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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1.580 


October  6,  1969 


STRENGTHENING  THE  TOTAL  FABRIC  OF  PEACE 

Address  by  President  Nixon  Before  the  24th  Session 
of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly     297 

PRESIDENT  NIXON  REDUCES  TROOP  CEILING  IN  VIET-NAM 

Statement  hy  the  President     302 

U.S.  ABSTAINS  ON  SECURITY  COUNCIL  RESOLUTION 
LINKING  MOSQUE  FIRE  TO  MIDDLE  EAST  CONFLICT 

Statement  by  Ambassador  Yost  and  Text  of  Resolution     307 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1580 
October  6,  1969 


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The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  tceekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  ivork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Infornuxtion  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative rruiterial  in  the  field  of  inter- 
natioruil  relations  are  listed  currently. 


Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of  Peace 


Address  by  President  Nixon  ^ 


Madam  President,  Mr.  Secretary  General, 
distinguished  Foreign  Ministers,  Prime  Minis- 
ters, delegates,  my  fellow  citizens  of  the  world 
community :  I  first  wish  to  express  my  deep  ap- 
preciation for  the  honor  of  addressing  this 
organization  for  the  first  time  and  also  to  take 
this  opportunity  to  welcome  all  of  those  from 
126  countries  who  are  here  at  the  United  Na- 
tions General  Assembly  session. 

Particularly,  on  a  personal  note,  I  appreciate 
the  opportunity  to  have  been  welcomed  today 
by  the  Secretary  General.  It  is  hard  to  realize, 
as  we  were  reminiscing,  that  just  16  years  ago 
he  welcomed  me  to  Burma  when  he  was  Chief 
of  Protocol  and  I  was  Vice  President.  Since 
then,  we  have  both  come  up  in  the  world  to  a 
certain  extent. 

I  think  we  would  all  agree  that  there  is  no 
nobler  destiny,  nor  any  greater  gift  that  one 
age  could  make  to  the  ages  that  follow,  than  to 
forge  the  key  to  a  lasting  peace. 

In  this  great  Assembly  the  desirability  of 
peace  needs  no  affirmation.  The  methods  of 
achieving  it  are  what  so  greatly  challenge  our 
courage,  our  intelligence,  our  discernment. 

Surely  if  one  lesson  above  all  rings  resound- 
ingly among  the  many  shattered  hopes  in  this 
world,  it  is  that  good  words  are  not  a  sub- 
stitute for  hard  deeds  and  noble  rhetoric  is  no 
guarantee  of  noble  results. 

We  might  describe  peace  as  a  process  em- 
bodied in  a  structure. 

For  centuries,  peace  was  the  absence  of  war : 
stability  was  the  absence  of  change. 

But  in  today's  world,  there  can  be  no  stability 
without  change — so  that  peace  becomes  a  con- 
tinuing process  of  creative  evolution.  It  is  no 


'  Made  before  the  24th  session  of  the  TT.N.  General 
Assembly  at  the  TJnitecI  Nations,  N.T.,  on  Sept.  18 
(White  House  press  release  (New  York,  N.Y.)). 


longer  enough  to  restrain  war.  Peace  must  also 
embrace  progress — both  in  satisfying  man's 
material  needs  and  in  fulfilling  his  spiritual 
needs. 

The  test  of  the  structure  of  peace  is  that  it 
ensure  for  the  people  of  each  nation  the  integrity 
of  their  borders,  their  right  to  develop  in  peace 
and  safety,  and  their  right  to  determine  their 
own  destiny  without  outside  interference. 

As  long  as  we  live  with  the  threat  of  aggres- 
sion, we  need  physical  restraints  to  contain  it. 

But  the  truest  peace  is  based  on  self- 
restraint — on  the  voluntary  acceptance  of  those 
basic  rules  of  behavior  that  are  rooted  in 
mutual  respect  and  demonstrated  in  mutual 
forbearance. 

The  more  closely  the  world  community  ad- 
heres to  a  single  standard  in  judging  interna- 
tional behavior,  the  less  likely  that  standard  is 
to  be  violated. 

World  Role  of  the  United  States 

I  am  well  aware  that  many  nations  have  ques- 
tions about  the  world  role  of  the  United  States 
in  the  years  ahead— about  the  nature  and  extent 
of  our  future  contribution  to  the  structure  of 
peace. 

Let  me  address  those  doubts  and  address  them 
quite  candidly  before  this  organization. 

In  recent  years  there  has  been  mounting 
criticism  here  in  the  United  States  of  the 
scope  and  the  results  of  our  international 
commitments. 

This  trend,  however,  has  not  been  confined  to 
the  United  States  alone.  In  many  coimtries  we 
find  a  tendency  to  withdraw  from  responsibili- 
ties, to  leave  the  world's  often  frustrating  prob- 
lems to  the  other  fellow  and  just  to  hope  for  the 
best. 


October  6,   1969 


297 


As  for  the  United  States,  I  can  state  here 
today  without  qualification:  We  have  not 
turned  away  from  the  world. 

We  know  that  with  power  goes  responsibility. 

We  are  neither  boastful  of  our  power  nor 
apologetic  about  it.  We  recognize  that  it  exists 
and  that,  as  well  as  conferring  certain  ad- 
vantages, it  also  imposes  upon  us  certain 
obligations. 

As  the  world  changes,  the  pattern  of  those 
obligations  and  responsibilities  changes. 

At  the  end  of  World  War  II,  the  United 
States  for  the  first  time  in  history  assumed  the 
major  responsibility  for  world  peace. 

We  were  left  in  1945  as  the  one  nation  with 
sufficient  strength  to  contain  the  new  tlireats 
of  aggression  and  with  sufficient  wealth  to  help 
the  injured  nations  back  to  their  feet. 

For  much  of  the  world,  those  first  difficult 
postwar  years  were  a  time  of  dependency. 

The  next  step  was  toward  independence,  as 
new  nations  were  born  and  old  nations  revived. 

Now  we  are  maturing  together  into  a  new 
pattern  of  interdependence. 

It  is  agamst  tliis  background  that  we  have 
been  urging  other  nations  to  assume  a  greater 
share  of  responsibility  for  their  own  security, 
both  individually  and  together  with  their  neigh- 
bors. The  great  challenge  now  is  to  enlist  the 
cooperation  of  many  nations  in  preserving 
peace  and  enriching  life.  This  cannot  be  done  by 
Ajnerican  edict  or  by  the  edict  of  any  other 
nation.  It  must  reflect  the  concepts  and  the 
wishes  of  the  people  of  those  nations  themselves. 

The  history  of  the  postwar  period  teaches 
that  nationalism  can  be  dangerously  disrup- 
tive— or  powerfully  creative. 

Our  aim  is  to  encourage  the  creative  forms  of 
nationalism;  to  join  as  partners  where  our 
partnership  is  appropriate  and  where  it  is 
wanted,  but  not  to  let  a  U.S.  presence  substitute 
for  independent  national  effort  or  infringe  on 
national  dignity  and  national  pride. 

It  is  not  my  belief  that  the  way  to  peace  is  by 
giving  up  our  friends  or  letting  down  our  allies. 
On  the  contrary,  our  aim  is  to  place  America's 
international  commitments  on  a  sustainable 
long-term  basis,  to  encourage  local  and  regional 
initiatives,  to  foster  national  independence  and 
self-sufficiency,  and  by  so  doing  to  strengthen 
the  total  fabric  of  peace. 

It  would  be  dishonest,  particularly  before 


this  sophisticated  audience,  to  pretend  that  the 
United  States  has  no  national  interests  of  its 
own  or  no  special  concern  for  its  own  interests. 
However,  our  most  fundamental  national  in- 
terest is  in  maintaining  that  structure  of  inter- 
national stability  on  which  peace  depends  and 
which  makes  orderly  progress  possible. 

Toward  Peace  in  Viet-Nam 

Since  I  took  office  as  President,  no  single 
question  has  occu^jied  so  much  of  my  time  and 
energy  as  the  search  for  an  end  to  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam:  an  end  fair  to  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam,  fair  to  the  people  of  North  Viet-Nam, 
and  fair  to  tliose  others  who  would  be  affected 
by  the  outcome. 

We  in  the  United  States  want  to  end  this  war, 
and  we  are  ready  to  take  every  reasonable  step 
to  acliieve  that  goal.  But  let  there  be  no  question 
on  this  one  fundamental  point:  In  good  con- 
science we  cannot — in  the  long-term  interests 
of  peace — we  will  not  accept  a  settlement  that 
would  arbitrarily  dictate  the  political  future 
of  South  Viet-Nam  and  deny  to  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam  the  basic  right  to  deter- 
mine their  own  future  free  of  any  outside 
interference. 

As  I  put  it  in  my  address  to  the  American 
people  last  May :  ^ 

What  the  United  States  wants  for  South  Viet-Nam 
is  not  the  important  thing.  TPhat  North  Viet-Nam  wants 
for  South  Viet-Nam  is  not  the  important  tiling.  What 
is  important  is  what  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam 
want  for  South  Viet-Nam. 

To  secure  this  right,  and  to  secure  this  princi- 
ple, is  our  one  limited  but  fundamental  objective, 

Both  in  public  and  at  the  Paris  talks,  we  have 
offered  a  number  of  proposals  which  would 
bring  peace  and  provide  self-determination. 
We  are  ready  to  consider  any  other  proposals 
that  have  the  same  objective.  The  missing  in- 
gredient so  far  has  been  the  willingness  of  the 
other  side  to  talk  on  any  terms  other  than  those 
that  would  predetermine  the  result  and  deny  the 
right  of  self-determination  to  the  people  of 
South  Viet-Nam.  Once  that  willingness  exists 
and  once  there  is  a  genuine  willingness  by  the 
other  side  to  reach  agreement,  the  practical 
solutions  can  readily  be  found. 

This  makes  it  urgent  that  the  U.N.  members, 

"  BtTLLETiN  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  457. 


298 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


those  in  this  room,  who  have  long  taken  an 
active  interest  in  peace  in  Viet-Nam,  now  take 
an  active  hand  in  achieving  it. 

Many  urged  that  if  only  we  halted  our 
bombing  of  the  North,  peace  would  follow. 
Nearly  a  year  has  passed  since  the  bombing  of 
the  North  was  halted. 

Three  months  have  passed  since  we  began  the 
process  of  troop  replacement,  signaling  both  our 
own  genuine  desire  for  a  settlement  and  the  in- 
creased readiness  of  the  South  Vietnamese  to 
manage  their  own  defense. 

As  I  announced  on  Tuesday,  by  December  15 
our  troop  strength  in  Viet-Nam  will  have  been 
reduced  by  a  minimimi  of  60,000  men.^ 

On  September  2,  1969,  North  Viet-Nam's 
chief  negotiator  in  Paris  said  that  if  the  United 
States  committed  itself  to  the  principle  of 
totally  withdrawing  its  forces  from  South 
Viet-Nam  and  if  it  withdrew  a  significant  num- 
ber of  troops,  Hanoi  would  take  this  into 
account. 

I  repeat  here  today  what  I  said  in  my  speech 
of  Slay  14 — that  we  are  prepared  to  withdraw 
all  of  our  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam.  And 
the  replacement  of  60,000  troops  is  a  significant 
step. 

The  time  has  come  for  the  other  side  to  re- 
spond to  these  initiatives.  The  time  has  come 
for  peace. 

And  in  the  name  of  peace,  I  urge  all  of  you 
here — representing  126  nations — to  use  your 
best  diplomatic  efforts  to  persuade  Hanoi  to 
move  seriously  into  the  negotiations  which 
could  end  this  war.  The  steps  we  have  taken 
have  been  responsive  to  views  expressed  in  this 
room.  And  we  hope  that  views  from  this  or- 
ganization may  also  be  influential  in  Hanoi.  If 
these  efforts  are  successful,  this  war  can  end. 

The  people  of  Viet-Nam,  North  and  South 
alike,  have  demonstrated  heroism  enough  to  last 
a  century.  And  I  speak  from  personal  observa- 
tion. I  have  been  to  North  Viet-Nam,  to  Hanoi 
in  1953,  and  all  over  South  Viet-Nam.  I  have 
seen  the  people  of  the  North  and  the  people  of 
the  South.  The  people  of  Viet-Nam,  North  and 
South,  have  endured  an  unspeakable  weight  of 
suffering  for  a  generation.  And  they  deserve  a 
better  futiu'e. 

Wlien  the  war  ends,  the  United  States  will 
stand  ready  to  help  the  people  of  Viet-Nam — 

'  See  p.  302. 


all  of  them — in  their  tasks  of  renewal  and  re- 
construction. And  when  peace  comes  at  last  to 
Viet-Nam,  it  can  truly  come  "with  healing  in 
its  wings." 

An   Era  of  Negotiation 

In  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
the  various  Commimist  powers,  I  have  said  that 
we  move  from  an  era  of  confrontation  to  an  era 
of  negotiation. 

I  believe  our  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
can  be  conducted  in  a  spirit  of  mutual  respect, 
recognizing  our  differences  and  also  our  right 
to  differ,  recognizing  our  divergent  interests  and 
also  our  common  interests,  recognizing  the  in- 
terests of  our  respective  allies  as  well  as  our  own. 

Now,  it  would  be  idle  to  pretend  that  there 
are  not  major  problems  between  us,  and  con- 
flicting interests.  The  tensions  of  the  past  30 
years  have  not  been  caused  by  mere  personal 
misunderstandings.  This  is  why  we  have  indi- 
cated the  need  for  extended  negotiations  on  a 
broad  front  of  issues. 

Already,  as  you  know,  we  have  had  extensive 
consultations  with  the  Soviet  Union  as  well  as 
with  others  about  the  Middle  East,  where  events 
of  the  past  few  days  point  up  anew  the  urgency 
of  a  stable  peace. 

The  United  States  continues  to  believe  that 
the  U.N.  cease-fire  resolutions  define  the  mini- 
mal conditions  that  must  prevail  on  the  groimd 
if  settlement  is  to  be  achieved  in  the  Middle 
East.  We  believe  the  Security  Council  resolution 
of  November  1967  charts  the  way  to  that 
settlement.* 

A  peace,  to  be  lasting,  must  leave  no  seeds  of 
a  future  war.  It  must  rest  on  a  settlement  which 
both  sides  have  a  vested  interest  in  maintaining. 

We  seek  a  settlement  based  on  respect  for  the 
sovereign  right  of  each  nation  in  the  area  to 
exist  within  secure  and  recognized  boundaries. 
We  are  convinced  that  peace  cannot  be  achieved 
on  the  basis  of  substantial  alterations  in  the 
map  of  the  Middle  East.  And  we  are  equally 
convinced  that  peace  cannot  be  achieved  on  the 
basis  of  anything  less  than  a  binding,  irrevo- 
cable commitment  by  the  parties  to  live  together 
in  peace. 

Failing  a  settlement,  an  agreement  on  the 


*  For  text  of  the  resolution,  see  Bttlletiw  of  Dec.  18, 
1967,  p.  843. 


October  6,  1969 


299 


limitation  of  the  shipment  of  arms  to  the 
Middle  East  might  heli)  to  stabilize  the  situa- 
tion. We  have  indicated  to  the  Soviet  Union, 
without  result,  our  willingness  to  enter  such 
discussions. 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

In  addition  to  our  talks  on  the  Middle  East, 
we  hope  soon  to  begin  talks  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  tlie  limitation  of  strategic  arms.  There 
is  no  more  important  task  before  us. 

The  date  we  proposed  for  the  opening  of  talks 
has  passed  for  lack  of  response.  We  remain 
ready  to  enter  negotiations. 

Since  the  United  States  first  proposed  stra- 
tegic arms  talks  3  years  ago,  the  task  of  devis- 
ing an  effective  agreement  has  become  more  dif- 
ficult. The  Soviet  Union  has  been  vigorously 
expanding  its  strategic  forces;  weapons  them- 
selves have  become  more  sophisticated,  more 
destructive.  But  as  the  difficulty  of  the  talks  in- 
creases, so,  too,  does  their  importance. 

Though  the  issues  are  complex,  we  are  pre- 
pared to  deal  with  them  seriously,  concretely, 
and  purposefully — and  to  make  a  determined 
effort  not  only  to  limit  the  buildup  of  strategic 
arms  but  to  reverse  it. 

Meanwhile,  I  want  to  affirm  our  support  for 
arms  control  proposals  which  we  hope  the 
Geneva  conference  will  place  before  this  As- 
sembly with  regard  to  the  seabed  and  chemical 
and  bacteriological  weapons.  We  hope  also  that 
the  Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty  will  soon 
enter  into  force. 

We  should  be  under  no  illusion,  however,  that 
arms  control  will  itself  bring  peace.  Wars  are 
fought  by  soldiers,  but  they  are  declared  by 
politicians.  Peace  also  requires  progress  on 
those  stubbornly  persistent  political  questions — 
questions  that  are  considered  in  tliis  room — 
questions  that  still  divide  the  world.  And  it  re- 
quires other  exchanges,  not  only  of  words  but  of 
deeds,  that  can  gradually  weave  a  fabric  of 
mutual  trust  among  the  nations  and  the  peoples 
of  the  world. 

We  intend  to  conduct  our  negotiations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  soberly  and  seriously,  neither 
encumbered  by  prejudice  nor  blinded  by  senti- 
mentality, seeking  to  reach  agreements  rather 
than  to  make  propaganda. 

T\1ienever  the  leaders  of  Communist  China 


choose  to  abandon  their  self-imposed  isolation, 
we  are  readj^  to  talk  with  them  in  the  same  frank 
and  serious  spirit. 

Building  the  Peace 

For  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century,  the  U.N. 
has  struggled  with  the  often  thankless  task  of 
peacekeeping.  As  we  look  to  the  future,  however, 
kee^nng  the  peace  is  only  part  of  our  task.  We 
also  must  concentrate  on  building  the  peace. 

Let  us  be  candid.  There  are  many  differ- 
ences—among the  great  powers  and  among 
others — wliich  as  realists  we  know  cannot  be 
resolved  quickly,  cannot  be  resolved  even  by 
tliis  organization.  But  we  also  know  that  there 
are  at  least  five  areas  in  particular  of  great  con- 
cern to  everyone  here  with  regard  to  which  there 
should  be  no  national  differences,  in  which  our 
interests  are  common,  and  on  which  there  should 
be  unanimity.  They  are  these : 

— Securing  the  safety  of  international  air 
travel. 

— Encouraging  international  volimteer  serv- 
ices. 

— Fostering  economic  development  and  popu- 
lation control. 

— Protecting  our  threatened  environment. 

— Exploring  the  frontiers  of  space. 

By  any  standards,  aircraft  hijackings  are 
morally,  politically,  and  legally  indefensible. 
The  Tokyo  Convention  has  now  been  brought 
into  force,  providing  for  prompt  release  of  pas- 
sengers, crew,  and  aircraft.  Along  with  other 
nations,  we  also  are  working  on  a  new  conven- 
tion for  the  punislunent  of  liijackers.  But 
neither  of  these  conventions  can  be  fully  ef- 
fective without  cooperation ;  sky  piracy  cannot 
be  ended  as  long  as  the  pirates  receive  asylum. 

Consequently,  I  urge  the  United  Nations  to 
give  high  priority  to  this  matter.  This  is  an 
issue  which  transcends  politics ;  there  is  no  need 
for  it  to  become  the  subject  of  polemics  or  a 
focus  of  political  differences.  It  mvolves  the 
interests  of  every  nation,  the  safety  of  every 
air  passenger,  and  the  integrity  of  that  struc- 
ture of  order  on  which  a  world  community 
depends. 

The  creative,  dynamic  kind  of  peace  I  have 
spoken  of,  of  course,  requires  more  than  such 
basic  protections  as  the  one  I  have  just  de- 
scribed. 


300 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


To  build  this  kind  of  peace,  we  must  join  to- 
gether in  building  our  societies — in  raising  a 
great  cathedral  of  the  spirit,  which  celebrates 
the  infinite  possibilities  of  man  himself. 

Such  a  peace  requires  a  fuller  enlistment  not 
only  of  government  resources  and  of  private 
enterprise  resources  but  also  of  the  dedication 
and  skill  of  those  thousands  of  people  all  over 
the  world  who  are  ready  to  volunteer  in  the 
cause  of  human  acliievement.  Our  own  Peace 
Corps  has  helped  in  many  countries.  And  I  es- 
pecially welcome  the  consideration  of  the  U.N. 
itself,  which  it  is  now  giving  to  establislrment  of 
an  international  volunteer  corps.  We  stand 
ready  to  give  this  exciting  new  venture  our  full 
and  enthusiastic  cooperation. 

U.N.  Second  Development  Decade 

As  the  U.N".  looks  toward  the  beginning  of 
its  Second  Development  Decade,  it  faces  a  time 
of  enormous  challenge  but  enormous  oppor- 
tunity. 

We  can  only  guess  at  the  new  scientific  dis- 
coveries that  the  seventies  may  bring.  But  we 
can  see  with  chilling  clarity  the  gap  that  already 
exists  between  the  developed  economies  and  the 
economies  of  the  developing  countries  and  the 
urgent  need  for  international  cooperation  in 
spurring  economic  development. 

If  in  the  course  of  that  Second  Development 
Decade  we  can  make  both  significant  gains  in 
food  production  and  significant  reductions  in 
the  rate  of  population  growth,  we  shall  have 
opened  the  way  to  a  new  era  of  splendid  pros- 
perity. If  we  do  only  one  without  the  other,  we 
shall  be  standing  still;  and  if  we  fail  in  both, 
great  areas  of  the  world  will  face  human 
disaster. 

Increasingly,  the  task  of  protecting  man's  en- 
vironment is  a  matter  of  international  concern. 
Pollution  of  air  and  water,  upsetting  the 
balance  of  nature — these  are  not  only  local 
problems,  and  not  only  national  problems,  but 
matters  that  affect  the  basic  relationships  of 
man  to  his  planet. 

The  United  Nations  already  is  planning  a 
conference  on  the  environment  in  1972. 1  pledge 
the  strongest  support  of  the  United  States  for 
that  effort.  I  hope  that  even  before  then  we  can 
launch  new  national  and  international  initia- 
tives toward  restoring  the  balance  of  nature 


and  maintaining  our  world  as  a  healthy  and 
hospitable  place  for  man. 

Of  all  of  man's  great  enterprises,  none  lends 
itself  more  logically  or  more  compellingly  to 
international  cooperation  than  the  venture  into 
space.  Here,  truly,  mankind  is  one:  as  fellow 
creatures  from  the  planet  earth  exploring  the 
heavens  that  all  of  us  enjoy. 

The  journey  of  Apollo  11  to  the  moon  and 
back  was  not  an  end,  but  the  beginning. 

Sharing  the  Benefits  of  Space  Technology 

There  will  be  new  journeys  of  discovery.  Be- 
yond this,  we  are  just  beginning  to  comprehend 
the  benefits  that  space  technology  can  yield 
here  on  earth.  And  the  potential  is  enormous. 

For  example,  we  now  are  developing  earth 
resource  survey  satellites,  with  the  first  experi- 
mental satellite  to  be  launched  sometime  early 
in  the  decade  of  the  seventies. 

Present  indications  are  that  these  satellites 
should  be  capable  of  yielding  data  which  could 
assist  in  as  widely  varied  tasks  as  these :  the  lo- 
cation of  schools  of  fish  in  the  oceans,  the  loca- 
tion of  mineral  deposits  on  land,  and  the  health 
of  agricultural  crops. 

I  feel  it  is  only  right  that  we  should  share 
both  the  adventures  and  the  benefits  of  space. 
As  an  example  of  our  plans,  we  have  deter- 
mined to  take  actions  with  regard  to  earth  re- 
source satellites  as  this  program  proceeds  and 
fulfills  its  promise. 

The  purpose  of  those  actions  is  that  this  pro- 
gram will  be  dedicated  to  produce  information 
not  only  for  the  United  States  but  also  for  the 
world  community.  We  shall  be  putting  several 
proposals  in  this  respect  before  the  United 
Nations. 

These  are  among  the  positive,  concrete  steps 
we  intend  to  take  toward  internationalizing 
man's  epic  venture  into  space — an  adventure 
that  belongs  not  to  one  nation  but  to  all  man- 
kind and  one  that  should  be  marked  not  by 
rivalry  biit  by  the  same  spirit  of  fraternal  co- 
operation that  has  so  long  been  the  hallmark 
of  the  international  community  of  science. 

And  now,  Madam  President,  Mr.  Secretary 
General,  if  I  could  speak  a  personal  word  to 
the  representatives  gathered  in  this  room : 

I  recognize  that  those  here  are  dedicating 
their  lives  to  the  cause  of  peace  and  that  in  this 
room,  what  is  done  here,  will  have  an  enormous 
effect  on  the  future  of  peace. 


October  6,   1969 


301 


I  have  had  the  great  privilege  over  the  past 
23  years  to  travel  to  most  of  the  countries  rep- 
resented in  this  room.  I  have  met  most  of  the 
leaders  of  the  nations  represented  in  this  room. 
And  I  have  seen  literally  thousands  of  people 
in  most  of  the  countries  represented  in  this 
room. 

There  are  differences  between  the  nations  and 
differences  between  the  leaders  and  differences 
between  the  peoples  in  this  world.  But  based 
on  my  own  experience,  of  this  one  thing  I  am 
sure:  The  people  of  the  world,  wherever  they 
are,  want  peace.  And  those  of  us  who  have  the 
responsibilities  for  leadership  in  the  world 
have  an  overwhelming  world  mandate  from  the 
people  of  the  nations  we  represent  to  bring 
peace,  to  keep  the  peace,  and  to  build  the  peace. 

Now,  I  realize  that  a  survey  of  history  might 
discourage  those  who  seek  to  establish  peace. 
But  we  have  entered  a  new  age,  different  not 
only  in  degree  but  in  kind  from  any  that  has 
ever  gone  before. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  we  have  truly  become 
a  single  world  community. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  we  have  seen  the  stag- 
gering fury  of  the  power  of  the  universe  un- 
leashed ;  and  we  know  that  we  hold  that  power 
in  a  very  precarious  balance. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  technological  advance 
has  brought  within  reach  what  once  was  only 
a  poignant  dream  for  hundreds  of  millions — 
freedom  from  hunger  and  freedom  from  want  ; 
want  and  hunger  tliat  I  have  personally  seen  in 
nation  after  nation  all  over  this  world. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  we  have  seen  changes 
in  a  single  lifetime — in  our  lifetime — that 
dwarf  the  achievements  of  centuries  before; 
and  those  changes  continue  to  accelerate. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  man  has  stepped  be- 
yond his  planet  and  revealed  us  to  ourselves  as 
"riders  on  the  earth  together,"  bound  insepa- 
rably on  this  one  bright,  beautiful  speck  in  the 
heavens,  so  tiny  in  the  universe  and  so  incom- 
parably welcoming  as  a  home  for  man. 

In  this  new  age  of  "firsts,"  even  the  goal  of 
a  just  and  lasting  peace  is  a  "first"  we  can  dare 
to  strive  for.  We  must  achieve  it.  And  I  believe 
we  can  achieve  it. 

In  that  spirit,  then,  let  us  press  t-oward  an 
open  world — a  world  of  open  doors,  open  hearts, 
open  minds;  a  world  open  t/O  the  exchange  of 
ideas  and  of  people  and  open  to  the  reach  of  the 
human  spirit;  a  world  open  in  the  search  for 
truth  and  unconcerned  with  the  fate  of  old  dog- 


mas and  old  isms;  a  world  open  at  last  to  the 
light  of  justice  and  the  light  of  reason  and  to 
the  achievement  of  that  true  peace  which  the 
people  of  every  land  carry  in  their  hearts  and 
celebrate  in  their  hopes. 


President  Nixon  Reduces 
Troop  Ceiling  in  Viet-Nam 

Statement  hy  President  Nixon  ^ 

After  careful  consideration  with  my  senior 
civilian  and  military  advisers  and  in  full  con- 
sultation with  the  Government  of  Viet-Nam,  I 
have  decided  to  reduce  the  authorized  troop 
ceiling  in  Viet-Nam  to  484,000  by  December  15. 
This  compares  with  the  ceiling  of  549,500  which 
existed  when  this  administration  took  office. 
Under  the  newly  authorized  troop  ceiling,  a 
minimum  of  60,000  troops  will  have  been  with- 
drawn from  Viet-Nam  by  December  15.^ 

Since  coming  into  office,  my  administration 
has  made  major  efforts  to  bring  an  end  to  the 
war: 

— "We  have  renounced  an  imposed  military 
solution. 

— We  have  proposed  free  elections  orga- 
nized by  joint  commissions  under  international 
supervision. 

— We  have  offered  the  withdrawal  of  U.S. 
and  Allied  forces  over  a  12-month  period. 

— We  have  declared  that  we  would  retain  no 
military  bases. 

— We  have  offered  to  negotiate  supervised 
cease-fires  under  international  supervision  to 
facilitate  the  process  of  mutual  withdrawal. 

— We  have  made  clear  that  we  would  settle 
for  the  de  facto  removal  of  North  Vietnamese 
forces  so  long  as  there  are  guarantees  against 
their  return. 

— We  and  the  Government  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  have  announced  that  we  are  prepared  to 


'Issued  on  Sopt.  16  (White  House  press  release). 

^  .\ctually,  the  tot.al  reduction  in  authorized  ceiling 
strength  amounts  to  6.5.500.  But  within  tlie  authorized 
ceiling,  all  units  are  shown  at  100  percent  strength.  In 
actual  practice,  most  units  are  slightly  below  full 
strength,  .so  that  actual  strength  normally  is  less  than 
the  authorized  ceiling  by  1  or  2  percent.  [Footnote  in 
White  House  press  release.] 


302 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


accept  any  political  outcome  which  is  arrived 
at  through  free  elections. 

— ^We  are  prepared  to  discuss  the  10-point 
program  of  the  other  side  together  with  plans 
put  forward  by  the  other  parties. 

— In  short,  the  only  item  which  is  not 
negotiable  is  the  right  of  the  peofile  of  South 
Viet-Nam  to  determine  their  own  future  free 
of  outside  interference. 

I  reiterate  all  these  proposals  today. 

The  withdrawal  of  60,000  troops  is  a  sig- 
nificant step. 

The  time  for  meaningful  negotiations  has 
therefore  arrived. 

I  realize  that  it  is  difficult  to  commimicate 
across  the  gulf  of  5  years  of  war.  But  the  time 
has  come  to  end  this  war.  Let  liistory  record 
that  at  this  critical  moment,  both  sides  turned 
their  faces  toward  peace  rather  than  toward 
conflict  and  war. 


34th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  text  of  the  opening  statement 
made  by  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head 
of  the  U.S.  delegation,  at  the  34th  plenary  ses- 
sion of  the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
September  18. 

Press  release  269  dated  September  18 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  At  the  past  33  meet- 
ings our  side  has  made  a  number  of  proposals 
for  negotiations  which  could  lead  to  the  end  of 
the  conflict  in  Viet-Nam.  We  have  also  taken  a 
number  of  concrete  steps  designed  to  open  the 
way  to  peace. 

In  accordance  with  tliis  policy,  President 
Nixon,  on  September  16,  made  the  following 
announcement : 

[Here  Ambassador  Lodge  read  the  test  of  the  Presi- 
dent's statement  priated  above.] 

The  President's  statement  makes  clear  our 
desire  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
war  in  Viet-Nam.  We  have  gone  far  in  opening 
the  door  to  negotiations  which  could  bring 
peace.  As  the  President  said  on  July  30,^  it  is 


'  For  President  Nixon's  statement  issued  at  Saigon  on 
July  30,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  25,  1969,  p.  155. 


now  time  for  your  side  to  sit  down  with  us  to 
talk  seriously  about  ways  to  stop  the  kUling,  to 
negotiate,  and  thus  to  put  an  end  to  this  tragic 
war  which  has  brought  so  great  destruction  to 
friend  and  foe  alike. 


Governor  Rockefeller  Reports 
on  Mission  to  Latin  America 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon  to  Governor  Nelson  A.  Rochefeller 
which  was  made  public  following  their  meeting 
at  San  Clemente,  Calif.,  on  September  3. 

White    House    press    release    (San   Clemente,    Calif.)    dated 
September  3 

Septembek  3,  1969 
Deak  Nelson  :  As  you  know,  it  was  my  convic- 
tion from  the  earliest  moment  of  my  Admin- 
istration that  our  policies  toward  Latin  America 
and  tlie  way  in  which  we  conceived  of  our  rela- 
tionships with  the  other  nations  of  this  hemi- 
sphere needed  a  fresh  and  comprehensive 
re-examination.  It  was  evident  during  the  past 
several  years  that  the  area  had  been  experienc- 
ing profound  change  which  had  deeply  affected 
institutions,  attitudes  and  relationships,  and  had 
set  in  motion  new  dynamics  of  which  we  were 
only  beginning  to  be  aware.  Yet  the  assumptions 
and  conceptions  that  guided  our  policj'  had  re- 
mained relatively  static  during  this  same  period. 
I  concluded,  therefore,  that  it  would  bo  ad- 
visable to  send  a  mission  to  the  other  American 
Eepublics  to  consult  with  leaders  and  people, 
to  listen  to  their  points  of  view  and  then  to  rec- 
ommend to  me  measures  that  we  could  take  to 
develop  new  policies,  and  more  effective  rela- 
tionships. As  you  know,  during  my  first  day  in 
office,  I  discussed  the  question  of  U.S.-Latin 
American  relations  with  Galo  Plaza,  Secretary 
General  of  the  OAS,  and  he  suggested  that  you 
be  asked  to  head  such  a  mission. 

I  cannot  express  to  you  adequately  enough  my 
appreciation  and  admiration  for  the  dedicated, 
courageous  and  efficient  way  in  which  you  and 
your  associates  carried  out  this  trust.  I  consider 
this  inconvenience  and  sacrifice  of  time  to  have 
been  tremendously  useful  and  worthwhile.  It 
has  dramatized  our  concern  with  the  relation- 
ships that  unite  us  with  our  sister  Republics,  it 
has  focused  attention  on  the  problems  and  con- 
cerns of  our  neighbors  and  it  has  provided  the 


October  6,   1969 


303 


Administration  with  an  informed  and  fresh 
perspective  of  our  relationships  and  policies. 

I  consider  your  mission  in  all  of  its  aspects — 
both  the  personal  contacts  and  the  analysis  and 
recommendations  you  are  now  submitting — to 
have  constituted  a  signal  contribution  to  our 
Latin  American  policy.  Your  report  and  its  rec- 
ommendations will  be  a  central  point  of  refer- 
ence m  the  formulation  of  new  policies  toward 
the  other  nations  of  the  hemisphere.  I  will  sub- 
mit your  report  and  its  proposals  very  promptly 
to  the  National  Security  Council  for  its  studj' 
and  appropriate  action,  and  I  am  confidert  that 
these  recommendations  will  play  a  vital  part  in 
the  construction  of  sensitive  new  concepts  and 
programs. 

Please  accept  again  my  very  sincere  gratitude 
and  appreciation  for  all  that  you  have  done,  and 
for  the  devotion  and  dedication  which  you 
brought  to  this  task.  Please  express  my  appre- 
ciation as  well  to  your  staff  and  to  the  advisors 
who  also  gave  so  generously  and  unselfishly  of 
their  time  and  energy. 

With  warmest  personal  regards, 

Richard  Nixon 

Honorable  Nelsox  A.  Rockefeller 
Governor  of  the  State  of  Neio  York 
Albany,  New  York 


Department  Establishes  New  Bureau 
of  Politico-Military  Affairs 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 19  (press  release  273)  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Bureau  of  Politico-Military  Af- 
fairs. The  new  bureau  replaces  the  OfBce  of  the 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Polit- 
ico-Military Affairs. 

The  Bureau  of  Politico-Military  Affairs  will 


be  responsible  for  liaison  between  the  Depart- 
ments of  State  and  Defense  and  will  be  anal- 
ogous to  the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense  for  International  Security  Affairs.  It 
will  also  have  responsibilitj'  within  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  for  international  security  policy 
and  operations,  for  atomic  energy  and  aerospace 
matters,  for  munitions  control,  military  assist- 
ance, and  sales  policy  and  disarmament. 

The  bureau  will  be  headed  by  a  Director,  who 
will  have  rank  equivalent  to  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State. 

Ronald  Spiers,  formerly  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Politico-Military  Affairs,  will  be 
the  first  Director  of  the  bureau.  Thomas  Picker- 
ing will  be  Deputy  Director.  (For  additional 
biographic  data,  see  press  release  273.) 


Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Delegation 
to  24th  U.N.  General  Assembly 

The  Senate  on  September  12  confirmed  the 
nominations  of  the  following  to  be  representa- 
tives and  alternate  representatives  of  the  United 
States  to  the  24th  session  of  the  General  As- 
sembly of  the  United  Nations: 

Representatives 

Charles  W.  Tost 

William  B.  Buffum 

Dante  B.  Fascell,  U.S.  Representative  from  the 

State  of  Florida 
J.  Irving  Whalley,  U.S.  Representative  from  the 

State  of  Pennsylvania 
Shirley  Temple  Black 

Alternate  Representatives 

Christopher  H.  Phillips 
Glenn  A.  Olds 
Rita  E.  Hauser 
William  T.  Coleman 
Joseph  E.  Johnson 


304 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND   CONFERENCES 


Calendar  of  International  Conferences  ^ 

Scheduled  October  Through  December 

Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament Geneva Mar.  14,  1962- 

ITU/CCIR  Study  Group  I,  II,  III,  VIII,  and  XIII Geneva Oct.  1-15 

UNESCO  International  Hydrologioal  Decade:  8th  Session  of  the  Bureau  Paris Oct.  2-3 

of  the  Coordinating  Council. 

OECD  Maritime  Transport  Committee Paris Oct.  2-3 

OECD  Trade  Committee:  Working  Party  on  Government  Procurement  Paris Oct.  6  (1  day) 

FAO  Committee  on  Control  of  Desert  Locust:  13th  Session Rome Oct.  6-10 

ECE  Timber  Committee:  27th  Session Geneva Oct.  6-10 

BIRPI/UNIDO  Joint  Meeting  of  Experts  on  the  Organization  and  Ad-  Vienna Oct.  6-10 

k^ ministration  of  Industrial  Property  Offices. 

UNESCO/ WMO  Joint  Conference  on  International  Cooperation  in  Re-  Paris Oct.  6-11 

suits  of  the  International  Hydrological  Decade  on  International  Co- 
operation in  Hydrologj''. 

WMO  Regional  Association  I  (Africa) :  5th  Session Geneva Oct.  6-18 

UNCTAD  Committee  on  Tungsten:  6th  Session Geneva Oct.  6-24 

IMCO  International  Tug  Conference London Oct.  7-9 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Accession  of  Romania Geneva Oct.  7-10 

ICAO  Sonic  Boom  Panel:  1st  Meeting Montreal Oct.  7-18 

OECD  Trade  Committee:  Working  Party  on  Preferences Paris Oct.  8-10 

South  Pacific  Conference Noumea Oct.  8-17 

Northeast  Atlantic  Fisheries  Commission:  Special  Meeting London Oct.  9-10 

Inter-American  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Labor:  3d  Session Washington  ....  Oct.  10-17 

ECE  Ad  Hoc  Meeting  of  Rapporteurs  on  Automation Geneva Oct.  13-14 

GATT  Committee  on  Agriculture Geneva Oct.  13-15 

GATT  Budget  Committee Geneva Oct.  13-17 

FAO  Intergovernmental  Committee  of  the  World  Food  Program    .    .    .  Rome Oct.  13-18 

International  Criminal  Police  Organization:  38th  General  Assembly  .    .  Mexico  City     .    .    .  Oct.  13-18 

GATT  Committee  on  Trade  in  Industrial  Products Geneva Oct.  13-24 

ILO  Tripartite  Technical  Meeting  for  Leather  and  Footwear  Industry  .  Geneva Oct.  13-24 

Consultative    Committee    on    Cooperative   Economic    Development   in  Victoria,  B.C    .    .    .  Oct.  14-31 
South  and  Southeast  Asia  (Colombo  Plan) :  20th  Session. 

GATT  Technical  Experts  on  Tariff  Study Geneva Oct.  15-17 

OECD  Industry  Committee Paris      Oct.  15-17 

IMCO  Working  Group  on  Technical  Assistance:  1st  Session London Oct.  15-30 

IMCO  Maritime  Safety  Committee:  20th  Session London Oct.  15-30 

IMCO  Assembly:  6th  Session London Oct.  15-30 

IMCO  Council:  23d  Session London Oct.  15-30 

OECD  Short-Term  Forecasters Paris Oct.  16-17 

ECE  Group  of  Experts  on  Gas  Statistics:  10th  Session Geneva Oct.  20-22 

South  Pacific  Commission:  32d  Session Noumea Oct.  20-24 

ECE  Committee  on  the  Development  of  Trade Geneva Oct.  20-24 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Border  Tax  Adjustment Geneva Oct.  20-24 

lA-ECOSOC  Meeting  at  the  Expert  Level Washington      .    .    .  Oct.  20-28 

WMO  Commission  for  Climatology:  5th  Session Geneva Oct.  20-31 


'  This  schedule,  which  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  International  Conferences  on  September  16,  1969,  Usts 
international  conferences  in  which  the  U.S.  Government  expects  to  participate  officially  in  the  period  October- 
December  1969.  Nongovernmental  conferences  and  meetings  are  not  included ;  these  are  listed  in  tlie  World  List  of 
Future  International  Meetings,  compiled  by  the  Library  of  Congress  and  available  from  the  Suijerintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

Following  is  a  key  to  the  abbreviations :  BIRPI,  United  International  Bureaux  for  the  Protection  of  Intel- 
lectual Property;  COIR,  International  Radio  Consultative  Committee;  CCITT,  InternaUonal  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative  Committee;  CENTO,  Central  Treaty  Organization;  ECAFE,  Economic  Commission  for 
Asia  and  the  Far  East;  ECE,  Economic  Commission  for  Europe;  ECOSOC,  Economic  and  Social  Council;  FAO, 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization;  GATT,  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade;  lA-ECOSOC,  Inter- 
American  Economic  and  Social  Council;  ICAO,  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization;  ICEM,  Intergovern- 
mental Committee  for  European  Migration ;  ILO,  International  Labor  Organization ;  IMCO,  Intergovernmental 
Maritime  Con.sultative  Organization;  IOC,  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic  Commission;  ITU,  International 
Telecommunication  Union;  OECD,  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development;  PAHC,  Pan 
American  Highway  Congresses;  UNCTAD,  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development;  UNESCO, 
United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization;  UNIDO,  United  Nations  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization;  WMO,  World  Meteorological  Organization. 

October  6,   1969  305 


ECE  Steel  Committee:  37th  Session Geneva Oct.  21-24 

FAO  Committee  on  Forest  Development  in  the  Tropics Rome Oct.  21-24 

FAO  Council:  53d  Session Rome Oct.  27  (1  day) 

OECD  Trade  Committee Paris Oct.  27-28 

GATT  Committee  on  Residual  Restrictions Geneva Oct.  27-29 

ECE/FAO  Codex  Group  of  Experts  on  Standardization  of  Fruit  Juices     .      Geneva Oct.  27-31 

CENTO  Council  for  Scientific  Education  and  Research:  18th  Session  Washington      .    .    .  Oct.  27-31 

UNCTAU  Permanent  Group  on  Synthetics  and  Substitutes:  3d  Session  .      Geneva Oct.  27-31 

ECOSOC  Group  of  Experts  on  Explosives Geneva Oct.  27-Nov.  7 

ECOSOC  Committee  of  Experts  on  the  Transport  of  Dangerous  Goods     .      Geneva Oct.  27-Nov.  7 

ECAFE  Transport  and  Communications  Committee:   10th  Session  of  New  Delhi    ....  Oct.  27-Nov.  10 

the  Railway  Subcommittee. 

FAO  Conference:  loth  Session Rome Oct.  28-Nov.  27 

OECD  Fisheries  Committee Paris October 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Association Geneva October 

UNCTAD  Committee  on  Preferences Geneva October 

Hague  Conference  on  Private  International  Law:  Special  Commission  The  Hague  ....  October 

on  Letters  Rogatory. 

International  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commission:  Annual  Meeting     .    .  Vancouver    ....  October  or 

November 

GATT  Committee  on  Trade  and  Development Geneva Nov.  3-7 

PAHC  Technical  Committee  on  Traffic  and  Safety Washington  ....  Nov.  3-7 

ECOSOC  Population  Commission:  15th  Session New  York    ....  Nov.  3-14 

ECE   Group  of  Rapporteurs  on  Customs  Questions  Concerning  Con-     Geneva Nov.  5-7 

tatners. 

Inter-American  Specialized  Conference  on  Human  Rights San  Jos6 Nov.  7-22 

GATT  Working  Party  on  Trade  with  Poland Geneva Nov.  10-14 

ILO  Governing  Body:  177th  Session Geneva Nov.  10-21 

IMCO  International  Legal  Conference  on  Marine  Pollution  Damage  .    .      Brussels Nov.  10-28 

GATT  Committee  on  Balance  of  Payments Geneva Nov.  11-21 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  on  Patents Strasbourg    ....  Nov.  12-14 

OECD  Manpower  and  Social  Affairs  Committee Paris Nov.  12-14 

OECD  Science  Policy  Committee Paris Nov.  12-14 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee Paris Nov.  17  (1  day) 

ECE  Senior  Economic  Advisers Geneva Nov.  17-22 

OECD  Economic  Policy  Committee:  Working  Party  III Paris Nov.  18  (1  day) 

ICAO  Limited  European  and  Mediterranean  Conference  on  Rules  of     Paris Nov.  18-Dec.  6 

the    Air,    Air    Tratfiic    Control/Communications,    and    Regional    Air 

Navigation. 

Plenipotentiary  Conference  on  Definitive  Arrangements  for  the  Inter-  Washington  ....  Nov.  IS-Dec.  15 

national  Telecommunications  Satellite  Consortium:  3d  Session. 

ICAO  Panel  on  the  Study  of  Economics  of  Route  Air  Facilities:  3d     Montreal Nov.  24-28 

Meeting. 

ECE  Committee  on  Electric  Power Geneva Nov.  24-28 

ECOSOC  Advisory  Committee  on  the  Application  of  Science  and  Tech-  Addis  Ababa    .    .    .  Nov.  24-Dec.  5 

nology  to  Development:  12th  Session. 

ICAO  Special  Conference  on  Aircraft  Noise Montreal Nov.  25-Dec.  17 

FAO  Council:  54th  Session Rome Nov.  28  (1  day) 

FAO    Conference    on    Animal    Production    and    Health    in    Africa:    2d     Kinshasa Nov.  28-Dec.  6 

Session. 

IOC  Cooperative  Investigation  of  Caribbean  and  Adjacent  Regions:  3d  undetermined  .    .    .  November 

Session. 

International  Coffee  Organization:  Executive  Board London November 

International  Lead  and  Zinc  Study  Group:  13th  Session Mexico  City     .    .    .  November 

ICEM  Council:  31st  Session Geneva November 

ICEM  Executive  Committee:  33d  Session Geneva November 

PAHC  Permanent  Executive  Committee Lima November 

OECD  Energy  Committee Paris November 

OECD  Comniittee  on  Scientific  and  Technical  Personnel Paris November 

OECD  Special  Committee  for  Textiles Paris November 

OECD  Agriculture  Committee Paris November 

OECD  Committee  for  Research  Cooperation Paris November 

lA-ECOSOC  Meeting  at  the  Ministerial  Level Caracas Dec.  1-9 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Fire  Protection:  9th  Session London Dec.  2-5 

UNESCO  Meeting  of  Governmental  Experts  on  International  Arrange-      Paris Dec.  2-9 

ments  to  Promote  Use  of  Space  Communications. 

ECE  Working  Party  on  Customs  Questions  Affecting  Transport     .    .    .      Geneva Dec.  8-12 

UNESCO  Council  of  the  International  Bureau  of  Education Geneva Dec.  8-12 

IMCO  Subcommittee  on  Subdivision  and  Stability:   10th  Session    .    .    .      London Dec.  9-12 

UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Committee  of  the  Rome  Convention  on     Paris Dec.  10-13 

Neighboring  Rights:  2d  Session. 
UNESCO  Intergovernmental  Copyright  Committee:  10th  Session. 
IMCO  Working  Group  on  Containers  and  Cargoes:  9th  Session. 
ECE  Committee  on  Agricultural  Problems:  21st  Plenary  Session 

ILO/IMCO  Committee  on  M.aritime  Safety  Training 

ITU/CCITT  Study  Group  III:   Working  Group  on  Tariff    .    .    . 

International  Wool  Study  Group:  10th  Session 

OECD  Committee  of  Experts  on  Restrictive  Business  Practices  . 


Geneva Dec.  1.5-19 

London Dec.  16-19 

Geneva December 

Geneva December 

Geneva December 

London December 

Paris December 


306  Department  of  State   Bulletin 


U.S.  Abstains  on  Security  Council  Resolution 
Linking  Mosque  Fire  to  Middle  East  Conflict 


Following  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  on  Sejdember  15  iy  U.S.  Rep- 
resentative Charles  W.  Yost,  together  tcith  the 
text  of  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Council  that 
day. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  YOST 

U.S./O.N.  press  release  98  dated  September  15 

The  United  States  was  profoundly  shocked 
and  dismayed  by  the  fire  on  Aug:iist  21  at  the  Al 
Aqsa  Jlosque  in  occupied  Jerusalem.  "We  under- 
stand and  are  deeply  moved  by  the  evidence  of 
genuine  concern  and  devotion  that  this  unfor- 
tunate incident  has  evoked  from  Moslems  the 
world  over.  In  addition  to  the  special  grief  felt 
by  all  the  followers  of  Islam,  the  damage  to  that 
historic  shrine  and  to  its  priceless  furnishings 
is  mourned  as  a  heavy  loss  of  part  of  the  spirit- 
ual legacy  of  all  mankind. 

We  respect  the  concerns  expressed  by  25  mem- 
bers in  their  message  to  the  President  of  the  Se- 
curity Comicil  of  August  22/  which,  as  we 
understand  them,  are  essentially  threefold. 

First,  we  would  agree  that  the  facts  surround- 
ing this  tragedy  must  be  mvestigated  thoroughly 
and  impartially.  To  do  any  less  would  be  to  en- 
courage suspicion,  emotionalism,  and  fanaticism. 

Secondly,  we  see  merit  in  the  proposal  that  a 
group  of  distinguished  Moslems  assist  m  deter- 
mining the  extent  of  the  damage  to  the  mosque 
and  be  associated  with  the  necessary  rei^airs.  We 
were  pleased  to  hear  Ambassador  Tekoah  [  Yosef 
Tekoah,  Eepresentative  of  Israel]  state  that  his 
Govermnent  has  no  objections  to  this  proposal. 
Such  a  step  would  be  entirely  consistent  with 
our  views  on  the  major  role  of  the  religious  com- 
munities in  Jerusalem  and  with  the  widely 
shared  view  that  Jerusalem  is  a  legitimate  con- 
cern of  the  international  community. 

Thirdly,  I  believe  there  is  no  disagreement  on 
the  necessity  for  more  adequate  precautions 
against  repetition  of  such  a  desecration. 


'  U.N.  doc.  S/9407. 


Having  said  this,  1  wish  to  make  it  clear  that 
my  Government's  deep  and  abiding  interest  in 
Jerusalem  has  caused  it  to  examine  very  care- 
fully the  facts  that  are  so  far  available.  Without 
attempting  to  prejudge  the  findings  of  compe- 
tent investigations,  let  me  say  that  we  have 
seen  no  shred  of  evidence  to  support  the  alle- 
gation that  the  act  of  suspected  arson  which 
occurred  at  the  Haram-as-Sharif  on  August  21 
was  other  than  an  individual  act,  as  demented 
as  it  was  dastardly.  We  would  think  it  most  un- 
fortunate if  the  international  community,  which 
itself  shares  a  deep  interest  in  Jerusalem's 
shrines,  were  diverted  from  formulating  a  posi- 
tive response  to  the  present  situation  by  incite- 
ments or  allegations  in  support  of  other  objec- 
tives. This  Council  cannot  lend  itself  to  any  such 
incitements  or  allegations.  Our  real  interest  lies 
in  ensuring  that  the  full  facts  regarding  the 
fire  and  the  circumstances  surrounding  it  are 
brought  to  light  in  a  manner  which  satisfies  the 
legitimate  interests  and  concerns  of  Moslems 
and  others  throughout  the  world. 

My  Government  notes  the  steps  taken  im- 
mediately by  the  Government  of  Israel  to  in- 
stitute a  broadly  based  commission  of  inquiry 
which  contains  representatives  of  all  three  great 
religions  which  have  holy  places  in  Jerusalem. 
We  welcome  Israel's  announcement  that  the 
hearings  of  the  commission  of  inquii-y  and  the 
trial  of  the  suspected  arsonist  will  be  public 
and  open  to  observers  from  any  country  or  faith. 

Several  speakers  have  already  referred  to  the 
1954  Convention  and  Protocol  for  the  Protec- 
tion of  Cultural  Property  in  the  Event  of  Armed 
Conflict,  to  which  Israel  and  the  Arab  states 
are  parties  and  to  which  they  have  already  had 
recourse  at  the  suggestion  of,  and  through  ma- 
chinery set  up  with  the  assistance  of,  the  Direc- 
tor General  of  UNESCO.  The  application  of 
this  convention  in  the  Arab-Israeli  area  appears 
to  have  proceeded  rather  smootUy.  We  view 
Ambassador  Tekoah's  remarks  as  indicating 
that  the  Government  of  Israel  is  prepared  to 
continue  to  cooperate  with  the  Director  General 


October  6,   1969 


307 


of  UNESCO  in  applying  this  convention.  It  is 
therefore  entirely  possible  that  it  could  also 
be  applied  in  a  satisfactory  manner  to  assist  in 
resolving  the  legitimate  question  regarding  the 
circumstances  of  the  fire  at  the  Al  Aqsa  Mosque. 
It  might  also  serve  as  a  basis  for  facilitating 
measures  to  gviai'd  against  future  tragedies  of 
tliis  nature  pending  the  achievement  of  a  just 
and  lasting  peace  in  the  area,  including  closer 
communication  and  planning  between  Moslem 
representatives  on  one  hand  and  the  occupation 
authorities  on  the  other. 

Mr.  President,  barely  9  weeks  have  passed 
since  this  Council  unanimously  reaffirmed  the 
special  interest  of  the  international  community 
in  the  city  of  Jerusalem.  On  that  occasion,  I 
elaborated  in  some  detail  the  position  of  the 
United  States  on  the  subject  of  Israel's  responsi- 
bilities as  an  occupying  power.^  That  position 
has  not  changed.  It  remains  as  I  stated  it  on 
that  occasion. 

We  do  not  consider  that  it  is  appropriate  or 
desirable  so  soon  again  to  reexamine  and  ]iro- 
nounce  upon  the  status  of  Jerusalem  or  to  link 
the  deplorable  fire  in  Al  Aqsa  to  the  whole 
tragic  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  We  regi-et  that  the 
draft  resolution  wliich  we  have  before  us  has 
gone  so  far  beyond  the  purpose,  as  we  under- 
stood it,  for  which  the  Security  Council  was 
called  mto  session.  We  were  hoping  for  a  resolu- 
tion which  would  concern  itself  directly  and  ex- 
clusively with  measures  for  the  maintenance, 
repair,  and  protection  of  the  holy  places, 
including  provision  for  adequate  participation 
of  Moslem  representatives,  but  not  one  wliich 
again  went  over  the  ground  covered  during  our 
debate  last  July.  Our  position  on  tlie  political 
elements  of  the  status  of  Jerusalem  was  made 
completely  clear  hj  our  vote  for  Security  Coun- 
cil Resolution  267. 

Had  the  present  draft  resolution  reaffirmed 
Resolution  267  but  dealt  substantively  only  with 
the  concerns  expressed  in  the  August  22  com- 
mimication  to  the  President  of  the  Security 
Council,  we  would  have  been  able  to  vote  for  it. 
Since  we  do  not  have  that  option  and  since,  as 
we  have  said,  we  find  other  portions  of  the 
resolution  inappropriate  in  the  present  context 
and  not  well  calculated  to  serve  the  ends  we  have 
in  mind,  the  United  States  will  abstain. 

This  does  not  imply  any  lack  of  concern  by 


my  Government  for  the  maintenance  and  pro- 
tection of  the  holy  places.  We  consider  that  the 
Government  of  Israel,  as  an  occupying  power, 
has  a  heavy  responsibility  to  Moslems  every- 
where and  to  all  mankind  to  see  that  the  holy 
places  are  protected.  We  urge  it  to  take  every 
precaution  to  do  so  and  to  cooperate  fully  with 
the  INIoslem  cormnimity  in  so  doing.  We  are  pre- 
pared to  support  any  suitable  action  by  the 
United  Nations  in  achieving  this  objective. 

Finally,  we  need  hardly  remind  ourselves,  jNIr. 
President,  that  our  presence  here  today — as  on 
so  many  occasions  in  the  past^ — is  against  the 
backdrop  of  another,  no  less  urgent,  need.  That 
need  is  for  even  greater  efforts  toward  the 
achievement  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the 
Middle  East,  a  peace  which  has  been  long 
awaited  and  is  long  overdue.  In  support  of  that 
goal,  restraint  and  cooperation  of  the  parties 
themselves  are  absolute  requirements.  As  we  ap- 
proach a  time  when  the  foreign  ministers  of  the 
states  most  concerned,  and  of  the  four  perma- 
nent members  of  the  Security  Council  which 
have  been  seeking  to  assist  in  the  search  for 
l^eace  in  the  Middle  East,  will  assemble  here,  let 
us  all  make  a  very  special  effort  to  restrain  vio- 
lence, to  moderate  debate,  and  to  create  an 
atmosphere  of  conciliation  and  good  will  in 
which  the  peacemakers  may  work  constructively. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  3 

The  Security  Covncil, 

Grieved  at  the  extensive  damage  caused  by  arson  to 
the  Holy  Al  Aqsa  Mosque  in  Jerusalem  on  21  August 
1069  under  the  military  occupation  of  Israel, 

Slindful  of  the  consequent  loss  to  human  culture. 

Having  heard  the  statements  made  before  the  Coun- 
cil reflecting  the  universal  outrage  caused  by  the  act 
of  sacrilege  in  one  of  the  most  venerated  shrines  of 
mankind, 

Recalling  its  resolutions  252  (196S)  of  21  May  1968 
and  267  (1969)  of  3  July  1969  and  the  earlier  General 
Assembly  resolutions  2253  (ES-V)  and  2254  (ES-V) 
of  4  and  14  July  1967,  respectively,  concerning  meas- 
ures and  actions  by  Israel  affecting  the  status  of  the 
city  of  Jerusalem, 

Reaffirming  the  established  principle  that  acquisition 
of  territory  by  military  conquest  is  inadmissible, 

1.  Reaffirms  its  resolutions  252  (1968)  and  267 
(1969)  ; 

2.  Recognizes  that  any  act  of  destruction  or  prof- 
anation of  the  Holy  Places,  religious  buildings  and 
sites  in  .Jerusalem  or  any  encouragement  of,  or  conniv- 


^For  U.S.  statements  and  text  of  Resolution  267 
adopted  by  the  Security  Council  on  July  3,  see  Bulletin 
of  July  28,  1969,  p.  76. 


»U.N.  doc.  S/RES/271  (1969)  ;  adopted  by  the  Coun- 
cil on  Sept.  15  by  a  vote  of  11  to  0,  with  4  abstentions 
(Colombia,  Finland,  Paraguay,  U.S.). 


308 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


aiice  at,  any  such  act  may  seriously  endanger  inter- 
national peace  and  security; 

3.  Determines  that  the  execrable  act  of  desecration 
and  jirofanation  of  the  Holy  Al  Aqsa  Mosque  empha- 
j^izes  the  immediate  necessity  of  Israel  desisting  from 
acting  in  violation  of  the  aforesaid  resolutions  and 
rescinding  forthwith  all  measures  and  actions  taken 
liy  it  designed  to  alter  the  status  of  Jerusalem ; 

4.  Calls  upon  Israel  scrupulously  to  observe  the  pro- 
\isions  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  international 
law  governing  military  occupation  and  to  refrain  from 
causing  any  hindrance  to  the  discharge  of  the  estab- 
lished functions  of  the  Supreme  Muslim  Council  of 
Jerusalem,  including  any  co-operation  that  Council  may 
desire  from  countries  with  predominantly  Muslim  pop- 
ulation and  from  Muslim  communities  in  relation  to 
its  plans  for  the  maintenance  and  repair  of  the  Islamic 
Holy  Places  in  Jerusalem; 

5.  Condemns  the  failure  of  Israel  to  comply  with  the 
aforementioned  resolutions  and  calls  upon  it  to  imple- 
ment forthwith  the  provisions  of  these  resolutions ; 

6.  Reiterates  the  determination  in  operative  para- 
graph 7  of  resolution  267  (1969)  that  in  the  event  of 
a  negative  response  or  no  response,  the  Security  Coun- 
cil shall  convene  without  delay  to  consider  what  further 
action  should  be  taken  in  this  matter; 

7.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  follow  closely 
the  implementation  of  the  present  resolution  and  to 
report  thereon  to  the  Security  Council  at  the  earliest 
possible  date. 


The  Flight  of  Apollo  1 1 

Follotoing  is  a  statement  tnade  hefore  the  U.N. 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 
on  September  8  iy  Thomas  0.  Paine.,  Admin- 
istrato7',  National  Aeronautics  and  Space 
Administration. 

U.S./U.N.   press  release  94  dated   September   8 

It  is  an  honor  and  a  pleasure  to  have  this 
opportunity  to  report  to  this  distinguished  com- 
mittee at  your  opening  session.  Tliis  occasion  is 
especially  appropriate  because  tliis  most  dra- 
matic extension  of  man's  capabilities  in  space  is 
indeed  an  achievement  by  and  for  all  men 
ever'ywhere. 

This  event  has  implications  for  mankind  far 
richer  and  more  meaningful  than  a  landing  on 
the  moon  in  the  narrowest  teclmical  sense.  If 
men  properly  develop  and  exploit  these  ad- 
vanced capabilities,  they  can  surely  be  directed 
to  a  great  expansion  of  those  practical  benefits 
■which  we  have  only  just  begun  to  reap  in  space 
in  the  fields  of  communications,  weather  pre- 
diction, navigation,  earth  resources,  and  other 
fields. 


And  man  will  be  able,  in  time,  to  extend  his 
domain  beyond  the  confines  of  his  home  planet 
earth.  From  our  small  8,000-mile-diameter 
planet  we  have  set  forth  in  this  first  step  up- 
ward and  outward  into  the  S,000-million-mile 
solar  system  around  us. 

Wlien  I  say  that  the  success  of  Apollo  11  is 
a  step  forward  of  all  mankind,  I  do  not  use  these 
words  without  thought.  The  variety  and  ex- 
tent of  foreign  contributions  to  the  Apollo  11 
flight  are  real  and  they  are  impressive,  and 
they  are  appreciated  by  all  Americans. 

It  is  most  appi'opriate  that  we  express  our 
appreciation  in  this  forum  to  so  many  of  the 
countries  i-epresented  here  for  accommodation 
and,  in  many  cases,  operation  of  tracking  facili- 
ties :  Australia,  the  Malagasy  Republic,  Mexico, 
Spain,  and  the  United  Kingdom. 

And  particularly  we  are  grateful  for  the  use 
of  a  special  210-foot-diameter  radio  astronomy 
facility  in  Australia  which  made  it  possible  to 
bring  back  the  movies  of  the  surface  of  the  moon 
to  all  television  watchers  everywhere. 

We  appreciate  the  cooperation  in  the  stag- 
ing of  our  search-and-rescue  aircraft  and  range- 
instrumentation  aircraft  from  Australia,  Brazil, 
Chile,  Japan,  Libya,  Mauritius,  Netherlands, 
Peru,  Portugal,  South  Africa,  Spain,  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  And  we  appreciate  the  over- 
flight privileges  which  were  granted  to  these 
aircraft  by  47  different  nations. 

And  we  appreciate  the  cooperation  in  the 
scientific  experiments  that  were  carried  on 
Apollo  11  from  Switzerland  for  Professor 
Geiss'  solar  wind  detector  and  from  Australia, 
Belgium,  Canada,  Finland,  Germany,  Japan, 
Switzerland,  and  the  United  Kingdom  for 
supporting  the  work  of  36  scientists  who  are 
now  receiving  lunar  surface  samples  for  anal- 
ysis in  their  laboratories. 

Brazil  has  cooperated  in  a  sounding-rocket 
program  that  was  coordinated  with  Apollo  to 
monitor  radiation  hazards  to  our  astronauts  in 
space. 

Other  countries,  including  France,  are  now 
utilizing  the  laser  reflector  left  on  the  moon  for 
scientific  experiments. 

Sweden  and  Germany  furnished  the  Hassel- 
blad  cameras  which  brought  back  the  magnifi- 
cently detailed  photos  of  the  lunar  topography. 

And  we  are  grateful  to  73  different  nations 
who  sent  a  memorable  series  of  messages  which 
we  etched  onto  a  small  disc  and  carried  to  the 
moon  and  left  behind. 

And,  finally,   I   want  to   acknowledge  the 


October  6,   T969 


309 


United  Nations  Outer  Space  Committee's  con- 
structive work  in  confirming  in  the  Outer  Space 
Treaty  the  status  of  astronauts  as  envoys  of  all 
mankind  and  in  providing  for  the  safe  return 
of  astronauts  who  might  land  under  emergency 
conditions. 

I  know  that  you  are  all  interested  in  the  pre- 
liminary scientific  i-esults,  wliich  even  at  this 
early  date  have  provided  extremely  valuable 
insights  into  the  lunar  surface.  There  will  be 
a  more  detailed  report  in  a  press  conference  in 
about  a  week,  but  the  following  can  already  be 
said  in  a  tentative  fashion : 

The  passive  seismometer  experiment  operated 
within  a  few  minutes  of  its  deployment.  It 
recorded  astronaut  footsteps  and  the  lunar 
landing  module  and  possible  surface  slides  on 
the  moon.  It  was  successfully  commanded  to 
a  standby  mode  during  the  lunar  night  and  then 
switched  back  on.  The  long-period  seismic  ele- 
ment lasted  until  August  26  and  the  short- 
period  element  until  August  28.  None  of  the 
long-period  seismic  data  resembles  earth  data, 
but  it  is  not  certain  whether  the  signals  are 
caused  by  instrumentation  changes  or  natural 
phenomena.  If  natural,  the  moon  would  be  struc- 
turally very  different  from  the  earth,  a  far 
more  heterogeneous  body  than  our  home  planet. 
This  we  will  explore  further  in  the  next  land- 
ing, which  is  now  scheduled  to  set  forth  on 
November  14,  when  additional  seismic  instru- 
ments will  be  deployed. 

We  have  found  as  yet  no  evidence  of  any 
previous  life  on  the  surface  of  the  moon.  But  all 
of  you  have  seen  men  walking  on  the  surface, 
men  who  will  be  the  precursors  of  terrestrial  life 
as  it  moves  outward  to  our  twin  planet. 

The  minimum  age  of  the  Sea  of  Tranquility 
area  in  which  we  landed  is  about  3  billion  years, 
much  older  than  believed  earlier  and  possibly 
indicating  that  the  moon  formed  at  the  same 
time  as  the  earth. 

The  length  of  time  that  the  materials  had 
been  lying  on  the  surface  which  we  collected 
as  our  samples  indicates  that  the  surface  of  the 
moon  is  very  ancient  and  has  changed  very 
slowly. 

The  average  density  of  the  rocks  is  very  high : 
3.2  to  3.4  grams  per  cc.  This  is  near  the  average 
density  of  the  entire  moon. 

The  limar  material  that  we  collected  shows  an 
igneous  origin,  possibly  volcanic;  but  it  is 
chemically   different   from   volcanic   material 


here  on  earth,  with  a  higher  percentage  of 
heavier  elements. 

We  have  detected  no  evidence  in  any  of  the 
samples  examined  to  date  of  the  presence  of 
water.  In  fact,  it  appears  likely  that  the  rocks 
were  formed  under  conditions  with  little  oxy- 
gen or  water  present.  They  are  typically  crystal- 
line and  glass.  The  lunar  surface  dust  is 
composed  of  a  very  high  percentage  of  small 
round  glass  spherules,  apparently  the  product 
of  impact  by  meteorites. 

The  laser  experiment,  which  is  still  being  con- 
ducted, has  already  refined  our  measurement  of 
the  lunar  distance  down  to  a  few  tens  of  meters, 
and  we  hope  in  time  to  get  it  down  to  within 
a  few  centimeters. 

If  man's  reach  should  exceed  his  grasp,  the 
fact  that  we  have  been  able  in  the  Apollo  pro- 
gram to  grasp  the  moon  shows  that  man  has 
perhaps  not  been  reacliing  far  enough.  We  can 
dare  and  we  can  win  far  more  for  man  than  we 
have  ever  thought  possible.  And  we  should,  not 
only  in  science  and  technology  but  in  all  the 
affairs  of  men. 

It  is  very  proper  that  men  everywhere  around 
the  world  are  asking  us :  If  man  can  indeed  go 
to  the  moon,  why  can't  we  do  a  far  better  job 
here  on  our  planet  earth  in  ordering  the  affairs 
of  man?  THs  is  a  question  which  is  indeed  ap- 
propriate and  a  question  which  those  of  us  con- 
cerned with  space  programs  should  welcome. 

There  is  much  to  be  learned  in  space,  and  it 
is  relevant  to  our  total  environmental  knowledge 
here  on  earth.  We  are  opening  a  whole  new 
field — that  of  planet  ecology.  We  should  not  as- 
sume that  an  environmental  fact  close  at  hand 
here  on  earth  is  necessarily  more  significant  to 
us  than  an  environmental  fact  at  lunar  distances 
or  even  at  the  surface  of  the  sun  or  in  the  at- 
mosphere of  Venus  or  the  surface  of  ilars.  We 
may  find  the  most  critical  facts  and  conditions 
that  determine  our  terrestrial  environment  in 
the  atmospheres  and  conditions  of  other  planets, 
perhaps  at  the  boundary  of  the  earth's  magneto- 
sphere  or  in  the  surface  of  the  sun.  We  may 
find  critical  msights  into  our  own  atmospheric 
processes  in  the  atmosphere  of  Jupiter  or  other 
planets.  We  can  and  we  must  pursue  this  in- 
creased knowledge,  and  we  must  turn  it  in- 
creasingly to  the  benefit  of  man. 

To  equip  ourselves  for  this  task,  we  should 
continue  the  work  we  have  begun  and  should 
increase  our  capabilities  still  further ;  but  above 


310 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


all,  we  should  do  it  as  much  as  possible  together. 
After  the  Apollo  program  we  see  a  very  rigor- 
ous opportunity  to  press  forward.  We  believe 
that  the  Apollo  11  astronauts  have  opened  a  trail 
that  many  men  will  follow.  Their  flight  is  a 
beginning,  not  an  end.  We  stand  at  the  start 
of  a  new  era  which  will  see  space  flight  become 
as  safe,  as  reliable,  and  as  economical  as  air- 
craft flight  through  the  atmosphere  is  today. 

We  see  lying  ahead  of  us  now  the  task  of  de- 
veloping reusable  spacecraft  and  permanent 
space  stations  in  orbit  that  will  greatly  reduce 
the  cost  of  space  operations  and  will  open  space 
travel  to  men  and  women  of  all  nations.  The  fu- 
ture space  programs  will  consist  of  equipment 
that  will  be  multipurpose ;  it  will  be  used  many 
times  and  will  bring  back  in  many  areas  far 
more  information  than  we  have  been  able  to 
acquire  in  the  first  dozen  years  of  space. 

These  future  programs  can  and  should  be 
carried  forward  with  far  greater  international 
participation  than  has  yet  been  the  case.  That 
participation  will  be  as  rewarding  to  all  nations 
who  take  part  as  it  has  been  to  those  nations 
which  have  started  down  this  trail.  The  charac- 
I  ter  of  the  space  effort  in  the  name  of  all  mankind 
will  surely  be  more  rewardmg  to  every  person 
I  on  this  planet  and  will  well  repay  the  energies 
i  and  the  resources  required.  Certainly,  we  in  the 
'  United  States  will,  as  we  have  in  the  past,  make 
:  increasing  opportunities  available  to  peoj^le  of 
:  all  nations  who  wish  to  join  with  us  in  the  press- 
j    ing  forward  of  this  great  himaan  endeavor. 

The  great  explorations  of  history,  carried  out 
by  many  nations,  have  always  opened  up  new 
vistas  of  the  possible.  And  the  sights  of  all  men 
have  been  raised  and  their  hearts  inspired.  The 
exploration  of  space  is  in  that  great  tradition, 
and  yet  it  extends  by  orders  of  magnitude  the 
past  explorations.  "Wliere,  before  Apollo,  ex- 
ploration was  a  challenge  in  itself,  its  successful 
beginnings  now  stand  as  a  challenge  for  our 
children  and  for  all  future  generations  as  we 
open  up  tliis  limitless  frontier.  Certainly  the 
greatest  challenge  of  all  is  that  the  world  which 
is  seen  as  one  from  space  should  also  be  seen  as 
one  from  the  earth  itself. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  concludes  my  remarks, 
and  with  your  permission  I  would  like  to  pre- 
sent to  you  for  this  committee  during  the  recess 
a  lunar  globe  which  contains  all  of  the  limar 
features  which  have  been  mapped  by  the  lunar 
probes  to  date. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Automotive  Traffic 

Customs  convention  on  the  temporary  importation  of 
private  road  vehicles.  Done  at  New  York  June  4, 
1954.  Entered  into  force  December  15,  1957.  TIAS 
3943. 

Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
July  18, 1969. 

Customs 

International  convention  to  facilitate  the  importation 
of  commercial  samples  and  advertising  material. 
Done  at  Geneva  November  7,  1952.  Entered  into 
force  November  20,  1955 ;  for  the  United  States  Oc- 
tober 17,  1957.  TIAS  3920. 

Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
JiUy  18,  1969. 

Customs  convention  on  containers,  with  annexes  and 
protocol  of  signature.  Done  at  Geneva  May  18,  1956. 
Entered  into  force  August  4,  1959 ;  for  the  United 
States  March  3, 1969.  TIAS  6634. 
Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
July  18, 1969. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  New 
York  March  30, 1961.  Entered  into  force  December  13, 
1964 ;  for  the  United  States  June  24, 1967.  TIAS  6298. 
Accession  deposited:  Monaco,  August  14,  1969. 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of 
execution.  Done  at  Vienna  July  10, 1964.  Entered  into 
force  January  1, 1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Brazil,  Netherlands,'  Au- 
gust 8,  1969. 

Publications 

Agreement  relating  to  the  repression  of  the  circulation 
of  obscene  publications,  signed  at  Paris  May  4,  1910, 
as  amended  by  the  protocol  signed  at  Lake  Success 
May  4,  1949.  Entered  into  force  September  15,  1911, 
and  May  4,  1949.  37  Stat.  1511 ;  TIAS  2161. 
Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
July  18,  1969. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms 
of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York  Decem- 
ber 21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4,  1969.' 


'  Applicable  to  Surinam  and  the  Netherlands  Antilles 
'Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


October  6,    1969 


311 


Signature:  Austria,  July  22,  1969. 
Ratification   deposited:  Mongolia    (with   a   declara- 
tion and  reservation),  August  6,  1969. 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
the  slave  trade,  and  institutions  and  practices  similar 
to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva  September  7,  1956.  En- 
tered into  force  April  30,  1957 ;  for  the  United  States 
December  6,  1967.  TIAS  &418. 

Notifleatioti  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
July  18, 1969. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Montreux  November  12, 1965.  Entered 
into  force  January  1,  1967 ;  for  the  United  States 
May  29,  1967.  TIAS  6267. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Bulgaria,  August  5,  1969;° 
Iraq,  July  15,  1969 ;  *  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist 
EepubUc,  August  8,  1969.' 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva,  1959, 
as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332) ,  relating  to  mari- 
time mobile  service,  with  annexes  and  final  protocol. 
Done  at  Geneva  November  3, 1967.  Entered  into  force 
April  1,  1969.  TIAS  6590. 
Notification  of  approval:  Paraguay,  July  25,  1969. 

White  Slave  Traffic 

Agreement  for  the  suppression  of  the  white  slave  traffic, 
as  amended  by  the  protocol  of  May  4,  1949  (TIAS 
2332).  Signed  at  Paris  May  18,  1904.  Entered  into 
force  Julv  18,  1905;  for  the  United  States  June  6, 
1908.  35  Stat.  1979. 

Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
July  IS,  1969. 

BILATERAL 


Philippines 

Agreement  on  the  use  of  the  Special  Fund  for  Educa- 
tion for  the  Philippine  Science  High  School  Project, 
with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila 
September  5,  1969.  Entered  into  force  September  5, 
1969. 


United  Arab  Republic 

Agreement  concerning  trade  in  cotton  textiles.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  September  4, 
1969,  between  the  United  States  and  the  Embassy  of 
India,  representing  the  interests  of  the  United  Arab 
Republic.  Entered  into  force  September  4,  1969. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities  of  July  28,  1969  (TIAS  6734). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Saigon  August  23, 
1969.  Entered  into  force  August  23,  1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN   SERVICE 


'  With  reservation  contained  in  final  protocol. 
'  With  declaration  contained  in  final  protocol. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  September  12  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Charles  W.  Adair,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  Uruguay. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  August  9. ) 

Charles  T.  Cross  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Singapore.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  276  dated  September  23.) 

Jack  W.  Lydman  to  be  Ambassador  to  Malaysia.  ( For 
biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
274  dated  September  22.) 

Douglas  MacArthur  II  to  be  Ambassador  to  Iran. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  August  20.) 

Robinson  Mcllvaine  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic 
of  Kenya.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  277  dated  September  23. ) 

Robert  M.  Sayre  to  be  Ambassador  to  Panama.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
August  9.) 


312 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX      Octoher  6,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No.  1580 


Aviation.    Strengthening    the   Total   Fabric    of 

Peace    (Nixon) 297 

China.  Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of  Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Adair,  Cross,  Lydman,  Mac- 
Arthur,  Mcllvaine,  Sayre) 312 

Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Delegation  to  24th  U.N. 
General   Assembly 304 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Confirmations  (Adair,  Cross,  Lydman,  Mac- 
Arthur,  Mcllvaine,  Sayre) 312 

Department  Establishes  New  Bureau  of  Politico- 
Military  Affairs 304 

Disarmament.  Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of 
Peace  (Nixon) 297 

Economic  Affairs.  Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric 

of   Peace    (Nixon) 297 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences. 

Calendar  of  International  Conferences     .     .     .      305 

Iran.  MacArthur  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .     .      312 

Israel.  U.S.  Abstains  on  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion Linking  Mosque  Fire  to  Middle  East  Con- 
flict (Yost,  text  of  resolution)     307 

Kenya.  Mcllvaine  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .      312 

Latin  America.  Governor  Rockefeller  Reports  on 
Mission  to  Latin  America  (letter  of  acknowl- 
edgment from  President  Nixon) 303 

Malaysia.  Lydman  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .      312 

Military  Affairs.  President  Nixon  Reduces 
Troop  Ceiling  in  Viet-Nam   (statement)     .     .      302 

Near  East 

Strengthening     the     Total     Fabric     of     Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

U.S.  Abstains  on  Security  Council  Resolution 
Linking  Mosque  Fire  to  Middle  East  Conflict 
(Tost,  text  of  resolution) 307 

Panama.  Sayre  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .     .     .      812 

Presidential  Documents 

Governor  Rockefeller  Reports  on  Mission  to 
Latin  America 303 

President  Nixon  Reduces  Troop  Ceiling  in  Viet- 
Nam      302 

Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of  Peace    .     .     .      297 

Science 

The  Flight  of  Apollo  11  (Paine) 309 

Strengthening     the     Total     E^bric     of     Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

Singapore.  Cross  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .      312 

Space.  The  Flight  of  Apollo  11  (Paine)     ...      309 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions     ....      311 

U.S.S.R.  Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of  Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

United  Nations 

TheFlightof  Apollo  11  (Paine) 309 

Senate  Confirms  U.S.  Delegation  to  24th  U.N. 

General   Assembly 304 

Strengthening     the     Total     Fabric     of     Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

U.S.  Abstains  on   Security   Council   Resolution 

Linking  Mosque  Fire  to  Middle  East  Confiict 

(Yost,  text  of  resolution) 307 

Uruguay.  Adair  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .     .      312 


Viet-Nam 

President  Nixon  Reduces  Troop  Ceiling  in  Viet- 
Nam    (statement) 302 

Strengthening    the    Total     Fabric    of    Peace 

(Nixon) 297 

34th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 303 

Name  Index 

Adair,  Charles  W.,  Jr 312 

Black,  Mrs.  Shirley  Temple 304 

Buffum,  William  B 304 

Coleman,   William   T 304 

Cross,  Charles  T 312 

Fascell,    Dante   B 304 

Hauser,  Rita  E 304 

.Johnson,  Joseph  E 304 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 303 

Lydman,    Jack   W 312 

MacArthur,  Douglas,  II 312 

Mcllvaine,    Robinson 312 

Nixon,  President 297, 302, 303 

Olds,  Glenn  A 304 

Paine,    Thomas    O 309 

Phillips,  Christopher  H 304 

Pickering,  Thomas 304 

Sayre,  Robert  M 312 

Spiers,    Ronald 304 

Whalley,  J.  Irving 304 

Yost,  Charles  W 304, 307 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  September  15-21 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflSce 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

No.       Date  Subject 

265  9/15  Lodge :  33d  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris,  September  13 
[printed  in  Bulletin  of  Septem- 
ber 29]. 

*266  9/16  Meeting  of  the  Board  of  the  Foreign 
Service. 

t267  9/16  U.S.-Japan  textile  meetings  at 
Washington  (rewrite). 

*268    9/17    Westerfield  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Liberia  (biographic  data). 
269    9/18    Lodge :  34th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 
Nam  at  Paris. 

*270  9/18  Pollack  reappointed  Director,  Inter- 
national Scientific  and  Technolog- 
ical Affairs   (biographic  data). 

*271  9/18  Moore  designated  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs  (biographic  data). 

♦272  9/19  Henderson  named  U.S.  Representa- 
tive to  Inter-American  Commit- 
tee on  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
(biographic  data). 
273  9/19  Bureau  of  Politico-Military  Af- 
fairs established   (rewrite). 

•  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1581 


October  13,  1969 


PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE  OF  SEPTEMBER  26     313 

PRIME  aONISTER  MEIR  OF  ISRAEL  VISITS  WASHINGTON 

Remarks  hy  President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  Meir     318 

INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE  OF  THE  RED  CROSS  CxiLLS  FOR  OBSERVANCE 
OF  THE  GENEVA  CONVENTION  ON  PRISONERS  OF  WAR 

Statement  l)y  Graham  Martin  and  Text  of  Resolution     323 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1581 
October  13,  1969 


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reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPAETIMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the  Headers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  xceekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
■with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  rela  tions  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  tlve  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
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President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  September  26 


FoUowing  are  excerpts  from  the  transcript  of 
a  neivs  conference  held  by  President  Nixon  in 
the  East  Room  of  the  White  House  on  Sep- 
tember 26. 

The  President :  Mr.  Cormier  [Frank  Cormier, 
Associated  Press]. 

Q.  Hoio  do  you  feel  about  the  various  pro- 
posals to  propose  an  arbitrary  cutoff  time  on 
our  military  presence  in  Yiet-Nam? 

The  President:  I  have  considered  a  number 
of  those  proposals  within  the  administration 
and,  of  course,  have  noted  some  of  the  refer- 
ences that  have  been  made  recently  in  the  Sen- 
ate in  that  regard.  I  know  they  were  made  with 
the  best  of  intentions.  However,  it  is  my  conclu- 
sion that  if  the  administration  were  to  impose 
an  arbitrary  cutoff  time — say,  the  end  of  1970 
or  the  middle  of  1971 — for  the  complete  with- 
drawal of  American  forces  in  Viet-Nam,  that 
inevitably  leads  to  perpetuating  and  continu- 
ing the  war  until  that  time  and  destroys  any 
chance  to  reach  the  objective  that  I  am  trying 
to  achieve  of  ending  the  war  befoi'e  the  end  of 
1970  or  before  the  middle  of  1971. 

I  think  this  is  a  defeatist  attitude,  defeatist 
in  terms  of  what  it  would  accomplish.  I  do  not 
think  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  United  States. 

I  also  believe  that  even  though  these  pro- 
posals, I  know,  are  made  with  the  best  of  inten- 
tions, they  inevitably  undercut  and  destroy  the 
negotiating  position  that  we  have  in  Paris.  We 
have  not  made  significant  progress  in  those 
negotiations.  But  any  incentive  for  the  enemy 
to  negotiate  is  destroyed  if  he  is  told  in  advance 
that  if  he  just  waits  for  18  months  we  will  be 
out  anywaj'.  Therefore,  I  oppose  that  kind  of 
arbitrary  action. 

Q.  Mr.  President.,  can  you  tell  us  the  reasons 
behind  Russia's  prolonged  failure  to  respond 
to  your  proposal  for  prompt  negotiations  on 
strategic  arms  limitations? 


October  13,   1969 


The  President:  We  are  trj-ing  to  explore 
those  reasons.  Mr.  Rogers  met  with  Mr.  Gro- 
myko  on  Monday.  He  will  meet  with  him  again 
on  next  Monday.  He  has  no  answer  except  a 
suggestion — and  I  don't  think  I  am  divulging 
any  confidences  in  this  respect — that  we  may 
expect  an  answer  in  the  near  future  and  that  it 
is  likely  to  be  a  positive  answer. 

Now,  why  the  answer  Inas  been  delayed  is  a 
question  really  that  would  have  to  be  asked  of 
those  who  have  control  of  policj'  in  the  EJremlin. 

Q.  How  are  you  doing,  Mr.  President,  in  your 
efforts  to  end  the  Viet-Nam  war? 

The  President:  Not  as  well  as  I  would  hope. 
I  will  not  be  doing  as  well  as  I  would  hope  until 
the  war  is  ended.  I  would  point,  however,  to 
some  progress. 

We  point,  first,  to  the  fact  that  we  have  an- 
nounced that  60,000  Americans  will  be  returned 
from  Viet-Xam.^ 

We  point,  second,  to  the  fact  that  as  a  result 
of  that  and  other  actions,  50,000  Americans  who 
otherwise  might  have  been  drafted  before  the 
end  of  the  year  will  not  be  drafted. 

In  addition  to  that,  we  find  that  infiltration, 
which  tells  us  a  lot  about  the  enemy's  future 
capabilities,  looking  at  the  first  9  months  of  this 
year,  is  two-thirds  less  than  it  was  in  the  cor- 
responding jieriod  last  year. 

We  find  that  American  casualties  are  down 
one-third  from  what  they  were  over  the  same 
9-month  period  last  year. 

We  find  also  that  on  the  negotiating  front  the 
United  States  has  made  a  far-reaching  and 
comprehensive  peace  offer,  a  peace  offer  which 
offers  not  only  mutual  withdrawal  of  forces, 
internationally  guaranteed  cease-fires,  interna- 
tionally supervised  elections — in  which  we  will 
accept  the  result  of  those  elections  and  the  South 


^  For  President  Nixon's  statement  of  Sept  16,  see 
Bulletin  of  Oct.  6,  1969,  p.  302. 


313 


Vietnamese  will  as  well,  even  if  it  is  a  Commu- 
nist government ;  and  by  making  that  offer  we 
have  reversed  the  whole  tide  of  world  public 
opinion. 

I  noted  when  I  was  at  the  U.N.  that  I  found 
no  significant  criticism  of  the  U.S.  policy.  Now 
is  the  time  for  Hanoi  to  make  the  next  move. 
We  certainly  have  made  it. 

There  is  one  thing,  however,  which  I  should 
emphasize,  that  is  not  negotiable.  We  will  talk 
about  anything  else.  What  is  not  negotiable  is 
the  right  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to 
choose  their  own  leaders  without  outside  im- 
position, either  by  us  or  by  anybody  else.  We 
believe  that  that  limited  goal  must  be  one  that 
we  must  insist  on.  We  believe  it  can  be  achieved, 
and  we  believe  that  if  we  stay  on  this  course 
and  if  we  can  have  some  more  support  in  the 
Nation — we  have  a  lot  of  support,  but  even  more 
support  in  the  Nation— for  tliis  steady  course, 
the  enemy  then  will  have  the  incentive  to  nego- 
tiate, recognizing  that  it  isn't  going  to  gain 
time,  that  it  isn't  going  to  wait  us  out. 

Once  the  enemy  recognizes  that  it  is  not  going 
to  win  its  objective  by  waiting  us  out,  then  the 
enemy  will  negotiate  and  we  will  end  this  war 
before  the  end  of  1970.  That  is  the  objective  we 
have. 

Q.  Going  hack  to  Mr.  Cormier's  question 
about  the  Viet-Nam  cutoff,  Senator  Goodell, 
who  will  he  a  candidate  next  year,  is  providing 
the  vehicle  for  a  new  round  of  Senate  hearings 
on  this  subject.  Will  this  eitJier  embarrass  you 
as  a  Republican  President  or  other  Bepuhlican 
candidates  next  year? 

The  President:  Mr.  Theis  [J.  William  Theis, 
Hearst  Newspapers],  I,  of  course,  can't  control 
the  course  of  Senate  hearings,  particularly  in 
the  Foreign  Kelations  Committee.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  far  as  those  hearings  are  concerned,  1 
believe  that  a  discussion  in  the  Senate  of  this 
matter,  an  open  discussion,  in  which  all  the 
consequences  of  this  very  well  intentioned  state- 
ment by  Senator  Goodell,  all  the  consequences 
of  itr— the  fact  that  it  inevitably  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  United  States  is  going  to 
be  stuck  in  Viet-Nam  until  the  end  of  1970,  that 
there  is  no  hope  of  ending  the  war  before  then — 
that  when  that  comes  home,  I  think  the  Senate 
will  overwhelmingly  reject  the  Goodell 
proposition. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  does  the  insistence  upon 


self-determination  in  Viet-Nam  as  an  indis- 
pensable condition  mean  that  you  will  support 
the  present  Thieu  regime  there  until  there  is  a 
negotiated  settlement  or  until  there  are  elections 
to  change  that  regime? 

The  President :  It  means,  Mr.  Lisagor  [Peter 
Lisagor,  Chicago  Daily  News],  that  the  Thieu 
regime  is  there  because  of  the  result  of  an  elec- 
tion, and  until  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam 
have  another  opportunity  to  vote,  I  think  that 
the  United  States  should  not  reverse  that  elec-  | 
tion  mandate.  That  is  the  answer  that  I  think  is  * 
only  appropriate  under  the  circumstances. 


Q.  Therehasbeen  growing  concern,  sir,  about  J 
deepening  U.S.  involvement  in  the  combat  in  1 
Laos.  If  you  confirm  that,  would  you  also  say 
where  this  runs  counter  to  your  new  Asian 
policy? 

The  President :  There  are  no  American  com- 
bat forces  in  Laos.  At  the  present  time,  we  are 
concerned  by  the  North  Vietnamese  move  into 
Laos.  There  are  50,000  North  Vietnamese  there 
at  the  present  time,  and  more  perhaps  are 
coming. 

As  you  know,  the  American  participation  in 
Laos  is  at  the  request  of  the  neutralist  govern- 
ment, which  was  set  up  in  accordance  with  the 
1962  accords,  which  were  agreed  to,  incidentally, 
by  Hanoi,  Peking,  and  the  Soviet  LTnion.  That 
was  during  the  administration  of  President 
Kennedy,  negotiated  by  Mr.  [W.  Averell] 
Harriraan. 

We  have  been  providing  logistical  support 
and  some  training  for  the  neutralist  govermnent 
in  order  to  avoid  Laos  falling  under  Commu- 
nist domination.  As  far  as  American  manpower 
in  Laos  is  concerned,  there  are  none  there  at  the 
l^resent  time  on  a  combat  basis. 

Q.  Mr.  President? 

The  President:  Mr.  Potter  [Philip  Potter, 
Baltimore  Sun]. 

Q.  You  say  there  are  no  combat  forces  in 
Laos.  How  do  you  regard  the  aii'men  who  bomb 
the  Ho  Chi  Minh  Trail  from  bases  in  Thailand 
and  Viet-Nam?  Would  you  regard  those  as  com- 
bat forces? 

The  President:  When  we  consider  the  situa- 
tion in  Laos,  I  think  President  Kennedy  in  his 
first  major  television  speech,  wliich  we  all  re- 


314 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


member,  in  1962,  put  it  very  well.  He  pointed  out 
that  Laos  was  potentially  the  key  to  what  would 
happen  in  Thailand,  as  well  as  in  Viet-Nam  and 
the  balance  of  Southeast  Asia. 

Now,  Laos  relates  very  much  to  Viet-Nam, 
because  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  Trail  runs  through 
Laos.  It  is  necessary,  under  those  circumstances, 
that  the  United  States  take  cognizance  of  that, 
and  we  do  have  aerial  reconnaissance;  we  do 
have  perhaps  some  other  activities.  I  won't 
discuss  those  other  activities  at  this  time. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Q.  Mr.  President.,  does  the  change  of  leader- 
ship in  Hanoi  brought  about  by  the  death  of 
Ho  Chi  Minh  show  any  sign  at  all  to  you,  sir, 
of  any  change  of  intent,  either  in  combat  or  in 
Paris,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy? 

The  President:  Not  yet,  and  we  would  ex- 
pect nothing  yet.  Each  of  our  systems  of  gov- 
ernment has  a  problem.  The  major  problem  in 
a  Communist  system  of  government  is  the  prob- 
lem of  succession,  and  the  North  Vietnamese  are 
going  thi'ough  that. 

Immediately  after  a  change  of  leadership, 
there  is  a  tendency  for  uncertainty  and  rigidity 
as  the  contest  for  power  goes  on.  We  think  that 
is  going  on  within  North  Viet-Nam  at  the  pres- 
ent time.  However,  looking  to  the  future,  as  new 
leaders  emerge,  as  they  look  at  the  consequences 
of  past  policy  and  the  prospects  for  future  pol- 
icy, and  as  long  as  the  United  States  holds  to 
its  course,  I  think  the  prospects  for  a  possible 
change  are  there. 

I  am  not  predicting  it.  I  am  not  trying  to  raise 
false  hopes.  I  am  only  suggesting  that  since  there 
is  new  leadership,  we  can  expect  perhaps  some 
reevaluation  of  policy. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  when  do  you  plan  to  Tnahe 
Governor  Rockefeller's  report  on  Latin  America 
public,  and  what  is  the  main  thrust  of  his  recom- 
mendations to  you? 


The  President: 
been  in  Washington 


During  the  time  that  I 


have 


-and  a  few  of  you,  not 
many,  have  been  in  Wasliington  longer  than  I, 
in  and  out — I  have  found  that  we  have  had  at 
least  eight  reports  on  Latin  America. 

In  talking  to  my  friends  in  the  diplomatic 
corps,  they  have  begged  me,  "Please  don't  study 
us" ;  because,  they  have  said,  "All  you  do  is  study 
us  and  make  headlines  with  the  words  and  then 
have  no  action." 

Now,  when  I  set  up  the  Rockefeller  Task 


Force,  I  made  one  commitment  to  him,  to  which 
he  completely  agreed :  that  he  would  make  the 
report  to  me,  and  what  we  would  try  to  do  is 
to  make  our  actions  make  the  news,  rather  than 
the  words  make  the  news. 

I  have  already  met  with  Governor  Rocke- 
feller. There  are  some  very  exciting  recom- 
mendations in  his  report  which  we  are  going  to 
adopt.  I  am  going  to  meet  with  him  for  an  ex- 
tended visit  tomorrow  at  Camp  David,  along 
with  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Latin 
America,  Mr.  Meyer. 

Then  later  in  the  month — I  mean  later  in  Oc- 
tober— we  will  be  making  a  major  new  pro- 
nouncement on  Latin  American  policy,  and  a 
number  of  the  Rockefeller  recommendations  will 
be  in  that  annoimcement. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  2  weeks  ago  today  you  had 
a  major  meeting  with  your  top  advisers  and  peo- 
ple directly  involved  in  the  Viet-Nam  effort.  I 
donH  think  we  have  had  a  report,  as  such,  on  that 
meeting.  I  wonder  if  tliere  was  a  focus,  such  as 
the  death  of  Ho  Chi  Minh,  or  just  what  was  it 
all  about? 

The  President:  Naturally,  much  of  what  was 
discussed  in  that  meeting  could  not  be  appropri- 
ately discussed  in  a  public  forum  like  this.  We 
looked  over  the  military  situation,  the  political 
situation,  in  South  Viet-Nam,  and  naturally  we 
speculated  privately — and  I  would  never  specu- 
late publicly — as  to  what  might  happen  with 
the  change  of  leadership. 

We  did  determine,  however,  that  there  were 
some  good  signs  on  the  horizon :  the  failure  of 
the  enemy  to  be  able  to  launch  a  summer  of- 
fensive which  everybody  had  predicted;  the 
fact  that  the  infiltration  rate  was  down  by  two- 
thirds,  which  means  that  the  possibility  of  an 
offensive  this  fall  has  receded. 

We  took  note  of  that  and  the  fact  that  this 
Vietnamization  program,  despite  some  prob- 
lems, was  moving  forward  and  that  political 
and  economic  stability  in  the  South,  despite 
some  significant  problems,  was  going  forward. 

All  of  these  matters  were  taken  into  considera- 
tion. Generally,  I  would  not  like  to  leave  the 
impression  that  this  was  an  overly  optimistic 
report,  because  I  believe  in  looking  at  Viet-Nam 
and  all  of  our  problems  in  a  very  realistic,  down- 
to-earth  manner. 

But  I  would  say  this :  I  think  we  are  on  the 
right  course  in  Viet-Nam.  We  are  on  a  course 
that  is  going  to  end  this  war.  It  will  end  much 


October   13,    1969 


315 


sooner  if  we  can  have  to  an  extent — to  the  ex- 
tent possible  in  this  free  country — a  united  front 
behind  very  reasonable  proposals.  If  we  have 
that  united  front,  the  enemy  then  will  begin  to 
talk;  because  the  only  missing  ingredient  to 
escalating  the  time  when  we  will  end  the  war 
is  the  refusal  of  the  enemy  in  Paris  to  even  dis- 
cuss our  proposals.  The  moment  that  they  start 
discussing  those  proposals,  then  that  means  that 
■we  can  bring  the  war  to  a  conclusion  sooner  than 
if  we  just  continue  on  our  present  course. 

The  press :  Thank  you  very  much. 


35th    Plenary   Session    on    Vlet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  text  of  the  opening  statement 
made  hy  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head 
of  the  U.S.  delegation,  at  the  35th  plenary  ses- 
sion of  the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Pans  on 
September  25,  together  with  the  text  of  a  resolu- 
tio'ii  on  pi^oners  of  war  introduced  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  on  September  17. 

STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  LODGE 

Press  release  280  dated  September  25 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  At  our  last  meeting  I 
presented  President  Nixon's  statement  of  Sep- 
tember 16  announcing  that  a  minimum  of  60,000 
American  troops  will  have  left  Viet-Nam  by 
December  15, 1969.^ 

Your  side  asserted  that  these  actions  were  a 
"farce"  and  "illusion"  and  a  reduction  by 
"driblets." 

The  reduction  in  our  forces  cannot  be  so  cav- 
alierly brushed  aside.  Under  the  reduction  ac- 
complished by  the  end  of  August,  the  following 
units  have  now  left  South  Viet-Nam : 

Nine  U.S.  infantry  battalions 

Four  U.S.  artillery  battalions 

Three  U.S.  aviation  squadrons 

One  U.S.  engineer  battalion 

Three  U.S.  regimental  or  brigade  headquarters 

One  U.S.  division  headquarters 

Under  the  program  announced  by  President 
Nixon  on  September  16,  U.S.  forces  will  be  fur- 


ther reduced.  By  December  15,  as  compared  with 
the  end  of  August,  the  following  will  have  left 
Viet-Nam : 

Nine  U.S.  infantry  battalions 

Six  U.S.  artillery  battalions 

One  U.S.  tank  battalion 

Ten  U.S.  aviation  squadrons 

Eight  U.S.  engineer  construction  battalions 

Three  U.S.  regimental  or  brigade  headquarters 

One  U.S.  division  headquarters 

One  reconnaissance  battalion 

The  replacement  of  U.S.  forces  by  South  Viet- 
namese constitutes  a  significant  step.  It  is  proof 
that  the  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  do  not  wish  to  keep  U.S.  forces  in  Viet- 
Nam  any  longer  than  they  are  needed  to  help 
defend  South  Viet-Nam  against  outside 
aggression. 

The  overriding  fact  represented  by  the  re- 
moval of  those  forces  is  that  the  trend  in  our 
force  strength  is  decisively  down.  Your  side 
knows  this.  You  should  therefore  take  it  seri- 
ously, rather  than  dismiss  it  or  belittle  it  by 
meaningless  arithmetical  juggling  or  by  slight- 
ing phrases. 

The  real  question  you  should  ask  yourselves  is 
not  how  to  deride  our  acts  but  how  to  respond 
to  them. 

And  so  I  ask  you :  Are  you  prepared  to  match 
the  steps  we  have  taken  ?  The  bulk  of  the  forces 
which  we  removed  from  South  Viet-Nam  before 
the  end  of  August  came  from  the  Mekong  Delta 
area.  But  you  have  just  sent  Kegular  North 
Vietnamese  Army  battalions  for  the  first  time 
into  the  delta,  thus  expanding  the  deployment 
of  North  Vietnamese  forces  as  we  reduce  our 
forces. 

I  ask  you :  How  are  we  to  interpret  this  ? 

Last  week  your  spokesman  claimed  that  we 
have  pledged  to  take  out  the  main  elements  of 
our  forces  from  Viet-Nam  in  12  months  but  that 
no  provision  is  made  for  the  removal  of  remain- 
ing forces. 

Let  me  clarify  this  point. 

We  have  affirmed  our  willingness  to  take  out 
our  forces  on  a  specific  timetable,  asking  only 
that  North  Viet-Nam  take  out  its  forces  from 
South  Viet-Nam,  Laos,  and  Cambodia  into 
North  Viet-Nam,  also  in  accordance  with  a 
timetable. 

President  Nixon  on  May  14  ^  proposed  that 
the  major  portions  of  all  U.S.,  Allied,  and  other 


'  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  statement  of  Sept.  16, 
see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  302. 


'  Bulletin  of  June  2, 1969,  p.  457. 


316 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


non-South  Vietnamese  forces  be  taken  out,  over 
a  period  of  12  months,  by  agreed  stages.  At  the 
end  of  this  12-month  period  the  remaining  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  would  move  into  des- 
ignated base  areas  and  wouhl  not  engage  in 
combat  operations.  The  remaining  U.S.  and  Al- 
lied forces  would  leave  as  the  remaining  North 
Vietnamese  forces  left  and  returned  to  North 
Viet-Nam. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  remaining  U.S. 
forces  would  be  in  South  Viet-Nam  indefinitely, 
as  you  have  claimed.  Their  departure  and  that 
of  remaining  North  Vietnamese  forces  would 
follow  and  is  a  subject  for  negotiation. 

We  are  ready  to  discuss  this  proposal  or  gen- 
uine counterproposals  so  that  we  may  negotiate 
this  vital  issue. 

Since  our  last  meeting — on  September  IS — 
President  Nixon  spoke  at  the  United  Nations. 
He  said :  ^ 

On  September  2,  1969,  North  Viet-Nam's  chief  nego- 
tiator in  Paris  said  that  if  the  United  States  committed 
itself  to  the  principle  of  totally  withdrawing  its  forces 
from  South  Viet-Nam  and  if  it  withdrew  a  significant 
number  of  troops,  Hanoi  would  take  this  into  account. 

I  repeat  here  today  what  I  said  in  my  speech  on  May 
14 — that  we  are  prepared  to  withdraw  all  our  forces 
from  South  Viet-Nam.  And  the  replacement  of  60,000 
troops  is  a  significant  step. 

The  time  has  come  for  the  other  side  to  respond  to 
these  initiatives. 

And  so  I  ask  you :  What  is  your  response  ? 

Before  closing,  I  wish  to  comment  on  the 
statements  you  made  last  week  that  my  discus- 
sion of  prisoners  of  war  was  a  move  to  "side- 
step the  central  issues."  The  fate  of  those 
prisoners  is  not  a  peripheral  question.  It  is  a 
central  issue.  You  have  acknowledged  that  your- 
selves by  including  the  question  of  prisoners  in 
your  10-point  proposal. 

The  whole  world  is  watching  to  see  what  you 
do  to  improve  the  treatment  of  the  men  you  hold 
and  whether  you  will  make  it  possible  for  their 
next  of  kin — who  have  assuredly  harmed  no 
one — at  least  to  know  whether  their  relations  are 
alive  or  dead.  This  is  not  much  to  ask. 


Before  I  close,  let  me  call  your  attention  to  a 
resolution  which  has  been  introduced  into  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States. 
This  resolution  is  cosponsored  by  200  Eepre- 
sentatives  and  calls  for  humane  treatment  of 
American  prisoners  in  Viet-Nam  and  compli- 
ance with  the  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Pro- 
tection of  Prisoners  of  War.  We  shall  give  you 
copies  of  the  text  of  this  resolution,  with  the 
request  that  you  consider  it  carefully. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  have  asked  some  di- 
rect questions  today.  I  believe  the  situation  calls 
for  them,  rather  than  complicated  niceties  of 
language.  Answers  to  these  questions  can  start 
us  negotiating  a  settlement  of  this  war.  We  hope 
you  will  stop  belittling  our  actions  and  join  us 
in  the  search  for  peace. 

TEXT  OF   HOUSE  RESOLUTION^ 

Whereas  the  United  States  Government  and  the  Re- 
public of  Vietnam  have  continuously  honored  the 
requirements  of  the  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war ;  and 

Whereas  the  United  States  Government  has  repeat- 
edly appealed  to  North  Vietnam  and  the  National 
Liberation  Front  of  South  Vietnam  to  respect  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Geneva  Convention,  which  North 
Vietnam  has  endorsed ;  and 

Whereas  the  North  Vietnamese  and  the  National 
Liberation  Front  of  South  Vietnam  have  disregarded 
the  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Convention  and  refused 
to  release  the  names  of  prisoners  of  war  who  are  mem- 
bers of  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  United  States,  to  per- 
mit the  regular  flow  of  mail  to  or  from  those  prisoners, 
and  otherwise  to  accord  humane  treatment  to  those 
prisoners,  and  to  permit  inspection  of  the  facilities  in 
which  those  prisoners  are  held :  Now,  therefore,  be  it 

Resolved  'by  the  House  of  Representatives  {the 
Senate  concurring).  That  it  is  the  sense  of  Congress 
that  the  President,  the  Department  of  State,  the 
Department  of  Defense,  and  all  other  concerned  depart- 
ments or  agencies  of  the  United  States  Government,  the 
United  Nations,  and  the  peoples  of  the  world  should 
appeal  to  North  Vietnam  and  the  National  Liberation 
Front  of  South  Vietnam  to  comply  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  Geneva  Convention  relative  to  the  treat- 
ment of  prisoners  of  war  and  to  take  such  steps  as  may 
be  appropriate  to  obtain  the  humane  treatment  and 
prompt  release  of  all  members  of  the  Armed  Forces  of 
the  United  States  so  held  as  prisoners  of  war. 


"  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  297. 


'  H.  Con.  Res.  355 ;  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess. 


October   13,    1969 


317 


Prime  Minister  Meir  of  Israel  Visits  Washington 


Golda  Meir,  Prime  Minister  of  the  State  of 
Israel,  visited  Washington  September  25-27. 
Following  are  an  exchange  of  remarks  hettoeen 
President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  Meir  at  a 
welcoming  ceremony  on  the  South  Laxon  of  the 
White  House  on  September  25,  their  exchange 
of  toasts  at  a  dinner  at  the  White  House  that 
evening,  and  their  exchange  of  remarks  follow- 
ing their  meeting  on  September  26. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  25 
President  Nixon 

It  is  a  very  great  privilege  for  me,  speaking  in 
behalf  of  the  American  people,  to  welcome  you, 
Madam  Prime  Minister,  in  a  very  personal 
sense,  because  you  were  raised  in  this  country. 
You  have  been  to  this  country  many  times,  but 
we  are  particularly  proud  that  for  the  first  time 
we  welcome  you  as  Prime  Minister  of  Israel. 

Speaking  to  you  in  that  capacity,  as  the  head 
of  government  of  a  very  courageous  people,  a 
people  who  are  determined  to  maintain  their 
indeiDendence,  who  also  are  determined  to 
acliieve  a  lasting  peace  in  the  area  in  which  they 
live,  I  look  forward  to  the  talks  we  shall  have 
individually  and  also  with  other  members  of 
your  party. 

It  would  be  less  than  candid  for  me  not  to  say 
that  the  problems  of  the  ^Mideast  are  terribly 
complex  and  not  susceptible  to  solution  in  one 
meeting  or  two  or  three,  or  even  more,  at  the 
level  at  which  we  will  be  talking. 

But  it  is  also  proper  to  say  that  the  Mideast — 
and  peace  in  the  Mideast — is  of  interest  not  only 
to  your  nation  and  your  neighbors  but  to  the 
whole  world  because  of  what  could  happen  in  the 
event  that  war  were  to  break  out  there,  the  re- 
percussions that  that  could  have  all  over  the 
world. 

We  know  that  you  and  your  people  want 
peace.  We  know  that  your  neighbors  want  peace. 
Certainly  the  majority  of  the  people  in  the 
whole  area  want  peace.  The  question  is  how  to 
achieve  it.  On  this  we  shall  have  discussions 
that  I  hope  will  be  helpful :  the  real  peace,  the 


peace  that  is  not  simply  one  of  words,  but  one 
which  both  parties  will  have  a  vested  interest 
in  maintaining. 

I  would  say  finally,  Madam  Prime  Minister, 
that  a  very  famous  British  Prime  Minister  once 
said :  "One  should  always  talk  as  much  as  possi- 
ble to  women,  because  this  is  the  best  school." 

I  can  assure  you  that  I  recognize  the  tre- 
mendous complexity  of  the  problem  we  will  be 
discussing.  I  recognize  that  it  is  necessary  to  get 
the  very  best  answers  that  we  can  to  find  a 
solution  to  these  problems,  and  I  realize  that  in 
talking  to  you — not  just  because  you  are  Prime 
Minister  but  because  you  are  one  of  the  out- 
standing women  in  political  leadership  in  the 
world — I  will  be  truly  going  to  the  best  school 
today  and  tomorrow. 

Prime  Minister  Meir 

Mr.  President,  needless  to  say,  I  am  deeply 
moved  by  the  reception  and  by  the  words  that 
you  have  spoken.  Every  official  gviest  from 
abroad  to  the  Wliite  House  must  surely  sense 
the  significance  of  the  occasion.  May  I  say  that 
this  is  particularly  so  for  a  representative  of  a 
people  small  in  numbers  and  in  resources. 

May  I  say  that  in  receiving  me  here  in  friend- 
ship and  equality  you  are  affirming  that  the 
attitude  of  the  United  States  to  other  peoples 
is  not  determined  by  physical  factors. 

The  history  of  Israel  reborn,  in  the  years  pre- 
ceding statehood  and  the  more  than  two  decades 
since  its  achievement,  cannot  be  told  without 
reference  to  the  unwavering  support  and  friend- 
ship shown  by  successive  American  Govern- 
ments and  by  the  American  people. 

Within  hours  after  the  proclamation  of  our 
statehood,  the  United  States  Government  rec- 
ognized Israel ;  and  Jewish  remnants  from  the 
Nazi  death  camps,  who  had  been  largely  liber- 
ated by  the  American  forces  in  Europe,  came 
to  our  shores. 

Mr.  President,  the  ties  between  our  two  coun- 
tries are  rooted  in  the  Biblical  heritage  and  in 
the  common  dedication  to  human  dignity,  free- 
dom, and  to  democracy. 

We  have  done  everything  in  our  power  to 


318 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


translate  these  ideals  into  the  fabric  of  our  na- 
tional life.  It  is  this  sense  of  affinity  that  has 
encouraged  us  to  ask  for  America's  understand- 
ing and  support  in  difficult  times. 

The  story  of  modern  Israel  is  essentially  the 
story  of  the  return  to  the  ancestral  homeland  of 
exiles  from  persecution,  insecurity,  and  fear  in 
quest  of  freedom,  human  dignity,  independence, 
and  peace. 

Today,  no  Jew  need  remain  homeless  because 
of  oppression  and  insecurity.  I  am  gratified  to 
be  able  to  say  this  here  in  this  great  land  which 
has  been  a  haven  for  the  oppressed,  including 
many  of  my  own  people. 

I  shall  be  able  to  tell  you,  Mr.  President,  of 
Israel's  progress  in  many  fields.  Tragically, 
peace  is  still  denied  us.  But  that  same  faith  that 
has  sustained  us  down  the  ages  instills  within 
us  the  confidence  that  the  hour  of  peace  will 
come. 

I  look  forward  to  the  day  when  an  Israeli 
Prime  Minister  will  be  able  to  come  here  bear- 
ing to  the  President  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States  the  tidings  that  the  Middle  East 
has  entered  a  new  epoch  of  amity  and  regional 
cooperation. 

Mr.  President,  the  prayers  and  hopes  of  my 
people  are  with  you  in  the  heavy  responsibility 
you  carry  not  only  for  your  great  country  but 
for  freedom-loving  mankind  at  large.  We  follow 
with  deep  sympathy  your  efforts  for  regional 
and  world  peace,  tlie  phenomenal  scientific  ad- 
1  vance  of  America  under  your  leadership,  the  re- 
sults of  which  are  open  to  all  nations,  and  your 
interest  in  economic  and  social  advancement  for 
all  peoples. 

I  am  privileged,  Mr.  President,  to  convey  to 
you  the  best  wishes  from  the  President,  the 
Government,  and  the  people  of  Israel,  together 
with  their  deep  appreciation  for  your  invitation 
to  me  and  for  your  interest  in  our  welfare  and 
progress. 

From  Jerusalem,  the  city  of  prophecy  and 
universal  inspiration,  I  bring  you  the  traditional 
Hebrew  greeting:  Shalom. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS 

White  Honse  press  release  dated  September  25 

President  Nixon 

As  I  look  aroimd  tliis  room,  I  see  several 
Members  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  who  have 
been  here  before  during  this  administration's 
dinners  in  this  state  dining  room  and  who  have 


seen  the  heads  of  state  and  heads  of  government 
who  have  been  here. 

All  of  them  were  very  distinguished  leaders 
of  their  countries ;  but  as  you  know,  this  is  the 
first  time  in  this  administration  we  have  had 
the  honor  to  receive  the  head  of  government  of 
another  state  who  also  is  a  woman. 

Now  that,  naturally,  should  give  a  great  deal 
of  opportunity  for  a  President  of  the  United 
States,  in  welcoming  the  Prime  Minister,  to  re- 
mark about  her  unusual  capabilities  not  only  in 
her  official  capacity  but  as  a  woman.  I  can  only 
say  this,  that  I  am  reminded  of  the  fact  that 
David  Ben-Gurion,  in  referring  to  our  very 
distinguished  guest  this  evening,  referred  to  her 
as  the  best  man  in  his  Cabinet. 

I  also  recall  the  old  Jewish  proverb  to  the 
effect  that  man  was  made  out  of  the  soft  earth 
and  woman  was  made  out  of  a  hard  rib. 

I  do  not  mean  by  these  references  to  indicate 
that  the  Prime  Minister  whom  we  honor  tonight 
is  one  who  does  not  have  those  very  remarkable 
and  unique  qualities  that  we  admire  in  the 
women  of  her  coimtry  and  the  women  of  our 
own  country  and  the  women  of  the  world.  But 
what  I  would  like  to  say  very  simply  is  this : 
that  throughout  the  history  of  her  people,  a 
history  that  we  know  very  well  in  tliis  coimtry, 
a  history  that  we  heard  even  the  Marine  Band 
and  our  Strolling  Strings  attempt  to  represent 
by  music  very  briefly  a  few  moments  ago,  we 
know  that  very  capable  women  and  strong 
women  have  played  a  remarkable  and  important 
part  in  that  history. 

In  Biblical  terms,  we  remember  Deborah, 
3,000  years  ago.  The  Bible  tells  us  very  little 
about  Deborah,  except  that  she  loved  her  people 
and  served  them  well.  Then,  if  I  may  para- 
phrase, it  concludes  with  this  one  thought :  That 
there  was  peace  in  the  land  for  40  years. 

Madam  Prime  Minister,  as  we  welcome  you 
here  at  this  dinner,  and  as  we  meet  with  you 
today  and  tomorrow  on  the  occasion  of  this 
visit,  what  is  really  deepest  in  our  hearts  is  the 
hope  that  history  will  record  that  after  your 
service  as  Prime  Minister  there  was  peace  in 
the  land  for  40  years  and  longer. 

Wlien  we  think  back  on  your  people,  a  war 
every  10  years,  when  we  think  back  on  your 
people  going  back  through  the  century,  how 
they  have  suffered,  we  know  how  much  the  word 
"peace"  means. 

We  can  say  to  you  that  while  it  is  fashionable 
in  the  great  councils  of  the  world  to  talk  rather 
casually  about  peace,  and  while  it  is,  of  course, 
expected  that  at  events  like  this  we  use  that 


October   13,    1969 


319 


term  almost  in  an  offhand  way,  we  feel  it  very 
deeply  here.  We  feel  it  because  the  people  of 
Israel  deserve  peace.  They  have  earned  peace, 
not  the  fragile  peace  that  comes  with  the  kind 
of  a  document  that  neither  partj-  has  an  interest 
in  keeping,  but  the  kind  of  peace  that  will  last, 
one  that  will  last  for  40  years  or  even  longer. 

I  say  that  for  another  reason,  too.  I  have  had 
the  privilege  and  I  know  that  many  of  our 
friends  around  this  room  have  had  the  privilege 
of  seeing  what  the  people  of  this  very  small 
country  have  done  in  Israel,  and  it  is  a  remark- 
able story.  "With  this  immense  military  burden, 
with  this  tremendous  budget  that  they  have  to 
bear  in  that  respect,  how  they  have  made  that 
land  bloom,  how  they  have  made  it  productive. 

But  also  I  have  seen  what  the  people  of  this 
country  have  done  in  other  lands,  in  Africa,  in 
Asia,  in  Latin  America.  People  have  gone  from 
the  State  of  Israel  to  these  other  lands  in  their 
own  programs  of  assistance  and  advice;  and 
this  kind  of  genius,  this  kind  of  ability,  is  very 
rare  in  the  world.  It  is  desperately  needed  in 
the  world.  It  is  desperately  needed  for  the  works 
of  peace. 

And  for  these  and  so  many  other  reasons,  we 
simply  want  to  say  that  we  are  very  honored 
to  have  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, and  others  in  this  distinguished  party  here 
in  this  room  tonight.  We  are  honored  to  pay 
tribute  to  a  very  brave  and  courageous  people. 
We  hope  that  as  a  result  of  our  meeting  we  will 
have  taken  a  significant  step  forward  toward 
that  peace  which  can  mean  so  much  to  the  people 
of  Israel,  to  the  people  of  all  the  Mideast,  and 
also  to  the  people  of  the  world. 

Now  I  would  like  to  ask  you,  in  affirming  that 
sentiment,  to  rise  and  raise  your  glasses  with 
me  to  the  Prime  Minister. 

Prime  Minister  Meir 

There  is  no  use  in  my  trying  to  liide  the  fact 
that  this  has  been  an  exceptional  day  in  my  life. 
One  reads  sometimes  that  representatives  of 
big  powers  get  together,  try  to  solve  problems, 
make  certain  decisions;  and  we  know  it  is 
important. 

Then  one  sentence  reads  that  representatives 
of  little  countries,  not  very  powerful,  not  very 
much,  not  very  able  to  give  each  to  the  other — 
one  has  a  feeling,  well,  they  got  together,  they 
at  least  shared  their  troubles  and  problems,  they 
at  least  feel  sorry  for  each  other.  That  helps 
sometimes. 


But  I  think  that  this  world  would  be  entirely 
different  if  there  was  a  possibility  of  meeting 
between  the  big  and  powerful  and  the  small  in 
an  atmosphere  and  a  feeling  not  of  one  asking 
for  something  and  one  giving  something  but  in 
an  atmosphere  that  in  this  world  there  must  be 
a  real  partnership  between  large  powers  and 
small,  ricli  and  poor. 

This  world  has  become  too  small  and  too  full 
of  pi'oblems  and  troubles  for  any  one  of  us  to 
feel  that  he  by  himself  can  either  separate  him- 
self from  the  world  and  be  happy  in  his  home, 
isolated  because  he  is  powerful,  or  that  it  doesn't 
matter. 

There  can  be  some  that  are  secure  and  strong 
and  resourceful,  and  there  are  othere  tliat  are 
small  and  poor  and  troubled,  as  though  it  did 
not  affect  all  of  us,  what  happens  in  any  corner 
of  the  earth. 

We  have  become  too  advanced  in  science.  If 
any  trouble  is  discovered  in  the  moon,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, I  am  afraid  it  will  affect  us  on  earth.  We 
are  all  a  part  of  everything  that  is  good  and 
everything  that  is  dangerous. 

To  me  this  has  been  a  great  day.  Not  because  I 
have  come  representing  the  people  that  has  no 
worry  in  the  world,  that  has  no  problems,  that 
needs  nothing,  but  this  is  a  great  day  for  me 
because  I  represent  a  small  country,  a  small 
people.  I  represent  a  people  that  throughout  its 
history  for  2,000  years  has  known  persecution, 
has  known  discrimination,  has  been  driven  from 
place  to  place.  And  for  2,000  years  this  people 
has  refused  to  give  up  a  dream,  an  ideal  that 
someday  it  will  come  back  to  its  home  and  re- 
build it. 

It  is  tragic  that  this  happened  when  G  million 
of  our  people  were  gone.  Those  6  million  in  East- 
ern and  Central  Europe — those  were  the  centers 
of  culture,  of  religion,  of  Zionism,  of  faith — 
withstood  everything,  all  hardships,  and  did  not 
give  up  their  faith.  They  are  gone. 

Every  one  of  us  feels  that  he  has  to  make  up 
and  he  owes  it  to  them,  not  only  to  those  who 
are  alive,  those  remnants  that  have  remained, 
but  owes  it  to  them  who  are  gone. 

Those  who  went  to  the  gas  chambers  went 
singing :  "I  believe  the  Messiah  will  come."  They 
knew  that  they  were  going  to  their  death,  and 
we  feel  that  they  left  us  a  legacy  that  we  must 
implement  and  put  into  life,  that  which  they 
believed  in  and  that  for  which  they  died.  It  is 
not  simple  in  this  world,  in  the  neighborhood 
in  which  we  live. 

When  I  say  this  was  a  great  day  for  me,  Mr. 


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President,  I  shall  remember  it  always,  because 
you  made  it  possible  for  me  to  speak  to  you,  to 
bring-  before  you  all  of  our  problems,  all  of  our 
worries,  all  of  our  hopes  and  aspirations,  and  if 
you  will  forgive  me,  I  did  not  have  a  feeling  for 
one  single  moment  that  I,  representing  little, 
tiny  Israel,  was  speaking  to  the  President  of  the 
great  United  States.  I  felt  I  was  speaking  to  a 
friend  who  not  only  listens — in  Hebrew  we  have 
two  words,  a  word  that  means  only  listening  and 
a  word  that  means  that  it  really  is  absorbed— 
and  I  felt  that  you  were  not  merely  kind  to 
listen  to  me  but  you  shared  what  I  was  saying, 
what  our  worries  are. 

We  discussed  the  problems  of  Israel  as  though 
they  were  our  common  problems.  This  means  a 
lot.  Israel  has  known  in  its  short  number  of 
years  too  many  hours  when  we  felt  we  were 
all  alone.  And  we  made  it. 

In  1948,  when  we  were  attacked  by  six  Arab 
armies  and  had  nothing  to  fight  with,  but  thank 
God  we  did  not  lose  our  sense  of  humor,  we 
said :  yes,  but  we  have  a  secret  weapon  and  our 
secret  weapon  is,  there  is  no  alternative,  we  must 
win  because  we  have  nowhere  to  run  to  except 
the  sea.  Therefore  we  chose  to  fight  and  to  fight 
it  out  and  win.  We  had  no  alternative.  We  had 
many  hours  that  were  dark,  the  hours  before  the 
5th  of  June  in  1967,  none  of  us  will  ever  forget 
them. 

But  we  believe.  We  have  not  lost  our  con- 
fidence. We  have  faith  not  only  in  the  life  and 
existence  and  development  of  Israel,  but  we  be- 
lieve honestly  and  sincerely  that  the  day  will 
come  when  there  will  be  peace  in  the  area.  The 
day  will  come  when  across  the  borders  there 
will  not  be  tanks  and  one  will  not  listen  only 
to  the  shelling,  to  the  shells  that  will  be  sent  from 
across  the  borders  into  villages  killing  men  and 
women  and  children. 

But  I  am  convinced  that  the  day  will  come 
when  farmers  from  Israel,  young  men  and  wom- 
en who  have  left  their  homes  and  left  their 
towns  and  went  to  the  desert  and  went  to  the 
hills  at  Galilee  and  brought  life  to  the  desert 
when  nothing  has  bloomed  for  hundreds  and 
hundreds  and  hundreds  of  years  and  have 
brought  forests  to  the  hills  and  have  absorbed 
liuman  beings  shattered  in  body  and  spirit  after 
the  Second  World  War  and  made  them  alive 
again,  and  they  straightened  their  backs  and  the 
children  who  came  to  us  with  eyes  full  of  fear 
are  happy  now  and  they  sing.  These  men  and 
women  and  these  scared  children  who  have  now- 
become  young  men  and  women  have  made  it  pos- 


sible for  us  to  develop  the  desert,  to  do  what  we 
have  done,  and  there  is  song  on  their  lips  and 
they  teach  and  they  study  and  they  farm  and 
they  build. 

No  greater  day  can  we  envisage  than  when 
these  people  merely  step  across  the  border  and 
witli  a  farmer  of  Jordan  and  with  a  farmer  in 
the  Nile  Valley  and  with  a  farmer  in  Syria— 
not  Avhen  we  are  on  the  Golan  Heights  and  we 
see  wliat  was  not  done  in  the  villages  of  the 
Golan  Heights — and  we  will  just  step  across  the 
border  and  bring  with  us  not  only  the  fruits  of 
our  experience  but  the  joy  in  being  alive  to- 
gether, we  and  they,  and  making  it  possible  for 
their  children,  too,  to  live  as  human  beings  and 
to  hope  for  a  life  where  one  will  bring  joy  to 
everyone  around  and  where  we  can  erase  from 
the  minds  of  young  people,  where  we  can  erase 
the  horror  of  mothers  that  they  bring  children 
into  this  world  and,  who  knows,  maybe  when 
they  are  just  beginning  their  life  they  will  be 
sent  into  the  battleground. 

We  believe  in  that,  Mr.  President,  honestly 
and  faithfully.  We  are  a  people  who  for  2,000 
years  believed  in  the  impossible.  And  here  we 
are,  a  sovereign  state,  accepted  in  the  family  of 
nations,  with  many  problems,  many  troubles, 
but  here  we  are. 

And  here  we  are  speaking  in  the  United 
States.  Here  I  am  as  a  guest  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  having  full  understanding  of 
what  this  day  means,  and  yet  I  will  come  home 
and  I  will  tell  my  Cabinet  and  I  will  tell  my  peo- 
ple and  I  will  tell  our  children  and  our  young 
people:  Don't  become  cynical,  don't  give  up 
hope,  don't  believe  that  everything  is  just 
judged  only  by  expediency. 

There  is  idealism  in  this  world.  There  is 
human  brotherhood  in  this  world.  There  is  a 
great  and  powerful  country,  the  United  States, 
that  feels  that  the  existence  of  Israel  is  im- 
portant to  it  because  it  is  important  that  we  all 
live  and  all  exist,  no  matter  how  small  and  how 
troubled  we  are. 

Mr.  President,  thank  you,  not  only  for  your 
wonderful  hospitality,  not  only  for  this  great 
day  and  every  moment  that  I  had  this  day,  but 
thank  you  for  enabling  me  to  go  home  and  tell 
my  people  that  we  have  a  friend,  a  great  friend 
and  a  dear  friend.  It  will  help.  It  will  help  us 
overcome  many  difficulties. 

When  the  great  day  comes  when  this  dream 
comes  true,  you  will  have  had  a  great  share  in  it. 

Thank  you  very  much. 

To  the  President  of  the  United  States. 


October   13,   1969 


321 


EXCHANGE  OF   REMARKS 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  26 

President  Nixon 

Madam  Prime  Minister,  it  seems  that  you  have 
just  arrived ;  and  of  course,  your  visit  has  been 
a  short  one.  But  in  the  brief  hours  you  liave  been 
in  "Washington  we  have  had  very  extended  talks, 
private  talks,  on  the  relations  between  our  two 
countries  and,  beyond  that,  I  want  the  members 
of  the  press  to  know,  on  problems  in  the  world 
generally. 

This  is  the  first  opportimity  I  have  had  to  talk 
to  the  Prime  Minister,  although  I  have  known  of 
her  work  in  the  field  of  diplomacy  and  in  other 
areas  over  many,  many  years.  She  is,  naturally, 
an  expert  and  an  advocate  of  the  great  principles 
that  concern  her  own  country,  but  she  has  a  very 
deep  understanding  of  those  issues  that  divide 
the  world. 

It  has  been  very  valuable  for  me  to  have  the 
benefit  of  her  counsel  on  those  problems  all 
over  the  world,  including  even  the  problems 
of  youth,  which  we  discussed  at  some  length 
last  night,  although  we  found,  I  must  admit, 
no  solutions. 

I  would  like  to  say,  too,  that  in  these  talks  we 
have  discussed  all  of  those  matters  that  have 
been  speculated  about  in  the  press.  We  will  not 
announce  any  decisions  at  this  time.  There  is  no 
formal  communique. 

This  was  a  meeting  where  we  thought  it  was 
very  important  for  us  to  have  a  direct  discus- 
sion of,  first,  our  past  relations,  where  we  are 
now,  and  what  course  of  action  should  be  fol- 
lowed in  the  future. 

I  think  we  have  a  very  good  understanding  as 
to  the  positions  that  we  both  take,  and  I  think 
growing  from  this  meeting  could  come  some 
progress  toward  a  solution  of  the  terribly  dif- 
ficult problems  we  confront  in  the  Mideast.  I 
say  "could"  because  I  want  to  be  very  realistic. 
I  find  that  one  thing  the  Prime  Minister  and  I 
have  in  common  is  that  we  are  no-nonsense  kind 
of  people.  We  talk  very  directly,  and  we  cover 
a  lot  of  subjects  in  a  very  brief  time. 

The  problems  in  the  Mideast  go  back  over 
centuries.  They  are  not  susceptible  to  easy  solu- 
tion. We  do  not  expect  them  to  be  susceptible  to 
instant  diplomacy.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must 
try— and  I  was  glad  to  find  a  willingness  on 


the  part  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  her  col- 
leagues— try  to  find  a  way  to  peace. 

We  have  no  new  initiatives  to  announce,  but 
we  do  think  that  we  have  a  better  understanding 
of  how  we  should  move  from  here  on  out  in  at- 
tempting to  meet  this  very  difficult  problem. 

I  can  only  wish  you  well  on  the  balance  of 
your  trip.  I  know  you  will  receive  a  wonderful 
welcome  everyplace  j-ou  go,  particularly  in 
Milwaukee.  Milwaukee  lost  the  Braves,  but  they 
got  you  back. 


Prime  Minister  Meir 

I  only  want  to  express  my  extreme  apprecia- 
tion for  the  opportunity  that  I  have  had  to 
spend  so  much  time  with  the  President.  It  was 
an  exceptional  opportunity  for  me  personally. 

The  President  says  he  knew  about  me. 

You  would  not  be  surprised,  I  suppose,  if  I 
said  I  knew  about  you,  Mr.  President. 

Also,  representing  my  country,  speaking  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  I  am  happy 
that  I  can  go  home  and,  without  any  announce- 
ment of  news,  say  that  I  found  in  the  President 
of  the  United  States  a  friend  of  Israel  and  found 
full  understanding  for  our  problems  and  diffi- 
culties and  that  there  is  something  that  we 
share  in  common ;  that  is,  that  everything  should 
be  done  that  is  possible  to  bring  real  peace  in 
the  area,  knowing  that  the  interest  of  peace  is 
for  the  welfare  of  all  in  the  area — not  only 
Israel  but  the  tens  of  millions  of  Arabs  and 
others  in  the  various  Arab  countries. 

It  is  good  to  know  that  in  the  search  for  peace, 
both  of  us,  both  of  our  countries,  the  popula- 
tions in  both  of  our  countries,  are  deeply  in- 
terested and  dedicated  to  this  quest — not  some- 
thing that  is  makeshift,  but  something  that  is 
real  peace  in  the  area  of  the  Middle  East  and 
all  over  the  world. 

Mr.  President,  I  don't  know  how  to  thank 
you  for  the  time  that  you  have  taken,  for  the 
privilege  that  I  have  had  to  discuss  many  prob- 
lems with  you  in  an  atmosphere  of  friendship 
and  frankness,  for  the  opportunity  that  you 
gave  me  to  plac«  upon  your  shoulders,  that  are 
carrying  such  a  heavy  burden  for  the  entire 
world,  also  the  burdens  of  a  little  country  some- 
where put  away  in  the  Jliddle  East  but  that  you 
have  made  me  feel  means  something  to  you  and 
to  j'our  people. 


322 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


International  Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  Calls  for  Observance 
of  the  Geneva  Convention  on  Prisoners  of  War 


Following  is  a  statement  made  before  the  21st 
International  Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  at 
Istanhul  on  Septemier  10  hy  Graham  Martin, 
Chairman  of  the  UjS.  Government  delegation, 
togetJier  with  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  by 
the  conference  on  September  13?- 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  MARTIN 

Those  of  you  who  were  present  at  the  20th 
International  Conference  of  the  Ked  Cross  in 
Vienna  in  October  1965  will  recall  that  the  con- 
ference expressed  its  concern  for  the  treatment 
of  prisoners  of  war  whose  confinement  remov^ed 
them  from  combat  and  whose  presence  pre- 
sented no  threat  to  their  captors.  The  armed 
conflicts  that  existed  at  that  time,  and  the  con- 
duct of  some  governments  who  have  acceded  to 
the  Geneva  conventions  in  failing  to  honor  their 
obligations  under  the  conventions  to  provide 
humane  treatment  to  prisoners  of  war,  showed 
the  need  for  the  resolution  which  the  confer- 
ence passed  4  years  ago. 

Now  4  long  years  have  passed  since  the  adop- 
tion of  that  resolution,  which  called  upon  "all  au- 
thorities involved  in  an  armed  conflict  to  ensure 
that  every  prisoner  of  war  is  given  the  treatment 
and  full  measure  of  protection  prescribed  by  the 
Geneva  Convention  of  1949.  ..."  In  the  case  of 
the  Communist  authorities  in  Southeast  Asia, 
the  solemn  appeal  of  the  last  conference  fell  on 
deaf  ears.  North  Viet-Nam  and  the  Viet  Cong 
have  refused  consistently  to  observe  even  inter- 
nationally recognized  minimvmi  standards  of 
humanitarian  treatment  for  prisoners  tliey  hold 


'  The  International  Conference  of  the  Ked  Cross,  the 
highest  governing  body  of  the  Red  Cross,  consists  of 
governments  which  have  signed  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  1949,  national  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent  Societies, 
the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross,  and  the 
League  of  Red  Cross  Societies. 


as  a  result  of  the  armed  conflict  in  Viet-Nam. 

The  concern  of  the  United  States  about  these 
prisoners  has  been  expressed  by  President  Nixon 
and  also  by  Ambassador  Lodge  at  the  Paris 
peace  talks.  Secretary  of  State  Rogers  and  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  Laird  also  have  repeatedly 
publicly  expressed  urgent  concern  about  the  fail- 
ure of  the  Communist  authorities  in  Viet-Nam 
to  live  up  to  the  humanitarian  standards  of  the 
convention  and  to  treat  humanely  personnel  who 
have  fallen  into  their  hands. 

The  concern  of  these  highest  officers  of  the 
United  States  is  universally  shared  by  all  the 
American  people.  I  am  glad  to  note  that  we  are 
not  alone  in  our  concern.  Speaking  in  London 
on  March  19,  Jacques  Freymond  of  the  ICRC 
[International  Committee  of  the  Eed  Cross] 
said  concerning  the  work  of  the  Committee : 

In  Viet-Nam,  it  has  so  far  had  limited  success.  In 
fact,  in  spite  of  repeated  representations.  It  has  not 
been  able  to  obtain  the  agreement  of  the  Democratic 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  to  the  installation  of  a  delegation 
in  Hanoi  nor  even  to  the  visiting  of  prisoners  of  war. 

The  Hanoi  authorities  have,  it  is  true,  assured  the 
ICRC  that  these  prisoners  are  treated  humanely  by 
them.  The  Committee  has  therefore  had  to  content 
itself  with  sending  medicines,  medical  equipment,  and, 
more  recently,  two  field  hospitals  to  the  Democratic 
Reptiblic  of  Viet-Nam. 

Mr.  Freymond  went  on  to  say : 

On  the  other  hand,  the  ICRC  is  represented  in  Saigon 
and  the  delegates  are  able  to  visit  all  prisoner  of  war 
camps.  They  also  regularly  receive  nominal  rolls  of 
these  prisoners. 

I  might  add  that  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam,  in  cooperation  with  its 
allies,  has  placed  great  emphasis  on  proper 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  captured  by 
Allied  forces. 

Today,  in  September  1969, 1  have  the  sad  duty 
to  report  to  you  that  we  have  seen  that  the  Com- 


October  13,   1969 


323 


munist  authorities  in  Soutlieast  Asia  have  re- 
fused to  cooperate  with  the  ICRC.  We  also  laiow 
as  a  fact  that  North  Viet-Nam  is  violating  every 
basic  provision  of  the  prisoner  of  war  conven- 
tion it  signed  and  is  in  fact  seriouslj^  mistreat- 
ing our  men  it  holds  as  prisoners.  We  are  deeply 
concerned  and  outraged  by  this  grave  affront  to 
human  dignity  and  international  responsibility. 

Wlien  I  said  that  we  know  that  our  men  who 
are  captured  in  Viet-Nam  are  being  mistreated, 
I  spoke  with  the  assurance  of  unmistakable  evi- 
dence— a  touching  witness  provided  by  one  who 
liad  himself  actually  been  subjected  to  this  sav- 
age and  inhuman  treatment.  Since  the  time  of 
the  last  conference  we  have  known  that  North 
Viet-Nam  was  refusing  to  provide  the  names  of 
all  the  men  it  held  as  prisoners  and  has  refused 
to  permit  impartial  inspection  of  its  prisoner 
facilities  by  the  ICRC  or  any  other  impartial 
intermediary.  It  has  long  been  obvious  that 
prisoners  have  been  denied  or  severely  restricted 
in  their  right  to  communicate  with  their  fami- 
lies. The  hundreds  of  waiting  families  who  do 
not  even  know  if  their  man  is  alive  today  are  sad 
witnesses  to  tliis  fact.  We  also  have  seen  the 
North  Vietnamese  release  photographs  of  seri- 
ously sick  or  wounded  prisoners  who  should  be 
repatriated  immediately. 

Today  we  have  confirmation  of  what  has  been 
an  even  greater  concern  for  us:  Our  men  are 
being  seriously  physically  and  mentally  mis- 
treated. The  men  whom  North  Viet-Nam  re- 
cently chose  to  release  have,  in  spite  of  threats  by 
their  captors,  felt  dutybound  to  tell  the  world 
how  North  Viet-Nam  treats  its  prisoners.  Their 
story  is  not  a  pleasant  one,  and  it  pleads  for 
jirompt  and  strong  action  by  this  conference. 
Nortli  Viet-Nam  denies  universally  accepted 
standards  of  humanitarian  treatment  for  prison- 
ers and  violates  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva 
convention,  to  which  it  acceded,  by : 

1.  Refusing  to  identify  the  prisoners  it  holds 
and  account  for  those  missing  in  North  Viet- 
Nam. 

2.  Torturing  prisoners  both  physically  and 
mentally. 

3.  Keeping  prisoners  in  isolation,  cut  off  from 
their  fellow  prisoners  and  from  the  outside 
world. 

4.  Failing  to  provide  an  adequate  diet. 

5.  Failing  to  repatriate  the  seriously  sick  or 
wounded. 


6.  Refusing  to  permit  impartial  inspection  of 
prisoner  facilities  by  the  ICRC  or  another  ap- 
propriate intermediary. 

7.  Using  prisoners  for  propaganda  purposes. 

8.  Denying  regular  exchange  of  mail  be- 
tween all  prisoners  and  their  families. 

9.  Failing  to  provide  adequate  medical  care 
to  all  prisoners  in  need  of  treatment. 

May  I  ask  you  to  hear  the  actual  words  of 
Navy  Lieutenant  Robert  F.  Frishman,  one  of 
the  prisoners  recently  released  by  North  Viet- 
Nam.  On  September  2,  1969,  less  than  a  fort- 
night ago,  from  our  Naval  Hospital  in  Bethesda, 
where  he  is  recovering  from  his  ordeal,  he  had 
this  to  say : 

My  intentions  are  not  to  scare  wives  and  families, 
but  Hanoi  has  given  false  impressions  that  all  is  wine 
and  roses  and  it  isn't  so.  AH  I'm  interested  in  is  for 
Hanoi  to  live  up  to  their  claims  of  humane  and  lenient 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war.  I  don't  think  solitary 
confinement,  forced  statements,  living  in  a  cage  for 
3  years,  being  put  in  straps,  not  being  allowed  to  sleep 
or  eat,  removal  of  fingernails,  being  hung  from  a  ceil- 
ing, having  an  infected  arm  which  was  almost  lost, 
not  receiving  medical  care,  being  dragged  along  the 
ground  with  a  broken  leg,  or  not  allowing  an  exchange 
of  mail  to  prisoners  of  war  are  humane. 

Why  don't  they  send  out  a  list  of  their  prisoners  of 
war?  Why  do  they  try  to  keep  us  from  even  seeing 
each  other?  Certain  prisoners  of  war  have  received 
publicity.  Others  are  kept  silent.  Why  aren't  their  names 
officially  released?  If  they  don't  have  any  secondary 
alternatives  or  motives  in  mind,  then  release  the  names 
of  the  prisoners  of  war  so  their  families  will  know 
their  loved  ones'  status.  I  feel  as  if  I  am  speaking  not 
only  for  myself  but  for  my  buddies  back  in  camp,  to 
whom  I  promised  I  would  tell  the  truth.  I  feel  it  is  time 
people  are  aware  of  the  facts. 

Lieutenant  Frislunan  was  addressing  his  own 
people  in  America.  But  it  is  time  for  the  world 
to  know  these  facts.  Therefore,  I  share  Lieu- 
tenant Frishman's  words  with  you  gathered 
here  in  this  conference. 

In  the  most  recent  provisional  activity  report 
submitted  to  this  conference  by  the  ICRC,  it  is 
stated  that  "on  3  June  1969  the  ICRC  again 
wrote  the  Government  of  the  Democratic  Re- 
public of  Vietnam  reminding  it  of  the  obliga- 
tions incumbent  on  it  in  accordance  with  the 
1919  Geneva  Conventions  for  the  protection  of 
war  victims."  And  at  our  opening  session  the 
distinguished  new  President  of  the  ICRC 
[IMarcel  Naville]  reported  to  us  that  North  Viet- 
Nam  had  not  yet  allowed  any  representative  of 
the  ICRC  to  enter  its  territory'. 


324 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Each  of  us  has  a  moral  duty  to  see  that  signers 
of  the  convention  honor  the  internationally  ac- 
cepted principles  of  humane  treatment  of  pris- 
oners of  war.  We  trust  that  tliis  conference, 
■which  has  a  fundamental  and  abiding  interest 
in  the  Greneva  Prisoner  of  War  Convention,  will 
declare  itself  clearly  and  unequivocally  con- 
cerning the  humane  treatment  of  prisoners — 
all  prisoners  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  Tlie  reso- 
lution before  us  was  carefully  drafted  by  the 
cosponsors  to  ensure  the  universality  of  its 
coverage  to  all  prisoners  of  war  wherever  held, 
by  whatever  nation,  great  or  small.  We  hope 
therefore,  that  all  national  delegations  and  all 
national  societies  will  join  those  nations  and 
national  societies  which  have  already  sponsored 
this  resolution.  We  believe,  Mr.  Chairman,  it 
should  be  supported  unanimously. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  = 

Protection  of  Prisoners  of  War 

The  XXIst  International  Conference  of  the  Red 
Cross, 

Recalling  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1949  on  the  pro- 
tection of  prisoners  of  war,  and  the  historic  role  of  the 
Red  Cross  as  a  protector  of  victims  of  war, 

Considering  that  the  Convention  applies  to  each 
armed  conflict  between  two  or  more  parties  to  the 
Convention  without  regard  to  how  the  conflict  may  be 
characterized, 

Recognizing  that,  even  apart  from  the  Convention, 
the  international  community  has  consistently  demanded 
humane  treatment  for  prisoners  of  war,  including  iden- 
tification and  accounting  for  all  prisoners,  provision  of 
an  adequate  diet  and  medical  care,  that  prisoners  be 
permitted  to  communicate  with  each  other  and  with 
the  exterior,  that  seriously  sick  or  wounded  prisoners 
be  promptly  repatriated,  and  that  at  all  times  prisoners 
be  protected  from  physical  and  mental  torture,  abuse 
and  reprisals. 

Requests  each  party  to  the  Convention  to  take  all 
.  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  humane  treatment  and 
I  prevent  violations  of  the  Convention. 
!      Calls  upon  all  parties  to  abide  by  the  obligations  set 
forth  in  the  Convention  and  upon  all  authorities  in- 
volved in  an  armed  conflict  to  ensure  that  all  uniformed 
members  of  the  regular  armed  forces  of  another  party 
to  the  conflict  and  all  other  persons  entitled  to  prisoner 
of  war  status  are  treated  humanely  and  given  the  full- 
est measure  of  protection  prescribed  by  the  Conven- 
;  tion ;  and  further  calls  upon  all  parties  to  provide  free 
access  to  the  prisoners  of  war  and  to  all  places  of  their 
detention  by  a  protecting  Power  or  by  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross. 


■  Adopted  on  Sept.  13  by  a  vote  of  114  to  0. 


President  Reaffirms  Interest 
in  International  Peace  Corps 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon  to  U.N.  Secretary  General  U  Thant, 
which  was  delivered  to  the  Secretary  General  on 
September  21j.  hy  Joseph  H.  Blatchfwd.  Direc- 
tor of  the  Peace  Corps,  and  Glenn  A.  OMs^ 
U.S.  Representative  on  the  V.N.  Economic  and 
Social  Council. 

D.S./U.N.  press  release  110  dated  September  24 

Deak  Mk.  Secretary  General:  Thank  you 
for  meeting  with  our  Peace  Corps  representa- 
tives who  are  serving  abroad.  Your  deep  com- 
mitment to  world  peace  and  to  economic,  social 
and  human  development  is  an  example  to  these 
fine  Americans,  and  to  the  thousands  of  Vol- 
unteers they  represent. 

I  am  sure  you  vrill  find  that  they  share  many 
of  your  goals,  especially  your  thought  that 
we  must  "channel  the  idealism  of  our  young 
people"  into  an  international  effort  against 
injustice  and  poverty. 

As  we  approach  the  United  Nations'  second 
development  decade,  I  find  appropriate  and  en- 
couraging the  mternational  interest  in  volimteer 
service  which  is  reflected  in  the  recent  significant 
resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly  and  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council.  I  am  deeply 
pleased  that  the  United  Nations  is  now  study- 
ing the  possibilities  of  an  International  Volim- 
teer Corps,  for  if  Volunteers  of  the  world  can 
work  together,  the  \asion  of  development  has 
become  less  distant  and  the  promise  of  peace 
will  move  closer  to  reality. 

In  keeping  with  this  Administration's  dedi- 
cation to  international  cooperation  and  develop- 
ment, the  Peace  Corps,  mider  the  direction  of 
Mr.  Joseph  Blatchford,  is  undertaking  a  num- 
ber of  new  initiatives,  including  a  commitment 
to  the  concept  of  International  Vohmtary  Serv- 
ice. Guiding  its  new  directions  is  the  conviction 
that  the  developing  countries  themselves  must 
take  part  in  their  own  human  development 
through  the  formation  of  their  ovm  voluntary 
organizations.  To  help  achieve  these  goals  the 
Peace  Corps  will  seek  to  send  abroad  more 
technically  skilled  Volunteers,  along  with  the 
traditional  generalists ;  it  will  persist  in  efforts 
to  develop  the  concept  of  exchange  voluntary 
programs  and  will  look  to  host  country  leader- 


October  13,   1969 


325 


ship    in    the    development    of    Peace    Corps        TEXT  OF  U.S.  NOTE 

activities. 

The  vast  number  of  people  of  all  ages  who 
wish  to  offer  their  goodwill,  skills  and  idealism 
as  Volunteers  must  be  given  the  chance  to  do 
so,  and  the  participation  of  the  United  Nations 
toward  this  goal  merits  the  highest  commenda- 
tion. I  wish  you  success  and  assure  our  full 
cooperation  in  this  most  important  effort. 
Sincerely, 


Richard  Nixon 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.  and  Czechoslovakia  Sign 
Cotton  Textile  Agreement 

Press   release    253   dated    September   2 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  United  States  and  Czechoslovakia  con- 
cluded a  cotton  textile  agreement  through  an  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  on  August  29. 
Philip  H.  Trezise,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Economic  Affairs,  and  Karel  Duda,  Am- 
bassador of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Repub- 
lic, signed  the  respective  notes. 

Under  the  agreement,  which  was  negotiated 
in  the  context  of  the  Long  Term  Arrangement 
Regarding  International  Trade  in  Cotton 
Textiles  (the  LTA),  Czechoslovakia  agrees  to 
control  exports  of  cotton  textiles  to  the  United 
States  for  2  years,  from  May  1,  1969,  through 
April  30, 1971. 

For  its  first  year,  the  agreement  provides  an 
aggregate  ceiling  of  2.5  million  square  yards 
and  a  ceiling  in  category  26  (other  than  duck) 
of  1  million  square  yards.  Consultation  levels 
are  specified  for  the  remaining  63  categories  of 
cotton  textiles.  Ceiling  and  consultation  levels 
are  increased  by  5  percent  in  the  second  year  of 
the  agreement. 


July  29,  1969 
Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  Long- 
term  Arrangement  Regarding  International  Trade  In 
Cotton  Textiles,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  LTA, 
done  in  Geneva  on  February  9,  1962,  and  to  the  Pro- 
tocol extending  the  LTA  through  September  30,  1970. 
I  also  refer  to  recent  discussions  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic,  as  the 
result  of  which  I  have  the  honor  to  propose  the  fol- 
lowing agreement,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Article 
IV  of  the  LTA  as  extended  by  the  Protocol,  relating 
to  trade  in  cotton  textiles  between  Czechoslovakia  and 
the  United  States: 

1.  During  the  term  of  this  agreement,  which  shall  be 
from  May  1,  19G9,  to  April  30,  1971,  inclusive,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic  shall 
limit  annual  exports  of  cotton  textiles  from  Czecho- 
slovakia to  the  United  States  to  aggregate  and  spe- 
cific limits  specified  in  the  following  paragraphs. 

2.  For  the  first  agreement  year,  constituting  the  12- 
month  period  beginning  May  1,  1969,  the  aggregate 
limit  shall  be  2.5  miUion  square  yards  equivalent 

3.  Within  this  aggregate  limit,  exports  in  Category 
26  (other  than  duck)  shall  be  Umited  to  1  mlUlon 
square  yards,  except  as  provided  in  paragraphs  4,  5, 
and  7. 

4.  In  the  second  and  any  succeeding  12-month  period 
that  any  limitation  is  applicable  under  this  agreement, 
the  level  of  permitted  exports  shall  be  increased  by  five 
percent  over  the  corresponding  level  for  the  preced- 
ing 12-month  period.  The  corresponding  level  for  the 
preceding  12-month  period  shall  not  include  any  ad- 
justments under  paragraphs  5  or  7. 

5.  Within  the  aggregate  limit,  the  limitation  on 
Category  26  (other  than  duck)  may  be  exceeded  by  five 
percent 

6.  The  Government  of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Re- 
public and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  agree 
to  consult  on  any  questions  concerning  trade  In  cot- 
ton textiles  between  their  two  countries,  including 
levels  of  exports  in  categories  not  given  specific  limits 
and  in  made-up  goods  or  apparel  made  from  a  par- 
ticular fabric.  Except  by  mutual  agreement  of  the 
two  governments  or  as  provided  In  paragraph  3,  ex- 
ports in  any  one  category  during  the  first  agreement 
year  shall  not  exceed  500,000  square  yards  equivalent 
in  Categories  1-27  or  350,000  square  yards  equivalent 
in  Categories  28-64. 

7.  (a)  For  any  agreement  year  subsequent  to  the 
first,   and  immediately  following  a  year  of  shortfall 

(i.e.,  a  year  in  which  cotton  textile  exports  from  Czech- 
oslovakia to  the  United  States  were  below  the  ag- 
gregate limit  and  any  specific  limit  applicable  to  the 
category  concerned),  exports  may  be  permitted  to  ex- 
ceed these  limits  by  carryover  in  the  following  amounts 
and  manner: 

(i)  The  carryover  shall  not  exceed  the  amount  of 
the  shortfall  in  either  the  aggregate  limit  or  any  ap- 


326 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


plicable  specific  limit  and  shall  not  exceed  five  percent 
of  the  aggregate  limit  in  the  year  of  the  shortfall,  and 

(ii)  in  the  case  of  shortfalls  in  any  category  sub- 
ject to  specific  limits  the  carryover  shall  be  used  in 
the  same  category  in  which  the  shortfall  occurred  and 
shall  not  exceed  five  percent  of  the  specific  limit  in  the 
year  of  the  shortfall,  and 

(iii)  in  the  case  of  shortfalls  not  attributable  to  cate- 
gories subject  to  specific  limits,  the  carryover  shall  not 
be  used  to  exceed  any  applicable  specific  limit  except  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  in  paragraph  5  and 
shall  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  6. 

(b)  The  limits  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (a)  of 
this  paragraph  are  without  any  adjustments  under  this 
paragraph  or  paragraph  5. 

(c)  The  carryover  shall  be  in  addition  to  the  ex- 
ports permitted  in  paragraph  5. 

8.  Cotton  textile  exports  from  Czechoslovakia  to  the 
United  States  within  each  category  shall  be  spaced 
as  evenly  as  practicable  throughout  the  agreement  year, 
taking  into  consideration  normal  seasonal  factors. 

9.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  shall 
promptly  supply  the  Government  of  the  Czechoslovak 
Socialist  Republic  with  data  on  monthly  imports  of 
cotton  textiles  from  Czechoslovakia;  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic  shall 
promptly  supply  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
with  data  on  monthly  exports  of  cotton  textiles  to  the 
United  States.  Each  government  agrees  to  supply 
promptly  any  other  pertinent  and  readily  available 
statistical  data  requested  by  the  other  government. 

10.  In  implementing  this  agreement,  the  system  of 
categories  and  the  rates  of  conversion  into  square 
yards  equivalents  listed  in  the  annex  hereto  ^  shall 
apply.  In  any  situation  where  the  determination  of  an 
article  to  be  a  cotton  textile  would  be  affected  by 
whether  the  criterion  provided  for  in  Article  9  of  the 
LTA  or  the  criterion  provided  for  in  paragraph  2  of 
Annex  E  of  the  LTA  is  used,  the  chief  value  criterion 
used  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica in  accordance  with  paragraph  2  of  Annex  E  shall 
apply. 

11.  For  the  duration  of  this  agreement,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  shall  not  invoke 
the  procedures  of  Article  3  and  6  (c)  of  the  LTA  to 
request  restraint  on  the  export  of  cotton  textiles  from 
Czechoslovakia  to  the  United  States. 

12.  If  the  Government  of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist 
Republic  considers  that,  as  a  result  of  limitations  spec- 
ified in  this  agreement,  Czechoslovakia  is  being  placed 
in  an  inequitable  position  vis-a-vis  a  third  country,  the 
Government  of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic  may 
request  consultation  with  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  with  a  view  to  taking  appropriate 
remedial  action  such  as  consent  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  to  reasonable  modification  of  this 
agreement. 

13.  Mutually  satisfactory  administrative  arrange- 
ments or  adjustments  may  be  made  to  resolve  minor 


problems  arising  in  the  implementation  of  this  agree- 
ment including  differences  in  points  of  procedures  or 
operation. 

14.  This  agreement  shall  continue  in  force  through 
April  30,  1971,  except  that  either  government  may 
terminate  it  effective  at  the  end  of  any  agreement  year 
by  written  notice  to  the  other  government  to  be  given 
at  least  90  days  prior  to  such  termination  date.  Either 
government  may  at  any  time  propose  revisions  in  this 
agreement. 

15.  Each  Government  shall  take  appropriate  meas- 
ures of  export  control  or  import  control,  as  applicable, 
to  implement  the  limitation  provisions  of  the  agreement 

I  have  the  honor  to  propose  that  this  note  and  your 
Excellency's  note  of  confirmation  on  behalf  of  the 
Government  of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic ' 
shall  constitute  an  agreement  between  our  two 
Governments. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

For  the  Secretary  of  State : 

Philip  H.  Trezise 

His  Excellency 

Dr.  Kakel  Dud  a. 

Ambassador  of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 


Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago,  1944, 
as  amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with  annex. 
Done  at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered 
into  force  October  24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Signature:  Turkey,  September  19,  1969. 

Consular  Relations 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  consular 
relations  concerning  the  compulsory  settlement  of  dis- 
putes. Done  at  Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into 
force  March  19, 1967.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  June  12,  1969. 

Cultural   Relations 

Agreement  on  the  importation  of  educational,  scientific, 
and  cultural  materials,  with  protocol.  Done  at  Lake 
Success  November  22, 1950.  Entered  into  force  for  the 
United  States  November  2,  1966.  TIAS  6129. 
Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauritius, 
July  18, 1969. 


'  For  text  of  the  annex,  see  press  release  258  dated 
Sept.  2. 


"  Not  printed  here. 

^  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


October   13,   1969 


327 


Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund.  Done  at  Washington  December  27,  1945.  En- 
tered into  force  December  27,  1945.  TIAS  1501. 
Signature  and  acceptance:  Swaziland,  September  22, 
1969. 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton December  27,  1945.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 27.  1945.  TIAS  1502. 

Signature  and  acceptance:  Swaziland,  September  22, 
1969. 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of  ex- 
ecution. Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered  into 
force  .January  1, 1966.  TIAS  .''.SSI. 
Ratification  deposited:  Cambodia,  August  11,  1969. 

Property 

Nice  agreement  concerning  the  international  classifi- 
cation of  goods  and  services  for  the  purposes  of  the 
registration  of  marks  of  June  15,  1957,  as  revised  at 
Stockholm  on  July  14,  1967.= 
Ratification  deposited:  Israel,  July  30,  1969. 

Slavery 

Convention  to  suppress  the  slave  trade  and  slavery, 
as  amended  (TIAS  3532).  Done  at  Geneva  Sep- 
tember 25,  1926.  Entered  into  force  March  9,  1927. 
46  Stat.  2183. 

Notification  that  it  considers  itself  iound:  Mauritius, 
July  IS,  1969. 

Women — Political    Rights 

Convention  on  the  political  rights  of  women.  Done  at 
New  York  March  31,  1953.  Entered  into  force  July  7, 
1954.' 

Notification  that  it  considers  itself  hound:  Mauritius 
(with  a  reservation),  July  18,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


China 

Agreement  concerning  the  status  of  the  American 
Embassy  School  of  Chinese  Language  and  Area 
Studies  at  Taichung  and  its  personnel  and  of  Chinese 
Embassy  personnel  studying  in  the  Washington  area. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Taipei  July  15  and 
August  22,  1969.  Entered  into  force  August  22,  1969. 

Guatemala 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting  of  au- 
thorizations to  permit  licensed  amateur  radio 
operators  of  either  country  to  operate  their  stations 
in  the  other  country.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Guatemala  November  30  and  December  11,  1967. 
Entered  into  force:  October  2,  1969. 

Italy 

Agreement  confirming  a  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing regarding  a  cooperative  satellite  research  project 
between  NASA  and  the  Aerospace  Research  Center 


of  the  University  of  Rome.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Rome  August  9  and  September  11,  1969. 
Entered  into  force  September  U,  1969. 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  relating  to  a  reciprocal  arrangement  under 
which,  in  certain  circumstances,  the  armed  forces 
of  either  country  would  advance  funds  to  units  or 
personnel  of  the  other  for  their  temporary  support, 
with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Welling- 
ton September  3,  1969.  Entered  into  force  Septem- 
ber 3, 1969. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  IG,  1909 
(TIAS  6693),  on  the  reciprocal  allocation  for  use 
free  of  charge  of  plots  of  land  in  Moscow  and  Wash- 
ington. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Moscow 
September  17  and  19,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
September  19,  1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN   SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  September  17  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Vincent  de  Roulet  to  be  Ambassador  to  Jamaica. 
(For  biographic  data,  .see  Department  of  State  press 
release  283  dated  October  1.) 

Joseph  S.  Farland  to  be  Ambassador  to  Pakistan. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  August  28.) 

William  E.  Schaiifele,  Jr.,  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Upper  Volta.  (For  biographic  data,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  279  dated 
September  24. ) 

William  C.  Trueheart  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Nigeria.  (For  biographic  data,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  278  dated  September 
24.) 

John  Patrick  Walsh  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  State  of 
Kuwait.  (For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press 
release  dated  August  20.) 


Designations 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  Not  in  force. 


Douglas  Henderson  as  the  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
Inter-American  Committee  on  the  Alliance  for  Progress 
( CIAP) .  ( For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  272  dated  September  19.) 

Robert  A.  Hurwitch  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter- American  Affairs,  effective  September  S.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
263  dated  September  11.) 

Jonathan  Moore  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  effective  September  22. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  271  dated  September  18.) 


328 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX      October  13,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No.  1581 


Asia.  Moore  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs     .     .      328 

Congress 

Confirmations  (De  Roulet,  Farland,  Schaufele, 
Trueheart,  Walsh) 328 

35tli  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 
(Lodge,  text  of  House  resolution  on  prisoners 
of   war) 316 

Czechoslovakia.  U.S.  and  Czechoslovakia  Sign 
Cotton  Textile  Agreement  (U.S.  note)     .     .     .      32G 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Confirmations   (De  Roulet,  Farland,  Schaufele, 

Trueheart,  Walsh) 328 

Designations  (Henderson,  Hurwitch,  Moore)     .       328 

Disarmament.  President  Nixon's  News  Confer- 
ence of  September  26  (excerpts) 313 

Economic  Affairs.  U.S.  and  Czechoslovakia  Sign 
Cotton  Textile  Agreement  (U.S.  note)     .     .     .       326 

International   Organizations   and   Conferences. 

International  Conference  of  the  Red  Cross 
Calls  for  Observance  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
on  Prisoners  of  War  (Martin,  text  of 
resolution) 323 

Israel.  Prime  Minister  Melr  of  Israel  Visits 
Washington  (Nixon,  Meir) .       318 

Jamaica.  De  Roulet  confirmed  as  Ambassador  32S 

Kuwait.  Walsh  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .     .       328 

Laos.  President  Nixon's  Nevrs  Conference  of 
September  26  (excerpts) 313 

Latin  America 

Henderson  designated  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
Inter-American  Committee  on  the  Alliance  for 
Progress  (CIAP) 328 

Hurwitch  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Inter-American  Affairs 328 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Spptcm- 

bcr   26    (excerpts) 313 

Near  East.  Prime  Minister  Meir  of  Israel  Visits 
Washington  (Nixon,  Meir) 31S 

Nigeria.  Trueheart  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .       328 

Pakistan.  Farland  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .       328 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Septem- 
ber 26  (excerpts) 313 

President  Reaffirms  Interest  in  International 
Peace  Corps 32.5 

Prime  Minister  Meir  of  Israel  Visits  Wash- 
ington     318 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 327 

U.S.  and  Czechoslovakia  Sign  Cotton  Textile 
Agreement    (U.S.    note) 326 

U.S.S.R.  President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of 
September  26  (excenrts) 313 

United  Nations.  President  Reaffirms  Interest  in 
International  Peace  Cori)s  (letter  to  U.N. 
Secretary  General) 325 


Upper  Volta.  Schaufele  confirmed  as  Ambas- 
sador      328 

Viet-Nam 

International  Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  Calls 
for  ObseiTance  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
on  Prisoners  of  War  (Martin,  text  of 
resolution) 323 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Septem- 
ber 26    (excerpts) 313 

35th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 
(Lodge,  text  of  House  resolution  on  prisoners 
of  war) 316 

Name   Index 

de  Roulet,  Vincent 328 

Farland,  .Joseph  S 328 

Henderson,  Douglas 328 

Hurwitch,   Robert   A .328 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 316 

Martin,  Graham 323 

Meir,   Golda 318 

Moore,  Jonathan 328 

Nixon,    President 313,318,325 

Schaufele,  William  E.,  Jr 328 

Trueheart,  William  C 328 

Walsh,  John  Patrick 328 


Date 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  September  22-28 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  September  22  which 
appears  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  253 
of  September  2. 

Subject 

Lydman  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Malaysia  ( biographic  data ) . 

Program  for  visit  of  Prime  Min- 
ister Meir  of  Israel. 

Revision  in  program  for  visit  of 
Prime  Minister  of  Israel 

Cross  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Singapore  ( biographic  data ) . 

Mcllvaine  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Kenya  (biographic 
data ) . 

Trueheart  sworn  in  as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Nigeria  (biographic 
data). 

Schaufele  sworn  in  as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Upper  Volta  (biographic 
data). 
Lodge :  35th  plenary  session  on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 


*274 

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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1582 


October  20,  1969 


GENERAL  CONFERENCE  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  ATOMIC  ENERGY  AGENCY 

HOLDS  13th  SESSION  AT  VIENNA 
Statement  by  Glenn  T.  Seaborg     329 

THE  UNITED  NATIONS:  ALIVE  AND  USEFUL 

hy  Assistant  Secretar'y  De  Pahna     336 

Bos  I; 

Sunerir;  > 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1582 
October  20,  1969 


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Note:     Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

ST.\TE   BULLETIN  as  the  .lource  will  be 

appreciated.  Tlie  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the  Eoaders'   Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  tlxe  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, atid  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  tvell  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
natioruil  relations  are  listed  currently . 


General  Conference  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
Holds  13th  Session  at  Vienna 


The  13th  session  of  the  General  Conference  of 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  was 
held  at  Vienna  September  23-29.  Following  is  a 
statement  made  before  the  conference  on  Sep- 
tember 21).  by  Glenn  T.  Sedborg,  Chairman  of 
the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  who  was 
chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation. 

AEC  press  release  S-29-69  dated  September  24 

I  would  like  to  extend  my  congratulations  to 
you,  Professor  Torki  [Bechir  Torki,  of  Tuni- 
sia], upon  your  election  as  President  of  this 
conference,  a  position  of  great  honor  and  re- 
sponsibility. It  is  an  honor  and  a  pleasure  for 
me  to  represent  the  United  States  for  the  ninth 
year  at  the  Greneral  Conference  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency,  to  address  my 
fellow  delegates  to  this  conference  and  to  be 
once  again  in  this  beautiful  city  of  Vienna. 

I  would  also  like,  at  the  outset,  to  commend 
the  Agency's  staff  for  its  competence  and  dedi- 
cation and  the  outstanding  leadership  Director 
General  [A.  Sigvard]  Eklimd  has  provided  the 
Agency.  We  are  deeply  gratified  that  Dr.  Ek- 
lund  has  agreed  to  serve  as  Director  General 
for  another  term,  and  we  know  that  this  feeling 
is  widely  shared  by  other  delegates. 

It  is  my  privilege  now  to  read  the  following 
message  to  the  conference  from  the  President  of 
the  United  States : 

I  am  happy  to  take  this  opportunity  to  greet  the 
delegates  to  the  Thirteenth  General  Conference  of  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  This  Agency  is 
deeply  involved  in  one  of  the  most  important  areas 
of  international  cooperation  in  which  we  participate, 
with  great  and  increasing  responsibilities  and  oppor- 
tunities in  ensuring  that  the  benefits  of  the  peaceful 
atom  are  widely  shared,  under  proper  safeguards 
against  diversion  to  military  uses. 

The  death  earlier  this  year  of  President  Dwight  D. 
Eisenhower  was  a  loss  not  only  to  me,  personally,  and 
to  my  nation  but  to  all  those  In  many  lands  who  devote 
their  lives  and  careers  to  advancing  the  peaceful  uses 
of  atomic  energy.  I  am  proud  that  the  Atoms-for-Peace 
program  and  the  establishment  of  this  great  Interna- 
tional agency  was  a  proposal  of  President  Eisenhower 


In  his  historic  message  before  the  United  Nations  Gen- 
eral Assembly  in  December  1953."  The  development 
of  this  Agency  and  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic 
energy  during  the  intervening  years  has  been  deeply 
impressive. 

I  should  like  to  reaffirm  my  country's  dedication  to 
continued  support  of  the  Agency  and  of  the  principles 
of  its  Statute.  I  should  also  like  to  renew  our  pledge 
to  support  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  which  con- 
stitutes yet  another  step  in  furthering  our  common  goal 
of  harnessing  the  atom  for  peaceful  uses. 

I  send  you  my  congratulations  for  the  past  accom- 
plishments of  this  Conference  and  this  Agency,  and 
the  best  wishes  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
for  your  future  endeavors. 

In  the  spirit  of  President  Nixon's  message  to 
this  conference,  I  would  like  to  reaffirm  my 
country's  longstanding  commitment  to  peace- 
ful nuclear  progress  and  to  the  proposals  that 
the  United  States  has  made  and  carried  forward 
throughout  the  existence  of  this  Agency.  Under 
the  Agency's  statute,  we  are  committed  to  the 
principle  of  seeking  to  accelerate  the  contribu- 
tion of  atomic  energy  to  peace,  health,  and  pros- 
perity throughout  the  world  and  to  the  prin- 
ciple that  in  allocating  its  resources  the  Agency 
is  to  bear  in  mind  the  special  needs  of  the  de- 
veloping areas  of  the  world.  These  principles 
are  also  clearly  reflected  in  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Treaty,  to  which,  as  President  Nixon  said, 
we  pledge  our  support. 

Much  has  been  done  and  much  remains  to  be 
done  in  our  common  quest  of  harnessing  the 
atom  to  serve  man  in  the  many  important  and 
imique  peaceful  applications  of  nuclear  energy. 
Cooperation,  both  bilaterally  and  through  the 
Agency,  has  been  and  will  continue  to  be  an  es- 
sential condition  for  progress  in  this  field  and  as 
a  way  of  enabling  all  countries,  regardless  of 
their  stage  of  development,  to  share  in  the  bene- 
fits of  the  peaceful  atom. 

We  are  proud  that  the  United  States  has 
pioneered  in  developing  and  pursuing  an  im- 
paralleled  program  of  cooperation  in  the  peace- 

•  Btjlletin  of  Dec.  21, 1953,  p.  847. 


October  20,   1969 


329 


ful  nuclear  field  over  the  past  15  years.  Our 
international  program  has  stressed  the  very 
activities  sjjecified  in  the  statute  and  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty :  the  exchange  of  scientific 
and  teclmical  information,  materials,  and  equip- 
ment. Perhaps  most  important  of  all  is  our  pol- 
icy to  supply  uranium  and  uranium-enricliing 
services  to  other  countries  under  attractive  terms 
and  conditions  to  satisfy  their  long-term  needs 
for  fuel. 

U.S.  Atoms-for-Peace  Program 

I  believe  it  might  be  worthwhile  to  review 
briefly  some  of  the  principal  features  of  my 
Government's  bilateral  and  multilateral  cooper- 
ation in  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy  to 
give  an  idea  of  the  scope,  level,  and  direction  of 
peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  undertaken  since 
our  Atoms-for-Peace  program  began  following 
President  Eisenhower's  address  to  the  United 
Nations.  As  many  of  you  will  recall,  immedi- 
ately following  his  address  the  United  States 
undertook  a  major  efi'ort  to  cooperate  with  other 
countries  in  sharing  the  existing  and  potential 
benefits  of  the  peaceful  atom.  One  of  the  prin- 
cipal steps  taken  was  to  bring  about  the  creation 
of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  a 
step  that  was  realized  on  July  29,  1957,  when 
the  Agency's  statute  came  into  force. 

The  United  States  has  been  a  vigorous  sup- 
porter of  the  Agency  since  its  inception.  One 
index  of  this,  perhaps,  is  the  extent  of  material 
support  we  have  extended  to  the  Agency.  Our 
direct  financial  support  of  the  regular  and  op- 
erational budgets  has  thus  far  totaled  about 
$27.5  million.  This  amount  has  been  supple- 
mented with  approximately  $5  million  in  the 
form  of  cost-free  fellowships,  services  of  ex- 
perts, equipment  grants,  and  support  for  Agencj' 
training  courses.  In  addition,  $500,000  worth  of 
special  nuclear  material  has  thus  far  been  pro- 
vided as  gifts  for  use  in  Agency-approved 
projects. 

Over  700  persons  from  55  countries  have  been 
trained  in  the  United  States  under  the  Agency's 
fellowship  program.  An  additional  5,400  indi- 
viduals from  69  countries  liave  been  trained  in 
my  country  under  other  arrangements,  and  26 
research-reactor  grants  were  made,  averaging 
about  $350,000  per  grant.  The  nuclear  centers 
established  around  these  research  reactors  have 
been  instrumental  in  promoting  and  expanding 
general  scientific  development  and  cooperation 
in  many  of  the  cotmtries,  in  addition  to  further- 


ing the  nuclear  sciences.  We  are  pleased  to  note 
the  increasing  cooperation  among  several  of 
these  centers,  which,  hopefully,  will  result  in 
additional  benefits  to  the  countries  concerned. 
I  understand,  for  example,  that  a  number  of 
nuclear  centers  in  Southeast  Asia  are  actively 
considering  various  regional  projects  of  inter- 
est to  the  coimtries  concerned.  We  commend 
these  efforts  and  would  encourage  similar  co- 
operation elsewhere. 

The  willingness  of  the  United  States  to  share 
its  scientific  and  teclmical  information  with 
other  countries  is  well  known.  For  almost  15 
yeai-s  now,  virtually  all  research  conducted  or 
funded  by  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission 
in  the  civil  uses  of  nuclear  energy  has  been  un- 
classified and  the  results  published  and  made 
widely  available.  I  should  also  mention  that  the 
United  States,  for  several  years,  has  strongly 
supported  the  establislmient  of  the  Agency's 
International  Nuclear  Information  System 
(INIS),  initial  funding  for  which  is  provided 
for  in  the  1970  budget.  We  believe  that  INIS 
will  substantially  increase  the  exchange  of  nu- 
clear scientific  and  technical  information  among 
the  member  states. 

I  offer  these  facts  and  figures  to  give  some 
idea  of  what  is  being  done  by  one  country,  out 
of  many  which  have  programs  in  the  nuclear 
field,  and  the  benefits  to  be  derived  tlirough 
international  cooperation. 

U.S.  Support  of  Future  Plans 

As  to  the  future,  I  am  very  pleased  to  be  able 
to  make  the  following  observations  and  pledges 
on  behalf  of  my  Government : 

1.  We  have  before  our  Congress  a  proposal 
which,  if  approved,  would  enable  us  to  increase 
the  level  of  our  cash  contribution  toward  the  $2 
million  target  of  the  operational  budget  above 
that  of  previous  years.  In  addition,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  provide  contributions  in  kind  in  the 
form  of  cost-free  experts,  training  opportuni- 
ties in  our  institutions,  and  items  of  equipment, 
as  we  are  able  to  do  so. 

We  continue  to  believe  that  the  chronic  lack 
of  adequate  funds  to  finance  the  Agency's  tech- 
nical assistance  program  is  one  of  the  most  seri- 
ous problems  the  Agency  faces,  and  we  urge  all 
members  to  support  the  operational  budget  to 
the  fullest  extent  possible. 

The  United  States  also  supports  the  regular 
program  and  budget  which  has  been  recom- 


330 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


mended  by  the  Board  of  Governors  for  1970,  and 
we  hope  other  member  states  will  likewise  sup- 
port it. 

2.  We  will  continue  to  supply  special  nuclear 
materials  through  the  Agency  to  other  coimtries 
for  fueling  reactors  or  for  research  purposes  on 
the  same  attractive  terms  and  conditions  that 
are  applicable  to  materials  supplied  on  a  bi- 
lateral basis  for  similar  purposes.  I  am  also 
pleased  to  announce  that  for  the  11th  consecutive 
year  we  are  prepared  to  make  available  as  a  gift 
up  to  $50,000  worth  of  special  nuclear  material 
for  use  in  Agency  projects  in  research  and  med- 
ical therapy. 

NonproliferaHon    Treaty  and    IAEA's    Functions 

One  of  the  important  items  on  the  General 
Conference's  agenda  (item  15)  is  a  report  by 
the  Board  of  Governors  concerning  the 
Agency's  role  in  connection  with  nuclear  explo- 
sions for  peaceful  purposes.^  You  will  recall 
that  the  Board's  report  is  in  response  to  a  re- 
quest by  the  General  Conference  last  year  to 
the  Director  General  "to  initiate  studies  of  the 
procedures  that  the  Agency  should  employ  in 
performing  such  a  role"  and  for  the  Board  to 
review  the  results  of  these  studies.  I  am  pleased 
to  say  that  my  Government  fully  endorses  the 
Board's  report.  We  believe  it  is  a  very  good 
analysis  of  the  role  the  Agency  can  play  in  this 
field,  and  it  reinforces  our  belief  that  the 
Agency  is  the  most  appropriate  organization  to 
foster  international  cooperation  relating  to  the 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  explosions  and  to  as- 
sume the  responsibilities  and  functions  antici- 
pated for  an  international  organization  under 
article  V  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.' 

The  report  notes  that  the  technology  of  nu- 
clear explosions  for  peaceful  purposes  is  at  an 
early  stage  of  development  and  that  progress 
will  likely  be  made  on  a  gradual  basis.  We  agree 
with  the  Board's  view  that  the  Agency's  orga- 
nization should  be  kept  under  review  and 
adapted  as  necessary  to  assure  that  it  will  be  able 
to  meet  its  anticipated  increasing  responsibili- 
ties in  this  field.  We  have  made  clear  our  inten- 
tion to  continue  support  of  the  development  of 
the  Agency's  competence  in  this  field  by  provid- 
ing the  Agency  with  extensive  information  on 
the  U.S.  experimental  Plowshare  program  and 
by  making  experts  available  to  assist  the  Agency 

'IAEA  doc.  GC(XIII)/410/July  31,  1969. 
'  For  text  of  the  treaty,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1, 1968, 
p.  8. 


as  necessary.  The  United  States  has  already 
provided  a  summary  report  on  the  current 
status  of  the  technology  of  the  peaceful  appli- 
cations of  nuclear  explosions,  which  the  Direc- 
tor General  has  circulated  to  all  member  states, 
and  we  have  provided  an  expert  to  assist  in  de- 
veloping an  agenda  and  program  for  the 
Agency's  first  planned  panel  meeting  on  this 
subject.  In  addition,  we  have  recently  made 
available  a  scientist  from  our  Plowshare  pro- 
gram to  serve  on  the  staif  of  the  Agency. 

Before  leaving  this  item,  I  would  also  like  to 
reiterate  that  my  Government  plans  to  make 
available,  when  technically  and  economically 
feasible,  peaceful  nuclear  explosion  services, 
pursuant  to  article  V  of  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty,  imder  attractive  conditions  which  we 
hope  will  be  of  interest  to  other  coimtries. 
Charges  will  be  as  low  as  possible  and  will 
exclude  the  sizable  costs  of  research  and  devel- 
opment that  have  been  incurred  in  the  de- 
velopment of  nuclear  explosives. 

Another  important  role  for  the  Agency  imder 
the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  will  be  in  the  safe- 
guards field.  I  would  like  to  reaffirm  the  pledges 
made  on  behalf  of  my  Government  at  the  last 
General  Conference  that  we  will  do  all  we  can 
in  support  of  the  Agency's  activities  in  this  im- 
portant area.  Our  research  and  development 
program  for  the  improvement  of  safeguards 
tecluiology  is  continuing,  and  we  are  developing 
new  instruments  for  nondestructive  assay 
measurements  of  a  wide  variety  of  fissionable 
materials.  These  instruments  will  be  mounted  in 
trailers  for  ease  of  mobility  and  will  be  on  dis- 
play during  a  symposivun  on  safeguards  to  bo 
held  at  Los  Alamos  Scientific  Laboratory  on 
October  27-30,  to  which  the  Agency  has  been 
invited  to  send  representatives.  We  are  continu- 


Members  of  U.S.  Delegation 
to  IAEA  Conference  Confirmed 

The  Senate  on  September  23  confirmed  the 
nomination  of  Glenn  T.  Seaborg  to  be  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  to  the  13th  session 
of  the  General  Conference  of  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

The  nominations  of  Verne  B.  Lewis,  James  T. 
Ramey,  Henry  DeWolf  Smyth,  and  Theos  J. 
Thompson  to  be  alternate  representatives  of  the 
United  States  to  the  13th  session  of  the  IAEA 
General  Conference  were  also  confirmed  on  that 
day. 


October  20,   1969 


331 


ing  to  hold  safeguards  training  courses  at 
Argorme  National  Laboratory,  to  which  the 
Agency  and  individual  countries  have  sent  safe- 
guards personnel. 

Mr.  President,  over  the  past  year  we  have 
witnessed  the  initiation  of  a  number  of  im- 
portant studies  and  reviews  that  bear  directly 
on  the  functions  and  future  of  the  Agency. 
Largely  through  the  stimulus  of  the  Nonprolif- 
eration  Treaty,  the  non-nuclear-weapon  states 
have  underscored  their  desire  to  be  assured  that 
they  will  have  continued  access  to  the  benefits 
of  the  peaceful  atom.  In  addition,  as  requested 
by  the  General  Conference  last  year,  the  Board 
of  Governors  has  been  performing  a  compre- 
hensive review  of  its  own  composition  to  deter- 
mine whether  any  changes  are  necessary. 

This  is  a  challenging  time  for  the  Agency, 
and  we  face  a  number  of  tasks  in  the  months 
and  years  ahead.  Given  the  requisite  good  will, 
I  have  every  confidence  that  the  Agency  has  the 
flexibility  and  strength  to  meet  these  challenges. 
Indeed,  over  the  past  year  in  several  areas,  such 
as  safeguards,  peaceful  nuclear  explosions,  and 
the  question  of  the  composition  of  the  Board, 
the  Secretariat  and  the  member  states  have 
demonstrated  their  ability  to  start  tackling  and 
resolving  a  number  of  these  issues.  There  is  an 
imderstandable  desire  on  the  part  of  some  states 
to  rectify  those  anomalies  that  exist  in  the  board 
of  Governors  and  to  make  the  Board  more  repre- 
sentative. "We  find  ourselves  in  sympathy  with 
these  nations,  although  we  believe  the  complex- 
ity of  the  problem  must  be  realistically  rec- 
ognized and  appreciated.  There  already  is  a 
broad  community  of  agreement  that  some 
modest  expansion  in  the  Board  is  warranted.  It 
is  my  earnest  hope  and  conviction  that  we  shall, 
in  the  next  year,  be  able  to  arrive  at  a  suitable 
and  equitable  amendment  to  the  statute  that 
will  be  sufficiently  attractive  to  command  the 
necessary  two-thirds  support  of  the  member- 
ship. Certainly,  for  our  part,  we  shall  do  every- 
thing we  can  to  try  to  make  this  possible. 

Environmental  Problems 

Before  closmg,  I  would  like  to  mention  a  prob- 
lem that  many  of  us  have  been  or  may  be  con- 
fronted with  in  connection  with  the  increasing 
use  of  modern  technology  in  today's  societies  and 
the  possible  effects  of  such  teclinology  on  the 
environment.  Today,  as  nuclear  power  and  other 
beneficial  uses  of  nuclear  energy  are  demonstrat- 
ing the  tremendous  promise  which  we  have  long 


held  for  them,  we  are  witnessing  in  some  parts 
of  the  world  a  renewed  public  questioning  of 
the  effects  of  these  activities  in  relation  to 
environmental  problems. 

This  develoi^ment  has  its  roots,  in  part,  in 
today's  widespread  concern  that  many  of  man's 
activities  have  injurious  effects  of  sometimes 
imknown  magnitude  on  his  own  environment. 
To  the  extent  that  these  concerns  are  derived 
from  an  honest  spirit  of  inquiry,  we  can  only 
welcome  them.  We  are  confident  that  the  facts, 
when  fully  presented,  will  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  nuclear  energy  in  all  its  peaceful  ramifica- 
tions, when  expertly  applied,  will  in  fact  rep- 
resent a  major  gain  in  our  efforts  to  preserve 
for  future  generations  the  beneficial  features  of 
our  present  environment.  We  must  conclude, 
however,  that  as  administrators  we  have  in  some 
measure  failed  to  communicate  to  our  concerned 
public  the  reassuring  facts  that  we  ourselves 
know  so  well. 

My  delegation  believes  that  the  Agency  can 
make  a  major  contribution  to  improved  public 
understanding  of  this  important  issue,  and  we 
urge  the  Director  General  and  the  staff  to  de- 
vote a  high  priority  to  it,  recognizing  that  fail- 
ure to  satisfy  the  concerns  that  are  now  being 
expressed  might  deter  and  postpone  for  many 
years  the  enjoyment  of  the  benefits  of  nuclear 
energy  which  people  everywhere  have  a  right  to 
expect.  As  one  possibility,  we  urge  the  Agency 
to  consider  including  in  its  conferences  and 
symposia  program  a  meeting  dealing  with  the 
environmental  aspects  of  power  reactors.  The 
United  States  would  be  prepared  to  serve  as 
host  for  such  a  meeting.  We  also  believe  the 
Agency  should  participate  fully  in  the  prepara- 
tory work  for  the  United  Nations  Conference 
on  the  Human  Environment,  which  is  being 
planned  for  1972. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  reemphasize  our  con- 
fidence that  the  Agency  and  all  of  its  member 
states  can  look  forward  to  an  increasingly  mean- 
ingful future  with  regard  to  the  peaceful  ap- 
plications of  nuclear  science  and  energy.  For 
our  part,  the  United  States  will  continue  to  give 
its  full  support  to  international  cooperation  in 
this  field.  We  have  come  a  long  way  in  develop- 
ing nuclear  technology  during  the  past  15  years 
and  in  the  growth  of  individual  country  pro- 
grams. Although  much  remains  to  be  done, 
much  has  been  achieved;  and  it  is  important 
that  we  keep  past  achievements  and  future  goals 
in  perspective.  In  looldng  to  the  future,  I  be- 
lieve it  fair  to  say  that  the  degree  of  success  in 


332 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


attracting  support  for  soundly  developed  nu- 
clear projects  will  depend  in  large  part  on  the 
priority  assigned  to  such  projects  by  individual 
countries  in  their  overall  development  plans. 
I  am  confident  that  the  judicious  application 
of  nuclear  science  to  the  problems  of  economic 
development  will  produce  great  dividends  over 
the  next  several  years.  In  our  age  of  rapid 
change,  we  are  in  a  field  in  which  the  rate  of 
evolution  is  perhaps  as  great  as  can  be  found 
anywhere.  This  kind  of  situation  challenges 
everyone  to  grasp  the  opportunity  to  apply 
new  approaches  to  the  solution  of  old  problems, 
and  innovation  becomes  both  appropriate  and 
feasible. 
ll  We  are  convinced  of  the  importance  of  sci- 
ence and  of  international  cooperation  in  solving 
both  national  and  international  problems.  After 
looking  back  over  the  period  since  1953,  we  are 
hopeful  for  the  future  and  eager  to  explore  new 
possibilities  of  development  in  cooperation  with 
like-minded  men  and  nations. 


United  States  and  Thailand  Agree 
on  Reduction  of  U.S.  Forces 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  statement  is- 
sued at  Washington  and  Bangkok  on  September 
30. 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  30 

The  President  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Prime  Minister  of  Thailand  announced  today 
that  the  United  States  Government  and  the 
Royal  Thai  Government  have  completed  bilat- 
eral talks  to  arrange  for  an  orderly  reduction 
of  U.S.  forces  in  Thailand,  which  are  there  in 
connection  with  the  Vietnam  war. 

The  two  governments  have  agreed  that  ap- 
proximately 6,000  U.S.  military  personnel,  from 
both  the  Air  Force  and  the  Army,  are  to  be  with- 
drawn from  Thailand.  They  will  be  withdrawn 
as  expeditiously  as  possible  consistent  with  oper- 
ational requirements  related  to  the  Vietnam  con- 
flict. Redeployment  action  will  begin  within  a 
few  weeks  and  it  is  planned  that  all  the  forces 
involved  will  have  departed  by  July  1, 1970. 

The  two  govermnents  will  continue  to  evalu- 
ate the  level  of  U.S.  armed  forces  in  Thailand 
in  light  of  their  assessment  of  developments  in 
the  Vietnam  conflict. 


36th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  text  of  the  opening  statement 
made  hy  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head 
of  the  U.S.  delegation,  at  the  36th  plenary  ses- 
sion of  the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam,  at  Paris  on 
October  2. 

Press  release  284  dated  October  2 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  At  his  recent  press 
conference  on  September  26  President  Nixon 
said :  ^ 

...  on  the  negotiating  front  the  United  States  has 
made  a  far-reaching  and  comprehensive  peace  offer,  a 
peace  offer  which  offers  not  only  mutual  withdrawal 
of  forces,  internationally  guaranteed  cease-fires,  inter- 
nationally supervised  elections — in  which  we  will 
accept  the  result  of  those  elections  and  the  South  Viet- 
namese will  as  well,  even  if  it  is  a  Communist 
government.  .  .  . 

The  President  then  said : 

There  is  one  thing,  however,  which  I  should  em- 
phasize, that  is  not  negotiable.  We  will  talk  about  any- 
thing else.  What  is  not  negotiable  is  the  right  of  the 
people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to  choose  their  own  leaders 
without  outside  imposition,  either  by  us  or  by  anybody 
else. 

As  the  President  makes  clear,  our  side  has  set 
forth  comprehensive  proposals  for  settlement  of 
both  political  and  military  issues  in  Viet-Nam 
which  are  well  suited  to  reasonable  discussion 
and  negotiation. 

But  you  of  the  other  side  have  given  no  in- 
dication that  you  are  ready  for  reasonable  dis- 
cussion and  negotiation.  Although  you  have 
pledged  to  negotiate  sincerely,  and  although  you 
assert  that  you  have  come  here  with  "good  will," 
your  proposals  are  put  forward  as  demands 
which  must  be  accepted  without  essential 
changes.  It  is  essentially  a  take-it-or-leave-it 
attitude. 

And  you  still  refuse  to  deal  in  any  kind  of 
meaningful  way  with  the  elected  government  of 
the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  let  us  consider  this  re- 
fusal of  yours.  Let  us  try  to  imagine  what  an 
impartial  observer  who  could  see  everythmg 
going  on  here  would  think  of  it.  I  submit  that 
if  he  were  to  visit  our  meetings  here  at  the  Ma- 
jestic he  would  be  struck  by  these  facts : 

Here  you  have  agreed  that  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  should  be  seated  at 

'  For  excerpts,  see  Buixetin  of  Oct.  13,  1969,  p.  313. 


October  20,   1969 


333 


this  table.  Yet,  except  for  the  speeches  which 
are  made  here,  you  refuse  to  meet  and  you  re- 
fuse to  deal  with  that  Govermnent.  There  must 
be  few,  if  any,  precedents  in  history  for  such  an 
attitude. 

You  say  you  do  not  want  to  deal  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  because 
you  do  not  like  it  and  you  do  not  agree  with  it. 
But,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  how  would  any  in- 
ternational dispute  ever  be  settled  if  people  only 
talked  with  those  whom  they  like  and  those  with 
whom  they  agree?  The  very  essence  of  peace 
negotiation  is  that  those  who  do  not  agree  and 
who  represent  widely  differing  viewpoints  and 
interests  should  sit  down  and  talk  together. 

Such  an  impartial  observer  would  surely 
characterize  your  refusal  to  deal  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  as  com- 
pletely inconsistent  with  sincere  negotiations. 

And  this  is  not  the  end  of  the  story.  You  have 
not  only  refused  to  deal  with  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  but  you  also  demand 
that  we  should  withdraw  our  forces  uncondi- 
tionally and  overthrow  that  Government  as  we 
leave  South  Viet-Nam.  You  thus  seek  to  domi- 
nate South  Viet-Nam  militarily  following  our 
withdrawal  and  to  dominate  South  Viet-Nam 
subversively  because  of  our  ha^^ng  overthrown 
the  constitutionally  elected  government  of  that 
country. 

Seldom  in  history  has  there  been  in  any  diplo- 
matic meeting  an  attitude  so  fundamentally  ex- 
treme and  so  calculated  to  make  any  progress 
impossible. 

Last  week  your  side  chose  to  conclude  its 
presentation  at  this  meeting  with  a  call  for 
"total  victory."  Your  attitude  clearly  reflects  an 
attempt  to  win  such  a  victory  here  at  this  table. 
It  must  be  ob\aous  to  you,  as  it  is  to  us,  that 
you  cannot  win  total  victory  on  the  ground  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  You  should  now  realize  that 
you  also  cannot  win  it  here,  that  you  cannot 
force  us  to  withdraw  all  our  forces  unless  you 
do  the  same,  that  you  cannot  impose  your  so- 
called  "coalition  government,"  and  that  you 
cannot  achieve  anything  of  consequence  in  South 
Viet-Nam  unless  it  is  negotiated  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

Our  side  has  proposed  a  solution  of  the  with- 
drawal issue  which  we  believe  to  be  fair  and 
reasonable.  We  believe  that  all  external  forces 
should  leave  South  Viet-Nam.  Not  just  yours. 
Not  just  ours.  But  all.  We  are  committed  to  the 
principle  of  total  withdrawal.  As  we  have  in- 
dicated, we  are  prepared  to  negotiate  the  details 
of  such  withdrawals.  We  are  prepared  to  be  flex- 


ible on  arrangements,  provided  the  basic  end  is 
achieved.  We  favor  a  position  which  leaves 
neither  victor  nor  vanquished.  We  do  not  at- 
tempt to  impose  anybody's  will  on  anybody  else. 
We  want  only  to  ensure  that  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam  have  a  genuine  opportunity  to  deter- 
mme  their  own  future  free  from  outside 
interference. 

Our  side  has  also  set  forth  a  reasonable  pro- 
posal for  a  peaceful  political  settlement.  We 
have  said  that  we  are  prepared  to  accept  the  re- 
sults of  elections  whatever  these  results  may  be. 
We  do  not  try  to  determine  them  in  advance. 
As  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  has  indicated,  we  are  prepared  to  accept 
an  arrangement  which  permits  participation  by 
all  South  Vietnamese  political  parties  and 
groups.  We  do  not  attempt  to  exclude  any  of 
them.  And  we  have  proposed  that  the  elections 
be  organized  by  an  electoral  commission  which 
will  include  representatives  of  all  political  ele- 
ments in  South  Viet-Nam.  We  have  also  pro- 
posed that  elections  be  held  under  international  I 
supervision. 

Last  week  your  side  called  our  jjroposals  a 
"farce"  and  "absurd." 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  this  is  not  the  way  to 
think  or  the  way  to  talk.  Nor  is  it  the  way  to  | 
act.  The  way  is  clear,  as  I  have  just  said.  Let 
us  at  last  start  discussing  the  issues.  That  does 
not  mean  that  we  agree  now  or  will  necessarily 
agree  later.  But  we  should  start  meaningful 
negotiations. 

Our  side  is  ready.  As  President  Nixon  said  on 
last  September  26 :  "Now  is  the  time  for  Hanoi 
to  make  the  next  move." 


U.S.,  India  Agree  on  Experiment 
in  Instructional  Television 

The  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Admin- 
istration announced  on  September  18  (NASA 
press  release  69-135)  that  a  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding concerning  an  India/US  ITV 
Satellite  Experiment  Project  had  been  signed 
that  day  at  NASA  headquarters  by  Vikram  A. 
Sarabhai,  Chairman  of  the  Indian  Space  Re- 
search Organization  and  head  of  India's  De- 
partment of  Atomic  Energy,  and  by  Thomas 
O.  Paine,  NASA  Administrator. 

Instructional  television  programs  will  be 
brought  to  some  5,000  Indian  villages  by  this 
experiment,  the  first  to  provide  direct  broad- 


334 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


casting  of  television  programs  from  a  space  sat- 
ellite into  small  village  receivers  without  the 
need  for  relay  stations  on  the  ground.  This  is 
made  possible  by  the  increase  in  on-board  power 
in  the  satellite  and  by  the  innovation  of  a  de- 
ployable  satellite  antenna  with  high  pointing 
accuracy.  This  in  turn  makes  it  possible  to  re- 
duce costs  at  the  receiver  end  and  so  to  multiply 
the  numbers  of  remote  receivers  at  reasonable 
cost. 

The  satellite  to  be  used  for  the  joint  experi- 
ment will  be  the  Applications  Tecluiology 
Satellite  (ATS-F),  the  sixth  iai  NASA's  ap- 
plications teclmology  series,  scheduled  for 
launch  about  the  middle  of  1972.  It  will  be  posi- 
tioned in  synchronous  orbit  over  the  equator  and 
will  be  available  to  India  wliile  additional  ex- 
periments are  conducted  by  U.S.  and  other 
experimenters. 

India  will  utilize  an  existing  experimental 
ground  station  at  Ahmedabad  in  Indian's  west 
coastal  state  of  Gujarat,  as  well  as  others  at 
different  locations,  to  transmit  TV  programs 
to  the  satellite,  wliich  will  then  relay  them  to 
village  receivers  as  well  as  to  larger  distribu- 
tion stations.  India  will  provide  and  maintain 
the  village  receivers. 

Under  the  memorandum  of  understanding, 
the  ATS-F  satellite  may  be  utilized  by  India 
for  a  period  of  1  year.  The  experiment  then 
ends,  and  any  continuing  service  wiU  be  the 
sole  responsibility  of  India.  No  exchange  of 
funds  between  the  two  cooperating  agencies  is 
provided. 

India  will  be  solely  responsible  for  the  tele- 
vision programing.  Tliis  will  be  primarily  di- 
rected to  contribute  to  family  planning,  im- 
prove agricultural  practices,  and  contribute  to 
national  integration. 

The  joint  TV  experiment  wiU  provide  a  first 
large-scale  test  of  instructional  television  to : 

— Demonstrate  the  potential  value  of  satellite 


teclmology  in  the  rapid  development  of  effective 
mass  conunmiications  in  developing  coimtries. 

— Demonstrate  the  potential  value  of  satellite 
broadcast  TV  in  the  practical  instruction  of  vil- 
lage inliabitants. 

— Stimulate  national  development  in  India, 
with  important  managerial,  economic,  teclino- 
logical,  and  social  implications. 

It  follows  several  years  of  careful  prepara- 
tion, including  an  experiment  conducted  in  the 
vicinity  of  New  Delhi  in  conventional  broad- 
casting of  television  programs  on  agi-icultural 
teclmiques  to  village  receivers.  Experience  in 
the  villages  receiving  the  TV  programs  was 
compared  with  experience  in  villages  not  receiv- 
ing these  programs.  The  residts  demonstrated 
the  effectiveness  of  television  instruction  of  a 
concrete  character  and  encouraged  India  to  pro- 
ceed further  with  this  space  satellite  project. 


U.S.  Responds  to  Cuban  Closing 
of  American  News  Services 

Department  Statement  ^ 

On  September  17  the  Government  of  Cuba 
closed  and  sealed  the  Havana  offices  of  United 
Press  International  and  the  Associated  Press 
and  blocked  the  bank  accomits  in  Cuba  of  these 
two  news  services.  This  imwarranted  action  was 
taken  without  warning  or  official  explanation. 

The  Department  of  State  therefore  has  asked 
the  Treasury  Department  to  revoke  the  license 
imder  which  Prensa  Latina,  the  official  Cuban 
news  agency,  operates  in  the  United  States  mitU 
such  time  as  American  wire  services  are  per- 
mitted to  restore  their  operations  in  Cuba. 

'  Kead  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch  on  Oct.  1. 


October  20,    1969 


335 


The  United  Nations:  Alive  and  Useful 


hy  Samuel  De  Palma 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Interruitional  Organisation  Affairs  ^ 


It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  be  here  with  you  to 
get  acquainted  with  those  who  report  the  ins 
and  outs  of  U.N.  affairs.  I  want  to  talk  about 
several  things  that  appear  important  to  me  and 
then  to  answer  your  questions. 

I  was  appointed  to  my  present  job  at  a  time 
when  it  seems  to  have  become  fashionable  to 
downgrade  the  United  Nations,  to  belittle  its 
achievements,  and  to  accent  its  shortcomings. 
Those  with  a  taste  for  alliteration  refer  to  the 
U.N.  as  bizarre,  bumbling,  and  broke,  if  not 
impotent,  irrational,  and,  perhaps,  irrelevant. 
Some  of  you  have  written  that  the  best  thing 
about  the  U.N.  is  the  fact  that,  under  the  cover 
of  public  meetings  in  this  Fim  City,  diplomats 
can  get  together  privately  in  dark  comers  and 
carry  on  meaningful  negotiations. 

There  is,  of  course,  a  tiny  bit  of  truth  in  these 
assertions.  Before  going  any  further,  I  would 
like  to  state  a  personal  Anew  as  to  the  condition 
of  the  U.N.  today.  Its  problems  are  many  and 
serious.  Its  procedures  are  often  clumsy ;  excess 
loquacity  and  emotion,  sometimes  reflecting  per- 
sonal or  other  than  official  views,  tend  to  distort 
the  outcome  of  discussions  and  too  often  con- 
sume an  inordinate  amount  of  time.  As  it  is,  the 
organization  is  drowning  in  its  documentation. 
Clearly  the  organization's  procedures  must  be 
streamlined. 

Its  finances  are  in  precarious  shape;  they 
must  be  put  on  a  solvent  basis.  A  majority  of  its 
members  often  use  the  organization  primarily 
to  promote  a  confrontation  with  the  more  af- 
fluent minority.  We  must  all  learn  to  seek  out 
the  broad  common  or  mutual  interests  on  which 
negotiation  and  progress  are  possible. 

But  this  is  not  surprising.  For  one  thing,  we 

'  Address  made  before  the  United  Nations  Corre- 
spondents Association  at  New  Tork,  N.Y.,  on  Sept.  25 
(U.S./U.N.  press  release  107). 


simply  must  allow  time  for  the  organization  to 
digest  its  large  membership  and  to  find  a  new 
equilibrium.  Then,  too,  there  are  signs  of  a 
growing  desire  among  the  major  powers  for 
an  accommodation  that  would  open  the  way  for 
greater  cooperation.  This  is  indispensable  if 
the  organization  is  to  begin  to  fulfill  its  security 
functions  and  broader  political  aims.  Moreover, 
there  is  a  general  desire  to  utilize  the  coming 
25th  anniversary  for  a  rededication  to  first 
principles  and  for  a  general  strengthening  of 
U.N.  machinery.  The  United  States  is  keenly 
interested  in  doing  so,  and  I  believe  we  shall 
find  a  large  mmiber  of  willing  partners  in  this 
admittedly  difficult  effort. 

Of  all  the  dangers  wliich  we  face,  the  single 
one  most  irmnediately  recognizable  is  the  danger 
of  war.  Yet  the  organization  whose  first  order  of 
business  is  to  maintain  international  peace  and 
security  has  still  not  achieved  a  workable  con- 
sensus on  how  peacekeeping  operations  should 
be  conducted. 

As  you  know,  for  years  the  negotiations  in 
the  Committee  of  33  made  no  headway  because 
of  the  rigid  Soviet  insistence  that  the  Security 
Council  control  peacekeeping  at  all  stages,  that 
only  the  Security  Council  should  authorize  a 
peacekeeping  exercise,  that  administration  and 
control  of  a  peacekeeping  operation  be  vested 
in  the  Security  Council,  and  that  only  the  Se- 
curity Council  should  recommend  ways  through 
which  the  operation  might  be  paid  for.  One 
doesn't  have  to  know  much  about  the  U.N.  or 
about  public  administration  to  recognize  that 
this  is  a  formula  for  frustration. 

Recently,  however,  we  have  seen  the  first  signs 
of  a  Soviet  willingness  to  discuss  these  prob- 
lems in  more  practical  and  realistic  terms,  and 
the  Committee  will  be  able  to  report  some  lim- 
ited progress,  at  least  as  regards  possible  ground 


336 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


rules  for  observer  missions.  But  many  difficult 
problems  remain  for  negotiation. 

For  our  part  we  are  prepared  to  recognize 
the  primary  role  of  the  Security  Council  in 
respect  to  peacekeeping,  but  we  believe  more 
flexible  procedures  than  those  advocated  until 
now  by  the  U.S.S.R.  should  be  agreed  upon. 
We  are  not  interested  in  some  rigid  or  doc- 
trinaire formula,  but  in  effective  procedures 
which  will  assure  that  U.N.  peacekeeping  forces 
can  and  will  be  made  available  when  needed  and 
can  be  adapted  to  the  unique  circumstances  of 
each  case. 

I  can  assure  you  that  the  United  States  wishes 
to  join  with  others  in  contributing  its  fair  share 
of  the  costs  and  in  facilitating  an  agreement 
on  effective  means  for  carrying  out  peacekeep- 
ing operations.  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  we  hope 
to  continue  businesslike  negotiations  with  the 
Soviets  and  others. 

Another  problem  which  must  be  solved  if  the 
U.N.  is  to  continue  and  increase  its  effectiveness 
in  world  affairs  is  the  question  of  membership. 
Today  it  is  necessary  to  think  about  the  micro- 
states.  You  still  refer  to  them  as  mini-states, 
but  we  find  that  term  too  closely  associated  with 
mini-skirts.  Still,  the  basic  problem  is  the  same : 
How  far  can  you  go  before  you  get  into  trou- 
ble? In  the  case  of  the  mini-skirt  the  end 
is  already  in  sight.  Not  so,  however,  with 
micro-states. 

The  facts  available  to  us  show  a  total  of  nearly 
60  territories  which  may  gain  (or,  in  one  or  two 
cases,  have  already  gained)  juridical  independ- 
ence, each  of  which  has  a  population  of  less  than 
100,000.  In  addition,  there  are  about  15  some- 
what larger  territories,  which  would  not  neces- 
sarily be  considered  micro-states. 

These  65  or  so  territories  would  have  a  grand 
total  population  of  about  4,600,000.  That  means 
that  all  of  these  potential  candidates  for  U.N. 
membership  added  together  muster  fewer  peo- 
ple than  any  one  of  the  69  most  populous  states 
now  members  of  the  U.N.  They  possess  0.2  per- 
cent of  the  total  population  of  the  present  mem- 
bership. Yet  if  they  were  added  to  the  present 
membership,  they  would  comprise  nearly  one- 
third  of  the  votes  in  the  Greneral  Assembly. 

These  are  the  facts  which  we  presume  the 
Secretary  General  had  in  mind  when  he  pointed 
out  that  such  a  general  influx  of  micro-states 
would  "lead  to  a  weakening  of  the  United  Na- 
tions itself"  and  that  "the  line  has  to  be  drawn 
somewhere." 


The  best  solution  to  this  problem,  in  our  view, 
is  the  creation  of  a  new  status  of  association 
with  the  United  Nations,  which  might  be  called 
"associate  member."  A  status  such  as  that  of 
associate  member  might  carry  with  it  all  bene- 
fits and  privileges  of  membership  except  the 
right  to  vote.  It  would  not  require  the  payment 
of  burdensome  assessments.  But  it  would  stand 
as  a  imiversal  sign  and  symbol  of  the  independ- 
ence of  the  state  concerned  and  of  the  recogni- 
tion of  its  independence  by  the  community  of 
nations. 

Let  me  make  it  clear  that  our  concept  is  not 
retroactive.  Moreover,  a  state  enjoying  associate 
membership  would  in  no  way  be  precluded 
from  applying  for  full  membership  at  any  time 
when  it  believed  itself  qualified  for  that  step. 
Nor  would  the  competence  under  the  charter  of 
the  Security  Council  to  recommend  and  the 
General  Assembly  to  vote  admission  to  full 
membership  be  in  any  way  affected.  What  we 
are  suggesting  is  that  the  time  has  come  for 
member  governments  to  exercise  their  judgment, 
as  called  for  in  the  charter,  to  determine  whether 
a  state  is  in  fact  able  as  well  as  willing  to  exer- 
cise fully  the  responsibilities  of  membership. 

The  Security  Council  has  now  referred  this 
problem  to  its  Conmiittee  of  Experts,  and  we 
will  await  its  recommendations  with  interest. 
We  strongly  hope  that  the  outcome  will  afford 
these  very  small  states  a  practical  and  attractive 
option  to  the  burdens  of  full  membership. 

I  believe  that  in  the  years  ahead  science  and 
technology  will  provide  us  with  the  greatest  po- 
tential for  international  cooperation  through 
the  United  Nations.  Technology  can  be  politi- 
cally neutral  while  being  economically  and 
socially  fruitful.  Technology  is  not  like  political 
doctrine  or  religious  dogma :  It  is  not  derived 
from  the  imseen  and  the  unprovable;  it  is  not 
revealed  to  a  few  chosen  insiders  alone.  It  is 
open,  and  whether  it  works  or  doesn't  is  an 
observable  fact. 

A  week  ago  President  Nixon,  in  his  address 
to  the  General  Assembly,^  expressed  the  hope 
that  all  nations  would  "share  both  the  adven- 
tures and  the  benefits"  of  space  exploration.  He 
spoke  about  international  cooperation  on  prob- 
lems of  cleaning  up  our  environment.  He  talked 
about  resource  survey  satellites.  These  are  all 
areas  of  great  potential  for  international  co- 


=  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6,  1969,  p.  297. 


October  20,   1969 


337 


operation,  along  with  the  exploration  and  ex- 
ploitation of  the  seabed  and  the  exciting 
possibilities  of  direct  broadcast  satellites. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  when  the  U.N.  deals 
with  outer  space  or  with  the  deep  seas  it  is  not 
dealing  with  the  real  problems  of  the  world. 
Those  who  think  this  are,  in  effect,  charging 
the  U.N.  with  some  sort  of  escapism. 

I  am  sure  you  will  agree  that  this  is  a  very 
shortsighted  view.  In  its  scientific  and  tech- 
nological work,  in  its  economic  development 
work,  the  U.N.  is  dealing  with  very  real,  pres- 
ent, and  urgent  problems.  It  is  trying  to  help 
create  international  agreement  on  matters 
which,  if  left  to  drift,  could  become  matters  of 
international  dispute.  It  is  trj'ing  to  help  set  the 
basis  for  world  order  and  thus  for  world  peace. 
That,  purely,  is  the  essence  of  the  task  facing 
the  U.N. 

As  for  the  agenda  of  the  present  Assembly, 
you  will  have  noted  the  stress  President  Nixon 
gave  to  the  need  for  concerted  international  ac- 
tion to  halt  the  hijacking  of  aircraft.  Wliile  it  is 
too  soon  to  predict  how  this  matter  will  be  dealt 
■with,  we  expect  that  during  the  course  of  tliis 
session  the  U.N.  will  act  to  put  the  influence  of 
this  organization  behind  the  effort  to  halt  piracy 
in  the  air. 

A  major  preoccupation  will  be  with  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament.  We  are  still  awaiting 
word  from  the  Soviets  permitting  a  start  on 
strategic  arms  talks.  This  would  provide  the 
most  encouraging  backdrop  for  the  Assembly's 
disarmament  debate. 

We  are  hopeful  that  the  Disarmament  Com- 
mittee in  Geneva  will  report  major  progress  on 
the  seabed  arms  control  treaty  and  useful  sug- 
gestions for  controlling  chemical  and  biological 
weapons.  We  expect  that  the  chemical-biological 
weapons  debate  in  the  Assembly,  including  the 
new  Soviet  item,  will  give  a  major  thrust  to  the 
growing  desire  to  control  these  weapons.  This 
is  a  good  example  of  the  way  the  U.N.  focuses 
international  attention  on  matters  of  common 
concern  and  gives  impetus  to  national  decision- 
making. As  you  know,  we  are  about  to  under- 
take a  detailed  review  of  U.S.  policy  in  this  area 
in  preparation  for  further  negotiations  regard- 
ing chemical  and  biological  weapons  in  Geneva. 

In  short,  regardless  of  its  prevailing  image, 
the  U.N.  looks  very  much  alive  and  useful  to  us 
and  I  would  bet  that  its  best  days  are  still  ahead 
of  it. 


U.S.-Japan  Textile  Meetings 
Held  at  Washington 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 16  (press  release  267)  that  United  States 
and  Japanese  delegations  had  convened  at  the 
Department  that  day  to  open  a  4-day  series  of 
textile  meetings. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Philip  H.  Trezise 
headed  the  U.S.  delegation.  For  subsequent  ses- 
sions, wliich  were  held  at  the  Department  of 
Commerce,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce Stanley  Nelomer  served  as  chairman  for 
the  United  States.  Shukaro  Takahashi,  Direc- 
tor, Textile  and  General  Merchandise  Bureau, 
Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry, 
headed  the  visiting  Japanese  delegation.  (For 
a  list  of  key  members  of  the  U.S.  and  Japanese 
delegations,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  267.) 

These  meetings  were  arranged  by  Secretary 
of  Commerce  Maurice  Stans  and  Minister  of 
International  Trade  and  Industry  Masayoshi 
Ohira  during  the  July  1969  meeting  in  Tokyo 
of  the  U.S.-Japan  Joint  Committee  on  Trade 
and  Economic  Affairs. 


President's  Science  Adviser 
To  Visit  Europe 

White  House  press  release  dated   September   12 

The  President's  Science  Adviser,  Lee  A.  Du- 
Bridge,  will  visit  four  Western  and  two  Eastern 
European  countries  in  September  and  October 
to  discuss  existing  arrangements  for  interna- 
tional scientific  and  teclinological  cooperation 
and  to  explore  specific  possibilities  for  strength- 
ening these  arrangements. 

Dr.  DuBridge  will  confer  with  government 
officials  and  scientific  colleagues  in  the  coimtries 
to  be  visited,  as  well  as  with  officials  of  inter- 
national organizations  headquartered  in  Eu- 
rope and  having  important  science  programs. 

He  will  be  accompanied  by  Gerald  Tape, 
former  member  of  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  and  presently  a  member  of  the 
President's  Science  Advisory  Committee 
(PSAC) ;  by  Lewis  Branscomb,  recently  ap- 
pointed Director  of  the  National  Bureau  of 


338 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Standards  and  a  former  member  of  PSAC; 
and  by  Herman  Pollack,  Director  of  Interna- 
tional Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs  in 
the  Department  of  State.  Joining  the  party  for 
portions  of  the  trip  will  be  Philip  Handler, 
President  of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences, 
and  Patrick  E.  Haggerty,  chairman  of  the 
board,  Texas  Instruments,  Inc.,  and  a  member 
of  PSAC.  David  Beckler  and  Norman  Neureiter 
of  the  Office  of  Science  and  Teclmology  will 
also  accompany  the  group. 

Dr.  DuBridge's  visit  to  France  (Septem- 
ber 18-24)  is  in  response  to  the  invitation  of 
F.  X.  Ortoli,  French  Minister  of  Industrial 
Development  and  Scientific  Research.'  The 
group  will  visit  scientific  facilities  and  dis- 
cuss the  broadening  of  U.S.-French  scientific 
cooperation. 

They  will  then  travel  to  Bucharest,  Romania 
(September  24—27).  The  President,  following 
his  talks  with  President  Ceaucescu,  asked  Dr. 
DuBridge  to  examine  the  opportimities  for 
strengthened  scientific  and  technical  coopera- 
tion with  that  country.  The  discussions  will 
build  on  the  already  existing  base  of  coopera- 
tion, which  was  formalized  with  the  signing  of 
the  educational,  scientific,  and  cultural  agree- 
ment between  the  two  countries  in  November 
1968. 

In  Yugoslavia  (September  27-October  1)  the 
group  will  review  the  cooperation  now  taking 
place  and  seek  ways  in  which  it  can  be  made 
more  effective.  The  Departments  of  Agricul- 
ture and  of  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare, 
the  Environmental  Science  Services  Adminis- 
tration, and  the  Smithsonian  Institution  are 
already  engaged  in  some  150  cooperative  scien- 
tific research  projects  with  Yugoslavia  under 
Public  Law  480,  whereby  funds  held  by  the 
United  States  in  local  Yugoslav  currency  are 
expended  on  cooperative  projects. 

In  Brussels  (October  1-3) ,  in  the  Netherlands 
(October  3-^),  and  in  the  United  Kingdom 
(October  5-7),  the  DuBridge  party  will  review 
current  U.S.  scientific  relationships  and  seek 
those  governments'  views  on  present  and  future 
programs  of  cooperation. 

To  emphasize  the  United  States  longstand- 


'  For  background,  see  Bitlletin  of  Ang.  18,  1969, 
p.  134. 


ing  interest  and  participation  in  multilateral 
cooperation  with  the  nations  of  Europe,  the 
group  will  meet  with  officials  of  NATO  and  the 
European  Community  in  Brussels  and  of 
UNESCO,  the  Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development,  and  the  European 
Space  Research  Organization  in  Paris. 

Plans  are  also  being  made  for  a  visit  next 
year  by  Dr.  DuBridge  to  Italy  and  Germany. 
The  United  States  now  has  a  formal  bilateral 
agreement  on  scientific  cooperation  with  Italy 
and  has  mutually  beneficial  scientific  programs 
of  cooperation  with  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany. 


President  Asks  Study  of  EfFects 
of  Certain  Tariff  Items 

The  "Wliite  House  announced  on  August  28 
("White  House  press  release  (San  Clemente, 
Calif.) )  that  the  President  has  requested  the 
Tariff  Commission  to  imdertake  a  study  of  the 
economic  effects  of  items  807.00  and  80G.30  of 
the  United  States  tariff  schedules.  He  asked  that 
the  Tariff  Commission  report  to  him  the  results 
of  its  stiidy  at  the  earliest  opportunity  but  not 
later  than  January  31, 1970. 

Tariff  item  807.00  is  a  provision  that  permits 
goods  assembled  abroad  from  American  com- 
ponents to  be  imported  into  the  United  States 
free  of  duties  except  on  the  value  added  by  the 
foreign  assembly.  Tariff  item  806.30  allows 
American  goods  made  of  metal  to  be  sent  abroad 
for  processing  and  returned  to  the  United  States 
for  further  processing  duty  free  except  for  the 
foreign  value  added.  Trade  in  these  items  has 
grown  rajiidly  in  the  last  few  years. 

The  President's  request,  made  under  section 
332  of  the  Tariff  Act  of  1930,  asked  that  the 
study  include  an  analysis  of:  the  competitive 
effects  of  these  tariff  items  on  both  the  export 
and  import  sides  of  transactions  covered  by 
them,  the  operations  of  U.S.  firms  making  use 
of  the  items,  the  effects  of  these  items  on  the 
U.S.  balance  of  payments,  their  relationship  to 
employment  and  wage  levels  in  this  coimtry, 
and  the  probable  effect  of  repeal  of  either  item 
or  both. 


October  20,   1969 


339 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND   CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Urges  U.N.  Outer  Space  Committee  Action  on  Liability  Convention 


Following  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space 
on  Seftemher  9  hy  Peter  8.  Thacher^  Counselor, 
Disarmament,  Science,  and  Technology,  UjS. 
Mission  to  the  United  Nations. 

C.S./U.N.  press  release  06  dated  September  9 

It  is  a  privilege  to  address  this  committee  in 
a  year  which  marks  one  of  the  great  milestones 
in  man's  efforts  to  push  back  the  frontiers  of 
outer  space.  As  the  world  knows,  the  first  step 
by  a  man  on  the  moon  was  taken  in  the  name  of 
all  mankind.  All  of  us  shared  the  excitement  and 
awe  as  Neil  Armstrong  took  that  first  step  on 
the  moon  and  as  the  astronauts  successfully 
completed  specific  tasks  during  their  delicate 
mission  on  the  lunar  surface.  And  we  all  shared 
feelings  of  pride  that  the  dreams  of  men  in  pre- 
ceding centuries  can  be  made  to  come  true  in 
our  own  time.  This  shared  adventure  is  indeed 
an  inspiration  for  all  of  us  who  seek  through 
cooperation  in  bodies  such  as  this  committee  to 
meet  the  challenges  facing  the  inhabitants  of 
the  earth. 

None  have  expressed  it  better  than  the  Secre- 
tary General  when,  in  welcoming  the  astronauts 
here  on  August  13,  he  said  the  flight  of  Apollo 
11  brought  us  "a  renewed  realization  of  what 
we,  as  members  of  the  human  race,  can  ac- 
complish on  this  planet  with  our  resources  and 
our  technology  if  we  are  prepared  to  combine 
our  efforts  and  work  together  for  the  benefit  of 
all  mankind."  The  astronauts  took  with  them  on 
their  voyage  to  the  moon  and  back  the  flag  of 
the  United  Nations  and  the  flags  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  U.N.  and  its  specialized  agencies. 

This  symbolism  is  particularly  meaningful 
because  it  reflects  the  fact  that  the  Apollo  11 
mission  owed  much  of  its  success  to  interna- 
tional cooperation  and  direct  international  con- 
tributions. Dr.  Paine  reported  some  of  the  de- 
tails of  these  contributions  yesterday.^  We  look 


forward  to  a  future  of  increasing  opportunities 
for  the  people  of  all  nations  to  join  with  us  in 
the  exploration  and  use  of  space. 

The  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Admin- 
istration regularly  invites  investigators  in  other 
nations  to  propose  experiments  for  flight  on 
its  spacecraft.  These  invitations — opportunity 
announcements,  we  call  them — are  distributed 
by  the  Secretariat  to  all  member  states.  The 
latest  of  these,  contained  in  document  A/AC- 
105/67,  calls  attention  to  the  opportunity  to  pro- 
pose experiments  to  be  performed  on  the  Viking 
missions  to  Mars  planned  for  1973.  The  impor- 
tant thing  about  these  announcements  is  that 
they  do  produce  foreign  proposals  which  are 
accepted  in  competition  with  proposals  from 
U.S.  experimenters.  The  selection  of  a  Swiss 
solar  wind  detector  which  we  saw  deployed  on 
the  first  lunar  landing  mission  is  only  the  most 
recent  and  dramatic  example  of  how  scientists 
of  other  countries  contribute  to,  share  in,  and 
gain  from  our  program. 

Mr.  Chairman,  among  the  many  other 
achievements  in  the  peaceful  uses  of  outer  space 
since  this  committee  last  met,  one  which  is  par- 
ticularly pertinent  to  note  in  this  context  is  the 
Astronaut  Assistance  and  Return  Agreement, 
which  was  negotiated  in  this  body  and  which 
entered  into  force  on  December  3,  1968.  More 
than  30  states  are  now  parties  to  it. 

The  Scientific  and  Technical  Subcommittee 
met  in  March  and  considered  the  useful  pro- 
posals of  India  and  Sierra  Leone  that  means 
be  found  to  jiromote  the  study  of  the  practical 
applications  of  space  technology.  These  pro- 
posals reflected  the  interest  of  developing  coun- 
tries in  the  promise  of  such  potential  applica- 
tions of  space  technology  as  earth  resources  sur- 


'  For  a  statement  by  Thomas  O.  Paine,  Administra- 
tor, National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration, 
see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6,  1969,  p.  309. 


340 


Oepartmenf  of  State  Bulletin 


veying  and  direct  instructional  broadcasts  as 
well  as  of  such  established  space  applications  as 
satellite  meteorology. 

The  subcommittee  made  a  niunber  of  con- 
structive recommendations  concerning  ways  in 
which  the  United  Nations,  its  specialized  agen- 
cies, and  its  member  states  can  cooperate  to  as- 
sure that  nonspace  powers,  and  especially  the 
developing  countries,  can  share  in  the  applica- 
tions of  space  teclinology.  The  subcommittee 
recommended  a  continuing  survey  of  the  capa- 
bilities of  the  U.N.  and  its  specialized  agencies 
in  the  area  of  space  technology  applications. 
It  recommended  that  the  Secretary  General  ap- 
point to  the  Outer  Space  Affairs  Division  a 
space  applications  expert  to  serve  as  a  practical 
guide  to  help  interested  countries  learn  who  is 
doing  what  specific  work  and  where.  He  would 
also  help  them  to  leam  about  the  opportunities 
for  participation  and  training  and  would  serve 
in  a  liaison  capacity  between  the  specialized 
agencies  and  countries  interested  in  work  un- 
derway on  space  applications.  As  a  necessary 
complement  to  this  applications  expert,  the 
subcommittee  has  also  recommended  that  con- 
cerned member  states  designate  a  specific  office 
or  individual  within  their  administration  as  a 
point  of  contact  on  space  applications.  Such 
designations  should  make  possible  a  more  ef- 
fective flow  of  communications. 

Mr.  Chairman,  my  Government  heartily  en- 
dorses these  recommendations.  The  United 
States  will  continue  to  pursue  an  open  space 
program — open  in  both  planning  and  execution. 
We  believe  that  the  information  flowing  from 
our  program  will  help  other  countries  determine 
what  their  own  role  in  space  and  in  its  applica- 
tions should  be.  We  shall  continue  to  make  the 
practical  benefits  deriving  from  our  work  avail- 
able on  the  broadest  possible  basis.  We  should  do 
all  we  can  to  facilitate  the  successful  operation 
of  the  machinery  which  the  subcommittee  has 
asked  this  committee  to  endorse. 

This  past  year,  Mr.  Chairman,  has  also  seen 
two  meetings  of  the  Working  Group  on  Direct 
Broadcast  Satellites,  one  in  February  to  study 
the  question  of  technical  feasibility  and  one  this 
svunmer  to  consider  the  social,  cultural,  legal, 
and  other  implications  of  direct  broadcasting 
from  satellites.  Again  the  emphasis  was  on  the 
need  for  international  cooperation.  Although 
the  working  group  did  not  foresee  direct  broad- 
casting from  satellites  to  unaugmented  home 
receivers  before  1985  at  the  earliest,  it  concluded 


that  further  studies  of  the  international  im- 
plications of  direct  broadcasting  should  be  car- 
ried out  in  the  period  before  us. 

My  Government  agrees,  Mr.  Chairman,  that 
such  studies,  based  as  far  as  possible  on  practi- 
cal experience  with  broadcasting  in  general  and 
with  experiments  in  direct  broadcasting  which 
may  be  conducted,  are  useful  at  this  time.  The 
international  effort  in  these  studies  will  itself 
assist  the  process  whereby  this  new  technology 
is  ultimately  to  benefit  all  nations  interested  in 
the  advantages  it  may  offer.  These  potential  ad- 
vantages include  closer  links  between  central 
and  village  authorities;  more  effective  dis- 
semmation  of  information  in  such  areas  as 
health,  agriculture,  and  education;  improved 
knowledge  of  the  world  around  us ;  and  a  better 
life  through  a  free  exchange  of  information. 

Another  matter  concerning  tliis  committee  in 
which  my  Government  is  pleased  to  cooperate 
is  the  proposed  United  Nations  survey  group 
to  visit  in  October  the  Argentine  Somiding 
Eocket  Range  at  Mar  Chiquita.  A  scientist  from 
the  United  States  has  accepted  an  invitation 
to  participate  in  this  survey  to  determine  the 
eligibility  of  the  sounding  rocket  range  for 
United  Nations  sponsorship.  My  Government 
believes  that  Argentina's  endorsement  of  the 
concept  of  a  rocket  range  open  to  the  world's 
scientific  community  can  contribute  significantly 
to  furthering  international  scientific  and  tech- 
nological cooperation  in  the  peaceful  use  of 
outer  space. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  success  of  space  explora- 
tion during  this  historic  year  1969  makes  the 
more  glaring  the  failure  of  the  Outer  Space 
Committee  to  complete  the  liability  convention. 
The  interest  of  the  international  community  in 
a  meaningful  liability  treaty  is  almost  as  old 
as  space  exploration.  During  the  administration 
of  President  Eisenhower  the  United  States  took 
the  lead  in  stressing  the  need  for  a  treaty  on  this 
subject. 

On  behalf  of  the  United  States  I  want  to  state 
emphatically  our  dissatisfaction  with  the  lack 
of  progress  and  our  discontent  at  the  unwilling- 
ness or  inability  on  the  part  of  some  to  fulfill 
the  commitment  all  of  us  imdertook  in  General 
Assembly  Resolution  2345,  which  called  on  this 
committee  to  complete  the  liability  convention 
during  1968.= 


*  For  text  of  the  resolution,  see  Bttlletin  of  Jan.  15, 
1968,  p.  85. 


October  20,   1969 


341 


The  report  of  the  Legal  Subcommittee^ 
sliows  that  members  were  able  to  agree  on  a 
number  of  aspects  of  the  liability  convention. 
But  this  is  1969,  and  our  1968  goal  has  still  not 
been  reached. 

The  basic  problem  remaining  to  be  resolved 
is,  as  it  was  last  year,  what  provision  to  make 
to  settle  a  claim  on  which  a  claimant  and 
launching  state  have  been  unable  promptly  to 
agree  through  the  process  of  negotiation.  Ex- 
cept for  East-ern  Europe,  countries  that  do  not 
conduct  space  activities  hold  the  view  that  a 
claimant  should  be  entitled  to  refer  the  claim 
to  arbitration.  The  nonspace  powers  appear  to 
see  in  the  possibility  of  impartial  arbitration  the 
only  guarantees  against  the  possibility  of  end- 
less bilateral  negotiations.  We  see  our  own 
interests  in  much  the  same  way. 

We  recognize  that  certain  other  delegations 
have  taken  a  different  position.  Some  of  the  few 
delegations  who  have  thus  far  been  unwilling 
to  accept  binding  arbitration  have  suggested 
the  possibility  of  providing  for  a  unilateral 
right  of  a  claimant  state  to  invoke  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  a  competent  and  impartial  tribunal  on  a 
disputed  claim;  this  procedure  would  result  in 
the  delivery  of  an  opinion  by  the  tribunal  which 
would  be  advisory  to  the  governments  con- 
cerned, rather  than  binding  on  them. 

We  think  that  the  draft  convention  intro- 
duced by  India  *  goes  far  toward  meeting  these 
differing  views  by  requiring  that  an  unresolved 
claim  first  be  submitted  to  an  inquiry  commis- 
sion. Only  if  the  commission  were  unable  to 
reach  agreement  on  a  recommendation  for  the 
settlement  of  the  claim  would  the  claimant  state 
be  able  to  refer  the  matter  to  binding  arbitra- 
tion. Although  there  are  one  or  two  drafting  im- 
provements we  consider  necessary,  the  Indian 
treaty  text  represents  a  fair  effort  to  reach  a 
compromise  on  this  most  difficult  of  questions. 
The  United  States  has  already  moved  to  in- 
dicate its  acceptance  of  this  good-faith  effort  to 
find  a  solution  that  may  be  accepted  by  all.  We 
hope  others  will  do  likewise. 

Indeed,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  a  solution  of  the 
problem  of  unresolved  claims  can  be  found,  the 
entire  liability  convention  should  fall  quickly 
into  place.  A  complete  treaty  text  could  be 
negotiated  within  a  matter  of  days  if  all  sides 
were  convinced  of  the  desirability  of  doing  so. 
Certainly  agreed  solutions  for  questions  relat- 


ing to  the  secondary  liability  of  members  of  an 
international  organization,  applicable  law,  and 
a  monetary  ceiling  for  damages  resulting  from 
an  accident  should  be  capable  of  prompt  resolu- 
tion. Let  us  consider  each  of  these  briefly. 

Already  in  the  last  session  of  the  Outer  Space 
Committee,  on  October  16, 1968,  the  representa- 
tive of  the  U.S.S.R.  told  us  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  ready  to  accept  a  requirement  that  a 
claimant  present  its  claim  first  to  an  interna- 
tional organization  where  that  organization's 
activities  have  caused  the  damage.  The  claimant 
would  quickly  proceed  against  the  states  mem- 
bers of  the  organization  in  the  event  the  organi- 
zation did  not  promptly  provide  appropriate 
compensation.  Professor  Blagonravov  said,  and 
I  quote  from  the  verbatim  record  for  the  55th 
meeting : 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Soviet  delegation  the  question 
of  international  organizations  might  be  resolved  on 
the  basis  of  the  well  known  proposal  of  the  delegation 
of  India,  concerning  the  inclusion  in  the  convention  of 
a  provision  indicating  that  claims  for  damage  done  by 
outer  space  objects  launched  by  international  organiza- 
tions are  presented  first  to  the  International  organiza- 
tion itself  or,  in  the  case  of  non-compensation  of  the 
damage  within  a  given  time-limit,  to  one  or  several 
of  the  States  members  of  such  organization. 

We  think  this  lays  the  groundwork  for  ac- 
ceptance by  all  members  of  the  reasonable  jjro- 
posal  put  forward  by  those  among  us  who  are 
conducting  or  anticipating  conducting  space 
activities  through  the  cooperative  mechanism 
of  an  international  organization.  I  refer  to  the 
proposal  put  forward  during  the  Legal  Sub- 
committee session  by  Belgium,  France,  Italy, 
Sweden,  and  the  United  Kingdom."  These 
countries  have  made  a  strong  effort  to  bridge 
the  gap  between  their  preferred  position  and 
those  who  expressed  a  certain  concern  that  im- 
portant international  organizations  might  not 
move  as  swiftly  as  desired  to  accept  the  liability 
convention.  The  proposal  by  Belgium,  France, 
Italy,  Sweden,  and  the  United  Kingdom  in- 
cludes a  new  second  paragraph  which  obligates 
a  state  that  is  a  party  to  the  liability  convention 
to  support  a  declaration  by  an  international  or- 
ganization of  which  it  is  a  member  accepting 
the  rights  and  obligations  provided  in  the  con- 
vention. A  "best  efforts"  undertaking  of  this 
character  is  certainly  a  reasonable  compromise. 
We  trust  it  can  be  accepted. 

Another  problem  remaining  to  be  resolved 


i 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/AC.  105/58. 

*  For  text,  see  iiid.,  annex  II,  p.  23. 


'  For  text,  see  ibid.,  annex  II,  p.  30. 


342 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


is  a  provision  on  the  law  applicable  to  govern 
measure-of-damage  questions.  The  United 
States  originally  proposed  a  straightforward 
international  law  standard,  but  many  civil  law 
countries  considered  that  some  reference  to  the 
nnmicipal  law  of  the  claimant  state  was  de- 
sirable in  order  to  fit  compensation  more  ex- 
pressly into  the  social  and  economic  context  of 
the  claimant  country.  Eventually,  a  compromise 
was  put  forward  whereby  the  governing  stand- 
ard would  be  "international  law,  taking  into 
account  the  law  of  the  claimant  State."  We 
thought  that  proposal  eminently  fair,  and  in 
our  view  it  remains  the  best  solution. 

Finally,  there  is  the  question  of  limitation. 
United  States  delegations  have  for  some  years 
noted  the  improbability  of  any  large  amount  of 
damage  but  have  stressed  the  likelihood  that  a 
convention  with  a  ceiling  would  meet  with 
greater  acceptance  than  one  without  any  limita- 
tion. We  recognize  that  many  delegations  have 
been  opposed  to  a  ceiling,  but  we  are  pleased 
that  there  has  come  to  be  a  greater  willingness 
on  the  part  of  an  increasingly  significant  num- 
ber to  accept  the  concept  of  a  limit,  provided  it  is 
sufficiently  high.  This  problem,  too,  can  surely 
be  resolved  tlirough  good- faith  negotiation. 

Mr.  Chairman,  my  Government  proposed  a 
liability  convention  as  early  as  1959.  The  United 
Nations  expected  a  liability  convention  in  1968. 
We  are  now  a  year  late.  We  should  not  be  later. 
The  liability  convention  should  not  be  a  project 
for  the  25tli  anniversary  of  the  United  Nations. 
It  should  be  a  practical  goal  for  the  24th  ses- 
sion of  the  General  Assembly. 

In  this  way,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  could  demon- 
strate once  again  that  this  committee  can  keep 
pace  with  the  splendid  thechnological  achieve- 
ments we  all  admire  so  greatly. 


Miss  Gore  Named  U.S.  Member 
of  Executive  Board  of  UNESCO 

The  President  announced  on  September  12 
(Wliite  House  press  release)  the  intention  of 
the  United  States  Government  to  nominate 
Miss  Louise  Gore,  of  Rockville,  Md.,  to  be  the 
U.S.  member  of  the  Executive  Board  of  the 
United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cul- 
tural   Organization    (UNESCO).^    (For   bio- 

'  On  Sept.  15  the  UNESCO  Executive  Board  unani- 
mously appointed  Miss  Gore. 


graphic  data,  see  "Wliite  House  press  release 
dated  September  12.) 

The  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific 
and  Cultural  Organization  is  one  of  the  largest 
of  the  U.N.  agencies,  having  125  members  and 
four  associate  members.  Its  current  program 
gives  liigh  priority  to  education  programs  con- 
tributing to  economic  and  social  development, 
with  special  emphasis  on  the  improvement  of 
teacher  training,  educational  planning  and  job- 
related  literacy  programs,  curriculum  develop- 
ment, and  the  use  of  new  techniques  in  education. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund.  Done  at  Washington  December  27,  1945.  En- 
tered into  force  December  27,  1945.  TIAS  1501. 
Signature  and  acceptance:  Southern  Yemen,  Septem- 
ber 29, 1969. 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  International  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton December  27,  1945.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 27, 1945.  TIAS  1502. 

Signature  and  acceptance:  Southern  Yemen,  October 
3,  1969. 

Grains 

International  grains  arrangement,  1967,  with  annexes. 

Open  for  signature  at  Washington  October  15  through 

November  30,  1967.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1968. 

TIAS  6537. 

Ratification  of  the  Wheat  Trade  Convention  de- 
posited: Luxembourg,  September  29,  1969. 

Ratification  of  the  Food  Aid  Convention  deposited: 
Luxembourg,  September  29,  1969. 

Judicial   Procedures 

Convention  on  the  service  abroad  of  judicial  and  ex- 
trajudicial documents  in  civil  or  commercial  matters. 
Done  at  The  Hague  November  15,  1965.  Entered  into 
force  February  10, 1969.  TIAS  6638. 
Ratification  deposited:  Finland  (with  declarations), 
September  11,  1969. 

Load  Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  1966.  Done  at 
London  April  5,  1966.  Entered  Into  force  July  21, 
1968.  TIAS  6331. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Brazil,   September  12,  1969. 


October  20,   1969 


343 


Nationality 

Protocol  relating  to  military  obligations  in  certain  cases 

of  double  nationality.  Done  at  The  Hague  April  12, 

1930.  Entered  into  force  May  25,  1937.  50  Stat  1317. 

Notification  that  it  continues  to  be  bound:  Mauritius, 

September  16, 1969. 


PUBLICATIONS 


BILATERAL 

Norway 

Agreement  amending  annex  C  of  the  mutual  defense  as- 
sistance agreement  of  January  27,  1950  (TIAS  2016). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Oslo  August  25  and 
September  17,  1969.  Entered  into  force  September  17, 
1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  September  24  confirmed  the  follow- 
ing nominations : 

John  P.  Humes  to  be  Ambassador  to  Austria.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
September  10.) 

William  B.  Macomber,  Jr.,  to  be  a  Deputy  Under 
Secretary  of  State.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  289  dated  October  3. ) 

Graham  A.  Martin  to  be  Ambassador  to  Italy.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
287  dated  October  3.) 

Francis  G.  Meyer  to  be  an  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  295  dated  October  6.) 

Idar  Rimestad  to  be  the  representative  of  the 
United  States  to  the  European  office  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, with  the  rank  of  Ambassador.  (For  biographic 
data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  288  dated 
October  3. ) 


Department  Releases  New  Pamphlet 
on  NATO  in  "Issues"  Series 

Department  of  State  press  release  dated  September  25 

The  Department  of  State  on  September  25  released 
"NATO  and  the  Defense  of  Europe,"  the  second  pam- 
phlet In  the  Issues  in  United  States  Foreign  Policy 
series  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs.  The 
series  is  prepared  primarily  to  assist  students  at  the 
secondary  and  junior  college  levels  in  the  study  of 
current  foreign  policy  problems. 

The  32-page  pamphlet  includes :  an  Informative 
profile  of  the  NATO  region  with  specific  information  on 
all  NATO  and  Warsaw  Pact  countries ;  a  description  of 
the  organization  of  NATO,  with  a  feature  on  the  effect 
of  French  withdrawal  from  NATO's  military  command 
structure ;  a  review  of  NATO's  changing  defense  poli- 
cies ;  a  description  of  NATO  and  Warsaw  Pact  military 
forces ;  and  a  review  of  United  States  policy  on  NATO 
and  European  defense. 

Also  included  are  questions  for  discussion,  with  com- 
ments on  "historical  revisionism"  and  the  cold  war,  and 
an  extensive  chronology,  as  well  as  statistical  tables 
and  charts  and  a  map  illustrating  the  natural  obstacles 
to  military  operations  and  the  historic  invasion  routes 
across  Europe. 

A  discussion  guide  for  use  by  teachers  and  discus- 
sion leaders  in  developing  student  ideas  on  this  topic 
will  be  released  shortly.  Subsequent  pamphlets  in  the 
Issues  series  will  deal  with  mainland  China,  commit- 
ments of  U.S.  power  abroad,  liberal  trade  versus  protec- 
tionism, and  arms  control. 

"NATO  and  the  Defense  of  Europe"  (Department  of 
State  publication  8476)  is  for  sale  by  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402,  at  60  cents  each.  Orders  of 
100  copies  or  more  sent  to  the  same  address  are  sold 
at  a  25-percent  discount. 


344 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     OctoUr  20,  1969      Vol.  LXI,  No.  1582 


Atomic  Energy 

General  Conference  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  Holds  13tU  Session  at  Vienna 
(Seaborg) 329 

Members  of  U.S.  Delegation  to  IAEA  Conference 
Confirmed 331 

Austria.  Humes  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      344 

Congress 

Confirmations      (Humes,     Macomber,     Martin, 

Meyer,  Rimestad) 344 

Members  of  U.S.  Delegation  to  IAEA  Conference 
Confirmed 331 

Cuba.  U.S.  Responds  to  Cuban  Closing  of  Ameri- 
can News  Services  (Department  statement)    .      335 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Confirmations      (Humes,     Macomber,     Martin, 

Meyer,  Rimestad) 344 

Macomber  confirmed  as  Deputy  Under  Secretary 
for  Administration 344 

Meyer  confirmed  as  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Administration 344 

Economic  Affairs 

President  Asks  Study  of  Effects  of  Certain  Tariff 
Items   (White  House  announcement)     .     .     .      339 

U.S.-Japan  Textile  Meetings  Held  at  Wash- 
ington    338 

Europe.  President's  Science  Adviser  To  Visit 
Europe 338 

India.  U.S.,  India  Agree  on  Experiment  in  In- 
structional Television 334 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

General  Conference  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  Holds  13th  Session  at  Vienna 
(Seaborg) 329 

Members  of  U.S.  Delegation  to  IAEA  Conference 

Confirmed 331 

Italy.  Martin  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .     .    .      344 

Japan.   U.S.-Japan    Textile   Meetings    Held    at 

Washington 338 

Military  Affairs.  United  States  and  Thailand 
Agree  on  Reduction  of  U.S.  Forces  (joint 
statement) 333 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Depart- 
ment Releases  New  Pamphlet  on  NATO  in 
"Issues"   Series 344 

Publications.  Department  Releases  Uew  Pam- 
phlet on  NATO  in  "Issues"  Series    ....      344 

Science 

President's  Science  Adviser  To  Visit  Europe    .     .      338 
U.S.  Urges  U.N.  Outer  Space  Committee  Action 

on  Liability  Convention  (Thacher)     ....      340 

Space 

U.S.,  India  Agree  on  Experiment  in  Instructional 

Television 334 

U.S.  Urges  U.N.  Outer  Space  Committee  Action 

on  Liability  Convention  (Thacher)     ....       340 

Thailand.  United  States  and  Thailand  Agree  on 

Reduction  of  U.S.  Forces  (joint  statement)     .      333 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions    ....      343 

United  Nations 

Miss  Gore  Named  U.S.  Member  of  Executive 
Board  of  UNESCO 343 

Rimestad  confirmed  as  U.S.  representative  to  the 

European  office  of  the  United  Nations     .     .     .      344 


The    United   Nations:    Alive   and   Useful    (De 

Palma) 336 

U.S.  Urges  U.N.  Outer  Space  Committee  Action 

on  Liability  Convention  (Thacher)     ....  340 

Viet-Nam.  36th  Plenary   Session  on  Viet-Nam 

Held  at  Paris   (Lodge) 333 

Name   Index 

De  Palma,  Samuel 336 

Gore,  Miss  Louise 343 

Humes,  John  P 344 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 333 

Macomber,  William  B.,  Jr 344 

Martin,  Graham  A 344 

Meyer,  Francis  G 344 

Rimestad,  Idar 344 

Seaborg,  Glenn  T 329,  331 

Thacher,    Peter    S 340 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  Sept.  29-Oct.  5 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  September  29  which 
appears  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  267 
of  September  16. 

No.        Date  Subject 

t281  9/29  International  copyright  joint  study 
group  meets  in  Washington 
(rewrite). 

*282  9/30  Suspension  of  right  of  innocent 
pas.sage  at  Amchitka  Island, 
October  1-3. 

*2S3     10/1       De  Roulet  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Jamaica  (biographic  data). 
284     10/2      Lodge :    36th    plenary    session    on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

t285  10/2  U.S.-Japan  talks  on  protection  of 
migratory  birds  (rewrite). 

t286  10/2  Air  transport  agreement  with 
Jamaica. 

*2S7  10/3  Martin  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Italy   (biographic  data). 

*28S  10/3  Rimestad  sworn  in  as  U.S.  repre- 
sentative to  the  European  office 
of  the  United  Nations  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*289  10/3  Macomber  sworn  in  as  Deputy 
Under  Secretary  for  Administra- 
tion (biographic  data). 

*290  10/3  MacArthur  sworn  in  as  Ambassa- 
dor to  Iran    (biographic  data). 

t291  10/3  U.S.  delegation  to  talks  on 
Japanese  trade  liberalization. 

*292  10/3  Program  for  visit  of  Prince 
Souvanna  Phouma,  Prime  Min- 
ister of  Laos. 

t293  10/3  Meeting  of  NATO  Science  Commit- 
tee, Washington,  October  6-9. 

*294  10/3  Cline  appointed  Director,  Bureau 
of  Intelligence  and  Research 
(biographic  data). 

"Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON.   D.C.     20402 


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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


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DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


SECRETARY  ROGERS  INTERVIEWED  ON  "MEET  THE  PRESS"     34S 

IMF  AND  IBRD  BOARDS  OF  GOVERNORS  MEET  AT  WASHINGTON 

Statement  iy  Secretary  of  the.  Tremunj  David  M.  Kennedy     353 

CONTRIBUTIONS  OF  FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  TO  NATIONAL  DEVELOPMENT 

by  Eugene  M.  Himhi itum      SoO 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1.583 
October  27,  1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publication 

approved  by  the  Director  of  the   Bureau  of 

the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Note:     Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  .source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the   Readers'   Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  tvork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  tlie  White  House  and  tlte  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  tlie 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  tlie  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  internatioruil 
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States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
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Publications  of  the  Department, 
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Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Following  is  the  transcript  of  an  interview 
with  Secretary  Rogers  on  the  National  Broad- 
casting Company'' s  television  and  radio  program 
^^Meet  the  Press''"'  on  Oetoier  12.  Intervietoing 
the  Secretary  were  Elie  Abel  of  NBC  News, 
John  Hightower  of  the  Associated  Press,  Joseph 
Kraft  of  the  Publishers  Newspaper  Syndicate, 
Lawrence  E.  Spivak,  permanent  member  of  the 
'■'■Meet  the  Press''''  panel,  and  Edwin  Newman  of 
NBC  News,  moderator. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Mr.  Secretary,  after  his  talk 
with  the  President  on  Friday,  Vice  President 
Humphrey  was  reported  to  say  that  the  country 
ought  to  recognize  that  we  are  making  some 
progress  toward  peace.  Do  you  agree  with  him  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Yes,  Mr.  Spivak,  I  agree 
with  him,  and  I  think  that  the  statement  that 
the  Vice  President  made  in  support  of  Presi- 
dent Nixon  was  a  very  statesmanlike  actioii  on 
his  part.  I  think  it  shows  that  he  recognizes  the 
difEculty  that  President  Nixon  has  in  dealing 
with  this  difficult  problem,  and  I  think  that 
the  fact  that  he  recognizes  that  some  progress 
is  being  made  is  very  important. 

Mr.  Spivak:  "What  can  you  tell  us  today  to 
convince  us,  as  Mr.  Humphrey  has  been  con- 
vinced, that  we  are  making  some  progress? 
There  has  been  so  much  confusion  on  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  we  are  or  are  not  making 
progress. 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  in  the  first  place, 
infiltration  is  way  down.  By  "infiltration,"  I 
mean  the  number  of  men  that  are  coming  down 
from  North  Viet-Nam  in  the  pipeline.  It  takes 
2  or  3  months  for  them  to  get  down  near  the 
Saigon  area.  Infiltration  is  way  down.  The  re- 
placement by  the  enemy  of  their  losses  is  way 
down.  In  other  words,  they  are  not  replacing 
their  losses.  They  have  had  a  net  reduction  of 
troop  strength  in  the  last  6  or  7  months  of 
roughly  25  to  30  thousand.  In  addition  to  that, 
of  course,  we  are  withdrawing  our  troops  and 
they  are  being  replaced  by  South  Vietnamese 


troops.  The  rate  of  combat  activity  is  less  than 
it  has  been  for  a  great  number  of  months.  Of 
course,  our  casualties  are  way  down,  the  enemy 
casualties  are  down,  the  South  Vietnamese  cas- 
ualties are  down,  so  it  is  fair  to  say,  I  think, 
Mr.  Spivak,  that  this  war  is  being  deescalated 
by  President  Nixon;  and  that  is  tremendous 
progress. 

Mr.  Spivak:  And  you  feel  that  the  enemy  also 
is  deescalating  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  yes,  certainly,  be- 
cause the  combat  activity  is  down  and  their 
troop  strength  has  been  decreased. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Are  you  suggesting  that  we  are 
now  winning  militarily  by  the  action  we  are 
taking  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  No,  I  am  not  suggesting 
that,  and  of  course  you  know  that  President 
Nixon  has  said  we  are  not  seeking  a  military 
victory.  "V^liat  I  am  suggesting  is  that  the  war 
has  been  deescalated,  as  President  Nixon  prom- 
ised it  would  be. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Has  there  been  any  indication  in 
Paris,  where  the  negotiators  meet,  that  we  are 
any  closer  to  peace  than  we  have  been  before? 

Secretary  Rogers:  There  hasn't  been  any 
progress  in  Paris  for  the  last  2  or  3  months,  and 
I  would  doubt  very  much  if  there  will  be  any 
progress  unless  it  is  clear  that  President  Nixon's 
policy  is  supported  by  the  American  public. 
Now,  I  think  the  policy  that  the  President  has 
initiated  is  supported  by  the  American  public, 
but  I  think  there  is  enough  doubt  in  the  minds 
of  the  enemy  so  that  they  will  not  negotiate  in 
good  faith  while  this  dissent  is  occurring  here 
in  tlie  United  States. 

Mr.  Kraft:  Mr.  Secretary,  in  listing  signs  of 
progress  you  listed  some  things  that  had  hap- 
pened on  the  battlefield  in  Viet-Nam.  Does  that 
mean  that  we  may  be  able  to  end  this  war  with- 
out coming  to  agreement  in  Paris,  that  the  war 
may  just  fade  away? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Yes,  I  think  that  is  en- 
tirely possible,  Mr.  Kraft.  I  think  that  we  have 


October  27,   1969 


345 


made  it  clear  by  our  actions  that  we  are  per- 
fectly -willing  to  deescalate  the  war.  "We  have 
changed  the  orders — President  Nixon  has 
changed  the  orders  from  maximum  pressure  to 
protective  reaction,  which  means  that  we  are 
not  maintaining  the  same  maximum  miiitai'y 
pressure  on  the  enemy ;  and  if  the  enemy  is  re- 
sponding to  our  deescalatory  moves  in  the  way 
that  they  seem  to  be,  then  it  is  possible  that  the 
war  would  just  deescalate  until  it  sort  of  fades 
out.  We  have  no  way  of  knowing,  but  I  think  it 
is  important  for  the  American  people  to  realize 
that  President  Nixon  has  deescalated  the  war. 
I  mean  at  a  time  when  the  war  has  deescalated 
and  he  has  carried  out  his  promises  to  deescalate 
it  in  the  first  less  than  9  months  of  this  admin- 
istration, the  dissent  in  the  coimtry  seems  to  be 
accelerating. 

Mr.  Kraft :  "Would  it  be  fair  to  say  that  is  the 
target  of  the  so-called  Nixon  plan  to  deescalate, 
to  make  the  war  fade  away,  is  that — 

Secretary  Rogers:  INIr.  Kraft,  that  is  one  part 
of  it.  The  other  part  of  it  is :  We  would  like  very 
much  to  end  this  war  by  negotiations  in  Paris, 
to  reach  a  peace  by  negotiation,  and  we  have 
taken  every  possible  step  to  achieve  that  end. 
We  have  made  every  concession  that  it  has  been 
suggested  we  make  in  the  past  9  months. 

Mr.  Kraft :  Every  concession,  Mr.  Secretary  ? 
Hasn't  there  been  some  suggestion  that  there 
needs  to  be  a  change  in  the  Saigon  government  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  the  only  concession 
we  have  not  made,  Mr.  Kraft,  is  that  we  have 
not  conceded,  nor  will  we  concede,  that  the 
Communists  have  the  right  to  determine  who 
is  going  to  govern  in  South  "Viet-Nam.  We  are 
perfectly  willing  to  have  that  choice  made  by 
the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam.  But  except  for 
that,  all  the  things  that  were  suggested  that  we 
do  when  this  administration  came  in  office,  we 
have  done. 

Mr.  Hlghtoiver:  Mr.  Secretai-y,  I'd  like  to  ask 
you  to  look  for  a  moment  at  the  critics'  side  of 
the  argument  and  put  this  question  to  you :  "Wliy 
doesn't  President  Nixon  just  set  a  short-range 
time  schedule,  say  6  months,  for  withdrawal 
of  American  forces  from  "Viet-Nam  and  then 
simply  bring  them  home?  This  seems  to  be  the 
objective  on  the  other  side  of  the  argiunent. 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  of  course,  if  we  set 
a  target  date  for  withdrawal  of  troops,  unre- 
lated to  the  events  in  South  "Viet-Nam,  we  do 
two  things:  One,  we  would  make  negotiations 
impossible  because  obviously  the  enemy  isn't 


going  to  negotiate  if  he  knows  that  in  6  months 
we  are  going  to  withdraw  our  troops. 

Secondly,  if  we  did  that,  the  enemy  would 
just  wait  until  the  propitious  time  and  then 
make  an  attack,  so  that  we  would  endanger  the 
lives  not  only  of  our  own  troops  but  of  the 
South  "Vietnamese. 

I  think  that  any  thoughtful  observer  of  the 
scene  recognizes  that  if  we  just  withdrew  our 
troops  there  would  be  a  tremendous  massacre : 
of  the  population  in  South  "Viet-Nam. 

In  addition  to  that,  it  would  create  so  much 
instability  in  the  area  that  it  could  be  very  dan- 
gerous to  the  security  of  the  world ;  and  second- 
ly, it  would  be  a  violation  of  everything  that  we 
promised  not  only  to  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam  but  the  people  of  Southeast  Asia. 

In  other  words,  if  the  United  States  makes 
firm  coimnitments  and  then  reneges  on  the  com- 
mitments, that  is  going  to  affect  our  position 
all  over  the  world. 

Decisions   on   Troop  Withdrawals 

Mr.  Hightower:  Another  aspect  of  this  same 
problem :  One  of  the  things  that  is  quite  unclear, 
I  think,  is  what  the  President's  Vietnamization 
program  or  troop  removal  program  is  ulti- 
mately designed  to  accomplish.  Is  it  directed 
toward  the  complete  removal  of  American 
troops  from  that  country,  or  does  it  contemplate 
leaving  some  thousands,  scores  of  thousands, 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  troops  there 
indefinitely  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  No,  it  contemplates  the 
complete  i-emoval  of  the  troops  in  Viet-Nam. 
Initially,  though,  it  contemplates  withdrawal 
of  combat  troops  and  the  replacement  of  Ameri- 
can troops  by  South  Vietnamese  troops.  At  the 
present  time  we  will — up  until  the  end  of  this 
year,  we  will  have  removed  20  percent  of  our 
combat  troops.  Now,  once  the  combat  part  of 
the  war  is  taken  over  by  the  South  Vietnamese, 
which  we  think  will  occur,  in  an  orderly  fashion, 
according  to  a  schedule  which  the  President  has 
in  mind,  then  we  will  consider  removal  of  the 
other  troops.  But  we  have  to  do  that  consistent 
with  the  conditions  in  South  Viet-Nam. 

The  purpose  of  the  war,  the  reason  we  are 
there,  is  to  provide  that  the  people  of  the  South 
have  the  right  to  determine  their  own  future, 
and  that  has  to  be  persisted  in  and  maintained. 

Mr.  Hightower:  Can  you  give  us  some  rough 
idea  of  what  kind  of  time  frame  the  President 
does  have  in  mind  ? 


346 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Secretary  Rogers:  No,  I  don't  think  so.  The 
time  frame  is  going  to  be  determined  by  period- 
ically observing  the  conditions  in  Viet-Nam 
and  pragmatically  making  a  decision  about  how 
to  remove  the  troops.  Now,  he  has  the  schedule 
in  mind.  He  knows  what  he  wants  to  do  but  he 
doesn't  plan  to  announce  it,  for  obvious  reasons. 

First,  you  don't  announce  it  to  the  enemy; 
and  secondly,  he  wants  to  review  it  each  time 
he  gets  ready  to  make  a  decision,  to  see  what  has 
happened.  But  he  does  have  a  program  in  mind. 
He  announced  to  the  American  people  at  the 
beginning  of  this  administration  that  he  had  a 
plan.  He  has  put  the  plan  into  operation,  and 
the  plan  is  succeeding. 

Mr.  Abel:  Mr.  Secretary,  at  the  risk  of  seem- 
ing to  repeat,  the  President,  5  months  ago,  in 
a  speech  on  May  14,  said :  "Repeating  the  old 
formulas  and  the  tired  rhetoric  of  the  past  is 
not  enough.  When  Americans  are  risking  their 
lives  in  war,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  their 
leaders  to  take  some  risks  for  peace."  ^ 

My  question  is:  Wliat  risks  have  we  taken 
and,  if  not,  when  do  we  start? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  we  have  taken  the 
risk  of  moving  some  of  our  troops  out.  We  are 
going  to  continue  that  program  of  troop  re- 
placement until  our  troops  are  replaced  by  the 
troops  of  South  Viet-Nam. 

Now,  that  entails  some  risks  and  it  will,  I 
suppose,  increasingly  entail  risks;  and  we  are 
prepared  to  take  those  risks. 

Decrease   in   Combat  Activity 

Mr.  Abel:  You  were,  I  believe,  the  first  Cabi- 
net officer  to  draw  attention  to  this  combat  lull, 
the  reduction  in  infiltration  and  reduced  casual- 
ties. Have  you  by  now  decided  what  this  means  ? 
There  seemed  to  be  some  confusion  in  the  ad- 
ministration earlier  about  whether  it  meant 
anything  at  all. 

Secretary  Rogers :  Well,  I  never  thought  there 
was  confusion  in  the  administration.  I  thought 
there  was  some  confusion  on  the  part  of  the 
press.  We  said — I  said — that  this  was 
significant. 

Mr.  Abel:  You  did,  but  certain  other  mem- 
bers of  the  administration  weren't  so  sure  it 
was  significant. 

Secretar'y  Roger's:  I  also  said  that  we  were 
not  sure  whether  it  had  merely  military  signifi- 


'  Bulletin  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  457. 


cance — whether  they  were  having  difficulty  re- 
placing their  men^ — or  whether  it  had  political 
significance — whether  they  were  trying  to  give 
us  some  political  signal.  We  still  don't  know. 
Obviously  it  is  a  very  significant  fact  that  their 
infiltration  is  down  by  two-thirds  this  year. 
They  are  only  sending  in  one-third  the  number 
of  men  they  did  before.  Their  total  troop 
strength  is  down  25,  30,  35  thousand — consid- 
erably down  from  what  it  was. 

Now,  those  obviously  are  significant  facts — 
the  fact  that  the  combat  activity  has  greatly 
decreased  and  our  casualties  are  down— I  don't 
see  how  anybody  could  fail  to  say  they  are 
significant. 

Mr.  Abel:  Well,  why  can  we  not  accept  the 
deed  that  you  have  just  explained  as  perhaps 
more  significant  than  the  word  they  have 
refused  to  give  in  Paris  ? 

Secretary  Rogers :  That  is  exactly  what  I  am 
doing  on  this  program.  I  do  think  it  is  very 
significant.  We  are  accepting  it,  and  that  is 
why  we  ai-e  deescalating  the  war. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Mr.  Secretary,  Senator  Church 
said  the  other  day  that  the  President's  plan  of 
replacing  U.S.  troops  with  South  Vietnamese 
forces  is  "a  formula  for  keeping  up  to  300,000 
American  troops  engaged  in  Viet-Nam  indefi- 
nitely." What  do  you  say  in  answer  to  that? 

Secretary  Rogers :  Well,  it  just  isn't  so.  It  is  a 
formula  for  deescalating  the  war  and  it  is  a 
formula  for  turning  the  war  over  to  the  South 
Vietnamese  and  it  is  a  formula  for  permitting, 
eventually,  the  South  Vietnamese  to  determine 
their  own  future;  so  his  conclusion  is  not 
accurate. 

3Ir.  Spivak :  Well,  at  the  present  rate  of  troop 
withdrawal,  aren't  we  likely  to  keep  troops 
there  for  anywhere  from  8  to  10  years? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  no  one  ever  said — 
certainly  President  Nixon  has  never  said — that 
the  rate  of  reduction  has  to  remain  constant. 
We  don't  intend  for  it  to  remain  constant. 

3/r.  Spivak :  Have  we  made  any  military  as- 
sessment as  to  how  fast  the  South  Vietnamese 
can  take  over,  how  fast  they  can  replace  Ameri- 
can troops? 

Secretary  Rogers:  We  certainly  have.  We 
have  made  assessments,  Mr.  Spivak,  about  every 
phase  of  this  war ;  and  of  course,  that  is  one  of 
the  assessments  that  we  have  made. 

Mr.  Spivak :  So  that  the  President  now  has  in 
mind  how  fast  he  can  withdraw  all  of  the 
troops  ? 


October  27,  1969 


347 


Secretary  Rogers:  Yes.  As  I  have  said,  he  has 
in  mind  a  schedule  and  he  is  going  to — and  lie 
is  not  going  to  announce  what  that  is,  but  he  is 
going  to  watch  developments  and  make  liis  deci- 
sions based  on  those  developments.  Now,  he  has 
a  schedule.  The  schedule  may  vary  from  time 
to  time  depending  on  events,  but  he  has  a  basic 
schedule  that  we  have  tliought  through  very 
carefully. 

Question  of  Coalition  Government 

Mr.  Spivak:  Mr.  Secretary,  may  I  change  the 
subject  for  a  moment  ?  President  Thieu  has  in- 
dicated clearly  that  he  is  opposed  to  a  coalition 
government  and  that  he  will  not  accept  a  coali- 
tion government  under  any  circumstances.  Does 
the  present  administration,  the  Nixon  admin- 
istration, see  eye  to  eye  with  President  Thieu  on 
the  question  of  a  coalition  government  ? 
_  Secretary  Rogers:  It  depends  on  the  defini- 
tion of  the  word  "coalition."  We  see  eye  to  eye 
with  President  Thieu  on  an  imposed  govern- 
ment. In  other  words,  we  do  not  think  it  is 
feasible  nor  would  we  agree  to  an  imposed  gov- 
ernment. We  have  also  said  we  would  accept  any 
government  tliat  results  from  a  free  and  fair 
election.  That  might  be  a  coalition  government, 
and  we  have  recognized  that  and  so  has  Presi- 
dent Thieu.  We  have  also  said  if  there  is  an 
election  and  the  Communists  win  the  election 
or  win  part  of  the  election  they  can  serve  in  the 
government.  We  have  no  doubt  about  that. 

Mr.  Spivak:  We  don't  see  eye  to  eye  witli 
him,  then,  when  he  says  "no  coalition  with  the 
Communist"  and  "no  domination  by  the 
Communist"  ? 

Secretary  Rogers :  When,  he  talks  about  coali- 
tion, he  is  talking  about  an  imposed  coalition 
government.  He  has  accepted  the  principle  of 
free  election,  and  he  will  be  bound  by  the  re- 
sults of  the  election. 

Mr.  Spivak:  So  that  if,  under  a  free  election, 
there  is  a  coalition,  he  will  be  satisfied? 
_  Secretary  Rogers:  Yes.  I  am  not  sure  we  will 
like  it.  We  will  accept  it. 

Mr.  Kraft:  Mr.  Secretary,  before  getting 
nasty  again  about  Viet-Nam,  can  I  ask  you  a 
personal  question?  There  has  been  a  lot  of  talk 
in  Washington,  and  I  guess  elsewhere,  about 
you  being  Secretary  of  State  in  rivalry  with 
Henry  Kissinger  [Assistant  to  the  President  for 
National  Security  Affairs]  and  rivalry  with 
Secretary  [of  Defense  Melvin  R.]  Laird.  Do 


you  like  being  Secretary  of  State?  How  does 
the  job  sit  with  you  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  I  like  it  very  much,  Mr. 
Kraft,  and  incidentally  I  didn't'  think  your 
questions  were  nasty  at  all.  I  enjoy  tlie  job  very 
much.  I  told  President  Nixon  I  would  take  the 
job  for  4  years,  and  I  fully  intend  to  carry  out 
my  commitment.  I  don't  think  I'd  serve  as  long 
as  Dean  Rusk,  so  I  have  no  plan  to  serve  the 
second  Nixon  term. 

Mr.  Kraft:  Let  me  get  back  to  Viet-Nam. 
You  have  been  talking  about  self-determination 
and  freedom  of  choice.  Do  you  regard  the  pres- 
ent government  in  Saigon  as  established  as  a 
government  that  represents  those  principles? 
Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  I  recognize  the  pres- 
ent government  in  South  Viet-Nam  as  having 
been  selected  by  the  people.  Now,  I  know  there 
has  been  some  criticism  of  the  election  itself, 
but  I  think  that  it  is  the  best  government  we 
have  in  terms  of  the  representation  of  the  people 
and  we  would  be  happy  to  have  another  elec- 
tion at  the  appropriate  time. 

Mr.  Kraft:  But  you  see  no  chance  of  chang- 
ing that  government  except  through  election? 
Wasn't  there  a  chance  to  broaden  the  Cabinet 
which  we  missed  5  or  6  weeks  ago? 

Secretary  Rogers:  There  is  no  question  about 
the  fact  that  President  Thieu  can  broaden  his 
Cabinet,  if  that  is  what  you  mean;  yes,  that  is 
a  possibility.  I  thought  you  meant  "change  the 
government. 

Mr.  Kraft:  No,  I  meant  broadening  it.  But 
didn't  we  miss  a  chance  to  broaden  it  or  didn't 
he  miss  a  chance,  and  what  have  we  been  doing 
about  that  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  President  Thieu 
tried  to  broaden  the  government ;  he  asked  sev- 
eral people  to  serve  as  ministers  who  refused. 

1  tliink  we  would  have  preferred  a  broader 
based  government.  He  knows  our  view  on  that. 
It  may  be  well  that  as  time  goes  on  he  can  bring 
in  more  representative  politicians  from  other 
groups. 

Mr.  Hightower:  Mr.  Secretary,  President 
Thieu  said  on  October  6  that  he  was  prepared 
to  talk  with  the  Communist  side  about  a  cease- 
fire in  Viet-Nam.  I  assume  this  involves  some 
consultation  and  some  kind  of  a  policy  deci- 
sion on  his  part.  Senator  Mansfield  on  October 

2  called  for  a  cease-fire  and  what  he  describes 
as  a  standfast.  What  is  the  administration's  at- 
titude, particularly  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that 


348 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


there  is  close  consultation  with  President 
Thieu — your  attitude  toward  a  cease-fire? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  as  you  know,  we 
liave  some  doubt  about  whether  a  cease-fire 
would  work  or  not  unless  there  is  some  prior 
agreement,  but  we  have  indicated  a  willingness 
to  discuss  cease-fires.  President  Nixon  in  his 
May  14  policy  statement  referred  to  cease-fires. 

I  think  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the 
North  Vietnamese  have  rejected  the  idea  of  a 
cease-fire. 

Mr.  Hightower:  You  don't  see  much  practical 
possibility  that  something  might  be  done — that 
a  cease-fire  proposal  might  be  a  way  now  to 
bring  the  fighting  to  an  end  relatively  quickly? 

Secretary  Rogers:  No,  I  don't,  Mr.  High- 
tower.  I  don't  at  the  moment  see  any  possibility 
for  a  negotiated  settlement,  at  least  for  a  few 
months.  I  think  if  it  is  clear  that  the  American 
people  support  President  Nixon  and  the  policy 
that  he  has  established  and  is  carrying  out, 
then  I  think  it  is  possible  that  the  enemy  will 
negotiate  a  settlement.  At  the  moment  I  think 
it  is  quite  imlikely,  because  there  is  so  much 
dissent  here  and  there  are  so  many  voices  being 
heard  that  I  think  they  must  have  a  feeling 
that  the  President  doesn't  have  the  amount  of 
support  that  is  necessary  to  carry  on  for  a  long 
time. 

Now,  I  think  they  are  mistaken.  The  Ameri- 
can people  do  support  President  Nixon.  The 
latest  Gallup  poll  shows  that  52  percent,  com- 
pared to  32  percent,  support  his  policies  in  Viet- 
Nam.  I  think  the  American  people  realize  that 
he  is  seeking  peace  in  every  possible  way.  There 
is  no  man  in  the  country  that  wants  peace  more 
than  President  Nixon,  and  I  think  the  Ameri- 
can people  realize  that;  I  think  they  realize  the 
war  has  been  deescalated,  and  I  think  they  will 
continue  to  support  him.  But  for  the  moment 
I  think  the  enemy  is  confused  because  they  hear 
all  these  voices  and  they  don't  quite  understand 
the  American  system. 

Mr.  Hightoiuer:  Ambassador  Lodge  is  due  in 
Washington,  I  believe,  tomorrow  afternoon  for 
conferences  with  the  President  and  I  assume 
yourself.  On  Wednesday  there  is  quite  a  large 
demonstration  scheduled  in  this  country  on 
the  whole  issue  of  war  and  peace.  Would  you 
expect  this  would  be  a  timely  occasion  for  the 
administration  to  make  Imown  some  further 
ideas  of  what  might  be  accomplished  in  the 
Paris  negotiations? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  I  think  any  time  is 


timely.  I  don't  think  that  is  the  purpose  of  the 
visit.  I  thmk  this  is  a  periodic  visit  that  Ambas- 
sador Lodge  makes  to  the  United  States.  It 
doesn't  have  any  particular  significance. 

U.S.S.R.-China  Talks  on   Border  Settlement 

Mr.  Abel:  Mr.  Secretary,  let  me  let  you  off 
the  Viet-Nam  hook  for  a  moment.  Red  China  in 
the  past  week  has  agreed  to  talks  with  the  Rus- 
sians about  a  border  settlement.  Wliat  does  that 
mean  to  us  ?  Wliat  do  we  make  of  it  ?  Do  we  see 
an  opportunity  here  for  new  American 
initiatives  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  We  are  pleased  with  this 
development.  We  were  very  concerned  that  the 
tensions  were  so  great  that  it  might  result  in 
armed  conflict.  If  that  had  occurred,  there  would 
have  been  a  very  difficult  situation  in  the  world 
community,  because  anything  of  that  kind 
causes  serious  disruptions  in  the  stability  in  that 
area.  So  we  are  pleased  that  these  discussions 
are  going  on,  and  I  think  if  they  are  successful 
in  eliminating  their  very  severe  tension  on  the 
border  that  it  might  give  us  an  opportunity  to 
develop  closer  relationships  both  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  with  China. 

Mr.  Abel:  Do  you  take  the  view  on  the  whole 
that  the  Chinese  perhaps  merely  yielded  to  Rus- 
sian threats  here ;  or  do  you  see,  as  some  profess 
to  see,  a  turn  toward  a  more  pragmatic  policy 
in  Peking? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Mr.  Abel,  I  think  it  is 
impossible  to  answer  that  question.  We  don't 
know  very  much  about  the  thinking  of  the 
Chinese.  It  is  one  of  the  areas  in  the  world  we 
know  very  little  about. 

Mr.  Nexotnan:  Mr.  Secretary,  are  you  say- 
ing that  the  moratorium  on  Wednesday  is  a 
bad  idea  and  a  bad  thing  for  the  coimtry  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  No,  I  didn't  say  that.  I 
said  that  I  tliink  the  American  people  have  to 
realize  that  they  have  one  President  at  a  time 
and  he  is  elected  for  4  years  and  once  he  makes 
the  decision,  as  he  has  made  in  this  case,  he 
deserves  the  support  of  the  American  people. 

Now,  as  far  as  the  moratorium  is  concerned, 
we  recognize  that  people  have  the  right  to  as- 
semble and  protest;  and  I  think  my  attitude, 
at  least,  on  the  moratorium  is  going  to  be  deter- 
mined by  their  methods  and  their  mood.  If  the 
spirit  of  the  moratorium  is  to  be  constructive 
and  help  the  President  and  assist  the  country 
in  this  difficult  period,  that  is  fine.  If,  on  the 


October  27,   1969 


349 


other  hand,  the  spirit  is  "You  either  accept  our 
decision,  Mr.  President,  or  else,"  if  it  is  coercive, 
then  it  could  be  very  disruptive. 

I  might  say  in  that  connection,  Mr.  New- 
man, the  President  is  going  to  release  a  letter 
tomorrow  that  he  has  written  to  a  student  at 
Georgetown  which  sets  forth  his  views,  I  think, 
very  clearly  and,  I  think,  sets  forth  the  position 
that  all  Americans  have  to  realize  that  the  Presi- 
dent has.  Once  he  has  made  the  decision  he 
should  have  support  for  it.  There  is  no  reason 
people  can't  suggest  things.  For  example,  Sena- 
tor Aiken  made,  I  thought,  a  very  constructive 
suggestion  yesterday,  but  he  said  in  his  speech 
that  he  was  going  to  support  the  President. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Mr.  Secretary,  you  had  a  num- 
ber of  meetings  with  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
on  the  Middle  East  particularly.  Did  you  make 
any  progress  at  all  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Yes,  I  thought  we  made 
some  progress. 

Mr.  Spivak :  Significant  progress  ? 

Secretary  Rogers:  Well,  I  have  used  that 
word  once  in  this  program.  Let's  just  say  we 
made  progress.  We  developed  the  thought  that 
the  parties  have  to  negotiate.  We  have  to  have 
more  active  negotiations  and  we  have  developed 
what  is  known  as  the  Rhodes  fomiula,  which 
we  think  could  lead  to  more  active  negotiations. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Haven't  the  Egyptians  just  re- 
pudiated that? 

Secretary  Rogers :  We  are  not  too  sure  about 
that.  There  was  an  editorial  in  the  paper  that 
suggested  that,  but  we  have  no  reason  to  think 
that  is  the  attitude  of  the  government  as  yet. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Wliat  about  the  long-delayed 
talks  on  arms  control?  Did  you  come  to  any 
agreement  with  him  on  when  those  would  take 
place? 

Secretary  Rogers:  He  told  me  that  they 
would  take  place  soon  and  he  asked  me  not  to 
prod  him  on  what  he  meant  by  "soon,"  so  I 
don't  intend  to  do  that. 

Mr.  Spivak:  Well,  what  do  you  think  he 
means  by  "soon"?  This  year?  Next  j^ear? 

Secretary  Rogers:  I  think  he  means  in  the 
next  2  or  3  months,  and  I  thmk  his  refusal  to 
give  us  a  time  is  related  to  the  discussions  they 
were  having  with  the  Chinese. 

Mr.  Newman:  I  am  sorry  to  interrupt;  our 
time  is  up  at  this  point.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secre- 
tary, for  being  with  us  today  on  "Meet  tlie 
Press." 


37th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  text  of  the  opening  statement 
7tiade  by  Ambassador  Henry  Cahot  Lodge,  head 
of  the  U.S.  delegation,  at  the  37th  plenary  ses- 
sion of  the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paii-s  on 
October  9. 

Press  release  301  dated  October  9 


\ 


Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Your  side  persists  in 
making  accusations  against  the  administration 
of  President  Nixon  which  cannot  be  factually 
sustained.  I  shall  today  examine  some  of  these 
charges  and  try  to  set  the  record  straight. 

Last  week  your  side  charged  that  President 
Nixon  is  seeking  to  prolong  the  war  in  Viet- 
Xam.  Let  us  examine  the  record  and  see  what 
the  tnitli  is. 

Since  he  took  office  last  January,  President 
Nixon's  policy  on  Viet-Nam  lias  been  to  bring  a 
rapid  end  to  the  war  tlirough  a  negotiated  set- 
tlement. He  has  sought  a  solution  which  would 
be  honorable  for  both  sides  and  thus  would 
bring  lasting  peace  to  Viet-Nam.  In  contrast, 
your  side  has  refused  to  enter  into  serious  ne- 
gotiations, apparently  in  the  hope — which  must 
surely  by  now  have  been  dashed — that  some- 
how you  could  win  what  you  described  as  "total 
victory." 

To  be  more  precise,  almost  5  months  ago 
President  Nixon  put  forward  his  proposals  for 
peace.'  Those  proposals  were  based  on  two  es- 
sential principles:  the  withdrawal  of  all  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam 
and  the  opportunity  for  self-determination  for 
the  South  Vietnamese  people  free  from  outside 
interference. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  these  are  not  the  words 
of  someone  who  wants  to  prolong  the  war. 

Then  at  last  week's  session,  a  spokesman  for 
your  side  declared  that  the  LTnited  States  wants 
to  keep  its  troops  in  South  Viet-Nam  for  many 
years  to  come.  This  is  contrary  to  fact.  We  have 
repeatedly  made  clear  here  our  willingness  to 
withdraw  all  United  States  forces  from  South 
Viet-Nam  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

President  Nixon  reiterated  that  pledge  before 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  as  re- 


'  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation 
on  May  14,  see  Bltlletin  of  June  2.  1(169,  p.  457. 


350 


Department  of  Sfafe  Bulletin 


cently  as  September  18.^  I  repeat  it  again  here 
today. 

But  we  have  also  said,  and  I  believe  this  is  only 
natural  and  fair,  that  North  Vietnamese  forces 
must  also  withdraw  from  South  Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia,  and  Laos  and  return  to  North  Viet- 
Nam.  We  have  made  clear  that  we  would  settle 
for  the  de  fcusto  removal  of  Nortli  Vietnamese 
forces  so  long  as  there  are  reliable  assurances 
against  their  return.  Yet  we  have  not  heard  one 
word  which  would  indicate  that  your  side  is 
prepared  to  have  North  Vietnamese  forces 
withdraw  back  to  North  Viet-Nam. 

Last  week,  as  before,  you  criticized  the  re- 
duction in  U.S.  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam  as 
a  result  of  the  program  of  Vietnamization.  Un- 
der this  program,  the  number  of  United  States 
troops  in  South  Viet-Nam  will  be  reduced  by 
a  minimum  of  60,000  by  December  15  of  this 
year,  and  they  will  be  replaced  by  South  Viet- 
namese forces. 

Your  side's  attacks  on  this  program  of  Viet- 
namization have  varied.  At  first,  you  claimed 
that  U.S.  troops  were  not  in  fact  leaving  South 
Viet-Nam.  Then,  when  we  cited  to  you  the  pre- 
cise facts  and  figures,  you  claimed  these  with- 
drawals were  insignificant. 

The  truth  is  that  the  removal  of  60,000  Amer- 
ican troops  from  South  Viet-Nam  is  a  signifi- 
cant step.  As  President  Nixon  said  on  July  11, 
U.S.  troop  reductions  underscore  our  desire  to 
reduce  violence  and  achieve  a  negotiated  peace.' 

The  question  therefore  arises :  Wlaat  are  you 
prepared  to  do  to  match  our  actions  rather  than 
to  condemn  them  ? 

President  Nixon  has  taken  other  steps  to  man- 
ifest his  desire  to  start  a  process  which  will  take 
us  all  away  from  violence  and  toward  peace.  lie 
has  made  clear  that  we  do  not  seek  an  imposed 
military  solution.  He  has  reduced  B-52  sorties. 
He  has  offered  to  negotiate  internationally  su- 
pervised cease-fires  to  facilitate  the  process  of 
mutual  withdrawal.  He  has  supported  the  pro- 
posal of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  for  free  elections  organized  by  joint 
commissions  under  international  supervision. 
ITe  has  also  made  clear  that  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  and  we  are  prepared 
to  accept  any  political  outcome  that  is  arrived 


'  Bulletin  of  Oct.  C,  19G9.  p.  297. 

'  For   background,  see  Bulletin  of  July  2S,  1969, 
p.  61. 


at  through  free  elections.  These  actions  disprove 
your  charge  last  week  that  the  design  of  the 
United  States  is  to  continue  and  intensify  the 
war. 

Your  side  also  charged  last  week  that  the  ad- 
ministration of  President  Nixon  is  plotting  to 
perpetuate  the  division  of  Viet-Nam.  Again,  I 
must  remind  you  of  the  facts.  In  his  address  of 
May  14,  the  President  said : 

We  have  no  objection  to  reunification,  if  that  turn.s 
out  to  be  what  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  and  the 
people  of  North  Viet-Nam  want ;  we  ask  only  that  the 
decision  reflect  the  free  choice  of  the  people  concerned. 

We  stand  on  that  position. 

On  July  20  President  Thieu  proposed  direct 
discussions  between  North  Viet-Nam  and  South 
Viet-Nam  looking  toward  reunification  of  Viet- 
Nam  by  the  free  choice  of  the  people  through 
democratic  processes.  The  United  States  Gov- 
ernment fully  supported  this  proposal. 

Your  side  made  a  statement  during  last 
week's  session  with  which  we  can  agree.  You 
said:".  .  .  peace  in  Viet-Nam  must  be  genuine, 
a  peace  in  real  independence  and  freedom." 
Your  side  said  that  if  the  Nixon  administration 
wisiied  to  settle  the  Vietnamese  problem  peace- 
fully on  the  basis  of  respect  for  the  national 
fundamental  rights  of  the  Vietnamese  people, 
you  were  ready  to  move  forward,  together  with 
the  other  parties. 

We  have  long  been  ready  to  negotiate  on  that 
basis.  If  you  are  prepared  to  act  as  you  spoke 
last  week,  we  would  be  delighted  to  see  some 
concrete  evidence  of  your  readiness  to  negotiate 
sincerely  with  all  the  other  parties.  If  in  par- 
ticular you  truly  desire  genuinely  free  and 
democratic  general  elections,  as  you  claim,  then 
come  forward  and  really  talk  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  about  the  way  in  which  such  elections 
can  be  organized  and  carried  out. 

If  )'0u  truly  want  to  see  the  fighting  brought 
to  an  end  and  the  South  Vietnamese  people 
given  a  chance  to  decide  their  own  destiny 
freely,  indicate  in  some  way  that  you  are  pre- 
pared to  withdraw  all  North  Vietnamese  troops 
out  of  South  Viet-Nam  back  to  North  Viet-Nam. 
Surely  you  do  not  contend  that  free  choice  by 
the  South  Vietnamese  is  possible  in  the  presence 
of  large  numbers  of  North  Vietnamese  regular 
army  forces,  who  have  no  right  to  be  in  South 
Viet-Nam  anyway. 

These  two  steps,  more  than  anything  else, 


October  27,  1969 


351 


would  demonstrate  your  readiness  to  negotiate 
meaningfully. 

We  also  believe  it  is  of  the  greatest  Imniani- 
tarian  importance  that  you  identify  all  the  pris- 
oners of  war  you  hold,  permit  regular  mail 
exchanges  with  them,  allow  impartial  inspec- 
tion of  prisoner  of  war  camps,  and  release  sick 
and  wounded  prisoners. 

readies  and  gentlemen,  our  side  has  demon- 
strated its  desire  to  bring  the  war  to  an  early 
end  both  by  its  actions  in  Viet-Nam  and  by  its 
comprehensive  and  constnictive  proposals  for 
peace  here  in  Paris.  We  have  indicated  the  flexi- 
bility in  our  negotiating  position  and  our  will- 
ingness to  consider  other  proposals  which  are 
consistent  with  the  basic  objective  of  ensuring 
for  the  South  Vietnamese  people  their  right  to 
genuine  self-determination. 

We  have  made  far-reaching  proposals  for 
peace.  It  is  now  time  for  your  side  to  shift  from 
unilateral  demands  to  a  genuine  discussion  and 
negotiation  of  the  issues. 


NATO  Science  Committee  Holds 
First  Meeting  in  United  States 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octo- 
ber 3  (press  release  29:5)  that  the  NATO  Science 
Committee  would  hold  its  first  meeting  in  the 
United  States  October  6-9.  Under  Secretary 
Eichardson  welcomed  the  Committee  at  its 
opening  session  on  October  6. 

The  Committee  was  establislied  as  one  of  the 
consequences  of  the  meeting  of  the  heads  of 
government  of  the  NATO  alliance  in  December 
1957.  Since  the  first  meeting  of  the  Committee 
in  March  1958,  scientific  activities  in  NATO 
have  grown  to  significant  proportions.  At  pres- 
ent the  Committee  directs  a  program  of  fellow- 
ships, advanced  study  institutes,  research  grants, 
studies,  and  conferences  amounting  to  about 
$4.5  million  annually. 

The  Committee  is  made  up  of  eminent  scien- 
tists from  member  countries,  often  from  the  pri- 
vate sector  but  individually  able  to  speak 
authoritatively  on  science  policy.'  The  U.S.  rep- 
resentative to  the  Committee  over  most  of  its 
life  has  been  Professor  1. 1.  Kabi,  Nobel  laureate, 
and  now  professor  emeritus  at  Columbia  Uni- 


'  For  names  of  delesatcs  to  tlie  meeting,  see  Depart- 
ment (if  State  press  release  293. 


versify.  The  Committee  is  chaired  by  Gmuiar 
Randers,  NATO  Assistant  Secretary  General 
for  Scientific  Affairs. 

During  the  week,  the  Conmiittee  reviewed  its 
program  of  scientific  activities  and  laid  out 
plans  for  future  work.  On  October  7  and  8  it 
visited  facilities  at  Cape  Kennedy  and  the 
NASA  Manned  Spacecraft  Center  at  Houston. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Domiriican  Republic 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Dominican  Republic,  Mario  Read  Vittini,  pre- 
sented liis  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on 
October  2.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  re- 
marks and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  dated  October  2. 

Luxembourg 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Luxem- 
bourg, Jean  Wagner,  presented  his  credentials 
to  President  Nixon  on  October  2.  For  texts  of 
the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's 
reply,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  October  2. 

Eiram/a 

Tlie  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Re- 
public of  Rwanda,  Fidele  Nkundabagenzi,  pre- 
sented his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on 
October  2.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  re- 
marks and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  dated  October  2. 

Sierra  Leone 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Sierra 
I^eone,  John  Akar,  presented  his  credentials  to 
President  Nixon  on  October  2.  For  texts  of  the 
Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's 
reply,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  October  2. 

Venezuela 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Vene- 
zuela, Julio  Sosa-Rodriguez,  presented  his  cre- 
dentials to  President  Nixon  on  October  2.  For 
texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  October  2. 


352 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


IMF  and  IBRD  Boards  of  Governors  Meet  at  Washington 


The  Boards  of  Governors  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  and  the  International  Bank  for 
Recon.sti'uction  and  Development  and  its  affil- 
iates held  their  annual  meetings  at  Washington 
September  29-Octoher  3.  Following  is  a  state- 
ment made  before  the  Boards  of  Governors  on 
September  30  by  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
David  M.  Kennedy,  U.S.  Governor  of  the  Fund 
and  Bank. 

I  am  honored  to  address  this  annual  session 
of  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and  Development  and  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund.  The  accomplishments  of  the  quarter 
century  since  Bretton  Woods  reflect  both  the 
foresight  of  those  who  set  these  institutions  on 
their  initial  course  and  the  outstanding  leader- 
ship that  has  guided  their  destinies  over  the 
postwar  years.  The  President  of  the  World 
Bank,  Mr.  [Robert  M.]  McNamara,  and  the 
Managing  Director  of  the  Fund,  Mr.  [Pierre- 
Paul]  Schweitzer,  are  carrying  forward  in  this 
great  tradition. 

Anniversaries  are  a  time  for  lookmg  back  on 
past  achievements — and  those  of  the  Bank  and 
tlie  Fund  are  indeed  impressive.  But  today  is 
even  more  a  time  for  looking  ahead  to  the  chal- 
lenges of  the  next  25  years,  for  setting  new 
goals,  and  for  appraising  our  methods  for 
reaching  them. 

Development   Finance 

In  the  field  of  development  finance,  Mr.  Mc- 
Namara has  already  pointed  toward  some  new 
directions  for  the  Bank's  lending  and  outlined 
his  thoughts  on  how  we  can  better  direct  avail- 
able resources  to  the  points  of  urgent  need.  The 
forthcoming  report  of  the  Honorable  Lester 
Pearson  and  his  distinguished  panel  will  pro- 
'  vide  us  all  with  a  fresh  perspective  and  thought- 
ful analysis  to  further  stimulate  our  thinking 
and  our  actions. 

This  report  is  particularly  timely  for  the 
United  States.  We  are  engaged  in  a  comprehen- 


sive review  of  our  own  foreign  assistance  effort. 
It  would  be  premature  to  anticipate  the  results 
of  this  study.  However,  I  would  like  to  empha- 
size two  basic  principles  that  will  help  guide 
my  country's  future  efforts: 

Fii-st,  we  are  finnly  committed  to  the  multi- 
lateral approach  to  development  financing,  epit- 
omized by  the  World  Bank  and  its  affiliates. 
This  approach  brings  to  bear  on  development 
problems  the  collective  efforts  and  experience 
of  all  nations,  large  and  small,  rich  and  poor. 
It  helps  achieve  equity  both  among  donors  and 
among  recipients.  One  of  President  Nixon's  first 
acts  after  assuming  office  was  to  recommend  to 
the  Congress  our  contribution  to  the  then  pend- 
ing second  replenishment  of  the  International 
Development  Association.  We  are  pleased  that 
this  multilateral  endeavor  has  been  able  to  go 
forward. 

Second,  we  are  convinced  that  tlie  develop- 
ment can  be  accelerated  if  we  enlist  more  ef- 
fectively the  vast  potential  of  private  enter- 
prise. Too  often,  the  individual  in  developing 
countries  with  ability  and  ambition  but  with 
a  paucity  of  resources  is  denied  an  ojjportunity 
to  help  his  country  grow.  Too  often,  companies 
with  ample  financial  strength  and  technical 
competence  shy  away  from  the  challenges  to 
be  found  in  less  developed  areas. 

The  1970's  are  sure  to  require  some  new  em- 
phasis in  the  development  process.  But  in  ap- 
proacliing  the  new  decade,  we  must  also  deal 
forcefully  with  key  problems  already  upon  us. 

For  instance,  the  external  debt  problem  has 
become  acute.  Debt  reschedulings  testify  that 
the  burden  of  debt  servicing  is  already  weigh- 
ing too  heavily  on  some  countries.  But  debt  re- 
schedulings in  themselves  provide  no  general 
solution.  Instead,  debtors  and  creditors  alike 
must  aim  to  avoid  unmanageable  levels  and 
structures  of  external  debt.  Assistance  on  real- 
istic concessionary  terms  must  be  provided  from 
a  broader  range  of  donor  countries.  Recipient 
countries,  for  their  part,  must  see  to  it  that 


Ocfober  27,   1969 

365-801—69 


353 


they  help  create  a  climate  in  which  funds  can 
be  efficiently  used  and  internal  development 
flourish. 

"We  must  also  seek  better  ways  of  meshing 
development  finance  with  the  needs  of  balance- 
of -payments  adjustment.  When,  as  at  present,  a 
number  of  large  providers  of  aid  must  simul- 
taneously deal  with  problems  in  their  inter- 
national payments,  the  flow  of  real  resources 
should  not  be  interrupted.  At  the  same  time, 
balance-of-payments  surpluses  should  more 
readily  be  put  to  work  for  development  pur- 
poses on  appropriate  terms. 

The  problem  of  coordination  looms  ever 
larger  as  the  regional  development  banks  grow 
side  by  side  with  the  worldwide  institutions. 
The  variety  of  institutions  now  at  work  to  com- 
plement national  efforts  makes  it  essential  that 
we  more  consciously  seek  improved  ways  to  fit 
the  pieces  together  in  mutually  complementary 
and  reinforcing  ways. 

I  wonder,  too,  whether  simple  numerical  tar- 
gets for  development  assistance  by  industrial 
nations  do  not  divert  too  much  attention  from 
the  quality  of  the  aid  provided  and  the  tech- 
niques employed. 

Finally,  I  must  emphasize  that  the  building 
and  expansion  of  new  economies,  as  well  as  of 
old,  must  be  achieved  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  outward-looking  trading  and  financial 
practices — practices  which  our  predecessors 
launched  when  they  adopted  the  Bretton  Woods 
proposals  and  its  trading-system  counterpart, 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
In  this  connection,  I  am  glad  to  hear  the  Man- 
aging Dii'ector's  statement  that  the  Fund  will 
be  prepared  to  reinforce  its  collaboration  with 
international  institutions  which  have  special 
responsibilities  in  the  field  of  trade  and  aid. 

Steps  To  Control  U.S.  Inflation 

I  am  acutely  conscious  of  the  fact  that  the 
climate  for  orderly  economic  growth  every- 
where will  be  enormously  affected  by  the  suc- 
cess with  which  we  in  the  United  States  guide 
our  own  economy. 

Looking  back  over  the  past  decade  or  more, 
I  believe  there  is  room  for  some  satisfaction. 
The  1960's  have  brought  virtually  uninter- 
i-upted  growth  of  real  production  in  the  United 
States  at  the  historically  high  rate  of  about 
41/^  percent  a  year.  Despite  evident  flaws  in 


the  record,  we  also  managed  to  maintain  over 
that  same  period  of  time  a  somewhat  better  de- 
gree of  internal  price  stability  than  nearly  all 
of  our  major  trading  partners. 

Nevertheless,  when  President  Nixon  and  his 
administration  took  office,  this  inflationary 
process  was  well  entrenched.  Quite  simply,  the 
United  States  failed  to  respond  with  sufficient 
vigor  in  making  available,  without  inflation,  the 
resources  required  by  the  Viet-Nam  conflict  at 
a  time  of  sharp  increase  in  other  public  expend- 
itures. Moreover,  our  traditionally  strong 
trade  surplus  had  almost  vanished. 

Some  countries  have  no  doubt  welcomed  the 
larger  export  markets  that  are  the  counterpart 
of  the  recent  surge  in  U.S.  imports.  Forced 
growth  in  the  U.S.  markets  under  the  pressure 
of  inflation  caimot,  however,  be  a  sound  basis 
for  sustained  payments  equilibrium.  Moreover, 
we  recognize  that  the  pressures  on  our  own 
money  markets  have  contributed  to  the  world- 
wide upward  ratcheting  of  interest  rates. 

Those  same  market  pressures  have  been  re- 
flected in  a  massive  flow  of  private  short-term 
capital  to  the  United  States.  This  has  tended  to 
keep  the  dollar  strong  in  the  exchange  markets 
and  to  hold  down  or  reduce  foreign  official  dol- 
lar holdings.  But  short-term  capital  inflows  are 
not  an  efi'ective  substitute  for  a  stronger  pay- 
ments structure  solidly  rooted  in  a  current  ac- 
count surplus  large  enough  to  support  a  steady 
flow  of  aid  and  foreign  investment. 

President  Nixon  has  made  control  of  inflation 
his  first  domestic  priority.  By  now,  the  basic 
strategy  of  his  administration  for  achieving  this 
goal  through  the  coordinated  use  of  expenditure, 
tax,  and  monetary  policies  is  widely  understood. 

Those  policies  are  not — nor  did  we  anticipate 
that  they  would  be — painless.  The  President  has 
pledged  a  strict  limit  of  $192.9  billion  on  budget 
spending  during  the  current  fiscal  year,  a  figure 
below  congressionally  authorized  ceilings.  To 
keep  within  that  limit  at  a  time  of  higher  costs 
all  along  the  line  and  despite  social  programs 
that  demand  larger  financing,  we  have  had  to 
cut  $7.5  billion  from  program  levels  planned  in 
the  budget  submitted  to  the  Congress  last  Janu- 
ary. Significantly,  the  expenditure  total  planned 
for  the  entire  fiscal  year  allows  for  virtually  no 
increase  from  the  current  rate  of  defense  and 
civilian  spending. 

This  restraint  is  being  achieved  at  a  time 
when  the  Viet-Nam  conflict  is  continuing.  Look- 


354 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ing  ahead,  however,  let  me  assure  this  audience 
that  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  solidly 
behind  President  Nixon  in  his  efforts  to  bring 
about  a  just  and  honorable  peace  in  Viet-Nam. 

We  have  continued  the  10-percent  income  tax 
surcharge  through  the  remainder  of  this  calen- 
dar year  and  have  requested  the  Congress  to 
maintain  half  of  that  surcharge  for  an  addi- 
tional 6  months.  We  are  also  moving  to  eliminate 
the  special  tax  credit  for  business  investment. 
These  revenue  measures,  combined  with  the  con- 
trol on  expenditures,  are  designed  to  produce  an 
overall  budgetary  surjDlus  of  nearly  $6  billion, 
the  largest  in  18  years. 

Meanwhile,  the  expansion  of  money  and 
credit  has  been  slowed  sharply.  Our  lending  in- 
stitutions are  unable  to  satisfy  fully  the  de- 
mands for  credit,  and  the  effects  are  being  felt 
on  important  sectors  of  the  economy.  Wliere 
possible,  we  have  moved  to  ease  points  of  exces- 
sive pressure,  such  as  those  on  housing  activity. 
But  we  are  determined  to  maintain  the  basic 
thrust  of  our  restrictive  policies  until  the  over- 
heating is  visibly  dissipated. 

Eight  months  ago  we  knew  that  controlling 
inflation  without  precipitating  a  serious  reces- 
sion would  be  a  long  and  difficult  process.  It  re- 
quires holding  the  rate  of  public  and  private 
spending  below  the  basic  trend  of  growth  in 
capacity  and  output,  thereby  relieving  excessive 
pressure  on  our  resources.  That  process  is  now 
well  underway,  and  we  anticipate  further  slack- 
ening in  the  quarters  immediately  ahead. 

Clearly,  a  reduced  rate  of  growth  is  not  a 
long-term  policy  objective.  But  it  is  essential 
to  an  effective  attack  on  inflation,  and  it  should 
be  a  prelude  to  renewed  growth  at  a  sustainable 
pace. 

Experience  warns  us  that  the  ti'end  of  prices, 
particularly  of  services  and  consumer  goods, 
levels  off  only  after  a  considerable  lag  behind 
other  business  indicators.  So  far  we  can  see  only 
scattered  and  not  wholly  conclusive  signs  of  an 
easing  of  price  pressure. 

In  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  time  to  shift 
gears.  I  believe  we  are  realistically  aware  of 
the  mevitable  risks  on  either  side  of  the  course 
we  have  set  for  ourselves.  But  all  our  planning 
is  rooted  in  the  basic  proposition  that  the  firm 
and  persistent  application  of  appropriate  fiscal 
and  monetary  restraint  can  lead  us  past  those 
shoals  into  calmer  waters. 


Closing  Imbalances  Among  Major  Countries 

Tension  and  pressures  have  also  been  evident 
over  recent  years  in  the  international  monetary 
system,  and  speculative  outbursts  have  recurred. 
Indeed,  it  is  a  tribute  to  the  underlying  strength 
of  the  system  devised  at  Bretton  Woods  and  to 
the  spirit  of  cooperation  nurtured  by  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund  that  disturbances  have 
been  contained  and  that  world  trade  and  pay- 
ments have  continued  to  grow  at  a  rapid  rate. 

Yet  we  still  face  the  challenge  of  moving  in 
a  coordmated  way  to  close  the  persistent  im- 
balances in  trade  and  payments  among  the 
major  comitries  that  have  contributed  so  im- 
portantly to  the  monetary  strains.  There  can  be 
no  escape  in  this  process  from  the  need  for  effec- 
tive national  economic  policies. 

I  have  already  commented  upon  the  circum- 
stances in  the  United  States.  In  the  case  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  we  have  highly  encouraging 
evidence  that  the  underlying  trend  in  its 
balance  of  payments  is  noticeably  improving, 
and  a  current  account  surplus  has  been  reestab- 
lished. France  has  within  recent  weeks  launched 
a  program  to  complement  the  adjustment  in  the 
franc  parity.  Consequently,  there  is  a  real  im- 
provement in  the  prospects  of  important  coim- 
tries  which  have  experienced  an  erosion  of  their 
external  positions  over  recent  years. 

It  is  vitally  important  that  this  recovery  not 
be  slowed  by  an  unwillingness  of  countries  in  a 
strong  position  to  see  a  decline  in  their  trade 
balance.  Sizable  trade  surpluses  happen  to  be 
highly  concentrated  among  only  a  few  coimtries. 
We  look  to  these  countries  to  not  only  refrain 
from  resisting  adjustment  but,  where  possible, 
to  take  actions  of  their  own  to  assist  and 
encourage  it. 

Certainly,  solutions  should  be  found  other 
than  internal  inflation,  and  the  prescription  ap- 
propriate for  one  country  may  not  be  suitable 
for  another.  But  it  is  equally  clear  that,  in  each 
case,  much  could  be  done  to  spread  and  diffuse 
existing  surpluses  in  ways  that  support  both  the 
broad  objectives  of  freer  trade  and  internal 
stability.  Import  controls,  systematic  tying  of 
aid,  failure  to  share  fully  in  the  burdens  of  de- 
fense, preferences  for  domestic  production,  ex- 
port incentives,  and  inliibitions  on  capital 
exports  are  all  out  of  place  for  countries  with 
current  account  surpluses  ranging  as  high  as 
2  or  3  percent  of  domestic  production.  The 
processes  of  international  consultation  and  co- 


Ortober  27,   1969 


355 


operation  embedded  in  the  IMF  might  well  be 
reviewed  to  assure  that  the  policies  of  chronic 
surplus  countries  are  subjected  to  the  same 
searching  evaluation  tliat  is  more  or  less  auto- 
matically given  to  deficit  countries. 

Activation   of  Special  Drawing  Rights 

Strong  ties  of  trade  and  investment,  close 
links  between  financial  markets,  and  the 
rapidity  of  communication  and  transportation 
in  the  modern  world  make  each  coimtry  highly 
sensitive  to  developments  abroad.  Yet  we  live  in 
a  world  of  nation-states,  each  of  which  seeks  to 
preserve  a  degree  of  economic  independence. 

We  must  face  the  facts  of  differing  emphases 
in  national  policy  objectives,  changes  in  the 
structure  of  industry  and  population,  cyclical 
excesses  or  deficiencies  of  internal  demand,  the 
economic  consequence  of  social  disturbances,  and 
rigidities  of  costs  and  prices.  x^Jiy  of  these  fac- 
tors can  become  a  source  of  disturbance  and  un- 
certainty. At  least  temporary  imbalances  are 
inevitable,  and  every  country  wants  to  preserve 
some  margin  of  liquid  financial  resources  to 
buttress  its  freedom  of  action. 

Our  international  monetary  arrangements 
will  serve  us  well  or  poorly  to  the  extent  that 
they  can  absorb  and  diffuse  sources  of  strain  on 
exchange  markets,  provide  effective  incentives 
for  national  adjustment,  and  thus  maintain  an 
efficient  and  durable  mechanism  for  the  finance 
of  trade  year  in  and  year  out.  It  is  one  of  the 
great  strengths  of  the  present  system  that 
tlirough  the  years  it  has  demonstrated  a  ca- 
pacity to  evolve  and  grow  in  response  to  chang- 
ing needs. 

Indeed,  in  adopting  the  first  amendment  to 
the  IMF  agreement  since  Bretton  Woods,  we 
now  stand  on  the  threshold  of  a  fundamental 
development:  the  creation  of  a  new  reserve 
asset,  special  drawing  rights.  We  are  indebted 
to  those  who  years  ago  not  only  foresaw  the 
potential  need  for  supplementing  the  tradi- 
tional sources  of  reserve  creation  but  who 
worked  tirelessly  to  translate  general  concepts 
into  concrete  reality. 

Their  efforts  could  not  have  come  to  fruition 
at  a  more  opportune  time.  I  believe  the  Fund's 
annual  report — and,  even  more,  the  report  em- 
bodying the  Managing  Director's  proposal  for 
activation  of  the  special  drawing  rights — makes 
amply  clear  that  the  contingency  against  which 
we  have  been  planning  has  now  arrived.  The 
United  States  therefore  fully  supports  the  pro- 
posal to  move  promptly  to  meet  the  acknowl- 


edged need  for  growth  in  international  reserves 
thi'ough  activation  of  the  new  facility.^  We  par- 
ticularly welcome  the  sense  of  conviction  and 
confidence  that  enables  us  to  move  forward  to 
use  this  new  instrument  in  stibstantial  amoimts, 
reasonably  commensurate  with  need. 

I  recognize,  but  do  not  share,  the  concern  ex- 
pressed by  some  that  fresh  additions  to  world 
reserves  might  delay  the  necessary  adjustment 
of  payments  imbalances.  I  am  persuaded  that  in 
fact  the  opposite  is  true.  Without  a  timely 
supplement  to  world  reserves,  the  efforts  of 
deficit  countries  to  eliminate  tliose  deficits  could 
be  made  more  difficult,  and  could  even  be 
frustrated,  by  actions  taken  by  other  countries 
to  safeguard  their  existing  reserves.  Moreover, 
I  can  assure  you  that  for  the  United  States  the 
activation  of  this  facility  will  in  no  way 
diminish  our  efforts  to  bring  inflation  under 
control. 

As  we  enter  this  new  era  of  managed  reserve 
creation,  SDK's  will  have  to  find  their  proper 
role  witliin  the  total  complex  of  reserve  assets 
and  credit  facilities.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my 
mind  tliat,  within  the  basic  framework  of  the 
amended  Fund  articles,  we  will  jointly  demon- 
strate our  ability  to  use  this  new  reserve  asset 
constructively — in  the  same  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion that  was  essential  to  its  development. 

SDK's  have  properly  been  at  the  center  of 
attention  in  recent  discussions  of  international 
liquidity.  However,  the  regular  drawing  rights 
in  the  IMF  also  have  an  important  role  to  play. 
The  approach  of  the  period  of  quinquennial  re- 
view makes  this  an  appropriate  occasion  for 
surveying  the  size  of  Fimd  quotas.  Preliminary 
discussions  indicate  that  a  number  of  questions 
remain  to  be  resolved  before  a  concrete  proposal 
can  be  presented  to  the  Governors.  I  feel  cer- 
tain that  this  matter  can  be  satisfactorily  re- 
solved within  the  framework  of  a  reasonable 
increase  in  the  overall  size  of  the  Fund  at  an 
early  date. 

"Limited   Flexibility"  in  Exchange   Rates 

The  clear  progress  we  are  making  in  dealing 
witli  the  provision  of  international  liquidity 
must  not  divert  our  attention  from  other  sources 
of  strain.  I  have  already  noted  that  the  process 
of  international  adjustment  lias  not  been  work- 


'  On  Oct.  3  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  IMF  voted 
to  allocate  $9.5  billion  of  special  drawing  rights  to  par- 
ticipating members  over  the  3-year  period  beginning 
Jan.  1,  1970. 


356 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ing  with  full  effectiveness  and  that  the  difficul- 
ties in  this  regard  are  in  large  part  a  byproduct 
of  inadequate  or  inappropriate  domestic 
policies. 

At  the  same  time,  I  believe  we  must  recog- 
nize tliat  events  themselves  have  raised  new 
questions  as  to  the  appropriate  role  for  adjust- 
ments in  exchange  rates — not  as  a  substitute  for 
but  as  a  complement  to  other  policies.  I  have 
particularly  in  mind  the  range  of  proposals  for 
"limited  flexibility"  to  which  Mr.  Schweitzer 
alluded  yesterday. 

These  proposals  all  look  to  less  rigidity  in  the 
exchange  rate  mechanism  than  has  in  fact 
developed  in  the  practices  of  industrialized 
countries.  Some  suggested  approaches  would, 
in  practice,  affect  only  a  handful  of  currencies 
or  would  introduce  largely  teclmical  changes  in 
the  management  of  exchange  markets.  Other 
versions,  such  as  those  for  a  very  substantial 
widening  of  exchange  rate  margins,  would  ap- 
pear to  introduce  so  large  an  element  of  uncer- 
tainty and  be  so  at  variance  with  the  basic  ob- 
jectives of  the  Fund  that  they  probably  do  not 
need  to  occupy  our  attention. 

Certainly,  in  the  United  States  we  have 
readied  no  conclusion  on  the  desirability  of  any 
particular  proposal.  I  would,  however,  like  to 
share  with  you  some  of  the  relevant  points  that, 
on  the  basis  of  our  own  review  of  the  matter, 
we  believe  should  be  kept  in  mind  in  further 
investigations  in  this  area. 

In  the  first  place,  the  various  plans  for 
limited  flexibility  in  exchange  rates  seem  to 
pose  formidable  technical  and  policy  problems 
that  will  require  careful  study  over  a  con- 
siderable period  by  national  authorities,  as  well 
as  international  monetary  bodies,  before  any 
consensus  is  possible. 

Secondly,  well-conceived  changes,  as  part  of 
their  laasic  design,  should  reduce  incentives  for 
speculation  or  make  it  more  costly.  Thus,  if  it 
is  to  be  successful,  any  proposal  must  come  to 
grips  with  the  difficulty  of  confining  changes  in 
exchange  rates  within  carefully  defined  limits 
while  providing  enough  flexibility  to  reduce 
the  need  for  and  expectations  of  large  abrupt 
changes  in  parities. 

Third,  we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  any  reasonable  scheme  to  remove  undesir- 
able rigidities  in  exchange  rates  would  have 
to  be  built  upon  the  foimdation  of  responsible 
and  appropriate  internal  policies  so  that  the 
need  for  large  and  discrete  changes  in  parities 
should  arise  even  less  frequently  than  in  the 
past.  Similarly,  the  world  would  continue  to 


require  an  orderly  growth  in  reserves  and 
credit  facilities  to  facilitate  the  maintenance  of 
parities  within  established  and  relatively  nar- 
row ranges. 

Fourth,  given  the  pivotal  role  of  the  dollar 
in  the  international  monetary  system,  the  ini- 
tiative for  even  limited  exchange  rate  adjust- 
ments would  continue  to  lie  with  countries 
other  than  the  United  States.  As  a  corollary, 
we  must  guard  against  the  possibility  of  encour- 
aging a  bias  toward  devaluations. 

It  is  implicit  in  these  comments  that  we  be- 
lieve that  proposals  for  limited  flexibility  in 
exchange  rates  offer  no  panacea  for  present 
problems.  Nonetheless,  the  increasingly  wide- 
spread discussion  of  these  ideas  in  this  country 
and  abroad  reflects  a  real  concern  over  the  need 
to  facilitate,  over  a  period  of  time,  a  better 
working  of  the  adjustment  process.  In  concept, 
these  proposals  seek  to  preserve  and  enhance 
the  basic  stability  of  the  system  as  a  whole  pre- 
cisely by  breaking  down  unnecessary  rigidities 
and  inhibitions  to  orderly  change  when  change 
is  necessary. 

In  this  light,  efforts  to  define  and  develop 
techniques  of  limited  flexibility  need  not  be 
looked  upon  as  radical  new  departures  from 
the  main  stream  of  developments  in  the  mone- 
tary area.  Instead,  they  seem  to  me  to 
fall  within  the  framework  of  orderly  and  evolu- 
tionary change  and  of  multilateral  monetary 
cooperation. 

As  I  have  noted,  these  devices  have  had  no 
official  sanction  and  are  full  of  subtle  and  un- 
settled technical  and  policy  questions.  In  sum, 
they  are  a  long  way  from  fruition,  if,  indeed, 
some  variant  proves  practical  at  all  in  the  end. 
But  neither  are  these  ideas  something  that  we 
can  or  will  responsibly  ignore. 

I  therefore  welcome  the  Managing  Dii'ector's 
statement,  elaborating  on  the  Fund's  annual 
report,  that  the  Fund  will  be  continuing  its 
study  and  appraisal  of  these  questions.  The 
United  States  will  actively  particii^ate  in  and 
contribute  to  such  a  study.  We  would  hope  that 
during  the  coming  months  the  Fund  will  exam- 
ine proposals  for  limited  exchange  flexibility, 
determine  which  pailicular  proposals  appear 
worthy  of  further  attention,  and  set  forth  the 
major  issues  and  considerations  that  would  con- 
cern officials  of  member  governments  as  they 
formulate  considered  judgments  on  such 
matters. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  say  the  principal  con- 
tribution of  the  United  States  to  the  stability 


October  27,   1969 


357 


and  viability  of  the  international  monetary  sj'S- 
tem  in  the  present  setting  is  perfectly  plain :  to 
brinii  our  inflation  to  an  end  and  to  do  so 
without  yendinj^  shock  wa\es  of  recession  to 
every  corner  of  the  world.  That  is  the  main  path 
we  in  the  Unite<.l  States  have  set  for  ourselves. 
In  participating  in  an  examination  of  possible 
further  improvements  in  our  monetary  arrange- 
ments, we  will  not  be  misled  into  thinking  that 
we  can  dispense  with  the  fundamental  need. 


President  Nixon  Names  Task  Force 
on  International  Development 

White  House  press  release  dated  September  24 

The  President  announced  on  September  24 
the  full  membership  of  the  Presidential  Task 
Force  on  International  Development,  which 
will  be  chaired  by  Kudolph  A.  Peterson,  presi- 
dent and  chief  executive  officer  of  the  Bank  of 
America. 

When  the  President  amiounced  the  appoint- 
ment of  Mr.  Peterson  on  September  2,  he 
directed  tlie  task  force  to  focus  on  the  under- 
lying rationale  of  the  United  States  aid  effort 
and  its  relationship  to  overall  United  States 
foreign  policy.  The  President  has  charged  the 
task  force  with  developing  a  new  U.S.  approach 
to  aid  for  the  1970's  for  presentation  to  him 
next  February.  It  will  hold  its  first  meeting  on 
September  24. 

The  members  of  the  task  force  are : 

Earl  L.  Butz,  vice  president  and  former  dean  of  agri- 
culture, I'urdiie  University,  Lafayette,  Ind. 

William  J.  Casey,  partner.  Hall,  Casey,  Dickler,  and 
Howley,  Roslyn  Harbor,  NY. 

Terence  Cardinal  Cooke,  .\rcliliishop  of  New  York. 

John  E.  Countryman,  chairman  of  the  board,  Del  Monte 
Corp.,  San  Francisco,  Calif. 

Thomas  B.  Curtis,  vice  president  and  general  counsel. 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  Inc.,  Chicago,  111. 

Kalph  Burton  Gookin,  president  and  chief  executive 
ofBcer.  H.  .7.  Heinz  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

William  T.  Gossett,  immediate  past  president,  Ameri- 
can Bar  Association,  Bloomfield  Hills,  ilieh. 

Walter  A.  Haas,  Jr.,  president,  Levi  Strauss  &  Co.,  San 
Francisco,  Calif. 

Gottfried  Haberler,  professor  of  international  trade, 
Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 

William  A.  Hewitt,  cliairman  of  board  and  chief  execu- 
tive ofBcer,  Deere  &  Co.,  Moline,  111. 

Samuel  P.  Huntington,  professor  of  government.  Har- 
vard University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 

Edward  Mason,  professor,  Harvard  University,  Cam- 
bridge, Mass. 

Rudolph  A.  Peterson  (Chairman),  president,  Bank  of 
America,  Piedmont,  Calif. 


David  Rockefeller,  chairman  of  board.  The  Chase  Man- 
hattan Bank,  N.A..  New  York,  N.Y. 

Robert  Roosa,  partner.  Brown  Brothers,  Harriman  & 
Co.,  Harrison,  N.Y. 

Gen.  Robert  Wood  (retired),  staff  member.  Research 
Analysis  Corporation,  Stafford,  Va. 


International  Copyright  Group 
Meets  at  Washington 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 29  (press  release  281)  that  the  Interna- 
tional Copyright  Joint  Study  Group  had  that 
day  opened  a  5-day  meeting  at  "Washington. 

Eugene  M.  Braderman,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  for  Commercial  Affairs  and 
Business  Activities,  headed  the  U.S.  delegation. 
He  was  unanimously  elected  chairman  of  the 
meeting,  and  Abraham  L.  Kaminstein,  the 
United  States  Register  of  Copj-rights,  was  made 
honorary  chairman.  (For  the  names  of  other 
members  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  see  press 
release  281.) 

The  study  group  was  established  by  the  Inter- 
governmental Copyright  Committee,  governing 
the  Universal  Copyright  Convention,  and  the 
Berne  Permanent  Committee,  which  governs 
the  Berne  Copyright  Convention.  These  two 
parent  Committees  accepted  the  United  States 
offer  to  host  the  conference  in  "Washington  and 
directed  in  a  joint  resolution  that  tlie  study 
group  examine  the  entire  situation  of  interna- 
tional relations  in  the  field  of  copyriglit.  At  its 
first  session  the  study  group  will  give  priority 
attention  to  three  subjects:  (1)  the  establish- 
ment of  an  international  mechanism  to  permit 
developing  countries  a  greater  degi-ee  of  access 
to  copyrighted  works  while  respecting  the 
rights  of  authors:  (2)  the  needs  of  the  develop- 
ing and  de\eloped  countries  in  the  international 
copyright  field  and  the  effect  of  the  international 
copyright  treaties  in  the  satisfaction  of  those 
needs;  and  (3)  the  problems  arising  from  the 
existence  of  two  copyright  conventions  of 
worldwide  scope  and  possible  methods  for  pro- 
viding links  between  them. 

In  addition  to  the  United  States,  the  follow- 
ing nations  are  members  of  the  joint  study 
group:  Argentina,  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada, 
Ceylon,  Czechoslovakia,  France,  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany,  India,  Italy,  Ivory  Coast, 
Japan,  Kenya,  Mexico,  Netherlands,  Nigeria, 
Peru,  Philippines,  Romania,  .">enegal,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Tunisia,  United  Kingdom,  and 
Yugoslavia. 


358 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Contributions    of   Foreign    Investment   to    National    Development 


hy  Eugene  M.  Braderman 

Deputy  Assistant  Seeretat^  for  Commercial  Affairs  and  Business  Activities 


The  subject  of  foreign  investment  is,  and  has 
been  historical!}',  a  practical  question  for  busi- 
ness, a  key  element  of  govermnent  policy,  and 
an  intensely  debated  political  issue.  Today,  for- 
eign investment  has  acquired  new  dimensions 
and  assumed  increased  significance.  It  has 
created  and  been  confronted  by  new  problems 
and  lias  brought  new  and  richer  opportunities 
to  both  investore  and  the  recipients  of  foreign 
investment. 

Every  country,  of  course,  must  weigh  the  ad- 
vantages of  admitting  foreign  investment 
against  the  possible  disadvantages  in  order  to 
formulate  a  policy  toward  foreign  investment 
that  will  best  serve  its  own  needs  and  goals  and 
its  own  national  interest. 

This  article  looks  at  one  side  of  the  balance 
sheet  and  focuses  on  the  benefits  of  foreign  in- 
vestment to  the  host  country.  Its  purpose  is  to 
set  forth  tlie  contributions  of  the  foreign  firm 
to  national  development;  for  in  developing  a 
national  policy  toward  foreign  investment 
whir'h  will  be  of  maximum  benefit,  it  is  essential 
that  the  contributions  of  foreign  firms  be  clearly 
recognized. 

The  term  "foreign  investment,"  as  used 
throughout  this  discussion,  refers  to  foi'eign  pri- 
vate direct  investment ;  in  other  words,  to  that 
form  of  equity  investment  wliich,  as  distin- 
guished from  portfolio  investment,  is  accom- 
panied by  the  exercise  of  control  or  substantial 
influence  in  the  affairs  of  an  enterjirise.  Foreign 
direct  investment,  while  principally  involving 
the  establishment  of  new  firms  in  the  economy 
bj'  citizens  of  another  country,  also  includes  tlie 
acquisition  of  existing  companies. 

Essentially,  the  benefits  which  can  be  gained 
from  foreign  investment  are  the  same  for  prac- 
tically all  countries.  For  the  purposes  of  this 
analysis,  therefore,  the  phrase  "recipient  na- 
tion" applies  to  any  country  which  admits 
foreign  investment;  no  distinction  is  drawn  be- 


tween countries  on  the  basis  of  the  nature  or 
state  of  development  of  their  economies. 

Complaints  and  apprehensions  have  been  ex- 
pressed about  the  effects  or  potential  implica- 
tions of  foreign  investment.  In  some  instances 
they  are  a  manifestation  of  economic  national- 
ism. They  reflect  fears  that  foreigners  may  come 
to  own  or  control  too  large  a  portion  of  a  na- 
tion's resources. 

Other  problems  concern  actual  or  possible  con- 
flicts between  the  laws  and  policies  of  the  host 
country  and  those  of  the  home  country  of  the 
investor.  Still  other  concerns  stem  from  the  size 
or  assumed  power  of  large  foreign  companies 
which  are  subsidiaries  of  international  or  what 
are  often  described  as  "multinational"  cor^wra- 
tions.  AVhile  it  is  generally  recognized  that  the 
opportunities  for  a  more  optimal  allocation  of 
the  world's  resources  and  for  the  spread  of  tech- 
nology and  economic  progress  through  such 
worldwide  corporations  are  immense,  it  has  also 
been  noted  by  some  observers  that  the  interests 
of  the  country  in  which  a  subsidiary  is  located 
and  the  objectives  of  that  firm's  parent  company 
could  in  some  instances  diverge. 

Criticisms  also  arise  because  special  interests 
might  suffer,  such  as  local  businesses  which  are 
unwilling  or  unable  to  meet  the  competition  of 
foreign  firms,  even  though  the  nation  as  a  whole 
might  profit  from  the  presence  of  these  foreign 
companies. 

In  evaluating  the  contributions  of  foreign  in- 
vestment, therefore,  it  is  clear  that  fundamental 
value  judgments  are  involved — attitudes  and 


•  Mr.  Bradermans  article  xoas  fuh- 
lished  in  French  in  the  March-April  issue 
of  the  Belgian  bimonthly  magazine  Revue 
de  la  Societe  d''£tudes  et  d' Expansion. 


October  27,   1969 


359 


assumptions  which  determine  whether  the  vari- 
ous economic,  social,  and  political  effects  of  for- 
eign investment  are  perceived  as  "beneficial"  or 
not. 

The  extent  to  which  foreign  investment  is  ad- 
mitted and  the  conditions  under  which  foreign 
firms  are  permitted  to  ojjerate  vary  from  one 
country  to  another.  They  take  into  account  se- 
curity considerations  and  views  as  to  areas  which 
should  be  under  national  control. 

They  also  result  from  policy  decisions  which 
are  based,  or  should  be  based,  on  a  clear  un- 
derstanding of  the  effects  which  can  be  expected 
from  the  conditions  imposed  on  the  foreign  in- 
vestor. Limitations  on  foreign  firms  can  reduce 
the  benefits  obtainable  from  them. 

For  example,  requirements  for  certain  per- 
centages of  local  participation  in  the  ownership 
and  management  of  foreign  firms  are  sometimes 
imposed  in  the  belief  that  this  is  necessary  to 
ensure  that  the  firm  will  be  responsive  to  the 
needs  and  aspirations  of  the  host  country. 
Shared  management  of  an  enterprise  may  be 
less  efficient,  however,  until  nationals  of  the 
host  country  have  gained  the  benefits  of  experi- 
ence with  the  company,  are  familiar  with  com- 
pany policies  and  practices,  and  can  contribute 
the  type  of  skills  and  knowledge  required  for 
effective  administration  of  that  particular  en- 
terprise. Shared  management  by  people  of  dif- 
ferent ways  of  thinking  and  different  business 
customs  may  be  difficult  in  any  case.  Local  equity 
participation,  or  shared  ownership,  may  lead 
to  disagreements  and  compromise  decisions 
which  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  an  operation. 
For  instance,  such  decisions  on  the  reinvestment 
of  earnings  or  the  choice  of  supply  sources  may 
adversely  affect  the  quality,  prices,  and  types 
of  products  which  might  otherwise  be  offered  if 
the  firm  were  a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  of  a 
foreign  corporation. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  treatment 
given  by  a  country  to  foreign  investment  exerts 
a  significant  influence  on  the  flow  of  investment 
into  its  economy.  Some  foreign  firms  may  de- 
cide, because  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by  a 
prospective  host  country,  not  to  enter  that  coun- 
try at  all. 

The  emphasis  of  much  recent  discussion  has 
been  on  the  price  which  must  be  paid  for  foreign 
investment  by  a  recipient  country.  Concern  has 
been  expressed  about  the  social  and  political  im- 
plications and  the  economic  costs  of  receiving 
foreign  investment.  For  perspective,  therefore, 
it  should  also  be  noted  that  a  nation  which 


chooses  not  to  admit  or  which  severely  restricts 
the  entry  and  operations  of  foreign  investors 
also  pa3's  a  price  in  terms  of  the  benefits  which  it 
denies  itself,  benefits  which  are  social  and  politi- 
cal as  well  as  economic. 

Foreign  investment  benefits  a  country  by  add- 
ing to  and  improving  the  quality  of  its  existing 
resources.  A  listing  of  the  potential  contribu- 
tions of  a  foreign  firm  would  include  the 
following: 

— It  brings  new  capital  into  the  economy, 
bej'ond  that  which  is  available  locally;  and  by 
reinvesting  its  earnings,  it  continues  to  con- 
tribute to  further  capital  formation. 

— It  is  often  more  willing  than  local  firms  to 
establish  its  plant  and  undertake  its  operations 
in  remote  and  economically  depressed  areas  of 
the  country.  Having  initially  no  strong  bonds  or 
affinity  to  any  particular  region  of  the  host 
country  and  being  less  influenced  by  a  sense  of 
the  geographic  or  cultural  "remoteness''  of  cer- 
tain areas,  the  foreign  investor  frequently  tends 
to  be  more  responsive  to  financial  incentives  and 
the  suggestions  of  the  host  country  regarding 
location. 

— The  foreign  firm  hires  local  workers,  techni- 
cians, managers,  and  salesmen ;  it  provides  em- 
ployment and  contributes  to  the  income  of  the 
local  population. 

— It  pays  taxes  to  the  government  of  the  host 
coimtry. 

— The  firm's  products  substitute  for  goods 
previously  imported. 

— It  often  exports  goods  and  services,  adding 
to  the  host  country's  earnings  of  foreign 
exchange. 

— It  usually,  through  affiliation  with  sister 
subsidiaries  located  in  other  parts  of  the  world, 
has  access  to  established  overseas  markets  and 
worldwide  distribution  facilities.  It  can  thus 
increase  the  export  potential  of  the  host  country. 

— It  can  take  advantage  of  financial  assistance 
from  its  parent  company  and  from  the  govern- 
ment and  private  financial  institutions  of  its 
home  country.  It  also  borrows  locally  and  stimu- 
lates the  local  capital  market. 

— The  foreign  firm  brings  industrial  knowl- 
edge and  management  experience.  It  can  con- 
tribute advanced  technology,  efficient  admin- 
istrative organization,  and  new  methods  of 
production,  marketing,  and  distribution ;  and  it 
enjoys,  through  its  parent  company,  access  on  a 
continuing  basis  to  new  developments. 

— "Wlien  it  establishes  local  research  and  de- 
velopment facilities,  it  offers  qualified  people 


360 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


additional  opportunities  for  suitable  employ- 
ment in  their  own  country. 

— It  helps  to  develojD  new  and  improved  uses 
for  local  raw  materials. 
I       — The  foreign  firm  trains  its  local  employees ; 
■  it  teaches  them  new  skills,  advanced  production 
and  marketing  techniques,  and  effective  man- 
agement methods. 

— It  offers  new  and  perhaps  lower  priced 
products  to  the  local  consumer. 

— The  foreign  firm  can  bring  ideas  on  how 
to  improve  labor-management  relations,  within 
the  framework  of  local  laws  and  practices. 

— It  often  provides  housing,  scliools,  and 
medical  facilities  for  its  emploj'ees. 

— It  participates  in  the  daily  life  of  the  local 
community,  taking  part  in  social  and  cultural 
activities  as  well  as  joining  in  the  activities  of 
business  and  industrial  associations.  Foreign 
employees  of  the  company  can  contribute  ideas 
and  suggestions  on  approaches  to  education  and 
community  relations. 

— The  foreign  firm  complements  and  stimu- 
lates the  development  of  local  enterprises  in  its 
own  and  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  Many 
of  the  technical  and  managerial  personnel 
trained  by  a  foreign  company  will  move  on  to 
existing  local  firms  or  establish  new  enterprises. 

— It  purchases  from  local  suppliers  and  sells 
to  local  distributors,  increasing  their  output 
and  employment  and  encouraging  more  local 
investment  in  these  enterprises. 

— Local  firms  are  stimulated  by  the  example 
and  compelled  by  the  competition  offered  by  the 
foreign  company  to  adopt  new  methods  and  to 
increase  their  efficiency.  The  operations  of  the 
foreign  firm  encourage  the  establishment  of 
additional  sources  of  supply  and  the  extension 
and  improvement  of  roads,  railways,  power- 
plants,  and  other  elements  of  economic  infra- 
structure. 

In  sum,  foreign  investment  can  enable  a  na- 
tion to  utilize  resources  which  would  otherwise 
lie  idle  and/or  to  employ  its  resources  more 
productively.  A  foreign  firm  undertakes  proj- 
ects which  might  not  otherwise  be  initiated  for 
lack  of  local  capital  or  markets  or  local  ex- 
pertise in  that  field.  It  is  a  channel  which  pro- 
vides the  country  in  which  it  locates  access  to 
outside  knowledge,  experience,  and  approaches 
as  well  as  to  foreign  markets.  It  can  exert  a 
modernizing  influence  on  attitudes,  customs, 
class  structure,  and  social  mobility.  It  is 
an  agent  of  economic  growth  and  an  instru- 


ment of  social  and  cultural  development. 

Obviously,  not  every  foreign  investment  will 
bring  all  of  the  advantages  which  have  been 
noted  above.  And  not  every  potential  host  coun- 
try will  regard  all  of  them  as  advantages.  The 
types  of  contributions  made  by  a  foreign  firm 
and  the  extent  of  each  will  be  dependent  on  a 
number  of  variable  factors,  such  as  the  nature 
and  policy  of  the  firm,  the  type  of  activity  in 
which  it  is  engaged,  the  product  it  manufac- 
tures, and  local  conditions. 

For  example,  whether  or  not  the  firm  forms 
a  part  of  an  international  or  so-called  "multi- 
national" corporation  will  affect  the  nature 
and  extent  of  its  access  to  external  financial 
sources,  foreign  markets,  and  technology. 
Another  important  consideration  in  analyz- 
ing the  effects  of  the  foreign  firm  on  other 
enterprises  in  the  economy  is  the  extent  to  which 
its  activities  are  linked  to  local  suppliers  and 
consumers.  The  impact  on  employment  will  be 
dependent  on  whether  the  firm's  products  are 
labor-  or  capital-intensive,  and  the  type  of  prod- 
uct produced  will  be  a  determinant  of  its  ca- 
pacity to  substitute  for  imports  or  to  contribute 
to  an  increase  in  exports.  Conditions  in  the  local 
economy  are  also  important  variables;  a  crucial 
one  is  the  extent  of  competition  met  by  the 
foreign  company  from  other  firms,  local  and 
foreign. 

The  contributions  of  foreign  investment  are 
indirect  as  well  as  direct;  some  are  manifested 
more  or  less  immediately,  while  others  are  rela- 
tively long  term.  Beyond  the  direct  impact  of  a 
foreign  firm  on  production,  employment,  in- 
come, government  revenue,  exports,  and  im- 
ports, there  are  the  chain  reactions  of  its  local 
purchases  and  sales,  the  multiplier  effects  of  the 
income  generated,  and  its  influence  on  the  cost 
and  price  structure  of  the  economy.  Some  of  the 
benefits  lend  themselves  to  fairly  precise  meas- 
urement, such  as  the  number  of  people  employed 
and  the  amount  of  taxes  paid.  Others,  includ- 
ing some  extremel}'  valuable  contributions,  are 
more  intangible,  such  as  the  beneficial  influences 
on  education,  social  structure,  cultural  habits 
and  attitudes. 

Although  it  is  well  known  that  much  of  the 
recent  foreign  private  direct  investment  in  the 
world  is  American,  I  would  like  to  note  that 
the  United  States  is  also  a  major  recipient  of 
foreign  direct  investment.  The  United  States 
Government  is  placing  renewed  emphasis  on 
encouraging  the  entry  of  more  foreign  firms  into 
the  United  States.  We  welcome  and  actively 


October  27,   1969 


361 


seek  foreign  investment,  which  we  view  as  one 
important  way  to  link  the  assets  and  compara- 
tive advantages  of  other  countries  with  the 
endowments  of  our  own  economy. 


U.S.  Passports  Remain  Invalid 
for  Travel  to  Certain  Areas 

On  September  16  Department  press  spokes- 
man Robert  J.  McCloskey  announced  that  '■'■It 
has  been  decided  to  extend  the  existing  restric- 
tions on  the  validity  of  United  States  passports 
for  travel  to  mainland  China,  Cuba,  North 
Korea,  and  North  Viet-Nam  for  a  period  of  6 
months.'''' 

Following  are  the  texts  of  four  public  notices 
which  were  published  in  the  Federal  Register 
on  September  18. 

Public  Notice  314' 

Mainland  China 
Restriction  on  Travel  of  U.S.  Citizena 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  of  Executive  Order  11295 
and  in  accordance  with  22  CFR  51.72(c),  travel  to,  in, 
or  through  Mainland  China  is  restricted  as  unrestricted 
travel  to,  in,  or  through  Mainland  China  would  seri- 
ously impair  the  conduct  of  U.S.  foreign  affairs  in  view 
of  the  continuing  unsettled  conditions  within  Mainland 
China  and  the  risks  and  dangers  which  might  ensue 
from  the  inadvertent  involvement  of  American  citizens 
in  domestic  disturbances. 

U.S.  pas.sports  shall  not  be  valid  for  travel  to,  in,  or 
through  Mainland  China  unless  specifically  endorsed 
for  such  travel  under  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

This  public  notice  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  6 
months  from  the  date  of  publication  in  the  Federal 
Registeb  unless  extended  or  sooner  revoked  by  public 
notice. 

Effective  date.  This  notice  becomes  effective  on 
September  16, 1969. 


Dated  :  September  15, 19G9. 


[SEAL] 


WnXIAM   P.   ROQEES, 

Secretary  of  State. 


Public  Notice  315' 

Cuba 
Restriction  on  Travel  of  U.S.  Citizens 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  of  Executive  Order  11295 
and  in  accordance  with  22  CFR  51.72(c),  travel  to,  In, 
or  through  Cuba  Is  restricted  as  unrestricted  travel 
to.  In,  or  through  Cuba  would  seriously  impair  the  con- 
duct of  U.S.  foreign  affairs.  To  permit  unrestricted 
travel   would  be  incompatible   with   the   resolutions 

362 


adopted  at  the  Xinth  Meeting  of  Consultation  of  Min- 
isters of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States,  of  which  the  United  States  is  a  member.  At 
this  meeting,  held  in  Washington  from  July  21  to  26, 
1964,  it  was  resolved  that  the  governments  of  the 
American  states  not  maintain  diplomatic,  consular, 
trade  or  shipping  relations  with  Cuba  under  its  present 
government.  This  re.solutlon  was  reaffirmed  in  the 
Twelfth  Meeting  of  Ministers  of  Foreign  .\ffairs  of  the 
OAS  held  in  September  19G7,  wliich  adopted  resolutions 
calling  upon  Member  States  to  apply  strictly  the  rec- 
ommendations pertaining  to  the  movement  of  funds  and 
arms  from  Cuba  to  other  American  nations.  Among 
other  things,  this  policy  of  isolating  Cuba  was  intended 
to  minimize  the  capability  of  the  Castro  government  to 
carry  out  its  openly  proclaimed  programs  of  subversive 
activities  in  the  Hemisphere. 

U.S.  passports  shall  not  be  valid  for  travel  to,  in,  or 
through  Cuba  unless  si)ecifically  endorsed  for  such 
travel  under  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 

This  public  notice  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  6  months 
from  the  date  of  publication  in  the  Fedebal  Registeb 
unle.ss  extended  or  sooner  revoked  by  public  notice. 

Effective  date.  This  notice  becomes  effective  on 
September  16, 1969. 


Dated  :  September  15, 1969. 
[seal] 


William  P.  Rogers, 
Secretary  of  State. 


Public  Notice  316 


NoBTH  Korea 
Restriction  on  Travel  of  U.S.  Citizens 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  of  Executive  Order  11295 
and  in  accordance  with  22  CFR  51.72(c),  travel  to.  In, 
or  through  North  Korea  is  restricted  as  unrestricted  I 
travel  to,  in,  or  through  North  Korea  would  seriously  ' 
impair  the  conduct  of  U.S.  foreign  affairs.  In  view  of 
the  dangerous  tensions  in  the  Far  East,  the  expressed 
and  virulent  hostility  of  the  North  Korean  regime  to- 
ward the  United  States,  the  increase  in  incidents  along 
the  military  demarcation  line,  the  seizure  by  North 
Korea  of  a  U.S.  naval  vessel  and  its  crew,  and  the 
special  position  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  which  is  recognized  by  resolution  of  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly  as  the  only  lawful  govern- 
ment in  Korea,  the  Department  of  State  believes  that 
wholly  unrestricted  travel  by  American  citizens  to 
North  Korea  would  seriously  impair  the  conduct  of 
U.S.  foreign  affairs. 

U.S.  passports  shall  not  be  valid  for  travel  to,  in, 
or  through  North  Korea  unless  specifically  endorsed  for 
such  travel  under  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

This  public  notice  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  six 
months  from  the  date  of  publication  in  the  Federal 
Register  unless  extended  or  sooner  revoked  by  pubUc 
notice. 

Effective  date.  This  notice  becomes  effective  on  Sep- 
tember 16,  1969. 


Dated :  September  15,  1969. 

[SEAL] 


William  P.  Rogers, 
Secretary  of  State. 


•  34  Fed.  Reg.  14533. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Public  NoHce  317' 

XOETH    ViET-NaM 

Restriction  on  Travel  of  U.S.  Citizens 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  of  Executive  Order  11295 
and  in  accordance  with  22  CFR  51.72(b),  travel  to,  in, 
or  through  North  \iet-Nam  is  restricted  as  this  is  "a 
country  or  area  where  armed  hostilities  are  in 
progress." 

U.S.  passports  shall  not  be  valid  for  travel  to,  in,  or 
through  North  Viet-Nam  unless  specifically  endorsed 
for  such  travel  under  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

This  public  notice  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  6  months 
from  the  date  of  publication  in  the  Federal  Register 
unless  extended  or  sooner  revoked  by  public  notice. 

Effective  date.  This  notice  becomes  effective  on  Sep- 
tember 16,  1969. 


Dated  :  September  15, 1969. 
[seal] 


TViLLiAM  p.  Rogers, 
Secretary  of  State. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the  north- 
west   Atlantic    fisheries    (TIAS    2089)    relating   to 
panel  membership  and  to  regulatory  measures.  Done 
at  Washington  October  1,  1969.  Enters  Into  force 
on  the  date  on  which  instruments  of  ratification  or 
approval  have  been  deposited  or  written  notifica- 
tions of  adherence  have  been  received  on  behalf  of 
all  Governments  parties  to  the  convention. 
nil/natures:  Canada,  October  10,  1960;  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany,  October  3,  1969 ;  United  King- 
dom, October  6,  1969 ;  United  States,  October  10, 
1969. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at 
New  York  March  30, 1961.  Entered  into  force  Decem- 
ber 13,  1964;  for  the  United  States  June  24,  1967. 
TIAS  6298. 

Accession   deposited:  Upper   Volta,   September  16, 
1969. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of  states 
in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space,  includ- 
ing the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies.  Opened  for 
signature  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Jan- 
uary 27,  1967.  Entered  into  force  October  10,  1967. 
TIAS  6347. 

Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Netherlands, 
October  10,  1969.' 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  South  Africa, 
October  6, 1969. 


MULTILATERAL 


BILATERAL 


Automotive  Traffic 

Convention  concerning  customs  facilities  for  touring. 
Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954.  Entered  into  force 
September  11,  1957.  TIAS  8879. 
Notification  that  it  considers  itself  bound:  Mauri- 
tius, July  18,  1969. 

Aviation 

Convention  on  the  international  recognition  of  rights 
in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June  19,  1948.  Entered 
into  force  September  17,  1953.  TIAS  2847. 
Adherence   deposited:   United  Arab   Republic,   Sep- 
tember 10,  1969. 
Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts  com- 
mitted on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  September 
14,  1963.  Enters  into  force  December  4,  1969. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  October  1,  1969. 
Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  con- 
vention   on   international    civil   aviation,    Chicago, 
1944,  as  amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with  an- 
nex. Done  at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968.  En- 
tered into  force  October  24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Signature:  Jordan,  October  9,  1969. 

Fisheries 

International  convention  for  the  conservation  of  At- 
lantic tuna.  Done  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  May  14,  1966. 
Entered  into  force  March  21,  1969. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  October  1,  1969. 


Ecuador 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities  of  June  30,  1969.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Quito  September  29  and 
October  1,  1969.  Entered  into  force  October  1,  1969. 

Germany 

Agreement  amending  the  administrative  agreement  of 
December  1,  1954,  as  amended  (TIAS  3233,  3717, 
4609),  concerning  the  arbitral  tribunal  and  mixed 
commission  under  the  agreement  on  German  ex- 
ternal debts  of  February  27,  1953  (TIAS  2792).  Done 
at  Bonn  June  26,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  26, 
1969. 

Signatures:  France,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
United  Kingdom,  United  States. 

Jamaica 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  exchange  of  notes. 
Signed  at  Kingston  October  2,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  October  2, 1969. 

Morocco 

Agreement  modifying  the  agreement  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities  of  February  25,  1969  (TIAS 
6648).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Rabat  Sep- 
tember 13,  1969.  Entered  into  force  September  13, 
1969. 


'  34  Fed.  Reg.  14533. 


'  Applicable   to   Surinam  and  the  Netherlands  An- 
tilles. 


October  27,   1969 


363 


PUBLICATIONS 


Recent  Releases 


Visas — Abolition  of  Certain  Visa  Fees.  Agreement  with 
Romania.  TIAS  6677.  3  pp.  10^ 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agretment  with  Chile.  TIAS 
6679.  10  pp.  10!*. 

Study  of  Radioactivity  of  Upper  Atmosphere  by  Means 
of  Balloons.  Agreement  with  Australia  amending  and 
extending  the  agreement  of  May  9,  1961,  as  amended 
and  extended.  TIAS  6680.  4  pp.  10^. 


For  sale  t>v  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Oovemment  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ftients.  A  25-pereent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100 
or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Background  Notes.  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  and,  in  some 
cases,  a  selected  bibliography.  (A  complete  set  of  all 
Background  Notes  currently  in  stock  (at  least  125)  — 
$6;  1-year  subscription  service  for  approximately  75 
updated  or  new  Notes — $3.50;  plastic  binder — $1.50.) 
Single  copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  100 
each. 


Angola 

Pub. 

7962 

6  pp. 

Brazil 

Pub. 

7756 

4  pp. 

Bulgaria 

Pub. 

7882 

6  pp. 

Burma 

Pub. 

7931 

6  pp. 

Cambodia 

Pub. 

7747 

6  pp. 

Congo  (Brazzaville) 

Pub. 

7896 

4  pp. 

Fiji  Islands 

Pub. 

8486 

4  pp. 

Guinea 

Pub. 

8057 

4  pp. 

Iraq 

Pub. 

7975 

4  pp. 

Luxembourg 

Pub. 

7856 

4  pp. 

Mozambique 

Pub. 

7965 

5  pp. 

Niger 

Pub. 

8293 

4  pp. 

Pakistan 

Pub. 

7748 

8  pp. 

Singapore 

Pub. 

8240 

7  pp. 

Surinam 

Pub. 

8268 

4  pp. 

Trucial  Shaikhdoms 

Pub. 

7901 

4  pp. 

U.S.S.R. 

Pub. 

7842 

14  pp. 

Vatican  City 

Pub. 

8258 

2  pp. 

Antarctica — Measures  in  Furtherance  of  Principles  and 
Objectives  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty.  Certain  recommen- 
dations adopted  at  the  Fourth  Consultative  Meeting 
under  Article  IX  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty.  TI.\S  6668. 
30  pp.  200. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Jordan. 
TIAS  6675.  3  pp.  100. 

Meteorological      Research— Cloud-Seeding      Project. 

Agreement  with  the  Philippines.  TIAS  6676.  2  pp.  100. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN   SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  October  8  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Clinton  E.  Knox  to  be  Ambassador  to  Haiti.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
September  19.) 

Claude  G.  Ross  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  United 
Republic  of  Tanzania.  (For  biographic  data,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  September  12.) 

Hewson  A.  Ryan  to  be  Ambassador  to  Honduras. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release 
dated  September  19.) 


Designations 

George  H.  Aldrich  as  Deputy  Legal  Adviser  of  the 
Department  of  State.  (For  biographic  data,  see  De- 
partment of  State  press  release  dated  October  7.) 

Edwin  M.  Cronk  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
International  Trade  Policy  in  the  Bureau  of  Economic 
.\fEairs.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  dated  September  29.) 

Frederick  Irving  as  (Senior)  Deputy  As.^istant 
Secretary  for  Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  October  1.) 

William  B.  Jones  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  (For  biographic 
data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
October  1. ) 


364 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX      October  27,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No.  1583 


China 

Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  ou  "Meet  the 
Press"  (transcript) 345 

U.S.  Passports  Remain  Invalid  for  Travel  to 
Certain  Areas   (texts  of  public  notices)     .     .      362 

Cuba.  U.S.  Passports  Remain  Invalid  for  Travel 
to  Certain  Areas  (tests  of  public  notices)     .      362 

Department  and  Foreign  Sei-vice 

Aldrleh  designated  Deputy  Legal  Adviser     .     .  364 

Confirmations  (Knox,  Ross,  Ryan) 364 

Designations  (Aldrich,  Cronk,  Irving,  Jones)     .  364 

Dominican  Republic.  Letters  of  Credence  (Read 

Yittini) 352 

Economic  Affairs 

Contributions  of  Foreign  Investment  to  National 
Development  (Braderman) 359 

Cronk  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for   International   Trade   Policy 364 

IMF  and  IBRD  Boards  of  Governors  Meet  at 
Washiugtou    (Kennedy) 3-53 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs 

Irving   designated    (Senior)    Deputy   Assistant 

Secretary 364 

.T(jnes  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary    .      364 

Foreign  Aid.  President  Nixon  Names  Task  Force 
ou  International  Development 35S 

Haiti.  Knox  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .     .       364 

Honduras.  Ryan  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .      364 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

International  Copyright  Group  Meets  at  Wash- 
ington    358 

IMF  and  IBRD  Boards  of  Governors  Meet  at 
Washington    (Kennedy) 353 

Korea.  U.S.  Passports  Remain  Invalid  for  Travel 
to  Certain  Areas   (texts  of  public  notices)  362 

Luxembourg.  Letters  of  Credence  (Wagner)  352 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  NATO  Sci- 
ence Committee  Holds  First  Meeting  in  United 
States 352 

Passports.  U.S.  Passports  Remain  Invalid  for 
Travel  to  Certain  Areas  (texts  of  public 
notices) 362 

Publications.    Recent    Releases 364 

Rwanda.  Letters  of  Credence  (Nkundabagenzi)    .       352 

Science.  NATO  Science  Committee  Holds  First 

Jleeting   in   United   States 352 

Sierra  Leone.  Letters  of  Credence  (Akar)     .     .       352 

Tanzania.  Ross  confirmed  as  Ambassador     .     .       364 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions    ....      363 

U.S.S.R.  Secretary  Rogers  Intervievred  on  "Meet 
the  Press"    (transcript) 345 

Venezuela.     Letters    of    Credence     (Sosa-Rod- 

riguezj       352 


Viet-Nam 

Secretary    Rogers    Interviewed    on    "Meet    the 

Press"  (transcript) 345 

37th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 350 

U.S.    Passports   Remain   Invalid  for  Travel   to 

Certain  Areas   (texts  of  public  notices)     .     .  362 

Name  Index 

Akar,  .lohn 352 

Aldrich,  George  H 364 

Braderman,    Eugene   M 359 

Cronk,    Edwin    M 364 

Irving,  Frederick 364 

Jones,   William   B 364 

Kennedy,  David  M 353 

Knox,    Clinton    E 364 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 350 

Nkundabagenzi,     Fidele 352 

Read    Vittini,    Mario 3-52 

Rogers,    Secretary 345 

Ross,  Claude  G 364 

Ryan,    Hewson    A 364 

Sosa-Rodriguez,  Julio 352 

Wagner,  Jean 352 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  6-12 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  6  which  appear 
in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  281  of 
September  29  and  293  of  October  3. 

No.       Date  Subject 

*295  10/0  ileyer  sworn  in  as  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Administration  (bio- 
graphic data ) . 

'290  10/7  Walsh  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Kuwait  (biographic  data). 

t297  10/7  U.S.-India  bilateral  talks  at  Wash- 
ington October  16-17. 

1298     10/7      Rogers  :  draft  treaty  on  seabed. 

*299  10/8  Sayre  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Panama    (biographic  data). 

*300     10/8      Adair  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Uruguay  (biographic  data). 
301     10/9      Lodge :    37tb    plenary    session    on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

t302  10/10  U.S.-Italian  negotiations  for  new 
extradition  treaty. 

t304  10/11  De  Palma :  Economic  Club  of  De- 
troit, October  13. 

*Not  printed. 

fHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  tlie  BttLLETiN. 


U.S.    GOVERNMENr  PRINTING    OFFICE:  1969 


Superintendent  of  Documents 

u.s.  government  printing  office 

washington.  d.c.   20402 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


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IM   AVT    O 

20YEARS  OF  PEACE 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1581, 


November  3,  1969 


U.S.  AND  U.S.S.R.  AGREE  ON  DRAFT  TREATY  BANNING  EMPLACEMENT 
OF  NUCLEAR  ^VEAPONS  ON  THE  SEABED 

Statement  hy  James  F.  Leonard  and  Text  of  Draft  Treaty     3G-5 

WHAT  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  MEANS  TO  AMERICA— NOW 

hy  Assistant  Secretary  De  PaJma     37 If. 


For  index  see  inside  iach  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1584 
November  3,  1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  OfEco 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

62  issues,  domestic  .$16,  foreign  $23 

Single  copy  30  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publication 

approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 

the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  tceekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  ivork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy-,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  tlie 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  piloses  of  inter/ui- 
tional  affairs  and  tite  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  interruitional 
agreements  to  ichich  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  interruitional 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  IS'ations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative nutterial  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently . 


U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Agree  on  Draft  Treaty  Banning  Emplacement 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the  Seabed 


A  joint  draft  treaty  on  the  jyroTiiiition  of  the 
emplacement  of  nuclear  weafons  and  other 
wea-pons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed  and 
the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof  was 
presented  at  the  Conference  of  the  Committee 
on  Disarmament  at  Geneva  by  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  on  October  7.  Follow- 
ing is  a  statement  made  before  the  conference 
that  day  by  James  F.  Leonard^  U.S.  Representa- 
tive to  the  conference,  together  with  the  text  of 
the  draft  treaty. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  LEONARD 

It  has  been  widely  recognized  during  our 
work  this  year  that  the  most  promising  item 
on  our  agenda,  in  terms  of  developing  a 
concrete  agreement,  has  been  the  question  of 
preventing  an  extension  of  the  arms  race  to  the 
seabed.  As  my  colleagues  know,  this  question 
has  been  the  subject  of  intensive  discussions 
between  the  delegations  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States ;  and  I  am  pleased  to  be 
able  to  join  my  Soviet  colleague  in  reporting 
that  our  labors  have  proved  fruitful.  The  prod- 
uct of  our  efforts  has  now  been  circulated  in  the 
fonn  of  a  revised  draft  treaty  to  prohibit  the 
emplacement  of  nuclear  weapons  or  other  types 
of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed 
and  ocean  floor  or  in  the  subsoil  thereof.^ 

The  draft  treaty  we  are  presenting  today  has 
been  worked  out  by  the  Governments  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  recom- 
mendation for  discussion  and  negotiation  in  this 
Committee.  In  view  of  the  comments  and  con- 
cerns and  the  very  positive  attitudes  expressed 
on  this  subject  by  other  delegations,  I  be- 
lieve that  this  draft  could  become  a  measure 
which  would  enhance  the  security  of  all  states. 


'  For  a  U.S.  statement  and  text  of  a  draft  treaty  sub- 
mitted by  the  United  States  on  May  22,  see  Buixetin 
of  June  16, 1969,  p.  520. 


My  delegation  hopes  that  the  members  of  the 
Committee  will  soon  be  in  a  position  to  com- 
ment on  the  draft,  having  in  mind  what  has 
also  been  very  much  in  the  minds  of  the  Co- 
chairmen  :  the  importance  of  timely  submission 
of  a  broadly  agreed  text  to  the  current  General 
Assembly.  Naturally,  other  governments  will 
wish  to  study  its  provisions  with  care,  and  we 
will  need  to  consider  the  possibility  of  changes 
in  the  text.  In  the  near  future  I  plan  to  make  a 
statement  on  the  considerations  that  have 
shaped  the  U.S.  delegation's  approach  to  cer- 
tain suggestions  that  have  already  been  put  for- 
ward and  on  possible  areas  in  which  the  draft 
might  be  improved. 

Mister  Chairman,  I  would  now  like  to  ex- 
plain some  of  the  provisions  of  the  new  draft 
treaty. 

The  first  paragraph  of  article  I  would  pro- 
hibit any  party  from  emplanting  or  emplacing 
on  the  seabed,  beyond  a  12-mile  contiguous 
zone,  any  objects  with  nuclear  weapons  or  any 
other  types  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction. 
This  prohibition,  like  the  Outer  Space  Treaty, 
would  thus  cover  in  particular  nuclear  weapons 
and  also  any  other  weapons  of  mass  destruction, 
such  as  chemical  or  biological  weapons.  This 
paragraph  would  also  ban  structures,  launch- 
ing installations,  or  any  other  facilities  spe- 
cifically designed  for  storing,  testing,  or  using 
such  weapons.  The  treaty  would  therefore  pro- 
hibit, inter  alia,  nuclear  mines  that  were  an- 
chored to  or  emplaced  on  the  seabed.  The  treaty 
would  not,  however,  apjaly  to  facilities  for  re- 
search or  for  commercial  exploitation  that 
might  somehow  be  able  to  accommodate  or  con- 
tain a  nuclear  weapon.  The  prohibition  would, 
on  the  other  hand,  most  definitely  apply  to  fa- 
cilities designed  for  both  nuclear  and  nonnu- 
clear  weapons ;  for  example,  launcliing  facilities 
specifically  designed  to  fire  either  nuclear  or 
conventional  weapons.  Since  this  is  a  treaty  re- 
garding uses  of  the  seabed,  vehicles  which  can 


November  3,  1969 


365 


Agreement  on  Draft  Seabed  Treaty 
Hailed  by  Secretary  Rogers 

statement  by  Secretary  Rogers 

Press  release  298  dated  October  7 

I  was  pleased  to  learn  this  morning  that  the 
American  and  Soviet  Cochairmen  of  the  Con- 
ference of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament  at 
Geneva  have  jointly  presented  a  draft  treaty  to 
prevent  the  spread  of  the  nuclear  arms  race  to 
the  seabed. 

This  draft  treaty  must  now  be  examined  by 
the  other  delegations  at  the  disarmament  con- 
ference and  then  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
United  Nations.  In  other  words,  it  still  has  some 
way  to  go  before  it  is  opened  for  signature  by 
the  world's  nations. 

It  is  nevertheless  encouraging  that  the  United 
States  and  the  U.S.S.R.,  working  together  with 
representatives  of  other  countries  at  the  Geneva 
disarmament  conference,  have  once  again  been 
able  to  reach  agreement  on  an  arms  control 
measure  which  is  in  their  own  interest  and  in 
the  interest  of  world  security  and  stability  as 
a  whole. 


navigate  in  the  water  above  the  seabed,  that  is, 
submersible  vehicles,  should  be  viewed  in  the 
same  way  as  any  other  ships ;  they  would  there- 
fore not  be  violating  the  treaty  if  they  were 
either  anchored  to  or  resting  on  the  seabed.  I 
would  also  like  to  point  out  that  this  treaty 
would  in  no  way  impede  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy.  Thus,  the  prohibitions  of  the  treaty  are 
not  intended  in  any  way  to  affect  the  conduct  of 
peaceful  nuclear  explosions  or  to  affect  appli- 
cations of  nuclear  reactors,  scientific  research, 
or  other  nonweapons  applications  of  nuclear 
energy. 

The  second  paragraph  of  article  I  is  similar 
to  provisions  of  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty 
and  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  and  is  intended 
to  ensure  that  this  treaty  effectively  accom- 
plishes its  i^urposes. 

Let  me  now  turn  to  article  II  of  the  new  draft. 
The  provisions  of  this  paragraph  reflect  my  del- 
egation's conviction  that  our  effort  to  develop 
a  sound  measure  for  seabed  arms  control  must 
be  based  squarely  on  existing  international  law. 
The  past  several  months  have  confirmed  our  con- 
viction that  a  seabed  arms  control  agreement 
should  not  and  can  not  be  an  instrument  to  solve 
complex  questions  of  the  law  of  the  sea  and  that 
the  prospects  for  broad  acceptance  of  a  treaty 
would  be  much  greater  if  the  treaty  were  fully 


in  accord  with  the  present  law  of  the  sea.  Other- 
wise, we  would  run  a  severe  risk  of  getting 
bogged  down  in  extraneous  questions  relating 
to  national  jurisdiction  and  exploitation  of  the 
resources  of  the  sea  and  of  the  seabed.  If  tliis 
were  to  happen,  it  would  be  much  more  difficult, 
perhaps  even  impossible,  for  us  to  reach  agree- 
ment on  a  practical  arms  control  measure. 

Moreover,  we  believe  that  there  is  wide  inter- 
national agreement  on  the  basic  principles  of 
the  law  of  the  sea,  particularly  as  those  prin- 
ciples are  spelled  out  in  the  1958  Geneva  con- 
ventions. We  have  therefore  taken  the  1958 
Convention  on  tlie  Territorial  Sea  and  Contigu- 
ous Zone  as  the  basis  for  measuring  the  contig- 
uous zone  beyond  which  the  prohibitions  would 
apply.' 

The  method  for  measuring  the  band  is  cov- 
ered in  two  provisions  of  the  treaty.  First, 
paragraph  1  of  article  I  specifies  that  the  pro- 
hibitions of  the  treaty  would  apply  beyond  the 
maximum  contiguous  zone  provided  for  in  the 
1958  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Territorial  Sea 
and  the  Contiguous  Zone.  As  delegations  are 
doubtless  aware,  article  24  of  the  1958  Conven- 
tion stipulates  that  the  maximum  zone  is  12 
miles.  The  width  of  the  contiguous  zone  in  our 
draft  seabed  treaty  is  thus  derived  from  an 
existing  agreement  with  wide  int«rnational  ac- 
ceptance. Second,  paragraph  1  of  article  II  spec- 
ifies that  tlie  outer  limit  of  the  contiguous  zone 
shall  be  measured  in  accordance  with  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  the  Contigu- 
ous Zone  and  international  law.  The  seabed 
treaty  would  in  this  way  make  full  use  of  exist- 
ing international  law  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
viding limits  for  this  treaty. 

Since,  however,  it  is  generally  agreed  that 
potential  parties  would  wish  to  be  reassured 
that  acceptance  of  this  seabed  treaty  would  in 
no  way  affect  their  positions  regarding  other 
questions,  the  disclaimer  provision  in  para- 
graph 2  of  article  II  has  been  included.  We  be- 
lieve this  provision  makes  it  completely  clear 
that  adherence  to  the  treaty  would  not  prej- 
udice the  position  of  any  party  on  questions 
regarding  coastal  waters  or  the  seabed  and 
ocean  floor.  In  particular,  it  should  be  imder- 
stood  that  acceptance  by  the  United  States  of ' 
the  provisions  of  this  treaty  would  not  imply 
any  change  in  the  positions  of  the  United  States  i 
regarding  the  limit  of  the  territorial  sea,  the , 


'  For  text  of  the  convention,  see  Btjlletin  of  June  | 
30,  1958,  p.  1111. 


366 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


rights  of  coastal  states  over  the  continental 
shelf,  or  other  questions  regarding  the  law  of 
the  sea.  It  is  the  strongly  held  view  of  the  spon- 
sors of  this  draft  that  this  would  also,  and 
equally,  be  true  of  any  other  state  which  may 
become  a  party  to  this  treaty. 

Mister  Chairman,  there  has  already  been  a 
good  deal  of  discussion  in  the  Committee  con- 
cerning possible  elements  of  a  verification  pro- 
vision for  the  seabed  treaty.  We  in  the  United 
States  delegation  have  explained  in  plenary 
statements  as  well  as  in  informal  discussions  the 
reasons  that  led  us  to  conclude  that  the  require- 
ment for  verification  is  dependent  on  the  nature 
of  tlie  proliibition.  Based  on  this  conclusion  and 
in  view  of  the  difficulties  of  the  seabed  environ- 
ment and  the  limitations  of  available  teclinol- 
ogy,  we  believe  that  the  right  to  veiif y  set  forth 
in  article  III  would  be  appropriate  for  this 
treaty.  This  provision  would  ensure  that  parties 
would  be  able  to  act  to  the  full  extent  neces- 
sary to  check  compliance  with  the  treaty,  tak- 
ing into  account  both  the  rights  and  the  obliga- 
tions of  present  mternational  law,  including 
particularly  the  freedoms  of  the  high  seas.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  provision  is  drafted  to  en- 
sure that  legitimate  acti\'ities  would  not  be  sub- 
ject to  interference.  It  would  not,  for  example, 
imply  either  the  right  of  access  to  seabed  in- 
stallations or  any  obligation  to  disclose  activities 
on  the  seabed  that  are  not  contrary  to  the  pur- 
poses of  the  treaty. 

A  number  of  delegations  have  made  clear 
that  they  might  wish  to  consider  obtaining  as- 
sistance from  other  states  in  carrying  out  veri- 
fication. As  provided  in  paragraph  2  of  article 
III,  the  treaty  would  permit  verification  to  be 
carried  out  by  a  party  either  by  its  own  means 
or  with  the  assistance  of  any  other  party, 
thereby  facilitating  participation  by  all  parties 
regardless  of  their  state  of  technological  devel- 
opment. The  verification  article  also  includes  a 
commitment  by  the  parties  to  consult  and  co- 
operate in  order  to  clear  up  questions  that 
miglit  arise  about  fulfillment  of  the  obligations 
of  the  treaty. 

This  completes  my  discussion  of  the  principal 
articles  of  the  new  draft  treaty,  Mister  Chair- 
man, but  I  would  like  to  offer  a  few  brief  com- 
ments on  some  of  the  remaining  administrative 
provisions  on  amendment,  accession,  and  the 
like. 

First,  we  have  proposed  an  amendment  pro- 
vision which  follows  the  precedent  of  the 
Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty,  in  that  it  requires  ac- 


ceptance by  a  majority  of  all  parties,  including 
all  nuclear-weapon  parties,  for  entry  into  force 
of  amendments.  Inasmuch  as  the  treaty  will  in 
practice  place  restrictions  upon  the  nuclear 
powers,  this  seems  a  reasonable  procedure. 

Next,  the  first  paragraph  of  article  VI  pro- 
vides that  the  treaty  shall  be  open  for  signature 
to  all  states.  Such  a  provision  would  not,  of 
course,  affect  the  recognition  or  status  of  an 
unrecognized  regime  or  entity  which  may  elect 
to  file  an  instrument  of  accession  to  this  treaty. 

Finally,  the  third  paragraph  of  article  "VT 
provides  that  the  treaty  would  enter  into  force 
after  22  countries  had  ratified,  including  the 
depositaries.  This  follows  the  precedent  of  the 
1958  Geneva  law  of  the  sea  conventions,  as  was 
suggested  by  the  Swedish  delegation. 

Alister  Chairman,  the  tabling  of  a  draft 
treaty  today  opens  up  an  opportunity  for  es- 
tablishing in  the  near  future  a  meaningful  re- 
striction on  the  deployment  of  nuclear  weapons 
and  as  such  would  contribute  to  the  security  of 
all  countries.  At  the  present  moment,  the  work 
of  this  Committee  has  entered  a  most  important 
phase.  Wliat  we  do  or  fail  to  do  can  have  wide 
consequences.  We  have  the  chance  to  work  out 
a  measure  which  will  be  an  effective  barrier  to 
the  spread  of  the  nuclear  arms  race  and  which 
will  facilitate  the  use  of  the  seabed  for  peace- 
ful purposes.  The  time  is  short,  and  we  will 
have  to  work  hard.  But  I  am  confident  that  we 
can  again  demonstrate  the  competence  and  the 
dedication  to  serious,  detailed  work  that  have 
brought  tills  Committee  to  its  present  position 
of  leadership  in  the  field  of  arms  control. 


TEXT  OF   DRAFT  TREATY 

Draft  Treaty  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  Emplace- 
ment OP  Ndcleae  Weapons  and  Otheb  Weapons 
of  Mass  Desteuction  on  the  Seabed  and  the 
Ocean  Floor  and  in  the  Subsoil  Thereof 

The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty, 

Recognizing  the  common  interest  of  mankind  in 
the  progress  of  the  exploration  and  use  of  the  seabed 
and  the  ocean  floor  for  peaceful  purposes, 

Considering  that  the  prevention  of  a  nuclear  arms 
race  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  serves  the  in- 
terests of  maintaining  world  peace,  reduces  interna- 
tional tensions,  and  strengthens  friendly  relations 
among  States, 

Convinced  that  this  Treaty  constitutes  a  step  to- 
wards the  exclusion  of  the  seabed,  the  ocean  floor  and 
the  subsoil  thereof  from  the  arms  race,  and  deter- 
mined to  continue  negotiations  concerning  further 
measures  leading  to  this  end. 

Convinced  that   this  Treaty  constitutes  a   step  to- 


November  3,   1969 


367 


wards  a  treaty  on  general  and  complete  disarmament 
under  strict  and  effective  international  control,  and 
determined  to  continue  negotiations  to  this  end, 

Convinced  that  this  Treaty  will  further  the  purposes 
and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  principles  of  interna- 
tional law  and  without  infringing  the  freedoms  of  the 
high  seas; 

Have  agreed  as  follows : 

Article  I 

1.  The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty  undertake  not 
to  emplant  or  emplace  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean 
floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof  beyond  the  maximum 
contiguous  zone  provided  for  in  the  1958  Geneva  Con- 
vention on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  the  Contiguous 
Zone  any  objects  with  nuclear  weapons  or  any  other 
types  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  as  well  as  struc- 
tures, launching  installations  or  any  other  facilities 
specifically  designed  for  storing,  testing  or  using  such 
weapons. 

2.  The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty  undertake  not 
to  assist,  encourage  or  induce  any  State  to  commit  ac- 
tions prohibited  by  this  Treaty  and  not  to  participate 
in  any  other  way  in  such  actions. 

Abticlg  II 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  this  Treaty  the  outer  limit  of 
the  contiguous  zone  referred  to  in  Article  I  shall  be 
measured  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Sec- 
tion II  of  the  1958  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Territorial 
Sea  and  the  Contiguous  Zone  and  in  accordance  with 
international  law. 

2.  Nothing  in  this  Treaty  shall  be  interpreted  as  sup- 
porting or  prejudicing  the  position  of  any  State  Party 
with  respect  to  rights  or  claims  which  such  State  Party 
may  assert,  or  with  respect  to  recognition  or  nonrecog- 
nition  of  rights  or  claims  asserted  by  any  other  State, 
related  to  waters  off  its  coasts,  or  to  the  seabed  and  the 
ocean  floor. 

Aeticle  III 

1.  In  order  to  promote  the  objectives  and  ensure  the 
observance  of  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  the  States 
Parties  to  the  Treaty  shall  have  the  right  to  verify  the 
activities  of  other  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  on  the 
seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof 
beyond  the  maximum  contiguous  zone,  referred  to  in 
Article  II,  if  these  activities  raise  doubts  concerning 
the  fulfillment  of  the  obligations  assumed  under  this 
Treaty,  without  interfering  with  such  activities  or 
otherwise  infringing  rights  recognized  under  interna- 
tional law,  including  the  freedoms  of  the  high  seas. 

2.  The  right  of  verification  recognized  by  the  States 
Parties  in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article  may  be  exercised 
by  any  State  Party  using  its  own  means  or  with  the 
assistance  of  any  other  State  Party. 

3.  The  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  undertake  to 
consult  and  to  cooperate  with  a  view  to  removing 
doubts  concerning  the  fulfillment  of  the  obligations 
assumed  under  this  Treaty. 

Article  IV 

Any  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  may  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Treaty.  Amendments  must  be  approved  by 


a  majority  of  the  votes  of  all  the  States  Parties  to  the 
Treaty,  including  those  of  all  the  States  Parties  to  this 
Treaty  possessing  nuclear  weapons,  and  shall  enter 
into  force  for  each  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  accept-      ■ 
ing  such  amendments  upon  their  acceptance  by  a  major-      | 
ity  of  the  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty,  including  the 
States  which  possess  nuclear  weapons  and  are  Parties 
to  this  Treaty.  Thereafter  the  amendments  shall  enter      j 
into  force  for  any  other  Party  to  the  Treaty  after  it 
has  accepted  such  amendments. 

Each  Party  to  this  Treaty  shall  in  exercising  Its 
national  sovereignty  have  the  right  to  withdraw  from 
this  Treaty  if  it  decides  that  extraordinary  events 
related  to  the  subject  matter  of  this  Treaty  have 
jeopardized  the  supreme  interests  of  its  Country.  It 
shall  give  notice  of  such  withdrawal  to  all  other  Par- 
ties to  the  Treaty  and  to  the  United  Nations  Security 
Council  three  months  in  advance.  Such  notice  shall 
include  a  statement  of  the  extraordinary  events  it 
considers  to  have  jeopardized  its  supreme  interests. 

Aeticle  VI 

1.  This  Treaty  shall  be  open  for  signature  to  all 
States.  Any  State  which  does  not  sign  the  Treaty  be-  I 
fore  its  entry  into  force  in  accordance  with  paragraph  | 
3  of  this  Article  may  accede  to  it  at  any  time. 

2.  This  Treaty  shall  be  subject  to  ratification  by 
signatory  States.  Instruments  of  ratification  and  of 
accession  shall  be  deposited  with  the  Governments  of 
,  which  are  hereby  designated  the  Deposi- 
tary Governments. 

3.  This  Treaty  shall  enter  into  force  after  the  de- 
posit of  instruments  of  ratification  by  twenty-two 
Governments,  including  the  Governments  designated 
as  Depositary  Governments  of  this  Treaty. 

4.  For  States  whose  instruments  of  ratification  or 
accession  are  deposited  after  the  entry  into  force  of 
this  Treaty  it  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  date  of  the 
deposit  of  their  instruments  of  ratification  or 
accession. 

5.  The  Depositary  Governments  shall  forthwith 
notify  the  Governments  of  all  States  signatory  and 
acceding  to  this  Treaty  of  the  date  of  each  signature, 
of  the  date  of  depo.sit  of  each  instrument  of  ratifica- 
tion or  of  accession,  of  the  date  of  the  entry  into  force 
of  this  Treaty,  and  of  the  receipt  of  other  notices. 

6.  This  Treaty  shall  be  registered  by  the  Depositary 
Governments  pursuant  to  Article  102  of  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations. 

Article  VII 

This  Treaty,  the  English,  Russian,  French,  Spanish 
and  Chinese  texts  of  which  are  equally  authentic,  shall 
be  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Depositary  Govern- 
ments. Duly  certified  copies  of  this  Treaty  shall  be 
transmitted  by  the  Depositary  Governments  to  the 
Governments  of  the  States  signatory  and  acceding 
thereto. 

In  witness  whereof  the  undersigned,  being  duly 
authorized  thereto,  have  signed  this  Treaty. 

Done    in    . at    this 


day  of 


368 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


38th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  are  texts  of  the  opening  statement 
and  supplementary  remarks  made  iy  Arnbas- 
sador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the  U.S.  del- 
egation, at  the  38th  plenary  session  of  the  meet- 
ings on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  October  16. 

OPENING  STATEMENT 


Press  release  i 


1  dated  October  16 


Ladies  and  gentlemen :  This  is  our  38th  ses- 
sion. Throughout  these  Paris  meetings,  your 
side  has  accused  the  United  States  and  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  of  impeding  progress.  You 
repeated  this  charge  at  last  week's  session.  To- 
day I  shall  try  to  show  the  truth. 

A  review  of  the  record  of  these  meetings 
shows  that  the  two  sides  liave  taken  fundamen- 
tally different  approaches  to  these  negotiations. 
I  shall  submit  that  it  also  clearly  shows  that  the 
lack  of  progress  is  directly  attributable  to  the 
attitude  which  your  side  has  taken. 

Beginning  with  the  very  first  session  here, 
the  United  States  and  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  have  presented  a  number 
of  specific  proposals  for  negotiation.  Our  pro- 
posals are  directed  at  negotiated  solutions  to 
both  the  key  militai-y  and  political  issues.  They 
embody  actions  to  be  taken  by  both  sides.  They 
are  based  on  the  assumption  that  tliere  should 
be  an  equitable  arrangement  in  bringing  the 
conflict  to  an  end. 

I  submit  that  our  proposals  have  been  rea- 
sonable and  flexible,  open  to  discussion,  nego- 
tiation, and  compromise.  For  our  part,  every 
aspect  of  this  conflict  is  negotiable,  except  the 
fundamental  right  of  the  South  Vietnamese 
people  to  determine  their  own  future  free  from 
outside  interference. 

Not  only  has  our  side  made  numerous  pro- 
posals for  negotiation;  we  have  also  welcomed 
the  fact  that  your  side  presented  a  comprehen- 
sive program.  "We  noted  that  some  of  the  points 
in  your  10-point  proposal  appeared  not  too  far 
from  the  positions  which  we  have  taken.  On  the 
fundamental  questions  of  the  withdrawal  of 
non-South  Vietnamese  forces  and  of  a  political 
solution  in  South  Viet-Nam,  we  have  attempted 
seriously  to  discuss  your  proposals  and  our  pro- 


posals. We  have  explained  our  proposals  and 
elaborated  them.  "We  have  commented  on  your 
proposals,  and  we  have  asked  specific  questions 
to  try  to  clarify  them  and  to  find  common 
ground  on  which  to  build  agreement.  In  par- 
ticular, the  Govermnent  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  has  repeatedly  called  for  private 
talks  with  the  National  Liberation  Front  with- 
out preconditions.  Only  last  week  President 
Thieu  reiterated  his  readiness  to  discuss  any 
matter  and  to  do  so  in  serious  negotiations. 

We  have  also  made  specific  proposals  for  the 
humanitarian  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war. 

Our  side  has  taken  a  number  of  specific  ac- 
tions to  reduce  the  violence  on  the  battlefield. 
Contrary  to  your  repeated  charges  that  the 
United  States  is  intensifying  the  war,  our  ac- 
tions demonstrate  that  the  trend  of  American 
force  strength  in  Viet-Nam  is  decisively  down. 
Specifically : 

In  March  1968,  the  United  States  restricted 
the  bombing  of  North  Viet-Nam  to  the  area 
below  the  19th  parallel. 

In  November  1968,  the  United  States  ceased 
all  acts  involving  the  use  of  force  against  North 
Viet-Nam. 

President  Nixon  pointed  out  in  his  press  con- 
ference on  June  19,  1969,^  that  United  States 
forces  had  not  intensified  their  military  oper- 
ations but  were  only  responding  to  what  your 
side  did.  The  President  has  repeatedly  cited 
our  limited  objective  and  the  defensive  nature 
of  the  United  States  military  effort  in  South 
Viet-Nam. 

In  his  press  conference  of  August  21,  1969, 
Secretary  of  Defense  Laird  specifically  stated 
that  U.S.  commanders  in  Viet-Nam  were  not 
under  orders  to  exert  maximum  military  pres- 
sure. In  his  press  conference  of  September  17, 
Secretary  Laird  stated  that  the  United  States 
was  moving  in  the  direction  of  turning  over  the 
responsibility  for  combat  operations  and  even- 
tually all  operations  in  Viet-Nam  to  the  forces 
of  South  Viet-Nam.  In  his  press  conference  of 
October  9,  Secretary  Laird  repeated  these 
points. 

Since  President  Nixon's  assumption  of  office, 
decisions  have  been  taken  to  reduce  the  niunber 
of  U.S.  troops  by  a  minimum  of  60,000  by 
December  15  of  this  year.  Twenty-five  thousand 
U.S.  troops  had  departed  South  Viet-Nam  by 


'  For  excerpts,  see  Bulletin  of  July  7,  1969,  p.  L 


November  3,   1969 


369 


the  end  of  August.  The  remainder  of  the  60,000 
will  depart  South  Viet-Nam  by  December  15. 

President  Nixon  has  reduced  B-52  sorties. 

This,  in  briefest  summary,  is  our  side's  record 
since  these  meetings  began.  It  is  a  record  of 
specific  and  concrete  proposals  for  action  by 
both  sides,  a  record  of  flexibility  and  readiness 
for  genuine  give-and-take,  a  record,  in  sum,  of 
a  sincere  effort  to  engage  in  meaningful  negoti- 
ation to  bring  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  end. 

Eegrettably  for  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam,  who  continue  to  suffer  daily,  and  for  the 
people  of  the  world,  who  yearn  for  peace  in 
Viet-Nam,  your  side  has  followed  an  entirely 
different  approach  to  these  meetings. 

From  the  outset,  you  have  engaged  in  delib- 
erate propaganda  and  name-calling.  Your  nego- 
tiating position  is  limited  to  demands  for 
unilateral  action  by  our  side.  You  have  said 
nothing  about  what  actions  your  side  is  prepared 
to  take  to  bring  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  end. 
You  have  sought  to  impose  your  view  that  our 
side  is  the  "aggressor"  and  your  side  the  inno- 
cent "victim  of  aggression,"  despite  the  facts  to 
the  contrary. 

At  last  week's  session,  you  advanced  claims  of 
your  side's  serious  intent  by  recalling  that  you 
put  forth  four-point,  five-point,  and  then  10- 
point  programs.  But  your  side  seems  to  believe 
that  putting  forward  a  proposal  is  the  end,  not 
the  beginning,  of  real  negotiations.  Thus,  you 
have  refused  to  discuss  and  clarify  your  10- 
point  program.  You  have  brushed  aside  our 
efforts  to  find  common  ground  between  our  i-e- 
spective  positions.  You  have  insisted  that  your 
10  points  must  be  accepted  as  the  only  basis  for 
a  settlement.  You  have  refused  to  deal  with  our 
side's  proposals  in  a  serious  mamier. 

You  have  even  failed  to  take  basic  steps  which 
would  ensure  humanitarian  treatment  of  prison- 
ers of  war  held  by  your  side. 

The  most  telling  evidence  of  your  lack  of  seri- 
ous intent  is  your  persistent  refusal  to  enter 
into  genuine  discussions  with  the  Govermnent 
of  the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam,  despite  the  fact 
that  you  agreed  to  its  full  participation  in  these 
Paris  meetings.  Instead  of  negotiating  with  that 
Government  in  order  to  find  some  basis  of  ac- 
commodation, you  have  demanded  its  overthrow 
and  replacement  by  a  coalition  government  of 
your  own  choosing  as  the  price  for  any  negotia- 
tions at  all. 

In  short,  your  side  has  blocked  these  talks  by 
putting  forth  preconditions  for  negotiations. 
You  have  shown  no  willingness  to  talk  on  terms 
other  than  those  that  would  predetermine  the 


result  and  deny  the  right  of  self-determination 
to  the  people  of  Viet-Nam. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  this  is  where  we  are 
today.  The  fighting  in  Viet-Nam  continues.  Our 
side  wants  to  see  it  end  as  soon  as  possible.  We 
wish  to  negotiate.  Our  side's  actions  are  clear. 
It  is  now  up  to  your  side  to  make  the  next  move. 


SUPPLEMENTARY   REMARKS 

Press  release  307  dated  October  16 

Once  again  you  have  seen  fit  to  make  an 
abusive  attack  on  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  While  in  so  doing  you  do  not  injure  him, 
you  may  mislead  yourself.  This  could  affect  the 
course  of  our  relationships  here  and  thus  the 
prospects  for  negotiations. 

This  makes  it  useful  for  me  to  say  that  I 
believe  you  are  underestimating  the  President's 
position  as  regards  the  Viet-Nam  question  and 
that  you  are  also  misjudging  the  American  po- 
litical scene. 

You  are  dealing  with  an  individual  who  is 
inured  to  hardship,  who  has  been  under  pres- 
sure before  in  his  public  life,  and  who  has 
proven  time  and  again  that  he  firmly  intends 
to  act  in  the  national  interest  and  not  be  de- 
terred from  doing  his  duty  as  he  sees  it  by 
articles,  polls,  and  political  onslaughts. 

The  demonstrations  currently  being  held  in 
the  United  States  are  quite  in  keeping  with  our 
traditions.  We  realize  that  they  would  be  incon- 
ceivable in  a  police  state.  In  fact,  if  such  mani- 
festations occurred  in  a  police  state,  it  would 
undoubtedly  foreshadow  the  end  of  the  regime. 
But  such  demonstrations  are  one  of  the  ways  in 
which  our  process  works. 

You  are  tluis,  I  believe,  misjudging  American 
public  opinion,  and  you  are  misjudging  the 
President  of  the  United  States  as  a  man. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  obstacle  to  progress 
here  in  Paris  is  not  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  Nor,  let  me  add,  is  it  the  South  Viet- 
namese Government.  The  obstacle  to  progress 
here  in  Paris  is  vour  flat  refusal  to  enjratre  in 
meaningful  negotiations  with  us  and  your  fur- 
ther refusal  to  have  any  kind  of  serious  talks 
with  the  South  Vietnamese  Government,  who 
have  publicly  offered  to  talk  about  everything. 

I  refer  to  your  proposal  that  the  United  States 
engage  in  direct  and  private  talks  with  the  dele- 
gate of  the  self-styled  Provisional  Eevolution- 
ary  Goverimient. 

The  United  States  has  always  made  clear  that 


370 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


it  came  to  Paris  ready  to  talk  in  any  meaningful 
way  witli  all  the  representatives  on  the  other 
side.  We  hold  to  that  position. 

It  is  your  side  wlaich  has  refused  to  talk 
meaningfully  with  the  representatives  of  the 
Kepublic  of  Viet-Nam,  which  is  a  legitimate 
ffovermnent  and  without  which  nothing  of  im- 
portance  can  be  done  in  South  Viet-Nam.  You 
refuse  to  do  this,  despite  the  fact  that  you  agreed 
to  their  presence  at  these  meetings.  In  all  hon- 
esty, your  position  now  can  only  mean  that  your 
policy  has  changed  and  that  you  are  not  pre- 
pared to  negotiate  genuinely  and  sincerely  with 
all  parties  concerned. 

Thus,  as  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  are  ready 
and  willing  to  carry  on  private  and  direct  talks 
in  which  all  those  represented  on  each  side  at 
these  meetings  will  participate. 

This  has  been  our  position  and  is  our  position 
today. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  wish  simply  to  say 
this :  We  are  ready  to  join  with  all  parties  rep- 
resented by  agreement  on  both  sides  in  meet- 
ing privately  at  any  time.  Are  you? 


President  Discusses  Responsibility 
for  Decisions  on  Viet-Nam  Policy 

Following  is  an  exchange  of  letters  hetween 
President  Nixon  and  Randy  J.  Dicks,  a  student 
at  Georgetown  University,  Washington,  D.C. 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  13 

TEXT  OF   PRESIDENT  NIXON'S   LETTER 

October  13,  1969 
Dear  Me.  Dicks  :  In  reply  to  your  comments 
about  my  [September  26]  press  conference  re- 
mark that  "under  no  circumstances  will  I  be  af- 
fected whatever"  by  the  demonstrations  planned 
for  October  15,  I  would  suggest  that  there  are 
several  points  you  should  bear  in  mind. 

First,  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  pub- 
lic opinion  and  public  demonstrations.  To  listen 
to  public  opinion  is  one  thing;  to  be  swayed  by 
public  demonstrations  is  another.  A  demonstra- 
tion— in  whatever  cause — is  an  organized  ex- 
pression of  one  particular  set  of  opinions,  which 
may  or  may  not  be  shared  by  the  majority  of  the 
people.  If  a  President — any  President — allowed 
his  course  to  be  set  by  those  who  demonstrate, 
he  would  betray  the  trust  of  all  the  rest.  Wiat- 


ever  the  issue,  to  allow  government  policy  to  be 
made  in  the  streets  would  destroy  the  demo- 
cratic process.  It  would  give  the  decision,  not 
to  the  majority,  and  not  to  those  with  the  strong- 
est arguments,  but  to  those  with  the  loudest 
voices.  It  would  reduce  statecraft  to  slogans.  It 
would  invite  anarchj'.  It  would  allow  every 
group  to  test  its  strength  not  at  the  ballot  box 
but  through  confrontation  in  the  streets. 

The  planned  demonstrations  will  tell  us  that 
a  great  many  Americans  are  deeply  concerned 
about  the  war;  that  some  of  these  consider 
U.S.  participation  iimnoral;  that  many  want 
U.S.  troops  withdrawn  immediately  and  uncon- 
ditionally. But  all  of  us  in  the  Administration 
are  already  well  aware  of  this  sentiment.  We 
are  already  well  aware  that  it  is  widespread— 
indeed,  that  no  matter  how  many  people  might 
participate,  there  would  be  many  more  who 
share  their  concern. 

Therefore,  there  is  nothing  new  we  can  learn 
from  the  demonstrations.  The  question  is 
whether,  in  the  absence  of  any  new  evidence  or 
any  new  arguments,  we  should  be  turned  aside 
from  a  carefully  considered  course.  The  policies 
we  are  now  following  reflect  our  own  best 
judgment,  based  on  exhaustive  study  of  all  the 
available  evidence,  of  how  to  achieve  that  goal. 
To  abandon  that  policy  merely  because  of  a  pub- 
lic demonstration  would  therefore  be  an  act 
of  gross  irresponsibility  on  my  part. 

One  further  point :  I  respect  the  right  of  each 
American  to  express  his  own  opinion.  I  rec- 
ognize that  many  feel  a  moral  obligation  to  ex- 
press their  opinions  in  the  most  conspicuous 
way  possible,  and  therefore  consider  such  ex- 
pression to  be  their  responsibility.  I  respect 
that.  However,  my  responsibility  is  different.  I 
must  consider  the  consequences  of  each  pro- 
posed course  of  action — short-tenn  and  long- 
term,  domestic  and  world-wide,  direct  and 
indirect.  Others  can  say  of  Vietnam,  "Get  out 
now ;"  when  asked  how,  they  can  give  the  simple, 
flip  answer:  "By  sea."  They  can  ignore  the 
consequences.  But  as  I  consider  those  conse- 
quences, in  both  human  and  international 
terms,  I  can  only  conclude  that  history  would 
rightly  condemn  a  President  who  took  such  a 
course. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  my  Administration 
was  to  review,  exhaustively  and  comprehen- 
sively, every  aspect  of  the  nation's  policies  in 
Vietnam.  We  have  drastically  altered  the  pol- 
icies we  inherited.  We  are  on  the  road  to  peace. 
That  road  is  not  easy.  It  is  not  simple.  But  I  am 
convinced  it  is  the  right  one.  There  is  no  prob- 


November  3,   1969 


371 


lem  to  which  I  have  given  more  of  my  time  and 
tho)i<jlit.  For  nine  months,  we  have  worked 
every  day  for  a  just  end  to  a  conflict  which  has 
been  building  for  more  than  eight  years. 

On  October  15th,  I  understand,  many  will 
simply  be  saying :  "I  am  for  peace."  I  ardently 
join  with  all  Americans  in  working  toward  that 
goal. 

Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 


TEXT  OF  MR.  DICKS'   LETTER 

Dear  Mr.  President  :  I  think  that  your  state- 
ment at  your  recent  press  conference  that  "un- 
der no  circumstances"  will  you  be  affected  by 
the  impending  anti-war  protests,  in  connection 
with  the  "Viet-Nam  Moratorium,"  is  ill-con- 
sidered to  say  the  least.  It  has  been  my  impres- 
sion that  it  is  not  unwise  for  the  President  of 
the  United  States  to  take  note  of  the  will  of  the 
people;  after  all,  these  people  elected  you,  you 
are  their  President,  and  your  office  bears  cer- 
tain obligations.  Might  I  respectfully  suggest 
that  the  President  reconsider  his  pre-judg- 
ment. 

Yours  sincerely, 

Randt  J.  Dicks 


President  Nixon  Greets  Leaders 
of  People  to  People  Program 

Reinarhs  hy  President  Nixon  ^ 

I  would  like  to  be  permitted  just  a  personal 
word  as  I  stand  here  with  Mrs.  Eisenhower  on 
this  occasion  of  the  general's  birthday.  I  think 
back  to  those  days  in  tliis  house  when  she,  as 
the  First  Lady,  presided  with  such  dignity  and 
such  great  credit  to  America  and  to  the  world.  I 
tliink,  too,  of  General  Eisenliower  and  jjar- 
ticularly  of  those  last  days.  Last  days  can  be  sad 
days,  but  I  think  Mrs.  Eisenhower  would  agree 
that  they  were  great  days — great  days  because 
the  general,  to  the  very  last,  sjjoke  of  his  family, 
spoke  of  his  country,  and  spoke  of  those  causes 
that  were  very,  very  close  to  his  heart. 

I  remember  asking  him  shortly  before  he  died, 

'  Made  before  the  People  to  People  Council  in  the 
East  Room  of  the  White  House  on  Oct.  14  (White 
House  press  release). 


as  he  looked  back  over  almost  60  j'ears  of  public 
service,  what  he  really  rated  the  highest — and 
what  a  choice  he  had :  commander  of  the  Armies 
that  brought  victory  in  "World  War  II  against 
aggression  that  would  have  otherwise  swept 
Europe  and  possibly  the  world;  President  of 
the  United  States,  in  which  he  brought  peace  to 
the  Nation  and  kept  the  peace  for  8  years ;  and 
then  a  distinguished  career  after  he  left  the 
Presidency,  in  which  he  continued  to  give 
leadership  on  the  highest  ideological  plane  to 
the  people  of  this  nation  and  to  the  people  of 
the  world. 

It  was  interesting  to  note  that  the  President 
often  told  me  that  among  his  activities  that  had 
not  received  as  much  publicity,  of  course,  as  the 
crusade  in  Europe  and  the  Presidency  and  the 
end  of  the  war  in  Korea  was  the  People  to 
People  program. 

Six  times  after  I  left  the  Vice  Presidency  and 
before  I  came  to  this  house  in  January  of  this 
year,  I  took  trips  aromid  the  world.  Mrs.  Eisen- 
hower remembered  that  before  all  six  times  I 
came  to  call  on  General  Eisenhower,  sometimes 
in  California  and  sometimes  in  Gettysburg,  to 
get  liis  advice  about  the  affairs  of  the  world  and 
matters  that  I  might  discuss  when  I  was  abroad. 
He  never  failed  to  mention  the  fact  that  he  had 
a  tremendous  interest  in  the  People  to  People 
program,  in  the  Eisenliower  Fellows,  another 
program  that  I  might  see  abroad. 

To  show  you  the  immense  impact  that  one 
part  of  the  whole  People  to  People  program  can 
have,  I  recall  one  coimtry  I  visited  on  one  trip. 
There  were  six  members  of  a  Cabinet  in  that 
country  who  had  been  Eisenhower  Fellows. 
They  started  as  young  people  in  the  People  to 
People  program,  and  in  a  young  country  they 
moved  up. 

I  think  that  if  General  Eisenliower  were  to 
look  back  on  those  great  years  of  his  service  to 
the  Nation  he  would  put  very  liigh  on  the  list 
People  to  People  and  he  would  urge  all  of  his 
friends  to  support  it,  support  it  because  it  is 
truly  one  of  those  paths  to  peace  that  we  must 
explore,  and  that  we  must  expand,  expand  it 
not  only  among  peoples  who  are  allies  and 
friends  but  expand  it  between  those  areas  of  the 
world  that  potentially  might  be  enemies  but 
that  should  be  friends,  whose  peoples  certainly 
should  be  friends. 

That  is  why  in  this  administration  we 
strongly  support  not  only  the  People  to  People 
program  as  it  presently  exists,  but  we  hope  that 
it  can  be  expanded  more  and  more  to  an  ex- 
change  between   the   United   States   and   the 


372 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Soviet  Union,  between  the  United  States  and 
other  Eastern  European  countries,  and  eventu- 
ally, we  would  hope,  also  between  the  United 
States  and  that  great  potential  power  of  people 
that  exists  in  mainland  China. 

All  of  these  things  are  our  goals,  and  all  of 
these  things  wUl  happen.  They  will  happen  in 
our  time. 

I  would  like  to  add  just  one  other  word  with 
regard  to  the  conversation  with  the  general  that 
I  am  sure  Mrs.  Eisenhower  has  often  recalled, 
because  he  has  spoken  to  me  as  well  as  to  others 
in  these  terms. 

He  had  a  very  friendly  smile.  Wlien  General 
Eisenhower  walked  into  a  room,  he  just  lit  it  up 
when  he  smiled.  We  all  remember  that.  But  be- 
neath that  friendly  smile  all  of  us  who  knew 
him  know  that  there  was  a  very  hard  intelli- 
gence wliich  knew  the  costs  of  war  and  also 
knew  the  costs  of  maintaining  peace. 

Because  he  knew  that  balance,  because  he 
knew  what  war  was  and,  knowing  what  it  was, 
hated  it  so  much,  he  was  able  to  provide  leader- 
ship that  ended  a  war  and  kept  the  peace. 

That,  of  course,  is  the  responsibility  we  have 
today. 

But  this  is  what  I  particularly  remember  that 
he  said.  In  his  last  days,  particularly,  he  talked 
about  history — the  history  of  this  nation,  the 
history  of  the  world.  And  as  he  talked  about 
history,  he  made  what  I  thought  was  a  very 
simple  but  a  very  profound  comment  about  the 
United  States  of  America  in  this  century. 

He  said :  "The  debate  in  the  United  States  of 
America  in  this  century  has  never  been  about 
whether  we  should  have  war.  The  debate  in  the 
United  States  of  America  has  always  been  about 
how  we  can  achieve  peace."  Putting  it  more 
simply,  "The  debate,"  as  he  put  it,  "was  never 
between  people  who  wanted  war  and  those  who 
wanted  peace,  it  was  always  between  Americans 
deeply  devoted  to  keeping  the  peace,  maintain- 
ing the  peace." 

Yet  we  have  had  four  wars  in  this  century. 

And  he  responded  to  a  question  as  to  how  he 
could  justify  the  fact  that  that  was  an  historical 
occurrence  with  his  statement  that  "Americans 
were  always  debating  about  peace  rather  than 
war."  He  said:  "In  World  War  I,  President 


Wilson  said  it  was  a  war  to  end  wars.  We  went 
to  Europe  for  the  cause  of  peace.  In  World  War 
II,  President  Roosevelt  said  the  American  fron- 
tier is  on  the  Rhine,  and  we  went  to  Europe  be- 
cause we  wanted  peace  and  we  knew  that  it  was 
necessary  to  stop  aggression  if  we  were  to  have 
peace.  In  the  Korean  war,  the  question  was  not 
any  desire  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
wage  war  but  to  defend  the  cause  of  peace,  the 
right  to  exist  of  a  nation  that  was  living  in  peace 
and  whose  identity  and  existence  was  threat- 
ened by  those  who  were  bent  on  war." 

And  so  it  is  also  in  Viet-Nam.  There  is  debate 
about  this  war.  But  let  us  imderstand  that  the 
debate  is  not  about  any  desire  of  the  American 
people  for  war.  The  debate  is  about  peace — 
how  to  achieve  it ;  how  best  to  achieve  it. 

Honest  men  and  honest  women  can  disagree 
about  those  means,  but  let  the  world  under- 
stand: The  American  i^eople  want  peace.  We 
believe  in  peace.  We  have  fought  our  wars  in 
this  century  because  we  wanted  peace.  And  we 
want  to  bring  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  to  an  end 
in  a  way  that  will  promote  not  a  temporary  but 
a  lasting  peace. 

I  think  I  have  spoken  or  paraphrased  what 
General  Eisenhower  said  to  many  visitors  in 
those  last  days  before  he  died. 

Finally,  may  I  say  that  with  regard  to  the 
People  to  People  program,  sometimes  I  sup- 
pose those  little  things  you  do — receiving  a  for- 
eign student,  spending  some  time  with  some 
individual  who  may  come  in  from  a  foreign 
country — seems  rather  inconsequential  when 
you  weigh  it  against  the  great  decisions  that 
have  to  be  made  in  the  Congress  or  in  the  State 
Department  or  in  the  Wliite  House. 

But  looking  far  down  that  road,  down  that 
road  to  the  end  of  this  century,  when,  I  am  con- 
fident, we  wUl  have  a  world  of  peace,  we  must 
remember  those  young  people  you  talk  to  today 
from  foreign  lands  will  be  the  leaders  of  those 
lands  tomorrow.  And  the  fact  that  they  have 
been  here,  the  fact  that  they  know  from  visiting 
our  homes  and  our  offices  that  Americans  are  a 
people  dedicated  to  peace,  tliis  fact  wUl  make 
them  leaders  in  the  cause  of  peace  just  as  the 
American  people,  I  know,  in  the  future  wUl  al- 
ways be  dedicated  to  the  cause  of  peace. 


November  3,  1969 

36ft-372— 69 2 


373 


What  the  United  Nations  Means  to  America — Now 


hy  Samuel  De  Palma 

Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organization  Affairs  ^ 


The  United  Nations  is  passing  through  a 
crisis  of  confidence.  Editorial  writers  and  ex- 
perts are  pessimistic  about  its  capacity  to  act 
effectively  and  gloomy  about  its  future. 

Much  of  what  you  hear  about  the  U.N.'s 
shortcomings  is  accurate,  but  most  of  it  is  not 
very  important.  Nor  is  it  relevant  for  an  under- 
standing of  the  real  world  in  which  it  operates. 

To  berate  the  U.N.  for  failing  to  behave  like 
a  world  government,  which  it  is  not,  or  for  not 
being  able  to  cure  the  ills  of  its  member  coun- 
tries is  to  miss  the  point.  The  significant  ques- 
tion is  whether  and  how  the  U.N.  can  serve  as 
a  reliable  vehicle  for  helping  nations  deal  with 
concrete  issues  confronting  the  world  today,  in 
particular  whether  the  U.N.  can  provide  the 
means  for  international  sharing  of  the 
responsibilities  and  costs  of  peacekeeping  and 
development. 

First  of  all,  let  us  face  the  U.N.'s  shortcom- 
ings. With  the  expansion  of  its  membership  to 
126  coimtries,  it  has  become  more  difficult  for  the 
nations  which  possess  economic  and  military 
power  to  exert  a  commensurate  influence  in  the 
organization.  Too  many  unrealistic  resolutions 
are  adopted  by  steamroller  majorities.  U.N. 
procedures  are  cumbersome,  and  its  discussions 
are  debased  by  loquacity  and  emotionalism. 
Deep  differences  exist  over  its  proper  role  in 
respect  to  colonial  and  racial  issues.  There  is 
concern  about  ever-rising  budgets  in  some  U.N. 
agencies.  There  are  serious  questions  about  effi- 
ciency and  effectiveness  in  certain  operations. 
And  the  U.N.'s  finances  are  in  precarious  shape. 

Above  all,  it  is  cause  for  concern  that  the 
U.N.  has  not  acquired  the  infiuence  or  prestige 
to  act  decisively  to  maintain  peace.  The  U.N. 
does  not  offer  effective  means  for  dealing  with 
issues  that  engage  the  vital  interests  of  the  ma- 

'  Address  made  before  the  Economic  Club  of  Detroit 
at  Detroit,  Mich.,  on  Oct  13  (press  release  304  dated 
Oct.  11). 


jor  power  unless  they  are  in  agreement,  al- 
though it  can  help  insulate  trouble  spots  from 
their  confrontation. 

Clearly  U.N.  institutions  and  procedures  need 
to  be  reformed  to  ensure  effective  functioning. 
The  answer  does  not  lie  primarily  in  structural 
change.  There  is  no  likelihood  of  agreement 
now  on  a  new  grand  design,  although  important 
procedural  improvements  are  possible  and  we 
are  working  at  them. 

For  example,  a  problem  which  must  be  solved 
is  that  of  accommodating  the  micro-states  near- 
ing  independence.  About  65  small  entities  are 
potential  candidates  for  U.N.  membership.  With 
a  combined  population  of  only  about  4,600,000 
they  would,  if  admitted  to  full  voting  member- 
ship, strain  beyond  credulity  the  U.N.  concept 
of  one  nation,  one  vote.  We  believe  the  best  solu- 
tion is  to  create  a  new  status  of  "associate  mem- 
ber," carrying  the  benefits  and  privileges  of 
membership  but  not  the  right  to  vote.  The  Secu- 
rity Council  has  referred  the  question  to  a  com- 
mittee of  experts,  and  we  hope  tliis  matter  will 
at  last  be  given  the  urgent  attention  it  needs. 

Despite  its  shortcomings,  the  U.N.  has  scored 
achievements  wliich  cannot  be  downgraded  and 
which  point  to  possibilities  for  future  improve- 
ments. The  U.N.  helped  to  contain  small  wars 
and  avert  others.  It  assisted  in  the  orderly  and, 
to  a  remarkable  degree,  nonviolent  liquidation 
of  vast  colonial  areas  and  the  emergence  of  many 
new  nations  to  independence.  It  launched  eco- 
nomic and  social  programs  to  help  these  new 
nations  get  on  their  feet.  It  made  a  beginning 
in  fashioning  international  machinery  to  deal 
with  the  new  teclmology.  It  has  provided  a 
unique  arena  for  quiet  diplomatic  exchanges 
and  negotiations,  most  of  which  go  unreported. 
And,  we  believe,  it  can  provide  machinery  to 
help  implement  settlements  in  the  Middle  East 
or  Viet-Nam  once  such  settlements  are  achieved. 

With  this  experience,  what  role  can  we  project 


374 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


for  the  U.N.  in  the  coming  years  ?  I  can  foresee 
at  least  three  promising  areas  of  increased  U.N. 
activity : 

— First  is  the  U.N.'s  role  in  helping  avoid  or 
contain  local  conflicts ; 

— Second  is  the  U.N.'s  role  in  helping  the 
orderly  processes  of  modernization  in  the  third 
world — the  familiar  problem  of  economic  and 
social  development ; 

— Third  is  the  U.N.'s  role  in  helping  the  world 
come  to  terms  with  the  physical  environment  as 
affected  by  the  new  technologies. 

Controlling  Arms — and  Local  Conflicts 

The  U.N.  has  long  been  preoccupied  with 
promoting  arms  control  and  disarmament  and 
has  helped  spur  negotiation  on  measures  to  re- 
strain the  arms  race.  Progress  has  been  slow  be- 
cause effective  arms  control  agreements  must 
be  based  on  balanced  obligations  and  provide 
adequate  assurance  of  compliance.  Such  agree- 
ments are  exceedingly  difficult  to  negotiate,  but 
we  have  succeeded  in  banning  nuclear  tests  in 
the  atmosphere,  in  agreeing  to  explore  and  ex- 
ploit the  Antarctic  and  outer  space  for  peaceful 
purposes  only,  and  in  drafting  a  treaty  to  pre- 
vent the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 

At  Geneva  we  and  the  Kussians  have  just 
agreed  on  a  draft  treaty  to  prevent  the  em- 
placement of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on 
the  seabed.  We  hope  that  the  Geneva  Disarma- 
ment Committee  will  be  able  to  forward  it  for 
final  action  to  the  present  session  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

We  anticipate  that  the  General  Assembly  will 
also  show  great  interest  in  controlling  chemical 
and  biological  weapons.  As  you  know,  within 
our  own  Government  we  are  presently  review- 
ing our  policy  on  the  production  and  use  of 
such  weapons.  This  may  well  emerge  as  the  next 
important  area  for  arms  control  negotiations. 

We  need  to  renew  the  search  for  more  effective 
ways  to  contain  and  alleviate  political  crises  and 
to  strengthen  means  for  keeping  or  restoring  the 
peace  in  conflict  situations.  The  U.N.  has  had 
valuable  experience  in  damping  down  conflict 
in  such  places  as  the  Congo,  Cyprus,  and  the 
Middle  East.  It  has  demonstrated  a  capacity — 
though  still  limited  and  rudimentary — to  take 
emergency  action  to  halt  fighting,  to  keep  out- 
breaks of  violence  in  check,  and  to  promote 
peaceful  settlement. 

We  believe  the  time  is  ripe  for  a  new  effort  to 


strengthen  U.N.  peacekeeping.  For  years  nego- 
tiations in  the  U.N.  on  arrangements  for  peace- 
keeping made  no  headway  because  of  the  rigid 
Soviet  insistence  that  the  Security  Council 
control  every  aspect  of  peacekeeping  and  decide 
how  it  was  to  be  financed.  That  would  mean  the 
veto  could  be  used  to  curtail  an  operation  at 
almost  every  stage. 

Recently,  however,  we  have  seen  the  first  signs 
of  Soviet  willingness  to  discuss  these  problems 
in  more  practical  and  realistic  terms.  We  are 
interested  in  seeking  a  practical  solution  which 
recognizes  the  primary  role  of  the  Security 
Council.  We  are  not  interested  in  some  rigid  or 
doctrinaire  formula,  but  we  do  attach  impor- 
tance to  effective  procedures  which  will  assure 
that  U.N.  peacekeeping  forces  can  be  made 
available  quickly  when  needed  and  that  they  can 
be  adapted  to  the  unique  and  evolving  circum- 
stances of  each  case. 

The  U.N.  and  the  Impoverished  Two-Thirds 

The  second  broad  task  in  which  the  U.N.  must 
play  a  larger  role  is  the  orderly  accommoda- 
tion into  a  stable  world  order  of  the  im- 
poverished two-thirds  of  the  world's  popula- 
tion. There  is  no  direct  relationship  between 
disaffection  and  poverty  or  between  world 
stability  and  the  satisfaction  of  rising  expecta- 
tions. Yet,  apart  from  the  conscience  of  the  rich, 
clearly  the  demands  of  the  impoverished  and 
underprivileged  cannot  be  ignored  if  we  are  to 
build  a  tolerable  world  order. 

Orderly  political  development  in  the  third 
world  is  threatened  by  resentment  among  the 
poor  countries  because  they  are  being  left  be- 
hind in  tliis  era  of  rapid  technological  advances 
and  because  the  economic  disparity  between  rich 
and  poor  is  growing. 

At  the  initiative  of  the  United  States,  the 
U.N.  proclaimed  the  decade  of  the  sixties  as 
the  First  Development  Decade.  During  the  past 
10  years  considerable  progress  was  made  in  or- 
ganizing multinational  efforts  in  aid  and  trade, 
in  teclmical  assistance  and  preinvestment  sur- 
veys, in  industrial  development,  in  agricultural 
production  and  improvement  of  health  stand- 
ards, and  in  rising  standards  of  education.  Few 
are  aware  that  some  85  percent  of  the  U.N.'s 
staff  and  finances  is  devoted  to  economic  and 
social  development.  But  impressive  as  this 
achievement  is,  the  U.N.  has  not  been  able  to 
keep  pace  with  the  needs  of  the  developing 
countries. 


November  3,  1969 


375 


The  U.N.  is  now  planning  for  the  Second 
Development  Decade,  in  the  midst  of  growing 
impatience  with  the  slow  pace  of  development. 

The  U.N.  Development  Program,  directed  by 
Paul  Hoffman,  in  1968  operated  3,400  projects 
in  134  comitries  and  territories,  spending 
nearly  $200  million  and  generating,  through  the 
input  of  local  money  and  efforts,  a  development 
"output"  that  is  worth  many  times  that  amount. 
President  Robert  McNamara  of  the  World 
Bank  recently  noted  that  World  Bank  loans 
arising  directly  out  of  UNDP  preinvestment 
projects  have  amounted  to  $700  million.  Na- 
tional governments  and  private  industry  have 
done  even  more. 

Incidentally,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the 
two  main  international  development  institu- 
tions are  headed  by  men  who  were  leading  ex- 
ecutives in  our  automobile  industries.  This 
serves  as  a  reminder  that  much  international 
development  is  the  result  of  private  investments 
abroad.  It  also  points  up  how  much  public  de- 
velopment institutions  can  learn  from  private 
industry  about  using  low-trained  workers  in  ad- 
vanced-technology industries.  They  might  also 
learn  much  from  the  multinational  corporations 
about  dynamic  adaptation  to  varying  political, 
economic,  and  social  conditions. 

An  advantage  of  the  U.N.  Development  Pro- 
gram is  that  it  avoids  some  of  the  political  prob- 
lems which  often  hamper  U.S.  bilateral  aid 
programs.  Equally  important  is  the  fact  that 
it  serves  to  enlist  financial  support  from  other 
donor  nations  because  our  contribution  is  limited 
to  40  percent  of  what  is  contributed  by  others. 

For  these  reasons  and  because  of  the  solid 
record  of  achievement  by  the  U.N.  Development 
Program  during  the  past  decade.  President 
Nixon  last  May  asked  Congress  for  a  U.S.  con- 
tribution of  up  to  $100  million  for  1970  to  this 
program,  a  43-percent  increase  over  our  current 
contribution. 

The  need  for  deciding  on  an  increased  con- 
tribution to  the  Second  Development  Decade 
confronts  us  at  a  time  when  we  are  about  to 
launch  a  basic  reappraisal  of  our  entire  foreign 
aid  policy.  This  reappraisal  will  have  to  take 
into  account  our  urgent  and  competing  domestic 
needs.  Both  needs  appear  insatiable.  Many  will 
find  it  easy  to  urge  that  we  shirk  our  interna- 
tional responsibility  as  a  means  of  diverting  re- 
sources to  domestic  programs.  But  that  would 
be  folly.  We  can  no  more  ignore  poverty  and 
social  tensions  abroad  tlian  we  can  at  home. 

But   more   than   money   and  flexible  trade 


policies  is  needed.  The  best  financed  scheme  of 
economic  development  can  be  frustrated  unless 
coordinated  gains  are  made  in  food  production 
and  in  checking  population  growth.  While  the 
Malthusian  warning  of  hungry  mouths  out- 
stripping available  food  supplies  seems  less 
likely  in  an  era  of  agricultural  production  mir- 
acles, the  fact  remains  that  at  the  present  rate  of 
world  population  growth,  the  earth  will  contain 
over  7  billion  people  by  the  end  of  this  century, 
as  compared  with  3  billion  in  1969.  After  that, 
the  next  billion  would  be  added  in  only  5  years, 
and  additional  billions  in  shorter  and  shorter 
periods  thereafter. 

As  President  Nixon  put  it  in  his  speech  to  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly :  ^ 

If  in  the  course  of  that  Second  Development  Decade 
we  can  make  both  significant  gains  In  food  production 
and  significant  reductions  in  the  rate  of  population 
growth,  we  shall  have  opened  the  way  to  a  new  era 
of  splendid  prosperity.  If  we  do  only  one  without  the 
other,  we  shall  be  standing  still ;  and  If  we  fail  in  both, 
great  areas  of  the  world  will  face  human  disaster. 

That  is  why  the  United  States  has  taken  the 
lead  in  stimulating  the  provision  of  family 
planning  services  through  the  U.N.  and  its  affil- 
iated agencies.  We  have  contributed  $3  million 
to  date  and  plan  to  contribute  more  in  the  fu- 
ture. Wliile  a  number  of  nations  have  out- 
stripped us  recently  in  their  relative  contribu- 
tions to  U.N.  development  programs,  few  have 
made  commensurate  contributions  to  family  I 
planning  activities.  We  are  urging  them  to  join 
us  in  this  vital  effort. 


The  New  Technology  and  the  U.N. 

The  third  broad  task  for  the  U.N.  is  to  help 
us  come  to  terms  with  the  new  technologies  by 
drafting  legal  rules  and  creating  institutions  for 
international  cooperation.  The  U.N.  is  helping 
to  develop  an  international  common  law  for  the 
orderly  regulation  of  new  areas  in  man's  use 
of  his  environment.  But  new  technologies  and 
the  changed  environment  are  not  unmixed  bless- 
ings. They  hold  dangers  as  well  as  promises.  As 
technology  shrinks  time  and  distance,  social  and 
political  stresses  both  within  and  between  na- 
tions could  become  inflamed.  The  world  is  also 
faced  with  the  "ecological  conflict"  which  man 
has  introduced  into  nature — the  depletion  of 
natural  resources  and  pollution  of  the  natural 
environment. 

We  try  through  the  U.N.  to  make  sure  that  the 

'For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct  6,  1969,  p.  297. 


376 


Department  of  Stafe  Bulletin 


technological  benefits  are  equitably  distributed 
and  the  perils  countered : 

From  the  beginning  of  the  space  age  the  U.N. 
has  organized  for  international  cooperation  in 
this  vast  frontier.  Its  Outer  Space  Committee 
prepared  the  way  for  the  treaty  banning  weap- 
ons of  mass  destruction  in  outer  space  and  is 
now  drafting  a  convention  defining  liability  for 
damages  caused  by  outer  space  objects. 

On  September  18  before  the  General  As- 
sembly, President  Nixon  described  the  enor- 
mous potential  of  space  technology  for  the  whole 
world  and  promised  to  share  its  benefits.  He 
noted  that  we  are  developing  earth  resource  sur- 
vey satellites  capable  of  yielding  data  which 
could  assist  in  as  widely  varied  tasks  as  locating 
mineral  deposits  and  schools  of  fish  or  providing 
data  on  the  health  of  crops.  "We  are  considering 
ways  to  make  available  the  data  acquired  by 
such  satellites  to  the  world  commimity  through 
international  arrangements  worked  out  under 
U.N.  auspices. 

Numerous  international  agencies  are  con- 
cerned with  oceanography  and  the  seabed.  We 
are  cooperating  in  efforts  to  write  principles 
governing  the  exploration  and  use  of  the  deep 
ocean  floor,  including  the  principle  of  reserva- 
tion of  the  deep  seabed  exclusively  for  peace- 
ful purposes,  and  to  ensure  that  the  exploitation 
of  its  resources  will  be  for  the  benefit  of  all  man- 
kind. It  is  already  clear  that  there  is  a  need  to 
establish  international  machinery  for  the  area 
of  the  seabed  beyond  national  jurisdiction  to 
avoid  conflict  because  of  competing  claims  and 
to  ensure  orderly  development  of  its  resources. 

Finally,  humanity  literally  has  a  vital  inter- 
est in  maintaining  a  healthful  coexistence  with 
our  environment,  in  preserving  the  resources 
and  the  beauties  of  the  planet. 

The  U.N.  has  scheduled  an  international  con- 
ference on  the  environment  in  Stockholm  in 
1972.  Our  aim  must  be  not  only  to  prevent  dam- 
age to  the  air  and  water  and  other  life-giving 
elements  of  our  environment  but  to  undertake  a 
systematic  effort  to  ensure  the  rational  use  and 
conservation  of  the  world's  resources. 

With  these  three  great  assignments  in  its  fu- 
ture— peacekeeping,  development,  and  coopera- 
tion in  technology — no  informed  student  of 
world  affairs  can  write  off  the  U.N.  as  obsolete. 

Probably  the  main  difference  in  our  national 
outlook  today  and  24  years  ago  when  the  U.N. 
was  established  is  that  we  define  our  national 
interest  in  less  restrictive  and  parochial  terms. 
We  find  it  more  difficult  to  disentangle  our  se- 


curity and  our  national  interests  from  those  of 
other  nations — at  the  same  time  that  we  are 
more  and  more  concerned  about  limiting  our 
commitments  abroad.  If  we  give  the  U.N.  the 
support  which  it  deserves,  it  can  in  time  acquire 
the  strength  and  prestige  it  needs  to  take  over 
many  of  our  foreign  economic  and  military 
burdens.  The  United  States  thus  has  a  vital 
stake  in  the  U.N.'s  future  not  only  because  its 
activities  are  beneficial  to  us  and  all  mankind 
but  because  it  is  becoming  more  relevant  to  the 
modern  world. 

We  can  no  longer,  in  our  own  interest,  adopt 
the  attitude  of  the  visitor  to  the  village  church 
as  described  by  the  French  philosopher  Henri 
Bergson.  This  outsider  sat  impassively  through 
a  moving  religious  service  and  inspiring  ser- 
mon. Asked  by  his  neighbor  how  he  could  re- 
main unmoved  while  the  others  were  so  touched, 
he  replied :  "But,  monsieur,  I  do  not  belong  to 
this  parish." 

We  all  belong  to  this  parish. 


U.S.  Informs  U.N.  of  Symposium 
on  Remote  Sensing  of  Environment 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  Charles 
W.  Yost,  UjS.  Representative  to  the  United  Na- 
tions, to  Secretary  General  V  Thant. 

U.S./U.N.  press  release  112  dated  September  26 

Septembek  26,  1969 
Excellency:  Speaking  before  the  General 
Assembly  on  18  September  President  Nixon 
cited  the  enormous  potential  of  "the  benefits 
that  space  technology  can  yield  here  on  earth," 
and  gave  as  an  example  currently  under  de- 
velopment the  earth  resource  survey  satellites 
being  prepared  for  the  1970's.^  President  Nixon 
said  that  the  United  States  program  "will  be 
dedicated  to  produce  information  not  only  for 
the  United  States,  but  also  for  the  world 
community." 

In  this  connection,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform 
you  that  an  International  Symposium  on  Re- 
mote Sensing  of  Environment  will  be  conducted 
October  13  through  16,  1969,  at  Ann  Arbor, 
Michigan,  by  the  Center  for  Eemote  Sensing 
Information  and  Analysis  of  the  University  of 
Michigan.  The  Symposium  will  include  lecture 


'  Bulletin  of  Oct  6,  1969,  p.  297. 


November  3,   1969 


377 


and  discussion  sessions  devoted  to  multispectral 
data  and  applications,  instrumentation  and  sys- 
tems analysis,  effective  use  of  environmental 
data,  and  to  the  meteoi'ological,  geological, 
oceanographic,  geographic,  and  agriculture- 
forestry  applications  of  remote  sensing. 

The  purpose  of  this  letter  is  to  invite  you  to 
call  the  Symposium  to  the  attention  of  inter- 
ested members  of  the  Secretariat  staff  and  of  the 
Specialized  Agencies  who  may  wish  to  attend. 
I  also  request  that  a  copy  of  this  letter  be  cir- 
culated as  a  document  of  the  Outer  Space  Com- 
mittee in  order  to  bring  this  Symposium  to  the 
attention  of  all  Member  States  who  may  wish  to 
send  their  experts  to  participate  and  observe. 

Additional  details,  including  registration 
procedures,  are  described  in  the  attached  an- 
nouncement. We  have  transmitted  extra  copies 
of  this  announcement  to  the  Outer  Space  Affairs 
Division. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

CuAELES  W.  Yost 


U.S.  and  Italy  Begin  Negotiations 
for  New  Extradition  Treaty 


Joint  Statement  ^ 


agreed  text  is  arrived  at  and  signed,  the  treaty 
will  be  submitted  to  the  United  States  Senate 
for  advice  and  consent  and  to  the  Italian  legis- 
lature for  its  authorization. 

The  United  States  Delegation  is  composed  of 
the  following: 

John  R.  Stevenson  (Head  of  Delegation),  Legal 
Adviser 

K.  E.  Malmborg,  Assistant  Legal  Adviser  for  Admin- 
istration and  Consular  Affairs 

H.  Rowan  Galther,  Attorney,  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser 

Peter  H.  Pfund,  Attorney,  Office  of  the  Legal  Adviser 

Advisers 

Charles  K.  Johnson,  Country  Desk  Officer,  Italian 
Affairs 

Murray  R.  Stein,  Attorney,  Criminal  Division,  Depart- 
ment of  Justice 

Neil  Seidenman,  Interpreter,  Language  Services 

The  composition  of  the  Italian  Delegation  is 
as  follows : 

Gennaro  do  NovelUs,  Minister  Plenipotentiary 

Dr.  Giovanni  Noccioli,  General  Director  of  Penal  Af- 
fairs, Ministry  of  Justice 

Ugo  Caldarera,  Justice  of  the  Court  of  "Cassazione" 

Alberto  Sciolla  Lagrange,  Justice  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals 

Giuseppe  CasteUi,  Deputy  Prefect  Inspector 

Rocco  Palamara,  Judge  of  Tribunal 

Professor  Giovanni  Kojanec,  Juridical  Consultant  of 
the  General  Direction  of  Emigration,  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs 

Mrs.  Maria  Lia  Borghesl  Verone,  Secretary-Inter- 
preter 


Delegations  representing  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  Eepublic  of  Italy  today 
completed  the  first  stage  of  negotiations  for  a 
new  extradition  treaty.  The  present  treaty  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Italy  which  entered 
into  force  on  September  17,  1868,  has  been 
supplemented  on  several  occasions,  but  this  is 
the  first  comprehensive  review. 

Wliile  it  will  still  take  some  time  to  arrive  at 
a  treaty,  the  two  Delegations  expressed  satis- 
faction with  the  progress  made  during  the  pres- 
ent negotiations.  These  negotiations,  in  partic- 
ular, have  resulted  in  far-reacliing  provisions 
directed  against  aircraft  hijacking  which  en- 
dangers civil  aircraft  and  the  passengers  they 
carry.  It  was  believed  that  special  measures  arc 
needed  in  such  cases  because  of  the  seriousness 
of  these  acts. 

A  second  stage  of  negotiations  is  expected  to 
take  place  in  Italy  early  next  year.  Once  an 

'Issued  at  Washington  Oct.  10  (press  release  302). 


U.S.  To  Continue  Friendly  Relations 
With  New  Government  of  Bolivia 

Department  Statemenf^ 

U.S.  Ambassador  Raul  Castro  this  noon.  La 
Paz  time,  delivered  a  note  to  the  Bolivian 
Foreign  Office  replying  to  a  note  of  Septem- 
ber 27  from  Acting  Foreign  Minister  David 
Lafuente.  The  United  States  note  stated  our 
wish  to  reciprocate  the  Bolivian  Government's 
intention,  expressed  in  its  note,  to  continue  and 
strengthen  the  friendly  relations  that  exist  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  This  action  was  taken 
after  consultation  with  the  other  American  Re- 
publics pursuant  to  Resolution  26  of  the  1965 
Rio  conference. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch  on  Oct  10. 


378 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


United  States  and  Japan  Consult 
on  Japanese  Trade  Liberalization 

The  Department  of  State  annoxmced  on  Octo- 
ber 3  (press  release  291)  that  a  delegation 
headed  by  Philip  H.  Trezise,  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Economic  Affairs,  was  going 
to  Tokyo  to  consult  with  officials  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan  concerning  Japanese  trade  lib- 
eralization. The  consultation,  which  was  held 
October  6-9,  was  agreed  to  at  the  July  meeting 
of  the  U.S.-Japan  Joint  Committee  on  Trade 
and  Economic  Affairs.  It  was  a  continuation  of 
discussions  that  have  been  underway  between 
the  two  Governments  regarding  removal  of 
Japan's  remaining  restrictions  on  products  of 
U.S.  export  interest. 

Other  members  of  the  delegation  were : 

Lawrence  A.  Fox,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
national Trade  Policy,  Department  of  Commerce 

Raymond  A.  loanes,  Administrator,  Foreign  Agricul- 
tural Service,  Department  of  Agriculture 

John  W.  Evans,  Assistant  Special  Representative  for 
Trade  Negotiations,  Office  of  the  President's  Special 
Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations 

Paul  A.  Heise,  Special  Assistant  to  the  Administrator 
of  the  Bureau  of  International  Labor  Affairs,  De- 
partment of  Labor 

Robert  E.  Fritts,  Country  Officer  for  Japan,  Depart- 
ment of  State 


Letters  of  Credence 

Barbados 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Bar- 
bados, Valerie  T.  McComie,  presented  his  cre- 
dentials to  President  Nixon  on  October  10.  For 
texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  October  10. 

Congo  (Kinshasa) 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo,  Justin- 
Marie  Bomboko,  presented  his  credentials  to 
President  Nixon  on  October  10.  For  texts  of  the 
Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's  re- 
ply, see  Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
October  10. 


Czechoslovakia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Czechoslovak  Socialist  Eepublic,  Ivan  Rohal- 
Ilkiv,  presented  his  credentials  to  Pi-esident 
Nixon  on  October  16.  For  texts  of  the  Ambas- 
sador's remarks  and  the  President's  reply,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  dated  Octo- 
ber 16. 

Iceland 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Re- 
public of  Iceland,  Magnus  V.  Magnusson,  pre- 
sented his  credentials  to  President  Nixon  on 
October  16.  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  re- 
marks and  the  President's  reply,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  dated  October  16. 

Iran 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Iran, 
Amir  Asian  Afshar,  presented  his  credentials 
to  President  Nixon  on  October  16.  For  texts  of 
the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's 
reply,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  October  16. 

Mali 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the  Re- 
public of  Mali,  Seydou  Traore,  presented  his 
credentials  to  President  Nixon  on  October  10. 
For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  October  10. 

Netherlands 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
liingdom  of  the  Netherlands,  Baron  Rijnhard 
B.  Van  Lynden,  presented  his  credentials  to 
President  Nixon  on  October  10.  For  texts  of  the 
Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  President's  re- 
ply, see  Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
October  10. 

Thailand 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Thai- 
land, Sunthorn  Hongladarom,  presented  his 
credentials  to  President  Nixon  on  October  10. 
For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  October  10. 


November  3,  1969 


379 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


4 


Youth-Related  Activities  of  the  United  Nations 


Statetnent  hy  Shirley  Temple  Black 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  V.N.  General  Assembly  ^ 


In  ancient  Eome  the  two-faced  god  Janus 
stood  at  the  door  of  time.  One  face  was  of  an  old 
man  looking  to  the  past,  the  other  of  a  young 
man  with  visions  of  the  future. 

In  one  sense  our  assemblage  of  nations  re- 
minds me  of  the  god  Janus.  Looking  back,  the 
old  man  sees  clearly  the  tremendous  strides 
of  mankind  in  the  past  century.  Looking  for- 
ward, as  we  do  today,  the  young  man  sees 
potentialities  of  modern  society,  but  his  vision 
is  clouded  by  frustrations  and  doubt. 

I  consider  myself  fortunate  that  I  can  speak 
for  my  first  time  as  a  delegate  to  the  United 
Nations  on  this  subject.  I  have  spent  a  great  deal 
of  time  traveling  throughout  the  United  States 
urging  that  the  age  of  majority  in  my  comitry 
be  lowered  from  21  to  18.  I  have  done  this  out 
of  the  profound  conviction  that  people  who  are 
yoimg  must  participate  in  the  planning  and 
decisionmaking  of  the  modern  world. 

Someone  has  wisely  said  it  is  better  to  be 
damned  than  to  be  ignored  or — almost  equally — 
to  be  tolerated.  These  younger  people,  now  bet- 
ter educated  and  better  informed  than  ever  be- 
fore, must  not  be  either  ignored  or  tolerated. 
They  must  be  given  both  influence  and  respon- 
sibility as  an  integral  part  of  our  society. 

All  of  us  would  agree  that  young  people  are 
the  major  human  resource  in  all  societies  in  the 
world  and  that  there  is  a  pressing  necessity  to 
have  them  completely  involved  in  the  attain- 
ment of  national  development.  Their  enthusi- 
asm, their  idealism,  and,  above  all,  their  flexibil- 
ity to  change  could  be  the  vital  elements  often 
lacking  as  our  various  societies  react  and  ad- 


'  Made  In  Committee  III  ( Social,  Humanitarian,  and 
Cultural)  on  Sept.  SO  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  111). 


380 


just  to  the  challenges  of  a  rapidly  changing 
existence. 

It  is  unrealistic  and  unproductive  to  consider 
people  who  are  yoimg  as  a  problem  and  a  sepa- 
rate entity  which  should  be  dealt  with  apart 
from  the  rest  of  society: 

— Unrealistic  because  more  than  half  of  man- 
kind is  under  25  years  of  age,  a  percentage  which 
can  only  increase  with  the  fantastic  explosion 
of  population  throughout  the  world ; 

— Unproductive  because  the  treatment  of 
youth  in  the  traditional  paternalistic  manner 
destroys  those  most  vital  qualities  which  they 
have  to  offer  to  development. 

Kather  than  youth's  "problem,"  is  it  not  really 
the  different  persi^ective  of  today's  youth  on 
mankind's  problem  which  should  draw  our  at- 
tention? As  Miss  Angle  Brooks  [President  of 
the  24th  General  Assembly]  so  eloquently 
quoted  from  Professor  George  Wald's  speech 
in  her  opening  remarks  to  the  General  Assem- 
bly :  "I  don't  think  that  there  are  problems  of 
youth,  or  student  problems.  All  the  real  prob- 
lems I  know  about  are  grownup  problems." 

Throughout  the  world  young  people  are  ask- 
ing for  a  voice  in  determining  the  type  of  edu- 
cation they  will  receive  in  their  high  schools 
and  universities.  They  realize  the  importance 
of  formal  education  in  shaping  tlie  values  and 
attitudes  of  society.  That  these  values  should  in- 
clude a  "respect  for  human  dignity  and  equal 
rights  of  man  without  discrimination  as  to  race 
colour,  language,  sex  or  faith"  has  been  fully 
recognized  by  the  General  Assembly  in  last 
year's  session. 

As  stated  in  Resolution  20  of  the  Human 
Rights  Commission  at  its  25th  session,  "Youth 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


J 


is  particularly  sensitive  to  any  infringement  of 
human  rights"  and  has  a  "legitimate  desire  to 
be  useful  to  society  and  to  have  its  full  share  in 
the  accomplishment  of  the  major  humanitarian 
demands  of  our  century."  We  support  the  orga- 
nization by  the  Secretary  General  of  human 
rights  seminars  on  the  education  of  youth  in 
himaan  rights  and  urge  that  a  major  effort  be 
made  to  include  young  people  themselves  as  full 
participants. 

Our  committee  is  discussing  today  the  role 
of  young  people  in  national  development.  While 
there  are  generally  shared  goals  for  peace 
abroad  and  social  justice  at  home  among  youth 
throughout  the  world,  I  see  a  difference  between 
the  specific  concerns  of  young  people  in  devel- 
oping countries  and  those  of  their  counterparts 
in  developed  countries. 

The  yoimger  people  of  my  own  and  other 
highly  industrialized  societies  have  many  ma- 
terial benefits  but  feel  that  they  are  deprived  of 
any  planning  role  in  shaping  their  environment. 

In  the  developing  countries,  however,  be- 
cause younger  people  have  often  led  the  struggle 
for  independence,  they  have  a  stronger  sense  of 
participation.  Yet  they  are  generally  frustrated 
in  obtaining  the  benefits  of  economic  security. 
We  are  discussing  today  youth's  role  in  that 
straggle,  the  struggle  for  growth  and  national 
development. 

Here  young  people  can  and  have  played  a 
major  role.  Over  one-third  of  the  members  of 
the  Umted  Nations  have  some  type  of  national 
youth  service  corps.  The  Secretary  General's 
preliminary  rejDOrt  on  long-term  policies  and 
programs  for  youth  in  national  development  ^ 
points  out  that  for  the  moment  these  groups 
represent  one  of  the  most  effective  methods  of 
liarnessing  for  development  the  often  frustrated 
and  undirected  energies  of  young  people. 

The  United  Nations,  through  its  specialized 
agencies,  should  continue  the  work  begun  in 
Denmark  at  the  Interregional  Seminar  on  Na- 
tional Youth  Programs  in  developing  informa- 
tion and  advisory  personnel  knowledgeable 
about  possible  activities  for  youth  service  corps. 
The  expansion  of  their  involvement  in  rural  de- 
^elopment,  their  participation  in  self-help  hous- 
ing projects,  and  their  contribution  to  literacy 
campaigns  are  only  a  few  ways  in  which  na- 
tional youth  corps  can  serve  national  develop- 
ment. 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/C.3/613. 


The  United  Nations  family  in  recent  years 
has  begun  to  take  a  serious  interest  in  the 
younger  elements  of  society.  My  Government 
welcomes  this  increased  attention  and  urges  that 
it  be  expanded.  We  see  an  active  role  in  this 
regard  for  both  the  United  Nations  itself  and 
the  specialized  agencies,  as  well  as  international 
nongovernmental  organizations. 

Of  special  interest  to  me  is  the  work  which 
the  International  Labor  Organization  has  been 
doing  with  training  and  education  directly  rel- 
evant to  the  economic  development  of  the  spe- 
cific country.  Too  many  countries  in  this  world 
have  suffered  the  burden  of  having  educational 
systems  which  were  designed  for  completely  dif- 
ferent societies  at  other  stages  of  development. 

We  support  the  attempts  by  ILO  and  other 
agencies  to  aid  in  the  formulation  of  both  in- 
school  and  out-of-school  training  programs 
relevant  to  national  development  needs.  The 
very  real  and  serious  unemployment  problems 
in  the  large  urban  areas  of  the  world,  which  are 
in  fact  largely  youth  imemployment  problems, 
can  only  be  met  with  large-scale  training  geared 
to  the  employment  needs  of  their  own  locales. 

The  efforts  of  the  World  Health  Organization 
to  organize  health  education  programs,  with 
emphasis  on  nutrition,  family  planning,  and  the 
problems  of  drag  dependence,  should  be 
encouraged. 

The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization's 
widely  successfid  Young  World  Food  and  De- 
velopment Conference  has  set  the  basis  for  its 
continued  work  in  involving  youth  in  rural  de- 
velopment. We  hope  that  youth  will  be  given 
a  major  role  in  its  proposed  1970  World  Food 
Congress. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  that  half  the  cliildren  of 
our  world  are  out  of  school,  but  it  is  true.  These 
children  without  education  are  deprived  by 
their  ignorance  of  a  role  in  modern  society. 
Efforts  to  reach  them,  aided  by  UNESCO-spon- 
sored literacy,  adult  education,  and  out-of- 
school  programs,  should  be  increased.  President 
Nixon,  in  his  General  Assembly  address,  men- 
tioned the  enormous  potential  of  space  technol- 
ogy to  benefit  man  here  on  earth.^  One  such 
benefit  might  be  the  widespread  use  of  space 
satellites  to  assist  in  mass  education  similar  to 
the  arrangement  just  finalized  between  my 
country  and  India.* 

"  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6,  1969,  p.  297. 
'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  20,  1969,  p. 
334. 


November  3,   1969 


381 


The  orientation  of  many  of  these  programs 
is  increasingly  to  involve  young  people  them- 
selves as  plamiers,  instructors,  and  organizers 
in  developuient  projects.  We  welcome  this 
orientation  and  see  it  as  the  necessary  prereq- 
uisite if  youth  is  to  have  a  feeling  of  meaning- 
ful involvement. 

I  think  the  interdependency  of  many  of  the 
United  Nations  activities  dealing  with  youth 
requires  a  much  greater  degree  of  coordination 
among  the  deliberations  of  the  General  As- 
sembly, the  Economic  and  Social  Council,  the 
Social  Development  and  Human  Rights  Com- 
missions, and  the  preparatory  conmiittees  for 
the  Second  Development  Decade  and  the  25tli 
aimiversary.  All  of  these  bodies  in  the  last  half 
year  have  had  major  discussions  on  youth  items. 

I  listened  with  interest  to  the  suggestion  made 
yesterday  by  the  distinguished  delegate  from 
the  United  Arab  Republic  tliat  an  intersessional 
gi'oup  be  created  to  study  youth's  role  in  to- 
day's society.  I  think  the  time  for  study  is  past. 
But  if  the  emphasis  of  such  a  group  were  to 
coordinate  the  legislation  of  youth  programs 
among  U.N.  bodies,  then  my  delegation  would 
be  interested  in  further  discussions  concerning 
his  idea. 

There  should  also  be  greater  coordination  of 
3'outh-related  activities  within  the  U.N.  organi- 
zations themselves.  "We  welcome  the  annual  Ad- 
visory Committee  on  Coordination  meetings  on 
youth  and  think  they  should  be  continued  and 
enlarged. 

Much  of  the  impetus  for  the  growmg  atten- 
tion within  the  U.N.  system  which  is  paid  to 
young  people  follows  from  the  Declaration  on 
the  Promotion  among  Youth  of  the  Ideals  of 
Peace,  ilutual  Respect  and  Understanding  be- 
tween Peoples,  passed  by  the  20th  General  As- 
sembly in  1965.  This  declaration  will  soon  be 
expanded  upon  by  a  UNESCO  convention  or 
recommendation  as  to  the  content  of  education 
for  human  rights  and  a  proposed  ILO  interna- 
tional instrument  on  youth  employment  and 
training.  My  delegation  agrees  with  other  dis- 
tinguished delegates  that  these  statements  are 
sufficient  and  opposes  any  efl'orts  to  cojisider  a 
further  declaration  on  youth  at  the  present  time. 

We  agree  with  many  of  the  previous  speakers 
that  there  have  been  enough  words,  enough  con- 
sideration, and  enough  analysis  of  the  role  of 
young  people  in  modern  life. 

If  the  United  Nations  and  its  activities  are  to 
be  meaningful  to  the  younger  part  of  our  so- 


ciety— in  their  concern  for  benefits  and  their 
concern  for  participation — it  is  time  for  con- 
crete proposals : 

1.  International  Voluntary  Service  Corps. 
Such  a  corps,  strongly  endorsed  by  President 
Nixon  in  his  address  to  the  General  Assembly 
2  weeks  ago,  could  collaborate  with  a  country's 
own  national  service  corps  in  development 
projects. 

2.  International  Youth  Assembly.  The  con- 
vening of  such  an  assembly  of  youth  from  all 
over  the  world  is  one  of  the  most  imaginative 
proposals  for  next  year's  25th  anniversary. 

3.  Young  delegates  at  the  25th  General  As- 
sembly. There  is  no  better  way  to  have  young 
people  participate  in  the  United  Nations  than 
to  have  them  be  a  working  part  of  its  actual 
deliberations.  A  way  can  be  found,  as  part  of 
the  25th  General  Assembly,  to  focus  their  atten- 
tion on  concerns  of  particular  interest  to  young 
people  where  they  can  make  their  greatest 
contribution. 

4.  Young  staff  members  in  the  United  Na- 
tions. UNESCO  has  already  endorsed  this  at 
their  general  conference.  We  urge  the  Secretary 
General  to  recruit  and  place  promising  young 
people  on  the  staff  of  the  U.N.  itself. 

5.  Conference  on  Youth  and  the  Second  De- 
velopment Decade.  We  urge  that  this  confer- 
ence in  1971  be  fully  coordmated  with  the  other 
activities  relating  to  youth  witliin  the  U.N.  sys- 
tem and  be  given  the  greatest  degree  of  rele- 
vance by  the  full  participation  of  young  people 
in  the  conference  ^proceedings  themselves. 

6.  U.N.  Information  Center  on  Youth  Pro- 
grams. This  projjosal,  first  made  by  our  repre- 
sentative on  the  Social  Development  Commis- 
sion, Mrs.  Jean  Picker,  would  bring  together  in 
one  place  for  the  use  of  member  states  all  such 
information  from  public  and  private,  national 
and  international  sources.  As  a  first  step  the 
Center  for  Economic  and  Social  Information's 
excellent  program  could  be  extended  to  include 
a  special  emphasis  on  youth. 

Youth's  demand  to  be  heard  and  to  participate 
in  development  will  increase  with  an  increase  in 
economic  well-being  in  all  comitries.  Their  full 
involvement  in  society  comes  with  a  recognition 
that  they  are  part  of  that  society.  These 
younger  peojjle  will  govern  the  world  in  the 
future,  but  they  live  in  it  in  the  present.  Let  us 
recognize  this  and  have  them  increasingly  be- 
come a  part  of  it. 


382 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Agenda  of  the  24th  Regular  Session 
of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly^ 

n.N.  doc.  A/7701 /Rev.  1 

1.  Opening  of  the  session  by  tlie  Chairman  of  the 
delegation  of  Guatemala. 

2.  Minute  of  silent  prayer  or  meditation. 

3.  Credentials  of  representatives  to  the  twenty-fourth 
session  of  the  General  Assembly. 

(a)  Appointment  of  the  Credentials  Committee; 

(b)  Report  of  the  Credentials  Committee. 

4.  Election  of  the  President. 

5.  Constitution  of  the  Main  Committees  and  election 
of  oflBcers. 

6.  Election  of  Vice-Presidents. 

7.  Notification  by  the  Secretary-General  under  Arti- 
cle 12,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations. 

8.  Adoption  of  the  agenda. 

9.  General  debate. 

10.  Report  of  the  Secretary-General  on  the  work  of 
the  Organization. 

11.  Report  of  the  Security  CouncU. 

12.  Reports  of  the  Economic  and  Social  Council. 

13.  Report  of  the  Tnisteeship  Council. 

14.  Report  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice. 

15.  Report  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency. 

16.  Election  of  five  non-permanent  members  of  the 
Security  Council. 

17.  Election  of  nine  members  of  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council. 

18.  Election  of  five  members  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice. 

19.  Election  of  fifteen  members  of  the  Industrial  De- 
velopment Board. 

20.  Appointment  of  the  members  of  the  Peace  Obser- 
vation Commission. 

21.  Problems  of  the  human  environment :  report  of 
the  Secretary-General. 

22.  Fourth  International  Conference  on  the  Peace- 
ful Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  :  report  of  the  Secre- 
tary-General. 

23.  Implementation  of  the  Declaration  on  the  Grant- 
ing of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and 
Peoples :  report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  the 
Situation  with  regard  to  the  Implementation  of 
the  Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  Independence 
to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples. 

24.  Special  programme  of  activities  in  connexion  with 
the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Declaration  on  the 
Granting  of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries 
and  Peoples  :  report  of  the  Preparatory  Committee 
for  the  Tenth  Anniversary  of  the  Declaration  on 
the  Granting  of  Independence  to  Colonial  Coun- 
tries and  Peoples. 

25.  Celebration  of  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the 
United  Nations :  report  of  the  Preparatory  Com- 
mittee for  the  Twenty-fifth  Anniversary  of  the 
United  Nations. 


(b) 


(c) 


26.  Installation  of  mechanical  means  of  voting :  report 
of  the  Secretary-General. 

27.  The  situation  in  the  Middle  East. 

28.  International  co-operation  in  the  peaceful  uses  of 
outer  space :  report  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space. 

29.  Question  of  general  and  complete  disarmament: 
report  of  the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament.^ 

30.  Urgent  need  for  suspension  of  nuclear  and  ther- 
monuclear tests :  report  of  the  Conference  of  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament. 

31.  Conference  of  Non-Nuclear-Weapon  States : 

(a)  Implementation  of  the  results  of  the  Confer- 
ence :  report  of  the  Secretary-General ; 
Establishment,  within  the  framework  of  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  of  an 
international  service  for  nuclear  explosions 
for  peaceful  purposes  under  appropriate 
international  control :  report  of  the  Secretary- 
General  ; 

Contributions  of  nuclear  technology  to  the 
economic  and  scientific  advancement  of  the 
developing  countries :  report  of  the  Secretary- 
General. 

32.  Question  of  the  reservation  exclusively  for  peace- 
ful purposes  of  the  sea-bed  and  the  ocean  floor,  and 
the  subsoil  thereof,  underlying  the  high  seas  be- 
yond the  limits  of  present  national  jurLsdiction, 
and  the  use  of  their  resources  in  the  interests  of 
mankind  :  reiiort  of  the  Committee  on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  the  Sea-Bed  and  the  Ocean  Floor  beyond 
the  Limits  of  National  Jurisdiction. 

33.  Effects  of  atomic  radiation :  report  of  the  United 
Nations  Scientific  Committee  on  the  Effects  of 
Atomic  Radiation. 

34.  The  policies  of  apartheid  of  the  Government  of 
South  Africa  :  report  of  the  Special  Committee  on 
the  Policies  of  Apartheid  of  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  South  Africa. 

35.  Comprehensive  review  of  the  whole  question  of 
peace-keeping  operations  in  all  their  aspects : 
report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  Peace-keeping 
Operations. 

36.  United  Nations  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for  Pal- 
estine Refugees  in  the  Near  East : 

(a)  Report  of  the  Commissioner-General; 

(b)  Report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

37.  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Devel- 
opment :  report  of  the  Trade  and  Development 
Board. 

United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organi- 
zation :    report    of    the    Industrial    Development 
Board. 
United  Nations  Capital  Development  Fund. 

40.  Second  United  Nations  Development  Decade :  re- 
port of  the  Preparatory  Committee  for  the  Second 
United  Nations  Development  Decade. 
International  Education  Year :  report  of  the  Sec- 
retary-General. 
One  day  of  war  for  peace. 


38. 


39. 


41. 


42. 


'  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  the  items  were  included 
in  the  agenda  at  the  l,7o8th  plenary  reading  on 
Sept.  20.  [Footnote  in  original.] 


'  Included  in  the  agenda  in  its  present  form  at  the 
l,7(>4th  plenai-y  meeting  on  Sept.  24.  [Footnote  in 
original.] 


November  3,    1969 


383 


43.  The  role  of  the  United  Nations  in  training  national 
technical  personnel  for  the  accelerated  industrial- 
ization of  tlie  developing  countries :  report  of  the 
Secretary-General. 

44.  United  Nations  Institute  for  Training  and  Re- 
search :  report  of  the  Executive  Director. 

45.  Operational  activities  for  development : 

(a)  Activities  of  the  United  Nations  Development 
Programme:  reports  of  the  Governing 
Council ; 

(b)  Activities  undertaken  by  the  Secretary- 
General. 

46.  Review  of  the  World  Food  Programme. 

47.  General  review  of  the  programmes  and  activities 
in  the  economic,  social,  technical  co-operation  and 
related  fields  of  the  United  Nations,  the  special- 
ized agencies,  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  the  United  Nations  Children's  Fund  and 
all  other  institutions  and  agencies  related  to  the 
United  Nations  system. 

48.  Draft  Declaration  on  Social  Progress  and  Develop- 
ment. 

49.  Report  of  the  United  Nations  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees. 

50.  Housing,  building  and  planning:  report  of  the 
Secretary-General. 

51.  Town  twinning  as  a  means  of  international  co- 
operation:  report  of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council. 

52.  Elimination  of  all  forms  of  religious  intolerance : 

(a)  Draft  Declaration  on  the  Elimination  of  All 
Forms  of  Religious  Intolerance; 

(b)  Draft  International  Convention  on  the  Elim- 
ination of  All  Forms  of  Intolerance  and  of 
Discrimination  Based  on  Religion  or  Belief. 

53.  Creation  of  the  post  of  United  Nations  High  Com- 
missioner for  Human  Rights. 

54.  Freedom  of  information  : 

(a)  Draft  Declaration  on  Freedom  of  Informa- 
tion ; 

(b)  Draft  Convention  on  Freedom  of  Information. 

55.  Elimination  of  all  forms  of  racial  discrimination : 

(a)  Implementation  of  the  United  Nations  Dec- 
laration on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of 
Racial  Discrimination ; 

(b)  Status  of  the  International  Convention  on 
the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Dis- 
crimination :  report  of  the  Secretary-General ; 

(c)  Programme  for  the  celebration  in  1971  of  the 
International  Year  for  Action  to  Combat 
Racism  and  Racial  Discrimination :  report  of 
the  Secretary-General. 

56.  Measures  to  be  taken  against  nazism  and  racial 
intolerance :   report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

57.  Question  of  the  violation  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms,  including  policies  of  ra- 
cial discrimination  and  segregation  and  of  apart- 
heid, in  all  countries,  with  particular  reference  to 
colonial  and  other  dependent  countries  and  ter- 
ritories : 

(a)  Measures  for  effectively  combatting  racial 
discrimination  and  the  policies  of  apartheid 
and  segregation  in  southern  Africa:  report 
of  the  Secretary-General ; 

(b)  Report  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Working  Group  of  Ex- 
perts on  the  treatment  of  political  prisoners  In 
South  Africa :  report  of  the  Secretary-General. 


58.  Status  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Eco- 
nomic, Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  the  Interna- 
tional Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and 
the  Optional  Protocol  to  the  International  Cov- 
enant on  Civil  and  Political  Rights :  report  of  the 
Secretary-General. 

59.  International  Year  for  Human  Rights :  report  of 
the  Secretary-General. 

60.  Implementation  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
International  Conference  on  Human  Rights:  re- 
port of  the  Secretary-General. 

61.  Respect  for  human  rights  in  armed  conflicts: 
report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

62.  Education  of  youth  in  the  respect  for  human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms :  report  of  the  Secre- 
tary-General. 

63.  Information  from  Non-Self-Governing  Territories 
transmitted  under  Article  73  e  of  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations : 

(a)  Report  of  the  Secretary-General; 

(b)  Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Situa- 
tion with  regard  to  the  Implementation  of  the 
Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  Independ- 
ence to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples ; 

64.  Question  of  Namibia  : 

(a)  Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Situa- 
tion with  regard  to  the  Implementation  of  the 
Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  Independence 
to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples  ; 

(b)  Report  of  the  United  Nations  Council  for 
Namibia ; 

(c)  Appointment  of  the  United  Nations  Commis- 
sioner for  Namibia. 

65.  Question  of  Territories  under  Portuguese  admin- 

istration : 

(a)  Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Situa- 
tion with  regard  to  the  Implementation  of 
tlae  Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  Independ- 
ence to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples ; 

(b)  Report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

66.  Question  of  Fiji :  report  of  the  Special  Committee 
on  the  Situation  with  regard  to  the  Implementa- 
tion of  the  Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  In- 
dependence to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples. 

67.  Question  of  Oman :  report  of  the  Special  Commit- 
tee on  the  Situation  with  regard  to  the  Imple- 
mentation of  the  Declaration  on  the  Granting  of 
Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples. 

68.  Activities  of  foreign  economic  and  other  interests 
which  are  impeding  the  implementation  of  the 
Declaration  on  the  Granting  of  Independence  to 
Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples  in  Southern 
Rhodesia,  Namibia  and  Territories  under  Portu- 
guese domination  and  in  all  other  Territories 
under  colonial  domination  and  efforts  to  eliminate 
colonialism,  apartheid  and  racial  discrimination 
In  southern  Africa:  report  of  the  Special  Com- 
mittee on  the  Situation  with  regard  to  the  Im- 
plementation of  the  Declaration  on  the  Granting 
of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples. 

69.  Implementation  of  the  Declaration  on  the  Grant- 
ing of  Indei)piidence  to  Colonial  Countries  and 
Peoples  by  the  specialized  agencies  and  the  inter- 
national institutions  associated  with  the  United 
Nations : 

(a)  Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  the 
Situation  with  regard  to  the  Implementation 
of  the  Declaration  on   the  Granting  of  In- 


384 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


dependence     to     Colonial     Countries     and 
Peoples  ; 
(b)   Report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

70.  United  Nations  Educational  and  Training  Pro- 
gramme for  Southern  Africa :  report  of  the  Secre- 
tary-General. 

71.  Offers  by  Member  States  of  study  and  training 
facilities  for  inhabitants  of  Non-Self-Governing 
Territories  :  report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

72.  Financial  reports  and  accounts  for  the  financial 
year  ended  31  December  1968  and  reports  of  the 
Board  of  Auditors : 

(a)  United  Nations ; 

(b)  United  Nations  Development  Programme; 

(c)  United  Nations  Children's  Fund; 

(d)  United  Nations  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for 
Palestine  Refugees  in  the  Near  East ; 

(e)  United  Nations  Institute  for  Training  and 
Research ; 

(f)  Voluntary  funds  administered  by  the  United 
Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees. 

73.  Supplementary  estimates  for  the  financial  year 
1969. 

74.  Budget  estimates  for  the  financial  year  1970. 

75.  Planning  estimate  for  the  financial  year  1971. 

76.  Pattern  of  conferences :  report  of  the  Committee 
on  Conferences. 

77.  Appointments  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  membership 
of  subsidiary  bodies  of  the  General  Assembly  : 

(a)  Advisory  Committee  on  Administrative  and 
Budgetary  Questions ; 

(b)  Committee  on  Contributions  ; 

(c)  Board  of  Auditors ; 

(d)  United  Nations  Administrative  Tribunal. 

78.  Scale  of  assessments  for  the  apportionment  of  the 
expenses  of  the  United  Nations :  report  of  the 
Committee  on  Contributions. 

79.  Audit  reports  relating  to  expenditure  by  the  spe- 
cialized agencies  and  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency : 

(a)  Allocations  from  the  Technical  Assistance 
Account  of  the  United  Nations  Development 
Programme ; 

( b )  Allocations  from  the  Sjyecial  Fund  Account  of 
the  United  Nations  Development  Programme. 

80.  Administrative  and  budgetary  co-ordination  of  the 
United  Nations  vfith  the  specialized  agencies  and 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency :  reports 
of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Administrative  and 
Budgetary  Questions. 

81.  Implementation  of  the  recommendations  of  the  AA 
Hoc  Committee  of  Experts  to  Examine  the  Fi- 
nances of  the  United  Nations  and  the  Specialized 
Agencies :  report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
Administrative  and   Budgetary   Questions. 

82.  Publications  and  documentation  of  the  United 
Nations :  report  of  the  Secretary-General. 

83.  Personnel  questions : 

(a)  Composition  of  the  Secretariat:  report  of  the 
Secretary-General ; 

(b)  Other  personnel  questions. 

84.  Report  of  the  United  Nations  Joint  Staff  Pen- 
sion Board. 

85.  United  Nations  International  School :  report  of  the 
Secreta  ry-General. 

86.  Report  of  the  International  Law  Commission  on 
the  vFork  of  its  twenty-first  session. 


88. 
89. 


90. 
91. 

92. 
93. 

94. 


95. 
96. 


97. 
98. 


99. 


100. 
101. 

102. 


103. 
104. 


Draft  Convention  on  Special  Missions. 
Report  of  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Question 
of  Defining  Aggression. 

Consideration  of  principles  of  international  law 
concerning  friendly  relations  and  co-operation 
among  States  in  accordance  with  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations:  report  of  the  Special  Com- 
mittee on  Principles  of  International  Law  con- 
cerning Friendly  Relations  and  Co-operation 
among  States. 

Report  of  the  United  Nations  Commission  on 
International  Trade  Law  on  the  work  of  its  sec- 
ond session. 

United  Nations  Programme  of  Assistance  in  the 
Teaching,  Study,  Dissemination  and  Wider  Ap- 
preciation of  International  Law :  report  of  the 
Secretary -General. 

The  problems  and  needs  of  youth  and  its  par- 
ticipation in  national  development. 
Amendment  to  Article  22  of  the  Statute  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  (Seat  of  the  Court) 
and  consequential  amendments  to  Articles  23  and 
28. 

Declaration  and  resolutions  adopted  by  the  United 
Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of  Treaties : 

(a)  Declaration  on  Universal  Participation  in  the 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties ; 

(b)  Resolution  relating  to  article  1  of  the  Vienna 
Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties ; 

(c)  Resolution  relating  to  article  66  of  the  Vienna 
Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  and  the 
annex  thereto. 

Fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  International  La- 
bour Organisation. 

Amendments  to  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  resulting  from  the  amendment  to 
rule  51. 

Development  of  tourism. 

Agreement  between  the  Republic  of  Indonesia  and 
the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  concerning  West 
New  Guinea  (West  Irian)  :  report  of  the  Secre- 
tary-General regarding  the  act  of  self-determi- 
nation in  West  Irian. 
Question  of  Korea : 

(a)  Withdrawal  of  United  States  and  all  other 
foreign  forces  occupying  South  Korea  under 
the  flag  of  the  United  Nations ; 

(b)  Dissolution  of  the  United  Nations  Commis- 
sion for  the  Unification  and  Rehabilitation  of 
Korea ; 

(c)  Report  of  the  United  Nations  Commission  for 
the  Unification  and  Rehabilitation  of  Korea. 

Question  of  the  elderly  and  the  aged. 
Restoration  of  the  lawful  rights  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  in  the  United  Nations. 
Question  of  Southern  Rhodesia  :  report  of  the  Spe- 
cial Committee  on  the  Situation  with  regard  to 
the  Implementation  of  the  Declaration  on  the 
Granting  of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries 
and  Peoples. 

The  strengthening  of  international  security.' 
Question  of  chemical  and  bacteriological  (biologi- 
cal) weapons :  ^ 

(a)  Report  of  the  Conference  of  the  Committee 
on    Disarmament ; 


'  Included  in  the  agenda  at  the  1,764th  plenary  meet- 
ing on  Sept.  24.  [Footnote  in  original.] 


November  3,   1969 


385 


(b)  Conclusion  of  a  convention  on  the  prohibi- 
tion of  the  development,  production  and  stock- 
piling of  chemical  and  bateriologieal  (biologi- 
cal) weapons  and  on  the  destruction  of  such 
weapons ; 

(c)  Report  of  the  Secretary-General. 
105.  Forcible  diversion  of  civil  aircraft  in  flight.* 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.-NetheHands  Estate  Tax 
Convention  Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Message  From  President  Nixon'^ 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I  transmit 
herewith  tlie  convention  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom  of  the 
Netherlands  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates  and  inheritances, 
signed  at  Washington  on  July  15, 1969,  and  the 
related  protocol  signed  on  the  same  date. 

I  transmit  also,  for  tlie  information  of  the 
Senate,  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
with  respect  to  the  convention  and  protocol. 

The  purposes  of  this  convention  are  the  same 
as  those  of  the  twelve  other  estate  tax  conven- 
tions now  in  force  between  the  United  States 
and  other  countries,  namely,  to  minimize  the 
burdens  of  double  taxation  at  death  and  to  pre- 
vent fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to  taxes  on  es- 
tates and  inheritances.  In  accomplishing  these 
purposes,  the  convention  departs  from  the  pat- 
tern of  our  existing  estate  tax  conventions  in 
order  (a)  to  take  into  account  problems  which 
employees  of  international  businesses  assigned 
to  foreign  countries  have  encountered  under  pre- 
vious conventions,  (b)  to  follow  the  direction 
indicated  by  the  Foreign  Investors  Tax  Act  of 

'  Included  in  the  agenda  at  the  1,785th  plenary 
meeting  on  Oct.  10  (U.N.  doc.  A/7701/Rev.  1/Add.  1). 

'Transmitted  on  Oct.  13  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  G.,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
which  includes  the  texts  of  the  convention  and  protocol 
and  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 


1966  in  assisting  our  balance  of  payments  by 
minimizing  deterrents  to  foreign  investment  in 
the  United  States,  and  (c)  to  conform  to  the 
extent  practicable  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Draft  Double  Taxation  Convention  on  Estates 
and  Inheritances  published  in  1966  by  the  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development. 

The  convention  contains  four  principal 
innovations : 

1.  Tlie  seven  year  domiciliary  rule,  whereby 
a  decedent  who  is  considered  by  each  country 
as  having  been  domiciled  therein  at  deatli  will 
generally  be  deemed  to  have  been  domiciled  only 
in  the  country  of  which  he  was  a  citizen  if  he 
had  been  resident  in  the  other  country  for  less 
than  seven  years  without  the  intent  to  remaia 
there  indefinitely. 

2.  As  a  corollary  of  the  seven  year  domicil- 
iary rule,  the  convention  provides  t-hat  if  a 
citizen  of  one  comitry  was  resident  in  the  other 
country  seven  or  more  years,  the  country  of 
citizenship  grants  a  credit  for  the  death  taxes 
of  the  otlier  country.  In  these  cases,  jurisdiction 
to  tax  real  property  and  business  assets  will 
be  retained  by  the  country  in  which  such  prop- 
erty is  situated,  with  the  other  country  provid- 
ing appropriate  credits. 

3.  Tlie  convention  exempts  tangible  and  in- 
tangible personal  property  (to  the  extent  such 
property  is  not  a  business  asset  of  a  permanent 
establishment)  from  taxation  by  either  coim- 
try  if  the  decedent  is  neither  a  domiciliary  nor 
a  citizen  of  such  country.  This  exemption  com- 
plements on  a  bilateral  basis  the  liberalized 
treatment  afforded  foreign  investors  in  the 
United  States  by  the  Foreign  Investors  Tax 
Act  of  1966,  aids  our  balance  of  payments  by 
removing  deterrents  to  investments  in  the 
United  States,  and  reduces  estate  tax  formali- 
ties for  Dutch  investors  in  the  United  States. 

4.  Under  the  convention,  the  Netherlands 
provides  treatment  analogous  to  the  relatively 
liberal  United  States  exemptions  which  the  Fed- 
eral estate  tax  law  grants  to  estates  of  for- 
eigners, by  granting  Americans  who  are  not 
residents  of  the  Netherlands  (and  who  are 
taxable  only  on  real  estates  and  business  as- 
sets situated  in  the  Netherlands)  an  exemption 
for  small  estates  and  an  exemption  which  cor- 
responds to  our  marital  deduction. 

Tlie  related  protocol,  containing  ten  num- 
bered paragraphs,  sets  forth  understandings 


386 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


concerning  certain  matters  of  interpretation  and 
application  of  the  convention. 

The  convention  and  protocol  have  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Department  of  State  and  the 
Department  of  the  Treasury.  The  Treasury 
will  provide  a  detailed  technical  explanation 
of  the  convention  at  the  time  of  the  hearings 
before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early  and 
favorable  consideration  to  the  convention  and 
protocol  with  the  Netherlands. 


Richard  Nixon 


The  White  House, 
October  13,  1969. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

Measures  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the  principles 
and  purposes  of  the  Antarctic  treaty  of  December  1, 
1959  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Paris  November  29, 
1968.^ 

Notiflcalion  of  approval:  Norway,  October  14,  1969, 
recommendations  V-1,  V-3  through  V-9.' 

Aviation 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts  com- 
mitted on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  Septem- 
ber 14,  1963.  Enters  into  force  December  4,  1969. 
Ratification  deposited:  Israel,  September  19,  1969. 

Coffee 

International   coffee   agreement,   1968,   with   annexes. 
Open  for  signature  at  United  Nations  Headquarters, 
New    York,    March    IS    through    March    31,    1968. 
Entered  into  force  December  30,  1968.  TIAS  6584. 
Accession  deposited:  Austria,  October  1, 1969. 

Customs 

Convention  concerning  the  international  union  for  the 
publication    of   customs    tariffs.    Done    at   Brussels 
July  5,  1890.  Entered  into  force  April  1,  1S91.  26  Stat. 
1518. 
Adherence  deposited:  Ireland,  September  26,  1969. 

Protocol  modifying  the  convention  signed  at  Brussels 
July  5,  1S90,  relating  to  the  creation  of  an  interna- 
tional union  for  the  publication  of  customs  tariffs  (26 
Stat.  1518).  Done  at  Brussels  December  16,  1949. 
Entered  into  force  May  5,  1950 ;  for  the  United  States 
September  15, 1957.  TIAS  3922. 
Adherence  deposited:  Ireland,   September  26,  1969. 

Fisheries 

Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the  north- 
west Atlantic  fisheries  relating  to  panel  membership 
and  to  regulatory  measures.  Done  at  Washington 
October  1,  1969.' 


Signatures:  Denmark,  October  15,  1969;  France, 
October  13,  1969 ;  Italy,  October  14,  1969 ;  Norway, 
October  14,  1969 ;  Poland,  October  14,  1969 ;  Spain, 
October  15,  1969. 

Postal  Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of 
execution.  Done  at  Vienna  July  10, 1964.  Entered  into 
force  January  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Ratification  deposited:  Venezuela,  September  12, 
1969. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  regulations  for  preventing  collisions  at 

sea.   Approved   by   the  international   conference  on 

safety  of  life  at  sea,  London,  May  17  to  June  17, 1960. 

Entered  into  force  September  1,  1965.  TIAS  5813. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Lebanon,  September  22,  1969. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 

safety    of    life    at    sea,    1960.    Adopted    at    London 

November  26,  1968.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Malagasy  Republic,  Septem- 
ber 29,  1969;  Philippines,  September  9,  1969. 

Space 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3, 1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Moscow:  Syrian  Arab  Re- 
public (with  a  reservation),  August  14,  1969. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Montreux  November  12, 1965.  Entered 
into  force  January  1,  1967;  for  the  United  States 
May  29, 1967.  TIAS  6267. 
Ratification  deposited:  Mauritania,  August  13,  1969. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva,  1959, 
as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6.3.32),  relating  to 
maritime  mobile  service,  with  annexes  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  November  3,  1967.  En- 
tered into  force  April  1,  1969.  TIAS  6590. 
Notifications  of  approval:  Australia,  Pakistan,  Sep- 
tember 4,  1969;  South  Africa,  August  19,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  loan  of  the  U.S.S.  Guest  and 
the  U.S.S.  Bennett  pursuant  to  the  agreement  of  Sep- 
tember 18  and  October  19,  1959,  as  amended  (TIAS 
4437,  5757),  relating  to  the  loan  of  vessels.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  September  11 
and  October  8,  1969.  Entered  into  force  Octolier  8, 
1969. 

France 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  5,  1966 
(TI.\S  6022),  relating  to  the  reciprocal  granting  of 
authorizations  to  permit  licensed  amateur  radio  oper- 
ators of  either  country  to  operate  their  stations  in 


'  Not  in  force. 

°  See  Bulletin  of  September  1,  1969,  p.  198. 


November  3,   1969 


387 


the  other  country.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Paris  October  3,  1969.  Entered  into  force  October  3, 
1969. 

Hungary 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  in  New  York 
of  a  branch  office  of  the  commercial  section  of  the 
Hungarian  Embassy.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  September  19, 1969.  Entered  into  force 
September  19,  1969. 

United  Kingdom 

Amendment  to  the  agreement  of  July  3,  1958,  as 
amended  (TIAS  4078,  4267),  for  cooperation  on  the 
uses  of  atomic  energy  for  mutual  defense  purposes. 
Signed  at  Washington  October  16,  1969.  Enters  into 
force  on  the  date  on  which  each  Government  shall 
have  received  from  the  other  written  notification 
that  it  has  complied  with  all  statutory  and  constitu- 
tional requirements  for  entry  into  force. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Second  Volume  in  Foreign  Relations 
Series  for  1946  Released 

On  September  18  the  Department  of  State  released 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  19^6,  Volume 
VI,  Eastern  Europe;  The  Soviet  Union  (ix,  993  pp.), 
the  second  volume  released  of  11  planned  for  1946.  The 
volumes  are  prepared  by  the  Historical  Office,  Bureau 
of  Public  Affairs. 

Of  particular  interest  in  the  new  volume  is  the  docu- 
mentation on  efforts  to  obtain  fulfillment  by  the  Soviet 
Union  of  the  Yalta  and  Potsdam  agreements  on 
Poland.  Other  documents  reflect  the  attempt  of  the 
United  States  to  establish  or  maintain  democratic  and 
representative  government  in  Bulgaria,  Hungary, 
Romania,  and  Yugoslavia.  There  is  also  material  on 
American  financial  and  economic  assistance  to 
Czechoslovakia  and  Finland. 

Copies  of  volume  VI  (Department  of  State  publica- 
tion 8470)  may  be  obtained  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402,  for  $5.50  each. 


Recent  Releases 

For  sale  hy  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Oovemment  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20Ifi2. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ment.t.  A  23-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100 
or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

NATO:  20  Years  of  Cooperation  for  Peace.  Texts  of 
opening  remarks,  principal  address  by  President  Nixon, 
and  final  communique  issued  at  the  annual  spring 
ministerial  meeting  of  the  North  Atlantic  Council,  held 
at  Washington,  D.C,  April  10-11.  Reprinted  from  the 
Department  of  State  Bulletin  of  April  28,  1969.  Pub. 
8465.  International  Organization  and  Conference  Series 
86.  8  pp.  15(t. 

8th  Annual  Report  to  Congress.  A  report  by  the  United 
States  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency  of  its 
activities  for  the  period  January  1,  1968  to  Decem- 
ber 31, 1968.  ACDA  Pub.  51.  73  pp.  40^ 

Protocol  on  the  Authentic  Trilingual  Text  of  the  Con- 
vention on  International  Civil  Aviation  (Chicago,  1944). 

Procfes-verbal  of  rectification  to  the  French  text  of  the 
convention  annexed  to  the  protocol  of  September  24, 
1968.  TIAS  6681.  2  pp.  10^. 

Meteorological  Research  by  Means  of  Rockets.  Agree- 
ment with  Canada  modifying  the  agreement  of  Septem- 
ber 29  and  October  6, 1966.  TIAS  6G82.  3  pp.  lO^". 

Uses  of  the  Waters  of  the  Niagara  River — Construc- 
tion of  Temporary  Cofferdam — ^Temporary  Diversions 
of  Water  for  Power  Production  Purposes.  Agreement 
with  Canada.  TIAS  6683.  8  pp.    100. 

Education — Financing  of  Exchange  Programs.  Agree- 
ment with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  amending 
the  agreement  of  November  20,  1962.  TIAS  6684.  4  pp. 
100. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Domin- 
ican Republic.  TIAS  6685.  23  pp.  200. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  India. 
TIAS  6G86.  4  pp.  100. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Demo- 
cratic Republic  of  the  Congo.  TIAS  66S7.  6  pp.  100. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Iceland. 
TIAS  6688.  3  pp.  100. 

Military  Mission.  Agreement  with  Liberia  extending 
the  agreement  of  January  11,  1951,  as  amended  and 
extended.  TIAS  6689.  2  pp.  100. 

Alien  Amateur  Radio  Operators.  Agreement  with 
Sweden.  TIAS  6690.  3  pp.  100. 


388 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX      Novemher  3,  1909      Vol.  LXI,  No.  1584 

Barbados.  Letters  of  Credence  (ilcComie)     .    .      379 

Bolivia.  U.S.  To  Continue  Friendly  Relations 
With  New  Government  of  Bolivia  (Dep.irt- 
ment  statement) 37S 

Congo      (Kinshasa).      Letters      of      Credence 

(BomboUo) 379 

Congress.  U.S.-Netherlands  Estate  Tax  Con- 
vention Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message 
from   President   Nixon) 386 

Czechoslovakia.  Letters  of  Credence  (Hohal- 
Ilkiv) 379 

Disarmament 

Agreement  on  Draft  Seabed  Treaty  Hailed  by 
Secretary  Rogers  (statement) 366 

U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Agree  on  Draft  Treaty  Ban- 
ning Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the 
Seabed   (Leonard) 365 

Economic  Affairs.  U.S.-Netherlands  Estate  Tax 
Convention  Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (mes- 
sage from   President  Nixon) 3S6 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  President 
Nixon  Greets  Leaders  of  People  to  People 
Program  (remarks) 372 

Iceland.  Letters  of  Credence  (Magnusson)     .     .       379 

International  Organizations  and   Conferences. 

U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Agree  on  Draft  Treaty  Ban- 
ning Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the 

Seabed   (Leonard) 36-5 

Iran.  letters  of  Credence  (Afshar) 379 

Italy.  U.S.  and  Italy  Begin  Negotiations  for  New 
Extradition  Treaty  (joint  statement)     .     .     .       37S 

Japan.   United    States   and   Japan    Consult    on 

.Japanese  Trade  Liberalization 379 

Mali.  Letters  of  Credence  (Traore) 379 

Marine  Science 

Agreement  on  Draft  Seabed  Treaty  Hailed  by 
Secretary  Rogers  (statement) 360 

U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Agree  on  Draft  Treaty  Ban- 
ning Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the 
Seabed  (Leonard) 365 

Netherlands 

Letters  of  Credence  (Van  Lyndeu) 379 

U.S.-Netherlands  Estate  Tax  Convention  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Senate  ( message  from  President 
Nixon) 386 

Presidential  Documents 

i'resident  Discusses  Responsibility  for  Decisions 
on  Viet-Nam  Policy 371 

I'resident  Nixon  Greets  Leaders  of  People  to 
People  Program 372 

L'.S.-Netherlands  Estate  Tax  Convention  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Senate 386 

Publications 

Recent  Releases 3SS 

Second  Volume  in  Foreign  Relations  Series  for 
1946  Released 3SS 

Science.  U.S.  Informs  U.N.  of  Symposium  on 
Remote  Sensing  of  Environment  (Yost)     .     .      377 

Thailand.  Letters  of  Credence  (Hongladarom)  379 

Trade.  United  States  and  Japan  Consult  on 
Japanese  Trade  Liberalization 379 


Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 387 

U.S.  and  Italy  Begin  Negotiations  for  New  Ex- 
tradition Treaty  (joint  statement)     ....      378 
U.S.-Netherlands  Estate  Tax  Convention  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Senate  (message  from  President 
Nixon)       386 

United  Nations 

Agenda  of  the  24th  Regular  Session  of  the  U.N. 

General   Assembly 383 

U.S.   Informs   U.N.   of   Symposium  on  Remote 

Sensing  of  Environment  (Yost) 377 

What  the  United  Nations  Means  to  America — 

Now    (De   PaUna) 374 

Youth-Related  Activities  of  the  United  Nations 

(Black) 380 

Viet-Nam 

President  Discusses  Responsibility  for  Decisions 

on  Viet-Nam  Policy  (exchange  of  letters  with 

Randy  J.  Dicks) 371 

President  Nixon  Greets  Leaders  of  People  to 

People  Program  (remarks) 372 

3Sth  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 369 

Name  Index 

Afshar,    Amir   Asian 379 

Black,  Shirley  Temple 380 

Bomboko,  Justin-Marie 379 

De  Palma,  Samuel 374 

Dicks,  Randy  J 371 

Hongladarom,  Sunthorn 379 

Leonard,  James  F 365 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 369 

Magnusson,  Magnus  V 379 

McComie,  Valerie  T 379 

Nixon,  President 371, 372, 386 

Rogers,  Secretary 366 

Rohal-Ilkiv,  Ivan 379 

Traore,  Seydou 379 

\'an  Lynden,  Baron  Rijnhard  B 379 

Yost,  Charles  W 377 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  13-19 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Otfice 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  13  which  ap- 
pear in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  291 
of  October  3,  298  of  October  7,  302  of  October  10, 
and  304  of  October  11. 


No. 


Subject 

Farland  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Pakistan  (biographic  data). 
Humes  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Austria  (biographic  data). 
Lodge:    38th    plenary    session    on 

Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 
Lodge :  supplementary  remarks. 
U.S.-India   talks  at   Washington : 

joint  statement. 


*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin'. 


*303 

10/13 

*305 

10/15 

306 

10/16 

307 

tsos 

10/16 
10/17 

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AVT    Q 

20YEARS  OF  PEACE 


/O'S^s 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


::ument8 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 


ncnn.'riTAPv 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1585 


November  10,  1969 


SECRETARY  ROGERS  DISCUSSES  FORTHCOMING  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  TALKS 
ON  CURBING  STRATEGIC  ARMS 

Transcript  of  Netvs  Conference     389 

THE  DEEP  CONCERN  FOR  PEACE  IN  VIETNAM 

Remarks  hy  Secretary  Rogers     39 Jj. 

PRESIDENT  NIXON  AND  THE  SHAH  OF  IRAN 
HOLD  TALKS  AT  WASHINGTON     396 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1585 
November  10,  1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintondcnt  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

PHICE: 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publication 

approved   by  the   Director  of  the  Bureau  of 

the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

iVote:     Contents  of  this  publication  nro  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

ST.\TE   Bi;i,I,ETlN  as  the  source  will  be 

apjireciuted.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the  Headers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  iveekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  deivloptnents  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  ivork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  ivell  as  special 
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Secretary  Rogers  Discusses  Forthcoming  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Talics 
on  Curbing  Strategic  Arms 


FoUowing  is  the  transcript  of  a  news  confer- 
ence held  ty  Secretary  Rogers  on  October  25. 

Press  release  318  dated  October  25 

Secretary  Rogers:  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I 
thought  that  it  might  be  helpful  to  get  together 
with  you  in  view  of  the  announcement  that 
was  made  in  the  White  House  at  11  o'clock,^ 
because  I  thought  you  might  have  some  ques- 
tions on  this  subject.  I  will  do  my  best  to  give 
you  the  information  that  you  would  like  to 
have. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  amplify  a  little 
Mt  on  what  will  he  treated  at  the  preliminary 
discussions? 

And  secondly,  will  you  tell  us  if  there''s  a 
possibility  that  President  Nixon  and  the  Soviet 
Premier,  Mr.  Kosygin,  might  formally  open 
the  second  phase  of  serious  negotiations  on  the 
substantive  issues? 

A.  On  the  second  part  of  the  question,  I  think 
the  answer  is  no,  there  is  no  present  intention 
of  any  procedure  of  that  kind,  and  I  don't  be- 
lieve that  it  will  happen. 

As  far  as  the  preliminary  talks  themselves 
are  concerned,  we  expect  that  they  will  be  ex- 
ploratory in  nature.  The  purpose  of  the  prelimi- 
nary talks  is  to  have  a  free  discussion  about  how 
the  negotiations  can  be  conducted. 

Now,  we  are  approaching  these  talks  very 
seriously.  Certainly  it's  as  serious  a  matter  as 
we  have  in  our  nation  today,  and  I  think  that 
the  Soviet  Union's  attitude  is  the  same.  Cer- 
tainly they  say  that  they  are  very  serious  about 
these  talks. 

So  we  want  to  discuss  how  we  can  best  ap- 
proach the  talks  in  a  serious,  businesslike  way 
that  wiU  be  productive. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary. 

A.  Yes. 


'  See  p.  390. 


Q.  These  talks  have  been  put  off  time  and  time 
again.  What  do  you  think  is  different  now  about 
this  time?  Why  did  the  Russians  agree  now? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know — and  I'm  not  sure  that 
it  would  help  any  to  speculate  on  the  reason  for 
the  delay  since  June.  They  probably  wonder  why 
we  delayed  from  the  time  our  administration 
came  into  office  until  June — and  we  did  it 
because  we  wanted  to  review  the  situation 
carefully. 

I  think  that  they  probably  have  problems  of 
one  kind  or  another  and  they  have  now  decided 
to  have  the  talks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  on  the  question  of  MIRY 
{multiple  independently  targeted  reentry  ve- 
hicle], is  it  the  intention  of  this  Government  to 
propose  a  freeze,  a  moratorium,  or  some  other 
device  to  halt  MIRY  testing  at  the  beginning  of 
this  conference  so  that  substantive  issues  can  be 
dealt  with  through  a  moratorium  or  a  freeze? 

A.  WeU,  as  President  Nixon  said  in  June,^ 
we  are  obviously  considering  the  whole  question 
of  MIKV  tests  and  possible  moratorium  on  the 
tests ;  and  that  will  be  one  of  the  subjects  that 
will  be  considered  when  we  start  these  talks. 

I  think  that  it's  a  complex  situation.  Now  that 
the  talks  are  scheduled  to  start  on  the  I7th,  why, 
we  will  consider  how  we  approach  that  subject. 

We  certainly  don't  intend  to  have  any  public 
discussion  as  we  go  along  on  each  one  of  these 
issues.  It's  too  serious  a  business.  We're  going 
to  try  as  much  as  possible  to  conduct  these 
negotiations  in  private. 

Now,  obviously,  we'll  keep  our  NATO  allies 
informed  of  the  progress,  and  we'll  keep  Con- 
gress informed.  But  as  much  as  possible,  we 
want  to  do  this  in  private ;  and  the  Soviet  Union 
indicates  that  that's  their  intention,  too. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  don't  understand  what 


November  10,   1969 


'  For  excerpts  from  President  Nixon's  news  confer- 
ence of  June  19,  see  Buixktin  of  July  7, 1969,  p.  1. 


389 


U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Announce 
Preliminary  Arms  Talks 

Wblte  House  press  release  dated  October  25 

Official  Announcement  of  the  Opening 
OF  Stbategic  Abms  Limitation  Talks  ' 

CJonflrming  the  agreement  reached  earlier  to 
enter  into  negotiation  on  curbing  the  strategic 
armaments  race,  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  USSR  have  agreed  that  specially 
designated  representatives  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  wlU  meet  In  Helsinki  on 
November  17,  1969  for  preliminary  discussion  of 
the  questions  Involved. 


'  Issued  at  Washington  and  Moscow  on  Oct.  25. 


ycm  mean  hy  saying  you  don't  intend  to  have  a 
public  discussion  because  the  issues  are  too 
serious. 

A.  Well,  I  mean,  at  each  step  of  the  negotia- 
tion, obviously,  we  will  have  a  discussion. 
Eventually  the  public  will  know.  But  while  we 
are  talking  we  think  it's  better  to  do  it  in  a 
private  session,  and  we  would  hope  that  with 
some  exceptions  they  vnll  be  private  sessions. 

Do  I  make  myself  clear  ? 

Q.  Tes.  But  could  I  ask  one  more  followup 
question? 

A.  But  let  me  say  on  that  point,  Mr.  High- 
tower  [John  Hightower,  Associated  Press],  that 
as  I  said,  we  will  keep  Congress  advised,  and  we 
will  keep  the  appropriate  committees  fully 
advised  of  the  general  approach  that  our  Gov- 
ernment is  taking.  And  we'll  keep  our  allies 
advised. 

But  we  don't  want  to  have  each  one  of  these 
negotiating  sessions  a  public  session,  because 
it's  a  very  complex  subject,  and  we  think  it's 
so  serious  that  it  should  be  conducted  in  a  busi- 
nesslike atmosphere.  And  when  it's  appropriate 
to  advise  the  public,  we  will. 

Q.  So  you  expect  some  public  information  to 
come  out  from,  time  to  time.  But  the  negotia- 
tions., as  such,  are  to  be  private. 

A.  That's  correct. 

Q.  Yes.  At  what  level  do  you  plan  to  open 
the  talks? 

A.  Well,  we  have  our  delegation,  that  we  have 


already  announced,  that  is  prepared  to  go  to 
Helsinki  on  the  17th.  The  chairman  of  that  is 
Ambassador  Gerard  Smith,  the  Alternate 
Chairman  is  Philip  Farley,  there's  Paul  Nitze 
and  General  Allison  [Maj.  Gen.  Koyal  B.  Al- 
lison, USAF],  Llewellyn  Tliompson,  and  Dr. 
Harold  Brown. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  Fm  not  quite  clear  on 
wliether  there's  going  to  be  one  meeting  in  Hel- 
sinki or  a  series  of  meetings  in  Helsinki  that 
are  ended  by  the  ending  of  the  preliminary 
talks — and  then  the  beginning  of  the  actual 
talks  somewhere  else?  Or  is  it  all  going  to  run 
together? 

A.  Well,  we  can't  predict  it  for  certain.  But 
I  think  it  will  run  sometliing  like  this : 

We  would  expect  that  preliminary  discussions 
in  Helsinki  will  run  for  several  days,  maybe  a 
few  weeks,  and  at  that  time  a  decision  will  be 
made  about  a  permanent  site.  And  also,  deci- 
sions will  be  made  about  how  best  to  conduct  the 
permanent  negotiations — how  many  should 
attend,  how  many  should  be  private,  and  wheth- 
er there  should  be  an  agenda  or  not  have  an 
agenda — those  things. 

In  other  words,  the  purpose  of  the  prelimi- 
nary talks  is  to  work  it  out  so  that  we  are  not 
arguing  about  details  and  we  get  right  down 
to  the  business  of  serious  negotiations  when  we 
get  to  the  permanent  talks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  there  any  thought  on 
our  part  of  proposing  soine  sort  of  limitation 
on  antiballistic  inissiles?  Or  does  it  appear  thai 
tlie  decision  of  both  governments  to  proceed   i 
xoith  limited  deployment  precludes  this?  'j] 

A.  Mr.  Scali  [John  Scali,  ABC  News],  we 
are  not  going  to  discuss  in  advance,  and  hope- 
fully not  while  the  negotiations  are  being  con- 
ducted, specific  proposals  that  we  are  going  to 
make. 

I  think  I  should  say  that  the  negotiations  will 
include  both  offensive  and  defensive  strategic 
weapons.  And  as  you  know,  under  the  non- 
proliferation  treaty,  we  have  an  obligation  to 
do  that,  and  we  are  going  to  fulfiU  that 
obligation. 

Chalmers  [Chalmers  M.  Roberts,  Washington 
Post]. 

Q.  Could  I  clarify  something — some  of  the 
answers  you  have  given?  You  are  going  to  Hel- 
sinki to  have  a  preliminary  meeting  of  a  few 
days  to  a  few  weeks.  Now,  that  is  essentially  to 


390 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


work  out  tlie  techniques  of  how  you  have  a 
j  longer  range,  more  permanent  meeting.  Does 
that  m£an  that  in  the  'preliminary  meeting  there 
will  he  no  possihiUty  of  discussing  a  substantive 
question  such  as  the  freeze  of  MIRV  while  we''re 
having  the  pennanent  meeting? 

\     A.  No. 

I  Q.  That  could  happen  at  the  prelitninary 
meeting? 

j  A.  Yes,  yes.  We  are  not  going  to  exclude  any 
'  subject  from  discussion  at  the  preliminary  meet- 
ings, and  I  don't  want  to  be  in  any  rigid  posi- 
tion about  how  long  these  preliminary  talks  are 
going  to  last  or  how  we're  going  to  discuss  it. 
Our  attitude  is  quite  flexible. 

And  I  think  the  Soviet  Union's  attitude  is  the 
same. 

I  We're  serious  about  this,  and  we  want  to  con- 
j  duct  the  negotiations  in  a  businesslike  manner, 
and  we  hope  that  we  can  avoid  long  arguments 
about  the  agenda  and  which  item  will  come  first 
and  whether  there's  a  limitation  on  what  we 
can  talk  about,  and  so  forth. 

If  we  can  have  a  more  reasonable,  flexible 
approach  to  negotiations,  and  if  we  can  talk 
back  and  forth,  and  do  it  with  a  serious  inten- 
tion in  mind — then  it's  possible  that  these  talks 
can  be  productive. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary.,  can  you  give  us  an  idea  at 
least  what  you  anticipate  what  the  general 
course  of  things  is  apt  to  be — whether  you  want 
to — whether  you  prefer  to  start  with  existing 
iveapons  systems  and  then  proceed  to — 

'  A.  No.  I  don't  want  to  get  involved  in  how 
we're  going  to  do  it — which  we're  going  to  take 
up  first,  and  so  forth. 

Selection   of  Site  for  the  Talks 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  don't  think  that  Helsinki 
was  our  original  preference.,  as  far  as  the  site 
is  concerned.  Do  you  have  another  preference 
for  the  permanent  site  of  the  talks? 

A.  Well,  I'm  glad  you  raised  that  question, 
because  there  has  been  some  misunderstanding 
about  it.  And  let  me  tell  you  exactly  how  it 
,  developed: 

i      In  my  discussions  with  Ambassador  Dobry- 

'  nin  [Anatoliy  F.  Dobrynin,  Soviet  Ambassador 

to  the  United  States]  in  June,  I  think  it  was 

June  11, 1  said  that  we  were  ready  to  have  talks, 

and  that  we  would  be  prepared  to  have  talks 


witliin  a  month.  And  I  listed  these  places  as  pos- 
sible sites  for  the  talks:  Geneva,  Vienna,  and 
Helsinki. 

Now,  we  did  suggest  Helsinki ;  and  when  Am- 
bassador Dobrynin  responded  the  other  day,  he 
selected  Helsinki,  and  that  was  one  of  the  places 
that  we  had  suggested. 

We  have  left  open  the  question  of  the  final 
site,  and  he  was  willing  to  do  that,  because  there 
are  some  problems  of  communication  and  avail- 
ability of  space  and  other  things.  It's  possible 
that  some  other  site  would  be  better. 

We  look  with  favor  on  Vienna,  for  example, 
but  we  are  not  exclucUng  the  possibility  of 
Helsinki  as  the  final  site. 

But  the  reason  I  mentioned  it  that  fully  is  we 
didn't  have  any  argument  about  the  site.  Hel- 
sinki was  a  site  that  we  proposed.  Later  on,  we 
indicated  we  thought  maybe  Vienna  would  be 
better  for  the  reasons  I  mentioned,  but  we  had 
no  dispute  about  the  site. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  give  us  a  more 
clear  definition  of  the  term  '"''strategic  arms''''? 
Does  this  include,  for  example,  land-based  inter- 
mediate ballistic  missiles? 

A.  No,  I  think  I'll  leave  that  to  the  negotia- 
tors. That's  a  subject  that  they  will  have  to  dis- 
cuss when  they  get  there. 

Q.  How  does  China^s  growing  strategic  power 
fit  in,  long  range,  with  these  negotiations  with 
the  Soviet  Union?  And  the  threat,  presumably, 
to  both  countries? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  think,  at  the  moment,  they 
are  relevant.  They  haven't  pi-ogressed  far 
enough,  and  I  tliink  if  we  can  work  out  some- 
thing that  is  constructive  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  two  superpowers  that  we  can  deal  with 
China's  problem  later  on. 

Keep  in  mind  that  the  word  that  was  used  was 
"curbing"  in  tliis  release — "limitation"  or  "curb- 
ing"— and  even  if  we  are  successful  at  working 
out  an  agreement,  both  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  United  States  are  going  to  be  way  ahead 
of  China  for  many  years  to  come. 

Q.  Mr,  Secretary,  could  you,  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public,  estimate  how  long  you  think 
these  talks  might  take  place? 

A.  No,  I  wouldn't  want  to  do  that.  I  try 
to  resist  doing  that.  I  noticed  the  other  day  in 
"Sleet  the  Press"  I  made  a  mistake  and  did 
indicate  that  I  thought  that  the  answer  that 


November  10,   1969 


391 


the  Soviets  would  give  us  would  be  within  2  or 
3  months. 

So  far,  I've  been  batting  pretty  well,  and 
I'm  not  going  to  make  any  further  predic- 
tions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  who  do  you  expect  will 
lead  the  Soviet  delegation?  And  have  you  any 
indication,  either  from  reading  the  Soviet 
press,  or  in  any  other  way,  tvhat  their  attitude 
is  toward  things  like  a  MIRY  moratorium,  or 
an  ABM— 

A.  We  do  not  know  who  is  going  to  head 
their  delegation.  At  one  time  it  was  thought 
that  Mr.  Kuznetsov  [Vasily  V.  Kuznetsov, 
First  Deputy  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
the  U.S.S.R.]  would  be  the  Chairman,  but  I 
think  that  he's  in  Cliina  now,  in  negotiations 
there,  so  we're  not  sure.  And  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  did  not  tell  me. 

He  did  say  that  he  thought  their  delegation 
probably  would  be  about  the  same  size  as  ours, 
five  or  six. 

Q.  What  mechanism  \oiU  he  used  for  consult- 
ing the  NATO  allies?  Will  they  be  contacted 
individually  or  collectively? 

A.  Well,  I  think  it  depends,  of  course,  upon 
what  the  consultation  consists  of. 

I  would  think,  generally  speaking,  we'll  do 
it  through  the  NATO  organization  in  Brus- 
sels, but  not  necessarily.  I  don't  want  to  be 
confined  to  that  as  a  possibility. 

In  our  discussions  here,  notification  of  our 
NATO  allies  that  the  talks  were  going  to  start, 
we  notified  the  ambassadors  in  Washington. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  is  bound  to  be  spec- 
ulation that  the  beginning  of  these  talks  may 
have  a  larger  meaning.  Do  you  think  that  this 
might  be  the  beginning  of  an  era  of  negotia- 
tions? 

A.  Well,  let  me  see  if  I  can  answer  your 
question:  I  think  this  is  an  important  step 
that  is  consistent  with  the  President's  policy 
of  an  era  of  negotiation,  and  it  could  be  a  very 
important  negotiation.  It's  possible  it's  one  of 
the  most  important  negotiations  our  country 
has  been  involved  in.  And  certainly  it  could 
be  one  of  the  most  important  that  we  ever 
undertook  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  should  not  confuse  the 


necessarily — there  is  quite  a  difference.  These 
talks  could  be  abortive,  they  could  be  fruitless, 
or  they  could  be  highly  successful  in  terms  of 
mankind.  And  those  things  will  be  determined 
by  the  talks  themselves. 

So  whereas  we  are  pleased  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  agreed  to  have  these  talks — we  think 
it  is  a  good  step — we  also  have  to  be  quite  con- 
scious of  the  fact  that  the  mere  start  of  the  talks 
themselves  is  not  what  counts.  Wliat  counts  is 
how  successful  they  are. 

Complex,  DifTicult  Negotiations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  if  these  talks  are  successfid, 
could  they  lead  to  a  form  of  nuclear  pa7'ity  be- 
tioeen  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  Well,  words  like  "parity"  I  think  are  apt 
to  be  confusing. 

"V^Hiat  we  hope  that  we  can  do  is  negotiate  an 
arms  limitation  agreement  which  will  keep  us 
in  the  same  relative  position  that  we  are  now — 
and  which  can  be  verified. 

Now,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  first  part  of 
that  formula,  we  have  to  be  sure  that  the  limi- 
tation agreement  is  mutually  advantageous, 
that  neither  side  gets  an  advantage  because  of 
the  agreement. 

Secondly,  we  have  to  be  sure  that  the  agree- 
ment can  be  verified,  because  if  it  can't  and  one 
side  can  cheat,  then  it  certainly  is  not  a  A-iable 
agreement. 

Now,  these  things  are  very  difficult  matters  to 
handle,  and  I  don't  tliink  anybody  should  be 
confused  about  the  fact  that  they  are  difficult. 
They  are  complex,  there's  mutual  suspicion,  the 
subject  matter  itself  is  very  involved,  and  so  we 
have  to  proceed  with  the  hope  that  we  can 
achieve  some  success — but  with  the  full  realiza- 
tion that  it's  not  going  to  be  easy. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ifs  almost  exactly  a  year 
ago  today,  I  believe,  that  Nixon,  then  a  candi- 
date, gave  a  speech  in  which  he  said  he  would 
approach  such  negotiations  only  on  the  grounds 
that  the  United  States  woidd  be  negotiating 
from  a  position  of  superiority.  Note,  at  this 
point  does  the  administration  feel  that  ifs  going 
into  these  talks  in  a  position  of  superiority  or 
rough  equality — or  however  you  want  to  char- 
acterize it — with  the  Soviet  Union? 


beginning  of  the  talks  with  success  of  the  talks  A.  Well,  I  don't,  as  you  know,  I  think  he's 


392 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


used  the  term  "sufficiency"  and  I  think  that  we 
feel  now  that  this  is  an  appropriate  time  to 
enter  these  discussions  and  enter  them  seriously, 
with  the  hope  that  we  can  arrive  at  an  agree- 
ment that  will  be  mutually  advantageous.  And 
I  don't  want  to  characterize  what  we  think.  We 
think  this  is  the  right  time  to  do  it,  and  I  think 
the  Soviet  Union  does,  too. 

Q.  Will  you  take  a  question  on  Leianon? 

A.  I'll  take  it —  [Laughter.]  No,  I'm  sorry, 
I  don't  want  to  get  involved  in  anything  else 
this  morning. 

Q.  By  '■'■agreement"  as  the  objective,  are  you 
speaking  of  the  treaty  that  would  he  submitted 
to  the  Senate  for  ratification? 

A.  "Well,  I  think  that  if  we  have  an  agree- 
ment, a  very  comprehensive  agreement,  we  are 
thinking  in  terms  of  the  treaty,  yes.  And  I  think 
that  that  is  the  most  likely  outcome,  assuming 
we  reach  an  agreement. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  wouldn't  want  to  be 
frozen  in  that  position,  because  it's  possible  that 
we  would  want  to  have  some  kind  of  an  agree- 
ment of  a  limited  nature,  that  would  not  re- 
quire a  treaty. 

But  in  any  event,  I  want  to  make  it  clear  that 
if  we  did  something  other  than  by  way  of  treaty, 
we  would  keep  Congress  constantly  advised  and 
consult  with  them  and  be  sure  that  it  met  with 
their  approval,  and  we  would  keep  our  allies 
advised. 

In  other  words,  I  think  the  chances  are  that 
the  agreement  would  be  in  treaty  form;  but 
I  wouldn't  want  to  necessarily  be  frozen  in  that 
position. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  having  talked  with  Am- 
bassador Dobrynin,  how  do  you  characterize 
the  Russian  attitude?  They  are  willing  to  talk, 
but  are  they  enthusiastic,  cautious — lohat  can 
you  tell  us  about  that? 

A.  Well,  I  had  long  talks  with  Mr.  Gromyko 
[Andrei  A.  Gromyko,  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  the  U.S.S.R.]  on  this  subject,  in  New 
York.  We  talked  three  times  for  3  or  4  hours' 
duration,  total;  and  I  would  characterize  his 
attitude  as  serious. 

He  gave  me  the  impression  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  serious  about  these  talks — he  didn't 
indicate  that  they  were  entering  the  talks  or 
about  to  enter  the  talks  for  purposes  of  prop- 


aganda— and  that  their  attitude  was  about 
the  same  as  ours.  It's  a  realistic  attitude. 

We  are  not  talking  about  detente,  or  anything 
else.  We  are  talking  about  whether  it  makes 
sense  for  the  two  of  us  to  continue  to  spend 
immense  amounts  of  money  for  the  next  5,  or 
10,  or  15  years  on  strategic  weapons  and  end  up 
at  the  end  of  that  time  in  the  same  relative  posi- 
tion— or  whether  it  would  be  wiser  to  use  the 
money  for  some  other  purposes. 

Now,  that's  just  a  matter  of  hardware. 

If  we  can  work  out  that  kind  of  an  agreement 
so  that  each  of  us  feels  it's  to  our  advantage  to 
enter  that  kind  of  an  agreement  and  we're  satis- 
fied that  the  agreement  can  be  verified  so  that 
neither  side  can  cheat — then  it  makes  sense 
to  do  it. 

So,  I  think  they  are  serious  about  it.  You  al- 
ways can  be  wrong,  but  at  the  moment  I  would 
say  that  their  attitude  is  serious  and  that  they 
intend  to  approach  it  in  the  same  attitude  that 
we  do. 

Effect  on  East-West  Relations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  expect,  sir,  that  the 
initiation  of  these  talks  will  itself  affect  the  gen- 
eral pattern  of  East-West  relations?  As  these 
talks  proceed,  will  they  have,  in  your  judgment, 
a  relationship  to  the  conduct  of  international 
affairs  as  a  whole,  in  the  Middle  East,  for — 

A.  Well,  let  me  say  this :  They  are  not  condi- 
tional in  any  sense  of  the  word. 

We  haven't  laid  down  any  conditions  for 
these  talks. 

I  suppose  that  when  you're  talking  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  any  field, 
it  does  tend  to  improve  the  relations  some- 
what— especially  if  the  talks  seem  to  be 
succeeding. 

Now,  we  are  talking  with  them  on  NPT,  for 
example.  We  hope  that  they  will  ratify  NPT. 

We  are  talking  with  them  in  Geneva  about  a 
seabeds  treaty — and  those  discussions  have  gone 
rather  well. 

We  are  going  to  talk  with  them  further  about 
chemical  and  biological  warfare  limitations. 

So  I  suppose  that  all  of  those  things  tend  to 
improve  the  atmosphere  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States. 

But  I  don't  think  anybody  should  be  misled. 
The  mere  fact  that  those  talks  seem  to  be  going 
well  doesn't  necessarily  mean  other  things  are 


November  10,   1969 


393 


going  to  go  well.  We  would  hope  that  they  will, 
but  I  think  that  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 
demonstrated  that  point.  Just  prior  to  the  in- 
vasion of  Czechoslovakia,  there  was  a  feeling  of 
detente  in  Europe,  that  things  were  going  very 
well  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union — between  East  and  West — and  unfortu- 
nately, that  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  changed 
that. 

So  to  summarize,  I  think  that  it  does  tend 
slightly  to  improve  the  atmosphere,  but  we 
shouldn't  be  euphoric  about  the  fact  that  we 
are  having  talks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  view  of  that,  the  ques- 
tion about  Viet-Nam,  xohich  may  relate  to  this, 
has  the  fact  that  you  have  said  we  are  deescalat- 
i/ng  in  Viet-Nam  had  an  efect  on  the  Soviet 
attitude  toward  these  talks? 

A.  Well,  as  I  say,  I  don't  know  what's  had 
an  effect  on  the  Soviet  attitude.  There's  no  way 
of  knowing  for  sure.  I  can  speculate,  but  I  don't 
think  my  speculation  is  worth  any  more  than 
anyone  else's. 

Q.  Thank  you. 

Q.  You  could  try,  sir.  [Laughter."] 

A.  Well,  I  would  rather  read  about  it. 
[Laughter.] 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  expect  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  enter  these 
preliminary  discussions  with  formed,  substan- 
tive proposals  on  the  17th  of  November? 

A.  Well,  I  wouldn't  think  that  we  would  start 
out  that  way,  no.  As  I  say,  I  think  these  talks 
will  be  exploratory. 

I  don't  rule  out,  as  Mr.  Koberts  asked,  whether 
we  rule  out  any  discussion  of  substantive 
matters. 

The  answer  to  that  is  no. 

But  I  wouldn't  think  that  would  be  the  way 
the  discussions  would  start. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  have  any  indica- 
tion of  what  the  Soviet  position  toill  be  in  terms 
of  loillingness,  or  lack  of  willingness,  to  agree  to 
things  like  a  MIRY  moratonum,  or  some  agree- 
ments on  ABM? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Thank  you,  sir. 


The  Deep  Concern  for  Peace 
in  Viet-Nam 

Remarks  by  Secretary  Rogers  ^ 

Among  the  fundamental  rights  which  we 
believe  belong  to  the  family  of  man  are  freedom 
of  speech  and  assembly — including  peaceful 
demonstrations  for  or  against  government 
policies. 

As  we  all  know,  there  are  many  places  where 
these  rights  are  not  granted — Moscow,  Peking, 
Hanoi,  and  Prague  being  among  them. 

In  our  coimtry,  where  these  fundamental 
rights  are  cherished  and  guaranteed,  we  have 
just  had  a  public  demonstration  on  the  issue  of 
Viet-Nam.  It  was  fully  covered  by  the  press, 
radio,  and  television — so  the  demonstrators  were 
lieard  in  the  smallest  towns  and  the  remotest 
corners  of  the  country.  So  were  the  views  of 
other  segments  of  public  opinion  which  feel 
differently — and  that's  in  the  best  American 
tradition. 

Demonstrations  are  difficult  to  weigh  and 
assess — the  quiet  judgment  of  the  thoughtful 
often  is  sounder  than  the  strident  views  of  the 
more  vocal. 

However,  demonstrations  by  significant  seg- 
ments of  the  population  are  within  the  demo- 
cratic process  and  deserve  a  respectful  audience, 
when  respectfully  conducted. 

Moratorium  Day,  as  it  was  called,  was  marked 
by  some  unpleasant  sights — like  smaller  groups 
marching  behind  the  flag  of  the  Viet  Cong. 

But  these  aspects  did  not  characterize  the 
demonstration.  On  the  whole,  it  seemed  to  me 
that  a  great  many  of  the  demonstrators  wished 
principally  to  register  dramatic  but  dignified 
expression  of  their  deep  concern  for  peace  in 
Viet-Nam.  And  we  listened  to  these  voices  with 
respect — because  we,  too,  have  a  deep  concern 
for  peace  in  Viet-Nam. 

The  question  that  confronts  our  nation,  how- 
ever, is  not  whether  we  want  peace  but  how 
rapidly  we  can  transfer  military  responsibility 
from  our  forces  to  the  South  Vietnamese  with- 
out abandoning  our  basic  single  objective.  The 


'  Made  upon  accepting  on  behalf  of  President  Nixon 
the  Family  of  Man  Award  of  the  Council  of  Churches 
of  the  City  of  New  Tork  at  New  York  on  Oct.  20  (press 
release  311). 


394 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


single  objective  of  wliicli  I  speak  is  the  right 
of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to  determine 
their  own  future  without  interference  from  any 
outside  quarter.  Some,  of  course,  urge  immedi- 
ate, total  withdrawal  and  abandonment  of  the 
people  of  Viet-Nam.  They  seem  to  pay  little 
heed  to  the  consequences  to  our  nation,  to  the 
people  of  South  Viet-Nam,  to  the  future  secu- 
rity of  the  Asian-Pacific  area,  or  for  the  integ- 
rity of  our  international  relations  and  interests. 

It  must  be  said — not  in  anger  or  by  way  of 
any  implied  indictment,  but  in  plain  truth — 
that  the  leaders  in  Hanoi  look  upon  disruption 
and  dissent  in  the  United  States  as  their  best 
ally.  Spokesmen  for  Hanoi  went  to  extraordi- 
nary lengths  to  make  this  clear  and  to  seek  to 
exploit  for  their  own  ends  the  yearning  for 
peace  that  runs  so  strongly  in  our  society. 

It  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the 
net  effect  of  large-scale  demonstrations,  if  they 
continue  and  become  coercive  in  tone  and  con- 
tent, may  encourage  Hanoi  not  to  negotiate. 
The  quickest  road  to  peace  is  through  negotia- 
tions in  Paris.  If  this  is  a  correct  assessment — 
and  I  believe  it  is — then  each  American  must  ask 
himself :  Am  I  in  reality  working  for  an  early 
peace  by  my  actions,  or  am  I  helping  to  delay 
negotiations  which  could  speed  the  way  to 
peace  ? 

Less  than  a  year  ago  we  elected  a  new  Presi- 
dent who  was  determined  to  bring  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam  to  an  early  end.  Nine  months  ago  to- 
day he  took  office. 

President  Nixon  initiated  new  policies  look- 
ing toward  peace  both  at  the  negotiating  table 
and  on  the  battlefield. 

At  the  negotiating  table,  we  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  South  Viet-Nam  have  made  construc- 
tive proposals  to  end  the  war.  We  stand  ready 
to  negotiate  a  mutual  withdrawal  of  all  ex- 
ternal military  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam 
and  to  hold  free  and  fair  elections  in  which  the 
NLF  [National  Liberation  Front],  or  PRG 
[Provisional  Revolutionary  Government],  may 
participate. 

On  the  battlefield  there  has  been  significant 
deescalation  of  the  war.  These  are  the  facts : 


— Orders  to  our  military  commanders  to 
maintain  maximum  pressure  have  been  changed. 

— The  level  of  fighting  has  been  substantially 
reduced. 

— Our  casualties  have  greatly  decreased;  the 
figures  for  the  past  month  are  the  lowest  for 
any  month  since  late  1966. 

— Levels  of  enemy  infiltration  remain  sub- 
stantially down — down  by  two-thirds. 

— Enemy  troop  replacement  has  diminished 
by  about  30,000  in  this  period. 

Our  President  is  striving  for  peace  in  ways 
that  only  the  man  in  that  Office  can.  His  con- 
stitutional responsibilities  are  accepted  and  car- 
ried out  on  behalf  of  the  people  as  a  whole.  The 
honor  you  do  him  tonight  gives  eloquent  recog- 
nition to  his  efforts  for  peace. 


39th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  text  of  the  statement  made  iy 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  39th  plenary  session  of 
the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  Octo- 
ber 23. 

Press  release  315  dated  October  23 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  I  have  sat  here  all  day 
listening  to  the  statements  which  you  on  the 
other  side  have  made.  I  am  constrained  to  say 
that  you  have  done  nothing  but  repeat  your  de- 
mands for  unilateral  actions  on  our  part  and 
engage  in  vituperative  language.  You  still  show 
no  desire  to  engage  in  genuine  negotiations. 

Under  these  circimistances,  I  see  no  point  in 
delivering  the  statement  I  have  prepared  for 
today.  All  of  our  many  proposals,  of  course,  still 
stand,  and  I  will  have  more  to  say  on  the  points 
at  issue  later.  For  today,  however,  I  move  that 
wo  adjourn  our  meeting  until  next  Thursday, 
October  30,  at  10 :30  a.m. 


November  10,   1969 


395 


President  Nixon  and  the  Shah  of  Iran  Hold  Talks  at  Washington 


His  Imperial  Majesty  Mohammad  Reza  Shah 
Pahlavi,  Shahanslmh  of  Iran,  made  an  ofjvcial 
visit  to  Washington  October  21-23.  Folloivlng 
are  an  exchange  of  remarks  between  President 
Nixon  and  His  Imperial  Majesty  at  a  welcom- 
ing ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House  on  October  £1,  their  exchange  of  toasts  at 
a  state  dinner  at  the  White  House  that  evening, 
and  their  exchange  of  remarks  upon  His  Maj- 
esty^s  departure  October  23. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  21 
President  Nixon 

This  is  the  ninth  time  over  the  past  20  years 
that  Your  Majesty  has  honored  our  country  by 
a  visit  to  the  United  States,  and  never  in  all  that 
period  will  you  be  more  welcome,  both  person- 
ally and  officially,  than  you  are  today  on  this 
truly  brilliant  autumn  day  in  Washington,  D.C. 

We  welcome  you  because  of  the  proud  and 
ancient  land  which  you  represent.  We  welcome 
you  because  of  the  title  that  you  bear  with  such 
distinction.  But  we  welcome  you  also  because 
of  the  personal  qualities  which  those  of  us  who 
know  you  as  I  know  you,  those  qualities  you 
have  exemplified  in  your  leadership  of  your 
country. 

Today  on  this  parade  ground  we  see  the  flag 
of  the  United  States  and  your  flag;  and  the 
colors  of  your  flag  are  green  and  red  and  white — 
green  standing  for  the  rich  spiritual  heritage  of 
your  country,  red  standing  for  courage,  and 
white  standing  for  peace. 

We  know,  Your  Majesty,  that  you,  in  your 
life,  stand  for  those  great  virtues.  But  we  also 
know  that  you  stand  for  more  than  that.  In  a 
period  in  which  many  new  nations  are  being 
bom  and  in  wliich  old  nations  are  being  born 
again  and  in  which  all  nations  are  going 
through  change,  you  have  provided  an  example 
of  leadership  in  your  nation  for  all  the  world  to 
see  and  for  many  to  follow. 


That  example  I  have  seen  firsthand  in  my 
visits  to  your  country.  I  recall  that  many  years 
ago  you  gathered  your  ministers  together;  and 
speaking  from  the  position  of  royalty  wliich 
you  held,  you  made  a  comment  that  has  since 
been  remembered  around  the  world.  You  said  to 
them:  Make  a  revolution  in  this  land. 

And  you  have  made  a  revolution  in  your  land, 
a  revolution  in  terms  of  literacy,  the  great  prog- 
ress that  all  of  us  have  noted  there ;  a  revolution 
in  terms  of  land  reform,  in  which  you  yourself 
set  the  example  by  giving  much  of  your  vast 
lands  to  the  people;  a  revolution  in  terms  of 
social  and  economic  and  political  progress. 

But  the  key  to  your  success  has  been  in  the 
nature  of  that  revolution.  It  has  been  a  revolu- 
tion designed  not  to  destroy  and  to  tear  down 
but  a  revolution  to  build — a  peaceful  revolution. 

It  is  this  example  that  the  world  sees  in  Iran. 
It  is  this  example  that  is  your  legacy,  not  only 
to  your  country  but  to  those  who  seek  peaceful 
progress  in  nations  around  the  world. 

Your  Majesty,  we  welcome  you  here  today — 
welcome  you  because  of  those  qualities  that  I 
have  mentioned  and  welcome  you  also  because 
of  the  personal  friendship  that  we  have  had  the 
opportunity  to  enjoy,  going  back  over  so  many 
years. 

We  know  that  all  of  the  American  people 
during  your  brief  stay  here  will  want  to  express, 
as  I  have  tried  to  express  in  my  words  today, 
their  admiration,  their  respect,  their  affection 
for  you  and  for  the  people  of  Iran. 

His  Imperial  Majesty 

Mr.  President,  first  of  all  I  would  like  to  thank 
you  from  deep  in  my  heart  for  the  words  that 
you  were  kind  enough  to  pronounce  toward  my- 
self and  my  country. 

It  is  true  that  I  am  not  a  newcomer  to  your 
wonderful  land,  but  this  time  in  particular  it  is 
a  distinct  pleasure  and  honor  to  be  your  guest ; 
that  is,  the  guest  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  a  Pi'esident  who  has  shown 
in  all  his  life  how  well  he  understands  the  prob- 


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Department  of  State   Bulletin 


lems  of  our  world,  the  problems  of  today  and 
the  problems  of  the  future ;  in  addition  to  this, 
to  be  welcomed  by  somebody  who  has  been  fol- 
lowing with  interest  the  deA^elopment  of  our 
country  in  the  last  20  years  or  so,  in  some  days 
maybe  the  darkest  days  of  our  history,  and 
today,  I  am  happy  to  say,  in  a  period  of 
renaissance. 

It  is  a  comfort  to  know  that  you  have  in  this 
great  country  a  President  who  has  those 
friendly  sentiments  and  also  that  knowledge  of 
your  country. 

You  have  mentioned  that  we  have  imdertaken 
a  revolution  in  our  country  whicli  is  really  cov- 
ering every  aspect  of  our  life.  We  believe  that 
all  of  our  coimtries  are  passing  through  periods 
of  either  evolution  or  revolution,  but  my  prayers 
are  that  the  result  of  all  that  will  be  for  a  better 
world,  better  understanding  between  the  people, 
and  the  realization  of  the  aspiration  of  man- 
kind for  the  betterment  of  not  only  the  living 
condition  but  also  of  the  spiritual  one. 

I  am  very  proud  to  say  on  behalf  of  myself 
and  the  people  of  my  covmtry  that  never  in  the 
long-established  relationship  between  our  two 
countries — although  our  relations  have  always 
been  excellent — never  have  we  enjoyed  such  a 
state  of  complete  mutual  trust,  understanding, 
and  respect. 

I  have  to  add  that  it  is  with  deep  gratitude  of 
your  attitude  of  the  past,  your  imseliish  and 
generous  attitude  toward  my  country — and  I 
could  say  toward  all  the  countries  of  the  world — 
that  we  want  to  express  this  feeling  of  oure  and, 
in  return,  wish  for  your  people,  your  good- 
hearted  people,  ever-increasing  prosperity  and 
your  great  country  ever-increasing  progress  and 
order  in  the  world  of  today. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  President. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  21 

President  Nixon 

We  are  honored  again  to  receive  His  Imperial 
Majesty  in  this  house  and  in  this  room.  Before 
the  dinner,  I  found  that  this,  of  course,  is  not 
the  first  time  that  His  Majesty  has  been  here ; 
but  you  will  be  interested  to  note  that  he  is  one 
of  the  few  leaders,  heads  of  state,  in  the  world 
who  has  been  a  guest  in  this  house  and  in  this 
room  as  the  guest  of  President  Truman  and  then 
of  President  Eisenhower  and  then  President 


Kennedy  and  then  President  Johnson  and  now, 
tonight,  as  our  guest. 

I  would  say  on  that  count  he  is  far  ahead  of 
me.  He  is  somewhat  younger  than  I,  although  he 
will  celebrate  a  birthday  on  Sunday. 

I  found  in  checking  into  his  background  that 
we  had  one  thing  in  common,  a  love  for  sports. 
We  both  played  football.  There  was  a  difference. 
I  sat  on  the  bench.  He  was  captain  of  the  team. 

But  in  welcoming  him  here  tonight,  I  could 
speak  of  those  usual  pleasantries  and  diplomatic 
cliches  that  grace  such  occasions;  but  I  think 
because  there  are  so  many  here  who  know  his 
country  and  have  for  his  country  the  affection 
and  admiration  that  I  have  and  Mrs.  Nixon 
has,  because  there  are  so  many  here  from  his 
own  country,  that  you  would  like  it  better  if  I 
shared  with  you  a  personal  view  of  the  leader- 
ship he  has  provided  for  his  country  and  the 
cause  of  peace  and  freedom  in  the  world. 

In  1953  my  wife  and  I  had  a  very  great  priv- 
ilege to  travel  around  the  world  and  particu- 
larly through  the  countries  of  Asia.  In  that 
period,  not  too  long  after  World  War  II,  the 
great  leaders  of  World  War  II  were  still  living 
and  still  active  and  powerful  on  the  world  scene. 

I  remember  them  well  now.  The  names,  most 
of  them,  you  will  recall,  and  some  are  still 
active:  Yosliida  in  Japan,  Syngman  Rhee  in 
Korea,  Chiang  Kai-shek  in  Taiwan,  Menzies  in 
Australia,  Nehru  in  India,  and  Ghulam  Moham- 
mad in  Pakistan,  and  many  others. 

The  last  stop  on  that  long  trip  of  70  days  was 
Iran.  On  that  stop  we  met  for  the  first  time  our 
very  honored  guest  tonight.  He  made  a  very 
deep  impression  on  me  and  on  my  wife  at  that 
time,  a  deep  impression  because  of  his  own  per- 
sonal character  and  also  with  regard  to  the  var- 
ious other  leaders  that  I  had  seen,  each  of  whom 
had  gi-eatness  in  his  own  way,  because  in  1953, 
Iran  had  very  difficult  problems. 

There  was  martial  law  in  the  land.  The  father 
of  the  new  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  was 
Prime  Minister,  and  His  Majesty  was  the  sym- 
bol— and  not  just  the  symbol  but  the  actual 
leader  of  authority  who  kept  the  nation  to- 
gether, to  whom  all  of  those  in  government 
and  the  people  of  Iran  turned  in  a  moment 
of  crisis. 

There  were  those  who  thought  that  Iran  in 
1953  might  not  make  it.  When  I  left  Iran,  I 
knew  it  would  make  it.  I  knew  it  because  of  the 
men  I  had  seen.  I  knew  it  not  only  because  of 
the  government  leaders  to  whom  I  have  referred 
but  particularly  because  of  the  personality  and 


November   10,   1969 

367-032—69 2 


397 


the  strength  and  the  character  of  the  man  who 
is  our  honored  guest  tonight. 

He  was  a  young  head  of  state  then,  just  as  he 
is  really  a  young  head  of  state  todiiy.  I  was  a 
young  Vice  President.  But  what  I  recall  was 
this :  Despite  the  deep  depression  of  spirit  which 
seemed  to  infect  many  of  those  who  observed 
Iran  in  that  period  of  crisis,  His  Majesty  saw 
the  problems  but  also  had  a  vision  for  the 
future. 

Omar  Khayyam  has  referred  eloquently  to 
the  ability  of  a  leader,  a  great  leader,  to  heed 
the  roll  of  distant  drums.  His  Majesty  had  that 
ability.  He  saw  his  country  in  the  future  and  he 
proceeded  to  move  his  country  into  the  future, 
and  that  story  of  progress  is  now  one  of  the 
most  exciting  stories  of  all  the  development 
that  has  occurred  in  the  world  in  the  past  16 
years. 

I  referred  to  it  this  morning :  progress  in  edu- 
cation, progress  in  economic  development,  prog- 
ress in  social  development,  imtil  today  Iran 
stands  as  one  of  the  strongest,  the  proudest, 
among  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 

So  today  we  honor  a  nation  and  a  people  with 
whom  we  are  proud  to  stand  as  friends  and 
allies.  We  honor  also  a  man  who  has  those  ele- 
ments of  leadership  which  are  too  rare  in  the 
world. 

In  a  moment  you  will  rise  with  me  and  we 
will  drink  a  toast.  We  will  be  drinking  a  toast, 
as  has  happened  in  this  room  for  over  150 
years,  to  His  Majesty.  But  I  can  say  that  to- 
night I  feel  very  deep  in  my  heart,  as  everyone 
here  who  knows  liim  and  knows  his  country 
and  his  record,  that  when  we  say  "His  Majes- 
ty," we  realize  we  are  drinking  to  a  man  who 
has  demonstrated  majesty — majesty  in  liis 
leadersliip,  majesty  in  his  reverence  for  the  past, 
but  in  his  vision  for  the  future. 

Our  friends,  will  you  please  rise  and  raise 
your  glasses  to  the  Shahanshah. 

His  Imperial  Majesty 

I  was  already  once  deeply  moved  by  your  kind 
words  of  greeting  this  morning;  and  tonight 
I  am  overwhelmed  by  the  warmth  of  your  sen- 
timents, which  could  only  come  from  a  true 
friend — someone  who  is  sharing  your  problems 
and  someone  who  is  understanding  your 
problems. 

For  our  association,  Mr.  President — and  the 


great  honor  and  pleasure  that  I  take  and  have 
by  saying  that  our  friendship  started  a  long 
time  ago — is  this  strong  and  this  durable  be- 
cause I  think  it  started  in  a  period  that  for 
my  country  was  a  very  vital  one.  That  was  the 
aftermath  of  the  war,  the  period  of  the  big 
drive  forward  of  the  policies  that  wanted  to 
dominate  the  world. 

We  on  our  part  tried  to  keep  our  independ- 
ence and  resist  those  pressures,  and  you  on  your 
part  wanted  to  be  the  bearer  of  this  flag  that 
America  has  always  waved  with  pride  in  the 
air — the  flag  of  always  standing  for  the  people 
who  are  standing  for  righteousness  and  for 
freedom. 

You  were  kind  enough  to  say  that  our  coun- 
try in  that  meantime  had  succeeded.  Much  of 
our  success  is  due  to  the  deeply  rooted  senti- 
ments of  our  country  in  being  true  to  them- 
selves, in  being  true  to  their  history,  in  being 
true  to  what  the  human  valor  of  the  individual, 
the  freedom  of  the  individual,  means,  and  also, 
I  must  admit,  to  the  heartening  effect  of  know- 
ing that  we  had  the  friendship  of  a  great  na- 
tion like  yours  and  great  leaders  like  the  late 
President  and  you,  Mr.  President,  as  his  very 
able  Vice  President  at  that  time. 

I  can  return  back  what  you  have  said  about 
me  even  more  by  saying  that  you  have  shown 
such  human  valor  and  dignity  during  your 
hours  of  triumph  and  success  and  also  during 
hours  of  trial.  This  is  what  makes  a  man  great 
and  reliable.  This  is  what  makes  a  man  have 
the  character  of  a  leader. 

Today  more  than  ever  we  need  the  friendship 
of  America  as  a  friend  and  the  leadersliip  of 
America  in  the  world  and  the  leadership  of  the 
President  of  this  gi-eat  country  to  uphold  all 
of  what  we  are  standing  for,  to  implement  the 
laws  of  equity,  of  justice,  to  encourage  decency 
in  relationships  between  states,  countries,  and 
people. 

You  might  rest  assured  that  nowhere  you 
would  find  more  than  in  our  country  friendship, 
understanding,  and  sympathy  in  everything 
you  do,  in  everything  you  enterprise,  because 
we  know  in  advance  that  it  is  being  done  in 
the  path  of  justice  and  equity. 

We  can  felicitate  ourselves  of  the  result  of 
your  friendship  because,  as  it  stands  now,  I 
hope  and  I  believe  that  our  country  is  trying 
to  represent  and  to  continue  to  do  what  our  past 
history  has  tried  to  do,  to  give  something  to  the 


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Department  of  State   Bulletin 


world,  something  spiritual,  something  that 
could  be  of  help  to  make  life  better,  to  render 
life  more  interesting. 

We  shall  never  stop  in  trying  to  do  so  be- 
cause this  is  the  history  of  our  country  and 
j  no  country  could  live  without  remaining  true 
I  to  its  past  while  trying  to  still  do  better  in 
the  future. 

"We  shall  always  remember  your  visit  to  our 
countiy  and  Mrs.  Nixon's  visit.  I  personally 
will  always  remember  the  long  hours  that  we 
spent  together  in  1967,  and  above  all,  we  shall 
be  waiting  with  the  greatest  of  anticipation  to 
the  future  visit  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  especially  of  President  Nixon,  a 
person  whom  we  respect,  and  a  person  for  whom 
we  have  such  an  admiration. 

So  I  would  like  also  to  ask  this  distinguished 
audience  to  raise  their  glasses  with  me  to  the 
health  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
a  man  to  which  I  am  sure  we  all  are  holding 
such  very  high  sentiments  of  esteem  and 
admiration. 


DEPARTURE   REMARKS 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  23 
President  Nixon 

As  you  leave  this  Capital  after  your  visit 
here,  I  can  echo  what  the  Secretary  of  State  just 
said  in  reflecting  on  your  visit.  He  said :  "The 
weather  today  is  like  our  relations." 

And  certainly  on  this  beautiful  day  as  we 
complete  our  talks,  I  believe  that  the  relations 
between  Iran  and  the  United  States  have  never 
been  better.  That  is  due  to  your  leadership.  It 
is  due  also  to  the  fact  that  we  feel  a  special  re- 
lationship not  only  to  your  country  but  to  you, 
a  relationship  which,  in  my  case,  goes  back  many 
years. 

We  have  had  bilateral  talks  which  have  been 
most  constructive. 

But  I,  too,  want  to  thank  you  for  giving  the 
Secretary,  myself,  and  our  colleagues  the  bene- 
fit of  your  analysis  of  the  problems  in  the  Mid- 
east, which  are  tremendously  explosive  at  the 
present  time,  and  also  the  problems  in  the  world ; 
because  Iran,  in  a  sense,  is  a  bridge  between  the 
East  and  West,  between  Asia  and  Europe,  and, 
for  that  matter,  Africa. 

And  at  that  vantage  point  you  are  able  to  see 


those  problems  perhaps  better  than  almost  any 
leader  in  the  world. 

We  thank  you  for  coming  to  us. 

And  I  can  say,  in  conclusion,  that  I  look  for- 
ward to  visiting  Iran  again.  I  have  not  yet  set 
a  date.  But  you  have  very  cordially  invited  me 
to  come.  I  accept  the  invitation  and  we  wUl  set 
a  date  at  a  later  time. 

Thank  you. 

His  Imperial  Majesty 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  President. 

I  must  say  once  more  how  honored  I  was  by 
your  hospitality  and  friendship  that  you  have 
shown  to  me  once  more  and  how  deeply  ap- 
preciative I  am  of  the  frankness  and  the  friend- 
liness in  which  we  have  had  our  talks  with  you, 
Mr.  President,  and  your  associates. 

As  you  very  well  mentioned,  our  relations 
have  never  been  as  good  as  they  are  now,  because 
they  are  based  on  an  absolute  trust  and  mutual 
interests. 

We  are  defending  the  same  principles,  up- 
holding the  same  moral  values  that  we  un- 
derstand and  for  which  we  are  living  and,  if 
necessary,  dying;  the  interest  of  your  country 
that  the  world  should  be  a  good  place  to  live  in, 
a  free  place  to  live  in ;  that  everybody  should  be 
given  the  opportimity  of  progressing,  of  living 
better  without  fear  and  in  health  and  happiness. 

For  these  ideals  that  we  respect,  we  wish  you 
an  ever-growing  strength. 

We  wish  you  success  in  all  your  enterprises 
and,  in  addition  to  this,  we  hope  that  you  will 
always  feel — maybe  sometimes  it  is  a  burden — 
but  feel  the  responsibility  that  you  have  toward 
the  human  race,  because  you  can  provide  it. 
When  you  can  provide  it,  if  I  could  be  bold 
enough  to  say,  you  must  provide  it. 

We  shall  continue  on  our  part  to  play  what- 
ever constructive  role  that  we  can  in  our  part  of 
the  world,  upholding  the  same  principles,  try- 
ing to  be  of  any  assistance  and  cooperation  for 
the  maintenance  of  peace,  stability,  and  as- 
sistance to  all  those  who  would  ask  for  it  with- 
out any  second  thought  and  as  liberally  as 
possible. 

The  state  of  relationships  between  our  two 
countries,  I  hope,  will  continue  in  this  manner 
for  the  better  of  our  two  countries,  of  our  region, 
and  I  hope  maybe  even  for  the  world. 

As  you  mentioned,  Mr.  President,  my  country 


November   10,    1969 


399 


/ 


is  a  crossroad  between  various  civilizations  and 
various  interests.  It  will  be  our  duty  to  be  able 
to  honor  this  task  faithfully,  with  dignity,  and, 
I  hope,  also  in  a  constructive  way. 

We  will  be  more  able  to  do  it  always  when  we 
have  the  moral  support,  assistance,  of  our 
friends,  the  greatest  of  them  being  this  great 
country  of  yours,  and  your  personal  friendship, 
Mr.  President,  which  I  personally,  and  I  am 
sure  my  people,  value  to  the  greatest  possible 
extent. 

Thank  you  very  much. 

President  Nixon 

On  behalf  of  all  of  the  American  people,  we 
wish  you  a  very  happy  birthday  Sunday. 

His  Imperial  Majesty 

Thank  you  very  much. 


Secretary  Rogers  Welcomes 
Atlantic  Treaty  Association 

The  15th  annual  assembly  of  the  Atlantic 
Treaty  Association,  which  is  composed  of  na- 
tional voluntary  associations  of  tlie  NATO 
member  countries  and  Malta,  was  held  at  Wash- 
ington October  £0-£4-  Following  are  remarks 
made  by  Secretary  Rogers  before  the  opening 
session  of  the  assembly  on  October  20. 

Press  release  310  dated  October  20 

I  am  very  happy,  on  behalf  of  President 
Nixon  and  the  entire  administration,  to  welcome 
the  Atlantic  Treaty  Association  to  "Washington. 

I  welcome  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  all  of 
you  here,  particularly  the  distinguished  men 
who,  in  the  words  of  my  bestselling  predecessor, 
Dean  Acheson,  were  "present  at  the  creation." 
I  welcome,  too,  the  younger  men  who  may  not 
yet  be  so  distuiguished  but  who  will  be  dis- 
tinguished soon. 

If  I  may  use  a  word  that  is  somewhat  over- 
used by  young  people  today,  I  should  like  to 
stress  that  NATO  and  its  guiding  North  At- 
lantic Council  are  relevant — relevant  in  many 
ways. 

Certainly  NATO  is  relevant  to  the  security 
of  Europe.  That  is  why  President  Nixon  visited 


the  Council  in  Brussels  early  in  his  administra- 
tion to  reaffirm  our  commitment  to  the  organi- 
zation and  our  determination  to  support  it.^ 

NATO  is  relevant  to  arms  control.  That  is 
why  together  we  are  working  out  specific  pro- 
posals for  balanced  and  mutual  force  reductions 
in  the  European  theater  and  why  we  consult  so 
closely  on  broader  disarmament  and  arms  con- 
trol measures. 

NATO  is  relevant  to  the  evolution  of  a  shared 
Western  viewpoint  toward  many  complex  polit- 
ical situations.  That  is  why  the  Council  and 
political  committees  spend  so  much  time  in  shar- 
ing information,  exchanging  views,  and  pre- 
paring political  analyses. 

NATO  is  relevant,  too,  to  some  of  the  social 
goals  of  its  members.  We  share  in  common  many 
of  the  problems  brought  about  by  industrializa- 
tion. That  is  why  we  have  started  to  consvdt 
together  on  the  problems  of  modern  societies. 

In  short,  NATO  is  relevant  to  its  purposes,  to 
its  times,  and  to  its  environment.  And  since 
relevance  is  so  fashionable,  I  conclude  that  this 
organization  is  a  fashionable  organization. 

I  believe  that  it  can  be  said  with  assurance 
that  NATO  is  the  most  successful  and  the  most 
durable  security  system  of  all  time. 

I  want  to  assure  those  of  you  who  have  given 
such  tremendous  support  to  NATO  over  the 
years  that  that  is  the  way  all  of  us  in  the  ad- 
ministration feel. 

I  am  especially  glad  that,  having  appropri- 
ately and  impressively  celebrated  our  20th  an- 
niversary a  few  months  ago,=  the  theme  of  this 
meeting  is  NATO  and  its  future  in  the  third 
decade.  Let  me  only  say  that  I  shall  follow  your 
proceedings  with  interest,  attention,  and 
respect. 

I  do  have  to  leave  right  away  for  a  trip  to 
New  York,  so  my  greetings  are  brief — but  I 
know  you  must  take  satisfaction  in  having  con- 
tributed so  much  to  a  successful  venture  and 
that  3'ou  look  forward  to  the  future  success  of 
NATO.  And  in  my  present  position  I  look  with 
envy  and  respect  on  persons  who  are  associated 
with  successful  ventures. 

Thank  you  very  much. 


'  For  President  Nixon's  remarks  made  before  the 
Nortli  Atlantic  Council  at  Brussels  on  Feb.  24,  see 
Bulletin  of  Mar.  24,  1969,  p.  250. 

'  For  an  address  by  President  Nixon  and  opening 
remarks  made  before  the  ministerial  meeting  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Council  at  Washington  on  Apr.  10,  see 
Bulletin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  349. 


400 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


United  States-Japanese  Relations  Today 


hy  V.  Alexis  Johnson 

Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs  ^ 


I  was  especially  pleased  and  honored  to  have 
been  invited  to  join  you  here  this  evening.  Some 
of  the  fondest  and  happiest  memories  I  have 
of  Japan  are  those  visits  Mrs.  Jolinson  and  I 
made  to  Prefectures  throughout  Japan  and  the 
overwhelming  courtesy  and  kindness  with  which 
we  were  always  received.  You  Prefectural  Gov- 
ernors were  always  also  overwhelming  in  your 
hospitality  and  more  than  generous  in  giving 
of  your  time.  Thus  I  feel  a  debt  to  you  and  your 
colleagues  which  I  can  never  repay. 

When  I  talk  to  other  Americans  about  Japan 
I  often  remark  on  how  impressed  I  have  been 
by  the  fact  that  the  democratic  political  proc- 
esses of  Japan  produce  provincial  Governors 
with  such  obviously  high  human  qualities  and 
dedication  to  their  responsibilities.  Thus  I  have 
been  especially  happy  over  the  years  to  see  the 
growth  and  vigor  in  this  relationship  between 
our  own  State  Governors,  who  have  the  same 
characteristics,  and  you  Prefectural  Governors 
from  Japan.  I  know  that  you  have  your  dif- 
ferences of  language  and  culture,  but  it  has 
been  my  impression  that  you  have  found  more 
similarities  than  differences  in  the  problems 
that  each  of  you  is  facing.  After  all,  limited 
budgets,  problems  of  urbanization,  pollution, 
and  education — and,  if  I  might  say  so,  the  prob- 
lem of  running  elections — know  no  national 
boundaries. 

I  am  sure  that  I  also  speak  for  my  longtime 
friend  and  valued  colleague  Ajnbassador 
Shimoda  [Takeso  Shimoda,  Japanese  Ambas- 
sador to  the  United  States] ,  when  I  say  that  we 
diplomats  dealing  in  the  often  rarefied  as  well 
as  often  cloudy  atmosjahere  of  national  policy 
heai-tily  welcome  the  relationship  that  has  been 
developing  between  you  Governors.  We  recog- 
nize that  what  we  can  or  cannot  do  ultimately 

'  Address  made  before  the  U.S.- Japan  Governors 
meeting,  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  on  Oct.  22  (press  release 
312). 


depends  upon  understanding  between  our  two 
great  peoples,  and  what  you  are  doing  is  mak- 
ing a  major  contribution  to  that  understanding. 
That  understanding  is  growing  at  a  very  satis- 
factory rate.  Yet  I  am  concerned  that  its  growth 
keep  pace  with  the  growth  m  our  relationship. 
For  as  our  relationship  grows  it  is  obvious  that 
the  problems  also  grow  apace,  and  it  is  going  to 
take  increasing  efforts  to  keep  these  problems 
in  focus  and  effectively  to  deal  with  them. 

Out  of  our  defense  relationship  has  grown 
the  problem  of  our  base  facilities  in  Japan  and 
concern  in  this  country  as  to  whether  Japan 
really  values  and  will  in  the  years  to  come  want 
to  maintain  that  relationship. 

Eelated  to  this  is  the  question  of  the  admin- 
istration of  the  Kyukyu  Islands,  which,  as  you 
all  know,  is  now  the  subject  of  discussion  be- 
tween our  two  governments.  I  know  that  the 
President  is  very  much  looking  forward  to  the 
visit  of  Prime  Minister  Sato  next  month,  which 
will  give  an  opportunity  for  both  of  them  to  in- 
clude this  among  the  subjects  that  they  will  per- 
sonally discuss. 

Another  area  in  which  there  has  been  a 
tremendous  growth  in  our  relationship,  and 
accordingly  our  problems,  has  been  in  the  field 
of  our  economic,  financial,  and  trade  exchanges. 
The  benefits  of  this  relationship  have  been  so 
overwhelmingly  to  the  advantage  of  both  of  our 
coimtries  that  we  should  not  let  the  problems 
assume  undue  importance  or  cast  a  shadow  over 
those  benefits.  However,  if  this  is  not  to  become 
the  case,  it  is  important  that  we  obtain  mutual 
understanding  and  Avork  at  resolving  these 
problems  in  the  same  spirit  as  we  work  at  prob- 
lems in  other  fields. 

I  mention  this  economic  field  here  this  eve- 
ning because  I  am  sure  that  in  your  discussions 
of  other  questions  you  American  Governors 
have  heard  much  from  your  Japanese  guests  on 
their  concerns  as  to  whether  there  was  a  growth 


November   10,   1969 


401 


in  trade  protectionist  sentiment  here  in  tlie 
United  States.  I  am  also  sure  that  you  Japanese 
Governors  have  heard  much  from  your  Ameri- 
can liosts  on  their  concerns  with  respect  to  the 
effects  that  some  imports  from  Japan  are  hav- 
ing on  certain  industries  and  employees  in  their 
States.  Others,  of  course,  will  have  mentioned 
their  recognition  of  the  important  role  Japan 
plays  as  a  market  for  the  products  of  their 
States.  This  is  understandable  and  natural  on 
both  sides  in  such  a  rapidly  changing  world, 
particularly  in  a  field  that  has  changed  so  fast 
as  have  the  economic  relations  between  our  two 
countries. 

Just  10  years  ago  Japan's  exports  to  the 
United  States  were  valued  at  about  $700  million 
(1958  figures)  and  our  exports  to  Japan  were 
valued  at  about  $1  billion,  for  a  total  two-way 
trade  of  $1.7  billion.  Last  year  Japan's  exports 
to  us  were  $4  billion,  and  our  exports  to  Japan 
not  quite  $3  billion,  for  a  total  two-way  trade 
of  $7  billion,  the  largest  transocean  bilateral 
trade  between  any  two  countries  in  the  world.  I 
know  that  both  of  us  want  to  see  this  trend  con- 
tinue, but  if  it  is  going  to  continue  we  must 
work  at  this  problem  of  making  sure  that  it  is, 
as  we  Americans  say,  a  two-way  street.  As  I 
noted,  back  in  1958  you  Japanese  were  buying 
considerably  more  from  the  United  States  than 
you  were  selling  here.  Although  this  was  largely 
offset  on  the  financial  side  by  our  expenditures 
within  Japan  as  well  as  by  loans  of  our  financial 
institutions,  we  recognized  this  was  not  a 
healthy  situation  and  as  a  general  proposition 
welcomed  the  growth  of  Japanese  exports  here 
so  that  our  trade  would  have  a  more  healthy 
balance.  However,  as  noted,  last  year  Japan 
sold  over  a  billion  dollars  more  to  us  than  we 
sold  Japan,  which,  taken  together  with  our  other 
expenditures  in  Japan  and  the  billions  of  dol- 
lars in  long-  and  short-term  loans  our  financial 
institutions  have  outstanding  in  Japan,  prob- 
ably has  more  of  an  adverse  impact  on  our 
international  financial  situation  than  our  rela- 
tions with  any  other  single  country  in  the  world. 
I  perfectly  well  know  that  you  Governors  do 
not  have  responsibility  for  Japan's  national 
policies  on  these  qiiestions  any  more  than  our 
American  Governors  have  responsibility  for 
what  our  Congress  will  do.  However,  I  feel  that 
these  questions  so  deeply  relate  to  the  questions 
of  growth,  industry,  employment,  prosperity, 
and  welfare  with  which  each  of  you  must  deal 
daily  in  your  own  areas  that  I  seek  your  under- 
standing of  what  is  involved  when  you  read  that 


our  two  governments  are  discussing  trade  and 
economic  matters. 

"We  have  been  discussing  and  will  be  continu- 
ing to  discuss  these  matters  which  are  of  such 
great  importance  to  our  two  countries  and  to 
each  of  you,  both  Japanese  and  American.  From 
the  standpoint  of  the  United  States  we  want  to 
see  these  problems  resolved  by  increasing  rather 
than  decreasing  trade.  However,  I  am  sure  that 
you  Japanese  will  understand  that  it  is  very 
hard  to  explain  to  Americans  why  under  these 
circumstances  Japan  should  continue  to  enjoy 
virtually  unrestricted  trade  and  investment  op- 
portunities in  the  United  States  while  American 
trade  and  investment  in  Japan  is  still  subject  to 
so  many  limitations.  I  realize  full  well  that 
Japan's  progress  in  liberalization  in  these  fields 
is  sincerely  felt  by  many  in  Japan  to  be  too  rapid 
when  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  history. 
But  it  must  also  be  understood  that  the  changes 
in  the  world  and  Japan's  economic  status  in  that 
world  have  moved  even  more  rapidly.  Thus,  the 
process  of  liberalization  has  not  been  quick 
enough  to  lay  to  rest  the  feeling  here  that  ele- 
ments of  economic  reciprocity  are  lacking  in  our 
relationship.  This  point,  I  am  convinced,  is 
basic — the  equality  of  opportunity.  It  is  only 
natural  that  the  clamor  of  our  business  com- 
munity for  a  more  equitable  access  to  Japan's 
growing  markets  becomes  reflected  in  the  Con- 
gress, in  our  press,  and  in  the  administration. 

The  subject  of  textile  trade  is  a  troublesome 
one  for  our  two  countries.  The  recent  high  rate 
of  growth  of  imports  of  manmade  and  woolen 
textiles  has  caused  grave  concern  to  American 
industry  and  labor.  Imports  of  some  items  have 
doubled  in  1  year;  many  others  have  increased 
50-75  percent.  American  businessmen  can  adjust 
to  growing  impoi'ts  if  the  growth  is  gradual.  It 
is  the  rapidity  and  magnitude  of  the  import 
growth  that  have  been  disruptive. 

All  we  are  seeking  therefore — of  all  exporters 
and  not  of  Japan  alone — is  moderation  in  the 
rate  of  increase  in  imports;  that  is,  an  orderly 
growth  in  the  textile  trade  to  give  American 
industry'  an  opportunity  to  accommodate.  It  is 
important  that  we  continue  our  efforts  to  resolve 
this  issue  so  that  it  does  not  color  and  distort 
our  relations. 

In  all  fairness,  I  want  first  to  note  I  fuUy 
understand  that  just  as  American  political  and 
Government  leader's  are  subjected  to  pressures 
from  large  nmnbers  of  diverse  interest  groups, 
Japan's  leaders  are  faced  with  similar  problems, 
This  is  only  logical.  Some  areas  of  Japanese  in- 


402 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


dustry  and  agriculture  are,  understandably, 
concerned  that  they  will  be  injured  by  liberali- 
zation of  trade  and  investment  policies. 
j  However,  the  experience  of  both  Japan  and 
I  the  United  States  has  been  that,  so  long  as 
policies  of  freer  trade  are  pursued  on  a  basis  of 
■  reciprocity  and  good  will,  the  advantages  to 
each  side  far  outweigh  the  disadvantages  from 
the  pomt  of  view  of  our  economies  examined  as 
a  whole.  Furthermore,  freer  trade  policies  en- 
able our  consumers,  the  average  man  in  each 
of  our  countries,  to  have  access  to  the  best 
goods — food  or  manufactures — ^at  the  best  pos- 
sible prices.  In  the  long  run,  it  is  our  people 
who  benefit  from  freer  trade  and  whose  living 
standards  are  raised  by  a  better  exchange  of 
goods  and  services.  The  American  people  have 
supported,  and  I  am  sure  will  continue  to  sup- 
port, a  world  of  such  freer  exchange;  but  we 
cannot  do  so  without  the  support  and,  even  more 
importantly,  the  example  of  the  economic  power 
that  is  second  only  to  ourselves  in  the  free  world. 
I  have  spoken  to  you  Japanese  guests  about 
some  of  the  things  that  concern  us  Americans 
not  in  any  spirit  of  criticism  or  carping,  but 
rather  that  you  may  leave  here  with  a  better 
understanding  of  us.  In  turn,  as  I  said  at  the 
outset,  I  know  that  these  are  things  that  con- 
cern you  Japanese.  I  hope  that  you  have  and 
will  speak  to  your  American  hosts  on  these  mat- 
ters with  equal  frankness,  for  it  is  only  from 
exchanges  such  as  tliis  that  we  can  move  to- 
ward that  understanding  between  us  which,  I 
am  convinced,  means  so  much  not  only  for  the 
future  of  our  two  peoples  and  countries  but  for 
all  of  the  peoples  of  the  Pacific  and  Asia. 


U.S.  Aircraft  To  Assist 
in  Famine  Relief  in  Chad 

Departinent  Statement '^ 

Ambassador  Todman  in  Fort  Lamy  has  re- 
ported extreme  famine  conditions  in  the  central 
and  north-central  portions  of  Chad. 

At  the  request  of  the  Government  of  Chad  for 
air  transport  to  deliver  United  Nations-sup- 
plied foodstuffs  to  stricken  areas,  the  United 
States  Government  has  agreed  to  send  two 
C-130  aircraft  of  the  U.S.  Strike  Command. 


*  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch  on  Oct.  9. 


November   10,   1969 


These  should  be  departing  from  Langley  Air 
Force  Base  sometime  today  [October  9].  We 
expect  the  aircraft  will  be  in  Chad  for  about  7 
days  on  this  humanitarian  mission.  The  French 
Govermnent  is  also  participating  in  the  airlift. 
The  U.S.  contribution  is  being  financed  from 
disaster  relief  contingency  funds  administered 
by  the  Agency  for  International  Development. 


Second  Round  of  Bilateral  Talks 
With  India  Held  at  Washington 

Joint  Statement  ^ 

Kepresentatives  of  the  Govermnents  of  the 
United  States  and  India  held  a  second  round 
of  bilateral  discussions  in  Washington  on  Octo- 
ber 16-17,  1969.  The  discussions  covered  a  wide 
range  of  subjects  including  matters  of  interna- 
tional importance  of  common  interest  to  both 
countries  and  bilateral  relations.  The  Indian 
Delegation  was  headed  by  Mr.  T.  N.  Kaul,  For- 
eign Secretary,  and  the  U.S.  Delegation  by  Mr. 
Elliot  Richardson,  Under  Secretary  of  State. 

The  discussions  carried  forward  the  review 
of  world  problems  and  bilateral  relations  ini- 
tiated during  the  talks  held  in  New  Delhi  in 
July  1968,  and  were  held  in  a  spirit  of  friend- 
ship, frankness,  and  cordiality.^  Both  sides  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  with  the  discussions  which 
were  characterized  by  a  greater  appreciation  of 
the  factors  underlying  each  country's  policies 
and  by  a  reaffirmation  of  the  close  friendsliip 
which  has  been  the  basis  of  relations  between 
the  two  countries  over  many  years. 

During  the  talks  the  two  delegations  exam- 
ined major  areas  of  tension  in  the  world.  They 
exchanged  views  and  analyses  on  the  current 
situation  in  these  areas.  They  exammed  the  con- 
ditions and  prospects  for  peace  and  considered 
ways  to  work  together  toward  the  peaceful  reso- 
lution of  international  problems.  This  second 
round  of  bilateral  talks  contributed  to  the  com- 
mon objective  of  further  strengthening  the 
friendship  between  the  two  countries  on  the 
basis  of  mutual  tmderstanding  and  respect  for 
each  other's  position.  It  was  agi'eed  that  the  next 
round  of  bilateral  discussions  will  be  held  in 
New  Delhi  next  year. 

'  Issued  at  Washington  on  Oct.  17  (press  release  308). 
'  For  text  of  a  joint  statement  issued  at  New  Delhi  on 
July  28,  1968,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  19,  1968,  p.  198. 


403 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Seventh  Annual  Review  of  the  Long-Term  Cotton  Textile  Arrangement 

Statement  hy  Henry  Brodie  * 


The  United  States  is  pleased  to  have  this  op- 
portunity again  to  discuss  the  textile  situation 
with  representatives  of  the  governments  of  the 
textile  trading  and  producing  community.  In 
my  statement  I  shall  review  United  States  cot- 
ton textile  trade,  conditions  in  the  domestic 
producing  industry,  developments  in  the  imple- 
mentation of  the  Long-Term  Arrangement,  and 
I  shall  briefly  comment  on  certain  changes  that 
have  taken  place  in  the  trade  and  in  the  indus- 
try.^ My  Government  believes  that  the  im- 
plications of  these  changes  must  be  carefully 
considered  to  ensure  for  the  future  the  healthy 
development  of  the  world's  textile  trade  and 
industry. 

As  we  review  the  operation  of  the  LTA  at  the 
conclusion  of  its  seventh  year,  my  Government 
believes  that  the  arrangement  has  functioned  to 
the  advantage  of  all  concerned :  those  who  pro- 
duce and  are  employed  in  the  United  States  as 
well  as  those  who  manufacture  and  sell  to  the 
United  States  and  other  countries.  I  will  not 
recount  the  well-known  principles  established  in 
the  LTA  concerning  the  orderly  growth  of  tex- 
tile trade  and  the  need  to  avoid  market  disrup- 
tion. But  I  do  wish  to  discuss  the  growth  and 
some  of  the  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  U.S. 
trade  in  these  products. 

Cotton  textile  imports  into  the  United  States 
during  the  seventh  LTA  year  amounted  to  1.7 
billion  square  yards  equivalent,  as  compared 


'  Made  before  the  Cotton  Textile  Committee  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  at  Geneva  on 
Oct  8.  Mr.  Brodie  Is  Counselor  of  Economic  Affairs  of 
the  U.S.  Mission  to  the  European  Offices  of  the  United 
Nations  and  Other  International  Organizations  at 
Geneva ;  he  was  U.S.  Representative  at  the  meeting  of 
the  Committee. 

'  For  text  of  the  Long-Term  Cotton  Textile  Arrange- 
ment, see  BtTLLETiN  of  Mar.  12, 1962,  p.  431. 


with  1.1  billion  yards  in  the  first  LTA  year  and 
just  over  800  million  j-ards  during  the  base  j^ear 
for  the  Short-Term  Arrangement.  Over  this 
period,  imports  of  cotton  textiles  and  apparel 
rose  faster  than  domestic  output.  Even  so,  the 
overall  figures  do  not  reveal  certain  significant 
developments  affecting  our  trade.  For  example, 
in  the  fourth  LTA  year,  the  peak  year  to  date, 
the  United  States  imported  361  million  square 
yards  equivalent  of  cotton  yam,  about  one-fifth 
of  total  cotton  textile  imports.  During  the  sev- 
enth LTA  year,  imports  of  cotton  yam  were 
down  sharply — to  about  one-twelfth  of  total  im- 
ports— but  imports  of  apparel,  fabrics,  and  other 
goods  rose  substantially  above  the  levels  reached 
in  the  fourth  LTA  year.  This  development  un- 
derscores the  shift  toward  more  highly  manufac- 
tured goods  for  export  to  the  United  States 
which  has  been  occurring  in  recent  years.  Be- 
tween the  first  and  seventh  LTA  years  the  value 
of  apparel  imports  increased  80  percent.  This 
shift  to  more  labor  intensive  goods  has  helped 
the  exporting  countries,  but  it  has  placed  a 
greater  burden  on  U.S.  labor  and  industry. 

Our  cotton  textile  imports  come  from  about 
100  countries.  Imports  from  the  developing 
countries  have  increased  significantly.  While  the 
share  of  the  U.S.  market  held  by  the  major  sup- 
pliers has  changed,  their  absolute  exports  to  the 
United  States  have  increased  substantially. 
Many  new  suppliers  have  entered  the  United 
States  market  and  have  been  able  to  sell  in  the 
market  without  jeopardizing  the  position  of 
other  suppliers.  In  the  process  of  providing  ac- 
cess for  new  suppliers  to  our  market,  the  United 
States  has  consistently  met  the  fundamental 
equity  obligation  stipulated  in  article  6(c)  of 
the  arrangement. 

All  of  these  developments  are  consistent  with 
the  provisions  and  the  spirit  of  the  LTA  itself. 


404 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Recurrent  Problem  of  Overshipments 

Imports  at  these  high  levels  have  produced  a 
I  number  of  problems.  The  most  difficult  and  frus- 
trating of  these  arises  when  agreement  limits  are 
oversliipped.  The  United  States  has  pointed  out 
at  previous  meetings  of  tliis  Committee  a  num- 
'  ber  of  the  difficulties  it  has  had  in  the  imple- 
mentation of  various  bilateral   cotton  textile 
agreements.  We  noted  that  while  many  of  these 
situations  are  inadvertent,  not  all  of  them  can 
'■  be  so  explained.  We  have  worked  with  a  number 
of  countries  to  assist  them  in  their  efforts  to  im- 
prove their  administration  of  the  bilateral  ar- 
rangements, and  in  the  current  year  we  have 
noted  some  decline  in  the  number  of  administra- 
tive and  overshipment  problems. 

A  more  timely  exchange  of  better  statistical 
information  on  trade  would  contribute  to  better 
operation  of  these  arrangements,  and  we  hope 
governments  will  continue  to  improve  upon  their 
efforts  in  this  area.  We  cannot  prevent  problems 
if  necessary  information  is  not  available  on  a 
timely  basis.  There  have  been  some  difficult  cases 
requiring  action  by  the  United  States  and  the 
exporting  coimtries  which  imavoidably  resulted 
in  some  interference  with  the  normal  flow  of 
trade.  The  United  States  regrets  very  much  the 
necessity  of  taking  these  actions  but  believes  that 
the  viability  of  this  arrangement  and  of  all  bi- 
lateral agreements  thereunder  depends  upon 
mutual  adlierence  to  their  terms.  We  would 
emphasize  again  that  it  is  the  joint  obligation  of 
exporting  and  importmg  countries  imder  the 
LTA  to  make  these  agreements  work. 

Future  of  the  Long-Term  Arrangement 

The  United  States,  in  giving  very  careful 
thought  to  the  future  of  the  LTA,  has  had  to 
consider  criticism  of  the  LTA  voiced  by  Ameri- 
can producers  and  labor  organizations  and  also 
by  many  in  the  U.S.  Congress.  They  have 
pointed  out  that  while  the  arrangement  contem- 
plates a  rate  of  growth  of  imports  equivalent  to 
5  percent  annually,  the  actual  growth  of  imports 
into  the  United  States  has  been  much  higher.  In 
addition  we  have  been  forced  to  acknowledge  the 
fimdamental  conflict  between  the  5-percent 
growth  formula  in  the  LTA  and  a  much  liigher 
actual  growth  of  imports  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  decline  in  the  output  of  cotton  textiles  in  the 
United  States,  now  below  the  levels  of  1961,  on 
the  other.  Thus  imports  have  been  mounting 
while  domestic  production  has  been  declining. 


November  10,   1969 


a  situation  which  has  produced  an  increasingly 
severe  impact  in  the  United  States  cotton  textile 
market. 

We  have  also  considered  the  views  of  export- 
ing countries  on  various  problems  they  have 
faced  during  the  life  of  the  LTA.  We  hope  this 
meeting  will  provide  further  insight  into  the 
views  of  other  participants  as  to  the  extension 
of  the  arrangement. 

The  LTA  in  a  Multifiber  Textile  World 

We  should  recognize  the  changes  that  have 
taken  place  in  world  trade  and  production  of 
textiles  and  the  emergence  of  today's  multifiber 
industry.  In  surveying  textile  developments  over 
the  life  of  this  arrangement,  one  cannot  help 
but  note  that  the  increase  in  the  relative  im- 
portance of  manmade  fiber  products  in  total  tex- 
tile production  is  one  of  the  most  conspicuous 
and  significant  facts  today.  While  cotton  con- 
sumption in  the  United  States  has  fallen  off, 
there  has  been  a  striking  increase  in  the  use  of 
manmade  fibers.  In  the  United  States  in  1961-62, 
when  the  LTA  was  negotiated,  manmade  fibers 
represented  only  30  percent  of  the  fibers  con- 
smned  by  the  United  States  textile  industry ;  cot- 
ton then  accoimted  for  over  60  percent.  Now 
manmade  fibers  account  for  more  than  50  per- 
cent of  consumption  as  cotton's  importance  has 
declined,  and  this  trend  is  continuing.  Blended 
goods  have  also  become  a  major  factor  in  the 
market  and  are  now  a  major  component  of 
United  States  textile  imports.  Indeed,  during 
1969,  for  the  first  time,  imports  of  maimiade 
fiber  textile  products  are  exceedmg  imports  of 
cotton  textile  products. 

The  tremendous  surge  of  manmade  fiber  tex- 
tile imports  is  of  major  concern  to  the  United 
States  Government.  This  year  these  imports  are 
running  at  an  annual  rate  of  1.8  billion  yards. 
Imports  of  manmade  fiber  apparel  are  run- 
ning at  an  annual  rate  of  930  million  yards,  as 
compared  with  558  million  yards  in  1968  and  92 
million  yards  in  1964.  These  imports  in  8  months 
of  1969  are  well  above  cotton  apparel  imports 
and  already  exceed  total  cotton  apparel  imports 
for  1968  by  more  than  100  million  yards.  In  this 
field  also,  as  in  cotton,  the  trend  is  toward  the 
importation  of  apparel  and  other  of  the  more 
labor  intensive  goods. 

At  the  same  time  wool  textile  imports  are  run- 
ning at  very  high  levels,  with  a  similar  emphasis 
on  more  highly  manufactured  goods.  Penetra- 


405 


tion  of  the  United  States  market  for  these  prod- 
ucts is  at  an  all-time  high,  with  imports 
enjoj'ing  more  than  one-fourth  of  the  domestic 
market.  The  decline  in  imports  of  certain  prod- 
ucts from  last  year's  level  notwithstanding, 
imports  of  wool  apparel  are  33  percent  above  the 
levels  reached  in  1966  and  1967.  Overall  U.S.  im- 
ports of  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  tex- 
tiles are  at  an  annual  rate  tliis  year  of  3.7  billion 
square  yards,  compared  with  3.3  billion  m  1968 
and  1.5  billion  in  1964.  The  import-consiunption 
ratios  for  these  products  have  doubled  in  recent 
years.  The  ratio  for  manmade  fiber  textiles  is 
now  at  the  point  reached  by  cotton  textiles  when 
the  LTA  was  negotiated.  The  wool  textile  ratio 
is  now  26  percent,  and  the  cotton  textile  ratio  is 
now  above  11  percent. 

Many  countries  that  began  their  trade  in  the 
cotton  textile  field  and  which  entered  into 
agreements  with  the  United  States  imder  the 
LTA  now  export  more  than  four  times  as  much 
maixmade  fiber  textiles  to  the  United  States  as 
they  do  cotton  textiles.  Other  countries  are  be- 
ginning to  ship  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  are 
expanding  their  exports  to  us  very  rapidly.  In 
our  view  the  dramatic  growth  of  these  imports 
carries  with  it  the  same  serious  problems  of 
market  disruption  that  existed  for  cotton  tex- 
tile products  at  the  birth  of  the  LTA  8  years 
ago. 

A  number  of  importing  and  exporting  coun- 
tries have  recognized  the  existence  of  problems 
in  these  areas  and  have  taken  action,  by  agree- 
ment and  otherwise,  to  regulate  the  flow  of  trade 
in  these  goods.  These  actions  have  had  the  effect 
of  channeling  exports  to  the  markets  of  coim- 
tries  that  do  not  have  such  restrictions.  The 
United  States  market  is  the  only  major  unre- 
stricted market  in  the  world.  This  situation  has 
been  a  major  contributing  factor  in  the  overall 
United  States  textile  import  problem,  a  problem 
which  requires  an  international  solution. 

The  United  States  remains  prepared  at  this 
time  to  accept  continued  growth  on  a  reason- 
able and  orderly  basis  m  the  exports  of  these 
products  to  the  United  States  market.  We  be- 
lieve most  firndy,  however,  that  this  trade  must 
be  on  an  orderly  basis  and  the  growth  in  our 
market  shared  equitably  by  both  domestic  and 
foreign  manufacturers. 

The  dramatic  increase  in  imports  of  man- 
made  fiber  and  wool  textiles  in  recent  years  has 
far  outpaced  the  growth  of  the  United  States 
market.  By  no  measure  can  this  be  considered 
an  orderly  trade  situation.  American  manufac- 


tures have  been  put  imder  heavy  pressure. 
Plants  have  been  closed,  operations  transferred 
overseas,  and  textile  investments  deferred  on 
the  grounds  that  disruptive  competition  from 
exporting  countries  will  not  alloM-  the  neces- 
sary return  on  investment.  This  trend  erodes 
the  strength  of  our  textile  industry  and 
has  potentially  wide-ranging  consequences 
for  the  United  States.  It  is  a  trend  to  which 
the  United  States  Government  carmot  remain 
indifferent.  It  is  not  our  desire  to  choke 
off  trade.  But  neither  can  we  permit  trade  to 
choke  off  our  textile  industry  or  its  growth.  We 
fully  recognize  the  importance  of  this  trade  to 
the  exporting  countries,  but  while  we  are  pre- 
pared to  accept  a  reasonable  growth  in  our  tex- 
tile imports,  we  are  determined  to  ensure  that 
it  be  on  an  orderly  basis. 

U.S.  Textile  and  Apparel  Industries 

It  is  not  widely  recognized  or  realized  that  in 
the  United  States,  a  highly  industrialized  coun- 
try, the  textile  and  apparel  industry  remains  in 
this  day  the  largest  employer  of  labor  of  any 
U.S.  manufacturing  industry.  It  employs  one- 
eighth  of  the  entire  manufacturing  work  force 
of  the  United  States.  In  addition,  it  is  the  sole 
customer  of  some  200,000  farms  producing  raw 
wool  and  it  is  the  principal  customer  for  our 
500,000  farms  that  produce  cotton.  Many  thou- 
sands more  depend  on  this  industry's  consump- 
tion of  manmade  fibers,  fuel  and  energy,  goods 
and  services,  and  all  of  the  myriad  elements 
which  lielp  the  industry  fimction. 

The  United  States  faces  a  major  social  prob- 
lem, and  the  textile  and  apparel  industry  is 
helping  to  ameliorate  it.  This  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  this  industry  makes  a  major  contribution  in 
the  hiring  and  training  of  underskilled  disad- 
vantaged persons  in  the  United  States,  particu- 
larly those  in  minority  groups.  A  threat  to  this 
industry  is  a  threat  to  those  persons  m  our  labor 
force  who  have  most  difficulty  in  securing  em- 
ployment in  the  first  place  and  who  would  face 
even  greater  difficulty  in  finding  alternative  job 
opportunities.  The  present  and  potential  con- 
tribution of  the  textile  and  apparel  industry  in 
providing  employment  for  this  large  group  of 
people  cannot  be  overestimated. 

There  are  many  in  the  United  States  who  feel 
that  the  only  viable  solution  to  the  textile  prob- 
lems we  face  should  be  attained  through  im- 
port quotas  enacted  in  legislation.  It  has  been 
my  Government's  view  that  rather  than  resort 


406 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


fl 


to  legislation  we  should  negotiate  acceptable  in- 
ternational arrangements  ■which  would  estab- 
lish a  reasonable  and  orderly  basis  for  the  devel- 
opment of  the  United  States  textile  market  and 
for  the  continued  growth  of  U.S.  textile  im- 
ports. President  Nixon  has  stated  his  commit- 
ment to  work  for  solutions  that  will  bring  about 
the  orderly  flow  of  imports  into  the  textile  mar- 
ket. We  are  endeavoring  to  do  that  and  cannot 
urge  too  strongly  the  cooperation  of  our  textile 
trading  partners. 

In  conclusion,  the  United  States  believes  the 
LTA  has  worked  well,  with  benefits  to  both  ex- 
porters and  importers,  and  should  continue  to 
do  so  in  the  future.  We  support  its  continuation 
beyond  September  30, 1970. 

We  are  most  interested  in  hearing  the  views 
of  others  on  the  issues  at  hand. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  on  tlie  international  recognition  of  rights  in 
aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June  19.  1948.  Entered  into 
force  September  17,  1953.  TIAS  2847. 
Adherence  deposited:  Paraguay,  September  26,  1969. 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts  com- 
mitted on   board  aircraft.   Done  at  Toliyo  Septem- 
ber 14,  1963.   Enters  into  force  December  4,  1969. 
TIAS  6768. 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  October  1, 1969. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations.  Opened  for 
signature  at  Vienna  April  24, 1963.  Entered  into  force 
March  19,  1967.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  October  22, 
1969. 

Optional  protocol,  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  consular 
relations,  concerning  the  compulsory  settlement  of 
disputes.  Opened  for  signature  at  Vienna  April  24, 
1963.  Entered  into  force  March  19, 1967.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  October  22, 
1969. 

Copyright 

Protocol  1  annexed  to  the  universal  copyright  conven- 
tion concerning  the  application  of  that  convention  to 
the  works  of  stateless  persons  and  refugees.  Done 
at  Geneva  September  6,  1952.  Entered  into  force 
September  16,  1955.  TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Australia,  July  24,  1969. 


Protocol  2  annexed  to  the   universal   copyright  con- 
vention concerning  the  application  of  that  convention 
to  the  works  of  certain  international  organizations. 
Done  at   Geneva   September  6,   1952.   Entered  Into 
force  September  16, 1955.  TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Australia,  July  24,  1969. 
Protocol  3  annexed  to  the  universal  copyright  conven- 
tion concerning  the  effective  date  of  instrmnents  of 
ratification  or  acceptance  of  or  accession   to   that 
convention.  Done  at  Geneva  September  6,  1952.  En- 
tered into  force  August  19, 19.54 ;  for  the  United  States 
December  6, 19.54.  TIAS  3324. 
Ratification  deposited:  Australia,  July  24,  1969. 

Fisheries 

Convention  on  conduct  of  fishing  operations  in  the 
North  Atlantic,  with  annexes.  Done  at  London  June 
1,  1967.  Open  for  signature  June  1  to  November  30, 
1967.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification :  October  22, 
1969. 

Labor 

International  Labor  Organization  convention  (no.  53) 
concerning  the  minimum  requirement  of  professional 
capacity  for  masters  and  officers  on  board  merchant 
ships.  Adopted  by  the  International  Labor  Confer- 
ence, 21st  session,  Geneva,  October  24,  1936.  54  Stat 
1683. 
Ratification  registered:  Israel,  June  19,  1969. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measurement  of 
ships,  1969.  Done  at  London  June  23,  1969.  Enters 
into  force  24  months  after  the  date  on  which  not 
less  than  25  governments  of  states  the  combined 
merchant  fleets  of  which  constitute  not  less  than  65 
percent  of  the  gross  tonnage  of  the  world's  mer- 
chant shipping  have  signed  without  reservation  as 
to  acceptance  or  deposited  instruments  of  accept- 
ance or  accession. 

Signatures:  Argentina,  Belgium,  Brazil,  Bulgaria, 
Canada,  Republic  of  China,  Denmark,  Finland, 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Ghana,  Greece,  Ice- 
land, Indonesia,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Korea,  Ku- 
wait, Liberia,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Philippines, 
Poland,  Portugal,  Switzerland,  U.S.S.R.,  United 
Arab  Republic  (with  declaration),  United  King- 
dom, United  States,  Venezuela,  and  Yugoslavia, 
June  23,  1969.' 

War 

Geneva  convention  relative  to  treatment  of  prisoners 

of  war ; 
Geneva   convention  for  amelioration  of  condition  of 

wounded  and  sick  in  armed  forces  in  the  field; 
Geneva  convention  for  amelioration   of  condition  of 
wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked  members  of  armed 
forces  at  sea ; 
Geneva   convention  relative  to  protection  of  civilian 
persons  in  time  of  war. 
Dated  at  Geneva  August  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
October  21,  1950;  for  the  United  States  February  2, 
1956.      TIAS      3364,      3362,      3363,      and      3365, 
respectively. 
Ratification   deposited:  Ethiopia,   October  13,  1969. 
Adherence  deposited:  Costa  Rica,  October  15,  1969. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

'  Not  in  force. 

'  All  subject  to  ratification  or  acceptance. 


November  10,   1969 


407 


Whaling 

Amendments  to  paragraphs  4(1)  (a),  6(1),  and  8(a) 
to  the  schedule  to  the  international  whaling  conven- 
tion of  December  2,  1W6  (TIAS  1849).  Adopted  at 
London  June  23-27,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
October  6,  1969. 


BILATERAL 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  October  1,  1969. 
Operative  October  1, 1969. 

India 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  re- 
lating to  the  agreement  of  February  20,  1967  (TIAS 
6221).  Signed  at  New  Delhi  October  13, 1969.  Entered 
into  force  October  13,  1969. 

Japan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  September  2, 

1968,  relating  to  the  establishment  by  Japan  of  a 
satellite  tracking  station  in  Okinawa  (TIAS  6558). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  September  25, 

1969.  Entered  into  force  September  25, 1969. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  May  11,  1967  (TIAS  6258). 
Signed  at  Islamabad  October  3,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  October  3, 1969. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  Releases  Publication 
of  Human  Rights  Year  Commission 

Press  release  314  dated  October  22 

"For  Free  Men  in  a  Free  World — A  Survey  of  Human 
Rights  in  the  United  States"  was  released  by  the  De- 
partment of  State  on  October  22.  The  book  is  a  first  in 
Its  field;  It  takes  the  standards  set  In  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Eights,  adopted  by  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  December  10,  1948,  and  for  each 
of  its  30  articles  measures  the  progress  made  in  the 
United  States  in  terms  of  practice,  laws,  constitutional 
provisions,  and  court  decisions.  The  250-page  book  was 
prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  President's  Com- 
mission for  the  Observance  of  Human  Rights  Year 
1968. 

The  President's  Commission  for  the  Observance  of 
Human  Rights  Year — the  20th  anniversary  of  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights — 
was  established  by  Executive  order  of  President  John- 


son on  January  30,  1968.  It  completed  its  activities  I 
1  year  later ;  however,  some  of  the  publications  it  inl-  j 
tiated  were  released  after  that  date.  The  Commission  j 
was  composed  of  the  heads  of  seven  Federal  depart- 
ments and  agencies  and  11  private  citizens.  W.  Averell  | 
Harriman  was  Chairman,  Mrs.  Anna  Roosevelt  Halsted  i 
was  Vice-Chairman,  and  James  Frederick  Green  was  I 
Executive  Director  of  the  Commission. 

"For  Free  Men  in  a  Free  World — A  Survey  of  Human  . 
Rights  in  the  United  States"    (Department  of  State 
publication  8434)  is  for  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washing- 
ton, D.C.  20402,  at  $1.25  each. 


Recent  Releases 


For  sale  hy  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  Z0402. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders 
for  100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed 
to  the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Su- 
perintendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

To  Continue  Action  for  Human  Rights.  Final  Report  of 
the  President's  Commission  for  the  Observance  of 
Human  Rights  Year  1968.  62  pp.  350.  Published  for  the 
Commission  by  the  Department  of  State. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  India 
amending  the  agreement  of  December  23,  19(58.  TIAS 
6691.  4  pp.  10(;t. 

Atomic  Energy— Application  of  Safeguards  by  the 
IAEA  to  the  United  States-Turkey  Cooperation  Agree- 
ment, Agreement  with  Turkey  and  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency.  TIAS  6692.  8  pp.  10«f. 

Embassy  Sites.  Agreement  with  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  6693.  22  pp.  504. 

Scientific  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  Iran.  TIAS 
6694.  2  pp.  10<f. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Ghana. 
TIAS  6695.  4  pp.  10(f. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Domini- 
can Republic.  TIAS  6696.  22  pp.  15(>. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Domini- 
can Republic.  TIAS  6697.  4  pp.  10(f. 


Correction 

The  Editor  of  the  Bdtxetin  wishes  to  call  at- 
tention to  an  error  which  appears  in  the  issue  of 
September  22, 1969,  p.  257. 

The  footnote  is  incorrect.  Under  Secretary 
Richardson  made  the  address  before  a  luncheon 
meeting  of  the  International  Studies  Association. 


408 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX      November  10,  1969     Vol.  LXL  No.  1585 


Chad.  U.S.  Ail-craft  To  A.ssist  in  Famine  Relief 
in   Cliacl    (.Deiiartmeiit   statement)      ....       403 

Disarmament 

Sefretary  Kogers  Distnsses  Forthcoming  U.S.- 
U.S.S.il.  Talks  on  Curbing  Strategic  Arms 
(news  conference) 389 

US  and  U.S.S.R.  Announce  Preliminary  Arms 
Talks 390 

Economic  Affairs.  Seventh  Annual  Review  of 
the  Long-Term  Cotton  Textile  Arrangement 
(Brodie) -tO^ 

Foreign  Aid.  U.S.  Aircraft  To  Assist  in  Famine 
Relief  in  Chad  (Department  statement)     .     .      403 

Human  Rights.  Department  Releases  Publica- 
tion of  Human  Rights  Year  Commission     .     .       408 

India.  Second  Round  of  Bilateral  Talks  With 
India  Held  at  Washington  (joint  statement)    .       403 

International   Organizations   and   Conferences. 

Seventh   Annual   Review    of   the    Long-Term 
Cotton  Textile  Arrangement  (Brodie)     .     .     .      404 

Iran.  President  Nixon  and  the  Shah  of  Iran  Hold 
Talks  at  Washington   (Nixon,  Pahlavi)     .     .      39C 

Japan.  United  States-Japanese  Relations  Today 

(Johnson) 401 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  Secretary 
Rogers  Welcomes  Atlantic  Treaty  Associa- 
tion (remarks) -100 

Presidential  Documents.  President  Nixon  and 
the  Shah  of  Iran  Hold  Talks  at  Washington     .       396 

Publications 

Department    Releases     I'ublication    of    Human 

Rights  Year  Ctmimission 408 

Recent  Releases 408 

Trade 

Seventh  Annual  Review  of  the  Long-Term  Cot- 
ton Textile  .Vrrangement   (Brodie)     ....       4(^4 

United      States-Japanese      Relations       Today 

(Johnson) 401 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions     ....      407 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Roger.s  Discusses  Forthcoming  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  Talks  on  Curbing  Strategic  Arms 
(news  conference) 389 

U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  Announce  Preliminary  Arms 
Talks 390 

Viet-Nam 

The    Deep    Concern    for    Peace    in    Viet-Nam 

(Rogers) 394 


39th  Plenai-y  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  I'aris 

(Lodge) 39.-5 

A'awc  Indea- 

Brodie,  Henry 404 

Johnson,  U.  Alexis 401 

Lodge,    Henry   Cabot 39.5 

Nixon,  President 396 

Pahlavi,  Mohammad  Reza  Shah 396 

Rogers,   Secretary 389,394,400 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  October  20-26 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  October  20  \\hich  ap- 
(lears  in  this  issue  of  the  Bu'LLETIN  is  No.  308  of 
October  17. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 

*300     10/20     Program  for  tlie  visit  of  the  Shall 
of  Iran. 

310  10/20     Rogers:   Atlantic   Treaty   Associa- 

tion. 

311  10/20     Rogers :    "Family  of  JIan"  Award 

ceremony. 

312  10/22     John.son :     U.S.-Japan     (iovernors 

meeting. 
f'ilo    10,'22     I'.S.  and  Republic  of  China  amend 
air  agreement. 

314  l(»/22     Department    relea.ses     "For    Free 

>Ien  in  a  Free  World — A  Survey 
of  Hiunan  Rights  in  the  United 
States." 

315  10/23     Lodge :    39th   plenary   meeting   on 

A'iet-Nam  at  Paris. 
t316     10/24     U.S.-Costa     Rica     cotton     textile 

agreement. 
*317     10/24     Knox  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Haiti    ( biographic  data ) . 
318     10/25     Rogers :  news  conference. 


*  Not  printed. 


t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 

u.s.  government  printing  office 

washington.  d.c.   20402 


OFFICIAL   BUSINESS 


POSTAGE  AND    FEES    PAID 
U  S     GOVERNMENT   PRINTING  OFF 


N   AVT    O 

20YEARS  OF  PEACE 


i 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 


Boston  Public  Library 
ouperintendeat  of  Documents 


BULLETIN 


DEPOSITORY 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1586 


November  17,  1969 


ACTION  FOR  PROGRESS  FOR  THE  AMERICAS 
Address  by  President  Nixon     409 

DEPARTMENT  PRESENTS  VIEWS  ON  SOUTHERN  RHODESIA 

/Statement  hy  Assistant  Secretary  Newsom     422 


THE  NATO  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  CHALLENGES  OF  MODERN  SOCIETY: 
RESPONSE  TO  A  COMJNION  ENVIRONMENTAL  PERIL 

hy   Daniel  P.   Moynihan     416 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1586 
November  17,  1969 


I 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Oovemment  Printing  OfBce 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

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the  Budget  (January  11,  1960). 

Note:     Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  .source  -will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical   Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  icell  as  special 
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tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative nuiterial  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  arc  listed  currently. 


I 


Action  for  Progress  for  the  Americas 


Address  hi/  President  Nixon  ^ 


As  we  stand  here  on  this  25th-anuiversary 
meeting  of  tlie  Inter  American  Press  Associa- 
tion, I  should  like  to  be  pex-mitted  some  per- 
sonal comments  before  I  then  deliver  my 
prepared  remarks  to  you. 

I  have  learned  that  this  is  the  first  occasion 
in  which  the  remarks  of  the  President  of  any 
one  of  the  American  nations  has  been  carried 
and  is  being  carried  live  by  Telstar  to  all  of  the 
nations  in  the  hemisphere.  We  are  proud  that 
it  is  before  the  Inter  American  Press  Associa- 
tion. I  am  sure  that  those  of  you,  and  I  know 
that  most  of  you  here  are  members  and  pub- 
lishers of  the  newspaper  profession,  will  not  be 
jealous  if  this  is  on  television  tonight. 

Also,  I  am  vei-y  privileged  to  appear  before 
tliis  organization  again.  I  was  reminded  it  was 
15  years  ago  that  I,  as  Vice  President,  addressed 
the  organization  in  New  Orleans.  It  is  good  to 
be  with  you  tonight,  and  particularly  as  the 
outgoing  President  is  an  old  friend,  Mr.  Ed- 
wards [Augustin  E.  Edwards,  president.  El 
Mercvrio'\  from  Santiago.  The  new  President  is 
also  an  old  friend,  Mr.  Copley  [James  Copley, 
president,  Copley  Press]  from  San  Diego — 
sister  cities,  one  in  the  Northern  Hemisphere 
of  the  Americas  and  the  other  in  the  Southern 
Hemisphere. 

There  is  one  other  remark  that  Mrs.  Ed- 
wards brought  eloquently  to  my  attention  as 
we  heard  that  magnificent  rendition  by  the 
Army  Chorus  of  "America  the  Beautiful." 
She  said,  "That  is  for  all  of  us.  We  are  all 
Americans  in  this  room." 

It  is  in  that  spirit  that  I  want  to  address 
my  remarks  tonight  to  our  partnership  in  the 
Americas.  In  doing  so,  I  wish  to  place  before 
you  some  suggestions  for  reshaping  and  re- 
invigorating  that  partnership. 


'  Made  before  the  Inter  American  Press  Association 
at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Oct.  31  (White  House  press 
release). 


Often  we  in  the  United  States  have  been 
charged  with  an  overweening  confidence  in  the 
rightness  of  our  own  prescriptions,  and  occa- 
sionally we  have  been  guilty  of  the  charge.  I 
intend  to  correct  that.  Therefore,  my  words 
tonight  are  meant  as  an  invitation  by  one  part- 
ner for  further  interchange,  for  increased  com- 
munication, and,  above  all,  for  new  imagination 
in  meetmg  our  shared  responsibilities. 

For  years,  we  in  the  United  States  have  pur- 
sued the  illusion  that  we  alone  could  remake 
continents.  Conscious  of  our  wealth  and  tech- 
nology, seized  by  the  force  of  good  intentions, 
driven  by  habitual  impatience,  remembering 
the  dramatic  success  of  tlie  Marshall  Plan  in 
postwar  Europe,  we  have  sometimes  imagined 
that  we  knew  what  was  best  for  everyone  else 
and  that  we  could  and  should  make  it  happen. 

Well,  experience  has  taught  us  better.  It  has 
taught  us  that  economic  and  social  development 
is  not  an  achievement  of  one  nation's  foreign 
policy,  but  something  deeply  rooted  in  each 
nation's  own  traditions.  It  has  taught  us  that 
aid  that  infringes  pride  is  no  favor  to  any 
nation.  It  has  taught  us  that  each  nation,  and 
each  region,  must  be  true  to  its  own  character. 

"Wliat  I  hope  we  can  achieve,  therefore,  is  a 
more  mature  partnership  in  which  all  voices  are 
heard  and  none  is  predominant,  a  partnership 
guided  by  a  healthy  awareness  that  give-and- 
take  is  better  than  take-it-or-leave-it. 

My  suggestions  this  evening  for  new  direc- 
tions toward  a  more  balanced  relationship  come 
from  many  sources. 

First,  they  are  rooted  in  my  personal  con- 
victions. I  have  seen  the  problems  of  tliis  hemi- 
sphere. As  those  in  this  room  know,  I  have 
\'isited  every  nation  in  this  hemisphere.  I  have 
seen  them  at  first  hand.  I  have  felt  the  surging 
spirit  of  those  nations — determined  to  break 
the  grip  of  outmoded  structures,  yet  equally  de- 
termined to  avoid  social  disintegration.  Free- 


November  17,   1969 


409 


doni,  justice,  a  chance  for  each  of  our  people  to 
live  a  better  and  more  abundant  life — these  are 
goals  to  which  I  am  unshakably  committed; 
because  progress  in  our  hemisphere  is  not  only  a 
practical  necessity,  it  is  a  moral  imperative. 

Second,  these  new  approaches  lia\e  been  sub- 
stantially shaped  by  the  report  of  Governor 
Rockefeller,  who,  at  my  request  and  at  your 
invitation,  listened  perceptively  to  the  voices 
of  our  neighbors  and  incorjjorated  their 
thoughts  into  a  set  of  foresighted  proposals. 

Third,  they  are  consistent  with  thoughts  ex- 
pressed in  the  Consensus  of  Viiia  del  Mar, 
which  we  have  studied  with  great  care. 

Fourth,  they  have  benefited  from  the  counsel 
of  many  persons  in  government  and  out,  in  this 
country  and  throughout  the  hemisphere. 

And  finally,  basically,  they  reflect  the  con- 
cern of  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  the 
development  and  progress  of  a  hemisphere 
which  is  new  in  spirit  and  which — through  our 
efforts  together — we  can  make  new  in  accom- 
plishment. 

Actions  Representing  a  New  Approach 

Tonight  I  offer  no  grandiose  promises  and  no 
panaceas. 

I  do  offer  action. 

The  actions  I  propose  represent  a  new  ap- 
proach. They  are  based  on  five  principles : 

— First,  a  firm  conunitment  to  the  inter- 
American  system,  to  the  compacts  which  bind 
us  in  that  system,  as  exemplified  by  the  Orga- 
nization of  American  States  and  by  the 
principles  so  nobly  set  forth  in  its  charter. 

— Second,  respect  for  national  identity  and 
national  dignity  in  a  partnership  in  which 
rights  and  responsibilities  are  shared  by  a  com- 
munity of  independent  states. 

— Tliird,  a  firm  commitment  to  continued 
United  States  assistance  for  hemispheric  de- 
velopment. 

— Fourth,  a  belief  that  the  principal  future 
pattern  of  this  assistance  must  be  U.S.  support 
for  Latin  American  initiatives  and  that  this  can 
best  be  achieved  on  a  multilateral  basis  witliin 
the  inter- American  system. 

— Finally,  a  dedication  to  improving  the  qual- 
ity of  life  in  this  New  World  of  ours — to  making 
people  the  center  of  our  concerns  and  to  helping 
meet  their  economic,  social,  and  human  needs. 

We  have  heard  many  voices  from  the  Ameri- 


cas in  these  first  months  of  our  new  administra- 
tion— voices  of  hope,  voices  of  concern,  and 
some  voices  of  frustration. 

We  have  listened. 

These  voices  have  told  us  they  wanted  fewer 
promises  and  more  action.  They  have  told  us 
that  the  United  States  aid  programs  seemed  to 
have  helped  the  United  States  more  than  Latin 
America.  They  have  told  us  that  our  trade 
policies  were  insensitive  to  the  needs  of  other 
American  nations.  They  have  told  us  that  if  our 
partnership  is  to  thrive  or  even  to  survive,  we 
must  recognize  that  the  nations  of  the  Americas 
must  go  forward  in  their  own  way  imder  their 
own  leadership. 

Now,  it  is  not  my  purpose  here  tonight  to  dis- 
cuss the  extent  to  which  we  consider  the  various 
charges  that  I  have  listed  right  or  wrong.  But 
I  recognize  the  concerns.  I  share  many  of  them. 
What  I  propose  tonight  is,  I  believe,  respon- 
sive to  those  concerns. 

The  most  pressing  concerns  center  on  eco- 
nomic development  and  especially  on  the  poli- 
cies by  wMch  aid  is  administered  and  by  which 
trade  is  regulated. 

In  proposing  specific  changes  tonight,  I  mean 
these  as  examples  of  the  actions  I  believe  are 
possible  in  a  new  kind  of  partnership  in  the 
Americas. 

Management  of  Development  Assistance 

Our  partnership  should  be  one  in  which  the 
United  States  lectures  less  and  listens  more.  It 
should  be  one  in  which  clear,  consistent  proce- 
dures are  established  to  ensure  that  the  shaping 
of  the  future  of  the  nations  in  the  Americas 
reflects  the  will  of  those  nations. 

I  believe  this  requires  a  number  of  changes. 

To  begin  with,  it  requires  a  fundamental 
change  in  the  way  in  which  we  manage  develop- 
ment assistance  in  the  hemisphere. 

That  is  whj'  I  propose  that  a  multilateral 
inter-American  agency  be  given  an  increasing 
share  of  responsibility  for  development  assist- 
ance decisions.  CIAP — the  Inter-American 
Committee  on  the  Alliance  for  Progress — could 
be  given  this  new  fimction.  Or  an  entirely  new 
agency  could  be  created  within  the  system. 

Wliatever  the  form,  the  objective  would  be 
to  evolve  an  effective  multilatei-al  framework 
for  bilateral  assistance,  to  provide  the  agency 
with  an  expert  international  staff,  and,  over 
time,  to  give  it  major  operational  and  decision- 
making responsibilities. 


410 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  other  American  nations  themselves 
would  thus  jointly  assume  a  primary  role  in 
setting  priorities  within  the  hemisphere,  in  de- 
veloping realistic  programs,  in  keeping  their 
own  performance  under  critical  review. 

Access  to  Expanding  Markets 

One  of  the  areas  most  urgently  in  need  of  new 
policies  is  the  area  of  trade.  In  my  various  trips 
to  the  Latin  American  countries  and  other 
American  countries,  I  have  found  that  this  has 
been  uppermost  on  the  minds  of  the  leaders  for 
many,  many  years.  In  order  to  finance  their  im- 
port needs  and  to  achieve  self-sustaining 
growth,  the  other  American  nations  must  ex- 
pand their  exports. 

Most  Latin  American  exports  now  are  raw 
materials  and  foodstuffs.  We  are  attempting  to 
help  the  other  countries  of  the  hemisphere 
to  stabilize  their  earnings  from  these  exports,  to 
increase  them  as  time  goes  on. 

Increasingly,  however,  those  countries  will 
have  to  turn  more  toward  manufactured  and 
semimanufactured  products  for  balanced  devel- 
opment and  major  export  growth.  Thus  they 
need  to  be  assured  of  access  to  the  expanding 
markets  of  the  industrialized  world.  In  order  to 
help  achieve  this,  I  have  determined  to  take  the 
following  major  steps : 

— First,  to  lead  a  vigorous  effort  to  reduce 
the  nontariff  barriers  to  trade  maintained  by 
nearly  all  industrialized  countries  against  prod- 
ucts of  particular  interest  to  Latin  America  and 
other  developing  countries. 

— Second,  to  support  increased  technical  and 
financial  assistance  to  promote  Latin  American 
trade  expansion. 

— Third,  to  support  the  establishment  within 
the  inter-American  system  of  regular  proce- 
dures for  advance  consultation  on  trade  mat- 
ters. United  States  trade  policies  often  have  a 
very  heavy  impact  on  our  neighbors.  It  seems 
only  fair  that  in  the  more  balanced  relationship 
we  seek,  there  should  be  full  consultation  within 
the  hemisphere  family  before  decisions  affecting 
its  members  are  taken,  not  after. 

— Finally,  and  most  important,  in  world 
trade  forums,  I  believe  it  is  time  to  press  for  a 
liberal  system  of  generalized  tariff  preferences 
for  all  developing  countries,  including  Latin 
America.  We  will  seek  adoption  by  all  of  the 
industrialized  nations  of  a  scheme  with  broad 
product  coverage  and  with  no  ceilings  on  pref- 


erential imports.  We  will  seek  equal  access  to 
industrial  markets  for  all  developing  countries 
so  as  to  eliminate  the  discrimination  against 
Latin  America  that  now  exists  in  many  coun- 
tries. We  will  also  urge  that  such  a  system  elim- 
inate the  inequitable  "reverse  preferences"  that 
now  discriminate  against  Western  Hemisphere 
coimtries. 

Restrictions  on  Assistance  Loans   Reduced 

There  are  three  other  important  economic  is- 
sues that  directly  involve  the  new  partnership 
concept  and  which  a  number  of  our  partners 
have  raised.  They  raised  them  with  me  and 
raised  them  with  Governor  Eockefeller,  with 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  others  in  our 
administration. 

These  are :  "tied"  loans,  debt  service,  and  re- 
gional economic  integration. 

For  several  years  now,  virtually  all  loans 
made  under  United  States  aid  programs  have 
been  "tied";  that  is,  as  you  know,  they  have 
been  encumbered  with  restrictions  designed  to 
maintain  United  States  exports,  including  a  re- 
quirement that  the  money  be  spent  on  purchases 
in  the  United  States. 

These  restrictions  have  been  burdensome  for 
the  borrowers.  They  have  impaired  the  effective- 
ness of  the  aid.  In  June  I  ordered  the  most 
cumbersome  restrictions  removed.^ 

In  addition,  I  announce  tonight  that  I  am 
now  ordering  that,  effective  November  1,  loan 
dollars  sent  to  Latin  America  under  AID  be 
freed  to  allow  purchases  not  only  here  but  any- 
where in  Latin  America. 

As  a  third  step,  I  am  also  ordering  that  all 
other  onerous  conditions  and  restrictions  on 
U.S.  assistance  loans  be  reviewed  with  the  ob- 
jective of  modifying  or  eliminating  them. 

If  I  might  add  a  personal  word,  this  decision 
on  freeing  AID  loans  is  one  of  those  things 
that  people  kept  saying  ought  to  be  done  but 
could  not  be  done.  In  light  of  our  own  balance- 
of-payments  problems,  there  were  compelling 
arguments  against  it.  I  can  assure  you  that 
within  the  administration  we  had  a  very  vigor- 
ous session  on  this  subject.  But  I  felt,  and  the 
rest  of  my  colleagues  within  the  administra- 
tion felt,  that  the  needs  of  the  hemisphere  had 
to  come  first,  so  I  simply  ordered  it  done,  show- 


21. 


'  For  background,  see  Buixetest  of  July  14,  1969,  p. 


November  17,  1969 


411 


ing  our  commitment  in  actions  latlier  than  only 
in  words.  This  will  be  our  guiding  principle  in 
the  future. 

We  have  present  many  Members  of  the  House 
and  Senate  here  tonight.  I  am  sure  they  realize 
that  there  are  not  too  many  occasions  that  the 
I'resident  can  accomplish  something  by  just 
ordering  it  to  be  done. 

Debt  Service  and   Economic  Integration 

The  growing  burden  of  external  debt  service 
has  increasingly  become  a  major  problem  of  fu- 
ture development.  Some  countries  find  them- 
selves making  heavy  payments  in  debt  service 
which  reduce  tlie  positive  effects  of  development 
aid.  Therefore,  tonight  I  suggest  that  CIAP 
might  appropriately  urge  the  international 
financial  organizations  to  recommend  possible 
remedies. 

We  have  seen  a  number  of  moves  in  the 
Americas  toward  regional  economic  integra- 
tion, such  as  the  establishment  of  the  Central 
American  Common  Market,  the  Latm  Ameri- 
can and  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Areas,  and  the 
Andean  Group.  The  decisions  on  how  far  and 
how  fast  this  process  of  integration  goes,  of 
course,  are  not  ours  to  make.  But  I  do  want  to 
stress  this :  We  in  the  United  States  stand  ready 
to  help  in  this  effort  if  our  help  is  requested  and 
is  needed. 

On  all  of  these  matters,  we  look  forward  to 
consulting  further  with  our  hemisphere  neigh- 
bors and  partners.  In  a  major  related  move,  I 
am  also  directing  our  representatives  to  invite 
CIAP,  as  a  regular  procedure,  to  conduct  a 
periodic  review  of  U.S.  economic  policies  as 
they  affect  the  other  nations  of  the  hemisphere 
and  to  consult  with  us  about  them. 

Similar  reviews  are  now  made  of  the  other 
hemisphere  countries'  policies,  as  you  are 
aware;  but  the  United  States  has  not  previ- 
ously opened  its  policies  to  such  consultation.  I 
believe  that  true  partnership  requires  that  we 
should ;  and  henceforth,  if  our  partners  so  de- 
sire— as  I  gather  from  your  applause  you  do— 
we  shall. 

I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  a  vital  subject  in 
connection  with  economic  development  in  the 
hemisphere;  namely,  the  role  of  private  invest- 
ment. Clearly,  each  government  in  the  Americas 
must  make  its  own  decision  about  the  place  of 
private  investment,  domestic  and  foreign,  in 


its  development  process.  Each  must  decide  for 
itself  whether  it  wishes  to  accept  or  forgo  the 
benefits  that  private  investment  can  bring. 

Advantages  of  Private  Investment 

For  a  developing  country,  consti'uctive  for- 
eign private  investment  has  the  special  advan- 
tage of  being  a  prime  vehicle  for  the  transfer 
of  teclinology.  And  certainly  from  no  other 
source  is  so  much  investment  capital  available, 
because  capital  from  government  to  govern- 
ment on  that  basis  is  not  expansible.  In  fact,  it 
tends  to  be  more  restricted,  whereas  private 
capital  can  be  greatly  expanded. 

As  we  have  seen,  liowever,  just  as  a  capital- 
exporting  nation  cannot  expect  another  coun- 
try to  accept  investors  against  its  will,  so  must 
a  capital-importing  country  expect  a  serious 
impairment  of  its  ability  to  attract  investment 
funds  when  it  acts  against  existing  investments 
in  a  way  which  runs  counter  to  commonly  ac- 
cepted norms  of  international  law  and  behavior. 
Unfortunately  and  perhaps  unfairly,  such  acts 
in  one  of  the  Americas  affect  investors  in  the 
entire  region. 

We  will  not  encourage  U.S.  private  invest- 
ment where  it  is  not  wanted  or  where  local  con- 
ditions face  it  with  unwarranted  risks.  But  I 
must  state  my  own  strong  belief,  and  it  is  this : 
I  think  that  properly  motivated  private  enter- 
prise has  a  vitally  important  role  to  play  in 
social  as  well  as  economic  development  in  all  of 
the  nations.  We  have  seen  it  work  in  our  own 
country.  We  have  seen  it  work  in  other  coun- 
tries, whether  they  are  developing  or  developed, 
other  countries  that  lately  have  been  recording 
the  world's  most  spectacular  rates  of  economic 
growth. 

Referring  to  a  completely  other  area  of  the 
world,  exciting  stories  of  the  greatest  gi'owth 
rates  are  those  that  have  turned  toward  more 
private  investment  rather  than  less.  Japan  we 
all  know  about,  but  the  story  is  repeated  in 
Korea,  Taiwan,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  and 
Thailand. 

In  line  with  this  belief  we  are  examining 
ways  to  modify  our  direct  investment  controls 
in  order  to  help  meet  the  investment  require- 
ments of  developing  nations  in  the  Americas 
and  elsewhere.  I  have  further  directed  that  our 
aid  pi'ograms  place  increasing  emphasis  on  as- 
sistance to  locally  owned  private  enterprise.  I 


412 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


am  also  directing  that  we  expand  our  technical 
assistance  for  establishing  national  and  regional 
capital  markets. 

As  we  all  have  seen,  in  this  age  of  rapidly  ad- 
vancing science,  the  challenge  of  development 
is  only  partly  economic.  Science  and  technology 
increasingly  hold  the  key  to  our  national  fu- 
tures. If  the  promise  of  this  final  third  of  the 
20th  century  is  to  be  realized,  the  wonders  of 
science  must  be  turned  to  the  service  of  man. 

In  the  Consensus  of  Vina  del  Mar  we  were 
asked  for  an  unprecedented  effort  to  share  our 
scientific  and  technical  capabilities. 

To  that  request  we  shall  respond  in  a  true 
spirit  of  partnership. 

This  I  pledge  to  you  tonight:  Tlie  Nation 
that  went  to  the  moon  in  peace  for  all  mankind 
is  ready,  ready  to  share  its  teclinology  in  peace 
with  its  nearest  neighbors. 

Coordination  of  U.S.  Government  Activities 

Tonight  I  have  discussed  with  you  a  new 
concept  of  partnership.  I  have  made  a  commit- 
ment to  act.  I  have  been  trying  to  give  some 
examples  of  actions  we  are  prepared  to  take. 

But  as  anyone  familiar  with  government 
knows,  commitment  alone  is  not  enough.  There 
has  to  be  the  machinery  to  ensure  an  effective 
followthrough. 

Therefore,  I  am  also  directing  a  major  re- 
organization and  upgrading  of  the  United 
States  Government  structure  for  dealing  with 
Western  Hemisphere  affairs. 

As  a  key  element  of  this — and  this  is  one  of 
those  areas  where  the  President  cannot  do  it  and 
he  needs  the  approval  of  the  Congress — but  as 
a  key  element  of  this,  I  have  ordered  prepara- 
tion of  a  legislative  request,  which  I  will  submit 
to  the  Congress,  raising  the  rank  of  the  Assist- 
ant Secretary  of  State  for  Inter- American  Af- 
fairs to  Under  Secretary,  thus  giving  the  hem- 
isphere special  representation. 

I  know  that  many  in  this  room,  15  years  ago, 
urged  that  upon  me,  and  I  see  Mr.  Pedro  Bel- 
tran  here  particularly  applauding.  He  urged  it 
upon  me  just  a  few  years  ago,  too. 

I  trust  we  will  be  able,  through  the  new 
Under  Secretary  of  State,  to  do  a  more  effective 
job  with  regard  to  the  problems  of  the  hemi- 
sphere; and  the  new  Under  Secretary  will  be 
given  avithority  to  coordinate  all  United  States 
Government  activities  in  the  hemisphere  so  that 


there   will   be  one   window    for  all   of   those 
activities. 

And  now,  my  friends  in  the  American  family, 
I  turn  to  a  sensitive  subject.  Debates  have  long 
raged,  raged  in  the  United  States  and  else- 
where, as  to  what  our  attitude  should  be  toward 
the  various  forms  of  government  within  the 
inter-American  system. 

Dealing  With   Governments  As  They  Are 

Let  me  sum  up  my  own  views  very  candidly. 

First,  my  own  country  lives  by  a  democratic 
system  which  has  preserved  its  form  for  nearly 
two  centuries.  It  has  its  problems.  But  we  are 
proud  of  our  system.  We  are  jealous  of  our  lib- 
erties. We  hope  that  eventually  most,  perhaps 
all,  of  the  world's  people  will  share  what  we  be- 
lieve to  be  the  blessings  of  a  genuine  democracy. 

AVe  are  aware  that  most  people  today  in  most 
countries  of  the  world  do  not  share  those 
blessings. 

I  would  be  less  than  honest  if  I  did  not  ex- 
pi'ess  my  concern  over  examples  of  liberty  com- 
promised, of  justice  denied,  or  of  rights 
infringed. 

Nevertheless,  we  recognize  that  enormous, 
sometimes  explosive,  forces  for  change  are  oper- 
ating in  Latin  America.  These  create  instabili- 
ties and  bring  changes  in  governments.  On  the 
diplomatic  level,  we  must  deal  realistically  with 
governments  in  the  inter- American  system  as 
they  are.  We  have,  of  course — we  in  this  coun- 
try— a  preference  for  democratic  procedures; 
and  we  hope  that  each  government  will  help  its 
own  people  to  move  forward  toward  a  better,  a 
fuller,  and  a  freer  life. 

In  this  connection,  however,  I  would  stress 
one  other  point.  We  cannot  have  a  peaceful  com- 
munity of  nations  if  one  nation  sponsors  armed 
subversion  in  another's  territory.  The  ninth 
meeting  of  American  Foreign  Ministers  clearly 
enunciated  this  principle.^  The  "export"  of  rev- 
olution is  an  intervention  which  our  system 
cannot  condone;  and  a  nation,  like  Cuba,  which 
seeks  to  practice  it  can  hardly  expect  to  share 
in  the  benefits  of  this  community. 

And  now,  finally,  a  word  about  what  all  this 
can  mean — not  just  for  the  Americas  but  for  the 
world. 


=  For  background,  see  Bulletin   of  Aug.   10,   1964, 
p.  179. 


November   17,   1969 


413 


Today,  the  -world's  most  fervent  hope  is  for 
a  lastmg  peace  in  which  life  is  secure,  progress 
is  possible,  and  freedom  can  flourish.  In  each 
part  of  the  world  we  can  have  lasting  peace 
and  progress  only  if  the  nations  directly  con- 
cerned take  the  lead  themselves  in  achieving  it, 
and  in  no  part  of  the  world  can  there  be  a  true 
partnership  if  one  partner  dictates  its  direction. 

I  can  think  of  no  assembly  of  nations  better 
suited  than  ours  to  point  the  way  in  developing 
such  a  partnership.  A  successfully  progressing 
Western  Hemisphere,  here  in  this  New  World, 
demonstrating  in  action  mutual  help  and  mu- 
tual respect,  will  be  an  example  for  the  world. 
Once  again,  by  this  example,  we  will  stand  for 
something  larger  tlian  ourselves. 

For  three-quarters  of  a  century,  many  of  us 
have  been  linked  together  in  the  Organization 
of  American  States  and  its  predecessors  in  a 
joint  quest  for  a  better  future.  Eleven  years 
ago.  Operation  Pan  America  was  launched  as  a 
Brazilian  initiative.  More  recently,  we  have 
joined  in  a  noble  Alliance  for  Progress,  whose 
principles  still  guide  us.  Now  I  suggest  our 
goal  for  the  seventies  should  be  a  decade  of 
Action  for  Progress  for  the  Americas. 

As  we  seek  to  forge  a  new  partnership,  we 
must  recognize  that  we  are  a  community  of 
widely  diverse  peoples.  Our  cultures  are  differ- 
ent. Our  perceptions  are  often  different.  Our 
emotional  reactions  are  often  different.  May  it 
always  be  that  way.  What  a  dull  world  it  would 
be  if  we  were  all  alike.  Partnership,  mutu- 
ality— these  do  not  flow  naturally.  We  have  to 
work  at  them. 

Understandably  perhaps,  a  feeling  has  arisen 
in  many  Latin  American  countries  tliat  the 
United  States  really  "no  longer  cares." 

My  answer  to  that  is  very  simple. 

We  do  care.  I  care.  I  have  visited  most  of 
your  countries,  as  I  have  said  before.  I  have  met 
most  of  your  leaders.  I  have  talked  with  your 
people.  I  have  seen  your  great  needs  as  well 
as  your  great  achievements. 

And  I  know  this,  in  my  heart  as  well  as  in 
my  mind :  If  peace  and  freedom  are  to  endure 
in  this  world,  there  is  no  task  more  urgent 
than  lifting  up  the  hungry  and  the  helpless  and 
putting  flesh  on  the  dreams  of  those  who  yearn 
for  a  better  life. 

Today,  we  in  this  American  community  share 
an  historic  opportunity. 


As  we  look  together  down  the  closing  decades 
of  the  century,  we  see  tasks  that  summon  the 
very  best  that  is  in  us.  But  those  tasks  are  diffi- 
cult, precisely  because  they  do  mean  the  differ- 
ence between  despair  and  fulfillment  for  most 
of  the  600  million  people  who  will  live  in  Latin 
America  in  the  year  2000.  Those  lives  are  our 
challenge.  Those  lives  are  our  hope.  And  we 
could  ask  no  prouder  reward  than  to  have  our 
efforts  crowned  by  peace,  prosperity,  and  dig- 
nity in  the  lives  of  those  GOO  million  human 
beings  in  Latin  America — and  in  the  United 
States — each  so  precious,  each  so  unique — our 
children  and  our  legacy. 


40th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  are  texts  of  the  opening  statement 
and  supplementary  remarks  made  hy  Ambas- 
sador Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the  U.S. 
delegation,  at  the  40th  plenary  session  of  the 
meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  October  30. 


OPENING  STATEMENT 

Press  release  322  dated  October  30 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  As  I  said  at  our  last 
meeting,  you  of  the  other  side  have  done  noth- 
ing in  our  39  plenary  sessions  but  demand  uni- 
lateral actions  by  us  and  engage  in  vituperative 
language.  You  have  shown  no  desire  to  engage 
in  genuine  negotiations.  In  all  this  time  you 
have  allowed  agreement  only  on  the  shape  of 
the  table.  The  plenary  meetings  have  served 
only  as  a  propaganda  forum — not  as  a  peace 
forum. 

We  need  a  new  approach  to  break  out  of  this 
sterile  situation  and  promote  serious  negotia- 
tions. Therefore,  in  agreement  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  the 
United  States  proposes  that  on  next  Tuesday, 
November  4,  the  four  principal  spokesmen, 
each  accompanied  by  no  more  than  three  ad- 
visers, meet  in  a  restricted  session  at  10 :30  a.m. 
here  at  the  Majestic  Hotel.  At  this  session  and 
any  subsequent  ones,  each  spokesman  can  raise 
any  subject  he  wishes.  There  would  be  no  public 


414 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


release  of  the  recoi-d  of  what  is  said  at  such 
meetings,  but  we  could  agree  on  exactly  what 
would  be  said  to  the  press  after  each  session. 


SUPPLEMENTARY   REMARKS 


ings  will  participate.  Unlike  your  side,  we  seek 
to  exclude  no  one  from  such  talks.  Therefore, 
my  proposal  remains  pending  in  the  hope  that 
at  some  future  date  you  will  be  able  to  respond 
to  it  in  a  more  constructive  way. 


Press  release  323  dated  October  30 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  First,  as  to  the  ques- 
tion of  United  States  withdrawal  from  South 
Viet-Nam.  I  will  remind  you  of  the  proposal 
made  by  President  Nixon  on  May  14,  and  pre- 
sented here.  The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
reach  agreement  on  the  withdrawal  of  all  non- 
South  Vietnamese  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam. 
On  May  14  the  President  said :  ^ 

— Over  a  period  of  12  months,  by  agreed-upon  stages, 
the  major  portions  of  all  U.S.,  Allied,  and  other  non- 
Sonth  Vietnamese  forces  would  be  withdrawn.  At  the 
end  of  this  12-month  period,  the  remaining  U.S.,  Allied, 
and  other  non-South  Vietnamese  forces  would  move 
into  designated  base  areas  and  would  not  engage  In 
combat  operations. 

— The  remaining  U.S.  and  Allied  forces  would  move 
to  complete  their  withdrawals  as  the  remaining 
North  Vietnamese  forces  were  withdrawn  and  re- 
turned to  North  Viet-Nam. 

— An  international  supervisory  body,  acceptable  to 
both  sides,  would  be  created  for  the  purpose  of  verify- 
ing withdrawals  and  for  any  other  purposes  agreed 
upon  between  the  two  sides. 

If  you  have  an  alternative  timetable  for 
mutual  withdrawal  of  non-South  Vietnamese 
forces,  we  are  prepared  to  consider  it. 

This  concludes  what  I  have  to  say  about  your 
first  question. 

I  urge  you  to  give  our  proposal  made  today 
for  restricted  meetings  more  careful  considera- 
tion. Your  response  is  sure  to  raise  grave  doubts 
about  your  readiness  to  negotiate  genuinely 
with  all  the  parties  concerned.  Your  refusal  to 
accept  reasonable  ways  to  work  toward  a  peace- 
ful solution  of  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  is  regretta- 
ble indeed. 

For  our  part,  we  will  remain  ready  to  engage 
in  genuine  negotiations.  We  are  ready  to  carry 
on  direct  talks,  privately  or  publicly,  in  which 
all  those  represented  on  each  side  at  these  meet- 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation  on 
May  14,  see  Builetin  of  June  2,  1969,  p.  457. 


President  Nixon  Congratulates 
Chancellor  Brandt  of  Germany 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon  to  Chancellor  Willy  Brandt  of  tJie 
Federal  Republic  of  Ger-many. 

White  House  press  release  dated  October  21 

October  21, 1969 

Deak  Mr.  Chancellor:  It  gives  me  great 
pleasure  to  congratulate  you  on  your  elevation 
to  the  high  office  of  Chancellor  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  You  have  already  done 
much  for  your  people,  as  Governing  Mayor  of 
Berlin  and  as  Foreign  Minister  and  Vice  Chan- 
cellor. The  admiration  and  respect  you  have  won 
throughout  the  world  in  these  earlier  capacities 
promises  much  for  the  discharge  of  the  even 
greater  and  more  challenging  duties  you  have 
now  assumed.  I  think  you  are  aware  of  the  con- 
fidence you  have  enjoyed  in  this  country  for 
many  years. 

In  our  complex  and  difficult  world  today,  I 
particularly  value  such  elements  of  stability  as 
the  close  relationship  that  exists  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Federal  Eepublic  of  Ger- 
many. I  attribute  the  highest  importance  to  the 
maintenance  of  this  relationship,  which  I  am 
convinced  must  be  based  on  mutual  understand- 
ing and  confidence.  Whenever  occasion  war- 
rants, I  would  like  to  feel  free  to  consult  with 
you  directly  on  matters  of  mutual  interest.  I  will 
welcome  it  if  you  will  do  the  same. 

I  look  forward  to  the  prospect  of  working 
with  you  in  the  interest  of  those  objectives 
which  join  our  two  countries  in  responsibility  as 
well  as  friendship. 

With  warm  personal  regards. 
Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 


November   17,   1969 


415 


The  NATO  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modem  Society: 
Response  to  a  Common  Environmental  Peril 

hy  Daniel  P.  Moynihan  ^ 


There  is  to  be  encountered  in  one  of  the  novels 
of  Benjamin  Disraeli  a  gentleman  described  as 
one  "distinguished  for  ignorance"  as  he  had  but 
one  idea  and  that  was  wi-ong.  As  with  much  else, 
this  curiosity  of  the  19th  century  has  become 
rather  a  commonplace  of  the  20th.  It  is  the  na- 
ture of  the  complex  technological  societies  that 
have  developed  in  our  century  that  no  one  thing 
about  them  is  so  especially  and  importantly  time 
that  other  truths  are  of  necessity  subordinate. 
This  in  turn  has  had  its  effect  on  the  way  we 
think  about  our  societies,  of  those  problems  we 
inherit  from  the  past  and  tliose  we  have  created 
in  the  present.  Every  truth  has  its  antitruth,  its 
qualifying  truth,  its  mediating  truth.  Hence  the 
only  certainty  is  that  the  man  with  a  single 
ti-uth  is  not  only  sure  to  be  wrong  but  likely  to 
be  disastrously  so. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  I  rise  to  address  the 
North  Atlantic  Assembly,  conscious  both  of  the 
honor  of  doing  so  and  the  trust,  implicitly  im- 
posed and  explicitly  acknowledged,  that  in 
speaking  of  the  Committee  on  the  Challenges 
of  Modern  Society,  to  be  established  as  the  new- 
est subsidiary  body  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization,  I  shall  do  so  with  careful  regard 
to  the  earlier  and  stUl  primary  tasks  of  the  alli- 
ance and  also  of  the  necessary  interrelationship 
among  all  its  activities. 

The  proposal  for  the  creation  of  the  commit- 
tee was,  of  course,  first  put  forward  by  Presi- 
dent Xixon  in  his  address  last  April  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  20th  anniversary  of  NATO :  ^ 


'  Address  made  before  the  North  Atlantic  Assembly 
at  Brussels  on  Oct.  21.  Mr.  Moynihan,  Assistant  for 
Urban  Affairs  to  President  Nixon,  has  been  designated 
by  the  President  as  U.S.  Representative  on  the  NATO 
Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern  Society. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  349. 


The  industrial  nations  share  no  challenge  more 
urgent  than  that  of  bringing  20th-century  man  and  his 
environment  to  terms  with  one  another — of  making  the 
world  iit  for  man  and  helping  man  learn  how  to  remain 
in  harmony  with  the  rapidly  changing  world. 

Article  2  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  may 
have  envisaged  such  activity,  pledging  the  par- 
ties to  cooperate  in  "promoting  conditions  of 
stability  and  well-being."  But  that  was  1949; 
and  for  Europe,  as  for  much  of  the  world, 
stability  and  well-being  meant  military  security 
combined  with  the  rudiments  of  economic  re- 
coverj'.  It  is  only  as  these  two  conditions  have 
gradually  been  secured,  especially  that  of  eco- 
nomic growth,  wliich  is  to  say  tecluiological  de- 
velopment, that  a  third  dimension  of  the  great 
alliance  has  emerged  not  only  as  a  feasible  and 
possible  effort  but  increasingly  as  an  urgent  and 
necessary  one. 

Military  defense  and  political  consultation 
are,  and  will  continue  to  be,  the  first  functions 
of  the  alliance.  But  the  time  clearly  is  at 
hand  to  add  a  third  dimension,  provided  for 
from  the  outset  but  only  now  emerging  as  a 
concern  and  activity  in  its  own  right.  That  the 
United  States  regards  this  as  a  matter  of  the 
higliest  importance  will  have  been  obvious 
from  the  President's  proposal  and  subsequent 
consultations  that  have  taken  place  with  Allied 
governments.  It  would  seem  important,  how- 
ever, to  go  beyond  the  simple  assei'tion  of  this 
concern  to  a  fuller  explication  of  it. 

There  could  be  no  more  appropriate  forum 
in  which  to  do  so  than  the  North  Atlantic 
Assembly.  It  is,  in  general,  the  tradition  of  our 
democracies  that  the  executive  branch  of  func- 
tion in  government  is  accountable  to  the  legis- 
lative component  and  that  tliis  responsibility 
is  in  part  met  by  periodic  expositions  as  to 
what  is  proposed  and  why.  The  North  Atlantic 


416 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Assembly,  if  not  the  parliament  of  NATO,  is 
unquestionably  composed  of  NATO  parlia- 
mentarians. It  is  owed  a  measure  of  account- 
ability by  virtue  both  of  the  general  principles 
of  governance  whicli  shape  and  inform  our 
actions  and  of  the  specific  nature  of  the  work 
of  the  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern 
Society,  which  will  require  in  such  great  meas- 
j  ure  the  assent,  support,  and  judgment  of  the 
legislatures  of  our  several  nations. 

In  speaking  to  this  point,  I  would  hope  to 
reflect,  without  of  course  in  any  way  com- 
mitting them,  the  views  of  the  representa- 
tives from  other  nations  with  whom  I  was 
associated  in  the  meeting  of  the  preparatory 
committee  that  drew  up  a  charter  for  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Challenges  of  Modern  Society. 

The  Newest  Dimension  of  Freedom 

The  first  and  continuing  challenge  of  mod- 
ern society  is  to  safeguard  freedom  and,  in  an 
important  sense,  to  expand  it.  The  history  of 
freedom  in  the  Western  World  is  not  that  of 
a  fully  formed  idea  gradually  winning  wider 
and  more  complete  acceptance.  To  the  contrary, 
the  meaning  of  freedom,  the  content  of  the  idea, 
has  evolved  through  two  early  stages  and  is 
now  manifestly  entering  a  third.  This  evolu- 
tion lias  been  from  simple  to  complex  forms. 
It  began  with  the  securing  of  personal  liberties 
for  tlie  individual.  It  went  on  to  the  assertion, 
and  gradual  establishment,  of  political  liber- 
ties of  the  kind  we  associate  with  the  democratic 
state.  It  has  now  moved  beyond  that  into  the 
elusive,  often  ambiguous,  but  extraordinarily 
challenging  effort  to  provide  a  quality  of  life 
that  releases  the  unique  potential  of  every  in- 
dividual while  maintaining  a  coherent  and 
sustaining  sense  of  community  that  binds  one 
individual  to  another. 

It  will  be  evident  enough  that  this  is  not  an 
easy  thing  to  do;  it  is  not  even  an  easy  thing 
to  define.  But  neither,  then,  were  civil  rights, 
or  political  freedoms,  in  the  eras  when  they 
were  evolving  in  the  face  of  persistent  incom- 
prehension, hostility,  and  resistance — attitudes 
that  continue  to  rule  in  far  too  great  a  portion 
of  the  world  today.  Wliat  is  different,  what  is 
singular,  about  the  evolution  of  this  newest 
dimension  of  freedom  is  that  it  is  so  extraor- 
dinarily dependent  on  the  element  of  time. 
This  is  new,  different.  It  is  a  fact,  moreover, 
indispensable  to  an  imderstanding  of  the  chal- 
lenge before  us. 


The  newest  dimension  of  freedom  arises  in 
the  context  of  advancing  technology.  More  ac- 
curately, it  arises  from  advancing  technology. 
First  the  folk  teclmology  of  the  early  industrial 
revolution,  and  later  the  ever-mounting  and 
more  systematic  application  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge to  practical  problems,  have  created  an 
almost  worldwide  vision  of  societies  of  material 
plenty  in  which  individvial  men  become  all  they 
are  capable  of  being.  Personal  liberty  and 
democratic  government  would  be  the  precondi- 
tions of  such  societies,  but  their  unique  achieve- 
ment would  be  measured  by  the  degi'ee  to  which 
the  men  and  women  comprising  them  lived 
large,  creative,  and  fulfilling  lives. 

This  is  a  very  large  vision  indeed.  The  dif- 
ficulty with  it  is  that  it  exists  in  the  context  of 
time  constraints  that  make  it,  for  a  vision  at 
once  so  powerful,  also  extraordinarily  fragile. 
This  is  so,  in  a  word,  because  the  teclmology  that 
created  it  only  hours  ago,  in  the  history  of  man- 
kind, threatens  to  destroy  it  only  hours  from 
now.  Therein  lies  the  difference  between  the 
evolution  of  this  dimension  of  freedom  and  that 
of  earlier  ones.  If  habeas  corpus  was  slow  in 
coming,  the  reality,  once  it  did  arrive,  was  not 
diminished  by  the  time  that  elapsed.  And  if 
thereafter  it  disappeared  in  this  place  or  that,  it 
could  still  return,  again  undiminished.  Much 
the  same  can  be  said  of  the  processes  of  political 
democracy.  We  have  seen  democratic  societies 
broken,  only  to  be  made  again  and  made  whole. 
But  technology  has  seemingly  little  patience 
witli  manldnd.  It  seems  to  be  offering  us  every- 
thing or  nothing  and  demanding  that  we  make 
our  choice  almost  this  very  moment. 

The  Central  Problem  of  the  Modern  Age 

There  is,  I  believe,  a  not  especially  compli- 
cated explanation  for  this.  Just  as  advancing 
teclmology  has  given  rise  to  the  central  social 
vision  of  our  age,  so  also  has  it  become  the  cen- 
tral problem  of  the  age.  In  massive  and  domi- 
nant proportion,  the  things  that  threaten 
modern  society  are  the  first,  second,  third,  of 
whichever  order  effects  of  new  teclmology.  It 
is  not  that  man  has  changed,  has  become  any 
more  irrational,  any  less  inliibited  by  concerns 
of  moral  right  and  wrong.  One  must  assume 
that  man  is  no  different  now  than  he  has  ever 
been  with  respect  to  these  primal  failings.  What 
has  changed,  simply,  is  that  technology  has 
created  a  world  situation  in  which  irrational  and 
immoral  behavior  can  and  does  lead  to  cata- 
ch"smic  consequences. 


November   17,   1969 


417 


For  a  quarter  century  now,  mankind  has  lived 
•with  the  possibility  of  the  ultimate  technologi- 
cal disaster,  that  of  the  nuclear  holocaust.  But 
more  recently,  it  has  come  to  be  perceived  that 
this  would  be  only  the  most  spectacular  of  the 
fates  that  might  await  us.  The  perils  of  the 
modern  age  are  wondrous  and  protean  and,  if 
anything,  accumulating.  An  ecological  crisis  is 
surely  upon  us — and  developing  at  quite  ex- 
traordinary rates.  Thus  we  may  expect  that  by 
the  year  2000  the  carbon  dioxide  content  of  the 
atmosphere,  the  result  of  the  burning  of  fossil 
fuels,  will  have  increased  by  a  quarter.  This 
cmild  raise  the  temperature  of  the  earth's  atmos- 
phere by  7  degrees  Fahrenheit.  Thw  would 
likely  raise  the  level  of  seas  by  10  feet — there- 
by solving  some  of  the  urban  problems  of  the 
world  but  hardly  improving  the  circumstance 
of  mankind.  No  one  is  certain,  of  course,  that 
this  will  happen.  The  computer  will  doubtless 
figure  it  out  but  as  yet  has  not  done  so.  In  the 
meantime,  alternative  theories  and  some  evi- 
dence suggest  that  the  earth's  albedo  is  being 
affected  by  pollutants  in  such  a  way  as  to  lower 
temperatures.  Fire  or  ice,  as  Robert  Frost  said ; 
either  way,  trouble.  In  another  area,  the  popu- 
lation trend  makes  its  steady  way  toward  cul- 
tural, if  not  biologic,  catastrophe,  and  very  pos- 
sibly to  both.  Examples  abound. 

A  publication  of  the  European  Cultural 
Foundation,  headed  by  Prince  Bernhard  of  the 
Netherlands,  recently  observed  that  industrial 
technology,  which  was  the  creation  of  European 
civilization,  had  become  the  foremost  threat  to 
its  survival.  As  much  or  more  may  be  said  of  the 
United  States.  Technology  has  been  the  great 
American  art,  the  true  Apollonian  passion  of 
our  people.  (I  speak,  jmri  pass^/,  as  a  member  of 
the  American  Philosophical  Society,  which 
Benjamin  Franklin  founded  in  1743  in  Phila- 
delphia not  for  tlie  pursuit  of  large  abstractions 
concerning  man's  fate  but  rather,  in  the  words 
of  our  charter,  "for  promoting  useful  knowl- 
edge.") Our  passion  has  rarely  flagged;  and  it 
may,  I  think,  be  fairly  stated  that  few  peoples 
have  been  more  successful  in  that  quest — nor 
got  more  things  they  hadn't  bargained  for. 
(Only  3  days  ago  a  symbolic  pinnacle  of  sorts 
was  reached.  The  Secretary  of  Health,  Educa- 
tion, and  Welfare  announced  that  an  ingredient 
in  soft  drinks  used  by  millions  of  Americans  to 
ward  off  the  perils  of  overweight  in  an  affluent 
society  has  on  closer  examination  turned  out, 
with  disturbing  frequency,  to  cause  cancer  in 
animals.) 


Increasingly  these  separate  phenomena  are 
seen  and  described  as  crises.  Yet  it  would  be  the 
most  prof  oimd  mistake  to  view  them  separately. 
In  the  words  of  the  American  physicist  John 
Piatt :  "There  is  only  one  crisis  in  the  world.  It 
is  the  crisis  of  transformation" — that  is  to  say, 
of  the  change  wrought  in  society  by  the  intro- 
duction of  technology.  "Teclmology,"  Piatt  con- 
tinues, "did  not  create  human  conflicts  and  in- 
equities, but  it  has  made  them  unendurable." 
And  it  has  raised  questions  as  to  whether  man 
himself  will  endure.  Some  years  ago  Leo  Szilard 
estimated  the  half-life  of  mankind — to  employ 
that  useful  term  of  the  nuclear  physicist — at 
something  between  10  and  20  years.  Piatt  would 
argue  that  situation  is  worse  today : 

I  think  multiplication  of  domestic  and  international 
crises  today  will  shorten  that  short  half-life.  In  the 
continued  absence  of  better  ways  of  heading  off  these 
multiple  crises,  our  half-life  may  no  longer  be  10 
or  20  years,  but  more  likely  5  to  10  years,  or  less.  We 
may  have  even  less  than  a  50-50  chance  of  living  until 
1980. 

And  yet  our  situation,  if  sorely  pressed,  is 
anything  but  hopeless.  To  the  contrary  we  may 
be  approaching  the  leveling-out  point  of  a  great 
S  curve.  If  we  get  through  the  next  30  years  or 
so  we  may  just  have  accomplished  that  great 
transformation,  whence  we  would  enter  a  new 
period  of  stability  offering  the  utmost  promise 
for  mankind. 


The  Demands  on  Government 

There  is  no  reason  tliis  should  not  be  so — no 
reason  the  outcome  should  not  be  that.  But  such 
deliverance  is  not  certain,  probably  not  even 
likely,  to  come  to  pass  if  modern  societies  do  not 
begin  a  quite  imprecedented  effort  to  ensure  that 
it  does.  The  impact  of  technology  on  society  can 
only  be  mediated  by  the  effective  use  of  govern- 
ment. This  amounts  to  saying  that  modem  gov- 
ernment must  be  made  to  direct  itself  to  these 
issues  and  to  do  so  successfully.  It  must  be  made 
to  work. 

It  isn't  working  very  well.  Or  perhaps  the 
more  accurate  thing  is  to  say  that  it  isn't  work- 
ing well  enough.  There  is,  I  would  hazard, 
hardly  one  of  our  nations  that  is  not  seized  with 
the  extraordinary  difficulty  of  making  modem 
government  work — of  bringing  about  the  actual 
results  which  the  societies  in  question  desire  and 
which  they  were  thought  able  to  command. 

Wliy  is  this  ?  Again  I  tliink  there  is  a  not  espe- 
cially complicated  answer.  Modem  governments 
fail  because  they  are  not  modem.  They  face  the 


418 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


problems  created  by  technology  with  the  men- 
tality and  the  organization  of  a  pretechnologi- 
cal  society. 

A  variety  of  responses  can  be  made  to  such  a 
condition,  all  but  one  of  which  would  seem 
doomed,  even  committed,  to  failure.  The 
demands  on  pretechnological  systems  of  govern- 
ment cannot  be  met  by  rendering  them  even 
more  simplistic  and  disoriented  or  yet  by  mak- 
ing them  more  rigid  and  ideological.  Only 
technology  can  cope  with  technology.  What  sci- 
ence has  wrought  only  a  liigher  science  can 
reshape. 

Modem  government  requires  first  of  all  the 
application  of  knowledge  to  problems.  It  re- 
quires, if  you  will,  the  art  of  technology.  The 
essence  of  that  art  is  the  steady  production  of 
new  knowledge  and  the  rapid  transition  from 
new  knowledge  to  new  realities  in  the  form  of 
changed  teclinology.  The  task  of  government 
is  to  keep  abreast  of  such  new  realities,  which 
is  to  say  that  government  has  got  to  learn  to  re- 
spond to  new  knowledge  at  at  least  something 
like  the  rate  at  which  technology  does.  Other- 
wise technology  is  always  ahead  on  creating 
problems,  and  government  is  always  behind  on 
resolving  them.  (To  take  the  process  a  further 
step,  modem  govermnent  must  learn  to  respond 
to  teclmologically  induced  difficulties  with  some- 
thing of  the  same  economy  of  talent  that  tech- 
nology has  devised.  We  cannot  go  on  devising 
government  arrangements  that  only  extraordi- 
nary men  can  make  work.  Most  of  the  work  of 
the  world  has  to  be  done  by  men  of  average 
endowment,  energy,  and  social  vision.) 

Advent  of  the  NATO  Committee 

Each  of  our  governments  is  in  one  way  or 
another  struggling  with  this  situation.  With  the 
advent  of  the  North  Atlantic  Alliance  Commit- 
tee on  the  Challenges  of  Modern  Society,  how- 
ever, it  becomes  possible  to  introduce  a  further 
measure  of  international  cooperation  into  such 
efforts. 

Why  NATO? 

There  are  any  number  of  complex  and  subtle 
subsidiary  answers  to  this  query,  but  the  pri- 
mai-y  answer  could  not  be  more  direct :  because 
it  is  there.  NATO  is  unique.  For  almost  two 
decades  now  it  has  carried  on,  at  ever-increasing 
levels  of  complexity,  a  massive  system  of  tech- 
nology transfer.  There  has  been  no  such  sus- 
tained experience  in  the  history  of  the  world.  If 
technology  is  the  issue,  NATO  is  imiquely  the 


forum  in  which  to  raise  it.  Moreover,  if  the  issue 
is  one  of  pressing  urgency  which  somehow  does 
not  seem  to  command  the  attention  it  deserves, 
NATO  is  doubly  appropriate ;  for  here  is  an  in- 
stitution which  year  in  and  year  out  has  been 
able  to  command  attention  and  response  at  the 
highest  levels  of  government. 

What  are  the  specifics  ? 

This  will  of  course  be  for  the  Council  of 
NATO  to  decide,  having  received  proposals 
from  the  committee,  but  the  interests  of  the  al- 
lies are  already  emerging.  They  deal  with  the 
degradation  of  the  environment  through  pollu- 
tion, the  complex  interaction  of  technology  on 
individual  and  group  motivation,  the  compel- 
ling issues  of  nutrition,  the  pressing  matter  of 
population  growth,  and  the  use  of  space.  It 
may  be  possible,  for  example,  to  begin  a  system- 
atic inquiry  into  the  impact  on  modern  society 
of  the  automobile,  which  may  be  said  to  have 
had  led  to  more  of  what  economists  call  exter- 
nalities than  any  phenomenon  of  the  age  save 
modem  warfare  itself.  Surely  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  consider  the  whole  matter  of  inadvertent 
weather  changes.  And  very  early  one  would 
hope  to  see  some  recognition  of  the  matter  of 
ocean  pollution,  for  the  North  Atlantic  itself 
is  no  more  immune  to  environmental  degrada- 
tion than  the  now  pathetic  streams  that  once 
proudly  flowed  by  the  great  cities  of  our  nations. 
But  examples  abound ;  the  question  is  really  one 
of  operating  procedure. 

Our  opportunities  are  twofold.  First,  we  can 
envision  a  kind  of  trade  springing  up  among 
the  allies.  The  law  of  comparative  advantage 
can  come  into  effect :  As  one  nation  learns  better 
to  cope  with  this  problem,  another  with  that, 
these  abilities  can  be  exchanged  to  the  benefit 
of  both.  To  some  extent  this  process  already 
takes  place ;  ours  are  anything  but  closed  socie- 
ties, and  two  decades  of  the  alliance  have 
brought  them  much  closer  together.  But  the 
great  fact  of  the  age  is  that  time  is  short,  and 
governments  must  get  about  their  business 
with  far  greater  urgency  and  effectiveness  than 
they  have  done.  The  second  benefit  will  come 
from  common  imdertakings,  agreements  to  act 
in  concert  with  respect  to  this  or  that  difficulty 
or  opportunity  as  such  present  themselves.  This 
has  been  the  great  feat  of  the  alliance  with 
respect  to  matters  of  defense  and  political  con- 
sultation. It  can  become  a  not  less  important 
feature  of  our  response  to  the  common  perU 
of  a  threatened  and  threatening  environment. 

Perhaps  our  first  need  is  to  develop  far  more 


November   17,   1969 


419 


complex  and  yet  workable  analyses  of  just  how 
our  economic,  social,  and  political  systems 
work.  The  possibilities  of  technology,  the  re- 
quirements of  society,  and  the  structure  of 
policymaking  have  to  be  coupled  with  far 
greater  sensitivity  than  has  ever  been  the  case 
in  the  past.  (This  is  not  at  all  to  suggest  that 
any  one  component  must  direct  the  others,  but 
only  that  they  must  be  related.  In  the  words 
of  President  Kennedy :  ^  '"Scientists  alone  can 
establish  the  objectives  of  their  research,  but 
society,  in  extending  support  to  science,  must 
take  account  of  its  own  needs.")  In  doing  so, 
these  couplings  become  critical — more  inter- 
esting and  in  ways  more  important,  as  Dr. 
E.  Pestel  of  the  NATO  Science  Committee  has 
observed,  than  the  components  themselves.  An 
enormous  task,  but  it  is  almost  the  nature  of 
technology  that  what  can  be  described  can  be 
created,  and  we  should  not  in  the  least  doubt 
that  it  is  something  we  can  do  if  we  will  it. 

It  is,  at  all  events,  the  view  of  the  American 
Government  that  we  can  and  should.  Not  every 
nation  will  see  the  Committee  on  Challenges  of 
IModem  Society  in  these  terms,  and  the  commit- 
tee when  it  comes  into  being  will  not  only  reflect 
the  views  of  all  governments  but  will  doubtless 
evolve  in  ways  none  can  now  foresee.  (Most  cer- 
tainly, for  one  thing,  it  will  be  the  desire  of 
many  nations  to  see  that  the  activities  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Alliance  CCMS  draw  upon  and 
add  to  the  work  of  bodies  such  as  the  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment. Hopefully,  the  CCMS  will  lead  to  much 
wider  ancl  more  general  forms  of  international 
cooperation,  looking,  for  example,  to  the  United 
Nations  Conference  on  the  Environment  to  be 
held  in  1972.) 

It  would  be  unforgivable  to  annoimce  results 
before  the  committee  has  even  met.  It  is  pre- 
cisely such  avoidance  of  reality  that  has  brought 
us  to  this  time  of  immediate  if  only  dimly  per- 
ceived crisis.  But  the  committee  will  meet; 
efforts  will  begin ;  results  will  or  will  not  follow. 
In  President  Nixon's  words,  those  results  will  in 
no  small  measure  determine  our  ability  '"to  en- 
hance our  environments,  and  not  to  destroy 
them."  As  mankind  itself  is  part  of  those  en- 
vironments, the  full  implication  of  the  outcome 
would  seem  evident. 


^  For  remarks  by  Presidont  Kennedy  m.ide  at  the 
National  Academy  of  Sciences.  Washington.  D.(".,  on 
Oct.  22,  190.3,  see  Bdi.i.etin  of  Nov.  IS.  196.3,  p.  77S. 


Southern  Yemen  Severs  Relations 
With  the  United  States 

Department  Statement  ^ 

We  have  been  hi  formed  that  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  the  People's  Kepublic  of  Southern 
Yemen  informed  our  Charge  d'Affaires  today 
[October  24]  that  his  Government  had  decided 
to  sever  relations  with  the  United  States. 

The  Charge,  who  is  William  L.  Eagleton,  was 
given  24  hours  to  leave,  and  the  remaining 
members  of  his  staff  48  hours.  The  total  number 
of  official  Americans,  including  dependents,  is 
37.  There  are,  in  addition,  some  pri\ate  Ameri- 
cans there,  most  of  whom  are  of  local  origin. 


United  States  and  Japan  Discuss 
Protection  of  Migratory  Birds 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octo- 
ber 2  (press  release  285)  that  representatives  of 
the  Government  of  Japan  were  meeting  in 
Washington  October  1-3  with  officials  of  the 
Departments  of  State  and  Interior,  the  Smith- 
sonian Institution,  and  a  number  of  United 
States  conservation  organizations  to  discuss  the 
protection  of  birds  which  migrate  between  the 
two  countries  and  areas  under  their  administra- 
tion. The  talks  were  expected  to  lead  to  a  con- 
vention for  the  protection  of  birds  and  their 
environment  similar  to  the  existing  conventions 
with  Mexico  and  Canada. 

The  representative  of  the  United  States  at 
the  talks  was  Donald  L.  McKernan,  Special 
Assistant  for  Fisheries  and  AVildlife  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  and  the  alternate  representa- 
tive was  Jolin  S.  Gottschalk,  Director,  Bureau 
of  Sport  Fisheries  and  Wildlife,  Department  of 
the  Interior.-  The  representative  of  Japan  was 
Shoichi  Fukuda,  Director,  Operations  Depart- 
ment, Forestry  Agency,  and  the  alternate 
representative  was  Yoshimaro  Yamashina, 
President,  Yamashina  Institute  of  Ornithology. 

In  1960,  the  International  Council  for  Bird 

'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  press 
spokesman  Robert  .1.  MeCloskey  on  Oct.  24. 

'  For  names  of  advisers  to  the  U.S.  delegation,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  28.5  dated  Oct.  2. 


420 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Preservation  recommended  that  all  nations 
bordering  the  Pacific  conclude  arrangements 
to  protect  migratory  birds.  In  1968,  U.S.  and 
Japanese  ornithologists  met  to  discuss  the  data 
compiled  in  the  intervening  years.  There  are  an 
estimated  180  species  of  birds  common  to  lands 
under  Japanese  or  United  States  jurisdiction. 
Of  these,  22  species  are  not  now  protected  under 
Federal  law  in  the  50  States. 

Major  private  conservation  organizations  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Federal  and  State 
Governments  favor  a  convention  with  Japan  to 
protect  migratory  birds.  A  convention  would 
not  only  extend  Federal  protection  and  regula- 
tion of  hunting  to  the  migratory  birds  con- 
cerned but  would  also  aid  in  preserving  the 
unique  faunas  of  oceanic  islands. 


Intellectual  Property  Bureaux 
Granted  Organization  Immunities 

AN    EXECUTIVE  ORDER' 

Designating  the  United  Inteenational  Bttbeattx  fob 
THE  Protection  op  Intellectual  Peopebty  (BIRPI) 
AS  A  Public  International  Organization  Entitled 
To  Enjoy  Certain  Privileges,  Exemptions,  and 
Immunities 

By  virtue  of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  section  1 
of  the  International  Organizations  Immunities  Act,  ap- 
proved December  29,  1945  (59  Stat  669),  and  having 
found  that  the  United  States  participates  in  the  United 
International  Bureaux  for  the  Protection  of  Intellectual 
Property  ( BIRPl )  pursuant  to  the  Convention  of  Paris 
for  the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property  of  20th 
March,  1883,  as  revised,  13  UST  1,  and  the  joint  resolu- 
tion approved  July  12,  1960,  as  amended,  22  U.S.C. 
269f,  I  hereby  designate  the  United  International  Bu- 
reaux for  the  Protection  of  Intellectual  Property 
(BIRPI)    as  a  pubUc  international  organization  en- 

'■  No.  11484 ;  34  Fed.  Beg.  15837. 


titled  to  enjoy  the  privileges,  exemptions,  and  immuni- 
ties conferred  by  the  International  Organizations 
Immunities  Act 

The  designation  of  the  United  International  Bureaur 
for  the  Protection  of  Intellectual  Property  (BIRPI)  as 
a  public  international  organization  veithin  the  meaning 
of  the  International  Organizations  Immunities  Act 
shall  not  be  deemed  to  abridge  in  any  respect  privileges, 
exemptions,  and  immunities  which  that  organization 
may  have  acquired  or  may  acquire  by  treaty  or  con- 
gressional action. 


CfLjL4<K.:/^ 


The  White  House, 
September  29,  1969. 


President  Appoints  Mr.  Taylor 
to  South  Pacific  Commission 

The  President  announced  on  October  8 
(White  House  press  release)  his  intention  to  ap- 
point William  B.  Taylor  III  as  a  U.S.  Com- 
missioner on  the  South  Pacific  Commission. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press 
release  dated  October  8.)  He  will  succeed 
Manuel  Guerrero. 

The  Commission  is  an  international  organi- 
zation founded  in  1947  to  encourage  and 
strengthen  international  cooperation  in  pro- 
moting the  economic  and  social  welfare  and  de- 
velopment of  the  non-self-governing  territories 
in  the  South  Pacific.  This  is  to  be  done  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  of  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations.  At  the  present  time  the 
Commission  is  made  up  of  representatives  from 
the  United  States,  Australia,  France,  Nauru, 
New  Zealand,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  West- 
em  Samoa. 


November   17,   1969 

367-709 — 69 2 


421 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Presents  Views  on  Southern  Rhodesia 


Statement  hy  David  D.  Newsom 
Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  ^ 


I  am  pleased  to  have  this  chance  to  present 
the  views  of  the  Department  and  something 
of  the  background  on  the  difficult  pi-oblem  of 
Rhodesia.  People  who  have  lived  in  Rhodesia 
for  many  generations,  both  white  and  black, 
consider  it  their  homeland.  But  the  white  minor- 
ity, fearful  of  its  own  future,  seeks  to  i-etain 
mastery  over  the  black  majority  in  a  manner 
that  has  awakened  the  deep  concern  of  those 
who  wish  to  see  racial  barriers  removed,  not 
erected. 

American  policy  on  Rhodesia  rests  on  the 
basic  principles  of  self-determination  and  ma- 
jority rule.  The  Rhodesian  unilateral  declara- 
tion of  independence  in  November  1965  ran  di- 
rectly counter  to  these  basic  tenets  of  policy. 
From  the  beginning,  the  actions  taken  by  Mr. 
Ian  Smith  and  his  colleagues  have  made  it 
clear  that  their  objective  is  the  iDerpetuation  of 
economic  and  political  control  by  a  4-percent 
European  minority  over  the  4.8  million  black 
citizens  in  Rhodesia.  In  proposing  its  new  con- 
stitution earlier  this  year,  the  Rhodesian  regime 
explicitly  declared  that  one  of  the  objex^tives 
was  to  prevent  the  advent  of  majority  rule.  The 
terms  of  the  constitution  which  the  Rhodesian 
Parliament  is  now  in  the  process  of  adopting  are 
such  that  the  African  population  may  not  ever 
peacefully  gain  control  of  the  government. 

British  opposition  to  UDI  was  based  not  on 
opposition  to  the  idea  of  independence  for 
Rhodesia  but  on  a  flat  unwillingness  to  grant 
independence  under  arrangements  which  would 
on  racial  groimds  deny  basic  rights  and  an  effec- 
tive voice  in  government  to  96  percent  of  the 
population.  There  is  no  real  parallel  between  the 
effort  at  domination  by  this  small  white  minor- 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Africa  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on  Oct.  17. 


ity  and  our  own  independence  struggle,  which 
brought  liberty  to  the  great  majority  in  the 
Thirteen  Colonies. 

Further,  opposition  to  UDI  on  our  part  or 
that  of  the  British  was  not  based  on  any  desire 
to  dejjrive  the  white  minority  of  rights.  The 
British  in  previous  negotiations  went  to  very 
great  lengths  to  protect  white  minority  rights, 
and  these  are  the  subject  of  special  constitutional 
guarantees  in  Zambia  and  Malawi,  the  other 
parts  of  the  former  Federation. 

Primary  responsibility  for  Rhodesia  has 
rested  and  co)itinues  to  rest  with  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  legal  sovereign.  The  United 
States  nevertheless  has  interests  of  its  own  at 
stake  relating  to  its  position  in  the  rest  of  Africa 
and  as  a  member  of  the  U.N. 

There  appeared  to  be  three  broad  alternatives 
for  the  British  in  the  face  of  Ian  Smith's  imi- 
lateral  declaration  of  independence:  military 
action,  sanctions,  or  acquiescence. 

While  the  African  states  advocated  the  im- 
mediate use  of  force,  the  British,  who  would 
have  had  to  carry  out  such  an  action,  considered 
it  impractical  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  They 
wanted  to  avoid  bloodshed  if  at  all  possible,  and 
they  believed  they  could  exert  effective  influence 
in  other  ways. 

Acquiescence  in  and  accommodation  with 
political  control  by  a  small  white  minority  in 
Rhodesia  was  rejected  at  once.  Crass  repudia- 
tion of  human  and  political  rights  could  not  be 
countenanced. 

The  imposition  of  economic  pressures  through 
sanctions  while  political  negotiations  were 
underway  in  search  of  an  acceptable  solution  to 
the  problem  was  seen  by  the  British  as  the  most 
feasible  way  to  register  their  opposition  and 
that  of  the  international  community  as  a  whole 


422 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Smith 
regime  to  come  to  a  reasonable  agreement  on  the 
question  of  majority  rule.  It  was,  however, 
recognized  from  the  start  that  there  would  be 
serious  problems  in  making  sanctions  totally 
effective. 

The  United  States,  being  opposed  to  the  un- 
just and  increasingly  racist  policies  of  the 
Smith  regime,  has  given  strong  support  to  the 
position  taken  by  the  U.K.  and  to  the  manda- 
tory economic  sanctions  voted  by  the  U.N.  Se- 
curity Council.^  We  have  continued  to  recognize 
British  sovereignty  in  Rhodesia  and  regard  the 
Smith  regime  as  illegal.  We  have  reduced  our 
Salisbury  consulate  general  staff  from  21  to 
eight  and  replaced  the  consul  general  with  a 
consul;  our  consvil  remains  to  safeguard  U.S. 
interests  and  to  serve  the  American  community 
in  Ehodesia ;  neither  his  presence  nor  his  acts 
evidence  recognition  of  the  Ehodesian  state  or 
the  Smith  regime.  We  discourage  travel  by 
Americans  to  Rhodesia  and  strictly  control  the 
release  of  dollars  for  use  in  Rhodesia.  We  have 
given  full  support  to  the  imposition  of  economic 
sanctions  against  Rhodesia  in  U.N.  discussions 
preceding  this  action,  in  voting  in  the  Security 
Council,  and  subsequently  in  application  of  the 
stringent  restrictions  required  by  it.  The  United 
States  is  second  to  none  in  its  conscientious  ob- 
servance of  the  sanctions  restrictions. 

As  a  result  of  our  comjjliance  with  the  manda- 
tory U.N.  sanctions  program,  U.S.  exchanges 
with  Rhodesia  have  fallen  from  $33  million  in 
1965  to  $3.7  million  in  1968  (the  residual  being 
comjjosed  of  nonsanction  goods,  mainly  medical 
and  educational  material).  We  had  realized 
when  we  undertook  the  sanctions  program  that 
it  would  affect  certain  American  firms  with 
mining  interests  in  Rhodesia,  pai'ticularly 
chrome.  But  under  the  circumstances,  strong 
action  was  considered  necessary.  The  U.N. 
sanctions  program  is,  moreover,  of  a  mandatory 
nature,  and  compliance  with  it  represents  a  firm 
international  obligation. 

In  the  negotiations  wliich  took  place  aboard 
the  British  warshijis  Tiger  (1966)  and  Fearless 
(1968),  the  British  Government  offered  a  vari- 
ety of  arrangements  to  open  the  way  to  mean- 
ingful black  participation  in  Rhodesian  polit- 
ical life.  Many  formulas  were  advanced,  and 


'  For  U.S.  statements  and  texts  of  resolutions  adopted 
by  the  Security  Council  on  Dec.  16,  1967,  and  May  29, 
196S,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  9,  1967,  p.  73,  and  June  24, 
196S,  p.  845. 


the  British  made  very  substantial  concessions  in 
the  process,  insisting  only  that  the  new  Rhode- 
sian constitution  contain  adequate  guarantees 
of  representative  government  and  the  possibility 
of  eventual  majority  rule.  Unfortunately,  all 
British  efforts  have  thus  far  proved  fruitless; 
Ian  Smith  has  not  agi-eed. 

Despite  economic  difficulties  and  political 
ostracism,  the  white  Rhodesian  minority  is  mov- 
ing ahead  with  the  adoption  of  a  constitution 
which  institutionalizes  racial  domination  and 
denies  the  African  majority  any  hope  of  peace- 
fully gaining  control  of  their  country's  govern- 
ment. The  land  is  to  be  divided  in  so-called 
"equal"  fashion,  half  to  the  black  96  percent  of 
the  i^opulation  and  half  to  the  wlute  4  percent. 
Censorship  is  tightening,  police  powers  are 
being  increased,  access  by  the  mdividual  to  the 
courts  is  being  cut  off — most  particularly  by 
legislation  broadly  authorizing  police  detention. 
Indeed,  the  constitution  itself  enshrines  such 
police  power  at  the  expense  of  individual  rights. 

The  course  of  these  events  is  of  grave  con- 
cern to  us.  A  continuation  of  the  Rhodesian 
regime's  present  policies  and  course  may  well 
lead  to  increasing  racial  tensions  and  possibly 
widespread  violence.  Politically  motivated  Rho- 
desian Africans  are  likely  to  turn  increasingly 
to  extremist  leaders  and  seek  the  assistance  and 
cooperation  of  countries,  including  Communist 
states,  which  are  willing  to  support  extremist 
measures. 

Faced  with  this  situation,  for  which  there  is 
no  obvious  or  easy  solution,  the  United  States 
has  come  under  strong  criticism  from  various 
quarters.  The  Africans  and  many  in  this  coun- 
try have  not  understood  why  more  dramatic  ac- 
tion against  the  Smith  regime  was  not  possible. 
They  call  for  military  intervention,  and  sanc- 
tions against  South  Africa. 

At  the  other  extreme,  it  is  argued  that  we 
should  support  and  cooperate  with  the  Smith 
regime.  Proponents  of  tliis  position  would  have 
us  ignore  our  obligations  under  the  United  Na- 
tions Charter,  arguing  that  the  regime  is  anti- 
Commimist  and  in  power. 

Neither  course  is  consistent  with  the  U.S. 
national  interest.  We  seek  peaceful  solutions, 
and  we  do  not  wish  to  create  new  or  expand 
existing  areas  of  armed  conflict.  We  believe  com- 
munism cannot  be  held  back  by  an  enclave  plii- 
losophy,  but  only  by  a  broad  recognition  of 
human  rights  and  dignity  and  by  the  espousal 
by  and  identification  of  Western  nations  with 
these  values. 


November   17,   1969 


423 


il 


There  is  no  doubt  that  the  sanctions  have 
worked  hardship  on  American  companies  and 
American  citizens.  We  are  concerned  with 
adverse  effects  to  the  U.S.  economy  which  the 
denial  of  Rhodesian  raw  material  may  bring. 
Our  present  evaluation  is  that  the  embargo 
has  not  created  serious  economic  problems  for 
the  United  States. 

Sanctions  have  not  been  totally  effective  be- 
cause of  the  noncompliance  of  South  Africa  and 
Portugal.  To  many  Africans  who  do  not  fully 
recognize  the  new  ground  we  have  broken  over 
Ehodesia,  we  have  not  gone  far  enough.  An 
early  solution  to  the  problem  does  not  seem 
in  sight.  Nevertheless,  we  feel  that  our  obliga- 
tions to  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and 
our  position  as  a  leader  of  the  free  world  jus- 
tify our  present  policy. 

Meanwhile,  the  nations  concerned  are 
actively  seeking  to  maintain  and  strengthen  the 
economic  sanctions  program,  with  the  expecta- 
tion that,  as  this  program  bites  more  deeply 
into  the  Rhodesian  economy,  the  Smith  regime 
will  see  the  ultimate  necessity  of  coming  to 
terms  with  the  world  in  which  it  lives.  The 
United  States  is  giving  full  support  to  efforts 
in  this  regard,  in  the  hope  that  the  objective 
may  be  reached  before  it  is  too  late. 


Consular  Convention  With  Belgium 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Message  From,  President  Nixon'^ 

To  tTie  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I  transmit 
herewith  the  consular  convention  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom  of 
Belgivmi,  signed  at  Washington  on  Septem- 
ber 2,  1969,  and  two  exchanges  of  notes  related 
thereto. 

The  convention  deals  with  the  conduct  of 
consular  relations  between  the  two  countries 
and  the  functions,  privileges,  and  immunities 

^  Transmitted  on  Oct.  8  (White  House  press  release)  ; 
also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  F.,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  which 
includes  the  texts  of  the  convention  and  exchanges  of 
notes  and  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 


of  their  respective  consular  officers.  Upon  entry 
into  force  it  will  replace  the  consular  convention 
of  March  9, 1880  between  the  United  States  and 
Belgium.  Like  other  recent  consular  conven- 
tions of  the  United  States,  the  new  convention 
with  Belgium  covers  such  important  matters 
as  the  obligations  of  the  two  countries  to  as- 
sure free  communication  between  a  citizen  and 
his  consul,  to  inform  consular  officers  of  the 
arrest  or  detention  of  their  countrymen,  and  to 
permit  visits  by  consuls  to  any  of  their  country- 
men who  are  in  prison.  It  covers  consular  func- 
tions and  responsibilities  in  such  fields  as  the 
issuance  of  visas  and  passports,  and  the  per- 
formance of  notarial  services.  It  provides  for 
the  inviolability  of  consular  communications, 
documents,  and  archives,  and  the  obligations  of 
the  host  country  to  protect  consular  jiremises 
against  intrusion  or  damage. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early  and 
favorable  consideration  to  the  convention  and 
related  exchanges  of  notes  and  give  its  advice 
and  consent  to  the  ratification  thereof. 

I  transmit  also,  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate,  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  with 
respect  to  the  convention  and  exchanges  of 
notes. 


Richard  Nixon 


The  White  House, 
October  8, 1969. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

91  si  Congress,   1st  Session 

Temporary  Extension  of  Suspension  of  Duty  on  Hep- 
tanoic  Acid;  1-Month  Extension  of  Existing  With- 
hoUling  Tax  Rates.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  4229. 
S.  Rept.  91-279.  June  25, 1969.  5  pp. 

Twenty-Fourtli  Report  of  U.S.  Advisory  Commission 
on  Information.  H.  Doc.  91-133.  July  1.  19G9.  12  pp. 

Diplomatic  and  Strategic  Impact  of  Multiple  Warhead 
Missiles.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Na- 
tional Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  AfCairs.  July  8- 
August  5, 1969.  302  pp. 

Endangered  Species.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  11363. 
H.  Rept.  91-382.  July  IS,  1969.  34  pp. 

Interest  Equalization  Tax  Extension  Act  of  1969.  Re- 
port to  accomp.iny  H.R.  12829.  H.  Rept.  91-383. 
July  21,  1969.  22  pp. 


424 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  Discusses  Verification  Procedures  Under  the  Draft  Treaty 
Banning  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the  Seabed 

Statement  hy  James  F.  Leonard  ^ 


In  my  statement  last  Tuesday  on  the  tabling 
of  the  U.S.-U.S.S.K.  draft  seabed  treaty,  I  said 
that  we  shall  have  to  work  hard  in  order  to  be 
able  to  submit  a  sound  and  broadly  agreed  text 
to  the  current  session  of  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly.^ This  applies  equally  to  the  Cochair- 
men,  who  Iiave  the  responsibility  for  explaining 
and  clarifying  the  treaty  provisions  wliich  they 
have  put  forward  and  the  considerations  that 
form  the  basis  for  the  text.  We  have  taken  care- 
ful note  of  the  comments  of  other  delegations 
on  the  treaty  text  and  wish  to  contmue  receiving 
any  suggestions  other  delegations  may  have. 

I  would  like  today,  in  order  to  facilitate  full 
understanding,  to  discuss  the  factors  that  under- 
lie my  delegation's  approach,  particularly  as 
regards  verification,  the  aspect  of  the  treatj'  that 
has  received  the  most  attention  so  far.  It  is  per- 
fectly understandable  that  this  matter  should 
be  carefully  examined,  since  no  responsible  gov- 
ermnent  could  accept  an  arms  limitation  unless 
it  was  confident  that  the  obligations  of  the 
agreement  would  be  complied  with  by  the  other 
parties.  Many  delegations  have  commented  on 
verification  in  our  plenary  meetings,  and  con- 
siderable informal  discussion  has  also  taken 
place.  We  have  also  had  a  detailed  presentation 
on  this  subject  in  the  form  of  a  workmg  paper 
submitted  by  the  distinguished  Representative 
of  Canada.^ 

As  I  understand  the  concerns  that  have  been 

'  Made  before  the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament  at  Geneva  on  Oct  16.  Mr.  Leonard  is  U.S. 
Representative  to  the  conference. 

"  For  a  statement  made  by  Mr.  Leonard  on  Oct.  7 
and  the  text  of  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  draft  treaty,  see  Bul- 
letin of  Nov.  3, 1969,  p.  365. 

'  CCD/270. 


November   17,   1969 


expressed,  there  seem  to  be  three  points  of  par- 
ticular interest  to  a  number  of  delegations : 

First,  there  is  the  concern  that  verification,  to 
be  adequate,  requires  a  more  complete  inspec- 
tion of  seabed  facilities;  this  concern  is  reflected 
in  suggestions  that  tliere  might  be  provisions  in 
the  treaty  covering  access  into  facilities. 

Second,  there  is  a  feeling  that  verification,  to 
be  effective  in  practice,  requires  that  assistance 
be  available ;  and  this  feeling  is  reflected  in  sug- 
gestions for  arranging  assistance  through  an  in- 
ternational organization,  such  as  the  United 
Nations. 

Third,  there  is  a  fear  that  verification,  to  pro- 
tect the  rights  of  coastal  states,  requires  the  es- 
tablislmient  of  explicit  procedures,  as  reflected 
in  suggestions  for  procedures  for  notification 
and  participation  of  a  coastal  state  in  verifica- 
tion activities  in  the  vicinity  of  its  continental 
shelf. 

Access  Into  Seabed  Installations 

Let  me  address  these  points  in  order.  There 
has  already  been  considerable  discussion  of  the 
possible  need  for  a  right  of  access  to  enter 
facilities  on  the  seabed.  As  Ambassador  Fisher 
pointed  out  in  some  detail  in  his  statement  on 
May  22,  the  United  States  believes  that  a  right 
of  access,  for  the  purpose  of  a  nuclear  measure, 
would  be  both  impractical  and  unnecessary.* 

Before  we  go  further,  however,  I  would  like 
to  explain  that  when  the  United  States  delega- 
tion refers  to  the  right  of  access  we  mean  the 


*  For  a  statement  made  before  the  conference  on 
May  22  by  U.S.  Representative  Adrian  S.  Fisher,  see 
Bulletin  of  June  16, 1969,  p.  520. 


425 


{ 


right  to  go  into  a  facility  or  the  right  to  open 
up  a  piece  of  equipment.  When  vre  say  that  such 
access  is  impractical  and  unnecessary,  we  are  not 
referring  to  access  in  the  sense  of  ability  to  go 
close  to  the  object  or  facility  in  question.  In 
other  words,  in  one  sense,  access  would  be  per- 
mitted ;  that  is,  under  the  freedoms  of  the  high 
seas  parties  could  have  access — close  access — 
to  the  area  of  a  facility  or  an  object,  so  long  as 
there  is  no  interference  with  the  activities  of  the 
states  concerned. 

Without  repeating  our  earlier  statements,  let 
me  simply  sketch  out  our  reasons  for  the  con- 
clusions that  access  in  the  narrow,  specific  sense 
of  physical  intrusion  into  a  seabed  installation 
would  be  impractical  and  unnecessary.  Such  ac- 
cess into  sealDcd  installations  would  be  difficult, 
hazardous,  and  costly  and  could  be  destructive 
to  both  property  and  human  life,  owing  to  the 
high  pressures  in  deep  water  around  the  object 
to  be  verified.  Furthermore,  the  resources  which 
might  be  available  for  this  purpose  are  in  very 
short  supply. 

Now,  these  obstacles  might  have  to  be  faced 
if  it  were  absolutely  necessary  to  have  inspec- 
tions of  the  interior  of  installations  to  assure 
compliance  with  the  treaty  which  we  have  be- 
fore us.  But  we  are  convinced  that  access  into 
installations  would  be  unnecessary  for  us  or  for 
other  nations,  whatever  the  level  of  their  knowl- 
edge of  marine  technology.  We  believe  that  sea- 
bed emplacements  for  nuclear  weapons,  on  the 
scale  required  to  be  of  significant  military  value, 
would  be  difficult  to  build  without  the  knowl- 
edge of  other  countries.  Emplacing  such  in- 
stallations would  involve  a  great  deal  of 
sophisticated  equipment,  unusual  engineering 
activities,  and  a  highly  visible  support  effort.  In 
addition,  the  deploy uig  country  would  obvi- 
ously endeavor  to  enforce  elaborate  security  sys- 
tems to  protect  the  vital  military  secrets  which 
would  be  involved  in  such  installations.  All  these 
activities  would  undoubtedly  attract  the  atten- 
tion of  other  maritime  countries. 

Even  if  one  were  to  assume,  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  that  some  facilities  for  the  emplace- 
ment of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  might  be 
emplaced  before  the  construction  was  discov- 
ered, the  configuration  and  operation  of  facili- 
ties specifically  designed  for  nuclear  weapons 
or  other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  would  be 
plainly  observable  and  identifiable  without  ac- 
cess into  such  facilities  being  required. 


It  has  been  asked  how  we  can  be  so  sure  of 
our  capability  and  the  capability  of  others  to 
check  compliance  with  this  treaty,  when  we 
have  insisted  on  much  more  elaborate  provisions 
in  other  arms  control  measures.  This  question 
seems  to  imply  that  there  should  be  virtually 
identical  verification  provisions  for  any  meas- 
ure, regardless  of  its  nature.  In  contrast,  the 
United  States  has  always  sought  to  establish  ver- 
ification procedures  appropriate  for  the  par- 
ticular measure  in  question.  In  some  instances, 
it  may  be  necessary  to  have  certain  types  of  off- 
site  inspections;  in  other  cases,  as  for  example 
the  ban  on  stationing  nuclear  weapons  in  outer 
space,  access  to  objects  is  not  required. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  hope  we  can  all  agree  that 
it  is  the  path  of  progress  for  us  to  adopt  a  flexi- 
ble, imaginative,  and  creative  view  regarding 
procedures  for  verification.  If  a  country  were 
to  refuse  to  accept  verification  procedures  for 
one  situation  because  in  another  situation  other 
verification  procedures  may  be  necessary  and 
appropriate,  the  opportunities  for  reaching 
agreement  would  be  severely  lunited.  I  think  it 
would  be  correct  to  say  that  this  Committee  has 
an  interest  in  demonstrating  its  ability  to  fash- 
ion verification  procedures  uniquely  tailored  for 
the  needs  of  each  unique  situation.  This  is  the 
pragmatic  way  to  achieve  progress,  and  we  ask 
the  Committee's  support  for  proceeding  in  this 
manner. 

Wide  Range  of  Possible  Actions 

If  we  return  now  to  the  seabed,  we  believe  that 
there  is  a  wide  range  of  possible  actions  which 
parties  could  take  to  verify  compliance  with  this 
treaty,  short  of  actual  entry  into  installations. 
As  we  pointed  out  earlier,  the  vast  majority  of 
states  have  ships  and  planes  that  can  and  do 
constantly  carry  out  surveillance  of  their  coastal 
waters.  Even  more  important,  the  activities  of 
states  on  and  over  the  high  seas  are  not  and 
will  not  be  subject  to  the  kind  of  restrictions 
that  would  apply  in  the  case  of  inspections  on 
the  territory  of  another  state.  So  long  as  the 
activity  was  not  interfered  with,  states  could 
observe  the  facility  as  often  and  as  closely  as 
the  circumstances  warranted.  Photographs 
could  be  taken  and  data  collected  to  evaluate  the 
activity  and  assist  in  the  determination  of 
whether  the  treaty  has  been  violated.  So  long 
as  they  took  place  within  the  treaty  area  and  did 


426 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


not  interfere  with  the  activities  of  the  states  con- 
cerned, these  procedures  would  be  consistent 
with  existing  international  law. 

If  it  is  suggested,  as  we  have  sometimes  heard, 
that  the  500-meter  safety  zone  permitted  under 
the  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf 
would  preclude  close  examination  of  a  particu- 
lar installation,  I  would  respond  that  it  is  highly 
imlikely  that  a  potential  violator  of  this  treaty 
would  announce  the  precise  location  of  his  viola- 
tion by  giving  due  notice  of  the  installation  and 
the  safety  zone  as  provided  in  that  convention." 
Even  if  he  were  to  do  just  that,  observation — 
rather  close  and  continuous  observation — would 
still  be  possible  and  tlie  nature  of  the  activities 
being  carried  out  at  the  installation  could  indi- 
cate whether  further  consultation  was  required. 

The  Matter  of  Assistance 

Let  me  turn  now,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  another 
aspect  of  the  verification  question :  the  matter  of 
assistance.  It  is  an  undisputed  fact  that  there 
are  differences  among  states  regarding  their 
respective  levels  of  technology.  This  has  led 
some  to  wonder  whether  there  should  be  pro- 
visions in  the  treaty  to  establish  arrangements 
which  would  enable  less  advanced  states  to  ob- 
tain assistance  in  carrying  out  verification  activ- 
ities on  the  seabed.  The  United  Nations  has 
been  mentioned  as  a  possible  source  or  channel 
for  such  assistance. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  need  for  access,  this  is  a 
legitimate  question  and  deserves  to  be  answered. 
We  continue  to  believe  that  efforts  to  provide  ex- 
plicit procedures  for  assistance  would  be  pre- 
mature, in  view  of  uncertainty  about  what  is 
involved,  and  could  also  raise  severe  problems 
of  resource  allocation.  The  equipment  and  per- 
sonnel for  these  specialized  activities  are  in 
short  supply,  and  there  would  be  a  need  for  de- 
tailed examination  by  the  states  possessing  them 
of  any  proposed  treaty  provisions  governing 
their  use. 

The  suggestion  contained  in  paragraph  5(a) 
of  the  Canadian  working  paper  is  that  states 
"shall  have  the  right  to  apply  to  another  state 
party"  for  assistance.  The  distinguished  Rep- 
resentative of  Canada  has  pointed  out  that  his 
paper  does  not  propose  treaty  language,  and  we 
think  that  this  represents  a  helpful  clarification 

'  For  text  of  the  convention,  see  Builetin  of  June  30, 
1958,  p.  1121. 


at  this  stage.  However,  the  language  used  in 
paragraph  5(a)  points  up  the  difficulties  of  the 
suggestion.  We  think  that  problem  is  now  cov- 
ered adequately  and  in  a  practical  and  workable 
manner  as  a  result  of  the  present  language  in 
article  III,  paragraph  2,  of  the  draft  treaty 
(CCD/269).  This  language  clearly  reflects  that 
parties  may  exercise  their  right  of  verification 
by  their  own  means  or  with  the  assistance  of 
other  parties.  If  the  proposed  paragraph  5(a) 
means  something  more  than  this,  it  might  imply 
obligations  for  the  United  States  and  other 
countries;  and  given  the  present  state  of  tech- 
nology and  the  varying  political  relations 
among  the  large  number  of  countries  that  might 
become  parties  to  the  treaty,  it  would  not  be  pos- 
sible for  us  to  accept  such  obligations. 

There  is  another  aspect  of  this  question  that 
deserves  careful  study.  It  may  be  thought  that 
the  United  Nations  should  play  a  role  in  veri- 
fication, since  this  is  the  organization  charged 
with  the  responsibility  for  international  peace 
and  security.  In  fact,  under  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  there  are  already  provisions  for 
dealing  with  possible  threats  to  peace.  But  I 
would  urge  caution  against  specifying  in  this 
treaty  how  the  U.N.  should  be  used  or  what 
the  Secretary  General  might  do. 

I  believe  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  try  to  turn 
the  question  of  verification  over  to  the  U.N. 

Instead,  I  believe  that  reliance  should  be 
placed  on  informal  procedures  for  consultation 
and  cooperation  as  already  envisioned  in  the 
draft.  States  that  have  mutual  interests  in  par- 
ticular areas  of  the  seabed  would  no  doubt  wish 
to  work  out  appropriate  arrangements.  All  this 
would  take  place  within  the  framework  of  nor- 
mal international  relations. 

In  those  very  few  cases  where  consultation 
and  cooperation  might  not  be  sufficient,  or  where 
a  party  might  have  serious  questions  about  the 
observance  of  the  prohibitions,  there  are  exist- 
ing procedures  for  bringing  such  questions  to 
the  attention  of  the  Security  Council.  These  are 
set  forth  in  the  U.N.  Charter,  and  the  seabed 
treaty  would  certainly  not  change  any  party's 
rights  or  obligations  under  the  charter.  In  con- 
trast to  efforts  to  specify  in  the  seabed  treaty 
procedures  for  U.N.  action,  it  might  be  more 
fruitful  to  consider  the  ways  in  which  existing 
U.N.  procedures  might  apply.  Wliile  my  dele- 
gation would  be  opposed  to  efforts  to  include  ex- 
plicit provisions  for  U.N.  participation  in,  say, 


November  17,  1969 


427 


verification,  we  are  ready  to  examine  how  the 
existing  framework  of  international  law,  in- 
cUiding  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
might  be  used  to  reinforce  the  provisions  of  the 
seabed  treaty.  I  would  hope  that  those  delega- 
tions concerned  about  verification  assistance 
would  comment  on  this  approach. 

The   Rights  of  Coastal   States 

The  last  of  the  three  interests  I  mentioned 
earlier  has  to  do  witli  the  right  of  coastal  states. 
Although  the  treaty  clearly  provides  that  veri- 
fication would  have  to  take  place  without  in- 
fringing rights  under  international  law,  some 
delegations  have  expressed  the  view  that  pro- 
cedures should  be  established  to  assure  that  the 
coastal  state's  rights  regarding  its  continental 
shelf  are  protected.  The  procedures  which  have 
been  suggested  involve  notification  and  partici- 
pation of  a  coastal  state  wliich  is  a  party  to 
the  treaty  in  verification  activities  taking  place 
on  the  continental  shelf  or  in  its  superjacent 
waters.  Since  I  believe  we  are  agreed  that  this 
treaty  should  not  prejudice  any  state's  existing 
rights,  it  is  proper  that  we  review  the  draft  to 
see  whether  this  concern  is  fully  met  and,  if  not, 
whether  new  procedures  should  be  formulated 
and  negotiated. 

After  reviewing  this  question  carefully,  the 
United  States  continues  to  be  convinced  that 
new  procedures  need  not  and  should  not  be  de- 
veloped. The  draft  treaty  is  written  in  such  a 
way  as  to  ensure  that  it  would  not  infringe  or 
otherwise  interfere  with  existing  rights  or  obli- 
gations under  international  law,  except  insofar 
as  parties  would  accept  the  new  prohibitions 
of  the  treaty  itself,  such  as  not  to  emplace  mass 
destruction  weapons  beyond  the  contiguous 
zone.  The  provision  for  verification  depends 
directly  on  international  law  and  the  exer- 
cise of  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas.  As  a 
practical  matter,  we  are  confident  that  parties 
would  be  able  to  verify  effectively  without  in 
any  way  infringing  the  rights  of  coastal  states 
regarding  the  continental  shelf. 

In  contrast  to  this  flexible  and  realistic  pro- 
vision, the  proposal  for  notification  and  partic- 
ipation or  association  of  the  coastal  state  seems 
to  us  to  be  an  unnecessary  and  undesirable  re- 
striction on  the  right  of  a  party  to  verifj-  the 
activities  of  others.  If  the  projjosed  procedure 
for  involving  the  coastal  state  is  to  have  any 
meaning,  it  would  require  a  corresponding 
power  or  authority  to  enforce  the  obligation. 


But  it  would  not  be  immediately  apparent 
whether  a  ship  sailing  on  the  high  seas  was  en- 
gaged in  activities  completely  unrelated  to  this 
treaty  or  whether  it  was  carrying  on  some  form 
of  verification  for  which  permission  would  be 
needed.  The  coastal  state,  therefore,  might  feel 
authorized  to  attempt  to  exercise  some  form 
of  control  over  the  activities  of  any  ship  or  sub- 
marine in  the  vicinity  of  its  continental  shelf. 
We  would  regard  any  such  effort  to  be  a  serious 
infringement  of  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas. 
It  would  also  be  inconsistent  with  the  1958 
Geneva  Convention  on  the  Continental  Shelf, 
which  stipulates  that  the  rights  of  the  coastal 
state  over  the  continental  shelf  do  not  affect 
the  legal  status  of  the  superjacent  waters  as 
high  seas,  or  that  of  the  air  space  above  those 
waters,  and  that  the  coastal  state's  rights  on  the 
shelf  are  limited  to  exclusive  rights  of  exjjlora- 
tion  and  exploitation. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  problems  of  "co-participa- 
tion"' or  "association"  are  not  solved  by  inclu- 
sion of  a  clause  like  that  contained  in  paragraph 
6(c)  of  the  Canadian  working  paper.  This  para- 
graph states  that  the  provisions  for  notice  and 
association  do  not  apply  to  the  process  of  "sim- 
ple observation"  in  the  normal  course  of  navi- 
gation or  overflight.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to 
visualize,  and  I  believe  it  would  in  fact  be  even 
more  difficult  to  establish,  clear-cut  dividing 
lines  between  "simple  observation"  and  observa- 
tion that  might  be  described  as  not  "simple"  be- 
cause something  more  than  the  naked  eye,  such 
as  cameras,  has  been  used.  Would  it  cease  to  be 
"simple"  because  observation  had  taken  place 
by  some  divers  in  the  water  who  had  not  de- 
scended to  the  actual  seabed,  et  cetera?  Com- 
plexities of  this  sort  should  be  avoided. 

We  hope  that  members  of  this  Committee 
will  ask  themselves  frankly  whether  we  really 
need  to  establish  procedures  for  "co-participa- 
tion" or,  to  use  the  word  in  the  Canadian  paper, 
"association"  to  satisfy  those  concerns  of  coastal 
states  that  seem  to  lie  behind  the  idea.  We  im- 
derstand  that  coastal  states  who  highly  value 
their  right  to  exploit  the  resources  of  their  own 
continental  shelves  would  not  like  to  see  the 
right  of  verification  under  the  seabed  treaty 
utilized  somehow  to  prejudice  their  right  to  de- 
velop these  resources.  It  seems  to  us  improbable, 
however,  that  any  country  could  in  some  fashion 
approach  the  continental  shelf  of  another  state 
and,  under  the  guise  of  seabed  arms  control 
verification,  exploit  resources  of  the  shelf  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  the  coastal  state. 


428 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Exploitation  of  resources  in  the  seabed  is  a 
big  and  difficult  job.  It  takes  equipment  and 
men  on  a  large  scale.  It  cannot  be  done  in  an 
hour  or  two  by  a  ghost  ship  in  the  night.  These 
obvious  factual  realities  should  not  be  ignored 
in  this  Committee.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it 
should  be  felt  that  another's  verification  activi- 
ties under  the  seabed  arms  control  treaty  were 
somehow  being  used  as  a  cover  to  circumvent 
the  coastal  state's  exclusive  right  of  exploration 
and  exploitation  on  the  continental  shelf,  those 
activities  could  certainly  be  brought  into  ques- 
tion by  the  coastal  state.  On  the  basis  of  these 
realities,  we  would  conclude  that  special  new 
procedures  providing  for  "co-participation"  or 
"association"  are  simply  not  needed  to  protect 
the  rights  of  the  coastal  state  on  the  continental 
shelf.  ^Vll  of  these  considerations  have  convinced 
my  delegation  that  an  attempt  to  develop  these 
procedures  would  seriously  complicate  the  ne- 
gotiation of  this  treaty  and  would  be  undesira- 
ble in  any  case.  Such  procedures  would  raise 
difficult  and  complex  questions  of  the  law  of  the 
sea.  Furthermore,  there  would  be  important  and 
adverse  security  implications,  since  the  proce- 
dures would  inevitably  infringe  on  the  rights 
to  use  the  high  seas  freely. 

At  the  same  time,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  should 
not  simply  dismiss  the  concern  that  lies  behind 
all  of  these  suggestions.  We  appreciate  the  in- 
terest of  coastal  states  in  ensuring  that  their 
rights  are  safeguarded.  The  United  States,  after 
all,  has  a  very  long  coast  and  a  large  continental 
shelf.  As  has  been  pointed  out,  international  law 
covers  not  only  such  things  as  the  freedoms  of 
the  high  seas  but  also  rights  regarding  the  con- 
tinental shelf.  If  there  remains,  despite  our  pre- 
vious efforts  to  avoid  even  the  implication  of 
prejudice  to  the  positions  of  parties,  a  strong 
feeling  that  this  needs  to  be  spelled  out  with 
somewhat  greater  attention  to  existing  rights, 
then  I  believe  that  further  consideration  is  war- 
ranted. Accordingly,  I  would  hope  that  those 
delegations  who  are  concerned  about  protect- 
ing the  rights  of  coastal  states  will  give  some 
thought  as  to  how  this  might  be  done  in  ways 
which  would  not  require  restrictions  on  what 
for  centuries  has  been  accepted  as  part  of  the 
doctrine  of  freedom  of  the  seas. 

Before  leaving  the  question  of  the  rights  of 
coastal  states,  I  think  it  would  be  helpful  to 
point  out  the  interrelationship  between  the 
question  of  inspection  with  access,  as  suggested 
in  paragraph  4  of  the  Canadian  working  paper, 
and  the  question  of  protecting  the  legitimate 


existing  rights  of  coastal  states  on  their  own 
continental  shelves.  If  access  into  facilities  were 
to  be  provided  under  this  treaty,  then  clearly 
there  would  be  greater  opportunity  for  some- 
how impeding  or  complicating  activities  of 
coastal  states  on  their  own  continental  shelves. 
We  would  tliink,  therefore,  that  the  interests  of 
coastal  states,  which  presumably  want  to  mini- 
mize any  possible  risk  of  impeding  the  operation 
of  their  facilities  on  their  own  continental 
shelves,  would  best  be  served  by  simplify- 
ing, not  complicating,  possible  procedures  of 
verification. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  the  course  of  the  next  few 
weeks  this  Committee  will  have  a  valuable  op- 
portunity to  work  out  a  meaningful  nuclear 
arms  limitation.  This  will  require  perseverance 
and  the  sincere  cooperation  of  all  delegations. 
It  will  require  a  realistic  appreciation  of  each 
other's  real  concerns  and  needs.  Tlie  United 
States  delegation,  for  its  part,  is  prepared  to 
give  careful  and  serious  consideration  to  all  sug- 
gestions that  other  delegations  have  made  and 
may  wish  to  make  with  respect  to  the  draft 
treaty. 


United  Nations  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 


Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  tclow)  may  be  consulted  at  depository  libraries 
in  the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publications  may  be 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 


General  Assembly 

Creation  of  the  Post  of  United  Nations  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Human   Rights.   Note  by  the   Secretary 
General.  A/7498.  July  18, 1969.  38  pp. 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space : 
Information  furnished  by  the  U.S.S.R.  concerning 
objects  launched  into  orbit  around  the  earth  or 
into  outer  space.  A/AC.105/INF.208.  July  23,  1969. 
2  pp. 
Information  furnished  by  the  United  States  concern- 
ing   objects    launched    into    orbit    or    beyond. 
A/AC.105/INF.209.  August  12,  1969.  2  pp. 
Broadcasting  From  Satellites.  Working  paper  .sub- 
mitted to  the  Working  Group  on  Direct  Broadcast 
Satellites    by    the    United    Kingdom    delegation. 
A/AC.105/65.  August  18, 1969.  14  pp. 
Conference  of  Non-Nuclear-Weapon  States.  Contribu- 
tions of  Nuclear  Technology  to  the  Economic  and 
Scientific  Advancement  of  the  Developing  Countries. 
A/7.n68.  July  24,  1969.  78  pp. 
Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  the  Seabed  and  the 
Ocean  Floor  Beyond  the  Limits  of  National  Jurisdic- 
tion.  Note   by   the  Secretary   General  transmitting 


November   17,   1969 


429 


Draft  Comprehensive  Outline  of  the  Scope  of  the 
Long-Term  and  Expanded  Program  of  Oceanic  B3x- 
ploratlon  and  Research  prepared  by  the  Special 
Working  Group  of  the  Intergovernmental  Ocean- 
ographic  Commission.  A/AC.138A4.  July  29,  1969. 
34  pp. 
Election  of  Five  Slembers  of  the  International  Court 
of  Justice.  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  GeneraL 
A/7569.  July  31, 1969.  5  pp. 


Economic  and  Social   Council 

Commission  on  Human  Rights.  Subcommlssion  on 
Prevention  of  Discrimination  and  Protection  of 
Minorities.  Study  of  Equality  In  the  Administration 
of  Justice.  Report  submitted  by  the  Special  Rap- 
porteur, Mr.  Mohammed  Ahmed  Abu  Rannat. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/296.  June  10,  1969.  267  pp. 

Committee  on  Housing,  Building  and  Planning.  Hous- 
ing, Building  and  Planning  in  the  Second  United 
Nations  Development  Decade.  Report  of  the  Secre- 
tary General.  E/C.6/90.  July  24,  1969.  55  pp. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.  and  Jamaica  Conclude 
Air  Transport  Agreement 

Press  release  286  dated  October  2 
DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  United  States  and  Jamaica  on  October  2 
concluded  an  air  transport  agreement  which 
provides  a  continuing  basis  for  commercial  air 
services  between  the  two  countries  and  allows 
for  the  expansion  of  services  by  airlines  of  both 
countries. 

Under  the  new  agreement,  U.S.  airlines  may 
provide  service  from  the  United  States  to  Mon- 
tego  Bay  and  Kingston  and  beyond  to  the 
Caribbean,  Central  America,  South  America, 
and  Africa.  Four  U.S.  airlines  now  have  author- 
ity from  the  Civil  Aeronautics  Board  to  operate 
to  Jamaica.  Delta  Air  Lines  and  Pan  American 
World  Airways  already  serve  the  island,  and 
Eastern  Airlines  and  Caribbean-Atlantic  Air- 
lines will  be  able  to  initiate  entirely  new  opera- 
tions to  Jamaica. 

The  agreement  also  provides  for  routes  to  be 


operated  by  Jamaican  airlines.  These  include 
routes  to  New  York,  Miami,  Philadelphia, 
Detroit,  and  Chicago.  Air  Jamaica  now  serves 
New  York  and  Miami. 

The  agreement  and  a  related  exchange  of  dip- 
lomatic notes  were  signed  in  Kingston  by  U.S. 
Charge  d'Affaires  a.i.  David  Wilken  and  by 
Neville  Gallimore,  Acting  Minister  of  External 
Affairs. 


TEXT  OF  AGREEMENT 

AiB  Tbanspobt  Aqeeement  Between  the  Govebnment 
OF  THE  United  States  of  Amebica  and  the  Govebn- 
ment OP  Jamaica 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Government  of  Jamaica, 

Desiring  to  conclude  an  agreement  for  the  purpose  of 
promoting  air  transportation  between  their  respective 
territories. 

Have  agreed  as  follows : 

Abticlb   1 
For  the  purposes  of  the  present  Agreement : 

A.  "Agreement"  shall  mean  this  Agreement,  the 
Schedule  attached  thereto,  and  any  amendments 
thereto. 

B.  "Aeronautical  authorities"  shall  mean,  in  the  case 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  Civil  Aeronautics 
Board,  and  in  the  case  of  Jamaica,  the  Minister  respon- 
sible for  Civil  Aviation,  the  Air  Transport  Licensing 
Board,  or,  in  both  cases,  any  person  or  agency  author- 
ized to  perform  the  functions  exercised  at  present  by 
those  authorities. 

C.  "Designated  airline"  shall  mean  an  airline  which 
one  Contracting  Party  has  notified  to  the  other  Con- 
tracting Party  to  be  an  airline  which  will  operate  a 
specific  route  or  routes  listed  in  the  Schedule  to  this 
Agreement.  Such  designation  shall  be  notified  in  writ- 
ing through  diplomatic  channels. 

D.  "Territory",  in  relation  to  a  State,  shall  mean  the 
land  areas  under  the  sovereignty,  suzerainty,  protec- 
tion, jurisdiction  or  trusteeship  of  that  State,  and 
territorial  waters  adjacent  thereto. 

E.  "Air  Service"  shall  mean  any  scheduled  air  service 
performed  by  aircraft  for  the  pubUc  transport  of 
passengers,  cargo,  and  mail,  separately  or  in 
combination. 

F.  "International  air  service"  shall  mean  an  air 
service  which  passes  through  the  air  space  over  the 
territory  of  more  than  one  State. 

G.  "Stop  for  non-traffic  purposes"  shall  mean  a 
landing  for  any  purpose  other  than  taking  on  or  dis- 
charging passengers,  cargo  or  mail. 

Abticle  2 

A.  Each  Contracting  Party  grants  to  the  other  Con- 
tracting Party  the  rights  specified  in  this  Agreement  for 
the  purpose  of  operating  international  air  services  on 


430 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  routes  specified  In  the  appropriate  paragraph  of 
the  Schedule  to  this  Agreement  (hereinafter  called  the 
"agreed  services"  and  "specified  routes"). 

B.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Agreement,  the 
airlines  designated  by  each  Contracting  Party  shall 
enjoy,  while  operating  the  agreed  services  on  the  speci- 
fied routes,  the  following  privileges : 

(1 )  To  fly  across  the  territory  of  the  other  Contract- 
ing Party  without  landing ; 

(2)  To  land  in  the  territory  of  the  other  Conti-actlng 
Party  for  non-trafiic  purposes  ; 

(3)  To  malie  stops  at  the  points  In  the  territory  of 
the  other  Contracting  Party  named  on  each  of  the 
specified  routes  for  the  purpose  of  putting  down  and 
taking  on  international  traffic  in  passengers,  cargo,  and 
mail,  separately  or  In  combination. 

C.  Nothing  in  paragraph  B  of  this  Article  shall  be 
deemed  to  confer  on  the  airlines  of  one  Contracting 
Party  the  privilege  of  taking  on,  in  the  territory  of  the 
other  Contracting  Party,  passengers,  cargo  or  mall 
carried  for  remuneration  or  hire  and  destined  for 
another  point  in  the  territory  of  that  other  Contract- 
ing Party.  However,  airlines  designated  by  one  Con- 
tracting Party  to  provide  service  over  a  route  contain- 
ing more  than  one  point  in  the  territory  of  the  other 
Contracting  Party  may  provide  a  stopover  at  any  of 
such  points  to  traffic  moving  on  a  ticket  or  waybill 
providing  for  transportation  on  the  same  airline  on  a 
through  journey  to  or  from  a  point  outside  the  territory 
of  such  other  Contracting  Party. 

Abticle   3 

Air  services  on  a  specified  route  may  be  inaugurated 
by  an  airline  or  airlines  of  one  Contracting  Party  at 
any  time  after  that  Contracting  Party  has  designated 
such  airline  or  airlines  for  that  route  and  the  other 
Contracting  Party  has  granted  the  appropriate  operat- 
ing permission.  Such  other  Contracting  Party  shall, 
subject  to  Article  4,  grant  this  permission,  with  a  mini- 
mum of  procedural  delay,  provided  that  the  designated 
airline  or  airlines  may  be  required  to  qualify  before 
the  competent  aeronautical  authorities  of  that  Con- 
tracting Party,  under  the  laws  and  regulations  normally 
applied  by  those  authorities,  before  being  permitted  to 
engage  in  the  operations  contemplated  In  this 
Agreement. 

Article   4 

A.  Each  Contracting  Party  reserves  the  right  to  with- 
hold or  revoke  the  operating  permission  referred  to  In 
Article  3  of  this  Agreement  with  respect  to  an  airline 
designated  by  the  other  Contracting  Party,  or  to  im- 
pose conditions  on  such  permission,  in  the  event  that  : 

(1)  Such  airUne  fails  to  qualify  iinder  the  laws  and 
regulations  normally  applied  by  the  aeronautical  au- 
thorities of  that  Contracting  Party; 

(2)  Such  airline  fails  to  comply  with  the  laws  and 
regulations  referred  to  in  Article  5  of  this  Agreement; 
or 

(3)  That  Contracting  Party  is  not  satisfied  that 
substantial  ownership  and  effective  control  are  vested 
In  the  Contracting  Party  designating  the  airline  or  in 
nationals  of  that  Contracting  Party. 


B.  Each  Contracting  Party  reserves  the  right  to 
revoke  the  operating  permission  referred  to  In  Article  3 
of  this  Agreement  with  respect  to  an  airline  designated 
by  the  other  Contracting  Party  in  the  event  that  such 
airline  fails  to  fulfill  or  commits  any  breach  of  the 
conditions  of  that  operating  permission. 

C.  Unless  immediate  action  is  essential  to  prevent 
infringement  of  the  laws  and  regulations  referred  to 
in  Article  5  of  this  Agreement,  the  right  to  revoke 
such  permission  shall  be  exercised  only  after  con- 
sultation with  the  other  Contracting  Party. 

Abticle   5 

A.  The  laws  and  regulations  of  one  Contracting 
Party  relating  to  the  admission  to  or  departure  from 
its  territory  of  aircraft  engaged  in  international  air 
navigation,  or  to  the  operation  and  navigation  of  such 
aircraft  while  within  its  territory,  shall  be  applied  to 
the  aircraft  of  the  airline  or  airlines  designated  by  the 
other  Contracting  Party  and  shall  be  complied  with  by 
such  aircraft  upon  entrance  into  or  departure  from 
and  whUe  within  the  territory  of  the  first  Contracting 
Party. 

B.  The  laws  and  regulations  of  one  Contracting 
Party  relating  to  the  admission  to  or  departure  from 
its  territory  of  passengers,  crew,  mall  or  cargo  of  air- 
craft, including  laws  and  regulations  relating  to  entry, 
clearance,  immigration,  passports,  customs,  and  quar- 
antine shall  be  compUed  with  by  or  on  behalf  of  such 
passengers,  crew,  mall  or  cargo  of  the  airline  or  air- 
lines of  the  other  Contracting  Party  upon  entrance  into 
or  departure  from  and  while  within  the  territory  of 
the  first  Contracting  Party. 

Article  6 

Certificates  of  airworthiness,  certificates  of  com- 
petency, and  licences  issued  or  rendered  valid  by  one 
Contracting  Party,  and  still  in  force,  shall  be  recog- 
nized as  valid  by  the  other  Contracting  Party  for  the 
purpose  of  operating  the  routes  and  services  provided 
for  in  this  Agreement,  provided  that  the  requirements 
under  which  such  certificates  or  licences  were  Issued 
or  rendered  valid  are  equal  to  or  above  the  minimum 
standards  which  may  be  established  pursuant  to  the 
Convention  on  International  Civil  Aviation.  Each  Con- 
tracting Party  reserves  the  right,  however,  to  refuse  to 
recognize,  for  the  purpose  of  flights  above  its  own 
territory,  certificates  of  competency  and  licences 
granted  to  its  own  nationals  by  the  other  Contracting 
Party. 

Abticle  7 

A.  Bach  Contracting  Party  may  impo.se  or  permit  to 
be  imposed  just  and  reasonable  charges  for  the  use  of 
public  airports  and  other  facilities  under  its  control, 
provided  that  such  charges  shall  not  be  higher  than  the 
charges  Imposed  for  the  use  of  such  airports  and 
facilities  by  its  national  aircraft  engaged  in  similar 
international  air  services. 

B.  Neither  of  the  Contracting  Parties  shall  give  a 
preference  to  Its  own  airlines  over  the  airline  or  air- 
lines of  the  other  Contracting  Party  in  the  application 
of  its  customs,  immigration,  quarantine,  and  similar 
regulations  or  in  the  use  of  airports,  airways,  and  other 
facilities  under  its  control. 


November  17,   1969 


431 


Article   8 

A.  Each  Contracting  Party  shall  exempt  the  desig- 
nated airline  or  airlines  of  the  other  Contracting  Party 
to  the  fullest  extent  possible  under  its  national  law,  on 
the  basis  of  reciprocity,  from  import  restrictions, 
customs  duties,  excise  taxes,  inspection  fees,  and  other 
national  duties  and  charges  on  fuel,  lubricants,  con- 
sumable technical  supplies,  spare  parts  including 
engines,  regular  equipment,  ground  equipment,  stores, 
and  other  items  intended  for  use  solely  in  connection 
with  the  operation  or  servicing  of  aircraft  of  the  air- 
lines of  such  other  Contracting  Party  engaged  in  inter- 
national air  service.  The  exemptions  provided  under 
this  paragraph  shall  apply  to  items : 

(1)  Introduced  into  the  territory  of  one  Contracting 
Party  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  designated  airlines  of  the 
other  Contracting  Party ; 

(2)  Retained  on  aircraft  of  the  designated  airlines 
of  one  Contracting  Party  upon  arriving  in  or  leaving 
the  territory  of  the  other  Contracting  Party ;  or 

(3)  Taken  on  board  aircraft  of  the  designated  air- 
lines of  one  Contracting  Party  in  the  territory  of  the 
other  and  intended  for  use  in  international  air  service ; 

whether  or  not  such  items  are  used  or  consumed  wholly 
within  the  territory  of  the  Contracting  Party  granting 
the  exemption. 

B.  The  exemptions  provided  for  by  this  Article  shall 
also  be  available  in  situations  where  the  designated 
airline  or  airlines  of  one  Contracting  Party  have 
entered  into  arrangements  with  another  airline  or  air- 
lines for  the  loan  or  transfer  In  the  territory  of  the 
other  Contracting  Party  of  the  items  specified  in  para- 
graph A,  provided  such  other  airline  or  airlines  similar- 
ly enjoy  such  exemptions  from  such  other  Contracting 
Party. 

Article  9 

A.  There  shall  be  a  fair  and  equal  opportunity  for 
the  airlines  of  each  Contracting  Party  to  operate  on 
any  route  covered  by  this  Agreement. 

B.  In  the  operation  by  the  airline  or  airlines  of  either 
Contracting  Party  of  the  air  services  described  in  this 
Agreement,  the  interest  of  the  airline  or  airlines  of  the 
other  Contracting  Party  shall  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion so  as  not  to  affect  unduly  the  services  which  the 
latter  provide  on  all  or  part  of  the  same  routes. 

C.  The  air  services  made  available  to  the  public  by 
the  airlines  operating  under  this  Agreement  shall  bear 
a  close  relationship  to  the  requirements  of  the  public 
for  such  services. 

D.  Services  provided  by  a  designated  airline  under 
this  Agreement  shall  retain  as  their  primary  objective 
the  provision  of  capacity  adequate  to  the  traffic 
demands  between  the  country  of  which  such  airline  is 
a  national  and  the  countries  of  ultimate  destination  of 
the  traffic.  The  right  to  embark  or  disembark  on  such 
services  international  traffic  destined  for  and  coming 
from  third  countries  at  a  point  or  points  on  the  routes 
specified  in  this  Agreement  shall  be  applied  in  accord- 
ance with  tlie  general  principles  of  orderly  develop- 
ment to  which  both  Contracting  Parties  subscribe  and 
shall  be  subject  to  the  general  principle  that  capacity 
should  be  related  to  : 

(1)   traffic  requirements  between  the  country  of  ori- 


gin and  the  countries  of  ultimate  destination  of  the 
traffic ; 

(2)  the  requirements  of  through  airline  oi)erations; 
and 

(3)  the  traffic  requirements  of  the  area  through 
which  the  airline  passes,  after  taking  account  of  local 
and  regional  services. 

E.  Without  prejudice  to  the  right  of  each  Contract- 
ing Party  to  impose  such  uniform  conditions  on  the  use 
of  airports  and  airport  facilities  as  are  consistent  with 
Article  15  of  the  Convention  on  International  Civil 
Aviation,  neither  Contracting  Party  shall  unilaterally 
restrict  the  airline  or  airlines  of  the  other  Contract- 
ing Party  with  respect  to  capacity,  frequency,  schedul- 
ing or  type  of  aircraft  employed  in  connection  with 
services  over  any  of  tlie  specified  routes.  In  the  event 
that  one  of  the  Contracting  Parties  believes  that  the 
operations  conducted  by  an  airline  of  the  other  Con- 
tracting Party  have  been  inconsistent  with  the  stand- 
ards and  principles  set  forth  in  this  Article,  it  may 
request  consultations  pursuant  to  Article  12  of  this 
Agreement  for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  the  operations 
in  question  to  determine  whether  they  are  in  con- 
formity with  said  standards  and  principles. 

Article  10 

A.  All  rates  to  be  charged  by  an  airline  of  one  Con- 
tracting Party  for  carriage  to  or  from  the  territory  of 
the  other  Contracting  Party  shall  be  established  at 
reasonable  levels,  due  regard  being  paid  to  all  relevant 
factors,  such  as  costs  of  operation,  reasonable  profit, 
and  the  rates  charged  by  any  other  airlines,  as  well  as 
the  characteristics  of  each  service.  Sucli  rates  shall  be 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  aeronautical  authorities 
of  the  Contracting  Parties,  who  shall  act  in  accordance 
with  their  obligations  under  this  Agreement,  within 
the  limits  of  their  legal  competence. 

B.  Any  rate  proposed  to  be  charged  by  an  airline  of 
either  Contracting  Party  for  carriage  to  or  from  the 
territory  of  the  other  Contracting  Party  shall,  if  so  re- 
quired, be  filed  by  such  airline  with  the  aeronautical 
authorities  of  the  other  Contracting  Party  at  least 
thirty  (30)  days  before  the  proposed  date  of  introduc- 
tion unless  the  Contracting  Party  with  whom  the  filing 
is  to  be  made  permits  filing  on  shorter  notice.  The 
aeronautical  authorities  of  each  Contracting  Party 
shall  use  their  best  efforts  to  insure  that  the  rates 
charged  and  collected  conform  to  the  rates  filed  with 
either  Contracting  Party,  and  that  no  airline  rebates 
any  portion  of  such  rates  by  any  means,  directly  or  in- 
directly, including  the  payment  of  excessive  sales  com- 
missions to  agents. 

C.  It  is  recognized  by  both  Contracting  Parties  that 
during  any  period  for  which  either  Contracting  Party 
has  approved  the  traffic  conference  procedures  of  the 
International  Air  Transport  Association,  or  other  as- 
sociation of  international  carriers,  any  rate  agreements 
concluded  through  these  procedures  and  involving  an 
airline  or  airlines  of  that  Contracting  Party  will  be 
subject  to  the  api)roval  of  the  aeronautical  authorities 
of  that  Contracting  Party. 

D.  If  the  aeronautical  authorities  of  a  Contracting 
Party,  on  receipt  of  the  notification  referred  to  in  para- 
graph B  above,  are  dissatisfied  with  the  rate  proposed, 
the  other  Contracting  Party  shall  be  so  informed  at 


432 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


least  fifteen  (15)  days  prior  to  the  date  that  such  rate 
would  otherwise  become  effective,  and  the  Contracting 
Parties  shall  endeavour  to  reach  agreement  on  the  ap- 
propriate rate. 

E.  If  the  aeronautical  authorities  of  a  Contracting 
Party,  upon  review  of  an  existing  rate  charged  for  car- 
riage to  or  from  the  territory  of  that  Party  by  an  air- 

>  line  or  airlines  of  the  other  Contracting  Party,  are  dis- 
satisfied with  that  rate,  the  other  Contracting  Party 
shall  be  so  informed  and  the  Contracting  Parties  shall 
endeavour  to  reach  agreement  on  the  appropriate  rate. 

F.  In  the  event  that  an  agreement  is  reached  pur- 
suant to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  D  or  E,  each  Con- 
tracting Party  will  exercise  its  best  efforts  to  put  such 
rate  into  effect. 

G.  If: 

(1)  under  the  circumstances  set  forth  in  paragraph 

D,  no  agreement  can  be  reached  prior  to  the  date  that 
such  rate  would  otherwise  become  effective ;  or 

(2)  under  the  circumstances  set  forth  in  paragraph 

E,  no  agreement  can  be  reached  prior  to  the  expira- 
tion of  sixty   (60)   days  from  the  date  of  notification, 

then  the  aeronautical  authorities  of  the  Contracting 
Party  raising  the  objection  to  the  rate  may  take  such 
steps  as  may  be  considered  necessary  to  prevent  the 
inauguration  or  the  continuation  of  the  service  in  ques- 
tion at  the  rate  complained  of :  provided,  however,  that 
the  aeronautical  authorities  of  the  Contracting  Party 
raising  the  objection  shall  not  require  the  charging  of  a 
rate  higher  than  the  lowest  rate  charged  by  its  own  air- 
line or  airlines  for  comparable  service  between  the 
same  points. 

H.  When  in  any  case  under  paragraphs  D  and  E,  the 
Contracting  Parties  cannot  agree  within  a  reasonable 
time  upon  the  appropriate  rate  after  consultation  initi- 
ated by  either  of  them,  the  terms  of  Article  13  of  this 
Agreement  shall  apply.  In  rendering  its  decision  or 
award,  the  arbitral  tribunal  shall  be  guided  by  the 
principles  laid  down  in  this  Article. 

Abticle  11 

The  following  provisions  shall  govern  the  sale  of  air 
transportation  and  the  conversion  and  remittance  of 
revenues : 

A.  Each  designated  airline  shall  have  the  right  to 
engage  in  the  sale  of  air  transportation  in  the  territory 
of  the  other  Contracting  Party  directly  and,  in  its 
discretion,  through  its  agents.  Such  airline  shall  have 
the  right  to  sell  such  transportation,  and  any  person 
shall  be  free  to  purchase  such  transportation,  in  the 
currency  of  that  territory  or  in  freely  convertible  cur- 
rencies of  other  countries. 

B.  Any  rate  specified  in  terms  of  the  national  cur- 
rency of  one  of  the  Contracting  Parties  shall  be  estab- 
lished in  an  amount  which  reflects  the  effective  ex- 
change rate  (including  all  exchange  fees  or  other 
charges)  at  which  the  airlines  of  both  Parties  can 
convert  and  remit  the  revenues  from  their  transport 
operations   into   the   national   currencv    of   the   other 

I  Party. 

C.  Each  designated  airline  shall  have  the  right  to 
convert  and  remit  to  its  country  local  revenues  in  ex- 
cess of  sums  locally  disbursed.  Conversion  and  remit- 
tance shall  be  permitted  promptly  and  without  restric- 


tions at  the  rate  of  exchange  in  effect  for  the  sale  of 
transportation  at  the  time  such  revenues  are  presented 
for  conversion  and  remittance  and  shall  be  exempted 
from  taxation  to  the  fullest  extent  permitted  by  na- 
tional law.  If  a  Contracting  Party  does  not  have  a  con- 
vertible currency  and  requires  the  submission  of  ap- 
plications for  conversion  and  remittance,  the  airlines  of 
the  other  Contracting  Party  shall  be  permitted  to  file 
such  applications  as  often  as  weekly  free  of  burdensome 
or  discriminatory  documentary  requirements. 

Article   12 

Either  Contracting  Party  may  at  any  time  request 
consultations  on  the  interpretation,  application  or 
amendment  of  this  Agreement.  Such  consultations  shall 
commence  as  soon  as  practicable  but  in  any  event  not 
later  than  sixty  (60)  days  from  the  date  of  receipt  of 
the  request  for  consultation,  unless  otherwise  agreed 
by  the  Contracting  Parties. 

Article  13 

A.  Any  dispute  with  respect  to  matters  covered  by 
this  Agreement  not  satisfactorily  adjusted  through 
consultation  shall,  upon  request  of  either  Contract- 
ing Party,  be  submitted  to  arbitration  in  accordance 
with  the  procedures  set  forth  herein. 

B.  Arbitration  shall  be  by  a  tribunal  of  three  arbi- 
trators constituted  as  follows : 

(1 )  One  arbitrator  shall  be  named  by  each  Contract- 
ing Party  within  sixty  (60)  days  of  the  date  of  delivery 
by  either  Contracting  Party  to  the  other  of  a  request 
for  arbitration.  Within  thirty  (30)  days  after  such 
period  of  sixty  (60)  days,  the  two  arbitrators  so  des- 
ignated shall  by  agreement  designate  a  third  arbitra- 
tor, who  shall  not  be  a  national  of  either  Contracting 
Party. 

(2)  If  either  Contracting  Party  fails  to  name  an 
arbitrator,  or  if  the  third  arbitrator  is  not  agreed  upon 
in  accordance  with  paragraph  (1),  either  Contracting 
Party  may  request  the  President  of  the  Council  of  the 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization  to  designate 
the  necessary  arbitrator  or  arbitrators. 

C.  Each  Contracting  Party  shall  use  its  best  efforts 
consistent  with  its  national  law  to  put  into  effect  any 
decision  or  award  of  the  arbitral  tribunal. 

D.  The  expenses  of  the  arbitral  tribunal,  including 
the  fees  and  expenses  of  the  arbitrators,  shall  be 
shared  equally  by  the  Contracting  Parties. 

Aeticle  14 

This  Agreement  and  all  amendments  thereto  shall 
be  registered  with  the  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization. 

Article  15 

Either  Contracting  Party  may  at  any  time  notify  the 
other  through  diplomatic  channels  of  its  intention  to 
terminate  this  Agreement.  Such  notice  shall  be  sent 
simultaneously  to  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Or- 
ganization. This  Agreement  shall  terminate  one  year 
after  the  date  on  which  the  notice  of  termination  is 
received  by  the  other  Contracting  Party,  unless  with- 
drawn before  the  end  of  this  period  by  agreement 
between  the  Contracting  Parties. 


November   17,   1969 


433 


AuncLE   16 

This  AKreement  sliall  supersede  prior  agreements 
relating  to  air  transport  services  in  effect  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  Jamaica.  In  any  case 
in  which  an  air  service  has  been  authorized  before  the 
date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  this  Agreement,  and 
is  also  provided  for  in  this  Agreement,  an  airline  au- 
thorized by  the  aeronautical  authorities  of  both  Con- 
tracting Parties  to  operate  such  service  shall  be  deemed 
to  have  been  authorized  to  operate  the  service  under 
this  Agreement  and  in  accordance  therewith. 

Article  17 

This  Agreement  will  come  into  force  on  the  day  it  is 
signed. 

I:^  WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the  undersigned,  being  duly 
authorized  by  their  respective  Governments,  have 
signed  the  present  Agreement. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Kingston,  Jamaica,  this  2d  day 
of  October,  1969. 

For  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  : 

David  Wilken 

For  the  Government  of  Jamaica : 

Neville  E.  Galliuore 

SCHEDULE 

A.  An  airline  or  airlines  designated  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  shall  be  entitled  to  operate 
the  agreed  services  on  each  of  the  specified  routes. 
In  both  directions,  and  to  make  scheduled  landings  in 
Jamaica  at  the  points  specified  in  this  paragraph  : 

1.  From  the  United  States^  via  points  In  Mexico, 
Central  America,  Panama,  the  Bahama  Islands,  and 
the  Cayman  Islands  to  Montego  Bay  and  Kingston  and 
beyond  to  points  in  the  Caribbean^  (including  Puerto 
Rico  and  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands),  Panama,  South 
America,  and  Africa. 

2.  From  the  United  States '  via  points  in  the  Domini- 
can Republic  and  Haiti  to  Kingston  and  Montego  Bay 
and  beyond  to  points  in  Panama,  Central  America,  and 
the  United  States.* 


'  Flights  must  serve  one  of  the  following  as  the  last 
point  of  departure  or  first  point  of  arrival :  New  York, 
Washington,  Baltimore,  Miami,  New  Orleans,  Houston, 
Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco,  Chicago,  Atlanta,  Puerto 
Rico,  U.S.  Virgin  Islands  or  Canal  Zone.  [Footnote  in 
original.] 

'  For  the  purposes  of  this  Agreement,  the  term 
"Caribbean"  shall  comprise  the  following:  Haiti, 
Dominican  Republic,  St.  Martin,  British  Virgin  Islands, 
Antigua,  St  Kitts,  Nevis,  Anguilla,  Montserrat, 
Guadeloupe,  Dominica,  Martinique,  St  Lucia,  St.  Vin- 
cent, Grenada,  Barbados,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Aruba, 
and  Curacao.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

'  Flights  must  serve  one  of  the  following  as  the  last 
point  of  departure  or  first  point  of  arrival :  Miami, 
Washington,  Baltimore,  New  York,  Puerto  Rico  or  U.S. 
Virgin  Island.s.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

'  Flights  must  serve  one  of  the  following  as  the  last 
point  of  departure  or  first  point  of  arrival :  San 
Francisco,  Los  Angeles,  Houston  or  New  Orleans. 
[Footnote  in  original.] 


B.  An  airline  or  airlines  designated  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Jamaica  shall  be  entitled  to  operate  the  agreed 
services  on  each  of  the  specified  routes,  in  both  direc- 
tions, and  to  make  scheduled  landings  in  the  United 
States  at  the  points  specified  in  this  paragraph : 

1.  °  From  Jamaica  via  a  point  in  the  Bahama  Is- 
lands °  to  New  York  and  beyond  to  Montreal  and 
London. 

2.  °  From  Jamaica  via  a  point  in  the  Bahama 
Islands "  to  Chicago. 

3.  '     From  Jamaica  to  Philadelphia  and  Detroit. 

4.  '  From  Jamaica  via  a  point  in  the  Bahama  Is- 
lands '  to  Detroit 

5.  From  Jamaica  to  Philadelphia  and  beyond  to 
Toronto. 

6.  From  Jamaica  via  points  in  the  Cayman  Islands 
to  Miami. 

C.  Points  on  any  of  the  specified  routes  may  at  the 
option  of  the  designated  airline  be  omitted  on  any  or  all 
flights. 


EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES 


Jamaican  Note 

Kingston,  Jamaica. 

October  2.  1969 
Sib,  I  have  the  honour  to  refer  to  the  Air  Transport 
Agreement  between  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Government  of  Jamaica 
which  was  signed  at  Kingston  on  this  date  and  to  pro- 
pose, on  behalf  of  my  Government,  the  following  under- 
standings relating  to  this  Agreement : 

1.  Article  11  is  not  to  be  interpreted  to  impose  an 
obligation  on  either  Contracting  Party  to  make  foreign 
exchange  available  to  persons  for  the  purchase  of  air 
transportation. 

2.  With  regard  to  the  U.S.  routes  specified  in  para- 
graph A  of  the  Schedule  to  the  Agreement,  air  services 
may  be  operated  to  and  from  points  in  the  United 
States  behind  the  named  points  without  changes  of  air- 
craft or  fiight  number. 


"  As  of  May  15,  1973,  or  as  of  such  earlier  date  as  the 
Government  of  Jamaica,  by  notification  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  may  elect,  the  phrase  "via 
a  point  in  the  Bahama  Islands"  will  be  deleted  from 
either  route  1  or  route  2  at  the  selection  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Jamaica.  If  the  phrase  is  deleted  from  route  1, 
route  2  will  be  changed  to  read  "From  Jamaica  via 
points  in  the  Bahama  Islands  to  Chicago"  and  footnote 
6  will  then  not  apply  to  route  2.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

"  The  point  in  the  Bahama  Islands  on  each  of  these 
routes  will  be  selected  by  the  Government  of  Jamaica 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  be  noti- 
fied. Changes  in  the  point  selected  on  each  such  route 
will  not  be  made  more  frequently  than  once  every 
three  years.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

'  Jamaica  route  4  will  not  come  into  effect,  and  will 
not  be  operated,  until  such  time,  after  the  changes  re- 
ferred to  in  footnote  5  occur,  that  the  Government  of 
Jamaica,  by  notification,  elects  not  to  operate  air  serv- 
ices on  route  3,  at  which  time  route  3  will  cease  to  be 
effective.  [Footnote  in  original.] 


434 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


3.  Recognizing  the  need  for  a  reasonable  period  of 
development  foi'  newly  established  air  services  In  cer- 
tain markets,  it  is  agreed  that : 

A.  Non-stop  air  services  by  a  second  U.S.  designated 
airline  on  U.S.  route  1  between  New  York  and  Jamaica 
will  not  begin  before  December  1, 1970. 

B.  Before  December  1,  1970,  turn-around  air  services 
by  a  second  U.S.  designated  airline  between  Miami  and 
Jamaica  will  not  exceed  two  round-trip  flights  per  day, 
and  services  through  Jamaica  by  such  airline  will  not 
exceed  one  round  trip  flight  per  day. 

C.  U.S.  designated  airlines  will  not  operate  air  serv- 
ices on  the  U.S.  specified  routes  from  Chicago  before 
January  1,  1971. 

4.  If  one  Contracting  Party  believes  that  a  situation 
has  arisen  which  requires  consultations  pursuant  to 
Article  12  of  the  Agreement  in  less  than  sixty  days,  the 
other  Contracting  Party  will  use  its  best  efEorts  to  meet 
within  the  time  period  requested. 

5.  In  keeping  with  the  objective  that  the  routes  pro- 
vided in  the  Schedule  to  the  Agreement  should  at  all 
times  reflect  an  equal  exchange  of  economic  oppor- 
tunities for  the  designated  airlines  of  both  Contracting 
Parties  in  the  light  of  changing  circumstances,  the 
Contracting  Parties  will,  at  the  request  of  either,  con- 
sult in  1974  for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  the  Schedule. 

If  these  understandings  are  acceptable  to  your  Gov- 
ernment, I  have  the  honour  to  propose  that  this  Note 
and  your  reply  thereto  constitute  an  agreement  between 
our  two  governments  relating  to  the  Air  Transport 
Agreement 

Please  accept.  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
high  consideration. 

Nevihj:   E.    Gallimobe 

Acting  Minister  of 

External  Affairs. 

Mb.  David  Wilken, 

American  Charge  d' Affaires  a.i.. 

Embassy  of  the  United  States  of  America, 

Kingston. 


U.S.  Note 

Kingston,  October  2,  1969 
SiE :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  Note  No.  C94/03V  dated  October  2,  1969,  which 
reads  as  follows : 

[Text  of  Jamaican  note.] 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  of  America  accepts  the  under- 
standings set  forth  in  your  Note  and  considers  that 
your  Note  and  this  reply  constitute  an  agreement  relat- 
ing to  the  Air  Transport  Agreement 

Accept,  Sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

David  Wilken 
Charge    d'Affaires    a.i. 

The  Honorable 

De.  Neville  E.  Gallimobe 

Acting  Minister  of  External  Affairs 

Kingston 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 
Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  conven- 
tion on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago,  1944,  as 
amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with  annex.  Done 
at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  October  24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Signature:  Nigeria,  October  29,  1969. 

Customs 

Convention  establishing  a  Customs  Cooperation  Coun- 
cil, with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels  December  15,  1950. 
Entered  into  force  November  4,  19.52.' 
Adherence  deposited:  Paraguay,  October  3,  1969. 

Grains 

International  grains  arrangement,  1967,  with  annexes. 
Open    for    signature    at    Washington    October    15 
through  November  30,  1967.  Entered  into  force  July 
1,  1968.  TIAS  6537. 
Approval  of  the  WJieat  Trade  Convention  deposited: 

France,  October  30, 1969. 
Approval  of   the  Food  Aid   Convention  deposited: 

France,  October  30,  1969. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimum  age  for 
marriage,  and  registration  of  marriages.  Done  at 
New  York  December  10,  1962.  Entered  into  force 
December  9,  1964.' 

Accessions  deposited:  Austria,  October  1,  1969;  Trin- 
idad and  Tobago,  October  2,  1969. 


BILATERAL 

China 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agreement  of 
December  20,  1946,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
1609,  2184,  3347).  EfCected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Taipei  October  22,  1969.  Entered  into  force  October 
22,  1969. 

Congo 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  March  15,  1967  (TIAS  6329). 
Signed  at  Kinshasa  October  21,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  October  21, 1969. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  providing  for  investment  guaranties  as 
authorized  by  section  413(b)(4)  of  the  Mutual  Se- 
curity Act  of  1954.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
San  Jos6  February  23  and  25, 1955.  Entered  into  force 
February  25,  1955.  TIAS  3201. 
Terminated:  October  24,  1969. 

Agreement  relating  to  investment  guaranties.  Signed 
at  San  Jos6  November  22,  1968. 
Entered  into  force:  October  24,  1969. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities  of  July  28,  1969  (TIAS  6734). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Saigon  October  17, 
1969.  Entered  into  force  October  17,  1969. 


^  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


November  17,  1969 


435 


PUBLICATIONS 


Recent  Releases 

For  sale  hy  the  Superintendent  of  Document,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  201,02. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Doc- 
uments. A  ^o-pcrcent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Background  Notes.  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  tlie  people,  history,  government,  economy,  and 
foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains  a  map, 
a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and  U.S.  diplo- 
matic and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading  list.  ( A  com- 
plete set  of  all  Background  Notes  currently  in  stock  (at 
least  125) — $6;  1-year  subscription  .service  for  ap- 
proximately 75  updated  or  new  Notes — $3.50 ;  plastic 
binder — $1.50.)  Single  copies  of  those  listed  below  are 
available  at  10^  each. 


Bahamas 

Pub. 

8329 

4  pp. 

Cameroon 

Pub. 

8010 

6  pp. 

French  Guiana 

Pub. 

8321 

3  pp. 

Japan 

Pub. 

7770 

12  pp. 

Mongolia 

Pub. 

8318 

6  pp. 

How  Foreign  Policy  Is  Made  (revised).  Illustrated 
pamphlet  describing  the  role  of  the  President,  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  the  Congress,  and  the  American  peo- 
ple in  the  shaping  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  Pub.  7707. 
General  Foreign  Policy  Series  195.  28  pp.  50^. 

Defense — Basic  Pilot  Training  Aircraft.  Agreement 
with  Indonesia.  TIAS  6678.  2  pp.  lQ<i. 

Economic  Cooperation — Spanish-United  States  Eco- 
nomic Committee.  Agreement  with  Sjrain.  TIAS  6698. 
4  pp.  lOi!*. 

Defense — Use  of  Military  Facilities  in  Spain.  Agree- 
ment with  Spain  extending  the  agreement  of  Septem- 
ber 26,  1953,  as  extended.  TIAS  6699.  4  pp.  10^. 

Extension  of  Loan  of  Vessels.  Agreement  with  Spain. 
TIAS6700.  3  pp.  10(f. 


Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Paraguay. 
TIAS  6701.  20  pp.  15#. 

Extension  of  Loan  of  Vessels— U.S.S.  Edwards  and 
U.S.S.  Leary.  Agreement  with  Japan.  TIAS  6702.  7  pp. 
10(J. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Viet-Nam. 
TIAS  6703.  3  pp.  10<?. 

Fisheries  in  the  Western  Region  of  the  Middle  Atlantic 
Ocean.  Agreement  with  Poland.  TIAS  6704.  14  pp.  10#. 

Tracking  Station.  Agreement  with  Spain  extending  the 
agreement  of  January  29,  1964,  as  supplemented.  TIAS 

6714.  3  pp.  10<l. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Office.  Agreement  with 
Japan  relating  to  the  agreement  of  March  8, 1954.  TIAS 

6715.  4  pp.  10«. 

Atomic  Energy — Cooperation  for  Civil  Uses.  .-Vgree- 
ment  with  Portugal.  TIAS  6717.  33  pp.  20(>. 

Atomic  Energy — Application  of  Safeguards  by  the 
IAEA  to  the  United  States-Portugal  Cooperation 
Agreement.  Agreement  with  Portugal  and  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency.  TIAS  6718.  9  pp.  10<». 

Technical  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  Afghanistan 
extending  the  agreement  of  June  30,  1953,  as  extended. 
TIAS  6719.  3  pp.  10<f. 

Load  Lines.  Proc^s-verbal  of  rectification  to  the  conven- 
tion of  AprU  5, 1966.  TIAS  6720. 10  pp.  10^. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Appointments 

Ray  S.  Cline  as  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence 
and  Research,  effective  October  31.  (For  biographic 
data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  294  dated 
October  3.) 


436 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX      November  17,  1969 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1686 


Aviation.  U.S.  and  Jamaica  Conclude  Air  Trans- 
port Agreement  (text  of  agreement  and  ex- 
change of  notes) 


430 

Belgium.  Consular  Convention  With  Belgium 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message  from 
President  Nixon) 424 

Congress 

Congressional   Documents   Relating  to  Foreign 

Policy 424 

Consular  Convention  With  Belgium  Transmitted 

to    the    Senate     (message    from    President 

Nixon) 424 

t|  Department     Presents     Views     on      Southern 

Rhodesia  (Newsom) 422 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Cline  ap- 
pointed Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence 
and  Research 436 

Disarmament.  U.S.  Discusses  Verification  Pro- 
cedures Under  the  Draft  Treaty  Banning 
Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the 
Seabed   (Leonard) 425 

Germany.  President  Nixon  Congratulates  Chan- 
cellor Brandt  of  Germany  (text  of  letter)     .     .      415 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Intellectual  Property  Bureaux  Granted  Orga- 
nization Immunities    (Executive  order)     .     .      421 

President  Appoints  Mr.  Taylor  to  South  Pacific 
Commission 421 

U.S.  Discusses  Verification  Procedures  Under  the 
Draft  Treaty  Banning  Emplacement  of  Nu- 
clear Weapons  on  the  Seabed  (Leonard)     .     .      425 

Jamaica.  U.S.  and  Jamaica  Conclude  Air  Trans- 
port Agreement  (text  of  agreement  and  ex- 
change of  notes) 430 

Japan.  United  States  and  Japan  Discuss  Pro- 
tection of  Migratory  Birds 420 

Latin  America.  Action  for  Progress  for  the 
,i      Americas   (Nixon) 409 

Marine  Science.  U.S.  Discusses  Verification  Pro- 
cedures   Under    the    Draft    Treaty    Banning 
y      Emplacement    of    Nuclear    Weapons    on    the 
y      Seabed   (Leonard) 425 

Non-Self-Governing  Territories.  President 
Appoints  Mr.  Taylor  to  South  Pacific 
Commission 421 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  The  NATO 
':  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern 
ll  Society :  Response  to  a  Common  Environmen- 
i      tal  Peril   (Moynihan) 416 

Presidential  Documents 

Action  for  ProKress  for  the  Americas     ....      409 

Consular  Convention  With  Belgium  Transmitted 
to  the  Senate 424 

Intellectual  Property  Bureaux  Granted  Orga- 
nization Immunities 421 

President  Nixon  Congratulates  Chancellor 
Brandt  of  Germany 415 


Publications.  Recent  Releases 436 

Science 

The  NATO  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Mod- 
ern Society :  Response  to  a  Common  Environ- 
mental Peril  (Moynihan) 416 

Southern  Rhodesia.  Department  Presents  Views 
on  Southern  Rhodesia  (Newsom) 422 

Southern  Yemen.  Southern  Yemen  Severs  Re- 
lations With  the  United  States  (Department 
statement) 420 

Treaty  Information 

Consular  Convention  With  Belgium  Transmitted 
to    the     Senate     (message    from    President 

Nixon) 424 

Current  Actions 435 

U.S.  and  Jamaica  Conclude  Air  Transport  Agree- 
ment (text  of  agreement  and  exchange  of 
notes) 430 

United  Nations.  United  Nations  Documents    .    .      429 

Viet-Nam.  40th   Plenary   Session  on  Viet-Nam 

Held  at  Paris    (Lodge) 414 

Name  Index 

Cline,  Ray  S 436 

Leonard,  James  F 425 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 414 

Moynihan,    Daniel   P 416 

Newsom,  David  D 422 

Nixon,  President 409, 415, 421, 424 

Taylor,  William  B.,  Ill 421 


Check  List  of  Deparfment  of  State 
Press  Releases:  Oct.  27-Nov.  2 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20.520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  October  27  which  ap- 
pear in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  285 
and  286  of  October  2. 

No.        Date  Subject 

*319  10/27  Ryan  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Honduras  (biograplxic  data). 

1320  10/29  Under  Secretary  to  attend  special 
session  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Council. 

*321  10/29  Conference  of  chiefs  of  U.S.  diplo- 
matic missions  in  Europe  at 
Rome,  November  10-12. 

322  10/30     Lodge :   40th   plenary   meeting  on 

Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

323  10/30     Lodge :  supplementary  remarks. 
*324    10/31    Ross  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Tanzania  (biographic  data). 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletiit. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 

u.s.  government  printing  office 

washington,  d.c.    20402 


OFFICIAL   BUSINESS 


POSTAGE  AND    FEES    PAID 
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20YEARS  OF  PEACE 


9»    THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


.I//087 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 


BULLETIN 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  PEACE  IN  VIETNAM 

Address  Jyy  President  Nixon     ^37 

A  LOOK  AT  ASIAN  REGIONALISM 
hy  Assistant  Secretary  Green     445 

THE  UNITED  NATIONS  BUDGET  FOR  1970 
Statement  hy  Congressman  Dante  B.  Fascell     4^4 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  LABOR  ORGANIZATION:  50  YEARS  OF  SERVICE 
Statement  hy  Secretary  of  Labor  Shultz  Before  the  UJf.  General  Assembly     45SS 

Boston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

DEC1 

nrDOSiTOPy 
For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1587 
November  24,  1969 


i 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

52  Issues,  domestic  $16,  foreign  $23 

Single  copy  30  cents 

Use  of  funds  for  printing  of  this  publication 

approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 

the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE   BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  tceekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
urith  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  tcell  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  interruttional 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg' 
islative  material  in  the  field  of  inter' 
luitional  relations  are  listed  currently  mi 


The  Pursuit  of  Peace  in  Viet-Nam 


Address  hy  President  Nixon ' 


Good  evening,  my  fellow  Americans :  Tonight 
I  want  to  talk  to  you  on  a  subject  of  deep  con- 
cern to  all  Americans  and  to  many  people  in  all 
parts  of  the  world — the  war  in  Viet-Nam. 

I  believe  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  deep 
division  about  Viet-Nam  is  that  many  Ameri- 
cans have  lost  confidence  in  what  their  Govern- 
ment has  told  them  about  our  policy.  The  Ameri- 
can people  camiot  and  should  not  be  asked  to 
support  a  policy  which  involves  the  overriding 
issues  of  war  and  peace  imless  they  know  the 
truth  about  that  policy. 

Tonight,  therefore,  I  would  like  to  answer 
some  of  the  questions  that  I  know  are  on  the 
minds  of  many  of  you  listening  to  me. 

How  and  why  did  America  get  involved  in 
Viet-Nam  in  the  first  place? 

How  has  this  administration  changed  the 
policy  of  the  previous  administration  ? 

WHiat  has  really  happened  in  the  negotiations 
in  Paris  and  on  the  battlef  ront  in  Viet-Nam  ? 

Wliat  choices  do  we  have  if  we  are  to  end  the 
war? 

"Wliat  are  the  prospects  for  peace  ? 

Let  me  begin  by  describing  the  situation  I 
found  when  I  was  inaugurated  on  January  20. 

— The  war  had  been  going  on  for  4  years. 

— 31,000  Americans  had  been  killed  in  action. 

— The  training  program  for  the  South  Viet- 
namese was  behind  schedule. 

— 540,000  Americans  were  in  Viet-Nam,  with 
no  plans  to  reduce  the  number. 

— No  progress  had  been  made  at  the  negotia- 
tions in  Paris  and  the  United  States  had  not  put 
forth  a  comprehensive  peace  proposal. 

— The  war  was  causing  deep  division  at  home 
and  criticism  from  many  of  our  friends,  as  well 
as  our  enemies,  abroad. 

In  view  of  these  circumstances  there  were 
some  who  urged  that  I  end  the  war  at  once 


'Made   to   the   Nation   on   television   and   radio   on 
Nov.  3  (White  House  press  release). 


by  ordering  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  all 
American  forces. 

From  a  political  standpoint  this  would  have 
been  a  popular  and  easy  course  to  follow.  After 
all,  we  became  involved  in  the  war  while  my 
predecessor  was  in  office.  I  could  blame  the 
defeat  which  would  be  the  result  of  my  action 
on  him  and  come  out  as  the  peacemaker.  Some 
put  it  to  me  quite  bluntly :  This  was  the  only 
way  to  avoid  allowing  Jolinson's  war  to  become 
Nixon's  war. 

But  I  had  a  greater  obligation  than  to  think 
only  of  the  years  of  my  administration  and  the 
next  election.  I  had  to  think  of  the  effect  of  my 
decision  on  the  next  generation  and  on  the 
future  of  peace  and  freedom  in  America  and 
in  the  world. 

Let  us  all  understand  that  the  question  before 
us  is  not  whether  some  Americans  are  for  peace 
and  some  Americans  are  against  peace.  The 
question  at  issue  is  not  whether  Jolmson's  war 
becomes  Nixon's  war. 

The  great  question  is:  How  can  we  win 
America's  peace? 

History  of  U.S.  Involvement  in  Viet-Nam 

Let  us  turn  now  to  the  fundamental  issue. 
"Why  and  how  did  the  United  States  become  in- 
volved in  Viet-Nam  in  the  first  place? 

Fifteen  years  ago  North  Viet-Nam,  with  the 
logistical  support  of  Commimist  China  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  launched  a  campaign  to  impose  a 
Communist  government  on  South  Viet-Nam  by 
instigating  and  supporting  a  revolution. 

In  response  to  the  request  of  the  Government 
of  South  Viet-Nam,  President  Eisenhower  sent 
economic  aid  and  military  equipment  to  assist 
tlie  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  in  their  efforts 
to  prevent  a  Communist  takeover.  Seven  years 
ago  President  Kennedy  sent  16,000  military  per- 
sonnel to  Viet-Nam  as  combat  advisers.  Four 
years  ago  President  Johnson  sent  American 
combat  forces  to  South  Viet-Nam. 


November  24,    1969 


437 


Now,  many  believe  that  President  Johnson's 
decision  to  send  American  combat  forces  to 
Soutli  Viet-Nam  was  wrong.  And  many  others, 
I  among  them,  have  been  strongly  critical  of 
the  way  the  war  has  been  conducted. 

But  the  question  facmg  us  today  is:  Now 
that  we  are  in  the  war,  what  is  the  best  way  to 
end  it? 

Consequences   of  Precipitate   Withdrawal 

In  January  I  could  only  conclude  that  the 
precipitate  withdrawal  of  American  forces  from 
Viet-Nam  would  be  a  disaster  not  only  for 
South  Viet-Nam  but  for  the  United  States  and 
for  the  cause  of  peace. 

For  the  South  Vietnamese,  our  precipitate 
withdrawal  would  inevitably  allow  the  Com- 
munists to  repeat  the  massacres  which  followed 
their  takeover  in  the  North  15  years  before. 

— They  then  murdered  more  than  50,000 
people,  and  liundreds  of  thousands  more  died  in 
slave  labor  camps. 

— We  saw  a  prelude  of  what  would  happen 
in  South  Viet-Nam  when  the  Commmiists 
entered  the  city  of  Hue  last  year.  During  their 
brief  rule  there,  there  was  a  bloody  reign  of 
terror  in  which  3,000  civilians  were  clubbed,  shot 
to  death,  and  buried  in  mass  graves. 

— With  the  sudden  collapse  of  our  support, 
these  atrocities  of  Hue  would  become  the  night- 
mare of  the  entire  nation — and  particularly  for 
the  million  and  a  half  Catholic  refugees  who 
fled  to  South  Viet-Nam  when  the  Communists 
took  over  in  the  North. 

For  the  United  States,  this  first  defeat  in  our 
nation's  history  would  result  in  a  collapse  of 
confidence  in  American  leadership  not  only  in 
Asia  but  throughout  the  world. 

Three  American  Presidents  have  recognized 
the  great  stakes  involved  in  Viet-Nam  and 
understood  what  had  to  be  done. 

In  1963  President  Kennedy,  with  his  charac- 
teristic eloquence  and  clarity,  said :  ^ 

...  we  want  to  see  a  stable  government  there, 
carrying  on  a  struggle  to  maintain  its  national 
independence. 

We  believe  strongly  in  that.  We  are  not  going  to 
withdraw  from  that  effort.  In  my  opinion,  for  us  to 
withdraw  from  that  effort  would  mean  a  collapse 
not  only  of  South  Viet-Nam,  but  Southeast  Asia.  So 
we  are  going  to  stay  there. 

President  Eisenhower  and  President  Johnson 


expressed  the   same   conclusion   during  their 
terms  of  office. 

For  the  future  of  peace,  precipitate  with- 
drawal would  thus  be  a  disaster  of  immense 
magnitude. 

— A  nation  cannot  remain  great  if  it  betrays 
its  allies  and  lets  down  its  friends. 

— Our  defeat  and  humiliation  in  South  Viet- 
Nam  without  question  would  promote  reck- 
lessness in  the  cotmcils  of  those  great  powers 
who  have  not  yet  abandoned  their  goals  of  world 
conquest. 

— This  would  spark  \'iolence  wherever  our 
commitments  help  maintain  the  peace — in  the 
Middle  East,  in  Berlin,  eventually  even  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

Ultimately,  this  would  cost  more  lives.  It 
would  not  bring  peace;  it  would  bring  more 
war. 

For  these  reasons  I  rejected  the  recommenda- 
tion that  I  should  end  the  war  by  immediately 
withdrawing  all  our  forces.  I  chose  instead  to 
change  American  policy  on  both  the  negotiating 
front  and  the  battlefront. 

U.S.  Peace  Proposals 

In  order  to  end  a  war  fought  on  many  fronts, 
I  initiated  a  pursuit  for  peace  on  many  fronts. 

In  a  television  speech  on  May  14,^  in  a  speech 
before  the  United  Nations,*  and  on  a  number 
of  other  occasions,  I  set  forth  our  peace  pro- 
posals in  great  detail. 

— We  have  offered  the  complete  withdrawal 
of  all  outside  forces  within  1  year. 

— We  have  proposed  a  cease-fire  under  inter- 
national supervision. 

— We  have  offered  free  elections  under  inter- 
national supervision,  with  the  Commimists  par- 
ticipating in  the  organization  and  conduct  of 
the  elections  as  an  organized  political  force.  The 
Saigon  Government  has  pledged  to  accept  the 
result  of  the  elections. 

We  have  not  put  forth  our  proposals  on  a 
take-it-or-leave-it  basis.  We  have  indicated  that 
we  are  willmg  to  discuss  the  proposals  that  have 
been  put  forth  by  the  other  side.  We  have  de- 
clared that  anything  is  negotiable,  except  the 
right  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to  deter- 
mine their  own  future.  At  the  Paris  peace  con- 
ference, Ambassador  Lodge  has  demonstrated 


'  At  a  news  conference  on  July  17,  1963 ;  for  tran- 
script, see  Public  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  John  F. 
Kennedy,  196S,  p.  566. 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  June  2, 1969,  p.  457. 
'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  297. 


438 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


our   flexibility    and   good   faith  in  40   public 
meetings. 

Hanoi  has  refused  even  to  discuss  our  pro- 
posals. They  demand  our  unconditional  accept- 
ance of  their  terms,  which  are  that  we  withdraw 
all  American  forces  immediately  and  uncondi- 
tionally and  that  we  overthrow  the  Government 
of  South  Viet-Nam  as  we  leave. 

Private  Initiatives  Undertaken 

We  have  not  limited  our  peace  initiatives  to 
public  forums  and  public  statements.  I  recog- 
nized in  January  that  a  long  and  bitter  war  like 
this  usually  cannot  be  settled  in  a  public  forum. 
That  is  why,  in  addition  to  the  public  state- 
ments and  negotiations,  I  have  explored  every 
possible  private  avenue  that  might  lead  to  a 
settlement. 

Tonight  I  am  taking  the  unprecedented  step 
of  disclosing  to  you  some  of  our  other  initiatives 
for  peace — initiatives  we  undertook  privately 
and  secretly  because  we  thought  that  we  thereby 
might  open  a  door  which  publicly  would  be 
closed. 

I  did  not  wait  for  my  inauguration  to  begin 
my  quest  for  peace. 

— Soon  after  my  election,  through  an  indi- 
vidual who  is  directly  in  contact  on  a  personal 
basis  with  the  leaders  of  North  Viet-Nam,  I 
made  two  private  offers  for  a  rapid,  compre- 
hensive settlement.  Hanoi's  replies  called  in 
effect  for  our  surrender  before  negotiations. 

— Since  the  Soviet  Union  furnishes  most  of 
the  military  equipment  for  North  Viet-Nam, 
Secretary  of  State  Rogers,  my  Assistant  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs  Dr.  Kissinger,  Ambas- 
sador Lodge,  and  I  personally  have  met  on  a 
number  of  occasions  with  representatives  of  the 
Soviet  Government  to  enlist  their  assistance  in 
getting  meaningful  negotiations  started.  In 
addition  we  have  had  extended  discussions  di- 
rected toward  that  same  end  with  representa- 
tives of  other  governments  which  have  diplo- 
matic relations  with  North  Viet-Nam.  None  of 
these  initiatives  have  to  date  produced  results. 

— In  mid- July,  I  became  convinced  that  it  was 
necessary  to  make  a  major  move  to  break  the 
deadlock  in  the  Paris  talks.  I  spoke  directly,  in 
this  office  where  I  am  now  sitting,  with  an  indi- 
vidual who  had  known  Ho  Chi  Illinh  on  a  per- 
sonal basis  for  25  years.  Through  him  I  sent  a 
letter  to  Ho  Chi  Minli. 

I  did  this  outside  of  the  usual  diplomatic 
channels  with  the  hope  that,  with  the  necessity 
of  making  statements  for  propaganda  removed, 


there  might  be  constructive  progress  toward 
bringing  the  war  to  an  end.  Let  me  read  from 
that  letter : 

Dkab  Me.  Pkesident  :  I  realize  that  it  is  difficult  to 
communicate  meaningfully  across  the  gulf  of  four 
years  of  war.  But  precisely  because  of  this  gulf,  I 
wanted  to  take  this  opportunity  to  reaffirm  in  all 
solemnity  my  desire  to  work  for  a  just  peace.  I  deeply 
believe  that  the  war  in  Vietnam  has  gone  on  too  long 
and  delay  in  bringing  it  to  an  end  can  benefit  no  one — 
least  of  all  the  people  of  Vietnam.  .  .  . 

The  time  has  come  to  move  forward  at  the  confer- 
ence table  toward  an  early  resolution  of  this  tragic 
war.  You  will  find  us  forthcoming  and  open-minded  in 
a  common  effort  to  bring  the  blessings  of  peace  to  the 
brave  people  of  Vietnam.  Let  history  record  that  at 
this  critical  juncture,  both  sides  turned  their  face  to- 
ward peace  rather  than  toward  conflict  and  war. 

I  received  Ho  Chi  Minh's  reply  on  August  30, 
3  days  before  his  death.  It  simply  reiterated  the 
public  position  North  Viet-Nam  had  taken  at 
Paris  and  flatly  rejected  my  initiative.  The  full 
text  of  both  letters  is  being  released  to  the 
press.^ 

—In  addition  to  the  public  meetings  that  I 
have  referred  to.  Ambassador  Lodge  has  met 
with  Viet-Nam's  chief  negotiator  in  Paris  in  11 
private  sessions. 

— We  have  taken  other  significant  initiatives 
wliich  must  remain  secret  to  keep  open  some 
channels  of  communication  which  may  still 
prove  to  be  productive. 

But  the  effect  of  all  the  public,  private,  and 
secret  negotiations  wliich  have  been  undertaken 
since  the  bombing  halt  a  year  ago  and  since  this 
administration  came  into  office  on  January  20 
can  be  summed  up  in  one  sentence :  No  progress 
whatever  has  been  made  except  agreement  on 
the  shape  of  the  bargaining  table. 

Now,  who  is  at  fault  ? 

It  has  become  clear  that  the  obstacle  in  nego- 
tiating an  end  to  the  war  is  not  the  President  of 
the  United  States.  It  is  not  the  South  Viet- 
namese Government. 

The  obstacle  is  the  other  side's  absolute  re- 
fusal to  show  the  least  willingness  to  join  us  in 
seeking  a  just  peace.  It  will  not  do  so  while  it  is 
convinced  that  all  it  has  to  do  is  to  wait  for 
our  next  concession,  and  our  next  concession 
after  that  one,  until  it  gets  everything  it  wants. 

There  can  now  be  no  longer  any  question  that 
progress  in  negotiation  depends  only  on  Hanoi's 
deciding  to  negotiate,  to  negotiate  seriously. 

I  realize  that  this  report  on  our  efforts  on  the 
diplomatic  front  is  discouraging  to  the  Ameri- 


'  See  p.  443. 


November  24,    1969 


439 


can  people,  but  the  American  people  are  entitled 
to  know  the  truth — the  bad  news  as  well  as  the 
good  news — where  the  lives  of  our  young  men 
are  involved. 


New  Direction  in  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 

Now  let  me  turn,  however,  to  a  more  encourag- 
ing report  on  another  front. 

At  the  time  we  launched  our  search  for  peace, 
I  recognized  we  might  not  succeed  in  bringing 
an  end  to  the  war  tlirough  negotiation. 

I  therefore  put  into  eifect  another  plan  to 
bring  peace — a  plan  which  will  bring  the  war  to 
an  end  regardless  of  what  happens  on  the 
negotiating  front.  It  is  in  line  with  a  major  shift 
in  U.S.  foreign  policy  which  I  described  in  my 
press  conference  at  Guam  on  July  25. 

Let  me  briefly  explain  wliat  has  been  described 
as  the  Nixon  doctrine — a  policy  which  not  only 
will  help  end  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  but  which  is 
an  essential  element  of  our  program  to  prevent 
future  Viet-Nams. 

We  Americans  are  a  do-it-yourself  people.  We 
are  an  impatient  people.  Instead  of  teaching 
someone  else  to  do  a  job,  we  like  to  do  it  our- 
selves. Ajid  this  trait  has  been  carried  over  into 
our  foreign  policy. 

In  Korea  and  again  in  Viet-Nam,  the  United 
States  furnished  most  of  the  money,  most  of  the 
arms,  and  most  of  the  men  to  help  the  people 
of  those  comitries  defend  their  freedom  against 
Communist  aggression. 

Before  any  American  troops  were  committed 
to  Viet-Nam,  a  leader  of  another  Asian  country 
expressed  this  opinion  to  me  when  I  was  travel- 
ing in  Asia  as  a  private  citizen.  He  said :  "^Vlien 
you  are  trying  to  assist  another  nation  defend  its 
freedom,  U.S.  policy  should  be  to  help  them 
fight  the  war,  but  not  to  fight  the  war  for  them." 

Well,  in  accordance  with  this  wise  counsel,  I 
laid  down  in  Guam  three  principles  as  guide- 
lines for  future  American  policy  toward  Asia : 

— First,  the  United  States  wiU  keep  all  of  its 
treaty  commitments. 

— Second,  we  shall  provide  a  shield  if  a  nu- 
clear power  threatens  the  freedom  of  a  nation 
allied  with  us  or  of  a  nation  whose  survival  we 
consider  vital  to  our  security. 

— Third,  in  cases  involving  other  types  of 
aggression,  we  shall  furnish  military  and  eco- 
nomic assistance  when  requested  in  accordance 
with  our  treaty  commitments.  But  we  shall  look 
to  the  nation  directly  threatened  to  assume  the 


primary  responsibility  of  providing  the  man- 
power for  its  defense. 

After  I  announced  this  policy,  I  found  that 
the  leaders  of  the  Philippines,  Thailand,  Viet- 
Nam,  South  Korea,  and  other  nations  which 
might  be  threatened  by  Communist  aggression 
welcomed  this  new  direction  in  American  for- 
eign policy. 

The  VIetnamization  Plan 

The  defense  of  freedom  is  everybody's  busi- 
ness— not  just  America's  business.  And  it  is  par- 
ticularly the  responsibility  of  the  people  whose 
freedom  is  threatened.  In  the  previous  admin- 
istration we  Americanized  the  war  in  Viet-Nam. 
In  this  administration  we  are  Vietnamizing  the 
search  for  peace. 

The  policy  of  the  previous  administration  not 
only  resulted  in  our  assuming  the  primary  re- 
sponsibility for  fighting  the  war  but,  even  more 
significantly,  did  not  adequately  stress  the  goal 
of  strengthening  the  South  Vietnamese  so  that 
they  could  defend  themselves  when  we  left. 

The  Vietnamization  plan  was  launched  fol- 
lowing Secretary  [of  Defense  Melvin  E.] 
Laird's  visit  to  Viet-Nam  in  March.  Under  the 
plan,  I  ordered  fii-st  a  substantial  increase  in  the 
training  and  equipment  of  South  Vietnamese 
forces. 

In  July,  on  my  visit  to  Viet-Nam,  I  changed 
General  Abrams'  orders  so  that  they  were  con- 
sistent with  the  objectives  of  our  new  policies. 
Under  the  new  orders,  the  primary  mission  of 
our  troops  is  to  enable  the  South  Vietnamese 
forces  to  assume  the  full  responsibility  for  the 
security  of  South  Viet-Nam. 

Our  air  operations  have  been  reduced  by  over 
20  percent. 

And  now  we  have  begun  to  see  the  results  of 
this  long-overdue  change  in  American  policy  in 
Viet-Nam : 

— After  5  years  of  Americans  going  into  Viet- 
Nam,  we  are  finally  bringing  American  men 
home.  By  December  15,  over  60,000  men  will 
have  been  withdrawn  from  South  Viet-Nam, 
including  20  percent  of  all  of  our  combat  forces. 

— The  South  Vietnamese  have  continued  to 
gain  in  strength.  As  a  result,  they  have  been 
able  to  take  over  combat  responsibilities  from 
our  American  troops. 

Two  other  significant  developments  have  oc- 
curred since  this  administration  took  oiEce : 


440 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


— Enemy  infiltration,  infiltration  which  is  es- 
sential if  they  are  to  launch  a  major  attack,  over 
the  last  3  months  is  less  than  20  percent  of  what 
it  was  over  the  same  period  last  year. 

— Most  important,  United  States  casualties 
have  declined  during  the  last  2  months  to  the 
lowest  point  in  3  years. 

Our  Program  for  the  Future 

Let  me  now  turn  to  our  program  for  the 
future. 

We  have  adopted  a  plan  which  we  have 
worked  out  in  cooperation  with  the  South  Viet- 
namese for  the  complete  withdrawal  of  all  U.S. 
combat  ground  forces  and  their  replacement  by 
South  Vietnamese  forces  on  an  orderly  sched- 
uled timetable.  This  withdrawal  will  be  made 
from  strength  and  not  from  weakness.  As  South 
Vietnamese  forces  become  stronger,  the  rate  of 
American  withdrawal  can  become  greater. 

I  have  not  and  do  not  intend  to  announce 
the  timetable  for  our  program.  There  are  ob- 
vious reasons  for  this  decision,  which  I  am  sure 
you  will  understand.  As  I  have  indicated  on 
several  occasions,  the  rate  of  withdrawal  will 
depend  on  developments  on  three  fronts. 

One  of  these  is  the  progress  which  can  be,  or 
might  be,  made  in  the  Paris  talks.  An  announce- 
ment of  a  fixed  timetable  for  our  withdrawal 
would  completely  remove  any  incentive  for  the 
enemy  to  negotiate  an  agreement.  They  would 
simply  wait  until  our  forces  had  withdrawn  and 
then  move  in. 

The  other  two  factors  on  which  we  will  base 
our  withdrawal  decisions  are  the  level  of  enemy 
activity  and  the  progress  of  the  training  pro- 
gram of  the  South  Vietnamese  forces.  I  am 
glad  to  be  able  to  report  tonight  progress  on 
both  of  these  fronts  has  been  greater  than  we 
anticipated  when  we  started  the  program  in 
June  for  withdrawal.  As  a  result,  our  timetable 
for  withdrawal  is  more  optimistic  now  than 
when  we  made  our  first  estimates  in  June. 

This  clearly  demonstrates  why  it  is  not  wise 
to  be  frozen  in  on  a  fixed  timetable.  We  must 
retain  the  flexibility  to  base  each  withdrawal 
decision  on  the  situation  as  it  is  at  that  time 
rather  than  on  estimates  that  are  no  longer 
valid. 

Along  with  this  optimistic  estimate,  I  must 
in  all  candor  leave  one  note  of  caution :  If  the 
level  of  enemy  activity  significantly  increases, 
we  might  have  to  adjust  our  timetable  accord- 
ingly. 


However,  I  want  the  record  to  be  completely 
clear  on  one  point. 

At  the  time  of  the  bombing  halt  just  a  year 
ago,  there  was  some  confusion  as  to  whether 
there  was  an  understanding  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  that  if  we  stopped  the  bombing  of  North 
Viet-Nam,  they  would  stop  the  shelling  of  cities 
in  South  Viet-Nam.  I  want  to  be  sure  that  there 
is  no  misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  with  regard  to  our  withdrawal  program. 

We  have  noted  the  reduced  level  of  infiltra- 
tion, the  reduction  of  our  casualties,  and  are 
basing  our  withdrawal  decisions  partially  on 
those  factors. 

If  the  level  of  infiltration  or  our  casualties 
increase  while  we  are  trying  to  scale  down  the 
fighting,  it  will  be  the  result  of  a  conscious 
decision  by  the  enemy. 

Hanoi  could  make  no  greater  mistake  than  to 
assume  that  an  increase  in  violence  will  be  to  its 
advantage.  If  I  conclude  that  increased  enemy 
action  jeopardizes  our  remaining  forces  in  Viet- 
Nam,  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  take  strong  and 
effective  measures  to  deal  with  that  situation. 

This  is  not  a  threat.  This  is  a  statement  of 
policy  which  as  Commander  in  Cliief  of  our 
Armed  Forces  I  am  making  in  meeting  my 
responsibility  for  the  protection  of  American 
fighting  men  wherever  they  may  be. 

My  fellow  Americans,  I  am  sure  yovi  can 
recognize  from  what  I  have  said  that  we  really 
only  have  two  choices  open  to  us  if  we  want  to 
end  this  war: 

— I  can  order  an  immediate,  precipitate  with- 
drawal of  all  Americans  from  Viet-Nam  with- 
out regard  to  the  effects  of  that  action. 

— Or  we  can  persist  in  our  search  for  a  just 
peace,  through  a  negotiated  settlement  if  pos- 
sible or  through  continued  implementation  of 
our  plan  for  Vietnamization  if  necessary — a 
plan  in  which  we  will  withdraw  all  of  our  forces 
from  Viet-Nam  on  a  schedule  in  accordance  with 
our  program,  as  the  South  Vietnamese  become 
strong  enough  to  defend  their  own  freedom. 

I  have  chosen  this  second  course.  It  is  not  the 
easy  way.  It  is  the  right  way.  It  is  a  plan  which 
will  end  the  war  and  serve  the  cause  of  peace, 
not  just  in  Viet-Nam  but  in  the  Pacific  and  in 
the  world. 

In  speaking  of  the  consequences  of  a  precipi- 
tate withdrawal,  I  mentioned  that  our  allies 
would  lose  confidence  in  America. 

Far  more  dangerous,   we   would  lose  con- 


November  24,   1969 


441 


fidence  in  ourselves.  Oh,  the  immediate  reaction 
■would  be  a  sense  of  relief  that  our  men  were 
coming  home.  But  as  we  saw  the  consequences 
of  what  we  had  done,  inevitable  remorse  and 
divisive  recrimination  would  scar  our  spirit 
as  a  people. 

We  have  faced  other  crises  in  our  history  and 
have  become  stronger  by  rejecting  the  easy  way 
out  and  taking  the  right  way  in  meeting  our 
challenges.  Our  greatness  as  a  nation  has  been 
our  capacity  to  do  what  had  to  be  done  when 
we  knew  our  course  was  right. 

I  recognize  that  some  of  my  fellow  citizens 
disagree  with  the  plan  for  peace  I  have  chosen. 
Honest  and  patriotic  Americans  have  reached 
different  conclusions  as  to  how  peace  should  be 
achieved. 

In  San  Francisco  a  few  weeks  ago  I  saw 
demonstrators  carrying  signs  reading :  "Lose  in 
Viet-Nam,  bring  the  boys  home." 

Well,  one  of  the  strengths  of  our  free  society 
is  that  any  American  has  a  right  to  reach  that 
conclusion  and  to  advocate  that  point  of  view. 
But  as  President  of  the  United  States,  I  would 
be  untrue  to  my  oath  of  office  if  I  allowed  the 
policy  of  this  nation  to  be  dictated  by  the  minor- 
ity who  hold  that  point  of  view  and  who  try 
to  impose  it  on  the  Nation  by  mounting  demon- 
strations in  the  street. 

For  almost  200  years,  the  policy  of  this  nation 
has  been  made  vmder  our  Constitution  by  those 
leaders  in  the  Congress  and  in  the  White  House 
elected  by  all  of  the  people.  If  a  vocal  minority, 
however  fervent  its  cause,  prevails  over  reason 
and  the  will  of  the  majority,  this  nation  has  no 
future  as  a  free  society. 

And  now  I  would  like  to  address  a  word,  if 
I  may,  to  the  young  people  of  this  nation  who 
are  particularly  concerned — and  I  understand 
why  they  are  concerned — about  this  war. 

I  respect  your  idealism. 

I  share  your  concern  for  peace. 

I  want  peace  as  much  as  you  do. 

There  are  powerful  personal  reasons  I  want 
to  end  this  war.  This  week  I  will  have  to  sign  83 
letters  to  mothers,  fathers,  wives,  and  loved  ones 
of  men  who  have  given  their  lives  for  America 
in  Viet-Nam.  It  is  very  little  satisfaction  to  me 
that  this  is  only  one-third  as  many  letters  as 
I  signed  the  first  week  in  office.  There  is  nothing 
I  want  more  than  to  see  the  day  come  when  I 
do  not  have  to  write  any  of  those  letters. 

— I  want  to  end  the  war  to  save  the  lives  of 
those  brave  young  men  in  Viet-Nam. 

— But  I  want  to  end  it  in  a  way  which  will 


increase  the  chance  that  their  younger  brothers 
and  their  sons  will  not  have  to  fight  in  some 
future  Viet-Nam  someplace  in  the  world. 

— And  I  want  to  end  the  war  for  another  rea- 
son. I  want  to  end  it  so  that  the  energy  and 
dedication  of  you,  our  young  people,  now  too 
often  directed  into  bitter  hatred  against  those 
responsible  for  the  war,  can  be  turned  to  the 
great  challenges  of  peace :  a  better  life  for  all 
Americans,  a  better  life  for  all  people  on  this 
earth. 

I  have  chosen  a  plan  for  peace.  I  believe  it 
will  succeed. 

If  it  does  succeed,  what  the  critics  say  now 
won't  matter.  If  it  does  not  succeed,  anything 
I  say  then  won't  matter. 

I  know  it  may  not  be  fashionable  to  speak  of 
patriotism  or  national  destiny  these  days.  But 
I  feel  it  is  appropriate  to  do  so  on  this  occasion. 

Two  hundred  years  ago  this  nation  was  weak 
and  poor.  But  even  then,  America  was  the  hope 
of  millions  in  the  world.  Today  we  have  become 
the  strongest  and  richest  nation  in  the  world. 
The  wheel  of  destiny  has  turned  so  that  any  hope 
the  world  has  for  the  survival  of  peace  and  free- 
dom will  be  determined  by  whether  the  Ameri- 
can people  have  the  moral  stamina  and  the 
courage  to  meet  the  challenge  of  free-world 
leadersliip. 

Let  historians  not  record  that  when  America 
was  the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world  we 
passed  on  the  other  side  of  the  road  and  allowed 
the  last  hopes  for  peace  and  freedom  of  millions 
of  people  to  be  suffocated  by  the  forces  of 
totalitarianism. 

And  so  tonight — to  you,  the  great  silent 
majority  of  my  fellow  Americans — I  ask  for 
your  support. 

I  pledged  in  my  campaign  for  the  Presidency 
to  end  the  war  in  a  way  that  we  could  win  the 
peace.  I  have  mitiated  a  plan  of  action  which 
will  enable  me  to  keep  that  pledge. 

The  more  support  I  can  have  from  the  Ameri- 
can people,  the  sooner  that  pledge  can  be  re- 
deemed ;  for  the  more  divided  we  are  at  home, 
the  less  likely  the  enemy  is  to  negotiate  at  Paris. 

Let  us  be  united  for  peace.  Let  us  also  be 
united  against  defeat.  Because  let  us  under- 
stand: North  Viet-Nam  cannot  defeat  or 
humiliate  the  United  States.  Only  Americans 
can  do  that. 

Fifty  years  ago,  in  this  room  and  at  this  very 
desk.  President  AVoodrow  Wilson  spoke  words 
which  caught  the  imagination  of  a  war-weary 
world.  He  said :  "This  is  the  war  to  end  wars." 


442 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


His  dream  for  peace  after  World  War  I  was 
shattered  on  the  hard  realities  of  great-power 
politics,  and  Woodrow  Wilson  died  a  broken 
man. 

Tonight  I  do  not  tell  you  that  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam  is  the  war  to  end  wars.  But  I  do  say 
this :  I  have  initiated  a  plan  which  will  end  this 
war  in  a  way  that  will  bring  us  closer  to  that 
great  goal  to  which  Woodrow  Wilson  and  every 
American  President  in  our  history  has  been 
dedicated — the  goal  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace. 

As  President  I  hold  the  responsibility  for 
choosing  the  best  path  to  that  goal  and  then 
leading  the  Nation  along  it. 

I  pledge  to  you  tonight  that  I  shall  meet  this 
responsibility  with  all  of  the  strength  and 
wisdom  I  can  command  in  accordance  with  your 
hopes,  mindful  of  your  concerns,  sustained  by 
your  prayers. 


As  I  have  said  repeatedly,  there  is  nothing  to 
be  gained  by  waiting.  Delay  can  only  increase 
the  dangers  and  multiply  the  suffering. 

The  time  has  come  to  move  forward  at  the 
conference  table  toward  an  early  resolution  of 
this  tragic  war.  You  will  find  us  forthcoming 
and  open-minded  in  a  common  effort  to  bring 
the  blessings  of  peace  to  the  brave  people  of 
Vietnam.  Let  history  record  that  at  this  critical 
juncture,  both  sides  turned  their  face  toward 
peace  rather  than  toward  conflict  and  war. 
Sincerely, 

Richard  Nixon 

His  Excellency 
Ho  Chi  Minh 

President 

Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam 

Hanoi 


The  Exchange  of  Letters  Between 
President  Nixon  and  President  Ho 

Following  is  the  exchange  of  letters  between 
President  Nixon  and  President  Ho  Chi  Minh  of 
the  Democratic  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  referred 
to  by  President  Nixon  in  his  address  to  the 
Nation  on  November  3. 


White  House  press  release  dated  November  3 

PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  LETTER 

JuLT  15, 1969 
De^vr  Mr.  President  :  I  realize  that  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  communicate  meaningfully  across  the 
gulf  of  four  years  of  war.  But  precisely  because 
of  this  gulf,  I  wanted  to  take  this  opportunity 
to  reaffirm  in  all  solemnity  my  desire  to  work  for 
a  just  peace.  I  deeply  believe  that  the  war  in 
Vietnam  has  gone  on  too  long  and  delay  in 
bringing  it  to  an  end  can  benefit  no  one — least 
of  all  the  people  of  Vietnam.  My  speech  on 
May  14  ^  laid  out  a  proposal  which  I  believe  is 
fair  to  all  parties.  Other  proposals  have  been 
made  which  attempt  to  give  the  people  of  South 
Vietnam  an  opportimity  to  choose  their  own 
future.  These  proposals  take  into  account  the 
reasonable  conditions  of  all  sides.  But  we  stand 
ready  to  discuss  other  programs  as  well,  specif- 
ically the  10-point  program  of  the  NLF. 

'  Bulletin  of  June  2, 1969,  p.  457. 


PRESIDENT  HO'S  LETTER 

Hanoi,  25  August  1969 
{Received  in  Paris  August  80) 

To  His  Excellency  Richard  Milhous  Nixon 
President  of  the  United  States 
Washington 

Mr.  President,  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowl- 
edge receipt  of  your  letters. 

The  war  of  aggression  of  the  United  States 
against  our  people,  violating  our  fundamental 
national  rights,  still  continues  in  South  Viet- 
nam. The  United  States  continues  to  intensify 
military  operations,  the  B-52  bombings  and  the 
use  of  toxic  chemical  products  multiply  the 
crimes  against  the  Vietnamese  people.  The 
longer  the  war  goes  on,  the  more  it  accumulates 
the  mourning  and  burdens  of  the  American 
people.  I  am  extremely  indignant  at  the  losses 
and  destructions  caused  by  the  American  troops 
to  our  people  and  our  comitry.  I  am  also  deeply 
touched  at  the  rising  toll  of  death  of  young 
Americans  who  have  fallen  in  Vietnam  by 
reason  of  the  policy  of  American  governing 
circles. 

Our  Vietnamese  people  are  deeply  devoted  to 
peace,  a  real  peace  with  independence  and  real 
freedom.  They  are  determined  to  fight  to  the 
end,  without  fearing  the  sacrifices  and  difficul- 
ties in  order  to  defend  their  country  and  their 
sacred  national  rights.  The  overall  solution  in 
10  points  of  the  National  Liberation  Front  of 
South  Vietnam  and  of  the  Provisional  Revolu- 
tionary Government  of  the  Republic  of  South 


November  24,   1969 


443 


Vietnam  is  a  logical  and  reasonable  basis  for 
the  settlement  of  the  Vietnamese  problem.  It 
has  earned  the  sympathy  and  support  of  the 
peoples  of  the  world. 

In  your  letter  you  have  expressed  the  desire  to 
act  for  a  just  peace.  For  this  the  United  States 
must  cease  the  war  of  aggression  and  withdraw 
tlieir  troops  from  South  Vietnam,  respect  the 
right  of  the  population  of  the  South  and  of 
the  Vietnamese  nation  to  dispose  of  themselves, 
without  foreign  influence.  This  is  the  correct 
manner  of  solving  the  Vietnamese  problem  in 
conformity  with  the  national  rights  of  the  Viet- 
namese people,  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
and  the  hopes  for  peace  of  the  peoples  of  the 
world.  This  is  the  path  that  will  allow  the 
United  States  to  get  out  of  the  war  with  honor. 

With  good  will  on  both  sides  we  might  arrive 
at  common  efforts  in  view  of  finding  a  correct 
solution  of  the  Vietnamese  problem. 
Sincerely, 

Ho  Chi  IMinh 


41st  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  hy 
Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
VjS.  delegation,  at  the  Jflst  plenary  session  of 
the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
November  6. 

Press  release  328  dated  November  6 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Last  Monday  eve- 
ning, President  Nixon  stated  that  the  IJnited 
States  will  persist  in  its  search  for  a  just  peace 
in  Viet-Nam.^  We  shall  do  so,  he  said,  "through 
a  negotiated  settlement  if  possible  or  through 
continued  implementation  of  our  plan  for 
Vietnamization  if  necessary." 

We  have  made  detailed  offers  which  are 
before  you.  There  is  no  need  to  recoimt  them 
here. 

We  have  not,  however,  put  forth  our  proposals 
on  a  take-it-or-leave-it  basis.  We  have  indicated 
that  we  are  willing  to  discuss  the  proposals 
which  have  been  put  forth  by  your  side.  We 
have  said  that  everything  is  negotiable  except 
the  right  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  to 
have  the  opportunity  to  determine  their  own  fu- 
ture. We  have  demonstrated  our  flexibility  and 


'  See  p.  437. 


good  faith  in  40  plenary  sessions  of  these  Paris 
meetings. 

Your  side  has  refused  to  discuss  our  proposals 
seriously.  As  the  President  said : 

It  has  become  clear  that  the  obstacle  in  negotiating 
an  end  to  the  war  is  not  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  not  the  South  Vietnamese  Government. 

The  obstacle  is  the  other  side's  absolute  refusal  to 
show  the  least  willingness  to  join  us  in  seeking  a  just 
peace. 

You  must  not  rely  on  our  making  concession 
after  concession  until  you  get  everything  you 
want. 

In  our  search  for  peace,  we  have  recognized 
that  your  side  was  capable  of  blocking  all  at- 
tempts to  bring  an  end  to  the  war  through  nego- 
tiations. President  Nixon  therefore  put  into 
effect  another  plan.  This  is  a  plan  which  will 
bring  the  war  to  an  end  regardless  of  what 
liappens  on  the  negotiating  front. 

As  President  Nixon  said  on  November  3,  we 
have  noted  the  reduced  level  of  North  Viet- 
namese infiltration  into  South  Viet-Nam  and 
the  reduction  of  our  casualties.  We  are  basing 
our  program  of  Vietnamization  partially  on 
those  factors.  If  your  military  activity  signif- 
icantly increases,  we  might  have  to  take  other 
measures.  As  the  President  said,  you  could  make 
no  greater  mistake  than  to  assume  that  an  in- 
crease \i\  \aolence  will  be  to  your  own  advantage. 

You  should  be  under  no  illusion  that  our 
position  here  at  these  talks  is  going  to  crumble 
because  of  the  words  or  actions  of  a  vocal  mi- 
nority of  the  American  public.  As  President 
Nixon  said  on  November  3,  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  has  been  made  under  our  Consti- 
tution by  the  President  and  the  Congress,  all 
of  whom  have  been  elected  by  the  people.  Recent 
opinion  polls  in  the  United  States  make  it  clear 
that  the  President  has  behind  him  the  support 
of  the  vast  majority  of  the  American  people  as 
he  carries  out  his  Viet-Nam  policy.  That  sup- 
port has  increased  since  tlie  launching  of  the 
moratorium  movement  to  which  you  refer  so 
much.  Indeed,  a  poll  taken  since  tlie  President's 
speech  has  shown  great  public  support  for  the 
policies  of  President  Nixon. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  our  course  is  set.  The 
President  has  stated  the  alternatives.  We  remain 
ready  through  these  meetings,  through  private 
meetings,  or  through  restricted  meetings  to  dis- 
cuss the  issues  seriously  and  to  find  mutually 
acceptable  solutions  to  them.  TiHiether  peace  is 
achieved  through  negotiations  depends  on  your 
readiness  to  deal  with  the  issues  in  the  same 
spirit. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


.  A  Look  at  Asian  Regionalism 


hy  Marshall  Green 

Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacifjc  Affairs  ' 


Distinguished  mayors  and  presidents  of 
chambers  of  commerce  and  other  colleagues 
here  today :  I  call  you  colleagues,  for  we  are  all 
coworkers  in  public  affairs  with  a  special  stake 
in  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  Pacific  Basin. 
I  suspect  that  j'our  responsibilities,  like  mine, 
too  seldom  permit  reflective  glances  at  the  past 
or  thoughtful  contemplation  of  the  future. 
Crises  of  the  moment — whether  they  be  student 
dissidence,  air  pollution,  inflation,  protective  re- 
strictions on  trade  and  investment,  or  the  all- 
pervasive  problem  of  ending  the  war  in  Viet- 
Nam  on  an  honorable  basis — these  crises  tend  to 
preoccupy  our  thoughts  and  actions,  so  much  so 
that  we  are  inclined  to  forget  where  we  have 
been,  to  overlook  basic  changes  that  have  taken 
place,  and  to  neglect  to  analyze  where  present 
trends  will  be  taking  us. 

It  is  about  one  of  these  trends  that  I  would 
like  to  talk  with  you  today;  namely,  the  trend 
toward  greater  regional  awareness  and  coopera- 
tion in  East  Asia,  and  how  it  relates  to  United 
States  policy. 

By  East  Asia  I  refer  to  the  vast  area  sweep- 
ing from  Korea  and  Jajjan  down  through  China 
and  Southeast  Asia  to  Australia  and  New  Zea- 
land. Obviously  this  area,  wherein  dwells  one- 
third  of  humanity,  disposes  of  vast  potential. 
What  happens  there  is  of  utmost  consequence  to 
the  whole  world. 

It  is  a  region  of  infinite  diversity,  of  different 
traditions  and  cultures,  of  varying  degrees  of 
economic  and  political  development,  and  of 
often  conflicting  national  interests.  Yet  we  can 
detect  a  gradual  movement  toward  recognition 
of  the  need  for  common  attitudes  and  goals,  and 
this  movement  appears  to  be  accelerating. 

When  I  first  joined  the  Bureau  which  I  now 
head,  it  was  responsible  for  only  three  independ- 


'  Address  made  before  the  Japan-American  Confer- 
ence of  Mayors  and  Chambers  of  Commerce  Presidents 
at  Long  Beach,  Calif.,  on  Oct.  20. 


ent  nations  in  what  was  then  known  as  the  Far 
East.  Most  of  the  remainder  of  the  region  was 
under  foreign  domination.  Colonialism  was  a 
conunon  experience  for  most  countries  of  East 
Asia,  but  it  rarely  fostered  common  interests 
among  neighbors.  The  small  elite  groups  in 
colonized  nations  were  oriented  toward  distant 
powers ;  the  common  people  remained  locked  in 
a  close  circle  of  local  tradition. 

The  great  surges  of  nationalism  which  swept 
through  these  nations  after  World  War  II  actu- 
ally did  little  to  draw  them  together.  National- 
ism was  inwardly  directed.  Understandably, 
new  governments  often  tried  to  forge  a  national 
identity  by  evoking  traditions  from  a  pre- 
colonial  past.  A  sense  of  inadequacy  and  frus- 
tration resulting  from  years  of  harsh  foreign 
rule  was  often  expressed  in  hostility,  not  only 
toward  former  colonial  masters  but  toward 
neighbors.  This  factor  may  also  help  to  explain 
the  frequent  convergence  at  that  particular 
point  in  history  of  nationalism  and  communism, 
an  ideology  which  feeds  upon  hostility. 

By  1969  many  of  the  first-generation  revolu- 
tionary elite  had  passed  from  the  scene.  They 
are  now  being  replaced  by  a  new  generation 
which,  though  possessing  a  strong  sense  of  na- 
tional identity,  is  weary  of  sterile  ideologies  and 
anticolonialist  sloganeering.  Increasingly  the 
new  generation  seeks  pragmatic  paths  to  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress. 

Japan  commands  their  attention.  Prostrate  at 
the  end  of  World  War  II,  Japan  has  now  be- 
come the  third  greatest  industrial  producer  in 
the  world  and  has  taken  her  rightful  place  as 
one  of  the  great  trading  nations  in  the  world, 
whose  interest  embraces  the  United  States,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  West  Germany  as  inti- 
mately as  countries  nearby. 

These  four  coimtries  may  illustrate  an  im- 
portant law  governing  the  relationships  be- 
tween nations.  Although  we  have  and  will 
continue  to  have  conflicts  of  interest,  the  major 


November  24,   1969 


445 


social  and  economic  changes  involved  in  the 
modernization  of  our  countries  have  given  our 
peoples  increasingly  common  outlooks,  atti- 
tudes, and  goals.  If,  as  I  am  suggesting,  mod- 
ernization is  the  leveler  of  cultural  barriers 
between  nations,  it  may  also  be  regarded  as  the 
mother  of  regional  cooperation. 

Economic   Progress  and   Regional   Cooperation 

Let  us  look  briefly  at  the  economic  progress 
which  has  recently  been  attained  by  the  younger 
Asian  nations,  at  their  latest  effort  to  build  re- 
gional cooperation,  and  at  the  roles  of  Japan 
and  the  United  States  in  fostering  moderniza- 
tion and  cooperation. 

The  Republic  of  Korea,  in  a  brief  16  years, 
has  risen  from  the  ruins  of  a  devastating  war, 
has  developed  one  of  the  highest  growth  rates  in 
the  world,  and  astonishes  its  visitors  by  the 
vitality  and  confidence  of  its  economic  progress. 
Surely  it  must  be  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
of  recent  economic  achievements  for  a  previ- 
ously totally  unindustrialized  small  country  to 
increase  its  exports  in  the  highly  competitive 
modern  world  from  approximately  $32  million 
in  1963,  of  which  more  than  three- fourths  were 
raw  materials,  to  over  $450  million  in  1968,  of 
which  more  than  three-fourths  were  manufac- 
tured goods. 

The  Republic  of  Cliina  is  now  entering  the  big 
leagues  in  world  commerce  and  industry.  Its 
remarkable  rate  of  growth,  like  that  of  Singa- 
pore and  Hong  Kong,  shows  what  the  Chinese 
people  can  achieve  in  a  free  setting.  Annual 
GNP  growth  rates  in  the  Philippines,  Thailand, 
and  Malaysia  are  also  encouraging :  somewhere 
between  6  and  9  percent  on  the  average.  The 
new  leadership  in  Indonesia,  faced  with  eco- 
nomic chaos  in  1966,  including  an  annual  in- 
flation rate  of  630  percent,  is  making  extraor- 
dinary progi-ess  in  putting  its  house  in  order, 
including  reduction  of  the  current  rate  of  in- 
flation to  less  than  that  of  the  United  States. 
All  this  is  the  more  noteworthy  when  we  recall 
that  Indonesia  is  approximately  one-half  of 
Southeast  Asia  in  area  and  m  population. 

Along  with  these  instances  of  individual  prog- 
ress there  has  developed  an  increasing  interest 
on  the  part  of  the  countries  of  the  region  in  their 
neighbors  and  in  the  region  as  a  whole.  Govern- 
ments are  becoming  increasingly  aware  of  the 
potential  benefits,  even  the  necessity,  of  coopera- 


tion with  their  neighbors.  Technology,  espe- 
cially improved  conununications  and  transport, 
is  making  possible  an  almost  immediate  aware- 
ness of  what  is  going  on  in  neighboring  coun- 
tries to  an  extent  hitherto  unknown.  Asian  busi- 
nessmen, engineers,  government  officials,  and 
political  leaders  now  have  a  far  wider  horizon 
than  their  predecessors.  They  are  coming  to 
know  about  each  other  through  travel,  press 
and  radio  and  television,  business  arrangements, 
and  regional  conferences.  Some  of  them  came  to 
know  each  other  as  fellow  students  in  Japan, 
the  United  States,  and  elsewhere. 

Regional  relationships  have  developed  natu- 
rally in  response  to  perceived  needs,  rather  than 
being  imposed  according  to  any  predetermined 
pattern.  Therefore,  they  take  a  variety  of  forms : 
some  bilateral,  some  multilateral  with  par- 
ticipation from  outside  the  area,  and  some 
multilateral  with  purely  Asian  participation. 
This  variety  is  sometimes  confusing  and  some- 
times risks  duplication  of  effort.  It  has,  never- 
theless, the  strength  of  having  developed 
naturally. 

In  the  field  of  bilateral  assistance,  for  ex- 
ample, Japan's  foreign  assistance  (including 
private  flows)  exceeded  $1  billion  in  1968  and 
is  aimed  at  reaching  1  percent  of  her  gross  na- 
tional product.  The  Republic  of  China  is  help- 
ing others  to  help  themselves  with  teclinical  aid 
programs  in  over  20  countries  in  Africa,  South- 
east Asia,  and  Latin  America. 

Asian  Regional  Organizations 

Multilaterally,  Thailand,  Laos,  Cambodia, 
and  Viet-Nam  are  collaborating  with  each  other 
and  with  24  other  countries  in  modest  programs 
for  the  development  of  the  Mekong  River  Val- 
ley, and  this  collaboration  has  continued  even  at 
times  when  political  relations  between  these 
Southeast  Asian  comitries  are  strained  or  in 
some  cases  suspended. 

The  Mekong  Committee  was  founded  by  the 
Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the  Far 
East,  the  oldest  and  most  comprehensive  of  the 
Asian  regional  organizations. 

Also  on  ECAFE  initiative,  the  Asian  De- 
velopment Bank  has  been  established  and  has 
begun  to  operate.  Tlie  contribution  of  .Japan  to 
the  ADB  exceeds  that  of  the  United  States, 
and  its  President  is  a  distinguished  Japanese. 
Although  they  are  not  regional  institutions,  the 


446 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


International  IMonetary  Fund  and  the  World 
Bank  are  playing  significant  roles  in  the  devel- 
opment of  the  East  Asian  region  as  well  as  in 
providing  bilateral  assistance  and  advice  to 
Asian  countries  and  to  donor  groups  assisting 
certain  Asian  countries. 

One  of  the  most  interesting,  and  in  the  long 
run  perhaiJS  one  of  the  most  potentially  signif- 
icant, developments  has  been  the  beginnings  of 
collaboration  between  the  coimtries  of  the  region 
in  purely  Asian  terms.  The  Asian  and  Pacific 
Council  and  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian 
Nations  and  the  Southeast  Asian  Economic 
Ministers  Conference  are  groupings  of  exclu- 
sively Asian  comitries  developed  at  Asian  ini- 
tiative to  collaborate  on  Asian  problems.  They 
are  as  yet  informal  and  have  confined  them- 
selves to  general  political  and  some  economic 
collaboration.  They  have  already  provided  use- 
ful forums  for  quiet  and  constructive  discus- 
sion of  potentially  difficult  problems. 

The  Asian  and  Pacific  Council  is  involved  in 
such  practical  cooperative  enterprises  as  the 
establishment  in  Canberra  of  a  Registry  of  Ex- 
pert Sei-vices,  and  a  Cultural  and  Social  Cen- 
ter in  Seoul,  and  is  considering  a  food  and 
fertilizer  technology  center  in  Taipei  and  an 
economic  coordination  center  in  Bangkok. 
Japan  has  recently  proposed  a  maritime  project 
which  would  include  marine  training,  the 
promotion  of  maritime  safety,  and  navigational 
matters,  all  of  great  interest  to  the  members, 
who  are  all  maritime  nations. 

The  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations, 
a  subregional  groupmg  which  now  comprises 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singa- 
pore, and  Thailand — but  leaves  its  door  open 
for  others  in  Southeast  Asia  to  join — is  also  con- 
centrating its  efforts  on  projects  which  would 
be  of  common  benefit  to  Southeast  Asia.  These 
include  exchanges  of  trade  missions,  trade  fairs, 
simplification  of  travel  regulations,  promotion 
of  tourism,  and  exchanges  of  tecluiical  experts. 
The  members  are  also  interested  in  improving 
intraregional  telecommunications,  navigation, 
and  transportation. 

The  Southeast  Asian  Economic  Ministers 
Conference,  founded  at  Japanese  initiative, 
meets  amiually  to  discuss  problems  of  South- 
east Asian  economic  development. 

Sophisticated  Asians  in  the  educational  field, 
conscious  of  the  correlation  between  excellence 


in  the  higher  education  and  technical  training 
fields  and  the  development  and  modernization 
process,  have  formed  the  Southeast  Asian  Min- 
isters of  Education  Council.  This  organization 
is  concentrating  upon  longer  range  projects 
such  as  regional  centers  for  tropical  medicine, 
research  in  agriculture,  tropical  biology,  teacher 
training  in  science  and  mathematics,  educa- 
tional innovation  and  teclmology,  and  training 
of  English-language  teachers. 

Legislators,  jurors,  and  lavs^ers  from  the  Re- 
public of  China,  Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea,  Laos, 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Thailand,  and  Viet- 
Nam  collaborate  in  the  Asian  Parliamentarians 
Union,  the  aims  of  which  are  the  acliievement 
and  preservation  of  "full  freedom  and  genuine 
democracy  thereby  securing  enduring  peace  and 
prosperity  in  Asia."  Australia  and  New  Zea- 
land have  observer  status  in  this  organization. 

Improvements  in  regional  cooperation  have 
not  been  extensive  in  the  field  of  mutual  secu- 
rity. In  fact,  the  security  structure  in  East  Asia 
has  not  altered  much  in  the  past  15  years ;  and 
I  do  not  expect  to  see  any  new  formal  security 
arrangements,  at  least  in  the  near  future. 
There  may  be  from  time  to  time  useful  military 
collaboration  as,  for  example,  that  of  Malaysia 
and  Indonesia  in  suppressing  insurgency  in 
Borneo  and  that  of  Thailand  and  Malaysia  in 
putting  down  terrorism  along  the  Thai- 
Malaysian  border.  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
have  recently  announced  that  they  intend  to 
maintain  some  troops  in  Malaysia  and  Singa- 
pore after  British  withdrawal  in  that  area  in 
1971,  in  full  recognition  of  their  role  as  Asian 
powers.  This  constructive  and  statesmanlike  ac- 
tion will  contribute  to  the  stability  and  confi- 
dence in  the  region. 

All  these  developments  in  the  field  of  neigh- 
borly cooperation  are  encouraging,  but  they  do 
not  obscure  harsh  realities  which  will  continue 
to  confront  tliis  part  of  the  world.  One  of  these 
is  the  problem  of  divided  nations.  With  three  of 
the  world's  four  divided  nations.  East  Asia  will 
continue  to  bear  the  major  portion  of  the  pres- 
sures exerted  by  militant  communism.  Although 
regionalism  may  eventually  provide  a  frame- 
work for  alleviating  these  pressures,  the  prob- 
lems posed  by  divided  nations  will  in  the 
immediate  future  affect  the  pace  and  manner  in 
which  regional  cooperation  will  develop.  Simi- 
larly, regional  cooperation  can  provide  ma- 
chinery   but    not    the    power    for    economic 


November  24,    1969 


447 


dev^elopment.  The  transfer  of  capital  and  skills 
from  developed  countries  can  help,  but  the  real 
thrust  for  modernization  must  be  provided  by 
the  determined  efforts  of  each  individual  nation. 


Regionalism  Consistent  With  U.S.  Policy 

One  final  point  should  be  made  about  im- 
provements hi  cooperation  between  East  Asian 
coimtries.  They  are  consistent  with  developing 
United  States  policy. 

While  United  States  interests  in  the  area  re- 
main essentially  the  same  and  our  commitments 
will  be  honored,  we  recognize  that  there  is 
change  in  the  mood  of  the  American  people. 
They  are  cautious  about  undertaking  new  com- 
mitments. They  are  becoming  somewhat  impa- 
tient with  carrying  what  many  consider  to  be  a 
disproportionate  share  of  the  burden  of  mili- 
tary security  and  economic  assistance  abroad. 
They  are  asking  more  and  more  frequently  what 
other  countries  are  doing  to  help  themselves  and 
each  other.  We  in  this  administration  will  ask 
the  same  questions,  and  our  actions  will  depend 
to  an  important  extent  upon  what  the  countries 
of  the  area  are  prepared  to  do  for  themselves 
and  for  each  other. 

Since  this  meeting  is  one  of  Americans  and 
Japanese  occupying  positions  of  responsibility 
in  our  respective  countries,  it  is  perhaps  ap- 
propriate that  I  should  close  with  a  special  word 
on  Japan.  We  admire  and  applaud  the  industi-y, 
imagination,  and  the  discipline  with  which  the 
people  of  Japan  have  brought  about  so  great 
a  development  of  their  country  in  so  short  a 
time — to  the  point  where  Japan  is  now  the  third 
most  powerful  economic  entity  in  the  world  to- 
day. But  these  great  acliievements  carry  with 
them  great  responsibilities.  And  the  world  is 
watching  to  see  the  role  which  Japan  will  hence- 
forth play  in  the  development  and  security  of 
Asia.  Japan  has  already  made  substantial  con- 
tributions t-o  the  development  of  other  countries 
in  the  region,  and  the  Government  has  stated 
that  it  will  be  the  policy  of  Japan  to  expand 
significantly  its  assistance  to  East  Asian  coun- 
tries in  the  years  ahead. 

This  is  good  news,  though  it  is  as  it  should 


be,  and  my  Government  looks  forward  to  co- 
operating closely  with  the  Government  of  Japan 
and  those  of  other  free  nations  of  Asia  in  creat- 
ing the  conditions  in  which  those  countries  can 
with  confidence  develop  tlieir  own  economies  in 
their  own  way  and  brmg  about  a  riclier  and  a 
fuller  life  for  their  people. 


Under  Secretary  Richardson  Attends 
Special  NATO  Session  at  Brussels 

The  Department  of  State  amiounced  on  Octo- 
ber 29  (pi-ess  release  320)  that  Under  Secretary 
Richardson  would  represent  the  United  States 
at  a  special  session  of  the  North  Atlantic  Coun- 
cil at  Brussels  November  5-6.^  The  meeting, 
with  particijDation  of  ministers  and  high-level 
officials  of  the  Allies,  has  been  long  in  planning 
and  is  the  first  to  be  held  since  the  suggestion 
for  such  a  meeting  was  made  by  President 
Nixon  last  April  as  a  means  of  furthering 
AVestern  political  consultation.- 

AVliile  in  Brussels,  Under  Secretary  Richard- 
son will  meet  with  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, Pierre  Harmel.  He  will  also  call  on  the 
Commission  of  the  European  Commimities  in 
Brussels. 

Following  the  2-day  Council  session,  he  will 
travel  to  London.  He  will  meet  with  Foreign 
Minister  Michael  Stewart  and  other  British 
leaders  and  officials  on  November  7. 

The  Under  Secretary  will  then  proceed  to 
Rome  to  participate  in  a  3-day  conference  of 
chiefs  of  American  diplomatic  missions  in  Eu- 
rope. The  conference,  which  is  scheduled  for 
November  10-12,  is  one  of  a  series  of  regional 
meetings  called  periodically  to  permit  an  ex- 
change of  views  between  senior  Washington 
officials  and  American  ambassadors  abroad. 
While  in  Rome  he  will  meet  with  the  Italian 
Foreign  Minister,  Aldo  Moro. 


'For  names  of  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  320  dated  Oct.  29. 

'  For  President  Nixon's  address  before  the  ministerial 
meeting  of  the  North  Atlantic  Council  on  Apr.  10,  see 
Bulletin  of  Apr.  28, 1969,  p.  351. 


448 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Responsibility  for  the  U.N.'s  Development 
as  an  Instrument  of  World  Order 


ly  Charles  W.  Tost 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  '• 


As  your  rei^resentative  to  the  United  Nations 
I  deeply  appreciate  the  recognition  you  are  giv- 
ing here  in  Cincinnati  this  week,  as  others  are 
doing  in  many  parts  of  the  United  States,  to  the 
United  Nations  as  it  reaches  the  age  of  24. 

This  milestone  in  the  life  of  this  international 
organization  happens  to  coincide  with  a  moment 
hi  our  history  when  the  concern  of  many  pub- 
lic-spirited citizens  is  turning  inward  to  cope 
with  pressmg  domestic  problems:  those  of  our 
cities,  of  the  aspirations  of  ethnic  minorities,  of 
the  search  by  a  new  generation  of  Americans  for 
a  more  meaningful  life.  Meanwlule,  interna- 
tionally, one  single  question,  peace  in  Viet- 
Nam — a  question  to  which  for  historical  reasons 
the  United  Nations  has  been  able  to  contrib- 
ute little — nearly  monopolizes  our  national 
attention. 

It  would  scarcely  be  surprising  if,  in  the 
clamor  of  these  urgent  American  concerns,  the 
sound  of  the  U.N.'s  24th  birthday  party  were 
almost  drowned  out.  Yet  if  that  were  to  happen, 
and  if  ignoring  or  shrugging  off  the  U.N.  were 
to  become  an  American  habit  in  future  years, 
this  would  be  an  ominous  development  for  our 
coxmtry  and  for  the  world. 

I  do  not  say  this  in  any  mood  of  utopianism, 
but  in  sober  realism.  After  all,  a  part  of  realism 
is  the  ability  to  see  beyond  the  ends  of  our  noses. 
I  suggest  that,  in  our  hard  national  interest,  we 
must  be  able  to  look  beyond  Viet-Nam,  beyond 
the  urgent  and  glaring  crises  of  the  moment, 
beyond  our  own  shores — and  address  ourselves 
to  the  world  problems  of  the  1970's.  Among 
them  we  will  find  problems  that  affect  the  fu- 


'  Address  made  before  the  tJ.N.  Week  luncheon  of 
the  Cincinnati  World  Affairs  Council  at  Cincinnati, 
Ohio,  on  Oct.  22  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  129  dated 
Oct.  21). 


ture  security  and  well-being  of  our  country  but 
which,  because  they  are  worldwide  in  scope,  we 
camiot  solve  by  ourselves.  In  their  solution  the 
United  Nations  and  its  family  of  agencies  must 
play  an  important  and,  in  some  cases,  an  indis- 
pensable part. 

Some  of  these  problems  have  long  since  ap- 
proached crisis  proportions: 

1.  There  is  the  crisis  of  an  ever-mounting 
global  arms  race,  especially  in  nuclear  weapons 
and  missile  systems,  which  heavily  strains  the 
world's  resources  and  yet  fails  to  bring  security 
to  either  side. 

2.  There  is  the  crisis  of  human  fertility, 
which  is  fast  causing  the  world's  population  to 
outnin  food  supplies,  which  is  aggravating  im- 
measurably all  our  other  problems,  and  which, 
unless  it  is  soon  brought  under  control,  threat- 
ens witliin  our  children's  lifetime  to  visit  famine 
and  chaos  on  vast  regions  of  the  world. 

3.  There  is  the  crisis  of  the  poor  nations,  most 
of  them  recently  independent,  whose  insistent 
demand  for  a  better  material  life  is  one  of  the 
most  inescapable  realities  of  our  time. 

4.  There  is  the  gathering  worldwide  crisis  of 
the  human  environment,  of  depleted  resources, 
polluted  air  and  water,  disfigured  landscapes, 
overcrowded  and  disorganized  cities. 

5.  And  on  top  of  all  these,  it  takes  no  prophet 
to  foresee  recurrent  crises  of  international  vi- 
olence, especially  among  poor  and  politically 
unstable  nations,  any  one  of  wliich,  unless  there 
is  an  impartial  police  force  to  keep  the  peace, 
could  draw  the  major  powers  into  direct  and 
fatal  confrontation. 

All  five  of  these  world  problems — armaments, 
population,  development,  environment,  peace- 
keeping— are,  in  one  degree  or  another,  direct 
concerns  of  the  United  Nations.  All  of  them  are 


November  24,   1969 

368-239—69 2 


449 


recurrent  themes  in  U.N.  debates ;  some  of  them 
are  the  subject  of  major  U.N.  programs  and 
negotiations.  Yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
United  Nations,  or  the  community  of  nations, 
has  any  of  them  anywhere  nearly  under  control. 
A  few  months  ago  U  Thant,  speaking  from 
his  imique  vantage  point  as  Secretary  General 
of  the  United  Nations,  spoke  on  this  subject  as 
follows : 

...  I  can  only  conclude  from  the  information  that  is 
available  to  me  as  Secretary-General  that  the  Members 
of  the  United  Nations  have  perhaps  10  years  left  in 
which  to  subordinate  their  ancient  quarrels  and  launch 
a  global  partnership  to  curb  the  arms  race,  to  improve 
the  human  environment,  to  defuse  the  population  ex- 
plosion, and  to  supply  the  required  momentum  to  world 
development 

If  such  a  global  partnership  is  not  forged  within  the 
next  decade,  then  I  very  much  fear  that  the  problems 
I  have  mentioned  will  have  reached  such  staggering 
proportions  that  they  will  be  beyond  our  capacity  to 
control. 

You  will  notice  that  the  Secretary  General 
estimates  that  the  nations  have  10  years  in 
which  to  act.  That  may  sound  like  a  comforta- 
ble cushion  of  time,  but  it  is  not.  Our  situation 
might  be  compared  to  that  of  a  community  that 
has  to  finish  building  a  dike  before  the  floods 
come.  Whether  the  next  flood  will  come  in  10 
years,  or  20,  or  5,  is  a  matter  of  educated  guess- 
work at  best.  But  building  dikes  is  a  slow  busi- 
ness. Even  with  10  years  to  go,  there  is  not  a 
single  day  to  be  lost. 

The  "dike"  of  which  I  speak,  of  course,  is  the 
United  Nations,  together  with  all  the  interna- 
tional agencies  and  programs  that  promote  its 
purposes.  Next  year  the  U.N.'s  25th  anniversary 
will  be  duly  celebrated  with  speeches  and  com- 
memorative ceremonies.  But  the  observances 
that  really  coimt  will  be  renewed  efforts  to  make 
the  U.N.  a  more  effective  instrument  of  peace 
and  progress  among  nations  and  a  more  reliable 
dike  against  chaos  and  disorder. 

Those  efforts,  as  U  Thant  correctly  pointed 
out,  must  be  made  by  the  member  states.  The 
U.N.,  after  all,  has  virtually  no  power  of  its  own. 
Its  success  rests  entirely  on  the  readiness  of  its 
members  to  put  their  power  at  its  service  and  to 
subordinate  their  parochial  concerns  to  the 
conunon  cause  of  a  more  peaceful  and  secure 
world. 

No  country  has  a  more  vitally  important  con- 
tribution to  make  to  this  process  than  the 
United  States.  All  five  of  the  world  problems  I 
mentioned  have  three  things  in  common  that  we 


Americans  should  remember:  First,  if  not 
solved  they  tlireaten  our  own  nation;  second, 
we  cannot  solve  them  alone ;  third,  they  cannot 
be  solved  without  us.  As  a  nation  uniquely  great 
in  its  wealth  and  power  and  deeply  committed 
to  the  ideals  of  peace  and  progress,  our  country 
simply  must  continue  to  bear  its  share  of  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  U.N.'s  future  development 
as  an  instrmnent  of  world  order.  Other  members 
must  also  do  their  part,  but  they  will  under- 
standably look  for  leadership  to  the  American 
Government  and  people. 

As  for  the  American  Government,  I  can  as- 
sure you  that  its  support  for  the  United  Nations 
remains  firm.  Last  December,  even  before  his 
inauguration,  Mr.  Nixon  with  Mr.  Sogers  paid 
a  call  on  Secretary  General  Thant  at  the  U.N. 
Headquarters.  Their  purpose  was  to  give  evi- 
dence, as  Mr.  Nixon  put  it  at  the  time,  of  "our 
continuing  support  of  the  United  Nations  and 
our  intention  in  these  years  ahead  to  do  every- 
thing that  we  can  to  strengthen  this  organiza- 
tion as  it  works  in  the  cause  of  peace  throughout 
the  world." 

The  President's  appearance  to  address  the 
General  Assembly  on  September  18  was  a  fur- 
ther reaffirmation  of  that  American  intention.' 
In  his  address  the  President  spoke  frankly  of 
doubts  that  have  arisen  concerning  the  future 
world  role  of  the  United  States.  "As  for  the 
United  States,"  he  said  in  reply  to  those  doubts, 
"I  can  state  here  today  without  qualification: 
We  have  not  turned  away  from  the  world." 

And  the  President  concluded  this  part  of  his 
address  with  these  words : 

It  would  be  dishonest,  particularly  before  this  sophis- 
ticated audience,  to  pretend  that  the  United  States 
has  no  national  interests  of  its  own  or  no  special  con- 
cern for  its  own  interests. 

However,  our  most  fundamental  national  interest  is 
in  maintaining  that  structure  of  international  stability 
on  which  peace  depends  and  which  makes  orderly 
progress  possible. 

During  its  first  9  months,  the  Nixon  adminis- 
tration has  adopted  concrete  policies  aimed  at 
precisely  that  national  interest  in  the  "structure 
of  international  stability."  It  has  deliberately 
and  firmly  moved,  insofar  as  lies  in  its  power  to 
move,  from  an  era  of  confrontation  to  an  era 
of  negotiation.  It  seeks  urgently  to  engage  the 
Soviet  Union  in  negotiations  for  limitation  of 


'  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  General 
Assembly,  see  Bui-letin  of  Oct  6,  1969,  p.  297. 


450 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


strategic  weapons  and  in  negotiations  to  help 
settle  the  conflict  in  the  Middle  East.  It  pro- 
poses a  greater  emphasis  on  the  United  Nations 
Developnaent  Program  and  other  international 
agencies  as  channels  for  American  assistance 
during  the  Second  Development  Decade.  It  vig- 
orously and  concretely  supports  United  Na- 
tions efforts  to  help  nations  grow  more  food  and 
reduce  their  rates  of  population  growth,  to  pro- 
tect the  world's  threatened  environment,  and 
to  share  the  benefits  of  space  exploration. 

These  are  proofs  that  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment remains  steadfast  in  its  support  of  the 
United  Nations.  However,  much  more  needs  to 
be  done  by  our  Government  and  other  govern- 
ments before  the  United  Nations  can  even  come 
close  to  carrying  out  the  missions  we  have  as- 
signed to  it.  Of  course  the  government  of  our 
free  society  cannot  exceed  what  the  people  are 
willing  to  accept.  Your  support  for  the  United 
Nations,  and  for  our  country's  more  effective 
participation  in  it,  is  a  vital  necessity  if  it  is  to 
succeed  and  if  we  and  our  children  are  ever  to 
live  in  a  safer  world. 

In  saying  this  I  have  in  mind  particularly 
our  children.  To  one  like  myself,  who  has  been 
associated  with  the  United  Nations  in  one  way 
or  another  since  the  days  when  the  charter  was 
being  written,  it  is  still  hard  to  realize  that  tliis 
institution,  possibly  the  greatest  political  in- 
novation of  the  20th  century,  is  no  longer  new. 
It  is  older  than  today's  college  generation ;  older 
than  a  great  proportion  of  our  men  in  uniform ; 
older  than  nuclear  weapons,  network  television. 
Communist  China,  the  space  age,  and  all  of 
those  looming  crises  I  was  discussing  a  moment 
ago.  Unless  the  United  Nations  is  capable  of 
continuous  self-renewal — unless  it  can  face  new 
problems,  accept  new  ideas,  new  blood,  new 
young  people — it  will  become  obsolete  and  ir- 
relevant just  at  the  time  when  humanity  needs 
it  most. 

It  is  encouraging,  therefore,  to  see  that  in  the 
preparations  for  next  year's  celebration  of  the 
U.N.'s  25th  anniversary,  there  has  developed  a 
strong  accent  on  youth.  Plans  are  being  dis- 
cussed now  for  a  world  youth  congress  to  be 
held  at  the  United  Nations  next  year,  composed 
of  representatives  of  the  young  people  of  each 
member  state.  There  are  proposals  to  increase 
the  recruitment  of  yoimg  people  as  interna- 
tional civil  servants  in  the  United  Nations  and 
in  an  international  volmiteer  service  corps.  And 


our  Government  has  also  supported  the  inclu- 
sion of  young  people  in  the  delegations  of  mem- 
ber states  to  next  year's  General  Assembly  itself. 

Long  after  the  last  shot  in  Viet-Nam  has  been 
fired,  the  great  problems  of  the  family  of  man 
will  continue  to  demand  the  devoted  efforts  of 
leaders  and  citizens,  old  and  young,  in  every 
nation.  If,  as  we  review  the  record  of  the  United 
Nations,  we  find  that  the  efforts  made  in  that 
organization  are  not  good  enough,  let  us  not 
forget  that  the  responsibility  for  that  state  of 
affairs  lies  with  us,  the  members.  As  Adlai  Ste- 
venson once  said,  it  is  a  bad  idea  to  mock  the 
U.N.'s  weakness,  for  when  we  do  we  are  mocking 
ourselves. 

Let  us  then  dedicate  ourselves,  as  he  did  him- 
self in  his  last  years,  to  making  the  U.N.  strong 
enough  to  carry  out  our  purjjoses,  strong  enough 
to  preserve  our  civilization  from  our  own  exces- 
ses, strong  enough  to  create  a  world  fit  for  our 
children  and  our  children's  cliildren. 


Mr.  Moynihan  To  Represent  U.S. 
on  NATO  Environmental  Committee 

The  "Wliite  House  amiounced  on  November  6 
(Wliite  House  press  release)  that  the  President 
has  designated  Daniel  P.  Sloynihan  to  represent 
the  United  States  at  the  first  meeting  of  the 
NATO  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern 
Society,  expected  to  be  held  in  Brussels  starting 
December  8. 

Establisliment  of  the  Committee  on  the  Chal- 
lenges of  Modern  Society  by  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  was  announced  in  Brussels  November  6. 
The  Council's  decision  implemented  a  proposal 
made  by  President  Nixon  to  the  foreign  minis- 
ters of  the  alliance  last  April. ^  Speakuag  at  the 
ministerial  session  in  Wasliington,  he  urged 
creation  of  such  a  committee  in  NATO  to  mar- 
shal the  experience  and  resources  of  Western 
nations  to  deal  with  common  environmental 
problems. 

Mr.  Moynihan  has  served  as  coordinator  of 
the  United  States  contribution  to  the  detailed 
study  in  NATO  which  led  to  the  establishment 
of  the  Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Alodern 
Society. 


'■  Bulletin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  351. 


November  24,   1969 


451 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


The  International  Labor  Organization:     50  Years  of  Service 


Statement  by  George  P.  Shultz 
Secretary  of  Labor  ^ 


A  prerequisite  of  an  organization's  effective- 
ness is  relevancy  to  the  times.  The  International 
Labor  Organization  meets  and  has  met  this  cri- 
terion. It  has  recognized  the  dimensions  of 
social  problems,  the  opportunities  for  effective 
work  on  them,  and  the  factor  of  change  as  es- 
sential to  human  existence.  Its  programs  and 
policies  have  been  governed  accordingly. 

Underlying  these  policies  and  programs  is  an 
awareness  of  the  breakthroughs  in  modern 
tecluiology  wliich  give  man  undreamed-of 
powers  for  both  preserving  life  and  sowing 
destruction. 

And  underlying  the  success  of  the  ILO — the 
Organization  whose  50th  year  of  service  we  are 
honoring  here  today — is  its  pervasive  awareness 
of  the  basic  principle  that  we  now  live  in  a 
mutually  dependent  world  community. 

Recognition  of  the  wisdom  of  these  principles 
in  the  operation  of  the  International  Labor  Or- 
ganization was  provided  by  the  awarding  of  the 
1969  Nobel  Peace  Prize  to  this  unique  Organiza- 
tion which,  in  the  words  of  the  Nobel  awards 
body,  strives  "to  improve  working  condi- 
tions .  .  .  and  thereby  contribute  to  the  safe- 
guarding of  world  peace." 

In  its  early  years  the  ILO's  primary  instru- 
ment for  action  was  standard  setting.  Its  inter- 
national labor  standards  take  the  form  of  con- 
ventions, treaties  open  to  ratification  by  gov- 
ernments, and  recommendations  for  guidance  of 
national  legislatures ;  and  they  represent  a  con- 
sensus among  tripartite  elements  of  the  Organi- 
zation's membership  on  desirable  goals  for 
national  legislation  and  practice. 

During  the  Second  World  War  a  new  genera- 
tion of  statesmen,  meeting  in  the  city  of 
Pliiladelphia  in  1944,  gave  the  ILO,  and  work- 


'  Made  in  plenary  session  of  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly on  Oct.  29   (U.S./XJ.N.  press  release  134). 


ing  people  the  world  over,  a  new  lease  on  life. 
At  Philadelphia  the  ILO  articulated  once  again 
the  principle  of  social  and  economic  interde- 
pendence of  states  in  the  declaration  that  "pov- 
erty anywhere  constitutes  a  danger  to  prosperity 
everywhere." 

It  was  this  declaration  that  heralded  two 
decades  of  activity  during  wliich  the  Organiza- 
tion played  a  leading  role  in  formulating  the 
concept  and  executing  the  policy  of  teclmical 
assistance  to  the  newly  emerging  countries  of 
Asia  and  Africa. 

As  a  large  number  of  former  colonies 
achieved  independence  and  very  quickly  there- 
after full  membership  in  the  ILO,  the  Organiza- 
tion rapidly  became  a  nearly  universal  body. 
The  result  was  a  significant  shift  in  the  ILO's 
membership.  Whereas  before  the  war  it  con- 
sisted in  large  part  of  the  highly  industrialized 
countries  of  Europe  and  North  America,  today 
more  than  half  of  its  membere  are  developing 
countries.  As  a  result,  the  ILO's  emphasis  over 
the  past  20  years  has  been  placed  less  on  pro- 
tecting workers  from  certain  adverse  conse- 
quences of  industrialization — although  this  is 
still  a  major  concern — and  more  on  helping  to 
bring  about  economic  and  social  develo])ment 
through  ever-expanding  programs  of  technical 
assistance. 

The  ILO  seeks  to  provide  training  not  only 
for  technical  skills  but  also  for  responsible 
leadership  in  the  developing  countries.  The 
trade  union  freedom  which  the  ILO  continually 
advocates  will  have  little  meaning,  and  will  be 
short-lived,  if  not  accompanied  by  the  trade 
union  leadersliip  which  the  Organization  ac- 
tively encourages.  Managers  and  employers,  too, 
must  provide  effective  direction  and  competent 
leadership,  as  emphasized  by  the  ILO's  expand- 
ing programs  in  this  area. 


452 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Organization  is  firmly  committed  to  the 
achievement  of  human  rights  for  all.  In  addi- 
tion to  its  safeguarding  of  trade  union  rights 
and  its  attack  upon  forced  labor,  it  has  con- 
^  demned  all  forms  of  discrimination  in  employ- 
'  ment.  And  with  the  same  forthrightuess  with 
which  it  upholds  the  principle  of  freedom  of 
association  it  has  opposed  the  practice  of 
ajyai'theid. 

Xow,  m  this  50th  anniversary  year,  the  ILO's 
Director  General  has  launched  a  "World  Em- 
ployment Program,  argumg  to  his  121  constit- 
uent member  states,  both  developed  and  de- 
veloping alike,  that  the  creation  of  jobs  for 
people  everywhere  in  the  world  be  given  a  top 
priority.  His  argument  that  job  security  is  as 
vital  as,  and  is  vital  to,  political  security  and 
that  unemployment  in  far-flmig  developing 
countries  can  be  a  real  danger  for  affluent  na- 
tions once  again  falls  into  the  pattern  of  the  ILO 
philosophy  that  human  betterment  is  indi- 
visible. 

Thus  is  the  ILO  relevant  to  the  times. 

Eelevancy  was  built  into  the  Organization's 
conception  and  structure  with  the  adoption  of 
the  tripartite  composition  of  governments,  em- 
ployers, and  workers.  Radical  alterations  in  the 
world's  social  and  economic  structure,  and  the 
ILO's  ability  to  minister  to  the  needs  of  its 
members  within  the  context  of  change,  attest  to 
the  Organization's  viability. 

For  half  a  century  the  ILO  has  effectively 
worked  to  adjust  to  these  changes  as  well  as  to 
achieve  a  deejDer  miderstanding  of  the  role  eacli 
of  its  three  component  groups  must  play  in  na- 
tional and  international  development.  Accord- 
ingly, a  recognition  has  evolved  that  more  must 
be  done  to  remove  or  lessen  tensions  where  the,v 
exist  if  the  world  is  ever  to  attain  the  goal  of 
balanced  economic  and  social  development. 

In  noting  the  ILO's  relevance  to  its  times,  one 
must  acknowledge  that  this  alone  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  make  the  Organization  the  important 
institution  it  has  become.  Leadership  is  another 
factor.  It  is  fortunate  that  the  ILO  has  always 
had  able  and  distinguished  men  to  guide  it 
through  the  many  difficult  years,  through  wars 
and  depressions  as  well  as  times  of  prosperity. 

Albert  Thomas,  the  first  Director  General, 
was  able  to  build  from  the  wreckage  of  World 
War  I  an  organization  that  has  improved  the 
lot  of  mankind. 

Today  the  U.S.  Government  salutes  the  work 
that  lias  been  done  over  the  past  21  years  by 
another  great  Director  General,  David  A. 
Morse — an  American  who  is  also  a  citizen  of 


the  world,  and  one  of  whom  my  country  is  justly 
proud.  Mr.  Morse  has  presided  over  the  Office 
through  years  of  unparalleled  change  in  which 
our  miderstanding  of  the  world  and  human  re- 
lationsliips  has  deepened  and  even  the  cosmos 
itself  has  begun  to  reveal  its  secrets.  Thi'ough 
all  this  the  Organization  has  been  able  to  adjust, 
to  maintam  its  relevancy. 

But  our  agenda  for  the  future  is  full.  We  can 
take  no  comfort  in  the  fact  that  there  are  still 
millions  verging  on  starvation,  deprived  of  ele- 
mentary medical  care,  doomed  to  illiteracy,  who 
suffer  discrimination  and  who  do  not  share  in 
the  most  basic  liberties  and  human  dignities. 

There  is  much  work  to  be  done  in  the  fields 
of  employment  policy,  social  security,  industrial 
safety,  the  fight  against  discrimination,  solv- 
ing the  problems  of  youth  and  older  workers, 
and  vocational  training  and  rehabilitation. 

There  are  danger  signs  ahead,  and  the  ILO 
has  joined  with  other  groups  in  pointing  out  the 
inlierent  tlireat  posed  by  overpopulation.  Until 
this  problem  is  contained,  no  increase  in  gi-oss 
national  product  alone  will  be  able  to  generate 
the  right  social  climate  for  effective  hiunan  de- 
velopment. Production  increases  alone  will  not 
be  able  to  neutralize  the  effects  of  overpopula- 
tion in  the  developing  world,  which  could  de- 
stroy the  peace  and  security  of  the  more  affluent 
nations. 

For  this  reason  we  also  endorse  the  inclusion 
of  social  objectives  in  the  Second  Development 
Decade. 

I  believe  the  ILO  can  make  no  greater  con- 
tribution to  the  United  Nations  Second  Devel- 
opment Decade  than  its  World  Employment 
Program ;  for  economic  growth  and  national  de- 
velopment cannot  be  achieved  without  adequate 
and  systematic  development  and  utilization  of 
human  resources.  The  recent  Pearson  Connnis- 
sion  report  to  the  World  Bank,  as  well  as  the 
address  to  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  World 
Bank  by  its  Director  General,  Mr.  Robert  S. 
McNamara,  gives  prominence  to  the  develop- 
ment of  human  resources  as  a  key  to  rapid 
economic  development. 

]\Iadam  President,  on  behalf  of  my  Govern- 
ment I  extend  warm  congratulations  to  the 
International  Labor  Organization  on  the 
occasion  of  its  50th  anniversary  of  service  to 
mankind. 

In  the  words  of  President  Nixon:  ".  .  .  we 
rededicate  ourselves  to  ILO  as  an  instrument 
toward  the  realization  of  lasting  human  peace 
through  the  attainment  of  economic  and  social 
justice  for  peoples  everywhere." 


November  24,    1969 


453 


The  United  Nations  Budget  for  1970 


Statement  hy  Congressman  Dante  B.  Fascell 
U.S.  Re'presentative  to  the  General  Assembly  ^ 


Before  commenting  on  the  budget  estimates 
for  1970  and  several  other  important  issues 
■whicli  will  be  before  our  committee,  I  should 
like  to  say  a  few  words  about  a  somewhat  larger, 
but  also  a  relevant,  issue. 

Since  I  have  been  attending  this  session,  I 
have  listened  carefully  to  statements  presented 
both  m  this  committee  and  in  tlie  plenary  ses- 
sion, and  I  have  been  struck  by  a  theme  which 
appeared  to  recur  in  many  of  them — a  theme 
reflecting  certain  uneasiness,  even  certain  pro- 
fomid  concern,  about  the  direction  in  which  this 
organization  is  moving  and  its  capacity  for 
effective  action. 

I  would  like  to  stress,  Mr.  Chairman,  that 
this  theme,  tliis  concern,  was  not  particular  to 
any  one  delegation  nor  to  the  delegates  from  any 
one  geographical  area.  It  was  expressed  by 
representatives  of  small  states  and  of  large  ones, 
of  those  which  are  advancing  along  the  ladder 
of  development  as  well  as  by  more  developed 
countries. 

Viewing  its  present,  and  looking  back  at  the 
development  of  this  organization  during  the 
past  24  years,  I  find  this  concern  to  be  fully 
warranted.  For  nearly  two  and  a  half  decades, 
the  United  Nations  and  its  affiliated  organs  and 
agencies  have  gi'own  considerably  m  response 
to  the  wishes  of  their  member  states  and  the 
needs  of  the  moment.  This  growth  has  been 
necessary  and  beneficial  to  the  world  com- 
munity, but  we  would  be  less  than  frank  with 
each  other  if  we  were  to  claim  that  it  has  pro- 
ceeded at  all  times  along  clearly  defined,  ra- 
tional, and  systematic  lines.  As  a  result,  many 
thoughtful  people,  looldng  at  the  complex  and 
proliferating  machinery  of  the  United  Nations 
system,  conscious  of  its  financial  and  other  prob- 
lems, have  wondered  aloud  about  this  organiza- 


'  Made  in  Committee  V  (Administrative  and  Budget- 
ary) on  Oct.  21  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  128). 


tion's  ability  to  respond  effectively  during  the 
next  10  or  25  years  to  both  the  legitimate  desires 
of  its  membership  and  the  immensely  challeng- 
ing tasks  which  lie  ahead  of  us. 

All  of  us  are  agreed,  I  am  certain,  that  the 
United  Nations  is  a  vitally  important  organiza- 
tion which  should,  and  indeed  must,  continue  to 
respond  to  the  needs  of  its  members.  At  the  same 
time,  is  it  not  for  us  who  have  some  respon- 
sibility for  the  future  of  mankind  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  assure  that  our  cumulative 
efforts  may  actively  promote  the  cause  of  peace 
and  development  for  all  people  ? 

These  are,  admittedly,  large  issues,  and  some 
may  say  that  they  do  not  belong  in  the  Fifth 
Committee.  I  feel  otherwise.  I  believe  that  this 
committee  has  a  legitimate  and  vital  concern 
for  the  effectiveness  of  this  organization,  its 
management,  and  wise  use  of  the  resources  en- 
trusted to  it  by  the  world  community. 

For  example,  we  ought  to  devote  attention 
and  comprehensive  consideration  to  the  rela- 
tionships—financial, budgetary,  administrative, 
and  other — between  the  United  Nations,  its 
volimtary  programs  and  the  entire  family  of 
U.N.  specialized  agencies. 

Several  items  on  the  agenda  of  the  Fifth 
Committee  relate  to  this  subject.  Therefore,  this 
committee  is  competent  to  act  in  this  field  with 
a  view  to  projDOsing  changes  and  improvements 
which  will  assure  a  more  systematic,  coordi- 
nated, and  efficient  utilization  of  scarce  re- 
sources— manpower  as  well  as  financial.  The 
methods  and  procedures  which  we  have  fol- 
lowed during  the  past  24  years  are  not  neces- 
sarily suitable  to  the  tasks  which  will  confront 
the  United  Nations  family  of  organizations  dur- 
ing the  next  quarter  of  a  century.  It  is  incum- 
bent upon  us,  therefore,  as  necessary,  to  devise 
new,  effective  methods  of  coping  with  future 
challenges. 

Accordingly,  I  would  suggest  that  in  ap- 


454 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


proaching  the  agenda  items  before  us,  and  in 
our  corridor  conversations,  we  begin  to  focus  on 
ways  and  means  to  make  this  organization  as 
effective  an  instrument  as  possible.  And  in 
doing  so,  I  would  hope  that  we  could  keep  cer- 
tain basic  concepts  in  mind.  They  are : 

First,  that  we  recognize  that  tlie  task  before 
us  is  a  collective  effort  in  which  we  are  all  vitally 
interested  and  that,  while  there  are  and  will 
always  be  differences  of  opinion  on  various 
items,  there  is  no  rational  basis  for  confronta- 
tion. This  is  an  organization  to  which  we  have 
all  contributed  and  which  is  of  major  im- 
portance to  all  of  us.  Accordingly,  we  must 
listen  to  each  other  and  realize  that  none  of  us 
is  the  exclusive  repository  of  wisdom. 

Secondly,  we  should  recognize  that,  in  order 
to  carry  out  the  pixrposes  and  principles  of  the 
charter  and  to  be  a  vital  force  in  international 
life,  the  United  Nations  must  develop  its  capac- 
ity to  meet  the  needs  of  its  members.  As  we 
take  on  new  activities  we  must  constantly  reas- 
sess our  priorities  to  see  whether  they  are  stUl 
valid.  None  of  us,  I  am  certain,  is  willing  to 
abandon  his  early  dreams  and  hopes  for  the 
United  Nations,  and  none  of  us  wants  to  place 
what  has  sometimes  been  called  a  "ceiling"  on 
its  essential  activities.  But  at  the  same  time,  all 
of  us  should  agree  that  the  organization's 
growth  should  follow  a  rational  pattern  related 
to  the  increasingly  challenging  and  complex 
tasks  which  will  confront  our  world  during  the 
next  25  years. 

Budget  Estimates  for  1970 

Because  we  feel  as  we  do  about  this  matter, 
Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  pleased  that  the  Secretary 
General  has  taken  the  lead  in  dealing  with  the 
problems  which  have  troubled  us  and  that  in 
this  he  has  the  support  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Administrative  and  Budgetary  Ques- 
tions. We  believe  that  the  Secretary  General  has 
been  wise  to  consider  that  the  present  is  a  period 
in  which  to  assess  the  existing  resources,  capac- 
ity, and  methods  of  work  of  the  United  Na- 
tions— that  it  is  a  period  of  consolidation.  We 
consider  that  his  budget  estimates  for  1970  -  on 
the  whole  reflect  this  view  and  that  he  should 
be  commended  for  them.  We  consider  them  to  be 
a  considerable  improvement,  particularly  at  this 
stage  in  the  life  of  the  organization,  over  the 
estimates   which  were  presented   last  year.   I 

'  U.N.  doc.  A/7606. 


should  add,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we  consider 
that  the  Advisory  Conunittee  has  done  its  usual 
excellent  job  in  making  its  recommendations 
with  respect  to  the  estimates. 

It  is,  of  course,  true,  as  many  representatives 
have  pointed  out,  that  we  have  no  clear  picture 
as  yet  as  to  what  the  final  budget  level  will  be, 
and  so  it  is  premature  to  take  a  position  with 
respect  to  it.  We,  like  other  delegations,  will 
carefully  scrutinize  the  additional  estimates 
which  will  come  before  us. 

Before  going  further,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would 
like  to  emphasize  one  point  to  which  sufficient 
attention  is  seldom  given.  The  United  States 
does  not  mean  to  speak  as  if  the  major  admin- 
istrative and  budgetary  problems  about  which 
we  are  concerned  can  be  solved  by  the  Secretary 
General  alone.  We  recognize  that  these  problems 
have  been  created,  to  a  very  large  extent,  by  the 
demands  of  member  governments  themselves; 
that  we  all  share  the  responsibility  for  the  ex- 
istence of  these  problems.  We  must  realize  that 
greater  discipline  and  restraint  on  our  part  is 
required  if  the  development  of  this  organiza- 
tion in  the  administrative  and  budgetary  area 
is  to  be  orderly  and  rational. 

Provisional  Posts 

A  number  of  delegations  have  questioned  the 
credit  sought  by  the  Secretary  General  to  pro- 
vide for  234  provisional  posts  in  1970.  It  can,  of 
course,  be  questioned  whether  the  request  of  the 
Secretary  General  for  this  credit  is  wise,  in  view 
of  the  manpower  survey  being  undertaken  and 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  a  number  of  existing 
posts  have  not  yet  been  filled.  Further,  one  can 
question  the  provisional-post  approach — which 
was  tried  and  discarded  some  years  ago — and 
we  do  not  favor  it  as  a  normal  method  of  budg- 
eting. However,  we  recognize  that  the  Advi- 
sory Committee  has  scmtinized  this  credit  very 
carefully  and  has  decided  to  accept  it  for  1970, 
with  some  reduction  and  some  question  as  to  the 
total,  in  the  light  of  the  limitations  the  Secre- 
tary General  has  imposed  upon  himself  with 
respect  to  its  use.  Further,  we  can  understand 
why  the  Secretary  General  has  chosen  to  call 
for  posts  on  a  provisional  basis  during  the 
period  in  which  the  manpower  survey  is  under- 
way. While  sharing  the  misgivings  of  the  Ad- 
visory Committee  on  the  numbers  involved,  we 
believe  that  this  limited  approach  can  be  ac- 
cepted as  an  exceptional  measure  to  deal  with 
an  unusual  situation. 


November  24,   1969 


455 


There  is  another  area  to  which  many  delega- 
tions have  referred  as  one  in  which  savings  can 
be  made ;  that  is,  conference  and  documentation 
costs.  We  strongly  share  this  view.  The  prob- 
lems which  exist  in  this  area  arise  almost  en- 
tirely from  the  demands  of  member  states,  and 
there  is  only  a  minimal  amount  which  the  Secre- 
tary General  can  do  on  his  own  to  solve  them. 
We  are  convinced  that  the  best  way  in  which 
to  deal  with  this  matter  is  for  this  committee 
to  approve  the  recommendations  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Seven,  which  are  before  us.-^ 

The  Secretary  General  is  making  an  effort  to 
deal  with  that  part  of  the  problem  which  is  his 
responsibility.  Recognizing  the  interest  of  this 
committee  in  the  matter,  he  designated  the  Of- 
fice of  Conference  Services  as  the  first  area  to  be 
the  subject  of  the  survey  being  imdertaken  by 
the  new  Administrative  Management  Service. 
The  survey  is  now  underway  and  is  expected  to 
be  completed  by  the  end  of  the  year.  In  this  con- 
nection, we  would  like  to  congratulate  the  Sec- 
retary General  for  the  manner  in  which  he  has 
responded  to  this  committee's  request  for  a 
study  of  the  utilization  and  deployment  of  the 
entire  Secretariat. 

Planning  Estimates,   1971 

One  of  the  most  important  items  which  will 
come  before  us  is  the  planning  estimates  for 
1971.  We  can  say  little  on  this  subject  at  the 
present  time,  since  the  Secretary  General's  pro- 
posals are  not  yet  before  us.  We  assume  that,  in 
preparing  the  1971  planning  estimates,  the 
Secretary  General  will  be  guided  by  the  same 
jDhilosophy  which  he  has  sought  to  reflect  in  the 
1970  estimates ;  namely,  that  no  significant  in- 
crease in  existing  staff  resources  will  be  sought 
imtil  the  results  of  the  manpower  survey  become 
reasonably  clear. 

Unforeseen   Expenses 

Let  me  now  turn  to  another  matter,  the  report 
of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  procedures  for 
dealing  with  unforeseen  expenses  and  their  fi- 
nancing.^ This  report  was  held  over  from  last 
year  because  of  an  understandable  desire  on  the 
part  of  many  delegations  for  additional  in- 
formation and  clarification.  We  believe  that 
this  committee  should  at  this  session  adopt  the 
Advisory  Conunittee's  recommendations.  As  we 


•  U.N.  doc.  A/7359. 
'  U.N.  doc.  A/7336. 


have  pointed  out  on  an  earlier  occasion,  the  size 
of  the  supplemental  appropriations  for  1969 — 
of  which  only  a  part  qualified  under  the  present 
resolution  on  miforeseen  and  extraordinary  ex- 
penses— makes  clear  that  additional  discipline 
is  needed  in  incurring  obligations  during  a  fi-  ■ 
nancial  year  and  approving  proposed  expendi-  f 
tures  which  were  not  foreseen  at  the  time  an- 
nual appropriations  for  that  year  were  made. 

Subsidiary  Administrative  Bodies 

We  share  the  concern  expressed  by  the  Secre- 
tary General,  by  the  chairman  of  the  Advisory 
Committee,  and  by  a  number  of  delegations  to 
the  effect  that  the  activities  of  subsidiary  bodies, 
established  to  help  brmg  about  efficiency  and 
economy,  may  not  be  properly  interrelated. 
Perhaps  the  problem  results  from  the  fact  that 
this  committee  was  not  sufficiently  careful  when 
it  established  tlie  terms  of  reference  of  these 
bodies.  We  consider  it  essential  that  the  activi- 
ties of  the  various  subsidiary  organs  wliich 
are  now  dealmg  with  administrative,  budget- 
ary, and  management  problems  be  carefully 
aligned  and  that  their  responsibilities  and  rela- 
tionships be  clearly  delineated.  To  accomplish 
this,  we  believe  that  the  Advisory  Committee 
should  examine  this  problem  in  depth  during 
the  coming  year,  in  consultation  with  the  other 
bodies  involved,  and  should  present  this  com- 
mittee with  specific  recommendations  next  year 
as  to  how  we  should  deal  with  it. 

Strengtiiening  the  Advisory  Committee 

For  many  years  now,  we  have  been  calling 
upon  the  Advisory  Committee  to  study  more 
and  more  problems,  and  obviously  we  will  have 
to  rely  increasingly  on  this  committee  as  United 
Nations  operations  expand  and  grow  more 
complex.  It  seems  to  us  that  the  time  has  come 
to  recognize  that  we  have  overloaded  the  Ad- 
visory Committee  in  relation  to  its  existing  pro- 
gram and  method  of  work.  We  believe  that  it  is, 
in  part,  because  the  Advisory  Committee  is  so 
overloaded  that  we  have  tended  in  recent  years 
to  create  new  bodies  to  perform  tasks  in  the  ad- 
ministrative, budgetary,  and  management  field. 
It  occurs  to  us  that  what  is  needed  for  the  fu- 
ture is  to  ensure  that  members  elected  to  the 
Advisory  Committee  are  able  to  devote  more 
time,  perhaps  substantially  full  time,  to  this  im- 
portant committee.  This  will,  in  turn,  enable  it 
to  give  greater  attention  to  its  program  of  work, 
including  providing  broader  services  to  the  com- 


456 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


mittee,  by  being  in  session  during  a  substantial 
part  of  tlie  year.  It  also  occurs  to  us  that  it  may 
very  well  be  necessaiy  for  the  future  to  make 
arrangements  to  enable  the  chainnan  of  the 
Advisory  Committee  to  serve  on  a  full-time, 
year-round  basis.  We  recommend  that  the  Ad- 
\  isory  Committee  be  asked  to  look  into  this  mat- 
ter seriously  during  the  coming  year  and  report 
its  conclusions  to  us  at  the  next  session  of  the 
Assembly. 

Scale  of  Assessments 

In  response  to  the  General  Assembly's  request 
of  last  year,  the  Committee  on  Contributions 
has  made  a  report  to  us  of  the  results  of  its  re- 
view of  the  criteria  and  terms  of  reference  used 
in  establishing  the  scale  of  assessments.  We  are 
impressed  with  the  general  conclusions  of  the 
committee,  contained  in  paragraphs  47  through 
50  of  its  report.^  In  particular,  we  agree  that 
the  various  guidelines  laid  down  for  the  com- 
mittee by  the  General  Assembly  have  withstood 
the  test  of  time  and  permit  the  establishment  of 
a  balanced  and  equitable  scale  based  primarily 
on  the  principle  of  capacity  to  pay.  Accord- 
ingly, we  believe  that  no  new  guidelines  are  re- 
quired for  the  Committee  on  Contributions  in 
connection  with  its  establislmient  of  a  new  scale 
of  assessments  next  year. 

Financial  Solvency 

I  Speaking  earlier  before  this  committee,  the 
Secretary  General  reported  to  us  on  the  finan- 
cial position  of  the  organization.  If  we  believe 
that  there  is  a  vital  necessity  for  the  survival 
and  continued  development  of  this  organization 
to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the  charter,  we  can- 
not permit  the  existing  financial  situation  to 
continue.  All  our  other  efforts  will  be  in  vain 
unless  we  can  solve  the  financial  problem.  Our 
own  views  concerning  the  responsibility  for  this 
problem  are  well  known  and  need  not  be  re- 
peated here.  We  believe  that,  as  part  of  the 
overall  effort  to  put  this  organization  on  a 
sound  basis  by  its  25th  anniversary,  a  most  seri- 
ous effort  must  be  made  during  the  coming  year 
to  find  a  solution.  We  suggest  that  this  commit- 
tee request  the  Secretary  General  to'  devote  his 
own  efforts  and  those  of  appropriate  senior  staff 
members  during  the  coming  year  to  an  attempt 
to  negotiate  the  modus  vivendi  of  which  he 
spoke  at  our  first  meeting. 

'  U.N.  doc.  A/7611. 


Mr.  Chairman,  in  concluding  this,  my  first 
intervention  in  the  deliberations  of  this  com- 
mittee, I  want  to  return  briefly  to  my  earlier  re- 
marks concerning  the  need  for  a  meaningful 
reappraisal  of  the  operations  of  this  organiza- 
tion and  its  affiliated  agencies  in  order  to  find 
out  where  we  are,  where  we  wish  to  go,  and  how 
we  hope  to  get  there.  It  is  an  obvious  fact,  not 
requiring  any  lengthy  elaboration,  that  a  sound 
financial  basis  and  effective  management  are 
essential  if  tliis  organization  is  to  enjoy  signifi- 
cant growth  and  live  up  to  the  expectations 
which  millions  of  peoples  throughout  the  world 
have  placed  in  it. 

The  fiuiancial  resources  required  to  sustain  the 
organization's  gi-owth  will  not  be  forthcoming 
if  tlie  member  states  lose  faith  in  the  organiza- 
tion's ability  to  use  them  wisely  and  effectively. 
Already,  a  number  of  governments  have  ques- 
tioned tlie  wisdom  of  providing  the  United  Na- 
tions with  significantly  increased  support  unless 
and  imtil  our  organizational  structures,  methods 
of  work,  and  guidelines  for  future  development 
are  changed  so  as  to  alleviate  the  concern  which 
has  been  expressed  in  this  forum.  In  my  view, 
the  United  Nations  must  respond  to  this  situa- 
tion. Then  and  only  then  will  most  of  ovir  mem- 
bers be  willing  to  give  proper  attention  to  con- 
sidering tlie  inputs  of  resources  which  may  be 
required  to  make  the  engine  go. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have  suggested 
that  the  United  Nations  use  the  next  year 
wisely.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have  urged 
that  this  committee  take  the  necessary  action  to 
set  in  motion  the  several  suggestions  set  forth 
above.  If  we  can  find  solutions  to  these  problems 
alone,  it  will,  I  believe,  set  the  pace  for  the  rest 
of  the  organization.  If  we  catcli  the  beat  here, 
this  very  rhytlim  may  well  pulsate  throughout 
the  entire  organization  in  time  to  give  us  all  the 
basis  for  celebrating  a  truly  glorious  25th 
anniversary. 


Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Wieczorowski 
as  U.S.  Executive  Director  of  IBRD 

The  Senate  on  October  30  confirmed  the 
nomination  of  Eobert  E.  Wieczorowski  to  be 
U.S.  Executive  Director  of  the  International 
Bank  for  Keconstruction  and  Development  for 
a  term  of  2  years.  (For  biographic  data,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  September  30.) 


November  24,   1969 


457 


United  States  Urges  Negotiation 
and  Dialogue  in  Southern  Africa 

Statement  by  Christopher  H.  Phillips  ^ 

The  general  debate  on  Namibia,  Southern 
Rhodesia,  and  the  territories  under  Portuguese 
administration  has  held  the  attention  of  this 
committee  for  the  past  week.  My  delegation  has 
listened  with  interest  to  the  views  of  the  numer- 
ous delegations  that  have  taken  part.  We  have 
been  struck  by  the  virtually  unanimous  agree- 
ment in  certain  conclusions  which  ran  like  a 
thread  throughout  the  discussion.  If  one  were  to 
summarize  this  agreement  it  was :  (1)  that  there 
is  a  profound  sense  of  disillusionment,  nay  of 
frustration,  over  the  lack  of  progress  in  the 
achievement  of  self-determination  for  the  peo- 
ple of  southern  Africa;  (2)  that  there  is  wide- 
spread dissatisfaction  with  the  adoption  of  in- 
creasingly shrill  yet  meaningless  resolutions; 
(3)  that  there  is  growing  concern  with  the 
hardening  of  positions  between  the  mass  of  peo- 
ples striving  for  self-determination  on  the  one 
hand  and  those  in  power  on  the  other,  which 
bodes  ill  for  a  peaceful  settlement. 

My  delegation  shares  tliis  frustration,  this 
dissatisfaction,  this  concern.  We,  too,  are  dis- 
illusioned by  the  lack  of  progress  in  achieving 
self-determination.  We  are  deeply  concerned  by 
the  tendency  to  adopt  resolutions  which  are 
more  and  more  unrealistic,  which  even  their  au- 
thors do  not  expect  to  see  implemented.  This 
concern  is  not  limited  to  the  fact  that  no  relief 
is  being  afforded  to  those  concerned;  we  are 
seriously  concerned  by  their  effect  on  the  credi- 
bility and  prestige  of  the  United  Nations. 
Finally,  we  are  deeply  troubled  by  the  increas- 
ing intractability  of  South  Africa  and  the  Ian 
Smith  regime  [in  Southern  Rhodesia].  Each 
passing  day  without  progress,  each  unrealistic 
and  unenforceable  resolution  from  these  halls, 
each  act  of  defiance  by  these  regimes  constitutes 
a  setback  to  the  cause  of  peace  and  to  a  negoti- 
ated solution  acceptable  to  the  parties  in  dispute. 

In  his  eloquent  address  to  the  General  As- 
sembly last  week,  His  Excellency  President 
Ahidjo  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  the  Came- 

'Made  in  Committee  IV  (Trusteeship)  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  Oct.  16  (U.S./D.N.  press  release 
122).  Mr.  Phillips  is  U.S.  Representative  to  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 


458 


roon  commended  the  Lusaka  Manifesto  to  us. 
The  fact  that  this  distinguished  African  states- 
man spoke  to  us  as  President  of  the  Assembly 
of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  African  Unity,  which  had  re- 
cently given  its  endorsement  to  this  important 
document,  gave  added  weight  to  President 
Aliidjo's  recommendation.  For  this  document, 
the  Lusaka  Manifesto,  is  imdoubtedly  one  of  the 
most  important  political  and  human  documents 
to  have  emerged  from  modern  Africa.  Its  adop- 
tion first  by  the  14  Central  and  East  African 
states  that  participated  at  the  Lusaka  confer- 
ence last  April  and  its  recent  endorsement  by 
the  Organization  of  African  Unity,  represent- 
ing 41  independent  states,  make  it  worthy  of  the 
attention  and  most  careful  study  by  the  world 
community. 

My  Government  finds  itself  in  agreement 
with  much  that  is  contained  in  this  moving 
document.  The  manifesto  presents  in  memora- 
ble terms  the  aim  of  the  authors :  first,  that  the 
peoples  of  the  area  "shall  be  free  to  determine 
for  themselves  their  own  institutions  of  self- 
government"  and,  secondly,  that  they  shall  be 
"given  an  opportunity  to  be  men — not  white 
men,  brown  men,  yellow  men,  or  black  men." 

The  categorical  rejection  of  racialism  em- 
bodied in  the  manifesto  accords  with  our  own 
views.  Equally  encouraging  is  its  advocacy  of 
dialogue  as  the  first  and  perhaps  the  best  way 
to  achieve  the  manifesto's  stated  objective  of 
freedom  for  all  the  people  of  southern  Africa. 

We  wholeheartedly  applaud  the  manifesto's 
declaration  that  the  authors  still  prefer  to 
achieve  their  goals  without  physical  violence 
and  that  "We  would  prefer  to  negotiate  rather 
than  destroy,  to  talk  rather  than  kill.  We  do  not 
advocate  violence;  we  advocate  an  end  to  the 
violence  against  human  dignity  which  is  now 
being  perpetrated  by  the  oppressors  of  Africa." 

With  the  certain  knowledge  that  his  words 
were  not  spoken  lightly  but  represented  the 
most  careful  and  considered  thoughts  of  the  > 
leading  statesmen  of  Africa,  we  arc  pleased  to  ' 
echo  the  words  of  President  Ahidjo  before  the 
General   Assembly  of  these  United   Nations,  j 
when  he  said : 

Our  campaign,  therefore,  implies  the  condemnation 
of  all  racialism  and  not  the  establishment  of  a  racial- 
ism in  reverse.  It  is  nourished  by  the  unshakable  con- 
viction that,  in  denying  human  value  to  a  single  man, 
the  dignity  of  all  men  is  under  attack. 

By  thus  appealing  to  the  universal  conscience,  we 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Intend  not  only  to  demonstrate  our  attachment  to  peace 
and  the  ideal  of  human  brotherhood,  our  desire  to 
contribute  through  dialogue  and  negotiation  to  the 
world's  great  problems,  but  also  to  revive  our  faith 
in  man  and  our  attachment  to  his  dignity,  to  foster 
aspirations,  in  these  troubled  times,  to  the  highest 
values  of  mankind,  and  the  orientation  of  history  to- 
wards the  recognition  of  man  by  man. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  wish  to  suggest  most  ear- 
nestly that  those  now  in  power  in  southern 
Africa  accept  this  offer  to  negotiate,  accept  this 
invitation  to  a  dialogue.  If  they  were  to  do  so, 
we  believe  that  their  action  would  receive  wide 
endorsement  not  only  among  their  neighbors  in 
Africa  but  in  Europe,  in  the  Americas,  and  else- 
where throughout  the  world.  For  herein  lies  the 
only  true  hope  for  a  solution  to  a  situation  that 
anguishes  the  conscience  of  civilized  men  every- 
where and  does  violence  to  the  legitimate  rights 
and  aspirations  of  millions  of  men  who  are  also 
our  brothers. 


Centennial  of  the  Birth 
of  Mahatma  Gandhi 

Statement  by  William  T.  Coleman,  Jr.  ^ 

:  The  United  States  delegation  would  not  wish 
this  committee  to  make  it  a  habit  to  interrupt  its 
work  for  commemorative  purposes.  For  each 
nation-state  has  its  outstanding  figures  whose 
existence  inspired  and  changed  the  quality  of 
the  lives  of  their  peoples,  but  observance  for 
every  leader  would  make  it  impossible  to  get 
our  work  done.  Nevertheless,  we  regard  the 
100th  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  Mohandas 
Karamchand  Gandhi  as  the  rule-proving  excep- 
tion. As  our  vice  chairman  has  already  said,  his 
contributions  exceed  national  boundaries.  He 
was  certainly  not  the  only  charismatic  leader 
of  our  times — not  even  the  only  such  leader  who 
was  trained  in  the  law.  These  are  not  the  reasons 
why  one  cannot  but  treat  the  100th  anniversary 
of  his  birth  as  an  exceptional  and  noteworthy 
occasion. 

His  greatness  lay  not  in  that  he  was  a  leader, 
that  he  helped  his  people  to  have  a  new  birth 


'  Made  in  Committee  VI  (Legal)  of  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  on  Oct.  2  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  113).  Mr. 
Coleman  is  U.S.  Representative  to  the  General 
Assembly. 


of  freedom,  and  perhaps  not  even  in  the  Tight- 
ness of  the  cause  he  led.  Rather  it  lay  in  the 
quality  of  his  leadership  and  the  restraint  with 
which  he  pressed  his  just  cause.  His  nonviolent 
campaigns  not  only  represented  a  call  to  the 
finest  in  his  followers  demanding  of  them  great 
forbearance;  they  also  were  a  direct  appeal  to 
the  noblest  siairit  of  those  whom  he  opposed.  He 
taught  not  merely  those  he  led  but  those  against 
whom  he  led.  He  recognized  the  potential  of 
man  for  good  and  sought  to  bring  it  out  in 
friend  and  foe.  No  other  leader  of  our  times 
has  so  steadfastly  chmg  to  so  ennobling  a  view 
of  mankind  nor  succeeded  to  such  an  extent  with 
a  policy  based  upon  appealing  to  all  that  was 
good  and  decent  in  his  adversary.  It  might  be 
said  that  he  succeeded  in  his  greatest  struggle, 
independence  for  his  people,  because  of  the 
fundamentally  humane  and  tolerant  tradition 
of  those  whom  he  opposed.  Certainly  the  great 
traditions  of  those  to  whom  he  apjjealed  pro- 
vided a  responsive  chord  for  liis  moral  message. 
My  delegation  would  prefer,  however,  to  think 
that  all  men  have  the  potential  for  good  and 
that  human  nature  can  be  inspired  toward  the 
lofty  goals  of  justice,  fair  play,  integrity,  and 
respect  for  the  rights  and  aspirations  of  their 
fellow  men. 

So  great  was  the  message  of  his  teaching  that 
it  transcended  liis  country  and  his  adversaries. 
Indeed,  my  own  country  and,  as  a  personal 
aside,  my  own  people  have  been  made  the  better 
for  it.  It  was  the  teaching  of  Gandlii  that 
played  so  important  a  role  in  the  struggle  of 
American  Negroes  which  Dr.  IMartin  Luther 
King  led.  Dr.  King,  while  a  very  yoimg  man, 
led  a  movement  which  brought  about  and  is  still 
bringing  about  great  and  beneficial  change  in 
American  life.  We  are  particularly  indebted  to 
India  for  having  developed  a  native  son  to  in- 
spire our  peoples  in  their  struggles  for  equality 
and  justice.  Through  such  change  we  come 
nearer  to  our  national  goal  of  equality  and  jus- 
tice for  all.  Though  King's  ideas  did  not  meet 
with  universal  acceptance  at  first,  today  most 
citizens  of  my  country  will  acknowledge  the 
rightness  of  his  cause  and  the  fact  that  we  are 
a  better  people  because  the  cause  is  now  accepted 
as  a  national  goal. 

The  goals  Gandhi  and  King  inculcated  in 
their  people  must  also  be  the  goals  of  the  United 
Nations.  Unfortunately,  Gandhi,  like  Dr.  King, 
was  the  victim  of  assassination.  In  both  cases  the 
loss  was  tragic.  In  both  cases  all  mankind  was 


November  24,   1969 


459 


the  poorer.  We  must,  however,  be  grateful  that 
for  even  a  short  time  mankind  was  lucky 
enough  to  have  such  men. 

The  debt  of  all  Americans  to  Dr.  King  and 
to  Mahatma  Gandhi  is  incalculable  and  not 
reducible  to  words.  Perhaps  the  greatest  tribute 
that  we  here  can  pay  to  the  memory  of  Mohan- 
das Gandhi  and  those  who  draw  strength 
from  his  teachings  would  be  to  work  together 
in  this  gi-eat  world  organization  for  peace  and 
justice. 


United  States  Delegations 
to  International  Conferences 

OECD  Trade  Committee 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  No- 
vember 3  (press  release  326)  that  Edwin  M. 
Cronk,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
International  Trade  Policy,  would  be  the  U.S. 
Representative  to  the  meeting  of  the  Trade 
Conmiittee  of  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  at  Paris  Novem- 
ber 6-7.  Lawrence  A.  Fox,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Conmierce  for  International  Trade 
Policy,  is  Alternate  U.S.  Eepresentative.^ 

The  Trade  Committee  will  approve  an 
OECD  report  on  the  issue  of  trade  preferences 
for  developing  countries,  which  is  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development. 

International  Legal  Conference 
on  Marine  Pollution  Damage 

The  Department  of  State  amiounced  on  No- 
vember 7  (press  release  331)  that  Robert  H. 
Neuman,  Assistant  Legal  Adviser,  Department 
of  State,  would  be  the  U.S.  Representative  to 
the  International  Legal  Conference  on  Marine 
Pollution  Damage  at  Brussels  November  10-28. 
Rear  Adm.  William  L.  Morrison,  Chief  Coun- 
sel, U.S.  Coast  Guard,  is  Alternate  U.S.  Repre- 


sentative. The  delegation  includes  advisei-s 
from  the  shipping  industry  and  the  Congress. 

The  conference  is  being  held  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization,  the  specialized  agency 
of  the  United  Nations  dealing  with  maritime 
affairs,  which  has  its  headquarters  in  London. 

The  conference  will  consider  two  conventions 
relating  to  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil.  One  of 
these  conventions  deals  with  the  right  of  coastal 
states  to  intervene  when  a  mishap  which  causes, 
or  might  cause,  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil  occurs 
on  the  high  seas.  The  other  deals  with  various 
aspects  of  civil  liability  for  oil  pollution  dam- 
age, including  the  question  of  whether  liability 
is  to  be  absolute  or  based  on  negligence,  the  fi- 
nancial limits  of  such  liability,  and  in  which 
jurisdiction  suits  for  damages  may  be  brought. 


Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Costanzo 
as  IDB  Executive  Director 

The  Senate  on  October  30  confirmed  the 
nomination  of  Henry  J.  Costanzo  to  be  Execu- 
tive Director  of  the  Inter-American  Develop- 
ment Bank  for  a  term  of  3  years  and  until  his 
successor  is  appointed.  (For  biographic  data,  see 
Wliite  House  press  release  dated  September  15.) 


Additional  Item  Included 

in  Agenda  of  General  Assembly 

The  U.N.  General  Assembly,  on  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  General  Committee,  included 
the  followmg  item  in  the  agenda  of  the  24th 
General  Assembly  at  the  1,791st  plenary  meet- 
ing on  October  28 :  '■ 

106.  Co-operation  between  the  United  Nations  and  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity :  Manifesto  on 
Southern  Africa. 


'  For  names  of  the  advisers  to  the  delegation,  see 
Department  of  State  press  release  326  dated  Nov.  3. 


'  For  agenda  items  adopted  on  Sept.  20  and  24  and 
Oct.  10,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  3,  1969,  p.  383. 


460 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


United  States  and  Costa  Rica 
Sign  Cotton  Textile  Agreement 

Press  release  316  dated  October  24 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

On  October  1  the  United  States  and  Costa 
Rica  concluded  a  cotton  textile  agreement 
through  an  exchange  of  notes  in  Wasliington. 
Philip  H.  Trezise,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Economic  Affairs,  and  the  Ambassador  of 
Costa  Rica,  Luis  Demetrio  Tinoco,  signed  the 
respective  notes. 

Under  the  agreement,  which  was  negotiated 
in  the  context  of  the  Long-Term  Arrangement 
Regarding  International  Trade  in  Cotton  Tex- 
tiles (the  LTA),  annual  exports  of  cotton  tex- 
tiles from  Costa  Rica  to  the  United  States  shall 
be  subject  to  limitations.  For  its  first  year,  the 
agreement  provides  an  aggregate  ceiling  of  3.0 
million  square  yards  and  the  following  specific 
ceilings :  category  39,  130,000  dozen  pair ;  cate- 
gory 48, 4,500  dozen ;  category  53,  28,000  dozen ; 
and  category  61,  85,000  dozen.  Consultation  lev- 
els are  specified  for  the  remaining  60  categories 
of  cotton  textiles.  All  the  limitations  are  to  be 
increased  by  5  percent  in  the  second  year  of  the 
agreement. 


EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES 


Text  of  U.S.  Note 

OCTOBEE   1,    1969 

Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  recent 
discussions  between  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica, 
as  the  result  of  which  I  wish  to  propose  the  following 
agreement,  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles  between 
Costa  Rica  and  the  United  States : 

1.  During  the  term  of  this  agreement,  which  shall  be 
from  October  1,  1969  to  September  30,  1971  inclusive, 
annual  exports  of  cotton  textiles  from  Costa  Rica  to  the 
United  States  shall  be  limited  to  aggregate  and  specific 
limits  specified  in  the  following  paragraphs. 

2.  For  the  first  agreement  year,  constituting  the  12- 


month  period  beginning  October  1,  1969,  the  aggregate 
limit  shall  be  3.0  million  square  yards  equivalent. 

3.  Within  this  aggregate  limit,  the  following  specific 
limits  shall  apply  for  the  first  agreement  year: 


Category 

Quantity 

39 

130,000  dozen  pair 

48 

4,500  dozen 

53 

28,000  dozen 

61 

85,000  dozen 

4.  In  the  second  12-month  period  that  any  limitation 
is  applicable  under  this  agreement,  the  level  of  per- 
mitted exports  shall  be  increased  by  five  percent  over 
the  corresponding  level  for  the  preceding  12-month 
period.  The  corresponding  level  for  the  preceding 
12-month  period  shall  not  include  any  adjustments  un- 
der paragraphs  5  or  8.  The  phrase  "level  of  permitted 
exports"  in  this  paragraph  refers  to  the  aggregate  and 
specific  limits  set  out  in  paragraphs  2  and  3,  and  to  the 
limitations  set  out  in  paragraph  6  of  this  agreement. 

5.  Within  the  aggregate  limit,  any  specific  limit  may 
be  exceeded  by  five  percent. 

6.  Categories  not  given  specific  limits  are  subject  to 
consultation  levels  and  to  the  aggregate  limit.  In  the 
event  Costa  Rica  desires  to  export  in  any  category  in 
excess  of  its  consultation  level  during  any  agreement 
year,  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  shall  request  con- 
sultations with  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America  on  this  question  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  shall  agree  to  enter  into  such 
consultations.  Until  agreement  is  reached,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Costa  Rica  shall  limit  its  exports  in  the  cate- 
gory in  question  to  the  consultation  level.  For  the  first 
agreement  year,  the  consultation  level  for  each  cate- 
gory not  given  a  specific  limit  shall  be  500,000  square 
yards  equivalent  in  categories  1-27,  and  350,000  square 
yards  equivalent  in  categories  28-64. 

7.  The  square  yard  equivalent  of  any  shortfalls  oc- 
curring in  exports  in  the  categories  given  specific  limits 
may  be  used  in  any  category  not  given  a  specific  limit 
or  for  the  purpose  described  in  paragraph  5,  provided 
that  the  aggregate  limit  is  not  thereby  exceeded. 

8.  (a)  For  any  agreement  year  immediately  follow- 
ing a  year  of  shortfall  (i.e.,  a  year  in  which  cotton 
textile  exports  from  Costa  Rica  to  the  United  States 
were  below  the  aggregate  limit  and  any  specific  limit 
applicable  to  the  category  concerned)  the  Government 
of  Costa  Rica  may  permit  exports  to  exceed  these  limits 
by  carryover  in  the  following  amounts  and  manner: 

(i)  The  carryover  shall  not  exceed  the  amount  of  the 
shortfall  in  either  the  aggregate  limit  or  any  applicable 
specific  limit  and  shall  not  exceed  five  percent  of  the 
aggregate  limit  applicable  to  the  year  of  the  shortfall ; 

(ii)  In  the  case  of  shortfalls  in  the  categories  sub- 
ject to  specific  limits,  the  carryover  shall  not  exceed 
five  percent  of  the  specific  limit  in  the  year  of  the 


November  24,  1969 


461 


shortfall  and  shall  be  used  in  the  same  category  in 
which  the  shortfall  occurred ;  and 

(iii)  In  the  case  of  shortfalls  not  attributable  to 
categories  subject  to  specific  limits,  the  carryover  shall 
not  be  used  to  exceed  any  applicable  specific  limit  ex- 
cept in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  paragraph  5 
and  shall  not  be  used  to  exceed  the  levels  in  paragraph 
6. 

(b)  The  limits  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (a)  of 
this  paragraph  are  without  any  adjustments  under  this 
paragraph  or  paragraph  5. 

(c)  The  carryover  shall  be  in  addition  to  the  exports 
permitted  by  paragraph  5. 

9.  The  Government  of  Costa  Rica  will  use  its  best 
efforts  to  space  cotton  textile  exports  to  the  United 
States  within  each  category  as  evenly  as  practicable 
throughout  the  agreement  year,  taking  into  considera- 
tion normal  seasonal  factors. 

10.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
shall  promptly  supply  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica 
with  data  on  monthly  Imports  of  cotton  textiles  from 
Costa  Rica ;  and  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  shall 
promptly  supply  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
of  America  with  data  on  monthly  exports  of  cotton 
textiles  to  the  United  States.  Each  government  agrees 
to  supply  promptly  any  other  pertinent  and  readily 
available  statistical  data  requested  by  the  other  gov- 
ernment. 

11.  In  implementing  this  agreement,  the  system  of 
categories  and  the  rates  of  conversion  into  square  yard 
equivalents  listed  in  the  annex  hereto  shall  apply.'  In 
any  situation  where  the  determination  of  an  article 
to  be  a  cotton  textile  would  be  affected  by  whether  a 
weight  or  value  criterion  is  used,  the  chief  value  cri- 
terion used  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  shall  apply. 

12.  For  the  duration  of  this  agreement,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  will  not  request 
restraint  on  the  export  of  cotton  textiles  from  Costa 
Rica  to  the  United  States  under  the  procedures  of  Arti- 
cles 3  and  6  (c)  of  the  Long-Term  Arrangements  Re- 
garding International  Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles  done  at 
Geneva  on  February  9,  1962,  as  extended. 

13.  If  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  considers  that, 
as  a  result  of  limitations  specified  in  this  agreement, 
Costa  Rica  is  being  placed  in  an  inequitable  position 
vis-a-vis  a  third  country,  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica 
may  request  consultation  with  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America  with  a  view  to  appropriate 
remedial  action  such  as  reasonable  modification  of  this 
agreement. 

14.  The  Government  of  Costa  Rica  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  agree  to  consult 
on  any  question  arising  in  the  implementation  of  this 
agreement. 

15.  Mutually  satisfactory  administrative  arrange- 
ments or  adjustments  may  be  made  to  resolve  minor 
problems  arising  in  the  implementation  of  this  agree- 
ment including  differences  in  points  of  procedure  or 
operation. 

10.  Both  governments  will  take  appropriate  meas- 
ures to  assure  that  trade  in  articles  covered  by  this 


agreement  is  maintained  within  the  limitations  pro- 
vided therein.  The  nature  of  these  measures  may  be  a 
matter  of  discussion  between  the  two  governments. 

17.  The  Government  of  Costa  Rica  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  may  at  any  time 
propose  revisions  in  the  terms  of  this  agreement.  Each 
government  agrees  to  consult  promptly  with  the  other 
government  about  such  proposals  with  a  view  to  mak- 
ing such  revisions  to  the  present  agreement,  or  taking 
such  other  appropriate  action,  as  may  be  mutually 
agreed  upon. 

18.  This  agreement  shall  continue  in  force  through 
September  30,  1971,  except  that  either  government  may 
terminate  it  effective  at  the  end  of  any  agreement  year 
by  written  notice  to  the  other  government  to  be  given 
at  least  90  days  prior  to  such  termination  date. 


'  For  text  of  the  annex,  see  press  release  316  dated 
Oct.  24. 


If  these  proposals  are  acceptable  to  your  Govern- 
ment, this  note  and  your  note  of  acceptance  on  behalf 
of  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  shall  constitute  an 
agreement  between  our  Governments.  -^ 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highesf  consideration. 

For  the  Secretary  of  State : 

Philip  H.  Trezise 

His  Excellency 

Luis  Demetrio  Tinoco 

Ambassador  of  Costa  Rica 

Text  of  Costa  Rican  Note 

OCTOBEB   1,    1969 

Excellency :  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  Your 
Excellency's  note  of  October  1,  1969  concerning  exports 
of  cotton  textiles  from  Costa  Rica  to  the  United  States 
of  America,  which  reads  as  follows  : 

[Text  of  U.S.  note.] 

The  proposals  contained  in  said  note  are  acceptable 
to  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica,  including  the  pro- 
posal that  the  note  and  this  reply  should  constitute  an 
agreement  between  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  and 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  which 
will  come  Into  force  definitively  on  the  date  of  a  note 
informing  the  Government  of  the  United  States  that 
the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  has  completed  Its  con- 
stitutional processes. 

Even  though  my  Government  is  unable  to  accept  the 
agreement  definitively  pending  completion  of  its  con- 
stitutional processes,  it  will  abide  by  the  terms  of  that 
agreement  through  certain  internal  mechanisms,  with- 
out prejudice  to  rights  Your  Excellency's  Government 
may  exercise  under  the  terms  of  this  agreement,  includ- 
ing Article  16. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  testimony  of  my  highest 
consideration. 

Luis  Demetrio  Tinoco      " 
Ambassador 

His  Excellency 
William  P.  Rogers 
Secretary  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C. 


462 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX     November  S4,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No. 

Africa.  United  States  Urges  Negotiation  and 
Dialogue  in  Southern  Africa   (Phillips)     .     .      458 

Asia.  A  Look  at  Asian  Regionalism  (Green)     .      445 

Burundi.  Melady  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    .      464 

Canada.  U.S.-Canada  Flood  Control  Payment 
Agreement  Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (mes- 
sage from   President  Nixon) 463 

China.  U.S.  and  Republic  of  China  Amend 
Air  Transport  Agreement  (Department 
announcement) 463 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Faunce.Heuer,  Melady,  Root)     .      464 

Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Costanzo  as  IDB  Execu- 
tive Director 460/ 

Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Wieczorowski  as  U.S. 
Executive  Director  of  IBRD 45' 

U.S.-Canada  Flood  Control  Payment  Agreement 
Transmitted    to    the    Senate    (message   from 

(c)  of  the  Columbia  River  Treaty. 

It  is  provided  in  the  agreement  that  it  will 
enter  into  force  uiDon  notification  by  tlie  United 
States  Government  to  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment that  all  internal  measures  necessary  to  give 
effect  to  the  agreement  for  the  United  States 
have  been  completed. 

Pursuant  to  the  treaty  relating  to  cooperative 
development  of  the  water  resources  of  the 
Columbia  Eiver  basin  signed  at  Washington  on 
January  17,  1961,  Canada  constructed  the  Dun- 
can Dam  and  the  Arrow  Dam  in  British  Colum- 
bia. The  treaty  provides  that  the  United  States 
shall  pay  to  Canada  specified  sums  with  respect 
to  each  of  the  dams  for  the  flood  control  bene- 
fits. The  sums  specified  were  based  on  a  period 
of  55  years  of  flood  control  benefits,  and  it  was 
expected  that  the  projects  would  be  completed 
subsequent  to  the  spring  of  1969.  The  dams  actu- 
ally commenced  operation  well  in  advance  of 
the  expected  dates,  so  that  the  United  States  has 
received  additional  benefits  for  two  years  in  the 
case  of  Duncan  Dam  and  one  year  in  the  case  of 
Arrow  Dam. 

The  treaty  provides  that  the  United  States 
would  pay  less  if  full  operation  of  the  storage 
were  not  commenced  within  the  time  specified, 
but  does  not  provide  for  additional  payments 
if  such  operation  were  commenced  prior  to  the 
time  specified.  By  an  exchange  of  notes  dated 
January  22,  1964,  prior  to  the  entry  into  force 

'  Transmitted  on  Oct.  14  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  H.,  91st  Cong.,  1st  sess., 
which  includes  the  texts  of  the  exchange  of  notes  and 
the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 


of  the  treaty,  the  two  Governments  agreed  to 
consult  with  a  view  to  adjustments  in  the  pay- 
ments if  there  should  be  an  early  completion  of 
the  dams.  The  agreement  transmitted  herewith 
has  resulted  from  such  consultation.  It  provides 
for  a  payment  to  Canada  of  a  total  of  $278,000 
for  the  additional  flood  control  benefits  result- 
ing from  early  completion  of  Duncan  Dam  and 
Arrow  Dam. 

The  treaty  of  1961  does  not  without  modifica- 
tion provide  a  basis  for  authorizing  the  addi- 
tional payments.  It  is  desirable,  therefore,  that 
in  effect  the  treaty  provisions  be  modified  so  that 
there  may  be  an  adequate  legal  basis  for  an 
authorization  for  appropriations.  The  notes  of 
August  18  and  20, 1969  have  been  exchanged  for 
this  purpose. 

I  also  transmit  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate  a  report  by  the  Secretary  of  State  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  effected  by  that  exchange 
of  notes. 

I  urge  that  the  Senate  give  early  and  favor- 
able consideration  to  the  agreement  concerning 
adjustments  in  the  flood  control  payments  by 
the  United  States  Government  to  the  Canadian 
Government. 


Richard  Nixon 


The  White  House, 
October  U,  1969. 


U.S.  and  Republic  of  China  Amend 
Air  Transport  Agreement 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  Octo- 
ber 22  (press  release  313)  that  the  United  States 
and  China  had  that  day  exchanged  notes  ^  at 
Taipei  amending  and  extending  indefinitely 
the  Sino-U.S.  Air  TransiDort  Agreement  of  De- 
cember 20,  1946.^  The  notes  exchanged  today 
superseded  earlier  notes  amending  the  agree- 
ment which  had  been  exchanged  in  1950  and 
1955.5 

The  new  amendment  and  a  recently  issued 
U.S.  operating  license  give  the  Chinese  airline 
authorized  under  the  agreement  the  right  to 
pick  up  and  discharge  international  traffic  in 


^  For  texts  of  the  notes,  see  press  release  313  dated 
October  22. 
"  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  1609. 
'  TIAS  2184,  3347. 


November  24,   1969 


463 


passengers,  cargo,  and  mail  at  Los  Angeles  as 
well  as  Honolulu  and  San  Francisco.  The  fol- 
lowing routes  in  both  directions  are  authorized 
for  the  Chinese  carrier :  (1)  China  to  Okinawa 
and  beyond;  (2)  China  via  intermediate  points 
in  the  Pacific  to  Honolulu  and  San  Francisco ; 
(3)  China  via  intermediate  points  in  the  Pacific 
to  Honolulu  and  Los  Angeles. 

American  airlines  authorized  under  the  agree- 
ment now  have  the  right,  subject  to  the  issuance 
of  a  Chinese  operating  permit,  to  offer  services 
over  the  following  route  in  both  directions: 
"The  United  States  via  intermediate  points  to 
Taipei  and  Kaohsiung  and  beyond  and  via  in- 
termediate points  to  the  United  States." 

Operating  under  a  provisional  license  from 
the  Chinese  Civil  Aeronautics  Administration, 
Trans  World  Airlines  has  had  scheduled  serv- 
ices through  Taipei  since  mid-August  on  its 
round-the-world  flights.  Under  a  separate 
CCAA  provisional  license.  Flying  Tiger  Air- 
lines has  recently  initiated  an  all-cargo  service 
between  Taiwan  and  major  cities  in  the  United 
States.  China  Airlmes  plans  to  begin  service 
to  the  United  States  on  February  2,  1970. 


agreement  is  maintained  within  the  limitations  pro- 
vided therein.  The  nature  of  these  measures  may  be  a 
matter  of  discussion  between  the  two  governments. 

17.  The  Government  of  Costa  Rica  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  may  at  any  time 
propose  revisions  in  the  terms  of  this  agreement.  Each 
government  agrees  to  consult  promptly  with  the  other 
government  about  such  proposals  with  a  view  to  mak- 
ing such  revisions  to  the  present  agreement,  or  taking 
such  other  appropriate  action,  as  may  be  mutually 
agreed  upon. 

18.  This  agreement  shall  continue  in  force  through 
\\  September  30,  1971,  except  that  either  government  may 

\  terminate  it  effective  at  the  end  of  any  agreement  year 
\by  written  notice  to  the  other  government  to  be  given 
,  \at  least  90  days  prior  to  such  termination  date. 

t  If  these  proposals  are  acceptable  to  your  Govern- 
fenent,  this  note  and  your  note  of  acceptance  on  behalf 
lof  the  Government  of  Costa  Rica  shall  constitute  an 
JBgreement  between  our  Governments. -^ 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


Confirmations 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcoUc  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  New 
York  March  30, 1961.  Entered  into  force  December  13, 
1964 ;  for  the  United  States  June  24, 1967.  TIAS  6298. 
Ratification  deposited:  Belgium,  October  17,  1969. 

Refugees 

Protocol   relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at 
New    York   January   31,    1967.    Entered   into   force 
October  4,  1967 ;  for  the  United  States  November  1, 
1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Zambia,  September  24, 1969. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Agreement  establishing  interim  arrangements  for  a 


The  Senate  on  October  30  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Anthony  Faunce  to  be  Deputy  Inspector  General, 
Foreign  Assistance.  (For  biographic  data,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  September  19.) 

Scott  Heuer,  Jr.,  to  be  Inspector  General,  Foreign 
Assistance.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  327  dated  November  6.) 

Thomas  Patrick  Melady  to  be  Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Burundi.  (For  biographic  data,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  September  19. ) 

John  F.  Root  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Republic  of 
Ivory  Coast.  ( For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of 
State  press  release  334  dated  November  10.) 


Designations 

Sidney  Weintraub  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Monetary  Affairs,  effective  Novem- 
ber 3.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State 
press  release  dated  November  4. ) 


464 


Department  of  State  Bulletin] 


INDEX     November  U,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No.  1587 


Africa.   United    States   Urges   Negotiation   and 
Dialogue  in  Southern  Africa   (Phillips)     . 

Asia.  A  Look  at  Asian  Regionalism  (Green) 

Burundi.  Melady  confirmed  as  Ambassador    . 

Canada.  U.S.-Canada  Flood  Control  Payment 
Agreement  Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (mes 
sage  from   President  Nixon) 


China.  U.S.  and  Republic  of  China  Amend 
Air  Transport  Agreement  (Department 
announcement) 

Congress 

Confirmations  (Faunce,  Heuer,  Melady,  Root)     . 

Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Costanzo  as  IDB  Execu- 
tive Director 

Senate  Confirms  Mr.  Wieczorowski  as  U.S. 
Executive  Director  of  IBRD 

U.S.-Canada  Flood  Control  Payment  Agreement 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message  from 
President  Nixon) 

Costa  Rica.  United  States  and  Costa  Rica  Sign 
Cotton  Textile  Agreement  (exchange  of 
notes)    

Department  and  Foreign  Service 
Confirmations  (Faunce,  Heuer,  Melady,  Root)     . 
Designations  (Weintraub) 

Economic  Affairs 

The  International  Labor  Organization :  50  Years 
of  Service  ( Shultz ) 

Weintraub  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  International  Monetary  Affairs    .     . 

Europe.  Under  Secretary  Richardson  Attends 
Special  NATO  Session  at  Brussels     .... 

Foreign  Aid 

Heuer  confirmed  as  Inspector  General,  Foreign 
Assistance 

Faunce  confirmed  as  Deputy  Inspector  General, 
Foreign  Assistance         

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

International  Legal  Conference  on  Marine  Pollu- 
tion Damage    (delegation) 

OECD  Trade  Committee  (delegation)     .     .     .     . 

Ivory  Coast.  Root  confirmed  as  Ambassador    .    . 

Japan.  A  Look  at  Asian  Regionalism  (Green)     . 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

Mr.  Moynihan  To  Represent  U.S.  on  NATO  En- 
vironmental  Committee 

Under  Secretary  Richardson  Attends  Special 
NATO  Session  at  Brussels 

Presidential  Documents 

The  Exchange  of  Letters  Between  President 
Nixon  and  President  Ho 

The  Pursuit  of  Peace  in  Viet-Nam 

U.S.-Canada  Flood  Control  Payment  Agreement 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 

United  States  and  Costa  Rica  Sign  Cotton  Tex- 
tile Agreement  (exchange  of  notes)     .... 

U.S.  and  Republic  of  China  Amend  Air  Transport 
Agreement  (Department  announcement)     .     . 

U.S.-Canada  Flood  Control  Payment  Agreement 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message  from 
President  Nixon) 

United  Nations 

Additional  Item  Included  in  Agenda  «f  General 

Assembly 

Centennial   of  the  Birth   of  Mahatma   Gandhi 

(Coleman) 

The  International  Labor  Organization :  50  Years 

of  Service  (Shultz) 


458 
445 
464 

463 

463 

464 
460 

457 

463 

461 

464 
464 

452 
464 

448 

464 
464 


460 
460 
464 
445 


451 

448 

443 
437 

463 

464 
461 
463 

463 

460 
459 
452 


The  Responsibility  for  the  U.N.'s  Development  as 

an  Instrument  of  World  Order  (Yost)     .     .     .  449 

The  United  Nations  Budget  for  1970  ( FasceU )     .  454 
United  States  Urges  Negotiation  and  Dialogtue  in 

Southern  Africa  (Phillips) 458 

Viet-Nam 

The    Exchange    of   Letters   Between   President 

Nixon    and   President    Ho 443 

41st  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 444 

The  Pursuit  of  Peace  in  Viet-Nam  (Nixon)     .    .  437 

Name   Index 

Coleman,  William  T.,  Jr 459 

Costanzo,  Henry  J 460 

FasceU,  Dante  B 454 

Faunce,  Anthony 464 

Green,  Marshall 445 

Heuer,  Scott,  Jr 464 

Ho  Chi  Minh 443 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 444 

Melady,  Thomas  Patrick 464 

Moynihan,  Daniel  P 451 

Nixon,  President 437, 443, 463 

Phillips,  Christopher  H 458 

Root,  John  F 464 

Shultz,    George    P 452 

Weintraub,  Sidney 464 

Wieczorowski,     Robert     E 457 

Yost,    Charles   W 449 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  3—9 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  November  3  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  313 
of  October  22,  316  of  October  24,  and  320  of 
October  29. 

No.       Date  Subject 

*325  11/3  Regional  conference  on  U.S.  foreign 
policy,  Los  Angeles,  Calif., 
November  20, 
326  11/3  U.S.  delegation  to  OECD  Trade 
Committee,  Paris,  November  6-7 
(rewrite). 

*327     11/6    Heuer  sworn  in  as  Inspector  Gen- 
eral of  Foreign  Assistance   (bio- 
graphic data). 
328    11/6     Lodge :    41st    plenary    meeting    on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

*329  11/6  Federal  Republic  of  Cameroon: 
70th  member  of  Intelsat. 

*330  11/6  Cultural  exchanges :  University  of 
Illinois  Jazz  Band  visits  Soviet 
Union,  November  lO-December  22. 
331  11/7  U.S.  delegation  to  International 
Legal  Conference  on  Marine  Pol- 
lution Damage,  Brussels,  Novem- 
ber 10-28  (rewrite). 

*332  11/7  Regional  conference  on  U.S.  foreign 
policy,  Louisville,  Ky.,  Decem- 
ber 3. 

t333  11/7  U.S.-Portugal  aviation  negotiations 
concluded. 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


STRATEGIC  ARMS  LIMITATION  TALKS 

Address  by  Secretary  Rogers     ]fi5 

U.S.  BRINGS  ILANOI'S  TREATMENT  OF  AMERICAJ^  PRISONERS  OF  WAR 
TO  ATTENTION  OF  U.N.  COMMITTEE 

Statements  iy  Rita  E.  Hauser     ^71 

MOVE  TO  CHANGE  REPRESENTATION  OF  CHINA  IN  THE  U.N. 
REJECTED  BY  THE  24tli  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY 

Statement  by  Congressonan  J.  Irving  WhaU-ey 
and  Texts  of  Resolutions     476 

UNITED  STATES  COMMENTS  ON  REVISIONS  IN  DRAFT  TREATY 

BANNING  EMPLACEMENT  OF  NUCLEAR  WEAPONS  ON  THE  SEABED 

Staternent  by  James  F.  Leonard  and  Text  of  Revised  Draft  Treaty     1^80 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1588 
December  1,  1969 


i 

i 


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the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN^ 
a  tceekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Govern  ment 
ujith  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service. 
Tlie  BULLETIIS'  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  fa>'  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  well  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  tlie  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
fuxtional  relations  are  listed  currently. 


strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 


Address  hy  Secretary  Rogers  ^ 


Next  Monday  in  Helsinki  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  will  open  preliminary 
talks  leading  to  what  could  be  the  most  critical 
negotiations  on  disarmament  ever  undertaken. 
The  two  most  powerful  nations  on  earth  will  be 
seeking  a  way  to  curb  what  to  date  has  been 
an  unending  competition  in  the  strategic  arms 
race. 

Tlie  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
enter  these  negotiations  with  serious  purpose 
and  with  the  hope  that  we  can  achieve  balanced 
understandings  that  will  benefit  the  cause  of 
world  peace  and  security.  Yet  we  begin  these 
negotiations  knowing  that  they  are  likely  to  be 
long  and  complicated  and  with  the  full  realiza- 
tion that  they  may  not  succeed. 

"V\1iile  I  will  not  be  able  to  discuss  specific 
proposals  tonight,  I  thought  it  might  be  help- 
ful to  outline  the  general  approach  of  our  Gov- 
ernment in  these  talks. 

Nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  when  we 
alone  possessed  nuclear  power,  the  United 
States  proposed  the  formation  of  a  United  Na- 
tions atomic  development  authority  with  a 
world  monopoly  over  all  dangerous  aspects  of 
nuclear  energy.  This  proposal  might  well  have 
eliminated  for  all  nations  the  dangers  and  bur- 
dens of  atomic  weapons.  Unhappily,  as  we  all 
know,  it  was  rejected. 

The  implications  were  obvious.  Others  in- 
tended to  develop  nuclear  weapons  on  a  na- 
tional basis.  The  United  States  then  would  have 
to  continue  its  own  nuclear  program.  It  would 
have  to  look  to  its  own  security  in  a  nuclear- 
armed  world.  Thus  we  established  a  national 
policy  of  maintaining  nuclear-weapon  strength 
adequate  to  deter  nuclear  war  by  any  other  na- 
tion or  nations.  It  was  our  hope  then,  as  it  is 
now,  to  make  certain  that  nuclear  weapons 
would  never  again  be  used. 

The  intervening  decades  have  seen  enormous 


'  Made  before  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers  Re- 
tired (DACOR)  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on  Nov.  13  (press 
release  343). 


resources  devoted  to  the  development  of  nuclear 
weapons  systems.  As  both  sides  expanded  their 
force  levels,  an  action-reaction  pattern  was  es- 
tablished. This  pattern  was  fed  by  rapid  prog- 
ress in  the  technology  of  nuclear  weapons  and 
advanced  delivery  systems.  The  mere  availabil- 
ity of  such  sophisticated  technology  made  it 
difficult  for  either  side  by  itself  to  refrain  from 
translating  that  teclmology  into  offensive  and 
defensive  strategic  armaments. 

Aleanwliile,  strategic  plamiers,  operating  in 
an  atmosphere  of  secrecy,  were  obliged  to  make 
conservative  assumptions,  including  calcula- 
tions based  on  what  became  known  as  the  "worst 
case."  The  people  responsible  for  plamiing  our 
strategic  security  had  to  take  account  of  the 
worst  assumptions  about  the  other's  intentions, 
the  maximum  plausible  estimate  of  the  other's 
capabilities  and  performance,  and  the  lowest 
plausible  performance  of  our  own  forces.  The 
Soviets  no  doubt  did  the  same. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  difficult 
during  these  many  years  for  either  side  to  con- 
clude that  it  had  si^cient  levels  of  destructive 
power. 


Capacity  for  Mutual   Destruction 

Yet  that  point  in  time  has  now  clearly  been 
reached.  As  absolute  levels  of  nuclear  power 
and  delivery  capability  increased,  a  situation 
developed  in  which  both  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  could  effectively  destroy  the 
society  of  the  other,  regardless  of  which  one 
struck  first. 

There  are  helpful  mutual  restraints  in  such  a 
situation.  Sane  national  leaders  do  not  initiate 
strategic  nuclear  war  and  thus  commit  their 
people  to  national  suicide.  Also,  they  must  be 
careful  not  to  precipitate  a  conflict  that  could 
easily  escalate  into  nuclear  war.  They  have  to 
take  elaborate  precautions  against  accidental  re- 
lease of  a  nuclear  weapon,  which  might  bring 
on  a  nuclear  holocaust. 


December  1,   1969 


465 


In  brief,  the  nuclear  deterrent,  dangerous 
though  it  is,  has  worked. 

The  present  situation— in  wliich  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  could  effec- 
tively destroy  the  other  regardless  of  which 
struck  first — radically  weakens  the  rationale  for 
continuing  the  arms  race. 

Ck)mpetitive  accumulation  of  more  sophisti- 
cated weapons  would  not  add  to  the  basic 
security  of  either  side.  Militarily,  it  probably 
would  produce  little  or  no  net  advantage. 
Economically,  it  would  divert  resources  needed 
elsewhere.  Politically,  it  would  perpetuate  the 
tensions  and  fears  that  are  the  social  fallout  of 
the  nuclear  arms  race. 

So  a  capacity  for  mutual  destruction  leads  to 
a  mutual  interest  in  putting  a  stop  to  the 
strategic  nuclear  arms  race. 

Nonetheless,  technology  advances  remorse- 
lessly. It  offers  new  opportunities  to  both  sides 
to  add  to  their  offensive  and  defensive  strategic 
systems.  Both  sides  find  it  difficult  to  reject  these 
opportunities  in  an  atmosphere  of  rivalry  and 
in  the  absence  of  a  verifiable  agreement.  It 
raises  temptations  to  seek  strategic  advantages. 
Yet,  now  such  advantages  cannot  be  hidden  for 
long,  and  both  sides  will  certainly  take  whatever 
countermeasures  are  necessary  to  preserve  their 
retaliatory  capability. 

This  is  the  situation  in  which  the  two  sides 
now  find  themselves.  Where  national  security 
interests  may  have  operated  in  the  past  to 
stimulate  the  strategic  arms  race,  those  same  na- 
tional security  interests  may  now  operate  to 
stop  or  slow  down  the  race.  Tlie  question  to  be 
faced  in  the  strategic  arms  talks  is  whether 
societies  with  the  advanced  intellect  to  develop 
these  awesome  weapons  of  mass  destruction  have 
the  combined  wisdom  to  control  and  curtail 
them. 

Confidence-Building   Preliminary  Steps 

In  point  of  fact,  we  have  already  had  some 
successes  in  preliminary  limitations: 

— We  have  a  treaty  banning  military  activi- 
ties in  Antarctica. 

— We  have  a  treaty  banning  the  orbiting  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  in  outer  space  and 
prohibiting  the  establishment  of  military  in- 
stallations on  the  moon  or  other  celestial  bodies. 

-—We  have  reached  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union  on  the  text  of  a  treaty  forbidding  the 
emplacement  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on 
the  ocean  floors,  about  to  be  considered  at  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly. 


These  are  agreements  not  to  arm  environ- 
ments previously  inaccessible  to  weapons. 
Manifestly,  there  are  fewer  obstacles  to  such 
agreements  than  there  are  to  agreements  con- 
trolling weapons  already  deployed  or  under 
development. 

But  even  in  already  "contaminated"  environ- 
ments there  have  been  two  important  control 
agreements : 

— We  have  negotiated  and  ratified  a  Test  Ban 
Treaty  prohibiting  the  testing  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons in  the  atmosphere,  under  water,  and  in  outer 
space. 

— We  have  negotiated,  and  are  prepared  at 
any  time  to  ratify  simultaneously  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  a  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 

It  should  be  pointed  out,  though,  that  the 
main  objective  of  a  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  is  to  prevent  nonnuclear  powers  from 
acquiring  atomic  weapons.  The  treaty  does  not 
restrain  any  of  the  present  nuclear  powers  from 
further  development  of  their  capabilities.  The 
nonnuclear  countries  therefore  tend  to  look 
upon  the  treaty  essentially  as  a  self-denying 
ordinance. 

Accordingly,  during  the  negotiations  they  in- 
sisted upon  assurances  that  the  nuclear  powers 
would  seriously  pursue  strategic  arras  negotia- 
tions. We  concurred  and  incorporated  a  para- 
graph in  the  treaty  which  would  require  us  to 
do  so.  I  mention  this  to  underscore  two  points : 

— First,  that  the  disarmament  agreements 
previously  concluded  have  widely  been  regarded 
as  confidence-building  preliminary  steps  which 
hopefully  might  lead  to  more  meaningful  agree- 
ments on  strategic  arms. 

— Second,  when  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  ratify  the  NPT,  they  will  agree 
to  undertake  negotiations  in  good  faith  for  a 
cessation  of  the  nuclear  arms  race. 

However,  given  the  complexity  of  the 
strategic  situation,  the  vital  national  interests 
involved,  and  the  traditional  impulses  to  seek 
protection  in  military  strength,  it  is  easy  to  be 
cynical  about  the  prospects  for  the  talks  into 
which  we  are  about  to  enter. 

Nonetheless,  some  basis  for  hope  exists. 

First  is  the  fact  that  the  talks  are  being  held 
at  all.  The  diplomatic  exchanges  leading  up  to 
these  talks  were  responsible  in  nature.  And  the 
talks  themselves  will  require  discussion  of  mili- 
tary matters  by  both  sides  in  which  the  veil  of 
secrecy  will  have  to  be,  if  not  lifted,  at  least  re- 


466 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


fashioned.  These  factors  lead  us  to  the  hope  that 
the  talks  are  being  entered  into  seriously. 

Second  is  the  matter  of  timing.  Previous 
disparity  in  nuclear  strength  has  been  succeeded 
by  the  situation  of  sufficiency,  of  wliich  I  have 
already  spoken.  And  because  this  condition  will 
contuaue  for  the  foreseeable  future,  the  time, 
then,  seems  to  be  propitious  for  considering  how 
to  curb  the  race  in  which  neither  side  in  all  like- 
lihood can  gain  meaningful  advantage. 

Tliird  is  a  mutuality  of  interest.  Under 
present  circumstances  an  equitable  limitation  on 
strategic  nuclear  weapons  would  strengthen  the 
national  security  of  both  sides.  If  tlus  is  mu- 
tually perceived — if  botli  sides  conduct  these 
talks  in  the  light  of  that  perception — the  talks 
may  accomplish  an  historic  breakthrough  in 
the  pattern  of  confrontation  that  has  charac- 
terized the  postwar  world. 

May  I  pause  to  point  out  again  that  I  do  not 
wish  to  predict  that  the  talks  will  be  easy  or  that 
progress  is  imminent  or,  for  that  matter,  likely. 
Mutuality  of  interest  for  states  accustomed  to 
rivalry  is  difficult  to  perceive.  Traditions  are 
powerful.  Temptations  to  seek  advantage  nm 
strong.  Developments  in  other  areas  are  bound 
to  have  an  impact  on  these  discussions. 

Both  parties  will  approach  the  talks  with 
great  caution.  The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  entirely  capable  of  protecting  their 
vital  interests  and  can  be  counted  upon  to  do 
so.  So  there  is  little  chance  that  either  side  would 
accept  an  outcome  that  leads  to  its  net  national 
disadvantage.  In  our  case,  also  we  would  not 
agree  to  anything  adversely  affecting  the  na- 
tional interests  of  our  allies,  who  will  continue 
to  be  consulted  as  the  talks  develop. 

On  the  other  hand  we  must  also  recognize 
that  a  prime  teclmique  of  international  politics, 
as  of  other  politics,  is  talk.  If  these  talks  are 
serious,  they  can  lead  to  better  understandmg  on 
both  sides  of  the  rationales  behind  strategic 
weapons  decisions.  This  in  itself  might  provide 
a  climate  m  which  to  avoid  compulsive  decisions. 

Talks  need  not  necessarily  call  for  an 
explicit  agreement  at  any  particular  stage. 
Whether  we  can  slow  down,  stop,  or  eventually 
throw  the  arms  race  into  reverse,  remains  to  be 
seen. 

It  also  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this  be 
by  a  formal  treaty  or  treaties,  by  a  series  of 
agreements,  by  parallel  action,  or  by  a  conver- 
gence of  viewpoints  resulting  from  a  better  un- 
derstanding of  respective  positions. 

Wliat  counts  at  this  point  is  that  a  dialogue  is 
beginning  about  the  management  of  the  strate- 


gic relations  of  the  two  superpowers  on  a  better, 
safer,  cheaper  basis  than  uncontrolled  acquisi- 
tion of  still  more  weapons. 

U.S.  Objectives 

The  United  States  approaches  the  talks  as  an 
opportunity  to  rest  our  security  on  what  I 
would  call  a  balanced  strategy. 

In  pursuit  of  this  balanced  strategy  of  se- 
curity we  will  enter  the  Helsinki  talks  with 
three  objectives: 

—To  enhance  international  security  by  main- 
taining a  stable  U.S.-Soviet  strategic  relation- 
ship through  limitations  on  the  deployment  of 
strategic  armaments. 

■ — To  halt  the  upward  spiral  of  strategic  arms 
and  avoid  the  tensions,  uncertainties,  and  costs 
of  an  unrestrained  continuation  of  the  strategic 
arms  race. 

— To  reduce  the  risk  of  an  outbreak  of  nuclear 
war  tlirough  a  dialogue  about  issues  arising 
from  the  strategic  situation. 

Some  say  that  there  will  be  risks  in  such  a 
process.  But  it  is  easy  to  focus  too  much  on  the 
risks  that  would  accompany  such  a  new  environ- 
ment and  too  little  on  the  risks  of  the  one  in 
wliich  we  now  live.  Certainly,  such  risks  are 
minimal  compared  to  the  benefits  for  mankind 
which  would  flow  from  success.  I  am  confident 
that  this  country  will  not  let  down  its  guard, 
lose  its  alertness,  or  fail  to  maintain  adequate 
programs  to  protect  against  a  collapse  or  eva- 
sion of  any  strategic  arms  agreement.  No  delega- 
tion to  any  disarmament  negotiation  has  ever 
been  better  prepared  or  better  qualified  than 
the  United  States  delegation.  The  risks  in  seek- 
ing an  agreement  seem  to  be  manageable,  in- 
surable, and  reasonable  ones  to  nm.  They  seem 
less  dangerotts  than  the  risks  of  open-ended 
arms  competition — risks  about  which  we  per- 
haps have  become  somewhat  callous. 

I  have  mentioned  the  rewards  of  progi'ess  in 
terms  of  international  security,  world  order, 
and  improved  opportunities  for  replacing  a 
stalemated  confrontation  with  a  process  of 
negotiation. 

But  there  are  also  other  stakes  in  these  talks 
that  come  closer  to  home.  On  both  sides  of  this 
strategic  race  there  are  urgent  needs  for  re- 
sources to  meet  pressing  domestic  needs. 
Strategic  weapons  cannot  solve  the  problems  of 
how  we  live  at  home  or  how  we  live  in  the  world 
in  this  last  third  of  the  20th  century.  The  Soviet 
Union,  which  devotes  a  much  larger  proportion 


December  1,  1969 


467 


of  its  national  resources  to  armaments  than  do 
we,  must  see  this  as  well. 

Who  knows  the  rewards  if  we  succeed  in 
diverting  the  energy,  time,  and  attention — the 
manpower  and  brainpower — devoted  to  ever 
more  sophisticated  weapons  to  other  and  more 
worthwhile  purposes? 

Speaking  before  tlie  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  2  months  ago,  President  Nixon  said 
that  he  hoped  the  strategic  arms  talks  would 
begin  soon  because  "Tliere  is  no  more  im- 
portant task  before  us."  ^  And  he  added  that 
we  must  "make  a  determined  effort  not  only  to 
limit  the  buildup  of  strategic  arms  but  to 
reverse  it." 

Just  last  week  President  Podgorny  of  the 
Soviet  Union  said :  "A  positive  outcome  of  the 
talks  would  undoubtedly  help  improve  Soviet- 
American  relations  and  preserve  and  strengthen 
the  peace."  To  that  I  say  "Amen." 

He  added  that :  "The  Soviet  Union  is  striving 
to  achieve  precisely  such  results."  Well,  so  are 
we;  and  in  this  we  have  the  support  of  the 
military  services,  of  the  Congress,  and  of  the 
American  people. 

To  that  end  this  Government  approaches  the 
strategic  arms  limitations  talks  in  sober  and 
serious  determination  to  do  our  full  part  to 
bring  a  halt  to  this  unproductive  and  costly 
competition  in  strategic  nuclear  armaments. 


42d  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  by 
Ambassador  Hemy  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation,  at  the  l^Sid  plenary  session  of 
the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  November 
13. 

Press  release  342  dated  November  13 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  Last  week,  your  side's 
statements  were  once  again  couched  in  the  lan- 
guage of  propaganda  and  abuse.  You  showed  no 
willingness  to  discuss  our  projiosals.  You  only 
made  charges  which  are  so  patently  unbeliev- 
able as  to  have  no  persuasive  effect.  Facts 
available  to  anyone  show  your  charges  to  be 
contrary  to  fact,  and  I  will  therefore  not  discuss 
them   further. 

Instead  of  making  such  charges,  why  do  you 


not  discuss  our  proposals,  as  we  have  offered 
to  discuss  yours,  in  reasonable  give-and-take? 
Wliy  do  you  refuse  to  talk  seriously  with  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  no  questions  of  importance 
in  South  Viet-Nam  can  be  successfully  dealt 
with  without  its  participation  ? 

Why  do  3'ou  flout  world  opinion  by  block- 
ing progress  at  these  talks  ? 

The  answer  to  these  questions  is  clear.  You 
prefer  propaganda  to  making  practical  progress 
toward  peace.  You  continue  to  rely  on  false 
expectations  about  events  in  the  United  States 
and  South  Viet-Nam,  rather  than  on  joining 
us  in  seeking  a  settlement  with  justice  for  all 
parties. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  we  all  know  wliat  are 
the  real  problems  which  must  be  dealt  with  in 
these  negotiations.  Over  the  last  41  weeks,  our 
side  has  made  comprehensive  proposals  concern-  J 
ing  these  problems;  our  j^roposals  still  stand.       \ 

President  Nixon  stated  in  his  November  3 
speech  ^  that  "We  have  not  put  forth  our  pro-   . 
posals  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it  basis.  .  .  .  We  I 
have  declared  that  an3i:hing  is  negotiable,  ex- 
cept the  right  of  the  people  of  South  Viet-Nam 
to  determine  their  own  future." 

We  ask  you  to  join  us  in  serious  negotiations  | 
because  we  wish  to  see  this  war  ended,  to  spare 
the  brave  people  of  South  Viet-Nam  further 
suffering,  to  save  the  lives  of  our  soldiers,  and 
to  end  this  waste  of  so  many  North  Vietnamese 
troops,  whose  courage  entitles  them  to  a  better 
fate.  If  progress  at  these  talks  is  not  possible, 
we  can  continue  with  our  plan  under  which  we 
will  witlidraw  our  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam   ■ 
on  an  orderly  scheduled  timetable  in  accord-  | 
ance  with  the  three  criteria  we  have  mentioned 
before. 

The  evidence  shows  that  the  great  majority  of 
American  people  support  the  President  as  he 
seeks  a  just  peace. 

Yesterday,  a  remarkable  exjiression  of  this 
support  took  place.  Tliree  hundi'ed  and  one 
Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  co- 
sponsored  and  signed  a  House  resolution.  I  will 
read  the  text  of  the  resolution : 

Resolved,  That  the  House  of  Representatives  af- 
firms its  support  for  the  President  in  his  efforts  to 
negotiate  a  just  peace  in  A'ietnam,  expresses  the 
earnest  hope  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  for 
such  a  peace,  calls  attention  to  the  numerous  peaceful 
overtures  which  the  United  States  has  made  in  good 
faith  toward  the  Government  of  North  Vietnam,  ap- 
proves and  supports  the  principles  enunciated  by  the 


'  Bin-LETiN  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  297. 
468 


'  For  text,  see  Bitlletin  of  Nov.  24,  1969,  p.  437. 
Department  of  State  Bullefin 


President  that  the  people  of  South  Vietnam  are  en- 
titled to  choose  their  own  government  by  means  of  free 
elections  open  to  all  South  Vietnamese  and  supervised 
by  an  impartial  international  body,  and  that  the  United 
States  is  willing  to  abide  by  the  results  of  such  elec- 
tions, and  supports  the  President  in  his  call  upon  the 
;  Government  of  North  Vietnam  to  announce  its  willing- 
ness to  honor  such  elections  and  to  abide  by  such  re- 
sults and  to  allow  the  issues  in  controversy  to  be 
peacefully  so  resolved  in  order  that  the  war  may  be 
ended  and  peace  may  be  restored  at  last  in  Southeast 
Asia. 

It  may  interest  you  to  know  that  tliis  resolu- 
tion was  originated  by  members  of  the  Demo- 
cratic Party,  although,  of  course,  members  of 
botli  parties  have  signed  it.  At  first,  the  sponsors 
had  planned  to  have  50  Kepublican  and  50  Dem- 
I  ocratic  signers.  But  so  many  wished  to  co- 
sponsor  that  this  idea  was  dropped,  and  instead 
the  resolution  went  in  with  301  cosponsors. 

As  far  as  the  Senate  is  concerned,  it  is  worthy 
of  note  that  56  Senators  have  each  of  them 
signed  a  separate  letter  to  me,  and  I  will  now 
read  the  text  of  that  letter,  as  follows : 

Dear  Mr.  Ambassador  :  Let  me  commend  you  for  the 
efforts  you  have  made  toward  reaching  a  just  and  hon- 
orable peace  in  Viet-Nam  and  I  know  you  will  con- 
tinue to  pursue  this  goal. 

I  believe  that  the  President  has  taken  every  step 
that  any  self-respecting  nation  could  take  to  find  peace 
through  mediation  and  negotiation  and  to  terminate 
the  conflict  at  the  earliest  possible  time.  Further,  I 
feel  that  the  great  majority  of  the  American  people 
support  him  in  these  efforts. 

Frankly,  I  have  advised  against  any  abrupt  with- 
drawal or  substantial  reduction  of  our  forces  in  Viet- 
Nam  on  a  unilateral  basis  and  I  believe  this  is  in 
accord  with  the  thinking  and  views  of  the  overwhelm- 
ing majority  of  the  American  people. 

Three  more  Senators  have  separately  sent 
similar  letters.  This  makes  a  total  of  59  Senators. 

Wlien  more  than  a  majority  in  each  House 
decide  to  commit  themselves  in  advance  in  this 
mamier,  it  can  only  be  described  as  a  very 
unusual  event.  These  members  are  elected  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people.  Every  State  is  rep- 
resented among  the  signers  of  the  resolution. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  let  me  say  that  our 

strength  as  a  nation  does  not  mean  that  we  are 

inflexible.  We  ask  you  to  match  our  flexibility 

and  desire  for  peace  now.  Join  us  in  serious 

I  negotiations. 

Progress  in  these  talks  awaits  your  action. 
Whenever  you  decide  to  address  yourself  seri- 
ously to  the  issues  and  to  engage  in  meaningful 
talks,  you  will  find  that  we  are  ready  to  meet 
you  with  good  will. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  that  concludes  my 
statement. 


Secretary  Reports  on  U.S.  Efforts 
To  Help  Nigeria  Civil  War  Victims 

Statement  by  Secretary  Rogers  ^ 

Over  the  past  9  months  this  administration 
has  made  a  major  effort  to  help  relieve  the 
anguish  and  suffering  of  civilian  victims  of  the 
Nigerian  civil  war.  A  further  report  on  our 
efforts  is  in  order. 

From  the  beginning  of  this  tragic  event  the 
United  States  has  sought  to  support  and  ensure 
an  effective  means  of  delivermg  relief  to  the 
sufferers  on  both  sides. 

Some  of  the  steps  this  Government  has  taken 
include  the  appointment  of  a  high-level  co- 
ordinator of  all  United  States  activities  relating 
to  Nigerian/Biafran  relief,  Ambassador  C. 
Clyde  Fei'guson ;  the  donation  of  over  $65  mil- 
lion to  the  international  relief  effort;  and  sus- 
tained diplomatic  efforts,  both  bilaterally  and 
in  concert  with  other  concerned  Governments, 
to  obtain  agreement  on  expanded  international 
relief  arrangements. 

Nevertheless,  relief  into  Biafran-held  terri- 
tory remams  tragically  inadequate. 

Relief  supplies  now  reach  the  Biafran  enclave 
only  at  night,  in  insufficient  amounts,  by  aircraft 
across  Federally  controlled  territory  lacking 
the  approval  of  the  Federal  Government  and 
originating  outside  Federal  jurisdiction.  Fur- 
thennore,  following  the  shooting  down  of  one 
of  its  aircraft  on  June  5,  the  International  Com- 
mittee of  the  Red  Cross  suspended  its  night 
flight  operations,  which  had  provided  roughly 
one-half  of  relief  supplies.  ICRC  flights  have 
remained  suspended  since  that  time  in  view  of 
the  Federal  Government's  reiteration  on  June 
30  that  it  could  no  longer  permit  such  night 
flights  across  its  territory.  One  major  considera- 
tion cited  by  the  Federal  authorities  was  the 
intermingling  at  night  of  arms  flights  and  relief 
flights  into  the  enclave.  Tlie  present  arrange- 
ments for  getting  relief  into  the  enclave  are  con- 
sidered by  the  agencies  involved  to  be  both 
dangerous  and  inefficient. 

In  recent  weeks,  the  United  States  has  vigor- 
ously supported  efforts  of  the  ICRC  to  obtain 
agreement  by  both  sides  on  a  program  of  day- 
light relief  flights. 

On  September  18  the  ICRC,  after  extensive 
diplomatic  efforts,  concluded  an  agreement  with 


'  Issued  on  Nov.  12  (press  release  339). 


December  1,   1969 


i 


469 


the  Government  of  Nigeria  allowing  an  inter- 
nationally inspected  and  militarily  inviolable 
relief  airlift  during  dajdight  hours  for  an  ex- 
perimental period,  with  good  prospects  for  re- 
newal. The  Biafran  authorities,  liowever,  have 
refused  to  accept  such  flights — principally  on 
the  grounds  that  they  believed  tliey  could  not 
rely  on  either  the  Eed  Cross  or  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment to  assure  that  the  daylight  airlift 
■would  not  be  violated  by  a  surprise  attack  on 
the  Biafran  airfield,  the  vital  terminus  for  their 
arms  supply.  They  asked  instead  that  they  be 
given  third-party  assurances  as  to  the  good  faith 
of  the  Federal  Government  of  Nigeria. 

To  meet  tliis  concern,  at  President  Nixon's 
direction  we  took  the  following  initiatives  de- 
signed to  facilitate  agreement  on  a  safe  and  ef- 
fective method  of  getting  relief  into  the  enclave : 

1.  We  sought  and  received  the  solemn  assur- 
ance of  the  Federal  Government  of  Nigeria  that 
it  would  ensure  that  no  hostile  military  action 
would  be  taken  against  the  ICKC  relief 
aircraft. 

2.  After  consultations  with  us,  other  govern- 
ments agreed  to  offer  impartial  observers  to  ac- 
company ICRC  aircraft  on  their  relief  flights. 

3.  Ambassador  Ferguson  went  to  West 
Africa  to  give  the  Biafrans  the  specific  pledge 
of  the  Federal  Government  of  Nigeria  as  to  the 
inviolability  of  the  ICEC  daylight  relief  flights. 
On  October  2-i,  1969,  the  Biafran  authorities 
formally  rejected  tliis  assurance. 

On  October  31  the  Biafrans  jjublicly  an- 
noimced  their  acceptance  of  an  earlier  U.S.  plan 
for  a  surface  route  utilizing  the  Cross  Eiver  in 
Eastern  Nigeria.  Under  this  proposal,  relief 
supplies  would  be  delivered  by  ship  to  a  mutu- 
ally agi-eed  neutralized  distribution  point.  We 
have  stated  our  willingness  to  resume  discus- 
sions on  this. 

In  our  view,  however,  this  Cross  River  route 
cannot  substitute  for  the  immediate  resump- 
tion of  ICRC  daylight  flights.  Even  if  the  plan 
could  be  promptly  implemented,  the  capacity 
of  the  river  route  will  be  greatly  reduced  by  a 
low  water  level  for  several  more  months.  The 
agreement  of  the  two  sides  to  this  plan  is  so  far 
in  principle  only,  and  there  has  been  no  meeting 
of  minds  on  the  specifics  of  inspection  and  guar- 
antees. Nevertheless,  our  relief  coordinator  is 


continuing  his  efforts  to  bring  about  agreement 
on  tlie  Cross  River  proposal. 

Daylight  flights  imder  agreed  procedures 
therefore  remain  the  only  practicable  scheme  for 
an  immediate  and  substantial  expansion  of 
relief  operations. 

We  believe  that  the  ICRC  proposal  is  such  a 
realistic  and  reasonable  scheme.  We  consider 
that  tliQ  Federal  Government,  in  agreeing  to  the 
ICRC  proposal,  has  acted  constructively  and  in 
accordance  with  its  himfianitarian  responsibil- 
ities. We  also  believe  that  the  proposed  arrange- 
ments for  daylight  flights  meet  in  a  reasonable 
manner  the  legitimate  security  concerns  of  the 
Biafran  authorities. 

Innocent  ci^nlians  are  in  desperate  need  of 
food  and  medical  supplies.  The  United  States 
stands  ready  to  continue  its  aid  to  these  help- 
less victims  of  the  Nigerian  war.  We  earnestly 
hope  that  the  Biafran  leadership  will  recon- 
sider its  position  regarding  daylight  flights. 

Beyond  these  immediate  measures,  however, 
we  clearly  recognize  that  the  ultimate  solution 
to  the  problem  of  relief  is  an  end  to  the  war. 
The  sutfering  and  the  fighting  have  gone  on  too 
long.  As  President  Nixon  has  said,  the  United 
States  earnestly  hopes  for  the  earliest  negoti- 
ated end  to  the  conflict  and  a  settlement  that  will 
assure  the  security  and  peaceful  development  of 
all  the  people  involved.^ 


U.S.  and  Portugal  Conclude 
Aviation  Negotiations 

Department  Statement 

Press  release  S33  dated  November  7 

Delegations  representing  the  Governments  of 
Portugal  and  the  United  States  met  in  Wash- 
ington from  October  27  to  November  6, 1969,  to 
discuss  civil  aviation  relations  between  the  two 
coimtries.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  consultations, 
which  took  place  in  a  cordial  atmosphere,  the 
delegations  agreed  to  submit  their  recommenda- 
tions to  the  respective  Governments  for  their 
consideration. 


^  For  a  statement  by  President  Nixon  on  Feb.  22,  see 
Bulletin  of  Mar.  17, 1969,  p.  222. 


470 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND   CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Brings  Hanoi's  Treatment  of  American  Prisoners  of  War 
to  Attention  of  U.N.  Committee 


Following  are  statcTnents  made  in  Commit- 
tee III  {Social,  Humanitarian,  aiul  Cultural) 
of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  November  11 
and  12  by  Rita  E.  Eauser,  UjS.  Alternate 
Representative  to  the  General  Assembly. 


STATEMENT  OF  NOVEMBER   11 

U.S. /U.N.  press  release  147  dated  November  11 

We  now  commence  general  debate  in  this 
committee  on  three  subjects  of  moment :  elimi- 
nation of  all  forms  of  racial  discrimination, 
measures  to  be  taken  against  nazism  and  racial 
intolerance,  and  violation  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms.  Of  the  three,  the  viola- 
tion of  human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms appears  to  my  delegation  to  be  singularly 
important.  Indeed,  its  importance  to  all  delega- 
tions is  demonstrated  by  its  recurrence  each 
year  as  a  major  subject  of  discussion. 

This  agenda  item  makes  particular  reference 
to  colonial  and  other  dependent  countries  and 
territories.  My  delegation  continues  to  deplore 
the  inhumane  practice  of  apartheid  in  South 
Africa  and  in  Namibia  and  associates  itself  with 
the  efforts  of  the  international  community  seek- 
ing peaceful  and  practicable  means  for  its 
elimmation  as  soon  as  possible.  We  also  remain 
very  concerned  about  the  serious  violations  of 
hiunan  rights  in  other  parts  of  Africa.  These 
questions  are  rightfully  treated  in  many  bodies 
of  the  United  Nations,  including  the  Security 
Council,  for  they  are  of  the  utmost  urgency 
and  gravity. 

Accordmgly,  Madam  Chairman,  while  we 
recognize  fully  the  persistent  and  serious  human 
rights  violations  in  southern  Africa,  we  are  of 
the  view  that  the  Third  Committee  should  not 
utilize  all  of  its  time  on  this  aspect  of  the  sub- 
ject, so  widely  treated  elsewhere  in  the  United 
Nations,  lest  by  so  doing  we  neglect  the  many 


instances  of  grave  violations  of  human  rights 
elsewhere  in  the  world.  I  wish  to  recall  that  our 
agenda  item  itself  refers  to  "the  violation  of 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  .  .  . 
in  all  countries." 

On  reading  the  hundreds  of  petitions  alleging 
violations  of  human  rights  which  come  to  the 
Coimnission  on  Human  Eights  from  sources  in 
many  countries,  my  delegation  has  noted  the 
large  number  referring  to  violations  of  articles 
9-12  and  article  19  of  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights.  The  latter  provides  that 
"Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  opinion 
and  expression,"  including  freedom  to  "seek, 
receive  and  impart  information  and  ideas 
through  any  media  and  regardless  of  frontiers." 
Article  9  states  that  "No  one  shall  be  subjected 
to  arbitrary  arrest,  detention  or  exile."  Articles 
10,  11,  and  12  afford  full  protection  and  due 
process  of  law  as  to  those  charged  with  a  penal 
offense. 

In  reviewing  the  1969  annual  report  of  that 
singular  institution.  Amnesty  International, 
now  consisting  of  20  national  sections  and  over 
15,000  individual  members,  the  work  of  wlaich  is 
to  strengthen  all  international  movements  sup- 
porting human  rights,  my  delegation  was  very 
much  struck  by  the  fact  that  Anmesty  Interna- 
tional has  taken  up  investigation  of  cases  of 
political  prisoners  during  the  year  1968-69  in 
72  countiies.  Included  was  my  own  country, 
where  the  status  of  conscientious  objectors  who 
have  been  imprisoned  for  violations  of  the  con- 
scription laws  has  been  looked  into  with  the  full 
cooperation  of  my  Government. 

Newspaper  reports  and  other  media  sources 
make  perfectly  clear  to  us  that  the  right  of 
political  dissent  is  stiU  a  very  precarious  one  for 
millions  of  people.  Prisons  bulge  with  those  who 
have  dared  to  criticize  or  oppose  peacefully  the 
policies  of  their  governments;  and,  alas,  many 
such  prisoners  are  brutally  ill-treated,  in  viola- 
tion of  all  standards  of  human  decency.  We  note 


December  1,   1969 


471 


particularly  the  evidence  compiled  in  the  re- 
port of  the  ad  hoc  working  group  of  experts  as 
to  African  territories  under  colonial  domina- 
tion, which  documents  the  degree  to  which 
political  prisoners  have  been  brutalized  in  these 
areas. 

Eather  than  promote  and  encourage  open  dis- 
sent, many  governments  have  maintained  power 
with  a  reign  of  fear  which  serves  to  terrorize 
the  minds  and,  eventually,  the  bodies  of  those 
who  disagree. 

In  the  time  available  to  me.  Madam  Chair- 
man, I  cannot  review  all  of  these  situations  oc- 
curring the  world  over.  But  in  the  course  of  this 
debate,  my  delegation  wishes  strongly  to  affirm 
the  inlierent  faculty  of  all  men — if  they  are  in- 
deed, as  article  1  of  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Ilimian  Rights  states,  "born  free  and  equal 
in  dignity  and  rights  .  .  .  endowed  with  rea- 
son and  conscience" — to  exercise  their  basic 
right  of  freedom  of  spirit,  mind,  and  belief, 
wherever  they  may  be  located  and  whatever 
may  be  the  political  and  social  system  under 
which  they  live. 

These  rights  are  no  greater  or  smaller  in  Af- 
rica than  in  the  Americas,  in  Asia  than  in  Eu- 
rope. They  belong  to  all  mankind  and  derive 
from  man's  basic  humanity.  The  right  to  dis- 
agree, to  dissent,  is  perhaps  the  most  cherished 
of  all  the  political  rights  of  man.  History 
teaches  that  yesterday's  dissenters  often  become 
today's  majority,  for  through  reasoned  dissent, 
man  progresses.  If  I  may  so  note,  my  delegation 
was  proud  to  witness  the  free  exercise  of  free 
minds  across  our  country  on  October  15,  a  day 
on  which  many  Americans  were  able  to  express 
their  dissent  with  the  Government's  policy  as 
others  were  equally  able  to  disagree  publicly 
with  the  dissenters.  We  are  grateful  for  orderly 
and  reasonable  disagreement ;  for  we  know  that 
no  country's  policies  are  so  soimd  or  so  correct 
that  none  will  be  found  who  disagree. 

Geneva   Convention   on   Prisoners   of  War 

Madam  Chairman,  my  delegation  is  also 
deeply  disturbed  at  a  most  fundamental  viola- 
tion of  human  decency  as  to  another  category 
of  prisoners:  those  who  are  prisoners  of  war 
protected  by  international  law. 

I  would  like  to  discuss  a  specific  situation  in- 
volving prisoners  which,  I  am  sure  you  will 
understand,  is  of  particular  concern  to  my  coun- 
try. United  States  forces  are  engaged  in  combat 
in  Viet-Nam.  It  is  our  earnest  hope  that  this 


conflict  will  soon  be  terminated  and  the  task 
of  rebuilding  begun.  But  many  Imndreds  of 
American  soldiers,  airmen,  marines,  and  naval 
pei'sonnel  are  at  present  missing  or  captured  in 
Viet-Xam.  How  many  of  these  men,  and  which 
ones,  are  in  captivity  is  a  secret  closely  guarded 
by  the  North  Vietnamese  authorities.  For  each 
of  these  men  there  is  a  wife,  a  child,  a  parent, 
who  is  concerned  with  his  fate.  They  are  sub- 
jected to  uncertainty  and  despair  which  grow  as 
each  day  passes. 

Our  concern  in  this  matter,  expressed  here 
before  the  assemblage  of  nations,  is  humanitar- 
ian, not  political.  This  concern  was  succinctly 
but  urgently  expressed  in  the  agonizing  question 
put  by  the  many  wives  who  have  gone  to  Paris 
to  ask  the  North  Vietnamese  delegation  to  the 
Paris  talks:  Please  tell  me  if  I  am  a  wife  or  a 
widow. 

There  exists  an  mternational  convention, 
legally  binding  upon  all  parties  concerned :  the 
Convention  on  Protection  of  Prisoners  of  "War, 
concluded  at  Geneva  in  1949.^  This  convention 
applies  to  "all  cases  of  declared  war  or  of  any 
other  armed  conflict  which  may  arise  between 
two  or  more  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 
even  if  the  state  of  war  is  not  recognized  by  one 
of  them."  It  thus  binds  the  United  States,  which 
ratified  it  in  1955,  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam, 
which  acceded  to  it  in  1953,  and  North  Viet- 
Nam,  which  acceded  in  1957. 

This  convention,  to  which,  I  may  add,  there 
are  125  parties,  including  more  than  100  mem- 
bers  of  the  United  Nations,  contains  provisions  I 
which,  if  implemented,  would  let  children  know 
if  their  fathers  are  alive,  parents  if  their  sons 
are  well  treated.  It  requires  that,  and  I  quote : 

Immediately  upon  capture,  or  not  more  than  one 
week  after  arrival  at  a  camp,  even  if  it  is  a  transit 
camp,  likewise  in  case  of  sickness  or  transfer  to  hos-     A 
pital  or  to  another  camp,  every  prisoner  of  war  shall     '| 
be  enabled  to  write  direct  to  his  family.  .  .  . 

The  convention  assures  a  prisoner  the  right 
to  remain  in  communication  with  his  loved  ones 
and  with  an  international  or  state  organization 
which  has  assumed  the  obligation  of  safeguard- 
ing the  rights  of  the  prisoner. 

In  addition  to  the  right  to  receive  mail  and 
packages,  and  to  send  a  minimum  of  two  letters 
and  four  cards  each  month,  the  Geneva  con- 
vention specifies  minimum  humane  standards 
of  detention,  of  hygiene,  diet,  recreation,  and 
employment.  It  requires  that  seriously  wounded 


'  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  3364. 


472 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


or  ill  prisoners  be  repatriated  as  soon  as  they 
are  able  to  travel.  It  specifies  that  the  detaining 
power  shall  accept  a  neutral  party  to  the  con- 
flict or  a  respected  international  organization 
such  as  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross  as  a  protecting  power  for  the  prisoners. 
It  requires  that  the  detaining  power  provide 
the  names  of  the  prisoners  it  holds  to  their 
families,  as  well  as  to  the  jDrotecting  power,  or 
to  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross,  to  pass  on  to  their  country  of  origin. 
It  requires  that  the  detaining  party  permit  on- 
the-scene  inspection  of  its  detention  facilities. 

Madam  Chairman,  my  fellow  delegates,  this 
convention  is  not  meant  to  create  a  life  of 
privilege  for  captured  military  personnel.  It  is 
meant  to  ensure  minimum  standards  of  human 
decency  to  helpless  men  who  are  in  the  power  of 
their  military  enemy  and  can  no  longer  pose  a 
threat  to  that  enemy  and  to  provide  minimum 
solace  to  families  who  are  far  from  the  front 
lines.  In  wartime,  when  passions  ai'e  inflamed, 
this  convention  seeks  to  preserve  those  frail 
links  of  compassion  and  decency  which  are  so 
urgently  needed.  Nurtured,  these  links  may  in 
turn  help  move  enemies  toward  a  realization  of 
their  common  stake  in  finding  the  path  to  peace. 

My  country  places  the  highest  priority  upon 
implementation  of  this  convention.  There  are 
now  some  30,000  North  Vietnamese  and  Viet 
Cong  prisoners  of  war  in  South  Viet-Nam  who 
have  been  accorded  the  status  and  the  rights  of 
prisoners  of  war  under  the  Geneva  convention, 
even  though  many  of  them  may  not  teclmically 
be  entitled  to  such  prisoner-of-war  status  as 
defined  in  the  convention. 

The  United  States  has  tried  again  and  again 
to  persuade  Hanoi  to  apply  the  basic  minimum 
standards  guaranteed  by  the  convention :  identi- 
fication of  prisoners,  the  right  to  send  and  re- 
ceive mail,  and  a  protecting  power  to  inspect 
detention  conditions.  We  remain  immensely 
grateful  to  the  governments  which  have  co- 
operated in  these  regrettably  misuccessful 
efforts. 

In  contrast,  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam,  with  the  cooperation  of  its  allies, 
opened  all  detention  camps  to  inspection  by  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  The 
names  of  POWs  have  been  made  available  to 
the  ICRC.  Prisoners  of  war  detained  by  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  have  the  right  to  send  and 
receive  mail  and  packages.  They  are  interned 
in  six  camps  which  are  administered  by  the  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam  and  which,  as  regular  inter- 


national inspection  has  shown,  conform  to  the 
requirements  of  the  Geneva  convention. 

Let  me  be  clear  that  we  are  not  claiming  a 
perfect  record  on  tliis  subject.  War  is  ugly  and 
brutal  by  nature,  and  violations  by  individuals 
have  occurred.  The  pomt  is,  however,  that  the 
Allied  command  has  made  every  effort  to  en- 
sure that  the  convention  is  applied.  This  in- 
cludes the  issuance  of  clear  and  explicit  orders 
and,  even  moi-e  important,  thorough  investiga- 
tion of  alleged  violations  and  punishment  of 
those  found  guilty.  This  policy  is  confirmed  and 
supported  by  the  continuous  review,  both  official 
and  unofficial,  which  results  from  free  access  to 
POW's  by  delegates  and  doctors  of  the  ICRC. 

The  United  States  neither  seeks  nor  deserves 
praise  for  its  efforts  to  implement  the  conven- 
tion. This  is  our  duty — our  legal  duty  and  our 
moral  duty.  The  tragic  fact,  however,  is  that 
North  Viet-Nam  and  the  National  Liberation 
Front  refuse  to  acknowledge  their  legal  and 
moral  duty  to  apply  similar  standards  of  treat- 
ment to  the  helpless  prisoners  in  their  power, 
Vietnamese  as  well  as  American. 

North  Viet-Nam's  Treatment  of  Prisoners 

The  record  is  indeed  sad.  The  North  Viet- 
namese authorities  have  refused  to  identify  the 
prisoners  they  hold.  Only  a  limited  minority 
of  those  men  known  by  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment to  have  been  captured  have  been  al- 
lowed to  communicate  with  the  outside  world. 
Mail  even  from  this  small  minority  has  been  in- 
frequent and  irregular.  The  sick  and  the 
womided  have  not  been  repatriated,  nor  have 
they  been  identified.  Even  the  minimum  pro- 
tection that  would  be  afforded  by  inspection  of 
POW  facilities  by  an  impartial  international 
body  has  been  denied.  The  ICRC's  repeated  re- 
quests to  be  allowed  to  visit  the  prisoners  at 
their  places  of  detention  have  been  repeatedly 
denied,  nor  has  any  other  accepted  intermediary 
been  given  access  to  the  prisoners. 

From  the  reports  of  the  few  men  actually  re- 
leased by  North  Viet-Nam  and  from  other 
sources  has  come  disturbing  evidence  that 
prisoners  are  being  depi-ived  of  adequate  medi- 
cal care  and  diets  and  that,  in  many  instances, 
they  have  been  subjected  to  physical  and 
mental  torture.  For  example,  Lieutenant 
Robert  Frishman,  one  of  the  recently  released 
American  prisoners,  in  a  public  statement  on 
September  2,  1969,  shortly  after  his  release, 
said  American  prisoners  are  subject  to  "soli- 
tary   confinement,    forced    statements,    living 


December  1,   1969 


473 


in  a  cage  for  3  years,  being  put  in  straps, 
not  being  allowed  to  sleep  or  eat,  removal 
of  fingernails,  being  hung  from  a  ceiling,  having 
an  infected  arm  which  was  almost  lost,  not  re- 
ceiving medical  care,  being  dragged  along  the 
ground  with  a  broken  leg.  .  .  ."  Recounting 
the  treatment  of  Lieutenant  Commander  Strat- 
ton,  Lieutenant  Frishman  said : 

The  North  Vietnamese  tried  to  get  Lieutenant  Com- 
mander Stratton  to  appear  before  a  press  delegation 
and  say  that  he  had  received  humane  and  lenient  treat- 
ment. He  refused  because  his  treatment  hadn't  been 
humane.  He'd  been  tied  up  with  ropes  to  such  a  degree 
that  he  still  has  large  scars  on  his  arms  from  rope 
bums  which  became  infected.  He  was  deprived  of 
sleep,  beaten,  had  his  fingernails  removed,  and  was  put 
in  .solitary,  but  the  North  Vietnamese  insisted  that  he 
make  the  false  "humane  treatment  statements"  and 
threw  him  into  a  dark  cell  alone  for  38  days  to  think 
about  it. 

Tliis  record  is  indeed  chilling.  It  has  been 
noted  and  deplored  by  a  great  many  interna- 
tional observers.  For  example,  Jacques  Frey- 
mond  of  the  International  Committee  of  the 
Red  Cross,  reportmg  on  the  work  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Prisoners  of  War,  higUighted  the 
contrasts  between  North  and  South  Viet-Nam 
as  follows : 

In  Viet-Nam,  it  (the  ICRC)  has  so  far  had  limited 
success.  In  fact,  in  spite  of  repeated  representations, 
it  has  not  been  able  to  obtain  the  agreement  of  the 
Democratic  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  to  the  installation 
of  a  delegation  in  Hanoi  nor  even  to  the  visiting  of 
prisoners  of  war.  .  .  . 

On  the  other  hand,  the  ICRC  is  represented  in  Saigon 
and  the  delegates  are  able  to  visit  all  prisoner  of  war 
camps.  They  also  regularly  receive  nominal  rolls  of 
these  prisoners. 

In  the  face  of  such  international  criticism 
there  have  been  few  breaks  in  the  silence  of 
Hanoi.  We  have,  however,  been  told — though 
in  the  shrill  phrases  of  propaganda,  rather  than 
in  the  measured  tones  of  statesmanship  or  hu- 
manitarianism — that  the  Geneva  convention 
does  not  apply  because  there  has  not  been  a 
formal  declaration  of  war  and  that  the  Ameri- 
can prisoners  are  "war  criminals"  and  therefore 
not  entitled  to  the  rights  conferred  upon 
prisoners  of  war  by  the  Geneva  convention.  De- 
spite this,  Hanoi  says,  it  treats  the  prisoners 
"humanely." 

Madam  Chairman,  my  Government  cannot 
accept  these  assertions.  The  Geneva  convention 
provides  a  detailed  international  standard  of 
humane  treatment  agamst  which  the  treatment 


of  prisoners  of  war  can  be  measured.  Hanoi's 
mere  assertion  of  "humane"  treatment,  which 
has  never  been  verified  by  impartial  inspection, 
is  no  substitute.  Further,  North  Viet-Nam's 
denial  that  the  convention  is  applicable  and  its 
assertion  that  it  therefore  cannot  be  the  stand- 
ard to  measure  its  conduct  have  no  basis  in 
international  law.  Hanoi  says  that  the  conven- 
tion applies  only  where  there  has  been  a  declara- 
tion of  war.  But  it  is  clear  from  the  language 
of  tlie  convention,  which  I  quoted  earlier,  that 
the  absence  of  such  a  declaration  has  no  rela- 
tionship to  the  convention's  applicability  and 
does  not  justify  a  refusal  to  apply  it. 

Hanoi  has  also  asserted  that  our  men  held  as 
prisoners  are  war  criminals,  apparently  on  the 
tlieory  that  any  attacks  against  North  Viet- 
Nam  or  Viet  Cong  forces  or  facilities  are  crimi- 
nal acts  and  that  all  military  personnel  involved 
in  such  attacks  are  criminals.  Such  assertions 
are  patently  absurd.  Our  men  are  not  war 
criminals.  IVIoreover,  the  Geneva  conventions 
and  modern  international  humanitarian  law 
reject  any  suggestion  that  the  protection  of 
individual  war  victims,  whether  soldiers  or 
civilians,  is  dependent  upon  moral  or  legal 
judgments  about  the  cause  for  which  their  gov- 
ernment is  fighting.  The  law  is  there  to  protect 
all  the  victims  of  war  on  both  sides.  All  coun- 
tries have  an  interest  in  seeing  that  it  is 
respected. 

The  United  States  understands  that  every 
country  believes  that  it  is  right  and  its  enemy 
wrong.  But,  Madam  Chairman,  the  Geneva  con- 
vention was  designed  specifically  to  meet  this 
problem.  It  imposes  upon  all  combatant  powers 
the  obligation  to  treat  military  personnel  made 
helpless  by  their  captivity  in  accordance  with  a 
single  objective  and  verifiable  standard. 

ICRC  Resolution 

The  21st  International  Conference  of  the  Red 
Cross,  held  at  Istanbul  in  September,  cut 
through  any  possible  quibbles  that  could  be 
made  by  a  party  to  the  Viet-Nam  conflict.  It 
adopted  without  dissent  a  resolution  which  ob- 
tained the  support  of  11-4  governments  and  na- 
tional Red  Cross  organizations."  That  resolu- 
tion called  upon  all  parties : 


"  For  a  U.S.  statement  and  text  of  the  resolution,  see 
Bulletin  of  Oct.  13, 1969,  p.  323. 


474 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


...  to  abide  by  the  obligations  set  forth  in  the 
Convention  and  upon  all  authorities  involved  in  an 
armed  conflict  to  ensure  that  all  uniformed  members 
of  the  regular  armed  forces  of  another  party  to  the 
conflict  and  all  other  persons  entitled  to  prisoner  of  war 
status  are  treated  hiunanely  and  given  the  fullest  meas- 
ure of  protection  prescribed  by  the  Convention.  .  .  . 

It  also  recognized — and  again  I  repeat  the 
exact  words  of  this  resolution : 

.  .  .  that,  even  apart  from  the  Convention,  the  in- 
ternational community  has  consistently  demanded 
humane  treatment  for  prisoners  of  war,  including  iden- 
tification and  accounting  for  all  prisoners,  provision  of 
an  adequate  diet  and  medical  care,  that  prisoners  be 
permitted  to  communicate  with  each  other  and  with 
the  exterior,  that  seriously  sick  or  wounded  prisoners 
be  promptly  repatriated,  and  that  at  all  times  prisoners 
be  protected  from  physical  and  mental  torture,  abuse 
and  reprisals. 

We  hope  this  committee  will  take  note  at  this 
session  of  the  resolution  passed  without  dissent 
by  the  International  Red  Cross  Conference  in 
Istanbul  and  that  it  will  in  a  similar  fashion  re- 
affirm the  obligations  of  all  parties  to  the  Geneva 
convention.  We  especially  hope  that  North  Viet- 
Nam,  which  has  frequently  expressed  its  abiding 
regard  for  humane  principles,  will  lieed  this 
unequivocal  and  specific  call  reflectmg  the  con- 
science of  tlie  international  community. 

Madam  Chairman,  2  weeks  ago,  on  October 
30,  the  Secretary  General  made  the  following 
statement : 

It  is  the  view  of  the  Secretary  General  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  North  Vietnam  ought  to  give  an  interna- 
tional humanitarian  organization  such  as  the  League 
of  Red  Cross  Societies  access  to  the  Americans  detained 
in  North  Vietnam. 

We  join  in  this  view,  and  we  urge  all  the 
governments  represented  here  today  to  use  their 
utmost  influence  so  that  at  least  this  single  step 
forward  can  be  accomplished.  We  would  indeed 
welcome  the  intervention  of  any  organization 
or  group  of  concerned  people  who  may  be  able 
to  reduce  the  anguish  of  the  prisoners  and  their 
families.  But  the  Secretary  General  has  made 
a  concrete,  limited  proposal;  its  immediate  im- 
plementation would  bring  closer  the  day  when 
the  observance  of  the  humanitarian  principles 
of  the  Geneva  convention  by  all  parties  is 
complete. 

I  have  spoken  at  length  on  this  matter, 
Madam  Chairman,  for  it  is  of  vital  importance 
to  the  United  States.  It  is  also  of  paramoimt  in- 
terest to  all  nations  of  the  world.  The  failure  to 


treat  any  prisoner  of  war,  wherever  he  may  be, 
m  accordance  with  common  standards  of  de- 
cency, is  an  affront  to  all  who  claim  the  mantle 
of  civilization. 


STATEMENT  OF  NOVEMBER   12 

U.S./U.N.  press  release  157  dated  November  12 

I  excuse  myself  for  taking  the  right  of  reply 
at  this  time.  We  have  been  honored  here,  all  of 
us,  by  the  presence  of  the  Permanent  Eepre- 
sentative  of  Algeria,  who  has  chosen  to  reply 
to  a  humanitarian  point  in  political  terms. 

I  should  like  simply  to  refer  to  him — and  I 
will  be  glad  to  give  to  him  a  copy — a  note  which 
was  addressed  to  the  Secretary  General  dated 
February  10,  1960,  and  circulated  by  the  Sec- 
retariat at  the  request  of  20  member  countries 
to  disseminate  a  report  of  the  International  Eed 
Cross  Committee  on  the  interimient  camps  in 
Algeria.  Madam  Chairman,  the  investigation 
of  the  ICRC  in  that  matter  came  about  in  large 
part  because  of  the  representations  my  Govern- 
ment made,  and  the  American  Eed  Cross  So- 
ciety made,  to  the  ICEC.  We  did  so  before 
Algeria  had  gained  her  independence.  We  did 
not  judge  the  rights  or  wrongs  of  the  conflict. 
We  did  not  pick  between  friend  and  foe.  We 
responded  to  a  human  demand,  and  in  direct 
answer  to  evidence  of  torture  and  maltreatment 
of  Algerians  who  were  interned  at  that  time. 

Madam  Chairman,  the  Algerian  Eepresenta- 
tive,  as  well  as  the  Cuban  Representative,  has 
chosen  to  speak  of  article  85  of  the  Geneva  con- 
vention and  the  reservation  which  was  made 
by  the  Democratic  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam.  It 
was  a  reservation  made  by  almost  all  of  the 
Socialist  countries.  It  was  cited  here  several 
times  today,  and  very  key  words  in  it  were  sim- 
ply ignored.  The  reservation  reads  "the  Demo- 
cratic Eepublic  of  Vietnam  declares  that 
prisoners  of  war  prosecuted  and  convicted" — 
I  repeat,  "prosecuted  and  convicted" — "for  war 
crimes  or  for  crimes  against  humanity  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  laid  down  by  the 
Nuremberg  Court  of  Justice  shall  not  benefit 
from  the  present  convention."  Madam  Chair- 
man, there  have  been  no  prosecutions  and  no 
convictions  of  any  prisoners  of  war  held  by 
North  Viet-Nam. 

I  might  state,  and  I  have  done  considerable 


December  1,   1969 


475 


research  on  tlie  matter,  that  the  official  position 
of  the  Soviet  Union  ex^jhiined  at  the  time  it 
enacted  this  reservation  was  that  a  prisoner  is 
not  deprived  of  any  of  the  protections  of  the 
convention  until  after  prosecution  and  final  con- 
viction with  all  rights  of  appeal. 

I  should  like  further  to  state,  Madam  Chair- 
man, in  response  to  the  comments  today  and 
yesterday  by  the  distinguished  delegate  of  the 
Soviet  Union  concerning  my  Government's  in- 
diiference  to  the  political  question  of  Viet-Nam 
in  this  forum :  Madam  Chairman,  my  Govern- 


ment in  1964,  before  our  troops  were  in  Viet- 
Nam,  and  in  1966,  after  our  troops  were  in 
Viet-Xam,  made  several  attempts  to  bring  the 
matter  of  Viet-Nam  before  the  Security  Council. 

The  last  attempt  made  by  Ambassador  Gold- 
berg in  19GG  was  met  with  the  following  re- 
sponse from  the  Soviet  delegation,  and  I  quote : 

"The  Soviet  delegation  deems  it  necessary  to 
state  that  it  is  opposed  to  the  convening  of  the 
Security  Council  to  discuss  the  question  of  Viet- 
Nam  and  to  the  inclusion  of  this  question  on  the 
Council's  agenda." 


Move  To  Change  Representation  of  China  in  the  U.N. 
Rejected  by  the  24th  General  Assembly 


Following  is  a  statement  hy  Congressman 
J.  Irving  Whalley,  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations,  made  in  plenary  session  on 
November  Ji.,  together  with  the  texts  of  a  resolu- 
tion adopted  by  the  Assembly  on  November  11 
and  an  Albanian  draft  resolution  tohich  ivas 
rejected  on  that  day. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  WHALLEY 

U.S./U.N.  press  release  144  dated  November  4 

Once  again,  as  in  so  many  years  past,  the  As- 
sembly lias  before  it  the  proposal  of  a  small 
group  of  members  under  the  leadership  of  Al- 
bania to  bring  the  representatives  of  Com- 
munist China  into,  and  simultaneously  expel  the 
representatives  of  the  Republic  of  China  from, 
the  United  Nations  and  all  its  agencies. 

This  is  the  same  proposal  which  the  Assembly 
has  rejected  for  many  years  past.  Moreover,  the 
facts  iDearing  on  this  question  remain,  most  re- 
grettably, essentially  the  same  as  for  many 
years  past. 

The  United  States  will,  therefore,  again  op- 
pose the  Albanian  resolution,  and  we  urge  that 
it  again  be  decisively  rejected. 

Once  again  also,  as  a  result  of  this  issue  hav- 
ing been  raised,  it  becomes  necessary  to  resolve 
any  doubts  that  may  exist  on  the  voting  proce- 
dure applying  to  this  question.  For  that  pur- 
pose, my  Government  has  joined  with  Australia 


and  13  other  members  in  offering  a  draft  res- 
olution which  reaffirms  the  validity  of  the 
Assembler's  long-established  position  that  any 
proposal  to  change  the  representation  of  China 
in  the  United  Nations  is  an  important  question, 
requiring  a  two-thirds  majority  for  adoption. 
Let  me  emphasize  that  my  delegation  con- 
siders this  debate,  in  the  circumstances,  to  be 
superfluous  and  unnecessary.  Nevertheless, 
other  delegations,  with  a  perseverance  that  de- 
serves a  better  cause,  have  once  again  joined  the 
issue.  In  the  circumstances,  my  delegation  has 
no  alternative  but  to  reiterate  its  position.  Tliis 
I  shall  now  do,  first  on  the  "important  question" 
resolution  and  then  on  the  Albanian  resolution. 

The   Important-Question   Resolution 

I  place  the  important-question  resolution  first 
because  it  takes  priority  in  order  of  voting.  This 
priority  flows  not  only  from  the  fact  that  this 
resolution,  contained  in  document  A/L.567,  was 
submitted  before  the  Albanian  resolution,  num- 
bered A/L.569,  but  also  from  the  manifest  logic 
of  the  proposition  that  a  decision  on  the  voting 
procedure  to  be  applied  to  a  substantive  resolu- 
tion should  precede  the  vote  on  that  resolution 
itself. 

Madam  President,  I  described  the  important- 
question  resolution  a  moment  ago  as  embodying 
the  long-established  position  of  the  General  As- 
sembly. This  position  has  been  affirmed  and  re- 


476 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


affirmed  on  every  occasion  when  the  Assembly 
has  held  a  substantive  debate  on  the  issue  of 

,  Chinese  representation.  Specifically,  when  this 
question  in  its  present  form  first  arose  in  1961, 
the  Assembly  decided,  as  the  present  draft  res- 

'  olution  recalls,  that,  in  accordance  with  article 

1  18  of  the  charter,  "any  proposal  to  change  the 
representation  of  Cliina  is  an  important  ques- 
tion." ^  Resolutions  subsequently  adopted  in 
1965,  1966,  1967,  and  1968  affirmed  again  by 
large  majorities  the  validity  of  that  decision. 

I  Madam  President,  it  seems  almost  superflu- 
ous to  recall  to  the  members  the  compelling  rea- 
sons why  the  Assembly  consistently  has  affirmed 
the  important-question  procedure.  The  issue 
before  us  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  replacing  one 
set  of  representatives  with  another.  The  very 
fact  that  each  year  this  issue  has  been  debated  at 
length  is  testimony  to  the  fact  that  we  all  do  in 
reality  regard  the  question  as  important. 

Among  that  large  majority  of  members  who 
have  supported  the  important-question  proce- 
dure, there  are,  as  we  laiow,  divergent  views  on 
the  question  of  mainland  China's  participation 
in  the  United  Nations.  All  are  united,  however, 
in  the  importance  they  attach  to  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  the  charter's  provisions  on  this 
point. 

Article  18  of  the  charter  not  only  requires  that 
decisions  of  this  Assembly  on  important  ques- 
tions be  decided  by  a  two-thirds  majority;  it 
goes  on  to  list  some  of  the  types  of  questions 
that  fall  within  this  categoi-y,  including  specifi- 
cally "the  admission  of  new  Members  to  the 
United  Nations,  the  suspension  of  the  rights 
and  privileges  of  membersliip,  the  expulsion  of 
Members."  Certainly  a  close  reading  of  article 
18  makes  clear  that  the  Albanian  proposal  is  an 
important  question.  To  insist  on  the  integrity  of 
this  charter  provision  is  in  the  manifest  self- 
interest  of  us  all.  For  surely  all  here  must  rec- 
ognize that  to  permit  a  perhaps  temporary 

,  simple  majority  of  those  present  and  voting  to 
expel  a  member  of  the  United  Nations — an  act 
that  has  never  been  taken  in  the  24  years  of  this 
organization's  life — would  set  a  most  dangerous 
precedent.  Those  who  may  be  tempted  now  to 
disregard  the  charter's  safeguards  because  of 
their  views  on  the  present  issue  should  ponder 
well  whether,  at  some  future  time  on  some  fu- 
ture issue,  they  might  not  find  themselves  in  a 
challenged  position  similar  to  that  in  which 


they  now  seek  to  place  the  Republic  of  China. 

Thus,  in  reaffirming  the  important-question 
principle,  we  will  be  taking  an  action  that  re- 
lates to  far  more  than  the  question  of  Chinese 
representation.  We  will  in  effect  be  deciding  to 
remain  faithful  to  a  basic  rule  of  tlie  charter 
on  which  the  orderly  conduct  of  our  work — 
perhaps  even  the  future  of  some  of  us  in  the 
United  Nations — depends. 

Therefore,  my  delegation  strongly  urges  the 
members  of  this  Assembly,  whatever  may  be 
their  position  on  the  substance  of  the  question 
of  Chinese  representation,  once  again  to  re- 
affirm the  vital  procedural  point  set  forth  in 
document  A/L.567. 

The  Albanian   Resolution 

Madam  President,  it  seems  almost  equally  un- 
necessary to  reiterate  my  Govermnent's  firm  op- 
position to  the  substantive  proposal  contained 
in  document  A/L.569,  a  proposal  remarkable 
neither  for  its  wisdom  nor  for  its  justice.  For 
almost  a  decade,  Albania  and  other  sponsors  of 
the  current  draft  resolution  have  presented  us 
with  almost  identical  proposals.  On  each  of 
those  occasions  the  Assembly  has  refused  to  be 
blinded  by  false  appeals  to  the  principle  of 
miiversality  of  membership — in  a  resolution  the 
effect  of  which  is  to  expel  a  present  member — 
and  by  other  distortions  of  fact  and  misrepre- 
sentations of  Peking's  actions  and  attitudes.  On 
each  occasion  the  Assembly  has  rejected  the 
proposition  that  representatives  of  Communist 
China  should  occupy  seats  from  which  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Republic  of  Cliina  would 
in  the  same  instant  be  expelled. 

The  language  of  the  draft  resolution,  as  in 
the  recent  past,  deliberately  has  been  cast  in 
such  a  fashion  that  these  two  actions — the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Republic  of  China  and  the  seat- 
ing in  its  place  of  Communist  China — are  bound 
together  as  an  integral  and  indivisible  whole. 

The  views  of  the  United  States  on  this  prop- 
osition and  on  the  broader  question  of  the 
desirability  of  the  improvement  of  mainland 
China's  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
have  been  made  clear  on  a  number  of  recent  oc- 
casions. Little  has  changed  since  we  last  con- 
sidered and  rejected  an  identical  Albanian 
resolution  in  1968.=^  Nevertheless,  so  that  there 
can  be  no  misunderstanding,  I  would  like  briefly 
to  restate  the  main  reasons  why  my  Government 


'  For  background,  see  Btilletin  of  Jan.  15,  1962, 
p.  108. 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  9, 1968,  p.  609. 


December  1,   1969 

368-879—69 2 


477 


once  again  opposes  the  Albanian  resolution. 

This  resolution  demands  that  rei)resentation 
in  this  organization  and  all  its  related  agencies 
be  denied  to  the  Republic  of  China: 

— A  Government  which  effectively  governs 
over  13  million  people,  a  population  which  ex- 
ceeds that  of  most  of  the  members  of  this 
organization ; 

— ^A  Government  recognized  diplomatically 
by  a  majority  of  the  membersliip  of  this 
organization; 

— A  Government  which  has  been  a  member  of 
this  organization  from  its  founding  and  which 
has  committed  no  act  that  would  justify  its  ar- 
bitrary expulsion  but  which,  on  the  contrary, 
has  contributed  faithfully  and  constructively 
to  the  work  of  the  organization,  including  the 
specialized  agencies. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  expulsion  of 
the  Republic  of  China  could  only  be  regarded 
as  a  grave  injustice. 

The  demand  that  the  Republic  of  China  be 
summarily  expelled  from  this  organization 
should  therefore  gain  no  acceptance  from  those 
who  genuinely  favor  universality  of  member- 
ship; for  its  most  immediate  result,  indeed  its 
only  certain  result,  woidd  be  the  loss  of  one 
member. 

Nor  can  this  demand,  we  believe,  be  sup- 
ported by  those  devoted  to  the  cause  of  equity 
and  justice.  It  should  be  opposed  as  well  by 
those  who  maintain  that  the  charter  must  be  up- 
held if  this  organization  itself  is  to  survive  and 
be  effective. 

The  language  of  the  charter  on  the  matter  of 
expulsion  of  members  is  clear.  Article  6  reserves 
this  extraordinary  and  extremely  important  ac- 
tion to  cases  m  which  a  member  has  persistently 
violated  the  principles  contained  in  the  charter. 
It  requires  the  combined  action  of  both  the  Se- 
curity Council  and  the  General  Assembly,  as 
well  it  might,  in  view  of  the  grave  import  of 
such  an  action  both  for  the  organization  and  for 
the  individual  members.  I  believe  that  there  is 
not  a  single  delegation  here  that  could  argue 
with  any  logic  or  justice  that  the  conduct  of  the 
Republic  of  China  justifies  article  6  action.  Yet 
what  is  proposed  here  is  still  worse;  namely, 
that  the  Assembly  accomplish  the  same  unjusti- 
fiable end  by  the  imjustifiable  means  of  circum- 
venting the  charter. 

All  these  reasons.  Madam  President,  should 
impel  this  Assembly  firmly  to  reject  this  pro- 
posal to  expel  the  Republic  of  China  from  the 


United  Nations.  The  formulation  of  the  Al- 
banian proposal  requires  the  rejection  in  toto  of 
that  resolution,  whatever  the  views  members 
might  have  on  the  question  of  Peking's  par- 
ticipation in  this  organization. 

Obstacles   Raised   by  Mainland   China 

Many  believe  that  an  area  as  large  as  main- 
land China  and  an  authority  as  real  and  as  po- 
tentially influential  as  that  in  Peking  cannot  be 
ignored  and  should  be  represented  in  the  United 
Nations  and  brought  out  of  its  isolation.  While 
these  views  are  understandable — and  my  Gov- 
ernment shares  the  conviction  that  it  is  im- 
portant for  mainland  China  to  return  to  the 
family  of  nations — they  ignore  the  real  obstacles 
which  mainland  China  itself  raises  to  its  par- 
ticipation here  under  j^resent  circumstances.  It 
seems  to  my  delegation  that  the  real  question 
is  when  the  authorities  in  Peking  will  permit 
their  people  to  apply  their  great  talents  in  a 
constructive  relationship  with  the  community  of 
nations. 

Others,  including  the  sponsors  of  the  Alba- 
nian resolution,  go  a  step  farther  and  submit 
that  no  important  international  problem  can  be 
solved  without  the  participation  of  Commvmist 
China.  Wliat  are  the  facts  ? 

— Peking's  own  conditions  for  its  participa- 
tion, among  which  is  the  expulsion  of  the  Re- 
public of  China,  are  demands  which  this  As- 
sembly in  good  conscience,  indeed  in  fidelity  to 
the  principles  of  the  charter,  cannot  accept.  The 
United  Nations,  for  its  part,  makes  no  special 
demands ;  it  asks  only  that  members  accept  and 
be  able  and  willing  to  carry  out  the  obligations 
contained  in  the  charter.  Is  it  then  the  United 
Nations  or  is  it  rather  Peking  itself  which,  by 
imposing  unreasonable  conditions  and  by  pur- 
suing a  policy  of  open  hostility  to  its  neighbors 
great  and  small,  has  placed  obstacles  in  the 
path  of  its  participation  here  ? 

— It  has  condemned  efforts  to  end  the  nuclear 
arms  race;  it  rejected  this  Assembly's  invitation 
to  participate  in  disarmament  discussions. 

— It  has  indicated  clearly  that  it  opposes  the 
negotiation  of  a  peaceful  settlement  in  Viet- 
Nam. 

President  Nixon  has  called  for  an  era  of  nego- 
tiation to  replace  confrontation ;  yet  Peking  has 
thus  far  spurned  our  efforts  to  negotiate.  This 
year  it  canceled  the  Warsaw  meeting  of  Ameri- 
can and  Chinese  Communist  Ambassadors  pre- 
viously scheduled  for  February. 


478 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


We  are  entitled  under  such  circumstances  to 
question  whether  it  is  a  hostile  world  that  has 
isolated  Peking  or  rather  a  still-hostile  Peking 
that  isolates  itself. 

Under  such  circumstances  one  must  question 
whether  the  participation  of  Peking  in  the 
United  Nations  would  contribute  to  the  cause 
of  peace  or  to  the  work  of  this  organization. 

Nonetheless,  despite  these  discouraging 
circumstances  and  despite  continued  hostility 
and  rebuff,  my  Government  continues  to  share 
the  conviction  of  many  others  that  the  current 
state  of  tension  in  relationshijos  with  Peking 
should  not  continue.  As  Secretary  of  State 
Rogers  said  in  an  address  in  Canberra  last 
August :  ^ 

Communist  China  obviously  has  long  been  too  iso- 
lated from  world  affairs. 

This  is  one  reason  why  we  have  been  seeking  to  open 
Tip  channels  of  communication.  ...  to  remove  irritants 
in  our  relations  and  to  help  remind  people  on  main- 
land China  of  our  historic  friendship  for  them. 

To  this  end,  as  Secretary  Rogers  noted,  a 
number  of  steps  have  recently  been  taken  by  our 
Government.  We  have  proposed  an  exchange 
of  persons.  We  have  also  liberalized  regulations 
concerning  travel  and  trade  with  Commtmist 
China. 

INIoreover,  we  had  been  prepared  to  offer 
specific  suggestions  on  an  agreement  for  more 
normal  relations  at  the  planned  Warsaw  meet- 
ing in  February,  but,  as  I  said,  that  meeting 
unfortunately  was  canceled  by  Peking.  And  thus 
far,  none  of  our  mitiatives  has  met  with  a  posi- 
tive response. 

But,  Madam  President,  the  United  States  in- 
tends to  persevere.  As  President  Nixon  made 
clear  in  this  Assembly  hall  on  September  18,* 
we  are  ready  to  talk  with  the  leaders  of  Com- 
munist China  in  a  frank  and  serious  spirit 
whenever  they  choose  to  abandon  their  self- 
imposed  isolation. 

All  these  efforts,  however,  by  my  country  and 
by  others  to  improve  relationships  with  Peking 
camiot  be  furthered — nor  would  the  interests 
of  this  organization  be  served  in  any  way — 
through  the  adoption  of  the  Albanian  draft 
resolution.  That  resolution  would  merely  re- 
ward Peking's  attitude  of  self- isolation  and  dis- 
respect for  the  United  Nations  by  seating  it 
here  under  its  own  terms — which  would  expel 
the  Republic  of  China,  in  utter  disregard  for  its 


*  Btti-letin  of  Sept.  1, 1969,  p.  178. 

*  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6,  1969,  p.  297. 


December   1,    1969 


riglits  and  its  contributions  as  a  member  of  the 
United  Nations.  This  would  be  a  major  step 
backward,  not  forward.  It  would  encourage 
intransigence,  debase  the  charter,  and  perpetrate 
a  grave  injustice  against  a  member  of  the 
United  Nations. 

I  therefore  urge  my  fellow  delegates  once 
again  decisively  to  reject  the  resolution  con- 
tained in  document  A/L.569. 


TEXTS  OF   RESOLUTIONS 

Important-Question   Resolution  ^ 

Representation  of  China   in   the   United  Nations 

The  General  Assernbly, 

Recalling  the  recommendation  contained  in  its  res- 
olution 390  (V)  of  14  December  19.50  that,  whenever 
more  than  one  authority  claims  to  be  the  Government 
entitled  to  represent  a  Member  State  in  the  United  Na- 
tions and  this  question  becomes  the  subject  of  con- 
troversy in  the  United  Nations,  the  question  should  be 
considered  in  the  light  of  the  purposes  and  principles 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  circum- 
stances of  each  case, 

Recalling  further  Its  decision  in  resolution  1668 
(XVI)  of  15  December  1961,  in  accordance  with  Arti- 
cle 18  of  the  Charter,  that  any  proposal  to  change  the 
representation  of  China  is  an  important  question, 
which,  in  General  Assembly  re.solutions  2025  (XX)  of 
17  November  1965,  2159  (XXI)  of  29  November  1966, 
2271  (XXII)  of  28  November  1967  and  2389  (XXIII) 
of  19  November  1968,  was  affirmed  as  remaining  valid, 

Afflrms  again  that  this  decision  remains  valid. 

Albanian   Draft   Resolution  ^ 

The  General  Assertiljly, 

Recalling  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United 
Nations, 

Considering  that  the  restoration  of  the  lawful  rights 
of  tlie  People's  Republic  of  China  is  essential  both  for 
the  protection  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
and  for  the  cause  that  the  United  Nations  must  serve 
under  the  Charter, 

Recognizing  that  the  representatives  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  are  the  only 
lawful  representatives  of  China  to  the  United  Nations, 

Decides  to  restore  all  its  rights  to  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  and  to  recognize  the  representatives 
of  its  Government  as  the  only  lawful  representatives 
of  China  to  the  United  Nations,  and  to  expel  forthwith 
the  representatives  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  from  the  place 
which  they  unlawfully  occupy  at  the  United  Nations 
and  in  all  the  organizations  related  to  it. 


=  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/2500  (XXIV)  (A/L.  .567  and  Add. 
1-5)  ;  adopted  on  Nov.  11  by  a  vote  of  71  (U.S.)  in 
favor,  48  against,  with  4  abstentions. 

•U.N.  doc.  A/L.569;  rejected  on  Nov.  11  by  a  vote 
of  48  in  favor,  56  (U.S.)  against,  with  21  abstentions. 


479 


United  States  Comments  on   Revisions  in   Draft  Treaty 
Banning  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the  Seabed 


A  revised  joint  draft  treaty  on  the  prohiiition 
of  the  emp/acefnent  of  nuclear  weapons  and 
other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  sea- 
bed and  the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil 
thereof  was  presented  at  the  Conference  of  tlie 
Committee  on  Disannament  at  Geneva  by  the 
United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  on  October  30. 
Following  is  a  statement  made  before  the  con- 
ference that  day  by  U.S.  Representative  James 
F.  Leonard,  together  with  the  text  of  the  revised 
draft  treaty. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  LEONARD 

On  October  7  the  Cochairmen  tabled  the  text 
of  a  joint  draft  seabed  treaty  (CCD/269)  for 
the  consideration  of  this  Connnittee.^  The  joint 
text  was  the  result  of  long  and  involved  con- 
sultations between  the  Cochairmen  and  repre- 
sented, we  believe,  a  realistic  basis  for  broad 
agreement. 

My  delegation  has  appreciated  the  thoughtful 
comments  that  have  been  made  by  the  members 
of  the  Committee  during  our  discussion  of  the 
joint  text. 

We  have  noticed  that  the  major  concerns 
raised  during  these  discussions  have  been  in 
three  areas.  The  first  is  the  concern  that  the 
treaty  should  serve  to  protect  the  security  inter- 
ests of  all  the  states  parties  to  the  treaty ;  second, 
that  while  protecting  these  security  interests, 
the  treaty  should  clearly  reflect  that  it  in  no  way 
prejudices  or  infringes  on  existing  rights  rec- 
ognized imder  international  law,  except  for  the 
limitations  for  arms  control  purposes  on  activi- 
ties falling  within  the  scope  of  tliis  treaty ;  and 
tliird,  that  the  treaty  should  contribute  to  fur- 
ther progress  in  the  field  of  arms  control. 


'  For  a  U.S.  statement  and  text  of  the  Oct.  7  draft 
treaty,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  3,  1969,  p.  365. 


In  light  of  these  concerns,  a  munber  of  dele- 
gations have  made  specific  suggastions  for  im- 
proving the  present  draft  and  several  members 
of  the  Committee  have  introduced  working 
papers  and  formal  amendments.  The  Cochair- 
men have  carefully  considered  the  various  sug- 
gestions and  amendments.  As  a  result,  we  are 
able  to  present  to  the  Committee  today  a  revised 
treaty  text  (CCD/269/Rev.  1). 

In  view  of  the  importance  which  our  delega- 
tion attaches  to  the  changes  that  have  been 
made  in  the  revised  text,  I  would  like  to  discuss 
these  changes  in  the  context  of  the  three  areas 
of  concern  to  which  I  pre\aously  referred. 

Protection  of  Security  Interests 

First,  there  is  the  concern  that  the  treaty 
should  serve  to  protect  the  security  interests  of 
all  the  parties.  We  have  noted  the  statements 
made  recently  by  the  delegations  of  Japan,  the 
Netherlands,  Italy,  Sweden,  Poland,  Pakistan, 
Burma,  and  Morocco  and  the  specific  recom- 
mendation of  the  U.K.  delegation  which  have 
referred  to  a  problem  regarding  the  status  of  the 
zone — or  "gap" — lying  between  the  outer  limit 
of  the  maximum  contiguous  zone  and  the  outer 
limit  of  claimed  territorial  seas  which  are  nar- 
rower than  12  miles.  It  has  been  rightly 
pointed  out  that  the  treaty  does  not  clearly  in- 
dicate whether  the  prohibition  accepted  by  a 
party  in  article  I  applies  in  such  a  gap  off  the 
coast  of  another  party  and  that  such  uncer- 
tainty could  raise  serious  security  questions  for 
those  states  concerned.  To  eliminate  this  uncer- 
tainty, article  I  has  been  amended  by  the  addi- 
tion of  a  new  paragraph  2,  which  states : 

The  undertakin,!;.s  of  paragraph  1  of  this  Article 
shall  al.so  apply  within  the  contiguous  zone  referred  to 
in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article,  except  that  within  that 
zone  they  shall  not  apply  to  the  coastal  state. 

This  language  makes  clear  in  view  of  article  24 


480 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


of  the  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Territorial  Sea 
and  the  Contiguous  Zone  that  the  prohibition  of 
article  I,  paragraph  1,  applies  to  the  "gap"  be- 
tween the  territorial  sea  and  the  outer  limit  of 
the  contiguous  zone  for  all  states  except,  of 
>  course,  for  the  coastal  states.^  The  previous  para- 
graph 2  of  article  I  has  been  renumbered 
paragraph  3. 

Another  problem  relating  to  security  inter- 
ests has  been  reflected  in  the  comments  made  by 
the  delegations  of  the  Netherlands,  Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia,  Italy,  Poland,  Ethiopia,  Mon- 
golia, Yugoslavia,  and  the  United  Arab  Repub- 
I  lie  and  in  the  working  paper  submitted  by  the 
I  delegation  of  Canada.  I  refer  to  the  question  of 
I  whether  article  III  should  specify  the  possible 
recourse  parties  would  have  if  there  were  seri- 
,  ous  unresolved  questions  regarding  fulfillment 
of  the  obligations  of  the  treaty. 

Several  delegations  have  suggested  that  the 
treaty  would  be  strengthened  if  it  made  specific 
reference  to  the  existing  procedures  by  which 
states  can  bring  serious  matters  to  the  attention 
of  the  Security  Council.  We  believe  that  this  is 
an  important  suggestion  since  it  would  empha- 
size the  seriousness  with  which  states  would 
view  possible  violations  of  the  treaty  and  would 
clearly  restate  the  right  of  parties  to  bring  such 
questions  before  the  Security  Council.  Accord- 
ingly, we  have  added  a  second  sentence  to  ar- 
ticle III,  paragraph  3,  to  read  as  follows : 

In  the  event  that  consultation  and  cooperation  have 
not  removed  the  donbts  and  there  is  serious  question 
concerning  the  fulfillment  of  the  obligations  assumed 
under  this  Treaty,  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty  may, 
in  accordance  vfith  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations,  refer  the  matter  to  the  Security 
Council. 

Geographical  Coverage  of  the  Treaty 

I  would  like  to  turn  now,  Mr.  Chairman,  to 
the  second  major  area  of  concern ;  namely,  that 
the  treaty  should  in  no  way  prejudice  or  in- 
fringe existing  rights  recognized  under  inter- 
national law. 

A  number  of  delegations  have  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  how  the  treaty  envisages  the  application 
of  international  law,  including  the  1958  Con- 
vention on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  the  Contigu- 
ous Zone.  In  this  context,  we  have  noted  the 
views  expi-essed  by  several  delegations  regard- 


'  For  text  of  the  convention,  see  Buixetin  of  June  30, 
1958,  p.  1111. 


ing  the  application  of  international  law  to  the 
geographical  area  covered  by  the  treaty.  The 
United  States  delegation  has  not  yet  com- 
mented in  detail  in  the  Committee  on  the  geo- 
graphical coverage  of  the  treaty,  and  I  think 
it  would  be  appropriate  for  me  to  do  so  now. 

There  are  two  provisions  which  together  de- 
limit the  area  of  the  treaty's  prohibitions  so 
as  to  create  balanced  obligations  among  the 
parties.  The  rules  adopted  for  defining  the 
treaty  area  are  widely  accepted  international 
standards. 

Article  I,  paragraph  1,  extends  the  treaty 
prohibitions  to  the  entire  seabed  and  ocean 
floor  "beyond  the  maximum  contiguous  zone 
provided  for  in  the  1958  Geneva  Convention." 
The  maximum  seaward  limit  of  the  contiguous 
zone  provided  for  in  that  convention  is  12  miles. 
Under  paragraph  1  of  article  II  of  the  seabed 
treaty,  the  outer  limit  of  this  zone  will  be  meas- 
ured from  baselines  drawn  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  section  II  of  part  I  of  the 
1958  convention  and  "in  accordance  with  inter- 
national law."  This  section  of  the  Geneva  con- 
vention contains  the  detailed  rules  which  are  to 
be  used  to  determine  the  baselines  from  which 
the  12-mile  zone  is  measured  in  most  situations. 

However,  the  provisions  of  section  II  of  the 
convention  expressly  do  not  apply  to  certain 
situations,  such  as  "historic"  bays.  It  was  for 
this  reason  that  the  language  "and  in  accord- 
ance with  international  law"  was  also  included 
in  paragraph  1  of  article  II  of  the  treaty.  In 
those  situations  where  the  section  II  rules  are 
expressly  inapplicable  under  the  terms  of  the 
1958  convention,  the  rules  of  customary  inter- 
national law  will  govern  the  location  of  the 
baseline  for  the  purposes  of  this  treaty.  Thus, 
the  12-mile  contiguous  zone  would  be  measured 
from  the  closing  line  across  an  historic  bay  only 
if  the  waters  are  enclosed  as  internal  waters  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  of  customary  interna- 
tional law. 

Now  I  would  also  like  to  emphasize,  Mr. 
Chairman,  that  although  the  treaty  relies  on  the 
1958  Territorial  Sea  Convention  to  define  treaty 
baselines  and  the  outer  limit  of  the  exempted 
coastal  zone,  this  reference  in  no  way  implies 
that  any  party  to  the  seabed  treaty  which  is  not 
a  party  to  the  1958  convention  would  find  itself 
bound  by  or  adhering,  so  to  speak,  to  that  con- 
vention. In  other  words,  Mr.  Chairman,  a  party 
to  the  seabed  treaty  accepts  only  that  the  outer 
limits  of  the  zone  exempted  from  the  prohibi- 


December   1,   1969 


481 


tions  of  the  seabed  treaty  will  be  measured  in 
accordance  with  certain  rules  in  section  II  of 
the  1958  convention.  Therefore,  a  party  to  the 
seabed  treaty  is  not  accepting  these  1958  rules 
for  any  purpose  other  tlian  that  of  determining 
wliere  the  seabed  arms  control  treaty  applies. 

Mr.  Chairman,  there  is  one  other  point  I 
would  like  to  touch  upon  in  this  connection. 
This  is  the  question  of  disputes  regarding 
rights,  claims,  or  recognition  or  nonrecognition 
of  rights  or  claims,  affecting  the  law  of  the  sea. 
As  we  all  know,  there  are  differing  positions 
among  states  regarding,  for  example,  such  mat- 
ters as  the  proper  breadth  of  the  territorial  sea. 
I  may  state  unequivocally  that  it  is  not  the  pur- 
pose of  this  treaty  to  settle  such  matters.  Nor  is 
the  purpose  of  this  treaty  to  give  one  state  or 
another  state,  or  any  group  of  states,  an  ad- 
vantage vis-a-vis  any  other  state  or  group  of 
states  with  respect  to  law-of-the-sea  issues. 
That  is  why  article  II,  paragraph  2,  contains  the 
best  disclaimer  clause  that  it  has  been  possible 
for  the  authors  of  this  draft  to  devise. 

It  would  indeed  be  most  regrettable  if  any 
countries  considering  this  seabed  treaty  were  to 
fail  to  accept  the  disclaimer  clause  as  meaning 
just  what  it  says.  We  are  convinced  that  it  is 
possible  to  negotiate  and  conclude  a  seabed 
treaty  which  establishes  meaningful  arms 
limitations  but  which  does  not  prejudice  any 
state's  position  regarding  law-of-the-sea  ques- 
tions. The  disclaimer  clause,  in  effect,  would 
prevent  any  party  from  saying  to  any  other 
party  that  acceptance  of  this  treaty,  or  any  ac- 
tions under  it,  had  somehow  created  or  implied 
an  acceptance  of  new  or  different  positions  re- 
garding the  law  of  the  sea,  except  for  the  limita- 
tions for  arms  control  purposes  created  by  the 
treaty  itself.  With  this  in  mind,  I  trust  that  it 
is  possible  to  refer  in  this  treaty  to  "the  free- 
doms of  the  high  seas"  without  establishing  or 
implying  the  precise  boundary  for  the  limits  of 
the  high  seas. 


Furthering  Arms   Control   Progress 

I  would  now  like  to  discuss  the  third  major 
area  of  concern :  that  the  treaty  should  contrib- 
ute to  further  progress  in  the  field  of  arms  con- 
trol. This  concern  has  found  expression  in  a 
number  of  proposals  which  I  would  like  to  dis- 
cuss separately. 

First  is  the  idea  supported  by  the  delegations 


of  Canada,  Netherlands,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslo- 
vakia, the  United  Kingdom,  Hungary,  India, 
Brazil,  Ethiopia,  Mongolia,  Pakistan,  Argen- 
tina, Burma,  the  United  Arab  Republic,  and 
Nigeria  that  the  treaty  provide  for  a  review 
conference  as  envisaged  in  the  May  22  draft 
submitted  b}'  the  United  States.^  As  has  been 
pointed  out,  such  a  conference  would  review 
the  operation  of  the  treaty  with  a  view  to  en- 
suring that  the  purposes  of  the  preamble  and 
the  provisions  of  the  treaty  are  being  realized. 
At  the  same  time,  the  conference  would  provide 
an  opportunity  to  consider  the  effect  of  tech- 
nological or  other  changes  on  the  operation  of  j 
the  treaty  and  whether  it  would  be  appropriate  i 
to  expand  the  scope  of  the  treaty. 

In  this  connection,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would 
like  to  refer  to  the  draft  amendment  submitted 
by  the  distinguished  Representative  of  Sweden 
(CCD/271)  which  would  commit  parties  in  an 
operative  paragraph  to  continue  negotiations 
in  good  faith  on  further  measures  relating  to  a 
more  comprehensive  prohibition  of  the  use  for 
military  purposes  of  the  seabed.  It  has  been 
argued  that  this  suggested  amendment  would 
provide  an  additional  incentive  to  the  parties  to 
continue  negotiations  toward  further  measures 
to  prevent  an  arms  race  on  the  seabed.  The 
United  States  has  made  clear  in  its  statements 
that  it  considers  the  present  draft  treaty  as  a 
possible  first  step  toward  other  arms  control 
measures.  This  belief  was  reflected  in  the  pre- 
ambular  paragraphs  3  and  4  of  the  joint  draft 
of  October  7. 

We  have  also  stated  that  the  present  state  of 
seabed  teclmology  and  verification  capabilities 
calls  for  a  realistic  measure  at  tliis  time  which 
may  be  reviewed  later  as  these  capabilities  in- 
crease. Being  committed  to  this  principle,  we 
have  examined  the  various  suggestions  for  in- 
corporating this  principle  into  the  revised  draft. 
After  careful  consideration,  we  have  concluded 
that  provision  for  a  review  conference,  when 
considered  in  conjunction  with  preambular  par- 
agraph 3,  will  provide  assurances  that  are  ef- 
fective and  appropriate.  We  believe  that  if  the 
parties  obligate  themselves  to  review  the  treaty 
at  a  specified  period  of  time — that  is,  5  years 
after  its  entry  into  force — we  wUl  eliminate  the 
possibility  that  review  will  be  postponed  or  de- 


'  For  text  of  the  May  22  draft  treaty,  see  Buixetin 
of  June  16, 1969,  p.  523. 


482 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


jtayed  indefinitely  as  a  result  of  unforeseen  polit- 
iical  circumstances.  Accordingly,  Mr.  Chair- 
itnau,  we  have  included  in  the  revised  draft  a 
aew  article  V  which  provides  for  a  review 
conference  5  j^ears  after  the  treaty  enters  into 
■force.  The  language  of  the  article  reads  as 
^follows : 

Five  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  this  Treaty, 
a  conference  of  Parties  to  the  Treaty  shall  be  held  in 
Geneva,  Switzerland,  in  order  to  review  the  operation 
of  this  Treaty  with  a  view  to  assuring  that  the  purposes 
of  the  preamble  and  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  are 
being  realized.  Such  review  shall  take  into  account  any 
relevant  technological  developments.  The  review  con- 
ference shall  determine  in  accordance  with  the  views 
of  a  majority  of  those  Parties  attending  whether  and 
when  an  additional  review  conference  shall  be 
convened. 

Another  asj^ect  of  the  concern  that  the  treaty 
Ijg  a  flexible  mstrument  relates  to  the  procedure 
for  amendment.  We  have  reviewed  this  ques- 
tion, Mr.  Chairman,  and  it  seems  to  us  that  a 
procedure  by  wliich  all  parties  will  have  an 
equal  voice  in  deciding  which  amendments  will 
be  included  in  the  treaty  would  provide  for  a 
more  flexible  treaty.  Accordingly,  we  have  in- 
cluded in  the  revised  draft  a  new  article  IV 
based  on  the  amendments  article  of  the  Outer 
Space  Treaty.  The  article  reads  as  follows : 

Any  state  Party  to  the  Treaty  may  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Treaty.  Amendments  shall  enter  into 
force  for  each  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  accepting  the 
amendments  upon  their  acceptance  by  a  majority  of 
the  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  and  thereafter  for  each 
remaining  State  Party  on  the  date  of  acceptance  by  it. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  United  States  delegation 
believes  that  the  new  treaty  provisions  which  the 
Cochairmen  are  recommending  today  are  an- 
other major  step  in  the  negotiation  of  a  seabed 
treaty.  For  this  progress  we  are  greatly  in- 
debted to  the  members  of  this  Committee,  whose 
constructive  comments  have  contributed  signifi- 
cantly to  the  revised  text.  For  our  part,  we  will 
continue  to  study  carefully  all  the  comments 
that  have  been  made  in  the  Committee,  includ- 
ing those  made  in  the  last  few  days,  and  we 
shall  have  these  comments  very  much  in  mind 
when  we  are  continuing  our  work  in  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly.  The  General  Assembly  will,  of 
course,  wish  to  consider  this  text  carefully ;  and 
in  our  view,  it  might  be  possible  to  decide  at  a 
later  date  whether  any  future  modifications 
!  should  be  incorporated  in  response  to  desires  of 
the  international  community. 


TEXT  OF   REVISED   DRAFT  TREATY 

Union  op  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  and  United 
States  of  America  Draft  Tbeatt  on  the  Prohibi- 
tion OF  THE  Emplacement  of  Nuclear  Weapons  and 
Other  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  on  the  Sea- 
bed AND  THE  Ocean   Floor  and  in  the   Subsoil 

THEREOF 

The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty, 

Recognizing  the  common  interest  of  mankind  in  the 
progress  of  the  exploration  and  use  of  the  seabed  and 
the  ocean  floor  for  peaceful  purposes, 

Considering  that  the  prevention  of  a  nuclear  arms 
race  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  serves  the  in- 
terests of  maintaining  world  peace,  reduces  interna- 
tional tensions,  and  strengthens  friendly  relations 
among  States, 

Convinced  that  this  Treaty  constitutes  a  step  towards 
the  exclusion  of  the  seabed,  the  ocean  floor  and  the 
subsoil  thereof  from  the  arms  race,  and  determined 
to  continue  negotiations  concerning  further  measures 
leading  to  this  end, 

Convinced  that  this  Treaty  constitutes  a  step  to- 
wards a  treaty  on  general  and  complete  disarmament 
under  strict  and  effective  international  control,  and 
determined  to  continue  negotiations  to  this  end. 

Convinced  that  this  Treaty  will  further  the  purposes 
and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  in 
a  manner  consistent  with  the  principles  of  interna- 
tional law  and  without  infringing  the  freedoms  of  the 
high  seas, 

Have  agreed  as  follows : 

Article  I 

1.  The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty  undertake  not 
to  emplant  or  emplace  on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean 
floor  and  in  the  subsoU  thereof  beyond  the  maximum 
contiguous  zone  provided  for  in  the  1958  Geneva  Con- 
vention on  the  Territorial  Sea  and  the  Contiguous 
Zone  any  objects  with  nuclear  weapons  or  any  other 
types  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  as  well  as  struc- 
tures, launching  installations  or  any  other  facilities 
specifically  designed  for  storing,  testing  or  using  such 
weapons. 

2.  The  undertakings  of  paragraph  1  of  this  Article 
.shall  also  apply  within  the  contiguous  zone  referred  to 
in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article,  except  that  within  that 
zone  they  shall  not  apply  to  the  coastal  state. 

3.  The  States  Parties  to  this  Treaty  undertake  not 
to  assist,  encourage  or  induce  any  State  to  commit 
actions  prohibited  by  this  Treaty  and  not  to  partici- 
pate in  any  other  way  in  such  actions. 

Abticle  II 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  this  Treaty  the  outer  limit  of 
the  contiguous  zone  referred  to  in  Article  I  shall  be 
measured  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Part  I, 
Section  II  of  the  1958  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Terri- 
torial Sea  and  the  Contiguous  Zone  and  in  accordance 
with  international  law. 

2.  Nothing  in  this  Treaty  shall  be  interpreted  as  sup- 
porting or  prejudicing  the  position  of  any  State  Party 
with   respect   to   rights  or  claims  which   such   State 


December   1,   1969 


483 


Party  may  assert,  or  with  respect  to  recognition  or 
nonrefOgnition  of  rights  of  claims  asserted  by  any  other 
State,  related  to  waters  off  its  coasts,  or  to  the  seabed 
and  the  ocean  floor. 

Abticle  III 

1.  In  order  to  promote  the  objectives  and  ensure  the 
observance  of  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  the  States 
Parties  to  the  Treaty  shall  have  the  right  to  verify 
the  activities  of  other  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  on 
the  seabed  and  the  ocean  tioor  and  in  the  subsoil 
thereof  beyond  the  maximum  contiguous  zone,  referred 
to  in  Article  I,  if  these  activities  raise  doubts  concern- 
ing the  fulfillment  of  the  obligations  assumed  under 
this  Treaty,  without  interfering  with  such  activities  or 
otherwise  infringing  rights  recognized  under  interna- 
tional law,  including  the  freedoms  of  the  high  seas. 

2.  The  right  of  verification  recognized  by  the  States 
Parties  in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article  may  be  exercised 
by  any  State  Party  using  its  own  means  or  with  the 
assistance  of  any  other  State  Party. 

3.  The  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  undertake  to 
consult  and  cooperate  with  a  view  to  removing  doubts 
concerning  the  fulfillment  of  the  obligations  assumed 
under  this  Treaty.  In  the  event  that  consultation  and 
cooperation  have  not  removed  the  doubts  and  there  is 
serious  question  concerning  the  fulfillment  of  the  obli- 
gations assumed  under  this  Treaty,  States  Parties  to 
this  Treaty  may,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  refer  the  matter 
to  the  Security  Council 

Article  IV 

Any  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  may  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Treaty.  Amendments  .shall  enter  into 
force  for  each  State  Party  to  the  Treaty  accepting  the 
amendments  upon  their  acceptance  by  a  majority  of 
the  States  Parties  to  the  Treaty  and  thereafter  for 
each  remaining  State  Party  on  the  date  of  acceptance 
by  it. 

Abticle  V 

Five  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  this  Treaty, 
a  conference  of  Parties  to  the  Treaty  shall  be  held  in 
Geneva,  Switzerland,  in  order  to  review  the  opera- 
tion of  this  Treaty  with  a  view  to  assuring  that  the 
purposes  of  the  preamble  and  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  are  being  realized.  Such  review  shall  take  into 
account  any  relevant  technological  developments.  The 
review  conference  shall  determine  in  accordance  with 
the  views  of  a  majority  of  those  Parties  attending 
whether  and  when  an  additional  review  conference 
shall  be  convened. 

Article  VI 

Each  Party  to  this  Treaty  shall  in  exercising  its 
national  sovereignty  have  the  right  to  withdraw  from 
this  Treaty  if  it  decides  that  extraordinary  events 
related  to  the  subject  matter  of  this  Treaty  have  jeop- 
ardized the  supreme  interests  of  its  Country.  It  shall 
give  notice  of  such  withdrawal  to  all  other  Parties 
to  the  Treaty  and  to  the  United  Nations  Security  Coun- 
cil three  months  in  advance.  Such  notice  shall  include 
a  statement  of  the  extraordinary  events  it  considers  to 
have  jeopardized  its  supreme  interests. 


Article  VII 

1.  This  Treaty  shall  be  open  for  signature  to  all 
States.  Any  State  which  does  not  sign  the  Treaty 
before  its  entry  into  force  in  accordance  with  para- 
graph 3  of  this  Article  may  accede  to  it  any  time. 

2.  This  Treaty  shall  be  subject  to  ratification  by 
signatory  States.  Instruments  of  ratification  and  of  ac- 
cession shall  be  deposited  with  the  Governments  of 
,  which  are  hereby  designated  the  Deposi- 
tary Governments. 

3.  This  Treaty  shall  enter  into  force  after  the  deposit 
of  instruments  of  ratification  by  twenty-two  Govern- 
ments, including  the  Governments  designated  as  De- 
positary Governments  of  this  Treaty. 

4.  For  States  whose  instruments  of  ratification  or 
accession  are  deposited  after  the  entry  into  force  of 
this  Treaty  it  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  date  of 
the  deposit  of  their  instruments  of  ratification  or 
accession. 

5.  The  Depositary  Governments  shall  forthwith 
notify  the  Governments  of  all  States  signatory  and 
acceding  to  this  Treaty  of  the  date  of  each  signature, 
of  the  date  of  deposit  of  each  instrument  of  ratifica- 
tion or  of  accession,  of  the  date  of  the  entry  into 
force  of  this  Treaty,  and  of  the  receipt  of  other  notices. 

6.  This  Treaty  shall  be  registered  by  the  Depositary 
Governments  pursuant  to  Article  102  of  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations. 

Article  VIII 

This  Treaty,  the  English,  Russian,  French,  Spanish 
and  Chinese  texts  of  which  are  equally  authentic,  shall 
be  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the  Depositary  Gov- 
ernments. Duly  certified  copies  of  this  Treaty  shall  be 
transmitted  by  the  Depositary  Governments  to  the 
Governments  of  the  States  signatory  and  acceding 
thereto. 

In  witness  whekeof  the  undersigned,  being  duly  au- 
thorized thereto,  have  signed  this  Treaty. 

Done  in  at  this 

.  day  of , . 


General  Draper  To  Represent  U.S. 
on  U.N.  Population  Commission 

The  President  announced  on  November  7 
(White  House  press  release)  the  ajipointment  of 
Gen.  William  H.  Draper  as  United  States  Rep- 
resentative on  the  United  Nations  Population 
Commission.  (For  biographic  data,  see  White 
House  press  release  dated  November  7.) 

In  his  new  i^osition  Gen.  Draper  served  also 
as  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  15th 
session  of  the  U.N.  Population  Commission, 
which  met  at  Geneva  November  3-4. 


484 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Twenty-Fifth  Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations 


Following  is  a  statement  made  in  plenary  ses- 
sio^i  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  by  U.S. 
Representative  Charles  ^¥.  Yost  on  October  23, 
together  with  tlie  text  of  a  resolution  adopted 
by  the  Assembly  on  October  31. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  YOST 

D.S./U.N.  press  release  130  dated  October  23 

The  25th  anniversary  of  the  United  Nations 
is  certainly  an  occasion  to  be  commemorated. 
We  are  all  deeply  grateful  to  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral for  proposing  we  do  so.  It  is  no  small  thing 
for  tlus  extraordinary  experiment  in  interna- 
tional organization  to  have  survived  for  25 
years.  This  fact  in  itself  provides  the  occasion 
for  a  ceremony.  And  the  United  Nations  has 
not  only  survived;  it  has  made  unprecedented 
contributions  to  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity, to  the  self-determination  of  peoples,  to  eco- 
nomic and  social  development,  and  to  the 
advancement  of  human  rights. 

Yet  I  believe  none  of  us  is  vmder  the  illusion 
that  the  25th  anniversary  should  be  a  time  for 
self -congratulation  or  complacency.  On  the 
contrary,  it  must  be  a  time  for  soul-searching 
and  for  candid  recognition  of  how  far  we  have 
fallen  short  of  the  purposes  of  our  charter  and 
of  effective  means  of  carrying  them  out. 

On  May  9  of  this  year  U  Thant  said : 

...  I  can  only  conclude  from  the  Information  that 
is  available  to  me  as  Secretary-General  that  the  Mem- 
bers of  the  United  Nations  have  perhaps  10  years  left 
in  which  to  subordinate  their  ancient  quarrels  and 
launch  a  global  partnership  to  curb  the  arms  race,  to 
improve  the  human  environment,  to  defuse  the  popu- 
lation explosion,  and  to  supply  the  required  momentum 
to  world  development  efforts. 

If  such  a  global  partnership  is  not  forged  within 
the  next  decade,  then  I  very  much  fear  that  the  prob- 
lems I  have  mentioned  will  have  reached  such  stag- 
gering proportions  that  they  will  be  beyond  our 
capacity  to  control. 

You,  Madam  President  [Angle  Brooks,  Pres- 
ident of  the  24th  General  Assembly],  in  your 
opening  remarks  to  this  General  Assembly,  were 
eloquent  in  expressing  alarm  over  "the  gradual 


decline  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  eyes  of 
public  opinion"  and  stating  bluntly  that  "it 
would  be  complacency  on  our  part  if  we  were  to 
yield  to  the  delusion  that  we  are  doing  our  best 
and  that  the  world  persists  in  misjudging  us." 
You  then  set  us  all  an  example  when  you 
declared : 

But  to  satisfy  my  conscience,  I  must  not  refrain, 
in  the  evaluation  of  the  general  situation  in  the  United 
Nations,  from  asking  all  of  us  to  probe  our  souls  and 
to  search  deep  into  our  minds  to  ascertain  whether  or 
not  we  have  given,  and  are  giving,  to  the  United  Na- 
tions cause  the  best  and  the  most  of  ourselves. 

I  think  we  have  only  to  glance  at  some  of  the 
key  provisions  of  the  charter  to  see  how  far  we 
have  fallen  short  of  making  them  living  reali- 
ties, how  substantially  we  have  failed  to  develop 
the  institution  and  the  sort  of  international  soci- 
ety which  the  authors  of  the  charter  had  in 
mind. 

Do  we  in  fact  "take  effective  collective  meas- 
ures for  the  prevention  and  removal  of  threats 
to  the  peace"  ?  Do  we  "accept  and  carry  out  the 
decisions  of  the  Security  Council"? 

Do  all  of  us,  do  rrbost  of  us,  settle  our  "inter- 
national disputes  by  peaceful  means  in  such 
a  manner  that  international  peace  and  security, 
and  justice,  are  not  endangered"?  Do  we  all 
"refrain  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independ- 
ence of  any  state"  ? 

In  electing  new  members  to  our  organization 
do  we  judge  objectively  whether  they  "are  able 
and  willing  to  carry  out"  the  obligations  of  the 
charter  ?  In  electing  nonpermanent  members  to 
the  Security  Council  does  this  Assembly  pay 
due  regard  "in  the  first  instance  to  the  contri- 
bution of  Members  of  the  United  Nations  to  the 
maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security 
and  to  the  other  purposes  of  the  Organization"  ? 
Does  the  Security  Council  and  do  the  member 
states  "take  into  consideration  that  legal  dis- 
putes should  as  a  general  rule  be  referred  by  the 
parties  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice"  ? 

These  questions  only  need  to  be  asked  in  order, 
imhappily,  to  be  answered  in  the  negative.  We 


December  1,   1969 


485 


have  in  fact  only  just  begun,  after  25  years,  to 
implement  our  cliarter.  Perhaps  it  needs  in  some 
respect  to  be  amended ;  but  more  important  and 
more  urgent,  it  needs  to  be  implemented. 

So  I  would  look  forward  most  of  all  to  the 
25th  anniversary  as  an  occasion  for  collective 
soul-searching,  for  a  rigorous  self-examination 
as  to  whether  and  why  we  have  fallen  short  of 
our  purposes,  as  to  how  and  when  we  can  at 
long  last — next  year,  5  years  hence,  through 
the  coming  decade — make  them  effective. 

The  Secretary  General,  as  I  have  noted,  warns 
that  we  may  have  only  10  years  in  which  to  re- 
verse the  fatal  course  of  conflict,  armament, 
overpopulation,  and  underdevelopment  which 
we  are  now  pursuing.  I  can  think  of  no  more 
suitable  task,  no  more  imperative  duty,  for  us  to 
perform  next  year  than,  first,  to  take  whatever 
concrete  action  to  deal  with  these  problems  we 
can  agree  to  take  during  that  anniversary  year 
and,  second,  to  lay  down,  collectively  insofar  as 
possible,  concrete  objectives,  adequately  respon- 
sive to  the  disastrous  impact  of  those  problems, 
for  implementation  before  the  end  of  the  dec- 
ade. Whatever  we  may  decide  to  do  of  a  cere- 
monial character  in  celebration  of  the  anniver- 
sary should  merely  emphasize  and  reinforce  the 
practical  steps  we  should  take  or  propose  to  meet 
this  overriding  responsibility. 

We  believe  that  the  j^reparatory  committee 
for  the  25th  anniversary,  under  the  able,  patient, 
and  good-humored  guidance  of  Ambassador 
Eichard  Akwei  of  Ghana,  has  provided  us  with 
a  most  useful  report.^  The  recommendations  in 
that  report  provide  a  framework  for  commemo- 
ration by  the  United  Nations,  by  the  specialized 
agencies,  by  regional  organizations,  by  national 
governments,  and  by  nongovernmental  institu- 
tions around  the  world.  Wl^ile  we  shall  have  to 
see  how  some  of  the  proposals  mentioned  in  the 
report  are  elaborated,  we  support  the  main 
thrust  of  the  recommendations  in  that  report, 
particularly  the  theme  of  "Peace  and  Progress," 
and  for  that  reason  have  joined  as  a  cosponsor 
in  the  draft  resolution  which  is  now  before  the 
Assembly.  We  are  particularly  pleased  by  the 
large  number  of  cosponsors  of  the  resolution, 
representing  countries  from  all  over  the  world, 
and  hope  that  all  delegations  will  join  in  sup- 
porting and  implementing  the  resolution. 

President  Nixon,  in  his  address  to  the  General 
Assembly  last  month,  drew  our  attention  to  the 


challenge  and  opportunity  that  lie  before  us. 
He  said :  ^ 

For  the  first  time  ever,  we  have  truly  become  a  single 
world  community. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  we  have  seen  the  staggering 
fury  of  the  power  of  the  universe  unleashed ;  and  we 
know  that  we  hold  that  power  in  a  very  precariona 
balance. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  technological  advance  has 
brought  within  reach  what  once  was  only  a  poignant 
dream  for  hundreds  of  millions — freedom  from  hunger 
and  freedom  from  want ;  want  and  hunger  that  I  have 
personally  seen  in  nation  after  nation  all  over  this 
world. 

For  the  first  time  ever,  we  have  seen  changes  in  a 
single  lifetime — in  our  lifetime — that  dwarf  the 
achievements  of  centuries  before ;  and  those  changes 
continue  to  accelerate.  .  .  . 

In  this  new  age  of  "firsts,"  even  the  goal  of  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  is  a  "first"  we  can  dare  to  strive  for. 
We  must  achieve  it.  And  I  believe  we  can  achieve  it 

It  will  require  not  perfimctory  eloquence  but 
hard  work  to  strengthen  the  United  Nations  as 
a  dynamic  instrument  for  peace  and  progress, 
to  enable  it  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  a  world 
changing  with  bewildering  speed. 

The  job,  as  U  Thant  correctly  pointed  out, 
must  be  done  by  the  member  states.  The  U.N., 
after  all,  has  \artually  no  power  of  its  own.  Its 
success  rests  entirely  on  the  readiness  of  its 
members  to  put  their  power  at  its  service  and  to 
subordinate  their  parochial  concerns  to  the  com- 
mon cause  of  a  more  peaceful  and  secure  world. 

In  setting  our  goals,  we  must,  of  course,  be 
realistic.  Yet,  I  believe,  there  is  greater  danger 
from  the  kind  of  realism  that  makes  for  exces- 
sive caution  and  timidity  than  in  a  bold  ap- 
proach, which  offers  the  only  hope  of  meeting 
successfully  the  challenges  that  face  us. 

It  would  be  premature  for  me  to  outline  to- 
day a  definitive  program  of  goals  for  the  next 
decade.  My  Government  will  want  to  give  the 
most  serious  and  energetic  attention  to  these 
goals  during  the  year  ahead.  We  will  also  want 
to  study  the  thoughtful  submissions  of  other 
governments;  for  example,  the  stimulating 
memoranda  submitted  by  Ghana,  Guyana,  Ire- 
land, Italy,  the  Philippines,  Sweden,  and  Yugo- 
slavia which  are  annexed  to  the  report  before  us. 
We  shall  also  want  to  give  serious  attention  to 
certain  studies  prepared  by  responsible  private 
groups,  such  as  the  recent  study  entitled  "The 
United  Nations :  The  Next  25  Years,"  prepared 
by  the  Commission  To  Study  the  Organization 
of  Peace,  and  the  ideas  in  "Controlling  Con- 


'  U.N.  doe.  A/7690. 


•  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  297. 


486 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


flicts  in  the  1970's,"  set  forth  by  a  panel  of  the 
U.N.  Association  of  the  U.S.A.  But  I  should 
like  to  sketcli  out  in  a  preliminary  way  certain 
approaches  which  miglit  be  explored  further 
during  the  coming  year. 

Peace  and   Disarmament 

The  first  purpose  of  the  United  Nations  is  to 
keep  the  peace.  Without  a  reasonable  measure  of 
peace,  there  can  be  only  the  most  precarious 
progress  in  human  welfare  and  human  rights. 
The  United  Nations,  through  its  peacekeeping 
operations,  has  made  a  great  contribution  to 
peace  in  the  last  24  years.  Yet  all  of  us  are 
keenly  aware  of  how  often  we  have  failed  and 
continue  to  fail.  I  would  suggest  three  avenues 
of  approach  for  improving  the  effectiveness  of 
the  United  Nations  in  this  area : 

1.  We  should  greatly  accentuate  our  efforts  to 
agree  on  guidelines  for  strengthening  United 
Nations  peacekeeping.  The  Security  Council 
should  be  made  a  much  more  effective  instru- 
ment in  this  regard,  and  its  primary  role  should 
be  fully  recognized.  The  residual  responsibili- 
ties of  the  General  Assembly  should  also  be  pre- 
served, and  tlie  authority  of  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral should  be  maintained.  The  role  of  each  is 
laid  do^vn  in  the  charter;  these  roles  are  com- 
plementary and  in  no  sense  incompatible.  It 
would  be  a  signal  achievement  for  the  com- 
memoration of  the  25th  anniversary,  and  a 
significant  first  step,  if  there  were  general 
agreement  on  guidelines  for  strengthening  U.N. 
peacekeeping  operations — the  type  of  agree- 
ment which  the  Special  Committee  on  Peace- 
keeping Operations  is  seeking.  We  of  the 
United  States  hope  that  this  goal  can  be 
achieved  during  the  coming  year,  and  we  shall 
bend  every  effort  to  make  it  a  reality.  This  in 
turn  should  pave  the  way  for  the  strengthening 
of  standby  arrangements  and  for  more  reliable 
and  equitable  financing  of  U.N.  peacekeeping, 
based  on  the  collective  responsibility  of  the 
membership. 

2.  There  must  be  greater  emphasis  on  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes.  Wliile  contain- 
ing \dolence  through  U.N.  peacekeeping  is 
necessary,  such  peacekeeping  is  not  sufficient 
while  the  roots  of  conflict  remain.  Improvement 
must  be  found  through  developing  instruments 
for  factfinding,  negotiation,  conciliation,  and 
arbitration,  through  greater  use  of  the  Interna- 
tional   Court   of   Justice,   and   through   other 


methods  of  peaceful  settlement.  We  wiU  vigor- 
ously participate  in  efforts  during  the  coming 
decade  for  such  improvement.  Among  other 
steps  might  the  General  Assembly  next  year 
reconstitute  its  Panel  on  Inquiry  and  Concilia- 
tion in  order  to  revitalize  this  procedure  ? 

Naturally,  the  most  important  element  is  and 
will  remain  the  willingness  of  countries  to  en- 
gage in  procedures  for  peaceful  settlement. 
Tliere  must  be  a  greater  willingness  to  accept 
conciliation  and  mediation.  Eesort  to  arbitra- 
tion, as  was  done  so  successfully  between  India 
and  Pakistan  on  the  Eann  of  Kutch  issue,  must 
become  more  common. 

.3.  We  must  pursue  with  much  more  energy 
and  realism  our  common  responsibility  to  check 
the  dangerous  and  costly  arms  race.  There  are 
now  more  than  enough  nuclear  weapons  in  the 
world  to  destroy  every  living  thing  on  earth.  No 
nation  can  or  will  disarm  imilaterally ;  but 
prompt,  effective,  and  collective  means  of  check- 
ing the  arms  race,  particularly  as  regards 
weapons  of  mass  destruction,  are  long  overdue. 
Nor  is  the  need  for  disarmament  limited  to  the 
great  powers  and  nuclear  weapons.  All  the  wars 
now  being  fought  are  being  fought  with  con- 
ventional arms;  it  is  the  ever-mounting  burden 
of  conventional  armament  which  weighs  on  the 
poorest  nations  and  is  one  of  the  most  serious 
impediments  to  their  economic,  social,  and 
political  development. 

The  Second   Development  Decade 

Along  with  keeping  the  peace,  a  second,  and 
equally  important,  purpose  of  the  United  Na- 
tions is  building  peace  through  development. 
The  essential  imperatives  of  that  purpose  have 
been  in  recent  weeks  again  tellingly  brought  to 
our  attention  in  the  report  issued  by  the  Com- 
mission mider  the  eminent  chairmanship  of 
Lester  Pearson  and  in  Robert  McNamara's  an- 
nual address  to  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
World  Bank.  Both  deserve  earnest  study  and 
prompt  action. 

The  Pearson  report  recalls  the  well-known 
fact  that  "Development  is  not  a  guarantee  of 
political  stability  or  an  antidote  to  violence. 
Change  is,  itself,  intrinsically  disruptive." 
Nevertheless,  a  world  where  two-thirds  of  the 
people  are  in  countries  that  are  desperately  poor 
could  easily  become  a  world  of  desperate  na- 
tions— so  desperate  that  peace  would  be  much 
more  seriously  and  widely  threatened  than  it 
already  is.  Moreover,  a  world  where  such  glar- 


December   1,   1969 


487 


injij  disparities  exist  is  a  moral  challenge  to  us 
all  which  we  cannot  ignore  without  lessening 
our  own  moral  stature.  Many  speakers  from 
this  rostrum  have  expressed  disappointment 
over  the  results  of  the  First  Development 
Decade.  Certainly  we  all  wish  that  more  had 
been  done.  Still,  the  fact  remains  that  more  de- 
veloping countries  have  made  the  breakthrough 
to  self-sustaining  growth  during  the  past  decade 
than  during  any  other  decade  in  history.  While 
some  countries  have  grown  little  during  that 
time,  the  target  of  an  average  annual  increase 
of  5  percent  in  the  gross  national  product  of  de- 
veloping countries  by  the  end  of  the  decade  has 
apparently  been  reached. 

So  there  have  been  some  commendable 
achievements  in  the  First  Development  Decade, 
but  many  notable  failures.  The  level  of  eco- 
nomic aid  from  developed  to  developing  coun- 
tries fell  short  of  its  goal.  Many  harmful  trade 
barriers  to  the  exports  of  developing  countries 
have  not  been  eliminated.  The  burden  of  repay- 
ing loans  acts  as  a  serious  brake  on  the  progress 
of  developing  coimtries.  Social  progress,  the  es- 
sential corollary  of  economic  progress,  is  still 
woefully  neglected.  And  far  too  often  the 
appallingly  rapid  growth  of  population  has 
tragically  limited,  sometimes  even  nullified,  the 
benefits  of  econoniic  growth.  As  to  this  latter, 
]\Ir.  McNamara  in  the  address  I  mentioned  has 
repeated  a  timely  warning: 

The  enhancement  of  human  dignity,  and  the  conse- 
quent capacity  to  lead  a  fuller,  freer,  more  thoroughly 
human  life,  is  the  ultimate  objective  of  development. 
Economic  progress  is  a  means  to  that  end,  but  no 
achievable  rate  of  economic  growth  will  be  sufficient 
to  cope  with  an  unlimited  proliferation  of  i)eople  on 
our  limited  planet. 

We  shall  have  to  do  much  better  in  the  Second 
Development  Decade,  wliich  will  be  laimched 
during  the  25th  anniversary.  The  developed 
countries  will  have  to  take  a  new  look  at  their 
trade  and  aid  policies.  The  developing  coim- 
tries, for  their  part,  will  have  to  take  a  new  hard 
look  at  their  policies,  priorities,  and  perform- 
ance,  at  the  effectiveness  of  the  means  by  which 
they  mobilize  their  people  and  resources,  im- 
prove food  production,  and  carry  out  popula- 
tion policies  designed  to  promote  human  wel- 
fare as  well  as  economic  growth.  And  all  of  us 
will  have  to  take  a  new  look  at  the  machinery 
by  which  the  entire  U.N.  family  establishes 
priorities  and  coordinates  operations  in  this 
complex  field. 


All  these  and  other  aspects  of  the  Second  De- 
velopment Decade  are  being  considered  in  the 
preparatory  committee  created  for  that  purpose. 
I  want  to  assure  the  Assembly  that  the  United 
States  will  do  its  utmost  to  assist  in  that  pre- 
paratory committee's  work  so  that  we  may  move 
away  from  disenchantment  toward  a  true 
partnership  for  progress. 

Science   and   Technology 

If  there  is  hope  for  breakthroughs  in  the  | 
Second  Development  Decade — and  I  believe 
there  is — much  of  this  hope  lies  in  the  spectac- 
ular advance  of  science  and  technology.  Two 
men  walking  on  the  moon  last  July  were  a 
dramatic  symbol  of  how  science  has  turned  the 
wild  dreams  of  yesterday  into  the  realities  of 
today.  Science  and  technology  are  traditionally 
international.  Throughout  history  the  advances 
made  in  one  nation  have  found  their  way  to 
others,  and  scientists  learned  to  cooperate  long 
before  diplomats  did.  Now  we  are  meeting  two 
new  challenges,  wisely  recognized  by  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  when  it  established  the  commit- 
tees on  outer  space  and  the  deep  seabed.  By  their 
very  nature  these  ever  less  hostile  areas  are  the 
common  frontiers  of  all  mankind. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries, the  next  decade  should  see  a  greatly  ac- 
celerated program  for  scientific  and  technologi- 
cal cooperation  aimed  at  widespread  dissemina- 
tion of  technology  for  meeting  the  basic  needs 
of  man — such  as  nutrition,  shelter,  communica- 
tions, health,  and  sanitation.  This  should  include 
new  techniques  and  teaching  methods  for  the 
development  of  scientific  manpower. 

Decolonization  and   Human   Rights 

I  turn  now  to  the  question  of  decolonization, 
wliich  is  commended  to  our  attention  not  only 
by  the  charter  itself  but  also  bj'  the  rei:)ort  of 
the  Preparatory  Committee  for  the  Tenth  An- 
niversary of  the  Declaration  Against  Colonial- 
ism. Among  our  goals  for  the  coming  decade 
must  be  self-determination  for  all  peoples  and 
the  complete  abolition  of  colonialism  or  alien 
domination  wherever  it  exists  in  the  world.  This 
is  not  likely  to  be  accomplished  by  adopting 
more  resolutions  or  by  escalating  the  language 
of  the  resolutions.  It  certainly  will  not  happen 
overnight.  But  we  are  convinced  that  all  of  us 
must  take  a  serious  new  look  at  the  hard-core 


488 


Department   of  State   Bulletin 


jDroblems  which  remain.  We  should  recall  that 
97  percent  of  the  people  who  were  under  colonial 
domination  in  194:1  have  now  become  citizens  of 
independent  nations  and  that  the  bulk  of  these 
( I  nations  achieved  independence  without  violence. 
>  It  behooves  us  to  exercise  special  patience,  in- 
genuity, and  determination  in  bringiiag  about  a 
peaceful  exercise  of  self-determination  by  the 
remaining  3  percent,  as  suggested  in  the  Lusaka 
Manifesto. 

Finally,  there  can  be  no  more  significant  ob- 
jective for  the  United  Nations  in  its  second 
quarter  century  than  the  reinforcement  of  the 
dignity  and  the  rights  of  man  and  of  woman,  of 
simple  human  beings  of  every  color  and  creed. 
Some  progress  has  been  made  since  we  adopted 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights; 
but  I  w^ould  venture  to  say  that  there  is  hardly 
a  country  represented  in  this  hall,  my  own  coun- 
try included,  which  does  not  witness  daily  a 
violation  of  some  elemental  right  of  some  of  its 
citizens.  Surely  we  must  set  as  one  of  our  goals 
the  disappearance  from  this  earth  not  only  of 
the  evil  of  apartheid  but  of  all  other  violations 
of  human  rights  and  fimdamental  freedoms.  A 
good  way  to  begin  would  be  a  prompt  decision 
to  appoint  a  High  Commissioner  for  Human 
Rights,  as  has  been  proposed  by  Costa  Rica,  a 
country  which  has  been  recognized  as  a  leader  in 
this  field. 

All  of  this  cannot  be  accomplished.  Madam 
President,  without  great  improvements  in  our 
procedures  and  methods  of  work,  here  in  the 
Assembly  and  in  all  the  councils,  commissions, 
and  specialized  agencies  of  the  United  Nations. 
Constructive  suggestions  in  this  regard  were 
made  in  our  general  debate  by  a  distinguished 
former  President  of  this  Assembly,  Carlos 
Roniulo,  by  the  Foreign  INIinisters  of  Canada 
and  of  Italy,  and  by  many  others.  It  behooves 
us  to  pay  the  most  careful  heed  to  proposals 
such  as  theirs  if  we  are  to  escape  the  dead  hand 
of  rhetoric  and  bureaucracy  and  create  at  last 
the  peaceful  and  progressive  international 
society  which  our  charter  enjoms. 

Youth   and  the   United  Nations 

Madam  President,  I  am  particularly  grati- 
fied that  the  draft  resolution  places  so  much 
emphasis  on  the  role  of  youth.  If  the  United 
Nations  is  to  have  a  future  in  the  next  decade 
and  the  decades  to  follow,  then  surely  those  who 
are  now  young  must  become  involved  in  making 


it  work.  As  for  the  United  States,  our  young 
people  of  today — perhaps  more  than  at  any  time 
in  our  history  since  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence— are  becoming  concerned  with  and 
involved  in  the  world  around  them.  For  this 
reason,  we  welcome  the  resolution's  proposal 
that  this  General  Assembly  decide  to  convene 
a  United  Nations  youth  assembly  next  sum- 
mer. We  also  welcome  the  invitation  to  govern- 
ments of  member  states  to  consider  the  inclu- 
sion of  youth  in  their  delegations  to  the  25th 
General  Assembly.  Further,  Madam  President, 
the  United  States  delegation  will  propose  the  in- 
clusion on  the  agenda  of  the  25th  General  As- 
sembly of  an  item  entitled  "Youth  and  the 
United  Nations."  Personally,  I  look  forward  to 
this  infusion  of  new  blood  and  new  ideas  into 
the  work  of  the  United  Nations.  We  believe 
such  an  item  could  include  a  discussion  of  the 
results  of  the  youth  assembly,  could  help  to 
coordinate  actions  concernmg  youth  in  various 
U.N.  bodies,  and  would  enable  us  to  explore 
fully  the  role  of  youth  in  strengthening  the 
United  Nations. 

"The  central  question,"  Adlai  Stevenson  once 
said,  "is  whether  the  wonderfully  diverse  and 
gifted  assembly  of  human  beings  on  this  earth 
really  knows  how  to  run  a  civilization."  Madam 
President,  that  is  still  very  much  an  open  ques- 
tion. And  it  is  we,  and  the  governments  we 
represent  here,  who  must  start  at  once  to  think 
anew  and  chart  anew  the  course  we  must  take 
to  survive,  prosper,  and  live  peacefully  in  a 
world  that  changes  daily  with  frightening 
speed. 

What  is  supremely  important  is  not  this  in- 
stitution but  the  purposes  it  was  created  to 
serve.  If  it  does  not  serve  those  purposes,  history 
will  sweep  it  away.  But  who  can  believe  that 
sovereign  govermnents  without  the  United  Na- 
tions, without  a  common  institution  and  a  com- 
mon code  of  conduct,  would  serve  the  same 
purposes?  Let  no  one  suppose  that  the  U.N., 
this  organization,  these  buildings,  these  meet- 
ings, could  cease  to  exist  and  the  world  not  suf- 
fer things  far  worse  than  it  suffers  today.  In 
these  25  years  something  of  the  fate  of  humanity 
has  become  bound  up  with  what  is  done — or 
not  done — in  these  halls.  "We  cannot  escape 
history."  We,  and  the  governments  we  represent, 
must  make  this  institution  a  better  instrument 
of  man's  needs.  The  25th  anniversary  should  be 
above  all  an  occasion  for  common  efforts  to  that 
end. 


December   1,   1969 


489 


TEXT  OF   RESOLUTION^ 

Celebration  of  the  txccnty-fifth  anniversary 
of  the  United  Nations 

The  General  Assembly, 

Recalling  the  decision  adopted  at  its  twenty-tliird 
session  that  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the 
United  Nations  should  be  commemorated  in  an  appro- 
priate manner, 

Convinced  that  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  should 
be  an  occasion  to  strengthen  the  United  Nations  and 
malse  it  more  effective  by  reaffirming  the  faith  of  Gov- 
ernments and  peoples  in  the  purposes  and  principles 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  renewing 
their  endeavours  to  give  them  full  effect,  in  particular 
the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security, 
the  development  of  friendly  relations  among  nations 
based  on  respect  for  the  principles  of  equal  rights,  non- 
intervention, non-use  of  force  and  self-determination 
of  peoples,  and  achieving  international  co-operation  in 
solving  international  problems  of  an  economic,  social, 
cultural  or  humanitarian  character, 

Noting  further  that,  in  accordance  with  Article  2, 
paragraph  4,  of  the  Charter,  all  Members  shall  re- 
frain in  their  international  relations  from  the  threat 
or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or 
political  independence  of  any  State,  or  in  any  other 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of  the  United 
Nations, 

Considering  that  involvement  of  world  youth  in  the 
commemoration  is  most  desirable  in  relation  to  the 
present  and  future  tasks  of  the  Organization, 

Having  considered  the  report  of  the  Preparatory 
Committee  for  the  Twenty-fifth  Anniversary  of  the 
United  Nations, 

1.  Takes  note  of  the  programmes  and  activities  rec- 
ommended by  the  Preparatory  Committee  for  the 
Twenty-fifth  Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations  con- 
cerning the  United  Nations  and  related  organizations 
as  well  as  the  programmes  and  activities  suggested 
for  the  consideration  of  Governments  of  Member  States 
and  non-governmental  organizations ; 

2.  Decides  that  the  theme  of  the  anniversary  should 
be  "Peace,  justice  and  progress"  and  expresses  the 
desire  that  the  year  1970  will  mark  the  beginning  of 
an  era  of  Peace ; 

3.  Decides  also  that  a  commemorative  session  of 
the  General  Assembly  should  be  held  during  a  short 
period,  culminating  on  24  October  1970  with  the  signing 
and/or  adoption  of  a  final  document  or  documents ; 

4.  Expresses  the  hope  that  as  many  Heads  of  State 
or  Government  as  possible  will  be  able  to  participate  in 
the  commemorative  session ; 

5.  Decides  to  establish  a  Committee  for  the  Twenty- 
fifth  Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations,  composed  of 
twenty-five  members  to  be  designated  by  the  President 
of  the  General  Assembly  on  the  basis  of  equitable  geo- 
graphical distribution  and  bearing  in  mind  the  present 
composition  of  the  Preparatory  Committee,  for  the 
purpose    of : ' 

(o)  Drawing  up  and  co-ordinating  plans  for  the 
anniversary ; 

(6)  Organizing  suitable  activities  for  the  anniver- 
sary, to  be  undertaken  by  the  United  Nations,  in  the 
light  of  the  report  of  the  Preparatory  Committee ; 

(c)   Considering  proposals  and  suggestions,  in  rela- 


tion to  the  anniversary,  for  increasing  the  effectiveness 
of  the  United  Nations ; 

6.  Requests  the  Committee  to  prepare,  with  the  as- 
sistance of  the  Secretary-General,  a  suitable  test  for  a 
final  document  or  documents  to  be  signed  and/or 
adopted  during  the  commemorative  session,  for  con- 
sideration by  the  General  Assembly  during  the  early 
part  of  its  twenty-fifth  session ; 

7.  Decides  that  the  same  period  of  the  celebration 
of  the  twenty -fifth  anniversary  of  the  United  Nations 
should  provide  an  opportunity  for  the  celebration  of 
the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Declaration  on  the  Grant- 
ing of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples, 
which  should  conclude  with  the  adoption  of  an  ap- 
propriate document  by  the  General  Assembly  during 
the  commemorative  session ; 

8.  Decides  also  to  consider  during  the  early  part  of 
its  twenty-fifth  session  the  draft  of  the  international 
development  strategy  for  the  Second  United  Nations 
Development  Decade  with  a  view  to  having  it  adopted 
during  the  commemorative  session  ; 

9.  Endorses  the  call  of  the  Secretary-General  for  . 
the  proclamation  of  a  Disarmament  Decade,  which  wUl 
coincide  with  the  Second  United  Nations  Development, 
Decade,  and,  in  this  respect,  entrusts  the  competenti 
bodies  of  the  Organization  with  the  task  of  presentingi 
concrete  proposals  to  the  General  Assembly  at  itsi 
twenty-fifth  session ; 

10.  Invites  the  Special  Committee  on  Principles  of 
International  Law  concerning  Friendly  Relations  and 
Co-operation  among  States  to  expedite  its  work  with 
a  view  to  facilitating  the  adoption  of  an  appropriate 
document  by  the  General  Assembly  during  the  com- 
memorative session ; 

11.  Calls  upon  all  relevant  organs  and  eommitteesi 
of  the  United  Nations  to  speed  up  their  work  and  U» 
transmit  to  the  Committee  for  the  Twenty-fifth  Anni- 
versary of  the  United  Nations  material  which  may  be' 
useful  in  the  preparation  of  a  text  or  texts  for  a  final 
document  or  documents ; 

12.  Decides  to  convene  a  world  youth  assembly 
within  the  general  framework  described  in  the  report 
of  the  Preparatory  Committee ; 

13.  Invites  Governments  of  Member  States  to  con- 
sider the  inclusion  of  representatives  of  youth  in  their 
delegations  to  the  twenty-fifth  session  of  the  General 
Assembly ; 

14.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  provide  the 
necessary  facilities  for  implementing  the  recommenda- 
tions contained  in  the  report  of  the  Preparatory 
Committee ; 

15.  Urges  Governments  of  Member  States  to  im- 
plement General  Assembly  resolution  2445  (XXIII) 
of  19  December  19G8  entitled  "Teaching  in  schools  of 
the   purposes   and   principles   of   the   Charter   of  the 


"  U.N.  doc.  A/RES/2499  (XXIV)  ;  adopted  on  Oct  31 
by  a  vote  of  93  (U.S.)  to  0,  with  1  abstention. 

'  On  Oct.  31  the  President  of  the  General  Assembly 
designated  the  members  of  the  Committee  for  the 
Twent.v-fifth  Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
Committee  is  composed  of  Austria,  Bulgaria,  B.velorus- 
sian  S.S.R.,  Canada,  China,  France,  Ghana,  Guatemala, 
Guinea,  Guyana,  India,  Iran,  Italy,  Lebanon,  Mauri- 
tania, Peru,  Philii)pines,  Somalia,  Sweden,  Togo, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Uganda,  U.S.S.R.,  United^ 
Kingdom,  and  United  States. 


490 


Department  of  State   Bulletin ' 


United  Nations  and  the  structure  and  activities  of  the 
United  Nations  and  the  specialized  agencies,  with 
particular  reference  to  human  rights" ; 

16.  Invites  all  Member  States,  the  specialized  agen- 
cies, the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  and  the 
non-governmental  organizations  concerned  to  take  note 
of  the  observance  of  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of 

'  the  United  Nations  and  to  formulate  such  plans  and 
programmes  as  seem  to  them  appropriate  for  promot- 
ing the  purposes  of  the  observance ; 

17.  Appeals  to  all  Member  States  to  give  urgent 
consideration  to  the  ratification  of,  or  accession  to, 
a  number  of  multilateral  instruments  which  have  been 
adopted,  endorsed  or  supported  by  the  United  Nations 
and  which  have  not  entered  into  force  for  lack  of 
sufficient  ratifications  or  accessions  or  wliich  have  en- 
tered into  force  but  could  be  strengthened  by  additional 
ratifications  or  accessions,  as  well  as  to  their  effective 
implementation ; 

18.  Urges  appropriate  organs  of  the  United  Nations 
to  complete  as  early  as  possible  the  consideration  of 
important  conventions  still  to  be  concluded ; 

19.  Requests  the  Committee  for  the  Twenty-fifth 
Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations  to  submit  a  report 
on  the  observance  of  the  anniversary  to  the  General 
Assembly  at  its  twenty-sixth  session. 


Dr.  Ehrlich  To  Represent  U.S. 
on  WHO  Executive  Board 

The  Senate  on  November  6  confirmed  the 
nomination  of  Dr.  S.  Paul  Ehrlich,  Jr.,  to  be  the 
representative  of  the  United  States  on  the  Ex- 
ecutive Board  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion. (For  biographic  data,  see  White  House 
press  release  dated  October  4.) 


United  Nations  Documents: 
A  Selected  Bibliography 


Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  be  consulted  at  depository  libraries 
in  the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publications  may  be 
purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y. 


i   United  States  Delegations 
\  to  International  Conferences 

OECD   Restrictive  Business  Practices   Committee 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  No- 
,    vember  13  (press  release  345)  the  membership 

-  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  meeting  of  the  Re- 
strictive Business  Practices  Committee  of  the 

'  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development,  to  be  held  at  Paris  November  19- 

;  21.  Tliis  is  a  regular  semiannual  meeting  of  the 
Committee,  which  was  organized  for  the  pur- 

-  pose  of  exchanging  information  and  improving 
international  cooperation  in  the  field  of  anti- 
trust.   Preceding    the    meetings    of    the    full 

!    Committee,  its  working  parties  will  meet  on 
November  17  and  18. 
Members  of  the  U.S.  delegation  are: 

■     Representative 

Richard  W.  McLaren,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Anti- 
trust Division,  Department  of  Justice 

Alternative  Representative 

Eugene  M.  Braderman,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  for  Commercial  Affairs  and  Business  Activities 

Advisers 

Wilbur  L.  Fugate,  Chief,  Foreign  Commerce  Section, 

Antitrust  Division,  Department  of  Justice 
Northrnp  Kirk,  United  States  Mission  to  the  OECD, 
'IJ       Paris 


Security  Council 

Special  report  of  the  Secretary  General  on  the  death 
of  a  United  Nations  military  observer  on  July  27, 
1969,  in  the  Suez  Canal  sector.  S/9368.  July  30,  1969. 
6  pp. 

Letter  dated  August  22  from  the  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative of  Israel  transmitting  statements  issued  by 
the  Government  of  Israel  on  August  21  concerning 
the  fire  at  the  Al  Aqsa  Mosque  in  Jerusalem.  S/9403. 
August  22, 1969.  3  pp. 

Letter  dated  September  2  from  the  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative of  Iran  concerning  the  dispute  between 
Iran  and  Iraq  over  the  Shatt-al-Arab,  the  boundary 
river  flowing  between  the  two  countries  into  the 
Persian  Gulf.  S/9425.  September  2,  1969.  4  pp. 

Letter  dated  September  12  from  the  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative of  Jordan  transmitting  various  communi- 
cations concerning  the  fire  at  the  Al  Aqsa  Mosque  In 
Jerusalem  sent  to  the  President  of  the  Security  Coun- 
cil and  the  Secretary  General.  S/9447.  September  12, 
1969.  59  pp. 


General  Assembly 

Education  of  Youth  in  the  Respect  of  Human  Rights 
and  Fundamental  Freedoms.  Report  of  the  Secretary 
General.  A/7662.  September  20, 1969.  60  pp. 

International  Year  for  Human  Rights.  Measures  and 
Activities  Undertaken  in  Connection  with  the  Inter- 
national Year  for  Human  Rights.  Report  of  the 
Secretary  General.  A/7666.  September  23,  1969. 
142  pp. 


Economic  and  Social  Council 

An  Account  of  the  Operational  and  Research  Activities 
of  the  United  Nations  System  in  the  Field  of  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Development.  Prepared  by  the  En- 
larged Committee  on  Program  and  Coordination. 
E/4744  (Vol.  I),  274  pp.  E/4744  (Vol.  II),  59  pp. 
September  24,  1969. 

Final  Report  of  the  Enlarged  Committee  for  Program 
and  Coordination.  E/4748.  October  2,  1969.  80  pp. 


December  1,   1969 


491 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Automotive  Traffic 

Convention  on  road  traffic,  witli  annexes  and  protocol. 
Done  at  Geneva  September  19,  1949.  Entered  into 
force  March  26,  1952.  TIAS  2487. 
Accession  deposited:  Albania  (with  a  reservation), 
October  1, 1969. 

Disputes 

Convention  on  the  settlement  of  investment  disputes 
between  states  and  nationals  of  other  states.  Done  at 
Washington    March    18,    1965.    Entered    into    force 
October  14,  1966.  TIAS  6090. 
Ratification  deposited:  Burundi,  November  5, 1969. 

Fisheries 

Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the  north- 
west Atlantic  fisheries  (TIAS  2089)  relating  to  panel 
membership  and  to   regulatory   measures.  Done  at 
Washington  October  1, 1909.' 
Adherence  deposited:  Iceland,  November  14,  1969. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention  of  Union  of  Paris  of  March  20,  1883,  as 
revised,  for  the  protection   of  industrial  property. 
Done  at  Lisbon  on  October  31,  1958.  Entered  into 
force  January  4, 1962.  TIAS  4931. 
'Notification  o/  accession:  Austria,  October  31, 1969. 


BILATERAL 


France 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  March  23,  1956, 
as  amended  and  extended,  relating  to  the  establish- 
ment and  operation  of  a  rawinsonde  observation  sta- 
tion on  the  island  of  Guadeloupe  (TIAS  3647,  4298, 
4610,  5485,  6053).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Paris  September  5,  1968,  and  October  31,  1969. 
Entered  into  force  October  31,  1909. 

Guinea 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities  of  February  3,  1969  (TIAS 
6640).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Conakry 
October  23  and  28,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
October  28, 1969. 

Iran 

Parcel  post  agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  for 
execution.  Signed  at  Tehran  July  15  and  at  Wash- 
ington August  28,  1969.  Enters  into  force  on  a  date 
mutually  agreed  by  the  administrations  of  the  two 
countries. 

Turkey 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  February  6,  1969  (TIAS 
6645).  Signed  at  Ankara  November  3,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  November  3,  1969. 

Venezuela 

Amendment  to  agreement  for  cooperation  concerning 
the  civil  uses  of  atomic  energy  of  October  8,  1958 
(TIAS  4416).  Signed  at  Washington  November  14, 
1969.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  on  which  each 
government  shall  have  received  from  the  other  gov- 
ernment written  notification  that  it  has  complied  with 
all  statutory  and  constitutional  requirements  for 
entry  into  force. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  March  13.  1907  (TIAS  6271). 
Signed  at  Saigon  October  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
Gotober  29,  1969. 


Belgium 

Consular  convention,  with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed 
at  Washington  September  2, 1969.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  Novem- 
ber 10, 1969. 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  adjustments  in  the  flood  control 
payments  by  the  United  States  to  Canada  pursuant 
to  the  Columbia  River  treaty  of  January  17,  1961 
(TIAS  5638).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington August  18  and  20, 1969.' 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  Novem- 
ber 10, 1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN   SERVICE 


'  Not  in  force. 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  November  6  confirmed  the  nomina- 
tion of  Ernest  V.  Siracusa  to  be  Ambassador  to  Bolivia. 
(For  biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  348  dated  November  19.) 


492 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX      Decemier  1,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No.  1588 


Aviation.  U.S.  and  Portugal  Conclude  Aviation 
Negotiations  (Department  statement)     .     .     .      470 

Bolivia.  Siracusa  confirmed  as  U.S.  Am- 
bassador     492 

China.  Move  To  Change  Representation  of  China 
in  the  U.N.  Rejected  by  the  24th  General 
Assembly  (Whalley,  texts  of  resolutions)     .     .      476 

Congress 

Confirmations    (Siracusa) 492 

Dr.  Ehrlich  To  Represent  U.S.  ou  WHO  Execu- 
tive Board 491 

42d  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 468 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Confirmations 

(Siracusa) 492 

Disarmament 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  (Rogers)     .     .       465 
United  States  Comments  on  Revisions  in  Draft 
Treaty    Banning    Emplacement    of    Nuclear 
Weapons  on  the  Seabed  (Leonard,  text  of  re- 
vised draft  treaty) 480 

Economic  Affairs.  OECD  Restrictive  Business 
Practices  Committee  (delegation) 491 

International    Organizations    and    Conferences 
Dr.  Ehrlich  To  Represent  U.S.  on  WHO  Execu- 
tive Board 491 

OECD  Restrictive  Business  Practices  Committee 

(delegation) 491 

Marine  Science.  United  States  Comments  on  Re- 
visions in  Draft  Treaty  Banning  Emplacement 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  on  the  Seabed  (Leonard, 
text  of  revised  draft  treaty) 480 

Nigeria.  Secretary  Reports  on  U.S.  Efforts  To 
Help  Nigeria  Civil  War  Victims  (statement)    .      469 

Population.  General  Draper  To  Represent  U.S. 
on  U.N.  Population  Commission 484 

Portugal.  U.S.  and  Portugal  Conclude  Aviation 
Negotiations  (Department  statement)     .     .     .      470 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 492 

United  States  Comments  on  Revisions  in  Draft 
Treaty    Banning    Emplacement    of    Nuclear 
Weapons  on  the  Seabed  (Leonard,  text  of  re-     > 
vised  draft  treaty) 480 

U.S.S.R.     Strategic     Arms     Limitation     Talks 

(Rogers) 465 

United  Nations 

General  Draper  To  Represent  U.S.  on  U.N. 
Population  Commission 484 

Move  To  Change  Representation  of  China  in  the 
U.N.  Rejected  by  the  24th  General  Assembly 
(Whalley,  texts  of  resolutions) 476 

Twenty-Fifth  Anniversary  of  the  United  Nations 

(Tost,   text  of  resolution) 485 

United  Nations  Documents 491 

U.S.  Brings  Hanoi's  Treatment  of  American 
Prisoners  of  War  to  Attention  of  U.N.  Com- 
mittee (Hauser) 471 


Viet-Nam 

42d    Plenary    Session    on    Viet-Nam    Held    at 

Paris  (Lodge) 468 

U.S.  Brings  Hanoi's  Treatment  of  American 
Prisoners  of  War  to  Attention  of  U.N.  Com- 
mittee (Hauser) 471 

Name   Index 

Draper,  Gen.  William  H 484 

Ehrlich,   S.   Paul,   Jr 491 

Hauser,  Mrs.  Rita  E 471 

Leonard,  James  F 480 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 468 

Rogers,   Secretary 465,469 

Siracusa,  Ernest  V 492 

Whalley,  .T.  Irving 476 

Yost,  Charles  W 485 


No. 

Date 

*334 

11/10 

t335 

11/10 

*33C 

11/11 

t337 

11/11 

Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  10-16 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Wasliington,  D.C.  20520. 

Release  issued  prior  to  November  10  which 
appears  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  is  No.  333 
of  November  7. 

Subject 

Root  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Ivory  Coast    (biographic  data). 

Experts'  report  ou  defoliation  in 
Cambodia. 

Program  for  visit  of  Prime  Jlinis- 
ter  Sato  of  Japan. 

Foreign  military  service  by  U.S. 
citizens  (Department  state- 
ment). 

U.S.  and  Japan  amend  air  trans- 
port agreement. 

Rogers :  Biafran  relief. 

U.S.-Canada  automotive  agree- 
ment consultations  (rewrite). 

Herman  sworn  in  as  U.S.  Com- 
missioner, International  Bound- 
ary Commission,  U.S.-Canada 
( rewrite ) . 

Lodge :  42d  plenary  session  on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

Rogers:  "Strategic  Arms  Limita- 
tion Talks." 

U.S.-Honduras  Swan  Islands  ne- 
gotiations. 

U.S.  delegation  to  OECD  Restric- 
tive Business  Practices  Commit- 
tee, Paris,  November  19-21. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


t33S  11/12 


339 

t340 


11/12 
11/12 


t341  11/13 


342 

11/13 

343 

11/13 

t344 

11/13 

345 

11/13 

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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1589 


December  8,  1969 


QUALITY  OF  LIFE  IN  THE  AMERICAS 

Statement  hy  President  Nixon 
and  Text  of  the  Rockefeller  Mission  Report 


Foi'  contents  see-  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1589 
December  8,  1969 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  o(  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

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Single  copy  30  cents 

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approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 

the  Budget  (January  11,  1966). 

Nol^:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 

reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 

STATE    BUI,LET1N  as  the  source  wiU  be 

appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 

the   Readers'   Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  ivork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
Tlie  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  icell  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interna- 
tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently. 


The  Rockefeller  Report  on  Quality  of  Life  in  the  Americas 


Statement  by  President  Nixon  ' 


Tliere  are  two  points  I  want  to  stress  in  con- 
nection with  Governor  Rockefeller's  report 
which  is  being  released  today : 

First,  as  I  said  in  my  October  31  speech,^  this 
report  constituted  a  major  contribution  to  the 
formulation  of  our  policy  for  this  hemisphere. 
Both  our  general  conceptual  approach  and  the 
specific  lines  of  action  we  intend  to  follow  have 
been  substantially  shaped  by  that  rejDort. 

Secondh',  this  report  is  still  very  much  imder 
active  consideration.  Many  of  its  recommenda- 
tions which  are  far-reaching  and  complex  are 
still  being  staffed  and  examined  with  a  view  to 
their  implementation.  Therefore,  a  good  many 
of  the  things  we  will  be  doing  in  the  weeks  and 
months  ahead  will  have  had  their  genesis  in  this 
report. 

Let  me  give  you  an  example:  In  his  report. 
Governor  Eockefeller  recommends  a  unique 
and  imaginative  technique  that  might  be  used  in 
cases  where  this  type  of  action  is  indicated  in 
the  debt  service  area.  He  recommended  the  pos- 
sibility of  maintaining  equivalent  local  currency 
payments  in  instances  where  the  dollar  repay- 
ments are  suspended  or  stretched  out.  The  local 
currency  would  be  paid  into  a  fund  which  coidd 
in  turn  be  used  for  development  purposes  in 
that  country.  Now,  there  are  a  nimiber  of  tech- 
nical pomts  to  be  clarified ;  but  the  concept  is  an 
imagmative  one,  and  I  believe  it  is  something 
that  can  be  useful.  Accordingly,  I  have  directed 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  undertake  an 
immediate  study  of  this  proposal  with  a  view  to 
adopting  it  as  a  technique  in  those  cases  where 

'  Issued  on  Nov.  10  (White  House  press  release). 
'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  17, 1969,  p.  409. 


it  is  appropriate.  Mr.  Geor-e  Woods,  who  was  a 
senior  adviser  to  the  Governor  on  his  mission 
and  is  former  President  of  the  World  Bank, 
will  be  a  consultant  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  for  tliis  purpose. 

Now  let  me  make  a  more  general  point.  My 
speech  on  October  31  was  intended  as  a  philo- 
sophical foundation  for  what  I  envisage  as  a 
continuous  process  of  policy  formation  over  the 
months  ahead.  It  outlined  our  view  of  the  nature 
of  our  relationship  with  the  other  states  in  the 
hemisphere ;  the  principles  which  should  under- 
lie that  relationship ;  the  policies  which  should 
implement  it;  and  the  directions  those  policies 
should  take,  together  with  some  concrete 
examples. 

I  did  not  want  to  promise  thmgs  which  would 
have  been  unattainable,  such  as  greatly  in- 
creased aid  levels.  On  the  other  hand,  I  want  to 
do  the  maximum  of  what  is  possible  and 
"doable."  This  is  what  I  meant  by  an  action 
program,  and  we  intend  now  to  take  such  con- 
crete measures  in  conjunction  with  the  other 
American  nations.  We  intend  to  propose  over 
the  next  several  months  further  concrete  ac- 
tions. We  will  be  discussing  and  exchanging 
views  with  our  sister  nations  on  key  issues  and 
problems,  and  jointly  we  will  be  developing  pro- 
grams and  policies  to  meet  our  problems.  One 
of  the  things  I  want  to  explore  very  carefully 
when  budget  considerations  make  it  possible  is 
a  program  to  finish  the  highway  net  down  the 
center  of  the  South  American  Continent.  This  is 
a  program  which  I  think  would  have  an  im- 
mense effect  economically  and  be  a  great  boost 
to  integration  of  the  region. 

Next  week  the  Inter- American  Economic  and 
Social  Council  will  convene  here  in  Washington 


December  8,   1969 


493 


at  the  technical  level.  The  United  States  will  be 
making  some  specific  proposals  in  a  number  of 
fields;  we  will  want  to  have  the  views  of  the 
other  nations,  and  we  will  then  be  developing 
proposals  and  lines  of  action  accordingly  over 
the  next  several  months. 

Let  me  give  you  a  concrete  example:  All  of 
the  American  nations  want  to  see  the  early 
establisliment  of  a  liberal  worldwide  system  of 
generalized  trade  preferences  for  all  developing 
countries.  I  stated  in  my  speech  that  the  United 
States  intended  to  press  vigorously  with  the  de- 
veloped countries  for  the  adoption  of  such  a 
system.  This  week  U.S.  representatives  at 
OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development]  meetings  in  Paris  took 
that  position.  The  United  States  will  work  ac- 
tively now  for  such  a  system.  I  want  to  say, 
however,  that  if  for  any  reason  we  find  it  not 
possible  to  establish  a  satisfactory  system  of 
generalized  preferences  within  a  reasonable 
time,  then  the  United  States  will  be  prepared 
to  consider  other  alternative  actions  it  can  take 
to  assure  that  the  American  nations  will  have 
preferential  access  to  the  U.S.  market. 


As  another  example,  we  are  also  going  to  pro- 
pose to  the  other  American  nations  at  the  lA- 
ECOSOC  meetings  joint  initiatives  whose  costs 
we  are  prepared  to  share : 

— expansion  of  regional  science  programs, 
emphasizing  research  and  training ; 

— promotion  of  an  intensified  hemispheric 
effort  in  basic  and  applied  food  research ; 

— establishment  of  an  uiter- American  science 
information  exchange  program. 

I  am,  in  short,  most  serious  about  imdertak- 
ing  an  action  program  and  implementing  a 
mature  partnership  with  the  countries  of  this 
hemisphere.  Our  fimdamental  objective,  as 
Governor  Kockef  eller  so  eloquently  expressed  it, 
is  to  help  improve  the  quality  of  life  of  the 
people  of  this  hemisphere. 

The  Governor  knows  how  personally  grate- 
ful I  am  for  all  of  the  time  and  energy  he  spent 
on  this  mission  and  how  deeply  appreciative  I 
am  for  his  insights  and  imaginative  ideas.  Let 
me  once  more  take  this  opportunity  publicly  to 
express  my  appreciation. 


494 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


^''Forces  now  are  converging  that  make  possible,  for  the  fij'st  time, 
the  hope  tJiat  many  of  tnan's  deepest  aspirations  can  at  last  be 
realized.  .  .  . 

"TFe  seeh  an  open  world — open  to  ideas,  open  to  the  exchange  of 
goods  and  peopile — a  world  in  which  no  people,  great  or  small,  will 
live  in  angry  isolation.'''' 

President  Richard  Nixon 
Inaugural  Address,  January  20,  1969 


Qualify  of  Life  in  the  Americas 


Eeport  of  a  U.S.  Presidential  Mission  for 
THE  Western  BLemisphere 
— Nelson  A.  Rockefeller 


GOVERNOR   ROCKEFELLER'S  LETTER 
OF  TRANSMITTAL 

The  Honorable  Richard  M.  Nixon 
The  White  House 
Washington,  D.C. 

Dear  Mr.  President:  I  enclose  the  final  re- 
port and  recommendations  based  on  the  findings 
of  the  mission  you  requested  me  to  undertake. 
If  I  may,  I  should  like  to  take  this  opportunity 
to  review  briefly  the  developments  from  the 
time  of  your  original  call. 

It  was  on  your  first  full  day  in  the  White 
House  that  you  asked  me  to  undei-take  the  mis- 
sion, to  consult  with  the  leaders  of  the  other 
American  republics  on  your  behalf  and  to  help 
your  administration  develop  policies  for  the 
conduct  of  our  international  relations  through- 
out the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Youi'  decision  to  set  up  such  a  mission  was 
bold,  sensitive  and  significant.  Here  was  the 
newly-inaugurated  leader  of  the  most  power- 
ful nation  in  the  world,  at  the  very  outset  of  his 
administration,  seeking  the  advice  and  counsel 
of  the  leaders  of  our  neighbor  states  before  for- 
mulating his  policies  as  they  related  to  Western 
Hemisphere  affairs.  This  development,  in  my 
opinion,  has  given  promise  of  a  new  era  of 
consultation  and  close  cooperation  in  interna- 
tional relations. 

Only  through  consultation  in  the  develop- 
ment of  common  objectives  is  it  possible  for 


the  nation-states  today  to  work  out  common 
policies  and  joint  programs  that  will  truly  rep- 
resent the  best  interests  of  all.  In  thus  initiat- 
ing this  program  of  extensive  consultation  at 
the  liighest  levels,  you  were  embarking  on  a  new 
approach  at  a  crucial  point  in  Western  Hemi- 
sphere relations. 

As  I  am  sure  you  will  recall,  Mr.  President, 
you  firet  discussed  this  mission  with  the  dis- 
tinguished Secretary  General  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States,  Senor  Galo  Plaza, 
whom  you  received  on  your  first  day  in  the 
White  House — and  it  was  his  suggestion  that 
I  be  asked  to  head  the  mission. 

I  immediately  felt,  when  you  called  me,  that  it 
was  an  exciting  and  unique  idea.  As  I  said  at 
the  time,  however,  your  request  presented  me 
with  a  difficult  problem.  On  the  one  hand,  I 
have  long  had  an  abiding  faith  in  and  affection 
for  our  neighbors  in  the  hemisphere — and  a  deep 
belief  in  the  importance  of  Western  Hemisphere 
unity  to  our  mutual  security  and  well-being. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  Governor  of  New  York 
State,  I  had  a  great  responsibility  to  meet  a 
growing  fiscal  crisis  and  the  urgent  human 
needs  wliich  exist  in  our  state  as  they  do 
throughout  the  nation.  These  had  to  be  dealt 
with  first.  The  New  York  State  Legislature  was 


•  This  special  issue  of  the  Bulletin  con- 
tains the  complete  text  of  the  report  of  tJie 
Rockefeller  Mission.  The  charts,  graphs, 
and  index  included  in  the  report  are  not 
reproduced  here. 


December  8,   1969 


495 


in  session  and  my  obligations  to  the  people  of 
New  York  State  naturally  had  priority. 

You  were  very  understanding  of  this  di- 
lemma, and  you  made  it  possible  for  us  to  work 
together  toward  finding  solutions  to  the  critical 
needs  of  the  states.  You  gave  me  the  opportunity 
to  make  a  full  presentation  at  the  White  House 
on  these  matters  to  you  and  the  Urban  Affairs 
Council  and  to  put  before  you  the  Governors' 
recommendations  for  new  federal  policies.  Your 
expressed  concern  at  that  meeting  was  a  begin- 
ning of  the  change  of  federal-state  relationships 
which  you  have  so  significantly  been  carrying 
forward.  This  together  with  your  early  decision 
to  seek  substantially  increased  federal  aid  to 
state  and  local  governments,  with  reforms  in 
welfare  and  other  fields,  was  a  vital  assurance 
to  me  and  to  the  other  Governors  that  help  was 
on  the  way.  A  key  to  the  future  solution  of  the 
acute  fiscal  problems  of  the  states  and  localities 
was  about  to  be  turned. 

Finally,  there  was  your  understanding  accept- 
ance of  the  fact  that  our  trips  throughout  the 
hemisphere  could  not  begin  until  the  New  York 
State  Legislature  had  adjourned,  and  would 
have  to  be  broken  into  four  journeys  with  time 
in  between  to  maintain  direction  of  the  affairs 
of  the  State. 

In  preparing  for  the  mission,  it  was  obvious 
that  the  basic  facts  concerning  the  problems  and 
aspirations  of  the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere were  well  known.  It  was  equally  obvious, 
however,  that  we  in  the  United  States  had  not 
found  effective  answers  as  to  how  we  should 
solve  the  problems  and  moi-e  effectively  coop- 
erate in  meeting  the  aspirations  on  a  basis  of 
mutual  interest. 

In  view  of  the  wide  range  of  the  areas  of 
common  concern  among  the  peoples  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere,  and  because  there  were  23 
countries  to  visit,  each  with  its  own  special 
problems,  it  seemed  clear  to  me  that  I  could  not 
do  this  job  alone.  It  would  have  been  impossible 
for  one  i>erson  to  spend  enough  time  in  each 
country  to  talk  with  all  the  key  people  in  the 
various  areas  in  both  public  and  private  life. 
Therefore,  I  invited  a  group  of  outstanding  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  to  go  with  me.  Each 
was  an  expert  in  a  specialized  field — such  as 
trade,  finance,  education,  science,  culture, 
women's  activities,  agriculture,  labor  and  other 
fields.  The  names  of  these  citizens  who  gave  so 
generously  and  so  effectively  of  their  time  and 
talents  on  these  missions  appear  at  the  end  of 
this  letter. 


Twenty  to  25  of  these  distinguished  advisers 
were  on  each  trip.  In  each  country,  a  schedule 
of  visits  with  the  key  people  was  worked  out 
in  advance  of  our  arrival,  "\^^lile  I  was  meeting 
with  the  President  or  Prime  Minister  of  the 
country,  and  later  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  often  with  the  entire  cabinet,  each 
of  the  advisers  would  be  meeting  with  leaders, 
both  public  and  private,  in  the  fields  of  common 
interest  and  concern.  In  this  way,  the  advisers 
on  your  mission  were  able  to  visit  and  counsel 
with  some  100  to  200  people  in  each  country. 
It  would  have  taken  weeks  in  each  country  for 
one  person  to  cover  the  same  ground  in  similar 
depth.  Furthermore,  no  one  could  have  the 
combined  expertise  of  the  advisory  members 
of  your  mission.  They  are  an  extraordinary 
group  of  men  and  women,  and  they  sei-ved  their 
country  selflessly  and  brilliantly.  Through  this 
letter,  I  would  like  to  share  with  you  my  pro- 
found admiration  and  deep  gratitude  for  the 
contribution  they  have  made. 

Through  these  saturation  visits,  the  members 
of  your  mission  were  able  to  sit  down  and  talk, 
as  knowledgeable  colleagues,  with  experts  of  all 
sorts  on  specific  problems  and  to  gain  new  and 
sensitive  insights  on  what  could  be  done  more 
effectively  to  achieve  our  common  objectives.  I 
must  also  take  advantage  of  this  letter  to  say 
to  you,  Mr.  President,  how  grateful  and  ap- 
preciative we  are  for  the  time  and  invaluable 
advice  these  outstandingly  able  leaders  from 
public  and  private  life  in  the  various  countries 
gave  to  the  members  of  your  mission. 

Each  member  of  the  mission  has  written  de- 
tailed reports  on  his  findings,  all  of  which  will 
be  part,  of  the  final  record.  In  addition,  intensive 
group  discussions  were  held,  during  and  after 
our  travels.  This  group  effort  and  the  invalu- 
able counsel  it  produced  are  reflected  in  the 
findings  of  this  report.  However,  no  attempt 
was  made  to  achieve  a  consensus,  and  I  accept 
sole  responsibility  for  the  recommendations  in 
the  report. 

In  addition  to  being  able  to  communicate 
directly  with  national  leaders,  I  was  also  able 
to  communicate  with  the  people  of  each  country 
through  press,  radio  and  television  interviews. 
We  not  only  listened  to  the  problems,  hopes 
and  aspirations  of  the  people  and  the  leaders 
of  the  other  Amei'ican  republics,  but  also  were 
able  to  get  their  advice  and  counsel  and  their 
assessment  of  the  political  realities  of  today. 
Deeper  understanding  and  new  approaches  to 
solutions  of  our  common  problems  resulted. 


496 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


As  everyone  knows,  the  mission  encountered 
difficulties.  The  new  military  government  of 
Peru  stated  that  our  visit  would  be  "incon- 
venient"' and  requested  indefinite  postponement. 
This  action  was  the  result  of  a  specific  incident, 
growing  out  of  the  dispute  between  the  United 
States  and  Peru  over  fishing  rights  and  expro- 
priation of  oil  fields,  but  it  was  unrelated  to  our 
mission. 

After  a  student  was  accidentally  shot  and 
killed  in  a  demonstration  during  the  mission's 
early  visit  to  Honduras,  student  groups,  stimu- 
lated by  subvereive  elements  on  an  organized 
basis  throughout  the  hemisphere,  used  the  inci- 
dent as  a  rallying  point  in  attempting  to  pre- 
vent our  visits  or  to  disrupt  them.  As  a  result 
of  these  demonstrations  and  the  threats  of  vio- 
lence, together  with  certain  delicate  internal 
political  situations,  the  governments  of  Chile 
and  Venezuela  also  asked  us  to  postpone  our 
visit,  thus  reducing  to  20  the  number  of  coun- 
tries on  our  itinerary. 

Suggestions  have  been  made  that  the  trips 
were  ill-timed  and  should  have  been  cancelled. 
In  actual  fact,  the  trips  were  very  well  timed ; 
they  were  timed  to  the  opportunity  and  will  of 
a  new  administration  to  formulate  a  new  policy 
for  the  hemisphere.  And  it  became  clear  as  our 
trips  progressed  that,  without  such  a  new  policy, 
the  nations  of  this  hemisphere  would  steadily 
and  rapidly  become  less  disposed — because  of 
disillusionment  and  cynicism — to  deal  candidly 
and  effectively  with  the  United  States  and  with 
confidence  in  the  mutuality  of  our  interest  and 
good  will. 

In  any  case,  the  timing  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  demonstrations  and  violence  that  occurred ; 
they  can  be  attributed  to  these  causes :  There  is 
general  frustration  over  the  failure  to  achieve 
a  more  rapid  improvement  in  standards  of  liv- 
ing. The  United  States,  because  of  its  identifica- 
tion with  the  failure  of  the  Alliance  for  Prog- 
ress to  live  up  to  expectations,  is  blamed.  People 
in  the  countries  concerned  also  used  our  visit  as 
an  opportunity  to  demonstrate  their  frustra- 
tions with  the  failure  of  their  own  govei-nments 
to  meet  their  needs.  In  addition,  demonstrations 
that  began  over  grievances  were  taken  over  and 
exacerbated  by  anti-U.S.  and  subversive  ele- 
ments which  sought  to  weaken  and  discredit 
the  United  States,  and  their  own  governments 
in  the  process.  It  is  significant  that  these  same 
elements  were  active  in  demonstrations,  threats 
and  acts  of  violence  in  democratic  countries  as 
well  as  in  those  with  military  govermnents.  In 


fact,  one  mission  member  remarked  that  the 
only  frightening  confrontation  of  all  our  travels 
was  that  caused  by  an  SDS-organized  student 
demonstration  at  John  F.  Kennedy  Interna- 
tional Airport  as  we  returned  to  New  York 
City  at  the  end  of  our  fourth  trip. 

Had  we  cancelled  the  visits,  it  would  have 
been  seen  as  weakness  and  fear  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  govermnent.  This  would  have 
done  much  to  discredit  the  United  States  in  the 
other  Americas.  It  would,  moreover,  have  un- 
dei'mined  the  priority  and  impoi'tance  which 
you  attach  to  the  hemisphere's  needs.  Thus  it 
would  have  lost  us  as  a  nation  an  opportunity — 
one  that  is  increasingly  rare — to  work  out  our 
common  problems  for  our  common  benefit.  As 
it  was,  by  carrying  out  the  mission  despite  the 
difficulties,  the  determination  and  purposeful- 
ness  of  the  new  administration  were  clearly  evi- 
denced. The  reception  that  the  mission  received 
from  govermnent  officials  and  from  leaders  in 
j^rivate  fields  was  open  and  warm. 

One  important  by-product  of  the  demonstra- 
tions and  violence  was  that  they  put  the  mu- 
tuality of  the  problems  of  our  hemisphere  on  the 
front  pages  of  our  newspapers,  on  the  nation's 
television  screens,  and  therefore  in  the  minds 
of  most  Americans.  It  is  unfortimate  that  these 
problems  only  get  attention  in  this  fashion.  If 
we  in  the  mission  sei'ved  as  a  lightning  rod — if 
we  focused  attention  on  the  deep-rooted  nature 
of  the  hemisphere's  concerns  and  what  should 
be  done  about  them — the  difficulties  and  criti- 
cism that  we  encountered  were  well  worth  it. 

I  appreciated  the  opportunity  of  keeping  in 
touch  with  you  during  our  trips  and  visiting 
with  you  between  trips,  for  in  this  way  I  was 
able  to  give  you  a  general  review  of  our  findings 
as  we  went  along.  And  I  am  delighted  that  some 
specific  actions  have  already  been  taken  as  a 
result.  You  have  already  received  the  reports  on 
my  personal  conversations  and  observations  in 
each  country. 

This  report  is  based  on  the  mission's  findings, 
checked  against  many  other  sources.  One  that 
was  particularly  helpful  was  the  constinictive 
report  of  the  House  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
American  Affairs  headed  by  Representative 
Dante  Fascell.  We  also  acknowledge  the  coop- 
eration of  the  respective  chairmen  of  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  and  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee.  I  would  partic- 
ularly like  to  express  my  gratitude  for  the  inter- 
est, cooperation  and  participation  of  the  State 
Department. 

May  this  report,  with  its  recommendations, 


December  8,   1969 


497 


help  you  to  serve  the  cause  of  better  relations 
and   progress  for  all  people  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 
With  warm  best  wishes, 
Eespectfully, 

Nelson  A.  Rockefeller 

New  York,  New  York 
August  30, 1969 


Advisory  Members  of  the  Mission 

George  Beebe,  Senior  Managing  Editor,  The  "Miami 

Herald" 
Victor  Borella,  Special  Assistant  to  the  Governor  of 

New  York  for  Labor  Affairs 
David  Bronheim,  Director,  Center  for  Inter-American 

Relations 
Doctor  Detlev  W.  Bronk,  past  President  of  the  National 

Academy  of  Science,  Johns  Hopkins  University  and 

The  Rockefeller  University 
William  F.  Butler,  Vice  President  and  Chief  Economist 

of  The  Chase  Manhattan  Bank 
James  M.  Cannon,  Special  Assistant  to  the  Governor 

of  New  York 
Miss  Evelyn   Cunningham,   Director,  Women's   Unit, 

State  of  New  York 
Doctor    Gordon    F.    Ekholm,    Curator    of    Mexican 

Archeology,    The    American    Museum    of    Natural 

History 
Doctor  Robert  Goldwater,  Chairman,  Administrative 

Committee,  The  Museum  of  Primitive  Art,  and  Pro- 
fessor of  Fine  Arts,  New  York  University 
Doctor  Harold  B.   Gotaas,  Dean,  The  Technological 

Institute,  Northwestern  University 
Doctor  Samuel  B.  Gould,  Chancellor,  State  University 

of  New  York 
Doctor  Walter  D.  Harris,  Jr.,  Associate  Professor  of 

City   Planning,   Department  of  Architecture,   Yale 

University 
John   B.   Hightower,   Executive   Director,   New   York 

State  Council  on  the  Arts 
Mrs.   Patricia   Hitt,   Assistant   Secretary   of  Health, 

Education  and  Welfare 
Doctor   G.   Kenneth   Holland,   President,   Institute  of 

International  Education 
Thomas   P.   F.    Hoving,   Director,   The   Metropolitan 

Museum  of  Art 
Frederic    K.    Howard,     Consultant,     Inter-American 

Development  Bank 
Mrs.   Flora  Kampmann,  former  Republican  National 

Committeewoman  for  Texas 
Augustine    R.     Marusi,     Chairman    and     President, 

Borden,  Inc. 
Mrs.  Dorothy  McHugh,  Republican  National  Commit- 
teewoman for  New  York 
Andrew     McLellan,     Inter-American     Representative, 

AFLr-CIO 
Doctor  Alan  D.  Miller,  Commissioner  of  Mental  Hy- 
giene, State  of  New  York 
Doctor  Emil  M.  Mrak,  Chancellor  Emeritus,  Univer- 
sity of  California  at  Davis 
James  Noel,  Jr.,  Director  for  Central  America  and  the 

Caribbean,  Catholic  Relief  Services,  U.S.  Catholic 

Conference 


General  Robert  W.  Porter,  Jr.,  USA  (Ret.),  former 
Commander-in-Chief,   U.S.   Southern   Command 

Doctor  Clark  W.  Reynolds,  Associate  Professor  of 
Economics,  Stanford  University 

Doctor  W.  Kenneth  Riland,  Chief  Physician,  New 
York,  U.S.  Steel  Corporation 

Colonel  John  D.  Silvera,  Program  Coordinator,  New 
York  State  OflBce  on  Urban  Affairs 

Samuel  P.  Singletary,  Special  Assistant  to  the  Gov- 
ernor of  New  York 

The  Reverend  Wyatt  Tee  Walker,  Special  Assistant 
to  the  Governor  of  New  York  for  Urban  Affairs 

Arthur  K.  Watson,  Chairman  of  the  Board,  IBM  World 
Trade  Corporation,  former  President  of  the  Inter- 
national Chamber  of  Commerce 

Doctor  Leroy  Wehrle,  Fellow,  Institute  of  Politics, 
Harvard  University 

Doctor  Clifton  R.  Wharton,  Jr.,  Vice  President,  The 
Agricultural  Development  Council 

Monroe  Wheeler,  Counsellor  to  the  Tru.stees,  The 
Museum  of  Modern  Art 

Thomas  H.  Wolf,  Vice  President  and  Director  of  Tele- 
vision Documentaries,  ABC  News 

George  D.  Woods,  Consultant,  First  Boston  Corporation 
and  former  President,  World  Bank 

Special  Advisers 

Richard  Aldrich  ■: 

John  R.  Camp  | 

Jerry  Danzig 

Colonel  John  Deaver 

Bereut  Friele  \ 

John  W.  Johnston,  Jr.  t 

Jerome  I.  Levinson 

Kenneth  M.  Rabin 

Doctor  Hyman  Zuckerman 

Advance  Group 

Joseph  H.  Boyd,  Jr.,  Director 

Ronald  Abney 

Joseph  W.  Canzeri 

Henry  Diamond 

David  Duffy 

Theodore  Halaby 

Kenneth  T.  Hoeck,  Jr. 

Lincoln  Hoffman 

George  Humphreys 

James  Kiepper 

A.  Bruce  Manley 

John  W.  MeGrath 

John  Moss 

Joseph  E.  Persieo 

David  Reif 

Craig  Thorn  III 

Jerald  I.  Wolfgang 

F.taff 

Elizabeth  Boyd 
Ann  Boylan 
Flor  Brennan 
Harold  Brown 
Rodney  Campbell 
Arline  Chemiak 
Ann  Coleman 
Evelyn  Cook 
William  Eckhof 


498 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Major  Edward  Galvln 
Sally  Gardner 
Warren  E.  Gardner,  Jr. 
Luise  Greiner 
Georgia  Herrick 
Audrey  Hoffman 
Walter  Karpowich 
Lt.  William  Lovelock 
Nancy  Magimies 
Ronald  Maiorana 
Arthur  Maun 
Hugh  Morrow 
Mary  Nestor 
Maxine  Paul 
Martha  Plummer 
Hailey  Rodwell 
Nancy  Shea 
Bert  Smith 
Walter  Thompson 
Jlarshall  Watzke 
Ann  C.  Whitman 

Special  Acknowledgement  for  Counsel  and  Advice 
on  the  Preparation  of  the  Report  to  the  President : 

Hugh  Morrow 
Oscar  M.  Ruebhausen 
James  M.  Cannon 
Alan  D.  MUler,  M.D. 


FOREWORD 

The  following  report  and  recommendations 
are  the  outgrowth  of  what  the  members  of  the 
mission  learned  in  discussions  with  more  than 
3000  leaders  of  the  20  countries  wliich  the  mis- 
sion visited. 

We  found  in  the  course  of  our  travels  and 
talks  that  our  perspective  concerning  the  na- 
tions we  visited  and  the  hopes  of  their  people 
was  more  meaningful  when  taken  in  the  con- 
text of  the  entire  Western  Hemisphere.  The 
quality  of  life  in  one  area  of  the  hemisphere  is 
inseparably  linked  with  all  the  rest.  Moreover, 
if  we  do  not  meet  tlie  fimdamental  needs  of  our 
own  people  at  home,  we  cannot  expect  to  inspire 
or  assist  the  people  of  other  nations  to  meet  their 
own  needs.  The  more  we  imderstood  the  situa- 
tion in  the  other  republics,  the  more  clearly  we 
understood  what  was  happening  at  home — and 
the  more  we  appreciated  the  need  for  unity  of 
the  hemisphere. 

We  have,  accordingly,  in  this  report  looked  at 
tlie  challenges  and  opportunities  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  hemisphere  as  a  whole.  Because  of 
this,  we  have  written  this  report  with  the  hope 
that  Canada  might  join  with  aU  the  American 
republics  in  a  truly  hemisphere  response  to 
what  are  in  fact  common  concerns.  We  were  also 


moved  by  the  hope  that  one  day  Cuba  can  be  re- 
stored to  the  society  of  free  men. 

These  trips  were  an  enriching  experience.  To 
convey  some  sense  of  our  personal  reactions,  as 
a  group,  to  this  fruitful  opportunity  to  listen 
to  the  responsible  people  in  South  and  Central 
America,  and  the  Caribbean,  a  Preamble  is 
included  in  our  report. 

— N.A.E. 


PREAMBLE 

We  went  to  visit  neighbors  and  found  broth- 
ers. We  went  to  listen  to  the  spokesmen  of  our 
sister  republics  and  heard  the  voices  of  a  hemi- 
sphere. 

We  went  to  annotate,  to  document,  and  to 
record.  We  did  so ;  and  we  also  learned,  grew, 
and  changed. 

We  used  the  tools  of  specialists:  economists 
and  scientists,  artists  and  architects,  agrono- 
mists and  social  workers.  But  there  is  not  one 
of  us  who  did  not  reappraise  the  uses  of  his 
specialty,  who  did  not  find  his  sense  of  purpose 
and  values  renewed. 

We  thought  to  study  the  ways  of  life  in  the 
other  American  nations,  to  measure  their  per- 
formance and  ours.  We  rediscovered  the  quality 
of  life  for  each  person  in  the  hemisphere,  and 
finally  the  world,  as  the  only  measure  of  lasting 
consequence. 

Our  country  was  born  and  has  experienced  the 
greatest  flowering  of  human  capacities  in  all 
recorded  time  because  one  great  idea  was  un- 
loosed. And  though  many  neglect  it,  and  others 
would  suppress  it,  it  has  not  yet  been  contained : 
the  noble  concept  that  each  person  is  the  reason 
and  each  person  is  the  strength  for  the  nation. 

In  the  release  of  our  collective  energies,  we 
have  produced  great  systems  and  organizations, 
techniques  of  awesome  capabilities,  and  a  mosaic 
of  useful  tilings  and  objects  here  in  the  United 
States.  But  we  have  lost  sight  of  the  values 
which  are  the  real  source  of  our  greatness.  We 
have  exported  our  systems,  techniques,  and  ob- 
jects, but  their  distribution  has  not  been  essen- 
tially shaped  by  the  values  that  inspired  our 
nation  at  home — nor  have  we  transmitted  those 
values. 

In  the  countries  we  visited,  we  had  the  op- 
portunity to  see  ourselves  through  their  eyes. 
Even  allowing  for  the  distortions  of  distance 


December  8,   1969 


499 


and  the  biases  of  incomplete  knowledge,  one 
theme  resounded  throuf^hout  tlie  hemisphere: 
you  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  strong 
and  you  are  able,  but  you  lack  unifying  goals 
and  a  clear  sense  of  national  purpose. 

In  our  concentrated  exposure  to  20  nations, 
during  thousands  of  hours  of  discussions  for 
whicli  our  hosts  had  painstakingly  prepared, 
during  planned  and  unplanned  encounters,  in 
the  presence  of  both  hospitality  and  hostility, 
our  group  had  a  dual  experience. 

We  were  given  a  great  deal  of  information 
about  the  many  dimensions  of  life  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. We  exchanged  points  of  view  on  mutual 
problems  and  explored  possible  solutions.  And 
we  have  together  formed  new  hypotheses  and 
found  new  techniques  in  the  many  special  areas 
of  our  concern. 

We  have  also  come  to  one  simple  principle  and 
it  shapes  our  report:  All  that  we  have  seen,  all 
that  we  think  that  we  understand,  all  that  we 
will  recommend  must  be  tested  against  the 
single  question— how  does  this  affect  the  way 
that  men  live? 

The  logistics  of  travel  and  work  had  deter- 
mined our  itinerary.  Thus  each  week  of  our 
visits  was  followed  by  a  week  at  home.  Among 
us,  we  live  in  all  quarters  of  the  United  States 
and  work  in  many  different  situations.  This  re- 
peated alternation  may  have  contributed  to  a 
conviction  that  grew  among  us:  The  variations 
among  all  people  is  our  great  common  wealth ; 
and  we  share  the  same  human  problems. 

As  individuals  and  as  nations,  we  must  learn 
from  one  another,  and  we  need  constant  col- 
laboration and  communication  witli  each  other 
if  our  species  is  to  thrive — or  even  to  survive. 

It  is  for  each  individual,  each  family,  each 
community,  each  nation,  each  region  to  define 
its  own  particular  aspirations — but  these  share 
one  splendid  bias :  That  no  man  be  exploited  or 
degraded  to  enrich  another  and  that  we  work 
together  so  that  each  can  grow. 

Some  nations  have  moved  further  toward  this 
goal  than  others  but  all  nations,  including  our 
own,  have  more  to  grow  than  they  have  grown 
and  more  to  do  than  they  have  done. 

This  aspiration,  when  truly  applied,  has  a 
hard,  fine  cutting  edge.  We  must  ask  what  neces- 
sary elements  must  come  together,  in  and 
aroimd  each  person,  if  he  is  to  live  and  grow. 
Opportunity  for  self-realization  comes  immedi- 
ately to  mind — the  chance  to  grow  spiritually, 
the  respect  for  human  dignity  and  justice,  the 
right  to  hope  that  life  will  get  better,  not  worse. 


Certain  commodities,  physical  circumstances, 
material  requirements  also  come  to  mind.  Com- 
fort and  safety  amidst  the  changing  elements : 
shelter  and  clotlung.  Energy:  enough  of  the 
necessary  kinds  of  food,  water.  Safety  from 
violence  and  intrusion  upon  privacy,  and 
an  environment  sufficiently  free  of  noxious 
influence. 

But  man  is  a  social,  learning,  creative,  re- 
sponsible and  self-aware  creature  and  he 
needs — absolutely  requires — much  more  if  he 
is  to  thrive,  to  become  more  fully  himself.  He 
needs  the  ability  and  freedom  to  move,  the  op- 
portimities  to  learn  and  contribute,  to  ornament 
and  create,  to  share  his  experiences  and  his 
hopes.  He  needs  to  be  able  to  influence  the  forces 
which  impinge  upon  him,  to  participate  in  his 
own  destiny  and  to  be  recognized  for  liis  own 
accomplislunents. 

There  is  in  none  of  this  the  blandishment  of 
easy  or  final  success.  Even  our  expanding  hori- 
zons have  limits,  substance  and  energy  are  finite, 
hard  choices  must  be  made  again  and  again. 
We  are  a  species  tliat  is  both  giving  and  acquisi- 
tive, creative  and  indolent,  gentle  and  violent, 
petty  and  magnificent.  But  when  we  choose, 
when  we  commit  our  energies  to  a  common 
goal,  none  yet  has  been  beyond  us. 

We  face  today  a  crisis  m  human  expectations. 
Individuals  and  nations  expect  much  for  them- 
selves and  too  little  for  others.  But  expectations 
are  powerful  moving  forces.  They  change  the 
ways  people  act.  The  very  anticipation  that  it 
is  more  natural  to  take  than  to  give,  consume 
than  to  create,  tends  to  fulfill  itself.  It  is  urgent 
that  we  acknowledge  in  all  peoples  the  same 
capacities  for  giving  and  sharing  that  we 
ascribe  to  ourselves. 

Each  country  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  has 
its  own  special  history  and  tradition,  and  forms 
of  government  whicli  do  not  give  the  same  kind 
of  recognition  to  individuals.  Neither  do  indi- 
viduals in  each  of  our  nations  regard  their 
social  obligations  in  the  same  fasliion.  But  it 
is  a  basic  assumption  of  this  mission  that  men 
are  more  alike  than  otherwise  in  their  potential 
for  social  responsiveness,  and  that  latent  in  our 
species  and  in  each  of  us  is  a  capacity  for  per- 
sonal growth  tlirough  an  enlarged  concern  for 
others. 

The  urgent  human  problems  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  require  that  the  nations  help  one 
another.  At  the  least,  the  patterns  of  our  co- 
operation and  mutual  assistance  should  reflect 
the  expectation  that  all  of  us  will  move  toward 


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broadly  participating  governmental  systems 
wliicli  represent  the  interests  of  each  citizen.  If 
we  couple  this  expectation  with  an  appreciation 
for  the  work  and  steps  that  must  be  undertaken 
to  reach  this  goal,  and  for  the  difficulties  in 
change,  we  will  have  embarked  on  a  new  direc- 
tion in  which  we  all  begin  to  raise  each  other  up. 


CHAPTER   ONE:  THE  QUALITY   OF  LIFE 
IN  THE   WESTERN   HEMISPHERE 

A.  The  Special   Relationship 
in   the  Western   Hemisphere 

The  mission  heard  many  details  about  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  the  other 
American  republics  from  the  leaders  of  the 
hemisphere,  but  they  can  best  be  summed  up 
in  one  phrase :  The  United  States  has  allowed 
the  special  relationship  it  has  historically  main- 
tained with  the  other  nations  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  to  deteriorate  badly. 

The  United  States  has  allowed  a  host  of  nar- 
row special  interests,  a  series  of  other  foreign 
policy  priorities,  budgetary  and  balance  of  pay- 
ments constraints,  a  burgeoning  bureaucratic 
tangle,  and  well-intentioned  but  unrealistic 
rhetoric  to  submerge  this  special  relationship 
to  the  pomt  where  many  of  its  neighbors  in  the 
hemisphere  wonder  if  the  United  States  really 
does  care.  Its  assistance  and  trade  policies,  so 
critical  to  the  development  process  of  other  na- 
tions, have  been  distorted  to  serve  a  variety  of 
purposes  in  the  United  States  having  notliing 
to  do  with  the  aspirations  and  interests  of  its 
neighbors ;  in  fact,  all  too  often,  these  purposes 
have  been  in  sharp  conflict  with  the  goals  of 
development. 

Moreover,  in  its  relations,  the  United  States 
has  all  too  often  demonstrated,  at  least  subcon- 
sciously, a  paternalistic  attitude  toward  the 
other  nations  of  the  hemisphere.  It  has  tried  to 
direct  the  internal  affairs  of  other  nations  to  an 
unseemly  degree,  tliinking,  perhaps  arrogantly, 
that  it  knew  what  was  best  for  them.  It  has  un- 
derestimated the  capacities  of  these  nations  and 
their  willingness  to  assume  responsibility  for 
the  course  of  future  developments.  The  United 
States  has  talked  about  partnersliij),  but  it  has 
not  tmh'  practiced  it. 

At  the  same  time,  we  found  that  profound 
changes  are  occurring  in  the  hemisphere, 
changes  that  have  not  been  fully  underetood.  It 
is  clear  that  these  changes  will  affect  all  of  us, 


and  that  we  must  get  rid  of  some  of  our  stereo- 
types and  conditioned  thinking  if  we  are  to 
imderstand  and  respond  with  intelligence  and 
pragmatism  to  the  forces  of  change. 

We  have  concluded  that  the  national  mter- 
est  requires  the  United  States  to  revive  its 
special  relationship  with  the  nations  of  the 
hemisphere,  and  that  this  relationship  should  be 
reinvigorated  with  a  new  commitment,  new 
forms  and  new  style.  Western  Hemisphere  rela- 
tionships cannot  remain  static;  the  forces  of 
change — and  our  own  best  interests  as  well  as 
those  of  the  entire  hemisphere — will  not  permit 
it. 

This  report  tries  to  understand  some  of  the 
issues  we  must  face  in  attempting  to  reinvigo- 
rate  and  re-shape  our  special  relationship — and 
it  offers  some  specific  recommendations  for  ac- 
tion now. 

B.  The   Existing  Situation 

Everywhere  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  to- 
day, including  the  United  States,  men  and 
women  are  enjoying  a  fuller  life,  but  still  for 
many  the  realities  of  life  are  in  sharp  contrast 
with  the  deepest  felt  human  needs  and  goals 
of  the  people. 

Everywhere  in  the  hemisphere  we  see  similar 
problems — problems  of  population  and  poverty, 
urbanization  and  unemployment,  illiteracy  and 
injustice,  violence  and  disorder. 

Although  each  of  the  26  countries  in  the  hem- 
isphere is  different,  with  widely  varying  stages 
of  development,  aspirations  are  outrunning 
resources  and  accomplishments  eveiywhere.  All 
nations  of  the  hemisphere  share  rising  expecta- 
tions and  restlessness  among  those  men  and 
women  who  do  not  truly  participate  in  the  bene- 
fits of  the  industrial  revolution  and  the  stand- 
ard of  living  which  has  come  with  it. 

Even  among  some  who  have  shared  in  the 
benefits,  there  is  an  increasing  tendency  to  lose 
confidence  and  sureness  of  purpose.  This  makes 
fertile  soil  for  the  ever-present  disruptive  forces 
ready  to  exploit  those  who  are  uncertain  and  to 
stir  up  those  who  are  restless. 

We  know  from  our  experience  in  the  United 
States  that  those  who  live  in  deprived  circum- 
stances no  longer  live  out  of  sight  and  out  of 
mind.  Neither  are  they  resigned — nor  should 
they  be  resigned — to  the  fact  that  their  lives 
are  less  than  they  could  be. 

They  have  looked  at  the  relative  quality  of 
their  life  and  found  it  waiiting. 


December  8,   1969 


501 


As  a  result,  in  the  United  States  and  tlirough- 
out  tlie  Western  Hemisphere,  the  legitimacy  of 
the  democratic  political  system  and  the  individ- 
ual enterprise  economic  system  are  under 
challenge. 

The  upheavals  in  international  systems  over 
the  past  three  decades  have  subjected  the  mem- 
ber states  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  to  exter- 
nal economic,  political  and  ideological  stresses 
that  magnify  domestic  antagonisms. 

At  the  same  time,  the  issue  of  political  legit- 
imacy has  challenged  "accepted"  systems  of 
government,  not  only  in  the  United  States  but 
particularly  in  the  other  American  republics. 
With  the  disintegration  of  old  orders  which 
lacked  a  popular  base,  newly-emerging  domes- 
tic structures  have  had  difficulty  in  establishing 
their  legitimacj'.  Tliis  makes  the  problem  of 
creating  a  system  of  political  order  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere  more  difficult. 

Some  nations  have  retained  their  democratic 
institutions.  In  others,  when  democratic  forms 
of  government  have  not  been  successful,  na- 
tions have  moved  to  authoritarian  forms  as  a 
solution  to  political  and  social  dilennnas.  Gov- 
ernments everywhere  are  struggling  to  cope 
with  often  conflicting  demands  for  social  re- 
form and  economic  growth.  The  problem  is 
compounded  by  the  400-year-old  heritage  of 
intense  individualism  which  permeates  all 
phases  of  life  in  the  Latin  countries  of  the 
Americas.  Nationalism  is  burgeoning  in  most  of 
the  region  with  strong  anti-United  States  over- 
tones. Increasing  frustration  is  evidenced  over 
political  instability,  limited  educational  and 
economic  opportunities,  and  the  incapacity  or 
slo-miess  of  existing  government  structures  to 
solve  the  people's  problems.  Subversive  forces 
working  throughout  the  hemisphere  are  quick 
to  exploit  and  exacerbate  each  and  every 
situation. 

Change  and  the  stresses  and  problems 
brought  about  by  the  processes  of  cliange  char- 
acterize the  existing  situation  in  the  liemisphere. 
The  momentum  of  industrialization  and  mod- 
ernization has  strained  the  fabric  of  social  and 
political  structures.  Political  and  social  insta- 
bility, increased  pressure  for  radical  answers  to 
the  problems,  and  a  growing  tendency  to  nation- 
alistic independence  from  the  United  States 
dominate  the  setting. 

The  restless  yearning  of  individuals  for  a 
better  life,  particularly  when  accompanied  by 
a  well-developed  sense  of  social  responsibility, 
is  chipping  away  at  the  very  order  and  institu- 
tions by  which  society  makes  it  possible  for 


man  to  fulfill  his  personal  dignity.  The  seeds 
of  nihilism  and  anarchy  are  spreading  through- 
out the  hemisphere. 

C.   The   Forces  of  Change 

Change  is  the  crucial  characteristic  of  our 
time.  It  is  erupting,  and  disrupting,  in  all  cul- 
tures. It  creates  anxiety  and  uncertainty.  It  is 
demanding  of  all  peoples  an  adjustment  and 
flexibility  wliich  test  the  limits  of  individual 
and  collective  capacities. 

Change  is  everywhere  about  us:  in  the  ex- 
plosion of  new  knowledge,  the  acceleration  of 
all  communication,  the  massive  mobility  of  peo- 
ple, the  multiplicity  of  human  contacts,  the  pace 
and  diversity  of  experience,  the  increasingly 
transitory  nature  of  all  relationships  and  the 
uprooting  of  the  values  to  which  differing  cul- 
tures are  anchored. 

There  is  no  societj-  today,  whether  industri- 
alized or  developing,  that  is  not  coping  with 
these  hurricane  forces  of  change.  It  is  plain 
that,  depending  on  how  we  respond  to  the  need 
for  change  and  the  demands  of  these  forces,  the 
results  can  be  tremendously  constructive  or 
tremendously  destructive. 

The  sweeping  change  occurring  in  the  hemi- 
sphere will  affect  our  interests  and  our  relation- 
ships with  the  other  nations  of  the  hemisphere. 
We  must  recognize  that  the  United  States  can- 
not control  the  forces  of  change.  However,  we 
can  and  must  try  to  understand  the  forces  at 
work  in  the  hemisphere — as  well  as  at  home — 
and  how  they  may  affect  our  national  interests, 
if  we  are  to  shape  intelligently  and  realistically 
our  relationships. 

Throughout  the  hemisphere,  although  people 
are  constantly  moving  out  of  poverty  and  degra- 
dation in  varying  numbers,  the  gap  between  the 
advantaged  and  the  disadvantaged,  within  na- 
tions as  well  as  between  nations,  is  ever  sharper 
and  ever  more  difficult  to  endure.  It  is  made  to 
seem  all  the  worse  by  the  facility  of  modern 
communications. 

COMMUNICATIONS 

The  transistor  radio  has  brought  about  a  rev- 
olution in  awareness.  Millions  who  used  to  be 
isolated  by  illiteracy  and  remote  location  now 
know  that  there  is  a  different  way  of  life  wliich 
others  are  privileged  to  enjoy.  Never  again  will 
they  be  content  to  accept  as  inevitable  the  pat- 
terns of  the  past.  They  want  to  share  the  privi- 
leges of  progress.  Tliey  want  a  better  world  for 


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their  children.  They  have  listened  too  long  to 
unfilled  promises.  Their  expectations  have  out- 
run performance.  Their  frustration  is  turning 
to  a  growing  sense  of  injustice  and  disillusion- 
ment. 

SCIENCE  AND   TECHNOLOGY 

Science  and  teclmolog-y  have  not,  however, 
kept  pace  with  communications  in  the  develop- 
ing nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  These 
nations  have  lagged  seriously  in  their  participa- 
tion in  the  scientific  and  cultural  revolution 
which  has  been  an  essential  part  of  the  indus- 
trialization of  the  developed  nations.  Many 
American  republics  have  not,  therefore,  shared 
proportionately  in  the  increased  productivity 
and  rising  standards  of  living  of  their  northern 
neighbors.  This  has  fanned  the  flames  of  jeal- 
ousy, resentment  and  frustration. 

Most  of  the  American  republics  have  not  yet 
mobilized  the  necessary  elements  for  widespread 
industrialization  of  their  economies.  They  need, 
in  varying  degrees,  more  and  better  education, 
more  effective  systems  for  channeling  national 
savings  into  capital  formation  and  industrial  in- 
vestment, laws  to  protect  the  public's  interests 
while  encouraging  the  spirit  of  entrepreneur- 
ship,  and  expanding  governmental  services  to 
support  industrial  growth. 

POPULATION  GROWTH 

Another  vital  force  for  change  is  the  fact 
that  the  population  of  most  American  republics 
is  the  fastest-growing  in  the  world. 

The  fact  that  over  60  percent  of  the  popula- 
tion is  now  under  24  years  of  age  has  greatly 
increased  the  demands  on  government  for  more 
schools,  more  health  services,  more  housing  and 
roads — services  beyond  their  resources  to  pro- 
vide. It  produces  an  increasing  labor  supply 
which  cannot  find  enough  work,  and  thus  adds 
to  the  frustrations  and  tensions.  It  results  in 
slum  growth  and  a  multiplication  of  the  prob- 
lems of  urban  life,  and  it  cancels  out  so  much 
of  the  economic  growth  achieved  as  to  make 
improvement  of  living  standards  difficult  if  not 
impossible. 

URBAN  LIFE 

With  urbanization  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere have  come  crowded  living  conditions  and 
a  loss  of  living  space  in  physical  and  psychologi- 
cal terms.  The  urban  man  tends  to  become  both 
depersonalized  and  fragmented  in  his  human 


relationships.  Unemployment  is  high,  especially 
among  the  young,  ranging  as  liigh  as  25  to  40 
percent  in  some  countries — and  as  low  as  four 
percent  in  others.  The  impact  of  poverty  is 
widespread.  These  sprawling  urban  areas  of  the 
hemisphere  spawn  restlessness  and  anger  which 
are  readily  exploited  by  the  varying  forces  that 
thrive  on  trouble — and  such  forces  are  present 
in  all  societies. 

The  problems  of  urbanization  are  multiplied 
by  an  increasing  migration  to  the  cities  of  the 
rural  poor,  who  are  least  prepared  for  the 
stresses  of  industrial  urban  society. 

One  positive  force  is  the  political  emergence 
of  women.  They  now  have  the  right  to  vote  in 
every  country  of  the  hemisphere — and  are  prov- 
ing to  be,  by  and  large,  a  middle-of-the  road 
influence. 

NATIONALISM 

All  of  this  is  heightened  by  the  spirit  of  na- 
tionalism wliich  has  been  an  essential  element 
in  the  emotional  make-up  of  all  the  American 
republics  since  their  independence.  The  curve  of 
nationalist  sentiment  is  generally  rising  as  these 
societies  strive  toward  greater  national  identity 
and  self-assertiveness.  Since  the  United  States 
looms  so  large  in  the  lives  of  the  other  nations, 
and  its  power  and  presence  is  so  overwhelming, 
this  nationalism  tends  more  and  more  to  find 
the  United  States  a  temptmg  and  natural 
target. 

Nationalism  is  not  confined  to  any  one  coim- 
try,  nor  does  it  spring  from  any  one  source. 
Political  and  pressure  groups  of  all  persua- 
sions lean  heavily  on  the  exploitation  of 
nationalistic  sentiment. 

This  national  sensitivity  has  been  fed  by  the 
fact  that,  in  the  other  American  republics, 
United  States  management,  capital  and  highly 
advertised  products  have  played  a  dispropor- 
tionately visible  role.  A  high  percentage  of  over- 
seas investment  has  come  from  the  United 
States,  principally  to  seek  raw  materials  or  to 
preserve  markets. 

The  forces  of  nationalism  are  creating  in- 
creasing pressures  against  foreign  private  in- 
vestment. The  impetus  for  independence  from 
the  United  States  is  leading  toward  rising  pres- 
sures for  nationalization  of  U.S.  industry,  local 
control,  or  participation  with  U.S.  firms.  Most 
economists  and  businessmen  in  the  other  Ameri- 
can I'epublics  recognize  the  clear  need  for  U.S. 
capital  and  tecluiology,  but  they  want  them 
on  terms  consistent  with  their  desire  for 
self-determination. 


December  8,   1969 


503 


Thus,  the  rising  drive  for  self -identification  is 
naturally  and  inevitably  leading  many  nations 
to  seek  greater  independence  from  U.S.  influ- 
ence and  power.  The  dilemma  posed  for  the  gov- 
ernments is  that  they  know  that  U.S.  coopera- 
tion and  participation  can  contribute  greatly  to 
accelerating  achievement  of  their  development 
goals,  but  their  sense  of  political  legitimacy 
may  well  depend  on  the  degi-ee  of  independence 
they  can  maintain  from  the  United  States. 

YOUNG  PEOPLE 

In  \aew  of  current  conditions,  it  is  natural 
that  growing  numbers  of  jieople  in  nations 
throughout  the  hemisphere  including  the 
United  States  should  be  disillusioned  with  so- 
ciety's failures — and  perturbed  by  a  sense  of  loss 
of  individual  identity. 

Increasing  numbers  of  young  people  espe- 
cially are  questioning  many  of  our  basic  jirem- 
ises.  They  are  searching  for  new  values,  new 
meanings,  new  importance  for  the  individual's 
worth  and  dignity. 

Student  participation  in  demonstrations  and 
violence  is  becoming  a  major  force  in  all  coim- 
tries.  This  is  so  regardless  of  political  ideology, 
regardless  of  whether  the  students  are  acting 
spontaneously  or  have  been  organized.  Man  has 
demonstrated  in  the  past  that  he  can  endure 
regimentation;  the  test  today,  perhaps,  is 
whether  he  can  survive  his  freedom. 

The  idealism  of  youth  is  and  should  be  one 
of  the  most  promising  forces  for  the  future.  At 
the  same  time,  the  very  fact  of  their  idealism 
makes  some  of  the  young  vulnerable  to  subver- 
sive penetration  and  to  exploitation  as  a  revolu- 
tionary means  for  the  destruction  of  the  exist- 
ing order.  Above  all,  it  is  clear  that  the  young 
people  of  the  hemisphere  will  no  longer  accept 
slogans  as  substitutes  for  solutions.  They  know 
a  better  life  is  possible. 

LABOR 

Yet  it  is  not  only  the  yoimg  who  are  deeply 
concerned  or  seeking  instant  fulfillment  of  their 
aspirations.  The  same  phenomena  are  present  in 
the  ranks  of  labor.  The  largest  groups  in  the 
developing  labor  movement  throughout  the 
hemisphere  have  democratic  leadership.  They 
seek  increased  productivity  for  their  nations 
and  a  fair  share  of  that  increased  productivity 
for  the  workers  and  their  families.  But  a  sub- 
stantial segment  of  labor  is  Communist-led — 
and  less  concerned  with  the  nation's  productiv- 


ity than  with  the  overthrow  of  existing  institu- 
tions— public  and  private. 

THE   CROSS   AND   THE  SWORD 

Although  it  is  not  yet  widely  recognized,  the 
military  establishments  and  the  Catholic 
Church  are  also  among  today's  forces  for  social 
and  jiolitical  change  in  the  other  American  re- 
publics. This  is  a  new  role  for  them.  For  since 
the  arrival  of  the  Conquistadores  more  than  400 
years  ago,  the  history  of  the  military  and  the 
Catholic  Church,  working  hand  in  hand  with 
the  landowners  to  provide  "stability",  has  been 
a  legend  in  the  Americas. 

Few  people  realize  the  extent  to  which  both 
these  institutions  are  now  breaking  with  their 
pasts.  They  are,  in  fact,  moving  rapidly  to  the 
forefront  as  forces  for  social,  economic  and 
political  change.  In  the  case  of  the  Church,  this 
is  a  recognition  of  a  need  to  be  more  responsive 
to  the  popular  will.  In  the  case  of  the  military, 
it  is  a  reflection  of  a  broadening  of  opportuni- 
ties for  young  men  regardless  of  family 
background. 

The  Church 

ilodern  communications  and  increasing  edu- 
cation have  brought  about  a  stirring  among  the 
people  that  has  had  a  tremendous  impact  on  the 
Church,^'  making  it  a  force  dedicated  to 
change — revolutionary  change  if  necessary. 

Actually,  the  Church  may  be  somewhat  in  the 
same  situation  as  the  young — with  a  profound 
idealism,  but  as  a  result,  in  some  cases,  vulnera- 
ble to  subversive  penetration;  ready  to  under- 
take a  revolution  if  necessary  to  end  injustice 
but  not  clear  either  as  to  the  ultimate  nature  of 
the  revolution  itself  or  as  to  the  governmental 
system  by  which  the  justice  it  seeks  can  be 
I'ealized. 

jTAe  Military/ 

In  many  South  and  Central  American  coun- 
tries, the  militaiy  is  the  single  most  powerful 
political  grouping  in  society.  Militai-y  men  are 
symbols  of  power,  authority  and  sovereignty 
and  a  focus  of  national  pride.  They  have  tradi- 
tionally been  regarded  in  most  countries  as  the 
ultimate  arbiters  of  the  nation's  welfare. 

The  tendency  of  the  military  to  intervene 


'  See  documents  prepared  by  the  Second  General 
Conference  of  the  Latin  American  Roman  Catholic 
Episcopate  in  Medellin,  Colombia,  in  1968.  [Footnote 
in  original.] 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


when  it  judges  that  the  government  in  office  has 
failed  to  carry  out  its  responsibilities  properly 
has  generally  been  accepted  in  Central  and 
South  America.  Virtually  all  military  govern- 
ments in  the  hemisphere  have  assumed  power  to 
"rescue"  the  country  from  an  incompetent  gov- 
ernment, or  an  intolerable  economic  or  political 
situation.  Historical!}^,  these  regimes  have  var- 
ied widely  m  their  attitudes  toward  civil  liber- 
ties, social  reform  and  repression. 

Like  the  Chm'ch,  the  military  was  tradition- 
ally a  conservative  force  resistant  to  change. 
Most  officers  came  from  the  landowner  class.  In 
recent  years,  however,  the  owners  of  land  have 
shifted  more  and  more  to  an  urban  industrial 
life.  The  militai-y  service  has  been  less  attractive 
to  their  sons.  As  a  result,  opportunities  have 
opened  up  for  young  men  of  ambition  and  abil- 
ity from  poor  families  who  have  neither  land 
nor  professional  and  business  connections. 
These  ambitious  sons  of  the  working  classes 
have  entered  the  military  to  seek  an  education 
and  the  opportunity  for  advancement. 

This  pattern  has  become  almost  universal 
throughout  the  American  republics  to  the  south. 
The  ablest  of  these  young  officers  have  gone 
abroad  for  education  and  are  now  assuming  top 
positions  of  leadershiiD  in  almost  all  of  the  mili- 
tary groups  in  the  hemisphere.  And  while  their 
loyalties  are  with  the  armed  forces,  their  emo- 
tional ties  are  often  with  the  people.  Increas- 
ingly, their  concern  and  dedication  is  to  the 
eradication  of  poverty  and  the  improvement  of 
the  lot  of  the  oppressed,  both  in  rural  and  urban 
areas. 

In  short,  a  new  type  of  military  man  is  com- 
ing to  the  fore  and  often  becoming  a  major 
force  for  constructive  social  change  in  the 
American  republics.  Motivated  by  increasing 
impatience  with  corruption,  inefficiency,  and  a 
stagnant  political  order,  the  new  military  man 
is  prepared  to  adapt  his  authoritarian  tradition 
to  the  goals  of  social  and  economic  progress. 

This  new  role  by  the  military,  however,  is 
not  free  from  perils  and  dilemmas.  There  is  al- 
ways the  risk  that  the  authoritarian  style  will 
result  in  repression.  The  temptation  to  expand 
measures  for  security  or  discipline  or  efficiency 
to  the  point  of  curtailing  indiWdual  liberties, 
beyond  what  is  required  for  the  restoration  of 
order  and  social  progress,  is  not  easy  to  resist. 

Above  all,  authoritarian  governments,  bent 
on  rapid  change,  have  an  intrinsic  ideological 
unreliability  and  a  vulnerability  to  extreme  na- 


tionalism. They  can  go  in  almost  any  doctrinal 
direction. 

The  danger  for  the  new  militai-y  is  that  it 
may  become  isolated  from  the  people  with  au- 
thoritarianism turning  into  a  means  to  suppress 
rather  than  eliminate  the  buildup  of  social  and 
political  tension. 

The  critical  test,  ultimately,  is  whether  the 
new  military  can  and  will  move  the  nation, 
with  sensitivity  and  conscious  design,  toward 
a  transition  from  military  control  for  a  social 
purpose  to  a  more  pluralistic  form  of  govern- 
ment which  will  enable  individual  talent  and 
dignity  to  flourish.  Or  will  they  become  radical- 
ized, statist  and  anti-U.S.? 

In  this  connection,  special  mention  should  be 
made  of  the  aj^peal  to  the  new  military,  on  a 
theoretical  level,  of  Marxism:  (1)  It  justifies, 
through  its  elitist-vanguard  theories,  govern- 
ment by  a  relatively  small  group  or  single  in- 
stitution (such  as  the  Army)  and,  at  the 
same  time,  (2)  produces  a  rationale  for 
state-enforced  sacrifices  to  further  economic 
development. 

One  important  influence  counteractmg  this 
simplistic  Marxist  approach  is  the  exposm-e  to 
the  fundamental  achievements  of  the  U.S.  way 
of  life  that  many  of  the  militai-y  from  the  other 
American  countries  have  received  through  the 
military  training  programs  which  the  U.S.  con- 
ducts in  Panama  and  the  United  States. 

BUSINESS 

A  similar  phenomenon  is  apparent  within  the 
business  community.  Again,  there  is  a  dichot- 
omy. On  the  one  hand,  long-established  self- 
interests  cling  to  practices  of  paternalism  and 
monopoly  behind  high  protective  tariffs.  On  the 
other  hand,  new  enterprises  or  older  businesses 
with  new,  young  management  are  bringing  to 
bear  a  social  concern  for  workers  and  the  public 
as  well  as  for  stockliolders. 

This  new  business  leadership  is  a  promising 
and  constructive  force.  And  it  is  a  necessary 
force  in  the  process  of  change,  simply  because 
the  technical,  managerial  and  marketing  compe- 
tence of  private  business  must  assume  a  major 
role  in  the  development  of  the  Western 
Hemisphei'e. 

COMMUNIST  SUBVERSION 

In  every  country,  there  is  a  restless  striving 
for  a  better  life.  Coming  as  it  does  at  a  time  of 
uprooting  change,  it  brings  to  many  a  vague 


December  8,   1969 


505 


unease  that  all  the  systems  of  society  are  out  of 
control.  In  such  a  setting,  all  of  the  American 
nations  are  a  tempting  target  for  Communist 
subversion.  In  fact,  it  is  plainly  evident  that 
such  subversion  is  a  reality  today  with  alarming 
potential. 

Castro  has  consistently  recruited  from  the 
other  American  republics,  and  trained  in  Cuba, 
guerrillas  to  export  the  Cuban-type  Commimist 
agrarian  revolution.  Fortunately,  the  govern- 
ments of  the  American  republics  have  gradually 
improved  their  capabilities  for  dealing  with 
Castro-type  agrarian  guerrillas.  However,  radi- 
cal revolutionary  elements  in  the  hemisphere 
appear  to  be  increasingly  turning  toward  urban 
terrorism  in  their  attempts  to  bring  down  the 
existing  order.  Tliis  type  of  subversion  is  more 
difficult  to  control,  and  governments  are  forced 
to  use  increasingly  repressive  measures  to  deal 
with  it.  Thus,  a  cycle  of  terrorist  actions  and 
repressive  counter-reactions  tend  to  polarise  and 
imsettle  the  political  situation,  creating  more 
fertile  ground  for  radical  solutions  among  large 
segments  of  the  population. 

There  are  also  Maoist  Communist  forces  in 
the  hemisphere.  Although  they  are  relatively 
small  in  numbers  they  are  fanatically  dedicated 
to  the  use  of  violence  and  intimidation  to  achieve 
their  ends.  The  mystique  of  Maoism  has  ap- 
pealed most  to  the  idealism  of  the  yoimg 
and,  thus,  has  been  the  means  for  widespread 
subversion. 

Now  it  appears  in  some  cases  that  Castro  and 
Maoist  forces  have  joined  for  acts  of  subversion, 
terror  and  violence  in  the  cities.  These  forces 
also  concentrate  on  mass  student  demonstra- 
tions and  disruptions  of  various  institutions, 
public  and  private,  calling  on  the  support  of 
Communist  labor  front  organizations  to  the 
degree  possible. 

Although  Castro's  propaganda  casts  him  as  a 
leader  of  the  down-trodden  who  is  opposed  to 
United  States  imperialism  and  independent  of 
Soviet  Communism,  it  is  clear  that  the  Soviet 
Union  presently  has  an  important  degree  of 
financial,  economic,  and  military  influence  over 
Communist  Cuba.  The  recent  visit  of  Soviet 
fleet  to  Havana  is  one  evidence  of  growing 
warmth  in  their  relations. 

This  Soviet  performance  in  Cuba  and 
throughout  the  hemisphere  is  to  be  contrasted 
with  the  official  Soviet  government  and  Com- 
munist party  protestations  not  only  of  peaceful 
coexistence  but  of  disassociation  from  Castro 


and  his  program  of  terror  in  the  American 
republics. 

Clearly,  the  opinion  in  the  United  States  that 
Communism  is  no  longer  a  serious  factor  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  is  thoroughly  wrong. 

We  found  almost  universally  that  the  other 
American  republics  are  deeply  concerned  about 
the  threat  that  it  poses  to  them — and  the  United 
States  must  be  alert  to  and  concerned  about  the 
ultimate  threat  it  poses  to  the  United  States  and 
the  hemisphere  as  a  whole. 

CHANGES   IN   THE   DECADE   AHEAD 

The  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  iu 
the  decade  ahead  will  differ  greatly  from  their    i 
present  situation.  They  will  reflect  the  rapid 
and  widespread  changes  now  occurring,  which    i 
will  alter  the  institutions  and  processes  by  which    i 
the  American  republics  govern  and  progress.   - 
Wliile  it  is  not  possible  to  predict  with  any  , 
precision  the  precise  course  of  change,  the  hemi- 
sphere is  likely  to  exhibit  the  following  charac- 
teristics in  the  next  few  years : 

— Rising  frustration  with  the  pace  of  develop- 
ment, intensified  by  industrialization,  urbaniza- 
tion and  population  growth; 

— Political  and  social  instability ; 

— An  increased  tendency  to  turn  to  authori- 
tarian or  radical  solutions ; 

— Continuation  of  the  trend  of  the  military 
to  take  power  for  the  purpose  of  guiding  social 
and  economic  progress ;  and, 

— Growing  nationalism,  across  the  spectrum 
of  political  groupings,  which  will  often  find 
expression  in  terms  of  independence  from  U.S. 
domination  and  influence. 


CHAPTER   TWO:   THE   CHALLENGE 

TO   POLITICAL  AND   ECONOMIC   FREEDOM 


A.   The  Nature  of  the   Challenge 


( 


The  pace  and  intensity  of  change,  imposed 
on  rampant  inflation,  urban  violence,  grinding 
poveity,  embittering  injustice  and  flaming  na- 
tionalism, put  the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere at  a  crossroads.  The  question  of  whether 
systems  of  freedom  with  order  and  justice  will 
survive  and  prosper  is  no  longer  rhetorical; 
it  is  reality. 

The  key  issue  is  whether  government  of  free 
peoples  can  be  made  effective,  and  can  set  the 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


necessary  priorities,  to  cope  with  the  people's 
present  needs  and  their  aspirations  for  the  fu- 
ture; whether  political  and  social  institutions 
can  hold  the  confidence  not  only  of  a  questioning 
young  generation  but  of  adults  as  well. 

For  the  United  States,  the  challenge  is  a 
double  one :  First,  to  demonstrate  by  its  example 
that  a  free  society  can  resolve  its  own  internal 
problems  and  provide  a  more  rewarding  life  for 
all  its  people ;  second,  to  find  ways  in  which  its 
tremendous  human  and  material  resources  can 
effectively  supplement  the  efforts  of  the  other 
American  nations  themselves,  in  a  climate  of 
growing  instability,  extremism,  and  anti-U.S. 
nationalism. 

A  new  relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  the  other  American  republics  must  be 
shaped  with  a  recognition  that  devotion  to  our 
long-term  community  of  interests  will  often  re- 
quire sensitive  handling  of  our  short-term  differ- 
ences. In  forging  this  relationship  we  have  the 
opportmiity  to  demonstrate  how  sovereign  na- 
tions, working  together,  can  solve  common 
problems  and  thus  to  establish  a  model  for  co- 
operative arrangements  for  the  fulfillment  of 
men  and  women  tliroughout  the  world. 

It  is  a  fortunate  and  striking  fact  of  the 
modern  world  that,  for  the  first  time,  the  scien- 
tific know-how  and  managerial  competence  re- 
quired to  meet  the  economic  aspects  of  the  chal- 
lenge are  available.  Moreover,  we  believe  the 
Western  Hemisphere  possesses  the  human, 
material  and  spiritual  resources  that  are  needed 
for  the  task  in  all  its  aspects — economic,  social 
and  political. 

B.  The  United  States  National   Interest 

The  moral  and  spiritual  strength  of  the 
United  States  in  the  world,  the  political  credi- 
bility of  our  leadersMp,  the  security  of  our 
nation,  the  future  of  our  social  and  economic 
progress  are  now  at  stake. 

Rising  frustrations  throughout  the  Western 
Hemisphere  over  poverty  and  political 
instability  have  led  increasing  numbers  of 
people  to  pick  the  United  States  as  a  scapegoat 
and  to  seek  out  Marxist  solutions  to  their  socio- 
economic problems.  At  the  moment,  there  is  only 
one  Castro  among  the  26  nations  of  the  hemi- 
sphere; there  can  well  be  more  in  the  future. 
And  a  Castro  on  the  mainland,  supported  mili- 
tarily and  economically  by  the  Communist 
world,  would  present  the  gravest  kind  of  threat 


to  the  security  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and 
pose  an  extremely  difficult  problem  for  the 
United  States. 

Just  as  the  other  American  republics  depend 
upon  the  United  States  for  their  capital  equip- 
ment requirements,  so  the  United  States  de- 
pends on  them  to  provide  a  vast  market  for  our 
manufactured  goods.  And  as  these  comitries 
look  to  the  United  States  for  a  market  for  their 
primary  products  whose  sale  enables  them  to 
buy  equipment  for  their  development  at  home, 
so  the  United  States  looks  to  them  for  raw 
materials  for  our  industries,  on  which  depend 
the  jobs  of  many  of  our  citizens. 

But  these  forces  of  economic  interdependence 
are  changing,  and  must  change.  An  increasing 
flow  of  two-way  trade  in  industrial  products 
must  supplement  the  present  interchange  of 
manufactured  goods  and  primary  products. 

Today's  250  million  people  in  South  and  Cen- 
tral America  will  become  643  million  in  just 
30  years.  If  the  current  anti-U.S.  trend  con- 
tinues, one  can  foresee  a  time  when  the  United 
States  would  be  politically  and  morally  isolated 
from  part  or  much  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
If  this  should  happen,  the  barriers  to  our  collec- 
tive growth  would  become  formidable  indeed. 

It  is  plainly  evident  that  the  countries  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  including  the  United 
States,  have  become  increasingly  dependent  on 
each  other. 

Historically,  the  United  States  has  had  a 
special  relationship  with  the  other  American 
republics.  It  is  based  upon  long  association, 
geography  and,  above  all,  on  the  psychological 
acceptance  of  a  concept  of  hemisi^here  com- 
munity. It  is  embodied  in  the  web  of  organiza- 
tions, treaties  and  commitments  of  the  inter- 
American  system.  Beyond  conventional  security 
and  economic  interests,  the  political  and  psy- 
chological value  of  the  special  relationship  can- 
not be  overestimated.  Failure  to  maintain  that 
special  relationship  would  imply  a  failure  of 
our  capacity  and  responsibility  as  a  great 
power.  If  we  camiot  maintain  a  constructive  re- 
lationship in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  we  will 
hardly  be  able  to  achieve  a  successful  order  else- 
where in  the  world.  Moreover,  failure  to  main- 
tain the  special  relationship  would  create  a 
vacuum  in  the  hemisphere  and  facilitate  the  in- 
fluence in  the  region  of  hostile  foreign  powers. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  our  national  interest  re- 
quires the  maintenance  of  our  special  relation- 
ship which  should  have  as  its  goal  the  creation 


December  8,   1969 


507 


of  a  community  of  self-reliant,  independent  na- 
tions linked  in  a  mutually  beneficial  regional 
system,  and  seeking  to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
their  societies  and  the  quality  of  life  of  their 
peoples. 

C.  Our  National  Objective 

There  is  no  system  in  all  of  history  better 
than  our  own  flexible  structure  of  political 
democracy,  mdividual  initiative,  and  responsi- 
ble citizenship  in  elevating  the  quality  of  man's 
life.  It  makes  the  individual  of  central  im- 
portance; it  subordinates  the  role  of  govern- 
ment as  a  servant  of  the  people;  it  works 
with  people  and  for  people — it  has  no  other 
justification. 

Our  job  at  home  is  far  from  finished.  We 
must  keep  our  empliasis  on  people,  our  priority 
coricern  for  people.  This  will  mean  shaping  the 
forces  of  change  and  stretching  out  or  deferring 
those  programs  not  related  to  the  urgent  needs 
of  people.  Unless  human  needs  are  met,  democ- 
racy will  have  failed  of  its  purpose  and  cannot 
survive. 

What  is  true  at  home  is  essentially  also  true 
for  the  hemisphere.  Our  concern  must  be  for 
people.  'What  we  in  the  hemisphere  have  to  do 
is  work  together,  multiplying  our  relations  with 
the  people  of  the  hemisphere  nations,  helping 
each  other  develop  more  effective  societies  that 
can  enhance  the  health,  freedom  and  security  of 
all  the  people,  to  the  end  that  the  quality  of 
the  life  of  each  and  every  person  in  the 
hemisphere  is  enhanced. 

We  must  work  with  our  fellow  Americans 
to  the  end  that  no  one  is  exploited  or  degraded 
to  enrich  another  and  evei-y  man  and  woman 
has  a  full  opportunity  to  make  the  most  of 
his  endowments. 

However,  we  must  recognize  that  the  specific 
forms  or  processes  by  which  each  nation  moves 
towards  a  pluralistic  system  will  vary  with  its 
own  traditions  and  situation.  We  know  that  we, 
in  the  United  States,  camiot  determine  the  in- 
ternal political  structure  of  any  other  nation, 
except  by  example. 

Our  ability  to  affect  or  influence  the  course  of 
events  in  other  nations  is  limited.  We  may  find 
that  other  nations  may  perceive  their  interests 
in  ways  which  conflict  with  ours.  Wliat  we  must 
do  is  take  a  long-term  view  of  our  interests  and 
objectives,  always  maintaining  a  sense  of  our 
own  priorities  and  of  the  special  Western  Hem- 
isphere relationship  we  hope  to  achieve.  Such  a 
view  will  require  a  high  degree  of  tolerance  for 


diversity  and  for  nationalistic  expression  often 
directed  against  the  United  States,  and  a  rec- 
ognition that  our  style  may  often  have  a  more 
important  effect  than  what  we  actually  do  in  the 
hemisphere. 

The  kind  of  paternalistic  relationsliip  the 
United  States  has  had  in  the  past  with  other 
hemisphere  nations  will  be  increasingly  costly 
and  counter-productive  in  the  years  ahead.  We 
believe  the  United  States  must  move  increas- 
ingly toward  a  relationship  of  true  partnerslaip, 
in  which  it  will  cooperate  with  other  nations  of 
the  hemisphere  in  those  areas  where  its  cooper- 
ation can  be  helpful  and  is  wanted. 

The  United  States  must  face  several  impor- 
tant practical  issues  m  trying  to  shape  tliis  new 
relationsliip : 

1.  The  United  States  should  determine  its 
attitude  towards  internal  political  develop- 
ments in  a  more  pragmatic  way ; 

2.  The  United  States  should  decide  how  it  can 
shift  increasing  responsibility  to  the  other 
American  nations  (through  multi-lateral  chan- 
nels) for  the  development  process;  and. 

3.  The  United  States  should  decide  how  its 
interests  are  affected  by  insurgency  and  sub- 
version elsewhere  in  the  hemisphere  and  the  ex- 
tent to  which  its  programs  can  and  should  as- 
sist in  meeting  the  security  requirements  of  its 
neighbors. 

The  task  is  difficult  but  by  no  means  impossi- 
ble. It  will  require  disciplme  and  energy  and 
above  all  a  very  clear  and  consistent  sense  of 
purpose  at  home  and  abroad.  To  grasp  the  op- 
portunity that  lies  in  the  hemisphere,  the 
United  States  must  make  some  major  and  fun- 
damental changes  in,  first,  the  structure  of  the 
government  mechanisms  thi-ough  which  we 
work  with  our  hemisphere  neighbors,  and,  sec- 
ond, in  our  policies  and  programs  as  they  relate 
to  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Accordingly,  Chapters  Three  and  Four  of 
this  report  will  make  specific  recommendations 
in  each  of  the  areas:  first,  organization,  and, 
secondly,  policy. 


CHAPTER  THREE:  ORGANIZATION 

A.   Organization   of  the  United  States 
Government 

Unless  there  is  a  major  reorganization  of  the 
United  States  government  structure,  with  clear 
lines  of  responsibility  and  corresponding  au- 


508 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


thority  to  make  policy  and  direct  operations  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  the  effect  of  other 
recommendations  would,  at  best,  be  marginal. 

Under  the  Constitution,  the  President  has  the 
responsibility  for  the  formulation  and  execu- 
tion of  foreign  policy.  Where  there  are  conflict- 
ing interests  and  points  of  view  among  the  gov- 
ernment departments  and  agencies,  only  the 
President  has  the  authority  to  reconcile  the  dif- 
j    f  erences  and  make  the  decisions. 

With  the  present  United  States  goveriunent 
structure.  Western  Hemisphere  policy  can 
neither  be  soundly  formulated  nor  effectively 
carried  out. 

Contrary  to  popular  misconceptions,  the 
State  Department  does  not  have  effective  over- 
all responsibility  for  foreign  policy  where  the 
interests  of  other  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment are  concerned.  In  actual  fact,  the  State 
Department  controls  less  than  half  the  policy 
decisions  directly  relating  to  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. Responsibility  for  policy  and  operations 
is  scattered  among  many  departments  and  agen- 
cies— for  example,  Treasury,  Commerce,  Agri- 
culture, and  Defense. 

To  cope  with  the  diffusion  of  authority,  there 
has  grown  up  a  complex  and  cumbersome  sys- 
tem of  interdepartmental  committees  within 
which  there  are  interminable  negotiations  be- 
cause no  one  member  has  the  authority  to  make 
a  final  decision.  The  result  is  that  there  are 
endless  delays  in  decision-making.  Too  often, 
agreement  is  reached  on  major  subjects  only  by 
compromise  in  the  lower  echelons  of  govern- 
ment— often  at  the  lowest  common  denominator 
of  agreement. 

The  result  is  that  wo  have  no  clear  formula- 
tion of  United  States  policy  objectives  toward 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  Nor  are  there  clear 
policy  guide  lines  relating  to  substantive  and 
regional  problems  which  are  essential  to  effec- 
tive day-to-day  decision-making  in  our  contacts 
with  the  other  American  republics.  This  in  it- 
self leads  to  conflicts  within  the  government 
which  are  detrimental  to  the  best  interests  of 
our  country. 

In  this  maze  of  bureaucracy  and  procrastina- 
tion, the  representatives  of  the  Western  Hem- 
isphere governments  become  frustrated  and 
humiliated  because  they  are  referred  from  one 
department  to  another  without  finding  anyone 
who  can  make  a  final  decision.  Delays  in  Wash- 
ington of  months  and  even  years  on  decisions  of 
major  importance  to  their  countries  were  re- 
ported to  the  mission  in  almost  every  nation  we 
visited. 


The  lack  of  clear  policy  direction,  the  inde- 
cision and  the  resulting  frustration  are  major 
factors  in  preventing  the  kind  of  understand- 
ing and  close  working  relationships  which  are 
essential  in  light  of  our  growing  interdepend- 
ence. 

Obviously,  neither  the  President  nor  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  has  the  time  for  continuing  at- 
tention to  the  concern  of  25  other  nations  in  the 
hemisphere,  and  no  one  else  has  the  authority. 
As  a  result,  the  day-to-day  relationships  with 
our  friends  and  neighbors,  including  Canada, 
do  not  get  the  constant  consideration  of  our  top 
policy  makers. 

But  if  we  are  to  have  a  true  sense  of  com- 
munity within  the  Western  Hemisphere,  it  must 
be  possible  to  establish  and  maintain  high-level 
contacts  with  each  country  on  a  basis  of  frank- 
ness and  opemiess  that  will  minimize  the  danger 
of  misunderstanding  and  maximize  effective  co- 
operation. Such  cooperation  depends  on  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  respond  promptly 
and  decisively.  For  the  United  States  to  or- 
ganize itself  to  make  this  possible: 

1.  There  must  be  clearly-defined  national  ob- 
jectives consistent  with  the  goals  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  community ; 

2.  These  objectives  must  be  translated  into 
clear  policy  positions  relating  to  both  govern- 
mental and  private  activities ; 

3.  To  implement  these  national  goals  and  pol- 
icies effectively,  there  must  be  a  structure  with 
clear  lines  of  responsibility  and  authority  flow- 
ing directly  from  the  President; 

4.  There  must  be  efficiently-run  organizations 
that  can  carry  out  supporting  programs  free 
from  political  and  diplomatic  encumbrances 
which  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  technical  and 
professional  operations;  and, 

5.  There  must  be  a  close  working  relation- 
ship with  the  members  of  Congress  as  an  indis- 
pensable and  integral  part  of  the  policy-making 
process. 

Finally,  and  of  overriding  importance  in  our 
special  Western  Hemisphere  relationships  is 
the  psychological  factor  of  personal  relation- 
ships, so  important  to  the  Latins. 

A  characteristic  of  the  Latin  temperament  is 
to  put  more  faith  in  people  than  in  institutions. 
It  therefore  is  important  to  give  stature  and 
dignity  to  the  key  position  of  leadership  in  the 
structure  of  the  United  States  government  that 
deals  with  the  Western  Hemisphere.  One  man 
should  symbolize,  by  the  importance  of  his  posi- 


December  8,  1969 

369-529—69 3 


509 


tion,  the  President's  special  interest  in  and  con- 
cern for  our  Western  Hemisphere  relations. 
Creation  of  such  a  post  must  therefore  outweigh 
any  traditional  objections  to  a  change  of  govern- 
ment organization. 

In  this  way,  we  can  establish  a  sense  of  vital- 
ity, openness  and  effectiveness  in  our  relations 
w'ith  the  leaders  and  peoples  of  the  other  na- 
tions. This  is  essential  to  the  unity  and  security 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  will  make  pos- 
sible the  achievement  of  our  common  goals. 

BeconvmcTidation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  President  should  reorganize  the  for- 
eign -policy  and  operating  structure  of  United 
States  government  dealing  with  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

Becomviendations  for  Action 

1.  A  SECRETARY  OF  WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE  AFFAIRS  should  he 
created  to  give  day-to-day  leadership 
and  guidance  on  behalf  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  and  the  President.  He  loould 
also  coordinate  on  their  behalf  all  United 
States  govei'nment  activities  in  the  West- 
em  Hemisphere. 

a.  He  would  be  the  focal  point  within  the 
United  States  govermnent  of  all  matters 
pertaining  to  Western  Hemisphere  affairs, 
subject  to  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
of  State. 

b.  He  would  have  the  authority  and  re- 
sponsibility to  represent  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  of  State  in  negotiations  with 
chiefs  of  state,  foreign  ministers  and  other 
senior  officials  of  hemisphere  nations,  and 
with  heads  of  all  United  States  government 
departments  and  agencies  concerned  with 
hemisphere  policy  and  operations. 

c.  He  would  be  supported  by  Undersec- 
retaries for  Western  Hemisphere  economic 
and  political  affairs,  and  appropriate  As- 
sistant Secretaries  including  one  for  each 
regional  trading  group  of  nations. 

2.  There  should  be  created  within  the  Na- 
tional Secunty  Council  a  WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE  POLICY  STAFF 
DIRECTOR  to  service  the  President, 
the  National  Security  Council.,  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Western 
Hemisphere  A  fairs  and  the  various  de- 
partments and  agencies  involved,  such 


as  Defense,  Treasury,  Commerce  and 
Agriculture,  and  economic  and  social 
program  activities. 

a.  The  Director  would  serve  the  Assist- 
ant to  the  Pi-esident  for  National  Security 
Affairs  and  would  thus  have  experts  with 
competence  in  the  fields  represented  by  the 
key  departments  and  agencies  involved  in 
Western  Hemisphere  affairs. 

b.  The  purpose  of  this  White  House  staff 
would  be  to  help  in  the  formulation  of  the 
President's  Western  Hemisphere  goals  and 
policies  in  consultation  with  the  appropri- 
ate councils  of  government. 

c.  It  would  monitor  Executive  Office  de- 
cisions relating  to  the  Western  Hemisphere 
through  the  departments,  agencies  and  be- 
yond to  determine  whether  Presidential  de- 
cisions are  being  carried  out. 

3.  An  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  DE- 
VELOPMENT AGENCY  should  be 
created  in  the  Executive  Office  of  the 
President  to  siipersede  the  present  AID 
adininistration  in  the  State  Department. 
This  move  is  essential  for  a  number  of 
reasons : 

a.  The  financial  and  technical  operations 
of  the  State  Department  have  gotten  all 
tangled  up  with  the  diplomatic  responsibil- 
ities of  the  State  Department — to  the 
detriment  of  both. 

b.  Because  of  the  lack  of  clear  adminis- 
trative responsibility  and  authority  in  the 
AID  organization,  it  is  having  great  dif- 
ficulty in  recruiting  quality  staff. 

c.  Economic  assistance  policy  operating 
decisions  are  too  often  made  on  the  basis 
of  political  negotiations  rather  than  eco- 
nomic and  social  realities. 

d.  Under  the  proposed  structure,  the  new 
Development  Agency  would  have  clear 
lines  of  authority  from  the  President  but 
would  have  to  clear  its  operating  programs 
with  the  appropriate  policy  officials  in  the 
State  Department. 

4.  An  INSTITUTE  OF  WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE  AFFAIRS  shoidd  be 
set  up  under  tJie  Development  Agency  as 
the  operating  corporation  to  carry  out 
govemment-to-govemment  economic 
and  social  pi^ograms  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 


510 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


a.  The  activities  of  this  Western  Hemi- 
sphere corporate  institute  would  be  subject 
to  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  Western 
Hemisphere  Affairs  (on  behalf  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  State),  and  the  Policy  Staff 
Director  of  the  Security  Council. 

b.  Clearance  of  operating  programs 
would  be  accomplished  by  the  following 
procedure : 

— A  concise  project  memo  would  be  pre- 
pared and,  when  it  related  to  a  Western 
Hemisjjhere  nation,  it  would  be  submitted 
to  the  Secretary  of  Western  Hemisphere 
Affairs  for  his  political  approval.  Li  each 
case,  the  memo  would  clearly  state  the 
objectives  of  the  project,  its  nature  and 
character,  the  number  of  people  to  be  em- 
ployed, and  the  total  cost. 

— After  the  project  had  been  cleared  by 
the  Secretary  of  Western  Hemisphere  Af- 
fairs, he  would  inform  the  United  States 
ambassador  in  the  country  involved — and 
instruct  him  to  support  the  carrying-out 
of  the  project.  If,  at  any  time,  the  ambas- 
sador felt  that  the  project  was  in  any  way 
prejudicial  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
United  States,  he  would  first  take  the  mat- 
ter up  with  the  director  of  tlie  project; 
failing  satisfaction  there,  he  would  I'eport 
his  complaint  to  the  Seci'etary  of  Western 
Hemisphere  Affairs  who,  in  turn,  would 
take  it  up  with  the  head  of  either  the  as- 
sistance program  or  the  regional  fimctional 
institute  responsible  for  its  execution. 

c.  Creation  of  the  Institute  would 
recognize  the  special  needs  and  the  special 
relationship  and  would  symbolize  the  spe- 
cial importance  of  our  relations  in  the 
hemisphere;  the  President  of  the  corpora- 
tion would  become  a  figure  of  major  signif- 
icance in  hemisphere  affairs. 

d.  Use  of  a  corporation  as  the  operating 
arm  for  the  hemisphere  would  have  the 
added  advantage  of  assuring  the  conti- 
nuity of  programs  mider  three-to-five-year 
contracts. 

e.  The  present  large  staff  which  AID 
maintains  in  various  countries  would  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum ;  teclinicians  would 
be  sent  to  those  comitries  only  to  cai'ry  out 
specific  technical  assistance  programs  or 
other  agreed-upon  assignments. 

f.  In  addition,  the  Institute  could  pro- 
vide   assistance    through    contracts    with 


private  non-profit  organizations  where 
desirable,  thus  multiplying  the  points  of 
contact  between  all  facets  of  our  society 
and  those  of  other  hemisphere  nations. 

g.  This  corporation  would  have  the 
power  to  set  up  subsidiaries  to  give  special 
emphasis  in  fields  of  particular  concern. 
Two  such  subsidiaries  are  specifically 
recommended : 

— A  Western  Hemisphere  Institute  for 
Education,  Science  and  Culture ;  and, 

— ^An  Inter-American  Rural  Develop- 
ment Corporation. 

Each  would  be  an  operating  corporation 
to  carry  out  projects  in  its  respective  fields 
under  the  policy  guidance  of  the  President 
of  the  Institute  of  Western  Hemisphere 
Affairs  (further  descriptions  appear  on 
pages  523, 530,  and  532). 

5.  We  applavd  the  Presidenfs  support  of 
legislation  noio  before  Congress  to  create 
an  OVERSEAS  PRIVATE  INVEST- 
MENT CORPORATION;  it  slwuU  he 
enacted  into  law. 

a.  OPIC  would  take  over  the  activities 
relating  to  private  economic  development 
that  are  now  being  handled  by  AID,  in- 
cluding insurance,  contracts,  loans  and 
investment  surveys. 

b.  This  would  separate  administration  of 
govemment-to-goveniment  programs  from 
private  enterprise  activities — a  desirable 
step  since  an  agency  operating  primarily 
at  a  government-to-government  level  fuids 
it  difficult  to  get  the  orientation  to  handle 
private  enterprise  matters. 

6.  The  President  should  discuss  with  the 
leaders  of  the  Senate  and  the  House  of 
Representatives  the  possibility  of  cre- 
ating a  JOINT  CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE  to  coordinate  legislative 
policy  concerning  the  hemisphere. 

a.  A  broad-based  steering  committee 
could  work  with  the  appropriate  commit- 
tees of  both  houses  of  the  Congress  to  antic- 
ipate hemisphere  problems,  consider  new 
legislation  and  review  existing  laws  relat- 
ing to  hemisphere  affairs. 

b.  This  would  be  an  important  expression 
of  Congressional  interest  in  a  coordinated 
approach  to  the  otlier  hemisphere  nations. 


December  8,   1969 


511 


B.  Country-by-Country   Relations 

The  experiences  of  the  mission  in  the  course 
of  its  travels  demonstrated  anew  that  there  is 
no  substitute  in  the  institutions  and  practices  of 
diplomacy  for  the  warmth  and  interplay  of  per- 
sonal contact. 

In  country  after  country,  members  of  the  mis- 
sion were  told  by  our  hosts  of  a  feeling  in  that 
counti'y  that  they  had  no  real  personal  contact 
with  the  United  States — that  they  were  shut  out 
by  a  wall  of  bureaucracy,  the  inability  to  get  a 
decision,  the  low  priorities  for  hemisphere  mat- 
ters, the  fact  there  is  no  one  with  effective  au- 
thority with  whom  they  can  talk. 

It  was  apparent  that  the  spirit  of  personal 
friendship  and  respect  which  characterized  the 
"good  neighbor"  era  had  evaporated.  It  is  vital 
to  re-establish  that  spirit. 

Each  country  in  the  hemisphere  is  unique, 
with  its  own  special  problems,  its  own  special 
relations  with  other  countries  and  with  the 
United  States.  It  is  therefore  vital  that  our 
diplomacy  be  geared  to  close  and  effective  ties 
with  each  of  these  nations. 

All  nations  in  the  hemisphere  are  inter- 
dependent in  today's  world.  We  must  not  lose 
sight  of  the  need  for  close  ties  on  a  country-by- 
country  basis — a  purpose  which  the  foregoing 
proposal  for  a  Secretary  of  Western  Hemi- 
sphere Affairs  should  greatly  facilitate  on  be- 
half of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  President. 

Recommendations:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  maintain  close, 
open,  intimate  and  ejfective  ties  with  each  of  the 
hemisphere  nations,  on  a  country -hy -country 
basis,  recognizing  that  each  nation  is  different 
and  that  bilateral  relations  and  programs  have 
an  important  role  to  play. 

C.  Regional  Organizations 

As  individual  entities,  many  of  the  hemi- 
sphere countries  have  such  limited  resources 
that  they  could  not  promote  economic  growth 
and  social  progress  or  sustain  an  acceptable 
level  of  economic  competition  in  world  markets. 
Thus  they  have  begun  to  form  regional  group- 
ings to  coordinate  their  economic  policies. 

The  first  of  these  regional  groupings  and  the 
most  effective  thus  far  has  been  the  Central 
American  Common  Market.  It  began  with  a 
limited  list  of  "free  trade"  goods,  was  gradually 


broadened  into  fiscal  agreements  and  still  later 
expanded  to  handle  issues  of  economic  and  polit- 
ical significance. 

An  important  instrument  of  the  CACM  is  the 
Central  American  Bank  for  Economic  Integra- 
tion, which  makes  loans  for  public  works,  in- 
dustry, agriculture,  opening  new  markets  and 
other  region-wide  projects. 

The  Caribbean  nations  have  a  wide  variety 
of  regional  organizations  and  are  now  forming 
a  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Association  and  a  Car- 
ibbean Development  Bank. 

The  treaty  creating  the  Andean  Group  under 
the  Latin  American  Free  Trade  Association  was 
signed  this  siunmer.  The  River  Plate  countries 
have  been  discussing  the  possibility  of  a  re- 
gional organization,  but  have  thus  far  made  no 
commitment. 

The  Latin  American  Free  Trade  Association, 
which  began  in  1961  to  reduce  tariffs  among  11 
Latin  American  countries,  is  moving  slowly  be- 
cause of  the  complexities  of  negotiating  recipro- 
cal tariff  cuts  among  so  many  nations. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  cooperate  with  and 
support  fully  regional,  organizations  among  the 
nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Reconmiendations  for  Action 

1.  Upon  request,  the  United  States  should 
encourage  regional  organizations  with 
financial  and  technical  assistance  and 
support  for  industrial,  agricultural,  edu- 
cational and  scientific  programs. 

2.  To  facilitate  such  cooperation,  the 
United  States  should  appoint  ASSIST- 
ANT SECRETARIES  OF  WEST- 
ERN HEMISPHERE  AFFAIRS  for 
the  CACM  nations,  LAFTA  and  the 
Caribbean  nations. 

— Since  effective  cooperation  depends 
importantly  on  more  frequent  personal  con- 
tacts, adequate  air  transport  facilities  for 
these  Assistant  Secretaries  and  leaders  in 
the  region  would  promote  better  under- 
standing. 


D.  Inter-American   Organizations 

Necessary     and     important     organizational 
changes    have    already    been    worked    out   to 


512 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


strengthen  and  revitalize  the  Organization  of 
American  States.  Some  of  these  require  ratifi- 
cation by  the  individual  governments — a  proc- 
ess which  is  well  advanced.  However,  there  are 
some  possible  fiirther  initiatives  which  would 
extend  its  effectiveness. 

During  our  travels,  we  heard  varying  view- 
points in  regard  to  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States.  Some  felt  the  United  States  domi- 
nated the  organization.  Others  criticized  it  as 
ineffective  in  important  fields.  Yet  the  OAS  is 
a  constructive  force  in  the  hemisphere.  It  has 
dramatically  demonstrated  its  merit  anew  in  the 
political  field  with  the  successful  negotiations 
to  end  the  recent  hostilities  between  El  Salvador 
and  Honduras.  In  the  development  area,  the 
OAS  is  doing  increasingly  effective  work.  The 
reasons  for  this  are :  it  minimizes  political  fac- 
tors; it  can  impose  and  enforce  more  exacting 
project  conditions  and  performance  criteria; 
and  it  places  greater  responsibility  in  the  hands 
of  the  comitries  themselves  to  manage  available 
resources. 

The  Inter- American  Committee  for  the  Alli- 
ance for  Progress  (CIAP)  of  the  OAS  has 
done  increasingly  useful  work  in  reviewing  na- 
tional development  programs  and  projects. 

In  the  area  of  security,  the  OAS  can  play  an 
even  more  important  role,  but  this  will  require 
increased  authority  and  expanded  structures — 
for  the  security  structure  of  the  OAS  has  not 
kept  pace  with  the  changing  needs  of  the  times. 

The  Inter- American  Development  Bank  has 
made  a  major  contribution,  but  teclmical  rather 
than  political  consideration  should  be  stressed 
in  future  loans.  Wliile  the  U.S.  veto  power  over 
IDB  loans  has  not  been  used,  the  threat  of  using 
the  veto  for  political  purposes  has  influenced 
decisions. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  give  full  support  to 
and  work  through  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States  and  its  several  Councils  in  dealing 
with  Western  Hemisphere  affairs;  it  should 
re-affirm  its  adherence  to  the  principles  and 
policies  set  forth  in  the  various  treaties  and 
conventions  which  form  the  general  structure 
of  the  hemisphere. 

Reccmimendations  for  Action 

1.  Political:  The  United  States  should  co- 
operate fully  with  the  Organisation  of 


the  American  States  in  dealing  with  the 
political  problems  of  the  hemisphere. 

2.  Economic  and  Social :  The  United  States 
should  make  greater  use  of  the  multi- 
lateral channels  of  the  OAS  to  execute 
technical  assistance  programs  and  should 
propose  to  the  Inter- American  Economic 
and  Social  Council  that  CIAP  {the 
Council's  executive  arm)  he  assigned 
greater  responsibility  in  planning,  set- 
ting priorities  for,  and  allocating  devel- 
opment assistance  for  the  nations  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  and  that  its  name 
be  changed  to  the  WESTERN  HEMI- 
SPHERE DEVELOPMENT  COM- 
MITTEE. 

a.  The  United  States  in  developing  its 
assistance  programs  should  work  in  close 
cooperation  with  the  Western  Hemisphere 
Development  Committee  and  give  full  con- 
sideration to  its  recommendations  for  na- 
tional and  multi-national  assistance  pro- 
grams and  projects  as  provided  in  Title  6, 
Section  251  H,  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of 
1966. 

b.  The  United  States  should  submit  to  an 
annual  review  by  the  Western  Hemisphere 
Development  Committee  of  its  economic 
programs  as  originally  agi-eed  to  in  the 
Charter  of  Punta  del  Este. 

3.  Education,  Science  and  Culture:  When 
the  Inter- American  Council  for  Educa- 
tion, Scientific  and  Cultural  Affairs  is 
ratified,  the  United  States  should  under- 
take major  programs  to  support  its  ob- 
jectives.* 

4.  Security:  The  United  States  through 
appropriate  channels  should  propose  a 
WESTERN  HEMISPHERE  SECU- 
RITY COUNCIL  composed  of  civilian 
as  distinct  from  military  leaders  with 
headquarters  outside  the  United  States.^ 

5.  Migration:  The  United  States  should 
stand  ready  to  support  the  Organization 
of  American  States^  initiatives  toward 
facilitating  desirable  migrations  within 
the  hemisphere. 


*  See  Recommendation,  page  530.  [Footnote  in  origi- 
nal.] 

'  See  Recommendation,  page  517.  [Footnote  in  origi- 
nal.] 


December  8,    1969 


513 


— Working  in  cooperation  with  regional 
organizations,  the  OAS  can  make  a  ma- 
jor contribution  toward  negotiating  and 
implementing  migration  from  areas  of 
overcrowding — as  in  El  Salvador  for  ex- 
ample— to  countries  seeking  more  people. 

6.  CECLA :  The  United  States  shmdd  rec- 
ognize the  significance  and  the  role  of 
CECLA  as  an  effective  vehicle  of  in- 
dependent expression  for  the  other 
American  TMtions. 

— The  recommendations  gi'owing  out  of 
the  recent  Vina  del  Mar  conference  have 
been  reviewed  and  considered  in  preparing 
this  report.  They  have  proved  most  helpful. 

E.  International   Organizations 

It  is  important  that  the  special  relationship 
which  exists  among  nations  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  not  be  misunderstood  in  the  larger 
context  of  world-wide  relationships. 

Each  nation  in  the  hemisphere  has  its  own 
role  and  contacts  throughout  the  world.  The 
quest  for  hemisphere  imity  and  accelerated  eco- 
nomic and  social  gro^^lh  within  the  hemisphere 
sliould  not  be  regarded  as  Western  Hemisphere 
isolationism. 

The  United  Nations  and  its  specialized  agen- 
cies should  be  fully  supported  and  fully  utilized 
by  all  the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
together  with  the  machinery  and  facilities  of 
the  "special  relationship." 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  foster  a  world- 
wide outlooh  as  complementary  to  rather  than 
competitive  with  Western  Hemisphere  goals. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  The  United  States  should  make  use  of 
inte'mational  facilities,  such  as  the 
World  Bank  and  World  Health  Organi- 
zation., in  developing  its  regional  assist- 
ance programs. 

2.  United  States  policy-makers  should  he 
ever  mindful  of  the  urgent  need  to  avoid 
any  tendency  or  even  an  appearance  of  a 
tendency  toward  isolationism  inimical  to 
the  best  interests  of  the  hemisphere  and 
tJie  u)orld  at  large. 


CHAPTER   FOUR:   POLICY  AND  ACTION 

A.   United  States   Political   Relations 
With  the   Hemisphere 

Throughout  the  hemisphere,  there  is  growing 
imcertainty  concerning  the  extent  of  the  United 
States'  conunitment  to  work  with  the  people  of 
the  other  American  republics  for  their  eco- 
nomic and  social  betterment. 

Our  neighbors  need  to  be  reassured  of  our 
conviction  that  people  are,  indeed,  our  basic  con- 
cern, and  that  we  want  to  contmue  to  work  with 
them,  I'egardless  of  the  form  of  their  govern- 
ment, to  help  them  raise  the  level  of  their  lives. 
In  this  way,  we  can  help  strengthen  the  forces 
of  democracy. 

Commitment  to  representative,  responsive 
democratic  government  is  deeply  imbedded  in 
the  collective  political  consciousness  of  the 
American  people.  We  would  like  to  see  strong 
representative  government  develop  in  the  other 
nations  of  the  hemisphere  for  both  idealistic 
and  practical  reasons : 

- — Our  experience  convinces  us  that  repre- 
sentative democratic  government  and  free  socie- 
ties oifer  the  best  means  of  organizing  man's 
social,  political  and  economic  life  so  as  to  maxi- 
mize the  prospects  for  improving  the  indi- 
vidual's dignity  and  the  quality  of  liis  life. 

— Practically,  nations  with  broadly-based 
political  systems  of  a  democratic  type  are  more 
likely  to  have  outlooks  and  concepts  compatible 
with  the  style  of  the  United  States  and  its 
people,  and  more  willing  to  cooperate  with  us  in 
establishing  an  effective  world  order. 

All  Americans,  in  fact,  share  a  common  herit- 
age of  respect  for  human  dignity,  justice  and 
freedom  of  the  individual.  They  are  linked  by 
the  bonds  of  revolutionary  ancestors  who  suc- 
ceeded in  declaring  themselves  separate  from 
the  nations  of  Europe.  This  heritage  is  evi- 
denced in  different  ways  in  different  nations, 
especially  when  they  are  at  differing  stages  of 
development  or  reflect  different  cultural  in- 
fluences. Individualism  in  the  American  repub- 
lics often  takes  a  more  intense  form  than  it 
does  in  the  United  States  which  has  had  a 
successful  experience  with  greater  individual 
restraints  for  the  public  benefit.  It  must  be 
recognized  that  there  is  no  single  route  to  the 
fulfillment  of  human  dignity. 

Democracy  is  a  very  subtle  and  difficult  prob- 


514 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


lem  for  most  of  the  other  countries  in  the  hemi- 
sphere. The  authoritarian  and  hierarchical  tra- 
dition which  has  conditioned  and  formed  the 
cultures  of  most  of  these  societies  does  not  lend 
itself  to  the  j^articular  kind  of  popular  govern- 
ment we  are  used  to.  Few  of  these  countries, 
moreover,  have  achieved  the  sufficiently  ad- 
vanced economic  and  social  systems  required  to 
support  a  consistently  democratic  system.  For 
many  of  these  societies,  therefore,  the  question 
is  less  one  of  democracy  or  a  lack  of  it,  than  it 
is  simply  of  orderly  ways  of  getting  along. 

There  will  often  be  times  when  the  United 
States  will  find  itself  in  disagreement  with  tlie 
particular  policies  or  forms  of  government  of 
other  American  nations.  However,  the  funda- 
mental question  for  the  United  States  is  how  it 
can  cooperate  to  help  meet  the  basic  needs  of  the 
people  of  the  hemisphere  despite  the  pliilosoph- 
ical  disagreements  it  may  have  with  the  nature 
of  particular  regimes.  It  must  seek  pragmatic 
ways  to  help  people  without  necessarily  embrac- 
ing their  governments.  It  should  recognize  that 
diplomatic  relations  are  merely  practical  con- 
veniences and  not  measures  of  moral  judgment. 
This  can  be  done  by  maintaining  formal  lines 
of  communication  without  embracing  such 
regimes. 

The  U.S.  should  also  recognize  that  political 
evolution  takes  time  and  that,  realistically,  its 
long-term  interests  will  be  served  by  maintain- 
ing at  least  minimal  diplomatic  relationships 
with  otlier  governments  of  the  hemisphere, 
while  tiying  to  find  ways  to  assist  the  people 
of  those  comitries,  and  to  encourage  the  govei-n- 
ments  to  move  toward  democratic  processes. 
Such  a  policy  requires  a  very  difficult  balance, 
but  is  one  that  must  be  acliieved  pragmatically 
on  a  case  by  case  basis.  The  U.S.  camiot  renege 
on  its  commitment  to  a  better  life  for  all  of  the 
peoples  of  the  hemisphere  because  of  moral  dis- 
agreement with  regimes  which  the  people  them- 
selves did  not  establish  and  do  not  control. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

Ths  United  States  should  work  loith  and  for 
the  people  of  this  hemisphere  to  assist  them  in 
enliancing  the  quality  of  their  lives  and  to  pro- 
vide moral  leadership  as  a  force  for  freedom 
and  justice  in  the  Americas. 

The  United  States  cannot  allow  disagree- 
ments with  the  form  or  the  doinestic  policies  of 
other  Ainerican  governments  to  jeopardize  its 


basic  objective  of  working  with  and  for  their 
people  to  our  mutual  benefit. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

The  President  should  reaffirm  our  Tiational 
commitment: 

a.  To  work  with  and  for  the  people  of 
this  hemisphere. 

b.  To  recognize  hemisphere  governments 
in  accordance  with  Article  XXXV  of  the 
Act  of  the  Ninth  International  Conference 
of  American  States  in  1948 — where  it  was 
stated : 

— ^The  establishment  or  maintenance  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  a  government 
does  not  imply  any  judgment  upon  the  do- 
mestic policy  of  that  government. 

c.  To  the  covenants "  which  bind  together 
the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  in 
respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  nations  and 
opposition  to  foreign  intervention. 

In  this  comiection,  the  President  should  en- 
dorse Senate  Resolution  205  now  pending  before 
the  Senate. 


B.  Western   Hemisphere  Security 

If  the  quality  of  life  for  the  individual  in  this 
hemisphere  is  to  be  meaningful,  there  must  be 
freedom  from  fear  and  full  respect  for  the 
rights  and  the  personal  dignity  of  individuals — 
not  just  one's  own  rights  and  dignity,  but 
everyone's. 

Unfortunately,  far  too  many  people  in  the 
hemisphere — including  people  in  the  United 
States — are  denied  such  freedom  and  respect. 
Forces  of  anarchy,  terror  and  subvei-sion  are 
loose  in  the  Americas.  Moreover,  tliis  fact  has 
too  long  gone  unheeded  in  the  United  States. 

Doubt  and  cynicism  have  grown  in  the  other 
American  nations  as  to  the  purposefulness  of 
the  United  States  in  facing  tliis  serious  threat 
to  freedom,  democracy  and  the  vital  interests  of 
the  entire  hemisphere. 


"Fourth  Conference  of  Buenos  Aires  (1910),  estab- 
lishing Pan-American  Union ;  Inter-Ameriean  Treaty 
(1047)  ;  Charter  of  Organization  of  American  States 
and  conventions  concluded  at  Bogotd  Conference 
(1948),  and  current  amendments  to  the  charter;  Char- 
ter for  the  Alliance  for  Progress  (1961)  and  Declara- 
tion of  the  Presidents  (1967).  [Footnote  in  original.] 


December  8,   1969 


515 


Many  of  our  neighbors  find  it  incomprehensi- 
ble that  the  United  States  will  not  sell  them 
military  equipment  which  they  feel  is  required 
to  deal  with  internal  subversion.  They  have  been 
puzzled  by  the  reduction  in  U.S.  military  as- 
sistance grants  in  view  of  the  growing  inten- 
sity of  the  subversive  activities  they  face. 

They  were  concerned  that  their  young  people 
were  bemg  drawn  to  Cuba  in  never-diminish- 
ing numbers,  for  indoctrination  and  for  instruc- 
tion in  the  aits  of  propaganda,  the  skills  of 
subversion  and  the  tactics  of  terror. 

Castro's  recent  restatement  of  his  policy  in- 
dicates no  change  in  objectives.  Rather,  he 
reaffirms  his  revolutionary  concepts  and  estab- 
lishes a  new  set  of  priorities  and  conditions 
under  wliich  Cuban  support  for  revolutionaries 
will  be  given. 

The  subversive  capabilities  of  these  Commu- 
nist forces  are  increasing  throughout  the  hemi- 
sphere. The  inflation,  urban  terrorism,  racial 
strife,  overcrowding,  poverty,  violence  and 
rural  insurgency  are  all  among  the  weapons 
available  to  the  enemies  of  the  systems  of  the 
free  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  These 
forces  are  quick  to  exploit  for  their  own  ends  the 
freedoms  afforded  by  democratic  governments. 
The  seriousness  of  these  factors  when  ex- 
ploited by  covert  Communist  forces  is  not  fully 
recognized  in  the  United  States. 

Two  decades  and  more  ago,  in  the  presence  of 
an  overt  and  world-wide  Soviet  threat,  the 
Unit«d  States  response  was  realistic  and  flexible. 
It  included  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  the 
training  and  equipping  of  security  forces  for 
hemisphere  defense. 

Fortuitously,  the  military  capability  thus 
achieved  subsequently  enabled  the  individual 
nations  of  the  hemisphere  to  deal  with  the 
initial  im^jact  of  a  growing,  covert  Communist 
threat  to  their  internal  security.  However,  the 
threat  has  shifted  from  one  based  in  the  rural 
areas  to  one  centered  around  urban  terrorism. 
Eealistic  efforts  to  deal  with  this  increasingly 
dangerous  development  are  necessary,  on  an 
effective,  hemisphere- wide  basis. 

In  addition,  the  United  States  must  face  more 
forthrightly  the  fact  that  while  the  military 
in  the  other  American  nations  are  alert  to  the 
problems  of  internal  security,  they  do  not  feel 
that  this  is  their  only  role  and  responsibility. 
They  are  conscious  of  the  more  traditional  role 
of  a  military  establishment  to  defend  the  na- 
tion's territory,  and  they  possess  understandable 


professional  pride  which  creates  equally  under- 
standable desires  for  modern  arms ;  in  addition, 
they  are  suljjected  to  the  sales  pressures  and 
blandishments  of  suppliers  from  other  nations — 
east  and  west — eager  to  sell.  The  result  of  aU 
this  is  a  natural  resentment  on  the  part  of  the 
military  of  other  American  nations  when  the 
United  States  refuses  to  sell  modern  items  of 
equipment. 

Thus,  many  military  leaders  in  the  other 
American  republics  see  the  United  States  acting 
to  hold  them  back  as  second-class  citizens,  and 
they  are  becoming  increasingly  estranged  from 
us  at  a  time  when  their  political  role  is  on  the 
rise.  Our  dilemma  is  how  to  be  responsive  to 
their  legitimate  desires  for  modern  equipment 
without  encouraging  the  diversion  of  scarce  re- 
sources from  development  to  armaments  which, 
in  some  cases,  may  be  unrelated  to  any  real 
security  requirement. 

Military  leaders  throughout  the  hemisphere 
are  frequently  criticized  here  in  the  United 
States.  However,  we  will  have  to  give  increasing 
recognition  to  the  fact  that  many  new  military 
leaders  are  deeply  motivated  by  the  need  for 
social  and  economic  progress.  They  are  search- 
ing for  ways  to  bring  education  and  better 
standards  of  living  to  their  people  while  avoid- 
ing anarchy  or  violent  revolution.  In  many 
cases,  it  will  be  more  useful  for  the  United 
States  to  try  to  work  with  them  in  these  efforts, 
rather  than  t-o  abandon  or  insult  them  because 
we  are  conditioned  by  arbitrary  ideological 
stereotypes. 

In  addition,  there  is  not  in  the  United  States 
a  full  appreciation  of  the  important  role  played 
by  the  police.  There  is  a  tendency  in  the  United 
States  to  equate  the  police  in  the  other  American 
republics  with  political  action  and  repression, 
rather  than  with  security.  There  have,  unfortu- 
nately, been  many  such  instances  of  the  use  of 
police.  Yet  well-motivated,  well-tramed  police, 
when  present  in  local  commmiities,  enforce  the 
laws,  protect  the  citizenry  from  terror,  and  dis- 
courage criminal  elements.  At  the  present  time, 
liowever,  police  forces  of  many  countries  have 
not  been  strengthened  as  population  and  great 
urban  gro^vth  have  taken  place.  Consequently 
they  have  become  increasingly  less  capable  of 
providing  either  the  essential  psychological  sup- 
port or  the  internal  security  that  is  their  major 
function. 

Moreover,  the  people  of  the  United  States  do 
not  recognize  that,  as  a  whole,  the  other  Ameri- 


516 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


can  nations  spend  a  smaller  percentage  of  their 
Gross  National  Product  on  defense  than  any 
other  area  except  Africa  south  of  the  Sahara. 
Most  of  this  expenditure,  despite  much  talk  of 
supersonic  aircraft,  is  for  personnel  and  oper- 
ating costs.  Relatively  little  has  been  spent  on 
major  items  of  equipment.  For  this  reason,  most 
of  the  military  inventories  of  these  other  hemi- 
sphere nations  consist  of  equipment  acquired 
shortly  after  World  War  II.  Such  equipment 
is  becommg  obsolete  and  unserviceable  and 
spare  parts  are  becoming  increasingly  unavail- 
able. 

One  other  point  not  clearly  understood  in 
the  United  States  is  that  no  one  country  today 
can  effectively  protect  its  own  internal  security 
by  itself. 

The  youth  that  go  abroad  for  training  in  sub- 
versive activities,  the  money  and  directives  that 
flow  through  agents,  and  the  propaganda  that 
comes  from  outside  their  borders  are  all  beyond 
their  effective  control. 

Only  through  hemisphere  cooperation  can 
these  problems,  which  so  vitally  affect  internal 
security,  be  adequately  dealt  with. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  cooperate  with 
other  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  in 
measures  to  strengthen  internal  security. 

Recom^inendations  for  Action 

1.  A    WESTERN  HEMISPHERE  SE- 
CURITY COUNCIL 

a.  The  United  States  should  work  with 
the  other  republics  to  form  a  civilian- 
directed  Western  Hemisphere  Security 
Council  to  cope  with  the  forces  of  subver- 
sion that  operate  throughout  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  The  purpose  of  the  Comicil 
would  be  to  help  the  hemisphere  countries 
work  together  in  creating  and  preservdng 
the  kind  of  orderly  environment,  free  from 
terror  and  violence,  in  which  each  citizen 
of  each  country  can  build  a  better  life  for 
himself  and  his  family.  This  Council  would 
supersede  the  Special  Consultative  Com- 
mittee on  Security  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States. 

b.  Although  the  United  States  would 
have  membership  in  the  Covmcil,  the  Coim- 
cil  should  have  its  headquarters  outside  of 
our  counti-y. 


December  8,   1969 


2.  A  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE  SE- 
CURITY TRAINING  ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM 

a.  The  United  States  should  reverse  the 
recent  downward  trend  in  grants  for  assist- 
ing the  training  of  security  forces  for  the 
other  hemisphere  countries.  (The  total 
amount  proposed  for  fiscal  year  1970  is 
$21.4  million,  as  agamst  $80.7  million  in  fis- 
cal year  1966.)  In  view  of  the  growing  sub- 
version against  hemisphere  governments, 
the  momiting  terrorism  and  violence 
against  citizens,  and  the  rapidly  expanding 
population,  it  is  essential  that  the  training 
program  which  brings  military  and  police 
Ijersonnel  from  the  other  hemisphere 
nations  to  the  United  States  and  to  train- 
ms  centers  in  Panama  be  continued  and 
strengthened. 

b.  The  name  "Military  Assistance  Pro- 
gram" should  be  dropped  because  it  no 
longer  reflects  the  security  emphasis  we  be- 
lieve important.  The  program  should  be 
renamed  the  "Western  Hemisphere 
Security  Program". 

3.  Internal  Security  Support 

a.  The  United  States  should  respond  to 
requests  for  assistance  of  the  police  and  se- 
curity forces  of  the  hemisphere  nations  by 
providing  them  with  the  essential  tools 
to  do  their  job. 

b.  Accordingly,  the  United  States  should 
meet  reasonable  requests  from  other  hemi- 
sphere governments  for  trucks,  jeeps,  heli- 
copters and  like  equipment  to  provide 
mobility  and  logistical  support  for  these 
forces ;  for  radios,  and  other  command  con- 
trol equipment  for  proper  communications 
among  the  forces;  and  for  small  arms  for 
security  forces. 

c.  In  furtherance  of  these  objectives,  the 
United  States  should  provide,  on  request, 
military  and  technical  training  missions 
but  should  no  longer  maintain  the  perma- 
nent military  missions  in  residence  in  other 
nations  which  too  often  have  constituted 
too  large  and  too  visible  a  United  States 
presence. 

4.  Military  Sales  for  Defense 

a.  The  Executive  Branch  should  seek 
modification  of  the  Conte  and  Symington 
amendments  to  permit  the  United  States 


517 


to  sell  aircraft,  ships  and  other  major 
military  equipment  without  aid  cut  penal- 
ties to  the  more  developed  nations  of  the 
hemisphere  when  these  nations  believe  this 
equipment  is  necessary  to  protect  their 
land,  patrol  their  seacoasts  and  airspace, 
and  otherwise  maintain  the  morale  of  their 
forces  and  protect  their  sovereignty. 
Kealistically,  if  the  United  States  doesn't 
sell  such  equipment,  it  will  be  purchased 
from  other  sources,  east  or  west,  and  tliis 
would  not  be  compatible  with  the  United 
States'  best  interests. 

b.  Each  country  should  be  permitted  to 
buy  such  equipment  through  purchase 
orders  placed  with  the  United  States  De- 
fense Department  through  the  Military 
Assistance  Program,  in  order  that  each 
coimtry  may  get  full  value  for  its  military 
investment,  more  reliable  delivery  dates, 
and  better  maintenance. 

C.  Economic  and   Social   Development 

Our  common  objective — to  improve  the 
quality  of  life  for  all  individuals  in  the  hemi- 
sphere— can  only  be  accomplished  by  working 
together  to  accelerate  the  rate  of  economic  and 
social  development.  Hemisphere  interdepend- 
ence in  these  matters  is  more  than  a  theory.  It 
is  a  fact  of  life. 

The  Alliance  for  Progress  was  the  first 
formal  agreement  among  Western  Hemisphere 
nations  on  specific  goals  related  to  economic  and 
social  development.  The  goals  of  the  Alliance 
remain  the  best  expression  of  our  common  ob- 
jectives. To  be  sure,  actual  progress  under  the 
Alliance  has  not  come  up  to  the  grand  hopes 
entertained  in  1961  at  Punta  del  Este.  Yet  the 
broad  Alliance  objectives  of  economic  and  so- 
cial development  to  enrich  the  lives  of  indi- 
viduals remain  the  challenging  goals  which 
Western  Hemisphere  nations  seek. 

One  of  the  least  understood  features  of  the 
Alliance  is  the  fact  that  it  is  a  self-heli3  effort 
in  which  the  principal  responsibility  for  financ- 
ing and  implementation  has  been  with  the 
people  of  the  other  hemisphere  comitries.  It  is 
not  a  bilateral  United  States  aid  program,  con- 
trary to  popular  impression.  The  United  States 
is  but  one  partner  in  a  development  effort  which 
is  about  90  percent  financed  by  the  other  Ameri- 
can republics.^ 


'  CIAP  Document :  Meeting  IT,  March,  1969.  [Foot- 
note in  original.] 


To  say  the  Alliance  has  failed  is  to  discount 
the  genuine  progress  it  has  made.  The  fact  is 
that  many  of  the  expectations  generated  at  the 
outset  of  the  Alliance  were  unrealistic.  But  the 
Alliance  experience  shows  that  man  can  shape 
the  future  along  lines  which  wdll  contribute  to 
broad  national  and  hemispheric  objectives,  and 
this  is  the  important  fact.  To  be  sure,  mistakes 
are  made,  but  progress  frequently  involves  the 
process  of  learning  through  mistakes. 

One  of  tlie  things  learned  from  the  mission 
was  that  other  nations  have  deeply  resented  the 
way  in  which  the  United  States  has  carried  out 
its  assistance  progi-ams.  As  part  of  the  aid  ef- 
fort, the  United  States  has  intervened,  usually 
with  the  best  of  intentions,  in  almost  eveiy  as- 
pect of  their  economic  policies  and  programs. 
It  has  too  often  tried  to  do  things  for  them,  be- 
cause it  felt  it  could  do  them  better.  Not  only 
was  tliis  subconscious  paternalism  less  effective 
because  it  was  resented,  but  also  because  it  did 
not  give  the  other  nations  an  incentive  to  assume 
responsibility  and  initiative  themselves. 

It  is  clear  that  most  of  the  American  repub- 
lics are  psychologically  ready  to  assume 
direction  of  their  own  development  efforts. 
Moreover,  the  teclmical  capabilities  of  the  in- 
dividual nations  and  the  international  lending 
mstitutions  are  growing  steadily.  The  time  has 
arrived  for  the  United  States  to  move  con- 
sciously from  a  paternalistic  role  to  one  of  part- 
nership. The  United  States  must  build  on  the 
progress  already  achieved,  and  improve  and  ac- 
celerate its  efforts,  but  it  also  must  be  willing 
to  help  without  trying  to  dominate.  Shifting  an 
mcreasing  portion  of  our  assistance  through 
multilateral  institutions  would  help  to  accom- 
plish this  objective. 

The  other  American  nations  must  assume 
greater  responsibility  for  their  own  perform- 
ance in  utilizing  United  States  resources.  They 
also  must  recognize  that  their  performance  will 
influence  the  extent  to  which  the  United  States 
Congress  and  public  will  be  willing  to  main- 
tain or  increase  levels  of  cooperation  with  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

The  challenge  now  is  to  develop  pragmatic 
programs  wliich  build  on  the  long  experience 
of  hemisphere  cooperation  and  which  will  ac- 
celerate economic  and  social  progress. 
The  procedure  involves : 

1.  Efforts  to  improve  policies  and  programs 
which  have  produced  generally  constmctive 
results ; 


518 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


2.  A  resolve  to  modify  or  drop  those  which 
have  not  stood  the  test  of  time ;  and, 

3.  Most  importantly,  a  willingness  through- 
out the  hemisphere  to  innovate  by  developing 
new  policies  and  programs  to  meet  common 
objectives. 

Economic  and  social  development  must  go 
hand-in-hand.  Economic  growth  provides  the 
wherewithal  to  support  improved  diets,  health 
and  sanitation,  enhanced  educational  opportu- 
nities, better  housing  and  all  the  elements  wliich 
contribute  to  an  improvement  in  the  quality  of 
life.  The  process,  however,  is  not  automatic. 
Positive  policies  and  actions  are  called  for  to 
make  sure  that  the  benefits  of  economic  growth 
are  used  effectively  to  provide  expanding  hori- 
zons of  opportunity  for  all  individuals.  Thus 
social  development  is  not  only  made  possible  by 
economic  growth  but  is  essential  to  make  sui'e 
the  benefits  of  growth  are  broadly  shared. 

Econoinic  Progress 

The  rate  of  overall  economic  progress  in  the 
rest  of  the  Western  Hemisphei-e  outside  of 
Canada  and  the  United  States  compares  favor- 
ably with  other  regions  of  the  world  so  far  in 
the  1960's.  Gross  National  Product  in  constant 
prices  has  advanced  at  an  average  annual  rate 
of  -i.O  percent. 

But  in  terms  of  improving  the  quality  of  life 
for  individuals,  progress  has  not  been  satisfac- 
tory. The  rate  of  population  growth  in  other 
Western  Hemisphei'e  nations — 2.9  percent  per 
amium — is  the  highest  of  any  major  area  in  the 
woi-ld.  Thus,  the  4.9  percent  annual  increase  in 
total  production  has  yielded  an  increase  of  2 
percent  per  annum  in  production  per  person. 
This  measure  is  more  meaningful,  since  it  is 
production  per  person  which  supports  the  rise 
in  living  standards  for  individuals. 

If  these  trends  are  projected,  they  show  that 
overall  Gross  National  Product  would  double 
in  1.5  years — while  it  would  take  35  years  to 
double  the  per  capita  production  which 
supports  the  rise  in  living  standards  for 
mdividuals. 

This  is  just  not  good  enough. 

One  way  out  lies  in  increasing  the  rate  of 
growth  in  Gross  National  Product,  and  this 
should  be  a  broad  heniisphere  objective.  Yet 
long  experience  shows  that  it  is  extremely  dif- 
ficult to  achieve  and  maintain  overall  economic 
growth  rates  of  five  to  six  pei'cent  or  more. 
Simple  arithmetic  shows  that,  even  with  a  max- 


imum effort  to  step  up  the  pace  of  economic 
growth,  there  are  only  limited  possibilities  of 
producing  the  desired  rise  in  living  standards 
for  such  a  rapidly-growing  population. 

However,  experience  supports  the  view  that, 
in  time,  the  general  social  and  cultural  changes 
that  are  a  part  of  broad  development  may  oper- 
ate to  slow  the  rate  of  population  gi'owth.  Such 
processes  work  slowly,  however.  Thus,  the  prob- 
lem must  be  faced  now. 

The  rate  of  population  growth  in  many  of 
the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  so 
high  that  it  will  prove  extremely  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  meet  the  economic  and  social  ob- 
jectives of  steady  meaningful  improvement  in 
the  life  of  individuals.  This  problem  must  be 
faced  realistically. 

There  is  widespread  agreement  that  the  most 
important  elements  in  economic  development 
are  investment,  technology,  management  and 
markets  (including  those  abroad).  Government 
policies  can  encourage  or  deter  development  to 
the  extent  they  contribute  to  these  key  elements 
by  supporting  education,  encouraging  savings, 
providing  a  favorable  climate  for  domestic  and 
foreign  investment  and  developing  the  neces- 
sary infrastructure. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  main  impetus  for 
development  must  come  from  within  nations,  it 
is  also  true  that  hemisphere  cooperation  must 
provide  the  svipport  which  is  essential  for  ac- 
celerated progress.  Trade  policies  on  the  part 
of  industrial  nations  can  have  a  major  influence 
on  opportunities  for  export  expansion  on  the 
pai't  of  the  developing  nations.  Development  as- 
sistance by  the  United  States  and  the  govern- 
ments of  other  industrial  nations  can  j^rovide 
loans,  grants  and  technical  assistance  to  supple- 
ment local  efforts,  primarily  in  such  fields  as 
public  works,  education,  agriculture  and  health. 
Foreign  private  investment  can  provide  essen- 
tial technical  knowledge  and  capital. 

7.   TRADE  P01/C;ES 

Trade  policy  is  the  central  economic  issue 
facing  all  Western  Hemisphere  nations.  Freer 
access  to  markets  in  the  United  States  and  other 
industrial  countries  is  essential  to  support  ac- 
celerated economic  progress.  Provision  of  such 
opportunities  poses  problems  of  adjustment  for 
the  industrial  nations  in  terms  of  jobs  and  in- 
vestment. The  challenge  is  to  work  together  to 
develop  a  practical  approach  which  will  be  in 
the  best  interests  of  all  hemisphere  nations. 


December  8,   1969 


519 


Expanding  export  trade  is  the  soundest  and 
most  important  way  the  other  American  re- 
publics can  finance  the  imports  needed  for  broad 
development.  In  1967,  their  export  earnings 
were  six  times  the  net  inflow  of  private  and 
public  capital  from  abroad.  The  great  bulk  of 
the  area's  $10.3  billion  of  imports  consisted  of 
the  machinery  and  equipment  needed  to  sup- 
port industrialization  and  to  expand  govern- 
mental services,  i.e.,  power,  highways,  and 
commimications. 

The  slow  growth  in  exports  in  the  1960's  has 
been  an  important  factor  limiting  the  pace  of 
general  development.  From  1960  to  1968,  the 
value  of  the  area's  exports  increased  4.7  percent 
per  amium  as  compared  with  an  increase  of  8.2 
percent  for  world  exports.  Growth  in  world 
exports  was  75  percent  greater  tlian  that  for 
other  hemisphere  nations. 

A  major  problem  is  that  87  percent  of  the 
area's  exports  consist  of  primary  products — 
food,  natural  fibers  and  industrial  raw  mate- 
rials. In  contrast,  almost  two-thirds  of  the 
exports  of  the  industrial  nations  are  made  up  of 
manufactured  products. 

'\^1iile  sound  policy  calls  for  a  maximum 
effort  to  diversify  and  develop  exports  of  pri- 
mary products,  at  stable  prices,  it  is  unlikely 
that  such  exports  can  expand  rapidly  enough  to 
support  accelerated  growth  in  the  area  as  a 
whole.  Tliough  some  nations  have  favorable  op- 
portunities in  such  fields,  most  of  the  countries 
must  look  to  industrialization  and  increasing 
exports  of  industrial  products. 

Industrial  development  requires  broad  mar- 
kets for  efficient  production.  Domestic  markets 
in  most  of  the  nations  of  tlie  hemisphere  are  too 
limited  for  broad  industrialization.  Kegional 
trading  arrangements  offer  one  constructive 
way  to  broaden  markets.  But  even  with  a  rapid 
development  of  regional  markets,  freer  access 
to  markets  in  industrial  nations  will  be  needed 
to  support  the  industrial  growth  required  to 
improve  the  quality  of  life  through  the 
hemisphere. 

In  the  face  of  this  imperative  need  for 
expanding  trade,  the  United  States  imposes 
formidable  barriers  agamst  imports  from  other 
Western  Hemisphere  nations : 

— Imports  of  many  primary  products  are 
subject  to  quotas. 

— ^United  States  tariffs  are  so  high  on  proc- 
essed raw  materials  *  and  on  the  manufactured 
goods  the  area  could  export  to  the  United  States 
that  they  are  serious  impediments  to  trade. 


It  comes  down  to  the  elemental  fact  that  trade 
expansion  is  essential  to  support  accelerated 
economic  development  in  the  hemisphere.  In 
the  process,  individuals  tloroughout  the  hemi- 
sphere can  benefit.  There  will  be  adjustment 
problems  which  must  be  dealt  with  in  realistic 
terms.  But  a  broader  division  of  labor  on  a 
hemisphere  basis  can  bring  lower  prices  to  con- 
sumers, higher  wages  for  workers,  and  satis- 
factory incentives  for  saving  and  investment. 

Increasing  imports  by  tlie  United  States  from 
other  hemisphere  nations  will  help  expand 
United  States  exports  to  them.  Last  year,  the 
United  States  imported  goods  valued  at  $4.3 
billion  from  the  area  and  exported  $4.7  billion 
to  these  countries,  for  a  favorable  trade  balance 
of  over  $400  million.  United  States  exports  to 
other  hemisphere  nations  have  grown  41  per- 
cent since  1962,  as  against  an  increase  of  59 
percent  in  United  States  exports  to  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

The  problem  is  not  that  the  United  States 
has  lost  competitive  position — its  share  of  ex- 
ports to  Latm  America  from  all  industrial  na- 
tions has  been  quite  stable  in  recent  years.  The 
fact  is  that  the  slow  growth  in  the  export  earn- 
ings of  the  otlier  countries  in  the  hemisphere 
restricts  their  ability  to  finance  imports.  The 
record  shows  clearly  that  if  the  United  States 
buys  more  from  these  countries,  they  will  spend 
more  on  United  States  exports. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Ohjective 

The  United  States  should  press  for  the  maxi- 
mum feanhle  development  of  m^utually  bene- 
ficial trade  toith  other  nations  of  the  hemisphere. 
A  doubling  of  such  trade  by  1976  is  a  realistic 
goal.  This  can  only  be  accomplished  by  United 
States  action  to  revise  its  tariffs  and  quotas  to 
promote  such  mutually  beneficial  increased 
trade. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  Tlie  United  States  should  work  out  a 
balanced  approach  to  the  problem  of  ex- 
panding hemisphere  trade  in  industrial 


'  For  example,  the  producer  of  a  raw  material,  which 
could  be  beans  for  soluble  coffee,  might  ship  the  raw 
material  duty  free  and  get  $1  a  pound.  If  he  processes 
the  beans  and  ships  soluble  coffee,  he  might  get  $1.50 
a  pound  and  pay  a  20%  tariff — not  on  the  added  value 
but  on  the  full  price.  Thus  the  protection  to  the 
United  States  producer  would  not  be  20%,  but  300  of 
the  500  added  value,  or  an  effective  rate  of  60%.  [Foot- 
note in  original.] 


520 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


products  hy  moving  to  a  sy&tem  of  tariff 
'preferences  for  imports  from  all  develop- 
ing nations. 

a.  Tariff  preferences  should  be  phased  in 
to  avoid  sudden  large  impacts  and  to  pro- 
vide time  to  make  necessary  adjustments. 

b.  The  United  States  shoidd  make  vigor- 
ous efforts  to  secure  agreement  on  the  part 
of  other  industrial  nations  to  extend  gen- 
eralized preferences  to  all  developing  na- 
tions. Until  such  agreement  is  reached,  the 
United  States  would  extend  preferences 
only  to  nations  which  are  not  receiving  spe- 
cial treatment  from  other  industrial 
countries. 

c.  Tariff  preferences  should  be  extended 
to  those  items  where  careful  study  shows 
tlie  benefits  to  United  States  consumers 
clearly  outweigh  the  cost  of  the  adjustment. 

d.  In  return  for  tariff  preferences,  the 
developing  nations  should  agree  to  a  grad- 
ual reduction  in  their  barriers  to  imports 
from  the  industrial  nations — over  a  time 
period  which  might  be  as  long  as  10  to  20 
years.  In  this  way,  their  mfant  industries 
can  grow  to  a  stature  in  which  they  are 
fully  competitive  in  world  markets. 

e.  The  United  States  shoidd  press 
through  GATT  [General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  for  strict  adherence  to 
the  rules  of  fair  competition  in  interna- 
tional trade.  It  should  act  positively  to 
apply  countervailing  duties  where  there  is 
a  clear  presumption  that  other  nations  are 
violating  the  rules  with  subsidies,  under 
whatever  guise. 

2.  Realistic  and  effective  arrangements 
should  he  set  up  to  assist  United  States 
workers  and  producers  who  are  ad- 
versely affected  hy  increased  imports. 

a.  It  is  extremely  important  that  new 
procedures  be  devised  and  supporting 
funds  be  provided  to  make  sure  that  ad- 
justment assistance  is  provided  to  workers 
and  employers  when  there  is  a  prima  facie 
case  of  displacement  because  of  increased 
imports. 

b.  An  adjustment  program  was  part  of 
the  Kennedy  roimd  of  tariff  negotiations 
of  1967,  but  it  was  never  effective  because 
the  conditions  were  too  strict. 

3.  'Where  the  United  States  applies  import 
quotas  for  domestic  reasons,  as  in  meat 
and  cotton   textiles,   the  allotments   to 


hemisphere  nations  should  he  readju^sted 
to  assure  that  they  contribute  to  the  gen- 
eral ohjectives  of  hemisphere  develop- 
ment. 

— As  a  general  principle,  the  United 
States  should  allocate  a  major  part  of  the 
growth  in  its  imports  to  hemisphere  na- 
tions. Changes  in  the  allocation  of  quotas, 
even  though  relatively  small  in  relation  to 
United  States  consumption,  can  be  of  great 
benefit  to  some  hemisphere  nations. 

4.  The  United  States  should  support  com- 
modity agreements  which  operate  to 
stabilize  and  maintain  prices  for  pri- 
main/  products  at  levels  that  reflect  fair 
wages  and  other  costs  of  production. 

a.  Wliere  possible,  such  agreements 
should  provide  fimds  and  mechanisms  to 
control  surplus  production  by  offering  in- 
centives to  diversification  and  increased 
efficiency. 

b.  Price  targets  under  such  agreements 
should  not  be  set  so  high  as  to  provide 
incentives  for  the  development  of  syn- 
thetic products  wliich  will  replace  natural 
products.  With  the  tremendous  advances  in 
teclmology,  this  is  a  serious  consideration. 

c.  It  should  be  recognized  that  under 
such  agreements  the  United  States'  con- 
sumers are  providing  a  form  of  necessary 
assistance  to  producing  nations.  The  pro- 
ducing countries  on  their  part  should  en- 
sure that  benefits  are  broadly  shared  in  a 
manner  which  supports  general  develop- 
ment. 

5.  The  United  States  should  use  its  voting 
power  in  the  International  Coffee  Agree- 
ment, together  with  other  Western 
Hemisphere  nations,  to  make  sure  that 
the  system  works  as  effectively  as  pos- 
sible in  terms  of  its  ohjectives  relating  to 
prices  and  quotas,  and  that  Western 
Hemisphere  nations  receive  a  major 
share  in  the  growth  of  the  United  States 
market. 

a.  It  has  been  estimated  that  a  drop  of 
one  cent  per  pomid  in  the  price  of  coffee 
means  a  loss  of  $55  million  in  foreign  ex- 
change to  the  14  coffee-producing  countries 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

b.  The  United  States  should  urge  recon- 
sideration of  and  support  the  measures  ad- 
vanced at  the  last  meeting  of  the  executive 


December  8,   1969 


521 


board  of  the  International  Coffee  Council 
to  correct  the  weaknesses  that  are  prevent- 
ing the  coffee  agreement  from  fully  achiev- 
ing its  basic  objectives. 

6.  Sfeckil  attention  should  he  directed  to 
the  requirements  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere nations  when  sugar  quotas  are  re- 
viewed in  1971. 

a.  A  larger  share  of  the  growth  in  the 
United  States  market  should  be  assigned  to 
other  hemisphere  nations. 

b.  A  major  pi'oblem  concerns  the  adjust- 
ments which  would  be  required  if  and  when 
trading  relations  are  resumed  between  the 
members  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  and  Cuba.  A  program  shoidd  be  set 
up  for  advance  plamiing  and  considtation 
with  sugar-producing  nations  in  the  hemi- 
sphere so  that  such  a  contingency  could  be 
handled  through  a  phasLng-in  of  Cuban 
sugar  imports  with  minimum  disruption  of 
the  market. 

7.  The  United  States  should  lend  its  sup- 
port to  regional  markets  as  they  develop 
in  the  area,  including  jmrticipation  in 
regional  development  hanks. 

8.  Tlie  rates  set  hy  shipping  conferences 
on  United  States  trade  with  other  hemi- 
sphere nations  should  he  reviewed. 

— In  many  cases,  it  costs  two  to  three 
times  as  much  to  ship  from  a  United  States 
port  as  it  does  fi-om  Europe.  This  imposes 
a  serious  competitive  disadvantage  on 
United  States  exporters. 

2.  DiVElOPMBNT  ASS/SMNCE 

United  States  assistance  has  played  a  helpful 
role  in  hemisphere  development,  not  so  much  in 
terms  of  tlie  amount  of  aid — which  can  only  be 
marginal  to  a  counti-y's  own  resources — but  by 
placing  assistance  at  the  right  place  at  tlie  right 
time.  It  lias,  for  example,  financed  the  needed 
education  or  health  projects  which  could  not  be 
funded  elsewhere,  or  made  possible  a  child- 
feeding  pi'ogram,  or  supported  comprehensive 
land  reform.  More  significantly,  in  some  cases. 
United  States  assistance  appears  to  have  sup- 
plied the  margin  of  resources  that  pennitted  a 
country  to  break  out  of  stagnation  and  bring 
rampant  inflation  under  conti'ol,  thus  helping 
millions  of  people. 

In  this  way  the  $1  billion  a  year  which  repre- 


sents the  United  States  commitment  to  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress  has  made  its  contribution. 
In  the  process,  a  number  of  lessons  have  been 
learned : 

1)  Assistance  can  be  fully  effective  only 
where  a  coimtry  is  making  maximum  use  of  its 
own  productive  resources. 

2)  In  some  cases,  additional  assistance  from 
the  United  States  and  elsewhere  can  help  a 
countiy  move  into  a  phase  of  self-sustaining 
gro\Tth,  where  ultimately  foreign  assistance  is 
no  longer  needed. 

3)  Distributing  United  States  assistance  in 
small  and  inadequate  amounts  to  a  country, 
where  it  makes  little  impact  on  development, 
can  be  a  misuse  and  waste  of  funds. 

4)  Multi-national  and  regional  lending  in- 
stitutions ha^-e  made  great  strides  in  filling  the 
needs  of  developing  nations  for  project  loans. 
These  organizations  have  the  advantages  of 
drawing  on  the  skills  and  resources  of  many 
coimtries  rather  than  one,  and  of  being  better 
able  to  avoid  the  political  frictions  that  can  de- 
veloji  in  bilateral  programs. 

Impediments  to  AID  Program 

In  addition,  certain  problems  have  arisen 
which  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the  assistance 
program : 

1)  The  United  States  assistance  program  has 
become  increasingly  encumbered  with  condi- 
tions and  restrictions  which  seriously  reduce  the 
effectiveness  of  our  assistance.  These  include  re- 
quirements to  ship  half  the  goods  purchased 
with  assistance  loans  on  United  States 
freighters;  provision  that  all  imports  be  pur- 
chased in  the  United  States  no  matter  how 
mucli  more  expensive;  earmarking  of  fimds 
contrary  to  the  particular  needs  of  a  coimtry; 
and  threats  to  withhold  aid  if  United  States 
investments  are  expropriated  without  appro- 
priate payment,  if  a  nation  purchases  "sophis- 
ticated" weapons,  or  if  United  States  com- 
mercial fishing  boats  are  taken  into  custody  and 
fined. 

2)  These  encumbrances,  when  viewed  sepa- 
rately, may  appear  reasonable — and,  of  course, 
they  are  to  the  advantage  of  special-interest 
groups  in  the  United  States.  Taken  together, 
however,  they  seriously  weaken  our  efforts  to 
assist  developing  countries.  Some  of  them  ap- 
pear to  violate  the  sovereignty  of  other  nations. 
They  also  increase  costs  by  requiring,  for  ex- 
ample, that  imports  for  a  construction  project 


522 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


come  from  the  United  States  and  that  United 
States  engineering  firms  be  employed  regard- 
less of  cost. 

To  be  sure,  United  States  govermnent  funds 
must  be  expended  under  the  most  careful  con- 
trols. Existing  controls  are  exacting  in  prevent- 
ing ■waste  and  misuse  of  assistance  fimds  from 
the  United  States  point  of  view.  But  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  recipient  country,  loading 
extraneous  conditions  on  development  loans 
amounts  to  waste  and  misuse  of  funds  which 
they  must  repay  with  interest. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  make  a  renewed 
policy  commitment  to  support  development  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  as  a  means  of  improv- 
ing the  quality  of  life  for  individuals.  Assist- 
ance should  he  provided  without  special-interest 
considerations  and  with  due  attention  to  self- 
help  and  cowntry  performance. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  Development  or  program  loans  should 
ie  m,ade  on  a  three-to-flve-year  commit- 
ment hasis,  through  the  proposed  Insti- 
tute of  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs^ 
which  should  become  our  most  im- 
portant assistance  technique. 

a.  Such  loans  are  designed  to  finance  the 
overall  development  of  a  country,  rather 
than  any  one  specific  project  such  as  a 
power  plant  or  a  road.  The  loan  provides 
dollars  to  finance  imports.  Importers  pay 
for  such  items  in  local  currency  which  can 
be  used  by  the  local  governments  for  farm 
credit,  urban  development,  and  comparable 
purposes. 

b.  The  dollar  loans  are  made  to  local  gov- 
ernments on  the  basis  of  performance  m 
terms  of  broad  development  goals,  such  as 
increasing  exports,  curbmg  inflation  or  im- 
proving agriculture.  Such  loans  would  be 
made  only  to  countries  which  have  com- 
petent planning  organizations  and  effec- 
tive governmental  administrative  agencies. 

2.  Multi-national  and  regional  lending  in- 
stitutions should  finance  the  bulk  of  pub- 
lic works  projects  and  project  loans 
should  be  restncted  to  agricidture,  edu- 


'  The  economic  operating  arm  for  the  Western 
Hemisphere  of  the  proposed  Economic  and  Social  De- 
velopment Agency.  (See  page  510.)  [Footnote  in 
original.] 


cation,  public  health,  amd  urban  develop- 
ment projects  which  involve  pioneering 
and  testing  new  approaches. 

3.  In  providing  both  program  and  project 
assistance,  the  United  States  should  take 
full  cognizance  of  the  recommendations 
of  the  proposed  Western  Hemisphere 
Development  Committee  of  the  Organi- 
zation of  American  States,  giving  full 
weight  to  Title  6,  Section  251  H  of  tlie 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1966. 

4.  Development  assistance  loans  should 
carry  loto  interest  rates  and  lenient  re- 
payment terms  in  order  to  be  effective. 

a.  The  basic  concern  of  the  United  States 
lies  not  in  how  much  mterest  is  paid,  but 
whether  the  fimds  "pay  off"  in  helping  a 
country  develop. 

b.  AVhat  the  Marshall  Plan  accomplished 
almost  entirely  with  grants  of  aid  cannot 
be  accomplished  today  in  the  developing 
countries  with  loans  at  high  rates  of 
interest. 

5.  Tlie  encu7nb?'ances  on  United  States  as- 
sistance programs  should  be  removed  in 
all  cases  where  they  interfere  with  the 
process  of  development  or  impugn  the 
sovereignty  of  other  countries. 

— An  important  start  has  been  made  by 
the  present  Administration  in  substantially 
modifying  the  "additionality"  clause  by 
greatly  expanding  the  list  of  items  that 
must  be  purchased.  Actually,  the  concept  of 
"additionality"  should  be  eliminated 
entirely. 

6.  Loan  restrictions  should  be  broadened 
so  borrowers  can  spend  the  fu/nds  any- 
where in  the  Western  Hemisphere  with 
due  consideration  to  questions  of  qual- 
ity, price  and  delivery  dates. 

— Local  contractors  and  technicians 
should  be  used  wherever  possible  with 
United  States  advisers  where  necessary. 

7.  The  Executive  Branch  should  seek  the 
suspension  or  modifications  of  the  Pelly, 
Conte,  Hickenlooper,  Symington  and 
Reuss  amendments  which  affect  tlie  ex- 
tension of  assistance  including  cut-o-ffs 
where  countries  purchase  sophisticated 
weapons,  or  seize  United  States  fishing 
boats  operating  without  a  license,  or  ex- 
propriate without  due  compensation. 


December  8,   1969 


523 


8.  The  provision  that  half  of  tlie  goods  fi- 
nanced by  the  United  States  must  go  in 
United  States  freighters  should  ie 
repealed. 

It  has  been  estimated  that  this  provision 
reduces  the  effectiveness  of  each  $1.00  of 
United  States  assistance  by  as  much  as  200. 
It  is  one  of  the  major  irritants  felt  in  devel- 
oping countries.  This  is  a  disguised  sub- 
sidy to  United  States  shipping  companies. 
Any  necessary  subsidy  should  be  given 
openly  and  directly  by  Congressional 
appropriation. 

3.  DBBT  SERVICE  PROBLEMS 

In  the  effort  to  support  accelerated  economic 
development,  the  major  financial  mechanism 
used  has  been  loans  from  multi-national  and 
regional  agencies,  governments  and  private 
sources.  Many  of  the  loans  from  multi-national 
and  regional  institutions  and  from  governments 
are  "soft"  loans  in  the  sense  that  interest  rates 
are  low  and  terms  of  repayment  are  lenient.  The 
concept  of  soft  loans  is  basically  sound — they 
provide  real  assistance,  while  the  fact  that  they 
must  be  repaid  helps  keep  the  development 
process  realistic. 

Nevertheless,  interest  and  amortization  pay- 
ments must  be  made  on  schedule  on  all  loans, 
from  public  and  private  sources,  if  a  country  is 
to  maintain  its  credit  standing.  Heavy  borrow- 
ings by  some  Western  Hemisphere  countries  to 
support  development  have  reached  the  point 
where  annual  repayments  of  interest  and  amor- 
tization absorb  a  large  share  of  foreign  ex- 
change earnings.  Within  five  years,  a  number  of 
other  nations  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  could 
face  the  same  situation.  Many  of  the  countries 
are,  in  effect,  having  to  make  new  loans  to  get 
the  foreign  exchange  to  pay  interest  and  amor- 
tization on  old  loans,  and  at  higher  interest 
rates. 

This  debt  service  problem  is  a  major  con- 
cern. If  countries  get  into  a  position  where  in- 
terest and  amortization  payments  on  foreign 
loans  require  a  disproportionately  large  share 
of  available  foreign  exchange,  then  the  general 
pace  of  development  will  be  slowed  by  the  in- 
ability to  maintain  imports  of  the  capital 
equipment  needed  to  support  economic  growth. 

Recommendation:   National  Policy   Objective 

The  United  States  policy  for  the  Western 
Hemisphere    should    recognise    the    multiple 


advantages  of  a  GENERO  US  RESCUED  UL- 
ING  OF  DEBT  SERVICE  REQUIRE- 
MENTS for  countries  facing  balance  of 
payments  problems. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  Studies  of  the  debt  service  problem  on  a 
country-by-country  basis  should  be  ini- 
tiated by  the  Western  Hemisphere 
Development  Committee  {the  present 
CIAP). 

a.  In  this  way,  problems  can  be  antici- 
pated and  dealt  with  in  advance  through  an 
appropriate  rescheduling  by  the  United 
States  Government  of  the  dollar  payments 
of  interest  and  amortization. 

b.  In  addition,  CIAP  should  be  encour- 
aged to  discuss  with  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  and  other  international 
lending  institutions  the  possibility  of 
stretching  out  loan  payments  for  countries 
that  have  debt  problems. 

2.  Where  dollar  payments  are  suspended 
or  stretched  out,  the  equivalent  amounts 
in  local  currencies  should  be  paid  into  a 
special  fund  to  be  used — in  consultation 
with  the  United  States — to  meet  the  gen- 
eral development  objectives  of  the  other 
Western  Hemisphere  nations.  These 
would  include : 

a.  Financing  exports  of  capital  goods 
within  the  region ; 

b.  Financing  expanded  economic  devel- 
opment through  national  and  regional  de- 
velopment banks ;  and 

c.  Financing  local  private  participation 
in  local  joint  ventures  with  foreign  capital. 

4.   PRIVATE   SAVINGS    AND   INVESTMENT 

Accelerated  economic  growth  will  require  in- 
creasing flows  of  private  investment,  local  and 
foreign.  Yet  in  all  too  many  cases,  private  sav- 
ings and  investment  are  held  back  by  high  and 
erratic  rates  of  inflation  as  well  as  by  complex 
government  controls  and  restrictions.  Moreover, 
too  large  a  portion  of  local  savings  tends  to  seek 
safer  haven  abroad. 

Private  investment,  particularly  foreign  in- 
vestment, is  regarded  with  suspicion  in  many 
quarters.  A  great  many  and  probably  a  majority 
of  the  citizens  of  hemisphere  nations  regard 
United  States  private  investment  as  a  form  of 
exploitation  or  economic  colonialism.  There  is 


I 


524 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


a  widespread,  mistaken  view  that  such  invest- 
ment takes  more  out  of  the  area  than  it  con- 
tributes to  it.  Fear  of  domination  by  United 
States  companies  is  expressed  frequently. 

Tlie  central  problem  is  the  failure  of  govern- 
ments throughout  the  hemisphere  to  recognize 
fully  the  importance  of  private  investment. 
Thus,  realistic  steps  have  not  been  taken  to 
encourage  private  investment,  to  create  a  frame- 
work within  which  it  can  operate  and  which 
assures  that  it  will  serve  the  best  interests  of 
the  entire  community.  Yet  liistory  shows  that 
democratic  societies  which  have  provided  such 
j  encouragement  and  such  a  framework  have 
!  been  the  most  successful  in  attaining  their 
broad  objectives. 

United  States  government  tax  laws  and  regu- 
lations offer  a  number  of  significant  barriers  to 
private  investment  abroad.  They  make  it  im- 
possible for  local  governments  to  offer  effective 
tax  incentives  to  Unit«d  States  investors.  They 
discourage  joint  ventures — a  form  of  invest- 
ment viewed  with  favor  in  many  parts  of  the 
hemisphere.  Furthermore,  the  United  States 
offers  little  in  the  way  of  positive  incentives  to 
encourage  its  investors  to  engage  in  enterprises 
elsewhere  in  the  hemisphere. 

L     RecoinmeTidation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  provide  tnaximum 
encouragement  for  p/ivate  investment  through- 
out the  hemisphere. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  The  United  States  should  not,  for  nar- 
roio  domestic  reasons,  o-Pfly  tax  rules  to 
United  States  private  overseas  invest- 
ment which  controvert  efforts  iy  devel- 
oping nations  to  encourage  private 
investment  and  promote  joint  ventures. 

a.  United  States  companies  should  not 
have  to  pay  into  the  United  States  Treas- 
ury the  difference  between  the  United 
States  corporate  income  tax  and  any  lower 
tax  assessed  locally. 

b.  United  States  companies  with  minor- 
ity holdings  in  foreign  joint  ventures 
should  be  able  to  consolidate  returns  from 
such  ventures  and  offset  any  losses  from 
them  against  parent  company  losses. 

2.  Greater  use  should  be  made  of  the  con- 
tract mechanism  to  hring  pnvate  inves- 
tors into  ventures  with  discouragingly 
high   risks   iut  with   the   potential  to 


make  significant  contributions  to  local 
economies. 

a.  The  proposed  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation  should  have  the 
power  to  contract  with  private  companies 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere  to  create  pro- 
duction facilities  necessary  to  meet  an  im- 
portant need  wliich  is  not  being  filled  by 
private  investors.  In  many  cases,  the  prob- 
lem is  that  the  combinations  of  the  capi- 
tal required  and  the  overhead  costs  in- 
volved in  establishing  a  venture  during  its 
early  years  are  so  high  as  to  make  the  ven- 
ture miattractive  even  though  longer  term 
prospects  appear  favorable.  In  such  cases, 
the  contract  with  the  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation  would  cover  these 
start-up  costs  through  some  combination 
of  loans  and  contract  payments,  possibly 
involving  participation  by  multi-national, 
regional  or  national  development  banks. 

b.  Contracts  should  be  worked  out  in  a 
flexible  fashion  and  could  provide,  for  in- 
stance, that  the  participating  private  com- 
pany would  have  an  option  to  purchase  an 
agreed-upon  percent  of  the  equity  once  the 
venture  was  successful,  with  the  remainder 
of  the  equity  sold  to  local  investors.  Such 
a  contract  mechanism  offers  a  direct  and 
flexible  approach  towards  encouraging  a 
greater  flow  of  private  investment.  It  is  bet- 
ter than  the  shotgun  approach  of  tax  incen- 
tives to  U.S.  private  investment  which,  in 
reality,  constitutes  a  form  of  subsidy. 

3.  The  proposal  to  transfer  AID  functicms 
relating  to  pnvate  investment  into  a  new 
corporation— the  Overseas  Pnvate  In- 
vestment Corporation — should  be  sup- 
ported. 

a.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  form 
a  private  United  States  insurance  group 
to  take  over  insurance  of  private  foreign 
investment  under  a  reinsurance  arrange- 
ment with  the  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment Corporation. 

— This  would  further  remove  the  U.S. 
government  from  direct  involvement  in 
protecting  U.S.  private  investment. 

4.  Improved  mechanisms  should  be  sought 
to  bring  together  United  States  private 
investors  and  companies  elsewhere  in 
the  hemisphere  which  are  seeking 
United  States  partners. 

a.  The  need  for  comnnmication  is  par- 


December  8,  1969 


525 


ticularly  significant  in  the  case  of  small  and 
medium-sized  United  States  companies 
which  could  make  contributions  in  terms  of 
capital  and  technical  knowledge. 

b.  This  might  be  done  tlu-ough  Joint 
Councils  involving  the  United  States  Coun- 
cil for  Latin  America  and  local  counter- 
parts, perhaps  with  government  support. 

c.  The  contract  mechanism  might  be  use- 
ful in  certain  cases  in  facilitatmg  such  joint 
ventures. 

d.  It  might  be  feasible  to  revive  luider 
the  Organization  of  American  States  the 
Inter-American  Development  Commission 
with  its  country  conunissions  to  help  in 
mobilizing  the  private  sector. 

5.  High  jjrionty  should  he  given  to  the 
developtnent  and  training  of  entre- 
frenexirs,  managers,  scientists  and 
technicians. 

a.  The  proposed  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation  should  be  charged 
with  the  responsibility  for  actively  promot- 
ing such  efforts. 

b.  U.S.  companies  should  also  provide 
support.  Increased  facilities  for  training 
both  students  and  teachers  in  the  United 
States  should  be  a  part  of  the  progi-am. 
The  International  Executive  Service  Corps 
is  now  doing  outstanding  work  in  this 
field. 

6.  The  United  States  should  support  all 
efforts  to  encourage  local  savings  and 
to  channel  them  into  productive 
investment. 

a.  Regional  and  national  development 
banks  should  be  supported  by  the  United 
States  with  administrative,  technical  and 
financial  assistance. 

b.  The  United  States  should  support 
the  development  of  local  open-end  invest- 
ment trusts  (i)  to  mobilize  local  savings  for 
local  industrial  investment,  (ii)  as  a  veliicle 
to  utilize  counterpart  funds  to  finance  local 
private  participation  in  joint  ventures  with 
foreign  capital  for  local  industrial  develop- 
ment. This  could  be  a  means  of  acliieving 
greater  local  participation  in  joint  ventures 
with  United  States  companies. 

c.  Arrangements  could  be  set  up  in 
which  U.S.  government  loans  would  be 
used  to  finance  in  part  the  development  of 
local  and  regional  markets.  One  such  ex- 
periment is  now  underway  in  Brazil  with 


an  AID  loan.  If  successful,  the  pattern 
could  l)e  applied  elsewhere. 

d.  To  encourage  local  savings,  the  World 
Bank  might  issue  bonds  repaj'able  in  con- 
stant real  value. 

e.  A  Latin  American  dollar  market 
(similar  to  the  EuroDoUar  market)  could 
be  developed  in  which  deposits  denomi- 
nated in  dollars  could  be  used  to  finance 
local  development. 

f.  United  States  assistance  fimds  could 
be  used  to  guarantee  part  (e.g.  25  percent) 
of  loans  made  by  local  banks  or  other  fi- 
nancial institutions  to  support  rural  village 
development  projects  such  as  water  supply, 
grain  storage,  simple  irrigation,  housing 
and  farm-to-market  access  roads. 

7.  The  United  States  government  should 
work  with  the  proposed  Western  Hemi- 
sphere Development  Committee  and  with 
representatives  from  the  private  sectors 
to  develop  a  set  of  uniform  rules  of  con- 
duct for  private  foreign  investment. 

a.  Such  rules  should  cover  the  behavior 
of  both  private  companies  and  host 
governments. 

b.  Private  enterprise  flourishes  under  a 
system  of  reasonable  and  predictable  rules 
of  the  game  involving  a  minimmn  of  red 
tape. 

c.  A  greater  identification  between  the 
policies  of  private  foreign  investors  and 
the  national  interest  of  host  countries  is 
required.  Such  problems  can  best  be  worked 
out  on  a  hemisphere-wide  basis. 

5.   URBAN  DEVELOPMENr  AND  HOUSING 

Adequate  housing  and  improved  conditions  of 
urban  living  stand  high  on  the  list  of  factors 
which  contribute  to  the  quality  of  life  through- 
out the  Western  Hemisphere.  Yet  in  large  part 
because  of  a  continuing  influx  of  people  from 
rural  areas,  cities  are  falling  behind  in  provid- 
ing the  conditions  and  services  which  make 
them  reasonably  safe  and  decent  places  in  which 
to  work  and  live. 

Housing  needs  far  exceed  the  available  supply 
of  medium  and  low  cost  facilities.  Of  the  pop- 
ulation moving  into  cities,  a  higli  percentage 
live  in  slums.  This  not  only  causes  difficult  hous- 
ing and  health  problems  but  also  unprecedented 
structural  change.  Extreme  traffic  congestion  is 
seen  everywhere.  Health  facilities  are  inade- 


1 


526 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


quate  and  sanitary  and  water  supiily  systems 
are  presently  insufficient.  Tlie  very  high  urban 
population  growth  rate  (more  than  50  percent 
higher  than  the  rate  of  growth  in  total  popula- 
tion) exceeds  the  increase  in  job  opportunities, 
so  unemployment  is  generally  high  and  rising, 
particularly  among  the  young. 

In  confronting  these  massive  problems,  most 
of  which  have  intensified  greatly  in  the  past 
decade,  mimicipal  administration  has  been 
swamped.  Financial  requirements  are  stagger- 
ing, and  go  well  beyond  presently  available 
funds  from  archaic  urban  tax  systems  and  aid 
from  central  governments. 

These  problems  of  urban  development  are 
universal  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  IMajor 
cities  in  the  United  States  face  much  the  same 
difficulties  as  do  cities  elsewhere.  It  will  require 
the  combined  experience  and  cooperative  efforts 
of  people  and  governments  throughout  the 
Western  Hemisphere  to  accelerate  progress  in 
dealing  with  urban  problems. 

It  is  increasingly  clear  that  what  is  needed 
is  a  systems  approach  to  community  develop- 
ment. Specific  elements — such  as  transportation, 
schools,  housing,  sanitarj^  facilities,  administra- 
tion and  finance — must  be  integrated  into  a  co- 
hesive approach  within  the  context  of  national, 
regional  and  urban  planning.  Rural  and  urban 
development  need  to  be  considered  as  integral 
partners  in  overall  national  development.  Fac- 
tors influencing  the  migratory  flows  between 
rural  and  urban  areas  need  to  be  given  priority 
study  and  attention.  Both  agricultural  and  in- 
dustrial development  should  proceed  on  a  bal- 
anced basis. 

Wliile  much  has  been  learned  about  the  com- 
plex problems  involved  in  improving  housing 
and  urban  conditions,  much  more  remains  to 
be  learned.  This  is  a  hemisphere-wide  challenge. 
It  is  also  a  compelling  opportunity  to  work 
together,  to  learn  together,  to  deal  imagina- 
tively and  effectively  with  common  problems. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  give  maxinvum 
feasible  support  to  urban  and  rural  community 
development  to  iTriprove  housing  and  a  broad 
range  of  community  services  so  as  to  elevate  the 
quality  of  the  environment  in  which  people  live. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  The  United  States  should  undertake  a 
major  program  for  the  rehabilitation  of 
its  own  cities.  This  will  meet  the  essen- 


tial needs  of  our  own  people;  it  will  dem- 
onstrate to  other  American  republics 
that  this  job  can  be  done  and  it  will  es- 
tablish the  legitimacy  of  our  own  system 
and  its  ability  to  set  essential  priorities. 

2.  United  States  assistance  efforts  in  the 
other  American  republics  must  be  broad- 
ened in  orientation  to  total  community 
development. 

— Wliereas  some  of  the  other  countries 
are  beginning  to  work  to  meet  the  needs  for 
social  self-help  and  self-determination  of 
low  income  groups,  U.S.  assistance  pro- 
grams are  still  oriented  at  the  physical  and 
material  environment  and  not  at  total  so- 
cial, educational  and  community  develop- 
ment. 

3.  The  U.S.  housing  loan  guarantee  and 
loan  programs  shoidd  be  improved. 

— ^While  important  in  mdividual  cases, 
these  loan  programs  are  small  in  relation  to 
the  total  problem,  and  they  are  frequently 
not  integrated  into  broad  urban  and  rural 
development  plans.  However,  as  a  general 
rule,  the  funds  to  finance  housing  and  urban 
development  should  be  generated  locally. 

4.  United  States  programs  should  stress  ef- 
forts to  join  together  with  local  private 
sector  groups.,  municipal  and  national 
governments,  and  regional  and  hemi- 
sphere organizations  in  seeking  new., 
ways  to  improve  the  environment  in  both 
urban  and  rural  areas. 

5.  The  United  States  should  also  help  in 
the  development  of  mechanisms  which 
will  promote  individual  savings  and  di- 
rect them  into  housing  and  other  com- 
munity facilities. 

a.  Seed  capital  can  be  provided  to  help 
establish  local  institutions  which  will  pro- 
vide safe  and  attractive  places  in  which  in- 
dividuals can  deposit  their  savings. 

b.  These  institutions  can  use  such 
funds  to  finance  housing  and  urban 
improvements. 

c.  Where  there  is  a  problem  of  inflation, 
arrangements  can  be  worked  out  to  safe- 
guard the  value  of  individual  savings  by 
relating  both  the  return  to  savers  and  the 
payments  by  borrowers  to  an  agreed-upon 
index  of  prices. 


December  8,   1969 


527 


D.   The   Division   of  Labor 

In  essence,  what  we  the  people  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  really  need  is  a  more  efficient  divi- 
sion of  labor  among  us. 

Tlie  division  of  labor  is  one  of  the  tried  and 
true  economic  principles  that  will  be  as  valid  in 
1976  as  it  was  in  1776  when  it  was  first  spelled 
out  by  Adam  Smith.  His  example  involved  the 
manufacture  of  dress  pins  in  which  some  18 
distinct  operations  were  required.  "V\nien  one 
man  had  to  perform  all  18  operations,  he  "could 
certainly  not  make  20  pins  a  day"  said  Adam 
Smith.  But  if  the  process  could  be  divided  up 
so  that  18  people  specialized,  with  each  one 
performing  one  particular  function  of  the  proc- 
ess, the  total  output  per  person  could  be  raised 
to  as  much  as  4,800  pins  per  day,  according  to 
Adam  Smith. 

This  principle  of  the  division  of  labor  under- 
lies the  progress  of  modern  nations.  Within  na- 
tional boundaries,  the  forces  of  competition  in 
the  market  lead  to  specialization — a  division  of 
labor.  Individuals  and  companies  turn  to  what 
they  can  produce  most  effectively  because  that 
yields  the  greatest  returns.  Thus,  one  company 
will  concentrate  on  the  production  of  ax  handles 
while  another  will  specialize  on  producing  ax 
heads.  The  result  will  be  better  axes,  lower 
prices  to  consumers,  and  higher  returns 
to  workers  and  employers. 

The  same  principles  apply  internationally.  All 
participants  gain  from  the  fi-eest  possible  ex- 
change of  exports  and  imports,  since  that  pro- 
motes an  international  division  of  labor.  Each 
nation  concentrates  on  items  it  can  produce  with 
relatively  greater  efficiency  and  lowest  costs.  It 
trades  these  items  for  those  which  other  na- 
tions can  produce  with  selectively  greater  effi- 
ciency. Everyone  gains  in  the  process,  just  as 
they  do  in  the  division  of  labor  within  national 
boundaries. 

What  is  needed  now  is  a  broadening  division 
of  labor  among  the  nations  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  At  present,  the  United  States  is 
producing,  at  high  cost  behind  tariff  walls  and 
quotas,  goods  which  could  be  produced  more 
economically  by  other  hemisphere  nations.  The 
U.S.  is  short  of  skilled  labor  and,  if  anything, 
this  short<age  promises  to  get  worse.  The  short- 
age of  skilled  labor  is  intensified  when  the  U.S. 
continues  to  keep  workers  in  lines  which  are,  by 
definition,  inefficient,  since  production  can  only 
be  carried  on  here  behind  tariff  or  quota  bar- 
riers. National  productivity  would  be  enhanced 
by  shifting  workers  and  capital  out  of  protected 


industries  into  industries  where  advanced  tech- 
nology and  intensive  capital  investment  permits 
the  U.S.  to  pay  high  wages  and  still  remain 
competitive  in  world  markets.  The  goods  the 
United  States  is  now  producing  inefficiently 
would  be  imported,  mainly  from  less  developed 
countries.  Consumers  would  gain  tkrough  lower 
prices,  workers  would  receive  higher  wages  and 
the  return  on  capital  would  be  higher. 

The  less  developed  comitries  would  also  gain. 
Witli  abundant  supplies  of  labor  and  wage 
levels  well  below  those  in  the  United  States,  they 
could  export  processed  foods,  textiles,  apparel, 
footwear,  and  other  light  manufactures,  as  well 
as  meat  and  other  farm  products.  This  would 
provide  increased  employment  at  higher  wages 
than  are  now  available.  Workers  could  move  off 
farms  into  liigher  paid  industrial  jobs.  The  in- 
crease in  income  would  raise  living  standards 
generally,  contributing  to  the  improvement  in 
the  quality  of  life.  Such  nations  would  become 
better  customers  for  the  high-technology  prod- 
ucts of  the  United  States. 

In  a  real  sense,  the  failure  to  develop  a  full 
division  of  labor  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
can  be  termed  inhumane.  The  excess  produc- 
tion of  certain  farm  products  and  raw  materials 
in  the  less  developed  countries  results  from 
protectionism  in  the  industrial  nations  which 
slows  the  pace  of  industrialization  in  the  less 
developed  nations.  With  over-production, 
prices  of  such  farm  products  and  raw  materials 
smk  to  levels  which  yield  no  more  than  a  bare 
subsistence  return  to  most  of  the  individuals 
producing  them. 

It  has  been  objected  in  some  quartere  of  the 
United  States  that  the  adjustments  involved  in 
a  move  towards  a  greater  international  division 
of  labor  would  prove  too  painful  to  be  borne. 
There  would  be  adjustments,  and  an  effective 
program  would  be  needed  to  help  affected 
workers  and  businesses  to  make  the  transition  to 
more  productive  pursuits. 

Yet  experience  suggests  that  the  adjustment 
process  would  be  amazingly  smooth  if  tariffs 
and  quotas  were  phased  out  over  a  reasonable 
period.  The  European  Economic  Community 
eliminated  all  barriers  to  trade  in  industrial 
products  over  a  seven-year  period  with  few  per- 
ceptible difficulties.  The  massive  reductions  in 
U.S.  tariffs,  from  their  towering  heights  under 
the  Smoot-Hawley  tariff  act  in  1930,  have  had 
beneficial  effects.  A  healthy  domestic  economy 
can  absorb  adjustments  to  increased  imports 
with  little  disruption  and  with  benefits  to  all. 


528 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  President  should  request  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States  to  convene  a  major 
hemisphere  conference  to  establish  a  more  ra- 
tional division  of  labor  in  the  hemisphere. 

The  Western  Hemisphere  Development  Com- 
mittee conld  take  responsibility  for  the  prepara- 
tory arrangements  and  agenda  for  such  a 
Conference.  After  the  Conference,  that  same 
Committee  could  be  given  the  responsibility  for 
following  through  on  the  Conference  conclu- 
sions and  programs. 

Such  a  conference  should  be  composed  of  rep- 
resentatives of  all  concerned  sectors — legislative 
and  executive  branches  of  governments,  busi- 
ness, labor  unions,  agricultural  producers  and 
consumers. 

In  the  long  run,  such  a  conference  might  well 
prove  to  be  a  real  beginning  for  a  new  crusade 
to  elevate  the  dignity  of  the  individual  and  tlie 
quality  of  life  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

E.  Education,  Science,  and   Culture 

f  The  quality  of  life  in  any  nation  today  is 
fimdamentally  related  to  the  level  of  its  science 
and  the  vital  it  j^  of  its  culture.  Both,  in  turn, 
are  crucially  dependent  on  education. 

A  good  educational  system  is  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  produce  the  trained  leadership  required 
for  scholarship,  public  affairs,  the  creative  arts, 
management,  science,  modern  agricultural  pro- 
duction and  skilled  industrial  labor.  No  nation 
ever  has  had  enough  highly  trained  people  to 
meet  all  of  its  needs.  This  lack  has  been  espe- 
cially severe  m  the  less  industrialized  nations 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  educational  problems  in  many  of  the 
American  republics  are  critical;  there  are  oth- 
ers, however,  with  advanced  educational  sys- 
tems. In  the  aggregate,  out  of  108  million  chil- 
dren between  five  and  20  years  of  age  in  1965, 
65  million  were  not  enrolled  in  schools.  Drop- 
out rates  average  70  percent  for  primary 
schools,  and  65  percent  at  the  secondary  level. 

The  individuals  who  take  courses  in  the  imi- 
versity  constitute  only  four  percent  of  the  total 
age  group,  and  of  those,  still  fewer  receive  uni- 
versity degrees.  The  greatest  educational  needs 
are  at  the  secondary  level  and  higher  levels,  due 
in  large  part  to  the  emphasis  on  the  expansion 
of  primary  education  apparent  since  1961. 

Opportunities  for  study,  research  and  obser- 
vation in  the  United  States  have  developed  a 


growing  number  of  highly-qualified  leaders  in 
all  fields  in  the  American  republics.  This  is 
especially  true  in  the  critically  important  fields 
of  education,  agriculture,  economics,  govern- 
ment, the  sciences  and  engineering,  trade  and 
industry,  and  the  arts — fields  in  which  oppor- 
tunities for  advanced  training  in  most  of  the 
American  republics  are  exceedingly  limited. 

Until  recently,  however,  there  has  been  little 
appreciation  of  the  need  and  value  of  scientific 
and  technical  competence  among  those  who 
determine  national  policies  and  set  national 
priorities  in  other  hemisphere  countries.  En- 
couragement and  support  for  scientific  educa- 
tion or  for  scientific  research  or  for  laboratories 
and  research  institutes  have  also  been  lacking. 
The  use  of  scientists  and  engineers  in  schools 
and  colleges,  in  government  and  in  the  private 
sectors  of  agriculture  and  industry,  has  been 
inadequate. 

These  factors  have  had  a  direct  bearing  on 
the  health,  development  and  character  of  each 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  nations. 

Out  of  scientific  research  flow  new  products 
and  processes,  new  medicine  and  new  leisure. 
More  tlian  this,  science  colors  the  culture  of  a 
nation  and  directly  affects  tlie  health  of  its  peo- 
ple and  the  productivity  of  its  agriculture.  In 
a  considerable  measure,  science  determines  the 
vitality  of  a  nation's  industrial  economy — and 
it  is  basic  to  its  military  security. 

Science,  however,  is  only  one  part  of  culture. 
It  functions,  it  is  nourished,  and  it  contributes 
in  inter-relationship  with  the  total  culture  of  a 
nation- — its  creative  arts,  its  social  sciences,  its 
human  and  ethical  values.  Support  of  science 
must,  therefore,  neither  exclude  the  encourage- 
ment of  these  other  essential  elements  of  a  na- 
tion's culture,  nor  be  disproportionate. 

Wliat  is  needed  is  a  focal  point  in  government 
to  harness  the  concern  for  educational,  scientific 
and  cultural  development  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere into  one  agency.  In  recognition  of  this 
need,  the  Organization  of  American  States  in 
the  Protocol  of  Buenos  Aires  is  currently  pro- 
posing a  new  Council  for  Education,  Science 
and  Culture  to  support  initiatives  in  these  fields 
throughout  the  hemisphere. 

By  contrast,  in  the  United  States,  responsi- 
bility in  these  fields  remains  dispersed  in  a  num- 
ber of  government  agencies.  It  should  be 
centralized  in  a  new  government  Institute,  hav- 
ing cori^orate  form  and  powers,  which  could 
enlist  some  of  the  most  distinguished  heads  of 
the  nation's  outstandmg  educational,  scientific 


December  8,   1969 


529 


and  cultural  institutions  as  members  of  its 
board  of  directors.  The  objective  of  such  an 
Institute  would  be  to  mount  a  major  effort  to 
correct  the  previous  neglect  of  these  fields  which 
are  crucial  to  the  vitality  and  welfare  of  the 
hemisphere. 

The  Western  Hemisphere  has  had  a  uniquely- 
rich  cultural  life  in  pre-Columbian,  colonial  and 
modern  times.  Increased  cultural  interchange 
will  foster  increasing  mutual  appreciation  and 
respect.  Neither  art  nor  science  know  national 
boundaries.  They  are,  rather,  the  bridges  link- 
ing the  people  of  all  nations,  wherever  situated 
and  whatever  their  form  of  government,  in 
understanding  and  friendship. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  slioidd  give  full  support  to 
the  objectives  of  the  new  Council  for  Educa- 
tion, Science  and  Culture  of  the  Organization 
of  American  States. 

Recommendatio7is  for  Action 

In  order  to  support  the  new  Organization 
of  American  States  Council's  purposes,  the 
United  States  should  make  a  major  com- 
mitment  by  creating  a  new  corporation, 
with  financing  in  the  magnitude  of  $100 
million  annually  to  start  with.  The  major- 
ity of  its  Board  of  Directors  woxdd  be  out- 
standing heads  of  private  institutions.  It 
would  be  knovm  as  the  WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE  INSTITUTE  FOR 
EDUCATION,  SCIENCE  AND  CUL- 
TURE, and  toould  be  an  operating  arm  of 
the  Economic  and  Social  Development 
Agency. 

In  order  to  carry  out  its  mission,  such  an 
Institute  should  be  authorized  to : 

1.  Foster  effective  systems  of  elementary 
education  by  encouraging  the  creation  of 
demonstration  schools  that  encompass  the 
elements  of  modern  science  and  the  struc- 
ture of  modern  society  including  the  prin- 
ciples of  social  science  and  the  nature  of 
human  aspiration ; 

2.  Help  establish  regional  universities  to 
provide  leadership  m  the  training  of  men 
and  women  of  high  ability ; 

3.  Help  identify  and  support  with 
scholarships  and  fellowships  the  able  yomig 
men  and  women  who  might  otherwise  not 
bo  able  to  develop  to  a  high  level  their 


latent     skills,     ability     and     adventurous 
talent ; 

4.  Encourage  the  exchange  among  the 
hemisphere  nations  of  men  and  women — 
students,  technicians,  teachers,  journalists, 
artists  and  professionals — in  all  fields  of 
endeavor ; 

5.  Support  the  utilization  of  new  educa- 
tional teclmiques  such  as  the  use  of  radio 
and  television  for  elementary  education  in 
rural  areas ; 

6.  As  literacy  is  increased,  assist  in  im- 
provmg  the  availability  and  quality  of 
public  libraries ; 

7.  Expand  hemisphere  cultural  activities 
in  the  visual  and  lierforming  arts  as  well 
as  the  liumanities  and  experiment  with  new 
and  imaginative  approaches — such  as  the 
appointment  of  creative  people  as  cultural 
officers  in  United  States  embassies,  forming 
a  cultural  corps  on  the  pattern  of  the  Peace 
Corps,  arranging  for  youth  festivals  to  tour 
the  hemisphere  and  encouraguig  the  pro- 
duction of  folk  art  for  export  to  the  United 
States ; 

8.  Support  the  establislunent  of  regional 
institutes  for  basic  scientific  research ;  and, 

9.  Encourage  local  and  international  cor- 
porations to  allocate  a  larger  percentage 
of  their  resources  and  effort  to  scientific  re- 
search as  part  of  their  operations  in  the 
hemisphere. 

F.   Labor 

Tlie  key  to  progi'ess  in  any  country  is  its  work 
force.  Organized  labor  is  and  will  contmue  to 
be  a  major  factor  in  enhancing  the  quality  of 
life  m  the  "Western  Hemisphere. 

In  their  own  efforts  to  make  economic  and 
social  advances,  free  trade  union  movements 
in  the  hemisphere  nations  are  directing  their 
efforts  toward  increasing  the  productivity  of 
industry,  and  increasing  labor's  share  of  indus- 
trial productivity. 

Opposed  to  the  hemisphere  free  trade  unions 
are  the  Commmiist-dominated  unions.  These 
political  unions  called  for  general  strikes  in  al- 
most evei'y  comitry  the  mission  visited,  to  pre- 
vent or  protest  its  arrival,  but  democratic  trade 
imions  refused  to  go  along  with  them. 

In  most  hemisphere  countries,  labor  is  now 
excluded  from  government  planning  for  de- 
velopment. This  has  caused  wide-spread  frustra- 
tion   among    labor    leaders,    who    feel    their 


530 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


governments  show  little  concern  for  the  role  of 
organized  labor  and  little  concern  about  low 
wages,  poor  working  conditions,  and  imemploy- 
ment.  From  tlie  nation's  standpoint,  labor's  lack 
of  involvement  iia  plamiing  means  that  workers 
and  unions  cannot  make  their  maximum  con- 
tribution to  economic  development. 

Except  for  four  hemisphere  countries,  there 
are  no  reliable  statistics  about  imemployment, 
underemployment,  wage  levels,  costs  of  living 
and  other  data  that  concern  the  worker.  Unem- 
ployment is  known  to  be  high  in  most  hemi- 
sphere countries,  but  the  lack  of  precise  statisti- 
cal data  handicaps  eiforts  to  deal  with  the 
problem. 

Industrial  development  is  being  retarded  in 
manj'  countries  because  of  a  shortage  of  skilled 
workers,  due  to  the  lack  of  a  literate  work  force 
and  to  the  sliortage  of  facilities  for  vocational 
and  technical  training. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  encourage  strong^ 
effective,  free  trade  union  movements  through- 
out the  'Western  Hem,is'phere. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  The  United  States  should  encourage 
governments  of  the  hemisphere  to  in- 
cliule  labor  representation  in  planning 
their  programs  for  development. 

2.  The  United  States  should  increase  its  fi- 
nancial, and  technical  assistance,  through 
the  American  Institute  fen'  Free  Labor 
Development,  for  worker  education  and 
vocational  training  in  the  other  hemi- 
sphere countnes. 

G.  Agriculture 

To  the  24  nations  of  Central  America,  the 
Caribbean  and  South  America,  agriculture  is  a 
dominant  fact  of  life.  For  a  majority  of  the 
peoples  of  these  nations,  the  quality  of  life  itself 
is  dependent  on  the  farm. 
tt  On  the  average,  nearly  half  the  labor  force 
of  the  other  American  nations  is  in  agriculture, 
in  fishing,  or  in  forestry. 

To  those  who  live  as  subsistence  farmers,  life 
is  a  struggle  for  existence  on  the  land — with  a 
burro,  a  machete,  a  crude  hut  and  a  small  hoard 
of  maize  and  beans  patientlj-  coaxed  from  the 
soil.  These  millions  live  outside  any  national 
economy — and  they  live  with  the  bleak  realiza- 


tion that,  as  tilings  are,  there  will  never  be  a 
better  life  for  them. 

Yet  tliere  is  great  potential  wealth  in  the  good 
earth  of  the  hemisphere.  The  grasslands  of 
South  America  are  one  of  the  greatest  sources 
of  animal  protein  in  the  world.  The  tropical 
forests  of  the  hemisphere  represent  one  of  the 
earth's  largest  remaining  timber  reserves.  A 
vast  expanse  of  the  richest  land  in  all  the  world 
lies  in  a  broad  belt  on  the  eastern  slopes  of  the 
Andes.  In  addition,  entire  countries  and  great 
regions  are  blessed  with  good  soil  and  abundant 
svmshine,  ample  water  and  dependable  growing 
seasons.  With  existing  modern  scientific  and 
technical  laiowledge,  the  other  American  na- 
tions could  become  one  of  the  great  food  bas- 
kets of  the  world. 

Despite  this  great  potential,  and  the  impact  in 
some  countries  of  hybrid  seeds  on  increased 
yields  per  acre,  these  nations  taken  as  a  group 
do  not  now  produce  enough  food  inexpensively 
to  feed  their  own  peoples  properly.  Wliile  over- 
all food  production  is  going  up,  food  produc- 
tion per  person,  due  to  the  popidation  explosion, 
is  estimated  at  ten  percent  less  tlian  it  was  at 
the  end  of  World  War  II.  And  each  year  there 
are  eight  million  more  mouths  to  feed— an  an- 
nual increase  equivalent  to  the  population  of 
New  York  City. 

Individual  countries  and  areas  have  attained 
highly  industrialized  agricultural  production. 
As  a  whole,  however,  agriculture  is  slipping 
further  and  further  behind  its  great  promise. 

The  reasons  for  this  include  poor  living  con- 
ditions and  little  education  for  rural  people; 
inefficient  use  of  land;  inequitable  distribution 
of  land;  inadequate  credit  and  extension  serv- 
ices; lack  of  basic  and  applied  agricultural  re- 
search; too  few  farm-to-market  roads  and  too 
few  trucks  for  moving  agricultural  products; 
low  and  uncertain  prices  for  products;  lack 
of  packaging,  storage  and  marketing  facili- 
ties; and  lack  of  nutrition  and  good  health, 
initiative,  imagination  and  agricultural  man- 
agement— all  of  which,  in  turn,  are  chiefly 
caused  by  poverty  and  lack  of  education. 

The  end  results  include  not  only  malnutrition 
with  all  its  crippling  effects  on  human  energies 
and  intellectual  capacities,  but  also  a  flood  tide 
of  desperate  migration  from  rural  areas  to  city 
slums. 

Yet  our  discussions  brought  forth  the  central 
fact  that  all  the  countries  we  visited  see  agri- 
culture as  the  foundation  force  for  raising  their 
own    standards    of    living,    creating    employ- 


December  8,   1969 


531 


ment  opportunities  and  generating  foreign  ex- 
change and  capital  for  economic  and  social 
development. 

One  of  the  adverse  forces  in  this  situation  is 
the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  give  these 
countries  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  sufficient 
access  to  United  States  markets  for  their  agri- 
cultural products.  This  fact  highlights  the 
fundamental  inconsistency  between  our  policies 
of  economic  aid  and  our  policies  of  trade. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  U.S.  government,  espe- 
cially through  AID,  has  encouraged  the  coun- 
tries to  diversify  their  agriculture  and  produce 
beef,  tomatoes,  cotton,  wheat,  corn,  rice,  and 
other  products.  On  the  other  hand,  the  same 
U.S.  government,  through  orders  issued  by  the 
Agriculture  Department  and  restrictions  im- 
posed by  Congress,  prohibits  and  limits  exports 
of  these  products  so  as  to  protect  United  States 
prices  and  producers. 

Throughout  history,  agricultural  growth  has 
been  essential  to  the  general  progress  of  every 
nation  and  every  civilization.  If  the  nations  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere  are  to  make  the  great 
progress  of  which  they  are  capaljle  they  must 
make  the  most  of  their  greatest  assets — land, 
water,  climate  and  people  anxious  to  be 
trained — by  using  the  hybrid  seeds,  the  chemi- 
cals and  equipment  to  grow  food  cheaply  and 
abundantly,  which  have  been  developed  in  the 
last  two  decades.  The  other  Americas  have  no 
alternative  to  expanding  agricultural  produc- 
tion. As  a  minimum,  they  must  boost  it  by  four 
to  five  percent  a  year  just  to  keep  up  with  cur- 
rent population  growth  and  to  improve  diets. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  recognize  that  im- 
jyiwement  of  rural  life  and  increasing  agricul- 
tural froduction  are  basic  to  improvement  of 
the  quality  of  life  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  The  United  States  should  make  a  con- 
certed effort  through  program  and  proj- 
ect loans  and  technical  assistance  to  help 
OUT  neighbors  in  their  efforts  to  improve 
life  in  rural  areas.,  to  expand  employ- 
ment opportunities  and  to  grow  more 
food  for  themselves  and  for  export. 

a.  Programs  of  rural  development  in- 
cluding agrarian  reform  appropriate  to  the 
needs  of  the  country  are  essential  to  in- 


creased agricultural  production  and  to  im- 
prove the  quality  of  life  in  rural  areas. 

b.  These  programs  also  will  provide  ex- 
panding opportunities  for  work  in  the  face 
of  a  rapidly  growing  population,  and  help 
to  halt  the  flooding  of  overcrowded  cities 
with  economic  refugees  from  the  coimtry- 
side. 

2.  The  United  States  should  allocate  a  ma- 
jor part  of  future  growth  in  its  agricul- 
tural consumption  to  hemisphere  nations 
and  re-examine  the  present  limitations 
on  the  flow  of  farm  products  into  the 
U.S.  market  from  our  neighbors  to  the 
south. 

— The  self-defeating  nature  and  ultimate 
danger  of  the  protectionist  trend  in  the 
United  States  needs  to  be  better  understood 
by  the  people  of  the  United  States ;  other- 
wise, food  prices  will  continue  to  rise  and 
the  adverse  effect  on  the  economic  develop- 
ment of  our  neighbors  will  accelerate. 

3.  The  United  States  shoidd  undertake  a 
series  of  agricultural  demonstration  pro- 
grams at  selected  sites  in  different  coun- 
tries to  serve  both  as  examples  and  as  a 
nucleus  for  further  development  in  trans- 
forming subsistence  farming  into  a 
dynamic  factor  for  economic  growth. 

a.  To  carry  this  out,  a  non-profit  Inter- 
American  Rural  Development  Corporation 
should  be  established  as  a  subsidiary  of  the 
Institute  of  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs 
and  should  work  with  agricultural  agencies 
in  each  country  in  establishing  these  pilot 
projects. 

b.  Such  projects  would  be  operated  by 
agricultural  experts  of  the  country  con- 
cerned, with  United  States  teclmical  as- 
sistance. The  idea  would  be  to  develop  for 
each  selected  zone  or  region  a  working 
model  of  the  whole  range  of  production, 
processing  and  marketmg  ser\nces  and 
facilities  in  an  integrated  and  intensive 
operation. 

H.  Conservation 

With  few  exceptions,  the  coimtries  of  Central 
America,  South  America  and  the  Caribbean  lack 
effective  resource  conservation  programs.  With 
about  three-fourths  of  the  land  area  of  these 


532 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


countries  in  some  form  of  public  ownership, 
tliere  is  up  to  the  present  no  really  effective  pro- 
tection or  control  over  this  so-called  public 
domain. 

Unless  a  program  of  protection  and  conserva- 
tion of  these  resources  is  undertaken  in  tlae  next 
few  years,  the  pressures  of  a  rajiidly  increasing 
population  and  uncontrolled  resource  exploita- 
tion will  make  it  impossible  for  tliis  to  become 
a  region  of  economically  developed  and  self- 
supporting  nations. 

Of  a  7,925,000  square  mile  land  area,  (com- 
pared to  3,549,000  square  miles  in  the  United 
States,  including  Alaska),  one-half  is  covered 
with  forests,  one-quarter  is  made  up  of  barren 
mountains,  deserts  and  other  wild  lands,  and 
the  remaining  one-quarter  is  in  grazing  lands 
and  only  five  percent  in  cultivated  crops — com- 
pared to  20  percent  in  cultivated  crops  in  the 
United  States. 

The  food  production  base  is  largely  confined 
to  that  five  percent  of  the  total  area  in  culti- 
■\-ated  crops.  This  area  is  located  mainly  in  hilly 
and  mountainous  country  and  is  characterized 
by  the  most  destnictive  type  of  shifting  "fire 
and  hoe"  agriculture.  There  is  little  or  no  con- 
servation practiced  in  the  use  of  these  lands. 

The  soils  are  largely  trojiical  and  complex 
in  their  makeup — and  we  still  know  very  little 
about  their  proper  management.  "Wliile  com- 
mercial, mechanized  and  irrigation  farming  is 
expanding  in  the  more  level  lands,  and  there  are 
outstanding  examples  of  soil  conservation 
practices  in  many  coimtries,  the  control  of  sliift- 
ing  agriculture  and  the  development  of  alterna- 
tive sources  of  livelihood  for  almost  half  the 
present  farm  population  is  a  major  problem. 

The  conservation  of  water  resources  is  like- 
wise almost  completely  neglected.  There  is 
hardly  an  urban  center  that  does  not  have  a 
water  supply  problem.  Great  hydroelectric 
power  and  irrigation  schemes  are  being  under- 
taken without  proper  measures  to  insure  the 
conservation  of  watershed  lands.  The  develop- 
ment of  basic  laws  regulating  water  use  is  only 
now  being  given  attention  in  many  coimtries, 
and  water  pollution  is  particularly  serious  in 
the  rapidly  expanding  urban  areas. 

Tropical  forests  represent  one  of  the  largest 
timber  reserves  in  the  world — one- fourth  of  the 
world's  forest  area.  These  forests  are  a  basic 
though  complex  natural  resource;  very  little 
is  known  about  how  to  manage  them  properly. 
A  part  of  this  forest  land  area  will  be  cleared 


in  future  years  for  farm  crops  and  pastures, 
and  in  the  process,  much  valuable  timber  will 
be  destroyed.  A  rational  conservation  program 
should  permit  the  development  of  the  best  soils 
for  agriculture  but  retain  a  forest  cover  on  criti- 
cal watershed  lands,  protect  outstanding  nat- 
ural features  as  forested  national  parks  and 
recreation  areas,  and  manage  coimnercial  forests 
for  the  industrial  development  of  lumber,  pulp- 
wood  and  other  forest  products. 

Grasslands,  both  natural  and  developed  pas- 
ture lands,  are  potentially  among  the  greatest 
sources  of  animal  protein  in  the  world  because 
of  the  possibilities  of  year-roimd  grazing  use. 
The  livestock  industry  is  the  most  important 
branch  of  agi'iculture  in  many  countries,  but 
the  conservation  and  improvement  of  grazing 
lands  only  now  is  beginning  to  be  recognized 
as  necessary  to  sustain  the  industry.  There  are 
also  large  areas  of  savanna  and  swamplands, 
deserts  and  sparsely  vegetated  mountain  lands 
that  need  to  be  included  in  a  program  of  wise 
use  and  conservation. 

The  rapid  growth  of  human  population  and 
expanding  settlement  and  opening  up  of  the 
"back-lands"'  is  fast  destroying  the  birds,  fish 
and  other  wild  animal  life.  It  is  to  be  expected 
that  this  will  happen  to  some  extent,  but  the 
situation  is  especially  critical  in  Central  and 
South  America.  Wild  animals,  birds  and  fish  are 
still  a  means  of  sustenance  to  the  largely  im- 
poverished rural  population  and  to  the  indig- 
enous peoples  of  the  "back-land"  areas.  Wliile 
there  may  be  game  laws  in  many  countries,  they 
are  generally  not  enforced,  as  the  need  for  them 
is  little  imderstood.  At  present,  wildlife  is  re- 
garded as  an  expendable  resource,  and  without 
an  organized  consciousness  in  the  population, 
especially  among  sportsmen  and  rural  people, 
many  species  are  bound  to  disappear. 

Some  of  the  most  spectacular  natural  scenery 
in  the  world — the  whole  Andean  mountain 
chain,  the  moimtains  of  Mexico  and  Central 
America,  Lake  Titicaca,  Iguazu  and  Angel 
Falls,  the  seashore  areas  of  the  Caribbean,  and 
many  otliers — may  be  found  in  these  countries. 

National  parks  and  similar  reserves  have  been 
created  by  several  countries,  but  tliese  are  still 
insignificant  in  relation  to  the  need.  Outdoor 
recreation  is  only  now  coming  into  its  own,  and 
the  need  to  develop  adequate  services  and  facil- 
ities for  both  domestic  as  well  as  international 
tourism  is  just  now  becoming  apparent  in  many 
countries. 


December  8,   1969 


533 


But  in  a  few  years,  the  pressure  of  um-e- 
stricted  use  on  many  of  these  great  natural  areas 
will  irreparably  damage  or  destroy  them.  Now 
is  the  time  to  undertake  a  far-sighted  examina- 
tion of  the  park  and  recreation  needs,  aimed  at 
preserving  the  outstanding  natural  areas,  the 
historical  and  cultural  moniunents,  and  wild- 
life species  in  danger  of  extinction. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States,  through  the  combined  re- 
sources of  government  and  privately  supported 
conservation  agencies,  should  volunteer  leader- 
ship and  assistance  for  national  and  regional 
conservation  programs  wherever  desired  and 
feasible  in  the  American  republics. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  Create  an  INTER-AMERICAN  IN- 
STITUTE OF  NATURAL  RE- 
SOURCE CONSERVATION  within 
the  franiework  of  the  Organization  of 
Ameiican  States. 

a.  Such  an  organization  should  have  a 
board  of  directors  made  up  of  outstanding 
conservation  leaders  from  all  regions  of  the 
Americas. 

b.  It  would  need  substantial  financing, 
largely  from  direct  appropriations. 

c.  It  should  have  the  technical  advisory 
and  training  facilities  of  U.S.  goverimient 
and  privately  supported  conservation  agen- 
cies as  backstopping  for  its  program. 

2.  The  Conservation  Institute  should  make 
a  rapid  reconnaissance  survey  of  the 
American  countries  to  classify  and  de- 
fine the  problem  areas  with  regard  to  the 
destructive  exploitation  of  soil,  water, 
forests,  grasslands,  wildlife  and  out- 
standing natural  areas,  and  tlie  need  for 
conservation  practices  and  controls. 

— This  should  be  followed  by  a  program 
of  investigation  and  research  in  natural 
resource  use  and  management. 

3.  A  conservation  education  and  informa- 
tion program  should  be  launched,  espe- 
cially through  the  schools  and  in  the 
rural  areas. 

4.  A  demonstration  and  training  program 
in  natural  resource   management   and 


conservation  should  be  inaugurated,  es- 
pecially for  middle-level  {non-univer- 
sity) personnel  who  will  staff  conserva- 
tion pr-ojects  and  help  establish  control 
and  protective  measures  over  public 
lands. 

5.  A  conservation  public  works  program 
shoidd  be  created  incorporating  part  of 
the  Civilian  Conservation  Corps  arvd 
Peace  Corps  approach  with  the  part- 
time  employment  of  peasant  farmers. 

I.   Health  | 

Tlie  good  health  of  the  individual,  wherever 
he  lives,  is  fundamental  to  the  quality  of  his 
life. 

In  the  Western  Hemisphere,  significant  im- 
provements in  public  health  have  been  made  in 
the  last  quarter  of  a  centurj'.  Smallpox,  malaria 
and  yellow  fever  have  been  radically  reduced. 
Yaws  has  been  all  but  eradicated.  For  all  these 
gains,  infant  mortality  is  appallingly  high  in 
the  other  American  republics,  malnutrition  is 
increasing,  and  the  lack  of  sanitation  and  water 
supply  systems  is  the  primary  cause  of  intestinal 
parasites  and  other  origins  of  sickness. 

The  population  problem  exacerbates  all  the 
other  healtli  problems  through  overcrowding 
in  urban  slums.  It  is  so  acute  that  the  people 
themselves  are  promoting  birth  control. 

In  addition,  the  great  increase  of  travel  be- 
tween the  North  and  South  American  conti- 
nents, the  Central  American  countries  and  the 
islands  of  the  Caribbean  have  increasingly 
transformed  the  health  problems  of  one  coimtry 
or  region  into  the  health  problems  of  many 
areas. 

/NFANT  MORrAl/7-y 

As  the  1968  annual  report  of  the  World 
Health  Organization  pointed  out,  as  many  as 
20  percent  of  the  children  born  in  some  hemi- 
sphere countries  die  before  they  are  five  years 
old.  This  is  the  greatest  single  problem  of  health 
today  in  too  many  of  the  other  American 
republics. 

The  Pan  American  Health  Organization  re- 
ported that  in  one  recent  year,  at  least  7il,000 
cliild  deaths  in  the  other  hemisphere  nations 
should  have  been  preventable.  Of  these  deaths, 
450,000  were  under  one  year  of  age — and  291,000 
were  from  one  through  four  years  of  age. 

Deaths  of  children  under  five  years  of  age 


534 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


accomit  for  about  44  percent  of  all  deaths  in 
Central  and  South  ^^erica  (as  compared  to 
eight  percent  for  Xorth  America) . 

And  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  these  child 
deaths  is  contaminated  water. 

WATER   \S   LIFE 

The  biggest  cities  of  the  "Western  Hemisphere 
for  the  most  part  do  have  potable  water.  And 
other  Western  Hemisphere  cities  with  250,000 
and  more  people  are  building  and  operating 
mmiicipal  water  systems  through  their  own 
efforts  and  with  the  help  of  United  States  AID 
financial  and  teclmical  assistance.  The  1961  Al- 
liance for  Progress  goal  of  supplying  potable 
water  by  1971  for  70  percent  of  urban  peoples 
is  likely  to  be  met,  but  the  Alliance  goal  of 
doing  the  same  for  50  percent  of  the  rural 
peoples  will  fall  short  by  almost  ten  percent- 
age pomts. 

At  the  present  rate  of  progress,  only  40  per- 
cent to  50  percent  of  the  urban  peoples  in  the 
other  American  republics  may  have  potable 
water  within  the  decade.  For  rural  peoples,  the 
outlook  is  that  far  fewer  than  50  percent  will 
have  potable  water  by  1971,  the  advisers  were 
told. 

'"Don't  build  us  hospitals ;  help  us  build  water 
systems,"  a  health  officer  in  Brazil  told  the  mis- 
sion. "A  child  may  be  cured  in  a  hospital,  but 
with  liis  next  drink  he  is  reinfected." 

lEGACr   OF  HUNGER 

The  campesino  goes  to  bed  hungry  every 
night  of  his  life.  He  will  probably  never  see  a 
doctor,  a  hospital,  a  dentist,  or  a  nurse.  He  has 
little  hope  of  being  vaccinated  against  smallpox, 
or  inoculated  against  typhoid,  tetanus  or  yel- 
low fever.  If  he  becomes  ill,  there  is  no  medi- 
cine; he  trusts  to  fate  that  he  will  either  get 
better,  or  die. 

The  average  citizen  of  Central  and  South 
America  and  the  Caribbean  can  expect  a  life 
span  of  57  years,  compared  to  70  years  for  a 
North  American. 

Among  the  poor  of  most  American  countries, 
an  expectant  mother  has  so  little  to  eat — and 
especially  so  little  protein — that  the  child's 
physical  and  mental  capabilities  may  be  im- 
paired even  before  he  is  born. 

The  Minister  of  Health  of  Brazil  told  the 
mission  that  imdemourishment  of  an  infant 
during  the  pre-natal  period  and  first  year  of 
life  can  so  weaken  the  brain  cells  that  the  child 


may  never  attain  a  normal  capacity  to  learn. 
The  Brazilian  study  confirms  extensive  studies 
made  in  the  United  States. 

In  one  country,  a  health  official  proposed  that 
the  U.S.  Food  for  Peace  school  lunch  program 
be  taken  away  from  seven-  and  eight-year-old 
children  and  shifted  to  a  food  program  for 
expectant  mothers. 

"It  may  be  too  late  to  save  this  generation," 
the  official  said.  "We  should  begin  now  to  make 
sure  the  next  generation  reaches  full  physical 
and  mental  capacity." 

Malnutrition  blights  much  of  South  America, 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  coimtries. 
Only  five  nations  maintain  what  the  World 
Health  Organization  considers  to  be  adequate 
as  an  average  diet :  2200  calories  daily. 

In  Honduras,  70  percent  of  the  people  are 
undernourished ;  in  Haiti,  more  than  80  percent. 

BALANCE  OF  GROWTH 

Of  all  the  broad  concerns  of  the  other  hemi- 
sphere nations,  none  is  more  compelling — in 
terms  of  public  health,  economic  growth  and  so- 
cial progress — than  the  increase  in  population. 

At  the  present  extraordinary  rate  of  increase, 
the  number  of  people  in  the  other  American  re- 
publics will  more  than  double  the  present 
I)opulation — in  less  than  30  years. 

This  prospect — of  more  people  than  can  be 
fed,  employed,  housed  or  educated  with  present 
facilities — has  brought  a  sense  of  urgency  to  the 
leaders  of  the  20  countries  we  visited. 

In  country  after  country,  the  problem  of  pop- 
ulation growth,  and  the  need  for  family  plan- 
nmg  to  slow  that  growth,  was  voluntarily 
brought  before  the  mission  advisers — not  only 
by  physicians  and  public  health  officials,  but 
also  by  educators,  scientists,  leaders  of  women's 
groups,  economic  ministers  and  planning  di- 
rectors. Many  stated  plainly  that  they  could 
not  take  a  public  position  in  favor  of  family 
planning  because  the  issue  of  birth  control  in 
some  hemisphere  countries  is  too  emotional 
and  controversial.  In  private,  however,  they 
were  candid  and  realistic. 

"Our  number-one  problem  is  population,"  a 
Minister  in  Colombia  told  the  mission. 

A  new  impetus  for  family  planning  is  com- 
ing from  the  women  of  Latin  America,  our 
mission  advisers  learned. 

Enlightened  by  improved  education,  better 
informed  than  her  forebears  about  what  is  go- 
ing on  in  her  countrv  and  her  world,  the  Latin 


December  8,   1969 


535 


•wife — especially  if  she  lives  in  a  city — is  coming 
to  believe  that  she  has  no  ol)lifration,  religious  or 
marital,  to  bring  mto  the  world  a  child  she  does 
not  want  and  cannot  afford  to  feed. 

Throughout  Central  America,  the  Caribbean 
countries  and  South  America,  leaders  of  wom- 
en's organizations  told  the  mission  advisers  of 
their  efforts  to  promote  interest  in  family  plan- 
ning and  to  broadcast  Imowledge  about  birth 
control.  "And  both  the  government  and  the 
Church  turn  their  backs,"  one  woman  reported. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Ohjeetive 

The  United  States  should  recognize  that  the 
health  prohlems  of  our  sister  repuhllcs  are  also 
our  frohlems — for  we  share  theTn,  we  are  en- 
dangered iy  them,  and  we  are  moved  to  help 
deal  with  tliem. 

Recomnfiendations  for  Action 

1.  The  United  States  government  should 
jn-ovide  leadership  in  undertahing  a  spe- 
cial pre-natal  and  post-natal  nutrition 
program,  to  he  canned  out  throughout 
the  Western  Hemisphere  hy  cMtrch,  la- 
bor,  women's,  student  and  other  groups. 

a.  A  concerted,  hemisphere-wide  pro- 
gram to  mobilize  all  social  forces,  humani- 
tarian instincts  and  resources  including 
surplus  U.S.  food  and  available  local  prod- 
ucts could  make  the  largest  single  contribu- 
tion imaginable  toward  achieving  the  goal 
of  a  higher  quality  of  life. 

b.  This  undertaking  could  draw  on  exist- 
ing organizations  such  as  the  Catholic  Re- 
lief Services,  the  Peace  Corps,  and  the  trade 
imion  movement,  with  added  manpower 
from  students  mobilized  in  a  way  that  will 
provide  an  opportunity  to  express  in  tangi- 
ble form  the  idealism  which  motivates  so 
many  of  the  young  in  all  countries.  Its  pri- 
mary goal  should  be  the  proper  nutrition 
of  expectant  mothers  and  infants,  to  halt 
the  terrible  effect  on  mental  caijacities  now 
crippling  a  whole  generation  in  many  lands 
for  lack  of  protein  in  pre-natal  and  post- 
natal diets. 

2.  The  United  States  should  support  the 
World  Health  Organisation  (WHO) 
and  the  Pan  American  Health  Organiza- 
tion (PAHO)  as  the  prime  itistruments 


of  United  States  effort  toward  improv- 
ing public  health  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

a.  At  present,  the  United  States  contrib- 
utes 30  percent  of  the  World  Health  Orga- 
nization budget  and  66  percent  of  the  Pan 
American  Health  Organization  budget. 

b.  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment (AID)  loans  and  grants  are  concen- 
trated on  malaria  eradication,  community 
water  supply,  family  planning  and 
nutrition. 

c.  The  Public  Health  Service  (PHS) 
also  is  substantially  involved  m  the  inter- 
American  health  field,  especially  in  the  area 

of  technical  and  professional  training.  ■ 

d.  As  a  general  principle,  multilateral     | 
programs  as  in  WHO  and  PAHO  are  pref- 
erable to  bilateral  efforts  and  give  greater 
promise  of  achieving  the  staggering  scale 

of  effort  which  the  size  of  the  problem 
demands. 

3.  The  Technical  Training  Exchange  Pro- 
gram set  up  hy  AID  and  the  Pan  Ameri- 
can Health  Organization  with  Public 
Health  Service  support  should  he  broad- 
ened to  provide  greater  opportunity  for 
U.S.  health  j)rofessions  personiiel  to 
study  tropical  medicine  in  Cen- 
tral, South  American  and  Caribbean 
countries. 

— Tropical  medicine  is  sadly  neglected  in 
North  America,  but  transportation  ad- 
vances bring  not  only  progress  but  also  the 
communicable  diseases  of  distant  lands.  We 
have  much  to  learn  from  South  American 
doctors  in  this  field. 

J.  Women 

One  of  the  most  powerful  forces  for  change 
and  improvement  in  the  quality  of  life  in  the 
hemisphere  countries  is  the  newly  emancipated 
Latin  woman. 

Throughout  the  Western  Hemisphere,  wom- 
en are  becoming  better  educated,  better  in- 
formed, and  less  inclined  to  follow  the  tradi- 
tion that  women  should  be  sheltered  and  sub- 
servient. Women's  interests  m  the  hemisphere 
nations  cover  all  aspects  of  contemporary  liv- 
ing, but  they  are  increasingly  active  in  their 


536 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I 


support  of  reforms  in  urban  life,  rural  life,  edu- 
cation, health,  nutrition,  environment,  and 
politics. 

To  speed  the  process  of  change,  women  in 
the  hemisphere  are  becoming  political  activists. 
■'  They  are  eager  to  learn  more  about  the  tech- 
niques of  political  organization.  And  to  a  sub- 
stantial degree,  they  identify  themselves  with 
the  forces  of  moderation — the  middle-of-the- 
road. 

Twenty  years  ago,  women  could  vote  in  only 
five  countries.  Now  they  have  the  right  to  vote 
in  every  nation  of  the  hemisphere,  and  they  ex- 
ercise that  right.  President  Balaguer  of  the 
Dominican  Republic  openly  credits  his  election 
in  1966  to  women  voters,  who  were  enfranchised 
in  1965.  He  responded  by  appointing  a  woman 
as  Governor  of  every  one  of  the  Dominican 
Eepublic's  27  provinces. 

During  the  visits  by  the  mission,  leaders  of 
women  in  every  comitry  commented  on  the  fact 
that  this  was  the  first  time  any  President  of  the 
United  States  had  ever  sent  his  personal  repre- 
sentatives to  listen  to  the  women  of  each  coun- 
try— and  not  just  about  women's  activities,  but 
about  the  full  range  of  problems  and  oj^portmii- 
ties  facing  each  country. 

In  the  discussions,  the  women  leaders  spoke 
with  intelligence,  sympathy  and  candor.  They 
cited  irritants,  e.g.,  the  lack  of  interest  in  the 
United  States  in  learning  about  other  comitries 
of  the  hemis2:)here,  their  disappointment  in  the 
xilliance  for  Progress,  the  U.S.  strings  on  aid. 
But  they  spoke  in  a  spirit  of  wanting  to  air  and 
resolve  their  differences  with  the  United  States. 

Their  primary  plea  was  for  a  much  greater 
exchange — of  people,  ideas,  educational  meth- 
ods, techniques  for  political  organization,  in- 
formation about  health  services,  social  services, 
family  planning,  and  day  care  centers  for  work- 
ing mothers.  They  want  to  exchange  artists, 
writers,  lecturers,  scientists  and  teachers. 
Through  such  exchanges,  the  women  believe  the 
hemisphere  countries  can  develop  closer  ties  and 
greater  friendship  with  the  United  States,  to 
the  mutual  benefit  of  all. 

Recommendation:  National  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  should  recognize  fully  the 
expanding  role  of  wom^n  in  the  folitical  and 
economic,  social  and  cultural  development  of  the 
nations  of  the  hemisphere. 


Recommendation  for  Action 

The  United  States,  working  through  the 
proposed  Western  Hemispliere  Institute 
for  Education,  Science  and  Cidture,  should 
increase  its  program  of  exchange  in  all 
fields  relating  to  the  role  of  woinen  in  de- 
veloping the  quality  of  life  througlwut  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

K.   Communications 

Fundamental  to  the  accomplishment  of  the 
objectives  and  programs  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere outlined  in  this  report  is  better  luider- 
standing  among  the  peojjle  of  the  hemisphere. 
This  in  turn  rests  on  better  commimication  be- 
tween North  and  South  America,  and  between 
the  various  nations  themselves.  Tliis  was  a  clear 
consensus  of  the  350  leading  journalists  and 
broadcasters  in  20  countries  with  whom  the  mis- 
sion had  contact  in  its  travels. 

The  Latin  and  Caribbean  editors  complained 
that  the  United  States  consistently  gives  them 
bad  press  coverage.  Then  they  admitted  that 
they  are  inclined  to  play  up  the  negative  as- 
pects of  the  North  American  scene.  They  like- 
wise print  little  news  about  their  immediate 
neighbors. 

It  is  also  clear  that  the  U.S.  media  have  a 
limited  and  often  uninformed  interest  in  the 
news  of  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
North  or  south,  the  resvilt  is  less  than  ideal  com- 
mmiication  among  the  i^eoples  of  the 
hemisphere. 

Government  leaders  and  news  media  officials 
in  Central  ^Vmerica  and  the  Caribbean  expressed 
considerable  concern  over  Radio  Havana's 
continued  dominance  of  their  air  waves.  In  all 
but  one  Central  American  country,  radio  sta- 
tions cut  off  at  midnight  and  resume  operation 
at  five  a.m.  Radio  Havana  takes  advantage  of 
this  with  skillful  Communist  propaganda  aimed 
at  the  late-to-bedders  and  the  early-rising  farm- 
ers, most  of  whom  have  transistor  radios.  Radio 
Havana  is  even  beaming  programs  in  French 
and  Creole  into  Haiti — one  hour  a  day  of  each. 
The  television,  radio  and  newspaper  executives 
with  whom  we  talked  said  that  Radio  Havana, 
with  its  powerful  transmitter,  does  a  more  pro- 
fessional job  than  the  Voice  of  America,  wliich 
isn't  widely  heai'd  because  it  is  only  on  short 
wave  bands. 


December  8,  1969 


537 


The  Soviet  Union  spends  over  $1  billion  a 
year  on  its  foreign  information  programming, 
six  times  as  much  as  the  United  States  Infor- 
mation Agency.  Conununication  is  one  of  the 
three  major  channels  through  which  foreign 
affairs  are  conducted— along  with  trade  and  di- 
plomacy. The  "transistor  revolution"  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere — bringing  instant  news  of 
the  world  to  the  most  remotely  located  peas- 
ant— makes  it  all  the  more  crucial  that  a  major 
effort  be  undertaken  in  the  commimications 
field. 

Recommendation:  Natio')ial  Policy  Objective 

The  United  States  hy  its  0107%  actions  and  in 
consultation  and  collaboration  with  its  neigh- 
bors of  the  Western  Hemisphere  should  do 
everything  possible  to  improve  comm.iinication 
among  the  peoples  of  hemisphere  nations. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

1.  The  overall  United  States  infoi^mation 
program  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
should  be  stepped  up  substantially. 

2.  A  major  effort  should  be  made  to  make 
the  Voice  of  America  (VOA)  at  least 
competitive  with  Radio  Havana  in  the 
Central  American-Caribbean  area,  in- 
cluding improved  programming  and 
standard  radio  band  broadcasting  by 
VOA. 

3.  The  President  should  invite  a  special 
team  of  United  States  experts  on  West- 
ern Hemisphere  ajfairs  to  visit  United 
States  newspapers,  magazines,  and  tele- 
vision stations,  upon  request,  in  order  to 
improve  United  States  media  leaders'' 
knowledge  of  the  countries  in  the  south. 

— It  is  felt  that  discussions  between  the 
team  of  experts  and  media  representatives 
would  help  increase  the  volume  and  accu- 
racy of  United  States  coverage  of  Western 
Hemisphere  affairs.  This  would  be  partic- 
ularly enlightening  to  telegraph  editors, 
who  make  the  daily  qualitative  judgments 
and  decisions  on  whether  to  use  or  discard 
hemisphere  copy  on  the  newspaper  wire 
services.  The  Inter- American  Press  Associ- 
ation could  provide  such  a  team ;  it  is  also 
suggested  that  a  private  foundation  grant 
might  be  obtained  for  travel  expenses. 


4.  Greater  efforts  should  be  made  to  send 
United  States  journalists,  teachers,  intel- 
lectuals, wnters,  musicians,  artists  and 
other  representatives  of  the  United 
States  to  other  American  republics. 

— The  United  States  State  Department 
presently  spends  considerable  money  each 
year  in  bringing  top  journalists,  artists  and 
others  to  the  United  States,  but  a  better  bal- 
ance of  this  cultural  traffic  flow  is  needed. 
Hemisphere  editors,  for  example,  would 
welcome  United  States  experts  in  the  news 
media  fields  to  conduct  seminars  m  such 
areas  as  reporting  in  depth,  hni^roved  news- 
paper makeup,  and  training  of  cub  re- 
porters. This  could  become  a  part  of  the 
program  of  the  proposed  Western  Hemi- 
sphere Institute  for  Education,  Science  and 
Culture. 


CHAPTER   FIVE:  CONCLUSION 

This  report  has  touched  on  a  whole  range  of 
concerns  tliat  intrude  upon  the  lives  of  Ameri- 
cans, in  the  United  States  and  throughout  the 
hemisphere.  The  spectrum  of  these  concerns  is 
broad  and  the  patterns  are  kaleidoscopic.  Yet 
certain  concepts  emerge  as  fundamental : 

People 

The  concern  of  man  is  man.  And  man  must 
be  the  concern  not  only  of  his  own  government, 
but  of  all  governments  and  all  people.  If  we 
are  not  our  brother's  keeper,  we  are  at  least  our 
brother's  brother.  If  we  fail  in  our  awareness  or 
commitment  to  this  essential  concept,  we  will 
have  failed  ourselves  in  a  most  critical  way. 

The  Western   Hemisphere  as   a   Uni^y 

Not  only  brotherhood  but  also  geography  and 
a  common  heritage  of  respect  for  the  worth  of 
man  have  imited  our  hemisjihere.  No  one  can 
travel  through  this  hemisphere  without  being 
keenly  conscious  of  the  multiple  special  links 
that  bind  it  together.  The  Western  Hemisphere 
nations  are  not  separate  entities;  they  are  sov- 
ereign peoples  indissolubly  boimd  to  one  an- 
other by  mutual  hopes  and  needs,  mutual  inter- 
ests, and  conunon  goals. 

Every  problem  and  opportunity  before  the 


538 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


f 


hemisphere  will  yield  to  a  better  solution  if  it 
is  not  viewed  in  terms  of  "we"  here  in  the 
United  States  and  "they"  in  the  other  coun- 
tries. The  "we-they"  approach  is  banlo-upt  and 
wiU  defeat  the  aims  of  the  policy-makers,  and 
their  people,  who  resort  to  it  in  the  future. 

The  Western  Hemisphere  can  achieve  the 
common  aspirations  of  its  people  only  as  a  co- 
hesive unit  of  free  men. 


The  Crossroads 

]  There  is  a  convergence  of  forces  and  events  in 
the  last  of  this  century  that  is  producing  a  crisis 
for  free  men : 

— The  scientific  and  technological  explosion 
and  the  surge  of  industrialization  it  has 
produced ; 

— The  consequent  upward  push  in  the  stand- 
ard of  living  for  increasing  tens  of  millions  in 
the  industrialized  areas  of  the  free  world ; 

—The  resulting  increase  in  the  gulf  between 
the  advantaged  and  the  disadvantaged ; 

— The  awareness  both  of  the  gulf  and  of  the 
fact  that  it  need  not  exist ; 

— A  tidal  wave  of  population ; 
I     — An  uneasy  nationalism,  striving  for  self- 
identification  ; 

— And  a  technology  that  tears  at  the  fabric 
of  all  existing  cultures. 

However,  we  have  within  our  reach  the 
means — technical,  political  and  cultural — to 
shape  these  forces  and  to  bring  to  all  people 
in  this  hemisphere  the  fulfillment  of  their  ca- 
pacities and  their  own  sense  of  worth. 

Indeed,  the  fact  that  men  believe  this  to  be 
within  their  reach  is  one  cause  of  the  crisis  of 
our  times,  since  for  all  too  many  people  in  the 
United  States  and  elsewhere  in  the  hemisphere, 
indignity  and  degradation  are  their  intolerable 
lot. 

This  crossroads — this  challenge  to  our  system 
of  democracy  and  to  the  very  survival  of  our 
values  and  ourselves — is  not  rhetorical.  It  is 
factual.  Either  we  meet  this  challenge,  or  the 
prospect  is  for  revolutionary  changes  leading 
we  Iviiow  not  where.  We  have  the  values,  the 
ability  and  the  means  effectively  to  meet  this 
crisis  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  hemi- 
sphere. We  must  employ  these  means  with  na- 
tional dedication  and  determination,  with 
subtlety  and  purpose.  For  the  spiritual  soil  in 


the  hemisphere  is  fertile  for  change — and  the 
forces  that  would  nourish  revolution  are  ready 
and  in  place. 

Interdependence  of  the  Hemisphere 

It  is  clear  that  the  human  resources  and  eco- 
nomic strength  of  each  nation  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  contribute  to  the  strength  of  the 
others ;  that  disease  and  propaganda  cannot  be 
trained  to  observe  the  limits  of  national  boimd- 
aries;  that  the  physical  security  of  one  en- 
hances that  of  all;  that  a  virus  in  the  tropics 
will  soon  strike  in  the  cities — and  vice  versa — 
whether  that  virus  is  biological  or  political; 
that  violence  in  one  nation  uproots  order  and 
trust  in  its  neighbor;  that  the  bitterness  and 
anger  of  one  group  erodes  the  good  will  of  all ; 
that  confidence  and  courage  and  constructive 
concern  in  any  one  nation  are  contagious 
through  the  hemisphere. 

The   United  States  as   Example 

"Wliile  specific  problems  differ  from  country 
to  country,  the  fmidamental  thrust  of  the  issues 
is  the  same  throughout  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. It  is  plain,  accordingly,  that  we  in  the 
United  States  cannot  effectively  contribute  to 
the  forward  growth  of  our  nation  and  the  hemi- 
sphere unless  we  manage  the  central  problems 
of  our  time  at  home.  Unless  we  are  wholly  to 
fail  of  our  purpose  as  a  nation,  we  must,  there- 
fore, meet  the  hopes  of  our  own  people  for  a 
decent  and  dignified  life.  Only  if  we  do  this 
can  we  lead,  can  we  inspire,  can  we  add  to  the 
quality  of  life  for  free  men  throughout  the 
hemisphere. 

A   Course  of  Action 

It  is  in  tliis  spirit  that  tliis  report  has  rec- 
ommended reorganization  of  the  United  States 
government's  foreign  policy  structure,  fimda- 
mental  changes  of  U.S.  trade  and  lending  poli- 
cies, renegotiation  of  foreign  debts,  and  a  more 
realistic  division  of  labor  in  the  hemisi^here. 

For  the  capacity  of  sovereign  nations  and 
free  peoples  to  work  together  in  mutual  growth 
is  crucial  to  survival — and  crucial  to  the  quality 
of  life  for  those  who  do  survive. 

The  achievement  of  such  cooperation  among 
the  people  of  this  hemisphere  is  the  central  ob- 


December  8,   1969 


539 


V 


jective  of  this  report  and  of  all  its  specific 
recommendations. 

Recommendations  for  Action 

That  the  President  issue  a  major  policy 
statement  on  the  objectives  of  our  Western 
Hemisphere  relations  and  seek  a  joint  res- 
olution of  the  Congress  to  confirm  those 
ohjectives  so  they  become  our  recognized 
national  policy. 

— Such  a  declaration  of  policy  by  the 
Executive  and  Legislative  branches  would 
be  a  milestone  in  hemisphere  affairs. 

— It  would  have  enormous  imjiact 
throughout  the  hemisphere. 

—It  could  be  written  as  a  first  step  in  leg- 
islation to  supersede  the  present  encum- 
brances on  Western  Hemisphere  policies 
and  programs  and  to  discourage  similar 
new  measures  in  the  future. 


—It  should  enunciate  the  principle  that 
United  States  national  interests  must  su- 
persede those  of  any  domestic  special  inter- 
est group  in  the  conduct  of  Western 
Hemisphere  relations. 

— It  would  convey  a  new  character  and 
style  to  our  Western  Hemisphere  rela- 
tions— one  based  on  partnership,  not  domi- 
nance. 

- — It  would  help  to  create  the  framework 
for  a  new  era  of  cooperation,  progress,  and 
human  dignity  in  the  hemisphere. 

No  man  has  ever  lived  and  felt  worthy  of 
the  gift  of  life  who  hasn't  also  felt  tested  by 
his  own  times.  It  is  our  good  fortune  to  be  tested 
in  a  time  of  accelerated  change  and  extraordi- 
nary opportunity.  It  is  our  destiny  to  determine 
in  our  time  that  dignity  for  all  men  is  achiev- 
able by  a  free  democratic  society  in  our  nation, 
our  hemisphere — and  our  world. 


540 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I 


Table  of  Contents 


Statement    by    President    Nixon     .     . 

Quality  of  Life  in  tlie  Americas 
1 1     Report  of  a  U.S.  Presidential  Mission 

■Te[ 


for  the  Western  Hemisphere 


Zlt, 


Governor  Rockefeller's  Letter  of  Transmittal 
Idst  of  Advisers 

Foreword 

Preamble 


Chapter  One:  The  Quality  of  Life  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere 

A.  The  Special  Relationship  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere 

B.  The  Existing  Situation 

C.  The  Forces  of  Change 

Communications 

Science  and  Technology 

Population  Growth  . 

Urban  Life 

Nationalism 

Young  People 

Labor 

The  Cross  and  the  Sword 

Business 

Communist  Subversion 

Changes  in  the  Decade  Ahead    .... 

^apter  Two:  The  Challenge  to  Political  and 
Economic  Freedom 

A.  The  Nature  of  the  Challenge 

B.  The  United  States  National  Interest     .    . 

C.  Our  National  Objective 


B. 


'hapter  Three:  Organization 

A.  Organization  of  the  United  States   Gov- 
ernment   

Recommendaiions 

Country-by-Country  Relations 

Recommendation 

C.  Regional  Organizations 

Recommendations 

D.  Inter-American  Organizations 

Recommendations 

E.  International  Organizations 

Recommendations 


493 


■195 
498 

499 

499 

501 

501 
501 
502 
502 
503 
503 
503 
503 
504 
504 
504 
505 
505 
506 

506 

506 
507 
508 

508 


508 
510 
512 
512 
512 
512 
512 
513 
514 
514 


Chapter  Four:  Policy  and  Action 514 

A.  United    States    Political    Relations    With 

the  Hemisphere .514 

Recommendations .^15 

B.  Western  Hemisphere  Security 515 

Recommendaiions .317 

C.  Economic  and  Social  Development    .    .    .  518 

Economic  Progress .519 

1.  Trade  Policies 519 

Recommendations 520 

2.  Development  Assistance     ....  522 
Impediments  to  AID  Program   ....  522 

Recommendaiions 523 

3.  Debt  Service  Problems ,524 

Recommendations 524 

4.  Private  Savings  and  Investment  .  .524 

Recommendaiions 525 

5.  Urban  Development  and  Housing.  526 

Recommendations 527 

D.  The  Division  of  Labor 528 

Recommendation 529 

E.  Education,  Science,  and  Culture    ....  529 

Recommendaiions 530 

F-    Labor \    \  530 

Recommendaiions 531 

G.  Agriculture 531 

Recommendations 532 

H.  Conservation 532 

Recommendations 534 

I.    Health .534 

Infant  Mortality 534 

Water  Is  Life 53.5 

Legacy  of  Hunger 535 

Balance  of  Growth 535 

Recommendations 536 

J.    Women 536 

Recommendaiions 537 

K.  Communications 537 

Recommendaiions 538 

Chapter  Five:  Conclusion 538 

People .!j38 

The  Western  Hemisphere  as  a  Unity  ....  538 

The  Crossroads .539 

Interdependence  of  the  Hemisphere     ....  539 

The  United  States  as  Example 539 

A  Course  of  Action 539 

Recommendaiions 540 


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THE 

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BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1590 


December  15,  1969 


CHEMICAL  AND  BIOLOGICAL  DEFENSE  POLICIES  AND  PROGRAMS 

Statement  hy  President  Nixon     541 

STRATEGIC  ARMS  LIIMITATION  TALKS  OPEN  AT  HELSINKI 

Message  From,  President  Nixon     5^3 

NUCLEAR  NONPROLIFERATION  TREATY 

President  Nixon  Signs  Instrument  of  Ratificntion     544- 

Remarks  by  Secretai-y  Rogers  at  the  Signing  of  the  Treaty 

hy  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany     545 


UNITED  STATES  TRADE  POLICY 

'■'■The  Trade  Act  of  19G0" — President  Nixon's  Message  to  Congress      559 
'•''Trade  Expansion  Expectations''^ — hy  Carl  J.  Gilbert     564 
'^Agi'-icidtwe  and  Foreign  Economic  Policy^' — hy  Nathaniel  Samuels     569 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1590 
December  15,  1969 


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Chemical  and  Biological  Defense  Policies  and  Programs 


Following  is  a  statement  hy  President  Nixon 
issued  on  November  25,  together  with  the  texts 
of  the  Geneva  protocol  of  1925  and  a  revised 
draft  convention  for  the  prohibition  of  biologi- 
cal methods  of  warfare,  which  was  submitted  by 
the  United  Kingdmn  to  the  Conference  of  the 
Comnnittee  on  Disarmament  at  Geneva  on 
Augnst  26. 


STATEMENT  BY   PRESIDENT  NIXON 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  25 

Soon  after  taking  office  I  directed  a  com- 
prehensive study  of  our  chemical  and  biological 
defense  policies  and  programs.  There  had  been 
no  such  review  in  over  15  years.  As  a  result, 
objectives  and  policies  in  this  field  were  unclear 
and  programs  lacked  definition  and  direction. 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  National  Security 
Council,  the  Departments  of  State  and  Defense, 
the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency, 
the  Office  of  Science  and  Technology,  the  mtel- 
ligence  community,  and  other  agencies  worked 
closely  together  on  this  study  for  over  6  months. 
These  government  efforts  were  aided  by  con- 
tributions from  the  scientific  community 
through  the  President's  Scientific  Advisory 
Committee. 

Tliis  study  has  now  been  completed  and  its 
findings  carefully  considered  by  the  National 
Security  Council.  I  am  now  reporting  the  deci- 
sions taken  on  the  basis  of  this  review. 

Chemical  Warfare  Program 

As  to  our  chemical  warfare  program,  the 
United  States: 

■ — Eeaffirms  its  oft-repeated  renunciation  of 
the  first  use  of  lethal  chemical  weapons. 

— Extends  this  renunciation  to  the  first  use 
of  incapacitating  cliemicals. 

Consonant  with  these  decisions,  the  admin- 
istration will  submit  to  the  Senate,  for  its 
advice  and  consent  to  ratification,  the  Geneva 
protocol  of  1925,  which  prohibits  tlie  first  use 


ing  war  of  "asphyxiating,  poisonous  or  other 
gases  and  of  bacteriological  methods  of  war- 
fare." The  United  States  has  long  supported 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  this  protocol. 
We  take  this  step  toward  formal  ratification  to 
reinforce  our  continuing  advocacy  of  interna- 
tional constraints  on  the  use  of  these  weapons. 

Biological  Research  Program 

Biological  weapons  have  massive,  unpredict- 
able, and  potentially  uncontrollable  conse- 
quences. They  may  produce  global  epidemics 
and  impair  tlie  health  of  future  generations.  I 
have  therefore  decided  that : 

— The  United  States  shall  renounce  the  use 
of  lethal  biological  agents  and  weapons  and  all 
other  methods  of  biological  warfare. 

— Tlie  United  States  will  confine  its  biological 
research  to  defensive  measures,  such  as  im- 
mimization  and  safety  measures. 

— Tlie  Department  of  Defense  has  been  asked 
to  make  recommendations  as  to  the  disposal  of 
existing  stocks  of  bacteriological  weapons. 

In  the  spirit  of  these  decisions,  the  United 
States  associates  itself  with  the  principles  and 
objectives  of  the  United  Kingdom  draft  con- 
vention, which  would  ban  the  use  of  biological 
methods  of  warfare.  We  will  seek,  however,  to 
clarify  specific  provisions  of  the  draft  to  assure 
that  necessary  safeguards  are  included. 


TEXT  OF   1925   GENEVA  PROTOCOL 

Protocol  fob  the  Pkohibition  of  the  Use  in  Was  of 
Asphyxiating,  Poisonous  ob  Other  Gases,  and  of 
Bactebiological  Methods  op  Waefabe 

The  undersigned  Plenipotentiaries,  in  the  name  of 
their  respective  Governments : 

Whereas  the  use  in  war  of  asphyxiating,  poisonous 
or  other  gases,  and  of  all  analogous  liquids,  materials 
or  devices,  has  been  justly  condemned  by  the  general 
opinion  of  the  civilised  world ;  and 

Whereas  the  prohibition  of  such  use  has  been 
declared  in  Treaties  to  which  the  majority  of  Powers 
of  the  world  are  Parties ;  and 

To  the  end  that  this  prohibition  shall  be  universally 


December  15,   1969 


541 


accepted  as  a  part  of  International  Law,  binding  alike 
the  conscience  and  the  practice  of  nations ; 
Declare : 

That  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  so  far  as 
they  are  not  already  Parties  to  Treaties  prohibit- 
ing such  use,  accept  this  prohibition,  agree  to 
exteud  this  prohibition  to  the  use  of  bacteriologi- 
cal methods  of  warfare  and  agree  to  be  bound  as 
between  themselves  according  to  the  terms  of  this 
declaration. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  will  exert  every  effort 
to  Induce  other  States  to  accede  to  the  present  Protocol. 
Such  accession  will  be  notified  to  the  Government  of 
the  French  Republic,  and  by  the  latter  to  all  signatory 
and  acceding  Powers,  and  will  take  effect  on  the  date 
of  the  notification  by  the  Government  of  the  French 
Republic. 

The  present  Protocol,  of  which  the  French  and  Eng- 
lish texts  are  both  authentic,  shall  be  ratified  as  soon 
as  possible.  It  shall  bear  today's  date. 

The  ratifications  of  the  present  Protocol  shall  be 
addressed  to  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic, 
which  will  at  once  notify  the  deposit  of  such  ratifica- 
tion to  each  of  the  signatory  and  acceding  Powers. 

The  instruments  of  ratification  of  and  accession  to 
the  present  Protocol  wUl  remain  deposited  In  the 
archives  of  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic. 

The  present  Protocol  will  come  into  force  for  each 
signatory  Power  as  from  the  date  of  deposit  of  Its 
ratification,  and,  from  that  moment,  each  Power  will 
be  bound  as  regards  other  Powers  which  have  already 
deposited  their  ratlflcatlons. 

In  witness  whereof  the  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  present  Protocol. 

Done  at  Geneva  In  a  single  copy,  this  seventeenth 
day  of  June,  One  Thousand  Nine  Hundred  and  Twenty- 
Five. 


U.K.  DRAFT  CONVENTION 

Revised  Dratt  Convention  for  the  Peohibition 
OP  BioLooiCAi.  Methods  of  Warfare 

The  Stales  concluding  this  Convention,  hereinafter 
referred  to  as  the  "Parties  to  the  Convention", 

Recalling  that  many  States  have  become  Parties  to 
The  Protocol  for  the  Prohibition  of  the  Use  In  War  of 
Asphyxiating,  Poisonous  or  other  Gases,  and  of 
Bacteriological  Methods  of  Warfare,  signed  at  Geneva 
on  17  June  192.5, 

Recognising  the  contribution  that  the  said  Protocol 
has  already  made,  and  continues  to  make,  to  mitigat- 
ing the  horrors  of  war. 

Recalling  further  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
Resolutions  2162B  (XXI)  of  5  December,  1966,  and 
2454  A  (XXIII)  of  20  December,  1968,  which  called 
for  strict  observance  by  all  States  of  the  principles 
and  objectives  of  the  Geneva  Protocol  and  invited  all 
States  to  accede  to  it. 

Believing  that  chemical  and  biological  discoveries 
should  be  used  only  for  the  betterment  of  human  life. 

Recognising  nevertheless  that  the  development  of 
scientific  knowledge  throughout  the  world  will  increase 
the  risk  of  eventual  use  of  biological  methods  of 
warfare. 


Convinced  that  such  use  would  be  repugnant  to  the 
conscience  of  mankind  and  that  no  effort  should  be 
spared  to  minimise  this  risk, 

Desiring  therefore  to  reinforce  the  Geneva  Protocol 
by  the  conclusion  of  a  Convention  making  special 
provision  in  this  field, 

Declaring  their  belief  that,  in  particular,  provision 
should  be  made  for  the  prohibition  of  recourse  to 
biological  methods  of  warfare  in  any  circumstances. 

Have  agreed,  as  follows : 

Article  I 

Each  of  the  Parties  to  the  Convention  undertakes, 
insofar  as  it  may  not  already  be  committed  in  that 
respect  under  Treaties  or  other  instruments  In  force 
prohibiting  the  use  of  chemical  and  biological  methods 
of  warfare,  never  in  any  circumstances,  by  making  use 
for  hostile  purposes  of  microbial  or  other  biological 
agents  causing  death,  damage  or  disease  by  infection 
or  infestation  to  man,  other  animals,  or  crops,  to  engage 
in  biological  methods  of  warfare. 

Article  II 
Each  of  the  Parties  to  the  Convention  tindertakes : 

(a)  not  to  produce  or  otherwise  acquire,  or  assist 
in  or  permit  the  production  or  acquisition  of : 

(1)  microbial  or  other  biological  agents  of  types 
and  In  quantities  that  have  no  independent  justification 
for  prophylactic  or  other  peaceful  purposes ; 

(ii)  ancillary  equipment  or  vectors  the  puriwse  of 
which  is  to  facilitate  the  use  of  such  agents  for  hostile 
purjtoses ; 

(b)  not  to  conduct,  assist  or  permit  research  aimed 
at  production  of  the  kind  prohibited  in  sub-paragraph 
(a)  of  this  Article;  and 

(c)  to  destroy,  or  divert  to  peaceful  purposes,  with- 
in three  months  after  the  Convention  comes  into  force 
for  that  Party,  any  stocks  in  its  possession  of  such 
agents  or  ancillary  equipment  or  vectors  as  have  been 
produced  or  otherwise  acquired  for  hostile  purposes. 

Article  III 

1.  Any  Party  to  the  Convention  which  believes  that 
biological  methods  of  warfare  have  been  used  against 
it  may  lodge  a  complaint  with  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  United  Nations,  submitting  all  evidence  at  Its 
disposal  in  support  of  the  complaint,  and  request  that 
the  complaint  be  investigated  and  that  a  report  on  the 
result  of  the  investigation  be  submitted  to  the  Security 
Council. 

2.  Any  Party  to  the  Convention  which  believes  that 
another  Party  has  acted  in  breach  of  its  undertaking 
under  Articles  I  and  II  of  the  Convention,  but  which 
is  not  entitled  to  lodge  a  complaint  under  Paragraph  I 
of  this  Article,  may  lodge  a  complaint  with  the  Security 
Council,  submitting  ail  evidence  at  its  disposal,  and 
request  that  the  complaint  be  investigated. 

3.  Each  of  the  Parties  to  the  Convention  undertakes 
to  co-operate  fully  with  the  Secretary-General  and  his 
authorised  representatives  in  any  investigation  he 
may  carry  out,  as  a  result  of  a  complaint,  in  accordance 
with  Security  Council  Resolution  No.  } 


'  A   draft   Security   Council   resolution   attached  to 
the  U.K.  draft  convention  is  not  printed  here. 


542 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Article  IV 

Each  of  the  Parties  to  the  Convention  affirms  its 
intention  to  provide  or  support  appropriate  assistance, 
in  accordance  with  the  United  Nations  Charter,  to 
any  Party  to  the  Convention,  if  the  Security  Council 
concludes  that  biological  methods  of  warfare  have 
been  used  against  that  Party. 

Aeticle  V 

Each  of  the  Parties  to  the  Convention  undertakes  to 
pursue  negotiations  in  good  faith  on  effective  measures 
to  strengthen  the  existing  constraints  on  chemical 
methods  of  warfare. 

Aeticle  VI 

Nothing  contained  in  the  present  Convention  shall 
be  construed  as  in  any  way  limiting  or  derogating  from 
obligations  assumed  by  any  State  under  the  Protocol 
for  the  Prohibition  of  the  Use  in  War  of  Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous  or  other  Gases,  and  of  Bacteriological 
Methods  of  Warfare,  signed  at  Geneva  on  17  June, 
1925. 


Akticle  VII 

[Provisions  for  amendments.] 

Article  VIII 

[Provisions  for  Signature,  Ratification,  Entry  into 
Force,  etc.] 

Aeticle  IX 

1.  This  Convention  shall  be  of  unlimited  duration. 

2.  Each  Party  shall  in  exercising  its  national 
sovereignty  have  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  Con- 
vention, if  it  decides  that  extraordinary  events,  related 
to  the  subject  matter  of  this  Convention,  have  jeop- 
ardised the  supreme  interests  of  its  country.  It  shall 
give  notice  of  such  vrithdrawal  to  aU  other  Parties 
to  the  Convention  and  to  the  United  Nations  Security 
Council  three  months  in  advance.  Such  notice  shall 
include  a  statement  of  the  extraordinary  events  it 
regards  as  having  jeopardised  its  supreme  Interests. 

Aeticle  X 
[Provisions  on  languages  of  texts,  etc.] 


Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  Open  At  Helsinki 


Following  is  the  text  of  a  message  from  Presi- 
dent Nixon  to  Gerard  C.  Smith,  Chairman  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  preliminary  U.S.- 
U.S.S.E.  strategic  arms  limitation  talks  at 
Helsinki,  which  was  read  by  Ambassador  Smith 
at  the  opening  session  of  the  talks  on  Novem- 
ber 17. 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  17 

You  are  embarking  upon  one  of  the  most 
momentous  negotiations  ever  entrusted  to  an 
American  delegation.^ 

I  do  not  mean  to  belittle  the  past.  The  Ant- 
arctic Treaty,  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty, 
the  Outer  Space  Treaty,  and  most  recently  the 
Non- Proliferation  Treaty,  which  we  hope  will 
soon  enter  into  force,  were  all  important  steps 
along  the  road  to  international  security.  Other 
tasks  remain  on  the  agenda  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament.  Today,  however,  you  will  begin 
what  all  of  your  fellow  citizens  in  the  United 
States  and,  I  believe,  all  people  throughout  the 
world,  profoundly  hope  will  be  a  sustained  ef- 
fort not  only  to  limit  the  build-up  of  strategic 
forces  but  to  reverse  it. 

I  do  not  underestimate  the  difficulty  of  your 
task ;  the  nature  of  modem  weapons  makes  their 


control  an  exceedingly  complex  endeavor.  But 
this  very  fact  increases  the  importance  of  your 
effort. 

Nor  do  I  underestimate  the  suspicion  and 
distrust  that  must  be  dispelled  if  you  are  to 
succeed  in  your  assignment. 

I  am  also  conscious  of  the  historical  fact  that 
wars  and  crises  between  nations  can  arise  not 
simply  from  the  existence  of  arms  but  from 
clashing  interests  or  the  ambitious  pursuit  of 
unilateral  interests.  That  is  why  we  seek  prog- 
ress toward  the  solution  of  the  dangerous 
political  issues  of  our  day. 

I  am  nevertheless  hopeful  that  your  negotia- 
tions with  representatives  from  the  Soviet 
Union  will  serve  to  increase  mutual  security. 
Such  a  result  is  possible  if  we  approach  these 
negotiations  recognizing  the  legitimate  security 
interests  on  each  side. 

I  have  stated  that  for  our  part  we  wUl  be 
guided  by  the  concept  of  maintaining  "suf- 
ficiency" in  the  forces  required  to  protect  our- 
selves and  our  allies.  I  recognize  that  the  leaders 
of  the  Soviet  Union  bear  similar  defense  respon- 
sibilities. I  believe  it  is  possible,  however,  that 


'  For  names  of  the  members  of  the  delegation,  see 
Bulletin  of  July  28, 1969,  p.  66. 


December  15,   1969 


543 


we  can  carry  out  our  respective  responsibilities 
under  a  mutually  acceptable  limitation  and 
eventual  reduction  of  our  strategic  arsenals. 

"We  are  prepared  to  discuss  limitations  on 
all  ofl'ensive  and  defensive  systems,  and  to  reach 
agreements  in  which  both  sides  can  have  con- 
fidence. As  I  stated  in  my  address  to  the  United 
Nations,''  we  are  prepared  to  deal  with  the  is- 
sues seriously,  carefully,  and  purposefully.  We 
seek  no  unilateral  advantage.  Nor  do  we  seek 
arrangements  which  could  be  prejudicial  to  the 
interests  of  third  parties.  We  are  prepared  to 
engage  in  bona  fide  negotiations  on  concrete  is- 
sues, avoiding  polemics  and  extraneous  matters. 

No  one  can  foresee  what  the  outcome  of  your 
work  will  be.  I  believe  your  approach  to  these 
talks  will  demonstrate  the  seriousness  of  the 
United  States  in  pursuing  a  path  of  equitable 
accommodation.  I  am  convinced  that  the  limita- 
tion of  strategic  arms  is  in  the  mutual  interest 
of  our  country  and  the  Soviet  Union. 


President  Nixon  Ratifies 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty 

Following  are  remarks  made  hy  President 
Nixon  and  Secretary  Rogers  at  a  ceremony  in 
the  Presidents  office  on  November  24. 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  24 

PRESIDENT  NIXON 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  We  have  invited  you 
here  today  to  witness  the  signing  of  the  instru- 
ment of  ratification  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons,  to  which  the 
Senate  gave  its  advice  and  consent  on  March 
13  of  this  year.^ 

This  act  of  ratification  completes  a  process 
which  has  spanned  the  administrations  of  three 
Presidents  in  which  this  treaty  was  negotiated, 
and  it  is  now  being  ratified. 

It  is  our  hope  that  after  the  ratification  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  the  necessary  addi- 
tional number  of  nations  will  ratify  the  treaty 
so  that  it  will  go  into  effect. 


*  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  297. 

'  For  text  of  the  treaty,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1, 1968, 
p.  9. 


In  si^eaking  of  this  treaty,  we  believe  that 
this  action  today  underlines  the  commitment  of 
this  nation,  not  only  for  a  policy  of  limiting 
armaments  generally  but  also  to  reduce  those 
areas  of  confiict  that  potentially  would  result  in 
a  threat  to  the  peace  and  security  of  tlie  world. 

Finally,  I  believe  that  this  act  of  ratification 
clearly  demonstrates  that  this  nation,  through 
the  administrations  of  all  our  Presidents  in  this 
century,  is  dedicated  to  the  cause  of  peace,  and 
we  will  contmue  to  pursue  that  cause  in  every 
possible,  ell'ective  way. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  I  think,  will  explain 
to  you  the  final  action  with  regard  to  the  treaty 
and  the  ceremony  which  will  be  scheduled  at 
that  time.  We  have  not  set  the  date  for  it. 


SECRETARY   ROGERS 

The  final  act  in  this  process  of  ratification 
requires  the  exchange  of  the  instruments  of  rati- 
fication. And  we  will  deposit  those  instruments 
in  IVIoscow  and  in  London,  as  provided  by  the 
treaty,  sometime  within  the  next  10  days  or  2 
weel^. 

At  that  time,  we  will  provide  an  opportunity 
for  all  of  those  who  played  such  an  important 
role  in  this  treaty  to  attend  the  ceremonies.  Mr. 
Ziegler  [Eonald  L.  Ziegler,  Special  Assistant  to 
President  Nixon]  has  an  announcement  to  that 
effect. 

We  will,  at  that  time,  have  President  John- 
son, former  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk,  Bill 
Foster  [William  C.  Foster,  former  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative to  the  Conference  of  the  Eighteen- 
Nation  Disarmament  Committee],  the  legis- 
lative leaders,  and  others  to  attend  those 
ceremonies. 

Q.  Is  there  one  here,  Mr.  Secretary,  a  deposit 
here  as  well  as  in  London  and  Moscow? 

Secretary  Rogers :  Yes. 

President  Nixon:  That  ceremony  will  be  at 
the  State  Department. 

Secretary  Rogers:  Probably  in  about  2 
weeks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  when  will  the  Soviet  Union 
deposit  theirs? 

Secretary  Rogers:  At  the  same  time.  We  will 
work  that  out  with  them.  They  have  ratified 


544 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


today  at  the  same  time,  simultaneous  ratifica- 
tion. We  will  have  a  simultaneous  deposit 
of  the  instruments  of  ratification  in  about  2 
weeks.  I  have  been  in  touch  with  Ambassador 
Dobrynin  on  that  subject.  He  will  let  us  know 
their  plans.  "We  would  hope  that  it  is  possible  to 
have  a  joint  ceremony.  But  that  is  still  uncertain. 

Q.  When  would  you  expect  this  to  go  into 
effect? 

Secretary  Rogers:  We  would  hope  now,  in 
view  of  these  ratifications  by  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  that  it  would  be  in  the 
next  few  months. 

Mr.  Ziegler:  Thank  you,  gentlemen. 


Federal  Republic  of  Germany  Signs 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty 

On  November  28  Ambassador  Rolf  Paxds  of 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  signed  the 
Treaty  on  the  N onproUferation  of  Nuclear 
Weapons  on  behalf  of  his  Government  at  a  cere- 
mony at  the  Department  of  State.  Following 
is  a  statement  m,ade  by  Secretary  Rogers  on  that 
occasion. 

Press  release  362  dated  November  28 

Mr.  Ambassador,  your  signature  today  of  the 
NPT  here  in  Washington,  and  that  of  your 
colleagues  in  London  and  Moscow,  is  an  event 
of  historic  importance. 

The  United  States  Government  has  pursued 
the  goal  of  a  Nonproliferation  Treaty  because 
we  are  convinced  tliis  will  be  an  effective  meas- 
ure to  reduce  the  chances  of  nuclear  war.  We 
recognize  that  other  measui'es  are  necessary  to 
achieve  this  objective,  not  the  least  of  which 
are  restraints  on  the  part  of  those  countries 
which  have  gone  down  the  path  of  nuclear  arma- 
ment. Apart  from  our  interest  in  doing  so,  we 
shall  be  committed  by  treaty  obligation  to  seek 
such  restraints  when  the  NPT  comes  into  force. 

We  are  not  waiting  for  the  entry  into  force 
of  the  NPT  to  pursue  this  responsibility.  The 
strategic  arms  limitation  talks  have  already 
begun. 

We  are  deeply  conscious  that  your  nation  re- 
mains divided.  We  respect  the  decision  of  the 
Government  of  the  Federal  Republic  to  sign 
the  NPT  mider  circumstances  of  a  divided 


Germany,  a  divided  Europe,  and  a  divided 
world — which  almost  25  years  after  World  War 
II  leave  the  gi-eat  city  of  Berlin  under  quadri- 
partite responsibility. 

Your  signature  today  is  yet  further  evidence 
of  the  strong  desire  of  your  Government  to  play 
a  positive  and  central  role  in  the  important 
work  facing  the  nations  of  the  world,  in  shaping 
the  future  of  a  Europe  without  divisions,  and 
in  ensuring  the  preservation  of  peace.  We  are 
convinced  that  this  signature,  far  from  jeojsard- 
izing  your  country's  position,  will  improve  it. 

Peacemaking,  as  we  are  all  aware,  is  an  inter- 
national imdertaking  which  can  succeed  only 
when  nations  pledge  themselves  to  respect  the 
rights  of  their  neighbors.  In  this  regard  it  is 
clear  that  articles  53  and  107  of  the  United 
Nations  Charter  confer  no  right  to  intervene 
by  force  unilaterally  in  the  Federal  Eepublic 
of  Germany.  For  their  part,  the  Three  Powers, 
the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
France,  have  formally  declared  that  in  their 
relations  with  the  Federal  Republic  they  will 
follow  the  principles  set  out  in  article  2  of  the 
United  Nations  Charter.  All  the  other  parties 
to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  have  associated 
themselves  with  that  declaration.  Moreover,  as 
a  full  and  equal  partner  in  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty,  the  Federal  Republic  is  of  course  pro- 
tected by  that  treaty,  under  which  an  armed 
attack  upon  any  party  would  be  met  by  an  im- 
mediate Allied  response  in  the  form  of  self- 
defense  measures  pursuant  to  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty. 

Wlien  the  NPT  was  opened  for  signature, 
our  Government  formally  acknowledged  that 
confidence  in  our  solemnly  concluded  treaties 
of  mutual  security  constituted  a  vital  factor  in 
consideration  of  the  NPT  by  our  allies. 

During  hearings  on  the  NPT  before  the  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Committee  last  Febru- 
ary, I  reaffinned  the  understandings  of  the 
previous  U.S.  administration,  among  other 
points,  about  the  effect  of  the  NPT  on  our  exist- 
ing defense  alliances.^  I  can  reafBrm  that  this 
position  remains  that  of  the  U.S.  Government. 

Mr.  Ambassador,  I  quote  the  pronouncement 
of  President  Nixon  on  the  20th  anniversary  of 
NATO:  ".  .  .  the  American  commitment  to 
NATO  will  remain  in  force  and  it  will  remain 
strong.  We  in  America  contimie  to  consider 
Europe's  security  to  be  our  own."^ 


'  Bulletin  of  Mar.  10, 1969,  p.  189. 
=  Bulletin  of  Apr.  28, 1969,  p.  351. 


December  15,  1969 


545 


43d  and  44th  Plenary  Sessions 
on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 


Folloxinng  are  the  opening  statements  made 
hy  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the 
UjS.  delegation,  at  the  43d  plenary  session  of 
the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  Novem- 
ber 20  and  at  the  Ji4th  session  on  November  26, 
together  with  a  transcript  of  news  briefing  and 
a  statement  by  Ambassador  Lodge  after  the 
Jj,lf.th  session. 


43d   PLENARY  SESSION 

Press  release  3S1  dated  NoTember  20 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  The  United  States 
delegation  and  the  delegation  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam  are  here  in  Paris  to  talk  seriously 
about  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam. 

Of  course,  it  takes  two  sides  to  negotiate.  And 
it  is  obvious  that  your  side  is  not  yet  talking  in 
the  language  of  negotiation.  You  repeatedly  say 
that  you  are  full  of  good  will  and  that  you  are 
willing  to  reach  a  peaceful  settlement.  But  you 
refuse  to  talk  seriously  with  one  of  the  parties 
represented  here. 

You  say  that  a  settlement  is  possible  only 
if  our  side  accepts  your  demands  for  uni- 
lateral Allied  withdrawal  and  the  overthrow  of 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 
Indeed,  at  last  week's  session,  you  said  that  if 
the  United  States  refused  to  accept  your  side's 
proposals,  your  forces  would  continue,  and  even 
intensify,  the  war  in  Viet-Nam.  This  sounds 
like  a  threat. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  United  States 
will  not  accept  your  side's  take-it-or-leave-it 
position. 

Your  one-sided  approach  to  discussion  of  the 
Viet-Nam  question  does  not  show  good  will.  It 
is  not  negotiation.  If  there  is  to  be  a  negotiated 
settlement,  there  must  be  give-and-talce  on  both 
sides. 

Typical  of  your  rigidity  and  your  lack  of  con- 
cern for  the  welfare  of  even  your  own  per- 
sonnel was  your  rejection  last  week  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam's  offer 
to  release  62  sick  and  wounded  prisoners  of  war. 
This  was  a  humanitarian  proposal.  You  re- 
sponded with  a  demand  that  the  Government  of 


546 


I 


the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  release  all  prisoners 
on  the  spot.  In  so  doing  you  chose  to  ignore  the 
fact  that  at  the  very  first  session  of  these  Paris 
meetings,  our  side  proposed  discussion  of  the 
release  of  all  prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides. 
Maybe  you  forgot  about  this  offer.  In  any  case, 
let  me  renew  it  and  state  that  we  can  begin  dis- 
cussing this  question  immediately  if  you  are  now 
willing  to  do  so. 

If  your  attitude  continues  to  block  a  negoti- 
ated settlement  here.  President  Nixon  will  carry 
out  his  alternative  plan  for  peace  in  Viet-Nam. 
Under  this  plan,  we  are  withdrawing  our  forces 
on  an  orderly  scheduled  timetable.  But,  as 
President  Nixon  made  clear  on  November  3,  we 
are  willing  to  see  the  complete  withdrawal  of 
all  outside  forces  on  a  timetable  to  be  agreed 
through  negotiations  here.  He  said  on  Novem- 
ber 3,  and  I  quote :  ^  "We  have  offered  the  com- 
plete withdrawal  of  all  outside  forces  within 
1  year."  This  is  our  proposed  timetable.  If  you 
have  any  other  proposal  for  mutual  withdrawal 
of  non- South  Vietnamese  forces,  we  will  be 
prepared  to  consider  it.  Such  a  timetable  could 
be  quicker  than  that  to  be  used  if  there  is  no 
negotiated  settlement. 

President  Nixon  will  not  be  pressured  into 
depart mg  from  the  course  wMch  he  has  set. 
Those  who  live  in  authoritarian  countries 
should  try  to  understand  that  last  week's  events 
in  Washington  were  a  demonstration  of  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  right  of  free  speech.  You  should 
also  understand  that  the  evidence  shows  that  the  , 
great  majority  of  the  American  people  support  , 
the  President's  effort  for  peace. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  U.S.  and  GVN 
have  made  a  comprehensive  set  of  peace  offers 
which  we  have  explained  here  so  often  that  I 
will  not  repeat  them  today.  I  will,  however,  say     . 
for  the  record  that  they  all  still  stand. 

The  proposals  for  a  political  settlement  made 
by  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  offer  the  opportunity  for  all  to  take  part 
on  an  equal  basis  in  the  peaceful  life  of  that 
country.  The  United  States  fully  supports  those 
proposals,  which  are  based  on  the  right  of  self- 
determination  and  are  consistent  with  the  con- 
cept of  national  reconciliation. 

Our  proposals  are  ones  under  which  no  one 
is  humiliated — everyone  goes  ahead  together. 


'  For   President  Nixon'a  address  to  the  Nation  on 
Nov.  3,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  24, 1969,  p.  437. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


K 

i 


Our  offers  are  constructive.  They  seek  to  heal. 
Tliey  seek  to  build. 
That  concludes  my  statement. 


44th   PLENARY  SESSION 
Opening   Statement 

Press  release  360  dated  November  28 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  President  Nixon  has 
clearly  stated  the  alternative  courses  on  which 
he  is  ready  to  proceed  as  we  seek  to  end  the  con- 
flict in  Viet-Nam.  One  is  through  genuine  ne- 
gotiations here  in  Paris.  The  other  is  our  plan 
whereby  South  Vietnamese  forces  take  over  in- 
creasing responsibilities  for  the  defense  of 
South  Viet-Nam. 

You  should  not  doubt  that  the  President  will 
hold  to  the  course  which  has  been  many  times 
explained  to  you.  Since  you  appear  to  believe 
that  the  American  people  do  not  support  the 
President's  plans,  I  think  you  should  know  that 
recent  polls  show  a  marked  increase  in  popular 
support  for  the  President  in  the  past  month. 

In  your  statements  last  week,  you  again 
showed  no  willingness  to  join  us  on  the  negotia- 
tions route.  You  demanded  the  unilateral  with- 
drawal of  U.S.  forces  from  South  Viet-Nam. 
You  again  said  nothing  about  your  willingness 
to  withdraw  North  Vietnamese  forces.  All 
you  did  was  to  repeat  the  vague  formula  con- 
tained in  point  3  of  your  10-point  program. 
That  formula  provides  no  assurance  the  North 
Vietnamese  forces,  who  have  no  right  to  be  in 
South  Viet-Nam — or  in  Cambodia  and  Laos 
either — would  in  fact  return  to  North  Viet- 
Nam. 

In  your  comments  last  week  on  the  with- 
drawal of  U.S.  forces,  you  misrepresented 
United  States  policy  as  one  of  prolonging  and 
extending  our  withdrawal.  This  week  I  will 
once  again  try  to  set  forth  the  facts. 

The  United  States  has  long  urged  that  the 
question  of  troop  withdrawals  be  dealt  with 
by  negotiation  and  agreement.  We  have  said  re- 
peatedly that  a  negotiated  settlement  could 
bring  a  rapid  and  early  withdrawal  of  all  U.S. 
forces,  and  of  all  other  non-South  Vietnamese 
forces,  in  accordance  with  a  timetable  to  which 
both  sides  would  have  agreed. 

On  November  3  President  Nixon  said,  and  I 
quote:  "We  have  offered  the  complete  with- 


drawal of  all  outside  forces  within  1  year."  That 
is  our  proposed  timetable.  We  have  also  said 
that  if  you  wish  to  propose  any  other  timetable 
for  the  withdrawal  of  all  non-South  Vietnamese 
forces,  we  will  be  prepared  to  consider  it. 

But  because  of  your  side's  refusal  to  enter 
into  genuine  negotiations,  we  have  been  unable 
to  make  any  progress  here  in  Paris  toward 
agreement  on  withdrawals — or  on  any  other 
subject.  Consequently,  our  side  has  an  alterna- 
tive plan  in  accordance  with  which  the  United 
States  is  reducing  its  troop  strength  in  South 
Viet-Nam  on  an  orderly  timetable.  As  I  indi- 
cated last  week,  the  timetable  of  a  negotiated 
withdrawal  could  be  quicker  than  that  which 
would  be  used  if  there  is  no  negotiated 
settlement. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  it  is  clear  that  the  path 
to  rapid  progress  is  through  negotiation.  There 
is,  at  this  table,  an  opportunity  to  negotiate  the 
early  withdrawal  of  all  non-South  Vietnamese 
forces. 

But  if  your  side  continues  to  insist  on  our  un- 
conditional acceptance  of  your  terms,  progress 
through  negotiation  is  not  possible.  You  de- 
mand that  the  United  States  withdraw  all  its 
forces  immediately  and  unconditionally  while 
North  Vietnamese  forces  remain.  You  demand 
that  we  overthrow  the  Government  of  the  Ee- 
public  of  Viet-Nam  as  we  leave.  These  are 
things  we  will  not  do. 

Your  attitude  is  nowhere  better  illustrated 
than  by  your  refusal  to  accept  the  62  sick  and 
wounded  prisoners  of  war  who  have  freely  ex- 
pressed the  wish  to  return  to  their  homes  and 
families  in  North  Viet-Nam.  Rather  than  agree 
to  this  simple  humanitarian  repatriation  of 
your  own  men,  you  demand  the  immediate  re- 
lease of  all  prisoners  held  by  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam.  At  the  same  time, 
you  refuse  to  discuss  with  us  the  release  of  all 
prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides.  In  short,  you 
reject  any  actions  or  proposals  which  do  not 
conform  completely  with  your  demands. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  your  entire  position  at 
these  meetings  seems  to  be  based  on  some  notion 
which  entitles  you  to  insist  that  we  do  every- 
thing while  you  do  nothing  to  achieve  a  settle- 
ment. That  position  is  simply  untenable.  I  tell 
you  very  frankly  that  it  is  not  possible  to  nego- 
tiate on  that  basis.  If  you  are  prepared  to  talk 
seriously  with  all  the  parties  represented  here 
and  to  seek  with  them  mutually  acceptable  solu- 


December   15,   1969 


547 


tions  to  the  key  questions,  we  believe  that  prog- 
ress can  be  made. 

Ladies  and   gentlemen,  that  concludes  my 
statement. 


Transcript  of  News  Briefing 

Arribassador  Lodge:  We  had  our  regular 
meeting  and  recessed  imtil  a  week  from  tomor- 
row ;  that  is,  Thursday,  the  4th  of  December.  I 
made  the  point  that  you  obviously  cannot  have 
negotiations  when  one  side  has  an  intransigent 
attitude  and  says:  Take  it  just  the  way  I  give 
it  out  or  else  we  can't  agree  to  anything.  That 
was  about  what  happened. 

Q.  Mr.  Lodge.,  if  the  Viet  Cong  is  willing  to 
have  Hanoi  negotiate  on  its  iehalf,  lohich  I  be- 
lieve is  the  gist  of  what  Mr.  Xuan  Thuy  [chief 
North  Vietnamese  negotiator]  has  been  saying 
lately,  why  is  Saigon  not  willing  to  have  us 
negotiate  in  its  behalf^ 

A.  Well,  I  don't  think  there  is  any  problem 
about  our  talking  about  a  coalition  government 
and  other  matters  with  the  North  Vietnamese. 
Of  course,  we  have  to  keep  Saigon  in  touch  be- 
cause it  affects  the  South  Vietnamese,  after  all ; 
but  I  don't  think  there  would  be  any  problem 
about  talking  about  it.  Now,  if  you  want  to  reach 
an  agreement,  there  is  only  one  party  that  can 
cari'y  on  agreement  in  South  Viet-Nam,  and  that 
is  the  South  Vietnamese  Government.  And  it's 
a  practical  fact,  whether  you  like  it  or  whether 
you  don't — a  practical  fact  that  they  are  the 
biggest  single  entity  there  is  in  South  Viet- 
Nam;  and  so  no  agreement  is  worth  anything 
imless  they  are  involved  in  it. 

Q.  Were  there  any  feelers  that,  after  Mr. 
Xiuin  Thuyas  statement  of  yesterday,  he  would 
be  willing  to  have  secret  or  private  talks  with 
you,  that  such  might  be  forthcoming  now? 

A.  That  question  didn't  come  up  this  after- 
noon. 

Q.  May  I  pursue  that  point  just  as  a  concep- 
tual thing?  Are  you  saying  that  we  should  be 
prepared  to  negotiate  on  their  behalf  and  then 
just  have  Saigon  agree  to  the  agreement  we 
negotiated? 

A.  I  said  we  are  perfectly  willing  to  talk 
about  all  these  things,  and  then  I  am  saying  that 


if  you  are  ever  going  to  get  something  done  in 
South  Viet-Nam,  obviously  the  South  Viet- 
namese have  to  agi'ee  to  it ;  but  the  talking  can 
be  done  between  us  and  North  Viet-Nam. 

Q.  And  they  will  be  called  on  to  agree  only 
at  the  last  stage? 

A.  I  don't  say  that,  because  they  could  be 
kept  in  touch  concurrently. 

Q.  Will  you  be  present  at  the  next  session  of 
the  peace  talks? 

A.  Yes,  Thursday,  that  I  will ;  I  am  planning 
to  be  there. 

Q.  I  asked  that  because  of  your  resignation. 

A.  Yes,  but  I  am  planning  to  be  there  a  week 
from  Thursday,  and  that  will  be  positively  my 
last  appearance. 

Q.  If  it  is  positively  your  last  appearance,  do 
you  hope  for  any  positive  results? 

A.  Well,  I  always  hope ;  hope  springs  eternal, 
you  know. 

Q.  Mr.  Ambassador,  if  by  chance  there  were 
a  break  in  these  negotiations,  would  you  stay  on? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  think  I  am  that  important. 
I  don't  think  the  question  of  what  happens  in 
these  negotiations  really  depends  on  me. 

Q.  Have  the  North  Vietnamese  given  you  any 
reason  to  believe  that  they  might  be  interested 
in  a  neio  and  more  meaningful  start  on  these 
talks  after  your  successor  is  cJiosen  and  arrives? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Thank  you. 

Statement  by  Ambassador  Lodge 

It  is  plain  that  I  should  clarify  my  remarks 
to  the  press  this  afternoon.  I  definitely  was  not 
advocating  that  we  negotiate  the  imposition  of 
a  "provisional  coalition  govermnent"  on  the 
South  Vietnamese.  On  the  contrary,  I  was  try- 
ing to  show  that,  while  nothing  about  South 
Viet-Nam  can  be  negotiated  without  the  South 
Vietnamese  Government,  everything — includ- 
ing political  measures — can  be  talked  about  be- 
tween the  North  Vietnamese  and  ourselves. 


548 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


\ 


U.S.  ReafBrms  Willingness 
To  Negotiate  on  Viet-Nam 

Following  is  a  statement  hy  Ambassador 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  head  of  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam,  at  Paris, 
issued  at  Paris  on  November  24-. 

Press  release  355  dated  November  24 

I  consider  it  necessary  to  comment  on  an  ar- 
ticle in  the  press  in  which  Mr.  Xuan  Thuy,  the 
North  Vietnamese  reisresentative,  is  reported  to 
have  made  certain  allegations  concerning  the 
United  States  position  at  these  Paris  meetings. 

First,  it  is  not  true  that  I  have  not  been  will- 
ing to  meet  privately,  or  otherwise,  with  Mr. 
Thuy  to  discuss  general  problems  concerning 
Viet-Nam- — and  he  knows  it  very  well. 

Second,  it  is  also  not  true  that  in  the  private 
meetings  which  have  been  held  I  have  only  been 
willing  to  talk  on  only  one  question:  that  of 
mutual  troop  withdrawal.  He  Imows  that,  too. 

Third,  it  is  not  true,  as  alleged,  that  the 
United  States  wishes  to  continue  the  war  in 
Viet-Nam  and  is  therefore  inflexible. 

The  facts  are  that  Mr.  Thuy  has  been  as  in- 
transigent in  private  meetings  as  he  has  been 
in  public  meetings.  He  has  avoided  engaging 
in  any  give-and-take.  Instead  his  position  has 
been  to  insist  on  the  United  States  withdraw- 
ing completely  from  South  Viet-Nam  without 
}  any  indication  of  what  the  North  Vietnamese 
would  do.  He  has  also  demanded  that  the  United 
States  overthrow  the  present  government  in 
:  South  Viet-Nam  as  we  leave. 

For  our  part,  we  have  made  it  clear  that — 
far  from  rejecting — we  are  willing  to  discuss 
all  questions  relevant  to  peace.  We  have  made 
every  effort  to  have  the  parties  concerned  dis- 
cuss all  the  issues.  We  have  made  our  proposals, 
and  we  have  indicated  that  we  are  willing  to 
discuss  the  proposals  made  by  the  other  side. 
Contrary  to  the  position  of  the  other  side,  we 
do  not  make  proposals  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. 

At  one  stage  we  set  forth  a  list  of  all  the  sub- 
jects, military  and  political,  that  needed  dis- 
cussion if  there  was  to  be  a  peaceful  settlement 
of  the  conflict.  We  also  invited  the  other  side 
to  clarify  their  own  proposals. 

We  got  nowhere  because  they  either  refused 


to  consider  our  proposals  or  demanded  that  we 
take  unilateral  actions  without  any  parallel  ac- 
tion by  them.  And  they  even  declined  to  have 
any  serious  discussion  in  which  the  Government 
of  South  Viet-Nam  could  pai-ticipate. 

Mr.  Thuy  has  tried  to  make  it  appear  as  if 
he  has  all  along  been  ready  to  meet  privately  for 
serious  discussion.  The  fact  is  that  every  pri- 
vate meeting  which  we  have  held  has  been  at 
the  request  of  the  United  States.  If  Mr.  Thuy 
had  any  desire  to  meet,  he  managed  to  conceal 
that  desire  very  well. 

For  my  part,  I  sought  through  every  means 
to  engage  the  other  side  in  genuine  negotiations 
on  all  issues.  The  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Viet-Nam  has  also  been  willing  to  talk  about 
any  subject  without  prior  conditions. 

I  shall  not  speculate  on  the  purposes  Mr. 
Thuy  may  have  in  mind  in  making  his  allega- 
tions. But  these  allegations  are  untrue,  and  I 
believe  he  knows  that  they  are  untrue.  There 
has  never  been  any  doubt  that  the  United 
States  has  been  ready  to  meet  and  to  negotiate 
meaningfully  at  any  time  and  in  any  meeting- 
place.  The  same  is  true  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam. 

That  has  been  true  in  the  past,  it  is  true  to- 
day, and  it  will  be  true  in  the  future.  But  nego- 
tiation is  not  a  process  by  which  he  can  make 
demands  and  then  only  be  willing  to  discuss  our 
acceptance  of  those  demands.  I  also  submit  that 
negotiations  are  not  helped  by  making  false 
charges  which  are  boimd  to  complicate  the 
problem. 


Ambassador  Lodge  Resigns  as  Head 
of  U.S.  Delegation  to  Paris  Meetings 

WHITE   HOUSE  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  "^Vliite  House  announced  on  November 
20  (White  House  press  release)  that  Ambassa- 
dor Henry  Cabot  Lodge  has  resigned  as  the 
President's  personal  representative  and  head  of 
the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Paris  meetings  on 
Viet-Nam.  The  President  has  regretfully  ac- 
cepted his  resignation,  effective  December  8. 

Until    Ambassador    Lodge's    successor    is 


December  15,   1969 


549 


named,  Pliilip  C.  Habib,  who  has  been  Ambas- 
sador Lodge's  senior  adviser  in  Paris,  will  serve 
as  acting  head  of  the  delegation. 

The  President  also  accepted  on  November  20 
the  resignation  of  Lawrence  E.  Walsh  as  Am- 
bassador Lodge's  deputy.  An  exchange  of  cor- 
respondence was  released  separately  on  that 
day. 


EXCHANGE   OF   LETTERS 

Ambassador  Lodge 

Dear  Mr.  President  :  Herewith  I  submit  my 
resignation  as  your  personal  rej^resentative  to 
head  the  U.S.  Delegation  at  the  Paris  Meetings 
on  Vietnam.  I  do  so  because  personal  matters  at 
home  require  my  attention. 

I  strongly  support  your  efforts  to  negotiate  an 
end  to  the  war.  You  have  left  no  stone  unturned. 
It  is  sad  that  the  other  side  has  flatly  refused  to 
reciprocate  in  any  kind  of  meaningful  way. 

It  has  been  an  honor  to  be  your  representative 
here  and  I  thank  you  for  it. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

Henkt  Cabot  Lodge 


President  Nixon 

Dear  Cabot:  It  is  with  great  regret  that  I 
accept  your  resignation  as  Head  of  the  U.S. 
Delegation  at  the  Paris  Meetings  on  Vietnam. 
I  could  have  asked  for  no  better  representative, 
and  will  miss  your  counsel  and  efforts  as  we 
seek  to  negotiate  a  just  peace  in  Vietnam. 

You  have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  you 
have  done  all  that  imagination  and  dedication 
to  peace  could  accomplish. 

Please  accept  my  warmest  thanks  for  your 
service  to  the  Nation  in  this  demanding  job. 

It  is  reassuring  that  you  have  agreed  to  serve 
as  an  advisor  so  that  I  will  continue  to  have 
the  benefit  of  your  experience  and  wisdom  on 
Vietnam. 

With  best  personal  regards, 
Sincerely, 

RiCHAKD  Nixon 


U.S,  and  Honduras  To  Negotiate 
Swan  Islands  Sovereignty  issue 

Press  release  344  dated  November  13 

The  United  States  Government,  in  a  note  de- 
livered to  Honduran  Foreign  Minister  Tiburcio 
Carias  Castillo  November  12  ^  by  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador Hewson  A.  Ryan,  has  agreed  to  negotiate 
with  the  Honduras  Government  a  final  settle- 
ment of  the  problem  of  sovereignty  over  tlie 
Swan  Islands. 

A  joint  press  release  issued  in  Tegucigalpa  on 
the  same  day  by  our  Embassy  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Honduras  said : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  In  the  spirit  of 
close  cooperation  and  friendship  between  our  countries 
is  prepared  to  recognize  Honduran  sovereignty  over 
the  Swan  Islands.  In  a  reciprocal  gesture  of  coopera- 
tion and  friendship,  the  Government  of  Honduras 
would  allow  the  United  States  to  retain  its  installa- 
tions on  the  Islands,  wliich  consist  of  a  radio  beacon 
for  International  navigation  and  an  upper-air  weather 
sounding  stiition,  the  services  of  which  are  freely  avail- 
able to  all  nations. 

President  Nixon  had  earlier  authorized  the 
Secretary  of  State,  as  an  act  of  good  will  to- 
ward our  Latin  American  neighbors,  to  seek  an 
early  settlement  of  the  dispute  between  the 
United  States  and  Honduras  on  the  issue  of 
sovereignty  over  the  Swan  Islands,  which  are 
about  100  miles  northeast  of  the  Caribbean  coast 
of  Honduras. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Greece 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Greece, 
Basil  Greorge  Vitsaxis,  presented  his  credentials 
to  President  Nixon  on  November  18.  For  texts 
of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the  Presi- 
dent's reply,  see  Department  of  State  press  re- 
lease dated  November  18. 


'  Not  printed  here. 


550 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  Sato  of  Japan 
Hold  Talks  at  Washington 


Prime  Minister  Eisahu  Sato  m/ide  an  official 
visit  to  Washington  November  19-21  and  met 
with  President  Nixon  and  other  U.S.  officials. 
Following  are  texts  of  the  exchange  of  greet- 
ings between  President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minis- 
ter Sato  on  November  19,  their  exchange  of 
toasts  at  a  state  dinner  at  the  White  House 
that  evening,  and  their  exchange  of  remarks  at 
the  close  of  their  nwetings  on  November  21,  to- 
gether with  a  joint  communique  issued  on 
November  21. 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  19 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  ladies  and  gentlemen 
gathered  here  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House :  It  is  a  very  great  honor  for  me,  not  only 
in  my  official  capacity  representing  the  Amer- 
ican peojile  but  also  personally,  to  welcome  you, 
Mr.  Prime  IMinister,  to  the  United  States  again. 

This  is  your  third  visit  to  the  United  States, 
but  this  is  indeed  an  historic  day.  As  we  meet 
here  this  ceremony  is  being  carried  live  by  tele- 
vision to  millions  of  people  in  Japan  as  well  as 
people  in  the  United  States. 

And  at  this  same  moment  millions  of  people 
all  over  the  world  can  see  two  Americans  from 
earth  walking  on  the  face  of  the  moon. 

The  magnificent  welcome  which  was  given  to 
our  astronauts  when  they  visited  Tokyo  just  a 
few  weeks  ago  is  an  indication  of  the  ties  that 
bind  our  two  peoples  together.  Today,  as  we 
look  to  the  future  of  the  Pacific,  we  recognize 
that  whether  peace  survives  in  the  last  third  of 
the  century  will  depend  more  on  what  happens 
in  the  Pacific  than  in  any  other  area  of  the 
world.  And  whether  we  have  peace  and  prosper- 
ity and  progress  in  the  Pacific  will  depend  more 
than  anything  else  upon  the  cooperation  of  the 
United  States  and  Japan,  the  two  strongest 


and  the  two  most  prosperous  nations  in  the 
Pacific  area. 

In  this  period,  Japan,  which  has  the  fastest 
growing  economy  of  any  major  country  in  the 
world,  will  play  a  key  role.  That  is  why  our 
talks  are  so  important,  because  we  must  discuss 
those  areas  of  cooperation  where  our  two 
peoples  and  our  two  Governments  can  work  to- 
gether for  our  common  goal  of  peace  and  pros- 
perity for  the  whole  Pacific  area. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  I  believe  that  these  talks 
will  very  probably  be  the  most  successful  talks 
that  have  been  held  between  representatives  of 
our  two  Governments  going  back  over  many 
years.  I  say  this  not  only  because  the  talks  have 
been  well  prepared  by  both  sides  but  also  be- 
cause we  have  the  good  fortune  not  only  of 
being  official  friends  but  personal  friends. 

Just  a  few  yards  to  the  south  of  us  at  the 
Tidal  Basin,  we  can  see  the  cherry  trees  that 
were  presented  by  the  people  of  Tokyo  to  the 
people  of  Washington  many  years  ago.  There 
is  a  Japanese  proverb  that  "There  are  no 
strangers  under  the  cherry  blossoms."  This  is 
not  cherry  blossom  time,  but  I  can  assure  you 
that  as  we  meet  today  we  meet  as  friends — offi- 
cial friends,  personal  friends — working  together 
for  the  peace,  the  friendship,  and  the  prosperity 
that  both  of  our  countries  want. 

Prime  Minister  Sato  ^ 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Nixon,  distinguished 
guests,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  I  am  deeply 
touched  by  your  kind  words,  Mr.  President. 
Plaving  visited  Japan  six  times,  you  under- 
stand our  country  as  she  really  is  better  than 
any  previous  American  President,  and  I  am 
heartily  delighted  to  have  this  opportunity  to 
call  on  you  at  the  White  House. 

The  timing  is  perfect  for  me.  I  am  grateful 
for  my  good  fortime  to  be  able  to  stand  on  this 
jjlatform  right  after  the  successful  landing  on 
the  moon  of  Apollo  12,  which  has  so  closely 

'  Prime  Minister  Sato  spoke  In  Japanese. 


December   15,   1969 


551 


y 


followed  the  historic  feat  of  Apollo  11,  and  ex- 
press my  profound  respect  and  heartfelt  con- 
gratulations to  you  and  to  the  American  people. 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  are  becoming  increasingly  closer  in  re- 
cent years,  and  it  is  my  earnest  desire  to 
strengthen  further  the  relationship  of  mutual 
trust  and  friendship  between  our  two  countries 
through  my  talks  with  you. 

The  purpose  of  my  present  visit  here  is,  as 
you  already  know,  to  solve  the  Okinawa  prob- 
lem— the  biggest  issue  pending  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States — and  thereby  lay  a 
foundation  for  the  new  Japanese- American  re- 
lations of  the  1970's.  I  am  convinced  that  the 
ties  of  mutual  trust  and  friendship  binding  the 
peoples  of  our  two  countries  are  strong  enough 
to  make  it  possible  for  us  to  reach  a  mutually 
satisfactory  solution  to  this  problem. 

Cooperative  relations  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  are  assuming  ever  greater  im- 
portance for  the  maintenance  of  world  peace 
and  stability  in  the  fluid  international  situa- 
tion. Especially  in  Asia,  where  there  are  a  num- 
ber of  developing  coimtries,  our  two  countries 
are  expected  to  play  a  role  of  their  own  in  con- 
cert with  each  other  for  the  economic  independ- 
ence and  stabilization  of  people's  livelihood  of 
these  countries.  I  would  like  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity to  have  an  imreserved  exchange  of  views 
on  various  matters  of  common  interest  to  our 
two  coimtries  with  you,  Mr.  President,  and  with 
other  leaders  of  your  administration. 

I  am  confident  that  the  talks  between  our  two 
countries,  with  a  similar  social  system  and  a 
common  conception  of  values,  at  this  time  when 
we  are  about  to  greet  the  1970's,  will  bring  about 
a  substantial  effect  upon  the  peace  and  progress 
of  the  world. 

Thank  you. 


EXCHANGE  OF  TOASTS 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  19 

President  Nixon 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  Madame  Sato,  and  our 
guests  from  Japan  and  from  the  United  States : 
It  is  a  very  great  honor  for  me  to  welcome  the 
Prime  Minister  and  Mrs.  Sato  and  the  members 
of  their  party  to  our  country  and  to  this  house 
and,  in  welcoming  them,  to  do  so  both  officially 
and  personally. 


I  cherish  memories  of  my  visits  to  Japan 
when  the  Prime  Minister  has  been  my  host.  We 
are  very  honored  to  have  him  here  in  his  capac- 
ity as  Prime  Minister  of  a  great  and  friendly 
country  in  the  Pacific  and  in  Asia. 

I  have  been  trying  to  think  of  something  that 
would  be  appropriate  to  say  to  this  company 
made  up  of  so  many  people  from  the  United 
State  ;  and  Japan  and  who  are  so  deeply  inter- 
ested in  Japanese-American  friendship. 

I  think  first  of  our  honored  guest,  the  Prime 
Minister.  I  think  of  his  leadership  of  his  coun- 
try which  goes  back  over  many  years.  He  has 
been  Prime  ^Minister  now  for  5  years.  And  I 
think  that  perhaps  the  success  of  his  leadership 
is  best  indicated  by  what  I  understand  is  the 
literal  translation  of  his  first  name,  Eisaku  Sato. 
Eisaku,  as  I  understand,  means  "to  create  pros- 
perity," and  Japan  has  created  prosperity 
under  Prime  Minister  Sato. 

We  who  have  visited  Japan  and  we  who  have 
read  about  it  know  that  Japan  is  the  modern 
miracle  of  economic  progress.  We  know  that  its 
economic  growth  at  10  percent  a  year  is  the 
higltest  of  all  the  advanced  coimtries,  if  not  the 
highest  in  the  world. 

We  know,  too,  looking  down  to  the  end  of  the 
century,  that  there  are  those  who  predict  that 
if  the  present  rate  of  growth  continues,  Japan 
may  well  have  the  highest  per  capita  income  of 
all  the  people  in  the  world  25  years  from  now. 

I  could  dwell  on  those  subjects,  which  are 
usually  the  subjects  emphasized  when  our 
friends  from  Japan  are  present,  because  in  eco- 
nomic growth  and  economic  statistics,  Japan 
leads  the  world. 

But  I  think  for  our  guests  tonight  it  would  be 
well  to  point  out  a  very  different  aspect  of  this 
great  country,  this  friendly  country  in  the  Pa- 
cific, something  that  I  know  from  knowing  the 
coimtry  and  from  knowing  its  people. 

We  should  not  think  of  Japan  as  simply  a 
nation  of  statistics,  of  economic  growth,  an  eco- 
nomic giant;  but  we  should  think  of  it  as  it 
really  is.  It  is  a  great  country  though  a  very 
small  country. 

I  think  it  could  well  be  said  that  never  in  the 
world's  history  have  so  many  people  done  so 
much  with  so  little  in  the  way  of  resources. 

I  think,  too,  that  it  can  be  said  by  those  who 
have  visited  Japan  that  it  is  a  country  that 
captures  the  imagination,  captures  it  because  of 
the  magnificent  landscapes,  landscapes  that  I 
think  Mr.  Andrew  Wyeth,  the  great  American 


552 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


painter  who  honors  us  with  his  presence  tonight, 
would  agree  cannot  be  captured  except  in  a 
Japanese  painting. 

We  know  Japan,  those  of  us  wlio  liave  visited 
it,  because  of  the  incomparable  hospitality  and 
the  friendship  of  the  people  we  hav-e  met,  and 
we  know  Japan — and  I  emphasize  this  particu- 
larlj-  tonight — for  another  reason :  because  of 
the  character  of  its  people. 

I  saw  Japan  with  my  wife  in  1953.  I  saw  a 
people  who  were  recovering  from  the  devasta- 
tion of  war.  And  I  knew  then  what  the  future 
would  be  for  Japan,  although  it  exceeded  even 
my  own  predictions  and  those  of  my  colleagues 
as  to  what  would  happen.  I  knew  it  because  of 
the  people  that  I  met,  people  who  did  work  hard, 
yes,  but  people  who  had  the  will  and  also  the 
character  of  greatness.  And  it  is  that  charac- 
ter of  greatness  that  is  represented  by  our  hon- 
ored guest  tonight. 

I  said  when  the  Prime  Minister  arrived  that, 
looking  to  the  future,  in  the  last  third  of  this 
century,  whether  peace  and  freedom  survive 
would  depend  more  on  what  happened  in  Asia 
than  in  any  other  section  of  the  world. 

I  think  we  could  put  it  another  way.  As  we 
look  at  the  Pacific,  tlie  Pacific  and  Asia  is  the 
area  of  the  greatest  promise  and  also  the  great- 
est peril.  Whether  Asia  and  the  Pacific  becomes 
an  area  of  peace — as  the  "Pacific"  literally  trans- 
lated means — or  an  area  of  devastation  for  Asia 
and  the  world,  will  depend  on  what  happens 
!  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  more  than 
between  any  other  peoples  in  the  world.  That 
is  because  we  are  the  nations  with  the  greatest 
wealth ;  we  are  the  nations  with  potentially  the 
greatest  power. 

This  is  not  the  time  to  discourse  at  length 
on  the  great  problems  that  are  involved  in  that 
future  as  we  look  down  to  the  end  of  the  cen- 
tury, but  this  I  know :  As  I  think  of  the  people 
of  Japan,  as  I  think  of  the  character  that  has 
brought  Japan  now  to  the  pinnacle  of  economic 
power  and  wealth  which  it  now  has,  I  look  upon 
this  great  country  not  in  terms  of  its  richness 
economically  but  in  terms  of  a  wealth  that 
money  cannot  buy,  of  the  character  and 
strength  and  courage  of  a  great  people. 

That  is  why,  Mr.  Prime  Minister,  we  in  the 
United  States,  the  American  people,  are  proud 
that  we  stand  with  the  people  of  Japan,  work- 
ing toward  tlie  progress  and  harmony  for  all 
mankind  which  is  the  slogan  of  Expo  '70,  the 
■  Osaka  World's  Fair  of  1970. 


I  know  that  all  of  us  will  want  to  raise  our 
glasses,  not  only  to  those  thoughts  and  to  our 
honored  guest,  but  particularly  to  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan:  To  the 
Emperor. 

Prime   Minister  Sato  ^ 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Nixon,  Mr.  Vice  Presi- 
dent, Mrs.  Agnew,  distinguished  guests,  ladies 
and  gentlemen :  I  wish  to  express  my  deep  ap- 
preciation to  you,  Mr.  President,  for  this  warm 
and  cordial  reception  extended  to  us  this 
evening. 

First,  I  should  like  to  take  this  opportunity 
to  offer  you  my  heartiest  congratulations  on  the 
successful  landing  on  the  moon  of  the  Apollo 
12  spacecraft.  As  you  may  have  already  heard, 
the  Japanese  people  were  greatly  excited  by 
the  lunar  landing  of  the  Apollo  11  spacecraft. 
Almost  all  of  the  100  million  Japanese  people, 
young  and  old,  men  and  women,  were  glued  to 
their  television  sets  the  whole  time,  as  long  as 
they  could,  watching  the  astronauts'  activities 
on  the  moon  with  breatliless  suspense.  They 
shared  a  feeling  of  great  joy,  when  they  saw 
you,  Mr.  President,  smiling  a  welcome  to  the 
tliree  astronauts  upon  their  return  on  the 
Pacific. 

They  were  fascinated  by  the  revelation  to  hu- 
man sight  of  the  mysterious  lunar  world  and 
wholeheartedly  applauded  the  United  States 
success.  This  event  gave  the  Japanese  people  the 
opportunity  to  witness  the  advent  of  the  space 
age  as  a  personal  experience  and  to  be  able  to 
imagine  in  all  of  its  vividness  the  future  de- 
velopment of  human  society. 

It  can  be  said  that  the  United  States  has 
created  a  sense  of  solidarity  among  mankind 
by  appealing  directly  to  the  hearts  of  the  peo- 
ples of  various  countries  in  the  world  through 
this  project.  In  my  opinion,  this  is  not  only  the 
victory  of  the  superb  power  of  organization  of 
the  United  States  but  also  the  victory  of  the 
imagmation  and  courage  of  the  American 
people. 

Only  a  short  time  ago,  when  they  visited 
Japan,  I  had  the  opportunity  of  hearing  in  per- 
son from  the  three  astronauts  the  story  of  their 
experiences.  It  therefore  gives  me  special  pleas- 
ure to  be  informed  of  the  successful  landing  on 


'  Prime  Minister  Sato  spoke  in  Japanese. 


December  15,  1969 


553 


I 


the  moon  of  Apollo   12  during  my  stay  in 
Washington. 

Mr.  President,  at  this  time  when  United 
States-Japan  relations  are  about  to  make  a  new 
development,  we  have  found  it  extremely  heart- 
ening to  have  you  as  the  highest  leader  of  the 
United  States,  especially  since  you  have  visited 
Japan  as  many  as  six  times  after  the  war  and 
have  such  a  deep  understanding  of  our  country. 

Your  reference  to  my  name  is  but  another 
demonstration  of  your  great  knowledge  of  our 
culture  of  which  I  am  deeply  appreciative. 

I  had  the  pleasure  of  first  meeting  you,  Mr. 
President,  when  you  came  to  Japan  in  your 
capacity  as  Vice  President  under  the  admin- 
istration of  the  lat«  President  Eisenhower. 
Please  allow  me  to  confess  here  frankly  that 
since  then  I  have  always  had  a  sense  of  special 
closeness  to  you,  by  drawing  an  analogy  be- 
tween your  relations  with  the  late  President 
and  my  own  relations  with  the  late  Prime  Min- 
ister Shigeru  Yoshida. 

In  recent  years  Japan's  national  strength  has 
been  greatly  enlianced  through  steady  economic 
growth  and  teclinological  innovation.  Our  de- 
velopment up  to  the  present  time  represents  the 
fruits  of  the  Japanese  people's  many  years  of 
diligent  effort ;  but  at  the  same  time,  it  owes  a 
great  deal  to  the  close  cooperation  between  our 
two  countries  which  many  of  our  predecessors 
have  done  so  much  to  promote. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  difficulties  confront- 
ing the  present  world  are  numerous  and  deep 
rooted.  I  feel,  Mr.  President,  that  the  amount  of 
painstaking  effort  you  expend  in  carrying  out 
your  responsibilities  as  the  President  of  the 
United  States  cannot  be  measured.  No  person 
can  help  respecting  you  for  your  faith,  your  in- 
domitable statesman's  spirit,  so  to  speak,  in 
overcoming  the  many  difficulties  you  have  faced 
by  exercising  your  firm  will  and  in  finally 
reaching  your  present  exalted  position.  We  have 
also  heard  that  behind  your  successes  there  has 
always  been  the  warm  presence  of  Mi's.  Nixon. 

Unshakable  faith  and  untiring  aspiration — 
these  are  the  two  qualities  of  which  the  present 
world  is  in  the  utmost  need.  I  am  convinced  that 
your  excellent  leadership  combined  with  the 
wisdom  and  power  of  action  of  the  American 
people,  as  symbolized  in  the  Apollo  project, 
will  not  fail  to  contribute  to  the  reduction  of 
international  tensions  and  to  the  enhancement 
of  the  progress  of  mankind. 


554 


We  are  also  firmly  determined  to  establish  a 
relationship  of  mutual  trust  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  on  this  foundation,  to 
carry  out  such  international  responsibilities  and 
roles  as  would  be  commensurate  with  our  na- 
tional strength. 

It  is  my  sincere  hope  that,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  President  Nixon,  the  United  States  wiU 
continue  to  achieve  even  higher  development  as 
the  vanguard  of  world  civilization. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  wish  now  to  ask  you 
all  to  join  me  in  a  toast  to  the  good  health  and 
further  success  of  the  President  and  Mrs. 
Nixon,  as  well  as  to  the  everlasting  friendship 
and  mutual  trust  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan. 


EXCHANGE  OF  REMARKS 

White  Hoase  press  release  dated  November  21 
President  Nixon 

Tliere  have  been  many  meetings  between  the 
heads  of  government  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States  over  the  past  25  years.  I  am  confident 
that  history  will  record  that  this  is  the  most 
significant  meeting  that  has  occurred  since  the 
end  of  World  War  II. 

It  is  customary  on  such  occasions  to  say  that 
a  new  era  begins  in  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries  involved.  I  believe  today,  how- 
ever, that  there  is  no  question  that  tliis  is  a 
statement  of  the  fact,  that  a  new  era  begins  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Japan  in  our  rela- 
tions not  only  bilaterally  in  the  Pacific  but  in 
the  world. 

As  the  joint  communique  wliich  will  be  issued 
at  11 :30  indicates,  we  have  resolved  the  last 
major  issue  which  came  out  of  World  War  11, 
the  Okinawa  problem.  And  further,  we  have 
made  significant  progress  in  the  resolution  of 
other  bilateral  issues  in  the  economic  field,  as 
well  as  in  the  field  of  investment  and  trade,  not 
only  between  our  two  countries  but  in  the  Asian 
area.  s 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  I  believe  that  as  we 
stand  here  today  that  in  the  years  ahead  our 
two  Governments  and  our  two  peoples  will  work 
together  toward  that  great  goal  which  is  con- 
tained in  the  slogan  of  the  Expo  1970  in  Osaka : 
"Harmony  and  Progress  for  All  Mankind." 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Prime  Minister  Sato  ' 

I  am  leaving  "Washington  this  afternoon  after 
having  successfully  completed  3  days  of  talks 
with  President  Nixon  and  other  leaders  of  the 
United  States  Government. 

It  gave  me  the  greatest  pleasure  to  have  been 
able  to  strengthen  the  ties  of  mutual  trust  and 
friendship  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan  in  such  an  openhearted  atmosphere  as 
prevailed  throughout  our  meetings. 

Although  we  still  face  a  number  of  difficult 
problems  in  the  present  international  society, 
I  firmly  believe  that  the  paths  we  have  to  tread 
will  open  up  by  themselves  if  we  both  continue 
our  efforts  with  hope  in  the  future  and  in  the 
spirit  of  mutual  understanding  and  cooperation. 

In  particular,  it  is  an  event  of  historic  signi- 
ficance that  an  agreement  has  been  reached  on 
the  reversion  of  Okinawa  tlirough  our  talks. 

On  my  return  to  Japan,  I  am  determined  to 
make  every  possible  effort  to  set  up  new  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Japan, 
based  on  the  accomplishments  of  this  visit, 
which  would  also  contribute  toward  the  estab- 
lishment of  world  peace. 

As  I  take  my  leave,  may  I  express  to  Presi- 
dent and  Mrs.  Nixon,  as  well  as  to  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  people  of  the  United  States,  my 
heartfelt  gratitude  for  your  warm  solicitude 
and  my  best  wishes  for  the  good  health  and 
continued  prosperity  of  you  all. 


TEXT  OF  JOINT  COMMUNIQUE 

White  House  press  release  dated  NoTember  21 

1.  President  Nixon  and  Prime  Minister  Sato 
met  in  Washington  on  November  19,  20  and  21, 
1969,  to  exchange  views  on  the  present  hitema- 
tional  situation  and  on  other  matters  of  mutual 
interest  to  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

2.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
recognized  that  both  the  United  States  and 
Japan  have  greatly  benefited  from  their  close 
association  in  a  variety  of  fields,  and  they  de- 
clared that  guided  by  their  common  principles 
of  democracy  and  liberty,  the  two  countries 
would  maintain  and  strengthen  their  fruitful 
cooperation  in  the  continuing  search  for  world 
peace  and  prosperity  and  in  particular  for  the 
relaxation  of  international  tensions.  The  Presi- 


'  Prime  Minister  Sato  spoke  in  Japanese. 


dent  expressed  his  and  his  government's  deep 
interest  in  Asia  and  stated  his  belief  that  the 
United  States  and  Japan  should  cooperate  in 
contributing  to  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the 
region.  The  Prime  Minister  stated  that  Japan 
would  make  further  active  contributions  to  the 
peace  and  prosperity  of  Asia. 

3.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  ex- 
changed frank  views  on  the  current  interna- 
tional situation,  with  particiilar  attention  to  de- 
velopments in  the  Far  East.  The  President, 
while  emphasizing  that  the  countries  in  the  area 
were  expected  to  make  their  own  efforts  for  the 
stability  of  the  area,  gave  assurance  that  the 
United  States  would  continue  to  contribute  to 
the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  se- 
curity in  the  Far  East  by  honoring  its  defense 
treaty  obligations  in  the  area.  The  Prime  Minis- 
ter, appreciating  the  determination  of  the 
United  States,  stressed  that  it  was  important 
for  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Far  East  that 
the  United  States  should  be  in  a  position  to 
carry  out  fully  its  obligations  referred  to  by  the 
President.  He  further  expressed  his  recognition 
that,  in  the  light  of  the  present  situation,  the 
presence  of  United  States  forces  in  the  Far  East 
constituted  a  mainstay  for  the  stability  of  the 
area. 

4.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  spe- 
cifically noted  the  continuing  tension  over  the 
Korean  peninsula.  The  Prime  Minister  deeply 
appreciated  the  peacekeeping  efforts  of  the 
United  Nations  in  the  area  and  stated  that  the 
security  of  the  Eepublic  of  Korea  was  essential 
to  Japan's  own  security.  The  President  and  the 
Prime  Minister  shared  the  hope  that  Communist 
China  would  adopt  a  more  cooperative  and  con- 
structive attitude  in  its  external  relations.  The 
President  referred  to  the  treaty  obligations  of 
his  comitry  to  the  Kepublic  of  China  which  the 
United  States  would  uphold.  The  Prime  Min- 
ister said  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 
security  in  the  Taiwan  area  was  also  a  most  im- 
portant factor  for  the  security  of  Japan.  The 
President  described  the  earnest  efforts  made  by 
the  United  States  for  a  peaceful  and  just  settle- 
ment of  the  Viet-Nam  problem.  The  President 
and  the  Prime  Minister  expressed  the  strong 
hope  that  the  war  in  Viet-Nam  would  be  con- 
cluded before  return  of  the  administrative 
rights  over  Okinawa  to  Japan.  In  this  connec- 
tion, they  agreed  that,  should  peace  in  Viet- 
Nam  not  have  been  realized  by  the  time  rever- 


December  15,   1969 


555 


sion  of  Okinawa  is  scheduled  to  take  place,  the 
two  governments  would  fully  consult  with  each 
other  in  the  light  of  the  situation  at  that  time 
so  that  reversion  would  be  accomplished  with- 
out affecting  the  United  States  efforts  to  assure 
the  South  Vietnamese  people  the  opportunity  to 
determine  their  own  political  future  without 
outside  interference.  The  Prime  Minister  stated 
that  Japan  was  exploring  what  role  she  could 
play  in  bringing  about  stability  in  the  Indo- 
china area. 

5.  In  light  of  the  current  situation  and  the 
prospects  in  the  Far  East,  the  President  and 
the  Prime  Minister  agreed  that  they  highly 
valued  the  role  played  by  the  Treaty  of  Mutual 
Cooperation  and  Security  in  maintaining  the 
peace  and  security  of  the  Far  East  including 
Japan,  and  they  affirmed  the  intention  of  the 
two  governments  firmly  to  maintain  the  Treaty 
on  the  basis  of  mutual  trust  and  common  evalua- 
tion of  the  international  situation.*  They  fur- 
ther agreed  that  the  two  governments  should 
maintain  close  contact  with  each  other  on  mat- 
ters affecting  the  peace  and  security  of  the  Far 
East  mcluding  Japan,  and  on  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Cooperation  and 
Security. 

6.  The  Prime  Minister  emphasized  his  view 
that  the  time  had  come  to  respond  to  the  strong 
desire  of  the  people  of  Japan,  of  both  the  main- 
land and  Okinawa,  to  have  the  administrative 
rights  over  Okinawa  returned  to  Japan  on  the 
basis  of  the  friendly  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  and  thereby  to  restore 
Okinawa  to  its  normal  status.  The  President 
expressed  appreciation  of  the  Prime  Minister's 
view.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
also  recognized  the  vital  role  played  by  United 
States  forces  in  Okinawa  in  the  present  situa- 
tion in  the  Far  East.  As  a  result  of  their  discus- 
sion it  was  agreed  that  the  mutual  security  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  and  Japan  could  be 
accommodated  within  arrangements  for  the  re- 
turn of  the  administrative  rights  over  Okinawa 
to  Japan.  They  therefore  agreed  that  the  two 
govermnents  would  immediately  enter  into  con- 
sultations regarding  specific  arrangements  for 
accomplishing  the  early  reversion  of  Okinawa 
without  detriment  to  the  security  of  the  Far 
East  including  Japan.  They  further  agreed  to 
expedite  the  consultations  with  a  view  to  ac- 
complishing the  reversion  during  1972  subject 
to  the  conclusion  of  these  specific  arrangements 


1 


'  For  text  of  the  treaty,  see  Botletin  of  Feb.  8,  1960, 
p.  184. 


with  the  necessary  legislative  support.  In  this 
connection,  the  Prune  Minister  made  clear  the 
intention  of  his  government,  following  rever- 
sion, to  assume  gradually  the  responsibility  for 
the  immediate  defense  of  Okinawa  as  part  of 
Japan's  defense  efforts  for  her  own  territories. 
The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed 
also  that  the  United  States  would  retain  under 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Cooperation 
and  Security  such  military  facilities  and  areas 
in  Okinawa  as  required  in  the  mutual  security  of 
both  countries. 

7.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that,  upon  return  of  the  administrative 
rights,  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Cooperation  and 
Security  and  its  related  arrangements  would  ap- 
ply to  Okinawa  without  modification  thereof.  In 
this  connection,  the  Prime  Minister  affirmed  the 
recognition  of  his  government  that  the  security 
of  Japan  could  not  be  adequately  maintained 
without  international  peace  and  security  in  the 
Far  East  and,  therefore,  the  security  of  coun- 
tries in  the  Far  East  was  a  matter  of  serious 
concern  for  Japan.  The  Prime  Minister  was  of 
the  ^^ew  that,  in  the  light  of  sucli  recognition 
on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  Government,  the 
return  of  the  administrative  rights  over  Oki- 
nawa in  the  manner  agreed  above  should  not 
hinder  the  effective  discharge  of  the  interna-  ^ 
tional  obligations  assumed  by  the  United  States  " 
for  the  defense  of  countries  in  the  Far  East  in- 
cluding Japan.  The  President  replied  that  he 
shared  the  Prime  Minister's  view. 

8.  The  Prime  Minister  described  in  detail  the 
particular  sentiment  of  the  Japanese  people  * 
against  nuclear  weapons  and  the  jjolicy  of  the 
Japanese  Government  reflecting  such  sentiment. 
The  President  expressed  his  deep  understand- 
ing and  assured  the  Prime  Minister  that,  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  position  of  the  United  States 
Government  with  respect  to  the  prior  consulta- 
tion system  under  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Coop- 
eration and  Security,  the  reversion  of  Okinawa 
would  be  carried  out  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  tlie  policy  of  the  Japanese  Government  as  | 
described  by  the  Prime  Minister. 

9.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  took 
note  of  the  fact  that  there  would  be  a  number 
of  financial  and  economic  problems,  including 
those  concerning  United  States  business  inter- 
ests in  Okinawa,  to  be  solved  between  tlie  two 
countries  in  connection  with  the  transfer  of  the 
administrative  rights  over  Okinawa  to  Japan 
and  agreed  that  detailed  discussions  relative  to 
their  solution  would  be  initiated  promptly. 


556 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


10.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister, 
recognizing  the  complexity  of  the  problems  in- 
\-olved  in  the  reversion  of  Okinawa,  agreed  that 
the  two  governments  should  consult  closely  and 
cooperate  on  the  measures  necessary  to  assure  a 
Hinootli  transfer  of  administrative  rights  to  the 
Japanese  Government  in  accordance  with  rever- 
sion arrangements  to  be  agreed  to  by  botli  gov- 
ernments. They  agreed  that  the  United  States- 
Japan  Consultative  Committee  in  Toltyo  sliould 
undertake  overall  responsibility  for  this  pre- 
paratory work.  The  President  and  the  Prime 
-Minister  decided  to  establish  in  Okuiawa  a 
Preparatory  Commission  in  jjlace  of  the  exist- 
ing Advisory  Conmiittee  to  the  High  Commis- 
sioner of  the  Eyulcj'u  Islands  for  the  purpose 
of  consulting  and  coordinating  locally  on  meas- 
ures relating  to  preparation  for  the  transfer  of 
administrative  rights,  including  necessary  as- 
sistance to  the  Government  of  the  Eyukyu 
Islands.  The  Preparatory  Commission  will  be 
composed  of  a  representative  of  the  Japanese 
Govermnent  with  ambassadorial  rank  and  the 
Iligli  Commissioner  of  the  Ryukyu  Islands  with 
the  Chief  Executive  of  the  Government  of  the 
Ryukyu  Islands  acting  as  adviser  to  the  Com- 
mission. The  Commission  will  report  and  make 
recommendations  to  the  two  governments 
througli  the  United  States-Japan  Consultative 
Committee. 

11.  The  President  and  the  Prime  ^Minister 
expressed  their  conviction  that  a  mutually  satis- 
factory solution  of  tlie  question  of  the  return  of 
the  administrative  rights  over  Okinawa  to 
Japan,  which  is  the  last  of  the  major  issues  be- 
tween the  two  countries  arising  from  the  Sec- 
ond "NA'^orld  "War,  would  further  strengthen 
United  States-Japan  relations  which  are  based 
on  friendship  and  mutual  ti'ust  and  would  make 
a  major  contribution  to  the  peace  and  security 
of  the  Far  East. 

12.  In  their  discussion  of  economic  matters, 
the  President  and  the  Prime  IMinister  noted  the 
marked  growth  in  economic  relations  between 
the  two  countries.  They  also  acknowledged  that 
the  leading  positions  which  their  countries  oc- 
cupy in  the  world  economy  impose  important  re- 
sponsibilities on  each  for  the  maintenance  and 
strengthening  of  the  international  trade  and 
monetary  system,  especially  in  the  liglit  of  the 
current  large  imbalances  in  trade  and  i)ayments. 
In  this  regard,  tlie  President  stressed  his  deter- 
mination to  bring  inflation  in  the  United  States 
under  control.  He  also  reaffirmed  the  commit- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  the  principle  of 


promoting  freer  trade.  Tlie  Prime  IMinister  in- 
dicated the  intention  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment to  accelerate  rapidly  the  reduction  of 
Japan's  trade  and  capital  restrictions.  Specifi- 
cally, he  stated  the  intention  of  the  Japanese 
tiovernracnt  to  remove  Japan's  residual  import 
quota  restrictions  over  a  broad  range  of  prod- 
ucts by  the  end  of  1971  and  to  make  maximum 
efforts  to  accelerate  the  liberalization  of  the  re- 
maining items.  He  added  that  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment intends  to  make  periodic  reviews  of  its 
liberalization  program  with  a  view  to  imple- 
menting trade  liberalization  at  a  more  acceler- 
ated pace  than  hitherto.  The  President  and  the 
Prime  ^linister  agi'eed  that  their  respective  ac- 
tions would  further  solidify  the  foundation  of 
overall  U.S.-Japan  relations. 

13.  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  attention  to  the  economic  needs  of 
the  developing  countries  was  essential  to  the  de- 
velopment of  international  peace  and  stability. 
The  Prime  Minister  stated  the  intention  of  the 
Japanese  Government  to  expand  and  improve 
its  aid  programs  in  Asia  commensurate  with  tlie 
economic  growth  of  Japan.  The  President  wel- 
comed this  statement  and  confirmed  that  the 
United  States  would  continue  to  contribute  to 
the  econonuc  development  of  Asia.  The  Presi- 
dent and  Prime  Minister  recognized  that  there 
would  be  major  requirements  for  the  post-war 
rehabilitation  of  Viet-Nam  and  elsewhere  in 
Southeast  Asia.  The  Prime  Minister  stated  the 
intention  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  make 
a  substantial  contribution  to  this  end. 

Itt.  The  Prime  Minister  congratulated  the 
President  on  the  successful  moon  landing  of 
Apollo  XII,  and  expressed  the  hope  for  a  safe 
journej-  back  to  earth  for  the  astronauts.  The 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed  that 
the  exploration  of  space  offers  great  opportu- 
nities for  expanding  cooperation  in  peaceful 
scientific  projects  among  all  nations.  In  this 
connection,  the  Prime  Minister  noted  with 
pleasure  that  the  United  States  and  Japan  last 
sunnner  had  concluded  an  agreement  on  space 
cooperation."  The  President  and  the  Prime  Min- 
ister agreed  that  implementation  of  this  unique 
program  is  of  importance  to  both  countries. 

1.").  The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
discussed  prospects  for  the  promotion  of  arms 
control  and  the  slowing  down  of  the  arms  race. 
The  President  outlined  his  Government's  etforts 
to  initiate  the  strategic  arms  limitations  talks 


>  Bulletin  of  Sept.  1, 1069,  p.  195. 


December   15,   1969 

370-286—69 3 


557 


with  the  Soviet  Union  tliat  liavc  recently  started 
in  Ilelsinivi.  The  Prime  Minister  expressed  his 
Government's  strong  hopes  for  the  success  of 
these  talks.  The  Prime  Minister  pointed  out  his 
country's  strong  and  traditional  interest  in  ef- 
fective disarmament  measures  with  a  view  to 
achievement  of  general  and  complete  disarma- 
ment under  strict  and  effective  international 
control. 


U.S.  and  Spain  Begin  Negotiations 
for  New  Extradition  Treaty 

Joint  Statement^ 

Two  delegations,  one  from  Spain,  headed  by 
the  Honorable  Sr.  D.  Antonio  Garcia  Lahi- 
guera,  and  the  other  delegation  from  the  United 
States  of  America,  headed  by  Mr.  H.  Rowan 
Gaither,  have  held  the  first  round  of  discus- 
sions for  the  negotiation  of  a  new  extradition 
treaty  between  Spain  and  the  U.S. 

These  negotiations  have  resulted  in  agreement 
on  far-reaching  provisions  directed  against 
aircraft  hijacking.  In  addition  to  making  hi- 
jacking extraditable,  the  provisional  text  estab- 
lishes that  hijacking  which  endangers  civil  air- 
craft and  the  passengers  they  carry  is  such  a 
serious  crime  that  it  will  not  be  considered  a 
political  offense.  Thus  liij  ackers  of  this  kind 
would  always  be  subject  to  extradition. 

Agreement  was  also  reached  on  numerous 
other  points  which  will  result  in  the  moderniza- 
tion of  the  extradition  relations  between  the  two 
countries,  including  in  particular  a  discretion- 
ary provision  relating  to  minors  wherein  social 
and  rehabilitating  factors  may  be  taken  into 
consideration. 


A  second  stage  of  negotiations  is  expected  to 
take  place  in  "Washington  early  next  year.  Once 
an  agreed  text  is  arrived  at  and  signed,  the 
treaty  will  be  submitted  to  the  Spanish  legisla- 
ture and  to  the  United  States  Senate  for  ad^ce 
and  consent. 

The  pi'esent  treaty  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  which  was  signed  at  Madrid  on 
June  15,  1904,  was  supplemented  by  a  protocol 
in  1907,  but  this  is  the  first  comprehensive  re- 
view of  extradition  relations  between  the  two 
countries. 


Mr.  Herman  Named  to  U.S.-Canada 
international  Boundary  Commission 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
November  13  (press  release  341)  that  Richard 
L.  Herman  had  been  sworn  in  that  day  as 
United  States  Commissioner  on  the  Interna- 
tional Boundary  (Commission,  United  States 
and  Canada.  (For  biographic  data,  see  Depart- 
ment of  State  press  release  341.)  He  succeeds 
Edward  J.  Iving,  who  has  resigned. 

The  International  Boundary  Coimnission, 
United  States  and  Canada,  was  created  under 
the  provisions  of  the  treaties  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  April  21, 
1906,  April  11,  1908,  and  February  24,  1925.» 
The  Commission  consists  of  a  United  States 
Commissioner,  a  Canadian  Commissioner,  and 
their  assistants.  The  Secretary  of  State  exercises 
jurisdiction  over  the  United  States  section  of 
the  Commission.  Its  purpose  is  to  define,  mark, 
and  maintain  the  demarcation  of  the  interna- 
tional boundary  line  between  the  United  States 
and  Canada. 


'  Issued  at  W.ishington  Nov.  20  (press  release  350). 


'  34  Stat.  29J8,  35  Stat  2003,  44  Stat  2102. 


558 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


UNITED  STATES  TRADE   POLICY 


The  Trade  Act  of  1969 


Message  From  President  Nixon  to  the  Congress ' 


To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States : 

For  the  past  35  years,  the  United  States  has 
steadfastly  pursued  a  policy  of  freer  world 
trade.  As  a  nation,  we  have  recognized  that  com- 
petition cannot  stop  at  the  ocean's  edge.  We 
have  determined  that  American  trade  policies 
must  advance  the  national  interest — which 
means  they  must  respond  to  tlie  whole  of  our 
interests,  and  not  be  a  device  to  favor  the 
narrow  interest. 

This  Administi-ation  has  reviewed  that  policy 
and  we  find  that  its  continuation  is  in  our  na- 
tional interest.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is 
clear  that  the  trade  problems  of  the  1970s  wUl 
differ  significantly  from  those  of  the  past.  New 
developments  in  the  rapidly  evolving  world 
economy  will  require  new  responses  and  new 
initiatives. 

As  we  look  at  the  changing  patterns  of  world 
trade,  three  factors  stand  out  that  require  us  to 
continue  modernizing  our  own  trade  policies : 

First,  world  economic  interdependence  has  he- 
come  a  fact.  Reductions  in  tariffs  and  in  trans- 
portation costs  have  internationalized  the  world 
economy  just  as  satellites  and  global  television 
have  internationalized  the  world  communica- 
tions network.  The  growth  of  multinational  cor- 
porations provides  a  dramatic  example  of  this 
development. 

Second,  we  must  recognize  that  a  number  of 
foreign  countries  now  com,j)ete  fully  with  the 
United  States  in  world  markets.  We  ha^e 
always  welcomed  such  competition.  It  promotes 


'Transmitted  on  Nov.  18  (White  House  press  re- 
lease) ;  also  printed  aa  H.  Doc.  91-1£H,  91st  Cong., 
1st  sess. 


the  economic  development  of  the  entire  world 
to  the  mutual  benefit  of  all,  including  our  own 
consmners.  It  provides  an  additional  stimulus 
to  our  own  industry,  agriculture  and  labor 
force.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  requires  us 
to  insist  on  fair  competition  among  all  countries. 

Third,  the  traditional  smylus  in  the  U.S. 
balance  of  trade  has  disappeared.  This  is  largely 
due  to  our  own  internal  inflation  and  is  one 
more  reason  why  we  must  bring  that  inflation 
under  control. 

The  disappearance  of  the  surplus  has  sug- 
gested to  some  that  we  should  abandon  our 
traditional  approach  toward  freer  trade.  I 
reject  this  argument  not  only  because  I  believe 
in  the  principle  of  freer  trade,  but  also  for  a 
very  simple  and  pragmatic  reason:  any  reduc- 
tion in  our  imports  produced  by  U.S.  restric- 
tions not  accepted  by  our  trading  partners 
would  invite  foreign  reaction  against  our  own 
exports — all  quite  legally.  Reduced  imports 
would  thus  be  offset  by  reduced  exports,  and 
both  sides  would  lose.  In  the  longer  term,  such 
a  policy  of  trade  restriction  would  add  to  domes- 
tic inflation  and  jeopardize  our  competitiveness 
in  world  markets  at  the  very  time  when  tougher 
competition  throughout  the  world  requires  us 
to  improve  our  competitive  capabilities  in  every 
way  possible. 

In  fact,  the  need  to  restore  our  trade  surplus 
heightens  the  need  for  further  movement  to- 
ward freer  trade.  It  requires  us  to  persuade 
other  nations  to  lower  barriers  which  deny  us 
fair  access  to  their  markets.  An  environment  of 
freer  trade  will  permit  the  widest  possible  scope 
for  the  genius  of  American  industry  and  agri- 


December  15,   1969 


559 


culture  to  respond  to  the  competitive  chsillenge 
of  the  1970s. 

Fourth,  the  leas  developed  countries  need 
improved  access  to  the  markets  of  the  industri- 
alized  countries  if  their  economic  development 
is  to  proceed  satisfactorily.  Public  aid  will 
never  be  sufficient  to  meet  their  needs,  nor 
should  it  be.  I  recently  amiounced  that,  as  one 
step  toward  improving  their  market  access,  the 
United  States  would  press  in  world  trade 
forums  for  a  liberal  system  of  tariff  preferences 
for  all  developmg  countries.^  International  dis- 
cussions are  now  in  progress  on  the  matter  and 
I  will  not  deal  with  it  in  the  trade  bill  I  am  sub- 
mitting today.  At  the  appropriate  time,  I  will 
submit  legislation  to  the  Congress  to  seek  au- 
thorization for  the  United  States  to  extend 
preferences  and  to  take  any  other  steps  toward 
improving  the  market  access  of  the  less  devel- 
oped countries  wliich  might  appear  desirable 
and  wliich  would  require  legislation. 

The  Trade  Act  of  1969 

The  trade  bill  which  I  am  submitting  today 
addresses  these  new  problems  of  the  19T0s.  It  is 
modest  in  scope,  but  significant  in  its  impact.  It 
continues  the  general  drive  toward  freer  world 
trade.  It  also  explicitly  recognizes  that,  while 
seeking  to  advance  world  interests,  U.S.  trade 
policies  must  also  respect  legitimate  U.S.  inter- 
ests, and  that  to  be  fair  to  our  trading  partnei-s 
does  not  require  us  to  be  unfair  to  our  own 
people.  Specifically : 

—It  restores  the  authority  needed  by  the 
President  to  make  limited  tariff  reductions. 

—It  takes  concrete  steps  toward  the  increas- 
ingly urgent  goal  of  lowering  non-tariff  barriers 
to  trade. 

—It  recognizes  the  very  real  plight  of  par- 
ticular industries,  companies  and  workers  faced 
with  import  competition,  and  provides  for 
readier  relief  in  these  special  cases. 

—It  strengthens  GATT— the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade— by  regularizing  the 
fimding  of  United  States  participation. 

"Wliile  asking  enactment  of  these  proposals 
now,  the  trade  program  I  will  outline  in 
this  message  also  includes  setting  prepara- 
tions under  way  for  the  more  ambitious  initia- 
tives that  will  later  be  needed  for  the  long-term 
future. 


Tariff   Reduction  ' 

/  recommend  tluit  the  President  he  given 
authority  to  make  modest  reductions  in  U.S. 
tariffs. 

The  President  has  been  without  such  author- 
ity for  over  two  years.  This  authority  is  not  de- 
signed to  be  used  for  major  tariff  negotiations, 
but  rather  to  make  possible  minor  adjustments 
that  individual  circumstances  from  time  to  time 
require — as,  for  example,  when  it  becomes  neces- 
sary to  raise  the  duty  on  an  article  as  the  result 
of  an  "escape  clause"'  action  or  when  a  statutory 
change  is  made  in  tariff  classification.  Our  trad- 
mg  partners  are  then  entitled  to  reasonable 
compensation,  just  as  we  would  be  entitled  to 
receive  it  from  them  in  reverse  circumstances. 
Lack  of  this  authority  exposes  our  exports  to 
foreign  retaliation.  Therefore,  the  Bill  would 
provide  to  the  President,  through  Jime  30, 1973. 
the  authority  to  reduce  tariffs  by  limited 
amounts. 

Non-Tcriff  Barriers 

The  time  has  come  for  a  serious  and  sustained 
effort  to  reduce  non-tariff  barriere  to  trade. 
These  non-tariff  barriers  have  become  increas- 
ingly important  with  the  decline  in  tariff  pi-o- 
tecti'on  and  the  growing  interdependence  of  the 
world  economy.  Their  elimination  is  vital  to 
our  efforts  to  increase  U.S.  exports. 

^l.s  a  first  step  in  this  direction,  I  propose  to- 
day that  the  United  States  eliminate  tJie  Amen- 
can  Selling  Price  system  of  customs  valuation. 

Although  this  system  applies  only  to  a  very 
few  American  products — mainly  benzenoid 
chemicals— it  is  viewed  by  our  principal  trading 
pai-tners  as  a  major  symbol  of  American  pro- 
tectionism. Its  removal  will  bring  reciprocal  re- 
ductions in  foreign  tariffs  on  U.S.  chemical 
exports,  and  a  reduction  in  important  foreign 
non-tariff  barriers— including  European  road 
taxes,  which  discriminate  against  our  larger 
automobiles,  and  the  preferential  treatment  on 
tobacco  extended  by  the  United  Kingdom  to  the 
countries  of  the  Commonwealth.  Beyond  this, 
its  removal  will  unlock  the  door  to  new  negotia- 
tions on  the  entire  range  of  non-tariff'  barriers. 
Because  of  the  symbolic  importance  our  trad- 

"  For  ail  address  by  Pi-esident  Nixon  on  "Action  for 
rrosi-ess  for  tlie  Aiuericns,"  see  Bvlletin  of  Xov.  IT, 
loot),  p.  400. 


560 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


ing  partners  attach  to  it,  the  American  Selling 
Price  system  has  itself  become  a  major  barrier 
to  the  removal  of  other  barriers. 

Essentially,  the  American  Selling  Price  sys- 
tem is  a  device  by  which  the  value  of  imports  for 
tariff  purjioses  is  set  by  the  price  of  competitive 
American  products  instead  of  the  actual  price 
of  the  foreign  product,  which  is  the  basis  of 
tariff  valuation  for  all  other  imports.  The 
extraordinary  protection  it  provides  to  these 
u  few  products  has  outlived  its  original  purposes. 
The  special  advantage  it  gives  particular 
producers  can  no  longer  justify  its  heavy  cost 
in  terms  of  the  obstacles  it  places  in  the  way  of 
opening  foreign  markets  to  American  exports. 

Reducing  or  eliminating  other  non-tariff  bar- 
riers to  world  trade  will  require  a  great  deal 
of  detailed  negotiating  and  hard  bargaining. 

Unlike  tariffs,  approaches  to  the  reduction  of 
non-tariff  barriers  are  often  difficult  to  embody 
in  prior  delegation  of  authority.  Many — both 
here  and  abroad — have  their  roots  in  purely 
domestic  concerns  that  are  only  indirectly  re- 
lated to  foreign  trade,  and  many  arise  from 
domestic  laws. 

Many  would  require  specific  legislative  ac- 
tions to  accomplish  their  removal — but  the  na- 
ture of  this  action  would  not  finally  be  clear 
luitil  negotiation  had  shown  what  was  possible. 

This  presents  a  special  opportunity  for  Con- 
gress to  be  helpful  in  achieving  international 
agreements  in  this  vital  area. 

/  would  welcome  a  clear  statement  of  Con- 
gressional intent  with  regard  to  non-tariff  Car- 
riers to  assist  in  our  efforts  to  ohtain  reciprocal 
lowering  of  such  harriers. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  use  such  a  declara- 
tion as  a  "blank  check."  On  the  contrary,  I 
pledge  to  maintain  close  consultation  with  the 
Congress  during  the  course  of  any  such  nego- 
tiations, to  keep  the  Congress  fully  informed  on 
problems  and  progress,  and  to  submit  for 
Congressional  consideration  any  agreements 
which  would  require  new  legislation.  The  pur- 
pose of  seeking  such  an  advance  declaration  is 
not  to  bypass  Congress,  but  to  strengthen  our 
negotiating  position. 

In  fact,  it  is  precisely  because  ours  is  a  system 
in  which  the  Executive  caimot  commit  the  Leg- 
islative Branch  that  a  general  declaration  of 
legislative  intent  would  be  important  to  those 
with  whom  we  must  negotiate. 


At  the  same  time,  I  urge  private  interests  to 
work  closely  with  the  goveimment  in  seeking 
the  removal  of  these  harriers.  Close  cooperation 
by  the  private  sector  is  essential,  because  many 
non-tariff  barriers  are  subtle,  complex  and  dif- 
ficult to  appraise. 

Aid  for  Affected  Industries 

Freer  trade  brings  benefits  to  the  entire  com- 
mmiity,  but  it  can  also  cause  hardship  for  parts 
of  the  community.  The  price  of  a  trade  policy 
from  which  we  all  receive  benefits  must  not  fall 
unfairly  on  the  few — whether  on  particular  in- 
dustries, on  individual  firms  or  on  groups  of 
workers.  As  we  have  long  recognized,  there 
should  be  prompt  and  effective  means  of  help- 
ing those  faced  with  adversity  because  of 
increased  imports. 

The  Trade  Act  of  1969  provides  significant 
improvements  in  the  means  hy  which  U.S.  in- 
dustry, firms,  and  workers  can  receive  assistance 
from  their  government  to  meet  injury  truly 
caused  hy  imports. 

This  relief  falls  into  two  broad  categories :  1) 
the  escape  clause,  which  is  industry-wide;  and 
2)  adjustment  assistance,  which  provides  spe- 
cific aid  to  particular  firms  or  groups  of 
workers. 

These  improvements  are  needed  because  the 
assistance  programs  provided  in  the  Trade  Ex- 
pansion Act  of  1962  have  simply  not  worked. 

Escape  Clause 

The  escape  clause  provisions  of  the  1962  Act 
have  proved  so  stringent,  so  rigid,  and  so  techni- 
cal that  in  not  a  single  case  has  the  Tariff  Com- 
mission been  able  to  justify  a  recommendation 
for  relief.  This  must  be  remedied.  We  must  be 
able  to  provide,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  careful 
and  expedited  consideration  of  petitions  for 
relief,  and  such  relief  must  be  available  on  a 
fair  and  reasonable  basis. 

/  recom,mend  a  liieralization  of  the  escape 
clause  to  provide,  for  industries  adversely 
affected  by  import  competition,  a  test  that  will 
be  simple  and  clear:  relief  should  be  available 
whenever  increased  imports  are  the  primary 
cause  of  actual  or  potential  serious  injury.  The 
increase  in  imports  should  not — as  it  now  is — 
have  to  be  related  to  a  prior  tariff  reduction. 

'\^^iile   making  these   escape   clause   adjust- 


December  15,   1969 


561 


ments  more  readily  obtainable,  however,  we 
must  ensure  that  they  remain  what  they  are  in- 
tended to  be:  temporary  relief  measures,  not 
permanent  features  of  the  tariff  landscape.  An 
industry  provided  with  temporary  escape-clause 
relief  must  assume  responsibility  for  improv- 
ing its  competitive  position.  The  bill  provides 
for  regular  reports  on  these  efforts,  to  be  taken 
into  accoimt  in  determining  whether  relief 
should  be  continued. 

Adjustment  Assistance 

With  regard  to  adjustment  assistance  for  in- 
dividual firms  and  groups  of  workers,  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of  1962 
again  have  not  worked  adequately. 

The  Act  provides  for  loans,  technical  assist- 
ance and  tax  relief  for  firms,  and  readjustment 
allowances,  relocation  and  training  for  workers. 
This  direct  aid  to  those  individually  injured 
should  be  more  readily  available  than  tariff 
relief  for  entire  industries.  It  can  be  more 
closely  targeted;  it  matches  the  relief  to  the 
damage;  and  it  has  no  harmful  side  effects  on 
overall  trade  policy. 

/  recommend  that  firms  and  workers  ie  con- 
sidered eligible  for  adjustment  assistance  when 
increased  imports  are  found  to  ie  a  substantial 
cause  of  actual  or  potential  serious  injury. 

Again,  the  increase  in  imports  would  not  have 
to  be  related  to  a  prior  tariff  reduction.  The 
"substantial  cause"  criterion  for  adjustment  as- 
sistance would  be  less  stringent  than  the  "pri- 
mary cause"  criterion  for  tariff  relief. 

I  also  recommend  two  further  changes  in  ex- 
isting adjustment  provisions: 

— That  the  Tariff  Commission  continue  to 
gather  and  supply  the  needed  factual  informa- 
tion, but  that  determinations  of  eligibility  to 
apply  for  assistance  be  made  by  the  President. 

— That  adjustment  assistance  be  made  avail- 
able to  separate  units  of  multi-plant  companies 
and  to  groups  of  workers  in  them,  when  the  in- 
jury is  substantial  to  the  unit  but  not  to  the 
entire  parent  firm. 

With  these  modifications,  plus  improved  ad- 
ministrative procedures,  our  program  of  assist- 
ance to  import-injured  firms  and  workers  can 
and  will  be  made  to  work.  Taken  together,  they 
will  remedy  what  has  too  long  been  a  serious 
shortcoming  in  our  trade  programs. 

These  changes  in  our  escape  clause  and  adjust- 


ment assistance  programs  will  provide  an  ade- 
quate basis  for  government  help  in  cases  where 
such  help  is  justified  in  the  overall  national  in- 
terest. They  will  thus  help  us  move  away  from 
protectionist  proijosals,  which  would  reverse 
the  trend  toward  interdependence,  and  towards 
a  constructive  attack  on  the  existing  trade  bar- 
riers of  others. 

The  textile  import  problem,  of  course,  is  a  spe- 
cial circumstance  that  requires  special  measures. 
We  are  now  trying  to  persuade  other  countries 
to  limit  their  textile  shipments  to  the  United 
States.  In  doing  so,  however,  we  are  trying  to 
work  out  with  our  trading  partners  a  reason- 
able solution  which  will  allow  both  domestic 
and  foreign  producers  to  share  equitably  in  the 
development  of  the  U.S.  market. 

Such  measures  should  not  be  misconstrued, 
nor  should  they  be  allowed  to  turn  us  away 
from  the  basic  direction  of  our  progress  toward 
freer  exchange. 

Fair  Treatment  of  U.S.   Exports 

By  nature  and  by  definition,  trade  is  a  two- 
way  street.  We  must  make  every  effort  to  ensure 
that  American  products  are  allowed  to  compete 
in  world  markets  on  equitable  terms.  These 
efforts  will  be  more  successful  if  we  have  the 
means  to  take  effective  action  when  confronted 
with  illegal  or  unjust  restrictions  on  American 
exports. 

Section  252  of  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  of 
1962  authorizes  the  President  to  impose  duties 
or  other  import  restrictions  on  the  products  of 
any  nation  that  places  unjustifiable  restrictions 
on  U.S.  agricultural  products.  /  recommend 
that  this  authority  be  expanded  in  two  ways : 

— By  extending  the  existing  authority  to 
cover  unfair  actions  against  all  UjS.  products, 
rather  than  only  against  U.S.  agricultural 
products. 

— By  providing  new  authority  to  take  appro- 
priate action  against  nations  that  practice  what 
amounts  to  subsidized  competition  in  third- 
country  markets,  when  that  subsidized  competi- 
tion unfairly  affects  UjS.  exports. 

Any  weapon  is  most  effective  if  its  presence 
makes  its  use  unnecessary.  With  these  new 
weapons  in  our  negotiating  arsenal,  we  should 
be  better  able  to  negotiate  relief  from  the 
unfair  restrictions  to  wliich  American  exports 
still  are  subject. 


562 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Strengthening   GATT 

Ever  since  its  beginning  in  1947,  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  GATT — the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade — has  been  financed 
through  general  contingency  f  imds  rather  than 
through  a  specific  appropriation. 

GATT  has  proved  its  worth.  It  is  the  interna- 
tional organization  we  depend  on  for  the  en- 
forcement of  our  trading  rights,  and  toward 
which  we  look  as  a  forum  for  the  important 
new  negotiations  on  non-tariff  barriers  which 
must  now  be  undertaken. 

/  recommend  specific  authorization  for  the 
funding  of  our  particifation  in  GATT,  thus 
both  demonstrating  our  support  and  regulariz- 
ing our  procedures. 

For  the   Long-Term   Future 

The  trade  bill  I  have  submitted  today  is  a 
necessary  beginning.  It  corrects  deficiencies  in 
present  policies;  it  enables  us  to  begin  the 
1970s  with  a  program  geared  to  the  start  of  that 
decade. 

As  we  look  further  into  the  Seventies,  it  is 
clear  that  we  must  reexamine  the  entire  range  of 
our  policies  and  objectives. 

We  must  take  into  account  the  far-reaching 
changes  which  have  occurred  in  investment 
abroad  and  in  patterns  of  world  trade.  I  have 
already  outlined  some  of  the  problems  which  we 
will  face  in  the  1970s.  Many  more  will  develop — 
and  also  new  opportimities  will  emerge. 

Intense  international  competition,  new  and 
growing  markets,  changes  in  cost  levels,  tech- 
nological developments  in  both  agriculture  and 
industiy,  and  large-scale  exports  of  capital  are 
havuig  profoimd  and  continuing  effects  on  in- 
ternational production  and  trade  patterns.  We 
can  no  longer  afford  to  think  of  our  trade  poli- 
cies in  the  old,  simple  terms  of  liberalism  vs. 
protectionism.  Rather,  we  must  learn  to  treat 
investment,  production,  employment  and  trade 
as  interrelated  and  interdependent. 


We  need  a  deeper  understanding  of  the 
ways  in  wliich  the  major  sectors  of  our  economy 
are  actually  affected  by  international  trade. 

We  have  arrived  at  a  point  at  which  a  careful 
review  should  also  be  made  of  our  tariff  struc- 
ture itself — including  such  traditional  aspects 
as  its  reliance  upon  specific  duties,  the  rela- 
tionships among  tariff  rates  on  various  prod- 
ucts, and  adapting  our  system  to  conform  more 
closely  with  that  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

To  help  prepare  for  these  many  future  needs, 
I  will  appoint  a  Commission  on  World  Trade 
to  examine  the  entire  range  of  our  trade  and  re- 
lated policies,  to  analyze  the  problems  we  are 
likely  to  face  in  the  1970s,  and  to  prepare  rec- 
ommendations on  what  we  should  do  about 
them.  It  will  be  empowered  to  call  upon  the 
Tariff  Commission  and  the  agencies  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive Branch  for  advice,  support  and  assist- 
ance, but  its  recommendations  will  be  its  own. 

By  expanding  world  markets,  our  trade  poli- 
cies have  speeded  the  pace  of  our  own  economic 
progress  and  aided  the  development  of  others. 
As  we  look  to  the  future,  we  must  seek  a  con- 
tinued expansion  of  world  trade,  even  as  we 
also  seek  the  dismantling  of  those  other  bar- 
riers— political,  social  and  ideological — that 
have  stood  in  the  way  of  a  freer  exchange  of 
people  and  ideas,  as  well  as  of  goods  and 
teclmology. 

Our  goal  is  an  open  world.  Trade  is  one  of  the 
doors  to  that  open  world.  Its  continued  expan- 
sion requires  that  others  move  with  us,  and 
that  we  achieve  reciprocity  in  fact  as  well  as  in 
spirit. 

Armed  with  the  recommendations  and  anal- 
yses of  the  new  Commission  on  World  Trade, 
we  will  work  toward  broad  new  policies  for  the 
1970s  that  will  encourage  that  reciprocity,  and 
that  will  lead  us,  in  growing  and  shared  pros- 
perity, toward  a  world  both  open  and  just. 


ElCHARD  Nixox 


The  White  House, 
Novemher  18, 1969. 


December  15,  1969 


563 


Trade  Expansion  Expectations 


hy  Carl  J.  Gilbert 

Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations  ^ 


Some  of  you  here  this  afternoon  may  have 
long  memories,  long  enough  to  remember  the 
keynote  speaker  at  the  National  Foreign  Trade 
Convention  8  years  ago.  I  happen  to  remember 
because  I  know  him  well,  very  well  indeed.  As 
I  recall,  he  was  in  the  razor  blade  business  at  the 
time. 

Since  I  don't  have  to  ask  his  permission  to- 
day to  recall  for  you  the  remarks  he  made  then 
or  now,  I  can  freely  pick  and  choose  from  what 
he  said  on  November  16, 1961.  He  was  concerned 
then  and  discussed  with  you  such  subjects  as 
the  need  for  a  new  trade  policy  and  the  equal 
need  for  a  sound  fiscal  policy,  including  an  end 
to  budgetary  deficits.  He  stressed  them  par- 
ticularly because  of  their  close  and  vital  rela- 
tion to  our  foreign  trade  and  to  our  ability  to 
compete  in  world  markets. 

Your  1961  keynoter  was  also  concerned  with 
a  then  pending  tax  bill  and  its  effects  on  our 
trade  and  investments,  with  expanding  the 
activities  of  the  Export-Import  Bank,  with  im- 
proving our  Latin  American  policies  and  rela- 
tions, and  with  our  balance  of  trade  and  our 
balance  of  payments,  among  other  problems. 
Finally,  he  was  also  concerned  with  the  role  of 
U.S.  leadership  in  our  shrinking  world.  At  one 
point  he  said : 

In  the  coming  year  our  greatest  challenge  will  be  to 
break  down  the  barriers  which  limit  the  contact  be- 
tween free  economies.  Shifting  economic  forces  have 
created  frictions  in  international  trade.  More  than  ever 
before,  it  is  essential  that  we  have  the  bargaining  tools 
to  shape  the  world  to  the  pattern  of  freedom.  In  this 
the  United  States  has  been  a  leader  in  the  postwar 
years.   We  must  never  forget  that  leadership  is  not 


^  Address  made  before  the  National  Foreign  Trade 
Convention  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  on  Nov.  19. 


speeches,  table  thumping,  or  shrewd  negotiation.  It  is, 
instead,  the  process  of  demonstrating  the  values  of  an 
objective  and  creatively  devising  ways  of  reaching  it. 
Leadership  is  doing,  not  talking.  We  must  continue  to 
lead  by  liberalizing  our  own  restrictions  on  imports 
even  at  the  expense  of  possible  domestic  dislocations. 
Developing  a  new  trade  policy  should  command  the 
interest,  support,  and  openminded  understanding  of  all 
who  believe  in  the  free  enterprise  system.  For  on  It 
depends  the  ultimate  opportunities  of  that  system. 

Further  quotations  from  that  address,  I  fear, 
would  risk  the  slightly  slanderous  suspicion  of 
undying  pride  of  authorship.  But  the  point,  I 
think,  is  clear  enough.  Today  we  have  not  yet 
gone  about  as  far  as  we  can  go  with  liberal 
trade.  Some  of  the  old  problems  are  still  with 
us,  and  8  years  have  created  some  new  ones. 

The  work  is  not  finished,  and  the  benefits  are 
not  all  attained.  My  remarks  of  8  years  ago 
were  soon  followed  by  one  of  the  largest,  if  not 
the  largest,  assault  on  trade  barriers  the  world 
has  ever  known.  Inevitablj',  and  perhaps  under- 
standably, the  trade  negotiations  which  cul- 
minated in  1967  were  succeeded  by  a  lull,  by 
a  period  of  digestion  and  adjustment.  Now  an- 
other 2  years  have  passed ;  and  it  is  time  to  re- 
new our  efforts,  for  we  cannot  stand  still  in  a 
dynamic  world.  The  challenge  of  leadership  and 
potential  for  further  progress  are  there  and  we 
must  respond. 

It  is  with  great  pleasure,  therefore,  that  I  meet 
with  you  today,  wearing  a  somewhat  different 
hat — it  still  feels  a  little  bit  new  and  a  little 
big  on  me,  I  must  confess — than  I  did  at  your 
1961  convention  and  to  be  able  to  state  to  you 
that  your  administration  is  committed  and 
ready  to  move  ahead  once  again,  to  take  new 
initiatives  in  the  directions  of  freer  trade  and 
world  economic  growth. 

Yesterday,  as  you  know,  the  President  sub- 


564 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


initted  the  Trade  Act  of  1969  to  the  Congress.^ 
It,  together  with  his  policy  statement  of  Octo- 
ber 31  proposing  to  assist  and  expedite  the 
growth  of  the  developing  countries,^  sets  forth 
an  action  program  to  renew  our  attack  on  the 
remaining  barriers  to  trade.  During  the  months 
since  Inauguration  Day,  his  administration  has 
carefully  reviewed  this  policy.  Though  we  do 
recognize,  despite  some  of  my  earlier  remarks, 
that  the  problems  ahead  will  often  be  different 
from  those  behind  us,  the  President  clearly 
asserted  his  belief  in  the  fundamental  principle 
of  a  liberal  trade  philosophy. 

The  message  he  sent  to  the  Congress  yesterday 
rejects  the  pleas  of  those  who  would  see  in  the 
narrowing  of  world  differentials  in  competitive 
ability — a  goal  we  have  long  sought — or  in  the 
recent  disappearance  of  our  traditional  trade 
surplus  any  comi)clling  reason  for  turning 
inward. 

Instead,  President  Nixon  is  charting  a 
course  of  new  and  increased  effort  because,  and 
I  quote:  "An  environment  of  freer  trade  will 
permit  the  widest  possible  scope  for  the  genius 
of  American  industry  and  agriculture  to  re- 
spond to  the  competitive  challenge  of  the  1970s." 
Moreover,  and  again  I  quote,  the  President 
added : 

By  expanding  world  markets,  our  trade  policies  have 
speeded  the  pace  of  our  own  economic  progress  and 
aided  the  development  of  others.  As  we  loolj  to  the 
future,  we  must  seek  a  continued  expansion  of  world 
trade,  even  as  we  also  seek  the  dismantling  of  those 
other  barriers — political,  social  and  ideological — 
that  have  stood  in  the  way  of  a  freer  exchange  of 
people  and  ideas,  as  well  as  of  goods  and  technology. 

While  I  may  feel  privileged  to  crib  from  one 
of  your  speakers  of  an  earlier  year,  I  will  not 
trespass  further  upon  the  details  of  the  Presi- 
dent's trade  message.  I  commend  it  to  your  con- 
siderate attention,  giving  you  only  today  a 
summary  of  the  authority  he  is  now  requesting 
from  the  Congress.  The  Trade  Act  of  1969,  to 
summarize : 

— restores  the  authority  needed  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  make  limited  tariff  reductions. 

— takes  concrete  steps  toward  the  increasingly 
urgent  goal  of  lowering  nontariff  barriers  to 
trade. 


'See  p.   .559. 

'For  President  Nixon's  address  before  the  Inter 
American  Press  Association  at  Washington,  D.C.,  on 
Oct.  31,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  17, 1969,  p.  409. 


— recognizes  the  very  real  plight  of  particular 
industries,  companies,  and  workers  faced  with 
import  competition  and  provides  for  readier 
relief  in  these  special  cases. 

— strengthens  the  GATT — the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade — by  regulariz- 
ing the  funding  of  United  States  participation. 

■ — provides  the  means  to  take  effective  action 
when  confronted  with  illegal  or  mi  just  restric- 
tions on  American  exports. 

The  President  also  announced  his  intention 
of  appointing  a  Commission  on  World  Trade 
which  will  be  charged  with  reexamining  the  en- 
tire range  of  our  trade  and  related  policies  and 
objectives.  This  Commission  will  examine  the 
problems  ahead  in  the  1970's  and  will  prepare 
its  own  recommendations  for  new  policies. 

I  would  like  to  take  as  my  theme  for  the  re- 
maining minutes  of  this  address  a  single  para- 
gi-aph  in  the  President's  message;  for  in  it,  I 
believe,  lies  much  of  the  potential  for  success  in 
the  task  which  lies  ahead  of  us.  In  discussing  the 
approach  he  proposed  to  the  Congress  yesterday 
on  nontariff  trade  barriers,  he  stated : 

At  the  same  time,  I  urge  private  interests  to  work 
closely  with  the  government  in  seeking  the  removal  of 
these  barriers.  Close  cooperation  by  the  private  sector 
is  essential,  because  many  non-tariff  barriers  are  subtle, 
complex  and  difficult  to  appraise. 

American  Selling   Price  System 

In  the  first  instance,  the  President  urged  the 
Congress  both  to  eliminate  a  specific  nontariff 
barrier  and  to  express  its  intent  with  regard  to 
other  barriers,  both  here  and  abroad.  Specifi- 
cally, he  urged  the  elimination  of  the  American 
Selling  Price  system  of  customs  valuation — a 
system  applying  to  relatively  few  American 
products  but  one  wliich  has  achieved  gi-eat  sym- 
bolic importance  to  the  future  of  our  efforts  to 
come  to  grips  with  the  more  general  problem. 

Its  removal  would  directly  bring  both  recip- 
rocal reductions  in  the  foreign  tariff's  and  in 
the  foreign  nontariff  barriers  included  in  the 
[Kennedy  Round]  supplementary  agreement.* 
Beyond  those  immediate  results,  it  would  im- 
lock  the  door  to  new  negotiations  on  the  entire 
range  of  nontariff  barriers  to  trade. 

I  doubt  if  I  need  recall  many  of  the  details  of 
this  problem  for  tliis  audience.  The  American 


'  For  background,   see  Bulletin  of  July   24,  1967, 
p.  95. 


December   15,   1969 


565 


Selling  Price  system  is  a  device  to  provide 
extraordinary  protection  which  has  long  out- 
lived its  original  purposes;  indeed,  it  is  a  major 
research  project  to  be  certain  of  what  those  pur- 
poses really  were.  This  anachronism,  however, 
today  constitutes  a  heavy  burden  upon  all  of 
American  industry.  The  special  advantage  it 
gives  to  a  few  is  far  outweighed  by  its  heavy 
costs  to  the  many  in  terms  of  the  obstacle  it 
places  to  opening  up  foreign  markets  to  our 
exporters. 

What  is  the  relationship  of,  to  use  the  Presi- 
dent's adjectives,  this  subtle  and  complex  de- 
vice, to  a  more  general  lowermg  of  trade 
barriers  ?  Favorable  action  by  us  on  this  agree- 
ment has  become,  in  the  minds  of  most  Euro- 
peans, the  prime  test  of  whether  the  United 
States  is  really  interested  in  negotiating  the 
reduction  of  nontariff  barriers.  The  fact  that  we 
have  not  acted  in  more  than  2  years  has  caused 
doubt  that  we  mean  what  we  say.  Until  we  have 
removed  that  doubt,  it  is  going  to  continue  to 
be  difficult  to  get  other  countries  to  cooperate 
with  us  in  our  efforts  to  develop  a  program  for 
the  elimination  of  some  of  the  remaining  ob- 
stacles to  international  trade. 

U.S.   Leadership   Role 

But  let  me  return  to  other  aspects  of  the 
President's  trade  program.  In  addition  to  ac- 
tion on  the  ASP  agreement,  the  Trade  Act  of 
1969  contains  other  provisions  that  will  enable 
the  United  States  to  move  forward  in  world 
trade.  The  President  in  his  message  has  rightly 
described  them  as  "setting  preparations  under 
way  for  the  more  ambitious  initiatives  that  will 
later  be  needed." 

Liberalization  of  the  criteria  for  adjustment 
assistance,  for  example,  is  an  essential  condition 
to  any  further  moves  in  trade  liberalization  it- 
self, whether  in  the  context  of  trade  between 
industrialized  countries  or  of  that  with  the  de- 
veloping coimtries.  It  is  equally  important  to 
make  the  escape  clause  workable.  A  realistic  es- 
cape clause  serves  both  as  a  necessary  safety 
valve  and  an  essential  mechanism  for  adjudicat- 
ing claims  of  damage  due  to  imports  and  deter- 
mining where  the  national  interest  lies  in  each 
case.  Together,  liberalization  of  the  escape 
clause  and  of  adjustment  assistance  are  as  es- 
sential to  further  forward  movement  as  is  the 
elimination  of  ASP. 

Officials  of  many  of  the  world's  key  trading 
countries  have  told  me — some  of  them  as  re- 
cently as  last  week — that  they  are  waiting  for 


the  United  States  to  assume  leadership  in  trade. 
It  is  up  to  us,  they  believe,  to  start  the  rever- 
sal of  recent  trends  toward  trade  restrictions 
and  away  from  the  basic  principle  of  non- 
discrimination. 

They  recall  full  well  that  it  was  only  be- 
cause of  U.S.  leadership  after  the  Second  World 
War  that  a  multilateral  trading  system  emerged 
under  which  world  trade  has  increased  some 
200  percent  and  all  countries  have  benefited. 
The  trade  bill  provides  the  means  to  exercise 
once  again  this  vital  leadership  role. 

There  is,  of  course,  a  danger  that  the  pur- 
poses of  the  Trade  Act  of  1969  may  be  distorted 
and,  through  modification,  lead  us  in  another 
direction.  Whether  it  does  will  depend  in  large 
part  on  American  business  and  the  advice  it 
gives  to  Congress.  AVithin  American  business 
you  are  among  those  best  equipped  to  avert  this 
danger.  If  the  purposes  of  the  bill  are  to  be 
achieved,  American  business  is  going  to  have  to 
be  more  courageous  and  more  explicit  in  its  ad- 
vice to  the  Congress  than  it  has  been  in  the  past. 

Perhaps  I  am  being  a  little  unfair.  No  one 
appreciates  more  than  I  the  strenuous  efi'orts 
many  of  you  have  made  to  prevent  the  passage 
of  legislation  that  would  give  foreign  countries 
a  justification  for  restricting  our  exports.  Your 
adverse  reaction  to  import  quota  bills  in  general 
has  been  most  gratifying. 

But  I  also  hope  that  your  companies  will  not 
limit  their  activities  to  opposing  quota  bills  in 
general.  In  fact,  I  hope  that — as  some  of  you 
have  done  m  the  past — you  will  make  it  very 
clear  to  your  Congressmen  that  you  are  not  ask- 
ing for  additional  protection — that  what  you 
want  is  a  fair  opportunity  to  compete  in  world 
markets  and  that  to  legislate  quota  protection 
will  simply  reduce  your  chance  of  reasonable 
access  to  other  markets. 

There  is  another,  even  more  important 
change  that  also  seems  possible  to  me.  I  know 
that  it  is  asking  a  great  deal — too  much  per- 
haps— but  it  would  be  a  great  day  if  industry 
in  general  were  to  take  a  critical  view  of  protec- 
tive measures  sought  by  a  particular  industry 
as  being  a  source  of  risk  to  all  other  industry.  Is 
it  bad  form  to  cry  "Cop"  ? 

In  considering  the  effect  on  your  interests  of 
quota  or  so-called  orderly  marketing  bills,  I 
trust  you  will  take  into  account  some  of  the  in- 
direct as  well  as  the  direct  costs — the  effects 
both  on  the  ability  of  your  Goverimient  to  ob- 
tain export  opportunities  for  you  and  on  your 
own  competitive  ability  to  take  advantage  of 


566 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


them.  There  is,  for  example,  the  obvious  danger 
that  a  rash  of  quota  bills  will  convince  the 
world  that  the  United  States  is  not  interested 
in  a  liberal  trading  system  and  other  countries 
will  then  make  their  own  policies  accordingly. 
There  is  also  the  effect  of  such  policies  on  our 
own  cost-price  structure  and  our  ability  to  com- 
pete in  world  markets. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  business  organizations 
that  have  opposed  import  quota  bills  have  relied 
too  exclusively  on  a  single  reason  for  that  posi- 
tion: the  danger  of  retaliation  by  other  coun- 
tries. That  danger  is  a  real  one.  But  before 
retaliation  can  be  mounted  and  become  effective, 
there  is  a  much  more  immediate  danger  that 
affects  not  only  the  overall  interest  of  the  U.S. 
economy  but  also  the  competitive  position  of 
those  industries  that  are  efficient  enough  to  com- 
pete in  world  markets,  given  the  chance.  Ex- 
traordinary protection  for  any  industry  must 
be  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  circumstances  of 
the  case  and  not  on  any  hit-or-miss  formula. 

Expert  Advice  Needed 

I  hope  the  answer  is  that  American  business, 
separately  as  well  as  collectively,  will  lend  its 
support  to  the  passage  of  the  President's  trade 
bill — without  crippling  amendments.  But  if  it 
does  this  and  the  bill  is  enacted,  the  job  of  busi- 
ness will  be  only  fairly  begun.  In  the  first  place, 
the  Government  is  going  to  need  expert  advice 
if  it  is  to  conduct  meaningfully  the  negotiations 
made  possible  by  passage  of  the  bill  and  by  the 
essential  expression  of  congressional  support. 

The  Government  itself  cannot  get  far  with 
demands  that  other  governments  liberalize  their 
general  attitudes  toward  trade.  It  must  deal 
with  specific  measures.  It  must  have  facts  about 
them  and  about  their  effects. 

When  I  say  that  we  need  specific  information 
I  don't  mean  that  it  will  help  us  much  to  be  told 
that  all  European  countries  have  raised  their 
border  taxes.  In  the  first  place,  it  isn't  true  that 
all  have  done  so;  and  it  is  hardly  productive 
to  ignore  the  fact  that,  while  coimtries  have 
raised  their  border  taxes,  they  have  also  gen- 
erally raised  the  taxes  imposed  on  their  own 
domestic  production.  What  we  do  need  is  spe- 
cific information  on  the  net  effect  on  your  com- 
petitive position  of  the  combination  of  tax 
changes  that  are  affecting  your  product  and  the 
competing  domestic  product  in  your  foreign 
markets. 

When  further  public  hearings  on  trade  policy 


issues  are  held,  as  I  am  sure  they  will  be,  I  hope 
that  the  identification  and  evaluation  of  foreign 
barriers  will  become  a  joint  responsibility  of 
business  and  Government. 

If,  with  your  help,  our  negotiations  succeed 
in  opening  up  new  export  opportunities,  they 
are  not  going  to  be  of  much  use  unless  you  also 
take  advantage  of  them.  Tliis  is  going  to  take 
determination  and  effort.  I  wish  I  felt  that 
American  business  as  a  whole  was  making  its 
maximum  effort  to  capitalize  on  the  export  op- 
portunities that  already  exist.  Perhaps  it  would 
be  well  to  step  up  those  present  efforts  so  as 
to  develop  the  tactics  that  will  be  most  success- 
ful when  foreign  markets  have  been  opened 
more  widely. 

Planning  for  the   Future 

There  is  not  enough  time  today  for  me  to  out- 
line all  the  areas  in  which  it  will  be  necessary 
for  us  to  plan  together  for  the  future,  both  for 
the  future  that  we  hope  to  shape  and  for  con- 
tingencies that  may  arise  out  of  the  acts  of  other 
coimtries. 

One  of  our  most  urgent  needs  for  contingency 
plamiing,  for  example,  arises  from  the  move 
now  gaining  momentum  for  the  enlargement 
of  the  European  Economic  Community.  The  ac- 
cession to  the  Common  Market  of  Great  Britain, 
some  of  the  Scandinavian  countries,  and  Ire- 
land can  be  advantageous  from  the  point  of 
view  of  our  economic  as  well  as  our  political 
objectives.  But  much  also  depends  on  the  form 
of  accession  and  the  changes,  for  better  or 
worse,  that  may  be  made  in  the  shape  and  out- 
look of  an  enlarged  Community. 

It  is  too  soon  to  predict  just  what  those 
changes  will  be.  Meanwhile,  we  must  be  alert  to 
all  likely  contingencies — prepared  to  look  out 
for  our  interests  and  for  the  interests  of  an  open 
world  trading  system,  while  the  details  of  ac- 
cession are  still  fluid,  and  prepared  with  the 
right  responses  to  whatever  system  emerges. 
Work  on  these  questions  is  already  underway 
within  the  Government.  But  it  must  be  intensi- 
fied. We  will  need  your  help  and  advice. 

Another  problem  I  can  see  on  the  horizon — 
and  on  which  our  best  thinking  is  going  to  be 
necessary — is  the  conflict  which  can,  and  prob- 
ably will,  emerge  between  our  principles  and 
the  reality  of  serious  excess  of  capacities  for 
certain  goods.  When  this  happens — as  seems 
to  me  likely — the  temptation  for  governments 
will  be  to  try  to  preserve  domestic  markets 


December  15,   1969 


567 


and  breach  their  principles.  The  strain  on  the 
entire  international  trading  system  could  then 
be  overwhelming.  A  great  deal  more  thought 
will  have  to  be  given  to  our  response  to  this 
contingency.  Once  again,  we  will  welcome  your 
ideas. 

There  are  many  other  topics  to  which  our 
planning  must  be  directed.  Let  me  mention  only 
one,  which  I  will  call  the  trade-investment  com- 
plex. Traditionally,  economists  and  govern- 
ments have  assumed  that  the  optimum  use  of 
the  world's  resources  will  result  from  freeing 
trade  in  goods.  Today,  it  is  becoming  clear  that 
the  picture  is  incomplete  without  a  similar  free- 
dom of  movement  for  capital,  management,  and 
technology.  Future  negotiations  will  also  have 
to  take  these  realities  into  account. 

This  is  another  field  about  which  we  need  a 
great  deal  more  information.  We  need  to  know 
the  overall  net  effect  of  direct  investment 
abroad  on  our  trade  balance,  on  our  balance  of 
payments,  and  on  employment.  To  what  extent 
do  such  investments  replace  American  exports 
that  would  not  in  any  event  have  been  dis- 
placed by  new  production  abroad  ?  To  what  ex- 
tent do  they  stimulate  new  exports  or  enable  us 
to  maintain  domestic  production  of  components 


or  goods  that  could  not  otherwise  have  been 
maintained?  And  where  the  facts  show  that 
direct  investment  is  in  our  overall  interest,  what 
are  the  foreign  restrictions  that  inhibit  it  or  pre- 
vent it  from  more  fully  serving  those  interests  ? 

One  segment  of  this  question  is  now  imder 
study  in  Washington.  As  many  of  you  know, 
the  President  has  recently  directed  the  Tariff 
Commission  to  investigate  the  effects  of  the 
operation  of  item  807  of  the  Tariff  Act,  a  provi- 
sion which  excuses  from  duty  the  portion  of 
foreign  goods  consisting  of  U.S.-made  compo- 
nents. Those  of  you  who  make  any  use  of  this 
provision  either  have  been  given,  or  will  be 
given,  an  opportunity  to  express  your  views  and 
present  the  facts  available  to  you.  I  hope  you 
will  take  full  advantage  of  this  opportunity  and 
be  as  helpful  as  j^ossible. 

Trade  policy,  when  implemented,  opens  or 
closes  opportunities  for  trade.  People  in  Wash- 
ington, singly  or  collectively,  do  not  have  all 
the  knowledge  or  the  wisdom  to  formulate 
policy  without  a  strong  input  of  information 
from  the  business  commimity.  You  have  a  keen 
interest  in  trade  opportimities.  We  will  wel- 
come your  contribution  to  our  thinking.  We 
look  forward  to  hearing  from  you. 


568 


I 


« 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


I 


Agriculture  and  Foreign  Economic  Policy 


iy  Nathaniel  Samuels 

Deputy  Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  ' 


I  shall  talk  today,  first,  about  trade  policy  in 
general  and  agriculture  in  particular;  second, 
about  agricultural  policy  abroad  as  it  affects  lis; 
and  third,  about  the  need  for  greater  interna- 
tional harmonization  of  agricultural  policy. 

The  appropriate  role  of  agriculture  in  a  com- 
prehensive and  coherent  foreign  economic  pol- 
icy is  one  of  the  central  objects  of  our  concern. 
Agriculture  today  fiinctions  in  much  of  its  in- 
ternational dimension  in  fragmented  and  in- 
ward systems,  whereas  the  need  before  us  is  for 
a  rational  framework  of  production  and  trade 
on  a  world-oriented  scale — a  framework  in 
which  the  national  origins  of  foods  and  fibers 
are  subordinate  to  mankind's  need  for  adequate 
supplies  at  comparatively  efficient  costs.  The 
achievement  of  such  a  system  involves  more 
than  agricultural  and  trade  policies  themselves 
but  must  be  related  to  the  complex  social  and 
political  problems  inherent  in  land  use,  in  the 
balance  between  agriculture  and  industry,  be- 
tween rural  and  urban  equilibrium,  in  the  move- 
ment of  people  from  the  land  to  the  cities,  in 
their  orderly  absorption  into  the  economic  and 
social  framework  of  new  environments,  and  in 
the  qualitj'  of  life — challenges  that  are  so 
deeply  enmeshed  today  with  all  the  other  sec- 
tors of  our  national  and  international  life. 

Let  us  try  to  look  at  trade  policy  in  perspec- 
tive and  agriculture  within  it.  Three  decades  of 
effort  toward  reciprocal  reduction  of  tarifl'  bar- 
riers culminated  in  the  marked  achievements  of 
tlie  Kennedy  Round.  This  liberalization  move- 
ment, together  with  the  beneficial  effects  of  the 
postwar  international  monetary  system,  has  re- 
sulted in  unprecedented  exjDansion  of  world 
trade  and  income.  Our  increasingly  open  trade 


'Address  made  before  the  Arkansas  Agricultural 
Marketing  Conference  at  Little  Rock,  Ark.,  on  Nov.  19 
(press  release  349). 


policy  has  encouraged  international  coopera- 
tion ;  has  strengthened  the  habit  of  consultation 
among  sovereign  nations ;  has  reinforced  insti- 
tutions, such  as  the  GATT  [General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade] ,  in  the  orderly  resolution 
of  conflicting  interests;  and  has  helped  to  en- 
throne the  rule  of  law  in  connnercial  relations. 
American  agriculture  has  been  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal beneficiaries  of  this  trade  liberalization. 

Following  the  Kennedy  Round  we  have  now 
found  ourselves  in  a  period  of  reaction.  A  re- 
bound of  protectionist  sentiment  has  arisen  in 
many  countries  outside  of  the  United  States 
and  in  the  United  States  as  well.  The  hard  po- 
litical questions  arise  as  to  why  the  rebound  and 
how  to  deal  with  this  situation.  We  could,  on 
the  one  hand,  do  nothing  and  allow  things  to 
take  their  course  while  the  Kennedy  Round  cuts 
were  being  implemented.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  might  try  to  push  for  a  new  initiative  on  a 
grand  scale.  The  first  course  would  unneces- 
sarily allow  the  reaction  to  liberalization  to 
gain  momentum  and  to  threaten  the  hard-won 
advances  of  over  three  decades;  the  second 
course  raises  questions  about  the  political  readi- 
ness of  our  trading  partners  and  of  ourselves  to 
push  forward  before  the  advances  already 
achieved  are  consolidated  and  absorbed  by  our 
economies.  Moreover,  we  have  the  task  of  de- 
fining with  increased  precision  the  conditions 
which  are  reinforcing  protectionist  sentiment 
here  and  abroad  and  in  what  direction  to  launch 
our  next  offensive  in  the  trade  field. 

The  President  has  chosen  a  progressive  course 
that  will  consolidate  the  gains  of  the  past  and 
establish  foundations  for  great  advances  in  the 
years  ahead.  In  the  industrial  sphere  we  shall 
surely  have  to  fashion  a  trade  policy  for  the 
seventies  that  will  take  into  account  the  vast 
changes  in  multinational  production  and  world- 
wide investment  and  finance  and  their  effects 


December  15,   1969 


569 


U 


internally  and  on  international  trade  patterns 
and  policies.  In  the  agricultural  sphere  we  may 
have  to  harmonize  internal  land  utilization, 
acreage  controls,  production,  and  commercial 
policies  on  an  international  scale.  The  Presi- 
dent's announcement  yesterday,  in  comiection 
with  his  submission  to  Congress  of  trade  legis- 
lation,- of  a  blue-ribbon  commission  of  citizens 
to  undertake  a  major  inquiry  into  trade  and  in- 
vestment policy  is  an  important  step  forward; 
and  the  work  of  this  commission  could  focus 
attention  on  the  key  problems  which  confront 
us  in  designing  policy  to  fit  a,  hopefully,  dy- 
namic M-orld  of  the  seventies. 

Proposed  Trade   Legislation 

The  main  elements  of  the  proposed  trade  leg- 
islation submitted  to  Congress  by  the  President 
yesterday  would,  first,  give  him  authority  to 
make  modest  reductions  in  U.S.  tariffs  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  possible  minor  adjust- 
ments that  individual  circumstances  from  time 
to  time  require;  second,  it  would  eliminate  the 
American  Selling  Price  method  of  valuing  im- 
ports of  certain  chemicals  ( a  step  we  agreed  to 
in  the  Kennedy  Eound  in  return  for  certain 
benefits  to  be  accorded  us  by  other  countries) ; 
third,  it  would  announce  our  intention  to  mount 
an  assault  on  nontariff  barriers,  which  today  are 
more  important  than  tariffs  as  obstacles  to 
trade;  fourth,  it  would  liberalize  the  escape 
clause  providing  temporary  relief  to  U.S.  indus- 
tries adversely  affected  by  import  competition, 
and  it  would  broaden  adjustment  assistance  to 
firms  and  workers  so  affected;  and  fifth,  it 
would  establish  a  Commission  on  World  Trade 
to  make  the  fundamental  and  long-term  inquiry 
to  which  I  alluded  a  few  moments  ago. 

The  sharp  decline  of  our  trade  surplus  has 
been  a  very  disturbing  development.  From  an 
average  surplus  of  $5  billion  annually  over  the 
5  years  until  1968,  it  fell  to  less  than  $1  billion 
last  year.  If  we  exclude  exports  under  U.S.  Gov- 
erimient  programs,  our  commercial  trade  bal- 
ance disappeared;  in  fact,  we  were  in  deficit. 
The  high  level  of  economic  activity  and  the  ac- 
celerated inflationary  pressures  of  the  past  2  or 
3  years  have  pushed  up  costs  and  prices  rapidly 
and  impaired  our  competitiveness  in  world 
markets,  while  the  same  factors  have  attracted 
imports  on  a  sharply  increased  scale. 

Traditionally,  agricultural  commodities  have 
constituted  a  highly  important  element  in  our 


■  See  p.  u59. 
570 


total  exports.  These  have  contributed  greatly  to 
our  foreign  exchange  earnings.  However,  U.S. 
agricultural  exports  have  been  falling.  From  a 
peak  of  $6.8  billion  in  fiscal  year  1967,  they  de- 
clined to  $6..3  billion  in  fiscal  1968  and  to  $5.7 
billion  in  fiscal  1969.  At  the  same  time,  agricul- 
tural imports  in  fiscal  1969  rose  to  an  all-time 
high  of  $4.9  billion.  Exports  in  fiscal  1969  were, 
of  course,  reduced  by  the  dock  strike,  but  the 
bald  fact  is  that  our  market  outlets  are 
shrinking. 

Our  export  situation  would  be  a  happier  one 
were  it  not  for  the  tremendous  world  wheat 
supply.  Carryover  stocks  of  wheat  in  the  five 
principal  exporting  nations  will  total  aroimd  2 
billion  bushels  at  the  end  of  the  1968-69  market- 
ing year,  an  increase  of  som.e  620  million  bushels 
from  the  previous  season.  This  is  the  third  con- 
secutive year  that  stocks  have  mcreased.  Most 
exporting  and  some  traditionally  importing 
countries  have  contributed  to  the  increase.  The 
wheat  surplus  is  so  large  that  it  overflows  into 
the  markets  for  other  grains  and  feedstuffs 
throughout  the  world.  Sales  of  French  wheat  to 
Taiwan,  for  example,  have  been  priced  at  or 
below  the  levels  at  which  we  could  deliver  feed 
grains  at  free  market  prices  prevailing  in  the 
United  States.  Soviet  wheat  has  been  priced  to 
sell  in  the  United  Kingdom  at  levels  disruptive 
of  normal  trade  patterns. 

These  developments  in  grain,  stemming  from 
uneconomic  support  and  trade  policies,  have 
serious  repercussions  in  international  trade. 
Agricultural  policies  in  the  EFTA  [European 
Free  Trade  Association]  countries  as  they  affect 
us  should  be  a  subject  of  our  concern.  Japan,  as 
another  example,  has  very  high  support  prices 
for  rice  and  is  suffering  the  consequences  in 
surpluses  which  must  be  dealt  with  in  ways  that 
will  ultimately  affect  not  only  the  world  price  of 
rice  but  other  commodities  as  well. 

Agricultural   Policy  and  the   EEC 

Since  our  agricultural  relationships  with  the 
European  Economic  Community  are  of  such 
vital  importance,  let  me  turn  to  the  essential 
nature  of  our  overall  relationship  to  the  Com- 
munity as  affected  by  agricultural  policy.  The 
European  Economic  Community  has  received 
the  strong  support  of  the  U.S.  Government 
since  its  inception.  The  need  for  greater  eco- 
nomic and  political  integration  in  Europe  in  the 
postwar  period  was  clear  and  urgent,  and  Eu- 
rope responded  to  its  challenge  with  imagina- 
tion and  zeal.  This  meant  a  giant  step  in  a  neces- 
sary trend  toward  imification  of  AVestern  in- 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


dustrial  Europe  and  the  strengthening  of  its 
economic  and  social  fabric.  For  the  United 
States  tliis  meant  the  prospect  of  being  able  to 
carry  out  our  political,  economic,  and  defense 
responsibilities  in  the  world  with  the  independ- 
ent but  i^owerful  collaboration  of  several  of  the 
great  industrial  nations  of  the  West  which  con- 
stitute the  European  Economic  Community. 

The  American  people  were  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  this  de- 
velopment carried,  at  least  in  the  short  term,  a 
certain  economic  price.  This  price  consisted  in 
the  fact  that  an  economic  community  aiming  at 
a  single  internal  market  has  inlierent  in  it  an 
element  of  discrimination  against  nonmembers. 
It  is  this  fact  of  a  single  internal  market  and 
an  outer  tariff  wall  with  a  common  policy  for 
agriculture  wliich  has  been  the  central  core 
around  which  the  European  Economic  Com- 
munity has  achieved  a  feeling  of  community. 
The  cost  to  the  United  States,  in  net  terms,  has 
probably  not  j-et  been  large,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  our  exi)orts  to  the  Common  Market  have 
doubled  in  the  decade  since  its  formation.  When 
all  the  Kennedy  Roimd  cuts  are  implemented, 
its  tariffs  will  average  only  about  8  percent. 
The  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  however, 
whose  discriminatory  nature  I  have  alluded  to 
earlier,  has  hurt  the  export  of  American  agri- 
cultural products.  Even  so,  our  agricultural  ex- 
ports to  the  Community  have  held  up  well  thus 
far.  Our  main  concern  is  for  the  future.  Con- 
tinuation of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
as  it  now  operates  will  intensify  the  damage  to 
agricultural  exports  unless  the  Common  Agri- 
cultural Policy  evolves  in  a  direction  of  more 
competitive  price  levels  within  the  Commimity 
and  thus  permits  our  own  more  efficiently  pro- 
duced commodities  to  obtain  access  to  these  mar- 
kets, to  the  benefit  of  European  consumers  as 
well  as  ourselves. 

The  Common  Market  agricultural  policy  rests 
on  high  support  prices,  protected  by  variable 
levies  wliich  encourage  production  at  prices  sub- 
stantially above  those  prevailing  in  free  world 
markets.  The  consequences  are  reduced  imports 
from  lower  cost  producers  and  costly  subsidiza- 
tion of  exports  to  siphon  off  surpluses  of  wheat, 
barley,  poultry,  and  other  products. 

As  a  consequence  of  tliis  system  of  agricul- 
ture, plus  improved  farming  methods,  surpluses 
have  reached  the  point  where  the  Common 
Market  must  find  storage  space  for  some  700 
to  800  million  pounds  of  butter  stocks  which  are 
increasing  by  over  200  million  pounds  a  year 
(butter  is  being  fed  to  cows).  Billions  must  be 


spent  on  export  subsidies  to  sell  surplus  com- 
modities, and  large  sums  need  to  be  expended  on 
storage  of  those  commodities  that  cannot  be  sold. 
Since  much  European  production  still  lags  be- 
hind the  levels  of  productivity  prevailing  in  cer- 
tain other  countries,  including  our  own,  and 
agriculture  is  everywhere  becoming  more  effi- 
cient, we  must  expect  this  rise  in  output  to  con- 
tinue unless  and  until  more  rational  policies  are 
brought  into  being.  Declines  in  exports  from 
more  efficient  world  producers,  with  disruption 
in  international  agricultural  trade,  are  the  in- 
evitable consequences  with  which  we  are  faced. 
This  system  and  its  cost  are  finally  giving  rise 
within  the  Common  Market  itself  to  reexamina- 
tion of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  and 
the  cost  of  financing  it. 

The  situation  regarding  soybeans  and  soy- 
bean products  is  of  particular  importance  here 
in  Arkansas.  The  Common  Market  contains  our 
largest  customers,  taking  40  percent  of  these 
exports.  A  proposal  is  under  consideration  to 
tax  soybean  products  and  other  oilseeds  also, 
but  at  lower  rates.  The  Common  Market  has 
hardly  any  soybean  production  of  its  own,  and 
the  tax  is  intended  to  protect  other  products 
raised  internally.  An  alternative  proposal  in- 
volves an  international  agreement  on  fats  and 
oils.  Both  proposals  are  intended  to  alter  pres- 
ent price  relationships  in  fats  and  oils,  wheat, 
corn,  and  feed  grains,  and  thus  directly  or  in- 
directly try  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  a  costly 
system.  These  proposals,  in  the  process,  would 
have  the  consequence  of  prohibiting  lower  cost 
imports  from  the  United  States.  We  have  vigor- 
ously protested  these  proposals. 

On  our  own  side,  price  support  policies  in 
various  instances  have  lost  existing  and  poten- 
tial markets.  The  administration  had  to  make 
a  decision  this  year  whether  to  continue  the 
support  level  for  soybeans  or  to  resiune  a  price 
relationship  which  would  permit  sales  growth. 
We  chose  a  policy,  as  you  know,  of  producing 
for  consumption  rather  than  for  storage.  Our 
major  export  markets  are  already  responding 
with  a  certain  improvement.  "Wliile  import 
taxes  by  consuming  countries,  on  the  one  hand, 
would  be  prejudicial  to  efficient  producers,  un- 
wise support  and  pricing  policies  at  home  can 
be  equally  prejudicial  and  stimulate  adverse 
production  and  pricing  policies  in  consuming 
countries. 

The  proposed  enlargement  of  the  European 
Economic  Community  by  the  accession  of  the 
U.K.  and  certain  other  European  countries  may 
provide  the  Common  Market  with  an  opportu- 


December  15,   1969 


571 


nity  to  reexamine  its  Common  Agricultural 
Policy  and  the  evolutionary  course  it  could  take 
in  adopting  a  more  open  posture  in  its  trade 
relationships.  We  sincerely  hope  that  this  will 
be  so.  In  that  case  we  can  be  confident  that  the 
agi-icultural  community  of  the  United  States, 
traditionally  among  the  strongest  supporters  of 
a  liberal  trade  policy  in  the  world,  will  continue 
to  adhere  to  this  principle  of  international  life 
and  that  the  American  people  will  continue  to 
support  enthusiastically  a  Europe  and  a  United 
States  working  in  close  collaboration. 

Looking  Beyond  Parochial  Interests 

Our  continued  and  constructive  relationships 
with  the  European  Economic  Community  re- 
quire each  of  us  to  look  beyond  the  parochial 
nature  of  our  interests  and  to  raise  the  level  of 
these  relationships  to  that  of  high  policj'  in  an 
interdependent  and  economically  expanding 
world.  Perhaps  we  must  examine  new  patterns 
through  which  to  avoid  the  trade  conflicts 
which  have  arisen.  Perhaps  a  broader  coordi- 
nation of  internal  economic  policies  is  needed 
in  every  sphere  of  economic  and  financial  ac- 
tivity in  order  to  achieve  an  harmonious  inter- 
national orchestration.  Perhaps  it  is  only  by  a 
fundamental  convergence  of  internal  produc- 
tion and  support  policies  as  well  as  acreage  and 
land  use  appropriate  to  each  country  that  we 
can  eliminate  the  conflicts  inherent  in  different 
agricultural  systems  and  thereby  achieve  ra- 
tional international  order.  There  are  signs  of  a 
groping  inquiry  in  this  direction.  Our  thoughts 
should  turn  to  the  harmonization  of  policies 
rather  than  the  compromising  of  conflicts.  We 
might  also  be  justified  in  asking  whether  the 
discriminatory  trade  features  of  the  Common 
Market  really  must  continue  to  be  central  to  the 
whole  idea  of  the  Community  or  whether  the 
more  profound  ideological  forces  at  work  in 
Europe  which  gave  rise  to  the  Community,  and 
the  institutions  and  outlook  which  have 
emerged,  are  not  fundamentally  more  powerful 
and  can  carry  it  to  greater  unity  and  higher 
achievement. 

Another  set  of  problems  on  a  world  scale  to 
which  our  own  agriculture  will  have  to  addi'ess 
itself  is  the  ramifications  of  new  technology. 
We  have  all  heard  much  of  the  new  high-yield- 
ing seeds,  particularly  wheat  and  rice,  and  the 
enormous  increases  in  production  which  they 


have  brought  about.  It  is  conceivable  that  in  the 
years  ahead  man}'  countries  that  have  suffered 
feast  or  famine  alternately  or  who  have  not  had 
the  means  to  purchase  adequate  supplies  from 
other  countries  may  be  able  to  become  self-suf- 
ficient in  certain  food  commodities.  No  doubt, 
spectacular  advances  have  been  made  thus  far, 
although  the  experts  point  out  to  us  that  we 
should  not  ignore  the  many  problems  that  will 
exist  in  expanding  food  production  in  various 
parts  of  the  world.  Enormous  inputs  of  capital 
will  be  required  for  irrigation,  power  supply, 
and  fertilizers.  Moreover,  vastly  changed  meth- 
ods of  land  use  and  management  for  efficient 
production  and  for  the  control  of  possible  plant 
disease  will  be  required.  Not  the  least,  adequate 
transportation,  marketing,  and  credit  arrange- 
ments will  have  to  be  devised  to  bring  to  frui- 
tion the  benefits  that  new  technologies  are 
making  possible.  Nonetheless,  the  great  food- 
exporting  countries  of  the  world  will  have  to 
take  into  account  the  effects  that  these  changes 
are  likely  to  have  on  present  patterns  of  pro- 
duction and  trade.  The  next  decade  may  very 
well  see  aid  policy  in  the  industrial  countries 
aimed  more  and  more  at  achieving  the  benefits 
of  new  agi-icultural  possibilities ;  and  thus  agri- 
culture, aid,  and  foreign  policies  will  all  be 
interrelated  in  their  design  and  their  effects. 

To  sum  up,  agriculture  is  in  search  of  a  di- 
plomacy. This  must  be  a  diplomacy  by  which  to 
fashion  a  structure  of  production  and  exchange 
which  will  be  relevant  to  the  interdependence 
of  contemporary  life — an  interdependence  that 
is  not  only  geographic  in  the  context  of  more 
rapid  travel  and  instant  communication  but  in 
the  interactmg  patterns  of  investment,  produc- 
tion, and  trade;  in  the  interpenetration  of 
agricultural,  industrial,  and  environmental  fac- 
tors in  achieving  an  organic  and  equilibrated 
social  and  political  system;  and  in  the  universal 
ebb  and  flow  of  ideas,  attitudes,  moods,  and 
styles.  A  dynamic  agriculture  will  seek  to  iden- 
tify its  legitimate  and  private  interests  with  the 
needs  of  a  political,  economic,  and  social  policy 
that  will  enable  the  United  States  to  find  its 
opportunities  and  discharge  its  responsibilities 
among  the  less  developed  as  well  as  more  de- 
veloped nations,  among  the  industrialized  coim- 
tries  with  one  set  of  essential  interests  and  the 
nonindustrialized  countries  with  another  set  of 
essential  interests.  This  is  part  of  our  adventure 
for  the  seventies. 


572 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


United  States  and  Japan  Amend 
Air  Transport  Agreement 

Press  release  338  dated  November  12 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  United  States  and  Japan  on  November  12 
in  Tokyo  concluded  an  exchange  of  notes  to 
amend  the  Air  Transport  Agreement  signed  by 
the  two  Gc^vernments  in  1952.*  This  exchange  of 
notes  provides  two  new  routes  to  the  United 
States  for  Japan,  one  via  Anchorage  to  New 
York  and  the  second  to  Guam  via  Saipan.  This 
adjustment  in  route  authority  in  favor  of  Japan 
is  designed  to  correct  an  existing  economic  im- 
bahance  in  the  bilateral  air  agreement.  The  ex- 
change of  notes  also  deletes  the  annex  to  the 
schedule  of  the  agreement,  which  is  now 
obsolete. 


EXCHANGE  OF  NOTES 


Text  of  Japanese  Note 


NOVEMBEE  12,  1969 


Excellency,  I  have  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  civil 
aviation  consultations  which  took  place  in  Washing- 
ton from  June  23,  1989  to  July  9,  1969  and  in  Tokyo 
from  September  16,  1969  to  October  2,  1969  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Civil  Air  Transport  Agreement  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States  of  America  which  was 
signed  on  August  11,  1952,  and  was  amended  on  Janu- 
ary 14,  1959  and  December  28,  1965.  The  two  Delega- 
tions agreed  to  recommend  to  their  respective  Govern- 
ments the  deletion  of  the  Schedule  together  with  the 
Annex  thereto,  attached  to  the  said  Agreement  and  the 
insertion  of  a  new  Schedule,  which  is  enclosed  with 
this  Note. 

I  have  further  the  honor  to  inform  Tour  Excellency 
that  the  Government  of  Japan  accepts  the  new  Sched- 
ule and  to  propose  that  this  Note  and  your  reply 
thereto,  indicating  the  acceptance  of  the  new  Schedule 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
will  constitute  an  agreement  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments further  amending  the  CivU  Air  Transport  Agree- 


ment, as  amended,  which  will  enter  into  force  on  the 
date  of  your  reply. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Tour 
Excellency  the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

KncHi  AiCHi 

His  Excellency 
Aemin  H.  Metek, 
American  Ambassador, 
Tokyo. 

SCHEDULE 

(A)  An  airline  or  airlines  designated  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Japan  shall  be  entitled  to  operate  air 
services  on  each  of  the  air  routes  specified,  in  both 
directions,  and  to  make  scheduled  landings  in  the 
United  States  of  America  at  the  points  specified  in  this 
paragraph : 

(1)  From  Japan  to  Honolulu,  San  Francisco,  and: 

(a)  New  York  and  beyond  New  York  to  Europe 
(including  the  United  Kingdom)  and  beyond.' 

( b )  beyond  to  Mexico  and  Central  America.' 

(2)  From  Japan  to  Honolulu  and  Los  Angeles  and 
beyond  to  South  America." 

(3)  From  Japan  to  Okinawa  and  beyond.' 

(4)  From  Japan  via  Anchorage  to  New  York. 

(5 )  From  Japan  via  Saipan  to  Guam. 

(B)  An  airline  or  airlines  designated  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  of  America  shall  be 
entitled  to  operate  air  services  on  each  of  the  routes 
specified,  in  both  directions,  and  to  make  scheduled 
landings  in  Japan  at  the  points  specified  in  this 
paragraph : 

(1)  From  the  United  States  via  the  North  Pacific 
to  Tokyo  and  Osaka  and  beyond. 

(2)  From  the  United  States  via  the  Central  Pacific 
to  Tokyo  and  Osaka  and  beyond. 

(3)  From  Okinawa  to  Osaka  and  Tokyo.' 

(C)  Except  as  otherwise  indicated,  points  on  any 
of  the  specified  routes  may  at  the  option  of  the 
designated  airline  be  omitted  on  any  or  all  flights. 


'  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  2854, 
5939. 


'Any  flight  operating  eastbound  from  Japan  which 
makes  a  scheduled  landing  at  New  York,  and  any  flight 
operating  westbound  to  Japan  which  makes  a  scheduled 
departure  from  New  York,  must  make  a  scheduled  stop 
at  San  Francisco.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

'  Passengers,  cargo,  and  mail  destined  for  or  originat- 
ing at  points  beyond  the  United  States  may  not  make 
a  stopover  or  be  picked  up  or  discharged  at  United 
States  points  on  these  routes.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

'In  granting  these  routes,  the  respective  Contract- 
ing Parties  are  cognizant  of  the  provisions  of  Article  3 
of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Japan,  signed  at  San 
Francisco  on  September  8,  1951,  under  which  the 
United  States  of  America  exercises  the  powers  of 
administration,  legislation,  and  jurisdiction  over 
Okinawa.   [Footnote  in  original.] 


December  15,  1969 


573 


Text  of  U.S.  Note 


No.  783 


Tokyo,  November  12, 1969 


EicELLiaJCT:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  re- 
ceipt of  Your  Excellency's  Note  of  November  12,  1969, 
in  which  Your  Excellency  has  informed  me  as  follows : 

[Text  of  the  Japanese  note.] 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  accepts 
the  proposal  contained  in  Your  Excellency's  note 
which,  with  this  reply,  constitutes  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  two  Governments  further  amending  the  Civil 
Air  Transport  Agreement,  as  amended,  which  enters 
into  force  on  this  date. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your 
Excellency  the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 


AjufiN  H.  Meyeb 


His  Excellency 

KncHi  AicHi, 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Tokyo. 


U.S.  and  Canada  Sign  Convention 
on  Citizens  Radio  Service 

Press  release  3S3  dated  November  21 

A  convention  between  the  United  States  and 
Canada  to  permit  certain  radio  station  licensees 
of  either  country  to  operate  radiotelephone  sta- 
tions in  the  other  country  was  signed  in  Ottawa 
on  November  19. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  convention,  licensees 
in  the  Citizens  Radio  Service  may  use  their  two- 
way  radio  equipment,  on  a  reciprocal  basis, 
principally  for  the  purpose  of  emergency  assist- 
ance and  road  service  commimications  while 
traveling  on  highways  in  either  country. 

The  convention  will  be  sent  to  the  Senate  for 
advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts  commit- 
ted on  l)oard  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  September  14, 
19C>3.  Enters  into  force  December  4,  1969.  TIAS  6768. 
Bignaturcs:  Greece,  October  21,  1969 ;  Finland,  Octo- 
ber 24, 1969 ;  Switzerland,  October  31, 1969. 


Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations.  Done  at  Vien- 
na April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force  March  19, 1967.' 
Ratified  hy  the  President:  November  12, 1969. 

Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  consular 
relations   concerning  the  compulsory   settlement  of 
disputes.  Done  at  Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into 
force  March  19,  1967.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:  November  12, 1969. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international  transport  of 
goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets,  with  annexes  and 
protocol  of  signature.  Done  at  Geneva  January  15, 
1959.  Entered  into  force  January  7,  1960;  for  the 
United  States  March  3, 1969.  TIAS  6633. 
Accession  deposited:  Israel,  October  31, 1969. 

Fisheries 

Convention   on   conduct  of  fishing  operations   in   the 
North    Atlantic,    with    annexes.    Done    at    London 
June  1,  1967.  Open  for  signature  June  1  to  Novem- 
ber 30,  1967.' 
Ratified  by  the  President:  November  12, 1969. 

Fur  Seals 

Agreement  extending  the  Interim  convention  on  conser- 
vation of  North  Pacific  fur  seals  signed  February  9, 
1957,  as  amended   (TIAS  3948,  5558).  Entered  Into 
force  September  3, 1969.  TIAS  6774. 
Notifications  of  confirmation:  Canada,  June  3,  1969; 
Japan,  August  29,  1969 ;  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics,  April  1,  1969 ;  United  States,  March  19, 
1969. 

North   Atlantic  Treaty 

Protocol  on  the  status  of  International  Military  Head- 
quarters. Signed  at  Paris  August  28,  1952.  Entered 
into  force  April  10,  1954.  TIAS  2978. 
Accession  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
November  21,  1969. 

North   Atlantic  Treaty — Military  Headquarters 
— Accommodation 

Agreement  regarding  making  available  by  the  armed 
forces  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  of  the  United 
States  of  accommodation  to  International  military 
headquarters  of  NATO  In  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany.  Done  at  Bonn  February  7, 1969. 
Approval   deposited:   United    States,   November   21, 

1969. 
Ratifications   deposited:   Federal   Republic   of   Ger- 
many, November  21,  1969 ;  United  Kingdom,  No- 
vember 21,  1969. 
Enters  into  force:  December  31,  1969. 

North    Atlantic    Treaty — Military    Headquarters 
— Personnel 

Agreement  regarding  the  status  of  personnel  of  send- 
ing states  attached  to  an  International  military  head- 
quarters   of    NATO    in    the    Federal    Republic    of 
Germany.  Done  at  Bonn  February  7,  1969. 
Approvals  deposited:  Netherlands,  October  7,  1969; 

United  States,  November  21,  1969. 
Ratifications   deposited:   Federal   Republic   of   Ger- 
many,   November    21,    1969;     United    Kingdom, 
November  21,  1969. 
Enters  into  force:  December  21, 1969. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  Not  In  force. 


574 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty   on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear  weapons. 

Done  at  WasMngton,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 

1968.' 

Ratified  by  the  Pre«tdent.' November  24, 1969. 

Signatures  at  Washington:  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, November  28,  1969  (signature  included  a 
reference  "to  the  note  handed  by  the  Government 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  in  its  ca- 
pacity as  depositary  government")  ;  Switzerland, 
November  27,  1969    (with  declarations). 

Postal   Matters 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with  final 
protocol,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol,  and 
convention  with  final  protocol  and  regulations  of  ex- 
ecution. Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered  Into 
force  January  1, 1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Accession   deposited:    Swaziland,    October   14,   1969 

(with  reservations). 
Ratification  deposited:  Ecuador,  September  30, 1969. 

Publications 

Convention  concerning  the  exchange  of  oflSelal  publica- 
tions and  government  documents  between  states. 
Done  at  Paris  December  3,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
May  30,  1961;  for  the  United  States  June  9,  1968. 
TIAS  6439. 

Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
October  3,  1969." 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at  New 
Tork  January  31,  1967.  Entered  into  force  October  4, 
1967 ;  for  the  United  States  November  1,  1968.  TIAS 
6577. 

Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
November  5,  1969.' 

Telecommunications 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva,  1959, 
as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332),  relating  to 
maritime  mobile  service,  with  annexes  and  final  pro- 
tocol. Done  at  Geneva  November  3,  1967.  Entered 
into  force  April  1, 1969.  TIAS  6590. 
Notification  of  approval:  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, September  29,  1969.' 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  Montreux  November  12,  1965.  En- 
tered into  force  January  1,  1967 ;  for  the  United 
States  May  29,  1967.  TIAS  6267. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Ecuador,  October  10,  1969; 
United  Arab  Republic,  September  12, 1969. 

Trade 

Fourth  proc&s-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional  accession  of  the  United  Arab  Republic 
to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  of 
I  November  13,  1962  (TIAS  5309).  Done  at  Geneva 
November  19,  1968.  Entered  into  force  February  27, 
1969.' 

Acceptance:  Sweden,  October  24,  1969. 
Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  June  25,  1969. 

Fifth  proc&s-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on  the 
provisional  accession  of  Tunisia  to  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade  of  November  12,  1959 


(TIAS  4498).  Done  at  Geneva  November  19,  1968. 
Entered  Into  force  December  17,  1968 ;  for  the  United 
States  October  28, 1969.  TIAS  6785. 
Acceptances:    Sweden,    October    24,    1969;    United 

States,  October  28,  1969. 
Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  June  25, 1969. 


BILATERAL 


Australia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a  joint  de- 
fense space  communications  station  in  Australia. 
Signed  at  Canberra  November  10,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  November  10, 1969. 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  the  operation  of  radio  telephone 
stations.  Signed  at  Ottawa  November  19, 1969.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  instruments 
of  ratification. 

Japan 

Agreement  amending  the  civil  air  transport  agreement 
of  August  11,  1952,  as  amended  (TIAS  2854,  4158, 
5939).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo 
November  12,  1969.  Entered  Into  force  November  12, 
1969. 


PUBLICATIONS 


'  Not  In  force  for  the  United  States. 

'Not  in  force. 

'  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 


Recent  Releases 


For  tale  ty  the  Superintendent  o/  Documents,  U.S.  Oov- 
emment  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100 
or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Viet-Nam  Information  Notes.  A  series  of  Department 
of  State  publications,  each  of  which  sunomarizes  a 
significant  aspect  of  the  situation  in  Viet-Nam : 

No.  1.  Basic  Data  on  South  Viet-Nam  (revised). 
Pamphlet  summarizes  facts  about  the  land,  climate, 
people,  religion,  education,  history,  and  government ; 
Includes  a  chronology  of  political  events,  1955-69.  Pub. 
8196.  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Series  155.  4  pp.  10^. 

The  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (revised). 
The  third  pamphlet  in  a  series  on  international  orga- 
nizations of  particular  significance  to  U.S.  foreign  rela- 
tions. Summarizes  important  aspects  of  NATO  and  in- 
cludes a  chronology  of  events  from  the  signing  of  the 
U.N.  Charter  on  June  26,  1945,  to  the  NATO  ministerial 
meeting  of  April  11,  1969.  Pub.  8458.  International  Or- 
ganizations Series  3. 12  pp.  10^. 

Extension  of  Loan  of  Vessels — U.S.S.  Benson,  U.S.S. 
Hilary  P.  Jones,  and  U.S.S.  Plunkett.  Agreement  with 
the  Republic  of  China.  TIAS  6723.  7  pp.  10^. 


December  15,   1969 


575 


Claims— Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands.  Agree- 
ment Avith  Japan.  TIAS6724.  19  pp.  15(«. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Tunisia. 
TIAS  0725.  4  pp.  lOff. 

Atomic  Energy— Cooperation  for  Civil  Uses.  Agree- 
ment with  Iran  amending  agreement  of  JIarch  5,  1957, 
as  amended.  TIAS  6726.  7  pp.  10((. 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  France 
amending  the  agreement  of  March  27, 1946,  as  amended 
and  extended.  TIAS  6727.  6  pp.  10(^. 

Telecommunication— Facility  on  Norfolk  Island  to 
Study  Ionospheric  Propagation  in  Relation  to  Long 
Range  Radio  Paths.  Agreement  with  Australia  extend- 
ing the  agreement  of  January  13,  19G9.  TIAS  6728.  3 
pp.  100. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.  Agreement  with  Belgium 
amending  Annex  B  to  the  agreement  of  January  27, 
1950.  TIAS  6729.  3  pp.  10^. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Paldstan 
modifying  the  agreement  of  May  16,  1968.  TIAS  67S0. 
2  pp.  10«S. 


DEPARTMENT  AND   FOREIGN   SERVICE 


Confirmations 

The  Senate  on  November  26  confirmed  the  following 
nominations : 

Lewis  Hoffacker  to  be  Ambassador  to  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Cameroon  and  to  serve  concurrently  as  Am- 
bassador to  the  Republic  of  Equatorial  Guinea.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  White  House  press  release  dated 
October  17. ) 

Sam  Harry  Wright  to  be  the  representative  of  the 
United  States  on  the  Trusteeship  Council  of  the  United 
Nations.  (For  biographic  data,  see  White  House  press 
release  dated  November  5. ) 

Designations 

W.  Beverly  Carter,  Jr.,  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  African  Affairs,  effective  November  25.  (For 
biographic  data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release 
dated  November  13.) 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  November  17—30 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflBce 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  November  17  which 
appear  in  this  issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  338 
of  November  12,  and  341  and  344  of  November 
13. 

No.        Date  Subject 

t346  11/17  U.S.  delegation  to  lA-ECOSOC 
Special  Committee,  Washington, 
November  17  (rewrite). 
*347  11/18  Faunce  sworn  in  as  Inspector  Gen- 
eral of  Foreign  Assistance  (bi- 
ographic data). 

Siracusa  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Bolivia  (biographic  data). 

Samuels :  "Agriculture  and  For- 
eign Economic  Policy." 

Extradition  treaty  negotiations 
with  Spain. 

Lodge :  43d  plenary  session  on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

Richardson :  regional  foreign  pol- 
icy conference,  Los  Angeles. 

Citizens  radio  service  convention 
signed  with  Canada. 

Haugerud  sworn  in  as  Coordinator 
of  the  National  Interdepart- 
mental Seminar  (biographic 
data). 

Lodge :  U.S.  position  on  Paris 
meetings  on  Viet-Nam. 

Rogers :  Foreign  Operations  Sub- 
committee of  Senate  Appropria- 
tions Committee. 

U.S.  and  Netlierlands  amend  air 
transport  services  agreement 

Secretary  heads  U.S.  delegation  to 
NATO  ministerial  meeting. 

Melady  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Burundi  (biographic  data). 

Lodge:  44th  plenary  session  on 
Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 

Rogers :    NET  interview. 

Rogers :  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many's signing  of  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Treaty. 
t363     11/28     Collins  nominated  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  Public  Affairs. 

*Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


*348 

11/19 

349 

11/19 

350 

11/20 

351 

11/20 

t352 

11/20 

353 

11/21 

*354 

11/24 

355 

11/24 

t356 

11/24 

t357 

11/25 

t358 

11/25 

*359 

11/26 

360 

11/26 

t361 
362 

11/26 

11/28 

576 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     December  15,  1969     Vol.  LXI,  No.  1590 


Africa.  Carter  designated  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  African  Affairs 576 

Agriculture.  Agriculture  and  Foreign  Economic 
rolicy  (Samuels) 5G9 

Aviation.  United  States  and  Japan  Amend  Air 
Transport  Agreement  (exchange  of  notes)     .       ."uS 

Cameroon.  Hoffacker  confirmed  as  Ambassa- 
dor      ,     .     .     .     .      57G 

Canada 

Mr.  Herman  Xamed  to  U.S.-Cauada  Inter- 
national Boundary  Commission "mS 

U.S.  and  Canada  Sign  Convention  on  Citizens 
Radio  Service ri74 

Communications.  U.S.  and  Canada  Sign  Conven- 
tion on  Citizens  Radio  Service 


Congress 

Confirmations  (Hoffacker,  Wright) 

The  Trade  Act  of  196"J  (President  Nixon's 
message  to  Congress) 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Confirmations  ( Ilolfacker,  Wright ) 

Designations   (Carter)       

Disarmament 

Chemical  and  Biological  Defense  Policies  and 
Programs  (Nixon,  texts  of  192")  Geneva 
protocol  and  U.K.  draft  convention)     .... 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany  Signs  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Treaty  (Rogers)       .... 

President  Nixon  Ratifies  Nuclear  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty  (Nixon,  Rogers)       

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  Open  at  Hel- 
sinki (jnessage  from  President  Nixon  to 
Chairman  of  U.S.  delegation) 

Economic  Affairs 

Agriculture  and  Foreign  Economic  Policy 
(Samuels) 

The  Trade  Act  of  19C0  (President  Nixou's 
message  to  Congress) 

Trade  Expansion   Expectations    (Gilbert)     .     . 

Equatorial  Guinea.  Hoffacker  confirmed  as 
Ambassador 

Europe.  Agriculture  and  Foreign  Economic 
Policy   (Samuels)       

Germany.  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  Signs 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty  (Rogers)     . 

Greece.  Letters  of  Credence  (Vitsaxis)     .     .     . 

Honduras.    U.S.    and    Honduras    To    Negotiate 

Swan  Islands  Sovereignty  Issue 

Japan 

President   Nixon   and   Prime  Minister   Sato   of 

Japan  Hold  Talks  at  Washington  (exchanges 

of  remarks  and  joint  communique)      .... 
United  States  and  Japan  Amend  .\ir  Transport 

Agreement   (exchange  of  notes) 


.".74 

576 
.-..-)9 


.".70 
."76 


r>41 
.54.". 
->44 


.-.4.3 


569 

559 
564 

576 

-.09 

54.". 
550 

550 


551 
573 


Presidential  Documents 

Ambassador  Ijodge  Resigns  as  Head  of  U.S.  Dele- 
gation   to   I'aris   Meetings 

Chemical  and  Biological  Defense  Policies  and 
Programs 

President  Nixon  and  I'rimc  Minister  Sato  of 
Japan  Hold  Talks  at  Washington 

President  Nixon  Ratifies  Nuclear  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  'J'alks  Oimii  at 
Helsinki 

The  Trade  Act  of  1909 

Publications.  Recent  Releases 

Spain.  U.S.  and  Spain  Begin  Negotiations  for 
New  Extradition  Treaty  (joint  statement) 

Trade 

Agriculture  and  Foreign  lOcononiic  Policy 
(Samuels) 

The  Trade  Act  of  1969  (President  Nixon's  mes- 
sage to  Congress)    

Trade  Expansion  Expectations  (Gilbert)     .     .     . 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany  Signs  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Treaty  (Rogers) 

President  Nixon  Ratifies  Nuclear  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty    (Nixon,   Rogers) 

U.S.  and  Canada  Sign  Convention  on  Citizens 
Radio  Service 

U.S.  and  Honduras  To  Negotiate  Swan  Islands 
Sovereignty  Issue       

United  States  and  Japan  Amend  Air  Transport 
Agreement   (exchange  of  notes) 

U.S.  and  Spain  Begin  Negotiations  for  New  Ex- 
tradition Treaty   (joint  statement)     .... 

U.S.S.R.  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  Open 
at  Helsinki  ( message  from  President  Nixon  to 
Chairman  of  U.S.  delegation) 

United  Nations.  Wright  confirmed  as  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative on  the  Trusteeship  Council     .     .     . 

Viet-Nam 

Ambassador  Lodge  Resigns  as  Head  of  U.S.  Dele- 
gation to  Paris  Meetings  (Nixon,  Lodge)     .     . 

43d  and  44th  Plenary  Sessions  on  A'iet-Nam  Held 
at  Paris  (Lodge) 

U.S.  Reaffirms  Willingness  To  Negotiate  on 
Viet-Nam   (Lodge) 

Name  Iiiilcr 

Carter,  AV.  Beverly,  Jr 

Gilbert,  Carl  J 

Herman,   Richard   L 

Hoffacker,  Lewis 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot 546, 

Nixon,  President 541,  543,  544,  549,  551, 

Rogers,   Secretary 544, 

Samuels,  Nathaniel 

Sato,  Eisaku 

Vitsaxis,  Basil  George 

Wright,  Sam  Harry 


549 

541 

551 

544 

543 
559 

575 
558 

569 


559 
564 


574 
545 
544 
574 
550 
573 
55S 

543 
576 

549 
546 
549 


576 

504 
558 
570 
549 
5.->9 
545 
569 
551 
550 
570 


I 


U.S.    COVEINMENT    PSlNTtMG   OFFICE:  1970 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON,   D.C.     20402 


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1  THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


lCRETAEY  ROGERS  INTERVIEWED  ON  NATIONAL  EDUCATIONAL  TELEVISION     577 

U.S.-SOVIET  RELATIONS  IN  AN  ERA  OF  NEGOTIATION 

hy  Under  Secretary  Richardson     58^ 

^XRETARY  STRESSES  IMPORTANCE  OF  FUNDING  FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM 

■  Statement  Before  the  Foreign  Operations  Subconmiittee 
of  the  Senate  Ap-propriations  Committee     593 

TREATMENT  OF  AJMERICAN  PRISONERS  OF  WAR  IN  NORTH  VIET-NAM 

Statement  iy  William  H.  Sullivan     596 


For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1591 
December  22,  1969 


9 


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Note:    Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 

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the   Readers'   Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


The  Department  of  State  BVLLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  ivork  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
made  by  the  President  and  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  other  officers 
of  the  Department,  as  icell  as  special 
articles  on  various  phases  of  interrui- 
tional  affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  tvhich  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department, 
United  Nations  documents,  and  leg- 
islative material  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  are  listed  currently» 


Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  National  Educational  Television 


Following  is  the  transcript  of  an  interview 
with  Secretary  Rogers  for  the  National  Educa- 
tional Television  Network  series  ''''The  Presi- 
dent's Men^''  which  was  videotaped  at  the  De- 
partment on  November  25  and  televised  on  NET 
beginning  Novennber  26.  Interviewing  the  Sec- 
retary was  Paul  Niven,  NET  Washington 
correspondent. 

Press  release  361  dated  NoTember  28 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  some  of  your  predecessors 
have  been  moral  crusaders  in  one  cause  or 
another;  some  have  had  previous  experience  in 
the  Department  in  regard  to  the  Secretaryship, 
as  the  culmination  of  a  career,  and  enjoyed  be- 
ing part  of  the  Foreign  Ministers  club.  I  gather 
that,  coming  in  from  another  field,  you  have  a 
somewhat  different  attitude  toward  your  job. 
Could  you  describe  your  approach? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  my  approach  could  be  described 
by  saying  that  I  try  to  carry  out  this  assignment 
in  accordance  with  the  President's  wishes,  which 
is  to  enter  an  era  of  negotiation  rather  than 
confrontation.  Secondly,  to  sort  of  lower  our 
voice,  because  as  a  nation  we  have  at  times  ap- 
peared to  be  loud  and  strident  and  too  dominant 
in  our  attitudes.  So  I  would  hope  that  as  we  go 
along  in  this  administration,  we  can  have  some- 
what a  new  approach  of  lowering  our  voice  and 
projecting  the  American  personality  and  poli- 
cies as  they  really  are. 

Q.  This  may  be  why  Senator  Fulbright  looks 
upon  you  so  a2)provin.gly.  This  has  been  his 
theme  for  some  years — a  part  of  it. 

A.  Yes,  I  think  that  our  policy  is  so  sound  that 
we  don't  have  to  be  too  strident,  too  loud  in 
projecting  it. 

Q.  You  said  that  our  power  is  so  great — that 
only  the  iceak  need  make  noise. 

A.  Yes,  we  don't  have  to  speak  with  a  loud 
voice.  We  are  the  strongest  nation  in  the  world 
by  far,  both  militarily  and  economically.  And 
so  when  we  say  something,  it  carries  a  great 

December  22,   1969 

870-872—69 1 


weight  in  and  of  itself.  So  it  doesn't  have  to  be 
shouted;  it  doesn't  have  to  be  said  in  an  arro- 
gant or  egotistical  manner ;  it  just  carries  weight 
because  of  the  prominence  and  the  prestige  and 
importance  of  the  United  States. 

Q.  I  know  that  you  and  Mr.  Kissinger  [Henry 
A.  Kissinger,  Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tio7ial  Secu7'ity  Affairs'^  are  sick  of  being  asked 
about  each  other,  and  I  won't  labor  the  point; 
but  let  me  ask  you:  Institutionally,  Mr.  Acheson 
was  asked  in  a  recent  intervieto  how  he  would 
have  coped  with  an  office  of  international  secvr 
rity  affairs  in  the  White  House,  and  he  replied 
quite  simply:  "/  would  have  ceased  to  be  Secre- 
tary of  State.''''  Now,  you  and  Mr.  Rusk  seem,  to 
have  taken  a  different  view.  How  do  you  divide 
up  the  load?  Is  it  generically?  Are  there  some 
problems  that  go  to  the  President  directly  from, 
the  State  Department  and  others  that  go 
through  the  Kissinger  office?  Is  it  long-term, 
planning  and  long-term,  policy  from  here  and 
immediate  reaction  through  that  office,  or  what? 

A.  Well,  it  will  require  a  sort  of  long  answer. 
But  let  me  say  this.  Mr.  Acheson,  of  course,  was 
talking  about  his  experience.  If  he  were  here 
today,  he  would  have  to  create  something  like 
the  National  Security  Council.  He  couldn't 
operate  without  it. 

Q.  Why?  What's  happened? 

A.  Well,  because  the  volume  of  business  is 
so  much  greater.  What  happens  now  is  that  we 
have  a  great  many  problems  that  cut  across 
many  departments  and  agencies  of  government. 
We  had  one  this  morning,  for  example,  in- 
volving bacteriological  and  chemical  warfare. 
Now,  that  involves  the  Defense  Department,  the 
State  Department,  the  Science  Adviser,  and 
other  departments  of  government.  We  couldn't 
decide  that  just  in  the  State  Department;  it  is 
a  very  important  matter  for  the  Defense  De- 
partment. So  that  is  done  through  the  National 
Security  Council.  They  collect  the  opinions  of 
the  different  departments,  we  present  them  to 

577 


the  President,  and  the  President  makes  his  deci- 
sion. Furthermore,  there  is  so  much  paperwork 
these  days,  so  many  recommendations  that  we 
send  to  the  President,  that  someone  has  to  col- 
lect those  papers,  present  tliem  to  him  when  he 
has  an  opportimity  to  look  at  them,  and  so 
forth.  So  that  you  couldn't  get  along  without 
the  National  Security  Council,  and  you  couldn't 
get  along  without  some  staff  assistance  in  the 
White  House.  I  think  the  relationships  that  now 
exist  are  excellent.  There  is  no  problem. 

Q.  President  Kennedy  used  to  cast  aspersions 
on  the  Department  of  State  in  private.  Are 
Presidents  perhaps  m\duly  critical  of  the 
State  Department?  Do  they  fail  to  appreciate 
the  vast  volume  of  work  a  department  lihe  this 
has  to  do,  quite  apart  from  policy,  in  an 
immediate  reaction  to  crisis? 

A.  Yes,  and  I  think  there  is  another  reason. 
That  is  because  so  many  of  the  problems  are 
insoluble,  and  the  President  feels  that  he  wants 
to  solve  problems  and  he  expects  the  people  in 
his  administration  to  solve  them.  Now,  in  a  lot 
of  the  departments — for  example,  the  Depart- 
ment of  Justice,  that  I  headed  for  a  while — we 
could  solve  problems.  We  had  them  under  our 
control.  In  the  foreign  affairs  field,  quite  often 
they  are  well  beyond  your  control.  And  I  think 
the  President  has  the  feeling,  not  knowing  about 
all  of  the  ramifications,  that  maybe  something 
could  have  been  done  to  prevent  a  difficult  sit- 
uation from  arising.  But  the  fact  of  the  matter 
is,  and  quite  often  so,  it  is  not  possible  to  an- 
ticipate trouble.  It  is  not  possible  to  prevent  it. 

The  Situation  in  Viet-Nam 

Q.  During  the  campaign  I  think  many  people 
were  disposed  to  Relieve  that  a  new  adininistra- 
tion,  with  whatever  py'obleins  it  ran  into  with 
the  war  in  Viet-Nam,  woidd  at  least  have  the 
great  advantage  that  it  would  not  ie  saddled 
with  pride  of  authorship.  It  might  make  its 
oion  mistakes,  hut  it  would  not  he  concerned 
with  defending  the  policies  of  the  immediate 
past.  After  10  months  do  you  still  feel  that  you 
have  an  independence  in  Viet-Nam  that  a  pre- 
vious administration  did  not,  or  do  you  find 
yourself  increasingly  the  prisoner  of  the  same 
circumstances,  the  same  facts,  and  the  sa?ne  at- 
titudes on  the  other  side  that  the  other 
administration  had? 

A.  Not  at  all.  I  think  we  have  independence, 
and  we  are  going  to  assert  it.  I  mean,  we  have 


changed  the  war  from  an  escalatory  situation 
to  a  deescalation,  and  we  are  going  to  continue. 
And  when  I  hear  people  talk  about  the  fact 
that  our  policy  has  not  changed,  I  don't  under- 
stand what  thej'  mean.  We  have  reversed  the 
policy.  We  are  withdrawing  troops.  We  are 
going  to  Vietnamize  the  war.  We  are  going  to 
get  American  soldiers  out  of  combat.  And  that's 
irreversible. 

Q.  Is  progress  in  Viet-.Nam  in  the  10  months 
you  have  ieen  in  office  about  what  you  expected, 
or  less,  or  more? 

A.  Well,  I  think  progress  in  the  negotiations 
has  been  disappointing.  We  hoped  that  there 
would  be  greater  progress  in  Paris.  Insofar  as 
the  war  itself  and  the  pacification  program  are 
concerned,  I  think  it  has  gone  somewhat  better, 
possibly,  than  I  had  expected,  because  the  war 
has  been  considerably  deescalated,  as  you  know. 
Casualties  are  down  well  over  50  percent.  The 
combat  activity  is  down;  and  so  I  think,  on 
the  whole,  the  war  has  gone  better  than  I  would 
have  anticipated. 

The  Negotiations  in  Paris 

Q.  Do  you  interpret  Mr.  Thuy''s  New  York 
Times  interview  as  a  reaction  to  the  resigna- 
tion of  Mr.  Lodge  and,  an  effort  on  the  Com- 
munist part  to  keep  the  talks  going,  for  lohat- 
ever  purpose  loith  whatever  suhstance? 

A.  Are  you  speaking  of  Mr.  Thieu  ? 

Q.  No,  Mr.  Thuy,  in  Paris,  his  intervieu)  with 
Harrison  Salisbury. 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  how  to  interpret  it.  He 
wasn't  telling  the  truth.  Ambassador  Lodge 
has  been  willing  for  some  time,  and  has  clearly 
indicated  to  the  North  Vietnamese  that  we  were 
willing  to  talk  to  them  about  military  and 
political  matters  at  the  same  time.  We  always 
did  say,  though,  that  in  the  final  analysis  a 
political  solution  had  to  be  decided  upon  and 
determined  by  the  people  in  South  Viet-Nam. 
But  we  were  perfectly  willing  to  talk  about  it. 
In  fact,  we  did  have  private  talks  about  both 
military  and  political  matters  in  private 
sessions. 

Q.  I  ivas  wondenng  if  Mr.  Thuy's  initiative 
in  granting  this  interview  was  an  effort  to  keep 
the  talks  going  at  a  time  he  felt  the  American 
administration  icas  more  or  less  giving  up  on 
them. 


578 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


A.  It's  possible.  We  don't  exactly  know. 

Q.  Why?  Does  that  mean  they  want  to  talk 
substantively,  or  do  they  just  want  to  keep  them 
going  for  so7>ie  other  purpose? 

A.  Well,  I  thiiik  that  they  are  getting  some 
benefits  from  the  talks.  For  example,  they  have 
ready  access  to  the  American  press  that  they 
wouldn't  have  if  they  were  in  Hanoi.  So  from 
that  standpoint,  they  are  able  to  get  across  their 
point  of  view  on  a  daily  basis,  which  they 
couldn't  otherwise  do. 

Q.  Mr.  Thuy  stressed  that  if  we — if  a  settle- 
ment were  reached  and  we  pulled  out,  there 
would  he  no  bloodbath,  no  mass  slaughter  of 
South  Vietnamese  friendly  to  us,  and  he  in- 
voked Vietnamese  tradition  in  this  connection. 
Did  you  regard  this  as  an  effort  to  answer 
one  of  our  principal  fears  about  precipitate 
withdrawal? 

A.  I  don't  regard  those  public  statements  as 
anything  except  propaganda.  If  they  are  serious 
about  talking  to  us,  about  negotiating  peaceful 
settlement,  why  don't  they  discuss  it  in  private 
session  ?  "V\^iy  is  it  necessary  to  go  out  and  talk 
to  the  press  about  it?  We  are  perfectly  willing 
to  meet  them  at  any  time  and  talk  about  all 
phases  of  tliis  war. 

Q.  What  about  that  famous  controversial  last 
letter — the  Ho  Chi  Minh  letter  to  the  President, 
which  Mr.  Nixon,  in  his  broadcast,  interpreted 
as  a  rejection?'^  Some  students  of  Soviet  cor- 
respondence have  said,  well,  it  was  more  or  less 
open,  it  didn't  close  the  door.  Have  you  and  the 
President  taken  these — 

A.  Yes,  we  have  talked  about  these  things.  Of 
course,  it  is  pretty  clear  from  the  letter  that  it 
is  a  rejection;  but  on  the  other  hand,  if  it  is 
not  a  rejection,  all  they  have  to  do  is  pick  up 
the  phone  and  tell  us.  I  am  having  trouble  un- 
derstanding all  of  the  esoteric  interpretations 
that  are  put  upon  these  little  signs  by  the  media. 
It's  a  perfectly  simple  tiling  to  do.  We  are  in 
contact  every  day  almost;  so  if  they  have  any 
thoughts,  why  don't  they  express  them  to  us? 
If  there  is  anything  in  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  letter 
that  we  have  overlooked,  all  they  have  to  do  is 
suggest  it  to  us. 

Q.  The  President  said  that  the  rate  of  our 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation  on 
Nov.  .3  and  his  exchange  of  letters  with  President 
Ho,  see  Bttlletin  of  Nov.  24,  1969,  pp.  437  and  443. 


withdrawal  will  be  determined  by  progress  in 
the  talks,  the  lowering  level  of  the  battle,  and 
the  progress  of  Vietnamizaticm.  As  some  of  his 
political  opponents  have  suggested,  doesn't  this 
put  the  initiative  in  all  three  cases  upon  the 
other  side?  DoesnH  this  give  away  the  power 
to  decide  our  rate  of  withdrawal? 

Withdrawal  of  U.S.  Troops 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  so,  because  we  are  pretty 
coniident  about  the  ability  of  the  South  to  take 
over  the  combat  responsibilities.  President 
Nixon  has  a  plan  which  he  has  thought  through 
very  carefully,  and  he  is  going  to  put  that  plan 
into  effect.  He  hasn't  announced  the  timetable, 
but  he  has  it  clearly  in  mind.  Now,  the  time- 
table may  be  affected  slightly  from  month  to 
month. 

Q.  Only  slightly? 

A.  Only  slightly.  Because  we  are  quite  con- 
vinced that  the  South  Vietnamese  are  going  to 
be  able  to  take  over  the  combat  responsibilities. 
So  far  it  has  worked  quite  well. 

Q.  If  the  level  of  battle  suddenly  increased 
significantly,  if  there  were  another  Tet  offen- 
sive, would  not  that  affect  the  speed  of  Viet- 
namization?  And  of  Amei^ican  withdrawal  more 
thari  slightly? 

A.  Well,  slightly  in  terms  of  a  month  or  two, 
possibly.  But  I  don't  think  the  enemy  can — I 
hope  I  am  not  wrong — I  don't  think  the  enemy 
can  launcli  a  major  offensive.  They  can  launch 
offensives.  I  don't  have  any  doubt  about  that, 
but  I  think  their  ability  to  launch  that  kind  of 
an  offensive  is  somewhat  limited. 

Q.  Senator  Scott  made  a  striking  statement  a 
month  or  two  ago  that  the  enemy  might  have 
one  more  offensive  in  him  but  that  if  he  did 
that,  that  would  be  his  last  and  he  would  be  a 
defeated  enemy.  Well,  now,  the  soldiers  and  cer- 
tain columnists  have  been  telling  us  that  for  4 
years.  What  reason  is  there  to  believe  it  now 
when  it  has  been  wrong  so  Ttiany  times  in  the 
past? 

A.  Well,  I  wouldn't  want  to  make  that  pre- 
diction, that  they  couldn't  launch  several  of- 
fensives. But  I  mean  at  the  present  time  I  don't 
believe  they  are  in  a  position  to  launch  a  very 
large  major  offensive  that  would  last  a  long 
time.  Now,  they  might  be  able  to  if  they  sent 
more  men  into  the  South.  But  at  the  present 
time,  as  you  know,  they  have  not  been  replacing 


December  22,  1969 


I 


579 


their  troops  with  infiltration,  so  that  there  has 
been  a  net  reduction  of  their  forces  in  the  South. 

Q.  I  think  enough  has  been  said  in  the  press 
in  the  last  2  or  3  days  about  the  alleged  massacre 
of  Vietnamese  civilians,  that  probaUy  enough 
has  been  done  to  prejudice  the  court-martial 
proceedings  more  than  they  should  be,  but  in 
general  these  things  have  come  and  gone  be- 
jore — there  icas  the  Green  Beret  case,  which 
was  dropped,  and  others.  Isn't  one  of  the  worst 
things  about  this  kind  of  dirty  jungle  war  that 
it  brutalizes  large  numbers  of  young  Ameri- 
cans? 

A.  Yes — I  don't  think  there  is  any  way  to 
deny  that.  I  think  that  if  the  allegations  are 
true,  it  is  a  shocking,  shocking  incident,  and  all 
we  can  do  is  to  court-martial  any  responsible 
persons  and  to  show  the  world  that  we  don't 
condone  this.  Obviously,  if  anything  of  this 
kind  happened,  it  is  in  direct  contradiction  of 
the  orders. 

Q.  As  you  know,  it  is  big  news  in  Europe, 
almost  bigger  than  here.  Are  you  getting  much 
heat  diplomatically  about  it? 

A.  Well,  we  haven't  gotten  much  heat  diplo- 
matically. We  don't  need  much  heat.  It  is  a 
tragic  event  if  it  is  true.  And  certainly  there  is 
indication  of  some  truth  at  least.  So  we  are 
highly  concerned ;  it  is  a  shocking  thing. 

U.S.  Commifmenfs  and  World  Stability 

Q.  In  yoiir  own  conversations  with  more  than 
20  Foreign  Ministers,  you  stress  that  we  will 
uphold  our  present  commitments  but  we  are  go- 
ing to  take  a  long,  careful  look  at  new  commit- 
ments. Do  you  think  we  are  overcommitted  now? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  that  we  are  overcom- 
mitted. I  think  that  we  have  to  live  up  to  our 
commitments.  I  think  that  our  commitments  are 
sound  commitments.  I  think  they  should  be 
lived  up  to.  I  don't  think  that  we  should  make 
further  commitments.  I  think  we  have  enough. 
I  think  the  commitments  we  have  made  have 
contributed  greatly  to  the  stability  of  the  world. 
After  all,  we  have  avoided  a  world  war  now  for 
25  years,  and  our  NATO  commitments  certainly 
are  sound  and  should  be  continued ;  and  I  think 
our  commitments  in  Southeast  Asia,  on  the 
whole,  have  contributed  to  the  stability  of  the 
area. 

Q.  Well,  it  has  been  alleged  during  past  ad- 


ministrations by  some  people  on  the  Hill  that 
we  sometimes  slide  into  commitments,  sort  of 
willy-nilly  and  imperceptively,  without  a  con- 
scious decision  by  the  President  in  consultation 
with  the  Congress  and  the  Nation  and  the  pub- 
lic. Is  there  any  validity  to  this  charge,  do  you 
think? 

A.  Well,  I  think  we  have  to  be  careful  to 
avoid  that ;  I  think  Congress  is  performing  its 
constitutional  function  when  it  takes  this  posi- 
tion. We  are  going  to  do  what  we  can  to  work 
with  the  Congress  to  see  that  that  doesn't  hap- 
pen. We  have  no  interest  or  desire  to  have  any- 
thing of  that  kind  happen ;  so  I  think  Congress 
is  doing  its  job. 

Q.  Well,  some  people,  for  instance,  are  seizing 
on  the  President's  statement  that  we  are  furnish- 
ing some  aid  and  training  to  Laos.^  And  many 
have  said,  '■'■Oh,  here  loe  go  again.  This  may  end, 
up  another  Viet-Nam."  Now,  why  won't  that 
happen? 

A.  Well,  the  President  won't  let  it  happen, 
that  is  why.  We  have  learned  one  lesson  and  that 
is  that  we  are  not  going  to  fight  any  major  wars 
on  the  mainland  of  Asia  again,  and  we  are  not 
going  to  send  American  troops  there,  and  we 
certainly  aren't  going  to  do  it  unless  we  have 
the  American  public  and  the  Congress  behind 
us.  But  in  any  event,  we  have  no  such  plan ;  we 
don't  intend  to. 

Q.  Is  it  conceivable,  as  Professor  Reischauer 
has  suggested,  tlmt  our  experience  in  Viet-Nam 
has  so  embittered  the  Congress  and  the  public 
that  there  inight  be  sometime  in  the  futxire  when 
the  Communists  challenge  us  somewhere  in  the 
world  very  suddenly,  as  in  Korea,  in  a  way  that 
demanded  a  response  and  the  administration 
would  want  to  go  in — thought  xce  should  and, 
furthermore,  time  was  of  the  essence — but  we 
couldn't  because  Viet-Nam  has  so  dissipated 
public  and  congressional  support  for  overseas 
adventures?  Is  this  a  problem  about  the 
Legislature? 

A.  I  don't  think  so.  I  don't  believe  that  Con- 
gress would  ever  be  reluctant  to  meet  our  com- 
mitments,  our  treaty  obligations,  if  we  had  to; 
and  I  think  Congress  would  react  very  favor- 
ably if  the  President  ever  got  to  that  point,  God 
forbid.  We  certainly,  I  think,  would  have  diffi- 


"For  excerpts  from  President  Nixon's  news  confer- 
ence on  Sept.  26,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  13,  1969,  p.  313. 


580 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


culty  if  we,  as  you  suggested  earlier,  tried  to 
use  troops  in  Laos,  for  example ;  I  thiiili  Con- 
gress will  be  very  careful  about  approving  any- 
thing of  that  liind,  and  so  are  we.  The  President 
and  I  and  the  rest  of  us  are  not  going  to  get 
involved  in  anything  of  that  kind. 

Q.  Well,  treaty  ohUgations  don't  cover  every 
part  of  the  world  now.  If  the  Chinese  invaded 
Thailand,  we  are  both  members  of  SEATO  and 
we  would  go  to  Thalland''s  aid.  It  is  in  the 
treaty.  But  say,  very  hypothetically,  tlmt  the 
Chinese  army  in  force  crossed  the  border  of  the 
Union  of  Burma.  Burma  is  a  neutral  country. 
Burma  called  on  us  for  aid.  WoiddnH  our  re- 
sponse be  affected  by  the  knowledge  that  public 
support  and  congressional  support  would  be 
affected  by  the  experience  of  Viet-Nam? 

A.  Yes,  undoubtedly;  and  I  think  it  should. 
I  think  under  those  circumstances  it  should  be 
very  much  affected  by  congressional  attitudes 
and  public  attitudes,  if  we  are  talking  about 
invasion  of  Burma. 

Respect  for  Dissenting  Views 

Q.  As  a  latoyer  and  civil  libertarian,  you  have 
often  upheld  the  right  of  people  to  demonstrate 
against  our  foreign  policy,  yet  as  Secretary  of 
State  you  have  been  compelled  to  say,  frovi  time 
to  time,  that  some  of  this  7nust  encourage  Hanoi. 
Do  you  find  yourself  constantly  in  a  dilemma 
every  time  one  of  these  demonstrations  occurs? 

A.  Well,  yes,  to  some  extent.  Tliere  is  nothing 
more  sacred  to  our  system  of  govermnent  than 
the  right  of  free  speech  and  the  riglit  of  as- 
sembly, and  for  that  reason  I  am  veiy  sym- 
pathetic to  young  people  who  use  those  means 
to  voice  their  dissent.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
readies  a  point  sometimes  where  it  is  more  than 
just  voicing  dissent.  It  gets  to  the  point  where 
it  is  so  insistent,  it  almost  sounds  as  if  they  are 
saying  that  if  you  don't  do  what  we  tell  you, 
why  we  are  going  to  cause  more  severe  trouble 
for  you.  I  think  at  that  jDoint  it  becomes  a 
problem.  On  the  whole,  I  think  that  the  dis- 
sent that  has  been  manifested  in  this  country 
is  a  very  sincere  one.  I  think  those  of  us  in  the 
Government  have  an  obligation  to  take  it  seri- 
ously, listen  to  it,  which  we  have  done.  I  of 
course  criticize  the  violence  that  has  been  used 
on  some  occasions;  but,  by  and  large,  this  last 
moratorium — 250,000  people — consisted  of  a  lot 
of  people  that  are  very  seriously  concerned 


about  the  war  and  they  want  their  Government 
to  know  how  deeply  they  feel  about  it,  and  I 
think  we  have  an  obligation  to  listen  to  them 
and  to  respect  their  views. 

Q.  Without  naming  names,  it  sounds  as  if  you 
were  more  tolerant  of  them  than  some  of  your 
colleagues  in  the  administration. 

A.  Well,  I  don't  want  to  get  involved  in  that. 
I  certainly  am  not  tolerant  of  the  radical  ele- 
ment, those  who  use  violence  and  obscenities  and 
all  of  these  other  things,  but  I  think  we  cer- 
tainly have  an  obligation  in  the  Government  to 
respect  the  views  of  people  who  disagree  with  us. 

Q.  On  October  12  on  '■'■Meet  the  Press,^''  ^  you 
xoere  ashed  about  progress  in  Paris  and  lohen 
there  might  be  some,  and  you  said  there  might 
be  some  if  Hanoi  became  convinced  that  we 
meant  business  but  that  entailed  a  diminution 
in  this  protest  at  home.  Three  days  later  there 
was  the  moratorium;  now  we  have  had  a  mo- 
bilisation of  a  quarter  of  a  million.  We  are  not 
mahing  any  progress  in  curbing  dissent  or  per- 
suading the  dissenters  to  stop  disseriting  pub- 
licly, are  wef 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  about  that.  You  see, 
they  haven't  announced  another  march,  and  it 
may  well  be  that  they  will  decide  that  they 
have  made  their  point.  And  certainly  the  sum 
attitude — and  it's  the  attitude  of  some  Members 
of  the  Congress  that  that  is  the  case — and  if 
their  dissent  is  unsuccessful  in  causing  the 
public  to  change  its  attitude  toward  the  Presi- 
dent, then  it  could  well  be  that  it  will  be  counter- 
productive. In  other  words,  as  you  notice,  the 
President's  popularity  has  gone  up  since  the 
moratorium,  and  I  think  Hanoi  is  going  to  be 
quite  conscious  of  that.  They  watch  these 
things;  and  they  know  that  the  President's 
November  3  speech  was  very  effective  and  then 
they  will  see  that  the  public  is  supporting  the 
President;  so  it  may  well  be  that  it  will  have 
some  effect  on  their  attitudes  in  Paris. 

Q.  When,  before  the  moratorium,  the  Presi- 
dent said  that  he  would  not  be  influenced  in  any 
toay  whatever  and  when,  during  tlie  mobiliza- 
tion, he  said  it  xoas  a  good  day  to  watch  a  ball 
game,  some  of  the  kids  took  this  as  gratuitously 
insulting  to  them.  My  own  feeling  loas  that  he 
wasn't  speaking  to  them  at  all,  but  he  was  try- 
ing to  speak  above  tliem  to  Hanoi  to  make  it 


'  Bulletin  of  Oct.  27,  1969,  p.  345. 


December  22,   1969 


581 


clear  that  he,  arid  not  they,  was  running  the 
foreign  folicy  of  this  country.  Is  that  a  fair 
assessment? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  that  is  a  fair  assessment.  I 
think  what  he  was  saying  is  tliat  you  can't  really 
make  decisions  based  on  who  is  complaining  the 
most.  As  President,  you  have  to  make  a  decision 
based  on  what  you  think  is  in  the  national  inter- 
est, and  what  he  was  saying  was  that  he  was 
going  to  do  that.  He  was  not  saying  that  he 
wasn't  going  to  listen  or  pay  attention  to  the 
views. 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  SALT  talks  in  Helsinki 
are  still  in  the  early  stages  of  the  preliminary 
phase,  but  do  you  have  any  impressions  out  of 
them  yet? 

A.  Yes,  we  do.  The  impression  we  have  is 
that  the  Soviet  Union  is  quite  serious  about 
these  talks,  and  I  have  talked  to  some  of  those 
who  are  in  Helsinki  and  they  tell  me  that  the 
nature  of  the  talks,  the  manner  of  dialogue,  is 
the  best  of  any  discussion  they  have  had  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  They  are  serious,  they  are  not 
polemical,  and  we  were  very  encouraged  by  the 
general  atmosphere. 

Q.  Is  this  a  surprise? 

A.  No,  but  we  are  pleased. 

Q.  Why  did  they  put  them  off  so  long,  if  they 
were  ready  to  he  forthcoming?  Do  you  have  any 
idea? 

A.  No.  I  suppose  they  asked  that  question 
about  us,  because  we  delayed  from  the  beginning 
of  our  administration  until  June.  I  think  prob- 
ably the  reason  was  they  were  having  problems 
with  the  Chinese.  I  think  they  wanted  to  get 
those  talks  started — the  talks  started  with  the 
Chinese,  Eed  Chinese- — before  they  went  to 
Helsinki. 

Q.  Is  it  true  the  Department  of  State  wanted 
to  go  into  these  preliminary  talks  with  some 
substantive  proposals  but  that  other  agencies  of 
our  Government  did  not  and  prevailed? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  that  is  true.  We  thought 
all  along  that  these  talks  would  be  useful  to  try 
to  really  probe  to  see  what  we  could  do  in  the 
final  talks,  and  I  think  the  Soviet  Union  took 
the  same  attitude. 


Q.  What  does  the  Soviet  Union  want? 

A.  Well,  I  think  it  is  a  little  early  to  tell.  I 
think  what  they  want  is  the  same  thing  that  we 
want,  at  least  that  is  what  we  hope.  And  that  is 
that  we  can  curb  the  arms  race  and  maintain 
the  same  relative  position  so  that  each  of  U3 
does  not  have  to  spend  so  much  money  on  arms. 

Q.  Do  they  admit  this,  by  the  way,  that  they 
would  like  to  divert  some  of  their  resources  to 
domestic  affairs? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  as  I  have  ever  had  that 
exact  discussion  with  them,  but  that  clearly  is 
the  implication. 

Q.  Well,  we  are  going  to — by  Pentagon  testi- 
mony— we  are  going  to  conclude  our  MIRY 
[multiple  independently  targeted  reentry  ve- 
hicle'] testing  and  more  or  less  perfect  it  by  May 
or  June.  Isn't  this  going  to  make  any  agreement 
much  more  difficult  to  enforce? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  there  is  a  lot  to  that,  but  it 
is  just  one  of  those  facts  of  life  we  will  have  to 
face  up  to. 

Q.  Did  you  see  any  possibility  of  getting  an 
agreement  before  May  or  June? 

A.  I  doubt  it  very  much,  because  it  is  very 
difficult  to  imagine  that  it  could  happen.  We 
are  not  sure  what  stage  they  are  in,  and  they 
are  not  sure  what  stage  we  are  in;  and  if  we 
proposed  it  too  aggressively,  they  would  think 
that  we  had  completed  our  tests  to  the  point 
where  we  didn't  need  any  additional  tests,  and 
they  would  be  naturally  suspicious. 

Q.  Right. 

A.  And  vice  versa. 

Q.  But  if  it  does  go  to  May  or  June  and  our 
MIRY  is  operational,  doesn't  any  agreement  en- 
tail vast  detailed  inspection,  and  isn't  this  a 
stumbling  block  that  the  Soviet-American  arms 
talks  have  run  up  against  for  20  years? 

A.  Yes — but  your  question  suggests  an  incor- 
rect premise,  and  that  is  there  is  something 
magic  about  May  or  June. 

Q.  Well,  once  we  have  finished  the  MIRY 
tests  and  it  is  operational — 

A.  Wliat  I  am  saying  is  that  it  isn't  neces- 
sarily the  finish  of  the  tests  that  counts. 

Q.  Why  is  that,  sir? 


582 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


A.  Because  you  don't  necessarily  have  to 
finish  the  tests  in  order  to  deploy  them. 

Q.  Oh,  we  could  deploy  iefore — 

A.  Well,  as  I  say,  the  tests  that  run  for  a  long 
period  of  time  are  designed  to  give  you  the 
maximum  out  of  testing.  Now,  neither  side  quite 
knows  whether  the  other  side  has  tested  enough 
so  that  they  would  be  able  to  deploy  them  now. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  finally,  your  predecessor 
served  for  8  years,  one  of  the  longest  tenures  of 
Secretary  of  State  in  American  history.  You 
made  it  clear  the  other  day  that  this  is  one  ex- 
ample of  his  you  were  not  going  to  follow,  that 
Ij.  years  luould  he  enough.  Why  do  you  feel  that 
toay? 

A.  "Well,  I  think  it  is  a  very  diiScult  job,  and 
I  think  you  can  do  a  good  deal  in  4  j^ears ;  and 
I  think  maybe  after  that  it  is  better  to  have  a 
new  man  in  the  job.  I  think  he  may  have  some 
other  ideas.  Furthermore,  in  view  of  Dean 
Acheson's  success  as  an  author — I  noticed  he  is 
charging  $15  for  his  book — I  might  think  about 
selling  books. 

Q.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 


Crew  of  U.S.  Helicopter 
Released  by  North  Korea 

Folloiving  is  the  statement  released  at  Pan- 
munjom  on  Decemher  2  iy  the  United  Nations 
Command,  together  with  the  text  of  the  docu- 
ment signed  that  day  hy  Ma}.  Gen.  Arthur  H. 
Adams,  USMG,  Senior  Member,  UNG  Side, 
Military  Armistice  Commission. 


STATEMENT   BY   UNITED   NATIONS   COMMAND 

On  August  17,  1969,  at  about  1110  hours  a 
small  unarmed  U.S.  helicopter  was  shot  down  in 
North  Korea  just  north  of  the  Han  River  estu- 
ary, which  is  the  DMZ  at  that  point.  A  request 
was  immediately  made  to  the  North  Korean  side 
for  return  of  the  helicopter  and  members  of  the 
crew.  The  pilot  of  the  helicopter  was  Warrant 
Officer  Malcolm  Loepke,  and  there  were  two 
passengers :  Capt.  David  H.  Crawford  and  Sp4 
Herman  E.  Hofstatter.  This  incident  occurred 


in  the  course  of  a  training  flight.  The  flight  plan 
filed  by  the  pilot  called  for  him  to  remain  south 
of  the  DMZ  throughout  the  flight. 

The  UNO  side  has  held  many  meetings  with 
the  North  Korean  side  since  August  17  to  secure 
the  release  of  the  men,  and  these  negotiations 
were  successfully  ended  today  with  the  return 
of  the  three  men  to  the  custody  of  the  UNO  side. 

Upon  return  of  the  men,  a  UNC  spokesman 
made  the  following  statement : 

"To  secure  release  of  the  three  helicopter  crew 
members.  General  Adams  was  authorized  to 
sign  a  statement  today  that  the  United  Nations 
command  side  had  committed  a  'criminal-act' 
by  'infiltrating'  the  helicopter  'deep'  into  the 
territory  under  the  control  of  North  Korea.  The 
United  Nations  Command  has  consistently  ac- 
knowledged that  the  helicopter  inadvertently 
crossed  the  demilitarized  zone  without  hostile 
intent  when  the  pilot  became  disoriented.  It  was 
fired  upon  immediately  after  crossing  the  de- 
militarized zone  within  sight  of  observers  on  the 
south  side.  It  is  obvious  that  a  small  unarmed 
helicopter  of  this  type  would  not  be  deliberately 
sent  into  hostile  territory,  and  equally  obvious 
that  there  was  no  criminal  act  or  intentional 
infiltration.  General  Adams  signed  the  docu- 
ment in  question  in  the  humanitarian  interest 
of  securing  the  release  of  the  men." 


TEXT  OF  DOCUMENT 

To :  Korean  Peoples  Army  side :  The  United 
Nations  Command  side  assumes  full  responsi- 
bility, solemnly  apologizes  for  having  violated 
the  Armistice  Agreement  and  seriously  in- 
fringed upon  the  sovereignty  of  the  Democratic 
People's  Repviblic  of  Korea  by  uifiltratmg  on 
August  17, 1969  a  military  aircraft  deep  into  the 
territorial  air  of  the  northern  half  of  the  Dem- 
ocratic People's  Republic  of  Korea,  and  firmly 
guarantees  that  it  will  not  commit  such  a  crim- 
inal act  again  in  the  future  and  that  it  will 
strictly  abide  by  the  Armistice  Agreement,  re- 
questing the  Korean  People's  Army  side  to  send 
back  the  pilots  of  the  "OH-23G"  helicopter 
which  was  shot  down  by  the  self  defense  meas- 
ures of  the  Korean  People's  Army. 

Akthtjr  H.  Adams 
Major  General,  TJSMC 
Senior  Member,  UNC  Side, 
Military  ArTnistice  Commission 


December  22,   1969 


583 


U.S.-Soviet  Relations  in  an  Era  of  Negotiation 


hy  Under  Secretary  Elliot  L.  Richardson  ^ 


In  one  of  the  Disraeli  novels  there  appears  a 
character  described  as  being  "distinguished  for 
igiaorance;  for  he  had  only  one  idea  and  that 
was  wrong."  The  character's  name,  curiously 
enough,  was  Mr.  Kremlin. 

In  the  post-World  War  II  world  our  view  of 
the  goals  of  Communist  governments,  most  par- 
ticularly our  view  of  the  intentions  of  tlie  Soviet 
state,  has  so  dominated  the  direction  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy  that  those  who  disagree  with 
that  view  have  been  ready  to  apply  Disraeli's 
description  of  Mr.  Kremlin  to  the  entire  policy. 

Because  our  estimate  of  the  potential  for  con- 
structive relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  is 
central  to  our  entire  international  posture,  any 
change  in  our  assessment  of  this  potential  is 
bound  to  have  wide  significance.  Indeed,  this 
may  well  be  the  reason  why  the  most  quoted  and 
most  interpreted  of  all  of  President  Nixon's 
statements  since  he  took  office  has  been  the 
memorable  passage  in  his  inaugural  address  in 
which  he  said :  ^ 

After  a  period  of  confrontation,  we  are  entering  an 
era  of  negotiation. 

Let  all  nations  know  that  during  this  administra- 
tion our  lines  of  communication  will  be  open. 

Our  lines  of  communication  are  open.  During 
the  past  9  months  we  have  talked  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  with  other  Communist  bloc 
nations  on  a  large  number  of  subjects.  We  have 
conferred  with  the  Soviets  about  Viet-Nam,  un- 
fortunately with  little  effect,  and  have  had  a 
series  of  talks  on  the  Middle  East  which  we 
hope  will  be  productive  in  leading  the  nations 
of  the  area  toward  a  settlement. 

This  week  an  especially  significant  aspect  of 
the  new  "era  of  negotiation"  opened  in  Helsinki 


with  the  begimiing  of  preliminary  discussions 
on  the  limitation  of  strategic  arms. 

The  current  talks  are  probably  the  most  criti- 
cal negotiations  on  disarmament  that  the  United 
States  has  ever  undertaken,  and  we  approach 
them,  to  use  Secretary  Rogers'  phrase,  "in  sober 
and  serious  determination."  ^ 

As  the  President  himself  put  it :  "There  is  no 
more  important  task  before  us."  *  We  must,  he 
said,  "make  a  determined  effort  not  only  to  limit 
the  buildup  of  strategic  arms  but  to  reverse  it." 

Success  would  not  only  mean  a  great  stride 
forward  in  the  cause  of  disarmament  generally 
but  would  be  accompanied  by  significant  eco- 
nomic benefits.  Strategic  weapons  systems  have 
been  costing  us  some  $8  billion  a  year  to  pur- 
chase and  maintain,  and  these  costs  are  increas- 
ing. In  bringing  this  enormously  expensive  and 
unproductive  competition  to  an  end,  large  sums 
in  both  countries  could  be  diverted  to  other 
uses.  Since  the  Soviet  Union  spends  a  greater 
proportion  of  its  national  product  on  strategic 
weapons  than  we  do,  we  have  good  reason  to 
hope  that  this  incentive  for  strategic  arms 
limitations  is  at  least  as  important  to  them. 

Success  in  these  talks,  then,  seems  clearly  in 
the  interest  of  both  nations  and  presents  both 
with  exciting  opportunities.  In  addition  to  the 
immediate  material  benefits,  it  would  help  to 
brmg  about  a  beneficial,  if  still  only  partial, 
unraveling  of  the  skein  of  suspicion  that  has 
enveloped  relations  between  us  for  a  quarter 
of  a  century. 

The  doubts  and  concerns  that  have  charac- 
terized our  postwar  view  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment are,  unlike  Disraeli's  Mr.  Kremlin,  hardly 
"distinguished  for  ignorance."  They  were  not 


'  Address  made  on  Nov.  20  before  a  regional  foreign 
policy  conference  at  Los  Angeles,  Calif.,  cosponsored 
by  the  Department  of  State  and  the  World  Affairs 
Council  of  Los  Angeles  (press  release  352). 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  10,  1969,  p.  121. 


'  For  Secretary  Rogers'  address  at  Washington,  D.C., 
on  Nov.  13,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  1, 1969,  p.  46-5. 

*  For  President  Nison's  address  before  the  IT.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly  on  Sept.  18,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969, 
p.  297. 


584 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


conjured  up  in  dread  of  some  phantom  but  in 
response  to  palpable  Communist  threats  and 
initiatives.  The  areas  against  which  these  ag- 
gressive moves  came,  or  were  harshly  threat- 
ened, sound  a  grimly  familiar  litany:  Iran, 
Greece,  Turkey,  Czechoslovakia,  Berlin,  Korea, 
Hungary. 

Nor  were  NATO  and  the  other  structures  of 
defense  and  world  order  that  we  joined  in  erect- 
ing built  merely  as  an  excuse  for  maintaining  an 
American  presence  abroad.  The  United  States, 
contrary  to  Marxist  dogma,  had  no  need,  desire, 
or  intention  of  spreading  influence  or  empire. 
We  withdrew  our  troops  following  the  Second 
World  War  and  returned  them  overseas  only 
at  the  request  of  friendly  nations  which  felt 
endangered.  Our  worldwide  system  of  alliances 
was  constructed  in  the  face  of  a  real,  not  an 
imaginary,  threat. 

If  we  are  prompted  to  recall  this  melancholy 
history  now,  it  is  not  to  reopen  old  wounds  nor 
to  deny  that  our  actions,  though  not  so  designed, 
might  have  been  perceived  as  threatening  by 
the  Soviets.  It  is  rather  to  remind  a  new  gen- 
eration— and  ourselves — that  we  had  reason  for 
our  caution.  And  now,  even  as  possibilities  pre- 
sent themselves  for  a  lessening  of  tensions,  it  is 
prudent  once  again  to  examine  coldly  the  total 
realities  of  the  bargaining  situation.  The  era 
of  confrontation  has  left  a  complex  inheritance 
of  problems,  alignments,  and  alliances  which 
cannot  be  sorted  out  or  changed  overnight. 
Change  will  require  hard,  realistic,  and — in- 
evitaljly — protracted  bargaining.  For  interna- 
tional negotiating  is  always  a  tough  and  difficult 
business,  and  those  who  sit  across  the  table  from 
us  are  no  more  eager  than  we  to  lose  any 
advantages. 

So  as  we  seek  to  exploit  as  fully  as  we  can  any 
opening  for  meaningful  negotiation,  we  must  at 
the  same  time  take  advantage  of  opportuni- 
ties to  probe  carefully  and  meticulously  for 
fresh  evidence  indicating  whether  or  not  we 
can  safely  moderate  our  previous  fears  and 
doubts  about  Soviet  intentions. 

Two  Interpretations  of  Soviet  Attitudes 

I  In  viewing  the  Soviet  Government  today, 
some  are  naturally  more  skeptical  of  evidence  of 
its  amenability  to  an  era  of  negotiation  than 
others.  A  wide  shading  of  interpretation  is  pos- 
sible. At  the  two  poles,  and  perhaps  somewhat 
overstated  and  oversimplified,  the  interpreta- 
tions nm  something  like  this : 
Interpretation    1    hypothesizes    that    basic 


Soviet  attitudes  are  little  changed  and  that  the 
threat  to  our  security  is  not  significantly  dimin- 
ished. Those  who  propound  this  view  point 
to  the  continuing  and  accelerating  buildup  of 
Soviet  military  strength,  to  the  spread  of  Soviet 
power  into  tlie  Mediterranean  and  Middle  East, 
to  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  and  subver- 
sion of  its  Government,  to  Soviet  support  of 
Hanoi  in  its  evident  desire  to  take  over  South 
Viet-Nam.  They  see  the  continuation  of  Sta- 
linist harassment  and  persecution  of  Soviet 
writers  and  intellectuals,  the  political  trials  and 
suppression  of  dissent,  as  evidence  of  a  regime 
which  is  inherently  authoritarian  and  aggres- 
sive, no  matter  what  its  ideological  cast.  They 
believe  that  basic  to  this  authoritarianism  is  a 
fear  of  contamination  by  progressive  tenden- 
cies, both  within  the  Soviet  Union  itself  and  in 
neighboring  countries,  and  a  consequent  need 
to  extinguish  such  tendencies  whenever  they 
emerge.  And  they  fear  that  a  leadership  basi- 
cally isolated  from  public  response  is  more 
liable  to  follow  dangerous  and  adventuristic 
policies. 

This  interpretation  also  urges  us  to  take 
Soviet  ideological  pronouncements  at  face  value 
and  not  dismiss  them  as  ritualistic  Marxist  rhet- 
oric. It  would  take,  for  example,  the  statement 
adopted  on  June  17  of  this  year  by  the  Interna- 
tional Conference  of  Communist  and  Workers 
Parties,  which  met  in  Moscow  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  Soviet  Commmiist  Party,  as  in- 
dicating that  Soviet  intentions  are  as  inimical 
as  ever.  Among  other  things,  that  long  and 
turgid  document  said : 

To  curb  the  aggressors  and  liberate  mankind  from 
imperialism  is  the  mission  of  the  working  class,  of  all 
the  anti-imperialist  forces  fighting  for  peace,  democ- 
racy, national  independence,  and  socialism. 

Interpretation  2,  on  the  other  hand,  would 
read  such  polemics  only  as  window  dressing  in- 
tended to  proclaim  Marxist-Leninist  legitimacy. 
According  to  this  view,  actual  Soviet  policies 
bear  little  resemblance  to  official  ideology.  Those 
who  espouse  this  interpretation  see  Soviet  poli- 
cies as  having  moderated  greatly  since  the  death 
of  Stalin  and  believe  the  Soviets  now  display 
a  genuine  willingness  to  reach  accommodations 
with  us  on  issues  on  which  we  have  common 
or  parallel  interests.  The  Soviet  Union,  they 
feel,  no  longer  pursues  expansionist  ambitions ; 
on  the  contrary,  its  posture  appears  primarily 
oriented  toward  protecting  the  security  of  the 
motherland.  Soviet  military  strength  is  main- 
tained at  least  partially  in  response  to  the  mili- 


December  22,   1969 


585 


u 


tary  strength  of  the  United  States  and  our 
alliances. 

Those  who  put  this  interpretation  forward 
think  the  Soviet  Government,  if  only  by  neces- 
sity, is  willing  to  allow  a  certain  diversity 
among  the  countries  close  to  its  border.  Though 
it  is  not  a  democracy,  they  believe  it  is  still 
necessary  for  it  to  be  responsive  to  the  popular 
will  of  its  people  and  that  tliis  fact  is  causing 
it  to  moderate  its  policies.  For  this  reason,  too, 
the  Soviet  Government  is  held  to  be  preoc- 
cupied with  domestic  affairs,  with  problems  of 
agricultural  organization  and  growing  con- 
sumer demands. 

Soviet  society  is  pictured  as  conservative  and 
essentially  bourgeois  in  outlook,  with  all  the 
cultural  and  artistic  adventurism  of  George  F. 
Babbitt.  The  ruling  party  bureaucracy,  as  seen 
by  this  interpretation,  is  like  all  entrenched 
bureaucracies — cautious,  unimaginative,  and  a 
little  dull — and  the  Soviet  leadership,  since  it 
is  largely  a  product  of  the  bureaucracy,  is 
similarly  gray,  cautious,  and  devoted  to  the 
status  quo.  In  sum,  this  view  holds  that  as  prac- 
tical needs  have  become  more  insistent.  Com- 
munist ideological  fervor  has  waned.  The 
So\net  leadership  is  viewed,  like  Candide,  as 
increasingly  content  to  cultivate  its  own  garden. 

Accent  on  the  Future  Not  the  Past 

The  truth,  of  course,  may  simply  be  that  both 
portraits  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  facets  of  the 
same  reality  seen  through  different  eyes.  On  the 
face  of  things,  indeed,  neither  wholly  excludes 
the  other :  No  government,  and  certainly  no  gov- 
ernment in  a  nation  as  large  as  the  Soviet 
Union,  can  be  entirely  monolithic — monolithic, 
that  is,  in  the  sense  of  being  free  from  diver- 
gent and  competing  mterests,  forces,  or  views. 
Thus,  when  we  speak  of  "Soviet  intentions,"  we 
obviously  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  these  re- 
main static.  The  Soviet  Union,  we  know,  has  its 
own  hawks  and  doves,  its  hard-liners  and  soft- 
liners.  It  has  its  scientists  and  intellectuals  who 
are  quietly  pressing  for  more  freedom,  as  well 
as  its  Stalinists  who  favor  greater  repression; 
and  through  the  shifting  and  coming  to  influ- 
ence of  different  elements  and  personalities  is 
forged  the  amalgam  of  its  policies  and 
intentions. 

For  us,  of  course,  the  importance  of  trends  in 
Soviet  life  and  Government  lies  in  their  signifi- 
cance for  Soviet  attitudes  and  intentions  toward 
the  outside  world.  And  on  this  score  new  and 
important  evidence  can  be  obtained  tlirough 
negotiations  whose  objective  is  the  conci'ete  res- 


olution of  those  specific  issues  which  continue 
to  embody  the  risk  of  confrontation  or  to  en- 
hance the  danger  of  its  consequences.  Such  nego- 
tiations, whatever  their  outcome,  can  thus  serve 
the  wider  purpose  of  testmg  the  prospects  for 
a  more  stable  and  peaceful  world.  Progress  will 
come  only  through  the  concrete  resolution  of 
specific  issues  which  continue  to  disturb  inter- 
national tranquillity. 

In  tliis  we  are  more  than  willing  to  meet  tliQ 
Soviet  Union  halfway.  The  entire  drive  and 
approach  of  this  administration  is  designed  to 
bring  about  movement  in  the  solution  of  out- 
standing issues  and  the  growth  of  international 
understanding.  "V\1iile  we  cannot — until  new 
evidence  is  upon  us — allow  ourselves  to  forget 
past  manifestations  of  Soviet  aggressiveness,  we 
are  eager  to  put  the  accent  on  the  future  rather 
than  the  past,  to  stress  our  joint  opportunities 
rather  than  our  old  divisions. 

"I  believe  we  must  take  risks  for  peace," 
President  Nixon  has  said,  "but  calculated  risks, 
not  foolish  risks."  °  It  is  in  this  spirit  that  we 
have  entered  the  talks  on  strategic  arms  and 
the  other  discussions  in  which  we  have  been 
engaged. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  President  empha- 
sized at  Guam  that  the  job  of  countering  insur- 
gency in  the  field  will  hereinafter  have  to  be 
conducted  by  the  government  concerned,  mak- 
ing use  of  its  popular  support,  and  with  the 
nature  of  our  assistance  depending  on  the 
realities  of  the  particular  situation.  And  it  is 
in  this  spirit  also  that  the  President  has 
changed  the  pattern  of  the  Viet-Nam  war  by 
beginning  the  process  of  turning  our  share  of 
the  fighting  over  to  the  South  Vietnamese  and 
withdrawing  American  ground  forces. 

Underlying  these  steps  is  a  fresh  approach  to, 
and  a  new  implementation  of,  the  traditional 
American  desire  to  let  peoples  and  nations  deter- 
mine their  own  destinies.  President  Nixon 
recently  articulated  our  guiding  ]irinciple, 
which,  while  stated  in  the  context  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere,  is  equally  applicable  else- 
where. Our  approach,  he  said,  is  to  "respect  .  .  . 
national  identity  and  national  dignity  in  a  part- 
nership in  which  rights  and  responsibilities  are 
shared  by  a  community  of  independent  states."  ^ 

We  seek,  then,  a  structure  of  world  order 
based   on  the   independence   and   equality  of 


''For  President  Nixon's  address  at  the  Air  Force 
Academy  on  June  4,  see  Bulletin  of  June  23,  1969, 
p.  52.3. 

"  For  President  Nixon's  address  at  WashinKton,  D.C., 
on  Oct.  31,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  17, 1969,  p.  409. 


586 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


states;  we  do  not  seek  ideological  domination 
or  confrontation.  "We  care  less  about  the  order- 
ing of  a  nation's  economy  or  even  its  political 
structure  than  we  do  about  the  evidence  it  pre- 
sents to  us  about  its  willingness  to  live  in  peace 
with  its  neighbors. 

Tensions  Which  Can  Be  Lowered 

Wliat  is  all  this  evidence  that  I  keep  talking 
about?  Wliat  specific  moves  do  we  think  the 
Soviet  Government  can  make  to  reduce  ten- 
sions? Wliat  tensions  are  in  question?  Let  me 
briefly  outline  some  of  the  areas  and  issues  in 
which  progress  can  be  made. 

First,  there  is  Viet-Nam.  Over  18  months  ago 
the  South  Vietnamese  Government  and  the 
United  States  entered  negotiations  in  Paris 
with  the  hope  of  reaching  an  agreement  that 
would  bring  the  fighting  to  an  end.  For  a  long 
time  the  Soviet  Government  had  told  us  that, 
once  these  negotiations  began,  such  a  settlement 
should  be  possible.  After  a  beginning  in  which 
there  were  some  signs  of  progress,  the  talks 
ground  to  a  standstill  last  spring.  We  continue 
to  hope  that  these  talks  will  succeed  and  are 
still  looking  for  opportunities  to  move  them 
forward. 

Although  the  Soviets  do  not  control  North 
Viet-Nam,  as  the  single  most  important 
supplier  of  aid  to  North  Viet-Nam  they 
undoubtedly  exercise  much  leverage.  Unfortu- 
nately, there  is  little  to  indicate  that  tliey  have 
exerted  any  significant  influence  on  the  North 
Vietnamese  to  negotiate  an  end  to  this  tragic 
conflict.  Are  we  then  to  believe  that  the  Soviet 
Government  is  encouraging  Hanoi  to  reject  a 
negotiated  solution  and  to  continue  the  effort  to 
impose  its  will  on  the  people  of  South  Viet- 
Nam? 

There  is  Laos.  In  1962  we  agreed  with  the 
Soviet  LTnion  and  12  other  states  that  Laos 
should  be  neutral.  But  North  Vietnamese 
troops,  in  conjimction  with  the  Conmiimist 
Pathet  Lao,  continue  to  threaten  the  government 
of  Premier  Souvanna  Phouma.  Is  the  Soviet 
Government  willing  to  help  Laos  maintain  its 
neutrality  ? 

The  Middle  East,  on  which  we  have  been 
engaged  in  intensive  talks  with  the  Soviets,  is 
another  area  where  their  actions  will  provide 
important  indices  of  their  intentions.  For  the 
situation  in  the  Middle  East  today  is  so  emo- 
tional and  so  explosive  that  a  failure  by  the 
great  powers  to  act  firmly  and  responsibly  in 
support  of  United  Nations  efforts  could  mean 


yet  another  war  in  the  area  and  perhaps  even 
a  wider  catastrophe.  The  issue  here  is  whether 
the  Soviets  vdll  give  sufficient  priority  to  the 
long-term  advantages  of  a  genuine  Arab-Israeli 
settlement  or  will  instead  focus  on  short-run 
gains  that  could  only  be  swept  away  by  another 
Arab-Israeli  war. 

Soviet  attitudes  on  the  development  of  firmer 
foundations  for  peace  and  stability  in  Europe 
vsdll  prove  another  key  to  their  basic  willingness 
to  reduce  tensions.  The  Soviet  Government  has 
recently  proposed  the  convocation  of  a  Euro- 
pean security  conference.  But  when  they 
reached  the  point  of  suggesting  what  such  a 
conference  might  do,  they  and  their  Warsaw 
Pact  colleagues  avoided  concrete  issues  and  put 
forward  only  vague  suggestions. 

We  and  our  NATO  allies  are  more  than 
ready,  of  course,  to  do  our  part  in  solving  the 
manifold  and  complex  problems  which  for  so 
long  have  divided  Europe.  But  we  are  con- 
vinced that  the  way  to  go  about  it  is  through 
dealing  directly,  through  whatever  forum  or 
procedure  is  most  appropriate  to  the  subject, 
with  the  issues  that  generate  tension.  A  Europe- 
wide  conference  might  fittingly  climax,  but  can- 
not substitute  for,  this  painstaking  process. 

A  beginning  might  be  made  by  impro^ong  the 
situation  in  and  around  Berlin,  including  access 
to  the  city.  We  have,  along  with  the  British  and 
French  Governments,  suggested  this  to  the 
Soviet  Union  and  are  prepared  to  go  forward 
with  such  a  discussion.  An  even  more  important 
opportunity  for  East- West  negotiation  is  the 
subject  of  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions. Certainly  progress  on  the  reducing  of 
forces  would  significantly  contribute  to  reduc- 
ing tensions  in  Europe.  We  are  working  with 
our  allies  to  develop  specific  negotiating  pro- 
posals and  will  be  pursuing  the  issue  further 
at  the  NATO  ministerial  meeting  later  this 
month. 

These  are  only  some  of  the  areas  and  issues  on 
which  tensions  can  be  lowered,  though  perhaps 
they  are  the  most  important.  Each  is  a  part  of 
an  interrelated  whole  and  each  constitutes  a 
test  for  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  Can  we  reach  agreements  which  will 
contribute  to  the  achievement  of  a  lasting 
peace?  We  are  determined  to  seek  the  answers, 
cautiously  but  also  with  patience  and  deter- 
mination. 

After  all,  why  should  we  not  be  able  to  settle 
the  disputes  that  divide  us  ?  There  are  no  quar- 
rels of  the  traditional  sort  between  us,  no  dis- 
putes over  territory,  no  competition  for  trade. 


December  22,   1969 


587 


There  is  no  historic  enmity  between  our  peoples. 

The  aims  and  ambitions  of  our  peoples  seem 
in  fact  very  similar:  to  live  and  prosper,  to  edu- 
cate our  children,  to  build  our  communities 
free  of  the  threat  of  war  and  destruction. 

There  seems  no  final  reason  why  tliis  could 
not  be  so. 

Having  begun  with  a  quotation  from  a  Dis- 
raeli novel,  it  seems  fitting  to  end  with  one. 

"Man  is  not  the  creature  of  circumstances," 
the  British  Prime  Minister  wrote.  "Circum- 
stances are  the  creatures  of  men."  If  this  indeed 
be  so,  then  it  becomes  our  iDCCuliar  obligation  to 
mold  those  circumstances  so  that  all  nations, 
large  and  small,  can  live  in  peace  together. 


45th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Follawing  are  statements  made  hy  Amhassa- 
dor  Henry  Ca'bot  Lodge,  head  of  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation, at  tlie  Ji^th  plenary  session  of  the 
meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on  December  4- 

Press  release  366  dated  December  4 

OPENING  STATEMENT 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  As  I  leave  this  post, 
it  may  be  useful  to  set  down  the  things  which, 
after  some  45  weeks,  stand  out :  the  things  which 
we  on  our  side  have  proposed,  what  your  reac- 
tions have  been,  what  are  some  of  the  most 
persistent  and  erroneous  beliefs  which  impede 
progress,  and  what  is  the  hope  for  the  future. 

We  have  offered  the  complete  witlidrawal  of 
all  outside  forces  within  1  year  and  proposed  a 
cease-fire  under  international  supervision.  Pres- 
ident Thieu  has  offered  direct  talks  with  Hanoi 
on  reunification  and  other  questions.  He  has  also 
offered  direct,  private  discussions  with  the  NLF 
[National  Liberation  Front]  as  well  as  free 
elections  under  international  supervision,  with 
all  groups,  including  the  NLF,  participating 
in  the  elections  and  in  the  work  of  an  electoral 
commission.  The  United  States  and  the  Gov- 
ermnent  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam  have 
pledged  to  accept  the  results  of  those  elections. 
These  proposals  have  not  been  made  on  a  take- 
it-or-leave-it  basis.  "VVe  have  tried  to  engage  you 
in  genuine  discussion  of  both  sides'  jDroposals. 


588 


We  have  also  significantly  reduced  the  Ameri- 
can presence  in  South  Viet-Nam.  Our  air  opera- 
tions have  been  reduced  more  than  20  percent, 
and  more  than  60,000  U.S.  troops — 20  percent  of 
all  of  our  combat  troops — have  been  withdrawn 
from  South  Viet-Nam.  It  can  be  flatly  stated 
that  the  trend  of  American  involvement  in  the 
war  in  Viet-Nam  has  been  reversed. 

Yet  the  onlj'  concrete  progress  here  is  agree- 
ment on  the  shape  of  the  table. 

The  record  shows  graphically  that  the  ob- 
stacle in  negotiating  an  end  to  the  war  is  not 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  Nor  is  it  the 
Goverimient  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam.  The 
obstacle  is  your  side's  absolute  refusal  to  join 
us  in  seeking  a  just  peace.  You  have  had  the 
opportunity  since  January  to  negotiate  seri- 
ously, and  you  have  been  unwilling  to  do  so  in 
any  meetingplace,  public  or  private. 

We  have  hoped — and  still  hope — that  you 
would  be  willing  to  negotiate  seriously  with  us 
either  publicly  or  privately.  So  far  this  hope  has 
not  been  fulfilled. 

It  is  also  hard  for  us  to  understand  your  disre- 
gard of  hinnane  considerations  in  the  treatment 
of  prisoners,  whether  they  are  your  men  or 
ours.  Indeed,  your  refusal  to  accept  the  return 
of  your  own  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  is  to  us 
incomprehensible.  Once  again,  therefore,  we 
urge  the  humane  treatment  of  those  held  pris- 
oner by  your  side ;  they  are  entitled  to  impartial 
inspection  of  prisoner  of  war  camjis,  a  regular 
flow  of  mail  to  and  from  the  prisoners,  and 
release  of  the  sick  and  wounded.  Their  families 
are  entitled  to  a  list  of  those  who  are  alive. 

Let  me  turn  now  to  beliefs  of  yours  which 
you  have  frequently  expressed  here  and  which 
we  consider  distortions  of  the  facts. 

You  say,  first,  that  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam  is  an  American  puppet, 
created  by  us,  paid  by  us,  and  essentially  under 
our  control. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam 
is  represented  here  and  is  well  able  to  refute 
this  error.  It  is  also  a  duly  elected  government 
in  accordance  with  a  constitution  which  was 
democratically  created  and  promulgated. 

More  than  80  percent  of  all  registered  voters 
throughout  South  Viet-Nam  voted  in  the  1967 
national  elections,  despite  the  war  and  the  ; 
efforts  of  your  side  to  intimidate  the  voters. 
Tliis  was  more  than  60  percent  of  the  adult 
population.  These  elections  were  witnessed  by 
hundreds   of   observers  and   journalists   from 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


: 


many  countries.  Since  then,  in  more  than  nine 
out  of  ten  hamlets  and  villages  of  South  Viet- 
Nam,  the  people  have  elected  their  own  local 
officials — and  all  this  in  the  midst  of  war.  There 
are  countries  with  longer  political  experience 
which  have  not  done  this. 

The  Government  of  the  Kepublic  of  Viet- 
Nam  is  also  a  going  concern.  It  has  an  active 
administration  in  all  the  Provinces  and  districts 
of  South  Viet-Nam;  it  has  legislative  and  judi- 
cial branches,  military  and  police  forces,  and  a 
process  for  legal  and  orderly  change.  It  pro- 
vides security  and  economic  and  social  services 
to  over  90  percent  of  the  population  of  South 
Viet-Xam. 

Secondly,  you  refuse  to  talk  to  this  Govern- 
ment, even  though  you  agreed  to  attend  these 
meetings  with  this  Government  as  a  full  par- 
ticipant. One  might  well  ask  who  elected  the 
leadership  of  the  so-called  PRG  [Provisional 
Eevolutionary  Government].  Where  is  its 
capital  ?  '\Miy  are  two-thirds  of  its  regular  com- 
bat forces  North  Vietnamese?  Wliy  is  it  un- 
willing to  participate  in  a  genuine  political 
contest  open  to  all  on  an  equal  basis  ? 

In  your  10-point  program  you  state:  "The 
question  of  Vietnamese  armed  forces  in  South 
Viet-Xam  shall  be  resolved  by  the  Vietnamese 
parties  among  themselves."  Yet  in  tliis  matter 
so  vital  to  a  negotiated  settlement,  you  do  not 
accept  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  as  one  of  the  Vietnamese  parties  con- 
cerned. But  you  must  know  that  a  negotiated 
settlement  in  South  Viet-Nam  is  impossible 
without  the  participation  of  the  Government  of 
the  Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam. 

In  the  45  weeks  that  I  have  been  here,  you 
have  not  changed  your  attitude.  You  still  insist 
that  we  withdraw  immediately — all  alone,  by 
ourselves — from  South  Viet-Nam  so  that  you 
can  conquer  the  country  militarily.  You  insist 
that  we  overthrow  the  Government  of  the 
Eepublic  of  Viet-Nam  so  that  you  can  conquer 
the  country  subversively.  You  refuse  to  have 
anything  significant  to  do  with  that  Govern- 
ment. You  accuse  us  of  intensifying  the  war, 
although  you  know  that  this  charge  is  not  cor- 
rect. No  more  extreme  position  could  be 
imagined. 

Thirdly,  you  speak  of  our  presence  in  South 
Viet-Nam  as  an  example  of  "neocolonialism," 
which,  you  say,  impelled  us  to  come  across  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  Although  the  conditions  were 
different  in  many  ways,  we  came  across  the 


Atlantic  Ocean  twice  in  this  century  to  help 
protect  smaller  countries  against  aggression. 
The  fact  that  aggression  comes  from  a  country 
next  door  is  no  justification  for  committing  it. 
Most  of  the  flagrant  aggressions  in  history  have 
been  against  a  geographically  contiguous  neigh- 
bor. It  is  not  geograijhy  that  matters,  but  re- 
spect for  the  rights  of  others. 

I  come  to  the  fourth  obstacle  to  peace,  which 
concerns  your  attitude  toward  the  proposals 
which  our  side  has  made.  These  proposals  pro- 
vide more  than  enough  of  a  basis  to  settle  our 
dispute,  complicated  though  our  dispute  is,  if 
you  genuinely  wanted  to  settle  it.  You  appear, 
however,  to  want  more  than  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment which  provides  all  South  Vietnamese  a 
fair  chance  to  take  part  in  the  life  of  a  prosper- 
ous South  Viet-Nam  in  which  there  will  be  no 
victor  and  no  vanquished. 

^Vhy  are  you  not  satisfied  with  these  rea- 
sonable proposals? 

Two  reasons  can  be  imagined.  One  is  that  you 
want  to  conquer  and  dominate  South  Viet-Nam 
so  as  to  create  a  new  authoritarian  state  of  some 
40  million  people. 

The  other  reason  which  we  hear  talked  about 
constantly  is  that  you  want  to  do  all  this  so  as 
to  discredit  the  United  States,  so  as  to  shake 
the  confidence  of  smaller  countries — wherever 
they  may  be — in  the  value  of  American  friend- 
ship and  to  shake  the  confidence  of  Americans 
themselves  in  their  capacity  to  help  these 
smaller  countries.  This  may  explain  the  state- 
ment that  your  effort  to  conquer  South  Viet- 
Nam  is  in  the  vanguard  of  what  you  term  the 
"world  revolutionary  movement,"  a  different 
thing  indeed  from  the  best  national  interests  of 
North  Viet-Nam. 

We  are  loath  to  believe  such  explanations. 
Yet  only  such  an  ambition  can  explain  your 
demanding  a  unilateral  American  withdrawal 
and  the  overthrow  of  the  constitutional  govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

President  Nixon  has  set  his  course  and  will 
not  be  pressured  from  it. 

On  December  2  the  House  of  Eepresentatives 
of  the  United  States  Congress  adopted  a  resolu- 
tion by  a  vote  of  333  to  55  affirming  its  support 
for  the  President  in  his  efforts  to  negotiate  a 
just  peace  in  Viet-Nam.  By  a  unanimous  vote 
of  392  to  0,  the  House  also  adopted  an  amend- 
ment to  this  resolution  specifically  requesting 
the  President  to  continue  to  press  the  Govern- 
ment of  North  Viet-Nam  to  abide  by  the  Geneva 


December  22,   1969 


589 


convention  of  1949  in  tlie  treatment  of  prisoners 

of  war. 

You  should  cease  your  opposition  to  a  peace 
in  Viet-Nam  which  could  in  all  truth  be  ad- 
vantageous for  all  coiuitries  in  the  area,  includ- 
ino;  North  "Viet-Nam. 

To  conclude :  The  United  States  Government 
seeks  an  early  negotiated  settlement.  It  will 
continue  to  seek  it.  Although  I  am  leaving  these 
meetings,  the  President's  representative  will 
continue  to  participate  fully  in  them.  We  re- 
main ready  for  give-and-take  negotiation  in  any 
meetingplace.  We  remain  ready  for  compro- 
mise. Wlien  you  are  also  ready,  progress  can 
be  speedy. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  STATEMENT 

Today  your  side  has  made  wild  and  inac- 
curate charges  against  U.S.  actions  in  Viet- 
Nam. 

With  reference  to  your  statements  concerning 
Song  My,  I  will  say :  An  incident  such  as  that 
alleged  in  this  case  is  m  direct  violation  not 
only  of  U.S.  military  policy,  but  it  is  also  ab- 
horrent to  the  conscience  of  all  the  American 
people. 

"Wliatever  happened  will  be  known  because 
we  do  not  conceal  the  truth. 

Kesponsibility  will  be  fixed  as  the  facts  war- 
rant, and  appropriate  action  is  and  will  be 
taken  to  assure  that  conduct  as  alleged  will  be 
dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  strict  rules 
of  military  justice. 

In  all  this,  I  submit,  our  policy  is  in  direct 
contrast  to  your  own  deliberate  use  of  terror- 
ism as  a  matter  of  conscious  policy. 


Members  of  Advisory  Commission 
on  Cultural  Affairs  Confirmed 

The  Senate  on  November  6  confirmed  the 
nominations  of  Da^nd  R.  Derge,  Jewel  LaFon- 
tant,  and  William  C.  Turner  to  be  members  of 
the  U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  International 
Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs  for  terms  ex- 
piring May  11,  1972.  (For  biographic  data,  see 
White  House  press  release  dated  October  20.) 


U.S.  and  France  Continue  Talks 
on  Scientific  Cooperation 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  joint  statement  on 
Franco- American  scientific  and  technical  coop- 
eration, which  was  released  November  25  iy  the 
Office  of  Science  and  Technology,  Executive 
Office  of  the  President. 

M.  Francois  X.  Ortoli,  French  Minister  for 
Industrial  and  Scientific  Development,  visited 
the  United  States,  November  16  to  November  25, 
at  the  invitation  of  Dr.  Lee  A.  DuBridge,  Sci- 
ence Adviser  to  President  Nixon.  Minister 
Ortoli  and  Dr.  DuBridge  continued  their  dis- 
cussions, begun  in  Paris  two  months  ago,  on 
ways  to  expand  scientific  and  technical  coopera- 
tion between  the  two  countries.  Since  then,  a 
number  of  French  and  American  officials  have 
met  to  discuss  specific  cooperative  projects  in  a 
variety  of  fields  including  building  technology, 
urban  development,  environmental  pollution, 
marine  sciences,  metrology,  transportation  and 
medicine.  In  addition,  work  has  progressed  on 
the  development  of  the  terms  of  reference  under 
which  the  National  Science  Foundation  of  the 
United  States  and  the  French  National  Center 
for  Scientific  Research  will  organize  and  ex- 
pand the  exchange  of  scientists.  Both  Minister 
Ortoli  and  Dr.  DuBridge  expressed  their  satis- 
faction with  the  progress  which  has  occurred  in 
the  short  time  since  they  last  met,  and  reaffirmed 
their  support  for  an  expanded  program  of  scien- 
tific and  teclinical  cooperation. 

During  their  short  stay.  Minister  Ortoli  and 
his  associates  met  with  a  number  of  American 
scientific,  academic,  governmental  and  indus- 
trial leaders.  In  addition,  they  visited  various 
institutions  and  industrial  facilities  in  the 
United  States,  including  the  Locklieed  Corpora- 
tion, Jet  Propulsion  Laboratory,  the  Scripps 
Institution  for  Oceanography,  the  Oak  Ridge 
National  Laboratories,  Brookhaven  National 
Laboratories,  Bell  Telephone  Laboratory,  Na- 
tional Bureau  of  Standards,  Kennedy  Space 
Center,  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology, 
Harvard  University  and  the  Goddard  Space 
Center. 

To  pro\ade  high-level  coordination  of  the 
cooperative  program.  Minister  Ortoli  and 
Dr.  DuBridge  amiounced  the  appointment  of 
several  distinguished  scientists  and  admin- 
istrators.  M.   Pierre  Laurent,   Director   Gen- 


590 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


eral  for  Cultural  and  Scientific  Relations 
and  Technical  Assistance  for  Development 
at  the  Foreign  Ministry,  and  Dr.  Pierre 
Aigrain,  Delegate-General  for  Scientific  and 
Technological  Research,  will  serve  for  France ; 
Dr.  Allen  Astin,  former  Director  of  the 
National  Bureau  of  Standards,  has  been  ap- 
pointed by  the  Department  of  State  to  serve  as 
their  American  counterpart.  The  assignment 
of  this  group  is  to  provide  a  channel  for  con- 
tinuing liaison,  to  establish  a  flow  of  informa- 
tion on  the  status  and  development  of 
cooperative  arrangements,  and  to  pursue  the 
search  for  new  scientific  and  technical  areas  of 
mutual  interest. 


Consular  Posts  To  Be  Closed 
Under  Personnel  Reduction  Plan 

White  House  press  release  dated  November  24 

On  July  9,  the  President  directed  the  Under 
Secretaries  Committee  of  the  National  Security 
Council,  under  the  chairmanship  of  Under  Sec- 
retary of  State  Elliot  Richardson,  to  prepare  a 
plan  for  a  10-percent  reduction  of  American 
civilian  direct-hire  personnel  serving  abroad  as 
well  as  certain  U.S.  military  forces  overseas.^ 
The  President  has  now  approved  a  plan  known 
as  OPRED  [Operation  Reduction],  which  will 
result  in  bringing  back  to  the  United  States 
14,937  American  military  personnel.  It  will  also 
eliminate  5,100  overseas  civilian  jobs  of  all  agen- 
cies with  personnel  abroad. 

The  OPRED  plan  is  part  of  the  President's 
continuing  efforts  to  streamline  Government 
operations,  reduce  the  American  presence  over- 
seas, and  improve  our  balance  of  payments. 
OPRED  personnel  reductions  are  to  be  effected 
as  rapidly  as  possible  without  disrupting  opera- 
tions and  will  be  completed  by  June  30,  1970. 
It  is  estimated  that  the  reduction  in  yearly  ex- 
penditures abroad  resulting  from  OPRED  will 
be  about  $50  million. 

The  OPRED  exercise  is  separate  from,  and 
in  addition  to,  the  military  reductions  already 
announced  for  Southeast  Asia.  IVIilitary  forces 
in  Koi'ea  and  Berlin  and  troops  committed  to 
NATO  were  also  excluded  from  OPRED  vmder 


the  terms  of  the  President's  July  9  directive. 

A  review  conducted  by  the  Department  of 
State  of  its  overseas  offices  in  connection  with 
OPRED  resulted  in  a  decision  to  restructure  its 
consular  posts.  Among  the  consular  posts  to  be 
closed  are : 

Consulate  General 

Groteborg,  Sweden 

Consulates 

Adelaide,  Australia 

Belo  Horizoute,  Brazil 

Cochabamba,  Bolivia 

Nogales,  Mexico 

Piedras  Negras,  Mexico 

Puerto  la  Cruz,  Venezuela 

Saint  John,  Canada 

Santiago  de  los  Caballeros,  Dominican  Kepublic 

Windsor,  Canada 

Consular  Agencies 

Arequipa,  Peru 
Cap  Haitien,  Haiti 
Concepcion,   Chile 
Leticia,  Colombia 
Manaus,  Brazil 
Puntarenas,  Costa  Rica 
Sao  Luis,  Brazil 
Scarborough,  Tobago 
Valparaiso,  Chile 


U.S.  and  Canada  Hold  Talks 
on  Automotive  Trade  Agreement 

The  Department  of  State  amaounced  on  No- 
vember 12  (press  release  340)  that  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  United  States  and  Canada  would 
hold  consultations  November  12  and  13  in 
Washington  on  the  U.S.-Canada  Automotive 
Products  Trade  Agreement  of  1965.^ 

The  purpose  of  the  consultations,  which  are 
being  held  at  the  request  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment, is  to  discuss  ways  and  means  of  making 
further  progress  toward  the  full  objectives  of 
the  agreement  and  to  discuss  other  agreement- 
related  matters  of  mutual  interest. 

The  consultations  are  the  result  of  a  deci- 
sion, reached  at  a  meeting  of  the  Joint  U.S.- 
Canada Committee  on  Trade  and  Economic 
Affairs  last  June,  that  discussions  on  the 
Automotive  Agreement  would  be  held  this  fall. 

The  U.S.  delegation  to  the  consultations  is 


'  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  4,  1969,  p.  92. 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Feb.  8, 1965,  p.  191. 


December  22,   1969 


591 


chaired  by  Pliilip  H.  Trezise,  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Economic  Affairs.  The  delega- 
tion will  also  include :  John  R.  Petty,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  International 
Affairs;  La^vrence  A.  Fox,  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Commerce  for  International  Trade 
Policy;  Herbert  N.  Blackman,  Administrator, 
Bureau  of  International  Labor  Affairs,  De- 
partment of  Labor;  and  Morton  Pomeranz, 
Office  of  the  Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Kesotiations. 


13-Nation  Meeting  on  Hijacking 
of  Aircraft  Held  at  Washington 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
December  5  (press  release  368)  that  the  United 
States  has  invited  several  governments  to  attend 
a  meeting  at  Washington  December  16-19  to 
exchange  informal  views  on  aircraft  hijacking 
as  a  problem  of  common  concern.  Invitations 
were  extended  to  and  have  been  accepted  by  12 
countries  whose  airlines  are  leading  providers 
of  air  services.  A  meeting  of  this  size  was  felt 
to  be  desirable  in  order  to  permit  full  discussion 
in  the  limited  time  available.  The  following 
countries  will  attend :  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada, 
Denmark,  France,  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway, 
Sweden,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United 
States. 

The  meeting  is  intended  to  supplement  and 
support  other  international  efforts  to  deal  with 
the  liijacking  problem,  particularly  those  of  the 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization.  In 
tliis  connection,  the  United  States  notes  with 
pleasure  that  an  ICAO  committee  has  recently 
submitted  a  comprehensive  report  on  hijacking 
to  the  ICAO  Council  for  its  consideration. 


U.S.  and  France  Agree  To  Modify 
Extradition  Treaty 

Joint  Statement  ^  ^ 

Negotiations  have  now  been  completed  in 
Paris  with  a  view  to  the  modification  of  the 
present  treaty  of  extradition  between  France 
and  the  United  States  signed  in  1909. 

Agreement  has  been  reached  to  include  m  a 
supplemental  convention  a  provision  related  to 
aircraft  hijacking.  Among  other  modifications 
made  to  the  present  treaty  is  an  improved  defi- 
nition of  the  provisions  relating  to  narcotics 
offenses. 

The  signing  of  the  new  supplemental  conven- 
tion is  expected  in  the  near  future. 


U.S.  and  U.K.  Begin  Negotiations 
for  New  Extradition  Treaty 

Joint  Statement  ^ 

In  discussions  during  this  week,  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  L^nited 
States  of  America  have  agreed  in  principle  to 
conclude  a  new  extradition  treaty  between  the 
countries  which  will,  among  other  things,  enable 
aircraft  hijackers  to  be  extradited  as  soon  as  the 
unlawful  seizure  of  aircraft  becomes  an  extra- 
ditable crime  under  the  law  of  the  United  King- 
dom. The  first  round  of  negotiations  on  the  new 
treaty  was  completed  in  London  on  Decem- 
ber 4,  1969. 


'  IssiuhI  at  Paris  and  Washington  Dec.  1  (press  re- 
lease 364). 

'  Issued  at  London  and  Washington  Dec.  4  (press  re- 
lease 367). 


592 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  CONGRESS 


Secretary  Stresses  Importance  of  Funding  Foreign  Assistance  Program 


Statement  hy  Secretary  Rogers ' 


My  opening  statement  will  be  brief.  You  will 
of  course  want  to  get  into  many  details  in  the 
course  of  your  deliberations.  Dr.  Hannali  [John 
A.  Hamiah,  Administrator,  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development]  already  has  testified  this 
morning.  He  and  liis  staff  are  prepared  to  fur- 
nish you  with  facts  and  figures,  point  by  point. 

But  the  larger  question  before  this  committee, 
it  seems  clear  to  me,  does  not  turn  on  details.  It 
turns  on  a  question  of  principle:  whether  this 
comitry  is  going  to  continue  to  measure  up  to  a 
responsibility  which  is  clearly  ours  and  which 
we  ourselves  helped  to  shape. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  this  country  to  help 
some  two-thirds  of  the  peoples  of  this  world 
work  their  way  toward  a  tolerable  state  of 
material  existence.  It  also  is  within  the  power  of 
this  country  to  slow  down  or  stop  the  drive 
toward  self-sustaining  economic  growth  which 
is  underway  in  important  areas  of  the  world. 

Mr.  Chairman,  as  I  am  sure  you  know,  a 
comprehensive  study  of  the  international  de- 
velopment situation  has  been  completed  recentlj' 
for  the  World  Bank.  It  was  a  full  year  in  prep- 
aration. It  was  carried  out  by  a  competent  inter- 
national staff  of  professionals  mider  the  direc- 
tion of  a  distinguished  commission  chaired  by 
the  former  Prime  Minister  of  Canada,  Lester 
Pearson. 

The  study  poses  the  question :  "Can  a  majority 
of  the  developing  countries  achieve  self-sustain- 
ing growth  by  the  end  of  the  century?"  The 
answer  of  the  Pearson  Commission  is  this :  "For 
us  the  answer  is  clearly  yes.  In  our  view,  the 


^  Made  before  the  Foreign  Operations  Subcommittee 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Appropriations  on  Nov.  24 
(press  release  356). 


record  of  the  past  twenty  years  justifies  that 
answer."  But  the  Pearson  Commission  report 
directs  urgent  attention  to  what  it  describes  as 
a  "crisis  in  aid."  In  the  view  of  the  experts  and 
statesmen  who  prepared  the  report,  this  cur- 
rent crisis  is  the  product  of  an  unhappy  con- 
vergence of  two  trends. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  development  assistance 
efforts  of  the  past  two  decades  are  beginning  to 
pay  off  in  an  erratic  but  impressive  way  in 
the  key  areas  of  the  world,  and  the  developing 
coimtries  are  acquiring  an  increasing  capacity 
for  effective  use  of  external  aid. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  at  the  same  time 
a  flagging  mterest  in  the  development  drive  on 
the  side  of  those  m  a  position  to  provide  the  aid. 
The  authors  of  the  Pearson  report  made  this 
point.  Since  most  of  the  more  developed  coun- 
tries have  increased  their  assistance  programs 
over  the  years  while  ours  has  been  declining, 
it  is  obvious  that  a  principal  source  of  the 
predicament  described  lies  in  our  own  recent 
performance. 

The  United  States  should  not  be  asked  to 
carry  the  whole  load;  and,  in  fact,  we  do  not. 
Eight  other  more  developed  countries,  much 
less  affluent  than  our  own,  now  contribute  more 
official  aid  to  the  developing  world  m  relation  to 
their  national  income  than  does  the  United 
States.  Over  the  years,  we  have  lobbied,  with 
considerable  success,  in  the  capitals  of  these 
countries  and  within  the  relevant  international 
organizations  for  others  to  pick  up  their  fair 
share  of  the  load. 

Now  we  appear  to  be  cutting  back  on  our  share 
of  the  job.  In  fiscal  year  1968  and  again  in  fiscal 
year  1969,  sharp  cutbacks  were  made  m  the  level 
of  our  aid  for  international  development.  The 


December  22,  1969 

370-872—69 3 


593 


necessary  readjustments  in  India,  Pakistan,  and 
Turkey  almost  certainly  slowed  the  rate  of 
progress  in  those  countries.  In  Latin  America 
the  result  was  to  make  the  signs  of  development 
momentum  appear  more  tentative  than  before. 
In  Africa  our  declining  level  of  assistance  was 
taken  as  evidence  of  the  declining  interest  in 
the  poorest  of  all  the  continents. 

Early  tliis  year  the  new  administration  sent 
to  the  Congress  the  smallest  request  for  eco- 
nomic assistance  in  10  years,^  though  our  gross 
national  product  has  grown  by  over  $600  bil- 
lion— more  than  tripled,  that  is — in  real  terms 
over  the  past  two  decades.  Twenty  years  ago  we 
invested  nearly  3  percent  of  our  GNP  in  over- 
seas economic  aid.  The  percentage  represented 
in  the  request  before  you,  together  with  P.L.  480 
and  other  U.S.  economic  aid  programs,  is  less 
than  one-half  of  1  jDercent. 

We  did  not  design  this  austerity  program  of 
foreign  assistance  on  the  basis  of  declining 
needs.  It  was  motivated  by  the  fact  that  we  have 
very  heavy  competing  pressures  on  the  budget, 
and  we  wanted  to  keep  foreign  aid  to  a  level  that 
would  barely  provide  protection  for  our  politi- 
cal and  moral  position  in  a  world  preoccupied 
with  the  struggle  to  move  toward  standards  of 
living  which  bear  some  relationship  to  the 
promise  of  modern  science  and  technology. 

Last  Thursday  the  House  passed  an  authori- 
zation bill  which  cuts  the  President's  request  for 
economic  assistance  by  $466  million.  Indeed,  the 
economic  aid  programs  planned  would  be  af- 
fected to  an  even  greater  degree,  because  the 
House  added  funds  for  projects  we  did  not  pro- 
pose to  finance  at  this  time. 

I  am  not  going  to  argue  for  every  penny  for 
every  item  in  the  administration's  original  re- 
quest. But  I  must  say  to  you  that  the  action  of 
the  House  last  week  gives  substance  and  reality 
to  the  proposition  that  we  are  indeed  faced  with 
a  "crisis  in  aid."  In  past  years  further  cuts  have 
been  made  in  the  appropriation  process  in  this 
most  vulnerable  of  all  our  important  foreign 
policy  activities.  So  I  must  say  to  you,  too,  that 
additional  reductions  again  this  year  would 
leave  this  country  with  an  aid  program  so  di- 
minished that,  rightly  or  wrongly,  it  could  well 
be  interpreted  as  meaning : 


'  For  text  of  President  Nixon's  message  to  the  Con- 
gress on  May  28,  see  Bulletin  of  June  16,  1969,  p.  515. 


—that  we  are  indifferent  to  the  ominous  and 
widening  gap  between  per  capita  wealth  in 
the  more  developed  and  the  less  developed 
countries ; 

— that  we  are  turning  away  from  people  who 
are  poor  and  nations  which  are  young ; 

— that  we  are  in  the  process  of  a  major  change 
in  that  part  of  our  foreign  policy  which  relates 
our  interests  to  the  aspirations  of  a  very  large 
part  of  the  world's  population ;  and 

— that  we  are  growing  weary  of  our  leader- 
ship role  as  promoters  of  progressive  improve- 
ment in  standards  of  living  for  people  of  all 
regions  and  races. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  that  most  of  the  polit- 
ical leaders  around  the  world  understand  well 
that  we  in  this  country  have  enormous  compet- 
ing claims  upon  our  resources :  for  national  de- 
fense, for  exploring  outer  space,  for  restoring 
the  health  of  our  environment,  for  the  urgent 
needs  of  the  cities  and  the  areas  of  poverty  iron- 
ically passed  by  in  our  rush  to  national  affluence. 
But  these  leaders  can  hardly  be  expected  to  feel 
that  one-quarter  of  1  percent  of  our  gross  na- 
tional product — the  cost  of  the  {orogram  before 
you — is  a  worthy  response  to  the  urgency  of 
their  combined  needs  for  our  help  in  infusing 
some  dynamism  into  their  own  development 
efforts. 

We  asked  for  enough — not  more  than 
enough — supporting  assistance  funds  for  Viet- 
Nam  because  we  believed  it  to  be  critical  during 
a  time  when  we  are  continuing  a  systematic,  but 
necessarily  risky,  transfer  of  combat  responsi- 
bility to  the  South  Vietnamese.  That  request  has 
been  cut  in  the  House  by  $100  million  and  may 
be  subjected  to  threats  of  further  reduction. 

We  asked  only  for  enough  development  loan 
f mids  to  contribute  to  the  hopeful  movement  to- 
ward self-sustaining  growth  in  such  key  coun- 
tries as  Indonesia,  Korea,  Turkey,  et  cetera,  and 
to  strengthen  our  credentials  in  the  new  and 
mature  partnership  wliich  the  President  has 
offered  our  neighbors  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. Those  requests  have  been  cut  by  $350 
million  in  the  authorization  bill  passed  by  the 
House,  and  there  may  be  efforts  to  cut  it  fur- 
ther. In  the  case  of  Africa,  a  reduction  of  even 
$5  million  or  $10  million  means  that  a  whole 
coimtry  would  have  to  be  cut  out  of  the  pro- 
gram, or  that  whole  projects  in  several  coun- 
tries would  have  to  be  abandoned,  or  that  we 
would  have  to  withdraw  from  participation  in 


594 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  kind  of  multinational  projects  which  we 
ourselves  have  been  encouraguig. 

We  have  also  proposed  a  military  assistance 
program  at  $425  million.  For  the  past  few  years, 
we  have  actively  pursued  a  policy  of  phasing 
out  military  assistance  for  those  countries  whose 
economies  have  developed  sufficiently  so  that 
they  are  able  to  provide  for  their  own  defense 
needs. 

The  bulk  of  the  fiscal  year  1970  military  as- 
sistance request  presented  to  Congress — almost 
80  percent — continues  to  be  plamied  for  four 
strategic  countries :  the  Eepublics  of  Korea  and 
China,  Greece  and  Turkey.  Military  assistance 
is  also  programed  for  countries  which  provide 
to  the  United  States  facilities  important  to  the 
defense  posture  of  the  United  States  and  its 
allies.  Small  amounts  of  military  assistance  are 
also  planned  for  other  countries,  most  of  which 
are  to  receive  only  training. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  administration  agrees 
with  what  we  believe  is  the  dominant  sentiment 
in  the  Congress  to  the  effect  that  our  military 
assistance  program  should  be  held  to  the  mini- 
mum consistent  with  clear  interests,  that  what 
remains  should  be  concentrated  on  areas  that 
provide  maximum  security  benefits,  and  that 
grant  aid  should  be  scaled  down  as  allied  coun- 
tries become  economically  more  able  to  pay  for 
their  own  requirements. 

That  is,  in  fact,  our  policy,  and  the  amounts 
requested  in  the  bill  before  you  directly  reflect 
this  policy. 

It  follows  that  we  believe  it  is  important  to 
fund  the  program  presented  to  you. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  aware  that  these  annual 
messages  and  requests  and  authorization  and  ap- 
propriation hearings  and  floor  debates  about 
foreign  aid  are  not  the  most  welcome  business 


before  the  Congress.  I  am  aware  that  the  steady 
repetition  of  justifications,  of  expectations  and 
hopes  and  promises,  makes  for  a  certain 
monotony. 

We  share  the  desire  of  the  Congress  for  fresh 
guidelines  relevant  to  the  changing  conditions 
in  the  new  decade  about  to  begin.  As  you  know, 
an  able  group  of  private  citizens  luider  the 
chairmanship  of  Rudolph  Peterson  is  now  en- 
gaged in  an  effort  to  identify  and  articulate  such 
guidance.  The  result  of  their  deliberations  will 
be  presented  to  the  Congress  between  the  voting 
on  appropriations  for  this  fiscal  year  and  the 
presentation  of  the  next  program. 

Meanwhile,  we  feel  it  is  a  matter  of  major 
importance  to  arrest  the  downward  course  of 
our  participation  in  cooperative  international 
development,  to  hold  the  line  of  advance  in 
the  countries  launched  on  a  course  of  self- 
improvement,  whose  past  progress  surely  should 
be  rewarded  and  not  penalized  by  us. 

I  believe  that  the  moral  case — the  humani- 
tarian case — and  the  case  based  upon  expecta- 
tions in  other  countries  that  this  country  will 
continue  to  do  its  part  are  strong  arguments  in 
favor  of  the  program.  It  is  not  possible  to  think 
about  where  the  United  States  will  be  a  decade 
from  now  without  thinking  about  where  the 
world  will  be.  Wliere  the  world  will  be  a  decade 
from  now  will  have  a  lot  to  do  with  whether  the 
peaceful  revolution  in  economic  and  social 
development  now  taking  place  in  most  regions 
of  the  world  maintains  a  satisfactory  momen- 
tum or  not.  I  believe  that  it  is  in  our  national 
interest  to  help  to  see  to  it  that  it  does. 

I  therefore  respectfully  urge  that  this  com- 
mittee reconunend  an  appropriation  bill  as  close 
as  possible  to  the  administration's  requested 
program. 


December  22,   1969 


595 


Treatment  of  American  Prisoners  of  War  in  North  Viet-Nam 


Statement  ty  William  H.  Sullivan 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  ^ 


I  api^rcciate  the  opportunity  to  appear  in 
support  of  resolutions  expressing  the  concern  of 
the  Congress  about  the  treatment  and  welfare 
of  Americans  who  are  prisoners  of  war  or  miss- 
ing in  action  in  Southeast  Asia.  The  Depart- 
ment of  State  strongly  supports  the  passage  of 
sucli  a  resolution.  We  do  so  not  only  because  we 
share  and  sympathize  with  the  feelings  of  the 
families  of  our  men  who  are  missing  or  cap- 
tured but  also  because  we  believe  that  vocal  pub- 
lic concern  about  our  prisoners  may  be  the  most 
effective  way  to  bring  pressure  on  the  Commu- 
nist authorities  to  treat  our  men  humanely,  to 
release  information  about  them,  to  let  them  ex- 
change letters  regularly  with  their  loved  ones, 
to  enable  them  to  receive  gift  packages,  to  al- 
low the  seriously  sick  and  wounded  to  be  re- 
patriated, and  to  agree  to  arrangements  for 
the  early  release  of  all  prisoners  of  war. 

From  the  start  of  the  Viet-Nam  conflict,  the 
U.S.  Government  has  made  intensive  efforts  to 
arrange  proper  treatment  for  prisoners  of  war 
on  both  sides.  In  these  efforts  we  have  had  the 
support  and  cooperation  of  a  number  of  inter- 
mediaries, governmental,  private,  and  organi- 
zational. Despite  these  urgent  and  wide-ranging 
efforts,  wiiich  are  continuing.  North  Viet-Nam 
has  persisted  in  its  refusal  to  live  up  to  minimum 
standards  of  humane  treatment,  the  standards 
spelled  out  in  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1949 
Relative  to  the  Treatment  of  Prisoners  of  War.^ 
Even  apart  from  the  convention,  these  standards 
are  no  more  than  the  minimum  requirements 
of  decency  and  humanity  for  the  treatment  of 
military  personnel  who  have  fallen  into  the 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  National  Secu- 
rity Policy  and  Scientific  Developments  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  on  Nov.  13. 

^  Treaties  and  Other  International  Acts  Series  3364. 


hands  of  the  enemy.  Although  North  Viet-Nam 
has  denied  the  applicability  of  the  convention 
to  the  captured  U.S.  pilots — a  claim  without 
legal  validity,  I  should  point  out  at  once — we 
have  sought  to  avoid  fruitless  legal  contention 
on  this  subject  because  what  is  at  stake  here  is 
the  treatment  and  welfare  and  very  survival  of 
personnel  who  are  helpless  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  North  Viet-Nam  has  frequently  said 
that  its  policy  is  to  treat  the  prisoners  "hu- 
manely" and  "leniently,"  and  the  NLF  [Na- 
tional Liberation  Front]  as  well  as  the  Com- 
munist authorities  in  Laos  have  echoed  this 
claim.  In  a  sense,  we  are  simply  asking  the  Com- 
munists to  live  up  to  their  own  statements — and 
to  allow  this  to  be  verified  in  the  simple  manner 
prescribed  by  international  law  and  tradition; 
namely,  that  the  prisoners  be  visited  at  their 
places  of  detention  by  representatives  of  an  im- 
partial intermediary. 

The  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations, 
Mr.  U  Thant,  on  October  30,  just  2  weeks  ago, 
gave  support  to  this  view  when  he  called  on 
North  Viet-Nam  to  give  "an  international  hu- 
manitarian organization  such  as  the  League  of 
Red  Cross  Societies  access  to  the  Americans 
detained  in  North  Vietnam."  Wliether  it  is  the 
League  of  Red  Cross  Societies  or  the  ICRC 
[International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross]  or 
another  respected  neutral  intermediary  is  not 
the  question.  Any  of  these  groups  could  serve 
the  purpose  of  inspecting  the  conditions  of  in- 
ternment and  reporting  on  the  health  and  wel- 
fare of  the  prisoners.  The  ICRC  has  a  long 
history  of  responsibility  in  the  prisoner  of  war 
field  under  the  Geneva  conventions  and  carries 
out  prisoner  of  war  responsibilities  throughout 
the  world,  and  so  would  be  a  logical  choice.  The 
point  is,  however,  that  none  of  these  groups  or 
organizations,  or  any  neutral  govermnent,  has 


596 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ever  been  given  access  to  the  prisoners,  despite 
many  and  repeated  efforts  and  appeals  to  ar- 
range this. 

As  a  consequence,  we  have  long  been  con- 
cerned about  how  our  men  are  treated.  If  North 
Viet-Nam's  treatment  of  prisoners  is  humane, 
as  they  claim,  then  why  not  let  the  ICEC  in  to 
inspect  ?  If  conditions  in  the  prisoner  facilities 
are  as  good  as  North  Viet-Nam  has  tried  to 
depict  them  in  propaganda  films,  then  it  would 
be  to  their  advantage  to  invite  impartial  inspec- 
tion. If  the  men  really  are  treated  in  accordance 
with  the  standards  of  the  Geneva  convention, 
then  there  would  be  no  need  for  resolutions 
such  as  you  are  considering  today,  and  we  would 
not  be  witnessing  the  rising  tide  of  concern 
about  the  prisoners  tliat  is  apparent  in  this 
country  and  around  the  world. 

But  the  concern  is  tliere,  and  we  fear  it  is 
justified.  There  have  long  been  disturbing  indi- 
cations of  mistreatment,  and  those  indications 
liave  been  verified  by  the  factual  reports  of 
Lieutenant  Frishnian  and  other  returned 
prisoners. 

North  Viet-Nam's  intransigence  on  this  sub- 
ject has  moved  the  Secretary  of  State  to  speak 
out  repeatedly.  On  June  5,  1969,  he  said  at  a 
pi-ess  conference :  ^ 

.  .  .  There  Is  a  long  tradition  among  nations  that 
personnel  captured  in  wartime  be  treated  humanely. 
This  principle  has  been  expressed  in  the  Geneva  con- 
vention of  1949  and  is  recognized  by  more  than  120 
nations. 

A  basic  requirement  of  the  convention  is  that  names 
of  prisoners  be  provided  to  their  families  and  to  an 
appropriate  agency  in  a  neutral  country.  Communist 
leaders  have  failed  to  observe  this  simple  civilized  re- 
quirement which  would  mean  so  much  to  the  wives 
and  families  of  the  men  who  are  missing  in  combat. 

North  Vietnamese  officials  have  frequently  de- 
clared that  the  prisoners  are  treated  humanely.  Many 
seriously  question  these  statements.  Assurance  could 
readily  be  provided  if  North  Viet-Nam  would  permit 
visits  by  impartial  observers  to  the  prison  camps.  For 
the  sake  of  the  prisoners  and  for  their  families,  we 
continue  to  hope  for  a  positive  response  from  North 
Viet-Nam.  We  are  prepared  to  discuss  this  subject  and 
to  move  quickly  toward  arrangements  for  the  release 
of  prisoners  on  both  sides,  and  I  believe  that  any 
sign  of  good  faith  by  the  other  side  in  this  matter 
would  provide  encouragement  for  our  negotiations  in 
Paris. 

North  Viet-Nam  responded  to  this  sincere  ap- 
peal by  repeating  that  there  could  be  no  progress 
on  this  subject  until  the  United  States  with- 


drew all  of  its  military  personnel  from  South 
Viet-Nam. 

Under  Secretary  of  State  Elliot  L.  Eichard- 
son,  who  has  been  given  overall  responsibility 
for  our  efforts  for  our  prisoners  of  war,  has  also 
commented  on  Hanoi's  refusal  to  provide  names 
of  American  prisoners.  On  May  2,  Mr.  Richard- 
son said : 

We  are  deeply  concerned  about  the  lack  of  informa- 
tion about  our  prisoners.  Some  of  them  have  been  held 
4  years  and  longer  with  little  or  no  word  to  their 
families.  It  is  hard  to  see  what  Hanoi  hopes  to  gain 
by  denying  the  prisoners  the  basic  right  to  communi- 
cate with  their  families.  We  are  using  every  possible 
occasion  to  raise  this  subject  and  to  bring  abovit  the 
release  of  prisoners  on  both  sides. 

In  his  forceful  statement  May  19,'*  the  Secre- 
tary of  Defense  drew  further  attention  to  Ha- 
noi's cruelty  in  refusing  to  identify  prisoners. 
Xuan  Thuy,  the  chief  North  Vietnamese  nego- 
tiator at  the  Paris  talks,  responded  the  next  day 
by  telling  reporters  that  the  United  States 
would  "never"  have  a  list  of  prisoners  as  long 
as  the  war  continued  and  until  the  United 
States  has  withdrawn  its  troops  from  Viet-Nam, 
adding,  perhaps  with  conscious  irony,  that  Ha- 
noi's policy  in  the  treatment  of  prisoners  "has 
always  been  humane  and  generous." 

Ambassador  Lodge  answered  Xuan  Thuy's 
statements  on  May  22,  setting  forth  with  elo- 
quence and  emotion  exactly  what  is  at  stake  in 
Hanoi's  position  on  this  issue. 

Ambassador  Lodge  said :  ^ 

...  It  is  diflBcult  to  understand  how  you  can  claim 
to  be  treating  our  prisoners  humanely  when  you  refuse 
to  identify  the  prisoners  you  hold  so  that  their  families 
can  know  the  fate  of  their  relatives.  You  refuse  to 
permit  regular  mail  exchanges.  You  reject  impartial 
international  observation  of  conditions  under  which 
prisoners  are  held ;  you  refuse  to  discuss  release  of 
sick  and  wounded  prisoners.  Yet  these  are  basic  ele- 
ments of  humanitarian  treatment  under  established 
international  standards. 

We  do  not  see  how  you  can  be  hurt  by  merely  pub- 
lishing the  names  of  those  who  are  alive  so  that  the 
uncertainty  which  their  families  feel  may  be  ended. 

To  express  myself  for  a  moment  in  human  terms 
instead  of  the  language  of  diplomacy,  what  is  in- 
volved here  is  the  prisoner's  wife,  who  does  not  know 
whether  her  husband  is  alive  or  whether  he  is  dead.  It 
is  really  hard  to  believe  that  the  security  of  North 
Viet-Nam  would  be  threatened  if  this  wife  were  told 
the  truth  about  her  husband's  fate.  We  hope  you  will 
reconsider  your  attitude  on  these  questions  so  that  it 
will  truly  reflect  the  humane  policy  which  you  claim 
to  foUow. 


'  Bulletin  of  June  23,  1969,  p.  529. 


*  Bulletin  of  June  9,  1969,  p.  484. 
VftiU.p.  487. 


December  22,  1969 


597 


Faced  with  Hanoi's  intransigence  on  this  sim- 
ple humanitarian  question,  many  of  the  wives  of 
our  men  have  gone  to  Paris  in  the  past  2  months, 
at  private  expense  and  independent  of  the  U.S. 
Government,  to  ask  the  North  Vietnamese  dele- 
gation directly  for  information  about  their 
loved  ones.  They  wanted  to  know,  as  one  of 
them  put  it,  "Am  I  a  wife  or  a  widow?"  With 
maximum  publicity  the  North  Vietnamese  re- 
ceived the  wives  and  promised  the  information 
would  be  obtained  and  sent  to  them.  They  also 
announced  that  relatives  could  write  for  infor- 
mation, and  many  hundreds  have  done  so.  To 
date  there  has  been  no  response  to  these 
inquiries. 

These  were  not  the  first  attempts  by  the  fam- 
ilies to  seek  such  information.  For  years,  in- 
dividual wives  and  relatives  have  asked  the 
Communist  authorities  to  send  word  of  their 
loved  ones.  Hundreds  of  families  have  written 
letters  to  their  men — month  after  month  after 
month — with  never  a  reply.  The  letters  are  sent 
directly  to  North  Viet-Nam,  as  well  as  through 
the  Red  Cross.  In  a  small  number  of  cases, 
around  110  in  number,  letters  have  been  received 
from  American  prisoners  in  North  Viet-Nam. 
But  the  great  majority  of  letters  have  gone  un- 
answered and  unacknowledged. 

In  August  1965,  the  ICRC  addressed  an  ap- 
peal to  the  principal  parties  to  the  Viet-Nam 
conflict,  calling  on  them  to  abide  by  "the 
humanitarian  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Con- 
ventions." It  reminded  North  Viet-Nam,  the 
GVN  [Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam],  and  the  United  States  that  all  were 
parties  to  the  conventions  and  sent  a  copy  of 
the  appeal  to  the  NLF  on  the  ground  that  it,  too, 
was  bound  by  "the  undertakings  signed  by 
Viet-Nam."  The  ICRC  appeal  specified  five 
points :  ICRC  should  be  permitted  to  serve  as  a 
neutral  intermediary,  prisoners  of  war  should 
be  treated  humanely,  PW  lists  should  be  ex- 
changed, ICRC  delegates  should  be  authorized 
to  visit  PW  camps,  and  civilians  should  be 
spared. 

In  reply,  the  United  States  and  the  GVN 
undertook  to  respect  the  Geneva  convention  in 
their  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  and  ar- 
ranged for  the  ICRC  to  visit  PW  camps  in 
South  Viet-Nam.  Other  free-world  countries 
with  forces  in  South  Viet-Nam  subsequently 
joined  in  affirming  the  applicability  of  the  con- 
vention, specifically  stating  this  in  the  Declara- 


tion of  the  Manila  Conference,  196G.°  There  are 
now  six  PW  camps  in  South  Viet-Nam,  holding 
over  30,000  PW's,  operated  by  the  GVN,  with 
U.S.  advisers  present.  The  camps  are  regularly 
visited  by  ICRC  delegates  and  doctors,  who  are 
able  to  visit  privately  with  individual  prisoners. 
Any  complaints  or  comments  are  promptly  re- 
ported by  the  ICRC,  and  corrective  action  is 
taken.  After  initial  processing  and  classifica- 
tion, all  enemy  PW's  captured  by  U.S.  forces 
are  turned  over  to  the  GVN  for  permanent 
detention,  a  procedure  envisaged  by  article  12 
of  the  Geneva  convention. 

North  Viet-Nam  and  the  NLF  in  separate 
letters  to  the  ICRC  rejected  the  applicability 
of  the  Geneva  convention  and  in  particular  re- 
fused to  accept  the  ICRC  as  a  neutral  inter- 
mediary. Although  acknowledging  that  it  had 
acceded  to  the  convention  in  1957,  the  Hanoi 
government  said  it  did  not  apply  to  the  cap- 
tured pilots  because  there  has  been  no  dec- 
laration of  war  and  because  they  were  war 
criminals.  These  claims  are  invalid.  By  its  own 
terms,  the  Geneva  convention  applies  in  all  cases 
of  armed  conflict  between  two  or  more  of  the 
parties  to  the  convention  (see  article  2).  Fur- 
ther, the  U.S.  prisoners  are  not  war  criminals; 
and,  in  any  case,  Hanoi's  mere  assertion  to  this 
effect  does  not  deprive  them  of  their  rights 
under  the  Geneva  convention. 

Subsequently,  the  United  States  attempted 
through  diplomatic  channels  to  arrange  a  pro- 
tecting power  for  the  prisoners,  as  envisaged 
in  the  Geneva  convention.  We  approached 
a  number  of  govermnents,  including  neutrals 
as  well  as  countries  sympathetic  to  North 
Viet-Nam.  Despite  the  cooperation  we  obtained 
from  other  governments.  North  Viet-Nam 
refused  to  agree.  We  then  asked  the  ICRC 
to  offer  its  good  offices  to  the  DRV  [Democratic 
Republic  of  Viet-Nam]  as  a  substitute  for  a 
protecting  power,  pursuant  to  article  10  of  the 
convention.  The  ICRC  transmitted  the  U.S.  re- 
quest to  Hanoi  on  May  25,  1966,  but  it  was  re- 
jected by  the  DRV  on  July  27, 1966.  The  ICRC 
has  continued  its  efforts  to  visit  prisoners  in 
North  Viet-Nam,  to  no  avail.  Its  repeated  ap- 
plications to  enter  North  Viet-Nam  have  been 
persistently  denied.  North  Viet-Nam  has,  how- 
ever, frequently  sent  the  ICRC  complaints  al- 
leging U.S.  bombing  of  villages,  hospitals,  and 


1 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  14,  1966,  p.  730. 


598 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


civilian  targets  in  North  Viet-Nam.  The  United 
States  has  proposed  that  these  charges  be  inves- 
tigated by  the  ICRC,  but  North  Viet-Nam  has 
rejected  this  offer  as  well. 

In  short,  a  bleak  record.  Although  we  have 
pressed  North  Viet-Nam  by  every  available 
means  and  channel,  diplomatic  and  private, 
their  responses  have  been  imcompromising  and 
negative.  The  fact  that  what  we  are  requesting 
is  no  more  than  the  minimum  treatment  of 
prisoners  of  war  sanctioned  by  international  law 
and  tradition  has  convinced  other  governments 
and  organizations  to  join  in  these  eiforts  but  has 
not  thus  far  penetrated  Hanoi's  intransigence. 

Over  the  years,  however,  it  has  been  evident 
that  North  Viet-Nam  is  sensitive  to  public  pres- 
sure and  criticism,  and  that  is  why  the  resolu- 
tions you  are  considering  at  present  are 
important.  This  is  not  the  first  time  that  North 
Viet-Nam's  inhumanity  toward  the  prisoners 
has  been  the  subject  of  public  concern.  In  1966, 
for  example,  Hanoi  threatened  to  try  the  U.S. 
prisoners  on  charges  of  "war  crimes."  Prepara- 
tions for  the  trials  appeared  to  be  moving  for- 
ward. Specific  allegations  of  "war  crimes"  were 
broadcast  on  the  Communist  propaganda  media. 

As  many  of  you  may  recall,  there  occurred  a 
worldwide  outpouring  of  criticism  and  concern 
about  Hanoi's  proclaimed  intentions.  News- 
papers in  this  country  and  abroad  denounced 
the  plan.  Members  of  the  House  and  Senate 
representing  a  wide  range  of  opinion  joined  in 
warning  North  Viet-Nam  that  sucli  sham  trials 
could  not  be  tolerated.  A  number  of  govern- 
ments also  made  known  their  opposition  to  such 
proceedings.  Faced  with  this  chorus  of  protest, 
Hanoi  announced  the  trials  had  been  "set  aside," 
and  they  have  not  taken  place. 

Just  2  days  ago,  on  November  11 — Veterans 
Day — our  delegate  to  the  United  Nations  Hu- 


man Rights  Commission,  Rita  Hauser,  raised 
the  subject  of  prisoners  of  war  in  the  United 
Nations.'  Appropriately,  it  was  in  the  context 
of  human  rights — for  that  is  what  we  are  dis- 
cussing here:  the  basic  malienable  right  of  a 
man  who  is  a  prisoner  of  war  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  to  be  treated  in  accordance  with 
minimum  standards  of  decency.  A  number  of 
wives  of  our  prisoners  were  in  the  galleries  at 
the  United  Nations  when  that  statement  was 
delivered,  adding  their  mute  testimony  to  the 
words  and  phrases  of  our  presentation. 

I  understand  the  subcommittee  members  have 
copies  of  Ambassador  Hauser's  statement,  and 
I  would  respectfully  suggest  it  be  made  part  of 
tliis  record  following  my  statement. 

You  also  have  copies  of  Ambassador  Graham 
Martin's  statement  to  the  Istanbul  Interna- 
tional Conference  of  the  Red  Cross.^  I  will  leave 
to  the  witness  from  the  American  Red  Cross 
a  fuller  discussion  of  the  action  taken  by  that 
conference.  Suffice  to  say,  the  conference  gave 
important  international  endorsement  to  our 
concern  about  the  protection  of  prisoners  of 
war. 

The  actions  taken  thus  far  represent  a  broad 
range  of  effort,  but  tragically  little  in  the  way 
of  results.  The  prisoners  still  wait,  wait  and 
endure  and  suffer.  The  wives  and  families  wait 
and  endure,  and  our  hearts  go  out  to  them.  Ap- 
proval of  a  resolution  on  this  subject  by  this 
Congress  would  express  support  and  concern 
for  the  wives  and  for  the  men  they  wait  for. 
More  importantly,  it  may  help  convince  Hanoi 
to  treat  the  men  humanely  and  to  release  them 
soon. 


'  For  tests  of  Mrs.  Hauser's  statements  in  Committee 
II  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  Nov.  11  and  12, 
see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  1,  1969,  p.  471. 

'  BuxLETiN  of  Oct.  13,  1969,  p.  323. 


December  22,  1969 


599 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Discusses  Progress  in  Arms  Control 


Statement  hy  Charles  W.  Tost 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  V.N.  General  Assenibly ' 


We  are  now  beginning  our  annual  debate  on 
the  question  of  disarmament.  Many  of  you  may 
remember  tliat  when  Bernard  Barucli  pre- 
sented to  the  United  Nations  23  years  ago  the 
United  States  proposal  for  an  international 
atomic  development  authority  in  order  to  ensure 
the  exclusively  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  power, 
he  opened  his  statement  by  saying :  "We  are  here 
to  make  a  choice  between  the  quick  and  the 
dead." 

So  much  has  been  said  through  the  years  on 
the  control  of  nuclear  and  other  weapons  that  a 
danger  exists  of  our  minds  being  dulled  to  its 
real  significance,  to  its  overriding  necessity.  Let 
us  hope  and  pray  that  will  not  happen,  because 
this  is  truly  one  of  the  questions  on  which  all 
our  lives  depend. 

Although  for  essential  practical  reasons  the 
main  negotiating  forum  on  disarmament  ques- 
tions is  elsewhere,  the  General  Assembly  has 
important  powers  and  responsibilities  concern- 
ing this  subject,  deriving  from  the  charter  it- 
self. In  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  it  is 
customary  for  the  Assembly,  through  tliis  com- 
mittee, to  debate  every  year  the  issues  and  prin- 
ciples that  must  govern  the  continuing  search 
for  effective  measures  of  arms  control.  In  past 
years  our  debates  here  have  given  rise  to  resolu- 
tions of  great  value  in  guiding  the  negotiators 
of  such  major  agreements  as  the  Partial  Nuclear 
Test  Ban  Treaty,  tlie  Outer  Space  Treaty,  and 
the  Treaty  on  Nonproliferation  of  Nuclear 
Weapons. 

I  mention  these  well-lmown  facts  only  to 
stress  how  serious  these  debates  are  and  how 
essential  it  is  that  we  never  view  them  as  a  mat- 
ter of  routine. 


'Made  In  Committee  I   (Political  and  Security)  on 
Nov.  17  (U.S./U.N.  iiress  release  162). 


This  year  we  meet  at  a  time  when  both  the 
need  and  the  opportunity  for  i^rogress  in  arms 
control  are  greater  tlian  they  have  been  for 
some  time.  The  variety  and  breadth  of  activity 
currently  imderway  in  the  disarmament  field 
and  related  areas  should  be  heartening  to  all 
of  us  who  believe  that  armaments,  nuclear  and 
nonnuclear,  must  be  made  subject  to  effective 
control.  New  opportunities  exist  to  take  sig- 
nificant steps  toward  that  goal. 

The  favorable  developments  to  which  I  refer 
are,  in  brief,  the  following : 

— On  this  very  day  bilateral  talks  are  open- 
ing between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  on  limiting  strategic  armaments. 

- — The  prospects  are  now  favorable  for  early 
entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  on  Nonprolifera- 
tion of  Nuclear  WeajDons. 

— A  regional  organization  has  been  estab- 
lished, in  accordance  with  the  Treaty  on  the 
Prohibition  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Latin 
America,  to  help  ensure  compliance  with  that 
treaty. 

— Significant  work  is  continuing  at  the 
Geneva  Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament (the  CCD)  on  controlling  chemical 
and  biological  weapons. 

— A  draft  treaty  to  prohibit  emplacement  of 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed  has 
been  developed  at  the  CCD  and  presented  to 
the  General  Assembly  for  discussion. 

— The  CCD  has  been  enlarged  by  eight 
countries,  whose  participation  will,  we  are  con- 
fident, contribute  to  maintaining  the  CCD  as 
a  vital  forum  for  disarmament  negotiations. 

— Practical  ideas  are  being  elaborated  on  the 
international  exchange  of  seismic  data  in  order 
to  gain  increased  understanding  of  the  seismic 
characteristics  of  undergroimd  nuclear  explo- 


\ 


600 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


sions  and  thus  to  advance  the  search  for  a  com- 
prehensive nuclear  test  ban. 

■ — In  a  related  area  not  directly  of  a  disarma- 
ment nature,  intensive  work  is  underway  in  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  on  prob- 
lems relating  to  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy,  particularly  those  matter's  which  were 
;iddressed  by  the  1968  Conference  of  Non- 
Nuclear-Weapon  States. 

I  should  like  to  discuss  each  of  these  areas  of 
progress. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Strategic  Arms  Talks 

As  all  of  us  are  aware,  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  have  begun  today  in  Helsinki 
one  of  the  most  serious  and  important  negotia- 
tions ever  undertaken  in  the  field  of  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament.  These  negotiations  will 
be  for  the  purpose  of  curbing  the  strategic  arms 
race,  and  they  will  include  consideration  of  both 
offensive  and  defensive  strategic  weapons. 

The  importance  of  these  negotiations  can 
hardly  be  overestimated.  Their  subject  is  the 
most  powerful,  the  most  devastating,  and  the 
most  expensive  weapons  ever  devised  and  man- 
ufactured. They  will  involve  the  vital  security 
interests  of  both  participants. 

As  evidence  of  the  great  seriousness  with 
which  my  Government  approaches  these  talks, 
I  wish  to  quote  briefly  at  this  point  from  the 
message  which  President  Nixon  has  addressed 
today  to  the  United  States  delegation  in 
Helsinki :  ^ 

You  are  embarking  upon  one  of  the  most  momentous 
negotiations  ever  entrusted  to  an  American  delegation. 

.  .  .  you  will  begin  what  all  of  your  fellow  citizens 
in  the  United  States  and,  I  believe,  all  people  through- 
out the  world,  profoundly  hope  will  be  a  sustained 
effort  not  only  to  limit  the  build-up  of  strategic  forces 
but  to  reverse  it. 

I  do  not  underestimate  the  difficulty  of  your  task. .  .  . 

I  am  nevertheless  hopeful  that  your  negotiations 
with  representatives  from  the  Soviet  Union  will  serve 
to  increase  mutual  security.  .  .  . 

I  have  stated  that  for  our  part  we  will  be  guided 
by  the  concept  of  maintaining  "sufficiency"  in  the 
forces  required  to  protect  ourselves  and  our  allies.  I 
recognize  that  the  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union  bear 
similar  defense  responsibilities.  I  believe  it  is  pos- 
sible, however,  that  we  can  carry  out  our  respective 
responsibilities  under  a  mutually  acceptable  limita- 
tion and  eventual  reduction  of  our  strategic  arsenals. 

To  that  quotation  from  President  Nixon  let 
me    add    the    following   statement   made   last 


Thursday  by  our  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Rogers,  in  a  speech  discussmg  the  significance 
of  the  Helsinki  talks : ' 

Under  present  circumstances  an  equitable  limita- 
tion on  strategic  nuclear  weapons  would  strengthen 
the  national  security  of  both  sides.  If  this  is  mutually 
perceived — if  both  sides  conduct  these  talks  in  the 
light  of  that  perception— the  talks  may  accomplish  an 
historic  breakthrough  in  the  pattern  of  confrontation 
that  has  characterized  the  postwar  world. 

Mr.  Chairman,  these  statements  testify  to  the 
extraordinai-y  importance  which  my  country  at- 
taches to  the  talks  that  opened  today  in  Hel- 
sinki. AVe  are  encouraged  to  hope  and  believe 
that  our  Soviet  counterjiarts  also  approach  this 
task  with  great  seriousness  of  purpose  and  are 
prepared,  as  we  are,  to  be  reasonable  and  flexi- 
ble in  dealing  with  the  profound  complexities 
of  this  problem.  We  would  be  unwise  to  expect 
quick  results,  but  we  must  be  patient  and  per- 
sistent, determined  and  indefatigable.  Neither 
participant,  in  its  own  interest  and  that  of  the 
world  community,  can  pennit  itself  to  fail. 

Whatever  the  difficulties,  the  efl'ort  is  su- 
premely worthwhile.  This  is  true  not  only  be- 
cause of  the  inherent  value  of  strategic  arms 
limitation  itself.  It  is  true  also  because  progress 
on  this  central  problem  can  provide  impetus  in 
other  arms  control  areas  as  well.  In  particular, 
it  might  well  exert  a  favorable  impact  on  the 
negotiations  for  a  comprehensive  test  ban.  It 
could  also  improve  the  outlook  for  an  agree- 
ment to  cut  off  the  production  of  weapons-grade 
fissionable  materials  and  to  transfer  some  of  the 
existing  stockpiles  of  those  materials  to  peaceful 
uses. 


The  Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty 

I  would  now  like  to  review  where  we  stand 
with  respect  to  multilateral  international  agree- 
ments, beginning  with  the  nonproliferation 
treaty  and  then  turning  to  other  projects  that 
have  been  the  subject  of  consideration  at  the 
Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament 
in  Geneva. 

The  outstanding  achievement  of  the  Geneva 
disarmament  talks  so  far  was  the  negotiation 
of  the  Treaty  on  the  Nonproliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons,  or  NPT.^ 

The  principal  purpose  of  this  treaty  is,  of 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  15,  1969,  p.  543. 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  1,  1969,  p.  405. 
*  For  text  of  the  treaty,  see  Bulletin  of  July  1,  1968, 
p.  9. 


December  22,   1969 


601 


course,  to  arrest  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
among  tlie  nations  and  thus  to  lessen  the  risk 
tliat  the  world  will  ever  suffer  the  catastrophe 
of  nuclear  war.  It  has  additional  major  pur- 
poses as  well.  Many  members  of  the  Committee 
on  Disarmament,  as  the  current  report  of  that 
body  to  this  Assembly  shows,^  have  expressed 
the  conviction  that  the  treaty's  entry  into  force 
will  stimulate  progress  in  negotiation  of  effec- 
tive measures  relating  to  cessation  of  the 
nuclear  arms  race  and  to  nuclear  disarmament. 
The  treaty  will  also  serve  the  purpose  of 
facilitating  the  worldwide  dissemination  of 
nuclear  technology  for  peaceful  uses. 

As  you  will  recall,  the  Nonproliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons  Treaty  was  overwhelmingly 
commended  by  the  General  Assembly  in  June 
of  last  year  and  opened  for  signature  on  July  1, 
1968.  To  enter  into  force,  the  treaty  must  be 
ratified  by  the  three  nuclear-weapons  parties 
and  40  other  states.  Thus  far  it  has  been  signed 
by  91  countries,  22  of  which  have  deposited 
their  instruments  of  ratification.  We  are  espe- 
cially heartened  by  the  prospect  that  several 
important  additional  countries  are  expected  to 
sign  tlie  treaty  in  the  near  future.  My  Govern- 
ment lias  been  discussing  for  some  time  with 
the  Soviet  Union  the  question  of  depositing  our 
own  instruments  of  ratification  jointly  and 
simultaneously,  an  act  that  would  be  symbolic  of 
the  mutual  understanding  which  made  the  NPT 
possible.  We  hope  this  may  soon  occur.  As  more 
and  more  signatory  nations  complete  their  rati- 
fications, there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that 
the  NPT  will  enter  into  force  in  the  rather 
near  future. 

The  Nonprolif  eration  Treaty  is  without  doubt 
a  major  step  in  the  history  of  disarmament. 
Even  in  advance  of  its  entry  into  force,  the 
steps  toward  that  goal — its  negotiation,  its  en- 
dorsement by  the  General  Assembly,  and  the 
signatures  and  ratifications  it  has  already  re- 
ceived— have  done  much  to  create  favorable 
conditions  and  a  favorable  atmosphere  for  prog- 
ress on  other  aspects  of  disarmament.  Certainly 
article  VI  of  the  treaty  weighed  substantially  in 
the  decision  of  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  to  initiate  the  strategic  arms  limitation 
talks  that  opened  today.  In  addition,  several  of 
the  problems  involved  in  negotiating  a  seabed 
arms  control  treaty  were  materially  simplified 


•  U.N.  doc.  A/7741. 


by  the  fact  that  similar  problems  had  been 
faced  and  successfully  resolved  during  the  nego- 
tiation of  the  NPT. 


Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy 

I  turn  now  briefly  to  three  subitems  on  the 
agenda  of  this  committee  which  had  their  ori- 
gins in  the  Conference  of  Non-Nuclear- Weapon 
States.  These  are  the  Secretary  General's  report 
on  the  implementation  of  the  results  of  the  con- 
ference, his  report  dealing  with  the  provision  of 
peaceful  nuclear  explosion  services  through  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  and  the 
experts  report  on  the  role  nuclear  technology 
can  play  in  the  advancement  of  developing  coun- 
tries. Many  of  the  resolutions  that  were  adopted 
by  the  Non-Nuclear  Conference  reflected  the 
natural  desire  on  the  part  of  non-nuclear- 
weapon  states  to  be  assured  of  continuing  access 
to  the  benefits  from  this  promising  new  tech- 
nology and  provided  helpful  guidelines  to  be 
kept  in  mind  in  the  years  ahead. 

AVe  have  been  impressed  over  the  past  year 
by  the  efforts  of  the  Secretary  General  and  the 
IAEA  to  be  responsive  to  many  of  the  Non- 
Nuclear  Conference  recommendations,  and  we 
wish  to  commend  the  quality  of  the  reports  now 
before  us.  The  IAEA  now  has  underway  an  in- 
tensive reexamination  of  the  composition  of  its 
Board  of  Governors  in  order  to  make  that  body 
more  representative.  The  agency  has  produced 
a  thoughtful  smnmary  of  many  of  its  activities 
which  are  directly  relevant  to  the  views  ex- 
pressed at  the  Non-Nuclear  Conference.  With 
the  full  participation  of  all  interested  member 
states,  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
has  gone  a  long  way  in  defining  its  prospective 
responsibilities  in  the  field  of  peaceful  nuclear 
explosions. 

The  tasks  that  lie  ahead  in  the  field  of  peace- 
ful uses  of  nuclear  energy  are  not  easy  and  will 
not  be  quickly  finished.  However,  substantial 
progress  is  being  made.  We  believe  that  the 
activity  of  the  past  year  has  borne  out  our  asser- 
tion in  the  23d  General  Assembly  that  the  rec- 
ommendations of  the  Non-Nuclear  Conference 
can  be  carried  out  more  effectively  by  working 
through  existing  bodies  than  by  creating  new 
mechanisms.  We  continue  to  believe  firmly  that 
this  is  the  case.  The  United  States  will  devote 
its  best  energies  to  future  efforts  in  this  com- 
plex and  demanding  field. 


602 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


If 


Control  of  Chemical  and  Biological  Weapons 

During  tlie  past  year,  there  has  been  a  marked 
increase  in  proposals  to  limit  chemical  and 
biological  weapons.  At  the  last  Conference  of 
the  Committee  on  Disarmament  session  in  Ge- 
lu'va,  there  was  much  thoughtful  discussion  of 
this  subject.  Several  proposals  have  been  in- 
troduced which  seek  to  reduce  the  likeliliood 
tliat  chemical  and  biological  weapons  will  ever 
1  .e  used.  The  most  detailed  and  carefully  thought 
out  of  tliese  measures  is  a  draft  convention  in- 
troduced in  the  Conference  of  the  Committee 
on  Disarmament  by  tlie  United  Kingdom  to 
control  not  only  the  use  but  also  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of  biological 
weapons.  In  addition,  during  the  present  Gen- 
eral Assemblj',  a  draft  cliemical  and  bacterio- 
logical weapons  convention  was  introduced  by 
the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

An  extremely  valuable  contribution  to  this 
subject  is  the  Keport  of  the  Consiiltant  Experts 
to  the  Secretary  General  on  Chemical  and  Bio- 
logical "Weapons,  which  was  transmitted  on 
June  30,  1969.  This  report  indeed  makes  clear 
the  need  for  tlie  Conference  of  the  Comjnittee 
on  Disarmament  to  conduct  a  detailed  and  com- 
prehensive examination  of  all  the  CBW  arms 
control  proposals. 

As  President  Nixon  indicated  in  his  address 
before  tlie  United  Nations  General  Assembly  on 
September  18, 1969,"  the  United  States  supports 
the  development  by  the  Conference  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Disarmament,  for  consideration  in 
this  Assembly,  of  arms  control  initiatives  in  the 
chemical-biological  field.  On  several  occasions 
the  United  States  has  reiterated  its  support  for 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  1925  Geneva 
protocol.'  We  share  the  concern  of  our  fellow 
members  of  the  United  Nations  over  the  dan- 
gers of  uncontrolled  development  and  possible 
use  of  chemical  and  biological  weapons,  and 
we  shall  be  prepared  to  work  witli  others  in 
Geneva  on  any  proposals  that  offer  tlie  prospect 
of  reliable  arms  control  in  this  field.  We  shall 
have  more  to  say  on  this  subject  later  during 
this  debate. 

We  are  gratified  by  the  continuing  efforts  in 
Geneva  over  the  past  year  toward  an  ade- 
quately verified  comprehensive  nuclear  test  ban. 
President  Nixon,  in  his  messages  regarding  the 
work    of   the    Eighteen-Nation    Disarmament 


Committee  in  March  and  July,^  stated  that  the 
United  States  supports  the  conclusion  of  such  a 
comprehensive  test  ban  and  urged  efforts  to 
achieve  gi-eater  understanding  of  how  compli- 
ance with  it  could  be  verified.  To  this  end  my 
Government  has  taken  steps  to  implement  the 
seismic  investigation  proposal  which  our  dele- 
gation presented  in  this  committee  on  Decem- 
ber 5,  1968.^  Seismic  recordings  of  our  peaceful 
nuclear  explosion.  Project  Rulison,  last  Sep- 
tember 10,  are  bemg  analyzed  in  tlie  United 
States  and,  we  trust,  elsewhere.  Discussion  of 
these  analyses  in  the  relevant  teclmical  and 
scientific  forums  should  contribute  to  a  more 
complete  understanding  of  seismology  and 
of  its  potential  for  identifying  underground 
nuclear  explosions. 

With  tlie  same  end  in  view,  my  country  has 
welcomed  the  recent  important  Canadian  ini- 
tiative regarding  a  worldwide  exchange  of 
seismic  data.  The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
lend  its  support  to  the  type  of  exchange 
envisaged  in  Canada's  proposal  and  plans  to 
participate  to  the  fullest  possible  extent. 

For  some  years,  tlie  United  States  has  been 
seeking  agreement  on  a  cutoff'  of  the  production 
of  fissionable  material  for  use  in  weapons,  and 
a  transfer  of  agreed  amounts  of  these  materials 
to  safeguarded  peaceful  uses.  Last  April  in  Ge- 
neva we  modified  our  earlier  proposals  to  pro- 
vide that  inspection  under  such  an  agreement 
would  be  accomplished  solely  by  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  x\gency.  This  change  was 
introduced  in  order  to  facilitate  further  negotia- 
tion of  a  broadly  acceptable  agreement,  for 
which  the  safeguards  provisions  of  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty  would  serve  as  a  guide.  We 
remain  convinced  that  such  an  agreement  would 
be  a  major  contribution  to  the  control  of  nuclear 
armaments,  and  we  hope  for  early  progress 
on  it. 

Preventing  a  Seabed  Nuclear  Arms  Race 

The  principal  achievement  at  the  Conference 
of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament  this  year  has 
been  the  development  of  a  draft  treaty  to  pre- 
vent emplacement  of  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion on  the  seabed.  The  text  of  this  draft  treaty 


'  Bulletin  of  Oct.  6, 1969,  p.  297. 

'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  15,  1969,  p.  541. 


'  For  tests,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  7,  1969,  p.  289,  and 
July  28,  1969,  p.  65. 
"  For  background,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  20,  1969,  p. 

58. 


December  22,   1969 


603 


appears  as  annex  A  of  the  Conference  of  the 
Committee  on  Disarmament  report  to  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly.  To  assist  in  this  committee's 
consideration  of  it,  let  me  now  review  briefly 
how  the  draft  evolved  and  wliy  we  believe  it 
affords  a  good  basis  for  acliieving  a  worthwhile 
arms  control  measure. 

The  Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament began  its  intensive  consideration  of 
a  seabed  arms  control  measure  in  March.  Dur- 
ing the  succeeding  months,  detailed  discussion 
took  place  on  all  of  the  principal  issues :  on  the 
scope  of  the  prohibition,  that  is,  the  weapons 
and  facilities  wMch  should  be  prohibited;  on 
the  area  of  the  seabed  to  which  the  prohibition 
should  apply;  and  on  the  procedures  for 
verification. 

There  were  many  different  views  among  mem- 
bers of  the  Committee,  mcluding  the  delega- 
tions of  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
However,  it  proved  possible  for  these  two  dele- 
gations to  resolve  their  differences  and  on  Octo- 
ber 7  they  submitted  an  agreed  draft  for  the 
consideration  of  the  Committee.^"  Further  in- 
tensive discussion  took  place  in  the  Committee 
in  which  members  candidly  pointed  out  de- 
fects in  the  draft  and  made  suggestions  for 
improvements. 

As  a  result  of  these  discussions,  the  two  co- 
authors of  the  draft  presented  on  October  30 
a  revised  draft  containing  improvements  which 
had  been  suggested  by  the  proposals  of  many 
members."  It  is  this  revised  draft  of  October  30 
that  now  lies  before  this  committee. 

Ml".  Chairman,  in  this  statement  I  do  not  wish 
to  review  in  detail  every  provision  of  the  draft 
treaty.  I  would  merely  like  to  offer  some 
thoughts  on  its  basic  approach. 

The  principal  effect  of  the  treaty  would  be  to 
prohibit  the  emplacement  of  nuclear  weapons 
or  weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed 
beyond  the  maximum  contiguous  zone.  Thus, 
the  treaty  would  have  a  limited  application. 

We  see  the  following  virtues  in  this  limited 
approach : 

1.  The  treaty  will  cover  nuclear  weapons.  It 
is  technically  possible  for  these  devastating 
weapons  to  be  fired  from  silos  or  other  emplace- 
ments under  the  water.  An  effective  ban  on  such 
emplacement  would  prevent  extension  of  the 


"  For  text  of  tlie  Oct.  7  draft  tre.ity,  see  Bulletin 
of  Nov.  3,  1969,  p.  367. 

"  For  text  of  the  Oct.  30  draft  treaty,  see  Bulletin 
of  Dec.  1, 1969,  p.  483. 


nuclear  arms  race  into  tliis  new  dimension.  As 
we  know  from  experience,  in  such  matters,  pre- 
vention before  the  fact  is  far  easier  than  re- 
moval after  the  fact. 

2.  The  treaty  will  proliibit  the  only  weapons 
which  it  might  be  militarily  advantageous  to 
station  on  the  seabed.  It  would  be  extremely 
expensive  to  emplace  any  weapons  on  the  bot- 
tom of  the  ocean.  Only  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion could  have  enough  significance  militarily 
to  warrant  the  expense. 

3.  The  treaty  is  simple.  Because  of  the  limited 
scope  of  its  prohibitions,  verification  can  be 
based  on  existing  rights  under  international 
law,  including  especially  the  right  of  observa- 
tion. Let  me  interject  at  this  point  the  following 
unequivocal  assurance:  The  draft  treaty  is  not 
intended  to  affect,  and  in  fact  will  not  affect, 
any  state's  position  regarding  its  rights  under 
international  law  except,  of  course,  for  the  basic 
prohibitions  of  article  I,  which  will  constitute  a 
new  and  desirable  constraint  on  the  freedom  of 
action  of  parties  to  the  treaty.  A  disclaimer 
clause  is  included  in  the  draft  treaty  to  make 
perfectly  clear  that,  except  for  this  constraint, 
the  rights  of  states,  or  their  recognition  or  non- 
recognition  of  claims  of  rights,  will  in  no  way 
be  prejudiced. 

4.  The  treaty  will  constitute  a  step  in  our 
continuing  efforts  to  end  the  nuclear  arms  race. 
Another  area,  representing  almost  three-fourths 
of  the  earth's  surface,  will  be  kept  free  of  em- 
placed  nuclear  arms,  as  is  the  case  with  Antarc- 
tica and  outer  space. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  last  point  warrants  fur- 
ther comment.  We  do  not  iirge  international 
agreement  on  the  seabed  arms  control  treaty 
merely  because  it  is  simple  or  merely  because  it 
may  be  concluded  this  year  rather  than  next.  We 
urge  it  because  it  would  vastly  extend  the  area 
of  arms  control.  By  any  standard  this  makes  it 
eminently  worthwhile. 

Present  Capabilities 

Critics  have  frankly  asked  whether  the  ac- 
tions this  treaty  would  prohibit  are  actions  that 
any  state  ever  intends  to  take.  The  premise  of 
such  questions  seems  to  be  that  an  arms  control 
measure  is  worthwhile  only  if  it  stops  an  arms 
race  that  has  already  begun  or  prevents  an 
arms  race  which  is  about  to  begin.  This  premise 
cannot  be  sustained. 

In  1963  the  General  Assembly  adopted  a  reso- 
lution opposing  the  orbiting  of  weapons  of  mass 


604 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


clestruction  around  the  earth.  This  concept  was 
hxter  embodied  in  tlie  "no  bombs  in  orbit'' 
clause  of  the  Outer  Space  Treaty  of  1967.  When 
these  measures  were  being  developed  there  was 
no  arms  race  in  the  sky  and  nobody  knew 
whether  tliere  would  ever  be  one.  It  was  enough 
that  the  technical  possibility  existed.  I  think 
that  all  of  us  today  are  glad  that  we  did  take 
steps  early,  when  it  was  possible  to  do  so,  to 
forestall  the  risk  that  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion might  be  put  into  orbit.  Who  can  say  that 
if  we  had  not  done  so,  such  weapons  would  not 
be  even  now  constantly  passing  over  our  heads? 

Let  me  be  clear:  It  is  already  within  our 
capability  to  emplace  nuclear  weapons  on  the 
seabed,  and  such  action  would  not  be  without 
some  military  advantages.  For  example,  nu- 
clear weapons  emplaced  under  hundreds  of  feet 
of  water  could  constitute  a  deterrent  force 
which  would  be  difficult  for  an  adversary  to 
eliminate  with  offensive  missiles.  Also,  such 
weapons  would  be  relatively  far  from  populated 
areas.  It  would  be  rash  indeed  to  say  that  in 
the  absence  of  an  effective  treaty  prohibition, 
powers  possessing  this  capability  would  not 
make  use  of  it. 

In  addition  to  its  value  as  an  arms  control 
measure,  this  draft  treaty  will  also  help  to 
ensure  that  the  vast  areas  of  the  seabed  remain 
available  for  peaceful  economic  exploitation  for 
the  benefit  of  all  of  mankind.  Let  no  one  doubt 
that  a  nuclear  arms  race  on  the  seabed  could 
have  a  profound  effect  on  the  prospects  for 
complete  and  free  cooperation  in  its  peaceful 
exploitation. 

I  have  stressed,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  the  pres- 
ent draft  seabed  treaty  constitutes  a  limited  step 
but  one  that  is  worthwhile.  I  need  scarcely  add 
that  prospects  for  further  measures  of  arms 
conti'ol  relating  to  the  seabed  would  not  be 
foreclosed  by  the  present  draft  treaty.  On  the 
contrary,  the  preamble  contains  a  clear  affirma- 
tion that  parties  would  continue  negotiations 
concerning  further  measures  to  exclude  the  sea- 
bed from  the  arms  race.  Moreover,  the  text 
contains  a  provision  calling  for  a  treaty  review 
conference  5  years  after  its  entry  into  force. 
At  that  time,  if  not  sooner,  the  parties  will  be 
able  to  assess  whether  further  prohibitions  are 
possible  and  desirable. 

What  should  be  the  next  step  in  bringmg  a 
seabed  treaty  closer  to  conclusion?  As  the 
United  States  delegation  made  clear  in  Geneva, 
we  expect  the  draft  treaty  to  be  reviewed  care- 
fully in  this  committee  of  the  General  As- 


sembly. The  Seabed  Connnittee  is  also  consider- 
ing implications  of  the  treaty  withm  that  com- 
mittee's terms  of  reference.  We  do  not  believe 
tliat  this  draft,  as  far  as  it  was  developed  in 
Geneva,  necessarily  represents  the  last  word  as 
a  treaty  ready  to  receive  broad  international 
support.  For  our  part,  we  shall  listen  with  care 
and  understanding  to  the  comments  made  here 
and  will  be  prepared  to  consider  further  modi- 
fications, if  they  should  seem  called  for,  to  meet 
concerns  of  the  international  community. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  reviewed  briefly  all  of 
the  areas  in  which  important  activities  are  tak- 
ing place  in  the  field  of  disarmament.  Although 
there  are  a  number  of  hopeful  signs,  we  recog- 
nize that  progress  is  far  from  being  as  rapid 
as  most  of  us  would  wish.  However,  much  work 
that  can  lead  to  concrete  achievement  is  in  train. 
We  believe  that  the  CCD  sliould  be  asked  to 
continue  urgently  next  year  all  of  its  efforts  in 
the  fields  where  more  progress  might  be  pos- 
sible. The  CCD  will  of  course  profit  greatly 
from  the  guidance  established  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  this  Assembly. 

The  CCD  has  recently  been  strengthened  by 
the  addition  of  eight  new  members :  Argentina, 
Hungary,  Japan,  Mongolia,  Morocco,  Nether- 
lands, Pakistan,  and  Yugoslavia.  It  is  partic- 
ularly gratifying  that  these  countries  have 
begun  their  participation  in  the  Committee's 
work.  They  have  already  contributed  their 
share  of  valuable  ideas,  and  we  are  confident 
that  the  CCD  will  derive  much  benefit  from 
their  participation. 

Indeed,  my  Government  wishes  to  pay  tribute 
to  all  the  members  of  the  CCD.  I  would  like  to 
express  to  them  our  thanks  for  their  helpful, 
constructive,  patient — and  I  emphasize  pa- 
tient— efforts  to  bring  about  progress  in  Ge- 
neva. Progress  is  slow,  but  progress  must  and 
will  come.  We  look  forward  to  resmning  early 
in  1970,  with  the  utmost  seriousness  and  sense 
of  shared  responsibility,  the  meetings  of  the 
Conference  of  the  Committee  on  Disarmament. 

Speaking  of  1970,  may  I  take  the  libei'ty,  in 
conclusion,  of  repeatmg  to  this  connnittee  a  re- 
mark I  made  on  this  subject  in  plenary  last 
month  in  regard  to  preparation  for  the  25th 
anniversary  of  the  United  Nations,  I  said : " 

We  must  pursue  with  much  more  energy  and  re- 
alism our  common  responsibility  to  check  the  dangerous 
and  costly  arms  race.  There  are  now  more  than  enough 


"For  Ambassador  Yost's  statement  of  Oct.  23,  see 
Bulletin  of  Dec.  1,  1969,  p.  485. 


December  22,   1969 


605 


nuclear  weapons  in  the  world  to  destroy  every  living 
tiling  on  earth.  No  nation  can  or  will  disarm  uni- 
laterally ;  but  prompt,  effective,  and  collective  means 
of  checking  the  arms  race,  particularly  as  regards 
weapons  of  mass  destruction,  are  long  overdue.  Nor 
is  the  need  for  disarmament  limited  to  the  great  powers 
and  nuclear  weapons.  AH  the  wars  now  being  fought 
are  being  fought  with  conventional  arms ;  it  is  the 
ever-mounting  burden  of  conventional  armament  which 
weighs  on  the  poorest  nations  and  is  one  of  the  most 
serious  impediments  to  their  economic,  social,  and 
political  development. 

Let  us  all  then,  great  power  and  small  power, 
nuclear  armed  or  conventionally  armed,  take  a 
solemn  and  a  common  resolve  to  mark  our  25tli 
anniversary  by  substantial  agreements  to  con- 
trol, limit,  and  reduce  the  armaments  of  all  of 
us.  By  so  doing  we  may  indeed,  and  at  last, 
"take  effective  collective  measures  for  the  pre- 
vention and  removal  of  threats  to  the  peace," 
"promote  social  progress  and  better  standards 
of  life  in  larger  freedom,"  "live  together  in 
peace  with  one  another  as  good  neighbors,"  and 
"save  succeeding  generations  from  the  scourge 
of  war." 


U.N.  Command  in  Korea  Submits 
Report  to  the  Security  Council 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  to  the  Secu- 
rity Council  fro7n  Ambassador  Charles  W.  Yost, 
U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations, 
t7'ansmitting  a  report  of  the  United  Nations 
Command  in  Korea  covering  North  Korean 
violations  of  the  armistice  agreement  during 
the  first  7  months  of  1969. 

AMBASSADOR  YOST'S  LETTER 

October  30, 1969 

His  Excellency 

Lord  Car^vdon, 

President  of  the  Security  Council, 

United  Nations,  New  York 

Excellency  :  I  have  the  honor  to  convey,  on 
behalf  of  the  Unified  Command  established  pur- 
suant to  Security  Council  Kesolution  84  of 
July  7,  1950,  a  report  of  the  United  Nations 
Command  covering  North  Korean  violations  of 
the  Armistice  Agreement  during  the  first  seven 
months  of  the  calendar  year  1969. 

In  conveying  this  report,  I  wish  also  to  call 


the  attention  of  the  Council  to  three  serious 
incidents  which  have  occurred  since  the  prepa- 
ration of  the  report  which  underscore  the  unfor- 
timate  fact  that  there  has  been  no  change  in 
North  Korea's  attitude  of  willful  disregard  of 
the  Armistice  Agreements  as  well  as  a  lack  of 
respect  for  humanitarian  principles: 

(a)  On  August  17,  1969,  an  unarmed  United 
Nations  Command  helicopter,  which  inadvert- 
ently strayed  across  the  Demilitarized  Zone  into 
North  Korean  territory  while  on  a  routine  train- 
ing flight,  was  immediately  fired  upon  by  North 
Korean  units  and,  according  to  North  Korean 
reports,  shot  down  and  its  three  injured  crew 
members  captured.  Despite  repeated  requests 
and  in  violation  of  internationally  accepted 
standards  concerning  the  humane  treatment  of 
persons  under  detention,  the  North  Korean  au- 
thorities have  thus  far  refused  to  return  the 
crew  members. 

(b)  On  October  13-14, 1969,  the  armed  forces 
of  the  Kepublic  of  Korea  intercepted  and  sank 
in  waters  off  the  southern  coast  of  Korea  a 
North  Korean  vessel  apparently  attempting  to 
infiltrate  additional  armed  agents  into  the 
Republic  of  Korea. 

(c)  On  October  18, 1969,  North  Korean  units 
attacked  without  provocation  a  United  Nations 
Command  work  partj*  legitimately  engaged  in 
repairing  communications  lines  within  the 
Demilitarized  Zone.  Four  United  Nations 
Command  soldiers  were  killed. 

In  public  statements  as  well  as  in  four  letters 
forwarded  this  year  to  the  United  Nations  Su- 
pervisory Commission,  the  North  Koreans  con- 
tinue to  allege  United  Nations  Command 
violations  of  the  Military  Armistice  Agreement 
provisions  (paragraph  13  d)  against  reintro- 
duction  of  reinforcing  combat  equipment.  I 
would  like  to  note  for  the  benefit  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Council  that  United  Nations  Com- 
mand actions  in  modernizing  its  forces  in  Korea 
have  been  purely  defensive  and  in  response  to 
clear  North  Korean  violations  of  the  Agreement 

Since  1953,  North  Korea  has  increased  the 
size  of  its  ground  forces  by  one-third  and  its 
navy  and  air  forces  each  by  one-half.  Increases 
in  personnel  have  been  concurrent  with  substan- 
tial increases  in  armament.  North  Korea  has 
constructed  airfields  capable  of  handling  jet  air- 
craft, whereas  it  had  none  prior  to  the  signing 
of  the  Military  Armistice  Agreement.  It  has 
acquired  a  formidable  and  threatening  inven- 
tory of  MIG  15,  17  and  21  aircraft,  as  well  as 


606 


Department  of  Siate   Bulletin 


medium  bombers,  and  an  offensive  naval  force 
composed  of  guided  missile  boats  and  motor 
torpedo  boats,  in  addition  to  submarines.  Its 
ground  forces  have  been  equipped  witli  sopliisti- 
cated  equipment — all  acquired  subsequent  to  the 
signing  of  the  Military  Armistice  Agreement. 

When,  in  1957,  it  became  apparent  that  the 
North  Korean  arms  build-up  threatened  the 
parity  between  North  Korean  and  United  Na- 
tions Command  forces  and  after  repeated  re- 
quests that  this  build-up  cease  went  unheeded, 
the  United  Nations  Command  announced  the 
temporary  abrogation  of  paragraph  13  d  of  the 
Armistice  Agreement.  United  Nations  Com- 
mand actions  nevertheless  continue  to  be  care- 
fully measured  and  purely  defensive. 

I  request  that  this  letter,  together  with  the 
report  of  the  United  Nations  Command  trans- 
mitted herewith,  be  circulated  as  an  official  docu- 
ment of  the  Security  Council.^ 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

Charles  W.  Yost 


TEXT  OF   REPORT 

Eeport  of  the  United  Nations  Command 
TO  THE  United  Nations 

North  Korean  violations  of  tlie  Armistice  Agreement 
of  July  27,  1953,  committed  during  the  first  seven 
months  of  1969,  have  continued.  North  Korean  agents 
have  committed  acts  of  infiltration,  terrorism  and  sub- 
version in  the  Republic  of  Korea.  Armed  agents  have 
been  dispatched  across  the  Military  Demarcation  Line, 
or  they  have  been  landed  by  armed  agent  boats  along 
the  coast  of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  As  of  July  31  of  this 
year.  North  Korea  has  committed  99  serious  provoca- 
tions in  the  Demilitarized  Zone  and  throughout  the 
Republic  of  Korea.  The  United  Nations  Command  con- 
siders these  North  Korean  violations  of  the  Ai-mistice 
Agreement  to  be  of  such  seriousness  as  to  warrant 
a  report  to  the  United  Nations. 

In  violation  of  the  Armistice  Agreement,  North 
Korean  aggression  in  the  first  seven  months  of  this 
year  resulted  in  the  murder  of  15  Republic  of  Korea 
civilians  and  the  wounding  of  nine  others.  At  least  44 
Koreans  have  been  killed  during  engagements  in  the 
Republic  of  Korea  and  three  others  have  been 
captured. 

During  the  first  seven  months  of  1969,  the  North 
Koreans  have  sent  more  than  190  covert  agents  into 
the  Republic  of  Korea  with  missions : 

— To  organize  underground  Communist  party  cells 
in  support  of  North  Korea, 


'  U.N.  doc.  S/9493. 


— To  establish  themselves  as  legal  residents  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea, 

— To  recruit  collaborators  and  take  them  to  North 
Korea  for  training, 

—To  collect  general  and  military  intelligence. 

A  chronological  listing  of  the  most  significant  inci- 
dents which  occurred  during  the  first  seven  months 
of  1969  is  attached. 


APPENDIX  A 

Significant  Incidents — 1969 

(a)  On  February  25  at  0012  hours,  elements  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea  Navy  made  radar  contact  with  a 
North  Korean  agent  boat  in  the  vicinity  of  125°  35' 
east,  37°  20'  north.  During  the  subsequent  engagement 
a  ROK  destroyer  suflfered  substantial  damage  in  her 
superstructure.  In  addition,  two  of  the  destroyer's 
crewmen  were  killed  and  eight  others  were  wounded. 
The  agent  boat  also  was  damaged  heavily,  and  it  was 
taken  under  tow  by  a  North  Korean  patrol  boat  which 
towed  it  into  North  Korean  waters. 

(b)  On  March  15  at  1535  hours,  a  United  Nations 
Command  work  party,  supported  by  a  security  patrol, 
was  in  the  process  of  replacing  Military  Demarcation 
Line  marker  Number  0022,  when  it  was  taken  under 
fire  by  North  Korean  units  positioned  in  the  northern 
portion  of  the  Demilitarized  Zone.  In  the  ensuing  fire 
fight,  one  United  Nations  Command  .«oldier  was  killed 
and  three  were  wounded.  At  2145  hours,  a  UH-IB  medi- 
vac  helicopter,  dispatched  to  evacuate  UNC  casualties, 
crashed,  killing  four  crew  members  as  well  as  three  of 
the  previously  wounded. 

(c)  On  March  16,  a  group  of  North  Korean  agents 
infiltrated  from  the  sea  into  the  fishing  port  town  of 
Chumunjin  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Republic  of  Korea. 
They  killed  one  Korean  National  policeman  and  at- 
tempted to  abduct  another.  During  a  search  by  the 
Korean  National  Police  and  the  Homeland  Defense 
Reserve  Force,  a  boat  was  observed  moving  away  from 
the  shore,  and  it  was  taken  under  fire.  The  boat  was 
sunk  and  the  bodies  of  nine  of  the  North  Korean  agents 
aboard  were  later  recovered.  In  addition  to  the  police- 
man killed,  one  other  Republic  of  Korea  citizen  was 
killed  and  another  wounded. 

(d)  On  April  19  at  0100  hours,  three  North  Korean 
agents  landed  at  Sibi-Dong  a  Do  Island  and  kidnaped 
two  Republic  of  Korea  fishermen. 

(e)  On  May  14  at  0050  hours,  an  unknown  number 
of  North  Korean  infiltrators  were  detected  in  the 
southern  part  of  the  Demilitarized  Zone.  Defensive 
measures  resulted  in  the  death  of  one  of  the  infiltrators 
and  the  recovery  of  his  PPS  submachinegun,  122  rounds 
of  ammunition,  nine  hand  grenades. 

(f )  On  May  15  at  2229  hours,  United  Nations  Com- 
mand personnel,  conducting  a  routine  inspection  of  the 
southern  boundary  fence,  came  across  a  North  Korean 
agent.  In  the  ensuing  fire  fight,  two  United  Nations 
Command  personnel  were  wounded.  A  sweep  of  the 
area  discovered  a  trail  used  by  approximately  four 
agents.  The  following  equipment  was  also  discovered : 
two  RPG-2  rockets,  one  RPG  anti-tank  grenade,  four 
F-1  hand  grenades  and  one  pair  of  water  wings. 


December  22,   1969 


607 


(g)  On  May  20  at  0420  hours,  United  Nations  Com- 
mand personnel  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Demilita- 
rized Zone  sighted  a  North  Korean  agent  when  he  set 
(iff  a  trip  flare.  Small  arms  rounds  were  exchanged, 
resulting  in  the  death  of  the  infiltrator. 

(h)  Later  on  the  same  da.v,  at  2105  hours,  North 
Korean  agents  were  again  sighted  in  the  southern  por- 
tion of  the  Demilitarized  Zone.  As  a  result  of  the  en- 
suing fire  fight,  one  of  the  infiltrator.s  was  killed  and 
two  United  Nations  Command  soldiers  were  wounded. 

(i)  On  May  23  at  013.5  hours,  an  unknown  number 
of  infiltrators  were  discovered  cutting  their  way 
through  the  southern  boundary  fence.  A  United  Na- 
tions Command  soldier  was  killed  while  repelling  the 
intruders.  Later  in  the  morning  the  dead  body  of  one 
of  the  infiltrators  was  discovered. 

(j)  On  May  2.5  at  1047  hours,  a  United  Nations 
Command  routine  patrol  was  taken  under  fire  by  a 
group  of  North  Korean  infiltrators  in  the  southern 
portion  of  the  Demilitarized  Zone.  Three  of  the  in- 
truders were  killed  during  the  exchange  of  fire.  When 
United  Nations  Command  personnel  attempted  to 
remove  the  dead  bodies,  they  were  fired  at  from  a 
North  Korean  guard  post.  One  United  Nations  Com- 
mand  soldier  was  wounded   during  the  engagement. 

(k)  On  June  S  at  0150  hours,  a  North  Korean  agent 
boat  was  detected  off  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Republic 
of  Korea  near  Pupkyang.  A  rubber  raft  was  observed 
being  dispatched  from  the  agent  boat  and  moving  to- 
ward shore.  Both  the  boat  and  the  raft  were  taken 
under  fire  from  the  shore.  The  raft  sank,  drowning 
one  of  the  agents  aboard.  Another  agent  was  captured 
later  ashore.  The  agent  boat  fired  one  round  of  82 
mm.  recoilless  rifle  fire  which  impacted  in  a  housing 
area,  killing  five  civilians. 

(1)  On  June  12,  1969,  off  the  southwestern  coast  of 
the  Republic  of  Korea  near  the  Island  of  Tae-Huksan- 
do  a  75-ton,  150-foot  agent  boat  was  attempting  to  ex- 
filtrate  an  agent  from  the  island  when  it  was  taken 
under  fire  by  Republic  of  Korea  Navy  ves.seLs.  Air 
Force  planes  joined  the  fight  and  the  agent  boat  suf- 
fered heavy  damage,  and  was  eventually  captured 
and  boarded.  Some  of  the  agents  aboard  escaped  to 
shore  and  were  later  killed  or  captured  by  Republic  of 
Korea  security  units.  In  all,  at  least  14  North  Korean 
invaders  were  killed  as  a  result  of  the  Naval  battle  and 
the  subsequent  fire  fights  ashore.  One  Republic  of 
Korea  civilian  was  killed  and  a  member  of  the  Home- 
land Defense  Reserve  Forces  was  wounded.  Numerous 
items  of  radio  and  radar  equipment  were  recovered 
from  the  agent  boat,  along  with  pistols,  machineguns 
and  other  military  equipment. 

(m)  On  June  14,  1969,  at  1.540  hours,  a  Republic  of 
Korea  civilian  found  a  rubber  raft  near  the  shore  line 
off  the  western  coast  of  the  Republic.  Korean  National 
Police  began  an  immediate  search  of  the  area  and 
encountered  three  North  Korean  agents.  All  were 
killed  in  the  subsequent  fire  fight.  Four  Korean  Na- 
tional policemen  were  wounded  during  the 
engagement. 


(n)  On  July  12  at  0045  hours,  two  North  Korean 
agents  were  detected  south  of  the  Demilitarized  Zone 
in  the  western  sector  of  the  Republic.  In  the  ensuing 
fire  fight,  one  of  the  agents  v.'as  killed.  Equipment  re- 
covered included  two  North  Korean  submacliineguns, 
145  rounds  of  ammunition,  two  hand  grenades,  one 
radio,  two  code  books,  and  numerous  items  of  personal 
equipment. 

(o)  Also  on  July  12,  a  North  Korean  agent  was 
sighted  and  captured  in  a  section  of  the  Han  River 
Estuary  belonging  to  the  Republic  of  Korea. 

(p)  On  July  19,  a  Republic  of  Korea  shop  owner 
became  suspicious  of  an  individual  in  his  shop  at 
Hansong-ni  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Republic.  The 
Korean  National  Police  were  notified  and  instituted  an 
immediate  search  of  the  area.  Three  North  Korean 
agents  were  discovered  and  in  the  fire  fight  that  fol- 
lowed, one  of  the  intruders  was  wounded  and  captured. 

(q)  On  July  27,  1969,  United  Nations  Command  per- 
.sonnel  sighted  a  North  Korean  intruder  who  was  lo- 
cated in  the  vicinity  of  38°00'05"  north.  127°00'10" 
east,  in  the  Hant'an  River.  When  United  Nations  Com- 
mand personnel  fired  on  this  intruder  he  fled.  A  sweep 
force  was  dispatched  to  look  for  this  intruder,  and  they 
eventually  killed  three  North  Korean  agents.  United 
Nations  Command  personnel  suffered  two  killed  and  six 
wounded  in  this  action. 


APPENDIX  B 

The   Level   of   Noeth   Korean   SuBVERsn-E   AcTmiT 
Against  the  Republic  of  Korea 

1919  to 
1965    1966     1967       1968     July  SI 

Significant  incidents: 

DMZ— south  of  the 
Military  Demarcation 
Line 42     37     445     542       76 

Interior  of  ROK 17     13     121     219       23 

Exchanges  of  fire: 

DMZ— south  of  the 
Military  Demarcation 
Line 23     19     122     236       39 

Interior  of  ROK 6     II       96     120       13 

North  Koreans  kQIed  in 

ROK 4     43     228     321       44 

North  Koreans  captured 

in  ROK 51     19       57       13         3 

UNC  military  killed  in 

ROK 21     35     131     162         6 

UNC  military  wounded  in 

ROK 6     29     294     294       24 

ROK  National  Police  and 

other  civilians  kUled  In 

ROK 19       4       22       35       15 

ROK  National  Police  and 

other  civilians  wounded 

in  ROK 13      5       53       16        9 


608 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.N.   Reaffirms  Objectives  for  Reunification   of  Korea 


I 


a 


Following  are  statements  made  by  William  B. 
Buffum  and  Congressman  J.  having  Whalley, 
U.S.  Representatives  to  the  U.N.  General  As- 
senibly,  during  discussions  on  the  question  of 
Korea  in  the  General  Committee,  in  Committee 
I  {Political  and  Secunty),  and  in  plenary  ses- 
sion, together  with  the  text  of  a  resolution 
adopted  iy  the  General  Assembly  on 
November  25. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR   BUFFUM, 
GENERAL   COMMITTEE,  NOVEMBER   11 

U.S. /D.N.  press  release  151  dated  November  11 

Madam  President,  I  had  assumed  that  one  of 
tlie  proponents  of  the  item  which  we  have  before 
us  this  morning  might  have  felt  constrained  to 
justify  it  to  the  committee.  But  if  tliat  does  not 
seem  to  be  the  case,  I  am  quite  prepared,  based 
on  the  document  which  has  been  placed  before 
us,  to  explain  why  my  delegation,  for  one,  would 
find  it  impossible  to  be  a  party  to  an  inscription 
of  an  item  entitled  "Need  to  put  an  end  to  the 
discussion  in  the  United  Nations  on  the  unifica- 
tion of  Korea." 

I  am  inclined  to  say  that  I  tliink  submission 
of  this  item  at  this  time  and  in  this  way  comes 
close  to  insulting  the  intelligence,  the  logic,  and 
the  patience  of  the  members  of  this  organiza- 
tion. I  say  so  because,  in  the  view  of  my  Govern- 
ment, we  believe  that  the  item  which  we  find 
contained  in  document  A/7658  is  utterly  devoid 
of  logic,  reason,  substance,  or  merit.  It  is  repeti- 
tious of  items  already  on  our  agenda,  on  which 
full  debate  is  already  scheduled  for  this  week. 
And  what  is  more  bizarre,  this  proposal  to  "put 
an  end"  to  the  discussion  comes  from  many  of 
the  very  same  group  that  took  the  initiative  in 
precipitating  a  debate  on  Korea  at  this  session. 
First,  these  delegations  have  insisted  on  the 
debate  on  the  removal  of  the  United  Nations 
presence  from  that  country,  which  has  as  one  of 
its  stated  and  longstanding  aims  the  promotion 
of  the  unification  of  Korea.  Now,  however,  they 


say  we  must  no  longer  talk  about  the  unification 
of  Korea.  Of  all  the  Alice  in  "Wonderland  phi- 
losophies, this  is  one  of  the  most  outstanding. 

As  members  here  all  very  well  known,  the 
wording  of  the  agenda  item  on  Korea  was  dis- 
cussed at  length  in  this  committee  and  again  in 
the  plenary.  A  minority,  it  is  true,  opposed  in- 
clusion of  the  report  of  UNCURK  on  the 
agenda.  But  I  would  point  out  in  that  report  it 
is  stipulated  that  one  of  the  principal  aims  of 
the  United  Nations  is  the  establishment  of  a 
unified  Korea.  So  in  opposing  that  item  they 
were  opjjosing  a  discussion  of  the  unification  of 
Korea.  But,  I  submit,  that  effort  has  failed.  The 
report  of  UNCUEK  was  approved  for  inscrip- 
tion over  the  objection  of  this  group  on  Septem- 
ber 17  by  a  vote  of  17  to  4  with  3  abstentions, 
and  its  recommendation  was  accepted  by  the 
Assembh'  by  a  vote  of  76  to  26  with  15 
abstentions.  So,  in  fact,  the  unification  of 
Korea  will  once  again  be  debated,  and  nothing 
we  do  or  say  today  in  this  General  Committee 
can  change  that  situation. 

We  believe  that  the  proposals  reflected  m  this 
explanatory  memorandum  reflect  an  all  too  fa- 
miliar view  of  an  all  too  familiar  minority.  Of 
course,  they  have  a  perfect  right  to  this  view. 
But  bringing  forward  still  another  repetitious 
formulation  of  the  same  sterile  ideas  which  we 
have  heard  in  debates  so  far  and  expect  to  hear 
again  and  pressing  this  on  us  as  a  new  and 
urgent  item  halfway  through  a  bxisy  session  as 
"urgent  and  important"  under  the  rules,  I 
should  like  to  repeat,  is  indeed  a  tremendous  im- 
position on  the  patience  and  the  intelligence  of 
this  committee. 

Now,  it  may  well  be  that  what  the  sponsors 
have  in  mind  is  preventing  a  debate  on  the  uni- 
fication of  Korea  in  future  years.  But  in  the 
view  of  my  delegation,  if  that  is  their  idea,  they 
are  gomg  about  it  in  the  wrong  way,  both 
procedurally  and  substantively. 

As  members  are  well  aware,  no  Assembly  can 
bind  a  future  session  as  to  what  subject  it  may 
or  may  not  discuss.  Therefore,  we  think  that  one 


December  22,   1969 


609 


would  have  to  dismiss  tliis  effort  out  of  hand  as 
being  totally  illegal,  if  that  is,  m  fact,  the  intent. 
Moreover,  we  would  emphasize  there  is  abso- 
lutely nothing  contained  in  the  memorandum 
we  have  read  wliich  cannot  be  discussed  under 
one  of  the  headings  of  agenda  item  99,  which 
now  appears  in  the  Journal  as  being  dealt  with 
by  the  First  Committee. 

As  for  the  substance  of  the  draft  resolution, 
we  sincerely  believe  that  the  best  way  to  remove 
the  question  of  the  unification  of  Korea  from 
our  agenda  is  not  by  adding  one  more  redundant 
item,  such  as  the  one  we  have  before  us  now, 
which  can  only  give  rise  to  further  confusion, 
acrimony,  and  protracted  and  sterile  debate. 
The  best  way,  at  long  last,  would  be  to  accom- 
plish in  reality  the  unification  of  Korea  and  to 
do  so  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  charter's 
principles  of  peacefid  settlement,  self-deter- 
mination, and  avoidance  of  the  threat  or  use  of 
force. 

That,  in  fact,  is  the  stated  objective  of  the 
United  Nations,  which  the  Assembly  has  con- 
stantly reaffirmed  over  the  opposition  of  a 
minority. 

However  dilatory  the  procedural  devices  may 
be  by  which  this  minority  pursues  that  same 
purpose,  the  purpose  itself  is  a  serious  matter — 
a  life-and-death  matter  for  an  entire  nation. 
If  those  who  wish  to  destroy  the  independence 
of  Korea  are  untiring  in  their  service  to  that 
end,  then  the  United  Nations  must  be  equally 
tireless  in  opposing  them. 

So  I  would  reemphasize,  in  the  view  of  my 
delegation,  there  is  nothing  new,  important,  or 
urgent  about  the  request  we  are  asked  to  con- 
sider here  today.  The  sponsors  of  this  request 
must  have  Imown  ever  since  they  submitted  their 
initial  request  on  August  15  for  the  inclusion  of 
an  item  on  Korea  that  there  would  be  a  debate 
along  the  lines  of  that  held  last  year.  Moreover, 
since  the  General  Conunittee  decided  on  Sep- 
tember 17  to  inscribe  the  items  they  sponsored, 
together  with  the  report  of  UNCUEK,  they 
have  surely  had  ample  time  to  prepare  for  the 
substantive  debate  now  scheduled  for  the  Polit- 
ical Committee.  One  is  almost  tempted  to  con- 
clude in  reviewing  the  history  of  these  items 
that  perhaps  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  since 
their  views  on  the  so-called  invitation  question 
were  not  suj^ported  by  the  majority  of  members, 
that  now  in  anticipation  of  the  outcome  of  sub- 
stantive debate,  they  would  like  to  achieve 
through  a  new  and  separate  item  what  they  fear 
they  may  not  be  able  to  obtain  in  the  substan- 


tive discussion  of  the  existing  item  in  the  Polit- 
ical Committee.  So,  in  short,  it  may  be  that 
their  attitude  is  that  if  the  majority  does  not 
support  their  position  on  this  subject,  then  the 
Assembly  should  not  take  up  this  matter  any 
more. 

If,  despite  these  reservations  which  I  suspect 
may  be  shared  by  a  number  of  my  colleagues 
around  this  table,  this  proposed  item  should  be 
approved  for  inscription,  then  my  delegation 
hereby  formally  proposes  that  the  General  Com- 
mittee further  recommend  that  the  item  be  in- 
scribed as  subitem  (d)  of  item  99,  "The  Korean 
Question" ;  that  it  be  allocated  to  the  First  Com- 
mittee ;  and  that  it  be  discussed  by  that  commit- 
tee during  the  discussion  of  the  other  subitems 
under  item  99. 

If  the  committee  should  decide  to  recommend 
this  matter  for  consideration  by  the  current  ses- 
sion, then  we  would  hope  that  the  recommenda- 
tion could  be  acted  on  promptly  in  plenary  so 
that  the  proposal  for  simultaneous  discussion 
could  be  implemented.^ 


STATEMENT  BY  CONGRESSMAN  WHALLEY, 
COMMITTEE  I,   NOVEMBER   12 

U.S. /D.N.  press  release  154  dated  November  12 

It  is  a  sound  debating  principle  that  when 
one's  case  is  substantively  weak,  the  best  defense 
is  a  vigorous  offense.  Thus,  Mr.  Chairman,  my 
delegation  recognizes  why  the  Representative  of 
the  Soviet  Union  [Y.  A.  Malik],  the  first  speaker 
in  this  phase  of  our  consideration  of  the  ques- 
tion of  Korea,  adopted  the  strategy  that  he  em- 
ployed yesterday.  However,  we  cannot  but  de- 
plore the  harsh  and  abusive  language  he  chose 
and  his  deliberate  attempts  to  mislead  members 
of  this  committee  through  efforts  to  portray 
the  victim  of  aggression  as  an  aggressor  and 
other  attempts  to  depict  a  truculent  and  intem- 
perate North  Korea  as  peace-loving.  Perhaps  the 


'  On  Nov.  11  the  General  Committee  decided,  by  a 
vote  of  8  to  4,  with  12  abstentions,  to  recommend  that 
the  item  entitled  "Need  to  put  an  end  to  tlie  discussion 
in  the  United  Nations  on  the  unification  of  Korea" 
should  be  included  in  the  agenda  ;  the  U.S.  proposal 
that  the  item  shotild  be  included  as  subitem  (d)  of 
agenda  item  99  (Question  of  Korea)  was  adopted  by  a 
vote  of  14  to  3,  with  6  abstentions.  On  the  same  day 
the  General  Assembly  decided,  by  a  vote  of  49  to  13, 
with  44  abstentions,  that  the  additional  item  should  be 
included  in  the  agenda  and  also  decided,  by  a  vote  of 
60  to  23,  with  28  abstentions,  that  the  item  should 
become  subitem  (d)  of  item  99. 


610 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


answer  is  that  the  violent  speech  to  which  we 
were  subjected  yesterday  was  intended  pri- 
marily for  consumption  elsewhere,  in  a  place 
where  public  information  is  closely  controlled, 
where  the  reports  of  objective  U.N.  commissions 
are  not  openly  circulated,  and  where  the  oppor- 
tunity to  set  the  record  straight  in  free  debate 
does  not  yet  exist. 

!Mr.  Chairman,  we  cannot  do  otherwise  than 
deplore  the  shrill  tone  and  the  hackneyed  vocab- 
ulary used  yesterday  by  the  Representative  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  Such  phrases  as  "cold  war," 
"foreign  occujjation  troops,"  "bloody  aggres- 
sive puppet  regime,"  "obstinate  imperialists," 
"obedient  tool,"  "mercenary  clique"  are  all  too 
reminiscent  of  a  time  which  we  hoped  was  long 
since  jDast  in  these  halls.  It  would  be  easier  to 
ignore  their  rather  dated  and  old-fashioned 
tenor  were  we  not  concerned  that  their  usage 
here  in  this  committee  might  encourage  the 
hostility  of  those  authorities  in  Pyongyang  for 
whom  they  were  probably  primarily  intended^ 
hostility  toward  their  neighbor  to  the  south 
and  toward  this  organization.  In  all  frankness, 
my  delegation  also  questions  whether  the  Soviet 
Union  itself,  to  say  nothing  of  North  Korea, 
favors  the  peaceful  remiification  of  Korea  under 
a   truly    representative   form   of   government. 

My  Government  would  welcome  the  oppor- 
tmiity  to  participate  in  a  meaningful  debate 
which  could  lead  to  the  reimiiication  of  Korea 
and  to  the  establishment  of  peace  and  stability 
in  that  covmtry  and  the  surrounding  area.  How- 
ever, the  items  submitted  by  Algeria  and  several 
other  coimtries,  and  the  resolutions  circulated 
in  conjunction  with  them,  indicate  that  those 
countries  which  support  North  Korea  wish  to 
engage  in  the  same  polemics  which  have  marked 
consideration  of  this  issue  in  previous  years. 
One  would  imagine  that  if  they  indeed  wished 
to  contribute  constructively  to  the  objectives  of 
the  United  Nations  in  Korea,  they  would  have 
presented  new  proposals  to  this  committee. 
Moreover,  one  would  imagine  that  they  would 
have  urged  North  Korea  to  accept  the  com- 
petency of  the  United  Nations  in  Korea,  as  the 
Eepublic  of  Korea  has  done,  in  order  to  attend 
these  discussions  and  present  their  views 
directly  to  the  committee. 

Instead,  they  have  revived  the  same  resolu- 
tions which  have  been  rejected  on  many  previous 
occasions  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
members  of  this  committee.  They  have  again 
sponsored  a  resolution  calling  for  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  Commission  for  the 


Unification  and  Rehabilitation  of  Korea.^  They 
have  submitted  a  resolution  calling  for  the  with- 
drawal of  United  Nations  Forces  from  the  Re- 
public of  Korea.^  They  have  gone  beyond  that 
to  demand  explicitly  that  this  organization  cease 
its  efforts  in  behalf  of  a  united,  stable,  and  peace- 
ful Korea.*  My  Government  is  confident  that,  as 
in  the  past,  this  committee  will  reject  these  pro- 
posals which,  as  it  is  well  aware,  would  bring 
to  an  end  the  constructive  role  of  the  United 
Nations  in  Korea. 

We  need  only  look  back  20  years  to  see  what 
could  occur  as  the  result  of  the  withdrawal  of 
the  protective  shield  provided  by  the  United 
Nations  presence  in  Korea.  Except  for  the 
falsification  of  history  and  twisting  of  facts  we 
witnessed  here  yesterday,  I  would  not  feel  it 
necessary  to  review  the  events  which  brought 
about  the  legitimate  and  necessary  role  of  this 
organization  in  Korea.  In  the  light  of  that 
incredible  statement,  however,  I  should  like  very 
briefly  to  recall  some  of  those  events. 

Shortly  after  the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  troops 
from  Korea  in  1949,  North  Korea  began  a  series 
of  raids  into  the  Republic  of  Korea,  with  the 
purpose  of  introducing  trained  saboteurs  into 
the  territory  of  the  Republic.  In  less  than  a  year 
North  Korea  launched  a  massive,  improvoked 
surprise  attack  agaiiist  the  Republic  of  Korea. 
In  response  to  that  attack,  troops  placed  under 
the  United  Nations  Command  were  sent  to 
Korea  at  the  request  of  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea. 

After  the  fighting  stopped  in  1953,  the  bulk 
of  the  troops  which  had  supported  the  Republic 
of  Korea  in  defense  of  its  territorial  integrity 
and  political  independence  were  withdrawn. 
However,  mindful  of  the  need  for  protection 
against  possible  renewed  aggression  by  North 
Korea,  the  Goveriunent  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  requested  that  some  forces  remain.  Con- 
sequently, a  number  of  troops  have  remained 
in  Korea  for  16  years,  since  the  end  of  hostilities. 

These  forces  are  in  Korea  at  the  invitation  of 
the  Republic  of  Korea.  The  presence  of  these 
troof)S  is  not  imposed  upon  the  Korean  people  as 
some  would  have  us  believe.  If  the  Republic  of 
Korea  wished  these  troops  to  withdraw,  my 
Government,  for  its  part,  would  quickly  comply. 
The  governments  of  the  other  countries  which 
are  part  of  the  United  Nations  Command  also 


'  U.N.  doe.  A/C.l/L.  472  and  Add.  1. 
'  U.N.  doc.  A/C.l/L.  470  and  Add.  1-2. 
♦  U.N.  doc.  A/C.l/L.  483. 


December  22,   1969 


611 


have  repeatedly  affirmed  their  readiness,  as 
stated  in  draft  resolution  L.  471  "to  withdraw 
tlieir  remaining  forces  from  Korea  whenever 
such  action  is  requested  by  the  Republic  of 
Korea  or  whenever  the  conditions  for  a  lastinj^ 
settlement  formulated  by  the  General  Assembly 
have  been  fulfilled." 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  amazed  that  the  Repre- 
sentative of  the  Soviet  Union,  of  all  delegates, 
had  the  effrontery  yesterday  to  allege  the  pres- 
ence of  "foreign  occupation  troops"  in  Korea. 
Quite  obviously,  he  does  not  grasp  the  great  dis- 
tinction between  occupation  and  invitation. 

We  need  only  look  at  the  latest  report  of  the 
United  Nations  Command,  circulated  on  Octo- 
ber 31  of  this  year  as  Security  Council  Docu- 
ment S/9tt93,=  to  see  why  the  presence  of  the 
U.N.  forces  in  South  Korea  continues  to  be  de- 
sired by  the  South  Koreans  themselves.  This 
document,  in  reporting  the  most  significant  vi- 
olations of  the  military  armistice  agreements,  is 
an  indictment  of  the  actions  and  policies  of  the 
North  Korean  regime. 

I  do  not  wish  to  take  up  more  of  my  col- 
leagues' time  than  is  necessary,  so  I  will  not 
enumerate  each  of  the  serious  incidents  de- 
scribed in  the  report.  One  or  two  of  these  inci- 
dents are  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  continued 
need  for  the  United  Nations  presence  in  Korea : 

In  March  of  this  year,  eight  U.N.  Command 
members  were  killed  as  the  result  of  an  attack 
from  North  Korean  positions  upon  a  work  party 
that,  in  accordance  with  armistice  agreement 
provisions,  was  in  the  process  of  replacing  a 
military  demarcation  line  marker; 

Again  in  March  North  Korean  infiltrators 
landed  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  where  they  killed  one  Korean  national 
policeman  and  attempted  to  kidnap  another; 

In  June  Republic  of  Korea  vessels  off  the 
southwestern  coast  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  dis- 
covered a  75-ton,  150-foot  boat  which  was  at- 
tempting to  pick  up  an  agent  from  an  offshore 
island.  Military  and  radar  equipment  were  re- 
covered from  tills  boat. 

The  United  Nations  Command  report  lists 
many  more,  but  even  that  list  includes  only  the 
most  significant  violations  of  the  armistice 
agreements.  Since  the  preparation  of  that  report 
the  North  Koreans  have  been  responsible  for 
additional  acts  of  violence  and  provocations,  in- 
cluding the  ambushing  and  killing  of  four 
United  Nations  Conamand  soldiers.  These  hos- 


°  See  p.  606. 


tile  acts  of  North  Korea  should  make  it  evident 
to  the  members  of  this  committee  that  that  re- 
gime is  intent  upon  undermining  the  Republic 
of  Korea  and  taking  over  the  entire  peninsula, 
iloreover,  in  word  as  well  as  in  deed,  they 
have  made  that  intention  abundantly  clear.  At- 
tempts, such  as  that  to  which  we  were  treated 
yesterday,  to  hide  the  wolf  under  the  sheep's 
clothing  of  an  allegedly  "innocent  and  peace- 
loving  North  Korea,"  can  deceive  no  one.  The 
Representative  of  the  Soviet  Union  said 
yesterday : 

The  Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea,  a  peace- 
loving  Socialist  country,  has  never  represented  and 
does  not  represent  a  threat  to  South  Korea.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea 
has  officially  declared  .  .  .  that  consistent  efforts  are 
being  made  on  its  part  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion of  the  Korean  problem,  and  it  has  repeatedly  and 
unambiguously  stated  that  it  has  no  intention  ...  of 
solving  the  problem  of  Korean  unification  by  force  of 
arms. 

Kim  Il-Sung  [North  Korean  Premier]  has 
given  us  his  own  authoritative  definition  of  a 
"peaceful  solution."  Last  July,  as  already  noted 
by  the  Korean  Foreign  Minister,  he  said  in 
effect  that  the  unification  of  Korea  can  be 
achieved  only  after  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  is  overthrown.  This  is  indeed  a 
strange  definition  of  "peaceful  reunification." 

Moreover,  less  than  2  weeks  ago,  speaking  at 
a  meeting  in  Pyongyang,  Kun  Il-Sung  reiter- 
ated his  "peaceful"  formula — a  formula  for  con- 
tinued aggi'ession,  subversion,  and  sabotage.  I 
quote : 

The  main  force  of  the  revolution  should  rise  up  as 
one  in  the  anti-U.S.  national  salvation  struggle  and 
raise  a  violent  storm  of  revolution  all  over  the  south- 
ern land. 

I  submit,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  this  is  not  a 
formula  designed  to  achieve  national  salvation 
in  Korea,  but  rather  one  which  can  only  lead  to 
national  destruction  and  senseless  human  suf- 
fering. Such  statements  give  the  lie  to  asser- 
tions by  the  same  regime  that  it  respects  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  It  is  not  hard  to 
understand,  therefore,  why  the  Republic  of 
Korea  continues  to  request  the  presence  of 
United  Nations  forces  on  her  land. 

During  the  period  since  the  signing  of  the 
military  armistice  agreements,  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  under  the  protection  of  the  United  Na- 
tions presence  and  in  spite  of  continual  incur- 
sions by  North  Korea,  has  been  able  to  make 
remarkable  pi'ogress  in  recovering  from  the 
effects  of  the  war  in  the  early  1950's. 


612 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Economically,  its  rate  of  growth  has  been  one 
of  the  highest  of  all  the  developing  countries. 
Its  per  capita  income  is  steadily  rising. 

Politically,  it  has  demonstrated  a  determina- 
tion to  pursne  the  purposes  and  principles  set 
forth  in  the  United  Nations  Charter.  The  Re- 
public of  Korea  has  a  representative  govern- 
ment with  an  active  political  opposition.  It  has 
a  free  press,  and  its  citizens  enjoy  free  speech. 

'\'\nien  we  view  its  role  in  international  affairs, 
we  see  that  the  Republic  of  Korea  participates 
constructively  in  the  specialized  agencies  of  the 
United  Nations.  It  has  diplomatic  and  consular 
relations  with  over  80  countries  and  in  many 
cases  assists  these  coimtries  in  their  own  eco- 
nomic development.  Within  East  Asia  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  cooperates  with  its  partners 
and  makes  a  welcome  contribution  to  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  growth  of  the  region. 

Moreover,  the  Republic  of  Korea  is  an  in- 
dependent nation  which  has  shown  the  U.N. 
that  it  wishes  to  exist  in  peace,  free  from  the 
threat  of  aggression.  The  Republic  of  Korea's 
achievements  have  been  made  possible  by  the 
protection  afforded  that  country  by  the  United 
Nations. 

There  is,  of  course,  one  other  achievement  for 
which  the  Korean  people  yearn:  the  peaceful 
reunification  of  Korea.  Regrettably,  despite  the 
serious  and  responsible  efforts  of  UNCURK, 
that  goal  has  not  j'et  been  achieved.  The  Com- 
mission, however,  has  noted,  in  its  most  recent 
report,  circulated  as  Supplement  No.  29  (A/ 
7629),  that: 

.  .  .  the  United  Nations  presence  in  the  Republic  of 
Korea  remains  an  important  factor  in  maintaining 
peace  in  the  area.  Tlie  Commission  itself  is  ready  to  use 
its  influence  and  facilities  to  bring  about  conditions 
which  could  lead  to  a  peaceful  settlement  of  this  long 
outstanding  problem,  and  to  effect  the  unification  of 
the  Korean  people. 

We  believe  it  imperative  that  the  Commission 
continue  to  work  toward  those  important 
objectives. 

For  all  tliese  reasons,  Mr.  Chairman,  the 
United  States  has  joined  with  18  others  in  co- 
sponsoring  the  draft  resolution  contained  in 
document  A/C.1/L.471,  which  reafBrms  the  im- 
portant objectives  of  the  United  Nations  in 
Korea  and  which  would  enable  UNCURK  to 
continue  its  efforts  to  unite  the  Korean  people. 
I  We  urge  the  members  to  vote  in  favor  of  draft 
resolution  ^471." 


At  the  same  tune,  we  urge  the  committee  to 
reject  draft  resolutions  L.470  and  L.472,  pro- 
posals of  that  small,  mechanical  minority  who 
amiually  seek  to  end  the  United  Nations  con- 
structive role  in  Korea.' 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  conclude  with  this 
thought.  The  issue  m  Korea  is  real  and  im- 
portant. It  is  not  a  remote  issue  on  some  distant 
planet.  Korea,  my  fellow  delegates,  is  a  part  of 
our  world  and  the  world  has  become  a  small 
place.As  the  President  of  Cameroon  said  in  his 
recent  address  to  the  General  Assembly : 

The  unity  of  man's  destiny  is  today  more  concrete 
and  more  evident  than  ever  before.  For  the  first  time 
in  history,  mankind  is  becoming  a  totality  conscious  of 

itself. 

The  Korean  people's  destiny  and  ours — and 
that  of  the  United  Nations — are  boiuid  up  to- 
gether. "When  aggression  occurred  in  Korea  19 
years  ago,  it  is  to  the  everlasting  honor  of  the 
United  Nations  that  we  did  not  pass  by  on  the 
other  side  of  the  street.  Through  3  years  of  war 
and  16  years  of  armistice,  we  have  been  faithful 
to  our  charge. 

The  immediate  prospects  for  a  solution  may 
be  far  from  bright.  But  let  us  not  grow  weary  in 
a  good  cause.  Let  us  faithfully  pursue  it  imtil  it 
can  at  last  be  fulfilled. 


STATEMENT  BY  CONGRESSMAN  WHALLEY, 
PLENARY  SESSION,  NOVEMBER  25 

D.S./tJ.N.   press   release   175   dated   November   25 

The  United  States  will  vote  in  favor  of  the 
draft  resolution  on  Korea  which  the  First  Com- 
mittee has  reported  to  us  by  a  large  majority. 
We  hope  that  the  Assembly  will  also  vote  for 
this  draft  resolution.  The  Assembly  would 
thereby  reaffirm  the  liistoric  United  Nations  aim 
of  the  peaceful  remiification  of  Korea  through 
free  elections  under  international  supervision 
and  would  also  reaffirm  the  mandate  of  the 
United  Nations  Commission  for  the  Unifica- 
tion and  Rehabilitation  of  Korea  as  the  instru- 
ment of  the  United  Nations  in  pursuing  that 
aim. 


"On  Nov.  17  Committee  I  adopted  draft  resolution 
A/C.1/L.471  and  Add  1-2  by  a  rollcall  vote  of  71 
(U.S. )  to  29,  with  22  abstentions. 


'  On  Xov.  17  Committee  I  rejected  the  two  draft  res- 
olutions. The  rollcall  votes  were:  (A/C.1/L.470  and 
Add  1-2)  29  in  favor,  61  (U.S.)  opposed,  with  32 
abstentions;  (A/C.1/L.472  and  Add  1)  30  in  favor.  65 
(U.S.)  opposed,  with  27  abstention.s.  Draft  resolution 
A/C.1/L.483  and  Add  1  was  also  rejected  on  the  same 
day  by  a  rollcall  vote  of  29  in  favor,  6.5  (U.S.)  opposed, 
with  28  abstentions. 


December  22,   1969 


613 


In  casting  this  vote  we  do  not  feel  any  sense 
of  rejoicing,  for  unfortunately  neither  this  res- 
olution nor  any  other  step  within  our  power 
can  quickly  accomplish  the  aims  of  the  U.N. 
in  Korea.  Rather,  we  experience  mixed  feelings 
at  this  time.  "We  feel  sober  satisfaction — because 
of  the  peaceful  progress  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  sustained  and  reassured  tlirough  these 
difficult  years  by  the  presence  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. We  feel  i-egret  and  frustration — because 
of  the  position  of  North  Korea  and  its  advocates 
here,  wliich  is  so  inflexible  as  to  offer  no  early 
promise  of  progress  toward  peaceful  unification 
in  freedom.  But  we  also  feel  determination — 
because  of  the  need  to  persevere  in  this  good 
cause  and  not  to  yield  to  the  attempts  of  the 
North  Korean  leaders  to  impose  their  will  on 
the  people  of  Korea  by  force  and  intimidation. 

My  Government  does  not  yield  to  any  govern- 
ment on  earth  in  its  desire  for  progress  toward 
a  just  and  peaceful  reunification  of  Korea.  The 
key  to  progress  toward  that  goal,  however,  does 
not  immediately  lie  in  this  Assembly,  but  in  the 
policy  of  the  North  Korean  regime.  So  little  has 
that  policy  changed  during  the  past  year  that 
my  Government  among  others  foresaw  how 
fruitless  another  round  of  debate  on  Korea  in 
this  General  Assembly  was  likely  to  be.  We  were 
quite  prepared  to  spare  the  Assembly  what  some 
of  its  members  consider  to  be  a  familiar  and 
unproductive  discussion.  However,  for  reasons 
best  known  to  themselves,  those  members  who 
have  regularly  advocated  the  North  Korean 
cause  here  saw  fit  once  again  to  submit  the  very 
same  proposals  they  have  submitted  in  past 
years,  all  of  which  can  be  summed  up  in  six 
words :  "United  Nations  get  out  of  Korea."  They 
took  this  step  even  though  nothing  in  the  situa- 
tion liad  changed  and  they  had  no  reason  to  hope 
that  these  proposals,  which  have  regularly  been 
rejected  by  large  majorities,  would  now  sud- 
denly be  accepted. 

In  the  circumstances,  we  who  have  tradition- 
ally upheld  the  majority  view  on  Korea  had 
no  choice  but  once  again  to  join  the  issue.  Now 
the  Assembly  has  before  it  the  foreseeable  re- 
sult, as  shown  in  the  First  Committee  report.' 

As  could  also  have  been  predicted,  the  com- 
mittee voted  by  a  large  majority  in  favor  of 
the  resolution  now  before  us,  reaiRrming  the 
aims  of  the  United  Nations  in  Korea  and  con- 
tinuing the  mandate  of  UNCURK  in  pursuit  of 


'  U.N.  doc.  A/7781. 


those  historic  aims.  By  adopting  this  resolution, 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  United  Nations 
members  have  demonstrated  that  they  earnestly 
desire  a  Korea  reunited  by  peaceful  means  and 
governed  by  a  representative  government. 

Several  times  in  the  committee  debate  the 
Soviet  Representative  has  intimated  that  these 
majority  votes  were  not  a  valid  expression  of 
the  will  of  the  membership  but  were  the  result 
of  some  sinister  influence  by  the  United  States 
over  our  colleagues  here.  Of  course,  that  is  non- 
sense. Members  loiow  how  to  make  up  their  own 
minds;  and  I  am  sure  that  if  tlie  voting  had 
somehow  gone  the  other  way,  this  complaint 
would  not  have  been  heard.  The  secret  of  the 
success  of  the  resolution  now  before  us,  and  of 
the  failure  of  the  others,  is  simply  that  the  ma- 
jority once  again  found  this  resolution  had 
merit. 

This  verdict  by  the  committee  was  reached 
after  long  and  even  repetitious  debate,  in  which 
full  freedom  was  enjoyed  by  all  sides  on  all 
issues.  It  was  laboriously  alleged  that  North 
Korea  had  no  opportunity  to  plead  its  case ;  but 
this  allegation  is  without  merit.  North  Korea's 
case  was  argued  for  it,  at  great  length,  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  several  associates  here; 
and,  in  addition,  a  lengthy  brief  written  in 
Pyongyang  was  circulated  to  all  members  as  a 
General  Assembly  document.  So  the  case  for 
North  Korea's  policy,  and  against  that  of 
the  United  Nations,  was  presented  very  fully 
in  the  committee  and  was  overwhelmmgly 
rejected. 

Let  me  say  again.  Madam  President,  that  the 
United  States  is  happy  that  the  majority  of 
members  of  Committee  I  have  acknowledged  the 
efforts  put  forth  by  the  United  Nations  in  pur- 
suit of  the  peaceful  reunification  of  Korea.  But 
allow  me  to  add  that  we  realize  that  what  we  do 
here  is  only  one  factor  in  making  progress 
toward  real  peace  and  self-determination  for 
the  Korean  nation. 

We  must  face  the  fact  that  such  progress  will 
require  a  big  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  North 
Korean  regime  and  its  advocates  here.  If  they 
truly  want  peace,  let  them  cease  their  policy  of 
violence,  sabotage,  and  intimidation.  If  they 
wish  to  be  believed  when  they  claim  that  their 
intentions  are  peaceful,  let  them  at  least  permit 
the  United  Nations  and  other  impartial  and 
neutral  bodies  the  same  access  and  the  same  op- 
portunities for  verification  in  North  Korea  that 


614 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


have  been  freely  accorded  by  the  Republic  of 
Korea  for  more  than  20  years.  If  they  wish  to 
be  believed  when  they  say  they  are  ready  to  face 
general  elections  in  North  and  South  Korea  on 
a  "democratic"  basis,  let  them  accept  impartial 
international  supervision  of  those  elections  so 
that  the  world  may  know  that  they  really  are 
honest  and  fi-ee. 

It  is  to  serve  these  objectives,  after  all,  that 
the  United  Nations  first  became  involved  in  the 
Korean  question  and  remams  involved  today. 
My  country  is  proud  that  we,  together  with  a 
large  majority  in  the  U.N.,  have  supported  the 
United  Nations  cause  in  this  long  and  severe 
test.  There  is  no  use  in  charging  the  United 
Nations  or  my  country  with  "milawful  interven- 
tion" in  Korea.  We  are  there  at  the  explicit  re- 
quest and  invitation  of  a  freely  elected  and 
sovereign  government.  As  for  "intervention," 
the  people  of  Korea  have  had  more  than  their 
fill  of  intervention  during  their  history — espe- 
cially that  of  their  powerful  neighbors  on  the 
Asian  Continent,  whose  intentions  they  have 
good  reason  to  fear. 

This  is  a  small  world,  and  there  is  only  one 
human  family.  The  fabric  of  international  peace 
and  security  is  a  seamless  garment  which  all  na- 
tions must  wear  or  else  a  day  may  come  when 
all  will  go  naked  and  the  law  of  brute  force  will 
become  imiversal  and  irresistible. 

That,  my  fellow  delegates,  is  the  imiversal 
principle  at  stake  in  the  question  of  Korea.  In 
adopting  the  pending  resolution  we  shall  not 
immediately  solve  the  Korean  question ;  we  can- 
not, because  the  conditions  for  a  solution  do  not 
yet  exist.  But  we  shall  at  least  stand  fast  for  the 
gams  that  the  Eepublic  of  Korea  has  made  and 
preserve  the  hope  that  in  due  time  all  of  Korea 
will  be  united  by  the  generally  free  decision  of 
its  people.  And  thereby  we  shall  perhaps  have 
taken  one  more  step  toward  a  more  civilized 
world,  in  which  nations  do  not  need  to  be  power- 
ful in  order  to  be  independent  and  secure. 


TEXT  OF   RESOLUTION  3 

The  General  AssemMy, 

Having  noted  the  report  of  the  United  Nations  Com- 
mission for  the  Unification  and  Rehabilitation  of  Korea, 
signed  at  Seoul,  Korea,  on  6  September  1969, 

Reaffirming  its  resolution  2466  (XXIII)  of  20  De- 
cember 1968  and  its  previous  resolutions  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Korea  noted  therein, 

Recognizing  that  the  continued  division  of  Korea  does 


not  correspond  to  the  wishes  of  the  Korean  people  and 
constitutes  a  source  of  tension  vrhieh  prevents  the  full 
restoration  of  international  peace  and  security  in  the 
area. 

Recalling  that  the  United  Nations,  under  the  Charter, 
Is  fully  and  rightfully  empowered  to  take  collective  ac- 
tion to  maintain  peace  and  security  and  to  extend  its 
good  offices  iu  seeking  a  peaceful  settlement  in  Korea 
in  accordance  with  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the 
Charter, 

Anxious  that  progress  be  made  towards  creating  con- 
ditions which  would  facilitate  the  reunification  of 
Korea  on  the  basis  of  the  freely  expressed  will  of  the 
Korean  people, 

Conccryicd  at  reports  of  further  events  in  Korea 
which,  if  continued,  could  hamper  efforts  to  create  the 
peaceful  conditions  which  are  one  of  the  prerequisites 
of  the  establishment  of  a  unified  and  Independent 
Korea, 

1.  Reaffirms  that  the  objectives  of  the  United  Nations 
in  Korea  are  to  bring  about,  by  peaceful  means,  the 
establishment  of  a  unified,  independent,  and  demo- 
cratic Korea  under  a  representative  form  of  govern- 
ment, and  the  full  restoration  of  mtemational  peace 
and  security  in  the  area  ; 

2.  Expresses  the  belief  that  arrangements  should  be 
made  to  achieve  these  objectives  through  genuinely 
free  elections,  held  in  accordance  with  the  relevant 
resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly; 

3.  Calls  for  co-operation  in  the  easing  of  tensions  in 
the  area  and,  in  particular,  for  the  avoidance  of  inci- 
dents and  activities  in  violation  of  the  Armistice  Agree- 
ment of  1953 ; 

4.  Notes  with  approval  the  efforts  made  by  the 
United  Nations  Commission  for  the  Unification  and 
Rehabilitation  of  Korea,  in  pursuit  of  its  mandate,  to 
encourage  the  exercise  of  restraint  and  the  easing  of 
tensions  in  the  area  and  to  secure  maximum  support, 
assistance  and  co-operation  in  the  realization  of  the 
peaceful  reunification  of  Korea ; 

5.  Requests  the  United  Nations  Commission  for  the 
Unification  and  Rehabilitation  of  Korea  to  pursue  these 
and  other  efforts  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the 
United  Nations  in  Korea,  to  continue  to  carry  out  the 
tasks  previously  assigned  to  it  by  the  General  As- 
sembly and  to  keep  members  of  the  Assembly  informed 
on  the  situation  in  the  area  and  on  the  results  of  these 
efforts  through  regular  reports  submitted  to  the  Secre- 
tary-General, and  to  the  General  Assembly  as 
appropriate ; 

6.  Notes  that  the  United  Nations  forces  which  were 
sent  to  Korea  in  accordance  with  United  Nations  resolu- 
tions have  in  greater  part  already  been  withdrawn, 
that  the  sole  objective  of  the  United  Nations  forces  at 
present  in  Korea  is  to  preserve  the  peace  and  security 
of  the  area,  and  that  the  Governments  concerned  are 
prepared  to  withdraw  their  remaining  forces  from 
Korea  whenever  such  action  is  requested  by  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  or  whenever  the  conditions  for  a  last- 
ing settlement  formulated  by  the  General  Assembly 
have  been  fulfilled. 


'U.N.  doe.  A/RES/2516  (XXIV)  (A/C.1/L.471)  ; 
adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  on  Nov.  25  by  a  vote 
of  70  ( U.S. )  to  26,  with  21  abstentions. 


December  22,  1969 


615 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  Decemlier  3, 1968.  TIAS  6509. 
Ratification  deposited  at  Washington:  Iceland,  De- 
cemljer  4,  1969. 

Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of  the  conven- 
tion on  international  civil  aviation,  Chicago,  1944,  as 
amended  (TIAS  1591,  3756,  5170),  with  annex.  Done 
at  Buenos  Aires  September  24,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  October  24, 1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Sir/nature:  Ireland,  December  3, 1969. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna    convention    on    consular    relations.    Done    at 
Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force  March  19, 
1967. 
Ratification  deposited:  United  States,  November  24, 

1969. 
Enters  into  force  for  the  United  States:  December 

24,  1969. 
Optional  protocol  to  the  Vienna  convention  on  consular 
relations  concerning   the  compulsory  settlement  of 
disputes.  Done  at  Vienna  April  24, 1963.  Entered  into 
force  March  19,  1967. 
Ratification  deposited:  United  States,  November  24, 

1969. 
Enters  into  force  for  the  United  States:  December 

24,  1069. 

Fisheries — Northwest  Atlantic 

Protocol  to  the  international  convention  for  the  north- 
west Atlantic  fisheries  relating  to  panel  membership 
and  to  regulatory  measures.  Done  at  Washington  Oc- 
tober 1.  1969." 

Adherence  deposited:  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics, November  21, 1969. 

Oil   Pollution — Civil   Liability 

International  convention  on  civil  liability  for  oil  pollu- 
tion damage.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  90th  day  following  the  date 
on  which  eight  states  including  five  states  with  not 
less  than  1  million  gross  tons  of  tanker  tonnage  have 
either  signed  without  reservation  as  to  ratification, 
acceptance,  or  approval  or  have  deposited  appropriate 
instruments. 


*  Not  in  force. 


Signatures:  Cameroon,  Republic  of  China,  France, 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Guatemala,  Iceland, 
Indonesia,  Italy,  Korea,  Malagasy  Republic, 
Monaco,  Poland,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom, 
United  States,  and  Yugoslavia,  November  29,  1969. 

Oil   Pollution — High   Seas   Intervention 

International  convention  relating  to  intervention  on  the 
high  seas  in  cases  of  oil  pollution  casualties,  with 
annex.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  90th  day  following  the  date  on 
which  15  states  have  signed  it  without  reservation  as 
to  ratification,  acceptance,  or  approval  or  have  de- 
posited appropriate  instruments. 
Signatures:  Cameroon,   Republic  of  China,  France, 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Guatemala,  Iceland, 
Indonesia,  Italy,  Korea,  Malagasy  Republic,  Mon- 
aco, Poland,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  United 
States,   and   Yugoslavia,  November  29,  1969. 


BILATERAL 


Belgium 

Consular  convention,  with  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed 
at  Washington  September  2,  1969." 
Ratified  hy  the  President:  December  2, 1969. 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  adjustments  in  the  flood  control 
payments  by  the  United  States  to  Canada  pursuant  to 
the  Columbia  River  treaty  of  January  17, 1961  (TIAS 
5638).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
August  18  and  20,  1969.^ 
Ratified  hy  the  President:  December  2, 1969. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities,  relat- 
ing to  the  agreement  of  September  15,  19G7  (TIAS 
6346).  Signed  at  Djakarta  November  17,  1969. 
Entered  into  force  November  17,  1969. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agreement  of 
April  3,  1957  (TIAS  4782),  with  exchange  of  notes. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Novem- 
ber 25,  1969.  Entered  into  force  November  25,  1969. 


DEPARTMENT  AND  FOREIGN  SERVICE 


616 


Designations 

Robert  S.  Smith  as  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs,  effective  December  3.  (For  biographic 
data,  see  Department  of  State  press  release  dated 
December  3.) 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX      December  23,  1969      Vol.  LXl,  No.  lo91 


t    Africa.  Smith  designated  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary for  African  Affairs 616 

Asia.  Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  National 
Educational  Television  (transcript)     ....      577 

i    Aviation.  13-Nation  Meeting  on  Hijacking  of  Air- 
craft    Held     at     Washington     (Department 
announcement)       592 
I    Canada.  U.S.  and  Canada  Hold  Talks  on  Auto- 
motive Trade  Agreement 591 

\  Congress 

1  Members  of  Advisory  Commission  on  Cultural 

I       Affairs  Confirmed 590 

i  Secretary  Stresses  Importance  of  Funding  For- 
eign Assistance  Program  (Rogers)     ....      593 

I  Treatment  of  American   Prisoners  of   War  in 

I       North  Viet-Nam  (Sullivan) 596 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

Consuhu-  Posts  To  Be  Closed  Under  Persoimel 

Reduction    Plan 591 

Designations  (Smith) 616 

Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  National  Ed- 
ucational Television  (transcript) 577 

'  Disarmament 

Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  National  Ed- 
ucational Television  (transcript)     577 

U.S.     Discusses    Progress    in    Arms    Control 

(Yost) 6(X) 

Economic  Affairs.  Consular  Posts  To  Be  Closed 
Under  Personnel  Reduction  Plan 591 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  Members  of 
Advisory  Commission  on  Cultural  Affairs  Con- 
firmed     590 

Foreign  Aid.  Secretary  Stresses  Importance 
of  Funding  Foreign  Assistance  Program 
(Rogers) 593 

France 

U.S.  and  France  Agree  To  Modify  Extradition 

Treaty  (joint  statement) 592 

U.S.  and  France  Continue  Talks  on   Scientific 
i       Cooperation  (joint  statement) 590 

Korea 

Crew  of  U.S.  Helicopter  Released  by  North 
Korea  (U.N.  Command  statement,  text  of  docu- 
ment signed  by  Major  General  Adams)     .     .      583 

U.N.  Command  in  Korea  Submits  Report  to  the 
Security  Council  (Yost,  text  of  report)     .     .     .       606 

U.N.  Reaffirms  Objectives  for  Reunification  of 
Korea  ( BufCum,  Whalley,  text  of  resolution )     .       609 

Science.  U.S.  and  France  Continue  Talks  on  Sci- 
entific Cooperation   (joint  statement)     .     .     .      590 

Trade.  U.S.  and  Canada  Hold  Talks  on  Auto- 
motive Trade  Agreement 591 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 616 

U.S.  and  France  Agree  To  Modify  Extradition 

Treaty    (joint    statement) 592 

U.S.  and  U.K.  Begin  Negotiations  for  New  Ex- 
tradition Treaty  (joint  statement)     ....      592 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  National  Ed- 
ucational Television  (transcript) 577 

U.S.-Soviet  Relations  in  an  Era  of  Negotiation 

(Richardson) 584 


United  kingdom.  U.S.  and  U.K.  Begin  Negotia- 
tions for  New  Extradition  Treaty  (joint  state- 
ment)     592 

United  Nations 

U.N.  Command  in  Korea  Submits  Report  to  the 

Security  Council  (Yost,  text  of  report)     ...      606 

U.N.  ReaflBrms  Objectives  for  Reunification  of 

Korea  (Buff um,  Whalley,  text  of  resolution)    .      609 

U.S.     Discusses     Progress     in     Arms     Control 

(Yost) 600 

Viet-Nam 

45th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Lodge) 588 

Secretary  Rogers  Interviewed  on  National  Ed- 
ucational Television  (transcript)     577 

Treatment  of  American  Prisoners  of  War  in 
North  Viet-Nam  (Sullivan) 596 

Name  Index 

Adams,  Maj.  Gen.  Arthur  H 583 

Bufifum,  William  B 609 

Derge,  David  R 590 

LaFontant,   Mrs.   Jewel 590 

Lodge,   Henry   Cabot 588 

Richardson,  Elliot  L 584 

Rogers,    Secretary 577,593 

Smith,  Robert  S 616 

Sullivan,   William  H 596 

Turner,  William  C 590 

Whalley,  J.  Irving 609 

Yost,  Charles  W 600,  606 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  December  1-7 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  December  1  which  ap- 
pear in  this  issue  of  the  Buixetin  are  Nos.  340 
of  November  12,  346  of  November  17,  352  of  No- 
vember 20,  356  of  November  24,  361  of  Novem- 
ber 28,  and  363  of  November  28. 

No.        Dale  Subject 

364    12/1     Modification  of  U.S.-France  extradi- 
tion treaty. 
t365     12/2     Rogers:      arrival      statement      at 
Brussels. 

366  12/4     Lodge :  45th  plenary  session  on  Viet- 

Nam  at  Paris. 

367  12/4     U.S.-U.K.  extradition  treaty  nego- 

tiations. 

368  12/.")     Intergovernmental  meeting  on  air- 

craft hijacking. 
t369     12/6    Rogers :     Belgo-American    Associa- 
( revised)  tion,  Brussels. 

t370     12/G    NATO  communi(iue  and  declaration. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletix. 


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THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


THE 

DEPARTIVIENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Vol.  LXI,  No.  1592 


December  29,  1969 


PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE  OF  DECEMBER  8     617 

OUR  CONTINUING  COMMITMENT  TO  WESTERN  EUROPE 

Address   by  Secretary  Rogers 


lA-ECOSOC  SPECIAL  COMMITTEE  MEETS  AT  WASHINGTON 

Statement  hy  Assistant  Secretary  Meyer     631 


For  index  see  inside  hack  cover 


THE   DEPARTMENT   OF  STATE 


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Vol.  LXI,  No.  1592 
December  29,  1969 


The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN^ 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  the 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  and 
interested  agencies  of  the  Government 
with  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  foreign  relations  and  on 
the  work  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  Foreign  Service, 
The  BULLETIN  includes  selected 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issued 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart- 
ment, and  statements  and  addresses 
nuide  by  the  President  and  by  tlie 
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tional affairs  and  the  functions  of  the 
Department.  Information  is  included 
concerning  treaties  and  international 
agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party 
and  treaties  of  general  international 
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Publications  of  the  Department, 
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national relations  are  listed  currently. 


President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  December  8 


FoUoiring  are  excerpts  from  the  transcript  of 
a  news  conference  held  iy  President  Nixon  in 
the  East  Boom  of  the  White  House  on 
Decemher  8. 

The  President:  Won't  you  be  seated.  Mr. 
Smith  [Merriman  Smith,  United  Press  Inter- 
national]. 

Q.  Mr.  President.,  do  you  see  any  signs  of  tlie 
Viet-Nam  war  cooling  off? 

The  President:  Well,  looking  over  the  long 
period,  yes — as  far  as  recent  weeks  are  con- 
cerned, since  my  speech  of  November  3,^  no 
significant  change.  When  we  compare  the  situa- 
tion with  regard  to  infiltration  and  casualties 
this  year  with  last  year,  there  is  a  gi-eat 
difference. 

Lookmg  to  the  future,  if  that  situation  con- 
tinues, I  believe  that  we  can  see  that  the  Viet- 
Xam  war  will  come  to  a  conclusion  regardless 
of  what  happens  at  the  bargaining  table.  It 
will  come  to  a  conclusion  as  a  result  of  the  plan 
that  we  have  instituted  on  which  we  are  em- 
barked for  replacing  American  troops  with 
Vietnamese  forces. 

]\Ir.  Cornell  [Douglas  B.  Cornell,  Associated 
Press] . 

Q.  In  your  opinion,  was  what  happened  at 
My  Lai  a  massacre.,  an  alleged  massacre,  or  what 
■was  it?  And  what  do  you  think  can  be  done  to 
prevent  things  like  this?  If  it  was  a  massacre, 
do  you  think  it  was  justifiable  on  military  or 
other  grounds? 

The  President :  Well,  trying  to  answer  aU  of 
those  questions  and  sorting  it  out,  I  would  start 
first  with  this  statement:  What  appears  was 
certainly  a  massacre,  and  under  no  circum- 
stances was  it  justified.  One  of  the  goals  we  are 
fighting  for  in  Viet-Nam  is  to  keep  the  people 
from  South  Viet-Nam  from  having  imposed 
upon  them  a  government  which  has  atrocity 


against  civilians  as  one  of  its  policies.  We  can- 
not ever  condone  or  use  atrocities  against  civil- 
ians in  order  to  accomplish  that  goal. 

Now,  when  you  use  the  word  "alleged,"  that 
is  only  proper  in  terms  of  the  individuals  in- 
volved. Under  our  system  a  man  is  not  guilty 
until  proved  to  be  so.  There  are  several  indi- 
viduals involved  here  who  will  be  tried  by 
military  courts.  Consequently,  we  should  say 
"alleged"  as  far  as  they  are  concerned  until  they 
are  proved  guilty. 

As  far  as  this  kind  of  activity  is  concerned, 
I  believe  that  it  is  an  isolated  incident.  Certainly 
within  this  administration  we  are  doing  every- 
thing possible  to  find  out  whether  it  was  iso- 
lated ;  and  so  far  our  investigation  indicates  that 
it  was. 

As  far  as  the  future  is  concerned,  I  would  only 
add  tliis  one  point:  Looking  at  the  other  side 
of  the  coin,  we  have  1,200,000  Americans  who 
have  been  in  Viet-Nam.  Forty  thousand  of  them 
have  given  their  lives.  Virtually  all  of  them 
have  helped  the  people  of  Viet-Nam  in  one 
way  or  another.  They  built  roads  and  schools. 
They  built  churches  and  pagodas.  The  marines 
alone  this  year  have  built  over  250,000  churches, 
pagodas,  and  temples  for  the  people  of  Viet- 
Nam.- 

Our  soldiers  in  Viet-Nam  and  sailors  and  air- 
men this  year  alone  contributed  three-quarters 
of  a  million  dollars  to  help  the  people  of  South 
Viet-Nam. 

Now,  this  record  of  generosity,  of  decency, 
must  not  be  allowed  to  be  smeared  and  slurred 
because  of  this  kind  of  incident.  That  is  why 
I  am  going  to  do  everything  I  possibly  can 
to  see  that  all  of  the  facts  in  this  incident  are 
brouglit  to  light  and  that  those  who  are 
charged,  if  they  are  foimd  guilty,  are  punished. 
Because  if  it  is  isolated,  it  is  agauist  our  policy ; 
and  we  shall  see  to  it  that  what  these  men  did. 


'  For  text,  see  Btjxletin  of  Nov.  24, 1969,  p.  437. 


'The  White  House  Press  Office  later  said  that  the 
President  had  inadrertently  used  an  incorrect  figure. 
He  meant  to  say  that  the  marines  have  built  251  schools 
and  117  churches,  pagodas,  and  temples. 


December  29,   1969 


617 


if  they  did  it,  does  not  smear  the  decent  men  that 
have  gone  to  Viet-Nam  in  a  very,  in  my  opinion, 
important  cause. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Q.  May  I  go  hack  to  Mr.  Cornell's  question  to 
ask,  in  the  light  of  the  My  Lai  incident,  would 
you  prefer  a  civilian  commission,  something 
other  than  a  military  inquiry  in  this  case? 

The  President:  Mr.  Tlieis  [J.  William 
Theis,  Hearst  Newspapers] ,  I  do  not  believe  that 
a  civilian  commission  at  this  time  would  be  use- 
ful. I  believe  that  the  matter  now  is  in  the  judi- 
cial process  and  that  a  civilian  commission 
might  be,  and  very  properly  could  be,  used  by 
the  defendants'  attorneys  as  having  prejudiced 
their  rights. 

Now,  if  it  should  happen  that  the  judicial 
process,  as  set  up  by  the  military  under  the  new 
law  passed  by  Congress,  does  not  prove  to  be 
adequate  in  bringing  this  incident  completely 
before  the  public,  as  it  should  be  brought  before 
the  public,  then  I  would  consider  a  commission, 
but  not  at  this  time. 

Prospects  for  a   Further  Troop   Cutback 

Q.  Mr.  President,  today  Secretary  of  Defense 
Laird  is  reported  to  have  said  that  you  would  ie 
expected  to  annownce  a  further  troop  cutback 
from  Yiet-Nam  later  this  month,  probably 
Jfi,000  men.  Also,  today,  Senator  George  Aiken 
is  reported  as  having  said  that  you  have  already 
withdrawn  or  ordered  withdrawn  another  9,000 
that  loere  not  announced.  Could  you  give  us  your 
thinking  on  the  prospects  and  the  substance  of 
both  of  those  reports? 

The  President:  As  I  indicated  in  my  speech 
on  television  on  November  3,  the  reports  from 
Viet-Nam  with  regard  to  infiltration,  with  re- 
gard to  casualties,  and  with  regard  to  the  train- 
ing of  the  South  Vietnamese  indicate  more 
progress  on  all  fronts  than  we  had  anticipated 
when  we  started  our  troop  scheduled  with- 
drawal in  June. 

There  will  be  a  troop  cut,  with  a  replacement 
by  South  Vietnamese,  later  this  month,  I  would 
say  within  the  next  2  to  3  weeks.  As  far  as  the 
number  is  concerned,  the  number  is  still  under 
consideration.  It  will  depend  upon  the  events 
and  our  analysis  of  the  events  between  now  and 
the  time  I  make  the  announcement. 


Q.  .  .  .  on  November  8  you  called  for  sup- 
port for  your  policies  in  Viet-Nam.  You  since 
received  a  response  that  some  of  yo^ir  aides  feel 
is  gratifying.  My  question  is,  however,  have  you 
not,  with  the  help  of  Vice  President  Agnew — 
and  I  am  referring  to  some  of  his  re- 
cent speeches — purchased  this  support  at  the 
cost  of  alienating  a  sizable  segment  of  the 
American  public  and  insking  polanzation  of  the 
country? 

The  President:  Mr.  Semple  [Robert  B. 
Semple,  Jr.,  New  York  Times],  one  of  the  prob- 
lems of  leadership  is  to  take  a  position.  I  like 
to  be  liked ;  I  don't  like  to  say  things  that  every- 
body doesn't  agree  with. 

When  peace  marchers  come  to  Washington, 
it  would  be  very  easy  to  say  that  I  agree  with 
them  and  I  will  do  what  they  want.  But  a  Presi- 
dent has  to  do  what  he  considers  to  be  right, 
right  for  the  people,  right,  for  example,  in  pur- 
suing a  just  peace — not  just  peace  for  our  time, 
for  a  little  time. 

I  believe  that  I  pursued  that  path.  I  do  not 
believe  that  that  is  a  disservice  to  the  public 
interest,  because  I  believe  that  sometimes  it  is 
necessary  to  draw  the  line  clearly,  not  to  have 
enmity  against  those  who  disagree  but  to  make 
it  clear  that  there  can  be  no  compromise  where 
such  great  issues  as  self-determination  and 
freedom  and  a  just  peace  are  involved. 


Strategic  Arms   Limitation   Tall<s 

Q.  The  United  States  today  asked  for  a  post- 
2)onemc7it  in  the  SALT  talks,  the  strategic  arms 
talks.  Can  you  tell  us  why  and  assess  the  talks 
for  us,  please? 

The  President:  Well,  the  postponement  does 
not  have  any  long-range  significance.  It  is  only 
for  the  purpose  of  developing  positions  in  a 
proper  way.  x\.s  far  as  the  progress  is  concerned, 
I  would  say  it  is  encouraging.  I  say  that  some- 
what cautiously,  because  I  would  not  want  to 
leave  out  the  hope  that  we  would  have  an  agree- 
ment within  a  matter  of  weeks  or  even  months. 

But  it  is  encouraging  because  both  sides 
are  presenting  positions  in  a  very  serious  way 
and  are  not  trying  to  make  propaganda  out  of 
their  positions.  Both  sides,  I  believe  therefore, 
want  a  limitation  on  strategic  arms.  As  long  as 
this  is  the  case,  there  is  a  chance  for  an 
affreement. 


i 


618 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Now,  it  is  going  to  take  some  time,  because 
what  is  involved  here— as  distinguished  from 
the  test  ban,  as  distinguished  from  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty,  both  of  which  were  im- 
portant but  which  were  basically  peripheral 
issues — here  you  have  the  basic  security  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Soviet  Union 
involved.  Therefore,  both  must  bargain  hard. 
But  I  believe  that  the  progress  to  date  has  been 
good.  The  prospects  are  better  than  I  antici- 
pated they  would  be  when  the  talks  began. 

Q.  Mr.  President.,  as  the  Vietnamisation  proc- 
ess -moves  along,  are  there  any  circum,stances, 
such  as,  perhaps,  a  series  of  defeats  by  the  South 
Vietnamese  Army,  that  might  lead  you  to  want 
to  reverse  the  process  of  troop  withdrawals  and 
increase  our  troops  in  Yiet-Nam? 

The  President :  I  do  not  anticipate  that  at  this 
time.  I  want  to  make  it,  of  course,  clear  that  we 
do  not  anticipate  that  there  will  not  be  troubles. 
The  enemy  still  has  the  capability  of  laimching 
some  offensive  actions.  Not,  certainly,  the 
capability  that  it  had  a  year  ago — it  is  much 
less,  because  their  infiltration  has  been  less.  But 
the  present  prognosis  that  I  think  I  can  make 
is  this :  that  we  can  go  forward  with  our  troop 
withdrawal  program  and  that  any  action  that 
the  enemy  takes,  either  against  us  or  the  South 
Vietnamese,  can  be  contained  within  that 
program. 

Mr.  Horner  [Garnett  D.  Horner,  Washing- 
ton Evening  Star] . 

Q.  Mr.  President,  is  there  any  tnith  in  the 
reports  that  have  been  rather  persistent  for  the 
last  couple  of  weeks  that  xoe  paid  Thailand 
something  like  a  hillion  dollars  for  their  coop- 
eration in  Yiet-Nam?  In  that  connection,  where 
do  our  allies,  like  Thailand,  South  Korea,  and 
their  troops  fit  into  our  withdraioal  program? 

The  President :  Well,  first,  with  regard  to  the 
second  part  of  the  question,  both  Thailand  and 
South  Korea  have  no  intention,  at  least  none 
that  has  been  indicated  to  us,  of  withdrawing 
forces  at  the  time  that  we  are  withdrawing  ours, 
because  we  have  a  much  greater  commitment 
there  than  they  have. 

Second,  with  regard  to  the  billion  dollars  that 
allegedly  has  been  paid  to  Thailand,  the  amoimt 
is,  of  course,  far  less  than  that.  But  quite  can- 
didly, yes,  the  United  States  is  subsidizing  the 
Thai  troops.  We  also  are  subsidizing  the  South 
Korean  troops.  We  are  doing  exactly  what  we 


did  in  Western  Europe  immediately  after  World 
War  II,  when  we  subsidized  virtually  all  of 
Western  Europe  due  to  the  fact  that  they  could 
not  maintain  forces  themselves  for  their  own 
defense. 

These  are  newly  developing  countries.  They 
are  unable  to  maintain  their  forces  for  their  own 
defense.  Therefore,  we  think  that  subsidy  is  cor- 
rect. I  can  only  say  this :  It  seems  to  me  it  makes 
a  great  deal  of  sense.  The  Thais  are  in  Viet- Nam 
as  volunteers ;  and  if  they  are  willing  to  go  there 
as  volunteers,  I  would  much  rather  pay  out  some 
money  to  have  them  there  than  to  have  Ameri- 
can men  fighting  there  in  their  place. 

The   Paris  Talks  on  Vief-Nam 

Q.  Since  Ambassador  Lodge  resigned,  you 
have  not  named  a  successor  as  chief  negotiator. 
Is  this  in  effect  downgrading  the  Paries  talks 
because  they  have  been  nonproductive? 

The  President:  No.  Mr.  [Philip  C]  Habib  is 
a  very  competent  career  diplomat,  and  he  will  be 
able  to  discuss  anytliing  that  is  brought  up  seri- 
ously by  the  other  side.  We  are  simply  waiting 
for  a  serious  proposal. 

Q.  Considering  how  things  have  gone  in  Paris, 
how  do  you  now  rate  the  chances  of  a  nego- 
tiated settlement  of  the  ivar? 

The  President:  Not  good.  Quite  candidly,  I 
would  like  to  say  that  they  were  good;  but 
looking  at  the  present  situation,  the  enemy's 
line  continues  to  be  hard,  their  proposals  quite 
frivolous,  as  the  ones  by  the  VC  [Viet  Cong]  to- 
day, and  I  do  not  anticipate  any  progi-ess  on  the 
negotiating  front  at  this  time. 

But  I  put  in  this  one  condition :  As  our  pro- 
gram for  Vietnamization  continues  to  work  and 
as  it  becomes  apparent — as  I  believe  it  increas- 
ingly will — that  it  will  succeed,  I  think  the  pres- 
sures for  the  enemy  then  to  negotiate  a  settle- 
ment will  greatly  increase,  because  once  we  are 
out  and  the  South  Vietnamese  are  there,  they 
will  have  a  much  harder  individual  to  negotiate 
with  than  they  had  when  we  were  there. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  toill  our  Yiet-Nam  involve- 
ment be  reduced  in  your  administration  to  the 
point  where  it  will  command  no  more  public 
attention  than,  say,  Kcrrea  does  now? 

The  President :  That  is  certainly  our  goal,  and 
I  think  we  are  well  on  the  way  to  achievement 


December  29,   1969 


619 


of  that  goal.  We  have  a  plan  for  the  reduction  of 
American  forces  in  Viet-Nam,  for  removing  all 
combat  forces  from  Viet-Nam,  regardless  of 
what  happens  in  the  negotiations. 

That  plan  is  going  forward.  As  I  will  report  to 
the  Nation  when  I  announce  the  troop  with- 
drawal 2  or  3  weeks  from  now,  I  believe  that 
developments  since  my  November  3  speech  have 
been  on  schedule. 


The  Situation  in  Laos 

Q.  Mr.  President,  what  limits  do  you  put  on 
what  the  people  of  the  United  States  ought  to 
know  about  the  war  that  is  going  on  in  Laos  and 
the  American  involvement  in  it? 

The  President :  The  public  interest.  As  far  as 
I  am  concerned,  the  people  of  the  United  States 
are  entitled  to  know  everything  that  they  pos- 
sibly can  with  regard  to  any  involvement  of  the 
United  States  abroad. 

As  you  know,  in  answer  to  a  question  I  think 
Mr.  Potter  asked  at  the  last  press  conference,  I 
pointed  out  what  were  the  facts.'  There  are  no 
American  combat  troops  in  Laos.  Our  involve- 
ment in  Laos  is  solely  due  to  the  request  of 
Souvanna  Phouma,  the  neutralist  Prime  Min- 
ister, who  was  set  up  there  in  Laos  as  a  result 
of  the  Laos  negotiation  and  accords  that  were 
arranged  by  Governor  [W.  Averell]  Harriman 
during  the  Kennedy  administration. 

We  are  attempting  to  uphold  those  accords, 
and  we  are  doing  that  despite  the  fact  that 
North  Viet-Nam  has  50,000  troops  in  Laos.  We 
are  also,  as  I  have  publicly  indicated  and  as  you 
know,  interdicting  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  Trail  as  it 
nms  through  Laos.  Beyond  that,  I  don't  think 
the  public  ijiterest  would  be  served  by  any  fur- 
ther discussion. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Q.  Mr.  President,  the  enemy's  infltration  has 
been  up  recently  in  Viet-Nam.  Could  you  give  v^ 
your  assessment  of  this,  specifically  lohether 
you  think  he  is  replacing  losses  or  building  up 
for  an  offensive,  and  what  significance  could  this 
fact  have  in  terms  of  your  own  plans  for  troop 
reduction? 

The  President:  It  has  great  significance  be- 
cause, as  I  have  pointed  out,  enemy  uifiltration, 
the  fact  that  it  was  down,  is  one  of  the  reasons 


'  For  excerpts  from  President  Nixon's  news  confer- 
ence of  Sept.  26,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  13,  1969,  p.  313. 


that  we  have  been  able  to  go  forward  with  our 
own  troop  withdrawal  programs. 

However,  I  have  been  analyzing  these  reports 
week  by  week.  The  figures  that  we  got  2  weeks 
ago  seem  to  have  been  inflated.  The  infiltration 
rate  is  not  as  great  as  we  thought  then.  It  is 
higher  than  it  was  a  few  months  ago.  It  is  still 
lower  than  it  was  a  year  ago. 

We  do  not  consider  the  infiltration  significant 
enough  to  change  our  troop  withdrawal  plans. 
Now,  something  may  occur  in  the  next  2  to  3 
weeks  that  may  give  me  a  different  view  on  that, 
but  at  this  time  that  would  be  my  observation. 


46th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam 
Held  at  Paris 

Following  is  the  opening  statement  made  by 
Minister  Philip  C.  Habib,  acting  head  of  the 
UjS.  delegation,  at  the  46th  plenary  session  of 
the  meetings  on  Viet-Nam  at  Paris  on 
December  11. 

Press  release  373  dated  December  11 

Ladies  and  gentlemen :  In  recent  weeks  your 
side  has  sought,  outside  of  these  plenary  meet- 
ings, to  persuade  the  world  that  you  are  seri- 
ously seeking  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the  war 
in  Viet-Nam.  You  have  spoken  of  your  good 
will  and  serious  attitude  and  of  the  reasonable- 
ness and  correctness  of  your  proposals. 

We  continue  to  hear  the  same  demands  for 
unilateral  action  which  you  have  been  making 
for  the  past  10  months.  We  see  no  signs  that 
your  side  is  prepared  to  take  any  steps  of  its 
own  to  match  actions  by  our  side.  We  hear 
only  more  strident  language. 

You  cannot  convince  us  here,  or  public  opinion 
at  large,  of  your  desire  for  genuine  negotiations 
by  protestations  of  good  will  alone.  Tliis  is  a 
clear  case  where  actions  speak  louder  than  mere 
words. 

For  example,  you  constantly  claim  that  you 
came  to  these  meetings  with  what  you  term 
"good  will  and  a  serious  attitude."  It  is  wortli 
examining  what  "good  will  and  serious  attitude" 
consist  of. 

Normally,  in  international  negotiations,  good 
will  means  the  following  things :  to  present  rea- 
sonable proposals,  to  listen  to  the  pro^josals  of 


620 


Deportment  of  State   Bulletin 


others,  to  discuss  one's  own  proposals  and  to 
explain  them,  to  discuss  the  proposals  of  others 
and  to  ask  for  clarification,  to  be  ready  to  deal 
with  all  parties,  to  be  ready  for  give-and-take, 
and  to  reach  an  agreement  to  which  all  parties 
can  honorably  adiiere. 

By  any  normal  standards,  therefore,  you  have 
not  yet  shown  here  either  good  will  or  a  serious 
attitude.  You  have  made  imreasonable  demands 
and  insisted  that  we  accept  them  before  negotia- 
tions can  begin.  You  demand  actions  on  our  part 
with  no  indication  of  what  you  are  prepared  to 
do.  You  have  rejected  our  positions  out  of  hand 
and  refused  to  discuss  them.  You  have  refused 
to  deal  with  the  Go^'ernment  of  the  Republic  of 
Viet-Nam,  even  tliough  you  originally  agreed  to 
do  so  and  even  though  that  Government  has 
agreed  to  meet  with  you,  without  any  condi- 
tions, publicly  or  privately. 

These,  I  submit,  are  not  actions  which  demon- 
strate a  serious  attitude. 

Your  words  and  actions  diverge  also  when 
you  claim  to  accord  "humane"  treatment  to  our 
prisoners  of  war. 

Here  again,  there  are  standards  by  which  one 
can  define  "humane"  treatment.  In  addition  to 
adequate  diet  and  medical  care  and  the  absence 
of  physical  or  mental  duress,  humane  treatment 
by  any  standard  requires  at  least  the  following: 
repatriation  of  the  seriously  sick  and  woimded, 
inspection  of  POW  camps  by  a  recognized  im- 
partial authority,  lists  of  all  prisoners  so  that 
tlie  families  will  know  who  is  alive  and  who 
is  dead,  regular  exchange  of  mail  and  packages 
for  all  prisoners. 

Your  Government  has  not  met  these  stand- 
ards. You  have  not  released  the  seriously  sick 
and  woimded.  You  have  not  allowed  impartial 
inspection,  despite  many  attempts  to  arrange 
this.  You  have  not  provided  a  list  of  all  the 
prisoners.  Although  on  special  occasions  you 
Iiave  permitted  some  of  the  prisoners  to  receive 
mail  and  packages,  you  have  not  permitted  this 
on  a  regular  basis.  Virtually  no  mail  has  been 
received  by  families  in  the  past  4  months.  There 
is  no  confirmation  that  any  of  the  packages  sent 
following  your  announcement  of  July  4,  1969, 
liave  been  received  by  the  prisoners. 

Moreover,  there  is  disturbing  evidence  that 
the  actual  treatment  of  the  men  you  hold  does 
not  support  your  claim  of  hiunane  treatment. 
There  is  evidence  of  men  being  held  in  solitary 
confinement  and  being  subjected  to  physical  and 
mental  duress.  This  most  certainly  does  not  con- 


form to  universally  recognized  humanitarian 
principles.  Your  Government  acceded  to  the 
Geneva  convention  of  1949  on  prisoners  of  war 
and  is  thus  fully  aware  of  the  fundamental 
standards  of  decency  set  forth  in  the  convention, 
standards  which  over  120  governments  through- 
out the  world  have  pledged  to  honor. 

Let  me  also  refer  to  the  charge  you  made  last 
week  that  President  Nixon's  November  3  speech 
was  a  war  speech.^  This,  of  course,  is  a  patent 
distortion. 

The  truth  is  that  in  that  speech  the  President 
pointed  to  the  measures  which  we  have  taken  to 
reduce  our  military  activity  and  presence  in 
Viet-Nam.  He  renewed  the  niunerous  offers  for 
peace  which  we  have  made.  He  pointed  out 
that  we  have  offered  the  complete  withdrawal  of 
all  outside  forces  within  a  year.  He  recalled  that 
we  have  proposed  a  cease-fire  luider  interna- 
tional supervision.  He  referred  to  President 
Thieu's  offer  of  free  elections  under  interna- 
tional supervision.  Your  side  seeks  to  ignore  all 
of  these  elements. 

These  are  but  a  few  examples  of  the  attitude 
which  your  side  has  adopted  at  these  meetings. 
It  is  an  attitude  which  has  made  meaningful 
negotiations  impossible  up  to  this  time. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  objective  of  the 
United  States  remains  a  negotiated  settlement. 
We  are  ready  to  discuss  anything  that  is  brought 
up  seriously  by  your  side.  Frankly,  we  do  not 
consider  your  demands  for  unilateral  action  by 
our  side — ^no  matter  how  they  are  dressed  up — 
to  be  serious  efforts  at  negotiation.  We  do  not 
accept  your  attempts  to  impose  preconditions 
for  negotiations,  such  as  the  overthrow  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Viet-Nam. 

As  President  Nixon  said  in  liis  press  confer- 
ence on  Monday,^  we  are  waiting  for  a  serious 
proposal  from  your  side.  In  the  meantime,  we 
have  a  plan  for  the  orderly  reduction  of  Ameri- 
can forces  in  Viet-Nam  and  for  strengthening 
the  capabilities  of  the  South  Vietnamese  to 
defend  themselves.  President  Nixon  on  Monday 
indicated  that  that  plan  is  going  forward  and 
is  working. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  our  side  poses  no  ob- 
stacle to  full  discussion  of  all  issues  and  all 
proposals.  We  are  ready  for  serious  negotiations 
on  the  basis  of  actions  to  be  taken  on  both  sides. 
The  next  step  is  up  to  you. 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  to  the  Nation  on 
Nov.  3,  see  Buixetin  of  Nov.  24, 19G9,  p.  437. 
'  See  p.  617. 


December  29,   1969 


621 


Our  Continuing  Commitment  to  Western  Europe 


Address  hy  Secretary  Rogers  '■ 


This  audience  is  a  particularly  appropriate 
forum  for  a  brief  discussion  of  certain  policies 
of  the  United  States,  and  I  am  honored  to  be 
here  tonight. 

You  are  well  aware  of  the  steadily  rising  flow 
of  commerce,  of  ideas,  and  of  men  across  the 
Atlantic — the  joining  of  Americans  and  Euro- 
peans in  industrial  and  commercial  enter- 
prises, the  emergence  of  an  Atlantic  market  in 
investment  capital.  About  a  tliird  of  United 
States  world  trade  is  with  "Western  Europe. 
These  developments  since  the  Second  World 
War  have  immensely  deepened  the  bonds  be- 
tween the  Old  World  and  the  New. 

Indeed,  the  expanding  bonds  between  Europe 
and  America  are  among  the  most  significant 
developments  in  world  affairs.  They  are  also  a 
model  of  constructive  international  cooperation. 

It  is  now  nearly  20  years  since  President 
Truman  authorized  a  return  of  United  States 
military  forces  to  Europe  to  join  with  our  allies 
in  creating  a  collective  security  system.  That 
system  has  safeguarded  Europe  ever  since. 
However,  because  there  have  been  great  changes 
in  the  world  since  then,  some  are  asking  wliether 
the  time  has  not  come  for  American  forces  to 
be  brought  back  home. 

The  answer  that  I  can  give  you  tonight  is  no. 
The  judgment  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  is  that  the  commitment  to  NATO  must 
remain  in  force  and  must  remain  strong.  This 
judgment  is  shared  by  the  majority  of  Ameri- 
cans. It  is  clear,  too,  from  our  recent  NATO 
meetings,  that  it  is  shared  by  our  European 
allies. 

As  we  enter  an  era  of  negotiation  both  our 
allies  and  our  adversaries  must  have  no  doubts 
about  our  continuing  commitment  to  Western 


Europe.  And  I  am  happy  tonight  to  be  able 
to  give  you  that  assurance. 

We  recognize  today,  as  we  did  in  1950,  that 
Europe,  more  than  any  other  region  in  the 
world,  is  vital  to  U.S.  security.  In  the  words  of 
the  President:  "We  in  America  continue  to 
consider  Europe's  security  to  be  our  own."  ^  Be- 
cause we  believe  this,  we  intend  to  maintain 
substantial  levels  of  forces  in  Europe  and  we 
have  made  clear  our  intention  to  maintain  our 
combat  forces  in  Europe  at  essentially  present 
levels  until  at  least  the  middle  of  1971. 

But  those  of  mj'  countrymen  who  believe  that 
our  forces  in  Europe  should  be  reduced  argue 
that  Americans  are  shouldering  more  than  their 
fair  share  of  the  total  Western  security  burden. 
They  say  that  a  more  equitable  sharing  of  that 
burden,  taking  into  account  the  added  potential 
of  the  Euro^Dean  allies  in  the  last  decade,  is 
feasible. 

We  recognize  that  our  NATO  allies  spent 
over  $24  billion  for  defense  in  1968  and  that 
they  maintain  more  than  2  million  men  under 
arms.  But  we  also  believe  that  those  in  America 
who  call  for  a  gi-eater  European  contribution  to 
the  costs  of  maintaining  our  common  security 
have  a  point.  It  is  generally  recognized,  not  only 
in  America  but  in  Europe,  that  the  burden  is 
not  now  equitably  shared. 

Progress  in  redressing  that  balance  will  per- 
mit tlie  United  States  to  be  better  able  to  main- 
tain its  own  commitment  of  forces  in  Europe. 
And  progress  is  being  made.  Ten  NATO  na- 
tions have  agreed  to  increase  defense  spending 
substantially  next  year ;  during  the  ministerial 
meeting  a  number  of  countries  agreed  to  expand 
their  air  defense  system;  others  agreed  to  in- 
crease  the   commitment   of   existing  national 


'  Made  before  the  Belgo-American  Association  at 
Brussels,  Belgium,  on  Dec.  6  (press  release  369, 
revised). 


I 


'  For  President  Nixon's  address  at  Washington,  D.C., 
on  Apr.  10,  see  Buixetin  of  Apr.  28,  1969,  p.  351. 


622 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


forces  to  NATO  command.  So  I  think  it  is  fair 
to  say  that  we  are  working  in  harmony  in 
NATO  and  that  NATO  will  be  able  to  main- 
tain peace  in  the  area. 

It  is  quite  clear,  and  recognized  by  all  NATO 
countries,  that  strong  deterrent  forces  are  neces- 
sary for  our  collective  security.  But  we  must 
constantly  seek  to  strengthen  our  security  fur- 
ther by  working  to  eliminate  those  issues  which 
make  for  insecurity. 

We  believe  there  may  be  an  opportunity  now 
to  inaugurate  a  period  of  negotiations  over  these 
issues. 

It  is  important,  however,  that  certain  funda- 
mental principles  must  be  adhered  to  before 
negotiations  begin : 

First,  whatever  kind  of  negotiations  NATO 
allies  enter  into,  individually  or  together,  there 
must  be  the  closest  consultation  among  them. 

Second,  we  must  maintain  the  military 
strength  of  our  alliance  until  such  time  as  we 
may  be  able  to  reach  agreements  on  mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions. 

Third,  we  must  be  careful  not  to  confuse  the 
process  of  negotiation  with  real  progress  to- 
ward agreements,  and  we  must  not  lull  ourselves 
into  a  false  sense  of  detente. 

As  you  know,  the  United  States  has  already 
entered  into  a  number  of  negotiations  and  is 
prepared  to  enter  into  others  as  long  as  there  are 
prospects  for  achieving  meaningful  agreements. 
We  have  felt,  for  example,  that  there  might  be 
prospects  for  useful  negotiations  in  the  arma- 
ments field,  where  mutual  interests  clearly  exist. 

— Witliin  recent  days,  with  ratifications  by 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  and 
signatiire  by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
we  are  close  to  putting  into  effect  the  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Treaty,  the  valuable  product 
of  a  long  process  of  negotiation. 

— The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  agreed,  and  placed  before  the  United  Na- 
tions General  Assembly,  a  draft  treaty  to  ban 
the  emplacement  of  nuclear  weapons  on  the 
ocean  floors,^  as  we  already  have  banned  them 
from  orbit  in  outer  space. 

— ^We  have  been  engaged  for  the  past  3  weeks 
in  the  preliminary  phase  of  strategic  arms  lim- 
itation talks  with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  are  seri- 


ous about  these  strategic  arms  talks.  We  want 
to  put  an  end  to  the  competitive  accumulation 
of  ever  more  sophisticated  weapons  systems 
which  can  no  longer  add  significantly  to  the 
security  of  either  side.  We  want  to  limit,  and  if 
possible  reduce  on  both  sides,  inventories  of 
strategic  weapons.  The  preliminary  talks  in 
Helsinki  have  gotten  off  to  a  good  start.  The 
atmosphere  has  been  businesslike  and  without 
polemics.  We  exj^ect  the  preliminary  round  to 
conclude  in  a  couple  of  weeks,  thereby  provid- 
ing the  basis  for  proceeding  soon  to  substantive 
talks. 

These  steps  to  prevent  the  spread  and  to  curb 
the  level  of  nuclear  armament  necessarily  in- 
volve bilateral  negotiations  between  the  major 
nuclear  powers.  We  will  consult  fully  with  our 
Atlantic  allies,  and  we  will  take  no  steps  which 
would  weaken  their  security— which  is,  after 
all,  our  security. 

At  the  same  time,  the  search  for  solutions  to 
the  political  questions  which  still  divide  Europe 
is  a  fundamental  task  of  the  alliance.  It  is  one 
which  the  allies  have  given  an  importance  equal 
to  the  task  of  military  deterrence.  This  has  been 
consistent  NATO  policy  since  adoption  of  the 
1967  NATO  study  on  the  Future  Tasks  of  the 
Alliance,*  vmdertaken  at  the  suggestion  of  Bel- 
gium's distinguished  Foreign  Minister  Pierre 
Harmel. 

For  many  years  NATO  has  given  serious 
study  to  the  difficult  question  of  how  security  in 
Europe,  now  sustained  by  a  high  balance  of 
armaments,  could  be  maintained  at  a  lower  and 
less  expensive  level  of  arms  on  both  sides.  Since 
June  1968,  it  has  explicitly  stated  its  belief  that 
mutual  force  reductions  could  significantly  con- 
tribute to  lessening  of  tensions. 

Yesterday,  the  NATO  Foreign  Ministers  is- 
sued a  declaration  in  which  they  noted  the  lack 
of  response  to  our  offer  to  work  toward  a  mutual 
and  balanced  reduction  of  forces  on  either  side 
of  the  line  which  still  arbitrarily  and  unnatu- 
rally divides  Europe.^ 

Nevertheless,  in  the  hope  that  at  some  time 
we  might  receive  a  positive  response  from  the 
other  side,  we  have  now  instructed  the  NATO 
authorities  concerned  to  prepare  specific  models 
of  such  reductions  and  have  reaffirmed  our  belief 
that  an  agreement  in  this  field  would  be  an- 
other concrete  step  toward  ending  the  arms  race. 


'  For  text  of  the  Oct.  30  draft  treaty,  see  Bulletin  of 
Dec.  1, 1969,  p.  483. 


*  Bulletin  of  Jan.  8, 1968,  p.  50. 
=  See  p.  628. 


December  29,   1969 


623 


We  hope  that  the  Warsaw  Pact  nations  will  in 
time  indicate  interest  in  this  proposal. 

Meanwhile,  the  three  powers  with  special  re- 
sponsibilities in  Germany  are  seeking  discus- 
sions with  the  Soviet  Union  to  bring  about  an 
improvement  in  the  situation  of  Berlin.  And 
the  Federal  Kepublic  of  Germany  has  taken 
useful  new  initiatives  to  establish  contacts  with 
Eastern  European  states  and  with  Eastern  Ger- 
many in  an  effort  to  surmoimt  obstacles  which 
have  caused  severe  tension  in  the  political  life 
in  Central  Europe  for  a  generation. 

We  will  continue  to  probe  every  available 
opening  that  offers  a  prospect  for  better  East- 
West  relations,  for  the  resolution  of  problems 
large  or  small,  for  greater  security  for  all.  In 
this  the  United  States  will  continue  to  play  an 
active  role  in  concert  with  our  allies. 

The  West  has  taken  many  initiatives  in  the 
searcli  for  lasting  security  in  Europe.  The  allies 
already  have  named  a  number  of  areas  which 
provide  ample  opportunity  for  the  Warsaw  Pact 
to  show  interest  in  constructive  negotiations. 
We  would  welcome,  for  example: 

— A  demonstration  of  Soviet  willingness  to- 
ward improving  the  situation  in  and  around 
Berlin. 

— Constructive  responses  to  the  Federal  Re- 
public's efforts  toward  an  improved  modus  vi- 
vendi  between  the  two  parts  of  Germany  and 
bilateral  agi-eements  on  the  nonuse  of  force. 

— A  positive  Warsaw  Pact  response  to  our  re- 
peated proposals  for  mutual  and  balanced  force 
reductions. 

But  while  NATO  has  identified  issues  on 
which  East  and  West  might  negotiate  to  achieve 
an  increase  in  security  and  a  reduction  in  ten- 
sions, what  has  been  the  Warsaw  Pact's  re- 
sponse? It  has  proposed  a  European  security 
conference  based  on  what  appears  to  be  a  nebu- 
lous and  imprecise  agenda. 

"What  does  the  Soviet  Union  want  to  achieve 
by  proposing  such  a  conference  ? 

Does  it  want  to  deal  realistically  with  the  is- 
sues which  divide  Europe,  or  does  it  seek  to 
ratify  the  existing  division  of  Europe? 

Does  it  intend  to  draw  a  veil  over  its  subjuga- 
tion of  Czechoslovakia  ? 

Does  it  wish  to  use  a  conference  to  strengthen 
its  control  over  the  trade  policies  of  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Warsaw  Pact? 

Docs  it  wish  to  seek  to  retain  the  right  to 
intervene  in  Eastern  Europe  ? 


These  are  questions  that  have  to  be  answered 
before  meaningful  negotiations  can  be  entered 
into. 

We,  of  course,  want  a  better  European  secu- 
rity system  than  the  one  we  have,  if  that  can  be 
found. 

We  want  to  resolve  the  basic  political  issues. 

But  the  Warsaw  Pact  proposals  do  not  deal 
with  these  fimdamental  questions.  What  is  pro- 
posed cannot  properly  be  described  as  a  secu- 
rity conference  at  all.  Tlie  Warsaw  Pact  coun- 
tries have  suggested  merely  (1)  that  a  confer- 
ence discuss  an  East- West  agreement  on  the 
principle  of  nonuse  of  force — which  has  been  a 
basic  principle  of  the  United  Nations  Charter 
for  over  20  years,  so  that  another  pronounce- 
ment of  the  nonuse  of  force  would  have  no 
meaning — and  (2)  increased  trade  and  techni- 
cal exchanges,  for  which  regular  diplomatic 
channels  are  always  available. 

We  are  opposed  in  practice  to  an  unrealistic 
and  premature  exercise  which  could  lead  to  dis- 
appointment and  quite  possibly  a  deterioration 
in  East- West  relations. 

We  woidd  favor  a  negotiation  that  holds  out 
realistic  hope  for  a  reduction  of  tensions  in 
Europe.  But  we  will  not  participate  in  a  con- 
ference wliich  has  the  effect  of  ratifying  or  ac- 
quiescing in  the  Brezhnev  doctrine. 

I  have  referred  several  times  to  the  impor- 
tance of  a  strong  and  healthy  Western  alliance. 
My  NATO  colleagues  and  I  have  just  had  a 
most  successful  ministerial  meeting. 

We  cooperate  not  only  in  common  defense  but 
in  common  search  for  positive  solutions  to  polit- 
ical problems.  I  believe  that  in  the  process  the 
political  arm  of  the  alliance  is  developing  a 
capacity  for  creative  diplomacy  which  is  just 
as  unprecedented  as  the  unity  developed  for 
collective  security. 

There  is  now  yet  another  dimension  of  our 
alliance  which  should  appeal  to  people  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic.  We  have  come  to  recognize 
that  we  had  better  make  certain  that  what  we 
ha^-e  been  defending  has  been  worth  the  effort. 

There  is  an  awakening  in  our  societies  to  the 
degradation  of  our  environment.  The  North 
Atlantic  Council  has  decided  to  work  together 
in  seeking  ways  not  only  to  defend  but  to  im- 
prove our  environment  and  the  quality  of  human 
life  for  our  people.  Next  week,  experts  from  the 
NATO  countries  will  assemble  in  Brussels,  in 
the  first  meeting  of  NATO's  Committee  on  the 
Challenges  of  Modern  Society,  to  launch  tliis 


624 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


constructive  and  creative  new  work  of  the 
alliance. 

I  could  not  leave  Brussels,  the  capital  of  the 
European  Community,  without  noting  that  the 
United  States  welcomes  the  renewed  impetus 
from  The  Hague  this  week  toward  broadening 
and  deepening  the  unification  of  Europe.  We 
see  this  as  a  major  step  toward  realization  of  the 
full  constructive  potential  of  Europe.  An  en- 
larged European  Community  would  reflect  more 
accurately  than  is  now  the  case  the  reality  of 
Europe's  collective  influence  and  potential,  not 
only  in  an  Atlantic  context  but  in  world  affairs 
in  general. 

Let  me  close  now  by  speaking  about  another 
matter  which  is  of  concern  to  many  Europeans. 
Is  the  United  States  in  the  process  of  disen- 
gaging from  its  obligations  to  the  international 
community?  Is  there  a  danger  of  a  growing 
"neoisolationism"  in  the  United  States? 

Here  again,  the  answer  is  no.  It  is  true  that 
there  is  anxiety  on  the  part  of  many  Americans, 
reflected  especially  in  statements  by  Members  of 
the  Congress,  about  what  they  see  as  overex- 
tended American  conunitments  around  the 
world.  There  is  a  growing  sense  of  urgency 
about  the  critical  problems  of  the  cities  at  home 
and  about  the  anachronism  of  pockets  of  pov- 
erty in  the  midst  of  abimdance.  This,  of  course, 
is  reinforced  by  the  problems  stemming  from 
our  commitment  to  the  people  of  the  Kepublic  of 
Viet-Nam.  These  concerns  tend  to  divert  atten- 
tion of  some  of  our  people  away  from  world 
affairs  and  stimulate  a  tendency  to  look  inward. 

It  is  a  fact  that  the  time  has  come  when 
American  "presence"  abroad  will  be  looked  at 
more  critically  in  our  Congress.  The  administra- 
tion, too,  will  continue  to  review  our  policies 
in  the  light  of  current  requirements.  In  Asia,  for 
example,  while  we  fully  intend  to  meet  our  com- 
mitments— and  we  have  treaty  responsibilities 
in  Asia,  and  we  will  meet  them — we  believe  that 
a  greater  share  of  the  burden  of  security  should 
be  assumed  by  Asians. 

It  would,  however,  be  entirely  wrong  to  think 
about  this  as  a  return  to,  or  even  toward,  a  new 
isolationism.  It  is  practical  internationalism 
adapted  to  the  changing  needs  of  our  times. 

In  the  age  of  space  the  American  people  are 
more  aware  than  ever  that  the  world  is  unitary. 
The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  more 
conscious  than  ever  of  the  fact  of  interdepend- 
ence among  nations. 

The  problems  that  we  have  relate  to  our 


desire  to  reduce  our  presence  abroad.  We  have 
no  interest  in  domination.  Wlierever  we  have 
indicated  a  desire  to  reduce  our  presence,  the 
people  affected  have  indicated  that  they  want  us 
to  stay.  The  problem  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  just 
the  reverse.  They  want  to  stay  in  areas  where 
the  people  affected  clearly  prefer  that  they  not 
stay. 

We  believe — and  our  policies  will  continue  to 
be  based  on  the  belief — that  we  must  maintain 
our  active  involvement  in  the  international  com- 
munity as  a  necessary  condition  in  support  of 
world  order  in  the  decades  ahead. 


Secretary  Rogers  Attends 
NATO  Ministerial  Meeting 

Following  is  a  Department  announcement  is- 
sued Noveniber  25,  together  with  a  statement 
made  by  Secretary  Rogers  upon  his  arrival  at 
Bi^ssels  December  2. 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
November  25  (press  release  358)  that  Secretary 
Rogers  would  head  the  United  States  delega- 
tion to  the  ministerial  meeting  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  to  be  held  at 
Brussels,  Belgium,  December  3-5.  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  David  M.  Kennedy  and  Secretary 
of  Defense  Melvin  E.  Laird  accompanied  the 
Secretary.^ 

Following  the  conclusion  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  meeting  on  December  5,  the 
Secretary  will  travel  to  Bonn,  where  he  will 
meet  with  German  Chancellor  Willy  Brandt 
and  Foreign  Minister  Walter  Scheel  and  other 
officials.  He  will  return  to  Brussels  on  Decem- 
ber 6  to  address  the  Belgo- American  Associa- 
tion. On  December  7-8  the  Secretary  will  visit 
Paris,  where  he  will  meet  with  French  President 
Georges  Pompidou,  Prime  Minister  Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas,  and  Foreign  Minister  Maurice 
Schumami,  as  well  as  other  officials  and  with  the 


'  For  names  of  other  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation, 
see  press  release  358. 


December  29,   1969 


625 


United  States  delegation  to  the  Viet-Nam  talks. 
Secretary  of  Defense  Laird  will  participate  in 
the  meeting  with  our  delegation  to  the  Viet- 
Nam  talks.  During  his  initial  stay  ui  Brussels, 
Secretary  Rogers  will  call  on  the  Commission  of 
the  European  Commimities. 


SECRETARY  ROGERS'  ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 
BRUSSELS,   DECEMBER   2 

Press  release  365  dated  December  2 

At  the  beginning  of  this  year  I  visited  Brus- 
sels with  President  Nixon  on  his  first  trip  abroad 
after  his  inauguration.  Stating  then  to  His  Maj- 
esty King  Baudouin  that  "The  peoples  of  our 
two  countries  have  shared  many  things,"  the 
President  recalled  common  past  efforts  as  well 
as  our  shared  aspirations  for  the  future.^  There- 
after, the  President  spoke  again  and  agam,  here 
and  in  the  other  capitals  he  visited,  about  the 
elements  of  European-American  community — 
a  community  of  joint  endeavor  in  a  new  era  of 
allied  consultation. 

My  return  to  Brussels  is  in  that  spirit.  In  the 
days  ahead  my  colleagues  and  I  will  carry  for- 
ward the  vital  consultative  work  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  No  work  of  any 
international  organization,  indeed,  is  more  im- 
portant than  our  work  here  in  the  search  for 
unity  in  peaceful  purpose. 

We  can  all  take  pride  in  the  accomplishments 
of  the  last  two  decades :  We  have  preserved  our 

"  For  remarks  by  King  Baudouin  and  President  Nixon 
made  at  Brussels  on  Feb.  23,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  24, 
1969,  p.  249. 


security,  we  have  kept  the  peace,  and  we  have 
striven  for  agreements  that  would  remove  the 
causes  of  tension  and  mistrust. 

As  NATO  concludes  this  20th  anniversary 
year  and  begins  writing  the  history  of  its  tliird 
decade,  the  commitment  of  the  United  States  to 
the  alliance  and  its  goals  is  midimmished. 

— My  Government  plans  to  continue  to  main- 
tain substantial  forces  in  Europe  and  the  Medi- 
terranean. We  intend  to  do  so  because  a  sound 
defensive  posture  is  indispensable  for  the  alli- 
ance as  we  move  from  an  era  of  confrontation 
into  an  era  of  negotiation. 

— We  also  will  renew  again  at  this  NATO 
meeting  our  commitment  to  seek,  in  closest  con- 
sultation with  our  allies,  accejitable  solutions 
to  the  real  issues  that  divide  East  and  West. 

In  the  words  of  the  Harmel  report,  adopted 
in  1967  following  a  suggestion  of  Belgium's 
distinguished  Foreign  Minister:  "The  chances 
of  success  will  clearly  be  greatest  if  the  Allies 
remain  on  parallel  courses,  especially  in  matters 
of  close  concern  to  them  all.  .  .  ."  ^ 

That  is  why  we  are  here  and  why,  over  20 
years,  American  Secretaries  of  Stat«  have  trav- 
eled each  year  to  Europe  to  attend  NATO 
ministerial  sessions.  For  as  President  Nixon 
said:  ".  .  .  an  alliance  is  not  the  temporary 
pooling  of  selfish  interests;  it  is  a  continuing 
process  of  cooperation,  'a  ship  on  its  passage 
out,  and  not  a  voyage  complete.'  "  * 


'  For  bacliground.  see  Bulletin  of  Jan.  8,  1968,  p.  50. 

'  For  President  Nixon's  remarks  before  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  at  Brussels  on  Feb.  24,  see  Bulletin 
of  Mar.  24, 1969,  p.  250. 


626 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin 


North  Atlantic  Council  Ministerial  Meeting 
Held  at  Brussels 


The  North  Atlantic  Council  held  its  regular 
■ministerial  meeting  at  Brussels  December  Ji.-6. 
Following  are  texts  of  the  final  communique 
and  declaration  issued  at  the  close  of  the  meet- 
ing onDecernberS. 


Press  release  370  dated  December  5 

TEXT  OF  FINAL  COMMUNIQUE 

1.  The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in  Minis- 
terial Session  at  Brussels  on  4th  and  5th  Decem- 
ber, 1969.  The  meeting  was  attended  by  Foreign, 
Defence  and  Finance  Ministers. 

2.  Since  the  signing  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  twenty  years  ago,  the  members  of  the 
Alliance  have  dedicated  their  efforts  to  the 
preservation  of  their  freedom  and  security  and 
to  the  improvement  of  East- West  relations  in 
the  aim  of  reaching  an  ultimate  peaceful  solu- 
tion of  outstanding  problems  in  Europe.  They 
will  continue  to  do  so. 

3.  By  approving  in  December  1967  the  Ke- 
port  on  the  Future  Tasks  of  the  Alliance,^  the 
Allied  Governments  resolved  to  maintain  ade- 
quate military  strength  and  political  solidarity 
to  deter  aggression  and  other  forms  of  pressure 
and  to  defend  the  territoiy  of  member  coun- 
tries if  aggression  should  occur;  and  to  examine 
suitable  policies  designed  to  achieve  a  just  and 
stable  order  in  Europe,  to  overcome  the  division 
of  Germany  and  to  foster  European  security. 

4.  On  the  basis  of  these  two  concepts  of  de- 
fence and  the  relaxation  of  tensions,  the 
Ministers  issued  the  Declaration  attached  to 
this  Coimnunique  in  which  tliey  set  forth  their 
views  on  the  future  development  of  relations 
between  Eastern  and  Western  countries. 

5.  JNIinisters  welcomed  the  opening  of  Stra- 
tegic Arms  Limitation  Talks.  They  acknowl- 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Jan,  8,  1968,  p.  50. 


edged  the  work  in  progress  with  regard  to  arms 
control  on  the  sea  bed,  as  well  as  the  interest 
shown  both  by  the  Conference  of  the  Committee 
on  Disarmament  and  the  United  Nations  in 
measures  to  deal  with  chemical  and  biological 
warfare.  On  all  these  questions  the  Council  held 
detailed  consultations  which  proved  most  useful 
in  preparing  the  ground  for  the  negotiations 
taking  place  elsewhere.  The  Ministers  invited 
the  Council  in  Permanent  Session  to  continue 
to  examine  these  problems,  and  reaffirmed  the 
importance  of  any  genuine  disarmament  meas- 
ure, consistent  with  the  security  of  all  states 
and  guaranteed  by  adequate  international  con- 
trol, for  the  reduction  of  tension  and  the  con- 
solidation of  peace  in  Europe  and  the  world. 

6.  The  Ministers  also  studied  a  report  by  the 
Secretary  General  on  the  situation  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. Recalling  the  Communiques  issued 
on  27th  June,  1968  and  16th  November,  1968, 
the}'  expressed  the  concern  of  their  Governments 
with  regard  to  the  situation  in  that  area.  The 
]\Iinisters  reaffirmed  the  value  of  full  consulta- 
tions among  the  Allies  on  tliis  question.  Accord- 
ingly, they  requested  the  Council  in  Permanent 
Session  to  pursue  with  the  greatest  attention  its 
examination  of  the  situation  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean and  to  report  to  Ministers  at  their  Spring 
Meeting. 

7.  In  April  1969,  Ministers  called  attention  to 
the  role  the  Alliance  might  play  in  tackling 
common  environmental  problems  that  could  im- 
peril the  welfare  and  progress  of  modern  socie- 
ties. Consequently,  the  Council  in  Permanent 
Session  established  a  Committee  on  the  Chal- 
lenges of  Modern  Society.  The  new  Committee, 
begimiing  with  its  first  meeting  on  8th  Decem- 
ber, will  address  these  urgent  problems  with  the 
aim  of  stimulating  action  by  members  of  the 
Alliance,  either  singly,  jointly  or  in  interna- 
tional organizations.  The  Ministers  at  their 
Spring  Meeting  will  receive  the  Committee's 


December  29,   1969 


627 


first  report  on  the  newest  task  of  the  Alliance. 

8.  Ministers  of  countries  participating  in 
NATO's  integrated  defence  programme  met  as 
the  Defence  Planning  Committee  on  3rd  Decem- 
ber, 1969.  As  an  introduction  to  their  discussions 
the  Secretary  General  and  the  Chairman  of  the 
Military  Committee  gave  overall  appraisals  of 
the  state  of  defence  planning  within  the  Alli- 
ance. Ministers  thereafter  reviewed  the  work  ac- 
complished since  their  previous  meetmg  on  28tli 
May,  1969,  and  gave  directions  for  ftiture  work. 

9.  They  agreed  that  the  effectiveness  of 
NATO's  defensive  posture  continues  to  be  an 
essential  stabilising  factor  in  support  of  the 
search  for  meaningful  detente.  Therefore,  until 
agreement  can  be  reached  on  East -West  mutual 
force  reductions,  balanced  in  scope  and  timing 
so  as  to  maintain  the  present  degree  of  security, 
NATO  will  continue  to  ensure  that  there  is  no 
reduction  in  its  overall  military  capability. 

10.  In  reviewing  Force  Plans  for  1970,  Min- 
isters were  conscious  of  the  necessity  to  maintain 
adequate  and  readily  available  forces  both  con- 
ventional and  nuclear,  in  accordance  with  the 
NATO  strategy,  for  the  defence  of  the  main- 
land of  Europe  and  the  whole  NATO  area.  They 
took  note  of  the  i^ositive  outcome  of  consulta- 
tions with  the  Canadian  Authorities,  concerning 
their  forces  for  NATO,  which  were  initiated 
following  the  Defence  Planning  Committee 
meeting  of  28th  May,  1969.  Ministers  committed 
forces  for  the  year  1970  and  endorsed  a  number 
of  remedial  measures  necessary  to  maintain  ade- 
quate forces  in  Central  Europe ;  in  addition  fur- 
ther remedial  measures  are  under  consideration. 

11.  They  discussed  measures  required  to  im- 
plement the  NATO  strategy  of  forward  defence 
based  on  flexibility  in  response,  and  arrange- 
ments for  the  reinforcement,  in  times  of  tension, 
of  NATO's  ready  forces.  They  also  noted  a  pre- 
liminary report  on  a  comprehensive  study  which 
is  bemg  undertaken  of  the  relative  capabilities 
of  the  forces  of  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact 
and  gave  instructions  for  the  continuance  of  the 
study.  In  addition.  Ministers  reviewed  the  status 
of  other  defence  planning  studies  including 
those  for  improved  defence  of  the  flanks. 

12.  The  Ministerial  Meeting  also  provided 
the  Defence  Ministers  comprising  the  Nuclear 
Defence  Affairs  Committee  (Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Norway,  Portugal,  Turkey,  the  United  King- 
dom and  the  United  States)  with  the  occasion 
to  review  work  in  progress  in  the  Nuclear  Plan- 


ning Group  during  the  past  year  and  planned 
for  the  future.  The  Nuclear  Defence  Affairs 
Committee  agreed  that  Canada,  Germany, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Turkey,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States  ^vill  compose 
the  Nuclear  Planning  Group  starting  1st  Janu- 
ary, 1970. 

13.  Acting  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Nu- 
clear Defence  Affairs  Committee,  the  Defence 
Planning  Committee  adopted  two  policy  docu- 
ments originated  by  the  Nuclear  Planning 
Group  at  their  meeting  in  the  United  States 
last  November  concerning  general  guidelines 
for  nuclear  consultation  procedure  and  for  the 
possible  tactical  use  of  nuclear  weapons  in  de- 
fence of  the  Treaty  area.  These  documents  are 
based  upon  NATO's  strategy  of  flexibility  in 
response  wliich  was  adopted  in  December  1967 
and  which  remains  unchanged. 

14.  The  next  Ministerial  Meeting  of  the  De- 
fence Planning  Committee  will  take  place  in 
the  Spring  of  1970. 

15.  The  Spring  Ministerial  Meeting  of  the 
Council  will  be  held  in  Italy  on  26th  and  27th 
May,  1970. 


TEXT  OF   DECLARATION 

1.  Meeting  at  Brussels  on  4th  and  5tli  December, 
1969,  tUe  Ministers  of  the  Nortli  Atlantic  Alliance  re- 
affirmed the  commitment  of  their  nations  to  pursue 
effective  policies  directed  towards  a  greater  relaxation 
of  tensions  in  their  continuing  search  for  a  just  and 
durable  peace. 

2.  Peace  and  security  in  Europe  must  rest  upon 
universal  respect  for  the  principles  of  sovereign  equal- 
ity, political  independence  and  the  territorial  integrity 
of  each  European  state ;  the  right  of  its  peoples  to 
shape  their  own  destinies ;  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
disputes ;  nonintervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any 
state  by  any  other  state,  whatever  their  political  or 
social  system :  and  the  renunciation  of  the  use  of  the 
threat  of  force  against  any  state.  Past  experience  has 
shown  that  there  is,  as  yet,  no  common  interpretation 
of  these  principles.  The  fundamental  prol)lems  in 
Europe  can  be  solved  only  on  the  basis  of  these  prin- 
ciples and  any  real  and  lasting  improvement  of  East- 
West  relations  presupposes  respect  for  them  without 
any  conditions  or  reservations. 

3.  At  their  meeting  in  Washington  in  April  1969, 
Ministers  had  expressed  the  intention  of  their  govern- 
ments to  explore  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  other 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  which  concrete  issues  best 
lend  themselves  to  fruitful  negotiation  and  an  early 
resolution.  To  this  end,  the  Council  has  been  engaged 
in  a  detailed  study  of  various  issues  for  exploration 
and  possible  negotiation.  Ministers  recognized  that 
procedure  merited  closer  examination  and,  accordingly, 


( 


628 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


I 


icriuested  the  Council  in  Permanent  Session  to  report 
to  the  next  Ministerial  Meeting. 

4.  Ministers  considered  that,  in  an  era  of  negotiation, 
it  should  be  possible,  by  means  of  discussion  of  specific 
and  well-defined  subjects,  progressively  to  reduce  ten- 
sions. This  would  in  itself  facilitate  discussion  of  the 
more  fundamental  questions. 


Arms   Control   and   Disarmament 

5.  Ministers  again  expressed  the  interest  of  the 
Alliance  in  arms  control  and  disarmament  and  recalled 
the  Declaration  on  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions adopted  at  Eeylijavik  in  196S  and  reaffirmed  in 
Washington  in  I960.''  The  Members  of  the  Alliance  have 
noted  that  up  to  now  this  suggestion  has  led  to  no  re- 
sult. The  Allies,  nevertheless,  have  continued,  and  will 
continue,  their  studies  in  order  to  prepare  a  realistic 
basis  for  active  exploration  at  an  early  date  and 
thereby  establish  whether  it  could  serve  as  a  starting 
point  for  fruitful  negotiations.  They  requested  that  a 
report  of  the  Council  in  Permanent  Session  on  the  prep- 
aration of  models  for  mutual  and  balanced  force  re- 
ductions be  submitted  as  soon  as  possible. 

6.  Ministers  of  countries  participating  in  NATO's  in- 
tegrated defence  programme  consider  that  the  studies 
on  mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions  have  pro- 
gressed sufficiently  to  permit  the  establishment  of 
certain  criteria  which,  in  their  view,  such  reductions 
should  meet.  Significant  reductions  under  adequate 
verification  and  control  would  be  envisaged  under  any 
agreement  on  mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions, 
which  should  also  be  consistent  with  the  vital  security 
interests  of  all  parties.  This  would  be  another  concrete 
step  in  advancing  "along  the  road  of  ending  the  arms 
race  and  of  general  and  complete  disarmament, 
including  nuclear  disarmament". 

7.  These  Ministers  directed  that  further  studies 
sluiuld  be  given  to  measures  which  could  accompany  or 
follow  agreement  on  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions. Such  measures  could  include  advance  notification 
of  military  movements  and  manoeuvres,  exchange  of 
oliservers  at  military  manoeuvres  and  possibly  the  es- 
tablishment of  observation  posts.  Examination  of  the 
tfcliniques  and  methods  of  inspection  should  also  be 
further  developed. 


Germany  and   Berlin 

8.  The  Ministers  welcome  the  efforts  of  the  govern- 
ments of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  France, 
iii  tile  frameworli  of  their  special  responsibility  for 
lUrlin  and  Germany  as  a  whole,  to  gain  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Soviet  Union  in  improving  the  situation  with 
respect  to  Berlin  and  free  access  to  the  city.  The  elimi- 
nation of  difficulties  created  in  the  past  with  respect  to 
Berlin,  especially  with  regard  to  access,  would  increase 
tlie  prospects  for  serious  discussions  on  the  other  con- 
crete issues  which  continue  to  divide  East  and  West. 
Furthermore,  Berlin  could  play  a  constructive  role  in 
the  expansion  of  East-West  economic  relations  if  the 
city's  trade  with  the  East  could  be  facilitated. 


'  For  background,   see  Bulletin  of  July  15,  1968, 
p.  77,  and  Apr.  28, 1969,  p.  355. 


9.  A  just  and  lasting  jieace  settlement  for  Germany 
must  be  based  on  the  free  decision  of  the  German  people 
and  on  the  interests  of  European  security.  The  Minis- 
ters are  convinced  that,  pending  such  a  settlement,  the 
proposals  of  tlie  Federal  Republic  for  a  modus  Vivendi 
between  the  two  parts  of  Germany  and  for  a  bilateral 
exchange  of  declarations  on  the  non-use  of  force  or 
the  threat  of  force  would,  if  they  receive  a  positive  re- 
sponse, substantially  facilitate  co-operation  between 
East  and  West  on  other  problems.  They  consider  that 
these  efforts  by  the  Federal  Republic  represent  con- 
structive steps  toward  relaxation  of  tension  in  Europe 
and  express  the  hope  that  tlie  governments  will  there- 
fore take  them  into  account  in  forming  their  own  atti- 
tude toward  the  German  question. 

10.  The  Ministers  would  regard  concrete  progress  in 
both  these  fields  as  an  important  contribution  to  peace 
in  Europe.  They  are  bound  to  attach  great  weight  to  the 
responses  to  these  proposals  in  evaluating  the  prospects 
for  negotiations  looking  toward  improved  relations  and 
co-operation  in  Europe. 


Economic,  technical  and   cultural   exchanges 

11.  Allied  governments  consider  that  not  only  eco- 
nomic and  technical  but  also  cultural  exchanges  be- 
tween interested  countries  can  bring  mutual  benefit  and 
understanding.  In  these  fields  more  could  be  achieved 
by  freer  movement  of  people,  ideas  and  Information  be- 
tween the  countries  of  East  and  West. 

12.  The  benefit  of  the  Alliance's  work  in  the  field  of 
human  environment  would  be  enhanced  If  it  were  to 
become  the  basis  of  broader  co-operation.  This  could, 
and  should,  be  an  early  objective,  being  one  in  which 
the  Warsaw  Pact  governments  have  indicated  an  in- 
terest. Further  co-operation  could  also  be  undertaken, 
for  example,  in  the  more  specialized  field  of  oceanog- 
raphy. More  intensive  efforts  in  such  fields  should  be 
pursued  either  bilaterally,  multilaterally  or  in  the 
framework  of  existing  international  bodies  comprising 
interested  countries. 


Perspectives  for  negotiations 

13.  The  Ministers  considered  that  the  concrete  issues 
concerning  European  security  and  co-operation  men- 
tioned in  this  Declaration  are  subjects  lending  them- 
selves to  possible  discussions  or  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  other  countries  of  Eastern  Europe. 
The  Allied  governments  will  continue  and  intensify 
their  contacts,  discussions  or  negotiations  through  all 
appropriate  channels,  bilateral  or  multilateral,  believ- 
ing that  progress  is  most  likely  to  be  achieved  by  choos- 
ing in  each  instance  the  means  most  suitable  for  the 
subject.  Ministers  therefore  expressed  their  support  for 
bilateral  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  German  Federal 
Government  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  countries 
of  Eastern  Europe,  looking  toward  agreements  on  the 
renunciation  of  force  and  the  threat  of  force.  Ministers 
expressed  the  hope  that  existing  contacts  will  be  devel- 
oped so  as  to  enable  all  countries  concerned  to  partici- 
pate in  discussions  and  negotiations  on  substantial 
problems  of  co-operation  and  security  in  Europe  with 
real  prospects  of  success. 

14.  The  Members  of  the  Alliance  remain  receptive 


December  29,   1969 

371-595—70 2, 


629 


to  signs  of  willinKTiPSS  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  other  Eastern  European  countries  to  discuss  meas- 
ures to  reduce  tension  and  promote  co-operation  in 
Europe  and  to  false  constructive  actions  to  this  end. 
They  have  noted  in  this  connection  references  made  by 
these  countries  to  the  possibility  of  holding  an  early 
conference  on  European  security.  Ministers  agreed  that 
careful  advance  preparation  and  prospects  of  concrete 
results  would  in  any  ca.se  be  essential.  Ministers  con- 
sider that,  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  approach,  prog- 
ress In  the  bilateral  and  multilateral  discussions  and 
negotiations  which  have  already  begun,  or  could  begin 
shortly,  and  which  relate  to  fundamental  problems  of 
European  security,  would  make  a  major  contribution 
to  improving  the  political  atmosphere  in  Europe.  Prog- 
ress in  these  discussions  and  negotiations  would  help  to 
ensure  the  success  of  any  eventual  conference  in  which, 
of  course,  the  North  American  members  of  the  Alliance 
would  participate,  to  discuss  and  negotiate  substantial 
problems  of  co-operation  and  security  in  Europe. 

15.  The  Ministers  affirmed  that,  in  considering  all 
constructive  possibilities,  including  a  general  confer- 
ence or  conferences,  they  will  wish  to  assure  that  any 
such  meeting  should  not  serve  to  ratify  the  present 
division  of  Europe  and  should  be  the  result  of  a  com- 
mon effort  among  all  interested  countries  to  tackle  the 
problems  which  separate  them. 


Four  Powers  Resume  Consultations 
on  the  Middle  East 

Joint  Communiqxie  ^ 

The  Permanent  Eepresentatives  to  the  United 
Nations  of  France,  the  U.S.S.R.,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States  resumed  on 
December  2,  1969,  their  consultations  on  the 
question  of  contributing  to  a  peaceful  political 
settlement  in  the  Middle  East. 

They  confirmed  that  they  regard  the  situa- 


tion in  the  Middle  East  as  increasingly  serious 
and  urgent  and  reaffirmed  their  conviction  that 
this  situation  must  not  be  permitted  to  jeopard- 
ize international  peace  and  security. 

Their  objective  remains  unchanged — to  pro- 
mote the  establishment  of  lasting  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  through  supporting  Security  Coun- 
cil Resolution  242  of  November  22, 1967,  which 
should  be  carried  out  in  all  its  parts.=  They  are 
also  acting  pursuant  to  the  statement  made  by 
the  four  Foreign  Ministers  at  their  meeting  with 
tlie  Secretary  General  on  the  20th  of  Septem- 
ber 1969. 

They  expressed  their  readiness  to  consider  at 
their  meetings  specific  questions  concerning  the 
implementation  of  this  resolution  in  all  its  as- 
pects as  a  "package  deal"  relating  to  the  entire 
region  of  conflict  in  the  ]\Iiddle  East. 

Bearing  these  agreed  aims  in  mind,  the 
Permanent  Representatives  wish  to  assist  the 
Secretary  General's  Special  Representative  to 
resume  as  soon  as  possible  his  task  of  promoting 
agreement  and  assisting  efforts  to  achieve  a 
peaceful  and  accepted  settlement  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  and  principles  of  Security 
Council  Resolution  242. 

The  Permanent  Representatives  will  pursue 
their  endeavors  with  all  possible  speed.  The 
next  meeting  of  the  four  will  be  on  Saturday, 
December  6,  at  the  residence  of  the  French 
Ambassador. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  at  New  York,  N.Y.,  on 
Dec.  2  by  Charles  W.  Tost,  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations  (U.S./U.N.  press  release  184). 

^  For  text  of  the  resolution,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  18, 
1967,  p.  843. 


630 


I 


Department  of  Slate   Bulletin 


lA-ECOSOC  Special  Committee  Meets  at  Washington 


A  meeting  of  the  Special  Committee  of  the 
Inter-American  Economic  and  Social  Council 
convened  at  Washington  on  November  17.  Fol- 
lowing is  a  statement  made  before  the  meeting 
on  November  18  by  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Inter-American  Affairs  Charles  A.  Meyer,  U.S. 
Representative  and  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation, 
together  with  a  Department  announcement  on 
the  meeting. 


STATEMENT  BY  MR.  MEYER 

Welcome  to  Washington. 

First,  a  clarification  which  may  appear 
merely  semantic  but  which  I  mean  to  be  truly 
substantive:  When  in  these  remarks  I  use  the 
first  person  plural — "we"  or  "our" — I  mean 
"all  of  us"  together. 

For  it  is  in  that  spirit  of  "all  of  us"  that 
the  U.S.  delegation  which  I  hare  the  honor  to 
head  has  approached  and  looked  forward  to 
this  moment,  to  this  unique  and  special  and 
really  historic  meeting  of  lA-ECOSOC.  My 
delegation  recognizes  this  meeting  as  an  op- 
portunity for  a  true  demonstration  of  part- 
nership within  the  inter-American  system. 

This  special  meeting,  which  took  form  within 
that  system  and  which  is  the  product  of  that 
system,  has  been  preceded  by  a  series  of  signifi- 
cant events.  Chronologically,  they  have  been: 

— The  preparation  of  the  Consensus  of  Vina 
del  Mar ; 

— The  reference  of  the  consensus  to  the  inter- 
American  system  at  the  June  meeting  of  lA- 
ECOSOC  in  Trinidad;^ 

— The  presentation  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  by  Governor  Rockefeller  of  rec- 
ommendations for  actions  bv  the  U.S.  Govern- 


ment to  cooperate  in  the  improvement  of  the 
quality  of  life  in  the  Western  Hemisphere ; 

— Pi-esident  ^^ixon's  October  31  speech,^ 
which  advocated  a  new,  more  balanced,  more 
mature  partnership  among  us  and  which  an- 
nounced certain  immediate  actions  by  the 
United  States  Government  and  described  cer- 
tain proposals  for  our  joint  action  so  as  to  give 
real  substance  to  the  concept  of  partnership  for 
development. 

This  is  not  a  political  meeting.  This  is  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Americas  from  which  will  emerge, 
my  delegation  hopes,  some  specific  decisions 
jointly  taken  for  immediate  action  in  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  sphere  and  in  other  recom- 
mendations to  our  several  governments  which 
will  lead  to  further  actions  for  continued 
development. 

We  are  here  to  act  on  the  most  effective  ap- 
proaches to  development  that  time,  people, 
and  available  resources,  public  and  private,  can 
support. 

Right  here,  I  want  to  state  the  position  of  my 
President,  his  Government,  and  his  delegation. 

President  Nixon  is  dedicated  to  this  hemi- 
sphere, to  the  Americas.  His  speech  of  Octo- 
ber 31  and  his  additional  remarks  of  Novem- 
ber 10  reflect  the  dominant  thesis  which  runs 
through  the  Consensus  of  Viiia  del  Mar,  which 
runs  through  the  Rockefeller  report  (and  the 
report  will  continue  to  be  a  valuable  resource, 
due  in  large  part  to  the  contributions  made  by 
so  many  of  you  who  gave  your  time  and  your 
effort  so  generously  to  the  Rockefeller  mission), 
and  which  runs  through  the  policy  deliberations 
of  this  administration.^  That  thesis,  simple  in 
itself  but  great  in  its  implications,  is  that  we 


^  For  a  statement  by  Mr.  Meyer  made  before  the 
ministerial  meeting  of  lA-ECOSOC  at  Port-of-Spain 
on  June  23,  see  Bulletin  of  July  14,  1969,  p.  21. 


-  Bulletin  of  Nov.  17,  1969,  p.  409. 

°  For  tests  of  President  Nixon's  statement  on  Nov. 
10  and  the  Rockefeller  Report  on  Quality  of  Life  in 
the  Americas,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  S,  1969,  pp.  493 
and  495. 


December  29,   1969 


631 


liave  to  plan  together,  to  Avork  together,  and  to 
move  f  oi'ward  together. 

Second,  my  Government  is  aware  of  progress 
already  made  among  us,  even  though  those 
strides  have  not  been  nearly  great  enough  and 
have  been  accompanied  from  time  to  time  by 
frictions  and  recriminations.  There  has  been  a 
general  strengthening  of  the  inter-American 
sj'stem,  the  birth  and  dramatic  growth  of  the 
IDB  [Inter- American  Development  Banlc], 
tlie  reform  of  tlie  OAS  Charter,  the  emergence 
of  CIAP  [Inter- American  Committee  on  the 
Alliance  for  Progress]  and  CECIC  [Executive 
Committee  of  the  Inter-American  Cultural 
Council],  the  positive  effects  of  the  Alliance  for 
Progress,  the  accomplishments  of  subregions 
and  individual  American  nations  in  a  relatively 
short  span  of  10  years.  All  of  these  provide  a 
base  from  which  we  can  advance  together.  I 
suggest  that  all  of  us  now  have  a  more  solid 
base  for  advancing  than  we  had  at  the  start  of 
this  decade. 

Third,  my  Govermnent  is  convinced  that  the 
nations  of  Latin  America,  not  the  United  States, 
must  decide  the  road  to  economic  and  social  de- 
velopment which  thej'  want  to  follow.  The 
American  nations,  true  to  their  own  cultures, 
their  own  personalities,  their  own  dynamics, 
must  direct  tlieir  own  destinies.  The  United 
States,  by  its  actions  and  its  initiatives,  can 
help  remove  obstacles  or  create  opportunities, 
but  only  Latin  American  actions  and  initiatives 
can  take  advantage  of  them.  As  President  Nixon 
said,  the  cardinal  pi-inciple  for  the  United 
States  is  that  it  will  support,  not  direct. 

The  fourth  point  I  wish  to  stress  concerns 
the  substance  of  the  U.S.  position  at  this 
meeting. 

President  Nixon  has  already  indicated  that 
the  United  States  will  press  for  a  liberal  system 
of  generalized  tariff  preferences  to  be  extended 
bj'  all  developed  countries  to  all  developing 
countries,  including  those  in  Latin  America.  I 
can  tell  you  that  the  United  States  Kcpresenta- 
tive  in  the  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development]  has  just  in  the 
last  few  days  made  a  presentation  of  the  United 
States  position  faithfully  reflecting  the  Presi- 
dent's statement.  We  have  strongly  urged  all  the 
industrialized  nations  to  adopt  a  liberal  scheme ; 
that  is,  one  in  which  preference  duties  would  be 
set  at  zero,  with  coverage  on  a  broad  product 


list,    and    without    ceilings    on    preferential 
imports. 

If  it  develops  that  a  generalized  preference 
system  cannot  be  negotiated  within  a  reason- 
able time,  the  United  States  will  be  prepared  to 
consider  alternative  ways  to  assure  that  Latin 
America  will  enjoy  preferential  access  to  the 
United  States  market. 

My  Government  also  intends  to  take  the  lead 
in  international  forums  in  seeking  to  reduce 
some  of  the  nontariff  barriers  maintained  by 
industrialized  countries,  including  the  United 
States,  that  affect  Latin  ^Vmerica's  opportunities 
to  export.  We  are  now  preparing  a  specific  nego- 
tiating program.  In  addition,  there  are  steps 
that  the  United  States  is  pi-epared  to  take  uni- 
laterally, subject  to  congressional  approval,  in 
reducing  its  import  tarifi's  on  some  products  of 
export  interest  to  Latin  America  and  other  de- 
veloping countries.  My  delegation  is  prepared 
to  discuss  with  you  certain  liberalization  meas- 
ures, with  reciprocity,  affecting  trade  in  fruits 
and  vegetables  in  which  Latin  America  and  the 
United  States  have  mutual  interest.  Finally, 
it  would  like  to  discuss  with  3'ou  the  possibility 
of  developing  a  vehicle  within  the  inter- 
American  system  for  consulting  in  advance  of 
taking  action,  instead  of  after,  whenever  any 
of  us  is  contemplating  trade  policy  initiatives 
that  might  prejudice  the  trade  interests  of  other 
members  of  the  system. 

Latin  America's  ability  to  develop  export 
competence  in  new  products  on  world  markets 
is  in  many  ways  linked  to  the  progress  of  its  re- 
gional economic  integration  process.  Presi- 
dent Nixon  has  stated  that  the  decisions  on 
how  far  and  how  fast  this  integration  process 
should  go  are  not,  of  course,  for  the  United 
States  to  make.  The  United  States  does 
stand  ready  to  provide  assistance  to  regional 
and  subregional  groups  if  our  help  is  needed 
and  requested.  I  should  also  point  out  that 
the  "untying''  that  President  Nixon  has 
ordered  in  our  AID  development  assistance, 
to  permit  procurement  with  AID  loans  any- 
where in  Latin  America,  should  provide 
new  opportunities  for  intra-Latin  American 
trade.  As  a  further  measure,  we  are  taking 
comparable  untying  measures  under  extended 
risk  guarantees.  Our  Government  is  also  ex- 
amining additional  modifications  in  our  AID 
regulations  that  could  facilitate,  if  only  mod- 
estly, intraregional  trade. 


i 


632 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


i. 


I  have  no  particular  prescription  to  advance 
in  those  important  areas  of  internal  organiza- 
tion and  mobilization  of  resources  to  promote 
production  for  export.  I  recognize,  nevertheless, 
that  how,  how  much,  and  to  whom  the  U.S.A. 
provides  development  assistance  inevitablj'  be- 
comes involved  in  these  important  considera- 
tions. 

President  Nixon  has  proposed — and  I  now 
propose  to  the  committee — that  the  nations  of 
the  hemisphere  develop  an  inter-American  en- 
tity which  could  be  given  an  increasing  share 
of  responsibility  for  decisions  on  development 
assistance  in  the  hemisphere.  Tliis  coiild  be 
achieved  either  through  adaptuig  an  existmg 
inter- American  mstitution  or  the  development 
of  a  new  one.  The  objective  would  be  to  evolve 
over  time  a  multilateral  framework  that  would 
eventually  be  given  major  operational  and  de- 
cisiomnakmg  responsibilities  with  reference  to 
development  assistance.  We  make  this  proposal 
in  the  belief  that  it  responds  to  Latin  American 
desires.  How  it  progresses  and  what  form  it 
takes  are  matters  for  all  the  nations  of  the 
Americas,  not  only  for  the  United  States,  to 
decide.  I  look  forward  to  the  discussion  of  this 
subject  in  our  deliberations. 

We  are  conscious,  too,  that  one  camiot  arrive 
at  sound  decisions  with  regard  to  development 
assistance  without  taking  into  consideration 
Latin  America's  concern  over  heavy  debt  serv- 
ice problems  which  burden  so  many  of  the 
developing  countries  of  the  area.  Ad  hoc  re- 
scheduling in  the  past  has  been  cumbersome  and 
complex  and  may  often  have  been  damaging  to 
a  country's  credit  standing.  The  United  States 
can  see  merit  in  a  systematic  study  of  tliis  prob- 
lem and  the  development  of  objective  criteria 
for  carrying  forward  orderly  debt  relief  pro- 
cedures. As  President  Nixon  stated  on  Novem- 
ber 10,  he  has  already  directed  an  immediate 
study  of  certain  specific  measures  in  this  area. 

Any  discussion  of  resource  mobilization  for 
development  will  be  incomplete  without  some 
consideration  of  the  role  of  private  investment, 
both  domestic  and  foreign.  Cognizant  of  the 
importance  of  public  sector  bilateral  and  multi- 
lateral assistance  to  Latin  American  develop- 
ment efforts,  the  United  States  will  continue 
and  strengthen  where  possible  its  existing  pro- 
li'rams  in  the  public  sector.  My  Government  be- 
lieves, however,  that  both  private  and  public 
sector  efforts  are  essential  to  development.  It  re- 


gards foreign  private  investment  as  a  necessary 
complement  to  a  developuig  comitry's  own 
efforts  and  to  external  public  sector  assistance. 
At  the  same  time,  it  recognizes  that  each  nation 
must  make  its  own  decisions  as  to  the  role  to  be 
played  in  its  economic  and  social  development 
by  private  investment,  both  domestic  and 
foreign.  The  United  States  nevertheless  is  pre- 
pared to  give  special  emphasis,  where  it  is 
desired,  in  its  development  assistance  programs 
to  channeling  resources  to  Latin  America's  pri- 
vate sectors.  My  delegation  is  also  prepared  to 
explore  with  you  whether  new  multilateral  in- 
struments to  channel  resources  to  the  private 
sector  could  be  useful.  Moreover,  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  extend  technical  assistance 
to  help  in  the  establishment  of  national  and 
regional  capital  markets  that  could  play  a  major 
role  in  channeling  domestic  savings  into  pro- 
duction for  export. 

jNIy  delegation  invites  you  to  join  with  us  in 
exploring  ways  in  which  we  could  jointly  un- 
dertake and  finance  initiatives  to  help  upgrade 
the  scientific  and  teclinical  capabilities  of  the 
area. 

Some  of  the  matters  our  delegation  would  like 
to  discuss  are : 

— Increased  cooperation  in  regional  science 
programs  and  training  centers; 

— Expanded  efforts  in  basic  and  applied  food 
research ; 

— Cooperation  in  research  and  planning  in 
urban  problems; 

— Strengthening  of  an  inter-American  ex- 
change program  in  science  and  technology  and, 
more  generally,  fullest  possible  cooperation  be- 
tween the  scientific  agencies  of  our  governments. 

We  could  also  discuss  ways  in  wliich  new 
emphasis  could  be  given  to  the  field  of  export 
promotion.  In  this  terribly  competitive  world 
it  is  not  enough  to  have  access  to  world  markets, 
nor  is  it  enough  to  be  able  to  produce  goods 
the  market  wants  at  a  price  the  market  is  will- 
ing to  pay ;  by  and  large,  the  name  of  the  game 
is  selling.  The  United  States  is  prepared  to  con- 
sider increased  technical  assistance  to  programs 
designed  to  promote  Latin  American  export 
trade  expansion. 

In  this  connection,  it  would  be  worth  paying 
special  attention  to  an  export  field  in  which 
Latin  America  has,  I  believe,  great  expansion 
possibilities  because  it  really  has  something  to 


December  29,  1969 


633 


sell.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  field  of  tourism. 
This,  I  believe,  is  the  real  export  growth  indus- 
try of  the  seventies  and  one  in  which  Latin 
America  has  many  outstanding  competitive  ad- 
vantages. The  inter- American  system  may  wish 
to  set  a  joint  goal  of  establishing  a  "Year  of 
the  Americas"  in  the  near  future  as  a  focus 
for  developmental  and  promotional  activities 
designed  to  achieve  a  continentwide  explosion, 
if  you  will,  in  tourism. 

The  United  States  delegation  is  prepared  to 
discuss  with  you  in  depth  and  in  detail  the 
positions  set  down  in  the  Consensus  of  Viiia 
del  Mar  and  invites  similar  discussion  of  posi- 
tions the  U.S.  delegation  will  present.  Through 
such  discussion,  I  anticipate,  we  will  arrive  at 
agreement  now  on  many  points  of  the  agenda, 
on  understandings  that  some  agreements  may 
have  to  await  the  passage  of  time ;  and  on  some 
issues,  as  is  normal  and  healthy  in  any  true 
partnership,  we  may  find  our  views  differ  in  our 
assessment  of  problems  and  possible  solutions. 
We  will  be  seeking  to  carry  forward  a  partner- 
ship based  on  frank  discussion  and  mutual 
respect.  For,  as  President  Nixon  has  said,  a 
mature  partnership  is  one  "in  which  all  voices 
are  heard  and  none  is  predominant,  a  partner- 
shi^i  guided  by  a  healthy  awareness  that  give- 
and-take  is  better  than  take-it-or-leave-it." 

Thus,  the  fifth  and  final  principle  guiding 
the  U.S.  delegation  is  one  which  I  want  espe- 
cially to  emphasize.  It  is  simply  tlus :  This  meet- 
ing is  not  the  end  of  a  process  but  rather  the 
beginning. 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on  No- 
vember 17  (press  release  346)  that  Charles  A. 
Meyer,  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- American 
Affairs,  would  be  U.S.  Representative  and 
chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  meeting 
of  the  Special  Committee  of  the  Inter- American 
Economic  and  Social  Council  opening  that  day 
at  Washington.* 

The  meeting  in  Washington  will  continue  the 
deliberations  which  started  at  the  regular  lA- 
ECOSOC  meeting  held  last  June  in  Trinidad 
and  will  follow  the  review  of  U.S.  policy  by 


*For  names  of  other  members  of  the  U.S.  delegation, 
see  press  release  346  dated  Nov.  17. 


the  new  administration  and  the  presentation 
of  the  Rockefeller  report.  Recommendations 
arising  from  the  Washington  talks  will  be  pre- 
sented for  final  action  to  the  ministerial-level 
special  meeting  to  be  held  in  Venezuela  during 
the  firet  fortnight  in  December. 


Smallpox  Vaccinations  in  Africa 

Following  is  a  statement  ty  President  Nixon 
which  was  read  hy  John  A.  Hannah,  Admin- 
istrator, Agency  for  International  Development, 
at  a  ceremony  in  Niamey,  Niger,  on  Novem- 
ber 30  on  tlie  occasion  of  the  100  millionth  vac- 
cination against  smallpox  under  the  AID  pro- 
gram in  Africa. 

White    House    press    release     (Key    Blseayne.    Fla.)     dated 
November  30 

Of  the  many  humanitarian  programs  con- 
ducted by  the  United  States  through  the  Agency 
for  International  Development,  none  is  more 
important — or  more  expressive  of  our  national 
concern  with  peaceful  progress  in  the  develop- 
ing world — than  the  work  to  eliminate  the 
scourge  of  disease. 

The  challenge  is  measured  in  cruel  statistics. 
Smallpox  epidemics  in  Africa  have  killed  one 
in  four  stricken  by  the  disease.  Measles  kills 
about  10  percent  of  the  African  children  it  in- 
fects. Gastrointestinal  diseases  have  taken  a 
fearful  toll.  Even  for  those  who  survive,  these 
diseases  often  leave  behind  continuing  misery  in 
disfigurement,  crippling  arthritis,  blindness, 
and  increased  susceptibility  to  other  illnesses. 
There  is  also  the  tragedy  visited  upon  the 
families  of  the  victims. 

Beyond  the  suffering  of  the  individual,  there 
is  a  loss  to  the  larger  commmiity.  For  disease 
ravages  the  energy  of  body  and  mind  which  is 
the  engine  of  national  development. 

But  the  progress  you  mark  today  in  Niger  is 
dramatic  proof  that  man  can  be  free  of  these 
age-old  bonds. 

This  100  millionth  vaccination  against  small- 
pox is  not  only  an  impressive  measure  of  techni- 
cal assistance.  It  is  100  million  opportunities  to 
be  productive  citizens  of  the  new  Africa. 

And  like  most  great  strides  in  development,  it 
was  made  possible  by  people  working  together — 


f 


634 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


L'O  nations  of  "West  and  Central  Africa,  the 
A\'orld  Health  Organization,  regional  groups, 
and  AID,  all  doing  their  share  in  a  common 
cause. 

My  warmest  congratulations  to  all  those  who 
liave  helped  reach  this  milestone. 


U.S.  Welcomes  Nigerian  Statement 
on  Daylight  Relief  Flights  to  Biafra 

Department  Statement  ^ 

The  United  States  Government  is  gratified  to 
Irarn  of  yesterday's  [December  9]  statement  by 
the  Federal  Military  Government  of  Nigeria 
providing  further  assurances  that  it  will  not 
\iolate  militarily  the  proposed  program  of  the 
International  Conmiittee  of  the  Eed  Cross  for 
daylight  relief  flights  into  the  Biafran  enclave. 
Yesterday  s  statement  by  the  Nigerian  Govern- 
ment provides  commitments  against  Nigerian 
air  attacks  on  Uli  during  the  relief  flights  cov- 
ered by  the  agreement  and  explicitly  states  that 
"There  is  nothing  in  the  agreement  intended  to 
secure  any  military  advantage  for  the  Fed- 
eral Military  Government  from  the  relief 
operations." 

The  United  States  Government  continues  to 
believe  that  daylight  flights  are  the  only  im- 
mediately practicable  scheme  for  expansion  of 
relief  operations.  As  Secretary  Rogers  said  on 
November  12 :  "We  also  believe  that  the  pro- 
posed arrangements  for  daylight  flights  meet 
in  a  reasonable  manner  the  legitimate  security 
concerns  of  the  Biafran  authorities." - 

In  making  this  further  statement  yesterday, 
tlie  Nigerian  Govermnent  has  again  evinced  its 
readiness  to  meet  its  humanitarian  responsibil- 
ity to  support  the  humanitarian  mission  of  the 
ICRC.  AVe,  therefore,  hope  tliat  the  Biafran 
leadership  will  accept  these  assurances  as  meet- 
ing their  security  concern  and  will  agree 
promptly  to  ICRC  daylight  flights  to  meet  the 
urgent  need  of  the  helpless  victims  of  the  Ni- 
gerian war. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Department  pres.s 
spokesman  Carl  Bartch  on  Dec.  10. 

'  For  a  statement  by  Secretary  Rogers  issued  on 
Nov.  12,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  1,  1969,  p.  469. 


United  States  Experts  Report 
on  Defoliation  in  Cambodia 

Press  release  335  dated  November  10 

A  group  of  United  States  experts  visited 
Cambodia  from  June  30  to  July  9, 1969,  to  study 
areas  of  Kompong  Cham  Province  damaged  by 
herbicides  and  to  determine  the  cause,  severity, 
origin,  and  extent  of  damage.  Members  of  the 
team  were  Charles  E.  Minarik,  director.  Plant 
Sciences  Laboratories,  Department  of  Defense; 
Fred  H.  Tschirley,  assistant  cliief.  Crop  Pro- 
tection Research  Branch,  Agricultural  Research 
Service;  Nader  G.  Vakill,  agronomy  adviser, 
AID,  Saigon;  and  Jack  B.  Shumate,  chief. 
Forestry  Branch,  AID,  Saigon.  The  Cambodian 
Government  cooperated  fully  in  providing  fa- 
cilities for  the  study  carried  out  by  the  experts. 

The  team's  report  concluded  that  herbicide 
damage  in  the  affected  area  was  extensive,  due 
to  a  combination  of  two  factors:  (a)  defoliation 
of  fruit  trees  near  the  border  as  a  result  of  drift 
from  spray  operations  conducted  in  April  and 
May  1969  in  northern  Tay  Ninh  Province,  Re- 
public of  Viet-Nam ;  and  (b)  defoliation  of  rub- 
ber, fruit,  and  forest  trees  farther  north,  prob- 
ably by  direct  application  of  spray  from  the 
air  on  a  north-south  line  running  through  two 
major  rubber  plantations. 

The  team  also  concluded  that  few,  if  any, 
rubber  or  fruit  trees  have  been  killed.  The  de- 
gree and  rate  of  recovery  will  depend  on  a  num- 
ber of  factors  but  should  be  well  advanced  by 
July  or  August  1970.  The  team  recommended 
that  a  final  assessment  of  damage  be  made  then, 
based  on  the  decline  in  latex  and  fruit  produc- 
tion following  the  defoliation  damage. 


Foreign  Military  Service 
by  U.S.  Citizens 

Department  Statement 

Press  release  337  dated  November  11 

Questions  have  been  raised  in  the  past  few 
weeks  regarding  the  United  Stat«s  Govern- 
ment's policy  with  respect  to  service  by  private 
American  citizens  in  foreign  armed  forces. 

The  Department  of  State  strongly  opposes 


December  29,   1969 


635 


such  involvement  by  private  Americans  as  con- 
trary to  the  foreign  policy  interests  of  the 
United  States. 

Federal  statutes  long  in  force  prohibit  cer- 
tain aspects  of  foreign  military  service  originat- 
ing within  the  United  States.  For  example, 
section  958  of  title  18,  U.S.  Code,  prohibits  ac- 
ceptance and  exercise  within  the  United  States 
of  a  commission  to  serve  in  the  armed  forces  of 
a  state  at  war  against  a  state  with  which  the 
United  States  is  at  peace.  Section  959  prohibits 
enlistment  within  the  United  States  for  foreign 
military  service.  These  sections  carry  penalties 
of  fines  or  imprisonment  or  both. 

The  reason  that,  as  a  matter  of  policy,  the 
Department  of  State  opposes  service  in  foreign 
military  forces  is  that  such  service  can  raise 
serious  problems  for  our  Government  in  the  con- 
duct of  its  foreign  relations.  Service  in  foreign 
military  foi-ces  risks  involvement  by  United 
States  citizens  in  hostilities  with  countries  with 
which  we  are  at  peace. 

We  recognize  that  each  state  has  the  author- 
ity to  determine  who  shall  be  entitled  to  its 
citizenship,  as  well  as  the  power  to  determine 
who  within  its  territories  sliall  be  subject  to 
compulsory  military  service.  However,  the  De- 
partment of  State  hopes  that  individual  Ameri- 
cans will  do  all  that  is  legally  possible  to  avoid 
foreign  military  service,  with  its  attendant  risks 
for  the  overall  national  interest  as  well  as  their 
personal  welfare. 

The  Department  of  State  is  actively  consider- 
ing whether  there  are  additional  steps  tliat 
might  be  taken  to  support  more  fully  the  policy 
objectives  of  our  Government  on  tliis  matter. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

91st  Congress,  1st  Session 

Strategic  and  Foreign  Policy  Implications  of  ABM 
Systems,  Anti-Submarine  Warfare,  Multiple  Inde- 
pendently Targeted  Reentry  Vehicles  (MIRV). 
Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Organization  and  Disarmament  Affairs  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations.  Part  III.  May  16-July 
16,  1969.  69  pp. 

Export  Expansion  and  Regulation  Act  Report  to  ac- 
company S.  2696,  together  with  minority,  supple- 
mental, and  individual  views.  S.  Rept.  91-336. 
July  24,  1969.  31  pp. 

Peace  Corps  Act.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  11039.  H. 
Rept.  91-4.56.  August  7, 1969.  23  pp. 

Extension  of  Temporary  Duty  Suspension  on  Certain 
I.stle ;  Temporary  Extension  of  Interest  Equalization 
Tax.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  10107.  S.  Rept. 
91-373.  August  11,  1969.  4  pp. 

International  Claims  Settlement  Act  Amendment.  Re- 
port to  accompany  H.R.  11711.  H.  Rept.  91-488.  Sep- 
tember 15, 1969.  5  pp. 

Pan  American  Institute  of  Geography  and  History. 
Report  to  accompany  H.J.  Res.  746.  H.  Rept.  91-489. 
September  15, 1969.  6  pp. 

Exempting  Public  International  Organizations  From 
the  District  of  Columbia  Unemployment  Compensa- 
tion Act.  Report  to  accompany  H.R.  9526.  S.  Rept. 
91-403.  September  16, 1969.  7  pp. 

Peace  Corps  Amendments.  Report  to  accompany  H.R. 
11039.  S.  Rept.  91-114.  September  17,  1969.  11  pp. 

Establish  a  Commission  on  Population  Growth  and  the 
American  Future.  Report  to  accompany  S.  2701.  S. 
Rept.  91^31.  September  24,  1969.  10  pp. 

United  States-Mexico  Commission  for  Border  Develop- 
ment and  Friendship.  Report  to  accompany  H.J. 
Res.  S9i.  H.  Rept.  91-556.  October  9, 1969.  6  pp. 

Report  of  Audit  of  the  Saint  Lawrence  Seaway  Devel- 
opment Corporation,  Calendar  Tear  1968.  Letter  from 
the  Comptroller  General  transmitting  report.  H.  Doe. 
91-191.  November  12,  1969.  23  pp. 

Toward  Peace  with  Justice  in  Vietnam.  Report  to  ac- 
company H.  Res.  613.  H.  Rept  91-643.  November  13, 
1969.  21  pp. 


•r 


636 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


Fostering  International  Cooperation 
in  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy 


Statement  iy  William  B.  Bujfum 

U.S.  Representative  to  the  U.N.  General  Assernbly  * 


Before  I  begin  my  statement  I  should  like  to 
stress  how  gratified  my  Government  is  over  the 
fact  that  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
signed  the  Treaty  on  the  Nonproliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons  this  morning.  Tliis,  of  course, 
represents  a  very  welcome  development.  We  also 
are  very  gratified  to  note  that  yesterday  the 
Government  of  Switzerland  also  signed  this 
treaty.  This  means  that  93  countries  have  now 
signed  this  important  instrument.  As  Ambassa- 
dor Yost  has  already  mentioned,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  now  com- 
pleted their  ratification  processes  and  expect 
to  deposit  their  instrmnents  in  the  very  near 
fiiture.^  We  hope  that  several  other  nations  will 
soon  take  comparable  steps  to  assure  the  early 
entry  into  force  of  this  instrument. 

I  am  delighted  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
begin  my  statement  by  acknowledging  these 
Aery  significant  developments. 

In  our  discussions  to  date  we  have  addressed 
ourselves  primarily  to  important  questions  of 
disarmament  and  arms  control.  I  should  now, 
however,  like  to  draw  the  committee's  attention 
to  the  throe  reports  which  are  before  us  that 
found  their  origin  in  the  Conference  of  the  Non- 
Nuclear- Weapon  States.  They  include: 

— The  Secretary  General's  report  on  the  im- 
plementation of  the  results  of  the  NNC 
(A/7677) ; 


^  Made  in  Committee  I  (Political  and  Security)  of 
the  General  Assembly  on  Nov.  28  (U.S. /U.N.  press 
release  180). 

'  For  a  statement  by  Charles  W.  To.st,  U.S.  Represent- 
ative to  the  United  Nations,  made  in  Committee  I  on 
Nov.  25,  see  U.S./U.N.  press  release  176. 


— His  report  dealing  with  the  establislmient 
within  the  framework  of  the  IAEA  of  an  inter- 
national service  for  providing  nuclear  explo- 
sions for  peaceful  purposes  (Ay7678) ;  and 

— His  report  on  the  contributions  of  nuclear 
technology  to  the  economic  and  scientific  ad- 
vancement of  the  developing  countries 
(A/7568). 

These  documents,  in  our  view,  merit  the  most 
careful  attention  of  the  members  of  this  com- 
mittee, and  I  believe  they  reflect  credit  on  both 
the  Secretary  General  and  the  agencies,  notably 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  that 
assisted  in  the  preparations. 

In  the  view  of  my  delegation  they  are  indica- 
tive of  two  very  significant  developments. 

First,  they  reflect  a  growing  awareness  on  the 
part  of  many  countries  of  the  enormous  role 
the  peaceful  atom  can  play  in  improving  our 
lives. 

Secondly,  they  reflect  the  legitimate  desires  of 
the  non-nuclear- weapon  states  to  be  assured  that 
they  will  not  be  deprived  of  the  benefits  of  this 
promising  technology  if  they  renounce  the  right 
to  manufacture  nuclear  explosives  as  provided 
for  by  the  NPT.^  My  Government  attributes  the 
highest  importance  to  the  undertakings  in 
articles  IV  and  V  of  the  NPT  favoring  peace- 
ful atomic  development  and  international 
cooperation.  We  believe  our  sincerity  in  this 
regard  clearly  can  be  deduced  from  the  exten- 
sive program  we  have  had  underway  for  several 
years  to  share  our  most  iip-to-date  advance- 


"  For  text  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty,  see  Buixe- 
TiN  of  July  1, 1968,  p.  9. 


December  29,  1969 


637 


ments  concerning  the  peaceful  atom  with  other 
countries. 

Since  the  inception  of  the  atoms- for-peace 
program  we  have  declassified  and  broadly  dis- 
seminated information  on  peaceful  uses  to  other 
nations.  Moreover,  we  liave  assisted  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  foreign  nuclear  centers  by  making 
2G  reactor  and  63  equipment  grants  available. 
The  nuclear  centers  established  around  these 
research  reactors  have  been  instruments  for  pro- 
moting and  expanding  general  scientific  devel- 
opment and  cooperation  in  many  of  the  coun- 
tries, in  addition  to  furthering  nuclear  science. 

Also,  we  have  trained  rouglily  6,300  foreign 
scientists  in  our  atomic  laboratories,  and  we 
have  entered  into  several  technical  exchange 
agreements  in  fields  of  mutual  interest.  Addi- 
tionally, we  have  undertaken  a  major  program 
to  assure  that  ample  amounts  of  enriched 
uranium  are  available  to  foreign  countries, 
under  attractive  conditions,  to  satisfy  the  needs 
of  their  nuclear  power  programs.  As  of  this 
date,  we  have  committed  ourselves,  under  suit- 
able agreements,  to  supply  through  enriclmient 
services  approximately  540,000  kilograms  of  en- 
riched uraniimi  to  foreign  countries. 

Additionally,  our  Export-Import  Bank  has 
long  followed  a  policy  of  financing  foreign 
nuclear  power  plants.  The  Bank  has  authorized 
21  loans  totaling  $550  million  for  nuclear  facili- 
ties or  materials  in  11  countries.  Of  these,  18 
loans  have  been  for  nuclear  power  projects 
totaling  5,000  megawatts  in  installed  capacity. 
Lastly,  we  have  had,  for  some  time,  an  extensive 
program  of  assisting  the  IAEA  through  the 
provision  of  funds,  information,  equipment,  ex- 
pert advice,  and  free  fissionable  materials. 

I  mention  these  facts  simply  to  emphasize  tlie 
extent  of  our  commitment  to  nuclear  coopera- 
tion and  to  note  that  many  of  our  actions  have 
been  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  the 
NNC.  As  we  have  indicated  on  previous  oc- 
casions it  is  our  intention  to  continue  this  pro- 
gram and  strengthen  it  wherever  practicable. 
Others  undoubtedly  also  will  do  their  share. 
In  this  regard  it  is  useful  to  note  that  one  of  the 
reports  before  us  states  that : 

The  concerted  international  effort  that  has  already 
been  made  to  spread  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  en- 
ergy probably  has  no  parallel  in  other  branches  of 
modern  technology. 

As  Ambassador  Yost  indicated  earlier,  we  are 
convinced  that  the  greatest  progress  in  interna- 
tional cooperation  can  be  achieved  by  working 


638 


within  established  mechanisms  and  strengthen- 
ing them  wherever  feasible.*  I  am  referring  here, 
in  part,  to  the  important  responsibilities  which 
already  are  vested  in  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency.  We  are  encouraged  that  over 
the  last  year  there  has  been  a  broad  reaffirma- 
tion by  many  states,  both  here  and  in  Vienna,  of 
the  principle  that  the  IAEA  should  continue  to 
be  the  focal  point  for  fostering  international  co- 
operation in  the  area  of  the  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy.  We  would  urge  the  General  As- 
sembly to  reaffirm  this  principle  in  the  manner 
in  which  it  disposes  of  the  three  reports  now 
before  us. 

The  documents  before  us  realistically  sum- 
marize the  considerable  contribution  that  the 
l^eaceful  atom  can  make  toward  scientific,  medi- 
cal, and  industrial  progress.  At  the  same  time 
they  forthrightly  reveal  that  not  enough  funds 
are  available  to  meet  all  meritorious  demands. 

In  the  view  of  my  Government  the  basic  solu- 
tion to  this  problem  rests  to  a  large  degree  with 
the  countries  concerned.  It  will  depend  in  the 
first  instance  on  the  priority  assigned  to  meri- 
torious nuclear  projects  by  nations  when  they 
formulate  their  overall  plans  of  national  de- 
velopment. It  also  will  depend  in  large  part  on 
the  development  of  a  greater  appreciation  and 
awareness  by  all  interested  jDarties,  including 
the  approjDriate  financial  institutions,  of  the 
near  and  potential  long-term  contributions  of 
this  technology.  (We  should  bear  in  mind  that  it 
has  been  estimated  tliat  by  1980  the  total  in- 
stalled capacity  of  nuclear  power  throughout 
the  world  will  be  approximately  320,000 
megawatts.) 

Further,  it  will  require  the  broad-scale  finan- 
cial support  by  all  of  the  member  states  of  the 
IAEA  of  the  Agency's  program  for  teclmical 
assistance.  I  am  pleased  to  report  to  this  com- 
mittee that  we  intend  to  do  our  share  in  this  re- 
gard, over  and  above  the  very  substantial 
contributions  that  we  already  liave  made  to  the 
IAEA's  technical  assistance  program.  Specifi- 
cally, we  now  have  before  our  Congress  a  pro- 
posal which  would  enable  the  United  States  to 
increase  the  level  of  its  contribution  to  the 
IAEA  teclinical  assistance  program. 

I  would  now  like,  with  your  permission,  to 
make  some  specific  comments  on  the  tliree  re- 
ports before  us. 


p.  600. 


'  For  Ambassador  Yost's  statement  made  in  Com- 
mittee I  on  Nov.  17,  see  Bulletin  of  Dec.  22,  1969,       •' 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


3' 


In  the  view  of  the  United  States,  the  Secre- 
tary General's  report  on  the  implementation  of 
the  recormnendations  of  the  NNC  is  a  very  in- 
formative and  comprehensive  document.  Both 
the  achievements  of  the  past  year  and  the  prob- 
lems to  be  solved  are  reviewed  iu  a  straightfor- 
ward fashion.  As  Ambassador  Yost  noted  in  his 
general  statement,  the  IAEA  already  has  sev- 
eral activities  underway  that  are  in  keeping 
with  the  recommendations  of  the  NNC. 

The  Agency,  for  example,  is  reviewing  on  an 
urgent  basis  the  composition  of  its  Board  of 
Governors.  Every  effort  will  be  made  to  submit 
a  suitable  statutory  amendment  to  the  next 
IAEA  General  Conference  to  achieve  broader 
and  more  equitable  representation.  My  Govern- 
ment intends  to  give  its  active  support  to  the 
achievement  of  this  objective. 

Another  area  where  continued  progress  is 
being  made  concerns  the  field  of  safeguards  to 
detect  unauthorized  diversions  of  nuclear  ma- 
terials. A  careful  reading  of  the  report  before 
us  shows  that  the  Agency  safeguards  system  al- 
ready contains  many  features  which  are  de- 
signed to  avoid  any  disruption  of  normal 
industrial  activities.  Moreover,  a  continuous  ef- 
fort is  being  made  to  achieve,  through  studies 
and  research,  greater  simplifications.  In  the 
United  States  alone  we  are  spending  approxi- 
mately $i  million  this  year  in  various  develop- 
mental efforts  which  are  designed  to  make  safe- 
guards more  efficient  and  less  intrusive.  We 
shall  continue  to  share  the  results  of  our  ex- 
perience with  other  nations. 

Still  another  area  worthy  of  mention  concerns 
the  NNC  resolution  which  proposed  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  fund  of  special  fissionable  mate- 
rials within  the  IAEA.  This  question  was  con- 
sidered both  by  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors 
and  the  recent  General  Conference,  and  it  was 
noted  that  the  quantities  of  fissionable  materials 
already  available  to  the  Agency  have  far  ex- 
ceeded the  demands.  Notwithstanding  this  fact, 
however,  some  nuclear  powei-s,  including  the 
United  States,  have  indicated  that  when  this 
fund  needs  replenishing  they  will  be  prepared 
to  consider  making  additional  quantities  avail- 
able. Moreover,  in  our  case  we  have  stated  that 
we  would  expect  to  supply  such  additional 
amomits  under  terms  comparable  to  those  that 
apply  to  our  bilateral  agreements. 

I  have  already  discussed  the  question  of  fi- 
nancing. It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  under 
the  leadership  of  Ceylon  and  several  other  devel- 
oping countries  the  recent  IAEA  General  Con- 


ference adopted  a  resolution  which  directed  the 
Agency's  Director  General  to  make  a  compre- 
hensive study  as  to  how  the  problem  of  financ- 
ing nuclear  projects  can  best  be  solved.  Under 
this  study  the  Agency  is  to  assess  the  likely 
capital  and  foreign  exchange  requirements  for 
nuclear  projects  in  developing  countries  for  the 
next  decade  and  to  study  the  ways  and  means  to 
secure  financing  for  such  projects  from  interna- 
tional and  other  sources.  The  effective  carrying 
out  of  this  study  will  require  the  full  coopera- 
tion of  the  principal  financial  institutions  that 
may  be  involved. 

In  sum,  Mr.  Chairman,  my  Government  be- 
lieves the  Secretary  General  and  the  IAEA 
have  made  every  effort  to  be  responsive  to  the 
actions  taken  last  year  by  this  Assembly,  and 
we  feel  they  should  be  commended  for  their  ac- 
tions. Many  of  the  problems  which  have  been 
identified  will,  of  course,  not  be  soluble  over- 
night but  will  involve  continuing  efforts  on  the 
part  of  the  IAEA  and  the  other  interested  agen- 
cies. We  would  encourage  these  organizations  to 
keep  the  General  Assembly  informed  of  their 
further  progress. 

I  should  now  like  to  comment  on  the  proposi- 
tion of  establisliing,  within  the  framework  of 
the  IAEA,  of  a  "service"  to  assure  that  the 
benefits  of  peaceful  nuclear  explosions  are  made 
available  to  non-nuclear- weapon  states.  This,  of 
course,  is  a  new  and  unexplored  area  and  one 
where  much  further  work  needs  to  be  done.  We 
are  impressed,  however,  that  a  veiy  promising 
beginning  has  been  made,  and  we  believe  that 
the  steps  already  taken  are  fully  compatible 
with  the  statements  made  in  1968  that  studies 
relevant  to  the  implementation  of  article  V  of 
the  NPT  should  begin  even  before  the  treaty 
comes  into  force. 

We  also  are  pleased  to  note  that  most  states 
share  our  view  that  the  IAEA  is  the  appropriate 
body  to  deal  with  this  subject.  This  has  been 
evidenced  not  only  by  individual  comments  but 
also,  as  has  been  noted,  by  the  fact  that  the 
recent  IAEA  General  Conference  approved, 
without  objection,  a  resolution  expressmg  its 
confidence  that  the  Agency  is  fully  competent  to 
deal  with  this  subject.  We  note  that  the  con- 
clusions of  the  Secretary  General's  report  also 
indicate  that  the  teclmical  expertise  and  statu- 
tory authority  of  the  Agency  to  handle  the 
problem  have  been  convincingly  supported. 

In  our  view,  the  Agency  has  already  gone 
very  far  in  defining  the  prospective  responsi- 
bilities it  can  assume  in  this  field.  We  believe  it 


December  29,  1969 


639 


should  be  commended  for  this  effort  and  urged 
to  continue  its  studies. 

In  the  months  ahead  we  would  expect  the 
Agency  to  give  particular  attention  to  fostering 
the  exchange  of  information  in  this  field,  to  ex- 
amine the  responsibilities  it  might  assume  in 
performing  the  international  observation  called 
for  by  article  V  of  the  NPT,  and  to  consider  a 
number  of  other  important  questions. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  dealing  here  with  an 
exciting  new  teclinology  and  we  share  the  Secre- 
tary General's  optimism  that  the  awesome 
power  of  nuclear  explosions  will  be  harnessed  in 
the  not  too  distant  future  for  the  benefit  of  all 
mankind.  We  believe,  however,  that  it  must  be 
recognized  that  this  technology  is  still  in  an  ex- 
perimental stage  of  development,  and  for  this 
reason  we  endorse  the  concept  expressed  in  the 
Secretary  General's  report  that  this  subject 
should  be  approached  on  an  evolutionary  basis. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part,  will  do  its  best 
to  keep  the  IAEA  informed  of  technological 
progress  in  this  field,  and  we  were  encouraged 
that  the  Soviet  Union  recently  transmitted  to 
the  IAEA  information  on  its  own  activities  con- 
cerning the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  explosions. 

As  we  have  stated  many  times,  we  will  pro- 
vide, under  attractive  conditions,  and  pursuant 
to  article  V  of  the  NPT,  a  peaceful  nuclear  ex- 
plosion service  when  such  a  service  is  technically 
and  economically  feasible.  Moreover,  our 
charges  will  be  kept  as  low  as  possible,  and  they 
will  exclude  the  sizable  costs  which  the  United 
States  has  incurred  to  date  in  developing  its 
nuclear  explosive  devices.  Additionally,  we 
anticipate  that  our  charges  to  foreign  customers 
will  be  no  greater  than  the  charges  to  United 
States  domestic  users. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  should  like  to 
commend  the  Secretary  General  for  the  very  fine 
report  on  the  contributions  of  nuclear  technol- 
ogy to  the  economic  and  scientific  advancement 
of  the  developing  countries.  This  document. 


which  was  prepared  by  a  distinguished  group  of 
experts  and  with  the  help  of  IAEA,  describes 
in  a  realistic  fashion  the  various  significant 
contributions  that  already  can  be  made  by  the 
peaceful  atom  and  the  even  gi'eater  possibilities 
for  the  future.  It  also  describes,  in  detail,  steps 
that  a  developing  country  would  normally  have 
to  take  to  realize  some  of  these  benefits. 

Looking  at  the  near  term,  the  report  discusses 
in  a  succinct  yet  informative  fashion  the  numer- 
ous contributions  that  can  be  made  through  the 
use  of  radioisotopes.  We  also  are  alerted  to  the 
potential  advantages  of  nuclear  power.  The 
point  is  made  that  even  if  the  first  nuclear  plant 
in  a  country  may  not  be  able  to  comply  with 
stringent  requirements  of  competitiveness  it 
may  nevertheless  still  be  justifiable  if  it  is  the 
first  unit  in  an  economically  sound  long-term 
nuclear  power  program.  Additionally,  the  re- 
port reviews  both  the  great  promise  and  the 
further  experimental  work  that  will  be  required 
to  derive  the  full  benefits  from  peaceful  nuclear 
explosions  and  nuclear-powered  desalting  plans. 
Moreover,  we  are  reminded  of  the  important 
point  that  the  introduction  of  nuclear  technol- 
ogy into  a  developing  country  depends  on  the 
state  of  its  scientific  and  teclmological  infra- 
structure. Hence,  great  stress  is  placed  on  the 
necessity  to  establish  an  adequate  educational 
base  and  to  develop  additional  nuclear  centers 
in  such  countries.  Lastly,  the  report  contains  a 
very  forthright  and  useful  summary  of  the 
prospects  as  well  as  problems  associated  with  the 
adequate  fimding  of  projects  in  these  fields. 

All  in  all,  we  therefore  believe  this  should  be 
a  very  useful  and  valuable  document,  par- 
ticularly to  officials  responsible  for  national  de- 
velopment. We  therefore  commend  it  for  care- 
fid  review  by  all  of  the  members  of  this 
organization. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  concludes  my  remarks  on 
this  subject. 


I 


640 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


r 


U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution  on  Portuguese  Territories 


Statement  iy  Seymour  M.  Finger 


The  United  States  believes  very  strongly  that 
the  Government  of  Portugal  should  in  its  own 
best  interest  grant  self-determination  to  the  peo- 
ples of  ^^igola,  Mozambique,  and  Guinea  (Bis- 
sau). "We  also  believe  it  is  the  proper  business 
of  this  committee  to  debate  the  question  of 
Portuguese  administration  of  these  non-self- 
governing  territories  and  the  duty  of  tliis  com- 
mittee to  make  constructive  suggestions  on  the 
implementation  of  the  goal  of  self-determina- 
tion and  majority  government  for  the  peoples 
i  of  these  territories. 

I  The  United  States  was  encouraged  by  the 
statesmanlike  emphasis  in  the  Manifesto  of  the 
Organization  of  Afi'ican  Unity  -  on  the  attain- 
ment of  self-determination  througli  peaceful 
means,  and  we  are  convinced  that  Portugal 
would  serve  its  own  best  interests  by  accepting 
an  offer  to  discuss  and  negotiate  an  equitable 
solution — equitable  for  j^eople  of  all  races  in 
Angola,  Mozambique,   and   Guinea    (Bissau). 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  the  view  of  my  delegation 
tlie  resolution  now  before  us  ^  will  not  lead  to- 
ward that  goal.  This  resolution,  while  purport- 
ing to  recall  the  Manifesto  of  the  Organization 
of  African  Unity,  negates  the  spirit  of  the 
manifesto ;  in  fact,  it  tends  to  shut  the  door  to 
a  possible  dialogue  with  Portu-iral.  This  resolu- 
tion repeats  prescriptions  whicli  have  failed  in 
tlie  past  and  which  obviously  cannot  help  in 
achieving  what  we  all  desire :  self-determination 
for  the  African  peoples  under  Portuguese  ad- 
ministration. By  its  uncompromising  and  con- 
d'lmiatory  character,  this  resolution  will  only 
serve  to  discourage  any  tendency  tlie  Govern- 
ment of  Portugal  might  have  to  reach  toward 
conciliation. 

My  delegation  believes  that  the  sponsors  of 


'Made  in  Committee  IV  (Trusteeship)  of  tbe  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  Nov.  14  (U.S./TJ.N.  press  release 
]r.O).  Ambassador  Finger  is  senior  adviser  to  the  U.S. 
Ri'presentative  to  the   United  Nations. 

■  U.N.  doc.  A/7754. 

'  U.N.  doe.  A/C.4/L.  938. 


this  resolution  are  also  committing  a  serious 
error  in  tarring  the  Portuguese  people  with  the 
same  brush  of  racism  which  is  so  riclily  deserved 
by  the  illegal  regime  of  Ian  Smith  and  by  the 
Government  of  South  Africa.  The  tragedy  of 
this  error  is  that  it  tends  to  push  the  Govern- 
ment of  Portugal  toward  the  very  racist  regimes 
of  southern  Africa  which  it  has  been  condemned 
for  collaborating  with. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  not  at  all  certain 
that  a  conciliatory  approach  toward  Portugal 
would  lead  toward  the  goal  of  self-determina- 
tion for  the  people  of  Angola,  Mozambique,  and 
Guinea  (Bissau),  but  we  are  convinced  it  is 
worth  trying.  What  is  certain  in  the  light  of 
many  years'  exjaerience  is  that  the  harsh  ap- 
proach which  cliaracterizes  this  resolution  will 
faU. 

Although  we  are  compelled  to  express 
frankly  our  deep  disappointment  with  the  draft 
before  us,  we  would  not  want  the  sponsors  of 
this  resolution  to  think  that  we  do  not  appreciate 
their  attempt  to  engage  in  a  constructive  dis- 
cussion with  us.  We  regret,  however,  that  that 
discussion  had  to  be  built  on  such  an  unsound 
foundation.  The  sponsor  who  talked  with  us  had 
to  base  his  consultations  on  a  text  which  was 
very  far  indeed  from  what  we  would  consider  a 
useful  approach.  Though  he  showed  great 
courtesy,  patience,  and  understanding  and  tried 
to  take  our  suggestions  into  accoimt,  the  gap  was 
much  too  wide  and  the  time  available  for  dis- 
cussing changes  was  too  short.  How  much  bet- 
ter it  would  have  been  if  consultations  had  taken 
j)lace  before  a  first  draft  had  been  written, 
rather  than  after  several  drafts  and  days  of 
debate  by  the  potential  sponsors.  Nevertheless, 
I  want  to  reiterate  our  deep  appreciation  for  the 
manner  in  which  we  were  consulted. 

In  addition  to  our  misgivings  over  the  gen- 
eral thrust  of  this  draft,  which  we  consider  mis- 
guided, certain  provisions  are  particularly 
objectionable  in  our  view.  For  example,  para- 
graph 4  condemns  Portugal's  alleged  policy  of 


December  29,   1969 


641 


using  the  territories  under  its  domination  for 
violation  of  the  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty  of  independent  states.  The  United 
States,  as  a  member  of  the  Security  Council,  has 
carefully  considered  such  evidence  as  has  been 
presented  to  substantiate  such  charges  and  finds 
it  far  from  conclusive.  "We  find  in  paragraph  5 
a  new  concept,  not  present  in  last  year's  resolu- 
tion ;  i.e.,  a  condemnation  of  the  "colonial  war" 
which  is  allegedly  being  waged  by  Portugal 
against  people  in  its  African  territories.  This 
type  of  blanket  condemnation  is  hai'dly  likely 
to  achieve  a  constructive  dialogue  with  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Portugal.  Paragraph  7  purports  to 
condemn  the  alleged  intervention  of  South 
African  forces  against  the  people  in  these  ter- 
ritories. "Wliile  there  may  be  individual  armed 
South  Africans  in  these  territories,  we  know  of 
no  evidence  of  "South  African  forces,"  as 
alleged  in  this  paragraph. 

Paragraph  12  recommends  that  the  Security 
Council  take  effective  steps  "with  a  view  to  the 
immediate  implementation  of  resolution  1514 
(XV)  in  the  Territories  under  Portuguese 
domination.  .  .  ."  This  is  in  flagrant  contrast 
with  the  Manifesto  of  the  OAU,  which  envis- 
ages a  more  gradual  movement  toward  self- 
determination.  Paragraph  13  makes  particular 
reference  to  the  members  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization,  with  the  implication  that 
military  assistance  which  some  of  its  members 
give  to  Portugal  enables  that  country  to  pursue 
the  fighting  in  its  African  territories.  In  fact, 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  is  con- 
cerned exclusively  with  defense  in  the  North 
Atlantic  area,  and  there  is  no  evidence  whatso- 
ever that  any  military  equipment  provided  to 
Portugal  is  being  used  outside  that  area. 

"We  recognize  that  many  members  of  this 
committee  have  legitimate  grounds  for  im- 
patience when  they  see  their  hopes  of  bringing 
about  an  end  to  colonialism  frustrated.  We  share 
that  sense  of  frustration.  Yet  these  delegations 
should,  in  our  view,  ask  themselves  whether  it 
is  by  passing  still  more  violent  resolutions  that 
they  will  achieve  their  objective.  We  would  have 
thought  it  better  to  take  a  new  approach  along 
the  lines  suggested  by  the  very  manifesto  which 
was  endorsed  by  many  of  their  governments. 

Mr.  Chairman,  if  my  delegation  abstains  on 
this  resolution  when  you  bring  it  to  a  vote  later 
this  morning,  it  is  for  two  reasons :  first,  because 
we  desire  thereby  to  signify  our  support  for  the 
concept  of  self-determination,  even  though  we 


disagree  with  the  route  proposed  in  this  draft; 
second,  because  we  wish  thereby  to  recognize  the 
effort  of  certain  of  the  sponsors  to  consult  with 
us.  We  regretfully  conclude  that  this  is  still  a 
bad  resolution,  despite  the  last-minute  efforts 
of  the  sponsors  to  correct  some  of  its  worst  de- 
fects. It  was  for  these  reasons — and  only  for 
these  reasons — that  we  could,  after  agonizing 
consideration,  avoid  voting  against  this  draft. 
We  are  convinced  that  the  main  losers  when  this 
resolution  is  adopted  and  deposited  in  the 
archives  of  these  United  Nations  will  be  the  very 
people  whom  we  would  like  to  help  in  their 
search  for  self-determination  and  political  dig- 
nity— ^the  people  of  Angola,  Mozambique,  and 
Guinea  (Bissau) — and  along  with  them,  this  or- 
ganization, whose  credibility,  relevance,  and 
effectiveness  will  have  been  further  undermined 
by  the  addition  of  this  resolution  to  the  long  list 
of  other  misguided  and  ineffective  resolutions 
already  consigned  to  its  voluminous  records.^ 


United  States  Comments 
on  Work  of  UNICEF 

Statement  6y  Shirley  Temple  Black  ^ 

I  am  particularly  pleased  to  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  comment  on  the  work  of  UNICEF 
[United  Nations  Children's  Fund]  during  the 
past  year.  In  a  world  torn  by  strife,  marked  too 
often  by  man's  inhumanity,  there  is  common 
agreement  that  special  attention  must  be  given 
to  the  needs  of  children,  the  future  citizens  of 
the  world.  Throughout  its  existence,  UNICEF 
has  served  in  a  quiet  and  efficient  manner  in  re- 
sponding to  a  universal  need,  the  health  and  wel- 
fare of  children.  Of  the  1  billion  children  living 
in  the  developing  countries,  over  two-thirds  live 
in  countries  which  are  receiving  UNICEF  as- 
sistance. My  delegation  extends  its  appreciation 


*On  Nov.  14  the  draft  resolution  (A/C.4/L.938)  was 
adopted  by  Committee  IV  by  a  rollcall  vote  of  88  to  3, 
with  16  abstentions  (U.S.)  ;  and  on  Nov.  21  the  draft 
resolution  was  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly 
(A/RES/2507  (XXIV) )  by  a  vote  of  97  to  2,  with  18 
abstentions  (U.S.). 

'Made  in  Committee  III  (Social,  Humanitarian,  and 
Cultural)  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  on  Dec.  2 
(U.S./U.N.  press  release  182).  Mrs.  Black  is  U.S.  Rep- 
resentative to  the  General  Assembly. 


642 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


to  the  Executive  Director,  Mr.  Henry  R. 
Labouisse,  and  his  excellent  staff  for  the  creative 
and  ambitious  programs  wliich  the  Fimd  is 
undertaking. 

Possibly  the  greatest  strength  of  UNICEF 
has  been  its  flexibility  and  adaptability  in  the 
face  of  changed  situations.  Major  stress  is 
rightly  placed  on  the  development  of  the  whole 
child  and  his  adequate  preparation  to  assume 
responsibilities  of  maturity.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Fund  has  remained  sensitive  to  short-term 
relief  needs,  which  comprised  the  bulk  of  its  ac- 
tivities during  the  early  years.  In  this  comiec- 
tion,  my  delegation  highly  commends  the  re- 
sourcefulness and  skill  with  which  the  Fund  has 
responded  to  the  hmnanitarian  needs  arising 
from  the  tragic  conflict  in  Nigeria  by  providing 
assistance  to  children  and  mothers  on  both 
sides. 

UNICEF  has  been  alert  to  the  plans  and 
priorities  of  the  developing  countries  and  is  par- 
ticipating actively  in  planning  for  the  Second 
Development  Decade.  The  Fund  is  in  a  unique 
position  to  advise  on  programs  relating  to  chil- 
dren and  youth  as  a  whole  and  their  relation 
to  general  development  policies.  As  the  Execu- 
tive Director  stated  so  well  in  his  statement  to 
the  47th  session  of  ECOSOC  [Economic  and 
Social  Council],  development  must  be  viewed 
not  solely  in  economic  terms  but,  even  more 
importantly,  in  hmnan  terms. 

My  delegation  is  also  pleased  to  note  the  man- 
ner m  which  UNICEF  is  attuned  to  the  grow- 
ing emphasis  by  the  U.N.  family  on  the  role  of 
youth  in  national  development.  It  is  heartening 
to  realize  that  UNICEF  is  already  engaged  in 
programs  of  material  and  financial  support  for 
portions  of  country  programs  concerned  with 
youth. 

Control  of  excessive  population  growth  in 
countries  where  this  has  become  a  recognized 
problem  is  another  major  area  of  concern  in  the 
development  process  which  has  been  recognized 
by  the  United  Nations  through  creation  of  the 
Population  Fund.  UNICEF  has  again  demon- 
strated its  sensitivity  to  the  pressing  problems 
of  development  by  recognizing  that  excessive 
population  growth  will  inevitably  have  delete- 
rious consequences  for  the  welfare  of  children. 
My  delegation  welcomes  the  programs  under- 
taken by  UNICEF,  in  cooperation  with  other 
agencies,  in  extending  traditional  forms  of  as- 
sistance to  family  planning  in  response  to  coun- 
try initiatives.  TTe  hope  that  this  assistance  will 
be  expanded. 


Madam  Chairman,  my  delegation  believes  we 
can  all  be  proud  of  the  distinctive  contribution 
wliich  UNICEF  is  making  to  the  world  of 
tomorrow.  In  view  of  its  outstanding  perform- 
ance, we  trust  that  UNICEF  will  continue  to 
meet  the  needs  of  children  with  wisdom,  com- 
passion, and  dedication. 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Narcotic  Drugs 

Additions  to  schedules  of  the  single  convention  on 
narcotic  drugs,  1961  (TIAS  629S).  Notification  dated 
November  IS,  1969.  Entered  into  force  November  18, 
1969. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960  (TIAS  5780).  Adopted  at 
London  October  25, 1967. 

Acceptances   received:   Norway,    October   31,    1969; 
United  Kingdom,  October  14, 1969.' 


BILATERAL 


Ecuador 

Agreement   relating   to   a   cooperative   meteorological 
program  in  support  of  the  rawinsonde  observation 
station  at  Guayaquil.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Quito  August  20,  1968. 
Entered  into  force:  July  18, 1969. 

Honduras 

Agreement  on  the  limitation  of  imports  from  Honduras 
of  fresh,  chilled,  or  frozen  meat  of  cattle,  goats,  and 
sheep  (except  lamb).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Tegucigalpa  November  27,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  November  27,  1969. 

Union   of  Soviet  Socialist   Republics 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  16,  1969, 
as  amended  (TIAS  6693,  6763),  on  the  reciprocal  al- 
location for  use  free  of  charge  of  plots  of  land  in 
Moscow  and  Washington.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Moscow  November  19  and  26,  1969.  Entered 
into  force  November  26, 1969. 


*  Acceptance  does  not  cover  amendments  contained 
in  annexes  III  and  VI  of  IMCO  Assembly  Resolution 
A.122(V). 


December  29,   1969 


643 


Third  Volume  in  Foreign  Relations 
Series  for  1946  Released 

On  December  3  the  Department  of  State  released 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1946,  Volume 
VII,  The  year  East  and  Africa  (vili,  941  pages).  This 
voliune,  the  third  to  be  published  of  11  planned  for 
1946,  provides  documentation  on  American  relations 
with  all  the  major  nations  of  the  Near  East,  as  well 
as  with  Egypt,  Libya,  and  Morocco. 

Of  particular  interest  is  the  documentation  regarding 
American  efforts  to  secure  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
armed  forces  from  Iran,  the  involvement  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Arab-Zionist  controversy,  antecedents  of 
the  Truman  doctrine  on  aid  to  Greece  and  Turkey,  and 
the  American  attitude  toward  Soviet  demands  for  revi- 
sion of  the  Turkish  Straits  regime. 

The  volumes  are  prepared  by  the  Historical  OflBce, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs.  Copies  of  volume  VII  (De- 
partment of  State  publication  8490)  may  be  obtained 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402,  for  $5.25 
each. 


Recent  Releases 

For  sale  hy  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 
Address  requests  direct  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders 
for  100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed 
to  the  same  address.  Remittances,  payaile  to  the  Su- 
perintendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 

Issues  in  United  States  Foreign  Policy.  No.  2 — NATO 
and  the  Defense  of  Europe.  The  second  in  a  series  of 
illustrated  publications  designed  to  aid  in  the  study  of 
our  foreign  relations.  This  series  emphasizes  the  con- 
text in  which  decisions  must  be  made  rather  than  the 
decisions  themselves.  Pub.  8476.  International  Organi- 
zation and  Conference  Series  87.  32  pp.  60^. 


Discussion  Guide — Issues.  No.  2 — NATO  and  the  De- 
fense of  Europe.  A  teaching  tool  to  facilitate  classroom 
use  of  the  "Issues"  pamphlet  on  NATO  and  the  Defense 
of  Europe.  Attempts  to  make  students  aware  of  the 
problems  involved  and  raises  questions  for  further 
study.  Includes  maps  and  charts  for  conversion  to 
transparencies.  Pub.  8487.  International  Organization 
and  Conference  Series  89.  7  pp.  10^. 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  National  Interests.  Illustrated 
text  of  a  statement  by  Under  Secretary  Elliot  L. 
Richardson  before  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Af- 
fairs on  June  9,  1969.  Sir.  Richardson,  as  Acting 
Secretary  of  State,  was  presenting  the  administration's 
proposals  on  economic  and  military  assistance  for  fiscal 
year  1970.  Text  reprinted  from  the  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  of  June  30, 1969.  Pub.  8485.  8  pp.  15(*. 

Atomic  Energy— Cooperation  for  Civil  Uses.  Agree- 
ment with  Argentina.  TIAS6721.  42  pp.  20('. 

Atomic  Energy — Application  of  Safeguards  by  the 
IAEA  to   the   United  States-Argentina   Cooperation 

Agreement.  Agreement  with  Argentina  and  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency.  TIAS  6722.  18  pp. 
15^. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Indonesia. 
TIAS  6731.  4  pp.  10('. 

Boundary  Waters — Pilotage  Services  on  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  St.  Lawrence  Seaway.  Agreement  with 
Canada.  TIAS  6732.  10  pp.  lOt*. 

Cultural  Relations — American  and  Romanian  Li- 
braries. Understanding  with  Romania.  TIAS  6733.  5  pp. 
10<». 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Vlet-Nam. 
TIAS  6734.  3  pp.  10«f. 

Space  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  Japan.  TIAS  6735. 
9  pp.  10«f. 

Peace  Corps.  Agreement  with  Trinidad  and  Tobago. 
TIAS  6736.  5  pp.  10^. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Viet-Nam 
modifying  the  agreement  of  June  27,  1969.  TIAS  6737. 
2  pp.  10<?. 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance.  Agreement  with  Luxem- 
bourg amending  Annex  B  to  the  agreement  of  January 
27,  1950.  TIAS  6738.  3  pp.  10<}. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the 
Dominican  Republic.  TIAS  6739.  4  pp.  10(f. 

Maritime  Matters— Deployment  of  U.S.S.  Yosemite 
and  U.S.S.  Grand  Canyon  to  Malta.  Agreement  with 
Malta.  TIAS  6740.  5  pp.  lOf. 


644 


Department  of  Slate   Bulletin 


INDEX     December  29,  1969     Vol.  ZX/,  No.  1592 


Africa 

Smallpox  Vaccinations  in  Africa   (Nixon)     .     .      634 
U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Re.solution  on  Portuguesn 
Territories    (Finger) C41 

Atomic  Energy.  Fostering  International  Co- 
operation in  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy 
(BufEum) ".      (>37 

Cambodia.  United  States  Experts  Report  on 
Defoliation  in  Cambodia (535 

Congress.  Congressional  Documents  Relating  to 

Foreign  Policy 636 

Disarmament 

Fostering  International  Cooperation  in  Peaceful 

Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  (Butfum) (537 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Decem- 
ber 8   (excerpts)         617 

Economic  Affairs.  lA-ECOSOC  Special  Commit- 
tee Meets  at  Washington  (Meyer,  Department 
announcement) 631 

Europe.  Our  Continuing  Commitment  to  West- 
ern Europe   (Rogers) 622 

Foreign  Aid 

lA-ECOSOC  Special  Committee  Meets  at  Wash- 
ington (Meyer,  Department  announcement)     .       631 
Smallpox  Vaccinations  in  Africa   (Nixon)     .     .      634 

Health.     Smallpox     Vaccinations     in     Africa 

(Nixon) 634 

International   Organizations  and  Conferences. 

lA-ECOSOC  Special  Committee  Meets  at 
Washington  (Meyer,  Department  announce- 
ment)          631 

Laos.  President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of 
Decembers  (excerpts) 617 

Latin  America.  lA-ECOSOC  Special  Commit- 
tee Meets  at  Washington  (Meyer,  Department 
announcement) 631 

Military  Affairs.   Foreign   Military    Service   by 

U.S.  Citizens  (Department  statement)     .     .     .      635 

Near  East.  Four  Powers  Resume  Consultations 

on  the  Middle  East  (joint  communique)     .     .      630 

Nigeria.  U.S.  Welcomes  Nigerian  Statement  on 
Daylight  Relief  Flights  to  Biafra  (Depart- 
ment statement) 633 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

North    Atlantic    Council    Ministerial    Meeting 

Held  at  Brussels   (text  of  communique  and 

declaration) 627 

Our  CJontinuing  Commitment  to  Western  Europe 

(Rogers) 622 

Secretary    Rogers    Attends    NATO    Ministerial 

Meeting  (Rogers) 623 

Portugal.  U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution  on 
Portuguese  Territories  (Finger) 641 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Decem- 
ber 8  (excerpts) 617 

Smallpox  Vaccinations  in  Africa 634 


Publications 

Recent  Releases 644 

Third  Volume  in  Foreign  Relations  Series  for 

1946  Released 644 

Treaty    Information.    Current    Actions    .    .    .      643 

U.S.S.R.  President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of 
December  8  (excerpts) 617 

United  Nations 

Fostering  International  Cooperation  in  Peaceful 

Uses  of  Atomic  Energy   (Buffum)     ....      637 
U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution  on  Portuguese 

Territories  (Finger) GAl 

United  States  Comments  on  Work  of  UNICEF 

(Black) 642 

Viet-Nam 

46th  Plenary  Session  on  Viet-Nam  Held  at  Paris 

(Habib) 620 

President  Nixon's  News  Conference  of  Decem- 
ber 8  (excerpts) 617 

Name  Index 

Black,  Shirley  Temple 642 

Bufifum,  William  B 637 

Finger,  Seymour  M 641 

Habib,  Philip  C 620 

Meyer,  Charles  A 631 

Nixon,  President 617, 634 

Rogers,   Secretary 622,625 


Check  List  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  December  8-14 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  OflBce 
of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Releases  issued  prior  to  December  8  which  ap- 
pear in  this  Issue  of  the  Bulletin  are  Nos.  335  of 
November  10,  337  of  November  11,  358  of  Novem- 
ber 25,  365  of  December  2,  and  369  and  370  of 
December  6. 

No.       Date  Subject 

1371    12/9      Rogers:     Galaxy     Conference    on 

Adult  Education. 
*372    12/10    Hoffacker  sworn  in  as  Ambassador 

to     Cameroon    and     Equatorial 

Guinea  (biographic  data). 
373    12/11     Habib :    46th    plenary    session    on 

Viet-Nam  at  Paris. 
1374     12/11     Samuels :  "American  Business  and 

International  Investment  Flows." 

•Not  printed. 

tHeld  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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THE 

DEPARTMENT 

OF 

STATE 

BULLETIN 


Boston  PiiMi 
Superintend 


uraent' 


OtPOSITORY 


INDEX 


Number 

Date 

of 

Issue 

Pages 

1567 

Tulv 

7, 

1969 

1-20 

1568 

Iu!v 

14, 

1969 

21-40 

1569 

July 

21, 

1969 

41-60 

1570 

lulv 

28, 

1969 

61-80 

1571 

Aug. 

4, 

1969 

81-104 

1572 

Aug. 

11, 

1969 

105-120 

1573 

Aug. 

18, 

1969 

121-140 

1574 

Aug. 

25, 

1969 

141-176 

1575 

Sept. 

1, 

1969 

177-200 

1576 

Sept. 

8, 

1969 

201-236 

1577 

Sept. 

15, 

1969 

237-256 

1578 

Sept. 

22, 

1969 

257-276 

1579 

Sept. 

29, 

1969 

277-296 

Number 

Date 

of 

Issue 

Pages 

1580 

Oct. 

6, 

1969 

297-312 

1531 

Oct. 

13, 

1969 

313-328 

1582 

Oct. 

20, 

1969 

329-344 

1583 

Oct. 

27, 

1969 

345-364 

1584 

Nov. 

3, 

1969 

365-388 

1585 

Nov. 

10, 

1969 

389-408 

1586 

Nov. 

17, 

1969 

409-436 

1587 

Nov. 

24, 

1969 

437-464 

1588 

Dec. 

1, 

1969 

465-492 

1589 

Dec. 

8, 

1969 

493-540 

1590 

Dec. 

15, 

1969 

541-576 

1591 

Dec. 

22, 

1969 

577-616 

1592 

Dec. 

29, 

I9C9 

617-644 

Corrections  for  Volume  LXI 

The  Editor  of  the  Bulletin  wishes  to  call  attention  to  the  following  errors 
in  Volume  LXI : 

September  22,  p.  257:  The  footnote  is  incorrect.  Under  Secretary  Richardson 
made  the  address  before  a  luncheon  meeting  of  the  International  Studies 
Association. 

November  24,  p.  458:  Mr.  Phillips'  tide  in  the  footnote  is  incorrect.  He 
was  Alternate  U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly. 

p.  459:  Mr.  Coleman's  title  in  the  footnote  is  incorrect.  He  was  Alternate 
U.S.  Representative  to  the  General  Assembly. 

December  15,  p.  541,  President  Nixon's  statement  of  November  25  on  chemi- 
cal and  biological  defense  policies  and  programs  should  be  corrected  as  follows: 

The  first  sentence  of  the  paragraph  beginning  at  the  bottom  of  the  first 
column  should  read:  "Consonant  with  these  decisions,  the  administration  will 
submit  to  the  Senate,  for  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratification,  the  Geneva 
protocol  of  1925,  which  prohibits  the  first  use  in  war  of  'asph>'xiating,  poisonous 
or  other  gases  and  of  bacteriological  methods  of  warfare.'  " 

The  following  two  closing  paragraphs  should  be  added : 

"Neither  our  association  with  the  convention  nor  the  limiting  of  our  program 
to  research  will  leave  us  vulnerable  to  surprise  by  an  enemy  who  does  not 
observe  these  rational  restraints.  Our  intelligence  community  will  continue  to 
watch  carefully  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  biological  programs  of  others. 

"These  important  decisions  which  have  been  announced  today  have  been 
taken  as  an  initiative  toward  peace.  Mankind  already  carries  in  its  own  hands 
too  many  of  the  seeds  of  its  own  destruction.  By  the  examples  we  set  today,  we 
hope  to  contribute  to  an  atmosphere  of  peace  and  understanding  between 
nations  and  among  men." 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

Publication  8515 

Released  April  1970 


For  sale  by  the  Sup  erintcndent  ot  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 
Price  30  cents  (single  copy).  Subscription  price  $16  per  year;  $7  additional  for  foreign  mailing 


INDEX 


Volume  LXI,  Numbers   1567-1592,  July  7-December  29,   1969 


Abel,  EUe,  345 

Abrams,  Creighton  W.:  45;  Nixon,  2; 

Rogers,  46 
Adair,  Charles  W.,  Jr.,  312 
Adams,  Arthur  H.,  583 
Afghanistan,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

79,  276 
Africa  {see  also  Organization  of  Afri- 
can Unity  and  names  of  individ- 
ual   countries)  :     Haile    Selassie, 
87;  Nixon,  105,  262 
Communism,     rejection     (Richard- 
son), 28 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States:       Diplomatic       Papers, 
1945,  Volume  VIII,  The  Near 
East   and   Africa,   released,    19 
Smallpox  vaccinations  (Nixon),  634 
U.S.  aid  (Rogers),  83,  118,  594 
Afshar,  Amir  Asian,  379 
Agency     for     International     Develop- 
ment. See  Foreign  aid  programs, 
U.S. 
Agnew,  Spiro,  1 75 

Agricultural    surpluses,    U.S.    use    in 
overseas     programs,     agreements 
with:    Brazil,   296;   Congo    (Kin- 
shasa), 435;  Ecuador,   104,  363; 
Ghana,   18;  Guinea,  492;   India, 
408;    Indonesia,    616;    Morocco, 
363;    Pakistan,    104,   408;    Para- 
guay, 80;  Tunisia,   120;  Turkey, 
199,    492;    Viet-Nam,    80,     199, 
236,  312,  435,  492. 
Agriculture  (see  also  Agricultural  sur- 
pluses and  name  of  product)  : 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller     Re- 
port), 521,  531,  533 
Production   increases:    Nixon,    144; 

Samuels,  572 
Trade:  39,  123;  Samuels,  569 
Trust     Territory     of     the     Pacific: 
Johnston,  225;  Nimwes,  231 
Ahidjo,  President   (quoted),  458 
Aichi,  Kiichi,  122,  124 
Aigrain,  Pierre,  591 
Akar,  John,  352 
Akwei,  Richard  (Yost),  486 
Albania,      road      traffic      convention 

(1949),  accession,  42 
Aldrich,  George  H.,  364 
Alianza  para  el  Progreso.  See  AUiance 
for  Progress 


Alliance  for  Progress   (see  also  Inter- 
American    Development    Bank)  : 
Meyer,     21,     100;     Nixon,     22; 
Rockefeller,  497;  Rockefeller  Re- 
port, 518 
8th  anniversary  (Meyer),  215 
Inter-American      Committee      on: 
Meyer,      632;      Nixon,      410; 
Rockefeller  Report,  513 
U.S.      Representative      (Hender- 
son), designation,  328 
Allison,  Royal  B.:  66;  Rogers,  390 
Amistad  Dam:  Diaz  Ordaz,  278,  279; 

NLxon  277,  279,  280 
Amnesty  International   (Hauser),  471 
Andean  Common  Market:    Lleras,  9; 
Nixon,    8,   412;   Rockefeller   Re- 
port, 512 
Angola   (Finger),  641 
Antarctic  Treaty   (1959):    Astin,  34; 
NLxon,  543 
Current  actions,  Norway,  387 
Antarctic  Treaty   (1966),  current  ac- 
tions: Belgium,  198;  Japan,  255; 
Norway,  198;  U.S.,  18 
Antigua,  U.S.   Special  Representative 

(Donovan),  designation,   295 
Anwar  Khan,  164 

ANZUS     (Australia,     New     Zealand, 
United    States),     19tli    meeting: 
186;  Rogers,  180 
Apartheid.   See   Racial  discrimination 
Apollo  11.  See  Outer  space 
Arab-Israeli  conflict:  Ceausescu,  170; 
Meir,  319,  320,  322;  NAC,  627; 
Nixon,  172,  318,  322;  Rogers,  45 
Arms  race  (Nixon),  299-300 
Ceasefire    violations     (Yost),     273, 

274 
Four-power  talks:    630;  Nixon,   4; 

Richardson,  50,  587 
Israeli  air  attacks  on  Lebanon:  275; 

Yost,  272 
Jerusalem.  See  Jerusalem 
U.N.  role:  Nixon,  300;  Rogers,  41; 

Yost,  307 
U.S.-Soviet  bilateral  talks :  Richard- 
son,  50,  584;  Rogers,  41,  45, 
350 
Arbitration,    German    external    debts, 
agreement     (1969)     re:     France, 
Germany,  U.K.,  U.S.,  363 
Arbitration,  Permanent  Court  of,  U.S. 

members  designated,  54 
Arechaga,  Eduardo  Jimenez  de,  218 
Argentina,    treaties,   agreements,   etc., 
40,  59,  407 


Armaments     (see    also    Defense,    Dis- 
armament,     Military      assistance 
and  Nuclear  weapons)  : 
Arms  race   (Nixon),  299-300 
Nigeria,  supply  to  (Richardson),  96 
SALT  talks.  See  Strategic  arms  limi- 
tation talks 
Armed  forces: 

Geneva  convention   (1949)   relative 
to   treatment  in   time  of  war: 
Costa  Rica,  Ethiopia,  407 
NATO.  See  North  Atlantic  Treaty 

Organization 
U.S.: 

Temporary     support,     reciprocal 
agreement  with  New  Zealand, 
328 
Thailand,  reduction  of  U.S.  forces, 
245,  333 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agen- 
cy, U.S.,  seabed  arms  control  pro- 
posals  (Johnson),   192 
Armstrong,  Neil:   149   (quoted);  Diaz 

Ordaz,  279 
ASEAN     (Association     of     Southeast 

Asian  Nations)  :   Green,  447 
Asia,  South  .^sia,  and  Southeast  Asia 
(see     also     Asian     Development 
Bank,  Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Or- 
ganization, and  names  of  individ- 
ual countries) : 
Collective   security:    ANZUS,    187; 
Green,  447  ;  Nixon,  315 ;  Rogers, 
43,  179,  181,  182 
Communism:  Green,  447;  Richard- 
son,   28 
Economic  and  social  development: 
122,  243;  Nixon,  144;  Rogers, 
179,   181 
Japanese  role:    123,  557;  Green, 
446,  448;  Rogers,  121 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States,  1945,  Volume  VI,  The 
British     Commonwealth:     The 
Far  East,  released,  104 
Nationalism:    Marcos,    144;   Nixon, 

143 
Population  growth  and  related  prob- 
lems  (Nixon),  105 
Regional  cooperation  and  develop- 
ment:    ANZUS,    187;    Green, 
445;   Nixon,    143,    164;    Park, 
242;    Rogers,    179,    181,    182, 
186;    Seaborg,    330 
Self-determination:  Nixon,  154,  158, 

164;  Park,  241 
U.S.  military  commitment  (Rogers), 
580, 625 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


645 


Asia,  South  Asia,  and  Southeast  Asia 
— Continued 
U.S.  policy,  relations,  and  role:  555, 
557;  Marcos,  144;  Ni.\on,  143, 
145,  154,  158,  172,  440;  Park, 
242;  Richardson,  258;  Rogers, 
41,83,  118,  180,  181,  183,  186; 
Thieu,  155 
Viet-Nam,  importance  to:  Kennedy 

(quoted),  438;  Nixon,  156 
Visit  of  President  Nixon:  49;  Rich- 
ardson, 50 ;  Rogers,  42 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
84,177 
Asian  and  Pacific  Council  (Green) ,  447 
Asian  Development  Bank:  123;  Green, 
446;  Nixon,  121,  143 
U.S.  Alternate  Governor  (Samuels), 
confirmation,  261 
Asian    Parliamentarians    Union 

(Green),  447 
ASPAC  (Asian  and  Pacific  Council)  : 

Green,  447 
Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 

(Green),   447 
Astin,  Allen  V.,   32,   591 
Astronauts.  See  Outer  space 
Atlantic  Alliance.  See  North  Atlantic 

Treaty  Organization 
Atlantic-Pacific      Interoceanic     Canal 
Study  Commission,  5th  annual  re- 
port (Nixon),  218 
Atlantic  Treaty  .iXssociation,  15th  an- 
nual assembly  (Rogers),  400 
Atomic  energy,  peaceful  uses  of:   218; 
Astin,  33  ;  Buffum,  637  ;  Seaborg, 
329;  Yost,  601 
Civil  uses,  bilateral  agreements  for 
cooperation :      Argentina,     40 ; 
Austria,  79;  IAEA,  103;  Iran, 
199;    Portugal,    60,    103,    120; 
Venezuela,  492 
Safeguards,  agreements  re  applica- 
tion    of.  See     under     Atomic 
Energy  Agency,  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency,  International: 
Buffum,  638;  Seaborg,  330;  Yost, 
601 
Application  of  safeguards,  U.S.,  199 
Existing  bilateral  agreements,  to: 
Argentina,    59;    Austria,    255; 
Iran,  255;  Portugal,  103,  119; 
Turkey,  18 
13th    General    Conference:     Nixon 

(quoted),  329;  Seaborg,  329 
U.S.  representatives,  331 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  U.S.  (Sea- 
borg), 330 
Atoms-for-Peace      program :      Nixon 

(quoted),  329;  Seaborg,  330 
Australia: 

ANZUS,  19th  meeting:  186;  Rogers, 

180 
Malaysia     and     Singapore,     armed 
forces      in:       ANZUS,       187; 
Rogers,  185 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  199,  295, 

387,  407,  575 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Rice),  confirma- 
tion, 200 
U.S.-Australian  cooperation:  Paine, 

309 ;  Rogers,  1 78 
Visit  of  President  Nixon,  49 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
177,   178,   185 


Austria: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  64 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40,  59,  79, 
255,  312,  327,  387,  435,  492, 
575 
U.S.  Ambassador   (Humes),  confir- 
mation, 344 
Automotive  traffic.  See  Road  traffic 
Aviation : 

Air    transport    negotiations,    U.S.- 

Nethcrlands,   115 
Aircraft  hijacking:    DePalma,   338; 
Nixon,  300;  Rogers,  245 
Bilateral  treaty  negotiations  with: 
France,  592;  Italy,  378;  Spain, 
558;  U.K.,  592 
13-nation  meeting,  592 
Civil  aviation  talks  with :  Japan,  75 ; 

Portugal,  470 
Israeli  air  attacks  on  Lebanon  con- 
demned: 275;  Yost,  272 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.: 

Air  navigation  services  in  Iceland, 
Greenland,  and  the  Faroe  Is- 
lands, agreement  viath  India, 
236 
Air  transport,  bilateral  agreements 
with:  China,  435,  463;  France, 
18;  Jamaica,  430;  Japan,  573; 
Netherlands,  616 
Civil  aviation,  international  con- 
vention (1944),  protocol  on 
authentic  trilingual  text,  cur- 
rent actions:  Afghanistan  (with 
reservation),  276;  Belgium,  59; 
Canada,  255  ;  Ireland,  616;  Jor- 
dan, 363 ;  Lebanon,  59 :  Nigeria, 
435;  Saudi  Arabia,  18;  Tan- 
zania, 255  ;  Tunisia  (with  reser- 
vation), 103;  Turkey,  327; 
U.K.,  79 
International  recognition  of  rights 
in  aircraft,  convention  (1948)  : 
Cameroon,  236 ;  Central  Afri- 
can Republic,  198;  Paraguay, 
407;  U.A.R.,  363 
Offenses  and  certain  other  acts 
committed  on  board  aircraft, 
convention  (1963):  Barbados, 
120;  Ecuador,  236;  Finland, 
574;  France,  236;  Greece,  574; 
Israel,  387;  Niger,  236;  Spain, 
407;  Switzerland,  574;  Upper 
Volta,  120;  U.S.  59,  275,  276, 
363 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  (John- 
ston), 223 
U.S.  helicopter  crew  released  by 
North  Korea:    583;  Yost,  606 


B 


Bailey,  Charles  W.,  202 
Balance  of  payments : 
U.K.  (Kennedy),  355 
U.S.: 

Problems  and  efforts  to  improve: 
39,  92,  122,  591  ;  Gilbert,  568; 
Kennedy,  354;  Nixon,  41 1,  559 ; 
Samuels,  570 
U.S.-German  offset  agreement 
talks  concluded,  92 
Barbados : 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  379 
Offenses  and  certain  other  acts  on 
board       aircraft,       convention 
(1963),  120 


Barbados — Continued 

U.S.   Ambassador   (Donovan),  con- 
firmation, 120 
Bartch,  Carl,  54 
Baruch,  Bernard  (quoted),  600 
Baxter,  Richard  R.,  54 
Beckler,  David,  339 
Beggs,  James  M.,  124 
Belcher,  Taylor  G.,  200 
Belgium: 

Consular  convention  with  U.S.:  275, 

276;  Nixon,  424 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  59,   198, 

199,276,407,464,492,616 
Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers,  625 
Ben-Gurion,  David  (Nixon),  319 
Bennett,  Ivan  (Nixon),  65 
Bergson,  Henri  (quoted),  377 
Berlin:    Kiesinger,    212;    NAC,    629; 
Richardson,  587  ;  Rogers,  545,  624 
Biafra  (see  also  Nigeria)  : 

Recognition,  question  of   (Richard- 
son), 97 
Relief  efforts  and  U.S.  support :  635 ; 
Black,  643;  Ferguson,   14,  97; 
Richardson,  94;  Rogers,  48,  51, 
206,  280,  469 
Big-power  responsibility:   Nixon,  298, 
302,  543,  551,  553;  Richardson, 
28,  260;  Yost,  450 
Bikini  Atoll:   Johnston,  235;  Phillips, 

220 
BIRPI    (Intellectual  Property,  United 
International  Bureaux  for  the  Pro- 
tection of),  421 
Black,  Shirley  Temple,  304,  380,  642 
Blackman,  Herbert  N.,  592 
Blatchford,  Joseph  (Nixon),  325 
Bolivar,  Simon  (Lleras),  11 
Bolivia: 

U.S.   Ambassador    (Siracusa),   con- 
firmation, 492 
U.S.  diplomatic  relations  continued, 
378 
Bomboko,  justin-Marie,  379 
Borja,  Olyinpio  T.:  227,  232;  Phillips, 

221 
Borton,  Hugh,  93 
Braderman,  Eugene  M.,  358,  359 
Brandt,  Willy  (Nixon),  415 
Branscomb,  Lewis,  338 
Brazil :  Paine,  309 ;  Rogers,  83 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  236,  296, 
311,343,387,407 
Breznev,  Leonid  I.   (Rogers),  43,  179 
Brodie,  Henry,  404 
Brooks,  Angie  (quoted),  485 
Brown,  Harold:  66;  Rogers,  390 
Brownell,  Herbert,  54 
Buffum,    WilHam   B.,    119,    272,   304, 

609,  637 
Bulgaria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  276, 

295,  312,  407 
Burma,  Universal  Postal  Union  Con- 
stitution, 255 
Burns,  John  Howard,  200 
Burundi: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18,  492 
U.S.  .Ambassador  (Melady),  confir- 
mation, 464 
Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic, 
international     telecommunication 
convention  (1965),  with  annexes, 
103 
Byroade,  Henry  A.,  120 


646 


DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE   BULLETIN 


Calendar  of  international  conferences, 

16,  305 
Calhoun,  John  A.,  80 
Cambodia : 

Communist     forces,     presence     of: 

Habib,  209;  Lodge,   114,   115, 

245,    316,    351;    Thieu,    157; 

Walsh,  7 

Defoliation,  U.S.  report  on,  635 

Geneva     accords,     U.S.     support: 

Lodge,  31,  115;  Rogers,  203 
Universal  Postal  Union  constitution, 

328 
U.S.  Charge  d' Affaires  (Rives),  ap- 
pointment, 115 
U.S.  diplomatic  relations  resumed: 
43,  261;  Rogers,  41 
Cameroon : 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  236,  464, 

616 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Hoffacker),  con- 
firmation, 576 
Camps,  Miriam,  200 
Canada: 

Automotive   trade   agreement   talks 

with  U.S.,  39, 591 
Citizens   Radio   Service   convention 

with  U.S.  signed,  574 
Flood    control   payment   agreement 
with   U.S.:    255,   492;   Nixon, 
463 
Joint  U.S.-Canadian  Committee  on 
Trade   and   Economic   Affairs, 
12th  meeting,  text  of  commu- 
nique, 38 
St.    Lawrence    Seaway,    10th    anni- 
versary: Nixon,  67,  70;  Rocke- 
feller, 67;  Trudeau,  68,  69 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc.,   60,   79, 
255,  363,  407,  492,  574,  575, 
616 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Schmidt),  confir- 
mation, 80 
Cargo,  William  L:  74;  Rogers,  203 
Caribbean  Development  Bank  (Rocke- 
feller Report),  512 
Caribbean    Free    Trade    Association: 
Nixon,  412;  Rockefeller  Report, 
512 
Carlyle,  Thomas  (Richardson),  72 
Carter,  W.  Beverly,  Jr.,  576 
Castro,  Fidel:  Richardson,  28;  Rocke- 
feller Report,  506,  516 
Catholic  Relief  Services,  Latin  Ameri- 
can    health     programs,     role     in 
(Rockefeller  Report),  536 
Ceausescu,  Nicolae,  49,  141,  167,  169, 

173,  174 
CECIC   (Executive  Committee  of  the 
Inter-American    Cultural    Coun- 
cil) :  Meyer,  632 
Central  African  Republic,  international 
recognition  of  rights  in  aircraft, 
convention     (1948),     adherence, 
198 
Central  American  Bank  for  Economic 
Integration  (Rockefeller  Report), 
512 
Central   American  Common  Market: 
Nixon,  412;  Rockefeller  Report, 
512 
Chad: 

Famine  relief,  U.S.  aid,  403 
U.S.   Ambassador    (Todman),   con- 
firmation, 80 


Chemical  and  biological  warfare:  De- 
Palma,  338,  375;  Leonard,  365; 
NAG,  627;  Nixon,  65,  300,  541; 
Rogers,  393 ;  Yost,  603 
1925  Geneva  Protocol,  text,  541 
U.S.  draft  convention,  text,  542 
Chiang  Kai-shek   (Rogers),   182,   183 
Chile: 

Fisheries  conference,  216,  217 
U.S.  aid  (Rogers),  83 
China,  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States:  Diplomatic  Papers,  1945, 
Volume     VII,     The     Far    East: 
China,  relezised,  256 
China,  Communist  {see  also  Commu- 
nism) : 
Strategic       power,       question       of 

(Rogers),  391 
Two-China      policy,      question      of 

(Rogers),  207 
U.N.  membership,  question  of:  text 
of    resolution,    479;    Whalley, 
476 
U.S.    relations    and    efforts    to   im- 
prove:     362;      NLxon,      300; 
Richardson,  260;  Rogers,  178, 
180,  181,  183,  184,202 
World  relations  (ANZUS),  187 
China,  Republic  of  {see  also  Taiwan) : 
Air  transport  agreement  with  U.S. 

amended,  463 
Economic  development:  Green,  446; 

Rogers,  179,  186 
Soviet  interests  (Richardson),  28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,  328, 

407,  435,  616 
U.N.   membership:    text  of  resolu- 
tion, 479;  Whalley,  476,  478 
U.S.  policy,  relations,  and  support: 
555;  Rogers,  84,  180,  181,  184, 
185,  595 
Visit  of  President  Nixon,  49 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
177 
CIAP  (Inter-American  Committee  on 
the    Alhance   for   Progress).   See 
Alliance  for  Progress 
Civil  Aviation  Organization,  Interna- 
tional, 592 
Civil  rights  {see  also  Human  rights  and 
Racial  discrimination),  Southern 
Rhodesia  (Yost) ,  55 
Civilian  personnel  abroad,  reductions, 

92,  591 
Civilian  persons  in  time  of  war,  Ge- 
neva Convention  (1949)   re  pro- 
tection of:   Costa  Rica,  Ethiopia, 
407 
Claims: 

Canada-U.S.  flood  control  payments 

agreement,  255,  463,  492,  616 
Hungarian   surplus  property  debts, 

214 
Micronesian  war  claims:   Johnston, 
223;Phimps,  221 
Cleveland,  W.  B.,  93 
ClifiFord,  Clark  (Nixon),  1,  3 
Cline,  Ray  S.,  436 
Coffee : 

Diversification    fund:     Meyer,    24; 

Nixon,  262,  265 
Internationa]      CoflTee      Agreement 
(Rockefeller  Report),  521 
Fourth   annual   report,   transmit- 
tal: Nixon,  262;  text,  262 
1968    agreement,   with   annexes: 
Austria,  387;  Japan,  18 


Coleman,  William  T.,  Jr.,  304,  459 
Collective   security    {see   also   Mutual 
defense):     Nixon,    298;    Rogers, 
545,  625 
ANZUS.  See  ANZUS 
NATO.  See  North  Atlantic  Treaty 

Organization 
SEATO.  See  Southeast  Asia  Treaty 

Organization 
Western     hemisphere     (Rockefeller 
Report),  513,  515,  517 
Colombia:  Meyer,  101;  Rogers,  83 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Lleras,  8 
Visit      of      Governor      Rockefeller 
(Lleras),   12 
Columbia  Rjver  treaty,  flood  control 
payments:   255,  492;  Nixon,  463 
Communications   {see  also  Radio  and 
Telecommunications)  : 
Joint  defense  space  communication 
station  agreement  with  Austra- 
lia, 575 
Latin    America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 502,  537,  538 
Satellites : 

Applications  technology  satellite, 

335 
Direct  broadcast  satellites,  334 
Working        group        meetings 
(Thacher),  341 
Global    commercial    communica- 
tion satellites  system  (Astin), 
37 
Agreements  establishing  interim 
arrangements     and     special 
agreements:    Belgium,    198; 
Cameroon,  464;  Ivory  Coast, 
295 
INTELSAT:  Astin,  37;  Scranton, 

93 
NASA  satellites,   bilateral  agree- 
ments with  Italy,  40,  60,  328 
Tracking      station      agreements: 
Japan,  195,  408;  Spain,  60 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  (John- 
ston), 223 
U.S.-German  "hot  line",  213 
Communism  {see  also  China,  Commu- 
nist; and  Soviet  Union)  : 
Asia  (Green),  447 
Latin  America.  See  Latin  America 
Rejection     and      countermeasures : 
Marcos,  145;  Park,  241;  Rich- 
ardson, 28,  258 
Conferences,    international,    calendar, 

16,  305 
Congo  (Kinshasa) : 

Agricultural      coiimiodities      agree- 
ment, 435 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  379 
Congress,  U.S.: 

Foreign  policy,  documents  relating 
to,  lists,  75,  219,  251,  424,  636 
Legislation,  proposed : 

Alliance  for  Progress  appropria- 
tions request  (Meyer),  23 
Asian  Development  Bank,  appro- 
priations request  (Nixon),  143 
Inter-American  Development 

Bank  Fund  for  Special  Opera- 
tions, appropriations  request 
(Meyer),  23 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Cor- 
poration (Rockefeller  Report), 
511 
Trade  Act  of  1969  (NLxon),  559 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


647 


Congress,  U.S. — Continued 

Legislation,  proposed — Continued 
Trust    Territory    of    the    Pacific 
Islands:    Johnston,   226;   Phil- 
lips, 222 
Legislation,   International  Develop- 
ment    Association     appropria- 
tion:  Meyer,  24;  Rogers,  82 
SALT  talks,  information  as  to  prog- 
ress (Rogers),  389,  390,  393 
Senate : 

Advice  and  consent: 

Belgium-U.S.  consular  conven- 
tion: 492;  Nixon,  424 
Canada-U.S.  flood  control  pay- 
ment       agreement:         492; 
Nixon,  463 
Chemical   and   biological   war- 
fare,        Geneva         protocol 
(1925),     ratification     urged 
(Nixon),  541 
Consular  relations,  Vienna  con- 
vention (1963)  and  optional 
protocol  re  compulsory  settle- 
ment of  disputes,  407 
Fishing  operations  in  North  At- 
lantic, convention  (1967)  on 
conduct  of,  407 
Radio,   agreements   concerning 
broadcasting      in      standard 
band,  with  annexes,  18 
U.S.-Netherlands   tax   conven- 
tion,    transmittal     (Nixon), 
386 
Confirmations,  80,  120,  200,  261, 
304,  312,  328,  331,  344,  364, 
457,  460,  464,  491,  492,  576, 
590 
Resolutions: 

Seabed,     principles     governing 
activities  on   (Johnson),  191 
Viet-Nam,  317,  468 
Viet-Nam:  Lodge,  468,  589;  Nixon, 
314 
War  prisoners,  treatment  of:  209, 
282,  317;  Lodge,  282,  317,  589; 
SulUvan,  596 
Conservation : 

Fishing.  See  Fish  and  fisheries. 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller     Re- 
port), 532, 534 
Migratory    birds,    U.S.-Japan    dis- 
cussions, 420 
North  Atlantic  fur  seals,  agreement 
extending    interim    convention 
(1957)     on     conservation     of: 
Canada,  Japan,  Soviet  Union, 
U.S.,  574 
Consular  relations: 

Belgium-U.S.  consular  convention: 
275,  276,  492,  616;  Nixon,  424 
U.S.     consular    posts    closure,    an- 
nouncement and  list,  591 
Vienna  convention  (1963)  on:  Aus- 
tria,  59;   Italy    (with   reserva- 
tion), 103;  U.S.,  407,  574,  616 
Optional  protocols:  Austria,  327; 
Italy,  103;  U.S.,  407,  574,  616 
Contiguous  zone:  368;  Leonard,  366 
Continental  shelf  (Johnson),  193 

Convention  (1958)  on,  Kenya,  79 
Copley,  James  (Nixon),  409 
Copyright    convention,    universal 
(1952),     current    actions:     Aus- 
tralia, 407 


Cormier,  Frank,  313 

Cornell,  Douglas  B.,  6 1 7 

Costa  Rica,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

407,408,435,461 
Costanzo,  Henry  J.,  460 
Cotton  textiles: 

Bilateral    agreements    with:     Costa 
Rica,  408,  461 ;  Czechoslovakia, 
276,  326;U.A.R.,  312 
Long-term  textile  arrangement,  7th 

annual  review  (Brodie) ,  404 
U.S.-Japan    trade:     338;    Johnson, 
402;  Rogers,  186 
Council    for    Education,    Science    and 
Culture,     proposed     (Rockefeller 
Report),  529 
Craley,  Neiman  (Phillips),  221 
Crawford,   David   H.,   583 
Cronk,  Edwin  M.,  364,  460 
Cross,  Charles  T.,  312 
Cuba: 

American  news  services  closed,  335 
Revolutionism:   Meyer,  101;  Nixon, 

413;  Rockefeller  Report,  5 1 6 
Soviet     influence     and     relations 

(Rockefeller  Report) ,  506 
Sugar  exports  (Rockefeller  Report), 

522 
U.S.  travel  restrictions  extended,  362 
Cultural  relations  and  programs: 
Cultural   Property,  Convention 

(1954):  Yost,  307 
Educational,  scientific  and  cultural 
materials,     agreement     (1950) 
for  importation  of:    Mauritius, 
327:  Singapore,  198 
International  Educational  and  Cul- 
tural    .\fTairs,     U.S.     Advisory 
Commission    members    named, 
590 
U.S.-Japan     Joint     Committee    on 
Cultural   and   Educational  Co- 
operation, meeting,  93 
Customs: 

ATA   carnet   for  temporary  admis- 
sion     of      goods,      convention 
(1961)     with    annex,    Poland, 
236 
Commercial  samples  and  advertising 
material,  international  conven- 
tion (1952)  to  facilitate  impor- 
tation of,  Mauritius,  311 
Containers,     customs     convention 
(1956)   with  annexes  and  pro- 
tocol of  signature:  Malawi,  18; 
Mauritius,  311 
Customs  Cooperation  Council,  con- 
vention     (1950)      establishing, 
Paraguay,  435 
Customs  tariffs,  convention   (1890) 
re  international  union  for  pub- 
lication of,  and  protocol  modi- 
fying, Ireland,  387 
Professional   equipment,   convention 
(1961)   on  temporary  importa- 
tion, with  annexes  A,  B,  and  C: 
Germany,  Poland,  236 
TIR  carnets,  convention  (1959)  on 
international  transport  of  goods 
under  cover  of,  Israel,  574 
Touring,  convention  (1957)  on  cus- 
toms   facilities    for,    Mauritius, 
363 
Cyprus,  U.N.  peacekeeping  force,  U.S. 
support   (Rogers),  83 


Czechoslovakia : 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  379 
Cotton  textile  agreement  with  U.S., 

326  _ 
Soviet  intervention  in:   Richardson, 

28;Rogers,  203,  394 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,   120, 

276,  295 


D 


de  Roulet,  Vincent,  328 
Debts,  German  external  debts,  agree- 
ment    re     arbitration      (1969): 
France,  Germany,  U.K.,  U.S.,  363 
Decolonization,  U.N.  role  (Yost),  488 
Defense,  national   (see  also  Collective 
security  and  Mutual  defense)  : 
Armament  sufficiency  (Rogers),  465 
Chemical     and    biological    warfare 

(Nixon),  541 
Safeguard  ABM  system  (Nixon),  5 
Democracy  and  democratic  principles: 
Meyer,   22;   Nixon,   371;  Rocke- 
feller Report,  514 
Denmark,    treaties,    agreements,    etc., 

198,236,387,407 
DePalma,  Samuel,  191,  336,  374 
Derge,  David  R.,  590 
Derthick,  Lawrence  (Richardson),  73 
Diaz  Ordaz,  Gustavo,  278,  279 
Dicks,  Randy  J.,  371,372 
Dillard,  Hardy  C,  218 
Diplomatic  relations  and  recognition: 
Bolivia,  U.S.  relations  resumed,  378 
Cambodia,  U.S.  relations  resumed: 

43;  Rogers,  41 
Hungary,   U.S.   Embassies,   staffing, 

214 
Libya,  U.S.  relations  continued,  281 
Southern  Yemen,  U.S.  relations  ter- 
minated, 420 
Vienna  convention  (1961)  on:  Italy, 
103;     Kuwait     (wit',     reserva- 
tion), 255 
Optional  protocol  re  compulsory 
settlement  of  disputes,  Mauri- 
tius, 276 
Diplomatic  representatives  abroad.  See 

Foreign  Service 
Diplomatic  representatives  in  the  U.S., 
credentials:    Austria,   64;   Barba- 
dos, Congo  (Kinshasa),  Czechos- 
lovakia, 379;  Dominican  Repub- 
lic,   352;    Greece,    550;    Iceland, 
Iran,     379;     Luxembourg,     352; 
Mali,  Netherlands,  379;  Rwanda, 
Sierra  Leone,  352;  Thailand,  379; 
Venezuela,  352 
Disarmament   (see  also  Arms  Control 
and    Disarmament    Agency,    and 
Nuclear     weapons) :      Ceausescu, 
170;  N.\C,  629;  Nixon,  65;  Yost, 
600,605 
SALT  talks.  See  Strategic  arms  lim- 
itations talks 
U.N.  role:  DePalma,  375;  Leonard, 
365;  Yost,  487 
Disaster  relief  (Rogers),  83 

Chad,  403 
Disraeli:    588    (quoted);  Richardson, 

584 
Dobrynin,   Anatoliy  F.    (Rogers),  44, 

202 
Dominica,  U.S.  Special  Representative 
(Donovan),  designation,  295 


I 


648 


DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE    BULLETIN 


Dominican  Republic,   Ambassador   to 

U.S.,  credentials,  352 
Dona  Mercedes  (Ferguson),  14 
Donovan,  Eileen  R.,  1 20,  295 
Double     taxation,     conventions     and 

agreements  for  the  avoidance  of 

(Nixon),  386 
Netherlands,  104 
Draper,  Theodore  (quoted),  28 
Draper,  William  H.,  484 
DuBridge,  Lee  A.,  338,  590 

£ 

East- West  relations:    213;  Ceausescu, 

168,  170;  NAC,  627,  629;  Nixon, 

112,   171,  211;  Richardson,  259, 

587,  624;  Rogers,  42,  44,  64 

Romanian  visit  of  President  Nixon, 

effect  (Richardson),  50 
SALT     talks,     question     of     effect 

(Rogers),  393 
Soviet  position  (Rogers),  64 
EGAFE    (Economic    Commission    for 
Asia  and  the  Far  East)  :   Green, 
446 
Ecology.  See  Environmental  problems 

and  control 
Economic  and  Social  Council,  U.N.: 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (Yost),  307 
Documents,  lists,  78,  295,  430,  491 
Dr.  DuBridge,  meeting  with,  339 
Educational  programs  (Black),  381 
Executive     Board,     U.S.     member 
(Gore),  nomination,  343 
Economic  and  social  development  (see 
also    name    cf    country)  :    Nixon, 
300,  412;  Rogers,  81 
Less  developed  countries.   See  Less 
developed  countries 
Economic  Commission  for  Asia  and  the 

Far  East  (Green),  446 
Economic   policy   and   relations,   U.S. 
domestic:  92;  Richardson,  28 
Anti-inflation  efforts;  122,  214,  557; 

Kennedy,  354;  Nbcon,  559 
Foreign     investment     contributions 
(Braderman),  359 
Ecuador: 

Fisheries  conference,  216,  217 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  104,  236, 
363,  575,  643 
Education  {see  also  Cultural  relations 
and  programs;  and  Educational, 
scientific  and  cultural  materials) : 
Black,    380;    Haile    Selassie,    89; 
Richardson,  72;  Seaborg,  330 
China,  American  Embassy  School  at 

Taxchung,  agreement,   328 
Instructional  TV,  India-U.S.  agree- 
ment, 334 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 529 
Philippines,  agreement  re  use  of  Spe- 
cial Fund  for  Education,  312 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific:  Borja, 
229;      Johnston,      224,      233; 
Nimwes,  230 
U.S.-Japan  Conference  on  Cultural 
and    Educational    Interclaange, 
proposed,  93 
Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs,  U.S. 
Advisory   Commission   on,   Inter- 
national,  U.S.    members   named, 
590 


Educational,    scientific,    and    cultural 
materials,  importation  agreement 
(1950)  with  protocol:  Mauritius, 
327;  Singapore,  198 
Edwards,  Augustin  E.   (Nixon),  409 
Egypt.  See  United  Arab  Republic 
Ehrlich,  S.  Paul,  Jr.,  491 
Eighteen   Nation   Disarmament   Com- 
mittee : 
Multilateral    disarmament    negotia- 
tions   (Nixon),   65 
Seabed     arms     control     proposals: 
DePalma,  338;  Johnson,  192 
Eisenhower,    Dwieht    D. :     Kiesinger, 
212;  Nixon,  329   (quoted),  372; 
Trudeau,  69 
Eisenhower  Fellows   (Nixon),  372 
Eliot,  Theodore  L.,  Jr.,  200 
Eminescu,  Mihai  (quoted),  172 
Emperor  Haile  Selassie  I:   86,  87,  89, 

91 ;  Nixon,  88;  Richardson,  96 
Envirormiental   problems   and   control 
{see  also  Pollution):   NAC,  627; 
Nixon,   107,  301;  Seaborg,  332; 
Yost,  449 
International  Symposium  on  Remote 
Sensing         of         Environment 
(Yost),  377 
NATO  Committee  on  Challenges  of 
Modern     Society:     Moynihan, 
416;NAC,  627,  629 
U.S.  Representative  (Moynihan), 
designated,  451 
U.N.   role:    DePahna,   376;   Nixon, 

300;  U  Thant  (quoted),  450 
U.S.-France    scientific    cooperation 
talks  continued,  590 
Equatorial  Guinea,  U.S.  Ambassador 

(Hoffacker),   confirmation,   576 
Erickson,  Elden  B.,  43 
ESRO  (European  Space  Research  Or- 
ganization) :  339;  Astin,  37 
Esterline,  John  H.,  93 
Etiiiopia: 

Geneva     conventions      (1949)      re 
treatn.ent  of  prisoners  of  war, 
wounded      and      sick,      armed 
forces,  and  civilians  in  time  of 
war,  407 
U.S.  visit  of  Emperor  Selassie,  86 
Europe   {see  aho  European  Economic 
Community,        European        Free 
Trade  Association,  and  individual 
countries)  : 
Collective  security  conference,  pro- 
posed:   Richardson,   259,  587; 
Rogers,  624 
Eastern    {see    also    East-West   rela- 
tions) : 
Foreign  Relations  of  the   United 
States,  1946,  Volume  VI,  East- 
ern Europe;  The  Soviet  Union, 
released,  388 
Germany,   relations:    NAC,   629; 

Rogers,  545,  624 
U.S.  economic  relations.  See  East- 
West  relations  and  Trade 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States,  1946,   Volume   V,  The 
British   Commonwealth;    West- 
ern   and    Central   Europe,   re- 
leased, 60 
Unification:    214;  Ceausescu,   170; 
Richardson,  587;  Rogers,  623, 
625 


Europe — Continued 

Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  338 
Western,   U.S.    relations   and   role: 
Nixon,  172;  Rogers,  622 
European  Economic  Community:  339; 
Rockefeller  Report,  528;  Rogers, 
625 
Agricultural  policy   (Samuels),  571 
Membership     increases,     need     for 
(Great     Britain,     Scandinavia, 
Ireland):    Gilbert,   567;   Sam- 
uels, 571 
European     Free     Trade     Association 

(Samuels),  570 
European    Space   Research   Organiza- 
tion: 339;  Astin,  37 
Executive  orders.  Intellectual  Property 
Bureaux    granted    organizational 
immunities  {11484),  421 
Executive  Service  Corps,  International 

(Rockefeller  Report),  526 
EXPO  67  (Nixon),  70 
EXPO  70:  124;  Nixon,  553,554 
Export-Import  Bank: 

Nuclear      power     plant     financing 

(Buffum),638 
U.S.-Germany      offset      agreement 

talks  concluded,  92,  214 
U.S.-Spain    agreement   on    credits, 
text  of  note,  16 
Exports     {see    also     commodities     by 
name;  Export-Import  Bank;  Im- 
ports; Tariffs  and  trade,  general 
agreement  on;  and  Trade)  : 
Latin  America:  Meyer,  632;  Nixon, 
411;   Rockefeller  Report,   520, 
522,532 
U.S.: 

Agricultural  products   (Samuels), 

570 
Restrictions     on:     379;     Gilbert, 
565;    Nixon,    559,    562;    Sam- 
uels, 570 


Fairhall,  Allen,  186 

Falcam,Leo  (Phillips),  221 

Family  of  Man  Award,  394n 

Farland,  Joseph  S.,  328 

Farley,  Philip  J. :  66 ;  Rogers,  390 

Farrington,  Elizabeth:  Johnston,  225; 

Phillips,  221 
Fascell,  Dante  B.,  304,  454 
Faunce,  Anthony,  464 
Ferguson,  C.  Clyde,  Jr.:   14,  97;  Rich- 
ardson, 94;  Rogers,  48,  51,  469 
Finger,  Seymour  M.,  641 
Finland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  295, 

343,407,574 
Finn,  Richard  B.,  93 
Fish  and  fisheries: 

Chile-Ecuador-Peru-U.S.     fisheries 

conference,  216,  217 
Treaties;  agreements,  etc.: 

Conservation  of  Atlantic  tuna,  in- 
ternational convention  (1966), 
U.S.,  363 
High  seas,  fishing  and  conserva- 
tion of  living  resources,  conven- 
tion (1958)  on  the,  Kenya,  79 
North  Atlantic  fishing  operations, 
convention  (1967),  with  an- 
nexes: Iceland,  120;  U.S.,  407, 
574 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


649 


Fish  and  fisheries — Continued 

North  Atlantic  fishing  operations — 
Continued 
Northwest  Atlantic  fisheries,  pro- 
tocol  to   international   conven- 
tion (1969)   re  panel  member- 
ship and  regulatory  measures 
Canada,  Denmark,  France,  387 
Germany,    363;    Iceland,    492 
Italy,    Norway,     Poland,    387 
Soviet  Union,  616;  Spain,  387 
U.K.,  U.S.,  363 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific:  John- 
ston, 225;  PhilUps,  222 
Food  Aid  Convention: 
France,  435 
Luxembourg,  343 
Food   and   Agricultural   Organization, 

U.N.:  Black,  381;  Phillips,  286 
Food  and  population   crisis    (see  also 
Population):       DePalma,       376; 
Nixon,    105,    112;    Rogers,    117; 
Schultz,  453;  Yost,  449 
Latin  America  (Rockefeller  Report), 

531 
U.N.    role    in    alleviating:     Nixon, 
301;  U  Thant    (quoted),  450 
Food  for  Peace  program  (Rockefeller 

Report),  535 
For  Free  Men   in   a  Free   World — A 
Survey  of  Human  Rights  in  the 
United  States,  released,  408 
Foreign  aid  programs,  U.S.   {see  also 
Alliance  for  Progress)  : 
Appropriations    requests    FY    1970 

(Rogers),  81,  116,  593 
GNP,  percent  of  (Rogers),  85,  594 
Principles,    objectives,    and    policy: 
DePalma,     376;      (Rockefeller 
Report),  522 
Foreign  aid  programs  of  other  coun- 
tries: 
Canada,  39 
China  (Rogers),  184 
Japan  (Green),  446 
Foreign  policy,  U.S.: 

Congressional  documents  relating  to, 

lists,  75,  219,  251,  424,  636 
Foreign  aid  programs,  relationship: 

284;  Rogers,  84,  116,  594 
Principles,    objectives,    and    policy: 
Nixon,  3;  Richardson,  27,  72, 
207,  257 
Responsibilities:  Rockefeller  Report, 

509;  Rogers,  577 
Review  (Kennedy),  353 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States. 

See  Publications 
Foreign  Service : 

Appointments  and  designations,  115, 

295 
Director    General     (Burns),    desig- 
nated, 200 
Reduction  in  overseas  personnel,  92, 
591 
Foreign  students  in  the  U.S.,  meeting 
with    President    Nixon    (Nixon), 

in 

Fox,  Lawrence  A.,  460,  592 
France : 

Arab-Israeli     conflict,     four-power 

talks  resumed,  630 
Extradition  treaty  talks  with  U.S., 

592 
Monetary  problems  (Kennedy),  355 
Scientific    cooperation    with    U.S.: 
590;  Paine,  309 


France — Continued 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18,  236, 

363,387,435,492,616 
Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers,  625 
Franklin,  William  M.,  247 
Freedom    of    speech:     Hauser,    471; 

Rogers,  581 
Freeth,  Gordon,  186 
Freymond,  Jacques  (quoted),  323,  474 
Frishman,  Robert  (quoted),  282,  324, 

473,  474 
Frost,  Robert  (Trudeau),  69 
Fukuda,  Shoichi,  420 


Gandhi,  Mahatma   (Nixon),   161 
General  Assembly,  U.N. : 

Documents,   lists  of,   59,   255,   295, 

429,  491 
Resolutions : 

Korea,  unification:   Buffum,  609; 

text,  615;  Whalley,  610,  613 
Portuguese  territories,  642rt 
Representation  of  China,  479 
25th  anniversary,  490 
24th  session,  agenda,  383,  460 
U.S.  delegation,  confirmation,  304 
Viet-Nam  prisoners  of  war,  situation 
called  to  attention  of  (Hauser), 
471 
Geneva  accords.  See  Cambodia,  Laos, 

and  Viet-Nam 
Geneva  conventions  (1949)  relative  to 
the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war, 
wounded  and  sick,  armed  forces, 
and  civilians  in  time  of  war  {see 
also      Viet-Nam:      Prisoners      of 
war)  :  Hauser,  472 
Current  actions:    Costa  Rica,  Ethi- 
opia, 407 
Senate  resolution,  210 
Germany,    reunification:     214;    NAC, 

627,  629 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of: 

Apollo      1 1      project,      cooperation 

(Paine),  309 
Chancellor  Brandt,  election 

(Ni.xon),  415 
Nuclear  nonproliferation  treaty,  sig- 
nature:   BufTum,  637;  Rogers, 
545 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,   120, 
198,  236,  295,  363,  407,  574, 
575,  616 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Rush),  confirma- 
tion, 80 
U.S.-German  "hot  line",  213 
U.S.-German  ofTset  agreement  con- 
cluded, 92,  214 
U.S.   visit  of  Chancellor  Kiesinger, 

211 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers,  625 
Ghana,   treaties,  agreements,  etc.,   18, 

407 
Gilbert,  Cari  J.,  38,  124,  564 
Gore,  Louise,  343 
Gottschalk,  John  S.,  420 
Grains,   international    grains   arrange- 
ment (1967),  with  annexes: 
Current      actions:       Austria,      59; 
France,     435;     Lebanon,     59; 
Luxembourg,   343 ;   Venezuela, 
59 
Wheat  marketing  developments,  38 


Great  Lakes,  pollution,  40 

Greece  ( Rogers ) ,  84,  595 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentiab,  550 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  407,  574 

Green,  Marshall,  445 

Greene,  Joseph  N.,  Jr.,  200 

Greenwald,  Joseph  A.,  120 

Grenada,  U.S.  Special  Representative 
(Donovan),  designated,  295 

Gromyko,  .Andrei  A.  (Rogers),  393 

Gruber,  Karl,  64 

Guatemala  (Meyer),  101 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  328,  616 

Guinea     (Bissau),     self-determination 
(Finger),  641 

Guinea   (Conakry),  agricultural  com- 
modities agreement,  492 

Guyana,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  103, 
120 

H 

Habib,  Philip  C:   208,  549-550,  620; 

Nixon,  619 
Haggerty,  Patrick  E.,  339 
Haiti,  U.S.  Ambassador  (Knox),  con- 
firmation, 364 
Hall,  John  W.,  93 
Hander,  Philip,  339 
Hannah,  John  A.:  634;  Rogers,  593 
Hardin,  Clifford  M.,  38,  124 
Harkort,  Guenther,  92 
Harriman,  W.  Averell  (Nixon),  620 
Hartman,  Arthur  A.,  200 
Hauser,  Rita  E.,  304,  471.  475 
Health  and  medical  research: 

Africa,         smallpox         vaccinations 

(Nixon),  634 
Health  regulations  (1969),  interna- 
tional,  with   appendixes,   entry 
into  force,  198 
Latin  America  (Rockefeller  Report), 

534 
Protein     deficiencies,     problem     of 

(Nixon),  105 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  (John- 
ston), 224 
U.S.-France    scientific    cooperation 

talks,  590 
U.S.-Japan     Cooperative     Medical 
Science  Committee,  fifth  meet- 
ing and   text   of  communique, 
215 
World    Health    Organization.    See 
World  Health  Organization 
Hegdahl,  Douglas  B.  (quoted),  282 
Henderson,  Douglas,  328 
Hensley,  Stewart,  202 
Herman,  Richard  L.,  558 
Heuer,  Scott,  Jr.,  464 
Hickel,  Walter  J.:   38,  227  (quoted); 
Johnston,     225;     Nimwes,     230; 
Phillips,  220,  222 
HidayatuUah,  Mohammed,  159 
High  seas,  convention  (1958)  on  the, 

Kenya,  79 
Hightower,  John,  43,  345,  390 
Historical  summaries: 

Science,    international    cooperation 

(Astin),32 
U.S.  Foreign  Relations  series  (Frank- 
lin), 247 
Ho    Chi    Minh:     443;    Nixon,    439; 

Rogers,  579 
Hodgson,  James  D.,  124 
Hoffacker,  Lewis,  576 
Hofstatter,  Herman  E.,  583  | 

Holyoake,  Keith,  186 


650 


DEPARTMENT    OF    STATE    BULLETIN 


Honduras : 

Limitation    of    exports    agreement, 

643 
Swan    Islands    sovereignty    negotia- 
tions with  U.S.,  550 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Ryan),  confirma- 
tion, 364 
Hong  Kong  (Nixon),  144 

Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
184 
Hongladarom,  Sunthom,  379 
Horner,  Garnett  D.,  619 
Hoyt,  James,  93 

Himaan  rights  (see  also  Civil  rights  and 
Racial    discrimination)  :     Rocke- 
feller Report,  500 
Africa:   Hauser,  471;  Phillips,  458; 

Yost,  252 
For  Free  Man  in  a  Free  World — A 
Survey  of  Human  Rights  in  the 
United  States,  released,  408 
U.N.  role  (Yost),  488 
Humes,  John  P.,  344 
Hungary: 

Embassy,  agreement  re  establishment 
of  branch  office  in  New  York, 
388 
U.S.-Hungarian  trade  talks,  214 
Hurwitch,  Robert  A.,  328 
Hydrological    Organization,     Interna- 
tional,  convention    (1967),   with 
annexes:  Germany  (with  reserva- 
tion),   Japan,    79;    Korea,    236; 
Netherlands,  79 


IAEA.    See    Atomic    Energy   Agency, 

International 
IBRD.  See  International  Bank  for  Re- 
construction and  Development 
Iceland: 

Ambassador    to    U.S.,    credentials, 

379 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  103,  120, 

407,492,  616 
U.S.  Ambassador   (Replogle),  con- 
firmation, 80 
ICRC.  See  under  Biafra,  Nigeria,  and 

Viet-Nam:  Prisoners  of  war 
ICSU      (International      Council      of 

Scientific  Unions),  33,  286 
IDA.  See  International  Development 

Association 
lEC     (International    Electrotechnical 

Commission):   Astin,  36 
IMCO.    See    Maritime    Consultative 
Organization,    Intergovernmental 
IMF.     See     Monetary    Fund,     Inter- 
national 
Imports  {see  also  Exports;  Tariffs  and 
trade,     general     agreement     on; 
Trade;  and  name  of  commodity) : 
Commercial  samples  and  advertising 
material,  international  conven- 
tion   (1952)    to   faciHtate   im- 
portation of,  Mauritius,  311 
Japanese  import  quota  restrictions, 

122,  557 
Professional  equipment,  convention 
( 1 96 1 )  on  temporary  importa- 
tion, with  annexes  A,  B,  and  C: 
Germany,  Poland,  236 
U.S.  (see  also  Tariff  policy,  U.S.)  : 
American  Selling  Price:    Gilbert, 
565;  Nixon,  560;  Samuels,  570 


Imports — Continued 
U.S.— Continued 

Limitation  of  meat  imports  from 
Honduras,      agreement      with 
Honduras,  643 
Textiles:    39,    123;   Brodie,  405; 
Johnson,  402;  Nixon,  562 
India : 

Bilateral  talks,  second  round,  403 
Economic  and  social  development: 
335;  Rogers,  83,  118,  179,  594 
Instructional   TV,   agreement   with 

U.S.,  334 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40,  236, 

408 
Visit     of     President     Nixon:      49; 
Hidaytalluh,  159;  Nbion,  158, 
160 
Indonesia: 

Economic    and     political     develop- 
ment: Green,  446;  Nixon,  150; 
Richardson,   28;   Rogers,    179; 
Suharto,  148 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  407,  616 
U.S.  aid  (Rogers),  83,  118,  594 
Visit     of     President     Nixon:      49; 
Nixon,  147,  150,  152;  Suharto, 
_  146,  148 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
177   _ 
Indus      Basin      Development      Fund 

(Rogers),  83 
Industrial  property: 

Convention  of  Paris  (1883),  as  re- 
vised: Austria,  492;  Israel,  276 
World   Intellectual  Property  Orga- 
nization,   convention    (1967): 
Israel,  276;  Spain,  79 
Information  activities  and  programs: 
Apollo  11  (Paine),  309 
Cuba,      American      news      services 

closed,  335 
U.S.-Romania   libraries   agreement, 
196,  199 
INIS  (International  Nuclear  Informa- 
tion System)  :  Seaborg,  330 
Intellectual    Property,    United    Inter- 
national Bureaux  for  the  Protec- 
tion of    (BIRPI),   granted  orga- 
nizational  immunities.   Executive 
order,  421 
Inter-American      Cultural      Council: 
Meyer,  632;  Nixon  (quoted),  25; 
Rockefeller  Report,  513 
Inter-American    Development    Bank: 
Meyer,  23,  632;  Nixon  (quoted), 
24;  Rockefeller  Report,  513 
Executive  Director  ( Costanzo ),  con- 
firmation, 460 
U.S.  Alternate  Governor  (Samuels), 
confirmation,  261 
Inter-American  Development  Commis- 
sion (Rockefeller  Report),  526 
Inter-American  Economic  and  Social 
Council:       634;      Meyer,      631; 
Nixon,  493-494 
Ad   hoc   committee,   establishment: 

26;  Meyer,  25  _ 
6th  ministerial  meeting:  26;  Meyer, 
21 
Inter-American       Press       Association 

(Nixon),  409 
Inter-American     Rural     Development 
Corporation,    proposed     (Rocke- 
feller Report),  532 
Intergovernmental  Oceanographic 

Commission    (Phillips),   286 


International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and  Development:  DePalma,  376; 
Green,  447;  Kennedy,  353;  Rock- 
efeller Report,  514;  Rogers,  83 
Articles     of     agreement      (1945): 
Southern  Yemen,  343;   Swazi- 
land, 328 
U.S.  Alternate  Governor  (Samuels), 

confirmation,  261 
U.S.    Executive    Director     (Wiecz- 
orowski ) ,  confirmation,  457 
International    Boundary    Commission, 
U.S.  and  Canada,  U.S.  Commis- 
sioner (Herman),  named,  558 
International     conferences,     calendar, 

16,305 
International   Copyright   Joint   Study 

Group,  meeting  held,  358 
International  Council  of  Scientific  Un- 
ions: Astin,  33;  Phillips,  286 
International  Court  of  Justice,  54 
Nominations,  announcement,  218 
Statute  of,  current  actions,   Swazi- 
land, 18 
International    Decade   of   Ocean    Ex- 
ploration,    proposed :     Johnston, 
191,  194;  Phillips,  286 
International   Development,   Presiden- 
tial Task  Force  on,  284,  358 
International     Development     Associa- 
tion:  Kennedy,  353;  Meyer,  24; 
Rogers,  82 
U.S.  Alternate  Governor  (Samuels), 
confirmation,  261 
International  Executive  Service  Corps 

(Rockefeller  Report),  526 
International     Finance     Corporation, 
U.S.   Alternate   Governor    (Sam- 
uels), confirmation,  261 
International  Humanitarian  Law  Com- 
mission (Lodge),  282 
International   Hydrological   Organiza- 
tion, convention  (1967),  with  an- 
nexes:   Germany    (with    reserva- 
tion),   Japan,    79;    Korea,    236; 
Netherlands,  79 
International  Labor  Organization.  See 
Labor  Organization,  International 
International    monetary    system:     39, 

123,  214;  Kennedy,  353 
International  organizations  (Rockefel- 
ler Report),  514 
Protocol  annexed  to  universal  copy- 
right  convention    (1952)    con- 
cerning    application  of,     Aus- 
tralia, 407 
Investment      disputes,      convention 
(1965)   re  settlement  of  between 
states     and     nationals     of     other 
states:     Burundi,    492;    Guyana, 
103,   120;  Lesotho,   103;  Mauri- 
tius, 40 
Investment  guaranties,  bilateral  agree- 
ments   with:     Costa    Rica,    435; 
Western  Samoa,  255 
Investment  of  private  capital  abroad: 
123;  Braderman,  359;  DePalma, 
376;  Gilbert,  568;  Kennedy,  353; 
Rogers,  81,  117 
Latin  America:   Meyer,  25;  Nixon, 

412;  Rockefeller  Report,  524 
Overseas    Private    Investment    Cor- 
poration,  proposed :    Rockefel- 
ler Report,  511,  525;  Rogers, 
82,117 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


651 


Iran: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  379 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  199,  255, 

492 
U.S.      Ambassador      (MacArthtir), 

confirmation,  312 
U.S.   visit   of   Shah    Pahlavi:    396; 
Nixon,  397,  399;  Pahlavi,  398, 
399 
Iraq: 

Execution  of  Iraqi  citizens,  246 
International  telecommunication 
convention  (1965),  312 
Ireland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  387, 

407,  616  _ 
Irving,  Frederick,  364 
Israel  (see  also  Arab— Israeli  conflict) : 
Israeli  air  attacks  on  Lebanon  con- 
demned: 275;  Yost,  272 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  276,  328, 

387,407,574 
U.S.  plane  hijacked  to  Syria  (Rog- 
ers), 245 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Meir, 
318 
Italy: 

Extradition  treaty  negotiations  with 

U.S.,  378 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc.,   40,   60, 

103,  328,  387,407,616 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Martin),  confir- 
mation, 344 
Ivory  Coast : 

Global    commercial   communication 
satellite  system,  agreement,  295 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Root),  confirma- 
tion, 464 

J 

Jamaica: 

Air  Transport  agreement  with  U.S., 
430 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  295,  363 

U.S.  Ambassador  (de  Roulet),  con- 
firmation, 328 
Japan : 

Air  transport  agreement  with  U.S., 
573,575 

Asian  economic  development,  role 
in:  123,  557;  Green,  446; 
Rogers,  121 

Civil  aviation,  U.S.-Japan  consulta- 
tions, 75 

Economic  development:  Green,  445, 
448;  Nixon,  412,  552;  Rogers, 
179,  186;  Sato,  554 

Medical  Science,  U.S.-Japan  Coop- 
erative Conrmiittee,  5th  meet- 
ing, 215 

Micronesian  war  claims,  U.S.-Japan 
agreement  (Phillips),  221 

Migratory  birds,  discussion  with 
U.S.  re  conservation,  420 

Okinawa.  See  Okinawa 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18,  60, 
79,  104,  199,  255,  408,  574,  575 

U.S.-Japan  Conference  on  Cultural 
and  Educational  Interchange, 
proposed,  93 

U.S.-Japan  Joint  Committee  on 
Cultural  and  Educational  co- 
operation, meeting,  93 

U.S.-Japan  joint  labor  studies,  123 

U.S.-Japan  Panel  on  Transportation 
Research,  proposed,  124 

652 


Asian  economic  development — Con. 
U.S.-Japan  space  cooperation  agree- 
ment concluded:    195;  Rogers, 
195 
U.S.-Japanese  relations   (Johnson), 

401 
U.S.    trade:     122,    338,    379,    557; 
Johnson,  40 1 -402 ;  Rogers,  121, 
186 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Sato 

(Sato),  551,553,555 
Visit  of  President  Nixon,  49 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 

177 
Visit  of  U.S.  astronauts:  Nixon,  551 ; 
Sato,  553 
Jarring,    Gunnar:    Rogers,    41;    Yost, 

76,272 
Jerusalem: 

Al  Aqsa  Mosque,  damage  to:    245; 

Yost,  307 
Status  of:  78;  Yost,  76,  77 
Jessup,  Philip  C,  219 
Johnson,  Joseph  E.,  304 
Johnson,  U.  Alexis,  191,  215,  401 
Johnston,  Edward  E.:  223,  233;  Phil- 
lips, 221 
Jones,  William  B.,  364 
Jordan,     international     civil     aviation 
convention    (1944),   protocol    on 
authentic  trilingual  text,  363 
Jova,  Joseph  J.,  80 

Judicial  procedures,  service  abroad  of 
judicial  and  extra-judicial  docu- 
ments in  civil  or  commercial  mat- 
ters, convention  (1965);  Den- 
mark, 198;  Finland,  343;  Norway, 
Sweden,  198 

K 

Kalb,  Marvin,  49 

Kaminstein,  Abraham  L.,  358 

Kaul,  T.  N.,  403 

Kennedy,  David  M.,  38,  353,  625 

Kennedy,  John  F.  (quoted),  438 

Kennedy,  Robert  (Richardson),  28 

Kenya: 

Law  of  the  sea  conventions  (1958), 

79 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Mcllvaine),  con- 
firmation, 312 
Kieman,  Owen  (Richardson),  72 
Kiesinger,  Kurt  Georg,  211,213 
King,  Martin  Luther  (Coleman),  459 
Knight,  Ridgway  B.,  80 
Knox,  Clinton  E.,  364 
Korea : 

Reunification:    615;    Buffum,    609; 

Whalley,  610,  613 
U.N.  peacekeeping  efforts,  555,  607 
Korea,  North : 

DMZ  violations.  See  Korea,  Repub- 
lic of:    North  Korean  infiJtra- 
tion 
U.S.  helicopter  crew,  release:   583; 

Yost,  606 
U.S.  travel  restrictions  extended,  362 
Korea,  Republic  of: 

Economic  and  political  develop- 
ment: 243;  Green,  446;  Nixon, 
144,  237,  239,  240,  412;  Park, 
241;  Rogers,  179,  186;  Whal- 
ley, 612 
Military  and  other  aid  to  Viet-Nam: 
243;  Nixon,  238,  239,  619 


Korea,  Republic  of — Continued 

North  Korean   infiltration   and   ag- 
gressive   actions :    243 ;    Nixon, 
237;  Park,  241;  Whalley,  611; 
Yost,  606 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  198,  236, 

295,407,616 
U.S.  aid  (Rogers),  83,  84,  118,  594, 

595 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Park,  237 
Visit  of  President  Nixon,  49 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
177 
Kraft,  Joseph,  345 
Kulkanthorn,  Chalit,  152 
Kurile  Islands  (Phillips),  232 
Kurokawa,  Toshio,  215 
Kuwait: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  120,  255, 

295,  407 
U.S.     Ambassador     (Walsh),    con- 
firmation, 328 
Kuznetsov,  Vasily  V.  (Rogers),  392 


Labor: 

Adjustment    assistance    and    escape 
clause  provisions:  Gilbert,  565, 
566;  NLxon,  560,  561 ;  Samuels, 
570 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 504,  505,  521,  530 
U.S.-Japan  Joint  Study  of  Employ- 
ment, 123 
Labor  Organization,  International: 
Convention    (no.   53)    re  minimum 
requirement  of  professional  ca- 
pacity for  masters  and  officerj 
on  board  merchant  ships,  Israel, 
407 
Convention    (no.    58)    fixing   mini- 
mum age  of  children  for  em- 
ployment at  sea  (1936),  South- 
ern Yemen,  198 
50th  anniversary  (Schultz),  452 
Training  and  educational  programs 
(Black),  381 
Labouisse,  Henry  R.  (Black),  643 
LaFontant,  Jewel,  590 
Laird,  Melvin  R.;  45,  625;  Nixon,  440 
Land-locked  states,  convention  (1965) 
on     transit     trade    of:     Lesotho, 
Swaziland,  18 
Laos: 

Communist  presence  and  influence: 
ANZUS,  187;  Habib,  209; 
Lodge,  31,  114,  115,  245,  316, 
351;  Nixon.  314,  620;  Richard- 
son, 587;  Rogers,  203;  Thieu, 
157;  Walsh,  7 
U.S.  commitment  and  aid,  nature 
of:  Nixon,  115,  314,  620; 
Rogers,  44,  46,  83,  206,  580 
Latin  America: 

Catholic  Church,  role   (Rockefeller 

Report),  504 
Communism  in:  Meyer,  101 ;  Nixon, 
413;  Rockefeller  Report,   505, 
506,  516,  537,  538 
Consensus   of   Vifia   del   Mar:    26; 
Lleras,  12;  Meyer,  21,  24,  634 
Economic  and  social  development: 
Dec.  of  Port-of-Spain,  text,  26; 
Lleras,     12;    Meyer,    22,    101, 
632;    NLxon,    105,    262,    417; 
Rockefeller   Report,   501,   506, 
518 

DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE    BULLETIN 


Latin  America — Continued 

Health   programs    (Rockefeller  Re- 
port), 536 
Labor    (Rockefeller   Report),   528, 

530 
Nuclear-free  area  (Yost),  600 
Political  development  and  problems 
(Rockefeller  Report),  502,  506 
Private  investment,  role:  Meyer,  25, 

633 ;  Nixon,  412 
Regional      economic      integration : 
Meyer,  632;  Nixon,  411,  412, 
493;  Rockefeller  Report,  512 
Trade  policies  and  problems:  Meyer, 
24,    632;    Nixon,    410,    411; 
Rockefeller  Report,    501,  519, 
520,  522 
U.S.    aid:     Meyer,    24,    100,    633; 
Nixon,   410,   413,   493;   Rock- 
efeller Report,  522;  Rogers,  594 
Appropriations  request  FY   1970 
(Rogers),  83 
U.S.    relations,    policy,    and    role: 
Lleras,   11;  Meyer,  21;  Nixon, 
303,  409;   Rockefeller  Report, 
501,     507,     509,     514,     518; 
Rogers,  203 
Visit     of     Governor     Rockefeller: 
Meyer,  23;  Nixon,  4,  22,  303, 
315;  Rogers,  203 
.\dvisers:    493;    Rockefeller,   496 
Demonstrations    during:     Nixon, 

5 ;  Rockefeller,  497 
Rockefeller  Report:   Meyer,  631; 
Nixon,  493 ;  Rockefeller,  495 
Preamble  (Rockefeller),  499 
Text,  501 
Latin     America,     U.S.     Council     for 

(Rockefeller  Report),  526 
Latin   American  Free  Trade  Associa- 
tion: Nixon,  412;  Rockefeller  Re- 
port, 512 
Laurent,  Pierre,  590 
LavkT  of  the  sea,  conventions  (1958): 
Leonard,  366 
Accession,  Kenya,  79 
Lebanon : 

Israeli  air  attacks:    275;  Yost,  272 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  59,  387 
Leestma,  Robert  C,  93 
Leonard,  James  E.,  365,  425,  480 
Lesotho,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18, 

103 
Less  developed  countries: 
Agriculture.  See  Agriculture 
Economic  and  social  development: 
DePalma,     375;    Nixon,     105; 
Rogers,  84,  116 
UNICEFrole  (Black),  642 
Marine  research,  interest  in  (John- 
son), 192 
Nuclear   technology,   benefits:    Buf- 

fum,  637;  Yost,  602 
Trade  development  and  problems: 
39,  123;Meyer,  24,  632;NLxon, 
494,  560;   Rockefeller  Report, 
520 
U.S.  aid:    Meyer,  23;  Nbcon,   106; 

Rogers,  81,  116 
Youth,  role  (Black),  381 
Lewis,  Verne  B.,  331 
Liberia : 

Tonnage  measurement  of  ships,  con- 
vention (1969)  on,  407 
U.S.      Ambassador      (Westerfield), 
confirmation,  80 

INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 

377-145—70 2 


Libya : 

U.S.    Ambassador     (Palmer),    con- 
firmation, 80 
Universal  Postal  Union  Constitution 

(1964), 295 
U.S.  diplomatic  relations  continued, 
281 
Linder,  HaroIdF.,38 
Lisagor,  Peter,  3,  314 
Lleras   Restrepo,   Carlos:    9,    11,    13; 

Meyer,  21 
Load  lines: 

International     convention      (1933) 
with    final    protocol    and    an- 
nexes, denunciations:  Australia, 
Czechoslovakia,    Finland,    Ger- 
many, Korea,  Kuwait,  Norway, 
South  Africa,  Turkey,  U.A.R., 
295  ;  U.K.,  U.S.,  198 
International     convention     (1966), 
current    actions:     Brazil,    343; 
Czechoslovakia,      79;      Korea, 
198;  Poland,  Southern  Y'emen, 
79 
Lodge,    Henry    Cabot:    578;    Rogers, 
206,  349 
News  briefing,  transcript,  548 
Resignation  as  head  of  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  Paris:  549;  Lodge,  548, 
550;  Nixon,  550 
Statements,  29,  52,  62,  91,  113,  124, 
188,  189,  244,  281,  303,  316, 
333,  350,  369,  395,  414,  444, 
468,  546,  547,  549,  588 
Loepke,  Malcolm,  583 
Lord  Keynes  (quoted),  27 
Lunar  exploration.  See  Outer  space: 

Apollo  1 1 
Lusaka  Manifesto  of  East  and  Central 

African  States,  cited,  56 
Luxembourg: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  352 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,   18,   199, 
343 
Lydman,  Jack  W.,  312 

M 

Mac.\rthur,  Douglas  11,  312 
MacLeod,  CoHn,  215 
Macomber,  William  B.,  Jr.,  344 
Magnusson,  Magnus  V.,  379 
Mahatma  Ghandi  (Coleman),  459 
Malagasy    Republic,    treaties,    agree- 
ments, etc.,  387,  616 
Malawi,  customs  convention  (1956)  on 

containers,  18 
Malaysia : 

Economic      development:       Nixon, 

412;  Rogers.  179 
U.K.     armed     forces,     withdrawal 

(ANZUS),  187 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Lydman),   con- 
firmation, 312 
Maldive  Islands,  international  regula- 
tions for  preventing  collisions  at 
sea  (1960),  255 
MaU: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  379 
Nuclear    weapons     nonproliferation 
treaty  (1968),  103 
Malta: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40,  79 
U.S.   Ambassador    (Pritzlaff),   con- 
firmation, 80 
Marcos,  Ferdinand  E.,  141,  144 


Marine  science: 

Commission  on  Marine  Science,  En- 
gineering and  Resources  (John- 
son), 193 
Seabed,    exploration    and    exploita- 
tion:  DePalma,  377;  Johnson, 
191;  Leon.ard,  365;  McKelvey, 
287;    Phillips,    285;   Yost,   605 
U.S.-France  scientific  talks  contin- 
ued, 590 
Maritime    Consultative    Organization, 
Intergovernmental:  460;  Phillips, 
286 
Maritime  matters.  See  Ships  and  ship- 
ping 
Marriage,  convention   (1964)  on  con- 
sent, minimum  age,  and  registra- 
tion of  marriages:    Austria,  435; 
Germany,     198;     Trinidad     and 
Tobago,  435 
Martin,  Graham  A.,  323,  344 
Mauritania,  international   telecommu- 
nication convention   (1965),  387 
Mauritius,    treaties,    agreements,    etc., 
40.  103,  236,  276,  295  (with  reser- 
vation), 311,  312,  327,  328,  344, 
363 
Mayer,  Jean,  48 
McCain,  John  S.,  Jr.:    282;  Rogers, 

177 
McCloskey,  Robert  J. :  103,  362 ;  Rog- 
ers, 46 
McComie,  Valerie  T.,  379 
McCracken,  Paul  W.,  38,  124 
Mcllvaine,  Robinson,  312 
McKelvey,  Vincent  E.:  287,  290;  Phil- 
lips, 286 
McKernan,  Donald  L.,  191,  216,  420 
McLaren,  Richard  W.,  491 
Meeker,  Leonard  C,  120 
Meir,  Golda,  318,  320,  322 
Mekong  River  (Green ) ,  446 
Melady,  Thomas  Patrick,  464 
Meteorological  research : 

Bilateral  agreements  with:  Ecuador, 

643;  India,  236 
Swan  Islands,  550 
U.S.-France    scientific    cooperation 

continued,  590 
World      Meteorological     Organiza- 
tion:   Astin,   36;   Phillips,   286 
Convention     (1947),     Mauritius, 
103 
Mexico : 

Amistad  Dam  dedication  ceremony: 
Diaz  Ordaz,  278,  279;  Nixon, 
277,279,280 
Apollo    il    astronauts,    visit:    Diaz 

Ordaz,  279;  Nixon,  280 
Chamizal:  Diaz  Ord.iz,  278;  Frank- 
lin, 251 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18,  80 
Meyer,  Armin  H.,  124 
Meyer,  Charies  A.,  21,  100,  215,  631, 

634 
Meyer,  Francis  G.,  344 
Micronesia.  See  Trust  Territory  of  the 

Pacific 
Military  assistance  (Richardson),  258 
Appropriations    requests    FY    1970 

(Rogers),  84,  118,  595 
Latin  America,  U.S.  policy:  Meyer, 
100;  Rockefeller  Report,  516, 
517  _ 
U.S.-Spain  agreement,  te.xt  of  note, 
15 

653 


Military  bases,  Trust  Territory  of  the 

Pacific  (Phillips),  232 
Military  mission  agreement  with  Iran, 

199 
Minarik,  Charles  E.,  635 
Monaco,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40, 

311,616 
Monetary  Fund,  International: 
Annual  meeting  (Kennedy),  353 
Articles     of     agreement      (1945): 
Swaziland,   328;  Southern  Ye- 
men, 343 
Asian  development,  role  in  (Green), 

447 
Special    drawing    rights:     38,    123, 

214;  Kennedy,  356 
U.S.  Alternate  Governor  (Samuels), 
confirmation,  261 
Mongolia : 

Racial     discrimination,     convention 

(1965)  on  elimination,  312 
U.S.       recognition,       question       of 
(Rogers),  185 
Moore,  Jonathan,  328 
Morito,  Tatsuo,  93 
Morocco,      agricultural     commodities 

agreement,  363 
Morrison,  William  L.,  460 
Morse,  David  A.  (Schultz),  453 
Moynihan,  Daniel  P.,  261,  416,  451 
Mozambique,  59 

Self-determination  (Finger),  641 
Mutual  defense: 

Bilateral  agreements  with:  Belgium 
199;  Japan,  104;  Norway,  344 
Romania,   199;  Spain,   15,   18 
U.K.,  388 
U.S.-Germany  (Nixon),  211 
U.S.-Japan,  556 

N 

Namibia  (Soutli  West  Africa)  :  Finger, 
641;  Hauser,  471;  Phillips,  458; 
Yost,  252 
Narcotic  drugs: 

Convention    for    limiting   manufac- 
ture and  regulating  distribution 
(1931),    and    protocol,    Mau- 
ritius, 276 
Opium  and  other  drugs,  convention 
(1912)      and     final     protocols 
re     suppression     of    abuse    of, 
Mauritius,  276 
Single  convention   (1961)   on:   Bel- 
gium,    464;     Mauritius,     276; 
Monaco,     311;     Nigeria,     60; 
Upper  Volta,  363 
Additions     to     schedules,     entry 
into  force,  643 
U.S.-France    treaty    modifications, 
592 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Ad- 
ministration.    See     Communica- 
tions:      Satellites      and      Outer 
space 
National  Security  Council:  92;  Nixon, 
2,  304;  Richardson,  257;  Rocke- 
feller Report,  510;  Rogers,  577 
Nationalism:     Marcos,     144:     Nixon, 

143,  298;  Richardson,  27 
Nationality: 

Acquisition  of  optional  protocol  to 
Vienna  conventions  (1961), 
Italy,  103 
Double  nationality,  protocol  (1930) 
re  military  obligations  in  cer- 
tain cases  of,  Mauritius,  344 


Nationality — Continued 

NATO   and   the  Defense   of   Europe, 

released,  344 
Naiuoi,   treaties,  agreements,   etc.,  60, 

236 
Near  and  Middle  East  {see  also  Arab- 
Israeli     conflict     and     name     of 
country)  : 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States:       Diplomatic      Papers, 
1945,  Volume  VIII,  The  Near 
East  and  Africa,  released,  19 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States,  1946,  Volume  VII,  The 
Near  East  and  Africa,  released, 
644 
Soviet  naval  activity  (Rogers),  205 
Nehmer,  Stanley,  338 
Netherlands: 

.Ambassador     to    U.S.,    credentials, 

379 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,   104, 

311,  363,  574,  616 
U.S.-Netherlands  air  transport  ne- 
gotiations concluded,  115 
U.S.-Netherlands     tax     convention 
transmitted  to  Senate  (Nixon), 
386 
Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 
Neuman.  Robert  H.,  460 
Neureiter,  Norman,  339 
New  Zealand: 

ANZUS,       19th      meeting:        186; 

Rogers,  180 
Malaysia     and     Singapore,     armed 

forces  in  (.'\NZUS),  187 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,  295, 

328 
Visit  of  President  Nixon,  49 
Visit  of  Secretary  Rogers  (Rogers), 
177 
Newly  independent  nations    (see  also 
Less  developed  countries)  :  Rich- 
ardson, 28,  258 
Newman,  Edwin,  345 
Newsom,  David  D.,  80,  422 
Niger: 

Convention  (1963)  on  offenses  and 

certain  other  acts  committed  on 

board  aircraft,  ratification,  236 

Smallpox  vaccinations  (Nixon),  634 

Nigeria  (see  also  Biafra)  : 

.■\rms  supply  to  (Richardson) ,  96 
Four-power  talks,   proposed    (Rich- 
ardson), 97 
OAU     role:      Haile     Selassie,     90: 
Nixon,    280;    Richardson,    96: 
Rogers,  206,  280 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  60,  435 
U.S.  and  other  relief  efforts:  Black, 
635,    643;    Ferguson,    14,    97; 
Richardson,  94;  Rogers,  48,  51, 
206,  280,  469 
U.S.  .Ambassador  (Trueheart),  con- 
firmation, 328 
Nimwes,  Chutomu:  230;  Phillips,  221 
Nitze,  Paul:  66;  Rogers,  390 
Niven,  Paul,  577 
Nixon,  Richard  M. : 

.\ddrcsses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Action  for  progress  in  the  Ameri- 
cas, 409 
Africa,  105,  262 

Smallpox  vaccinations,  634 
Aircraft  hijackings,  300 
Alliance  for  Progress,  22,  410 
Amistad  Dam,  277,  279,  280 


Nixon,  Richard  M. — Continued 

.\ddresses,  remarks,  and  statements 

— Continued 
Andean  Common  Market,  8,  412 
Apollo   11,    111,    142,    147,    150, 

166,  172,  174,  176,  301,  302 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,  4,  172,  299, 

318,  322 
Arms  control,  172 

MIRV  tests,  question  of  effect, 
2 

Seabed,  300 
Asia,  105,  143,  156,  164,  172,  315 

Self-determination,     154,     158, 
164 

U.S.  policy  and  relations,  145, 
154,  158,  172,440 
Asian    Development    Bank,    121, 

143 
Big-power  responsibility,  298,  302, 

551,  553 
Chemical  and  biological  warfare, 

65,  300,  541 
Conununist  China,  300 
East- West  relations,  112,  171,  211 
Economic  and  social  development, 

300,  412 
Eisenhower,      Dwight     D.,      329 

(quoted) 
Eisenhower  Fellows,  372 
ENDC,  65 

Environmental  control,  107,  300 
Food  and  population  crisis,   105, 

112,  301 
Germany,  211,  415 
Indonesia,  147,  150,  152 
International  cooperation,  302 
Japan,  412,  552 
Korea,   144,  237,  239,  240,  412, 

619 
Laos,  115,314,600 
Latin  America,  105 

Rockefeller  visit  and  report,  4, 
22,303,315,409,493 
Mexico,  visit  to,  279,  280 
Nationalism,  143,298 
Nuclear   comprehensive   test   ban 

treaty,  proposed,  65 
Nuclear    nonproliferation    treaty, 

300,  329  (quoted),  543,  544 
OAS,  8,  410 
OAU,  86,  280 
Outer  space,  300 
Peace  Corps,  301,  325 
People  to  People  program,  372 
Presidential  powers,  4 
Safeguard  ABM  system,  5 
St.    Lawrence   Seaway,    10th   an- 
niversary', 67,  70 
SALT  talks,  2,  65,  172,  300,  313, 

543,  618 
Science      and      technology,      25 

(quoted),  413 
SE.ATO,  153 
Trade,  494,  559 

U.N.   Second   Development  Dec- 
ade, 301,  325 
U.S.-Canadian  relations,  67 
Viet-Nam    (for  details,  see  Wel- 
Nani)  : 

Cease-fire,    proposed,    3,    302, 
313,438 

Communist    infiltration    levek, 
313,  315,441,  620 

Communist     responsibility,     2, 
61,298,439 

Congressional  hearings,  314 


654 


DEPARTMENT    OF    STATE    BULLETIN 


Nixon,  Richard  M. — Continued 

Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements 
— Continued 
Viet-Nara — Continued 
Deescalation,  617 
Economic     development,     315, 

617 
Ho  Chi  Minh,  effect  of  death 

of,  315 
Internationally  supervised  elec- 
tions, proposed,   2,   61,   155, 

302,  313,  438 

Military  aid  from  other  coun- 
tries, 238,  239,  619 

My  Lai  incident,  617 

National  Liberation  Front,  61, 
303 

Paris  peace  talks,  1,  61,  64 
(quoted),  155,303,313,437, 
438,619 

Peace,  U.S.  goal,  146,  155,  298, 
313,  373,  443 

Presidential  responsibility,  371, 
618 

Self-determination,     61,      298, 

303,  314,  438 

South  Vietnamese  armed  forces, 

155,440,  617,619 
South  Vietnamese  government, 

3,155,315 
U.S.  casualties,  313,  441 
U.S.     military     forces,     with- 
drawal, conditions  and  tim- 
ing, 1,  62,  156,  298,  302,  313, 
438,  440,  618 
-U.S.  policy,  3,  61,  302,  438,  440 
U.S.  public  opinion  and  morale, 
316,  371,  437,  441 

World  peace,  66,   112,   161,  171, 
297,  302,  373,  414,  551,  553 
Correspondence  and  messages: 

Chancellor  Brandt  of  Germany, 
election,  415 

Ho  Chi  Minh,  to,  439;  text,  443 

Inter-American  Economic  and 
Social  Council,  6th  ministerial 
meeting,  22 

International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  13th  General  Confer- 
ence, 329 

International  Volunteer  Corps, 
proposed,  325 

Lodge,  acceptance  of  resignation, 
550 

Multilateral  disarmament  negotia- 
tions, ENDC  efforts  urged,  65 

OAU,  6th  assembly,  280 

Peace  Corps,  325 

Rockefeller  visit  to  Latin  America, 
303 

S.\LT  preliminary  talks,  543 

Viet-Nam,  U.S.  policy,  371 
Family  of  Man  Award,  394n 
Foreign  policy:  Lodge,  350;  NLxon, 
302;  Richardson,  257;  Rogers, 
346 
Meetings  with : 

Foreign  exchange  students.  111 

Heads  of  State  and  officials  of, 
remarks  and  joint  communi- 
ques: Colombia,  8;  Ethiopia, 
86;  Germany,  211;  India,  158; 
Indonesia,  148;  Iran,  396;  Is- 
rael, 318;  Japan,  551:  Korea, 
237;  Pakistan,  162  ;  Philippines, 
141;  Romania,  167;  Thailand, 
152;  U,K.,  174;  Viet-Nam,  155 


Nixon,  Richard  M. — Continued 
Meetings  with — Continued 

Heads  of  State,  etc, — Continued 
Messages,    letters,    and    reports    to 
Congress: 
Atlantic-Pacific   Interoceanic  Ca- 
nal Study  Commission,  5th  an- 
nual report,  transmittal,  218 
Canada-U.S.    flood    control   pay- 
ment   agreement,     transmittal, 
'163 
Consular    convention    with    Bel- 
gium, transmittal,  424 
International   Coffee   Agreement, 
4  th  annual  report,  transmittal, 
262 
Population    growth    and    related 

problems,  105 
Trade  Act  of  1969,  559 
U.S.-Netherlands  tax  convention, 
transmittal,  386 
News    conferences,     transcripts,     1, 

313,617 
Nishan-e-Pakistan  medal,  presenta- 
tion: Anwar  Khan,  164;  Nixon, 
164  _ 
Presidential  responsibilities:   Lodge, 

370;  Nixon,  371 
Round  the  world  trip:  Agnew,  175; 
Rogers,  179 
Schedule,  141 
Visit  to  Asia:  49,  141;  Richardson, 

50,  185;  Rogers,  42,  185 
Visit  to  Europe  (Richardson),  168, 

260 
Visit  to  Romania:   49;  Nixon,  168, 
171,    172,    173,    176;  Richard- 
son, 50,  260;  Rogers,  42,  206 
Nkundabagenzi,  Fidele,  352 
Non-nuclear  weapon  states,  conference 

(Buffum),637 
North    Atlantic    Council,    ministerial 
meeting,  Brussels ;  text  of  declara- 
tion, 628;  text  of  final  communi- 
que, 627 
U.S.  delegation,  625 
North  Atlantic  Treaty   (Rogers),  545 
Status     of     International     Military 
Headquarters        protocol        on 
(1952),  Germany,  574 
Status  of  personnel  at  International 
Military    Headquarters,    agree- 
ment (1969)  :  Germany,  Neth- 
erlands, U.K.,  U.S.,  574 
Entry  into  force,  574 
U.S.  and  U.K.  armed  forces  and  In- 
ternational Military  Headquar- 
ters, agreement    (1969)    re  ac- 
commodation: Germany,  U.K., 
U.S.,  574 
Entry  into  force,  574 
North  .-Atlantic  Treaty  Organization: 
Ceausescu,  173;  Richardson,  260; 
Rogers,  64,  622,  626 
Committee  on  Challenges  of  Modern 
Society:  Moynihan,  416;  NAC, 
627,  629;  Rogers,  624 
U.S.  Representative  (Moynihan), 
451 
Enviroimiental  study,  head  of  U.S. 

delegation   (Moynihan),  261 
European   security   conference,   pro- 
posed:   Richardson,   259,  587; 
Rogers,  624 
Meeting  with  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 
Mutual   force  reduction,  proposed: 
N.\C,  628,  629;  Rogers,  623 


North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization — 
Continued 
Role:  Finger,  642;  Rogers,  400 
S.VLT  talks,  consultations  proposed : 
213;  NAC,  627;  Rogers,  339, 
392 
Science  Committee: 
Meeting,  352 

U.S.  Representative   (Rabi),  352 
Special  Brussels  session,  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative (Richardson),  448 
Norway,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  198, 

295,  344,  387,  407,  643 
Nuclear         nonproliferation         treaty 
(1968):       Nixon,       300,       329 
(quoted),  543;  Rogers,  466;  Yost, 
601 
Current  actions:    Austria,  40;  Bul- 
garia,     276;      Czechoslovakia, 
120;    Germany,    575;    Iceland, 
Mali,  103;  New  Zealand,  295; 
Switzerland,  U.S.,  575 
Entry  into  force,  prospects   (Yost), 

600 
Germany,  signature:    Buffum,  637; 

Rogers,  545,  623 
Safeguards,     IAEA    role:     Buffum, 

639;Seaborg,  331 
Soviet  position:   Buffum,  637;  Rog- 
ers, 393,  623  ;  Yost,  602 
U.S.     ratification:      Buffum,     637; 
Nixon,  544;  Rogers,  544,  623; 
Yost,  602 
Nuclear  test  ban  treaty,  comprehensive, 
proposed:   Nixon,  65;  Yost,  601, 
603 
Nuclear    testing,    MIRV:    Nixon,    2; 

Rogers,  204,  389,  391,  393 
Nuclear  weapons    {see   also  Disarma- 
ment) : 
Japan,  position,  556 
Latin  America,  prohibition   (Yost), 

600 
Nuclear  arms  race:  557;  Rogers,  41, 
467,  623;  U  Thant   (quoted), 
450;  Yost.  449,  487,  604 
Seabed,  arms  limitation  draft  treat- 
ies:   DePalma,  338,  375,  377; 
Johnson,    192;    Leonard,    365, 
425;   Nixon,   65,   300;  Rogers, 
366;  text,  367 
Revised  text:  483;  Leonard,  480; 
NAC,  627;  Rogers,  466,  623; 
Yost,  603 

o 

Ocean  Exploration,  International 
Decade  of,  proposed :  Johnson, 
191,  194;  PhilHps,  286 

Oceanographic  Commission,  Inter- 
governmental (Phillips),  286 

OECD.  See  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment 

Office  of  Economic  Opportunity 
(Nixon),  110 

Ohira,  Masayoshi,  338 

Oil  pollution.  See  Environmental 
problems   and  Pollution 

Okinawa:  122,  555;  Nixon,  554; 
Rogers,  184,  186;  Sato,  552,  555 

Olds,  Glenn  A.,  304 

Operation  Reduction  (OPRED),  591 

OPIC  (Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corporation)  :  Rogers,  82,  117 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


655 


OPRED   (Operation  Reduction),  591 
Organization   for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development: 
Generalized    trade   preferences    sys- 
tem, proposed:  39,  123;  Meyer, 
24,  632;  NL\on,  494 
Restrictive  Business  Practices  Com- 
mittee,     U.S.      Representative 
(McLaren)  and  delegation,  491 
Trade     committee     meeting,     U.S. 

Representative  (Cronk),  460 
U.S.    Representative    (Greenwald), 
confirmation,  120 
Organization  of  African  Unity:    Fin- 
ger, 641;  Haile  Selassie,  87,  90; 
Nixon,  86 
Nigerian    civil    war    peace    efforts: 
Richardson,   96;   Rogers,   206, 
280 
6th  annual  assembly   (Nixon),  280 
Organization     of     American     States: 
Meyer,  23 ;  Nixon,  8,  410;  Rocke- 
feller Report,  513 
Charter     (1948),    current    actions, 

Jamaica,  295 
Council  for  Education,  Science,  and 
Culture,  proposed  (Rockefeller 
Report),  529 
Labor  conference,  proposed  (Rocke- 
feller Report),  529 
Organization     of     American     States, 
Council     of,     U.S.     Ambassador 
( Jova) ,  confirmation,  80 
Ortoli,  Fransois  X.,  590 
Outer  space: 

Apollo  11:  122,  557;  Ceausescu, 
169;  Diaz  Ordaz,  279;  Hida- 
yatullah,  159;  Marcos,  141; 
Nixon,  111,  142,  147,  150,  166, 
172,  174,  176,  301,  302;  Paine, 
309;  Rogers,  42,  121,  178,  185, 
195;  Sato,  551,  553;  Suharto, 
146,  149;  Thacher,  340;  Wil- 
son, 174 
Astronauts  round  the  vk-orld  trip: 
214;  Diaz  Ordaz,  279;  Nixon, 
280 
Liability  convention,  proposed: 
Blagonravov  (quoted),  342; 
Thacher,  340 
Mars,     Viking    missions,     proposed 

(Thacher),  340 
Space  research  and  technolog\':  214 
Astin,      37;      DePalma,      377 
NLxon,     301;     Thacher,     340 
Yost,  377 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.: 

Bilateral  agreements  with:    Italy, 

40,  60;  Japan,  191,  195 
Exploration    and     use    of    outer 
space,      treaty      (1967)      on: 
Lebanon,  60;  Netherlands,  363 
Rescue  and  return  of  astronauts 
and    space    vehicles,    agree- 
ment   (1967):     Paine,    310; 
Thacher,  340 
Current  actions:   Iceland,  616; 
Lebanon,  60;  New  Zealand, 
79;  South  Africa,  363;  Swe- 
den,   120;   Syrian  Arab  Re- 
public, 387 
U.N.  role  (Nixon),  300 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion (Rogers),  82,  117 


Pahlavi,  Mohammad  Reza  Shah,  396, 

398,  399 
Paine,  Thomas  O.,  309 
Pakistan : 

Economic    development    and    U.S. 
aid:  Rogers,  83,  118,  179,  594; 
Yahya,  165 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  104,  387, 

407,  408 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Farland),   con- 
firmation, 328 
Visit  of  President  Nixon:  49;  .\nwar 
Khan,    164;   Nixon,    163,    164, 
165;  Yahya,  162,  165 
Palmer,  Joseph  II,  80 
Pan    American    Health    Organization 

(Rockefeller  Report),  534,  536 
Panama: 

International     whaling     convention 

(1946),  18 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Sayre),    confir- 
mation, 312 
Paraguay : 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  80,  312, 

407,  435 
U.S.  Ambassador   (Ylitalo),  confir- 
mation, 120 
Paris  peace  talks.  See  under  Viet-Nam 
Park  Chung  Hee,  237,  239,  240,  242 
Patents.  See  Industrial  property 
Peace  Corps  program:  Johnston,  225; 
Nixon,  301,  325;  Rockefeller  Re- 
port, 536 
Bilateral   agreement  with   Trinidad 
and  Tobago,  199 
Pearson  Commission:  284;  Rogers,  82, 

593 
People    to   People   program    (Nixon), 

372 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  U.S. 

membership,  54 
Peru: 

Fisheries  conference,  216,  217 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Belcher),    con- 
firmation, 200 
U.S.  relations  (Rockefeller),  497 
Peterson,     Rudolph     A.:     284,     358; 

Rogers,  595 
Petty,  John  R.,  124,592 
Phihppincs:   Nixon,  143;  Rogers,  179 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  312,  387, 

407 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Byroade),   con- 
firmation, 120 
Visit  of  President  Nixon:  49;  Mar- 
cos, 141,  144 
Phillips,    Christopher    H.,    220,    231, 

285,  287,  293,  304,  458 
Phlcger,  Herman,  54 
Pickering,  Thomas,  304 
Piatt,  John  (quoted),  418 
Podgorny,  President  (quoted),  468 
Poland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79, 

236,295,387,407,616 
Pollack,  Herman,  191,  339 
Pollution      {see     also     Emaronmental 
problems)  : 
Air  and  water,  40 
Oil: 

Civil  liability  for  oil  pollution 
damage,  international  conven- 
tion (1969)  :  Cameroon,  China, 
France,  Germany,  Guatemala, 
Iceland,  Indonesia,  Italy, 
Korea,      Malagasy      Republic, 


Pollution   {see  also  Environmental)  — 
Continued 
Oil — Continued 

Ciwl  liability,  etc. — Continued 
Monaco,    Poland,    Switzerland, 
U.K.,  U.S.,  Yugoslavia,  616 
International    Legal    Conference 
on   Marine   Pollution   damage, 
U.S.      Representative       (Neu- 
man),  460 
Intcr\'ention  on  high  seas  in  cases 
of  oil   pollution  casualties,  in- 
ternational convention  (1969), 
with  annex:  Cameroon,  China, 
France,   Germany,   Guatemala, 
Iceland,        Indonesia,        Italy, 
Korea,      Malagasy      Republic, 
Monaco,    Poland,    Switzerland, 
U.K.,  U.S.,  Yugoslavia,  616 
Prevention  of  pollution  of  sea  by 
oil,     international     convention 
(1956),  with  annexes:    South- 
ern Yemen,  79 
Pomeranz,  Morton,  592 
Pope  Paul  VI  (Richardson),  96 
Population  growth  (NLxon),  105 

Control:  Black,  643;  DePalma,  376; 
Nixon,     106;    Rockefeller    Re- 
port, 534;  Rogers,  81,  117 
India,  335 

U.N.      Population      Commission, 
U.S.  Representative   (Draper), 
appointment,  484 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 503, 519 
U.S.  (Nixon),  106 
Portuged : 

Civil  aviation  negotiations  with  U.S. 

concluded,  470 
Portuguese  overseas  territories  (Fin- 
ger), 641 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  60,   103, 

119,  120,407 
U.N.  economic  sanctions,  proposed: 

58 ;  Yost,  58 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Knight),    con- 
finnation,  80 
Postal  matters: 

Parcel    post   agreement   with    Iran, 

492 
Postal    Union,   Universal,   constitu- 
tion  (1964),  with  final  proto- 
col: Brazil,  311 ;  Bulgaria,  295; 
Burma,  255  :  Burundi,  18;  Cam- 
bodia,    328;     Ecuador,     575; 
Libya,   Mauritius    (with   reser- 
vation ) ,  295 ;  Netherlands,  311; 
Romania,  18;  Swaziland  (with 
reservation),    575;    Venezuela, 
387 
Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and 
Spain,  convention   (1966)   and 
parcel  post  agreement  (1966), 
with  final  protocols,  Brazil,  236 
Potter,  Philip,  4,  314 
Prisoners : 

China,  Communist  (Rogers),  186 
Geneva  conventions  (1949)  relative 
to    treatment    of    prisoners    of 
war,  wounded  and  sick,  armed 
forces,  and  civilians  in  time  of 
war,  Costa  Rica,  Ethiopia,  407 
Viet-Nam.  See  under  Viet-Nam 
PritzlafT,  John  C,  Jr.,  80 
Proclamations  by  the  President,  United 
Nations  Day,  1969,  {3924),  217 


656 


DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE   BULLETIN 


* 


Project  Helios,  214 
Public  Law  480,  339 
Publications: 

Congressional  documents  relating  to 
foreign    policy,   lists,    75,    219, 
251,  424,  636 
Obscene     publications,     agreement 
(1910)  re  repression  of  circula- 
tion, Mauritius,  311 
Official    publications    and    govern- 
ment    documents,     convention 
(1958)    re   exchange   of,   Ger- 
many, 575 
State  Department: 

For  Free  Men  in  a  Free  World — 
A  Survey  of  Human  Rights  in 
the  United  States,  released,  408 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States  (Franklin),  247 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States:  Diplomatic  Papers, 
1945,  Volume  VII,  The  Far 
East:  China,  released,  256 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States:  Diplomatic  Papers, 
1945,  Volume  VIII,  The  Near 
East  and  Africa,  released,  19 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1945,  Volume  VI,  The 
British  Commonwealth;  The 
Far  East,  released,  104 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1946,  Volume  V,  The 
British  Commonwealth ;  West- 
ern and  Central  Europe,  re- 
leased, 60 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1946,  Volume  VI,  East- 
ern Europe;  The  Soviet  Union, 
released,  388 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1946,  Volurne  VII,  The 
Near  East  and  Africa,  released, 
644 

NATO  and  the  Defense  of  Eu- 
rope, released,  344 

Recent  releases,  lists,  19,  40,  104, 
199,  256,  296,  344,  364,  388, 
408,  436,  575,  644 

Treaties  and  Other  International 
Agreements  of  the  United 
States  of  America  1776-1949, 
second  volume  released,  19 

Trust    Territory    of    the    Pacific 
Islands,  223n 
U.N.  documents,  lists,  59,  78,  255, 
295,  429,  491 

R 

Rabi,  1. 1.,  352 

Racial   discrimination    [see   also   Civil 
rights.      Human      rights.      South 
Africa  and  Southern  Rhodesia) : 
Apartheid:    Hauser,    471;    Schultz, 
453;Yost,  252,  489 
Lusaka    Manifesto    of    East    and 
Central  African  States,  cited,  56 
International  convention  (1965)  on 
elimination  of:    Austria,   Mon- 
golia (with  reservation),  311 
Radio: 

Broadcasting  in  standard  band,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Mexico, 
18,79 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller     Re- 
port), 537, 538 

INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


Radio — Continued 

Licensed   amateur   radio   operators, 
bilateral  agreements  reciprocal 
operation:  France,  387;  Guate- 
mala, 328;  Sweden,  18 
Partial  revision  of  radio  regulations 
(1959),  as  amended,  re  mari- 
time  mobile   service,   with  an- 
nexes and  final  protocol:  Aus- 
tralia, 387;  Germany,  575;  In- 
dia,  40;   Pakistan,   387;   Para- 
guay, 312;  South  Africa,  387; 
U.K.,  104 
Radio  telephone  operation,  conven- 
tion (1969)  with  Canada,  574, 
575 
Receiving  station  on  Norfolk  Island, 
agreement  with  Australia,   199 
Ramey,  James  T.,  331 
Randers,  Guhnar,  352 
Red  Cross,  International.  See  Biafra, 
Nigeria,  and  Viet-Nam :  Prisoners 
of  war 
Refugees : 

Status  of  (1967),  protocol:  Canada, 
60 ;  Germany,  575  ;  Zambia,  464 
Works  of  stateless  persons  and  refu- 
gees, protocol  annexed  to  uni- 
versal     copyright      convention 
(1952),  Australia,  407 
Viet-Nam.  See  Viet-Nam 
Regional    cooperation    and     develop- 
ment: 
Asia.  See  Asia 

Latin  America.  See  Latin  America 
U.S.  aid  programs  FY  1970   (Rog- 
ers), 83 
Replogle,  Luther  I.,  80 
Revue  de  la  Societe  d'Studes  et  d'Ex- 

pansion  (Belgium),  359 
Rice,  Walter  L.,  200 
Richardson,  Elliot  L. : 

Addresses  and  statements,  27,  49,  72, 

94,  257,  408<;,  584 
India,    U.S.    delegate    for   bilateral 

talks,  403 
National    Security   Council,    Under 
Secretaries    Committee    chair- 
man, 92 
NATO  Brussels  meeting,  U.S.  Rep- 
resentative, 448 
TV  interview,  transcript,  49 
Richardson,  John,  Jr.,  80 
Rimestad,  Idar,  344 
Rives,  Lloyd  M.,  115 
Road  traffic : 

Convention     (1949)    with    annexes 
and    protocol,    Albania     (with 
reservation),  492 
Customs  convention  (1954)  re  tem- 
porary  importation   of   private 
road  vehicles,  Mauritius,  311 
Customs  facilities  for  touring,  con- 
vention (1957),  Mauritius,  363 
Robert  Moses-Robert  Saunders  Power 

Dam  (Nixon),  68 
Roberts,  Chalmers,  43,  202,  390 
Rockefeller,  Nelson  A.,  67 

Latin    American   visit:    Meyer,    23, 
631;  Nixon,   22,   303;  Rogers, 
203 
Advisers :  496 ;  list,  498 
Demonstrations  during,  497 
Preparation  for,  495 
Report  on  (Nixon),  493 
Preamble,  499 
Text  and  recommendations,  501 


Rogers,  William  P.  (Nixon),  67 

Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Apollo  11,  42,  121,  178,  185,  195 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,  41,  45,  350 
Asia,  43,  121 

U.S.  relations  and  role,  41,  83, 
118,  180,  181,  182,  183,  186, 
580,  625 
Atlantic  Treaty  Association,  15th 

annual  meeting,  400 
Cambodia,  41,203 
Chemical  and  biological  warfare, 

U.S.-Soviet  talks,  393 
China,  Communist,  207,  391 

U.S.  relations  and  efforts  to  im- 
prove,   178,    180,    181,    183, 
184,  202 
China,  Republic  of,  84,  177,  179, 

180,  181,  184,  185,  186,595 
Collective  security,  545,  625 
Czechoslovakia,  203,  394 
East-West  relations,  42,   44,   50, 

64,  393 
Environmental  problems  and  con- 
trol, NATO  role,  624 
Europe,  545,  622 

Foreign    aid     appropriations    re- 
quests FY   1970,  81,  83,   116, 

593 
Foreign  poUcy,  577 
Germany,  623 

International  Development  Asso- 
ciation, 82 
Investment     of     private     capital 

abroad,  81,  117 
Japan,  121,  179,  186,195 
Laos,  44,  46,  83,  203,  206,  580 
Latin  America,  83,  203,  594 
Less  developed  countries,  81,  116 
Military  assistance  appropriations 

request  FY  1970,  84,  118,  595 
MIRV  tests,  204,  389,  391,  393 
NATO,  400,  545,  622,  626 

SALT  talks,  389,  392 
Near    and    Middle    East,    Soviet 

naval  activity,  205 
Nigerian  civil  war,  U.S.  and  other 

relief  efforts,  48,  51,  206,  280, 

469 
Nuclear    nonproliferation    treaty, 
393,  466,  545,  623 

U.S.  ratification,  544,  623 
Okinawa,  184,  186 
Pearson  Commission,  82,  593 
Population  growth,  81,  117 
Romania,  visit  of  President  Nixon, 

42,  206,  207 
SALT  talks,  41,  44,  64,  202,  204, 

207,  350,  389,  390,  393,  465, 

582,  623 
Seabed,     limitation     of     nuclear 

weapons,  366,  466,  623 
SEATO,  180,  284 
Secretary  of  State,  work  of,  577 
Sino-Soviet    relations,    179,    181, 

349 
Soviet  Union,  U.S.  relations,  42, 

64,  181,  393,  465 
Term  of  Office,  348,  583 
Thailand,  205,  208 
Two-China    policy,    question    of, 

207 
U.N.  agencies,  U.S.  support,  83 
U.S.-Japan  Joint  Committee  on 

Trade   and   Economic  Affairs, 

seventh  meeting,  121 

657 


1 


Rogers,  William  P. — Continued 

Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements 
- — Continued 
U.S.-Japan      space     cooperation 

agreement,  195 
U.S.   military   commitments,   580 
U.S.  plane  hijacked  to  Syria,  245 
Viet-Nam   (for  details,  see  Viet- 
Nam)  : 
Casualties,  46,  47,  345 
Ceasefire,  proposed,  46,  349 
Coalition  government,  question 

of,  348 
Communist    activity,    level    of, 

47,  178,201,347,579 
Deescalation,  45,  177,  201,  345, 

347,  395,  578 
Elections,  internationally  super- 
vised, 48,  395 
Lodge  consultations  with  Presi- 
dent Nixon,  question  of  sig- 
nificance, 206,  349 
Military  aid  from  other  coun- 
tries, question  of  withdrawal, 
177 
Mutual  troop  withdrawal,  pro- 
posed, 179,  395 
Paris  peace  talks,  43,  345,  395, 

579 
Peace  prospects  and  U.S.  goal, 

46,  203,  345,  349,  394 
Political  future,  46 
Self-determination,     46,      1 79, 

181,  182,  346,  395 
Soviet  role,  question  of,  46 
U.S.   deescalation,   question  of 

effect  on  SALT  talks,  394 
U.S.  policy  and  commitments, 
179,  181,  182,  202,204,346, 
395,  578 
U.S.   public   opinion,  43,   345, 

349,  395,  581 
U.S.     troop     reductions,     con- 
ditions, 44, 47,  177,201,203, 
346,  546,  579 
ANZUS   council,   U.S.   Representa- 
tive, 186 
NATO  ministerial  meeting,  head  of 

U.S.  delegation,  625 
News    conferences,    transcripts,    41, 

177,  184,201,389 
TV    and     radio     interviews,     tran- 
scripts, 345,  577 
U.S.— Canadian  Economic  Commit- 
tee, delegate,  38 
U.S.-Japan    Joint    Committee    on 
Trade   and    Economic   Affairs, 
delegate,  124 
Visits  to: 

Asia  and   the  Pacific,    177,    178, 

181,  185 
Europe,  itinerary,  625 
Rohal-Ilkiv,  Ivan,  379 
Romania: 

Czechoslovakia,  position  on   (Rich- 
ardson), 28 
Treaties,  agreements,   etc.,    18,   199 
U.S.    Ambassador    (Meeker),    con- 
firmation, 120 
U.S.-Romania   libraries  agreement, 

signature,  196 
Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 
Visit     of     President     Nixon:      49; 
Ceausescu,  167,  169,  173,  174; 
Nixon,  168,  171,  172,  173,  176; 


Romania — Continued 

Visit  of  President  Nixon — Con. 

Richardson,  50;  Rogers,  42,  44, 
206,  207 

Root,  John  F.,  464 

Ross,  Claude  G.,  364 

Rush,  Kenneth,  80 

Rwanda,  Ambassador  to  U.S.,  creden- 
tials, 352 

Ryan,  Hewson  A.,  364 

Ryukyu  Islands,  administration:   557; 
Johnson,  401 


Safeguard  ABM  system  (Nixon),  5 
Safety  of  life  at  sea : 

Collisions  at  sea,  international  reg- 
ulations   (1960)     for    prevent- 
ing:    Lebanon,    387;    Maldive 
Islands,  255 
International     convention     (I960), 
Southern  Yemen,  79 
Amendments    (1966):    Denmark, 
236;  Germany,   120;  Southern 
Yemen,  79 
Amendments     (1967):     Canada, 
79;  Kuwait,  120;  Norway,  643; 
Southern    Yemen,    79;    U.K., 
643 
Amendments    (1968):    Malagasy 
Republic,  Philippines,  387 
St.    Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla,    U.S. 
Special     Representative      (Dono- 
van), designation,  295 
St.   Lawrence   Seaway,    19th   anniver- 
sary:  38;  Nixon,  67,  70;  Rocke- 
feller, 67;  Trudeau,  68,  69 
St.    Lucia,    U.S.    Speciail    Representa- 
tive (Donovan),  designation,  295 
Salisbury,  Harrison,  578 
SALT  talks.  See  Strategic  arms  limi- 
tations talks 
Samuels,  Nathaniel,  38,  92,  261,  569 
Satellites    (see    also    Communications 
anr!  Outer  space),  earth  resource 
survey  satellites  (Nixon),  301 
Sato,  Eisaku,  551,  553,  555 
Saudi  Arabia,  international  civil  avia- 
tion agreement   (1944),  protocol 
on  authentic  trilingual  text,  18 
Sayre,  Robert  N.,  312 
Scali,  John,  1,  390 
Schaufele,  William  E.,  Jr.,  328 
Schmidt,  Adolph  W.,  80 
Schultz,  George  P.,  452 
Science    and    technology:     DePalma, 
337,  376;  Moynihan,  417;  Nixon, 
413;    Rockefeller    Report,    529; 
Seaborg,  332 ;  Yost,  377,  488 
Cooperation    and    exchange    agree- 
ment with  Afghanistan,  79 
European  visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  338 
International     cooperation,     review 

(Astin),32 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller     Re- 
port), 503 
NATO     Science     Committee,     first 

meeting,  352 
U.S.-France  talks  continued,  590 
Scientific,    cultural,    and    educational 
materials,  importation  agreement 
(1950):    Mauritius,   327;   Singa- 
pore, 198 
Scranton,  William  W.,  93 


Seaborg,  Glenn  T.,  329,  331 
Security    Council,    U.N.     (DePalma), 
336 
Arab-Israeli    conflict,    role    (Yost), 

76,77,272,274,307 
Documents,  lists  of,  59,  255,  491 
Resolutions: 

Jerusalem,  status,  78 
Jerusalem  mosque  fire,  308 
Namibia    (South    West    Africa), 
254 
Resolutions,  draft: 

Associate  membership,  271 
Israeli    air    attacks    on    Lebanon 

condemned,  274 
Southern  Rhodesia,  58 
South  Africa,  sanctions  against,  U.S. 

position  (Yost),  252 
U.N.   Command  in  Korea,   text  of 
report,  607 
Self-determination : 

Asia:    Nixon,   154,   158,   164;  Park, 

241 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller     Re- 
port), 508  _ 
Portuguese  territories  (Finger),  641 
Southern  Rhodesia  (Phillips),  458 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  ( Phil- 
lips), 222,  232 
Viet-Nam.  See  under  Viet-Nam 
Semple,  Robert  B.,  2,618 
Sharp,  Mitchell,  38 

Sherman,  George,  46  , 

Ships  and  shipping: 

Treaties ;  agreements,  etc. : 

ILO  convention  (no.  53)  re  mini- 
mum   requirement    of    profes- 
sional capacity  for  masters  and 
officers     on     board     merchant 
ships,  Israel,  407 
ILO  convention    (no.   58)    fixing 
minimum   age   of  children   for 
employment     at     sea     (1936), 
Southern  Yemen,  198 
International      maritime      traffic, 
convention   (1965)   on  facilita- 
tion of,  with  annex,  Poland,  295 
Load  lines : 

International  convention  (1933) 
with  final  protocol  and  an- 
nexes, denunciation :  Aus- 
tralia, Czechoslovakia,  Fin- 
land, Germany,  Korea,  Ku- 
wait, Norway,  South  Africa, 
Turkey,  U.A.R.,  295;  U.K., 
U.S.,  198 
International  convention 

(1966)      on:      Brazil,     343; 
Czechoslovakia,    79;    Korea, 
198;    Poland,   Southern   Ye- 
men, 79 
Tonnage    measurement,    interna- 
tional  convention    (1969)    on: 
Argentina,  Belgium,  Brazil,  Bul- 
garia,    Canada,    China,    Den- 
mark,       Finland,        Germany, 
Ghana,  Greece,  Iceland,  Indo- 
nesia,    Ireland,     Israel,     Italy, 
Korea,   Kuwait,   Liberia,   Nor- 
way, Pakistan,  Philippines,  Po- 
land,  Portugal,   Soviet   Union, 
Switzeriand,      U.A.R.,      U.K., 
U.S.,     Venezuela,     Yugoslavia, 
407 


658 


DEPARTMENT    OF    STATE    BULLETIN 


ships  and  shipping — Continued 
Treaties;  agreements,  etc. — Con. 
U.S.  vessels,  bilateral  agreements: 
Brazil,  387;  China,  79;  Japan, 
60;  Malta,  79;  Spain,  18,  236; 
Thailand,    296;    Turkey,    296, 
464 
U.S.    freighters,    rates    (Rockefeller 
Report),  522,  524 
Shumate,  Jack  B.,  635 
Sierra  Leone,  Ambassador  to  U.S.,  cre- 
dentials, 352 
Singapore:   Nixon,   144,  412;  Rogers, 
179 
Educational,  scientific,  and  cultural 
materials,  agreement  (1950)  re 
importation,  198 
U.K.      armed     forces,     withdrawal 

(ANZUS),  187 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Cross),  confirma- 
tion, 312 
Sino-Soviet  relations:   Richardson,  28, 
260;  Rogers,  179,  181,  349 
SALT  talks,  effect  on  (Rogers) ,  204, 
582 
Siracusa,  Ernest  V.,  492 
Slavery  and  slave  trade : 

Convention    (1926)    on,   Mauritius, 

328 
Supplementary    convention    (1956) 
and  white  slave  traffic  conven- 
tion (1904)  as  amended,  Mau- 
ritius, 312 
Smith,    Adam    (Rockefeller    Report), 

528 
Smith,  Gerard  C:  66,  543;  Nixon,  65; 

Rogers,  390 
Smith,  Hedrick  L.,  45 
Smith,  Ian  (quoted),  55 
Smith,  Merriman,  617 
Smith,  Roberts.,  616 
Smyth,  Henry  DeWoIf,  331 
Sosa-Rodriguez,  Julio,  352 
South  Africa : 

Human  rights  (Hauser),471 

Lusaka    Manifesto    of    East    and 
Central   African    States,   cited, 
56 
Namibia,  administration  of:  Finger, 

641 ;  Phillips,  458;  Yost,  252 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  295,  363, 

387 
U.N.  economic  sanctions,  proposed: 
58;  Yost,  58,253 
South  Pacific  Commission : 

Agreement  establishing,  Nauru,  236 
U.S.    Commissioner    (Taylor),    ap- 
pointment, 421 
Southeast  Asia  Treaty  Organization: 
Nixon,_153;  Rogers,  180,  207,  284 
15th  anniversary  (Rogers),  284 
Southeast   Asian    Economic    Ministers 

Conference  (Green),  447 
Southern  Rhodesia: 

Racial        di.scrimination:        Ahidjo 
(quoted),  458;  Newsom,  422; 
Phillips,  458  ;  Yost,  55 
Referendum:  54;  Yost,  55,  57 
Southern  Yemen: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,  198, 

343 
U.S.     diplomatic     relations     termi- 
nated, 420 
Souvanna  Phouma  (Nixon),  620 
Soviet  Union: 

Arab-Israeli     conflict.     See     Arab- 
Israeli  conflict 

INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


Soviet  Union — Continued 

Armament  capability  [see  also 
SALT  talks)  :  Rogers,  465 

Asian  collective  security  proposals 
(Rogers),  43,  179,  181 

Chemical  and  biological  warfare 
talks  with  U.S.   (Rogers),  393 

Cuba,  relations  (Rockefeller  Re- 
port), 506 

East-West  relations,  position  on 
(Rogers),  64 

Economic  problems  (Richardson), 
259,  586 

Europe,  question  of  goals  (Rogers), 
624 

Foreign  information  programs 
(Rockefeller  Report),  538 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1946,  Volume  VI, 
Eastern  Europe;  The  Soviet 
Union,  released,  388 

MIRV  test  ban:  Nixon,  5;  Rogers, 
204 

Near  and  Middle  East,  naval  ac- 
tivity in  (Rogers),  205 

Nuclear  explosions,  transmittal  of 
information  on  to  IAE.\  (Buf- 
fum),  640 

Nuclear  nonproliferation  treaty, 
ratification:  Buffum,  637; 
Rogers,  393,  623  ;  Yost,  602 

Plots  of  land  in  Moscow  and  Wash- 
ington, reciprocal  allocation  for 
use  free  of  charge,  agreement 
amending  agreement  re,  328, 
643 

SALT  talks.  See  Strategic  arms  lim- 
itation talks 

Seabed,  draft  treaty  for  limitation  of 
arms  on.  See  under  Nuclear 
weapons 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40,  328, 
407,574,616,643 

U.S.  bUateral  talks  (Rogers),  47,  51 

U.S.    relations    and    efforts    to    im- 
prove: Nixon,  112,  300;  Rich- 
ardson,    27,     50,     260,     584; 
Rogers,  64,  181,  393,  585 
Czechoslovakia  invasion,  effect  on 

(Rogers),  394 
Nixon  visit  to  Romania,  question 
of  effect  (Rogers),  42 

Viet-Nam,  role  in  peace  negotia- 
tions: Nixon,  439;  Rogers,  46, 
203 

Visit  of  President  Nixon,  question  of 
(Rogers),  42 
Spain: 

Extradition  treaty  negotiations  with 
U.S.  begun,  558 

Mutual  defense  agreement  with  U.S. 
extended,  announcement  and 
text  of  notes,  15 

Treaties,   agreements,   etc.,    18,   60, 
79,236,387,407 
Spiers,  Ronald,  304 
Spivak,  Lawrence  E.,  345 
Sputnik  (Richardson),  73 
Stans,  Maurice  H.,  38,  124,  338 
State  Department: 

Appointments  and  designations,  60, 
200,  328,  344,  364,  436,  464, 
576,  616 

Assistant  Secretaries  of  State,  con- 
firmation: Meyer,  344;  New- 
som, Richardson,  Trezise,  80 


State  Department — Continued 

Bureau  of  Politico-Military  Affairs, 

establishment,  304 
Foreign  policy,  role  in  (Rockefeller 

Report),  509 
Inter-American  Affairs,  rank  of  sec- 
retary for  (Nixon),  413 
Legal    Adviser     (Stevenson),    con- 
firmation, 80 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  establish- 
ment, 103 
Planning  and  Coordination  Staff,  es- 
tablishment, 74 
Publications.  See  Publications 
Secretary      of      State,      work      of 

(Rogers),  577 
Staffing  (Rogers),  203 
Stateless    persons,    works    of,    protocol 
annexed    to    universal    copyright 
convention  ( 1952) ,  Australia,  407 
Stavropoulos,  Constantin,  218 
Stevenson,  Adlai  (quoted),  489 
Stevenson,  John  R.,  54,  80,  191,  378 
Strategic  arms  limitations  talks:   557; 
DePalma,   338,   390;  NAG,  627; 
Nixon,   65,    172,   300,   313,   543, 
618;      Richardson,      259,      584; 
Rogers,   41,    64,    202,   204,    389, 
393,  623;  Yost,  601 
Background  (Rogers),  465 
MIRV     tests,     effect:     Nbcon,     2; 

Rogers,  582 
Presidential  visit  to  Romania,  ques- 
tion of  effect:  Richardson,  50; 
Rogers,  44 
Sino-Soviet      relations,      effect      of 
(Rogers),  204,  207,  350,  391, 
582 
Soviet  delegation  (Rogers),  392 
U.S.  delegation:  66;  Rogers,  390 
Viet-Nam        deescalation,        effect 
(Rogers),  394 
Stratton,  Richard  A.,  282 
Suharto,  President,  146,  148,  151 
Sullivan,  William  H.,  596 
Swan   Islands,    Honduras-U.S.   sover- 
eignty negotiations,  550 
Swaziland,    treaties,    agreements,   etc., 

18,  328,  575 
Sweden: 

Apollo      1 1      project,      cooperation 

(Paine),  309 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18,  120, 
198,  575 
Switzerland : 

Nuclear      nonproliferation      treaty, 

signature  (Buffum),  637 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  407,  574, 
575,  6l6 
Syinington,  J.  Fife,  Jr.,  80 
Syria: 

Rescue    and    return    of    astronauts 
treaty  (1968),  ratification,  387 
U.S.    plane   hijacked   to    (Rogers), 
245 


Taiwan  (see  also  China,  Republic  of) ; 
economic   progress:    Nixon,    144, 
412;  Rogers,  181,  182 
Takahashi,  Shukaro,  338 
Tanzania : 

International  civil  aviation  conven- 
tion (1944),  protocol  on  au- 
thentic trilingual  text,  signa- 
ture, 255 


659 


Tanzania — Continued 

U.S.  Ambassador  (Ross),  confirma- 
tion, 364 
Tape,  Gerald,  338 

Tariff  policy,  U.S.  (see  also  Tariffs  and 
trade,  general  agreement  on;  and 
Trade)  : 
Latin     America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 520,  532 
Presidential  authority  for  reductions, 
need  for:  Gilbert,  565;  Nixon, 
560 ;  Samuels,  570 
Protectionism,  effect:    122;  Meyer, 
632;   Nixon,   559;   Rockefeller 
Report,  528;  Samuels,  569 
Tariff    schedules,    investigation    of 
effects     of    certain     items     re- 
quested: 339:  Gilbert,  568 
Tariffs  and   trade,  general  agreement 
on: 
Agreements,     exchange     of     notes, 
proces-verbal,    and    protocols: 
Accessions  to,  current  actions  on: 
Tunisia,    provisional   accession, 
5th    proces-verbal:     Austria, 
Sweden,  U.S.,  575 
U.A.R.,    provisional    accession, 
4th    proces-verbal :     Austria, 
Sweden,  575 
Schedules: 

Changes,    certification   of,    1st, 

entry  into  force,  199 
Rectifications     and     modifica- 
tions, 1st,  2nd,  and  3rd,  cer- 
tification of,  entry  into  force, 
198 
Kennedy  Round:   38,  39;  Samuels, 

569 
U.S.  participation,  funding:  Gilbert, 
565;  Nixon,  560,  563 
Taxation : 

Double    taxation,    conventions    and 
agreements    for    avoidance    of 
(Nixon),  386 
Netherlands,  104 
Private  investment  abroad,  effect  on 
(Rockefeller  Report),  525 
Taylor,  Harold  (quoted),  73 
Taylor,  William  B.  Ill,  421 
Technical     assistance:      Meyer,      25; 
Nixon   (quoted),  25;  Rogers,  81, 
117 
Technology.    See    Science    and    tech- 
nology 
Telecommunications  (see  also  Radio) : 
Instructional  TV,  India-U.S.  agree- 
ment, 334 
International         telecommunication 
convention    (1965),    with    an- 
nexes:    Bulgaria,    312;    Byelo- 
russian  S.S.R.,    103;   Ecuador, 
575;    Iraq,    312;    Malta,    40; 
Mauritania,     387;     Mauritius, 
236;  Monaco,  40;  Nauru,  60; 
Soviet  Union,  40;  U.A.R.,  575; 
Ukranian  S.S.R.,  312 
Teller,  Edward  (quoted),  73 
Territorial    sea    and    the    contiguous 
zone,     convention      (1958)      on, 
Kenya,  79 
Thacher,  Peter  S.,  340 
Thailand     {see    also    Southeast    Asia 
Treaty  Organization) : 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  379 
Economic  development:  Nixon,  412; 
Rogers,  179,  186 


Thailand — Continued 

Military  aid  to  Viet-Nam  (Nixon), 

619 
U.S.  aid  (Rogers),  83 
U.S.  armed  forces: 

Contingency  plan  (Rogers),  205, 

208 
Reduction,  33,  245 
U.S.S.    Hemminger,    agreement    re 

loan  of,  296 
Visit  of  President  Nixon:   49:  Kul- 
kanthorn,  152;  Nixon,  153,  154 
Thanat  Khoman,  218 
Thay  Sok:  43,  115,  261 ;  Rogers,  41 
Theis,  J.  William,  314,  618 
Thieu,    Nguyen    Van:    53     (quoted), 

141,  156;  Nixon,  155 
Thompson,  Llewellyn:  66;  Rogers,  390 
Thompson.  Theos  J.,  331 
Tibbetts,  Margaret  Joy,  60 
Todraan,  Terence  A.,  80 
Toscano,  Mario  (quoted),  247 
Touring  and  tourism: 

Canada  tourist  allowances,  39 
Customs  facilities  for  touring,  con- 
vention (1957),  Mauritius,  363 
St.  Lawrence  Seaway  (Trudeau),  69 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  (John- 
ston), 225 
Trade     (see     also     Agricultural     sur- 
pluses; Economic  policy  and  rela- 
tions, U.S.;  European  Economic 
Community;     Exports;     Imports; 
Tariff  policy,   U.S. ;   Tariffs  and 
trade,  general  agreement  on;  and 
name  of  commodity)  : 
East- West  trade  (Rogers),  44 
Latin  America.  See  Latin  America 
Less  developed  countries.  See  Less 

developed  countries 
Liberalization  and  expansion,  need 
for:   214;  Gilbert,  565;  Nixon, 
559;  Samuels,  569 
Transit  trade  of  land-locked  states, 
convention     (1965):     Lesotho, 
Swaziland,  18 
U.S.: 
Canada: 

Automotive     trade     agreement 

talks  held,  591 
Joint  Committee  on  Trade  and 
Economic  Affairs,  12th  meet- 
ing, text  of  communique,  38 
Commission  on  World  Trade,  pro- 
posed :     Gilbert,     565 ;    Nixon, 
563;  Samuels,  570 
Communist   China,   U.S.   policy: 
ANZUS.  187;  Rogers,  183,  184, 
185,  186 
Hungarian-U.S.  trade  talks,  214 
Japan:   379,  557;  Johnson,  401- 
402 
Joint  Committee  on  Trade  and 
Economic  Affairs,  7th  meet- 
ing:   Rogers,    121;   Text   of 
communique,   122 
Shipping   rates    (Rockefeller  Re- 
port), 522 
Trade  Act  of  1969:  Gilbert,  564; 
Nixon,  559;  Samuels,  569 
Trademarks,  registration,  international 
classification  of  goods  and  services, 
Nice    agreement     (1957,    as    re- 
vised), Israel,  328 
Train,  Russell  E.,  124 


Transit    trade    of    land-locked    states, 
convention    (1965)   on:    Lesotho, 
Swaziland,  18 
Transportation: 

Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific:  John- 
ston, 223;  Nimwes,  230 
U.S.-France    scientific    cooperation 

talks  continued,  590 
U.S.-Japan  Panel  on  Transportation 
Research,  proposed,  124  • 

Traore,  Seydon,  379  ■ 

Travel ; 

Communist     China,     Cuba,     North 
Korea,    and    North   Viet-Nam, 
U.S.  restrictions  extended,  362 
Communist  China,  U.S.  restrictions 
eased:    ANZUS,    187;   Rogers, 
183,  185,  186 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  18,  40,  59, 
79,  103,  119,  138,  198,  236,  255, 
276,  295,  311,  327,  343,  363,  387, 
407,  435,  464,  492,  574,  616,  643 
Treaties     and     Other     International 
Agreements  of  the  United  States 
of  America  1776-1949,  released, 
19 
Trezise,  Philip  H.,  80,  379,  592 
Trinidad  and  Tobago : 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  199,  435 
U.S.      Ambassador       (Symington), 
confirmation,  80 
Trudeau,  Pierre  Elliott,  67,  68,  69 
Trueheart,  William  C,  328 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific: 

Economic,  social  and  political  devel- 
opment: Borja,  228,  229;  John- 
ston,  224,   227,   233;   Nimwes, 
230;  Phillips,  220 
Self-determination:       Borja,      229; 

Phillips,  222,  232 
U.S.    status    commission,    proposed 

(Phillips),  222 
War  claims :  Johnston,  223  ;  Phillips, 
221 
Trust  Territory  of  the  Pacific  Islands, 

223n 
Tschirley,  Fred  H.,  635 
Tunisia: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  103,  120 
U.S.   Ambassador    (Calhoun),   con- 
firmation, 80 
Turkey : 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,   18,   199, 

295,296,327,464,492 
U.S.  aid  (Rogers),  83,  84,  594,  595 
Turner,  WilUam  C,  590 

u 

U  Thant  (quoted),  450,  475,  485,  596 

Udui.Kaleb  (Phillips),  221 

Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic, 
international  telecommunication 
convention  (1965),  with  annexes, 
ratification,  312 

UNCURK  (United  Nations  Commis- 
sion for  the  Unification  and  Re- 
habilitation of  Korea),  report  to 
Security  Council:  text,  607;  Yost, 
606 

UNESCO.  See  Economic  and  Social 
Council,  U.N. 

UNICEF  (United  Nations  Children's 
Fund):  Black,  642 

United  Arab  Republic,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  295,  312,  363,  407, 
575 


660 


DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE   BULLETIN 


United  Kingdom: 

Arab-Israeli      conflict      four-power 

talks.  See  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
Balance    of    payments    (Kennedy), 

355 
EEC  membership,  question  of:  Gil- 
bert, 567;  Samuels,  571 
Extradition  treaty  negotiations  with 

U.S.,  592 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States,  1945,  Volume  VI,  The 
British     Commonwealth:     The 
Far  East,  released,  104 
Foreign    Relations    of    the    United 
States,   1946,   Volume   V,  The 
British   Commonwealth;   West- 
ern   and    Central   Europe,   re- 
leased, 60 
Malaysia  and  Singapore,  withdrawal 
of    armed    forces    from     (AN- 
ZUS),  187 
Southern  Rhodesia  (Newsom),  422 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  79,  104, 
198,  363,  388,  407,  574,  616, 
643 
Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 
Visit    of    President    NLxon:    Nixon, 
174;  Wilson,  174 
United  Nations: 

Accomplishments  and  role:  Black, 
380;  DePalma,  336,  374;  John- 
son, 191 ;  Yost,  449 
Aircraft  hijackings,  role  in  preven- 
tion: DePalma,  338;  Nixon, 
300 
Documents,    lists   of,    59,    78,    255, 

295,429 
Headquarters,      2nd      supplemental 
agreement,  entry  into  force,  276 
Membership : 

Associate  membership,  proposed: 
Buffum,    272;    DePalma,    337, 
374;  Yost,  268,  271 
Communist   China,   question   of: 
479;     Rogers,     184;     Whalley, 
476 
Criteria    for,    meeting    requested 
{Buff'um),119 
1970  budget  (Fascell),  454 
Seabed  arms  limitations  draft  treaty, 
proposed      U.N.      verification: 
Leonard,  427 
South    Africa,    economic    sanctions 

proposed:  58;  Yost,  58,  253 
25th  anniversary:  490,  490n;  Yost, 

485 
U.S.  Representative  to  European  of- 
fice   (Rimestad),  confirmation, 
344 
Volunteer   corps,   proposed:    Black, 

382;  Nixon,  301,325 
World    youth    congress,    proposed: 
Black,  382 ;  Yost,  450,  489 
United      Nations      Children's      Fund 

(Black),  642 
United   Nations    Commission   for   the 
Unification  and  Rehabilitation  of 
Korea,  report  to  Security  Council: 
text,  607  ;  Yost,  606 
United  Nations  Day,   1969    (Nixon), 

217 
United     Nations     Development     Pro- 
gram: DePalma,  375;  Rogers,  82 
United  Nations  Disarmament  Commit- 
tee, Japanese  accession  to,  122 


United  Nations  Population  Com- 
mission, U.S.  Representative 
(Draper),  appointment,  484 

United  Nations  Relief  and  Works 
Agency  for  Palestine  Refugees  in 
the  Near  East  (Rogers),  83 

United  Nations  Second  Development 
Decade:  Black,  382,  643;  De- 
Palma, 376;  Nbcon,  301,  325; 
Schultz,  453;  Yost,  487 

United  Nations  Truce  Supervision  Or- 
ganization (Yost),  273 

United  Nations  Trusteeship  Council, 
U.S.  Representative  (Wright), 
confirmation,  576 

United  States  citizens  and  nationals, 
foreign  military  service,  U.S. 
policy,  635 

United  States  Information  Agency 
(Rockefeller  Report),  538 

Universal  Postal  Union.  See  Postal 
matters 

UNTSO  (United  Nations  Truce  Su- 
pervision Organization)  :  Yost, 
273 

Upper  Volta: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  120,  363 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Schaufele),  con- 
firmation, 328 

Urbanization  and  urban  problems: 
590;Nbcon,  107;  (RockefeUer  Re- 
port), 503,  526 

Uruguay,  U.S.  Ambassador  (Adair), 
confirmation,  312 

U.S.S.  Hornet.  49 


Vakill,  Nader  G.,  635 

Van  Lynden,  Baron  Rijnhard  B.,  379 

Venezuela: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  352 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  60,  387, 
407,  492 
Viet-Nam,  North: 

Ho  Chi  Minh,  death  of   (Nixon), 

315 
Ho   Chi   Minh-Nixon   exchange  of 

letters:  439;  Rogers,  579 
U.S.    travel    restrictions    extended, 
363 
Viet-Nam,  Republic  of: 

Asia,      importance      to:      Kennedy 

(quoted),  438;  Nixon,  156 
Coalition  government,  question  of: 
Lodge,  29,  189,  334,  370,  548; 
Rogers,  348;  Walsh,  6 
Ceasefires,   proposed:    Habib,   621; 
Lodge,  31,  351,  588;  Nixon,  3, 
302,  313,  438;  Rogers,  45,  349 
Communist  aggression  and  subver- 
sion: 
Infiltration    levels:    Lodge,    444; 
Nbcon,    313,    315,    441,    620; 
Rogers,  47,  178,  345,  347 
Intensification:        Lodge,       244  j 

Rogers,  579 
NVN  forces,  presence  of:   Habib, 
209;  Lodge,  63,  114,  244,  316, 
351 
Provisional  revolutionary  govern- 
ment: Nixon,  2;  Rogers,  395 
Soviet  aid  (Richardson),  587 


Viet-Nam,  Republic  of — Continued 
Communist  aggression  and  subver- 
sion— Continued 
Terror  tactics:   Lodge,  190,  283, 
590;  Nixon,  438 
Communist    propaganda     (Lodge), 

126,  189 
Communist  responsibility  for  situa- 
tion: Lodge,  245;  Nixon,  2,  61, 
298,  438;  Rogers,   179 
Deescalation:    Nixon,  617;  Rogers, 
44,  45,  177,  201,  345,  347,  395, 
578 
U.S.  efforts  (Lodge),  244,  369 
Demilitarized  zone    (Lodge),  30, 
53,  190 
Economic  development:  123;  Nixon, 
315;Thieu,  157 
U.S.  aid:  Nixon,  617;  Rogers,  83, 
118,  594 
Elections,  proposed : 

International  supervision: 

Communist    position :     Lodge, 

114;  Rogers,  48 
SVN   proposal   and   U.S.    sup- 
port: Habib,  621 ;  Lodge,  63, 
91,  113,  188,  189,  334,  351, 
369,  546;  Nixon,  2,  61,  302, 
313,  438;  Rogers,  48,  348: 
Walsh,  6 
NLF   participation,   question   of: 
Lodge,    125,    189,    334,    588; 
Nixon,   61,    155;  Rogers,   179, 
395;  Thieu,  157 
Korea,  position  (Park),  241 
Land  reform  program  (Nixon),  155 
Midway  meeting  of  President  Nixon 
and    President   Thieu:    Lodge, 
30,  53,  188;  Nixon,  62;  Rogers, 
_  43-44 
Military  and  other  aid  from  other 
countries: 
Korea:  243;  Nixon,  238,  239 
Reductions,  question  of :  ANZUS, 

187;  Nixon,  619;  Rogers,  177 
Thailand  (Nbcon),  619 
Mutual  troop  withdrawal,  proposed: 
Communist  position:   Lodge,  62, 
113,   125,  244,  334,  547,  549; 
Walsh,  6 
U.S.  position:    Habib,  208,  621; 
Lodge,  53,  63,   125,   188,  244, 
316,  334,  350,  369,  415,  546, 
547,588;  Nixon,  62,  302,  313; 
Rogers,  1 79,  395 
My     Lai     incident:      Nixon,     617; 

Rogers,  580 
Neutrality,  U.S.  position    (Lodge), 

124 
Pacification      (national     reconcilia- 
tion) :  Lodge,  188,  546;  Nbcon, 
155 
Paris  peace  talks : 

Communist  position:  ANZUS, 
187;  Ho  Chi  Minh,  443; 
Lodge,  29,  53,  189,  333,  546, 
588;  Rogers,  179;  Walsh,  5 
Communist  propaganda:  Habib, 
209;  Lodge,  189,  370,  468; 
Rogers,  46,  579 
Communist  responsibility  for  lack 
of  progress:  ANZUS,  187; 
Lodge,  63,  113,  125,  189,  244, 
333,  370,  395,  414,  444,  468, 
547,  548,  549,  588;  Nixon,  439 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


661 


Viet-Nam,  Republic  of — Continued 
Paris  peace  talks — Continued 

Communist  treatment  of  prisoners 
of  war,  effect   (Senate  Resolu- 
tion), 210 
National  Liberation  Front: 

Proposals:  Lodge,  30,  113,  188, 
369;   Nixon,   303;   Richard- 
son, 50;  Walsh,  7 
Status   (Thieu,  quoted),  53 
Prospects:    Nixon,   1,  619;  Rich- 
ardson, 49;  Rogers,  43,  206, 
345,  578 
Restricted  session,  U.S.   proposal 

(Lodge),  414 
SVN     position     and     proposals: 
Lodge,  53,  91,  188,  369,  549, 
588;  Walsh,  6  _ 
SVN     representation     and     role: 
Lodge,  30,  370,  548;  Walsh,  6 
U.S.  Delegate    (Lodge),   resigna- 
tion:   549;    Lodge,    548,   550; 
Nixon,  550 
U.S.     position     and     proposals: 
Habib,  621;  Lodge,  31,  52, 
91,  114,  188,  303,  468,  549, 
588;    Nixon,    64     (quoted), 
155,  313,  437,  438;  Rogers, 
179,  395 
Communist  position  contrasted : 
Lodi?e,    29,    124,    350,    369; 
Walsh,  6 
U.S.   public  opinion,  question  of 

effect  on  (Rogers),  43,  395 
U.S.     willingness     to     negotiate: 
Habib,  621 ;  Lodge,  29,  62,  190, 
303,  333,  546,  548 ;  Richardson, 
587;  Rogers,  578 
Peace : 

Geneva     accords     as     basis     for 

(Lodge),  31 
Prospects  (Rogers),  345,  349 
U.S.  goal:    122,  243;  Lodge,  31, 
125;  Nixon,  146,  155,  298,  313, 
373,437,443;  Rogers,  394 
Peace  negotiations : 

Private:  Lodge,  370,  548;  Nixon, 

439 
Soviet  role,  question   of:    Nixon, 
439;  Rogers,  46,  203 
Political  development  and  progress: 
Lodge,  588;  Nixon,  155,  315 
Communist     participation,     pro- 
posed: Lodge,  63,  124;  Rogers, 
348 
Political   settlement,   proposed.   See 

Elections 
Prisoners  of  war: 

Communist  treatment:  Frishman 
(quoted),  282,  324,  473; 
Habib,  209,  621  ;  Lodge,  30,  54, 
62,  245,  281,  317,  352,  369, 
370,  588;  Richardson  (quoted), 
597;  Rogers,  179;  Senate  reso- 
lution, 209;  U  Thant  (quoted), 
475 
Geneva  conventions,  violation  of: 
Hauser,  472;  Habib,  621 ;  Mar- 
tin, 324;  Lodge,  589-590;  Sul- 
livan, 596 
ICRC  position  and  efforts  to  re- 
lieve: Freymond  (quoted), 
323,  474;  Hauser,  473;  Lodge, 
282;  Martin,  323;  Senate  reso- 
lution, 474-475;  Sullivan,  598 


Viet-Nam,  Republic  of — Continued 

Prisoners  of  war — Continued 

SVN    and    Communist    positions 
compared:     Freymond     (quot- 
ed), 323;  Hauser,  473;  Lodge, 
281 ;  Sullivan,  596 
World    opinion     (Sullivan),    599 

Release  of  sick  and  wounded,  SVN 
proposal  (Lodge),  546,  547 

Reunification:  Lodge,  30,  124,  189, 
351,  588;  Nixon,  155;  Thieu, 
157 

Romania,  position  (Ceausescu),  170 

Self-determination:  243;  ANZUS, 
187  ;  Habib,  208 ;  Lodge,  30,  46, 
63,  113,  124,  190,  244,  350, 
444,  546;  Nixon,  61,  298,  303, 
314,  438;  Richardson,  50;  Rog- 
ers, 46,  179,  181,  182,346,395; 
Senate  resolution,  468-469 

SVN  armed  forces,  effectiveness: 
ANZUS,  187;  Habib,  621; 
Lodge,  316,  351,  369,  547; 
Nixon,  155,  156,  440,  617,  619; 
Richardson,  586;  Rogers,  203, 
394,  579;  Thieum,  157 

SVN  government:  Lodge,  30,  549, 
589;  Nixon,  3,  314;  Rogers,  348 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  80,  199, 
236,  312,  435,  492 

U.S.  casualties:  Lodge,  444;  Nixon, 
1,  313,  441;  Rogers,  46,  47, 
345,578 

U.S.  civilian  personnel,  reductions, 
92 

U.S.  involvement,  review  (Nixon), 
437 

U.S.     military    forces,     reductions: 
Lodge,  31,  126,  188,  190,  351, 
369,  468,  546,  547,  588;  Nixon, 
62,    156,   298,   302,    313,   438, 
440,  620;  Richardson,  49,  182, 
586;  Rogers,  346,  579;  Thieu, 
157      _ 
Communist     position      and      re- 
sponse:   ANZUS,   187;  Lodge, 
351 ;  Nbcon,  2,  299  ;  Rogers,  201 
Conditions  for:    Lodge,  53,   188, 
244;  Nixon,  441;   Rogers,  44, 
47,177,201,203 
Itemized  (Lodge),  316 
Timing:  469:  Lodge,  316;  Nixon, 
1,  618;  Rogers,  347 
Precipitate   withdrawal,   conse- 
quences (Nixon),  438 

U.S.  military  intelligence  (Rogers), 
47 

U.S.  miUtary  operations:  Lodge,  52, 
188,    369;    Nixon,    1;    Rogers, 
202,346 
Arbitrary     cutoff,     question     of: 
Nbcon,  313;  Rogers,  346 

U.S.  objectives  and  policy  {see  also 
Paris  peace  talks:  U.S.  position 
and  proposals) :  Kennedy 
(quoted),  438;  Lodge,  63,  124, 
125;  Nbton,  3,  314,  371,  438; 
Rogers,  204,  258,  347,  394 
Change  in  administration,  effect 
(Rogers),  578 

U.S.  public  opinion  and  morale: 
Kennedy,  355 ;  Lodge,  370,  444, 
468,  547;  Meyer,  102;  NLxon, 
316,  371,  437,  441-442;  Rog- 
ers, 43,  345,  581 


Viet-Nam,  Republic  of — Continued 
U.S.   public   opinion  and  morale — 
Continued 
Communist  misinterpretation 

(Rogers),  43,  395 
Moratorium    Day:     Dicks,    372; 
Hauser,  472;  Lodge,  444,  546; 
Rogers,  349,  394 
Visit  of  President  Nixon   (Nixon), 

155, 156 
World  opinion  (Nixon),  314 
Vitsaxis,  Basil  George,  550 
Vittini,  Mario  Read,  352 
Voice    of   America    (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 537, 538 

w 

Wagner,  Jean,  352 

Wald,  George  (quoted),  380 

Wallace,  George  (Richardson),  28 

Walsh,  John  Patrick,  328 

Walsh,  Lawrence  E.,  5,  550 

Wang,  Frank  F.  (Phillips),  286 

Ward,  Barbara  (quoted),  72 

Weather  satellites.  See  Meteorological 

research 
Weintraub,  Sidney,  464 
Westerfield,  Samuel  Z.,  Jr.,  80 
Western  Samoa,   investment  guaranty 

agreement  with  U.S.,  255 
Whaling,      international      convention 
(1946)   and  schedule  of  whaling 
regulations,  Panama,  18 
Amendments    to    paragraphs    4(1) 
(a),  6(1)  and  8(a),  entry  into 
force,  408 
Whalley,  J.  Ir%'ing,  304,  476,  610,  613 
Wheat:  38;  Samuels,  570 

Wheat    trade    convention    (1969): 
Austria,  60;  France,  435;  Leb- 
anon,   60;    Luxembourg,    343; 
Venezuela,  60 
White  slave  traffic,  agreement  (1904) 
for  suppression  of,  Mauritius,  312 
Wieczorowski,  Robert  A.,  457 
Wilson,  Harold,  141,  174 
Wilson,  Woodrow  (quoted),  442 
Women,  political  rights  of: 

Convention    (1953):    Luxembourg, 
18;    Mauritius    (with    reserva- 
tion), 328 
Latin    America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 503, 537 
Woods,  George  (NLxon),  493 
World    and    the    American    Teacher, 

The,  cited,  73 
World  Bank.  See  International  Bank 
for  Reconstruction  and  Develop- 
ment 
World    Health    Organization:     Black, 
381;  Nixon,  635;  Rockefeller  Re- 
port, 514,  534,  536 
U.S.  Representative  (Ehrlich),  con- 
firmation, 491 
World  Intellectual  Property  Organiza- 
tion,   convention     (1967)     estab- 
lishing, Spain,  79 
World    Meteorological    Organization: 
Astin,  36 ;  Phillips,  286 
Convention  (1947),  Mauritius,  103 
Worid   order:    Richardson,    27,    586; 
Rogers,  580,  625 


662 


DEPARTMENT   OF    STATE   BULLETIN 


World  order — Continued 

U.N.   role:    Nixon,   300;   U   Thant 
(quoted),  450;  Yost,  449,  487 
World  peace:  555;  NAC,  627;  Nixon, 
66,  112,  161,  171,  260  (quoted), 
297,    302,    373,   414,    551,   553; 
Yost,  449 
World  Weather  Watch  (Astin),  36 
Wright,  Sam  Harry,  576 


YahyaKhan,  162,  165 
Yamashina,  Yoshimaro,  420 
Ylitalo,  J.  Raymond,  120 
Yoshino,  Bunroku,  215 


Yost,  Charles  W. : 

Addresses,    statements,    and    corre- 
spondence : 

Arms  control,  600 

International  Symposium  on  Re- 
mote Sensing  of  the  Environ- 
ment, 377 

Israeli  air  attacks  on  Lebanon, 
272,  274 

Jerusalem,  76,  77,  307 

Korea,  U.N.  Command  report, 
transmittal,  606 

Namibia,  252 

Southern  Rhodesia,  55,  57 

U.N.,  268,  449,  485 


Yost,  Charles  W. — Continued 

U.N.   Representative,   confirmation, 
304 
Youth: 

Latin     America     (Rockefeller    Re- 
port), 504 
U.N.  programs:    Black,   381;  Yost, 
450,  489 
Yugoslavia  (Richardson),  28 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  407,  616 
Visit  of  Dr.  DuBridge,  339 


Zambia,   refugees,   protocol   re   status 

of,  accession,  464 
Ziegler,  Ronald  L.  (Rogers),  544 


INDEX,     July  to  December,  1969 


663 


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