  talked  down ;  our  allies  are  not 
going  to  be  let  down. 

I  have  seen  the  ugly  face  of  war  in  Viet-Nam. 
I  have  visited  the  wounded  in  field  hospitals — 
American  boys,  South  Vietnamese  boys,  North 
Vietnamese  boys.  They  were  different  in  many 
ways — the  color  of  their  skins,  their  religions, 
their  race.  Some  were  enemies,  some  were 
friends. 

But  the  differences  were  small  compared  with 
how  they  were  alike.  They  were  brave  men,  and 
they  were  so  young.  Their  lives — their  dreams 
for  the  future  had  been  shattered  by  a  war  over 
which  they  had  no  control. 

With  all  of  the  moral  authority  of  the  office 
which  I  hold,  I  say  that  America  could  have 
no  greater  and  prouder  role  than  to  help  to  end 
this  war  in  a  way  which  will  bring  nearer  that 
day  in  which  we  can  have  a  world  order  in 
which  young  men  can  grow  up  in  peace  and 
friendship. 

I  do  not  criticize  those  that  disagree  with  me 
on  the  conduct  of  our  peace  negotiations.  I  do 
not  ask  unlimited  patience  from  a  people  whose 
hopes  for  peace  have  too  often  been  raised  and 
cruelly  dashed  over  the  past  4  years. 

I  have  tried  to  present  the  facts  about  Viet- 
Nam  with  complete  honesty,  and  I  shall  con- 
tinue to  do  so  in  my  reports  to  the  American 
people. 

Tonight,  all  I  ask  is  that  you  consider  these 
facts  and,  whatever  our  differences,  that  you 
support  a  program  which  can  lead  to  a  peace 
we  can  live  with  and  a  peace  we  can  be  proud 
of.  Nothing  could  have  a  greater  effect  in  con- 
vincing the  enemy  that  he  should  negotiate  in 
good  faith  than  to  see  the  American  people 
united  behind  a  generous  and  reasonable  jDeace 
offer. 

In  my  campaign  for  the  Presidency,  I 
pledged  to  end  this  war  in  a  way  that  would 
increase  our  chances  to  win  true  and  lasting 
peace  in  Viet-Nam,  in  the  Pacific,  and  in  the 
world.  I  am  determined  to  keep  that  pledge.  If 
I  fail  to  do  so,  I  expect  the  American  people 
to  hold  me  accountable  for  that  failure. 

But  while  I  will  never  raise  false  expecta- 
tions, my  deepest  hope  as  I  speak  to  you  to- 
night is  that  we  shall  be  able  to  look  back  on 
this  day  as  that  critical  turning  point  when 


American  initiative  moved  us  off  dead  center 
and  forward  to  the  time  when  this  war  would 
be  brought  to  an  end  and  we  could  devote  the 
unlimited  energies  and  dedication  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  the  challenges  of  peace. 


Secretary  Rogers  Visits  Viet-Nam 

Following  is  a  statement  made  hy  Secretary 
Rogers  during  a  stopover  at  Los  Angeles  on 
May  12,  together  with  the  transcripts  of  news 
conferences  he  held  at  Tan  Son  Nhut  Airport, 
Saigon,  upon  his  arrival  May  H  and  upon  de- 
parture May  19. 


STATEMENT  AT  LOS  ANGELES,  MAY   12 

Press  release  117  dated  May  13 

I  am  looking  forward  very  much  to  my  first 
official  trip  to  an  important  part  of  the  Pacific 
community.  Californians  are  especially  aware 
of  our  part  in  that  community,  and  I  want  you 
to  know  that  this  administration  intends  to  play 
an  active  and  constructive  part  in  the  immediate 
and  future  growth  of  that  community.  That  is 
why  I  am  going  to  Asia  now. 

As  I  go  to  each  country  and  consult  with  the 
Asian  leaders,  I  shall  be  listening  to  their  ideas 
and  their  aspirations  and  their  proposals.  For 
what  we  seek  in  the  Pacific  community — as  in 
the  other  regions  of  the  world — is  not  to  ex- 
ploit our  immense  national  power  but  to  serve 
our  national  interests  in  partnership  and  com- 
munity with  others. 

That  is  the  spirit  in  which  I  am  approaching 
this  trip.  Where  there  is  peace,  our  purpose  is 
to  cooperate  constructively  to  build  a  more 
prosperous  and  progressive  community  of  na- 
tions bordering  the  great  Pacific  Ocean. 

Where  there  is  conflict — as  there  is  in  Viet- 
Nam — our  purpose  is  to  negotiate  a  peace. 

That  purpose  is  not  served  by  the  kind  of 
news  we  have  all  read  in  the  newspapers  for  the 
last  several  days  telling  of  new  terrorist  attacks 
against  civilians  in  Saigon. 

For  our  part,  we  are  engaged  in  a  serious 
effort  to  halt  the  violence  in  Viet-Nam — to  put 
an  end  to  the  war.  We  must  continue  to  hope 
that  North  Viet-Nam  is  also  serious  about  peace. 

Systematic  acts  of  terrorism  like  those  that 
took  place  in  a  number  of  cities  in  South  Viet- 
Nam  yesterday  do  not  reinforce  that  hope.  The 


JUNE    2.    1969 


461 


indiscriminate  and  senseless  killing  and  wound- 
ing of  civilians  in  their  homes  and  in  the  streets 
can  only  raise  questions  about  intentions  of  the 
other  side. 

However  difficult  it  may  be  to  achieve,  our 
true  national  interests  lie  in  peace,  in  the 
growth  of  individual  and  national  freedom,  in 
social  and  economic  progress  for  all  peoples, 
in  the  steady  evolution  of  international  coopera- 
tion for  all  those  many  tasks  that  can  be  per- 
formed better  by  working  together.  My  purpose 
on  this  trip,  then,  is  to  work  together  with  our 
associates  in  the  emerging  Pacific  community. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE  ON  ARRIVAL, 
SAIGON,  MAY  14 

Press  release  118  dated  May  14 

I  am  glad  to  have  this  opportunity  to  be  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  I  am  here  to  learn  and  to 
work. 

Of  course,  we  learn  every  morning  in  Wash- 
ington what  happened  overnight  here  in  Viet- 
Nam  and  we  work  together  continually  with 
your  representatives  on  our  mutual  problem  of 
bringing  a  lasting  peace  to  Viet-Nam  and 
Southeast  Asia,  but  there  is  a  great  value  in 
being  here  and  learning  by  direct  observation. 

I  have  particularly  admired  the  leadership 
and  wisdom  displayed  by  President  Thieti  dur- 
ing these  difficult  days.  I  am  eager  to  talk  with 
him  and  with  your  other  able  Vietnamese 
leaders  about  the  important  problems  both  our 
Governments  face  here  and  in  Paris. 

Although  we  are  in  constant  close  touch  with 
representatives  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
in  Saigon,  "Washington,  and  Paris,  this  visit 
will  give  me  the  occasion  to  describe  the  policies 
of  the  new  administration  in  Washington  in 
person  to  the  top  leaders  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  and  to  get  their  views  first  hand. 
This  kind  of  personal  exchange  is  a  vital  part 
of  the  relationship  of  close  allies  and  should 
increase  our  mutual  understanding  and  col- 
laboration in  the  weeks  and  months  ahead. 

We  are,  of  course,  earnestly  seeking  a  peace- 
ful solution  to  the  war.  We  are  in  complete 
agreement — your  Government  and  mine — about 
the  puriDose  of  the  peace  we  seek.  We  shall  not 
compromise  on  our  basic  objective:  the  estab- 
lishment of  conditions  which  assure  that  the 
people  of  South  Viet-Nam  can  determine  their 
future  unconditionally. 

What    is    meant   by    "unconditionally"?    It 


means  that  the  decision  must  not  be  imposed,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  by  outside  forces ;  it  must  be 
made  by  a  process  which  permits  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam  their  own  free  choice.  If  the 
other  side  were  willing  to  accept  this  principle, 
then  prospects  for  peace  would  be  greatly 
improved. 

As  you  probably  know,  President  Nixon  will 
be  making  an  important  public  address  in  a  mat- 
ter of  hours  on  the  present  prospects  for  peace 
in  Viet-Nam.  The  President  has  directed  me  to 
explore  in  depth  with  President  Thieu  how  we 
and  our  allies  can  most  eilectively  move  forward 
from  the  present  position  further  in  the  direc- 
tion of  peace. 

The  people  of  Viet-Nam  have  fought  long  and 
suffered  much  to  establish  the  conditions  for  a 
return  to  peace.  For  this  they  have  earned 
the  admiration  and  respect  of  all  who  value 
national  independence  and  the  right  of  self- 
determination. 

May  I  express  in  closing  to  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam  my  personal  regard  and  ap- 
preciation for  what  they  have  done.  We,  and 
our  allies,  are  determined  that  it  will  not  have 
been  in  vain. 

Thank  you  very  much,  ladies  and  gentlemen. 

Q.  Mr.  Rogers^!  I  wonder  if  you  can  tell  us 
whether  you  can  see  any  prospect  in  the  near 
future  of  withdraioal  or  reduction  in  the  num- 
ber of  American  troops  in  Viet-Nam? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  make  any  comment  on  that 
particular  question.  As  you  know,  President 
Nixon  and  I  both  have  expressed  in  Washington 
the  factors  which  he  will  take  into  consideration 
in  making  any  such  decision.  First,  it  would 
have  to  be  done  in  collaboration  and  close  con- 
sultation with  the  leaders  of  South  Viet-Nam 
and  we  would  consider  the  factors  that  he  men- 
tioned before  any  decision  is  made.  The  factors 
are  the  progress  in  the  talks  in  Paris,  the  level 
of  the  offensive  in  South  Viet-Nam,  and  the 
readiness  of  the  forces  of  South  Viet-Nam  to 
replace  our  troops.  So  I  have  nothing  to  say 
on  that  subject  at  this  time. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  believe  that  as  a 
result  of  tlie  10-point  plan  put  fonoard  last  week 
hy  the  National  Liberation  Front,  the  Com- 
munist side  is  now  interested  in  serious  talks 
to  end  this  v;ar? 

A.  I  think  it  is  too  early  to  answer  that 
question.  I  have  already  expressed  in  a  state- 


462 


DEPARTJrENT   OF   STATE   BTILLETIN 


ment  I  issued  in  Washington  ^  that  although 
many  of  the  points  listed  there  are  unacceptable 
to  us  we  think  there  are  suggestions  that  require 
exploration  and  we  are  anxious  to  do  that.  We 
would  hope  that  this  is  an  indication  of  a  wil- 
lingness to  have  a  free  discussion  with  them, 
a  discussion  which  might  move  the  peace  talks 
forward.  I  think,  however,  it  is  too  early  to 
tell  until  we  have  had  further  chance  to  discuss 
the  matter  with  the  other  side. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  call  this  latest 
rocket  and  shelling  an  offensive  in  your  last 
corrvment? 

A.  No,  you  mean  the  answer  to  the  question 
before  this  last  one? 

Q.  Right. 

A.  No,  I  did  not.  I  didn't  refer  to  that.  I  said 
that  was  one  of  the  factors  that  President  Nixon 
has  enumerated  for  him  to  consider  before  any 
decision  would  be  made  on  the  subject  of  troop 
replacement. 

Q.  This  latest  series  of  widespread  attacks — 
Iww  do  you  consider  them  in  relation  to  the  talks 
in  Paris?  How  is  this  going  to  affect  them? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  whether  yoii  received 
it  or  not,  but  in  Los  Angeles  I  made  the  point 
that  it  was  difficult  for  us  to  understand  why 
these  latest  tactics  were  used— which  result  in 
senseless  killing  of  civilians — if  the  other  side 
wants  seriously  to  discuss  a  peaceful  solution  to 
this  combat  and  this  war.  It's  very  difficult  to 
understand  how  that  has  any  relationship  to 
war — the  killing  of  civilians  and  engaging  in 
acts  of  terror — but  I  wouldn't  want  to  suggest 
that  it  totally  discourages  us.  Certainly  it  casts 
somewhat  of  a  cloud  over  their  intentions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  are  you  prepared,  to  discuss 
with  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam,  a  po- 
litical role  for  the  National  Liberation  Front  in 
the  South  Vietnamese  government  or  in  a  coali- 
tion government? 

A.  Well,  we  intend  to  discuss  with  the  officials 
of  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam  many  of 
the  problems  that  face  us  now.  But,  essentially, 
political  matters  are  matters  for  decision  by  the 
Government  and  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam. 
We  have  made  that  perfectly  clear. 

Thank  you  very  much,  ladies  and  gentlemen. 


'  Bulletin  of  Jlay  26, 1969,  p.  433. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE  ON   DEPARTURE, 
SAIGON,  MAY   19 

Press  release  123  dated  May  19 

This  visit  to  South  Viet-Nam  has  been  a  use- 
ful and  timely  visit  for  me.  The  talks  that  I  have 
had  here  have  given  me  the  opportunity  person- 
ally to  assure  the  leaders  of  this  country  that  the 
United  States  has  no  intention  of  changing  its 
single  fixed  objective  for  Viet-Nam :  that  is  that 
the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  must  have  the 
right  to  make  their  own  decisions  about  their 
own  future  without  interference  from  any  out- 
side quarter  of  any  kind.  On  other  questions,  we 
are  openminded  and  flexible. 

As  you  know.  President  Thieu  and  other 
members  of  the  Government,  because  of  their  in- 
creased strength  and  capability,  have  stated  that 
they  are  determined  to  assume  an  increasing 
share  of  the  burden  of  defending  South  Viet- 
Nam. 

We  also  had  discussions  about  how  to  move 
forward  in  Paris  on  the  proposals  previously 
made  by  President  Thieu  and  by  President 
Nixon  last  week. 

We  are  united  in  our  determination  to  press 
the  cause  of  peace  in  the  talks  at  Paris  to  see 
whether  the  other  side  is  ready  for  serious  ne- 
gotiations and  looking  for  a  peaceful  solution. 

We  are  in  agreement  that  the  withdrawal  of 
outside  forces  could  begin  at  any  time  if  Hanoi 
is  ready  to  play  its  part  in  that  process.  Peace  is 
up  to  Hanoi.  It  is  for  the  leaders  there  to  de- 
termine when  the  fighting  stops.  Meanwhile,  we 
can  depend  on  the  valor  and  ability  of  our  Allied 
soldiers  in  the  field.  My  visits  there  during  the 
last  2  days  convinced  me  there  is  no  doubt  on 
that  score. 

Let  me  say  that  I  have  been  much  impressed 
by  the  confidence  shown  by  the  leaders  I  have 
met  these  past  few  days.  They  are  courageously 
building  a  nation  while  still  at  war.  They  are 
planning  actively  for  the  postwar  development 
of  their  country.  I  found  no  doubts  here  that 
there  is  a  future  in  freedom  for  this  nation. 

I  have  during  my  visit  in  South  Viet-Nam 
come  away  with  a  sense  of  great  admiration  and 
respect  for  its  leaders  and  its  people.  If  the  war 
could  be  ended  on  some  reasonable  basis,  some 
honorable  basis,  and  a  way  found  to  devote  the 
time,  energy,  money,  and  human  resources  here 
employed  to  the  cause  of  peace,  the  world,  I 
believe,  might  witness  a  near  miracle  of  building 
and  advancement  for  the  betterment  of  man- 
kind. It  is  with  that  hope  that  I  leave  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  today. 


JUNE    2,    1969 


463 


Q,  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us  wTiether  you 
thinh  that  the  summit  meeting  hetween  Presi- 
dent Thieu  and  President  Nixon,  suggested  hy 
President  Thieu  the  other  day,  would  he  useful 
or  not? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  it  will  be  useful.  I  don't  know 
about  this  time.  I  think  that's  up  to  President 
Thieu  and  President  Nixon  to  determine.  I  think 
a  meeting  between  the  two  would  be  useful. 

Q.  I  wonder  if,  just  elaborating  on  that,  sir, 
you  could  suggest  to  us  some  of  tTie  points  which 
might  well  be  discussed  at  a  su/m/mit  meeting? 

A.  No,  I  wouldn't  want  to  do  that.  I  think 
most  of  them  are  quite  apparent:  some  of  the 
things  that  I've  talked  about  here,  the  whole 
negotiating  position.  There  are  many  things 
they  could  discuss,  but  I  wouldn't  want  to  at- 
tempt to  spell  out  an  agenda. 

Q.  {Vietnamese  tran^slator)  Mr.  Secretary, 
he^s  asking  if  you  would  comment  on  the  re- 
duction of  U.S.  forces  in  Viet-Nam,. 

A.  Well,  I  would  not  want  to  say  much  be- 
yond what  President  Nixon  has  said,  and  that 
is  that  this  is  one  of  the  matters  under  con- 
sideration. It's  clear  that  the  forces  of  South 
Viet-Nam  are  getting  stronger,  more  capable, 
are  better  trained ;  and  when  the  time  is  right, 
then  this  will  be  considered  and  decided.  You 
probably  know  President  Nixon  has  said  that 
there  are  three  factors  to  consider.  One  is  the 
progress  of  the  peace  talks  in  Paris ;  one  is  the 
level  of  the  fighting,  the  offensive  fighting  by 
the  enemy;  and  one  is  the  capability  and 
strength  of  the  ARVN.  And  as  I  said  in  my 
statement  just  now,  I've  been  very  much  im- 
pressed by  the  strength  of  the  ARVN  forces  and 
their  capability. 

Q.  (Vietnamese  translator)  Mr.  Secretary,  he 
wishes  to  ask  you  about  the  int.e7mational  agency 
which  will  control  any  future  elections  here. 
He  asks  what  is  your  idea,  what  is  your  concept, 
on  such  an  organisation. 

A.  Well,  of  course,  the  international  super- 
visory body  that  was  referred  to  in  the  Presi- 
dent's talk  the  other  night  would  not  be  for 
the  purpose  of  controlling  an  election.  The  elec- 
tion would  be  controlled  or  run  by  the  people 
of  South  Viet-Nam.  The  purpose  of  the  inter- 
national supervisory  body  would  be  to  make 
certain  that  the  election  was  an  honest  election 
and  that  evei-yone  had  an  opportunity  to  vote 
without  coercion  from  any  quarter. 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  an  optical  question.  Are      i 
you  beginning  to  see  the  light  at  the  end  of  the 
twinel? 

A.  Well,  first,  I've  only  been  here  4  days.  I 
think  that's  much  too  short  a  time  to  use  as  a 
basis  for  any  judgments.  Secondly,  I  thmk  that 
experience  has  demonstrated  that  predictions  of 
that  kind  are  certainly  not  wise,  and  I  don't 
intend  to  make  any. 

'  Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  wonder  if  you  could 
clarify  for  us  whether  or  not  the  United  States 
loill  accept  the  idea  of  an  interim  coalition  gov- 
ernment before  elections  are  held? 

A.  Well,  we  haven't  talked  about  a  coalition 
government  as  such.  Secondly,  when  you  say, 
will  the  United  States  accept  something,  what 
we  will  accept  is  a  system  which  will  permit 
the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to  express  their 
will  through  the  elective  process.  How  that  is 
done  is  a  subject  for  negotiation  by  the  people 
in  South  Viet-Nam.  So  I  think  that  the  election 
is  one  thing  and  the  government  during  the 
time  the  election  is  held  is  another  thing.  But 
we  don't  foresee  any  coalition  government  as 
such. 

Q.  But  you  would  not  rule  that  out  as  a 
possibility? 

A.  Well,  I  certainly  wouldn't  rule  it  in. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  your  talks  with  the  South 
Vietnamese  people,  did  you  discuss  at  all  with 
them  {the  arrest)  of  the  South  Vietnamese  po- 
litical opponents  of  the  government? 

A.  No,  we  discussed  in  a  general  way  the 
right  of  the  press,  freedom  of  the  press,  and 
we  expressed  the  concern  of  our  Government 
on  that  subject.  We  did  not  go  into  any  particu- 
lar cases.  We  don't  think  it's  appropriate  to. 
Secondly,  when  there's  a  war  on,  situations 
are  somewhat  different.  I  think  it  would  be 
unwise  for  us  to  attempt  to  spell  out  in  detail 
our  thoughts  on  that  subject.  Even  in  our  own 
case  during  the  war,  if  you  recall,  we  did  some 
things  that  were  somewhat  repressive,  and  I 
think  it's  understandable  why  there  is  a  tempta- 
tion in  that  regard.  I  must  say  that  there's  been 
considerable  improvement,  I  think,  here  in  free- 
dom of  the  press,  and  I  think  the  Government's 
quite  conscious  of  the  problem.  But  they  are 
fighting  a  war,  they  are  having  their  men  killed. 
And  the  problem  of  freedom  of  press  at  a  time 
when  the  nation  is  at  war  is  not  an  easy  one  to 
decide. 


464 


DEPAKTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Ambassador  Lodge  Discusses 
the  Paris  Peace  Talks 

Folloioing  are  remarks  made  to  the  fress  liy 
President  Nixon  arid  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot 
Lodge  on  May  15  after  a  joint  meeting  of  the 
Cabinet  and  the  National  Security  Cov/ncil. 

White  House  press  release  dated  May  15 

PRESIDENT  NIXON 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  Ambassador  Lodge, 
Ambassador  [Lawrence]  Walsh,  and  Mr. 
[Philip  C]  Habib  were  here  for  the  meeting  of 
the  Cabinet  and  the  Security  Council,  and 
helped  to  brief  the  Council  on  the  situation  in 
Viet- Nam  and  in  Paris. 

They  are  the  senior  members  of  our  negotiat- 
ing team  in  Paris  and  immediately  after  this 
meetmg  will  be  flying  to  Paris  for  the  plenary 
session  of  the  Paris  meeting,  which  will  take 
place  tomorrow. 

Ambassador  Lodge  does  have  time  to  answer  a 
few  questions  before  he  leaves,  and  I  will  pre- 
sent him  to  you  now. 

Mr.  Ambassador. 


AMBASSADOR  LODGE 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  President. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Last  Thursday  the  Na- 
tional Liberation  Front  made  a  10-point  pro- 
posal which  wo  have  been  studying  very  care- 
fully. The  President's  speech  of  last  night 
comes  along  at  a  providential  time,  because  it 
means  that  on  the  table  before  us  in  Paris  are 
two  comprehensive  j^roposals  wliich  deal  with 
substantive  issues,  and  if  there  is  a  desire  on  the 
other  side  to  have  solid  negotiations,  why,  this 
provides  the  opportunity. 

So  I  think  the  speech  that  the  President  made 
last  night,  from  the  standpomt  of  our  opera- 
tions in  Paris,  can  be  most  helpful.  It  was  con- 
structive, conciliatoi-y,  flexible,  and  I  think  of- 
fered as  much  as  one  could  possibly  expect  and 
was  completely  fair  and  just  to  the  other  side. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  the  initial  Viet  Cong  re- 
action has  been  that  it  is  the  same  old  package. 
What  do  you  think  ahout  that? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  don't  think  we  take 
those  statements  of  that  kind  at  face  value.  I 
think  the  statement  in  the  President's  speech 


about  troop  withdrawal;  I  think  the  statement 
about  political  solution — I  think  those  state- 
ments were  new. 

Q.  Mr.  A?ni>assador,  the  President  said  in  his 
speech  that  nothing  would  be  gained  by  delay. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  tlie  other  side,  tohy 
should  they  think  they  ivill  not  gain  by  delay? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  There  are  those  who 
think  they  have  an  advantage  in  waiting  us  out. 
That  involves  a  great  big  estimate,  and  a  great 
big  calculation  about  the  American  people  and 
about  American  public  opinion  and  about  the 
extent  to  which  the  American  people  under- 
stand all  that  is  at  stake  here. 

A  lifetime  in  public  life  m  this  country  has 
convinced  me  that  when  the  American  peoijle 
have  the  facts  they  usually  make  the  right  de- 
cision and  that  those  who  wait  and  hang  back  in 
the  hopes  that  American  public  opinion  is  going 
to  collapse  and  is  going  to  crumble  have  usually 
been  disappointed. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  in  the  past  you  have 
,  spoken  of  the  need  for  free  elections  to  settle  the 
political  future  of  South  Vict-Nam.  Is  it  correct 
to  infer  from  the  Presidents  remarks  last  night 
tliat  if  the  southerners  involved  should  now 
agree  to  negotiate  a  permanent  political  settle- 
ment this  would  be  satisfactory  to  the  United 
States — to  have  it  negotiated  rather  than  on  the 
basis  of  an  election? 

A7nbassador  Lodge:  I  think  one  of  the  things 
that  comes  into  a  negotiation  about  a  political 
settlement  would  be  the  holding  of  an  election.  I 
believe  elections  are  a  real  probability.  So  I 
don't  see  negotiations  as  a  substitute  for 
elections. 

I  think  the  negotiators  will  negotiate  how  and 
when  elections  will  be  held,  what  arrangements 
there  will  be  for  supervising  the  elections, 
whether  there  will  be  an  international  super- 
visory commission  or  whether  there  will  be 
mixed  commissions  to  take  care  of  each  election 
separately. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  do  you  think  that  talk 
of  reducing  American  troops  in  Viet-Nam  wider 
certain  conditions  encourages  the  other  side  to 
negotiate  in  Paris? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  Well,  I  don't  think  it 
need  necessarily  discourage  them. 

Q.  If  they  wait  it  out,  wouldn't  we  have 
unilaterally  withdrawn  a  good  proportion  of 
our  forces  there? 


JUNE    2,    1969 

350-547—69- 


465 


Ambassador  Lodge:  Well,  I  am  not  prepared 
to  assume  that  if  you  just  wait  long  enough, 
there  is  sroino;  to  be  a  helter-skelter  American 
withdrawal.  I  just  don't  assume  that. 

Q.  Mr.  Amlassador,  how  do  you  think  tJie 
negotiations  are  going? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  have  never  charac- 
terized them  since  I  have  been  there.  I  have 
been  asked  that  every  week,  and  I  try  to  think 
of  one  adjective  that  will  characterize  them, 
and  I  have  never  been  able  to  do  it. 

If  we  are  successful,  then  the  historian  of  the 
future,  looking  back  at  those  periods,  will  say, 
"Well,  at  that  time  they  were  clarifying  things 
and  making  it  easier  to  get  a  solution." 

If  we  are  not  successful,  then,  of  course,  what 
has  been  going  on  will  not  look  very  impressive. 
It  is  very  hard  to  characterize  these  negotiations 
in  one  word. 

Q.  Do  you  regard  the  other  side  as  being 
serious  about  these  negotiations? 

Ambassador  Lodge :  Well,  I  thought  that  this 
proposal  last  Thursday  could  be  called  serious, 
yes. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  what  indications  have 
you  had  from  the  other  side  that  this  would  be 
a  propitious  time  for  the  United  States  to  offer 
its  proposals? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  Well,  after  the  National 
Liberation  Front  made  its  proposal  last  Thurs- 
day and  I  had  time  to  take  it  back  to  the  office 
and  analyze  it  and  study  it,  the  tliought  that 
came  to  me,  and  in  fact  I  think  I  said  it  to 
Mr.  Habib,  I  said,  "The  greatest  thing  would 
be  if  we  had  a  really  comprehensive  statement 
of  the  American  position  of  at  least  correspond- 
ing scope,  because  then  we  would  have  the  two 
things  and  there  would  be  a  basis  for  real  solid 
meat-and-potatoes  discussion  about  the  real  mat- 
ters of  substance." 

I  think  that  was  Friday  night  I  said  that  to 
Mr.  Habib.  Then  Smiday  morning  we  got  word 
that  the  President  was  going  to  make  this 
speech.  So  it  was  not  just  being  clever.  That  was 
what  we  really  thought  before  we  knew  the 
President  was  going  to  make  the  speech. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  how  will  you  proceed 
when  you  go  back  to  Paris? 

Ambassador  Lodge :  I  intend  tomorrow  morn- 


ing to  present  to  the  Paris  meeting  all  those 
parts  in  the  President's  speech  which  are  perti- 
nent to  the  negotiations.  Then  I  intend  to  make 
a  speech  of  my  own  which  will  be  a  paraphrase 
of  what  the  President  said.  I  will  ask  them  not 
to  make  a  quick  judgment  but  to  think  it  over. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  tJie  Presidenfs  p^roposal 
on  mutual'  withdraioal  mentioned  also  the  with- 
drawal of  North  Vietnamese  forces  from  Laos. 
How  many  American  advisers  are  there  in 
Laos,  and  would  tlieir  withdrawal  be  part  of 
this  mutual  loithdratocd? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  think  the  provision  in 
the  President's  speech  uses  a  new  terminology. 
It  talks  about  non-South  Vietnamese  troops. 
That,  of  course,  obviously  covers  all  Americans. 

Q.  In  Laos,  also? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  think  the  withdrawal 
as  it  is  stated  in  the  President's  speech  covers  all 
non-South  Vietnamese  troops. 

Q.  Would  that  apply  to  American  forces  in 
Thailand? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  think  the  speech  was 
about  Viet-Nam. 

Q.  I  realize  that,  sir,  but  I  wonder,  the  North 
has  cx2)ressed  some  concern  about  U.S.  forces  in 
Tlmiland. 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  would  think  that  is  a 
separate  proposition. 

Q.  What  is  basically  wrong  with  the  NLF 
plan? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  We  have  not  finished  our 
analysis  of  it  yet.  It  was  3i/^  months  being  pre- 
pared, so  we  were  told,  so  we  are  taking  a  little 
time  to  analyze  it  and  we  will  conxment  on  it  very 
carefully  as  time  goes  on. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  your  predecessor  has 
mentioned  the  fact  that  there  was  an  oppor- 
tunity for  secret  talks  with  the  other  side  earlier 
than  this  icas  taken  advantage  of.  Would  you 
care  to  refute  or  respond  to  it? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  didn't  hear  the  ques- 
tion. 

Q.  Ambassador  [W.  Averell]  Harri^nan  in- 
dicated that  there  was  an  opportunity  set  up 
when  he  departed  for  secret  talks  with  the  other 


466 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BTIUJSTIN 


aide  and  this  opportunity  was  not  availed  of. 
Would  you  cominent  on  that,  please? 

Ainbassador  Lodge:  We  have  a  rule  that  we 
don't  talk  about  secret  talks,  and  I  am  not  going 
to  say  whether  we  have  had  them  or  whether  we 
have  not;  but  certainly  there  is  an  opportunity 
to  have  them. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  coidd  we  understand 
that  this  address  is  a  counterproposal  to  the 
NLF  10-point  plan? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  No,  I  don't  think  so.  As  I 
understand  it,  it  has  been  in  contemplation  a 
long,  long  time.  Obviously  a  full-dress  presen- 
tation by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  30 
minutes  prime  time  on  television,  is  a  major 
event  in  terms  of  jDublic  education  and  a  great 
many  other  purposes.  But  it  just  so  happens  that 
it  came  along  at  a  time  wliich  I  think  ought  to  be 
helpful  to  our  operations. 

No,  it  should  not  be  considered  as  a  counter- 
proposal. It  is  not  a  counterproposal,  but  I  think 
it  does  come  along  at  a  time  which  could  be  ex- 
tremely helpful,  assuming  the  other  side  really 
wants  to  do  some  serious  talking. 

Q.  We  know  that  General  \Creighton  W.] 
Abrams  was  put  under  instructions  in  Novem- 
ber to  heep  tlie  maxirmnn  military  pressure  on 
the  other  side.  Have  his  orders  changed  in  that 
regard,  the  orders  to  General  Abrams  to  keep  the 
7naximum  military  pressure  on  the  other  side? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  I  don't  know  what  his 
orders  are. 

Q.  What  are  we  doing  to  reduce  the  level  of 
violence  on  the  ground  in  South  Viet-Nani? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  If  you  have  troop  with- 
drawal, it  certainly  ought  to  lead  to  a  reduction 
of  the  level  of  violence,  I  should  think. 

Q.  Do  I  understand  your  previous  answer  to 
mean  that  our  proposal  of  last  night  in  the 
Presidents  speech  includes  xoithdrawal  of 
American  advisers  from  Laos,  if  the  agreement 
is  accepted? 

Ambassador  Lodge:  No,  I  did  not  go  into  that 
in  much  detail.  What  I  said  was  that  with- 
drawal in  the  President's  speech  applies  to  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces.  That  is  a  new  phrase 
that  I  have  never  seen  used  before,  and  ob- 
viously that  covers  Americans. 

The  press :  Thank  you. 


17th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  by 
Auibassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  at  the  17th 
plenary  session  of  the  neio  meetings  at  Paris  on 
May  16. 

Press  release  121  dated  May  16 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  Last  Wednesday 
evening  the  President  of  the  United  States 
made  a  proposal  for  peace — a  proposal  which 
can  end  the  fighting  in  Viet-Nam  and  establish 
peace  on  a  just  and  durable  basis. 

President  Nixon  stated  the  essential  objective 
of  the  United  States  in  clear  and  simple  terms. 
We  seek  the  opiDortunity,  he  said,  for  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  to  detei'mine  their  own 
political  future  without  outside  interference. 

Several  other  points  are  clear.  In  the  Presi- 
dent's words,  and  I  quote : 

- — We  seek  no  bases  in  Viet-Nam. 

— We  Insist  on  no  military  ties. 

— We  are  willing  to  agree  to  neutrality  if  that  is 
what  the  South  Vietnamese  people  freely  choose. 

— We  believe  there  should  be  an  opportunity  for  full 
participation  in  the  political  life  of  South  Viet-Nam 
by  all  political  elements  that  are  prepared  to  do  so 
without  the  use  of  force  or  intimidation. 

— We  are  prepared  to  accept  any  government  in 
South  Viet-Nam  that  results  from  the  free  choice  of 
the  South  Vietnamese  people  themselves. 

— We  have  no  intention  of  imposing  any  form  of 
government  upon  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam,  nor 
will  we  be  a  party  to  such  coercion. 

— We  have  no  objection  to  reunification,  if  that 
turns  out  to  be  what  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam 
and  the  people  of  North  Viet-Nam  want ;  we  ask  only 
that  the  decision  reflect  the  free  choice  of  the  people 
concerned. 

Let  me  now  smn  up  President  Nixon's 
further  words,  as  follows : 

In  pursuing  this  limited  objective,  we  insist 
on  no  rigid  diplomatic  formula.  Peace  can  be 
achieved  by  a  formal  negotiated  settlement.  Or 
it  could  be  achieved  by  an  informal  under- 
standing, provided  that  the  understanding  is 
clear  and  that  there  are  adequate  assurances 
that  it  would  be  observed.  As  the  President 
said:  "Peace  on  paper  is  not  as  important  as 
peace  in  fact." 

A  settlement  that  will  permit  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  to  determine  freely  their 
own  political  future  must  be  based  on  certain 
princii^les. 


JUNE    2,    1969 


467 


First,  such  a  settlement  will  require  the  with- 
drawal of  all  non-South  Vietnamese  forces 
from  South  Viet-Nam.  Second,  it  will  require 
procedures  for  political  choice  that  give  each 
significant  groujj  in  South  Viet-Nam  a  real  op- 
portunity to  participate  in  the  political  life  of 
the  nation. 

We  recognize  that  political  issues  should  be 
discussed  along  with  the  military  issues  and  that 
there  must  be  a  political  settlement  in  South 
Viet-Nam. 

President  Thieu  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
has  gone  far,  President  Nixon  said,  toward 
opening  the  way  to  a  political  settlement.  He 
has  publicly  declared  liis  government's  willmg- 
ness  to  discuss  a  political  solution  with  the 
National  Liberation  Front  and  has  offered  free 
elections.  It  was  a  reasonable  offer  that  could 
lead  to  a  settlement.  As  the  South  Vietnamese 
Government  has  offered  to  talk  without  precon- 
ditions, we  believe  that  your  side  should  also  be 
willing  to  talk  without  prior  conditions. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  recognizes,  as  we  do,  that  a  settlement 
must  permit  all  persons  and  groups  that  are 
prepared  to  renounce  the  use  of  force  to  par- 
ticipate freely  in  the  political  life  of  South 
Viet-Nam.  To  be  effective,  such  a  settlement 
would  require  a  process  that  would  allow  the 
South  Vietnamese  people  to  express  their  choice 
and  a  guarantee  that  this  process  would  be  fair. 

We  do  not  insist  on  a  particular  form  of 
guarantee.  The  important  thing  is  that  guaran- 
tees should  have  the  confidence  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  and  that  they  should  be 
broad  enough  and  strong  enough  to  protect  the 
interests  of  all  major  South  Vietnamese  groups. 

This,  then,  is  the  outline  of  President  Nixon's 
speech  regarding  the  settlement  we  seek  to  nego- 
tiate at  these  Paris  meetings.  Its  basic  terms 
are  simple:  mutual  withdrawal  of  non-South 
Vietnamese  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam  and 
free  choice  for  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam. 

On  the  instructions  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  I  now  present  the  following 
measures,  which  we  believe  are  consistent  with 
the  principles  of  all  the  parties.  These  proposals 
are  made  on  the  basis  of  full  consultation  with 
the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

Proposals  fob  Peace 

— As  soon  as  agreement  can  be  reached,  all  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  would  begin  withdrawals 
from  South  Viet-Nam. 

■ — Over  a  period  of  12  months,  by  agreed-upon  stages, 


4G8 


the  major  portions  of  all  U.S.,  Allied,  and  other  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  would  be  withdrawn.  At  the 
end  of  this  12-month  period,  the  remaining  U.S.,  Allied, 
and  other  non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  move 
into  designated  base  areas  and  would  not  engage  in 
combat  operations. 

— The  remaining  U.S.  and  Allied  forces  would  move 
to  complete  their  withdrawals  as  the  remaining  North 
Vietname.se  forces  were  withdrawn  and  returned  to 
North  Viet-Nam. 

— An  international  supervisory  body,  acceptable  to 
both  sides,  would  be  created  for  the  purpose  of  verify- 
ing withdrawals  and  for  any  other  purposes  agreed 
upon  between  the  two  sides. 

— This  international  body  would  begin  operating  in 
accordance  with  an  agreed  timetable  and  would  par- 
ticipate in  arranging  supervised  cease-fires. 

— As  soon  as  possible  after  the  international  body 
was  functioning,  elections  would  be  held  under  agreed 
procedures  and  under  the  supervision  of  the  inter- 
national body. 

— Arrangements  would  be  made  for  the  earliest  pos- 
sible release  of  prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides. 

— All  parties  would  agree  to  observe  the  Geneva 
accords  of  19.54  regarding  Viet-Nam  and  Cambodia 
and  the  Laos  accords  of  1962. 

President  Nixon  further  declared  that  we  be- 
lieve this  proposal  for  peace  is  realistic  and 
takes  account  of  the  legitimate  interests  of  all 
concerned.  It  is  consistent  with  President 
Thieu's  six  points.  It  can  accommodate  various 
programs  put  forth  by  your  side.  We  and  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  are 
prepared  to  discuss  it  in  detail  with  your  side. 

We  are  not  offering  these  proposals  on  a  take- 
it-or-leave-it  basis.  We  are  willing  to  consider 
other  approaches  consistent  with  our  principles. 
We  are  willing  to  talk  about  anybody's  pro- 
gram— Hanoi's  four  points,  the  NLF's  10 
points — provided  it  can  be  made  consistent  with 
the  few  basic  principles  we  have  set  forth. 

The  President  stated  in  addition  that,  despite 
our  disagreement  with  several  of  its  points,  we 
welcome  the  fact  that  the  NLF  has  put  forward 
its  first  comprehensive  program.  We  are  con- 
tinumg  to  study  it  closely,  in  full  consultation 
with  our  allies.  In  future  meetings,  we  expect 
to  address  the  10  points  and  to  comment  upon 
each  individual  issue,  just  as  we  hope  you  wUl 
address  the  elements  of  our  position.  With  re- 
gard to  the  internal  political  issues  raised  in  the 
10  i^oints,  we  suggest  that  you  enter  into  close 
discussions  with  the  delegation  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam,  as  President  Thieu  offered  to  do 
in  March  this  year. 

But  we  cannot  ignore  the  fact  that  imme- 
diately after  your  side  made  this  offer,  you 
stepped  up  the  scale  of  your  military  attacks  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  You  carried  out  systematic 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIX 


I 


acts  of  terrorism  in  a  number  of  cities,  causing 
indiscriminate  and  senseless  killing  and  woxind- 
ing  of  civilians;  and  as  I  pointed  out  at  our 
16th  plenary  session,  we  have  evidence  that 
plans  are  laid  and  preparations  underway  for 
further  increases  in  military  and  terrorist  op- 
erations by  your  side. 

If  your  side  wants  peace,  that  is  not  the  way 
to  get  it. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  set  forth  proposals  for  peace 
which  are  generous  in  their  terms.  We  have 
indicated  our  willingness  to  consider  other 
proposals. 

We  are  being  flexible  and  reasonable.  But  as 
President  Nixon  said  on  May  14:  "No  greater 
mistake  could  be  made  than  to  confuse  flexibil- 
ity with  weakness  or  being  reasonable  with  lack 
of  resolution." 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  delay  serves  no  one's 
interest.  Let  us  act  now  to  bring  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam  to  an  end. 

We  ask  you  not  to  answer  hastily  and  to  think 
over  our  proposal  just  as  we  are  thinking  about 
yours. 


U.S.  Extends  Condolences  on  Death 
of  President  Husain  of  India 

President  Zakir  Husain  of  India  died  May  3. 
Following  are  texts  of  messages  from  President 
Nixon  to  Acting  President  V.  V.  Giri  and  to 
Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi  and  from  Secre- 
tary Rogers  to  Foreign  Minister  Dinesh  Singh. 

Message  From   President  Nixon 
to  Acting   President  Giri 

Mat  3,  1969 

V.  V.  Gmi 

Acting  President  of  India 

Dear  Mr.  PREsroENT :  All  Americans  join  me 
in  sending  you  and  the  people  of  India  our  deep 
sympathy  for  your  great  loss.  We  mourn  with 
you  on  this  sad  occasion.  Zakir  Husain  was  a 
man  of  courage  and  integrity  whose  loss  will  be 
long  felt. 

Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 


U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Sign  Agreement 
on  Leases  on  New  Chancery  Sites 

Department  Statement  ^ 

An  agreement  covering  long-term  leases  on 
new  chancery  sites  here  and  in  Moscow  was 
signed  this  morning  [May  16]  in  Moscow.  Am- 
bassador [Jacob  D.]  Beam  signed  for  our  side; 
Deputy  Foreign  Minister  N.  Firyubin  for  the 
Soviet  side.  The  i^roperties  will  be  leased  free  of 
charge  for  an  85-year  period.  Our  property  will 
consist  of  the  land  on  which  the  Ambassador's 
l^resent  residence — Spaso  House — stands,  plus  a 
site  bordering  Konyushkovskaya  Street,  located 
between  the  present  chancery  and  the  Moscow 
River.  We  will  continue  to  pay  rent  on  Spaso 
House.  In  exchange,  we  will  be  leasing  to  the 
Soviets  the  area  f  onnerly  occupied  by  the  Moimt 
Alto  Veterans  Hospital. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartcb  on  May  16. 


Message  From  President  Nixon 
to   Prime  Minister  Gandhi 

May  4,  1969 
India  has  lost  a  great  statesman.  We  mourn 
the  death  of  Zakir  Husain,  a  man  admired  by 
all  for  his  service  to  humanity.  You  and  your 
people  have  my  deepest  sympathy  in  this  time 
of  sadness. 

Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 

Message   From   Secretary   Rogers 
to  Foreign   Minister  Singh 

Mat  3,  1969 

A  great  leader  has  been  lost  to  India  and  to 
the  world  with  the  passing  of  Zakir  Husain.  The 
United  States  mourns  the  loss  of  a  dear  friend. 
My  colleagues  join  me  in  sending  our  deep 
sympathy  on  this  sad  occasion. 
Sincerely, 

William  P.  Rogers 


JUNE    2,    1969 


469 


Nelson  Rockefeller  Begins  Mission  to  Latin  America 


Following  are  remarks  made  to  news  corres- 
pondents hy  President  Nixon  and  Governor  Nel- 
son Rockefeller  at  Key  Biscayne,  Fla.,  on 
May  11,  together  with  the  names  of  the  advisers 
accomjMnying  Governor  Rockefeller  on  his 
Presidential  mission  to  Latin  America. 


REMARKS  TO  NEWS   CORRESPONDENTS 

White  House  press  release  (Key  Biscayne,  Fla.)  dated  May  11 

President  Nixon 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Governor  Eockefeller 
and  members  of  his  party,  Mrs.  Rockefeller,  and 
others  have  stopped  here  at  Key  Biscayne  on  the 
first  leg  of  the  continental  tour  they  are  taking 
through  Latin  America. 

They  will  be  in  Mexico  for  a  late  luncheon  a 
few  hours  from  now  and  then  will  go  to  all  of 
the  coimtries  in  Central  America  before  return- 
ing to  Washington  and  to  New  York.  After  that 
there  will  be  several  other  trips  to  Latin 
America  over  the  next  3  to  4  months,  which  the 
Governor  will  be  glad  to  describe. 

As  I  have  indicated  previously,  I  consider 
this  to  be  one  of  the  most  vitally  important  mis- 
sions ever  undertaken  by  an  independent  group 
in  behalf  of  the  Govermnent  of  the  United 
States.i 

If  j'ou  look  at  the  members  of  the  Governor's 
party,  some  of  whom  are  standing  here  with 
us— Mr.  Watson,  Mr.  Woods,  and  others — it  is 
a  group  of  experts  which  has  never  been  equaled 
in  terms  of  qualifications  and  the  broad  base 
of  experience.  It  is  a  group  which  is  going  to 
Latin  America  not  for  the  purpose  of  studying 
the  problem — as  the  Governor  was  saying  to  me 
a  few  moments  ago,  and  he  is  an  expert  in  this 
field  because  he  first  visited  Latin  America  35  or 
40  years  ago,  Latin  America  has  been  studied 
over  the  years  and  all  kinds  of  study  recom- 


'  For  a  st.atcment  by  Tresident  Nixon  on  Feb.  17,  see 
Bulletin  of  Mar.  10,  1069,  p.  198. 


mendations  have  been  made— but  this  has  the 
unusual  and,  I  think,  very  necessary  purpose  of 
listening  to  the  leaders  of  Latin  America  and 
coming  back  to  Washington  and  making  recom- 
mendations for  new  directions  and  new  policies. 

The  group  goes  with  no  preconceived  preju- 
dices against  existing  programs,  but  it  has  an 
open  mind  with  regard  to  new  approaches. 

The  Governor  now  will  be  glad  to  answer  any 
questions,  insofar  as  he  can,  on  the  mission.  I 
want  to  say  that  we  are  grateful  that  he  could 
take  the  time  to  make  this  trip  at  this  point. 
It  will  be  vitally  important  to  not  only  the  new 
relations  and  better  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  our  friends  in  Latin  America 
but  toward  developing  new  policy  directions 
in  this  critical  area  of  the  world. 

Governor  Rockefeller 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  President. 

I  would  just  like  to  say  that  all  of  us  in  this 
mission  are  deeply  indebted  to  you  for  the 
opportunity  of  going  and  listening  and  getting 
the  benefit  of  experience  and  wisdom  and 
sophisticated  judgment  of  the  leaders  in  gov- 
ernment and  in  private  life  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  as  to  how  we  can  in  this  country 
more  effectively  assist  in  the  achievement  of  our 
common  goals. 

We  are  a  group  who  are  deeply  devoted  to  the 
concept  of  Western  Hemisphere  solidarity — 
who  have  great  respect  and  affection  for  the 
jieoples  of  the  various  countries — and  who  have 
had  long  association  in  one  form  or  another.  I 
think  collectively  we  should  be  able  to  bring 
back  and  report  the  point  of  view,  experience, 
and  recommendations  of  the  leaders  through- 
out this  hemisphere. 

Q.  Governor,  the  State  Department  seems  to 
have  lieen  reasonably  well  excluded  from  this 
whole  mission.  Is  that  purposeftil?  What  is  the 
liaison  with  the  State  Department? 

Governor  Rockefeller:  The  State  Depart- 
ment has  had,  as  you  know — and  I  was  in  it 


470 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BUIJJITIN 


once— long  years  of  association  and  contact. 
What  the  President  was  anxious  to  get  is  a 
fresh  point  of  view  not  committed  to  any  par- 
ticular position  on  any  particular  issue,  but  to 
get  men  and  women  who  could  go  there  and  to 
whom  the  heads  of  state  and  the  leaders  in  these 
countries  could  speak  in  utter  frankness — not 
just  pleasantries  but  the  hard  realities  as  they 
see  them — and  sometimes  it  is  a  little  difficult  if 
you  are  having  to  say  to  an  ongoing  associate 
things  which  may  not  be  what  he  would  like  to 
hear. 

So  I  think  this  is  a  very  constructive  ap- 
proach. It  is  not  trying  to  undermine  the  De- 
partment. We  are  working  very  closely  with 
them.  We  have  all  been  briefed  by  them.  But 
it  is  just  an  opportunity  for  the  heads  of  state 
and  the  leaders  to  speak  their  minds  directly, 
in  a  sense,  to  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

Q.  Do  you  foresee  any  hind  of  changing  of 
the  Alliance  for  Progress  as  a  result  of  your 
mission? 

Governor  Rockefeller:  I  have  absolutely  no 
preconceived  ideas  on  anything.  Wliat  all  of  us 
are  trying  to  do  in  the  different  areas  is  to  get 
the  reactions  of  our  friends,  their  analysis  and 
their  recommendations — the  friends  in  the 
other  countries.  Then  we  will  be  reporters  back 
to  the  President. 

Q.  Governor^  what  might  they  tell  you  that 
they  wouldrCt  tell  our  amhassadors  in  those 
countries? 

Governor  Rockefeller :  Well,  I  suppose  the 
things  they  feel  the  Ambassador  wouldn't  like 
to  hear  and  therefore  haven't  said  to  him  in  the 
past. 

Q.  Governor,  you  have  had  a  lot  of  experience 
in  Latin  America.  As  you  say,  you  have  teen 
there  many  times;  you  know  what  the  problems 
are.  Basically,  what  do  you  think  is  wrong  with 
our  Alliance  for  Progress  and  our  whole  ap- 
proach to  Latin  America  that  it  has  not  been  a 
success? 

Governor  Rockefeller:  I  have  not  said  I 
thought  anything  was  wrong.  I  am  just  taking 
a  mission  from  the  President  to  listen  to  what 
the  Latins  feel  and  their  reactions.  They  are  a 
very  able,  intelligent,  and  sophisticated  group. 
Believe  me,  to  survive  in  one  of  those  small 
countries  you  have  to  be  able,  because  the  eco- 
nomic conditions,  the  problems  which  they  face. 


their  dependency  on  the  outside  world  is  very 
great.  Therefore,  they  live  under  diificult 
circumstances. 

We  want  to  know  how  they  see  these  prob- 
lems and  what  they  feel  and  what  suggestions 
they  have,  based  on  their  experience. 

Q.  Governor,  you  undertook  a  very  similar 
trip  30  years  ago — Kennedy,  Stevenson,  the 
President  himself — do  you  kind  of  feel  these 
trips  are  kind  of  futile  ? 

Governor  RockefelUr:  I  am  not  sure  what  you 
are  referring  to  as  30  years  ago. 

Q.  1939,  lohsn  you  went  on  a  mission  and  re- 
ported to  President  Roosevelt. 

Governor  Rockefeller:  I  went  on  a  private 
visit  for  3  months,  but  it  was  not  an  official  visit. 
I  was  so  disturbed  by  what  I  saw  that  a  group 
of  us  who  had  been  traveling  on  this  trip  pre- 
pared a  memorandum  for  the  President. 

As  a  result  of  that  memorandum,  he  created 
the  Office  of  Coordinator  of  Inter-American 
Affairs.  Failing  anyone  else  to  head  it  up,  I 
ended  up,  which  is  often  what  happens  if  you 
make  a  suggestion  about  doing  something.  Then 
people  come  back  and  say,  "Well,  now,  why 
don't  you  undertake  it  ?" 

Q.  Does  this  foresee  your  coming  into  the 
Government? 

Governor  Rockefeller:  No,  ma'am.  This  is  a 
higher  level. 

Q.  Governor  Rockefeller,  one  of  ths  criticisms 
raised  in  advance  of  your  trip  is  that  there  loon't 
be  time,  there  aren't  procedures,  for  hearing 
from  any  Latins  other  than  those  in  the  estab- 
lishment, those  high  in  government,  those  among 
the  moneyed.  Is  that  a  fair  criticism? 

Governor  Rockefeller:  No,  I  really  don't 
think  it  is.  I  will  say  why.  I  am  very  fortunate 
that  with  us  on  this  trip  are  about  20  men  and 
women  of  outstanding  ability  and  experience. 
For  instance,  right  here  with  me  at  this  reunion 
today  is  Mr.  George  Woods,  who  was  President 
of  the  World  Bank,  appointed  by  President 
Kennedy,  served  under  President  Jolmson,  re- 
signed 2  years  ago.  He  has,  probably,  as  inti- 
mate a  knowledge  of  the  fiscal  problems  of  these 
countries  and  the  possibilities  for  development 
through  outside  capital  as  anyone.  He  comes 
with  an  open  mind  to  update  his  experience  and 
to  listen  to  the  leaders  in  that  field. 


JTDNE    2.    1969 


471 


Mr.  Watson,  Mr.  Arthur  Watson,  is  here,  who 
is  president  of  the  International  Chamber  of 
Commerce.  He  has  had  a  long  association  in  the 
business  field  around  the  world,  and  he  will  be 
able  to  talk  to  the  businessmen  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  as  well  as  the  American  business- 
men down  there,  to  get  their  point  of  view  and 
their  feelings  on  how  there  can  be  an  accelerated 
flow  of  capital.  Both  fields  are  essential,  public 
and  private. 

Then  in  all  fields,  whether  it  is  in  housing, 
whether  it  is  in  education,  whether  it  is  in  public 
healtli,  we  have  people  who  are  going,  who  will 
be  going  and  talking.  Let's  say  in  the  field  of 
intellectuals,  which  is  a  very  important  factor 
in  Latin  America.  We  have  a  gentleman  there, 
Dave  Bronheim  [director,  Center  for  Inter- 
American  Eelations,  New  York,  N.Y.] ,  who  will 
be  visiting  with  leading  intellectuals,  leaders  in 
various  groups. 

I  think  that  you  will  find  that  even  tliough 
the  time  is  short,  by  carefully  planned  program- 
ing in  advance,  meetings  set  up,  that  we  are 
going  to  cover  a  very  wide  range.  It  is  equivalent 
to  about  20  days  in  each  country,  because  we 
have  20  people  in  different  areas  who  will  be 
spending  a  full  day  visiting  with  covmterparts. 

Q.  Governor,  lohere  does  Cuba  -fit  into  this 
survey  of  inter-American  relations? 

Governor  RocJiefeUer:  As  you  know,  they 
have  taken  actions  which,  according  to  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States — while  Cuba  is 
still  a  member — kept  the  present  government 
from  participation.  Therefore,  they  are  not  part 
of  the  present  structure. 

Q.  Governor,  you  spent  quite  a  hit  of  time 
with  the  President  this  morning.  Can  you  give 
us  an  idea  of  what  particular  interests  he  had 
and  what  particular  instrtictioTis  he  gave  you 
regarding  the  trip? 

Governor  Rockefeller:  The  President  has 
been  deeply  interested  in  Latin  America  and  the 
various  countries.  He  is  one  of  the  few  Presi- 
dents who  has  visited  all  of  the  countries  once, 
and  many  of  them  two  or  three  times,  starting 
in  1940.  So  he  has  had  a  long  association,  a  deep 
personal  interest,  an  open  mind,  as  to  how  there 
are  things  that  may  be  changed  that  would  make 
it  possible  for  us  to  be  more  helpful  and  more 
effective  in  our  search  for  common  objectives, 
common  goals.  These  are  the  questions  we  dis- 
cussed this  morning. 


LIST  OF  ADVISERS 

White  House  press  release  (Key  Biscay ne,  Fla.)  dated  May  8 

Finance:  George  D.  Woods,  former  President  of  the 
World  Bank,  now  director  and  consultant  to  the 
First  Boston  Corp. ;  and  Claris  Reynolds,  professor 
of  economics,  Stanford  University 

Economics:  William  Butler,  vice  president  and  econo- 
mist, Chase  Manhattan  Bank 

Business:  Arthur  K.  Watson,  president,  IBM  World 
Trade  Corp.,  and  president.  International  Chamber 
of  Commerce 

Counselor  of  the  mission:  James  M.  Cannon,  special 
assistant  to  the  Governor 

Agriculture:  Emil  M.  Mrak,  chancellor,  University  of 
California  at  Davis;  and  Clifton  R.  Wharton,  Jr., 
vice  president  of  the  Agricultural  Development  Coun- 
cil, Inc. 

Education:  Samuel  B.  Gould,  chancellor.  State  Univer- 
sity of  New  York;  and  Kenneth  Holland,  president, 
Institute  of  International  Education 

Science  and  technology :  Detlev  W.  Bronk,  president 
emeritus.  Rockefeller  University,  former  President 
of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences 

Public  health:  Harold  B.  Gotaas,  dean  of  the  Techno- 
logical Institute  of  Northwestern  University ;  and 
Kenneth  Riland,  chief  physician,  U.S.  Steel  Corp. ; 
Public  Health  Council,  State  of  New  York 

Military  affairs:  Gen.  Robert  W.  Porter,  Jr.,  former 
Commander  in  Chief,  U.S.  Southern  Command 

Cultural  affairs:  Thomas  P.  Hoving,  director.  Metro- 
politan Museum  of  Art,  New  York,  N.Y. ;  and  Robert 
Goldwater,  director,  Museum  of  Primitive  Art,  New 
York,  N.Y. 

Vrian  affairs:  Alan  Miller,  urbanist.  Commissioner  of 
Mental  Hygiene  for  New  York  State;  and  Professor 
Walter  Harris,  Yale  School  of  Art  and  Architecture 

Women's  group:  Mrs.  Flo  Kampmann,  chief  of  proto- 
col for  the  world's  fair,  Texas,  former  Republican 
National  Committeewoman  from  Texas 

Agency  for  International  Development:  Leroy  S. 
Wehrle,  former  head  of  AID  in  Viet-Nam,  currently 
with  Harvard  Development  Center;  and  Kenneth 
Melvin  Rabin,  career  AID  oflScial 


United  States  and  Peru  Hold 
Round  of  Talks  at  Washington 

Department  Statement  ^ 

The  talks  between  the  Peruvian  special  com- 
mission, headed  by  Gen.  Marco  Fernandez  Baca, 
and  the  United  States  team,  headed  by  Ambas- 
sador John  Irwin,  recessed  yesterday  [May  14]  .^ 
The  talks  may  resume  in  Lima  after  the  two 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch  on  May  1.5. 

°  For  a  Department  statement  of  Apr.  25,  see 
Bulletin  of  May  12, 1969,  p.  400. 


472 


DEPARTMEN'T   OF   STATE   BULIiETINr 


teams  report  the  results  of  the  talks  to  their 
respective  Governments. 

The  atmosphere  of  cordiality  and  frankness 
continued  throughout  the  conversations.  Al- 
though no  substantive  agreements  liave  been 
reached,  issues  have  been  clarified  and  ideas 
raised  for  consideration  by  the  two  Govern- 
ments. 

As  the  Peruvians  did  in  Lima  with  Ambas- 
sador Irwin,  Department  of  State  officials,  dur- 
ing talks  here,  had  an  opportunity  to  make  a 
full  presentation  of  the  United  States  position 
on  territorial  waters  and  fishing. 

Therefore,  in  our  opinion,  the  sessions  have 
served  a  useful  purpose.  The  timing  of  any 
resumption  of  the  talks  will,  of  course,  be  set 
by  the  two  Governments  through  normal  dip- 
lomatic channels. 

Ambassador  Irwin  has  indicated  his  willing- 
ness to  continue  to  lead  the  U.S.  representatives 
in  any  further  conversations  with  Peruvian 
authorities.  The  Peruvian  team  plans  to  depart 
from  Washington  this  evening  and  return 
directly  to  Lima. 


Israel  Pays  Compensation  Claimed 
for  Men  Injured  on  U.S.S.  Liberty 

Press  release  116  dated  May  13 

On  April  28,  the  United  States  Government 
received  $3,566,457  from  the  Government  of 
Israel  in  settlement  of  certain  claims  arising  out 
of  the  attack  on  the  U.S.S.  Liberty  on  June  8, 
1967.  The  amount  received  represents  payment 
in  full  of  the  following  United  States  claims : 

A.  164  claims  totaling  $3,452,275  on  behalf 
of  the  members  of  the  crew  of  the  U.S.S.  Liberty 
who  were  injured  in  the  attack ; 

B.  A  claim  for  $92,437  for  expenses  incurred 
by  the  United  States  Government  in  providing 
medical  treatment  to  the  injured  men; 

C.  A  claim  for  $21,745  for  expenses  incurred 
by  the  United  States  Government  in  reimburs- 
ing members  of  the  crew  of  the  U.S.S.  Liberty 
for  personal  property  damaged  or  destroyed  in 
the  attack. 

Distribution  to  the  injured  men  of  funds  re- 
ceived in  settlement  of  their  claims  is  now  in 
process  and  will  be  completed  in  a  few  weeks. 

On  May  31,  1968,  the  Government  of  Israel 


paid  in  full  claims  totaling  $3,323,500  on  behalf 
of  the  families  of  the  34  men  killed  in  the  attack. 
Tlie  only  imsettled  claim  arising  out  of  the 
attack  on  the  U.S.S.  Liberty  is  the  claim  for 
damage  to  the  ship,  which  remains  under 
discussion. 


THE  CONGRESS 


Future  U.S.  Relations 
With  Latin  America 

Statement  by  Charles  A.  Meyer 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs^ 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  you  to  share 
my  thoughts  about  future  United  States  rela- 
tions with  our  Latin  American  neighbors.  As 
you  know,  the  administration  is,  as  is  tliis  com- 
mittee, assessing  our  experience  and  policies  of 
the  last  decade,  reexamining  our  assumptions, 
and  developing  the  policy  framework  in  which 
our  relations  and  our  cooperative  efforts  with 
the  hemisphere  will  evolve  in  the  decade  ahead. 
I  therefore  am  not  yet  able  to  give  you  what  I 
know  you  would  like  and  are  anxiously  await- 
ing ;  that  is,  a  clear  definitive  statement  of  the 
administration's  policies  and  program  priorities 
toward  Latin  America  for  the  years  ahead.  This 
is  now  being  worked  out.  To  this  end,  and  at 
the  President's  request.  Governor  Kockef  eller  is 
beginning  discussions  with  our  colleagues  in 
Latin  America  as  to  how  we  and  they  can  more 
effectively  work  together  in  our  common  interest 
over  the  years  ahead.  His  report  and  recom- 
mendations will,  of  course,  be  given  great 
weight  by  the  President  in  charting  the  course 
of  our  future  policies. 

I  would  like  to  concur  in  the  views  expressed 
before  this  committee  that  the  past  decade  has 
seen  many  quite  remarkable  changes  in  the 
hemisphere  and  that  within  the  framework  of 
the  Alliance  for  Progress  our  sister  Republics 
have  made  notable  gains  in  many  areas.  There 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Inter-American 
Affairs  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on 
May  8  (press  release  108) . 


JUNE    2,    1969 


473 


is  now,  for  example,  wide  recognition  that  the 
energies,  talents,  and  resources  available  to  the 
hemisphere  must  be  even  more  vigorously  di- 
rected toward  accelerated  development.  There 
are  now  a  number  of  increasingly  effective 
multilateral  and  bilateral  mechanisms  concen- 
trating and  coordinating  their  efforts  and  re- 
sources upon  development.  Much  has  been  done 
to  create  the  climate,  train  the  talent,  and  to 
tool  up  for  the  demands  of  the  decade  ahead. 
But  much  remains  to  be  done;  the  greatest 
challenges — ^and  opportunities — are  still  ahead. 
We  and  our  Latin  American  friends  know  now 
that  the  dimensions  of  development  are  enor- 
mous and  that  the  neglect  of  centuries  cannot  be 
solved  within  one  or  two  decades. 

We  must  also  recognize  that  Latin  American 
countries,  as  proud  independent  sovereignties, 
will  at  times  express  and  perceive  certain  of 
their  interests  in  ways  which  do  not  coincide 
with  our  own.  As  the  forces  of  change  accelerate 
within  the  hemisphere,  we  can  anticipate  from 
time  to  time  that  differences  will  appear  and 
at  times  may  assume  disturbing  proportions.  It 
is  imperative  that  we  and  they  recognize  the 
likelihood  of  these  divergencies,  attempt  to 
avoid  them  through  mutually  conciliatory  ef- 
forts, and  at  all  times  place  them  in  the  per- 
spective of  our  overriding  mutual  interests  in 
working  together  on  the  broad  range  of  com- 
mon interests  which  bind  us  together. 

We  must  keep  reminding  ourselves  that  the 
future  of  Latin  America  is  and  must  remain 
in  Latin  American  hands.  Our  wealthy  and 
powerful  country  cannot  help  but  be  a  prom- 
inent force  in  the  hemisphere  simply  in  terms 
of  what  we  buy  from  and  sell  to  Latin  America, 
how  much  we  invest,  the  extent  to  which  we 
share  our  technology,  and  the  degree  to  which 
we  assist  in  the  hemisphere's  development 
through  our  aid  programs.  At  the  heart  of 
the  matter  for  the  future,  however,  is  the  vigor 
and  courage  with  which  the  Latin  American 
govei-nments  themselves  address  their  own  prob- 
lems of  development  and  regional  cooperation. 
Because  of  our  great  size  and  power  we  must 
on  our  part  be  increasingly  sensitive  to  assure 
that  our  weight  falls — and  is  recognized  in  Latin 
America  as  falling — on  the  side  of  supporting 
their  development  aspirations  and  efforts.  We 
can  significantly  assist  these  efforts  and  support 
their  aspirations.  We  can  not  and  will  not,  how- 


ever, presume  to  make  the  hard  choices  for  our 
sister  countries  about  the  political  systems  they 
will  follow  or  the  priorities  and  resources  which 
they  themselves  will  assign  to  their  development 
needs.  Our  willingness  to  help,  where  they  seek 
it  and  can  effectively  use  it  in  conjunction  with 
their  own  efforts,  should  be  clear.  For  the  future, 
then,  I  look  forward  to  United  States  constancy 
in  supporting  Latin  American  drives  to  develop- 
ment, as  well  as  increased  United  States  recog- 
nition of  the  right  of  the  Latin  countries  to 
disagree  with  us  where  they  feel  their  interests 
compel  them  to  do  so.  Dissent  among  friends 
is  not  disaster,  and  tolerance  of  differences  is  no 
tragedy. 

We  in  the  United  States  must  temper  our 
expectations  about  progress  and  development  in 
the  hemisphere  with  far  more  realism  than  we 
have  exercised  in  the  past.  Unrealistic  expecta- 
tions inevitably  yield  bitter  disappointment. 
Thus,  while  the  many  solid  achievements  of  the 
past  decade  have  not  measured  up  to  the  results 
anticipated  by  many,  they  cannot  be  said  to 
have  disappointed  realistic  expectations.  Un- 
fortunately, and  unreasonably,  there  appears  to 
be  a  strong  inclination  in  this  country  to  meas- 
ure hemisphere  performance  to  date  against  the 
unrealistic  expectations  of  the  past  and  gloomily 
to  write  off  the  future.  This  we  must  avoid,  both 
in  the  interests  of  our  neighbors  to  the  south 
and  in  our  own  interests.  A  keynote  of  future 
LT.S.  policies  must  be  realism — not  an  attitude 
affected  by  frustration  and  pessimism,  but  one 
in  which  we  firmly  face  the  complex  challenges 
of  the  future  on  the  basis  of  a  hardheaded  assess- 
ment of  the  past.  I  am  confident  that  both  we 
and  our  Latin  friends  will  face  the  common 
tasks  of  tomorrow  with  the  candor,  confidence, 
and  cooperation  indispensable  to  good 
neighbors. 

For  example,  considerable  sophistication  has 
evolved  in  our  assistance  programs,  such  that 
heavy  future  concentration  can,  as  a  practical 
matter,  now  be  given  to  the  key  agriculture  and 
education  sectors.  Although  we  and  the  Latin 
countries  have  learned  a  great  deal  in  the  last 
decade  about  how  to  cooperate  in  these  very 
complicated  sectors,  the  progress  which  we  can 
reasonably  anticipate  will  occur  will  be  gradual 
and  inevitably  will  be  beset  with  difficulties. 
Rather  than  despairing  because  the  race  has  not 
been  won,  however,  it  is  important  for  us  to 
recognize  that  it  has  barely  begun  to  be  run. 


474 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   TtTTT.T.THTTV 


President  Sends  Vienna  Convention 
on  Consular  Relations  to  the  Senate 

Message  From  President  Nixon  ^ 

The  White  House,  May  6, 1969. 
To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I  transmit 
herewith  a  certified  copy  of  the  Vienna  Conven- 
tion on  Consular  Relations  and  a  certified  copy 
of  the  Optional  Protocol  Concerning  the  Com- 
pulsoi-y  Settlement  of  Disputes,  signed  at 
Vienna  under  date  of  April  24,  1963.  The  Con- 
vention and  Protocol  entered  into  foixje  on 
March  19,  1967. 

I  transmit  also,  for  the  mformation  of  the 
Senate,  the  report  which  the  Secretary  of  State 
has  addressed  to  me  in  regard  to  the  matter,  to- 
gether with  the  enclosures  thereto. 

The  convention  is  the  first  agreement  envisag- 
ing the  regulation  of  consular  relations  on  a 
world-wide  basis  and  represents  the  culmination 
of  eight  years  of  work.  Based  on  a  draft  con- 
vention prepared  by  the  International  Law 
Commission,  it  was  concluded  at  a  United  Na- 
tions Conference  of  92  States,  one  of  a  series  of 
Conferences  having  the  aim,  in  the  words  of  the 
United  Nations  Charter,  of  "encouraging  the 
progressive  development  of  international  law 
and  its  codification".  A  previous  United  Na- 
tions Conference  in  the  series  formulated  the 
1961  Vienna  Convention  on  Diplomatic  Rela- 
tions, which  was  approved  by  the  Senate  on 
September  14, 1965. 

Account  has  been  taken  of  the  interests  and 
views  of  new  and  old  nations  and  of  nations  with 
varied  political  and  economic  systems  in  the 
codification  and  development  of  consular  law 
as  contained  in  the  present  Convention,  and  the 
Convention  is  considered  to  be  an  important 
contribution  to  friendly  relations  between 
States.  I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early 
and  favorable  consideration  to  the  Convention 
and  Protocol  submitted  herewith  and  give  its 
advice  and  consent  to  their  ratification. 

RiCHAKD  NiXON 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


'Transmitted  on  May  8  (White  House  press  release 
dated  May  5)  ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  E,  91st  Cong.,  1st 
sess.,  which  includes  the  texts  of  the  convention  and 
optional  protocol,  as  well  as  the  report  of  the  Secretary 
of  State. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention   on  offenses   and  certain  other  acts  com- 
mitted on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  Septem- 
ber 14.  1963.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  May  13, 

1969. 
Signature:  Niger,  April  14,  1969. 

Convention  on  the  international  recognition  of  rights 
in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June  19,  1948.  Entered 
into  force  September  17, 1953.  TIAS  2847. 
Adherence  deposited:  Lebanon,  April  11,  1969. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  nature  protection  and  wildlife  preserva- 
tion in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  with  annex.  Done 
at  the  Pan  American  Union  October  12, 1940.  Entered 
into  force  April  30,  1942,  56  Stat.  1354. 
Signature  and  ratification  deposited:  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  April  24, 1969. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention.  Done  at  Geneva  Sep- 
tember 6, 1952.  Entered  into  force  September  16, 1955. 
TIAS  3324. 

Protocol  1  annexed  to  the  Universal  Copyright  Con- 
vention concerning  the  application  of  that  conven- 
tion to  the  works  of  stateless  persons  and  refugees. 
Done  at  Geneva  September  6,  1952.  Entered  into 
force  September  16, 1955.  TIAS  3324. 

Protocol  2  annexed  to  the  Universal  Copyright  Conven- 
tion concerning  the  application  of  that  convention  to 
the  works  of  certain  international  organizations. 
Done  at  Geneva  September  6,  1952.  Entered  into 
force  September  16, 1955.  TIAS  3324. 

Protocol  3  annexed  to  the  Universal  Copyright  Conven- 
tion concerning  the  effective  date  of  instruments  of 
ratification  or  acceptance  of  or  accession  to  that 
Convention.  Done  at  Geneva  September  6,  1952. 
Entered  into  force  August  19,  1954 ;  for  the  United 
States,  December  6,  1954.  TIAS  3324. 
Accession  deposited:  Tunisia,  March  19,  1969. 

Grains 

International  grains  arrangement,  1967,  with  annexes. 
Open  for  signature  at  Washington  October  15 
through  November  30,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
July  1, 1968.  TIAS  6537. 

Accession  to  the  Wheat  Trade  Convention  deposited: 
Ecuador,  May  14,  1969. 

Organization   of  American   States 

Protocol  of  amendment  to  the  Charter  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American   States    (TIAS   2361).    Signed   at 
Buenos  Aires  February  27,  1967.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Panama,  April  29,  1969. 


'  Not  in  force. 


JUNE    2,    1969 


475 


Postal   Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of 
execution.  Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  19&4.  Entered 
Into  force  January  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Cuba,  February  27,  1969; 
Jamaica,  November  8,  1968;  Malaysia,  Febru- 
ary 22,  1909. 

Racial   Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4, 
1969." 

Accession  deposited:  Syrian  Arab  Republic    (with 
reservations),  April  21, 1969. 


BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement  authorizing  temporary  additional  diversion 
for  power  purposes  of  water  flowing  over  American 
FaUs  at  Niagara.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  March  21,  1969. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  May  13, 
1969. 

Japan 

Agreement  concerning  the  trust  territory  of  the  Pacific 
Islands,  with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed  at  Tokyo 
April  18, 1969.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  receipt 
by  the  United  States  of  a  note  from  Japan  stating 
that  Japan  has  approved  the  agreement  in  accord- 
ance with  its  legal  procedures. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN  SERVICE 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  May  12  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Shelby  Davis  to  be  Ambassador  to  Switzerland.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  April  17. ) 

Guilford  Dudley,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  Denmark. 
( For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  128  dated  May  22.) 

Robert  Ellsworth  to  be  U.S.  Permanent  Representa- 
tive on  the  Council  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  April  12. ) 

Fred  L.  Hadsel  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Somali 
Republic.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  124  dated  May  19.) 

Malcolm  Toon  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Czechoslovak 
Socialist  Republic.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  April  19. ) 


Designations 

Christopher  Van  HoUen  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs,  effective 
May  7.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  dated  May  8.) 


476 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


INDEX     Jum  2,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1662 


Asia.  Van  HoUen  designated  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian 
Affairs       476 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Davis,  Dudley,  Ellsworth,  Had- 
sel.  Toon) 476 

Future    U.S.    Relations    With    Latin    America 

(Meyer) 473 

President  Sends  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular 
Relations  to  the  Senate  (message  from  Presi- 
dent  Nixon) 475 

Czechoslovakia.  Toon  confirmed  as  Ambassa- 
dor     476 

Denmark.  Dudley  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      476 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 
Confirmations  (Davis,  Dudley,  Ellsworth,  Had- 

sel.  Toon) 476 

Designations  (Van  Hollen) 476 

India.  U.S.  Extends  Condolences  on  Death  of 
President  Husain  of  India  (Nixon,  Rogers)     .      469 

Israel.  Israel  Pays  Compensation  Claimed  for 
Men  Injured  on  U.S.S.  Liberty 473 

Latin  America 

Future    U.S.    Relations    With    Latin    America 

(Meyer) 473 

Nelson  Rockefeller  Begins  Mission  to  Latin 
America  (Nixon,  Rockefeller) 470 

Near  East.  Van  Hollen  designated  Deputy  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs 476 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Ellsworth 
confirmed  as  U.S.  Permanent  Representative 
to  the  NATO  Council 476 

Peru.  United  States  and  Peru  Hold  Round  of 
Talks  at  Washington  (Department  state- 
ment)     472 

Presidential  Documents 

Ambassador  Lodge  Discusses  the  Paris  Peace 

Talks 465 

Nelson    Rockefeller   Begins    Mission    to    Latin 

America 470 

Peace  in  Viet-Nam 457 

President  Sends  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular 

Relations  to  the  Senate 475 

U.S.  Extends  Condolences  on  Death  of  President 

Husain  of  India 469 

Somali  Republic.  Iladsel  confirmed  as  Am- 
bassador     476 

Switzerland.  Davis  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .      476 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 475 

President  Sends  Vienna  Convention  on  Consular 
Relations  to  the  Senate  (message  from  Presi- 
dent  Nixon) 475 

U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Sign  Agreement  on  Leases  on 
New  Chancery  Sites 469 


U.S.SJR.  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Sign  Agreement  on 

Leases  on  New  Chancery  Sites 469 

Viet-Nam 

Ambassador  Lodge  Discusses  the  Paris  Peace 

Talks  (Nixon,  Lodge) 465 

Peace  in  Viet-Nam   (Nixon) 457 

Secretary  Rogers  Visits  Viet-Nam  (transcripts 

of  news  conferences) 461 

17th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 467 

Name  Index 

Davis,  Shelby 470 

Dudley,  Guilford.  Jr 476 

Ellsworth,  Robert 476 

Hadsel,   Fred  L 476 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 465,467 

Jleyer,  Charles  A 473 

Nixon,  President 457, 465, 469, 470, 475 

Rockefeller,  Nelson 470 

Rogers,  Secretary 461,469 

Toon,  Malcolm 476 

Van  HoUen,  Christopher 476 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  May  12-18 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflSce 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  May  12  which  appears 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  108  of  May  8. 

Subject 

Crowe  sworn  in  as  Amba.ssador  to 
Norway  (biographic  details). 

IJC  report  on  survey  of  Red  River 
pollution. 

DePalma:  "The  United  Nations— 
Up,  Down,  or  Sideways?" 

Payment  of  U.S.S.  Liberty  claims. 

Rogers :  statement  at  Los  Angeles, 
May  12. 

Rogers :  news  conference  at  Saigon, 
May  14. 

Access  by  researchers  to  foreign 
policy  records  for  1939-41. 

Johnson :  "The  Pacific  Basin  Poten- 
tial." 

Lodge:  17th  plenary  session  on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

Program  for  visit  of  King  Baudouin 
I  of  Belgium. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


No. 

Date 

*113 

5/12 

tll4 

5/12 

tll5 

5/12 

116 

117 

5/13 
5/13 

118 

5/14 

tll9 

5/15 

tl20 

5/16 

121 

5/16 

*122 

5/16 

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THE 

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OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1563 


June  9,  1969 


SEATO  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  MEETS  AT  BANGKOK 

Statement  by  Secretary  Rogers  and  Text  of  Communique     lfl7 

SEVEN  ASIAN  AND  PACIFIC  NATIONS  EXAMINE 

SECURITY  SITUATION  IN  ASIA 

Text  of  Com,muniqae     1^81 

THE  PACIFIC  BASIN  POTENTIAL 

hy  Under  Secretary  Johnson     Ji88 

THE  UNITED  NATIONS— UP,  DOWN,  OR  SIDEWAYS? 

iy  Assistant  Secretary  DePalma     A93         „    ,      „  . ,.    ,  ., 
^  ^  -T-  Boston  Public  Library 

Superintendent  of  Documents 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


JUN  2  6  1969 
DEPOSITORY 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


BULLETIN  I 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1563 
June  9,  1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

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Note:    Contents  of  tbls  publication  are  not 

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reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 

the  Readers'  Ouide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  tneekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
tcith  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy ,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  u>ell  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


SEATO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Bangkok 


The  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Southeast 
Asia  Treaty  Organization  tnet  at  Bangkok^ 
Thailand^  May  W-21.  Following  is  a  statement 
made  by  Secretary  Rogers  at  the  opening  ses- 
sion on  May  20,  together  with  the  text  of  the 
final  comrminique  issued  at  the  close  of  the  meet- 
ing on  May  21. 


STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  ROGERS 

Press  release  125  dated  May  20 

I  am  glad  for  this  opportunity  to  play  a 
part  in  the  14th  meeting  of  the  Southeast  Asia 
Treaty  Organization  and  to  meet  and  exchange 
views  with  the  members  of  this  alliance.  This 
is  particularly  so  because  it  comes  so  soon  after 
President  Nixon  took  office. 

Let  me  begin  by  stressing  that  the  interest  of 
the  United  States  in  Asia  is  not  secondary  to 
our  interest  in  any  other  areas  of  the  world.  By 
reason  of  geography,  resources,  and  common  in- 
terests, the  United  States  is  a  member  of  the 
Pacific  community.  That  is  why  the  United 
States  is  a  member  and  a  strong  supporter  of 
SEATO. 

There  have,  of  course,  been  profound  changes 
in  the  trends  of  Asian  affairs  since  the  Pacific 
Charter  was  signed  a  decade  and  a  half  ago. 

Those  were  dark  days.  Some  governments  in 
the  area  were  insecure  and  unstable.  Most  na- 
tional economies  were  beset  by  the  problems  of 
recovering  from  the  Second  "World  War,  of 
colonialism,  of  administrative  inexperience. 
Traditional  rivalries  darkened  relations  be- 
tween neighboring  states.  The  prospects  seemed 
bleak;  people  were  without  much  hope. 

Over  it  all  hung  a  contagious  fear  that  totali- 
tarian communism — thrusting  outward  from 
mainland  China — would  become  an  irresistible 
political  force  in  Asia. 

Since  SEATO  was  first  established  there  has 
been  an  extraordinary  reversal  in  outlook. 

Govenmients  are  more  stable  and  more  re- 
sponsive to  the  will  and  the  needs  of  their  peo- 


ple. Cooperation  has  increased,  as  narrow 
nationalism  has  yielded  to  an  emerging  spirit 
of  regionalism. 

Some  of  the  most  rapidly  developing  coun- 
tries in  the  world  today  are  foimd  in  East  Asia. 
Industrialization  is  underway;  rural  reform  is 
moving  forward;  communications  are  improv- 
ing; goods  and  ideas  flow  more  freely  across 
national  frontiers. 

These  developments  are  still  in  an  early  stage 
and  will  have  to  be  nourished  carefully.  But 
these  are  the  encouraging  new  trends.  They  are 
supported  by  the  new  organizations  in  which 
the  nations  of  Asia  are  developing  the  habits 
of  international  cooperation  for  the  common 
good.  These  trends  are  sustained  by  a  new  vital- 
ity which  bespeaks  the  growing  confidence  of 
governments  and  peoples  that  they  can,  in  fact, 
determme  their  own  futures. 

Meanwhile,  the  once  seemingly  irreversible 
tide  of  Asian  communism  is  being  blocked  by 
the  rising  will  and  courage  of  peoples  to  main- 
tain their  national  independence. 

The  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organization  can- 
not, of  course,  claim  sole  responsibility  for  these 
encouraging  trends  in  Asian  affairs. 

But  we  have  seen  again  and  again  in  the  post- 
war world— not  just  in  Asia  but  in  Europe  and 
elsewhere — that  security  comes  first.  If  govern- 
ments are  to  sponsor  ambitious  programs  for 
economic  development  and  social  reform,  if 
citizens  are  to  contribute  the  support  such  pro- 
grams require,  the  first  requisite  is  a  prevailing 
sense  of  national  security. 

Surely  SEATO,  and  the  assistance  provided 
in  connection  with  it,  have  helped  to  provide  a 
credible  sense  of  security  in  Asia.  In  this  in- 
direct but  very  real  sense,  the  Pacific  Charter 
can  be  considered  as  a  precondition  for  the 
healthy  developments  now  in  progress. 

This,  in  the  broadest  sense,  is  why  my  Gov- 
ernment has  so  valued  this  organization  over 
the  years  and  why  it  will  continue  to  value  it 
in  the  future.  Tliis  is  why  we  continue  to  adhere 
to  the  treaty  and  to  regard  the  Rusk-Thanat 


JUNE    9,    1969 


477 


communique  ^  as  a  valid  restatement  of  the  re- 
sponsibilities set  forth  in  article  IV  (1)  of  the 
treaty.- 

Institutions,  of  course,  adapt  to  new  condi- 
tions and  new  opportunities,  and  SEATO  is  no 
exception.  We  believe  it  would  be  a  good  idea 
to  have  a  look  together  at  future  tasks  for 
SEATO. 

One  suggestion  is  that  we  should  concentrate 
on  turning  the  assets  of  the  organization  toward 
countering  subversion.  We  believe  there  may  be 
merit  in  this,  smce  the  threat  of  externally  sup- 
ported subversion  is  still  an  urgent  one  and  may 
be  for  years  to  come. 

Another  suggestion  is  to  consider  the  role  of 
the  organization  in  the  closely  related  field  of 
economic  development.  These  suggestions  de- 
serve our  careful  consideration. 

Meanwhile,  SEATO  is  already  well  at  work — 
as  an  Asian  security  organization,  as  a  forum 
for  political  consultations  among  its  members, 
as  a  sponsor  of  selected  economic  and  technical 
and  cultural  projects. 

This  is  why  the  United  States  remains  a  loyal 
member  and  a  steadfast  supporter  of  SEATO. 

At  the  same  time,  I  must  point  out  that  my 
Government  faces  difficult  decisions  about  how 
to  allocate  available  resources  against  many 
urgent  claims.  These  competing  interests — for 
both  domestic  and  overseas  purposes — must 
somehow  be  balanced  and  compromised  and  rec- 
onciled. But  this  does  not  alter  the  underlying 
goal.  We  are  dedicated  at  home  to  expanding  in- 
dividual freedoms,  to  better  education,  to  equal- 
ity of  opportunity,  to  racial  harmony,  to  im- 
proving the  quality  of  life  for  all  our  people — 
most  urgently  in  our  crowded  cities,  which  suffer 
from  the  social  and  physical  impacts  of  rapid 
urbanization  and  industrialization.  These  goals 
are  enduring. 

My  country  also  has  enduring  goals  abroad. 
We  are  dedicated  to  the  resolution  of  conflict 
by  peaceful  means,  to  the  principle  of  national 
independence  and  the  free  choice  by  peoples  of 
their  own  forms  of  government  and  their  own 
leaders. 

Our  allegiance  to  these  goals  in  Asia  is  firm. 

Our  interest  in  the  prosperity  and  well-being 
of  Asia  and  Asians  is  a  permanent  fijxture  of 
our  foreign  policy.  I  hope  my  presence  here 
today  will  be  accepted  as  one  symbol  of  that 
fact. 

Our  current  position  in  Viet-Nam  under- 
scores this  point.  We  want  to  achieve  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  a  war  that  has  cost  everyone  too 
much  and  lasted  too  long. 


But  we  believe  that  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
nam should  have  the  right  to  make  their  own 
decisions  about  their  own  future  without  inter- 
ference or  pressure  from  any  outside  quarter. 

For  that  reason  President  Nixon  made  it  clear 
last  week  that  in  striving  to  achieve  this  goal : 
"Our  fighting  men  are  not  going  to  be  worn 
down ;  our  negotiators  are  not  going  to  be  talked 
down ;  our  allies  are  not  going  to  be  let  down."  ^ 

This  is  our  position.  It  is  intended  not  only 
to  secure  the  right  of  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  to  determine  their  own  future  but  to  en- 
sure against  another  Viet-Nam — in  Asia  or  else- 
where. It  is  intended  to  bring  peace  to  Southeast 
Asia. 

Wlien  the  war  stops,  the  immediate  mission 
of  our  troops  will  be  fulfilled.  But  our  long-term 
goals,  our  collective  missions,  in  Southeast  Asia 
will  remain.  Our  long-term  goals  are  these : 

First  is  to  make  sure  that  the  peace  is  not  a 
lull  between  wars,  but  a  lasting  peace  guaran- 
teed by  collective  security.  Thus  it  is  that  we 
warmly  welcome  the  f  arsighted  decision  of  our 
allies,  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  to  reinforce 
the  security  of  Southeast  Asia  by  maintaining 
peacekeeping  forces  in  Singapore  and  Malaysia. 

Second,  after  peace  has  been  restored,  we  will 
continue  working  together  for  a  dynamic,  pros- 
perous Southeast  Asia — free  at  last  to  turn  its 
resources  and  its  energies  to  meeting  the  aspira- 
tions of  its  peoples. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  say  that  when  our  forces 
are  no  longer  needed  in  South  Viet-Nam  we 
shall  not  abandon  in  peace  what  we  have  fought 
for  in  war :  the  peaceful  evolution  of  Southeast 
Asia — playing  its  full  and  rightful  part  in  an 
emerging  cooperative  Pacific  community. 


TEXT  OF  FINAL  COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  126  dated  May  21 

The  Council  of  the  South-East  Asia  Treaty  Organi- 
zation held  its  Fourteenth  Meeting  In  Bangkok  from 
20  May  to  21  May  1969,  under  the  chairmanship  of 
His  Excellency  Thanat  Khoman,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  Thailand. 


General  Observations 

The  Council  agreed  that  the  most  significant  de- 
velopment during  the  past  year  has  been  the  prospects 
for  peace  in  the  area  opened  up  by  the  Paris  Meetings 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  26,  1962,  p.  498. 

'  For  text  of  the  Southeast  Asia  Collective  Defense 
Treaty,  see  Bulletin  of  SepL  20, 1954,  p.  393. 

'  For  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation  on  May 
14,  see  Bulletin  of  June  2, 1969,  p.  457. 


478 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


and  by  the  determined  efforts  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Republic  of  Vietnam  in  close  consultation  with 
their  allies  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  and  just  solution 
to  the  Vietnam  conflict. 

The  Council  noted  that  economic  and  social  prog- 
ress had  continued  during  the  past  year  within  the 
Treaty  Area.  The  Council  agreed  that  this  progress 
had  been  achieved  mainly  by  the  individual  efforts  of 
the  countries  in  the  region,  and  by  the  further  strength- 
ening of  regional  co-operation  which  reflects  a  growing 
consciousness  of  mutual  interests.  The  Council  also 
noted  that  this  achievement  had  been  made  without 
sacrifice  of  human  liberty  and  fundamental  freedoms. 

The  Council  noted  that  these  political,  economic  and 
social  advances  would  not  have  been  possible  without 
the  shield  which  the  Manila  Treaty  has  helped  to  pro- 
vide over  the  past  fourteen  years. 

The  Council  agreed  that  aggression,  both  overt  and 
by  subversion,  infiltration  and  terrorism,  instigated  or 
supported  by  external  Communist  movements,  remains 
a  major  threat  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Area. 
The  Council  expressed  its  conviction  that  the  threat 
in  the  Treaty  Area  cannot  be  considered  in  isolation 
from  problems  of  international  peace  and  security,  and 
that  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  now  going  on  against 
such  aggression  in  South-East  Asia  will  have  profound 
effects  throughout  the  world.  The  Council  expressed 
its  determination  that  this  aggression  must  not  be  al- 
lowed to  succeed. 

The  Search   for  Peace 

The  Council  commended  the  determination  of  the  Re- 
public of  Vietnam,  and  the  governments  helping  to 
defend  it,  to  bring  about  a  peace  in  Vietnam  under 
which  the  people  of  South  Vietnam  will  be  assured  of 
their  right  to  determine  their  own  future,  free  from 
outside  interference  and  terrorism. 

The  Council  noted  with  approval  the  proposals  which 
have  been  made  by  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  and  the 
United  States  for  the  mutual  withdrawal  of  external 
forces  from  South  Vietnam,  for  respect  for  the  de- 
militarized zone,  for  full  implementation  of  the  1962 
Geneva  Agreements  on  Laos,  for  respect  for  the  sov- 
ereignty, independence,  neutrality  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  Cambodia  and  for  the  release  of  all  prisoners 
of  war.  The  Council  noted  that  these  proposals  not 
only  recognize  the  realities  of  the  situation  in  South- 
East  Asia  today,  but  are  firmly  based  on  the  precedents 
of  the  1954  and  1962  Geneva  Agreements.  The  Council 
noted  that  the  Paris  Talks  have  been  going  on  for  a 
year  and  expressed  the  hope  that  the  other  side  would 
now  respond  constructively  to  these  proposals. 

The  Council  expressed  its  conviction  that  serious 
negotiations  based  on  the  above  proposals  would  lead 
to  an  end  of  hostilities  and  to  peace  and  reconciliation 
in  Vietnam.  The  Council  noted  that  the  fundamental 
allied  objective  in  Vietnam  is  to  ensure  the  uncondi- 
tional right  of  self-determination  for  the  people  of 
South  Vietnam.  The  Council  agreed  that,  whatever  the 
difficulties,  the  intensive  search  for  a  just  and  lasting 
peace  must  continue  until  this  objective  is  attained 
and  stability  and  security  are  assured. 

Vietnam 

The  Council  heard  with  deep  Interest  a  statement  by 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 


nam. The  Council  expressed  its  concern  and  sympathy 
for  the  Vietnamese  people  who  have  suffered  so  long. 
It  reaffirmed  its  admiration  for  the  courage  with  which 
the  Government  and  people  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam 
are  defending  their  freedom. 

The  Council  noted  the  commendable  progress  being 
made  by  the  armed  forces  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam 
in  improving  their  ability  to  withstand  the  armed 
aggression  and  to  counter  subversive  activity.  The 
Council  warmly  welcomed  the  expressed  determination 
of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  pro- 
gressively to  assume  responsibility  for  the  defence  of 
its  territory. 

The  Council  also  welcomed  the  continued  progress 
that  has  been  made  by  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  in  the 
political,  economic  and  social  fields,  in  particular,  the 
evolution  and  strengthening  of  democratic  and  repre- 
sentative government. 

The  Council  noted  with  deep  concern  North  Viet- 
nam's continuing  aggression  by  means  of  armed  attack 
against  the  Republic  of  Vietnam.  The  Council  deplored 
the  conduct  of  North  Vietnam,  particularly  while  peace 
negotiations  are  in  progress,  in  continuing  indiscrim- 
inate attacks  on  the  civilian  population.  The  Council 
noted  with  regret  that  this  aggression  is  sustained  by 
a  heavy  flow  of  weapons  and  supplies  from  other 
Communist  regimes. 

The  Council  noted  with  appreciation  the  increases 
during  the  past  year  in  the  military,  economic  and 
humanitarian  assistance  by  Member  Governments  to 
the  Republic  of  Vietnam,  in  fulfilment  of  or  consistent 
with  their  obligations  under  the  South-East  Asia  Col- 
lective Defence  Treaty.  The  Council  also  noted  with 
appreciation  the  substantial  assistance  which  the  Re- 
public of  Vietnam  has  continued  to  receive  from  the 
Republic  of  Korea  and  other  countries  which  are  not 
members  of  SEATO. 

The  Council  stated  its  conviction  that  the  effective 
defence  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  in  its  current 
struggle  is  essential  to  the  security  of  South-East  Asia 
and  wiU  demonstrate  that  Communist  expansion 
through  aggression  of  this  kind  will  not  be  permitted. 

The  Council  noted  that  reconstruction  In  Vietnam, 
which  awaits  the  achievement  of  peace,  will  open  the 
way  to  a  new  era  of  development  and  progress  for  the 
peoples  and  nations  of  the  entire  region.  The  Council 
noted  the  intention  of  the  member  nations  of  SEATO 
to  continue  their  aid  to  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  and  to 
contribute  to  the  work  of  reconstruction.  The  Council 
welcomed  the  expressions  of  intent  by  other  nations 
around  the  world  to  participate  in  this  urgent  task. 

Laos 

The  Council  noted  with  grave  concern  that  North 
Vietnam,  in  violation  of  the  1962  Geneva  Agreements, 
continues  to  maintain  military  forces,  including  large 
units  of  its  regular  Army,  in  Laos,  to  commit  armed 
attacks  on  the  forces  of  the  Royal  Government  of  Laos, 
and  to  use  Laotian  territory  for  infiltrating  troops  and 
supplies  into  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  and  to  support 
insurgency  in  Thailand.  The  Council  reiterated  its  call 
for  full  implementation  by  all  signatories  of  the  1962 
Geneva  Agreements  on  Laos  and  expressed  support  for 
the  earnest  efforts  of  Prime  Minister  Souvanna 
Phouma  and  the  Royal  Government  of  Laos  to  secure 
peace  and  to  preserve  the  sovereignty,  independence, 
neutrality,  unity  and  territorial  integrity  of  Laos. 


479 


Philippines 

The  Council  was  pleased  to  note  the  recent  successes 
achieved  by  Government  forces  against  insurgents  in 
Central  Luzon  and  the  vigorous  efforts  by  all  agencies 
of  the  Government  of  the  Philippines,  with  support  of 
member  nations,  to  implement  an  integrated  socio- 
economic programme  designed  to  eliminate  the  root 
cause  of  the  complex  insurgency  problem  in  Central 
Luzon.  Since  one  of  the  causes  of  agrarian  unrest 
among  the  masses  is  the  land  problem,  the  Council  also 
noted  with  approval  the  efforts  of  the  Philippine  Gov- 
ernment to  accelerate  the  implementation  of  the  Land 
Reform  Code.  The  Council  further  noted  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  Government  of  the  Philippines  in  the 
development  of  its  rural  areas  and  expressed  its  grati- 
fication at  the  continuing  high  priority  given  to  irriga- 
tion, feeder  roads,  health,  electrification,  credit,  and 
agricultural  productivity  programmes. 

The  Council  noted  proposals  by  the  Philippines  for  a 
Youth  Volunteer  Corps,  a  Special  Problem  Oflice,  a  Uni- 
versity of  South-East  Asia,  a  Rural  Health  Training 
Centre,  and  Refugee  Rehabilitation. 


Thailand 

The  Council  noted  that  the  Royal  Thai  Government 
had  increased  during  the  year  the  major  contribution  it 
is  making  to  the  defence  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam. 
In  addition  to  air  and  naval  units  already  in  Vietnam, 
it  dispatched  a  division  of  ground  forces  to  aid  in  the 
struggle.  This  was  done  despite  the  continued  threat  of 
Communist-inspired  insurgency  within  Thailand  itself. 

The  Council  was  gratified  by  the  determined  endeav- 
ours of  the  Royal  Thai  Government  and  people  to 
encourage  economic  and  social  development  and  to 
counter  subversive  activities  directed  from  outside 
Thai  borders.  These  efforts  have  continued  under  the 
newly  formed  Government  following  the  national  elec- 
tions held  early  this  year. 

The  Council  expressed  concern  at  the  increase  in 
Communist  infiltration  and  terrorist  activities  particu- 
larly in  remote  areas  of  North  and  North-East  Thai- 
land. The  Council  noted  with  satisfaction  the  intensive 
efforts  of  the  Royal  Thai  Government  to  provide 
greater  security  and  a  higher  standard  of  living  for  the 
rural  population  and  the  vigorous  measures  taken  by 
Thai  authorities  to  eliminate  the  threat  of  Communist 
insurgency.  The  Council  reiterated  its  determination  to 
continue  to  assist  Thailand  In  meeting  this  threat. 


of  those  Governments.  The  Council  also  welcomed  the 
proposed  consultations  in  Canberra  between  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Australia,  Malaysia,  New  Zealand,  Singa- 
pore and  the  United  Kingdom. 


The  Organization 

The  Council  reaflBrmed  the  importance  which  it 
attaches  to  the  Organization  as  a  deterrent  to  Com- 
munist aggression  and  as  a  source  of  support  to  mem- 
ber nations  in  the  Area  in  countering  Communist 
subversion. 

The  Council  was  convinced  that  greater  emphasis 
should  be  placed  on  political  consultations,  counter- 
insurgency,  and  economic  and  cultural  co-operation,  to 
make  the  Organization's  role  more  effective  and  more 
responsive  to  the  new  Communist  tactics  being 
employed  to  undermine  the  stability  and  orderly 
progress  of  free  societies.  The  Council  expressed  its 
support  for  co-operative  endeavours  to  this  effect. 

The  Council  noted  the  Report  of  the  Military 
Advisers  and  commended  the  work  of  the  Military 
Planning  Office  during  the  past  year,  in  particular 
the  excellent  work  done  in  keeping  plans  up-to-date 
and  in  designing  military  exercises. 

The  Council  expressed  its  satisfaction  at  the 
progress  achieved  by  the  Organization  in  programmes 
related  to  economic  development,  cultural  affairs  and 
medical  research.  It  commended  the  efforts  of  the 
Organization  to  keep  these  programmes  under  review 
to  ensure  that  they  proved  complementary  to  pro- 
grammes for  counter-insurgency  and  civic  action.  The 
Council  agreed  that  the  value  of  these  programmes  has 
been  fuUy  demonstrated  and  that  they  deserve  the 
active  support  of  all  Members. 


Pakistan 

The  Pakistan  Delegate  wished  it  to  be  recorded  that 
he  did  not  participate  in  the  drafting  of  the  Communi- 
que and  that  the  views  expressed  in  it  do  not  neces- 
sarily reflect  the  position  of  the  Government  of 
Pakistan. 


Next  Meeting 

The  Council  accepted  with  pleasure  the  invitation 
of  the  Government  of  the  Philippines  to  bold  its 
Fifteenth  Meeting  in  the  Philippines  in  1970. 


Counter-Subversion 

The  Council  again  affirmed  its  support  for  SEATO 
activities  designed  to  aid  member  countries  in  the 
Treaty  Area  to  counter  Communist  subversion.  It  noted 
the  high  degree  of  success  achieved  by  the  Secretary- 
General  in  the  provision  of  such  assistance  and  re- 
quested him  to  continue  his  efforts  in  this  field. 


Auslralia-New  Zealand  Defence  Arrangements 

The  Council  welcomed  as  a  substantial  contribution 
to  the  security  of  the  area  the  decisions  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  to  maintain  mili- 
tary forces  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore  at  the  request 


Expression   of  Gratitude 

The  Council  expressed  gratitude  to  the  Royal  Thai 
Government  and  the  people  of  Thailand  for  their 
generous  hospitality  and  warm  welcome,  and  its 
appreciation  for  the  excellent  arrangements  made  for 
the  Meeting. 


Leaders  of  Delegations 

All  Member  Governments,  except  France,  partici- 
pated. The  Republic  of  Vietnam,  a  protocol  state,  was 
represented  by  an  observer. 

The  leaders  of  the  Delegations  to  the  Fourteenth 
Council  Meeting  were : 


480 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Australia 
New  Zealand 

Pakistan 
Philippines 
Thailand 
United  Kingdom 

United  States 

Republic  of  Vietnam 
(Observer) 


Hon.     Gordon     Freeth,     M.P., 

Minister  for  External  Affairs. 
Right    Hon.    Keith    Holyoake, 

C.H.,  M.P., 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of 

External  Affairs. 
H.    E.   Mr.    M.    Hayat   Junejo, 

Ambassador  to  Thailand. 
H.  E.  Gen.  Carlos  P.  Romulo, 

Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
H.    E.    Mr.    Thanat    Khoman, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Right  Hon.  Lord  Shepherd,  P.O., 

Minister    of    State,    Foreign 

and  Commonwealth  Office. 
Hon.      William      P.      Rogers, 

Secretary  of  State. 
H.  E,  air.  Tran  Chanh  Thanh, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


Seven  Asian  and  Pacific  Nations 
Examine  Security  Situation  in  Asia 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  communique  issued 
at  the  close  of  the  seven-nation  meeting  on  Viet- 
Nam  held  at  Bangkok  May  22. 

TEXT  OF  COMMUNIQUE 

Press  release  132  dated  May  22 

1.  The  Minister  for  External  Affairs  of  Aus- 
tralia, Mr.  Gordon  Freeth ;  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Mr.  Kyu 
Hah  Choi ;  the  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of 
External  Affairs  of  New  Zealand,  Mr.  Keith 
Holyoake;  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
the  Philippines,  Mr.  Carlos  P.  Romulo;  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Thailand,  Mr. 
Tlianat  Khoman ;  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  Mr.  William  P. 
Rogers ;  and  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  Mr.  Tran  Chanh 
Thanli,  met  in  Bangkok,  at  the  invitation  of  the 
Royal  Thai  Government,  on  22  May  1969. 

Purposes 

2.  Tlie  meeting  was  held  to  permit  the  Minis- 
ters to  continue  their  practice  of  regular  con- 
sultations on  important  matters  of  mutual 
interest.  Specifically,  they  wished  (1)  to  review 
the  current  situation  in  Viet-Nam,  (2)  to  con- 
sider the  prospects  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of 
the  conflict,  (3)  to  discuss  ways  in  which  their 


Governments  might  strengthen  their  efforts  to 
help  the  people  of  Viet-Nam,  (4)  to  examine 
the  security  situation  in  Asia. 

Situation   in  Viet-Nam 

3.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  described  the  important 
developments  wliich  had  taken  place  in  his  coun- 
try over  the  past  twelve  months.  He  emphasized 
the  broadly  based  representative  nature  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  and 
noted  the  successful  establishment  of  the  new 
and  elected  institutions,  such  as  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Justice  and  the  Inspectorate  called  for 
by  the  Vietnamese  Constitution.  He  also  de- 
scribed the  current  efforts  of  Vietnamese  non- 
Communist  political  parties  to  unite  to  further 
their  common  goal.  The  Ministers  expressed 
their  gratification  at  the  continued  strengthen- 
ing of  Vietnamese  political  institutions,  in  par- 
ticular the  effective  functioning  of  the  elected 
National  Assembly. 

4.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  also  outlined  the  efforts  be- 
ing made  to  raise  the  standard  of  living  of  his 
countrymen  and  to  bring  them  greater  social 
well-being,  making  particular  reference  to  his 
Government's  new  land  reform  program  and 
rural  development  policy.  He  described  the  in- 
creased autonomy  and  financial  resources  given 
to  local  authorities  to  foster  a  functioning  de- 
mocracy for  the  benefit  of  the  people.  He  under- 
lined tlie  achievements  of  the  pacification  pro- 
gram, which  have  made  possible  the  election  of 
additional  village  councils  and  hamlet  chiefs. 

5.  He  described  how  urban  housing  projects 
had  been  put  into  effect  to  resettle  the  victims  of 
Communist  indiscriminate  shellings.  He  pointed 
out  that,  in  spite  of  the  ravages  of  war,  pri- 
mary, secondary,  and  higher  education  had 
progressed  at  a  remarkable  rate. 

6.  Tlie  Minister  further  indicated  that  the 
open  arms  policy  had  brought  fruitful  results 
with  gi'owing  numbers  of  enemy  cadres  and  of- 
ficers rallying  to  the  national  community. 

7.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  stressed  the  strong  desire 
for  peace  of  his  Government  and  of  the  people 
of  Viet-Nam.  The  Ministers  made  it  clear  that 
the  peoples  of  aU  seven  nations  desired  a  just 
and  lasting  peace  at  the  earliest  possible  time. 
They  welcomed  the  willingness  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  to  hold  pri- 
vate talks  with  what  the  other  side  called  the 


JUNE    9,    1969 


481 


NLF  [National  Liberation  Front]  as  demon- 
strated by  President  Nguyen  Van  Thieu's 
statements  of  March  25,  and  April  7,  1969. 

8.  The  Ministers  examined  the  military  situa- 
tion and  received  a  briefing  from  Vietnamese 
and  American  military  commanders.  They  were 
encouraged  at  the  progress  being  made  by  allied 
forces  and  the  increasing  difficulties  encoun- 
tered by  the  other  side.  They  agreed  that  the 
failure  of  the  other  side  to  achieve  their  objec- 
tives should  convince  them  of  their  inability  to 
gain  a  victory  by  military  means.  The  Ministers 
noted  the  modernization  and  improvement  of 
the  Vietnamese  Armed  Forces,  welcomed  their 
determination  to  assume  greater  responsibilities 
for  the  defense  of  their  homeland,  and  com- 
mended the  progress  they  have  already  made  in 
that  direction.  They  noted  with  appreciation 
the  substantial  increase  in  the  strength  of  tlie 
armed  forces  contributed  by  Thailand  to  the  de- 
fense of  the  Kepublic  of  Viet-Nam.  The  Minis- 
ters expressed  their  admiration  and  gratitude 
for  the  courage  and  devotion  of  the  allied  sol- 
diers serving  in  Viet-Nam. 

9.  The  Ministers  emphasized  that  their  forces 
were  in  Viet-Nam  to  help  the  Vietnamese  people 
defend  themselves  against  outside  aggression 
and  to  ensure  that  such  aggression  shall  not  be 
rewarded.  They  reaffirmed  that  their  objective 
was  to  bring  about  a  peace  in  wliich  the  people 
of  South  Viet-Nam  are  able  to  exercise  their  un- 
conditional right  of  self-determination  free 
from  external  interference  and  terrorism.  The 
Ministers  of  the  seven  nations  reaffirmed  their 
determination  to  help  the  Vietnamese  people  re- 
sist this  aggression  and  accordingly  to  continue 
their  support  of  the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam. 
They  recognized  that  this  support  will  be  related 
to  the  progress  of  the  peace  negotiations,  the 
level  of  offensive  actions  by  the  enemy,  and  the 
relative  strength  of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  and  their  capability  of 
taking  over  an  even  greater  share  of  the 
fighting. 

10.  The  Ministers  viewed  with  grave  concern 
the  continuing  presence  of  a  large  number  of 
North  Vietnamese  troops  in  Laos  and  their  use 
of  Laotian  territory  in  violation  of  the  1962 
Geneva  Agreements. 

Effort  for  Peace 

11.  The  Ministers  also  reviewed  the  develop- 
ments in  the  negotiations  taking  place  in  Paris 
and  welcomed  the  proposals  which  had  been 


made  there  by  the  Governments  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  and  the  United  States  concerning 
mutual  troop  withdrawals.  They  agreed  that 
withdrawals  could  conunence  simultaneously 
and  proceed  expeditiously  on  tlie  basis  of  a 
mutually  acceptable  timetable;  that  all  exter- 
nally introduced  forces  would  have  to  be  with- 
drawn not  only  from  South  Viet-Nam  but  also 
from  Laos  and  Cambodia ;  and  that  the  further 
introduction  of  forces  must  be  prohibited.  Tliey 
also  agreed  that  a  clear  need  existed  for  ade- 
quate verification  and  supervision  of  compliance 
with  both  the  withdrawal  of  forces  and  the  pro- 
hibition against  further  introduction  of  forces. 

12.  The  Ministers  also  noted  with  approval 
the  proposals  put  forward  by  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  and  the  United  States  for  observance 
of  the  Demilitarized  Zone,  the  release  of  pris- 
oners of  war,  and  full  compliance  with  exist- 
ing international  agreements  on  Laos  and 
Cambodia. 

13.  The  Ministers  examined  the  positions  the 
other  side  has  taken  in  Paris.  In  contrast  to  the 
reasonable  nature  of  the  proposals  put  forward 
by  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  and  the  United 
States,  the  other  side  has  demanded  unilateral 
and  unconditional  withdrawal  of  the  allied 
forces  assisting  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  and 
destruction  of  the  democratic  institutions  and 
procedures  which  have  been  emerging  there  dur- 
ing the  past  several  years.  From  these  positions 
the  Ministers  concluded  with  regret  that  the 
other  side  was  still  intransigent  and  was  seeking 
to  wear  down  the  resistance  of  the  allied  nations 
and  to  impose  upon  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
a  totalitarian  regime  contrary  to  the  wishes  of 
its  people.  They  reiterated  their  common  resolve 
to  reject  any  attempt  to  impose  upon  the  Repub- 
lic of  Viet-Nam  any  system  or  program,  includ- 
ing the  spurious  coalition  govermnent  de- 
manded by  the  other  side,  without  regard  to  the 
will  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam. 

14.  The  Ministers  agreed  that  all  possibilities 
leading  to  peace  and  national  reconciliation 
should  be  thoroughly  explored,  and  they  en- 
dorsed the  efforts  in  this  direction  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Viet-Nam  and  the  United  States.  They 
welcomed  the  comprehensive  statements  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  on  April 
7,  1969,  and  the  President  of  the  United  States 
on  May  14,  1969,  as  important  contributions  to 
this  effort.^  They  agreed  that  all  of  the  nations 
which  are  making  available  armed  forces  to 


'■  For   President  NLxon's  address  to  the  Nation  on 
May  14,  see  Btjixetin  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  457. 


482 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BIILLETIN 


help  defend  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  must 
participate  in  the  settlement  of  the  conflict. 

15.  The  Ministers  discussed  the  need  for  in- 
ternational coopei'ation  to  support  economic  re- 
construction and  development  in  Viet-Nam 
after  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  They  noted  in 
this  regard  the  gi-eat  potential  for  economic  and 
social  progress  revealed  by  the  recently  released 
joint  development  group  report  prepared  at  the 
request  of  the  United  States  and  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam.  They  agreed  to  consult  closely  on 
the  important  goal  of  assisting  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam  to  achieve  the  better  future 
their  sacrifices  have  earned.  Tliey  expressed  the 
hope  that  North  Viet-Nam  will  come  to  realize 
the  advantages  of  living  in  peaceful  coopera- 
tion and  friendly  harmony  with  its  neighbors 
rather  than  in  confrontation  with  them;  and 
that  North  Viet-Nam  will  take  advantage  of 
arrangements  for  regional  cooperation  for  the 
benefit  of  its  own  people  and  for  the  progress 
of  Southeast  Asia  as  a  whole. 

16.  The  Ministers  also  agreed  that  a  general 
settlement  in  Southeast  Asia  will  require  the 
participation  by  Asian  powers  in  measm-es  to  as- 
sure peace  and  security  for  this  part  of  the 
world.  They  considered  it  desirable  that  the 
Asian  countries  themselves  should  have  the  pri- 
mary responsibility  for  their  own  future  well- 
being  and  peaceful  development.  They  agreed 
that  the  Asian  countries  might  in  exercise  of 
this  responsibility  assume  certain  duties  in 
connection  with  a  peace  settlement  for  Viet- 
Nam,  possibly  under  the  aegis  of  the  United 
Nations.  Again,  closest  consultation  among  the 
interested  parties  could  be  beneficial  in  this 
coimection. 

17.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea  gave  an  account  of  the  con- 
tinuing and  intensified  acts  of  provocation  and 
aggression  against  the  Republic  of  Korea  per- 
petrated by  the  North  Korean  Communists,  as 
evidenced  by  the  series  of  infiltrations  by  armed 
raiders  into  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  the  in- 
creased violation  during  the  past  year  of  the 
Armistice  Agreement  of  1953.  The  JNIinisters  ex- 
pressed their  indignation  over  these  continuing 
and  intensified  acts  of  provocation  and  aggres- 
sion, and  renewed  their  previous  agreement  that 
such  acts  by  the  North  Korean  Communists  are 
a  matter  of  grave  concern  and  directly  threaten 
the  peace  and  security  of  the  Korean  Peninsula 
and  the  area  surrounding  it. 

18.  The  Ministers  reaffirmed  their  support  for 
the  Republic  of  Korea  in  resisting  such  North 


Korean  aggression.  The  Ministers  welcomed  the 
intention  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  to  keep  them 
and  other  interested  governments  informed  of 
any  future  developments  through  ambassadors 
in  Seoul. 

Constitutional   Processes 

19.  The  Ministers  noted  that  actions  taken  in 
pursuance  of  the  policies  herein  stated  should  be 
in  accordance  with  their  respective  constitu- 
tional processes. 

Conclusion 

20.  The  Ministers  of  the  seven  nations  re- 
iterated their  continued  support  to  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  to  preserve  the  unconditional  right 
of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to  decide  their 
own  destiny  by  democratic  and  peaceful  means 
and  without  outside  interference.  The  Ministers 
stated  their  determination  to  continiie  their  ef- 
forts towards  this  goal,  while  a  just  and  peace- 
ful solution  to  the  conflict  is  pursued  through 
the  Paris  Meetings.  Finally,  in  view  of  the  situa- 
tion in  Korea  and  Southeast  Asia,  the  Alinisters 
reaffirmed  their  commitment  to  the  Declaration 
on  Peace  and  Progress  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
promulgated  at  the  Summit  Conference  in 
Manila  in  October  1966,^  and  agreed  to  continue 
the  close  cooperation  which  has  existed  among 
the  seven  nations. 


Secretary  Leaves  Bangkok  at  Close 
of  SEATO  and  Seven-Nation  Meetings 

Following  is  a  statement  made  hy  Secretary 
Rogers  upon  his  departure  from  Bangkok  on 
May  23. 

Press  release  134  dated  May  23 

As  you  know,  I  have  attended  two  meetings 
during  the  past  4  days  in  Bangkok:  the  14th 
Council  Meeting  of  SEATO  and  another  in  the 
series  of  meetmgs  of  the  seven  allies  in  Viet- 
Nam.  Both  were  highly  successful.  I  believe  that 
the  two  communiques  from  these  meetings  are 
very  clear  on  important  points  of  agreement. 

First,  the  members  of  SEATO  and  of  the 
troop-contributing    countries    are    determined 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  14,  1966,  p.  734. 


JUNE    9,    1969 


483 


that  it  is  their  policy  to  achieve  a  lasting  peace 
in  Southeast  Asia  so  the  peoples  of  this  area  can 
make  their  own  decisions  free  from  outside  in- 
terference. We  are  agreed  that  such  a  peace 
could  come  soon  if  the  leaders  in  Hanoi  will  ac- 
cept the  right  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam 
to  exercise  their  self-determination  without  any 
conditions.  The  troop-contributing  countries 
showed  the  way  to  a  prompt  reduction  of  hos- 
tilities by  endorsing  proposals  made  in  Paris  for 
mutual  withdrawal  of  North  Viet-Nam  and 
United  States  and  other  forces. 

Second,  we  are  agreed  that  a  sense  of  security 
is  the  essential  foundation  for  the  economic 
progress  and  social  reform  that  all  non-Com- 
munist governments  in  this  area  are  now  foster- 
ing. It  is  also  accepted  that  progressive  pro- 
grams of  rural  development  must  go  hand  in 
hand  with  security  measures  in  resisting  the  in- 
surgencies which  the  Communist  countries  are 
fostering. 

Third,  it  is  agreed  that  regional  cooperation, 
for  both  security  and  economic  growth,  is  the 
essential  and  chosen  course  of  action  for  the  na- 
tions of  Southeast  Asia  and  the  Pacific  area. 
Such  cooperation  is  on  the  rise  and  is  seen  by  all 
as  the  way  of  the  future. 

I  should  like  to  emphasize  this  last  point  be- 
cause it  has  come  out  so  clearly  in  our  private 
meetings  and  discussions. 

My  Government  is  fidly  aware  that  the  secu- 
rity of  Southeast  Asia  cannot  be  set  apart  from 
the  broad  problem  of  global  security,  and  the 
nations  of  this  area  are  fully  aware  that  the 
threat  to  their  security  requires  them  to  seek  the 
support  of  non-Asian  allies.  Our  common  inter- 
ests are  not  in  question. 

But  some  have  feared  that  our  association  to- 
gether would  lead  to  a  loss  of  independence  for 
the  Asian  allies.  These  fears  are  unfounded. 

Indeed,  I  find  the  nations  of  Southeast  Asia 
increasingly  determined  to  bear  the  main  bur- 
den of  area  security  on  their  own  collective 
shoulders.  I  find  them  anxious  to  be  the  prime 
movers  in  promoting  the  welfare  of  their  people 
through  regional  cooperation. 

We  are  the  ally  of  our  SEATO  partners.  We 
shall  continue  to  cooperate  in  their  peaceful 
development. 

At  the  same  time  we  salute  their  determina- 
tion to  be  the  responsible  masters  of  their  own 
aiYairs.  That  is  the  way  it  should  be;  that  is  the 
way  we  all  want  it  to  be;  and  I  leave  here  sus- 
tained by  the  conviction  that  this  is  the  way  it 
is  going  to  be. 


Secretary  Laird  Urges  Hanoi 

To  Release  U.S.  Prisoners  of  War 

Following  is  a  statement  made  hy  Secretary      ^ 
of  Defense  Melvin  R.  Laird  at  a  Department  of 
Defense  news  hriefing  on  May  19. 

On  numerous  occasions  I  have  expressed  my 
deep  concern  for  the  welfare  of  our  American 
servicemen  who  are  prisoners  of  war  or  missing 
in  action.  In  this  regard,  I  have  directed  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  Defense  (International  Se-  - 
curity  Affairs)  G.  Warren  Nutter,  who  has  been 
named  Chairman  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
Prisoner-of-War  Policy  Committee,  to  ensure 
that  the  families  of  these  servicemen  are  receiv- 
ing all  assistance  to  which  they  are  entitled. 

The  North  Vietnamese  have  claimed  that  they 
are  treating  our  men  humanely.  I  am  distressed 
by  the  fact  that  there  is  clear  evidence  that  this 
is  not  the  case. 

The  United  States  Government  has  urged  that 
the  enemy  respect  the  requirements  of  the  Ge- 
neva convention.  This  they  have  refused  to  do. 

The  North  Vietnamese  and  the  Viet  Cong 
have  never  identified  the  names  of  all  the  U.S. 
prisoners  whom  they  hold.  For  the  most  part, 
information  on  some  of  these  Americans  has 
come  in  the  form  of  scattered,  and  often  dis- 
torted, propaganda  films  and  photographs 
which  the  North  Vietnamese  have  chosen  to  sell 
or  release. 

We  know  that  at  least  several  U.S.  prisoners 
were  injured  at  the  time  of  their  capture,  and 
we  are  concerned  about  the  medical  care  they 
are  receiving. 

The  Geneva  convention  requires  a  free  ex- 
change of  mail  between  the  prisoners  and  their 
families,  and  yet  very  little  mail  has  been  re- 
ceived from  only  a  few  prisoners  in  the  past 
5  years. 

As  of  next  month,  more  than  200  American 
servicemen  will  have  been  listed  either  as  prison- 
ers of  war  or  as  missing  in  action  for  more  than 
31/^  years.  This  period  of  time  is  longer  than  any 
U.S.  serviceman  was  held  prisoner  during 
World  War  IT. 

The  Department  of  Defense  continues  to  hope 
for  meaningful  progress  on  the  matter  of  pris- 
oner release  in  the  Paris  discussions.  In  the 
meantime,  we  appeal  to  North  Viet-Nam  and 
the  Viet  Cong  to  respect  the  humane  rights  of 
those  whom  they  hold  prisoners  of  war. 

Specifically,  we  call  for  adherence  to  the 
Geneva  convention,  which  requires : 


484 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BtTLLETIN 


1.  Release  of  names  of  prisoners  held. 

2.  Immediate  release  of  sick  and  wounded 
prisoners. 

3.  Impartial  inspections  of  prisoner-of-war 
facilities. 

4.  Projoer  treatment  of  all  prisoners. 

5.  Regular  flow  of  mail. 

Most  importantly,  we  seek  the  prompt  release 
of  all  American  prisoners. 


18th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Follotoing  are  the  opening  statement  and  ad- 
ditional remarlis  made  hy  Ambassador  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  at 
the  18th  plenary  session  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris 
on  May  22. 

OPENING  STATEMENT 

Press  release  129  dated  May  22 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  At  the  last  plenary 
meeting  I  presented  proposals  for  peace  made 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States.^  At  the 
same  meeting  the  representative  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  said  that  these  proposals  were  con- 
sistent with  the  policy  of  his  Government  as 
embodied  in  President  Thieu's  six-point  pro- 
gram. 

In  the  16th  jjlenary  meeting  your  side  pro- 
posed a  10-point  program. 

Each  side  has  now  presented  specific  pro- 
posals, and  we  are  therefore  in  a  position  to 
define  the  questions  at  issue. 

Perhaps  by  reviewing  the  issues  we  will  cre- 
ate the  basis  for  serious  discussion  and  negotia- 
tion on  the  key  questions  which  must  be  dealt 
with  if  there  is  to  be  a  negotiated  settlement. 

Let  us  look  at  the  issues  on  which  both  sides 
seem  to  be  taking  a  common  approach. 

One  issue  on  which  there  seems  to  be  common 
ground  is  that  of  reunification.  President  Nixon, 
in  his  address  of  May  14,  said:  "We  have  no 
objection  to  reunification,  if  that  turns  out  to  be 
what  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  and  the 
people  of  North  Viet-Nam  want;  we  ask  only 
that  the  decision  reflect  the  free  choice  of  the 
people  concerned."  ^  Your  point  7  states  that  the 
reunification  of  Viet-Nam  will  be  achieved  step 
by  step,  by  peaceful  means,  through  discussions 
and  agreement  between  the  two  zones,  without 


foreign  interference.  Similarly,  the  question  of 
i-elations  between  North  and  South  Viet-Nam 
pending  reunification  is  a  matter  for  North  Viet- 
Nam  and  South  Viet-Nam  to  decide. 

Another  issue  is  restoration  of  the  demili- 
tarized zone  and  respect  for  the  provisional  mili- 
tary demarcation  line.  Your  point  7  states  that 
the  militarj'  demarcation  line  is  only  provisional 
and  does  not  constitute  a  permanent  political 
boundaiy.  "We  agree  to  that.  We  also  agree  that 
precise  arrangements  should  be  worked  out  re- 
garding the  status  of  the  DMZ  and  movements 
across  the  provisional  military  demarcation 
line. 

The  third  issue  on  which  there  seems  to  be 
common  ground  is  that  of  prisoners  of  war. 
President  Nixon's  proj^osals  call  for  arrange- 
ments to  be  made  for  the  earliest  possible  re- 
lease of  prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides.  Your 
point  9  states  that  the  parties  will  negotiate  the 
release  of  prisoners  captured  in  the  war. 

I  cannot  leave  this  subject  without  protesting 
the  attitude  wliich  you  have  expressed — most 
recently  last  Tuesday,  May  20 — with  respect  to 
the  prisoners  held  in  North  Viet-Nam.  You 
have  refused  to  provide  a  list  of  these  prisoners 
so  that  their  families  might  know  whether  they 
are  living  or  dead.  You  have  refused  to  discuss 
the  repatriation  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  which 
is  a  long-established  international  practice. 
You  should  know  that  the  attitude  you  have 
expressed  with  regard  to  these  basic  humani- 
tarian requirements  cannot  have  a  favorable 
effect  on  our  negotiations  here. 

President  Nixon's  proposals  provide  that  all 
parties  would  agree  to  observe  the  Geneva 
accords  of  1954  regarding  Cambodia,  and  the 
Laos  agreements  of  1962.  Your  side's  10-point 
program  calls  for  respect  for  the  1962  Geneva 
agreements  on  Laos  and  for  Cambodia's  inde- 
pendence, sovereignty,  neutrality,  and  terri- 
torial integrity.  While  your  program  states 
that  this  is  a  policy  which  South  Viet-Nam 
should  carry  out,  we  believe  it  is  necessary  that 
North  Viet-Nam  also  follow  the  same  policy. 
In  fact.  North  Viet-Nam  is  already  a  party  to 
the  1954  Geneva  accords  relating  to  Cambodia 
and  to  the  1962  Laos  agreements. 

There  seems  to  be  common  ground  on  a  num- 
ber of  other  military  questions.  For  example, 
President  Nixon  has  stated  that  we  seek  no 
bases  in  Viet-Nam  and  that  we  insist  on  no  mili- 


'  For  a  statement  made  by  Ambassador  Lodge  on 
May  16,  see  Bulletin  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  467. 
"  lUA.,  p.  457. 


JUNE    9,    1969 


351-333 — 69- 


4SS 


tary  ties.  We  have  also  said  in  the  past  that  we 
seek  no  permanent  military  establishment  in 
Viet-Nam.  Your  program  would  prohibit 
foreign  military  bases,  foreign  troops,  and 
foreign  military  alliances  for  North  and  South 
Viet-Nam. 

There  are  some  other  elements  of  your  side's 
10-point  program  which  are  related  to  elements 
of  our  own  position.  For  example,  as  President 
Nixon  stated  on  May  14:  "We  have  been  gen- 
erous toward  those  whom  we  have  fought,  help- 
ing former  foes  as  well  as  friends  in  the  task  of 
reconstruction.  We  are  proud  of  this  record, 
and  we  bring  the  same  attitude  to  our  search  for 
a  settlement  in  Viet-Nam."  You  speak  of  accept- 
ing economic  and  teclmical  aid  from  any  coun- 
try with  no  political  conditions  attached. 

We  support  the  principles  of  independence, 
sovereignty,  unity,  and  territorial  integrity. 
Your  program  also  calls  for  respect  for  the 
Vietnamese  people's  fundamental  national 
rights;  i.e.,  independence,  sovereignty,  unity, 
and  territorial  integrity,  as  recognized  by  the 
1954  Geneva  accords. 

Then  there  are  other  questions  which  are 
crucial  to  both  sides  and  which  must  be 
answered  if  the  fighting  is  to  end  and  peace  is 
to  ensue.  But  the  proposals  of  the  two  sides 
regarding  these  questions  are  different.  It  is 
therefore  our  responsibility  in  these  negoti- 
ations to  try  to  work  out  mutually  satisfactory 
solutions  to  these  problems. 

One  such  question  is  the  withdrawal  of  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  from  South  Viet- 
Nam.  President  Nixon  said  that  a  settlement 
which  would  permit  the  South  Vietnamese 
people  to  determine  freely  their  own  political 
future  would  require  the  withdrawal  of  all  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam. 
He  reaffirmed  our  willingness  to  withdraw  our 
forces  on  a  specified  timetable.  "We  ask  only," 
President  Nixon  said,  "that  North  Viet-Nam 
withdraw  its  forces  fi'om  South  Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia,  and  Laos  into  North  Viet-Nam,  also 
in  accordance  with  a  timetable." 

Our  offer  provides  for  a  simultaneous  start 
on  a  withdrawal  by  both  sides;  agreement  on  a 
mutually  acceptable  timetable;  and  for  the 
withdrawal  to  be  accomplished  quickly.  At  our 
last  meeting,  on  the  instructions  of  the  Presi- 
dent, I  proposed  precise  measures  for  carrying 
out  our  proposals  on  withdrawals. 

Points  2  and  3  of  your  proposals,  dealing 
with  the  question  of  the  withdrawal  of  outside 
forces,  need  clarification.  You  call  for  the  un- 
conditional withdrawal  of  all  United  States 


and  Allied  forces.  If  there  is  to  be  a  serious 
negotiation  of  this  key  question.  North  Viet- 
Nam  must  be  prepared  to  withdraw  its  military 
forces  and  subversive  personnel  out  of  South 
Viet-Nam  and  neighboring  Cambodia  and  Laos 
back  to  North  Viet-Nam. 

Both  sides  have  also  stated  tliat  a  political 
settlement  is  a  key  problem  that  must  be  solved 
if  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  is  to  be  brought  to  an 
end.  Here,  again,  there  are  different  views  on 
how  this  central  problem  is  to  be  solved. 

In  his  address  of  May  14  President  Nixon 
stated  the  essential  objective  of  the  United 
States :  "We  seek  the  opportunity  for  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  to  determine  their  own 
political  future  without  outside  interference." 

The  political  settlement  is  an  internal  matter 
to  be  decided  among  tlie  South  Vietnamese 
themselves  and  not  imposed  by  outside  parties. 
However,  as  the  President  said:  ".  .  .  if  our 
presence  at  these  political  negotiations  would 
be  helpful,  and  if  the  South  Vietnamese  con- 
cerned agreed,  we  would  be  willing  to  partici- 
pate, along  with  the  representatives  of  Hanoi  if 
that  were  also  desired." 

We  are  guided  as  regards  this  question  by  the 
principle  that  a  just  and  lasting  settlement  will 
require  procedures  for  political  choice  that  give 
each  significant  group  in  South  Viet-Nam  a  real 
opportunity  to  participate  in  the  political  life 
of  the  nation.  We  believe  there  should  be  an 
oppoitunity  for  full  participation  in  the  politi- 
cal life  of  South  Viet-Nam  by  all  political  ele- 
ments that  are  prepared  to  do  so  without  the 
use  of  force  or  intimidation.  We  are  prepared 
to  accept  any  government  in  South  Viet-Nam 
that  results  from  the  free  choice  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  people.  We  have  no  intention  of 
imposing  any  form  of  government  on  the  people 
of  South  Viet-Nam,  nor  will  we  be  a  party  to 
such  coercion. 

The  President  of  the  Rej^ublic  of  Viet-Nam  j 
has  publicly  declared  liis  government's  willing-  | 
ness  to  discuss  a  political  solution  with  the 
National  Liberation  Front.  He  has  offered  free 
elections.  He  has  offered  to  talk  without  pre- 
conditions. We  urge  your  side  to  enter  into  dis- 
cussions on  a  political  settlement  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  without  prior  conditions. 

Your  side's  10-point  program  calls  for  a 
neutral  South  Viet-Nam.  As  President  Nixon 
said :  "We  are  willing  to  agree  to  neutrality  if 
that  is  what  the  South  Vietnamese  people  freely 
choose."  Here,  again,  is  an  issue  which  the 
South  Vietnamese  must  decide  for  themselves. 


486 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BTJLLETIK' 


Our  two  sides  have  spoken  of  the  need  for 
international  supervision.  Your  program  calls 
for  international  supervision  of  the  withdrawal 
of  United  States  and  Allied  forces.  The  pro- 
posals put  forward  by  our  side  call  for  an  inter- 
national supervisory  body,  acceptable  to  both 
sides,  which  would  be  created  for  the  purpose 
of  verifying  the  withdrawal  of  all  non-South 
Vietnamese  forces  and  for  any  other  purposes 
agreed  upon  between  the  two  sides.  President 
Nixon  has  proposed  that  this  international 
body  begin  operating  in  accordance  with  an 
agreed  timetable  in  that  it  participate  in 
arranging  supervised  cease-fires.  Also,  as  soon 
as  possible  after  the  international  body  was 
functioning,  elections  would  be  held  under 
agreed  procedures  and  under  the  supervision 
of  the  international  body. 

Finally,  we  of  course  reject  your  suggestion 
that  the  United  States  Government  bear 
responsibility  for  the  war  losses  and  devasta- 
tion caused  to  the  Vietnamese  people. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  it  seems  to  us  that  we 
have  reached  a  stage  in  these  negotiations  where 
the  issues  have  become  clear  and  that  we  can 
now  get  down  to  the  serious  discussion  of  them 
in  specific  detail.  We  believe,  after  examining 
the  various  proposals  that  have  been  made,  that 
there  are  a  large  number  on  which  there  is  suffi- 
cient common  ground  so  that  detailed  and 
productive  negotiations  can  begin  immediately. 

There  are  other  questions  which  both  sides 
recognize  as  central  to  a  settlement  but  on 
which  we  still  need  to  search  for  agreement  in 
principle.  These  questions  relate  primarily  to 
withdrawal  of  outside  forces  and  political  set- 
tlement. We  think  the  parties  concerned  should 
begin  discussions  of  these  questions  in  earnest 
and  right  away. 

We  think  a  basis  now  exists  for  productive 
discussions  of  the  key  issues  involved  in  a  settle- 
ment. Our  side  is  ready  to  engage  in  such 
discussions. 


ADDITIONAL  REMARKS 

Press  release  133  (corrected)  dated  May  22 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  I  think  you  of  the 
other  side  do  not  correctly  understand  the  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States  if  you  say  that  we 
wish  to  prolong  the  presence  of  United  States 
and  Allied  forces  in  Viet-Nam.  Just  so  that 
you  may  have  no  misconceptions,  I  wish  to 
repeat  precisely  what  was  said  by  President 
Nixon : 


— As  soon  as  agreement  can  be  reached,  all  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  would  begin  withdrawals 
from  South  Viet-Nam. 

— Over  a  period  of  12  months,  by  agreed-upon  stages, 
the  major  portions  of  all  U.S.,  Allied,  and  other  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  would  be  withdrawn.  At  the 
end  of  this  12-month  period,  the  remaining  U.S.,  Allied, 
and  other  non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  move 
into  designated  base  areas  and  would  not  engage  in 
combat  operations. 

— The  remaining  U.S.  and  Allied  forces  would  move 
to  complete  their  withdrawals  as  the  remaining  North 
Vietnamese  forces  were  withdrawn  and  returned  to 
North  Viet-Nam. 

— An  international  supervisory  body,  acceptable  to 
both  sides,  would  be  created  for  the  purpose  of  verify- 
ing withdrawals,  and  for  any  other  purpo.ses  agreed 
upon  between  the  two  sides. 

You  should  not  be  concerned  over  the  time 
between  the  end  of  the  12-month  period  and  the 
completion  of  withdrawals.  This  can  be  agreed 
upon,  and  our  position  only  calls  for  the  re- 
maining North  Vietnamese  forces  to  complete 
their  withdrawal  within  the  same  time  period. 
If  you  would  like  to  propose  a  time  period  for 
these  remaining  mutual  actions,  we  are  ready 
to  listen.  Further,  we  are  ready  to  discuss  any 
aspect  of  mutual  withdrawal  and  to  deal  with 
all  such  details,  provided  that  you  are  willing  to 
enter  into  a  meaningful  discussion  of  the  with- 
drawal of  North  Vietnamese  forces  as  well. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Let  me  add  one  obser- 
vation about  prisoners.  It  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand how  you  can  claim  to  be  treating  our  pris- 
oners humanely  when  you  refuse  to  identify  the 
prisoners  you  hold  so  that  their  families  can 
know  the  fate  of  their  relatives.  You  refuse  to 
permit  regular  mail  exchanges.  You  reject  im- 
partial international  observation  of  conditions 
under  which  prisoners  are  held ;  you  refuse  to 
discuss  release  of  sick  and  wounded  prisoners. 
Yet  these  are  basic  elements  of  humani- 
tarian treatment  under  established  interna- 
tional standards. 

We  do  not  see  how  you  can  be  hurt  by  merely 
publishing  the  names  of  those  who  are  alive 
so  that  the  uncertainty  which  their  families  feel 
may  be  ended. 

To  express  myself  for  a  moment  in  human 
terms  instead  of  the  language  of  diplomacy, 
what  is  involved  here  is  the  prisoner's  wife,  who 
does  not  know  whether  her  husband  is  alive  or 
whether  he  is  dead.  It  is  really  hard  to  believe 
that  the  security  of  North  Viet-Nam  would  be 
threatened  if  this  wife  were  told  the  truth  about 
her  husband's  fate.  We  hope  you  will  recon- 
sider your  attitude  on  these  questions  so  that  it 
will  truly  reflect  the  humane  policy  which  you 
claim  to  follow. 


jrCTNE   9,    1969 


487 


The  Pacific  Basin  Potential 


hy  U.  Alexis  Johnson 

Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs  ^ 


I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  share  with  this 
distinguished  group  my  own  thoughts  on  the 
potential  of  the  Pacific  Basin  as  an  economic 
and  political  entity.  It  is  good  to  i-enew  old 
friendships  and  make  new  ones  with  leaders 
such  as  yourselves  who  share  a  deep  interest  in 
the  Pacific  area.  Thus  it  was  not  too  difficult  for 
me  to  agree  to  make  the  trip  out  here  to  meet 
with  you.  I  Imow  that  many  of  you  have  come 
much  greater  distances,  but  distances  no  longer 
have  the  meaning  they  once  had — particularly 
in  the  broad  reaches  of  the  Pacific,  where  one  can 
fly  with  so  little  let  or  hindrance.  As  I  will  men- 
tion later,  this  is  one  aspect  that  gives  reality 
to  the  concept  of  the  Pacific  Basin. 

Wliile  I  know  that  you  represent  business  in- 
terests, I  also  well  know  that  you  represent  what 
I  like  to  call  the  growing  ranks  of  the  business- 
man-statesman. This  is  a  most  encouraging  and 
heartening  development  for  those  of  us  who  try 
to  look  at  and  deal  with  the  overall  relations 
between  countries.  While  you,  of  course,  have  to 
be  concerned  with  tomorrow's  profit-and-loss 
statement,  you  are  looking  beyond  that  to  the 
world  of  the  future.  While  this  is,  of  course,  good 
and  enlightened  business,  it  also  brings  you  into 
the  fields  of  social  trends,  political  and  security 
questions — in  short,  into  the  whole  world  of 
diplomacy  and  foreign  affairs.  In  turn,  we  diplo- 
mats are  interested  in  and  mixed  up  with  your 
affairs  as  never  before. 

The  business  decisions  that  you  make,  and 
what  you  do  or  do  not  do,  can  have  a  profound 
effect  on  relations  between  nations,  just  as  I 
recognize  that  what  we  in  diplomacy  do  or  do 
not  do  has  a  profound  effect  on  you.  We  thus 
need  to  communicate  more  and  better  with  each 
other. 


'Address  made  before  the  Pacific  Basin  Economic 
Cooperation  Committee  at  San  Francisco,  Calif.,  on 
May  16  (press  release  120). 


For  example,  we  can  concoct  economic 
schemes  and  institutions  with  respect  to  the 
Pacific  Basin  area,  but  these  will  for  the  most 
part  only  have  reality  if  they  are  given  sub- 
stance by  the  decisions  of  people  such  as  your- 
selves. In  turn — and  this  is  my  hope — groups 
such  as  this  can  increasingly  get  out  ahead  of 
us  in  government  and,  without  waiting  for  gov- 
ernment action  or  inspiration,  set  up  your  own 
institutions  and  relationships.  This  is  why  I 
have  been  so  pleased  to  see  the  increasing  growth 
and  vigor  in  this  organization  and  have  been 
so  impressed  with  the  time  and  energy  so  many 
of  you  have  contributed  to  it.  My  own  conviction 
is  that  if  a  more  rational  world  order  is  ever 
to  emerge,  it  will  not  come  from  grand  political 
theories  imposed  from  the  top,  but  rather  from 
growth  of  the  web  of  interdependence  in  so 
many  fields — private  and  government ;  business, 
technical,  scientific,  economic,  political,  and 
security — that  is  being  woven  throughout  the 
world.  An  effort  such  as  yours  here  can  be  a 
strong  cord  in  that  web  and  augurs  well  for  the 
Pacific. 

Going  back  to  the  Pacific  area  as  I  knew  it  in 
the  prewar  period,  it  would  have  been  almost 
impossible  to  conceive  of  a  group  of  Pacific 
Basin  business  leaders  such  as  yourselves 
gathering  together  in  a  spontaneous  effort  of 
economic  cooperation.  The  Pacific  of  that  era 
was  not  a  center  of  economic  activity,  but  rather 
a  waterway  through  which  trade  flowed  from 
underdeveloped  countries  and  colonies  to  de- 
veloped nations  elsewhere,  in  large  part  Europe. 
Almost  as  unlikely  would  have  been  the  estab- 
lishment of  this  group  in  the  early  postwar 
period  when  the  peoples  of  the  Pacific  were 
recovering  from  the  effects  of  the  war — both 
physically  and  psychologically — and  in  some 
cases  were  also  engaged  in  the  struggle  for 
national  independence. 


488 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


What,  then,  have  been  the  changes  which  lead 
so  many  of  us  to  see  a  great  potential  for  the 
Pacific  Basin  as  a  political  and  economic,  as 
well  as  geographic,  unit? 

To  turn  back  a  bit,  traditionally  when  con- 
sidering a  part  of  the  world  as  a  definable  area, 
we  have  spoken  of  a  landnaass  such  as  Europe, 
Afi-ica,  North  America,  or  Latin  America.  In 
some  cases  we  did  consider  an  entity  to  be  cen- 
tered around  a  body  of  water,  but  only  a  rela- 
tively limited,  easily  navigated  one,  such  as 
the  Mediterranean.  However,  today  we  have 
reason  to  speak  of  the  Pacific,  with  its  almost 
64  million  square  miles  of  ocean — more  than 
double,  incidentally,  that  of  the  North  and 
South  Atlantic  combined  and  over  50  times 
that  of  the  Mediterranean — as  the  center  of  an 
ai-ea  having  a  political  and  economic  potential 
of  its  own. 

Improved  Transportation  and  Communications 

The  phenomenon  responsible  in  large  part  for 
this  change  is  the  relatively  recent  improvement 
in  transportation  and  communications  which 
makes  it  not  only  feasible  but  in  many  cases 
economically  advantageous  to  operate  across  a 
large  body  of  water.  'Wlien  I  first  traveled  to 
Japan  in  the  1930's,  the  trip  was  a  matter  of 
weeks  via  rail  and  slow  steamship.  When  I  re- 
turned right  after  the  war,  relatively  slow  prop 
planes  had  cut  the  transit  time  to  a  matter  of 
days.  Now  it  takes  only  a  day  or  so  to  go  any- 
where in  the  Pacific  region,  with  voice  com- 
munication a  matter  of  minutes. 

The  great  increases  in  speed  of  air  transporta- 
tion and  conxmunications  are,  however,  only  a 
small  part  of  the  picture.  Of  gi'eater  importance 
is  the  development  of  the  bulk  sea  carrier,  par- 
ticularly since  the  1957  Suez  crisis,  which  has 
radically  altered  the  cost-distance  factor  for 
the  transportation  of  raw  materials.  As  an  ex- 
treme example,  Japan  imports  a  large  part  of 
her  coal  needs  from  West  Virginia  through  Nor- 
folk, and  I  am  told  that  we  can  ship  coal 
cheaper  from  Norfolk  to  Japan  than  we  can 
ship  it  to  Pittsburgh.  The  same  thing  is  true 
of  iron  ore.  This,  then,  means  that  Pacific  Basin 
nations  can,  by  locating  heavy  industries  on 
tidewaters,  as  Japan  is  increasingly  doing,  en- 
joy very  competitive  production  costs.  Addi- 
tionally, possession  of  coal  and  iron  ore,  once 
considered  vital  for  any  industrial  nation,  no 
longer  limits  the  prospects  of  what  were  once 
known  as  the  "have-not"  Pacific  Basin  nations. 


In  fact,  and  in  many  ways,  any  nation  with  im- 
mediate access  to  the  waters  of  the  Pacific  could 
now  be  considered  a  "have"  nation.  Corre- 
spondingly, we  must  increasingly  think  in  terms 
of  what  is  known  as  "foreign  trade"  as  not  being 
so  very  "foreign"  and  being  the  rule  rather 
than  the  exception. 

Political  and  Economic  Factors 

Taking  into  accomit  the  revolutionary 
changes  in  transportation  and  coromunications 
which  should  benefit  all  Pacific  Basin  nations, 
there  are,  I  believe,  also  political  and  economic 
factors  at  work  in  the  individual  states  which 
will  lead  the  Pacific  Basin  to  become  more  of  a 
cohesive  entity  than  ever  before. 

First,  let  us  take  the  political  climate.  There 
are  now  more  than  two  dozen  independent  na- 
tions which  border  on  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Leav- 
ing aside  for  the  moment  the  Middle  and  South 
American  states,  which  still  consider  themselves 
primarily  as  a  part  of  Latin  America,  there 
is  a  vast  change  in  the  political  climate  in  the 
Pacific  free- world  states  compared  to  that  exist- 
ing a  generation  ago.  Up  until  the  war,  many 
of  the  now-independent  states  in  Asia  were 
colonies  or  dependencies  of  European  powers 
and  as  such  looked  to  the  mother  countries  for 
political  and  economic  guidance.  Now  these 
states  have  become  independent  and  have 
loosened  their  ties  with  their  former  "parents" 
or  "stepparents."  Today,  despite  the  gi-eat  di- 
versity of  cultures  and  varying  degrees  of  eco- 
nomic and  political  development,  these  countries 
share  a  growing  sense  of  nationalism  and  are 
faced  with  similar  problems  of  a  rising  level 
of  expectation  by  their  peoples. 

Another  factor  contributing  to  a  climate  fa- 
vorable to  a  Pacific  Basin  consciousness  is  the 
degree  of  political  stability  which  most  of  the 
free-world  states  in  Asia  have  achieved  in  the 
past  years.  Popularly  chosen  democratic  gov- 
ernments having  the  support  of  the  majority 
are  now  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception. 

These,  then,  are  the  two  major  political  fac- 
tors which  I  believe  have  prepared  the  Pacific 
Basin  countries,  particularly  those  in  Asia,  for 
greater  participation  in  activities  centered 
around  the  Pacific  Ocean:  first,  the  degree  of 
political  independence  which  has  been  achieved 
in  the  last  20  years,  with  parallel  aspirations 
and  problems  this  has  brought ;  and  second,  the 
degree  of  political  stability  which  permits  in- 
terests beyond  the  national  borders. 


JUNE    9,    1969 


489 


Turning  to  the  economic  factors,  we  have, 
of  course,  discussed  the  great  importance  of  the 
fact  that  the  Pacific  Ocean,  despite  its  vast 
size,  no  longer  acts  as  a  barrier  between  states 
which  are  far  apart,  but  rather  as  an  inexpensive 
highway  between  such  states.  However,  no  mat- 
ter how  good  the  highway  may  be,  trade  and 
economic  activity  will  only  take  place  when  the 
person  at  each  end  of  the  road  has  the  ability 
to  produce  something  of  value  and  the  means 
to  buy  the  products  of  others.  Fortunately, 
statistics  indicate  that  economic  progress  in  the 
Pacific  Basin  countries  is  suflScient  to  give  rise 
to  expectations  that  the  future  holds  a  high  de- 
gree of  trade  and  investment  among  the 
countries. 

For  example,  Japan  is  now  the  third  economic 
power  in  the  world — behind  only  ourselves  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  Given  present  rates  of  pro- 
jections, in  10  more  years  it  will  have  a  per 
capita  income  equal  to  ours  as  of  today  and  by 
1990,  if  you  carry  on  with  these  projections,  may 
well  have  the  highest  per  capita  income  in  the 
world. 

Korea  has  more  than  doubled  its  gross  na- 
tional product  in  the  last  10  years,  and  in  just 
6  years  its  exports  have  gone  from  $25  million 
to  over  $500  million. 

Taiwan  has  more  than  doubled  its  gross  na- 
tional product  in  the  last  10  years,  and  our 
grant  economic  aid  in  that  country  was  ter- 
minated in  1965.  Further,  the  Republic  of 
China  is  also  helping  others  to  help  themselves 
with  technical  aid  programs  in  Southeast  Asia, 
Africa,  and  Latin  America. 

Far  from  being  swept  by  a  wave  from  main- 
land China,  Southeast  Asia  is  showing  vigor 
and  vitality.  Next  to  Japan,  Singapore  and 
Malaysia  have  the  highest  per  capita  incomes 
in  all  of  Asia.  Thailand  is  growing  economically 
at  the  rate  of  8  percent  per  year. 

Indonesia,  which  in  early  1965  seemed  to  be 
almost  irretrievably  lost  to  communism,  has  en- 
tirely by  its  own  efforts  crushed  the  Communist 
Party,  made  peace  with  its  neighbors,  and  re- 
joined the  U.N.  and  other  international  organi- 
zations. Now  that  Indonesia  is  well  on  the  road 
toward  political  stability,  that  basically  wealthy 
country  can  look  forwai'd  to  economic  develop- 
ment. Indeed,  the  process  has  already  begun, 
but  its  pace  can  also  heavily  be  determined  by 
the  business  decisions  made  by  many  of  you  in 
this  room. 

In  contrast,  at  the  time  of  the  annoimcement 
of  the  "Great  Leap  Forward"  in  China  in  1958, 
many  predicted  that  the  economy  would  grow 


between  65  and  85  percent  in  the  next  5  years — 
the  actual  figure  was  minus  3. 

Looking  to  Viet-Nam  and  its  future,  I  am 
sure  that  all  of  you  know  of  the  report  on  its 
economic  future  which  David  Lilienthal  pre- 
sented yesterday  to  President  Nixon.  In  that 
report,  which  was  the  result  of  an  intensive 
study  by  a  group  of  Vietnamese  and  American 
experts  over  a  period  of  3  years,  Mr.  Lilienthal 
proposed  a  broad  development  strategy  designed 
to  enable  South  Viet-Nam  to  stand  on  its  own 
economically  within  10  years  after  the  cessation 
of  hostilities.  He  pointed  out  that  despite  the 
war  the  economic  wealth  of  South  Viet-Nam 
in  physical  facilities  and  modem  skills  has  in- 
creased. In  many  ways,  South  Viet-Nam  is  in  a 
good  economic  position  compared  with  other 
countries  at  the  end  of  a  war. 

Looking  at  the  area  of  the  Pacific  Basin  free- 
world  coimtries  as  a  group,  including  the  United 
States  and  Canada  on  this  side  of  the  ocean, 
our  best  estimates  are  that  the  total  GNP  will 
about  double  between  now  and  1980.  This  esti- 
mate parallels  that  for  the  free  world  as  a  whole. 

Now,  leaving  out  the  United  States,  which  as 
the  most  developed  nation  can  expect  a  rela- 
tively moderate  rate  of  growth,  we  find  that 
the  remaining  free-world  Pacific  Basin  states 
should,  according  to  available  projections,  al- 
most triple  their  GNP  between  now  and  1980. 
Looking  at  a  few  other  interesting  estimates, 
we  find  that  United  States  exports  to  Pacific 
Basin  coimtries  should  increase  twofold  to  $25 
billion  by  1980,  while  total  Pacific  Basin  coun- 
tries' exports  within  the  basin  region  should 
about  quadruple  in  the  same  period.  Of  course, 
these  estimates  are  based  upon  straight-line  pro- 
jections of  the  present  growth  rates,  and  I  would 
hope  that  the  United  States  will  share  more 
fully  in  the  increased  economic  actiAnty  of  the 
region  than  simple  straight-line  projections 
would  now  indicate.  You  here  in  PBECC  will 
certainly  be  concerned  with  this  in  the  future. 

One  phenomenon  of  the  past  few  years  which 
may  interest  you  is  the  development  of  an  Aus- 
tralia-Japan-United States-Australia  trade  tri- 
angle. Trade  in  that  direction  increased  86 
percent  from  1963  to  1967,  while  trade  in  the 
reverse,  Australia-United  States-Japan-Aus- 
tralia  direction  increased  a  more  moderate  49 
percent.  On  the  quantitative  side,  trade  in  the 
two  triangulations  was  about  equal  in  1963;  in 
1967  the  difference  between  the  two  was  over  $1 
billion.  While  I  wiU  not  attempt  to  analyze  in 
depth  this  phenomenon,  it  is,  of  course,  in  part 
a  function  of  the  large  surplus  Japan  has  de- 


490 


DEPABTMBNT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


veloped  in  her  trade  with  the  United  States 
in  the  past  years,  a  surplus  whose  very  size 
merits  attention  and  concern. 


Growth   of  Regionalism 

Having  touched  on  those  factors  which  I  be- 
lieve indicate  that  the  Pacific  Basin  has  the 
potential  for  considerable  growth  as  an  eco- 
nomic and  political  entity,  I  want  to  mention  a 
few  of  the  government-level  regional  organiza- 
tions which  have  already  been  developed  and 
then,  in  conclusion,  to  state  briefly  United  States 
policy  toward  the  area  in  the  light  of  the  de- 
velopments I  have  described. 

To  turn  back  a  decade,  when  I  went  to  Thai- 
land in  1958  to  talk  of  regional  organizations 
and  regionalism  among  the  countries  of  the 
area,  it  was  just  that — it  was  just  talk.  But 
developments  in  this  field  have  moved  much 
faster  than  I  thought  possible  at  that  time. 

For  example,  in  a  small  way,  in  spite  of  all 
the  strife  and  the  difficulties  in  the  area,  the 
four  countries,  riparian  countries,  of  the  Me- 
kong— Thailand,  Laos,  and  Cambodia,  and 
Viet-Nam — are  regularly  sitting  down  together, 
working  on  the  development  of  the  Mekong 
Eiver  Basin.  This  is  one  of  the  great  possibili- 
ties, one  of  the  great  xmtapped  resources  of  the 
world.  This  has  been  not  just  talk;  it  has  been 
very  practical.  There  are  now  about  $115  million 
in  projects  on  the  Mekong  already  under  devel- 
opment. As  to  the  future,  preliminary  survey 
work  has  now  been  completed  for  the  Pamong 
Dam  on  the  Mekong — a  $1  billion  project  that 
would  produce  twice  as  much  power  as  the 
Aswan  Dam. 

The  Asian  Development  Bank  indicates  also 
a  growth  of  regionalism,  particularly  in  the 
economic  field.  We  did  not  push  nor  promote 
this — frankly,  we  were  somewhat  reluctant  part- 
ners in  the  Asian  Development  Bank.  The  Asian 
Development  Bank  has  been  established.  Japan 
has  contributed  $200  million,  we  have  contrib- 
uted $200  million,  and  the  balance  of  its  $978 
million  capital  has  come  from  the  countries  of 
the  area  and  Europe. 

The  Asian  Development  Bank  is  now  in  the 
process  of  seeking  special  funds,  that  is,  a  soft- 
loan  window  to  provide  long-term,  low-interest 
loans  to  the  less  developed  members.  Japan  has 
already  pledged  $100  million,  and  we  intend  to 
seek  legislation  in  this  Congress  to  permit  us 
also  to  participate. 

We  also  have  the  growth  of  other  regional 
organizations.  ASPAC,  the  Asian  and  Pacific 


Council,  for  example,  is  formed  of  the  10  states, 
free  states  of  Asia,  including  New  Zealand  and 
Australia.  We  are  not  members,  nor  do  we  have 
any  part  in  this.  However,  it  is  increasingly 
becoming  involved  in  political  problems  and 
economic  problems  and  is  showing  a  cohesion 
and  a  common  interest  among  the  coimtries  of 
the  area  that,  again,  I  would  have  said  would 
have  been  impossible  10  years  ago. 

Other  regional  organizations  include  the  As- 
sociation of  Southeast  Asian  Nations,  started  2 
years  ago  by  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philip- 
pines, Singapore,  and  Thailand;  the  Asian 
Parliamentarians  Union,  with  nine  member 
and  three  observer  nations;  the  Japanese- 
sponsored  Ministerial  Council  on  Economic 
Development  of  Southeast  Asia ;  and  the  Japa- 
nese-sponsored Council  on  Agricultural  Devel- 
opment in  Southeast  Asia.  In  none  of  these  do 
we  directly  participate. 

Now,  the  point  I  am  making  is  this :  that  thus 
far  the  growth  of  regionalism  in  the  economic 
and  the  political  fields  in  the  Pacific  shows  very 
encouraging  trends.  I  do  not  want  to  overstate 
it,  but  the  trend  is  growing. 

Role   of  the   United  States 

What  is  the  role  of  the  United  States  in  the 
developing  pattern  in  the  Pacific?  Our  basic 
political  objective  in  the  Pacific,  as  elsewhere 
in  the  world,  is  to  contribute,  as  requested  by 
the  countries  of  the  area,  to  the  establislmient 
of  a  peaceful  community  of  nations,  each  free 
to  choose  its  own  way  of  government  and  own 
way  of  life,  to  the  development  of  its  resources  to 
the  maximum,  and  to  peaceful  and  productive 
relations  with  its  neighbors. 

We  recognize  that  to  develop  this  kind  of 
community  of  nations  they  have  to  have  security. 
I  am  sure  that  we  will  honor  our  security  com- 
mitments in  conjunction  with  the  efforts  of  the 
countries  themselves,  so  that  the  productive 
work  of  economic  development  and  social  prog- 
ress can  proceed  with  confidence. 

We  recognize  also  that  many  of  the  countries 
of  the  region  do  not  have  adequate  resources 
to  enable  them  to  carry  out  this  development 
alone.  We  are  prepared  to  contribute  in  appro- 
priate ways  to  this  essential  development 
process. 

This  having  been  said,  and  while  United 
States  interests  remain  essentially  the  same  and 
our  commitments  firm,  we  must  recognize  that 
there  is  undeniably  a  change  in  the  mood  of  the 
American  people.  They  will  be  cautious  about 


JtrtiTB   9,    1969 


491 


undertaking  new  commitments.  Tliey  are  be- 
coming somewhat  impatient  with  carrying  what 
many  consider  to  be  a  disproportionate  share  of 
the  burden  of  security  and  economic  assistance 
abroad.  They  are  asking  more  and  more  fre- 
quently what  otlier  countries  are  doing  to  help 
themselves  and  each  other  to  share  these  bur- 
dens. It  is  a  good  and  proper  question. 

Thus,  in  the  future,  I  believe  the  United  States 
Government  will  encourage,  but  not  foster 
directly,  the  growth  of  political  and  economic 
links  among  the  Pacific  Basin  nations.  The  ideal 
would  be  a  commvmity  of  the  free  states  of  Asia 
cooperating  together  in  their  common  interests 
in  the  political  and  economic  and  security  fields 
with  which  we  are  associated  only  to  the  degree 
that  those  states  desire  our  association. 

As  part  of  our  policy  of  encouragement  with- 
out paternalism,  we  look  hopefully  to  the  de- 
velopment of  more  nongovermental  associations 
such  as  the  PBECC.  In  this  respect,  I  hope  that 
in  the  future  you  will  find  it  possible  to  expand 
your  membership  to  include  a  larger  number  of 
Pacific  Basin  countries  and  that  you  will  also 
maintain  liaison  with  and  give  support  to  other 
cooperative  initiatives  within  the  region,  sucli 
as  the  ADB  and  ECAFE  [Economic  Commis- 
sion for  Asia  and  the  Far  East].  I  hope  also 
that  you  will  extend  the  range  of  your  activi- 
ties, as  well  as  the  size  of  your  membership.  Cer- 
tainly the  possibilities  are  virtually  unlimited 
for  a  group  such  as  yours,  concerned  with  an 
area  of  such  vast  potential. 

I  hope  that  the  members  of  the  PBECC  will 
serve  the  region  by  fostering  increased  invest- 
ment throughout  the  area  and  by  working  to- 


ward the  removal  of  trade  and  investment  bar- 
riers which  impede  progress.  And  it  is  only  fair 
to  say  that  the  United  States  commitment  to 
freer  trade  can  flourish  only  if  other  nations 
share  that  commitment  and  act  on  it. 

Before  closing,  I  would  like  to  touch  on  one 
further  area  in  which  there  are  increasing  signs 
of  a  Pacific  consciousness.  Apart  from  our  own 
security  relationship,  we  already  have  the  fact 
that  five  countries  of  the  area — Korea,  Thailand, 
Philippines,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand — are 
contributing  to  what  they  feel  is  a  common  cause 
in  South  Viet-Nam.  Obviously,  cooperation  in 
the  security  field  will  come  somewhat  slower  and 
with  greater  difficulty  than  it  has  already  come 
in  the  political  and  economic  fields.  However,  I 
feel  that  it  will  come,  although  it  is  not  possible 
at  this  time  to  predict  the  forms  and  the  way 
that  it  will  take. 

These,  then,  are  just  a  few  thoughts  of  my  own 
with  respect  to  the  great  Pacific  area,  which  I 
liope  will  make  some  contribution  to  your  own 
discussions  here,  as  well  to  the  decisions  each  of 
you  is  being  called  upon  to  make  with  respect 
to  the  great  enterprises  you  represent.  May  each 
of  you  continue  to  prosper  and  may  the  peoples 
of  the  Pacific  Basin  prosper  with  you. 

Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Blatchford 
as  Director  of  the  Peace  Corps 

The  Senate  on  May  1  confirmed  the  nomina- 
tion of  Joseph  H.  Blatchford  to  be  Director  of 
the  Peace  Corps,  (For  biographic  details,  see 
Wliite  House  press  release  dated  March  18.) 


492 


DEPARTMETiTT   OP   STATE   BTJLLETTN' 


".  .  .  horn  during  a  hot  war,  nurtured  during  a  cold  war,  grow- 
ing up  in  a  world  of  fantastic  changes,  the  U.N.,  any  way  you 
look  at  it — up,  down,  or  sideways — is  a  different  kind  of  enter- 
prise today  from  what  it  started  out  to  he  in  19Jt6.  Viewed 
against  this  hackground,  it  Juts  worked  rather  well.  .  .  ." 


The  United  Nations — Up,  Down,  or  Sideways? 


hy  Samu-el  DePalma 

Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organization  Affairs  ^ 


As  we  approach  the  25th  anniversary  of  the 
United  Nations,  it  is  useful  to  recall  the  words 
spoken  by  President  Truman  in  San  Francisco 
on  June  26,  1945,  just  after  agreement  was 
reached  on  the  United  Nations  Charter.  In  his 
customarily  blunt  style  he  said : 

You  have  created  a  great  instrument  for  peace  and 
security  and  human  progress  in  the  world. 

The  world  must  now  use  it ! 

If  we  fail  to  use  it,  we  shall  betray  all  those  who 
have  died  in  order  that  we  might  meet  here  in  freedom 
and  safety  to  create  it. 

The  successful  use  of  this  instrument  will  require  the 
united  will  and  firm  determination  of  the  free  peoples 
who  have  created  it. 

The  President  spoke  also  of  "economic  and 
social  cooperation";  of  removing  "artificial  and 
uneconomic  trade  barriers";  and  of  "framing 
an  international  bill  of  rights." 

As  President  Truman  spoke,  the  war  against 
Grermany  was  barely  over  and  the  war  against 
Japan  was  going  full  blast.  The  thoughtful  men 
and  women  who  drafted  the  U.N.  Charter  could 
hardly  have  been  expected  to  foresee  the  begin- 
ning of  the  nuclear  age  even  though  it  was  only 
months  away,  let  alone  the  other  technological 
advances  which  followed  in  rapid  succession 
and  soon  reinforced  the  ever-rising  material 
expectations  of  less  developed  nations.  They  did 
foresee  the  rapid  pace  of  decolonization,  and 
they  created  an  admirable  political  framework 
to  support  peaceful  change — a  framework 
based,  of  necessity,  on  the  expectation  of  unity 


'  Address  made  before  the  Council  of  Washington 
Representatives  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  May  12  (press 
release  115). 


of  purpose  among  tlie  big  powers.  "With  the 
ensuing  cold  war,  however,  this  supposed  bed- 
rock of  cooperation  soon  turned  into  shifting 
sands  of  disunity  and  conflict. 

And  so,  born  during  a  hot  war,  nurtured  dur- 
ing a  cold  war,  growing  up  in  a  world  of  fan- 
tastic changes,  the  U.N.,  any  way  you  look  at 
it — up,  down,  or  sideways — is  a  different  kind 
of  enterprise  today  from  what  it  started  out  to 
be  in  1945.  Viewed  against  this  background,  it 
has  worked  rather  well,  despite  all  the  changes 
in  assumptions  and  circumstances,  despite 
disunity  of  the  major  powers  on  many  issues, 
despite  many  attempts  to  weaken  its  structure. 

Up — Outer  Space,  Space  Communications 

In  fact  there  is  solid  evidence  for  the  view 
that  the  U.N.  is  on  the  way  up,  and  not  only  in 
respect  to  the  number  of  members,  size  of  budg- 
ets, or  increases  in  personnel  and  programs.  It 
is  in  a  literal  sense  looking  up,  far  into  outer 
space.  Here,  as  in  other  areas  of  U.N.  concern, 
"invention  is  the  mother  of  necessity,"  to  twist 
the  old  saying  a  bit.  Wlien  nuclear  weapons 
were  invented,  when  ways  were  found  to  make 
artificial  satellites  circle  the  earth,  when  men 
began  to  fear  that  weapons  of  mass  destruction 
might  be  placed  in  orbit — then  these  inventions 
mothered  the  necessity  to  do  sometliing.  Since 
the  problems  were  the  concern  of  all,  the  United 
Nations  was  a  logical  place  to  work ;  and,  hap- 
pily, the  work  has  been  successful. 

We  are  now  protected  against  the  threat  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  being  stationed  in 
outer  space.  The  credit  goes  to  the  U.N.  Outer 
Space  Committee,  which  negotiated  the  Outer 


JUNE   9,    1969 


493 


Space  Treaty  of  1966.  The  Astronaut  Rescue 
and  Return  A^'eement  of  1967  was  also  nego- 
tiated by  this  committee.  Last  year  negotiations 
got  underway  on  an  outer  space  liability  con- 
vention to  provide  a  fair  and  expeditious  way 
for  determining  damages  and  responsibility  for 
any  accidents  caused  by  space  objects. 

A  new  outer  space  interest  of  the  U.N.  is 
space  commimications.  The  organization  has 
begun  to  examine  the  implications  of  direct 
broadcasting  from  satellites  to  home  receivers. 
Last  October  the  Outer  Space  Committee  set 
up  a  Working  Group  on  Direct  Broadcast 
Satellites.  At  its  first  meeting  the  working 
group  concluded  that  direct-broadcast  satellites 
will  be  able  to  reach  community  and  village 
antennas  witliin  the  next  few  years,  reach  aug- 
mented— that  is,  specially  adapted — home  re- 
ceivers in  the  mid-1970's,  and  reach  unaug- 
mented  home  receivers  in  the  1980"s. 

A  second  session  of  the  Direct  Broadcast 
Working  Group  is  scheduled  to  meet  in  July  to 
consider  legal,  social,  economic,  and  other  inter- 
national ramifications  of  direct  broadcasting. 
Some  of  the  questions  to  be  studied  are : 

1.  What  existing  international  law  is  appli- 
cable to  satellite  direct  broadcasting? 

2.  Would  satellite  direct  broadcasting,  if  its 
use  were  imregulated  and  left  to  the  discretion 
of  the  space  powers,  have  harmful  political  and 
cultural  consequences  ? 

3.  Wliat  kind  of  restrictions  on  direct  broad- 
casting, if  any,  would  be  consonant  with 
maintaining  freedom  of  information? 

4.  To  what  extent  can  it  contribute  to  the 
strength  and  stability  of  developing  countries 
by  providing  closer  links  between  central  gov- 
ernments and  village  authorities  and  by  spread- 
ing information  on  agriculture,  health,  popula- 
tion control,  and  other  basic  problems? 

Down — Peaceful   Uses  of  the  Seabed 

A  case  can  also  be  made  for  the  allegation  that 
the  U.N.  is  on  its  way  down.  You  are  familiar 
with  the  charges :  The  organization  is  in  debt ; 
the  U.N.  has  done  little  besides  talk  about  Viet- 
Nam  and  South  West  Africa;  the  sanctions 
voted  by  the  Security  Council  against  Southern 
Rhodesia  have  not  forced  that  regime  to  change 
course;  the  U.N.  has  not  brought  peace  to  the 
Middle  East  or  to  Korea ;  the  organization  has 
been  taken  over  by  the  bloc  voting  of  a  lot  of 
little  countries  which  can,  and  often  do,  vote  the 
big  nations  down.  And  so  on,  through  a  familiar 
litany  of  U.N.  sins  of  omission  and  commission. 


All  of  this  may  have  some  truth.  But  it  has  not 
prevented  the  U.N.  from  engaging  in  many  use- 
ful activities.  The  organization  still  maintains 
peacekeeping  and  observation  forces.  It  still  pro- 
vides a  prime  forum  for  diplomacy  and  for  the 
mediation  of  disputes.  Together  with  its  family 
of  specialized  agencies,  it  carries  on  programs 
of  agriculture,  education,  health,  and  economic 
development — programs  which  each  year  have 
grown  in  size  and  importance  and  reached  more 
and  more  developing  countries. 

But  why  go  on?  The  allegation  that  the  U.N. 
is  so  far  down  as  to  be  almost  out  reminds  one 
of  the  story  about  the  bumblebee.  This  insect 
does  not  appear  to  have  enough  wing  area  to 
get  off  the  ground;  but  the  bee  doesn't  know 
this  and  goes  ahead  and  flies  anyhow. 

It  is  a  fact,  however,  that  the  U.N.  has  also 
been  going  down  in  a  constructive  waj'.  In  the 
past  few  years  the  General  Assembly  has  de- 
voted considerable  attention  to  peaceful  uses  of 
the  seabed,  to  ways  to  assure  the  harmonious 
exploitation  of  the  potential  riches  to  be  found 
on  ocean  bottoms.  The  23d  General  Assembly 
established  a  permanent  Seabed  Committee, 
which  is  presently  trying  to  work  out  a  list  of 
basic  principles  to  govern  exploration  and  use 
of  the  seabed.  This  involves  such  diflicult  ques- 
tions as  deciding  on  the  location  of  the  bound- 
ary, or  limit,  of  national  jurisdiction  and  the 
kind  of  international  arrangements  that  can  be 
made  to  assure  that  exploitation  of  the  area 
beyond  national  jurisdiction  will  be  generally 
beneficial  and  harmonious. 

The  committee  is  also  considering  questions 
relating  to  problems  of  marine  pollution  and  a 
U.S.-sponsored  proposal  for  an  International 
Decade  of  Ocean  Exploration. 

Next  fall  the  General  Assembly  will  be  dis- 
cussing the  results  of  the  work  of  the  Eighteen- 
Nation  Disarmament  Committee,  which  has 
"seabed  disarmament"  as  a  priority  item  on  its 
agenda.  President  Nixon  recognized  the  im- 
portance of  this  item  in  his  letter  of  instructions 
to  Mr.  Gerard  Smith,  the  Director  of  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  and  head 
of  our  delegation  to  the  Disarmament  Com- 
mittee.- The  letter  included  the  following 
guidance : 

First,  in  order  to  assure  that  the  seabed,  man's  latest 
frontier,  remains  free  from  the  nuclear  arms  race, 
the  United  States  delegation  should  indicate  that  the 
United  States  is  interested  in  working  out  an  inter- 
national agreement  that  would  prohibit  the  implace- 
ment  or  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  or  other  weapons  of 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  7,  1969,  p.  289. 


494 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


mass  destruction  on  the  seabed.  .  .  .  Such  an  agreement 
would,  like  the  Antarctic  Treaty  and  the  Treaty  on 
Outer  Space  which  are  already  in  effect,  prevent  an 
arms  race  before  it  had  a  chance  to  start.  It  would 
ensure  that  this  potentially  useful  area  of  the  world 
remained  available  for  peaceful  purposes. 


Sideways — Peacekeeping,   Disarmament,  and 
Development 

Having  taken  a  look  at  some  of  its  ups  and 
downs,  let  us  take  a  sideways  look  at  where  we 
can  expect  the  U.N.  to  go  from  here. 

One  overriding  issue  is  peacekeeping.  The 
subject  is  controversial — not  that  there  is  any 
controversy  about  the  need  for  U.N.  forces  to 
keep  the  peace  in  the  years  ahead,  only  that  there 
remain  wide  areas  of  disagreement  on  how 
peacekeeping  operations  should  be  authorized, 
administered,  and  financed.  The  Soviet  Union  is 
adamant  that  the  Security  Council  alone  should 
control  all  aspects  of  peacekeeping.  This  Soviet 
view,  if  adopted,  would  deprive  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  flexibility  he  needs  in  carrying 
out  the  executive  functions  in  support  of  peace- 
keeping operations.  As  for  fijiancing,  the  Soviet 
refusal  to  pay  the  costs  of  most  past  peacekeep- 
ing operations  has  created  uncertainty  regard- 
ing future  operations. 

Nonetheless,  there  are  some  signs  of  a  grow- 
ing awareness  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union 
that  U.N.  peacekeeping  or  observation  forces 
may  be  the  most  effective  way  of  dealing  with 
local  disputes  between  smaller  powers.  It  seems 
obvious  that  a  world  of  independent  sovereign 
nations,  most  of  them  armed ;  a  world  of  local 
enmities  and  regional  tensions ;  a  world  in  which 
superpowers  are  asked  to  choose  sides  and  help 
the  small  nations  settle  old  scores  against  each 
other — this  kind  of  world  represents  a  vast 
tinderbox,  requiring  just  one  spark  to  set  it  off. 
A  duel  between  small  adversaries,  with  the  su- 
perpowers acting  as  seconds,  could  provide  that 
kind  of  spark. 

Secretary  Rogers  noted  in  his  statement  be- 
fore the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Connnittee 
on  March  27  that  "To  the  maximum  extent 
feasible  this  administration  will  continue  to  look 
to  multilateral  institutions — and  particularly  to 
the  United  Nations — to  deal  with  threats  to  the 
security  of  weak  and  developing  countries  and 
to  promote  peaceful  settlement  of  localized 
conflicts."  ^ 

Recent  studies,  including  the  study  on  con- 
trolling  international   conflicts   by    a   distin- 


•  Bulletin  of  Apr.  14,  1969,  p.  305. 


guished  panel  assembled  by  the  UNA-USA, 
start  from  the  premise  that  we  and  the  Soviets 
share  a  conmion  interest  in  using  the  U.N.  to 
help  stabilize  local  conflicts.  These  studies  sug- 
gest that  the  time  is  ripe  to  seek  an  understand- 
ing on  more  reliable  arrangements  for  U.N. 
peacekeeping.  The  possibility  seems  worth  ex- 
ploring, though  we  await  a  clear  signal  from  the 
Soviet  side  as  to  its  readiness  to  cooperate. 

Three  areas,  in  particular,  are  worth  looking 
into. 

The  first  is  how  to  satisfy  the  Security 
Council's  legitimate  interest  in  maintaining  con- 
trol over  an  operation  after  it  has  been  launched 
while,  at  the  same  time,  protecting  the  Secretary 
General's  executive  flexibility  to  manage  a 
peacekeeping  operation. 

A  second  is  how  to  assure  reliable  arrange- 
ments for  supplying  troops  and  facilities,  in- 
cluding the  possibility  of  agreements  between 
member  states  and  the  Security  CoimcU  on 
terms  and  conditions  for  making  troops  avail- 
able. Suggestions  have  been  made  that  various 
nations  earmark  certain  contingents  and  keep 
them  available  on  a  standby  basis  for  service 
with  the  U.N.  when  needed  and  authorized.  It 
has  also  been  suggested  that  the  big  powers, 
particularly  the  United  States,  maintain  in  a 
state  of  readiness  certain  kinds  of  logistic  sup- 
port. The  history  of  peacekeeping  clearly  shows 
how  crucial  such  support  is.  To  date,  much  of 
it  has  come  from  the  United  States. 

The  third  area  of  concern  is  financing.  Many 
ideas  have  been  advanced,  including  that  of  a 
vohmtary  "peace  fund,"  paid  up  in  advance. 
This  idea  seems  worth  exploring.  However,  to 
be  acceptable  to  the  major  powers,  any  arrange- 
ment designed  to  insure  prompt  and  adequate 
financing  would  probably  have  to  be  tied  to  a 
special  finance  committee  in  which  contributors, 
especially  the  major  ones,  would  have  a  voice 
more  commensurate  with  their  contributions 
than  is  the  case  with  the  one-nation,  one-vote 
formula  which  governs  in  the  General 
Assembly. 

The  key  issue  is  not,  of  course,  procedure  but 
the  extent  of  common  political  interest  in  U.N. 
peacekeeping.  The  U.S.  stake  in  improving 
peacekeeping  is  manifest,  but  we  cannot  move 
forward  alone.  Tliere  are  few  measures  we  can 
take  by  ourselves  that  will  enhance  the  U.N. 
capability  for  peacekeeping.  The  central  pre- 
requisites for  reinforcing  the  peacekeeping  sys- 
tem are:  first,  a  greater  measure  of  big-power 
cooperation;  and  second,  the  development  of 
attitudes  throughout  the  world  that  national 


JUNE    9,    1969 


495 


interests  can  be  effectively  pursued  through  the 
U.N.  This  will  also  involve  the  willingness  of 
middle-  and  small-sized  countries  to  contribute 
troops  and  other  forms  of  support. 

Closely  related  to  peacekeeping  is  the  question 
of  disarmament.  The  ultimate  goal  remains 
what  it  has  been  for  many  years:  general  and 
'complete  disarmament.  But  there  is  not  enough 
trust  among  nations  and  not  enough  experience 
with  real  disarmament  to  pursue  this  goal  now. 
Trogi-ess  is  also  retarded  by  the  need  to  create 
mechanisms  to  guard  against  cheating  where 
purely  imilateral  means  are  not  deemed 
adequate. 

Therefore,  we  have  looked  for  places,  even 
small  ones,  where  progress  might  be  made.  We 
have  already  banned  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion from  outer  space.  We  have  done  the  same 
for  Antarctica.  We  have  achieved  a  Limited 
Test  Ban  Treaty.  We  have  negotiated  a  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty. 

President  Nixon  has  reaffirmed  the  U.S.  inter- 
est in  a  verified  ban  on  all  testing  of  nuclear 
weapons  as  well  as  our  desire  for  an  agreement 
to  cut  off  the  production  of  fissionable  materials 
for  weapons  purposes  and  to  transfer  such  ma- 
terials to  peaceful  purposes. 

But  there  has  been  no  progress  in  reducing 
existing  stockpiles  of  either  strategic  or  conven- 
tional arms,  nor  even  in  limiting  the  further 
buildup  of  strategic  arms.  That  is  why  so  much 
depends  on  the  pending  U.S.-Soviet  talks  on 
strategic  arms  limitations. 


Improving  the   Effectiveness  of  the  U.N. 

There  are  areas,  however,  in  which  the  U.N. 
has  made  rapid  progress.  The  U.N.  and  the 
specialized  agencies  conduct  an  impressive  series 
of  economic  and  social  development  programs 
in  many  countries.  We  are  getting  ready  to  start 
the  Second  Development  Decade,  trying  to 
build  upon  lessons  learned  from  the  First  U.N. 
Development  Decade. 

One  lesson  stands  out:  Economic  progress 
must  in  the  end  be  measured  on  the  basis  of  in- 
come per  capita — and  population  growth  which 
matches  or  exceeds  growth  in  production  of 
goods  and  services  can  nullify  progress,  if  not 
set  it  back. 

Rapid  increases  in  population,  and  the  fear 
that  Malthus  might  be  proved  right,  have 
caused  individual  nations  and  the  U.N.  itself  to 
begin  to  act  on  programs  of  information  and 
assistance  in  the  field  of  family  planning.  Only 
recently   have  certain   taboos  been   overcome. 


Only  recently  has  the  U.N.  become  involved 
with  this  delicate,  vital,  and  complex  field.  To- 
day, however,  in  addition  to  the  demographic 
activities  of  the  U.N.  Population  Commission, 
both  UNICEF  and  WHO  are  developing  pro- 
gi'ams  of  assistance  in  family  planning  for  vari- 
ous governments.*  For  the  year  1969,  the  United 
States  has  given  $2.5  million  to  the  Secretary 
General's  Population  Trust  Fund,  in  contrast 
with  our  contribution  of  only  half  a  million 
dollars  last  year. 

I  would  like  to  mention  one  other  item  that 
needs  attention.  That  is  the  whole  U.N.  admin- 
istrative system :  progi-ams  and  plaiming,  budg- 
ets, personnel,  coordination  of  work.  This  may 
sound  dull  and  prosaic,  but  some  attention  is 
necessary  if  we  are  to  maintain  reasonable  effi- 
ciency in  the  administration  of  the  U.N.  devel- 
opment and  assistance  programs. 

Wlien  the  U.N.  was  smaller  and  its  programs 
fewer,  when  everything  needed  to  be  done  at 
once,  then  the  problems  of  coordination  had  to 
be  relegated  to  second  place.  There  was  room 
enough  and  work  enough  for  all.  But  over  the 
years  total  personnel  in  the  U.N.  and  the  spe- 
cialized agencies  has  increased  from  some  2,500 
in  1946  to  some  30,000  as  of  December  31,  1968. 
Total  expenditures  of  all  U.N.  agencies,  exclud- 
ing the  lending  institutions,  have  increased  from 
$24.7  million  to  $686.1  million  over  the  same 
period. 

However,  "bigger"  does  not  equal  "better." 
The  answer  to  many  problems  is  not  necessarily 
"more."  So  we,  along  with  other  major  contrib- 
utors, are  taking  a  hard  look  at  the  whole  U.N. 
administrative  system,  trying  to  weed  out  pro- 
grams whose  effectiveness  cannot  be  demon- 
strated and  checking  against  wasteful  duplica- 
tion and  unnecessary  overhead.  Our  objective 
is  to  see  to  it  that  available  funds  are  used  so 
as  to  achieve  maxunum  "through-put"  in  terms 
of  results. 

As  we  get  ready  for  the  U.N.'s  25th  anniver- 
sary, it  is  not  enough  just  to  be  vaguely  in  favor 
of  the  organization.  We  must  try  to  find  ways 
and  means  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  the 
U.N.  in  all  areas.  This  does  not  mean  revising 
the  charter  or  reorganizing  the  basic  structure. 
It  does  mean  taking  hard  looks  at  procedures 
and  practices  and  making  improvements  wher- 
ever these  are  found  to  be  needed  and  possible. 

We  know  the  U.N.  is  good.  Now  is  the  time 
to  make  it  better. 


♦  UNICEF,  United  Nations  Children's  Fund ;  WHO, 
World  Health  Organization. 


496 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
AND   CONFERENCES 


U.N.  Command  in  Korea  Submits 
Report  to  the  Security  Council 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  to  the  Se- 
curity Council  from  Ambassador  Charles  W. 
Yost,  U./S.  Representative  to  the  United  Na- 
tions, transmitting  the  report  of  the  United 
Nations  Command  in  Korea  covering  North 
Korean  violations  of  the  Armistice  Agreement 
during  calendar  year  1968. 


U.S./U.N.  press  release  46  dated  May  8 

AMBASSADOR  YOST'S  LETTER 


Mat  8,  1969 


His  Excellency 

Mr.  Agha  Shahi, 

President  of  the  Security  Council, 

United  Nations,  New  York 

Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  convey,  on 
behalf  of  the  Unified  Command  established  pur- 
suant to  Security  Council  Resolution  84  of 
July  7,  1950,  a  report  of  the  United  Nations 
Command  covering  North  Korean  violations  of 
the  Armistice  Agreement  during  calendar  year 
1968. 

During  the  first  four  months  of  1969,  follow- 
ing the  period  covered  by  this  report,  the  North 
Koreans  have  committed  a  number  of  additional 
violations,  the  most  serious  of  which  was  an 
unprovoked  attack  upon  a  United  Nations  Com- 
mand work  party  within  the  Demilitarized 
Zone  on  March  15.  A  description  of  that  incident 
is  attached  as  a  supplement  to  the  United  Na- 
tions Command  report. 

These  North  Korean  aggressive  acts  in  vio- 
lation of  the  Armistice  Agreement  and  the  will- 
ful shooting  down  on  April  15  of  an  unarmed 
reconnaissance  aircraft  of  the  United  States, 
which  was  the  subject  of  my  letter  to  you  of 
April  18,  1969  (UN  Document  S/9163),i  are  a 
source  of  grave  concern.  They  demonstrate 
North  Korea's  intention  to  risk  further  escala- 
tion of  the  already  high  level  of  tension  on  the 
Korean  peninsula. 

I  request  that  this  letter,  together  with  the 


report  of  the  United  Nations  Command  and  the 
supplemental  statement  on  the  March  15  inci- 
dent, transmitted  herewith,  be  circulated  as  an 
official  document  of  the  Security  Council.^ 

Accept,   Excellency,  the  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

Charles  W.  Yost 


TEXT  OF   REPORT 

Report  of  the  United  Nations  Command 
TO  THE  United  Nations 

North  Korean  violations  of  the  Armistice  Agreement 
of  July  27, 1953,  committed  during  the  first  eight  months 
of  1968  and  reported  by  the  United  Nations  Command 
in  its  submission  of  October  3,  1968  (S/8839),'  were 
exceeded  both  in  frequency  and  magnitude  during 
the  final  four  months  of  the  year.  The  United  Nations 
Command  considers  these  North  Korean  acts  of  in- 
filtration, terrorism  and  subversion  to  have  been  of 
such  seriousness  as  to  vrarrant  a  further  report  to  the 
United    Nations. 


North  Korea's  Record  of  Armistice  Violations 
and  Armed  Incidents  During   1968 

The  year  1968  witnessed  761  serious  incidents  in  the 
UNC  half  of  the  Demilitarized  Zone  and  throughout 
the  Republic  of  Korea  as  a  result  of  North  Korean  in- 
filtrations, making  it  the  most  violent  year  since  the 
signing  of  the  Armistice  Agreement  in  1953.  (See 
Appendix. ) 

The  attempted  assassination  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea  in  his  Seoul  residence  on  January  21 
by  a  31-man  commando  team  of  the  North  Korean  124th 
Army  Unit  was  documented  and  reported  to  the  Se- 
curity Council  in  the  United  Nations  Command  Report 
of  January  26, 1968  (S/SSee).' 

Continued  North  Korean  acts  of  violence  during  the 
spring  and  summer  months  (through  August)  were 
documented  and  reported  to  the  President  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  by  the  United  Nations  Command  in  its 
report  of  October  3,  1968  (S/8839). 

September  witnessed  a  sharp  increase  in  the  number 
of  North  Korean  violations  of  the  Armistice  Agreement. 
During  this  single  month,  there  were  88  incidents  south 
of  the  Military  Demai'cation  Line.  Fifty-five  of  these 
incidents  resulted  in  exchanges  of  gunfire  during  which 
42  North  Korean  infiltrators  were  killed  south  of  the 
Military  Demarcation  Line,  making  this  the  bloodiest 
month  since  1953.  During  one  such  engagement,  on 
September  24,  seven  North  Korean  intruders  were 
killed,  the  largest  number  of  casualties  in  any  single  in- 
cident in  the  Demilitarized  Zone. 

In  October,  United  Nations  Command  forces  engaged 
North  Korean  infiltrators  south  of  the  Military  Demar- 


'  For  background,  see  Buixetin  of  May  5, 1969,  p.  383. 
'  U.N.  doc.  S/9198. 

•  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  11,  1968,  p.  512. 

*  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  12, 1968,  p.  199. 


JUNE    9.    1969 


497 


cation  Line  on  41  occasions,  as  a  result  of  which  29 
infiltrators  were  killed.  During  November  and  Decem- 
ber there  were  another  72  incidents  of  North  Korean 
infiltration  across  the  Military  Demarcation  Line  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Demilitarized  Zone.  Twenty-three  of 
these  incidents  involved  exchanges  of  gunfire,  as  a  re- 
sult of  which  14  more  North  Korean  infiltrators  were 
killed. 

The  largest  North  Korean  intrusion  since  the  end 
of  the  Korean  War  occurred  on  October  30  and  Novem- 
ber 1  and  2,  when  approximately  120  North  Korean 
commandos  crossed  the  seaward  extension  of  the  Mili- 
tary Demarcation  Line  and  infiltrated  into  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  in  the  vicinity  of  Ulchin  and  Samchok, 
two  small  villages  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  about  50  miles  south  of  the  Military  Demarca- 
tion Line.  According  to  the  testimony  of  captured  com- 
mandos, they  had  been  ordered  to :  infiltrate  and 
terrorize  designated  villages,  liquidate  "reactionary" 
Republic  of  Korea  citizens,  organize  clandestine  espi- 
onage networks,  recruit  or  kidnap  Republic  of  Korea 
citizens  to  be  taken  to  North  Korea  either  for  intelli- 
gence exploitation  or  for  training  as  intelligence  agents, 
intimidate  Republic  of  Korea  citizens  into  executing 
oaths  of  allegiance  to  various  North  Korean  communist 
organizations,  and  collect  intelligence  data  and  other 
information  which  would  facilitate  the  planning  of 
further  operations  against  the  Republic  of  Korea. 

The  commandos  were  all  members  of  the  124th  North 
Korean  Army  Unit,  the  si^ecialized  espionage  and  ter- 
rorist unit  which  had  trained  the  infiltrators  who  had 
attempted  to  assassinate  President  Park  in  January, 
1968.  They  had  received  three  months  training  for  this 
specific  mission  in  Sangwongun,  near  the  North  Korean 
capital  of  Pyongyang,  and  one  month  of  guerrilla  train- 
ing in  Tongsam-ni,  North  Korea,  before  being  sent  on 
their  illegal  mission.  They  were  heavily  armed  with 
submachine  guns,  hand  grenades  and  explosives,  and 
carried  large  quantities  of  equipment  including  prop- 
aganda material  and  Republic  of  Korea  currency,  both 
genuine  and  counterfeit. 

Their  presence  became  known  on  November  3  when 
loyal  Republic  of  Korea  citizens  reported  their  attempts 
to  propagandize  villagers  and  force  them  into  cooper- 
ating through  such  terrorist  tactics  as  beatings  and 
murder.  The  Republic  of  Korea  armed  forces,  national 
iwlice  and  militia  reacted  promptly  and,  with  the  active 
support  and  cooperation  of  the  local  citizenry,  began 
a  two-month-long  pursuit  of  the  infiltrators.  In  their 
anxiety  to  escape,  these  intruders  committed  acts  more 
inhumane  than  any  reported  since  the  end  of  the  Ko- 
rean War :  on  November  13,  a  Republic  of  Korea  post- 
man was  killed  and  his  body  savagely  mutilated  by 
bayonets;  on  November  17,  a  family  of  five,  including 
two  infants,  was  brutally  slain,  the  children's  brains 
having  been  beaten  out  by  rocks  or  blunt  instruments ; 
on  November  25,  another  family  was  massacred ;  and 
on  December  2,  a  58-year-old  nun  from  a  Buddhist 
Temple  was  stabbed  21  times,  causing  her  death. 

Altogether,  122  Republic  of  Korea  personnel  were 
killed  or  wounded  in  defense  of  their  country  during 
the  Ulchin-Samchok  operation.  These  included  23 
civilians  murdered  and  4  wounded;  30  soldiers  killed 
and  45  wounded ;  one  marine  killed  and  4  wounded ; 
8  members  of  the  militia  killed  and  6  wounded;  and 
one  member  of  the  national  police  killed. 


The  North  Korean  aggression  cost  them  107  dead. 
Seven  others,  all  oflicers  of  the  North  Korean  Army,  2Lt 
Chong  Tong-Ch'un,  2Lt  Ko  T'ung-Wun,  2Lt  Kim 
Kwang-Chung,  Jr.,  Lt  Cho  Ung-T'aek,  2Lt  Yi  Hyong- 
Su,  Jr.,  Lt  Kim  Chong-Myong,  and  2Lt  Kim  Ik-P'ung, 
were  taken  alive  or  surrendered.  Their  confessions  have 
plainly  revealed  the  North  Korean  regime's  full  respon- 
sibility for  the  operation,  exposing  as  totally  false 
North  Korean  propaganda  claims  that  the  commandos 
were  "South  Korean  patriots." 


APPENDIX 


The  Level  of  North  Korean  Subversive  Activity 
Against  the  Repcblic  op  Korea 

ms  me    imr    wes 
Significant  Incidents: 

DMZ— South  of  the  Military 

Demarcation  Line 42     37     445     542 

Interior  of  ROK 17     13     121     219 

Exchanges  of  Fire: 

DMZ— South  of  the  Military 

Demarcation  Line... 23     19     122     236 

Interior  of  ROK 6     11       96     120 

North  Koreans  killed  in  ROK 4     43     228     321 

North  Koreans  captured  in  ROK..  51     19       57       13 

UNO  Military  killed  in  ROK 21     35     131     162 

UNO  MUitary  wounded  in  ROK..     6     29     294     294 
ROK  National  Police  and  other 

civilians  killed  in  ROK. 19       4       22       35 

ROK  National  Police  and  other 

civilians  wounded  in  ROK 13       5       53       16 


SUPPLEMENTAL  REPORT 

MnjTABT  Demaeoation  Line  Incident 
OF  Maech  15,  1969 

On  March  15,  1969,  a  ten-man  work  party  of  the 
United  Nations  Command  was  fired  upon  by  a  North 
Korean  guard  post  while  replacing  a  Military  Demarca- 
tion Line  marker  in  the  extreme  western  sector  of  the 
Demilitarized  Zone. 

Paragraph  4  of  the  Armistice  Agreement  states  in 
part :  "The  Military  Armistice  Commission  shall  super- 
vise the  erection  of  all  markers  placed  along  the  Mili- 
tary Demarcation  Line.  .  ."  Administrative  agree- 
ments spelling  out  details  for  the  implementation  of 
this  instruction  were  reached  between  the  two  sides  on 
August  24,  August  31,  and  September  17,  1954.  The 
UN  Command  had,  on  March  12,  informed  the  North 
Koreans  that  the  marker  in  question  would  be  re- 
placed on  March  15.  The  work  party  involved  wore 
proper  identification  and  their  activities  were  easily 
recognizable.  Thirty-five  minutes  after  they  had  begun 
to  work,  the  North  Korean  guard  post  began  firing 
across  the  MDL  with  small  arms  and  machine  guns, 
killing  one  UN  Command  soldier  and  wounding  three 
more. 

At  the  March  26  and  April  5  meetings  of  the  Military 
Armistice  Commission  the  UNO  senior  member  pro- 
posed that  joint  observer  teams  be  convened  to  observe 
future  work  along  the  Military  Demarcation  Line  and 


498 


DEPAUTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETINi 


insisted  on  assurances  from  the  North  Koreans  that 
they  would  not  again  interfere  with  this  legitimate 
activity.  The  North  Korean  senior  member  failed  to 
reply  directly  either  to  the  proposal  on  joint  observer 
teams  or  to  the  request  for  assurances. 


Charles  F.  Butler  To  Represent 
United  States  on  iCAO  Council 

President  Nixon  on  May  2  (White  House 
press  release)  announced  the  appointment  of 
Charles  F.  Butler  as  the  Eepresentative  of  the 
United  States  on  the  Council  of  the  Interna- 
tional Civil  Aviation  Organization,  with  the 
personal  rank  of  Minister.^  He  will  replace 
Robert  P.  Boyle,  who  is  resigning. 

The  Council  has  been  established  for  the  pur- 
pose of  providing  coordination  for  the  member 
nations  in  all  matters  dealing  with  civil  avia- 
tion. One  himdred  and  sixteen  nations  are  mem- 
bers of  ICAO,  and  27  serve  on  the  Council. 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago, 
1944,  as  amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with 
annex.  Done  at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  October  24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Signature:  Chad,  May  21,  1969. 

Proc6s-verbal  of  rectification  of  the  text  of  the  proto- 
col of  September  24,  1968  (TIAS  6605),  on  the 
authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  convention  of  Decem- 
ber 7,  1944,  as  amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  on 
international  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Washington 
April  8,  1969.  Entered  into  force  April  8,  1969. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement,  1968,  with  annexes. 
Open  for  signature  at  United  Nations  Headquarters, 


New  York,  March  18  through  March  31, 1968.  Entered 
into  force  December  30,  1968.  TIAS  6584. 
Accession    deposited:    Spain    (with    a    statement), 
April  28,  1969. 

Consular 

Vienna    convention    on    consular   relations.    Done    at 
Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force  March  19, 
1967.' 
Accession  deposited:  Pakistan,  April  14,  1969. 

Load   Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  1966.  Done  at 
London  April  5,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  21, 
1968.  TIAS  6331. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
April  9, 1969.'' 

Racial   Discrimination 

International    convention    on    the   elimination    of   all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4, 
1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Holy  See,  May  1,  1969. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea, 

1960.  Done  at  London  June  17,  1960.  Entered  into 

force  May  26,  1965.  TIAS  5780. 

Acceptances    deposited:    Honduras,     February    18, 
1969;  Singapore,  February  12,  1969. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 

safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960  (TIAS  5780).  Adopted  at 

London  October  25,  1967.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Israel,  April  22,  1969. 

Telecommunications 

Partial    revision    of   the   radio    regulations    (Geneva 
1959),  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332),  relating 
to  maritime  mobile  service,  with  annexes  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  November  3,  1967.  Entered 
into  force  April  1, 1969.  TIAS  6590. 
Notifications  of  approval:  Belgium,  April  1,  1969; 
Finland,    March    31,    1969;    Korea,    Yugoslavia', 
March  21,  1969;  Malaysia,  April  2,  1969.' 
International     telecommunication     convention,     with 
annexes.    Done    at    Montreux    November    12,    1965. 
Entered  into  force  January  1,  1967;  for  the  United 
States  May  29,  1967.  TIAS  6267. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Jamaica,*  Venezuela,  April  2. 
1969. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement  amending  paragraphs  6  and  10  and  extend- 
ing the  agreement  of  May  9, 1961,  as  amended  (TIAS 
4739,  5231,  6017,  6078,  6092),  relaUng  to  sampling 
by  means  of  balloons  the  radioactivity  of  the  upper 
atmosphere.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Can- 
berra May  9,  1969.  Entered  into  force  May  9,  1969. 


'  For  biographic  information,  see  VThite  House  press 
release  dated  May  2. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 

*  Not  in  force. 

*  With  reservations  contained  in  final  protocol. 


JUNE    9,    1969 


499 


Burundi 

Agreement  relating  to  investment  guaranties.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bujumbura  May  6,  1969. 
Enters  into  force  on  tlie  date  of  the  note  from 
Burundi  indicating  its  approval  in  conformity  with 
its  constitutional  procedures. 

Canada 

Agreement  authorizing  temporary  additional  diversion 
for  power  purposes  of  water  flowing  over  American 
Falls  at  Niagara.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  March  21,  1969. 
Ratified  by  the  President:  May  19, 1969. 
Entered  into  force:  May  20, 1969. 

Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

Agreement  on  the  reciprocal  allocation  for  use  free  of 
charge  of  plots  of  land  in  Moscow  and  Washington, 
with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed  at  Moscow  May  16, 
1969 ;  entered  into  force  May  16, 1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  May  23  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Francis  J.  Galbraith  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Indonesia.  (For  biographic  details,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  April  24.) 

Kingdon  Gould,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  Luxem- 
bourg. ( For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press 
release  dated  May  5.) 

Spencer  M.  King  to  be  Ambassador  to  Guyana.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  April  30. ) 

John  Davis  Lodge  to  be  Ambassador  to  Argentina. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  April  30.) 

Matthew  .T.  Looram,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Dahomey.  (For  biographic  details,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  April  29.) 

Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Dominican  Republic.  (For  biographic  details,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  April  25.) 

Armin  H.  Meyer  to  be  Ambassador  to  Japan.  (For 
biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
AprU28.) 

David  H.  Popper  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Cyprus.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  May  5.) 

Oliver  L.  Troxel,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Repub- 
lic of  Zambia.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  April  29. ) 

Sheldon  B.  Vance  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Demo- 
cratic Republic  of  the  Congo.  (For  biographic  details, 
see  White  House  press  release  dated  April  25.) 


Jack  Hood  Vaughn  to  be  Ambassador  to  Colombia. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  May  1.) 


Appointments 

Daniel  Szabo  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Inter- American  Affairs  (Economic  Policy)  effective 
May  19.  (For  biographic  details,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  dated  May  19. ) 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 

Press  Releases:  May  19-25 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 

of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 

20520 

Releases  issued  prior  to  May  19  which  appear 

in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  115  of 

May  12  and  120  of  May  16. 

No. 

Date 

Subject 

123 

5/19 

Rogers :  news  conference  on  depar- 
ture   from    Saigon     (printed    in 
Bulletin  of  June  2). 

*124 

5/19 

Hadsel  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Somali  Republic   (biographic  de- 
tails). 

125 

5/20 

Rogers:   SEATO  Council  of  Minis- 
ters. 

126 

5/21 

SEATO  final  communique. 

»127 

5/21 

U.S.  delegation  to  1969  Moscow  In- 
ternational   Film   Festival,   July 
7-22. 

*128 

5/22 

Dudley  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Denmark   (biographic  details). 

129 

5/22 

Lodge :     opening     statement,     18th 
plenary  session  on  Viet-Nam  at 
Paris. 

tl30 

5/22 

Additional  U.S.  contribution  for  Ni- 
gerian relief. 

*131 

5/22 

Program  for  visit  of  Prime  Minis- 
ter Petrus  J.   S.   de  Jong  of  the 
Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands. 

132 

5/22 

Seven-nation    conference   communi- 
que. 

133 

5/22 

Lodge:  additional  remarks  at  18th 

(con-ected)     plenary  session  on  Viet-Nam.            | 

134 

5/23 

Rogers :  departure  statement,  Bang- 
kok. 

tl35 

5/23 

Rogers :     arrival    statement.     New 
Delhi. 

tl36 

5/24 

Rogers:  departure  statement,  New 
Delhi. 

tl37 

5/24 

Rogers :  arrival  statement,  Lahore. 

tl38 

5/25 

Rogers :    departure   statement,    La- 
hore. 

tl39 

5/25 

Rogers:  arrival  statement,  Tehran. 

* 
ted. 

*  Not  prir 

t  Held  for  a  later  Issue  of  the  Bulletin. 

500 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


INDEX     June  9,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1563 


Argentina.  Lodge  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      500 

Asia 

The  Pacific  Basin  Potential   (Johnson)     .     .     .      488 

Secretary  Leaves  Bangltok  at  Close  of  SEATO 
and  Seven-Nation  Meetings  (departure  state- 
ment)      483 

Seven  Asian  and  Pacific  Nations  Examine  Secu- 
rity Situation  in  Asia   (communique)    .     .     .      481 

SBATO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Bangkok 

(Rogers,     communique) 477 

Aviation.  Charles  F.  Butler  To  Represent  United 

States  on  ICAO  Council 499 

Colombia.  Vaughn  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .    .      500 

Communications.  The  United  Nations — Up, 
Down,  or  Sideways?  (DePalma) 493 

Congo      (Kinshasa).      Vance      confirmed      as 

Ambassador 500 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Galbraith,  Gould,  King,  Lodge, 
Looram,  Meloy,  Meyer,  Popper,  Troxel,  Vance, 
Vaughn) 500 

Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Blatchford  as  Director  of 
the  Peace  Cordis 492 

Cyprus.  Popper  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .      500 

Dahomey.  Looram  confirmed  as  Ambassador   .    .      500 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Appointments  (Szabo) 500 

Confirmations  (Galbraith,  Gould,  King,  Lodge, 
Looram,  Meloy,  Meyer,  Popper,  Troxel,  Vance, 
Vaughn) 500 

Disarmament.  The  United  Nations — Up,  Down, 

or   Sideways?    (DePalma) 493 

Dominican  Republic.  Meloy  confirmed  as 
Ambassador 500 

Economic  ACFairs 

The  Pacific  Basin  Potential   (Johnson)     .     .     .      488 

SEATO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Bangkok 

(Rogers,    communique) 477 

Szabo  appointed  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 

Inter-American  Affairs  ( Economic  Policy )   .     .       500 
The  United  Nations — Up,  Down,  or  Sideways? 

(DePalma) 493 

Foreign  Aid.  Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Blatchford 
as  Director  of  the  Peace  Corps 492 

Guyana.  King  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .     .      500 

Indonesia.  Galbraith  confirmed  as  Ambassador  .       500 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Charles  F.  Butler  To  Represent  United  States  on 
ICAO  Council 499 

Seven  Asian  and  Pacific  Nations  Examine  Secu- 
rity Situation  in  Asia   (communique)     .     .     .      481 

SEATO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Bangkok 

(Rogers,  communique) 477 

Japan.  Meyer  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .    .      500 

Korea 

Seven  Asian  and  Pacific  Nations  Examine  Secu- 
rity Situation  in  Asia  (communique)     .    .    .      481 


U.N.  Command  in  Korea  Submits  Report  to  the 

Security  Council  (Yost,  text  of  report)     .     .     .      497 

Latin  America.  Szabo  appointed  Deputy  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs  (Eco- 
nomic Policy) 500 

Luxembourg.  Gould  confirmed  as  Ambassador  500 

Marine  Science.  The  United  Nations — Up,  Down, 
or  Sideways?   (DePalma) 493 

Military  Affairs.  Secretary  Laird  Urges  Hanoi 

to  Release  U.S.  Prisoners  of  War 484 

Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organization 

Secretary  Leaves  Bangkok  at  Close  of  SEATO 
and  Seven-Nation  Meetings  (departure 
statement) 483 

SBATO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Bangkok 

(Rogers,  communique) 477 

Space.  The  United  Nations — Up,  Down,  or  Side- 
ways?  (DePalma) 493 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions    ....      499 

United  Nations 

The  United  Nations — Up,  Down,  or  Sideways? 

(DePalma) 493 

U.N.  Command  in  Korea  Submits  Report  to  the 

Security  Council  (Yost,  text  of  report)     .     .     .      497 

Viet-Nam 

18th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 485 

Secretary  Laird  Urges  Hanoi  To  Release  U.S. 
Prisoners  of  War 484 

Secretary  Leaves  Bangkok  at  Close  of  SEATO 
and  Seven-Nation  Meetings  (departure  state- 
ment)      483 

Seven  Asian  and  Pacific  Nations  Examine  Secu- 
rity Situation  in  Asia  (communique)   ....      481 

SEATO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Bangkok 

(Rogers,  communique) 477 

Zambia.  Troxel  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      500 


'Name  Index 

Blatchford,  Jo.seph  H 492 

Butler,   Charles  F 499 

DePalma,   Samuel 493 

Galbraith,  Francis  J 500 

Gould,  Kingdon,  Jr 500 

Johnson,  U.  Alexis 488 

King,    Spencer   M 500 

Laird,  Melvin  R 484 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 485 

Lodge,  John  Davis 500 

Looram,  Matthew  J.,  Jr 500 

Meloy,  Francis  E.,  Jr 500 

Meyer,  Armin  H 500 

Popper,  David  H 500 

Rogers,   Secretary 477,483 

Szabo,  Daniel 500 

Troxel,  Oliver  L.,  Jr 500 

Vance,  Sheldon  B 500 

Vaughn,   Jack  Hood 500 

Yost,  Charles  W 497 


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June  16,  1969 


CENTO  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS  MEETS  AT  TEHRAN 

Statement  by  Secretary  Rogers  and  Text  of  Cormrvanique     601 

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President  Nixon's  Message  to  the  Congress     515 


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June  16,  1969 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN^ 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
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The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
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CENTO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Tehran 


The  16th  session  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
of  the  Central  Treaty  Organization  was  held 
at  Tehran  May  26-27.  Following  is  a  statement 
made  hy  Secretary  Rogers  at  the  opening  session 
on  May  86,  together  with  the  text  of  a  com- 
rmxnique  issued  at  the  close  of  the  meeting  on 
May  27. 


STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY   ROGERS 

Press  release  140  dated  Ma;  26 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  be  able  to  participate 
in  this  year's  CENTO  Council  session.  I  bring 
to  my  colleagues  warm  greetings  from  President 
Nixon.  I  join  my  distinguished  colleagues  in  ex- 
pressing appreciation  for  the  warm  and  gracious 
welcome  that  has  been  accorded  to  us  by  His 
Imperial  Majesty  and  the  Government  and  peo- 
ple of  Iran. 

Some  years  ago,  at  a  time  when  world  affairs 
were  dominated  by  a  possible  confrontation  on 
a  global  scale,  a  system  of  alliances  was  put 
together  for  the  collective  defense  of  their  mem- 
bers. Today  we  live  in  a  more  hopeful  world. 
It  could  be  that  we  may  be  moving  out  of  an 
era  of  confrontation  into  an  era  of  negotiations. 
We  hope  so — and  we  are  doing  our  best  to  make 
it  so. 

The  United  States  intends  to  pursue  all  pru- 
dent efforts  to  improve  our  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 

We  are  preparing  for  discussions  this  summer 
on  limiting  the  accumulation  of  strategic  nu- 
clear weapons. 

We  are  searching  with  our  European  allies  for 
ways  to  reduce  tensions  in  Europe  and  ulti- 
mately to  resolve  the  fundamental  issues  there. 

We  are  pursuing  important  talks  with  the 
Soviet  Union  on  the  Middle  East. 

But  this  does  not  mean  that  the  non-Com- 
munist world  can  relax  its  vigilance. 

We  were  reminded  of  this  forcefully  last  year 
when  the  Soviet  Union  invaded  and  occupied 


Czechoslovakia  to  prevent  the  Conmiunist 
leaders  of  that  country  from  carrying  out  in- 
ternal reforms  which  were  clearly  responsive  to 
the  wishes  of  the  populace.  We  were  reminded 
of  this  when  the  Brezhnev  doctrine  was  pro- 
pounded, asserting  a  unilateral  right  to  inter- 
vene in  other  Communist  countries.  We  are 
reminded  of  it  today  in  Southeast  Asia,  where 
North  Viet-Nam  continues  its  war  against  the 
South  and  where  armed  insurgencies  are  being 
promoted  against  Laos,  Thailand,  and  else- 
where from  outside.  We  see  it  in  Northeast  Asia, 
where  the  North  Koreans  have  sharply  stepped 
up  their  efforts  at  armed  infiltration  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea. 

It  is  against  such  facts  as  these  that  collective 
defense  alliances  have  been  formed  to  promote 
a  sense  of  security  for  their  members.  For  a 
pervading  sense  of  national  security  is  a  prior 
condition  for  the  kind  of  national  effort  that 
must  be  made  if  governments  are  to  respond 
adequately  to  the  pressing  needs  of  their  peoples 
for  economic  progress  and  social  reform. 

In  CENTO,  of  course,  we  are  primarily  con- 
cerned with  problems  of  the  Middle  East  and 
South  Asia.  But  events  elsewhere  in  the  world 
affect  us  all.  None  is  more  important  than  Viet- 
Nam,  where  my  Govermnent  is  energetically 
pursuing  a  policy  of  a  negotiated  peace  in  which 
the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  will  have  the 
unconditional  right  to  determine  their  own 
future. 

In  Southeast  Asia  generally  I  found  a  grow- 
ing sense  of  confidence  and  of  self-reliance.  I 
believe  that  the  source  of  their  present  con- 
fidence is  quite  clear  and  it  is  this :  Their  socie- 
ties are  dynamic,  and  they  are  cooperating 
closely  with  each  other.  They  are  learning  the 
habit  of  international  cooperation,  and  a  new 
spirit  of  regionalism  has  taken  hold. 

I  have  sensed  also  in  this  region  similar  de- 
velopments— both  in  national  progress  and  in 
regional  cooperation. 

In  the  Middle  East,  which  so  vitally  affects 
this  area,  the  daily  incidents  are  a  cogent  re- 


JXTNH    16,    1969 


501 


minder  that  active  diplomacy  on  behalf  of  a 
permanent  peace  is  necessary.  The  United  States 
has  been  holding  important  talks  with  other 
major  powers  both  in  Washington  and  at  the 
United  Nations.  These  talks  are  reaching  a  more 
concrete  stage;  fimdamental  differences  remain, 
but  some  progress  has  been  made. 

Equally  as  important  to  the  development  of 
healthy  regional  cooperation  is  economic 
growth.  In  modem  society  with  its  complex 
technology,  many  aspects  of  this  growth  must 
extend  beyond  national  boundaries. 

In  this  important  region  of  the  world  we  have 
a  long  record  of  working  together  for  our  com- 
mon security  and  for  economic  and  social  de- 
velopment. CENTO  complements  and  builds 
upon  a  wide  range  of  close  and  active  bilateral 
relationships.  It  is  both  a  symbol  of  our  mutual 
intent  and  a  means  for  cooperation  and 
consultation. 

Regional  economic  cooperation  was  one  of 
cento's  early  purposes.  Iran,  Pakistan,  and 
Turkey  have  been  traveling  along  this  road 
together  for  several  years.  We  take  some  satis- 
faction that  CENTO,  and  the  United  States, 
have  been  able  to  play  a  part  in  this  achieve- 
ment. The  efforts  of  the  countries  of  this  region, 
both  in  CENTO  and  in  their  own  organiza- 
tion— the  Regional  Cooperation  for  Develop- 
ment— have  our  encouragement. 

The  cumulative  effects  of  the  CENTO 
economic  development  program  are  very  real. 
The  program  is  a  good  example  of  what  can  be 
accomplished  by  an  imaginative  sharing  of  re- 
sources, and  the  accomplishments  deserve  more 
credit  than  they  receive. 

It  is  fashionable  these  days  to  point  out  that 
the  world  has  changed — and  so  it  has. 

It  is  a  more  dynamic  world  than  we  knew 
until  a  few  years  ago — yet  full  of  uncertainties, 
surprises,  and  dangers. 

I  can  think  of  no  more  stabilizing  influence 
on  the  course  of  world  affairs — no  better  sign 
of  a  hopeful  future — than  the  remarkable 
growth  of  international  cooperation,  formal  and 
informal,  for  security  and  development  and  or- 
derly change.  We  intend  to  honor  all  of  our 
treaty  obligations  and  our  security  arrange- 
ments. 

When  nations  meet  to  consult  together  and  act 
together  in  their  common  interests,  they  con- 
tribute to  a  safer  and  a  more  progressive  world. 
It  is  for  this  reason  and  in  this  spirit  that  the 
United  States  is  participating  in  this  meeting 
of  the  CENTO  Council. 


I  am  confident  that  CENTO  has  an  important 
role  to  play  in  the  stability,  security,  and  future 
of  this  area  of  the  world. 


TEXT  OF  COMMUNIQUE,  MAY  27 


I 


Press  release  141  dated  May  28 

The  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Central  Treaty  Or- 
ganization (CENTO)  held  their  Sixteenth  Session  in 
Tehran  on  May  26  and  27,  1969.  Delegation  leaders 
were: 

H.B.  Mr.  Ardeshir  Zahedi  (Iran) 

H.B.  Mr.  Shah  Nawaz  (Pakistan) 

H.E.  Mr.  Ihsan  Sabri  Caglayangil  (Turkey) 

The  Rt.  Hon.  Michael  Stewart,  M.P.  (United  Kingdom) 

The  Hon.  William  P.  Rogers  (United  States) 

A  message  from  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Shahan- 
shah  Aryamehr  welcoming  the  Delegations  was  read 
at  the  opening  ceremony  by  His  Excellency  Mr.  Amir 
Abbas  Hoveyda,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Iran.  Following 
the  opening  remarks  by  the  Secretary  General,  the 
Delegation  leaders,  in  their  opening  statements,  ex- 
pressed their  appreciation  of  the  gracious  message  from 
His  Imperial  Majesty,  and  of  the  warm  hospitality  ex- 
tended to  them  by  Iran.  As  host,  the  Chairman,  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  Iran,  read  his  opening  statement. 

The  Council  expressed  regret  at  the  death  of  former 
President  Dwight  D.  Elsenhower  of  the  United  States, 
under  whose  leadership  the  United  States  began  Its 
participation  In  all  aspects  of  the  work  of  the  Organi- 
zation. 

In  a  broad  exchange  of  views  marked  by  cordiality 
and  understanding  the  Council  reviewed  international 
developments  since  their  last  meeting  in  London. 

During  the  review  statements  were  made  to  the 
Council  regarding  the  following  political  problems : 

The  Arab-Israeli  dispute ; 

The  efforts  to  achieve  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
Vietnam  problem ; 
The  Cyprus  problem ; 
The  Kashmir  and  Farrakha  disputes ;  and 
The  Shatt-al-Arab  dispute. 

The  Council  expressed  the  hope  that  present  tensions 
would  ease  and  that  the  causes  thereof  would  be  re- 
solved in  a  peaceful  and  satisfactory  manner,  in  keep- 
ing with  the  principles  and  practice  of  international 
law,  equity  and  justice. 

In  approving  the  report  of  the  Military  Committee, 
the  Council  noted  the  progress  made  in  different  fields 
of  cooperation.  I 

The  Council  noted  with  pleasure  the  progress  being 
made  in  the  economic  and  social  fields  in  each  of  the 
Regional  Member  Countries  which  is  proceeding  more 
rapidly  than  in  most  other  regions  of  the  world.  The 
Council  agreed  that  the  programme  of  economic  col- 
laboration constitutes  a  key  element  of  the  CENTO 
partnership  and  expressed  its  appreciation  for  the 
guidelines  conveyed  by  the  United  States  Government 
at  the  last  meeting  of  the  Economic  Committee  re-  i 
garding  its  support  of  this  collaboration.  The  Council  ' 
noted  with  satisfaction  the  guidance  given  by  the 
Economic    Committee    on   the   economic    development 


502 


DEPAKTMENT  OP  STATE  BULSjEUTS 


activities  of  the  Organization  along  lines  laid  down 
In  previous  Council  meetings  and  on  the  initiatives 
taken  in  this  field. 

The  Council  approved  the  decisions  taken  by  the 
Seventeenth  Economic  Committee  regarding  CENTO'S 
role  in  the  industrial  development  of  the  Region,  and 
endorsed,  In  particular,  the  decision  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  wing  within  the  Organization  to  deal  with 
industrial  development. 

The  Couucil  was  pleased  to  note  that  CENTO  high- 
way and  railway  programmes  are  advancing  towards 
completion. 


Reviewing  the  work  of  the  multilateral  technical  co- 
operation fund,  the  Council  took  note  of  the  progress 
being  made  in  the  fields  of  civil  aviation  training, 
minerals  and  mining,  other  specialized  training  and 
the  grant  of  scholarships.  They  observed  that  the  ob- 
jective of  increasing  the  technical  self-sufiiciency  of 
the  countries  of  the  region  was  being  well  served  and 
hoped  for  continued  progress  in  this  field. 

The  Council  accepted  the  invitation  extended  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  to  hold  the 
Seventeenth  Session  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  In 
Washington  in  the  week  of  May  11, 1970. 


Secretary  Rogers  Visits  New  Delhi,  Lahore,  and  Tehran 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS,  NEW  DELHI, 
MAY  23 

Press  release  136  dated  May  23 

I  am  very  pleased  to  have  been  able  to  accept 
tbe  kind  invitation  of  the  Government  of  India 
to  visit  New  Delhi  so  early  in  the  course  of  the 
new  Nixon  administration.  We  value  highly 
our  relations  with  the  nations  of  Asia. 

My  primary  purpose  is  to  leam  at  first  hand 
Indian  interests  and  viewpoints  concerning 
matters  of  mutual  concern.  I  hope  to  discuss  as 
well  some  of  our  own  views. 

I  look  forward  to  the  opportimity  to  call  on 
the  President,  Prime  Minister,  Deputy  Prime 
Minister,  and  Foreign  Minister. 

I  have  been  very  impressed  by  the  reports 
of  the  economic  progress  made  by  India  and 
of  your  "green  revolution." 

Because  of  the  importance  we  attach  to  our 
relations  with  India,  President  Nixon  has 
named  a  prominent  American,  Kenneth  Keat- 
ing, to  represent  him  in  your  country.  Mr.  Keat- 
ing, whom  I  have  known  for  a  long  time,  was 
for  years  an  influential  member  of  the  United 
States  Senate.  He  was  then  a  distinguished 
judge  and  gave  up  this  important  post  because 
of  his  deep  interest  in  India  and  his  desire  to 
serve  his  country  in  this  great  democratic 
nation. 

We  share  with  India  the  hope  that  a  lasting 
peace  in  Asia  can  be  achieved.  Since  assuming 
office,  and  most  recently  in  Southeast  Asia  in 
the  last  few  days,  I  have  been  deeply  involved 


in  the  quest  for  peace.  We  have  made  reasonable 
and  practical  suggestions  at  the  peace  talks  in 
Paris  and  in  the  proposals  made  by  President 
Nixon  in  his  address  of  May  14.^ 

As  you  know,  the  United  States  is  flexible 
and  openminded  on  the  means  to  achieve  a 
peaceful  settlement,  as  long  as  the  people  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  have  the  right  freely  to 
decide  their  own  future  through  a  democratic 
process  and  without  outside  interference  from 
any  quarter. 

Tonight  and  tomorrow,  I  welcome  the  op- 
portunity to  exchange  views  with  the  leaders 
of  the  Government  of  India  on  this  and  many 
other  matters.  Surely  the  world's  two  largest 
democracies  have  many  common  interests.  The 
need  to  compare  views  is  clear.  I  therefore  am 
very  happy  to  be  able  to  be  here.  I  have  every 
expectation  of  an  interesting  and  valuable  series 
of  talks  with  the  leaders  of  India. 


DEPARTURE   REMARKS,  NEW   DELHI, 
MAY  24 

Press  release  136  dated  May  24 

My  brief  visit  to  India  has  provided  for  me 
a  valuable  exchange  of  views  with  the  highest 
Government  officials  of  India.  It  is  always  val- 
uable for  officials  from  the  world's  two  largest 
democracies  to  confer. 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation  on 
May  14,  see  Bulletin  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  457. 


JUNE    16,    1969 


503 


I  have  learned  at  first  hand  the  Indian  out- 
look. It  seems  to  me  that  our  fundamental  pur- 
poses, which  concern  human  dignity  and  oppor- 
tunity in  peace  and  freedom,  are  essentially  the 
same. 

My  discussions  with  Indian  leaders  today 
have  ranged  freely  over  the  contemporary  prob- 
lems of  an  interdependent  world  in  which  the 
Asian  subcontinent  plays  such  an  important 
role.  I  have  sensed  India's  determination  to 
proceed  along  its  chosen  path. 

I  have  discussed  with  your  leaders  our  earnest 
desire  for  an  early  end  to  hostilities  in  Southeast 
Asia  and  the  urgent  priority  which  my  Govern- 
ment places  upon  this  objective.  I  have  also 
made  it  clear  that  the  United  States  sustains  its 
deep  interest  in  Asia. 

Economic  relationships  were  prominent  in 
our  discussions.  On  our  part,  we  plan  to  con- 
tinue our  economic  collaboration  with  India. 
We  welcome  India's  economic  progress  and  its 
determination  to  become  independent  of  exter- 
nal economic  assistance  in  the  reasonably  near 
future.  As  the  Indian  economy  continues  to 
grow,  we  hope  that  our  commerce  will  increase 
to  our  mutual  benefit. 

Our  discussions  have  confirmed  that  relations 
between  our  countries  are  soundly  based.  I  be- 
lieve these  bonds  will  be  strengthened  as  we 
continue  to  deal  with  each  other  in  a  frank  and 
friendly  way. 

I  am  grateful  to  the  President,  Prime  Minis- 
ter, Deputy  Prime  Minister,  and  Foreign  Min- 
ister for  their  hospitality  and  the  opportunity 
to  discuss  some  of  the  important  issues  which 
concern  us  both. 

I  look  forward  to  a  series  of  talks  between  the 
leaders  of  our  two  Governments,  including  a 
further  talk  with  your  Foreign  Minister  when 
he  comes  to  Washington  in  the  near  future  and 
our  next  round  of  scheduled  bilateral  talks.  I  am 
pleased  to  say  that  the  Foreign  Minister  ac- 
cepted today  my  invitation  to  visit  the  United 
States. 

In  closing,  let  me  say  that  although  my  visit 
has  been  brief  I  believe  it  was  very  successful, 
and  I  hope  it  conveyed  to  your  leaders  the  keen 
interest  which  President  Nixon  has  in  close  and 
friendly  relations  with  the  Government  of  India 
and  his  respect  and  high  regard  for  the  people 
of  India. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  when  will  he  the  next  bi- 


lateral conference  between  India  and  the  United     t 
States? 

A.  The  bilateral  talks  between  India  and  the 
United  States?  Well,  the  most  important  next 
one  is  the  visit  of  your  Foreign  Minister  to  the 
United  States,  and  we  hope  that  will  be  in  July. 
We  have  not  fixed  a  precise  date  yet,  but  that 
will  be  the  subject  of  discussions  we  will  have 
after  I  get  back  to  the  United  States. 

Q.  You  were  reported  to  have  handed  a  letter 
to  Mrs.  Gandhi  from  President  Nixon. 

A.  Yes,  I  did. 

Q.  Would  you  like  to  tell  its  what  it  said? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  want  to  disclose  what  was  in 
the  letter,  because  it  was  a  personal  letter  from 
the  President  to  your  Prime  Minister.  If  it  is  to 
be  released,  it  would  be  her  prerogative  to  do 
that. 

Q.  Did  the  Near  East  figure  in  your  talks — 
the  Near  East  crisis? 

A.  Yes,  the  Near  East  did  figure  in  our  talks. 

Q.  Did  the  possibility  of  India  providing 
troops  for  any  supervisory  force  for  a  pullout  in 
Yiet-Nam  come  up  for  discussion? 

A.  No,  we  didn't  discuss  that  particular  ques- 
tion. We  did  talk  about  matters  involving 
Southeast  Asia  and  some  of  the  problems  that 
might  occur  after  peace  comes. 

Q.  What  were  these  problems  you  discussed? 

A.  What  were  these  problems  ?  Yes,  there  are 
several.  One,  of  course,  is  regional  cooperation. 
I  think  the  Prime  Minister  and  I  agree  that  it 
is  important  for  Asian  countries  to  cooperate 
in  economic  development,  industrial  progress, 
and  we  talked  about  that  and  how  important  we 
thouglit  that  would  be  not  only  now  but  partic- 
ularly after  the  ending  of  hostilities.  And  we 
also  talked  about  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
has  an  interest  m  providing  assistance  to  devel- 
oping countries  so  that  they  will  develop  stable 
governments. 

Q.  Did  the  discussions  include  any  military 
cooperation  at  any  time? 

A.  No,  we  did  not  discuss  that. 

Q.  Is  there  any  idea  of  revitalizing  the  ma-    j 


504 


DEPAKTKENT   OF   STATE   BITLLETIN 


chinery  set  up  in  1954  under  the  Gmi&va  agree- 
ment for  supervising  the  truce? 

A.  Well,  as  you  know,  President  Nixon  has 
suggested  that  an  international  body  be  estab- 
lished as  part  of  a  peace  settlement.  What  that 
body  would  consist  of  would  depend  on  the  ne- 
gotiations themselves  because  the  body  has  to  be 
of  a  character  and  composition  that  would  be 
satisfactory  to  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam. 
In  other  words,  they  must  have  confidence  that 
the  body,  whatever  its  composition  may  be,  will 
provide  an  honest  election  and  provide  that  the 
votes  will  be  counted  so  the  outcome  vsdll  express 
the  will  of  the  people. 

Q.  Did  the  question  of  supplying  arms  and 
military  equipment  to  Pakistan  iy  the  United 
States  come  up  during  the  discussions? 

A.  No,  it  didn't.  There  was  some  peripheral 
discussion  on  my  part  commenting  on  tlie  fact 
that  the  So\aet  Union  was  supplying  arms  to 
Pakistan,  but  that  was  about  the  extent  of  it. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  China  also? 

A.  Yes,  we  discussed  it  quite  a  bit. 

The  press :  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS,  LAHORE,  MAY  24 

Press  release  137  dated  May  24 

I  am  pleased  to  accept  the  invitation  of  the 
Government  of  Pakistan  to  stop  in  the  fifth 
largest  nation  of  the  world  for  a  visit  in  the 
course  of  my  present  trip. 

President  Nixon  and  I  thought  it  important 
for  me  to  get  to  know  the  leaders  of  the  major 
nations  with  which  we  share  concerns  and  in- 
terests as  soon  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so  after 
assuming  office.  This  day  in  Lahore  is  part  of 
this  process,  and  I  am  very  pleased  that  it  will 
be  possible  to  meet  with  President  Yahya  and 
other  Pakistani  leaders. 

There  is  no  fixed  agenda  for  our  discussions, 
but  we  have  much  to  talk  about  and  I  am  look- 
ing forward  to  exchanging  views  on  a  variety 
of  subjects.  Pakistan's  success  in  economic  de- 
velopment has  been  an  object  of  admiration  to 
us  and  much  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  We  have 
contributed  to  it  as  best  we  can,  and  I  hope  to 
have  the  opportmiity  of  discussing  Pakistan's 
plans  for  continued  economic  growth. 


There  will  also  be  time,  I  hope,  for  a  review 
of  a  variety  of  regional  and  international  prob- 
lems in  which  both  of  our  countries  have  a 
major  and  continuing  interest.  I  hope  that  we 
will  also  have  a  chance  to  strengthen  the  close 
and  cordial  relations  that  exist  between  the 
United  States  and  Pakistan  through  a  discus- 
sion of  bilateral  questions. 

Finally,  as  you  know,  I  have  very  recently 
come  from  Southeast  Asia,  where  we  and  our 
allies  are  working  hard  to  produce  a  peaceful 
settlement  based  on  the  unconditional  right  of 
the  people  of  Viet-Nam  to  make  their  own  deci- 
sions about  their  own  future  without  interfer- 
ence from  any  quarter. 

After  peace  is  achieved  it  is  our  firm  hope 
that  the  countries  of  Asia  themselves  wUl  in- 
creasingly contribute  toward  a  new  era  of 
security  and  progress  for  the  peoples  of  South- 
east Asia.  I  will,  of  course,  welcome  any 
thoughts  that  the  Government  of  Pakistan  may 
have  on  this  subject. 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS,  LAHORE,  MAY  25 

Press  release  138  dated  May  25 

My  visit  to  Pakistan,  although  all  too  short, 
has  been  very  fruitful  for  me  and,  I  believe, 
beneficial  to  the  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Pakistan. 

My  visit  has,  I  hope,  conveyed  to  your  leaders 
the  firm  interest  of  President  Nixon  in  Paki- 
stan's progress. 

I  had  a  chance  to  meet  with  President  Yahya 
and  to  discuss  with  him  in  a  frank  and  cordial 
manner  problems  of  mutual  interest  and  con- 
cern. I  was  able  to  convey  to  him  the  importance 
we  attach  to  good  relations  with  Pakistan.  We 
discussed  tlie  urgent  priority  which  my  Govern- 
ment places  on  an  early  end  to  hostilities  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  our  common  desire  for 
peace  in  the  area.  We  also  discussed  Pakistan's 
impressive  strides  in  its  economic  development 
program  and  the  importance  of  our  continuing 
economic  relationships. 

I  was  also  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  see  something  of  the  lovely  city  of  Lahore, 
whose  beauty  indeed  matches  its  reputation. 

And,  finally,  I  deeply  appreciated  the 
courtesies  extended  to  me  and  my  party  by 
President  Yahya  and  by  everyone  we  have  en- 
countered here. 


JUNE    16,    1969 


505 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS,  TEHRAN,  MAY  25 

Press  release  139  dated  May  25 

I  am  glad  to  have  the  occasion  to  visit  this 
important  region  of  the  world  so  early  in  the 
Nixon  administration — and  particularly  happy 
to  be  in  Iran. 

In  Washington  a  few  weeks  ago  I  had  the 
privilege  of  talking  with  His  Majesty  the  Shah. 
I  feel  fortunate  that  after  such  a  short  period 
of  time  there  is  another  opportunity  to  meet 
and  consult  with  His  Majesty  on  matters  of 
common  interest.  President  Nixon  greatly 
values  his  counsel,  and  all  Americans  admire 
the  progress  Iran  has  made  under  his  leader- 
ship. We  also  take  gi'eat  satisfaction  in  the  close 
and  friendly  ties  between  our  two  countries. 
Iran  is  an  old  country ;  but  its  people  have  put 
its  energies  and  skills  into  building  a  modern 
country,  and  the  results  are  impressive. 

Wliile  I  am  here  I  shall  be  attending  my  first 
session  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  CENTO. 
I  look  forward  to  exchanging  views  with  my 
CENTO  colleagues  on  matters  of  concern  to  all 
of  us.  The  United  States  has  been  proud  to  be 
associated  with  the  impressive  progress  made 
by  Turkey,  Iran,  and  Pakistan  during  recent 
years.  This  week's  meeting  wUl  permit  us  to 
carry  on  in  the  cooperative  tradition  that  has 
characterized  our  relations  over  the  years. 

We  all  have  a  common  interest  in  the  res- 
olution of  international  conflict  by  peaceful 
means.  As  you  know,  I  have  just  been  in  South- 
east Asia.^  In  that  area  we  are  trying  very  hard 
to  bring  an  end  to  hostilities  through  peaceful 
negotiations — there  is  no  reason  why  peace 
could  not  be  restored  quickly  in  Southeast  Asia 
if  the  other  side  would  just  agree  that  the  peo- 
ple of  South  Viet-Nam  have  the  unconditional 
right  to  make  their  own  decisions  about  their 
own  future  by  the  elective  process. 

The  United  States  also  is  deeply  involved  in 
a  diplomatic  effort  to  help  find  a  formula  for 
permanent  peace  in  the  Middle  East  which  is 
acceptable  to  both  sides. 

No  doubt  these  matters  will  come  up  in  the 
course  of  my  discussions  in  Tehran  in  the  next 
few  days. 

In  addition  to  these  discussions,  I  am  eager 


'  For  background,  see  BtrLLETiN  of  May  26,  1969,  p. 
433 ;  June  2,  1969,  p.  461 ;  and  June  9,  1969,  pp.  477 
and  483. 


to  see  something  of  Iran's  ancient  glories  and 
modern  achievements,  about  which  I  have  heard 
so  much. 

Let  me  close  by  extending  the  warm  regards 
and  high  esteem  of  President  Nixon  and  the 
American  people  for  Iran  and  the  people  of 
Iran. 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS,  TEHRAN,  MAY  28 

Press  release  142  dated  May  28 

My  colleagues  and  I  come  to  the  end  of  our 
Asian  trip  much  encouraged.  In  all  the  coun- 
tries visited  we  have  seen  people  vigorously 
working  at  the  job  of  modernizing  their  coun- 
tries. We  have  seen  and  talked  with  leaders 
seriously  addressing  difficult  tasks  but  confident 
in  the  strength  and  vitality  of  their  peoples. 

Our  visit  to  Iran  has  been  both  profitable  and 
pleasurable.  Under  the  able  chairmanship  of 
Foreign  Minister  Zahedi,  my  CENTO  col- 
leagues and  I  had  an  excellent  meeting.  Both 
at  the  CENTO  session  and  at  private  meetings 
we  have  engaged  in  friendly,  frank,  and  useful 
exchanges  of  views  on  a  broad  range  of  inter- 
national questions  of  concern  to  us.  We  noted 
with  satisfaction  the  continued  cooperative 
spirit  and  the  constructive  work  of  CENTO, 
which  continues  to  have  an  important  role  to 
play  in  promoting  stability  and  progress  in  the 
region.  I  am  pleased  that  the  United  States  will 
be  the  host  country  at  the  next  session  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  in  Washington  next  May. 

It  was  a  particular  pleasure  and  honor  for 
me  to  have  had  the  opportunity  to  meet  again 
with  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Shahanshah,  the 
leader  of  this  country  which  is  making  such 
dynamic  strides  forward. 

The  ties  between  our  two  coimtries  continue 
to  be  firm  and  durable,  and  our  conversation 
reflected  the  confidence  and  trust  of  that  close 
relationship.  We  are  especially  glad  that  His 
Majesty  and  the  Empress  have  been  able  to 
accept  President  and  Mrs.  Nixon's  invitation 
to  visit  Washington  officially  this  autumn. 

We  also  enjoyed  the  chance  to  see  some  of 
the  beauties  as  well  as  the  impressive  accom- 
plishments of  Iran.  I  want  to  express  my  sincere 
thanks  to  His  Majesty,  to  the  Iranian  Govern- 
ment, and  to  the  people  of  Iran  for  the  gracious 
hospitality  which  made  our  visit  here  such  a 
happy  one. 


506 


DEPARTMENT  OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


19th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Folloioing  is  the  opening  statement  made  iy 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  19th  plenary  session  of 
the  new  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
May  29. 

Press  release  143  dated  May  29 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Today  I  shall  discuss 
further  the  key  questions  raised  by  President 
Nixon's  proposals  for  peace,  by  President 
Thieu's  six  points,  and  by  your  side's  10-point 
program.  In  particular,  I  shall  examine  your 
side's  comments  and  criticisms  of  President 
Nixon's  proposals. 

Two  issues  in  particular  emerge  from  the  pro- 
posals which  both  sides  have  made  and  from  the 
comments  which  have  been  made  about  them  at 
the  past  three  sessions.  One  is  the  withdrawal 
of  all  externally  introduced  forces  from  South 
Viet-Nam.  The  other  is  the  internal  political 
settlement  in  South  Viet-Nam.  There  are  a  num- 
ber of  other  important  matters  as  well,  which 
either  largely  derive  from  these  two  particular 
questions  or  are  matters  such  as  the  release  of 
prisoners  which  are  greatly  affected  by  them. 

President  Nixon's  proposals  stand  on  two 
fundamental  principles.  The  first  principle  is 
that  a  settlement  will  require  the  withdrawal  of 
all  non- South  Vietnamese  forces  from  South 
Viet-Nam.  The  second  principle  is  that  a  settle- 
ment will  require  procedures  for  political  choice 
which  give  each  significant  group  in  South  Viet- 
Nam  a  real  opportunity  to  participate  in  the 
political  life  of  the  nation. 

To  implement  these  principles,  the  President, 
in  his  speech  of  May  14,'  reaffirmed  our  willing- 
ness to  withdraw  our  forces  on  a  specified  time- 
table. He  said  we  ask  only  that  North  Viet-Nam 
withdraw  its  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam,  Cam- 
bodia, and  Laos  into  North  Viet-Nam,  also  in 
accordance  with  a  timetable.  The  President's 
offer  provides  for  a  simultaneous  start  on  with- 
drawal by  both  sides;  for  agreement  on  a  mu- 
tually acceptable  timetable;  and  for  the  with- 
drawal to  be  accomplished  quickly. 

Your  side's  proposals,  on  the  other  hand,  call 
for  the  unconditional  withdrawal  of  all  United 


'  Bulletin  of  June  2, 1969,  p.  457. 


States  and  Allied  forces.  They  also  demand  that 
the  question  of  Vietnamese  armed  forces  in 
South  Viet-Nam  be  resolved  by  the  Vietnamese 
parties  themselves.  In  commenting  on  President 
Nixon's  proposals,  your  side  has  repeated  your 
position  without  any  clarification.  You  have 
simply  restated  your  old  arguments  that  the 
United  States  is  violating  the  Vietnamese  peo- 
ple's fundamental  national  rights  and  that  to 
respect  these  rights  the  United  States  must  with- 
draw its  forces  unconditionally  from  South 
Viet-Nam. 

Last  week  you  described  your  demand  for  the 
unconditional  withdrawal  of  American  and  Al- 
lied forces  from  South  Viet-Nam  as  "correct, 
reasonable,  and  logical."  We  believe,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  the  idea  that  North  Vietnamese 
armed  forces  and  subversive  personnel  should 
be  left  alone  in  South  Viet-Nam  to  dominate  the 
people  of  South  Viet-Nam — while  American 
and  Allied  troops  are  withdrawn — is  what  will 
appear  to  the  entire  world  as  "incorrect,  unrea- 
sonable, and  illogical."  This  position  denies  to 
the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  their  most  funda- 
mental national  right:  the  right  to  determine 
their  own  future  without  outside  interference. 

The  central  point  which  you  seek  to  obscure 
by  your  arguments  is  that  the  United  States  has 
clearly  stated  its  willingness  to  withdraw  its 
forces  on  a  specified  timetable.  If  there  is  to  be 
a  productive  negotiation  on  this  key  question 
of  withdrawals.  North  Viet-Nam  must  be  pre- 
pared to  withdraw  its  military  forces  and  sub- 
versive personnel  from  South  Viet-Nam,  Cam- 
bodia, and  Laos  back  to  North  Viet-Nam.  We 
are  flexible  as  to  how  this  is  achieved.  What  is 
important  is  that  North  Vietnamese  forces  cease 
to  be  in  South  Viet-Nam  and  in  Cambodia  and 
Laos  and  that  we  have  reliable  assurances  that 
they  will  not  return. 

You  have  also  said  that  President  Nixon's 
proposals  for  peace  reveal  our  intention  to  keep 
some  of  our  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam  indefi- 
nitely in  order  to  control  its  political  future. 
This  is  not  so. 

Let  me  restate  once  again  President  Nixon's 
concrete  proposals  on  the  withdrawal  of  all  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  so  that  they  may  be 
understood  by  all  concerned : 

— As  soon  as  agreement  can  be  reached,  all 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  begin  with- 
drawals from  South  Viet-Nam.  And  over  a  pe- 


JUNB   16,   1969 


5or 


riod  of  12  months,  by  agreed  stages,  the  major 
portions  of  all  United  States,  Allied,  and  other 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  be  with- 
drawn. At  the  end  of  this  12-raontli  period,  the 
remaining  United  States,  Allied,  and  other  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  would  move  into  desig- 
nated base  areas  and  would  not  engage  in  com- 
bat operations. 

— ^The  remaining  United  States  and  Allied 
forces  would  move  to  complete  their  withdraw- 
als as  the  remaining  North  Vietnamese  forces 
were  withdrawn  and  returned  to  North  Viet- 
Nam. 

— ^An  international  supervisory  body,  accept- 
able to  both  sides,  would  be  created  for  the  pur- 
pose of  verifying  withdrawals  and  for  any  other 
purposes  agreed  to  by  the  two  sides. 

These  proposals  are  perfectly  clear.  The  with- 
drawal of  remaining  United  States  and  Allied 
forces  is  directly  related  to  the  return  of  all 
remaining  Nortla  Vietnamese  forces  to  North 
Viet-Nam.  The  time  between  the  end  of  the  12- 
raonth  period  and  the  completion  of  withdraw- 
als can  be  agreed  to.  Our  position  only  calls  for 
the  remaining  non-South  Vietnamese  forces  of 
both  sides  to  complete  their  withdrawal  within 
the  same  time  period.  As  I  said  at  our  last  plen- 
ary meeting,  if  you  would  like  to  propose  a  time 
period  for  these  remaining  mutual  actions,  we 
are  ready  to  listen.  Further,  we  are  ready  to 
discuss  any  aspect  of  withdrawal  of  forces- 
provided  that  you  are  willing  to  enter  into  a 
meaningful  discussion  of  the  withdrawal  of 
North  Vietnamese  forces  as  well. 

Thus,  we  have  stated  clearly  our  willingness 
to  withdraw  from  South  Viet-Nam.  We  have 
heard  no  clear  statement  from  your  side  regard- 
ing the  withdrawal  of  North  Vietnamese  forces. 
We  have  stated  clearly  our  willingness  to  with- 
draw on  a  specified  timetable.  ^Vliere  is  your 
timetable? 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  second  main  issue,  that 
of  political  settlement.  We  think  that  a  just  and 
lastmg  settlement  will  require  procedures  for 
political  choice  that  give  each  significant  group 
in  South  Viet-Nam  a  real  opportunity  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  political  life  of  the  nation.  Thus, 
we  believe  there  should  be  an  opportunity  for 
full  participation  in  the  political  life  of  South 
Viet-Nam  by  all  political  elements  that  are  pre- 
pared to  do  so  without  the  use  of  force  or 
intimidation.  We  have  no  intention  of  imposing 


any  form  of  government  on  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam,  nor  will  we  be  a  party  to  such 
coercion. 

You  have  argued  that  the  President's  pro- 
posals on  withdrawal  of  all  non-South  Viet- 
namese forces  and  on  political  settlement  reveal 
a  determination  to  continue  a  so-called  neo- 
colonialist  policy  in  South  Viet-Nam.  You  have 
also  argued  that  our  side's  proposals  are  tanta- 
mount to  forcing  the  National  Liberation  Front 
to  lay  down  its  weapons  and  surrender  to  the 
Vietnamese  Government,  while  United  States 
and  Allied  troops  continue  to  be  present  in 
South  Viet-Nam  and  the  armed  forces  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  remain  intact.  You  say 
President  Nixon's  proposals  ignore  the  issues  of 
a  coalition  government  and  how  elections  would 
be  organized. 

Once  again,  your  arguments  appear  to  be 
sadly  misleading.  Let  me  state  our  side's  posi- 
tion quite  clearly.  It  is  this :  The  United  States 
will  accept  any  government  in  South  Viet-Nam 
which  results  from  the  free  choice  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  people  themselves.  Let  me  also  re- 
peat that  the  United  States  seeks  no  bases  in 
Viet-Nam.  We  insist  on  no  military  ties,  nor  do 
we  seek  any  permanent  military  establisliment 
in  Viet-Nara. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
recognizes,  as  we  do,  that  an  equitable  political 
settlement  would  require  a  process  which  would 
allow  the  South  Vietnamese  people  to  express 
their  free  choice.  It  would  also  require  guaran- 
tees that  this  process  would  be  fair. 

As  President  Nixon  said  on  May  14,  and  I 
quote :  ".  .  .  the  guarantees  should  have  the  con- 
fidence of  the  South  Vietnamese  people  and  .  . . 
they  should  be  broad  enough  and  strong  enough 
to  protect  the  interests  of  all  major  South  Viet- 
namese groups." 

Instead  of  raising  misleading  criticisms  of 
President  Nixon's  major  contribution  to  these 
negotiations,  why  do  you  not  respond  positively 
to  tlie  offer  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam,  made  now  over  2  months  ago,  to  dis- 
cuss a  political  solution  with  the  National  Lib- 
eration Fi-ont?  President  Thieu  has  set  forth  a 
six-point  program  as  a  basis  for  negotiations. 
He  has  ofi'ered  free  elections.  He  has  offered  to 
talk  without  preconditions. 

Your  side  agreed  that  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  should  participate  in  the 


508 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


Paris  meetings.  A  political  settlement  cannot 
be  arrived  at  without  the  full  participation  and 
agreement  of  the  legitimate,  duly  elected  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam.  To  try 
to  exclude  that  Government  only  delays  peace 
and  prolongs  the  war. 

The  political  settlement  is  an  internal  matter 
to  be  decided  among  the  South  Vietnamese 
tliemselves  and  not  imposed  by  others.  As  a 
practical  matter,  therefore,  meaningful  prog- 
ress in  political  settlement  can  only  be  made 
through  discussions  such  as  those  proposed  by 
President  Thieu.  However,  as  President  Nixon 
has  said,  if  our  presence  at  these  political  nego- 
tiations would  be  helpful  and,  if  the  South  Viet- 
namese concerned  were  to  agi'ee,  we  would  be 
willing  to  participate,  along  with  the  represent- 
atives of  Hanoi,  if  that  were  also  desired. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  have  limited  my 
statement  today  to  two  particular  issues  because 
I  think  we  should  focus  on  them  and  begin 
serious  discussion  of  them  without  further  de- 
lay. As  I  said  last  week,  a  basis  now  seems  to 
exist  for  productive  discussions  of  the  key  issues 
involved  in  a  settlement.  Let  us  begin. 


ornment — is  addressed  in  some  detail  in  the 
jjaper  I've  given  you. 

It  is  a  matter  of  special  regret  that  the  Peru- 
vian Government  has  decided  not  to  receive 
Governor  Rockefeller.  It  has  been  and  contmues 
to  be  our  conviction  that,  through  dialogue,  mu- 
tually acceptable  resolutions  of  the  issues  out- 
standing between  the  two  Governments  can  be 
foimd.  It  has  been  and  continues  to  be  our  be- 
lief— and  Governor  Rockefeller  shares  that  be- 
lief— that  his  visit  to  Lima  would  have  been 
an  excellent  opportunity  to  pursue  constructive 
conversations  on  the  problems  which  currently 
complicate  the  historically  friendly  relations  be- 
tween our  two  comitries. 

In  spite  of  actions  wliich  make  difficult  the 
search  for  practical  solutions  to  existing  prob- 
lems, the  U.S.  Government,  mindful  of  its  own 
laws  and  the  law  of  nations,  intends,  for  its  part, 
to  continue  that  search  in  good  faith  and  with 
good  will. 


INFORMATION  ON  THE  SUSPENSION 
OF  U.S.  MILITARY  SALES  TO  PERU 


Peru's  Actions  on  Rockefeller  Visit 
and  U.S.  Military  Missions  Regretted 

Following  is  a  statement  read  to  news  cor- 
respondents on  May  £4-  ^y  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch,  together  with  informa- 
tion made  available  to  the  press  that  day  on  the 
suspension  of  U.S.  military  sales  to  the  Peru- 
vian Government. 

DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 

The  Department  of  State  profoundly  regrets 
the  decision  of  the  Peruvian  Government  [on 
May  23]  confirming  that  it  would  not  receive  the 
visit  of  Governor  Rockefeller  and  that  it  would 
require  the  withdrawal  of  the  U.S.  military 
missions  in  Peru. 

The  reason  presented  by  the  Peruvian  Gov- 
ernment for  this  decision — that  is,  the  confir- 
mation by  Ambassador  [J.  Wesley]  Jones  in  his 
meeting  yesterday  [May  23]  with  Foreign  Min- 
ister Mercado  of  the  mandatory  suspension  of 
sales  of  military  equipment  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 


SUMMAEY 

— The  suspension  of  military  sales  is  automatically 
required  by  U.S.  law  when  any  country  benefiting 
from  such  sales  seizes  a  U.S.  fishing  vessel  engaged 
in  fishing  more  than  12  miles  from  the  coast  of  that 
country. 

— The  President  has  very  restricted  authority  to 
waive  the  application  of  this  law  on  national  security 
grounds. 

— The  pertinent  provisions  of  the  U.S.  law  have  been 
brought  repeatedly  and  officially  to  the  attention  of 
the  Peruvian  Government. 

— The  Peruvian  Government  was  officially  notified  in 
early  April  and  again  in  mid-April  through  the  Em- 
bassy in  Washington  that  military  sales  had  been  sus- 
pended in  compliance  with  the  law. 

— The  suspension  of  military  sales  does  not  violate 
the  1952  Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Agreement 
between  the  two  Governments. 

— The  suspension  of  military  sales  does  not  affect 
the  supplying  of  military  training  or  equipment  on  a 
grant  basis,  nor  does  it  affect  direct  commercial  sales 
of  equipment. 

— The  longstanding  effort  of  the  United  States  to 
seek  a  practical  solution  to  the  fisheries  problem  will 
continue. 

—The  suspension  of  military  sales  is  not  in  any  way 
connected  with  the  problems  arising  from  the  expro- 
priation of  the  IPC  [International  Petroleum  Co.] 
holdings  in  Peru. 

The  legal  r>rovision  which  is  involved  in  the  present 


JUNE    16,    1969 
862-018—69- 


509 


case  is  section  3(b)  of  the  Foreign  Military  Sales  Act, 
Public  Law  90-629,  approved  by  Congress  on  Octo- 
ber 22,  1968.  Section  3(b)  reads: 

(b)  No  defense  article  or  defense  serv- 
ice shall  be  sold  by  the  United  States 
Government  under  this  Act  to  any  country 
which,  after  the  date  of  enactment  of  this 
Act,  seizes  or  takes  into  custody  or  fines  an 
American  fishing  vessel  engaged  in  fishing 
more  than  twelve  miles  from  the  coast  of 
that  country.  The  President  may  waive  the 
provisions  of  this  subsection  when  he 
determines  it  to  be  important  to  the  security 
of  the  United  States,  and  promptly  so  re- 
ports to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Eep- 
resentatives  and  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  of  the  Senate. 

Following  the  seizure  by  a  unit  of  the  Peruvian  Navy 
of  the  U.S.  fishing  vessel  Mariner  on  February  14, 
1969,  at  a  point  more  than  12  miles  from  the  coast 
of  Peru,  the  suspension  of  sales  under  section  3(b) 
occurred  automatically  on  a  provisional  basis.  The 
application  of  the  law  is  mandatory  unless  waived  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States  on  national  security 
grounds.  Following  confirmation  of  the  facts  relative 
to  the  capture,  the  suspension  became  definitive.  The 
Embassy  of  Peru  in  Washington  was  officially  advised 
of  this  fact  on  April  3.  The  Ambassador  of  Peru  in 
Washington  was  informed  of  the  foreign  military  sales 
suspension  by  Charles  A.  Meyer,  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Affairs,  on  April  15.  Between  the 
February  14  incident  with  its  consequence  of  the  sus- 
pension of  military  sales  and  the  official  notification 
to  the  Peruvian  authorities,  two  U.S.  fishing  vessels 
had  been  seized  on  March  19.  On  May  16,  a  fourth 
vessel  was  seized. 

The  suspension  of  foreign  military  sales  to  Peru  is 
not  in  violation  of  the  1952  Mutual  Defense  Assistance 
Agreement  between  Peru  and  the  United  States.  There 
is  nothing  in  that  agreement  which  requires  the  sale 
of  defense  articles  or  services.  Moreover,  section  3(b) 
of  the  Foreign  MiUtary  Sales  Act  does  not  apply  to 
assistance  provided  under  the  agreement.  Assistance 
under  the  Military  Assistance  Program  being  carried 
out  under  the  agreement,  i.e.,  training  and  equipment 
supplied  on  a  grant  basis,  was  not  affected  by  the 
suspension  of  military  sales  nor  were  direct  commercial 
sales  by  suppliers  in  the  United  States.  There  was 
also  no  change  in  the  activities  of  the  personnel  of  the 
U.S.  military  missions  in  Peru,  who  were  prepared  to 
continue  carrying  out  functions  and  programs  under 
the  relevant  agreements  providing  for  the  establish- 
ment of  missions  and  under  the  Mutual  Defense 
Assistance  Agreement. 

The  basic  problem  arises  out  of  the  assertion  by 
Peru  and  certain  other  countries  of  jurisdiction  over 
waters  that  are  regarded  by  the  United  States  and 
most  other  countries  of  the  world  as  high  seas  open 
to  the  sailing  and  fishing  vessels  of  all  countries.  Peru 
claims  a  territorial  sea  of  200  miles  and  has  seized  34 
United  States  fishing  vessels  since  1953.  In  our  desire 


to  remove  this  source  of  friction,  we  have  persistently 
endeavored  over  several  years  to  promote  a  practical 
solution  which  would  be  mutually  acceptable  to  all 
countries  concerned  without  prejudice  to  the  legal 
position  of  any.  Specifically,  the  United  States  has 
proposed  and  will  continue  to  seek  a  conference  among 
the  nations  concerned  to  work  out  a  mutually  accept- 
able solution.  It  is  our  hope  that  all  parties  will  come 
to  realize  that  an  equitable,  mutually  acceptable  solu- 
tion can  be  reached  through  negotiation  and  not  by 
unilateral  actions. 

It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  suspension  of 
foreign  military  sales  is  in  no  way  related  to  the 
problems  arising  from  the  expropriation  of  the  Inter- 
national Petroleum  Company  holdings  in  Peru. 


U.S.  Makes  New  Contribution  to 
ICRC  for  Nigerian  Relief  Operations 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  May 
22  (press  release  130)  that  the  United  States  is 
making  an  additional  contribution  of  $6  mil- 
lion for  the  relief  operations  of  the  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  in  easing  the 
plight  of  victims  of  the  civil  conflict  in  Nigeria. 
Ambassador  C.  Clyde  Ferguson,  Jr.,  the  U.S. 
Special  Coordinator  on  Nigerian  Relief,  in- 
formed the  ICRC  of  the  added  relief  contribu- 
tion during  his  current  visit  to  Geneva. 

The  additional  funds,  which  will  help  finance 
ICRC  operations  from  June  through  August, 
bring  total  U.S.  Government  financial  assist- 
ance to  $12  million  for  the  March  through 
August  relief  operation  in  Nigeria. 

At  the  same  time.  Ambassador  Ferguson 
announced  a  si^ecial  additional  contribution  of 
$150,000  to  purchase  500  tons  of  stockfish  from 
Iceland  to  replenish  ICRC's  stocks  in  Nigeria. 
Stockfish  requirements  are  presently  under  re- 
view, and  further  contributions  for  this  pur- 
pose may  be  made  to  meet  the  contingency  needs 
arising  from  the  Nigerian  conflict. 

The  Office  of  the  Special  Coordinator  has  co- 
operated closely  with  the  ICRC  in  obtaining 
special  equipment  to  assist  in  the  relief  effort. 
Two  landing  sliips  medium  (LSM's)  will  soon 
arrive  in  West  Africa  and  will  initially  serve 
to  increase  the  coastal  carrying  capacity  of  the 
relief  services.  Eventually,  these  ships  will  be 
available  for  a  variety  of  operations  for  which 
existing  craft  are  not  suitable. 


510 


DEPARTMENT  OP  STATE  BtlLLETIN 


The  Future  of  the  Atlantic  Alliance 


hy  Robert  Ellsworth ' 


In  speaking  abont  the  future  I  will  need  to 
speak  about  the  past,  because  the  past  20  years 
of  the  Atlantic  alliance  have  set  a  foundation 
for  the  future — although  some  of  the  grand  vi- 
sions of  the  last  two  decades  have  not  been 
realized. 

For  example,  a  United  States  of  Europe,  the 
dynamic  postwar  vision  of  Jean  Monnet,  does 
not  seem  to  be  in  the  cards. 

An  Atlantic  union  now  would  have  little 
popular  support  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

The  third  grand  vision  of  the  past  20  years 
has  not  diminished;  but  its  peaceful  purpose 
still  depends  on  the  views  and  moves  of  the  men 
in  the  Kremlin.  That  purpose,  shared  by  all  of 
our  allies,  is  the  settlement  of  the  problems  of 
Europe  left  over  from  World  War  II :  the  Ber- 
lin problem,  the  German  problem,  and  the 
tragic  division  between  the  peoples  of  Eastern 
and  Western  Europe — the  division  to  which 
Churchill  drew  attention  with  his  Fulton 
speech:  "From  Stettin  in  the  Baltic  to  Trieste 
in  the  Adriatic,  an  iron  curtain  has  descended 
across  the  Continent." 

Overcoming  the  armed  division  of  Europe  in 
two  camps.  East  and  West,  continues  to  be  one 
of  the  main  tasks  of  the  Atlantic  alliance.  Such 
an  achievement  will  not  come  suddenly  from 
one  day  to  the  next  or  perhaps  even  from  one 
year  to  the  next.  It  will  likely  come  slowly  and 
as  part  of  an  intense  process  of  negotiation,  of 
consultation.  For  our  own  part,  the  President 
has  pledged  his  willingness  to  enter  an  era  of 
negotiation  and  has  urged  the  allies  to  consult 


'  Address  made  at  Westminster  College,  Fulton,  Mo., 
on  May  10  at  the  conclusion  of  dedication  ceremonies 
at  the  Winston  S.  Churchill  Memorial  and  Library.  Mr. 
Ellsworth  was  then  an  Assistant  to  the  President  and 
U.S.  Permanent  Representative-designate  to  the  North 
Atlantic  Council.  His  nomination  to  the  NATO  post 
was  confirmed  by  the  Senate  on  May  12,  and  he  was 
sworn  in  at  the  White  House  on  May  21. 


fully  and  deeply  with  each  other  on  the  impli- 
cations of  anything  that  might  affect  the 
pattern  of  East-West  relations. 

The  process  of  political  and  military  consul- 
tation, the  process  of  negotiation — process  is  a 
key  word  in  viewing  the  future  of  the  Atlantic 
alliance,  for  NATO  is  the  living  institutional 
embodiment  of  a  purposeful  process  of  response 
to  challenge  and  to  felt  need. 

The  other  key  word  in  our  future,  and  a  new 
word  in  the  alliance  lexicon,  is  ecology:  the  re- 
lationship between  man  and  his  total  environ- 
ment. At  the  20th  amiiversary  session  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Council — the  highest  council  of 
NATO — in  Washington  last  month,  the 
President  said :  ^ 

The  industrial  nations  share  no  challenge  more  ur- 
gent than  that  of  bringing  20th-century  man  and  his 
environment  to  terms  with  one  another — of  making 
the  world  fit  for  man  and  helping  man  to  learn  how  to 
remain  in  harmony  with  the  rapidly  changing  world. 

Let  us  look  at  the  future  of  the  Atlantic  alli- 
ance, then,  in  terms  of  process :  a  process  involv- 
ing defense,  the  search  for  relaxation  of 
East-West  tension,  and  the  search  for  ways  to 
control  our  environment. 

But  first  let  us  look  briefly  at  the  past. 

Just  20  years  ago,  in  May  1949,  Winston 
Churchill  spoke  of  the  need  for  a  North  Atlan- 
tic Treaty  Organization.  At  the  time  Churchill 
was  in  the  opposition,  just  as  he  was  when  he 
made  his  "Sinews  of  Peace"  speech  in  1946  here 
in  Fulton.  He  proclaimed : 

It  is  our  plain  duty  to  persevere  steadfastly,  Irre- 
spective of  party  feelings  or  national  diversities,  for 
only  in  this  way  have  we  good  chances  of  securing  that 
lasting  world  peace  ...  on  which  our  hearts  are  set. 

That  is  still  true  today. 

Some  2  years  earlier.  Congressman  Richard 
Nixon  was  assigned  to  the  special  Herter  com- 


•  Bulletin  of  Apr.  28, 1969,  p.  351. 


JUNE    16,    1969 


511 


mittee,  the  committee  -wliicli  laid  the  foundation 
for  enactment  of  the  historic  Marshall  Plan. 
Mr.  Nixon  has  regarded  his  work  on  that  com- 
mittee as  the  most  important  work  he  did 
during  his  years  in  Congress. 

Twenty  yeare  later  President  Nixon  made  it 
a  very  early  order  of  business  in  his  new  admin- 
istration to  visit  Europe.  His  first  stop  was  in 
Brussels,  where  he  spoke  to  the  North  Atlantic 
Council.^  There  the  President  restated  his  will- 
ingness to  enter  an  era  of  negotiation  with  the 
Soviets  and  East  Europeans,  and  he  pledged 
full,  deep,  and  genuine  consultation:  a  new 
sjjirit  and  process  of  cooperation  within  the 
alliance.  Some  of  our  allies  in  recent  years  have 
criticized  the  United  States  for  failing  to  con- 
sult as  fully  as  it  might  have.  The  President  has 
made  it  clear  that  there  will  be  no  further 
grounds  for  such  criticisms. 

The  President's  two  addresses  to  the  North 
Atlantic  Council — in  Brussels  in  February  and 
in  Washington  in  April — were  the  first  major 
policy  addresses  of  his  Presidency. 

He  reminded  the  alliance  in  Washington : 

Two  decades  ago,  the  men  who  founded  NATO  faced 
the  truth  of  their  times ;  as  a  result,  the  Western  World 
prospers  today  in  freedom.  We  must  follow  their  ex- 
ample by  once  again  facing  the  truth — not  of  earlier 
times  but  of  our  own  times. 

.  .  .  NATO  is  needed ;  and  the  American  commit- 
ment to  NATO  will  remain  in  force  and  it  will  remain 
strong.  We  in  America  continue  to  consider  Europe's 
security  to  be  our  own. 

As  I  see  it,  the  people  of  this  country  have 
three  clear  interests  in  the  Atlantic  alliance : 

1.  Twice  in  this  century  America  has  been 
drawn  into  European  wars.  We  are  entitled  to 
maintain  a  basic  interest  in  preventing  conflict 
in  Western  Europe,  remote  as  that  possibility  is 
today.  The  great  Churchill  himself  spoke  in 
1952  of  "the  thousand  years'  quarrel  which  has 
torn  Europe  to  pieces.  .  .  ." 

2.  The  pursuit  of  a  stable  peace,  not  only  with 
Moscow  but  also  with  the  nations  of  Eastern 
Europe.  Here  the  Atlantic  alliance  must  main- 
tain cohesion  and  unity  in  approaching  the  dif- 
ficult and  potentially  divisive  issues  affecting 
East -West  relations. 

3.  Development  of  closer  and  more  effective 
relationships  among  the  arts,  the  economies,  and 
the  teclmologies,  whose  interdependence  gives 
substance  to  our  emerging  common  civilization. 


'  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  remarks  to  the  Coun- 
cil on  Feb.  24,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  24,  1969,  p.  250. 


Pursuit  of  peace  depends  above  all  on  solid 
military  security  in  the  West,  and  our  prospect 
for  success  in  any  arms  limitation  or  force  re- 
duction negotiation  depends  directly  on  the 
adequacy  of  our  joint  security  arrangements  in 
the  Atlantic  alliance. 

Thus,  we  must  preserve  military  strength  and 
political  solidarity  to  deter  aggression;  and  if 
it  does  occur,  we  must  be  ready  to  join  in  the 
common  defense. 

To  be  realistic,  we  must  recognize  that  the 
alliance  today  has  problems  on  this  score.  The 
forces  of  the  allies  need  to  be  strengthened 
through  improvements  whicli  have  been  recog- 
nized as  necessary  and  which  the  allies  have 
agreed  to  undertake. 

Let  me  make  one  thing  clear :  So  long  as  the 
achievement  of  a  European  settlement  remains 
a  major  piece  of  the  unfinished  business  of  our 
troubled  world,  the  Atlantic  alliance  must  re- 
main strong.  As  President  Nixon  said  to  the 
NATO  Council  last  month :  "It  is  not  enough 
to  talk  of  flexible  response,  if  at  the  same  time 
we  reduce  our  flexibility  by  cutting  back  on 
conventional  forces." 

With  respect  to  the  political  processes  of  the 
alliance,  the  President  added : 

It  is  not  enough  to  talk  of  relaxing  tension,  unless 
we  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  20  years  of  tension  were 
not  caused  by  superficial  misunderstandings.  A  change 
of  mood  is  useful  only  if  it  reflects  some  change  of  mind 
about  political  purpose. 

It  is  not  enough  to  talk  of  European  security  in  the 
abstract.  We  must  know  the  elements  of  insecurity 
and  how  to  remove  them. 

The  President  has  proposed  a  fundamental 
change  for  the  Atlantic  alliance:  a  break- 
through to  a  new  and  deeper  form  of  political 
consultation  as  a  means  of  approaching  these 
issues.  Thus,  in  connection  with  the  forthcom- 
ing strategic  arms  limitations  talks  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  President  has  pledged  and 
asked  for  full,  deep,  and  genuine  and  continu- 
ing alliance  consultation,  for  such  talks  will 
clearly  involve  not  only  our  own  security  but 
also  that  of  our  allies. 

The  other  major  alliance  task  for  the  future 
is  the  development  of  a  framework  to  define 
community  interests  in  our  ecology,  our  total 
environment.  As  Admiral  Rickover  said  last 
Wednesday,  the  problem  of  making  wise  future 
use  of  technology  might  be  the  paramount  issue 
facing  the  people  of  all  industrial  democracies. 

At  the  1969  Washington  ministerial  session  of 


512 


DEPARTMENT  OP   STATE   BUU^TIN 


the    North    Atlantic    Council,    the    nations 
agreed :  * 

The  members  of  the  Alliance  are  conscious  that 
they  share  common  environmental  problems  which, 
unless  squarely  faced,  could  imperil  the  welfare  and 
progress  of  their  societies. 

There  is  much  conventional  wisdom  about 
the  problems  of  our  environment  and  of  our 
urban  societies.  Most  of  it  tells  us  how  difficult 
these  problems  are.  A  review  of  it  shows  how 
few  are  the  solutions  which  we  can  be  confident 
will  really  work  and  how  important  it  is  that 
we  find  some  way  of  exchanging  views  and 
ideas  in  an  organized  fashion  designed  to  bene- 
fit those  involved  in  formulating  broad  public 
policy  on  essentially  internal  problems. 

For  instance,  our  own  Defense  Department, 
uninhibited  by  local  regulations  or  traditions, 
has  made  significant  advances  in  the  design, 
construction,  and  administration  of  hospitals 
on  a  "systems"  basis.  Studies  might  be  made, 
similarly,  of  training  and  use  of  paramedical 
personnel,  helicopter  rescue  service  for  accident 
victims,  occupational  and  physical  therapy,  the 
movement  of  goods  and  people,  heliport  con- 
struction and  operation,  school  construction, 
language  teaching  and  other  education  prac- 
tices. This  would  stress  the  positive  spinoff  of 
defense  efforts  and  could  result  in  better  mecha- 
nisms for  transfer  of  the  findings. 

Other  broad  categories  and  headings  suggest 
themselves  for  possible  exploration  within  the 
entire  Atlantic  alliance: 

Environmental  matters:  urban  planning,  air 
and  water  pollution,  urban  and  interurban 
transportation,  conservation,  leisure,  the  har- 
nessing of  teclmology,  and  the  role  of  the 
private  sector  in  all  these  fields. 

Civil  and  social  affairs:  adapting  Western 
institutions  to  the  technological  age,  investigat- 
ing the  potential  role  of  the  private  sector ;  for 
example,  extension  by  European  governments 
of  tax  advantages  to  contributors  to  founda- 
tions and  other  organizations  seeking  to  im- 
prove the  quality  of  life. 

Educational  matters:  stimulating  nonmili- 
tary  research  and  technology  on  an  Atlantic 
basis;  promoting  equivalence  of  university  en- 
trance requirements  and  degrees  to  provide 
greater  international  academic  mobility;  up- 
dating and  coordinating  curricula  to  provide 


'  For  text  of  a  final  communique  issued  on  Apr.  11,  see 
BuiXBTTiN  of  Apr.  28, 1969,  p.  354. 


more  meaningful  conceptions  of  the  past,  pres- 
ent, and  future  for  future  citizens  of  an  inter- 
dependent world;  plurinational  Peace  Corps- 
Vista  type  projects;  and  modernization  of 
educational  theory  and  practice. 

A  20-year-old  international  alliance  is  in  some 
ways  like  a  middle-aged  university  professor: 
Both  tend  to  resist  major  changes  in  their  life 
styles.  There  has  been  a  certain  amount  of  re- 
sistance to  involving  NATO,  as  such,  in  en- 
vironmental problems.  But  support  for  this 
dimension  for  the  alliance  is  growing. 

By  focusing  the  attention  of  the  alliance  on 
these  problems,  we  do  not  of  course  mean  to  im- 
ply that  only  the  members  of  the  alliance  need 
to  confront  them.  We  would  expect  that  alliance 
efforts  would  be  closely  related  to  efforts  in 
other  international  bodies  with  different  mem- 
berships. But  we  are  convinced  that  the  Atlan- 
tic alliance,  being  composed  of  many  of  the 
most  advanced  industrial  countries,  can  play  a 
major  role. 

One  of  the  most  intriguing  and  effective  as- 
pects of  the  new  alliance  initiative  will  be  the 
bringing  together  of  the  most  responsible  and 
knowledgeable  officials  having  broad  responsi- 
bilities cutting  across  such  fields  as  education, 
urban  development,  technology,  and  pollution 
control.  We  hope  that  these  men  and  women  can 
cut  through  bureaucratic  undergrowth  and 
bring  about  workable,  pragmatic  solutions  to 
problems  of  our  teclinological  age.  Within  our 
own  Government,  for  example,  the  Depart- 
ments of  Labor  and  of  Housing  and  Urban 
Development,  as  well  as  Mr.  Pat  Moynihan,  As- 
sistant to  the  President  for  Urban  Affairs,  have 
all  expressed  interest  in  the  new  alliance 
initiative. 

The  new  shape  of  the  Atlantic  alliance  is  not 
yet  here.  The  strategic  arms  limitation  talks 
have  not  begun,  nor  have  negotiations  on  Euro- 
pean problems.  The  key  processes,  however,  are 
underway:  The  alliance  was  consulted  on  the 
President's  decision  to  change  the  Sentinel 
ABM  system  to  the  more  defensive  and 
appropriate  Safeguard  system,  and  there  is 
widespread  understanding  and  universal  ap- 
preciation within  the  alliance. 

The  intense  concern  over  environmental  chal- 
lenges has  not  had  time  to  take  concrete  form 
within  the  alliance,  notwithstanding  extensive 
conversations  and  discussions  at  Brussels  and  in 
national  capitals. 

But,  in  fact,  there  will  be  a  new  Atlantic 


JXINE    16,    1969 


513 


alliance.  The  future  will  bring  steadfast  per- 
severance— ^to  use  Cliurchill's  phrase — stead- 
fast perseverance  in  the  maintenance  of  our 
overall  defense  strength.  It  will  bring  a  deep- 
ening of  the  process  of  political  consultation. 
And  the  future  will  bring  better  understand- 
ing and  control  of  our  teclmology  and  our 
environment. 

For  of  course  our  age  is  an  age  of  very  great 
peril.  The  central  questions  we  face  in  the  fu- 
ture are  the  questions  of  man's  survival  in  the 
face  of  his  weapons  technology  and  the  effects 
of  his  industrial  technology  on  his  environ- 
ment. If  we  do  survive,  it  will  be  because  we 
have  learned  how  to  consult  each  other  with 
regard  to  our  political  problems,  rather  than 
hurl  weapons  at  each  other ;  and  because  we  will 
have  learned  to  control  our  industrial  technol- 
ogy— to  make  our  world  fit  for  man. 


U.S.,  European  Communities  Officials 
Hold  Trade  Talks  at  Washington 

Tlie  Department  of  State  and  the  OfBce  of 
the  Special  Kepresentative  for  Trade  Negotia- 
tions announced  on  May  22  that  officials  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Commission  of  the  Euro- 
pean Communities  held  informal  consultations 
on  trade  questions  of  mutual  interest  at  Wash- 
ington May  21-22. 

A  delegation  headed  by  Commissioner  Jean- 
Francois  Deniau  of  the  European  Communities 
held  talks  with  an  interagency  delegation  of 
high  U.S.  officials  principally  concerned  with 
foreign  trade.  Tlie  European  officials  also  met 
with  Agriculture  Secretary  Clifford  M.  Hardin, 
Commerce  Secretai-y  Maurice  Stans,  Acting 
Secretary  of  State  Elliot  Richardson,  and  the 
President's  Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Negotiations-designate  Carl  J.  Gilbert. 

This  visit  is  a  further  step  in  the  consultation 
process  begun  when  President  Nixon  met  with 
European  Commimities  Commission  President 
Jean  Rey  in  Brussels  in  February  and  continued 
when  Secretary  Stans  and  Mr.  Gilbert  visited 
Europe  in  April. 

The  two  delegations  exchanged  views  on  bar- 
riers to  world  trade  and  specifically  on  prob- 


lems directly  involving  the  United  States  and 
the  European  Commimities.  In  particular,  they 
agreed  to  examine  further  what  procedures  and 
methods  might  be  envisaged  in  the  field  of  non- 
tariff  barriers  to  trade  between  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Communities.  Trade  in  both 
agricultural  and  industrial  products  was  dis- 
cussed. Both  sides  underlined  the  importance  of 
and  expressed  support  for  the  work  going  on  in 
these  fields  imder  the  auspices  of  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  in  Geneva. 
Issues  related  to  border  tax  adjustments,  trade 
in  textile  products,  and  trade  relations  with  the 
developing  countries  were  also  explored. 

Commissioner  Deniau  was  accompanied  by 
the  following  Commission  officials:  Edmund 
Wellenstein,  Director  General  for  External 
Trade ;  Louis  Rabot,  Director  General  for  Agri- 
culture; Theodore  Vogelaar,  Director  General 
for  Internal  Markets  and  Harmonization  of 
Legislation;  Fernand  Braun,  Deputy  Director 
General  for  Industrial  Affairs;  Claude  Trabuc, 
Chef  de  Cabinet  of  Commissioner  Deniau ;  Paul 
Luyten,  Chief,  U.S.  and  GATT  Affairs  Divi- 
sion, Directorate  General  for  External  Trade; 
and  Eberhard  Rhein,  Assistant  to  Mr.  Luyten. 


TASS  Correspondent  Required 
To  Depart  United  States 

Department  Statement '^ 

At  11 :00  o'clock  this  morning  [May  23]  the 
Coimtry  Director  for  Soviet  Affairs,  Adolph 
Dubs,  informed  Soviet  Counselor  of  Embassy 
Yuly  M.  Vorontsov  that  Soviet  correspondent 
Viktor  Kopytin,  representing  TASS  News 
Agency  in  Wasliington,  is  required  to  depart 
from  the  United  States  in  48  hours. 

This  action  is  taken  in  direct  reciprocity  for 
the  expulsion  of  Anatole  Shub  of  the  Washing- 
ton Post  from  the  Soviet  Union.  We  deeply 
regret  being  forced  to  take  this  action  because 
of  the  unwillingness  of  the  Soviet  Government 
to  tolerate  the  free  exercise  of  journalism  in  the 
Soviet  Union. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch  on  May  23. 


514 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


THE  CONGRESS 


The  Foreign  Aid  Program  for  Fiscal  Year  1970: 
New  Directions  in  Foreign  Aid 

Message  From  President  Nixon  to  the  Congress''- 


To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States : 

Americans  have  for  many  years  debated  the 
issues  of  foreign  aid  largely  in  terms  of  our 
own  national  self-interest. 

Certainly  our  efforts  to  help  nations  feed 
millions  of  their  poor  help  avert  violence  and 
upheaval  that  would  be  dangerous  to  peace. 

Certainly  our  military  assistance  to  allies 
helps  maintain  a  world  in  which  we  ourselves 
are  more  secure. 

Certainly  our  economic  aid  to  developing  na- 
tions helps  develop  our  own  potential  markets 
overseas. 

And  certainly  our  technical  assistance  puts 
down  roots  of  respect  and  friendship  for  the 
United  States  in  the  court  of  world  opinion. 

These  are  all  sound,  practical  reasons  for  our 
foreign  aid  programs. 

But  they  do  not  do  justice  to  our  fimdamental 
character  and  purpose.  There  is  a  moral  quality 
in  this  nation  that  will  not  permit  us  to  close 
our  eyes  to  the  want  in  this  world,  or  to  remain 
indifferent  when  the  freedom  and  security  of 
others  are  in  danger. 

We  should  not  be  self-conscious  about  this. 
Our  record  of  generosity  and  concern  for  oui" 
fellow  men,  expressed  in  concrete  terms  un- 
paralleled in  the  world's  history,  has  helped 
make  the  American  experience  unique.  We  have 
shown  the  world  that  a  great  nation  must  also 
be  a  good  nation.  We  are  doing  what  is  right 
to  do. 


^Transmitted  on  May  28  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) ;  also  printed  aa  H.  Doe.  91-122,  91st  Cong., 
1st  sess. 


A  Fresh  Approach 

This  Administration  has  intensively  ex- 
amined our  programs  of  foreign  aid.  We  have 
measured  them  against  the  goals  of  our  policy 
and  the  goad  of  our  conscience.  Our  review  is 
continuing,  but  we  have  come  to  this  central 
conclusion : 

U.S.  assistance  is  essential  to  express  and 
achieve  our  national  goals  in  the  international 
community — a  world  order  of  peace  and  justice. 

But  no  single  government,  no  matter  how 
wealthy  or  well-intentioned,  can  by  itself  hope 
to  cope  with  the  challenge  of  raising  the  stand- 
ard of  living  of  two-thirds  of  the  world's  peo- 
ple. This  reality  must  not  cause  us  to  retreat 
into  helpless,  sullen  isolation.  On  the  contrary, 
this  reality  must  cause  us  to  redirect  our  efforts 
in  four  main  ways: 

We  must  enlist  the  energies  of  private  enter- 
prise, here  and  abroad,  in  the  cause  of  economic 
development.  We  must  do  so  by  stimulat- 
ing additional  investment  through  business- 
like channels,  rather  than  offeiing  ringing 
exhortations. 

We  must  emphasize  innovative  technical 
assistance,  to  ensure  that  our  dollars  for  all 
forms  of  aid  go  further,  and  to  plant  the  seeds 
that  will  enable  other  nations  to  grow  their 
own  capabilities  for  the  future. 

We  must  induce  other  advanced  nations  to 
join  in  hearing  their  fair  share — by  contribut- 
ing jointly  to  multilateral  banks  and  the  United 
Nations,  by  consultation  and  by  the  force  of 
our  example,  and  by  effective  coordination  of 
national  and  multilateral  programs  in  individ- 
ual countries. 


JUNE    16,    ia«9 


515 


We  must  build  on  recent  successes  in  further- 
ing food  froduction  and  family  planning. 

To  accomplish  these  goals,  this  Administra- 
tion's foreign  aid  proposals  will  be  submitted 
to  the  Congress  today.  In  essence,  these  are  the 
new  approaches: 

1.  Enlisting  Private  Enterprise 

I  propose  the  establishment  of  the  Overseas 
Private  Investment  Corporation. 

The  purpose  of  the  Corporation  is  to  provide 
businesslike  management  of  investment  incen- 
tives now  in  our  laws  so  as  to  contribute  to  the 
economic  and  social  progress  of  developing 
nations. 

The  majority  of  the  Board  of  Directors,  in- 
cluding its  President,  will  be  drawn  from  pri- 
vate life  and  have  business  experience. 

Venture  capital  seeks  profit,  not  adventure. 
To  guide  this  capital  to  higher-risk  areas,  the 
Federal  government  presently  offers  a  system 
of  insurance  and  guaranties.  Like  the  Federal 
Housing  Administration  in  the  housing  field 
here  at  home,  the  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corporation  will  be  able  to  place  the  credit 
of  the  United  States  Government  behind  the  in- 
surance and  guaranties  which  the  Corporation 
would  sell  to  U.S.  private  investors. 

The  Corporation  will  also  have  a  small  direct 
lending  program  for  private  developmental 
projects.  It  will  carry  out  investment  survey 
and  development  activities.  And  it  will  under- 
take for  A.I.D.  some  of  the  teclmical  assistance 
required  to  strengthen  private  enterprise 
abroad.  The  financial  performance  of  OPIC 
will  be  measurable:  It  is  expected  to  break 
even  or  to  show  a  small  profit. 

The  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion will  give  new  direction  to  U.S.  private  in- 
vestment abroad.  As  such,  it  will  provide  new 
focus  to  our  foreign  assistance  effort. 

Simultaneously,  I  propose  a  mandate  for  the 
Agency  for  International  Development  to  direct 
a  growing  part  of  its  capital,  technical  and 
advisoiy  assistance  to  improving  opportunities 
for  local  private  enterprise  in  developing  coun- 
tries— on  farms  as  well  as  in  commerce  and 
industry. 

We  do  not  insist  that  developing  countries 
imitate  the  American  system.  Each  nation  must 
fashion  its  own  institutions  to  its  own  needs. 
But  progress  has  been  greatest  where  gov- 
ernments have  encouraged  private  enterprise, 
released  bureaucratic  controls,  stimulated  com- 


petition and  allowed  maximum  opportunity  for 
individual  initiative.  A.I.D.'s  mandate  will  be 
directed  to  this  end. 

2.  Expanding  Technical  Assistance 

I  propose  a  strong  new  emphasis  on  technical 
assistance. 

Over  one-fifth  of  the  funds  requested  for  fis- 
cal year  1970  are  for  teclmical  assistance  activi- 
ties. Imaginative  use  of  these  funds  at  the  points 
where  change  is  beginning  can  have  a  gradual 
but  pervasive  impact  on  the  economic  growth  of 
developing  nations.  It  can  make  our  dollars  for 
all  forms  of  aid  go  further. 

Technical  assistance  takes  many  forms.  It  in- 
cludes the  adaptation  of  U.S.  technical  knowl- 
edge to  the  special  needs  of  poor  countries,  the 
training  of  their  people  in  modern  skills,  and 
the  strengthening  of  institutions  which  will 
have  lives  and  influence  of  their  own.  The  main 
emphases  of  teclmical  assistance  must  be  in  agri- 
culture, education  and  in  family  planning.  But 
needs  must  also  be  met  m  health,  public  admin- 
istration, community  action,  public  safety  and 
other  areas.  In  all  of  these  fields,  our  aim  must 
be  to  raise  the  quality  of  our  advisory,  training 
and  research  services. 

Teclmical  assistance  is  an  important  way  for 
private  U.S.  organizations  to  participate  in 
development.  U.S.  technical  assistance  person- 
nel serving  abroad  must  increasingly  come  from 
private  firms,  universities  and  colleges  and  non- 
profit service  groups.  We  will  seek  to  expand 
this  broad  use  of  the  best  of  our  American 
talent. 

A.I.D.  is  preparing  plans  to  reorganize  and 
revitalize  U.S.  technical  assistance  activities.  A 
new  Teclmical  Assistance  Bureau  headed  by  an 
Assistant  Administrator  will  be  created  within 
A.I.D.  to  focus  on  technical  assistance  needs  and 
ensure  effective  administration  of  these  activi- 
ties. The  bureau  will  devise  new  techniques, 
evaluate  effectiveness  of  programs,  and  seek  out 
the  best  qualified  people  in  our  imiversities  and 
otlier  private  groups. 

To  make  it  possible  to  carry  through  these 
plans  most  effectively,  I  am  requesting  a  two- 
year  funding  authorization  for  this  part  of  the 
A.I.D.  program. 

3.  Sharing  the  Assistance  Effort 

I  propose  that  we  channel  more  of  our  as- 
sistance in  ways  tlmt  encourage  other  advanced 


516 


DEPARTMENT  OP  STATE  BIILLETIN 


nations  to  fairly  share  the  burden  of  interna- 
tional development. 
Tliis  can  be  done  by : 

— ^Increasing  jointly  our  contributions  to  in- 
ternational development  banks. 

— Increasing  jointly  our  contributions  to  the 
United  Nations  technical  assistance  program. 

— Acting  in  concert  with  other  advanced  coun- 
tries to  share  the  cost  of  aid  to  individual  devel- 
oping countries. 

Most  development  assistance — from  other  ad- 
vanced nations  as  well  as  the  United  States — 
is  provided  directly  from  one  country  to  an- 
other. That  is  understandable.  Such  bilateral 
programs  provide  assistance  in  accordance  with 
each  country's  own  standards,  make  the  source 
more  visible  to  the  recipient's  people  and  can 
reflect  historical  political  ties. 

But  assistance  through  international  develop- 
ment banks  and  the  United  Nations  is  approach- 
ing a  fifth  of  total  world-wide  aid  for  develop- 
ment and  should  be  expanded.  Multilateral 
programs  cushion  political  frictions  between 
donors  and  recipients  and  bring  the  experience 
of  many  nations  to  bear  on  the  development 
problem.  Moreover,  they  explicitly  require 
shared  contributions  among  the  advanced  na- 
tions. This  calls  for  funds  in  addition  to  those 
which  I  am  proposing  today. 

I  appreciate  the  prompt  response  by  the  Con- 
gress to  my  earlier  proposal  authorizing  the 
United  States  to  join  with  othere  in  the  second 
replenislunent  of  the  International  Develop- 
ment Association.  I  urge  early  passage  of 
appropriations  for  this  contribution  so  that  we 
may  meet  our  pledge. 

I  reaffirm  my  request  for  appropriations  in 
Fiscal  1970  of  $20  million  for  the  ordinary  capi- 
tal of  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  and  $300 
million  for  our  scheduled  contribution  to  the 
Fund  for  Special  Operations  of  the  Inter- Amer- 
ican Development  Bank. 

In  separate  legislation  I  will  submit  a  new 
proposal  for  a  U.S.  contribution  of  $25  million 
to  the  Special  Fund  of  the  Asian  Development 
Bank  in  FY  1970. 1  am  convinced  that  a  fairly- 
shared  Special  Fund,  to  enable  the  Bank  to  pro- 
vide concessional  financing  for  priority  needs,  is 
a  necessary  supplement  to  the  Bank's  ordinary 
lending  facilities.  The  United  States  should  join 
with  other  donor  countries  in  establishing  this 
Special  Fund,  and  strengthen  the  Bank  so  that 


it  can  better  deal  with  Asia's  current  develop- 
ment problems  and  future  needs. 

The  United  States  will  consult  with  the  man- 
agement of  the  African  Development  Bank  and 
with  other  potential  donors,  to  identify  the  most 
appropriate  way  we  can  support  the  objectives 
of  African  development  and  assist  in  meeting 
the  needs  of  that  continent. 

Today's  proposed  legislation  includes  a  43 
per  cent  increase  in  the  U.S.  contribution  to 
multilateral  teclinical  assistance  through  the 
United  Nations  Development  Program.  Our 
contribution  wiU  be  on  the  same  sharing  basis 
as  in  the  past. 

4.  Furthering  Food  Production  and  Family 
Planning 

This  Administration,  while  moving  in  the  new 
directions  I  have  outlined,  will  apply  the  lessons 
of  experience  in  our  foreign  aid  programs. 

One  basic  lesson  is  the  critical  importance  of 
releasing  the  brakes  on  development  caused  by 
low  agricultural  productivity.  A  few  years  ago, 
mass  starvation  within  a  decade  seemed  clearly 
possible  in  many  poor  nations.  Today  they  stand 
at  least  on  the  threshold  of  a  dramatic  break- 
through in  food  production.  The  combination 
of  the  new  "miracle"  seeds  for  wheat  and  rice, 
aid-financed  fertilizer,  improved  cultivation 
practices,  and  constructive  agriculture  policies 
shows  what  is  possible.  They  also  demonstrate 
the  potential  for  success  when  foreign  aid,  for- 
eign private  investment  and  domestic  resources 
in  developing  countries  join  together  in  a  con- 
certed attack  on  poverty. 

The  experience  of  this  decade  has  also  shown 
that  lower  rates  of  population  growth  can  be 
critical  for  speeding  up  economic  development 
and  social  progress.  An  increasing  number  of 
countries  have  adopted  national  family  plan- 
ning programs  to  attack  the  problem.  At  least 
another  decade  of  sustained  hard  work  will  be 
needed  if  we  are  to  win  the  battle  between 
economic  development  and  population.  But  our 
assistance  to  voluntary  family  planning  pro- 
grams and  support  for  the  work  of  the  United 
Nations  and  other  international  organizations  in 
this  field  must  continue  to  have  high  priority,  as 
will  our  support  of  efforts  to  increase  food 
production. 

Another  important  lesson  is  that  our  aid  pro- 
grams need  better  means  of  continuous  manage- 
ment inspection.  AVe  are  creating  a  new  position 


JUNE    16,    1969 


517 


of  Auditor-General  in  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional  Development.  His  job  will  be  to  make 
sure  that  A.I.D.'s  funds  are  used  for  their  in- 
tended purpose  and  that  A.I.D.'s  operations  are 
managed  as  tightly  and  efficiently  as  possible. 
He  will  report  directly  to  the  A.I.D. 
Administrator. 

Legislative  and  Budget  Requests 

Tlie  proposed  legislation  revises  that  part  of 
the  present  Foreign  Assistance  Act  which  deals 
with  economic  aid,  to  reflect  the  priorities  of  this 
Administration.  The  proposals  are  designed  to 
accomplish  the  following : 

— Create  the  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corporation  and  authorize  its  programs  for  an 
initial  five  years. 

— Strengthen  A.I.D.'s  mandate  to  use  official 
aid  to  stimulate  private  initiative  in 
development. 

— Expand  the  role  of  teclinical  assistance 
under  consolidated  legislation  and  a  two-year 
authorization. 

The  proposed  budget  includes  new  appropria- 
tion of  $2,210  million  for  A.I.D.,  $138  million 
below  the  January  budget  request  of  the  pre- 
vious Administration.  In  addition,  the  budget 
includes  $75  million  to  augment  existing  reserves 
for  guaranties  to  be  issued  by  the  proposed 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation. 

The  appropriation  request  for  economic  as- 
sistance will  support  these  regional  programs: 

— ^For  Latin  America,  $605  million. 
— For  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia,  $625 
million. 

—For  Africa,  $186  million. 
—For  East  Asia,  $234  million. 
— And  for  Vietnam,  $440  million. 

In  order  to  protect  the  U.S.  balance  of  pay- 
ments at  the  same  time  we  are  providing  assist- 
ance abroad,  goods  and  services  will  be 
purchased  in  the  United  States  wherever  prac- 
ticable. Over  90  per  cent  of  all  A.I.D.  expend- 
itures and  virtually  all  purchases  of  goods  wiU 
be  made  in  the  United  States.  The  remaining 
funds  that  are  spent  abroad  are  mainly  for  liv- 
ing expenses  of  U.S.  personnel  and  for  other 
local  expenditures  in  support  of  technical  as- 
sistance programs. 

For  military  assistance,  the  proposed  budget 
includes  $375  million,  the  same  as  in  the  Jan- 


uary budget.  Maintenance  of  a  climate  of  inter- 
national security  still  calls  for  military  strength 
sufficient  to  deter  aggression.  Seventy-seven  per 
cent  of  the  total  amount  available  for  the  mili- 
tary assistance  program  will  be  allocated  to  four 
of  our  long-standing  allies — Korea,  the  Republic 
of  China,  Turkey  and  Greece.  The  balance  of 
the  request  will  be  used  to  provide  modest 
amounts  of  training  and  equipment  to  44  other 
countries  where  our  security  and  foreign  policy 
interests  are  partially  met  by  this  form  of 
assistance.  We  are  negotiating  a  renewal  of  our 
base  agreement  with  Spain.  If  these  negotia- 
tions succeed,  we  shall  then  need  to  request  an 
amendment  to  this  authorization  asking  for 
additional  funds  to  cover  our  year's  needs  for 
Spain. 

The  United  States  wiU  continue  to  provide 
military  assistance  from  the  U.S.  Armed  Serv- 
ices budget  to  Vietnam,  Laos  and  Thailand. 

I  am  also  asking  in  separate  legislation  for 
$275  million  for  credit  necessary  to  facilitate 
the  purchase  of  essential  military  equipment  by 
countries  now  able  to  buy  all  or  a  growing  part 
of  their  defense  requirements.  These  funds  will 
be  returned  to  the  United  States  during  the  next 
few  years  as  the  purchasing  countries  meet  their 
repayment  obligations. 

Planning  for  the  70s 

I  believe  these  proposals  for  fiscal  year  1970 
are  sound — and  necessary  to  make  clearly  de- 
sirable improvements  in  our  foreign  aid 
program. 

But  we  need  to  learn  more  about  the  role 
which  foreign  assistance  can  play  in  the  devel- 
opment process,  and  the  relationship  between 
development  and  overall  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

I  am  therefore  establishing  a  task  force  of 
private  citizens  to  make  a  comprehensive  review 
of  the  entire  range  of  U.S.  aid  activities,  to  con- 
sider proposals  of  the  United  Nations  bodies  and 
international  commissions,  and  to  help  me  de- 
termine what  our  national  policies  should  be 
toward  the  developing  countries  in  the  decade 
of  the  1970s.  I  will  look  to  the  task  force's  report 
in  developing  the  program  next  year,  in  my 
response  to  the  Javits  Amendment  to  the  For- 
eign Assistance  Act,  and  in  considering  the 
recommendations  of  the  internationally-spon- 
sored Pearson  Commission  report  to  be  pub- 
lished in  the  fall. 


518 


DEPAKTMENT   OF   STATE  BOTJiKTIX 


Toward  a  World  of    Order 

Foreign  aid  cannot  be  viewed  in  isolation. 
That  is  a  statement  with  a  double  meaning, 
each  side  of  which  is  true. 

If  we  turn  inward,  if  we  adopt  an  attitude  of 
letting  the  underdeveloped  nations  shift  for 
themselves,  we  would  soon  see  them  shift  away 
from  the  values  so  necessary  to  international 
stability.  Moreover,  we  would  lose  the  tradi- 
tional concern  for  humanity  which  is  so  vital  a 
part  of  the  American  spirit. 

In  another  sense,  foreign  aid  must  be  viewed 
as  an  integral  part  of  our  overall  effort  to 
achieve  a  world  order  of  peace  and  justice.  That 
order  combines  our  sense  of  responsibility  for 
helping  those  determined  to  defend  their  free- 
dom ;  our  sensible  understanding  of  the  mutual 
benefits  tliat  flow  from  cooperation  between  na- 
tions ;  and  our  sensitivity  to  the  desires  of  our 
fellow  men  to  improve  their  lot  in  the  world. 

In  this  time  of  stringent  budgetary  restraint, 
we  must  stimulate  private  investment  and  the 
cooperation  of  other  governments  to  share  with 
us  in  meeting  the  most  urgent  needs  of  those  just 
beginning  to  climb  the  economic  ladder.  And  we 
must  continue  to  minimize  the  immediate  im- 
pact on  our  balance  of  payments. 

This  request  for  foreign  economic  and  mili- 
tary assistance  is  the  lowest  proposed  since  the 
program  began.  But  it  is  about  900  million  dol- 
lars more  than  was  appropriated  last  year.  I 
consider  it  necessary  to  meet  essential  require- 
ments now,  and  to  maintain  a  base  for  future 
action. 

The  support  by  the  Congress  of  these  pro- 
grams will  help  enable  us  to  press  forward  in 
new  ways  toward  the  building  of  respect  for 
the  United  States,  security  for  our  people  and 
dignity  for  human  beings  in  every  comer  of 
the  globe. 


EiCHAKD  Nixon 


The  WnrTE  House, 
May  28, 1969. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

91st  Congress,  1st  Session 

Marine  Science  Affairs — A  Year  of  Broadened  Partici- 
pation. Third  report  of  the  President  to  the  Congress 
on  marine  resources  and  engineering  development. 
H.  Doc.  91-56.  January  1969.  277  pp. 

Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission for  1968.  S.  Doc.  91-2.  January  1969.  348  pp. 

Wintry  Days  in  Prague  and  Moscow — November  1968. 
Report  of  Senators  Albert  Gore  and  Claiborne  Pell 
to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  Jan- 
uary 1969.  7  pp.  [Committee  print.] 

Report  Relating  to  Trade  and  Other  Transactions  In- 
volving Southern  Rhodesia.  Communication  from 
the  President.  H.  Doc.  91-37.  January  8,  1969.  6  pp. 

United  States-Japan  Cooperative  Medical  Science  Pro- 
gram. Message  from  the  President  transmitting  the 
second  annual  report  of  the  Prog^ram.  H.  Doc.  91-48. 
January  16, 1969. 12  pp. 

Report  of  the  National  Science  Foundation.  Message 
from  the  President  transmitting  the  18th  annual 
report  of  the  Foundation,  covering  fiscal  year  1968. 
H.  Doc.  91-19.  January  16,  1969.  297  pp. 

Sixth  Annual  Report  on  the  Communications  Satellite 
Act  of  1962.  Message  from  the  President  transmit- 
ting the  report.  H.  Doc.  91-61.  January  23,  1969.  13 
pp. 

Sixth  Annual  Report  of  the  U.S.  Advisory  Commission 
on  International  Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs. 
H.  Doc.  91-66.  January  27, 1969.  36  pp. 

The  Use  of  U.S.-Owned  Excess  Foreign  Currencies. 
Letter  from  the  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  Advisory 
Commission  on  International  Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs  transmitting  a  special  report  pre- 
pared by  Prof.  Byron  W.  Brov?n  of  the  Economics 
Department,  Michigan  State  University.  H.  Doc.  91- 
67.  January  27, 1969.  23  pp. 

International  Labor  Organization's  Recommendations 
on  Minimum  Age  for  Employment  Underground  In 
Mines.  Letter  from  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Congressional  Relations,  transmitting  the  text 
of  ILO  Convention  123  and  Recommendation  124 
concerning  the  admission  to  employment  under- 
ground In  mines.  H.  Doc.  91-72.  February  17,  1969. 
9  pp. 

Report  of  the  Special  Study  Mission  to  East  and 
Southeast  Asia  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign 
Affairs.  H.  Rept.  91-30.  March  6,  1969.  29  pp. 

Increasing  Participation  of  the  United  States  in  the 
International  Development  Association.  Report, 
together  with  supplemental  views,  from  the  House 
Committee  on  Banking  and  Currency.  H.  Rept  91- 
31.  March  7, 1969. 15  pp. 

Aircraft  Piracy.  Preliminary  report  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce.  H. 
Rept.  91-33.  March  11, 1969.  28  pp. 


JUNE    16,    1969 


519 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Submits  Draft  Treaty  Banning  Emplacement 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the  Seabed 


The  United  States  submitted  a  draft  treaty 
prohibiting  the  emplacement  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons and  other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on 
the  seabed  and  ocean  floor  to  the  Conference 
of  the  Eighteen-N ation  Committee  on  Disarma- 
ment at  Geneva  on  May  22.  Following  is  a  state- 
ment m/ide  before  the  conference  that  day  by 
Adrian  S.  Fisher,  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
conference,  together  with  the  text  of  the  draft 
treaty. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.   FISHER 

The  idea  of  an  arms  control  agreement  for 
the  seabed  is  basically  responsive  to  a  techno- 
logical fact  of  life:  the  fact  that  the  environ- 
ment of  the  seabed  is  becoming  increasingly 
accessible  to  men.  At  the  same  time,  it  may 
be  said  that  if  we  succeed  in  arriving  at  an  arms 
control  agreement  for  the  seabed,  we  will  have 
added  one  more  important  element  in  the  larger 
picture  of  international  restraints  on  arma- 
ments which  has  been  taking  form. 

Viewed  as  one  more  step  in  that  all-important 
process,  a  seabed  agreement  apjDears  as  the 
logical  follow-on  to  the  treaties  on  Antarctica 
and  Outer  Space ;  and  indeed  it  would  be  anal- 
ogous in  many  ways  to  those  treaties.  It  would 
be  analogous  in  many  ways,  but  not  in  all  ways. 
For  the  seabed  is  a  imique  environment  with  its 
own  special  characteristics.  Foremost  among 
these,  for  our  purposes,  is  the  obvious  but  im- 
portant fact  that  the  seabed  is  contiguous  with 
the  sea  itself,  which  has  been  used  for  offensive 
and  defensive  military  action  almost  since  the 
beginning  of  history— hence  our  belief  that,  in 
the  circumstances  in  which  we  are  now  living, 
total  demilitarization  of  the  seabed  is  scarcely 
practical  or  attainable. 

We  have  studied  intensively  the  elements 
wliich  might  comprise  a  successful  arms  control 


agreement  for  the  seabed,  as  we  have  studied 
very  carefully  the  views  which  have  been  put 
forth  in  this  Committee.  We  believe  that  great 
progress  has  already  been  realized  in  apjDroach- 
ing  this  complex  subject  and  that  we  have  now 
reached  the  point  where  it  is  useful  and  appro- 
priate to  set  forth  our  views  in  the  form  of  a 
draft  treaty. 

From  the  statements  that  have  been  made 
here,  I  believe  we  can  agree  that  there  exists  a 
desire  on  the  part  of  all  the  members  of  this 
Committee  to  make  progress  rapidly  toward 
preventing  an  arms  race  on  the  seabed  and  to 
arrive,  if  possible,  at  an  agreement  on  this  sub- 
ject before  the  next  session  of  the  General 
Assembly. 

However,  there  have  been  several  suggestions 
as  to  how  this  goal  can  best  be  achieved.  Some 
delegations  have  proposed  complete  demilitari- 
zation of  the  seabed.  This  concept  is  embodied 
in  the  draft  treaty  submitted  by  the  Soviet 
Union  on  March  18  (ElSrDC/240).  Some  have 
suggested  a  catalogue  of  the  various  types  of 
installations  which  should  be  prohibited ;  others 
have  suggested  that  specific  exceptions  be  writ- 
ten to  permit  certain  defensive  installations. 

For  its  part,  the  United  States  has  attempted 
to  make  clear,  in  its  statements  of  March  25  ^ 
and  May  15,  its  belief  that  the  only  practical 
way  to  prevent  an  arms  race  on  the  seabed 
would  be  an  agreement  bamiing  the  emplace- 
ment or  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  and  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed. 
Such  an  agreement  would  remove  the  major 
threat  to  the  peaceful  use  of  the  seabed.  At  the 
same  time,  it  would  reduce  the  verification 
problem  to  manageable  proportions  and  would 
be  consistent  with  the  security  interests  of 
coastal  states. 

Accordingly,    on    the    instructions    of    the 


'■  Bulletin  of  Apr.  21, 1969,  p.  333. 


520 


DEPAETMEIfT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


United  States  Government,  we  are  submitting 
for  the  consideration  of  the  Committee  a  draft 
treaty  which  would  prohibit  the  emplacement 
or  fixing  of  nuclear  weapons  and  other  weapons 
of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed  and  ocean 
floor.  We  are  of  the  firm  conviction,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, that  by  adopting  this  approach  we  will 
accomplish  our  task  of  preventing  the  extension 
of  the  arms  race  to  the  seabed  in  the  simplest 
and  speediest  manner. 

I  should  now  like  to  discuss  briefly  the  in- 
dividual articles  of  our  draft  treaty. 

The  first  paragraph  of  article  I  prohibits  any 
party  from  emplanting  or  emplacing  fixed  nu- 
clear weapons  or  other  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion on,  within,  or  beneath  the  seabed  and  ocean 
floor  beyond  a  narrow  band,  as  defined  in  article 
II,  adjacent  to  the  coast  of  any  state.  The  pro- 
hibition would  also  apply  to  fixed  launching 
platforms  associated  with  nuclear  weapons  and 
other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  whether  or 
not  a  missile  or  a  warhead  containing  a  nuclear 
weapon  or  other  weapon  of  mass  destruction 
was  actually  in  place.  The  language  of  the  pro- 
hibition goes  to  the  heart  of  our  greatest  con- 
cern; namely,  that  the  seabed  might  be  used 
as  an  area  for  the  emplacement  of  weapons  of 
mass  destruction. 

Paragraph  2  of  article  I  obligates  each  party 
to  refrain  from  causing,  encouraging,  facilitat- 
ing, or  in  any  way  participating  in  the  activities 
prohibited  by  the  first  paragraph  of  article  I. 

Article  II  deals  with  the  limits  of  the  narrow 
band  mentioned  in  article  I  and  with  the  ques- 
tion of  territorial  sea  claims.  Paragraph  1  es- 
tablishes the  boundary  of  the  narrow  band. 

In  deciding  on  the  width  of  the  band,  we  have 
taken  into  consideration  two  views  expressed  by 
nearly  all  the  members  of  this  Committee.  The 
first  is  that  the  prohibition  should  extend  to 
the  maximum  practical  area  of  the  seabed.  The 
other  is  that  the  limits  establishing  the  area  in 
which  the  prohibition  would  apply  should  be 
separated  from  such  complex  issues  as  terri- 
torial sea  claims  and  national  jurisdiction,  a 
view  that  has  been  given  express  recognition 
by  paragraph  3  of  article  II. 

We  believe  that  setting  the  width  of  the  nar- 
row band  at  3  miles,  as  is  done  in  paragraph  1 
of  this  article,  responds  to  both  of  these  views. 
First  of  all,  compared  with  the  12-mile  width, 
it  would  add  roughly  2  million  square  miles  of 
seabed  to  the  area  of  prohibition.  This  is  an 
area,  moreover,  where  the  temptation  to  extend 
the  nuclear  arms  race  might  be  very  great  be- 


cause of  its  proximity  to  the  shore.  Secondly,  by 
placing  the  outer  limit  of  the  narrow  band  at 
3  miles  we  have  avoided  the  complex  questions 
associated  with  the  extent  of  national  jurisdic- 
tion. Moreover,  it  takes  care  of  the  concerns  ex- 
pressed by  several  delegations  over  the  status 
of  the  maritime  zone  that  would  exist  between  a 
12-mile  limit,  for  example,  and  the  outer  limits 
of  territorial  waters  that  were  less  than  12  miles. 
Under  our  draft  treaty,  no  such  zone  would 
exist,  since  the  3-mile  limit  represents,  I  believe, 
the  narrowest  claim  for  a  territorial  sea. 

Paragraph  2,  at  present  blank,  would  define 
the  baselmes  from  which  the  outer  limit  of  the 
3-mile  narrow  band  is  measured.  We  believe 
such  definitions  of  baselines  are  necessary  in 
view  of  existing  claims  to  certain  marginal  seas 
as  internal  waters.  In  order  to  establish  equita- 
ble boundaries  and  balanced  obligations  for  all 
parties  to  the  treaty,  agreement  will  need  to  be 
worked  out  on  how  such  marginal  seas  are  to  be 
treated.  In  this  connection,  it  might  be  desirable 
and  practical  to  draw  on  an  existing  interna- 
tional agreement  dealing  with  the  establish- 
ment of  baselines.  For  its  part,  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  accept  baselines  drawn  in 
a  manner  specified  in  the  1958  Geneva  Conven- 
tion on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  Contiguous  Zone 
if  agreement  can  be  reached  on  the  appropriate 
interpretations.^ 

Article  III  of  the  draft  treaty  deals  with 
verification.  As  is  well  known,  the  United  States 
has  consistently  supported  the  principle  of 
adequate  verification  for  all  arms  control 
agreements. 

The  question  arises  as  to  what  constitutes 
"adequate"  verification  of  this  particular  meas- 
ure in  the  light  of  our  present  and  developing 
capabilities.  This  is  not  an  easy  question  to 
answer,  particularly  in  view  of  the  immense 
technical  problems  associated  with  operating  in 
the  hostile  seabed  environment.  However,  if  we 
can  ensure  that  the  parties  to  the  treaty  remain 
free  to  observe  the  activities  of  other  states  on 
the  seabed  and  ocean  floor,  we  are  confident  that 
such  observation  will  provide  appropriate  veri- 
fication for  the  purposes  of  this  treaty.  One 
reason  for  this  is  our  feeling  that  if  a  party 
were  to  violate  this  treaty,  it  would  not  limit 
itself  to  the  installation  of  a  single  weapon.  If 
it  were  to  violate  the  treaty,  it  would  doubtless 
do  so  on  a  large  scale. 


•  For  text  of  the  convention,  see  Bulletin  of  June  30, 
1958,  p.  1111. 


JUNE    16,    1969 


521 


Paragraph  1  of  article  III  therefore  ensures 
the  right  of  observation  of  activities  on  the 
seabed  and  ocean  floor,  to  be  carried  on  in  a  way 
which  does  not  interfere  with  the  activities  of 
states  on  the  seabed  or  otherwise  infringe  on 
rights  recognized  under  international  law, 
including  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas. 

Paragraph  1  of  article  III  also  provides  that 
in  the  event  such  observation  does  not  in  any 
particular  case  suffice  to  eliminate  questions  re- 
garding fulfillment  of  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty,  the  parties  undertake  to  consult  and 
to  cooperate  in  endeavoring  to  resolve  the 
questions. 

I  am  aware  that  the  draft  treaty  placed  be- 
fore this  conference  by  the  delegation  of  the 
Soviet  Union  contains  the  flat  provisions  that 
all  installations  and  structures  on  the  seabed 
shall  be  open  for  verification,  a  provision  which 
is  qualified  only  by  the  requirement  of  recipro- 
city. This,  of  course,  is  modeled  on  the  provision 
in  the  Outer  Space  Treaty  for  verifying  that 
there  are  no  military  installations  on  the  moon 
or  other  celestial  bodies.  But  an  attempt  to 
transplant,  so  to  speak,  a  provision  applicable 
to  the  moon,  where  all  claims  of  national  juris- 
diction have  been  renounced,  to  the  seabed, 
where  there  are  existing  claims  of  national 
jurisdiction  and  a  growing  number  of  scientific 
and  commercial  uses,  raises  many  difficult 
political  and  legal  questions. 

In  addition,  there  would  be  an  immense  tech- 
nical problem  in  living  up  to  such  an  unqualified 
provision  in  the  hostile  environment  of  the  sea- 
bed. For  example,  the  entry  of  an  observer  into 
any  installation  on  the  seabed,  at  great  depth  or 
pressure,  is  both  difficult  and  dangerous.  Its 
solution  might  require  special  equipment  de- 
signed for  each  particular  type  of  installation. 
The  entry  into  even  one  installation,  in  addition 
to  being  hazardous,  could  take  lengthy  prepara- 
tion and  be  extremely  expensive.  In  order  to 
avoid  complicated  efforts  to  establish  any  such 
procedure  at  this  time,  the  United  States  pro- 
poses a  simple  and  straightforward  verifica- 
tion system  based  on  observation  and  consulta- 
tion to  resolve  any  questions  as  to  compliance 
with  the  treaty  which  the  observation  might 
have  raised. 

The  United  States  believes  such  a  system 
would  be  workable.  In  my  intervention  on  the 
15th  of  this  month  I  set  forth  the  reasons  why 
the  emplacing  or  fixing  on  the  ocean  floor  of 
an  installation  that  was  capable  of  serving  as 


part  of  an  effective  weapons  system  involving 
nuclear  weapons  or  other  weapons  of  mass  de- 
struction would  be  unlikely  to  escape  the  atten- 
tion of  other  maritime  powers.  If  they  suspected 
a  violation  of  the  treaty,  they  could  act  under 
the  observation  provision  of  article  III  in  the 
U.S.  draft. 

Let  us  consider  the  role  this  observation 
would  play  in  verifying  compliance  with  the 
treaty. 

If  the  installation  has  a  configuration  which 
could  contain  a  missile  for  delivery  of  a  nuclear 
weapon  and  apertures  or  hatches  from  which 
such  a  missile  could  be  launched,  this  would  be 
observable.  If  the  installation  had  the  com- 
munications facilities  for  a  sophisticated  com- 
mand and  control  system,  this  might  also  be 
observed.  And  if  the  installation  contained  an 
airlock  designed  to  permit  entry  of  personnel  or 
contained  large  detachable  parts,  which  could 
be  detached  for  maintenance,  this,  too,  could 
be  observed. 

All  the  questions  raised  by  these  observations 
would  have  to  be  resolved  by  the  consultation 
provided  for  in  article  III,  and  the  other  party 
would  be  committed  to  cooperate  to  resolve 
them.  I  assure  you  that  if  the  United  States 
were  to  request  consultations  under  this  article, 
it  would  not  propose  to  let  the  consultations 
drop  until  its  questions  were  satisfactorily 
resolved. 

This  procedure  for  verification  involving  ob- 
servation and  consultation  would  be  available 
to  all  parties  to  the  treaty. 

In  our  view,  international  consultation  would 
thus  play  an  important  role  in  the  treaty's  pro- 
vision for  verification,  without  the  need  for  a 
special  international  verification  organization, 
which  we  would  consider  as  both  premature  and 
wasteful  of  resources. 

The  United  States  believes  that  the  verifica- 
tion procedure  set  forth  in  article  III  of  this 
draft  is  consonant  with  our  present  and  devel- 
oping capability  to  verify  activities  on  the  sea- 
bed. It  is  also  appropriate  to  protect  against  the 
threat  that  we  have  reason  to  be  concerned  about 
both  now  and  in  the  immediate  future.  But  the 
draft  treaty  we  are  presenting  today  provides 
that  5  years  after  its  entry  into  force  a  review 
conference  will  be  held.  If  technological  and 
other  developments  warrant  revision  of  the 
verification  provisions  of  the  treaty,  they  can 
be  considered  at  that  time.  So  that  there  may  be 
no  doubt  as  to  our  intentions  in  this  regard, 


522 


DEPARTMENT   Or  STATE  BUULETXlf 


paragraph  2  of  article  III  expressly  provides 
that  the  review  conference  shall  consider 
•whether  any  additional  rights  or  procedures  of 
verification  should  bo  established. 

Article  IV  provides  for  amendments  to  the 
treaty  and  is  identical  in  language  to  article 
XV  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty. 

Article  V  provides  for  the  review  conference 
which  I  have  already  mentioned.  The  confer- 
ence would  meet  here  in  Geneva  5  years  after 
entry  into  force  of  the  treaty  and  review  the 
operation  of  the  treaty  with  a  view  to  assuring 
that  the  purposes  of  the  preamble  and  the  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  are  being  realized.  The 
provision  for  the  review  conference  has  been 
included  because  the  United  States  considers  the 
treaty  as  an  initial  undertaking  in  a  complex 
environment.  Accordingly,  the  United  States 
believes  that  all  parties  will  have  an  interest  in 
assuring  that  there  is  an  opportunity  to  con- 
sider the  effect  of  technological  or  other 
changes  on  the  operation  of  the  treaty.  Article 
V  also  provides  that  the  review  conference  shall 
determine,  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  a 
majority  of  the  parties  attending,  whether  and 
when  an  additional  review  conference  shall  be 
convened. 

The  withdrawal  provision  of  article  VI  is 
identical  to  that  found  in  paragraph  1,  article 
X  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.  This  type  of 
clause  found  its  origin  in  a  similar  provision  in 
the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty. 

This  completes  the  description  of  the  opera- 
tional clauses  of  the  treaty.  There  will,  of 
course,  have  to  be  some  routine  provisions  deal- 
ing with  entering  into  force,  accessions,  official 
languages,  et  cetera.  But  if  we  can  agree  on  the 
operational  clauses,  these  latter  provisions 
should  not  be  difficult  and  can  be  worked  out  at 
a  later  stage  of  the  negotiations,  once  progress 
has  been  made  toward  agreement  on  the 
substantive  treaty  articles. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  United  States  delegation 
has  repeatedly  expressed  its  hope  that  this  Com- 
mittee can  reach  satisfactory  agreement  which 
would  prevent  the  nuclear  arms  race  from 
spreading  to  the  seabed.  Likewise,  we  are  con- 
vinced that  such  an  agreement  must  be  reached 
quickly,  since  it  might  be  much  more  difficult, 
and  perhaps  not  possible,  to  reach  agreement 
once  deployments  have  started.  It  is  for  these 
reasons  that  the  draft  treaty  which  we  have 
submitted  today  does  not  attempt  to  solve  all 


the  problems  at  once.  Eather  it  is  designed  to 
be  a  realistic  and  important  first  step  toward 
more  comprehensive  disarmament.  That  is  why 
we  have  included  a  provision  that  would  sub- 
ject the  treaty  to  review  and  to  possible  amend- 
ment in  the  light  of  the  experience  gained  in  its 
operation  and  of  technological  developments 
which  could  bear  on  such  issues  as,  for  example, 
verification. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like 
to  add  that  I  believe  the  draft  treaty  we  have 
submitted  provides  a  sound  basis  for  negotiat- 
ing a  realistic  and  meaningful  agi-eement; — one 
which  will  add  a  significant  restraint  on  the 
nuclear  arms  race  and,  at  the  same  time,  help 
to  ensure  that  the  resources  of  the  seabed  are 
used  for  the  benefit  of  all  countries. 


TEXT  OF  U.S.  DRAFT  TREATY 

Dbaft  Treaty  Prohibitino  the  Emplacement  op 
NtTCLEAB  Weapons  and  Other  Weapons  of  Mass 
Destruction  on  the  Seabed  and  Ocean  Floor 

The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty, 

Eecognizing  the  common  interest  of  all  mankind  in 
the  progress  of  the  exploration  and  use  of  the  seabed 
and  ocean  floor  for  peaceful  purposes, 

Considering  that  the  prevention  of  a  nuclear  arms 
race  on  the  seabed  and  oeean  floor  serves  the  interests 
of  maintaining  world  peace,  reduces  international 
tensions,  and  strengthens  friendly  relations  among 
States, 

Convinced  that  this  Treaty  will  further  the  princi- 
ples and  purposes  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  principles  of  inter- 
national law  and  without  infringing  the  freedoms  of 
the  high  seas. 

Have  Agreed  as  Follows : 

Article  I 

1.  Each  State  Party  to  this  Treaty  undertakes  not 
to  emplant  or  emplace  fixed  nuclear  weapons  or  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  or  associated  fixed 
launching  platforms  on,  within  or  beneath  the  seabed 
and  ocean  floor  beyond  a  narrow  band,  as  defined  in 
Article  II  of  this  Treaty,  adjacent  to  the  coast  of 
any  State. 

2.  Each  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  undertakes  to 
refrain  from  causing,  encouraging,  facilitating  or  in 
any  way  participating  in  the  activities  prohibited  by 
this  Article. 

Article  II 

1.  For  purposes  of  this  Treaty,  the  outer  limit  of 
the  narrow  band  referred  to  in  Article  I  shall  be  meas- 
ured from  baselines  drawn  in  the  manner  specified  in 
paragraph  2,  hereof.  The  width  of  the  narrow  band 
shall  be  three  (3)  miles. 

2.  Blank  {Baselines). 


523 


3.  Nothing  in  this  Treaty  shall  be  interpreted  as 
prejudicing  the  ixjsition  of  any  State  Party  with  re- 
spect to  rights  or  claims  which  such  State  Party  may 
assert,  or  with  respect  to  recognition  or  non-recogni- 
tion of  rights  or  claims  asserted  by  any  other  state, 
relating  to  territorial  or  other  contiguous  seas  or  to 
the  seabed  and  ocean  floor. 

Abticle  III 

1.  In  order  to  promote  the  objectives  and  ensure  the 
observance  of  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  the  Parties 
to  the  Treaty  shall  remain  free  to  observe  activities  of 
other  States  on  the  seabed  and  ocean  floor,  without 
interfering  with  such  activities  or  otherwise  infringing 
rights  recognized  under  international  law  including 
the  freedoms  of  the  high  seas.  In  the  event  that  such 
observation  does  not  in  any  particular  case  sufl3ce  to 
eliminate  questions  regarding  fulfillment  of  the  pro- 
visions of  this  treaty,  parties  undertake  to  consult  and 
to  cooperate  in  endeavoring  to  resolve  the  questions. 

2.  At  the  review  conference  provided  for  in  Article 
V,  consideration  shall  be  given  to  whether  any  addi- 
tional rights  or  procedures  of  verification  should  be 
established  by  amendment  to  this  treaty. 

Abticle  IV 

Any  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  may  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Treaty.  Amendments  shall  enter  into 
force  for  each  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  accepting  the 
amendments  upon  their  acceptance  by  a  majority  of 
the  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  and  thereafter  for 
each  remaining  State  Party  on  the  date  of  acceptance 
by  it. 

Abtiolh  V 

Five  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  this  Treaty, 
a  conference  of  Parties  to  the  Treaty  shall  be  held  in 
Geneva,  Switzerland,  in  order  to  review  the  operation 
of  this  Treaty  with  a  view  to  assuring  that  the  pur- 
poses of  the  Preamble  and  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
are  being  realized.  Such  review  shall  take  into  account 
any  relevant  technological  developments.  The  review 
conference  shall  determine  in  accordance  with  the 
views  of  a  majority  of  those  Parties  attending  whether 
and  when  an  additional  review  conference  shall  be 
convened. 

Article  VI 

Each  Party  shall  in  exercising  its  national  sov- 
ereignty have  the  right  to  withdraw  from  this  Treaty 
if  it  decides  that  extraordinary  events,  related  to  the 
subject  matter  of  this  Treaty,  have  jeopardized  the 
supreme  interests  of  its  Country.  It  shall  give  notice 
of  such  withdrawal  to  all  other  Parties  to  the  Treaty 
and  to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  three 
months  in  advance.  Such  notice  shall  include  a  state- 
ment of  the  extraordinary  events  it  regards  as  having 
jeopardized  its  supreme  interests. 

Aeticles  VII  &  VIII 
Blank  (Administrative  Provisions) . 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Fisheries 

Protocol  to  the  International  convention  for  the  north- 
west Atlantic  fisheries  (TIAS  2089),  relating  to 
measures  of  control ; 

Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the  north- 
west Atlantic  fisheries  (TIAS  2089),  relating  to  en- 
try into  force  of  proposals  adopted  by  the 
Commission. 

Done  at  Waslilngton  November  29, 1965.' 
Ratification    deposited:   Federal    Republic   of   Ger- 
many, May  29, 1969.' 

Load  Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  1966.  Done  at 
London  April  5,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  21, 
1968.  TIAS  6331. 
Accession  deposited:  Cyprus,  May  5, 1969. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 
1968.' 

Ratification    deposited    at    Washington:    Hungary, 
May  27, 1969. 


BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  September  29 
and  October  6,  1966,  relating  to  the  establishment 
of  a  cooperative  meteorological  rocket  project  at 
Cold  Lake,  Alberta  (TIAS  6128).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Ottawa  February  13  and  April  24, 
1969.  Entered  into  force  April  24, 1969. 

Congo  (Kinshasa) 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreements  of  March  15,  1967  (TIAS 
6329),  and  August  12,  1968  (TIAS  6545).  Signed  at 
Kinshasa  May  14,  19(59.  Entered  into  force  May  14, 
1969. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  September  15,  1967  (TIAS 
6346).  Signed  at  Djakarta  April  23,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  April  23, 1969. 


'  Not  in  force. 

"  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 


52i 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX     Jxme  16,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1564. 


Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 519 

The  Foreign  Aid  Program  for  Fiscal  Year  1970 : 
New  Directions  in  Foreign  Aid  (message  from 
President  Nixon  to  the  Congress)     ....      515 

Disarmament.  U.S.  Submits  Draft  Treaty  Ban- 
ning Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the 
Seabed  (Fisher,  text  of  draft  treaty)    ...      520 

Economic  Affairs.  U.S.,  European  Communities 

OfBcials  Hold  Trade  Talks  at  Washington   .  514 

Europe.  U.S.,   European   Communities   Officials 

Hold  Trade  Talks  at  Washington 514 

Foreign  Aid 

The  Foreign  Aid  Program  for  Fiscal  Tear  1970 : 
New  Directions  in  Foreign  Aid  (message  from 
President  Nixon  to  the  Congress) 515 

Peru's  Actions  on  Rockefeller  Visit  and  U.S. 
Military  Missions  Regretted  (Department 
statement,  press  Information) 509 

India.    Secretary    Rogers    Visits    New    Delhi, 

Lahore,  and  Tehran   (remarks) 503 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 
CENTO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets  at  Tehran 

(Rogers,  text  of  communique) 501 

U.S.  Submits  Draft  Treaty  Banning  Emplace- 
ment of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the  Seabed 
(Fisher,  text  of  draft  treaty) 520 

Iran.     Secretary     Rogers     Visits     New     Delhi, 

Lahore,  and  Tehran   (remarks) 503 

Marine  Science.  U.S.  Submits  Draft  Treaty 
Banning  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on 
the  Seabed  (Fisher,  text  of  draft  treaty)    .     .      520 

Near  East.  CENTO  Council  of  Ministers  Meets 
at  Tehran  (Rogers,  text  of  communique)    .     .       501 

Nigeria.  U.S.  Makes  New  Contribution  to  ICRC 
for  Nigerian  Relief  Operations 510 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  The  Future 

of  the  Atlantic  Alliance  ( Ellsworth )    ....      511 

Pakistan.   Secretary  Rogers  Visits  New  Delhi, 

Lahore,  and  Tehran   (remarks) 503 

Peru.  Peru's  Actions  on  Rockefeller  Visit  and 
U.S.  Military  Missions  Regretted  (Depart- 
ment statement,  press  information)    ....      509 


Presidential  Documents.  The  Foreign  Aid  Pro- 
gram for  Fiscal  Year  1970 :  New  Directions  in 
Foreign  Aid 515 

Trade.    U.S.,    European    Communities    Officials 

Hold  Trade  Talks  at  Washington 514 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions    ....      524 

U.S.S.R.  TASS  Correspondent  Required  To  De- 
part United  States  (Department  statement)    .      514 

Viet-Nam.  19th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris   (Lodge) 507 

Name   Index 

Ellsworth,  Robert 511 

Fisher,  Adrian   S 520 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 507 

Nixon,  President 515 

Rogers,   Secretary 501,  503 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  May  26— June  1 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  May  26  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  130  of 
May  22,  135  of  May  23,  136  and  137  of  May  24, 
and  138  and  139  of  May  25. 

No.       Date  Subject 

140  5/26     Rogers:  CENTO  Council  of  Minis- 

ters. 

141  .5/28     CENTO  communique. 

142  5/28    Rogers :  departure  statement,  Teh- 

ran. 

143  5/29     Lodge :    19th    plenary    session    on 

Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 
tl44     5/29     Amendment     to     U.S.-France     air 
transport  agreement. 

fHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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JUL  09  1969 
DEPOSITORY 


THE 
'  DEPARTMENT 
OF 
STATE 

BULLETIN 


Yol.  LX,  No.  1565 


June  23, 1969 


AMERICA'S  ROLE  IN  THE  WORLD 

Address  ty  President  Nixon     525 

SECRETARY  ROGERS'  NEWS  CONFERENCE  OF  JUNE  5     529 

DEPAJRTMENT  SUPPORTS  EXTENSION  OF  EXPORT  CONTROL  ACT 

Statement  hy  Joseph  A.  Greenwald     545 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1565 
June  23,  1969 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
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The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
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ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
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and  treaties  of  general  international 
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Publications  of  tlie  Department, 
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America's  Role  in  the  World 


Address  iy  President  Nixon  ^ 


For  each  of  you  and  your  parents  and  your 
countrymen,  this  is  a  moment  of  quiet  pride. 
After  years  of  study  and  training,  you  have 
earned  the  right  to  be  saluted. 

But  you  are  beginning  your  careers  at  a  dif- 
ficult time  in  military  life. 

On  a  fighting  front,  you  are  asked  to  be  ready 
to  make  unlimited  sacrifice  in  a  Ihnited  war. 

On  the  home  front,  you  are  under  attack 
from  those  who  question  the  need  for  a  strong 
national  defense  and  indeed  see  a  danger  in  the 
power  of  the  defenders. 

You  are  entering  the  military  service  of  your 
country  wlien  the  Nation's  potential  adversaries 
abroad  have  never  been  stronger  and  when  your 
critics  at  home  have  never  been  more  numerous. 

It  is  open  season  on  the  Armed  Forces.  Mili- 
tary programs  are  ridiculed  as  needless  if  not 
deliberate  waste.  The  military  profession  is 
derided  in  some  of  the  so-called  best  circles  of 
America.  Patriotism  is  considered  by  some  to 
be  a  backward  fetish  of  the  uneducated  and 
unsophisticated.  Nationalism  is  hailed  and 
applauded  as  a  panacea  for  the  ills  of  every 
nation — except  the  United  States  of  America. 

This  paradox  of  military  power  is  a  symptom 
of  something  far  deeper  that  is  stirring  in  our 
body  politic.  It  goes  beyond  tlie  dissent  about 
the  war  in  Viet-Nam.  It  goes  behind  the  fear  of 
the  "military-industrial  complex." 

The  underlying  questions  are  really  these : 

What  is  America's  role  in  the  world?  What 
are  the  responsibilities  of  a  great  nation  toward 
protecting  freedom  beyond  its  shores?  Can  we 
ever  be  left  in  peace  if  we  do  not  actively  assume 
the  burden  of  keeping  the  peace  ? 

'  Made  at  commencement  exercises  at  the  Air  Force 
Academy,  Colorado  Springs,  Colo.,  on  June  4  (White 
House  press  release,  Colorado  Springs,  Colo.). 


When  great  questions  are  posed,  fundamental 
differences  of  opinion  come  into  focus.  It  serves 
no  purpose  to  gloss  over  these  differences  or  to 
try  to  pretend  that  they  are  mere  matters  of 
degree. 

Because  there  is  one  school  of  thought  that 
holds  that  the  road  to  imderstanding  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Communist  China  lies 
through  a  downgrading  of  our  own  alliances 
and  what  amounts  to  a  unilateral  reduction  of 
our  own  arms — in  order  to  demonstrate  our 
"good  faith." 

They  believe  that  we  can  be  conciliatory  and 
accommodating  only  if  we  do  not  have  the 
strength  to  be  otherwise.  They  believe  America 
will  be  able  to  deal  with  the  possibility  of  peace 
only  when  we  are  unable  to  cope  with  the  threat 
of  war. 

Those  who  think  that  way  have  grown  weary 
of  the  weight  of  free-world  leadership  that  fell 
upon  us  in  the  wake  of  World  War  II.  They 
argiie  that  we,  the  United  States,  are  as  much 
responsible  for  the  tensions  in  the  world  as  the 
adversaries  we  face. 

They  assert  that  the  United  States  is  block- 
ing the  road  to  peace  by  maintaining  its  mil- 
itary strength  at  home  and  its  defenses  abroad. 
If  we  would  only  reduce  our  forces,  they  con- 
tend, tensions  would  disappear  and  the  chances 
for  peace  would  brighten.  America's  powerful 
military  presence  on  the  world  scene,  they 
believe,  makes  peace  abroad  improbable  and 
peace  at  home  impossible. 

Now,  we  should  never  underestimate  the  ap- 
peal of  the  isolationist  school  of  thought.  Their 
slogans  are  simplistic  and  powerful:  "Charity 
begins  at  home.  Let's  first  solve  our  problems 
at  home  and  then  we  can  deal  with  the  problems 
of  the  world." 

This  simple  formula  touches  a  responsive 


JUNE    23,    1969 


525 


chord  with  many  an  overburdened  taxpayer.  It 
would  be  easy,  easy  for  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  buy  some  popularity  by  going 
along  with  the  new  isolationists.  But  I  submit 
to  you  that  it  would  be  disastrous  for  our  nation 
and  the  world. 

The  Direction  America  Must  Take 

I  hold  a  totally  different  view  of  the  world, 
and  I  come  to  a  different  conclusion  about  the 
direction  America  must  take. 

Imagine  for  a  moment,  if  you  will,  what 
would  happen  to  this  world  if  America  were  to 
become  a  dropout  in  assuming  the  responsibil- 
ity for  defending  peace  and  freedom  in  the 
world.  As  every  world  leader  knows  and  as  even 
the  most  outspoken  critics  of  America  would 
admit,  the  rest  of  the  world  would  live  in  terror. 

Because  if  America  were  to  turn  its  back  on 
the  world,  there  would  be  peace  that  would 
settle  over  this  planet,  but  it  would  be  the 
kind  of  peace  that  suffocated  freedom  in 
Czechoslovakia. 

The  danger  to  us  has  changed,  but  it  has  not 
vanished.  We  must  revitalize  our  alliances,  not 
abandon  them. 

We  must  iiile  out  unilateral  disarmament,  be- 
cause in  the  real  world  it  wouldn't  work.  If  we 
pursue  arms  control  as  an  end  in  itself,  we  will 
not  achieve  our  end.  The  adversaries  in  the 
world  are  not  in  conflict  because  they  are  armed. 
They  are  armed  because  they  are  in  conflict  and 
have  not  yet  learned  peaceful  ways  to  resolve 
their  conflicting  national  interests. 

The  aggi-essors  of  this  world  are  not  going  to 
give  the  United  States  a  period  of  grace  in 
wliich  to  put  our  domestic  house  in  order,  just 
as  the  crises  within  our  society  camiot  be  put  on 
a  back  burner  until  we  resolve  the  problem  of 
Viet-Nam. 

The  most  successful  solutions  that  we  can  pos- 
sibly imagine  for  our  domestic  programs  will  be 
meaningless  if  we  are  not  around  to  enjoy  them. 
Nor  can  we  conduct  a  siiccessful  peace  policy 
abroad  if  our  society  is  at  war  with  itself  at 
home. 

There  is  no  advancement  for  Americans  at 
home  in  a  retreat  from  the  problems  of  the 
world.  I  say  that  America  has  a  vital  national 
interest  in  world  stability,  and  no  other  nation 
can  uphold  that  interest  for  us. 

We  stand  at  a  crossroad  in  our  history.  We 
shall  reaffirm  our  destiny  for  greatness,  or  we 


shall  choose  instead  to  withdraw  into  ourselves. 
The  choice  will  affect  far  more  than  our  foreign 
policy;  it  wiU  determine  the  quality  of  our 
lives. 

A  nation  needs  many  qualities,  but  it  needs 
faith  and  confidence  above  all.  Skeptics  do  not 
build  societies;  the  idealists  are  the  builders. 
Only  societies  that  believe  in  themselves  can 
rise  to  their  challenges.  Let  us  not,  then,  pose  a 
false  choice  between  meeting  our  responsibil- 
ities abroad  and  meeting  the  needs  of  our  people 
at  home.  We  shall  meet  both  or  we  shall  meet 
neither. 

Resurgence  of  American  Idealism 

That  is  why  my  disagreement  with  the  skep- 
tics and  the  isolationists  is  fundamental.  They 
have  lost  the  vision  indispensable  to  great 
leadership.  They  observe  the  problems  that  con- 
front us,  they  measure  our  resources,  and  then 
they  despair.  When  the  first  vessels  set  out  from 
Europe  for  the  New  World,  these  men  would 
have  weighed  the  risks  and  they  would  have 
stayed  behind.  When  the  colonists  on  the  eastern 
seaboard  started  across  the  Appalachians  to 
the  unknown  reaches  of  the  Ohio  Valley,  these 
men  would  have  counted  the  cost  and  they 
would  have  stayed  behind. 

Our  current  exploration  of  space  makes  the 
point  vividly ;  here  is  testimony  to  man's  -vision 
and  to  man's  courage.  The  journey  of  the  astro- 
nauts is  more  than  a  technical  achievement ;  it  is 
a  reaching  out  of  the  human  spirit.  It  lifts  our 
sights;  it  demonstrates  that  magnificent  con- 
ceptions can  be  made  real. 

They  inspire  us,  and  at  the  same  time  they 
teach  us  true  humility.  What  could  bring  home 
to  us  more  the  limitations  of  the  human  scale 
than  the  hauntingly  beautiful  picture  of  our 
earth  seen  from  the  moon? 

Wlien  the  first  man  stands  on  the  moon  next 
month,  every  American  will  stand  taller  because 
of  what  he  has  done ;  and  we  should  be  proud  of 
this  magnificent  achievement. 

We  will  know  then  that  every  man  achieves 
his  own  greatness  by  i-eaching  out  beyond  him- 
self, and  so  it  is  with  nations.  When  a  nation 
believes  in  itself — as  Athenians  did  in  their 
Golden  xVge,  as  Italians  did  in  the  Renais- 
sance— that  nation  can  perform  miracles.  Only 
when  a  nation  means  something  to  itself  can 
it  mean  something  to  others. 

That  is  why  I  believe  a  resurgence  of  Ameri- 


526 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


can  idealism  can  bring  about  a  modem  mira- 
cle— and  that  modern  miracle  is  a  world  order 
of  peace  and  justice. 

I  know  that  every  member  of  this  graduaiting 
class  is,  in  that  sense,  an  idealist. 

However,  I  must  warn  you  that  in  the  years 
to  come  you  may  hear  your  commitment  to  the 
American  responsibility  in  the  world  derided 
as  a  form  of  militarism.  It  is  important  that 
you  recognize  that  strawman  issue  for  what  it 
is :  the  outward  sign  of  a  desire  by  some  to  turn 
America  inward  and  to  have  America  turn  away 
from  greatness.  I  am  not  speaking  about  those 
responsible  critics  who  reveal  waste  and  ineffi- 
ciency in  our  defense  establishment,  who  de- 
mand clear  answers  on  procurement  policies, 
who  want  to  make  sure  new  weapons  systems 
will  truly  add  to  our  defense.  On  the  contrary, 
you  should  be  in  the  vanguard  of  that  move- 
ment. Nor  do  I  speak  of  those  with  sharp  eyes 
and  sharp  pencils  who  are  examining  our  post- 
Viet-Nam  planning  with  other  pressing  na- 
tional priorities  in  mind.  I  count  myself  as  one 
of  those. 

Need  for  National   Security 

But  as  your  Commander  in  Chief,  I  want  to 
relay  to  you  as  future  officers  of  our  Armed 
Forces  some  of  my  thoughts  on  some  of  these 
great  issues  of  national  moment. 

I  worked  closely  with  President  Eisenliower 
for  8  years.  I  know  what  he  meant  when  he 
said:  ".  .  .  we  must  guard  against  the  acquisi- 
tion of  unwarranted  influence,  wliether  sought 
or  unsought,  by  the  military-industrial 
complex."  ^ 

Many  people  conveniently  forget  that  he  fol- 
lowed that  warning  with  another:  ".  .  .  we 
must  also  be  alert  to  the  equal  and  opposite 
danger  that  public  policy  could  itself  become 
the  captive  of  a  scientific-teclmological  elite." 

We  sometimes  forget  that  in  that  same  fare- 
well address,  President  Eisenhower  spoke  of  the 
need  for  national  security.  He  said:  "A  vital 
element  in  keeping  the  peace  is  our  Military 
Establisliment.  Our  arms  must  be  mighty,  ready 
for  instant  action,  so  that  no  potential  aggressor 
may  be  tempted  to  risk  his  own  destruction." 

I  say  to  you,  my  fellow  Americans,  let  us 
never  forget  those  wise  words  of  one  of  Amer- 
ica's greatest  leaders. 


'  For  President  Eisenhower's  address  to  the  Nation 
on  Jan.  17,  1961,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  6,  1961,  p.  179. 


The  American  defense  establishment  should 
never  be  a  sacred  cow,  but  on  the  other  hand, 
the  American  military  should  never  be  any- 
body's scapegoat. 

America's  wealth  is  enormous,  but  it  is  not 
limitless.  Every  dollar  available  in  the  Federal 
Government  has  been  taken  from  the  American 
people  in  taxes.  A  responsible  government  has 
a  duty  to  be  prudent  when  it  spends  the  people's 
money.  There  is  no  more  justification  for  wast- 
ing money  on  unnecessary  military  hardware 
than  there  is  for  wasting  it  on  unwarranted 
social  programs. 

"We  Most  Not  Confuse  Our  Priorities" 

There  can  be  no  question  that  we  should  not 
spend  unnecessarily  for  defense.  But  we  must 
also  not  confuse  our  priorities. 

The  question,  I  submit,  in  defense  spending 
is  a  very  simple  one :  "How  much  is  necessary?" 
The  President  of  the  United  States  is  the  man 
charged  with  making  that  judgment.  After  a 
complete  review  of  our  foreign  and  defense 
policies  I  have  submitted  requests  to  the  Con- 
gress for  military  appropriations— some  of 
these  are  admittedly  controversial.  These  re- 
quests represent  the  minimum  I  believe  essen- 
tial for  the  United  States  to  meet  its  current 
and  long-range  obligations  to  itself  and  to  the 
free  world.  I  have  asked  only  for  those  pro- 
grams and  those  expenditures  that  I  believe  are 
necessary  to  guarantee  the  security  of  this 
country  and  to  honor  our  obligations.  I  will 
bear  the  responsibility  for  those  judgments.  I  do 
not  consider  my  recommendations  infallible. 
But  if  I  have  made  a  mistake,  I  pray  that  it  is 
on  the  side  of  too  much  and  not  too  little.  If  we 
do  too  much,  it  will  cost  us  our  money.  If  we 
do  too  little,  it  may  cost  us  our  lives. 

Mistakes  in  military  policy  today  can  be  irre- 
trievable. Time  lost  in  this  age  of  science  can 
never  be  regained.  America  had  months  in  order 
to  prepare  and  to  catch  up  in  order  to  wage 
World  War  I.  We  had  months  and  even  years 
in  order  to  catch  up  so  we  could  play  a  role  in 
winning  World  War  II.  When  a  war  can  be  de- 
cided in  20  minutes,  the  nation  that  is  behind 
will  have  no  time  to  catch  up. 

I  say :  Let  America  never  fall  behind  in  main- 
taining the  defenses  necessary  for  the  strength 
of  this  nation. 

I  have  no  choice  in  my  decisions  but  to  come 
down  on  the  side  of  security,  because  history 


JUISTE    23,    1969 


527 


has  dealt  harshly  with  those  nations  who  have 
taken  the  other  course. 

So  in  that  spirit,  to  the  members  of  this  grad- 
uating class,  let  me  offer  this  credo  for  the 
defenders  of  our  nation : 

I  believe  that  we  must  balance  our  need  for 
survival  as  a  nation  with  our  need  for  survival 
as  a  people.  Americans,  soldiers  and  civilians, 
must  remember  that  defense  is  not  an  end  in 
itself — it  is  a  way  of  holding  fast  to  the  deepest 
values  known  to  civilized  man. 

I  believe  that  our  defense  establishment  will 
remain  the  servant  of  our  national  policy  of 
bringing  about  peace  in  the  world  and  that 
those  in  any  way  connected  with  the  military 
must  scrupulously  avoid  even  the  appearance  of 
becoming  the  masters  of  that  policy. 

I  believe  that  every  man  in  uniform  is  a 
citizen  first  and  a  serviceman  second  and  that 
we  must  resist  any  attempt  to  isolate  or  sepa- 
rate the  defenders  from  the  defended.  So  you 
can  see  that,  in  this  regard,  those  who  agitate 
for  the  removal  of  the  EOTC  from  college  cam- 
puses contribute  to  an  unwanted  militarism. 

I  believe  that  the  basis  for  decisions  on  de- 
fense spending  must  be  "Wliat  do  we  do,  what 
do  we  need  for  our  security?"  and  not  "Wliat 
will  this  mean  for  business  and  employment?" 
The  Defense  Department  must  never  be  consid- 
ered as  a  modern  WPA.  There  are  far  better 
ways  for  government  to  help  ensure  a  sound 
prosperity  and  high  employment. 

I  feel  that  moderation  has  a  moral  significance 
only  in  those  who  have  another  choice.  The  weak 
can  only  plead.  Magnanimity  and  restraint  gain 
moral  meaning  coming  from  the  strong. 

I  believe  that  defense  decisions  must  be  made 
on  the  hard  realities  of  the  offensive  capabilities 
of  our  potential  adversaries  and  not  on  the 
fervent  hopes  about  their  intentions.  With 
Thomas  Jefferson,  we  can  prefer  "the  flatteries 
of  hope"  to  the  gloom  of  despair,  but  we  cannot 
survive  in  the  real  world  if  we  plan  our  defense 
in  a  dream  world. 

I  believe  we  must  take  risks  for  peace — but 
calculated  risks,  not  foolish  risks.  We  shall  not 
trade  our  defenses  for  a  disarmmg  smile  or 
charming  words.  We  are  prepared  for  new  ini- 
tiatives in  the  control  of  arms  in  the  contest  of 


other  specific  moves  to  reduce  tensions  around 
the  world. 

I  believe  that  America  is  not  going  to  become 
a  garrison  state  or  a  welfare  state  or  a  police 
state — simply  because  the  American  people  will 
defend  our  values  from  those  forces,  external 
or  internal,  that  would  challenge  or  erode  them. 

And  I  believe  this  above  all :  that  this  nation 
shall  continue  to  be  a  source  of  world  leadership, 
a  source  of  freedom's  strength,  in  creating  a 
just  world  order  that  will  bring  an  end  to  war. 

Members  of  the  graduating  class  and  your  col- 
leagues in  the  Academy,  a  President  shares  a 
special  bond  with  the  men  and  women  in  the  Na- 
tion's Armed  Forces.  He  feels  that  bond  strongly 
at  moments  like  these,  facing  all  of  you  who 
have  pledged  your  lives,  your  fortunes,  and  j'our 
sacred  honor  to  the  service  of  your  country.  He 
feels  that  bond  most  strongly  when  he  presents 
the  Medal  of  Honor  to  an  8-year-old  boy  who 
will  never  see  his  father  again.  Because  of  that 
bond,  let  me  say  this  to  you : 

In  the  past  generation,  since  1941,  this  na- 
tion has  paid  for  14  years  of  peace  with  14  years 
of  war.  The  American  war  dead  of  this  genera- 
tion have  been  far  greater  than  all  of  the  preced- 
ing generations  of  American  history.  In  terms 
of  human  suffering,  this  has  been  the  costliest 
generation  in  the  two  centuries  of  our  history. 

Perhaps  this  is  why  my  generation  is  so  deter- 
mined to  pass  on  a  different  legacy.  We  want 
to  redeem  that  sacrifice.  We  want  to  be  remem- 
bered not  as  the  generation  that  suffered  in  war 
but  as  the  generation  that  was  tempered  in  its 
fire  for  a  great  purpose:  to  make  the  kind  of 
peace  that  the  next  generation  will  be  able  to 
keep. 

This  is  a  challenge  worthy  of  the  idealism 
which  I  know  motivates  every  man  who  will 
receive  his  diploma  today. 

I  am  proud  to  have  served  in  the  Armed 
Forces  of  this  nation  in  a  war  which  ended 
before  the  members  of  this  class  were  born. 

It  is  my  deepest  hope  and  my  belief  that 
each  of  you  will  be  able  to  look  back  on  your 
military  career  with  pride,  not  because  of  the 
wars  in  which  you  have  fought  but  because  of 
the  peace  and  freedom  which  your  service  will 
make  possible  for  America  and  the  world. 


528 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  June  5 


Press  release  14S  dated  June  5 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  am  glad  to  see  the 
room  is  not  as  crowded  as  it  was  the  last  time. 
I  have  a  short  statement  here  I  would  like  to 
read : 

I  want  to  express  my  serious  concern  about 
the  Americans  who  are  prisoners  of  war  in 
Southeast  Asia.  Many  of  these  prisoners  have 
been  held  for  3  years  or  more.  There  is  a  long 
tradition  among  nations  that  personnel  captured 
in  wartime  be  treated  humanely.  This  principle 
has  been  expressed  in  the  Geneva  convention  of 
1949  and  is  recognized  by  moi'e  than  120  nations. 

A  basic  requirement  of  the  convention  is  that 
names  of  prisoners  be  provided  to  their  families 
and  to  an  appropriate  agency  in  a  neutral 
country.  Communist  leaders  have  failed  to  ob- 
serve this  simple  civilized  requirement  which 
would  mean  so  much  to  the  wives  and  families  of 
the  men  who  are  missing  in  combat. 

North  Vietnamese  officials  have  frequently 
declared  that  the  prisoners  are  treated 
humanelj-.  Many  seriously  question  these  state- 
ments. Assurance  could  readily  be  provided  if 
North  Viet-Nam  would  permit  visits  by  impar- 
tial observers  to  the  prison  camps.  For  the  sake 
of  the  prisoners  and  for  their  families,  we  con- 
tinue to  hope  for  a  positive  response  from  North 
Viet-Nam.  We  are  prepared  to  discuss  this  sub- 
ject and  to  move  quickly  toward  arrangements 
for  the  release  of  prisoners  on  both  sides,  and  I 
believe  that  any  sign  of  good  faith  by  the  other 
side  in  this  matter  would  provide  encourage- 
ment for  our  negotiations  in  Paris. 

Thank  you.  I  will  take  some  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary.,  in  the  light  of  your  trip  to 
Viet-Nam.,  how  do  you  feel  about  the  readiness 
and  the  willingness  of  the  South  Vietnamese 
Government  to  take  over  more  of  the  war? 

A.  Well,  Mr.  Hightower  [John  Hightower, 
Associated  Press] ,  I  have  no  doubt  in  my  mind 
at  all  that  the  Government  of  South  Viet-Nam 
is  moving  in  the  direction  as  you  suggest.  I  think 
they  are  willing  to  take  over  more  of  the  respon- 


sibility. I  think  that  the  training  of  the  ARVN 
has  been  moving  along  at  a  rapid  pace.  They 
recognize  that  the  United  States  commitment 
is  not  open  ended,  and  they  are  not  being  pushed 
in  this  position.  They  came  to  this  conclusion 
on  their  own  and  I  think  are  perfectly  ready  to 
move  in  this  direction.  As  you  know,  President 
Thieu  had  a  conference,  press  conference,  while 
we  were  there  and  indicated  this,  and  I  believe 
he's  sincere  about  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary? 

A.  Hi,  Stewart  [Stewart  Hensley,  United 
Press  International] . 

Q.  Have  you  any  idea  with  regard  to  tim- 
ing— /  don^t  mean  specific  months  and  so 
forth — as  to  when  the  so-called  replacement 
program  can  begin  to  show  some  results  by  the 
removal  of  some  American  troops  from  that 
area? 

A.  Well,  I  haven't  any  timetable.  As  you 
know,  the  President  has  announced  three 
criteria  which  he  will  follow  in  making  that 
decision.  I  am  sure  that  he  plans  to  watch  the 
situation  carefully,  and  when  he's  prepared  to 
make  the  decision  he  will  announce  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  a  number  of  critics  on  the 
Hill  have  raised  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
administration  is  wedded  in  its  pursuit  of  a 
negotiated  peace  to  the  current  govermnent  in 
Saigon.  Could  you  help  us  understand  that 
problem? 

A.  Yes,  I'll  try  to.  We  are  not  wedded  to  any 
government  in  Saigon.  The  President  made  that 
clear  in  his  speech  on  May  14.^  The  only  prin- 
ciple to  which  the  administration  is  wedded  is 
that  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  should  have 
the  right  by  free  choice  to  decide  their  future ; 
so  that  any  government  which  represents  the 
will  of  the  people  in  South  Viet-Nam  is  ac- 
ceptable to  the  United  States. 


■  For  text,  see  Buxletin  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  457. 


JUNE    23,    1969 


529 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  Chile,  in  succession  to 
Peru  and  Venezuela,  has  noto  disinvited  Gov- 
ernor Rockefeller,  and  there  are  indications  that 
this  many  continue  in  other  countries  in  Latin 
America.  How  deep  is  this  feeling  in  Latin 
America,  and  what  is  wrong  with  our  current 
policy  down  there? 

A.  I  had  a  long  talk  with  Governor  Rocke- 
feller yesterday  about  his  trip.  Naturally,  all  of 
us  are  disappointed  that  these  demonstrations 
have  occurred  and  have  resulted  in  the  cancel- 
lation of  his  visits  to  some  of  these  countries.  Of 
course,  it  is  difficult,  I  think,  for  an  American 
at  this  distance  to  analyze  the  reasons  for  the 
demonstrations,  the  motivations  for  them.  Cer- 
tainly we  can  understand  them,  though,  because 
we  have  some  here  in  our  own  country. 

Governor  Rockefeller  does  not  feel,  and  I  do 
not  believe,  that  they  represent  any  deep-seated 
feeling  on  the  part  of  the  public  generally  in 
Latin  America  or  on  the  part  of  government 
officials. 

And  I  also  would  like  to  say  that  I  hope  that 
these  demonstrations  and  the  cancellations  will 
not  cause  the  American  public  to  form  any 
wrong  judgments  about  our  relationships  with 
Latin  America.  There  is  no  part  of  the  world 
that  is  more  important  to  us,  and  we  intend 
to  do  all  we  can  to  improve  our  relations.  Gov- 
ernor Rockefeller  feels  that  the  trip  has  been 
successful.  He  has  visited  10  countries  to  date. 
He  intends  to  continue  his  trips  and  will  make 
a  full  report  to  the  President  when  he  returns. 
And  I  would  hope  that  as  a  result  of  those 
reports  and  of  the  work  that  we  are  doing  that 
we  can  appreciably  improve  our  relations  with 
Latin  America. 

I  think  I  should  also  say,  obviously,  the 
demonstrations  show  some  discontent  with  our 
relationships  and  we  have  to  recognize  that  they 
need  to  be  improved.  And  I  think  that,  although 
it  is  unfortunate,  maybe  these  demonstrations 
will  help  us  in  the  realization  that  they  do  have 
some  dissatisfaction  with  our  alliances  and  that 
we  have  to  recognize  that,  take  them  into  ac- 
count and  attempt  to  improve  them. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  h/ive  been  a  spate  of 
reports,  recent  reports,  that  President  Nixon 
and  President  Thieu  will  issue  a  statement  at 
Midtoay  on  troop  withdrawals  and  the  figure  of 
50,000  has  heen  suggested.  Can  you  say  whether 
those  reports  are  true? 

A.  No,  I  wouldn't  want  to  say  anything  that 
would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  prediction  about 
what  will  come  out  of  the  Midway  meeting.  I 


think  that  President  Nixon  and  President  Thieu 
have  many  things  to  discuss  in  the  meeting.  The 
nature  of  the  communique  that  will  be  issued  I 
think  will  have  to  be  decided  at  Midway. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  order  to  give  the  people, 
all  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam,  a  fair  shake, 
the  NLF  ^National  Liberation  Front~\  appar- 
ently feel  that  they  have  to  he  part  of  the  gov- 
ernment  machinery  in  some  form.  Would  we  he 
prepared  to  encourage  them  to  play  a  substan- 
tial role  on  a  supervisory  commission  to  super- 
vise free  elections  in  the  South? 

Elections  in   South   Viet-Nam 

A.  Well,  I  think  we  have  to  be  prepared,  and 
I  tliink  the  President  indicated  in  his  speech 
that  we  are  prepared,  to  set  Tip  an  international 
supervisory  body  to  make  certain  that  the  elec- 
tions are  fair  and  free  elections.  What  that  body 
will  consist  of  should  be  decided  in  the  negotia- 
tions. I  think  that  we  have  to  recognize  that 
the  other  side  would  have  to  have  some  guar- 
antee that  there  would  be  no  coercion  and  that 
their  votes  could  be  cast  without  coercion  and 
counted  properly.  And  whether  that  would  be 
supervised  by  an  international  group  made  up 
of  outside  nations  or  whether  it  would  include 
the  NLF  or  not,  I  don't  know.  I  certainly  would 
not  be  opposed  to  that.  But  I  want  to  make  it 
clear  that  that  is  not  a  coalition  government. 

Q.  Well,  Mr.  Secretary,  could  I  just  follow 
that  up  for  a  minute :  Do  you  regard  the  idea 
of  a  mixed  commission  possibly  as  a  means  of 
bridging  the  gap  between  Saigon's  insistence 
that  tliere  he  no  coalition  govei'nment  and  the 
NLF''s  demands  for  some  kind  of  participation? 

A.  Well,  as  we  have  said  on  several  occasions, 
we  think  this  question  should  be  answered  by 
the  South  Vietnamese.  I  don't  want  to  say  any- 
thing here  that  differs  from  that  position.  But 
I  would  think  that  as  long  as  it  is  clearly  under- 
stood that  we  are  not  talking  about  a  change  of 
the  government  and  we  are  talking  merely  about 
some  supervisory  commission  that  would  guar- 
antee the  fairness  of  the  election,  that  would  be 
a  possibility. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  that  connection,  are  you 
talking  about  a  special  election,  or  are  you  talk- 
ing about  elections  as  provided  for  in  the  Viet- 
namese Constitution  that  come  next  year? 

A.  I  am  not  talking  about  either.  I  am  talk- 
ing about  the  speech  that  the  President  made  on 


530 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


May  14,  where  he  said  the  future  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  should  be  decided  by  elections  and  that 
the  particular  kind  of  elections,  their  timing, 
and  what  they  would  consist  of  should  be  deter- 
mined by  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam.  And 
that  should  be  done  by  negotiations.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  very,  I  thought,  constructive  pro- 
posal of  President  Thieu  that  he  negotiate 
directly  with  the  NLF  has  so  far  received  no 
response.  If  the  NLF  would  sit  down  with  the 
Government  of  South  Viet-Nam,  which  is  some- 
thing they  previously  said  they  wanted  to  do, 
they  could  negotiate  these  matters.  It  is  not  too 
difficult  to  provide  a  method  of  giving  the  peo- 
ple of  a  country  of  that  size  the  right  to  select 
their  own  leadership  and  their  own  form  of 
government  if  the  other  side  is  willing  to  do  it. 
So  far  the  other  side  is  talking  about  imposing 
a  government  on  the  South.  And  we  suspect 
that  what  they  are  interested  in  is  to  attack  the 
present  government,  cause  confusion  and  chaos, 
and  thereby  impose  a  governmental  structure 
on  South  Viet-Nam  that  will  not  represent  the 
will  of  the  people.  Now,  that  the  President  has 
made  clear  he  will  not  accept. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  awhile  ago  you  told  tlie 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  that  the 
missile  limitations  talks  could  begin  in  either 
late  spring  or  early  shimmer.  Well,  late  spring 
and  early  swmmer  is  here.  What  is  holding  them 
up? 

A.  Well,  late  spring  is  here;  early  summer 
isn't — I  will  answer  your  question. 

I  have  read  the  reports  to  the  effect  that  there 
is  slippage  in  these  talks  and  there  is  a  lot  of 
backstage  play,  and  so  forth.  This  is  not  the 
case.  We  plan  in  the  administration  to  have  a 
review  of  the  matter  in  the  Security  Council  in 
about — I  think  it  is  10  days  or  so.  Now,  there 
has  been  a  slight  delay  in  that  because  of  the 
Midway  trip,  but  this  will  not  result  in  any 
appreciable  delay. 

We  expect  after  that  meeting  to  consult  with 
our  allies  in  NATO,  and  at  that  same  time  I 
will  talk  to  the  Soviet  Union's  representatives 
about  a  date  and  a  place.  And  I  would  think 
that  my  prediction  about  early  summer  would 
not  be  too  far  off. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  has  been  a  series  of 
talks  hettoeen  yourself  and  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter of  Japan  on  the  future  status  of  Ohinawa. 
Could  you  gi/ve  us  your  assessment  of  these  talks 
and  if  any  progress  has  been  made  and  say  what 
it  is? 


Progress  of  Talks  With  Japan 

A.  I  might  say  in  that  connection  we  have 
had  a  very  pleasant  series  of  talks.  I  have  talked 
to  him  three  times  now  at  length.  And  he  made 
what  I  thought  was  an  interesting  observation. 
He  said  when  he  talked  to  President  Nixon, 
the  President  told  him  that  hard  negotiations 
made  good  friends.  And  he  said :  "Mr.  Rogers, 
I  think  you  and  I  are  going  to  become  vei'y  good 
friends." 

We  have  had,  I  think,  useful  talks.  Our  rela- 
tionship with  Japan  is  of  special  importance. 
It  is  now  the  third  largest  nation  in  the  world 
in  terms  of  gross  national  product.  We  value 
the  relationship  very  much.  The  fact  is  that  our 
interests  are  common.  The  interest  of  Japan  in 
the  Far  East  is  to  assume  a  greater  burden  of 
economic  aid  and  to  provide  additional  security 
for  that  region.  Our  objective  is  complemen- 
tary. We  would  like  to  reduce  our  presence  in 
that  area,  to  some  extent  lessen  our  foreign  aid, 
consistent  with  our  security  obligations  under 
treaties. 

So  I  would  not  think  that  we  would — al- 
though the  negotiations  will  be  lengthy,  I  am 
sure  they  will  proceed  for  several  months — I 
would  not  think  that  we  would  be  unable  to 
reach  an  agreement  that  would  be  acceptable 
to  both  Japan  and  the  United  States,  and  I 
certainly  hope  so. 

Q.  I  have  a  group  of  questions.  Tou  men- 
tioned in  your  visit  to  Pakistan  that  there  is 
some  thought  of  resumption  of  military  supplies 
that  is  under  review. 

And  the  second  question  is:  What  is  the  status 
of  President  Eisenhower'' s  categorical  undertak- 
ing that  any  arms  that  you  give  Pakistan  will 
not  be  used  against  India? 

A.  I  didn't  hear  the  first  part  of  the  question, 
I'm  sorry. 

Q.  The  first  part  is  that  you  mentioned  India 
and  Pakistan,  that  the  question  of  resumiption 
of  military  supplies  is  under  review. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  What  does  it  Tnean?  Are  we  leaving  the 
option  to  resume  the  supplies,  or  what  have  you 
in  m,ind? 

A.  No,  we  are  reviewing  our  position  in  re- 
gard to  sales  of  military  equipment.  No  conclu- 
sion has  been  reached  as  a  result  of  that  review 
yet.  Pakistan  is  interested,  and  particularly  in 
replacement  parts  for  machines  which  they  have 


JTJNTE    23,    1969 


531 


purchased  from  us  previously,  and  also,  of 
course,  would  be  interested  in  additional  arms 
purchases.  No  decision  has  been  made  on  that 
matter  yet. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  the  NLF  participate 
in  the  forthcoming  elections  that  you  have 
spoken  aiout  under  the  current  Constitution? 
And  if  not,  have  you  received  any  indications 
during  your  trip  that  there  would  he  a  pos- 
sibility of  amending  that  Constitution? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  want  to  get  into  the  precise 
question  about  who  might  appear  and  whose 
party  might  appear  on  the  ballot  and  in  what 
form,  except  to  say  that  President  Nixon  made 
it  clear  in  his  statement  that  he  thought  all 
persons  who  reside  in  South  Viet-Nam  and  who 
renounce  the  use  of  force  should  be  able  to  par- 
ticipate in  an  election  either  as  voters  or  as 
candidates. 

Now,  President  Thieu,  I'm  satisfied  from 
what  he  has  said  and  from  my  conversations 
with  him,  agrees  with  that  position.  How  the 
names  would  appear  on  the  ballot  and  whether 
the  Constitution  would  permit  certain  can- 
didates and  certain  labels  on  the  ballot  I 
think  are  subjects  for  negotiation  by  the  South 
Vietnamese  and  the  NLF. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  role  for  the  present  Inter- 
national Control  Commission  in  Viet-Nam  in 
the  peacemaking  process? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  think  the  Commission  as  it 
now  exists  would  be  adequate.  It  might  be  that 
it  could  be  built  upon.  It  might  be  used  as  the 
beginning  of  a  supervisory  force  to  guarantee 
the  fairness  of  elections. 

I  think  though  that,  looking  at  it  realistically, 
it  has  to  be  a  much  more  substantial  supervisory 
group  than  the  ICC. 

The  Middle  East 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  this  is  the  second  anniver- 
sary of  the  Middle  East  situation  and  the  war. 
You  have  seen  so7ne  rather  pessimistic  reports 
recently  aiout  progress  in  the  hig-four  talks  in 
New  York  and  the  hilateral  talks  here.  Can  you 
characterize  the  discussions  as  they  are  now? 

A.  It's  a  little  dangerous  to  characterize 
things,  because  it  sometimes  creates  false  hopes 
or  false  impressions.  I  think  I  could  say  that  I 
am  not  discouraged  by  the  discussions  up  to 
date. 

The  bilateral  discussions  between  Ambassa- 


dor Dobrynin  [Anatoliy  F.  Dobrynin,  Soviet 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States]  and  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  [for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs  Joseph  J.]  Sisco  I  tliink  have 
been  somewhat  encouraging.  And  I  think  that 
one  of  the  encouraging  aspects  is  there  seems  to 
be  general  agreement  now  that  the  final  ar- 
rangement has  to  be  a  package.  In  other  words, 
it  has  to  be  a  total  agreement,  and  I  think  that 
is  pretty  well  understood  by  all  persons. 

Initially  there  was  some  thought  that  you 
could  do  it  by  phases.  You  could  have  phase  one 
and  phase  two.  I  think  now  that  idea  has  been 
discarded.  So  I  think  that  in  itself  is  some 
progress. 

Then  there  are  other  areas  of  progress  which 
I  don't  think  I  would  want  to  go  into  at  tliis 
time. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  say  Governor  Rocke- 
feller came  hack  encouraged  hy  his  trip  through 
Latin  America.  In  what  respects?  How? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  as  I  want  to  say  "en- 
couraged," because  I  am  sure  he  was  somewhat 
disappointed  at  the  cancellation  of  some  of 
these  trips.  But  he  felt,  and  expressed  to  me, 
that  he  had  had  very  good  discussions  in  10 
countries,  that  he  had  learned  a  good  deal,  the 
views  that  had  been  expressed  to  him  he 
thought  were  heliiful,  and  that  he  believed  that 
the  total  effect  of  the  trip  and  the  recommenda- 
tions which  he  will  make  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  visits  will  be  helpful  to  the  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Latin  America. 

"Coalition  Government"  in  South  Viet-Nam 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  have  heen  reports 
from  Asia  while  you  were  out  there  on  your 
trip  that  you  had  indicated  such  questions  as 
amending  the  South  Vietnamese  Constitution, 
holding  special  elections  under  that  Constitu- 
tion, the  question  of  an  interim  coalition  gov- 
ernment in  South  Viet-Nam  are  open  to  nego- 
tiation at  Paris.  Is  that  a  correct  reflection  of 
your  position? 

A.  Well,  you  have  asked  quite  a  few  questions 
in  one.  Let  me  talk  about  coalition  government 
first.  I  had  a  background  conference — I  think  it 
was  in  Saigon — and  if  there  is  any  question 
about  what  I  said,  we  have  a  transcript.  I  made 
it  clear  at  that  time  that  we  think  that  the 
political  questions  about  the  future  of  South 
"Viet-Nam  should  be  decided  by  the  South  Viet- 
namese. And  I  said  that  I  thought  that  the 
phrase  "coalition  government,"  as  used  by  the 


532 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Communists,  would  be  unacceptable  because  it 
is  used  to  convey  the  thought  that  they  will 
impose  certain  of  their  leaders  on  the  people 
of  South  Viet-Nam.  So  that  from  that  stand- 
point, if  that  is  what  the  phrase  means,  it 
would  not  be  acceptable  to  anj'body  on  our  side. 

Now,  on  the  other  hand,  the  President,  Presi- 
dent Nixon  has  stated,  and  President  Thieu  has 
stated,  that  as  a  result  of  an  election  if  the  peo- 
ple want  to  vote  for  the  Communists  or  any 
other  system  of  government  and  their  vote  is 
freely  cast  and  counted,  then  all  parties  will 
abide  by  their  choice. 

Now,  if  that  is  what  you  mean  by  a  govern- 
ment that  represents  both  leaders  now  in  South 
Viet-Nam  and  some  Communists,  obviously  that 
would  be  acceptable  to  us.  And,  obviously,  that 
would  be  acceptable  to  the  South  Vietnamese. 

Q.  Sir,  are  you  talking  about  the  election  of 
197  If 

A.  Well,  as  I  said,  I  am  not  talking  about 
any  particular  election.  The  type  of  election, 
when  it  is  to  be  held,  should  be  negotiated  hy 
South  Viet-Nam  and  the  NLF. 

Q.  But  their  Constitution  provides  for  an 
election  before  ^71,  Mr.  Secretary. 

A.  Well,  President  Thieu  has  indicated  he  is 
willing  to  discuss  the  elective  process  with  the 
other  side  in  order  to  set  up  a  system  whicli  will 
permit  the  people  of  the  South  to  express  their 
views,  and  their  views  will  be  controlling. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  speak  of  free  elections 
and  of  letting  the  people  of  South  Viet-Natn 
decide,  and  yet  you  have  just  been  in  Saigon, 
you  know  there  is  no  freedom  of  press,  that  the 
jails  are  full  of  oppositionists,  many  of  them 
non-Communist.  What  have  you  done  about  the 
absence  of  civil  liberty  and  the  absence  of  any 
atmosphere  that  loould  promise  free  elections 
in  South  Viet-Namf 

A.  Well,  I  don't— 

Q.  Have  you  taken  this  up  loith  the  Govern- 
ment or  done  anything  about  it? 

A.  I  don't  agree  with  your  premise.  It  is 
true  I  was  in  South  Viet-Nam.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  Do  you  think  there  is  freedom  of  the  press 
there? 

A.  Let  me  finish,  if  you  don't  mind.  I  don't 
think  that  the  jails  are  full.  In  any  war  situa- 
tion, the  government  in  the  war  has  some 
problems. 


Now,  in  terms  of  free  press,  there  are  plenty 
of  newspapers  there.  I  think  any  nation  at  war 
has  some  difficulty  with  the  press.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  even  nations  at  peace  have  a  little  dif- 
ficulty with  the  press.  If  you  remember  our 
own  situation  during  World  War  II,  we  had 
some  press  problems.  We  also — if  you  will 
remember — on  the  west  coast,  we  took  some 
action  that  we  are  not  particularly  proud  of 
now. 

Now,  I  think  President  Thieu  is  making  every 
eifort  to  provide  a  free  society  in  South  Viet- 
Nam  consistent  with  the  war.  And  when  you 
mention  what  you  have  mentioned  without  men- 
tioning the  terrorist  activities  there,  when  they 
blow  up  schools  and  post  offices  and  kill 
civilians — 

Q.  [Truong  Dinh'\  Dzu  is  not  a  terrorist. 

A.  "Wliat  I  am  saying  is  it's  a  little  easier  to 
criticize  the  Government  of  Viet-Nara  from  this 
distance  than  it  is  when  you're  there. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  your  talk  with  Foreign 
Minister  Aichi,  you  concluded  that  the  talks 
were  successful.  Cotdd  you  tell  me  on  what 
grounds  the  talks — you  characterized  the  talks 
as  successful? 

A.  Yes.  Well,  I  don't  want  to,  obviously,  ex- 
plain the  progress  that  we  have  made.  But  we 
did  have  a  very  good  exchange,  particularly 
yesterday,  of  ideas.  And  I  would  have — as  I  say, 
I  have  every  reason  to  think  that  a  plan  can 
be  worked  out  that  will  be  satisfactory  to  Japan 
and,  hopefully,  to  the  United  States. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  your  earlier  anstvers  appear 
to  indicate  that  we  are  a  long  way  from  any 
statement  of  troop  withdrawal  from  South  Viet- 
Nam.  Is  that  a  correct  and  accurate  impression 
of  what  you  have  said? 

A.  Well,  are  you  sure  that  is  what  I  said? 
[Laughter.]  I  said  I  just  didn't  want  to  make 
any  prediction  about  what  was  going  to  happen. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  is  a  bipartisan  reso- 
lution in  the  Senate  suggesting  tliat  the  State 
Department  or  the  administration  change  its 
recognition  policy  on  China.  Does  this  mean  toe 
are  moving  closer  to  recognizing  Peking? 

A.  No.  The  only  thing  that  I  have  said  about 
China  has  been  that  we  would  like  to  improve 
our  relations  with  China,  and  we  have  taken 
several  measures  looking  in  that  direction. 

So  far  we  haven't  had  any  response  from 
China  that  is  encouraging.  Any  time  they  are 


JXJNE    23,    1969 
352-642—69- 


533 


prepared  to  have  further  discussions  about  it 
or  have  an  exchange  of  students  or  journalists 
or  things  of  that  kind,  we  would  welcome  it. 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary^  the  administratlooi  has 
resumed  testing  of  MIRVs  [^multiple  independ- 
ently targeted  reentry  vehicles~\  at  a  time  when 
some  on  the  HIU  are  calling  for  a  test  ban  to  be 
negotiated  loith  the  Soviet  Union.  Does  this  in- 
dicate that  you  are  not  interested  in  such  a  ban? 
If  that  is  not  the  case,  how  does  the  testing 
square  with  the  likelihood  of  achieving  the  nego- 
tiated test  ban? 

A.  Well,  the  administration  would  be  very 
interested  in  a  successful  outcome  of  arms  limi- 
tation talks.  We  have  agreed  to  that  in  the 
NPT  treaty,  paragraph  6,=  and  we  have  stated 
it,  and  we  mean  it,  and  we  are  going  to  engage 
in  the  SALT  [strategic  arms  limitation]  talks. 

Now,  we  are  not  going  to  delay  all  our  mili- 
tary preparations  in  the  meantime,  any  more 
than  I  expect  the  Soviet  Union  is.  In  fact,  they 
are  not.  As  you  know,  they  have  been  testing 
their  SS-9's  in  the  Pacific  right  along. 

Wlien  we  are  in  a  position  to  have  some  rea- 
sonable limitation  or  reduction  of  arms  and  the 
Soviet  Union  wants  to  do  it  and  we  know  that 
they  are  not  violating — we  have  a  provision  so 
they  won't  violate  such  an  agreement — then  we 
are  willing  to  proceed.  But  not  until. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary.,  this  morning  an  American 
reconnaissance  plane  was  shot  down  over  North 
Viet-Nam.,  and  the  U.S.  escort  planes  bombed 
the  antiaircraft  site.  Does  this  reflect  any  change 
of  policy? 

A.  Jim  [James  Anderson,  Westinghouse 
Broadcasting  Co.],  I  hadn't  heard  that.  I  am  not 
familiar  with  that  incident. 

Q.  It  was  announced — it  just  came  over  tlie 
wires. 

Q.  It  was  announced  this  morning  at  8:15. 

A.  I  don't  believe  it  indicates  any  change 
of  policy,  but  I  haven't  read  about  the  incident. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  follow  up  the  MIKV 
question,  the  issue  here  is  whether  or  not  the 
testing  program  itself,  by  advancing  to  a  cer- 
tain point,  precludes  an  agreement  on  prevent- 

'  For  text  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Nonproliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1,  1968,  p.  9. 


ing  the  deployment  of  MIRV-headed  missiles. 
I  th  inh  that  is  the  question. 

A.  Yes.  Well,  I  think  the  answer  is:  No. 

And  as  I  say,  the  Soviet  Union  is  testing,  and 
we  can't  stop  our  testing  on  the  hope  that  some- 
time an  agreement  would  be  reached.  On  the 
NPT  it  took  us  5  years  to  negotiate  the  treaty, 
so  I  think  the  answer  is :  No,  that  won't  prevent 
the  talks  from  being  successful  and  it  wouldn't 
affect  the  talks,  I  don't  believe. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  at  the  discretion  can  I  ash 
you  this  question :  If  the  United  States  and  So- 
viet Union,  Russia,  complete  the  testing  of  the 
MIRV  and  then  imposing  of  the  ABM  system — 
is  there  anything  left  to  talk  aiout? 

A.  Well,  sure,  there  are  a  good  many  things 
left  to  talk  about.  The  whole  question  of  deploy- 
ment of  weapons  and  an  additional  manufac- 
ture of  weapons  and  inspection,  and  so  forth — 
there  are  plenty  of  things  to  talk  about  in  the 
field  of  disarmament. 

Q.  Does  this  m,ean  that  MIRY  is  or  is  not 
negotiable?  My  wnderstanding  is  that  after  a 
certain  point  of  testing,  it  might  become  iTnpos- 
sible  to  negotiate,  because  the  spy  satellites 
wouldrCt  be  able  to  tell  how  many  tvarheads  are 
atomic  missiles — and  this  might  make  it  more 
difficult  to  reach  an  agreement. 

A.  Well,  the  people  that  I  have  talked  to 
about  it,  whose  opinion  I  respect,  say  that  we'll 
be  able  to  have  successful  talks  if  the  other  side 
is  willing  to,  whether  we  have  tested  MIRVs 
or  not. 

Relations  With  Latin  America 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  I  get  back  to  Latin 
America  for  one  minute?  Do  you  have  the  feel- 
ing that  anybody  in  Congress,  authority  in- 
Congress,  appreciates  the  depth  of  discontent 
in  Latin  America  with  our  current  economic 
policies  toward  them  and  our  current  aid 
policies  toward  them? 

A.  Yes,  I  am  sure  there  are  some  that  do.  I 
am  not  sure  that  Congress  as  a  whole  does,  and 
I  think  one  of  the  responsibilities  that  we  have 
is  to  determine  what  it  is  that  causes  this  dis- 
cont«nt  and  whether  some  of  our  legislative 
restrictions  are  causing  it.  And  if  so,  then  we 
should  ask  for  i-epeal  or  change  in  some  of  those. 
I  think  that  is  one  of  the  things  that  we  have 
to  give  serious  consideration  to. 


534 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  Latin  American  min- 
isters liave  met  mul  come  up  with  a  series  of 
recommendations  for  future  inter- American 
economic  cooperation,  heavily  slanted  toward 
getting  more  trade,  nwre  of  their  goods  into  the 
United  States.  What  is  the  U.S.  answer  going  to 
be  to  this? 

A.  As  you  know,  they  will  be  here  next  week 
and  present  their  documentation  to  the  admin- 
istration, and  I  think  we  will  want  to  give  it 
very  careful  consideration.  I  think  it  represents 
a  good  deal  of  work  and  thought  on  their  part, 
although  as  I  understand  it,  many  of  the  for- 
eign ministers  have  been  represented  in  that 
group.  The  President  of  Colombia  is  going  to 
be  here  next  week,  and  I  think  those  are  things 
we'll  have  to  consider  very  seriously. 

It  would  be  a  tragic  thing  if  our  relations 
deteriorated  in  Latin  America,  and  this  admin- 
istration has  no  intention  of  letting  that 
happen. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  threat,  any  seriotis  threat 
in  this  country  of  a  neio  isolationism?  And  if 
so,  hoto  would  you  define  it?  From  what  direc- 
tion do  you  see  it  coming  ? 

A.  Well,  I  thought  my  views  were  very  well 
expressed  by  the  President  yesterday. 
[Laughter.] 

The  press :  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 


20th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  iy 
Arnbassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  at  the  20th 
plenary  session  of  the  neio  tneetings  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris  on  June  6. 

Press  release  146  dated  June  5 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Last  week  I  discussed 
President  Nixon's  proposals  for  peace,  partic- 
ularly as  they  relate  to  the  two  key  issues — with- 
drawal of  forces  and  political  settlement. 

I  sought  to  answer  questions  which  you  had 
raised  about  the  President's  proposals.  At  the 
same  session,  your  side  contended  that  there  was 
no  similarity  between  any  of  the  proposals  being 
made  by  either  of  our  two  sides.  It  seemed  that 
you  did  not  wish  to  look  for  common  groimd. 

Instead,  your  side  repeated  its  old  charge  that 


the  United  States  is  committing  aggression  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  As  you  know,  we  do  not  ac- 
cept that  charge.  We  have  known  since  these 
meetings  began  that  our  views  on  the  question 
of  aggression  in  Viet-Nam  are  different.  Despite 
these  differences,  both  sides  have  come  to  Paris 
to  seek  a  negotiated  end  of  the  war  in  Viet-Nam. 

We  must,  therefore,  search  for  common 
ground.  I  have  accordingly  examined  and  com- 
pared President  Nixon's  proposals  for  peace, 
the  six  points  of  President  Thieu,  and  your 
side's  10  points. 

Today  I  intend  to  continue  that  examination. 
I  will  discuss  certain  aspects  of  your  side's  10- 
point  program  and  ask  you  for  clarification  of 
some  aspects  thereof. 

Let  us  look  at  your  side's  first  point.  It  speaks 
of  respect  for  the  Vietnamese  people's  funda- 
mental national  rights — that  is,  independence, 
sovereignty,  unity,  and  territorial  integrity,  as 
recognized  by  the  1954  Geneva  agreements  on 
Viet-Nam. 

We  agree  that  the  Vietnamese  people's  funda- 
mental national  rights  should  be  respected.  We 
think  it  would  be  appropriate  for  a  final  settle- 
ment to  include  an  undertaking  by  the  parties 
to  respect  the  sovereignty,  independence,  unity, 
and  territorial  integrity  of  Viet-Nam.  Such  an 
undertaking  was  contained  in  the  1954  Geneva 
accords. 

The  fundamental  national  rights  of  the  Viet- 
namese people  would  be  in  jeopardy  if  United 
States  forces  were  to  withdraw  from  South 
Viet-Nam  so  as  to  leave  North  Vietnamese 
forces  free  to  carry  out  their  conquest  of  the 
country.  We  propose  that  all  non-South  Viet- 
namese forces  leave  South  Viet-Nam — your 
forces  as  well  as  ours.  Such  an  outcome  would 
be  consistent  with  the  1954  accords,  under  which 
respect  for  the  sovereignty,  independence, 
unity,  and  territorial  integrity  of  Viet-Nam  was 
to  be  achieved. 

Under  the  1954  Geneva  accords,  the  funda- 
mental national  rights  of  the  Vietnamese  peo- 
ple were  to  be  achieved  on  the  basis  of  certain 
principles:  regroupment  and  withdrawal  of 
forces;  nonintervention  by  either  zone  of  Viet- 
Nam  in  the  affairs  of  the  other  while  the  coun- 
try was  temporarily  divided;  and  reunification 
through  free  choice.  We  believe  these  remain 
essential  elements  for  the  achievement  of  the 
Vietnamese  people's  fundamental  national 
rights  today.  We  are  ready  to  work  together  for 
their  achievement.  Does  the  first  point  of  your 
side's  10-point  program  mean  that  North  Viet- 


JtJKE    23,    1969 


535 


Nam  is  prepared  to  carry  out  these  principles? 
The  second  aspect  of  your  side's  10-point  pro- 
gram which  requires  clarification  relates  spe- 
cifically to  the  withdrawal  of  forces. 

President  Nixon's  proposals  for  peace  and 
President  Thieu's  six-point  program  both  call 
for  the  withdrawal  from  South  Viet-Nam  of  all 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces.  Your  side's  points 
2  and  3  deal  with  the  question  of  withdrawal 
of  forces.  Li  point  2,  you  call  for  the  uncondi- 
tional withdrawal  of  U.S.  and  Allied  forces.  In 
point  3,  you  say  the  question  of  Vietnamese 
forces  in  South  Viet-Nam  shall  be  settled  by  the 
Vietnamese  parties  among  themselves. 

We  have  no  rigid  formula  for  the  withdrawal 
of  non-South  Vietnamese  forces.  We  are  inter- 
ested in  results.  And  the  results  must  be  that 
North  Vietnamese,  as  well  as  U.S.  and  Allied, 
forces  withdraw  from  South  Viet-Nam. 

You  have  asked  us  whether  the  United  States 
really  intends  to  withdraw  its  forces  from  South 
Viet-Nam.  We  have  answered  affirmatively. 
Now  we  ask  you :  Are  North  Vietnamese  forces 
prepared  to  withdraw  from  South  Viet-Nam? 

It  is  essential  that  North  Viet-Nam  also 
withdraw  its  forces  from  Cambodia  and  Laos 
back  to  North  Viet-Nam.  On  this  question,  your 
side's  10-point  program  calls  for  respect  for  the 
1962  Geneva  agreements  on  Laos  and  respect 
for  the  independence,  sovereignty,  neutrality, 
and  territorial  integrity  of  Cambodia. 

North  Viet-Nam  claims  now  to  be  respecting 
the  Laos  agreements  and  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  Cambodia,  despite  the  presence  of 
thousands  of  North  Vietnamese  troops  in  those 
countries.  Does  your  10-point  program  mean 
that  North  Viet-Nam  is  prepared  to  withdraw 
its  forces  from  Cambodia  and  Laos? 

A  settlement  must  also  contain  assurances 
that  outside  forces  in  fact  withdraw  from 
South  Viet-Nam,  Laos,  and  Cambodia  and  that 
they  do  not  return.  That  is  why  President 
Nixon's  proposals  for  peace  and  President 
Thieu's  six  points  call  for  an  international 
supervisory  body. 

Your  side's  10th  point  speaks  of  international 
supervision   of   the   withdrawal   of   U.S.   and 


Allied  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam.  But  your 
program  makes  no  mention  of  international 
supervision  of  the  withdrawal  of  North  Viet- 
namese forces,  nor  do  you  refer  to  international 
supervision  of  other  agreed  aspects  of  a  settle- 
ment as  President  Nixon's  proposals  do.  We 
would  like  to  know  your  view  on  international 
supervision  of  other  aspects  of  a  settlement  be- 
yond that  mentioned  in  your  10th  point. 

We  would  like  to  raise  one  other  question 
about  your  program.  It  relates  to  the  internal 
political  settlement  in  South  Viet-Nam.  Your 
side,  in  your  10-point  program,  has  made  a 
number  of  proposals  concerning  a  political 
settlement.  The  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  has  also 
set  forth  a  number  of  principles,  reflected  in  the 
six-point  program  of  President  Thieu,  on  which 
it  believes  a  political  settlement  should  be  based. 
The  President  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  has 
long  since  offered  to  engage  in  talks  with  the 
National  Liberation  Front  on  political  issues 
without  any  jDrior  conditions. 

Yet  you  continue  to  attack  the  South  Viet- 
namese Government  and  to  call  for  its  over- 
throw. On  May  24,  a  spokesman  for  your  side 
is  reported  to  have  said  that  "if  the  Paris  Meet- 
ings are  to  make  progress,  it  is  necessary 
to  abandon  the  present  administration  in 
Saigon.  .  .  ." 

This  attitude  is  unrealistic.  Since  we  have 
both  agreed  that  the  internal  political  problem 
is  for  the  South  Vietnamese  themselves  to  solve, 
why  doesn't  the  NLF  enter  into  productive 
negotiation  of  a  political  settlement  with  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  with- 
out making  any  prior  conditions? 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  have  asked  a  num-  , 
ber  of  questions  today  about  your  10-point  pro-  I 
gram  in  the  hope  that  further  elucidation  by 
your  side  will  help  to  advance  these  negotia- 
tions. We  believe  that  through  the  process  of 
exchanging  views  on  our  respective  proposals 
we  can  clarify  the  issues,  find  common  ground, 
narrow  differences,  and  ultimately  establish  a 
basis  for  bringing  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an 
end.  I  would  welcome  your  considered  replies 
to  the  questions  I  have  raised. 


536 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BUIXETIN 


President  Nixon  Hails  Sixth  Anniversary 
of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity 


Following  is  an  exchange  of  remarks  between 
/S.  Edward  Peal,  Ambassador  of  the  Repuhllc  of 
Liberia,  and  President  Nixon  at  a  reception  at 
the  Liherian  Embassy  on  May  25  marking  the 
sixth  anniversary  of  the  Organization  of  Afri- 
can Unity. 


White  House  press  release  dated  May  25 

REMARKS  BY  AMBASSADOR  PEAL 

Mr.  President,  it  is  a  source  of  pride  and  o;rati- 
fication  for  me  on  behalf  of  my  colleagues,  Their 
Excellencies  the  African  Ambassadors  and 
Chief  of  Mission,  and  their  wives  and  Mrs.  Peal 
to  welcome  you,  Mr.  President,  and  Mrs.  Nixon 
and  our  other  distinguished  guests  and  friends 
here  today  to  what  is  not  merely  another  home 
in  this  famous  and  historic  city. 

This  place  is  also  a  small  part  of  our  famous 
and  historic  continent.  You  stand  now,  Mr. 
President,  not  for  the  first  time,  on  African  soil, 
and  I  assure  you  you  are  surrounded  by  that 
African  hospitality  which  you  have  savored 
twice  before:  once  when  you  were  Vice  Presi- 
dent and  once  when,  as  a  private  citizen, 
you  renewed  your  acquaintance  with  our  prob- 
lems and  with  the  progress  we  were  then  malcing 
in  our  still  continuing  effort  to  build  a  brighter 
future  for  all  our  people. 

The  fact  that  your  charming  counsel  worked 
with  you  on  one  of  these  visits  gave  to  the 
friendship  you  formed  with  our  leaders  and  our 
people  an  ever-enriching  quality.  And  on  this 
occasion  we  render  to  Mrs.  Nixon  once  again  our 
special  homage  and  a  most  cordial  welcome. 

We  accept  it,  Mr.  President,  as  a  signal  honor, 
despite  the  onerous  duties  of  the  high  office 
which  you  have  only  recently  assumed,  it  has 
been  possible  for  you  to  join  us  in  the  celebration 
of  the  sixth  anniversary  of  the  signing  of  the 
Charter  of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity 
and  a  day  proclaimed  by  our  leaders  as  African 


Liberation  Day.  Enshrined  in  this  day  are  the 
hopes  of  our  people  for  the  completion  of  the 
process  of  decolonization,  for  the  economic  de- 
velojDment  of  our  countries,  and  for  the  building 
of  an  effective  unity  and  cooperation  among  our 
nations. 

We  recognize  that  like  many  things  on  this 
earth,  our  unity  is  imperfect  and  our  liberation 
incomplete.  But  we  look  forward  to  the  time 
when  we  shall  see  both  of  them  accomplished 
in  their  logical,  necessary,  and  glorious  entirety, 
a  goal  we  shall  achieve,  I  pray  and  am  confident, 
in  a  spirit  not  of  revenge  but  of  justice,  not  of 
racial  separation  and  strife  but  of  reconciliation 
and  harmony,  intent  on  seeking  new  ways  for 
cooperation  and  progress  in  a  spirit  of  brotherly 
adventure. 

Six  years,  Mr.  President,  is  not  a  long  time  in 
tlie  life  of  a  man,  let  alone  a  big  continent.  But 
that  brief  span  has  already  seen  us  contributing 
our  share  to  the  building  of  a  new  era  of  part- 
nership between  all  free  nations. 

Among  ourselves,  we  have  broken  down 
ancient  barriers,  fostering  cultural  and  commer- 
cial ties  which  transcend  the  old  colonial  fron- 
tiers and  giving  millions  of  our  citizens  a  sense 
of  vibrance  and  viable  nationhood. 

Our  remaining  tasks,  however,  are  formi- 
dable. In  facing  them,  we  draw  immense  en- 
couragement from  the  knowledge  that  we  can 
rely  on  the  sustained  sympathy  and  understand- 
ing of  the  United  States. 

Your  generous  concern  for  our  welfare  has 
been  manifested  through  many  agencies  and  ac- 
tivities in  the  past.  All  have  been  devoted  to  a 
collective  enterprise  in  the  best  sense  of  your 
tradition  and  ideals. 

By  keeping  faith  with  freedom,  we  are  prov- 
ing our  sincerity  and  its  worth  by  projecting  to 
the  rest  of  the  world  an  ever-clearer  image  of 
responsible  and  cooperative  statesmanship. 

In  particular,  a  responsive  note  has  been 
touched  in  us  by  you,  Mr.  President,  when  you 


JUNE    23,    1969 


537 


announced  in  one  of  your  statements  that  you 
were  concerned  and  you  were  committed  to  see- 
ing the  establishment  of  peace  which  will  be 
truly  indivisible,  founded  on  a  liberty  which 
will  be  indivisible,  too. 

We  know  that  our  struggle  in  Africa  is  one 
in  which  the  United  States  is  irretrievably  and 
honorably  involved.  We  are  grateful  to  all  of 
those  who  have  cried  out  against  colonialism 
and  oppression.  And  it  is  enough  for  us  to  ask : 
Could  anyone  who  is  true  to  the  American 
heritage  do  less  ? 

The  noble  phrasing  of  the  1776  Declaration 
of  Independence  far  outran  the  limited  issues  of 
that  day  and  touched,  indeed,  in  the  heart  of 
humanity  everywhere. 

In  Africa,  Mr.  President,  we  long  ago  began 
to  take  very  seriously  the  electric  assertion  that 
all  men  are  born  equal.  And  we  know  that  the 
leaders  of  this  country  are  dedicated  to  assuring 
that  all  Americans,  whatever  their  social,  ethnic, 
or  religious  background,  are  reared  in  a  society 
whose  law,  custom,  and  natural  instinct  require 
them  to  do  the  same. 

That  is  why,  Mr.  President,  should  a  country 
of  which  you  are  the  distinguished  leader  and 
the  countries  which  we  here  from  Africa  repre- 
sent hold  fast  to  our  fully  professed  and  oft- 
reiterated  ideals,  there  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  not  together  set  an  example  which  will 
both  stir  praise  and  challenge  emulation. 

Mr.  President,  on  occasions  such  as  this,  it  is 
the  natural  instinct  of  an  African  to  try  to  wind 
up  his  remarks  in  an  appropriate  African  man- 
ner. My  colleagues  would  expect  no  less  from 
me. 

One  of  the  mysteries  of  life  tending  to  puzzle 
ordinary  mortals,  among  them  us  diplomats, 
is  the  differences  between  individuals.  Wliat  it 
is  that  singles  out  a  few  for  a  lofty  position  and 
accomplishment  and  the  acclaim  of  the 
multitude? 

Two  nights  ago,  I  fell  into  an  illumination  of 
this,  Mr.  President,  as  I  thought  of  the  rare 
and  burdensome  distinction  which  had  fallen 
to  your  lot. 

My  small  son  ventured  to  suggest  that  the 
secret  of  your  success  was  your  shrewd  selection 
many  years  ago  of  the  zoological  ally  to  whom 
I  shall  refer,  if  I  may  use  a  famous  set  of  initials, 
as  the  Grand  Old  Pachyderm. 

"Do  you  not  recall,"  chided  my  son,  "that 
among  the  Kpelle" — which  is  one  of  our  tribes — 
"it  is  always  said  that  when  there  is  a  fight 


between  man  and  an  elephant,  the  whole  forest 
is  thrown  into  fear.  Not  that  man  is  mighty,  but 
the  elephant.  He  is  not  only  strong,  but  durable ; 
not  only  intelligent,  but  versatile.  He  has  the 
additional  convenient  virtue  that  he  can  be 
carved  up  to  feed  a  whole  village  in  an  emer- 
gency. And  his  memory  is  so  prodigious  that 
he  never  forgets  either  a  face  or  a  Idndness." 

I  congratulate  you,  sir,  if  I  may  simply  do  so 
in  this  bipartisan  gathering,  on  the  company  you 
keep. 

But  I  would  remind  you  that  the  best  ele- 
phants are  African  elephants.  We  have  learned 
over  the  centuries  to  be  patient  and  long-suffer- 
ing. Since  Mr.  Hemingway  discovered  them, 
they  make  excellent  movie  stars. 

May  I  recommend  that  you  add  a  few  of 
tliem  to  your  retinue.  Here,  surely,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, is  the  nucleus  of  an  alliance  which  could 
move  political  mountains. 

Indeed,  Mr.  President,  in  Afi-ica  many  of  the 
malevolences  which  distract  our  time  can  be 
brought  to  bear  and  finally  disarmed. 

In  Africa,  we  are  trying  to  cope  with  the 
problems  of  underdevelopment,  and  the  question 
of  race  in  its  southern  part  is  acute.  I  do  not 
wish,  in  an  atmosphere  as  congenial  as  this,  to 
plead  the  whole  sad  record  of  the  rich  and  the 
poor,  the  developed  and  the  underdeveloped,  the 
haves  and  have-nots.  That  would  be  merely  to 
perpetuate  what  is  in  danger  of  becoming  a 
dialogue  of  discord.  Wliereas  what  we  must  seek 
if  the  pressures  of  this  demanding  age  are  to 
be  taken  soberly  into  account  is,  above  all,  a 
dialogue  in  unison. 

We  have  listened  to  you  and  we  have  ex- 
amined your  public  statements.  Our  conclusion 
is  that  from  this  point  of  vantage  in  Washington 
at  this  moment  there  ai-e  certain  hopeful  trends 
happily  discernible  in  the  ebbing  onrush  of  the 
turbulent  mainstream  of  world  affairs. 

Mr.  President,  we  salute  you  without  hesita- 
tion, because  you  have  shown  yourself  to  be 
genuinely  enlisted  in  the  earnest  and  dedicated 
vanguard  of  those  whose  purpose  is  indivisible 
peace,  indivisible  liberty,  and  at  the  end  of  a 
long  and  weary  road,  indivisible  prosperity. 
And  it  is  in  this  spirit  that  my  colleagues  and 
I  raise  our  glasses  and  ask  all  of  you  present 
to  join  us  in  drinking  to  the  health  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  tlie  United  States :  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 


538 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BtrLLETIN 


REMARKS  BY  PRESIDENT  NIXON 

I  am  very  honored  to  be  here  to  participate  in 
the  sixth  anniversary  of  the  formation  of  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity. 

As  I  was  listening  to  Ambassador  Peal  de- 
scribe the  problems  of  Africa  and  also  of  my 
relationship  to  those  problems,  both  privately 
and  now  officially,  I  simf)ly  want  to  bring  the 
proper  bipartisan  note  into  this  occasion.  I  hojje 
that  on  this  occasion  we  carve  up  neither  ele- 
phants nor  donkeys. 

We  are  glad  that  today  we  have  our  Demo- 
cratic and  Republican  Representatives  and 
Senators  present,  because  there  is  one  thing  that 
I  can  assure  all  of  our  guests  here:  And  that 
is  that  in  this  comitry,  when  it  comes  to  support 
of  the  great  goals  that  the  Ambassador  has 
described  in  his  eloquent  remarks  of  unity,  of 
prosperity,  and  of  the  progress  that  we  all 
want,  that  we  in  the  United  States,  regardless 
of  party,  share  your  desires.  We  want  to  helji 
you.  We  want  to  work  with  you.  And  this  is 
true  whether  it  is  a  Eei^ublican  administration 
or  a  Democratic  administration. 

Having  said  that,  I  would  like  also  to  remind 
some  of  our  hosts  here  today  that  while  I  do  not 
know  Africa  as  well  as  I  would  like  to,  that  I 
have  had  the  privilege  of  visiting  more  African 
countries  than  any  man  who  has  ever  been 
President  of  the  United  States. 

For  fear  that  my  alleged  very  good  memory — 
which  I  derived  from  my  elephant  association 
— might  fail  me,  I  will  try  to  name  those  coun- 
tries. If  I  leave  one  out,  I  trust  someone  in  the 
audience  will  remind  me. 

But  on  those  two  trips — the  one  in  1957,  where 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  now  the  Assist- 
ant Secretary  of  State  for  African  Affairs, 
Joseph  Palmer,  accompanied  me,  and  then  in 
another  one,  which  came  as  a  private  citizen  10 
years  later — I  learned  to  know  this  continent, 
to  know  its  people,  through  visiting  what  few 
of  the  coimtries  I  was  able  to  visit:  Morocco, 
Tunisia,  Libya,  the  Sudan,  and  Ethiopia  in  the 
northern  and  central  part  of  the  continent,  and 
then  in  1957  to  the  independence  celebration  for 
Ghana,  and  then  to  Liberia,  Uganda,  and  then 
in  1967  again  returning  on  that  occasion,  I 
visited  the  Congo,  Zambia,  Ivory  Coast,  and 
Kenya.  I  think  I  have  mentioned  12  countries. 
If  there  is  another  one,  I  may  have  made  some 
airport  stops. 

I  mentioned  these  countries  not  for  the  pur- 


pose of  demonstrating  any  ability  to  memorize, 
but  more  to  make  a  point.  There  are  41  nations 
in  Africa.  The  Ambassador  has  spoken  of  the 
great  hopes  for  African  unity  which  were  there 
6  years  ago  when  this  organization  was  set  up 
and  which  are  there  today. 

And  I  would  like  to  speak  quite  candidly  and 
directly  about  African  unity  and  unity  in  this 
world  in  which  we  live  and  to  speak  about  it 
in  terms  of  what  we  can  expect  and  what  we 
cannot  expect. 

First,  one  thing  I  learned  about  Africa  is 
that  we  have  a  tendency  in  this  nation,  particu- 
larly those  of  us  who  have  not  had  the  oppor- 
tunity to  know  the  continent  well,  to  think  of 
Africa  as  just  one  gi-eat  continent  very  much 
the  same. 

Now,  of  course,  any  even  unsophisticated 
observer  knows  that  North  Africa  is  diffei'ent 
from  Central  Africa,  and  that  is  different  from 
South  Africa.  But  on  the  other  hand,  what  I 
have  found  as  I  traveled  through  Africa,  what- 
ever the  place  might  be,  that  the  diversity  of  the 
continent  was  what  was  impressive.  Not  one  of 
the  countries  is  the  same. 

The  costumes  are  different.  There  are  differ- 
ent religions.  There  are  different  traditions. 
There  are  different  governments. 

So  when  we  talk  about  unity,  the  kind  of 
unity  that  will  be  meaningful  for  the  continent 
of  Africa,  it  does  not  mean  a  unity  in  which  all 
will  be  the  same.  It  does  mean  the  unity  which 
will  allow  the  diversity.  Let  me  put  it  another 
way. 

When  ours  was  a  very  young  country — and 
we  still  are  a  young  country  by  most  standards, 
I  suppose,  but  when  we  were  a  very  young 
country — George  Washington  reminded  the 
American  people  as  he  was  finishing  his  second 
term  as  President  of  the  United  States  that  the 
new  nation  would  find  itself  in  great  difficulty 
or  greater  difficulty  as  the  glow  of  winning  the 
War  of  Independence  began  to  go  away  and 
that  then  what  the  Nation  had  to  guard  against 
was  the  disunity  that  might  follow. 

The  United  States  did  have  problems  in  that 
respect.  And  we  survived  those  problems. 

But  I  would  simply  say  that  as  we  look  at  the 
new  nations  of  Africa,  as  we  see  the  problems 
that  are  there,  it  is,  of  course,  very  natural  to 
expect  that  a  new  country,  a  young  country, 
starting  with  new  programs,  dealing  with  great, 
great  problems,  cannot  be  expected  overnight  to 
have  the  unity  either  within  a  country  and  cer- 


JUNE    23,    1969 


539 


tainly  not  the  kind  of  a  unity  which  covers  a 
wliole  continent. 

This  should  not  be  discouraging.  It  is  only  a 
challenge. 

I  would  add  another  point.  As  we  look  back 
on  our  own  history  and  as  each  of  you  looks  back 
on  your  history,  we  tend  and  you  tend  to  think 
of  those  who  led  the  revolutions — they  are  our 
great  heroes.  I  would  suggest  tliat  perhaps  the 
more  difficult  task  is  not  for  those  who  lead  a 
revolution,  as  difficult  and  as  challenging  as  that 
is,  but  those  who  build  a  nation  after  the  revolu- 
tion is  won. 

And  that  is  one  problem  that  you  have — the 
Ajnbassadors  who  are  here,  your  Governments 
at  home.  It  is  not  as  exciting.  It  sometimes  may 
be  very,  very  difficult  and  tortuous  and  some- 
times almost  dull.  But  this  kind  of  work,  the 
challenging  job,  day  in  and  day  out,  of  building 
rather  than  destroying,  building  a  nation 
rather  than  destroying  one,  this  is  the  true  test 
of  a  people. 

And  all  over  this  great  continent,  particularly 
in  the  newer  comitries,  the  people  of  Africa  are 
meeting  that  test. 

And  then  another  point  I  would  make  with 
regard  to  the  Organization  of  African  Unity, 
I  would  emphasize  that  we  would  not  want  and 
you  would  not  want  to  see  that  unity  destroy 
the  differences  that  can  enrich  the  whole  life  of 
a  continent  and  the  life  of  this  world. 

What  we  want  is  the  kind  of  unity  which  al- 
lows the  diversity  which  enriches  a  nation  or  a 
continent  and  avoiding  the  disunity  which 
destroys. 

As  we  consider  that,  we  think,  therefore,  of 
the  future  of  Africa  at  this  time,  on  the  sixth 
amiiversary  of  a  very  young  organization — but 
an  organization  with  tremendous  responsibil- 
ities in  the  years  ahead. 

And  I  simply  want  to  say  that  speaking  as  one 
who  has  visited  several  of  your  countries,  speak- 
ing as  one  who  knows  that  the  problems  of  build- 
ing a  new  government,  building  a  new  society, 
are  perhaps  infinitely  greater  than  those  of 
simply  changing  it  through  revolution,  that  I 
admire  and  respect  those  who  are  working  in 
this  difficult  task. 

I  do  not  expect  and  no  one  should  expect  that 
that  task  will  be  achieved  overnight.  And  I 
would  say  that  what  we  all  are  privileged  today 
to  commemorate  is  the  fact  that  people  so 
diverse,  so  different,  over  this  great  continent 
with  300  million  people  and  all  the  potential  for 
the  future,  that  the  people  there  are  working  in 


their  different  way  toward  the  same  goal,  the 
unity  which  will  avoid  that  destruction  which 
comes  from  war,  but  also  the  diversity  which 
will  allow  for  the  creative  freedom  which  we 
all  know  leads  to  progress  and  prosperity. 

Mr.  Ambassador,  I  want  you  to  know  that 
Mrs.  Nixon  and  I  are  privileged  to  be  here  in 
this  house,  to  be  here  on  this  bit  of  African  soil. 
As  we  are  here,  we  want  you  to  know,  all  of  you 
from  every  one  of  the  countries  represented,  that 
with  all  the  grave  problems  we  have  in  the 
M'orld,  the  jiroblems  of  Asia  and  Viet-Nam,  of 
Europe,  of  Latin  America,  that  you  do  have  in 
the  President  of  the  United  States  a  man  who 
knows  Africa— not  as  well  as  he  should,  but  he 
knows  it,  he  believes  in  its  future,  and  he  wants 
to  work  with  you  for  that  greater  future. 

Thank  you. 


University  of  Minnesota  Band  Returns 
From  Tour  of  Soviet  Union 

The  University  of  Minnesota  Concert  Band 
Ensemhle^  which  toured  the  Soviet  Union 
April  1-May  20  under  the  cultural  exchanges 
]7rogram,  gave  a  concer't  in  the  Rose  Garden  of 
the  White  House  on  May  23.  Following  are 
excerpts  from  remarks  made  on  that  occasion 
hy  President  Nixon  and  Soviet  Ambassador 
Anatoliy  F.  Dohrynin.^ 

White  House  press  release  dated  May  23 

PRESIDENT  NIXON 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  On  behalf  of  all  of  you 
who  had  the  opportunity  to  hear  this  splendid 
program,  I  wish  to  express  our  appreciation 
and  the  appreciation  of  the  Nation  for  this  fine 
musical  organization. 

I  think  that  as  we  conclude  the  program  you 
would  like  to  know  and  to  meet  at  least  some  of 
the  other  distinguished  guests  who  are  here  in 
addition  to  the  distinguished  guests  who  are 
part  of  this  musical  organization. 

First  I  should  say  that  when  you  hear  a  band 


'  The  president  of  the  University  of  Minnesota,  Mal- 
oolm  Moos,  and  former  American  Ambassador  to  the 
Soviet  Union  Llewellyn  F.  Thompson  also  spoke 
briefly ;  their  remarks  are  included  in  the  White  House 
press  release. 


540 


DEPAKTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


like  this  play  so  well,  including  somebody  who 
can  play  a  tuba  like  I  didn't  think  a  trumpet 
could  be  played,  when  you  hear  that  you 
wonder:  Are  they  really  amateurs,  are  they 
really  students  ? 

I  am  sure  that  we  would  all  like  to  see  the 
man  who  played  a  major  role  in  helping  to 
make  these  arrangements  and  wlio  represents 
his  countiy  with  such  distinction  here  in  Wash- 
ington, Ambassador  Dobrynin.  Mr.  Ambassa- 
dor, would  you  like  to  come  uj:)  and  say  a  word? 


AMBASSADOR  DOBRYNIN 

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  thank  you  very 
much,  Mr.  President,  and  you,  Mrs.  Nixon,  for 
this  wonderful  occasion  wliich  you  organized 
here  and  so  graciously  invited  my  wife  and 
myself  here  on  tliis  special  occasion. 

In  a  way  it  is  really  rather  a  special  occasion 
for  my  wife  and  myself,  because  my  unpression 
is  that  this  is  the  first  time — at  least  during  the 
lengthy  tour  of  my  being  here  as  Ambassador  to 
this  country — that  for  the  first  time  Russian 
music,  together  with  tlie  American  music,  was 
played  here  at  the  Rose  Garden  of  the  Wliite 
House. 

I  should  confess  that  even  before  they  began 
playing — I  knew  what  wonderful  success  they 
had  in  my  country,  but  even  today  before  they 
began  playing — I  was  prepared  to  say  the  music 
is  going  to  be  very  nice  and  very  good  for  me. 

During  the  tour  of  this  orchestra  they  had 
a  wonderful  success  in  my  country.  They 
traveled  through  many  cities,  many  places  of 
my  country ;  and  as  far  as  I  know,  they  had  real 
good  receptions. 

They  are  not  only  good  musicians,  but  they 
were  very  good  and  distinguished  ambassadors 
of  your  people,  Mr.  President ;  and  I  would  like 
to  congratulate  all  of  you  Americans  for  these 
wonderful  ambassadors  you  had  in  my  country 
for  2  months. 

There  is  no  discriminaition  to  the  professional 
diplomats,  the  professional  ambassadors,  and 
I  take  the  occasion  to  congratulate  the  presence 
here  of  Ambassador  Thompson  and  his  wife, 
who  contributed  so  much  to  tlie  development  of 
relations  between  two  countries. 

I  would  like  to  add  just  a  few  words.  That 
nice  young  man  who  was  playing  this  wonder- 
ful instrument  of  his,  if  I  were  in  your  place, 
Mr.  President,  I  would  appoint  him  Assistant 


Secretary  for  the  State  Department  [Laughter.] 
because  his  notes  sounded  much  better  than 
the  notes  we  exchange  in  a  diplomatic  way. 
[Laughter.]  But  this,  of  course,  is  a  joke. 

Well,  Mr.  President,  really,  the  performance 
which  was  made  today  and  the  lengthy  tour  of 
my  country  of  this  wonderful  orchestra  once 
again  shows  that  the  real  good  music  really  is 
of  a  wide  world  nature  and  as  one  of  our  f  ixmous 
Russian  composers  of  the  19th  century  once 
said — Glinka — "It  is  not  we,  it  is  the  people 
who  create  the  music  but  not  we  composers.  We 
composers  only  arrange  this  music." 

So  although  music  is  national  in  character, 
if  it  is  a  real  good  one,  it  soon  crosses  the 
boundaries  and  becomes  the  common  heritage 
of  all  mankind. 

With  this  particular  consideration,  I  would 
like  to  finish  these  few  remarks  and  emphasize 
that  today's  occasion  was  a  very  particular  one, 
not  because  we  have  a  very  good  performance, 
a  very  good  audience,  but  we  have  also  not  only 
very  good  entertainment,  but  it  was  a  very  good 
sign  and  a  very  good  symbol  of  our  relations 
between  two  countries,  and  I  hope  they  are 
going  to  improve  more  and  more. 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  President. 


PRESIDENT  NIXON 

Ten  years  ago — and  it  was  just  10  years  ago 
that  Mrs.  Nixon  and  I  went  to  the  Soviet  Union 
on  an  official  visit — our  host  on  that  occasion 
was  the  man  mentioned  a  moment  ago  by  Am- 
bassador Dobrynin,  one  of  the  most  distin- 
guished representatives  of  the  Foreign  Service 
of  the  United  States,  one  wlio  has  served  in 
major  posts  throughout  the  world  and  who  has 
just  completed  his  diplomatic  career  but  is 
going  on  in  other  careers  and  still  serving  the 
Nation  in  special  capacities,  Ambassador 
Thompson. 

I  would  like  to  conclude  this  very  heartwarm- 
ing and  exciting  performance  here  in  the  Rose 
Garden  with  a  response  to  the  remarks  of  our 
two  Ambassadors,  Ambassador  Thompson  and 
Ambassador  Dobrynin,  and  to  say  a  word  with 
regard  to  the  itinerary  of  this  band. 

Here  in  the  United  States  we  all,  of  course, 
know  of  Moscow  and  Leningrad,  the  great  cities 
that  are  so  often  visited  and  are  so  often  in  the 


JUNE    23,    1909 


541 


news;  but  very  few  Americans  have  had  the 
opportunity  to  visit  and  to  know  the  other  parts 
of  this  country  and  those  parts  this  band  had 
the  opportunity  to  visit,  and  I  think  this  is  of 
interest  to  all  of  us. 

I  noticed  on  their  itinerary  is  Novosibirsk,  a 
great  city  in  the  heart  of  Siberia.  I  recall  that 
when  we  were  there  in  1959  we  saw  the  Novosi- 
birsk Ballet  Company  put  on  a  performance  of 
Swan  Lake  that  was,  I  think,  almost  up  to  the 
Bolshoi.  Some  said  it  was  better.  But  in  any 
event,  it  indicated  what  was  going  on  in  the 
other  parts  of  the  country. 

In  addition  to  that,  this  musical  organiza- 
tion went  to  Alma-Ata,  which  is  down  in  what 
is  called  the  Asian  part  of  the  Soviet  Union.  It 
is  only  about  100  miles  from  the  Chinese  border. 
It  is  a  very  different  part  of  the  country.  It  is 
called  the  country  where  the  apples  grow. 

Then  in  addition  they  went  to  the  storied  and 
famous  city  of  Samarkand,  where  you  can  see 
the  magnificent  temples  for  miles  and  miles 
before  you  get  there,  glistening  there  in  the  sun- 
light. Then,  as  I  was  reading,  before  the  band 
came  this  morning,  some  background  with  re- 
gard to  Samarkand,  in  the  year  327  Alexander 
the  Great  took  it  by  storm,  and  in  the  year  700 
the  Arab  forces  had  to  conquer  it  by  siege.  Then 
700  years  ago,  in  the  year  1200,  Genghis  Khan 
again  conquered  Samarkand,  but  only  after  a 
siege.  I  think,  Mr.  Ambassador,  you  will  agree 
that  this  musical  organization,  without  firing  a 
shot,  took  Samarkand  easily  on  this  trip  by  the 
reception  they  received  there. 

But  if  I  could  indicate  the  thrust  of  my  re- 
marks directly  to  what  the  Ambassador  has 
said,  any  of  us  who  have  traveled  in  the  Soviet 
Union  know,  as  we  meet  the  Russian  people  in 
all  of  the  f  arflung  areas  of  that  country,  that  the 
Russian  people  and  the  American  people  are  not 
natural  enemies.  The  Russian  people  and  the 
American  people,  on  the  contrary,  are  natural 
friends. 

We  have  somewhat  the  same  sense  of  humor, 
as  the  Ambassador  so  well  demonstrated  a  few 
moments  ago.  We  like  much  of  the  same  kind 
of  music.  We  respect  each  other. 

Now,  it  is  true  that  in  terms  of  our  diplo- 
matic problems  today  we  have  some  very  great 
differences,  to  which  the  Ambassador  alluded, 
and  those  differences  it  is  the  responsibility  of 
statesmen  and  diplomats  to  resolve  without 
having  them  escalate  into  armed  conflict. 

But  I  think  that  the  hope  of  all  of  us  today, 


as  we  hear  this  magnificent  musical  organiza- 
tion and  as  we  think  of  those  things  we  have 
in  common,  is  this :  that  the  time  will  come  when 
the  Russian  people  and  the  American  people 
and  the  Soviet  Nation  and  the  American  Nation 
will  continue  to  be  rivals — as  good  friends  can 
be — and  we  shall  continue  to  compete — as 
friends  can  compete— but  we  shall  compete  in 
how  each  of  us  can  enrich  life  rather  than  de- 
stroy it,  how  we  can  enrich  life  through  our 
music,  through  our  culture,  through  our  eco- 
nomic progress,  through  all  of  those  areas  in 
which  the  people  of  the  world,  wherever  they 
may  live,  have  a  vital  interest  in  the  quality  of 
life. 

I  think  this  is  the  lesson  this  band  brings  to 
us  here  today.  I  hope  this  will  only  be  the  be- 
ginning of  more  exchanges  where  the  Russian 
people  and  the  American  peojDle  will  know  each 
other  better  so  that  we  can  realize  as  states- 
men what  a  responsibility  that  we  have  to  see 
to  it  that  these  two  great  peoples  can  live 
together — yes,  in  rivalry,  but  in  rivalry  with  the 
peaceful  competition  which  can  only  be  good 
for  both  of  us. 

Thank  you. 


U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Recommend  Admission 
of  Japan  and  Mongolia  to  ENDC 

Follotoing  is  a  statement  issued  at  Geneva  on 
May  23  hy  the  Cochairmen  of  the  Eighteen- 
Nation  Disarmament  CoTnmittee,  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative Adrian  S.  Fisher  and  U.S.S.R. 
Representative  A.  A.  Roshchin. 

The  Co-Chairmen  of  the  ENDC  have  been  in 
consultation  for  some  time  about  the  composi- 
tion of  this  Committee. 

Our  aim  is  to  promote  further  use  of  this 
Committee  as  an  instrument  to  pursue  the  re- 
laxation of  international  tensions  and  to  nego- 
tiate disarmament  measures,  ending  ultimately 
in  an  agreement  on  GCD  [general  and  complete 
disarmament] ,  in  accordance  with  the  report  of 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  the 
16th  General  Assembly  on  the  results  of  the 
bilateral  talks :  Agreed  Statement  of  Principles, 
September,  1961.^ 

The  choice  of  additional  candidate-countries 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  9,  1961,  p.  589. 


542 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


has  been  most  difficult  for  both  Co-Chairmen. 
Many  countries  desire  and  deserve  to  be  in- 
cluded in  this  Committee,  but  it  has  been  found 
impossible  to  reach  agreement  on  a  Co-Chair- 
men recommendation  before  the  close  of  this 
session  which  would  preserve  the  balance  of  the 
Committee  when  it  was  established  in  1961. 

Co-Chairmen  at  this  stage  have  agreed  on  two 
comitries,  Japan  and  the  Mongolian  People's 
Republic,  which  they  could  jointly  recommend 
as  additional  members  to  the  Committee.  The 
Co-Chairmen  also  agreed  that  the  enlargement 
of  the  Committee  cannot  be  confined  to  these 
two  countries.  Various  other  regions  of  the 
world  should  be  represented  to  give  the  enlarge- 
ment geographic  and  political  balance.  The 
Co-Chairmen  will  continue  their  efforts  to  reach 
agreement  urgently  on  these  other  coimtries 
during  the  recess. 

The  Co-Chairmen  asked  the  views  of  the 
Committee  on  whether  it  would  be  appropriate 
to  invite  Japan  and  the  Mongolian  People's 
Republic  to  participate  in  the  summer  session, 
scheduled  to  start  July  3, 1969. 

After  consultation  with  the  Committee,  the 
Co-Chairmen  have  decided  that  such  invitations 
should  be  extended. 


U.S.,  Canada  Release  IJC  Report 
on  Survey  of  Red  River  Pollution 

Press  release  114  dated  May  12 

The  U.S.  Government  on  May  12  released  the 
International  Joint  Commission's  report  on  the 
pollution  of  the  Eed  River.^  The  Government 
of  Canada  simultaneously  made  the  same  docu- 
ment public  in  Ottawa. 

The  IJC,  the  international  body  charged  by 
both  Governments  with  a  watchdog  role  over 
boundary  and  transboundary  waters,  began  its 
investigation  of  the  Red  River  in  October  1964. 
The  Commission  concluded  that  during  the 
survey  period  the  waters  of  the  Red  River  cross- 
ing the  boundary  were  not  polluted  to  an  extent 
that  caused  injury  to  health  or  property  in 
Canada.  The  Commission  also  concluded  that 
injury  to  health  or  property  in  Canada  is  not 


^  Single  copies  of  the  IJC  report  are  available  on 
request  from  the  International  Joint  Commission,  1711 
New  York  Ave.,  NW.,  Washington,  D.C.  20440. 


likely  so  long  as  the  States  of  Minnesota  and 
North  Dakota  adhere  to  the  water  quality 
standards  established  by  legislation  in  each 
State. 

The  IJC  recommended  that  the  water  quality 
at  the  boundary  be  maintained  at  a  level  which 
would  permit  its  use  for  human  consumption, 
industry,  livestock,  and  wildlife  and  for  irri- 
gation, fishing,  or  boating.  The  Commission 
further  recommended  that  it  be  authorized  to 
establish  and  maintain  continuous  supervision 
over  the  quality  of  the  waters  crossing  the  in- 
ternational border.  The  two  Governments  have 
accepted  and  approved  these  recommendations. 


Department's  Records  for  1939-41 
Now  Open  to  Researchers 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
May  15  (press  release  119)  that  it  has  tempo- 
rarily modified  its  procedures  for  granting  ac- 
cess to  formerly  classified  foreign  policy  records 
of  the  years  1939,  1940,  and  1941. 

The  standing  regulations  of  the  Department 
provide  for  the  opening  of  records  30  years  old 
to  all  scholars.  Thus,  on  January  1,  1969,  the 
"open  period"  for  Department  of  State  records 
was  extended  through  1938. 

These  regulations  also  provide  that  scholars 
who  are  American  citizens  may  be  granted  ac- 
cess to  certain  classified  records  less  than  30 
years  old  by  applying  to  the  Department  and 
by  agreeing  to  the  review  of  their  notes.  It  has 
now  been  administratively  determined  that  these 
requirements  need  not  be  followed  for  records 
of  the  years  1939, 1940,  and  1941.  These  records 
will  be  treated  as  though  they  were  in  the  "open 
period." 

The  records  for  these  3  years  are  under  the 
administrative  control  of  the  National  Arcliives, 
and  most  of  them  are  physically  in  the  National 
Archives  building  in  Washington.  They  may 
now  be  consulted  by  all  scholars  in  accordance 
with  the  standard  procedures  of  the  National 
Archives. 

For  access  to  records  of  the  years  1942-45, 
scholars  who  are  American  citizens  may  apply 
to  the  Director  of  the  Historical  Office,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520.  The 
classified  foreign  policy  records  of  the  Depart- 
ment are  closed  for  the  period  after  1945. 


JUNE    23.    1969 


543 


Mr.  Meyer  Named  Chairman 
of  U.S.  Section  of  CODAF 

The  "VVliite  House  announced  on  May  21  that 
President  Nixon  had  that  day  designated 
Charles  A.  Meyer,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Inter-American  Affairs,  to  succeed  Am- 
bassador Raymond  Telles  as  Chairman  of  the 
U.S.  Section  of  the  United  States-Mexico  Com- 
mission for  Border  Development  and  Friend- 
ship. 

Mr.  Meyer  will  assume  this  position  concur- 
rently with  his  other  responsibilities  for  execut- 
ing United  States  policy  toward  Latin 
America. 

The  President  also  designated  Antonio  F. 
Rodriguez  as  Commissioner  and  Director  of 
US-CODAF. 


U.S.  Implements  Convention 
on  Service  of  Documents 

AN     EXECUTIVE     ORDER' 

Relating  to  the  Implementation  of  the  Convention 
ON  the  Service  Abroad  of  .Judicial  and  Extra- 
judicial   Documents    in     Civil    or    Commercial 

Matters 

The  Couvention  on  the  Service  Abroad  of  Judicial 
and  Extrajudicial  Documents  °  was  ratified  by  the 
United  States  of  America  and  proclaimed  by  the  Presi- 
dent on  January  8,  1969.  It  came  into  force  on  Feb- 
ruary 10, 1969.  The  Contracting  States  have  now  under- 
taken to  designate  authorities  to  give  effect  to  the 
Convention's  provisions. 

In  order  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America  may  give  full  and  complete  effect  to  the 
Convention,  it  is  expedient  and  necessary  that  several 
departments  of  the  Executive  Branch  of  that  Govern- 
ment perform  certain  functions. 

Now,  therefore,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in 
me  by  section  301  of  title  3  of  the  United  States  Code 
and  as  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  it 
is  ordered  as  follows  : 

Section  1.  Designation  of  Central  Authority.  The 
Department  of  State  is  designated  as  the  Central  Au- 
thority to  receive  requests  for  service  from  other  Con- 
tracting States  and  to  proceed  in  conformity  with 
articles  3-6  of  the  Convention. 

Sec  2.  Designation  of  Authority  To  Complete  Certif- 
icate. The  Department  of  State,  the  Department  of 
Justice  and  the  United  States  Marshal  or  Deputy  Mar- 
shal for  the  judicial  district  in  which  service  is  made 


are  designated  as  authorities  to  complete  the  certificate 
in  the  form  annexed  to  the  Convention. 

Sec.  3.  Additional  Designations.  The  Secretary  of 
State,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Attorney  General 
in  cases  involving  designations  of  authority  to  officers 
of  the  Department  of  Justice,  is  authorized  to  make  ad- 
ditional designations  provided  for  in  the  Convention 
or  to  modify  the  designations  made  by  this  order- 


The  White  House, 
May  28,  1969. 


Authority  Delegated  to  Secretary 
on  Fisheries  Recommendations 

AN   EXECUTIVE    ORDERi 

Delegating  to  the  Secretary  of  State  Authority  To 
Approve  or  Reject  Recommendations  and  Actions 
OF  Certain  Fisheries  Commissions 

By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  In  me  by  section 
301  of  title  3  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  it  is  ordered  as  follows : 

Section  1.  The  Secretary  of  State  is  hereby  desig- 
nated and  empowered  to  perform  the  following-de- 
scribed functions  without  the  approval,  ratification,  or 
other  action  of  the  President : 

(1)  The  authority  vested  in  the  President  by  section 
6  ( a )  of  the  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Act  of  1954  (68  Stat. 
699;  16  U.S.C.  1025(a) )  to  accept  or  reject,  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States,  recommendations  made  by  the 
International  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commission  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  III,  section  1, 
of  the  International  Convention  for  the  High  Seas 
Fisheries  of  the  North  Pacific  Ocean  (signed  at  Tokyo 
May  9,  1952,  TIAS  2786)  and  recommendations  made 
by  the  Commission  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Protocol  to  that  Convention. 

(2)  The  authority  vested  in  the  President  by  Article 
III,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Convention  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Canada  for  the  Preservation  of 
the  Halibut  Fishery  of  the  Northern  Pacific  Ocean  and 
Bering  Sea  (signed  at  Ottawa,  March  2,  1953,  TIAS 
2900)  to  approve  or  reject  actions  of  the  International 
Pacific  Halibut  Commission  taken  pursuant  to  that 
paragraph. 

Sec  2.  In  carrying  out  his  authority  under  section  1 
of  this  order  the  Secretary  of  State  shall  consult  with 
the  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 

The  White  House, 
May  1, 1969. 


'  No.  11471 ;  34  Fed.  Reg.  8349. 

"  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  6638. 


'  No.  11467 ;  34  Fed.  Reg.  7271. 


544 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Supports  Extension  of  Export  Control  Act 


Statement  hy  Joseph  A.  Greenwald 

Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ' 


Tlie  Department  of  State  has  an  important 
interest  in  the  continuation  of  the  authority  set 
fortli  in  the  Export  Control  Act  of  1949,  as 
amended.  This  act  represents  the  legislative 
basis  for  the  operation  of  a  selective  control  on 
strategic  exports  to  Communist  countries  as  re- 
quired in  the  Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Con- 
trol Act  of  1951  (the  Battle  Act).  It  thus 
enables  the  United  States  to  fulfill  its  commit- 
ments to  other  allied  countries  cooperating  in  the 
multilateral  strategic  trade  control  system 
known  as  COCOM,  or  the  Coordinating 
Committee. 

The  Export  Control  Act  also  makes  it  pos- 
sible to  carry  out  the  United  States  trade  denial 
programs  which  are  a  part  of  United  States 
policy  toward  Communist  China,  North  Korea, 
North  Viet-Nam,  and  Cuba.  We  participate  in 
a  trade  sanction  program  toward  Southern 
Rhodesia  and  an  arms  denial  program  toward 
the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  both  under 
United  Nations  resolutions.  In  support  of  the 
Limited  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty  and  the  U.S. 
nuclear  nonproliferation  policy,  export  controls 
are  exercised  over  commodities  and  technology 
used  in  the  development  and  testing  of  nuclear 
weapons. 

These  export  control  programs  all  fall  within 
the  policy  declaration  in  section  2,  paragraph 
(1),  of  the  Export  Control  Act  that  sets  forth 
the  policy  of  using  expoi-t  controls  to  the  extent 
necessary  "to  further  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  and  to  aid  in  fulfilling  its  inter- 
national responsibilities"  and  "to  exercise  the 


'  Made  before  the  Subcominittee  on  International 
Finance  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking  and  Cur- 
rency on  May  28. 


necessary  vigilance  over  exports  from  the  stand- 
point of  their  significance  to  the  national  secu- 
i-ity  of  the  United  States." 

We  believe  that  the  present  act  has  proven 
to  be  over  the  years  a  workable  formulation 
of  policy  and  of  necessary  authority  and  en- 
forcement. It  provides  sufficient  discretionary 
power  to  permit  the  President  to  act  flexibly  in 
response  to  different  situations  at  different 
times.  There  is  great  virtue  in  such  legislation. 
If  the  language  of  the  law  were  more  explicit, 
its  versatility  in  meeting  changed  circumstances 
would  be  less.  As  it  is,  the  act  has  permitted  the 
implementation  of  policies  of  total  trade  denial 
to  certain  Communist  countries  while  at  the 
same  time  permitting  policies  of  continuing  to 
facilitate  nonstrategic  trade  with  certain  other 
Communist  countries. 

The  Department  of  State  participates  ac- 
tively in  the  interdeiiartmental  consultation 
with  the  Department  of  Commerce  that  is  called 
for  in  the  Export  Control  Act.  This  assistance 
includes  consideration  of  general  policy  issues, 
decisions  on  categories  of  items  to  be  controlled, 
and  examination  of  individual  licensing  trans- 
actions. The  Department  of  State  has  a  prin- 
cipal responsibility  for  providing  guidance  to 
Commerce  on  the  need  for  controls  to  further 
our  foreign  policy  and  to  fulfill  United  States 
obligations  resulting  from  international  com- 
mitments. The  Department  of  State  also  has 
an  interest  in  the  adequacy  of  controls  over 
goods  and  technology  of  potential  strategic 
significance  that  may  effectively  be  controlled 
by  the  United  States  alone.  Wliile  we  do  not 
have  extensive  technical  expertise  in  this  area, 
we  do  provide  relevant  information  and  advice 
either  from  the  Department  in  Washington  or 


JUNE    23,    1969 


545 


on  occasion  from  our  Foreign  Service  missions 
abroad. 

Beyond  the  area  of  strategic  trade,  as  defined 
eitlier  by  COCOM  or  by  the  process  of  inter- 
departmental consultation  with  the  Department 
of  Commerce  respectmg  equipment  and  tech- 
nology controlled  by  the  United  States  alone, 
there  is  also  the  question  of  trade  in  other  goods. 

It  is  the  policy  of  this  administration  to  con- 
tinue to  facilitate  participation  by  American 
businessmen  in  nonstrategic  trade  or,  as  it  is 
sometimes  referred  to,  trade  in  peaceful  goods 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe,  so  long  as  this  trade  is  con- 
ducted in  accordance  with  the  applicable  laws 
and  regulations.  Admittedly,  it  is  difficult  to 
draw  a  clear  line  between  strategic  and  non- 
strategic.  For  this  reason,  review  of  individual 
transactions  is  often  necessary,  except,  of  course, 
for  such  goods  as  are  freely  exportable  under 
general  license  to  the  U.S.S.R.  and  Eastern 
Europe. 

Consistent  with  our  export  promotion  drive, 
we  believe  it  is  desirable  that  American  com- 
panies not  be  placed  at  any  more  of  a  competi- 
tive handicap  than  is  necessary  in  terms  of  the 
national  security.  This  can  be  accomplished 
imder  the  authority  in  the  present  Export  Con- 
trol Act  which  provides  room  for  further  re- 
duction of  the  U.S.  export  control  list  for  trade 
with  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  to 
the  extent  consistent  with  national  security. 

The  prospects  for  an  increase  in  nonstrategic 
trade  are  modest  at  best  imder  present  condi- 
tions. The  other  major  trading  countries  of  the 
world  have  historically  been  more  deeply  in- 
volved in  East- West  trade  than  has  the  United 
States.  Our  exports  last  year  represented  only 
$217  million  of  trade,  while  exports  to  the  So- 
viet Union  and  Eastern  Europe  by  other 
COCOM  countries  were  in  the  vicinity  of  $3.7 
billion. 

The  impact  of  United  States  export  controls 
in  limiting  the  volume  of  our  trade  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  has  fre- 
quently been  exaggerated.  The  prospects  for  the 
United  States  to  obtain  a  larger  share  of  this 
market  are  limited  by  other  impediments  as 
well.  Availability  of  gold  and  convertible  cur- 
rencies in  the  Eastern  European  countries  is 
limited  in  relation  to  their  import  needs.  The 
range  and  market  appeal  of  the  products  of 
these  countries  are  also  limited  and  are  not  com- 


546 


petitive  in  the  American  market.  Existing  trade 
patterns  and  practices  as  well  as  a  tendency  to- 
ward bilateral  commercial  arrangements  op- 
erate to  perpetuate  the  inlierent  advantages  of 
Western  Europe  and  Japan  in  trade  with  the 
Communist  countries.  The  rigidities  still  in- 
herent in  state  trading  and  economic  planning 
systems  as  well  as  Communist  objectives  of  co- 
ordinating their  economic  and  trading  systems 
among  themselves  are  also  limiting  factors. 

The  economic  benefits  that  might  flow  from  a 
liberalization  of  export  controls  are  therefore 
limited,  unless  accompanied  by  some  modifica- 
tion of  other  elements  that  have  a  role  in  deter- 
mining the  level  of  potential  trade. 

Wliile  the  potential  economic  benefits  would 
be  relatively  modest,  the  larger  question  would 
relate  to  the  political  significance  that  may  be 
connected  with  East- West  trade.  There  are  a 
number  of  elements  to  be  considered  in  examin- 
ing this  question. 

It  is  first  necessary  to  recognize  that  trade  by 
itself  cannot  be  a  determining  factor  in  defining 
the  nature  of  our  relationship  with  the  Com- 
munist world  or  in  resolving  international  ten- 
sions. The  conduct  of  trade  usually  assumes 
some  minimiun  standards  of  harmonious  inter- 
governmental relations,  but  there  is  not  a 
clearly  established  cause-and-effect  relationship 
between  the  two.  Indeed,  the  experience  of  some 
of  our  allies  in  their  commercial  relations  with 
mainland  China  has  been  that  trade  has  not 
been  associated  with  harmonious  bilateral 
relationships. 

A  further  consideration  is  that  the  limited  po- 
tential of  trade  to  be  associated  with  improve- 
ment in  the  political  climate  has  relatively  more 
significance  for  our  relations  with  the  Eastern 
European  countries  than  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  U.S.S.R.  has  substantially  less  dependence 
on  international  trade  than  do  the  smaller  and 
economically  weaker  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe. 

Despite  the  limited  significance  of  trade  as 
a  determinant  of  policy  and  despite  its  varying 
economic  impoitance  as  among  the  different 
Communist  coimtries  of  Europe,  trade  is  fre- 
quently given  a  political  significance — both  in 
the  East  and  in  the  West.  If  such  significance  is 
to  be  ascribed  to  trade,  it  must  be  put  in  the 
context  of  our  overall  relations  with  the  Eastern 
European  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
Actions  which  might  be  judged  desirable  in 


I 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


this  setting  would  be  possible  under  the  Export 
Control  Act  as  it  stands.  It  provides  the  neces- 
sary degree  of  flexibility,  including  flexibility 
to  differentiate  ia  the  treatment  of  individual 
Communist  countries. 

To  the  extent  that  liberalizing  amendments  of 
the  Export  Control  Act  could  be  broadly  viewed 
as  a  decision  having  political  and  foreign  rela- 
tions significance,  we  think  such  definitive  action 
would  not  be  warranted  in  present  circum- 
stances. We  are  exploring  possibilities  with  the 
hope  of  finding  a  basis  which  may  lead  to  more 
far-reaching  action  to  liberalize  trade.  We  do 
not,  however,  feel  that  this  situation  exists 
today. 

We  therefore  favor  a  simple  extension  of  the 
Export  Control  Act. 


Food  for  Peace  Report  for  1968 
Transmitted  to  the  Congress 

Message  From  President  Nixon 

White  House  press  release  dated  April  22 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States : 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  the  report  for  1968 
on  the  Food  for  Peace  Program  ^  under  Public 
Law  480 — a  program  which  over  the  years  has 
helped  provide  better  diets  for  millions  of  peo- 
ple in  more  than  100  nations.  In  addition  to 
its  primary  humanitarian  aspects,  Food  for 
Peace  contributes  significantly  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  export  markets  for  U.S.  agricultural 
commodities  and  to  the  U.S.  balance  of  pay- 
ments position. 

While  this  is  my  first  official  report  on  the 
program  as  President,  I  have  been  closely  as- 
sociated with  it  since  its  beginning.  This  great 
humanitarian  effort  began  in  1954  during  the 
Presidency  of  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower.  As  Vice 
President  at  the  time,  I  was  keenly  interested 
in  the  program  and  have  followed  its  develop- 
ment and  accomplishments  ever  since. 

It  is  evident  that  the  battle  against  hunger 
must  continue,  both  in  the  United  States  and  in 
the  world  at  large,  through  programs  such  as 
Food  for  Peace.  The  present  Administration 


eagerly  accepts  this  challenge  and  dedicates  it- 
self to  dealing  effectively  with  the  problems  of 
hunger  and  malnutrition  at  home  and  abroad. 


KiCHARD  NiXOX 


The  Whtte  House, 
April  22, 1969. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


United  States  and  France  Amend 
Air  Transport  Agreement 

Press  release  144  dated  May  29 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
France  on  May  29  concluded  in  Paris  an  ex- 
change of  diplomatic  notes  amending  the  route 
schedule  to  the  Air  Transport  Services  Agree- 
ment between  the  United  States  and  France 
dated  March  27,  1946,  as  amended.^  The  effect 
of  the  amendments  is  as  follows : 

(1)  The  substitution  of  Philadelphia  for 
Baltimore  on  French  route  1 ; 

(2)  The  grant  to  France  of  Pago  Pago 
(American  Samoa)  via  Nandi  (Fiji)  on  a  re- 
drawn French  route  8  from  New  Caledonia, 
Bora  Bora,  and  Tahiti  to  the  west  coast  of  the 
United  States; 

(3)  The  grant  to  the  United  States  of  local, 
stopover,  and  connecting  traffic  rights  between 
Paris  and  points  in  Turkey  on  U.S.  route  1 ; 

(4)  The  grant  to  the  United  States  of  flexi- 
bility of  all-cargo  operations,  i.e.,  all -cargo 
services  operated  without  regard  to  linear  route 
description,  between  named  points  in  France 
(Paris,  Marseille,  and  Nice),  and  points  in  the 
United  States,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, and  points  on  U.S.  routes  1  and  2 ; 

(5)  Confirmation  of  Montreal-New  York 
"blind  sector"  rights  for  Air  France  all-cargo 
flights  and  the  grant  to  France  of  a  similar 
degree  of  flexibility  with  respect  to  all-cargo 
operations  from  France  to  New  York,  Chicago, 
or  Los  Angeles  via  Montreal. 


^  H.  Doe.  91-104, 91st  Cong.,  1st  sess. 


'  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  1679, 
2106,  2257,  2258,  4336. 


JUNE    23,    1969 


547 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the  principles 
and  purposes  of  the  Antarctic  treaty  of  December  1, 
1959  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Paris  November  29, 
1968.' 

Notification  of  approval:  United  Kingdom,  Recom- 
mendation V-2,  May  27,  1969. 

Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago,  1944 
(TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170) ,  with  annex.  Done  at  Buenos 
Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Mall,  May  27, 1969. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  ATA  carnet  for  the  tem- 
porary admission  of  goods  with  annex.  Opened  for 
signature  at  Brussels  December  6,  1961.  Entered 
into  force  July  30,  1963;  for  the  United  States 
March  3, 1969.  TIAS  6631. 

Acceptance  of  ATA  cornets  for  goods  temporarilii  im- 
ported under  the  international  convention  to  facil- 
itate the  importation  of  commercial  samples  and 
advertising  material  (TIAS  3920):  United  States, 
effective  June  30, 1969. 

Narcotic   Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at 
New  York  March  30,  1961.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 13,  1964;  for  the  United  States  June  24,  1967. 
TIAS  6298. 

Ratification  deposited:  Republic  of  China,  May  12, 
1969. 

Nuclear  Test  Ban 

Treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the  atmos- 
phere, in  outer  space,  and  under  water.  Done  at 
Moscow  August  5,  1963.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 10, 1963.  TIAS  5433. 

Accession  deposited  in  Washington:  Swaziland, 
May  29, 1969. 

Space 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession     deposited     at     Washington:     Thailand, 

May  30,  1969. 
Ratification    deposited    at    Washington:    Hungary, 

June  4,  1969. 


Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with  an- 
nexes.  Done  at   Moutreux  November  12,  1965.  En- 
tered into  force  January  1,  1967;  for  the  United 
States  May  29, 1967.  TIAS  6267. 
Accession  deposited:  Albania,  May  5,  1969. 

Trade 

Fourth  proeSs-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional  accession  of  the  United  Arab  Republic 
to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  of 
November  13,  1962  (TIAS  5309).  Done  at  Geneva 
November  19,  1968.  Entered  into  force  February  27, 
1969.^ 

Acceptances:  Czechoslovakia,  March  24,  1969 ;  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  April  1,  1969 ; '  Kenya, 
May  12,  1969 ;  Tanzania,  March  26,  1969. 
Fifth  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional    accession    of    Tunisia    to    the    General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  of  November  12, 
1959    (TIAS  449S).  Done  at  Geneva  November  19, 
1968.  Entered  into  force  December  17,  1968." 
Acceptances:  Czechoslovakia,  March  24,  1969:  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  April  1,  1969 ; '  Kenya, 
May  12,  1969 ;  Tanzania,  March  26,  1069. 

Treaties 

Convention  on  the  law  of  treaties.  Adopted  at  Vienna 
May  22,  1969.  Enters  into  force  on  the  30th  day 
following  the  date  of  deposit  of  the  35th  instrument 
of  ratification  or  accession. 

Signatures:  Afghanistan,  Argentina,  Barbados, 
Bolivia,  Brazil,  Cambodia,  Chile,  Colombia,  Congo 
(Brazzaville),  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Finland, 
Ghana,  Guatemala,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Iran, 
Jamaica,  Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Mexico, 
Morocco,  Nepal,  Nigeria,  Peru,  Philippines,  Sudan, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Uruguay,  Yugoslavia, 
Zambia,  May  23, 1969. 


BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement  authorizing  temporary  additional  diversion 
for  power  purposes  of  water  flowing  over  American 
Falls  at  Niagara.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  March  21,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
May  20,  1969. 
Proclaimed  hy  the  President:  May  27,  1969. 

Iceland 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  June  5, 1967  (TIAS  6300). 
Signed  at  Reykjavik  May  23,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  May  23, 1969. 


"  Not  in  force. 

"  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

'  Subject  to  ratification. 


548 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX      June  23,  1969      Vol.  LX,  No.  1565 


Africa.  President  Nixon  Hails  Sixth  Anni- 
versary of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity 
(remarks  by  President  Nixon  and  Liberian 
Ambassador    Peal) 537 

Aviation.  United  States  and  France  Amend  Air 
Transport   Agreement 547 

Canada.  U.S.,  Canada  Release  IJC  Report  on 

Survey  of  Red  River  Pollution 543 

China.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of 
June  5  (transcript) 529 

Congress 

Department  Supports  Extension  of  Export  Con- 
trol Act  (Greenwald) 545 

Food  for  Peace  Report  for  1968  Transmitted 
to  the  Congress  (Nixon) 547 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Authority  Delegated  to  Secretary  on  Fisheries 
Recommendations   (Executive    order)     .     .     .      544 

Department's  Records  for  1939-41  Now  Open 
to  Researchers 543 

Disarmament 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  June  5 

(transcript)        529 

U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Recommend  Admission  of  Japan 

and  Mongolia  to  ENDC   (joint  statement)     .      542 

Economic  Affairs 

Authority  Delegated  to  Secretary  on  Fisheries 
Recommendations    (Executive  order)     .     .     .      544 

U.S.,  Canada  Release  IJC  Report  on  Survey  of 
Red    River    Pollution 543 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  University 
of  Minnesota  Band  Returns  From  Tour  of 
Soviet  Union  (Nixon,  Dobrynin) 540 

Europe.  Department  Supports  Extension  of  Ex- 
port Control  Act  (Greenwald) 545 

Foreign  Aid.  Food  for  Peace  Report  for  1968 

Transmitted  to  the  Congress  (Nixon)     .     .     .      547 

France.  United  States  and  France  Amend  Air 
Transport   Agreement 547 

International  Organizations  and   Conferences. 

U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Recommend  Admission  of  Japan 

and  Mongolia  to  ENDC   (joint  statement)     .       542 

Japan 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  June  5 

(transcript) 529 

U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Recommend  Admission  of  Japan 

and  Mongolia  to  ENDC   (joint  statement)     .       542 

Latin  America.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Con- 
ference of  June  5  (transcript) 529 

Mexico.  Mr.   Meyer  Named  Chairman   of  U.S. 

Section  of  CODAF 544 

Mongolia.  U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Recommend  Admisision 
of  Japan  and  Mongolia  to  ENDC  (joint 
statement) 542 

Near  East.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference 

of  June  5  (transcript) 529 

Pakistan.  Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference 
of  June  5  (transcript) 529 

Presidential  Documents 

America's  Role  in  the  World 525 

Authority  Delegated  to  Secretary  on  Fisheries 
Recommendations 544 

Food  for  Peace  Report  for  1968  Transmitted 
to  the  Congress 547 

President  Nixon  Hails  Sixth  Anniversary  of  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity 537 

U.S.  Implements  Convention  on  Service  of  Docu- 
ments      544 

University  of  Minnesota  Band  Returns  From 
Tour  of  Soviet  Union 540 


Public  Affairs.  Department's  Records  for  1939- 
41  Now  Open  to  Researchers 543 

Trade.  Department  Supports  Extension  of  Ex- 
port Control  Act  (Greenwald) 545 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 548 

United  States  and  France  Amend  Air  Trans- 
port   Agreement 547 

U.S.  Implements  Convention  on  Service  of  Docu- 
ments (Executive  order) 544 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  June  5 

(transcript) 529 

U.S.,  U.S.S.R.  Recommend  Admission  of  Japan 

and  Mongolia  to  ENDC   (joint  statement)  542 

University  of  Jlinnesota  Band  Returns  From 
Tour  of  Soviet  Union  (Nixon,  Dobrynin)     .     .      540 

Viet-Nam 

Secretary  Rogers'  News  Conference  of  June  5 

(transcript) 529 

20th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at 
Paris  (Lodge) 535 

Name  Index 

Dobrynin,  Anatoliy  F 540 

Greenwald,  Joseph  A 545 

Lodge,    Henry   Cabot 535 

Meyer,    Charles   A 544 

Nixon,  President 525,  537,  540,  544,  547 

Peal,  S.  Edward 537 

Rogers,     Secretary 529 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  June  2-8 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflSce 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  June  2  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  114  of 
May  12,  119  of  May  15,  and  144  of  May  29. 

No.        Dale  Subject 

tl45    6/5    U.S.    delegation    to    Inter- American 
Cultural     Council,     Port-of-Spain, 
June  3-10. 
146    6/5     Lodge :  20th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris. 

*147    6/5    Vaughn  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Colombia  (biographic  details). 
148    6/5     Rogers :  news  conference  on  June  5. 

*149  6/5  Moore  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Ireland  (biographic  details). 

*150  6/5  Meyer  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Japan   (biographic  details). 

*151  6/6  John  Davis  Lodge  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Argentina  (biographic 
details). 

*152  6/6  Program  for  the  visit  of  President 
Carlos  Lleras  Restrepo  of  Colom- 
bia. 

tl53  6/8  Richardson:  Emerson  College,  Bos- 
ton, Mass. 


*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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JUL  111969 

THE 

DEPOSITORY 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1566 


June  SO,  1969 


PRESIDENT^NIXON  AND  PRESIDENT  THIEU  CONFER  AT  MIDWAY  ISLAND 
Exchanges  of  Remarks  and  Text  of  Joint  Statement     549 

EAST-WEST  RELATIONS:  THE  PROCESS  OF  GAINING  NEW  EVIDENCE 

Address  by  Under  Secretary  Richardson     557 

ECONOMIC  AND  MILITARY  ASSISTANCE  PROPOSALS 
FOR  FISCAL  YEAR  1970 

Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Richardson 
Made  Before  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations     569 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


^. 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LX,  No.  1566 
June  30,  1969 


for  sale  by  tbe  Superintendent  of  Documents 

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Washington,  D.C.  20402 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publication 

approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 

the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OP 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN^ 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by   the 
Office  of  Media   Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
tvith  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The     BULLETIN    includes    selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made   by   the   President  and  by   the  I 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers\ 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements     to     which     the     Vnitedi 
States    is    or    may    become    a   partyl 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg' 
islative  material  in  the  field  of  inter' 
national  relations  are  listed  currently tj 


President  Nixon  and  President  Thieu  Confer  at  Midway  Island 


President  Nixon  and  President  Thieu  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  met  at  Midway  Island 
on  June  8.  Following  are  their  exchange  of 
remarks  after  a  private  meeting  that  morning, 
the  text  of  their  joint  statement,  and  their  ex- 
change of  remarks  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
meeting,  together  with  remarks  made  iy  Presi- 
dent Nixon  at  a  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn 
of  the  White  House  upon  his  return  on  June  10. 


THE  MEETING  AT  MIDWAY  ISLAND,  JUNE  8 
Exchange  of  Remarks  After  Private  Meeting 

White  House  press  release  (Midway  Island)  dated  June  8 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  President,  I  want  to  take  this  opportu- 
nity officially  to  welcome  you  to  this  meeting  at 
Midway  and  to  tell  you  how  much  I  have  ap- 
preciated the  opportunity  to  talk  with  you 
again.  We  met  on  two  occasions  in  your  country. 
This  is  the  first  time  we  have  had  the  chance  to 
talk  in  our  present  capacities  as  heads  of  our 
Governments  and  chiefs  of  state. 

Our  meeting  this  morning  has  taken  approxi- 
mately 2  hours.  We  will  continue  our  private 
discussion  through  the  noon  hour  before  meet- 
ing the  larger  group,  including  the  Secretary 
of  State,  and  their  opposite  numbers,  for  ap- 
proximately an  hour  and  a  half  later  in  the 
afternoon. 

The  communique  at  the  end  of  the  day,  which 
will  be  issued  at  approximately  4 :00,  will  cover 
the  wide  range  of  subjects  that  the  President 
and  I  have  discussed.  Among  those  this  morn- 
ing were  these:  the  progress  of  the  talks  in 
Paris;  the  situation  in  Viet-Nam  in  a  number 
of  areas ;  the  pacification  program,  where  I  re- 
ceived a  very  encouraging  report  from  the 
President;  plans  for  what  seems  to  me  a  very 
important  land  reform  program,  which  will  be 


implemented  in  South  Viet-Nam  by  President 
Tlueu  and  his  government;  and  the  progress 
insofar  as  the  conduct  of  the  war  is  concerned. 

In  addition  to  these  subjects,  all  of  wliich  will 
be  covered  in  the  communique  wliich  will  be 
given  to  you  later  this  afternoon,  the  President 
and  I  had  a  substantial  discussion  with  regard 
to  the  present  situation  insofar  as  the  training 
of  South  Vietnamese  armed  forces  is  concerned. 

As  a  result  of  that  discussion,  we  reached  a 
decision  wliich  I  should  like  to  report  to  you 
now,  and  President  Thieu  will  also  express  his 
views  with  regard  to  this  decision. 

President  Thieu  mformed  me  that  the  prog- 
ress of  the  training  program  and  the  equipping 
program  for  South  Vietnamese  forces  had  been 
so  successful  that  he  could  now  recommend  that 
the  United  States  begin  to  replace  U.S.  combat 
forces  with  Vietnamese  forces.  This  same  as- 
sessment was  made  by  General  [Creighton  W.] 
Abrams  when  he  reported  to  me  last  night  and 
this  morning. 

As  a  consequence  of  the  recommendation  by 
the  President  and  the  assessment  of  our  own 
commander  in  the  field,  I  have  decided  to  order 
the  immediate  redeployment  from  Viet-Nam  of 
a  division  equivalent  of  approximately  25,000 
men. 

This  troop  replacement  will  begin  within  the 
next  30  days  and  will  be  completed  by  the  end 
of  August.  During  the  month  of  August  and  at 
regular  intervals  thereafter,  we  shall  review 
the  situation,  having  in  mind  the  three  criteria 
that  I  have  previously  mentioned  with  regard 
to  troop  replacement :  first,  the  progress  insofar 
as  the  training  and  equipping  of  South  Viet- 
namese forces;  second,  progress  in  the  Paris 
peace  talks;  and  third,  the  level  of  enemy 
activity. 

I  will  announce  plans  for  further  replace- 
ments as  decisions  are  made.  As  replacement  of 
U.S.  forces  begins,  I  want  to  emphasize  two 
fundamental   principles:   No   actions  will   be 


JUNE    30,    1969 


549 


taken  which  threaten  the  safety  of  our  troops 
and  the  troops  of  our  allies;  and  second,  no 
action  will  be  taken  wliich  endangers  the  attain- 
ment of  our  objective — the  right  of  self-deter- 
mination for  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam. 

It  is  significant  to  note  that  it  was  just  27 
years  ago  that  the  Battle  of  Midway,  which 
liistory  records  as  one  of  the  major  turning 
points  in  World  War  II,  came  to  a  conclusion. 
I  believe  that  the  decision  made  at  Midway 
today,  and  which  we  are  announcing  at  this 
time,  marks  a  significant  step  forward  in 
achieving  our  goal  of  protecting  the  right  of 
self-determination  for  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  and  in  bringing  lasting  peace  to  the 
Pacific. 

President  Thieu,  I  know  that  the  members  of 
the  press  would  like  to  hear  your  views  on  our 
discussions  as  well. 

President  Thieu 

Thank  you,  Mr.  President. 

Once  again  I  would  like  to  thank  you  most 
sincerely  for  your  very  kind  words  and  your 
cordial  welcome.  It  is  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to 
meet  with  President  Nixon  on  this  island  in  the 
middle  of  the  Pacific. 

It's  our  honest  hope  that  the  Pacific  will  be- 
come a  vast  community  of  free  nations  living 
in  peace,  prosperity,  and  brotherhood. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  as  everyone  knows,  this 
ocean  was  named  after  peace  because  the  first 
navigators  were  fortimate  enough  to  sail  over 
peaceful  waves.  But  other  navigators  subse- 
quently found  out  that  this  name  can  be  at  times 
only  a  pious  hope.  They  knew  they  had  to  rely 
on  their  strength,  determination,  and  persever- 
ance when  they  ran  into  stormy  weather. 

But  after  the  tempest  and  typhoon,  the  sun 
always  rises  over  the  immense  stretch  of  the  blue 
waters.  We  are,  therefore,  always  confident  of 
the  bright  and  beautiful  tomorrow. 

So,  Mr.  President,  once  again  I  look  forward 
very  much  to  my  exchange  of  views  with  you  on 
our  common  efforts  to  establish  a  long-lasting 
peace  and  freedom  in  Viet-Nam  and  in  South- 
east Asia. 

Now,  I  come  to  a  more  substantial  matter; 
that  is,  what  President  Nixon  just  said  to  you. 

As  you  know,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  as  I  have 
amaounced  many  times  in  the  past  12  months, 
it  has  been  the  constant  purpose  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam  to  shoulder 


an  increasing  share  in  the  stniggle  to  defend 
freedom  in  Viet-Nam  and  to  alleviate  the  bur- 
den nobly  assumed  by  the  United  States  in  par- 
ticipating with  us  in  tliis  struggle.  We  have 
made  continued  efforts  in  that  direction. 

And  in  the  past  months  the  strengthening  of 
the  Vietnamese  armed  forces  through  general 
mobilization  and  the  rapid  progi-ess  on  the  paci- 
fication and  the  rural  development  have  made  it 
possible  for  me  to  inform  President  Nixon  that 
the  anned  forces  of  Viet-Nam  are  now  able  to 
start  the  process  of  the  replacement  of  the  Amer- 
ican forces. 

And  the  equivalent  of  one  U.S.  combat  di- 
vision will  be  replaced  by  Vietnamese  troops. 
That  first  replacement  will  start  in  July  and 
will  be  completed  the  end  of  August.  Further 
reialacements  of  American  troops  will  be  con- 
sidered at  i-egular  intervals  in  the  light  of  the 
three  criteria  that  President  Nixon  has  decided : 
That  means  the  progress  in  training  and  equip- 
ment of  Vietnamese  armed  forces ;  secondly,  the 
level  of  Communist  hostility ;  and  thirdly,  the 
progress  which  can  be  made  in  Paris  talks. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  on  tliis  occasion  I 
would  like  once  again,  in  the  name  of  the  Viet- 
namese people,  to  express  our  deep  gratitude  for 
the  sacrifice  generously  accepted  by  the  Amer- 
ican people  in  joining  us  in  the  defense  of  free- 
dom in  Viet-Nam. 

Joint  Statement  of  President  Thieu 
and   President  Nixon 

White  House  press  release  (Midway  Island)  dated  June  8 

President  Nguyen  Van  Thieu  of  the  Republic 
of  Vietnam  and  President  Nixon  of  the  United 
States  met  on  Midway  Island  on  June  8,  1969. 
The  meeting  was  at  the  invitation  of  President 
Nixon. 

The  principal  purpose  of  the  meeting  was  to 
permit  the  two  Presidents  to  review  a  broad 
range  of  matters  of  mutual  interest.  These  in- 
cluded developments  in  Vietnam — political,  eco- 
nomic, and  military — the  Paris  talks,  and  the 
general  situation  in  Southeast  Asia.  Their  day- 
long discussions  were  chiefly  private  though 
they  drew  on  the  assistance  and  counsel  of  senior 
members  of  their  respective  governments. 
Though  it  marked  their  first  meeting  as  Chiefs 
of  State,  the  occasion  offered  President  Thieu 
and  President  Nixon  the  opportunity  to  renew 
a  friendship  dating  from  1965. 


550 


DEPAETMENT  OF   STATE  BULLETIN 


The  two  Presidents  examined  in  detail  the 
military  situation  in  Vietnam  and  received  a 
briefing  from  Vietnamese  and  American  mili- 
tary commanders.  They  agreed  that  the  failure 
of  the  other  side  to  achieve  its  objectives  should 
convince  it  of  its  inability  to  gain  a  victory  by 
military  means.  They  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  other  side  will  realize  the  futility  and  dan- 
gers of  its  efforts  and  that  it  will  accept  a  so- 
lution based  on  the  principle  of  self-determina- 
tion for  the  people  of  South  Vietnam.  They 
agreed  that  application  of  the  principle  of  self- 
determination  x'equires  that  the  people  be  able  to 
choose  without  interference  or  terror.  They  re- 
jected communist  attempts  to  pre-determine  the 
outcome  of  future  elections  before  they  are  held. 

The  two  Presidents  confirmed  their  conviction 
that  the  form  of  government  under  which  the 
people  of  South  Vietnam  will  live  should  be  de- 
cided by  the  people  themselves.  They  reiterated 
their  common  resolve  to  reject  any  attempt  to 
impose  upon  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  any  sys- 
tem or  program  or  any  particular  form  of  gov- 
ernment, such  as  coalition,  without  regard  to  the 
will  of  the  people  of  South  Vietnam.  They  de- 
clared for  their  part  they  will  respect  any  deci- 
sion by  the  people  of  South  Vietnam  that  is 
arrived  at  through  free  elections. 

The  two  Presidents  agreed  that  it  would  be 
appropriate  to  ofi'er  guarantees  and  safeguards 
for  free  elections.  Provisions  for  international 
supervision  could  be  written  into  the  political 
settlement. 

The  two  Presidents  reviewed  with  particular 
attention  the  steps  being  taken  to  modernize  and 
improve  the  Vietnamese  armed  forces.  Presi- 
dent Thieu  referred  to  the  principle  of  replace- 
ment of  American  by  Vietnamese  troops  which 
he  had  first  enunciated  in  his  address  to  the  na- 
tion of  December  31,  1968,  and  he  expressed 
pleasure  in  informing  President  Nixon  that  the 
armed  forces  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  were 
now  reaching  the  point  where  they  can  assume 
an  increasingly  large  share  of  the  burden  of 
combat. 

President  Nixon  welcomed  this  development. 
He  and  President  Thieu  thereafter  made  an 
annoimcement  regarding  the  replacement  pro- 
gram. Both  Presidents  agreed  that  the  replace- 
ment program  should  be  can-ied  out  in  conso- 
nance with  the  security  situation  prevailing  at 
the  moment. 

President  Thieu  explained  his  plans  for  fur- 


ther strengthening  the  local  forces  and  asked 
for  additional  assistance  for  that  program. 
President  Nixon  said  he  would  give  tliis  request 
sympathetic  consideration. 

The  two  Presidents  then  discussed  the  nego- 
tiations taking  place  in  Paris.  They  reviewed 
cai'ef  ully  the  positions  each  had  recently  enunci- 
ated— President  Thieu  on  March  25,  when  he 
made  the  offer  to  talk  directly  with  the  "Na- 
tional Liberation  Front,"  the  six  points  he  pre- 
sented on  April  7,  and  President  Nixon's  May 
14  speech.!  -j'j^e  (^^^q  Presidents  are  convinced 
that  the  proposals  they  have  put  forward  rep- 
resent a  reasonable  basis  for  peace.  They  took 
note  of  the  10-point  proposal  tabled  by  the  other 
side  in  Paris  on  May  8,  and  observed  that  de- 
spite the  fact  that  it  contained  certain  unac- 
ceptable provisions,  there  were  certain  points 
which  appear  not  too  far  from  the  positions 
taken  by  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Vietnam  and  the  United  States. 

The  two  Presidents  expressed  their  intention 
to  seek  a  just  settlement  to  the  conflict  in  the 
spirit  of  patience  and  good  ■will.  President 
Thieu  reiterated  his  Government's  willingness 
to  talk  directly  to  the  NLF  about  moves  relat- 
ing to  a  peaceful  settlement. 

The  two  Presidents  reviewed  and  reaffirmed 
the  positions  taken  in  conceit  by  the  allies  at  the 
recent  seven-nations  conference  of  ministers  in 
Bangkok.^  They  reiterated  in  particular  the  al- 
lied position  concerning  mutual  withdrawals  of 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces,  agreeing  that 
withdrawals  could  commence  simultaneously 
and  proceed  expeditiously  on  the  basis  of  a 
mutually  acceptable  timetable;  that  all  exter- 
nally introduced  forces  would  have  to  be  with- 
drawn not  only  from  South  Vietnam  but  also 
from  Laos  and  Cambodia ;  and  that  the  further 
introduction  of  forces  into  these  countries  must 
be  prohibited.  They  agreed  that  the  essential 
element  of  any  arrangement  on  withdrawal  of 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  is  that  there  be 
adequate  assurances  and  guarantees  of  compli- 
ance with  the  terms  of  the  arrangement. 

President  Thieu  informed  President  Nixon 
that  his  Government  was  devoted  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  social  and  political  justice  for  the  peo- 
ple of  South  Vietnam.  The  policy  of  national 


*  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation 
on  May  14,  see  Bulletin  of  June  2, 1969,  p.  457. 

'  For  text  of  a  communique  issued  at  Bangkok  on 
May  22,  see  Bulletin  of  June  9, 1969,  p.  481. 


JUNE    30,    1969 


551 


reconciliation  had  been  adopted  with  this  in 
mind.  His  offer  to  negotiate  directly  with  the 
"National  Liberation  Front" — without  condi- 
tions— had  been  inspired  by  tlais  principle.  If 
the  other  side  is  genuinely  interested  in  finding 
jjeace,  it  should  be  possible  to  create  an  atmos- 
phere in  South  Vietnam  in  which  all  of  the  peo- 
ple of  South  Vietnam  can  participate  in  the 
life  of  a  free,  viable,  and  prosperous  state. 

Tlie  two  Presidents  discussed  the  progress 
that  has  been  made  in  economic  and  political  de- 
velopment in  Vietnam  despite  the  present  con- 
flict, including  the  installation  of  the  supreme 
court  and  the  inspectorate  i^rovided  for  by  the 
Constitution,  the  wide-spread  holding  of  vil- 
lage and  hamlet  elections,  and  the  extension  of 
security  in  rural  areas.  President  Thieu  out- 
lined his  Government's  plans  for  additional 
village  and  hamlet  elections,  and  he  laid  par- 
ticular stress  on  his  pureuit  of  a  vigorous  land 
redistribution  program  that  would  give  the 
land  to  those  who  work  it.  President  Nixon  ex- 
pressed gratification  at  this  progress,  expressed 
special  interest  in  the  new  concepts  of  land  dis- 
tribution developed  by  President  Thieu  and  of- 
fered American  cooperation  to  help  acliieve  it. 

Finally,  the  two  Presidents  reviewed  the 
plans  now  being  formulated  by  the  Republic 
of  Vietnam  for  the  post-war  development  of 
the  country.  They  expressed  gratification  that, 
despite  the  continuation  of  the  conflict,  plans 
were  going  forward.  Given  the  substantial  nat- 
ural and  human  resources  available,  the  pros- 
pects are  excellent  for  conversion  to  a  peacetime 
economy,  job  opportunities,  increased  domestic 
production  in  agriculture  and  industry,  as  well 
as  exports.  President  Nixon  pledged  his  coun- 
try's assistance  to  this  end.  Economic  self-suffi- 
ciency could  be  achieved  in  a  decade  of  peace. 
The  two  Presidents  looked  forward,  after  the 
termination  of  hostilities,  to  an  era  of  peace  and 
the  economic  and  national  development  of 
Southeast  Asia. 

President  Thieu  asked  President  Nixon  to 
convey  to  the  American  people  the  deep  grati- 
tude of  the  people  of  South  Vietnam  for  the 
sacrifices  they  have  made  and  the  assistance 
they  have  given  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  in  its 
struggle  to  maintain  its  freedom.  President 
Nixon  assured  President  Thieu  of  the  deter- 
muiation  of  the  American  people  to  assist  their 
South  Vietnamese  allies  to  realize  the  basic  ob- 
jectives of  the  two  nations.  He  acknowledged 


the  trust  placed  in  the  American  people  by  the 
people  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  and  prom- 
ised that  tliis  trust  will  be  honored. 

The  two  Presidents  agreed  to  meet  again  and 
review  developments  in  the  near  future. 

Exchange  of  Remarks  at  Close  of  Meeting 

White  Honse  press  release  (Midway  Island)  dated  June  8 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  President,  as  we  complete  our  talks,  I 
wish  to  express  my  appreciation  to  you  for  your 
frankness  and  candor  in  discussing  the  prol^lems 
that  we  mutually  face  in  Viet- Nam ;  and  I  know 
that  you  share  with  me  the  sentiments  that 
were  expressed  in  our  communique,  which  has 
already  been  distributed  to  members  of  the 
press. 

I  believe  that  that  communique  indicates  the 
progress  tliat  has  been  made  and  the  progress 
we  can  expect  in  the  future  toward  a  resolution 
of  this  struggle  which  has  torn  apart  the  peo- 
ple of  North  Viet-Nam,  which  has  cost  your 
l^eople  so  much  in  men,  in  lives,  and  has  cost 
our  people  as  well. 

I  would  like  to  say,  finally,  this  one  personal 
word.  You  have  a  long  journey.  You  will  be 
back  in  Saigon  tonight  because  of  the  time 
change.  You  will  be  speaking  to  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam  when  you  amve.  Would  you 
extend  to  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  from 
the  people  of  the  United  States  our  good  wishes. 
We  know  how  they  have  suffered.  We  share 
with  them  the  tragedy  of  war.  We  want  for 
them  what  we  have  for  ourselves,  the  blessings 
of  peace  witliin  our  own  country  and  witliin 
your  own  country. 

We  know — and  I  speak  personally  in  this 
respect — that  the  people  of  your  coimtry  are  a 
peaceful  people,  a  hard-working  people,  that  if 
only  you  have  the  opportunity,  that  Viet-Nam 
can  be  one  of  the  most  powerful,  constructive 
forces  for  peace  and  progress  and  economic  de- 
velopment in  all  of  Southeast  Asia  and  the 
Pacific. 

This  is  what  I  feel  from  having  been  there 
many  times  before.  This  is  what  your  people 
are  fighting  for.  It  is  the  goal  which  we  all 
seek. 

We  wish  you  well  personally;  more  than 
that,  the  people  of  the  United  States  wish  your 
people  well.  We  look  forward  to  the  day  when 
they  can  live  in  peace  together. 


552 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


President  Thieu 

Mr.  President,  I  thank  you  very  much  for 
your  very  comfortable  words.  I  can  say  that  our 
first  meeting  here  in  Midway  is  very  useful.  It 
is  not  like  some  speculation  before  I  arrived 
here  that  there  would  be  some  difference  be- 
tween President  Nixon  and  President  Tliieu 
and  I  had  to  come  here  to  dissipate  or  to  discuss 
again  those  differences.  It  is  not  true. 

I  come  here  for  more  understanding  and 
closer  cooperation,  for  more  common  position 
between  President  Nixon  and  I — not  for  differ- 
ence, because  we  have  had  no  difference  before. 

You  may  mention  about  the  eight-point  pro- 
gram of  President  Nixon  for  peace.  I  ask  you 
to  remember  that  immediately  after  President 
Nixon  had  his  speech,  I  said  it  was  consistent 
with  the  position  of  Viet-Nam  and  very  consis- 
tent with  my  six  points. 

So  we  have  close  consultation  before,  and  we 
have  a  very  close  understanding  on  that.  So 
I  come  here  to  discuss  with  President  Nixon,  to 
have  better  cooperation,  and  to  have  a  better 
common  position. 

I  think  in  the  future,  when  the  circumstance 
demands  and  when  we  have  an  opportunity,  we 
may  agree  together  to  meet  again,  so  I  think 
this  is  the  best  way  to  have  closer  cooperation 
between  two  Governments  and  two  people. 

Now,  for  you  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  the 
press,  I  think  that  this  morning  President 
Nixon  and  I,  we  have  announced — and  what  I 
consider  good  news  for  the  American  people — - 
that  the  Vietnamese  forces  replace  the  U.S. 
combat  forces  to  an  equivalent  of  one  combat 
division. 

I  would  like  to  emphasize  again  it  is  a  con- 
stant duty  of  Vietnamese  people  to  take  over 
more  responsibility  and  to  alleviate  the  burden 
of  U.S.  people  to  support  us  to  defend  the  free- 
dom in  Viet-Nam. 

We  never  forget  that  the  blood  and  human 
life  are  precious  to  anyone,  to  any  people,  at 
any  time. 

So  I  tliink,  once  again,  we  are  very  grateful 
and  the  whole  Vietnamese  people  are  very 
grateful  for  the  sacrifice  that  the  United  States 
people  have  accepted  and  continue  to  accept  to 
join  us  in  defense  of  freedom  and  defend  the 
conmion  cause  of  the  free  world. 

But,  once  again,  I  say  that  we  will  do  our 
best — our  best — from  now  on  to  alleviate  the 
burden  of  the  American  people.  We  have  to 


do  our  best  to  deserve  the  noble  sacrifice  that  the 
American  people  have  accepted  for  Vietnamese 
people. 

Once  again,  I  hope  you  imderstand  well  my 
English.  I  am  ready  to  leave  for  Saigon  and  I 
sincerely  thank  President  Nixon  for  the  useful 
talks,  for  the  heartfelt  welcome,  the  hospitality 
of  the  people  in  Midway  Island.  It  is  the  first 
time  I  know  this  island  and  it  is  very 
interesting. 

I  think  you  may  join  us  to  share  the  success 
of  this  meeting.  Thank  you. 


PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
WASHINGTON,   JUNE   10 

White  House  press  release  dated  June  10 

After  a  very  long  jouniey  that  took  us  to  the 
middle  of  the  Pacific,  it  is  good  to  be  home 
again  and  to  be  received  so  warmly  by  all  of  you 
who  have  been  so  kind  to  come  out  here  and 
greet  us. 

As  all  of  you  know,  from  having  heard  the 
reports  from  our  meetings  in  the  Pacific,  it  was 
just  27  years  ago  that  a  great  battle  took  place 
at  Midway,  which  historians  now  recognize  was 
one  of  the  turning  points,  a  decisive  battle,  in 
World  War  II. 

I  know  that  all  of  you  will  be  interested  in 
an  appraisal  of  the  meaning  of  Midway  today. 
I  am  going  to  meet,  immediately  after  address- 
ing you,  with  the  legislative  leaders  in  order  to 
brief  them.  But  prior  to  that  time,  let  me  briefly 
tell  you  what  I  tliink  is  the  meaning  of  the 
meeting  that  we  had  at  Midway. 

First,  that  meeting  brought  home  the  message 
that  the  forces  of  South  Viet-Nam  have  now 
been  trained  and  equipped  to  the  point  that 
they  are  able  to  take  over  a  substantial  portion 
of  combat  activities  presently  being  borne  by 
Americans. 

Second,  that  meeting  means  that  President 
Tliieu  completely  approves  and  supports  the 
eight-point  peace  program  which  I  set  forth 
in  my  May  18  (May  14)  speech  to  the  Nation. 
There  is  no  disagreement  between  us  on  that 
program. 

And,  third,  that  meeting  means  that  after 
5  years  in  which  more  and  more  Americans 
have  been  sent  to  Viet-Nam,  we  finally  have 
reached  the  point  where  we  can  begin  to  brmg 
Americans  home  from  Viet-Nam. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  war  is  over. 


JUNE    30,    1969 


553 


There  are  negotiations  still  to  be  undertaken. 
There  is  fighting  still  to  be  borne  until  we  reach 
the  point  that  we  can  have  peace. 

But  I  do  think  in  conclusion  that  this  observa- 
tion is  worth  making:  By  the  May  18  (May  14) 
speech  that  I  made  setting  forth  an  eiglit- 
l^oint  program  for  peace,  and  by  our  action  in 
withdrawing  25,000  American  combat  forces 
from  Viet-Nam,  we  have  opened  wide  the  door 
to  peace. 

And  now  we  invite  the  leaders  of  North  Viet- 
Nam  to  walk  with  us  through  that  door,  either 
by  withdrawing  forces — their  forces — from 
South  Viet-Nam  as  we  have  withdrawn  ours  or 
by  negotiating  in  Paris  or  through  both 
avenues. 

We  believe  this  is  the  time  for  them  to  act. 
We  have  acted,  and  acted  in  good  faith.  And  if 
they  fail  to  act  in  one  direction  or  the  other, 
they  must  bear  the  responsibility  for  blocking 
the  road  to  peace  and  not  walking  through  that 
door  wliich  we  have  opened. 


21st  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  hy 
Latorence  Walsh,  deputy  head  of  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation, at  the  21st  plenary  session  of  the  new 
meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  June  12. 

Press  release  15G  dated  Juno  12 

Before  beginning  my  formal  statement  today, 
I  wish  to  make  some  remarks  regarding  the 
statements  by  the  spokesman  of  your  side  this 
morning. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  Paris  meetings  on 
Viet-Nam,  the  United  States  has  looked  on  these 
meetings  as  meetings  between  two  sides.  We 
have  recognized  that  each  side  may  organize 
itself  as  it  chooses.  We  continue  to  regard  these 
meetings  as  two-sided. 

As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  the  spokesmen  for 
your  side  have  introduced  changes  in  name  only. 
We  place  no  significance  on  the  manner  in  which 
you  choose  to  style  yourselves.  Such  changes  in 
no  way  ailect  the  conduct  of  our  business  at 
these  meetings. 

"Wliatever  you  do  for  self-serving  propaganda 
does  not  change  the  reality  of  the  political  and 


military  situation  in  South  Viet-Nam.  Nor  does 
it  change  the  basis  upon  which  these  negotia- 
tions at  the  Paris  meetings  should  seek  to 
achieve  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam.  In  tliis  regard,  we  will  continue  to 
l^resent  constructive  proposals  for  peace  in  the 
same  spirit  which  has  guided  us  in  the  past. 

I  now  propose  to  read  my  formal  statement. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Today  we  continue 
our  search  for  a  way  to  bring  lasting  peace  to 
Viet-Nam. 

Throughout  these  Paris  meetings,  our  side  has 
demonstrated  its  desire  to  bring  the  earliest 
ix)ssible  end  to  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  through 
negotiations.  From  the  very  first  session,  we 
have  sought  to  present  concrete  proposals  to 
solve  the  various  problems  involved  in  a  settle- 
ment. We  have  described  what  we  believe  the 
essential  elements  of  a  settlement  should  be 
and  how  we  might  reach  agreement  on  them. 

On  May  14  the  President  of  the  United  States 
proposed  measures  which  could  lead  rapidly  to 
peace.^  Two  days  later  Ambassador  Lodge  pre- 
sented the  President's  pi'oposals  for  peace  at  the 
Paris  meetings.^ 

President  Nixon  made  clear  that  we  have  a 
limited  objective  in  Viet-Nam;  it  is  to  seek  the 
opportunity  for  the  South  Vietnamese  people  to 
determine  their  own  political  future  without 
outside  interference.  As  the  President  said  on 
May  14,  we  are  not  attempting  to  impose  a 
military  solution  on  the  battlefield. 

The  proposals  we  have  made  are  based  on 
two  fundamental  principles:  First,  there 
should  be  a  withdrawal  of  all  non-South  Viet- 
namese forces  from  Soutli  Viet-Nam;  second, 
there  must  be  procedures  for  political  clioice  in 
South  Viet-Nam  that  give  each  sigmficant  group 
there  a  real  opportunity  to  participate  in  the 
political  life  of  the  nation. 

At  the  last  three  sessions  of  the  Paris  meet- 
ings, we  have  discussed  the  President's  pro- 
posals and  answered  questions  which  your  side 
has  raised  about  them. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  has  also  from  the  veiy  beginning  partici- 
pated in  these  meetings  in  a  constructive  and 
serious  manner. 

As  long  ago  as  March  25,  the  President  of 
the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  without  setting  any 


I 


I 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  to  tlie  Nation  on 
May  14,  see  Bulletin  of  June  2,  1969.  p.  457. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  467. 


554 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


prior  conditions,  offered  to  discuss  internal  po- 
litical matters  with  the  National  Liberation 
Front.  On  April  7,  he  made  his  six-point  pro- 
posal, which  was  the  foreninner  of  other  pro- 
posals made  since  that  time  by  the  two  sides. 

Last  Sunday  President  Nixon  and  President 
Thieu  met  at  Midway  Island.^  They  expressed 
their  intention  to  seek  a  just  settlement  in  Paris 
in  the  spirit  of  patience  and  good  will. 

Tlie  two  Presidents  confirmed  their  convic- 
tion that  the  form  of  government  under  which 
tlie  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  will  live  should 
be  decided  by  the  people  themselves.  They  re- 
iterated their  common  resolve  to  reject  any  at- 
tempt to  impose  upon  the  Kepublic  of  Viet-Nam 
any  system  or  program  or  any  particular  form 
of  government,  such  as  coalition,  without  re- 
gard to  the  will  of  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam.  They  declared  for  their  pai-t  they  will 
respect  any  decision  by  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  that  is  arrived  at  through  free  elections. 
The  two  Presidents  also  agreed  that  it  would  be 
appropriate  to  offer  guarantees  and  safeguards 
for  free  elections.  Provisions  for  international 
supervision  could  be  written  into  the  political 
settlement. 

President  Nixon  and  President  Thieu  reiter- 
ated their  position — a  position  shared  by  all  the 
nations  allied  in  the  defense  of  South  Viet- 
Nam — concerning  mutual  withdrawal  of  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  from  Soutli  Viet-Nam. 
They  agreed  that  withdrawals  could  commence 
simultaneously  and  proceed  expeditiously  on 
the  basis  of  a  mutually  acceptable  timetable, 
that  all  externally  introduced  forces  would  have 
to  be  withdrawn  not  only  from  South  Viet-Nam 
but  also  from  Laos  and  Cambodia,  and  that  the 
further  introduction  of  forces  into  these  coun- 
tries must  be  prohibited.  They  agreed  that  the 
essential  element  of  any  arrangement  on  with- 
drawal of  non-South  Vietnamese  forces  is  that 
there  be  adequate  assurances  and  guarantees  of 
compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  arrangement. 

The  two  Presidents  reviewed  the  steps  being 
taken  to  modernize  and  improve  the  South  Viet- 
namese armed  forces.  They  announced  the  re- 
placement of  25,000  American  combat  troops  by 
South  Vietnamese  forces.  President  Nixon  said 
that  tliis  reduction  of  some  combat  units  would 
begm  withui  30  days  and  be  completed  by  the 
end  of  August.  He  also,  on  his  return  to  Wash- 


'  See  p.  549. 


ington,  invited  the  leaders  of  North  Viet-Nam 
to  respond  to  this  action  toward  peace  both  by 
action  in  the  field  and  by  negotiating  in  Paris. 

Let  me  now  contrast  our  side's  positions  and 
actions  with  your  side's  attitude. 

Your  side  has  presented  a  10-point  proposal 
for  a  settlement.  We  have  examined  the  propos- 
als carefully.  In  the  past  several  sessions  of 
these  meetings  we  have  conmiented  on  them, 
compared  them  with  our  own  proposals,  and 
asked  a  number  of  questions  about  them  in  an 
effort  to  seek  clarification  and  find  common 
grotmd.  At  Midway,  President  Tliieu  and 
President  Nixon  obsei-ved  that,  despite  the  fact 
that  your  side's  10-point  proposal  contained 
certain  unacceptable  provisions,  there  were  cer- 
tain points  which  appear  not  too  far  from  the 
positions  taken  by  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  and  the  United  States. 

Wliile  we  welcome  the  fact  that  your  side  has 
presented  its  first  comprehensive  program,  we 
have  not  been  encouraged  by  the  approach  you 
have  taken  since  you  put  your  proposals 
forward. 

Instead  of  trying  to  find  common  points 
among  the  proposals  of  the  two  sides,  as  we 
have  done,  you  have  stressed  the  differences. 
You  have  even  denied  that  there  is  any  com- 
mon ground  between  our  two  proposals,  despite 
certain  obvious  similarities.  And  where  there 
are  differences  between  our  sides,  you  have 
shown  no  inclination  to  try  to  bridge  those 
differences. 

Rather,  you  either  reject  out  of  hand  or 
simply  criticize  the  proposals  which  our  side 
puts  forward.  And  you  continue  to  insist  that  a 
settlement  can  only  be  based  on  your  own  10 
points. 

Your  side  demands  the  unconditional  with- 
drawal of  United  States  and  Allied  forces.  You 
have  not  yet  stated  whether  North  Vietnamese 
military  and  subversive  forces  will  withdraw 
from  South  Viet-Nam  and  from  Cambodia  and 
Laos. 

You  call  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  despite  the 
fact  that  you  came  to  the  Paris  meetings  which 
were  convened  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  a  set- 
tlement through  negotiations  with  the  partici- 
pation of  that  government. 

Your  side  continues  to  dwell  upon  the  charge 
that  the  United  States  is  committing  aggi'ession 
in  Viet-Nam.  You  do  this  knowing  that  we 
reject  that  charge  and  despite  our  repeated 


JUXE    30,    1969 


555 


pleas  to  set  the  question  of  aggression  aside 
and  get  on  with  the  practical  business  of  ne- 
gotiating a  settlement.  This  way  of  approach- 
ing the  problem — of  trying  to  impose  one  side's 
point  of  view  on  the  other — only  hinders  the 
effort  to  arrive  at  a  negotiated  solution. 

Moreover,  on  tlie  ground  in  South  Viet-Nam, 
you  increase  your  military  and  terrorist  activ- 
ities and  plan  new  military  offensives.  Wliile 
you  admonisli  us  not  to  try  to  negotiate  from  a 
position  of  strength,  you  exhort  your  own 
troops  to  win  military  victories  so  that  you  can 
force  us  to  accept  your  terms  in  Paris. 

As  we  have  said  before,  if  your  side  wants 
peace,  that  is  not  the  way  to  get  it. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  whatever  the  differ- 
ences of  views  between  us,  we  have  come  to 
Paris  to  negotiate  an  end  to  the  war  in  Viet- 
Nam.  On  our  side,  we  have  set  aside  ideological 
differences  and  made  practical  proposals  for  a 
settlement.  We  have  stated  clearly  that  our  pro- 
posals are  not  presented  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.  We  are  ready  to  negotiate. 

We  have  said  that  we  insist  on  no  rigid  diplo- 
matic formula.  Peace  could  be  achieved  by  a 
formal  negotiated  settlement.  Or  it  could  be 
achieved  by  an  informal  tmderstanding,  pro- 
vided the  understanding  is  clear  and  there  are 
adequate  assurances  it  will  be  observed.  Peace 
on  paper  is  not  as  important  as  peace  in  fact. 

Your  insistence  that  our  side  accept  your  way 
of  looking  at  questions  cannot  lead  to  practical 
solutions  to  the  problems  we  face  here.  We 
intend  to  continue  to  try  to  exchange  views  on 
each  other's  proposals  in  the  hope  that  we  can 
find  common  ground.  We  would  like  you  to 
join  us  in  a  genuine  give-and-take  process, 
which  is  necessary  if  negotiations  are  to  be 
successful. 


U.S.  Regrets  Nigerian  Attack 
on  Relief  Plights  Into  Biafra 

Department  Statement  ^ 

The  United  States  has  learned  with  deep  re- 
gret of  the  attack  by  the  Nigerian  Air  Force  on 
one  and  possibly  more  transport  aircraft  carry- 
ing relief  supplies  into  Biafra.  The  exact  nimi- 
ber  of  aircraft  involved  and  the  circumstances 
are  not  yet  clear.  We  are  urgently  seeking 
details. 

The  United  States  has  taken  a  clear  position 
with  regard  to  relief  in  the  Nigerian  civil  war. 
We  have  drawn  a  sharp  distinction  between  the 
political  issues  underlying  the  conflict  and 
humanitarian  relief  to  both  sides.  We  have  con- 
sistently avoided  military  and  direct  political 
involvement  in  the  war.  At  the  same  time,  how- 
ever, we  have  played  a  leading  role  in  the  inter- 
national effort  to  reduce  suffering  on  both  sides. 
The  American  people  have  contributed  gener- 
ously to  this  cause. 

We  have  on  a  number  of  occasions  urged  Ni- 
geria to  take  precautions  which  would  avoid  the 
dangers  of  action  against  relief  operations. 
Wliile  recognizing  the  problem  created  by  the 
intermingling  of  arms  flights  and  relief  flights, 
the  United  States  Government  deplores  this 
attack. 

This  incident  underlines  the  urgency  of  al- 
ternative relief  arrangements  for  daylight 
fliglits  and  surface  corridors.  This  has  been  the 
mission  of  Ambassador  C.  Clyde  Ferguson,  our 
Special  Coordinator  for  relief,  who  has  been 
working  with  both  sides  to  this  end. 


1 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Robert  J.  McCloskey  on  June  6. 


556 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


East-West  Relations:  The  Process  of  Gaining  New  Evidence 


ty  Under  Secretary  Elliot  L.  Biclmrdson ' 


The  role  of  the  visitor  on  campus  is  some- 
what reversed  this  year.  Normally  he  views 
himself  as  coming  from  the  world  of  activity 
to  an  island  of  peace  and  contemplation.  He 
expects  to  be  asked  what  is  going  on.  This  year 
it  is  he  who  is  asking  what  is  going  on.  He  is 
the  observer  coming  to  where  the  action  is  and 
the  headlines  are  being  made,  and  he  is  eager 
to  learn  more  about  the  springs  and  levers  of 
campus  intrigue  and  activity. 

I  shall  refrain,  therefore,  from  giving  you 
sententious  advice  on  what  you  ought  or 
ought  not  to  do  after  leaving  this  campus.  But 
I  cannot  resist  pointing  out  certain  seeming 
parallels  between  life  on  campus  and  beyond. 

I  was  reminded  of  these  not  long  ago  on  hear- 
ing of  a  sign  held  by  a  student  at  one  of  the 
iimumerable  demonstrations  at  Columbia.  It 
said :  "If  you  don't  know  where  you  are,  you're 
in  the  right  place." 

Beyond  the  somewhat  poignant  humor  of 
that  slogan  lies,  I  think,  a  wry  and  perhaps 
even  profound  commentary  on  our  cuiTent  state 
of  affairs.  On  and  off  campus  many  of  us  don't 
quite  know  where  we  are  or  where  we  may  be 
going.  Many  of  our  traditional  moorings  have 
come  loose,  and  we  have  not  yet  foimd  new 
places  where  we  can  safely  drop  anchor.  And 
this  fact  is,  I  think,  as  true  for  the  world  of 
international  affairs  as  it  is  in  our  social  mores 
and  our  personal  lives. 

It  is  the  international  world  to  which  I 
would  like  to  address  myself  today.  The  high 
interest  of  this  generation  of  students  in  for- 
eign affairs — an  interest  apparently  exceeding 
upon  occasion  even  such  subjects  as  the  sexual 


'  Commencement  address  made  at  Emerson  College, 
Boston,  Mass.,  on  June  8  (press  release  153). 


integration  of  dormitory  accommodations  or 
the  "liberation"  of  administration  buildings — 
is  most  welcome  and  is  already  having  an  im- 
portant impact. 

One  reason  for  this  impact  is  easily  identified. 
We  are  getting  younger  as  a  nation.  By  the  end 
of  this  year,  fully  half  of  our  population  will 
be  under  25  years  old. 

Much  is  talked  and  written  about  the  genera- 
tion gap.  (Gaps — generation,  missile,  credibil- 
ity, and  so  on — seem,  in  fact,  almost  to  be  an 
obsession  with  us.)  I  have  seen  everything  from 
Dr.  Spock  to  international  conspiracies  blamed 
for  the  fact  that  the  yomiger  half  of  the  coun- 
try does  not  necessarily  agree  with  all  of  the 
wisdom  that  we  in  our  magnanimity  are  pleased 
to  bestow  on  it. 

Challenge  and  Response  After  World  War  II 

I  shall  not  venture  into  this  bog  of  specula- 
tion, though  I  do  want  to  suggest  what  seems 
to  me  an  obvious  contributing  factor  to  the 
difference  between  the  generations  in  their  atti- 
tudes on  foreign  affairs :  The  tragic  events  im- 
mediately following  World  War  II  which  gave 
rise  to  what  we  now  know  as  the  cold  war  are 
not  part  of  the  collective  memory  of  the  younger 
half  of  our  population. 

To  you,  indeed,  it  may  seem  as  if  life  has  al- 
ways been  the  way  it  is  now,  that  there  has 
always  been  the  need  to  maintain  a  veiy  power- 
fid  military,  that  there  has  always  been  a  nu- 
clear balance  of  terror,  that  there  has  always 
been  a  draft.  But,  of  course,  this  is  not  so.  As 
Harvard's  Professor  George  Wald  pointed  out 
in  his  celebrated  speech  at  MIT  m  March,  be- 
fore World  War  II  our  whole  Army  and  Air 
Force  consisted  of  only  139,000  men.  Following 


JUNE    30,    1969 


557 


V-J  Day  we  once  again  demobilized  our  armies. 
Between  1945  and  1948,  in  fact,  we  slashed  our 
annual  military  expenditures  from  $80  billion 
to  $11  billion. 

For  the  younger  half  of  our  population,  the 
series  of  postwar  events  which  reversed  this 
pattern  are  lost  in  the  dim  mists  of  history.  But 
for  many  of  us  these  events,  which  sent  trau- 
matic shock  waves  through  this  country,  remain 
a  vivid  memory.  We  remember  how  in  March 
of  1946  the  Soviet  Union  announced  that  it 
would  keep  its  troops  in  Iran,  despite  earlier 
agreements  to  the  contrary.  We  remember  how 
it  threatened  to  use  force  against  Turkey  if 
that  neighboring  country  would  not  allow  her 
to  establish  bases  on  Turkish  soil.  We  remember 
also  how  it  walked  out  of  the  meeting  launching 
the  Marshall  Plan,  how  it  blocked  access  to 
Berlin,  and  how  veto  after  veto  obstructed  the 
work  of  the  U.N.  And  we  remember  how  it 
reneged  on  the  wartime  agreement  made  at 
Yalta  calling  for  free  elections  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  forced  the  establislmient  of  Com- 
munist-dominated govermuents  in  Poland, 
Romania,  Bulgaria,  and  Hungary. 

To  us,  probably  the  most  traiunatic  blow  of 
all  was  the  fall  of  Czechoslovakia.  Under  the 
enlightened  leadership  of  philosopher-states- 
man Thomas  Masaryk,  Czechoslovakia  had  been 
a  bastion  of  democracy  in  prewar  Central 
Europe.  In  February  of  1948  the  nation's  Com- 
munist leadership,  backed  by  the  Russian  Army 
at  its  border,  seized  power  from  the  Czechoslo- 
vak coalition  government  and  forced  the  resig- 
nation of  Eduard  Benes,  Masaryk's  successor. 
Two  weeks  later,  Jan  Masaryk,  the  son  of 
Thomas  Masaryk  and  a  close  associate  of  Benes, 
died  under  circumstances  strongly  suggesting 
foul  play. 

"The  tragic  death  of  the  Republic  of  Czecho- 
slovakia," President  Truman  told  a  joint  meet- 
ing of  Congress  that  March,  "has  sent  a  shock 
throughout  the  civilized  woi'ld.  Now  pressure  is 
being  brought  to  bear  on  Finland,  to  the  hazard 
of  the  entire  Scandinavian  peninsula.  Greece  is 
under  direct  military  attack  from  rebels  actively' 
supported  by  her  Communist-dominated  neigh- 
bors. In  Italy,  a  determined  and  aggressive  ef- 
fort is  being  made  by  a  Communist  minority 
to  take  control  of  that  country.  The  methods 
vary,  but  the  pattern  is  all  too  clear." 

The  Soviet  Union,  offspring  of  an  interna- 
tional conspiratorial  movement,  trumpeted  the 


aim  of  worldwide  domination  for  all  to  hear.  I 
"Like  a  mighty  titan,"  Khrushchev  said,  using  1 
the  standard  Communist  rhetoric  of  the  period, 
"the  Soviet  power  .  .  .  confidently  marches 
forward  to  the  great  goal,  scoring  one  victory 
after  another.  There  are  no  forces  in  the  world 
which  could  halt  our  victorious  advance  to 
Communism!" 

And  we  were  forced  to  respond.  Out  of  this 
cycle  of  challenge  and  response,  action  and  re- 
action, blast  and  counterblast,  arose  the  state 
of  strained  antagonism  which  became  known  as 
the  cold  war. 

With  enormous  effort  and  imder  feverish 
strain,  the  Soviet  Union  caught  up  with  our 
capacity  to  produce  atomic  weapons.  Defensive 
alliances  were  formed  and  hardened,  NATO, 
SEATO,  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  among  them. 
Each  advance — real  or  imagined — in  the  quan- 
tity or  quality  of  destructive  capacity  was 
countered  by  the  other  side. 

The  1960  "missile  gap,"  though  later  exposed 
as  myth,  spurred  a  vast  increase  in  U.S.  strategic 
weapons  at  enormous  cost.  Several  years  earliei-, 
when  Secretary  Dulles  spoke  of  "massive  re- 
taliation," he  was  talking  about  the  capacity  to 
respond  with  only  a  few  tens  of  megatons.  By 
the  time  we  had  become  satisfied  that  we  had 
closed  the  "missile  gap,"  we  could  launch  more 
than  100  times  as  much  destructive  force  even 
after  being  hit  by  a  well-designed  first  strike. 
In  still  more  recent  years  the  Soviet  Union — also 
at  enormous  cost — has  once  again  been  catching 
up. 

I  recall  this  history  now  not  to  stir  unhappy 
memories  or  to  rub  new  salt  in  old  wounds  but 
only  to  make  vivid  the  events  and  climate  of 
opinion  which  led  to  our  rearmament,  the  new  ■ 
buildup  of  our  defense  establishment,  and  the 
construction  of  our  system  of  alliances. 

Reaction  to  Changing  International  Atmosphere 

But  even  while  your  generation  has  witnessed 
the  continuing  upward  spiral  of  the  arms  race, 
it  has  also  seen  a  lessening  of  cold- war  tensions. 
Since  Stalin,  Soviet  policies  have  changed  and 
moderated.  The  Russians  withdrew  from 
Austria  and  established  diplomatic  relations 
with  West  Germany.  Cultural  and  scientific  ex- 
changes were  initiated  and  continue. 

Other  changes  have  taken  place.  China  has 
broken  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  appears  as 


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DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


hostile  to  her  as  to  us.  Communist  nations  are 
charting,  or  trying  to  chart,  more  independent 
courses.  Many  other  nations,  including  those  of 
Western  Europe,  have  also  taken  more  inde- 
pendent stances.  As  a  result,  the  international 
political  situation  is  more  fragmented,  less 
polarized,  and  not  so  obviously  tense  and 
dangerous. 

Although,  ironically,  this  more  relaxed  inter- 
national atmosphere  may  well  stem  in  part  from 
the  success  of  our  past  policies,  an  influential 
new  segment  of  U.S.  public  opinion  has  called 
into  question  the  continuing  relevance  of  the 
security  arrangements  built  to  meet  the  threat 
of  an  aggressive,  expansionist  Russia.  Disen- 
chantment with  alliances,  commitments,  and 
foreign  entanglements  is  also  spurred  by  im- 
patience with  the  difficulties  that  delay  an 
honorable  settlement  of  the  Viet-Nam  war  and 
by  awareness  of  the  imperative  claims  of  our 
domestic  needs. 

Those  who  hold  this  view  do  not  seek  a  return 
to  Fortress  America,  though  they  are  increas- 
ingly skeptical  of  our  ability  to  influence  events 
abroad.  They  want  to  limit  our  involvements, 
especially  those  of  a  militai-y  character,  and 
reorder  our  priorities  in  favor  of  domestic  needs. 

Such  a  view  is  expressed,  for  example,  by  the 
report  of  the  Congi'essional  Conference  on  the 
Military  Budget  and  National  Priorities,  issued 
earlier  this  week  by  a  group  of  nine  Senators 
and  36  Congressmen.  "Our  country,"  it  claims, 
"is  in  danger  of  becoming  a  national  security 
state."  Saying  that  our  present  defense  posture 
is  based  on  the  need  to  fight  three  wars  simul- 
taneously— a  major  nuclear  war,  a  major  con- 
ventional war,  and  a  "brushfire  war" — the 
report  asserts :  "If  more  realistic  contingencies 
are  assumed  and  the  defense  of  our  own  shores 
is  taken  as  the  primary  and  proper  role  of  our 
armed  forces,  substantial  saA^ngs  can  be  made." 

A  recent  Scripps-Howard  editorial  states  the 
same  theme  in  more  familiar  language:  "We 
are  not  obliged  to  be  the  world's  policeman.  We 
simply  do  not  have  the  economic,  military  or 
spiritual  strength  for  such  exalted  and  lonely 
roles — nor  the  wisdom.  .  .  ." 

Most  of  us,  I  think,  agree  that  a  substantial 
backlog  of  domestic  needs  exists  and  requires 
attention:  revitalized  cities,  poverty  programs 
in  the  ghettos  and  Appalachia,  modernized 
transportation,  pollution  control,  improved  ed- 
ucation   and    medical    services,    housing.    But 


where  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  would 
maintain  our  existing  defense  structure  and 
the  point  of  view  of  those  who  would  contract 
it  begin  to  diverge  is  in  their  differing  ap- 
praisals of  the  continuing  external  threat  to  our 
security. 

Differing  Interpretations  of  Soviet  Threat 

For  certainly  it  is  possible  to  reach  two  quite 
different  interpretations  of  the  threat  posed  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  The  first  stresses  the  mod- 
erated nature  of  Soviet  policy  and  its  apparent 
willingness  to  seek  out  and  negotiate  areas  of 
common  or  parallel  interest.  This  interpretation 
doubts  that  the  Soviet  Union  any  longer  pur- 
sues overriding  imperialist  ambitions  and  holds 
that  the  Soviet  defense  posture  is  oriented  pri- 
marily toward  protecting  the  U.S.S.R.'s  own 
security.  This  view  also  points  to  the  Soviet 
preoccupation  with  its  own  domestic  affairs — 
its  agricultural  problems  and  its  efforts  to  meet 
growing  consumer  demands.  It  sees  Soviet  soci- 
ety becoming  more  conservative  as  its  bureauc- 
racies develop  vested  interests  in  the  status 
quo.  In  sirni,  this  view  sees  Russian  communism 
losing  momentum  as  practical  needs  become 
more  insistent  and  ideological  fervor  wanes. 

The  second  interpretation,  though  it  would 
not  necessarily  quarrel  with  all  of  these  asser- 
tions, is  not  persuaded  that  basic  Soviet  atti- 
tudes are  much  changed  or  that  the  threat  to 
our  security  is  significantly  diminished.  As 
indications  that  the  Soviet  Union's  fundamen- 
tally aggressive  jjolicies  remain  unchanged,  it 
points  to  the  continuing  buildup  of  Soviet  mili- 
tary strength,  to  the  spread  of  Soviet  power 
into  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Middle  East,  to 
last  year's  brutal  military  occupation  of 
Czechoslovakia,  to  Soviet  support  of  the  irre- 
sponsible regime  in  North  Korea  and  Soviet 
backing  of  Hanoi. 

Both  interpretations  are  held  by  experienced 
and  knowledgeable  men,  close  students  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  On  the  basis  of  the  evidence  we 
now  have  available,  an  impressive  case  can  be 
built  up  for  each.  And  that,  I  think,  is  exactly 
the  trouble.  We  simply  do  not  have  enough 
solid  evidence  to  support  either  view 
conclusively. 

Like  our  own  country,  the  Soviet  Union  is  a 
large  and  complex  society  containing  many 
diverse  and  competing  interests.  We  are  aware 


JDNE    30,    1969 


569 


that  ferment  and  pressures  for  liberalization 
exist  beneath  the  surface.  But  we  do  not  know 
if  these  pressures  can  or  will  emerge.  Nor  can 
we  be  sure  what  group  or  set  of  attitudes  will  be 
dominant.  We  cannot  even  take  for  granted  that 
the  gradual  reorientation  that  appears  to  be  tak- 
ing place  will  continue. 

Given  this  uncertainty  about  Soviet  policies, 
we  have  two  choices.  One  is  to  rely  on  the  hunch 
that  the  danger  has  abated  and  on  this  basis 
reduce  the  scale  of  our  defensive  effort.  The 
other  is  to  conclude  that  we  cannot  afford  the 
risk  of  being  wrong. 

Faced  with  this  choice,  how  can  we  fail  to 
take  the  second  course?  As  President  Nixon 
recently  said:  "I  do  not  consider  my  recom- 
mendations infallible.  But  if  I  have  made  a 
mistake,  I  pray  that  it  is  on  the  side  of  too 
much  and  not  too  little."  ^ 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  must  necessarily 
be,  however,  backed  forever  into  an  upward 
spiral  of  arms  expenditures.  As  the  President 
also  said : 

I  believe  we  must  take  risks  for  peace — but  cal- 
culated risks,  not  foolish  risks.  We  shall  not  trade  our 
defenses  for  a  disarming  smile  or  charming  words.  We 
are  prepared  for  new  initiatives  in  the  control  of  arms 
in  the  context  of  other  specific  moves  to  reduce  tensions 
around  the  world. 

The  key  to  unlocking  this  spiral  and  reversing 
its  direction  lies,  I  am  convinced,  in  the  success 
with  "which  we  are  able  to  carry  out  the  "specific 
moves"  referred  to  by  the  President.  It  will 
take  energy  and  resourcefulness.  It  will  take 
imagination.  It  will  take  hard  bargaining.  But 
only  thus  can  we  hope  to  obtain  solid,  up-to-date 
evidence  bearing  on  current  Soviet  policies. 

Resolving  Situations  of  Tension 

The  point  of  departure  for  any  such  move 
is  a  specific  situation  of  tension,  one  which 
breeds  conflict  and  holds  a  significant  risk  of 
confrontation  between  the  Soviet  Union  and 
ourselves.  The  Middle  East  is  one  such  situation. 
Viet-Nam  is  another.  Berlin  access  is  a  third. 

The  next  step  must  be  to  seek  the  opportunity 
to  put  forward  proposals  for  a  satisfactory  reso- 
lution of  the  problem — proposals  we  believe  to 
be  valid  and  reasonable,  not  just  asking  crises 
to  be  reduced  under  pressure.  The  manner  in 


which  the  Soviets  respond  to  this  approach  can 
afford  one  test  of  their  intentions.  Have  they  met 
us  halfway  ?  Has  our  attempt  to  be  reasonable 
received  a  reasonable  reply  ^  Are  the  negotia-  m 
tions  being  conducted  in  good  faith  ?  ■ 

If  a  settlement  can  be  reached,  another  test 
of  Soviet  intentions  will  be  the  manner  in  wliich 
it  is  carried  out.  Even  if  no  settlement  is 
reached,  there  may  nevertheless  be  some  degree 
of  mutuality  of  understanding  in  an  agreement 
to  disagree.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  agree- 
ment is  obstructed  willfully  and  capriciously, 
then  we  shall  at  least  have  gained  enough  evi- 
dence that  the  old  intransigence  has  not  been 
moderated. 

In  this  process  we  must  recognize  that  neither 
we  nor  the  Soviet  Union  can  encompass  all  the 
factors  bearing  on  a  given  problem.  Our  respec- 
tive allies  have  vital  and  legitimate  interest-s. 
These  practical  restrictions  must  be  taken  into 
account,  and  that  is  another  reason  why  a  series 
of  negotiations  is  needed. 

Nor  will  it  be  enough,  quite  obvioush%  that 
any  single  step  in  such  a  series  has  succeeded. 
The  task  of  identifying,  negotiating,  and  re- 
solving situations  of  tension  must  be  a  continu- 
ing one,  and  only  as  it  is  gradually  accomplished 
will  we  be  justified  in  significant  modification 
of  our  own  policies. 

The  process  will  take  time.  It  will  demand 
patience,  as  well  as  ingenuity  and  skill.  The 
suspicions  and  distrust  accumulated  over  two 
decades  cannot  be  dispelled  quickly.  Just  as 
tensions  were  progressively  heightened  during 
the  early  cold- war  period,  so  now  must  they  be 
progressively  unwound.  Indeed,  progress  will 
only  be  possible  if  at  each  step  in  the  process 
each  side  is  satisfied  that  its  security  has  not 
been  jeopardized. 

The  important  thing,  however,  is  that  the 
downward  spiral  be  started.  Such  a  start,  we 
hope,  is  being  made  in  the  Middle  East.  We  con- 
tinue to  search  for  ways  in  which  it  can  be  given  J 
added  momentum  in  Viet-Nam.  And  the  final  ' 
communique  of  the  April  meeting  of  NATO 
foreign  ministers  explicitly  embraced  this  ob- 
jective for  Europe.  It  said :  ^ 

The  Allies  propose,  while  remaining  in  close  consul- 
tation, to  explore  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  other 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  which  concrete  issues  best 
lend  themselves  to  fruitful  negotiation  and  an  early     j 
resolution.  I 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  at  the  Air  Force 
Academy  on  June  4,  see  Bulletin  of  June  23,  1969, 
p.  525. 


'  For   text   of   the   communique,   see   Bulletin    of 
April  28, 1969,  p.  354. 


560 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


Movement  on  the  resohition  of  political  issues 
will  also  be  helpful  to  negotiations  on  arms 
control.  Such  negotiations  are  likely  to  be  pro- 
ductive only  in  a  climate  of  rationality.  The 
mutual  limitation  of  strategic  weapons  could, 
aside  from  its  more  direct  benefits,  also  be  use- 
ful as  a  catalytic  factor  leading  to  an  additional 
lessening  of  tensions  and  to  further  agreements. 

I  mentioned  at  the  outset  the  sign  which  said : 
"If  you  don't  know  where  you  are,  you're  in  the 
right  place."  We  know  that  we  have  moved  in 
the  last  few  years  into  a  more  fluid  and  open 
international  political  situation.  But  if  we  are 
to  find  out  more  precisely  where  we  are  in  East- 
West  relations,  we  must  gain  new  evidence.  We 
must  seek  ways  to  create  new  confidence.  We 


must  strive  to  replace  antagonism  with  analy- 
sis and  negation  with  negotiation. 

In  his  inaugural  address,  the  President  re- 
called Archibald  MacLeish's  moving  tribute  to 
the  Apollo  astronauts  who  orbited  the  moon 
last  Christmas : 

To  see  the  earth  as  it  truly  is,  small  and  blue  and 
beautiful  in  that  eternal  silence  where  it  floats,  is  to 
see  ourselves  as  riders  on  the  earth  together,  brothers 
on  that  bright  loveliness  in  the  eternal  cold — brothers 
who  know  now  they  are  truly  brothers. 

It  is  a  vision  to  be  nurtured  and  strengthened 
and  made  part  of  ourselves,  for  we  shall  have 
frequent  need  to  call  upon  it  in  the  long  and 
difficult  course  of  the  "era  of  negotiation" 
upon  which  we  now  embark. 


President  Nixon  Meets  With  Prime  Minister 
and  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Netherlands 


Petrus  J.  8,  de  Jong,  Prime  Minister  of  the 
Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands,  and  Joseph  M. 
A.  H.  Luns,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  made 
an  offtcial  visit  to  Washington  May  27-29.  Fol- 
lowing is  an  exchange  of  greetings  between 
President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  de  Jong 
at  a  welcoming  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn 
of  the  White  House  on  May  27,  together  with 
remarks  made  hy  President  Nixon,  Prime  Min- 
ister de  Jong,  and  Foreign  Minister  Luns  fol- 
lowing their  talks  on  May  28. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS,  MAY  27 

White  House  press  release  dated  May  27 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Foreign  Minister: 
On  this  beautiful  day  we  ai-e  very  honored  to 
welcome  you  to  Washington,  D.C.,  our  Nation's 
Capital,  as  the  first  official  visitor  from  a  West- 
em  European  coiintry. 

It  is  appropriate  that  you  should  be  the  first 
visitor  in  several  respects.  Next  year  the  United 
States  marks  its  350th  anniversary  of  the  Pil- 
grims arriving  in  the  New  World.  It  was  from  a 


Dutch  port  that  the  Pilgrims  embarked  from 
the  Old  World  to  come  to  the  New  World. 

Through  that  350  years,  your  country  and 
ours  have  been  so  closely  associated  in  friend- 
ship and  in  good  causes.  We  are  not  imaware 
of  the  fact  that  you  were  one  of  the  first  of  the 
major  countries  to  recognize  the  new  nation  in 
major  countries  to  recognize  the  new  nation  in 
1782.  Then,  through  the  period  that  has  passed 
since  then,  we  have  worked  together,  we  have 
shared  problems  together,  and  we  are  strong 
partners  in  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  alliance. 

You  also  have  given  to  our  country  so  many 
of  your  own  people;  and  we  are  proud  of  the 
Americans  of  Dutch  heritage,  who  have  added 
so  much  to  our  culture  and  who  have  enriched 
our  land. 

Today,  as  you  arrive  for  this  official  visit,  we 
want  you  to  know  that  we  hope  that  we  can  con- 
tinue to  work  with  your  people  and  your  Gov- 
ernment in  the  pursuit  of  peace,  which  has  been 
a  cause  to  which  you  and  your  people  have  been 
so  devoted. 

I  think  all  of  our  guests  here  today  would  be 
interested  to  note  that  the  Government  of  the 
Netlierlands  is  one  of  the  very  few  countries  of 
the  world  that  has  earmarked  a  portion  of  its 


JUNE    30,    1969 
353-712—69- 


561 


armed  forces  for  U.K  peaxiekeeping  duties. 
This  is  an  indication  of  foresight  and  an  indica- 
tion also  of  the  kind  of  cooperation  that  the 
United  States  desires  to  have  with  other  free 
peoples  throughout  the  world. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister  and  Mr.  Foreign  Min- 
ister, you  are  most  welcome.  We  trust  that  the 
sun  will  shine  on  you  during  tliis  visit  and  all  of 
the  years  ahead  in  your  own  country  as  it  does 
today. 

Prime  Minister  de  Jong 

Mr.  President :  On  behalf  of  my  colleague,  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  myself,  allow 
me  to  say  a  few  words  of  thanks  for  your  warm 
words  of  welcome. 

Wlien  we  approached  your  shores  yesterday, 
we  received  the  happy  news  of  the  safe  arrival 
and  the  splashdown  of  the  astronauts.  Before  I 
say  anything,  I  want  to  extend  my  most 
warmest  and  sincerest  congratulations  to  you 
and  the  American  people  on  this  magnificent 
performance.  The  whole  world  followed  the 
voyage  of  the  astronauts  with  bated  breath.  I 
think  all  mankind  rejoices  with  you  in  this 
glorious  victory  of  mind  over  the  limitations.  A 
very  great  performance. 

As  we  proceeded,  Mr.  President,  by  way  of 
contrast,  to  Williamsburg,  we  had  an  interest- 
ing experience  of  going  back  to  the  18th  cen- 
tury. We  saw  where  George  Washington  and 
so  many  of  your  American  patriots  of  global 
fame  have  lived.  The  name  of  the  town  itself 
perpetuates  in  your  history  tlie  idea  of  King 
William  the  Third,  the  Prince  of  Orange,  who 
as  Stadtholder  of  the  Netlierlands,  became  at 
the  same  time  King  of  England  in  what  in  his- 
tory is  known  as  tlie  Glorious  Revolution. 

In  those  days,  Mr.  President,  the  first  alliance 
between  your  country  and  ours  was  forged.  In 
1776,  just  half  a  year  after  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  was  wi-itten,  the  first  time  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  were  saluted  by  a  foreign 
power  was  by  a  Dutch  fortress  at  St.  Eustatius, 
one  of  the  Windward  Islands  in  the  Caribbean, 
now  forming  part  of  the  Netherland  Antilles. 

In  1780,  the  English  declared  war  on  us  and 
gave  as  tlie  principal  war  reason  the  fact  tliat 
we  gave  too  great  a  support  to  the  American 
cause  for  independence. 

In  1782,  we  concluded  a  formal  treaty  of 
friendship  between  tlie  United  States  and  the 
then  Republic  of  the  United  Netherlands. 

But  as  we  crossed  the  Atlantic  yesterday,  Mr. 


President,  in  a  few  hours  and  in,  incidentally, 
more  comfortable  circumstances  than  our 
ancestors  did,  I  felt  the  same  words  could  still 
apply  that  the  very  first  Minister  to  the  United 
States  spoke  in  the  Congress  of  Princeton  in 
1783,  when  he  said : 

We  know  the  value  of  independent  freedom,  and  we 
appreciate  the  greatness  of  your  aims.  We  will  do  all 
that  is  in  our  power  to  help  you  further  the  ties  of 
friendship  and  further  the  alliance  as  much  as  we  can. 

I  don't  think,  Mr.  President,  there  are  very 
many  countries  in  the  world  wliich  share  such 
long  ties  of  friendship  as  your  country  and 
ours.  The  efforts  and  the  sacrifices  of  the  United 
States  for  the  liberation  of  Europe  and  the  re- 
construction afterward  have  not  been  forgotten 
by  my  country.  With  you  we  share  a  continued 
dedication  to  the  ideals  of  peace,  freedom,  and 
democracy.  Those  ideals  will  guide  us  during 
the  talks  we  hope  to  have  together. 


EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS,  MAY  28 

White  House  press  release  dated  May  28 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  Prime  Minister  and  Mr.  Foreign  Minis- 
ter: As  this  visit  concludes,  I  wish  to  tell  you 
how  much  we  have  been  honored  having  you 
here  as  the  first  official  visitors  from  Western 
Europe  and  also  as  the  first  visitor  from  your 
country  at  the  Prime  Minister  level  on  an  official 
visit. 

We  think  that  the  discussions  that  we  have  J 
had  have  been  most  helpful  on  a  bilateral  basis,  1 
but  I  would  like  to  say  further  that  they  have 
been  for  me  most  constructive,  as  we  have  dis- 
cussed some  of  the  broader  problems  we  have, 
not  only  with  regard  to  Western  Europe  but 
internationally. 

It  is  this  kind  of  exchange  between  leaders 
who  have  responsibilities  to  our  countries  which 
is  most  valuable,  most  valuable  in  helping  us  in 
each  of  our  respective  capacities  to  make  de- 
cisions that  are  not  parocliial,  not  provincial, 
and  not  limited  to  those  bilateral  matters  that 
concern  our  two  countries  and  see  the  whole 
world  and  not  just  part  of  the  world. 

I  would  say,  finally,  that  one  of  the  things 
that  has  always  impressed  me  about  my  friends 
in  the  Netherlands  is  that  they  look  outward, 
they  think  in  international  terms,  and  there- 
fore it  is  always  helpful  to  me  to  talk  to  leaders 
from  the  Netherlands  and  to  get  that  broad 
world  perspective  which  we  sometimes  lose  sight 


562 


DEPABTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


of  as  we  sit  in  our  offices  thinking  of  the  im- 
mediate problems  we  have. 

I  conclude  with  one  personal  thought.  The 
Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Minister  reminded 
me  that  I  had  not  visited  the  Nethei-lands.  Of 
course  that  is  true,  although  my  wife  and 
daughters  have;  and  I  remember  during  the 
days  I  was  Vice  President  I  visited  many  coun- 
tries but  I  usually  went  to  countries  where  we 
had  problems,  and  it  is  because  we  seem  to  have 
no  serious  problems  with  the  Netherlands  that 
I  never  have  gotten  there.  I  hope  to  correct 
that  oversight  during  my  term  of  office  and 
to  be  able  to  return  this  visit  that  you  so  grace- 
fully have  paid  to  us. 

We  wish  you  hon  voyage. 

Prime  Minister  de  Jong 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  I  really  have  nothing 
to  add  to  what  the  President  has  said. 

As  regards  the  invitation  on  the  official  side, 
one  expects  between  countries  with  such  good 
relations  to  be  received  pleasantly,  but  I  must 
say  we  have  been  struck  by  the  warmth  of  the 
welcome  and  the  genuine  friendly  style  of  the 
reception. 

As  regards  the  talks  we  had,  the  thing  we 
appreciate  most  is  that  we  come  directly,  with 
vei-y  open  and  honest  talks,  to  the  crux  of  the 
matter  and  are  able  to  talk  together  and  ex- 
change views  on  the  whole  world.  We  have  been 
very  pleased  with  the  results  of  our  talks  and 
I  for  one  am  much  better  informed  and,  I  hope, 
a  slightly  wiser  man  on  return  than  when  I 
arrived  here. 

We  are,  I  must  say,  very  pleased  that  you, 
Mr.  President,  are  willing  to  accept  our  invita- 
tion to  visit  the  Netherlands  whenever  your  very 
busy  schedule  allows  you  to  do  so. 

Thank  you  once  again  very  much  for  a  very, 
very  nice  reception. 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  Foreign  INIinister,  you  may  say  some- 
thing, if  you  wish. 


Foreign   Minister  Luns 

It  would  be  very  presumptuous  for  me  to 
make  a  long  statement,  so  I  won't  talk  much 
longer  than  25  minutes  after  the  President  and 
Prime  Minister.  I  would  only  confirm  what  the 
Prime  Minister  said  a  moment  ago :  that  we  are 
pleased  with  the  results  of  our  bilateral  talks 
and  the  results  of  the  talks  on  multilateral 
matters. 

There  were  some  rather  tricky  problems 
which,  to  our  great  satisfaction,  have  now  been 
solved.  I  think  we  owe  a  debt  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States  and  to  the  Acting  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  the  way  these  talks  were  pre- 
pared and  for  the  way  we  came,  in  2  days,  to 
solutions  which  will  be  worked  out — I  am  think- 
ing of  air  matters — and  which  I  feel  sure  will 
be  hailed  in  the  Netherlands  as  a  result  which 
was  worth  while. 

So  this  ceremonial  visit  was  at  the  same  time 
a  working  visit,  and  I  am  very  gi'ateful  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States  that  we  got  so 
much  of  his  time  and  tliat  he  devoted  so  much 
of  his  energy  and  knowledge  to  this  discussion. 

President  Nixon 

I  would  just  like  to  add  one  thing  for  all  of 
those  who  cover  the  Washington  scene.  This  does 
mark  a  special  occasion  in  another  sense.  We 
have  all — those  of  us  who  have  been  here — 
known  the  Ambassador  to  the  United  States 
[Carl  W.  A.  Schurmann],  have  known  him  and 
his  family,  and  realize  how  much  he  has  con- 
tributed to  good  relations  between  our  two  coun- 
tries and  also  to  the  very  distinguished  ambas- 
sadorial corps  that  we  have  in  this  city. 

This  year  I  learned  that  he  is  retiring  from 
diplomatic  service.  This  is  one  of  his  last  of- 
ficial appearances.  Mr.  Ambassador,  we  thank 
you  for  your  years  of  service  to  your  country, 
to  the  cause  of  good  relations  between  our  two 
countries,  and  we  wish  you  the  very  best  in 
whatever  you  undertake. 

Ambassadors  deserve  a  little  credit  for  these 
visits,  too. 


JUNE    30,    1969 


563 


The  United  Nations — Its  Past  and  Its  Future 


Tjy  Charles  TF.  Yost 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  ^ 


I  am  very  glad  indeed  to  have  this  opportu- 
nity to  meet  with  the  Capital  Ai'ea  United  Na- 
tions Association.  Since  your  association,  in  a 
sense,  speaks  for  the  U.N.  in  Washington  and 
since  I  speak  for  Washington  in  the  U.N.,  we 
have  much  in  common  and  many  reasons  to  talk 
together.  This  is  particularly  true  now,  in  the 
early  months  of  a  new  administration  and  at  a 
critical  point  in  the  history  of  the  U.N.  itself. 
I  should  like  to  share  with  you  this  evening 
some  thoughts  about  the  U.N. — its  past  and 
still  more  its  future. 

For  someone  in  my  position  it  is  always  a  bit 
of  a  shock  to  realize  that  this  world  organiza- 
tion, to  whose  beginnings  I  was  a  witness  at 
Dumbarton  Oaks  and  San  Francisco,  will  be  25 
years  old  next  year.  In  New  York  a  preparatory 
committee  is  now  busy  considering  a  suitable 
way  of  marking  that  anniversary.  Certainly 
it  is  time  for  all  of  us  to  be  thinking  about  its 
significance. 

The  U.N.  is  perhaps  the  most  striking  insti- 
tutional innovation  of  modern  times  in  the  con- 
duct of  international  affairs.  Yet  it  is  now  an 
innovation  that  is  no  longer  new.  It  is  older 
than  the  present  college  generation ;  older  than 
a  great  proportion  of  our  men  in  uniform ;  older 
than  nuclear  weapons,  network  television. 
Communist  China,  the  space  age,  the  worldwide 
movement  for  racial  equality,  the  population 
crisis,  the  cold  war,  and  several  hot  wars.  It  is 
also  older  than  the  independence  of  nearly  half 
its  own  members. 

]\Iany  great  events,  both  wonderful  and 
tragic,  have  intervened  to  dim  the  memory  of 
its   founding.   For   us   Americans,   on    whose 

'  Address  made  before  the  Capital  Area  Division  of 
the  United  Nations  Association  of  the  U.S.A.  at 
Washington,  B.C.,  on  May  26  (U.S./U.N.  press  release 
51). 


shores  its  headquarters  are  located,  the  U.N. 
has  long  since  lost  much  of  the  glamour  of  new- 
ness— and  most  of  the  popular  attributes  of 
magic  power  that  himg  about  it  in  its  earliest 
days.  Indeed,  m  this  age  of  rapid  obsolescence, 
it  would  not  be  entirely  impertinent  to  ask  to 
what  extent  the  U.N.  is  still  (if  I  may  use  one 
of  the  all-purpose  words  of  the  moment) 
relevant. 

Needless  to  say,  I  would  not  be  in  my  present 
post  if  I  were  not  convinced  that  the  U.N.,  with 
all  its  weaknesses,  is  highly  relevant  and  that 
the  U.N.  of  the  future  can  and  must  be  still 
more  relevant,  not  only  to  American  needs  but 
to  the  fundamental  needs  of  security  and  a 
decent  life  that  we  share  with  the  vast  majority 
of  mankind. 

President  Nixon  has  made  clear  his  own  view 
on  this  subject.  Last  December,  before  his 
inauguration,  he  and  his  Secretary  of  State- 
designate,  Mr.  Eogers,  visited  Secretary  General 
Thant.  To  the  Secretary  General  Mr.  Nixon 
emphasized  "our  continuing  support  of  the 
United  Nations  and  our  intention  in  these  years 
ahead  to  do  everything  that  we  can  to  strength- 
en this  organization  as  it  works  in  the  cause 
of  peace  throughout  the  world."  He  has  par- 
ticularly stressed  the  importance  of  two  key 
fields  of  U.N.  work:  first,  keeping  the  peace 
where  peace  is  broken  or  endangered,  and  sec- 
ond, promoting  a  better  life  through  economic 
and  social  development. 

Those  two  functions  would  certainly  rank 
near  the  top  of  any  list  of  major  U.N.  concerns. 
But  the  question  remains:  How  much  can  we 
realistically  look  to  the  U.N.  to  do  in  these 
and  other  important  fields  in  the  years  to  come? 
In  these  remarks  I  should  like  to  discuss  that 
question  with  you  in  the  light  of  our  experi- 
ence— not  to  attempt  any  easy  answers,  but  to 


564 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BTTLLETIN 


suggest  something  of  the  U.N.'s  promise  and 
something  of  its  limitations  and  peculiarities. 
And  I  should  like  to  do  so  in  the  spirit  of  Adlai 
Stevenson's  remark  that  "Man  does  not  live 
by  words  alone — in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he 
sometimes  has  to  eat  them." 

It  may  be  useful  to  begin  with  a  backward 
glance,  from  which  we  may  take  both  hope  and 
warning. 

The  hope  derives  from  a  lengthening  record 
of  achievement  in  many  fields  through  the  U.N. 
family  of  agencies.  That  record  is  familiar  to 
you,  and  I  need  only  recall  it  briefly. 

Record  of  Services  to  Peace  and  Security 

It  includes,  first  and  foremost,  many  services 
to  peace  and  security  among  nations  in  an  in- 
secure world — including  the  avoidance  of  those 
confrontations  to  which  President  Nixon  has 
also  referred.  Whatever  tenuous  and  intermit- 
tent peace  has  been  enjoyed  in  recent  times  in 
Kashmir,  the  Middle  East,  the  Congo,  and 
Cyprus  owes  a  major  debt  to  the  blue-helmet 
peace  forces  and  observer  groups  deployed  in 
those  places.  Such  impartial  U.N.  units  have 
done,  and  are  still  doing,  a  priceless  service  in 
situations  where  a  unilateral  attemi^t  at  peace- 
keeping by  a  single  great  power  would  carry  a 
grave  danger  of  escalation  and  confrontation. 
It  is  ironic  that  the  rather  modest  cost,  by  any 
military  standard,  of  these  United  Nations 
operations  has  aroused  so  much  bitter  ai'gu- 
ment,  when  one  compares  it  to  the  colossal  cost 
of  often  less  successful  unilateral  peacekeeping. 

In  addition,  we  should  remember  the  United 
Nations  proven  value  as  a  neutral  ground,  a 
unique  point  of  contact  where  dangerous 
disputes  can  be  resolved,  or  at  least  defused,  by 
quiet  diplomacy.  The  examples  of  this  service 
include  even  the  most  ominous  situations  of 
all,  those  few  that  have  involved  major  powers. 
Twice — in  the  Berlin  crisis  of  1948  and  again 
in  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  of  1962 — the  United 
Nations  has  performed  critical  functions  as  a 
center  of  diplomatic  communication  leading 
away  from  confrontation. 

A  frequent  criticism  of  the  United  Nations 
efforts  in  the  cause  of  peace  is  that  it  limits  its 
efforts  to  patching  up  quarrels  instead  of  get- 
ting at  the  causes — what  might  be  called  the 
"band-aid"  approach  to  peacemaking.  Of  course 
its  authority  is  limited — limited  to  what  its  126 
member  states  and  particularly  the  great 
powers  will  permit  it  to  do.  It  cannot  impose 


peace  or  the  terms  of  a  settlement,  much  though 
the  world  as  a  whole  might  profit  if  it  could. 
But  even  within  its  present  limitations  there  is 
much  that  it  does  do. 

Two  current  examples  are  Cyprus  and  the 
Middle  East.  In  Cyprus  the  United  Nations  has 
for  4  years  contributed  a  peacekeeping  force 
to  deter  and  control  violence  there.  Meanwhile, 
in  various  ways,  including  the  presence  of  a 
representative  of  the  Secretary  General  on  the 
island,  it  also  seeks  to  foster  the  processes  of 
diplomacy  among  the  parties  directly  concerned. 
Unfortunately  those  processes  sometimes  seem 
to  produce  more  heat  than  light,  more  discord 
than  harmony;  but  at  least  war  between  two  of 
our  allies  has  been  avoided.  Someday  the  an- 
cient quarrel  will  be  brought  to  an  end,  and 
both  sides  will  wonder  why  they  let  it  last  so 
long. 

In  the  Middle  East  also,  as  we  all  know,  the 
normal  processes  of  diplomacy  have  been  tragi- 
cally inadequate.  Time  and  again  in  these  20 
years  the  intervention  of  the  United  Nations 
has  been  required  to  j^atch  up  the  tragic  failures 
of  bilateral  and  regional  diplomacy  and  to  pre- 
vent wider  and  even  more  disastrous  conflict. 

Surely  in  the  case  of  the  Middle  East  no  one 
can  now  fairly  charge  the  United  Nations  with 
treating  symptoms  and  neglecting  causes.  Since 
November  1967  the  Security  Council  has  been  on 
record  as  calling  for  nothing  less  ambitious  than 
"a  just  and  lasting  peace"  in  that  area.  It  has 
set  forth  unanimously  the  basic  principles  on 
which  such  a  peace  can  be  built.  A  special  repre- 
sentative of  the  Secretary  General,  Ambassador 
Jarring,  has  labored  long  and  patiently  to  assist 
the  parties  in  their  search  for  such  a  peace. 
When  this  effort,  after  more  tlian  a  year,  came 
to  naught  and  fighting  resumed  and  spread,  the 
four  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Coun- 
cil, conscious  of  their  responsibilities  under  the 
charter  for  international  peace  and  security, 
conscious  also  of  their  own  vital  interests  in 
avoiding  a  wider  war,  decided  to  lend  the 
weiglit  of  their  influence  to  bringing  about  a  just 
and  lasting  peace.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  under 
the  circumstances  they  could  have  done  other- 
wise without  abdication  of  their  responsibilities 
and  grave  danger  to  their  own  security. 

Whether  the  four  powers,  and  the  United 
Nations,  will  succeed  or  fail  in  this  most  urgent 
of  present  peacemaking  tasks  depends  less  on 
them  than  on  the  governments  and  peoples  of 
the  Middle  East,  who  are  after  all,  and  most  of 
all,  mastei-s  of  their  own  fate  and  future.  In 


JUNE    30,    19  69 


565 


this  case  at  least,  the  resources  and  the  authority 
of  the  United  Nations,  limited  as  they  may  be  in 
the  pi'esent  state  of  the  world,  are  being  and, 
I  am  confident,  will  be  fully  applied  in  the 
pursuit  of  peace. 

The  U.N.  and  International   Development 

Equally  impressive,  though  perhaps  less 
dramatic,  is  tlie  United  Nations  record  of  serv- 
ice to  international  economic  develoj)ment.  For 
this  purpose  the  United  Nations  spends  about 
four-fifths  of  the  funds  that  governments  make 
available  to  it.  The  relatively  small  but  strategic 
United  Nations  Development  Program,  which 
is  now  11  years  old,  has  grown  steadily  in  size 
and  impact  and  this  year  will  conduct  $275  mil- 
lion worth  of  preinvestment,  training,  and  tech- 
nical assistance  jDrojects  in  the  less  developed 
nations.  About  half  of  that  money  is  contributed 
by  the  recipient  governments  and,  incidentally, 
only  about  one-fifth  of  it  by  the  United  States. 

This  program,  in  turn,  is  a  key  element  in  the 
worldwide  effort  which  the  United  Nations  has 
been  coordinating  through  the  1960's  under  tlie 
name  of  the  Development  Decade.  That  effort 
has  no  precedent  in  history,  and  it  is  little  won- 
der that  it  is  only  just  begimiing  to  show  results. 
But  it  is  an  important  beginning,  including  the 
probable  attainment  by  1970  of  the  5  percent 
annual  growth  rate  which  was  set  as  a  world- 
wide average  target  for  the  decade.  IVliat  is 
even  more  important,  these  years  have  given  us 
invaluable  experience  in  framing  the  strategy 
for  the  Second  Development  Decade,  which  is 
now  in  preparation. 

We  must  candidly  face  the  fact  that  quantita- 
tive progress  in  this  First  Development  Decade 
has  been  very  small.  A  5  percent  annual  growth, 
when  it  begins  from  a  base  of  about  $100  in  per 
capita  income  and  is  offset  by  a  3  percent  annual 
growth  in  population,  amounts  to  enriching  the 
average  person  by  less  than  1  cent  a  day.  But 
these  slow  beginnings  can  still  be  the  prelude  to 
a  great  enterprise.  They  may  be  like  those  first 
painfully  slow  and  anxious  seconds  in  the 
launching  of  a  space  vehicle,  when  the  huge 
rocket  barely  inches  up  from  the  launching  pad. 

As  of  1969,  it  is  true,  the  movement  for  world 
economic  and  social  development  can  scarcely 
be  said  to  have  been  launched  at  all.  We  do  not 
know  yet  whether  it  will  achieve  orbit.  The 
innumerable  components  that  must  be  specially 
designed  for  it — including  the  growth  of  new 


habits  of  mind  among  many  millions  of  people — 
make  it  far  more  complex  than  any  space  rocket 
ever  built. 

But  whatever  the  difficulties,  we  have  no  ra- 
tional choice  but  to  make  this  effort  succeed.  If 
it  should  fail,  if  the  poor  nations  become  in- 
creasingly con\'inced  that  the  rich  nations  are 
able  but  unwilling  to  give  them  the  amounts  and 
kmds  of  help  they  need  and  that  they  camiot 
escape  by  any  rational  means  from  the  circle  of 
poverty,  then  we  are  likely  to  wake  up  some 
dark  morning  10  or  15  years  hence  to  find  our- 
selves faced  on  a  worldwide  scale  with  the  same 
wrath  and  violence  that  we  now  encounter  in 
the  neglected  ghettos  of  our  great  cities. 

If  and  when  we  Americans  finally  realize  how 
much  of  the  world's  future  and  our  own  future 
depends  on  the  success  of  this  enterprise,  we 
will,  I  trust,  decide  to  play  in  it  a  far  stronger 
and  more  consistent  part  than  we  have  so  far 
done. 

In  all  realism,  the  United  Nations  services  to 
those  two  functions — international  peace  and 
security  and  economic  development — would  be 
enough  to  justify  its  existence.  But  there  are, 
of  course,  many  others  which  I  can  mention  only 
briefly  tliis  evening : 

— Its  service  to  the  crucial  cause  of  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament,  especially  in  nuclear 
weapons,  where  through  the  General  Assembly 
the  public  opinion  of  the  world  is  focused  with 
increasing  concern  and  insistence  on  the  posses- 
sors of  those  appalling  weapons. 

— Its  assistance  in  the  rapid  and  largely 
peaceful  transition  to  independence  of  more 
than  97  percent  of  the  peoples  only  recently 
under  colonial  rule — over  800  million  people  in 
all — and  its  admission  of  them  as  new  nations  to 
membership  in  the  United  Nations. 

— Its  service  to  the  cause  of  human  rights, 
not  by  coercion,  for  which  it  lacks  the  power, 
but  by  setting  international  standards  in  the 
form  of  conventions  and  covenants,  by  investi- 
gation and  relentless  publicity  in  the  case  of 
those  violations,  such  as  apartheid,  which  most 
deeply  concern  the  majority  of  members. 

— Its  initiatives  toward  opening  two  com- 
pletely new  realms  of  human  exploration — 
outer  space  and  the  seabed— to  the  beneficial 
use  of  nations  and  to  the  rule  of  international 
law. 

— And  finally,  though  thus  far  only  a  small 
beginning,  its  concern  with  the  immense  danger 


666 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE  BTJLLETIN 


posed  by  the  population  crisis.  It  was  the  U.N. 
that  fii-st  directed  public  attention  to  the  proba- 
bility that  world  population  would,  at  present 
rates  of  increase,  more  than  double  by  the  year 
2000,  to  an  unacceptable  figure  of  7  billion 
people  on  our  shrinking  planet.  Now  the  activ- 
ity of  the  U.N.  and  various  of  its  agencies  in 
this  field,  including  the  recently  established 
Population  Trust  Fund,  shows  a  rising  deter- 
mination to  assist  and  stimulate  the  nations 
of  the  world  in  coping  with  what  is^  at  last 
being  perceived  as  a  threat  to  our  civilization 
abnost  as  grave  as  the  nuclear  arms  race. 

Such  are  some  of  the  contributions  of  the  U.N. 
during  its  first  quarter-century  to  human  sur- 
vival and  progress.  This  record  certainly  offers 
no  comfortable  plateau  to  rest  on,  but  it  does 
offer  a  foundation  on  which  to  build.  But  as  I 
said  at  the  outset,  the  record  also  contains 
warnings. 

High  Hopes  and   Disappointments 

Often  in  the  U.N.'s  history  we  have  been 
tempted  by  extravagant  hopes — and  when  these 
were  disappointed  we  have  been  extravagantly 
disillusioned.  For  example : 

At  the  very  outset  many  of  us  hoped  that  the 
allies  of  World  War  II  would  remain  as  united 
in  peace  as  they  had  been  in  war,  enabling  the 
major  powers  in  the  Security  Coimcil  to  co- 
operate in  enforcing  peace  throughout  the 
world.  Wlien  the  Soviet  Union,  for  strategic 
and  ideological  reasons  of  its  own,  took  a  con- 
trary turn,  there  was  bitter  disillusionment 
among  many  Americans. 

Even  then,  some  people  cherished  the  hope 
that  an  errant  Soviet  Union  could  somehow  be 
coerced  by  the  votes  of  the  U.N.  majority.  We 
had,  of  course,  no  rational  ground  for  this  hope, 
since  we  had  ourselves  insisted  on  the  great- 
power  veto  in  the  Security  Council  and  no  other 
U.N.  organ  is  given  enforcement  power  by  the 
charter.  Still,  the  repetitious  Soviet  vetoes  of 
those  early  years  and  the  Soviet  defiance  of 
overwhelming  votes  in  the  General  Assembly 
aroused  much  indignation  and  perplexity  in 
this  country. 

Then,  years  later,  when  the  great  influx  of 
new  members  began,  many  Americans  cherished 
a  different  hope:  that  between  us  and  this  en- 
larged U.N.  majority  a  natural  harmony  of  in- 
terests would  develop  and  would  express  itself 
in  the  same  comfortable  voting  majorities  in 


the  Assembly  which  we  had  regularly  enjoyed 
in  the  early  years.  It  may  well  be  that  the  Soviet 
Union,  counting  on  anticolonial  and  therefore 
anti-Western  feelings  in  this  new  majority, 
cherished  similar  hopes  on  its  side.  In  any  case, 
such  hopes  were  for  the  most  part  illusory.  The 
new  members  are  not  primarily  swayed  by 
East- West  quarrels  or  even  by  East- West  agree- 
ments. They  save  most  of  their  diplomatic 
energies  for  the  North-South  issues  of  anti- 
colonialism,  human  rights,  and  "trade  and  aid," 
which  are  their  own  primary  interests.  And 
although  a  considerable  underlying  harmony  of 
interests  does  exist  between  them  and  the  United 
States  on  all  these  subjects,  it  is  far  from  perfect 
and  is  often  disturbed  by  differences  less  over 
objectives  than  over  methods  and  timing.  Even 
the  new  members  are  gradually  learning,  as  the 
old  did  before  them,  that  the  U.N.  in  its  present 
stage  is  better  adapted  to  expounding  principles 
than  to  enforcing  them. 

Many  people  have  been  tempted  to  hope  also 
that  somehow  the  U.N.  could  overcome  the  ob- 
stacles to  universality  and  bring  the  major  non- 
members  within  its  membership  and  the  scope 
of  its  influence.  But  we  underestimated  the  stub- 
bornness of  these  problems.  After  nearly  25 
years  the  divided  countries — Germany,  Korea, 
and  Viet-Nam — remain  outside  the  U.N.,  al- 
though their  non-Communist  halves  participate 
in  some  of  its  fimctions.  And  still  Communist 
China,  with  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  people  of 
the  world,  remains  completely  outside,  most  of 
all  by  its  own  preference,  since  it  prescribes  as 
a  condition  of  its  own  entrance  a  price  unaccept- 
able to  the  majority  of  members — the  expulsion 
of  the  Republic  of  China  on  Taiwan. 

Finally,  we  allowed  ourselves  to  hope  that  the 
peacemaking  authority  of  the  U.N.  could  be 
brought  to  bear  on  any  major  international  con- 
flict. We  know  now  that  this  is  not  so,  as  has 
been  demonstrated  in  the  case  of  Viet-Nam.  Al- 
though the  United  States  sought  repeatedly, 
from  1964  to  early  1966,  to  have  the  Security 
Council  deal  with  the  matter,  one  party — North 
Viet-Nam — categorically  refused  to  acknowl- 
edge U.N.  jurisdiction ;  and  this  attitude,  with 
the  diplomatic  backing  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
made  U.N.  consideration  impossible.  This  ex- 
perience illustrates  the  general  rule  that  U.N. 
action  in  peacemaking  cannot,  under  present  cir- 
cumstances, be  fruitful  without  the  cooperation, 
or  at  least  the  acquiescence,  of  the  major  powers 
and  of  the  immediate  parties  to  the  conflict. 


567 


So  far  more  than  one  of  our  high  hopes  for  the 
U.N.'s  first  quarter-century  have  fallen  far  short 
of  their  mark.  What  is  the  basic  cause  of  this 
faihire?  It  is  quite  simple.  The  Ethiopian  Am- 
bassador, who  has  just  left  after  2  years  on  the 
Security  Council,  said  at  a  farewell  lunch  given 
him  by  the  Secretary  General:  "The  U.N.  is 
ahead  of  us  in  time.  We  are  not  prepared  for  it. 
If  it's  not  effective,  it's  because  we,  its  members, 
don't  make  it  so." 

Dag  Hammarskjold  put  his  finger  on  the  same 
cause  in  his  last  annual  report  as  Secretary 
General  8  years  ago,  when  he  wrote:  "It  is 
clearly  for  the  Governments,  Members  of  the 
Organization,  and  for  these  Governments  only, 
to  make  their  choice  and  decide  on  the  direction 
in  which  they  wish  the  Organization  to  de- 
velop.'" As  Pogo  said  in  the  comic  strip :  "We 
have  met  the  enemy  and  they  are  us." 

Reaching  the  Goals  of  the  U.N. 

The  U.X.  is  not  a  superstate.  It  is  a  mutual  aid 
society  of  126  members  with  only  the  powers 
and  resources  they  give  it — which  so  far  are 
pitifully  inadequate.  Practical  people  with  both 
feet  on  the  ground  frequently  tell  you  it  can 
never  be  anything  more  than  a  debating  society. 

I  refuse  to  believe  that.  Someone  said  re- 
cently: "Show  me  a  man  with  his  feet  on  the 
ground  and  I'll  show  you  a  man  who  can't  get 
his  pants  on."  I  like  that  spirit.  If  the  great 
powers,  and  most  of  all  the  United  States,  decide 
that  in  this  precarious,  dangerous,  revolutionary 
world  it  is  in  their  interest  to  do  more  with 
each  other  and  less  against  each  other,  that  the 
U.N.  is  the  best  means  there  is  for  surviving 
together  rather  than  dying  together,  and  that 
they  can  make  it  work  and  worlc  well  if  they 
want  to  badly  enough,  then  we  may  be  surprised 
to  find  how  soon  and  how  well  the  United 
Nations  could  reach  the  great  goals  its  founding 
fathers  set  for  it. 

In  conclusion  let  me  once  more  list  those 
goals : 

— Peacekeeping  and  peaceful  settlement,  so 
reinforced  that  international  security  becomes 
no  longer  a  slogan  but  a  fact ; 

— Economic  and  social  development  in  time 
to  satisfy  the  unmet  basic  needs  of  two-thirds  of 
mankind ; 

— Control  and  reduction  of  both  nuclear  and 
conventional  arms ; 

— Completion  of  the  historic  movement  for 


self-determination,    self-government,    and    in- 
dependence ; 

— Promotion  of  human  rights  and  an  end  to 
racial  discrimination  in  all  its  forms. 

Along  with  these  basic  goals  are  new  ones 
arising  from  new  problems  and  possibilities 
which  were  scarcely  dreamed  of  when  the  U.N. 
was  foimded  but  which  now  confront  us: 

— Control  of  excessive,  self-defeating,  and 
self-destructive  population  gi-owth ; 

— Fuller  development  of  the  law  and  the  tech- 
nology of  outer  space  and  the  seabed ; 

— Safeguards  against  the  further  pollution, 
destruction,  and  dehumanizing  of  man's  en- 
vironment on  earth. 

And  finally,  we  must  have  a  care  for  the  in- 
stitutional needs  of  the  U.N.  itself : 

— A  rational  solution  to  the  problem  of  "mini- 
states"  and  their  proper  relation  to  the  U.N. ; 

— Sounder  budgetary  and  managerial 
methods ; 

— A  better  U.N.  personnel  system  to  assure 
high  standards  in  the  Secretariat  and  excellence 
among  new  recruits ; 

— Improved  parliamentary  procedures  and 
practices  to  assure  the  effectiveness  of  the  U.N.'s 
deliberative  organs,  especially  the  General 
Assembly. 

Such  are  the  major  problems  with  which  we 
expect  to  be  wrestling  over  the  coming  years  as 
we  seek,  in  President  Nixon's  words,  "to 
strengthen  this  organization  as  it  works  in  the 
cause  of  peace  throughout  the  world." 

What  is  most  of  all  needed,  as  I  have  said,  is 
the  will  to  succeed  and  the  willingness  to  pay 
the  price  of  success.  And  I  need  hardly  tell  this 
audience  what  a  major  share  of  that  will  and 
that  willingness  must  come  from  this  country. 

There  are  signs  today  that  other  members,  in- 
cluding the  Soviet  Union,  may  be  prepared  to 
join  in  giving  the  U.N.  more  support  than  they 
once  did  in  such  vital  fields  as  peacekeeping. 
There  are  signs  that  many  of  the  nations  of  the 
"third  world"  may  be  in  a  mood  to  develop 
greater  common  ground  with  the  West  on  the 
anticolonial  and  economic  issues  that  most  con- 
cern them.  '\Vliether  or  not  these  signs  will  be 
borne  out  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the 
leadership  and  the  example  we  provide.  We 
alone  cannot  make  the  U.N.  fulfill  its  promises 
and  the  world's  vital  needs.  But  certainly  neither 
will  be  fulfilled  without  us. 


568 


DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE   BULLETIN 


THE  CONGRESS 


Economic  and  Military  Assistance  Proposals 
for  Fiscal  Year  1970 


Statement  hy  Under  Secretary  Elliot  L.  Richardson  ^ 


I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  present  the 
administration's  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance proposals  for  FY  1970.  The  extent  and 
nature  of  United  States  cooperation  with  the 
nations  of  Latin  America,  Asia,  and  Africa  is 
in  large  part  expressed  in  these  two  important 
programs. 

Basic  Rationale 

In  his  foreign  aid  message,^  the  President 
emphasized  that  the  moral  quality  of  this  na- 
tion does  not  pennit  us  to  close  our  eyes  to  want 
and  deprivation  in  this  world.  We  believe  that 
the  programs  we  have  developed  are  responsive 
both  to  this  moral  quality  and  to  vital  consid- 
erations of  our  economic  well-being  and  our 
national  security. 

United  States  aid  programs  are  a  critical 
chapter  in  the  unfolding  story  of  the  post- 
World  War  II  era.  Many  of  our  strongest  and 
most  dependable  allies  are  past  or  present  re- 
cipients of  American  aid.  United  States  coop- 
eration in  development  projects  represents  our 
single  strongest  tie  to  the  developing  nations, 
where  two-thirds  of  the  world's  people  live. 
Development,  which  will  bring  a  Mgher  quality 
of  life,  is  the  primary  goal  toward  which  these 
nations  struggle.  To  turn  our  back  or  disassoci- 
ate ourselves  from  this  drive  now  would  ulti- 
mately imperil  not  only  them  but  ourselves. 


'Made  before  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Af- 
fairs on  June  9.  As  Secretary  Rogers  liad  accompanied 
President  Nixon  to  Midway,  Mr.  Richardson  was 
Acting  Secretary  that  day. 

'  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  message  to  the  Con- 
gress on  May  28,  see  Bulletin  of  June  16,  1969,  p.  515. 


This  administration  believes  that  we  have 
moved  well  beyond  the  time  when  the  concept 
of  assistance  could  be  related  to  short-term  U.S. 
political  and  security  interests.  Such  a  view 
misrepresents  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the 
current  effort.  We  have  learned  at  home  that 
neglect  of  the  poor  and  underprivileged  can 
have  explosive  effects.  It  is  only  prudent  to  ap- 
ply that  lesson  to  a  world  which  is  growing  ever 
smaller  and  more  interdependent. 

Foreign  Assistance  Objectives 

Within  this  basic  rationale,  the  foreign  assist- 
ance programs  serve  these  national  interests : 

— The  maintenance  of  friendly  and  effective 
relationships  with  the  developing  countries  is 
profoundly  affected  by  our  interest  and  concern 
in  their  most  important  problem — economic  de- 
velopment. Cooperative  relations  with  them 
would  become  impossible  if  we  let  them  down 
on  their  most  urgent  need. 

— The  developed  countries,  among  them  the 
United  States,  cannot  allow  themselves  to  be- 
come isolated  islands  of  affluence  in  a  sea  of 
poverty  and  frustration.  The  question  is  some- 
times asked:  "So  what  if  they  don't  develop?" 
Our  fear  is  that  a  world  in  which  two-thirds 
of  the  people  live  indefinitely  in  poverty,  hun- 
ger, and  overcrowding  would  be  a  vicious  and 
dangerous  world.  But  it  is  not  simply  the  danger 
we  seek  to  avoid.  For  the  basic  moral  reasons 
the  President  stated  in  his  message,  we  want  at 
least  to  narrow  the  great  disparities  between 
rich  and  poor  in  the  world,  not  let  them  grow 
even  greater. 


JUNE    30,    1969 


569 


— To  assure  a  reasonable  chance  for  success 
in  the  poorer  nations'  development  drive,  we 
must  expand  our  own  investment.  Building  a 
more  prosperous  world  is,  after  all,  essential  to 
our  own  economic  well-being  as  well.  The  long- 
term  benefits  to  our  own  people  are  clear :  Suc- 
cessfully developing  economies  make  better  mar- 
kets for  our  goods  and  also  produce  better  goods 
and  raw  material  for  our  needs. 

— Our  security  and  that  of  our  allies  remain 
a  matter  of  jjrimary  interest.  Because  world 
tensions  have  lessened  somewhat  in  many  areas 
in  the  last  decade,  our  request  for  military  as- 
sistance for  countries  not  related  to  the  current 
hostilities  in  Southeast  Asia  is  the  lowest  ever 
made.  Neither  military  nor  economic  assistance 
should  be  viewed  as  a  short-term  political  pay- 
off, however.  Our  strategic  interests  in  Turkey, 
Greece,  Korea,  and  Taiwan  demand  that  we 
continue  our  assistance  to  ensvire  the  long-tenn 
security  of  these  nations.  These  countries  are 
essential  to  our  defense  postui'e.  We  also  con- 
tinue to  attach  the  highest  priority  to  the  assist- 
ance i^rovided  Viet-Nam,  Thailand,  and  Laos 
through  the  Defense  budget,  which  is  their  pri- 
marj'  means  of  resisting  Communist  attack. 

Aid   Purposes   and   Experience 

The  appropriations  requested  by  the  Presi- 
dent— $2.2  billion  for  economic  assistance,  $375 
million  for  military  assistance,  and  $75  million 
for  guarantee  reserves — have  been  pared  to  the 
minimum.  Much  money  is  involved.  But  when 
compared  to  the  importance  of  the  objectives 
these  funds  will  serve  and  the  mag-nitude  of  the 
task  to  be  accomplished,  these  are  modest  fig- 
ures. Moreover,  much  of  our  expenditure  is  in 
the  form  of  repayable  loans.  It  is  long-term 
investment.  It  is  at  the  same  time  a  form  of  in- 
surance. If  we  stopped  or  delayed  our  effort 
now,  far  larger  fiiture  expenditures  would  prob- 
ably not  put  the  situation  right. 

We  cannot  guarantee  success  in  every  in- 
stance. In  fact,  success  is  difficult  to  measure. 
At  the  same  time,  solid  e\ddence  is  available 
for  achievements  directly  attributable  to  past 
aid  efforts.  The  remarkable  economic  momen- 
tum built  up  by  Israel,  Turkey,  Iran,  Korea, 
and  the  Republic  of  Cliina  testifies  to  the  fact 
that  economic  assistance  does  work. 

Other  evidence  is  available.  Major  break- 
throughs in  food  production  seem  imminent  in 
many  aid-receiving  countries.  The  widespread 
introduction  of  newly  developed  hybrid  strains 
of  rice,  wheat,  and  other  grains  through  our 


AID  programs  has  already  brought  about  dra- 
matic increases  in  agricultural  productivity  in 
India,  Pakistan,  Turkey,  the  Philippines,  and 
elsewhere.  Last  year's  wheat  harvest  in  Paki- 
stan and  in  India  were  up  over  35  percent  above 
the  previous  records,  an  increase  without 
precedent. 

At  the  same  time,  official  family  planning 
programs  have  been  imdertaken  in  more  and 
more  aid-assisted  countries,  and  population 
pressures  are  being  recognized  throughout  the 
world  as  a  challenge  to  be  faced.  Thus  the  pros- 
pect of  mass  starvation  within  a  decade  that 
many  experts  predicted  seems  to  have  been 
forestalled. 

These  and  other  advances  show  that  progress 
is  possible.  This  progress,  plus  the  certain 
knowledge  that  only  so  much  assistance  can  be 
effectively  absorbed  by  developing  nations, 
counters  the  often-heard  statement  that  for- 
eign aid  is  poured  into  a  "bottomless  pit."  Re- 
sources from  the  United  States  and  other  donor 
countries  are  needed  in  only  finite  yearly 
amounts  because  these  resources  must  be  put  to 
specific  tasks  in  the  development  process.  These 
tasks  and  the  education  of  individuals  to  ful- 
fill them  must  be  carefully  planned  and  can 
only  be  accomplished  during  a  long,  slow  proc- 
ess. It  isn't  that  we  and  the  less  developed 
countries  wouldn't  like  to  see  the  situation  im- 
pi'ove  more  rapidly,  but  rather  that  the  basic 
facts  will  not  permit  such  an  overnight  change. 

The  Role  of  the  United  States 

Neither  mutual  security  nor  development  can 
be  sustained  if  the  United  States  cannot  be  de- 
pended upon  to  continue  playing  a  leading  role. 
If  we  do  not  follow  through  now  until  the  coun- 
tries we  aid  become  self-sustaining,  our  earlier 
investment  will  be  lost.  We  now  stand  at  a 
point  where  our  will  to  follow  through  is  in 
doubt. 

We  are  no  longer  carrying  a  disproportionate 
share  of  the  aid  burden.  Many  industrialized 
nations  are  devoting  a  larger  share  of  their 
income  to  development  assistance  than  we  are. 
and  several  are  offering  more  liberal  terms  on 
their  loans  than  our  average  terms. 

In  the  late  fifties  the  United  States  devoted 
nearly  1  percent  of  its  GNP  to  public  and  pri- 
vate resource  flows  to  poor  coimtries.  Last  year 
those  flows  were  only  about  two-thirds  of  1 
percent.  Next  year,  as  our  GNP  reaches  a  tril- 
lion dollars,  we  will  spend  little  more  than  one- 
half  of  1  percent  of  this  unprecedented  income 


570 


DEPARTMENT   OP  STATE   BTJLLETrN 


on  aid  and  private  investment  in  poor  countries. 
The  increase  in  our  national  income  in  1970 
alone  is  likely  to  be  over  10  times  our  aid  out- 
lays, including  P.L.  480  agricultural  products, 
Peace  Corps  programs,  and  contributions  to 
multilateral  banks,  as  well  as  economic  and  mil- 
itary programs  under  the  Foreign  Assistance 
Act. 

The  appropriations  that  President  Nixon  has 
requested  would  arrest  the  decline  in  actual  net 
expenditure  flows  of  official  aid  to  poor  coun- 
tries— but  no  more.  Failure  to  appropriate  this 
amount  would  mean  that  actual  flows  would 
continue  to  fall  beyond  fiscal  1970  into  the  fu- 
ture. Merely  arresting  this  falling  trend  is  not 
too  much  to  do  now,  despite  other  urgent  pri- 
orities at  home  and  abroad.  After  looking  care- 
fully at  all  our  needs  we  conclude  that  this 
much  we  can  do  now ;  in  fact,  we  can  ill  afford 
to  do  less. 

Proposals  we  now  put  forward  have  not  been 
arrived  at  hastily  or  casually.  They  are  geared 
to  the  longer  term  future.  They  are  not  simply 
the  old  programs.  They  are  the  beginning  of 
this  administration's  efforts  to  move  United 
States  participation  in  the  development  process 
in  new  directions  and  with  changed  emphasis. 

The  Congress  has  directed,  by  passage  of  the 
Ja\ats  amendment,  that  we  restudy  our  objec- 
tives and  past  programs  as  well  as  future  needs. 
You  are  also  aware  that  the  internationally 
sponsored  Pearson  Commission  will  be  making 
its  report  in  the  fall.  In  view  of  these  studies, 
the  President  could  have  postponed  any  new 
departures  and  significant  innovations.  Instead, 
after  an  intensive  review  by  an  interagency 
working  group  which  I  chaired,  the  decision 
was  made  to  begin  a  reorientation  of  our 
aid  efforts  while  future,  broader  studies  are 
underway. 

This  committee  has  shown  an  intense  and 
sympathetic  interest  in  past  foreign  aid  pro- 
posals and  requests.  We  ask  only  that  you  con- 
sider these  new  proposals  with  the  same  interest 
and  concern. 

The   Program   for  Fiscal   Year   1970 

The  result  of  our  executive  branch  review  and 
of  our  talks  with  congressional  leaders  is  em- 
bodied in  the  President's  message  which  you  re- 
ceived on  May  28.  The  main  new  directions 
embodied  in  that  message  are : 

— First,  a  greater  emphasis  on  private  enter- 
prise and  individual  initiative ; 

— Second,  a  new  stimulus  to  technical  assist- 


ance measures  as  an  important  part  of  our 
program ; 

— Third,  greater  emphasis  on  strengthening 
multilateral  cooperation  in  aid ;  and 

— Fourth,  furthering  food  production  and 
family  planning. 

Let  me  comment  on  each  of  these  in  some- 
what greater  detail. 

— First,  private  enterprise  and  individual 

initiative. 

The  histoiy  of  development  shows  that  pri- 
vate enterprise  is  a  crucial  catalyst  of  growth. 
The  most  successful  developing  nations  are  those 
which  have  adopted  incentive  economies.  In  all 
of  our  AID  programs — loans  and  technical  as- 
sistance— we  shall  support  efforts  to  expand 
opportunities  for  local  private  enterprise  and 
improve  the  economic  and  institutional  climate 
for  successful  investment.  As  part  of  this  process 
we  must  do  more  to  stimulate  and  channel  ad- 
ditional investment  by  American  businesses  into 
the  key  growth  sectors  of  developing  nations. 
For  this  purpose,  we  shall  establish  the  Over- 
seas Private  Investment  Corporation  (OPIC). 

The  new  Corporation  will : 

• — mobilize  private  U.S.  funds  through  our  ex- 
tended risk  guarantee  program ; 

■ — bring  the  advantages  of  corporate  loan 
management  to  present  insurance  and  incentive 
programs ; 

— pro\ade  direct  loans  in  modest  amounts 
where  necessary  to  enable  high-priority  de- 
velopmental investments  to  proceed;  and 

— administer  managerial  and  other  technical 
assistance  to  private  enterprise. 

The  Corporation  will  provide  a  new  focus  to 
the  role  of  private  capital  in  our  entire  aid 
program — based  on  our  recognition  that  public 
capital  alone  is  not  enough. 

■ — Second,  technical  assistance. 

Lack  of  technical  and  managerial  skills  lim- 
its the  efficient  use  of  economic  assistance  and 
mobilization  of  resources  witliin  the  develop- 
ing nations.  Greater  emphasis  must  thus  be 
given  to  technical  assistance,  and  new  and  bet- 
ter means  must  be  developed  for  its  application. 
We  believe  this  to  be  an  enormously  important 
objective  and  for  this  reason  have  allotted  over 
one-fifth  of  our  entire  appropriations  request 
to  a  revised  and  expanded  technical  assistance 
program— both  bilateral  and  multilateral.  We 
have  also  requested  a  2-year  authorization  to 


JUNE    30,    1969 


571 


assure  its  orderly  expansion  and  effective  man- 
agement. 

Our  aim  will  be  to  raise  the  quality  of  our 
advisoi-y,  training,  and  research  services  in  the 
fields  of  agriculture,  family  planning,  educa- 
tion, health,  public  administration,  and  public 
safety.  U.S.  teclinical  knowledge  must  be  better 
adapted  to  the  special  needs  of  underdeveloped 
countries.  In  pui-suit  of  this  goal  we  shall  seek 
to  make  more  effective  use  of  the  resources  of 
our  universities,  colleges,  and  private  groups. 
New  working  an-angements  will  be  established 
in  AID  for  attracting  private  services  into 
technical  assistance. 

— Third^  multilateral  cooperation. 

We  are  convinced  that  a  greater  emphasis 
must  be  put  on  improving  multilateral  pro- 
grams, in  which  other  advanced  nations  accept 
a  fair  share  of  the  cost.  We  shall  step  up  our 
efforts  to  coordinate  our  assistance  with  other 
donors  and  increase  multilateral  cooperation 
wherever  possible. 

The  multilateral  banks,  such  as  IBRD/IDA 
[International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development/International  Development  As- 
sociation], the  Inter- American  Development 
Bank,  the  Asian  Development  Bank,  and  the 
African  Development  Bank,  are  assuming  a 
greater  role  in  providing  essential  resources  to 
the  developing  nations.  Funds  for  IDA,  funds 
for  special  operations  of  the  IDB,  and  special 
funds  for  ADB  are  provided  under  separate 
legislation.  We  are  pleased  that  Congress  has 
authorized  the  U.S.  contribution  to  the  second 
IDA  replenislunent  and  hope  that  early  passage 
of  appropriations  will  follow. 

Our  support  for  the  United  Nations  and  its 
related  agencies  has  continued  to  increase  over 
the  years.  Funds  for  this  purpose  are  included 
in  this  legislation.  The  technical  assistance  ac- 
tivities of  the  United  Nations  Development 
Program  are  particularly  important  in  Africa, 
where  AID  programs  are  small  and  limited  to 
only  a  few  countries.  Other  U.N.  members  pro- 
vide over  60  percent  of  UNDP  funds.  We  pro- 
pose to  increase  our  support  to  $100  million  in 
FY  1970  within  this  40  percent-60  percent 
formula. 

- — Fourth^  continuing  encouragement  for  food 
production  and  family  pla7ining. 

The  dramatic  expansion  of  food  production 
in  some  areas,  particularly  in  South  Asia,  which 
I  have  already  mentioned,  has  substantially  re- 


duced the  need  for  export  of  food  resources.  As  i 
the  President's  message  points  out,  these  gains 
also  "demonstrate  the  potential  for  success  when 
foreign  aid,  foreign  private  investment  and  do- 
mestic resources  in  developing  countries  join 
together  in  a  concerted  attack  on  poverty."  De- 
spite the  encouraging  gains,  the  developing  na- 
tions still  are  not  able  to  meet  all  requirements 
on  normal  commercial  terms.  We  shall  there- 
fore do  what  we  can  to  adjust  food  shipments 
so  that  they  will  do  the  most  good  and  go  where 
they  are  most  needed. 

We  will  review  P.L.  480  legislation  to  see  if 
we  can  better  use  our  agricultural  resources  to 
promote  development  while  ensuring  continua- 
tion of  our  access  to  these  markets  for  our  agri- 
cultural i)roducts.  Food  and  other  resources  pro- 
vided under  P.L.  480  make  up  over  a  fourth  of 
total  official  U.S.  economic  assistance. 

Despite  these  advances  in  meeting  the  basic 
food  needs  of  developing  coimtries,  we  cannot 
neglect  the  other  half  of  the  equation.  Con- 
tinued uncontrolled  growth  in  population  not 
only  absorbs  gains  in  food  production  but  also 
means  that  real  economic  growth  is  not  trans- 
mitted to  the  people  in  the  form  of  perceptible 
improvement  in  their  well-being.  Therefore  we 
shall  continue  to  carry  out  earlier  congressional 
mandates  for  increased  assistance  for  voluntary 
family  planning  programs.  We  shall  also  con- 
tinue to  give  a  high  priority  to  the  population 
work  of  the  United  Nations  and  other  interna- 
tional organizations. 

FY   1970   Program   in  the   Regions 

In  preparing  these  programs  we  have  been 
careful  to  adjust  them  to  the  specific  require- 
ments of  particular  regions.  Obviously,  what 
may  work  in  Southeast  Asia  may  not  be  appro- 
jjriate  to  South  America  or  Africa.  In  shaping 
our  proposals  we  have  used  the  experience  of  the 
last  two  decades  to  adjust  them  to  the  particular 
needs  and  opportunities  in  each  region  and 
country. 

Let  me  now  give  you  a  brief  regional  break- 
down. 

First,  Latin  America.  Any  realistic  appraisal 
of  our  relationships  with  Latin  America  must 
recognize  that  the  hopes  and  expectations  of  the 
past  decade  have  not  been  realized.  Although 
important  economic  gains  have  been  registered 
in  many  places,  only  a  few  of  the  Latin  Ameri- 
can nations  have  achieved  self-sustaining  prog- 
ress within  a  democratic  framework.  We  can  ill 


572 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BrTLLETIN 


afford  to  withdraw  our  lielp  to  Latin  America 
now.  The  opportunities  for  significant  advances 
are  present  and  sliould  be  pui'siied. 

Our  $605  million  request,  consisting  of  $483 
million  for  development  loans  and  $121  million 
l'(  >v  technical  assistance,  is  a  minimum  to  sustain 
the  Alliance  for  Progress,  following  the  severe 
reductions  this  year.  If  Governor  Nelson  Rocke- 
feller's findings  in  Latin  America  suggest  imme- 
diate revisions  in  the  program  we  are  now  sub- 
mitting, we  shall  come  back  with  fui'ther  pro- 
posals during  the  course  of  your  hearings. 

In  A^ear  East  and  South  Asia,  the  $625  mil- 
lion requested  will  again  be  concentrated  in 
India,  Pakistan,  and  Turkey.  If  the  sharp  re- 
duction in  assistance  levels  to  India  and 
Pakistan  during  tlie  past  2  years  were  to  con- 
tinue, it  would  cost  them  millions  of  tons  in 
food  production  and  increase  underemploy- 
ment in  their  cities  and  villages.  India  and 
Pakistan  are  independent  leaders  in  the  third 
world.  Their  societies  are  oriented  toward  the 
West.  Their  performance,  particularly  that  of 
India,  will  be  compared  with  Communist  China 
to  show  what  a  free  development  process  can 
accomplish.  The  prospect  for  the  success  of  their 
efforts  and  the  continuation  of  their  leadership 
role  depends  on  our  continued  support. 

For  East  Asia,  we  are  requesting  $234  million. 
The  problems  of  this  region  are  complex.  Laos 
and  Thailand  are  subjected  to  many  of  the 
pressures  of  the  conflict  in  Viet-Nam.  Indonesia 
has  made  a  dramatic  turnaround.  Although  she 
is  now  understandably  absorbed  by  her  internal 
problems,  her  size  will  inevitably  make  her  play 
a  key  role  in  future  regional  cooperation  in 
Southeast  Asia. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  has  achieved  one  of 
the  most  outstanding  records  of  economic 
growth  of  any  of  tlie  developing  nations.  With 
the  serious  security  threat  from  North  Korea, 
South  Korea  has  borne  a  double  burden  of  main- 
taining its  military  readiness  while  pursuing 
economic  progress. 

Our  assistance  to  the  nations  of  Africa  is 
concentrated  in  10  larger  countries,  where  op- 
portunities for  economic  progress  are  greatest. 
The  $186  million  proposed  for  FY  1970  will 
permit  continuation  of  these  major  development 
programs  and  help  build  cooperation  among 
many  African  countries  througli  expansion  of 
regional  activities. 

The  President  has  requested  $440  million  for 
economic,  technical,  and  relief  assistance  to  Viet- 
Nam.  Despite  the  continued  conflict,  the  people 


of  Viet-Nam  have  proved  to  be  remarkably 
resilient  and  capable  of  continuing  a  develop- 
ment effort.  Our  assistance  will  help  maintain 
economic  stability,  accelerate  village  economic 
development,  expand  opportunities  for  land 
ownership  by  the  farmers,  and  bring  relief  to 
refugees  and  other  civilian  victims  of  the  war. 

Grant  Military  Assistance 

Development  requires  stability.  For  20  years 
our  grant  militaiy  assistance  program  has  been 
an  instrmnent  of  our  foreign  policy,  strength- 
ening the  internal  and  external  security  of 
friendly  nations. 

We  are  liopeful  that  the  time  will  soon  come 
when  we  will  no  longer  have  to  be  concerned 
with  assistance  of  a  military  nature.  Indeed, 
we  are  now  in  a  transitional  phase.  Most  of  the 
countries  who  received  assistance  at  the  begin- 
ning of  these  programs  no  longer  require  it. 
Many  of  our  allies  are  now  able  to  bear  a  much 
greater  share  of  the  burden.  We  are  of  one 
mind  with  Congress  when  it  enjoins  the  Presi- 
dent to  reduce  and  terminate  grant  assistance 
"to  any  country  having  sufficient  wealth  to  en- 
able it  ...  to  maintain  and  equip  its  own  mili- 
tary forces  at  adequate  strength,  without  undue 
burden  to  its  economy."  But  reductions  in  our 
assistance  must  be  carefully  managed  and 
gradual,  as  security  conditions  pennit,  to  avoid 
placing  too  early  a  strain  on  the  economies  of 
the  developing  nations. 

The  bulk  of  military  assistance — over  SO 
percent — continues  to  be  furnished  to  countries 
that  provide  us  with  important  facilities  and  to 
four  major  allies:  the  Republic  of  China, 
Korea,  Greece,  and  Turkey.  In  addition,  we 
continue  to  attach  importance  to  the  modest 
assistance  programs  provided  to  44  other  coun- 
tries, 26  of  which  are  to  receive  training  only. 

Tighter  Administration 

Let  me  say  a  fuial  word  about  the  administra- 
tion of  our  aid  program.  I  assure  this  commit- 
tee that  we  shall  spare  no  effort  to  assure  tight- 
ened management  and  better  organization  of 
assistance  programs.  Greater  stress  will  be 
placed  on  monitoring  assistance  activities  in 
order  to  assm-e  Congress,  the  American  tax- 
payer, and  the  executive  branch  that  each  pro- 
gram is  being  properly  implemented. 

To  this  end,  we  are  creating  the  position  of 
Auditor-General  to  assure  the  AID  Adminis- 


JUNE    30,    196y 


573 


trator  that  AID  funds  are  used  for  their  in- 
tended purpose  and  that  AID  operations  are 
efficiently  managed. 

In  closing  I  wish  to  reempliasize  that  our 
assistance  continues  to  be  a  critical  factor  in 
the  task  of  development.  Unless  the  United 
States  continues  a  substantial  program  of  lend- 
ing and  tecluiical  assistance,  development  just 
won't  hai^pen  on  a  broad  scale.  Even  under  the 
most  optimistic  assumptions  about  self-Iielp  by 
the  developing  countries  and  about  contribu- 
tions from  other  advanced  nations,  if  the 
United  States  gave  up,  progress  would  falter  or 
perhaps  even  cease. 

We  must  face  up  to  the  fact  that  politically, 
the  United  States  cannot  opt  out  of  participa- 
tion in  the  sti-uggle  for  development  and  still 
expect  to  remain  influential  and  relevant  in  the 
developing  world. 

I  do  not  think  any  of  us  want  these  things  to 
happen.  The  freedom  and  progress  of  the  nearly 
2  billion  people  in  the  developing  world,  vital 
ends  in  themselves,  are  also  profoundly  related 
to  our  own  security  and  well-being.  Our  invest- 
ment in  this  effort  must  continue,  and  I  ask  you 
for  your  help  and  support. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


91st  Congress,  1st  Session 

The  Continuing  Near  East  Crisis.  Background  infonna- 
tlon  prepared  for  the  Subcommittee  on  the  Near  East 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  Janu- 
ary 10,  1969.  40  pp.  [Subcommittee  print] 

Annual  Report  of  Activities  of  the  National  Advisory 
Council  on  International  Monetary  and  Financial 
Policies.  Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
transmitting  a  report  on  the  jxolicies  and  operations 
of  the  Advisory  Council  covering  the  period  July  1, 
1967,  to  June  30,  1968.  H.  Doc.  91-52.  January  17, 
1969.  150  pp. 

The  Soviet  Approach  to  Negotiation.  Selected  writings 
compiled  by  the  Subcommittee  on  National  Security 
and  International  Operations  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Government  Operations.  February  26,  1969. 
92  pp.  [Committee  print.] 

A  Review  of  Alliance  for  Progress  Goals.  A  Report  by 
the  Bureau  for  Latin  America,  Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development.  Submitted  to  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Government  Operation.?.  March  1969.  66 
pp.  [Committee  print.] 

The  United  Nations.  Report  to  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  by  Senator  Stuart  Syming- 
ton, member  of  the  delegation  of  the  United  States 
to  the  23d  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly. 
March  1969.  37  pp.  [Committee  print] 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
AND   CONFERENCES 


U.N.  Force  in  Cyprus  Extended 
Through  December  1969 

Statement  by  Charles  W.  Yost 

U.S.  Eepresentative  in  the  Security  Council^ 

Eighteen  months  ago  the  threat  of  disaster 
had  been  narrowly  averted  as  the  Council  met 
to  consider  the  Cyprus  situation  and  the  future 
of  the  United  Nations  Force  in  Cyprus.  Then  it 
was  clearly  necessary  to  extend  once  more  this 
peacekeeping  force.  We  came  to  tliis  same  deci- 
sion again  in  March,  June,  and  December  of 
last  year. 

During  the  first  6  months  of  1968  considerable 
improvement  in  the  situation  on  the  island  took 
place,  reflecting  an  awareness  both  of  how  close 
Cyprus  had  come  to  catastrophe  and  of  the  ur- 
gent need  to  find  a  framework  in  which  a  settle- 
ment might  be  sought  which  would  bring  real 
peace  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  island.  In  the 
second  half  of  1968  that  framework  was  found. 
It  is  greatly  to  the  credit  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots,  and  to  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Secretary  General  who  assisted 
them,  that  for  the  first  time  since  the  events  of 
1963  the  two  sides  began  negotiating  directly 
with  one  another  and  that  intercommunal  talks 
at  last  got  underway.  The  talks  have  now  been 
in  progress  for  just  a  year. 

That  we  in  this  Council  are  anxious  to  see 
progress  in  the  talks  is  self-evident.  We  believe 
the  parties  themselves  share  this  sense  of  ur- 
gency. The  world  has  borne  the  weight  of  the 
Cyprus  crisis  too  long;  but  its  weight  has  been 
a  greater  burden  on  those  directly  concerned. 
Patience  is  demanded  from  all  of  us,  but  we 
share  with  the  Secretary  General  the  concern 
expressed  in  his  report  of  June  3  ^  that  "no  sub- 
stantive results  on  the  basic  issues  which  sepa- 
rate the  two  sides  have  as  yet  emerged." 
Regarding  the  question  before  us  today,  we 


'  Made  in  the  Security  Council  on  June  10  (U.S./U.N. 
press  release  59). 
'  U.N.  doc.  S 79233. 


5Y4: 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BtlLLETIN 


agree  with  tlie  Secretary  General  that  the  work 
of  UNFICYP  "represents  an  indispensable  ele- 
ment in  maintaining  and  further  improving  the 
calm  atmosphere  in  the  Island  and  in  promoting 
the  steps  towaixl  normalization,  wliich  constitute 
as  before  the  two  major  prerequisites  for  sub- 
stantive progress  in  the  intercommunal  talks." 
We  therefore  have  supported  the  recommenda- 
tion that  UNFICYP's  mandate  be  extended 
for  another  6  months,  until  December  15,  1969.^ 

Looking  ahead,  we  hope  that  the  parties  in 
Cyprus  will  build  on  the  progress  achieved  to 
date,  that  they  will  press  on  with  measures  de- 
signed to  normalize  the  situation  on  the  island, 
and  that  they  will  pursiie  with  determination 
the  search  for  a  negotiated  settlement  of  their 
problems.  If  in  these  ways  an  advance  should 
take  place  toward  an  ultimate  solution,  with  a 
commensurate  reduction  of  internal  tensions,  all 
of  us  would,  I  am  sure,  expect  the  Secretary 
General  to  contemplate  a  corresponding  reduc- 
tion of  the  size  of  the  U.N.  Force.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  Council  would  be  highly  grati- 
fied if  conditions  of  stability  were  to  make  it 
possible  and  safe  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  Force 
and  eventually,  over  the  longer  term,  to  termi- 
nate its  mission  when  there  was  agreement  that 
it  was  no  longer  required.  My  delegation  hopes 
that  the  Secretary  General  and  the  parties  will 
keep  these  objectives  in  mind  and  that  they  will 
reassess  the  immediate  situation  with  respect  to 
UNFICYP  durmg  the  next  6  months. 

Mr.  President,  my  Government  has  contrib- 
uted heavily  to  the  financing  of  UNFICYP; 
and  although  we  intend  to  continue  our  financial 
suppoi-t  to  this  peacekeeping  effort,  we  are  in- 
creasmgly  concerned  over  the  burden  it  repre- 
sents and  over  the  mounting  deficit  caused,  as 
the  Secretary  General  has  pointed  out,  by  the 
failure  of  some  members  to  shoulder  an  equita- 
ble part  of  the  burden. 

We  should  therefore  hope  that  the  Secretary 
General,  who  under  the  mandate  of  UNFICYP 
is  responsible  for  the  composition  and  size  of 
the  Force,  would  undertake  a  full  examination 
of  the  possibilities  for  effective  economies  in  the 
operation  of  the  Force,  including  a  study  of  pos- 


=  In  a  resolution  (S/RES/266  (1969) )  adopted  unani- 
mously on  June  10,  the  Security  Council  extended  "the 
stationing  In  Cyprus  of  the  United  Nations  Peace- 
keeping Force  .  .  .  for  a  further  period  ending  15 
December  1969,  in  the  expectation  that  by  then  suffi- 
cient progress  toward  a  final  solution  will  make  possible 
a  withdrawal  or  substantial  reduction  of  the  Force." 


sible  persomiel  adjustments  consistent  with 
UNFICYP's  ability  to  continue  fully  to  dis- 
charge its  present  functions. 

In  addition  we  urge  other  members,  particu- 
larly Security  Council  members,  to  review  their 
own  position  on  financial  contributions.  The 
entii-e  world  coimnunity  profits  from  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  in  Cypnis,  and  those  with  par- 
ticular responsibility  for  international  peace 
and  security  have  a  special  obligation  to  can-y  a 
fair  sliare  of  the  burden. 

The  United  States  would  hope  that  those 
members  who  have  not  contributed  financially 
to  UNFICYP  will  do  so  now,  so  that  the  force 
can  continue  to  discharge  its  important  func- 
tions with  full  assurance  of  future  financial 
support. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the  principles 
and  purposes  of  the  Antarctic  treaty  of  December  1, 
1959  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Paris  November  29, 
1968.' 

Notification  of  approval:  United  States,  recom- 
mendations V-2  through  V^  and  V-7  through 
V-9,  June  7,  1969. 

Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago,  1944 
( TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170) ,  with  annex.  Done  at  Buenos 
Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Malawi,  June  9,  1969. 

Hydrography 

Convention    on    the    International   Hydrographic   Or- 
ganization, with  annexes.  Done  at  Monaco  May  3, 
1967.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  June  2,  1969. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 
Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 
1968.' 

Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Poland, 
June  12,  1969. 


'  Not  in  force. 


JUNE    30,    19G9 


576 


Racial   Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Adopted  by  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  December  21,  1965. 
Entered  into  force  January  4,  1969." 
Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
May  16,  1969." 

Space 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession  deposited  at  Washington:  Swaziland, 
June  9,  1969. 

War 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  treatment  of  prisoners 

of  war ; 
Geneva   convention  for  amelioration   of  condition  of 

wounded  and  sick  iu  armed  forces  in  the  field ; 
Geneva   convention  for  amelioration   of  condition  of 
wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked  members  of  armed 
forces  at  sea  ; 
Geneva  convention  relative  to  protection  of  civilian 
persons  in  time  of  war. 

Dated  at  Geneva  August  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
October  21,  1950;  for  the  United  States  Feb- 
ruary 2,  1956.  TIAS  3364,  3362,  3363,  and  3365,  re- 
spectively. 
Ratification  deposited:  Uruguay  (with  a  declara- 
tion), March  5,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


India 

Agreement    amending    the    agreement    for    sales    of 
agricultural    commodities    of    December    23,    1968 


(TIAS  6642).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  New 
Delhi  May  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  May  29,  1969. 

Liberia 

Agreement  extending  and  amending  the  agreement  of 
January  11,  1959,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
2171,  3140,  3955,  4660,  4733,  5591),  relating  to  a 
military  mission.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Monrovia  May  28  and  June  2,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  June  2,  1969,  operative  from  January  11,  1969. 

Poland 

Agreement  regarding  fisheries  in  the  western  region 
of  the  middle  Atlantic  Ocean.  Signed  at  Warsaw 
June  12,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  12,  1969. 


DEPARTAAENT  AND   FOREIGN   SERVICE 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  June  12  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Richard  Funkhouser  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Gabon 
Republic.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  May  9.) 

G.  McMurtrie  Godley  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  King- 
dom of  Laos.  (For  biographic  details,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  May  8. ) 

Robert  H.  McBride  to  be  Ambassador  to  Mexico. 
(For  biographic  details,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  April  23.) 

J.  William  Middendorf  II  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands.  (For  biographic  details, 
see  White  House  press  release  dated  May  9.) 


576 


DEPARTMENT   OF   STATE   BULLETIN 


INDEX      June  30,  1969     Vol.  LX,  No.  1566 


Congress 

Confirmations  (Funkhouser,  Godley,  McBride, 
Middendorf)       576 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 574 

Economic  and  Military  Assistance  Proposals  for 

Fiscal  Year  1970    (Richardson) 5G9 

Cyprus.  U.N.  Force  in  Cyprus  Extended  Through 
December  1969  (Yost) 574 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirmations 
(Funkhouser,  Godley,  McBride,  Midden- 
dorf) 576 

Foreign  Aid.  Economic  and  Military  Assistance 
Proposals  for  Fiscal  Year  1970  (Richard- 
son)  569 

Gabon.  Funkhouser  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .      576 

Laos.  Godley  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .    .      576 

Mexico.  McBride  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      576 

Military  Affairs.  President  Nixon  and  President 
Thieu  Confer  at  Midway  Island  (exchanges  of 
remarks,    joint    statement)        549 

Netherlands 

Middendorf  confirmed  as  Ambassador    ....      576 
President  Nixon  Meets  With  Prime  Minister  and 
Foreign  Minister  of  the  Netherlands   (Nixon, 
De  Jong,  Luns) 561 

Nigeria.  U.S.  Regrets  Nigerian  Attack  on  Relief 
Flights  Into  Biafra  (Department  state- 
ment)     556 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Nixon  and  President  Thieu  Confer  at 

Midway    Island 549 

President  Nixon  Meets  With  Prime  Minister  and 

Foreign  Minister  of  the  Netherlands    ....      561 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions    ....      575 

U.S.S.R.  East- West  Relations:  The  Process  of 
Gaining  New  Evidence  (Richardson)     .    .    .      557 

United  Nations 

U.N.  Force  in  Cyprus  Extended  Through  Decem- 
ber 1969   (Yo.st) 574 

The  United  Nations — Its  Past  and  Its  Future 

(Yost)        564 


Viet-Nam 

President  Nixon  and  President  Thieu  Confer  at 
Midway  Island  (exchanges  of  remarks,  joint 
statement) 549 

21st  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Walsh) 554 

Name  Index 

de  Jong,  Petrus  J.  S 561 

Funkhouser,  Richard 576 

Godley,  G.  McMurtrie 576 

Luns,  Joseph  M.  A.  H 561 

McBride,  Robert  H 576 

Middendorf,  J.  William,  II 576 

Nixon,  President 549,  561 

Richardson,  Elliot  L 557,569 

Thieu,    Nguyen    Van 549 

Walsh,  Lawrence 554 

Yost,  Charles  W 564, 574 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  June  9-15 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  News,  Department  of  State,  Washington, 
D.C.  20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  June  9  which  appears 
in  this  issue  of  the  BtrLLETiN  is  No.  153  of  June  8. 


No. 


Date 


•154      6/9 


•155      6/11 
156      6/12 


tl57 

*158 


6/13 
6/13 


Subject 

Meloy  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
the  Dominican  Republic  (bio- 
graphic details). 

Troxel  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Zambia  (biographic  details). 

Walsh:  21st  plenary  session  on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

Richardson :  Advertising  Council. 

U.S.  delegation  to  lA-ECOSOC, 
Port-of-Spaln,  June  14-23. 


•Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bm-uajriN. 


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