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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1.580 




October 6, 1969 



STRENGTHENING THE TOTAL FABRIC OF PEACE 

Address by President Nixon Before the 24th Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly 297 

PRESIDENT NIXON REDUCES TROOP CEILING IN VIET-NAM 

Statement hy the President 302 

U.S. ABSTAINS ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 
LINKING MOSQUE FIRE TO MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 

Statement by Ambassador Yost and Text of Resolution 307 



For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1580 
October 6, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this pubUcation are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the .source wffl be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Llteratiue. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the ivork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Infornuxtion is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative rruiterial in the field of inter- 
natioruil relations are listed currently. 



Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace 



Address by President Nixon ^ 



Madam President, Mr. Secretary General, 
distinguished Foreign Ministers, Prime Minis- 
ters, delegates, my fellow citizens of the world 
community : I first wish to express my deep ap- 
preciation for the honor of addressing this 
organization for the first time and also to take 
this opportunity to welcome all of those from 
126 countries who are here at the United Na- 
tions General Assembly session. 

Particularly, on a personal note, I appreciate 
the opportunity to have been welcomed today 
by the Secretary General. It is hard to realize, 
as we were reminiscing, that just 16 years ago 
he welcomed me to Burma when he was Chief 
of Protocol and I was Vice President. Since 
then, we have both come up in the world to a 
certain extent. 

I think we would all agree that there is no 
nobler destiny, nor any greater gift that one 
age could make to the ages that follow, than to 
forge the key to a lasting peace. 

In this great Assembly the desirability of 
peace needs no affirmation. The methods of 
achieving it are what so greatly challenge our 
courage, our intelligence, our discernment. 

Surely if one lesson above all rings resound- 
ingly among the many shattered hopes in this 
world, it is that good words are not a sub- 
stitute for hard deeds and noble rhetoric is no 
guarantee of noble results. 

We might describe peace as a process em- 
bodied in a structure. 

For centuries, peace was the absence of war : 
stability was the absence of change. 

But in today's world, there can be no stability 
without change — so that peace becomes a con- 
tinuing process of creative evolution. It is no 



' Made before the 24th session of the TT.N. General 
Assembly at the TJnitecI Nations, N.T., on Sept. 18 
(White House press release (New York, N.Y.)). 



longer enough to restrain war. Peace must also 
embrace progress — both in satisfying man's 
material needs and in fulfilling his spiritual 
needs. 

The test of the structure of peace is that it 
ensure for the people of each nation the integrity 
of their borders, their right to develop in peace 
and safety, and their right to determine their 
own destiny without outside interference. 

As long as we live with the threat of aggres- 
sion, we need physical restraints to contain it. 

But the truest peace is based on self- 
restraint — on the voluntary acceptance of those 
basic rules of behavior that are rooted in 
mutual respect and demonstrated in mutual 
forbearance. 

The more closely the world community ad- 
heres to a single standard in judging interna- 
tional behavior, the less likely that standard is 
to be violated. 

World Role of the United States 

I am well aware that many nations have ques- 
tions about the world role of the United States 
in the years ahead— about the nature and extent 
of our future contribution to the structure of 
peace. 

Let me address those doubts and address them 
quite candidly before this organization. 

In recent years there has been mounting 
criticism here in the United States of the 
scope and the results of our international 
commitments. 

This trend, however, has not been confined to 
the United States alone. In many coimtries we 
find a tendency to withdraw from responsibili- 
ties, to leave the world's often frustrating prob- 
lems to the other fellow and just to hope for the 
best. 



October 6, 1969 



297 



As for the United States, I can state here 
today without qualification: We have not 
turned away from the world. 

We know that with power goes responsibility. 

We are neither boastful of our power nor 
apologetic about it. We recognize that it exists 
and that, as well as conferring certain ad- 
vantages, it also imposes upon us certain 
obligations. 

As the world changes, the pattern of those 
obligations and responsibilities changes. 

At the end of World War II, the United 
States for the first time in history assumed the 
major responsibility for world peace. 

We were left in 1945 as the one nation with 
sufficient strength to contain the new tlireats 
of aggression and with sufficient wealth to help 
the injured nations back to their feet. 

For much of the world, those first difficult 
postwar years were a time of dependency. 

The next step was toward independence, as 
new nations were born and old nations revived. 

Now we are maturing together into a new 
pattern of interdependence. 

It is agamst tliis background that we have 
been urging other nations to assume a greater 
share of responsibility for their own security, 
both individually and together with their neigh- 
bors. The great challenge now is to enlist the 
cooperation of many nations in preserving 
peace and enriching life. This cannot be done by 
Ajnerican edict or by the edict of any other 
nation. It must reflect the concepts and the 
wishes of the people of those nations themselves. 

The history of the postwar period teaches 
that nationalism can be dangerously disrup- 
tive — or powerfully creative. 

Our aim is to encourage the creative forms of 
nationalism; to join as partners where our 
partnership is appropriate and where it is 
wanted, but not to let a U.S. presence substitute 
for independent national effort or infringe on 
national dignity and national pride. 

It is not my belief that the way to peace is by 
giving up our friends or letting down our allies. 
On the contrary, our aim is to place America's 
international commitments on a sustainable 
long-term basis, to encourage local and regional 
initiatives, to foster national independence and 
self-sufficiency, and by so doing to strengthen 
the total fabric of peace. 

It would be dishonest, particularly before 



this sophisticated audience, to pretend that the 
United States has no national interests of its 
own or no special concern for its own interests. 
However, our most fundamental national in- 
terest is in maintaining that structure of inter- 
national stability on which peace depends and 
which makes orderly progress possible. 

Toward Peace in Viet-Nam 

Since I took office as President, no single 
question has occu^jied so much of my time and 
energy as the search for an end to the war in 
Viet-Nam: an end fair to the people of South 
Viet-Nam, fair to the people of North Viet-Nam, 
and fair to tliose others who would be affected 
by the outcome. 

We in the United States want to end this war, 
and we are ready to take every reasonable step 
to acliieve that goal. But let there be no question 
on this one fundamental point: In good con- 
science we cannot — in the long-term interests 
of peace — we will not accept a settlement that 
would arbitrarily dictate the political future 
of South Viet-Nam and deny to the people of 
South Viet-Nam the basic right to deter- 
mine their own future free of any outside 
interference. 

As I put it in my address to the American 
people last May : ^ 

What the United States wants for South Viet-Nam 
is not the important thing. TPhat North Viet-Nam wants 
for South Viet-Nam is not the important tiling. What 
is important is what the people of South Viet-Nam 
want for South Viet-Nam. 

To secure this right, and to secure this princi- 
ple, is our one limited but fundamental objective, 

Both in public and at the Paris talks, we have 
offered a number of proposals which would 
bring peace and provide self-determination. 
We are ready to consider any other proposals 
that have the same objective. The missing in- 
gredient so far has been the willingness of the 
other side to talk on any terms other than those 
that would predetermine the result and deny the 
right of self-determination to the people of 
South Viet-Nam. Once that willingness exists 
and once there is a genuine willingness by the 
other side to reach agreement, the practical 
solutions can readily be found. 

This makes it urgent that the U.N. members, 

" BtTLLETiN of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



298 



Department of State Bulletin 



those in this room, who have long taken an 
active interest in peace in Viet-Nam, now take 
an active hand in achieving it. 

Many urged that if only we halted our 
bombing of the North, peace would follow. 
Nearly a year has passed since the bombing of 
the North was halted. 

Three months have passed since we began the 
process of troop replacement, signaling both our 
own genuine desire for a settlement and the in- 
creased readiness of the South Vietnamese to 
manage their own defense. 

As I announced on Tuesday, by December 15 
our troop strength in Viet-Nam will have been 
reduced by a minimimi of 60,000 men.^ 

On September 2, 1969, North Viet-Nam's 
chief negotiator in Paris said that if the United 
States committed itself to the principle of 
totally withdrawing its forces from South 
Viet-Nam and if it withdrew a significant num- 
ber of troops, Hanoi would take this into 
account. 

I repeat here today what I said in my speech 
of Slay 14 — that we are prepared to withdraw 
all of our forces from South Viet-Nam. And 
the replacement of 60,000 troops is a significant 
step. 

The time has come for the other side to re- 
spond to these initiatives. The time has come 
for peace. 

And in the name of peace, I urge all of you 
here — representing 126 nations — to use your 
best diplomatic efforts to persuade Hanoi to 
move seriously into the negotiations which 
could end this war. The steps we have taken 
have been responsive to views expressed in this 
room. And we hope that views from this or- 
ganization may also be influential in Hanoi. If 
these efforts are successful, this war can end. 

The people of Viet-Nam, North and South 
alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last 
a century. And I speak from personal observa- 
tion. I have been to North Viet-Nam, to Hanoi 
in 1953, and all over South Viet-Nam. I have 
seen the people of the North and the people of 
the South. The people of Viet-Nam, North and 
South, have endured an unspeakable weight of 
suffering for a generation. And they deserve a 
better futiu'e. 

Wlien the war ends, the United States will 
stand ready to help the people of Viet-Nam — 

' See p. 302. 



all of them — in their tasks of renewal and re- 
construction. And when peace comes at last to 
Viet-Nam, it can truly come "with healing in 
its wings." 

An Era of Negotiation 

In relations between the United States and 
the various Commimist powers, I have said that 
we move from an era of confrontation to an era 
of negotiation. 

I believe our relations with the Soviet Union 
can be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect, 
recognizing our differences and also our right 
to differ, recognizing our divergent interests and 
also our common interests, recognizing the in- 
terests of our respective allies as well as our own. 

Now, it would be idle to pretend that there 
are not major problems between us, and con- 
flicting interests. The tensions of the past 30 
years have not been caused by mere personal 
misunderstandings. This is why we have indi- 
cated the need for extended negotiations on a 
broad front of issues. 

Already, as you know, we have had extensive 
consultations with the Soviet Union as well as 
with others about the Middle East, where events 
of the past few days point up anew the urgency 
of a stable peace. 

The United States continues to believe that 
the U.N. cease-fire resolutions define the mini- 
mal conditions that must prevail on the groimd 
if settlement is to be achieved in the Middle 
East. We believe the Security Council resolution 
of November 1967 charts the way to that 
settlement.* 

A peace, to be lasting, must leave no seeds of 
a future war. It must rest on a settlement which 
both sides have a vested interest in maintaining. 

We seek a settlement based on respect for the 
sovereign right of each nation in the area to 
exist within secure and recognized boundaries. 
We are convinced that peace cannot be achieved 
on the basis of substantial alterations in the 
map of the Middle East. And we are equally 
convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the 
basis of anything less than a binding, irrevo- 
cable commitment by the parties to live together 
in peace. 

Failing a settlement, an agreement on the 



* For text of the resolution, see Bttlletiw of Dec. 18, 
1967, p. 843. 



October 6, 1969 



299 



limitation of the shipment of arms to the 
Middle East might heli) to stabilize the situa- 
tion. We have indicated to the Soviet Union, 
without result, our willingness to enter such 
discussions. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

In addition to our talks on the Middle East, 
we hope soon to begin talks with the Soviet 
Union on tlie limitation of strategic arms. There 
is no more important task before us. 

The date we proposed for the opening of talks 
has passed for lack of response. We remain 
ready to enter negotiations. 

Since the United States first proposed stra- 
tegic arms talks 3 years ago, the task of devis- 
ing an effective agreement has become more dif- 
ficult. The Soviet Union has been vigorously 
expanding its strategic forces; weapons them- 
selves have become more sophisticated, more 
destructive. But as the difficulty of the talks in- 
creases, so, too, does their importance. 

Though the issues are complex, we are pre- 
pared to deal with them seriously, concretely, 
and purposefully — and to make a determined 
effort not only to limit the buildup of strategic 
arms but to reverse it. 

Meanwhile, I want to affirm our support for 
arms control proposals which we hope the 
Geneva conference will place before this As- 
sembly with regard to the seabed and chemical 
and bacteriological weapons. We hope also that 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will soon 
enter into force. 

We should be under no illusion, however, that 
arms control will itself bring peace. Wars are 
fought by soldiers, but they are declared by 
politicians. Peace also requires progress on 
those stubbornly persistent political questions — 
questions that are considered in tliis room — 
questions that still divide the world. And it re- 
quires other exchanges, not only of words but of 
deeds, that can gradually weave a fabric of 
mutual trust among the nations and the peoples 
of the world. 

We intend to conduct our negotiations with 
the Soviet Union soberly and seriously, neither 
encumbered by prejudice nor blinded by senti- 
mentality, seeking to reach agreements rather 
than to make propaganda. 

T\1ienever the leaders of Communist China 



choose to abandon their self-imposed isolation, 
we are readj^ to talk with them in the same frank 
and serious spirit. 

Building the Peace 

For nearly a quarter of a century, the U.N. 
has struggled with the often thankless task of 
peacekeeping. As we look to the future, however, 
kee^nng the peace is only part of our task. We 
also must concentrate on building the peace. 

Let us be candid. There are many differ- 
ences—among the great powers and among 
others — wliich as realists we know cannot be 
resolved quickly, cannot be resolved even by 
tliis organization. But we also know that there 
are at least five areas in particular of great con- 
cern to everyone here with regard to which there 
should be no national differences, in which our 
interests are common, and on which there should 
be unanimity. They are these : 

— Securing the safety of international air 
travel. 

— Encouraging international volimteer serv- 
ices. 

— Fostering economic development and popu- 
lation control. 

— Protecting our threatened environment. 

— Exploring the frontiers of space. 

By any standards, aircraft hijackings are 
morally, politically, and legally indefensible. 
The Tokyo Convention has now been brought 
into force, providing for prompt release of pas- 
sengers, crew, and aircraft. Along with other 
nations, we also are working on a new conven- 
tion for the punislunent of liijackers. But 
neither of these conventions can be fully ef- 
fective without cooperation ; sky piracy cannot 
be ended as long as the pirates receive asylum. 

Consequently, I urge the United Nations to 
give high priority to this matter. This is an 
issue which transcends politics ; there is no need 
for it to become the subject of polemics or a 
focus of political differences. It mvolves the 
interests of every nation, the safety of every 
air passenger, and the integrity of that struc- 
ture of order on which a world community 
depends. 

The creative, dynamic kind of peace I have 
spoken of, of course, requires more than such 
basic protections as the one I have just de- 
scribed. 



300 



Department of State Bulletin 



To build this kind of peace, we must join to- 
gether in building our societies — in raising a 
great cathedral of the spirit, which celebrates 
the infinite possibilities of man himself. 

Such a peace requires a fuller enlistment not 
only of government resources and of private 
enterprise resources but also of the dedication 
and skill of those thousands of people all over 
the world who are ready to volunteer in the 
cause of human acliievement. Our own Peace 
Corps has helped in many countries. And I es- 
pecially welcome the consideration of the U.N. 
itself, which it is now giving to establislrment of 
an international volunteer corps. We stand 
ready to give this exciting new venture our full 
and enthusiastic cooperation. 

U.N. Second Development Decade 

As the U.N". looks toward the beginning of 
its Second Development Decade, it faces a time 
of enormous challenge but enormous oppor- 
tunity. 

We can only guess at the new scientific dis- 
coveries that the seventies may bring. But we 
can see with chilling clarity the gap that already 
exists between the developed economies and the 
economies of the developing countries and the 
urgent need for international cooperation in 
spurring economic development. 

If in the course of that Second Development 
Decade we can make both significant gains in 
food production and significant reductions in 
the rate of population growth, we shall have 
opened the way to a new era of splendid pros- 
perity. If we do only one without the other, we 
shall be standing still; and if we fail in both, 
great areas of the world will face human 
disaster. 

Increasingly, the task of protecting man's en- 
vironment is a matter of international concern. 
Pollution of air and water, upsetting the 
balance of nature — these are not only local 
problems, and not only national problems, but 
matters that affect the basic relationships of 
man to his planet. 

The United Nations already is planning a 
conference on the environment in 1972. 1 pledge 
the strongest support of the United States for 
that effort. I hope that even before then we can 
launch new national and international initia- 
tives toward restoring the balance of nature 



and maintaining our world as a healthy and 
hospitable place for man. 

Of all of man's great enterprises, none lends 
itself more logically or more compellingly to 
international cooperation than the venture into 
space. Here, truly, mankind is one: as fellow 
creatures from the planet earth exploring the 
heavens that all of us enjoy. 

The journey of Apollo 11 to the moon and 
back was not an end, but the beginning. 

Sharing the Benefits of Space Technology 

There will be new journeys of discovery. Be- 
yond this, we are just beginning to comprehend 
the benefits that space technology can yield 
here on earth. And the potential is enormous. 

For example, we now are developing earth 
resource survey satellites, with the first experi- 
mental satellite to be launched sometime early 
in the decade of the seventies. 

Present indications are that these satellites 
should be capable of yielding data which could 
assist in as widely varied tasks as these : the lo- 
cation of schools of fish in the oceans, the loca- 
tion of mineral deposits on land, and the health 
of agricultural crops. 

I feel it is only right that we should share 
both the adventures and the benefits of space. 
As an example of our plans, we have deter- 
mined to take actions with regard to earth re- 
source satellites as this program proceeds and 
fulfills its promise. 

The purpose of those actions is that this pro- 
gram will be dedicated to produce information 
not only for the United States but also for the 
world community. We shall be putting several 
proposals in this respect before the United 
Nations. 

These are among the positive, concrete steps 
we intend to take toward internationalizing 
man's epic venture into space — an adventure 
that belongs not to one nation but to all man- 
kind and one that should be marked not by 
rivalry biit by the same spirit of fraternal co- 
operation that has so long been the hallmark 
of the international community of science. 

And now, Madam President, Mr. Secretary 
General, if I could speak a personal word to 
the representatives gathered in this room : 

I recognize that those here are dedicating 
their lives to the cause of peace and that in this 
room, what is done here, will have an enormous 
effect on the future of peace. 



October 6, 1969 



301 



I have had the great privilege over the past 
23 years to travel to most of the countries rep- 
resented in this room. I have met most of the 
leaders of the nations represented in this room. 
And I have seen literally thousands of people 
in most of the countries represented in this 
room. 

There are differences between the nations and 
differences between the leaders and differences 
between the peoples in this world. But based 
on my own experience, of this one thing I am 
sure: The people of the world, wherever they 
are, want peace. And those of us who have the 
responsibilities for leadership in the world 
have an overwhelming world mandate from the 
people of the nations we represent to bring 
peace, to keep the peace, and to build the peace. 

Now, I realize that a survey of history might 
discourage those who seek to establish peace. 
But we have entered a new age, different not 
only in degree but in kind from any that has 
ever gone before. 

For the first time ever, we have truly become 
a single world community. 

For the first time ever, we have seen the stag- 
gering fury of the power of the universe un- 
leashed ; and we know that we hold that power 
in a very precarious balance. 

For the first time ever, technological advance 
has brought within reach what once was only 
a poignant dream for hundreds of millions — 
freedom from hunger and freedom from want ; 
want and hunger tliat I have personally seen in 
nation after nation all over this world. 

For the first time ever, we have seen changes 
in a single lifetime — in our lifetime — that 
dwarf the achievements of centuries before; 
and those changes continue to accelerate. 

For the first time ever, man has stepped be- 
yond his planet and revealed us to ourselves as 
"riders on the earth together," bound insepa- 
rably on this one bright, beautiful speck in the 
heavens, so tiny in the universe and so incom- 
parably welcoming as a home for man. 

In this new age of "firsts," even the goal of 
a just and lasting peace is a "first" we can dare 
to strive for. We must achieve it. And I believe 
we can achieve it. 

In that spirit, then, let us press t-oward an 
open world — a world of open doors, open hearts, 
open minds; a world open t/O the exchange of 
ideas and of people and open to the reach of the 
human spirit; a world open in the search for 
truth and unconcerned with the fate of old dog- 



mas and old isms; a world open at last to the 
light of justice and the light of reason and to 
the achievement of that true peace which the 
people of every land carry in their hearts and 
celebrate in their hopes. 



President Nixon Reduces 
Troop Ceiling in Viet-Nam 

Statement hy President Nixon ^ 

After careful consideration with my senior 
civilian and military advisers and in full con- 
sultation with the Government of Viet-Nam, I 
have decided to reduce the authorized troop 
ceiling in Viet-Nam to 484,000 by December 15. 
This compares with the ceiling of 549,500 which 
existed when this administration took office. 
Under the newly authorized troop ceiling, a 
minimum of 60,000 troops will have been with- 
drawn from Viet-Nam by December 15.^ 

Since coming into office, my administration 
has made major efforts to bring an end to the 
war: 

— "We have renounced an imposed military 
solution. 

— We have proposed free elections orga- 
nized by joint commissions under international 
supervision. 

— We have offered the withdrawal of U.S. 
and Allied forces over a 12-month period. 

— We have declared that we would retain no 
military bases. 

— We have offered to negotiate supervised 
cease-fires under international supervision to 
facilitate the process of mutual withdrawal. 

— We have made clear that we would settle 
for the de facto removal of North Vietnamese 
forces so long as there are guarantees against 
their return. 

— We and the Government of South Viet- 
Nam have announced that we are prepared to 



'Issued on Sopt. 16 (White House press release). 

^ .\ctually, the tot.al reduction in authorized ceiling 
strength amounts to 6.5.500. But within tlie authorized 
ceiling, all units are shown at 100 percent strength. In 
actual practice, most units are slightly below full 
strength, .so that actual strength normally is less than 
the authorized ceiling by 1 or 2 percent. [Footnote in 
White House press release.] 



302 



Department of State Bulletin 



accept any political outcome which is arrived 
at through free elections. 

— ^We are prepared to discuss the 10-point 
program of the other side together with plans 
put forward by the other parties. 

— In short, the only item which is not 
negotiable is the right of the peofile of South 
Viet-Nam to determine their own future free 
of outside interference. 

I reiterate all these proposals today. 

The withdrawal of 60,000 troops is a sig- 
nificant step. 

The time for meaningful negotiations has 
therefore arrived. 

I realize that it is difficult to commimicate 
across the gulf of 5 years of war. But the time 
has come to end this war. Let liistory record 
that at this critical moment, both sides turned 
their faces toward peace rather than toward 
conflict and war. 



34th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the text of the opening statement 
made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head 
of the U.S. delegation, at the 34th plenary ses- 
sion of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
September 18. 

Press release 269 dated September 18 

Ladies and gentlemen : At the past 33 meet- 
ings our side has made a number of proposals 
for negotiations which could lead to the end of 
the conflict in Viet-Nam. We have also taken a 
number of concrete steps designed to open the 
way to peace. 

In accordance with tliis policy, President 
Nixon, on September 16, made the following 
announcement : 

[Here Ambassador Lodge read the test of the Presi- 
dent's statement priated above.] 

The President's statement makes clear our 
desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the 
war in Viet-Nam. We have gone far in opening 
the door to negotiations which could bring 
peace. As the President said on July 30,^ it is 



' For President Nixon's statement issued at Saigon on 
July 30, see Bulletin of Aug. 25, 1969, p. 155. 



now time for your side to sit down with us to 
talk seriously about ways to stop the kUling, to 
negotiate, and thus to put an end to this tragic 
war which has brought so great destruction to 
friend and foe alike. 



Governor Rockefeller Reports 
on Mission to Latin America 

Following is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Nixon to Governor Nelson A. Rochefeller 
which was made public following their meeting 
at San Clemente, Calif., on September 3. 

White House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated 
September 3 

Septembek 3, 1969 
Deak Nelson : As you know, it was my convic- 
tion from the earliest moment of my Admin- 
istration that our policies toward Latin America 
and tlie way in which we conceived of our rela- 
tionships with the other nations of this hemi- 
sphere needed a fresh and comprehensive 
re-examination. It was evident during the past 
several years that the area had been experienc- 
ing profound change which had deeply affected 
institutions, attitudes and relationships, and had 
set in motion new dynamics of which we were 
only beginning to be aware. Yet the assumptions 
and conceptions that guided our policj' had re- 
mained relatively static during this same period. 
I concluded, therefore, that it would bo ad- 
visable to send a mission to the other American 
Eepublics to consult with leaders and people, 
to listen to their points of view and then to rec- 
ommend to me measures that we could take to 
develop new policies, and more effective rela- 
tionships. As you know, during my first day in 
office, I discussed the question of U.S.-Latin 
American relations with Galo Plaza, Secretary 
General of the OAS, and he suggested that you 
be asked to head such a mission. 

I cannot express to you adequately enough my 
appreciation and admiration for the dedicated, 
courageous and efficient way in which you and 
your associates carried out this trust. I consider 
this inconvenience and sacrifice of time to have 
been tremendously useful and worthwhile. It 
has dramatized our concern with the relation- 
ships that unite us with our sister Republics, it 
has focused attention on the problems and con- 
cerns of our neighbors and it has provided the 



October 6, 1969 



303 



Administration with an informed and fresh 
perspective of our relationships and policies. 

I consider your mission in all of its aspects — 
both the personal contacts and the analysis and 
recommendations you are now submitting — to 
have constituted a signal contribution to our 
Latin American policy. Your report and its rec- 
ommendations will be a central point of refer- 
ence m the formulation of new policies toward 
the other nations of the hemisphere. I will sub- 
mit your report and its proposals very promptly 
to the National Security Council for its studj' 
and appropriate action, and I am confidert that 
these recommendations will play a vital part in 
the construction of sensitive new concepts and 
programs. 

Please accept again my very sincere gratitude 
and appreciation for all that you have done, and 
for the devotion and dedication which you 
brought to this task. Please express my appre- 
ciation as well to your staff and to the advisors 
who also gave so generously and unselfishly of 
their time and energy. 

With warmest personal regards, 

Richard Nixon 

Honorable Nelsox A. Rockefeller 
Governor of the State of Neio York 
Albany, New York 



Department Establishes New Bureau 
of Politico-Military Affairs 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 19 (press release 273) the establish- 
ment of the Bureau of Politico-Military Af- 
fairs. The new bureau replaces the OfBce of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Polit- 
ico-Military Affairs. 

The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs will 



be responsible for liaison between the Depart- 
ments of State and Defense and will be anal- 
ogous to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs. It 
will also have responsibilitj' within the Depart- 
ment of State for international security policy 
and operations, for atomic energy and aerospace 
matters, for munitions control, military assist- 
ance, and sales policy and disarmament. 

The bureau will be headed by a Director, who 
will have rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary 
of State. 

Ronald Spiers, formerly Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, will be 
the first Director of the bureau. Thomas Picker- 
ing will be Deputy Director. (For additional 
biographic data, see press release 273.) 



Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 24th U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 12 confirmed the 
nominations of the following to be representa- 
tives and alternate representatives of the United 
States to the 24th session of the General As- 
sembly of the United Nations: 

Representatives 

Charles W. Tost 

William B. Buffum 

Dante B. Fascell, U.S. Representative from the 

State of Florida 
J. Irving Whalley, U.S. Representative from the 

State of Pennsylvania 
Shirley Temple Black 

Alternate Representatives 

Christopher H. Phillips 
Glenn A. Olds 
Rita E. Hauser 
William T. Coleman 
Joseph E. Johnson 



304 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences ^ 

Scheduled October Through December 

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Geneva Mar. 14, 1962- 

ITU/CCIR Study Group I, II, III, VIII, and XIII Geneva Oct. 1-15 

UNESCO International Hydrologioal Decade: 8th Session of the Bureau Paris Oct. 2-3 

of the Coordinating Council. 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Oct. 2-3 

OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government Procurement Paris Oct. 6 (1 day) 

FAO Committee on Control of Desert Locust: 13th Session Rome Oct. 6-10 

ECE Timber Committee: 27th Session Geneva Oct. 6-10 

BIRPI/UNIDO Joint Meeting of Experts on the Organization and Ad- Vienna Oct. 6-10 

k^ ministration of Industrial Property Offices. 

UNESCO/ WMO Joint Conference on International Cooperation in Re- Paris Oct. 6-11 

suits of the International Hydrological Decade on International Co- 
operation in Hydrologj''. 

WMO Regional Association I (Africa) : 5th Session Geneva Oct. 6-18 

UNCTAD Committee on Tungsten: 6th Session Geneva Oct. 6-24 

IMCO International Tug Conference London Oct. 7-9 

GATT Working Party on Accession of Romania Geneva Oct. 7-10 

ICAO Sonic Boom Panel: 1st Meeting Montreal Oct. 7-18 

OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Preferences Paris Oct. 8-10 

South Pacific Conference Noumea Oct. 8-17 

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Special Meeting London Oct. 9-10 

Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 3d Session Washington .... Oct. 10-17 

ECE Ad Hoc Meeting of Rapporteurs on Automation Geneva Oct. 13-14 

GATT Committee on Agriculture Geneva Oct. 13-15 

GATT Budget Committee Geneva Oct. 13-17 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program . . . Rome Oct. 13-18 

International Criminal Police Organization: 38th General Assembly . . Mexico City . . . Oct. 13-18 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products Geneva Oct. 13-24 

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for Leather and Footwear Industry . Geneva Oct. 13-24 

Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in Victoria, B.C . . . Oct. 14-31 
South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan) : 20th Session. 

GATT Technical Experts on Tariff Study Geneva Oct. 15-17 

OECD Industry Committee Paris Oct. 15-17 

IMCO Working Group on Technical Assistance: 1st Session London Oct. 15-30 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 20th Session London Oct. 15-30 

IMCO Assembly: 6th Session London Oct. 15-30 

IMCO Council: 23d Session London Oct. 15-30 

OECD Short-Term Forecasters Paris Oct. 16-17 

ECE Group of Experts on Gas Statistics: 10th Session Geneva Oct. 20-22 

South Pacific Commission: 32d Session Noumea Oct. 20-24 

ECE Committee on the Development of Trade Geneva Oct. 20-24 

GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustment Geneva Oct. 20-24 

lA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Expert Level Washington . . . Oct. 20-28 

WMO Commission for Climatology: 5th Session Geneva Oct. 20-31 



' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on September 16, 1969, Usts 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October- 
December 1969. Nongovernmental conferences and meetings are not included ; these are listed in tlie World List of 
Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Suijerintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations : BIRPI, United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intel- 
lectual Property; COIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT, InternaUonal Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, 
Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovern- 
mental Committee for European Migration ; ILO, International Labor Organization ; IMCO, Intergovernmental 
Maritime Con.sultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, International 
Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan 
American Highway Congresses; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

October 6, 1969 305 



ECE Steel Committee: 37th Session Geneva Oct. 21-24 

FAO Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics Rome Oct. 21-24 

FAO Council: 53d Session Rome Oct. 27 (1 day) 

OECD Trade Committee Paris Oct. 27-28 

GATT Committee on Residual Restrictions Geneva Oct. 27-29 

ECE/FAO Codex Group of Experts on Standardization of Fruit Juices . Geneva Oct. 27-31 

CENTO Council for Scientific Education and Research: 18th Session Washington . . . Oct. 27-31 

UNCTAU Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes: 3d Session . Geneva Oct. 27-31 

ECOSOC Group of Experts on Explosives Geneva Oct. 27-Nov. 7 

ECOSOC Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods . Geneva Oct. 27-Nov. 7 

ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee: 10th Session of New Delhi .... Oct. 27-Nov. 10 

the Railway Subcommittee. 

FAO Conference: loth Session Rome Oct. 28-Nov. 27 

OECD Fisheries Committee Paris October 

GATT Working Party on Caribbean Free Trade Association Geneva October 

UNCTAD Committee on Preferences Geneva October 

Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission The Hague .... October 

on Letters Rogatory. 

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Annual Meeting . . Vancouver .... October or 

November 

GATT Committee on Trade and Development Geneva Nov. 3-7 

PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety Washington .... Nov. 3-7 

ECOSOC Population Commission: 15th Session New York .... Nov. 3-14 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning Con- Geneva Nov. 5-7 

tatners. 

Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights San Jos6 Nov. 7-22 

GATT Working Party on Trade with Poland Geneva Nov. 10-14 

ILO Governing Body: 177th Session Geneva Nov. 10-21 

IMCO International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage . . Brussels Nov. 10-28 

GATT Committee on Balance of Payments Geneva Nov. 11-21 

Council of Europe: Committee on Patents Strasbourg .... Nov. 12-14 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Nov. 12-14 

OECD Science Policy Committee Paris Nov. 12-14 

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Nov. 17 (1 day) 

ECE Senior Economic Advisers Geneva Nov. 17-22 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III Paris Nov. 18 (1 day) 

ICAO Limited European and Mediterranean Conference on Rules of Paris Nov. 18-Dec. 6 

the Air, Air Tratfiic Control/Communications, and Regional Air 

Navigation. 

Plenipotentiary Conference on Definitive Arrangements for the Inter- Washington .... Nov. IS-Dec. 15 

national Telecommunications Satellite Consortium: 3d Session. 

ICAO Panel on the Study of Economics of Route Air Facilities: 3d Montreal Nov. 24-28 

Meeting. 

ECE Committee on Electric Power Geneva Nov. 24-28 

ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Tech- Addis Ababa . . . Nov. 24-Dec. 5 

nology to Development: 12th Session. 

ICAO Special Conference on Aircraft Noise Montreal Nov. 25-Dec. 17 

FAO Council: 54th Session Rome Nov. 28 (1 day) 

FAO Conference on Animal Production and Health in Africa: 2d Kinshasa Nov. 28-Dec. 6 

Session. 

IOC Cooperative Investigation of Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 3d undetermined . . . November 

Session. 

International Coffee Organization: Executive Board London November 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 13th Session Mexico City . . . November 

ICEM Council: 31st Session Geneva November 

ICEM Executive Committee: 33d Session Geneva November 

PAHC Permanent Executive Committee Lima November 

OECD Energy Committee Paris November 

OECD Comniittee on Scientific and Technical Personnel Paris November 

OECD Special Committee for Textiles Paris November 

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris November 

OECD Committee for Research Cooperation Paris November 

lA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Ministerial Level Caracas Dec. 1-9 

IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection: 9th Session London Dec. 2-5 

UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts on International Arrange- Paris Dec. 2-9 

ments to Promote Use of Space Communications. 

ECE Working Party on Customs Questions Affecting Transport . . . Geneva Dec. 8-12 

UNESCO Council of the International Bureau of Education Geneva Dec. 8-12 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 10th Session . . . London Dec. 9-12 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee of the Rome Convention on Paris Dec. 10-13 

Neighboring Rights: 2d Session. 
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 10th Session. 
IMCO Working Group on Containers and Cargoes: 9th Session. 
ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 21st Plenary Session 

ILO/IMCO Committee on M.aritime Safety Training 

ITU/CCITT Study Group III: Working Group on Tariff . . . 

International Wool Study Group: 10th Session 

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices . 



Geneva Dec. 1.5-19 

London Dec. 16-19 

Geneva December 

Geneva December 

Geneva December 

London December 

Paris December 



306 Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Abstains on Security Council Resolution 
Linking Mosque Fire to Middle East Conflict 



Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council on Sejdember 15 iy U.S. Rep- 
resentative Charles W. Yost, together tcith the 
text of a resolution adopted by the Council that 
day. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOST 

U.S./O.N. press release 98 dated September 15 

The United States was profoundly shocked 
and dismayed by the fire on Aug:iist 21 at the Al 
Aqsa Jlosque in occupied Jerusalem. "We under- 
stand and are deeply moved by the evidence of 
genuine concern and devotion that this unfor- 
tunate incident has evoked from Moslems the 
world over. In addition to the special grief felt 
by all the followers of Islam, the damage to that 
historic shrine and to its priceless furnishings 
is mourned as a heavy loss of part of the spirit- 
ual legacy of all mankind. 

We respect the concerns expressed by 25 mem- 
bers in their message to the President of the Se- 
curity Comicil of August 22/ which, as we 
understand them, are essentially threefold. 

First, we would agree that the facts surround- 
ing this tragedy must be mvestigated thoroughly 
and impartially. To do any less would be to en- 
courage suspicion, emotionalism, and fanaticism. 

Secondly, we see merit in the proposal that a 
group of distinguished Moslems assist m deter- 
mining the extent of the damage to the mosque 
and be associated with the necessary rei^airs. We 
were pleased to hear Ambassador Tekoah [ Yosef 
Tekoah, Eepresentative of Israel] state that his 
Govermnent has no objections to this proposal. 
Such a step would be entirely consistent with 
our views on the major role of the religious com- 
munities in Jerusalem and with the widely 
shared view that Jerusalem is a legitimate con- 
cern of the international community. 

Thirdly, I believe there is no disagreement on 
the necessity for more adequate precautions 
against repetition of such a desecration. 



' U.N. doc. S/9407. 



Having said this, 1 wish to make it clear that 
my Government's deep and abiding interest in 
Jerusalem has caused it to examine very care- 
fully the facts that are so far available. Without 
attempting to prejudge the findings of compe- 
tent investigations, let me say that we have 
seen no shred of evidence to support the alle- 
gation that the act of suspected arson which 
occurred at the Haram-as-Sharif on August 21 
was other than an individual act, as demented 
as it was dastardly. We would think it most un- 
fortunate if the international community, which 
itself shares a deep interest in Jerusalem's 
shrines, were diverted from formulating a posi- 
tive response to the present situation by incite- 
ments or allegations in support of other objec- 
tives. This Council cannot lend itself to any such 
incitements or allegations. Our real interest lies 
in ensuring that the full facts regarding the 
fire and the circumstances surrounding it are 
brought to light in a manner which satisfies the 
legitimate interests and concerns of Moslems 
and others throughout the world. 

My Government notes the steps taken im- 
mediately by the Government of Israel to in- 
stitute a broadly based commission of inquiry 
which contains representatives of all three great 
religions which have holy places in Jerusalem. 
We welcome Israel's announcement that the 
hearings of the commission of inquii-y and the 
trial of the suspected arsonist will be public 
and open to observers from any country or faith. 

Several speakers have already referred to the 
1954 Convention and Protocol for the Protec- 
tion of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, to which Israel and the Arab states 
are parties and to which they have already had 
recourse at the suggestion of, and through ma- 
chinery set up with the assistance of, the Direc- 
tor General of UNESCO. The application of 
this convention in the Arab-Israeli area appears 
to have proceeded rather smootUy. We view 
Ambassador Tekoah's remarks as indicating 
that the Government of Israel is prepared to 
continue to cooperate with the Director General 



October 6, 1969 



307 



of UNESCO in applying this convention. It is 
therefore entirely possible that it could also 
be applied in a satisfactory manner to assist in 
resolving the legitimate question regarding the 
circumstances of the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque. 
It might also serve as a basis for facilitating 
measures to gviai'd against future tragedies of 
tliis nature pending the achievement of a just 
and lasting peace in the area, including closer 
communication and planning between Moslem 
representatives on one hand and the occupation 
authorities on the other. 

Mr. President, barely 9 weeks have passed 
since this Council unanimously reaffirmed the 
special interest of the international community 
in the city of Jerusalem. On that occasion, I 
elaborated in some detail the position of the 
United States on the subject of Israel's responsi- 
bilities as an occupying power.^ That position 
has not changed. It remains as I stated it on 
that occasion. 

We do not consider that it is appropriate or 
desirable so soon again to reexamine and ]iro- 
nounce upon the status of Jerusalem or to link 
the deplorable fire in Al Aqsa to the whole 
tragic Arab-Israeli conflict. We regi-et that the 
draft resolution wliich we have before us has 
gone so far beyond the purpose, as we under- 
stood it, for which the Security Council was 
called mto session. We were hoping for a resolu- 
tion which would concern itself directly and ex- 
clusively with measures for the maintenance, 
repair, and protection of the holy places, 
including provision for adequate participation 
of Moslem representatives, but not one wliich 
again went over the ground covered during our 
debate last July. Our position on tlie political 
elements of the status of Jerusalem was made 
completely clear hj our vote for Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 267. 

Had the present draft resolution reaffirmed 
Resolution 267 but dealt substantively only with 
the concerns expressed in the August 22 com- 
mimication to the President of the Security 
Council, we would have been able to vote for it. 
Since we do not have that option and since, as 
we have said, we find other portions of the 
resolution inappropriate in the present context 
and not well calculated to serve the ends we have 
in mind, the United States will abstain. 

This does not imply any lack of concern by 



my Government for the maintenance and pro- 
tection of the holy places. We consider that the 
Government of Israel, as an occupying power, 
has a heavy responsibility to Moslems every- 
where and to all mankind to see that the holy 
places are protected. We urge it to take every 
precaution to do so and to cooperate fully with 
the INIoslem cormnimity in so doing. We are pre- 
pared to support any suitable action by the 
United Nations in achieving this objective. 

Finally, we need hardly remind ourselves, jNIr. 
President, that our presence here today — as on 
so many occasions in the past^ — is against the 
backdrop of another, no less urgent, need. That 
need is for even greater efforts toward the 
achievement of a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East, a peace which has been long 
awaited and is long overdue. In support of that 
goal, restraint and cooperation of the parties 
themselves are absolute requirements. As we ap- 
proach a time when the foreign ministers of the 
states most concerned, and of the four perma- 
nent members of the Security Council which 
have been seeking to assist in the search for 
l^eace in the Middle East, will assemble here, let 
us all make a very special effort to restrain vio- 
lence, to moderate debate, and to create an 
atmosphere of conciliation and good will in 
which the peacemakers may work constructively. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 3 

The Security Covncil, 

Grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to 
the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 
1069 under the military occupation of Israel, 

Slindful of the consequent loss to human culture. 

Having heard the statements made before the Coun- 
cil reflecting the universal outrage caused by the act 
of sacrilege in one of the most venerated shrines of 
mankind, 

Recalling its resolutions 252 (196S) of 21 May 1968 
and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General 
Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) 
of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning meas- 
ures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the 
city of Jerusalem, 

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition 
of territory by military conquest is inadmissible, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 
(1969) ; 

2. Recognizes that any act of destruction or prof- 
anation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and 
sites in .Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or conniv- 



^For U.S. statements and text of Resolution 267 
adopted by the Security Council on July 3, see Bulletin 
of July 28, 1969, p. 76. 



»U.N. doc. S/RES/271 (1969) ; adopted by the Coun- 
cil on Sept. 15 by a vote of 11 to 0, with 4 abstentions 
(Colombia, Finland, Paraguay, U.S.). 



308 



Department of State Bulletin 



aiice at, any such act may seriously endanger inter- 
national peace and security; 

3. Determines that the execrable act of desecration 
and jirofanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque empha- 
j^izes the immediate necessity of Israel desisting from 
acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and 
rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken 
liy it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem ; 

4. Calls upon Israel scrupulously to observe the pro- 
\isions of the Geneva Conventions and international 
law governing military occupation and to refrain from 
causing any hindrance to the discharge of the estab- 
lished functions of the Supreme Muslim Council of 
Jerusalem, including any co-operation that Council may 
desire from countries with predominantly Muslim pop- 
ulation and from Muslim communities in relation to 
its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic 
Holy Places in Jerusalem; 

5. Condemns the failure of Israel to comply with the 
aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to imple- 
ment forthwith the provisions of these resolutions ; 

6. Reiterates the determination in operative para- 
graph 7 of resolution 267 (1969) that in the event of 
a negative response or no response, the Security Coun- 
cil shall convene without delay to consider what further 
action should be taken in this matter; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely 
the implementation of the present resolution and to 
report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest 
possible date. 



The Flight of Apollo 1 1 

Follotoing is a statement tnade hefore the U.N. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
on September 8 iy Thomas 0. Paine., Admin- 
istrato7', National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 

U.S./U.N. press release 94 dated September 8 

It is an honor and a pleasure to have this 
opportunity to report to this distinguished com- 
mittee at your opening session. Tliis occasion is 
especially appropriate because tliis most dra- 
matic extension of man's capabilities in space is 
indeed an achievement by and for all men 
ever'ywhere. 

This event has implications for mankind far 
richer and more meaningful than a landing on 
the moon in the narrowest teclmical sense. If 
men properly develop and exploit these ad- 
vanced capabilities, they can surely be directed 
to a great expansion of those practical benefits 
■which we have only just begun to reap in space 
in the fields of communications, weather pre- 
diction, navigation, earth resources, and other 
fields. 



And man will be able, in time, to extend his 
domain beyond the confines of his home planet 
earth. From our small 8,000-mile-diameter 
planet we have set forth in this first step up- 
ward and outward into the S,000-million-mile 
solar system around us. 

Wlien I say that the success of Apollo 11 is 
a step forward of all mankind, I do not use these 
words without thought. The variety and ex- 
tent of foreign contributions to the Apollo 11 
flight are real and they are impressive, and 
they are appreciated by all Americans. 

It is most appi'opriate that we express our 
appreciation in this forum to so many of the 
countries i-epresented here for accommodation 
and, in many cases, operation of tracking facili- 
ties : Australia, the Malagasy Republic, Mexico, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. 

And particularly we are grateful for the use 
of a special 210-foot-diameter radio astronomy 
facility in Australia which made it possible to 
bring back the movies of the surface of the moon 
to all television watchers everywhere. 

We appreciate the cooperation in the stag- 
ing of our search-and-rescue aircraft and range- 
instrumentation aircraft from Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, Japan, Libya, Mauritius, Netherlands, 
Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. And we appreciate the over- 
flight privileges which were granted to these 
aircraft by 47 different nations. 

And we appreciate the cooperation in the 
scientific experiments that were carried on 
Apollo 11 from Switzerland for Professor 
Geiss' solar wind detector and from Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom for 
supporting the work of 36 scientists who are 
now receiving lunar surface samples for anal- 
ysis in their laboratories. 

Brazil has cooperated in a sounding-rocket 
program that was coordinated with Apollo to 
monitor radiation hazards to our astronauts in 
space. 

Other countries, including France, are now 
utilizing the laser reflector left on the moon for 
scientific experiments. 

Sweden and Germany furnished the Hassel- 
blad cameras which brought back the magnifi- 
cently detailed photos of the lunar topography. 

And we are grateful to 73 different nations 
who sent a memorable series of messages which 
we etched onto a small disc and carried to the 
moon and left behind. 

And, finally, I want to acknowledge the 



October 6, T969 



309 



United Nations Outer Space Committee's con- 
structive work in confirming in the Outer Space 
Treaty the status of astronauts as envoys of all 
mankind and in providing for the safe return 
of astronauts who might land under emergency 
conditions. 

I know that you are all interested in the pre- 
liminary scientific i-esults, wliich even at this 
early date have provided extremely valuable 
insights into the lunar surface. There will be 
a more detailed report in a press conference in 
about a week, but the following can already be 
said in a tentative fashion : 

The passive seismometer experiment operated 
within a few minutes of its deployment. It 
recorded astronaut footsteps and the lunar 
landing module and possible surface slides on 
the moon. It was successfully commanded to 
a standby mode during the lunar night and then 
switched back on. The long-period seismic ele- 
ment lasted until August 26 and the short- 
period element until August 28. None of the 
long-period seismic data resembles earth data, 
but it is not certain whether the signals are 
caused by instrumentation changes or natural 
phenomena. If natural, the moon would be struc- 
turally very different from the earth, a far 
more heterogeneous body than our home planet. 
This we will explore further in the next land- 
ing, which is now scheduled to set forth on 
November 14, when additional seismic instru- 
ments will be deployed. 

We have found as yet no evidence of any 
previous life on the surface of the moon. But all 
of you have seen men walking on the surface, 
men who will be the precursors of terrestrial life 
as it moves outward to our twin planet. 

The minimum age of the Sea of Tranquility 
area in which we landed is about 3 billion years, 
much older than believed earlier and possibly 
indicating that the moon formed at the same 
time as the earth. 

The length of time that the materials had 
been lying on the surface which we collected 
as our samples indicates that the surface of the 
moon is very ancient and has changed very 
slowly. 

The average density of the rocks is very high : 
3.2 to 3.4 grams per cc. This is near the average 
density of the entire moon. 

The limar material that we collected shows an 
igneous origin, possibly volcanic; but it is 
chemically different from volcanic material 



here on earth, with a higher percentage of 
heavier elements. 

We have detected no evidence in any of the 
samples examined to date of the presence of 
water. In fact, it appears likely that the rocks 
were formed under conditions with little oxy- 
gen or water present. They are typically crystal- 
line and glass. The lunar surface dust is 
composed of a very high percentage of small 
round glass spherules, apparently the product 
of impact by meteorites. 

The laser experiment, which is still being con- 
ducted, has already refined our measurement of 
the lunar distance down to a few tens of meters, 
and we hope in time to get it down to within 
a few centimeters. 

If man's reach should exceed his grasp, the 
fact that we have been able in the Apollo pro- 
gram to grasp the moon shows that man has 
perhaps not been reacliing far enough. We can 
dare and we can win far more for man than we 
have ever thought possible. And we should, not 
only in science and technology but in all the 
affairs of men. 

It is very proper that men everywhere around 
the world are asking us : If man can indeed go 
to the moon, why can't we do a far better job 
here on our planet earth in ordering the affairs 
of man? THs is a question which is indeed ap- 
propriate and a question which those of us con- 
cerned with space programs should welcome. 

There is much to be learned in space, and it 
is relevant to our total environmental knowledge 
here on earth. We are opening a whole new 
field — that of planet ecology. We should not as- 
sume that an environmental fact close at hand 
here on earth is necessarily more significant to 
us than an environmental fact at lunar distances 
or even at the surface of the sun or in the at- 
mosphere of Venus or the surface of ilars. We 
may find the most critical facts and conditions 
that determine our terrestrial environment in 
the atmospheres and conditions of other planets, 
perhaps at the boundary of the earth's magneto- 
sphere or in the surface of the sun. We may 
find critical msights into our own atmospheric 
processes in the atmosphere of Jupiter or other 
planets. We can and we must pursue this in- 
creased knowledge, and we must turn it in- 
creasingly to the benefit of man. 

To equip ourselves for this task, we should 
continue the work we have begun and should 
increase our capabilities still further ; but above 



310 



Department of State Bulletin 



all, we should do it as much as possible together. 
After the Apollo program we see a very rigor- 
ous opportunity to press forward. We believe 
that the Apollo 11 astronauts have opened a trail 
that many men will follow. Their flight is a 
beginning, not an end. We stand at the start 
of a new era which will see space flight become 
as safe, as reliable, and as economical as air- 
craft flight through the atmosphere is today. 

We see lying ahead of us now the task of de- 
veloping reusable spacecraft and permanent 
space stations in orbit that will greatly reduce 
the cost of space operations and will open space 
travel to men and women of all nations. The fu- 
ture space programs will consist of equipment 
that will be multipurpose ; it will be used many 
times and will bring back in many areas far 
more information than we have been able to 
acquire in the first dozen years of space. 

These future programs can and should be 
carried forward with far greater international 
participation than has yet been the case. That 
participation will be as rewarding to all nations 
who take part as it has been to those nations 
which have started down this trail. The charac- 
I ter of the space effort in the name of all mankind 
will surely be more rewardmg to every person 
I on this planet and will well repay the energies 
i and the resources required. Certainly, we in the 
' United States will, as we have in the past, make 
: increasing opportunities available to peoj^le of 
: all nations who wish to join with us in the press- 
j ing forward of this great himaan endeavor. 

The great explorations of history, carried out 
by many nations, have always opened up new 
vistas of the possible. And the sights of all men 
have been raised and their hearts inspired. The 
exploration of space is in that great tradition, 
and yet it extends by orders of magnitude the 
past explorations. "Wliere, before Apollo, ex- 
ploration was a challenge in itself, its successful 
beginnings now stand as a challenge for our 
children and for all future generations as we 
open up tliis limitless frontier. Certainly the 
greatest challenge of all is that the world which 
is seen as one from space should also be seen as 
one from the earth itself. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks, 
and with your permission I would like to pre- 
sent to you for this committee during the recess 
a lunar globe which contains all of the limar 
features which have been mapped by the lunar 
probes to date. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary importation of 
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 
3943. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
July 18, 1969. 

Customs 

International convention to facilitate the importation 
of commercial samples and advertising material. 
Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into 
force November 20, 1955 ; for the United States Oc- 
tober 17, 1957. TIAS 3920. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
JiUy 18, 1969. 

Customs convention on containers, with annexes and 
protocol of signature. Done at Geneva May 18, 1956. 
Entered into force August 4, 1959 ; for the United 
States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6634. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
July 18, 1969. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New 
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 
1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 
Accession deposited: Monaco, August 14, 1969. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, Netherlands,' Au- 
gust 8, 1969. 

Publications 

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation 
of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 4, 1910, 
as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success 
May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 15, 1911, 
and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511 ; TIAS 2161. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
July 18, 1969. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination. Done at New York Decem- 
ber 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.' 



' Applicable to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles 
'Not in force for the United States. 



October 6, 1969 



311 



Signature: Austria, July 22, 1969. 
Ratification deposited: Mongolia (with a declara- 
tion and reservation), August 6, 1969. 

Slavery 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar 
to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. En- 
tered into force April 30, 1957 ; for the United States 
December 6, 1967. TIAS &418. 

Notifleatioti that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
July 18, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered 
into force January 1, 1967 ; for the United States 
May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 

Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, August 5, 1969;° 
Iraq, July 15, 1969 ; * Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
EepubUc, August 8, 1969.' 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332) , relating to mari- 
time mobile service, with annexes and final protocol. 
Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. Entered into force 
April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 
Notification of approval: Paraguay, July 25, 1969. 

White Slave Traffic 

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave traffic, 
as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 
2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into 
force Julv 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 
1908. 35 Stat. 1979. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
July IS, 1969. 

BILATERAL 



Philippines 

Agreement on the use of the Special Fund for Educa- 
tion for the Philippine Science High School Project, 
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila 
September 5, 1969. Entered into force September 5, 
1969. 



United Arab Republic 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington September 4, 
1969, between the United States and the Embassy of 
India, representing the interests of the United Arab 
Republic. Entered into force September 4, 1969. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of July 28, 1969 (TIAS 6734). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon August 23, 
1969. Entered into force August 23, 1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



' With reservation contained in final protocol. 
' With declaration contained in final protocol. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on September 12 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Charles W. Adair, Jr., to be Ambassador to Uruguay. 
(For biographic data, see White House press release 
dated August 9. ) 

Charles T. Cross to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Singapore. (For biographic data, see Department of 
State press release 276 dated September 23.) 

Jack W. Lydman to be Ambassador to Malaysia. ( For 
biographic data, see Department of State press release 
274 dated September 22.) 

Douglas MacArthur II to be Ambassador to Iran. 
(For biographic data, see White House press release 
dated August 20.) 

Robinson Mcllvaine to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of Kenya. (For biographic data, see Department of 
State press release 277 dated September 23. ) 

Robert M. Sayre to be Ambassador to Panama. (For 
biographic data, see White House press release dated 
August 9.) 



312 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Octoher 6, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 1580 



Aviation. Strengthening the Total Fabric of 

Peace (Nixon) 297 

China. Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

Congress 

Confirmations (Adair, Cross, Lydman, Mac- 
Arthur, Mcllvaine, Sayre) 312 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 24th U.N. 
General Assembly 304 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Adair, Cross, Lydman, Mac- 
Arthur, Mcllvaine, Sayre) 312 

Department Establishes New Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs 304 

Disarmament. Strengthening the Total Fabric of 
Peace (Nixon) 297 

Economic Affairs. Strengthening the Total Fabric 

of Peace (Nixon) 297 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences . . . 305 

Iran. MacArthur confirmed as Ambassador . . 312 

Israel. U.S. Abstains on Security Council Resolu- 
tion Linking Mosque Fire to Middle East Con- 
flict (Yost, text of resolution) 307 

Kenya. Mcllvaine confirmed as Ambassador . . 312 

Latin America. Governor Rockefeller Reports on 
Mission to Latin America (letter of acknowl- 
edgment from President Nixon) 303 

Malaysia. Lydman confirmed as Ambassador . 312 

Military Affairs. President Nixon Reduces 
Troop Ceiling in Viet-Nam (statement) . . 302 

Near East 

Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

U.S. Abstains on Security Council Resolution 
Linking Mosque Fire to Middle East Conflict 
(Tost, text of resolution) 307 

Panama. Sayre confirmed as Ambassador . . . 812 

Presidential Documents 

Governor Rockefeller Reports on Mission to 
Latin America 303 

President Nixon Reduces Troop Ceiling in Viet- 
Nam 302 

Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace . . . 297 

Science 

The Flight of Apollo 11 (Paine) 309 

Strengthening the Total E^bric of Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

Singapore. Cross confirmed as Ambassador . . 312 

Space. The Flight of Apollo 11 (Paine) ... 309 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 311 

U.S.S.R. Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

United Nations 

TheFlightof Apollo 11 (Paine) 309 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 24th U.N. 

General Assembly 304 

Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

U.S. Abstains on Security Council Resolution 

Linking Mosque Fire to Middle East Confiict 

(Yost, text of resolution) 307 

Uruguay. Adair confirmed as Ambassador . . 312 



Viet-Nam 

President Nixon Reduces Troop Ceiling in Viet- 
Nam (statement) 302 

Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

34th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 303 

Name Index 

Adair, Charles W., Jr 312 

Black, Mrs. Shirley Temple 304 

Buffum, William B 304 

Coleman, William T 304 

Cross, Charles T 312 

Fascell, Dante B 304 

Hauser, Rita E 304 

.Johnson, Joseph E 304 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 303 

Lydman, Jack W 312 

MacArthur, Douglas, II 312 

Mcllvaine, Robinson 312 

Nixon, President 297, 302, 303 

Olds, Glenn A 304 

Paine, Thomas O 309 

Phillips, Christopher H 304 

Pickering, Thomas 304 

Sayre, Robert M 312 

Spiers, Ronald 304 

Whalley, J. Irving 304 

Yost, Charles W 304, 307 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

265 9/15 Lodge : 33d plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris, September 13 
[printed in Bulletin of Septem- 
ber 29]. 

*266 9/16 Meeting of the Board of the Foreign 
Service. 

t267 9/16 U.S.-Japan textile meetings at 
Washington (rewrite). 

*268 9/17 Westerfield sworn in as Ambassador 

to Liberia (biographic data). 
269 9/18 Lodge : 34th plenary session on Viet- 
Nam at Paris. 

*270 9/18 Pollack reappointed Director, Inter- 
national Scientific and Technolog- 
ical Affairs (biographic data). 

*271 9/18 Moore designated Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs (biographic data). 

♦272 9/19 Henderson named U.S. Representa- 
tive to Inter-American Commit- 
tee on the Alliance for Progress 
(biographic data). 
273 9/19 Bureau of Politico-Military Af- 
fairs established (rewrite). 

• Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



SuPERINTErJDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 




IM AVT O 

20YEARS OF PEACE 



T%\ 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1581 




October 13, 1969 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 26 313 

PRIME aONISTER MEIR OF ISRAEL VISITS WASHINGTON 

Remarks hy President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir 318 

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS CxiLLS FOR OBSERVANCE 
OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON PRISONERS OF WAR 

Statement l)y Graham Martin and Text of Resolution 323 



For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1581 
October 13, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Govemnient Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

B2 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (.Tanuary 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPAETIMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Headers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a xceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
■with information on developments in 
the field of foreign rela tions and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and tlve Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and intcrruttional 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



President Nixon's News Conference of September 26 



FoUowing are excerpts from the transcript of 
a neivs conference held by President Nixon in 
the East Room of the White House on Sep- 
tember 26. 

The President : Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, 
Associated Press]. 

Q. Hoio do you feel about the various pro- 
posals to propose an arbitrary cutoff time on 
our military presence in Yiet-Nam? 

The President: I have considered a number 
of those proposals within the administration 
and, of course, have noted some of the refer- 
ences that have been made recently in the Sen- 
ate in that regard. I know they were made with 
the best of intentions. However, it is my conclu- 
sion that if the administration were to impose 
an arbitrary cutoff time — say, the end of 1970 
or the middle of 1971 — for the complete with- 
drawal of American forces in Viet-Nam, that 
inevitably leads to perpetuating and continu- 
ing the war until that time and destroys any 
chance to reach the objective that I am trying 
to achieve of ending the war befoi'e the end of 
1970 or before the middle of 1971. 

I think this is a defeatist attitude, defeatist 
in terms of what it would accomplish. I do not 
think it is in the interest of the United States. 

I also believe that even though these pro- 
posals, I know, are made with the best of inten- 
tions, they inevitably undercut and destroy the 
negotiating position that we have in Paris. We 
have not made significant progress in those 
negotiations. But any incentive for the enemy 
to negotiate is destroyed if he is told in advance 
that if he just waits for 18 months we will be 
out anywaj'. Therefore, I oppose that kind of 
arbitrary action. 

Q. Mr. President., can you tell us the reasons 
behind Russia's prolonged failure to respond 
to your proposal for prompt negotiations on 
strategic arms limitations? 



October 13, 1969 



The President: We are trj-ing to explore 
those reasons. Mr. Rogers met with Mr. Gro- 
myko on Monday. He will meet with him again 
on next Monday. He has no answer except a 
suggestion — and I don't think I am divulging 
any confidences in this respect — that we may 
expect an answer in the near future and that it 
is likely to be a positive answer. 

Now, why the answer Inas been delayed is a 
question really that would have to be asked of 
those who have control of policj' in the EJremlin. 

Q. How are you doing, Mr. President, in your 
efforts to end the Viet-Nam war? 

The President: Not as well as I would hope. 
I will not be doing as well as I would hope until 
the war is ended. I would point, however, to 
some progress. 

We point, first, to the fact that we have an- 
nounced that 60,000 Americans will be returned 
from Viet-Xam.^ 

We point, second, to the fact that as a result 
of that and other actions, 50,000 Americans who 
otherwise might have been drafted before the 
end of the year will not be drafted. 

In addition to that, we find that infiltration, 
which tells us a lot about the enemy's future 
capabilities, looking at the first 9 months of this 
year, is two-thirds less than it was in the cor- 
responding jieriod last year. 

We find that American casualties are down 
one-third from what they were over the same 
9-month period last year. 

We find also that on the negotiating front the 
United States has made a far-reaching and 
comprehensive peace offer, a peace offer which 
offers not only mutual withdrawal of forces, 
internationally guaranteed cease-fires, interna- 
tionally supervised elections — in which we will 
accept the result of those elections and the South 



^ For President Nixon's statement of Sept 16, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 302. 



313 



Vietnamese will as well, even if it is a Commu- 
nist government ; and by making that offer we 
have reversed the whole tide of world public 
opinion. 

I noted when I was at the U.N. that I found 
no significant criticism of the U.S. policy. Now 
is the time for Hanoi to make the next move. 
We certainly have made it. 

There is one thing, however, which I should 
emphasize, that is not negotiable. We will talk 
about anything else. What is not negotiable is 
the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to 
choose their own leaders without outside im- 
position, either by us or by anybody else. We 
believe that that limited goal must be one that 
we must insist on. We believe it can be achieved, 
and we believe that if we stay on this course 
and if we can have some more support in the 
Nation — we have a lot of support, but even more 
support in the Nation— for tliis steady course, 
the enemy then will have the incentive to nego- 
tiate, recognizing that it isn't going to gain 
time, that it isn't going to wait us out. 

Once the enemy recognizes that it is not going 
to win its objective by waiting us out, then the 
enemy will negotiate and we will end this war 
before the end of 1970. That is the objective we 
have. 

Q. Going hack to Mr. Cormier's question 
about the Viet-Nam cutoff, Senator Goodell, 
who will he a candidate next year, is providing 
the vehicle for a new round of Senate hearings 
on this subject. Will this eitJier embarrass you 
as a Republican President or other Bepuhlican 
candidates next year? 

The President: Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, 
Hearst Newspapers], I, of course, can't control 
the course of Senate hearings, particularly in 
the Foreign Kelations Committee. On the other 
hand, as far as those hearings are concerned, 1 
believe that a discussion in the Senate of this 
matter, an open discussion, in which all the 
consequences of this very well intentioned state- 
ment by Senator Goodell, all the consequences 
of itr— the fact that it inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the United States is going to 
be stuck in Viet-Nam until the end of 1970, that 
there is no hope of ending the war before then — 
that when that comes home, I think the Senate 
will overwhelmingly reject the Goodell 
proposition. 

Q. Mr. President, does the insistence upon 



self-determination in Viet-Nam as an indis- 
pensable condition mean that you will support 
the present Thieu regime there until there is a 
negotiated settlement or until there are elections 
to change that regime? 

The President : It means, Mr. Lisagor [Peter 
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], that the Thieu 
regime is there because of the result of an elec- 
tion, and until the people of South Viet-Nam 
have another opportunity to vote, I think that 
the United States should not reverse that elec- | 
tion mandate. That is the answer that I think is * 
only appropriate under the circumstances. 



Q. Therehasbeen growing concern, sir, about J 
deepening U.S. involvement in the combat in 1 
Laos. If you confirm that, would you also say 
where this runs counter to your new Asian 
policy? 

The President : There are no American com- 
bat forces in Laos. At the present time, we are 
concerned by the North Vietnamese move into 
Laos. There are 50,000 North Vietnamese there 
at the present time, and more perhaps are 
coming. 

As you know, the American participation in 
Laos is at the request of the neutralist govern- 
ment, which was set up in accordance with the 
1962 accords, which were agreed to, incidentally, 
by Hanoi, Peking, and the Soviet LTnion. That 
was during the administration of President 
Kennedy, negotiated by Mr. [W. Averell] 
Harriraan. 

We have been providing logistical support 
and some training for the neutralist govermnent 
in order to avoid Laos falling under Commu- 
nist domination. As far as American manpower 
in Laos is concerned, there are none there at the 
l^resent time on a combat basis. 

Q. Mr. President? 

The President: Mr. Potter [Philip Potter, 
Baltimore Sun]. 

Q. You say there are no combat forces in 
Laos. How do you regard the aii'men who bomb 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail from bases in Thailand 
and Viet-Nam? Would you regard those as com- 
bat forces? 

The President: When we consider the situa- 
tion in Laos, I think President Kennedy in his 
first major television speech, wliich we all re- 



314 



Department of State Bulletin 



member, in 1962, put it very well. He pointed out 
that Laos was potentially the key to what would 
happen in Thailand, as well as in Viet-Nam and 
the balance of Southeast Asia. 

Now, Laos relates very much to Viet-Nam, 
because the Ho Chi Minh Trail runs through 
Laos. It is necessary, under those circumstances, 
that the United States take cognizance of that, 
and we do have aerial reconnaissance; we do 
have perhaps some other activities. I won't 
discuss those other activities at this time. 

• • • • • 

Q. Mr. President., does the change of leader- 
ship in Hanoi brought about by the death of 
Ho Chi Minh show any sign at all to you, sir, 
of any change of intent, either in combat or in 
Paris, on the part of the enemy? 

The President: Not yet, and we would ex- 
pect nothing yet. Each of our systems of gov- 
ernment has a problem. The major problem in 
a Communist system of government is the prob- 
lem of succession, and the North Vietnamese are 
going thi'ough that. 

Immediately after a change of leadership, 
there is a tendency for uncertainty and rigidity 
as the contest for power goes on. We think that 
is going on within North Viet-Nam at the pres- 
ent time. However, looking to the future, as new 
leaders emerge, as they look at the consequences 
of past policy and the prospects for future pol- 
icy, and as long as the United States holds to 
its course, I think the prospects for a possible 
change are there. 

I am not predicting it. I am not trying to raise 
false hopes. I am only suggesting that since there 
is new leadership, we can expect perhaps some 
reevaluation of policy. 

Q. Mr. President, when do you plan to Tnahe 
Governor Rockefeller's report on Latin America 
public, and what is the main thrust of his recom- 
mendations to you? 



The President: 
been in Washington 



During the time that I 



have 



-and a few of you, not 
many, have been in Wasliington longer than I, 
in and out — I have found that we have had at 
least eight reports on Latin America. 

In talking to my friends in the diplomatic 
corps, they have begged me, "Please don't study 
us" ; because, they have said, "All you do is study 
us and make headlines with the words and then 
have no action." 

Now, when I set up the Rockefeller Task 



Force, I made one commitment to him, to which 
he completely agreed : that he would make the 
report to me, and what we would try to do is 
to make our actions make the news, rather than 
the words make the news. 

I have already met with Governor Rocke- 
feller. There are some very exciting recom- 
mendations in his report which we are going to 
adopt. I am going to meet with him for an ex- 
tended visit tomorrow at Camp David, along 
with the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
America, Mr. Meyer. 

Then later in the month — I mean later in Oc- 
tober — we will be making a major new pro- 
nouncement on Latin American policy, and a 
number of the Rockefeller recommendations will 
be in that annoimcement. 

Q. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago today you had 
a major meeting with your top advisers and peo- 
ple directly involved in the Viet-Nam effort. I 
donH think we have had a report, as such, on that 
meeting. I wonder if tliere was a focus, such as 
the death of Ho Chi Minh, or just what was it 
all about? 

The President: Naturally, much of what was 
discussed in that meeting could not be appropri- 
ately discussed in a public forum like this. We 
looked over the military situation, the political 
situation, in South Viet-Nam, and naturally we 
speculated privately — and I would never specu- 
late publicly — as to what might happen with 
the change of leadership. 

We did determine, however, that there were 
some good signs on the horizon : the failure of 
the enemy to be able to launch a summer of- 
fensive which everybody had predicted; the 
fact that the infiltration rate was down by two- 
thirds, which means that the possibility of an 
offensive this fall has receded. 

We took note of that and the fact that this 
Vietnamization program, despite some prob- 
lems, was moving forward and that political 
and economic stability in the South, despite 
some significant problems, was going forward. 

All of these matters were taken into considera- 
tion. Generally, I would not like to leave the 
impression that this was an overly optimistic 
report, because I believe in looking at Viet-Nam 
and all of our problems in a very realistic, down- 
to-earth manner. 

But I would say this : I think we are on the 
right course in Viet-Nam. We are on a course 
that is going to end this war. It will end much 



October 13, 1969 



315 



sooner if we can have to an extent — to the ex- 
tent possible in this free country — a united front 
behind very reasonable proposals. If we have 
that united front, the enemy then will begin to 
talk; because the only missing ingredient to 
escalating the time when we will end the war 
is the refusal of the enemy in Paris to even dis- 
cuss our proposals. The moment that they start 
discussing those proposals, then that means that 
■we can bring the war to a conclusion sooner than 
if we just continue on our present course. 

The press : Thank you very much. 



35th Plenary Session on Vlet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the text of the opening statement 
made hy Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head 
of the U.S. delegation, at the 35th plenary ses- 
sion of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Pans on 
September 25, together with the text of a resolu- 
tio'ii on pi^oners of war introduced in the House 
of Representatives on September 17. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE 

Press release 280 dated September 25 

Ladies and gentlemen : At our last meeting I 
presented President Nixon's statement of Sep- 
tember 16 announcing that a minimum of 60,000 
American troops will have left Viet-Nam by 
December 15, 1969.^ 

Your side asserted that these actions were a 
"farce" and "illusion" and a reduction by 
"driblets." 

The reduction in our forces cannot be so cav- 
alierly brushed aside. Under the reduction ac- 
complished by the end of August, the following 
units have now left South Viet-Nam : 

Nine U.S. infantry battalions 

Four U.S. artillery battalions 

Three U.S. aviation squadrons 

One U.S. engineer battalion 

Three U.S. regimental or brigade headquarters 

One U.S. division headquarters 

Under the program announced by President 
Nixon on September 16, U.S. forces will be fur- 



ther reduced. By December 15, as compared with 
the end of August, the following will have left 
Viet-Nam : 

Nine U.S. infantry battalions 

Six U.S. artillery battalions 

One U.S. tank battalion 

Ten U.S. aviation squadrons 

Eight U.S. engineer construction battalions 

Three U.S. regimental or brigade headquarters 

One U.S. division headquarters 

One reconnaissance battalion 

The replacement of U.S. forces by South Viet- 
namese constitutes a significant step. It is proof 
that the United States and the Republic of Viet- 
Nam do not wish to keep U.S. forces in Viet- 
Nam any longer than they are needed to help 
defend South Viet-Nam against outside 
aggression. 

The overriding fact represented by the re- 
moval of those forces is that the trend in our 
force strength is decisively down. Your side 
knows this. You should therefore take it seri- 
ously, rather than dismiss it or belittle it by 
meaningless arithmetical juggling or by slight- 
ing phrases. 

The real question you should ask yourselves is 
not how to deride our acts but how to respond 
to them. 

And so I ask you : Are you prepared to match 
the steps we have taken ? The bulk of the forces 
which we removed from South Viet-Nam before 
the end of August came from the Mekong Delta 
area. But you have just sent Kegular North 
Vietnamese Army battalions for the first time 
into the delta, thus expanding the deployment 
of North Vietnamese forces as we reduce our 
forces. 

I ask you : How are we to interpret this ? 

Last week your spokesman claimed that we 
have pledged to take out the main elements of 
our forces from Viet-Nam in 12 months but that 
no provision is made for the removal of remain- 
ing forces. 

Let me clarify this point. 

We have affirmed our willingness to take out 
our forces on a specific timetable, asking only 
that North Viet-Nam take out its forces from 
South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia into 
North Viet-Nam, also in accordance with a 
timetable. 

President Nixon on May 14 ^ proposed that 
the major portions of all U.S., Allied, and other 



' For text of President Nixon's statement of Sept. 16, 
see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 302. 



' Bulletin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



316 



Department of State Bulletin 



non-South Vietnamese forces be taken out, over 
a period of 12 months, by agreed stages. At the 
end of this 12-month period the remaining non- 
South Vietnamese forces would move into des- 
ignated base areas and wouhl not engage in 
combat operations. The remaining U.S. and Al- 
lied forces would leave as the remaining North 
Vietnamese forces left and returned to North 
Viet-Nam. 

This does not mean that the remaining U.S. 
forces would be in South Viet-Nam indefinitely, 
as you have claimed. Their departure and that 
of remaining North Vietnamese forces would 
follow and is a subject for negotiation. 

We are ready to discuss this proposal or gen- 
uine counterproposals so that we may negotiate 
this vital issue. 

Since our last meeting — on September IS — 
President Nixon spoke at the United Nations. 
He said : ^ 

On September 2, 1969, North Viet-Nam's chief nego- 
tiator in Paris said that if the United States committed 
itself to the principle of totally withdrawing its forces 
from South Viet-Nam and if it withdrew a significant 
number of troops, Hanoi would take this into account. 

I repeat here today what I said in my speech on May 
14 — that we are prepared to withdraw all our forces 
from South Viet-Nam. And the replacement of 60,000 
troops is a significant step. 

The time has come for the other side to respond to 
these initiatives. 

And so I ask you : What is your response ? 

Before closing, I wish to comment on the 
statements you made last week that my discus- 
sion of prisoners of war was a move to "side- 
step the central issues." The fate of those 
prisoners is not a peripheral question. It is a 
central issue. You have acknowledged that your- 
selves by including the question of prisoners in 
your 10-point proposal. 

The whole world is watching to see what you 
do to improve the treatment of the men you hold 
and whether you will make it possible for their 
next of kin — who have assuredly harmed no 
one — at least to know whether their relations are 
alive or dead. This is not much to ask. 



Before I close, let me call your attention to a 
resolution which has been introduced into the 
House of Representatives of the United States. 
This resolution is cosponsored by 200 Eepre- 
sentatives and calls for humane treatment of 
American prisoners in Viet-Nam and compli- 
ance with the Geneva Convention on the Pro- 
tection of Prisoners of War. We shall give you 
copies of the text of this resolution, with the 
request that you consider it carefully. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I have asked some di- 
rect questions today. I believe the situation calls 
for them, rather than complicated niceties of 
language. Answers to these questions can start 
us negotiating a settlement of this war. We hope 
you will stop belittling our actions and join us 
in the search for peace. 

TEXT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION^ 

Whereas the United States Government and the Re- 
public of Vietnam have continuously honored the 
requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the 
treatment of prisoners of war ; and 

Whereas the United States Government has repeat- 
edly appealed to North Vietnam and the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam to respect the re- 
quirements of the Geneva Convention, which North 
Vietnam has endorsed ; and 

Whereas the North Vietnamese and the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam have disregarded 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention and refused 
to release the names of prisoners of war who are mem- 
bers of the Armed Forces of the United States, to per- 
mit the regular flow of mail to or from those prisoners, 
and otherwise to accord humane treatment to those 
prisoners, and to permit inspection of the facilities in 
which those prisoners are held : Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved 'by the House of Representatives {the 
Senate concurring). That it is the sense of Congress 
that the President, the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and all other concerned depart- 
ments or agencies of the United States Government, the 
United Nations, and the peoples of the world should 
appeal to North Vietnam and the National Liberation 
Front of South Vietnam to comply with the require- 
ments of the Geneva Convention relative to the treat- 
ment of prisoners of war and to take such steps as may 
be appropriate to obtain the humane treatment and 
prompt release of all members of the Armed Forces of 
the United States so held as prisoners of war. 



" Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 



' H. Con. Res. 355 ; 91st Cong., 1st sess. 



October 13, 1969 



317 



Prime Minister Meir of Israel Visits Washington 



Golda Meir, Prime Minister of the State of 
Israel, visited Washington September 25-27. 
Following are an exchange of remarks hettoeen 
President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir at a 
welcoming ceremony on the South Laxon of the 
White House on September 25, their exchange 
of toasts at a dinner at the White House that 
evening, and their exchange of remarks follow- 
ing their meeting on September 26. 



EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

White House press release dated September 25 
President Nixon 

It is a very great privilege for me, speaking in 
behalf of the American people, to welcome you, 
Madam Prime Minister, in a very personal 
sense, because you were raised in this country. 
You have been to this country many times, but 
we are particularly proud that for the first time 
we welcome you as Prime Minister of Israel. 

Speaking to you in that capacity, as the head 
of government of a very courageous people, a 
people who are determined to maintain their 
indeiDendence, who also are determined to 
acliieve a lasting peace in the area in which they 
live, I look forward to the talks we shall have 
individually and also with other members of 
your party. 

It would be less than candid for me not to say 
that the problems of the ^Mideast are terribly 
complex and not susceptible to solution in one 
meeting or two or three, or even more, at the 
level at which we will be talking. 

But it is also proper to say that the Mideast — 
and peace in the Mideast — is of interest not only 
to your nation and your neighbors but to the 
whole world because of what could happen in the 
event that war were to break out there, the re- 
percussions that that could have all over the 
world. 

We know that you and your people want 
peace. We know that your neighbors want peace. 
Certainly the majority of the people in the 
whole area want peace. The question is how to 
achieve it. On this we shall have discussions 
that I hope will be helpful : the real peace, the 



peace that is not simply one of words, but one 
which both parties will have a vested interest 
in maintaining. 

I would say finally, Madam Prime Minister, 
that a very famous British Prime Minister once 
said : "One should always talk as much as possi- 
ble to women, because this is the best school." 

I can assure you that I recognize the tre- 
mendous complexity of the problem we will be 
discussing. I recognize that it is necessary to get 
the very best answers that we can to find a 
solution to these problems, and I realize that in 
talking to you — not just because you are Prime 
Minister but because you are one of the out- 
standing women in political leadership in the 
world — I will be truly going to the best school 
today and tomorrow. 

Prime Minister Meir 

Mr. President, needless to say, I am deeply 
moved by the reception and by the words that 
you have spoken. Every official gviest from 
abroad to the Wliite House must surely sense 
the significance of the occasion. May I say that 
this is particularly so for a representative of a 
people small in numbers and in resources. 

May I say that in receiving me here in friend- 
ship and equality you are affirming that the 
attitude of the United States to other peoples 
is not determined by physical factors. 

The history of Israel reborn, in the years pre- 
ceding statehood and the more than two decades 
since its achievement, cannot be told without 
reference to the unwavering support and friend- 
ship shown by successive American Govern- 
ments and by the American people. 

Within hours after the proclamation of our 
statehood, the United States Government rec- 
ognized Israel ; and Jewish remnants from the 
Nazi death camps, who had been largely liber- 
ated by the American forces in Europe, came 
to our shores. 

Mr. President, the ties between our two coun- 
tries are rooted in the Biblical heritage and in 
the common dedication to human dignity, free- 
dom, and to democracy. 

We have done everything in our power to 



318 



Department of State Bulletin 



translate these ideals into the fabric of our na- 
tional life. It is this sense of affinity that has 
encouraged us to ask for America's understand- 
ing and support in difficult times. 

The story of modern Israel is essentially the 
story of the return to the ancestral homeland of 
exiles from persecution, insecurity, and fear in 
quest of freedom, human dignity, independence, 
and peace. 

Today, no Jew need remain homeless because 
of oppression and insecurity. I am gratified to 
be able to say this here in this great land which 
has been a haven for the oppressed, including 
many of my own people. 

I shall be able to tell you, Mr. President, of 
Israel's progress in many fields. Tragically, 
peace is still denied us. But that same faith that 
has sustained us down the ages instills within 
us the confidence that the hour of peace will 
come. 

I look forward to the day when an Israeli 
Prime Minister will be able to come here bear- 
ing to the President and the people of the 
United States the tidings that the Middle East 
has entered a new epoch of amity and regional 
cooperation. 

Mr. President, the prayers and hopes of my 
people are with you in the heavy responsibility 
you carry not only for your great country but 
for freedom-loving mankind at large. We follow 
with deep sympathy your efforts for regional 
and world peace, tlie phenomenal scientific ad- 
1 vance of America under your leadership, the re- 
sults of which are open to all nations, and your 
interest in economic and social advancement for 
all peoples. 

I am privileged, Mr. President, to convey to 
you the best wishes from the President, the 
Government, and the people of Israel, together 
with their deep appreciation for your invitation 
to me and for your interest in our welfare and 
progress. 

From Jerusalem, the city of prophecy and 
universal inspiration, I bring you the traditional 
Hebrew greeting: Shalom. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 

White Honse press release dated September 25 

President Nixon 

As I look aroimd tliis room, I see several 
Members of the Senate and the House who have 
been here before during this administration's 
dinners in this state dining room and who have 



seen the heads of state and heads of government 
who have been here. 

All of them were very distinguished leaders 
of their countries ; but as you know, this is the 
first time in this administration we have had 
the honor to receive the head of government of 
another state who also is a woman. 

Now that, naturally, should give a great deal 
of opportunity for a President of the United 
States, in welcoming the Prime Minister, to re- 
mark about her unusual capabilities not only in 
her official capacity but as a woman. I can only 
say this, that I am reminded of the fact that 
David Ben-Gurion, in referring to our very 
distinguished guest this evening, referred to her 
as the best man in his Cabinet. 

I also recall the old Jewish proverb to the 
effect that man was made out of the soft earth 
and woman was made out of a hard rib. 

I do not mean by these references to indicate 
that the Prime Minister whom we honor tonight 
is one who does not have those very remarkable 
and unique qualities that we admire in the 
women of her coimtry and the women of our 
own country and the women of the world. But 
what I would like to say very simply is this : 
that throughout the history of her people, a 
history that we know very well in tliis coimtry, 
a history that we heard even the Marine Band 
and our Strolling Strings attempt to represent 
by music very briefly a few moments ago, we 
know that very capable women and strong 
women have played a remarkable and important 
part in that history. 

In Biblical terms, we remember Deborah, 
3,000 years ago. The Bible tells us very little 
about Deborah, except that she loved her people 
and served them well. Then, if I may para- 
phrase, it concludes with this one thought : That 
there was peace in the land for 40 years. 

Madam Prime Minister, as we welcome you 
here at this dinner, and as we meet with you 
today and tomorrow on the occasion of this 
visit, what is really deepest in our hearts is the 
hope that history will record that after your 
service as Prime Minister there was peace in 
the land for 40 years and longer. 

Wlien we think back on your people, a war 
every 10 years, when we think back on your 
people going back through the century, how 
they have suffered, we know how much the word 
"peace" means. 

We can say to you that while it is fashionable 
in the great councils of the world to talk rather 
casually about peace, and while it is, of course, 
expected that at events like this we use that 



October 13, 1969 



319 



term almost in an offhand way, we feel it very 
deeply here. We feel it because the people of 
Israel deserve peace. They have earned peace, 
not the fragile peace that comes with the kind 
of a document that neither partj- has an interest 
in keeping, but the kind of peace that will last, 
one that will last for 40 years or even longer. 

I say that for another reason, too. I have had 
the privilege and I know that many of our 
friends around this room have had the privilege 
of seeing what the people of this very small 
country have done in Israel, and it is a remark- 
able story. "With this immense military burden, 
with this tremendous budget that they have to 
bear in that respect, how they have made that 
land bloom, how they have made it productive. 

But also I have seen what the people of this 
country have done in other lands, in Africa, in 
Asia, in Latin America. People have gone from 
the State of Israel to these other lands in their 
own programs of assistance and advice; and 
this kind of genius, this kind of ability, is very 
rare in the world. It is desperately needed in 
the world. It is desperately needed for the works 
of peace. 

And for these and so many other reasons, we 
simply want to say that we are very honored 
to have the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minis- 
ter, and others in this distinguished party here 
in this room tonight. We are honored to pay 
tribute to a very brave and courageous people. 
We hope that as a result of our meeting we will 
have taken a significant step forward toward 
that peace which can mean so much to the people 
of Israel, to the people of all the Mideast, and 
also to the people of the world. 

Now I would like to ask you, in affirming that 
sentiment, to rise and raise your glasses with 
me to the Prime Minister. 

Prime Minister Meir 

There is no use in my trying to liide the fact 
that this has been an exceptional day in my life. 
One reads sometimes that representatives of 
big powers get together, try to solve problems, 
make certain decisions; and we know it is 
important. 

Then one sentence reads that representatives 
of little countries, not very powerful, not very 
much, not very able to give each to the other — 
one has a feeling, well, they got together, they 
at least shared their troubles and problems, they 
at least feel sorry for each other. That helps 
sometimes. 



But I think that this world would be entirely 
different if there was a possibility of meeting 
between the big and powerful and the small in 
an atmosphere and a feeling not of one asking 
for something and one giving something but in 
an atmosphere that in this world there must be 
a real partnership between large powers and 
small, ricli and poor. 

This world has become too small and too full 
of pi'oblems and troubles for any one of us to 
feel that he by himself can either separate him- 
self from the world and be happy in his home, 
isolated because he is powerful, or that it doesn't 
matter. 

There can be some that are secure and strong 
and resourceful, and there are othere tliat are 
small and poor and troubled, as though it did 
not affect all of us, what happens in any corner 
of the earth. 

We have become too advanced in science. If 
any trouble is discovered in the moon, Mr. Presi- 
dent, I am afraid it will affect us on earth. We 
are all a part of everything that is good and 
everything that is dangerous. 

To me this has been a great day. Not because I 
have come representing the people that has no 
worry in the world, that has no problems, that 
needs nothing, but this is a great day for me 
because I represent a small country, a small 
people. I represent a people that throughout its 
history for 2,000 years has known persecution, 
has known discrimination, has been driven from 
place to place. And for 2,000 years this people 
has refused to give up a dream, an ideal that 
someday it will come back to its home and re- 
build it. 

It is tragic that this happened when G million 
of our people were gone. Those 6 million in East- 
ern and Central Europe — those were the centers 
of culture, of religion, of Zionism, of faith — 
withstood everything, all hardships, and did not 
give up their faith. They are gone. 

Every one of us feels that he has to make up 
and he owes it to them, not only to those who 
are alive, those remnants that have remained, 
but owes it to them who are gone. 

Those who went to the gas chambers went 
singing : "I believe the Messiah will come." They 
knew that they were going to their death, and 
we feel that they left us a legacy that we must 
implement and put into life, that which they 
believed in and that for which they died. It is 
not simple in this world, in the neighborhood 
in which we live. 

When I say this was a great day for me, Mr. 



320 



Department of State Bulletin 



President, I shall remember it always, because 
you made it possible for me to speak to you, to 
bring- before you all of our problems, all of our 
worries, all of our hopes and aspirations, and if 
you will forgive me, I did not have a feeling for 
one single moment that I, representing little, 
tiny Israel, was speaking to the President of the 
great United States. I felt I was speaking to a 
friend who not only listens — in Hebrew we have 
two words, a word that means only listening and 
a word that means that it really is absorbed— 
and I felt that you were not merely kind to 
listen to me but you shared what I was saying, 
what our worries are. 

We discussed the problems of Israel as though 
they were our common problems. This means a 
lot. Israel has known in its short number of 
years too many hours when we felt we were 
all alone. And we made it. 

In 1948, when we were attacked by six Arab 
armies and had nothing to fight with, but thank 
God we did not lose our sense of humor, we 
said : yes, but we have a secret weapon and our 
secret weapon is, there is no alternative, we must 
win because we have nowhere to run to except 
the sea. Therefore we chose to fight and to fight 
it out and win. We had no alternative. We had 
many hours that were dark, the hours before the 
5th of June in 1967, none of us will ever forget 
them. 

But we believe. We have not lost our con- 
fidence. We have faith not only in the life and 
existence and development of Israel, but we be- 
lieve honestly and sincerely that the day will 
come when there will be peace in the area. The 
day will come when across the borders there 
will not be tanks and one will not listen only 
to the shelling, to the shells that will be sent from 
across the borders into villages killing men and 
women and children. 

But I am convinced that the day will come 
when farmers from Israel, young men and wom- 
en who have left their homes and left their 
towns and went to the desert and went to the 
hills at Galilee and brought life to the desert 
when nothing has bloomed for hundreds and 
hundreds and hundreds of years and have 
brought forests to the hills and have absorbed 
liuman beings shattered in body and spirit after 
the Second World War and made them alive 
again, and they straightened their backs and the 
children who came to us with eyes full of fear 
are happy now and they sing. These men and 
women and these scared children who have now- 
become young men and women have made it pos- 



sible for us to develop the desert, to do what we 
have done, and there is song on their lips and 
they teach and they study and they farm and 
they build. 

No greater day can we envisage than when 
these people merely step across the border and 
witli a farmer of Jordan and with a farmer in 
the Nile Valley and with a farmer in Syria— 
not Avhen we are on the Golan Heights and we 
see wliat was not done in the villages of the 
Golan Heights — and we will just step across the 
border and bring with us not only the fruits of 
our experience but the joy in being alive to- 
gether, we and they, and making it possible for 
their children, too, to live as human beings and 
to hope for a life where one will bring joy to 
everyone around and where we can erase from 
the minds of young people, where we can erase 
the horror of mothers that they bring children 
into this world and, who knows, maybe when 
they are just beginning their life they will be 
sent into the battleground. 

We believe in that, Mr. President, honestly 
and faithfully. We are a people who for 2,000 
years believed in the impossible. And here we 
are, a sovereign state, accepted in the family of 
nations, with many problems, many troubles, 
but here we are. 

And here we are speaking in the United 
States. Here I am as a guest of the President of 
the United States, having full understanding of 
what this day means, and yet I will come home 
and I will tell my Cabinet and I will tell my peo- 
ple and I will tell our children and our young 
people: Don't become cynical, don't give up 
hope, don't believe that everything is just 
judged only by expediency. 

There is idealism in this world. There is 
human brotherhood in this world. There is a 
great and powerful country, the United States, 
that feels that the existence of Israel is im- 
portant to it because it is important that we all 
live and all exist, no matter how small and how 
troubled we are. 

Mr. President, thank you, not only for your 
wonderful hospitality, not only for this great 
day and every moment that I had this day, but 
thank you for enabling me to go home and tell 
my people that we have a friend, a great friend 
and a dear friend. It will help. It will help us 
overcome many difficulties. 

When the great day comes when this dream 
comes true, you will have had a great share in it. 

Thank you very much. 

To the President of the United States. 



October 13, 1969 



321 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS 

White House press release dated September 26 

President Nixon 

Madam Prime Minister, it seems that you have 
just arrived ; and of course, your visit has been 
a short one. But in the brief hours you liave been 
in "Washington we have had very extended talks, 
private talks, on the relations between our two 
countries and, beyond that, I want the members 
of the press to know, on problems in the world 
generally. 

This is the first opportimity I have had to talk 
to the Prime Minister, although I have known of 
her work in the field of diplomacy and in other 
areas over many, many years. She is, naturally, 
an expert and an advocate of the great principles 
that concern her own country, but she has a very 
deep understanding of those issues that divide 
the world. 

It has been very valuable for me to have the 
benefit of her counsel on those problems all 
over the world, including even the problems 
of youth, which we discussed at some length 
last night, although we found, I must admit, 
no solutions. 

I would like to say, too, that in these talks we 
have discussed all of those matters that have 
been speculated about in the press. We will not 
announce any decisions at this time. There is no 
formal communique. 

This was a meeting where we thought it was 
very important for us to have a direct discus- 
sion of, first, our past relations, where we are 
now, and what course of action should be fol- 
lowed in the future. 

I think we have a very good understanding as 
to the positions that we both take, and I think 
growing from this meeting could come some 
progress toward a solution of the terribly dif- 
ficult problems we confront in the Mideast. I 
say "could" because I want to be very realistic. 
I find that one thing the Prime Minister and I 
have in common is that we are no-nonsense kind 
of people. We talk very directly, and we cover 
a lot of subjects in a very brief time. 

The problems in the Mideast go back over 
centuries. They are not susceptible to easy solu- 
tion. We do not expect them to be susceptible to 
instant diplomacy. On the other hand, we must 
try— and I was glad to find a willingness on 



the part of the Prime Minister and her col- 
leagues — try to find a way to peace. 

We have no new initiatives to announce, but 
we do think that we have a better understanding 
of how we should move from here on out in at- 
tempting to meet this very difficult problem. 

I can only wish you well on the balance of 
your trip. I know you will receive a wonderful 
welcome everyplace j-ou go, particularly in 
Milwaukee. Milwaukee lost the Braves, but they 
got you back. 



Prime Minister Meir 

I only want to express my extreme apprecia- 
tion for the opportunity that I have had to 
spend so much time with the President. It was 
an exceptional opportunity for me personally. 

The President says he knew about me. 

You would not be surprised, I suppose, if I 
said I knew about you, Mr. President. 

Also, representing my country, speaking to 
the President of the United States, I am happy 
that I can go home and, without any announce- 
ment of news, say that I found in the President 
of the United States a friend of Israel and found 
full understanding for our problems and diffi- 
culties and that there is something that we 
share in common ; that is, that everything should 
be done that is possible to bring real peace in 
the area, knowing that the interest of peace is 
for the welfare of all in the area — not only 
Israel but the tens of millions of Arabs and 
others in the various Arab countries. 

It is good to know that in the search for peace, 
both of us, both of our countries, the popula- 
tions in both of our countries, are deeply in- 
terested and dedicated to this quest — not some- 
thing that is makeshift, but something that is 
real peace in the area of the Middle East and 
all over the world. 

Mr. President, I don't know how to thank 
you for the time that you have taken, for the 
privilege that I have had to discuss many prob- 
lems with you in an atmosphere of friendship 
and frankness, for the opportunity that you 
gave me to plac« upon your shoulders, that are 
carrying such a heavy burden for the entire 
world, also the burdens of a little country some- 
where put away in the Jliddle East but that you 
have made me feel means something to you and 
to j'our people. 



322 



Department of State Bulletin 



International Conference of the Red Cross Calls for Observance 
of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War 



Following is a statement made before the 21st 
International Conference of the Red Cross at 
Istanhul on Septemier 10 hy Graham Martin, 
Chairman of the UjS. Government delegation, 
togetJier with the text of a resolution adopted by 
the conference on September 13?- 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN 

Those of you who were present at the 20th 
International Conference of the Ked Cross in 
Vienna in October 1965 will recall that the con- 
ference expressed its concern for the treatment 
of prisoners of war whose confinement remov^ed 
them from combat and whose presence pre- 
sented no threat to their captors. The armed 
conflicts that existed at that time, and the con- 
duct of some governments who have acceded to 
the Geneva conventions in failing to honor their 
obligations under the conventions to provide 
humane treatment to prisoners of war, showed 
the need for the resolution which the confer- 
ence passed 4 years ago. 

Now 4 long years have passed since the adop- 
tion of that resolution, which called upon "all au- 
thorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure 
that every prisoner of war is given the treatment 
and full measure of protection prescribed by the 
Geneva Convention of 1949. ..." In the case of 
the Communist authorities in Southeast Asia, 
the solemn appeal of the last conference fell on 
deaf ears. North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong 
have refused consistently to observe even inter- 
nationally recognized minimvmi standards of 
humanitarian treatment for prisoners tliey hold 



' The International Conference of the Ked Cross, the 
highest governing body of the Red Cross, consists of 
governments which have signed the Geneva conventions 
of 1949, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the 
League of Red Cross Societies. 



as a result of the armed conflict in Viet-Nam. 

The concern of the United States about these 
prisoners has been expressed by President Nixon 
and also by Ambassador Lodge at the Paris 
peace talks. Secretary of State Rogers and Sec- 
retary of Defense Laird also have repeatedly 
publicly expressed urgent concern about the fail- 
ure of the Communist authorities in Viet-Nam 
to live up to the humanitarian standards of the 
convention and to treat humanely personnel who 
have fallen into their hands. 

The concern of these highest officers of the 
United States is universally shared by all the 
American people. I am glad to note that we are 
not alone in our concern. Speaking in London 
on March 19, Jacques Freymond of the ICRC 
[International Committee of the Eed Cross] 
said concerning the work of the Committee : 

In Viet-Nam, it has so far had limited success. In 
fact, in spite of repeated representations. It has not 
been able to obtain the agreement of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam to the installation of a delegation 
in Hanoi nor even to the visiting of prisoners of war. 

The Hanoi authorities have, it is true, assured the 
ICRC that these prisoners are treated humanely by 
them. The Committee has therefore had to content 
itself with sending medicines, medical equipment, and, 
more recently, two field hospitals to the Democratic 
Reptiblic of Viet-Nam. 

Mr. Freymond went on to say : 

On the other hand, the ICRC is represented in Saigon 
and the delegates are able to visit all prisoner of war 
camps. They also regularly receive nominal rolls of 
these prisoners. 

I might add that the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, in cooperation with its 
allies, has placed great emphasis on proper 
treatment of prisoners of war captured by 
Allied forces. 

Today, in September 1969, 1 have the sad duty 
to report to you that we have seen that the Com- 



October 13, 1969 



323 



munist authorities in Soutlieast Asia have re- 
fused to cooperate with the ICRC. We also laiow 
as a fact that North Viet-Nam is violating every 
basic provision of the prisoner of war conven- 
tion it signed and is in fact seriouslj^ mistreat- 
ing our men it holds as prisoners. We are deeply 
concerned and outraged by this grave affront to 
human dignity and international responsibility. 

Wlien I said that we know that our men who 
are captured in Viet-Nam are being mistreated, 
I spoke with the assurance of unmistakable evi- 
dence — a touching witness provided by one who 
liad himself actually been subjected to this sav- 
age and inhuman treatment. Since the time of 
the last conference we have known that North 
Viet-Nam was refusing to provide the names of 
all the men it held as prisoners and has refused 
to permit impartial inspection of its prisoner 
facilities by the ICRC or any other impartial 
intermediary. It has long been obvious that 
prisoners have been denied or severely restricted 
in their right to communicate with their fami- 
lies. The hundreds of waiting families who do 
not even know if their man is alive today are sad 
witnesses to tliis fact. We also have seen the 
North Vietnamese release photographs of seri- 
ously sick or wounded prisoners who should be 
repatriated immediately. 

Today we have confirmation of what has been 
an even greater concern for us: Our men are 
being seriously physically and mentally mis- 
treated. The men whom North Viet-Nam re- 
cently chose to release have, in spite of threats by 
their captors, felt dutybound to tell the world 
how North Viet-Nam treats its prisoners. Their 
story is not a pleasant one, and it pleads for 
jirompt and strong action by this conference. 
Nortli Viet-Nam denies universally accepted 
standards of humanitarian treatment for prison- 
ers and violates the provisions of the Geneva 
convention, to which it acceded, by : 

1. Refusing to identify the prisoners it holds 
and account for those missing in North Viet- 
Nam. 

2. Torturing prisoners both physically and 
mentally. 

3. Keeping prisoners in isolation, cut off from 
their fellow prisoners and from the outside 
world. 

4. Failing to provide an adequate diet. 

5. Failing to repatriate the seriously sick or 
wounded. 



6. Refusing to permit impartial inspection of 
prisoner facilities by the ICRC or another ap- 
propriate intermediary. 

7. Using prisoners for propaganda purposes. 

8. Denying regular exchange of mail be- 
tween all prisoners and their families. 

9. Failing to provide adequate medical care 
to all prisoners in need of treatment. 

May I ask you to hear the actual words of 
Navy Lieutenant Robert F. Frishman, one of 
the prisoners recently released by North Viet- 
Nam. On September 2, 1969, less than a fort- 
night ago, from our Naval Hospital in Bethesda, 
where he is recovering from his ordeal, he had 
this to say : 

My intentions are not to scare wives and families, 
but Hanoi has given false impressions that all is wine 
and roses and it isn't so. AH I'm interested in is for 
Hanoi to live up to their claims of humane and lenient 
treatment of prisoners of war. I don't think solitary 
confinement, forced statements, living in a cage for 
3 years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep 
or eat, removal of fingernails, being hung from a ceil- 
ing, having an infected arm which was almost lost, 
not receiving medical care, being dragged along the 
ground with a broken leg, or not allowing an exchange 
of mail to prisoners of war are humane. 

Why don't they send out a list of their prisoners of 
war? Why do they try to keep us from even seeing 
each other? Certain prisoners of war have received 
publicity. Others are kept silent. Why aren't their names 
officially released? If they don't have any secondary 
alternatives or motives in mind, then release the names 
of the prisoners of war so their families will know 
their loved ones' status. I feel as if I am speaking not 
only for myself but for my buddies back in camp, to 
whom I promised I would tell the truth. I feel it is time 
people are aware of the facts. 

Lieutenant Frislunan was addressing his own 
people in America. But it is time for the world 
to know these facts. Therefore, I share Lieu- 
tenant Frishman's words with you gathered 
here in this conference. 

In the most recent provisional activity report 
submitted to this conference by the ICRC, it is 
stated that "on 3 June 1969 the ICRC again 
wrote the Government of the Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam reminding it of the obliga- 
tions incumbent on it in accordance with the 
1919 Geneva Conventions for the protection of 
war victims." And at our opening session the 
distinguished new President of the ICRC 
[IMarcel Naville] reported to us that North Viet- 
Nam had not yet allowed any representative of 
the ICRC to enter its territory'. 



324 



Department of State Bulletin 



Each of us has a moral duty to see that signers 
of the convention honor the internationally ac- 
cepted principles of humane treatment of pris- 
oners of war. We trust that tliis conference, 
■which has a fundamental and abiding interest 
in the Greneva Prisoner of War Convention, will 
declare itself clearly and unequivocally con- 
cerning the humane treatment of prisoners — 
all prisoners in all parts of the world. Tlie reso- 
lution before us was carefully drafted by the 
cosponsors to ensure the universality of its 
coverage to all prisoners of war wherever held, 
by whatever nation, great or small. We hope 
therefore, that all national delegations and all 
national societies will join those nations and 
national societies which have already sponsored 
this resolution. We believe, Mr. Chairman, it 
should be supported unanimously. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION = 

Protection of Prisoners of War 

The XXIst International Conference of the Red 
Cross, 

Recalling the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the pro- 
tection of prisoners of war, and the historic role of the 
Red Cross as a protector of victims of war, 

Considering that the Convention applies to each 
armed conflict between two or more parties to the 
Convention without regard to how the conflict may be 
characterized, 

Recognizing that, even apart from the Convention, 
the international community has consistently demanded 
humane treatment for prisoners of war, including iden- 
tification and accounting for all prisoners, provision of 
an adequate diet and medical care, that prisoners be 
permitted to communicate with each other and with 
the exterior, that seriously sick or wounded prisoners 
be promptly repatriated, and that at all times prisoners 
be protected from physical and mental torture, abuse 
and reprisals. 

Requests each party to the Convention to take all 
. appropriate measures to ensure humane treatment and 
I prevent violations of the Convention. 
! Calls upon all parties to abide by the obligations set 
forth in the Convention and upon all authorities in- 
volved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed 
members of the regular armed forces of another party 
to the conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner 
of war status are treated humanely and given the full- 
est measure of protection prescribed by the Conven- 
; tion ; and further calls upon all parties to provide free 
access to the prisoners of war and to all places of their 
detention by a protecting Power or by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 



■ Adopted on Sept. 13 by a vote of 114 to 0. 



President Reaffirms Interest 
in International Peace Corps 

Following is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Nixon to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, 
which was delivered to the Secretary General on 
September 21j. hy Joseph H. Blatchfwd. Direc- 
tor of the Peace Corps, and Glenn A. OMs^ 
U.S. Representative on the V.N. Economic and 
Social Council. 

D.S./U.N. press release 110 dated September 24 

Deak Mk. Secretary General: Thank you 
for meeting with our Peace Corps representa- 
tives who are serving abroad. Your deep com- 
mitment to world peace and to economic, social 
and human development is an example to these 
fine Americans, and to the thousands of Vol- 
unteers they represent. 

I am sure you vrill find that they share many 
of your goals, especially your thought that 
we must "channel the idealism of our young 
people" into an international effort against 
injustice and poverty. 

As we approach the United Nations' second 
development decade, I find appropriate and en- 
couraging the mternational interest in volimteer 
service which is reflected in the recent significant 
resolutions of the General Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Council. I am deeply 
pleased that the United Nations is now study- 
ing the possibilities of an International Volim- 
teer Corps, for if Volunteers of the world can 
work together, the \asion of development has 
become less distant and the promise of peace 
will move closer to reality. 

In keeping with this Administration's dedi- 
cation to international cooperation and develop- 
ment, the Peace Corps, mider the direction of 
Mr. Joseph Blatchford, is undertaking a num- 
ber of new initiatives, including a commitment 
to the concept of International Vohmtary Serv- 
ice. Guiding its new directions is the conviction 
that the developing countries themselves must 
take part in their own human development 
through the formation of their ovm voluntary 
organizations. To help achieve these goals the 
Peace Corps will seek to send abroad more 
technically skilled Volunteers, along with the 
traditional generalists ; it will persist in efforts 
to develop the concept of exchange voluntary 
programs and will look to host country leader- 



October 13, 1969 



325 



ship in the development of Peace Corps TEXT OF U.S. NOTE 

activities. 

The vast number of people of all ages who 
wish to offer their goodwill, skills and idealism 
as Volunteers must be given the chance to do 
so, and the participation of the United Nations 
toward this goal merits the highest commenda- 
tion. I wish you success and assure our full 
cooperation in this most important effort. 
Sincerely, 



Richard Nixon 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 253 dated September 2 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

The United States and Czechoslovakia con- 
cluded a cotton textile agreement through an ex- 
change of notes at Washington on August 29. 
Philip H. Trezise, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs, and Karel Duda, Am- 
bassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Repub- 
lic, signed the respective notes. 

Under the agreement, which was negotiated 
in the context of the Long Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton 
Textiles (the LTA), Czechoslovakia agrees to 
control exports of cotton textiles to the United 
States for 2 years, from May 1, 1969, through 
April 30, 1971. 

For its first year, the agreement provides an 
aggregate ceiling of 2.5 million square yards 
and a ceiling in category 26 (other than duck) 
of 1 million square yards. Consultation levels 
are specified for the remaining 63 categories of 
cotton textiles. Ceiling and consultation levels 
are increased by 5 percent in the second year of 
the agreement. 



July 29, 1969 
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the Long- 
term Arrangement Regarding International Trade In 
Cotton Textiles, hereinafter referred to as the LTA, 
done in Geneva on February 9, 1962, and to the Pro- 
tocol extending the LTA through September 30, 1970. 
I also refer to recent discussions between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America and the Gov- 
ernment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as the 
result of which I have the honor to propose the fol- 
lowing agreement, pursuant to the provisions of Article 
IV of the LTA as extended by the Protocol, relating 
to trade in cotton textiles between Czechoslovakia and 
the United States: 

1. During the term of this agreement, which shall be 
from May 1, 19G9, to April 30, 1971, inclusive, the Gov- 
ernment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall 
limit annual exports of cotton textiles from Czecho- 
slovakia to the United States to aggregate and spe- 
cific limits specified in the following paragraphs. 

2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12- 
month period beginning May 1, 1969, the aggregate 
limit shall be 2.5 miUion square yards equivalent 

3. Within this aggregate limit, exports in Category 
26 (other than duck) shall be Umited to 1 mlUlon 
square yards, except as provided in paragraphs 4, 5, 
and 7. 

4. In the second and any succeeding 12-month period 
that any limitation is applicable under this agreement, 
the level of permitted exports shall be increased by five 
percent over the corresponding level for the preced- 
ing 12-month period. The corresponding level for the 
preceding 12-month period shall not include any ad- 
justments under paragraphs 5 or 7. 

5. Within the aggregate limit, the limitation on 
Category 26 (other than duck) may be exceeded by five 
percent 

6. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Re- 
public and the Government of the United States agree 
to consult on any questions concerning trade In cot- 
ton textiles between their two countries, including 
levels of exports in categories not given specific limits 
and in made-up goods or apparel made from a par- 
ticular fabric. Except by mutual agreement of the 
two governments or as provided In paragraph 3, ex- 
ports in any one category during the first agreement 
year shall not exceed 500,000 square yards equivalent 
in Categories 1-27 or 350,000 square yards equivalent 
in Categories 28-64. 

7. (a) For any agreement year subsequent to the 
first, and immediately following a year of shortfall 

(i.e., a year in which cotton textile exports from Czech- 
oslovakia to the United States were below the ag- 
gregate limit and any specific limit applicable to the 
category concerned), exports may be permitted to ex- 
ceed these limits by carryover in the following amounts 
and manner: 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of 
the shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any ap- 



326 



Department of State Bulletin 



plicable specific limit and shall not exceed five percent 
of the aggregate limit in the year of the shortfall, and 

(ii) in the case of shortfalls in any category sub- 
ject to specific limits the carryover shall be used in 
the same category in which the shortfall occurred and 
shall not exceed five percent of the specific limit in the 
year of the shortfall, and 

(iii) in the case of shortfalls not attributable to cate- 
gories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall not 
be used to exceed any applicable specific limit except in 
accordance with the provisions in paragraph 5 and 
shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph 6. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph are without any adjustments under this 
paragraph or paragraph 5. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the ex- 
ports permitted in paragraph 5. 

8. Cotton textile exports from Czechoslovakia to the 
United States within each category shall be spaced 
as evenly as practicable throughout the agreement year, 
taking into consideration normal seasonal factors. 

9. The Government of the United States shall 
promptly supply the Government of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic with data on monthly imports of 
cotton textiles from Czechoslovakia; and the Govern- 
ment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall 
promptly supply the Government of the United States 
with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the 
United States. Each government agrees to supply 
promptly any other pertinent and readily available 
statistical data requested by the other government. 

10. In implementing this agreement, the system of 
categories and the rates of conversion into square 
yards equivalents listed in the annex hereto ^ shall 
apply. In any situation where the determination of an 
article to be a cotton textile would be affected by 
whether the criterion provided for in Article 9 of the 
LTA or the criterion provided for in paragraph 2 of 
Annex E of the LTA is used, the chief value criterion 
used by the Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica in accordance with paragraph 2 of Annex E shall 
apply. 

11. For the duration of this agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America shall not invoke 
the procedures of Article 3 and 6 (c) of the LTA to 
request restraint on the export of cotton textiles from 
Czechoslovakia to the United States. 

12. If the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic considers that, as a result of limitations spec- 
ified in this agreement, Czechoslovakia is being placed 
in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the 
Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic may 
request consultation with the Government of the United 
States of America with a view to taking appropriate 
remedial action such as consent of the Government of 
the United States to reasonable modification of this 
agreement. 

13. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 



problems arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedures or 
operation. 

14. This agreement shall continue in force through 
April 30, 1971, except that either government may 
terminate it effective at the end of any agreement year 
by written notice to the other government to be given 
at least 90 days prior to such termination date. Either 
government may at any time propose revisions in this 
agreement. 

15. Each Government shall take appropriate meas- 
ures of export control or import control, as applicable, 
to implement the limitation provisions of the agreement 

I have the honor to propose that this note and your 
Excellency's note of confirmation on behalf of the 
Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ' 
shall constitute an agreement between our two 
Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 

Philip H. Trezise 

His Excellency 

Dr. Kakel Dud a. 

Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 



Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944, 
as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. 
Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered 
into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Signature: Turkey, September 19, 1969. 

Consular Relations 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular 
relations concerning the compulsory settlement of dis- 
putes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into 
force March 19, 1967.' 
Ratification deposited: Austria, June 12, 1969. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, 
and cultural materials, with protocol. Done at Lake 
Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force for the 
United States November 2, 1966. TIAS 6129. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauritius, 
July 18, 1969. 



' For text of the annex, see press release 258 dated 
Sept. 2. 



" Not printed here. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 



October 13, 1969 



327 



Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. En- 
tered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 
Signature and acceptance: Swaziland, September 22, 
1969. 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Done at Washing- 
ton December 27, 1945. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 27. 1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptance: Swaziland, September 22, 
1969. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of ex- 
ecution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force .January 1, 1966. TIAS .''.SSI. 
Ratification deposited: Cambodia, August 11, 1969. 

Property 

Nice agreement concerning the international classifi- 
cation of goods and services for the purposes of the 
registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at 
Stockholm on July 14, 1967.= 
Ratification deposited: Israel, July 30, 1969. 

Slavery 

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery, 
as amended (TIAS 3532). Done at Geneva Sep- 
tember 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927. 
46 Stat. 2183. 

Notification that it considers itself iound: Mauritius, 
July IS, 1969. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 
1954.' 

Notification that it considers itself hound: Mauritius 
(with a reservation), July 18, 1969. 



BILATERAL 



China 

Agreement concerning the status of the American 
Embassy School of Chinese Language and Area 
Studies at Taichung and its personnel and of Chinese 
Embassy personnel studying in the Washington area. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei July 15 and 
August 22, 1969. Entered into force August 22, 1969. 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au- 
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio 
operators of either country to operate their stations 
in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Guatemala November 30 and December 11, 1967. 
Entered into force: October 2, 1969. 

Italy 

Agreement confirming a memorandum of understand- 
ing regarding a cooperative satellite research project 
between NASA and the Aerospace Research Center 



of the University of Rome. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Rome August 9 and September 11, 1969. 
Entered into force September U, 1969. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to a reciprocal arrangement under 
which, in certain circumstances, the armed forces 
of either country would advance funds to units or 
personnel of the other for their temporary support, 
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Welling- 
ton September 3, 1969. Entered into force Septem- 
ber 3, 1969. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement amending the agreement of May IG, 1909 
(TIAS 6693), on the reciprocal allocation for use 
free of charge of plots of land in Moscow and Wash- 
ington. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow 
September 17 and 19, 1969. Entered into force 
September 19, 1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on September 17 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Vincent de Roulet to be Ambassador to Jamaica. 
(For biographic data, .see Department of State press 
release 283 dated October 1.) 

Joseph S. Farland to be Ambassador to Pakistan. 
(For biographic data, see White House press release 
dated August 28.) 

William E. Schaiifele, Jr., to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Upper Volta. (For biographic data, see 
Department of State press release 279 dated 
September 24. ) 

William C. Trueheart to be Ambassador to the Fed- 
eral Republic of Nigeria. (For biographic data, see 
Department of State press release 278 dated September 
24.) 

John Patrick Walsh to be Ambassador to the State of 
Kuwait. (For biographic data, see White House press 
release dated August 20.) 



Designations 



' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 



Douglas Henderson as the U.S. Representative to the 
Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress 
( CIAP) . ( For biographic data, see Department of State 
press release 272 dated September 19.) 

Robert A. Hurwitch as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Inter- American Affairs, effective September S. (For 
biographic data, see Department of State press release 
263 dated September 11.) 

Jonathan Moore as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, effective September 22. 
(For biographic data, see Department of State press 
release 271 dated September 18.) 



328 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 13, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 1581 



Asia. Moore designated Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs . . 328 

Congress 

Confirmations (De Roulet, Farland, Schaufele, 
Trueheart, Walsh) 328 

35tli Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 
(Lodge, text of House resolution on prisoners 
of war) 316 

Czechoslovakia. U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement (U.S. note) . . . 32G 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (De Roulet, Farland, Schaufele, 

Trueheart, Walsh) 328 

Designations (Henderson, Hurwitch, Moore) . 328 

Disarmament. President Nixon's News Confer- 
ence of September 26 (excerpts) 313 

Economic Affairs. U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement (U.S. note) . . . 326 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

International Conference of the Red Cross 
Calls for Observance of the Geneva Convention 
on Prisoners of War (Martin, text of 
resolution) 323 

Israel. Prime Minister Melr of Israel Visits 
Washington (Nixon, Meir) . 318 

Jamaica. De Roulet confirmed as Ambassador 32S 

Kuwait. Walsh confirmed as Ambassador . . . 328 

Laos. President Nixon's Nevrs Conference of 
September 26 (excerpts) 313 

Latin America 

Henderson designated U.S. Representative to the 
Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for 
Progress (CIAP) 328 

Hurwitch designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs 328 

President Nixon's News Conference of Spptcm- 

bcr 26 (excerpts) 313 

Near East. Prime Minister Meir of Israel Visits 
Washington (Nixon, Meir) 31S 

Nigeria. Trueheart confirmed as Ambassador . 328 

Pakistan. Farland confirmed as Ambassador . 328 

Presidential Documents 

President Nixon's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 26 (excerpts) 313 

President Reaffirms Interest in International 
Peace Corps 32.5 

Prime Minister Meir of Israel Visits Wash- 
ington 318 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 327 

U.S. and Czechoslovakia Sign Cotton Textile 
Agreement (U.S. note) 326 

U.S.S.R. President Nixon's News Conference of 
September 26 (excenrts) 313 

United Nations. President Reaffirms Interest in 
International Peace Cori)s (letter to U.N. 
Secretary General) 325 



Upper Volta. Schaufele confirmed as Ambas- 
sador 328 

Viet-Nam 

International Conference of the Red Cross Calls 
for ObseiTance of the Geneva Convention 
on Prisoners of War (Martin, text of 
resolution) 323 

President Nixon's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 26 (excerpts) 313 

35th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 
(Lodge, text of House resolution on prisoners 
of war) 316 

Name Index 

de Roulet, Vincent 328 

Farland, .Joseph S 328 

Henderson, Douglas 328 

Hurwitch, Robert A .328 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 316 

Martin, Graham 323 

Meir, Golda 318 

Moore, Jonathan 328 

Nixon, President 313,318,325 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 328 

Trueheart, William C 328 

Walsh, John Patrick 328 



Date 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to September 22 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 253 
of September 2. 

Subject 

Lydman sworn in as Ambassador 
to Malaysia ( biographic data ) . 

Program for visit of Prime Min- 
ister Meir of Israel. 

Revision in program for visit of 
Prime Minister of Israel 

Cross sworn in as Ambassador to 
Singapore ( biographic data ) . 

Mcllvaine sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Kenya (biographic 
data ) . 

Trueheart sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Nigeria (biographic 
data). 

Schaufele sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Upper Volta (biographic 
data). 
Lodge : 35th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 



*274 


9/22 


*275 


9/22 


*275-A 


9/25 


*276 


9/23 


*277 


9/23 


*278 


9/24 


*279 


9/24 


280 


9/25 


'' Not printed 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 




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20YEARS OF PEACE 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1582 




October 20, 1969 



GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

HOLDS 13th SESSION AT VIENNA 
Statement by Glenn T. Seaborg 329 

THE UNITED NATIONS: ALIVE AND USEFUL 

hy Assistant Secretar'y De Pahna 336 

Bos I; 

Sunerir; > 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1582 
October 20, 1969 



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General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
Holds 13th Session at Vienna 



The 13th session of the General Conference of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency was 
held at Vienna September 23-29. Following is a 
statement made before the conference on Sep- 
tember 21). by Glenn T. Sedborg, Chairman of 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who was 
chairman of the U.S. delegation. 

AEC press release S-29-69 dated September 24 

I would like to extend my congratulations to 
you, Professor Torki [Bechir Torki, of Tuni- 
sia], upon your election as President of this 
conference, a position of great honor and re- 
sponsibility. It is an honor and a pleasure for 
me to represent the United States for the ninth 
year at the Greneral Conference of the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, to address my 
fellow delegates to this conference and to be 
once again in this beautiful city of Vienna. 

I would also like, at the outset, to commend 
the Agency's staff for its competence and dedi- 
cation and the outstanding leadership Director 
General [A. Sigvard] Eklimd has provided the 
Agency. We are deeply gratified that Dr. Ek- 
lund has agreed to serve as Director General 
for another term, and we know that this feeling 
is widely shared by other delegates. 

It is my privilege now to read the following 
message to the conference from the President of 
the United States : 

I am happy to take this opportunity to greet the 
delegates to the Thirteenth General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. This Agency is 
deeply involved in one of the most important areas 
of international cooperation in which we participate, 
with great and increasing responsibilities and oppor- 
tunities in ensuring that the benefits of the peaceful 
atom are widely shared, under proper safeguards 
against diversion to military uses. 

The death earlier this year of President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was a loss not only to me, personally, and 
to my nation but to all those In many lands who devote 
their lives and careers to advancing the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy. I am proud that the Atoms-for-Peace 
program and the establishment of this great Interna- 
tional agency was a proposal of President Eisenhower 



In his historic message before the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly in December 1953." The development 
of this Agency and of the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy during the intervening years has been deeply 
impressive. 

I should like to reaffirm my country's dedication to 
continued support of the Agency and of the principles 
of its Statute. I should also like to renew our pledge 
to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which con- 
stitutes yet another step in furthering our common goal 
of harnessing the atom for peaceful uses. 

I send you my congratulations for the past accom- 
plishments of this Conference and this Agency, and 
the best wishes of the people of the United States 
for your future endeavors. 

In the spirit of President Nixon's message to 
this conference, I would like to reaffirm my 
country's longstanding commitment to peace- 
ful nuclear progress and to the proposals that 
the United States has made and carried forward 
throughout the existence of this Agency. Under 
the Agency's statute, we are committed to the 
principle of seeking to accelerate the contribu- 
tion of atomic energy to peace, health, and pros- 
perity throughout the world and to the prin- 
ciple that in allocating its resources the Agency 
is to bear in mind the special needs of the de- 
veloping areas of the world. These principles 
are also clearly reflected in the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty, to which, as President Nixon said, 
we pledge our support. 

Much has been done and much remains to be 
done in our common quest of harnessing the 
atom to serve man in the many important and 
imique peaceful applications of nuclear energy. 
Cooperation, both bilaterally and through the 
Agency, has been and will continue to be an es- 
sential condition for progress in this field and as 
a way of enabling all countries, regardless of 
their stage of development, to share in the bene- 
fits of the peaceful atom. 

We are proud that the United States has 
pioneered in developing and pursuing an im- 
paralleled program of cooperation in the peace- 

• Btjlletin of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847. 



October 20, 1969 



329 



ful nuclear field over the past 15 years. Our 
international program has stressed the very 
activities sjjecified in the statute and the Non- 
proliferation Treaty : the exchange of scientific 
and teclmical information, materials, and equip- 
ment. Perhaps most important of all is our pol- 
icy to supply uranium and uranium-enricliing 
services to other countries under attractive terms 
and conditions to satisfy their long-term needs 
for fuel. 

U.S. Atoms-for-Peace Program 

I believe it might be worthwhile to review 
briefly some of the principal features of my 
Government's bilateral and multilateral cooper- 
ation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to 
give an idea of the scope, level, and direction of 
peaceful nuclear cooperation undertaken since 
our Atoms-for-Peace program began following 
President Eisenhower's address to the United 
Nations. As many of you will recall, immedi- 
ately following his address the United States 
undertook a major efi'ort to cooperate with other 
countries in sharing the existing and potential 
benefits of the peaceful atom. One of the prin- 
cipal steps taken was to bring about the creation 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a 
step that was realized on July 29, 1957, when 
the Agency's statute came into force. 

The United States has been a vigorous sup- 
porter of the Agency since its inception. One 
index of this, perhaps, is the extent of material 
support we have extended to the Agency. Our 
direct financial support of the regular and op- 
erational budgets has thus far totaled about 
$27.5 million. This amount has been supple- 
mented with approximately $5 million in the 
form of cost-free fellowships, services of ex- 
perts, equipment grants, and support for Agencj' 
training courses. In addition, $500,000 worth of 
special nuclear material has thus far been pro- 
vided as gifts for use in Agency-approved 
projects. 

Over 700 persons from 55 countries have been 
trained in the United States under the Agency's 
fellowship program. An additional 5,400 indi- 
viduals from 69 countries liave been trained in 
my country under other arrangements, and 26 
research-reactor grants were made, averaging 
about $350,000 per grant. The nuclear centers 
established around these research reactors have 
been instrumental in promoting and expanding 
general scientific development and cooperation 
in many of the cotmtries, in addition to further- 



ing the nuclear sciences. We are pleased to note 
the increasing cooperation among several of 
these centers, which, hopefully, will result in 
additional benefits to the countries concerned. 
I understand, for example, that a number of 
nuclear centers in Southeast Asia are actively 
considering various regional projects of inter- 
est to the coimtries concerned. We commend 
these efforts and would encourage similar co- 
operation elsewhere. 

The willingness of the United States to share 
its scientific and teclmical information with 
other countries is well known. For almost 15 
yeai-s now, virtually all research conducted or 
funded by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
in the civil uses of nuclear energy has been un- 
classified and the results published and made 
widely available. I should also mention that the 
United States, for several years, has strongly 
supported the establislmient of the Agency's 
International Nuclear Information System 
(INIS), initial funding for which is provided 
for in the 1970 budget. We believe that INIS 
will substantially increase the exchange of nu- 
clear scientific and technical information among 
the member states. 

I offer these facts and figures to give some 
idea of what is being done by one country, out 
of many which have programs in the nuclear 
field, and the benefits to be derived tlirough 
international cooperation. 

U.S. Support of Future Plans 

As to the future, I am very pleased to be able 
to make the following observations and pledges 
on behalf of my Government : 

1. We have before our Congress a proposal 
which, if approved, would enable us to increase 
the level of our cash contribution toward the $2 
million target of the operational budget above 
that of previous years. In addition, we will con- 
tinue to provide contributions in kind in the 
form of cost-free experts, training opportuni- 
ties in our institutions, and items of equipment, 
as we are able to do so. 

We continue to believe that the chronic lack 
of adequate funds to finance the Agency's tech- 
nical assistance program is one of the most seri- 
ous problems the Agency faces, and we urge all 
members to support the operational budget to 
the fullest extent possible. 

The United States also supports the regular 
program and budget which has been recom- 



330 



Department of State Bulletin 



mended by the Board of Governors for 1970, and 
we hope other member states will likewise sup- 
port it. 

2. We will continue to supply special nuclear 
materials through the Agency to other coimtries 
for fueling reactors or for research purposes on 
the same attractive terms and conditions that 
are applicable to materials supplied on a bi- 
lateral basis for similar purposes. I am also 
pleased to announce that for the 11th consecutive 
year we are prepared to make available as a gift 
up to $50,000 worth of special nuclear material 
for use in Agency projects in research and med- 
ical therapy. 

NonproliferaHon Treaty and IAEA's Functions 

One of the important items on the General 
Conference's agenda (item 15) is a report by 
the Board of Governors concerning the 
Agency's role in connection with nuclear explo- 
sions for peaceful purposes.^ You will recall 
that the Board's report is in response to a re- 
quest by the General Conference last year to 
the Director General "to initiate studies of the 
procedures that the Agency should employ in 
performing such a role" and for the Board to 
review the results of these studies. I am pleased 
to say that my Government fully endorses the 
Board's report. We believe it is a very good 
analysis of the role the Agency can play in this 
field, and it reinforces our belief that the 
Agency is the most appropriate organization to 
foster international cooperation relating to the 
peaceful uses of nuclear explosions and to as- 
sume the responsibilities and functions antici- 
pated for an international organization under 
article V of the Nonproliferation Treaty.' 

The report notes that the technology of nu- 
clear explosions for peaceful purposes is at an 
early stage of development and that progress 
will likely be made on a gradual basis. We agree 
with the Board's view that the Agency's orga- 
nization should be kept under review and 
adapted as necessary to assure that it will be able 
to meet its anticipated increasing responsibili- 
ties in this field. We have made clear our inten- 
tion to continue support of the development of 
the Agency's competence in this field by provid- 
ing the Agency with extensive information on 
the U.S. experimental Plowshare program and 
by making experts available to assist the Agency 

'IAEA doc. GC(XIII)/410/July 31, 1969. 
' For text of the treaty, see Bulletin of July 1, 1968, 
p. 8. 



as necessary. The United States has already 
provided a summary report on the current 
status of the technology of the peaceful appli- 
cations of nuclear explosions, which the Direc- 
tor General has circulated to all member states, 
and we have provided an expert to assist in de- 
veloping an agenda and program for the 
Agency's first planned panel meeting on this 
subject. In addition, we have recently made 
available a scientist from our Plowshare pro- 
gram to serve on the staif of the Agency. 

Before leaving this item, I would also like to 
reiterate that my Government plans to make 
available, when technically and economically 
feasible, peaceful nuclear explosion services, 
pursuant to article V of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, imder attractive conditions which we 
hope will be of interest to other coimtries. 
Charges will be as low as possible and will 
exclude the sizable costs of research and devel- 
opment that have been incurred in the de- 
velopment of nuclear explosives. 

Another important role for the Agency imder 
the Nonproliferation Treaty will be in the safe- 
guards field. I would like to reaffirm the pledges 
made on behalf of my Government at the last 
General Conference that we will do all we can 
in support of the Agency's activities in this im- 
portant area. Our research and development 
program for the improvement of safeguards 
tecluiology is continuing, and we are developing 
new instruments for nondestructive assay 
measurements of a wide variety of fissionable 
materials. These instruments will be mounted in 
trailers for ease of mobility and will be on dis- 
play during a symposivun on safeguards to bo 
held at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory on 
October 27-30, to which the Agency has been 
invited to send representatives. We are continu- 



Members of U.S. Delegation 
to IAEA Conference Confirmed 

The Senate on September 23 confirmed the 
nomination of Glenn T. Seaborg to be the repre- 
sentative of the United States to the 13th session 
of the General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 

The nominations of Verne B. Lewis, James T. 
Ramey, Henry DeWolf Smyth, and Theos J. 
Thompson to be alternate representatives of the 
United States to the 13th session of the IAEA 
General Conference were also confirmed on that 
day. 



October 20, 1969 



331 



ing to hold safeguards training courses at 
Argorme National Laboratory, to which the 
Agency and individual countries have sent safe- 
guards personnel. 

Mr. President, over the past year we have 
witnessed the initiation of a number of im- 
portant studies and reviews that bear directly 
on the functions and future of the Agency. 
Largely through the stimulus of the Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states 
have underscored their desire to be assured that 
they will have continued access to the benefits 
of the peaceful atom. In addition, as requested 
by the General Conference last year, the Board 
of Governors has been performing a compre- 
hensive review of its own composition to deter- 
mine whether any changes are necessary. 

This is a challenging time for the Agency, 
and we face a number of tasks in the months 
and years ahead. Given the requisite good will, 
I have every confidence that the Agency has the 
flexibility and strength to meet these challenges. 
Indeed, over the past year in several areas, such 
as safeguards, peaceful nuclear explosions, and 
the question of the composition of the Board, 
the Secretariat and the member states have 
demonstrated their ability to start tackling and 
resolving a number of these issues. There is an 
imderstandable desire on the part of some states 
to rectify those anomalies that exist in the board 
of Governors and to make the Board more repre- 
sentative. "We find ourselves in sympathy with 
these nations, although we believe the complex- 
ity of the problem must be realistically rec- 
ognized and appreciated. There already is a 
broad community of agreement that some 
modest expansion in the Board is warranted. It 
is my earnest hope and conviction that we shall, 
in the next year, be able to arrive at a suitable 
and equitable amendment to the statute that 
will be sufficiently attractive to command the 
necessary two-thirds support of the member- 
ship. Certainly, for our part, we shall do every- 
thing we can to try to make this possible. 

Environmental Problems 

Before closmg, I would like to mention a prob- 
lem that many of us have been or may be con- 
fronted with in connection with the increasing 
use of modern technology in today's societies and 
the possible effects of such teclinology on the 
environment. Today, as nuclear power and other 
beneficial uses of nuclear energy are demonstrat- 
ing the tremendous promise which we have long 



held for them, we are witnessing in some parts 
of the world a renewed public questioning of 
the effects of these activities in relation to 
environmental problems. 

This develoi^ment has its roots, in part, in 
today's widespread concern that many of man's 
activities have injurious effects of sometimes 
imknown magnitude on his own environment. 
To the extent that these concerns are derived 
from an honest spirit of inquiry, we can only 
welcome them. We are confident that the facts, 
when fully presented, will lead to the conclusion 
that nuclear energy in all its peaceful ramifica- 
tions, when expertly applied, will in fact rep- 
resent a major gain in our efforts to preserve 
for future generations the beneficial features of 
our present environment. We must conclude, 
however, that as administrators we have in some 
measure failed to communicate to our concerned 
public the reassuring facts that we ourselves 
know so well. 

My delegation believes that the Agency can 
make a major contribution to improved public 
understanding of this important issue, and we 
urge the Director General and the staff to de- 
vote a high priority to it, recognizing that fail- 
ure to satisfy the concerns that are now being 
expressed might deter and postpone for many 
years the enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear 
energy which people everywhere have a right to 
expect. As one possibility, we urge the Agency 
to consider including in its conferences and 
symposia program a meeting dealing with the 
environmental aspects of power reactors. The 
United States would be prepared to serve as 
host for such a meeting. We also believe the 
Agency should participate fully in the prepara- 
tory work for the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment, which is being 
planned for 1972. 

In conclusion, I would reemphasize our con- 
fidence that the Agency and all of its member 
states can look forward to an increasingly mean- 
ingful future with regard to the peaceful ap- 
plications of nuclear science and energy. For 
our part, the United States will continue to give 
its full support to international cooperation in 
this field. We have come a long way in develop- 
ing nuclear technology during the past 15 years 
and in the growth of individual country pro- 
grams. Although much remains to be done, 
much has been achieved; and it is important 
that we keep past achievements and future goals 
in perspective. In looldng to the future, I be- 
lieve it fair to say that the degree of success in 



332 



Department of State Bulletin 



attracting support for soundly developed nu- 
clear projects will depend in large part on the 
priority assigned to such projects by individual 
countries in their overall development plans. 
I am confident that the judicious application 
of nuclear science to the problems of economic 
development will produce great dividends over 
the next several years. In our age of rapid 
change, we are in a field in which the rate of 
evolution is perhaps as great as can be found 
anywhere. This kind of situation challenges 
everyone to grasp the opportunity to apply 
new approaches to the solution of old problems, 
and innovation becomes both appropriate and 
feasible. 
ll We are convinced of the importance of sci- 
ence and of international cooperation in solving 
both national and international problems. After 
looking back over the period since 1953, we are 
hopeful for the future and eager to explore new 
possibilities of development in cooperation with 
like-minded men and nations. 



United States and Thailand Agree 
on Reduction of U.S. Forces 

Following is the text of a joint statement is- 
sued at Washington and Bangkok on September 
30. 

White House press release dated September 30 

The President of the United States and the 
Prime Minister of Thailand announced today 
that the United States Government and the 
Royal Thai Government have completed bilat- 
eral talks to arrange for an orderly reduction 
of U.S. forces in Thailand, which are there in 
connection with the Vietnam war. 

The two governments have agreed that ap- 
proximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel, from 
both the Air Force and the Army, are to be with- 
drawn from Thailand. They will be withdrawn 
as expeditiously as possible consistent with oper- 
ational requirements related to the Vietnam con- 
flict. Redeployment action will begin within a 
few weeks and it is planned that all the forces 
involved will have departed by July 1, 1970. 

The two govermnents will continue to evalu- 
ate the level of U.S. armed forces in Thailand 
in light of their assessment of developments in 
the Vietnam conflict. 



36th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the text of the opening statement 
made hy Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head 
of the U.S. delegation, at the 36th plenary ses- 
sion of the meetings on Viet-Nam, at Paris on 
October 2. 

Press release 284 dated October 2 

Ladies and gentlemen: At his recent press 
conference on September 26 President Nixon 
said : ^ 

... on the negotiating front the United States has 
made a far-reaching and comprehensive peace offer, a 
peace offer which offers not only mutual withdrawal 
of forces, internationally guaranteed cease-fires, inter- 
nationally supervised elections — in which we will 
accept the result of those elections and the South Viet- 
namese will as well, even if it is a Communist 
government. . . . 

The President then said : 

There is one thing, however, which I should em- 
phasize, that is not negotiable. We will talk about any- 
thing else. What is not negotiable is the right of the 
people of South Viet-Nam to choose their own leaders 
without outside imposition, either by us or by anybody 
else. 

As the President makes clear, our side has set 
forth comprehensive proposals for settlement of 
both political and military issues in Viet-Nam 
which are well suited to reasonable discussion 
and negotiation. 

But you of the other side have given no in- 
dication that you are ready for reasonable dis- 
cussion and negotiation. Although you have 
pledged to negotiate sincerely, and although you 
assert that you have come here with "good will," 
your proposals are put forward as demands 
which must be accepted without essential 
changes. It is essentially a take-it-or-leave-it 
attitude. 

And you still refuse to deal in any kind of 
meaningful way with the elected government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

Ladies and gentlemen, let us consider this re- 
fusal of yours. Let us try to imagine what an 
impartial observer who could see everythmg 
going on here would think of it. I submit that 
if he were to visit our meetings here at the Ma- 
jestic he would be struck by these facts : 

Here you have agreed that the Government 
of the Republic of Viet-Nam should be seated at 

' For excerpts, see Buixetin of Oct. 13, 1969, p. 313. 



October 20, 1969 



333 



this table. Yet, except for the speeches which 
are made here, you refuse to meet and you re- 
fuse to deal with that Govermnent. There must 
be few, if any, precedents in history for such an 
attitude. 

You say you do not want to deal with the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam because 
you do not like it and you do not agree with it. 
But, ladies and gentlemen, how would any in- 
ternational dispute ever be settled if people only 
talked with those whom they like and those with 
whom they agree? The very essence of peace 
negotiation is that those who do not agree and 
who represent widely differing viewpoints and 
interests should sit down and talk together. 

Such an impartial observer would surely 
characterize your refusal to deal with the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam as com- 
pletely inconsistent with sincere negotiations. 

And this is not the end of the story. You have 
not only refused to deal with the Government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam, but you also demand 
that we should withdraw our forces uncondi- 
tionally and overthrow that Government as we 
leave South Viet-Nam. You thus seek to domi- 
nate South Viet-Nam militarily following our 
withdrawal and to dominate South Viet-Nam 
subversively because of our ha^^ng overthrown 
the constitutionally elected government of that 
country. 

Seldom in history has there been in any diplo- 
matic meeting an attitude so fundamentally ex- 
treme and so calculated to make any progress 
impossible. 

Last week your side chose to conclude its 
presentation at this meeting with a call for 
"total victory." Your attitude clearly reflects an 
attempt to win such a victory here at this table. 
It must be ob\aous to you, as it is to us, that 
you cannot win total victory on the ground in 
South Viet-Nam. You should now realize that 
you also cannot win it here, that you cannot 
force us to withdraw all our forces unless you 
do the same, that you cannot impose your so- 
called "coalition government," and that you 
cannot achieve anything of consequence in South 
Viet-Nam unless it is negotiated with the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

Our side has proposed a solution of the with- 
drawal issue which we believe to be fair and 
reasonable. We believe that all external forces 
should leave South Viet-Nam. Not just yours. 
Not just ours. But all. We are committed to the 
principle of total withdrawal. As we have in- 
dicated, we are prepared to negotiate the details 
of such withdrawals. We are prepared to be flex- 



ible on arrangements, provided the basic end is 
achieved. We favor a position which leaves 
neither victor nor vanquished. We do not at- 
tempt to impose anybody's will on anybody else. 
We want only to ensure that the people of South 
Viet-Nam have a genuine opportunity to deter- 
mme their own future free from outside 
interference. 

Our side has also set forth a reasonable pro- 
posal for a peaceful political settlement. We 
have said that we are prepared to accept the re- 
sults of elections whatever these results may be. 
We do not try to determine them in advance. 
As the Government of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam has indicated, we are prepared to accept 
an arrangement which permits participation by 
all South Vietnamese political parties and 
groups. We do not attempt to exclude any of 
them. And we have proposed that the elections 
be organized by an electoral commission which 
will include representatives of all political ele- 
ments in South Viet-Nam. We have also pro- 
posed that elections be held under international I 
supervision. 

Last week your side called our jjroposals a 
"farce" and "absurd." 

Ladies and gentlemen, this is not the way to 
think or the way to talk. Nor is it the way to | 
act. The way is clear, as I have just said. Let 
us at last start discussing the issues. That does 
not mean that we agree now or will necessarily 
agree later. But we should start meaningful 
negotiations. 

Our side is ready. As President Nixon said on 
last September 26 : "Now is the time for Hanoi 
to make the next move." 



U.S., India Agree on Experiment 
in Instructional Television 

The National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 
istration announced on September 18 (NASA 
press release 69-135) that a memorandum of un- 
derstanding concerning an India/US ITV 
Satellite Experiment Project had been signed 
that day at NASA headquarters by Vikram A. 
Sarabhai, Chairman of the Indian Space Re- 
search Organization and head of India's De- 
partment of Atomic Energy, and by Thomas 
O. Paine, NASA Administrator. 

Instructional television programs will be 
brought to some 5,000 Indian villages by this 
experiment, the first to provide direct broad- 



334 



Department of State Bulletin 



casting of television programs from a space sat- 
ellite into small village receivers without the 
need for relay stations on the ground. This is 
made possible by the increase in on-board power 
in the satellite and by the innovation of a de- 
ployable satellite antenna with high pointing 
accuracy. This in turn makes it possible to re- 
duce costs at the receiver end and so to multiply 
the numbers of remote receivers at reasonable 
cost. 

The satellite to be used for the joint experi- 
ment will be the Applications Tecluiology 
Satellite (ATS-F), the sixth iai NASA's ap- 
plications teclmology series, scheduled for 
launch about the middle of 1972. It will be posi- 
tioned in synchronous orbit over the equator and 
will be available to India wliile additional ex- 
periments are conducted by U.S. and other 
experimenters. 

India will utilize an existing experimental 
ground station at Ahmedabad in Indian's west 
coastal state of Gujarat, as well as others at 
different locations, to transmit TV programs 
to the satellite, wliich will then relay them to 
village receivers as well as to larger distribu- 
tion stations. India will provide and maintain 
the village receivers. 

Under the memorandum of understanding, 
the ATS-F satellite may be utilized by India 
for a period of 1 year. The experiment then 
ends, and any continuing service wiU be the 
sole responsibility of India. No exchange of 
funds between the two cooperating agencies is 
provided. 

India will be solely responsible for the tele- 
vision programing. Tliis will be primarily di- 
rected to contribute to family planning, im- 
prove agricultural practices, and contribute to 
national integration. 

The joint TV experiment wiU provide a first 
large-scale test of instructional television to : 

— Demonstrate the potential value of satellite 



teclmology in the rapid development of effective 
mass conunmiications in developing coimtries. 

— Demonstrate the potential value of satellite 
broadcast TV in the practical instruction of vil- 
lage inliabitants. 

— Stimulate national development in India, 
with important managerial, economic, teclino- 
logical, and social implications. 

It follows several years of careful prepara- 
tion, including an experiment conducted in the 
vicinity of New Delhi in conventional broad- 
casting of television programs on agi-icultural 
teclmiques to village receivers. Experience in 
the villages receiving the TV programs was 
compared with experience in villages not receiv- 
ing these programs. The residts demonstrated 
the effectiveness of television instruction of a 
concrete character and encouraged India to pro- 
ceed further with this space satellite project. 



U.S. Responds to Cuban Closing 
of American News Services 

Department Statement ^ 

On September 17 the Government of Cuba 
closed and sealed the Havana offices of United 
Press International and the Associated Press 
and blocked the bank accomits in Cuba of these 
two news services. This imwarranted action was 
taken without warning or official explanation. 

The Department of State therefore has asked 
the Treasury Department to revoke the license 
imder which Prensa Latina, the official Cuban 
news agency, operates in the United States mitU 
such time as American wire services are per- 
mitted to restore their operations in Cuba. 

' Kead to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Carl Bartch on Oct. 1. 



October 20, 1969 



335 



The United Nations: Alive and Useful 



hy Samuel De Palma 

Assistant Secretary for Interruitional Organisation Affairs ^ 



It is a great pleasure to be here with you to 
get acquainted with those who report the ins 
and outs of U.N. affairs. I want to talk about 
several things that appear important to me and 
then to answer your questions. 

I was appointed to my present job at a time 
when it seems to have become fashionable to 
downgrade the United Nations, to belittle its 
achievements, and to accent its shortcomings. 
Those with a taste for alliteration refer to the 
U.N. as bizarre, bumbling, and broke, if not 
impotent, irrational, and, perhaps, irrelevant. 
Some of you have written that the best thing 
about the U.N. is the fact that, under the cover 
of public meetings in this Fim City, diplomats 
can get together privately in dark comers and 
carry on meaningful negotiations. 

There is, of course, a tiny bit of truth in these 
assertions. Before going any further, I would 
like to state a personal Anew as to the condition 
of the U.N. today. Its problems are many and 
serious. Its procedures are often clumsy ; excess 
loquacity and emotion, sometimes reflecting per- 
sonal or other than official views, tend to distort 
the outcome of discussions and too often con- 
sume an inordinate amount of time. As it is, the 
organization is drowning in its documentation. 
Clearly the organization's procedures must be 
streamlined. 

Its finances are in precarious shape; they 
must be put on a solvent basis. A majority of its 
members often use the organization primarily 
to promote a confrontation with the more af- 
fluent minority. We must all learn to seek out 
the broad common or mutual interests on which 
negotiation and progress are possible. 

But this is not surprising. For one thing, we 

' Address made before the United Nations Corre- 
spondents Association at New Tork, N.Y., on Sept. 25 
(U.S./U.N. press release 107). 



simply must allow time for the organization to 
digest its large membership and to find a new 
equilibrium. Then, too, there are signs of a 
growing desire among the major powers for 
an accommodation that would open the way for 
greater cooperation. This is indispensable if 
the organization is to begin to fulfill its security 
functions and broader political aims. Moreover, 
there is a general desire to utilize the coming 
25th anniversary for a rededication to first 
principles and for a general strengthening of 
U.N. machinery. The United States is keenly 
interested in doing so, and I believe we shall 
find a large mmiber of willing partners in this 
admittedly difficult effort. 

Of all the dangers wliich we face, the single 
one most irmnediately recognizable is the danger 
of war. Yet the organization whose first order of 
business is to maintain international peace and 
security has still not achieved a workable con- 
sensus on how peacekeeping operations should 
be conducted. 

As you know, for years the negotiations in 
the Committee of 33 made no headway because 
of the rigid Soviet insistence that the Security 
Council control peacekeeping at all stages, that 
only the Security Council should authorize a 
peacekeeping exercise, that administration and 
control of a peacekeeping operation be vested 
in the Security Council, and that only the Se- 
curity Council should recommend ways through 
which the operation might be paid for. One 
doesn't have to know much about the U.N. or 
about public administration to recognize that 
this is a formula for frustration. 

Recently, however, we have seen the first signs 
of a Soviet willingness to discuss these prob- 
lems in more practical and realistic terms, and 
the Committee will be able to report some lim- 
ited progress, at least as regards possible ground 



336 



Department of State Bulletin 



rules for observer missions. But many difficult 
problems remain for negotiation. 

For our part we are prepared to recognize 
the primary role of the Security Council in 
respect to peacekeeping, but we believe more 
flexible procedures than those advocated until 
now by the U.S.S.R. should be agreed upon. 
We are not interested in some rigid or doc- 
trinaire formula, but in effective procedures 
which will assure that U.N. peacekeeping forces 
can and will be made available when needed and 
can be adapted to the unique circumstances of 
each case. 

I can assure you that the United States wishes 
to join with others in contributing its fair share 
of the costs and in facilitating an agreement 
on effective means for carrying out peacekeep- 
ing operations. It is in this spirit that we hope 
to continue businesslike negotiations with the 
Soviets and others. 

Another problem which must be solved if the 
U.N. is to continue and increase its effectiveness 
in world affairs is the question of membership. 
Today it is necessary to think about the micro- 
states. You still refer to them as mini-states, 
but we find that term too closely associated with 
mini-skirts. Still, the basic problem is the same : 
How far can you go before you get into trou- 
ble? In the case of the mini-skirt the end 
is already in sight. Not so, however, with 
micro-states. 

The facts available to us show a total of nearly 
60 territories which may gain (or, in one or two 
cases, have already gained) juridical independ- 
ence, each of which has a population of less than 
100,000. In addition, there are about 15 some- 
what larger territories, which would not neces- 
sarily be considered micro-states. 

These 65 or so territories would have a grand 
total population of about 4,600,000. That means 
that all of these potential candidates for U.N. 
membership added together muster fewer peo- 
ple than any one of the 69 most populous states 
now members of the U.N. They possess 0.2 per- 
cent of the total population of the present mem- 
bership. Yet if they were added to the present 
membership, they would comprise nearly one- 
third of the votes in the Greneral Assembly. 

These are the facts which we presume the 
Secretary General had in mind when he pointed 
out that such a general influx of micro-states 
would "lead to a weakening of the United Na- 
tions itself" and that "the line has to be drawn 
somewhere." 



The best solution to this problem, in our view, 
is the creation of a new status of association 
with the United Nations, which might be called 
"associate member." A status such as that of 
associate member might carry with it all bene- 
fits and privileges of membership except the 
right to vote. It would not require the payment 
of burdensome assessments. But it would stand 
as a imiversal sign and symbol of the independ- 
ence of the state concerned and of the recogni- 
tion of its independence by the community of 
nations. 

Let me make it clear that our concept is not 
retroactive. Moreover, a state enjoying associate 
membership would in no way be precluded 
from applying for full membership at any time 
when it believed itself qualified for that step. 
Nor would the competence under the charter of 
the Security Council to recommend and the 
General Assembly to vote admission to full 
membership be in any way affected. What we 
are suggesting is that the time has come for 
member governments to exercise their judgment, 
as called for in the charter, to determine whether 
a state is in fact able as well as willing to exer- 
cise fully the responsibilities of membership. 

The Security Council has now referred this 
problem to its Conmiittee of Experts, and we 
will await its recommendations with interest. 
We strongly hope that the outcome will afford 
these very small states a practical and attractive 
option to the burdens of full membership. 

I believe that in the years ahead science and 
technology will provide us with the greatest po- 
tential for international cooperation through 
the United Nations. Technology can be politi- 
cally neutral while being economically and 
socially fruitful. Technology is not like political 
doctrine or religious dogma : It is not derived 
from the imseen and the unprovable; it is not 
revealed to a few chosen insiders alone. It is 
open, and whether it works or doesn't is an 
observable fact. 

A week ago President Nixon, in his address 
to the General Assembly,^ expressed the hope 
that all nations would "share both the adven- 
tures and the benefits" of space exploration. He 
spoke about international cooperation on prob- 
lems of cleaning up our environment. He talked 
about resource survey satellites. These are all 
areas of great potential for international co- 



= Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 



October 20, 1969 



337 



operation, along with the exploration and ex- 
ploitation of the seabed and the exciting 
possibilities of direct broadcast satellites. 

It is sometimes said that when the U.N. deals 
with outer space or with the deep seas it is not 
dealing with the real problems of the world. 
Those who think this are, in effect, charging 
the U.N. with some sort of escapism. 

I am sure you will agree that this is a very 
shortsighted view. In its scientific and tech- 
nological work, in its economic development 
work, the U.N. is dealing with very real, pres- 
ent, and urgent problems. It is trying to help 
create international agreement on matters 
which, if left to drift, could become matters of 
international dispute. It is trj'ing to help set the 
basis for world order and thus for world peace. 
That, purely, is the essence of the task facing 
the U.N. 

As for the agenda of the present Assembly, 
you will have noted the stress President Nixon 
gave to the need for concerted international ac- 
tion to halt the hijacking of aircraft. Wliile it is 
too soon to predict how this matter will be dealt 
■with, we expect that during the course of tliis 
session the U.N. will act to put the influence of 
this organization behind the effort to halt piracy 
in the air. 

A major preoccupation will be with arms con- 
trol and disarmament. We are still awaiting 
word from the Soviets permitting a start on 
strategic arms talks. This would provide the 
most encouraging backdrop for the Assembly's 
disarmament debate. 

We are hopeful that the Disarmament Com- 
mittee in Geneva will report major progress on 
the seabed arms control treaty and useful sug- 
gestions for controlling chemical and biological 
weapons. We expect that the chemical-biological 
weapons debate in the Assembly, including the 
new Soviet item, will give a major thrust to the 
growing desire to control these weapons. This 
is a good example of the way the U.N. focuses 
international attention on matters of common 
concern and gives impetus to national decision- 
making. As you know, we are about to under- 
take a detailed review of U.S. policy in this area 
in preparation for further negotiations regard- 
ing chemical and biological weapons in Geneva. 

In short, regardless of its prevailing image, 
the U.N. looks very much alive and useful to us 
and I would bet that its best days are still ahead 
of it. 



U.S.-Japan Textile Meetings 
Held at Washington 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 16 (press release 267) that United States 
and Japanese delegations had convened at the 
Department that day to open a 4-day series of 
textile meetings. 

Assistant Secretary of State Philip H. Trezise 
headed the U.S. delegation. For subsequent ses- 
sions, wliich were held at the Department of 
Commerce, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Com- 
merce Stanley Nelomer served as chairman for 
the United States. Shukaro Takahashi, Direc- 
tor, Textile and General Merchandise Bureau, 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
headed the visiting Japanese delegation. (For 
a list of key members of the U.S. and Japanese 
delegations, see Department of State press 
release 267.) 

These meetings were arranged by Secretary 
of Commerce Maurice Stans and Minister of 
International Trade and Industry Masayoshi 
Ohira during the July 1969 meeting in Tokyo 
of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade 
and Economic Affairs. 



President's Science Adviser 
To Visit Europe 

White House press release dated September 12 

The President's Science Adviser, Lee A. Du- 
Bridge, will visit four Western and two Eastern 
European countries in September and October 
to discuss existing arrangements for interna- 
tional scientific and teclinological cooperation 
and to explore specific possibilities for strength- 
ening these arrangements. 

Dr. DuBridge will confer with government 
officials and scientific colleagues in the coimtries 
to be visited, as well as with officials of inter- 
national organizations headquartered in Eu- 
rope and having important science programs. 

He will be accompanied by Gerald Tape, 
former member of the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission and presently a member of the 
President's Science Advisory Committee 
(PSAC) ; by Lewis Branscomb, recently ap- 
pointed Director of the National Bureau of 



338 



Department of State Bulletin 



Standards and a former member of PSAC; 
and by Herman Pollack, Director of Interna- 
tional Scientific and Technological Affairs in 
the Department of State. Joining the party for 
portions of the trip will be Philip Handler, 
President of the National Academy of Sciences, 
and Patrick E. Haggerty, chairman of the 
board, Texas Instruments, Inc., and a member 
of PSAC. David Beckler and Norman Neureiter 
of the Office of Science and Teclmology will 
also accompany the group. 

Dr. DuBridge's visit to France (Septem- 
ber 18-24) is in response to the invitation of 
F. X. Ortoli, French Minister of Industrial 
Development and Scientific Research.' The 
group will visit scientific facilities and dis- 
cuss the broadening of U.S.-French scientific 
cooperation. 

They will then travel to Bucharest, Romania 
(September 24—27). The President, following 
his talks with President Ceaucescu, asked Dr. 
DuBridge to examine the opportimities for 
strengthened scientific and technical coopera- 
tion with that country. The discussions will 
build on the already existing base of coopera- 
tion, which was formalized with the signing of 
the educational, scientific, and cultural agree- 
ment between the two countries in November 
1968. 

In Yugoslavia (September 27-October 1) the 
group will review the cooperation now taking 
place and seek ways in which it can be made 
more effective. The Departments of Agricul- 
ture and of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
the Environmental Science Services Adminis- 
tration, and the Smithsonian Institution are 
already engaged in some 150 cooperative scien- 
tific research projects with Yugoslavia under 
Public Law 480, whereby funds held by the 
United States in local Yugoslav currency are 
expended on cooperative projects. 

In Brussels (October 1-3) , in the Netherlands 
(October 3-^), and in the United Kingdom 
(October 5-7), the DuBridge party will review 
current U.S. scientific relationships and seek 
those governments' views on present and future 
programs of cooperation. 

To emphasize the United States longstand- 



' For background, see Bitlletin of Ang. 18, 1969, 
p. 134. 



ing interest and participation in multilateral 
cooperation with the nations of Europe, the 
group will meet with officials of NATO and the 
European Community in Brussels and of 
UNESCO, the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development, and the European 
Space Research Organization in Paris. 

Plans are also being made for a visit next 
year by Dr. DuBridge to Italy and Germany. 
The United States now has a formal bilateral 
agreement on scientific cooperation with Italy 
and has mutually beneficial scientific programs 
of cooperation with the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 



President Asks Study of EfFects 
of Certain Tariff Items 

The "Wliite House announced on August 28 
("White House press release (San Clemente, 
Calif.) ) that the President has requested the 
Tariff Commission to imdertake a study of the 
economic effects of items 807.00 and 80G.30 of 
the United States tariff schedules. He asked that 
the Tariff Commission report to him the results 
of its stiidy at the earliest opportunity but not 
later than January 31, 1970. 

Tariff item 807.00 is a provision that permits 
goods assembled abroad from American com- 
ponents to be imported into the United States 
free of duties except on the value added by the 
foreign assembly. Tariff item 806.30 allows 
American goods made of metal to be sent abroad 
for processing and returned to the United States 
for further processing duty free except for the 
foreign value added. Trade in these items has 
grown rajiidly in the last few years. 

The President's request, made under section 
332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, asked that the 
study include an analysis of: the competitive 
effects of these tariff items on both the export 
and import sides of transactions covered by 
them, the operations of U.S. firms making use 
of the items, the effects of these items on the 
U.S. balance of payments, their relationship to 
employment and wage levels in this coimtry, 
and the probable effect of repeal of either item 
or both. 



October 20, 1969 



339 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Urges U.N. Outer Space Committee Action on Liability Convention 



Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
on Seftemher 9 hy Peter 8. Thacher^ Counselor, 
Disarmament, Science, and Technology, UjS. 
Mission to the United Nations. 

C.S./U.N. press release 06 dated September 9 

It is a privilege to address this committee in 
a year which marks one of the great milestones 
in man's efforts to push back the frontiers of 
outer space. As the world knows, the first step 
by a man on the moon was taken in the name of 
all mankind. All of us shared the excitement and 
awe as Neil Armstrong took that first step on 
the moon and as the astronauts successfully 
completed specific tasks during their delicate 
mission on the lunar surface. And we all shared 
feelings of pride that the dreams of men in pre- 
ceding centuries can be made to come true in 
our own time. This shared adventure is indeed 
an inspiration for all of us who seek through 
cooperation in bodies such as this committee to 
meet the challenges facing the inhabitants of 
the earth. 

None have expressed it better than the Secre- 
tary General when, in welcoming the astronauts 
here on August 13, he said the flight of Apollo 
11 brought us "a renewed realization of what 
we, as members of the human race, can ac- 
complish on this planet with our resources and 
our technology if we are prepared to combine 
our efforts and work together for the benefit of 
all mankind." The astronauts took with them on 
their voyage to the moon and back the flag of 
the United Nations and the flags of the mem- 
bers of the U.N. and its specialized agencies. 

This symbolism is particularly meaningful 
because it reflects the fact that the Apollo 11 
mission owed much of its success to interna- 
tional cooperation and direct international con- 
tributions. Dr. Paine reported some of the de- 
tails of these contributions yesterday.^ We look 



forward to a future of increasing opportunities 
for the people of all nations to join with us in 
the exploration and use of space. 

The National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 
istration regularly invites investigators in other 
nations to propose experiments for flight on 
its spacecraft. These invitations — opportunity 
announcements, we call them — are distributed 
by the Secretariat to all member states. The 
latest of these, contained in document A/AC- 
105/67, calls attention to the opportunity to pro- 
pose experiments to be performed on the Viking 
missions to Mars planned for 1973. The impor- 
tant thing about these announcements is that 
they do produce foreign proposals which are 
accepted in competition with proposals from 
U.S. experimenters. The selection of a Swiss 
solar wind detector which we saw deployed on 
the first lunar landing mission is only the most 
recent and dramatic example of how scientists 
of other countries contribute to, share in, and 
gain from our program. 

Mr. Chairman, among the many other 
achievements in the peaceful uses of outer space 
since this committee last met, one which is par- 
ticularly pertinent to note in this context is the 
Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement, 
which was negotiated in this body and which 
entered into force on December 3, 1968. More 
than 30 states are now parties to it. 

The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
met in March and considered the useful pro- 
posals of India and Sierra Leone that means 
be found to jiromote the study of the practical 
applications of space technology. These pro- 
posals reflected the interest of developing coun- 
tries in the promise of such potential applica- 
tions of space technology as earth resources sur- 



' For a statement by Thomas O. Paine, Administra- 
tor, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 309. 



340 



Oepartmenf of State Bulletin 



veying and direct instructional broadcasts as 
well as of such established space applications as 
satellite meteorology. 

The subcommittee made a niunber of con- 
structive recommendations concerning ways in 
which the United Nations, its specialized agen- 
cies, and its member states can cooperate to as- 
sure that nonspace powers, and especially the 
developing countries, can share in the applica- 
tions of space teclinology. The subcommittee 
recommended a continuing survey of the capa- 
bilities of the U.N. and its specialized agencies 
in the area of space technology applications. 
It recommended that the Secretary General ap- 
point to the Outer Space Affairs Division a 
space applications expert to serve as a practical 
guide to help interested countries learn who is 
doing what specific work and where. He would 
also help them to leam about the opportunities 
for participation and training and would serve 
in a liaison capacity between the specialized 
agencies and countries interested in work un- 
derway on space applications. As a necessary 
complement to this applications expert, the 
subcommittee has also recommended that con- 
cerned member states designate a specific office 
or individual within their administration as a 
point of contact on space applications. Such 
designations should make possible a more ef- 
fective flow of communications. 

Mr. Chairman, my Government heartily en- 
dorses these recommendations. The United 
States will continue to pursue an open space 
program — open in both planning and execution. 
We believe that the information flowing from 
our program will help other countries determine 
what their own role in space and in its applica- 
tions should be. We shall continue to make the 
practical benefits deriving from our work avail- 
able on the broadest possible basis. We should do 
all we can to facilitate the successful operation 
of the machinery which the subcommittee has 
asked this committee to endorse. 

This past year, Mr. Chairman, has also seen 
two meetings of the Working Group on Direct 
Broadcast Satellites, one in February to study 
the question of technical feasibility and one this 
svunmer to consider the social, cultural, legal, 
and other implications of direct broadcasting 
from satellites. Again the emphasis was on the 
need for international cooperation. Although 
the working group did not foresee direct broad- 
casting from satellites to unaugmented home 
receivers before 1985 at the earliest, it concluded 



that further studies of the international im- 
plications of direct broadcasting should be car- 
ried out in the period before us. 

My Government agrees, Mr. Chairman, that 
such studies, based as far as possible on practi- 
cal experience with broadcasting in general and 
with experiments in direct broadcasting which 
may be conducted, are useful at this time. The 
international effort in these studies will itself 
assist the process whereby this new technology 
is ultimately to benefit all nations interested in 
the advantages it may offer. These potential ad- 
vantages include closer links between central 
and village authorities; more effective dis- 
semmation of information in such areas as 
health, agriculture, and education; improved 
knowledge of the world around us ; and a better 
life through a free exchange of information. 

Another matter concerning tliis committee in 
which my Government is pleased to cooperate 
is the proposed United Nations survey group 
to visit in October the Argentine Somiding 
Eocket Range at Mar Chiquita. A scientist from 
the United States has accepted an invitation 
to participate in this survey to determine the 
eligibility of the sounding rocket range for 
United Nations sponsorship. My Government 
believes that Argentina's endorsement of the 
concept of a rocket range open to the world's 
scientific community can contribute significantly 
to furthering international scientific and tech- 
nological cooperation in the peaceful use of 
outer space. 

Mr. Chairman, the success of space explora- 
tion during this historic year 1969 makes the 
more glaring the failure of the Outer Space 
Committee to complete the liability convention. 
The interest of the international community in 
a meaningful liability treaty is almost as old 
as space exploration. During the administration 
of President Eisenhower the United States took 
the lead in stressing the need for a treaty on this 
subject. 

On behalf of the United States I want to state 
emphatically our dissatisfaction with the lack 
of progress and our discontent at the unwilling- 
ness or inability on the part of some to fulfill 
the commitment all of us imdertook in General 
Assembly Resolution 2345, which called on this 
committee to complete the liability convention 
during 1968.= 



* For text of the resolution, see Bttlletin of Jan. 15, 
1968, p. 85. 



October 20, 1969 



341 



The report of the Legal Subcommittee^ 
sliows that members were able to agree on a 
number of aspects of the liability convention. 
But this is 1969, and our 1968 goal has still not 
been reached. 

The basic problem remaining to be resolved 
is, as it was last year, what provision to make 
to settle a claim on which a claimant and 
launching state have been unable promptly to 
agree through the process of negotiation. Ex- 
cept for East-ern Europe, countries that do not 
conduct space activities hold the view that a 
claimant should be entitled to refer the claim 
to arbitration. The nonspace powers appear to 
see in the possibility of impartial arbitration the 
only guarantees against the possibility of end- 
less bilateral negotiations. We see our own 
interests in much the same way. 

We recognize that certain other delegations 
have taken a different position. Some of the few 
delegations who have thus far been unwilling 
to accept binding arbitration have suggested 
the possibility of providing for a unilateral 
right of a claimant state to invoke the jurisdic- 
tion of a competent and impartial tribunal on a 
disputed claim; this procedure would result in 
the delivery of an opinion by the tribunal which 
would be advisory to the governments con- 
cerned, rather than binding on them. 

We think that the draft convention intro- 
duced by India * goes far toward meeting these 
differing views by requiring that an unresolved 
claim first be submitted to an inquiry commis- 
sion. Only if the commission were unable to 
reach agreement on a recommendation for the 
settlement of the claim would the claimant state 
be able to refer the matter to binding arbitra- 
tion. Although there are one or two drafting im- 
provements we consider necessary, the Indian 
treaty text represents a fair effort to reach a 
compromise on this most difficult of questions. 
The United States has already moved to in- 
dicate its acceptance of this good-faith effort to 
find a solution that may be accepted by all. We 
hope others will do likewise. 

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, if a solution of the 
problem of unresolved claims can be found, the 
entire liability convention should fall quickly 
into place. A complete treaty text could be 
negotiated within a matter of days if all sides 
were convinced of the desirability of doing so. 
Certainly agreed solutions for questions relat- 



ing to the secondary liability of members of an 
international organization, applicable law, and 
a monetary ceiling for damages resulting from 
an accident should be capable of prompt resolu- 
tion. Let us consider each of these briefly. 

Already in the last session of the Outer Space 
Committee, on October 16, 1968, the representa- 
tive of the U.S.S.R. told us that the Soviet 
Union is ready to accept a requirement that a 
claimant present its claim first to an interna- 
tional organization where that organization's 
activities have caused the damage. The claimant 
would quickly proceed against the states mem- 
bers of the organization in the event the organi- 
zation did not promptly provide appropriate 
compensation. Professor Blagonravov said, and 
I quote from the verbatim record for the 55th 
meeting : 

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation the question 
of international organizations might be resolved on 
the basis of the well known proposal of the delegation 
of India, concerning the inclusion in the convention of 
a provision indicating that claims for damage done by 
outer space objects launched by international organiza- 
tions are presented first to the International organiza- 
tion itself or, in the case of non-compensation of the 
damage within a given time-limit, to one or several 
of the States members of such organization. 

We think this lays the groundwork for ac- 
ceptance by all members of the reasonable jjro- 
posal put forward by those among us who are 
conducting or anticipating conducting space 
activities through the cooperative mechanism 
of an international organization. I refer to the 
proposal put forward during the Legal Sub- 
committee session by Belgium, France, Italy, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom." These 
countries have made a strong effort to bridge 
the gap between their preferred position and 
those who expressed a certain concern that im- 
portant international organizations might not 
move as swiftly as desired to accept the liability 
convention. The proposal by Belgium, France, 
Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in- 
cludes a new second paragraph which obligates 
a state that is a party to the liability convention 
to support a declaration by an international or- 
ganization of which it is a member accepting 
the rights and obligations provided in the con- 
vention. A "best efforts" undertaking of this 
character is certainly a reasonable compromise. 
We trust it can be accepted. 

Another problem remaining to be resolved 



i 



' U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/58. 

* For text, see iiid., annex II, p. 23. 



' For text, see ibid., annex II, p. 30. 



342 



Department of State Bulletin 



is a provision on the law applicable to govern 
measure-of-damage questions. The United 
States originally proposed a straightforward 
international law standard, but many civil law 
countries considered that some reference to the 
nnmicipal law of the claimant state was de- 
sirable in order to fit compensation more ex- 
pressly into the social and economic context of 
the claimant country. Eventually, a compromise 
was put forward whereby the governing stand- 
ard would be "international law, taking into 
account the law of the claimant State." We 
thought that proposal eminently fair, and in 
our view it remains the best solution. 

Finally, there is the question of limitation. 
United States delegations have for some years 
noted the improbability of any large amount of 
damage but have stressed the likelihood that a 
convention with a ceiling would meet with 
greater acceptance than one without any limita- 
tion. We recognize that many delegations have 
been opposed to a ceiling, but we are pleased 
that there has come to be a greater willingness 
on the part of an increasingly significant num- 
ber to accept the concept of a limit, provided it is 
sufficiently high. This problem, too, can surely 
be resolved tlirough good- faith negotiation. 

Mr. Chairman, my Government proposed a 
liability convention as early as 1959. The United 
Nations expected a liability convention in 1968. 
We are now a year late. We should not be later. 
The liability convention should not be a project 
for the 25tli anniversary of the United Nations. 
It should be a practical goal for the 24th ses- 
sion of the General Assembly. 

In this way, Mr. Chairman, we could demon- 
strate once again that this committee can keep 
pace with the splendid thechnological achieve- 
ments we all admire so greatly. 



Miss Gore Named U.S. Member 
of Executive Board of UNESCO 

The President announced on September 12 
(Wliite House press release) the intention of 
the United States Government to nominate 
Miss Louise Gore, of Rockville, Md., to be the 
U.S. member of the Executive Board of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul- 
tural Organization (UNESCO).^ (For bio- 

' On Sept. 15 the UNESCO Executive Board unani- 
mously appointed Miss Gore. 



graphic data, see "Wliite House press release 
dated September 12.) 

The United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization is one of the largest 
of the U.N. agencies, having 125 members and 
four associate members. Its current program 
gives liigh priority to education programs con- 
tributing to economic and social development, 
with special emphasis on the improvement of 
teacher training, educational planning and job- 
related literacy programs, curriculum develop- 
ment, and the use of new techniques in education. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. En- 
tered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 
Signature and acceptance: Southern Yemen, Septem- 
ber 29, 1969. 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Done at Washing- 
ton December 27, 1945. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptance: Southern Yemen, October 
3, 1969. 

Grains 

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. 

Open for signature at Washington October 15 through 

November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 1, 1968. 

TIAS 6537. 

Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de- 
posited: Luxembourg, September 29, 1969. 

Ratification of the Food Aid Convention deposited: 
Luxembourg, September 29, 1969. 

Judicial Procedures 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and ex- 
trajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. 
Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Entered into 
force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638. 
Ratification deposited: Finland (with declarations), 
September 11, 1969. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Entered Into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331. 
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, September 12, 1969. 



October 20, 1969 



343 



Nationality 

Protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases 

of double nationality. Done at The Hague April 12, 

1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937. 50 Stat 1317. 

Notification that it continues to be bound: Mauritius, 

September 16, 1969. 



PUBLICATIONS 



BILATERAL 

Norway 

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense as- 
sistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 25 and 
September 17, 1969. Entered into force September 17, 
1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on September 24 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations : 

John P. Humes to be Ambassador to Austria. (For 
biographic data, see White House press release dated 
September 10.) 

William B. Macomber, Jr., to be a Deputy Under 
Secretary of State. (For biographic data, see Depart- 
ment of State press release 289 dated October 3. ) 

Graham A. Martin to be Ambassador to Italy. (For 
biographic data, see Department of State press release 
287 dated October 3.) 

Francis G. Meyer to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State. (For biographic data, see Department of State 
press release 295 dated October 6.) 

Idar Rimestad to be the representative of the 
United States to the European office of the United Na- 
tions, with the rank of Ambassador. (For biographic 
data, see Department of State press release 288 dated 
October 3. ) 



Department Releases New Pamphlet 
on NATO in "Issues" Series 

Department of State press release dated September 25 

The Department of State on September 25 released 
"NATO and the Defense of Europe," the second pam- 
phlet In the Issues in United States Foreign Policy 
series published by the Bureau of Public Affairs. The 
series is prepared primarily to assist students at the 
secondary and junior college levels in the study of 
current foreign policy problems. 

The 32-page pamphlet includes : an Informative 
profile of the NATO region with specific information on 
all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries ; a description of 
the organization of NATO, with a feature on the effect 
of French withdrawal from NATO's military command 
structure ; a review of NATO's changing defense poli- 
cies ; a description of NATO and Warsaw Pact military 
forces ; and a review of United States policy on NATO 
and European defense. 

Also included are questions for discussion, with com- 
ments on "historical revisionism" and the cold war, and 
an extensive chronology, as well as statistical tables 
and charts and a map illustrating the natural obstacles 
to military operations and the historic invasion routes 
across Europe. 

A discussion guide for use by teachers and discus- 
sion leaders in developing student ideas on this topic 
will be released shortly. Subsequent pamphlets in the 
Issues series will deal with mainland China, commit- 
ments of U.S. power abroad, liberal trade versus protec- 
tionism, and arms control. 

"NATO and the Defense of Europe" (Department of 
State publication 8476) is for sale by the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402, at 60 cents each. Orders of 
100 copies or more sent to the same address are sold 
at a 25-percent discount. 



344 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX OctoUr 20, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 1582 



Atomic Energy 

General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Holds 13tU Session at Vienna 
(Seaborg) 329 

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference 
Confirmed 331 

Austria. Humes confirmed as Ambassador . . 344 

Congress 

Confirmations (Humes, Macomber, Martin, 

Meyer, Rimestad) 344 

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference 
Confirmed 331 

Cuba. U.S. Responds to Cuban Closing of Ameri- 
can News Services (Department statement) . 335 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Humes, Macomber, Martin, 

Meyer, Rimestad) 344 

Macomber confirmed as Deputy Under Secretary 
for Administration 344 

Meyer confirmed as Assistant Secretary for 
Administration 344 

Economic Affairs 

President Asks Study of Effects of Certain Tariff 
Items (White House announcement) . . . 339 

U.S.-Japan Textile Meetings Held at Wash- 
ington 338 

Europe. President's Science Adviser To Visit 
Europe 338 

India. U.S., India Agree on Experiment in In- 
structional Television 334 

International Organizations and Conferences 

General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Holds 13th Session at Vienna 
(Seaborg) 329 

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference 

Confirmed 331 

Italy. Martin confirmed as Ambassador . . . 344 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Textile Meetings Held at 

Washington 338 

Military Affairs. United States and Thailand 
Agree on Reduction of U.S. Forces (joint 
statement) 333 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Depart- 
ment Releases New Pamphlet on NATO in 
"Issues" Series 344 

Publications. Department Releases Uew Pam- 
phlet on NATO in "Issues" Series .... 344 

Science 

President's Science Adviser To Visit Europe . . 338 
U.S. Urges U.N. Outer Space Committee Action 

on Liability Convention (Thacher) .... 340 

Space 

U.S., India Agree on Experiment in Instructional 

Television 334 

U.S. Urges U.N. Outer Space Committee Action 

on Liability Convention (Thacher) .... 340 

Thailand. United States and Thailand Agree on 

Reduction of U.S. Forces (joint statement) . 333 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 343 

United Nations 

Miss Gore Named U.S. Member of Executive 
Board of UNESCO 343 

Rimestad confirmed as U.S. representative to the 

European office of the United Nations . . . 344 



The United Nations: Alive and Useful (De 

Palma) 336 

U.S. Urges U.N. Outer Space Committee Action 

on Liability Convention (Thacher) .... 340 

Viet-Nam. 36th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 

Held at Paris (Lodge) 333 

Name Index 

De Palma, Samuel 336 

Gore, Miss Louise 343 

Humes, John P 344 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 333 

Macomber, William B., Jr 344 

Martin, Graham A 344 

Meyer, Francis G 344 

Rimestad, Idar 344 

Seaborg, Glenn T 329, 331 

Thacher, Peter S 340 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 29-Oct. 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to September 29 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 267 
of September 16. 

No. Date Subject 

t281 9/29 International copyright joint study 
group meets in Washington 
(rewrite). 

*282 9/30 Suspension of right of innocent 
pas.sage at Amchitka Island, 
October 1-3. 

*2S3 10/1 De Roulet sworn in as Ambassador 

to Jamaica (biographic data). 
284 10/2 Lodge : 36th plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

t285 10/2 U.S.-Japan talks on protection of 
migratory birds (rewrite). 

t286 10/2 Air transport agreement with 
Jamaica. 

*2S7 10/3 Martin sworn in as Ambassador to 
Italy (biographic data). 

*28S 10/3 Rimestad sworn in as U.S. repre- 
sentative to the European office 
of the United Nations (bio- 
graphic data). 

*289 10/3 Macomber sworn in as Deputy 
Under Secretary for Administra- 
tion (biographic data). 

*290 10/3 MacArthur sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Iran (biographic data). 

t291 10/3 U.S. delegation to talks on 
Japanese trade liberalization. 

*292 10/3 Program for visit of Prince 
Souvanna Phouma, Prime Min- 
ister of Laos. 

t293 10/3 Meeting of NATO Science Commit- 
tee, Washington, October 6-9. 

*294 10/3 Cline appointed Director, Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research 
(biographic data). 

"Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAU BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 




IM AVT a 

20YEARS OF PEACE 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



S^2 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 




SECRETARY ROGERS INTERVIEWED ON "MEET THE PRESS" 34S 

IMF AND IBRD BOARDS OF GOVERNORS MEET AT WASHINGTON 

Statement iy Secretary of the. Tremunj David M. Kennedy 353 

CONTRIBUTIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

by Eugene M. Himhi itum SoO 



For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1.583 
October 27, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Govenmient Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

E2 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the .source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the tvork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tlie White House and tlte Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by tlie 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and tlie functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and internatioruil 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rogers on the National Broad- 
casting Company'' s television and radio program 
^^Meet the Press''"' on Oetoier 12. Intervietoing 
the Secretary were Elie Abel of NBC News, 
John Hightower of the Associated Press, Joseph 
Kraft of the Publishers Newspaper Syndicate, 
Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of the 
'■'■Meet the Press'''' panel, and Edwin Newman of 
NBC News, moderator. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, after his talk 
with the President on Friday, Vice President 
Humphrey was reported to say that the country 
ought to recognize that we are making some 
progress toward peace. Do you agree with him ? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, Mr. Spivak, I agree 
with him, and I think that the statement that 
the Vice President made in support of Presi- 
dent Nixon was a very statesmanlike actioii on 
his part. I think it shows that he recognizes the 
difEculty that President Nixon has in dealing 
with this difficult problem, and I think that 
the fact that he recognizes that some progress 
is being made is very important. 

Mr. Spivak: "What can you tell us today to 
convince us, as Mr. Humphrey has been con- 
vinced, that we are making some progress? 
There has been so much confusion on the ques- 
tion of whether we are or are not making 
progress. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, in the first place, 
infiltration is way down. By "infiltration," I 
mean the number of men that are coming down 
from North Viet-Nam in the pipeline. It takes 
2 or 3 months for them to get down near the 
Saigon area. Infiltration is way down. The re- 
placement by the enemy of their losses is way 
down. In other words, they are not replacing 
their losses. They have had a net reduction of 
troop strength in the last 6 or 7 months of 
roughly 25 to 30 thousand. In addition to that, 
of course, we are withdrawing our troops and 
they are being replaced by South Vietnamese 



troops. The rate of combat activity is less than 
it has been for a great number of months. Of 
course, our casualties are way down, the enemy 
casualties are down, the South Vietnamese cas- 
ualties are down, so it is fair to say, I think, 
Mr. Spivak, that this war is being deescalated 
by President Nixon; and that is tremendous 
progress. 

Mr. Spivak: And you feel that the enemy also 
is deescalating ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, yes, certainly, be- 
cause the combat activity is down and their 
troop strength has been decreased. 

Mr. Spivak: Are you suggesting that we are 
now winning militarily by the action we are 
taking ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I am not suggesting 
that, and of course you know that President 
Nixon has said we are not seeking a military 
victory. "V^liat I am suggesting is that the war 
has been deescalated, as President Nixon prom- 
ised it would be. 

Mr. Spivak: Has there been any indication in 
Paris, where the negotiators meet, that we are 
any closer to peace than we have been before? 

Secretary Rogers: There hasn't been any 
progress in Paris for the last 2 or 3 months, and 
I would doubt very much if there will be any 
progress unless it is clear that President Nixon's 
policy is supported by the American public. 
Now, I think the policy that the President has 
initiated is supported by the American public, 
but I think there is enough doubt in the minds 
of the enemy so that they will not negotiate in 
good faith while this dissent is occurring here 
in tlie United States. 

Mr. Kraft: Mr. Secretary, in listing signs of 
progress you listed some things that had hap- 
pened on the battlefield in Viet-Nam. Does that 
mean that we may be able to end this war with- 
out coming to agreement in Paris, that the war 
may just fade away? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I think that is en- 
tirely possible, Mr. Kraft. I think that we have 



October 27, 1969 



345 



made it clear by our actions that we are per- 
fectly -willing to deescalate the war. "We have 
changed the orders — President Nixon has 
changed the orders from maximum pressure to 
protective reaction, which means that we are 
not maintaining the same maximum miiitai'y 
pressure on the enemy ; and if the enemy is re- 
sponding to our deescalatory moves in the way 
that they seem to be, then it is possible that the 
war would just deescalate until it sort of fades 
out. We have no way of knowing, but I think it 
is important for the American people to realize 
that President Nixon has deescalated the war. 
I mean at a time when the war has deescalated 
and he has carried out his promises to deescalate 
it in the first less than 9 months of this admin- 
istration, the dissent in the coimtry seems to be 
accelerating. 

Mr. Kraft : "Would it be fair to say that is the 
target of the so-called Nixon plan to deescalate, 
to make the war fade away, is that — 

Secretary Rogers: INIr. Kraft, that is one part 
of it. The other part of it is : We would like very 
much to end this war by negotiations in Paris, 
to reach a peace by negotiation, and we have 
taken every possible step to achieve that end. 
We have made every concession that it has been 
suggested we make in the past 9 months. 

Mr. Kraft : Every concession, Mr. Secretary ? 
Hasn't there been some suggestion that there 
needs to be a change in the Saigon government ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, the only concession 
we have not made, Mr. Kraft, is that we have 
not conceded, nor will we concede, that the 
Communists have the right to determine who 
is going to govern in South "Viet-Nam. We are 
perfectly willing to have that choice made by 
the people of South Viet-Nam. But except for 
that, all the things that were suggested that we 
do when this administration came in office, we 
have done. 

Mr. Hlghtoiver: Mr. Secretai-y, I'd like to ask 
you to look for a moment at the critics' side of 
the argument and put this question to you : "Wliy 
doesn't President Nixon just set a short-range 
time schedule, say 6 months, for withdrawal 
of American forces from "Viet-Nam and then 
simply bring them home? This seems to be the 
objective on the other side of the argiunent. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, of course, if we set 
a target date for withdrawal of troops, unre- 
lated to the events in South "Viet-Nam, we do 
two things: One, we would make negotiations 
impossible because obviously the enemy isn't 



going to negotiate if he knows that in 6 months 
we are going to withdraw our troops. 

Secondly, if we did that, the enemy would 
just wait until the propitious time and then 
make an attack, so that we would endanger the 
lives not only of our own troops but of the 
South "Vietnamese. 

I think that any thoughtful observer of the 
scene recognizes that if we just withdrew our 
troops there would be a tremendous massacre : 
of the population in South "Viet-Nam. 

In addition to that, it would create so much 
instability in the area that it could be very dan- 
gerous to the security of the world ; and second- 
ly, it would be a violation of everything that we 
promised not only to the people of South Viet- 
Nam but the people of Southeast Asia. 

In other words, if the United States makes 
firm coimnitments and then reneges on the com- 
mitments, that is going to affect our position 
all over the world. 

Decisions on Troop Withdrawals 

Mr. Hightower: Another aspect of this same 
problem : One of the things that is quite unclear, 
I think, is what the President's Vietnamization 
program or troop removal program is ulti- 
mately designed to accomplish. Is it directed 
toward the complete removal of American 
troops from that country, or does it contemplate 
leaving some thousands, scores of thousands, 
hundreds of thousands of troops there 
indefinitely ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, it contemplates the 
complete i-emoval of the troops in Viet-Nam. 
Initially, though, it contemplates withdrawal 
of combat troops and the replacement of Ameri- 
can troops by South Vietnamese troops. At the 
present time we will — up until the end of this 
year, we will have removed 20 percent of our 
combat troops. Now, once the combat part of 
the war is taken over by the South Vietnamese, 
which we think will occur, in an orderly fashion, 
according to a schedule which the President has 
in mind, then we will consider removal of the 
other troops. But we have to do that consistent 
with the conditions in South Viet-Nam. 

The purpose of the war, the reason we are 
there, is to provide that the people of the South 
have the right to determine their own future, 
and that has to be persisted in and maintained. 

Mr. Hightower: Can you give us some rough 
idea of what kind of time frame the President 
does have in mind ? 



346 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so. The 
time frame is going to be determined by period- 
ically observing the conditions in Viet-Nam 
and pragmatically making a decision about how 
to remove the troops. Now, he has the schedule 
in mind. He knows what he wants to do but he 
doesn't plan to announce it, for obvious reasons. 

First, you don't announce it to the enemy; 
and secondly, he wants to review it each time 
he gets ready to make a decision, to see what has 
happened. But he does have a program in mind. 
He announced to the American people at the 
beginning of this administration that he had a 
plan. He has put the plan into operation, and 
the plan is succeeding. 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, at the risk of seem- 
ing to repeat, the President, 5 months ago, in 
a speech on May 14, said : "Repeating the old 
formulas and the tired rhetoric of the past is 
not enough. When Americans are risking their 
lives in war, it is the responsibility of their 
leaders to take some risks for peace." ^ 

My question is: Wliat risks have we taken 
and, if not, when do we start? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we have taken the 
risk of moving some of our troops out. We are 
going to continue that program of troop re- 
placement until our troops are replaced by the 
troops of South Viet-Nam. 

Now, that entails some risks and it will, I 
suppose, increasingly entail risks; and we are 
prepared to take those risks. 

Decrease in Combat Activity 

Mr. Abel: You were, I believe, the first Cabi- 
net officer to draw attention to this combat lull, 
the reduction in infiltration and reduced casual- 
ties. Have you by now decided what this means ? 
There seemed to be some confusion in the ad- 
ministration earlier about whether it meant 
anything at all. 

Secretary Rogers : Well, I never thought there 
was confusion in the administration. I thought 
there was some confusion on the part of the 
press. We said — I said — that this was 
significant. 

Mr. Abel: You did, but certain other mem- 
bers of the administration weren't so sure it 
was significant. 

Secretar'y Roger's: I also said that we were 
not sure whether it had merely military signifi- 



' Bulletin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



cance — whether they were having difficulty re- 
placing their men^ — or whether it had political 
significance — whether they were trying to give 
us some political signal. We still don't know. 
Obviously it is a very significant fact that their 
infiltration is down by two-thirds this year. 
They are only sending in one-third the number 
of men they did before. Their total troop 
strength is down 25, 30, 35 thousand — consid- 
erably down from what it was. 

Now, those obviously are significant facts — 
the fact that the combat activity has greatly 
decreased and our casualties are down— I don't 
see how anybody could fail to say they are 
significant. 

Mr. Abel: Well, why can we not accept the 
deed that you have just explained as perhaps 
more significant than the word they have 
refused to give in Paris ? 

Secretary Rogers : That is exactly what I am 
doing on this program. I do think it is very 
significant. We are accepting it, and that is 
why we ai-e deescalating the war. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, Senator Church 
said the other day that the President's plan of 
replacing U.S. troops with South Vietnamese 
forces is "a formula for keeping up to 300,000 
American troops engaged in Viet-Nam indefi- 
nitely." What do you say in answer to that? 

Secretary Rogers : Well, it just isn't so. It is a 
formula for deescalating the war and it is a 
formula for turning the war over to the South 
Vietnamese and it is a formula for permitting, 
eventually, the South Vietnamese to determine 
their own future; so his conclusion is not 
accurate. 

3Ir. Spivak : Well, at the present rate of troop 
withdrawal, aren't we likely to keep troops 
there for anywhere from 8 to 10 years? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, no one ever said — 
certainly President Nixon has never said — that 
the rate of reduction has to remain constant. 
We don't intend for it to remain constant. 

3/r. Spivak : Have we made any military as- 
sessment as to how fast the South Vietnamese 
can take over, how fast they can replace Ameri- 
can troops? 

Secretary Rogers: We certainly have. We 
have made assessments, Mr. Spivak, about every 
phase of this war ; and of course, that is one of 
the assessments that we have made. 

Mr. Spivak : So that the President now has in 
mind how fast he can withdraw all of the 
troops ? 



October 27, 1969 



347 



Secretary Rogers: Yes. As I have said, he has 
in mind a schedule and he is going to — and lie 
is not going to announce what that is, but he is 
going to watch developments and make liis deci- 
sions based on those developments. Now, he has 
a schedule. The schedule may vary from time 
to time depending on events, but he has a basic 
schedule that we have tliought through very 
carefully. 

Question of Coalition Government 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, may I change the 
subject for a moment ? President Thieu has in- 
dicated clearly that he is opposed to a coalition 
government and that he will not accept a coali- 
tion government under any circumstances. Does 
the present administration, the Nixon admin- 
istration, see eye to eye with President Thieu on 
the question of a coalition government ? 
_ Secretary Rogers: It depends on the defini- 
tion of the word "coalition." We see eye to eye 
with President Thieu on an imposed govern- 
ment. In other words, we do not think it is 
feasible nor would we agree to an imposed gov- 
ernment. We have also said we would accept any 
government tliat results from a free and fair 
election. That might be a coalition government, 
and we have recognized that and so has Presi- 
dent Thieu. We have also said if there is an 
election and the Communists win the election 
or win part of the election they can serve in the 
government. We have no doubt about that. 

Mr. Spivak: We don't see eye to eye witli 
him, then, when he says "no coalition with the 
Communist" and "no domination by the 
Communist" ? 

Secretary Rogers : When, he talks about coali- 
tion, he is talking about an imposed coalition 
government. He has accepted the principle of 
free election, and he will be bound by the re- 
sults of the election. 

Mr. Spivak: So that if, under a free election, 
there is a coalition, he will be satisfied? 
_ Secretary Rogers: Yes. I am not sure we will 
like it. We will accept it. 

Mr. Kraft: Mr. Secretary, before getting 
nasty again about Viet-Nam, can I ask you a 
personal question? There has been a lot of talk 
in Washington, and I guess elsewhere, about 
you being Secretary of State in rivalry with 
Henry Kissinger [Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs] and rivalry with 
Secretary [of Defense Melvin R.] Laird. Do 



you like being Secretary of State? How does 
the job sit with you ? 

Secretary Rogers: I like it very much, Mr. 
Kraft, and incidentally I didn't' think your 
questions were nasty at all. I enjoy tlie job very 
much. I told President Nixon I would take the 
job for 4 years, and I fully intend to carry out 
my commitment. I don't think I'd serve as long 
as Dean Rusk, so I have no plan to serve the 
second Nixon term. 

Mr. Kraft: Let me get back to Viet-Nam. 
You have been talking about self-determination 
and freedom of choice. Do you regard the pres- 
ent government in Saigon as established as a 
government that represents those principles? 
Secretary Rogers: Well, I recognize the pres- 
ent government in South Viet-Nam as having 
been selected by the people. Now, I know there 
has been some criticism of the election itself, 
but I think that it is the best government we 
have in terms of the representation of the people 
and we would be happy to have another elec- 
tion at the appropriate time. 

Mr. Kraft: But you see no chance of chang- 
ing that government except through election? 
Wasn't there a chance to broaden the Cabinet 
which we missed 5 or 6 weeks ago? 

Secretary Rogers: There is no question about 
the fact that President Thieu can broaden his 
Cabinet, if that is what you mean; yes, that is 
a possibility. I thought you meant "change the 
government. 

Mr. Kraft: No, I meant broadening it. But 
didn't we miss a chance to broaden it or didn't 
he miss a chance, and what have we been doing 
about that ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, President Thieu 
tried to broaden the government ; he asked sev- 
eral people to serve as ministers who refused. 

1 tliink we would have preferred a broader 
based government. He knows our view on that. 
It may be well that as time goes on he can bring 
in more representative politicians from other 
groups. 

Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, President 
Thieu said on October 6 that he was prepared 
to talk with the Communist side about a cease- 
fire in Viet-Nam. I assume this involves some 
consultation and some kind of a policy deci- 
sion on his part. Senator Mansfield on October 

2 called for a cease-fire and what he describes 
as a standfast. What is the administration's at- 
titude, particularly in the light of the fact that 



348 



Department of State Bulletin 



there is close consultation with President 
Thieu — your attitude toward a cease-fire? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, as you know, we 
liave some doubt about whether a cease-fire 
would work or not unless there is some prior 
agreement, but we have indicated a willingness 
to discuss cease-fires. President Nixon in his 
May 14 policy statement referred to cease-fires. 

I think it should be pointed out that the 
North Vietnamese have rejected the idea of a 
cease-fire. 

Mr. Hightower: You don't see much practical 
possibility that something might be done — that 
a cease-fire proposal might be a way now to 
bring the fighting to an end relatively quickly? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't, Mr. High- 
tower. I don't at the moment see any possibility 
for a negotiated settlement, at least for a few 
months. I think if it is clear that the American 
people support President Nixon and the policy 
that he has established and is carrying out, 
then I think it is possible that the enemy will 
negotiate a settlement. At the moment I think 
it is quite imlikely, because there is so much 
dissent here and there are so many voices being 
heard that I think they must have a feeling 
that the President doesn't have the amount of 
support that is necessary to carry on for a long 
time. 

Now, I think they are mistaken. The Ameri- 
can people do support President Nixon. The 
latest Gallup poll shows that 52 percent, com- 
pared to 32 percent, support his policies in Viet- 
Nam. I think the American people realize that 
he is seeking peace in every possible way. There 
is no man in the country that wants peace more 
than President Nixon, and I think the Ameri- 
can people realize that; I think they realize the 
war has been deescalated, and I think they will 
continue to support him. But for the moment 
I think the enemy is confused because they hear 
all these voices and they don't quite understand 
the American system. 

Mr. Hightoiuer: Ambassador Lodge is due in 
Washington, I believe, tomorrow afternoon for 
conferences with the President and I assume 
yourself. On Wednesday there is quite a large 
demonstration scheduled in this country on 
the whole issue of war and peace. Would you 
expect this would be a timely occasion for the 
administration to make Imown some further 
ideas of what might be accomplished in the 
Paris negotiations? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think any time is 



timely. I don't think that is the purpose of the 
visit. I thmk this is a periodic visit that Ambas- 
sador Lodge makes to the United States. It 
doesn't have any particular significance. 

U.S.S.R.-China Talks on Border Settlement 

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, let me let you off 
the Viet-Nam hook for a moment. Red China in 
the past week has agreed to talks with the Rus- 
sians about a border settlement. Wliat does that 
mean to us ? Wliat do we make of it ? Do we see 
an opportunity here for new American 
initiatives ? 

Secretary Rogers: We are pleased with this 
development. We were very concerned that the 
tensions were so great that it might result in 
armed conflict. If that had occurred, there would 
have been a very difficult situation in the world 
community, because anything of that kind 
causes serious disruptions in the stability in that 
area. So we are pleased that these discussions 
are going on, and I think if they are successful 
in eliminating their very severe tension on the 
border that it might give us an opportunity to 
develop closer relationships both to the Soviet 
Union and with China. 

Mr. Abel: Do you take the view on the whole 
that the Chinese perhaps merely yielded to Rus- 
sian threats here ; or do you see, as some profess 
to see, a turn toward a more pragmatic policy 
in Peking? 

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Abel, I think it is 
impossible to answer that question. We don't 
know very much about the thinking of the 
Chinese. It is one of the areas in the world we 
know very little about. 

Mr. Nexotnan: Mr. Secretary, are you say- 
ing that the moratorium on Wednesday is a 
bad idea and a bad thing for the coimtry ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say that. I 
said that I tliink the American people have to 
realize that they have one President at a time 
and he is elected for 4 years and once he makes 
the decision, as he has made in this case, he 
deserves the support of the American people. 

Now, as far as the moratorium is concerned, 
we recognize that people have the right to as- 
semble and protest; and I think my attitude, 
at least, on the moratorium is going to be deter- 
mined by their methods and their mood. If the 
spirit of the moratorium is to be constructive 
and help the President and assist the country 
in this difficult period, that is fine. If, on the 



October 27, 1969 



349 



other hand, the spirit is "You either accept our 
decision, Mr. President, or else," if it is coercive, 
then it could be very disruptive. 

I might say in that connection, Mr. New- 
man, the President is going to release a letter 
tomorrow that he has written to a student at 
Georgetown which sets forth his views, I think, 
very clearly and, I think, sets forth the position 
that all Americans have to realize that the Presi- 
dent has. Once he has made the decision he 
should have support for it. There is no reason 
people can't suggest things. For example, Sena- 
tor Aiken made, I thought, a very constructive 
suggestion yesterday, but he said in his speech 
that he was going to support the President. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you had a num- 
ber of meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko 
on the Middle East particularly. Did you make 
any progress at all ? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I thought we made 
some progress. 

Mr. Spivak : Significant progress ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I have used that 
word once in this program. Let's just say we 
made progress. We developed the thought that 
the parties have to negotiate. We have to have 
more active negotiations and we have developed 
what is known as the Rhodes fomiula, which 
we think could lead to more active negotiations. 

Mr. Spivak: Haven't the Egyptians just re- 
pudiated that? 

Secretary Rogers : We are not too sure about 
that. There was an editorial in the paper that 
suggested that, but we have no reason to think 
that is the attitude of the government as yet. 

Mr. Spivak: Wliat about the long-delayed 
talks on arms control? Did you come to any 
agreement with him on when those would take 
place? 

Secretary Rogers: He told me that they 
would take place soon and he asked me not to 
prod him on what he meant by "soon," so I 
don't intend to do that. 

Mr. Spivak: Well, what do you think he 
means by "soon"? This year? Next j^ear? 

Secretary Rogers: I think he means in the 
next 2 or 3 months, and I thmk his refusal to 
give us a time is related to the discussions they 
were having with the Chinese. 

Mr. Newman: I am sorry to interrupt; our 
time is up at this point. Thank you, Mr. Secre- 
tary, for being with us today on "Meet tlie 
Press." 



37th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is text of the opening statement 
7tiade by Ambassador Henry Cahot Lodge, head 
of the U.S. delegation, at the 37th plenary ses- 
sion of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paii-s on 
October 9. 

Press release 301 dated October 9 



\ 



Ladies and gentlemen : Your side persists in 
making accusations against the administration 
of President Nixon which cannot be factually 
sustained. I shall today examine some of these 
charges and try to set the record straight. 

Last week your side charged that President 
Nixon is seeking to prolong the war in Viet- 
Xam. Let us examine the record and see what 
the tnitli is. 

Since he took office last January, President 
Nixon's policy on Viet-Nam lias been to bring a 
rapid end to the war tlirough a negotiated set- 
tlement. He has sought a solution which would 
be honorable for both sides and thus would 
bring lasting peace to Viet-Nam. In contrast, 
your side has refused to enter into serious ne- 
gotiations, apparently in the hope — which must 
surely by now have been dashed — that some- 
how you could win what you described as "total 
victory." 

To be more precise, almost 5 months ago 
President Nixon put forward his proposals for 
peace.' Those proposals were based on two es- 
sential principles: the withdrawal of all non- 
South Vietnamese forces from South Viet-Nam 
and the opportunity for self-determination for 
the South Vietnamese people free from outside 
interference. 

Ladies and gentlemen, these are not the words 
of someone who wants to prolong the war. 

Then at last week's session, a spokesman for 
your side declared that the LTnited States wants 
to keep its troops in South Viet-Nam for many 
years to come. This is contrary to fact. We have 
repeatedly made clear here our willingness to 
withdraw all United States forces from South 
Viet-Nam as rapidly as possible. 

President Nixon reiterated that pledge before 
the United Nations General Assembly as re- 



' For text of President Nixon's address to the Nation 
on May 14, see Bltlletin of June 2. 1(169, p. 457. 



350 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



cently as September 18.^ I repeat it again here 
today. 

But we have also said, and I believe this is only 
natural and fair, that North Vietnamese forces 
must also withdraw from South Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia, and Laos and return to North Viet- 
Nam. We have made clear that we would settle 
for the de fcusto removal of Nortli Vietnamese 
forces so long as there are reliable assurances 
against their return. Yet we have not heard one 
word which would indicate that your side is 
prepared to have North Vietnamese forces 
withdraw back to North Viet-Nam. 

Last week, as before, you criticized the re- 
duction in U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam as 
a result of the program of Vietnamization. Un- 
der this program, the number of United States 
troops in South Viet-Nam will be reduced by 
a minimum of 60,000 by December 15 of this 
year, and they will be replaced by South Viet- 
namese forces. 

Your side's attacks on this program of Viet- 
namization have varied. At first, you claimed 
that U.S. troops were not in fact leaving South 
Viet-Nam. Then, when we cited to you the pre- 
cise facts and figures, you claimed these with- 
drawals were insignificant. 

The truth is that the removal of 60,000 Amer- 
ican troops from South Viet-Nam is a signifi- 
cant step. As President Nixon said on July 11, 
U.S. troop reductions underscore our desire to 
reduce violence and achieve a negotiated peace.' 

The question therefore arises : Wlaat are you 
prepared to do to match our actions rather than 
to condemn them ? 

President Nixon has taken other steps to man- 
ifest his desire to start a process which will take 
us all away from violence and toward peace. lie 
has made clear that we do not seek an imposed 
military solution. He has reduced B-52 sorties. 
He has offered to negotiate internationally su- 
pervised cease-fires to facilitate the process of 
mutual withdrawal. He has supported the pro- 
posal of the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam for free elections organized by joint 
commissions under international supervision. 
ITe has also made clear that the Government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam and we are prepared 
to accept any political outcome that is arrived 



' Bulletin of Oct. C, 19G9. p. 297. 

' For background, see Bulletin of July 2S, 1969, 
p. 61. 



at through free elections. These actions disprove 
your charge last week that the design of the 
United States is to continue and intensify the 
war. 

Your side also charged last week that the ad- 
ministration of President Nixon is plotting to 
perpetuate the division of Viet-Nam. Again, I 
must remind you of the facts. In his address of 
May 14, the President said : 

We have no objection to reunification, if that turn.s 
out to be what the people of South Viet-Nam and the 
people of North Viet-Nam want ; we ask only that the 
decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned. 

We stand on that position. 

On July 20 President Thieu proposed direct 
discussions between North Viet-Nam and South 
Viet-Nam looking toward reunification of Viet- 
Nam by the free choice of the people through 
democratic processes. The United States Gov- 
ernment fully supported this proposal. 

Your side made a statement during last 
week's session with which we can agree. You 
said:". . . peace in Viet-Nam must be genuine, 
a peace in real independence and freedom." 
Your side said that if the Nixon administration 
wisiied to settle the Vietnamese problem peace- 
fully on the basis of respect for the national 
fundamental rights of the Vietnamese people, 
you were ready to move forward, together with 
the other parties. 

We have long been ready to negotiate on that 
basis. If you are prepared to act as you spoke 
last week, we would be delighted to see some 
concrete evidence of your readiness to negotiate 
sincerely with all the other parties. If in par- 
ticular you truly desire genuinely free and 
democratic general elections, as you claim, then 
come forward and really talk to the representa- 
tives of the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam about the way in which such elections 
can be organized and carried out. 

If )'0u truly want to see the fighting brought 
to an end and the South Vietnamese people 
given a chance to decide their own destiny 
freely, indicate in some way that you are pre- 
pared to withdraw all North Vietnamese troops 
out of South Viet-Nam back to North Viet-Nam. 
Surely you do not contend that free choice by 
the South Vietnamese is possible in the presence 
of large numbers of North Vietnamese regular 
army forces, who have no right to be in South 
Viet-Nam anyway. 

These two steps, more than anything else, 



October 27, 1969 



351 



would demonstrate your readiness to negotiate 
meaningfully. 

We also believe it is of the greatest Imniani- 
tarian importance that you identify all the pris- 
oners of war you hold, permit regular mail 
exchanges with them, allow impartial inspec- 
tion of prisoner of war camps, and release sick 
and wounded prisoners. 

readies and gentlemen, our side has demon- 
strated its desire to bring the war to an early 
end both by its actions in Viet-Nam and by its 
comprehensive and constnictive proposals for 
peace here in Paris. We have indicated the flexi- 
bility in our negotiating position and our will- 
ingness to consider other proposals which are 
consistent with the basic objective of ensuring 
for the South Vietnamese people their right to 
genuine self-determination. 

We have made far-reaching proposals for 
peace. It is now time for your side to shift from 
unilateral demands to a genuine discussion and 
negotiation of the issues. 



NATO Science Committee Holds 
First Meeting in United States 

The Department of State announced on Octo- 
ber 3 (press release 29:5) that the NATO Science 
Committee would hold its first meeting in the 
United States October 6-9. Under Secretary 
Eichardson welcomed the Committee at its 
opening session on October 6. 

The Committee was establislied as one of the 
consequences of the meeting of the heads of 
government of the NATO alliance in December 
1957. Since the first meeting of the Committee 
in March 1958, scientific activities in NATO 
have grown to significant proportions. At pres- 
ent the Committee directs a program of fellow- 
ships, advanced study institutes, research grants, 
studies, and conferences amounting to about 
$4.5 million annually. 

The Committee is made up of eminent scien- 
tists from member countries, often from the pri- 
vate sector but individually able to speak 
authoritatively on science policy.' The U.S. rep- 
resentative to the Committee over most of its 
life has been Professor 1. 1. Kabi, Nobel laureate, 
and now professor emeritus at Columbia Uni- 



' For names of delesatcs to tlie meeting, see Depart- 
ment (if State press release 293. 



versify. The Committee is chaired by Gmuiar 
Randers, NATO Assistant Secretary General 
for Scientific Affairs. 

During the week, the Conmiittee reviewed its 
program of scientific activities and laid out 
plans for future work. On October 7 and 8 it 
visited facilities at Cape Kennedy and the 
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston. 



Letters of Credence 

Domiriican Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Dominican Republic, Mario Read Vittini, pre- 
sented liis credentials to President Nixon on 
October 2. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated October 2. 

Luxembourg 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Luxem- 
bourg, Jean Wagner, presented his credentials 
to President Nixon on October 2. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated October 2. 

Eiram/a 

Tlie newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of Rwanda, Fidele Nkundabagenzi, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
October 2. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated October 2. 

Sierra Leone 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Sierra 
I^eone, John Akar, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on October 2. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated October 2. 

Venezuela 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Vene- 
zuela, Julio Sosa-Rodriguez, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Nixon on October 2. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated October 2. 



352 



Department of State Bulletin 



IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors Meet at Washington 



The Boards of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Recon.sti'uction and Development and its affil- 
iates held their annual meetings at Washington 
September 29-Octoher 3. Following is a state- 
ment made before the Boards of Governors on 
September 30 by Secretary of the Treasury 
David M. Kennedy, U.S. Governor of the Fund 
and Bank. 

I am honored to address this annual session 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Mone- 
tary Fund. The accomplishments of the quarter 
century since Bretton Woods reflect both the 
foresight of those who set these institutions on 
their initial course and the outstanding leader- 
ship that has guided their destinies over the 
postwar years. The President of the World 
Bank, Mr. [Robert M.] McNamara, and the 
Managing Director of the Fund, Mr. [Pierre- 
Paul] Schweitzer, are carrying forward in this 
great tradition. 

Anniversaries are a time for lookmg back on 
past achievements — and those of the Bank and 
tlie Fund are indeed impressive. But today is 
even more a time for looking ahead to the chal- 
lenges of the next 25 years, for setting new 
goals, and for appraising our methods for 
reaching them. 

Development Finance 

In the field of development finance, Mr. Mc- 
Namara has already pointed toward some new 
directions for the Bank's lending and outlined 
his thoughts on how we can better direct avail- 
able resources to the points of urgent need. The 
forthcoming report of the Honorable Lester 
Pearson and his distinguished panel will pro- 
' vide us all with a fresh perspective and thought- 
ful analysis to further stimulate our thinking 
and our actions. 

This report is particularly timely for the 
United States. We are engaged in a comprehen- 



sive review of our own foreign assistance effort. 
It would be premature to anticipate the results 
of this study. However, I would like to empha- 
size two basic principles that will help guide 
my country's future efforts: 

Fii-st, we are finnly committed to the multi- 
lateral approach to development financing, epit- 
omized by the World Bank and its affiliates. 
This approach brings to bear on development 
problems the collective efforts and experience 
of all nations, large and small, rich and poor. 
It helps achieve equity both among donors and 
among recipients. One of President Nixon's first 
acts after assuming office was to recommend to 
the Congress our contribution to the then pend- 
ing second replenishment of the International 
Development Association. We are pleased that 
this multilateral endeavor has been able to go 
forward. 

Second, we are convinced that tlie develop- 
ment can be accelerated if we enlist more ef- 
fectively the vast potential of private enter- 
prise. Too often, the individual in developing 
countries with ability and ambition but with 
a paucity of resources is denied an ojjportunity 
to help his country grow. Too often, companies 
with ample financial strength and technical 
competence shy away from the challenges to 
be found in less developed areas. 

The 1970's are sure to require some new em- 
phasis in the development process. But in ap- 
proacliing the new decade, we must also deal 
forcefully with key problems already upon us. 

For instance, the external debt problem has 
become acute. Debt reschedulings testify that 
the burden of debt servicing is already weigh- 
ing too heavily on some countries. But debt re- 
schedulings in themselves provide no general 
solution. Instead, debtors and creditors alike 
must aim to avoid unmanageable levels and 
structures of external debt. Assistance on real- 
istic concessionary terms must be provided from 
a broader range of donor countries. Recipient 
countries, for their part, must see to it that 



Ocfober 27, 1969 

365-801—69 



353 



they help create a climate in which funds can 
be efficiently used and internal development 
flourish. 

"We must also seek better ways of meshing 
development finance with the needs of balance- 
of -payments adjustment. When, as at present, a 
number of large providers of aid must simul- 
taneously deal with problems in their inter- 
national payments, the flow of real resources 
should not be interrupted. At the same time, 
balance-of-payments surpluses should more 
readily be put to work for development pur- 
poses on appropriate terms. 

The problem of coordination looms ever 
larger as the regional development banks grow 
side by side with the worldwide institutions. 
The variety of institutions now at work to com- 
plement national efforts makes it essential that 
we more consciously seek improved ways to fit 
the pieces together in mutually complementary 
and reinforcing ways. 

I wonder, too, whether simple numerical tar- 
gets for development assistance by industrial 
nations do not divert too much attention from 
the quality of the aid provided and the tech- 
niques employed. 

Finally, I must emphasize that the building 
and expansion of new economies, as well as of 
old, must be achieved in a manner consistent 
with outward-looking trading and financial 
practices — practices which our predecessors 
launched when they adopted the Bretton Woods 
proposals and its trading-system counterpart, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
In this connection, I am glad to hear the Man- 
aging Dii'ector's statement that the Fund will 
be prepared to reinforce its collaboration with 
international institutions which have special 
responsibilities in the field of trade and aid. 

Steps To Control U.S. Inflation 

I am acutely conscious of the fact that the 
climate for orderly economic growth every- 
where will be enormously affected by the suc- 
cess with which we in the United States guide 
our own economy. 

Looking back over the past decade or more, 
I believe there is room for some satisfaction. 
The 1960's have brought virtually uninter- 
i-upted growth of real production in the United 
States at the historically high rate of about 
41/^ percent a year. Despite evident flaws in 



the record, we also managed to maintain over 
that same period of time a somewhat better de- 
gree of internal price stability than nearly all 
of our major trading partners. 

Nevertheless, when President Nixon and his 
administration took office, this inflationary 
process was well entrenched. Quite simply, the 
United States failed to respond with sufficient 
vigor in making available, without inflation, the 
resources required by the Viet-Nam conflict at 
a time of sharp increase in other public expend- 
itures. Moreover, our traditionally strong 
trade surplus had almost vanished. 

Some countries have no doubt welcomed the 
larger export markets that are the counterpart 
of the recent surge in U.S. imports. Forced 
growth in the U.S. markets under the pressure 
of inflation caimot, however, be a sound basis 
for sustained payments equilibrium. Moreover, 
we recognize that the pressures on our own 
money markets have contributed to the world- 
wide upward ratcheting of interest rates. 

Those same market pressures have been re- 
flected in a massive flow of private short-term 
capital to the United States. This has tended to 
keep the dollar strong in the exchange markets 
and to hold down or reduce foreign official dol- 
lar holdings. But short-term capital inflows are 
not an efi'ective substitute for a stronger pay- 
ments structure solidly rooted in a current ac- 
count surplus large enough to support a steady 
flow of aid and foreign investment. 

President Nixon has made control of inflation 
his first domestic priority. By now, the basic 
strategy of his administration for achieving this 
goal through the coordinated use of expenditure, 
tax, and monetary policies is widely understood. 

Those policies are not — nor did we anticipate 
that they would be — painless. The President has 
pledged a strict limit of $192.9 billion on budget 
spending during the current fiscal year, a figure 
below congressionally authorized ceilings. To 
keep within that limit at a time of higher costs 
all along the line and despite social programs 
that demand larger financing, we have had to 
cut $7.5 billion from program levels planned in 
the budget submitted to the Congress last Janu- 
ary. Significantly, the expenditure total planned 
for the entire fiscal year allows for virtually no 
increase from the current rate of defense and 
civilian spending. 

This restraint is being achieved at a time 
when the Viet-Nam conflict is continuing. Look- 



354 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing ahead, however, let me assure this audience 
that the people of the United States are solidly 
behind President Nixon in his efforts to bring 
about a just and honorable peace in Viet-Nam. 

We have continued the 10-percent income tax 
surcharge through the remainder of this calen- 
dar year and have requested the Congress to 
maintain half of that surcharge for an addi- 
tional 6 months. We are also moving to eliminate 
the special tax credit for business investment. 
These revenue measures, combined with the con- 
trol on expenditures, are designed to produce an 
overall budgetary surjDlus of nearly $6 billion, 
the largest in 18 years. 

Meanwhile, the expansion of money and 
credit has been slowed sharply. Our lending in- 
stitutions are unable to satisfy fully the de- 
mands for credit, and the effects are being felt 
on important sectors of the economy. Wliere 
possible, we have moved to ease points of exces- 
sive pressure, such as those on housing activity. 
But we are determined to maintain the basic 
thrust of our restrictive policies until the over- 
heating is visibly dissipated. 

Eight months ago we knew that controlling 
inflation without precipitating a serious reces- 
sion would be a long and difficult process. It re- 
quires holding the rate of public and private 
spending below the basic trend of growth in 
capacity and output, thereby relieving excessive 
pressure on our resources. That process is now 
well underway, and we anticipate further slack- 
ening in the quarters immediately ahead. 

Clearly, a reduced rate of growth is not a 
long-term policy objective. But it is essential 
to an effective attack on inflation, and it should 
be a prelude to renewed growth at a sustainable 
pace. 

Experience warns us that the ti'end of prices, 
particularly of services and consumer goods, 
levels off only after a considerable lag behind 
other business indicators. So far we can see only 
scattered and not wholly conclusive signs of an 
easing of price pressure. 

In these circumstances, it is not time to shift 
gears. I believe we are realistically aware of 
the mevitable risks on either side of the course 
we have set for ourselves. But all our planning 
is rooted in the basic proposition that the firm 
and persistent application of appropriate fiscal 
and monetary restraint can lead us past those 
shoals into calmer waters. 



Closing Imbalances Among Major Countries 

Tension and pressures have also been evident 
over recent years in the international monetary 
system, and speculative outbursts have recurred. 
Indeed, it is a tribute to the underlying strength 
of the system devised at Bretton Woods and to 
the spirit of cooperation nurtured by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund that disturbances have 
been contained and that world trade and pay- 
ments have continued to grow at a rapid rate. 

Yet we still face the challenge of moving in 
a coordmated way to close the persistent im- 
balances in trade and payments among the 
major comitries that have contributed so im- 
portantly to the monetary strains. There can be 
no escape in this process from the need for effec- 
tive national economic policies. 

I have already commented upon the circum- 
stances in the United States. In the case of the 
United Kingdom, we have highly encouraging 
evidence that the underlying trend in its 
balance of payments is noticeably improving, 
and a current account surplus has been reestab- 
lished. France has within recent weeks launched 
a program to complement the adjustment in the 
franc parity. Consequently, there is a real im- 
provement in the prospects of important coim- 
tries which have experienced an erosion of their 
external positions over recent years. 

It is vitally important that this recovery not 
be slowed by an unwillingness of countries in a 
strong position to see a decline in their trade 
balance. Sizable trade surpluses happen to be 
highly concentrated among only a few coimtries. 
We look to these countries to not only refrain 
from resisting adjustment but, where possible, 
to take actions of their own to assist and 
encourage it. 

Certainly, solutions should be found other 
than internal inflation, and the prescription ap- 
propriate for one country may not be suitable 
for another. But it is equally clear that, in each 
case, much could be done to spread and diffuse 
existing surpluses in ways that support both the 
broad objectives of freer trade and internal 
stability. Import controls, systematic tying of 
aid, failure to share fully in the burdens of de- 
fense, preferences for domestic production, ex- 
port incentives, and inliibitions on capital 
exports are all out of place for countries with 
current account surpluses ranging as high as 
2 or 3 percent of domestic production. The 
processes of international consultation and co- 



Ortober 27, 1969 



355 



operation embedded in the IMF might well be 
reviewed to assure that the policies of chronic 
surplus countries are subjected to the same 
searching evaluation tliat is more or less auto- 
matically given to deficit countries. 

Activation of Special Drawing Rights 

Strong ties of trade and investment, close 
links between financial markets, and the 
rapidity of communication and transportation 
in the modern world make each coimtry highly 
sensitive to developments abroad. Yet we live in 
a world of nation-states, each of which seeks to 
preserve a degree of economic independence. 

We must face the facts of differing emphases 
in national policy objectives, changes in the 
structure of industry and population, cyclical 
excesses or deficiencies of internal demand, the 
economic consequence of social disturbances, and 
rigidities of costs and prices. x^Jiy of these fac- 
tors can become a source of disturbance and un- 
certainty. At least temporary imbalances are 
inevitable, and every country wants to preserve 
some margin of liquid financial resources to 
buttress its freedom of action. 

Our international monetary arrangements 
will serve us well or poorly to the extent that 
they can absorb and diffuse sources of strain on 
exchange markets, provide effective incentives 
for national adjustment, and thus maintain an 
efficient and durable mechanism for the finance 
of trade year in and year out. It is one of the 
great strengths of the present system that 
tlirough the years it has demonstrated a ca- 
pacity to evolve and grow in response to chang- 
ing needs. 

Indeed, in adopting the first amendment to 
the IMF agreement since Bretton Woods, we 
now stand on the threshold of a fundamental 
development: the creation of a new reserve 
asset, special drawing rights. We are indebted 
to those who years ago not only foresaw the 
potential need for supplementing the tradi- 
tional sources of reserve creation but who 
worked tirelessly to translate general concepts 
into concrete reality. 

Their efforts could not have come to fruition 
at a more opportune time. I believe the Fund's 
annual report — and, even more, the report em- 
bodying the Managing Director's proposal for 
activation of the special drawing rights — makes 
amply clear that the contingency against which 
we have been planning has now arrived. The 
United States therefore fully supports the pro- 
posal to move promptly to meet the acknowl- 



edged need for growth in international reserves 
thi'ough activation of the new facility.^ We par- 
ticularly welcome the sense of conviction and 
confidence that enables us to move forward to 
use this new instrument in stibstantial amoimts, 
reasonably commensurate with need. 

I recognize, but do not share, the concern ex- 
pressed by some that fresh additions to world 
reserves might delay the necessary adjustment 
of payments imbalances. I am persuaded that in 
fact the opposite is true. Without a timely 
supplement to world reserves, the efforts of 
deficit countries to eliminate tliose deficits could 
be made more difficult, and could even be 
frustrated, by actions taken by other countries 
to safeguard their existing reserves. Moreover, 
I can assure you that for the United States the 
activation of this facility will in no way 
diminish our efforts to bring inflation under 
control. 

As we enter this new era of managed reserve 
creation, SDK's will have to find their proper 
role witliin the total complex of reserve assets 
and credit facilities. There is no doubt in my 
mind tliat, within the basic framework of the 
amended Fund articles, we will jointly demon- 
strate our ability to use this new reserve asset 
constructively — in the same spirit of coopera- 
tion that was essential to its development. 

SDK's have properly been at the center of 
attention in recent discussions of international 
liquidity. However, the regular drawing rights 
in the IMF also have an important role to play. 
The approach of the period of quinquennial re- 
view makes this an appropriate occasion for 
surveying the size of Fimd quotas. Preliminary 
discussions indicate that a number of questions 
remain to be resolved before a concrete proposal 
can be presented to the Governors. I feel cer- 
tain that this matter can be satisfactorily re- 
solved within the framework of a reasonable 
increase in the overall size of the Fund at an 
early date. 

"Limited Flexibility" in Exchange Rates 

The clear progress we are making in dealing 
witli the provision of international liquidity 
must not divert our attention from other sources 
of strain. I have already noted that the process 
of international adjustment lias not been work- 



' On Oct. 3 the Board of Governors of the IMF voted 
to allocate $9.5 billion of special drawing rights to par- 
ticipating members over the 3-year period beginning 
Jan. 1, 1970. 



356 



Department of State Bulletin 



ing with full effectiveness and that the difficul- 
ties in this regard are in large part a byproduct 
of inadequate or inappropriate domestic 
policies. 

At the same time, I believe we must recog- 
nize tliat events themselves have raised new 
questions as to the appropriate role for adjust- 
ments in exchange rates — not as a substitute for 
but as a complement to other policies. I have 
particularly in mind the range of proposals for 
"limited flexibility" to which Mr. Schweitzer 
alluded yesterday. 

These proposals all look to less rigidity in the 
exchange rate mechanism than has in fact 
developed in the practices of industrialized 
countries. Some suggested approaches would, 
in practice, affect only a handful of currencies 
or would introduce largely teclmical changes in 
the management of exchange markets. Other 
versions, such as those for a very substantial 
widening of exchange rate margins, would ap- 
pear to introduce so large an element of uncer- 
tainty and be so at variance with the basic ob- 
jectives of the Fund that they probably do not 
need to occupy our attention. 

Certainly, in the United States we have 
readied no conclusion on the desirability of any 
particular proposal. I would, however, like to 
share with you some of the relevant points that, 
on the basis of our own review of the matter, 
we believe should be kept in mind in further 
investigations in this area. 

In the first place, the various plans for 
limited flexibility in exchange rates seem to 
pose formidable technical and policy problems 
that will require careful study over a con- 
siderable period by national authorities, as well 
as international monetary bodies, before any 
consensus is possible. 

Secondly, well-conceived changes, as part of 
their laasic design, should reduce incentives for 
speculation or make it more costly. Thus, if it 
is to be successful, any proposal must come to 
grips with the difficulty of confining changes in 
exchange rates within carefully defined limits 
while providing enough flexibility to reduce 
the need for and expectations of large abrupt 
changes in parities. 

Third, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that any reasonable scheme to remove undesir- 
able rigidities in exchange rates would have 
to be built upon the foimdation of responsible 
and appropriate internal policies so that the 
need for large and discrete changes in parities 
should arise even less frequently than in the 
past. Similarly, the world would continue to 



require an orderly growth in reserves and 
credit facilities to facilitate the maintenance of 
parities within established and relatively nar- 
row ranges. 

Fourth, given the pivotal role of the dollar 
in the international monetary system, the ini- 
tiative for even limited exchange rate adjust- 
ments would continue to lie with countries 
other than the United States. As a corollary, 
we must guard against the possibility of encour- 
aging a bias toward devaluations. 

It is implicit in these comments that we be- 
lieve that proposals for limited flexibility in 
exchange rates offer no panacea for present 
problems. Nonetheless, the increasingly wide- 
spread discussion of these ideas in this country 
and abroad reflects a real concern over the need 
to facilitate, over a period of time, a better 
working of the adjustment process. In concept, 
these proposals seek to preserve and enhance 
the basic stability of the system as a whole pre- 
cisely by breaking down unnecessary rigidities 
and inhibitions to orderly change when change 
is necessary. 

In this light, efforts to define and develop 
techniques of limited flexibility need not be 
looked upon as radical new departures from 
the main stream of developments in the mone- 
tary area. Instead, they seem to me to 
fall within the framework of orderly and evolu- 
tionary change and of multilateral monetary 
cooperation. 

As I have noted, these devices have had no 
official sanction and are full of subtle and un- 
settled technical and policy questions. In sum, 
they are a long way from fruition, if, indeed, 
some variant proves practical at all in the end. 
But neither are these ideas something that we 
can or will responsibly ignore. 

I therefore welcome the Managing Dii'ector's 
statement, elaborating on the Fund's annual 
report, that the Fund will be continuing its 
study and appraisal of these questions. The 
United States will actively particii^ate in and 
contribute to such a study. We would hope that 
during the coming months the Fund will exam- 
ine proposals for limited exchange flexibility, 
determine which pailicular proposals appear 
worthy of further attention, and set forth the 
major issues and considerations that would con- 
cern officials of member governments as they 
formulate considered judgments on such 
matters. 

In conclusion, let me say the principal con- 
tribution of the United States to the stability 



October 27, 1969 



357 



and viability of the international monetary sj'S- 
tem in the present setting is perfectly plain : to 
brinii our inflation to an end and to do so 
without yendinj^ shock wa\es of recession to 
every corner of the world. That is the main path 
we in the Unite<.l States have set for ourselves. 
In participating in an examination of possible 
further improvements in our monetary arrange- 
ments, we will not be misled into thinking that 
we can dispense with the fundamental need. 



President Nixon Names Task Force 
on International Development 

White House press release dated September 24 

The President announced on September 24 
the full membership of the Presidential Task 
Force on International Development, which 
will be chaired by Kudolph A. Peterson, presi- 
dent and chief executive officer of the Bank of 
America. 

When the President amiounced the appoint- 
ment of Mr. Peterson on September 2, he 
directed tlie task force to focus on the under- 
lying rationale of the United States aid effort 
and its relationship to overall United States 
foreign policy. The President has charged the 
task force with developing a new U.S. approach 
to aid for the 1970's for presentation to him 
next February. It will hold its first meeting on 
September 24. 

The members of the task force are : 

Earl L. Butz, vice president and former dean of agri- 
culture, I'urdiie University, Lafayette, Ind. 

William J. Casey, partner. Hall, Casey, Dickler, and 
Howley, Roslyn Harbor, NY. 

Terence Cardinal Cooke, .\rcliliishop of New York. 

John E. Countryman, chairman of the board, Del Monte 
Corp., San Francisco, Calif. 

Thomas B. Curtis, vice president and general counsel. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 111. 

Kalph Burton Gookin, president and chief executive 
ofBcer. H. .7. Heinz Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. 

William T. Gossett, immediate past president, Ameri- 
can Bar Association, Bloomfield Hills, ilieh. 

Walter A. Haas, Jr., president, Levi Strauss & Co., San 
Francisco, Calif. 

Gottfried Haberler, professor of international trade, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

William A. Hewitt, cliairman of board and chief execu- 
tive ofBcer, Deere & Co., Moline, 111. 

Samuel P. Huntington, professor of government. Har- 
vard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Edward Mason, professor, Harvard University, Cam- 
bridge, Mass. 

Rudolph A. Peterson (Chairman), president, Bank of 
America, Piedmont, Calif. 



David Rockefeller, chairman of board. The Chase Man- 
hattan Bank, N.A.. New York, N.Y. 

Robert Roosa, partner. Brown Brothers, Harriman & 
Co., Harrison, N.Y. 

Gen. Robert Wood (retired), staff member. Research 
Analysis Corporation, Stafford, Va. 



International Copyright Group 
Meets at Washington 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 29 (press release 281) that the Interna- 
tional Copyright Joint Study Group had that 
day opened a 5-day meeting at "Washington. 

Eugene M. Braderman, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Commercial Affairs and 
Business Activities, headed the U.S. delegation. 
He was unanimously elected chairman of the 
meeting, and Abraham L. Kaminstein, the 
United States Register of Copj-rights, was made 
honorary chairman. (For the names of other 
members of the U.S. delegation, see press 
release 281.) 

The study group was established by the Inter- 
governmental Copyright Committee, governing 
the Universal Copyright Convention, and the 
Berne Permanent Committee, which governs 
the Berne Copyright Convention. These two 
parent Committees accepted the United States 
offer to host the conference in "Washington and 
directed in a joint resolution that tlie study 
group examine the entire situation of interna- 
tional relations in the field of copyriglit. At its 
first session the study group will give priority 
attention to three subjects: (1) the establish- 
ment of an international mechanism to permit 
developing countries a greater degi-ee of access 
to copyrighted works while respecting the 
rights of authors: (2) the needs of the develop- 
ing and de\eloped countries in the international 
copyright field and the effect of the international 
copyright treaties in the satisfaction of those 
needs; and (3) the problems arising from the 
existence of two copyright conventions of 
worldwide scope and possible methods for pro- 
viding links between them. 

In addition to the United States, the follow- 
ing nations are members of the joint study 
group: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, France, Federal Re- 
public of Germany, India, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, .">enegal, Spain, 
Sweden, Tunisia, United Kingdom, and 
Yugoslavia. 



358 



Department of State Bulletin 



Contributions of Foreign Investment to National Development 



hy Eugene M. Braderman 

Deputy Assistant Seeretat^ for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities 



The subject of foreign investment is, and has 
been historical!}', a practical question for busi- 
ness, a key element of govermnent policy, and 
an intensely debated political issue. Today, for- 
eign investment has acquired new dimensions 
and assumed increased significance. It has 
created and been confronted by new problems 
and lias brought new and richer opportunities 
to both investore and the recipients of foreign 
investment. 

Every country, of course, must weigh the ad- 
vantages of admitting foreign investment 
against the possible disadvantages in order to 
formulate a policy toward foreign investment 
that will best serve its own needs and goals and 
its own national interest. 

This article looks at one side of the balance 
sheet and focuses on the benefits of foreign in- 
vestment to the host country. Its purpose is to 
set forth tlie contributions of the foreign firm 
to national development; for in developing a 
national policy toward foreign investment 
whir'h will be of maximum benefit, it is essential 
that the contributions of foreign firms be clearly 
recognized. 

The term "foreign investment," as used 
throughout this discussion, refers to foi'eign pri- 
vate direct investment ; in other words, to that 
form of equity investment wliich, as distin- 
guished from portfolio investment, is accom- 
panied by the exercise of control or substantial 
influence in the affairs of an enterjirise. Foreign 
direct investment, while principally involving 
the establishment of new firms in the economy 
bj' citizens of another country, also includes tlie 
acquisition of existing companies. 

Essentially, the benefits which can be gained 
from foreign investment are the same for prac- 
tically all countries. For the purposes of this 
analysis, therefore, the phrase "recipient na- 
tion" applies to any country which admits 
foreign investment; no distinction is drawn be- 



tween countries on the basis of the nature or 
state of development of their economies. 

Complaints and apprehensions have been ex- 
pressed about the effects or potential implica- 
tions of foreign investment. In some instances 
they are a manifestation of economic national- 
ism. They reflect fears that foreigners may come 
to own or control too large a portion of a na- 
tion's resources. 

Other problems concern actual or possible con- 
flicts between the laws and policies of the host 
country and those of the home country of the 
investor. Still other concerns stem from the size 
or assumed power of large foreign companies 
which are subsidiaries of international or what 
are often described as "multinational" cor^wra- 
tions. AVhile it is generally recognized that the 
opportunities for a more optimal allocation of 
the world's resources and for the spread of tech- 
nology and economic progress through such 
worldwide corporations are immense, it has also 
been noted by some observers that the interests 
of the country in which a subsidiary is located 
and the objectives of that firm's parent company 
could in some instances diverge. 

Criticisms also arise because special interests 
might suffer, such as local businesses which are 
unwilling or unable to meet the competition of 
foreign firms, even though the nation as a whole 
might profit from the presence of these foreign 
companies. 

In evaluating the contributions of foreign in- 
vestment, therefore, it is clear that fundamental 
value judgments are involved — attitudes and 



• Mr. Bradermans article xoas fuh- 
lished in French in the March-April issue 
of the Belgian bimonthly magazine Revue 
de la Societe d''£tudes et d' Expansion. 



October 27, 1969 



359 



assumptions which determine whether the vari- 
ous economic, social, and political effects of for- 
eign investment are perceived as "beneficial" or 
not. 

The extent to which foreign investment is ad- 
mitted and the conditions under which foreign 
firms are permitted to ojjerate vary from one 
country to another. They take into account se- 
curity considerations and views as to areas which 
should be under national control. 

They also result from policy decisions which 
are based, or should be based, on a clear un- 
derstanding of the effects which can be expected 
from the conditions imposed on the foreign in- 
vestor. Limitations on foreign firms can reduce 
the benefits obtainable from them. 

For example, requirements for certain per- 
centages of local participation in the ownership 
and management of foreign firms are sometimes 
imposed in the belief that this is necessary to 
ensure that the firm will be responsive to the 
needs and aspirations of the host country. 
Shared management of an enterprise may be 
less efficient, however, until nationals of the 
host country have gained the benefits of experi- 
ence with the company, are familiar with com- 
pany policies and practices, and can contribute 
the type of skills and knowledge required for 
effective administration of that particular en- 
terprise. Shared management by people of dif- 
ferent ways of thinking and different business 
customs may be difficult in any case. Local equity 
participation, or shared ownership, may lead 
to disagreements and compromise decisions 
which reduce the effectiveness of an operation. 
For instance, such decisions on the reinvestment 
of earnings or the choice of supply sources may 
adversely affect the quality, prices, and types 
of products which might otherwise be offered if 
the firm were a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
foreign corporation. 

It should also be noted that the treatment 
given by a country to foreign investment exerts 
a significant influence on the flow of investment 
into its economy. Some foreign firms may de- 
cide, because of the restrictions imposed by a 
prospective host country, not to enter that coun- 
try at all. 

The emphasis of much recent discussion has 
been on the price which must be paid for foreign 
investment by a recipient country. Concern has 
been expressed about the social and political im- 
plications and the economic costs of receiving 
foreign investment. For perspective, therefore, 
it should also be noted that a nation which 



chooses not to admit or which severely restricts 
the entry and operations of foreign investors 
also pa3's a price in terms of the benefits which it 
denies itself, benefits which are social and politi- 
cal as well as economic. 

Foreign investment benefits a country by add- 
ing to and improving the quality of its existing 
resources. A listing of the potential contribu- 
tions of a foreign firm would include the 
following: 

— It brings new capital into the economy, 
bej'ond that which is available locally; and by 
reinvesting its earnings, it continues to con- 
tribute to further capital formation. 

— It is often more willing than local firms to 
establish its plant and undertake its operations 
in remote and economically depressed areas of 
the country. Having initially no strong bonds or 
affinity to any particular region of the host 
country and being less influenced by a sense of 
the geographic or cultural "remoteness'' of cer- 
tain areas, the foreign investor frequently tends 
to be more responsive to financial incentives and 
the suggestions of the host country regarding 
location. 

— The foreign firm hires local workers, techni- 
cians, managers, and salesmen ; it provides em- 
ployment and contributes to the income of the 
local population. 

— It pays taxes to the government of the host 
coimtry. 

— The firm's products substitute for goods 
previously imported. 

— It often exports goods and services, adding 
to the host country's earnings of foreign 
exchange. 

— It usually, through affiliation with sister 
subsidiaries located in other parts of the world, 
has access to established overseas markets and 
worldwide distribution facilities. It can thus 
increase the export potential of the host country. 

— It can take advantage of financial assistance 
from its parent company and from the govern- 
ment and private financial institutions of its 
home country. It also borrows locally and stimu- 
lates the local capital market. 

— The foreign firm brings industrial knowl- 
edge and management experience. It can con- 
tribute advanced technology, efficient admin- 
istrative organization, and new methods of 
production, marketing, and distribution ; and it 
enjoys, through its parent company, access on a 
continuing basis to new developments. 

— "Wlien it establishes local research and de- 
velopment facilities, it offers qualified people 



360 



Department of State Bulletin 



additional opportunities for suitable employ- 
ment in their own country. 

— It helps to develojD new and improved uses 
for local raw materials. 
I — The foreign firm trains its local employees ; 
■ it teaches them new skills, advanced production 
and marketing techniques, and effective man- 
agement methods. 

— It offers new and perhaps lower priced 
products to the local consumer. 

— The foreign firm can bring ideas on how 
to improve labor-management relations, within 
the framework of local laws and practices. 

— It often provides housing, scliools, and 
medical facilities for its emploj'ees. 

— It participates in the daily life of the local 
community, taking part in social and cultural 
activities as well as joining in the activities of 
business and industrial associations. Foreign 
employees of the company can contribute ideas 
and suggestions on approaches to education and 
community relations. 

— The foreign firm complements and stimu- 
lates the development of local enterprises in its 
own and other sectors of the economy. Many 
of the technical and managerial personnel 
trained by a foreign company will move on to 
existing local firms or establish new enterprises. 

— It purchases from local suppliers and sells 
to local distributors, increasing their output 
and employment and encouraging more local 
investment in these enterprises. 

— Local firms are stimulated by the example 
and compelled by the competition offered by the 
foreign company to adopt new methods and to 
increase their efficiency. The operations of the 
foreign firm encourage the establishment of 
additional sources of supply and the extension 
and improvement of roads, railways, power- 
plants, and other elements of economic infra- 
structure. 

In sum, foreign investment can enable a na- 
tion to utilize resources which would otherwise 
lie idle and/or to employ its resources more 
productively. A foreign firm undertakes proj- 
ects which might not otherwise be initiated for 
lack of local capital or markets or local ex- 
pertise in that field. It is a channel which pro- 
vides the country in which it locates access to 
outside knowledge, experience, and approaches 
as well as to foreign markets. It can exert a 
modernizing influence on attitudes, customs, 
class structure, and social mobility. It is 
an agent of economic growth and an instru- 



ment of social and cultural development. 

Obviously, not every foreign investment will 
bring all of the advantages which have been 
noted above. And not every potential host coun- 
try will regard all of them as advantages. The 
types of contributions made by a foreign firm 
and the extent of each will be dependent on a 
number of variable factors, such as the nature 
and policy of the firm, the type of activity in 
which it is engaged, the product it manufac- 
tures, and local conditions. 

For example, whether or not the firm forms 
a part of an international or so-called "multi- 
national" corporation will affect the nature 
and extent of its access to external financial 
sources, foreign markets, and technology. 
Another important consideration in analyz- 
ing the effects of the foreign firm on other 
enterprises in the economy is the extent to which 
its activities are linked to local suppliers and 
consumers. The impact on employment will be 
dependent on whether the firm's products are 
labor- or capital-intensive, and the type of prod- 
uct produced will be a determinant of its ca- 
pacity to substitute for imports or to contribute 
to an increase in exports. Conditions in the local 
economy are also important variables; a crucial 
one is the extent of competition met by the 
foreign company from other firms, local and 
foreign. 

The contributions of foreign investment are 
indirect as well as direct; some are manifested 
more or less immediately, while others are rela- 
tively long term. Beyond the direct impact of a 
foreign firm on production, employment, in- 
come, government revenue, exports, and im- 
ports, there are the chain reactions of its local 
purchases and sales, the multiplier effects of the 
income generated, and its influence on the cost 
and price structure of the economy. Some of the 
benefits lend themselves to fairly precise meas- 
urement, such as the number of people employed 
and the amount of taxes paid. Others, includ- 
ing some extremel}' valuable contributions, are 
more intangible, such as the beneficial influences 
on education, social structure, cultural habits 
and attitudes. 

Although it is well known that much of the 
recent foreign private direct investment in the 
world is American, I would like to note that 
the United States is also a major recipient of 
foreign direct investment. The United States 
Government is placing renewed emphasis on 
encouraging the entry of more foreign firms into 
the United States. We welcome and actively 



October 27, 1969 



361 



seek foreign investment, which we view as one 
important way to link the assets and compara- 
tive advantages of other countries with the 
endowments of our own economy. 



U.S. Passports Remain Invalid 
for Travel to Certain Areas 

On September 16 Department press spokes- 
man Robert J. McCloskey announced that '■'■It 
has been decided to extend the existing restric- 
tions on the validity of United States passports 
for travel to mainland China, Cuba, North 
Korea, and North Viet-Nam for a period of 6 
months.'''' 

Following are the texts of four public notices 
which were published in the Federal Register 
on September 18. 

Public Notice 314' 

Mainland China 
Restriction on Travel of U.S. Citizena 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 
and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel to, in, 
or through Mainland China is restricted as unrestricted 
travel to, in, or through Mainland China would seri- 
ously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs in view 
of the continuing unsettled conditions within Mainland 
China and the risks and dangers which might ensue 
from the inadvertent involvement of American citizens 
in domestic disturbances. 

U.S. pas.sports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or 
through Mainland China unless specifically endorsed 
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of 
State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 6 
months from the date of publication in the Federal 
Registeb unless extended or sooner revoked by public 
notice. 

Effective date. This notice becomes effective on 
September 16, 1969. 



Dated : September 15, 19G9. 



[SEAL] 



WnXIAM P. ROQEES, 

Secretary of State. 



Public Notice 315' 

Cuba 
Restriction on Travel of U.S. Citizens 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 
and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel to, In, 
or through Cuba Is restricted as unrestricted travel 
to. In, or through Cuba would seriously impair the con- 
duct of U.S. foreign affairs. To permit unrestricted 
travel would be incompatible with the resolutions 

362 



adopted at the Xinth Meeting of Consultation of Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States, of which the United States is a member. At 
this meeting, held in Washington from July 21 to 26, 
1964, it was resolved that the governments of the 
American states not maintain diplomatic, consular, 
trade or shipping relations with Cuba under its present 
government. This re.solutlon was reaffirmed in the 
Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign .\ffairs of the 
OAS held in September 19G7, wliich adopted resolutions 
calling upon Member States to apply strictly the rec- 
ommendations pertaining to the movement of funds and 
arms from Cuba to other American nations. Among 
other things, this policy of isolating Cuba was intended 
to minimize the capability of the Castro government to 
carry out its openly proclaimed programs of subversive 
activities in the Hemisphere. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or 
through Cuba unless si)ecifically endorsed for such 
travel under the authority of the Secretary of State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 6 months 
from the date of publication in the Fedebal Registeb 
unle.ss extended or sooner revoked by public notice. 

Effective date. This notice becomes effective on 
September 16, 1969. 



Dated : September 15, 1969. 
[seal] 



William P. Rogers, 
Secretary of State. 



Public Notice 316 



NoBTH Korea 
Restriction on Travel of U.S. Citizens 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 
and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel to. In, 
or through North Korea is restricted as unrestricted I 
travel to, in, or through North Korea would seriously ' 
impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. In view of 
the dangerous tensions in the Far East, the expressed 
and virulent hostility of the North Korean regime to- 
ward the United States, the increase in incidents along 
the military demarcation line, the seizure by North 
Korea of a U.S. naval vessel and its crew, and the 
special position of the Government of the Republic of 
Korea which is recognized by resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly as the only lawful govern- 
ment in Korea, the Department of State believes that 
wholly unrestricted travel by American citizens to 
North Korea would seriously impair the conduct of 
U.S. foreign affairs. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, 
or through North Korea unless specifically endorsed for 
such travel under the authority of the Secretary of 
State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of six 
months from the date of publication in the Federal 
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by pubUc 
notice. 

Effective date. This notice becomes effective on Sep- 
tember 16, 1969. 



Dated : September 15, 1969. 

[SEAL] 



William P. Rogers, 
Secretary of State. 



• 34 Fed. Reg. 14533. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Public NoHce 317' 

XOETH ViET-NaM 

Restriction on Travel of U.S. Citizens 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 
and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(b), travel to, in, 
or through North \iet-Nam is restricted as this is "a 
country or area where armed hostilities are in 
progress." 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel to, in, or 
through North Viet-Nam unless specifically endorsed 
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary of 
State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 6 months 
from the date of publication in the Federal Register 
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice. 

Effective date. This notice becomes effective on Sep- 
tember 16, 1969. 



Dated : September 15, 1969. 
[seal] 



TViLLiAM p. Rogers, 
Secretary of State. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



Protocol to the international convention for the north- 
west Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to 
panel membership and to regulatory measures. Done 
at Washington October 1, 1969. Enters Into force 
on the date on which instruments of ratification or 
approval have been deposited or written notifica- 
tions of adherence have been received on behalf of 
all Governments parties to the convention. 
nil/natures: Canada, October 10, 1960; Federal Re- 
public of Germany, October 3, 1969 ; United King- 
dom, October 6, 1969 ; United States, October 10, 
1969. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. 
TIAS 6298. 

Accession deposited: Upper Volta, September 16, 
1969. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, includ- 
ing the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for 
signature at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan- 
uary 27, 1967. Entered into force October 10, 1967. 
TIAS 6347. 

Ratification deposited at Washington: Netherlands, 
October 10, 1969.' 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Ratification deposited at Washington: South Africa, 
October 6, 1969. 



MULTILATERAL 



BILATERAL 



Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 8879. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: Mauri- 
tius, July 18, 1969. 

Aviation 

Convention on the international recognition of rights 
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered 
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847. 
Adherence deposited: United Arab Republic, Sep- 
tember 10, 1969. 
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 
14, 1963. Enters into force December 4, 1969. 
Proclaimed by the President: October 1, 1969. 
Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with an- 
nex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. En- 
tered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Signature: Jordan, October 9, 1969. 

Fisheries 

International convention for the conservation of At- 
lantic tuna. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966. 
Entered into force March 21, 1969. 
Proclaimed by the President: October 1, 1969. 



Ecuador 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of June 30, 1969. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Quito September 29 and 
October 1, 1969. Entered into force October 1, 1969. 

Germany 

Agreement amending the administrative agreement of 
December 1, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3233, 3717, 
4609), concerning the arbitral tribunal and mixed 
commission under the agreement on German ex- 
ternal debts of February 27, 1953 (TIAS 2792). Done 
at Bonn June 26, 1969. Entered into force June 26, 
1969. 

Signatures: France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
United Kingdom, United States. 

Jamaica 

Air transport agreement, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Kingston October 2, 1969. Entered into 
force October 2, 1969. 

Morocco 

Agreement modifying the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of February 25, 1969 (TIAS 
6648). Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat Sep- 
tember 13, 1969. Entered into force September 13, 
1969. 



' 34 Fed. Reg. 14533. 



' Applicable to Surinam and the Netherlands An- 
tilles. 



October 27, 1969 



363 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 



Visas — Abolition of Certain Visa Fees. Agreement with 
Romania. TIAS 6677. 3 pp. 10^ 

Agricultural Commodities. Agretment with Chile. TIAS 
6679. 10 pp. 10!*. 

Study of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by Means 
of Balloons. Agreement with Australia amending and 
extending the agreement of May 9, 1961, as amended 
and extended. TIAS 6680. 4 pp. 10^. 



For sale t>v the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ftients. A 25-pereent discount is made on orders for 100 
or more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers and, in some 
cases, a selected bibliography. (A complete set of all 
Background Notes currently in stock (at least 125) — 
$6; 1-year subscription service for approximately 75 
updated or new Notes — $3.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) 
Single copies of those listed below are available at 100 
each. 



Angola 


Pub. 


7962 


6 pp. 


Brazil 


Pub. 


7756 


4 pp. 


Bulgaria 


Pub. 


7882 


6 pp. 


Burma 


Pub. 


7931 


6 pp. 


Cambodia 


Pub. 


7747 


6 pp. 


Congo (Brazzaville) 


Pub. 


7896 


4 pp. 


Fiji Islands 


Pub. 


8486 


4 pp. 


Guinea 


Pub. 


8057 


4 pp. 


Iraq 


Pub. 


7975 


4 pp. 


Luxembourg 


Pub. 


7856 


4 pp. 


Mozambique 


Pub. 


7965 


5 pp. 


Niger 


Pub. 


8293 


4 pp. 


Pakistan 


Pub. 


7748 


8 pp. 


Singapore 


Pub. 


8240 


7 pp. 


Surinam 


Pub. 


8268 


4 pp. 


Trucial Shaikhdoms 


Pub. 


7901 


4 pp. 


U.S.S.R. 


Pub. 


7842 


14 pp. 


Vatican City 


Pub. 


8258 


2 pp. 



Antarctica — Measures in Furtherance of Principles and 
Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Certain recommen- 
dations adopted at the Fourth Consultative Meeting 
under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. TI.\S 6668. 
30 pp. 200. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan. 
TIAS 6675. 3 pp. 100. 

Meteorological Research— Cloud-Seeding Project. 

Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 6676. 2 pp. 100. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on October 8 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Clinton E. Knox to be Ambassador to Haiti. (For 
biographic data, see White House press release dated 
September 19.) 

Claude G. Ross to be Ambassador to the United 
Republic of Tanzania. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated September 12.) 

Hewson A. Ryan to be Ambassador to Honduras. 
(For biographic data, see White House press release 
dated September 19.) 



Designations 

George H. Aldrich as Deputy Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State. (For biographic data, see De- 
partment of State press release dated October 7.) 

Edwin M. Cronk as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Trade Policy in the Bureau of Economic 
.\fEairs. (For biographic data, see Department of State 
press release dated September 29.) 

Frederick Irving as (Senior) Deputy As.^istant 
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. (For 
biographic data, see Department of State press release 
dated October 1.) 

William B. Jones as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Educational and Cultural Affairs. (For biographic 
data, see Department of State press release dated 
October 1. ) 



364 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 27, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 1583 



China 

Secretary Rogers Interviewed ou "Meet the 
Press" (transcript) 345 

U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel to 
Certain Areas (texts of public notices) . . 362 

Cuba. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel 
to Certain Areas (tests of public notices) . 362 

Department and Foreign Sei-vice 

Aldrleh designated Deputy Legal Adviser . . 364 

Confirmations (Knox, Ross, Ryan) 364 

Designations (Aldrich, Cronk, Irving, Jones) . 364 

Dominican Republic. Letters of Credence (Read 

Yittini) 352 

Economic Affairs 

Contributions of Foreign Investment to National 
Development (Braderman) 359 

Cronk designated Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for International Trade Policy 364 

IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors Meet at 
Washiugtou (Kennedy) 3-53 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Irving designated (Senior) Deputy Assistant 

Secretary 364 

.T(jnes designated Deputy Assistant Secretary . 364 

Foreign Aid. President Nixon Names Task Force 
ou International Development 35S 

Haiti. Knox confirmed as Ambassador . . . 364 

Honduras. Ryan confirmed as Ambassador . . 364 

International Organizations and Conferences 

International Copyright Group Meets at Wash- 
ington 358 

IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors Meet at 
Washington (Kennedy) 353 

Korea. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel 
to Certain Areas (texts of public notices) 362 

Luxembourg. Letters of Credence (Wagner) 352 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Sci- 
ence Committee Holds First Meeting in United 
States 352 

Passports. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for 
Travel to Certain Areas (texts of public 
notices) 362 

Publications. Recent Releases 364 

Rwanda. Letters of Credence (Nkundabagenzi) . 352 

Science. NATO Science Committee Holds First 

Jleeting in United States 352 

Sierra Leone. Letters of Credence (Akar) . . 352 

Tanzania. Ross confirmed as Ambassador . . 364 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 363 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rogers Intervievred on "Meet 
the Press" (transcript) 345 

Venezuela. Letters of Credence (Sosa-Rod- 

riguezj 352 



Viet-Nam 

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Meet the 

Press" (transcript) 345 

37th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 350 

U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel to 

Certain Areas (texts of public notices) . . 362 

Name Index 

Akar, .lohn 352 

Aldrich, George H 364 

Braderman, Eugene M 359 

Cronk, Edwin M 364 

Irving, Frederick 364 

Jones, William B 364 

Kennedy, David M 353 

Knox, Clinton E 364 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 350 

Nkundabagenzi, Fidele 352 

Read Vittini, Mario 3-52 

Rogers, Secretary 345 

Ross, Claude G 364 

Ryan, Hewson A 364 

Sosa-Rodriguez, Julio 352 

Wagner, Jean 352 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 6-12 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 6 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 281 of 
September 29 and 293 of October 3. 

No. Date Subject 

*295 10/0 ileyer sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for Administration (bio- 
graphic data ) . 

'290 10/7 Walsh sworn in as Ambassador to 
Kuwait (biographic data). 

t297 10/7 U.S.-India bilateral talks at Wash- 
ington October 16-17. 

1298 10/7 Rogers : draft treaty on seabed. 

*299 10/8 Sayre sworn in as Ambassador to 
Panama (biographic data). 

*300 10/8 Adair sworn in as Ambassador to 

Uruguay (biographic data). 
301 10/9 Lodge : 37tb plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

t302 10/10 U.S.-Italian negotiations for new 
extradition treaty. 

t304 10/11 De Palma : Economic Club of De- 
troit, October 13. 

*Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of tlie BttLLETiN. 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1581, 




November 3, 1969 



U.S. AND U.S.S.R. AGREE ON DRAFT TREATY BANNING EMPLACEMENT 
OF NUCLEAR ^VEAPONS ON THE SEABED 

Statement hy James F. Leonard and Text of Draft Treaty 3G-5 

WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS MEANS TO AMERICA— NOW 

hy Assistant Secretary De PaJma 37 If. 



For index see inside iach cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1584 
November 3, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OfEco 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues, domestic .$16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the ivork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy-, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by tlie 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various piloses of inter/ui- 
tional affairs and tite functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and interruitional 
agreements to ichich the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general interruitional 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United IS'ations documents, and leg- 
islative nutterial in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently . 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement 
of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed 



A joint draft treaty on the jyroTiiiition of the 
emplacement of nuclear weafons and other 
wea-pons of mass destruction on the seabed and 
the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof was 
presented at the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament at Geneva by the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. on October 7. Follow- 
ing is a statement made before the conference 
that day by James F. Leonard^ U.S. Representa- 
tive to the conference, together with the text of 
the draft treaty. 



STATEMENT BY MR. LEONARD 

It has been widely recognized during our 
work this year that the most promising item 
on our agenda, in terms of developing a 
concrete agreement, has been the question of 
preventing an extension of the arms race to the 
seabed. As my colleagues know, this question 
has been the subject of intensive discussions 
between the delegations of the Soviet Union 
and the United States ; and I am pleased to be 
able to join my Soviet colleague in reporting 
that our labors have proved fruitful. The prod- 
uct of our efforts has now been circulated in the 
fonn of a revised draft treaty to prohibit the 
emplacement of nuclear weapons or other types 
of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed 
and ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof.^ 

The draft treaty we are presenting today has 
been worked out by the Governments of the 
United States and the Soviet Union as a recom- 
mendation for discussion and negotiation in this 
Committee. In view of the comments and con- 
cerns and the very positive attitudes expressed 
on this subject by other delegations, I be- 
lieve that this draft could become a measure 
which would enhance the security of all states. 



' For a U.S. statement and text of a draft treaty sub- 
mitted by the United States on May 22, see Buixetin 
of June 16, 1969, p. 520. 



My delegation hopes that the members of the 
Committee will soon be in a position to com- 
ment on the draft, having in mind what has 
also been very much in the minds of the Co- 
chairmen : the importance of timely submission 
of a broadly agreed text to the current General 
Assembly. Naturally, other governments will 
wish to study its provisions with care, and we 
will need to consider the possibility of changes 
in the text. In the near future I plan to make a 
statement on the considerations that have 
shaped the U.S. delegation's approach to cer- 
tain suggestions that have already been put for- 
ward and on possible areas in which the draft 
might be improved. 

Mister Chairman, I would now like to ex- 
plain some of the provisions of the new draft 
treaty. 

The first paragraph of article I would pro- 
hibit any party from emplanting or emplacing 
on the seabed, beyond a 12-mile contiguous 
zone, any objects with nuclear weapons or any 
other types of weapons of mass destruction. 
This prohibition, like the Outer Space Treaty, 
would thus cover in particular nuclear weapons 
and also any other weapons of mass destruction, 
such as chemical or biological weapons. This 
paragraph would also ban structures, launch- 
ing installations, or any other facilities spe- 
cifically designed for storing, testing, or using 
such weapons. The treaty would therefore pro- 
hibit, inter alia, nuclear mines that were an- 
chored to or emplaced on the seabed. The treaty 
would not, however, apjaly to facilities for re- 
search or for commercial exploitation that 
might somehow be able to accommodate or con- 
tain a nuclear weapon. The prohibition would, 
on the other hand, most definitely apply to fa- 
cilities designed for both nuclear and nonnu- 
clear weapons ; for example, launcliing facilities 
specifically designed to fire either nuclear or 
conventional weapons. Since this is a treaty re- 
garding uses of the seabed, vehicles which can 



November 3, 1969 



365 



Agreement on Draft Seabed Treaty 
Hailed by Secretary Rogers 

statement by Secretary Rogers 

Press release 298 dated October 7 

I was pleased to learn this morning that the 
American and Soviet Cochairmen of the Con- 
ference of the Committee on Disarmament at 
Geneva have jointly presented a draft treaty to 
prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to 
the seabed. 

This draft treaty must now be examined by 
the other delegations at the disarmament con- 
ference and then by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. In other words, it still has some 
way to go before it is opened for signature by 
the world's nations. 

It is nevertheless encouraging that the United 
States and the U.S.S.R., working together with 
representatives of other countries at the Geneva 
disarmament conference, have once again been 
able to reach agreement on an arms control 
measure which is in their own interest and in 
the interest of world security and stability as 
a whole. 



navigate in the water above the seabed, that is, 
submersible vehicles, should be viewed in the 
same way as any other ships ; they would there- 
fore not be violating the treaty if they were 
either anchored to or resting on the seabed. I 
would also like to point out that this treaty 
would in no way impede peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Thus, the prohibitions of the treaty are 
not intended in any way to affect the conduct of 
peaceful nuclear explosions or to affect appli- 
cations of nuclear reactors, scientific research, 
or other nonweapons applications of nuclear 
energy. 

The second paragraph of article I is similar 
to provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
and the Nonproliferation Treaty and is intended 
to ensure that this treaty effectively accom- 
plishes its i^urposes. 

Let me now turn to article II of the new draft. 
The provisions of this paragraph reflect my del- 
egation's conviction that our effort to develop 
a sound measure for seabed arms control must 
be based squarely on existing international law. 
The past several months have confirmed our con- 
viction that a seabed arms control agreement 
should not and can not be an instrument to solve 
complex questions of the law of the sea and that 
the prospects for broad acceptance of a treaty 
would be much greater if the treaty were fully 



in accord with the present law of the sea. Other- 
wise, we would run a severe risk of getting 
bogged down in extraneous questions relating 
to national jurisdiction and exploitation of the 
resources of the sea and of the seabed. If tliis 
were to happen, it would be much more difficult, 
perhaps even impossible, for us to reach agree- 
ment on a practical arms control measure. 

Moreover, we believe that there is wide inter- 
national agreement on the basic principles of 
the law of the sea, particularly as those prin- 
ciples are spelled out in the 1958 Geneva con- 
ventions. We have therefore taken the 1958 
Convention on tlie Territorial Sea and Contigu- 
ous Zone as the basis for measuring the contig- 
uous zone beyond which the prohibitions would 
apply.' 

The method for measuring the band is cov- 
ered in two provisions of the treaty. First, 
paragraph 1 of article I specifies that the pro- 
hibitions of the treaty would apply beyond the 
maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone. As delegations are 
doubtless aware, article 24 of the 1958 Conven- 
tion stipulates that the maximum zone is 12 
miles. The width of the contiguous zone in our 
draft seabed treaty is thus derived from an 
existing agreement with wide int«rnational ac- 
ceptance. Second, paragraph 1 of article II spec- 
ifies that tlie outer limit of the contiguous zone 
shall be measured in accordance with the Con- 
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu- 
ous Zone and international law. The seabed 
treaty would in this way make full use of exist- 
ing international law for the purpose of pro- 
viding limits for this treaty. 

Since, however, it is generally agreed that 
potential parties would wish to be reassured 
that acceptance of this seabed treaty would in 
no way affect their positions regarding other 
questions, the disclaimer provision in para- 
graph 2 of article II has been included. We be- 
lieve this provision makes it completely clear 
that adherence to the treaty would not prej- 
udice the position of any party on questions 
regarding coastal waters or the seabed and 
ocean floor. In particular, it should be imder- 
stood that acceptance by the United States of ' 
the provisions of this treaty would not imply 
any change in the positions of the United States i 
regarding the limit of the territorial sea, the , 



' For text of the convention, see Btjlletin of June | 
30, 1958, p. 1111. 



366 



Department of State Bulletin 



rights of coastal states over the continental 
shelf, or other questions regarding the law of 
the sea. It is the strongly held view of the spon- 
sors of this draft that this would also, and 
equally, be true of any other state which may 
become a party to this treaty. 

Mister Chairman, there has already been a 
good deal of discussion in the Committee con- 
cerning possible elements of a verification pro- 
vision for the seabed treaty. We in the United 
States delegation have explained in plenary 
statements as well as in informal discussions the 
reasons that led us to conclude that the require- 
ment for verification is dependent on the nature 
of tlie proliibition. Based on this conclusion and 
in view of the difficulties of the seabed environ- 
ment and the limitations of available teclinol- 
ogy, we believe that the right to veiif y set forth 
in article III would be appropriate for this 
treaty. This provision would ensure that parties 
would be able to act to the full extent neces- 
sary to check compliance with the treaty, tak- 
ing into account both the rights and the obliga- 
tions of present mternational law, including 
particularly the freedoms of the high seas. On 
the other hand, the provision is drafted to en- 
sure that legitimate acti\'ities would not be sub- 
ject to interference. It would not, for example, 
imply either the right of access to seabed in- 
stallations or any obligation to disclose activities 
on the seabed that are not contrary to the pur- 
poses of the treaty. 

A number of delegations have made clear 
that they might wish to consider obtaining as- 
sistance from other states in carrying out veri- 
fication. As provided in paragraph 2 of article 
III, the treaty would permit verification to be 
carried out by a party either by its own means 
or with the assistance of any other party, 
thereby facilitating participation by all parties 
regardless of their state of technological devel- 
opment. The verification article also includes a 
commitment by the parties to consult and co- 
operate in order to clear up questions that 
miglit arise about fulfillment of the obligations 
of the treaty. 

This completes my discussion of the principal 
articles of the new draft treaty, Mister Chair- 
man, but I would like to offer a few brief com- 
ments on some of the remaining administrative 
provisions on amendment, accession, and the 
like. 

First, we have proposed an amendment pro- 
vision which follows the precedent of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, in that it requires ac- 



ceptance by a majority of all parties, including 
all nuclear-weapon parties, for entry into force 
of amendments. Inasmuch as the treaty will in 
practice place restrictions upon the nuclear 
powers, this seems a reasonable procedure. 

Next, the first paragraph of article VI pro- 
vides that the treaty shall be open for signature 
to all states. Such a provision would not, of 
course, affect the recognition or status of an 
unrecognized regime or entity which may elect 
to file an instrument of accession to this treaty. 

Finally, the third paragraph of article "VT 
provides that the treaty would enter into force 
after 22 countries had ratified, including the 
depositaries. This follows the precedent of the 
1958 Geneva law of the sea conventions, as was 
suggested by the Swedish delegation. 

Alister Chairman, the tabling of a draft 
treaty today opens up an opportunity for es- 
tablishing in the near future a meaningful re- 
striction on the deployment of nuclear weapons 
and as such would contribute to the security of 
all countries. At the present moment, the work 
of this Committee has entered a most important 
phase. Wliat we do or fail to do can have wide 
consequences. We have the chance to work out 
a measure which will be an effective barrier to 
the spread of the nuclear arms race and which 
will facilitate the use of the seabed for peace- 
ful purposes. The time is short, and we will 
have to work hard. But I am confident that we 
can again demonstrate the competence and the 
dedication to serious, detailed work that have 
brought tills Committee to its present position 
of leadership in the field of arms control. 



TEXT OF DRAFT TREATY 

Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplace- 
ment OP Ndcleae Weapons and Otheb Weapons 
of Mass Desteuction on the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 

The States Parties to this Treaty, 

Recognizing the common interest of mankind in 
the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed 
and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, 

Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms 
race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the in- 
terests of maintaining world peace, reduces interna- 
tional tensions, and strengthens friendly relations 
among States, 

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step to- 
wards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and 
the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and deter- 
mined to continue negotiations concerning further 
measures leading to this end. 

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step to- 



November 3, 1969 



367 



wards a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, and 
determined to continue negotiations to this end, 

Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
in a manner consistent with the principles of interna- 
tional law and without infringing the freedoms of the 
high seas; 

Have agreed as follows : 

Article I 

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not 
to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean 
floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum 
contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Con- 
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone any objects with nuclear weapons or any other 
types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as struc- 
tures, launching installations or any other facilities 
specifically designed for storing, testing or using such 
weapons. 

2. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not 
to assist, encourage or induce any State to commit ac- 
tions prohibited by this Treaty and not to participate 
in any other way in such actions. 

Abticlg II 

1. For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of 
the contiguous zone referred to in Article I shall be 
measured in accordance with the provisions of Sec- 
tion II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone and in accordance with 
international law. 

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as sup- 
porting or prejudicing the position of any State Party 
with respect to rights or claims which such State Party 
may assert, or with respect to recognition or nonrecog- 
nition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, 
related to waters off its coasts, or to the seabed and the 
ocean floor. 

Aeticle III 

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States 
Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify the 
activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the 
seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof 
beyond the maximum contiguous zone, referred to in 
Article II, if these activities raise doubts concerning 
the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this 
Treaty, without interfering with such activities or 
otherwise infringing rights recognized under interna- 
tional law, including the freedoms of the high seas. 

2. The right of verification recognized by the States 
Parties in paragraph 1 of this Article may be exercised 
by any State Party using its own means or with the 
assistance of any other State Party. 

3. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to 
consult and to cooperate with a view to removing 
doubts concerning the fulfillment of the obligations 
assumed under this Treaty. 

Article IV 

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amend- 
ments to this Treaty. Amendments must be approved by 






a majority of the votes of all the States Parties to the 
Treaty, including those of all the States Parties to this 
Treaty possessing nuclear weapons, and shall enter 
into force for each State Party to the Treaty accept- ■ 
ing such amendments upon their acceptance by a major- | 
ity of the States Parties to the Treaty, including the 
States which possess nuclear weapons and are Parties 
to this Treaty. Thereafter the amendments shall enter j 
into force for any other Party to the Treaty after it 
has accepted such amendments. 

Each Party to this Treaty shall in exercising Its 
national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its Country. It 
shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Par- 
ties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security 
Council three months in advance. Such notice shall 
include a statement of the extraordinary events it 
considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. 

Aeticle VI 

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all 
States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty be- I 
fore its entry into force in accordance with paragraph | 
3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of 
accession shall be deposited with the Governments of 
, which are hereby designated the Deposi- 
tary Governments. 

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the de- 
posit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two 
Governments, including the Governments designated 
as Depositary Governments of this Treaty. 

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited after the entry into force of 
this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 

5. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith 
notify the Governments of all States signatory and 
acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, 
of the date of depo.sit of each instrument of ratifica- 
tion or of accession, of the date of the entry into force 
of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 

Article VII 

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish 
and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall 
be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Govern- 
ments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the States signatory and acceding 
thereto. 

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly 
authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. 

Done in . at this 



day of 



368 



Department of State Bulletin 



38th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are texts of the opening statement 
and supplementary remarks made iy Arnbas- 
sador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. del- 
egation, at the 38th plenary session of the meet- 
ings on Viet-Nam at Paris on October 16. 

OPENING STATEMENT 



Press release i 



1 dated October 16 



Ladies and gentlemen : This is our 38th ses- 
sion. Throughout these Paris meetings, your 
side has accused the United States and the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam of impeding progress. You 
repeated this charge at last week's session. To- 
day I shall try to show the truth. 

A review of the record of these meetings 
shows that the two sides liave taken fundamen- 
tally different approaches to these negotiations. 
I shall submit that it also clearly shows that the 
lack of progress is directly attributable to the 
attitude which your side has taken. 

Beginning with the very first session here, 
the United States and the Government of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam have presented a number 
of specific proposals for negotiation. Our pro- 
posals are directed at negotiated solutions to 
both the key militai-y and political issues. They 
embody actions to be taken by both sides. They 
are based on the assumption that tliere should 
be an equitable arrangement in bringing the 
conflict to an end. 

I submit that our proposals have been rea- 
sonable and flexible, open to discussion, nego- 
tiation, and compromise. For our part, every 
aspect of this conflict is negotiable, except the 
fundamental right of the South Vietnamese 
people to determine their own future free from 
outside interference. 

Not only has our side made numerous pro- 
posals for negotiation; we have also welcomed 
the fact that your side presented a comprehen- 
sive program. "We noted that some of the points 
in your 10-point proposal appeared not too far 
from the positions which we have taken. On the 
fundamental questions of the withdrawal of 
non-South Vietnamese forces and of a political 
solution in South Viet-Nam, we have attempted 
seriously to discuss your proposals and our pro- 



posals. We have explained our proposals and 
elaborated them. "We have commented on your 
proposals, and we have asked specific questions 
to try to clarify them and to find common 
ground on which to build agreement. In par- 
ticular, the Govermnent of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam has repeatedly called for private 
talks with the National Liberation Front with- 
out preconditions. Only last week President 
Thieu reiterated his readiness to discuss any 
matter and to do so in serious negotiations. 

We have also made specific proposals for the 
humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war. 

Our side has taken a number of specific ac- 
tions to reduce the violence on the battlefield. 
Contrary to your repeated charges that the 
United States is intensifying the war, our ac- 
tions demonstrate that the trend of American 
force strength in Viet-Nam is decisively down. 
Specifically : 

In March 1968, the United States restricted 
the bombing of North Viet-Nam to the area 
below the 19th parallel. 

In November 1968, the United States ceased 
all acts involving the use of force against North 
Viet-Nam. 

President Nixon pointed out in his press con- 
ference on June 19, 1969,^ that United States 
forces had not intensified their military oper- 
ations but were only responding to what your 
side did. The President has repeatedly cited 
our limited objective and the defensive nature 
of the United States military effort in South 
Viet-Nam. 

In his press conference of August 21, 1969, 
Secretary of Defense Laird specifically stated 
that U.S. commanders in Viet-Nam were not 
under orders to exert maximum military pres- 
sure. In his press conference of September 17, 
Secretary Laird stated that the United States 
was moving in the direction of turning over the 
responsibility for combat operations and even- 
tually all operations in Viet-Nam to the forces 
of South Viet-Nam. In his press conference of 
October 9, Secretary Laird repeated these 
points. 

Since President Nixon's assumption of office, 
decisions have been taken to reduce the niunber 
of U.S. troops by a minimum of 60,000 by 
December 15 of this year. Twenty-five thousand 
U.S. troops had departed South Viet-Nam by 



' For excerpts, see Bulletin of July 7, 1969, p. L 



November 3, 1969 



369 



the end of August. The remainder of the 60,000 
will depart South Viet-Nam by December 15. 

President Nixon has reduced B-52 sorties. 

This, in briefest summary, is our side's record 
since these meetings began. It is a record of 
specific and concrete proposals for action by 
both sides, a record of flexibility and readiness 
for genuine give-and-take, a record, in sum, of 
a sincere effort to engage in meaningful negoti- 
ation to bring the war in Viet-Nam to an end. 

Eegrettably for the people of South Viet- 
Nam, who continue to suffer daily, and for the 
people of the world, who yearn for peace in 
Viet-Nam, your side has followed an entirely 
different approach to these meetings. 

From the outset, you have engaged in delib- 
erate propaganda and name-calling. Your nego- 
tiating position is limited to demands for 
unilateral action by our side. You have said 
nothing about what actions your side is prepared 
to take to bring the war in Viet-Nam to an end. 
You have sought to impose your view that our 
side is the "aggressor" and your side the inno- 
cent "victim of aggression," despite the facts to 
the contrary. 

At last week's session, you advanced claims of 
your side's serious intent by recalling that you 
put forth four-point, five-point, and then 10- 
point programs. But your side seems to believe 
that putting forward a proposal is the end, not 
the beginning, of real negotiations. Thus, you 
have refused to discuss and clarify your 10- 
point program. You have brushed aside our 
efforts to find common ground between our i-e- 
spective positions. You have insisted that your 
10 points must be accepted as the only basis for 
a settlement. You have refused to deal with our 
side's proposals in a serious mamier. 

You have even failed to take basic steps which 
would ensure humanitarian treatment of prison- 
ers of war held by your side. 

The most telling evidence of your lack of seri- 
ous intent is your persistent refusal to enter 
into genuine discussions with the Govermnent 
of the Eepublic of Viet-Nam, despite the fact 
that you agreed to its full participation in these 
Paris meetings. Instead of negotiating with that 
Government in order to find some basis of ac- 
commodation, you have demanded its overthrow 
and replacement by a coalition government of 
your own choosing as the price for any negotia- 
tions at all. 

In short, your side has blocked these talks by 
putting forth preconditions for negotiations. 
You have shown no willingness to talk on terms 
other than those that would predetermine the 



result and deny the right of self-determination 
to the people of Viet-Nam. 

Ladies and gentlemen, this is where we are 
today. The fighting in Viet-Nam continues. Our 
side wants to see it end as soon as possible. We 
wish to negotiate. Our side's actions are clear. 
It is now up to your side to make the next move. 



SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS 

Press release 307 dated October 16 

Once again you have seen fit to make an 
abusive attack on the President of the United 
States. While in so doing you do not injure him, 
you may mislead yourself. This could affect the 
course of our relationships here and thus the 
prospects for negotiations. 

This makes it useful for me to say that I 
believe you are underestimating the President's 
position as regards the Viet-Nam question and 
that you are also misjudging the American po- 
litical scene. 

You are dealing with an individual who is 
inured to hardship, who has been under pres- 
sure before in his public life, and who has 
proven time and again that he firmly intends 
to act in the national interest and not be de- 
terred from doing his duty as he sees it by 
articles, polls, and political onslaughts. 

The demonstrations currently being held in 
the United States are quite in keeping with our 
traditions. We realize that they would be incon- 
ceivable in a police state. In fact, if such mani- 
festations occurred in a police state, it would 
undoubtedly foreshadow the end of the regime. 
But such demonstrations are one of the ways in 
which our process works. 

You are tluis, I believe, misjudging American 
public opinion, and you are misjudging the 
President of the United States as a man. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the obstacle to progress 
here in Paris is not the President of the United 
States. Nor, let me add, is it the South Viet- 
namese Government. The obstacle to progress 
here in Paris is vour flat refusal to enjratre in 
meaningful negotiations with us and your fur- 
ther refusal to have any kind of serious talks 
with the South Vietnamese Government, who 
have publicly offered to talk about everything. 

I refer to your proposal that the United States 
engage in direct and private talks with the dele- 
gate of the self-styled Provisional Eevolution- 
ary Goverimient. 

The United States has always made clear that 



370 



Department of State Bulletin 



it came to Paris ready to talk in any meaningful 
way witli all the representatives on the other 
side. We hold to that position. 

It is your side wlaich has refused to talk 
meaningfully with the representatives of the 
Kepublic of Viet-Nam, which is a legitimate 
ffovermnent and without which nothing of im- 
portance can be done in South Viet-Nam. You 
refuse to do this, despite the fact that you agreed 
to their presence at these meetings. In all hon- 
esty, your position now can only mean that your 
policy has changed and that you are not pre- 
pared to negotiate genuinely and sincerely with 
all parties concerned. 

Thus, as far as we are concerned, we are ready 
and willing to carry on private and direct talks 
in which all those represented on each side at 
these meetings will participate. 

This has been our position and is our position 
today. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I wish simply to say 
this : We are ready to join with all parties rep- 
resented by agreement on both sides in meet- 
ing privately at any time. Are you? 



President Discusses Responsibility 
for Decisions on Viet-Nam Policy 

Following is an exchange of letters hetween 
President Nixon and Randy J. Dicks, a student 
at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

White House press release dated October 13 

TEXT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER 

October 13, 1969 
Dear Me. Dicks : In reply to your comments 
about my [September 26] press conference re- 
mark that "under no circumstances will I be af- 
fected whatever" by the demonstrations planned 
for October 15, I would suggest that there are 
several points you should bear in mind. 

First, there is a clear distinction between pub- 
lic opinion and public demonstrations. To listen 
to public opinion is one thing; to be swayed by 
public demonstrations is another. A demonstra- 
tion — in whatever cause — is an organized ex- 
pression of one particular set of opinions, which 
may or may not be shared by the majority of the 
people. If a President — any President — allowed 
his course to be set by those who demonstrate, 
he would betray the trust of all the rest. Wiat- 



ever the issue, to allow government policy to be 
made in the streets would destroy the demo- 
cratic process. It would give the decision, not 
to the majority, and not to those with the strong- 
est arguments, but to those with the loudest 
voices. It would reduce statecraft to slogans. It 
would invite anarchj'. It would allow every 
group to test its strength not at the ballot box 
but through confrontation in the streets. 

The planned demonstrations will tell us that 
a great many Americans are deeply concerned 
about the war; that some of these consider 
U.S. participation iimnoral; that many want 
U.S. troops withdrawn immediately and uncon- 
ditionally. But all of us in the Administration 
are already well aware of this sentiment. We 
are already well aware that it is widespread— 
indeed, that no matter how many people might 
participate, there would be many more who 
share their concern. 

Therefore, there is nothing new we can learn 
from the demonstrations. The question is 
whether, in the absence of any new evidence or 
any new arguments, we should be turned aside 
from a carefully considered course. The policies 
we are now following reflect our own best 
judgment, based on exhaustive study of all the 
available evidence, of how to achieve that goal. 
To abandon that policy merely because of a pub- 
lic demonstration would therefore be an act 
of gross irresponsibility on my part. 

One further point : I respect the right of each 
American to express his own opinion. I rec- 
ognize that many feel a moral obligation to ex- 
press their opinions in the most conspicuous 
way possible, and therefore consider such ex- 
pression to be their responsibility. I respect 
that. However, my responsibility is different. I 
must consider the consequences of each pro- 
posed course of action — short-tenn and long- 
term, domestic and world-wide, direct and 
indirect. Others can say of Vietnam, "Get out 
now ;" when asked how, they can give the simple, 
flip answer: "By sea." They can ignore the 
consequences. But as I consider those conse- 
quences, in both human and international 
terms, I can only conclude that history would 
rightly condemn a President who took such a 
course. 

One of the first acts of my Administration 
was to review, exhaustively and comprehen- 
sively, every aspect of the nation's policies in 
Vietnam. We have drastically altered the pol- 
icies we inherited. We are on the road to peace. 
That road is not easy. It is not simple. But I am 
convinced it is the right one. There is no prob- 



November 3, 1969 



371 



lem to which I have given more of my time and 
tho)i<jlit. For nine months, we have worked 
every day for a just end to a conflict which has 
been building for more than eight years. 

On October 15th, I understand, many will 
simply be saying : "I am for peace." I ardently 
join with all Americans in working toward that 
goal. 

Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 



TEXT OF MR. DICKS' LETTER 

Dear Mr. President : I think that your state- 
ment at your recent press conference that "un- 
der no circumstances" will you be affected by 
the impending anti-war protests, in connection 
with the "Viet-Nam Moratorium," is ill-con- 
sidered to say the least. It has been my impres- 
sion that it is not unwise for the President of 
the United States to take note of the will of the 
people; after all, these people elected you, you 
are their President, and your office bears cer- 
tain obligations. Might I respectfully suggest 
that the President reconsider his pre-judg- 
ment. 

Yours sincerely, 

Randt J. Dicks 



President Nixon Greets Leaders 
of People to People Program 

Reinarhs hy President Nixon ^ 

I would like to be permitted just a personal 
word as I stand here with Mrs. Eisenhower on 
this occasion of the general's birthday. I think 
back to those days in tliis house when she, as 
the First Lady, presided with such dignity and 
such great credit to America and to the world. I 
tliink, too, of General Eisenliower and jjar- 
ticularly of those last days. Last days can be sad 
days, but I think Mrs. Eisenhower would agree 
that they were great days — great days because 
the general, to the very last, sjjoke of his family, 
spoke of his country, and spoke of those causes 
that were very, very close to his heart. 

I remember asking him shortly before he died, 

' Made before the People to People Council in the 
East Room of the White House on Oct. 14 (White 
House press release). 



as he looked back over almost 60 j'ears of public 
service, what he really rated the highest — and 
what a choice he had : commander of the Armies 
that brought victory in "World War II against 
aggression that would have otherwise swept 
Europe and possibly the world; President of 
the United States, in which he brought peace to 
the Nation and kept the peace for 8 years ; and 
then a distinguished career after he left the 
Presidency, in which he continued to give 
leadership on the highest ideological plane to 
the people of this nation and to the people of 
the world. 

It was interesting to note that the President 
often told me that among his activities that had 
not received as much publicity, of course, as the 
crusade in Europe and the Presidency and the 
end of the war in Korea was the People to 
People program. 

Six times after I left the Vice Presidency and 
before I came to this house in January of this 
year, I took trips aromid the world. Mrs. Eisen- 
hower remembered that before all six times I 
came to call on General Eisenhower, sometimes 
in California and sometimes in Gettysburg, to 
get liis advice about the affairs of the world and 
matters that I might discuss when I was abroad. 
He never failed to mention the fact that he had 
a tremendous interest in the People to People 
program, in the Eisenliower Fellows, another 
program that I might see abroad. 

To show you the immense impact that one 
part of the whole People to People program can 
have, I recall one coimtry I visited on one trip. 
There were six members of a Cabinet in that 
country who had been Eisenhower Fellows. 
They started as young people in the People to 
People program, and in a young country they 
moved up. 

I think that if General Eisenliower were to 
look back on those great years of his service to 
the Nation he would put very liigh on the list 
People to People and he would urge all of his 
friends to support it, support it because it is 
truly one of those paths to peace that we must 
explore, and that we must expand, expand it 
not only among peoples who are allies and 
friends but expand it between those areas of the 
world that potentially might be enemies but 
that should be friends, whose peoples certainly 
should be friends. 

That is why in this administration we 
strongly support not only the People to People 
program as it presently exists, but we hope that 
it can be expanded more and more to an ex- 
change between the United States and the 



372 



Department of State Bulletin 



Soviet Union, between the United States and 
other Eastern European countries, and eventu- 
ally, we would hope, also between the United 
States and that great potential power of people 
that exists in mainland China. 

All of these things are our goals, and all of 
these things wUl happen. They will happen in 
our time. 

I would like to add just one other word with 
regard to the conversation with the general that 
I am sure Mrs. Eisenhower has often recalled, 
because he has spoken to me as well as to others 
in these terms. 

He had a very friendly smile. Wlien General 
Eisenhower walked into a room, he just lit it up 
when he smiled. We all remember that. But be- 
neath that friendly smile all of us who knew 
him know that there was a very hard intelli- 
gence wliich knew the costs of war and also 
knew the costs of maintaining peace. 

Because he knew that balance, because he 
knew what war was and, knowing what it was, 
hated it so much, he was able to provide leader- 
ship that ended a war and kept the peace. 

That, of course, is the responsibility we have 
today. 

But this is what I particularly remember that 
he said. In his last days, particularly, he talked 
about history — the history of this nation, the 
history of the world. And as he talked about 
history, he made what I thought was a very 
simple but a very profound comment about the 
United States of America in this century. 

He said : "The debate in the United States of 
America in this century has never been about 
whether we should have war. The debate in the 
United States of America has always been about 
how we can achieve peace." Putting it more 
simply, "The debate," as he put it, "was never 
between people who wanted war and those who 
wanted peace, it was always between Americans 
deeply devoted to keeping the peace, maintain- 
ing the peace." 

Yet we have had four wars in this century. 

And he responded to a question as to how he 
could justify the fact that that was an historical 
occurrence with his statement that "Americans 
were always debating about peace rather than 
war." He said: "In World War I, President 



Wilson said it was a war to end wars. We went 
to Europe for the cause of peace. In World War 
II, President Roosevelt said the American fron- 
tier is on the Rhine, and we went to Europe be- 
cause we wanted peace and we knew that it was 
necessary to stop aggression if we were to have 
peace. In the Korean war, the question was not 
any desire on the part of the United States to 
wage war but to defend the cause of peace, the 
right to exist of a nation that was living in peace 
and whose identity and existence was threat- 
ened by those who were bent on war." 

And so it is also in Viet-Nam. There is debate 
about this war. But let us imderstand that the 
debate is not about any desire of the American 
people for war. The debate is about peace — 
how to achieve it ; how best to achieve it. 

Honest men and honest women can disagree 
about those means, but let the world under- 
stand: The American i^eople want peace. We 
believe in peace. We have fought our wars in 
this century because we wanted peace. And we 
want to bring the war in Viet-Nam to an end 
in a way that will promote not a temporary but 
a lasting peace. 

I think I have spoken or paraphrased what 
General Eisenhower said to many visitors in 
those last days before he died. 

Finally, may I say that with regard to the 
People to People program, sometimes I sup- 
pose those little things you do — receiving a for- 
eign student, spending some time with some 
individual who may come in from a foreign 
country — seems rather inconsequential when 
you weigh it against the great decisions that 
have to be made in the Congress or in the State 
Department or in the Wliite House. 

But looking far down that road, down that 
road to the end of this century, when, I am con- 
fident, we wUl have a world of peace, we must 
remember those young people you talk to today 
from foreign lands will be the leaders of those 
lands tomorrow. And the fact that they have 
been here, the fact that they know from visiting 
our homes and our offices that Americans are a 
people dedicated to peace, tliis fact wUl make 
them leaders in the cause of peace just as the 
American people, I know, in the future wUl al- 
ways be dedicated to the cause of peace. 



November 3, 1969 

36ft-372— 69 2 



373 



What the United Nations Means to America — Now 



hy Samuel De Palma 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 



The United Nations is passing through a 
crisis of confidence. Editorial writers and ex- 
perts are pessimistic about its capacity to act 
effectively and gloomy about its future. 

Much of what you hear about the U.N.'s 
shortcomings is accurate, but most of it is not 
very important. Nor is it relevant for an under- 
standing of the real world in which it operates. 

To berate the U.N. for failing to behave like 
a world government, which it is not, or for not 
being able to cure the ills of its member coun- 
tries is to miss the point. The significant ques- 
tion is whether and how the U.N. can serve as 
a reliable vehicle for helping nations deal with 
concrete issues confronting the world today, in 
particular whether the U.N. can provide the 
means for international sharing of the 
responsibilities and costs of peacekeeping and 
development. 

First of all, let us face the U.N.'s shortcom- 
ings. With the expansion of its membership to 
126 coimtries, it has become more difficult for the 
nations which possess economic and military 
power to exert a commensurate influence in the 
organization. Too many unrealistic resolutions 
are adopted by steamroller majorities. U.N. 
procedures are cumbersome, and its discussions 
are debased by loquacity and emotionalism. 
Deep differences exist over its proper role in 
respect to colonial and racial issues. There is 
concern about ever-rising budgets in some U.N. 
agencies. There are serious questions about effi- 
ciency and effectiveness in certain operations. 
And the U.N.'s finances are in precarious shape. 

Above all, it is cause for concern that the 
U.N. has not acquired the infiuence or prestige 
to act decisively to maintain peace. The U.N. 
does not offer effective means for dealing with 
issues that engage the vital interests of the ma- 

' Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit 
at Detroit, Mich., on Oct 13 (press release 304 dated 
Oct. 11). 



jor power unless they are in agreement, al- 
though it can help insulate trouble spots from 
their confrontation. 

Clearly U.N. institutions and procedures need 
to be reformed to ensure effective functioning. 
The answer does not lie primarily in structural 
change. There is no likelihood of agreement 
now on a new grand design, although important 
procedural improvements are possible and we 
are working at them. 

For example, a problem which must be solved 
is that of accommodating the micro-states near- 
ing independence. About 65 small entities are 
potential candidates for U.N. membership. With 
a combined population of only about 4,600,000 
they would, if admitted to full voting member- 
ship, strain beyond credulity the U.N. concept 
of one nation, one vote. We believe the best solu- 
tion is to create a new status of "associate mem- 
ber," carrying the benefits and privileges of 
membership but not the right to vote. The Secu- 
rity Council has referred the question to a com- 
mittee of experts, and we hope tliis matter will 
at last be given the urgent attention it needs. 

Despite its shortcomings, the U.N. has scored 
achievements wliich cannot be downgraded and 
which point to possibilities for future improve- 
ments. The U.N. helped to contain small wars 
and avert others. It assisted in the orderly and, 
to a remarkable degree, nonviolent liquidation 
of vast colonial areas and the emergence of many 
new nations to independence. It launched eco- 
nomic and social programs to help these new 
nations get on their feet. It made a beginning 
in fashioning international machinery to deal 
with the new teclmology. It has provided a 
unique arena for quiet diplomatic exchanges 
and negotiations, most of which go unreported. 
And, we believe, it can provide machinery to 
help implement settlements in the Middle East 
or Viet-Nam once such settlements are achieved. 

With this experience, what role can we project 



374 



Department of State Bulletin 



for the U.N. in the coming years ? I can foresee 
at least three promising areas of increased U.N. 
activity : 

— First is the U.N.'s role in helping avoid or 
contain local conflicts ; 

— Second is the U.N.'s role in helping the 
orderly processes of modernization in the third 
world — the familiar problem of economic and 
social development ; 

— Third is the U.N.'s role in helping the world 
come to terms with the physical environment as 
affected by the new technologies. 

Controlling Arms — and Local Conflicts 

The U.N. has long been preoccupied with 
promoting arms control and disarmament and 
has helped spur negotiation on measures to re- 
strain the arms race. Progress has been slow be- 
cause effective arms control agreements must 
be based on balanced obligations and provide 
adequate assurance of compliance. Such agree- 
ments are exceedingly difficult to negotiate, but 
we have succeeded in banning nuclear tests in 
the atmosphere, in agreeing to explore and ex- 
ploit the Antarctic and outer space for peaceful 
purposes only, and in drafting a treaty to pre- 
vent the spread of nuclear weapons. 

At Geneva we and the Kussians have just 
agreed on a draft treaty to prevent the em- 
placement of weapons of mass destruction on 
the seabed. We hope that the Geneva Disarma- 
ment Committee will be able to forward it for 
final action to the present session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

We anticipate that the General Assembly will 
also show great interest in controlling chemical 
and biological weapons. As you know, within 
our own Government we are presently review- 
ing our policy on the production and use of 
such weapons. This may well emerge as the next 
important area for arms control negotiations. 

We need to renew the search for more effective 
ways to contain and alleviate political crises and 
to strengthen means for keeping or restoring the 
peace in conflict situations. The U.N. has had 
valuable experience in damping down conflict 
in such places as the Congo, Cyprus, and the 
Middle East. It has demonstrated a capacity — 
though still limited and rudimentary — to take 
emergency action to halt fighting, to keep out- 
breaks of violence in check, and to promote 
peaceful settlement. 

We believe the time is ripe for a new effort to 



strengthen U.N. peacekeeping. For years nego- 
tiations in the U.N. on arrangements for peace- 
keeping made no headway because of the rigid 
Soviet insistence that the Security Council 
control every aspect of peacekeeping and decide 
how it was to be financed. That would mean the 
veto could be used to curtail an operation at 
almost every stage. 

Recently, however, we have seen the first signs 
of Soviet willingness to discuss these problems 
in more practical and realistic terms. We are 
interested in seeking a practical solution which 
recognizes the primary role of the Security 
Council. We are not interested in some rigid or 
doctrinaire formula, but we do attach impor- 
tance to effective procedures which will assure 
that U.N. peacekeeping forces can be made 
available quickly when needed and that they can 
be adapted to the unique and evolving circum- 
stances of each case. 

The U.N. and the Impoverished Two-Thirds 

The second broad task in which the U.N. must 
play a larger role is the orderly accommoda- 
tion into a stable world order of the im- 
poverished two-thirds of the world's popula- 
tion. There is no direct relationship between 
disaffection and poverty or between world 
stability and the satisfaction of rising expecta- 
tions. Yet, apart from the conscience of the rich, 
clearly the demands of the impoverished and 
underprivileged cannot be ignored if we are to 
build a tolerable world order. 

Orderly political development in the third 
world is threatened by resentment among the 
poor countries because they are being left be- 
hind in tliis era of rapid technological advances 
and because the economic disparity between rich 
and poor is growing. 

At the initiative of the United States, the 
U.N. proclaimed the decade of the sixties as 
the First Development Decade. During the past 
10 years considerable progress was made in or- 
ganizing multinational efforts in aid and trade, 
in teclmical assistance and preinvestment sur- 
veys, in industrial development, in agricultural 
production and improvement of health stand- 
ards, and in rising standards of education. Few 
are aware that some 85 percent of the U.N.'s 
staff and finances is devoted to economic and 
social development. But impressive as this 
achievement is, the U.N. has not been able to 
keep pace with the needs of the developing 
countries. 



November 3, 1969 



375 



The U.N. is now planning for the Second 
Development Decade, in the midst of growing 
impatience with the slow pace of development. 

The U.N. Development Program, directed by 
Paul Hoffman, in 1968 operated 3,400 projects 
in 134 comitries and territories, spending 
nearly $200 million and generating, through the 
input of local money and efforts, a development 
"output" that is worth many times that amount. 
President Robert McNamara of the World 
Bank recently noted that World Bank loans 
arising directly out of UNDP preinvestment 
projects have amounted to $700 million. Na- 
tional governments and private industry have 
done even more. 

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the 
two main international development institu- 
tions are headed by men who were leading ex- 
ecutives in our automobile industries. This 
serves as a reminder that much international 
development is the result of private investments 
abroad. It also points up how much public de- 
velopment institutions can learn from private 
industry about using low-trained workers in ad- 
vanced-technology industries. They might also 
learn much from the multinational corporations 
about dynamic adaptation to varying political, 
economic, and social conditions. 

An advantage of the U.N. Development Pro- 
gram is that it avoids some of the political prob- 
lems which often hamper U.S. bilateral aid 
programs. Equally important is the fact that 
it serves to enlist financial support from other 
donor nations because our contribution is limited 
to 40 percent of what is contributed by others. 

For these reasons and because of the solid 
record of achievement by the U.N. Development 
Program during the past decade. President 
Nixon last May asked Congress for a U.S. con- 
tribution of up to $100 million for 1970 to this 
program, a 43-percent increase over our current 
contribution. 

The need for deciding on an increased con- 
tribution to the Second Development Decade 
confronts us at a time when we are about to 
launch a basic reappraisal of our entire foreign 
aid policy. This reappraisal will have to take 
into account our urgent and competing domestic 
needs. Both needs appear insatiable. Many will 
find it easy to urge that we shirk our interna- 
tional responsibility as a means of diverting re- 
sources to domestic programs. But that would 
be folly. We can no more ignore poverty and 
social tensions abroad tlian we can at home. 

But more than money and flexible trade 



policies is needed. The best financed scheme of 
economic development can be frustrated unless 
coordinated gains are made in food production 
and in checking population growth. While the 
Malthusian warning of hungry mouths out- 
stripping available food supplies seems less 
likely in an era of agricultural production mir- 
acles, the fact remains that at the present rate of 
world population growth, the earth will contain 
over 7 billion people by the end of this century, 
as compared with 3 billion in 1969. After that, 
the next billion would be added in only 5 years, 
and additional billions in shorter and shorter 
periods thereafter. 

As President Nixon put it in his speech to the 
U.N. General Assembly : ^ 

If in the course of that Second Development Decade 
we can make both significant gains In food production 
and significant reductions in the rate of population 
growth, we shall have opened the way to a new era 
of splendid prosperity. If we do only one without the 
other, we shall be standing still ; and If we fail in both, 
great areas of the world will face human disaster. 

That is why the United States has taken the 
lead in stimulating the provision of family 
planning services through the U.N. and its affil- 
iated agencies. We have contributed $3 million 
to date and plan to contribute more in the fu- 
ture. Wliile a number of nations have out- 
stripped us recently in their relative contribu- 
tions to U.N. development programs, few have 
made commensurate contributions to family I 
planning activities. We are urging them to join 
us in this vital effort. 



The New Technology and the U.N. 

The third broad task for the U.N. is to help 
us come to terms with the new technologies by 
drafting legal rules and creating institutions for 
international cooperation. The U.N. is helping 
to develop an international common law for the 
orderly regulation of new areas in man's use 
of his environment. But new technologies and 
the changed environment are not unmixed bless- 
ings. They hold dangers as well as promises. As 
technology shrinks time and distance, social and 
political stresses both within and between na- 
tions could become inflamed. The world is also 
faced with the "ecological conflict" which man 
has introduced into nature — the depletion of 
natural resources and pollution of the natural 
environment. 

We try through the U.N. to make sure that the 

'For text, see Bulletin of Oct 6, 1969, p. 297. 



376 



Department of Stafe Bulletin 



technological benefits are equitably distributed 
and the perils countered : 

From the beginning of the space age the U.N. 
has organized for international cooperation in 
this vast frontier. Its Outer Space Committee 
prepared the way for the treaty banning weap- 
ons of mass destruction in outer space and is 
now drafting a convention defining liability for 
damages caused by outer space objects. 

On September 18 before the General As- 
sembly, President Nixon described the enor- 
mous potential of space technology for the whole 
world and promised to share its benefits. He 
noted that we are developing earth resource sur- 
vey satellites capable of yielding data which 
could assist in as widely varied tasks as locating 
mineral deposits and schools of fish or providing 
data on the health of crops. "We are considering 
ways to make available the data acquired by 
such satellites to the world commimity through 
international arrangements worked out under 
U.N. auspices. 

Numerous international agencies are con- 
cerned with oceanography and the seabed. We 
are cooperating in efforts to write principles 
governing the exploration and use of the deep 
ocean floor, including the principle of reserva- 
tion of the deep seabed exclusively for peace- 
ful purposes, and to ensure that the exploitation 
of its resources will be for the benefit of all man- 
kind. It is already clear that there is a need to 
establish international machinery for the area 
of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction to 
avoid conflict because of competing claims and 
to ensure orderly development of its resources. 

Finally, humanity literally has a vital inter- 
est in maintaining a healthful coexistence with 
our environment, in preserving the resources 
and the beauties of the planet. 

The U.N. has scheduled an international con- 
ference on the environment in Stockholm in 
1972. Our aim must be not only to prevent dam- 
age to the air and water and other life-giving 
elements of our environment but to undertake a 
systematic effort to ensure the rational use and 
conservation of the world's resources. 

With these three great assignments in its fu- 
ture — peacekeeping, development, and coopera- 
tion in technology — no informed student of 
world affairs can write off the U.N. as obsolete. 

Probably the main difference in our national 
outlook today and 24 years ago when the U.N. 
was established is that we define our national 
interest in less restrictive and parochial terms. 
We find it more difficult to disentangle our se- 



curity and our national interests from those of 
other nations — at the same time that we are 
more and more concerned about limiting our 
commitments abroad. If we give the U.N. the 
support which it deserves, it can in time acquire 
the strength and prestige it needs to take over 
many of our foreign economic and military 
burdens. The United States thus has a vital 
stake in the U.N.'s future not only because its 
activities are beneficial to us and all mankind 
but because it is becoming more relevant to the 
modern world. 

We can no longer, in our own interest, adopt 
the attitude of the visitor to the village church 
as described by the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson. This outsider sat impassively through 
a moving religious service and inspiring ser- 
mon. Asked by his neighbor how he could re- 
main unmoved while the others were so touched, 
he replied : "But, monsieur, I do not belong to 
this parish." 

We all belong to this parish. 



U.S. Informs U.N. of Symposium 
on Remote Sensing of Environment 

Following is the text of a letter from Charles 
W. Yost, UjS. Representative to the United Na- 
tions, to Secretary General V Thant. 

U.S./U.N. press release 112 dated September 26 

Septembek 26, 1969 
Excellency: Speaking before the General 
Assembly on 18 September President Nixon 
cited the enormous potential of "the benefits 
that space technology can yield here on earth," 
and gave as an example currently under de- 
velopment the earth resource survey satellites 
being prepared for the 1970's.^ President Nixon 
said that the United States program "will be 
dedicated to produce information not only for 
the United States, but also for the world 
community." 

In this connection, I have the honor to inform 
you that an International Symposium on Re- 
mote Sensing of Environment will be conducted 
October 13 through 16, 1969, at Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, by the Center for Eemote Sensing 
Information and Analysis of the University of 
Michigan. The Symposium will include lecture 



' Bulletin of Oct 6, 1969, p. 297. 



November 3, 1969 



377 



and discussion sessions devoted to multispectral 
data and applications, instrumentation and sys- 
tems analysis, effective use of environmental 
data, and to the meteoi'ological, geological, 
oceanographic, geographic, and agriculture- 
forestry applications of remote sensing. 

The purpose of this letter is to invite you to 
call the Symposium to the attention of inter- 
ested members of the Secretariat staff and of the 
Specialized Agencies who may wish to attend. 
I also request that a copy of this letter be cir- 
culated as a document of the Outer Space Com- 
mittee in order to bring this Symposium to the 
attention of all Member States who may wish to 
send their experts to participate and observe. 

Additional details, including registration 
procedures, are described in the attached an- 
nouncement. We have transmitted extra copies 
of this announcement to the Outer Space Affairs 
Division. 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

CuAELES W. Yost 



U.S. and Italy Begin Negotiations 
for New Extradition Treaty 



Joint Statement ^ 



agreed text is arrived at and signed, the treaty 
will be submitted to the United States Senate 
for advice and consent and to the Italian legis- 
lature for its authorization. 

The United States Delegation is composed of 
the following: 

John R. Stevenson (Head of Delegation), Legal 
Adviser 

K. E. Malmborg, Assistant Legal Adviser for Admin- 
istration and Consular Affairs 

H. Rowan Galther, Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser 

Peter H. Pfund, Attorney, Office of the Legal Adviser 

Advisers 

Charles K. Johnson, Country Desk Officer, Italian 
Affairs 

Murray R. Stein, Attorney, Criminal Division, Depart- 
ment of Justice 

Neil Seidenman, Interpreter, Language Services 

The composition of the Italian Delegation is 
as follows : 

Gennaro do NovelUs, Minister Plenipotentiary 

Dr. Giovanni Noccioli, General Director of Penal Af- 
fairs, Ministry of Justice 

Ugo Caldarera, Justice of the Court of "Cassazione" 

Alberto Sciolla Lagrange, Justice of the Court of 
Appeals 

Giuseppe CasteUi, Deputy Prefect Inspector 

Rocco Palamara, Judge of Tribunal 

Professor Giovanni Kojanec, Juridical Consultant of 
the General Direction of Emigration, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 

Mrs. Maria Lia Borghesl Verone, Secretary-Inter- 
preter 



Delegations representing the United States 
of America and the Eepublic of Italy today 
completed the first stage of negotiations for a 
new extradition treaty. The present treaty be- 
tween the United States and Italy which entered 
into force on September 17, 1868, has been 
supplemented on several occasions, but this is 
the first comprehensive review. 

Wliile it will still take some time to arrive at 
a treaty, the two Delegations expressed satis- 
faction with the progress made during the pres- 
ent negotiations. These negotiations, in partic- 
ular, have resulted in far-reacliing provisions 
directed against aircraft hijacking which en- 
dangers civil aircraft and the passengers they 
carry. It was believed that special measures arc 
needed in such cases because of the seriousness 
of these acts. 

A second stage of negotiations is expected to 
take place in Italy early next year. Once an 

'Issued at Washington Oct. 10 (press release 302). 



U.S. To Continue Friendly Relations 
With New Government of Bolivia 

Department Statemenf^ 

U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro this noon. La 
Paz time, delivered a note to the Bolivian 
Foreign Office replying to a note of Septem- 
ber 27 from Acting Foreign Minister David 
Lafuente. The United States note stated our 
wish to reciprocate the Bolivian Government's 
intention, expressed in its note, to continue and 
strengthen the friendly relations that exist be- 
tween the two countries. This action was taken 
after consultation with the other American Re- 
publics pursuant to Resolution 26 of the 1965 
Rio conference. 



' Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Carl Bartch on Oct 10. 



378 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States and Japan Consult 
on Japanese Trade Liberalization 

The Department of State annoxmced on Octo- 
ber 3 (press release 291) that a delegation 
headed by Philip H. Trezise, Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Economic Affairs, was going 
to Tokyo to consult with officials of the Govern- 
ment of Japan concerning Japanese trade lib- 
eralization. The consultation, which was held 
October 6-9, was agreed to at the July meeting 
of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade 
and Economic Affairs. It was a continuation of 
discussions that have been underway between 
the two Governments regarding removal of 
Japan's remaining restrictions on products of 
U.S. export interest. 

Other members of the delegation were : 

Lawrence A. Fox, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
national Trade Policy, Department of Commerce 

Raymond A. loanes, Administrator, Foreign Agricul- 
tural Service, Department of Agriculture 

John W. Evans, Assistant Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations, Office of the President's Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations 

Paul A. Heise, Special Assistant to the Administrator 
of the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, De- 
partment of Labor 

Robert E. Fritts, Country Officer for Japan, Depart- 
ment of State 



Letters of Credence 

Barbados 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Bar- 
bados, Valerie T. McComie, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Nixon on October 10. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated October 10. 

Congo (Kinshasa) 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Justin- 
Marie Bomboko, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on October 10. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's re- 
ply, see Department of State press release dated 
October 10. 



Czechoslovakia 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Eepublic, Ivan Rohal- 
Ilkiv, presented his credentials to Pi-esident 
Nixon on October 16. For texts of the Ambas- 
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated Octo- 
ber 16. 

Iceland 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of Iceland, Magnus V. Magnusson, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
October 16. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated October 16. 

Iran 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, 
Amir Asian Afshar, presented his credentials 
to President Nixon on October 16. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated October 16. 

Mali 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re- 
public of Mali, Seydou Traore, presented his 
credentials to President Nixon on October 10. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated October 10. 

Netherlands 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
liingdom of the Netherlands, Baron Rijnhard 
B. Van Lynden, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on October 10. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's re- 
ply, see Department of State press release dated 
October 10. 

Thailand 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Thai- 
land, Sunthorn Hongladarom, presented his 
credentials to President Nixon on October 10. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated October 10. 



November 3, 1969 



379 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



4 



Youth-Related Activities of the United Nations 



Statetnent hy Shirley Temple Black 

U.S. Representative to the V.N. General Assembly ^ 



In ancient Eome the two-faced god Janus 
stood at the door of time. One face was of an old 
man looking to the past, the other of a young 
man with visions of the future. 

In one sense our assemblage of nations re- 
minds me of the god Janus. Looking back, the 
old man sees clearly the tremendous strides 
of mankind in the past century. Looking for- 
ward, as we do today, the young man sees 
potentialities of modern society, but his vision 
is clouded by frustrations and doubt. 

I consider myself fortunate that I can speak 
for my first time as a delegate to the United 
Nations on this subject. I have spent a great deal 
of time traveling throughout the United States 
urging that the age of majority in my comitry 
be lowered from 21 to 18. I have done this out 
of the profound conviction that people who are 
yoimg must participate in the planning and 
decisionmaking of the modern world. 

Someone has wisely said it is better to be 
damned than to be ignored or — almost equally — 
to be tolerated. These younger people, now bet- 
ter educated and better informed than ever be- 
fore, must not be either ignored or tolerated. 
They must be given both influence and respon- 
sibility as an integral part of our society. 

All of us would agree that young people are 
the major human resource in all societies in the 
world and that there is a pressing necessity to 
have them completely involved in the attain- 
ment of national development. Their enthusi- 
asm, their idealism, and, above all, their flexibil- 
ity to change could be the vital elements often 
lacking as our various societies react and ad- 



' Made In Committee III ( Social, Humanitarian, and 
Cultural) on Sept. SO (U.S./U.N. press release 111). 



380 



just to the challenges of a rapidly changing 
existence. 

It is unrealistic and unproductive to consider 
people who are yoimg as a problem and a sepa- 
rate entity which should be dealt with apart 
from the rest of society: 

— Unrealistic because more than half of man- 
kind is under 25 years of age, a percentage which 
can only increase with the fantastic explosion 
of population throughout the world ; 

— Unproductive because the treatment of 
youth in the traditional paternalistic manner 
destroys those most vital qualities which they 
have to offer to development. 

Kather than youth's "problem," is it not really 
the different persi^ective of today's youth on 
mankind's problem which should draw our at- 
tention? As Miss Angle Brooks [President of 
the 24th General Assembly] so eloquently 
quoted from Professor George Wald's speech 
in her opening remarks to the General Assem- 
bly : "I don't think that there are problems of 
youth, or student problems. All the real prob- 
lems I know about are grownup problems." 

Throughout the world young people are ask- 
ing for a voice in determining the type of edu- 
cation they will receive in their high schools 
and universities. They realize the importance 
of formal education in shaping tlie values and 
attitudes of society. That these values should in- 
clude a "respect for human dignity and equal 
rights of man without discrimination as to race 
colour, language, sex or faith" has been fully 
recognized by the General Assembly in last 
year's session. 

As stated in Resolution 20 of the Human 
Rights Commission at its 25th session, "Youth 



Department of State Bulletin 



J 



is particularly sensitive to any infringement of 
human rights" and has a "legitimate desire to 
be useful to society and to have its full share in 
the accomplishment of the major humanitarian 
demands of our century." We support the orga- 
nization by the Secretary General of human 
rights seminars on the education of youth in 
himaan rights and urge that a major effort be 
made to include young people themselves as full 
participants. 

Our committee is discussing today the role 
of young people in national development. While 
there are generally shared goals for peace 
abroad and social justice at home among youth 
throughout the world, I see a difference between 
the specific concerns of young people in devel- 
oping countries and those of their counterparts 
in developed countries. 

The yoimger people of my own and other 
highly industrialized societies have many ma- 
terial benefits but feel that they are deprived of 
any planning role in shaping their environment. 

In the developing countries, however, be- 
cause younger people have often led the struggle 
for independence, they have a stronger sense of 
participation. Yet they are generally frustrated 
in obtaining the benefits of economic security. 
We are discussing today youth's role in that 
straggle, the struggle for growth and national 
development. 

Here young people can and have played a 
major role. Over one-third of the members of 
the Umted Nations have some type of national 
youth service corps. The Secretary General's 
preliminary rejDOrt on long-term policies and 
programs for youth in national development ^ 
points out that for the moment these groups 
represent one of the most effective methods of 
liarnessing for development the often frustrated 
and undirected energies of young people. 

The United Nations, through its specialized 
agencies, should continue the work begun in 
Denmark at the Interregional Seminar on Na- 
tional Youth Programs in developing informa- 
tion and advisory personnel knowledgeable 
about possible activities for youth service corps. 
The expansion of their involvement in rural de- 
^elopment, their participation in self-help hous- 
ing projects, and their contribution to literacy 
campaigns are only a few ways in which na- 
tional youth corps can serve national develop- 
ment. 



' U.N. doc. A/C.3/613. 



The United Nations family in recent years 
has begun to take a serious interest in the 
younger elements of society. My Government 
welcomes this increased attention and urges that 
it be expanded. We see an active role in this 
regard for both the United Nations itself and 
the specialized agencies, as well as international 
nongovernmental organizations. 

Of special interest to me is the work which 
the International Labor Organization has been 
doing with training and education directly rel- 
evant to the economic development of the spe- 
cific country. Too many countries in this world 
have suffered the burden of having educational 
systems which were designed for completely dif- 
ferent societies at other stages of development. 

We support the attempts by ILO and other 
agencies to aid in the formulation of both in- 
school and out-of-school training programs 
relevant to national development needs. The 
very real and serious unemployment problems 
in the large urban areas of the world, which are 
in fact largely youth imemployment problems, 
can only be met with large-scale training geared 
to the employment needs of their own locales. 

The efforts of the World Health Organization 
to organize health education programs, with 
emphasis on nutrition, family planning, and the 
problems of drag dependence, should be 
encouraged. 

The Food and Agriculture Organization's 
widely successfid Young World Food and De- 
velopment Conference has set the basis for its 
continued work in involving youth in rural de- 
velopment. We hope that youth will be given 
a major role in its proposed 1970 World Food 
Congress. 

It is not easy to say that half the cliildren of 
our world are out of school, but it is true. These 
children without education are deprived by 
their ignorance of a role in modern society. 
Efforts to reach them, aided by UNESCO-spon- 
sored literacy, adult education, and out-of- 
school programs, should be increased. President 
Nixon, in his General Assembly address, men- 
tioned the enormous potential of space technol- 
ogy to benefit man here on earth.^ One such 
benefit might be the widespread use of space 
satellites to assist in mass education similar to 
the arrangement just finalized between my 
country and India.* 

" For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 
' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 20, 1969, p. 
334. 



November 3, 1969 



381 



The orientation of many of these programs 
is increasingly to involve young people them- 
selves as plamiers, instructors, and organizers 
in developuient projects. We welcome this 
orientation and see it as the necessary prereq- 
uisite if youth is to have a feeling of meaning- 
ful involvement. 

I think the interdependency of many of the 
United Nations activities dealing with youth 
requires a much greater degree of coordination 
among the deliberations of the General As- 
sembly, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Social Development and Human Rights Com- 
missions, and the preparatory conmiittees for 
the Second Development Decade and the 25tli 
aimiversary. All of these bodies in the last half 
year have had major discussions on youth items. 

I listened with interest to the suggestion made 
yesterday by the distinguished delegate from 
the United Arab Republic tliat an intersessional 
gi'oup be created to study youth's role in to- 
day's society. I think the time for study is past. 
But if the emphasis of such a group were to 
coordinate the legislation of youth programs 
among U.N. bodies, then my delegation would 
be interested in further discussions concerning 
his idea. 

There should also be greater coordination of 
3'outh-related activities within the U.N. organi- 
zations themselves. "We welcome the annual Ad- 
visory Committee on Coordination meetings on 
youth and think they should be continued and 
enlarged. 

Much of the impetus for the growmg atten- 
tion within the U.N. system which is paid to 
young people follows from the Declaration on 
the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of 
Peace, ilutual Respect and Understanding be- 
tween Peoples, passed by the 20th General As- 
sembly in 1965. This declaration will soon be 
expanded upon by a UNESCO convention or 
recommendation as to the content of education 
for human rights and a proposed ILO interna- 
tional instrument on youth employment and 
training. My delegation agrees with other dis- 
tinguished delegates that these statements are 
sufficient and opposes any efl'orts to cojisider a 
further declaration on youth at the present time. 

We agree with many of the previous speakers 
that there have been enough words, enough con- 
sideration, and enough analysis of the role of 
young people in modern life. 

If the United Nations and its activities are to 
be meaningful to the younger part of our so- 



ciety — in their concern for benefits and their 
concern for participation — it is time for con- 
crete proposals : 

1. International Voluntary Service Corps. 
Such a corps, strongly endorsed by President 
Nixon in his address to the General Assembly 
2 weeks ago, could collaborate with a country's 
own national service corps in development 
projects. 

2. International Youth Assembly. The con- 
vening of such an assembly of youth from all 
over the world is one of the most imaginative 
proposals for next year's 25th anniversary. 

3. Young delegates at the 25th General As- 
sembly. There is no better way to have young 
people participate in the United Nations than 
to have them be a working part of its actual 
deliberations. A way can be found, as part of 
the 25th General Assembly, to focus their atten- 
tion on concerns of particular interest to young 
people where they can make their greatest 
contribution. 

4. Young staff members in the United Na- 
tions. UNESCO has already endorsed this at 
their general conference. We urge the Secretary 
General to recruit and place promising young 
people on the staff of the U.N. itself. 

5. Conference on Youth and the Second De- 
velopment Decade. We urge that this confer- 
ence in 1971 be fully coordmated with the other 
activities relating to youth witliin the U.N. sys- 
tem and be given the greatest degree of rele- 
vance by the full participation of young people 
in the conference ^proceedings themselves. 

6. U.N. Information Center on Youth Pro- 
grams. This projjosal, first made by our repre- 
sentative on the Social Development Commis- 
sion, Mrs. Jean Picker, would bring together in 
one place for the use of member states all such 
information from public and private, national 
and international sources. As a first step the 
Center for Economic and Social Information's 
excellent program could be extended to include 
a special emphasis on youth. 

Youth's demand to be heard and to participate 
in development will increase with an increase in 
economic well-being in all comitries. Their full 
involvement in society comes with a recognition 
that they are part of that society. These 
younger peojjle will govern the world in the 
future, but they live in it in the present. Let us 
recognize this and have them increasingly be- 
come a part of it. 



382 



Department of State Bulletin 



Agenda of the 24th Regular Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly^ 

n.N. doc. A/7701 /Rev. 1 

1. Opening of the session by tlie Chairman of the 
delegation of Guatemala. 

2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 

3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-fourth 
session of the General Assembly. 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 

4. Election of the President. 

5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election 
of oflBcers. 

6. Election of Vice-Presidents. 

7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Arti- 
cle 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 

8. Adoption of the agenda. 

9. General debate. 

10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of 
the Organization. 

11. Report of the Security CouncU. 

12. Reports of the Economic and Social Council. 

13. Report of the Tnisteeship Council. 

14. Report of the International Court of Justice. 

15. Report of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

16. Election of five non-permanent members of the 
Security Council. 

17. Election of nine members of the Economic and 
Social Council. 

18. Election of five members of the International 
Court of Justice. 

19. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial De- 
velopment Board. 

20. Appointment of the members of the Peace Obser- 
vation Commission. 

21. Problems of the human environment : report of 
the Secretary-General. 

22. Fourth International Conference on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Atomic Energy : report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples : report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

24. Special programme of activities in connexion with 
the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples : report of the Preparatory Committee 
for the Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun- 
tries and Peoples. 

25. Celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
United Nations : report of the Preparatory Com- 
mittee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the 
United Nations. 



(b) 



(c) 



26. Installation of mechanical means of voting : report 
of the Secretary-General. 

27. The situation in the Middle East. 

28. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space : report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

29. Question of general and complete disarmament: 
report of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament.^ 

30. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and ther- 
monuclear tests : report of the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament. 

31. Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States : 

(a) Implementation of the results of the Confer- 
ence : report of the Secretary-General ; 
Establishment, within the framework of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, of an 
international service for nuclear explosions 
for peaceful purposes under appropriate 
international control : report of the Secretary- 
General ; 

Contributions of nuclear technology to the 
economic and scientific advancement of the 
developing countries : report of the Secretary- 
General. 

32. Question of the reservation exclusively for peace- 
ful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and 
the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas be- 
yond the limits of present national jurLsdiction, 
and the use of their resources in the interests of 
mankind : reiiort of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 

33. Effects of atomic radiation : report of the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation. 

34. The policies of apartheid of the Government of 
South Africa : report of the Special Committee on 
the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa. 

35. Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects : 
report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping 
Operations. 

36. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pal- 
estine Refugees in the Near East : 

(a) Report of the Commissioner-General; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel- 
opment : report of the Trade and Development 
Board. 

United Nations Industrial Development Organi- 
zation : report of the Industrial Development 
Board. 
United Nations Capital Development Fund. 

40. Second United Nations Development Decade : re- 
port of the Preparatory Committee for the Second 
United Nations Development Decade. 
International Education Year : report of the Sec- 
retary-General. 
One day of war for peace. 



38. 



39. 



41. 



42. 



' Unless otherwise indicated, the items were included 
in the agenda at the l,7o8th plenary reading on 
Sept. 20. [Footnote in original.] 



' Included in the agenda in its present form at the 
l,7(>4th plenai-y meeting on Sept. 24. [Footnote in 
original.] 



November 3, 1969 



383 



43. The role of the United Nations in training national 
technical personnel for the accelerated industrial- 
ization of tlie developing countries : report of the 
Secretary-General. 

44. United Nations Institute for Training and Re- 
search : report of the Executive Director. 

45. Operational activities for development : 

(a) Activities of the United Nations Development 
Programme: reports of the Governing 
Council ; 

(b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary- 
General. 

46. Review of the World Food Programme. 

47. General review of the programmes and activities 
in the economic, social, technical co-operation and 
related fields of the United Nations, the special- 
ized agencies, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and 
all other institutions and agencies related to the 
United Nations system. 

48. Draft Declaration on Social Progress and Develop- 
ment. 

49. Report of the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees. 

50. Housing, building and planning: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

51. Town twinning as a means of international co- 
operation : report of the Economic and Social 
Council. 

52. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance : 

(a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Religious Intolerance; 

(b) Draft International Convention on the Elim- 
ination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 

53. Creation of the post of United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Human Rights. 

54. Freedom of information : 

(a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Informa- 
tion ; 

(b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information. 

55. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination : 

(a) Implementation of the United Nations Dec- 
laration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination ; 

(b) Status of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis- 
crimination : report of the Secretary-General ; 

(c) Programme for the celebration in 1971 of the 
International Year for Action to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination : report of 
the Secretary-General. 

56. Measures to be taken against nazism and racial 
intolerance : report of the Secretary-General. 

57. Question of the violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including policies of ra- 
cial discrimination and segregation and of apart- 
heid, in all countries, with particular reference to 
colonial and other dependent countries and ter- 
ritories : 

(a) Measures for effectively combatting racial 
discrimination and the policies of apartheid 
and segregation in southern Africa: report 
of the Secretary-General ; 

(b) Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Ex- 
perts on the treatment of political prisoners In 
South Africa : report of the Secretary-General. 



58. Status of the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Interna- 
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Optional Protocol to the International Cov- 
enant on Civil and Political Rights : report of the 
Secretary-General. 

59. International Year for Human Rights : report of 
the Secretary-General. 

60. Implementation of the recommendations of the 
International Conference on Human Rights: re- 
port of the Secretary-General. 

61. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: 
report of the Secretary-General. 

62. Education of youth in the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms : report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

63. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 
transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of 
the United Nations : 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ; 

64. Question of Namibia : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples ; 

(b) Report of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia ; 

(c) Appointment of the United Nations Commis- 
sioner for Namibia. 

65. Question of Territories under Portuguese admin- 

istration : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situa- 
tion with regard to the Implementation of 
tlae Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

66. Question of Fiji : report of the Special Committee 
on the Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of In- 
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

67. Question of Oman : report of the Special Commit- 
tee on the Situation with regard to the Imple- 
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

68. Activities of foreign economic and other interests 
which are impeding the implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern 
Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories under Portu- 
guese domination and in all other Territories 
under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate 
colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination 
In southern Africa: report of the Special Com- 
mittee on the Situation with regard to the Im- 
plementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

69. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Indei)piidence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples by the specialized agencies and the inter- 
national institutions associated with the United 
Nations : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation 
of the Declaration on the Granting of In- 



384 



Department of State Bulletin 



dependence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples ; 
(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

70. United Nations Educational and Training Pro- 
gramme for Southern Africa : report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

71. Offers by Member States of study and training 
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories : report of the Secretary-General. 

72. Financial reports and accounts for the financial 
year ended 31 December 1968 and reports of the 
Board of Auditors : 

(a) United Nations ; 

(b) United Nations Development Programme; 

(c) United Nations Children's Fund; 

(d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East ; 

(e) United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research ; 

(f) Voluntary funds administered by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

73. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 
1969. 

74. Budget estimates for the financial year 1970. 

75. Planning estimate for the financial year 1971. 

76. Pattern of conferences : report of the Committee 
on Conferences. 

77. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership 
of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly : 

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions ; 

(b) Committee on Contributions ; 

(c) Board of Auditors ; 

(d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal. 

78. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the 
expenses of the United Nations : report of the 
Committee on Contributions. 

79. Audit reports relating to expenditure by the spe- 
cialized agencies and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency : 

(a) Allocations from the Technical Assistance 
Account of the United Nations Development 
Programme ; 

( b ) Allocations from the Sjyecial Fund Account of 
the United Nations Development Programme. 

80. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the 
United Nations vfith the specialized agencies and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency : reports 
of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions. 

81. Implementation of the recommendations of the AA 
Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Fi- 
nances of the United Nations and the Specialized 
Agencies : report of the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 

82. Publications and documentation of the United 
Nations : report of the Secretary-General. 

83. Personnel questions : 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the 
Secretary-General ; 

(b) Other personnel questions. 

84. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pen- 
sion Board. 

85. United Nations International School : report of the 
Secreta ry-General. 

86. Report of the International Law Commission on 
the vFork of its twenty-first session. 



88. 
89. 



90. 
91. 

92. 
93. 

94. 



95. 
96. 



97. 
98. 



99. 



100. 
101. 

102. 



103. 
104. 



Draft Convention on Special Missions. 
Report of the Special Committee on the Question 
of Defining Aggression. 

Consideration of principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations: report of the Special Com- 
mittee on Principles of International Law con- 
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States. 

Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on the work of its sec- 
ond session. 

United Nations Programme of Assistance in the 
Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Ap- 
preciation of International Law : report of the 
Secretary -General. 

The problems and needs of youth and its par- 
ticipation in national development. 
Amendment to Article 22 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (Seat of the Court) 
and consequential amendments to Articles 23 and 
28. 

Declaration and resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties : 

(a) Declaration on Universal Participation in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ; 

(b) Resolution relating to article 1 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties ; 

(c) Resolution relating to article 66 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 
annex thereto. 

Fiftieth anniversary of the International La- 
bour Organisation. 

Amendments to the rules of procedure of the Gen- 
eral Assembly resulting from the amendment to 
rule 51. 

Development of tourism. 

Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West 
New Guinea (West Irian) : report of the Secre- 
tary-General regarding the act of self-determi- 
nation in West Irian. 
Question of Korea : 

(a) Withdrawal of United States and all other 
foreign forces occupying South Korea under 
the flag of the United Nations ; 

(b) Dissolution of the United Nations Commis- 
sion for the Unification and Rehabilitation of 
Korea ; 

(c) Report of the United Nations Commission for 
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. 

Question of the elderly and the aged. 
Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's 
Republic of China in the United Nations. 
Question of Southern Rhodesia : report of the Spe- 
cial Committee on the Situation with regard to 
the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples. 

The strengthening of international security.' 
Question of chemical and bacteriological (biologi- 
cal) weapons : ^ 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament ; 



' Included in the agenda at the 1,764th plenary meet- 
ing on Sept. 24. [Footnote in original.] 



November 3, 1969 



385 



(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibi- 
tion of the development, production and stock- 
piling of chemical and bateriologieal (biologi- 
cal) weapons and on the destruction of such 
weapons ; 

(c) Report of the Secretary-General. 
105. Forcible diversion of civil aircraft in flight.* 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S.-NetheHands Estate Tax 
Convention Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon'^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit 
herewith tlie convention between the United 
States of America and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates and inheritances, 
signed at Washington on July 15, 1969, and the 
related protocol signed on the same date. 

I transmit also, for tlie information of the 
Senate, the report of the Secretary of State 
with respect to the convention and protocol. 

The purposes of this convention are the same 
as those of the twelve other estate tax conven- 
tions now in force between the United States 
and other countries, namely, to minimize the 
burdens of double taxation at death and to pre- 
vent fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on es- 
tates and inheritances. In accomplishing these 
purposes, the convention departs from the pat- 
tern of our existing estate tax conventions in 
order (a) to take into account problems which 
employees of international businesses assigned 
to foreign countries have encountered under pre- 
vious conventions, (b) to follow the direction 
indicated by the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 

' Included in the agenda at the 1,785th plenary 
meeting on Oct. 10 (U.N. doc. A/7701/Rev. 1/Add. 1). 

'Transmitted on Oct. 13 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. G., 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the texts of the convention and protocol 
and the report of the Secretary of State. 



1966 in assisting our balance of payments by 
minimizing deterrents to foreign investment in 
the United States, and (c) to conform to the 
extent practicable with the provisions of the 
Draft Double Taxation Convention on Estates 
and Inheritances published in 1966 by the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 

The convention contains four principal 
innovations : 

1. Tlie seven year domiciliary rule, whereby 
a decedent who is considered by each country 
as having been domiciled therein at deatli will 
generally be deemed to have been domiciled only 
in the country of which he was a citizen if he 
had been resident in the other country for less 
than seven years without the intent to remaia 
there indefinitely. 

2. As a corollary of the seven year domicil- 
iary rule, the convention provides t-hat if a 
citizen of one comitry was resident in the other 
country seven or more years, the country of 
citizenship grants a credit for the death taxes 
of the otlier country. In these cases, jurisdiction 
to tax real property and business assets will 
be retained by the country in which such prop- 
erty is situated, with the other country provid- 
ing appropriate credits. 

3. Tlie convention exempts tangible and in- 
tangible personal property (to the extent such 
property is not a business asset of a permanent 
establishment) from taxation by either coim- 
try if the decedent is neither a domiciliary nor 
a citizen of such country. This exemption com- 
plements on a bilateral basis the liberalized 
treatment afforded foreign investors in the 
United States by the Foreign Investors Tax 
Act of 1966, aids our balance of payments by 
removing deterrents to investments in the 
United States, and reduces estate tax formali- 
ties for Dutch investors in the United States. 

4. Under the convention, the Netherlands 
provides treatment analogous to the relatively 
liberal United States exemptions which the Fed- 
eral estate tax law grants to estates of for- 
eigners, by granting Americans who are not 
residents of the Netherlands (and who are 
taxable only on real estates and business as- 
sets situated in the Netherlands) an exemption 
for small estates and an exemption which cor- 
responds to our marital deduction. 

Tlie related protocol, containing ten num- 
bered paragraphs, sets forth understandings 



386 



Department of State Bulletin 



concerning certain matters of interpretation and 
application of the convention. 

The convention and protocol have the ap- 
proval of the Department of State and the 
Department of the Treasury. The Treasury 
will provide a detailed technical explanation 
of the convention at the time of the hearings 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

I recommend that the Senate give early and 
favorable consideration to the convention and 
protocol with the Netherlands. 



Richard Nixon 



The White House, 
October 13, 1969. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Antarctica 

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles 
and purposes of the Antarctic treaty of December 1, 
1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Paris November 29, 
1968.^ 

Notiflcalion of approval: Norway, October 14, 1969, 
recommendations V-1, V-3 through V-9.' 

Aviation 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963. Enters into force December 4, 1969. 
Ratification deposited: Israel, September 19, 1969. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement, 1968, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, March IS through March 31, 1968. 
Entered into force December 30, 1968. TIAS 6584. 
Accession deposited: Austria, October 1, 1969. 

Customs 

Convention concerning the international union for the 
publication of customs tariffs. Done at Brussels 
July 5, 1890. Entered into force April 1, 1S91. 26 Stat. 
1518. 
Adherence deposited: Ireland, September 26, 1969. 

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels 
July 5, 1S90, relating to the creation of an interna- 
tional union for the publication of customs tariffs (26 
Stat. 1518). Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. 
Entered into force May 5, 1950 ; for the United States 
September 15, 1957. TIAS 3922. 
Adherence deposited: Ireland, September 26, 1969. 

Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention for the north- 
west Atlantic fisheries relating to panel membership 
and to regulatory measures. Done at Washington 
October 1, 1969.' 



Signatures: Denmark, October 15, 1969; France, 
October 13, 1969 ; Italy, October 14, 1969 ; Norway, 
October 14, 1969 ; Poland, October 14, 1969 ; Spain, 
October 15, 1969. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of 
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, September 12, 
1969. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions at 

sea. Approved by the international conference on 

safety of life at sea, London, May 17 to June 17, 1960. 

Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813. 

Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, September 22, 1969. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960. Adopted at London 

November 26, 1968.' 

Acceptances deposited: Malagasy Republic, Septem- 
ber 29, 1969; Philippines, September 9, 1969. 

Space 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Ratification deposited at Moscow: Syrian Arab Re- 
public (with a reservation), August 14, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered 
into force January 1, 1967; for the United States 
May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Ratification deposited: Mauritania, August 13, 1969. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6.3.32), relating to 
maritime mobile service, with annexes and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. En- 
tered into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 
Notifications of approval: Australia, Pakistan, Sep- 
tember 4, 1969; South Africa, August 19, 1969. 



BILATERAL 



Brazil 

Agreement extending the loan of the U.S.S. Guest and 
the U.S.S. Bennett pursuant to the agreement of Sep- 
tember 18 and October 19, 1959, as amended (TIAS 
4437, 5757), relating to the loan of vessels. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington September 11 
and October 8, 1969. Entered into force Octolier 8, 
1969. 

France 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 5, 1966 
(TI.\S 6022), relating to the reciprocal granting of 
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio oper- 
ators of either country to operate their stations in 



' Not in force. 

° See Bulletin of September 1, 1969, p. 198. 



November 3, 1969 



387 



the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Paris October 3, 1969. Entered into force October 3, 
1969. 

Hungary 

Agreement relating to the establishment in New York 
of a branch office of the commercial section of the 
Hungarian Embassy. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington September 19, 1969. Entered into force 
September 19, 1969. 

United Kingdom 

Amendment to the agreement of July 3, 1958, as 
amended (TIAS 4078, 4267), for cooperation on the 
uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. 
Signed at Washington October 16, 1969. Enters into 
force on the date on which each Government shall 
have received from the other written notification 
that it has complied with all statutory and constitu- 
tional requirements for entry into force. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Second Volume in Foreign Relations 
Series for 1946 Released 

On September 18 the Department of State released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^6, Volume 
VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (ix, 993 pp.), 
the second volume released of 11 planned for 1946. The 
volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau 
of Public Affairs. 

Of particular interest in the new volume is the docu- 
mentation on efforts to obtain fulfillment by the Soviet 
Union of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements on 
Poland. Other documents reflect the attempt of the 
United States to establish or maintain democratic and 
representative government in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, and Yugoslavia. There is also material on 
American financial and economic assistance to 
Czechoslovakia and Finland. 

Copies of volume VI (Department of State publica- 
tion 8470) may be obtained from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402, for $5.50 each. 



Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20Ifi2. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ment.t. A 23-percent discount is made on orders for 100 
or more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

NATO: 20 Years of Cooperation for Peace. Texts of 
opening remarks, principal address by President Nixon, 
and final communique issued at the annual spring 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held 
at Washington, D.C, April 10-11. Reprinted from the 
Department of State Bulletin of April 28, 1969. Pub. 
8465. International Organization and Conference Series 
86. 8 pp. 15(t. 

8th Annual Report to Congress. A report by the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of its 
activities for the period January 1, 1968 to Decem- 
ber 31, 1968. ACDA Pub. 51. 73 pp. 40^ 

Protocol on the Authentic Trilingual Text of the Con- 
vention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944). 

Procfes-verbal of rectification to the French text of the 
convention annexed to the protocol of September 24, 
1968. TIAS 6681. 2 pp. 10^. 

Meteorological Research by Means of Rockets. Agree- 
ment with Canada modifying the agreement of Septem- 
ber 29 and October 6, 1966. TIAS 6G82. 3 pp. lO^". 

Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River — Construc- 
tion of Temporary Cofferdam — ^Temporary Diversions 
of Water for Power Production Purposes. Agreement 
with Canada. TIAS 6683. 8 pp. 100. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany amending 
the agreement of November 20, 1962. TIAS 6684. 4 pp. 
100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Domin- 
ican Republic. TIAS 6685. 23 pp. 200. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India. 
TIAS 6G86. 4 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Congo. TIAS 66S7. 6 pp. 100. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Iceland. 
TIAS 6688. 3 pp. 100. 

Military Mission. Agreement with Liberia extending 
the agreement of January 11, 1951, as amended and 
extended. TIAS 6689. 2 pp. 100. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Sweden. TIAS 6690. 3 pp. 100. 



388 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Novemher 3, 1909 Vol. LXI, No. 1584 

Barbados. Letters of Credence (ilcComie) . . 379 

Bolivia. U.S. To Continue Friendly Relations 
With New Government of Bolivia (Dep.irt- 
ment statement) 37S 

Congo (Kinshasa). Letters of Credence 

(BomboUo) 379 

Congress. U.S.-Netherlands Estate Tax Con- 
vention Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Nixon) 386 

Czechoslovakia. Letters of Credence (Hohal- 
Ilkiv) 379 

Disarmament 

Agreement on Draft Seabed Treaty Hailed by 
Secretary Rogers (statement) 366 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Draft Treaty Ban- 
ning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the 
Seabed (Leonard) 365 

Economic Affairs. U.S.-Netherlands Estate Tax 
Convention Transmitted to the Senate (mes- 
sage from President Nixon) 3S6 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. President 
Nixon Greets Leaders of People to People 
Program (remarks) 372 

Iceland. Letters of Credence (Magnusson) . . 379 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Draft Treaty Ban- 
ning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the 

Seabed (Leonard) 36-5 

Iran. letters of Credence (Afshar) 379 

Italy. U.S. and Italy Begin Negotiations for New 
Extradition Treaty (joint statement) . . . 37S 

Japan. United States and Japan Consult on 

.Japanese Trade Liberalization 379 

Mali. Letters of Credence (Traore) 379 

Marine Science 

Agreement on Draft Seabed Treaty Hailed by 
Secretary Rogers (statement) 360 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Draft Treaty Ban- 
ning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the 
Seabed (Leonard) 365 

Netherlands 

Letters of Credence (Van Lyndeu) 379 

U.S.-Netherlands Estate Tax Convention Trans- 
mitted to the Senate ( message from President 
Nixon) 386 

Presidential Documents 

i'resident Discusses Responsibility for Decisions 
on Viet-Nam Policy 371 

I'resident Nixon Greets Leaders of People to 
People Program 372 

L'.S.-Netherlands Estate Tax Convention Trans- 
mitted to the Senate 386 

Publications 

Recent Releases 3SS 

Second Volume in Foreign Relations Series for 
1946 Released 3SS 

Science. U.S. Informs U.N. of Symposium on 
Remote Sensing of Environment (Yost) . . 377 

Thailand. Letters of Credence (Hongladarom) 379 

Trade. United States and Japan Consult on 
Japanese Trade Liberalization 379 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 387 

U.S. and Italy Begin Negotiations for New Ex- 
tradition Treaty (joint statement) .... 378 
U.S.-Netherlands Estate Tax Convention Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from President 
Nixon) 386 

United Nations 

Agenda of the 24th Regular Session of the U.N. 

General Assembly 383 

U.S. Informs U.N. of Symposium on Remote 

Sensing of Environment (Yost) 377 

What the United Nations Means to America — 

Now (De PaUna) 374 

Youth-Related Activities of the United Nations 

(Black) 380 

Viet-Nam 

President Discusses Responsibility for Decisions 

on Viet-Nam Policy (exchange of letters with 

Randy J. Dicks) 371 

President Nixon Greets Leaders of People to 

People Program (remarks) 372 

3Sth Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 369 

Name Index 

Afshar, Amir Asian 379 

Black, Shirley Temple 380 

Bomboko, Justin-Marie 379 

De Palma, Samuel 374 

Dicks, Randy J 371 

Hongladarom, Sunthorn 379 

Leonard, James F 365 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 369 

Magnusson, Magnus V 379 

McComie, Valerie T 379 

Nixon, President 371, 372, 386 

Rogers, Secretary 366 

Rohal-Ilkiv, Ivan 379 

Traore, Seydou 379 

\'an Lynden, Baron Rijnhard B 379 

Yost, Charles W 377 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the Otfice 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 13 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 291 
of October 3, 298 of October 7, 302 of October 10, 
and 304 of October 11. 



No. 



Subject 

Farland sworn in as Ambassador 

to Pakistan (biographic data). 
Humes sworn in as Ambassador to 

Austria (biographic data). 
Lodge: 38th plenary session on 

Viet-Nam at Paris. 
Lodge : supplementary remarks. 
U.S.-India talks at Washington : 

joint statement. 



*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin'. 



*303 


10/13 


*305 


10/15 


306 


10/16 


307 

tsos 


10/16 
10/17 



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U.S. government PRrNTING OFFICE 
V/ASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
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AVT Q 

20YEARS OF PEACE 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



::ument8 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



ncnn.'riTAPv 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1585 




November 10, 1969 



SECRETARY ROGERS DISCUSSES FORTHCOMING U.S.-U.S.S.R. TALKS 
ON CURBING STRATEGIC ARMS 

Transcript of Netvs Conference 389 

THE DEEP CONCERN FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM 

Remarks hy Secretary Rogers 39 Jj. 

PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE SHAH OF IRAN 
HOLD TALKS AT WASHINGTON 396 



For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1585 
November 10, 1969 



For sale by the Superintondcnt of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PHICE: 

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Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

iVote: Contents of this publication nro not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

ST.\TE Bi;i,I,ETlN as the source will be 

apjireciuted. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Headers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a iveekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on deivloptnents in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the ivork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as ivell as special 
articles on various pliases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
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States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general interruitional 
in terest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national rclaltnnfi are liste<t currently. 



Secretary Rogers Discusses Forthcoming U.S.-U.S.S.R. Talics 
on Curbing Strategic Arms 



FoUowing is the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held ty Secretary Rogers on October 25. 

Press release 318 dated October 25 

Secretary Rogers: Ladies and gentlemen, I 
thought that it might be helpful to get together 
with you in view of the announcement that 
was made in the White House at 11 o'clock,^ 
because I thought you might have some ques- 
tions on this subject. I will do my best to give 
you the information that you would like to 
have. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a little 
Mt on what will he treated at the preliminary 
discussions? 

And secondly, will you tell us if there''s a 
possibility that President Nixon and the Soviet 
Premier, Mr. Kosygin, might formally open 
the second phase of serious negotiations on the 
substantive issues? 

A. On the second part of the question, I think 
the answer is no, there is no present intention 
of any procedure of that kind, and I don't be- 
lieve that it will happen. 

As far as the preliminary talks themselves 
are concerned, we expect that they will be ex- 
ploratory in nature. The purpose of the prelimi- 
nary talks is to have a free discussion about how 
the negotiations can be conducted. 

Now, we are approaching these talks very 
seriously. Certainly it's as serious a matter as 
we have in our nation today, and I think that 
the Soviet Union's attitude is the same. Cer- 
tainly they say that they are very serious about 
these talks. 

So we want to discuss how we can best ap- 
proach the talks in a serious, businesslike way 
that wiU be productive. 

Q. Mr. Secretary. 

A. Yes. 



' See p. 390. 



Q. These talks have been put off time and time 
again. What do you think is different now about 
this time? Why did the Russians agree now? 

A. Well, I don't know — and I'm not sure that 
it would help any to speculate on the reason for 
the delay since June. They probably wonder why 
we delayed from the time our administration 
came into office until June — and we did it 
because we wanted to review the situation 
carefully. 

I think that they probably have problems of 
one kind or another and they have now decided 
to have the talks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of MIRY 
{multiple independently targeted reentry ve- 
hicle], is it the intention of this Government to 
propose a freeze, a moratorium, or some other 
device to halt MIRY testing at the beginning of 
this conference so that substantive issues can be 
dealt with through a moratorium or a freeze? 

A. WeU, as President Nixon said in June,^ 
we are obviously considering the whole question 
of MIKV tests and possible moratorium on the 
tests ; and that will be one of the subjects that 
will be considered when we start these talks. 

I think that it's a complex situation. Now that 
the talks are scheduled to start on the I7th, why, 
we will consider how we approach that subject. 

We certainly don't intend to have any public 
discussion as we go along on each one of these 
issues. It's too serious a business. We're going 
to try as much as possible to conduct these 
negotiations in private. 

Now, obviously, we'll keep our NATO allies 
informed of the progress, and we'll keep Con- 
gress informed. But as much as possible, we 
want to do this in private ; and the Soviet Union 
indicates that that's their intention, too. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't understand what 



November 10, 1969 



' For excerpts from President Nixon's news confer- 
ence of June 19, see Buixktin of July 7, 1969, p. 1. 



389 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Announce 
Preliminary Arms Talks 

Wblte House press release dated October 25 

Official Announcement of the Opening 
OF Stbategic Abms Limitation Talks ' 

CJonflrming the agreement reached earlier to 
enter into negotiation on curbing the strategic 
armaments race, the Governments of the United 
States and USSR have agreed that specially 
designated representatives of the United States 
and the Soviet Union wlU meet In Helsinki on 
November 17, 1969 for preliminary discussion of 
the questions Involved. 



' Issued at Washington and Moscow on Oct. 25. 



ycm mean hy saying you don't intend to have a 
public discussion because the issues are too 
serious. 

A. Well, I mean, at each step of the negotia- 
tion, obviously, we will have a discussion. 
Eventually the public will know. But while we 
are talking we think it's better to do it in a 
private session, and we would hope that with 
some exceptions they vnll be private sessions. 

Do I make myself clear ? 

Q. Tes. But could I ask one more followup 
question? 

A. But let me say on that point, Mr. High- 
tower [John Hightower, Associated Press], that 
as I said, we will keep Congress advised, and we 
will keep the appropriate committees fully 
advised of the general approach that our Gov- 
ernment is taking. And we'll keep our allies 
advised. 

But we don't want to have each one of these 
negotiating sessions a public session, because 
it's a very complex subject, and we think it's 
so serious that it should be conducted in a busi- 
nesslike atmosphere. And when it's appropriate 
to advise the public, we will. 

Q. So you expect some public information to 
come out from, time to time. But the negotia- 
tions., as such, are to be private. 

A. That's correct. 

Q. Yes. At what level do you plan to open 
the talks? 

A. Well, we have our delegation, that we have 



already announced, that is prepared to go to 
Helsinki on the 17th. The chairman of that is 
Ambassador Gerard Smith, the Alternate 
Chairman is Philip Farley, there's Paul Nitze 
and General Allison [Maj. Gen. Koyal B. Al- 
lison, USAF], Llewellyn Tliompson, and Dr. 
Harold Brown. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Fm not quite clear on 
wliether there's going to be one meeting in Hel- 
sinki or a series of meetings in Helsinki that 
are ended by the ending of the preliminary 
talks — and then the beginning of the actual 
talks somewhere else? Or is it all going to run 
together? 

A. Well, we can't predict it for certain. But 
I think it will run sometliing like this : 

We would expect that preliminary discussions 
in Helsinki will run for several days, maybe a 
few weeks, and at that time a decision will be 
made about a permanent site. And also, deci- 
sions will be made about how best to conduct the 
permanent negotiations — how many should 
attend, how many should be private, and wheth- 
er there should be an agenda or not have an 
agenda — those things. 

In other words, the purpose of the prelimi- 
nary talks is to work it out so that we are not 
arguing about details and we get right down 
to the business of serious negotiations when we 
get to the permanent talks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any thought on 
our part of proposing soine sort of limitation 
on antiballistic inissiles? Or does it appear thai 
tlie decision of both governments to proceed i 
xoith limited deployment precludes this? 'j] 

A. Mr. Scali [John Scali, ABC News], we 
are not going to discuss in advance, and hope- 
fully not while the negotiations are being con- 
ducted, specific proposals that we are going to 
make. 

I think I should say that the negotiations will 
include both offensive and defensive strategic 
weapons. And as you know, under the non- 
proliferation treaty, we have an obligation to 
do that, and we are going to fulfiU that 
obligation. 

Chalmers [Chalmers M. Roberts, Washington 
Post]. 

Q. Could I clarify something — some of the 
answers you have given? You are going to Hel- 
sinki to have a preliminary meeting of a few 
days to a few weeks. Now, that is essentially to 



390 



Department of State Bulletin 



work out tlie techniques of how you have a 
j longer range, more permanent meeting. Does 
that m£an that in the 'preliminary meeting there 
will he no possihiUty of discussing a substantive 
question such as the freeze of MIRV while we''re 
having the pennanent meeting? 

\ A. No. 

I Q. That could happen at the prelitninary 
meeting? 

j A. Yes, yes. We are not going to exclude any 
' subject from discussion at the preliminary meet- 
ings, and I don't want to be in any rigid posi- 
tion about how long these preliminary talks are 
going to last or how we're going to discuss it. 
Our attitude is quite flexible. 

And I think the Soviet Union's attitude is the 
same. 

I We're serious about this, and we want to con- 
j duct the negotiations in a businesslike manner, 
and we hope that we can avoid long arguments 
about the agenda and which item will come first 
and whether there's a limitation on what we 
can talk about, and so forth. 

If we can have a more reasonable, flexible 
approach to negotiations, and if we can talk 
back and forth, and do it with a serious inten- 
tion in mind — then it's possible that these talks 
can be productive. 

Q. Mr. Secretary., can you give us an idea at 
least what you anticipate what the general 
course of things is apt to be — whether you want 
to — whether you prefer to start with existing 
iveapons systems and then proceed to — 

' A. No. I don't want to get involved in how 
we're going to do it — which we're going to take 
up first, and so forth. 

Selection of Site for the Talks 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't think that Helsinki 
was our original preference., as far as the site 
is concerned. Do you have another preference 
for the permanent site of the talks? 

A. Well, I'm glad you raised that question, 
because there has been some misunderstanding 
about it. And let me tell you exactly how it 
, developed: 

i In my discussions with Ambassador Dobry- 

' nin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador 

to the United States] in June, I think it was 

June 11, 1 said that we were ready to have talks, 

and that we would be prepared to have talks 



witliin a month. And I listed these places as pos- 
sible sites for the talks: Geneva, Vienna, and 
Helsinki. 

Now, we did suggest Helsinki ; and when Am- 
bassador Dobrynin responded the other day, he 
selected Helsinki, and that was one of the places 
that we had suggested. 

We have left open the question of the final 
site, and he was willing to do that, because there 
are some problems of communication and avail- 
ability of space and other things. It's possible 
that some other site would be better. 

We look with favor on Vienna, for example, 
but we are not exclucUng the possibility of 
Helsinki as the final site. 

But the reason I mentioned it that fully is we 
didn't have any argument about the site. Hel- 
sinki was a site that we proposed. Later on, we 
indicated we thought maybe Vienna would be 
better for the reasons I mentioned, but we had 
no dispute about the site. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us a more 
clear definition of the term '"''strategic arms''''? 
Does this include, for example, land-based inter- 
mediate ballistic missiles? 

A. No, I think I'll leave that to the negotia- 
tors. That's a subject that they will have to dis- 
cuss when they get there. 

Q. How does China^s growing strategic power 
fit in, long range, with these negotiations with 
the Soviet Union? And the threat, presumably, 
to both countries? 

A. Well, I don't think, at the moment, they 
are relevant. They haven't pi-ogressed far 
enough, and I tliink if we can work out some- 
thing that is constructive from the standpoint 
of the two superpowers that we can deal with 
China's problem later on. 

Keep in mind that the word that was used was 
"curbing" in tliis release — "limitation" or "curb- 
ing" — and even if we are successful at working 
out an agreement, both the Soviet Union and 
the United States are going to be way ahead 
of China for many years to come. 

Q. Mr, Secretary, could you, for the benefit 
of the public, estimate how long you think 
these talks might take place? 

A. No, I wouldn't want to do that. I try 
to resist doing that. I noticed the other day in 
"Sleet the Press" I made a mistake and did 
indicate that I thought that the answer that 



November 10, 1969 



391 



the Soviets would give us would be within 2 or 
3 months. 

So far, I've been batting pretty well, and 
I'm not going to make any further predic- 
tions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, who do you expect will 
lead the Soviet delegation? And have you any 
indication, either from reading the Soviet 
press, or in any other way, tvhat their attitude 
is toward things like a MIRY moratorium, or 
an ABM— 

A. We do not know who is going to head 
their delegation. At one time it was thought 
that Mr. Kuznetsov [Vasily V. Kuznetsov, 
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the U.S.S.R.] would be the Chairman, but I 
think that he's in Cliina now, in negotiations 
there, so we're not sure. And Ambassador 
Dobrynin did not tell me. 

He did say that he thought their delegation 
probably would be about the same size as ours, 
five or six. 

Q. What mechanism \oiU he used for consult- 
ing the NATO allies? Will they be contacted 
individually or collectively? 

A. Well, I think it depends, of course, upon 
what the consultation consists of. 

I would think, generally speaking, we'll do 
it through the NATO organization in Brus- 
sels, but not necessarily. I don't want to be 
confined to that as a possibility. 

In our discussions here, notification of our 
NATO allies that the talks were going to start, 
we notified the ambassadors in Washington. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is bound to be spec- 
ulation that the beginning of these talks may 
have a larger meaning. Do you think that this 
might be the beginning of an era of negotia- 
tions? 

A. Well, let me see if I can answer your 
question: I think this is an important step 
that is consistent with the President's policy 
of an era of negotiation, and it could be a very 
important negotiation. It's possible it's one of 
the most important negotiations our country 
has been involved in. And certainly it could 
be one of the most important that we ever 
undertook with the Soviet Union. 

On the other hand, we should not confuse the 



necessarily — there is quite a difference. These 
talks could be abortive, they could be fruitless, 
or they could be highly successful in terms of 
mankind. And those things will be determined 
by the talks themselves. 

So whereas we are pleased that the Soviet 
Union has agreed to have these talks — we think 
it is a good step — we also have to be quite con- 
scious of the fact that the mere start of the talks 
themselves is not what counts. Wliat counts is 
how successful they are. 

Complex, DifTicult Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if these talks are successfid, 
could they lead to a form of nuclear pa7'ity be- 
tioeen the United States and the Soviet Union? 

A. Well, words like "parity" I think are apt 
to be confusing. 

"V^Hiat we hope that we can do is negotiate an 
arms limitation agreement which will keep us 
in the same relative position that we are now — 
and which can be verified. 

Now, in order to accomplish the first part of 
that formula, we have to be sure that the limi- 
tation agreement is mutually advantageous, 
that neither side gets an advantage because of 
the agreement. 

Secondly, we have to be sure that the agree- 
ment can be verified, because if it can't and one 
side can cheat, then it certainly is not a A-iable 
agreement. 

Now, these things are very difficult matters to 
handle, and I don't tliink anybody should be 
confused about the fact that they are difficult. 
They are complex, there's mutual suspicion, the 
subject matter itself is very involved, and so we 
have to proceed with the hope that we can 
achieve some success — but with the full realiza- 
tion that it's not going to be easy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ifs almost exactly a year 
ago today, I believe, that Nixon, then a candi- 
date, gave a speech in which he said he would 
approach such negotiations only on the grounds 
that the United States woidd be negotiating 
from a position of superiority. Note, at this 
point does the administration feel that ifs going 
into these talks in a position of superiority or 
rough equality — or however you want to char- 
acterize it — with the Soviet Union? 



beginning of the talks with success of the talks A. Well, I don't, as you know, I think he's 



392 



Department of State Bulletin 



used the term "sufficiency" and I think that we 
feel now that this is an appropriate time to 
enter these discussions and enter them seriously, 
with the hope that we can arrive at an agree- 
ment that will be mutually advantageous. And 
I don't want to characterize what we think. We 
think this is the right time to do it, and I think 
the Soviet Union does, too. 

Q. Will you take a question on Leianon? 

A. I'll take it — [Laughter.] No, I'm sorry, 
I don't want to get involved in anything else 
this morning. 

Q. By '■'■agreement" as the objective, are you 
speaking of the treaty that would he submitted 
to the Senate for ratification? 

A. "Well, I think that if we have an agree- 
ment, a very comprehensive agreement, we are 
thinking in terms of the treaty, yes. And I think 
that that is the most likely outcome, assuming 
we reach an agreement. 

On the other hand, I wouldn't want to be 
frozen in that position, because it's possible that 
we would want to have some kind of an agree- 
ment of a limited nature, that would not re- 
quire a treaty. 

But in any event, I want to make it clear that 
if we did something other than by way of treaty, 
we would keep Congress constantly advised and 
consult with them and be sure that it met with 
their approval, and we would keep our allies 
advised. 

In other words, I think the chances are that 
the agreement would be in treaty form; but 
I wouldn't want to necessarily be frozen in that 
position. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, having talked with Am- 
bassador Dobrynin, how do you characterize 
the Russian attitude? They are willing to talk, 
but are they enthusiastic, cautious — lohat can 
you tell us about that? 

A. Well, I had long talks with Mr. Gromyko 
[Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs of the U.S.S.R.] on this subject, in New 
York. We talked three times for 3 or 4 hours' 
duration, total; and I would characterize his 
attitude as serious. 

He gave me the impression that the Soviet 
Union is serious about these talks — he didn't 
indicate that they were entering the talks or 
about to enter the talks for purposes of prop- 



aganda — and that their attitude was about 
the same as ours. It's a realistic attitude. 

We are not talking about detente, or anything 
else. We are talking about whether it makes 
sense for the two of us to continue to spend 
immense amounts of money for the next 5, or 
10, or 15 years on strategic weapons and end up 
at the end of that time in the same relative posi- 
tion — or whether it would be wiser to use the 
money for some other purposes. 

Now, that's just a matter of hardware. 

If we can work out that kind of an agreement 
so that each of us feels it's to our advantage to 
enter that kind of an agreement and we're satis- 
fied that the agreement can be verified so that 
neither side can cheat — then it makes sense 
to do it. 

So, I think they are serious about it. You al- 
ways can be wrong, but at the moment I would 
say that their attitude is serious and that they 
intend to approach it in the same attitude that 
we do. 

Effect on East-West Relations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect, sir, that the 
initiation of these talks will itself affect the gen- 
eral pattern of East-West relations? As these 
talks proceed, will they have, in your judgment, 
a relationship to the conduct of international 
affairs as a whole, in the Middle East, for — 

A. Well, let me say this : They are not condi- 
tional in any sense of the word. 

We haven't laid down any conditions for 
these talks. 

I suppose that when you're talking with the 
representatives of the Soviet Union in any field, 
it does tend to improve the relations some- 
what — especially if the talks seem to be 
succeeding. 

Now, we are talking with them on NPT, for 
example. We hope that they will ratify NPT. 

We are talking with them in Geneva about a 
seabeds treaty — and those discussions have gone 
rather well. 

We are going to talk with them further about 
chemical and biological warfare limitations. 

So I suppose that all of those things tend to 
improve the atmosphere between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 

But I don't think anybody should be misled. 
The mere fact that those talks seem to be going 
well doesn't necessarily mean other things are 



November 10, 1969 



393 



going to go well. We would hope that they will, 
but I think that the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
demonstrated that point. Just prior to the in- 
vasion of Czechoslovakia, there was a feeling of 
detente in Europe, that things were going very 
well between the United States and the Soviet 
Union — between East and West — and unfortu- 
nately, that invasion of Czechoslovakia changed 
that. 

So to summarize, I think that it does tend 
slightly to improve the atmosphere, but we 
shouldn't be euphoric about the fact that we 
are having talks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of that, the ques- 
tion about Viet-Nam, xohich may relate to this, 
has the fact that you have said we are deescalat- 
i/ng in Viet-Nam had an efect on the Soviet 
attitude toward these talks? 

A. Well, as I say, I don't know what's had 
an effect on the Soviet attitude. There's no way 
of knowing for sure. I can speculate, but I don't 
think my speculation is worth any more than 
anyone else's. 

Q. Thank you. 

Q. You could try, sir. [Laughter."] 

A. Well, I would rather read about it. 
[Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the United 
States and the Soviet Union to enter these 
preliminary discussions with formed, substan- 
tive proposals on the 17th of November? 

A. Well, I wouldn't think that we would start 
out that way, no. As I say, I think these talks 
will be exploratory. 

I don't rule out, as Mr. Koberts asked, whether 
we rule out any discussion of substantive 
matters. 

The answer to that is no. 

But I wouldn't think that would be the way 
the discussions would start. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indica- 
tion of what the Soviet position toill be in terms 
of loillingness, or lack of willingness, to agree to 
things like a MIRY moratonum, or some agree- 
ments on ABM? 

A. No. 

Q. Thank you, sir. 



The Deep Concern for Peace 
in Viet-Nam 

Remarks by Secretary Rogers ^ 

Among the fundamental rights which we 
believe belong to the family of man are freedom 
of speech and assembly — including peaceful 
demonstrations for or against government 
policies. 

As we all know, there are many places where 
these rights are not granted — Moscow, Peking, 
Hanoi, and Prague being among them. 

In our coimtry, where these fundamental 
rights are cherished and guaranteed, we have 
just had a public demonstration on the issue of 
Viet-Nam. It was fully covered by the press, 
radio, and television — so the demonstrators were 
lieard in the smallest towns and the remotest 
corners of the country. So were the views of 
other segments of public opinion which feel 
differently — and that's in the best American 
tradition. 

Demonstrations are difficult to weigh and 
assess — the quiet judgment of the thoughtful 
often is sounder than the strident views of the 
more vocal. 

However, demonstrations by significant seg- 
ments of the population are within the demo- 
cratic process and deserve a respectful audience, 
when respectfully conducted. 

Moratorium Day, as it was called, was marked 
by some unpleasant sights — like smaller groups 
marching behind the flag of the Viet Cong. 

But these aspects did not characterize the 
demonstration. On the whole, it seemed to me 
that a great many of the demonstrators wished 
principally to register dramatic but dignified 
expression of their deep concern for peace in 
Viet-Nam. And we listened to these voices with 
respect — because we, too, have a deep concern 
for peace in Viet-Nam. 

The question that confronts our nation, how- 
ever, is not whether we want peace but how 
rapidly we can transfer military responsibility 
from our forces to the South Vietnamese with- 
out abandoning our basic single objective. The 



' Made upon accepting on behalf of President Nixon 
the Family of Man Award of the Council of Churches 
of the City of New Tork at New York on Oct. 20 (press 
release 311). 



394 



Department of State Bulletin 



single objective of wliicli I speak is the right 
of the people of South Viet-Nam to determine 
their own future without interference from any 
outside quarter. Some, of course, urge immedi- 
ate, total withdrawal and abandonment of the 
people of Viet-Nam. They seem to pay little 
heed to the consequences to our nation, to the 
people of South Viet-Nam, to the future secu- 
rity of the Asian-Pacific area, or for the integ- 
rity of our international relations and interests. 

It must be said — not in anger or by way of 
any implied indictment, but in plain truth — 
that the leaders in Hanoi look upon disruption 
and dissent in the United States as their best 
ally. Spokesmen for Hanoi went to extraordi- 
nary lengths to make this clear and to seek to 
exploit for their own ends the yearning for 
peace that runs so strongly in our society. 

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
net effect of large-scale demonstrations, if they 
continue and become coercive in tone and con- 
tent, may encourage Hanoi not to negotiate. 
The quickest road to peace is through negotia- 
tions in Paris. If this is a correct assessment — 
and I believe it is — then each American must ask 
himself : Am I in reality working for an early 
peace by my actions, or am I helping to delay 
negotiations which could speed the way to 
peace ? 

Less than a year ago we elected a new Presi- 
dent who was determined to bring the war in 
Viet-Nam to an early end. Nine months ago to- 
day he took office. 

President Nixon initiated new policies look- 
ing toward peace both at the negotiating table 
and on the battlefield. 

At the negotiating table, we and the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam have made construc- 
tive proposals to end the war. We stand ready 
to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of all ex- 
ternal military forces from South Viet-Nam 
and to hold free and fair elections in which the 
NLF [National Liberation Front], or PRG 
[Provisional Revolutionary Government], may 
participate. 

On the battlefield there has been significant 
deescalation of the war. These are the facts : 



— Orders to our military commanders to 
maintain maximum pressure have been changed. 

— The level of fighting has been substantially 
reduced. 

— Our casualties have greatly decreased; the 
figures for the past month are the lowest for 
any month since late 1966. 

— Levels of enemy infiltration remain sub- 
stantially down — down by two-thirds. 

— Enemy troop replacement has diminished 
by about 30,000 in this period. 

Our President is striving for peace in ways 
that only the man in that Office can. His con- 
stitutional responsibilities are accepted and car- 
ried out on behalf of the people as a whole. The 
honor you do him tonight gives eloquent recog- 
nition to his efforts for peace. 



39th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the text of the statement made iy 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.S. delegation, at the 39th plenary session of 
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on Octo- 
ber 23. 

Press release 315 dated October 23 

Ladies and gentlemen : I have sat here all day 
listening to the statements which you on the 
other side have made. I am constrained to say 
that you have done nothing but repeat your de- 
mands for unilateral actions on our part and 
engage in vituperative language. You still show 
no desire to engage in genuine negotiations. 

Under these circimistances, I see no point in 
delivering the statement I have prepared for 
today. All of our many proposals, of course, still 
stand, and I will have more to say on the points 
at issue later. For today, however, I move that 
wo adjourn our meeting until next Thursday, 
October 30, at 10 :30 a.m. 



November 10, 1969 



395 



President Nixon and the Shah of Iran Hold Talks at Washington 



His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi, Shahanslmh of Iran, made an ofjvcial 
visit to Washington October 21-23. Folloivlng 
are an exchange of remarks between President 
Nixon and His Imperial Majesty at a welcom- 
ing ceremony on the South Lawn of the White 
House on October £1, their exchange of toasts at 
a state dinner at the White House that evening, 
and their exchange of remarks upon His Maj- 
esty^s departure October 23. 



EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

White House press release dated October 21 
President Nixon 

This is the ninth time over the past 20 years 
that Your Majesty has honored our country by 
a visit to the United States, and never in all that 
period will you be more welcome, both person- 
ally and officially, than you are today on this 
truly brilliant autumn day in Washington, D.C. 

We welcome you because of the proud and 
ancient land which you represent. We welcome 
you because of the title that you bear with such 
distinction. But we welcome you also because 
of the personal qualities which those of us who 
know you as I know you, those qualities you 
have exemplified in your leadership of your 
country. 

Today on this parade ground we see the flag 
of the United States and your flag; and the 
colors of your flag are green and red and white — 
green standing for the rich spiritual heritage of 
your country, red standing for courage, and 
white standing for peace. 

We know, Your Majesty, that you, in your 
life, stand for those great virtues. But we also 
know that you stand for more than that. In a 
period in which many new nations are being 
bom and in wliich old nations are being born 
again and in which all nations are going 
through change, you have provided an example 
of leadership in your nation for all the world to 
see and for many to follow. 



That example I have seen firsthand in my 
visits to your country. I recall that many years 
ago you gathered your ministers together; and 
speaking from the position of royalty wliich 
you held, you made a comment that has since 
been remembered around the world. You said to 
them: Make a revolution in this land. 

And you have made a revolution in your land, 
a revolution in terms of literacy, the great prog- 
ress that all of us have noted there ; a revolution 
in terms of land reform, in which you yourself 
set the example by giving much of your vast 
lands to the people; a revolution in terms of 
social and economic and political progress. 

But the key to your success has been in the 
nature of that revolution. It has been a revolu- 
tion designed not to destroy and to tear down 
but a revolution to build — a peaceful revolution. 

It is this example that the world sees in Iran. 
It is this example that is your legacy, not only 
to your country but to those who seek peaceful 
progress in nations around the world. 

Your Majesty, we welcome you here today — 
welcome you because of those qualities that I 
have mentioned and welcome you also because 
of the personal friendship that we have had the 
opportunity to enjoy, going back over so many 
years. 

We know that all of the American people 
during your brief stay here will want to express, 
as I have tried to express in my words today, 
their admiration, their respect, their affection 
for you and for the people of Iran. 

His Imperial Majesty 

Mr. President, first of all I would like to thank 
you from deep in my heart for the words that 
you were kind enough to pronounce toward my- 
self and my country. 

It is true that I am not a newcomer to your 
wonderful land, but this time in particular it is 
a distinct pleasure and honor to be your guest ; 
that is, the guest of the President of the United 
States of America, a Pi'esident who has shown 
in all his life how well he understands the prob- 



396 



Department of State Bulletin 



lems of our world, the problems of today and 
the problems of the future ; in addition to this, 
to be welcomed by somebody who has been fol- 
lowing with interest the deA^elopment of our 
country in the last 20 years or so, in some days 
maybe the darkest days of our history, and 
today, I am happy to say, in a period of 
renaissance. 

It is a comfort to know that you have in this 
great country a President who has those 
friendly sentiments and also that knowledge of 
your country. 

You have mentioned that we have imdertaken 
a revolution in our country whicli is really cov- 
ering every aspect of our life. We believe that 
all of our coimtries are passing through periods 
of either evolution or revolution, but my prayers 
are that the result of all that will be for a better 
world, better understanding between the people, 
and the realization of the aspiration of man- 
kind for the betterment of not only the living 
condition but also of the spiritual one. 

I am very proud to say on behalf of myself 
and the people of my covmtry that never in the 
long-established relationship between our two 
countries — although our relations have always 
been excellent — never have we enjoyed such a 
state of complete mutual trust, understanding, 
and respect. 

I have to add that it is with deep gratitude of 
your attitude of the past, your imseliish and 
generous attitude toward my country — and I 
could say toward all the countries of the world — 
that we want to express this feeling of oure and, 
in return, wish for your people, your good- 
hearted people, ever-increasing prosperity and 
your great country ever-increasing progress and 
order in the world of today. 

Thank you, Mr. President. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 

White House press release dated October 21 

President Nixon 

We are honored again to receive His Imperial 
Majesty in this house and in this room. Before 
the dinner, I found that this, of course, is not 
the first time that His Majesty has been here ; 
but you will be interested to note that he is one 
of the few leaders, heads of state, in the world 
who has been a guest in this house and in this 
room as the guest of President Truman and then 
of President Eisenhower and then President 



Kennedy and then President Johnson and now, 
tonight, as our guest. 

I would say on that count he is far ahead of 
me. He is somewhat younger than I, although he 
will celebrate a birthday on Sunday. 

I found in checking into his background that 
we had one thing in common, a love for sports. 
We both played football. There was a difference. 
I sat on the bench. He was captain of the team. 

But in welcoming him here tonight, I could 
speak of those usual pleasantries and diplomatic 
cliches that grace such occasions; but I think 
because there are so many here who know his 
country and have for his country the affection 
and admiration that I have and Mrs. Nixon 
has, because there are so many here from his 
own country, that you would like it better if I 
shared with you a personal view of the leader- 
ship he has provided for his country and the 
cause of peace and freedom in the world. 

In 1953 my wife and I had a very great priv- 
ilege to travel around the world and particu- 
larly through the countries of Asia. In that 
period, not too long after World War II, the 
great leaders of World War II were still living 
and still active and powerful on the world scene. 

I remember them well now. The names, most 
of them, you will recall, and some are still 
active: Yosliida in Japan, Syngman Rhee in 
Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, Menzies in 
Australia, Nehru in India, and Ghulam Moham- 
mad in Pakistan, and many others. 

The last stop on that long trip of 70 days was 
Iran. On that stop we met for the first time our 
very honored guest tonight. He made a very 
deep impression on me and on my wife at that 
time, a deep impression because of his own per- 
sonal character and also with regard to the var- 
ious other leaders that I had seen, each of whom 
had gi-eatness in his own way, because in 1953, 
Iran had very difficult problems. 

There was martial law in the land. The father 
of the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs was 
Prime Minister, and His Majesty was the sym- 
bol — and not just the symbol but the actual 
leader of authority who kept the nation to- 
gether, to whom all of those in government 
and the people of Iran turned in a moment 
of crisis. 

There were those who thought that Iran in 
1953 might not make it. When I left Iran, I 
knew it would make it. I knew it because of the 
men I had seen. I knew it not only because of 
the government leaders to whom I have referred 
but particularly because of the personality and 



November 10, 1969 

367-032—69 2 



397 



the strength and the character of the man who 
is our honored guest tonight. 

He was a young head of state then, just as he 
is really a young head of state todiiy. I was a 
young Vice President. But what I recall was 
this : Despite the deep depression of spirit which 
seemed to infect many of those who observed 
Iran in that period of crisis, His Majesty saw 
the problems but also had a vision for the 
future. 

Omar Khayyam has referred eloquently to 
the ability of a leader, a great leader, to heed 
the roll of distant drums. His Majesty had that 
ability. He saw his country in the future and he 
proceeded to move his country into the future, 
and that story of progress is now one of the 
most exciting stories of all the development 
that has occurred in the world in the past 16 
years. 

I referred to it this morning : progress in edu- 
cation, progress in economic development, prog- 
ress in social development, imtil today Iran 
stands as one of the strongest, the proudest, 
among all the nations of the world. 

So today we honor a nation and a people with 
whom we are proud to stand as friends and 
allies. We honor also a man who has those ele- 
ments of leadership which are too rare in the 
world. 

In a moment you will rise with me and we 
will drink a toast. We will be drinking a toast, 
as has happened in this room for over 150 
years, to His Majesty. But I can say that to- 
night I feel very deep in my heart, as everyone 
here who knows liim and knows his country 
and his record, that when we say "His Majes- 
ty," we realize we are drinking to a man who 
has demonstrated majesty — majesty in liis 
leadersliip, majesty in his reverence for the past, 
but in his vision for the future. 

Our friends, will you please rise and raise 
your glasses to the Shahanshah. 

His Imperial Majesty 

I was already once deeply moved by your kind 
words of greeting this morning; and tonight 
I am overwhelmed by the warmth of your sen- 
timents, which could only come from a true 
friend — someone who is sharing your problems 
and someone who is understanding your 
problems. 

For our association, Mr. President — and the 



great honor and pleasure that I take and have 
by saying that our friendship started a long 
time ago — is this strong and this durable be- 
cause I think it started in a period that for 
my country was a very vital one. That was the 
aftermath of the war, the period of the big 
drive forward of the policies that wanted to 
dominate the world. 

We on our part tried to keep our independ- 
ence and resist those pressures, and you on your 
part wanted to be the bearer of this flag that 
America has always waved with pride in the 
air — the flag of always standing for the people 
who are standing for righteousness and for 
freedom. 

You were kind enough to say that our coun- 
try in that meantime had succeeded. Much of 
our success is due to the deeply rooted senti- 
ments of our country in being true to them- 
selves, in being true to their history, in being 
true to what the human valor of the individual, 
the freedom of the individual, means, and also, 
I must admit, to the heartening effect of know- 
ing that we had the friendship of a great na- 
tion like yours and great leaders like the late 
President and you, Mr. President, as his very 
able Vice President at that time. 

I can return back what you have said about 
me even more by saying that you have shown 
such human valor and dignity during your 
hours of triumph and success and also during 
hours of trial. This is what makes a man great 
and reliable. This is what makes a man have 
the character of a leader. 

Today more than ever we need the friendship 
of America as a friend and the leadersliip of 
America in the world and the leadership of the 
President of this gi-eat country to uphold all 
of what we are standing for, to implement the 
laws of equity, of justice, to encourage decency 
in relationships between states, countries, and 
people. 

You might rest assured that nowhere you 
would find more than in our country friendship, 
understanding, and sympathy in everything 
you do, in everything you enterprise, because 
we know in advance that it is being done in 
the path of justice and equity. 

We can felicitate ourselves of the result of 
your friendship because, as it stands now, I 
hope and I believe that our country is trying 
to represent and to continue to do what our past 
history has tried to do, to give something to the 



398 



Department of State Bulletin 



world, something spiritual, something that 
could be of help to make life better, to render 
life more interesting. 

We shall never stop in trying to do so be- 
cause this is the history of our country and 
j no country could live without remaining true 
I to its past while trying to still do better in 
the future. 

"We shall always remember your visit to our 
countiy and Mrs. Nixon's visit. I personally 
will always remember the long hours that we 
spent together in 1967, and above all, we shall 
be waiting with the greatest of anticipation to 
the future visit of the President of the United 
States, and especially of President Nixon, a 
person whom we respect, and a person for whom 
we have such an admiration. 

So I would like also to ask this distinguished 
audience to raise their glasses with me to the 
health of the President of the United States, 
a man to which I am sure we all are holding 
such very high sentiments of esteem and 
admiration. 



DEPARTURE REMARKS 

White House press release dated October 23 
President Nixon 

As you leave this Capital after your visit 
here, I can echo what the Secretary of State just 
said in reflecting on your visit. He said : "The 
weather today is like our relations." 

And certainly on this beautiful day as we 
complete our talks, I believe that the relations 
between Iran and the United States have never 
been better. That is due to your leadership. It 
is due also to the fact that we feel a special re- 
lationship not only to your country but to you, 
a relationship which, in my case, goes back many 
years. 

We have had bilateral talks which have been 
most constructive. 

But I, too, want to thank you for giving the 
Secretary, myself, and our colleagues the bene- 
fit of your analysis of the problems in the Mid- 
east, which are tremendously explosive at the 
present time, and also the problems in the world ; 
because Iran, in a sense, is a bridge between the 
East and West, between Asia and Europe, and, 
for that matter, Africa. 

And at that vantage point you are able to see 



those problems perhaps better than almost any 
leader in the world. 

We thank you for coming to us. 

And I can say, in conclusion, that I look for- 
ward to visiting Iran again. I have not yet set 
a date. But you have very cordially invited me 
to come. I accept the invitation and we wUl set 
a date at a later time. 

Thank you. 

His Imperial Majesty 

Thank you very much, Mr. President. 

I must say once more how honored I was by 
your hospitality and friendship that you have 
shown to me once more and how deeply ap- 
preciative I am of the frankness and the friend- 
liness in which we have had our talks with you, 
Mr. President, and your associates. 

As you very well mentioned, our relations 
have never been as good as they are now, because 
they are based on an absolute trust and mutual 
interests. 

We are defending the same principles, up- 
holding the same moral values that we un- 
derstand and for which we are living and, if 
necessary, dying; the interest of your country 
that the world should be a good place to live in, 
a free place to live in ; that everybody should be 
given the opportimity of progressing, of living 
better without fear and in health and happiness. 

For these ideals that we respect, we wish you 
an ever-growing strength. 

We wish you success in all your enterprises 
and, in addition to this, we hope that you will 
always feel — maybe sometimes it is a burden — 
but feel the responsibility that you have toward 
the human race, because you can provide it. 
When you can provide it, if I could be bold 
enough to say, you must provide it. 

We shall continue on our part to play what- 
ever constructive role that we can in our part of 
the world, upholding the same principles, try- 
ing to be of any assistance and cooperation for 
the maintenance of peace, stability, and as- 
sistance to all those who would ask for it with- 
out any second thought and as liberally as 
possible. 

The state of relationships between our two 
countries, I hope, will continue in this manner 
for the better of our two countries, of our region, 
and I hope maybe even for the world. 

As you mentioned, Mr. President, my country 



November 10, 1969 



399 



/ 



is a crossroad between various civilizations and 
various interests. It will be our duty to be able 
to honor this task faithfully, with dignity, and, 
I hope, also in a constructive way. 

We will be more able to do it always when we 
have the moral support, assistance, of our 
friends, the greatest of them being this great 
country of yours, and your personal friendship, 
Mr. President, which I personally, and I am 
sure my people, value to the greatest possible 
extent. 

Thank you very much. 

President Nixon 

On behalf of all of the American people, we 
wish you a very happy birthday Sunday. 

His Imperial Majesty 

Thank you very much. 



Secretary Rogers Welcomes 
Atlantic Treaty Association 

The 15th annual assembly of the Atlantic 
Treaty Association, which is composed of na- 
tional voluntary associations of tlie NATO 
member countries and Malta, was held at Wash- 
ington October £0-£4- Following are remarks 
made by Secretary Rogers before the opening 
session of the assembly on October 20. 

Press release 310 dated October 20 

I am very happy, on behalf of President 
Nixon and the entire administration, to welcome 
the Atlantic Treaty Association to "Washington. 

I welcome you, Mr. Chairman, and all of 
you here, particularly the distinguished men 
who, in the words of my bestselling predecessor, 
Dean Acheson, were "present at the creation." 
I welcome, too, the younger men who may not 
yet be so distuiguished but who will be dis- 
tinguished soon. 

If I may use a word that is somewhat over- 
used by young people today, I should like to 
stress that NATO and its guiding North At- 
lantic Council are relevant — relevant in many 
ways. 

Certainly NATO is relevant to the security 
of Europe. That is why President Nixon visited 



the Council in Brussels early in his administra- 
tion to reaffirm our commitment to the organi- 
zation and our determination to support it.^ 

NATO is relevant to arms control. That is 
why together we are working out specific pro- 
posals for balanced and mutual force reductions 
in the European theater and why we consult so 
closely on broader disarmament and arms con- 
trol measures. 

NATO is relevant to the evolution of a shared 
Western viewpoint toward many complex polit- 
ical situations. That is why the Council and 
political committees spend so much time in shar- 
ing information, exchanging views, and pre- 
paring political analyses. 

NATO is relevant, too, to some of the social 
goals of its members. We share in common many 
of the problems brought about by industrializa- 
tion. That is why we have started to consvdt 
together on the problems of modern societies. 

In short, NATO is relevant to its purposes, to 
its times, and to its environment. And since 
relevance is so fashionable, I conclude that this 
organization is a fashionable organization. 

I believe that it can be said with assurance 
that NATO is the most successful and the most 
durable security system of all time. 

I want to assure those of you who have given 
such tremendous support to NATO over the 
years that that is the way all of us in the ad- 
ministration feel. 

I am especially glad that, having appropri- 
ately and impressively celebrated our 20th an- 
niversary a few months ago,= the theme of this 
meeting is NATO and its future in the third 
decade. Let me only say that I shall follow your 
proceedings with interest, attention, and 
respect. 

I do have to leave right away for a trip to 
New York, so my greetings are brief — but I 
know you must take satisfaction in having con- 
tributed so much to a successful venture and 
that 3'ou look forward to the future success of 
NATO. And in my present position I look with 
envy and respect on persons who are associated 
with successful ventures. 

Thank you very much. 



' For President Nixon's remarks made before the 
Nortli Atlantic Council at Brussels on Feb. 24, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 24, 1969, p. 250. 

' For an address by President Nixon and opening 
remarks made before the ministerial meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council at Washington on Apr. 10, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 349. 



400 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States-Japanese Relations Today 



hy V. Alexis Johnson 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 



I was especially pleased and honored to have 
been invited to join you here this evening. Some 
of the fondest and happiest memories I have 
of Japan are those visits Mrs. Jolinson and I 
made to Prefectures throughout Japan and the 
overwhelming courtesy and kindness with which 
we were always received. You Prefectural Gov- 
ernors were always also overwhelming in your 
hospitality and more than generous in giving 
of your time. Thus I feel a debt to you and your 
colleagues which I can never repay. 

When I talk to other Americans about Japan 
I often remark on how impressed I have been 
by the fact that the democratic political proc- 
esses of Japan produce provincial Governors 
with such obviously high human qualities and 
dedication to their responsibilities. Thus I have 
been especially happy over the years to see the 
growth and vigor in this relationship between 
our own State Governors, who have the same 
characteristics, and you Prefectural Governors 
from Japan. I know that you have your dif- 
ferences of language and culture, but it has 
been my impression that you have found more 
similarities than differences in the problems 
that each of you is facing. After all, limited 
budgets, problems of urbanization, pollution, 
and education — and, if I might say so, the prob- 
lem of running elections — know no national 
boundaries. 

I am sure that I also speak for my longtime 
friend and valued colleague Ajnbassador 
Shimoda [Takeso Shimoda, Japanese Ambas- 
sador to the United States] , when I say that we 
diplomats dealing in the often rarefied as well 
as often cloudy atmosjahere of national policy 
heai-tily welcome the relationship that has been 
developing between you Governors. We recog- 
nize that what we can or cannot do ultimately 

' Address made before the U.S.- Japan Governors 
meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio, on Oct. 22 (press release 
312). 



depends upon understanding between our two 
great peoples, and what you are doing is mak- 
ing a major contribution to that understanding. 
That understanding is growing at a very satis- 
factory rate. Yet I am concerned that its growth 
keep pace with the growth m our relationship. 
For as our relationship grows it is obvious that 
the problems also grow apace, and it is going to 
take increasing efforts to keep these problems 
in focus and effectively to deal with them. 

Out of our defense relationship has grown 
the problem of our base facilities in Japan and 
concern in this country as to whether Japan 
really values and will in the years to come want 
to maintain that relationship. 

Eelated to this is the question of the admin- 
istration of the Kyukyu Islands, which, as you 
all know, is now the subject of discussion be- 
tween our two governments. I know that the 
President is very much looking forward to the 
visit of Prime Minister Sato next month, which 
will give an opportunity for both of them to in- 
clude this among the subjects that they will per- 
sonally discuss. 

Another area in which there has been a 
tremendous growth in our relationship, and 
accordingly our problems, has been in the field 
of our economic, financial, and trade exchanges. 
The benefits of this relationship have been so 
overwhelmingly to the advantage of both of our 
coimtries that we should not let the problems 
assume undue importance or cast a shadow over 
those benefits. However, if this is not to become 
the case, it is important that we obtain mutual 
understanding and Avork at resolving these 
problems in the same spirit as we work at prob- 
lems in other fields. 

I mention this economic field here this eve- 
ning because I am sure that in your discussions 
of other questions you American Governors 
have heard much from your Japanese guests on 
their concerns as to whether there was a growth 



November 10, 1969 



401 



in trade protectionist sentiment here in tlie 
United States. I am also sure that you Japanese 
Governors have heard much from your Ameri- 
can liosts on their concerns with respect to the 
effects that some imports from Japan are hav- 
ing on certain industries and employees in their 
States. Others, of course, will have mentioned 
their recognition of the important role Japan 
plays as a market for the products of their 
States. This is understandable and natural on 
both sides in such a rapidly changing world, 
particularly in a field that has changed so fast 
as have the economic relations between our two 
countries. 

Just 10 years ago Japan's exports to the 
United States were valued at about $700 million 
(1958 figures) and our exports to Japan were 
valued at about $1 billion, for a total two-way 
trade of $1.7 billion. Last year Japan's exports 
to us were $4 billion, and our exports to Japan 
not quite $3 billion, for a total two-way trade 
of $7 billion, the largest transocean bilateral 
trade between any two countries in the world. I 
know that both of us want to see this trend con- 
tinue, but if it is going to continue we must 
work at this problem of making sure that it is, 
as we Americans say, a two-way street. As I 
noted, back in 1958 you Japanese were buying 
considerably more from the United States than 
you were selling here. Although this was largely 
offset on the financial side by our expenditures 
within Japan as well as by loans of our financial 
institutions, we recognized this was not a 
healthy situation and as a general proposition 
welcomed the growth of Japanese exports here 
so that our trade would have a more healthy 
balance. However, as noted, last year Japan 
sold over a billion dollars more to us than we 
sold Japan, which, taken together with our other 
expenditures in Japan and the billions of dol- 
lars in long- and short-term loans our financial 
institutions have outstanding in Japan, prob- 
ably has more of an adverse impact on our 
international financial situation than our rela- 
tions with any other single country in the world. 
I perfectly well know that you Governors do 
not have responsibility for Japan's national 
policies on these qiiestions any more than our 
American Governors have responsibility for 
what our Congress will do. However, I feel that 
these questions so deeply relate to the questions 
of growth, industry, employment, prosperity, 
and welfare with which each of you must deal 
daily in your own areas that I seek your under- 
standing of what is involved when you read that 



our two governments are discussing trade and 
economic matters. 

"We have been discussing and will be continu- 
ing to discuss these matters which are of such 
great importance to our two countries and to 
each of you, both Japanese and American. From 
the standpoint of the United States we want to 
see these problems resolved by increasing rather 
than decreasing trade. However, I am sure that 
you Japanese will understand that it is very 
hard to explain to Americans why under these 
circumstances Japan should continue to enjoy 
virtually unrestricted trade and investment op- 
portunities in the United States while American 
trade and investment in Japan is still subject to 
so many limitations. I realize full well that 
Japan's progress in liberalization in these fields 
is sincerely felt by many in Japan to be too rapid 
when viewed from the perspective of history. 
But it must also be understood that the changes 
in the world and Japan's economic status in that 
world have moved even more rapidly. Thus, the 
process of liberalization has not been quick 
enough to lay to rest the feeling here that ele- 
ments of economic reciprocity are lacking in our 
relationship. This point, I am convinced, is 
basic — the equality of opportunity. It is only 
natural that the clamor of our business com- 
munity for a more equitable access to Japan's 
growing markets becomes reflected in the Con- 
gress, in our press, and in the administration. 

The subject of textile trade is a troublesome 
one for our two countries. The recent high rate 
of growth of imports of manmade and woolen 
textiles has caused grave concern to American 
industry and labor. Imports of some items have 
doubled in 1 year; many others have increased 
50-75 percent. American businessmen can adjust 
to growing impoi'ts if the growth is gradual. It 
is the rapidity and magnitude of the import 
growth that have been disruptive. 

All we are seeking therefore — of all exporters 
and not of Japan alone — is moderation in the 
rate of increase in imports; that is, an orderly 
growth in the textile trade to give American 
industry' an opportunity to accommodate. It is 
important that we continue our efforts to resolve 
this issue so that it does not color and distort 
our relations. 

In all fairness, I want first to note I fuUy 
understand that just as American political and 
Government leader's are subjected to pressures 
from large nmnbers of diverse interest groups, 
Japan's leaders are faced with similar problems, 
This is only logical. Some areas of Japanese in- 



402 



Department of State Bulletin 



dustry and agriculture are, understandably, 
concerned that they will be injured by liberali- 
zation of trade and investment policies. 
j However, the experience of both Japan and 
I the United States has been that, so long as 
policies of freer trade are pursued on a basis of 
■ reciprocity and good will, the advantages to 
each side far outweigh the disadvantages from 
the pomt of view of our economies examined as 
a whole. Furthermore, freer trade policies en- 
able our consumers, the average man in each 
of our countries, to have access to the best 
goods — food or manufactures — ^at the best pos- 
sible prices. In the long run, it is our people 
who benefit from freer trade and whose living 
standards are raised by a better exchange of 
goods and services. The American people have 
supported, and I am sure will continue to sup- 
port, a world of such freer exchange; but we 
cannot do so without the support and, even more 
importantly, the example of the economic power 
that is second only to ourselves in the free world. 
I have spoken to you Japanese guests about 
some of the things that concern us Americans 
not in any spirit of criticism or carping, but 
rather that you may leave here with a better 
understanding of us. In turn, as I said at the 
outset, I know that these are things that con- 
cern you Japanese. I hope that you have and 
will speak to your American hosts on these mat- 
ters with equal frankness, for it is only from 
exchanges such as tliis that we can move to- 
ward that understanding between us which, I 
am convinced, means so much not only for the 
future of our two peoples and countries but for 
all of the peoples of the Pacific and Asia. 



U.S. Aircraft To Assist 
in Famine Relief in Chad 

Departinent Statement '^ 

Ambassador Todman in Fort Lamy has re- 
ported extreme famine conditions in the central 
and north-central portions of Chad. 

At the request of the Government of Chad for 
air transport to deliver United Nations-sup- 
plied foodstuffs to stricken areas, the United 
States Government has agreed to send two 
C-130 aircraft of the U.S. Strike Command. 



* Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Carl Bartch on Oct. 9. 



November 10, 1969 



These should be departing from Langley Air 
Force Base sometime today [October 9]. We 
expect the aircraft will be in Chad for about 7 
days on this humanitarian mission. The French 
Govermnent is also participating in the airlift. 
The U.S. contribution is being financed from 
disaster relief contingency funds administered 
by the Agency for International Development. 



Second Round of Bilateral Talks 
With India Held at Washington 

Joint Statement ^ 

Kepresentatives of the Govermnents of the 
United States and India held a second round 
of bilateral discussions in Washington on Octo- 
ber 16-17, 1969. The discussions covered a wide 
range of subjects including matters of interna- 
tional importance of common interest to both 
countries and bilateral relations. The Indian 
Delegation was headed by Mr. T. N. Kaul, For- 
eign Secretary, and the U.S. Delegation by Mr. 
Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State. 

The discussions carried forward the review 
of world problems and bilateral relations ini- 
tiated during the talks held in New Delhi in 
July 1968, and were held in a spirit of friend- 
ship, frankness, and cordiality.^ Both sides ex- 
pressed satisfaction with the discussions which 
were characterized by a greater appreciation of 
the factors underlying each country's policies 
and by a reaffirmation of the close friendsliip 
which has been the basis of relations between 
the two countries over many years. 

During the talks the two delegations exam- 
ined major areas of tension in the world. They 
exchanged views and analyses on the current 
situation in these areas. They exammed the con- 
ditions and prospects for peace and considered 
ways to work together toward the peaceful reso- 
lution of international problems. This second 
round of bilateral talks contributed to the com- 
mon objective of further strengthening the 
friendship between the two countries on the 
basis of mutual tmderstanding and respect for 
each other's position. It was agi'eed that the next 
round of bilateral discussions will be held in 
New Delhi next year. 

' Issued at Washington on Oct. 17 (press release 308). 
' For text of a joint statement issued at New Delhi on 
July 28, 1968, see Bulletin of Aug. 19, 1968, p. 198. 



403 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Seventh Annual Review of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement 

Statement hy Henry Brodie * 



The United States is pleased to have this op- 
portunity again to discuss the textile situation 
with representatives of the governments of the 
textile trading and producing community. In 
my statement I shall review United States cot- 
ton textile trade, conditions in the domestic 
producing industry, developments in the imple- 
mentation of the Long-Term Arrangement, and 
I shall briefly comment on certain changes that 
have taken place in the trade and in the indus- 
try.^ My Government believes that the im- 
plications of these changes must be carefully 
considered to ensure for the future the healthy 
development of the world's textile trade and 
industry. 

As we review the operation of the LTA at the 
conclusion of its seventh year, my Government 
believes that the arrangement has functioned to 
the advantage of all concerned : those who pro- 
duce and are employed in the United States as 
well as those who manufacture and sell to the 
United States and other countries. I will not 
recount the well-known principles established in 
the LTA concerning the orderly growth of tex- 
tile trade and the need to avoid market disrup- 
tion. But I do wish to discuss the growth and 
some of the changes that have taken place in U.S. 
trade in these products. 

Cotton textile imports into the United States 
during the seventh LTA year amounted to 1.7 
billion square yards equivalent, as compared 



' Made before the Cotton Textile Committee of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva on 
Oct 8. Mr. Brodie Is Counselor of Economic Affairs of 
the U.S. Mission to the European Offices of the United 
Nations and Other International Organizations at 
Geneva ; he was U.S. Representative at the meeting of 
the Committee. 

' For text of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange- 
ment, see BtTLLETiN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 



with 1.1 billion yards in the first LTA year and 
just over 800 million j-ards during the base j^ear 
for the Short-Term Arrangement. Over this 
period, imports of cotton textiles and apparel 
rose faster than domestic output. Even so, the 
overall figures do not reveal certain significant 
developments affecting our trade. For example, 
in the fourth LTA year, the peak year to date, 
the United States imported 361 million square 
yards equivalent of cotton yam, about one-fifth 
of total cotton textile imports. During the sev- 
enth LTA year, imports of cotton yam were 
down sharply — to about one-twelfth of total im- 
ports — but imports of apparel, fabrics, and other 
goods rose substantially above the levels reached 
in the fourth LTA year. This development un- 
derscores the shift toward more highly manufac- 
tured goods for export to the United States 
which has been occurring in recent years. Be- 
tween the first and seventh LTA years the value 
of apparel imports increased 80 percent. This 
shift to more labor intensive goods has helped 
the exporting countries, but it has placed a 
greater burden on U.S. labor and industry. 

Our cotton textile imports come from about 
100 countries. Imports from the developing 
countries have increased significantly. While the 
share of the U.S. market held by the major sup- 
pliers has changed, their absolute exports to the 
United States have increased substantially. 
Many new suppliers have entered the United 
States market and have been able to sell in the 
market without jeopardizing the position of 
other suppliers. In the process of providing ac- 
cess for new suppliers to our market, the United 
States has consistently met the fundamental 
equity obligation stipulated in article 6(c) of 
the arrangement. 

All of these developments are consistent with 
the provisions and the spirit of the LTA itself. 



404 



Department of State Bulletin 



Recurrent Problem of Overshipments 

Imports at these high levels have produced a 
I number of problems. The most difficult and frus- 
trating of these arises when agreement limits are 
oversliipped. The United States has pointed out 
at previous meetings of tliis Committee a num- 
' ber of the difficulties it has had in the imple- 
mentation of various bilateral cotton textile 
agreements. We noted that while many of these 
situations are inadvertent, not all of them can 
'■ be so explained. We have worked with a number 
of countries to assist them in their efforts to im- 
prove their administration of the bilateral ar- 
rangements, and in the current year we have 
noted some decline in the number of administra- 
tive and overshipment problems. 

A more timely exchange of better statistical 
information on trade would contribute to better 
operation of these arrangements, and we hope 
governments will continue to improve upon their 
efforts in this area. We cannot prevent problems 
if necessary information is not available on a 
timely basis. There have been some difficult cases 
requiring action by the United States and the 
exporting coimtries which imavoidably resulted 
in some interference with the normal flow of 
trade. The United States regrets very much the 
necessity of taking these actions but believes that 
the viability of this arrangement and of all bi- 
lateral agreements thereunder depends upon 
mutual adlierence to their terms. We would 
emphasize again that it is the joint obligation of 
exporting and importmg countries imder the 
LTA to make these agreements work. 

Future of the Long-Term Arrangement 

The United States, in giving very careful 
thought to the future of the LTA, has had to 
consider criticism of the LTA voiced by Ameri- 
can producers and labor organizations and also 
by many in the U.S. Congress. They have 
pointed out that while the arrangement contem- 
plates a rate of growth of imports equivalent to 
5 percent annually, the actual growth of imports 
into the United States has been much higher. In 
addition we have been forced to acknowledge the 
fimdamental conflict between the 5-percent 
growth formula in the LTA and a much liigher 
actual growth of imports on the one hand and 
the decline in the output of cotton textiles in the 
United States, now below the levels of 1961, on 
the other. Thus imports have been mounting 
while domestic production has been declining. 



November 10, 1969 



a situation which has produced an increasingly 
severe impact in the United States cotton textile 
market. 

We have also considered the views of export- 
ing countries on various problems they have 
faced during the life of the LTA. We hope this 
meeting will provide further insight into the 
views of other participants as to the extension 
of the arrangement. 

The LTA in a Multifiber Textile World 

We should recognize the changes that have 
taken place in world trade and production of 
textiles and the emergence of today's multifiber 
industry. In surveying textile developments over 
the life of this arrangement, one cannot help 
but note that the increase in the relative im- 
portance of manmade fiber products in total tex- 
tile production is one of the most conspicuous 
and significant facts today. While cotton con- 
sumption in the United States has fallen off, 
there has been a striking increase in the use of 
manmade fibers. In the United States in 1961-62, 
when the LTA was negotiated, manmade fibers 
represented only 30 percent of the fibers con- 
smned by the United States textile industry ; cot- 
ton then accoimted for over 60 percent. Now 
manmade fibers account for more than 50 per- 
cent of consumption as cotton's importance has 
declined, and this trend is continuing. Blended 
goods have also become a major factor in the 
market and are now a major component of 
United States textile imports. Indeed, during 
1969, for the first time, imports of maimiade 
fiber textile products are exceedmg imports of 
cotton textile products. 

The tremendous surge of manmade fiber tex- 
tile imports is of major concern to the United 
States Government. This year these imports are 
running at an annual rate of 1.8 billion yards. 
Imports of manmade fiber apparel are run- 
ning at an annual rate of 930 million yards, as 
compared with 558 million yards in 1968 and 92 
million yards in 1964. These imports in 8 months 
of 1969 are well above cotton apparel imports 
and already exceed total cotton apparel imports 
for 1968 by more than 100 million yards. In this 
field also, as in cotton, the trend is toward the 
importation of apparel and other of the more 
labor intensive goods. 

At the same time wool textile imports are run- 
ning at very high levels, with a similar emphasis 
on more highly manufactured goods. Penetra- 



405 



tion of the United States market for these prod- 
ucts is at an all-time high, with imports 
enjoj'ing more than one-fourth of the domestic 
market. The decline in imports of certain prod- 
ucts from last year's level notwithstanding, 
imports of wool apparel are 33 percent above the 
levels reached in 1966 and 1967. Overall U.S. im- 
ports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex- 
tiles are at an annual rate tliis year of 3.7 billion 
square yards, compared with 3.3 billion m 1968 
and 1.5 billion in 1964. The import-consiunption 
ratios for these products have doubled in recent 
years. The ratio for manmade fiber textiles is 
now at the point reached by cotton textiles when 
the LTA was negotiated. The wool textile ratio 
is now 26 percent, and the cotton textile ratio is 
now above 11 percent. 

Many countries that began their trade in the 
cotton textile field and which entered into 
agreements with the United States imder the 
LTA now export more than four times as much 
maixmade fiber textiles to the United States as 
they do cotton textiles. Other countries are be- 
ginning to ship manmade fiber textiles and are 
expanding their exports to us very rapidly. In 
our view the dramatic growth of these imports 
carries with it the same serious problems of 
market disruption that existed for cotton tex- 
tile products at the birth of the LTA 8 years 
ago. 

A number of importing and exporting coun- 
tries have recognized the existence of problems 
in these areas and have taken action, by agree- 
ment and otherwise, to regulate the flow of trade 
in these goods. These actions have had the effect 
of channeling exports to the markets of coim- 
tries that do not have such restrictions. The 
United States market is the only major unre- 
stricted market in the world. This situation has 
been a major contributing factor in the overall 
United States textile import problem, a problem 
which requires an international solution. 

The United States remains prepared at this 
time to accept continued growth on a reason- 
able and orderly basis m the exports of these 
products to the United States market. We be- 
lieve most firndy, however, that this trade must 
be on an orderly basis and the growth in our 
market shared equitably by both domestic and 
foreign manufacturers. 

The dramatic increase in imports of man- 
made fiber and wool textiles in recent years has 
far outpaced the growth of the United States 
market. By no measure can this be considered 
an orderly trade situation. American manufac- 



tures have been put imder heavy pressure. 
Plants have been closed, operations transferred 
overseas, and textile investments deferred on 
the grounds that disruptive competition from 
exporting countries will not alloM- the neces- 
sary return on investment. This trend erodes 
the strength of our textile industry and 
has potentially wide-ranging consequences 
for the United States. It is a trend to which 
the United States Government carmot remain 
indifferent. It is not our desire to choke 
off trade. But neither can we permit trade to 
choke off our textile industry or its growth. We 
fully recognize the importance of this trade to 
the exporting countries, but while we are pre- 
pared to accept a reasonable growth in our tex- 
tile imports, we are determined to ensure that 
it be on an orderly basis. 

U.S. Textile and Apparel Industries 

It is not widely recognized or realized that in 
the United States, a highly industrialized coun- 
try, the textile and apparel industry remains in 
this day the largest employer of labor of any 
U.S. manufacturing industry. It employs one- 
eighth of the entire manufacturing work force 
of the United States. In addition, it is the sole 
customer of some 200,000 farms producing raw 
wool and it is the principal customer for our 
500,000 farms that produce cotton. Many thou- 
sands more depend on this industry's consump- 
tion of manmade fibers, fuel and energy, goods 
and services, and all of the myriad elements 
which lielp the industry fimction. 

The United States faces a major social prob- 
lem, and the textile and apparel industry is 
helping to ameliorate it. This is due to the fact 
that this industry makes a major contribution in 
the hiring and training of underskilled disad- 
vantaged persons in the United States, particu- 
larly those in minority groups. A threat to this 
industry is a threat to those persons m our labor 
force who have most difficulty in securing em- 
ployment in the first place and who would face 
even greater difficulty in finding alternative job 
opportunities. The present and potential con- 
tribution of the textile and apparel industry in 
providing employment for this large group of 
people cannot be overestimated. 

There are many in the United States who feel 
that the only viable solution to the textile prob- 
lems we face should be attained through im- 
port quotas enacted in legislation. It has been 
my Government's view that rather than resort 



406 



Department of State Bulletin 



fl 



to legislation we should negotiate acceptable in- 
ternational arrangements ■which would estab- 
lish a reasonable and orderly basis for the devel- 
opment of the United States textile market and 
for the continued growth of U.S. textile im- 
ports. President Nixon has stated his commit- 
ment to work for solutions that will bring about 
the orderly flow of imports into the textile mar- 
ket. We are endeavoring to do that and cannot 
urge too strongly the cooperation of our textile 
trading partners. 

In conclusion, the United States believes the 
LTA has worked well, with benefits to both ex- 
porters and importers, and should continue to 
do so in the future. We support its continuation 
beyond September 30, 1970. 

We are most interested in hearing the views 
of others on the issues at hand. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on tlie international recognition of rights in 
aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19. 1948. Entered into 
force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847. 
Adherence deposited: Paraguay, September 26, 1969. 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Toliyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963. Enters into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 
Ratification deposited: Spain, October 1, 1969. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Opened for 
signature at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force 
March 19, 1967.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 22, 
1969. 

Optional protocol, to the Vienna convention on consular 
relations, concerning the compulsory settlement of 
disputes. Opened for signature at Vienna April 24, 
1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 22, 
1969. 

Copyright 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright conven- 
tion concerning the application of that convention to 
the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done 
at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force 
September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, July 24, 1969. 



Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention concerning the application of that convention 
to the works of certain international organizations. 
Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered Into 
force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, July 24, 1969. 
Protocol 3 annexed to the universal copyright conven- 
tion concerning the effective date of instrmnents of 
ratification or acceptance of or accession to that 
convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. En- 
tered into force August 19, 19.54 ; for the United States 
December 6, 19.54. TIAS 3324. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, July 24, 1969. 

Fisheries 

Convention on conduct of fishing operations in the 
North Atlantic, with annexes. Done at London June 
1, 1967. Open for signature June 1 to November 30, 
1967.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification : October 22, 
1969. 

Labor 

International Labor Organization convention (no. 53) 
concerning the minimum requirement of professional 
capacity for masters and officers on board merchant 
ships. Adopted by the International Labor Confer- 
ence, 21st session, Geneva, October 24, 1936. 54 Stat 
1683. 
Ratification registered: Israel, June 19, 1969. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement of 
ships, 1969. Done at London June 23, 1969. Enters 
into force 24 months after the date on which not 
less than 25 governments of states the combined 
merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 65 
percent of the gross tonnage of the world's mer- 
chant shipping have signed without reservation as 
to acceptance or deposited instruments of accept- 
ance or accession. 

Signatures: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Republic of China, Denmark, Finland, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ice- 
land, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Ku- 
wait, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, U.S.S.R., United 
Arab Republic (with declaration), United King- 
dom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, 
June 23, 1969.' 

War 

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 

of war ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, 
respectively. 
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, October 13, 1969. 
Adherence deposited: Costa Rica, October 15, 1969. 



' Not in force for the United States. 

' Not in force. 

' All subject to ratification or acceptance. 



November 10, 1969 



407 



Whaling 

Amendments to paragraphs 4(1) (a), 6(1), and 8(a) 
to the schedule to the international whaling conven- 
tion of December 2, 1W6 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at 
London June 23-27, 1969. Entered into force 
October 6, 1969. 



BILATERAL 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington October 1, 1969. 
Operative October 1, 1969. 

India 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of February 20, 1967 (TIAS 
6221). Signed at New Delhi October 13, 1969. Entered 
into force October 13, 1969. 

Japan 

Agreement amending the agreement of September 2, 

1968, relating to the establishment by Japan of a 
satellite tracking station in Okinawa (TIAS 6558). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo September 25, 

1969. Entered into force September 25, 1969. 

Pakistan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of May 11, 1967 (TIAS 6258). 
Signed at Islamabad October 3, 1969. Entered into 
force October 3, 1969. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department Releases Publication 
of Human Rights Year Commission 

Press release 314 dated October 22 

"For Free Men in a Free World — A Survey of Human 
Rights in the United States" was released by the De- 
partment of State on October 22. The book is a first in 
Its field; It takes the standards set In the Universal 
Declaration of Human Eights, adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly on December 10, 1948, and for each 
of its 30 articles measures the progress made in the 
United States in terms of practice, laws, constitutional 
provisions, and court decisions. The 250-page book was 
prepared under the direction of the President's Com- 
mission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 
1968. 

The President's Commission for the Observance of 
Human Rights Year — the 20th anniversary of the adop- 
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — 
was established by Executive order of President John- 



son on January 30, 1968. It completed its activities I 
1 year later ; however, some of the publications it inl- j 
tiated were released after that date. The Commission j 
was composed of the heads of seven Federal depart- 
ments and agencies and 11 private citizens. W. Averell | 
Harriman was Chairman, Mrs. Anna Roosevelt Halsted i 
was Vice-Chairman, and James Frederick Green was I 
Executive Director of the Commission. 

"For Free Men in a Free World — A Survey of Human . 
Rights in the United States" (Department of State 
publication 8434) is for sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402, at $1.25 each. 



Recent Releases 



For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Z0402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders 
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

To Continue Action for Human Rights. Final Report of 
the President's Commission for the Observance of 
Human Rights Year 1968. 62 pp. 350. Published for the 
Commission by the Department of State. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India 
amending the agreement of December 23, 19(58. TIAS 
6691. 4 pp. 10(;t. 

Atomic Energy— Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Turkey Cooperation Agree- 
ment, Agreement with Turkey and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 6692. 8 pp. 10«f. 

Embassy Sites. Agreement with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. TIAS 6693. 22 pp. 504. 

Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 
6694. 2 pp. 10<f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ghana. 
TIAS 6695. 4 pp. 10(f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Domini- 
can Republic. TIAS 6696. 22 pp. 15(>. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Domini- 
can Republic. TIAS 6697. 4 pp. 10(f. 



Correction 

The Editor of the Bdtxetin wishes to call at- 
tention to an error which appears in the issue of 
September 22, 1969, p. 257. 

The footnote is incorrect. Under Secretary 
Richardson made the address before a luncheon 
meeting of the International Studies Association. 



408 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 10, 1969 Vol. LXL No. 1585 



Chad. U.S. Ail-craft To A.ssist in Famine Relief 
in Cliacl (.Deiiartmeiit statement) .... 403 

Disarmament 

Sefretary Kogers Distnsses Forthcoming U.S.- 
U.S.S.il. Talks on Curbing Strategic Arms 
(news conference) 389 

US and U.S.S.R. Announce Preliminary Arms 
Talks 390 

Economic Affairs. Seventh Annual Review of 
the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement 
(Brodie) -tO^ 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Aircraft To Assist in Famine 
Relief in Chad (Department statement) . . 403 

Human Rights. Department Releases Publica- 
tion of Human Rights Year Commission . . 408 

India. Second Round of Bilateral Talks With 
India Held at Washington (joint statement) . 403 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Seventh Annual Review of the Long-Term 
Cotton Textile Arrangement (Brodie) . . . 404 

Iran. President Nixon and the Shah of Iran Hold 
Talks at Washington (Nixon, Pahlavi) . . 39C 

Japan. United States-Japanese Relations Today 

(Johnson) 401 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary 
Rogers Welcomes Atlantic Treaty Associa- 
tion (remarks) -100 

Presidential Documents. President Nixon and 
the Shah of Iran Hold Talks at Washington . 396 

Publications 

Department Releases I'ublication of Human 

Rights Year Ctmimission 408 

Recent Releases 408 

Trade 

Seventh Annual Review of the Long-Term Cot- 
ton Textile .Vrrangement (Brodie) .... 4(^4 

United States-Japanese Relations Today 

(Johnson) 401 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 407 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Roger.s Discusses Forthcoming U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Talks on Curbing Strategic Arms 
(news conference) 389 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Announce Preliminary Arms 
Talks 390 

Viet-Nam 

The Deep Concern for Peace in Viet-Nam 

(Rogers) 394 



39th Plenai-y Session on Viet-Nam Held at I'aris 

(Lodge) 39.-5 

A'awc Indea- 

Brodie, Henry 404 

Johnson, U. Alexis 401 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 39.5 

Nixon, President 396 

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 396 

Rogers, Secretary 389,394,400 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to October 20 \\hich ap- 
(lears in this issue of the Bu'LLETIN is No. 308 of 
October 17. 



No. 



Date 



Subject 

*300 10/20 Program for tlie visit of the Shall 
of Iran. 

310 10/20 Rogers: Atlantic Treaty Associa- 

tion. 

311 10/20 Rogers : "Family of JIan" Award 

ceremony. 

312 10/22 John.son : U.S.-Japan (iovernors 

meeting. 
f'ilo 10,'22 I'.S. and Republic of China amend 
air agreement. 

314 l(»/22 Department relea.ses "For Free 

>Ien in a Free World — A Survey 
of Hiunan Rights in the United 
States." 

315 10/23 Lodge : 39th plenary meeting on 

A'iet-Nam at Paris. 
t316 10/24 U.S.-Costa Rica cotton textile 

agreement. 
*317 10/24 Knox sworn in as Ambassador to 

Haiti ( biographic data ) . 
318 10/25 Rogers : news conference. 



* Not printed. 



t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF 




N AVT O 

20YEARS OF PEACE 



i 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



Boston Public Library 
ouperintendeat of Documents 



BULLETIN 



DEPOSITORY 



Vol. LXI, No. 1586 




November 17, 1969 



ACTION FOR PROGRESS FOR THE AMERICAS 
Address by President Nixon 409 

DEPARTMENT PRESENTS VIEWS ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA 

/Statement hy Assistant Secretary Newsom 422 



THE NATO COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY: 
RESPONSE TO A COMJNION ENVIRONMENTAL PERIL 

hy Daniel P. Moynihan 416 



For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1586 
November 17, 1969 



I 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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PRICE: 

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Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of tho Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1960). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the .source -will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as icell as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative nuiterial in the field of inter- 
national relations arc listed currently. 



I 



Action for Progress for the Americas 



Address hi/ President Nixon ^ 



As we stand here on this 25th-anuiversary 
meeting of tlie Inter American Press Associa- 
tion, I should like to be pex-mitted some per- 
sonal comments before I then deliver my 
prepared remarks to you. 

I have learned that this is the first occasion 
in which the remarks of the President of any 
one of the American nations has been carried 
and is being carried live by Telstar to all of the 
nations in the hemisphere. We are proud that 
it is before the Inter American Press Associa- 
tion. I am sure that those of you, and I know 
that most of you here are members and pub- 
lishers of the newspaper profession, will not be 
jealous if this is on television tonight. 

Also, I am vei-y privileged to appear before 
tliis organization again. I was reminded it was 
15 years ago that I, as Vice President, addressed 
the organization in New Orleans. It is good to 
be with you tonight, and particularly as the 
outgoing President is an old friend, Mr. Ed- 
wards [Augustin E. Edwards, president. El 
Mercvrio'\ from Santiago. The new President is 
also an old friend, Mr. Copley [James Copley, 
president, Copley Press] from San Diego — 
sister cities, one in the Northern Hemisphere 
of the Americas and the other in the Southern 
Hemisphere. 

There is one other remark that Mrs. Ed- 
wards brought eloquently to my attention as 
we heard that magnificent rendition by the 
Army Chorus of "America the Beautiful." 
She said, "That is for all of us. We are all 
Americans in this room." 

It is in that spirit that I want to address 
my remarks tonight to our partnership in the 
Americas. In doing so, I wish to place before 
you some suggestions for reshaping and re- 
invigorating that partnership. 



' Made before the Inter American Press Association 
at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 31 (White House press 
release). 



Often we in the United States have been 
charged with an overweening confidence in the 
rightness of our own prescriptions, and occa- 
sionally we have been guilty of the charge. I 
intend to correct that. Therefore, my words 
tonight are meant as an invitation by one part- 
ner for further interchange, for increased com- 
munication, and, above all, for new imagination 
in meetmg our shared responsibilities. 

For years, we in the United States have pur- 
sued the illusion that we alone could remake 
continents. Conscious of our wealth and tech- 
nology, seized by the force of good intentions, 
driven by habitual impatience, remembering 
the dramatic success of tlie Marshall Plan in 
postwar Europe, we have sometimes imagined 
that we knew what was best for everyone else 
and that we could and should make it happen. 

Well, experience has taught us better. It has 
taught us that economic and social development 
is not an achievement of one nation's foreign 
policy, but something deeply rooted in each 
nation's own traditions. It has taught us that 
aid that infringes pride is no favor to any 
nation. It has taught us that each nation, and 
each region, must be true to its own character. 

"Wliat I hope we can achieve, therefore, is a 
more mature partnership in which all voices are 
heard and none is predominant, a partnership 
guided by a healthy awareness that give-and- 
take is better than take-it-or-leave-it. 

My suggestions this evening for new direc- 
tions toward a more balanced relationship come 
from many sources. 

First, they are rooted in my personal con- 
victions. I have seen the problems of tliis hemi- 
sphere. As those in this room know, I have 
\'isited every nation in this hemisphere. I have 
seen them at first hand. I have felt the surging 
spirit of those nations — determined to break 
the grip of outmoded structures, yet equally de- 
termined to avoid social disintegration. Free- 



November 17, 1969 



409 



doni, justice, a chance for each of our people to 
live a better and more abundant life — these are 
goals to which I am unshakably committed; 
because progress in our hemisphere is not only a 
practical necessity, it is a moral imperative. 

Second, these new approaches lia\e been sub- 
stantially shaped by the report of Governor 
Rockefeller, who, at my request and at your 
invitation, listened perceptively to the voices 
of our neighbors and incorjjorated their 
thoughts into a set of foresighted proposals. 

Third, they are consistent with thoughts ex- 
pressed in the Consensus of Viiia del Mar, 
which we have studied with great care. 

Fourth, they have benefited from the counsel 
of many persons in government and out, in this 
country and throughout the hemisphere. 

And finally, basically, they reflect the con- 
cern of the people of the United States for the 
development and progress of a hemisphere 
which is new in spirit and which — through our 
efforts together — we can make new in accom- 
plishment. 

Actions Representing a New Approach 

Tonight I offer no grandiose promises and no 
panaceas. 

I do offer action. 

The actions I propose represent a new ap- 
proach. They are based on five principles : 

— First, a firm conunitment to the inter- 
American system, to the compacts which bind 
us in that system, as exemplified by the Orga- 
nization of American States and by the 
principles so nobly set forth in its charter. 

— Second, respect for national identity and 
national dignity in a partnership in which 
rights and responsibilities are shared by a com- 
munity of independent states. 

— Tliird, a firm commitment to continued 
United States assistance for hemispheric de- 
velopment. 

— Fourth, a belief that the principal future 
pattern of this assistance must be U.S. support 
for Latin American initiatives and that this can 
best be achieved on a multilateral basis witliin 
the inter- American system. 

— Finally, a dedication to improving the qual- 
ity of life in this New World of ours — to making 
people the center of our concerns and to helping 
meet their economic, social, and human needs. 

We have heard many voices from the Ameri- 



cas in these first months of our new administra- 
tion — voices of hope, voices of concern, and 
some voices of frustration. 

We have listened. 

These voices have told us they wanted fewer 
promises and more action. They have told us 
that the United States aid programs seemed to 
have helped the United States more than Latin 
America. They have told us that our trade 
policies were insensitive to the needs of other 
American nations. They have told us that if our 
partnership is to thrive or even to survive, we 
must recognize that the nations of the Americas 
must go forward in their own way imder their 
own leadership. 

Now, it is not my purpose here tonight to dis- 
cuss the extent to which we consider the various 
charges that I have listed right or wrong. But 
I recognize the concerns. I share many of them. 
What I propose tonight is, I believe, respon- 
sive to those concerns. 

The most pressing concerns center on eco- 
nomic development and especially on the poli- 
cies by wMch aid is administered and by which 
trade is regulated. 

In proposing specific changes tonight, I mean 
these as examples of the actions I believe are 
possible in a new kind of partnership in the 
Americas. 

Management of Development Assistance 

Our partnership should be one in which the 
United States lectures less and listens more. It 
should be one in which clear, consistent proce- 
dures are established to ensure that the shaping 
of the future of the nations in the Americas 
reflects the will of those nations. 

I believe this requires a number of changes. 

To begin with, it requires a fundamental 
change in the way in which we manage develop- 
ment assistance in the hemisphere. 

That is whj' I propose that a multilateral 
inter-American agency be given an increasing 
share of responsibility for development assist- 
ance decisions. CIAP — the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress — could 
be given this new fimction. Or an entirely new 
agency could be created within the system. 

Wliatever the form, the objective would be 
to evolve an effective multilatei-al framework 
for bilateral assistance, to provide the agency 
with an expert international staff, and, over 
time, to give it major operational and decision- 
making responsibilities. 



410 



Department of State Bulletin 



The other American nations themselves 
would thus jointly assume a primary role in 
setting priorities within the hemisphere, in de- 
veloping realistic programs, in keeping their 
own performance under critical review. 

Access to Expanding Markets 

One of the areas most urgently in need of new 
policies is the area of trade. In my various trips 
to the Latin American countries and other 
American countries, I have found that this has 
been uppermost on the minds of the leaders for 
many, many years. In order to finance their im- 
port needs and to achieve self-sustaining 
growth, the other American nations must ex- 
pand their exports. 

Most Latin American exports now are raw 
materials and foodstuffs. We are attempting to 
help the other countries of the hemisphere 
to stabilize their earnings from these exports, to 
increase them as time goes on. 

Increasingly, however, those countries will 
have to turn more toward manufactured and 
semimanufactured products for balanced devel- 
opment and major export growth. Thus they 
need to be assured of access to the expanding 
markets of the industrialized world. In order to 
help achieve this, I have determined to take the 
following major steps : 

— First, to lead a vigorous effort to reduce 
the nontariff barriers to trade maintained by 
nearly all industrialized countries against prod- 
ucts of particular interest to Latin America and 
other developing countries. 

— Second, to support increased technical and 
financial assistance to promote Latin American 
trade expansion. 

— Third, to support the establishment within 
the inter-American system of regular proce- 
dures for advance consultation on trade mat- 
ters. United States trade policies often have a 
very heavy impact on our neighbors. It seems 
only fair that in the more balanced relationship 
we seek, there should be full consultation within 
the hemisphere family before decisions affecting 
its members are taken, not after. 

— Finally, and most important, in world 
trade forums, I believe it is time to press for a 
liberal system of generalized tariff preferences 
for all developing countries, including Latin 
America. We will seek adoption by all of the 
industrialized nations of a scheme with broad 
product coverage and with no ceilings on pref- 



erential imports. We will seek equal access to 
industrial markets for all developing countries 
so as to eliminate the discrimination against 
Latin America that now exists in many coun- 
tries. We will also urge that such a system elim- 
inate the inequitable "reverse preferences" that 
now discriminate against Western Hemisphere 
coimtries. 

Restrictions on Assistance Loans Reduced 

There are three other important economic is- 
sues that directly involve the new partnership 
concept and which a number of our partners 
have raised. They raised them with me and 
raised them with Governor Eockefeller, with 
the Secretary of State and others in our 
administration. 

These are : "tied" loans, debt service, and re- 
gional economic integration. 

For several years now, virtually all loans 
made under United States aid programs have 
been "tied"; that is, as you know, they have 
been encumbered with restrictions designed to 
maintain United States exports, including a re- 
quirement that the money be spent on purchases 
in the United States. 

These restrictions have been burdensome for 
the borrowers. They have impaired the effective- 
ness of the aid. In June I ordered the most 
cumbersome restrictions removed.^ 

In addition, I announce tonight that I am 
now ordering that, effective November 1, loan 
dollars sent to Latin America under AID be 
freed to allow purchases not only here but any- 
where in Latin America. 

As a third step, I am also ordering that all 
other onerous conditions and restrictions on 
U.S. assistance loans be reviewed with the ob- 
jective of modifying or eliminating them. 

If I might add a personal word, this decision 
on freeing AID loans is one of those things 
that people kept saying ought to be done but 
could not be done. In light of our own balance- 
of-payments problems, there were compelling 
arguments against it. I can assure you that 
within the administration we had a very vigor- 
ous session on this subject. But I felt, and the 
rest of my colleagues within the administra- 
tion felt, that the needs of the hemisphere had 
to come first, so I simply ordered it done, show- 



21. 



' For background, see Buixetest of July 14, 1969, p. 



November 17, 1969 



411 



ing our commitment in actions latlier than only 
in words. This will be our guiding principle in 
the future. 

We have present many Members of the House 
and Senate here tonight. I am sure they realize 
that there are not too many occasions that the 
I'resident can accomplish something by just 
ordering it to be done. 

Debt Service and Economic Integration 

The growing burden of external debt service 
has increasingly become a major problem of fu- 
ture development. Some countries find them- 
selves making heavy payments in debt service 
which reduce tlie positive effects of development 
aid. Therefore, tonight I suggest that CIAP 
might appropriately urge the international 
financial organizations to recommend possible 
remedies. 

We have seen a number of moves in the 
Americas toward regional economic integra- 
tion, such as the establishment of the Central 
American Common Market, the Latm Ameri- 
can and Caribbean Free Trade Areas, and the 
Andean Group. The decisions on how far and 
how fast this process of integration goes, of 
course, are not ours to make. But I do want to 
stress this : We in the United States stand ready 
to help in this effort if our help is requested and 
is needed. 

On all of these matters, we look forward to 
consulting further with our hemisphere neigh- 
bors and partners. In a major related move, I 
am also directing our representatives to invite 
CIAP, as a regular procedure, to conduct a 
periodic review of U.S. economic policies as 
they affect the other nations of the hemisphere 
and to consult with us about them. 

Similar reviews are now made of the other 
hemisphere countries' policies, as you are 
aware; but the United States has not previ- 
ously opened its policies to such consultation. I 
believe that true partnership requires that we 
should ; and henceforth, if our partners so de- 
sire — as I gather from your applause you do— 
we shall. 

I would like to turn now to a vital subject in 
connection with economic development in the 
hemisphere; namely, the role of private invest- 
ment. Clearly, each government in the Americas 
must make its own decision about the place of 
private investment, domestic and foreign, in 



its development process. Each must decide for 
itself whether it wishes to accept or forgo the 
benefits that private investment can bring. 

Advantages of Private Investment 

For a developing country, consti'uctive for- 
eign private investment has the special advan- 
tage of being a prime vehicle for the transfer 
of teclinology. And certainly from no other 
source is so much investment capital available, 
because capital from government to govern- 
ment on that basis is not expansible. In fact, it 
tends to be more restricted, whereas private 
capital can be greatly expanded. 

As we have seen, liowever, just as a capital- 
exporting nation cannot expect another coun- 
try to accept investors against its will, so must 
a capital-importing country expect a serious 
impairment of its ability to attract investment 
funds when it acts against existing investments 
in a way which runs counter to commonly ac- 
cepted norms of international law and behavior. 
Unfortunately and perhaps unfairly, such acts 
in one of the Americas affect investors in the 
entire region. 

We will not encourage U.S. private invest- 
ment where it is not wanted or where local con- 
ditions face it with unwarranted risks. But I 
must state my own strong belief, and it is this : 
I think that properly motivated private enter- 
prise has a vitally important role to play in 
social as well as economic development in all of 
the nations. We have seen it work in our own 
country. We have seen it work in other coun- 
tries, whether they are developing or developed, 
other countries that lately have been recording 
the world's most spectacular rates of economic 
growth. 

Referring to a completely other area of the 
world, exciting stories of the greatest gi'owth 
rates are those that have turned toward more 
private investment rather than less. Japan we 
all know about, but the story is repeated in 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand. 

In line with this belief we are examining 
ways to modify our direct investment controls 
in order to help meet the investment require- 
ments of developing nations in the Americas 
and elsewhere. I have further directed that our 
aid pi'ograms place increasing emphasis on as- 
sistance to locally owned private enterprise. I 



412 



Department of State Bulletin 



am also directing that we expand our technical 
assistance for establishing national and regional 
capital markets. 

As we all have seen, in this age of rapidly ad- 
vancing science, the challenge of development 
is only partly economic. Science and technology 
increasingly hold the key to our national fu- 
tures. If the promise of this final third of the 
20th century is to be realized, the wonders of 
science must be turned to the service of man. 

In the Consensus of Vina del Mar we were 
asked for an unprecedented effort to share our 
scientific and technical capabilities. 

To that request we shall respond in a true 
spirit of partnership. 

This I pledge to you tonight: Tlie Nation 
that went to the moon in peace for all mankind 
is ready, ready to share its teclinology in peace 
with its nearest neighbors. 

Coordination of U.S. Government Activities 

Tonight I have discussed with you a new 
concept of partnership. I have made a commit- 
ment to act. I have been trying to give some 
examples of actions we are prepared to take. 

But as anyone familiar with government 
knows, commitment alone is not enough. There 
has to be the machinery to ensure an effective 
followthrough. 

Therefore, I am also directing a major re- 
organization and upgrading of the United 
States Government structure for dealing with 
Western Hemisphere affairs. 

As a key element of this — and this is one of 
those areas where the President cannot do it and 
he needs the approval of the Congress — but as 
a key element of this, I have ordered prepara- 
tion of a legislative request, which I will submit 
to the Congress, raising the rank of the Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for Inter- American Af- 
fairs to Under Secretary, thus giving the hem- 
isphere special representation. 

I know that many in this room, 15 years ago, 
urged that upon me, and I see Mr. Pedro Bel- 
tran here particularly applauding. He urged it 
upon me just a few years ago, too. 

I trust we will be able, through the new 
Under Secretary of State, to do a more effective 
job with regard to the problems of the hemi- 
sphere; and the new Under Secretary will be 
given avithority to coordinate all United States 
Government activities in the hemisphere so that 



there will be one window for all of those 
activities. 

And now, my friends in the American family, 
I turn to a sensitive subject. Debates have long 
raged, raged in the United States and else- 
where, as to what our attitude should be toward 
the various forms of government within the 
inter-American system. 

Dealing With Governments As They Are 

Let me sum up my own views very candidly. 

First, my own country lives by a democratic 
system which has preserved its form for nearly 
two centuries. It has its problems. But we are 
proud of our system. We are jealous of our lib- 
erties. We hope that eventually most, perhaps 
all, of the world's people will share what we be- 
lieve to be the blessings of a genuine democracy. 

AVe are aware that most people today in most 
countries of the world do not share those 
blessings. 

I would be less than honest if I did not ex- 
pi'ess my concern over examples of liberty com- 
promised, of justice denied, or of rights 
infringed. 

Nevertheless, we recognize that enormous, 
sometimes explosive, forces for change are oper- 
ating in Latin America. These create instabili- 
ties and bring changes in governments. On the 
diplomatic level, we must deal realistically with 
governments in the inter- American system as 
they are. We have, of course — we in this coun- 
try — a preference for democratic procedures; 
and we hope that each government will help its 
own people to move forward toward a better, a 
fuller, and a freer life. 

In this connection, however, I would stress 
one other point. We cannot have a peaceful com- 
munity of nations if one nation sponsors armed 
subversion in another's territory. The ninth 
meeting of American Foreign Ministers clearly 
enunciated this principle.^ The "export" of rev- 
olution is an intervention which our system 
cannot condone; and a nation, like Cuba, which 
seeks to practice it can hardly expect to share 
in the benefits of this community. 

And now, finally, a word about what all this 
can mean — not just for the Americas but for the 
world. 



= For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 10, 1964, 
p. 179. 



November 17, 1969 



413 



Today, the -world's most fervent hope is for 
a lastmg peace in which life is secure, progress 
is possible, and freedom can flourish. In each 
part of the world we can have lasting peace 
and progress only if the nations directly con- 
cerned take the lead themselves in achieving it, 
and in no part of the world can there be a true 
partnership if one partner dictates its direction. 

I can think of no assembly of nations better 
suited than ours to point the way in developing 
such a partnership. A successfully progressing 
Western Hemisphere, here in this New World, 
demonstrating in action mutual help and mu- 
tual respect, will be an example for the world. 
Once again, by this example, we will stand for 
something larger tlian ourselves. 

For three-quarters of a century, many of us 
have been linked together in the Organization 
of American States and its predecessors in a 
joint quest for a better future. Eleven years 
ago. Operation Pan America was launched as a 
Brazilian initiative. More recently, we have 
joined in a noble Alliance for Progress, whose 
principles still guide us. Now I suggest our 
goal for the seventies should be a decade of 
Action for Progress for the Americas. 

As we seek to forge a new partnership, we 
must recognize that we are a community of 
widely diverse peoples. Our cultures are differ- 
ent. Our perceptions are often different. Our 
emotional reactions are often different. May it 
always be that way. What a dull world it would 
be if we were all alike. Partnership, mutu- 
ality — these do not flow naturally. We have to 
work at them. 

Understandably perhaps, a feeling has arisen 
in many Latin American countries tliat the 
United States really "no longer cares." 

My answer to that is very simple. 

We do care. I care. I have visited most of 
your countries, as I have said before. I have met 
most of your leaders. I have talked with your 
people. I have seen your great needs as well 
as your great achievements. 

And I know this, in my heart as well as in 
my mind : If peace and freedom are to endure 
in this world, there is no task more urgent 
than lifting up the hungry and the helpless and 
putting flesh on the dreams of those who yearn 
for a better life. 

Today, we in this American community share 
an historic opportunity. 



As we look together down the closing decades 
of the century, we see tasks that summon the 
very best that is in us. But those tasks are diffi- 
cult, precisely because they do mean the differ- 
ence between despair and fulfillment for most 
of the 600 million people who will live in Latin 
America in the year 2000. Those lives are our 
challenge. Those lives are our hope. And we 
could ask no prouder reward than to have our 
efforts crowned by peace, prosperity, and dig- 
nity in the lives of those GOO million human 
beings in Latin America — and in the United 
States — each so precious, each so unique — our 
children and our legacy. 



40th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following are texts of the opening statement 
and supplementary remarks made hy Ambas- 
sador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the U.S. 
delegation, at the 40th plenary session of the 
meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on October 30. 



OPENING STATEMENT 

Press release 322 dated October 30 

Ladies and gentlemen : As I said at our last 
meeting, you of the other side have done noth- 
ing in our 39 plenary sessions but demand uni- 
lateral actions by us and engage in vituperative 
language. You have shown no desire to engage 
in genuine negotiations. In all this time you 
have allowed agreement only on the shape of 
the table. The plenary meetings have served 
only as a propaganda forum — not as a peace 
forum. 

We need a new approach to break out of this 
sterile situation and promote serious negotia- 
tions. Therefore, in agreement with the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the 
United States proposes that on next Tuesday, 
November 4, the four principal spokesmen, 
each accompanied by no more than three ad- 
visers, meet in a restricted session at 10 :30 a.m. 
here at the Majestic Hotel. At this session and 
any subsequent ones, each spokesman can raise 
any subject he wishes. There would be no public 



414 



Department of State Bulletin 



release of the recoi-d of what is said at such 
meetings, but we could agree on exactly what 
would be said to the press after each session. 



SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS 



ings will participate. Unlike your side, we seek 
to exclude no one from such talks. Therefore, 
my proposal remains pending in the hope that 
at some future date you will be able to respond 
to it in a more constructive way. 



Press release 323 dated October 30 

Ladies and gentlemen : First, as to the ques- 
tion of United States withdrawal from South 
Viet-Nam. I will remind you of the proposal 
made by President Nixon on May 14, and pre- 
sented here. The United States is prepared to 
reach agreement on the withdrawal of all non- 
South Vietnamese forces from South Viet-Nam. 
On May 14 the President said : ^ 

— Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, 
the major portions of all U.S., Allied, and other non- 
Sonth Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the 
end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., Allied, 
and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move 
into designated base areas and would not engage In 
combat operations. 

— The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would move 
to complete their withdrawals as the remaining 
North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and re- 
turned to North Viet-Nam. 

— An international supervisory body, acceptable to 
both sides, would be created for the purpose of verify- 
ing withdrawals and for any other purposes agreed 
upon between the two sides. 

If you have an alternative timetable for 
mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese 
forces, we are prepared to consider it. 

This concludes what I have to say about your 
first question. 

I urge you to give our proposal made today 
for restricted meetings more careful considera- 
tion. Your response is sure to raise grave doubts 
about your readiness to negotiate genuinely 
with all the parties concerned. Your refusal to 
accept reasonable ways to work toward a peace- 
ful solution of the war in Viet-Nam is regretta- 
ble indeed. 

For our part, we will remain ready to engage 
in genuine negotiations. We are ready to carry 
on direct talks, privately or publicly, in which 
all those represented on each side at these meet- 



' For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
May 14, see Builetin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



President Nixon Congratulates 
Chancellor Brandt of Germany 

Following is the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Nixon to Chancellor Willy Brandt of tJie 
Federal Republic of Ger-many. 

White House press release dated October 21 

October 21, 1969 

Deak Mr. Chancellor: It gives me great 
pleasure to congratulate you on your elevation 
to the high office of Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. You have already done 
much for your people, as Governing Mayor of 
Berlin and as Foreign Minister and Vice Chan- 
cellor. The admiration and respect you have won 
throughout the world in these earlier capacities 
promises much for the discharge of the even 
greater and more challenging duties you have 
now assumed. I think you are aware of the con- 
fidence you have enjoyed in this country for 
many years. 

In our complex and difficult world today, I 
particularly value such elements of stability as 
the close relationship that exists between the 
United States and the Federal Eepublic of Ger- 
many. I attribute the highest importance to the 
maintenance of this relationship, which I am 
convinced must be based on mutual understand- 
ing and confidence. Whenever occasion war- 
rants, I would like to feel free to consult with 
you directly on matters of mutual interest. I will 
welcome it if you will do the same. 

I look forward to the prospect of working 
with you in the interest of those objectives 
which join our two countries in responsibility as 
well as friendship. 

With warm personal regards. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 



November 17, 1969 



415 



The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society: 
Response to a Common Environmental Peril 

hy Daniel P. Moynihan ^ 



There is to be encountered in one of the novels 
of Benjamin Disraeli a gentleman described as 
one "distinguished for ignorance" as he had but 
one idea and that was wi-ong. As with much else, 
this curiosity of the 19th century has become 
rather a commonplace of the 20th. It is the na- 
ture of the complex technological societies that 
have developed in our century that no one thing 
about them is so especially and importantly time 
that other truths are of necessity subordinate. 
This in turn has had its effect on the way we 
think about our societies, of those problems we 
inherit from the past and tliose we have created 
in the present. Every truth has its antitruth, its 
qualifying truth, its mediating truth. Hence the 
only certainty is that the man with a single 
ti-uth is not only sure to be wrong but likely to 
be disastrously so. 

It is in this spirit that I rise to address the 
North Atlantic Assembly, conscious both of the 
honor of doing so and the trust, implicitly im- 
posed and explicitly acknowledged, that in 
speaking of the Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society, to be established as the new- 
est subsidiary body of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, I shall do so with careful regard 
to the earlier and stUl primary tasks of the alli- 
ance and also of the necessary interrelationship 
among all its activities. 

The proposal for the creation of the commit- 
tee was, of course, first put forward by Presi- 
dent Xixon in his address last April on the oc- 
casion of the 20th anniversary of NATO : ^ 



' Address made before the North Atlantic Assembly 
at Brussels on Oct. 21. Mr. Moynihan, Assistant for 
Urban Affairs to President Nixon, has been designated 
by the President as U.S. Representative on the NATO 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 349. 



The industrial nations share no challenge more 
urgent than that of bringing 20th-century man and his 
environment to terms with one another — of making the 
world iit for man and helping man learn how to remain 
in harmony with the rapidly changing world. 

Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty may 
have envisaged such activity, pledging the par- 
ties to cooperate in "promoting conditions of 
stability and well-being." But that was 1949; 
and for Europe, as for much of the world, 
stability and well-being meant military security 
combined with the rudiments of economic re- 
coverj'. It is only as these two conditions have 
gradually been secured, especially that of eco- 
nomic growth, wliich is to say tecluiological de- 
velopment, that a third dimension of the great 
alliance has emerged not only as a feasible and 
possible effort but increasingly as an urgent and 
necessary one. 

Military defense and political consultation 
are, and will continue to be, the first functions 
of the alliance. But the time clearly is at 
hand to add a third dimension, provided for 
from the outset but only now emerging as a 
concern and activity in its own right. That the 
United States regards this as a matter of the 
higliest importance will have been obvious 
from the President's proposal and subsequent 
consultations that have taken place with Allied 
governments. It would seem important, how- 
ever, to go beyond the simple assei'tion of this 
concern to a fuller explication of it. 

There could be no more appropriate forum 
in which to do so than the North Atlantic 
Assembly. It is, in general, the tradition of our 
democracies that the executive branch of func- 
tion in government is accountable to the legis- 
lative component and that tliis responsibility 
is in part met by periodic expositions as to 
what is proposed and why. The North Atlantic 



416 



Department of State Bulletin 



Assembly, if not the parliament of NATO, is 
unquestionably composed of NATO parlia- 
mentarians. It is owed a measure of account- 
ability by virtue both of the general principles 
of governance whicli shape and inform our 
actions and of the specific nature of the work 
of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society, which will require in such great meas- 
j ure the assent, support, and judgment of the 
legislatures of our several nations. 

In speaking to this point, I would hope to 
reflect, without of course in any way com- 
mitting them, the views of the representa- 
tives from other nations with whom I was 
associated in the meeting of the preparatory 
committee that drew up a charter for the Com- 
mittee on the Challenges of Modern Society. 

The Newest Dimension of Freedom 

The first and continuing challenge of mod- 
ern society is to safeguard freedom and, in an 
important sense, to expand it. The history of 
freedom in the Western World is not that of 
a fully formed idea gradually winning wider 
and more complete acceptance. To the contrary, 
the meaning of freedom, the content of the idea, 
has evolved through two early stages and is 
now manifestly entering a third. This evolu- 
tion lias been from simple to complex forms. 
It began with the securing of personal liberties 
for tlie individual. It went on to the assertion, 
and gradual establishment, of political liber- 
ties of the kind we associate with the democratic 
state. It has now moved beyond that into the 
elusive, often ambiguous, but extraordinarily 
challenging effort to provide a quality of life 
that releases the unique potential of every in- 
dividual while maintaining a coherent and 
sustaining sense of community that binds one 
individual to another. 

It will be evident enough that this is not an 
easy thing to do; it is not even an easy thing 
to define. But neither, then, were civil rights, 
or political freedoms, in the eras when they 
were evolving in the face of persistent incom- 
prehension, hostility, and resistance — attitudes 
that continue to rule in far too great a portion 
of the world today. Wliat is different, what is 
singular, about the evolution of this newest 
dimension of freedom is that it is so extraor- 
dinarily dependent on the element of time. 
This is new, different. It is a fact, moreover, 
indispensable to an imderstanding of the chal- 
lenge before us. 



The newest dimension of freedom arises in 
the context of advancing technology. More ac- 
curately, it arises from advancing technology. 
First the folk teclmology of the early industrial 
revolution, and later the ever-mounting and 
more systematic application of scientific knowl- 
edge to practical problems, have created an 
almost worldwide vision of societies of material 
plenty in which individvial men become all they 
are capable of being. Personal liberty and 
democratic government would be the precondi- 
tions of such societies, but their unique achieve- 
ment would be measured by the degi'ee to which 
the men and women comprising them lived 
large, creative, and fulfilling lives. 

This is a very large vision indeed. The dif- 
ficulty with it is that it exists in the context of 
time constraints that make it, for a vision at 
once so powerful, also extraordinarily fragile. 
This is so, in a word, because the teclmology that 
created it only hours ago, in the history of man- 
kind, threatens to destroy it only hours from 
now. Therein lies the difference between the 
evolution of this dimension of freedom and that 
of earlier ones. If habeas corpus was slow in 
coming, the reality, once it did arrive, was not 
diminished by the time that elapsed. And if 
thereafter it disappeared in this place or that, it 
could still return, again undiminished. Much 
the same can be said of the processes of political 
democracy. We have seen democratic societies 
broken, only to be made again and made whole. 
But technology has seemingly little patience 
witli manldnd. It seems to be offering us every- 
thing or nothing and demanding that we make 
our choice almost this very moment. 

The Central Problem of the Modern Age 

There is, I believe, a not especially compli- 
cated explanation for this. Just as advancing 
teclmology has given rise to the central social 
vision of our age, so also has it become the cen- 
tral problem of the age. In massive and domi- 
nant proportion, the things that threaten 
modern society are the first, second, third, of 
whichever order effects of new teclmology. It 
is not that man has changed, has become any 
more irrational, any less inliibited by concerns 
of moral right and wrong. One must assume 
that man is no different now than he has ever 
been with respect to these primal failings. What 
has changed, simply, is that technology has 
created a world situation in which irrational and 
immoral behavior can and does lead to cata- 
ch"smic consequences. 



November 17, 1969 



417 



For a quarter century now, mankind has lived 
•with the possibility of the ultimate technologi- 
cal disaster, that of the nuclear holocaust. But 
more recently, it has come to be perceived that 
this would be only the most spectacular of the 
fates that might await us. The perils of the 
modern age are wondrous and protean and, if 
anything, accumulating. An ecological crisis is 
surely upon us — and developing at quite ex- 
traordinary rates. Thus we may expect that by 
the year 2000 the carbon dioxide content of the 
atmosphere, the result of the burning of fossil 
fuels, will have increased by a quarter. This 
cmild raise the temperature of the earth's atmos- 
phere by 7 degrees Fahrenheit. Thw would 
likely raise the level of seas by 10 feet — there- 
by solving some of the urban problems of the 
world but hardly improving the circumstance 
of mankind. No one is certain, of course, that 
this will happen. The computer will doubtless 
figure it out but as yet has not done so. In the 
meantime, alternative theories and some evi- 
dence suggest that the earth's albedo is being 
affected by pollutants in such a way as to lower 
temperatures. Fire or ice, as Robert Frost said ; 
either way, trouble. In another area, the popu- 
lation trend makes its steady way toward cul- 
tural, if not biologic, catastrophe, and very pos- 
sibly to both. Examples abound. 

A publication of the European Cultural 
Foundation, headed by Prince Bernhard of the 
Netherlands, recently observed that industrial 
technology, which was the creation of European 
civilization, had become the foremost threat to 
its survival. As much or more may be said of the 
United States. Technology has been the great 
American art, the true Apollonian passion of 
our people. (I speak, jmri pass^/, as a member of 
the American Philosophical Society, which 
Benjamin Franklin founded in 1743 in Phila- 
delphia not for tlie pursuit of large abstractions 
concerning man's fate but rather, in the words 
of our charter, "for promoting useful knowl- 
edge.") Our passion has rarely flagged; and it 
may, I think, be fairly stated that few peoples 
have been more successful in that quest — nor 
got more things they hadn't bargained for. 
(Only 3 days ago a symbolic pinnacle of sorts 
was reached. The Secretary of Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare announced that an ingredient 
in soft drinks used by millions of Americans to 
ward off the perils of overweight in an affluent 
society has on closer examination turned out, 
with disturbing frequency, to cause cancer in 
animals.) 



Increasingly these separate phenomena are 
seen and described as crises. Yet it would be the 
most prof oimd mistake to view them separately. 
In the words of the American physicist John 
Piatt : "There is only one crisis in the world. It 
is the crisis of transformation" — that is to say, 
of the change wrought in society by the intro- 
duction of technology. "Teclmology," Piatt con- 
tinues, "did not create human conflicts and in- 
equities, but it has made them unendurable." 
And it has raised questions as to whether man 
himself will endure. Some years ago Leo Szilard 
estimated the half-life of mankind — to employ 
that useful term of the nuclear physicist — at 
something between 10 and 20 years. Piatt would 
argue that situation is worse today : 

I think multiplication of domestic and international 
crises today will shorten that short half-life. In the 
continued absence of better ways of heading off these 
multiple crises, our half-life may no longer be 10 
or 20 years, but more likely 5 to 10 years, or less. We 
may have even less than a 50-50 chance of living until 
1980. 

And yet our situation, if sorely pressed, is 
anything but hopeless. To the contrary we may 
be approaching the leveling-out point of a great 
S curve. If we get through the next 30 years or 
so we may just have accomplished that great 
transformation, whence we would enter a new 
period of stability offering the utmost promise 
for mankind. 



The Demands on Government 

There is no reason tliis should not be so — no 
reason the outcome should not be that. But such 
deliverance is not certain, probably not even 
likely, to come to pass if modern societies do not 
begin a quite imprecedented effort to ensure that 
it does. The impact of technology on society can 
only be mediated by the effective use of govern- 
ment. This amounts to saying that modem gov- 
ernment must be made to direct itself to these 
issues and to do so successfully. It must be made 
to work. 

It isn't working very well. Or perhaps the 
more accurate thing is to say that it isn't work- 
ing well enough. There is, I would hazard, 
hardly one of our nations that is not seized with 
the extraordinary difficulty of making modem 
government work — of bringing about the actual 
results which the societies in question desire and 
which they were thought able to command. 

Wliy is this ? Again I tliink there is a not espe- 
cially complicated answer. Modem governments 
fail because they are not modem. They face the 



418 



Department of State Bulletin 



problems created by technology with the men- 
tality and the organization of a pretechnologi- 
cal society. 

A variety of responses can be made to such a 
condition, all but one of which would seem 
doomed, even committed, to failure. The 
demands on pretechnological systems of govern- 
ment cannot be met by rendering them even 
more simplistic and disoriented or yet by mak- 
ing them more rigid and ideological. Only 
technology can cope with technology. What sci- 
ence has wrought only a liigher science can 
reshape. 

Modem government requires first of all the 
application of knowledge to problems. It re- 
quires, if you will, the art of technology. The 
essence of that art is the steady production of 
new knowledge and the rapid transition from 
new knowledge to new realities in the form of 
changed teclinology. The task of government 
is to keep abreast of such new realities, which 
is to say that government has got to learn to re- 
spond to new knowledge at at least something 
like the rate at which technology does. Other- 
wise technology is always ahead on creating 
problems, and government is always behind on 
resolving them. (To take the process a further 
step, modem govermnent must learn to respond 
to teclmologically induced difficulties with some- 
thing of the same economy of talent that tech- 
nology has devised. We cannot go on devising 
government arrangements that only extraordi- 
nary men can make work. Most of the work of 
the world has to be done by men of average 
endowment, energy, and social vision.) 

Advent of the NATO Committee 

Each of our governments is in one way or 
another struggling with this situation. With the 
advent of the North Atlantic Alliance Commit- 
tee on the Challenges of Modern Society, how- 
ever, it becomes possible to introduce a further 
measure of international cooperation into such 
efforts. 

Why NATO? 

There are any number of complex and subtle 
subsidiary answers to this query, but the pri- 
mai-y answer could not be more direct : because 
it is there. NATO is unique. For almost two 
decades now it has carried on, at ever-increasing 
levels of complexity, a massive system of tech- 
nology transfer. There has been no such sus- 
tained experience in the history of the world. If 
technology is the issue, NATO is imiquely the 



forum in which to raise it. Moreover, if the issue 
is one of pressing urgency which somehow does 
not seem to command the attention it deserves, 
NATO is doubly appropriate ; for here is an in- 
stitution which year in and year out has been 
able to command attention and response at the 
highest levels of government. 

What are the specifics ? 

This will of course be for the Council of 
NATO to decide, having received proposals 
from the committee, but the interests of the al- 
lies are already emerging. They deal with the 
degradation of the environment through pollu- 
tion, the complex interaction of technology on 
individual and group motivation, the compel- 
ling issues of nutrition, the pressing matter of 
population growth, and the use of space. It 
may be possible, for example, to begin a system- 
atic inquiry into the impact on modern society 
of the automobile, which may be said to have 
had led to more of what economists call exter- 
nalities than any phenomenon of the age save 
modem warfare itself. Surely it will be neces- 
sary to consider the whole matter of inadvertent 
weather changes. And very early one would 
hope to see some recognition of the matter of 
ocean pollution, for the North Atlantic itself 
is no more immune to environmental degrada- 
tion than the now pathetic streams that once 
proudly flowed by the great cities of our nations. 
But examples abound ; the question is really one 
of operating procedure. 

Our opportunities are twofold. First, we can 
envision a kind of trade springing up among 
the allies. The law of comparative advantage 
can come into effect : As one nation learns better 
to cope with this problem, another with that, 
these abilities can be exchanged to the benefit 
of both. To some extent this process already 
takes place ; ours are anything but closed socie- 
ties, and two decades of the alliance have 
brought them much closer together. But the 
great fact of the age is that time is short, and 
governments must get about their business 
with far greater urgency and effectiveness than 
they have done. The second benefit will come 
from common imdertakings, agreements to act 
in concert with respect to this or that difficulty 
or opportunity as such present themselves. This 
has been the great feat of the alliance with 
respect to matters of defense and political con- 
sultation. It can become a not less important 
feature of our response to the common perU 
of a threatened and threatening environment. 

Perhaps our first need is to develop far more 



November 17, 1969 



419 



complex and yet workable analyses of just how 
our economic, social, and political systems 
work. The possibilities of technology, the re- 
quirements of society, and the structure of 
policymaking have to be coupled with far 
greater sensitivity than has ever been the case 
in the past. (This is not at all to suggest that 
any one component must direct the others, but 
only that they must be related. In the words 
of President Kennedy : ^ '"Scientists alone can 
establish the objectives of their research, but 
society, in extending support to science, must 
take account of its own needs.") In doing so, 
these couplings become critical — more inter- 
esting and in ways more important, as Dr. 
E. Pestel of the NATO Science Committee has 
observed, than the components themselves. An 
enormous task, but it is almost the nature of 
technology that what can be described can be 
created, and we should not in the least doubt 
that it is something we can do if we will it. 

It is, at all events, the view of the American 
Government that we can and should. Not every 
nation will see the Committee on Challenges of 
IModem Society in these terms, and the commit- 
tee when it comes into being will not only reflect 
the views of all governments but will doubtless 
evolve in ways none can now foresee. (Most cer- 
tainly, for one thing, it will be the desire of 
many nations to see that the activities of the 
North Atlantic Alliance CCMS draw upon and 
add to the work of bodies such as the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment. Hopefully, the CCMS will lead to much 
wider ancl more general forms of international 
cooperation, looking, for example, to the United 
Nations Conference on the Environment to be 
held in 1972.) 

It would be unforgivable to annoimce results 
before the committee has even met. It is pre- 
cisely such avoidance of reality that has brought 
us to this time of immediate if only dimly per- 
ceived crisis. But the committee will meet; 
efforts will begin ; results will or will not follow. 
In President Nixon's words, those results will in 
no small measure determine our ability '"to en- 
hance our environments, and not to destroy 
them." As mankind itself is part of those en- 
vironments, the full implication of the outcome 
would seem evident. 



^ For remarks by Presidont Kennedy m.ide at the 
National Academy of Sciences. Washington. D.("., on 
Oct. 22, 190.3, see Bdi.i.etin of Nov. IS. 196.3, p. 77S. 



Southern Yemen Severs Relations 
With the United States 

Department Statement ^ 

We have been hi formed that the Foreign 
Minister of the People's Kepublic of Southern 
Yemen informed our Charge d'Affaires today 
[October 24] that his Government had decided 
to sever relations with the United States. 

The Charge, who is William L. Eagleton, was 
given 24 hours to leave, and the remaining 
members of his staff 48 hours. The total number 
of official Americans, including dependents, is 
37. There are, in addition, some pri\ate Ameri- 
cans there, most of whom are of local origin. 



United States and Japan Discuss 
Protection of Migratory Birds 

The Department of State announced on Octo- 
ber 2 (press release 285) that representatives of 
the Government of Japan were meeting in 
Washington October 1-3 with officials of the 
Departments of State and Interior, the Smith- 
sonian Institution, and a number of United 
States conservation organizations to discuss the 
protection of birds which migrate between the 
two countries and areas under their administra- 
tion. The talks were expected to lead to a con- 
vention for the protection of birds and their 
environment similar to the existing conventions 
with Mexico and Canada. 

The representative of the United States at 
the talks was Donald L. McKernan, Special 
Assistant for Fisheries and AVildlife to the 
Secretary of State, and the alternate representa- 
tive was Jolin S. Gottschalk, Director, Bureau 
of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Department of 
the Interior.- The representative of Japan was 
Shoichi Fukuda, Director, Operations Depart- 
ment, Forestry Agency, and the alternate 
representative was Yoshimaro Yamashina, 
President, Yamashina Institute of Ornithology. 

In 1960, the International Council for Bird 

' Read to news correspondents by Department press 
spokesman Robert .1. MeCloskey on Oct. 24. 

' For names of advisers to the U.S. delegation, see 
Department of State press release 28.5 dated Oct. 2. 



420 



Department of State Bulletin 



Preservation recommended that all nations 
bordering the Pacific conclude arrangements 
to protect migratory birds. In 1968, U.S. and 
Japanese ornithologists met to discuss the data 
compiled in the intervening years. There are an 
estimated 180 species of birds common to lands 
under Japanese or United States jurisdiction. 
Of these, 22 species are not now protected under 
Federal law in the 50 States. 

Major private conservation organizations and 
interested agencies of the Federal and State 
Governments favor a convention with Japan to 
protect migratory birds. A convention would 
not only extend Federal protection and regula- 
tion of hunting to the migratory birds con- 
cerned but would also aid in preserving the 
unique faunas of oceanic islands. 



Intellectual Property Bureaux 
Granted Organization Immunities 

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER' 

Designating the United Inteenational Bttbeattx fob 
THE Protection op Intellectual Peopebty (BIRPI) 
AS A Public International Organization Entitled 
To Enjoy Certain Privileges, Exemptions, and 
Immunities 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 
of the International Organizations Immunities Act, ap- 
proved December 29, 1945 (59 Stat 669), and having 
found that the United States participates in the United 
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property ( BIRPl ) pursuant to the Convention of Paris 
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20th 
March, 1883, as revised, 13 UST 1, and the joint resolu- 
tion approved July 12, 1960, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 
269f, I hereby designate the United International Bu- 
reaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(BIRPI) as a pubUc international organization en- 

'■ No. 11484 ; 34 Fed. Beg. 15837. 



titled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immuni- 
ties conferred by the International Organizations 
Immunities Act 

The designation of the United International Bureaur 
for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) as 
a public international organization veithin the meaning 
of the International Organizations Immunities Act 
shall not be deemed to abridge in any respect privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities which that organization 
may have acquired or may acquire by treaty or con- 
gressional action. 



CfLjL4<K.:/^ 



The White House, 
September 29, 1969. 



President Appoints Mr. Taylor 
to South Pacific Commission 

The President announced on October 8 
(White House press release) his intention to ap- 
point William B. Taylor III as a U.S. Com- 
missioner on the South Pacific Commission. 
(For biographic data, see White House press 
release dated October 8.) He will succeed 
Manuel Guerrero. 

The Commission is an international organi- 
zation founded in 1947 to encourage and 
strengthen international cooperation in pro- 
moting the economic and social welfare and de- 
velopment of the non-self-governing territories 
in the South Pacific. This is to be done in ac- 
cordance with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations. At the present time the 
Commission is made up of representatives from 
the United States, Australia, France, Nauru, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and West- 
em Samoa. 



November 17, 1969 

367-709 — 69 2 



421 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Presents Views on Southern Rhodesia 



Statement hy David D. Newsom 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 



I am pleased to have this chance to present 
the views of the Department and something 
of the background on the difficult pi-oblem of 
Rhodesia. People who have lived in Rhodesia 
for many generations, both white and black, 
consider it their homeland. But the white minor- 
ity, fearful of its own future, seeks to i-etain 
mastery over the black majority in a manner 
that has awakened the deep concern of those 
who wish to see racial barriers removed, not 
erected. 

American policy on Rhodesia rests on the 
basic principles of self-determination and ma- 
jority rule. The Rhodesian unilateral declara- 
tion of independence in November 1965 ran di- 
rectly counter to these basic tenets of policy. 
From the beginning, the actions taken by Mr. 
Ian Smith and his colleagues have made it 
clear that their objective is the iDerpetuation of 
economic and political control by a 4-percent 
European minority over the 4.8 million black 
citizens in Rhodesia. In proposing its new con- 
stitution earlier this year, the Rhodesian regime 
explicitly declared that one of the objex^tives 
was to prevent the advent of majority rule. The 
terms of the constitution which the Rhodesian 
Parliament is now in the process of adopting are 
such that the African population may not ever 
peacefully gain control of the government. 

British opposition to UDI was based not on 
opposition to the idea of independence for 
Rhodesia but on a flat unwillingness to grant 
independence under arrangements which would 
on racial groimds deny basic rights and an effec- 
tive voice in government to 96 percent of the 
population. There is no real parallel between the 
effort at domination by this small white minor- 



' Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Oct. 17. 



ity and our own independence struggle, which 
brought liberty to the great majority in the 
Thirteen Colonies. 

Further, opposition to UDI on our part or 
that of the British was not based on any desire 
to dejjrive the white minority of rights. The 
British in previous negotiations went to very 
great lengths to protect white minority rights, 
and these are the subject of special constitutional 
guarantees in Zambia and Malawi, the other 
parts of the former Federation. 

Primary responsibility for Rhodesia has 
rested and co)itinues to rest with the United 
Kingdom, the legal sovereign. The United 
States nevertheless has interests of its own at 
stake relating to its position in the rest of Africa 
and as a member of the U.N. 

There appeared to be three broad alternatives 
for the British in the face of Ian Smith's imi- 
lateral declaration of independence: military 
action, sanctions, or acquiescence. 

While the African states advocated the im- 
mediate use of force, the British, who would 
have had to carry out such an action, considered 
it impractical for a variety of reasons. They 
wanted to avoid bloodshed if at all possible, and 
they believed they could exert effective influence 
in other ways. 

Acquiescence in and accommodation with 
political control by a small white minority in 
Rhodesia was rejected at once. Crass repudia- 
tion of human and political rights could not be 
countenanced. 

The imposition of economic pressures through 
sanctions while political negotiations were 
underway in search of an acceptable solution to 
the problem was seen by the British as the most 
feasible way to register their opposition and 
that of the international community as a whole 



422 



Department of State Bulletin 



and to bring pressure to bear on the Smith 
regime to come to a reasonable agreement on the 
question of majority rule. It was, however, 
recognized from the start that there would be 
serious problems in making sanctions totally 
effective. 

The United States, being opposed to the un- 
just and increasingly racist policies of the 
Smith regime, has given strong support to the 
position taken by the U.K. and to the manda- 
tory economic sanctions voted by the U.N. Se- 
curity Council.^ We have continued to recognize 
British sovereignty in Rhodesia and regard the 
Smith regime as illegal. We have reduced our 
Salisbury consulate general staff from 21 to 
eight and replaced the consul general with a 
consul; our consvil remains to safeguard U.S. 
interests and to serve the American community 
in Ehodesia ; neither his presence nor his acts 
evidence recognition of the Ehodesian state or 
the Smith regime. We discourage travel by 
Americans to Rhodesia and strictly control the 
release of dollars for use in Rhodesia. We have 
given full support to the imposition of economic 
sanctions against Rhodesia in U.N. discussions 
preceding this action, in voting in the Security 
Council, and subsequently in application of the 
stringent restrictions required by it. The United 
States is second to none in its conscientious ob- 
servance of the sanctions restrictions. 

As a result of our comjjliance with the manda- 
tory U.N. sanctions program, U.S. exchanges 
with Rhodesia have fallen from $33 million in 
1965 to $3.7 million in 1968 (the residual being 
comjjosed of nonsanction goods, mainly medical 
and educational material). We had realized 
when we undertook the sanctions program that 
it would affect certain American firms with 
mining interests in Rhodesia, pai'ticularly 
chrome. But under the circumstances, strong 
action was considered necessary. The U.N. 
sanctions program is, moreover, of a mandatory 
nature, and compliance with it represents a firm 
international obligation. 

In the negotiations wliich took place aboard 
the British warshijis Tiger (1966) and Fearless 
(1968), the British Government offered a vari- 
ety of arrangements to open the way to mean- 
ingful black participation in Rhodesian polit- 
ical life. Many formulas were advanced, and 



' For U.S. statements and texts of resolutions adopted 
by the Security Council on Dec. 16, 1967, and May 29, 
196S, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73, and June 24, 
196S, p. 845. 



the British made very substantial concessions in 
the process, insisting only that the new Rhode- 
sian constitution contain adequate guarantees 
of representative government and the possibility 
of eventual majority rule. Unfortunately, all 
British efforts have thus far proved fruitless; 
Ian Smith has not agi-eed. 

Despite economic difficulties and political 
ostracism, the white Rhodesian minority is mov- 
ing ahead with the adoption of a constitution 
which institutionalizes racial domination and 
denies the African majority any hope of peace- 
fully gaining control of their country's govern- 
ment. The land is to be divided in so-called 
"equal" fashion, half to the black 96 percent of 
the i^opulation and half to the wlute 4 percent. 
Censorship is tightening, police powers are 
being increased, access by the mdividual to the 
courts is being cut off — most particularly by 
legislation broadly authorizing police detention. 
Indeed, the constitution itself enshrines such 
police power at the expense of individual rights. 

The course of these events is of grave con- 
cern to us. A continuation of the Rhodesian 
regime's present policies and course may well 
lead to increasing racial tensions and possibly 
widespread violence. Politically motivated Rho- 
desian Africans are likely to turn increasingly 
to extremist leaders and seek the assistance and 
cooperation of countries, including Communist 
states, which are willing to support extremist 
measures. 

Faced with this situation, for which there is 
no obvious or easy solution, the United States 
has come under strong criticism from various 
quarters. The Africans and many in this coun- 
try have not understood why more dramatic ac- 
tion against the Smith regime was not possible. 
They call for military intervention, and sanc- 
tions against South Africa. 

At the other extreme, it is argued that we 
should support and cooperate with the Smith 
regime. Proponents of tliis position would have 
us ignore our obligations under the United Na- 
tions Charter, arguing that the regime is anti- 
Commimist and in power. 

Neither course is consistent with the U.S. 
national interest. We seek peaceful solutions, 
and we do not wish to create new or expand 
existing areas of armed conflict. We believe com- 
munism cannot be held back by an enclave plii- 
losophy, but only by a broad recognition of 
human rights and dignity and by the espousal 
by and identification of Western nations with 
these values. 



November 17, 1969 



423 



il 



There is no doubt that the sanctions have 
worked hardship on American companies and 
American citizens. We are concerned with 
adverse effects to the U.S. economy which the 
denial of Rhodesian raw material may bring. 
Our present evaluation is that the embargo 
has not created serious economic problems for 
the United States. 

Sanctions have not been totally effective be- 
cause of the noncompliance of South Africa and 
Portugal. To many Africans who do not fully 
recognize the new ground we have broken over 
Ehodesia, we have not gone far enough. An 
early solution to the problem does not seem 
in sight. Nevertheless, we feel that our obliga- 
tions to the Charter of the United Nations and 
our position as a leader of the free world jus- 
tify our present policy. 

Meanwhile, the nations concerned are 
actively seeking to maintain and strengthen the 
economic sanctions program, with the expecta- 
tion that, as this program bites more deeply 
into the Rhodesian economy, the Smith regime 
will see the ultimate necessity of coming to 
terms with the world in which it lives. The 
United States is giving full support to efforts 
in this regard, in the hope that the objective 
may be reached before it is too late. 



Consular Convention With Belgium 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From, President Nixon'^ 

To tTie Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit 
herewith the consular convention between the 
United States of America and the Kingdom of 
Belgivmi, signed at Washington on Septem- 
ber 2, 1969, and two exchanges of notes related 
thereto. 

The convention deals with the conduct of 
consular relations between the two countries 
and the functions, privileges, and immunities 

^ Transmitted on Oct. 8 (White House press release) ; 
also printed as S. Ex. F., 91st Cong., 1st sess., which 
includes the texts of the convention and exchanges of 
notes and the report of the Secretary of State. 



of their respective consular officers. Upon entry 
into force it will replace the consular convention 
of March 9, 1880 between the United States and 
Belgium. Like other recent consular conven- 
tions of the United States, the new convention 
with Belgium covers such important matters 
as the obligations of the two countries to as- 
sure free communication between a citizen and 
his consul, to inform consular officers of the 
arrest or detention of their countrymen, and to 
permit visits by consuls to any of their country- 
men who are in prison. It covers consular func- 
tions and responsibilities in such fields as the 
issuance of visas and passports, and the per- 
formance of notarial services. It provides for 
the inviolability of consular communications, 
documents, and archives, and the obligations of 
the host country to protect consular jiremises 
against intrusion or damage. 

I recommend that the Senate give early and 
favorable consideration to the convention and 
related exchanges of notes and give its advice 
and consent to the ratification thereof. 

I transmit also, for the information of the 
Senate, the report of the Secretary of State with 
respect to the convention and exchanges of 
notes. 



Richard Nixon 



The White House, 
October 8, 1969. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

91 si Congress, 1st Session 

Temporary Extension of Suspension of Duty on Hep- 
tanoic Acid; 1-Month Extension of Existing With- 
hoUling Tax Rates. Report to accompany H.R. 4229. 
S. Rept. 91-279. June 25, 1969. 5 pp. 

Twenty-Fourtli Report of U.S. Advisory Commission 
on Information. H. Doc. 91-133. July 1. 19G9. 12 pp. 

Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead 
Missiles. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Na- 
tional Security Policy and Scientific Developments 
of the House Committee on Foreign AfCairs. July 8- 
August 5, 1969. 302 pp. 

Endangered Species. Report to accompany H.R. 11363. 
H. Rept. 91-382. July IS, 1969. 34 pp. 

Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969. Re- 
port to accomp.iny H.R. 12829. H. Rept. 91-383. 
July 21, 1969. 22 pp. 



424 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Discusses Verification Procedures Under the Draft Treaty 
Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed 

Statement hy James F. Leonard ^ 



In my statement last Tuesday on the tabling 
of the U.S.-U.S.S.K. draft seabed treaty, I said 
that we shall have to work hard in order to be 
able to submit a sound and broadly agreed text 
to the current session of the U.N. General As- 
sembly.^ This applies equally to the Cochair- 
men, who Iiave the responsibility for explaining 
and clarifying the treaty provisions wliich they 
have put forward and the considerations that 
form the basis for the text. We have taken care- 
ful note of the comments of other delegations 
on the treaty text and wish to contmue receiving 
any suggestions other delegations may have. 

I would like today, in order to facilitate full 
understanding, to discuss the factors that under- 
lie my delegation's approach, particularly as 
regards verification, the aspect of the treatj' that 
has received the most attention so far. It is per- 
fectly understandable that this matter should 
be carefully examined, since no responsible gov- 
ermnent could accept an arms limitation unless 
it was confident that the obligations of the 
agreement would be complied with by the other 
parties. Many delegations have commented on 
verification in our plenary meetings, and con- 
siderable informal discussion has also taken 
place. We have also had a detailed presentation 
on this subject in the form of a workmg paper 
submitted by the distinguished Representative 
of Canada.^ 

As I understand the concerns that have been 

' Made before the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament at Geneva on Oct 16. Mr. Leonard is U.S. 
Representative to the conference. 

" For a statement made by Mr. Leonard on Oct. 7 
and the text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. draft treaty, see Bul- 
letin of Nov. 3, 1969, p. 365. 

' CCD/270. 



November 17, 1969 



expressed, there seem to be three points of par- 
ticular interest to a number of delegations : 

First, there is the concern that verification, to 
be adequate, requires a more complete inspec- 
tion of seabed facilities; this concern is reflected 
in suggestions that tliere might be provisions in 
the treaty covering access into facilities. 

Second, there is a feeling that verification, to 
be effective in practice, requires that assistance 
be available ; and this feeling is reflected in sug- 
gestions for arranging assistance through an in- 
ternational organization, such as the United 
Nations. 

Third, there is a fear that verification, to pro- 
tect the rights of coastal states, requires the es- 
tablislmient of explicit procedures, as reflected 
in suggestions for procedures for notification 
and participation of a coastal state in verifica- 
tion activities in the vicinity of its continental 
shelf. 

Access Into Seabed Installations 

Let me address these points in order. There 
has already been considerable discussion of the 
possible need for a right of access to enter 
facilities on the seabed. As Ambassador Fisher 
pointed out in some detail in his statement on 
May 22, the United States believes that a right 
of access, for the purpose of a nuclear measure, 
would be both impractical and unnecessary.* 

Before we go further, however, I would like 
to explain that when the United States delega- 
tion refers to the right of access we mean the 



* For a statement made before the conference on 
May 22 by U.S. Representative Adrian S. Fisher, see 
Bulletin of June 16, 1969, p. 520. 



425 



{ 



right to go into a facility or the right to open 
up a piece of equipment. When vre say that such 
access is impractical and unnecessary, we are not 
referring to access in the sense of ability to go 
close to the object or facility in question. In 
other words, in one sense, access would be per- 
mitted ; that is, under the freedoms of the high 
seas parties could have access — close access — 
to the area of a facility or an object, so long as 
there is no interference with the activities of the 
states concerned. 

Without repeating our earlier statements, let 
me simply sketch out our reasons for the con- 
clusions that access in the narrow, specific sense 
of physical intrusion into a seabed installation 
would be impractical and unnecessary. Such ac- 
cess into sealDcd installations would be difficult, 
hazardous, and costly and could be destructive 
to both property and human life, owing to the 
high pressures in deep water around the object 
to be verified. Furthermore, the resources which 
might be available for this purpose are in very 
short supply. 

Now, these obstacles might have to be faced 
if it were absolutely necessary to have inspec- 
tions of the interior of installations to assure 
compliance with the treaty which we have be- 
fore us. But we are convinced that access into 
installations would be unnecessary for us or for 
other nations, whatever the level of their knowl- 
edge of marine technology. We believe that sea- 
bed emplacements for nuclear weapons, on the 
scale required to be of significant military value, 
would be difficult to build without the knowl- 
edge of other countries. Emplacing such in- 
stallations would involve a great deal of 
sophisticated equipment, unusual engineering 
activities, and a highly visible support effort. In 
addition, the deploy uig country would obvi- 
ously endeavor to enforce elaborate security sys- 
tems to protect the vital military secrets which 
would be involved in such installations. All these 
activities would undoubtedly attract the atten- 
tion of other maritime countries. 

Even if one were to assume, for the sake of 
argument, that some facilities for the emplace- 
ment of weapons of mass destruction might be 
emplaced before the construction was discov- 
ered, the configuration and operation of facili- 
ties specifically designed for nuclear weapons 
or other weapons of mass destruction would be 
plainly observable and identifiable without ac- 
cess into such facilities being required. 



It has been asked how we can be so sure of 
our capability and the capability of others to 
check compliance with this treaty, when we 
have insisted on much more elaborate provisions 
in other arms control measures. This question 
seems to imply that there should be virtually 
identical verification provisions for any meas- 
ure, regardless of its nature. In contrast, the 
United States has always sought to establish ver- 
ification procedures appropriate for the par- 
ticular measure in question. In some instances, 
it may be necessary to have certain types of off- 
site inspections; in other cases, as for example 
the ban on stationing nuclear weapons in outer 
space, access to objects is not required. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope we can all agree that 
it is the path of progress for us to adopt a flexi- 
ble, imaginative, and creative view regarding 
procedures for verification. If a country were 
to refuse to accept verification procedures for 
one situation because in another situation other 
verification procedures may be necessary and 
appropriate, the opportunities for reaching 
agreement would be severely lunited. I think it 
would be correct to say that this Committee has 
an interest in demonstrating its ability to fash- 
ion verification procedures uniquely tailored for 
the needs of each unique situation. This is the 
pragmatic way to achieve progress, and we ask 
the Committee's support for proceeding in this 
manner. 

Wide Range of Possible Actions 

If we return now to the seabed, we believe that 
there is a wide range of possible actions which 
parties could take to verify compliance with this 
treaty, short of actual entry into installations. 
As we pointed out earlier, the vast majority of 
states have ships and planes that can and do 
constantly carry out surveillance of their coastal 
waters. Even more important, the activities of 
states on and over the high seas are not and 
will not be subject to the kind of restrictions 
that would apply in the case of inspections on 
the territory of another state. So long as the 
activity was not interfered with, states could 
observe the facility as often and as closely as 
the circumstances warranted. Photographs 
could be taken and data collected to evaluate the 
activity and assist in the determination of 
whether the treaty has been violated. So long 
as they took place within the treaty area and did 



426 



Department of State Bulletin 



not interfere with the activities of the states con- 
cerned, these procedures would be consistent 
with existing international law. 

If it is suggested, as we have sometimes heard, 
that the 500-meter safety zone permitted under 
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
would preclude close examination of a particu- 
lar installation, I would respond that it is highly 
imlikely that a potential violator of this treaty 
would announce the precise location of his viola- 
tion by giving due notice of the installation and 
the safety zone as provided in that convention." 
Even if he were to do just that, observation — 
rather close and continuous observation — would 
still be possible and tlie nature of the activities 
being carried out at the installation could indi- 
cate whether further consultation was required. 

The Matter of Assistance 

Let me turn now, Mr. Chairman, to another 
aspect of the verification question : the matter of 
assistance. It is an undisputed fact that there 
are differences among states regarding their 
respective levels of technology. This has led 
some to wonder whether there should be pro- 
visions in the treaty to establish arrangements 
which would enable less advanced states to ob- 
tain assistance in carrying out verification activ- 
ities on the seabed. The United Nations has 
been mentioned as a possible source or channel 
for such assistance. 

As in the case of the need for access, this is a 
legitimate question and deserves to be answered. 
We continue to believe that efforts to provide ex- 
plicit procedures for assistance would be pre- 
mature, in view of uncertainty about what is 
involved, and could also raise severe problems 
of resource allocation. The equipment and per- 
sonnel for these specialized activities are in 
short supply, and there would be a need for de- 
tailed examination by the states possessing them 
of any proposed treaty provisions governing 
their use. 

The suggestion contained in paragraph 5(a) 
of the Canadian working paper is that states 
"shall have the right to apply to another state 
party" for assistance. The distinguished Rep- 
resentative of Canada has pointed out that his 
paper does not propose treaty language, and we 
think that this represents a helpful clarification 

' For text of the convention, see Builetin of June 30, 
1958, p. 1121. 



at this stage. However, the language used in 
paragraph 5(a) points up the difficulties of the 
suggestion. We think that problem is now cov- 
ered adequately and in a practical and workable 
manner as a result of the present language in 
article III, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty 
(CCD/269). This language clearly reflects that 
parties may exercise their right of verification 
by their own means or with the assistance of 
other parties. If the proposed paragraph 5(a) 
means something more than this, it might imply 
obligations for the United States and other 
countries; and given the present state of tech- 
nology and the varying political relations 
among the large number of countries that might 
become parties to the treaty, it would not be pos- 
sible for us to accept such obligations. 

There is another aspect of this question that 
deserves careful study. It may be thought that 
the United Nations should play a role in veri- 
fication, since this is the organization charged 
with the responsibility for international peace 
and security. In fact, under the Charter of the 
United Nations there are already provisions for 
dealing with possible threats to peace. But I 
would urge caution against specifying in this 
treaty how the U.N. should be used or what 
the Secretary General might do. 

I believe it would be a mistake to try to turn 
the question of verification over to the U.N. 

Instead, I believe that reliance should be 
placed on informal procedures for consultation 
and cooperation as already envisioned in the 
draft. States that have mutual interests in par- 
ticular areas of the seabed would no doubt wish 
to work out appropriate arrangements. All this 
would take place within the framework of nor- 
mal international relations. 

In those very few cases where consultation 
and cooperation might not be sufficient, or where 
a party might have serious questions about the 
observance of the prohibitions, there are exist- 
ing procedures for bringing such questions to 
the attention of the Security Council. These are 
set forth in the U.N. Charter, and the seabed 
treaty would certainly not change any party's 
rights or obligations under the charter. In con- 
trast to efforts to specify in the seabed treaty 
procedures for U.N. action, it might be more 
fruitful to consider the ways in which existing 
U.N. procedures might apply. Wliile my dele- 
gation would be opposed to efforts to include ex- 
plicit provisions for U.N. participation in, say, 



November 17, 1969 



427 



verification, we are ready to examine how the 
existing framework of international law, in- 
cUiding the Charter of the United Nations, 
might be used to reinforce the provisions of the 
seabed treaty. I would hope that those delega- 
tions concerned about verification assistance 
would comment on this approach. 

The Rights of Coastal States 

The last of the three interests I mentioned 
earlier has to do witli the right of coastal states. 
Although the treaty clearly provides that veri- 
fication would have to take place without in- 
fringing rights under international law, some 
delegations have expressed the view that pro- 
cedures should be established to assure that the 
coastal state's rights regarding its continental 
shelf are protected. The procedures which have 
been suggested involve notification and partici- 
pation of a coastal state wliich is a party to 
the treaty in verification activities taking place 
on the continental shelf or in its superjacent 
waters. Since I believe we are agreed that this 
treaty should not prejudice any state's existing 
rights, it is proper that we review the draft to 
see whether this concern is fully met and, if not, 
whether new procedures should be formulated 
and negotiated. 

After reviewing this question carefully, the 
United States continues to be convinced that 
new procedures need not and should not be de- 
veloped. The draft treaty is written in such a 
way as to ensure that it would not infringe or 
otherwise interfere with existing rights or obli- 
gations under international law, except insofar 
as parties would accept the new prohibitions 
of the treaty itself, such as not to emplace mass 
destruction weapons beyond the contiguous 
zone. The provision for verification depends 
directly on international law and the exer- 
cise of the freedom of the high seas. As a 
practical matter, we are confident that parties 
would be able to verify effectively without in 
any way infringing the rights of coastal states 
regarding the continental shelf. 

In contrast to this flexible and realistic pro- 
vision, the proposal for notification and partic- 
ipation or association of the coastal state seems 
to us to be an unnecessary and undesirable re- 
striction on the right of a party to verifj- the 
activities of others. If the projjosed procedure 
for involving the coastal state is to have any 
meaning, it would require a corresponding 
power or authority to enforce the obligation. 



But it would not be immediately apparent 
whether a ship sailing on the high seas was en- 
gaged in activities completely unrelated to this 
treaty or whether it was carrying on some form 
of verification for which permission would be 
needed. The coastal state, therefore, might feel 
authorized to attempt to exercise some form 
of control over the activities of any ship or sub- 
marine in the vicinity of its continental shelf. 
We would regard any such effort to be a serious 
infringement of the freedom of the high seas. 
It would also be inconsistent with the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
which stipulates that the rights of the coastal 
state over the continental shelf do not affect 
the legal status of the superjacent waters as 
high seas, or that of the air space above those 
waters, and that the coastal state's rights on the 
shelf are limited to exclusive rights of exjjlora- 
tion and exploitation. 

Mr. Chairman, the problems of "co-participa- 
tion"' or "association" are not solved by inclu- 
sion of a clause like that contained in paragraph 
6(c) of the Canadian working paper. This para- 
graph states that the provisions for notice and 
association do not apply to the process of "sim- 
ple observation" in the normal course of navi- 
gation or overflight. It is extremely difficult to 
visualize, and I believe it would in fact be even 
more difficult to establish, clear-cut dividing 
lines between "simple observation" and observa- 
tion that might be described as not "simple" be- 
cause something more than the naked eye, such 
as cameras, has been used. Would it cease to be 
"simple" because observation had taken place 
by some divers in the water who had not de- 
scended to the actual seabed, et cetera? Com- 
plexities of this sort should be avoided. 

We hope that members of this Committee 
will ask themselves frankly whether we really 
need to establish procedures for "co-participa- 
tion" or, to use the word in the Canadian paper, 
"association" to satisfy those concerns of coastal 
states that seem to lie behind the idea. We im- 
derstand that coastal states who highly value 
their right to exploit the resources of their own 
continental shelves would not like to see the 
right of verification under the seabed treaty 
utilized somehow to prejudice their right to de- 
velop these resources. It seems to us improbable, 
however, that any country could in some fashion 
approach the continental shelf of another state 
and, under the guise of seabed arms control 
verification, exploit resources of the shelf with- 
out the knowledge of the coastal state. 



428 



Department of State Bulletin 



Exploitation of resources in the seabed is a 
big and difficult job. It takes equipment and 
men on a large scale. It cannot be done in an 
hour or two by a ghost ship in the night. These 
obvious factual realities should not be ignored 
in this Committee. On the other hand, if it 
should be felt that another's verification activi- 
ties under the seabed arms control treaty were 
somehow being used as a cover to circumvent 
the coastal state's exclusive right of exploration 
and exploitation on the continental shelf, those 
activities could certainly be brought into ques- 
tion by the coastal state. On the basis of these 
realities, we would conclude that special new 
procedures providing for "co-participation" or 
"association" are simply not needed to protect 
the rights of the coastal state on the continental 
shelf. ^Vll of these considerations have convinced 
my delegation that an attempt to develop these 
procedures would seriously complicate the ne- 
gotiation of this treaty and would be undesira- 
ble in any case. Such procedures would raise 
difficult and complex questions of the law of the 
sea. Furthermore, there would be important and 
adverse security implications, since the proce- 
dures would inevitably infringe on the rights 
to use the high seas freely. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we should 
not simply dismiss the concern that lies behind 
all of these suggestions. We appreciate the in- 
terest of coastal states in ensuring that their 
rights are safeguarded. The United States, after 
all, has a very long coast and a large continental 
shelf. As has been pointed out, international law 
covers not only such things as the freedoms of 
the high seas but also rights regarding the con- 
tinental shelf. If there remains, despite our pre- 
vious efforts to avoid even the implication of 
prejudice to the positions of parties, a strong 
feeling that this needs to be spelled out with 
somewhat greater attention to existing rights, 
then I believe that further consideration is war- 
ranted. Accordingly, I would hope that those 
delegations who are concerned about protect- 
ing the rights of coastal states will give some 
thought as to how this might be done in ways 
which would not require restrictions on what 
for centuries has been accepted as part of the 
doctrine of freedom of the seas. 

Before leaving the question of the rights of 
coastal states, I think it would be helpful to 
point out the interrelationship between the 
question of inspection with access, as suggested 
in paragraph 4 of the Canadian working paper, 
and the question of protecting the legitimate 



existing rights of coastal states on their own 
continental shelves. If access into facilities were 
to be provided under this treaty, then clearly 
there would be greater opportunity for some- 
how impeding or complicating activities of 
coastal states on their own continental shelves. 
We would tliink, therefore, that the interests of 
coastal states, which presumably want to mini- 
mize any possible risk of impeding the operation 
of their facilities on their own continental 
shelves, would best be served by simplify- 
ing, not complicating, possible procedures of 
verification. 

Mr. Chairman, in the course of the next few 
weeks this Committee will have a valuable op- 
portunity to work out a meaningful nuclear 
arms limitation. This will require perseverance 
and the sincere cooperation of all delegations. 
It will require a realistic appreciation of each 
other's real concerns and needs. Tlie United 
States delegation, for its part, is prepared to 
give careful and serious consideration to all sug- 
gestions that other delegations have made and 
may wish to make with respect to the draft 
treaty. 



United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed tclow) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 



General Assembly 

Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Human Rights. Note by the Secretary 
General. A/7498. July 18, 1969. 38 pp. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space : 
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. concerning 
objects launched into orbit around the earth or 
into outer space. A/AC.105/INF.208. July 23, 1969. 
2 pp. 
Information furnished by the United States concern- 
ing objects launched into orbit or beyond. 
A/AC.105/INF.209. August 12, 1969. 2 pp. 
Broadcasting From Satellites. Working paper .sub- 
mitted to the Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
Satellites by the United Kingdom delegation. 
A/AC.105/65. August 18, 1969. 14 pp. 
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Contribu- 
tions of Nuclear Technology to the Economic and 
Scientific Advancement of the Developing Countries. 
A/7.n68. July 24, 1969. 78 pp. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic- 
tion. Note by the Secretary General transmitting 



November 17, 1969 



429 



Draft Comprehensive Outline of the Scope of the 
Long-Term and Expanded Program of Oceanic B3x- 
ploratlon and Research prepared by the Special 
Working Group of the Intergovernmental Ocean- 
ographic Commission. A/AC.138A4. July 29, 1969. 
34 pp. 
Election of Five Slembers of the International Court 
of Justice. Memorandum by the Secretary GeneraL 
A/7569. July 31, 1969. 5 pp. 



Economic and Social Council 

Commission on Human Rights. Subcommlssion on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. Study of Equality In the Administration 
of Justice. Report submitted by the Special Rap- 
porteur, Mr. Mohammed Ahmed Abu Rannat. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/296. June 10, 1969. 267 pp. 

Committee on Housing, Building and Planning. Hous- 
ing, Building and Planning in the Second United 
Nations Development Decade. Report of the Secre- 
tary General. E/C.6/90. July 24, 1969. 55 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Jamaica Conclude 
Air Transport Agreement 

Press release 286 dated October 2 
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

The United States and Jamaica on October 2 
concluded an air transport agreement which 
provides a continuing basis for commercial air 
services between the two countries and allows 
for the expansion of services by airlines of both 
countries. 

Under the new agreement, U.S. airlines may 
provide service from the United States to Mon- 
tego Bay and Kingston and beyond to the 
Caribbean, Central America, South America, 
and Africa. Four U.S. airlines now have author- 
ity from the Civil Aeronautics Board to operate 
to Jamaica. Delta Air Lines and Pan American 
World Airways already serve the island, and 
Eastern Airlines and Caribbean-Atlantic Air- 
lines will be able to initiate entirely new opera- 
tions to Jamaica. 

The agreement also provides for routes to be 



operated by Jamaican airlines. These include 
routes to New York, Miami, Philadelphia, 
Detroit, and Chicago. Air Jamaica now serves 
New York and Miami. 

The agreement and a related exchange of dip- 
lomatic notes were signed in Kingston by U.S. 
Charge d'Affaires a.i. David Wilken and by 
Neville Gallimore, Acting Minister of External 
Affairs. 



TEXT OF AGREEMENT 

AiB Tbanspobt Aqeeement Between the Govebnment 
OF THE United States of Amebica and the Govebn- 
ment OP Jamaica 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Jamaica, 

Desiring to conclude an agreement for the purpose of 
promoting air transportation between their respective 
territories. 

Have agreed as follows : 

Abticlb 1 
For the purposes of the present Agreement : 

A. "Agreement" shall mean this Agreement, the 
Schedule attached thereto, and any amendments 
thereto. 

B. "Aeronautical authorities" shall mean, in the case 
of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and in the case of Jamaica, the Minister respon- 
sible for Civil Aviation, the Air Transport Licensing 
Board, or, in both cases, any person or agency author- 
ized to perform the functions exercised at present by 
those authorities. 

C. "Designated airline" shall mean an airline which 
one Contracting Party has notified to the other Con- 
tracting Party to be an airline which will operate a 
specific route or routes listed in the Schedule to this 
Agreement. Such designation shall be notified in writ- 
ing through diplomatic channels. 

D. "Territory", in relation to a State, shall mean the 
land areas under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protec- 
tion, jurisdiction or trusteeship of that State, and 
territorial waters adjacent thereto. 

E. "Air Service" shall mean any scheduled air service 
performed by aircraft for the pubUc transport of 
passengers, cargo, and mail, separately or in 
combination. 

F. "International air service" shall mean an air 
service which passes through the air space over the 
territory of more than one State. 

G. "Stop for non-traffic purposes" shall mean a 
landing for any purpose other than taking on or dis- 
charging passengers, cargo or mail. 

Abticle 2 

A. Each Contracting Party grants to the other Con- 
tracting Party the rights specified in this Agreement for 
the purpose of operating international air services on 



430 



Department of State Bulletin 



the routes specified In the appropriate paragraph of 
the Schedule to this Agreement (hereinafter called the 
"agreed services" and "specified routes"). 

B. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the 
airlines designated by each Contracting Party shall 
enjoy, while operating the agreed services on the speci- 
fied routes, the following privileges : 

(1 ) To fly across the territory of the other Contract- 
ing Party without landing ; 

(2) To land in the territory of the other Conti-actlng 
Party for non-trafiic purposes ; 

(3) To malie stops at the points In the territory of 
the other Contracting Party named on each of the 
specified routes for the purpose of putting down and 
taking on international traffic in passengers, cargo, and 
mail, separately or In combination. 

C. Nothing in paragraph B of this Article shall be 
deemed to confer on the airlines of one Contracting 
Party the privilege of taking on, in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party, passengers, cargo or mall 
carried for remuneration or hire and destined for 
another point in the territory of that other Contract- 
ing Party. However, airlines designated by one Con- 
tracting Party to provide service over a route contain- 
ing more than one point in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party may provide a stopover at any of 
such points to traffic moving on a ticket or waybill 
providing for transportation on the same airline on a 
through journey to or from a point outside the territory 
of such other Contracting Party. 

Abticle 3 

Air services on a specified route may be inaugurated 
by an airline or airlines of one Contracting Party at 
any time after that Contracting Party has designated 
such airline or airlines for that route and the other 
Contracting Party has granted the appropriate operat- 
ing permission. Such other Contracting Party shall, 
subject to Article 4, grant this permission, with a mini- 
mum of procedural delay, provided that the designated 
airline or airlines may be required to qualify before 
the competent aeronautical authorities of that Con- 
tracting Party, under the laws and regulations normally 
applied by those authorities, before being permitted to 
engage in the operations contemplated In this 
Agreement. 

Article 4 

A. Each Contracting Party reserves the right to with- 
hold or revoke the operating permission referred to In 
Article 3 of this Agreement with respect to an airline 
designated by the other Contracting Party, or to im- 
pose conditions on such permission, in the event that : 

(1) Such airUne fails to qualify iinder the laws and 
regulations normally applied by the aeronautical au- 
thorities of that Contracting Party; 

(2) Such airline fails to comply with the laws and 
regulations referred to in Article 5 of this Agreement; 
or 

(3) That Contracting Party is not satisfied that 
substantial ownership and effective control are vested 
In the Contracting Party designating the airline or in 
nationals of that Contracting Party. 



B. Each Contracting Party reserves the right to 
revoke the operating permission referred to In Article 3 
of this Agreement with respect to an airline designated 
by the other Contracting Party in the event that such 
airline fails to fulfill or commits any breach of the 
conditions of that operating permission. 

C. Unless immediate action is essential to prevent 
infringement of the laws and regulations referred to 
in Article 5 of this Agreement, the right to revoke 
such permission shall be exercised only after con- 
sultation with the other Contracting Party. 

Abticle 5 

A. The laws and regulations of one Contracting 
Party relating to the admission to or departure from 
its territory of aircraft engaged in international air 
navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such 
aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to 
the aircraft of the airline or airlines designated by the 
other Contracting Party and shall be complied with by 
such aircraft upon entrance into or departure from 
and whUe within the territory of the first Contracting 
Party. 

B. The laws and regulations of one Contracting 
Party relating to the admission to or departure from 
its territory of passengers, crew, mall or cargo of air- 
craft, including laws and regulations relating to entry, 
clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quar- 
antine shall be compUed with by or on behalf of such 
passengers, crew, mall or cargo of the airline or air- 
lines of the other Contracting Party upon entrance into 
or departure from and while within the territory of 
the first Contracting Party. 

Article 6 

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of com- 
petency, and licences issued or rendered valid by one 
Contracting Party, and still in force, shall be recog- 
nized as valid by the other Contracting Party for the 
purpose of operating the routes and services provided 
for in this Agreement, provided that the requirements 
under which such certificates or licences were Issued 
or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum 
standards which may be established pursuant to the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. Each Con- 
tracting Party reserves the right, however, to refuse to 
recognize, for the purpose of flights above its own 
territory, certificates of competency and licences 
granted to its own nationals by the other Contracting 
Party. 

Abticle 7 

A. Bach Contracting Party may impo.se or permit to 
be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of 
public airports and other facilities under its control, 
provided that such charges shall not be higher than the 
charges Imposed for the use of such airports and 
facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar 
international air services. 

B. Neither of the Contracting Parties shall give a 
preference to Its own airlines over the airline or air- 
lines of the other Contracting Party in the application 
of its customs, immigration, quarantine, and similar 
regulations or in the use of airports, airways, and other 
facilities under its control. 



November 17, 1969 



431 



Article 8 

A. Each Contracting Party shall exempt the desig- 
nated airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party 
to the fullest extent possible under its national law, on 
the basis of reciprocity, from import restrictions, 
customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees, and other 
national duties and charges on fuel, lubricants, con- 
sumable technical supplies, spare parts including 
engines, regular equipment, ground equipment, stores, 
and other items intended for use solely in connection 
with the operation or servicing of aircraft of the air- 
lines of such other Contracting Party engaged in inter- 
national air service. The exemptions provided under 
this paragraph shall apply to items : 

(1) Introduced into the territory of one Contracting 
Party by or on behalf of the designated airlines of the 
other Contracting Party ; 

(2) Retained on aircraft of the designated airlines 
of one Contracting Party upon arriving in or leaving 
the territory of the other Contracting Party ; or 

(3) Taken on board aircraft of the designated air- 
lines of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other and intended for use in international air service ; 

whether or not such items are used or consumed wholly 
within the territory of the Contracting Party granting 
the exemption. 

B. The exemptions provided for by this Article shall 
also be available in situations where the designated 
airline or airlines of one Contracting Party have 
entered into arrangements with another airline or air- 
lines for the loan or transfer In the territory of the 
other Contracting Party of the items specified in para- 
graph A, provided such other airline or airlines similar- 
ly enjoy such exemptions from such other Contracting 
Party. 

Article 9 

A. There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for 
the airlines of each Contracting Party to operate on 
any route covered by this Agreement. 

B. In the operation by the airline or airlines of either 
Contracting Party of the air services described in this 
Agreement, the interest of the airline or airlines of the 
other Contracting Party shall be taken into considera- 
tion so as not to affect unduly the services which the 
latter provide on all or part of the same routes. 

C. The air services made available to the public by 
the airlines operating under this Agreement shall bear 
a close relationship to the requirements of the public 
for such services. 

D. Services provided by a designated airline under 
this Agreement shall retain as their primary objective 
the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic 
demands between the country of which such airline is 
a national and the countries of ultimate destination of 
the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such 
services international traffic destined for and coming 
from third countries at a point or points on the routes 
specified in this Agreement shall be applied in accord- 
ance with tlie general principles of orderly develop- 
ment to which both Contracting Parties subscribe and 
shall be subject to the general principle that capacity 
should be related to : 

(1) traffic requirements between the country of ori- 



gin and the countries of ultimate destination of the 
traffic ; 

(2) the requirements of through airline oi)erations; 
and 

(3) the traffic requirements of the area through 
which the airline passes, after taking account of local 
and regional services. 

E. Without prejudice to the right of each Contract- 
ing Party to impose such uniform conditions on the use 
of airports and airport facilities as are consistent with 
Article 15 of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation, neither Contracting Party shall unilaterally 
restrict the airline or airlines of the other Contract- 
ing Party with respect to capacity, frequency, schedul- 
ing or type of aircraft employed in connection with 
services over any of tlie specified routes. In the event 
that one of the Contracting Parties believes that the 
operations conducted by an airline of the other Con- 
tracting Party have been inconsistent with the stand- 
ards and principles set forth in this Article, it may 
request consultations pursuant to Article 12 of this 
Agreement for the purpose of reviewing the operations 
in question to determine whether they are in con- 
formity with said standards and principles. 

Article 10 

A. All rates to be charged by an airline of one Con- 
tracting Party for carriage to or from the territory of 
the other Contracting Party shall be established at 
reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant 
factors, such as costs of operation, reasonable profit, 
and the rates charged by any other airlines, as well as 
the characteristics of each service. Sucli rates shall be 
subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities 
of the Contracting Parties, who shall act in accordance 
with their obligations under this Agreement, within 
the limits of their legal competence. 

B. Any rate proposed to be charged by an airline of 
either Contracting Party for carriage to or from the 
territory of the other Contracting Party shall, if so re- 
quired, be filed by such airline with the aeronautical 
authorities of the other Contracting Party at least 
thirty (30) days before the proposed date of introduc- 
tion unless the Contracting Party with whom the filing 
is to be made permits filing on shorter notice. The 
aeronautical authorities of each Contracting Party 
shall use their best efforts to insure that the rates 
charged and collected conform to the rates filed with 
either Contracting Party, and that no airline rebates 
any portion of such rates by any means, directly or in- 
directly, including the payment of excessive sales com- 
missions to agents. 

C. It is recognized by both Contracting Parties that 
during any period for which either Contracting Party 
has approved the traffic conference procedures of the 
International Air Transport Association, or other as- 
sociation of international carriers, any rate agreements 
concluded through these procedures and involving an 
airline or airlines of that Contracting Party will be 
subject to the api)roval of the aeronautical authorities 
of that Contracting Party. 

D. If the aeronautical authorities of a Contracting 
Party, on receipt of the notification referred to in para- 
graph B above, are dissatisfied with the rate proposed, 
the other Contracting Party shall be so informed at 



432 



Department of State Bulletin 



least fifteen (15) days prior to the date that such rate 
would otherwise become effective, and the Contracting 
Parties shall endeavour to reach agreement on the ap- 
propriate rate. 

E. If the aeronautical authorities of a Contracting 
Party, upon review of an existing rate charged for car- 
riage to or from the territory of that Party by an air- 

> line or airlines of the other Contracting Party, are dis- 
satisfied with that rate, the other Contracting Party 
shall be so informed and the Contracting Parties shall 
endeavour to reach agreement on the appropriate rate. 

F. In the event that an agreement is reached pur- 
suant to the provisions of paragraph D or E, each Con- 
tracting Party will exercise its best efforts to put such 
rate into effect. 

G. If: 

(1) under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 

D, no agreement can be reached prior to the date that 
such rate would otherwise become effective ; or 

(2) under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 

E, no agreement can be reached prior to the expira- 
tion of sixty (60) days from the date of notification, 

then the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting 
Party raising the objection to the rate may take such 
steps as may be considered necessary to prevent the 
inauguration or the continuation of the service in ques- 
tion at the rate complained of : provided, however, that 
the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Party 
raising the objection shall not require the charging of a 
rate higher than the lowest rate charged by its own air- 
line or airlines for comparable service between the 
same points. 

H. When in any case under paragraphs D and E, the 
Contracting Parties cannot agree within a reasonable 
time upon the appropriate rate after consultation initi- 
ated by either of them, the terms of Article 13 of this 
Agreement shall apply. In rendering its decision or 
award, the arbitral tribunal shall be guided by the 
principles laid down in this Article. 

Abticle 11 

The following provisions shall govern the sale of air 
transportation and the conversion and remittance of 
revenues : 

A. Each designated airline shall have the right to 
engage in the sale of air transportation in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party directly and, in its 
discretion, through its agents. Such airline shall have 
the right to sell such transportation, and any person 
shall be free to purchase such transportation, in the 
currency of that territory or in freely convertible cur- 
rencies of other countries. 

B. Any rate specified in terms of the national cur- 
rency of one of the Contracting Parties shall be estab- 
lished in an amount which reflects the effective ex- 
change rate (including all exchange fees or other 
charges) at which the airlines of both Parties can 
convert and remit the revenues from their transport 
operations into the national currencv of the other 

I Party. 

C. Each designated airline shall have the right to 
convert and remit to its country local revenues in ex- 
cess of sums locally disbursed. Conversion and remit- 
tance shall be permitted promptly and without restric- 



tions at the rate of exchange in effect for the sale of 
transportation at the time such revenues are presented 
for conversion and remittance and shall be exempted 
from taxation to the fullest extent permitted by na- 
tional law. If a Contracting Party does not have a con- 
vertible currency and requires the submission of ap- 
plications for conversion and remittance, the airlines of 
the other Contracting Party shall be permitted to file 
such applications as often as weekly free of burdensome 
or discriminatory documentary requirements. 

Article 12 

Either Contracting Party may at any time request 
consultations on the interpretation, application or 
amendment of this Agreement. Such consultations shall 
commence as soon as practicable but in any event not 
later than sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of 
the request for consultation, unless otherwise agreed 
by the Contracting Parties. 

Article 13 

A. Any dispute with respect to matters covered by 
this Agreement not satisfactorily adjusted through 
consultation shall, upon request of either Contract- 
ing Party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with the procedures set forth herein. 

B. Arbitration shall be by a tribunal of three arbi- 
trators constituted as follows : 

(1 ) One arbitrator shall be named by each Contract- 
ing Party within sixty (60) days of the date of delivery 
by either Contracting Party to the other of a request 
for arbitration. Within thirty (30) days after such 
period of sixty (60) days, the two arbitrators so des- 
ignated shall by agreement designate a third arbitra- 
tor, who shall not be a national of either Contracting 
Party. 

(2) If either Contracting Party fails to name an 
arbitrator, or if the third arbitrator is not agreed upon 
in accordance with paragraph (1), either Contracting 
Party may request the President of the Council of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization to designate 
the necessary arbitrator or arbitrators. 

C. Each Contracting Party shall use its best efforts 
consistent with its national law to put into effect any 
decision or award of the arbitral tribunal. 

D. The expenses of the arbitral tribunal, including 
the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, shall be 
shared equally by the Contracting Parties. 

Aeticle 14 

This Agreement and all amendments thereto shall 
be registered with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 

Article 15 

Either Contracting Party may at any time notify the 
other through diplomatic channels of its intention to 
terminate this Agreement. Such notice shall be sent 
simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Or- 
ganization. This Agreement shall terminate one year 
after the date on which the notice of termination is 
received by the other Contracting Party, unless with- 
drawn before the end of this period by agreement 
between the Contracting Parties. 



November 17, 1969 



433 



AuncLE 16 

This AKreement sliall supersede prior agreements 
relating to air transport services in effect between the 
United States of America and Jamaica. In any case 
in which an air service has been authorized before the 
date of the coming into force of this Agreement, and 
is also provided for in this Agreement, an airline au- 
thorized by the aeronautical authorities of both Con- 
tracting Parties to operate such service shall be deemed 
to have been authorized to operate the service under 
this Agreement and in accordance therewith. 

Article 17 

This Agreement will come into force on the day it is 
signed. 

I:^ WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly 
authorized by their respective Governments, have 
signed the present Agreement. 

Done in duplicate at Kingston, Jamaica, this 2d day 
of October, 1969. 

For the Government of the United States of America : 

David Wilken 

For the Government of Jamaica : 

Neville E. Galliuore 

SCHEDULE 

A. An airline or airlines designated by the Govern- 
ment of the United States shall be entitled to operate 
the agreed services on each of the specified routes. 
In both directions, and to make scheduled landings in 
Jamaica at the points specified in this paragraph : 

1. From the United States^ via points In Mexico, 
Central America, Panama, the Bahama Islands, and 
the Cayman Islands to Montego Bay and Kingston and 
beyond to points in the Caribbean^ (including Puerto 
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands), Panama, South 
America, and Africa. 

2. From the United States ' via points in the Domini- 
can Republic and Haiti to Kingston and Montego Bay 
and beyond to points in Panama, Central America, and 
the United States.* 



' Flights must serve one of the following as the last 
point of departure or first point of arrival : New York, 
Washington, Baltimore, Miami, New Orleans, Houston, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, Puerto 
Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands or Canal Zone. [Footnote in 
original.] 

' For the purposes of this Agreement, the term 
"Caribbean" shall comprise the following: Haiti, 
Dominican Republic, St. Martin, British Virgin Islands, 
Antigua, St Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, Montserrat, 
Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, St Lucia, St. Vin- 
cent, Grenada, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, 
and Curacao. [Footnote in original.] 

' Flights must serve one of the following as the last 
point of departure or first point of arrival : Miami, 
Washington, Baltimore, New York, Puerto Rico or U.S. 
Virgin Island.s. [Footnote in original.] 

' Flights must serve one of the following as the last 
point of departure or first point of arrival : San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston or New Orleans. 
[Footnote in original.] 



B. An airline or airlines designated by the Govern- 
ment of Jamaica shall be entitled to operate the agreed 
services on each of the specified routes, in both direc- 
tions, and to make scheduled landings in the United 
States at the points specified in this paragraph : 

1. ° From Jamaica via a point in the Bahama Is- 
lands ° to New York and beyond to Montreal and 
London. 

2. ° From Jamaica via a point in the Bahama 
Islands " to Chicago. 

3. ' From Jamaica to Philadelphia and Detroit. 

4. ' From Jamaica via a point in the Bahama Is- 
lands ' to Detroit 

5. From Jamaica to Philadelphia and beyond to 
Toronto. 

6. From Jamaica via points in the Cayman Islands 
to Miami. 

C. Points on any of the specified routes may at the 
option of the designated airline be omitted on any or all 
flights. 



EXCHANGE OF NOTES 



Jamaican Note 

Kingston, Jamaica. 

October 2. 1969 
Sib, I have the honour to refer to the Air Transport 
Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of Jamaica 
which was signed at Kingston on this date and to pro- 
pose, on behalf of my Government, the following under- 
standings relating to this Agreement : 

1. Article 11 is not to be interpreted to impose an 
obligation on either Contracting Party to make foreign 
exchange available to persons for the purchase of air 
transportation. 

2. With regard to the U.S. routes specified in para- 
graph A of the Schedule to the Agreement, air services 
may be operated to and from points in the United 
States behind the named points without changes of air- 
craft or fiight number. 



" As of May 15, 1973, or as of such earlier date as the 
Government of Jamaica, by notification to the Govern- 
ment of the United States, may elect, the phrase "via 
a point in the Bahama Islands" will be deleted from 
either route 1 or route 2 at the selection of the Govern- 
ment of Jamaica. If the phrase is deleted from route 1, 
route 2 will be changed to read "From Jamaica via 
points in the Bahama Islands to Chicago" and footnote 
6 will then not apply to route 2. [Footnote in original.] 

" The point in the Bahama Islands on each of these 
routes will be selected by the Government of Jamaica 
and the Government of the United States will be noti- 
fied. Changes in the point selected on each such route 
will not be made more frequently than once every 
three years. [Footnote in original.] 

' Jamaica route 4 will not come into effect, and will 
not be operated, until such time, after the changes re- 
ferred to in footnote 5 occur, that the Government of 
Jamaica, by notification, elects not to operate air serv- 
ices on route 3, at which time route 3 will cease to be 
effective. [Footnote in original.] 



434 



Department of State Bulletin 



3. Recognizing the need for a reasonable period of 
development foi' newly established air services In cer- 
tain markets, it is agreed that : 

A. Non-stop air services by a second U.S. designated 
airline on U.S. route 1 between New York and Jamaica 
will not begin before December 1, 1970. 

B. Before December 1, 1970, turn-around air services 
by a second U.S. designated airline between Miami and 
Jamaica will not exceed two round-trip flights per day, 
and services through Jamaica by such airline will not 
exceed one round trip flight per day. 

C. U.S. designated airlines will not operate air serv- 
ices on the U.S. specified routes from Chicago before 
January 1, 1971. 

4. If one Contracting Party believes that a situation 
has arisen which requires consultations pursuant to 
Article 12 of the Agreement in less than sixty days, the 
other Contracting Party will use its best efEorts to meet 
within the time period requested. 

5. In keeping with the objective that the routes pro- 
vided in the Schedule to the Agreement should at all 
times reflect an equal exchange of economic oppor- 
tunities for the designated airlines of both Contracting 
Parties in the light of changing circumstances, the 
Contracting Parties will, at the request of either, con- 
sult in 1974 for the purpose of reviewing the Schedule. 

If these understandings are acceptable to your Gov- 
ernment, I have the honour to propose that this Note 
and your reply thereto constitute an agreement between 
our two governments relating to the Air Transport 
Agreement 

Please accept. Sir, the renewed assurances of my 
high consideration. 

Nevihj: E. Gallimobe 

Acting Minister of 

External Affairs. 

Mb. David Wilken, 

American Charge d' Affaires a.i.. 

Embassy of the United States of America, 

Kingston. 



U.S. Note 

Kingston, October 2, 1969 
SiE : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your Note No. C94/03V dated October 2, 1969, which 
reads as follows : 

[Text of Jamaican note.] 

I have the honor to inform you that the Government 
of the United States of America accepts the under- 
standings set forth in your Note and considers that 
your Note and this reply constitute an agreement relat- 
ing to the Air Transport Agreement 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest 
consideration. 

David Wilken 
Charge d'Affaires a.i. 

The Honorable 

De. Neville E. Gallimobe 

Acting Minister of External Affairs 

Kingston 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 
Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the conven- 
tion on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944, as 
amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done 
at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into 
force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Signature: Nigeria, October 29, 1969. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Coun- 
cil, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. 
Entered into force November 4, 19.52.' 
Adherence deposited: Paraguay, October 3, 1969. 

Grains 

International grains arrangement, 1967, with annexes. 
Open for signature at Washington October 15 
through November 30, 1967. Entered into force July 
1, 1968. TIAS 6537. 
Approval of the WJieat Trade Convention deposited: 

France, October 30, 1969. 
Approval of the Food Aid Convention deposited: 

France, October 30, 1969. 

Marriage 

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at 
New York December 10, 1962. Entered into force 
December 9, 1964.' 

Accessions deposited: Austria, October 1, 1969; Trin- 
idad and Tobago, October 2, 1969. 



BILATERAL 

China 

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of 
December 20, 1946, as amended and extended (TIAS 
1609, 2184, 3347). EfCected by exchange of notes at 
Taipei October 22, 1969. Entered into force October 
22, 1969. 

Congo 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of March 15, 1967 (TIAS 6329). 
Signed at Kinshasa October 21, 1969. Entered into 
force October 21, 1969. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement providing for investment guaranties as 
authorized by section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Se- 
curity Act of 1954. Effected by exchange of notes at 
San Jos6 February 23 and 25, 1955. Entered into force 
February 25, 1955. TIAS 3201. 
Terminated: October 24, 1969. 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed 
at San Jos6 November 22, 1968. 
Entered into force: October 24, 1969. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of July 28, 1969 (TIAS 6734). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon October 17, 
1969. Entered into force October 17, 1969. 



^ Not in force for the United States. 



November 17, 1969 



435 



PUBLICATIONS 



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Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe tlie people, history, government, economy, and 
foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, 
a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplo- 
matic and consular officers, and a reading list. ( A com- 
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binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are 
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8010 


6 pp. 


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Pub. 


8321 


3 pp. 


Japan 


Pub. 


7770 


12 pp. 


Mongolia 


Pub. 


8318 


6 pp. 



How Foreign Policy Is Made (revised). Illustrated 
pamphlet describing the role of the President, the Sec- 
retary of State, the Congress, and the American peo- 
ple in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 7707. 
General Foreign Policy Series 195. 28 pp. 50^. 

Defense — Basic Pilot Training Aircraft. Agreement 
with Indonesia. TIAS 6678. 2 pp. lQ<i. 

Economic Cooperation — Spanish-United States Eco- 
nomic Committee. Agreement with Sjrain. TIAS 6698. 
4 pp. lOi!*. 

Defense — Use of Military Facilities in Spain. Agree- 
ment with Spain extending the agreement of Septem- 
ber 26, 1953, as extended. TIAS 6699. 4 pp. 10^. 

Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Spain. 
TIAS6700. 3 pp. 10(f. 



Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Paraguay. 
TIAS 6701. 20 pp. 15#. 

Extension of Loan of Vessels— U.S.S. Edwards and 
U.S.S. Leary. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 6702. 7 pp. 
10(J. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam. 
TIAS 6703. 3 pp. 10<?. 

Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean. Agreement with Poland. TIAS 6704. 14 pp. 10#. 

Tracking Station. Agreement with Spain extending the 
agreement of January 29, 1964, as supplemented. TIAS 

6714. 3 pp. 10<l. 

Mutual Defense Assistance Office. Agreement with 
Japan relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. TIAS 

6715. 4 pp. 10«. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. .-Vgree- 
ment with Portugal. TIAS 6717. 33 pp. 20(>. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Portugal Cooperation 
Agreement. Agreement with Portugal and the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 6718. 9 pp. 10<». 

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan 
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended. 
TIAS 6719. 3 pp. 10<f. 

Load Lines. Proc^s-verbal of rectification to the conven- 
tion of AprU 5, 1966. TIAS 6720. 10 pp. 10^. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Appointments 

Ray S. Cline as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research, effective October 31. (For biographic 
data, see Department of State press release 294 dated 
October 3.) 



436 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 17, 1969 



Vol. LXI, No. 1686 



Aviation. U.S. and Jamaica Conclude Air Trans- 
port Agreement (text of agreement and ex- 
change of notes) 



430 

Belgium. Consular Convention With Belgium 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 
President Nixon) 424 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 424 

Consular Convention With Belgium Transmitted 

to the Senate (message from President 

Nixon) 424 

t| Department Presents Views on Southern 

Rhodesia (Newsom) 422 

Department and Foreign Service. Cline ap- 
pointed Director of the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research 436 

Disarmament. U.S. Discusses Verification Pro- 
cedures Under the Draft Treaty Banning 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the 
Seabed (Leonard) 425 

Germany. President Nixon Congratulates Chan- 
cellor Brandt of Germany (text of letter) . . 415 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Intellectual Property Bureaux Granted Orga- 
nization Immunities (Executive order) . . 421 

President Appoints Mr. Taylor to South Pacific 
Commission 421 

U.S. Discusses Verification Procedures Under the 
Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nu- 
clear Weapons on the Seabed (Leonard) . . 425 

Jamaica. U.S. and Jamaica Conclude Air Trans- 
port Agreement (text of agreement and ex- 
change of notes) 430 

Japan. United States and Japan Discuss Pro- 
tection of Migratory Birds 420 

Latin America. Action for Progress for the 
,i Americas (Nixon) 409 

Marine Science. U.S. Discusses Verification Pro- 
cedures Under the Draft Treaty Banning 
y Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the 
y Seabed (Leonard) 425 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. President 
Appoints Mr. Taylor to South Pacific 
Commission 421 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO 
': Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
ll Society : Response to a Common Environmen- 
i tal Peril (Moynihan) 416 

Presidential Documents 

Action for ProKress for the Americas .... 409 

Consular Convention With Belgium Transmitted 
to the Senate 424 

Intellectual Property Bureaux Granted Orga- 
nization Immunities 421 

President Nixon Congratulates Chancellor 
Brandt of Germany 415 



Publications. Recent Releases 436 

Science 

The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Mod- 
ern Society : Response to a Common Environ- 
mental Peril (Moynihan) 416 

Southern Rhodesia. Department Presents Views 
on Southern Rhodesia (Newsom) 422 

Southern Yemen. Southern Yemen Severs Re- 
lations With the United States (Department 
statement) 420 

Treaty Information 

Consular Convention With Belgium Transmitted 
to the Senate (message from President 

Nixon) 424 

Current Actions 435 

U.S. and Jamaica Conclude Air Transport Agree- 
ment (text of agreement and exchange of 
notes) 430 

United Nations. United Nations Documents . . 429 

Viet-Nam. 40th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 

Held at Paris (Lodge) 414 

Name Index 

Cline, Ray S 436 

Leonard, James F 425 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 414 

Moynihan, Daniel P 416 

Newsom, David D 422 

Nixon, President 409, 415, 421, 424 

Taylor, William B., Ill 421 



Check List of Deparfment of State 
Press Releases: Oct. 27-Nov. 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20.520. 

Releases issued prior to October 27 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 285 
and 286 of October 2. 

No. Date Subject 

*319 10/27 Ryan sworn in as Ambassador to 
Honduras (biograplxic data). 

1320 10/29 Under Secretary to attend special 
session of the North Atlantic 
Council. 

*321 10/29 Conference of chiefs of U.S. diplo- 
matic missions in Europe at 
Rome, November 10-12. 

322 10/30 Lodge : 40th plenary meeting on 

Viet-Nam at Paris. 

323 10/30 Lodge : supplementary remarks. 
*324 10/31 Ross sworn in as Ambassador to 

Tanzania (biographic data). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletiit. 



Superintendent of Documents 

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washington, d.c. 20402 



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^ A 7^ 




20YEARS OF PEACE 



9» THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



.I//087 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 



BULLETIN 




THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN VIETNAM 

Address Jyy President Nixon ^37 

A LOOK AT ASIAN REGIONALISM 
hy Assistant Secretary Green 445 

THE UNITED NATIONS BUDGET FOR 1970 
Statement hy Congressman Dante B. Fascell 4^4 

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: 50 YEARS OF SERVICE 
Statement hy Secretary of Labor Shultz Before the UJf. General Assembly 45SS 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

DEC1 

nrDOSiTOPy 
For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1587 
November 24, 1969 



i 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
urith information on developments in 
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the work of the Department of State 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
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The Pursuit of Peace in Viet-Nam 



Address hy President Nixon ' 



Good evening, my fellow Americans : Tonight 
I want to talk to you on a subject of deep con- 
cern to all Americans and to many people in all 
parts of the world — the war in Viet-Nam. 

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep 
division about Viet-Nam is that many Ameri- 
cans have lost confidence in what their Govern- 
ment has told them about our policy. The Ameri- 
can people camiot and should not be asked to 
support a policy which involves the overriding 
issues of war and peace imless they know the 
truth about that policy. 

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer 
some of the questions that I know are on the 
minds of many of you listening to me. 

How and why did America get involved in 
Viet-Nam in the first place? 

How has this administration changed the 
policy of the previous administration ? 

WHiat has really happened in the negotiations 
in Paris and on the battlef ront in Viet-Nam ? 

Wliat choices do we have if we are to end the 
war? 

"Wliat are the prospects for peace ? 

Let me begin by describing the situation I 
found when I was inaugurated on January 20. 

— The war had been going on for 4 years. 

— 31,000 Americans had been killed in action. 

— The training program for the South Viet- 
namese was behind schedule. 

— 540,000 Americans were in Viet-Nam, with 
no plans to reduce the number. 

— No progress had been made at the negotia- 
tions in Paris and the United States had not put 
forth a comprehensive peace proposal. 

— The war was causing deep division at home 
and criticism from many of our friends, as well 
as our enemies, abroad. 

In view of these circumstances there were 
some who urged that I end the war at once 



'Made to the Nation on television and radio on 
Nov. 3 (White House press release). 



by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all 
American forces. 

From a political standpoint this would have 
been a popular and easy course to follow. After 
all, we became involved in the war while my 
predecessor was in office. I could blame the 
defeat which would be the result of my action 
on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some 
put it to me quite bluntly : This was the only 
way to avoid allowing Jolinson's war to become 
Nixon's war. 

But I had a greater obligation than to think 
only of the years of my administration and the 
next election. I had to think of the effect of my 
decision on the next generation and on the 
future of peace and freedom in America and 
in the world. 

Let us all understand that the question before 
us is not whether some Americans are for peace 
and some Americans are against peace. The 
question at issue is not whether Jolmson's war 
becomes Nixon's war. 

The great question is: How can we win 
America's peace? 

History of U.S. Involvement in Viet-Nam 

Let us turn now to the fundamental issue. 
"Why and how did the United States become in- 
volved in Viet-Nam in the first place? 

Fifteen years ago North Viet-Nam, with the 
logistical support of Commimist China and the 
Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a 
Communist government on South Viet-Nam by 
instigating and supporting a revolution. 

In response to the request of the Government 
of South Viet-Nam, President Eisenhower sent 
economic aid and military equipment to assist 
tlie people of South Viet-Nam in their efforts 
to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years 
ago President Kennedy sent 16,000 military per- 
sonnel to Viet-Nam as combat advisers. Four 
years ago President Johnson sent American 
combat forces to South Viet-Nam. 



November 24, 1969 



437 



Now, many believe that President Johnson's 
decision to send American combat forces to 
Soutli Viet-Nam was wrong. And many others, 
I among them, have been strongly critical of 
the way the war has been conducted. 

But the question facmg us today is: Now 
that we are in the war, what is the best way to 
end it? 

Consequences of Precipitate Withdrawal 

In January I could only conclude that the 
precipitate withdrawal of American forces from 
Viet-Nam would be a disaster not only for 
South Viet-Nam but for the United States and 
for the cause of peace. 

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate 
withdrawal would inevitably allow the Com- 
munists to repeat the massacres which followed 
their takeover in the North 15 years before. 

— They then murdered more than 50,000 
people, and liundreds of thousands more died in 
slave labor camps. 

— We saw a prelude of what would happen 
in South Viet-Nam when the Commmiists 
entered the city of Hue last year. During their 
brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of 
terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot 
to death, and buried in mass graves. 

— With the sudden collapse of our support, 
these atrocities of Hue would become the night- 
mare of the entire nation — and particularly for 
the million and a half Catholic refugees who 
fled to South Viet-Nam when the Communists 
took over in the North. 

For the United States, this first defeat in our 
nation's history would result in a collapse of 
confidence in American leadership not only in 
Asia but throughout the world. 

Three American Presidents have recognized 
the great stakes involved in Viet-Nam and 
understood what had to be done. 

In 1963 President Kennedy, with his charac- 
teristic eloquence and clarity, said : ^ 

... we want to see a stable government there, 
carrying on a struggle to maintain its national 
independence. 

We believe strongly in that. We are not going to 
withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to 
withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse 
not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So 
we are going to stay there. 

President Eisenhower and President Johnson 



expressed the same conclusion during their 
terms of office. 

For the future of peace, precipitate with- 
drawal would thus be a disaster of immense 
magnitude. 

— A nation cannot remain great if it betrays 
its allies and lets down its friends. 

— Our defeat and humiliation in South Viet- 
Nam without question would promote reck- 
lessness in the cotmcils of those great powers 
who have not yet abandoned their goals of world 
conquest. 

— This would spark \'iolence wherever our 
commitments help maintain the peace — in the 
Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the 
Western Hemisphere. 

Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It 
would not bring peace; it would bring more 
war. 

For these reasons I rejected the recommenda- 
tion that I should end the war by immediately 
withdrawing all our forces. I chose instead to 
change American policy on both the negotiating 
front and the battlefront. 

U.S. Peace Proposals 

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, 
I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. 

In a television speech on May 14,^ in a speech 
before the United Nations,* and on a number 
of other occasions, I set forth our peace pro- 
posals in great detail. 

— We have offered the complete withdrawal 
of all outside forces within 1 year. 

— We have proposed a cease-fire under inter- 
national supervision. 

— We have offered free elections under inter- 
national supervision, with the Commimists par- 
ticipating in the organization and conduct of 
the elections as an organized political force. The 
Saigon Government has pledged to accept the 
result of the elections. 

We have not put forth our proposals on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that 
we are willmg to discuss the proposals that have 
been put forth by the other side. We have de- 
clared that anything is negotiable, except the 
right of the people of South Viet-Nam to deter- 
mine their own future. At the Paris peace con- 
ference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated 



' At a news conference on July 17, 1963 ; for tran- 
script, see Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. 
Kennedy, 196S, p. 566. 



' For text, see Bulletin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 



438 



Department of State Bulletin 



our flexibility and good faith in 40 public 
meetings. 

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our pro- 
posals. They demand our unconditional accept- 
ance of their terms, which are that we withdraw 
all American forces immediately and uncondi- 
tionally and that we overthrow the Government 
of South Viet-Nam as we leave. 

Private Initiatives Undertaken 

We have not limited our peace initiatives to 
public forums and public statements. I recog- 
nized in January that a long and bitter war like 
this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. 
That is why, in addition to the public state- 
ments and negotiations, I have explored every 
possible private avenue that might lead to a 
settlement. 

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step 
of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives 
for peace — initiatives we undertook privately 
and secretly because we thought that we thereby 
might open a door which publicly would be 
closed. 

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin 
my quest for peace. 

— Soon after my election, through an indi- 
vidual who is directly in contact on a personal 
basis with the leaders of North Viet-Nam, I 
made two private offers for a rapid, compre- 
hensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in 
effect for our surrender before negotiations. 

— Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of 
the military equipment for North Viet-Nam, 
Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for Na- 
tional Security Affairs Dr. Kissinger, Ambas- 
sador Lodge, and I personally have met on a 
number of occasions with representatives of the 
Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in 
getting meaningful negotiations started. In 
addition we have had extended discussions di- 
rected toward that same end with representa- 
tives of other governments which have diplo- 
matic relations with North Viet-Nam. None of 
these initiatives have to date produced results. 

— In mid- July, I became convinced that it was 
necessary to make a major move to break the 
deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly, in 
this office where I am now sitting, with an indi- 
vidual who had known Ho Chi Illinh on a per- 
sonal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a 
letter to Ho Chi Minli. 

I did this outside of the usual diplomatic 
channels with the hope that, with the necessity 
of making statements for propaganda removed, 



there might be constructive progress toward 
bringing the war to an end. Let me read from 
that letter : 

Dkab Me. Pkesident : I realize that it is difficult to 
communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four 
years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I 
wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all 
solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply 
believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long 
and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one — 
least of all the people of Vietnam. . . . 

The time has come to move forward at the confer- 
ence table toward an early resolution of this tragic 
war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in 
a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the 
brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at 
this critical juncture, both sides turned their face to- 
ward peace rather than toward conflict and war. 

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 
3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the 
public position North Viet-Nam had taken at 
Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full 
text of both letters is being released to the 
press.^ 

—In addition to the public meetings that I 
have referred to. Ambassador Lodge has met 
with Viet-Nam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 
private sessions. 

— We have taken other significant initiatives 
wliich must remain secret to keep open some 
channels of communication which may still 
prove to be productive. 

But the effect of all the public, private, and 
secret negotiations wliich have been undertaken 
since the bombing halt a year ago and since this 
administration came into office on January 20 
can be summed up in one sentence : No progress 
whatever has been made except agreement on 
the shape of the bargaining table. 

Now, who is at fault ? 

It has become clear that the obstacle in nego- 
tiating an end to the war is not the President of 
the United States. It is not the South Viet- 
namese Government. 

The obstacle is the other side's absolute re- 
fusal to show the least willingness to join us in 
seeking a just peace. It will not do so while it is 
convinced that all it has to do is to wait for 
our next concession, and our next concession 
after that one, until it gets everything it wants. 

There can now be no longer any question that 
progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's 
deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously. 

I realize that this report on our efforts on the 
diplomatic front is discouraging to the Ameri- 



' See p. 443. 



November 24, 1969 



439 



can people, but the American people are entitled 
to know the truth — the bad news as well as the 
good news — where the lives of our young men 
are involved. 



New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy 

Now let me turn, however, to a more encourag- 
ing report on another front. 

At the time we launched our search for peace, 
I recognized we might not succeed in bringing 
an end to the war tlirough negotiation. 

I therefore put into eifect another plan to 
bring peace — a plan which will bring the war to 
an end regardless of what happens on the 
negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift 
in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my 
press conference at Guam on July 25. 

Let me briefly explain wliat has been described 
as the Nixon doctrine — a policy which not only 
will help end the war in Viet-Nam but which is 
an essential element of our program to prevent 
future Viet-Nams. 

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We 
are an impatient people. Instead of teaching 
someone else to do a job, we like to do it our- 
selves. Ajid this trait has been carried over into 
our foreign policy. 

In Korea and again in Viet-Nam, the United 
States furnished most of the money, most of the 
arms, and most of the men to help the people 
of those comitries defend their freedom against 
Communist aggression. 

Before any American troops were committed 
to Viet-Nam, a leader of another Asian country 
expressed this opinion to me when I was travel- 
ing in Asia as a private citizen. He said : "^Vlien 
you are trying to assist another nation defend its 
freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them 
fight the war, but not to fight the war for them." 

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I 
laid down in Guam three principles as guide- 
lines for future American policy toward Asia : 

— First, the United States wiU keep all of its 
treaty commitments. 

— Second, we shall provide a shield if a nu- 
clear power threatens the freedom of a nation 
allied with us or of a nation whose survival we 
consider vital to our security. 

— Third, in cases involving other types of 
aggression, we shall furnish military and eco- 
nomic assistance when requested in accordance 
with our treaty commitments. But we shall look 
to the nation directly threatened to assume the 



primary responsibility of providing the man- 
power for its defense. 

After I announced this policy, I found that 
the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Viet- 
Nam, South Korea, and other nations which 
might be threatened by Communist aggression 
welcomed this new direction in American for- 
eign policy. 

The VIetnamization Plan 

The defense of freedom is everybody's busi- 
ness — not just America's business. And it is par- 
ticularly the responsibility of the people whose 
freedom is threatened. In the previous admin- 
istration we Americanized the war in Viet-Nam. 
In this administration we are Vietnamizing the 
search for peace. 

The policy of the previous administration not 
only resulted in our assuming the primary re- 
sponsibility for fighting the war but, even more 
significantly, did not adequately stress the goal 
of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that 
they could defend themselves when we left. 

The Vietnamization plan was launched fol- 
lowing Secretary [of Defense Melvin E.] 
Laird's visit to Viet-Nam in March. Under the 
plan, I ordered fii-st a substantial increase in the 
training and equipment of South Vietnamese 
forces. 

In July, on my visit to Viet-Nam, I changed 
General Abrams' orders so that they were con- 
sistent with the objectives of our new policies. 
Under the new orders, the primary mission of 
our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese 
forces to assume the full responsibility for the 
security of South Viet-Nam. 

Our air operations have been reduced by over 
20 percent. 

And now we have begun to see the results of 
this long-overdue change in American policy in 
Viet-Nam : 

— After 5 years of Americans going into Viet- 
Nam, we are finally bringing American men 
home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will 
have been withdrawn from South Viet-Nam, 
including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. 

— The South Vietnamese have continued to 
gain in strength. As a result, they have been 
able to take over combat responsibilities from 
our American troops. 

Two other significant developments have oc- 
curred since this administration took oiEce : 



440 



Department of State Bulletin 



— Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is es- 
sential if they are to launch a major attack, over 
the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what 
it was over the same period last year. 

— Most important, United States casualties 
have declined during the last 2 months to the 
lowest point in 3 years. 

Our Program for the Future 

Let me now turn to our program for the 
future. 

We have adopted a plan which we have 
worked out in cooperation with the South Viet- 
namese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. 
combat ground forces and their replacement by 
South Vietnamese forces on an orderly sched- 
uled timetable. This withdrawal will be made 
from strength and not from weakness. As South 
Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of 
American withdrawal can become greater. 

I have not and do not intend to announce 
the timetable for our program. There are ob- 
vious reasons for this decision, which I am sure 
you will understand. As I have indicated on 
several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will 
depend on developments on three fronts. 

One of these is the progress which can be, or 
might be, made in the Paris talks. An announce- 
ment of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal 
would completely remove any incentive for the 
enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would 
simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and 
then move in. 

The other two factors on which we will base 
our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy 
activity and the progress of the training pro- 
gram of the South Vietnamese forces. I am 
glad to be able to report tonight progress on 
both of these fronts has been greater than we 
anticipated when we started the program in 
June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable 
for withdrawal is more optimistic now than 
when we made our first estimates in June. 

This clearly demonstrates why it is not wise 
to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must 
retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal 
decision on the situation as it is at that time 
rather than on estimates that are no longer 
valid. 

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must 
in all candor leave one note of caution : If the 
level of enemy activity significantly increases, 
we might have to adjust our timetable accord- 
ingly. 



However, I want the record to be completely 
clear on one point. 

At the time of the bombing halt just a year 
ago, there was some confusion as to whether 
there was an understanding on the part of the 
enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North 
Viet-Nam, they would stop the shelling of cities 
in South Viet-Nam. I want to be sure that there 
is no misunderstanding on the part of the 
enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. 

We have noted the reduced level of infiltra- 
tion, the reduction of our casualties, and are 
basing our withdrawal decisions partially on 
those factors. 

If the level of infiltration or our casualties 
increase while we are trying to scale down the 
fighting, it will be the result of a conscious 
decision by the enemy. 

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to 
assume that an increase in violence will be to its 
advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy 
action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Viet- 
Nam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and 
effective measures to deal with that situation. 

This is not a threat. This is a statement of 
policy which as Commander in Cliief of our 
Armed Forces I am making in meeting my 
responsibility for the protection of American 
fighting men wherever they may be. 

My fellow Americans, I am sure yovi can 
recognize from what I have said that we really 
only have two choices open to us if we want to 
end this war: 

— I can order an immediate, precipitate with- 
drawal of all Americans from Viet-Nam with- 
out regard to the effects of that action. 

— Or we can persist in our search for a just 
peace, through a negotiated settlement if pos- 
sible or through continued implementation of 
our plan for Vietnamization if necessary — a 
plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces 
from Viet-Nam on a schedule in accordance with 
our program, as the South Vietnamese become 
strong enough to defend their own freedom. 

I have chosen this second course. It is not the 
easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which 
will end the war and serve the cause of peace, 
not just in Viet-Nam but in the Pacific and in 
the world. 

In speaking of the consequences of a precipi- 
tate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies 
would lose confidence in America. 

Far more dangerous, we would lose con- 



November 24, 1969 



441 



fidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction 
■would be a sense of relief that our men were 
coming home. But as we saw the consequences 
of what we had done, inevitable remorse and 
divisive recrimination would scar our spirit 
as a people. 

We have faced other crises in our history and 
have become stronger by rejecting the easy way 
out and taking the right way in meeting our 
challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been 
our capacity to do what had to be done when 
we knew our course was right. 

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens 
disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. 
Honest and patriotic Americans have reached 
different conclusions as to how peace should be 
achieved. 

In San Francisco a few weeks ago I saw 
demonstrators carrying signs reading : "Lose in 
Viet-Nam, bring the boys home." 

Well, one of the strengths of our free society 
is that any American has a right to reach that 
conclusion and to advocate that point of view. 
But as President of the United States, I would 
be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the 
policy of this nation to be dictated by the minor- 
ity who hold that point of view and who try 
to impose it on the Nation by mounting demon- 
strations in the street. 

For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation 
has been made vmder our Constitution by those 
leaders in the Congress and in the White House 
elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, 
however fervent its cause, prevails over reason 
and the will of the majority, this nation has no 
future as a free society. 

And now I would like to address a word, if 
I may, to the young people of this nation who 
are particularly concerned — and I understand 
why they are concerned — about this war. 

I respect your idealism. 

I share your concern for peace. 

I want peace as much as you do. 

There are powerful personal reasons I want 
to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 
letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones 
of men who have given their lives for America 
in Viet-Nam. It is very little satisfaction to me 
that this is only one-third as many letters as 
I signed the first week in office. There is nothing 
I want more than to see the day come when I 
do not have to write any of those letters. 

— I want to end the war to save the lives of 
those brave young men in Viet-Nam. 

— But I want to end it in a way which will 



increase the chance that their younger brothers 
and their sons will not have to fight in some 
future Viet-Nam someplace in the world. 

— And I want to end the war for another rea- 
son. I want to end it so that the energy and 
dedication of you, our young people, now too 
often directed into bitter hatred against those 
responsible for the war, can be turned to the 
great challenges of peace : a better life for all 
Americans, a better life for all people on this 
earth. 

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it 
will succeed. 

If it does succeed, what the critics say now 
won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything 
I say then won't matter. 

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of 
patriotism or national destiny these days. But 
I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. 

Two hundred years ago this nation was weak 
and poor. But even then, America was the hope 
of millions in the world. Today we have become 
the strongest and richest nation in the world. 
The wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope 
the world has for the survival of peace and free- 
dom will be determined by whether the Ameri- 
can people have the moral stamina and the 
courage to meet the challenge of free-world 
leadersliip. 

Let historians not record that when America 
was the most powerful nation in the world we 
passed on the other side of the road and allowed 
the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions 
of people to be suffocated by the forces of 
totalitarianism. 

And so tonight — to you, the great silent 
majority of my fellow Americans — I ask for 
your support. 

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency 
to end the war in a way that we could win the 
peace. I have mitiated a plan of action which 
will enable me to keep that pledge. 

The more support I can have from the Ameri- 
can people, the sooner that pledge can be re- 
deemed ; for the more divided we are at home, 
the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris. 

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be 
united against defeat. Because let us under- 
stand: North Viet-Nam cannot defeat or 
humiliate the United States. Only Americans 
can do that. 

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very 
desk. President AVoodrow Wilson spoke words 
which caught the imagination of a war-weary 
world. He said : "This is the war to end wars." 



442 



Department of State Bulletin 



His dream for peace after World War I was 
shattered on the hard realities of great-power 
politics, and Woodrow Wilson died a broken 
man. 

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in 
Viet-Nam is the war to end wars. But I do say 
this : I have initiated a plan which will end this 
war in a way that will bring us closer to that 
great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every 
American President in our history has been 
dedicated — the goal of a just and lasting peace. 

As President I hold the responsibility for 
choosing the best path to that goal and then 
leading the Nation along it. 

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this 
responsibility with all of the strength and 
wisdom I can command in accordance with your 
hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by 
your prayers. 



As I have said repeatedly, there is nothing to 
be gained by waiting. Delay can only increase 
the dangers and multiply the suffering. 

The time has come to move forward at the 
conference table toward an early resolution of 
this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming 
and open-minded in a common effort to bring 
the blessings of peace to the brave people of 
Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical 
juncture, both sides turned their face toward 
peace rather than toward conflict and war. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon 

His Excellency 
Ho Chi Minh 

President 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

Hanoi 



The Exchange of Letters Between 
President Nixon and President Ho 

Following is the exchange of letters between 
President Nixon and President Ho Chi Minh of 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam referred 
to by President Nixon in his address to the 
Nation on November 3. 



White House press release dated November 3 

PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER 

JuLT 15, 1969 
De^vr Mr. President : I realize that it is diffi- 
cult to communicate meaningfully across the 
gulf of four years of war. But precisely because 
of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity 
to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for 
a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in 
Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in 
bringing it to an end can benefit no one — least 
of all the people of Vietnam. My speech on 
May 14 ^ laid out a proposal which I believe is 
fair to all parties. Other proposals have been 
made which attempt to give the people of South 
Vietnam an opportimity to choose their own 
future. These proposals take into account the 
reasonable conditions of all sides. But we stand 
ready to discuss other programs as well, specif- 
ically the 10-point program of the NLF. 

' Bulletin of June 2, 1969, p. 457. 



PRESIDENT HO'S LETTER 

Hanoi, 25 August 1969 
{Received in Paris August 80) 

To His Excellency Richard Milhous Nixon 
President of the United States 
Washington 

Mr. President, I have the honor to acknowl- 
edge receipt of your letters. 

The war of aggression of the United States 
against our people, violating our fundamental 
national rights, still continues in South Viet- 
nam. The United States continues to intensify 
military operations, the B-52 bombings and the 
use of toxic chemical products multiply the 
crimes against the Vietnamese people. The 
longer the war goes on, the more it accumulates 
the mourning and burdens of the American 
people. I am extremely indignant at the losses 
and destructions caused by the American troops 
to our people and our comitry. I am also deeply 
touched at the rising toll of death of young 
Americans who have fallen in Vietnam by 
reason of the policy of American governing 
circles. 

Our Vietnamese people are deeply devoted to 
peace, a real peace with independence and real 
freedom. They are determined to fight to the 
end, without fearing the sacrifices and difficul- 
ties in order to defend their country and their 
sacred national rights. The overall solution in 
10 points of the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam and of the Provisional Revolu- 
tionary Government of the Republic of South 



November 24, 1969 



443 



Vietnam is a logical and reasonable basis for 
the settlement of the Vietnamese problem. It 
has earned the sympathy and support of the 
peoples of the world. 

In your letter you have expressed the desire to 
act for a just peace. For this the United States 
must cease the war of aggression and withdraw 
tlieir troops from South Vietnam, respect the 
right of the population of the South and of 
the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves, 
without foreign influence. This is the correct 
manner of solving the Vietnamese problem in 
conformity with the national rights of the Viet- 
namese people, the interests of the United States 
and the hopes for peace of the peoples of the 
world. This is the path that will allow the 
United States to get out of the war with honor. 

With good will on both sides we might arrive 
at common efforts in view of finding a correct 
solution of the Vietnamese problem. 
Sincerely, 

Ho Chi IMinh 



41st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made hy 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, head of the 
VjS. delegation, at the Jflst plenary session of 
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on 
November 6. 

Press release 328 dated November 6 

Ladies and gentlemen : Last Monday eve- 
ning, President Nixon stated that the IJnited 
States will persist in its search for a just peace 
in Viet-Nam.^ We shall do so, he said, "through 
a negotiated settlement if possible or through 
continued implementation of our plan for 
Vietnamization if necessary." 

We have made detailed offers which are 
before you. There is no need to recoimt them 
here. 

We have not, however, put forth our proposals 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated 
that we are willing to discuss the proposals 
which have been put forth by your side. We 
have said that everything is negotiable except 
the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to 
have the opportunity to determine their own fu- 
ture. We have demonstrated our flexibility and 



' See p. 437. 



good faith in 40 plenary sessions of these Paris 
meetings. 

Your side has refused to discuss our proposals 
seriously. As the President said : 

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating 
an end to the war is not the President of the United 
States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. 

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to 
show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just 
peace. 

You must not rely on our making concession 
after concession until you get everything you 
want. 

In our search for peace, we have recognized 
that your side was capable of blocking all at- 
tempts to bring an end to the war through nego- 
tiations. President Nixon therefore put into 
effect another plan. This is a plan which will 
bring the war to an end regardless of what 
liappens on the negotiating front. 

As President Nixon said on November 3, we 
have noted the reduced level of North Viet- 
namese infiltration into South Viet-Nam and 
the reduction of our casualties. We are basing 
our program of Vietnamization partially on 
those factors. If your military activity signif- 
icantly increases, we might have to take other 
measures. As the President said, you could make 
no greater mistake than to assume that an in- 
crease \i\ \aolence will be to your own advantage. 

You should be under no illusion that our 
position here at these talks is going to crumble 
because of the words or actions of a vocal mi- 
nority of the American public. As President 
Nixon said on November 3, the policy of the 
United States has been made under our Consti- 
tution by the President and the Congress, all 
of whom have been elected by the people. Recent 
opinion polls in the United States make it clear 
that the President has behind him the support 
of the vast majority of the American people as 
he carries out his Viet-Nam policy. That sup- 
port has increased since tlie launching of the 
moratorium movement to which you refer so 
much. Indeed, a poll taken since tlie President's 
speech has shown great public support for the 
policies of President Nixon. 

Ladies and gentlemen, our course is set. The 
President has stated the alternatives. We remain 
ready through these meetings, through private 
meetings, or through restricted meetings to dis- 
cuss the issues seriously and to find mutually 
acceptable solutions to them. TiHiether peace is 
achieved through negotiations depends on your 
readiness to deal with the issues in the same 
spirit. 



Department of State Bulletin 



. A Look at Asian Regionalism 



hy Marshall Green 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacifjc Affairs ' 



Distinguished mayors and presidents of 
chambers of commerce and other colleagues 
here today : I call you colleagues, for we are all 
coworkers in public affairs with a special stake 
in the peace and prosperity of the Pacific Basin. 
I suspect that j'our responsibilities, like mine, 
too seldom permit reflective glances at the past 
or thoughtful contemplation of the future. 
Crises of the moment — whether they be student 
dissidence, air pollution, inflation, protective re- 
strictions on trade and investment, or the all- 
pervasive problem of ending the war in Viet- 
Nam on an honorable basis — these crises tend to 
preoccupy our thoughts and actions, so much so 
that we are inclined to forget where we have 
been, to overlook basic changes that have taken 
place, and to neglect to analyze where present 
trends will be taking us. 

It is about one of these trends that I would 
like to talk with you today; namely, the trend 
toward greater regional awareness and coopera- 
tion in East Asia, and how it relates to United 
States policy. 

By East Asia I refer to the vast area sweep- 
ing from Korea and Jajjan down through China 
and Southeast Asia to Australia and New Zea- 
land. Obviously this area, wherein dwells one- 
third of humanity, disposes of vast potential. 
What happens there is of utmost consequence to 
the whole world. 

It is a region of infinite diversity, of different 
traditions and cultures, of varying degrees of 
economic and political development, and of 
often conflicting national interests. Yet we can 
detect a gradual movement toward recognition 
of the need for common attitudes and goals, and 
this movement appears to be accelerating. 

When I first joined the Bureau which I now 
head, it was responsible for only three independ- 



' Address made before the Japan-American Confer- 
ence of Mayors and Chambers of Commerce Presidents 
at Long Beach, Calif., on Oct. 20. 



ent nations in what was then known as the Far 
East. Most of the remainder of the region was 
under foreign domination. Colonialism was a 
conunon experience for most countries of East 
Asia, but it rarely fostered common interests 
among neighbors. The small elite groups in 
colonized nations were oriented toward distant 
powers ; the common people remained locked in 
a close circle of local tradition. 

The great surges of nationalism which swept 
through these nations after World War II actu- 
ally did little to draw them together. National- 
ism was inwardly directed. Understandably, 
new governments often tried to forge a national 
identity by evoking traditions from a pre- 
colonial past. A sense of inadequacy and frus- 
tration resulting from years of harsh foreign 
rule was often expressed in hostility, not only 
toward former colonial masters but toward 
neighbors. This factor may also help to explain 
the frequent convergence at that particular 
point in history of nationalism and communism, 
an ideology which feeds upon hostility. 

By 1969 many of the first-generation revolu- 
tionary elite had passed from the scene. They 
are now being replaced by a new generation 
which, though possessing a strong sense of na- 
tional identity, is weary of sterile ideologies and 
anticolonialist sloganeering. Increasingly the 
new generation seeks pragmatic paths to eco- 
nomic and social progress. 

Japan commands their attention. Prostrate at 
the end of World War II, Japan has now be- 
come the third greatest industrial producer in 
the world and has taken her rightful place as 
one of the great trading nations in the world, 
whose interest embraces the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany as inti- 
mately as countries nearby. 

These four coimtries may illustrate an im- 
portant law governing the relationships be- 
tween nations. Although we have and will 
continue to have conflicts of interest, the major 



November 24, 1969 



445 



social and economic changes involved in the 
modernization of our countries have given our 
peoples increasingly common outlooks, atti- 
tudes, and goals. If, as I am suggesting, mod- 
ernization is the leveler of cultural barriers 
between nations, it may also be regarded as the 
mother of regional cooperation. 

Economic Progress and Regional Cooperation 

Let us look briefly at the economic progress 
which has recently been attained by the younger 
Asian nations, at their latest effort to build re- 
gional cooperation, and at the roles of Japan 
and the United States in fostering moderniza- 
tion and cooperation. 

The Republic of Korea, in a brief 16 years, 
has risen from the ruins of a devastating war, 
has developed one of the highest growth rates in 
the world, and astonishes its visitors by the 
vitality and confidence of its economic progress. 
Surely it must be one of the most remarkable 
of recent economic achievements for a previ- 
ously totally unindustrialized small country to 
increase its exports in the highly competitive 
modern world from approximately $32 million 
in 1963, of which more than three- fourths were 
raw materials, to over $450 million in 1968, of 
which more than three-fourths were manufac- 
tured goods. 

The Republic of Cliina is now entering the big 
leagues in world commerce and industry. Its 
remarkable rate of growth, like that of Singa- 
pore and Hong Kong, shows what the Chinese 
people can achieve in a free setting. Annual 
GNP growth rates in the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Malaysia are also encouraging : somewhere 
between 6 and 9 percent on the average. The 
new leadership in Indonesia, faced with eco- 
nomic chaos in 1966, including an annual in- 
flation rate of 630 percent, is making extraor- 
dinary progi-ess in putting its house in order, 
including reduction of the current rate of in- 
flation to less than that of the United States. 
All this is the more noteworthy when we recall 
that Indonesia is approximately one-half of 
Southeast Asia in area and m population. 

Along with these instances of individual prog- 
ress there has developed an increasing interest 
on the part of the countries of the region in their 
neighbors and in the region as a whole. Govern- 
ments are becoming increasingly aware of the 
potential benefits, even the necessity, of coopera- 



tion with their neighbors. Technology, espe- 
cially improved conununications and transport, 
is making possible an almost immediate aware- 
ness of what is going on in neighboring coun- 
tries to an extent hitherto unknown. Asian busi- 
nessmen, engineers, government officials, and 
political leaders now have a far wider horizon 
than their predecessors. They are coming to 
know about each other through travel, press 
and radio and television, business arrangements, 
and regional conferences. Some of them came to 
know each other as fellow students in Japan, 
the United States, and elsewhere. 

Regional relationships have developed natu- 
rally in response to perceived needs, rather than 
being imposed according to any predetermined 
pattern. Therefore, they take a variety of forms : 
some bilateral, some multilateral with par- 
ticipation from outside the area, and some 
multilateral with purely Asian participation. 
This variety is sometimes confusing and some- 
times risks duplication of effort. It has, never- 
theless, the strength of having developed 
naturally. 

In the field of bilateral assistance, for ex- 
ample, Japan's foreign assistance (including 
private flows) exceeded $1 billion in 1968 and 
is aimed at reaching 1 percent of her gross na- 
tional product. The Republic of China is help- 
ing others to help themselves with teclinical aid 
programs in over 20 countries in Africa, South- 
east Asia, and Latin America. 

Asian Regional Organizations 

Multilaterally, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, 
and Viet-Nam are collaborating with each other 
and with 24 other countries in modest programs 
for the development of the Mekong River Val- 
ley, and this collaboration has continued even at 
times when political relations between these 
Southeast Asian comitries are strained or in 
some cases suspended. 

The Mekong Committee was founded by the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East, the oldest and most comprehensive of the 
Asian regional organizations. 

Also on ECAFE initiative, the Asian De- 
velopment Bank has been established and has 
begun to operate. Tlie contribution of .Japan to 
the ADB exceeds that of the United States, 
and its President is a distinguished Japanese. 
Although they are not regional institutions, the 



446 



Department of State Bulletin 



International IMonetary Fund and the World 
Bank are playing significant roles in the devel- 
opment of the East Asian region as well as in 
providing bilateral assistance and advice to 
Asian countries and to donor groups assisting 
certain Asian countries. 

One of the most interesting, and in the long 
run perhaiJS one of the most potentially signif- 
icant, developments has been the beginnings of 
collaboration between the coimtries of the region 
in purely Asian terms. The Asian and Pacific 
Council and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the Southeast Asian Economic 
Ministers Conference are groupings of exclu- 
sively Asian comitries developed at Asian ini- 
tiative to collaborate on Asian problems. They 
are as yet informal and have confined them- 
selves to general political and some economic 
collaboration. They have already provided use- 
ful forums for quiet and constructive discus- 
sion of potentially difficult problems. 

The Asian and Pacific Council is involved in 
such practical cooperative enterprises as the 
establishment in Canberra of a Registry of Ex- 
pert Sei-vices, and a Cultural and Social Cen- 
ter in Seoul, and is considering a food and 
fertilizer technology center in Taipei and an 
economic coordination center in Bangkok. 
Japan has recently proposed a maritime project 
which would include marine training, the 
promotion of maritime safety, and navigational 
matters, all of great interest to the members, 
who are all maritime nations. 

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
a subregional groupmg which now comprises 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa- 
pore, and Thailand — but leaves its door open 
for others in Southeast Asia to join — is also con- 
centrating its efforts on projects which would 
be of common benefit to Southeast Asia. These 
include exchanges of trade missions, trade fairs, 
simplification of travel regulations, promotion 
of tourism, and exchanges of tecluiical experts. 
The members are also interested in improving 
intraregional telecommunications, navigation, 
and transportation. 

The Southeast Asian Economic Ministers 
Conference, founded at Japanese initiative, 
meets amiually to discuss problems of South- 
east Asian economic development. 

Sophisticated Asians in the educational field, 
conscious of the correlation between excellence 



in the higher education and technical training 
fields and the development and modernization 
process, have formed the Southeast Asian Min- 
isters of Education Council. This organization 
is concentrating upon longer range projects 
such as regional centers for tropical medicine, 
research in agriculture, tropical biology, teacher 
training in science and mathematics, educa- 
tional innovation and teclmology, and training 
of English-language teachers. 

Legislators, jurors, and lavs^ers from the Re- 
public of China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet- 
Nam collaborate in the Asian Parliamentarians 
Union, the aims of which are the acliievement 
and preservation of "full freedom and genuine 
democracy thereby securing enduring peace and 
prosperity in Asia." Australia and New Zea- 
land have observer status in this organization. 

Improvements in regional cooperation have 
not been extensive in the field of mutual secu- 
rity. In fact, the security structure in East Asia 
has not altered much in the past 15 years ; and 
I do not expect to see any new formal security 
arrangements, at least in the near future. 
There may be from time to time useful military 
collaboration as, for example, that of Malaysia 
and Indonesia in suppressing insurgency in 
Borneo and that of Thailand and Malaysia in 
putting down terrorism along the Thai- 
Malaysian border. Australia and New Zealand 
have recently announced that they intend to 
maintain some troops in Malaysia and Singa- 
pore after British withdrawal in that area in 
1971, in full recognition of their role as Asian 
powers. This constructive and statesmanlike ac- 
tion will contribute to the stability and confi- 
dence in the region. 

All these developments in the field of neigh- 
borly cooperation are encouraging, but they do 
not obscure harsh realities which will continue 
to confront tliis part of the world. One of these 
is the problem of divided nations. With three of 
the world's four divided nations. East Asia will 
continue to bear the major portion of the pres- 
sures exerted by militant communism. Although 
regionalism may eventually provide a frame- 
work for alleviating these pressures, the prob- 
lems posed by divided nations will in the 
immediate future affect the pace and manner in 
which regional cooperation will develop. Simi- 
larly, regional cooperation can provide ma- 
chinery but not the power for economic 



November 24, 1969 



447 



dev^elopment. The transfer of capital and skills 
from developed countries can help, but the real 
thrust for modernization must be provided by 
the determined efforts of each individual nation. 



Regionalism Consistent With U.S. Policy 

One final point should be made about im- 
provements hi cooperation between East Asian 
coimtries. They are consistent with developing 
United States policy. 

While United States interests in the area re- 
main essentially the same and our commitments 
will be honored, we recognize that there is 
change in the mood of the American people. 
They are cautious about undertaking new com- 
mitments. They are becoming somewhat impa- 
tient with carrying what many consider to be a 
disproportionate share of the burden of mili- 
tary security and economic assistance abroad. 
They are asking more and more frequently what 
other countries are doing to help themselves and 
each other. We in this administration will ask 
the same questions, and our actions will depend 
to an important extent upon what the countries 
of the area are prepared to do for themselves 
and for each other. 

Since this meeting is one of Americans and 
Japanese occupying positions of responsibility 
in our respective countries, it is perhaps ap- 
propriate that I should close with a special word 
on Japan. We admire and applaud the industi-y, 
imagination, and the discipline with which the 
people of Japan have brought about so great 
a development of their country in so short a 
time — to the point where Japan is now the third 
most powerful economic entity in the world to- 
day. But these great acliievements carry with 
them great responsibilities. And the world is 
watching to see the role which Japan will hence- 
forth play in the development and security of 
Asia. Japan has already made substantial con- 
tributions t-o the development of other countries 
in the region, and the Government has stated 
that it will be the policy of Japan to expand 
significantly its assistance to East Asian coun- 
tries in the years ahead. 

This is good news, though it is as it should 



be, and my Government looks forward to co- 
operating closely with the Government of Japan 
and those of other free nations of Asia in creat- 
ing the conditions in which those countries can 
with confidence develop tlieir own economies in 
their own way and brmg about a riclier and a 
fuller life for their people. 



Under Secretary Richardson Attends 
Special NATO Session at Brussels 

The Department of State amiounced on Octo- 
ber 29 (pi-ess release 320) that Under Secretary 
Richardson would represent the United States 
at a special session of the North Atlantic Coun- 
cil at Brussels November 5-6.^ The meeting, 
with particijDation of ministers and high-level 
officials of the Allies, has been long in planning 
and is the first to be held since the suggestion 
for such a meeting was made by President 
Nixon last April as a means of furthering 
AVestern political consultation.- 

AVliile in Brussels, Under Secretary Richard- 
son will meet with the Belgian Foreign Minis- 
ter, Pierre Harmel. He will also call on the 
Commission of the European Commimities in 
Brussels. 

Following the 2-day Council session, he will 
travel to London. He will meet with Foreign 
Minister Michael Stewart and other British 
leaders and officials on November 7. 

The Under Secretary will then proceed to 
Rome to participate in a 3-day conference of 
chiefs of American diplomatic missions in Eu- 
rope. The conference, which is scheduled for 
November 10-12, is one of a series of regional 
meetings called periodically to permit an ex- 
change of views between senior Washington 
officials and American ambassadors abroad. 
While in Rome he will meet with the Italian 
Foreign Minister, Aldo Moro. 



'For names of members of the U.S. delegation, see 
Department of State press release 320 dated Oct. 29. 

' For President Nixon's address before the ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Apr. 10, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 351. 



448 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Responsibility for the U.N.'s Development 
as an Instrument of World Order 



ly Charles W. Tost 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations '• 



As your rei^resentative to the United Nations 
I deeply appreciate the recognition you are giv- 
ing here in Cincinnati this week, as others are 
doing in many parts of the United States, to the 
United Nations as it reaches the age of 24. 

This milestone in the life of this international 
organization happens to coincide with a moment 
hi our history when the concern of many pub- 
lic-spirited citizens is turning inward to cope 
with pressmg domestic problems: those of our 
cities, of the aspirations of ethnic minorities, of 
the search by a new generation of Americans for 
a more meaningful life. Meanwlule, interna- 
tionally, one single question, peace in Viet- 
Nam — a question to which for historical reasons 
the United Nations has been able to contrib- 
ute little — nearly monopolizes our national 
attention. 

It would scarcely be surprising if, in the 
clamor of these urgent American concerns, the 
sound of the U.N.'s 24th birthday party were 
almost drowned out. Yet if that were to happen, 
and if ignoring or shrugging off the U.N. were 
to become an American habit in future years, 
this would be an ominous development for our 
coxmtry and for the world. 

I do not say this in any mood of utopianism, 
but in sober realism. After all, a part of realism 
is the ability to see beyond the ends of our noses. 
I suggest that, in our hard national interest, we 
must be able to look beyond Viet-Nam, beyond 
the urgent and glaring crises of the moment, 
beyond our own shores — and address ourselves 
to the world problems of the 1970's. Among 
them we will find problems that affect the fu- 



' Address made before the tJ.N. Week luncheon of 
the Cincinnati World Affairs Council at Cincinnati, 
Ohio, on Oct. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 129 dated 
Oct. 21). 



ture security and well-being of our country but 
which, because they are worldwide in scope, we 
camiot solve by ourselves. In their solution the 
United Nations and its family of agencies must 
play an important and, in some cases, an indis- 
pensable part. 

Some of these problems have long since ap- 
proached crisis proportions: 

1. There is the crisis of an ever-mounting 
global arms race, especially in nuclear weapons 
and missile systems, which heavily strains the 
world's resources and yet fails to bring security 
to either side. 

2. There is the crisis of human fertility, 
which is fast causing the world's population to 
outnin food supplies, which is aggravating im- 
measurably all our other problems, and which, 
unless it is soon brought under control, threat- 
ens witliin our children's lifetime to visit famine 
and chaos on vast regions of the world. 

3. There is the crisis of the poor nations, most 
of them recently independent, whose insistent 
demand for a better material life is one of the 
most inescapable realities of our time. 

4. There is the gathering worldwide crisis of 
the human environment, of depleted resources, 
polluted air and water, disfigured landscapes, 
overcrowded and disorganized cities. 

5. And on top of all these, it takes no prophet 
to foresee recurrent crises of international vi- 
olence, especially among poor and politically 
unstable nations, any one of wliich, unless there 
is an impartial police force to keep the peace, 
could draw the major powers into direct and 
fatal confrontation. 

All five of these world problems — armaments, 
population, development, environment, peace- 
keeping — are, in one degree or another, direct 
concerns of the United Nations. All of them are 



November 24, 1969 

368-239—69 2 



449 



recurrent themes in U.N. debates ; some of them 
are the subject of major U.N. programs and 
negotiations. Yet it cannot be said that the 
United Nations, or the community of nations, 
has any of them anywhere nearly under control. 
A few months ago U Thant, speaking from 
his imique vantage point as Secretary General 
of the United Nations, spoke on this subject as 
follows : 

... I can only conclude from the information that is 
available to me as Secretary-General that the Members 
of the United Nations have perhaps 10 years left in 
which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch 
a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve 
the human environment, to defuse the population ex- 
plosion, and to supply the required momentum to world 
development 

If such a global partnership is not forged within the 
next decade, then I very much fear that the problems 
I have mentioned will have reached such staggering 
proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to 
control. 

You will notice that the Secretary General 
estimates that the nations have 10 years in 
which to act. That may sound like a comforta- 
ble cushion of time, but it is not. Our situation 
might be compared to that of a community that 
has to finish building a dike before the floods 
come. Whether the next flood will come in 10 
years, or 20, or 5, is a matter of educated guess- 
work at best. But building dikes is a slow busi- 
ness. Even with 10 years to go, there is not a 
single day to be lost. 

The "dike" of which I speak, of course, is the 
United Nations, together with all the interna- 
tional agencies and programs that promote its 
purposes. Next year the U.N.'s 25th anniversary 
will be duly celebrated with speeches and com- 
memorative ceremonies. But the observances 
that really coimt will be renewed efforts to make 
the U.N. a more effective instrument of peace 
and progress among nations and a more reliable 
dike against chaos and disorder. 

Those efforts, as U Thant correctly pointed 
out, must be made by the member states. The 
U.N., after all, has virtually no power of its own. 
Its success rests entirely on the readiness of its 
members to put their power at its service and to 
subordinate their parochial concerns to the 
conunon cause of a more peaceful and secure 
world. 

No country has a more vitally important con- 
tribution to make to this process than the 
United States. All five of the world problems I 
mentioned have three things in common that we 



Americans should remember: First, if not 
solved they tlireaten our own nation; second, 
we cannot solve them alone ; third, they cannot 
be solved without us. As a nation uniquely great 
in its wealth and power and deeply committed 
to the ideals of peace and progress, our country 
simply must continue to bear its share of the re- 
sponsibility for the U.N.'s future development 
as an instrmnent of world order. Other members 
must also do their part, but they will under- 
standably look for leadership to the American 
Government and people. 

As for the American Government, I can as- 
sure you that its support for the United Nations 
remains firm. Last December, even before his 
inauguration, Mr. Nixon with Mr. Sogers paid 
a call on Secretary General Thant at the U.N. 
Headquarters. Their purpose was to give evi- 
dence, as Mr. Nixon put it at the time, of "our 
continuing support of the United Nations and 
our intention in these years ahead to do every- 
thing that we can to strengthen this organiza- 
tion as it works in the cause of peace throughout 
the world." 

The President's appearance to address the 
General Assembly on September 18 was a fur- 
ther reaffirmation of that American intention.' 
In his address the President spoke frankly of 
doubts that have arisen concerning the future 
world role of the United States. "As for the 
United States," he said in reply to those doubts, 
"I can state here today without qualification: 
We have not turned away from the world." 

And the President concluded this part of his 
address with these words : 

It would be dishonest, particularly before this sophis- 
ticated audience, to pretend that the United States 
has no national interests of its own or no special con- 
cern for its own interests. 

However, our most fundamental national interest is 
in maintaining that structure of international stability 
on which peace depends and which makes orderly 
progress possible. 

During its first 9 months, the Nixon adminis- 
tration has adopted concrete policies aimed at 
precisely that national interest in the "structure 
of international stability." It has deliberately 
and firmly moved, insofar as lies in its power to 
move, from an era of confrontation to an era 
of negotiation. It seeks urgently to engage the 
Soviet Union in negotiations for limitation of 



' For text of President Nixon's address to the General 
Assembly, see Bui-letin of Oct 6, 1969, p. 297. 



450 



Department of State Bulletin 



strategic weapons and in negotiations to help 
settle the conflict in the Middle East. It pro- 
poses a greater emphasis on the United Nations 
Developnaent Program and other international 
agencies as channels for American assistance 
during the Second Development Decade. It vig- 
orously and concretely supports United Na- 
tions efforts to help nations grow more food and 
reduce their rates of population growth, to pro- 
tect the world's threatened environment, and 
to share the benefits of space exploration. 

These are proofs that the United States Gov- 
ernment remains steadfast in its support of the 
United Nations. However, much more needs to 
be done by our Government and other govern- 
ments before the United Nations can even come 
close to carrying out the missions we have as- 
signed to it. Of course the government of our 
free society cannot exceed what the people are 
willing to accept. Your support for the United 
Nations, and for our country's more effective 
participation in it, is a vital necessity if it is to 
succeed and if we and our children are ever to 
live in a safer world. 

In saying this I have in mind particularly 
our children. To one like myself, who has been 
associated with the United Nations in one way 
or another since the days when the charter was 
being written, it is still hard to realize that tliis 
institution, possibly the greatest political in- 
novation of the 20th century, is no longer new. 
It is older than today's college generation ; older 
than a great proportion of our men in uniform ; 
older than nuclear weapons, network television. 
Communist China, the space age, and all of 
those looming crises I was discussing a moment 
ago. Unless the United Nations is capable of 
continuous self-renewal — unless it can face new 
problems, accept new ideas, new blood, new 
young people — it will become obsolete and ir- 
relevant just at the time when humanity needs 
it most. 

It is encouraging, therefore, to see that in the 
preparations for next year's celebration of the 
U.N.'s 25th anniversary, there has developed a 
strong accent on youth. Plans are being dis- 
cussed now for a world youth congress to be 
held at the United Nations next year, composed 
of representatives of the young people of each 
member state. There are proposals to increase 
the recruitment of yoimg people as interna- 
tional civil servants in the United Nations and 
in an international volmiteer service corps. And 



our Government has also supported the inclu- 
sion of young people in the delegations of mem- 
ber states to next year's General Assembly itself. 

Long after the last shot in Viet-Nam has been 
fired, the great problems of the family of man 
will continue to demand the devoted efforts of 
leaders and citizens, old and young, in every 
nation. If, as we review the record of the United 
Nations, we find that the efforts made in that 
organization are not good enough, let us not 
forget that the responsibility for that state of 
affairs lies with us, the members. As Adlai Ste- 
venson once said, it is a bad idea to mock the 
U.N.'s weakness, for when we do we are mocking 
ourselves. 

Let us then dedicate ourselves, as he did him- 
self in his last years, to making the U.N. strong 
enough to carry out our purjjoses, strong enough 
to preserve our civilization from our own exces- 
ses, strong enough to create a world fit for our 
children and our children's cliildren. 



Mr. Moynihan To Represent U.S. 
on NATO Environmental Committee 

The "Wliite House amiounced on November 6 
(Wliite House press release) that the President 
has designated Daniel P. Sloynihan to represent 
the United States at the first meeting of the 
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society, expected to be held in Brussels starting 
December 8. 

Establisliment of the Committee on the Chal- 
lenges of Modern Society by the North Atlantic 
Council was announced in Brussels November 6. 
The Council's decision implemented a proposal 
made by President Nixon to the foreign minis- 
ters of the alliance last April. ^ Speakuag at the 
ministerial session in Wasliington, he urged 
creation of such a committee in NATO to mar- 
shal the experience and resources of Western 
nations to deal with common environmental 
problems. 

Mr. Moynihan has served as coordinator of 
the United States contribution to the detailed 
study in NATO which led to the establishment 
of the Committee on the Challenges of Alodern 
Society. 



'■ Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1969, p. 351. 



November 24, 1969 



451 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



The International Labor Organization: 50 Years of Service 



Statement by George P. Shultz 
Secretary of Labor ^ 



A prerequisite of an organization's effective- 
ness is relevancy to the times. The International 
Labor Organization meets and has met this cri- 
terion. It has recognized the dimensions of 
social problems, the opportunities for effective 
work on them, and the factor of change as es- 
sential to human existence. Its programs and 
policies have been governed accordingly. 

Underlying these policies and programs is an 
awareness of the breakthroughs in modern 
tecluiology wliich give man undreamed-of 
powers for both preserving life and sowing 
destruction. 

And underlying the success of the ILO — the 
Organization whose 50th year of service we are 
honoring here today — is its pervasive awareness 
of the basic principle that we now live in a 
mutually dependent world community. 

Recognition of the wisdom of these principles 
in the operation of the International Labor Or- 
ganization was provided by the awarding of the 
1969 Nobel Peace Prize to this unique Organiza- 
tion which, in the words of the Nobel awards 
body, strives "to improve working condi- 
tions . . . and thereby contribute to the safe- 
guarding of world peace." 

In its early years the ILO's primary instru- 
ment for action was standard setting. Its inter- 
national labor standards take the form of con- 
ventions, treaties open to ratification by gov- 
ernments, and recommendations for guidance of 
national legislatures ; and they represent a con- 
sensus among tripartite elements of the Organi- 
zation's membership on desirable goals for 
national legislation and practice. 

During the Second World War a new genera- 
tion of statesmen, meeting in the city of 
Pliiladelphia in 1944, gave the ILO, and work- 



' Made in plenary session of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on Oct. 29 (U.S./XJ.N. press release 134). 



ing people the world over, a new lease on life. 
At Philadelphia the ILO articulated once again 
the principle of social and economic interde- 
pendence of states in the declaration that "pov- 
erty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity 
everywhere." 

It was this declaration that heralded two 
decades of activity during wliich the Organiza- 
tion played a leading role in formulating the 
concept and executing the policy of teclmical 
assistance to the newly emerging countries of 
Asia and Africa. 

As a large number of former colonies 
achieved independence and very quickly there- 
after full membership in the ILO, the Organiza- 
tion rapidly became a nearly universal body. 
The result was a significant shift in the ILO's 
membership. Whereas before the war it con- 
sisted in large part of the highly industrialized 
countries of Europe and North America, today 
more than half of its membere are developing 
countries. As a result, the ILO's emphasis over 
the past 20 years has been placed less on pro- 
tecting workers from certain adverse conse- 
quences of industrialization — although this is 
still a major concern — and more on helping to 
bring about economic and social develo])ment 
through ever-expanding programs of technical 
assistance. 

The ILO seeks to provide training not only 
for technical skills but also for responsible 
leadership in the developing countries. The 
trade union freedom which the ILO continually 
advocates will have little meaning, and will be 
short-lived, if not accompanied by the trade 
union leadersliip which the Organization ac- 
tively encourages. Managers and employers, too, 
must provide effective direction and competent 
leadership, as emphasized by the ILO's expand- 
ing programs in this area. 



452 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Organization is firmly committed to the 
achievement of human rights for all. In addi- 
tion to its safeguarding of trade union rights 
and its attack upon forced labor, it has con- 
^ demned all forms of discrimination in employ- 
' ment. And with the same forthrightuess with 
which it upholds the principle of freedom of 
association it has opposed the practice of 
ajyai'theid. 

Xow, m this 50th anniversary year, the ILO's 
Director General has launched a "World Em- 
ployment Program, argumg to his 121 constit- 
uent member states, both developed and de- 
veloping alike, that the creation of jobs for 
people everywhere in the world be given a top 
priority. His argument that job security is as 
vital as, and is vital to, political security and 
that unemployment in far-flmig developing 
countries can be a real danger for affluent na- 
tions once again falls into the pattern of the ILO 
philosophy that human betterment is indi- 
visible. 

Thus is the ILO relevant to the times. 

Eelevancy was built into the Organization's 
conception and structure with the adoption of 
the tripartite composition of governments, em- 
ployers, and workers. Radical alterations in the 
world's social and economic structure, and the 
ILO's ability to minister to the needs of its 
members within the context of change, attest to 
the Organization's viability. 

For half a century the ILO has effectively 
worked to adjust to these changes as well as to 
achieve a deejDer miderstanding of the role eacli 
of its three component groups must play in na- 
tional and international development. Accord- 
ingly, a recognition has evolved that more must 
be done to remove or lessen tensions where the,v 
exist if the world is ever to attain the goal of 
balanced economic and social development. 

In noting the ILO's relevance to its times, one 
must acknowledge that this alone is not suffi- 
cient to make the Organization the important 
institution it has become. Leadership is another 
factor. It is fortunate that the ILO has always 
had able and distinguished men to guide it 
through the many difficult years, through wars 
and depressions as well as times of prosperity. 

Albert Thomas, the first Director General, 
was able to build from the wreckage of World 
War I an organization that has improved the 
lot of mankind. 

Today the U.S. Government salutes the work 
that lias been done over the past 21 years by 
another great Director General, David A. 
Morse — an American who is also a citizen of 



the world, and one of whom my country is justly 
proud. Mr. Morse has presided over the Office 
through years of unparalleled change in which 
our miderstanding of the world and human re- 
lationsliips has deepened and even the cosmos 
itself has begun to reveal its secrets. Thi'ough 
all this the Organization has been able to adjust, 
to maintam its relevancy. 

But our agenda for the future is full. We can 
take no comfort in the fact that there are still 
millions verging on starvation, deprived of ele- 
mentary medical care, doomed to illiteracy, who 
suffer discrimination and who do not share in 
the most basic liberties and human dignities. 

There is much work to be done in the fields 
of employment policy, social security, industrial 
safety, the fight against discrimination, solv- 
ing the problems of youth and older workers, 
and vocational training and rehabilitation. 

There are danger signs ahead, and the ILO 
has joined with other groups in pointing out the 
inlierent tlireat posed by overpopulation. Until 
this problem is contained, no increase in gi-oss 
national product alone will be able to generate 
the right social climate for effective hiunan de- 
velopment. Production increases alone will not 
be able to neutralize the effects of overpopula- 
tion in the developing world, which could de- 
stroy the peace and security of the more affluent 
nations. 

For this reason we also endorse the inclusion 
of social objectives in the Second Development 
Decade. 

I believe the ILO can make no greater con- 
tribution to the United Nations Second Devel- 
opment Decade than its World Employment 
Program ; for economic growth and national de- 
velopment cannot be achieved without adequate 
and systematic development and utilization of 
human resources. The recent Pearson Connnis- 
sion report to the World Bank, as well as the 
address to the Board of Governors of the World 
Bank by its Director General, Mr. Robert S. 
McNamara, gives prominence to the develop- 
ment of human resources as a key to rapid 
economic development. 

]\Iadam President, on behalf of my Govern- 
ment I extend warm congratulations to the 
International Labor Organization on the 
occasion of its 50th anniversary of service to 
mankind. 

In the words of President Nixon: ". . . we 
rededicate ourselves to ILO as an instrument 
toward the realization of lasting human peace 
through the attainment of economic and social 
justice for peoples everywhere." 



November 24, 1969 



453 



The United Nations Budget for 1970 



Statement hy Congressman Dante B. Fascell 
U.S. Re'presentative to the General Assembly ^ 



Before commenting on the budget estimates 
for 1970 and several other important issues 
■whicli will be before our committee, I should 
like to say a few words about a somewhat larger, 
but also a relevant, issue. 

Since I have been attending this session, I 
have listened carefully to statements presented 
both m this committee and in tlie plenary ses- 
sion, and I have been struck by a theme which 
appeared to recur in many of them — a theme 
reflecting certain uneasiness, even certain pro- 
fomid concern, about the direction in which this 
organization is moving and its capacity for 
effective action. 

I would like to stress, Mr. Chairman, that 
this theme, tliis concern, was not particular to 
any one delegation nor to the delegates from any 
one geographical area. It was expressed by 
representatives of small states and of large ones, 
of those which are advancing along the ladder 
of development as well as by more developed 
countries. 

Viewing its present, and looking back at the 
development of this organization during the 
past 24 years, I find this concern to be fully 
warranted. For nearly two and a half decades, 
the United Nations and its affiliated organs and 
agencies have gi'own considerably m response 
to the wishes of their member states and the 
needs of the moment. This growth has been 
necessary and beneficial to the world com- 
munity, but we would be less than frank with 
each other if we were to claim that it has pro- 
ceeded at all times along clearly defined, ra- 
tional, and systematic lines. As a result, many 
thoughtful people, looldng at the complex and 
proliferating machinery of the United Nations 
system, conscious of its financial and other prob- 
lems, have wondered aloud about this organiza- 



' Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budget- 
ary) on Oct. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 128). 



tion's ability to respond effectively during the 
next 10 or 25 years to both the legitimate desires 
of its membership and the immensely challeng- 
ing tasks which lie ahead of us. 

All of us are agreed, I am certain, that the 
United Nations is a vitally important organiza- 
tion which should, and indeed must, continue to 
respond to the needs of its members. At the same 
time, is it not for us who have some respon- 
sibility for the future of mankind to take the 
necessary steps to assure that our cumulative 
efforts may actively promote the cause of peace 
and development for all people ? 

These are, admittedly, large issues, and some 
may say that they do not belong in the Fifth 
Committee. I feel otherwise. I believe that this 
committee has a legitimate and vital concern 
for the effectiveness of this organization, its 
management, and wise use of the resources en- 
trusted to it by the world community. 

For example, we ought to devote attention 
and comprehensive consideration to the rela- 
tionships—financial, budgetary, administrative, 
and other — between the United Nations, its 
volimtary programs and the entire family of 
U.N. specialized agencies. 

Several items on the agenda of the Fifth 
Committee relate to this subject. Therefore, this 
committee is competent to act in this field with 
a view to projDOsing changes and improvements 
which will assure a more systematic, coordi- 
nated, and efficient utilization of scarce re- 
sources — manpower as well as financial. The 
methods and procedures which we have fol- 
lowed during the past 24 years are not neces- 
sarily suitable to the tasks which will confront 
the United Nations family of organizations dur- 
ing the next quarter of a century. It is incum- 
bent upon us, therefore, as necessary, to devise 
new, effective methods of coping with future 
challenges. 

Accordingly, I would suggest that in ap- 



454 



Department of State Bulletin 



proaching the agenda items before us, and in 
our corridor conversations, we begin to focus on 
ways and means to make this organization as 
effective an instrument as possible. And in 
doing so, I would hope that we could keep cer- 
tain basic concepts in mind. They are : 

First, that we recognize that tlie task before 
us is a collective effort in which we are all vitally 
interested and that, while there are and will 
always be differences of opinion on various 
items, there is no rational basis for confronta- 
tion. This is an organization to which we have 
all contributed and which is of major im- 
portance to all of us. Accordingly, we must 
listen to each other and realize that none of us 
is the exclusive repository of wisdom. 

Secondly, we should recognize that, in order 
to carry out the pixrposes and principles of the 
charter and to be a vital force in international 
life, the United Nations must develop its capac- 
ity to meet the needs of its members. As we 
take on new activities we must constantly reas- 
sess our priorities to see whether they are stUl 
valid. None of us, I am certain, is willing to 
abandon his early dreams and hopes for the 
United Nations, and none of us wants to place 
what has sometimes been called a "ceiling" on 
its essential activities. But at the same time, all 
of us should agree that the organization's 
growth should follow a rational pattern related 
to the increasingly challenging and complex 
tasks which will confront our world during the 
next 25 years. 

Budget Estimates for 1970 

Because we feel as we do about this matter, 
Mr. Chairman, we are pleased that the Secretary 
General has taken the lead in dealing with the 
problems which have troubled us and that in 
this he has the support of the Advisory Com- 
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- 
tions. We believe that the Secretary General has 
been wise to consider that the present is a period 
in which to assess the existing resources, capac- 
ity, and methods of work of the United Na- 
tions — that it is a period of consolidation. We 
consider that his budget estimates for 1970 - on 
the whole reflect this view and that he should 
be commended for them. We consider them to be 
a considerable improvement, particularly at this 
stage in the life of the organization, over the 
estimates which were presented last year. I 

' U.N. doc. A/7606. 



should add, Mr. Chairman, that we consider 
that the Advisory Conunittee has done its usual 
excellent job in making its recommendations 
with respect to the estimates. 

It is, of course, true, as many representatives 
have pointed out, that we have no clear picture 
as yet as to what the final budget level will be, 
and so it is premature to take a position with 
respect to it. We, like other delegations, will 
carefully scrutinize the additional estimates 
which will come before us. 

Before going further, Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to emphasize one point to which sufficient 
attention is seldom given. The United States 
does not mean to speak as if the major admin- 
istrative and budgetary problems about which 
we are concerned can be solved by the Secretary 
General alone. We recognize that these problems 
have been created, to a very large extent, by the 
demands of member governments themselves; 
that we all share the responsibility for the ex- 
istence of these problems. We must realize that 
greater discipline and restraint on our part is 
required if the development of this organiza- 
tion in the administrative and budgetary area 
is to be orderly and rational. 

Provisional Posts 

A number of delegations have questioned the 
credit sought by the Secretary General to pro- 
vide for 234 provisional posts in 1970. It can, of 
course, be questioned whether the request of the 
Secretary General for this credit is wise, in view 
of the manpower survey being undertaken and 
in view of the fact that a number of existing 
posts have not yet been filled. Further, one can 
question the provisional-post approach — which 
was tried and discarded some years ago — and 
we do not favor it as a normal method of budg- 
eting. However, we recognize that the Advi- 
sory Committee has scmtinized this credit very 
carefully and has decided to accept it for 1970, 
with some reduction and some question as to the 
total, in the light of the limitations the Secre- 
tary General has imposed upon himself with 
respect to its use. Further, we can understand 
why the Secretary General has chosen to call 
for posts on a provisional basis during the 
period in which the manpower survey is under- 
way. While sharing the misgivings of the Ad- 
visory Committee on the numbers involved, we 
believe that this limited approach can be ac- 
cepted as an exceptional measure to deal with 
an unusual situation. 



November 24, 1969 



455 



There is another area to which many delega- 
tions have referred as one in which savings can 
be made ; that is, conference and documentation 
costs. We strongly share this view. The prob- 
lems which exist in this area arise almost en- 
tirely from the demands of member states, and 
there is only a minimal amount which the Secre- 
tary General can do on his own to solve them. 
We are convinced that the best way in which 
to deal with this matter is for this committee 
to approve the recommendations of the Com- 
mittee of Seven, which are before us.-^ 

The Secretary General is making an effort to 
deal with that part of the problem which is his 
responsibility. Recognizing the interest of this 
committee in the matter, he designated the Of- 
fice of Conference Services as the first area to be 
the subject of the survey being imdertaken by 
the new Administrative Management Service. 
The survey is now underway and is expected to 
be completed by the end of the year. In this con- 
nection, we would like to congratulate the Sec- 
retary General for the manner in which he has 
responded to this committee's request for a 
study of the utilization and deployment of the 
entire Secretariat. 

Planning Estimates, 1971 

One of the most important items which will 
come before us is the planning estimates for 
1971. We can say little on this subject at the 
present time, since the Secretary General's pro- 
posals are not yet before us. We assume that, in 
preparing the 1971 planning estimates, the 
Secretary General will be guided by the same 
jDhilosophy which he has sought to reflect in the 
1970 estimates ; namely, that no significant in- 
crease in existing staff resources will be sought 
imtil the results of the manpower survey become 
reasonably clear. 

Unforeseen Expenses 

Let me now turn to another matter, the report 
of the Advisory Committee on procedures for 
dealing with unforeseen expenses and their fi- 
nancing.^ This report was held over from last 
year because of an understandable desire on the 
part of many delegations for additional in- 
formation and clarification. We believe that 
this committee should at this session adopt the 
Advisory Conunittee's recommendations. As we 



• U.N. doc. A/7359. 
' U.N. doc. A/7336. 



have pointed out on an earlier occasion, the size 
of the supplemental appropriations for 1969 — 
of which only a part qualified under the present 
resolution on miforeseen and extraordinary ex- 
penses — makes clear that additional discipline 
is needed in incurring obligations during a fi- ■ 
nancial year and approving proposed expendi- f 
tures which were not foreseen at the time an- 
nual appropriations for that year were made. 

Subsidiary Administrative Bodies 

We share the concern expressed by the Secre- 
tary General, by the chairman of the Advisory 
Committee, and by a number of delegations to 
the effect that the activities of subsidiary bodies, 
established to help brmg about efficiency and 
economy, may not be properly interrelated. 
Perhaps the problem results from the fact that 
this committee was not sufficiently careful when 
it established tlie terms of reference of these 
bodies. We consider it essential that the activi- 
ties of the various subsidiary organs wliich 
are now dealmg with administrative, budget- 
ary, and management problems be carefully 
aligned and that their responsibilities and rela- 
tionships be clearly delineated. To accomplish 
this, we believe that the Advisory Committee 
should examine this problem in depth during 
the coming year, in consultation with the other 
bodies involved, and should present this com- 
mittee with specific recommendations next year 
as to how we should deal with it. 

Strengtiiening the Advisory Committee 

For many years now, we have been calling 
upon the Advisory Committee to study more 
and more problems, and obviously we will have 
to rely increasingly on this committee as United 
Nations operations expand and grow more 
complex. It seems to us that the time has come 
to recognize that we have overloaded the Ad- 
visory Committee in relation to its existing pro- 
gram and method of work. We believe that it is, 
in part, because the Advisory Committee is so 
overloaded that we have tended in recent years 
to create new bodies to perform tasks in the ad- 
ministrative, budgetary, and management field. 
It occurs to us that what is needed for the fu- 
ture is to ensure that members elected to the 
Advisory Committee are able to devote more 
time, perhaps substantially full time, to this im- 
portant committee. This will, in turn, enable it 
to give greater attention to its program of work, 
including providing broader services to the com- 



456 



Department of State Bulletin 



mittee, by being in session during a substantial 
part of tlie year. It also occurs to us that it may 
very well be necessaiy for the future to make 
arrangements to enable the chainnan of the 
Advisory Committee to serve on a full-time, 
year-round basis. We recommend that the Ad- 
\ isory Committee be asked to look into this mat- 
ter seriously during the coming year and report 
its conclusions to us at the next session of the 
Assembly. 

Scale of Assessments 

In response to the General Assembly's request 
of last year, the Committee on Contributions 
has made a report to us of the results of its re- 
view of the criteria and terms of reference used 
in establishing the scale of assessments. We are 
impressed with the general conclusions of the 
committee, contained in paragraphs 47 through 
50 of its report.^ In particular, we agree that 
the various guidelines laid down for the com- 
mittee by the General Assembly have withstood 
the test of time and permit the establishment of 
a balanced and equitable scale based primarily 
on the principle of capacity to pay. Accord- 
ingly, we believe that no new guidelines are re- 
quired for the Committee on Contributions in 
connection with its establislmient of a new scale 
of assessments next year. 

Financial Solvency 

I Speaking earlier before this committee, the 
Secretary General reported to us on the finan- 
cial position of the organization. If we believe 
that there is a vital necessity for the survival 
and continued development of this organization 
to carry out the purposes of the charter, we can- 
not permit the existing financial situation to 
continue. All our other efforts will be in vain 
unless we can solve the financial problem. Our 
own views concerning the responsibility for this 
problem are well known and need not be re- 
peated here. We believe that, as part of the 
overall effort to put this organization on a 
sound basis by its 25th anniversary, a most seri- 
ous effort must be made during the coming year 
to find a solution. We suggest that this commit- 
tee request the Secretary General to' devote his 
own efforts and those of appropriate senior staff 
members during the coming year to an attempt 
to negotiate the modus vivendi of which he 
spoke at our first meeting. 

' U.N. doc. A/7611. 



Mr. Chairman, in concluding this, my first 
intervention in the deliberations of this com- 
mittee, I want to return briefly to my earlier re- 
marks concerning the need for a meaningful 
reappraisal of the operations of this organiza- 
tion and its affiliated agencies in order to find 
out where we are, where we wish to go, and how 
we hope to get there. It is an obvious fact, not 
requiring any lengthy elaboration, that a sound 
financial basis and effective management are 
essential if tliis organization is to enjoy signifi- 
cant growth and live up to the expectations 
which millions of peoples throughout the world 
have placed in it. 

The fiuiancial resources required to sustain the 
organization's gi-owth will not be forthcoming 
if tlie member states lose faith in the organiza- 
tion's ability to use them wisely and effectively. 
Already, a number of governments have ques- 
tioned tlie wisdom of providing the United Na- 
tions with significantly increased support unless 
and imtil our organizational structures, methods 
of work, and guidelines for future development 
are changed so as to alleviate the concern which 
has been expressed in this forum. In my view, 
the United Nations must respond to this situa- 
tion. Then and only then will most of ovir mem- 
bers be willing to give proper attention to con- 
sidering tlie inputs of resources which may be 
required to make the engine go. 

It is for this reason that I have suggested 
that the United Nations use the next year 
wisely. It is for this reason that I have urged 
that this committee take the necessary action to 
set in motion the several suggestions set forth 
above. If we can find solutions to these problems 
alone, it will, I believe, set the pace for the rest 
of the organization. If we catcli the beat here, 
this very rhytlim may well pulsate throughout 
the entire organization in time to give us all the 
basis for celebrating a truly glorious 25th 
anniversary. 



Senate Confirms Mr. Wieczorowski 
as U.S. Executive Director of IBRD 

The Senate on October 30 confirmed the 
nomination of Eobert E. Wieczorowski to be 
U.S. Executive Director of the International 
Bank for Keconstruction and Development for 
a term of 2 years. (For biographic data, see 
White House press release dated September 30.) 



November 24, 1969 



457 



United States Urges Negotiation 
and Dialogue in Southern Africa 

Statement by Christopher H. Phillips ^ 

The general debate on Namibia, Southern 
Rhodesia, and the territories under Portuguese 
administration has held the attention of this 
committee for the past week. My delegation has 
listened with interest to the views of the numer- 
ous delegations that have taken part. We have 
been struck by the virtually unanimous agree- 
ment in certain conclusions which ran like a 
thread throughout the discussion. If one were to 
summarize this agreement it was : (1) that there 
is a profound sense of disillusionment, nay of 
frustration, over the lack of progress in the 
achievement of self-determination for the peo- 
ple of southern Africa; (2) that there is wide- 
spread dissatisfaction with the adoption of in- 
creasingly shrill yet meaningless resolutions; 
(3) that there is growing concern with the 
hardening of positions between the mass of peo- 
ples striving for self-determination on the one 
hand and those in power on the other, which 
bodes ill for a peaceful settlement. 

My delegation shares tliis frustration, this 
dissatisfaction, this concern. We, too, are dis- 
illusioned by the lack of progress in achieving 
self-determination. We are deeply concerned by 
the tendency to adopt resolutions which are 
more and more unrealistic, which even their au- 
thors do not expect to see implemented. This 
concern is not limited to the fact that no relief 
is being afforded to those concerned; we are 
seriously concerned by their effect on the credi- 
bility and prestige of the United Nations. 
Finally, we are deeply troubled by the increas- 
ing intractability of South Africa and the Ian 
Smith regime [in Southern Rhodesia]. Each 
passing day without progress, each unrealistic 
and unenforceable resolution from these halls, 
each act of defiance by these regimes constitutes 
a setback to the cause of peace and to a negoti- 
ated solution acceptable to the parties in dispute. 

In his eloquent address to the General As- 
sembly last week, His Excellency President 
Ahidjo of the Federal Republic of the Came- 

'Made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. 
General Assembly on Oct. 16 (U.S./D.N. press release 
122). Mr. Phillips is U.S. Representative to the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 



458 



roon commended the Lusaka Manifesto to us. 
The fact that this distinguished African states- 
man spoke to us as President of the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government of the Or- 
ganization of African Unity, which had re- 
cently given its endorsement to this important 
document, gave added weight to President 
Aliidjo's recommendation. For this document, 
the Lusaka Manifesto, is imdoubtedly one of the 
most important political and human documents 
to have emerged from modern Africa. Its adop- 
tion first by the 14 Central and East African 
states that participated at the Lusaka confer- 
ence last April and its recent endorsement by 
the Organization of African Unity, represent- 
ing 41 independent states, make it worthy of the 
attention and most careful study by the world 
community. 

My Government finds itself in agreement 
with much that is contained in this moving 
document. The manifesto presents in memora- 
ble terms the aim of the authors : first, that the 
peoples of the area "shall be free to determine 
for themselves their own institutions of self- 
government" and, secondly, that they shall be 
"given an opportunity to be men — not white 
men, brown men, yellow men, or black men." 

The categorical rejection of racialism em- 
bodied in the manifesto accords with our own 
views. Equally encouraging is its advocacy of 
dialogue as the first and perhaps the best way 
to achieve the manifesto's stated objective of 
freedom for all the people of southern Africa. 

We wholeheartedly applaud the manifesto's 
declaration that the authors still prefer to 
achieve their goals without physical violence 
and that "We would prefer to negotiate rather 
than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not 
advocate violence; we advocate an end to the 
violence against human dignity which is now 
being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa." 

With the certain knowledge that his words 
were not spoken lightly but represented the 
most careful and considered thoughts of the > 
leading statesmen of Africa, we arc pleased to ' 
echo the words of President Ahidjo before the 
General Assembly of these United Nations, j 
when he said : 

Our campaign, therefore, implies the condemnation 
of all racialism and not the establishment of a racial- 
ism in reverse. It is nourished by the unshakable con- 
viction that, in denying human value to a single man, 
the dignity of all men is under attack. 

By thus appealing to the universal conscience, we 



Department of State Bulletin 



Intend not only to demonstrate our attachment to peace 
and the ideal of human brotherhood, our desire to 
contribute through dialogue and negotiation to the 
world's great problems, but also to revive our faith 
in man and our attachment to his dignity, to foster 
aspirations, in these troubled times, to the highest 
values of mankind, and the orientation of history to- 
wards the recognition of man by man. 

Mr. Chairman, we wish to suggest most ear- 
nestly that those now in power in southern 
Africa accept this offer to negotiate, accept this 
invitation to a dialogue. If they were to do so, 
we believe that their action would receive wide 
endorsement not only among their neighbors in 
Africa but in Europe, in the Americas, and else- 
where throughout the world. For herein lies the 
only true hope for a solution to a situation that 
anguishes the conscience of civilized men every- 
where and does violence to the legitimate rights 
and aspirations of millions of men who are also 
our brothers. 



Centennial of the Birth 
of Mahatma Gandhi 

Statement by William T. Coleman, Jr. ^ 

: The United States delegation would not wish 
this committee to make it a habit to interrupt its 
work for commemorative purposes. For each 
nation-state has its outstanding figures whose 
existence inspired and changed the quality of 
the lives of their peoples, but observance for 
every leader would make it impossible to get 
our work done. Nevertheless, we regard the 
100th anniversary of the birth of Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi as the rule-proving excep- 
tion. As our vice chairman has already said, his 
contributions exceed national boundaries. He 
was certainly not the only charismatic leader 
of our times — not even the only such leader who 
was trained in the law. These are not the reasons 
why one cannot but treat the 100th anniversary 
of his birth as an exceptional and noteworthy 
occasion. 

His greatness lay not in that he was a leader, 
that he helped his people to have a new birth 



' Made in Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General 
Assembly on Oct. 2 (U.S./U.N. press release 113). Mr. 
Coleman is U.S. Representative to the General 
Assembly. 



of freedom, and perhaps not even in the Tight- 
ness of the cause he led. Rather it lay in the 
quality of his leadership and the restraint with 
which he pressed his just cause. His nonviolent 
campaigns not only represented a call to the 
finest in his followers demanding of them great 
forbearance; they also were a direct appeal to 
the noblest siairit of those whom he opposed. He 
taught not merely those he led but those against 
whom he led. He recognized the potential of 
man for good and sought to bring it out in 
friend and foe. No other leader of our times 
has so steadfastly chmg to so ennobling a view 
of mankind nor succeeded to such an extent with 
a policy based upon appealing to all that was 
good and decent in his adversary. It might be 
said that he succeeded in his greatest struggle, 
independence for his people, because of the 
fundamentally humane and tolerant tradition 
of those whom he opposed. Certainly the great 
traditions of those to whom he apjjealed pro- 
vided a responsive chord for liis moral message. 
My delegation would prefer, however, to think 
that all men have the potential for good and 
that human nature can be inspired toward the 
lofty goals of justice, fair play, integrity, and 
respect for the rights and aspirations of their 
fellow men. 

So great was the message of his teaching that 
it transcended liis country and his adversaries. 
Indeed, my own country and, as a personal 
aside, my own people have been made the better 
for it. It was the teaching of Gandlii that 
played so important a role in the struggle of 
American Negroes which Dr. IMartin Luther 
King led. Dr. King, while a very yoimg man, 
led a movement which brought about and is still 
bringing about great and beneficial change in 
American life. We are particularly indebted to 
India for having developed a native son to in- 
spire our peoples in their struggles for equality 
and justice. Through such change we come 
nearer to our national goal of equality and jus- 
tice for all. Though King's ideas did not meet 
with universal acceptance at first, today most 
citizens of my country will acknowledge the 
rightness of his cause and the fact that we are 
a better people because the cause is now accepted 
as a national goal. 

The goals Gandhi and King inculcated in 
their people must also be the goals of the United 
Nations. Unfortunately, Gandhi, like Dr. King, 
was the victim of assassination. In both cases the 
loss was tragic. In both cases all mankind was 



November 24, 1969 



459 



the poorer. We must, however, be grateful that 
for even a short time mankind was lucky 
enough to have such men. 

The debt of all Americans to Dr. King and 
to Mahatma Gandhi is incalculable and not 
reducible to words. Perhaps the greatest tribute 
that we here can pay to the memory of Mohan- 
das Gandhi and those who draw strength 
from his teachings would be to work together 
in this gi-eat world organization for peace and 
justice. 



United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

OECD Trade Committee 

The Department of State announced on No- 
vember 3 (press release 326) that Edwin M. 
Cronk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Trade Policy, would be the U.S. 
Representative to the meeting of the Trade 
Conmiittee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development at Paris Novem- 
ber 6-7. Lawrence A. Fox, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Conmierce for International Trade 
Policy, is Alternate U.S. Eepresentative.^ 

The Trade Committee will approve an 
OECD report on the issue of trade preferences 
for developing countries, which is to be sub- 
mitted to the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development. 

International Legal Conference 
on Marine Pollution Damage 

The Department of State amiounced on No- 
vember 7 (press release 331) that Robert H. 
Neuman, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department 
of State, would be the U.S. Representative to 
the International Legal Conference on Marine 
Pollution Damage at Brussels November 10-28. 
Rear Adm. William L. Morrison, Chief Coun- 
sel, U.S. Coast Guard, is Alternate U.S. Repre- 



sentative. The delegation includes advisei-s 
from the shipping industry and the Congress. 

The conference is being held under the aus- 
pices of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization, the specialized agency 
of the United Nations dealing with maritime 
affairs, which has its headquarters in London. 

The conference will consider two conventions 
relating to pollution of the sea by oil. One of 
these conventions deals with the right of coastal 
states to intervene when a mishap which causes, 
or might cause, pollution of the sea by oil occurs 
on the high seas. The other deals with various 
aspects of civil liability for oil pollution dam- 
age, including the question of whether liability 
is to be absolute or based on negligence, the fi- 
nancial limits of such liability, and in which 
jurisdiction suits for damages may be brought. 



Senate Confirms Mr. Costanzo 
as IDB Executive Director 

The Senate on October 30 confirmed the 
nomination of Henry J. Costanzo to be Execu- 
tive Director of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank for a term of 3 years and until his 
successor is appointed. (For biographic data, see 
Wliite House press release dated September 15.) 



Additional Item Included 

in Agenda of General Assembly 

The U.N. General Assembly, on the recom- 
mendation of the General Committee, included 
the followmg item in the agenda of the 24th 
General Assembly at the 1,791st plenary meet- 
ing on October 28 : '■ 

106. Co-operation between the United Nations and the 
Organization of African Unity : Manifesto on 
Southern Africa. 



' For names of the advisers to the delegation, see 
Department of State press release 326 dated Nov. 3. 



' For agenda items adopted on Sept. 20 and 24 and 
Oct. 10, see Bulletin of Nov. 3, 1969, p. 383. 



460 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Costa Rica 
Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 316 dated October 24 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

On October 1 the United States and Costa 
Rica concluded a cotton textile agreement 
through an exchange of notes in Wasliington. 
Philip H. Trezise, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs, and the Ambassador of 
Costa Rica, Luis Demetrio Tinoco, signed the 
respective notes. 

Under the agreement, which was negotiated 
in the context of the Long-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex- 
tiles (the LTA), annual exports of cotton tex- 
tiles from Costa Rica to the United States shall 
be subject to limitations. For its first year, the 
agreement provides an aggregate ceiling of 3.0 
million square yards and the following specific 
ceilings : category 39, 130,000 dozen pair ; cate- 
gory 48, 4,500 dozen ; category 53, 28,000 dozen ; 
and category 61, 85,000 dozen. Consultation lev- 
els are specified for the remaining 60 categories 
of cotton textiles. All the limitations are to be 
increased by 5 percent in the second year of the 
agreement. 



EXCHANGE OF NOTES 



Text of U.S. Note 

OCTOBEE 1, 1969 

Excellency : I have the honor to refer to recent 
discussions between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of Costa Rica, 
as the result of which I wish to propose the following 
agreement, relating to trade in cotton textiles between 
Costa Rica and the United States : 

1. During the term of this agreement, which shall be 
from October 1, 1969 to September 30, 1971 inclusive, 
annual exports of cotton textiles from Costa Rica to the 
United States shall be limited to aggregate and specific 
limits specified in the following paragraphs. 

2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12- 



month period beginning October 1, 1969, the aggregate 
limit shall be 3.0 million square yards equivalent. 

3. Within this aggregate limit, the following specific 
limits shall apply for the first agreement year: 



Category 


Quantity 


39 


130,000 dozen pair 


48 


4,500 dozen 


53 


28,000 dozen 


61 


85,000 dozen 



4. In the second 12-month period that any limitation 
is applicable under this agreement, the level of per- 
mitted exports shall be increased by five percent over 
the corresponding level for the preceding 12-month 
period. The corresponding level for the preceding 
12-month period shall not include any adjustments un- 
der paragraphs 5 or 8. The phrase "level of permitted 
exports" in this paragraph refers to the aggregate and 
specific limits set out in paragraphs 2 and 3, and to the 
limitations set out in paragraph 6 of this agreement. 

5. Within the aggregate limit, any specific limit may 
be exceeded by five percent. 

6. Categories not given specific limits are subject to 
consultation levels and to the aggregate limit. In the 
event Costa Rica desires to export in any category in 
excess of its consultation level during any agreement 
year, the Government of Costa Rica shall request con- 
sultations with the Government of the United States 
of America on this question and the Government of the 
United States of America shall agree to enter into such 
consultations. Until agreement is reached, the Govern- 
ment of Costa Rica shall limit its exports in the cate- 
gory in question to the consultation level. For the first 
agreement year, the consultation level for each cate- 
gory not given a specific limit shall be 500,000 square 
yards equivalent in categories 1-27, and 350,000 square 
yards equivalent in categories 28-64. 

7. The square yard equivalent of any shortfalls oc- 
curring in exports in the categories given specific limits 
may be used in any category not given a specific limit 
or for the purpose described in paragraph 5, provided 
that the aggregate limit is not thereby exceeded. 

8. (a) For any agreement year immediately follow- 
ing a year of shortfall (i.e., a year in which cotton 
textile exports from Costa Rica to the United States 
were below the aggregate limit and any specific limit 
applicable to the category concerned) the Government 
of Costa Rica may permit exports to exceed these limits 
by carryover in the following amounts and manner: 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of the 
shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any applicable 
specific limit and shall not exceed five percent of the 
aggregate limit applicable to the year of the shortfall ; 

(ii) In the case of shortfalls in the categories sub- 
ject to specific limits, the carryover shall not exceed 
five percent of the specific limit in the year of the 



November 24, 1969 



461 



shortfall and shall be used in the same category in 
which the shortfall occurred ; and 

(iii) In the case of shortfalls not attributable to 
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall 
not be used to exceed any applicable specific limit ex- 
cept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 
and shall not be used to exceed the levels in paragraph 
6. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph are without any adjustments under this 
paragraph or paragraph 5. 

(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports 
permitted by paragraph 5. 

9. The Government of Costa Rica will use its best 
efforts to space cotton textile exports to the United 
States within each category as evenly as practicable 
throughout the agreement year, taking into considera- 
tion normal seasonal factors. 

10. The Government of the United States of America 
shall promptly supply the Government of Costa Rica 
with data on monthly Imports of cotton textiles from 
Costa Rica ; and the Government of Costa Rica shall 
promptly supply the Government of the United States 
of America with data on monthly exports of cotton 
textiles to the United States. Each government agrees 
to supply promptly any other pertinent and readily 
available statistical data requested by the other gov- 
ernment. 

11. In implementing this agreement, the system of 
categories and the rates of conversion into square yard 
equivalents listed in the annex hereto shall apply.' In 
any situation where the determination of an article 
to be a cotton textile would be affected by whether a 
weight or value criterion is used, the chief value cri- 
terion used by the Government of the United States of 
America shall apply. 

12. For the duration of this agreement, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America will not request 
restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Costa 
Rica to the United States under the procedures of Arti- 
cles 3 and 6 (c) of the Long-Term Arrangements Re- 
garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at 
Geneva on February 9, 1962, as extended. 

13. If the Government of Costa Rica considers that, 
as a result of limitations specified in this agreement, 
Costa Rica is being placed in an inequitable position 
vis-a-vis a third country, the Government of Costa Rica 
may request consultation with the Government of the 
United States of America with a view to appropriate 
remedial action such as reasonable modification of this 
agreement. 

14. The Government of Costa Rica and the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America agree to consult 
on any question arising in the implementation of this 
agreement. 

15. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange- 
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor 
problems arising in the implementation of this agree- 
ment including differences in points of procedure or 
operation. 

10. Both governments will take appropriate meas- 
ures to assure that trade in articles covered by this 



agreement is maintained within the limitations pro- 
vided therein. The nature of these measures may be a 
matter of discussion between the two governments. 

17. The Government of Costa Rica and the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America may at any time 
propose revisions in the terms of this agreement. Each 
government agrees to consult promptly with the other 
government about such proposals with a view to mak- 
ing such revisions to the present agreement, or taking 
such other appropriate action, as may be mutually 
agreed upon. 

18. This agreement shall continue in force through 
September 30, 1971, except that either government may 
terminate it effective at the end of any agreement year 
by written notice to the other government to be given 
at least 90 days prior to such termination date. 



' For text of the annex, see press release 316 dated 
Oct. 24. 



If these proposals are acceptable to your Govern- 
ment, this note and your note of acceptance on behalf 
of the Government of Costa Rica shall constitute an 
agreement between our Governments. -^ 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highesf consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 

Philip H. Trezise 

His Excellency 

Luis Demetrio Tinoco 

Ambassador of Costa Rica 

Text of Costa Rican Note 

OCTOBEB 1, 1969 

Excellency : I have the honor to refer to Your 
Excellency's note of October 1, 1969 concerning exports 
of cotton textiles from Costa Rica to the United States 
of America, which reads as follows : 

[Text of U.S. note.] 

The proposals contained in said note are acceptable 
to the Government of Costa Rica, including the pro- 
posal that the note and this reply should constitute an 
agreement between the Government of Costa Rica and 
the Government of the United States of America, which 
will come Into force definitively on the date of a note 
informing the Government of the United States that 
the Government of Costa Rica has completed Its con- 
stitutional processes. 

Even though my Government is unable to accept the 
agreement definitively pending completion of its con- 
stitutional processes, it will abide by the terms of that 
agreement through certain internal mechanisms, with- 
out prejudice to rights Your Excellency's Government 
may exercise under the terms of this agreement, includ- 
ing Article 16. 

Accept, Excellency, the testimony of my highest 
consideration. 

Luis Demetrio Tinoco " 
Ambassador 

His Excellency 
William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State, 
Washington, D.C. 



462 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November S4, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 

Africa. United States Urges Negotiation and 
Dialogue in Southern Africa (Phillips) . . 458 

Asia. A Look at Asian Regionalism (Green) . 445 

Burundi. Melady confirmed as Ambassador . . 464 

Canada. U.S.-Canada Flood Control Payment 
Agreement Transmitted to the Senate (mes- 
sage from President Nixon) 463 

China. U.S. and Republic of China Amend 
Air Transport Agreement (Department 
announcement) 463 

Congress 

Confirmations (Faunce.Heuer, Melady, Root) . 464 

Senate Confirms Mr. Costanzo as IDB Execu- 
tive Director 460/ 

Senate Confirms Mr. Wieczorowski as U.S. 
Executive Director of IBRD 45' 

U.S.-Canada Flood Control Payment Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 

(c) of the Columbia River Treaty. 

It is provided in the agreement that it will 
enter into force uiDon notification by tlie United 
States Government to the Canadian Govern- 
ment that all internal measures necessary to give 
effect to the agreement for the United States 
have been completed. 

Pursuant to the treaty relating to cooperative 
development of the water resources of the 
Columbia Eiver basin signed at Washington on 
January 17, 1961, Canada constructed the Dun- 
can Dam and the Arrow Dam in British Colum- 
bia. The treaty provides that the United States 
shall pay to Canada specified sums with respect 
to each of the dams for the flood control bene- 
fits. The sums specified were based on a period 
of 55 years of flood control benefits, and it was 
expected that the projects would be completed 
subsequent to the spring of 1969. The dams actu- 
ally commenced operation well in advance of 
the expected dates, so that the United States has 
received additional benefits for two years in the 
case of Duncan Dam and one year in the case of 
Arrow Dam. 

The treaty provides that the United States 
would pay less if full operation of the storage 
were not commenced within the time specified, 
but does not provide for additional payments 
if such operation were commenced prior to the 
time specified. By an exchange of notes dated 
January 22, 1964, prior to the entry into force 

' Transmitted on Oct. 14 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. H., 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the texts of the exchange of notes and 
the report of the Secretary of State. 



of the treaty, the two Governments agreed to 
consult with a view to adjustments in the pay- 
ments if there should be an early completion of 
the dams. The agreement transmitted herewith 
has resulted from such consultation. It provides 
for a payment to Canada of a total of $278,000 
for the additional flood control benefits result- 
ing from early completion of Duncan Dam and 
Arrow Dam. 

The treaty of 1961 does not without modifica- 
tion provide a basis for authorizing the addi- 
tional payments. It is desirable, therefore, that 
in effect the treaty provisions be modified so that 
there may be an adequate legal basis for an 
authorization for appropriations. The notes of 
August 18 and 20, 1969 have been exchanged for 
this purpose. 

I also transmit for the information of the 
Senate a report by the Secretary of State relat- 
ing to the agreement effected by that exchange 
of notes. 

I urge that the Senate give early and favor- 
able consideration to the agreement concerning 
adjustments in the flood control payments by 
the United States Government to the Canadian 
Government. 



Richard Nixon 



The White House, 
October U, 1969. 



U.S. and Republic of China Amend 
Air Transport Agreement 

The Department of State announced on Octo- 
ber 22 (press release 313) that the United States 
and China had that day exchanged notes ^ at 
Taipei amending and extending indefinitely 
the Sino-U.S. Air TransiDort Agreement of De- 
cember 20, 1946.^ The notes exchanged today 
superseded earlier notes amending the agree- 
ment which had been exchanged in 1950 and 
1955.5 

The new amendment and a recently issued 
U.S. operating license give the Chinese airline 
authorized under the agreement the right to 
pick up and discharge international traffic in 



^ For texts of the notes, see press release 313 dated 
October 22. 
" Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1609. 
' TIAS 2184, 3347. 



November 24, 1969 



463 



passengers, cargo, and mail at Los Angeles as 
well as Honolulu and San Francisco. The fol- 
lowing routes in both directions are authorized 
for the Chinese carrier : (1) China to Okinawa 
and beyond; (2) China via intermediate points 
in the Pacific to Honolulu and San Francisco ; 
(3) China via intermediate points in the Pacific 
to Honolulu and Los Angeles. 

American airlines authorized under the agree- 
ment now have the right, subject to the issuance 
of a Chinese operating permit, to offer services 
over the following route in both directions: 
"The United States via intermediate points to 
Taipei and Kaohsiung and beyond and via in- 
termediate points to the United States." 

Operating under a provisional license from 
the Chinese Civil Aeronautics Administration, 
Trans World Airlines has had scheduled serv- 
ices through Taipei since mid-August on its 
round-the-world flights. Under a separate 
CCAA provisional license. Flying Tiger Air- 
lines has recently initiated an all-cargo service 
between Taiwan and major cities in the United 
States. China Airlmes plans to begin service 
to the United States on February 2, 1970. 



agreement is maintained within the limitations pro- 
vided therein. The nature of these measures may be a 
matter of discussion between the two governments. 

17. The Government of Costa Rica and the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America may at any time 
propose revisions in the terms of this agreement. Each 
government agrees to consult promptly with the other 
government about such proposals with a view to mak- 
ing such revisions to the present agreement, or taking 
such other appropriate action, as may be mutually 
agreed upon. 

18. This agreement shall continue in force through 
\\ September 30, 1971, except that either government may 

\ terminate it effective at the end of any agreement year 
\by written notice to the other government to be given 
, \at least 90 days prior to such termination date. 

t If these proposals are acceptable to your Govern- 
fenent, this note and your note of acceptance on behalf 
lof the Government of Costa Rica shall constitute an 
JBgreement between our Governments. -^ 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcoUc drugs, 1961. Done at New 
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 
1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 17, 1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at 
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967 ; for the United States November 1, 
1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Zambia, September 24, 1969. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 



The Senate on October 30 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Anthony Faunce to be Deputy Inspector General, 
Foreign Assistance. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated September 19.) 

Scott Heuer, Jr., to be Inspector General, Foreign 
Assistance. (For biographic data, see Department of 
State press release 327 dated November 6.) 

Thomas Patrick Melady to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Burundi. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated September 19. ) 

John F. Root to be Ambassador to the Republic of 
Ivory Coast. ( For biographic data, see Department of 
State press release 334 dated November 10.) 



Designations 

Sidney Weintraub as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for International Monetary Affairs, effective Novem- 
ber 3. (For biographic data, see Department of State 
press release dated November 4. ) 



464 



Department of State Bulletin] 



INDEX November U, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 1587 



Africa. United States Urges Negotiation and 
Dialogue in Southern Africa (Phillips) . 

Asia. A Look at Asian Regionalism (Green) 

Burundi. Melady confirmed as Ambassador . 

Canada. U.S.-Canada Flood Control Payment 
Agreement Transmitted to the Senate (mes 
sage from President Nixon) 



China. U.S. and Republic of China Amend 
Air Transport Agreement (Department 
announcement) 

Congress 

Confirmations (Faunce, Heuer, Melady, Root) . 

Senate Confirms Mr. Costanzo as IDB Execu- 
tive Director 

Senate Confirms Mr. Wieczorowski as U.S. 
Executive Director of IBRD 

U.S.-Canada Flood Control Payment Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 
President Nixon) 

Costa Rica. United States and Costa Rica Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement (exchange of 
notes) 

Department and Foreign Service 
Confirmations (Faunce, Heuer, Melady, Root) . 
Designations (Weintraub) 

Economic Affairs 

The International Labor Organization : 50 Years 
of Service ( Shultz ) 

Weintraub designated Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for International Monetary Affairs . . 

Europe. Under Secretary Richardson Attends 
Special NATO Session at Brussels .... 

Foreign Aid 

Heuer confirmed as Inspector General, Foreign 
Assistance 

Faunce confirmed as Deputy Inspector General, 
Foreign Assistance 

International Organizations and Conferences 

International Legal Conference on Marine Pollu- 
tion Damage (delegation) 

OECD Trade Committee (delegation) . . . . 

Ivory Coast. Root confirmed as Ambassador . . 

Japan. A Look at Asian Regionalism (Green) . 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Mr. Moynihan To Represent U.S. on NATO En- 
vironmental Committee 

Under Secretary Richardson Attends Special 
NATO Session at Brussels 

Presidential Documents 

The Exchange of Letters Between President 
Nixon and President Ho 

The Pursuit of Peace in Viet-Nam 

U.S.-Canada Flood Control Payment Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 

United States and Costa Rica Sign Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement (exchange of notes) .... 

U.S. and Republic of China Amend Air Transport 
Agreement (Department announcement) . . 

U.S.-Canada Flood Control Payment Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 
President Nixon) 

United Nations 

Additional Item Included in Agenda «f General 

Assembly 

Centennial of the Birth of Mahatma Gandhi 

(Coleman) 

The International Labor Organization : 50 Years 

of Service (Shultz) 



458 
445 
464 

463 

463 

464 
460 

457 

463 

461 

464 
464 

452 
464 

448 

464 
464 



460 
460 
464 
445 



451 

448 

443 
437 

463 

464 
461 
463 

463 

460 
459 
452 



The Responsibility for the U.N.'s Development as 

an Instrument of World Order (Yost) . . . 449 

The United Nations Budget for 1970 ( FasceU ) . 454 
United States Urges Negotiation and Dialogtue in 

Southern Africa (Phillips) 458 

Viet-Nam 

The Exchange of Letters Between President 

Nixon and President Ho 443 

41st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 444 

The Pursuit of Peace in Viet-Nam (Nixon) . . 437 

Name Index 

Coleman, William T., Jr 459 

Costanzo, Henry J 460 

FasceU, Dante B 454 

Faunce, Anthony 464 

Green, Marshall 445 

Heuer, Scott, Jr 464 

Ho Chi Minh 443 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 444 

Melady, Thomas Patrick 464 

Moynihan, Daniel P 451 

Nixon, President 437, 443, 463 

Phillips, Christopher H 458 

Root, John F 464 

Shultz, George P 452 

Weintraub, Sidney 464 

Wieczorowski, Robert E 457 

Yost, Charles W 449 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: November 3—9 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to November 3 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 313 
of October 22, 316 of October 24, and 320 of 
October 29. 

No. Date Subject 

*325 11/3 Regional conference on U.S. foreign 
policy, Los Angeles, Calif., 
November 20, 
326 11/3 U.S. delegation to OECD Trade 
Committee, Paris, November 6-7 
(rewrite). 

*327 11/6 Heuer sworn in as Inspector Gen- 
eral of Foreign Assistance (bio- 
graphic data). 
328 11/6 Lodge : 41st plenary meeting on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

*329 11/6 Federal Republic of Cameroon: 
70th member of Intelsat. 

*330 11/6 Cultural exchanges : University of 
Illinois Jazz Band visits Soviet 
Union, November lO-December 22. 
331 11/7 U.S. delegation to International 
Legal Conference on Marine Pol- 
lution Damage, Brussels, Novem- 
ber 10-28 (rewrite). 

*332 11/7 Regional conference on U.S. foreign 
policy, Louisville, Ky., Decem- 
ber 3. 

t333 11/7 U.S.-Portugal aviation negotiations 
concluded. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 




POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIC 



I 




N AVT O 

20 YEARS OF PEACE 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



I lis^t 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 




STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS 

Address by Secretary Rogers ]fi5 

U.S. BRINGS ILANOI'S TREATMENT OF AMERICAJ^ PRISONERS OF WAR 
TO ATTENTION OF U.N. COMMITTEE 

Statements iy Rita E. Hauser ^71 

MOVE TO CHANGE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE U.N. 
REJECTED BY THE 24tli GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

Statement by Congressonan J. Irving WhaU-ey 
and Texts of Resolutions 476 

UNITED STATES COMMENTS ON REVISIONS IN DRAFT TREATY 

BANNING EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SEABED 

Staternent by James F. Leonard and Text of Revised Draft Treaty 1^80 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1588 
December 1, 1969 



i 

i 



i 



For sale by the Superintendent ot Documents 

U.S. Oovenunent Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1986). 

Note: Contents of this public-ation are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN^ 
a tceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Govern ment 
ujith information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
Tlie BULLETIIS' includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and fa>' the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of tlie Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
fuxtional relations are listed currently. 



strategic Arms Limitation Talks 



Address hy Secretary Rogers ^ 



Next Monday in Helsinki the United States 
and the Soviet Union will open preliminary 
talks leading to what could be the most critical 
negotiations on disarmament ever undertaken. 
The two most powerful nations on earth will be 
seeking a way to curb what to date has been 
an unending competition in the strategic arms 
race. 

Tlie Government of the United States will 
enter these negotiations with serious purpose 
and with the hope that we can achieve balanced 
understandings that will benefit the cause of 
world peace and security. Yet we begin these 
negotiations knowing that they are likely to be 
long and complicated and with the full realiza- 
tion that they may not succeed. 

"V\1iile I will not be able to discuss specific 
proposals tonight, I thought it might be help- 
ful to outline the general approach of our Gov- 
ernment in these talks. 

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, when we 
alone possessed nuclear power, the United 
States proposed the formation of a United Na- 
tions atomic development authority with a 
world monopoly over all dangerous aspects of 
nuclear energy. This proposal might well have 
eliminated for all nations the dangers and bur- 
dens of atomic weapons. Unhappily, as we all 
know, it was rejected. 

The implications were obvious. Others in- 
tended to develop nuclear weapons on a na- 
tional basis. The United States then would have 
to continue its own nuclear program. It would 
have to look to its own security in a nuclear- 
armed world. Thus we established a national 
policy of maintaining nuclear-weapon strength 
adequate to deter nuclear war by any other na- 
tion or nations. It was our hope then, as it is 
now, to make certain that nuclear weapons 
would never again be used. 

The intervening decades have seen enormous 



' Made before Diplomatic and Consular Officers Re- 
tired (DACOR) at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 13 (press 
release 343). 



resources devoted to the development of nuclear 
weapons systems. As both sides expanded their 
force levels, an action-reaction pattern was es- 
tablished. This pattern was fed by rapid prog- 
ress in the technology of nuclear weapons and 
advanced delivery systems. The mere availabil- 
ity of such sophisticated technology made it 
difficult for either side by itself to refrain from 
translating that teclmology into offensive and 
defensive strategic armaments. 

Aleanwliile, strategic plamiers, operating in 
an atmosphere of secrecy, were obliged to make 
conservative assumptions, including calcula- 
tions based on what became known as the "worst 
case." The people responsible for plamiing our 
strategic security had to take account of the 
worst assumptions about the other's intentions, 
the maximum plausible estimate of the other's 
capabilities and performance, and the lowest 
plausible performance of our own forces. The 
Soviets no doubt did the same. 

Under these circumstances it was difficult 
during these many years for either side to con- 
clude that it had si^cient levels of destructive 
power. 



Capacity for Mutual Destruction 

Yet that point in time has now clearly been 
reached. As absolute levels of nuclear power 
and delivery capability increased, a situation 
developed in which both the United States and 
the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the 
society of the other, regardless of which one 
struck first. 

There are helpful mutual restraints in such a 
situation. Sane national leaders do not initiate 
strategic nuclear war and thus commit their 
people to national suicide. Also, they must be 
careful not to precipitate a conflict that could 
easily escalate into nuclear war. They have to 
take elaborate precautions against accidental re- 
lease of a nuclear weapon, which might bring 
on a nuclear holocaust. 



December 1, 1969 



465 



In brief, the nuclear deterrent, dangerous 
though it is, has worked. 

The present situation— in wliich both the 
United States and the Soviet Union could effec- 
tively destroy the other regardless of which 
struck first — radically weakens the rationale for 
continuing the arms race. 

Ck)mpetitive accumulation of more sophisti- 
cated weapons would not add to the basic 
security of either side. Militarily, it probably 
would produce little or no net advantage. 
Economically, it would divert resources needed 
elsewhere. Politically, it would perpetuate the 
tensions and fears that are the social fallout of 
the nuclear arms race. 

So a capacity for mutual destruction leads to 
a mutual interest in putting a stop to the 
strategic nuclear arms race. 

Nonetheless, technology advances remorse- 
lessly. It offers new opportunities to both sides 
to add to their offensive and defensive strategic 
systems. Both sides find it difficult to reject these 
opportunities in an atmosphere of rivalry and 
in the absence of a verifiable agreement. It 
raises temptations to seek strategic advantages. 
Yet, now such advantages cannot be hidden for 
long, and both sides will certainly take whatever 
countermeasures are necessary to preserve their 
retaliatory capability. 

This is the situation in which the two sides 
now find themselves. Where national security 
interests may have operated in the past to 
stimulate the strategic arms race, those same na- 
tional security interests may now operate to 
stop or slow down the race. Tlie question to be 
faced in the strategic arms talks is whether 
societies with the advanced intellect to develop 
these awesome weapons of mass destruction have 
the combined wisdom to control and curtail 
them. 

Confidence-Building Preliminary Steps 

In point of fact, we have already had some 
successes in preliminary limitations: 

— We have a treaty banning military activi- 
ties in Antarctica. 

— We have a treaty banning the orbiting of 
weapons of mass destruction in outer space and 
prohibiting the establishment of military in- 
stallations on the moon or other celestial bodies. 

-—We have reached agreement with the Soviet 
Union on the text of a treaty forbidding the 
emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on 
the ocean floors, about to be considered at the 
United Nations General Assembly. 



These are agreements not to arm environ- 
ments previously inaccessible to weapons. 
Manifestly, there are fewer obstacles to such 
agreements than there are to agreements con- 
trolling weapons already deployed or under 
development. 

But even in already "contaminated" environ- 
ments there have been two important control 
agreements : 

— We have negotiated and ratified a Test Ban 
Treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weap- 
ons in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer 
space. 

— We have negotiated, and are prepared at 
any time to ratify simultaneously with the 
Soviet Union, a Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 

It should be pointed out, though, that the 
main objective of a Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty is to prevent nonnuclear powers from 
acquiring atomic weapons. The treaty does not 
restrain any of the present nuclear powers from 
further development of their capabilities. The 
nonnuclear countries therefore tend to look 
upon the treaty essentially as a self-denying 
ordinance. 

Accordingly, during the negotiations they in- 
sisted upon assurances that the nuclear powers 
would seriously pursue strategic arras negotia- 
tions. We concurred and incorporated a para- 
graph in the treaty which would require us to 
do so. I mention this to underscore two points : 

— First, that the disarmament agreements 
previously concluded have widely been regarded 
as confidence-building preliminary steps which 
hopefully might lead to more meaningful agree- 
ments on strategic arms. 

— Second, when the United States and the 
Soviet Union ratify the NPT, they will agree 
to undertake negotiations in good faith for a 
cessation of the nuclear arms race. 

However, given the complexity of the 
strategic situation, the vital national interests 
involved, and the traditional impulses to seek 
protection in military strength, it is easy to be 
cynical about the prospects for the talks into 
which we are about to enter. 

Nonetheless, some basis for hope exists. 

First is the fact that the talks are being held 
at all. The diplomatic exchanges leading up to 
these talks were responsible in nature. And the 
talks themselves will require discussion of mili- 
tary matters by both sides in which the veil of 
secrecy will have to be, if not lifted, at least re- 



466 



Department of State Bulletin 



fashioned. These factors lead us to the hope that 
the talks are being entered into seriously. 

Second is the matter of timing. Previous 
disparity in nuclear strength has been succeeded 
by the situation of sufficiency, of wliich I have 
already spoken. And because this condition will 
contuaue for the foreseeable future, the time, 
then, seems to be propitious for considering how 
to curb the race in which neither side in all like- 
lihood can gain meaningful advantage. 

Tliird is a mutuality of interest. Under 
present circumstances an equitable limitation on 
strategic nuclear weapons would strengthen the 
national security of both sides. If tlus is mu- 
tually perceived — if botli sides conduct these 
talks in the light of that perception — the talks 
may accomplish an historic breakthrough in 
the pattern of confrontation that has charac- 
terized the postwar world. 

May I pause to point out again that I do not 
wish to predict that the talks will be easy or that 
progress is imminent or, for that matter, likely. 
Mutuality of interest for states accustomed to 
rivalry is difficult to perceive. Traditions are 
powerful. Temptations to seek advantage nm 
strong. Developments in other areas are bound 
to have an impact on these discussions. 

Both parties will approach the talks with 
great caution. The United States and the Soviet 
Union are entirely capable of protecting their 
vital interests and can be counted upon to do 
so. So there is little chance that either side would 
accept an outcome that leads to its net national 
disadvantage. In our case, also we would not 
agree to anything adversely affecting the na- 
tional interests of our allies, who will continue 
to be consulted as the talks develop. 

On the other hand we must also recognize 
that a prime teclmique of international politics, 
as of other politics, is talk. If these talks are 
serious, they can lead to better understandmg on 
both sides of the rationales behind strategic 
weapons decisions. This in itself might provide 
a climate m which to avoid compulsive decisions. 

Talks need not necessarily call for an 
explicit agreement at any particular stage. 
Whether we can slow down, stop, or eventually 
throw the arms race into reverse, remains to be 
seen. 

It also remains to be seen whether this be 
by a formal treaty or treaties, by a series of 
agreements, by parallel action, or by a conver- 
gence of viewpoints resulting from a better un- 
derstanding of respective positions. 

Wliat counts at this point is that a dialogue is 
beginning about the management of the strate- 



gic relations of the two superpowers on a better, 
safer, cheaper basis than uncontrolled acquisi- 
tion of still more weapons. 

U.S. Objectives 

The United States approaches the talks as an 
opportunity to rest our security on what I 
would call a balanced strategy. 

In pursuit of this balanced strategy of se- 
curity we will enter the Helsinki talks with 
three objectives: 

—To enhance international security by main- 
taining a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relation- 
ship through limitations on the deployment of 
strategic armaments. 

■ — To halt the upward spiral of strategic arms 
and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs 
of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic 
arms race. 

— To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear 
war tlirough a dialogue about issues arising 
from the strategic situation. 

Some say that there will be risks in such a 
process. But it is easy to focus too much on the 
risks that would accompany such a new environ- 
ment and too little on the risks of the one in 
wliich we now live. Certainly, such risks are 
minimal compared to the benefits for mankind 
which would flow from success. I am confident 
that this country will not let down its guard, 
lose its alertness, or fail to maintain adequate 
programs to protect against a collapse or eva- 
sion of any strategic arms agreement. No delega- 
tion to any disarmament negotiation has ever 
been better prepared or better qualified than 
the United States delegation. The risks in seek- 
ing an agreement seem to be manageable, in- 
surable, and reasonable ones to nm. They seem 
less dangerotts than the risks of open-ended 
arms competition — risks about which we per- 
haps have become somewhat callous. 

I have mentioned the rewards of progi'ess in 
terms of international security, world order, 
and improved opportunities for replacing a 
stalemated confrontation with a process of 
negotiation. 

But there are also other stakes in these talks 
that come closer to home. On both sides of this 
strategic race there are urgent needs for re- 
sources to meet pressing domestic needs. 
Strategic weapons cannot solve the problems of 
how we live at home or how we live in the world 
in this last third of the 20th century. The Soviet 
Union, which devotes a much larger proportion 



December 1, 1969 



467 



of its national resources to armaments than do 
we, must see this as well. 

Who knows the rewards if we succeed in 
diverting the energy, time, and attention — the 
manpower and brainpower — devoted to ever 
more sophisticated weapons to other and more 
worthwhile purposes? 

Speaking before tlie United Nations General 
Assembly 2 months ago, President Nixon said 
that he hoped the strategic arms talks would 
begin soon because "Tliere is no more im- 
portant task before us." ^ And he added that 
we must "make a determined effort not only to 
limit the buildup of strategic arms but to 
reverse it." 

Just last week President Podgorny of the 
Soviet Union said : "A positive outcome of the 
talks would undoubtedly help improve Soviet- 
American relations and preserve and strengthen 
the peace." To that I say "Amen." 

He added that : "The Soviet Union is striving 
to achieve precisely such results." Well, so are 
we; and in this we have the support of the 
military services, of the Congress, and of the 
American people. 

To that end this Government approaches the 
strategic arms limitations talks in sober and 
serious determination to do our full part to 
bring a halt to this unproductive and costly 
competition in strategic nuclear armaments. 



42d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam 
Held at Paris 

Following is the opening statement made by 
Ambassador Hemy Cabot Lodge, head of the 
U.S. delegation, at the l^Sid plenary session of 
the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on November 
13. 

Press release 342 dated November 13 

Ladies and gentlemen : Last week, your side's 
statements were once again couched in the lan- 
guage of propaganda and abuse. You showed no 
willingness to discuss our projiosals. You only 
made charges which are so patently unbeliev- 
able as to have no persuasive effect. Facts 
available to anyone show your charges to be 
contrary to fact, and I will therefore not discuss 
them further. 

Instead of making such charges, why do you 



not discuss our proposals, as we have offered 
to discuss yours, in reasonable give-and-take? 
Wliy do you refuse to talk seriously with the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in 
spite of the fact that no questions of importance 
in South Viet-Nam can be successfully dealt 
with without its participation ? 

Why do 3'ou flout world opinion by block- 
ing progress at these talks ? 

The answer to these questions is clear. You 
prefer propaganda to making practical progress 
toward peace. You continue to rely on false 
expectations about events in the United States 
and South Viet-Nam, rather than on joining 
us in seeking a settlement with justice for all 
parties. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we all know wliat are 
the real problems which must be dealt with in 
these negotiations. Over the last 41 weeks, our 
side has made comprehensive proposals concern- J 
ing these problems; our j^roposals still stand. \ 

President Nixon stated in his November 3 
speech ^ that "We have not put forth our pro- . 
posals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. . . . We I 
have declared that an3i:hing is negotiable, ex- 
cept the right of the people of South Viet-Nam 
to determine their own future." 

We ask you to join us in serious negotiations | 
because we wish to see this war ended, to spare 
the brave people of South Viet-Nam further 
suffering, to save the lives of our soldiers, and 
to end this waste of so many North Vietnamese 
troops, whose courage entitles them to a better 
fate. If progress at these talks is not possible, 
we can continue with our plan under which we 
will witlidraw our forces from South Viet-Nam ■ 
on an orderly scheduled timetable in accord- | 
ance with the three criteria we have mentioned 
before. 

The evidence shows that the great majority of 
American people support the President as he 
seeks a just peace. 

Yesterday, a remarkable exjiression of this 
support took place. Tliree hundi'ed and one 
Members of the House of Representatives co- 
sponsored and signed a House resolution. I will 
read the text of the resolution : 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives af- 
firms its support for the President in his efforts to 
negotiate a just peace in A'ietnam, expresses the 
earnest hope of the people of the United States for 
such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful 
overtures which the United States has made in good 
faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, ap- 
proves and supports the principles enunciated by the 



' Bin-LETiN of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 
468 



' For text, see Bitlletin of Nov. 24, 1969, p. 437. 
Department of State Bullefin 



President that the people of South Vietnam are en- 
titled to choose their own government by means of free 
elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised 
by an impartial international body, and that the United 
States is willing to abide by the results of such elec- 
tions, and supports the President in his call upon the 
; Government of North Vietnam to announce its willing- 
ness to honor such elections and to abide by such re- 
sults and to allow the issues in controversy to be 
peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be 
ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast 
Asia. 

It may interest you to know that tliis resolu- 
tion was originated by members of the Demo- 
cratic Party, although, of course, members of 
botli parties have signed it. At first, the sponsors 
had planned to have 50 Kepublican and 50 Dem- 
I ocratic signers. But so many wished to co- 
sponsor that this idea was dropped, and instead 
the resolution went in with 301 cosponsors. 

As far as the Senate is concerned, it is worthy 
of note that 56 Senators have each of them 
signed a separate letter to me, and I will now 
read the text of that letter, as follows : 

Dear Mr. Ambassador : Let me commend you for the 
efforts you have made toward reaching a just and hon- 
orable peace in Viet-Nam and I know you will con- 
tinue to pursue this goal. 

I believe that the President has taken every step 
that any self-respecting nation could take to find peace 
through mediation and negotiation and to terminate 
the conflict at the earliest possible time. Further, I 
feel that the great majority of the American people 
support him in these efforts. 

Frankly, I have advised against any abrupt with- 
drawal or substantial reduction of our forces in Viet- 
Nam on a unilateral basis and I believe this is in 
accord with the thinking and views of the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the American people. 

Three more Senators have separately sent 
similar letters. This makes a total of 59 Senators. 

Wlien more than a majority in each House 
decide to commit themselves in advance in this 
mamier, it can only be described as a very 
unusual event. These members are elected repre- 
sentatives of the people. Every State is rep- 
resented among the signers of the resolution. 

Ladies and gentlemen, let me say that our 

strength as a nation does not mean that we are 

inflexible. We ask you to match our flexibility 

and desire for peace now. Join us in serious 

I negotiations. 

Progress in these talks awaits your action. 
Whenever you decide to address yourself seri- 
ously to the issues and to engage in meaningful 
talks, you will find that we are ready to meet 
you with good will. 

Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes my 
statement. 



Secretary Reports on U.S. Efforts 
To Help Nigeria Civil War Victims 

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^ 

Over the past 9 months this administration 
has made a major effort to help relieve the 
anguish and suffering of civilian victims of the 
Nigerian civil war. A further report on our 
efforts is in order. 

From the beginning of this tragic event the 
United States has sought to support and ensure 
an effective means of delivermg relief to the 
sufferers on both sides. 

Some of the steps this Government has taken 
include the appointment of a high-level co- 
ordinator of all United States activities relating 
to Nigerian/Biafran relief, Ambassador C. 
Clyde Fei'guson ; the donation of over $65 mil- 
lion to the international relief effort; and sus- 
tained diplomatic efforts, both bilaterally and 
in concert with other concerned Governments, 
to obtain agreement on expanded international 
relief arrangements. 

Nevertheless, relief into Biafran-held terri- 
tory remams tragically inadequate. 

Relief supplies now reach the Biafran enclave 
only at night, in insufficient amounts, by aircraft 
across Federally controlled territory lacking 
the approval of the Federal Government and 
originating outside Federal jurisdiction. Fur- 
thennore, following the shooting down of one 
of its aircraft on June 5, the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross suspended its night 
flight operations, which had provided roughly 
one-half of relief supplies. ICRC flights have 
remained suspended since that time in view of 
the Federal Government's reiteration on June 
30 that it could no longer permit such night 
flights across its territory. One major considera- 
tion cited by the Federal authorities was the 
intermingling at night of arms flights and relief 
flights into the enclave. Tlie present arrange- 
ments for getting relief into the enclave are con- 
sidered by the agencies involved to be both 
dangerous and inefficient. 

In recent weeks, the United States has vigor- 
ously supported efforts of the ICRC to obtain 
agreement by both sides on a program of day- 
light relief flights. 

On September 18 the ICRC, after extensive 
diplomatic efforts, concluded an agreement with 



' Issued on Nov. 12 (press release 339). 



December 1, 1969 



i 



469 



the Government of Nigeria allowing an inter- 
nationally inspected and militarily inviolable 
relief airlift during dajdight hours for an ex- 
perimental period, with good prospects for re- 
newal. The Biafran authorities, liowever, have 
refused to accept such flights — principally on 
the grounds that they believed tliey could not 
rely on either the Eed Cross or the Federal Gov- 
ernment to assure that the daylight airlift 
■would not be violated by a surprise attack on 
the Biafran airfield, the vital terminus for their 
arms supply. They asked instead that they be 
given third-party assurances as to the good faith 
of the Federal Government of Nigeria. 

To meet tliis concern, at President Nixon's 
direction we took the following initiatives de- 
signed to facilitate agreement on a safe and ef- 
fective method of getting relief into the enclave : 

1. We sought and received the solemn assur- 
ance of the Federal Government of Nigeria that 
it would ensure that no hostile military action 
would be taken against the ICKC relief 
aircraft. 

2. After consultations with us, other govern- 
ments agreed to offer impartial observers to ac- 
company ICRC aircraft on their relief flights. 

3. Ambassador Ferguson went to West 
Africa to give the Biafrans the specific pledge 
of the Federal Government of Nigeria as to the 
inviolability of the ICEC daylight relief flights. 
On October 2-i, 1969, the Biafran authorities 
formally rejected tliis assurance. 

On October 31 the Biafrans jjublicly an- 
noimced their acceptance of an earlier U.S. plan 
for a surface route utilizing the Cross Eiver in 
Eastern Nigeria. Under this proposal, relief 
supplies would be delivered by ship to a mutu- 
ally agi-eed neutralized distribution point. We 
have stated our willingness to resume discus- 
sions on this. 

In our view, however, this Cross River route 
cannot substitute for the immediate resump- 
tion of ICRC daylight flights. Even if the plan 
could be promptly implemented, the capacity 
of the river route will be greatly reduced by a 
low water level for several more months. The 
agreement of the two sides to this plan is so far 
in principle only, and there has been no meeting 
of minds on the specifics of inspection and guar- 
antees. Nevertheless, our relief coordinator is 



continuing his efforts to bring about agreement 
on tlie Cross River proposal. 

Daylight flights imder agreed procedures 
therefore remain the only practicable scheme for 
an immediate and substantial expansion of 
relief operations. 

We believe that the ICRC proposal is such a 
realistic and reasonable scheme. We consider 
that tliQ Federal Government, in agreeing to the 
ICRC proposal, has acted constructively and in 
accordance with its himfianitarian responsibil- 
ities. We also believe that the proposed arrange- 
ments for daylight flights meet in a reasonable 
manner the legitimate security concerns of the 
Biafran authorities. 

Innocent ci^nlians are in desperate need of 
food and medical supplies. The United States 
stands ready to continue its aid to these help- 
less victims of the Nigerian war. We earnestly 
hope that the Biafran leadership will recon- 
sider its position regarding daylight flights. 

Beyond these immediate measures, however, 
we clearly recognize that the ultimate solution 
to the problem of relief is an end to the war. 
The sutfering and the fighting have gone on too 
long. As President Nixon has said, the United 
States earnestly hopes for the earliest negoti- 
ated end to the conflict and a settlement that will 
assure the security and peaceful development of 
all the people involved.^ 



U.S. and Portugal Conclude 
Aviation Negotiations 

Department Statement 

Press release S33 dated November 7 

Delegations representing the Governments of 
Portugal and the United States met in Wash- 
ington from October 27 to November 6, 1969, to 
discuss civil aviation relations between the two 
coimtries. At the conclusion of the consultations, 
which took place in a cordial atmosphere, the 
delegations agreed to submit their recommenda- 
tions to the respective Governments for their 
consideration. 



^ For a statement by President Nixon on Feb. 22, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 17, 1969, p. 222. 



470 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Brings Hanoi's Treatment of American Prisoners of War 
to Attention of U.N. Committee 



Following are statcTnents made in Commit- 
tee III {Social, Humanitarian, aiul Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly on November 11 
and 12 by Rita E. Eauser, UjS. Alternate 
Representative to the General Assembly. 



STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11 

U.S. /U.N. press release 147 dated November 11 

We now commence general debate in this 
committee on three subjects of moment : elimi- 
nation of all forms of racial discrimination, 
measures to be taken against nazism and racial 
intolerance, and violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Of the three, the viola- 
tion of human rights and fundamental free- 
doms appears to my delegation to be singularly 
important. Indeed, its importance to all delega- 
tions is demonstrated by its recurrence each 
year as a major subject of discussion. 

This agenda item makes particular reference 
to colonial and other dependent countries and 
territories. My delegation continues to deplore 
the inhumane practice of apartheid in South 
Africa and in Namibia and associates itself with 
the efforts of the international community seek- 
ing peaceful and practicable means for its 
elimmation as soon as possible. We also remain 
very concerned about the serious violations of 
hiunan rights in other parts of Africa. These 
questions are rightfully treated in many bodies 
of the United Nations, including the Security 
Council, for they are of the utmost urgency 
and gravity. 

Accordmgly, Madam Chairman, while we 
recognize fully the persistent and serious human 
rights violations in southern Africa, we are of 
the view that the Third Committee should not 
utilize all of its time on this aspect of the sub- 
ject, so widely treated elsewhere in the United 
Nations, lest by so doing we neglect the many 



instances of grave violations of human rights 
elsewhere in the world. I wish to recall that our 
agenda item itself refers to "the violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . 
in all countries." 

On reading the hundreds of petitions alleging 
violations of human rights which come to the 
Coimnission on Human Eights from sources in 
many countries, my delegation has noted the 
large number referring to violations of articles 
9-12 and article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The latter provides that 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression," including freedom to "seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers." 
Article 9 states that "No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Articles 
10, 11, and 12 afford full protection and due 
process of law as to those charged with a penal 
offense. 

In reviewing the 1969 annual report of that 
singular institution. Amnesty International, 
now consisting of 20 national sections and over 
15,000 individual members, the work of wlaich is 
to strengthen all international movements sup- 
porting human rights, my delegation was very 
much struck by the fact that Anmesty Interna- 
tional has taken up investigation of cases of 
political prisoners during the year 1968-69 in 
72 countiies. Included was my own country, 
where the status of conscientious objectors who 
have been imprisoned for violations of the con- 
scription laws has been looked into with the full 
cooperation of my Government. 

Newspaper reports and other media sources 
make perfectly clear to us that the right of 
political dissent is stiU a very precarious one for 
millions of people. Prisons bulge with those who 
have dared to criticize or oppose peacefully the 
policies of their governments; and, alas, many 
such prisoners are brutally ill-treated, in viola- 
tion of all standards of human decency. We note 



December 1, 1969 



471 



particularly the evidence compiled in the re- 
port of the ad hoc working group of experts as 
to African territories under colonial domina- 
tion, which documents the degree to which 
political prisoners have been brutalized in these 
areas. 

Eather than promote and encourage open dis- 
sent, many governments have maintained power 
with a reign of fear which serves to terrorize 
the minds and, eventually, the bodies of those 
who disagree. 

In the time available to me. Madam Chair- 
man, I cannot review all of these situations oc- 
curring the world over. But in the course of this 
debate, my delegation wishes strongly to affirm 
the inlierent faculty of all men — if they are in- 
deed, as article 1 of the Universal Declaration 
of Ilimian Rights states, "born free and equal 
in dignity and rights . . . endowed with rea- 
son and conscience" — to exercise their basic 
right of freedom of spirit, mind, and belief, 
wherever they may be located and whatever 
may be the political and social system under 
which they live. 

These rights are no greater or smaller in Af- 
rica than in the Americas, in Asia than in Eu- 
rope. They belong to all mankind and derive 
from man's basic humanity. The right to dis- 
agree, to dissent, is perhaps the most cherished 
of all the political rights of man. History 
teaches that yesterday's dissenters often become 
today's majority, for through reasoned dissent, 
man progresses. If I may so note, my delegation 
was proud to witness the free exercise of free 
minds across our country on October 15, a day 
on which many Americans were able to express 
their dissent with the Government's policy as 
others were equally able to disagree publicly 
with the dissenters. We are grateful for orderly 
and reasonable disagreement ; for we know that 
no country's policies are so soimd or so correct 
that none will be found who disagree. 

Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War 

Madam Chairman, my delegation is also 
deeply disturbed at a most fundamental viola- 
tion of human decency as to another category 
of prisoners: those who are prisoners of war 
protected by international law. 

I would like to discuss a specific situation in- 
volving prisoners which, I am sure you will 
understand, is of particular concern to my coun- 
try. United States forces are engaged in combat 
in Viet-Nam. It is our earnest hope that this 



conflict will soon be terminated and the task 
of rebuilding begun. But many Imndreds of 
American soldiers, airmen, marines, and naval 
pei'sonnel are at present missing or captured in 
Viet-Xam. How many of these men, and which 
ones, are in captivity is a secret closely guarded 
by the North Vietnamese authorities. For each 
of these men there is a wife, a child, a parent, 
who is concerned with his fate. They are sub- 
jected to uncertainty and despair which grow as 
each day passes. 

Our concern in this matter, expressed here 
before the assemblage of nations, is humanitar- 
ian, not political. This concern was succinctly 
but urgently expressed in the agonizing question 
put by the many wives who have gone to Paris 
to ask the North Vietnamese delegation to the 
Paris talks: Please tell me if I am a wife or a 
widow. 

There exists an mternational convention, 
legally binding upon all parties concerned : the 
Convention on Protection of Prisoners of "War, 
concluded at Geneva in 1949.^ This convention 
applies to "all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one 
of them." It thus binds the United States, which 
ratified it in 1955, the Republic of Viet-Nam, 
which acceded to it in 1953, and North Viet- 
Nam, which acceded in 1957. 

This convention, to which, I may add, there 
are 125 parties, including more than 100 mem- 
bers of the United Nations, contains provisions I 
which, if implemented, would let children know 
if their fathers are alive, parents if their sons 
are well treated. It requires that, and I quote : 

Immediately upon capture, or not more than one 
week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit 
camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hos- A 
pital or to another camp, every prisoner of war shall '| 
be enabled to write direct to his family. . . . 

The convention assures a prisoner the right 
to remain in communication with his loved ones 
and with an international or state organization 
which has assumed the obligation of safeguard- 
ing the rights of the prisoner. 

In addition to the right to receive mail and 
packages, and to send a minimum of two letters 
and four cards each month, the Geneva con- 
vention specifies minimum humane standards 
of detention, of hygiene, diet, recreation, and 
employment. It requires that seriously wounded 



' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3364. 



472 



Department of State Bulletin 



or ill prisoners be repatriated as soon as they 
are able to travel. It specifies that the detaining 
power shall accept a neutral party to the con- 
flict or a respected international organization 
such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross as a protecting power for the prisoners. 
It requires that the detaining power provide 
the names of the prisoners it holds to their 
families, as well as to the jDrotecting power, or 
to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, to pass on to their country of origin. 
It requires that the detaining party permit on- 
the-scene inspection of its detention facilities. 

Madam Chairman, my fellow delegates, this 
convention is not meant to create a life of 
privilege for captured military personnel. It is 
meant to ensure minimum standards of human 
decency to helpless men who are in the power of 
their military enemy and can no longer pose a 
threat to that enemy and to provide minimum 
solace to families who are far from the front 
lines. In wartime, when passions ai'e inflamed, 
this convention seeks to preserve those frail 
links of compassion and decency which are so 
urgently needed. Nurtured, these links may in 
turn help move enemies toward a realization of 
their common stake in finding the path to peace. 

My country places the highest priority upon 
implementation of this convention. There are 
now some 30,000 North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong prisoners of war in South Viet-Nam who 
have been accorded the status and the rights of 
prisoners of war under the Geneva convention, 
even though many of them may not teclmically 
be entitled to such prisoner-of-war status as 
defined in the convention. 

The United States has tried again and again 
to persuade Hanoi to apply the basic minimum 
standards guaranteed by the convention : identi- 
fication of prisoners, the right to send and re- 
ceive mail, and a protecting power to inspect 
detention conditions. We remain immensely 
grateful to the governments which have co- 
operated in these regrettably misuccessful 
efforts. 

In contrast, the Government of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam, with the cooperation of its allies, 
opened all detention camps to inspection by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. The 
names of POWs have been made available to 
the ICRC. Prisoners of war detained by the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam have the right to send and 
receive mail and packages. They are interned 
in six camps which are administered by the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam and which, as regular inter- 



national inspection has shown, conform to the 
requirements of the Geneva convention. 

Let me be clear that we are not claiming a 
perfect record on tliis subject. War is ugly and 
brutal by nature, and violations by individuals 
have occurred. The pomt is, however, that the 
Allied command has made every effort to en- 
sure that the convention is applied. This in- 
cludes the issuance of clear and explicit orders 
and, even moi-e important, thorough investiga- 
tion of alleged violations and punishment of 
those found guilty. This policy is confirmed and 
supported by the continuous review, both official 
and unofficial, which results from free access to 
POW's by delegates and doctors of the ICRC. 

The United States neither seeks nor deserves 
praise for its efforts to implement the conven- 
tion. This is our duty — our legal duty and our 
moral duty. The tragic fact, however, is that 
North Viet-Nam and the National Liberation 
Front refuse to acknowledge their legal and 
moral duty to apply similar standards of treat- 
ment to the helpless prisoners in their power, 
Vietnamese as well as American. 

North Viet-Nam's Treatment of Prisoners 

The record is indeed sad. The North Viet- 
namese authorities have refused to identify the 
prisoners they hold. Only a limited minority 
of those men known by the United States Gov- 
ernment to have been captured have been al- 
lowed to communicate with the outside world. 
Mail even from this small minority has been in- 
frequent and irregular. The sick and the 
womided have not been repatriated, nor have 
they been identified. Even the minimum pro- 
tection that would be afforded by inspection of 
POW facilities by an impartial international 
body has been denied. The ICRC's repeated re- 
quests to be allowed to visit the prisoners at 
their places of detention have been repeatedly 
denied, nor has any other accepted intermediary 
been given access to the prisoners. 

From the reports of the few men actually re- 
leased by North Viet-Nam and from other 
sources has come disturbing evidence that 
prisoners are being depi-ived of adequate medi- 
cal care and diets and that, in many instances, 
they have been subjected to physical and 
mental torture. For example, Lieutenant 
Robert Frishman, one of the recently released 
American prisoners, in a public statement on 
September 2, 1969, shortly after his release, 
said American prisoners are subject to "soli- 
tary confinement, forced statements, living 



December 1, 1969 



473 



in a cage for 3 years, being put in straps, 
not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal 
of fingernails, being hung from a ceiling, having 
an infected arm which was almost lost, not re- 
ceiving medical care, being dragged along the 
ground with a broken leg. . . ." Recounting 
the treatment of Lieutenant Commander Strat- 
ton, Lieutenant Frishman said : 

The North Vietnamese tried to get Lieutenant Com- 
mander Stratton to appear before a press delegation 
and say that he had received humane and lenient treat- 
ment. He refused because his treatment hadn't been 
humane. He'd been tied up with ropes to such a degree 
that he still has large scars on his arms from rope 
bums which became infected. He was deprived of 
sleep, beaten, had his fingernails removed, and was put 
in .solitary, but the North Vietnamese insisted that he 
make the false "humane treatment statements" and 
threw him into a dark cell alone for 38 days to think 
about it. 

Tliis record is indeed chilling. It has been 
noted and deplored by a great many interna- 
tional observers. For example, Jacques Frey- 
mond of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, reportmg on the work of the Com- 
mittee on Prisoners of War, higUighted the 
contrasts between North and South Viet-Nam 
as follows : 

In Viet-Nam, it (the ICRC) has so far had limited 
success. In fact, in spite of repeated representations, 
it has not been able to obtain the agreement of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the installation 
of a delegation in Hanoi nor even to the visiting of 
prisoners of war. . . . 

On the other hand, the ICRC is represented in Saigon 
and the delegates are able to visit all prisoner of war 
camps. They also regularly receive nominal rolls of 
these prisoners. 

In the face of such international criticism 
there have been few breaks in the silence of 
Hanoi. We have, however, been told — though 
in the shrill phrases of propaganda, rather than 
in the measured tones of statesmanship or hu- 
manitarianism — that the Geneva convention 
does not apply because there has not been a 
formal declaration of war and that the Ameri- 
can prisoners are "war criminals" and therefore 
not entitled to the rights conferred upon 
prisoners of war by the Geneva convention. De- 
spite this, Hanoi says, it treats the prisoners 
"humanely." 

Madam Chairman, my Government cannot 
accept these assertions. The Geneva convention 
provides a detailed international standard of 
humane treatment agamst which the treatment 



of prisoners of war can be measured. Hanoi's 
mere assertion of "humane" treatment, which 
has never been verified by impartial inspection, 
is no substitute. Further, North Viet-Nam's 
denial that the convention is applicable and its 
assertion that it therefore cannot be the stand- 
ard to measure its conduct have no basis in 
international law. Hanoi says that the conven- 
tion applies only where there has been a declara- 
tion of war. But it is clear from the language 
of tlie convention, which I quoted earlier, that 
the absence of such a declaration has no rela- 
tionship to the convention's applicability and 
does not justify a refusal to apply it. 

Hanoi has also asserted that our men held as 
prisoners are war criminals, apparently on the 
tlieory that any attacks against North Viet- 
Nam or Viet Cong forces or facilities are crimi- 
nal acts and that all military personnel involved 
in such attacks are criminals. Such assertions 
are patently absurd. Our men are not war 
criminals. IVIoreover, the Geneva conventions 
and modern international humanitarian law 
reject any suggestion that the protection of 
individual war victims, whether soldiers or 
civilians, is dependent upon moral or legal 
judgments about the cause for which their gov- 
ernment is fighting. The law is there to protect 
all the victims of war on both sides. All coun- 
tries have an interest in seeing that it is 
respected. 

The United States understands that every 
country believes that it is right and its enemy 
wrong. But, Madam Chairman, the Geneva con- 
vention was designed specifically to meet this 
problem. It imposes upon all combatant powers 
the obligation to treat military personnel made 
helpless by their captivity in accordance with a 
single objective and verifiable standard. 

ICRC Resolution 

The 21st International Conference of the Red 
Cross, held at Istanbul in September, cut 
through any possible quibbles that could be 
made by a party to the Viet-Nam conflict. It 
adopted without dissent a resolution which ob- 
tained the support of 11-4 governments and na- 
tional Red Cross organizations." That resolu- 
tion called upon all parties : 



" For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1969, p. 323. 



474 



Department of State Bulletin 



... to abide by the obligations set forth in the 
Convention and upon all authorities involved in an 
armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members 
of the regular armed forces of another party to the 
conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner of war 
status are treated hiunanely and given the fullest meas- 
ure of protection prescribed by the Convention. . . . 

It also recognized — and again I repeat the 
exact words of this resolution : 

. . . that, even apart from the Convention, the in- 
ternational community has consistently demanded 
humane treatment for prisoners of war, including iden- 
tification and accounting for all prisoners, provision of 
an adequate diet and medical care, that prisoners be 
permitted to communicate with each other and with 
the exterior, that seriously sick or wounded prisoners 
be promptly repatriated, and that at all times prisoners 
be protected from physical and mental torture, abuse 
and reprisals. 

We hope this committee will take note at this 
session of the resolution passed without dissent 
by the International Red Cross Conference in 
Istanbul and that it will in a similar fashion re- 
affirm the obligations of all parties to the Geneva 
convention. We especially hope that North Viet- 
Nam, which has frequently expressed its abiding 
regard for humane principles, will lieed this 
unequivocal and specific call reflectmg the con- 
science of tlie international community. 

Madam Chairman, 2 weeks ago, on October 
30, the Secretary General made the following 
statement : 

It is the view of the Secretary General that the Gov- 
ernment of North Vietnam ought to give an interna- 
tional humanitarian organization such as the League 
of Red Cross Societies access to the Americans detained 
in North Vietnam. 

We join in this view, and we urge all the 
governments represented here today to use their 
utmost influence so that at least this single step 
forward can be accomplished. We would indeed 
welcome the intervention of any organization 
or group of concerned people who may be able 
to reduce the anguish of the prisoners and their 
families. But the Secretary General has made 
a concrete, limited proposal; its immediate im- 
plementation would bring closer the day when 
the observance of the humanitarian principles 
of the Geneva convention by all parties is 
complete. 

I have spoken at length on this matter, 
Madam Chairman, for it is of vital importance 
to the United States. It is also of paramoimt in- 
terest to all nations of the world. The failure to 



treat any prisoner of war, wherever he may be, 
m accordance with common standards of de- 
cency, is an affront to all who claim the mantle 
of civilization. 



STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 12 

U.S./U.N. press release 157 dated November 12 

I excuse myself for taking the right of reply 
at this time. We have been honored here, all of 
us, by the presence of the Permanent Eepre- 
sentative of Algeria, who has chosen to reply 
to a humanitarian point in political terms. 

I should like simply to refer to him — and I 
will be glad to give to him a copy — a note which 
was addressed to the Secretary General dated 
February 10, 1960, and circulated by the Sec- 
retariat at the request of 20 member countries 
to disseminate a report of the International Eed 
Cross Committee on the interimient camps in 
Algeria. Madam Chairman, the investigation 
of the ICRC in that matter came about in large 
part because of the representations my Govern- 
ment made, and the American Eed Cross So- 
ciety made, to the ICEC. We did so before 
Algeria had gained her independence. We did 
not judge the rights or wrongs of the conflict. 
We did not pick between friend and foe. We 
responded to a human demand, and in direct 
answer to evidence of torture and maltreatment 
of Algerians who were interned at that time. 

Madam Chairman, the Algerian Eepresenta- 
tive, as well as the Cuban Representative, has 
chosen to speak of article 85 of the Geneva con- 
vention and the reservation which was made 
by the Democratic Eepublic of Viet-Nam. It 
was a reservation made by almost all of the 
Socialist countries. It was cited here several 
times today, and very key words in it were sim- 
ply ignored. The reservation reads "the Demo- 
cratic Eepublic of Vietnam declares that 
prisoners of war prosecuted and convicted" — 
I repeat, "prosecuted and convicted" — "for war 
crimes or for crimes against humanity in ac- 
cordance with the principles laid down by the 
Nuremberg Court of Justice shall not benefit 
from the present convention." Madam Chair- 
man, there have been no prosecutions and no 
convictions of any prisoners of war held by 
North Viet-Nam. 

I might state, and I have done considerable 



December 1, 1969 



475 



research on tlie matter, that the official position 
of the Soviet Union ex^jhiined at the time it 
enacted this reservation was that a prisoner is 
not deprived of any of the protections of the 
convention until after prosecution and final con- 
viction with all rights of appeal. 

I should like further to state, Madam Chair- 
man, in response to the comments today and 
yesterday by the distinguished delegate of the 
Soviet Union concerning my Government's in- 
diiference to the political question of Viet-Nam 
in this forum : Madam Chairman, my Govern- 



ment in 1964, before our troops were in Viet- 
Nam, and in 1966, after our troops were in 
Viet-Xam, made several attempts to bring the 
matter of Viet-Nam before the Security Council. 

The last attempt made by Ambassador Gold- 
berg in 19GG was met with the following re- 
sponse from the Soviet delegation, and I quote : 

"The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to 
state that it is opposed to the convening of the 
Security Council to discuss the question of Viet- 
Nam and to the inclusion of this question on the 
Council's agenda." 



Move To Change Representation of China in the U.N. 
Rejected by the 24th General Assembly 



Following is a statement hy Congressman 
J. Irving Whalley, U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations, made in plenary session on 
November Ji., together with the texts of a resolu- 
tion adopted by the Assembly on November 11 
and an Albanian draft resolution tohich ivas 
rejected on that day. 



STATEMENT BY MR. WHALLEY 

U.S./U.N. press release 144 dated November 4 

Once again, as in so many years past, the As- 
sembly lias before it the proposal of a small 
group of members under the leadership of Al- 
bania to bring the representatives of Com- 
munist China into, and simultaneously expel the 
representatives of the Republic of China from, 
the United Nations and all its agencies. 

This is the same proposal which the Assembly 
has rejected for many years past. Moreover, the 
facts iDearing on this question remain, most re- 
grettably, essentially the same as for many 
years past. 

The United States will, therefore, again op- 
pose the Albanian resolution, and we urge that 
it again be decisively rejected. 

Once again also, as a result of this issue hav- 
ing been raised, it becomes necessary to resolve 
any doubts that may exist on the voting proce- 
dure applying to this question. For that pur- 
pose, my Government has joined with Australia 



and 13 other members in offering a draft res- 
olution which reaffirms the validity of the 
Assembler's long-established position that any 
proposal to change the representation of China 
in the United Nations is an important question, 
requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption. 
Let me emphasize that my delegation con- 
siders this debate, in the circumstances, to be 
superfluous and unnecessary. Nevertheless, 
other delegations, with a perseverance that de- 
serves a better cause, have once again joined the 
issue. In the circumstances, my delegation has 
no alternative but to reiterate its position. Tliis 
I shall now do, first on the "important question" 
resolution and then on the Albanian resolution. 

The Important-Question Resolution 

I place the important-question resolution first 
because it takes priority in order of voting. This 
priority flows not only from the fact that this 
resolution, contained in document A/L.567, was 
submitted before the Albanian resolution, num- 
bered A/L.569, but also from the manifest logic 
of the proposition that a decision on the voting 
procedure to be applied to a substantive resolu- 
tion should precede the vote on that resolution 
itself. 

Madam President, I described the important- 
question resolution a moment ago as embodying 
the long-established position of the General As- 
sembly. This position has been affirmed and re- 



476 



Department of State Bulletin 



affirmed on every occasion when the Assembly 
has held a substantive debate on the issue of 

, Chinese representation. Specifically, when this 
question in its present form first arose in 1961, 
the Assembly decided, as the present draft res- 

' olution recalls, that, in accordance with article 

1 18 of the charter, "any proposal to change the 
representation of Cliina is an important ques- 
tion." ^ Resolutions subsequently adopted in 
1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968 affirmed again by 
large majorities the validity of that decision. 

I Madam President, it seems almost superflu- 
ous to recall to the members the compelling rea- 
sons why the Assembly consistently has affirmed 
the important-question procedure. The issue 
before us is not simply a matter of replacing one 
set of representatives with another. The very 
fact that each year this issue has been debated at 
length is testimony to the fact that we all do in 
reality regard the question as important. 

Among that large majority of members who 
have supported the important-question proce- 
dure, there are, as we laiow, divergent views on 
the question of mainland China's participation 
in the United Nations. All are united, however, 
in the importance they attach to maintaining 
the integrity of the charter's provisions on this 
point. 

Article 18 of the charter not only requires that 
decisions of this Assembly on important ques- 
tions be decided by a two-thirds majority; it 
goes on to list some of the types of questions 
that fall within this categoi-y, including specifi- 
cally "the admission of new Members to the 
United Nations, the suspension of the rights 
and privileges of membersliip, the expulsion of 
Members." Certainly a close reading of article 
18 makes clear that the Albanian proposal is an 
important question. To insist on the integrity of 
this charter provision is in the manifest self- 
interest of us all. For surely all here must rec- 
ognize that to permit a perhaps temporary 

, simple majority of those present and voting to 
expel a member of the United Nations — an act 
that has never been taken in the 24 years of this 
organization's life — would set a most dangerous 
precedent. Those who may be tempted now to 
disregard the charter's safeguards because of 
their views on the present issue should ponder 
well whether, at some future time on some fu- 
ture issue, they might not find themselves in a 
challenged position similar to that in which 



they now seek to place the Republic of China. 

Thus, in reaffirming the important-question 
principle, we will be taking an action that re- 
lates to far more than the question of Chinese 
representation. We will in effect be deciding to 
remain faithful to a basic rule of tlie charter 
on which the orderly conduct of our work — 
perhaps even the future of some of us in the 
United Nations — depends. 

Therefore, my delegation strongly urges the 
members of this Assembly, whatever may be 
their position on the substance of the question 
of Chinese representation, once again to re- 
affirm the vital procedural point set forth in 
document A/L.567. 

The Albanian Resolution 

Madam President, it seems almost equally un- 
necessary to reiterate my Govermnent's firm op- 
position to the substantive proposal contained 
in document A/L.569, a proposal remarkable 
neither for its wisdom nor for its justice. For 
almost a decade, Albania and other sponsors of 
the current draft resolution have presented us 
with almost identical proposals. On each of 
those occasions the Assembly has refused to be 
blinded by false appeals to the principle of 
miiversality of membership — in a resolution the 
effect of which is to expel a present member — 
and by other distortions of fact and misrepre- 
sentations of Peking's actions and attitudes. On 
each occasion the Assembly has rejected the 
proposition that representatives of Communist 
China should occupy seats from which the rep- 
resentatives of the Republic of Cliina would 
in the same instant be expelled. 

The language of the draft resolution, as in 
the recent past, deliberately has been cast in 
such a fashion that these two actions — the ex- 
pulsion of the Republic of China and the seat- 
ing in its place of Communist China — are bound 
together as an integral and indivisible whole. 

The views of the United States on this prop- 
osition and on the broader question of the 
desirability of the improvement of mainland 
China's relations with the rest of the world 
have been made clear on a number of recent oc- 
casions. Little has changed since we last con- 
sidered and rejected an identical Albanian 
resolution in 1968.=^ Nevertheless, so that there 
can be no misunderstanding, I would like briefly 
to restate the main reasons why my Government 



' For background, see Btilletin of Jan. 15, 1962, 
p. 108. 



' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 9, 1968, p. 609. 



December 1, 1969 

368-879—69 2 



477 



once again opposes the Albanian resolution. 

This resolution demands that rei)resentation 
in this organization and all its related agencies 
be denied to the Republic of China: 

— A Government which effectively governs 
over 13 million people, a population which ex- 
ceeds that of most of the members of this 
organization ; 

— ^A Government recognized diplomatically 
by a majority of the membersliip of this 
organization; 

— A Government which has been a member of 
this organization from its founding and which 
has committed no act that would justify its ar- 
bitrary expulsion but which, on the contrary, 
has contributed faithfully and constructively 
to the work of the organization, including the 
specialized agencies. 

Under these circumstances, the expulsion of 
the Republic of China could only be regarded 
as a grave injustice. 

The demand that the Republic of China be 
summarily expelled from this organization 
should therefore gain no acceptance from those 
who genuinely favor universality of member- 
ship; for its most immediate result, indeed its 
only certain result, woidd be the loss of one 
member. 

Nor can this demand, we believe, be sup- 
ported by those devoted to the cause of equity 
and justice. It should be opposed as well by 
those who maintain that the charter must be up- 
held if this organization itself is to survive and 
be effective. 

The language of the charter on the matter of 
expulsion of members is clear. Article 6 reserves 
this extraordinary and extremely important ac- 
tion to cases m which a member has persistently 
violated the principles contained in the charter. 
It requires the combined action of both the Se- 
curity Council and the General Assembly, as 
well it might, in view of the grave import of 
such an action both for the organization and for 
the individual members. I believe that there is 
not a single delegation here that could argue 
with any logic or justice that the conduct of the 
Republic of China justifies article 6 action. Yet 
what is proposed here is still worse; namely, 
that the Assembly accomplish the same unjusti- 
fiable end by the imjustifiable means of circum- 
venting the charter. 

All these reasons. Madam President, should 
impel this Assembly firmly to reject this pro- 
posal to expel the Republic of China from the 



United Nations. The formulation of the Al- 
banian proposal requires the rejection in toto of 
that resolution, whatever the views members 
might have on the question of Peking's par- 
ticipation in this organization. 

Obstacles Raised by Mainland China 

Many believe that an area as large as main- 
land China and an authority as real and as po- 
tentially influential as that in Peking cannot be 
ignored and should be represented in the United 
Nations and brought out of its isolation. While 
these views are understandable — and my Gov- 
ernment shares the conviction that it is im- 
portant for mainland China to return to the 
family of nations — they ignore the real obstacles 
which mainland China itself raises to its par- 
ticipation here under j^resent circumstances. It 
seems to my delegation that the real question 
is when the authorities in Peking will permit 
their people to apply their great talents in a 
constructive relationship with the community of 
nations. 

Others, including the sponsors of the Alba- 
nian resolution, go a step farther and submit 
that no important international problem can be 
solved without the participation of Commvmist 
China. Wliat are the facts ? 

— Peking's own conditions for its participa- 
tion, among which is the expulsion of the Re- 
public of China, are demands which this As- 
sembly in good conscience, indeed in fidelity to 
the principles of the charter, cannot accept. The 
United Nations, for its part, makes no special 
demands ; it asks only that members accept and 
be able and willing to carry out the obligations 
contained in the charter. Is it then the United 
Nations or is it rather Peking itself which, by 
imposing unreasonable conditions and by pur- 
suing a policy of open hostility to its neighbors 
great and small, has placed obstacles in the 
path of its participation here ? 

— It has condemned efforts to end the nuclear 
arms race; it rejected this Assembly's invitation 
to participate in disarmament discussions. 

— It has indicated clearly that it opposes the 
negotiation of a peaceful settlement in Viet- 
Nam. 

President Nixon has called for an era of nego- 
tiation to replace confrontation ; yet Peking has 
thus far spurned our efforts to negotiate. This 
year it canceled the Warsaw meeting of Ameri- 
can and Chinese Communist Ambassadors pre- 
viously scheduled for February. 



478 



Department of State Bulletin 



We are entitled under such circumstances to 
question whether it is a hostile world that has 
isolated Peking or rather a still-hostile Peking 
that isolates itself. 

Under such circumstances one must question 
whether the participation of Peking in the 
United Nations would contribute to the cause 
of peace or to the work of this organization. 

Nonetheless, despite these discouraging 
circumstances and despite continued hostility 
and rebuff, my Government continues to share 
the conviction of many others that the current 
state of tension in relationshijos with Peking 
should not continue. As Secretary of State 
Rogers said in an address in Canberra last 
August : ^ 

Communist China obviously has long been too iso- 
lated from world affairs. 

This is one reason why we have been seeking to open 
Tip channels of communication. ... to remove irritants 
in our relations and to help remind people on main- 
land China of our historic friendship for them. 

To this end, as Secretary Rogers noted, a 
number of steps have recently been taken by our 
Government. We have proposed an exchange 
of persons. We have also liberalized regulations 
concerning travel and trade with Commtmist 
China. 

INIoreover, we had been prepared to offer 
specific suggestions on an agreement for more 
normal relations at the planned Warsaw meet- 
ing in February, but, as I said, that meeting 
unfortunately was canceled by Peking. And thus 
far, none of our mitiatives has met with a posi- 
tive response. 

But, Madam President, the United States in- 
tends to persevere. As President Nixon made 
clear in this Assembly hall on September 18,* 
we are ready to talk with the leaders of Com- 
munist China in a frank and serious spirit 
whenever they choose to abandon their self- 
imposed isolation. 

All these efforts, however, by my country and 
by others to improve relationships with Peking 
camiot be furthered — nor would the interests 
of this organization be served in any way — 
through the adoption of the Albanian draft 
resolution. That resolution would merely re- 
ward Peking's attitude of self- isolation and dis- 
respect for the United Nations by seating it 
here under its own terms — which would expel 
the Republic of China, in utter disregard for its 



* Btti-letin of Sept. 1, 1969, p. 178. 

* Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 



December 1, 1969 



riglits and its contributions as a member of the 
United Nations. This would be a major step 
backward, not forward. It would encourage 
intransigence, debase the charter, and perpetrate 
a grave injustice against a member of the 
United Nations. 

I therefore urge my fellow delegates once 
again decisively to reject the resolution con- 
tained in document A/L.569. 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

Important-Question Resolution ^ 

Representation of China in the United Nations 

The General Assernbly, 

Recalling the recommendation contained in its res- 
olution 390 (V) of 14 December 19.50 that, whenever 
more than one authority claims to be the Government 
entitled to represent a Member State in the United Na- 
tions and this question becomes the subject of con- 
troversy in the United Nations, the question should be 
considered in the light of the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the circum- 
stances of each case, 

Recalling further Its decision in resolution 1668 
(XVI) of 15 December 1961, in accordance with Arti- 
cle 18 of the Charter, that any proposal to change the 
representation of China is an important question, 
which, in General Assembly re.solutions 2025 (XX) of 
17 November 1965, 2159 (XXI) of 29 November 1966, 
2271 (XXII) of 28 November 1967 and 2389 (XXIII) 
of 19 November 1968, was affirmed as remaining valid, 

Afflrms again that this decision remains valid. 

Albanian Draft Resolution ^ 

The General Assertiljly, 

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 

Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights 
of tlie People's Republic of China is essential both for 
the protection of the Charter of the United Nations 
and for the cause that the United Nations must serve 
under the Charter, 

Recognizing that the representatives of the Govern- 
ment of the People's Republic of China are the only 
lawful representatives of China to the United Nations, 

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Re- 
public of China and to recognize the representatives 
of its Government as the only lawful representatives 
of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith 
the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place 
which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations 
and in all the organizations related to it. 



= U.N. doc. A/RES/2500 (XXIV) (A/L. .567 and Add. 
1-5) ; adopted on Nov. 11 by a vote of 71 (U.S.) in 
favor, 48 against, with 4 abstentions. 

•U.N. doc. A/L.569; rejected on Nov. 11 by a vote 
of 48 in favor, 56 (U.S.) against, with 21 abstentions. 



479 



United States Comments on Revisions in Draft Treaty 
Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed 



A revised joint draft treaty on the prohiiition 
of the emp/acefnent of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction on the sea- 
bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil 
thereof was presented at the Conference of tlie 
Committee on Disannament at Geneva by the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. on October 30. 
Following is a statement made before the con- 
ference that day by U.S. Representative James 
F. Leonard, together with the text of the revised 
draft treaty. 



STATEMENT BY MR. LEONARD 

On October 7 the Cochairmen tabled the text 
of a joint draft seabed treaty (CCD/269) for 
the consideration of this Connnittee.^ The joint 
text was the result of long and involved con- 
sultations between the Cochairmen and repre- 
sented, we believe, a realistic basis for broad 
agreement. 

My delegation has appreciated the thoughtful 
comments that have been made by the members 
of the Committee during our discussion of the 
joint text. 

We have noticed that the major concerns 
raised during these discussions have been in 
three areas. The first is the concern that the 
treaty should serve to protect the security inter- 
ests of all the states parties to the treaty ; second, 
that while protecting these security interests, 
the treaty should clearly reflect that it in no way 
prejudices or infringes on existing rights rec- 
ognized imder international law, except for the 
limitations for arms control purposes on activi- 
ties falling within the scope of tliis treaty ; and 
tliird, that the treaty should contribute to fur- 
ther progress in the field of arms control. 



' For a U.S. statement and text of the Oct. 7 draft 
treaty, see Bulletin of Nov. 3, 1969, p. 365. 



In light of these concerns, a munber of dele- 
gations have made specific suggastions for im- 
proving the present draft and several members 
of the Committee have introduced working 
papers and formal amendments. The Cochair- 
men have carefully considered the various sug- 
gestions and amendments. As a result, we are 
able to present to the Committee today a revised 
treaty text (CCD/269/Rev. 1). 

In view of the importance which our delega- 
tion attaches to the changes that have been 
made in the revised text, I would like to discuss 
these changes in the context of the three areas 
of concern to which I pre\aously referred. 

Protection of Security Interests 

First, there is the concern that the treaty 
should serve to protect the security interests of 
all the parties. We have noted the statements 
made recently by the delegations of Japan, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Poland, Pakistan, 
Burma, and Morocco and the specific recom- 
mendation of the U.K. delegation which have 
referred to a problem regarding the status of the 
zone — or "gap" — lying between the outer limit 
of the maximum contiguous zone and the outer 
limit of claimed territorial seas which are nar- 
rower than 12 miles. It has been rightly 
pointed out that the treaty does not clearly in- 
dicate whether the prohibition accepted by a 
party in article I applies in such a gap off the 
coast of another party and that such uncer- 
tainty could raise serious security questions for 
those states concerned. To eliminate this uncer- 
tainty, article I has been amended by the addi- 
tion of a new paragraph 2, which states : 

The undertakin,!;.s of paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall al.so apply within the contiguous zone referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this Article, except that within that 
zone they shall not apply to the coastal state. 

This language makes clear in view of article 24 



480 



Department of State Bulletin 



of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone that the prohibition of 
article I, paragraph 1, applies to the "gap" be- 
tween the territorial sea and the outer limit of 
the contiguous zone for all states except, of 
> course, for the coastal states.^ The previous para- 
graph 2 of article I has been renumbered 
paragraph 3. 

Another problem relating to security inter- 
ests has been reflected in the comments made by 
the delegations of the Netherlands, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Ethiopia, Mon- 
golia, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Repub- 
I lie and in the working paper submitted by the 
I delegation of Canada. I refer to the question of 
I whether article III should specify the possible 
recourse parties would have if there were seri- 
, ous unresolved questions regarding fulfillment 
of the obligations of the treaty. 

Several delegations have suggested that the 
treaty would be strengthened if it made specific 
reference to the existing procedures by which 
states can bring serious matters to the attention 
of the Security Council. We believe that this is 
an important suggestion since it would empha- 
size the seriousness with which states would 
view possible violations of the treaty and would 
clearly restate the right of parties to bring such 
questions before the Security Council. Accord- 
ingly, we have added a second sentence to ar- 
ticle III, paragraph 3, to read as follows : 

In the event that consultation and cooperation have 
not removed the donbts and there is serious question 
concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed 
under this Treaty, States Parties to this Treaty may, 
in accordance vfith the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security 
Council. 

Geographical Coverage of the Treaty 

I would like to turn now, Mr. Chairman, to 
the second major area of concern ; namely, that 
the treaty should in no way prejudice or in- 
fringe existing rights recognized under inter- 
national law. 

A number of delegations have raised the ques- 
tion of how the treaty envisages the application 
of international law, including the 1958 Con- 
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu- 
ous Zone. In this context, we have noted the 
views expi-essed by several delegations regard- 



' For text of the convention, see Buixetin of June 30, 
1958, p. 1111. 



ing the application of international law to the 
geographical area covered by the treaty. The 
United States delegation has not yet com- 
mented in detail in the Committee on the geo- 
graphical coverage of the treaty, and I think 
it would be appropriate for me to do so now. 

There are two provisions which together de- 
limit the area of the treaty's prohibitions so 
as to create balanced obligations among the 
parties. The rules adopted for defining the 
treaty area are widely accepted international 
standards. 

Article I, paragraph 1, extends the treaty 
prohibitions to the entire seabed and ocean 
floor "beyond the maximum contiguous zone 
provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention." 
The maximum seaward limit of the contiguous 
zone provided for in that convention is 12 miles. 
Under paragraph 1 of article II of the seabed 
treaty, the outer limit of this zone will be meas- 
ured from baselines drawn in accordance with 
the provisions of section II of part I of the 
1958 convention and "in accordance with inter- 
national law." This section of the Geneva con- 
vention contains the detailed rules which are to 
be used to determine the baselines from which 
the 12-mile zone is measured in most situations. 

However, the provisions of section II of the 
convention expressly do not apply to certain 
situations, such as "historic" bays. It was for 
this reason that the language "and in accord- 
ance with international law" was also included 
in paragraph 1 of article II of the treaty. In 
those situations where the section II rules are 
expressly inapplicable under the terms of the 
1958 convention, the rules of customary inter- 
national law will govern the location of the 
baseline for the purposes of this treaty. Thus, 
the 12-mile contiguous zone would be measured 
from the closing line across an historic bay only 
if the waters are enclosed as internal waters in 
accordance with the rules of customary interna- 
tional law. 

Now I would also like to emphasize, Mr. 
Chairman, that although the treaty relies on the 
1958 Territorial Sea Convention to define treaty 
baselines and the outer limit of the exempted 
coastal zone, this reference in no way implies 
that any party to the seabed treaty which is not 
a party to the 1958 convention would find itself 
bound by or adhering, so to speak, to that con- 
vention. In other words, Mr. Chairman, a party 
to the seabed treaty accepts only that the outer 
limits of the zone exempted from the prohibi- 



December 1, 1969 



481 



tions of the seabed treaty will be measured in 
accordance with certain rules in section II of 
the 1958 convention. Therefore, a party to the 
seabed treaty is not accepting these 1958 rules 
for any purpose other tlian that of determining 
wliere the seabed arms control treaty applies. 

Mr. Chairman, there is one other point I 
would like to touch upon in this connection. 
This is the question of disputes regarding 
rights, claims, or recognition or nonrecognition 
of rights or claims, affecting the law of the sea. 
As we all know, there are differing positions 
among states regarding, for example, such mat- 
ters as the proper breadth of the territorial sea. 
I may state unequivocally that it is not the pur- 
pose of this treaty to settle such matters. Nor is 
the purpose of this treaty to give one state or 
another state, or any group of states, an ad- 
vantage vis-a-vis any other state or group of 
states with respect to law-of-the-sea issues. 
That is why article II, paragraph 2, contains the 
best disclaimer clause that it has been possible 
for the authors of this draft to devise. 

It would indeed be most regrettable if any 
countries considering this seabed treaty were to 
fail to accept the disclaimer clause as meaning 
just what it says. We are convinced that it is 
possible to negotiate and conclude a seabed 
treaty which establishes meaningful arms 
limitations but which does not prejudice any 
state's position regarding law-of-the-sea ques- 
tions. The disclaimer clause, in effect, would 
prevent any party from saying to any other 
party that acceptance of this treaty, or any ac- 
tions under it, had somehow created or implied 
an acceptance of new or different positions re- 
garding the law of the sea, except for the limita- 
tions for arms control purposes created by the 
treaty itself. With this in mind, I trust that it 
is possible to refer in this treaty to "the free- 
doms of the high seas" without establishing or 
implying the precise boundary for the limits of 
the high seas. 



Furthering Arms Control Progress 

I would now like to discuss the third major 
area of concern : that the treaty should contrib- 
ute to further progress in the field of arms con- 
trol. This concern has found expression in a 
number of proposals which I would like to dis- 
cuss separately. 

First is the idea supported by the delegations 



of Canada, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Czechoslo- 
vakia, the United Kingdom, Hungary, India, 
Brazil, Ethiopia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Argen- 
tina, Burma, the United Arab Republic, and 
Nigeria that the treaty provide for a review 
conference as envisaged in the May 22 draft 
submitted b}' the United States.^ As has been 
pointed out, such a conference would review 
the operation of the treaty with a view to en- 
suring that the purposes of the preamble and 
the provisions of the treaty are being realized. 
At the same time, the conference would provide 
an opportunity to consider the effect of tech- 
nological or other changes on the operation of j 
the treaty and whether it would be appropriate i 
to expand the scope of the treaty. 

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to refer to the draft amendment submitted 
by the distinguished Representative of Sweden 
(CCD/271) which would commit parties in an 
operative paragraph to continue negotiations 
in good faith on further measures relating to a 
more comprehensive prohibition of the use for 
military purposes of the seabed. It has been 
argued that this suggested amendment would 
provide an additional incentive to the parties to 
continue negotiations toward further measures 
to prevent an arms race on the seabed. The 
United States has made clear in its statements 
that it considers the present draft treaty as a 
possible first step toward other arms control 
measures. This belief was reflected in the pre- 
ambular paragraphs 3 and 4 of the joint draft 
of October 7. 

We have also stated that the present state of 
seabed teclmology and verification capabilities 
calls for a realistic measure at tliis time which 
may be reviewed later as these capabilities in- 
crease. Being committed to this principle, we 
have examined the various suggestions for in- 
corporating this principle into the revised draft. 
After careful consideration, we have concluded 
that provision for a review conference, when 
considered in conjunction with preambular par- 
agraph 3, will provide assurances that are ef- 
fective and appropriate. We believe that if the 
parties obligate themselves to review the treaty 
at a specified period of time — that is, 5 years 
after its entry into force — we wUl eliminate the 
possibility that review will be postponed or de- 



' For text of the May 22 draft treaty, see Buixetin 
of June 16, 1969, p. 523. 



482 



Department of State Bulletin 



jtayed indefinitely as a result of unforeseen polit- 
iical circumstances. Accordingly, Mr. Chair- 
itnau, we have included in the revised draft a 
aew article V which provides for a review 
conference 5 j^ears after the treaty enters into 
■force. The language of the article reads as 
^follows : 

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, 
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in 
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation 
of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes 
of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are 
being realized. Such review shall take into account any 
relevant technological developments. The review con- 
ference shall determine in accordance with the views 
of a majority of those Parties attending whether and 
when an additional review conference shall be 
convened. 

Another asj^ect of the concern that the treaty 
Ijg a flexible mstrument relates to the procedure 
for amendment. We have reviewed this ques- 
tion, Mr. Chairman, and it seems to us that a 
procedure by wliich all parties will have an 
equal voice in deciding which amendments will 
be included in the treaty would provide for a 
more flexible treaty. Accordingly, we have in- 
cluded in the revised draft a new article IV 
based on the amendments article of the Outer 
Space Treaty. The article reads as follows : 

Any state Party to the Treaty may propose amend- 
ments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into 
force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the 
amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of 
the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each 
remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation 
believes that the new treaty provisions which the 
Cochairmen are recommending today are an- 
other major step in the negotiation of a seabed 
treaty. For this progress we are greatly in- 
debted to the members of this Committee, whose 
constructive comments have contributed signifi- 
cantly to the revised text. For our part, we will 
continue to study carefully all the comments 
that have been made in the Committee, includ- 
ing those made in the last few days, and we 
shall have these comments very much in mind 
when we are continuing our work in the Gen- 
eral Assembly. The General Assembly will, of 
course, wish to consider this text carefully ; and 
in our view, it might be possible to decide at a 
later date whether any future modifications 
! should be incorporated in response to desires of 
the international community. 



TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT TREATY 

Union op Soviet Socialist Republics and United 
States of America Draft Tbeatt on the Prohibi- 
tion OF THE Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea- 
bed AND THE Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 

THEREOF 

The States Parties to this Treaty, 

Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the 
progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and 
the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, 

Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms 
race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the in- 
terests of maintaining world peace, reduces interna- 
tional tensions, and strengthens friendly relations 
among States, 

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards 
the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the 
subsoil thereof from the arms race, and determined 
to continue negotiations concerning further measures 
leading to this end, 

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step to- 
wards a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, and 
determined to continue negotiations to this end. 

Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in 
a manner consistent with the principles of interna- 
tional law and without infringing the freedoms of the 
high seas, 

Have agreed as follows : 

Article I 

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not 
to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean 
floor and in the subsoU thereof beyond the maximum 
contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Con- 
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone any objects with nuclear weapons or any other 
types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as struc- 
tures, launching installations or any other facilities 
specifically designed for storing, testing or using such 
weapons. 

2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article 
.shall also apply within the contiguous zone referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this Article, except that within that 
zone they shall not apply to the coastal state. 

3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not 
to assist, encourage or induce any State to commit 
actions prohibited by this Treaty and not to partici- 
pate in any other way in such actions. 

Abticle II 

1. For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of 
the contiguous zone referred to in Article I shall be 
measured in accordance with the provisions of Part I, 
Section II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Terri- 
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and in accordance 
with international law. 

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as sup- 
porting or prejudicing the position of any State Party 
with respect to rights or claims which such State 



December 1, 1969 



483 



Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or 
nonrefOgnition of rights of claims asserted by any other 
State, related to waters off its coasts, or to the seabed 
and the ocean floor. 

Abticle III 

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States 
Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify 
the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on 
the seabed and the ocean tioor and in the subsoil 
thereof beyond the maximum contiguous zone, referred 
to in Article I, if these activities raise doubts concern- 
ing the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under 
this Treaty, without interfering with such activities or 
otherwise infringing rights recognized under interna- 
tional law, including the freedoms of the high seas. 

2. The right of verification recognized by the States 
Parties in paragraph 1 of this Article may be exercised 
by any State Party using its own means or with the 
assistance of any other State Party. 

3. The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to 
consult and cooperate with a view to removing doubts 
concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed 
under this Treaty. In the event that consultation and 
cooperation have not removed the doubts and there is 
serious question concerning the fulfillment of the obli- 
gations assumed under this Treaty, States Parties to 
this Treaty may, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter 
to the Security Council 

Article IV 

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amend- 
ments to this Treaty. Amendments .shall enter into 
force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the 
amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of 
the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for 
each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance 
by it. 

Abticle V 

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, 
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in 
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the opera- 
tion of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the 
Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into 
account any relevant technological developments. The 
review conference shall determine in accordance with 
the views of a majority of those Parties attending 
whether and when an additional review conference 
shall be convened. 

Article VI 

Each Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its 
national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeop- 
ardized the supreme interests of its Country. It shall 
give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties 
to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Coun- 
cil three months in advance. Such notice shall include 
a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to 
have jeopardized its supreme interests. 



Article VII 

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all 
States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty 
before its entry into force in accordance with para- 
graph 3 of this Article may accede to it any time. 

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of ac- 
cession shall be deposited with the Governments of 
, which are hereby designated the Deposi- 
tary Governments. 

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit 
of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Govern- 
ments, including the Governments designated as De- 
positary Governments of this Treaty. 

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited after the entry into force of 
this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of 
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 

5. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith 
notify the Governments of all States signatory and 
acceding to this Treaty of the date of each signature, 
of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratifica- 
tion or of accession, of the date of the entry into 
force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 

Article VIII 

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish 
and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall 
be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Gov- 
ernments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the States signatory and acceding 
thereto. 

In witness whekeof the undersigned, being duly au- 
thorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. 

Done in at this 

. day of , . 



General Draper To Represent U.S. 
on U.N. Population Commission 

The President announced on November 7 
(White House press release) the ajipointment of 
Gen. William H. Draper as United States Rep- 
resentative on the United Nations Population 
Commission. (For biographic data, see White 
House press release dated November 7.) 

In his new i^osition Gen. Draper served also 
as Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 15th 
session of the U.N. Population Commission, 
which met at Geneva November 3-4. 



484 



Department of State Bulletin 



Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations 



Following is a statement made in plenary ses- 
sio^i of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. 
Representative Charles ^¥. Yost on October 23, 
together with tlie text of a resolution adopted 
by the Assembly on October 31. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOST 

D.S./U.N. press release 130 dated October 23 

The 25th anniversary of the United Nations 
is certainly an occasion to be commemorated. 
We are all deeply grateful to the Secretary Gen- 
eral for proposing we do so. It is no small thing 
for tlus extraordinary experiment in interna- 
tional organization to have survived for 25 
years. This fact in itself provides the occasion 
for a ceremony. And the United Nations has 
not only survived; it has made unprecedented 
contributions to international peace and secu- 
rity, to the self-determination of peoples, to eco- 
nomic and social development, and to the 
advancement of human rights. 

Yet I believe none of us is vmder the illusion 
that the 25th anniversary should be a time for 
self -congratulation or complacency. On the 
contrary, it must be a time for soul-searching 
and for candid recognition of how far we have 
fallen short of the purposes of our charter and 
of effective means of carrying them out. 

On May 9 of this year U Thant said : 

... I can only conclude from the Information that 
is available to me as Secretary-General that the Mem- 
bers of the United Nations have perhaps 10 years left 
in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and 
launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to 
improve the human environment, to defuse the popu- 
lation explosion, and to supply the required momentum 
to world development efforts. 

If such a global partnership is not forged within 
the next decade, then I very much fear that the prob- 
lems I have mentioned will have reached such stag- 
gering proportions that they will be beyond our 
capacity to control. 

You, Madam President [Angle Brooks, Pres- 
ident of the 24th General Assembly], in your 
opening remarks to this General Assembly, were 
eloquent in expressing alarm over "the gradual 



decline of the United Nations in the eyes of 
public opinion" and stating bluntly that "it 
would be complacency on our part if we were to 
yield to the delusion that we are doing our best 
and that the world persists in misjudging us." 
You then set us all an example when you 
declared : 

But to satisfy my conscience, I must not refrain, 
in the evaluation of the general situation in the United 
Nations, from asking all of us to probe our souls and 
to search deep into our minds to ascertain whether or 
not we have given, and are giving, to the United Na- 
tions cause the best and the most of ourselves. 

I think we have only to glance at some of the 
key provisions of the charter to see how far we 
have fallen short of making them living reali- 
ties, how substantially we have failed to develop 
the institution and the sort of international soci- 
ety which the authors of the charter had in 
mind. 

Do we in fact "take effective collective meas- 
ures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace" ? Do we "accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council"? 

Do all of us, do rrbost of us, settle our "inter- 
national disputes by peaceful means in such 
a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered"? Do we all 
"refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independ- 
ence of any state" ? 

In electing new members to our organization 
do we judge objectively whether they "are able 
and willing to carry out" the obligations of the 
charter ? In electing nonpermanent members to 
the Security Council does this Assembly pay 
due regard "in the first instance to the contri- 
bution of Members of the United Nations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the other purposes of the Organization" ? 
Does the Security Council and do the member 
states "take into consideration that legal dis- 
putes should as a general rule be referred by the 
parties to the International Court of Justice" ? 

These questions only need to be asked in order, 
imhappily, to be answered in the negative. We 



December 1, 1969 



485 



have in fact only just begun, after 25 years, to 
implement our cliarter. Perhaps it needs in some 
respect to be amended ; but more important and 
more urgent, it needs to be implemented. 

So I would look forward most of all to the 
25th anniversary as an occasion for collective 
soul-searching, for a rigorous self-examination 
as to whether and why we have fallen short of 
our purposes, as to how and when we can at 
long last — next year, 5 years hence, through 
the coming decade — make them effective. 

The Secretary General, as I have noted, warns 
that we may have only 10 years in which to re- 
verse the fatal course of conflict, armament, 
overpopulation, and underdevelopment which 
we are now pursuing. I can think of no more 
suitable task, no more imperative duty, for us to 
perform next year than, first, to take whatever 
concrete action to deal with these problems we 
can agree to take during that anniversary year 
and, second, to lay down, collectively insofar as 
possible, concrete objectives, adequately respon- 
sive to the disastrous impact of those problems, 
for implementation before the end of the dec- 
ade. Whatever we may decide to do of a cere- 
monial character in celebration of the anniver- 
sary should merely emphasize and reinforce the 
practical steps we should take or propose to meet 
this overriding responsibility. 

We believe that the j^reparatory committee 
for the 25th anniversary, under the able, patient, 
and good-humored guidance of Ambassador 
Eichard Akwei of Ghana, has provided us with 
a most useful report.^ The recommendations in 
that report provide a framework for commemo- 
ration by the United Nations, by the specialized 
agencies, by regional organizations, by national 
governments, and by nongovernmental institu- 
tions around the world. Wl^ile we shall have to 
see how some of the proposals mentioned in the 
report are elaborated, we support the main 
thrust of the recommendations in that report, 
particularly the theme of "Peace and Progress," 
and for that reason have joined as a cosponsor 
in the draft resolution which is now before the 
Assembly. We are particularly pleased by the 
large number of cosponsors of the resolution, 
representing countries from all over the world, 
and hope that all delegations will join in sup- 
porting and implementing the resolution. 

President Nixon, in his address to the General 
Assembly last month, drew our attention to the 



challenge and opportunity that lie before us. 
He said : ^ 

For the first time ever, we have truly become a single 
world community. 

For the first time ever, we have seen the staggering 
fury of the power of the universe unleashed ; and we 
know that we hold that power in a very precariona 
balance. 

For the first time ever, technological advance has 
brought within reach what once was only a poignant 
dream for hundreds of millions — freedom from hunger 
and freedom from want ; want and hunger that I have 
personally seen in nation after nation all over this 
world. 

For the first time ever, we have seen changes in a 
single lifetime — in our lifetime — that dwarf the 
achievements of centuries before ; and those changes 
continue to accelerate. . . . 

In this new age of "firsts," even the goal of a just and 
lasting peace is a "first" we can dare to strive for. 
We must achieve it. And I believe we can achieve it 

It will require not perfimctory eloquence but 
hard work to strengthen the United Nations as 
a dynamic instrument for peace and progress, 
to enable it to respond to the needs of a world 
changing with bewildering speed. 

The job, as U Thant correctly pointed out, 
must be done by the member states. The U.N., 
after all, has \artually no power of its own. Its 
success rests entirely on the readiness of its 
members to put their power at its service and to 
subordinate their parochial concerns to the com- 
mon cause of a more peaceful and secure world. 

In setting our goals, we must, of course, be 
realistic. Yet, I believe, there is greater danger 
from the kind of realism that makes for exces- 
sive caution and timidity than in a bold ap- 
proach, which offers the only hope of meeting 
successfully the challenges that face us. 

It would be premature for me to outline to- 
day a definitive program of goals for the next 
decade. My Government will want to give the 
most serious and energetic attention to these 
goals during the year ahead. We will also want 
to study the thoughtful submissions of other 
governments; for example, the stimulating 
memoranda submitted by Ghana, Guyana, Ire- 
land, Italy, the Philippines, Sweden, and Yugo- 
slavia which are annexed to the report before us. 
We shall also want to give serious attention to 
certain studies prepared by responsible private 
groups, such as the recent study entitled "The 
United Nations : The Next 25 Years," prepared 
by the Commission To Study the Organization 
of Peace, and the ideas in "Controlling Con- 



' U.N. doe. A/7690. 



• Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297. 



486 



Department of State Bulletin 



flicts in the 1970's," set forth by a panel of the 
U.N. Association of the U.S.A. But I should 
like to sketcli out in a preliminary way certain 
approaches which miglit be explored further 
during the coming year. 

Peace and Disarmament 

The first purpose of the United Nations is to 
keep the peace. Without a reasonable measure of 
peace, there can be only the most precarious 
progress in human welfare and human rights. 
The United Nations, through its peacekeeping 
operations, has made a great contribution to 
peace in the last 24 years. Yet all of us are 
keenly aware of how often we have failed and 
continue to fail. I would suggest three avenues 
of approach for improving the effectiveness of 
the United Nations in this area : 

1. We should greatly accentuate our efforts to 
agree on guidelines for strengthening United 
Nations peacekeeping. The Security Council 
should be made a much more effective instru- 
ment in this regard, and its primary role should 
be fully recognized. The residual responsibili- 
ties of the General Assembly should also be pre- 
served, and tlie authority of the Secretary Gen- 
eral should be maintained. The role of each is 
laid do^vn in the charter; these roles are com- 
plementary and in no sense incompatible. It 
would be a signal achievement for the com- 
memoration of the 25th anniversary, and a 
significant first step, if there were general 
agreement on guidelines for strengthening U.N. 
peacekeeping operations — the type of agree- 
ment which the Special Committee on Peace- 
keeping Operations is seeking. We of the 
United States hope that this goal can be 
achieved during the coming year, and we shall 
bend every effort to make it a reality. This in 
turn should pave the way for the strengthening 
of standby arrangements and for more reliable 
and equitable financing of U.N. peacekeeping, 
based on the collective responsibility of the 
membership. 

2. There must be greater emphasis on the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Wliile contain- 
ing \dolence through U.N. peacekeeping is 
necessary, such peacekeeping is not sufficient 
while the roots of conflict remain. Improvement 
must be found through developing instruments 
for factfinding, negotiation, conciliation, and 
arbitration, through greater use of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice, and through other 



methods of peaceful settlement. We wiU vigor- 
ously participate in efforts during the coming 
decade for such improvement. Among other 
steps might the General Assembly next year 
reconstitute its Panel on Inquiry and Concilia- 
tion in order to revitalize this procedure ? 

Naturally, the most important element is and 
will remain the willingness of countries to en- 
gage in procedures for peaceful settlement. 
Tliere must be a greater willingness to accept 
conciliation and mediation. Eesort to arbitra- 
tion, as was done so successfully between India 
and Pakistan on the Eann of Kutch issue, must 
become more common. 

.3. We must pursue with much more energy 
and realism our common responsibility to check 
the dangerous and costly arms race. There are 
now more than enough nuclear weapons in the 
world to destroy every living thing on earth. No 
nation can or will disarm imilaterally ; but 
prompt, effective, and collective means of check- 
ing the arms race, particularly as regards 
weapons of mass destruction, are long overdue. 
Nor is the need for disarmament limited to the 
great powers and nuclear weapons. All the wars 
now being fought are being fought with con- 
ventional arms; it is the ever-mounting burden 
of conventional armament which weighs on the 
poorest nations and is one of the most serious 
impediments to their economic, social, and 
political development. 

The Second Development Decade 

Along with keeping the peace, a second, and 
equally important, purpose of the United Na- 
tions is building peace through development. 
The essential imperatives of that purpose have 
been in recent weeks again tellingly brought to 
our attention in the report issued by the Com- 
mission mider the eminent chairmanship of 
Lester Pearson and in Robert McNamara's an- 
nual address to the Board of Governors of the 
World Bank. Both deserve earnest study and 
prompt action. 

The Pearson report recalls the well-known 
fact that "Development is not a guarantee of 
political stability or an antidote to violence. 
Change is, itself, intrinsically disruptive." 
Nevertheless, a world where two-thirds of the 
people are in countries that are desperately poor 
could easily become a world of desperate na- 
tions — so desperate that peace would be much 
more seriously and widely threatened than it 
already is. Moreover, a world where such glar- 



December 1, 1969 



487 



injij disparities exist is a moral challenge to us 
all which we cannot ignore without lessening 
our own moral stature. Many speakers from 
this rostrum have expressed disappointment 
over the results of the First Development 
Decade. Certainly we all wish that more had 
been done. Still, the fact remains that more de- 
veloping countries have made the breakthrough 
to self-sustaining growth during the past decade 
than during any other decade in history. While 
some countries have grown little during that 
time, the target of an average annual increase 
of 5 percent in the gross national product of de- 
veloping countries by the end of the decade has 
apparently been reached. 

So there have been some commendable 
achievements in the First Development Decade, 
but many notable failures. The level of eco- 
nomic aid from developed to developing coun- 
tries fell short of its goal. Many harmful trade 
barriers to the exports of developing countries 
have not been eliminated. The burden of repay- 
ing loans acts as a serious brake on the progress 
of developing coimtries. Social progress, the es- 
sential corollary of economic progress, is still 
woefully neglected. And far too often the 
appallingly rapid growth of population has 
tragically limited, sometimes even nullified, the 
benefits of econoniic growth. As to this latter, 
]\Ir. McNamara in the address I mentioned has 
repeated a timely warning: 

The enhancement of human dignity, and the conse- 
quent capacity to lead a fuller, freer, more thoroughly 
human life, is the ultimate objective of development. 
Economic progress is a means to that end, but no 
achievable rate of economic growth will be sufficient 
to cope with an unlimited proliferation of i)eople on 
our limited planet. 

We shall have to do much better in the Second 
Development Decade, wliich will be laimched 
during the 25th anniversary. The developed 
countries will have to take a new look at their 
trade and aid policies. The developing coim- 
tries, for their part, will have to take a new hard 
look at their policies, priorities, and perform- 
ance, at the effectiveness of the means by which 
they mobilize their people and resources, im- 
prove food production, and carry out popula- 
tion policies designed to promote human wel- 
fare as well as economic growth. And all of us 
will have to take a new look at the machinery 
by which the entire U.N. family establishes 
priorities and coordinates operations in this 
complex field. 



All these and other aspects of the Second De- 
velopment Decade are being considered in the 
preparatory committee created for that purpose. 
I want to assure the Assembly that the United 
States will do its utmost to assist in that pre- 
paratory committee's work so that we may move 
away from disenchantment toward a true 
partnership for progress. 

Science and Technology 

If there is hope for breakthroughs in the | 
Second Development Decade — and I believe 
there is — much of this hope lies in the spectac- 
ular advance of science and technology. Two 
men walking on the moon last July were a 
dramatic symbol of how science has turned the 
wild dreams of yesterday into the realities of 
today. Science and technology are traditionally 
international. Throughout history the advances 
made in one nation have found their way to 
others, and scientists learned to cooperate long 
before diplomats did. Now we are meeting two 
new challenges, wisely recognized by the Gen- 
eral Assembly when it established the commit- 
tees on outer space and the deep seabed. By their 
very nature these ever less hostile areas are the 
common frontiers of all mankind. 

From the standpoint of the developing coun- 
tries, the next decade should see a greatly ac- 
celerated program for scientific and technologi- 
cal cooperation aimed at widespread dissemina- 
tion of technology for meeting the basic needs 
of man — such as nutrition, shelter, communica- 
tions, health, and sanitation. This should include 
new techniques and teaching methods for the 
development of scientific manpower. 

Decolonization and Human Rights 

I turn now to the question of decolonization, 
wliich is commended to our attention not only 
by the charter itself but also bj' the rei:)ort of 
the Preparatory Committee for the Tenth An- 
niversary of the Declaration Against Colonial- 
ism. Among our goals for the coming decade 
must be self-determination for all peoples and 
the complete abolition of colonialism or alien 
domination wherever it exists in the world. This 
is not likely to be accomplished by adopting 
more resolutions or by escalating the language 
of the resolutions. It certainly will not happen 
overnight. But we are convinced that all of us 
must take a serious new look at the hard-core 



488 



Department of State Bulletin 



jDroblems which remain. We should recall that 
97 percent of the people who were under colonial 
domination in 194:1 have now become citizens of 
independent nations and that the bulk of these 
( I nations achieved independence without violence. 
> It behooves us to exercise special patience, in- 
genuity, and determination in bringiiag about a 
peaceful exercise of self-determination by the 
remaining 3 percent, as suggested in the Lusaka 
Manifesto. 

Finally, there can be no more significant ob- 
jective for the United Nations in its second 
quarter century than the reinforcement of the 
dignity and the rights of man and of woman, of 
simple human beings of every color and creed. 
Some progress has been made since we adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
but I w^ould venture to say that there is hardly 
a country represented in this hall, my own coun- 
try included, which does not witness daily a 
violation of some elemental right of some of its 
citizens. Surely we must set as one of our goals 
the disappearance from this earth not only of 
the evil of apartheid but of all other violations 
of human rights and fimdamental freedoms. A 
good way to begin would be a prompt decision 
to appoint a High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, as has been proposed by Costa Rica, a 
country which has been recognized as a leader in 
this field. 

All of this cannot be accomplished. Madam 
President, without great improvements in our 
procedures and methods of work, here in the 
Assembly and in all the councils, commissions, 
and specialized agencies of the United Nations. 
Constructive suggestions in this regard were 
made in our general debate by a distinguished 
former President of this Assembly, Carlos 
Roniulo, by the Foreign INIinisters of Canada 
and of Italy, and by many others. It behooves 
us to pay the most careful heed to proposals 
such as theirs if we are to escape the dead hand 
of rhetoric and bureaucracy and create at last 
the peaceful and progressive international 
society which our charter enjoms. 

Youth and the United Nations 

Madam President, I am particularly grati- 
fied that the draft resolution places so much 
emphasis on the role of youth. If the United 
Nations is to have a future in the next decade 
and the decades to follow, then surely those who 
are now young must become involved in making 



it work. As for the United States, our young 
people of today — perhaps more than at any time 
in our history since the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence — are becoming concerned with and 
involved in the world around them. For this 
reason, we welcome the resolution's proposal 
that this General Assembly decide to convene 
a United Nations youth assembly next sum- 
mer. We also welcome the invitation to govern- 
ments of member states to consider the inclu- 
sion of youth in their delegations to the 25th 
General Assembly. Further, Madam President, 
the United States delegation will propose the in- 
clusion on the agenda of the 25th General As- 
sembly of an item entitled "Youth and the 
United Nations." Personally, I look forward to 
this infusion of new blood and new ideas into 
the work of the United Nations. We believe 
such an item could include a discussion of the 
results of the youth assembly, could help to 
coordinate actions concernmg youth in various 
U.N. bodies, and would enable us to explore 
fully the role of youth in strengthening the 
United Nations. 

"The central question," Adlai Stevenson once 
said, "is whether the wonderfully diverse and 
gifted assembly of human beings on this earth 
really knows how to run a civilization." Madam 
President, that is still very much an open ques- 
tion. And it is we, and the governments we 
represent here, who must start at once to think 
anew and chart anew the course we must take 
to survive, prosper, and live peacefully in a 
world that changes daily with frightening 
speed. 

What is supremely important is not this in- 
stitution but the purposes it was created to 
serve. If it does not serve those purposes, history 
will sweep it away. But who can believe that 
sovereign govermnents without the United Na- 
tions, without a common institution and a com- 
mon code of conduct, would serve the same 
purposes? Let no one suppose that the U.N., 
this organization, these buildings, these meet- 
ings, could cease to exist and the world not suf- 
fer things far worse than it suffers today. In 
these 25 years something of the fate of humanity 
has become bound up with what is done — or 
not done — in these halls. "We cannot escape 
history." We, and the governments we represent, 
must make this institution a better instrument 
of man's needs. The 25th anniversary should be 
above all an occasion for common efforts to that 
end. 



December 1, 1969 



489 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION^ 

Celebration of the txccnty-fifth anniversary 
of the United Nations 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling the decision adopted at its twenty-tliird 
session that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
United Nations should be commemorated in an appro- 
priate manner, 

Convinced that the twenty-fifth anniversary should 
be an occasion to strengthen the United Nations and 
malse it more effective by reaffirming the faith of Gov- 
ernments and peoples in the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and renewing 
their endeavours to give them full effect, in particular 
the maintenance of international peace and security, 
the development of friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principles of equal rights, non- 
intervention, non-use of force and self-determination 
of peoples, and achieving international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural or humanitarian character, 

Noting further that, in accordance with Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter, all Members shall re- 
frain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations, 

Considering that involvement of world youth in the 
commemoration is most desirable in relation to the 
present and future tasks of the Organization, 

Having considered the report of the Preparatory 
Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, 

1. Takes note of the programmes and activities rec- 
ommended by the Preparatory Committee for the 
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations con- 
cerning the United Nations and related organizations 
as well as the programmes and activities suggested 
for the consideration of Governments of Member States 
and non-governmental organizations ; 

2. Decides that the theme of the anniversary should 
be "Peace, justice and progress" and expresses the 
desire that the year 1970 will mark the beginning of 
an era of Peace ; 

3. Decides also that a commemorative session of 
the General Assembly should be held during a short 
period, culminating on 24 October 1970 with the signing 
and/or adoption of a final document or documents ; 

4. Expresses the hope that as many Heads of State 
or Government as possible will be able to participate in 
the commemorative session ; 

5. Decides to establish a Committee for the Twenty- 
fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, composed of 
twenty-five members to be designated by the President 
of the General Assembly on the basis of equitable geo- 
graphical distribution and bearing in mind the present 
composition of the Preparatory Committee, for the 
purpose of : ' 

(o) Drawing up and co-ordinating plans for the 
anniversary ; 

(6) Organizing suitable activities for the anniver- 
sary, to be undertaken by the United Nations, in the 
light of the report of the Preparatory Committee ; 

(c) Considering proposals and suggestions, in rela- 



tion to the anniversary, for increasing the effectiveness 
of the United Nations ; 

6. Requests the Committee to prepare, with the as- 
sistance of the Secretary-General, a suitable test for a 
final document or documents to be signed and/or 
adopted during the commemorative session, for con- 
sideration by the General Assembly during the early 
part of its twenty-fifth session ; 

7. Decides that the same period of the celebration 
of the twenty -fifth anniversary of the United Nations 
should provide an opportunity for the celebration of 
the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
which should conclude with the adoption of an ap- 
propriate document by the General Assembly during 
the commemorative session ; 

8. Decides also to consider during the early part of 
its twenty-fifth session the draft of the international 
development strategy for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade with a view to having it adopted 
during the commemorative session ; 

9. Endorses the call of the Secretary-General for . 
the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade, which wUl 
coincide with the Second United Nations Development, 
Decade, and, in this respect, entrusts the competenti 
bodies of the Organization with the task of presentingi 
concrete proposals to the General Assembly at itsi 
twenty-fifth session ; 

10. Invites the Special Committee on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States to expedite its work with 
a view to facilitating the adoption of an appropriate 
document by the General Assembly during the com- 
memorative session ; 

11. Calls upon all relevant organs and eommitteesi 
of the United Nations to speed up their work and U» 
transmit to the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anni- 
versary of the United Nations material which may be' 
useful in the preparation of a text or texts for a final 
document or documents ; 

12. Decides to convene a world youth assembly 
within the general framework described in the report 
of the Preparatory Committee ; 

13. Invites Governments of Member States to con- 
sider the inclusion of representatives of youth in their 
delegations to the twenty-fifth session of the General 
Assembly ; 

14. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the 
necessary facilities for implementing the recommenda- 
tions contained in the report of the Preparatory 
Committee ; 

15. Urges Governments of Member States to im- 
plement General Assembly resolution 2445 (XXIII) 
of 19 December 19G8 entitled "Teaching in schools of 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 



" U.N. doc. A/RES/2499 (XXIV) ; adopted on Oct 31 
by a vote of 93 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention. 

' On Oct. 31 the President of the General Assembly 
designated the members of the Committee for the 
Twent.v-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations. The 
Committee is composed of Austria, Bulgaria, B.velorus- 
sian S.S.R., Canada, China, France, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guyana, India, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, Mauri- 
tania, Peru, Philii)pines, Somalia, Sweden, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago. Uganda, U.S.S.R., United^ 
Kingdom, and United States. 



490 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



United Nations and the structure and activities of the 
United Nations and the specialized agencies, with 
particular reference to human rights" ; 

16. Invites all Member States, the specialized agen- 
cies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
non-governmental organizations concerned to take note 
of the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 

' the United Nations and to formulate such plans and 
programmes as seem to them appropriate for promot- 
ing the purposes of the observance ; 

17. Appeals to all Member States to give urgent 
consideration to the ratification of, or accession to, 
a number of multilateral instruments which have been 
adopted, endorsed or supported by the United Nations 
and which have not entered into force for lack of 
sufficient ratifications or accessions or wliich have en- 
tered into force but could be strengthened by additional 
ratifications or accessions, as well as to their effective 
implementation ; 

18. Urges appropriate organs of the United Nations 
to complete as early as possible the consideration of 
important conventions still to be concluded ; 

19. Requests the Committee for the Twenty-fifth 
Anniversary of the United Nations to submit a report 
on the observance of the anniversary to the General 
Assembly at its twenty-sixth session. 



Dr. Ehrlich To Represent U.S. 
on WHO Executive Board 

The Senate on November 6 confirmed the 
nomination of Dr. S. Paul Ehrlich, Jr., to be the 
representative of the United States on the Ex- 
ecutive Board of the World Health Organiza- 
tion. (For biographic data, see White House 
press release dated October 4.) 



United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 



i United States Delegations 
\ to International Conferences 

OECD Restrictive Business Practices Committee 

The Department of State announced on No- 
, vember 13 (press release 345) the membership 

- of the U.S. delegation to the meeting of the Re- 
strictive Business Practices Committee of the 

' Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, to be held at Paris November 19- 

; 21. Tliis is a regular semiannual meeting of the 
Committee, which was organized for the pur- 

- pose of exchanging information and improving 
international cooperation in the field of anti- 
trust. Preceding the meetings of the full 

! Committee, its working parties will meet on 
November 17 and 18. 
Members of the U.S. delegation are: 

■ Representative 

Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Anti- 
trust Division, Department of Justice 

Alternative Representative 

Eugene M. Braderman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities 

Advisers 

Wilbur L. Fugate, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, 

Antitrust Division, Department of Justice 
Northrnp Kirk, United States Mission to the OECD, 
'IJ Paris 



Security Council 

Special report of the Secretary General on the death 
of a United Nations military observer on July 27, 
1969, in the Suez Canal sector. S/9368. July 30, 1969. 
6 pp. 

Letter dated August 22 from the Permanent Repre- 
sentative of Israel transmitting statements issued by 
the Government of Israel on August 21 concerning 
the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. S/9403. 
August 22, 1969. 3 pp. 

Letter dated September 2 from the Permanent Repre- 
sentative of Iran concerning the dispute between 
Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab, the boundary 
river flowing between the two countries into the 
Persian Gulf. S/9425. September 2, 1969. 4 pp. 

Letter dated September 12 from the Permanent Repre- 
sentative of Jordan transmitting various communi- 
cations concerning the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque In 
Jerusalem sent to the President of the Security Coun- 
cil and the Secretary General. S/9447. September 12, 
1969. 59 pp. 



General Assembly 

Education of Youth in the Respect of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Report of the Secretary 
General. A/7662. September 20, 1969. 60 pp. 

International Year for Human Rights. Measures and 
Activities Undertaken in Connection with the Inter- 
national Year for Human Rights. Report of the 
Secretary General. A/7666. September 23, 1969. 
142 pp. 



Economic and Social Council 

An Account of the Operational and Research Activities 
of the United Nations System in the Field of Eco- 
nomic and Social Development. Prepared by the En- 
larged Committee on Program and Coordination. 
E/4744 (Vol. I), 274 pp. E/4744 (Vol. II), 59 pp. 
September 24, 1969. 

Final Report of the Enlarged Committee for Program 
and Coordination. E/4748. October 2, 1969. 80 pp. 



December 1, 1969 



491 




Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic, witli annexes and protocol. 
Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into 
force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487. 
Accession deposited: Albania (with a reservation), 
October 1, 1969. 

Disputes 

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done at 
Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Ratification deposited: Burundi, November 5, 1969. 

Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention for the north- 
west Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089) relating to panel 
membership and to regulatory measures. Done at 
Washington October 1, 1909.' 
Adherence deposited: Iceland, November 14, 1969. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as 
revised, for the protection of industrial property. 
Done at Lisbon on October 31, 1958. Entered into 
force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. 
'Notification o/ accession: Austria, October 31, 1969. 



BILATERAL 



France 

Agreement extending the agreement of March 23, 1956, 
as amended and extended, relating to the establish- 
ment and operation of a rawinsonde observation sta- 
tion on the island of Guadeloupe (TIAS 3647, 4298, 
4610, 5485, 6053). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Paris September 5, 1968, and October 31, 1969. 
Entered into force October 31, 1909. 

Guinea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of February 3, 1969 (TIAS 
6640). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry 
October 23 and 28, 1969. Entered into force 
October 28, 1969. 

Iran 

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations for 
execution. Signed at Tehran July 15 and at Wash- 
ington August 28, 1969. Enters into force on a date 
mutually agreed by the administrations of the two 
countries. 

Turkey 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of February 6, 1969 (TIAS 
6645). Signed at Ankara November 3, 1969. Entered 
into force November 3, 1969. 

Venezuela 

Amendment to agreement for cooperation concerning 
the civil uses of atomic energy of October 8, 1958 
(TIAS 4416). Signed at Washington November 14, 
1969. Enters into force on the date on which each 
government shall have received from the other gov- 
ernment written notification that it has complied with 
all statutory and constitutional requirements for 
entry into force. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of March 13. 1907 (TIAS 6271). 
Signed at Saigon October 29, 1969. Entered into force 
Gotober 29, 1969. 



Belgium 

Consular convention, with exchanges of notes. Signed 
at Washington September 2, 1969.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Novem- 
ber 10, 1969. 

Canada 

Agreement relating to adjustments in the flood control 
payments by the United States to Canada pursuant 
to the Columbia River treaty of January 17, 1961 
(TIAS 5638). Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington August 18 and 20, 1969.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Novem- 
ber 10, 1969. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



' Not in force. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on November 6 confirmed the nomina- 
tion of Ernest V. Siracusa to be Ambassador to Bolivia. 
(For biographic data, see Department of State press 
release 348 dated November 19.) 



492 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX Decemier 1, 1969 Vol. LXI, No. 1588 



Aviation. U.S. and Portugal Conclude Aviation 
Negotiations (Department statement) . . . 470 

Bolivia. Siracusa confirmed as U.S. Am- 
bassador 492 

China. Move To Change Representation of China 
in the U.N. Rejected by the 24th General 
Assembly (Whalley, texts of resolutions) . . 476 

Congress 

Confirmations (Siracusa) 492 

Dr. Ehrlich To Represent U.S. ou WHO Execu- 
tive Board 491 

42d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris 

(Lodge) 468 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 

(Siracusa) 492 

Disarmament 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Rogers) . . 465 
United States Comments on Revisions in Draft 
Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons on the Seabed (Leonard, text of re- 
vised draft treaty) 480 

Economic Affairs. OECD Restrictive Business 
Practices Committee (delegation) 491 

International Organizations and Conferences 
Dr. Ehrlich To Represent U.S. on WHO Execu- 
tive Board 491 

OECD Restrictive Business Practices Committee 

(delegation) 491 

Marine Science. United States Comments on Re- 
visions in Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement 
of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed (Leonard, 
text of revised draft treaty) 480 

Nigeria. Secretary Reports on U.S. Efforts To 
Help Nigeria Civil War Victims (statement) . 469 

Population. General Draper To Represent U.S. 
on U.N. Population Commission 484 

Portugal. U.S. and Portugal Conclude Aviation 
Negotiations (Department statement) . . . 470 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 492 

United States Comments on Revisions in Draft 
Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons on the Seabed (Leonard, text of re- > 
vised draft treaty) 480 

U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

(Rogers) 465 

United Nations 

General Draper To Represent U.S. on U.N. 
Population Commission 484 

Move To Change Representation of China in the 
U.N. Rejected by the 24th General Assembly 
(Whalley, texts of resolutions) 476 

Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations 

(Tost, text of resolution) 485 

United Nations Documents 491 

U.S. Brings Hanoi's Treatment of American 
Prisoners of War to Attention of U.N. Com- 
mittee (Hauser) 471 



Viet-Nam 

42d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at 

Paris (Lodge) 468 

U.S. Brings Hanoi's Treatment of American 
Prisoners of War to Attention of U.N. Com- 
mittee (Hauser) 471 

Name Index 

Draper, Gen. William H 484 

Ehrlich, S. Paul, Jr 491 

Hauser, Mrs. Rita E 471 

Leonard, James F 480 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 468 

Rogers, Secretary 465,469 

Siracusa, Ernest V 492 

Whalley, .T. Irving 476 

Yost, Charles W 485 



No. 


Date 


*334 


11/10 


t335 


11/10 


*33C 


11/11 


t337 


11/11 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: November 10-16 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Wasliington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to November 10 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 333 
of November 7. 

Subject 

Root sworn in as Ambassador to 
Ivory Coast (biographic data). 

Experts' report ou defoliation in 
Cambodia. 

Program for visit of Prime Jlinis- 
ter Sato of Japan. 

Foreign military service by U.S. 
citizens (Department state- 
ment). 

U.S. and Japan amend air trans- 
port agreement. 

Rogers : Biafran relief. 

U.S.-Canada automotive agree- 
ment consultations (rewrite). 

Herman sworn in as U.S. Com- 
missioner, International Bound- 
ary Commission, U.S.-Canada 
( rewrite ) . 

Lodge : 42d plenary session on 
Viet-Nam at Paris. 

Rogers: "Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks." 

U.S.-Honduras Swan Islands ne- 
gotiations. 

U.S. delegation to OECD Restric- 
tive Business Practices Commit- 
tee, Paris, November 19-21. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



t33S 11/12 



339 

t340 



11/12 
11/12 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1589 




December 8, 1969 



QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE AMERICAS 

Statement hy President Nixon 
and Text of the Rockefeller Mission Report 



Foi' contents see- inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXI, No. 1589 
December 8, 1969 



For sale by the Superintendent o( Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues, domestic $16, foreign $23 

Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 

approved by the Director of the Bureau of 

the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Nol^: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BUI,LET1N as the source wiU be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the ivork of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
Tlie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as icell as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 
interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



The Rockefeller Report on Quality of Life in the Americas 



Statement by President Nixon ' 



Tliere are two points I want to stress in con- 
nection with Governor Rockefeller's report 
which is being released today : 

First, as I said in my October 31 speech,^ this 
report constituted a major contribution to the 
formulation of our policy for this hemisphere. 
Both our general conceptual approach and the 
specific lines of action we intend to follow have 
been substantially shaped by that rejDort. 

Secondh', this report is still very much imder 
active consideration. Many of its recommenda- 
tions which are far-reaching and complex are 
still being staffed and examined with a view to 
their implementation. Therefore, a good many 
of the things we will be doing in the weeks and 
months ahead will have had their genesis in this 
report. 

Let me give you an example: In his report. 
Governor Eockefeller recommends a unique 
and imaginative technique that might be used in 
cases where this type of action is indicated in 
the debt service area. He recommended the pos- 
sibility of maintaining equivalent local currency 
payments in instances where the dollar repay- 
ments are suspended or stretched out. The local 
currency would be paid into a fund which coidd 
in turn be used for development purposes in 
that country. Now, there are a nimiber of tech- 
nical pomts to be clarified ; but the concept is an 
imagmative one, and I believe it is something 
that can be useful. Accordingly, I have directed 
the Secretary of the Treasury to undertake an 
immediate study of this proposal with a view to 
adopting it as a technique in those cases where 

' Issued on Nov. 10 (White House press release). 
' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 17, 1969, p. 409. 



it is appropriate. Mr. Geor-e Woods, who was a 
senior adviser to the Governor on his mission 
and is former President of the World Bank, 
will be a consultant to the Secretary of the 
Treasury for tliis purpose. 

Now let me make a more general point. My 
speech on October 31 was intended as a philo- 
sophical foundation for what I envisage as a 
continuous process of policy formation over the 
months ahead. It outlined our view of the nature 
of our relationship with the other states in the 
hemisphere ; the principles which should under- 
lie that relationship ; the policies which should 
implement it; and the directions those policies 
should take, together with some concrete 
examples. 

I did not want to promise thmgs which would 
have been unattainable, such as greatly in- 
creased aid levels. On the other hand, I want to 
do the maximum of what is possible and 
"doable." This is what I meant by an action 
program, and we intend now to take such con- 
crete measures in conjunction with the other 
American nations. We intend to propose over 
the next several months further concrete ac- 
tions. We will be discussing and exchanging 
views with our sister nations on key issues and 
problems, and jointly we will be developing pro- 
grams and policies to meet our problems. One 
of the things I want to explore very carefully 
when budget considerations make it possible is 
a program to finish the highway net down the 
center of the South American Continent. This is 
a program which I think would have an im- 
mense effect economically and be a great boost 
to integration of the region. 

Next week the Inter- American Economic and 
Social Council will convene here in Washington 



December 8, 1969 



493 



at the technical level. The United States will be 
making some specific proposals in a number of 
fields; we will want to have the views of the 
other nations, and we will then be developing 
proposals and lines of action accordingly over 
the next several months. 

Let me give you a concrete example: All of 
the American nations want to see the early 
establisliment of a liberal worldwide system of 
generalized trade preferences for all developing 
countries. I stated in my speech that the United 
States intended to press vigorously with the de- 
veloped countries for the adoption of such a 
system. This week U.S. representatives at 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] meetings in Paris took 
that position. The United States will work ac- 
tively now for such a system. I want to say, 
however, that if for any reason we find it not 
possible to establish a satisfactory system of 
generalized preferences within a reasonable 
time, then the United States will be prepared 
to consider other alternative actions it can take 
to assure that the American nations will have 
preferential access to the U.S. market. 



As another example, we are also going to pro- 
pose to the other American nations at the lA- 
ECOSOC meetings joint initiatives whose costs 
we are prepared to share : 

— expansion of regional science programs, 
emphasizing research and training ; 

— promotion of an intensified hemispheric 
effort in basic and applied food research ; 

— establishment of an uiter- American science 
information exchange program. 

I am, in short, most serious about imdertak- 
ing an action program and implementing a 
mature partnership with the countries of this 
hemisphere. Our fimdamental objective, as 
Governor Kockef eller so eloquently expressed it, 
is to help improve the quality of life of the 
people of this hemisphere. 

The Governor knows how personally grate- 
ful I am for all of the time and energy he spent 
on this mission and how deeply appreciative I 
am for his insights and imaginative ideas. Let 
me once more take this opportunity publicly to 
express my appreciation. 



494 



Department of State Bulletin 



^''Forces now are converging that make possible, for the fij'st time, 
the hope tJiat many of tnan's deepest aspirations can at last be 
realized. . . . 

"TFe seeh an open world — open to ideas, open to the exchange of 
goods and peopile — a world in which no people, great or small, will 
live in angry isolation.'''' 

President Richard Nixon 
Inaugural Address, January 20, 1969 



Qualify of Life in the Americas 



Eeport of a U.S. Presidential Mission for 
THE Western BLemisphere 
— Nelson A. Rockefeller 



GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER'S LETTER 
OF TRANSMITTAL 

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: I enclose the final re- 
port and recommendations based on the findings 
of the mission you requested me to undertake. 
If I may, I should like to take this opportunity 
to review briefly the developments from the 
time of your original call. 

It was on your first full day in the White 
House that you asked me to undei-take the mis- 
sion, to consult with the leaders of the other 
American republics on your behalf and to help 
your administration develop policies for the 
conduct of our international relations through- 
out the Western Hemisphere. 

Youi' decision to set up such a mission was 
bold, sensitive and significant. Here was the 
newly-inaugurated leader of the most power- 
ful nation in the world, at the very outset of his 
administration, seeking the advice and counsel 
of the leaders of our neighbor states before for- 
mulating his policies as they related to Western 
Hemisphere affairs. This development, in my 
opinion, has given promise of a new era of 
consultation and close cooperation in interna- 
tional relations. 

Only through consultation in the develop- 
ment of common objectives is it possible for 



the nation-states today to work out common 
policies and joint programs that will truly rep- 
resent the best interests of all. In thus initiat- 
ing this program of extensive consultation at 
the liighest levels, you were embarking on a new 
approach at a crucial point in Western Hemi- 
sphere relations. 

As I am sure you will recall, Mr. President, 
you firet discussed this mission with the dis- 
tinguished Secretary General of the Organiza- 
tion of American States, Senor Galo Plaza, 
whom you received on your first day in the 
White House — and it was his suggestion that 
I be asked to head the mission. 

I immediately felt, when you called me, that it 
was an exciting and unique idea. As I said at 
the time, however, your request presented me 
with a difficult problem. On the one hand, I 
have long had an abiding faith in and affection 
for our neighbors in the hemisphere — and a deep 
belief in the importance of Western Hemisphere 
unity to our mutual security and well-being. 

On the other hand, as Governor of New York 
State, I had a great responsibility to meet a 
growing fiscal crisis and the urgent human 
needs wliich exist in our state as they do 
throughout the nation. These had to be dealt 
with first. The New York State Legislature was 



• This special issue of the Bulletin con- 
tains the complete text of the report of tJie 
Rockefeller Mission. The charts, graphs, 
and index included in the report are not 
reproduced here. 



December 8, 1969 



495 



in session and my obligations to the people of 
New York State naturally had priority. 

You were very understanding of this di- 
lemma, and you made it possible for us to work 
together toward finding solutions to the critical 
needs of the states. You gave me the opportunity 
to make a full presentation at the White House 
on these matters to you and the Urban Affairs 
Council and to put before you the Governors' 
recommendations for new federal policies. Your 
expressed concern at that meeting was a begin- 
ning of the change of federal-state relationships 
which you have so significantly been carrying 
forward. This together with your early decision 
to seek substantially increased federal aid to 
state and local governments, with reforms in 
welfare and other fields, was a vital assurance 
to me and to the other Governors that help was 
on the way. A key to the future solution of the 
acute fiscal problems of the states and localities 
was about to be turned. 

Finally, there was your understanding accept- 
ance of the fact that our trips throughout the 
hemisphere could not begin until the New York 
State Legislature had adjourned, and would 
have to be broken into four journeys with time 
in between to maintain direction of the affairs 
of the State. 

In preparing for the mission, it was obvious 
that the basic facts concerning the problems and 
aspirations of the nations of the Western Hemi- 
sphere were well known. It was equally obvious, 
however, that we in the United States had not 
found effective answers as to how we should 
solve the problems and moi-e effectively coop- 
erate in meeting the aspirations on a basis of 
mutual interest. 

In view of the wide range of the areas of 
common concern among the peoples of the West- 
ern Hemisphere, and because there were 23 
countries to visit, each with its own special 
problems, it seemed clear to me that I could not 
do this job alone. It would have been impossible 
for one i>erson to spend enough time in each 
country to talk with all the key people in the 
various areas in both public and private life. 
Therefore, I invited a group of outstanding citi- 
zens of the United States to go with me. Each 
was an expert in a specialized field — such as 
trade, finance, education, science, culture, 
women's activities, agriculture, labor and other 
fields. The names of these citizens who gave so 
generously and so effectively of their time and 
talents on these missions appear at the end of 
this letter. 



Twenty to 25 of these distinguished advisers 
were on each trip. In each country, a schedule 
of visits with the key people was worked out 
in advance of our arrival, "\^^lile I was meeting 
with the President or Prime Minister of the 
country, and later with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and often with the entire cabinet, each 
of the advisers would be meeting with leaders, 
both public and private, in the fields of common 
interest and concern. In this way, the advisers 
on your mission were able to visit and counsel 
with some 100 to 200 people in each country. 
It would have taken weeks in each country for 
one person to cover the same ground in similar 
depth. Furthermore, no one could have the 
combined expertise of the advisory members 
of your mission. They are an extraordinary 
group of men and women, and they sei-ved their 
country selflessly and brilliantly. Through this 
letter, I would like to share with you my pro- 
found admiration and deep gratitude for the 
contribution they have made. 

Through these saturation visits, the members 
of your mission were able to sit down and talk, 
as knowledgeable colleagues, with experts of all 
sorts on specific problems and to gain new and 
sensitive insights on what could be done more 
effectively to achieve our common objectives. I 
must also take advantage of this letter to say 
to you, Mr. President, how grateful and ap- 
preciative we are for the time and invaluable 
advice these outstandingly able leaders from 
public and private life in the various countries 
gave to the members of your mission. 

Each member of the mission has written de- 
tailed reports on his findings, all of which will 
be part, of the final record. In addition, intensive 
group discussions were held, during and after 
our travels. This group effort and the invalu- 
able counsel it produced are reflected in the 
findings of this report. However, no attempt 
was made to achieve a consensus, and I accept 
sole responsibility for the recommendations in 
the report. 

In addition to being able to communicate 
directly with national leaders, I was also able 
to communicate with the people of each country 
through press, radio and television interviews. 
We not only listened to the problems, hopes 
and aspirations of the people and the leaders 
of the other Amei'ican republics, but also were 
able to get their advice and counsel and their 
assessment of the political realities of today. 
Deeper understanding and new approaches to 
solutions of our common problems resulted. 



496 



Department of State Bulletin 



As everyone knows, the mission encountered 
difficulties. The new military government of 
Peru stated that our visit would be "incon- 
venient"' and requested indefinite postponement. 
This action was the result of a specific incident, 
growing out of the dispute between the United 
States and Peru over fishing rights and expro- 
priation of oil fields, but it was unrelated to our 
mission. 

After a student was accidentally shot and 
killed in a demonstration during the mission's 
early visit to Honduras, student groups, stimu- 
lated by subvereive elements on an organized 
basis throughout the hemisphere, used the inci- 
dent as a rallying point in attempting to pre- 
vent our visits or to disrupt them. As a result 
of these demonstrations and the threats of vio- 
lence, together with certain delicate internal 
political situations, the governments of Chile 
and Venezuela also asked us to postpone our 
visit, thus reducing to 20 the number of coun- 
tries on our itinerary. 

Suggestions have been made that the trips 
were ill-timed and should have been cancelled. 
In actual fact, the trips were very well timed ; 
they were timed to the opportunity and will of 
a new administration to formulate a new policy 
for the hemisphere. And it became clear as our 
trips progressed that, without such a new policy, 
the nations of this hemisphere would steadily 
and rapidly become less disposed — because of 
disillusionment and cynicism — to deal candidly 
and effectively with the United States and with 
confidence in the mutuality of our interest and 
good will. 

In any case, the timing had nothing to do with 
the demonstrations and violence that occurred ; 
they can be attributed to these causes : There is 
general frustration over the failure to achieve 
a more rapid improvement in standards of liv- 
ing. The United States, because of its identifica- 
tion with the failure of the Alliance for Prog- 
ress to live up to expectations, is blamed. People 
in the countries concerned also used our visit as 
an opportunity to demonstrate their frustra- 
tions with the failure of their own govei-nments 
to meet their needs. In addition, demonstrations 
that began over grievances were taken over and 
exacerbated by anti-U.S. and subversive ele- 
ments which sought to weaken and discredit 
the United States, and their own governments 
in the process. It is significant that these same 
elements were active in demonstrations, threats 
and acts of violence in democratic countries as 
well as in those with military govermnents. In 



fact, one mission member remarked that the 
only frightening confrontation of all our travels 
was that caused by an SDS-organized student 
demonstration at John F. Kennedy Interna- 
tional Airport as we returned to New York 
City at the end of our fourth trip. 

Had we cancelled the visits, it would have 
been seen as weakness and fear on the part of 
the United States govermnent. This would have 
done much to discredit the United States in the 
other Americas. It would, moreover, have un- 
dei'mined the priority and impoi'tance which 
you attach to the hemisphere's needs. Thus it 
would have lost us as a nation an opportunity — 
one that is increasingly rare — to work out our 
common problems for our common benefit. As 
it was, by carrying out the mission despite the 
difficulties, the determination and purposeful- 
ness of the new administration were clearly evi- 
denced. The reception that the mission received 
from govermnent officials and from leaders in 
j^rivate fields was open and warm. 

One important by-product of the demonstra- 
tions and violence was that they put the mu- 
tuality of the problems of our hemisphere on the 
front pages of our newspapers, on the nation's 
television screens, and therefore in the minds 
of most Americans. It is unfortimate that these 
problems only get attention in this fashion. If 
we in the mission sei'ved as a lightning rod — if 
we focused attention on the deep-rooted nature 
of the hemisphere's concerns and what should 
be done about them — the difficulties and criti- 
cism that we encountered were well worth it. 

I appreciated the opportunity of keeping in 
touch with you during our trips and visiting 
with you between trips, for in this way I was 
able to give you a general review of our findings 
as we went along. And I am delighted that some 
specific actions have already been taken as a 
result. You have already received the reports on 
my personal conversations and observations in 
each country. 

This report is based on the mission's findings, 
checked against many other sources. One that 
was particularly helpful was the constinictive 
report of the House Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs headed by Representative 
Dante Fascell. We also acknowledge the coop- 
eration of the respective chairmen of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. I would partic- 
ularly like to express my gratitude for the inter- 
est, cooperation and participation of the State 
Department. 

May this report, with its recommendations, 



December 8, 1969 



497 



help you to serve the cause of better relations 
and progress for all people in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
With warm best wishes, 
Eespectfully, 

Nelson A. Rockefeller 

New York, New York 
August 30, 1969 



Advisory Members of the Mission 

George Beebe, Senior Managing Editor, The "Miami 

Herald" 
Victor Borella, Special Assistant to the Governor of 

New York for Labor Affairs 
David Bronheim, Director, Center for Inter-American 

Relations 
Doctor Detlev W. Bronk, past President of the National 

Academy of Science, Johns Hopkins University and 

The Rockefeller University 
William F. Butler, Vice President and Chief Economist 

of The Chase Manhattan Bank 
James M. Cannon, Special Assistant to the Governor 

of New York 
Miss Evelyn Cunningham, Director, Women's Unit, 

State of New York 
Doctor Gordon F. Ekholm, Curator of Mexican 

Archeology, The American Museum of Natural 

History 
Doctor Robert Goldwater, Chairman, Administrative 

Committee, The Museum of Primitive Art, and Pro- 
fessor of Fine Arts, New York University 
Doctor Harold B. Gotaas, Dean, The Technological 

Institute, Northwestern University 
Doctor Samuel B. Gould, Chancellor, State University 

of New York 
Doctor Walter D. Harris, Jr., Associate Professor of 

City Planning, Department of Architecture, Yale 

University 
John B. Hightower, Executive Director, New York 

State Council on the Arts 
Mrs. Patricia Hitt, Assistant Secretary of Health, 

Education and Welfare 
Doctor G. Kenneth Holland, President, Institute of 

International Education 
Thomas P. F. Hoving, Director, The Metropolitan 

Museum of Art 
Frederic K. Howard, Consultant, Inter-American 

Development Bank 
Mrs. Flora Kampmann, former Republican National 

Committeewoman for Texas 
Augustine R. Marusi, Chairman and President, 

Borden, Inc. 
Mrs. Dorothy McHugh, Republican National Commit- 
teewoman for New York 
Andrew McLellan, Inter-American Representative, 

AFLr-CIO 
Doctor Alan D. Miller, Commissioner of Mental Hy- 
giene, State of New York 
Doctor Emil M. Mrak, Chancellor Emeritus, Univer- 
sity of California at Davis 
James Noel, Jr., Director for Central America and the 

Caribbean, Catholic Relief Services, U.S. Catholic 

Conference 



General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA (Ret.), former 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command 

Doctor Clark W. Reynolds, Associate Professor of 
Economics, Stanford University 

Doctor W. Kenneth Riland, Chief Physician, New 
York, U.S. Steel Corporation 

Colonel John D. Silvera, Program Coordinator, New 
York State OflBce on Urban Affairs 

Samuel P. Singletary, Special Assistant to the Gov- 
ernor of New York 

The Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker, Special Assistant 
to the Governor of New York for Urban Affairs 

Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of the Board, IBM World 
Trade Corporation, former President of the Inter- 
national Chamber of Commerce 

Doctor Leroy Wehrle, Fellow, Institute of Politics, 
Harvard University 

Doctor Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Vice President, The 
Agricultural Development Council 

Monroe Wheeler, Counsellor to the Tru.stees, The 
Museum of Modern Art 

Thomas H. Wolf, Vice President and Director of Tele- 
vision Documentaries, ABC News 

George D. Woods, Consultant, First Boston Corporation 
and former President, World Bank 

Special Advisers 

Richard Aldrich ■: 

John R. Camp | 

Jerry Danzig 

Colonel John Deaver 

Bereut Friele \ 

John W. Johnston, Jr. t 

Jerome I. Levinson 

Kenneth M. Rabin 

Doctor Hyman Zuckerman 

Advance Group 

Joseph H. Boyd, Jr., Director 

Ronald Abney 

Joseph W. Canzeri 

Henry Diamond 

David Duffy 

Theodore Halaby 

Kenneth T. Hoeck, Jr. 

Lincoln Hoffman 

George Humphreys 

James Kiepper 

A. Bruce Manley 

John W. MeGrath 

John Moss 

Joseph E. Persieo 

David Reif 

Craig Thorn III 

Jerald I. Wolfgang 

F.taff 

Elizabeth Boyd 
Ann Boylan 
Flor Brennan 
Harold Brown 
Rodney Campbell 
Arline Chemiak 
Ann Coleman 
Evelyn Cook 
William Eckhof 



498 



Department of State Bulletin 



Major Edward Galvln 
Sally Gardner 
Warren E. Gardner, Jr. 
Luise Greiner 
Georgia Herrick 
Audrey Hoffman 
Walter Karpowich 
Lt. William Lovelock 
Nancy Magimies 
Ronald Maiorana 
Arthur Maun 
Hugh Morrow 
Mary Nestor 
Maxine Paul 
Martha Plummer 
Hailey Rodwell 
Nancy Shea 
Bert Smith 
Walter Thompson 
Jlarshall Watzke 
Ann C. Whitman 

Special Acknowledgement for Counsel and Advice 
on the Preparation of the Report to the President : 

Hugh Morrow 
Oscar M. Ruebhausen 
James M. Cannon 
Alan D. MUler, M.D. 



FOREWORD 

The following report and recommendations 
are the outgrowth of what the members of the 
mission learned in discussions with more than 
3000 leaders of the 20 countries wliich the mis- 
sion visited. 

We found in the course of our travels and 
talks that our perspective concerning the na- 
tions we visited and the hopes of their people 
was more meaningful when taken in the con- 
text of the entire Western Hemisphere. The 
quality of life in one area of the hemisphere is 
inseparably linked with all the rest. Moreover, 
if we do not meet tlie fimdamental needs of our 
own people at home, we cannot expect to inspire 
or assist the people of other nations to meet their 
own needs. The more we imderstood the situa- 
tion in the other republics, the more clearly we 
understood what was happening at home — and 
the more we appreciated the need for unity of 
the hemisphere. 

We have, accordingly, in this report looked at 
tlie challenges and opportunities from the point 
of view of the hemisphere as a whole. Because of 
this, we have written this report with the hope 
that Canada might join with aU the American 
republics in a truly hemisphere response to 
what are in fact common concerns. We were also 



moved by the hope that one day Cuba can be re- 
stored to the society of free men. 

These trips were an enriching experience. To 
convey some sense of our personal reactions, as 
a group, to this fruitful opportunity to listen 
to the responsible people in South and Central 
America, and the Caribbean, a Preamble is 
included in our report. 

— N.A.E. 



PREAMBLE 

We went to visit neighbors and found broth- 
ers. We went to listen to the spokesmen of our 
sister republics and heard the voices of a hemi- 
sphere. 

We went to annotate, to document, and to 
record. We did so ; and we also learned, grew, 
and changed. 

We used the tools of specialists: economists 
and scientists, artists and architects, agrono- 
mists and social workers. But there is not one 
of us who did not reappraise the uses of his 
specialty, who did not find his sense of purpose 
and values renewed. 

We thought to study the ways of life in the 
other American nations, to measure their per- 
formance and ours. We rediscovered the quality 
of life for each person in the hemisphere, and 
finally the world, as the only measure of lasting 
consequence. 

Our country was born and has experienced the 
greatest flowering of human capacities in all 
recorded time because one great idea was un- 
loosed. And though many neglect it, and others 
would suppress it, it has not yet been contained : 
the noble concept that each person is the reason 
and each person is the strength for the nation. 

In the release of our collective energies, we 
have produced great systems and organizations, 
techniques of awesome capabilities, and a mosaic 
of useful tilings and objects here in the United 
States. But we have lost sight of the values 
which are the real source of our greatness. We 
have exported our systems, techniques, and ob- 
jects, but their distribution has not been essen- 
tially shaped by the values that inspired our 
nation at home — nor have we transmitted those 
values. 

In the countries we visited, we had the op- 
portunity to see ourselves through their eyes. 
Even allowing for the distortions of distance 



December 8, 1969 



499 



and the biases of incomplete knowledge, one 
theme resounded throuf^hout tlie hemisphere: 
you the people of the United States are strong 
and you are able, but you lack unifying goals 
and a clear sense of national purpose. 

In our concentrated exposure to 20 nations, 
during thousands of hours of discussions for 
whicli our hosts had painstakingly prepared, 
during planned and unplanned encounters, in 
the presence of both hospitality and hostility, 
our group had a dual experience. 

We were given a great deal of information 
about the many dimensions of life in this hemi- 
sphere. We exchanged points of view on mutual 
problems and explored possible solutions. And 
we have together formed new hypotheses and 
found new techniques in the many special areas 
of our concern. 

We have also come to one simple principle and 
it shapes our report: All that we have seen, all 
that we think that we understand, all that we 
will recommend must be tested against the 
single question— how does this affect the way 
that men live? 

The logistics of travel and work had deter- 
mined our itinerary. Thus each week of our 
visits was followed by a week at home. Among 
us, we live in all quarters of the United States 
and work in many different situations. This re- 
peated alternation may have contributed to a 
conviction that grew among us: The variations 
among all people is our great common wealth ; 
and we share the same human problems. 

As individuals and as nations, we must learn 
from one another, and we need constant col- 
laboration and communication witli each other 
if our species is to thrive — or even to survive. 

It is for each individual, each family, each 
community, each nation, each region to define 
its own particular aspirations — but these share 
one splendid bias : That no man be exploited or 
degraded to enrich another and that we work 
together so that each can grow. 

Some nations have moved further toward this 
goal than others but all nations, including our 
own, have more to grow than they have grown 
and more to do than they have done. 

This aspiration, when truly applied, has a 
hard, fine cutting edge. We must ask what neces- 
sary elements must come together, in and 
aroimd each person, if he is to live and grow. 
Opportunity for self-realization comes immedi- 
ately to mind — the chance to grow spiritually, 
the respect for human dignity and justice, the 
right to hope that life will get better, not worse. 



Certain commodities, physical circumstances, 
material requirements also come to mind. Com- 
fort and safety amidst the changing elements : 
shelter and clotlung. Energy: enough of the 
necessary kinds of food, water. Safety from 
violence and intrusion upon privacy, and 
an environment sufficiently free of noxious 
influence. 

But man is a social, learning, creative, re- 
sponsible and self-aware creature and he 
needs — absolutely requires — much more if he 
is to thrive, to become more fully himself. He 
needs the ability and freedom to move, the op- 
portimities to learn and contribute, to ornament 
and create, to share his experiences and his 
hopes. He needs to be able to influence the forces 
which impinge upon him, to participate in his 
own destiny and to be recognized for liis own 
accomplislunents. 

There is in none of this the blandishment of 
easy or final success. Even our expanding hori- 
zons have limits, substance and energy are finite, 
hard choices must be made again and again. 
We are a species tliat is both giving and acquisi- 
tive, creative and indolent, gentle and violent, 
petty and magnificent. But when we choose, 
when we commit our energies to a common 
goal, none yet has been beyond us. 

We face today a crisis m human expectations. 
Individuals and nations expect much for them- 
selves and too little for others. But expectations 
are powerful moving forces. They change the 
ways people act. The very anticipation that it 
is more natural to take than to give, consume 
than to create, tends to fulfill itself. It is urgent 
that we acknowledge in all peoples the same 
capacities for giving and sharing that we 
ascribe to ourselves. 

Each country in the Western Hemisphere has 
its own special history and tradition, and forms 
of government whicli do not give the same kind 
of recognition to individuals. Neither do indi- 
viduals in each of our nations regard their 
social obligations in the same fasliion. But it 
is a basic assumption of this mission that men 
are more alike than otherwise in their potential 
for social responsiveness, and that latent in our 
species and in each of us is a capacity for per- 
sonal growth tlirough an enlarged concern for 
others. 

The urgent human problems in the Western 
Hemisphere require that the nations help one 
another. At the least, the patterns of our co- 
operation and mutual assistance should reflect 
the expectation that all of us will move toward 



500 



Department of State Bulletin 



broadly participating governmental systems 
wliicli represent the interests of each citizen. If 
we couple this expectation with an appreciation 
for the work and steps that must be undertaken 
to reach this goal, and for the difficulties in 
change, we will have embarked on a new direc- 
tion in which we all begin to raise each other up. 



CHAPTER ONE: THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

A. The Special Relationship 
in the Western Hemisphere 

The mission heard many details about rela- 
tions between the United States and the other 
American republics from the leaders of the 
hemisphere, but they can best be summed up 
in one phrase : The United States has allowed 
the special relationship it has historically main- 
tained with the other nations of the Western 
Hemisphere to deteriorate badly. 

The United States has allowed a host of nar- 
row special interests, a series of other foreign 
policy priorities, budgetary and balance of pay- 
ments constraints, a burgeoning bureaucratic 
tangle, and well-intentioned but unrealistic 
rhetoric to submerge this special relationship 
to the pomt where many of its neighbors in the 
hemisphere wonder if the United States really 
does care. Its assistance and trade policies, so 
critical to the development process of other na- 
tions, have been distorted to serve a variety of 
purposes in the United States having notliing 
to do with the aspirations and interests of its 
neighbors ; in fact, all too often, these purposes 
have been in sharp conflict with the goals of 
development. 

Moreover, in its relations, the United States 
has all too often demonstrated, at least subcon- 
sciously, a paternalistic attitude toward the 
other nations of the hemisphere. It has tried to 
direct the internal affairs of other nations to an 
unseemly degree, tliinking, perhaps arrogantly, 
that it knew what was best for them. It has un- 
derestimated the capacities of these nations and 
their willingness to assume responsibility for 
the course of future developments. The United 
States has talked about partnersliij), but it has 
not tmh' practiced it. 

At the same time, we found that profound 
changes are occurring in the hemisphere, 
changes that have not been fully underetood. It 
is clear that these changes will affect all of us, 



and that we must get rid of some of our stereo- 
types and conditioned thinking if we are to 
imderstand and respond with intelligence and 
pragmatism to the forces of change. 

We have concluded that the national mter- 
est requires the United States to revive its 
special relationship with the nations of the 
hemisphere, and that this relationship should be 
reinvigorated with a new commitment, new 
forms and new style. Western Hemisphere rela- 
tionships cannot remain static; the forces of 
change — and our own best interests as well as 
those of the entire hemisphere — will not permit 
it. 

This report tries to understand some of the 
issues we must face in attempting to reinvigo- 
rate and re-shape our special relationship — and 
it offers some specific recommendations for ac- 
tion now. 

B. The Existing Situation 

Everywhere in the Western Hemisphere to- 
day, including the United States, men and 
women are enjoying a fuller life, but still for 
many the realities of life are in sharp contrast 
with the deepest felt human needs and goals 
of the people. 

Everywhere in the hemisphere we see similar 
problems — problems of population and poverty, 
urbanization and unemployment, illiteracy and 
injustice, violence and disorder. 

Although each of the 26 countries in the hem- 
isphere is different, with widely varying stages 
of development, aspirations are outrunning 
resources and accomplishments eveiywhere. All 
nations of the hemisphere share rising expecta- 
tions and restlessness among those men and 
women who do not truly participate in the bene- 
fits of the industrial revolution and the stand- 
ard of living which has come with it. 

Even among some who have shared in the 
benefits, there is an increasing tendency to lose 
confidence and sureness of purpose. This makes 
fertile soil for the ever-present disruptive forces 
ready to exploit those who are uncertain and to 
stir up those who are restless. 

We know from our experience in the United 
States that those who live in deprived circum- 
stances no longer live out of sight and out of 
mind. Neither are they resigned — nor should 
they be resigned — to the fact that their lives 
are less than they could be. 

They have looked at the relative quality of 
their life and found it waiiting. 



December 8, 1969 



501 



As a result, in the United States and tlirough- 
out tlie Western Hemisphere, the legitimacy of 
the democratic political system and the individ- 
ual enterprise economic system are under 
challenge. 

The upheavals in international systems over 
the past three decades have subjected the mem- 
ber states of the Western Hemisphere to exter- 
nal economic, political and ideological stresses 
that magnify domestic antagonisms. 

At the same time, the issue of political legit- 
imacy has challenged "accepted" systems of 
government, not only in the United States but 
particularly in the other American republics. 
With the disintegration of old orders which 
lacked a popular base, newly-emerging domes- 
tic structures have had difficulty in establishing 
their legitimacj'. Tliis makes the problem of 
creating a system of political order in the West- 
ern Hemisphere more difficult. 

Some nations have retained their democratic 
institutions. In others, when democratic forms 
of government have not been successful, na- 
tions have moved to authoritarian forms as a 
solution to political and social dilennnas. Gov- 
ernments everywhere are struggling to cope 
with often conflicting demands for social re- 
form and economic growth. The problem is 
compounded by the 400-year-old heritage of 
intense individualism which permeates all 
phases of life in the Latin countries of the 
Americas. Nationalism is burgeoning in most of 
the region with strong anti-United States over- 
tones. Increasing frustration is evidenced over 
political instability, limited educational and 
economic opportunities, and the incapacity or 
slo-miess of existing government structures to 
solve the people's problems. Subversive forces 
working throughout the hemisphere are quick 
to exploit and exacerbate each and every 
situation. 

Change and the stresses and problems 
brought about by the processes of cliange char- 
acterize the existing situation in the liemisphere. 
The momentum of industrialization and mod- 
ernization has strained the fabric of social and 
political structures. Political and social insta- 
bility, increased pressure for radical answers to 
the problems, and a growing tendency to nation- 
alistic independence from the United States 
dominate the setting. 

The restless yearning of individuals for a 
better life, particularly when accompanied by 
a well-developed sense of social responsibility, 
is chipping away at the very order and institu- 
tions by which society makes it possible for 



man to fulfill his personal dignity. The seeds 
of nihilism and anarchy are spreading through- 
out the hemisphere. 

C. The Forces of Change 

Change is the crucial characteristic of our 
time. It is erupting, and disrupting, in all cul- 
tures. It creates anxiety and uncertainty. It is 
demanding of all peoples an adjustment and 
flexibility wliich test the limits of individual 
and collective capacities. 

Change is everywhere about us: in the ex- 
plosion of new knowledge, the acceleration of 
all communication, the massive mobility of peo- 
ple, the multiplicity of human contacts, the pace 
and diversity of experience, the increasingly 
transitory nature of all relationships and the 
uprooting of the values to which differing cul- 
tures are anchored. 

There is no societj- today, whether industri- 
alized or developing, that is not coping with 
these hurricane forces of change. It is plain 
that, depending on how we respond to the need 
for change and the demands of these forces, the 
results can be tremendously constructive or 
tremendously destructive. 

The sweeping change occurring in the hemi- 
sphere will affect our interests and our relation- 
ships with the other nations of the hemisphere. 
We must recognize that the United States can- 
not control the forces of change. However, we 
can and must try to understand the forces at 
work in the hemisphere — as well as at home — 
and how they may affect our national interests, 
if we are to shape intelligently and realistically 
our relationships. 

Throughout the hemisphere, although people 
are constantly moving out of poverty and degra- 
dation in varying numbers, the gap between the 
advantaged and the disadvantaged, within na- 
tions as well as between nations, is ever sharper 
and ever more difficult to endure. It is made to 
seem all the worse by the facility of modern 
communications. 

COMMUNICATIONS 

The transistor radio has brought about a rev- 
olution in awareness. Millions who used to be 
isolated by illiteracy and remote location now 
know that there is a different way of life wliich 
others are privileged to enjoy. Never again will 
they be content to accept as inevitable the pat- 
terns of the past. They want to share the privi- 
leges of progress. Tliey want a better world for 



502 



Department of State Bulletin 



their children. They have listened too long to 
unfilled promises. Their expectations have out- 
run performance. Their frustration is turning 
to a growing sense of injustice and disillusion- 
ment. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

Science and teclmolog-y have not, however, 
kept pace with communications in the develop- 
ing nations of the Western Hemisphere. These 
nations have lagged seriously in their participa- 
tion in the scientific and cultural revolution 
which has been an essential part of the indus- 
trialization of the developed nations. Many 
American republics have not, therefore, shared 
proportionately in the increased productivity 
and rising standards of living of their northern 
neighbors. This has fanned the flames of jeal- 
ousy, resentment and frustration. 

Most of the American republics have not yet 
mobilized the necessary elements for widespread 
industrialization of their economies. They need, 
in varying degrees, more and better education, 
more effective systems for channeling national 
savings into capital formation and industrial in- 
vestment, laws to protect the public's interests 
while encouraging the spirit of entrepreneur- 
ship, and expanding governmental services to 
support industrial growth. 

POPULATION GROWTH 

Another vital force for change is the fact 
that the population of most American republics 
is the fastest-growing in the world. 

The fact that over 60 percent of the popula- 
tion is now under 24 years of age has greatly 
increased the demands on government for more 
schools, more health services, more housing and 
roads — services beyond their resources to pro- 
vide. It produces an increasing labor supply 
which cannot find enough work, and thus adds 
to the frustrations and tensions. It results in 
slum growth and a multiplication of the prob- 
lems of urban life, and it cancels out so much 
of the economic growth achieved as to make 
improvement of living standards difficult if not 
impossible. 

URBAN LIFE 

With urbanization in the Western Hemi- 
sphere have come crowded living conditions and 
a loss of living space in physical and psychologi- 
cal terms. The urban man tends to become both 
depersonalized and fragmented in his human 



relationships. Unemployment is high, especially 
among the young, ranging as liigh as 25 to 40 
percent in some countries — and as low as four 
percent in others. The impact of poverty is 
widespread. These sprawling urban areas of the 
hemisphere spawn restlessness and anger which 
are readily exploited by the varying forces that 
thrive on trouble — and such forces are present 
in all societies. 

The problems of urbanization are multiplied 
by an increasing migration to the cities of the 
rural poor, who are least prepared for the 
stresses of industrial urban society. 

One positive force is the political emergence 
of women. They now have the right to vote in 
every country of the hemisphere — and are prov- 
ing to be, by and large, a middle-of-the road 
influence. 

NATIONALISM 

All of this is heightened by the spirit of na- 
tionalism wliich has been an essential element 
in the emotional make-up of all the American 
republics since their independence. The curve of 
nationalist sentiment is generally rising as these 
societies strive toward greater national identity 
and self-assertiveness. Since the United States 
looms so large in the lives of the other nations, 
and its power and presence is so overwhelming, 
this nationalism tends more and more to find 
the United States a temptmg and natural 
target. 

Nationalism is not confined to any one coim- 
try, nor does it spring from any one source. 
Political and pressure groups of all persua- 
sions lean heavily on the exploitation of 
nationalistic sentiment. 

This national sensitivity has been fed by the 
fact that, in the other American republics, 
United States management, capital and highly 
advertised products have played a dispropor- 
tionately visible role. A high percentage of over- 
seas investment has come from the United 
States, principally to seek raw materials or to 
preserve markets. 

The forces of nationalism are creating in- 
creasing pressures against foreign private in- 
vestment. The impetus for independence from 
the United States is leading toward rising pres- 
sures for nationalization of U.S. industry, local 
control, or participation with U.S. firms. Most 
economists and businessmen in the other Ameri- 
can I'epublics recognize the clear need for U.S. 
capital and tecluiology, but they want them 
on terms consistent with their desire for 
self-determination. 



December 8, 1969 



503 



Thus, the rising drive for self -identification is 
naturally and inevitably leading many nations 
to seek greater independence from U.S. influ- 
ence and power. The dilemma posed for the gov- 
ernments is that they know that U.S. coopera- 
tion and participation can contribute greatly to 
accelerating achievement of their development 
goals, but their sense of political legitimacy 
may well depend on the degi-ee of independence 
they can maintain from the United States. 

YOUNG PEOPLE 

In \aew of current conditions, it is natural 
that growing numbers of jieople in nations 
throughout the hemisphere including the 
United States should be disillusioned with so- 
ciety's failures — and perturbed by a sense of loss 
of individual identity. 

Increasing numbers of young people espe- 
cially are questioning many of our basic jirem- 
ises. They are searching for new values, new 
meanings, new importance for the individual's 
worth and dignity. 

Student participation in demonstrations and 
violence is becoming a major force in all coim- 
tries. This is so regardless of political ideology, 
regardless of whether the students are acting 
spontaneously or have been organized. Man has 
demonstrated in the past that he can endure 
regimentation; the test today, perhaps, is 
whether he can survive his freedom. 

The idealism of youth is and should be one 
of the most promising forces for the future. At 
the same time, the very fact of their idealism 
makes some of the young vulnerable to subver- 
sive penetration and to exploitation as a revolu- 
tionary means for the destruction of the exist- 
ing order. Above all, it is clear that the young 
people of the hemisphere will no longer accept 
slogans as substitutes for solutions. They know 
a better life is possible. 

LABOR 

Yet it is not only the yoimg who are deeply 
concerned or seeking instant fulfillment of their 
aspirations. The same phenomena are present in 
the ranks of labor. The largest groups in the 
developing labor movement throughout the 
hemisphere have democratic leadership. They 
seek increased productivity for their nations 
and a fair share of that increased productivity 
for the workers and their families. But a sub- 
stantial segment of labor is Communist-led — 
and less concerned with the nation's productiv- 



ity than with the overthrow of existing institu- 
tions — public and private. 

THE CROSS AND THE SWORD 

Although it is not yet widely recognized, the 
military establishments and the Catholic 
Church are also among today's forces for social 
and jiolitical change in the other American re- 
publics. This is a new role for them. For since 
the arrival of the Conquistadores more than 400 
years ago, the history of the military and the 
Catholic Church, working hand in hand with 
the landowners to provide "stability", has been 
a legend in the Americas. 

Few people realize the extent to which both 
these institutions are now breaking with their 
pasts. They are, in fact, moving rapidly to the 
forefront as forces for social, economic and 
political change. In the case of the Church, this 
is a recognition of a need to be more responsive 
to the popular will. In the case of the military, 
it is a reflection of a broadening of opportuni- 
ties for young men regardless of family 
background. 

The Church 

ilodern communications and increasing edu- 
cation have brought about a stirring among the 
people that has had a tremendous impact on the 
Church,^' making it a force dedicated to 
change — revolutionary change if necessary. 

Actually, the Church may be somewhat in the 
same situation as the young — with a profound 
idealism, but as a result, in some cases, vulnera- 
ble to subversive penetration; ready to under- 
take a revolution if necessary to end injustice 
but not clear either as to the ultimate nature of 
the revolution itself or as to the governmental 
system by which the justice it seeks can be 
I'ealized. 

jTAe Military/ 

In many South and Central American coun- 
tries, the militaiy is the single most powerful 
political grouping in society. Militai-y men are 
symbols of power, authority and sovereignty 
and a focus of national pride. They have tradi- 
tionally been regarded in most countries as the 
ultimate arbiters of the nation's welfare. 

The tendency of the military to intervene 



' See documents prepared by the Second General 
Conference of the Latin American Roman Catholic 
Episcopate in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968. [Footnote 
in original.] 



504 



Department of State Bulletin 



when it judges that the government in office has 
failed to carry out its responsibilities properly 
has generally been accepted in Central and 
South America. Virtually all military govern- 
ments in the hemisphere have assumed power to 
"rescue" the country from an incompetent gov- 
ernment, or an intolerable economic or political 
situation. Historical!}^, these regimes have var- 
ied widely m their attitudes toward civil liber- 
ties, social reform and repression. 

Like the Chm'ch, the military was tradition- 
ally a conservative force resistant to change. 
Most officers came from the landowner class. In 
recent years, however, the owners of land have 
shifted more and more to an urban industrial 
life. The militai-y service has been less attractive 
to their sons. As a result, opportunities have 
opened up for young men of ambition and abil- 
ity from poor families who have neither land 
nor professional and business connections. 
These ambitious sons of the working classes 
have entered the military to seek an education 
and the opportunity for advancement. 

This pattern has become almost universal 
throughout the American republics to the south. 
The ablest of these young officers have gone 
abroad for education and are now assuming top 
positions of leadershiiD in almost all of the mili- 
tary groups in the hemisphere. And while their 
loyalties are with the armed forces, their emo- 
tional ties are often with the people. Increas- 
ingly, their concern and dedication is to the 
eradication of poverty and the improvement of 
the lot of the oppressed, both in rural and urban 
areas. 

In short, a new type of military man is com- 
ing to the fore and often becoming a major 
force for constructive social change in the 
American republics. Motivated by increasing 
impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a 
stagnant political order, the new military man 
is prepared to adapt his authoritarian tradition 
to the goals of social and economic progress. 

This new role by the military, however, is 
not free from perils and dilemmas. There is al- 
ways the risk that the authoritarian style will 
result in repression. The temptation to expand 
measures for security or discipline or efficiency 
to the point of curtailing indiWdual liberties, 
beyond what is required for the restoration of 
order and social progress, is not easy to resist. 

Above all, authoritarian governments, bent 
on rapid change, have an intrinsic ideological 
unreliability and a vulnerability to extreme na- 



tionalism. They can go in almost any doctrinal 
direction. 

The danger for the new militai-y is that it 
may become isolated from the people with au- 
thoritarianism turning into a means to suppress 
rather than eliminate the buildup of social and 
political tension. 

The critical test, ultimately, is whether the 
new military can and will move the nation, 
with sensitivity and conscious design, toward 
a transition from military control for a social 
purpose to a more pluralistic form of govern- 
ment which will enable individual talent and 
dignity to flourish. Or will they become radical- 
ized, statist and anti-U.S.? 

In this connection, special mention should be 
made of the aj^peal to the new military, on a 
theoretical level, of Marxism: (1) It justifies, 
through its elitist-vanguard theories, govern- 
ment by a relatively small group or single in- 
stitution (such as the Army) and, at the 
same time, (2) produces a rationale for 
state-enforced sacrifices to further economic 
development. 

One important influence counteractmg this 
simplistic Marxist approach is the exposm-e to 
the fundamental achievements of the U.S. way 
of life that many of the militai-y from the other 
American countries have received through the 
military training programs which the U.S. con- 
ducts in Panama and the United States. 

BUSINESS 

A similar phenomenon is apparent within the 
business community. Again, there is a dichot- 
omy. On the one hand, long-established self- 
interests cling to practices of paternalism and 
monopoly behind high protective tariffs. On the 
other hand, new enterprises or older businesses 
with new, young management are bringing to 
bear a social concern for workers and the public 
as well as for stockliolders. 

This new business leadership is a promising 
and constructive force. And it is a necessary 
force in the process of change, simply because 
the technical, managerial and marketing compe- 
tence of private business must assume a major 
role in the development of the Western 
Hemisphei'e. 

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 

In every country, there is a restless striving 
for a better life. Coming as it does at a time of 
uprooting change, it brings to many a vague 



December 8, 1969 



505 



unease that all the systems of society are out of 
control. In such a setting, all of the American 
nations are a tempting target for Communist 
subversion. In fact, it is plainly evident that 
such subversion is a reality today with alarming 
potential. 

Castro has consistently recruited from the 
other American republics, and trained in Cuba, 
guerrillas to export the Cuban-type Commimist 
agrarian revolution. Fortunately, the govern- 
ments of the American republics have gradually 
improved their capabilities for dealing with 
Castro-type agrarian guerrillas. However, radi- 
cal revolutionary elements in the hemisphere 
appear to be increasingly turning toward urban 
terrorism in their attempts to bring down the 
existing order. Tliis type of subversion is more 
difficult to control, and governments are forced 
to use increasingly repressive measures to deal 
with it. Thus, a cycle of terrorist actions and 
repressive counter-reactions tend to polarise and 
imsettle the political situation, creating more 
fertile ground for radical solutions among large 
segments of the population. 

There are also Maoist Communist forces in 
the hemisphere. Although they are relatively 
small in numbers they are fanatically dedicated 
to the use of violence and intimidation to achieve 
their ends. The mystique of Maoism has ap- 
pealed most to the idealism of the yoimg 
and, thus, has been the means for widespread 
subversion. 

Now it appears in some cases that Castro and 
Maoist forces have joined for acts of subversion, 
terror and violence in the cities. These forces 
also concentrate on mass student demonstra- 
tions and disruptions of various institutions, 
public and private, calling on the support of 
Communist labor front organizations to the 
degree possible. 

Although Castro's propaganda casts him as a 
leader of the down-trodden who is opposed to 
United States imperialism and independent of 
Soviet Communism, it is clear that the Soviet 
Union presently has an important degree of 
financial, economic, and military influence over 
Communist Cuba. The recent visit of Soviet 
fleet to Havana is one evidence of growing 
warmth in their relations. 

This Soviet performance in Cuba and 
throughout the hemisphere is to be contrasted 
with the official Soviet government and Com- 
munist party protestations not only of peaceful 
coexistence but of disassociation from Castro 



and his program of terror in the American 
republics. 

Clearly, the opinion in the United States that 
Communism is no longer a serious factor in the 
Western Hemisphere is thoroughly wrong. 

We found almost universally that the other 
American republics are deeply concerned about 
the threat that it poses to them — and the United 
States must be alert to and concerned about the 
ultimate threat it poses to the United States and 
the hemisphere as a whole. 

CHANGES IN THE DECADE AHEAD 

The nations of the Western Hemisphere iu 
the decade ahead will differ greatly from their i 
present situation. They will reflect the rapid 
and widespread changes now occurring, which i 
will alter the institutions and processes by which i 
the American republics govern and progress. - 
Wliile it is not possible to predict with any , 
precision the precise course of change, the hemi- 
sphere is likely to exhibit the following charac- 
teristics in the next few years : 

— Rising frustration with the pace of develop- 
ment, intensified by industrialization, urbaniza- 
tion and population growth; 

— Political and social instability ; 

— An increased tendency to turn to authori- 
tarian or radical solutions ; 

— Continuation of the trend of the military 
to take power for the purpose of guiding social 
and economic progress ; and, 

— Growing nationalism, across the spectrum 
of political groupings, which will often find 
expression in terms of independence from U.S. 
domination and influence. 



CHAPTER TWO: THE CHALLENGE 

TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 



A. The Nature of the Challenge 



( 



The pace and intensity of change, imposed 
on rampant inflation, urban violence, grinding 
poveity, embittering injustice and flaming na- 
tionalism, put the nations of the Western Hemi- 
sphere at a crossroads. The question of whether 
systems of freedom with order and justice will 
survive and prosper is no longer rhetorical; 
it is reality. 

The key issue is whether government of free 
peoples can be made effective, and can set the 



506 



Department of State Bulletin 



necessary priorities, to cope with the people's 
present needs and their aspirations for the fu- 
ture; whether political and social institutions 
can hold the confidence not only of a questioning 
young generation but of adults as well. 

For the United States, the challenge is a 
double one : First, to demonstrate by its example 
that a free society can resolve its own internal 
problems and provide a more rewarding life for 
all its people ; second, to find ways in which its 
tremendous human and material resources can 
effectively supplement the efforts of the other 
American nations themselves, in a climate of 
growing instability, extremism, and anti-U.S. 
nationalism. 

A new relationship between the United States 
and the other American republics must be 
shaped with a recognition that devotion to our 
long-term community of interests will often re- 
quire sensitive handling of our short-term differ- 
ences. In forging this relationship we have the 
opportmiity to demonstrate how sovereign na- 
tions, working together, can solve common 
problems and thus to establish a model for co- 
operative arrangements for the fulfillment of 
men and women tliroughout the world. 

It is a fortunate and striking fact of the 
modern world that, for the first time, the scien- 
tific know-how and managerial competence re- 
quired to meet the economic aspects of the chal- 
lenge are available. Moreover, we believe the 
Western Hemisphere possesses the human, 
material and spiritual resources that are needed 
for the task in all its aspects — economic, social 
and political. 

B. The United States National Interest 

The moral and spiritual strength of the 
United States in the world, the political credi- 
bility of our leadersMp, the security of our 
nation, the future of our social and economic 
progress are now at stake. 

Rising frustrations throughout the Western 
Hemisphere over poverty and political 
instability have led increasing numbers of 
people to pick the United States as a scapegoat 
and to seek out Marxist solutions to their socio- 
economic problems. At the moment, there is only 
one Castro among the 26 nations of the hemi- 
sphere; there can well be more in the future. 
And a Castro on the mainland, supported mili- 
tarily and economically by the Communist 
world, would present the gravest kind of threat 



to the security of the Western Hemisphere and 
pose an extremely difficult problem for the 
United States. 

Just as the other American republics depend 
upon the United States for their capital equip- 
ment requirements, so the United States de- 
pends on them to provide a vast market for our 
manufactured goods. And as these comitries 
look to the United States for a market for their 
primary products whose sale enables them to 
buy equipment for their development at home, 
so the United States looks to them for raw 
materials for our industries, on which depend 
the jobs of many of our citizens. 

But these forces of economic interdependence 
are changing, and must change. An increasing 
flow of two-way trade in industrial products 
must supplement the present interchange of 
manufactured goods and primary products. 

Today's 250 million people in South and Cen- 
tral America will become 643 million in just 
30 years. If the current anti-U.S. trend con- 
tinues, one can foresee a time when the United 
States would be politically and morally isolated 
from part or much of the Western Hemisphere. 
If this should happen, the barriers to our collec- 
tive growth would become formidable indeed. 

It is plainly evident that the countries of the 
Western Hemisphere, including the United 
States, have become increasingly dependent on 
each other. 

Historically, the United States has had a 
special relationship with the other American 
republics. It is based upon long association, 
geography and, above all, on the psychological 
acceptance of a concept of hemisi^here com- 
munity. It is embodied in the web of organiza- 
tions, treaties and commitments of the inter- 
American system. Beyond conventional security 
and economic interests, the political and psy- 
chological value of the special relationship can- 
not be overestimated. Failure to maintain that 
special relationship would imply a failure of 
our capacity and responsibility as a great 
power. If we camiot maintain a constructive re- 
lationship in the Western Hemisphere, we will 
hardly be able to achieve a successful order else- 
where in the world. Moreover, failure to main- 
tain the special relationship would create a 
vacuum in the hemisphere and facilitate the in- 
fluence in the region of hostile foreign powers. 

It is clear, then, that our national interest re- 
quires the maintenance of our special relation- 
ship which should have as its goal the creation 



December 8, 1969 



507 



of a community of self-reliant, independent na- 
tions linked in a mutually beneficial regional 
system, and seeking to improve the efficiency of 
their societies and the quality of life of their 
peoples. 

C. Our National Objective 

There is no system in all of history better 
than our own flexible structure of political 
democracy, mdividual initiative, and responsi- 
ble citizenship in elevating the quality of man's 
life. It makes the individual of central im- 
portance; it subordinates the role of govern- 
ment as a servant of the people; it works 
with people and for people — it has no other 
justification. 

Our job at home is far from finished. We 
must keep our empliasis on people, our priority 
coricern for people. This will mean shaping the 
forces of change and stretching out or deferring 
those programs not related to the urgent needs 
of people. Unless human needs are met, democ- 
racy will have failed of its purpose and cannot 
survive. 

What is true at home is essentially also true 
for the hemisphere. Our concern must be for 
people. 'What we in the hemisphere have to do 
is work together, multiplying our relations with 
the people of the hemisphere nations, helping 
each other develop more effective societies that 
can enhance the health, freedom and security of 
all the people, to the end that the quality of 
the life of each and every person in the 
hemisphere is enhanced. 

We must work with our fellow Americans 
to the end that no one is exploited or degraded 
to enrich another and evei-y man and woman 
has a full opportunity to make the most of 
his endowments. 

However, we must recognize that the specific 
forms or processes by which each nation moves 
towards a pluralistic system will vary with its 
own traditions and situation. We know that we, 
in the United States, camiot determine the in- 
ternal political structure of any other nation, 
except by example. 

Our ability to affect or influence the course of 
events in other nations is limited. We may find 
that other nations may perceive their interests 
in ways which conflict with ours. Wliat we must 
do is take a long-term view of our interests and 
objectives, always maintaining a sense of our 
own priorities and of the special Western Hem- 
isphere relationship we hope to achieve. Such a 
view will require a high degree of tolerance for 



diversity and for nationalistic expression often 
directed against the United States, and a rec- 
ognition that our style may often have a more 
important effect than what we actually do in the 
hemisphere. 

The kind of paternalistic relationsliip the 
United States has had in the past with other 
hemisphere nations will be increasingly costly 
and counter-productive in the years ahead. We 
believe the United States must move increas- 
ingly toward a relationship of true partnerslaip, 
in which it will cooperate with other nations of 
the hemisphere in those areas where its cooper- 
ation can be helpful and is wanted. 

The United States must face several impor- 
tant practical issues m trying to shape tliis new 
relationsliip : 

1. The United States should determine its 
attitude towards internal political develop- 
ments in a more pragmatic way ; 

2. The United States should decide how it can 
shift increasing responsibility to the other 
American nations (through multi-lateral chan- 
nels) for the development process; and. 

3. The United States should decide how its 
interests are affected by insurgency and sub- 
version elsewhere in the hemisphere and the ex- 
tent to which its programs can and should as- 
sist in meeting the security requirements of its 
neighbors. 

The task is difficult but by no means impossi- 
ble. It will require disciplme and energy and 
above all a very clear and consistent sense of 
purpose at home and abroad. To grasp the op- 
portunity that lies in the hemisphere, the 
United States must make some major and fun- 
damental changes in, first, the structure of the 
government mechanisms thi-ough which we 
work with our hemisphere neighbors, and, sec- 
ond, in our policies and programs as they relate 
to the Western Hemisphere. 

Accordingly, Chapters Three and Four of 
this report will make specific recommendations 
in each of the areas: first, organization, and, 
secondly, policy. 



CHAPTER THREE: ORGANIZATION 

A. Organization of the United States 
Government 

Unless there is a major reorganization of the 
United States government structure, with clear 
lines of responsibility and corresponding au- 



508 



Department of State Bulletin 



thority to make policy and direct operations in 
the Western Hemisphere, the effect of other 
recommendations would, at best, be marginal. 

Under the Constitution, the President has the 
responsibility for the formulation and execu- 
tion of foreign policy. Where there are conflict- 
ing interests and points of view among the gov- 
ernment departments and agencies, only the 
President has the authority to reconcile the dif- 
j f erences and make the decisions. 

With the present United States goveriunent 
structure. Western Hemisphere policy can 
neither be soundly formulated nor effectively 
carried out. 

Contrary to popular misconceptions, the 
State Department does not have effective over- 
all responsibility for foreign policy where the 
interests of other departments of the govern- 
ment are concerned. In actual fact, the State 
Department controls less than half the policy 
decisions directly relating to the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Responsibility for policy and operations 
is scattered among many departments and agen- 
cies — for example, Treasury, Commerce, Agri- 
culture, and Defense. 

To cope with the diffusion of authority, there 
has grown up a complex and cumbersome sys- 
tem of interdepartmental committees within 
which there are interminable negotiations be- 
cause no one member has the authority to make 
a final decision. The result is that there are 
endless delays in decision-making. Too often, 
agreement is reached on major subjects only by 
compromise in the lower echelons of govern- 
ment — often at the lowest common denominator 
of agreement. 

The result is that wo have no clear formula- 
tion of United States policy objectives toward 
the Western Hemisphere. Nor are there clear 
policy guide lines relating to substantive and 
regional problems which are essential to effec- 
tive day-to-day decision-making in our contacts 
with the other American republics. This in it- 
self leads to conflicts within the government 
which are detrimental to the best interests of 
our country. 

In this maze of bureaucracy and procrastina- 
tion, the representatives of the Western Hem- 
isphere governments become frustrated and 
humiliated because they are referred from one 
department to another without finding anyone 
who can make a final decision. Delays in Wash- 
ington of months and even years on decisions of 
major importance to their countries were re- 
ported to the mission in almost every nation we 
visited. 



The lack of clear policy direction, the inde- 
cision and the resulting frustration are major 
factors in preventing the kind of understand- 
ing and close working relationships which are 
essential in light of our growing interdepend- 
ence. 

Obviously, neither the President nor the Sec- 
retary of State has the time for continuing at- 
tention to the concern of 25 other nations in the 
hemisphere, and no one else has the authority. 
As a result, the day-to-day relationships with 
our friends and neighbors, including Canada, 
do not get the constant consideration of our top 
policy makers. 

But if we are to have a true sense of com- 
munity within the Western Hemisphere, it must 
be possible to establish and maintain high-level 
contacts with each country on a basis of frank- 
ness and opemiess that will minimize the danger 
of misunderstanding and maximize effective co- 
operation. Such cooperation depends on the 
ability of the United States to respond promptly 
and decisively. For the United States to or- 
ganize itself to make this possible: 

1. There must be clearly-defined national ob- 
jectives consistent with the goals of the Western 
Hemisphere community ; 

2. These objectives must be translated into 
clear policy positions relating to both govern- 
mental and private activities ; 

3. To implement these national goals and pol- 
icies effectively, there must be a structure with 
clear lines of responsibility and authority flow- 
ing directly from the President; 

4. There must be efficiently-run organizations 
that can carry out supporting programs free 
from political and diplomatic encumbrances 
which reduce the effectiveness of technical and 
professional operations; and, 

5. There must be a close working relation- 
ship with the members of Congress as an indis- 
pensable and integral part of the policy-making 
process. 

Finally, and of overriding importance in our 
special Western Hemisphere relationships is 
the psychological factor of personal relation- 
ships, so important to the Latins. 

A characteristic of the Latin temperament is 
to put more faith in people than in institutions. 
It therefore is important to give stature and 
dignity to the key position of leadership in the 
structure of the United States government that 
deals with the Western Hemisphere. One man 
should symbolize, by the importance of his posi- 



December 8, 1969 

369-529—69 3 



509 



tion, the President's special interest in and con- 
cern for our Western Hemisphere relations. 
Creation of such a post must therefore outweigh 
any traditional objections to a change of govern- 
ment organization. 

In this way, we can establish a sense of vital- 
ity, openness and effectiveness in our relations 
w'ith the leaders and peoples of the other na- 
tions. This is essential to the unity and security 
of the Western Hemisphere and will make pos- 
sible the achievement of our common goals. 

BeconvmcTidation: National Policy Objective 

The President should reorganize the for- 
eign -policy and operating structure of United 
States government dealing with the Western 
Hemisphere. 

Becomviendations for Action 

1. A SECRETARY OF WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS should he 
created to give day-to-day leadership 
and guidance on behalf of the Secretary 
of State and the President. He loould 
also coordinate on their behalf all United 
States govei'nment activities in the West- 
em Hemisphere. 

a. He would be the focal point within the 
United States govermnent of all matters 
pertaining to Western Hemisphere affairs, 
subject to the President and the Secretary 
of State. 

b. He would have the authority and re- 
sponsibility to represent the President and 
the Secretary of State in negotiations with 
chiefs of state, foreign ministers and other 
senior officials of hemisphere nations, and 
with heads of all United States government 
departments and agencies concerned with 
hemisphere policy and operations. 

c. He would be supported by Undersec- 
retaries for Western Hemisphere economic 
and political affairs, and appropriate As- 
sistant Secretaries including one for each 
regional trading group of nations. 

2. There should be created within the Na- 
tional Secunty Council a WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE POLICY STAFF 
DIRECTOR to service the President, 
the National Security Council., the Sec- 
retary of State, the Secretary of Western 
Hemisphere A fairs and the various de- 
partments and agencies involved, such 



as Defense, Treasury, Commerce and 
Agriculture, and economic and social 
program activities. 

a. The Director would serve the Assist- 
ant to the Pi-esident for National Security 
Affairs and would thus have experts with 
competence in the fields represented by the 
key departments and agencies involved in 
Western Hemisphere affairs. 

b. The purpose of this White House staff 
would be to help in the formulation of the 
President's Western Hemisphere goals and 
policies in consultation with the appropri- 
ate councils of government. 

c. It would monitor Executive Office de- 
cisions relating to the Western Hemisphere 
through the departments, agencies and be- 
yond to determine whether Presidential de- 
cisions are being carried out. 

3. An ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DE- 
VELOPMENT AGENCY should be 
created in the Executive Office of the 
President to siipersede the present AID 
adininistration in the State Department. 
This move is essential for a number of 
reasons : 

a. The financial and technical operations 
of the State Department have gotten all 
tangled up with the diplomatic responsibil- 
ities of the State Department — to the 
detriment of both. 

b. Because of the lack of clear adminis- 
trative responsibility and authority in the 
AID organization, it is having great dif- 
ficulty in recruiting quality staff. 

c. Economic assistance policy operating 
decisions are too often made on the basis 
of political negotiations rather than eco- 
nomic and social realities. 

d. Under the proposed structure, the new 
Development Agency would have clear 
lines of authority from the President but 
would have to clear its operating programs 
with the appropriate policy officials in the 
State Department. 

4. An INSTITUTE OF WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS shoidd be 
set up under tJie Development Agency as 
the operating corporation to carry out 
govemment-to-govemment economic 
and social pi^ograms in the Western 
Hemisphere. 



510 



Department of State Bulletin 



a. The activities of this Western Hemi- 
sphere corporate institute would be subject 
to the President, the Secretary of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs (on behalf of the Sec- 
retary of State), and the Policy Staff 
Director of the Security Council. 

b. Clearance of operating programs 
would be accomplished by the following 
procedure : 

— A concise project memo would be pre- 
pared and, when it related to a Western 
Hemisjjhere nation, it would be submitted 
to the Secretary of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs for his political approval. Li each 
case, the memo would clearly state the 
objectives of the project, its nature and 
character, the number of people to be em- 
ployed, and the total cost. 

— After the project had been cleared by 
the Secretary of Western Hemisphere Af- 
fairs, he would inform the United States 
ambassador in the country involved — and 
instruct him to support the carrying-out 
of the project. If, at any time, the ambas- 
sador felt that the project was in any way 
prejudicial to the best interests of the 
United States, he would first take the mat- 
ter up with the director of tlie project; 
failing satisfaction there, he would I'eport 
his complaint to the Seci'etary of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs who, in turn, would 
take it up with the head of either the as- 
sistance program or the regional fimctional 
institute responsible for its execution. 

c. Creation of the Institute would 
recognize the special needs and the special 
relationship and would symbolize the spe- 
cial importance of our relations in the 
hemisphere; the President of the corpora- 
tion would become a figure of major signif- 
icance in hemisphere affairs. 

d. Use of a corporation as the operating 
arm for the hemisphere would have the 
added advantage of assuring the conti- 
nuity of programs mider three-to-five-year 
contracts. 

e. The present large staff which AID 
maintains in various countries would be 
reduced to a minimum ; teclinicians would 
be sent to those comitries only to cai'ry out 
specific technical assistance programs or 
other agreed-upon assignments. 

f. In addition, the Institute could pro- 
vide assistance through contracts with 



private non-profit organizations where 
desirable, thus multiplying the points of 
contact between all facets of our society 
and those of other hemisphere nations. 

g. This corporation would have the 
power to set up subsidiaries to give special 
emphasis in fields of particular concern. 
Two such subsidiaries are specifically 
recommended : 

— A Western Hemisphere Institute for 
Education, Science and Culture ; and, 

— ^An Inter-American Rural Develop- 
ment Corporation. 

Each would be an operating corporation 
to carry out projects in its respective fields 
under the policy guidance of the President 
of the Institute of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs (further descriptions appear on 
pages 523, 530, and 532). 

5. We applavd the Presidenfs support of 
legislation noio before Congress to create 
an OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVEST- 
MENT CORPORATION; it slwuU he 
enacted into law. 

a. OPIC would take over the activities 
relating to private economic development 
that are now being handled by AID, in- 
cluding insurance, contracts, loans and 
investment surveys. 

b. This would separate administration of 
govemment-to-goveniment programs from 
private enterprise activities — a desirable 
step since an agency operating primarily 
at a government-to-government level fuids 
it difficult to get the orientation to handle 
private enterprise matters. 

6. The President should discuss with the 
leaders of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives the possibility of cre- 
ating a JOINT CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE to coordinate legislative 
policy concerning the hemisphere. 

a. A broad-based steering committee 
could work with the appropriate commit- 
tees of both houses of the Congress to antic- 
ipate hemisphere problems, consider new 
legislation and review existing laws relat- 
ing to hemisphere affairs. 

b. This would be an important expression 
of Congressional interest in a coordinated 
approach to the otlier hemisphere nations. 



December 8, 1969 



511 



B. Country-by-Country Relations 

The experiences of the mission in the course 
of its travels demonstrated anew that there is 
no substitute in the institutions and practices of 
diplomacy for the warmth and interplay of per- 
sonal contact. 

In country after country, members of the mis- 
sion were told by our hosts of a feeling in that 
counti'y that they had no real personal contact 
with the United States — that they were shut out 
by a wall of bureaucracy, the inability to get a 
decision, the low priorities for hemisphere mat- 
ters, the fact there is no one with effective au- 
thority with whom they can talk. 

It was apparent that the spirit of personal 
friendship and respect which characterized the 
"good neighbor" era had evaporated. It is vital 
to re-establish that spirit. 

Each country in the hemisphere is unique, 
with its own special problems, its own special 
relations with other countries and with the 
United States. It is therefore vital that our 
diplomacy be geared to close and effective ties 
with each of these nations. 

All nations in the hemisphere are inter- 
dependent in today's world. We must not lose 
sight of the need for close ties on a country-by- 
country basis — a purpose which the foregoing 
proposal for a Secretary of Western Hemi- 
sphere Affairs should greatly facilitate on be- 
half of the Secretary of State and the President. 

Recommendations: National Policy Objective 

The United States should maintain close, 
open, intimate and ejfective ties with each of the 
hemisphere nations, on a country -hy -country 
basis, recognizing that each nation is different 
and that bilateral relations and programs have 
an important role to play. 

C. Regional Organizations 

As individual entities, many of the hemi- 
sphere countries have such limited resources 
that they could not promote economic growth 
and social progress or sustain an acceptable 
level of economic competition in world markets. 
Thus they have begun to form regional group- 
ings to coordinate their economic policies. 

The first of these regional groupings and the 
most effective thus far has been the Central 
American Common Market. It began with a 
limited list of "free trade" goods, was gradually 



broadened into fiscal agreements and still later 
expanded to handle issues of economic and polit- 
ical significance. 

An important instrument of the CACM is the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integra- 
tion, which makes loans for public works, in- 
dustry, agriculture, opening new markets and 
other region-wide projects. 

The Caribbean nations have a wide variety 
of regional organizations and are now forming 
a Caribbean Free Trade Association and a Car- 
ibbean Development Bank. 

The treaty creating the Andean Group under 
the Latin American Free Trade Association was 
signed this siunmer. The River Plate countries 
have been discussing the possibility of a re- 
gional organization, but have thus far made no 
commitment. 

The Latin American Free Trade Association, 
which began in 1961 to reduce tariffs among 11 
Latin American countries, is moving slowly be- 
cause of the complexities of negotiating recipro- 
cal tariff cuts among so many nations. 

Recommendation: National Policy Objective 

The United States should cooperate with and 
support fully regional, organizations among the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. 

Reconmiendations for Action 

1. Upon request, the United States should 
encourage regional organizations with 
financial and technical assistance and 
support for industrial, agricultural, edu- 
cational and scientific programs. 

2. To facilitate such cooperation, the 
United States should appoint ASSIST- 
ANT SECRETARIES OF WEST-