Department of State bulletin

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bulletin

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82/ Number 2058

January 1982

OAS General Assemb

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2058 / January 1982

Cover Photo:

Secretary Haig listens intently

to the translation of a speech during

the OAS General Assembly meeting.

ILJPI photo)

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Secretary of State

DEAN FISCHER

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director.

Office of Public Communication

MARTIN JUDGE

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Price: 12
issues plus annual index— $21.00 (domestic) t
$26.25 (foreign) Single copy-$3.75
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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 OAS General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia (Secretary Haig's Address,
Department Announcement, Texts of Resolutions)

he President

News Conference of November 10

(Excerpts)
News Conference of December 17

(Excerpts)

ie Vice President

Visit to Latin America (Remarks,
Dinner Toasts, Departure State-
ment)

ie Secretary

Overview of Recent Foreign
Policy

frica

Liberia: The Road to Recovery
(William Lacy Swing)
f U.S. Interests in Africa (Chester

A. Crocker)
! Internal Situation in Zimbabwe

(President Reagan's Letter to the
Congress)
Libyan Involvement in Sudan and
Chad (Princeton Lyman)

ms Control

INF Negotiations Open in Geneva
(Secretary Haig)

U.S. Consults With Allies on INF
Negotiating Position (Richard
R. Burt, Lawrence S. Eagle-
burger)

U.S.-Soviet INF Systems: A Re-
sponse to Soviet Claims

bnada

Canadian Investment Policy and
U.S. Responses (Ernest B.
Johnston, Jr.)

::onomics

Voluntary International Guide-
lines on Antitrust (William F.
Baxter, Robert D. Hormats,
Davis R. Robinson)

Europe

36 Preserving Western Independence
and Security (Lawrence S.
Eagleburger)

40 The Situation in Poland (Secretary
Haig, Department Statements)

43 Fourth Report on Cyprus (Presi-
dent Reagan's Message to the
Congress)

43 Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos
I (President Reagan, King Juan
Carlos J)

Middle East

45 U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic

Cooperation (Joint Press State-
ment, Memorandum of Under-
standing)

46 President Asks Americans to

Leave Libya (William P. Clark)

46 U.S. and Israel Review MFO

Participation (U.S. -Israel State-
ment)

47 Pursuing Peace and Security in

the Middle Bast (Nicholas A.
Veliotes)

49 Claims Against Iran

50 Visit of Jordanian King Hussein

(King Hussein I, President
Reagan)

Military Affairs

52 Use of Chemical Weapons in
Asia (Richard R. Burt)

Terrorism

55 The Impact of International
Terrorism (Frank H. Perez)

United Nations

57 Afghan Situation and Implications
for Peace (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
Text of Resolution, Department
Statement)

60 Security Council Votes on Golan
Heights Situation (Text of
Resolution, Department State-
ment)

60 Libya: A Source of International
Terrorism (Kenneth Adehnan)

63 U.N. Conference on New and

Renewable Sources of Energy
(Stanton D. A nderson, Presi-
dent's Letter, Program of Ac-
tion)

79 The Situation in Kampuchea

(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Text of
Resolution)

81 Ethiopia (Jeane J. Kirkpatrick)

82 U.N. Conference on Least De-

veloped Countries (M. Peter
McPherson)

Western Hemisphere

85 U.S. Ratifies Protocol I of Treaty

of Tlatelolco (Secretary Haig,
Text of Protocol, Senate Under-
standings)

86 Visit of Venezuelan President

(Luis Herrera Campins, Presi-
dent Reagan)

Treaties

89 Current Actions

Chronology

92 November 1981

Press Releases

93 Department of State

94 U.S.U.N.

Publications

94 Department of State

Index

.

Secretary Haig with St. Lucian Prime
Minister Winston Cenac (center) and
Alejandro Orfila, Secretary General of the
OAS (right).

Hotel La Toe complex in Castries, site of the 1981 OAS General Assembly.

FEATURE

OAS General Assembly

OAS General Assembly
Meets in St. Lucia

The 11th regular session of the General Assembly

of the Organization of American States (OAS) met in

Castries, St. Lucia, December 2-11, 1981. Secretary

Haig headed the U.S. delegation during his presence

Dec. 2-4. Following are the Secretary's address before

the OAS on December 4, a Department announcement of

December 9 on the El Salvador resolution, and texts of

resolutions adopted by the Assembly on December 10.

Secretary's
Address,
Dec. 4, 19811

At the dawn of the inter-American era,
Simon Bolivar wrote that it was ex-
tremely difficult "to foresee the future
fate of the New World, to set down its
political principles, or to prophesy what
manner of government it will adopt."
The history of the Americas since his
time has shown that liberty was to be
the basis of the New World's political
principles and democracy its preferred
manner of government. The nations of
this hemisphere, despite their diverse
cultures, drew strength from their
historic mission to offer man the oppor-
tunity for self-development in freedom.
Today, the Americas are confronted
by new obstacles to the achievement of
this mission. Democracy is being ques-
tioned. Economic progress is uncertain.
And the prospects for peaceful change
are threatened by a pattern of violent
intervention.

• If we have learned anything this
century, it is that respect for the in-
dividual, democracy, and the rule of law-

are essential to progress. Yet under the
stresses and strains of change, voices
are heard again advocating that freedom
be sacrificed, individual rights be cur-
tailed, and that government should
dominate the productive process. Is the
hemisphere going to be plagued again by
totalitarian experiments that destroy
liberty and also fail to deliver pros-
perity?

• This region's rich natural
resources, productive agriculture, and
increasingly sophisticated technology
should offer a bright future. But the sus-
tained economic growth of the past two
decades seems to have slowed or halted.
The terms of trade have turned sharply
against many countries. Can we use this
period of adjustment to forge the basis
for a resumption of stable growth?

• Experience has taught us that the
search for economic progress, social
justice, and human dignity can succeed
only in the context of peace and tran-
quility. Precious resources and energies
necessary for development cannot be
squandered on conflict. Vet today we
are faced by a trend toward violent
change, including so-called wars of
national liberation and foreign inter-
vention. Can we allow force to become

the decisive arbiter of national destiny
without jeopardizing our own prospects
for peace and prosperity? It will not be
easy to answer these questions. But if
we are to advance at all, we must draw
on our collective strengths to create an
agenda for cooperation.

This agenda should focus on three
objectives: first, to reaffirm and promote
democracy; second, to create new
economic opportunity; and third, most
urgently, to oppose interventionism by
strengthening the principles of non-
intervention and collective security.

Asserting Democratic Values

First, we must assert the enduring
value of democracy. The nations of this
hemisphere are strongly dedicated to the
democratic tradition. This tradition is
based upon the idea of man as a creative
and responsible individual. We believe
that respect for the rights of the in-
dividual— including freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of religion, and freedom
of choice — is fundamental to a humane
society.

It is not surprising that pluralistic
societies respectful of such rights have
created unparalleled opportunities in this
hemisphere for their citizens. The revo-
lutionary proposal that the just powers
of government derive from the consent
of the governed provides the best
framework for human development. And
democracy alone, among the world's
political systems, has proven to be most
protective of individual rights. The
United States opposes human rights
abuses regardless of the source. Our
judgment of events must be fair, and we
must not allow ourselves a double stand-
ard. We should not be more tolerant of
the infractions of those who reject
democratic values and peaceful change
yet more critical of the lapses of those
searching for democracy and social
justice.

Clearly, a nation cannot be liberated
when its people are deprived of liberty.
A civilization cannot be creative when
its poets and philosophers are in jail or
in exile. A state cannot be free when its
independence is subordinated to a

Secretary Haig addresses the OAS General
Assembly.

foreign power. And a government can-
not be democratic if it refuses to submit
to the test of a free election. The OAS,
true to its democratic tradition, should
express its support for prompt, free, and
open elections as the best course for
ending civil violence and keeping social
peace. Specifically, we hope that the
countries of this hemisphere will support
the Government of El Salvador as it
leads its people through the electoral
process toward a political solution of the
conflict there.

The OAS can also play a more active
role in strengthening democracy
throughout the region. If requested, this
organization should be able to offer both
technical services and good offices for

the observation of elections. But we
should go further. The nations of the
Americas have already established man
institutions for economic, social, and
military cooperation. Surely the time h:
come for us to create a permanent
forum that will foster democratic leade
ship and the democratic process.
An institute for the study of
democracy in the Americas, under OAi
auspices, would provide a regular ex-
change of ideas and experiences amonf
democratic leaders. By making the
Secretary General its director, we won
insure a cooperative effort. And by
naming the institute in honor of one of
our greatest democratic leaders, Romu
Betancourt, we would signify our high
purpose.

Creating Economic Opportunities

Second, we can act together to creat
new economic opportunity. Economic
growth can be revived if opportunity ft
productive enterprise is encouraged.
Cooperation for development is needed
to strengthen incentives for private in-
vestment in new ventures and to open
new markets for trade. Clearly, ine-
qualities in the distribution of income
cannot be ignored. But a more equitab
distribution of income can only be
achieved in a climate of economic
growth.

In this spirit, President Reagan co
mitted the United States at Cancun to
the search for progress through coope
tion. He urged that we direct our attei
tion to practical issues: how to develop
energy and food resources; how to rail
productivity through better education,
health, and nutrition; how to improve
the climate for investment and trade.

We have already begun to ccopera
together on a program for the econom
development of the Caribbean Basin.
This program reflects the spirit of
Cancun. It is based on a clear under-
standing that the serious economic
decline of many countries in the Carib •>
bean and Central America can be re-
versed only by bold action. For our pa ,;
President Reagan is preparing a

Department of State Bulle

FEATURE
OAS
General
Assembly

tnprehensive economic package for the
tions of the Caribbean Basin. The
ckage includes:

» New legislative authority to offer
e countries in the Caribbean Basin
ijor trading opportunities — including
ssible one-way free trade arrange-
;nts— in the U.S. market. We have
ver offered such a preference before
any region;

1 Specific investment incentives and
ler measures to spur private invest-
;nt in private ventures; and

• An increase in U.S. financial
istance to deal with acute liquidity
ses and to help countries achieve
)re flexible, diversified economies.

The three parts of this plan— trade,
'estment, and assistance— form an
egrated program. The preferential
tide treatment will provide wider ac-
;s to large markets, encouraging new
iductive investment and structural
justments in national economies. In-
stment incentives will stimulate
jital formation. And assistance will
5e the liquidity crisis enabling coun-
es to restore their credit standing in
■rid capital markets and to restructure
ir economies.

We believe that the Congress of the
ited States will see the wisdom of
:h an integrated approach and ap-
)ve these initiatives. And we hope
it other countries working with us to
iviate the plight of our Caribbean
ighbors will also offer meaningful pro-
sals.

The Caribbean Basin effort is only
2 aspect of a cooperative strategy to
:rease economic opportunities.

• The existing world trading system
i serve our interests more effectively.

President Reagan said at Cancun, we
re yet to unleash the full potential for
>wth in a world of open markets. We
1 make a strong effort in the GATT
•neral Agreement on Tariffs and
ade] negotiations next year to reduce
Tiers restricting trade opportunities.

As Secretary General Orfila has
>posed, we should consult among OAS
Ambers on the multilateral trading
stem in preparation for the November

1982 GATT meetings. The most useful
way to conduct such a consultation
might be a conference of our trade
ministers.

• Another of the priority areas iden-
tified at Cancun was agriculture. The
actions of this hemisphere take on
special importance because we have be-
tween us much of the world's capacity to
export food. We should explore together
how to use our agricultural potential,
perhaps convening for that purpose a
meeting of our agricultural ministers.

These issues and others have been
proposed for the agenda of a special
OAS General Assembly on cooperation
for development. The United States sup-

ports such a general assembly. It could
address our objectives over the next two
decades for agriculture, energy, trade,
and other areas. It could debate how to
achieve those goals. This regional
meeting, like those proposed for trade
and agriculture, is intended not to
displace but to reinforce the inter-
national dialogue begun at Cancun.

Strengthening Security

Third, we must act to strengthen the
principles of both nonintervention and
collective security. The nations of the
Western Hemisphere have long under-
stood that the search for a better life

U.S. Ambassador to the OAS

J. William Middendorf II was born in
Baltimore, Md., on September 22, 1924, He
received a Bachelor of Naval Science degree
from Holy Cross College (1945) and a B \
from Harvard (1947). In 1954 he received an

N.B.A. from New York University Graduate
School of Business Administration.

Ambassador Middendorf has had a long
career in investment banking which
culminated in 1962 with the formation of his
own partnership which he left in 1969 to
enter government service. He recently was
President and Chief Executive Officer of
Financial General Bankshares, Inc.

He served as Ambassador to the
Netherlands (1969-73) and then as Under
Secretary and Secretary of the Navy
(1973-77). He was Chairman of the Finance
Committee of the Presidential Inaugural Com-
mittee. During the 1980 presidential cam-
paign, he was coordinator of the Interna-
tional Economic Advisory Committee and the
Naval Advisory Committee. He was also a
member of the Strategic Minerals Task
Force,

He has been active in the Republican Par
t\ . serving as Treasurer of the Republican
National Committee, a delegate or alternate
to three Republican national conventions, and
Treasurer of the 1968 Transition Commit!. ,
He is the author of numerous articles, a fre-
quent lecturer on major international secunt\
and economic issues, and is a member of
several national and international organiza-
tions concerned with defense, trade, and
monetary questions.

Ambassador Middendorf was sworn in as
Permanent Representative of the United
States to the Organization of American
States on July i, 1981. ■

uary 1982

depends not only on commerce, credit,
and trade but also on security. Born
ourselves of revolutions, we have sought
peaceful change as a basic objective of
the inter- American system. And the
principle of nonintervention has been
regarded as fundamental to peace and
progress.

History has shown, however, that
the pledge of nonintervention by itself
cannot prevent conflict. That task is
beyond the power of any single nation.
The Americas can be safe only if we
work together, through collective secu-
rity, to deal with threats to peace.

The Rio treaty reminds us that this
mutual responsibility is essentially
related to our democratic ideals. Our
obligation to resist aggression is all the
more important when an outside power
seeks to impose a totalitarian ideology
or when the purpose of insurgency is to
destroy any possibility of freedom and
democracy.

We must all face up to the fact that
the principle of nonintervention is being
violated today. Since 1978, Cuba, with
the support of the Soviet Union, has
embarked on a systematic campaign of
increasing interference against its
neighbors. It no longer makes any
pretense of respecting the sovereignty
of other countries. Instead, Havana calls
the leaders of violent opposition groups
together, forges unity pacts among
them, trains their men, provides their
arms, and sends them back to mount a
violent challenge to legitimate govern-
ments. Terror for the innocent has been
the result. We are witnessing this pat-
tern in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
now in Colombia. All around the
hemisphere, democratic governments
have had to downgrade or break rela-
tions with Cuba.

There is also cause for worry in
Nicaragua today. Despite commitments
made to the OAS, pluralism is in danger
of repression. The possibility of
economic progress for the Nicaraguan
people is being undermined by militariza-
tion.

The Sandinista regime already sup-
ports an army three times greater than
that of the government it replaced. Now
it is working to establish the largest

Organization of American States

O

EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS
Policy-making bodies

Executive organs

Autonomous advisory
organs

Organs that meet only
when convoked, in
, case of emergency, or
to ii» or execute
policies

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

— Functional relations
... Advisory relations

Department of State Bulle

FEATURE
OAS
General
Assembly

AS— A Profile

lgin

e ideal of unity among nations of the
;stern Hemisphere found its first expres-
n in the Treaty of Perpetual Union,
ague, and Confederation signed in 1826. In
30, 20 Latin American nations and the
lited States held the first International
nference of American States at which they
inded the International Union of American
ites. The union was served by a Commer-
1 Bureau in Washington, D.C., which col-
ted information on commerce and trade
;ful to the member states. The Commercial
reau grew in importance, and in 1910 it
:ame the Pan American Union. In 1948 at
; Ninth International Conference of
nerican States, the republics of the
misphere adopted a charter and renamed
:ir association the Organization of
nerican States (OAS).

irpose

achieve an order of peace and justice; pro-
)te solidarity; strengthen collaboration; and
fend the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
d independence of member states.

;mbers

iere are 28 members of the OAS— Argen-
a, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
i, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
ipublic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
latemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mex-
i, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St.
icia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
lited States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. By
cision of the eighth Meeting of Consulta-
m of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1962),
e present Cuban Government was excluded
)m participation in the inter-American
stem. However, Cuba, as a national entity,
still considered a member state.

jpresentation

ich member appoints representatives to the
ecialized bodies of the OAS and an am-
.ssador to the Permanent Council located in

OAS main building, Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C, the headquarters of the
OAS and its General Secretariat. Council
representatives often serve concurrently as
their country's ambassador to the United
States.

Juridical Equality

Each nation has only one vote, and no veto
power exists.

Secretary General

Alejandro Orfila of Argentina.

Official Languages

English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish.

Principal Organs

General Assembly; Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the three

councils — Permanent Council, Inter-American
Economic and Social Council (CIES), and
Inter-American Council for Education,
Science, and Culture (CIECC); Inter-
American Juridical Committee; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights;
General Secretariat; and specialized con-
ferences and organizations.

Budget

Approximately $73 million (regular assessed
fund of about $49 million plus voluntary con-
tributions to four special multinational funds,
1980). The U.S. share is $47 million (60%).

The OAS is financed by obligatory
assessments and voluntary contributions by
member states as determined by a scale of
quotas. These quotas follow a modified for
mula similar to the U.N. quota system based
on the countries' population and size with the
reservation that no one state's quota may
represent more than 66% of the total. ■

nuary 1982

force in Central American history— with
the assistance of at least 1,500 military
and security advisers from Cuba.
Nicaragua's arsenal already includes
tanks and other heavy offensive
weapons never deployed before in Cen-
tral America. Pilots are being trained
and facilities readied for modern jet
fighters. Meanwhile, the principle of
nonintervention is being violated as
arms, ammunition, and other military
supplies flow from Nicaragua to the
Salvadoran insurgents. The people of
Nicaragua must be wondering about the
purpose of these armaments. How can
such a costly military array advance the
cause of social justice? Whose interests
are served by support of insurrection in
El Salvador? The other nations of Cen-
tral America must also be asking about
the meaning of these militant activities.
They fear— and we must all fear— that
the future may hold a costly arms race
at the expense of economic development
and social progress. They fear— and we
must all fear— that the militarization of
Nicaraguans is but a prelude to a wid-
ening war on Central America. The
tragedy of an uncontrolled arms race
and war itself must be prevented. Is
there nothing that we can do together to
allay insecurity?

For our part, the United States is
prepared to join others in doing
whatever is prudent and necessary to
prevent any country in Central America
from becoming the platform of terror
and war in the region. The United
States has made proposals to Nicaragua
to normalize relations. If Nicaragua
addresses our concerns about interven-
tionism and militarization, we are
prepared to address their concerns. We
do not close the door to the search for
proper relations.

But, in addition, should we not be
discussing together how to prevent the
import of heavy offensive weapons — by
any country in Central America? Should
we not be searching for ways to limit
the number of foreign military advisers
to reasonable levels — in all countries of
Central America? The countries of the
region should know that the United

States will help them resist illegal inter-
vention from their neighbors or from the
outside. President Reagan has made
clear that we have no plans to send com-
bat troops to Central America. But we
will provide needed additional economic
and military assistance. Small countries
must be able to call for help when help
is needed. And, to paraphrase Abraham
Lincoln, when the townsmen come to
drive the wolf away from the sheep's
throat, the wolf should not then cry that
his liberty is being violated.

We must understand that this threat
to peace in Central America is not con-
fined only to the victims of violence and
intervention in that region. If we fail to
act on behalf of the principles of non-
intervention and collective security, then
the inter-American system will be
jeopardized. Ultimately democracy itself
will be imperiled.

Conclusion

The agenda for cooperation that I have
discussed today draws upon the Western
Hemisphere's tradition of democracy, its
record of social and economic achieve-
ment, and its devotion to peace. These
resources are remarkable for their
strength and duration. They give us con-
fidence to overcome the difficult
obstacles that confront us.

Let us measure our progress against
the historic mission defined by the OAS
Charter: ". . . to offer to man a land of
liberty, and a favorable environment for
the development of his personality and
the realization of his just aspirations."
This goal can be reached. We can rein-
force our individual efforts by working
together, and our example will give hope
to others around the world. Our inter-
dependence can be a source of strength,
and our diversity can become a source of
unity.

Bolivar once prophesied that the in-
habitants of the New World would
throw off their passivity in order to
search for greatness, a greatness
defined by justice, liberty, and equality.
We have come some distance toward
such greatness since Bolivar's time. The
mission, indeed the vocation of our gen-
eration, is to further advance his vision.

Department
Announcement,
Dec. 9, 19812

The Department was extremely please'
by the OAS General Assembly resoluti
on El Salvador adopted in St. Lucia.
The resolution was sponsored by three
Central American countries— El Salva
dor, Costa Rica, and Honduras— whicl
have either had, or will soon have elec-
tions of their own. Passed by 22 coun-
tries including Brazil, Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador, Venezuela, and the rest of th
Andean countries, among others, the
resolution constitutes a hemispheric en
dorsement of the democratic electoral
process in El Salvador.

The resolution stated that the
Government of El Salvador sees in the
democratic process now underway the
political solution to the violence affecti
its country. In brief, the resolution's fj
specific points included the wish that t
people of El Salvador attain peace,
social justice, and democracy within a
pluralist system permitting them to ex
ercise their inalienable rights; hope the
peace and harmony can be achieved
through an authentically democratic
political process; the suggestion that
other governments might respond to ti
Government of El Salvador's invitatior
to observe the elections, the repudiatic
of violence, terrorism, and any act con
travening the principle of noninterven-
tion; and a reiteration that it is up to t
Salvadoran people to solve their intern
affairs.

We see the overwhelming support
for this resolution by 22 countries
representing a wide range of Latin
American concerns, as an important ei
dorsement of the electoral process now
underway in El Salvador. We see this
collective action as a clear call by Latii
America for the leftist guerrillas in El i
Salvador to renounce violence and enti|
the political process.

' 1

Department of State Bullet

FEATURE
OAS
General
Assembly

exts of Resolutions

Salvador

! General Assembly,
ving seen:

The provisions of Articles 3 and 16 of the
irter of the OAS, which refer to the prin-
le of solidarity of the American States
h a political organization based on the real
rcise of a representative democracy, to
pect for the fundamental rights of the in-
idual, and to the principle of free deter-
lation of the peoples;

Resolution AG/RES. 510 (X-0/80), which
vides that the democratic system is the
is for the establishment of a political
iety where human values can be fully
lized, and

ving heard:

The statements by the chiefs of delega-
is during the proceedings of the General
;embly, and
tsidering:

That the Government of El Salvador has
ressed its intention to find, through the
locratic process, the political solution to
violence affecting its country and, to that
, it has scheduled the election of a Na-
lal Constituent Assembly for March 1982;
That the Government of El Salvador has
ounced that the political electoral process
CI Salvador is in progress, and
That the Government of El Salvador has
ted other Governments to observe the
iing of elections,
olves:

To express the wish that the people of El
/ador attain peace, social justice, and
locracy within a pluralist system that
bles its citizens to exercise their in-
nable rights.

To express the hope that all Salvadorans
attain an atmosphere of peace and har-
ly through an authentically democratic
:toral process.

To suggest to the Governments that wish
lo so that they consider the possibility of
spting the invitation extended by the
'ernment of El Salvador to observe its
:tion proceedings.

To repudiate violence and terrorism and
act that constitutes a violation of the
iciple of non-intervention.
To reiterate that, in accordance with the
iciple of non-intervention, it is up to the
radoran people alone to settle their inter-
affairs.

Annual Reports and Special Reports of the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights

The General Assembly,
Having seen,

The annual report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (AG/DOC.
1364/81), the special reports of the Commis-
sion (AG/DOCS. 1365/81, 1366/81, 1367/81
and 1368/81 and the replies from the govern-
ments (AG/DOC. 1369/81), and
Considering:

That the protection and implementation
of human rights is one of the lofty aims of
the Organization of American States and that
their observance is a source of solidarity
among the member states, as well as a
guarantee of respect for human life and the
dignity of man;

That the principal aim of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights
(IACHR) is to promote respect for, and the
defense of human rights in all the member
states;

That the democratic structure is an
essential factor for the establishment of a
political society where human values can be
fully realized;

That the evolution underway or com-
pleted in some countries to return to
representative democracy is a positive fact;

That the measures adopted in certain
countries, which contribute significantly to
the observance of the rights mentioned in the
American declaration of the rights and duties
of man and in the American Convention of
Human Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica)
are also a positive fact;

That although the Commission reports
that there has been relative progress with
respect to compliance with human rights, it
also makes clear that situations persist where
restrictions on such rights have not be [been]
eliminated;

That it is necessary to reiterate the im-
portance of economic, social and cultural
rights within the context of human rights for
the integral development of human beings;
Resolves:

1. To take note of the annual report, the
special reports, of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights and the recommen-
dations and to express its appreciation for
the work performed in the fild [field] of pro-
tection and promotion of human rights.

2. To take note of the observations, objec-
tions and comments of the governments and
of the information on the measures which
they have taken on their own free initiative
and will continue to take to strengthen
human rights in their countries.

3. To urge the governments of the
member states that have not already done so
to adopt and carry into effect the necessary
measures to preserve and ensure the full ef-
fectiveness of human rights.

4. To recommend to the member states
that they continue adopting and applying ap-
propriate legislative measures and provisions
to preserve and maintain the full effec-
tiveness of human rights in accordance with
the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man.

5. To reaffirm that the effective protec-
tion of human rights should also include
social, economic and cultural rights; and to
indicate, in this respect, to the governments
of member states, the responsibility of mak-
ing every possible effort to participate fully
in cooperation for hemispheric development,
inasmuch as it is a fundamental way of con-
tributing to the integral development of the
human person.

6. To note with satisfaction the decision
of the governments of the member states
that have invited the Commission to visit
their respective countries, and to urge the
governments of the states that have not
already accepted or have not set a date for
this visit to do so as soon as possible.

7. To invite the governments of the
member states that have not already done so,
to consider the advisability of acceding to or
ratifying the American Convention on Human
Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica).

8. To recommend that, consistent with
the democratic system of government, the
member states seek to ensure that the exer-
cise of power derive from the legitimate and
free expression of the will of people in ac-
cordance with the characteristics and cir-
cumstances of each country.

9. To affirm the need vigorously to de-
fend and promote human rights, among
them, the right to life, personal security and
freedom, which will effectively contribute to
the preservation and full observance of such
rights.

10. To urge all the governments to con-
tinue to provide the Commission with the
necessary cooperation to enable it to ac-
complish its tasks.

'Press release 409.

2Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

3Adopted by the Assembly at the eighth
plenery session on Dec. 10 by a vote of 22 for
(U.S.) with 4 against (Mexico, Nicaragua,
Grenada), and 4 abstentions (Panama. St.
Lucia. Surinam*, and Trinidad and Tobago).

'Adopted by the Assembly at the eighth
plenery session on Dec. 10 by consensus. ■

uary 1982

THE PRESIDENT

News Conference of
November 10 (Excerpts)

Q. Your recent statements on limited
nuclear war, State Department
memos, interviews, have all hinted at
possible intervention against Qadhafi,
Castro. A high state of belligerency
seems to personify your foreign policy,
and people say it's in disarray.

My question is, were you
misunderstood on the question of
nuclear war? Are we going to in-
tervene in the Caribbean or anywhere
else? Are we going to provide a
military shield for Egypt if it goes in-
to Libya?

A. I have been just as disturbed as
you are and just as confused by some of
the things that I've been reading about
our supposed foreign policy.

Let me say that that statement that
started the whole thing with regard to
the possibility of the spread of nuclear
war, I can't say that it was mis-
understood. I don't think it was
misunderstood by the editors who were
in the room. I was having lunch with a
group of editors, and I made a state-
ment that I've made a number of times.
I won't repeat it here, but it was an ex-
planation of the whole strategic concept.
And then, evidently hearing it second-
hand, because it wasn't written by
anyone who was in that room, to my
knowledge, it appeared in an entirely
different context. And we could go back
and get the transcript of what was ac-
tually said, and I would stand by that.

We have no plans for putting
Americans in combat any place in the
world. And our goal is peace; it has
always been. And at the end of this
month, we will go into negotiations with
the Soviet Union on what I hope will be
reduction of the theater nuclear
weapons in Europe to the lowest point
possible.

Q. Are you repudiating those
memos that have been publicized in
connection with Libya and the Carib-
bean?

A. We are interested, of course, in
the Caribbean. This is why we've been
helping El Salvador, because we believe
that revolution has been exported to
that area and with design. Again, as I
say, our economic help to El Salvador is

three times the military assistance we're
giving. And that military assistance is
not in the nature of combat forces of
ours, nor do we have any plans to make
it that way.

But, yes, we continue our interest in
preserving the Americas from this kind
of exported revolution, this expansionist
policy that is coming by way of, I think,
the Soviets and the Cubans.

Q. You mentioned El Salvador
and the importance that El Salvador
has to the United States and this
region. Yet, the El Salvador Govern-
ment is rapidly losing ground, and
guerrillas already control almost one-
fourth of the land there. How far will
the United States go to keep the
Durate government in power?

A. Let me say that there's some
disagreement — a great deal of
disagreement — about who is mostly in
power or what the guerrillas might con-
trol. We have been urging, and hopefully
cooperating with, a solution that would
lead to an election and settle this dispute
by peaceful means. It is true the guer-
rillas have switched their tactics now.
Unable to win a military victory, they
have switched them to hit-and-run tac-
tics against the infrastructure of in-
dustry and the economy— trying to
bring down the government by destroy-
ing the economy. But I don't believe that
we could accept without question that
there may be something of a statement
in the inability to bring about a quick
military solution to this, but we would
prefer the other.

How far are we prepared to go? As
I've said, we're giving economic aid. I
think we should continue to do that. I
don't believe this requires in any way,
nor have we considered, aid of the kind
of actual military intervention on our
part. But we are hopeful, still, that with
the help of some of the other neighbors
in Central America which feel as we do,
that we can bring about the idea of an
election and a peaceful settlement.

It is true about one thing: It cannot
be denied, the guerrillas, with their ter-
rorist tactics in El Salvador, have failed
miserably in an attempt to bring the
population over on their side. The
populace is still in support of the govern-
ment.

Q. In your exchange with the
editors — I happen to have the
transcript — I'd like to read you what
you said. You said, "I could see," you
said, "where you could have the ex-
change of tactical weapons against
troops in the field without it bringing
either one of the major powers to
pushing the button." Then, Secretary
Haig last week talked of the possibili-
ty of a nuclear warning shot as part o
NATO's contingency plans.

I would like to ask you, first if
you endorse still what you said to the
editors and, second, if you believe tha
the nuclear warning shot should be a
part of NATO's plans.

A. I have not been a party to the
contingency planning of NATO that has
gone on now for approximately 30 year
and which, I think, has proven itself a
deterrent to military action in Europe
and for all this period of time.

What you've just quoted that I said
there, the discussion was in the area
of— and I suppose it's hypothet-
ical— where you're talking about is it
possible to ever use a nuclear weapon
without this spreading automatically to
the exchange of the strategic weapons
from nation to nation. And I gave as
what I thought was something that wasi
possible, that the great difference be-
tween theater nuclear weapons— the ar
tillery shells and so forth that both side
have — that I could see where both side!
could still be deterred from going into
the exchange of strategic weapons if
there had been battlefield weapons,
troop-to-troop exchange there.

I think there's high risk, there's no
question of that. I think the thing we
have to recognize and why our goal
must be able to seek peace is what
someone said the other day: "If war
comes, is any nation — would the op-
ponents, faced with inevitable defeat,
take that defeat without turning to the
ultimate weapon?" And this is part of
the danger and why we're going to pur-
sue arms reductions as much as we can
and do what we can to insure peace.
And I still believe that the only real in-
surance we have with that is deterrent I
power.

Q. Could there be a nuclear warn
ing shot? And I take it that you do ei|
dorse what you said in the context yc
said it.

A. I endorse only that I said it was|
offered as a possibility, and I think you

Department of State Bullet <

THE PRESIDENT

ave to still say that that possibility
:>uld take place. You could have a
essimistic outlook on it or an opti-
listic, and I always tend to be op-
mistic. Your other question —

Q. Nuclear warning shot?

A. There seems to be some confu-
on as to whether that is still a part of
ATO strategy or not, and so far I've
ad no answer to that.

Q. I wonder if there's any portion
f the Saudi eight-point peace plan
lat could be incorporated in the
merican peace initiative or that
auld be added on to the Camp David
ccords?

A. One in particular. I know that
lere's also some dispute about what I'm
aing to say between the parties con-
;rned, but I believe— and I have stated
reviously that I believe— that it's im-
licit in the offering of that plan,
'cognition of Israel's right to exist as a
ition. And this has been one of the
ieking points so far, with the Arab
orld refusing to make that acknowl-
igment. This was why I have referred
i it as a hopeful sign that here was an
'fer of a plan, whether you agreed with
or not, but indicated the willingness to
jgotiate, which does imply.

The other point in the plan is that
le of the eight points calls for all of the
ates of the region living together in
;ace, and I think we all endorse that.

Q. Any other parts of it besides
lose two?

A. Let me answer it this way. I
ink that the most realistic approach is
e one that we are taking, which is the
tempt to bring peace in the Middle
ast must be based on the Camp David
:cords and 242 Resolution of the
nited Nations.

Q. Some Members of Congress say
at this B-l bomber you want to
lild is a "flying Edsel." The Congres-
onal Budget Office says that it will
•st twice as much as your people
ink it will cost. Your own Secretary

Defense calculates that its useful
me — before the Soviets could keep it
om penetrating Soviet airspace —
ould be about 4 years. Are you going

reconsider? Do we reallv need the
-1?

A. Yes, we do. I believe that this
and the MX are both important parts of
strengthening our weakened triad of
strategic nuclear power.

The B-52, which has been hailed at
the moment as the one that could be our
craft for carrying missiles and pene-
trating, was never built for that. It
would have to be rebuilt. So, you're not
home free by using that older plane.
There's a cost to that. The B-l carries
anywhere from one and a half to two
times the payload that it carries. The
B-l has a target on radar that's only a
fraction of that of the B-52. And it has
greater speed.

But the problem that has neces-
sitated that is a gap that remains be-
tween what has to be the ultimate use of
the B-52, with their age, and the
development of the new tactical bomber.
That is only in a state of research and
study right now. We cannot guarantee
the date that it will be ready. It is that
gap when we would have nothing that
the B-l would fill. But the very fact
that its one mission of penetrating
enemy airspace might be eliminated in a
few years time, at the end of that gap
as, hopefully, the other plane comes on
line, does not mean that you scrap it.
There will be other purposes and func-
tions for which it can be used. So, it isn't
a total loss.

As to the figure given by Congress,
Cap Weinberger was my finance direc-
tor for a while in California, and I trust
his figures better than I trust theirs.
And I think that we go ahead, and I
think that's a worst-case situation that
they're taking with regard to cost.

Q. What adjustments are you plan-
ning in your foreign policy structure
or in your staff to avoid situations
such as that last week, when your
Secretaries of Defense and State were
making conflicting statements on
nuclear policy and which made it
necessary for you to call your
Secretary of State and your National
Security Adviser into the Oval Office
for a private meeting?

A. I called them in, actually, to find
out and to urge that they, with their
staffs just as I have with my own, insure
that we're a little more careful. There
seems to be too much just loose talk go-
ing around, but it has been exaggerated
out of all reality. There's no animus, per-
sonal animus, and there is no bickering

or back-stabbing going on. We're a very
happy group. [Laughter]

The picture that has been given of
chaos and disarray is a disservice to the
country and to other countries and allies
as well. We are not in disarray with
regard to foreign policy. I think our ac-
complishments have been rather as-
tounding.

I have had 70 meetings— bilateral
and multilateral— with heads of state,
foreign secretaries, ranging from
Southeast Asia, to Asia, to Europe,
Africa, and certainly here within the
Americas. We have a better rapport
established now between the three
North American countries than I believe
we've ever had. We have — our allies — I
don't think we've ever had a stronger
relationship than we have with them in
Europe.

We were supposed to be destroyed
at the Ottawa summit, and suddenly you
decided that by some fluke we weren't.
And then came Cancun, and I was not
burned at the stake. [Laughter]
Everything turned out just fine, and I
had bilateral meetings there with .17 in-
dividual heads of state that were there.
They were very pleased with the presen-
tation we made about how to meet some
of their problems.

I think in the Middle East, we've
progressed there. I think that we've
made great progress and rectified some
things that had been giving the country
problems for a time. And tied with this
is our economic plan and our defense
program to refurbish our defenses, so
that I am greatly encouraged. Our
meetings here with heads of state in
every instance have — they have
responded with statements to the effect
that they have better relations than
they've ever had before with our coun-
try, better understanding of where we
stand with relation to each other.

And I think that Al Haig has done a
remarkable job as Secretary of State.
He is trusted and approved of in every
country that we do business with. And
the only thing that seems to be going
wrong is, I think sometimes that the
District of Columbia is one gigantic ear.
[Laughter]

Q. You've criticized the press for
circulating what you've called reports
of disarray. I'm wondering if you
think that Mr. Haig's behavior may
have been at play in these reports
also?

A. All that I meant by that— I must

nuary 1982

THE PRESIDENT

say, there have been times when we've
checked on "Is this story correct?" and
we have been able to refute that the
story is not correct, and then see it, still,
appear and be made public. But all I
would ask is — I know you've got a job to
do and you're trying to do a job — but all
I'd ask is all of us, I think it behooves all
of us to recognize that every word that
is uttered here in Washington winds up,
by way of ambassadors and embassies,
in all the other countries of the world.
And we should reflect on whether it's
going to aid in what we're trying to do
in bringing peace to troublespots like the
Middle East, or whether it's going to set
us back.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Nov. 16, 1981. ■

News Conference
of December 17
(Excerpts)

All the information that we have con-
firms that the imposition of martial law
in Poland has led to the arrest, confine-
ment in prisons and detention camps, of
thousands of Polish trade union leaders
and intellectuals.

Factories are being seized by securi-
ty forces, workers beaten. These acts
make plain there's been a sharp reversal
of the movement toward a freer society
that has been underway in Poland for
the past year and a half.

Coercion and violation of human
rights, on a massive scale, have taken
the place of negotiation and com-
promise. All of this is in gross violation
of the Helsinki Pact to which Poland is a
signatory.

It would be naive to think this could
happen without the full knowledge and
the support of the Soviet Union. We are
not naive. We view the current situation
in Poland in the gravest of terms — par-
ticularly the increasing use of force
against an unarmed population and
violations of the basic civil rights of the
Polish people.

Violence invites violence and
threatens to plunge Poland into chaos.
We call upon all free people to join in
urging the Government of Poland to

10

reestablish conditions that will make
constructive negotiations and com-
promise possible. Certainly, it will be im-
possible for us to continue trying to help
Poland solve its economic problems
while martial law is imposed on the peo-
ple of Poland, thousands are imprisoned,
and the legal rights of free trade unions
previously granted by the government
are now denied.

We've always been ready to do our
share to assist Poland in overcoming its
economic difficulties but only if the
Polish people are permitted to resolve
their own problems free of internal coer-
cion and outside intervention.

Our nation was born in resistance to
arbitrary power and has been repeatedly
enriched by immigrants from Poland
and other great nations of Europe. So,
we feel a special kinship with the Polish
people in their struggle against Soviet
opposition to their reforms.

The Polish nation, speaking through
Solidarity, has provided one of the
brightest, bravest moments of modern
history. The people of Poland are giving
us an imperishable example of courage
and devotion to the values of freedom in
the face of relentless opposition.

Left to themselves, the Polish people
would enjoy a new birth of freedom. But
there are those who oppose the idea of
freedom, who are intolerant of national
independence, and hostile to the Euro-
pean values of democracy and the rule
of law.

Two Decembers ago, freedom was
lost in Afghanistan. This Christmas, it's
at stake in Poland. But the torch of
liberty is hot. It warms those who hold
it high. It burns those who try to ex-
tinguish it.

Q. With the apparent, in your
words, "Soviet involvement," how will
this affect our relations both with
Poland as a commandant and with the
Soviet Union, including trade and
arms talks?

A. You're getting into the area
there that I just don't feel I can
discuss — the area of initiatives and op-
tions that might be available as condi-
tions develop that we may not be able to
foresee, so, I just am not going to
answer questions or discuss what those
emissions might be or what our reaction
might be.

Q. Have you made it clear to the
Soviet Union how there might be some
impact?

A. I think not only we but the — our
allies in Western Europe have made it

very plain how seriously we will considei
Russian intervention there.

Q. There are repressions in other
areas in the world. In recent days, the
newspapers have been filled with
reports of oppressions by the Israelis
in the occupied zones against the peo-
ple there, even killing children,
shooting and killing children, and an-
nexing the Golan Heights. How can
the American taxpayer, in good cons-
cience, continue to support aid to
Israel with arms and money under the
circumstances?

A. We have no information on any
violence or anything that's taken -that's
been happening there. We have
registered our disagreement and the fa<
that we do deplore this unilateral actior
by Israel which has increased the dif-
ficulty of seeking peace in the Middle
East under the terms of the U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338. And we con-
tinue to address them with the idea,
hopefully, that this action can be
ameliorated.

Q. Did you get any indications,
whatsoever, from the Israelis that
they were about to annex the Golan
Heights before they, indeed, very
quickly took that action? And, second I
ly, I was wondering what effect you
felt this unilateral annexation will
have on the Camp David peace proces
and your hopes for peace in that part
of the world?

A. I partially answered that with
regard to the difficulties now with 242
and 338. We were caught by surprise.
This was done without any notification
to us. But, apparently, other than a few
hours interruption, the peace process is
going forward. Egypt and Israel are
continuing to work on the subject of
autonomy. And we still continue to be
optimistic about the Middle East,
although we recognize that difficulties
can arise.

Q. But doesn't it make your job a
little more difficult in trying to bring
the parties there together?

A. Yes, but then I've come to the
conclusion that there is a worldwide plo
to make my job more difficult almost
any day that I go to the office.
[Laughter] Yes, it is. It introduces a fac
tor that has complicated things.

Q. There are reports today of kill-
ings in Poland and more violence.

Department of State Bulleti

THE PRESIDENT

iat do you think the people of
land should do? Should they ac-
iesce quietly to this martial law?
ould they resist it? And if they
list it, what help will the United
ites give them?

A. Again, you're getting into the
;a that I said I cannot discuss, what
' initiatives might be, what our op-
ns might be. I don't think those
>uld be discussed in advance of any
id for it, for action. We have the
>ort also, but we have no confirma-
n, as yet, with regard to today's
lence, and we're waiting to get that
lfirmation.

Q. Aren't we letting the Russians
t away with it? With each passing
y, aren't they solidifying their posi-
n and, in fact, there's nothing we
1 do about it?

A. No, we're not letting them get
ay with it, and I thought that I in-
ated that in my remarks. But, again,
1 are leading, in another way, into the
;a that I just don't feel would be prop-
for me to discuss.

Q. Jimmy Carter said that when he
s in office he also was the subject
perceived death threats from Libya,
t he thought it was unwise to
cuss it publicly. Can you tell us
ir reasoning behind making the
irge public? And, secondly, can you
' — can you comment on the concern
some people that your dialogue
th Col. Qadhafi has resulted largely
ienhancing his stature in the world?

A. I haven't had any dialogue with
. Qadhafi, and we did not make it
)lic. The news, claiming leaks from
dentified sources, made it public at a
e when we had held this entire mat-
confidential and secret for a long
e, because we believed that we had a
ter opportunity of apprehending any
rorists or terrorists' squads if it was
I made public. And, so, we're sorry
It it was. And for anyone to suggest,
has been suggested lately, that we
1 some reason for making this public,
don't put that shoe on. We made an
)rt, at one point, to call in some
iers in the media and ask for their
peration in restraint from talk on
i, and that, then, became the story in
news for that evening.

Q. Do you believe that the Golan
ights should be returned to Syria
en Syria's record of bombarding the
aeli farms for so many years?

A. Now you are getting into the
area of what is trying to be settled in
the talks under 242 and 338, the
peacemaking talks regarding all of the
territory that might be held and,
therefore, it is not proper for me to
comment on this. This is the very matter
that is being negotiated.

Q. Yesterday, Senator Baker said
that the chances of an assassination
attempt on you by this hit squad [Lib-
yan] have been diminished. I wonder,
is that true and, secondly, is this hit
squad still on the loose?

A. I understand that words [have]
come out from the senators office that
he did not have any intelligence informa-
tion that would give rise to such a state-
ment or such an assumption. Now,
maybe he was giving an opinion and
believed that things are cooling down a
little bit. I think it would be very foolish
of us to relax any of the security
measures. And I can only tell all of you
that our information on this entire mat-
ter has come from not one, but several
widespread sources, and we have com-
plete confidence in it and that the threat
was real.

Q. What prospect do you see that
the Soviet Union could become involv-
ed militarily in Poland and that, con-
sequently, the United States could
have to have some kind of military in-
volvement too? Should we be relaxed
about it or concerned about it?

A. We are concerned about it and,
beyond that, again, I can't say as to ini-
tiatives. We have in no unmistakable
terms, with our allies, let the Soviet
Union know how the free world would
view and how seriously we would take
any overinterference or military in-
terference in Poland.

Q. In your statement on Poland,
you seemed to imply that there will be
no more food shipments or other aids
to Poland until martial law ends. Is
that the intent?

A. We have suspended the
shipments that we were going to make
because those were intended, and we've
had quite a record of humanitarian aid
to the people of Poland. We'd like to
continue that, but under the present cir-
cumstances, we cannot go forward with
that if it can be used by the government
as a measure to further oppress and
control the people of Poland. So we've
suspended such shipments.

Q. There's been a report, recently.

that that so-called, "Libyan assassina-
tion squad," was not really under the
sponsorship of Mr. Qadhafi but that
they were Shiite Moslems who,
themselves, were opposed to Mr.
Qadhafi. And, secondly, that the U.S.
Government paid the informers, or at
least one of them, a quarter of a
million dollars for his information.
Can you confirm those reports? And
are you still determined to go ahead
with the evacuation of American
citizens from Libya?

A. I cannot confirm — I know
nothing of anything of the kind that you
said or that they are not the terrorist
groups that we were led to believe they
were. As I said, I'm confident of our in-
formation. I don't know anything about
anyone being paid or not. — the
American people — here, again, I regret
very much the disrupting of their lives,
and I know that they probably had the
greatest relationship with the people of
Libya, their own friends and neighbors
that surround them, and fellow workers.
But, also, our information was such that
it would have been irresponsible for us
not to think forward to a possible hazard
for them. As this situation developed,
we didn't have any choice. The only
choice we had was that if we didn't do
what we have done, there could have
come a moment in which you all would
have been asking me: Why were we so
irresponsible?

Q. During the campaign and in the
early months in office, you used harsh,
even strident, terms to criticize the
Soviet Union's policies and positions
on any number of issues. But last
month you turned statesman in your
message to the Russians about
negotiating deployment missiles. And,
last week you intentionally used
words about the situation in Poland
that wouldn't rouse the Russian Bear.
Should these alterations be inter-
preted as a change in tactics, or
should they be interpreted as soften-
ing in your policy toward Moscow?

A. At the first press conference, I
did not volunteer any information about
the Soviet Union. I was asked a ques-
tion, and I answered the question to the
best of my ability. I think you will find
that the teachings of Marxist-Leninism
confirm what I said. At that time, what
I spelled out was that they recognize as
immoral only those things which would
delay or interfere with the spread of
socialism and that, otherwise, anything
that furthers socialism is moral. I didn't
set out to talk harshly about them. I just
told the truth.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Dec. 21, 1981. ■

uary 1982

11

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Vice President Bush Visits Latin America

Vice President Bush departed
Washington, D.C., on October 11, 1981,
to visit Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic (October 11-13), Bogota, Colom-
bia (October 13-14), and Brasilia and
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (October 14-17).
He returned to the United States on Oc-
tober 18.

Following are the Vice President's
remarks prepared for delivery before a
joint session of the Congress of the
Dominican Republic on October 12, his
dinner toasts in Colombia on October 13
and in Brasilia on October 14, and his
departure statement from Brasilia on
October 16.

REMARKS BEFORE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
CONGRESS,
SANTO DOMINGO,
OCT. 12, 1981

You do me a great honor by inviting me
to speak before this distinguished
assembly on this historic day. It has now
been almost 500 years since Cristobal
Colon made his magnificent mistake and
dropped anchor here off this island. The
record shows that he was overjoyed at
the knowledge that after his long,
perilous journey from Spain, he had
finally arrived in China. The great ad-
miral had not found China but a new
world and had changed forever the
course of history.

From a letter he wrote to Spain, we
know something of his first impressions
of the island he called Espanola. Of the
island's inhabitants, he wrote: "... they
are honest and exceedingly liberal with
all they have; none of them refusing
anything he may possess when he is ask-
ed for it, but, on the contrary, inviting
us to ask them. They exhibit great love
toward all others in preference to
themselves."

With these lines, Colon told us a
great deal about the character of the
first Dominicans. To judge from the
warmth of my reception here, I would
say that five centuries have done
nothing to alter that generosity.

I hope it is not being impolite to his
ghost to say that he brought to this otro,
or Nuevo Mundo, both the best and the
worst of the Old World from which he

had come. He brought sugar from the
Canary Islands; horses; the rudiments of
science and western knowledge. He
brought word of a man who had been
born the son of a carpenter in Nazareth
1,500 years before. He brought another
aspect of civilization with him too — that
imperial extension of political power
called colonization, a term oddly similar
to his own name.

It was here that the first cathedral,
the first hospital, the first university in
the New World were built. But Colon
also brought the beginning of succession
of foreign dominations — Spanish,
French, Haitian. It was not until
1844 — the era of Juan Pablo Duarte,
whose name in the Dominican Republic
is synonymous with freedom, liberty,
and democracy — that the country was
truly independent. If this sounds recent,
bear in mind that my own country was
not free from foreign domination until
the battle of Yorktown in 1781, 200
years ago next week.

We are both Colon's children, our
two countries. We share a common
history. We also share a common
destiny.

We live in an age in which the forces

of totalitarianism cast a long shadow
over the world. The longest is cast by
the Soviet Union. When countries undi
its thrall raise their voices and cry for
freedom, the Soviets answer with tank
secret police, the Gulag. In our time w
have seen those tanks roll into Hungai
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan. We musi
now hope they do not roll into Poland.

In Africa, Soviet influence has
spread. It has spread to this hemisphe
It is only because of the Soviet Union
that Fidel Castro still rules over Cuba
Every day, the Soviet Union has to in-
ject about $10 million into the Cuban
economy to keep it alive — $3 billion a
year. It amounts to 25% of Cuba's gro
national product. Of course, Castro
misses no opportunity of proclaiming
that he is beloved by the Cuban
people — and yet he has not held an elt
tion in 22 years. We in the free world
can draw two conclusions. The first is
that he must not trust the Cuban peop
otherwise why not give them the right
to vote? The second conclusion follows
from the first: He is a tyrant. He will
not be pleased to hear this, no doubt.
find that Mr. Castro is frequently an-
noyed by my remarks. I must confess

Vice President and Mrs. Bush attend dinner in honor of President Antonio Y Guzman
(right) of the Dominican Republic.

12

Department of State Bulle

THE VICE PRESIDENT

s gives me some pleasure. On the day
lei Castro holds free elections in
ba, I will say something nice about
n.

Of course, that day will never come
Cuba, so long as Castro rules. It will
/er come in Libya, either, as long as
dhafi rules there. And so it will be for
i totalitarian country. So it is with
■ants.

The particular danger we in this
nisphere face is this: A total-
rianism has to expand. Totalitarian
fimes cannot survive by winning
irts and minds of the people, because
sy rule by force — by fear, not by law.
t there will always be someone — a
ber Matos, a Solzhenitsyn, a Juan
bio Duarte — who will stand up to
anny. Having nothing to offer but
rolution, these regimes must create
ler revolutions by destabilizing, by in-
rating, by terrorizing. The Cubans
/e been caught doing this red-handed
?r and over in this hemisphere — in El
Ivador, in Costa Rica, in Nicaragua, in
atemala, in Colombia.

But we must remember that Cuba is
que in our hemisphere. The people of
:aragua, on the other hand, still have

chance to throw off the chains that
• slowly being wrapped around them
ithose 5,000 "advisers" Castro has
it there. But they should act soon, or
y will find, as some other poor coun-
;s that have accepted Communist ad-
ers have found, that self-determina-
i as well as the most basic human
edoms, is never allowed. Only last
ir Jamaica had the courage and
;dom to throw out a regime that had
iught it to the brink of ruin.

Those who say that totalitarianism is
the march in our hemisphere are
id wrong. On the contrary; the cause
freedom is on the march in our
nisphere. The cause of democracy is
the march in our hemisphere. And
i are one of the reasons why that is
e. In the Dominican Republic, the
[its of the individual are based on the
quent defenses of Montesinos and De

Casas. You have made advances in
ication, in health care, in public
vices.

Your presidential election next year
I be an affirmation, both of the social
1 economic progress you have made
1 of the democratic, pluralistic proc-

by which you have made it. We look
ward to continued good relations with
omever the people of the Dominican
[public elect as their leader. I might
1 that the role of this distinguished
ly of legislators is critical to the con-
aed good health of your government.

If a democracy is to flourish, there must
be that balance between the executive
and the legislative branches. Through
that division of power, the people are
assured that their will can never be
made subordinate to that of one man.
And through that division of power, the
president can always be assured that he
is well-advised concerning the will of the
people.

Over the last 2 years alone, we have
seen 12 elections in the Caribbean. We
have seen new democratic governments
in Ecuador, in Peru. We have seen aber-
tura in Brazil.

Next year will see elections here in
the Dominican Republic, in Colombia, in
El Salvador. Venezuela will have elec-
tions in 1983. Only the week before last,
I attended a sad occasion in
Venezuela — the funeral of Romulo
Betancourt, the man who was called the
father of democracy in that country.

We will see elections in Brazil, in
Uruguay, Honduras, Costa Rica. I,
myself, will be spending a lot of time on
the campaign road in the United States
during our congressional elections. It's
awfully tiring, as you know. But we will
see in all of these hemispheric elections
the continuing triumph of pluralism. We
will hear the will of the people.

Next week, as you know, President
Reagan will go to Cancun to meet with
leaders of developed and developing na-
tions from every continent. I think these
meetings are going to be very positive.
We think we're going to learn a great
deal about the problems of and the
challenges facing the developing nations.

President Reagan's Caribbean Basin
initiative is a concrete demonstration of
his commitment to economic develop-
ment in our hemisphere. At the same
time it is a major step forward toward
political stability for the region. Why?
Because it's designed to get at the very
roots of economic privation and frustra-
tion that provide foreign powers with an
excuse for interference. We've made
significant progress so far in organizing
the initiative with Venezuela, Mexico,
and Canada. There was a meeting here
in Santo Domingo last week between
representatives of the basin states and
the organizing nations. Together we've
tried to come up with the right combina-
tions of private ventures and official aid.
We're working on proposals that will
open up new trade and investment op-
portunities. We will also continue to pro-
vide significant amounts of foreign
assistance, linked to private sector ac-
tivities, to help countries help them-
selves.

Right now the best way America can
help is by putting its own economic
house in order. There are some who say
that the United States isn't concerned
about Third World problems. That isn't
true. What is true is that President
Reagan recognizes that only if America's
economy is healthy is it in a position to
assist other countries. But recognizing
this has not blinded him to the real con-
cerns and needs of these countries.

For too many years, we allowed
taxes and government spending to go
out of control, with predictable
results — inflation skyrocketed, and our
national debt is now approaching the
nearly incomprehensible sum of $1
trillion. One gropes for a way by which
to explain the sheer magnitude of this
sum. Let me put it this way. The annual
interest on this debt comes out to about
$75 billion — approximately 12 times
your gross domestic product. And that's
only the yearly interest.

And so the job of restoring the
economy to health is not easy. There is
much to do. Interest rates are high.
They're hurting Americans, and they're
hurting you. Money for investment
overseas is now very expensive. We
understand, in the meantime, the hard-
ships that these efforts have placed on
you and other countries in the region.
The price of sugar has fallen. The price
of coffee has fallen. The cost of energy
has jumped. We know you and other
Caribbean states are hurting. I under-
stand the central importance that sugar
has in your economy. We have heard
your words of concern on this subject.
You can be sure that I will convey to
President Reagan this important
message that you have given me. But
we think there are encouraging signs in
our economy. Our inflation has started
to come down. The interest rates have
started to come down. And once we
have won the battle and made our
economy whole again, then not just we
but all our trading partners will benefit.

We believe that as democracy and
freedom flourish, so will economic
development. The two are tied together.
In choosing where to invest their money
overseas, foreign investors look for
political stability. They look for countries
where democratic principles guarantee
that no one group shall oppress another,
and where democratic principles
guarantee that all voices will be heard.
Once they know such conditions exist,
and are permanent, all else follows.

You have made such a society. Your
democracy, your commitment to free
elections, to pluralism does honor to

uary 1982

13

THE VICE PRESIDENT

many. It honors the people of your coun-
try; to you, their elected leaders; to the
spirit of Juan Pablo Duarte, whose
dream was for this land to be free; and
it honors the spirit of Cristobal Colon,
whose memory we celebrated today.
When he left this country, he called it la
tierra mas hermosa que ojos humanos
hayan visto [the most beautiful land
human eyes have seen]. Were he alive
today, and with all us here in this
Chamber, I think he would join us in
saying viva la Republical

DINNER TOAST,
BOGOTA,

OCT. 13, 19811

I have greatly appreciated the oppor-
tunity to visit the beautiful and friendly
Republic of Colombia. My wife and I
have enjoyed firsthand the hospitality of
the Colombian people. Without question,
our discussions have been cordial and
extremely useful.

May I say that I am impressed by
the example that Colombia has main-
tained as a stable, democratic country.
The United States cares about
safeguarding democracy, human rights,
and open societies in the hemisphere. It
is particularly gratifying to me that Co-
lombia, a country that shares these same
beliefs and values, is allied with us in
promoting stability and self-
determination in this hemisphere and
peace in key areas of the world.

Many talk about the need for peace:
Not as many contribute to achieving it.
Colombia does. Colombia's participating
in an area that is critical to all mankind.
Colombia is taking dynamic initiatives in
the Caribbean Basin — through export
credits to Jamaica, through your efforts
to match Colombian products to the
area's trade needs, through scholarships
to Colombia's excellent technological in-
stitutions, and through the example of
how a stable democracy seeks to solve
its own economic, political, and social
problems.

Positive efforts to increase the pros-
perity and security of the Caribbean
Basin would be difficult enough under
the best of circumstances. Unfortunate-
ly, as the people of Colombia know so
well from personal experience, Cuban ef-
forts to export revolution — to train and
arm guerrillas to invade other coun-
tries— have added to tensions in this
region. Cuban efforts are aimed at one
thing — destroying free governments.
We see that today in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and here.

The United States believes in the
self-determination of peoples. It also

The Vice President meets with President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala of Bogata.

believes in nonintervention. But it can-
not and will not sit by while foreign
powers — hostile to the principles we in
the Americas have struggled so long
for — intervene brutally in the interna-
tional affairs of one of our neighbors.

Looking back over today, I have
greatly enjoyed the opportunities to talk
with a great many dedicated Colombian
leaders. It also has been a pleasure just
to be in this wonderfully cosmopolitan
city nestled alongside the mountains.
I've seen around me the signs of the
election campaign underway in Colom-
bia. I take sustenance in seeing these
signs of your love of democracy and
freedom.

Mr. President, I propose a toast: to
your health, to the well-being of the Co-
lombian people, to the success of our
common endeavors and to democracy.
Vive la Republical

DINNER TOAST,
BRASILIA,
OCT. 14, 198P

My wife and I are delighted to be with
you this evening. We are touched by the
warmth of our reception and excited by
the opportunity to meet with you and
learn more about your magnificent coun-
try.

To learn about Brazil, to exchange
ideas, and strengthen our friendship
with you are the purposes of our trip. It
is entirely proper that we, as two of the
largest countries in our hemisphere,
should get together like this. We haven't
done this enough. Let's resolve to do it
more often in the future.

Together with President Reagan and
the American people, I want to say how
much we hope that President
Figueiredo's recovery from his recent ill-
ness will be full and rapid. We have a

special sympathy with you. We ourselv'
recently passed through a time of anxit
ty over our own President's health.
President Reagan deeply appreciated
your expressions of good wishes at tha'
time.

The long transcontinental flight
from Bogota today brought home to
me — perhaps more than anything else
could — that we both are giant countrie:
with the special responsibilities which
size and importance bestow. But this is
not the only thing we share. We are na<
tions of immigrants, ethnically and
racially diverse, and from this diversity
we have both evolved our own unique
national personalities.

Our two national developments wei
also characterized by a pushing out of
frontiers by strong willed, courageous,
independent men and women. Our na-
tional characters still, I think, retain
that frontier spirit. Out of this comes
our strong commitment to the liberty
and integrity of the individual.

Although I am new to Brazil, I feel
at home. I feel among friends and col-
leagues with whom I can speak with
frankness and candor, confident that I
will receive the same. Out of this will
come understanding, if not always
agreement. North Americans, as
Brazilians, will not compromise integrit
just for the sake of agreement, and this
is a source of strength in our relation
ship.

Today I opened my talks with Vicet
President Chaves. Tomorrow I will be I
meeting with President of the Chambei
of Deputies Marchezan, who is our of- I
ficial and most gracious host, President
of the Federal Senate Passarinho,
Minister Albuquerque [President of the||
Supreme Federal Tribunal], Minister [C|(
Foreign Affairs] Guerreiro, and Ministii|
Leitao de Abreu [Chief of Cabinet]. To I

14

Department of State Bullet

THE VICE PRESIDENT

ich I will bring a message of friendship
id goodwill and a willingness to discuss
1 issues. I will emphasize the Reagan
dministration's commitment to peace
id noninterference throughout the
orld. I will explain how we are meeting
ie challenge of those who do not share
iese ideals.

I will also explain our domestic pro-
•ams which are designed to revitalize
ir national economy and our national
>fense. We know that our high interest
.tes are adversely affecting everyone. I
ant to make especially sure that our
r-azilian friends understand that high
terest rates are not the policy of the
nited States. We have high interest
tes. It's our policy to bring them
twn, and the signs are that they are
arting to ease.

The United States is committed, as
iu know, to having sufficient military
rength to demonstrate to any potential
versary that there is no alternative to
ace, that we are prepared to protect
r interests wherever they are
allenged.

We are, all of us, attempting to deal
th the world as it is. That world is in-
easingly complex. Your government is
interested as ours in world af-
irs — in the Middle East, in southern
I'rica. And we want to work with you

1 a catalyst for world peace. As far as
ms are concerned, we don't want arms
litation. We want arms reduction —
ms reduction that is verifiable. Mean-
lile, for all the complexity of the world
! now live in, we should not lose sight
simple truths, of the difference be-
een right and wrong, between social
stems which celebrate the human

irit and those that stifle it.

I have not come just to explain our
licies but to learn about yours. The
spect Brazil enjoys in the eyes of the
brld is a tribute to you. You are a
cognized global leader, sought out for

2 wisdom and the strength you bring
any situation. In the industrialized
>rld, you are a renowned competitor

• export markets — skillful, aggressive,
d imaginative. As a nation dedicated
free enterprise and free trade, we ad-
re these qualities. As a hemispheric
ighbor, you are a friend and partner
maintaining stability and — this is
)st important — in advocating freedom
>m outside interference.

My talks here will occur against a
lid background of private cooperation
d expanded official contacts. We are
ijor trading partners with $8 billion in
ateral trade last year. We are Brazil's
)st important export market, with
er $3.7 billion in imports in 1980. At

Vice President Bush meets with acting
President Aureliavio Chaves in Brasilia.

the end of the 1970s, U.S. direct invest-
ment in Brazil amounted to over $7.5
billion.

Our cultural and educational inter-
change is immense. Finance Minister
Galveas and I are both graduates of the
same university, Yale. Brazilian films
and films about Brazil are hits in the
United States. And you shared a na-
tional treasure with us, the great Pele,
who did so much to popularize in the
United States your national sport,
futebol.

Since President Reagan took office,
Secretary Haig has met twice with
Foreign Minister Guerreiro. Ambassador
[at Large] Walters and Assistant
Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs]
Tom Enders visited Brazil for a week to
meet with you. Finance Minister Galveas
met with Treasury Secretary Regan,
Commerce Secretary Baldrige, and me
in Washington. Next week, Foreign
Minister Guerreiro and President
Reagan will join together to consult with
other world leaders at the Cancun sum-
mit.

And today, I had the great honor of
extending to Vice President Chaves an
invitation from President Reagan for
President Figueiredo to visit the United
States next year. We look forward with
great anticipation and pleasure to his ar-
rival, for the opportunity to intensify the
dialogue we have already begun, and for
us personally to reciprocate the many
kindnesses and courtesies with which we
have been received here.

Let us toast then, this renewed
dialogue, sustained and enhanced friend-
ship between Brazil and the United
States, and the health of President
Figueiredo.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT,

BRASILIA,

OCT. 16, 1981

I am so glad to have had this opportuni-
ty to visit Brasilia, to have exchanged

views and ideas with so many of your
leaders. Though 2 days is a short time, I
had many hours of lively and timely
discussions on bilateral, regional, and
world issues.

My visit to Brazil has come toward
the end of President Reagan's first year
in office. In that short time, I feel that
our bilateral relations have developed in
some fresh and positive new directions.
Most importantly, I believe that the
temper and tone of those relations are
much improved.

We have discussed issues of foreign
affairs — issues that not only relate to
this hemisphere but to the world. The
current economic climate, in the United
States and Brazil, was discussed from
the viewpoint of two major economic
forces in the world. While it isn't possi-
ble to agree on every issue, recent
negotiations and discussions show that
friendly nations can reach mutual resolu-
tion or agreement on sensitive subjects.

For example, as I announced last
evening, the United States and Brazil
have worked out a mutually satisfactory
resolution on the issue of the first reload
for the Angra I nuclear reactor. Brazil
will purchase the fuel reload elsewhere.
After extensive consultation, and as a
special case, the Secretary of Energy of
the United States has made an exception
so that the penalty clause in the nuclear
contract with Brazil is waived for
Brazil's purchase of its next fuel load for
Angra I. The United States wants
nuclear cooperation with Brazil, and
both nations will work actively over the
next year to resolve differences to
establish a reliable supply relationship.

Because of discussions during the
past 2 years, I think that we have
strengthened the mutual understanding
between our two countries with this
visit.

Let me leave with a personal obser-
vation. I feel a bond of common ex-
perience with Vice President Chaves in
the common problems we faced in
managing our governments while
Presidents Reagan and Figueiredo were
temporarily incapacitated. This is a
great test of constitutional government.
It is a credit to Vice President Chaves
and the Brazilian people that this transi-
tion has worked so smoothly. I applaud
you for it and wish President Figueiredo
a full recovery.

'Made at Narino Palace.
2Madr ,it ttamaraty Palace.

uary 1982

15

THE SECRETARY

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy

Secretary Haig's statement before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
November 12, 198 1.1

These have been an eventful few months
in U.S. foreign policy. We have received
a steady stream of foreign visitors, in-
cluding the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and
Jordan. The President has traveled to
two summits: the Ottawa meeting of our
major partners and the Cancun summit
of leaders from both industrialized
democracies and developing nations. We
participated actively at the U.N. General
Assembly, where I also met for over 9
hours with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko. The Middle East has been af-
fected by several events, including
renewed violence followed by a cessation
of hostilities in Lebanon, the tragic
assassination of President Sadat, and
congressional approval of the AW ACS
[airborne warning and control system]
package for Saudi Arabia.

It is important that we not allow
this rush of events to obscure the main
lines of American policy and the pro-
gress we have been making toward the
achievement of our objectives. I am,
therefore, thankful today for the oppor-
tunity offered by this committee to give
a brief overview of our activities.

The President's foreign policy seeks
to establish a world environment which
is hospitable to fundamental American
values — above all, the freedom and
dignity of the individual. We believe that
individual freedom will flourish in a
world where necessary and desirable
change takes place peacefully, not
through aggression, subversion, and ter-
rorism. Each nation should be allowed to
shape its own future, free from coercion
or intimidation.

We are working toward a more
peaceful and secure world by structuring
our policy on four pillars:

• The restoration of American
economic health and military strength;

• The renewal of our traditional
alliances and development of new friend-
ships;

• The promotion of peaceful pro-
gress in developing nations; and

• The achievement of a relationship
with the Soviet Union based on restraint
and reciprocity.

We have already begun to see con-
crete achievements in each of these
areas. Under the President's leadership,
the United States emerged from both

16

the Cancun and Ottawa summits with
greater prestige and influence among
the participants. These two successful
meetings also underlined the improved
relationship that we now enjoy with our
next door neighbors, Canada and Mex-
ico. Mending our North American fences
was one of the President's first
priorities, and he has established a con-
structive and cordial relationship with
both Prime Minister Trudeau and Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo.

These meetings saw us working
closely with our other traditional friends
and allies. An excellent example is our
continued close cooperation with our
oldest ally — France. There were fears
that the Reagan Administration would
be unable to work with the new Socialist
government, turning our oldest alliance
into a bitter quarrel. That has not hap-
pened. Instead, President Reagan and
President Mitterrand celebrated our
alliance together at Yorktown and
worked closely together to achieve a
conciliatory atmosphere and a produc-
tive outcome at Cancun. Franco-
American collaboration in the Middle
East and Africa holds great promise.

This is also the place to say a word
about those European peace demonstra-
tions. We are witnessing in Europe to-
day a convergence of several groups.
Some people are concerned about the
environment while other people fear
Soviet power. Still others are worried
about nuclear weapons and nuclear
energy. All of them are anxious about
threats to peace. But this does not mean
that our European allies are going
"neutral" or that they are abandoning
NATO and the policy of unity and
strength that has preserved our
freedom. The invasion of neutral
Afghanistan and the violation of neutral
Sweden's territory by a Soviet sub-
marine should dispel the illusion that
neutrality confers immunity.

U.S. Role in Development

The Cancun summit made clear our
commitment to playing a constructive
role in the historic drama of develop-
ment. President Reagan clearly and
forcefully expressed our belief that in-
dividual initiative in a free market has
been and remains the surest route to
economic growth. And he showed that
the variety of nations called "north" and
"south" can exchange views without ran-
cor. Cancun was marked by a spirit of

mutual respect and pragmatic coopera-
tion. The President declared our willing-
ness to participate in future multilateral
talks that focus on growth and make
good use of existing institutions.

The participants at Cancun noticed
not only that the United States took a
constructive attitude but that the
Soviets stayed home. The same contrast
was evident at the U.N. General
Assembly, where my speech was de-
voted to development but was followed
by a sterile polemic from the Soviet side

U.S. -Soviet Relations

My meetings with Mr. Gromyko,
however, like President Reagan's ex-
change of letters with President Brezh-
nev, were substantive and devoid of
polemics and posturing on either side.
The United States wants a constructive
relationship with the Soviet Union. Sue!
a relationship must be based on a secun
military balance, respect for the inde-
pendence of others, restraint in the use
of force, and reciprocity in the making
and fulfilling of agreements. We have
explained our objections to Soviet or
Soviet-supported aggression and subver
sion. We have made known our intentio
to counter such activity, but we have
also expressed our desire for coopera-
tion in solving problems peacefully. We
have affirmed, too, that we want bal-
anced and verifiable arms reductions
that would reduce the risks of war.

Mr. Gromyko and I made concrete
progress by agreeing to start the talks
on theater nuclear forces on Novem-
ber 30. Many Europeans are deeply con
cerned about this issue. The Soviets
have deployed over 750 warheads on
their SS-20s threatening Europe, while
NATO has not yet deployed one of its
planned 572 missiles. Despite this
revealing fact, well-meaning people war
to know whether we are serious about
negotiating limitations on theater
nuclear forces. The answer is clear: Of
course we are. We want a balanced
agreement, one that would establish
equal, global, and verifiable limits at the
lowest possible level, ideally zero.

Clearly, a sound agreement would
strengthen deterrence in Europe. But it
would be unsound and dangerous to ac-
cept an outcome, as the Soviets propose
that would freeze us at zero and the
Soviets at their present high level of
warheads. And we cannot expect the
Soviets to take balanced proposals
seriously unless NATO firmly supports |
its own modernization plans.

The prospects for cooperation with |
the Soviets depend not only on clear

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

nmunication but also on the credibili-
that comes from the successful con-
ct of our policies elsewhere.
3. -Soviet relations have always been
iped as much by the success of our ac-
ns at home and in other parts of the
rid as by our bilateral contacts with
;m. The renewal of our economic and
litary strength, the reinvigoration of
r traditional alliances, and the promo-
n of peaceful progress and new
sndships will help to make restraint
i reciprocity the most realistic options
Moscow.

iddle East

1 review of our recent foreign policy
fculd be complete without reference to
m Middle East. In the aftermath of
Resident Sadat's death and the
'■VACS decision, it is important to
icuss briefly our policy toward that
■rial region.

I; President Sadat's extraordinary
|irage and vision will be sorely missed.
le AWACS decision was rightly
|:>ated in Congress, among the public,
b by our friends abroad. And the
i'orable result is clearly a significant
fitribution to our position in the area.
It our broad regional strategy can be
fther defeated by a tragic murder nor
inpleted by a single legislative event.
I This strategy must be based on the
jderlying realities of the Middle East,
le Soviets and their proxies still
reaten our vital interests; the Arab-
l-aeli dispute still divides our friends.
IS. leadership is still needed in both
1? peace process and security coopera-

I The Middle East today is marked by
■onsensus of strategic concern about
e threats posed by the Soviet Union
Id its allies. The increasing level of
■viet or Soviet-sponsored intervention
■recent years, culminating in the inva-
In of Afghanistan, has aroused the
Irs of our friends in the area. Many of
fcm pointed to this Soviet danger
■ore we were ready to accept it. Our
iorts to resolve regional conflicts must
tie this consensus into account.
| The elements of our policy in the
fddle East are integrated into a
Manced strategy which recognizes that
IE peace process and security coopera-
pjn reinforce one another. If our friends
p more secure, they will be more will-
jp to take risks for peace. And if they
rike progress toward resolving their
cferences, they will be more willing to
[operate with us and with each other
sainst threats to their security.

It is essential to demonstrate that
we can implement such a strategy, one
that takes full account of the complex
facts of the Middle East. That is why we
are vigorously supporting the autonomy
talks in partnership with Egypt and
Israel. That is why we are moving ahead
with security assistance to countries
threatened by Soviet or Libyan aggres-
sion. That is also why we are pursuing
strategic cooperation with other friends
in the Middle East and Africa who can
assist our efforts in the region.

The Reagan Administration is fully
committed to the Camp David accords
which have not only brought peace be-
tween Egypt and Israel but provide the
basis for broader participation as well.
When the President took office, we
found the peace process in disarray.
Egypt and Israel disagreed over the
character of the multilateral force and
observers crucial to the Israeli with-
drawal from Sinai. President Reagan's
decision to commit U.S. forces to the
multilateral force was essential to the
resolution of this problem by demon-
strating our willingness to share the risk
of assuring the peace. We are now in
the process of putting such a force
together so that withdrawal from Sinai
can take place as scheduled.

The autonomy talks were suspended
with profound differences separating the
parties. The talks have now resumed
with a businesslike work schedule and a
promising dialogue. We have made clear
our intention to participate as a full
partner in these difficult negotiations.
Our objective is to achieve tangible and
rapid progress. And the President is
prepared to raise the level of our repre-
sentation whenever he feels that a con-
structive contribution can be made.

The United States has also worked
to contain violence in Lebanon, which is
critical to the wider peace process. The
cooperation of Saudi Arabia, the
restraint shown by Israel, and the
efforts of the President's emissary, Am-
bassador Habib, have brought about the
cessation of hostilities across the Israeli-
Lebanese border. Furthermore, the
Lebanese Government, with the aid of
the Bayt ad-Din quadripartite group2
and our strong support, is engaged in
efforts to find political solutions to
Lebanon's troubles.

Turkey and Pakistan

Much public attention has already been
given to our cooperation with such na-
tions in the Middle East as Egypt,
Israel, and Saudi Arabia. But our broad
strategic approach also recognizes the

impact of areas adjacent to the region.
Turkey sits astride the most vital lines
of communications in the world. It is
essential to have a strong Turkey, not
only anchoring NATO's southern flank
but supporting our presence in the east-
ern Mediterranean. Western assistance
to Turkey is, therefore, essential.

Security assistance to Pakistan,
which lies between the Soviets and the
gulf, is also crucial. The invasion of
Afghanistan places Pakistan in the front
line of defense against Soviet aggres-
sion. Pakistan not only shelters 2 million
Afghan refugees but suffers from
repeated raids by Soviet-supported
Afghan forces. These pressures have not
deterred Pakistan from courageously
leading the condemnations of the inva-
sion by the United Nations, the non-
aligned movement, and the Islamic Con-
ference. Nor have they stopped Pakistan
from agreeing to a new relationship with
us. Indeed, President Zia has personally
conducted a vigorous public campaign
for renewed U.S. ties throughout his
country. We must show that this con-
fidence is not misplaced.

Southern Africa

Southern Africa is another area where
our diplomacy is making progress. When
we came into office the talks on Namibia
were stalled. South Africa's leaders lack-
ed confidence that Namibian in-
dependence could be compatible with
their security. Years of sterile diatribe
led South Africa to distance itself from
U.N. Resolution 435 and to oppose a
U.N. presence and involvement in the
settlement process.

We abhor apartheid and oppose con-
tinued South African occupation of
Namibia. Nonetheless, our objective has
been to achieve results rather than to
engage in arguments. We have attempt-
ed to persuade the South Africans that
their true interests lie in a peaceful
settlement. Acting through quiet
diplomacy with our allies, South Africa,
Nigeria, and front-line states, we have
shown that we are prepared to push for
a balanced Namibian settlement. We
have also addressed widespread concern
about the Soviet and Cuban presence in
Angola. Now South Africa has accepted
435 and a U.N. presence: Pretoria has
agreed to work on a phased approach to
resolve the remaining issues, thus clear-
ing the way for tangible movement in
1982. At long last we see the prospect of
real progress toward an independent
Namibia.

Jiuary 1982

17

AFRICA

Carribbean and Central America

We are also seeking to promote peaceful
progress in the Caribbean and Central
America. Together with Venezuela and
our neighbors Canada and Mexico, the
United States is developing a regional
plan to encourage the growth of produc-
tive enterprise and trade. But the
obstacles to economic development and
democratic reform also include external-
ly supported subversion and terrorism.
That is why in El Salvador our aid for
peaceful reform and free elections must
be accompanied by assistance to counter
outside intervention.

Throughout the world we are show-
ing that we have a broad and practical
program to foster respect for individual
liberty, to preserve peace, to increase
security, and to promote development.
But the examples I have discussed also
show that if we are to conduct an effec-
tive policy directed toward these goals,
Congress must provide the necessary
resources. If we are denied those
resources, we cannot hope to succeed,
no matter how forceful and coherent our
strategy. Without those resources, our
policy will appear to friend and foe alike
as nothing more than hollow rhetoric.

These expenditures are not charity.
They are the most economical way,
sometimes even the only practical way,
to defend our vital interests. By pro-
viding our friends the confidence to de-
fend their own interests, these expen-
ditures clearly aid in the defense of
American interests.

When I first appeared before this
committee, I noted that you have been
instrumental in promoting nuclear non-
proliferation, in advancing human rights,
in enhancing NATO, and in fostering
economic development. But your most
difficult role is to marshal the resources
and congressional support we need if
American foreign policy is to succeed.
Your task is all the greater in these
austere times, but your success has
never been more essential to the pros-
pects for peace and security. We are in-
deed grateful for your efforts. Let me
assure you not only of our support but
of the appreciation of our friends around
the world.

Liberia: The Road to Recovery

'Press release 377. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402.

2The Bayt ad-Din quadripartite group is
sponsored by the Arab League to promote
national reconcilation in Lebanon. It is com-
posed of the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria and chaired by the
Lebanese President. ■

by William Lacy Swing

Address before the Liberian Ship
Owners' Council in Houston on Octo-
ber 28, 1981. Mr. Swing is U.S. Am-
bassador to Liberia.

The members of this council play an
important part in current efforts to
achieve economic stability and social
development in the new Liberia, whose
flag still flies over the world's largest
merchant fleet. I want to speak about
Liberian efforts and achievements since
the 1980 revolution in the context of
Liberia's political and economic history.
I will also sketch U.S. Government aid
efforts and our policy toward Liberia.

LIBERIA'S POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC HISTORY

Historical Perspective

As you know, Liberia is Africa's oldest
independent black republic. Liberia is
also our oldest friend on the continent
and only 50 years younger than the
United States. Until April 12, 1980, it
had also been considered among the
most politically stable countries in
Africa. On that date a small group of
enlisted men from the rural areas broke
into the presidential mansion and killed
President William Tolbert. This first
nonconstitutional change of government
since 1871 brought to an end Africa's
first republic and its oldest political
party.

The April 1980 coup did not just
happen overnight. The roots leading to
that event go back some years to the
Tubman government and beyond. While
it was an announced policy of Presidents
Tubman and Tolbert to integrate more
fully the indigenous population into the
social, economic, and political fabric of
the nation, the pace was apparently too
slow to keep up with heightened expec-
tations. The perceived concentration of
power was made all the more evident
and intolerable by the extreme involve-
ment of President Tolbert's family in the
economic life of the country— in
manufacturing, commerce, agriculture,
and banking. Development was largely
confined to the capital of Monrovia and
a few scattered port and concession
areas. The rural poor— the vast majority

of Liberians— benefited little from pro-
grams designed to improve education,
agriculture, health, and housing.

It was against this background that
the April 14, 1979, rice riots occurred,
protesting a proposed increase in the
price of rice, the main staple in the
Liberian diet. More than 80 persons losl
their lives, many others were wounded,
while still others lost possessions in the
large-scale looting which took place. A
committee Tolbert then appointed
recommended reforms to open up fur-
ther Liberian society, encourage foreigi
investment, and heal the riot wounds.
However, the government made little
real progress in settling the grievances
of the Liberian majority.

Measures were also proposed to
overcome the deplorable state of the
armed forces including improved mili-
tary housing, increased pay, merit pro-
motions, and removal or reassignment
of corrupt officers. However, these
measures were never fully implementec
Additionally, in 1979 Dr. Amos Sawyer
of the Liberia University became an in-
dependent mayoral candidate, challeng-
ing the previously unopposed ruling
True Whig Party candidate. Fearing a
Sawyer victory, the ruling party post-
poned the election. This exacerbated th
already tense situation. In early 1980
the People's Progressive Party (PPP),
which had been permitted to register a
an opposition party, called on Presiden
Tolbert to resign under threat of a
general strike. The PPP leadership was
jailed and scheduled to be brought to
trial on April 14, the anniversary date
the rice riots. They were saved by that
small band of 17 enlisted men who tool
the mansion and proclaimed the revolu
tion of the Liberian people against the
ruling elite of the True Whig Party.
Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe,
the leader of the revolution, was pro-
claimed head of state, and the "countrj
people" for the first time in Liberian
history took power.

Goals of the Revolution

Although still being defined, the goals
the revolution— as the process the couj
set in motion has come to be called—
were stated by Head of State Doe sooi
after Tolbert's overthrow as eradicatin
a high rate of illiteracy; reconciling
Liberians with their culture; developin
an economy that can support the peop

18

Department of State Bullet

AFRICA

.iberia— A Profile

eography

rea: 43,000 sq. mi. Capital: Monrovia (pop.
p6,000). Other Cities: Harbel (60,000),
^chanan (25,000), Yekepa (16,000). Terrain:
oiling plateau bordered by coastal plain and
mountains near inland borders.

eople

opulation: 1.9 million (July 1981). Annual
rowth Rate: 3%. Ethnic Groups: 5%

ascendants of immigrant blacks, 95% in-
genous tribes, the largest of which are
pelle, Bassa, Gio, Km, Grebo, Mano, Krahn,
ola, Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, and Bella,
eligions: Tribal religions 75%, Muslim 15%,
hristian 10%. Languages: English (official);
rer 20 local languages and dialects of the
iger-Congo language group. Education:
ears compulsory — 11. Percentage attend-
ice — primary 40; secondary 16.
iteracy — 24%. Health: Infant mortality
ite— 159 per 1,000 (US = 15/1,000). Life
•pectancy — 46 yrs.

overnment

sype: Military. Date of Independence: 1847.

onstitution: July 26, 1847 (partially
lispended after April, 1980 coup d'etat).
tranches: Executive — Head of State, Vice
|ead of State, Cabinet. Legislative — People's
ledemption Council comprised of the non-
[immissioned officers who staged the 1980
,iup. Judicial — People's Supreme Tribunal,
Isople's Military Tribunal. Political Parties:
livilian political activity suspended indefi-
Itely. Administrative Subdivisions: 9 coun-
ts and 6 territories. Central Government
ludget: $350 million (1981). Defense: 2% of

DP (1981 est).

conomy

DP: $372 million at constant factor. Annual
rowth Rate: Less than 1% (adjusted for in-
ition). Per Capita Income: $196 (at con-
ant factor costs). Average Rate of Infla-
on 1977-80: 15% per year. Natural
esources: Iron ore. rubber, timber, dia-
[londs, gold. Agriculture: Products — rubber,
Ice, oil palm, cassava, coffee, cocoa. In-
ustry: Types — iron, gold and diamond
lining, rubber processing, food processing,
Hmber milling. Trade (1980):

Liberia

®

t

— International boundary
National capital

— Railroad

— Road
International airport

0

n SO Kilomalvrt

0

50 Miles

Atlantic
Ocean

Exports — $600.4 million: iron ore, rubber,
timber, diamonds, gold. Partners — West
Germany, U.S., Italy, Belgium. Im-
ports— $533.9 million: machinery, petroleum
products, transportation equipment,
foodstuffs. Partners — U.S., Western Europe.
Official Exchange Rate: Liberia uses U.S.
dollars. Economic Aid Received: U.S.
economic aid received: $58.6 million (1981).

Membership in International
Organizations

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies,
Organization of African Unity (OAU),

Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), Mano River Union.

p Liberia; improving health delivery
jystems; reducing Liberia's high level of
Inemployment; and stamping out cor-
uption.

Foreign Minister Matthews last
lonth reaffirmed these goals before the
16th session of the U.N. General
.ssembly.

Our people are being motivated with a
rm determination to resolve the problems
hich beset Liberia: 90% illiteracy; cultural

alienation; an economy which produces what
we do not consume, while we consume what
it does not produce; an inadequate health
delivery system; 53% unemployment within
the active labor force; and a pattern of cor-
ruption which was bequeathed to the people
by the erstwhile princes of privilege.

Actions Taken to Implement Goals

Doe, as Head of State and Chairman of
the People's Redemption Council (PRC),

made up of the soldiers who made the
revolution, plus a 16-member cabinet
constitute the governing bodies of the
nation. As would be expected from an
inexperienced team, the Doe govern-
ment began with a rocky start. The
transition from manipulation of power to
effective government is not an easy one.
The coup awakened unrealistic expecta-
tions which have complicated the task of
governing. The execution of 13 former

anuary 1982

19

AFRICA

U.S. Ambassador to Liberia

William Lacy Swing was born September 11,
1934, in Lexington, North Carolina. He
graduated from Catawba College and Yale
University. In 1961 he attended postgraduate
studies at Tuebingen University in Germany
and was a school teacher in that country. He
was Associate Director of the Council on
Religion in Independent Schools (New York)
in 1961-63.

Ambassador Swing entered the Foreign
Service in 1963 and attended consular and
African area studies at the Foreign Service
Institute. He served as Vice Consul in Port
Elizabeth (1964-65) and, upon returning to
the Department of State, was an interna-
tional economist in the Bureau of Economic
and Business Affairs (1966-67). During
1968-72, he was posted to Hamburg, first as
head of the Visa Section and then as Chief of
the Consular Section.

In 1972-74 he was the country desk of-
ficer for West Germany in the State Depart-
ment. He was assigned as Deputy Chief of
Mission in Banqui in 1974 and served there
until 1976, when he attended Harvard's
Center for International Affairs. Ambassador
Swing then became alternate-Director of the
Department's Office of Central African Af-
fairs (1977-79).

He was named U.S. Ambassador to the

Congo in 1979, and on July 27, 1981, he was
sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Liberia. ■

members of the Tolbert government pre-
cipitated an exodus of capital and pro-
fessional talent, although many key per-
sonnel remained on the job. Some 200
members and supporters of the old
government were taken as political
prisoners. In subsequent months there
have been three reported countercoups
resulting in the conviction and execution
of some of those involved.

In September, 39 political prisoners
were freed. Shortly thereafter all travel
restrictions on those freed were lifted.
One of these former political detainees
has since been named a deputy minister.
According to our informal estimate,
there are now no more than 20 de-
tainees— making Liberia's political
prisoner population one of the smallest
in Africa. Prison conditions and prisoner
treatment have improved since the PRC
government came to power.

The head of state continues to
appeal to self-exiled Liberians to return
home. Those who have come back have
found the situation more normal than
expected. Some prominent families who
fled after the coup have returned to
resume their business activities. One
returnee has been made a deputy
minister. The government's stated policy

20

is to see all Liberians return home and
help in the building of the nation.

The Doe government has reaffirmed
Liberia's traditional commitment to pro-
mote and protect foreign investment.
Besides iron ore, rubber and timber, the
Ship Owners' Council also represents an
important resource for Liberia and plays
an important role in the implementation
of Liberia's free enterprise policy. As
professor Rodney P. Carlisle observed in
Sovereignty for Sale, his recent study of
the origins and evolution of the Liberian
flag of convenience:

One of the first actions of the new regime
was to send assurances to the International
Trust Company that the ship registry system
would not be disturbed. . . The continued
operation of the registry system demon-
strated that, whatever domestic reforms
might be implemented, the Government of
Liberia was still a reliable and stable one.

The trend in recent months is more
positive. Several key appointments have
been made directed at achieving more
effective performance. These include
new ministers of agriculture, planning
and economic affairs, commerce, justice,
and a new commissioner of customs.
Together these represent an important
step forward.

A New Identity

The revolution sparked off a number of
seemingly unrelated events which taken
together, seem to constitute a tentative
move toward a new Liberian identity.
There has been increased emphasis on
African dress, names, food, and
customs. There is an increased emphasis
on the use of African names. Christian
names, many of which country people in
voluntarily took on at the time, are
either dropped or only the initial is used
with indigenous Liberian names being
preferred. A national dialogue on the
symbols of Liberian nationhood has beer
engaged on the flag, the national
anthem, the pledge of allegiance and, as
mentioned, the constitution.

Return to Civilian Rule

In his first address to the nation on
assuming power. Head of State Doe
committed himself to return the country
to civilian rule. Although there is as yet
no target date, Doe has commissioned a
25-member constitutional drafting com-
mission and given them immunities to
facilitate the holding of hearings and
taking of testimony. The U.S. Govern-
ment encourages a return to democratic
rule and supports the work of the com-
mission.

While the tendency is to discard
much of the old, there is also a concern
that Liberia reaffirm its history as
Africa's oldest republic and that nationa
symbols should not be destroyed just be-
cause they are from the past. The de-
bate on authenticity is still going on as
Liberians seek to rationalize the "col-
onial" past with the "revolutionary"
future. As the debate continues, the
sense of pride which all Liberians feel in
their history as an old independent
nation will serve them well and help
bring about national reconciliation.

The Economy

When the Doe government came to
power, the economy had been depressed
as a result of low prices for the
country's major exports, and — like many
other developing countries — it has been
forced to pay ever-higher oil bills. The
Doe government inherited an economy
suffering from the weight of an am-
bitious development plan instituted in
1976 and extraordinary expenditures
associated with hosting the 1979 con-
ference of heads of state of the
Organization of African Unity. These
placed heavy burdens on the govern-
ment's budget.

Department of State Bulletir

AFRICA

With this fiscal legacy, the commit-
;nt by the Doe government to improve
e salaries of government employees, to
use the army adequately, and to im-
ove the lot of the Liberian people has
en a near impossible task. Bilateral
nors — including, of course, the United
ates— and international financial
stitutions have provided substantial
pport to enable the government to
;et its needs. The Liberians them-
Ives have undertaken a number of
Blf-help" measures.

It was in this spirit that the Govern-
;nt of Liberia decided late last year
at they must increase the tonnage
xes levied on the vessels using the
en registry. I understand that while
me owners have found it difficult to
jet these higher fees, the great major-
r have recognized the need to respond
Liberia's financial difficulties,
lipping registry fees have been supply-
y 6%-7% of domestic revenues, a not
lonsiderable sum for a relatively poor
untry with few sources of income. I
nnot overemphasize how much this
source means to Liberia.

Despite these official programs,
wever, private investment will be the
y to achieving self-sustained develop-
;nt in Liberia. One development which
11 be of practical interest in the city of
>uston is the completion of a serious
rvey of the offshore oil potential,
lich was financed by the World Bank,
le results should be available before
e end of the year, and interested com-
nies will be requested to bid for
ploration concessions early in 1982.
e have also seen growing levels of
iderstanding between established
ivate investors and the Doe govern-
snt as each becomes better acquainted
th the realities of the current business
uation.

There are still many problems, to be
re. We expect Liberia will continue to
quire our support and that of its other
iends for some time, but we are en-
gaged by the efforts which Liberians
a the private sector, as well as the
Jiblic sector, are making to restore con-
tlence in their country and to restore
m image as a friendly partner of private
uterprise.

A key part of this image is, of
lurse, the Liberian ship registry. That
lis is important to the new government
i Liberia is underscored by the fact
>at since Commander in Chief Doe
ime to power, his government has rati-
id a number of key international
rreements designed to improve the

Ambassador Swing and Col. Abraham
Kollie, Secretary General of the ruling Peo-
ple's Redemption Council.

safety and reliability of ocean transpor-
tation. While some of these agreements
may have had the immediate effect of
imposing some additional costs on ship-
owners, I think you will agree that in
the longer run, the benefits of these
measures to the well-being of the world
community are worth the effort and ex-
pense. I am encouraged by the Govern-
ment of Liberia's adherence to these
internationally agreed standards of
performance, which can only increase
still further the growing respect being
accorded to the Liberian flag fleet.

U.S. INTERESTS

The Special Relationship

Almost from the Republic of Liberia's
founding in 1847, the United States
maintained close relations. This relation-
ship has sometimes been turbulent and
sometimes peaceful; sometimes nig-
gardly and sometimes generous. Today,
however, with the possible exception of
Nigeria, no West African country is
receiving greater attention in
Washington than Liberia. True, this
reflects the problems faced in the after-
math of the 1980 coup. However, this
high-level Washington attention also
manifests the importance of U.S.
national interests in Liberia.

U.S. interests in Liberia are still
extensive. They include:

• A Voice of America transmitter
that broadcasts to all of Africa, the
Middle East, and parts of Southwest
Asia;

• A telecommunications relay sta-
tion that transmits diplomatic traffic
between Washington and more than 40
embassies on the Continent of Africa;

• An OMEGA navigational station,
one of eight in the worldwide network
which enables ships and aircraft to
calculate continuously their positions.
The OMEGA station is a joint effort be-
tween the United States and Liberia. On

January 15 it will be "Liberianized" and
turned over entirely to the control of the
Liberian Government to operate inde-
pendently of the United States;

• These three communications in-
stallations—the largest concentration of
U.S. Government assets in Africa-
are symbols of Liberia's friendship for
the United States. They are also a mark
of the confidence the government and
the American people have in Liberia.
There are still approximately 3,500 to
4,000 American citizens residing in
Liberia— this number is increasing;

• With about $0.5 billion, private
investment from U.S. sources is still
extensive. In fact, U.S. investment in
Liberia is our third largest in Africa.
This investment comes from such com-
panies as Firestone and the Uniroyal
rubber plantations; the major iron ore
mine, LAMCO, in which Bethlehem
Steel has a 25% interest; and local
branches or affiliates of Chase Man-
hattan and Citibank;

• As many of you know, Liberia is a
principal stopping point for Pan
American Airways. A PanAm subsidiary
also has a management contract for the
Roberts International Airport;

• And, last but by no means least,
Liberia's preeminence as the world's
largest maritime nation, as measured in
registered tonnage, represents an impor-
tant American interest which, again, is a
vote of confidence in Liberia and its
people.

Because of these interests and our
historically close relationship, other
leading donors, as well as U.S. banks
and business enterprises, look to the
U.S. Government to take the lead in
helping Liberia to meet its current and
immediate financial problems. We are
doing that.

U.S. Assistance to Liberia

Official U.S. Aid. Official U.S. aid
to Liberia has increased some tenfold
since the April 1980 coup. Liberia today
receives the greatest per capita U.S. aid
of any African country. In the fiscal
year just ended, this totaled $58.6
million. We have requested similar levels
for the current fiscal year. Our priorities
are direct budget support and military
housing.

We are following a short-term and a
long-term development strategy. The
key problems are: the small and narrow

inuary 1982

21

AFRICA

The Ambassador discusses U.S. AID-World Bank agricultural project in Lofa County with
the County superintendent, AID Mission Director Ray Garufi, Counselor for Public Af-
fairs, David Gray, and the project director.

productive base of the economy, the in-
sufficient private investment because of
inadequate political and fiscal stability,
low agricultural productivity (especially
food crops), and a rapid population
growth rate and related health prob-
lems.

The short-term strategy focuses on
restoring economic and political stability
in the country. To achieve this, since the
April 12, 1980, coup the U.S. Govern-
ment has provided three grants totaling
$37 million. These grants, which were
used for budgetary support of Liberia,
helped the government overcome the
immediate fiscal crisis. They also sig-
naled continued U.S. government sup-
port to future development of the coun-
try.

The other component of our short-
term strategy is the PL-480, Title I
(rice) program. PL-480, Title I author-
izes concessional credit for sales of U.S.
farm products to developing countries.
The PL-480 Title I program in Liberia
is being used to meet growing food con-
sumption needs— keeping rice on the
market to avoid shortages and political
instability. Funds generated by this pro-
gram are used to finance longer term
agricultural development efforts in
Liberia.

Our long-term AID [Agency for
International Development] strategy is
directed at increasing traditional farmer
agricultural productivity and supporting
traditional farmer needs in order for
Liberian farmers to enter the market
economy. In a nutshell, the areas of our
long-term strategy are:

• Agriculture and rural develop-
ment, focused on increased productivity
and dissemination of development infor-
mation to rural communities;

• Education and human resources
development designed to provide basic

22

education for children and to improve
the fundamental life skills of adults.

U.S. Peace Corps. Since 1962
nearly 3,000 Peace Corps volunteers
have served in Liberia. At present, there
are more than 150 volunteers, assigned
primarily to the rural areas. By
February 1982, more than 200 volun-
teers will be in active service within
Liberia. Rural development and
agriculture volunteers serve as water
technicians, county project planners,
rural road technicians, foresters,
livestock developers, agriculture plan-
ners, vocational agriculture instructors,
fisheries technicians, and wildlife
managers.

In addition to primary projects,
volunteers also work on secondary proj-
ects, such as adult literacy classes,
demonstration chicken raising, demon-
stration gardening, establishing school
libraries or laboratories, construction of
school facilities through the school part-
nership program and the ambassador's
self-help fund.

As Liberia continues to request per-
sonnel, the Peace Corps, in cooperation
with the ministries, will endeavor to
maintain its high level of commitment to
the development of Liberia and to the
support of its people.

Military Assistance. The other cor-
nerstone of our aid policy is to improve
military housing conditions, which the
Liberian leadership sees as a top priority
in anticipation of the soldiers' returning
to the barracks with the arrival of
civilian rule. This 4-year program total-
ing some $43.5 million is the most
ambitious security assistance project the

United States has ever undertaken sine
bilateral military aid to Liberia began i
1911.

The increased military aid providec
Liberia since the 1980 coup also
addresses armed forces modernization
including equipment, transportation, ai
communication, and training helpful to
national development which included a
program for an engineer battalion. Foi
example, the U.S. grant of $1 million
provided 20 2V2-ton military trucks plu
a technical quality assistance team. Th
was the first such aid since terminatioi
of the military assistance program to
Liberia in the early 1970s. We look at
the armed forces in the service sense
but also as part of a needed nation-
building effort. The housing helps a
significant part of the population and
the force modernization program
enhances needed nation-building skills.

The international military educatio
and training (IMET) program— also a
very important nation-building
effort — has increased from less than
$200,000 in 1979 to current levels of
about $600,000. These grants bring U.
military mobile training teams to Libei
to train the army in basic construction
organization, and civic action skills. Th
grants also enable Liberia's soldiers to
receive training at U.S. military school

As a further demonstration of our
concern for the security of an "old
trusted friend," 100 U.S. green berets
conducted joint training exercises with
the Armed Forces of Liberia in April
1981. The presence of U.S. Army troo:
in sub-Saharan Africa conducting joint
exercises was a first in recent history
and was a plus in our bilateral relation

Finally, in sum our security assist-
ance efforts are intended to help solve
economic and social problems and hast
the return to civilian rule. Developmen
of the armed forces into a disciplined,
reliable national asset will upgrade the
soldiers' image in the minds of the
overall population. The United States
and Liberia mutual defense treaty of
1951 calls for consultations between oui
two countries. We take this commitmei
very seriously.

Political Asylum. Many Liberians :
fled after the coup. Others already in
the United States remained. More thar'
500 have sought to stay in the United .
States as "political refugees." Their
asylum applications are processed in-
dividually in accordance with our immi-
gration and nationality act, the U.N.

Department of State Bullet

AFRICA

rivention and protocol relating to the
itus of refugees, and our assessment
the political and social situation in
Deria since the coup. In the latter
jard, there are some encouraging
;ns of normalcy in Liberia, including
idelines on confiscated property,
ease of political prisoners, and public
peals by Head of State Doe encourag-
l self-exiled Liberians to return home
assist in the task of national develop-
fflt.

Based on information available to us,
! are convinced that Liberians who
ve returned to Liberia since the coup
ve not suffered persecution and that it
safe for most Liberians to return to
beria without a well-founded fear of
rsecution.

S. Policy

nong our primary objectives are:

First, we are trying to help Liberia
hieve economic recovery. The govern-
mt has reached agreement with the
ternational Monetary Fund on a
'ear stabilization program which pro-
les strict performance targets and ex-
nditure controls and access to a
ostantial fund which assists the
:overy process. It is of the utmost
portance to Liberia's economic
lovery and to international support
it Liberia meet the IMF standby per-
•mance targets, including strict
penditure control.

Second, we support a return to
ilian rule, release or fair trials for the
maining political prisoners, and fair
atment for businessmen and others.
Iherence to the rule of law is crucial to
ntinued international support and
rmalization of Liberia's relations with

neighbors and the rest of the world
d to rebuilding foreign investor con-
lence in the country.

Third, we want to assure the
jivernment of our support for its basic
curity. The Doe government is gen-
tiely worried about possible counter-
ups. It remains concerned that there
ight be an external attack against
beria. Liberia has repeatedly re-
vested increased U.S. military assist-
ice for purchases of weapons, trucks,
id radios. Our provision of ongoing
isic infantry training and construction

housing meets the basic needs of the
med forces in accordance with
iberia's most urgent requests.

Fourth, we support the long-term
development of the country. The govern-
ment has announced its intention to pur-
sue economic and social development
more vigorously than the previous
government. We hope this will be the
case. We have continued our aid projects
which are primarily in the areas of
health, agriculture, and education— all
target sectors of the new government.
Long-term development, of course, de-
pends on finding solutions to the imme-
diate financial and economic problems.

CONCLUSION

The year 1982 marks the 135th year of
Liberia's independence. We also observe
the 120th anniversary of the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between
our republics. This is an appropriate
time to renew our commitment to
cooperation.

A joint effort between U.S. Govern-
ment assistance and private investment
is the best method to achieve economic
development. Liberia, historically, has
welcomed private participation in the
development of its economy. In this con-
nection, we understand the Government
of Liberia is looking at ways to reconcile
the critical need to comply with the IMF
stabilization measures, while insuring
that high taxes do not discourage
private initiative.

Liberia is still going through a
critical transition period, and let us be
under no illusions— the road to recovery
is difficult and long. However, there has
been some progress in recent months,
and there is reason to be cautiously
optimistic about the future of Liberia.
We have been discussing Liberia not in
terms of what the Government of the
United States can do, but what we and
the public and private sectors can do
together with our Liberian friends. I
urge you to continue and strengthen
your support for Liberia and urge others
in the private sector to do likewise. ■

U.S. Interests in Africa

by Chester A. Crocker

Address before the Council on
Foreign Relations in New York City on
October 5, 1981. Mr Crocker is Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs.

It is a pleasure to be with you this eve-
ning and to have this opportunity to
discuss U.S. interests in Africa and the
actions we are taking in pursuit of those
interests. I believe we are at a par-
ticularly important juncture in our
African policy and so welcome the
chance to exchange ideas with a group
so knowledgeable about foreign affairs
issues.

U.S. interests in Africa are wide and
varied, spanning the spectrum of invest-
ment, trade, human liberties, political,
security, and strategic concerns. They
touch every corner of the African Conti-
nent, from the largest country to the
smallest, from the Horn to Cape Verde,
and from the Cape of Good Hope to the
Mideast front-line states.

On the economic side, the countries
of sub-Saharan Africa are the source of
many minerals which are vital to our
own development and defense. These na-
tions supply the majority and, in some
instances, virtually all of our re-
quirements for chrome for our auto-
mobile and defense industries, man-
ganese for the steel industry, cobalt for
jet engines and mining equipment, cop-
per, industrial diamonds, and mica to
cite but a few.

During the oil embargo of 1973,
Nigeria became the first and is now the
second largest foreign supplier of oil to
the United States. Angola and Gabon
are also African oil exporters. Several
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa
are actively exploring for oil, often with
American companies as contractors.

The countries of sub-Saharan Africa
bought more than $3.2 billion worth of
commodities, technology, and equipment
from the United States during the first
6 months of this year and represent a
market for greater exports.

Our political and strategic interests
in Africa are significant. We have
agreements with countries in black
Africa which permit U.S. naval and air
access, including that needed for our
rapid deployment force. Others grant us
tracking station rights and house our
Voice of America transmitters and our

nuary 1982

23

AFRICA

relay stations. African countries are an
important dimension in defining our
strategy in the Indian Ocean and the
southern Atlantic areas.

African Interests

Let me now turn to Africa's interests.
The overwhelming economic problem in
Africa is of development. The persistent
long-term problems of food, shelter, and
education remain far from solved. There
is, however, an even more urgent and
crisis character to the economic situation
in Africa today.

The adverse economic impact of the
1973 and 1979 oil price increases, record
high debt servicing costs, galloping infla-
tion rates, and slowed economic expan-
sion due to the recession in the West
have brought many African states to the
verge of bankruptcy. Development pro-
grams must be scaled down and major
internal structural reforms will have to
be carried out to weather this crisis. The
recent meeting of the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank focused
on these grim issues and could offer no
easy outs, no quick fixes.

While development is undoubtedly
the preeminent common problem in
Africa, it is, nevertheless, not the only
interest of the peoples of Africa. They
are also concerned about threats to their
security due to internal instability and
external adventurism. Very few African
states have been free of such threats,
and for some there has been continued
internal or border struggles for decades.

The sources of such instability are
varied— often having roots in long-
standing ethnic rivalries or in border
disputes arising from unclear colonial
agreements. Because African states are
economically poor, they are also often
unable to manage adequate security
forces. This leads to outside involve-
ment, sometimes in the form of legit-
imate assistance but sometimes in the
form of exploitation of these conflicts by
outside powers. While the sources of in-
stability usually have their roots within
Africa, African states are worried that
regional problems such as those in the
Horn or in southern Africa will erupt in-
to superpower confrontations. There is a
saying in Africa that when elephants
fight, it is the grass which gets
trampled.

And finally, of course, African states
are deeply committed to removing the
last instance of colonial rule in Africa,
Namibia, and in seeing an end to apart-
heid in South Africa.

24

Mutual Economic Interests

We are very much aware of these in-
terests. I would like to focus my
remarks today on key areas where our
interests and those of the African states
converge with mutually beneficial conse-
quences.

The first great area of mutual in-
terest is economic. There is no question,
when all is said of international
economic orders and North-South rela-
tions, that the West offers Africa the
greatest opportunity for growth and
development, access to technology, and
eventual graduation from the need for
concessional assistance. Much of this
potential, indeed the greatest part, is in
our markets for African goods and in
the expansion of Africa's linkages with
our private sector.

Just as we need access to African
raw materials, Africa seeks expanded
markets abroad. In 1980 our exports to
Africa totaled $5.25 billion, while our
imports rose to $18.7 billion. Africa is
already a substantial market for U.S.
technology and commodities. Its
markets offer major growth potential
for American exporters. Most of this
trade is now with South Africa and
Nigeria. But the trend in the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa is one of rapid increase.
From this trade, key technologies and
skills are transferred to a continent that
increasingly recognizes that its economic
future is naturally intertwined with our
own.

When the West is in recession,
Africa also suffers deeply, buffeted by
high inflation and interest rates. These
macroeconomic trends are of far greater
significance to our African partners than
government assistance levels. Our cur-
rent efforts to revitalize our own
economy are, therefore, of major impor-
tance to the Third World as well. And
they also contain the key to the future
of government assistance programs.

Notwithstanding our own budgetary
constraints, which impact on the role we
are able to play, the United States con-
tinues to be a major contributor to
bilateral and multilateral programs in
Africa. Our assistance in all forms is
approximately $1.2 billion annually, con-
centrated on the poorest countries.

As Secretary of State Alexander
Haig noted in his address to the U.N.
General Assembly recently: "The poorest
developing countries require long-term
and generous concessional aid from
developed and other developing coun-
tries. . . ." But he said: "Ultimately, the
objective must be to involve them in the
international economic system, thereby
strengthening opportunities and incen-
tives for self-sustaining growth."

In this regard, the Secretary said:
"The United States can offer what it
knows best from its own experience. W
have seen that policies which encouragi
private initiatives will promote better
resource allocation and more rapid
economic growth." This same view is
emphasized in a recent World Bank
report on Africa, and— in spite of
rhetoric to the contrary— is being
accepted by many countries as the way
out of the current crisis.

One of our greatest resources is ou
free market economy, and it is a
resource which we can utilize to our ov
benefit and to that of the peoples of
Africa. U.S. private investment in sub-
Saharan Africa now approaches $6
billion. It is contributing to our own
economy and to development in Africa
Whatever the rhetoric from some
quarters, it is unmistakably clear that
African decisionmakers are increasingl
aware of the benefits of expanding
African-American economic links.

Because of our recognition of the
great potential for expanded economic
ties with Africa and the benefits which
could be accrued from these ties, this
Administration has begun a concerted
program to encourage increased privat
sector involvement in Africa. This pro-
gram includes discussions with banks
and multinational lending institutions t
elicit their assistance, requesting Con-
gress to remove provisions in law whic
inhibit U.S. investment and trade oppo
tunities, and discussions with individua
governments in an effort to improve tl
foreign investment climate and to
remove, where necessary, existing
obstacles to U.S. investment. The
Agency for International Development
reorganizing its programs to provide
more support to the private sector.

We are already beginning to see
positive results from these efforts. One
case which illustrates the progress and
the potential for such cooperation is
Nigeria. I have already indicated
Nigeria's importance to us as a source
oil and a major focus of U.S. invest-
ment. Nigeria is also a country which
has recently returned to civilian goverr
ment, with a constitution very similar t
our own. It is an important partner for
us both politically and economically.

Nigeria, in spite of oil resources, is
country of great poverty. Food is be-
coming a major problem. Between 197'
and 1980, its agricultural imports rose

Department of State Bullet

AFRICA

■om $123 million to more than $1.95
illion. In 1980, in U.S. -Nigerian
xmomic consultations, we agreed to
le formation of a Joint Agricultural
onsultative Committee. The unique
sature of the committee is that the
lembership on both sides is primarily
•om the private sector. It is a major
ffort to bring our agribusiness skills to
ear on Nigeria's food problem. Prog-
jss has been very encouraging. In
leetings this past month, the joint com-
littee negotiated several specific proj-
:ts.

We also signed this year with
figeria cooperative programs in educa-
on and health. Substantial progress
'as made on a trade agreement. All of
lese arrangements are outside of any
id program, for we have no bilateral
id program in Nigeria.

I believe this is illustrative of the
Dntributions and benefits of private sec-
jr involvement in Africa to which we
re giving encouragement. We are hope-
al that the Nigerian-U.S. efforts will ex-
and our ties with that country and will
rovide us with experience for develop-
lg similar relationships with more
irican countries. It is in our national
iterest as well as in the interests of the
eveloping countries of Africa.

he Search for Peace

second important sphere where
frican and U.S. interests intersect is in
le search for peace and security. This
dministration recognizes and respects
le fact that African states have chosen
istorically the path of nonalignment.
he majority of them continue to adhere
) that course, and we in this country
ave nothing to fear from their choice,
laving experienced our own nationalist
Evolution, we are sensitive to the desire
k African leaders to reduce or eliminate
itogether foreign intervention and
preign military presence. Let there be
p mistake: The OAU [Organization of
lirican Unity] Charter and the foreign
olicy principles of most African states
lo not run counter to American national
Interests. There are three factors that
nderscore U.S. respect for Africa's
onalignment.

• We have no interest in seeing the
eveloping world become a battleground
If East- West rivalries. We do not aspire
b a military mandate in Africa.

• Our growing economic interests in
nfriea and in African development are
bt well served if Africa becomes a
pore militarized and unstable zone. The

continent's economic growth will inevi-
tably be hampered in such circum-
stances.

• Our interests in a stable world
order, especially in the developing
world, hinge on mutual restraint be-
tween the superpowers. Our goal— in
Africa as elsewhere— is the establish-
ment of rules of the game among the
most powerful nations that limit the
application of external force in regional
conflicts and the exploitation of these
conflicts for purposes of great power
aggrandizement.

But there is another side to this coin
which African decisionmakers are well
aware of, even if many in the West are
not. Africa does not exist in a vacuum.
The state of the global balance inevitably
affects regional security in Africa.
Unilateral self-denial by the United
States and our allies cannot strengthen
the principle of African nonalignment;
on the contrary, it can only erode the
climate of confidence necessary for true
independence and economic growth. It is
a truism that most of Africa's instability
is of regional origin. This reality is
clearly understood and clearly reflected
in our African policies. But it is also
time to recognize, as we have done, that
the solution to regional disputes does
not lie in Western abstinence at a time
when Libyan, Soviet, and Cuban policies
seek actively to exploit and fuel the fires
of instability.

It is striking that African leaders
are increasingly sensitive to regional
security issues. Their concern to see the
removal of Soviet-Cuban military
presence is increasingly evident. Their
desire to come to grips with Libya's
diplomacy of violence and subversion is
also clear, even if the tactical remedies
appear elusive or obscure. This Admini-
stration is committed to providing
assistance to our friends in Africa to
meet their legitimate security needs. It
is no denigration of the principle of
nonalignment when African leaders take
heart from the fact that the United
States and other Western nations are to-
day prepared to do their part to bolster
African security.

Our security assistance programs
are also sensitive to the interplay of
economic and security problems. We
know that simply adding large amounts
of arms to the local scene will exacer-
bate both the security situation and the
countries' development efforts. The
Soviet Union has been notorious in
doing just this: providing very large
arms shipments to selective parts of

Africa while providing almost no
economic assistance. Our programs are
different. While increasing our security
assistance to our friends in Africa, we
still maintain a ratio of more than three
to one of economic over military
assistance in our bilateral aid. We have
also asked Congress for concessional
terms for military assistance to poor
countries like Sudan which should not be
asked to shoulder large new debts to
meet a security threat, especially when
that threat is of vital concern to us.

At a time when security issues have
come more to the fore, greater burdens
are placed on African statesmanship and
on the institutional mechanisms of the
OAU as an instrument for regional prob-
lem solving. It is decidedly in the U.S.
interest for these efforts to make prog-
ress, as OAU-sponsored initiatives on
the Western Sahara problem appear to
have done during the past 3 months.
With little fanfare, the activity of the
current OAU chairman— President Moi
of Kenya— played a role in dampening
border tensions between Nigeria and
Cameroon in recent months. In the case
of the Chadian conflict, complicated by
the continued presence of thousands of
Libyan troops, we have made clear U.S.
support for OAU decisions aimed at
restoring national unity and ending the
Libyan presence. If it proves possible to
organize an inter-African force to assist
the Chadian authorities, the United
States would look sympathetically at
appropriate requests to support that ef-
fort.

The case of Sudan, Africa's largest
nation, illustrates our approach to
African security questions. It is clearly
in our interest to assist its moderate and
stable government which shares our
goals for peace in Africa and the Middle
East. Flanked by strife-torn neighbors,
and directly threatened by Libyan activ-
ities, Sudan's political and economic
health is of obvious concern to many of
our closest Arab and African friends. It
is our goal that Sudan weather the
storms that surround it, having emerged
successfully from its own prolonged civil
war and having played involuntary host
for years to refugees and movements
from neighboring lands. The United
States is currently providing a package
of assistance to Sudan which addresses
its economic and security needs, in-
cluding military training, assistance in
the purchase of needed equipment, and
significant support through bilateral and

,inuary 1982

25

AFRICA

multilateral channels for its troubled
economy.

The United States and the states of
Africa also share a strong desire for
reduced conflict and enhanced security
in southern Africa. These regional con-
flicts—especially the inter-related ones
in Namibia and Angola— inhibit
economic development and have the
potential for heightened East-West ten-
sions in the area. There can be no doubt
that the region contains within itself the
seeds of heightened violence. Unless
voices of compromise and coexistence
are strengthened, a cycle of deteri-
orating security could develop with
potentially dangerous consequences
going well beyond the immediate area.

We are determined to press for an
internationally acceptable settlement for
the independence of Namibia. That
settlement must be one which meets the
vital security needs of Namibia's
neighbors as well as permits the exercise
of self-determination by Namibia's
people. We believe we have made prog-
ress toward that objective. In the next
few weeks I will accompany represen-
tatives of our Western partners in the
contact group to discuss the latest pro-
posals with the African front-line states,
Nigeria, South Africa, and other in-
volved parties.

The process of negotiation on
Namibia has been long and hard these
past few months. In January of this
year, when this Administration took
office, the negotiations had come to a
complete standstill and the implementa-
tion of U.N. Security Council Resolution
435 was totally stalled. We undertook to
restore momentum to the negotiations
through uncovering and dealing with the
fundamental obstacles to progress. That
could only be done through a process of
quiet and private diplomacy, one in
which our bona fides would be clearly
established with South Africa, which is
key to the solution, as well as the other
parties.

As I have said on other occasions,
while this leadership role is not one
which we have sought, it is one which
the United States is uniquely qualified to
fill. It is the right course, the only
course which has the possibility of suc-
ceeding.

I know you have heard about a U.S.
"tilt" to South Africa. There has been
much other misinformation printed
about our policy. But we have received
encouragement not only from our allies
in the contact group but from black
African leaders as well. This is because
we are actively addressing a problem of
great concern to the Africans, and they

know we have a unique role in bringing
about a peaceful as well as satisfactory
resolution.

Let me speak frankly to you also of
Angola. We have not made Cuban troop
withdrawal a precondition of the
Namibia settlement. The Namibia
negotiations are proceeding on their own
track. But the problems are empirically
related. The presence of Cuban troops
undoubtedly makes the Namibian inde-
pendence process more difficult. As long
as the Angola situation remains un-
settled and dangerous to Angola's
neighbors, the prospects for peace and
stability in the region are made very
dim.

We are not seeking the downfall of
any African government. We have had
useful discussions with the government
of Angola, and we have continuing
economic involvement there. Recently, a
major Export-Import Bank loan was
approved for Angola. We do recognize,
and our African colleagues recognize,
that the Cuban troop presence is a
major impediment to progress on
Namibia. It is also a situation which
allows the Soviet Union and Cuba to
foment disorder: to keep the pot boiling,
to continue a dependence on Soviet
arms, and to prevent development of
regional cohesion. By contrast, if there
is a solution to the Cuban troop prob-
lem, along with that of Namibia, we
foresee an economic development proc-
ess across southern and central Africa
of enormous dimension and of benefit
not only to the people there but to
neighboring African states.

We have begun to contribute to that
process through a very substantial
economic assistance pledge to Zimbabwe
and through assistance to the Southern
Africa Development Coordinating Com-
mittee of black African states in the
region. Our private sector is increasingly
aware of and interested in opportunities
in the region; U.S. investment on the
basis of mutual benefit can add to the
area's potential.

It is in this promise that we and the
African states have a common set of
basic objectives. In the coming months, I
hope this mutuality of interests will
come to dominate more our discussion of
southern Africa, and of Africa generally,
especially as we together make concrete
progress on the issue of Namibia. ■

Internal Situation in
Zimbabwe

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
NOV. 5, 19811

In accordance with the provisions of Section
720 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1980, I am
submitting the following report on the inter
nal situation in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is well into its second year of
independence, and in the period which has
elapsed since the last report to the commit-
tees, the state of the nation can be describe1
as basically stable politically. The disarma-
ment and integration of the two former gue
rilla groups continued on schedule and is ex
pected to be completed in the very near
future. This process represents one of this
young nation's most significant achievemeni

Prime Minister Mugabe's position withii
the government and within his party is still
strong and his overall position in the countr
was enhanced by his skillful handling of the
dismissal of former Minister of Manpower,
Planning and Development. Edgar Tekere.
While Mr. Mugabe is still lobbying for the
creation of a one-party state, he has stated
that he will not move in this direction
without a popular mandate. The Prime
Minister is also becoming a more prominent
spokesman among Front Line leaders and
within the OAU [Organization of African Ui
ty]. Of obvious concern, however, is the in-
creasing sensitivity Prime Minister Mugabe
and other government officials are beginnin
to display over what they perceive as un-
favorable press. The government recently
fired the editor of the Umtali Post allegedly
for questioning the military arrangement
with the North Koreans.

In making public the government's deci-
sion to conclude a military agreement with
North Korea, the Prime Minister stated tha i
the brigade to be trained and equipped by t
North Koreans would be used for internal
security only. He also said that the accept-
ance of military assistance has no political c
ideological significance so far as Zimbabwe':
non-alignment policy goes, but rather this a
tion, balancing British military aid, is an af-
firmation of that non-alignment.

Economically, Zimbabwe appears to be
going through a period of defining what
government's policy and role in the econom
sphere should be. This could be a lengthy
process, and it is already generating con-
siderable concern in the private sector abou
its own role in the country's plans for
economic development. Zimbabwe's econom
policymakers remain very realistic, howevei
and, for the most part, seem inclined to ap-
proach structural changes in the economy
with caution and gradualism, recognizing tr
importance of relating ideology to attainabl
goals.

The government has attempted to main
tain a favorable investment climate.

26

Department of State Bullet

AFRICA

owever, in keeping with its commitment to
e implementation of socialist goals, the
>vernment wants the private sector to
come more responsive to its development
ncerns as well as to Zimbabwe's overall
velopment goals. The recent decision to
eate a minerals marketing authority to con-
ol the production and marketing of the
untry's minerals and metals no doubt
presents an attempt to manifest these con-
rns.

Although the new budget reflects a
oderately socialist path, it contains no
ferences to drastic income redistribution
ograms or plans for nationalization of the
ivate sector. Tax hikes called for in the
idget are high by Zimbabwe standards; they
e designed to increase government revenue
id will have the added effect of allowing the
>vernment to increase expenditures in the
Ids of health services, schooling and other
cial programs.

While there is no question that Zimbabwe
continuing to make economic progress and
at the economy is growing, the rate of
owth is slowing somewhat and inflation is
i for both high- and low-income families,
ly factors contributing to the economic
jw-down include constraints in foreign ex-
ange and labor and transportation prob-
tis. The emigration of whites is continuing,
t there has been no significant increase or
crease in the numbers leaving.

There are also indications that recent ten-
ins between South Africa and Zimbabwe
ly be having a negative impact on the
onomy. Also, the Zimbabwe Government
s acknowledged that the country cannot
t off commercial relations with its
ighbor. South Africa's decision to cancel
e preferential trade agreement and to
ase out Zimbabwean contract workers
esently in the Republic will certainly ag-
avate an already difficult foreign exchange
uation. The reclaiming by South Africa of

of its railroad locomotives is also causing
rious transport problems for Zimbabwe,
rticularly with respect to the transport of
troleum products and to the movement of
rplus grain from Zimbabwe's record maize
rvest.

Land distribution is being carried out
ry cautiously and carefully, to insure that
s basic infrastructure is either in place or
der construction before settlement takes
ice. Present plans call for the resettlement
18,000 families by the end of this year on
esently unused land.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Charles H.
rcy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
ns Committee, and Clement J. Zablocki,
(airman of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
littee (text from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Nov. 9, 1981). ■

Libyan Involvement in
Sudan and Chad

by Princeton Lyman

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on November If, 1981. Mr.
Lyman is Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs. 1

I appreciate the opportunity to testify
here today on U.S. policy concerning
Sudan and Chad, particularly as it in-
volves Libya.

The United States has had and con-
tinues to have interests in Sudan and
Chad outside of the Libyan context.
First and foremost, we are interested in
seeing a stable atmosphere conducive to
development in the region. The peoples
of Chad and Sudan are among the
poorest in Africa, and their economic
needs can be most effectively addressed
in a context void of hostility. It is also in
our interest to assist those countries,
such as Sudan, which have been support-
ive of U.S. goals in Africa and the Mid-
dle East. We also believe the internal
reconciliation of the warring factions
within Chad to be both in our interest
and in that of the region.

The actions of Col. Qadhafi and
Libya frustrate and threaten the attain-
ment of these goals. Not only in this
part of Africa, where Libyan involve-
ment against its neighbors has been so
flagrant, but in many parts of Africa,
Libya is acting as a force for instability
and the overthrow of established
governments.

Libyan Involvement in Africa

It would appear that the Libyans have
objectives in Africa which do not bode
well for the region. These goals seem to
include establishing, without regard to
existing national boundaries, an Arab-
Islamic bloc, including Moslems of
Africa and the Middle East. In fact, it
would appear Qadhafi envisions the
elimination of these boundaries in the
creation of a super-Libya, as it were,
with Qadhafi as its spokesman. He also
appears ready to work actively against
any countries which resist his ambitions.

The most recent example of his ef-
fort to implement his expansionist goals
is the treaty among Libya, Ethiopia, and

South Yemen which was signed in
August. The treaty contains provisions
under which the armed forces of each of
the signatories may, under certain cir-
cumstances, deploy in the territory of
the others. Specifically, there have been
indications that units of the Ethiopian
Armed Forces may be sent to Libya,
and, in fact, a high-level Ethiopian
delegation recently visited Tripoli.

While such forces as those provided
by the Ethiopians may be intended
primarily to protect the Libyan regime
against various alleged threats, there
are also grounds for concern that they
may participate in Qadhafi's foreign
adventures, including efforts to
destabilize governments in the region.
While we have no details on when such
an Ethiopian force might be sent to
Libya, we do believe the subject to be
under active discussion.

Libya supported the regime of Idi
Amin in Uganda and has been charged
by the Presidents of Niger, Mali, and

. . . in many parts
of Africa, Libya is act-
ing as a force for in-
stability and the over-
throw of established
governments.

Sudan with attempts to overthrow their
governments and by the Senegalese and
The Gambians with imprisoning their na-
tionals in Libya and putting them into
military training against their wills.

We have also received numerous
reports of Libyan disinformation cam-
paigns within African countries aimed at
existing regimes.

The United States is not alone in our
concern over these activities. Senegal,
Equatorial Guinea, and The Gambia
broke diplomatic relations with Libya in
1980. Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana,
and Niger objected to the establishment
of "People's Bureaus" last year and ex-
pelled the Libyan diplomats from their
countries. Liberia, Sudan, and the Cen-
tral African Republic followed suit this

.;nuary 1982

27

AFRICA

year. The Libyan activities also played a
role in our decision to close the Libyan
[diplomatic] mission here earlier this
year.

Therefore, I would respectfully sug-
gest that the Libyan-Sudan-Chad
triangle of which you referred in the ti-
tle of today's hearing would be more ac-
curately described as a circle which en-
compasses a number of other nations
within Africa, including but not limited
to those such as Niger in the immediate
proximity of Sudan and Chad.

Developments in Sudan

Sudan has been supportive of many U.S.
policy initiatives, particularly in the Mid-
dle East where President Nimeiri has
supported the Camp David accords,
reestablished relations with Egypt, and
called upon other Arab states to do so.
The Sudan has a generally good human
rights record and has sought to play a
moderating role in other conflicts in the
region, including the Horn of Africa and
the Western Sahara.

Several events have occurred in
rapid succession which have heightened
public concern about Sudan. In
September, Libyan aircraft began fre-
quent bombings of Sudanese villages
located near the Sudan-Chad border.
These raids and Sudan's inability effec-
tively to deter them confirmed Sudan's
defense needs, which had been previous-
ly recognized by this Administration in
its decision early this year to increase
foreign military sales credits to Sudan
from $30 million in FY 1981 to $100
million in FY 1982 to help Sudan ac-
complish a meaningful modernization
program. The air attacks highlighted the
urgency of proceeding with this pro-
gram. And other countries, such as
Egypt, have expressed their concern
over Sudanese security. Recognizing
this, when Secretary Haig met President
Nimeiri at President Sadat's funeral, he
announced that we would expedite
delivery of the equipment already on
order as well as that to be ordered with
FY 1982 funds. We believe improving
Sudan's defensive capabilities will con-
tribute to stabilizing the region.

The urgency of bolstering Sudan's
defense capabilities has also been
heightened by the treaty of cooperation
among Libya, Ethiopia, and the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen to which
I referred earlier. This treaty threatens

polarization of a region where Sudan
seeks only to live in peace. The Govern-
ment of Sudan under President Nimeiri
maintains a policy of seeking good rela-
tions with all of its neighbors and to be
a moderating influence toward ending
hostilities in Ethiopia and the Western
Sahara.

At home Nimeiri has pursued a
policy of decentralizing government to
stimulate greater participation in the
political process by factions throughout
Sudan, a policy initiated in 1972 when
he granted regional autonomy to a large
portion of southern Sudan. Since that
time, he has expanded this concept to
other regions of the country. Elections
for the five new northern regional
assemblies were held in May of this
year. He can be expected to continue to
pursue these policies in the foreseeable
future.

However, in addition to the military
threats along its borders, Sudan faces
serious structural economic problems
which could threaten the stability of the
country. Sudan's inability to earn the
foreign exchange required to meet basic
popular demand has resulted in periodic
shortages of essential goods such as
bread, sugar, and gasoline and in long
lines for these goods when they are
available. Sudan has little leeway on
either the export or import side to
resolve this problem. In the short run,
investment in additional productive

In September, Libyan
aircraft began frequent
bombings of Sudanese
villages located near the
Sudan-Chad border.

capacity, especially agriculture, is need-
ed, but currently nearly all foreign ex-
change earnings must be sent on con-
sumption. If productive capacity is not
expanded, the gap between public expec-
tations and the ability of the system to
meet them will widen and could well
result in popular unrest.

The present gap between demand
and supply already provides fertile
ground for the destabilizing activities of
Libyan-trained and -paid agents. Libya

has been infiltrating agents into Sudan
with the intent of arousing popular
discontent with President Nimeiri. The
arrests in early October of roughly
10,000 undocumented refugees and
suspected Libyan agents demonstrated
the Sudanese Government's current coi
cern with this type of subversion.
However, the dissolution of parliament
in October— another recent developmei
which has sometimes also been cited as
a sign of internal political difficulty —
was, in fact, part of a long planned
devolution of political power to the nev
regional governments. The National
Assembly will be reconstituted as a
smaller body to reflect this devolution
its authority.

In order to correct its structural
economic problems, Sudan will require
scheduling of its debt service, balance-i
payments support, and new public andi
private investment in its productive se>
tor. Stability in Sudan can be maintain |
in the face of Libyan aggression and
subversion, but it will require a con-
certed effort on the part of the
Sudanese Government and Sudan's
friends.

Thus, our policy toward the Sudan
one aimed at promoting stability and,
thus, protecting crucial interests in the^
region. It consists of substantial
economic as well as military assistance
Because of Sudan's serious economic
problems, the Administration has asketi
that Sudan's legitimate defense needs 1
assisted on a concessional basis in FY
1982. We hope Congress will approve
this request.

Developments in Chad

As this subcommittee well knows, the
situation in Chad is complex and tragic
with roots that go back for many years
Basic cleavages in the Chadian society
go back for generations— northerners
versus southerners, nomads versus
sedentary farmers, Moslems versus
animists and Christians, Arabs versus
black African groups. In the postcolonii
period, the country failed to maintain a
political consensus, and a festering civi
war began in 1965. Political authority
was contested among as many as 1 1
rival factions, all of which sought
foreign assistance at some time. The
most recent attempt at a coalition
government— the National Union Trail
sition Government (GUNT), which was

28

Department of State Bulleti1

AFRICA

irmed in November 1979 — has been
jset by internal struggles reflecting the
■ndencies of its constituent parts, the
irmer factions, to break away.

In March 1980, fighting broke out
?tween the forces of GUNT President
oukouni and Defense Minister Habre
ith the battle for N'Djamena so fierce
le United States was forced to close its
nbassy and withdraw. The fighting
•agged on for months, until late 1980
hen President Goukouni appealed to
ibya's Qadhafi to help him fight Habre.
he resultant massive incursion of
ibyan troops and weapons helped turn
ie tide, and on December 15, Habre
as forced to flee the capital.

Libyan intervention interrupted and
intravened efforts by the Organization
' African Unity (OAU) to resolve the
vil war in Chad. OAU plans had en-
saged a cease-fire, an African
;acekeeping force to keep order, and
itional elections. The OAU, in the
agos accord of 1979, called for
ithdrawal of foreign troops and early
jployment of the peacekeeping force to
lfill the original OAU plan. Libyan
rces, however, have remained in Chad.

On January 6, 1981, a joint corn-
unique was issued in Tripoli which an-
mnced the forthcoming merger of
had and Libya. This event caused
tockwaves to protest throughout
frica, and Libya backed down from its
an. However, there are indications — as
te as last week — that Libya continues
press the Chadians into such a
erger.

At its annual summit in Nairobi
ine 24-26, 1981, the OAU reaffirmed
s intention to create an OAU
;acekeeping force in Chad, after which
ie GUNT was expected to request a
ibyan withdrawal. Unfortunately, the
AU has been unable so far to organize
id deploy this force, although the cur-
Hit OAU chairman, President Moi of
enya, is working very actively to this
id.

In the meantime, Libya has rein-
irced its troops in Chad to a level of
>me 7,000. It has introduced tanks and
-mor and airpower and has begun
ailding more permanent facilities in the
arth. The threat from Libyan troops in
had has been felt in many countries.

Libyan troops are now deployed
ong much of Sudan's western border.

Libyan subversive potential against
Sudan is, thus, greatly increased. Radio
Tripoli beams disinformation into
western Sudan, reporting false disorders
in Khartoum and encouraging insurrec-
tion. Infiltration of subversives is more
easily accomplished. In the wake of
Sadat's assassination, Radio Tripoli — in
addition to horribly distasteful rejoicing
over the assassination — sought to stir

Libyan intervention
interrupted and con-
travened efforts by the
OA U to resolve the civil
war in Chad.

immediate uprisings in both Egypt and
Sudan. These efforts continue.

To the west, Qadhafi unleased
threats on Niger, saying it was "second
in line after Chad." In nearly all the sur-
rounding countries — Cameroon, Nigeria,
the Central African Republic, as well as
Sudan, and in countries farther away
such as Ghana, Gabon, Guinea, and
Liberia — there was open concern over
the implications of the Libyan military
presence in Chad.

It is against this background that
events of the past few weeks should be
viewed. Apparently, the GUNT has been
under increasing pressure from Libya
perhaps to agree to a merger or to delay
the OAU peacekeeping force. In
response, the GUNT announced it would
not act on a merger. There were then
rumors of a Libyan-backed coup against
Goukouni. These rumors proved false.
But the GUNT has now asked that Lib-
yan forces be withdrawn immediately
from N'Djamena and the surrounding
provinces and be totally withdrawn by
December 31.

These most recent events have
spurred intensified efforts by the OAU
to organize the peacekeeping force.
Several African countries have offered

troops. The French have offered to help
the OAU by providing financial and
logistics support. OAU officials are ac-
tively working out arrangements. Never-
theless, African countries will not be
able to deploy such a force easily, given
their own economic constraints and the
difficulties of organization, terrain, etc.

The United States has expressed
strong support for the rapid deployment
of an OAU peacekeeping force to
replace Libyan troops. This is, first of
all, an African security problem and one
which the OAU has undertaken to ad-
dress. We also welcome the GUNT's call
during the past few days for Libyan
withdrawal. We hope this withdrawal
takes place soon to relieve much of the
tension in the surrounding area.

Conclusion

Both Sudan and Chad are countries
which need, above all, peace and
economic development. Sudan has been
directly threatened by Qadhafi and been
subjected to cross-border air raids from
Libyan forces in Chad. We need to help
assure that Sudan is not left vulnerable
to such actions. In the larger context,
we must play a strong role with others
in helping Sudan through its current
economic crisis and back to a position of
growth.

Chad has become so traumatized by
the continuing cycle of violence that
basic services are totally disrupted, the
country cannot feed itself — although it
is a former food exporter — and the
economy is in shambles. Once Libyan
troops are withdrawn, there should be
an international program of reconstruc-
tion assistance.

The events of the past year have
been deeply disturbing in this region. If
Libya continues to be a destabilizing
force, the countries of the Sahel — and,
indeed, in most of Africa — will get
caught up in the effects of its policy.
The challenges of economic development
is great enough in Africa. It should not
be made more difficult by these con-
scious efforts to exploit every facet of
internal difference or difficulty for the
purpose of serving Qadhafi's expan-
sionist dreams.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
he available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

nuary 1982

29

ARMS CONTROL

INF Negotiations Open in Geneva

On November JO, lusi. in Geneva,
the United States and the Soviet Union
<ijH tied formal negotiation* on inter-
inediati -range nuclear threes (INF).
Following is a statement made by Sec re-
turn Haig in Washington, D.C., which
was broadcast by satellite to Western
Europe. '

Today marks the formal opening of
negotiations between the United States
and the Soviet Union on intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF). These
negotiations are of fundamental impor-
tance to the security of the Atlantic
alliance and to the peace of the world.

These negotiations are a result of
the December 1979 decision of the
alliance to initiate arms control involving
intermediate-range forces while proceed-
ing with modernization of alliance
forces. The United States is especially
gratified that the opportunity has ar-
rived to reduce the Soviet nuclear threat
to its allies through negotiations. As
President Reagan said in his November
18 speech, the United States views that
threat as a threat to itself. We will
negotiate in this spirit.

President Reagan has proposed a
fair and straightforward solution to this
problem: The United States would
cancel its plans to deploy cruise missiles

and Pershing II missiles if the Soviet
Union dismantled its SS-20 and retired
its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Thus, if the
Soviets are prepared to eliminate the
problem that caused the December 1979
modernization decision, we are prepared
not to implement the decision. Our posi-
tion takes into account Soviet desires
that we not implement our moderniza-
tion decision. We now look to the
Soviets to show an equally forthcoming-
attitude. Ambassador Nitze [Paul H.
Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the
INF negotiations] will lay the details of
this proposal before Soviet represen-
tatives in the negotiations that begin to-
day.

The American position at these talks
is based upon intensive and lengthy
alliance-wide consultations. It is fully
supported by our NATO partners. It is
based on our common concerns about
the threat and our common goal of
genuine arms control. [West German]
Chancellor Schmidt has left no doubt of
this during his recent conversations with
[Soviet] President Brezhnev.

We do not approach these negotia-
tions with a closed mind. As the Presi-
dent stated: "We intend to negotiate in
good faith and go to Geneva willing to

listen to and consider the proposals of
our Soviet counterparts."

We note that President Brezhnev ir
dicated in Bonn that the Soviet Union
was prepared to negotiate reductions in
intermediate-range missiles. While we
are dissappointed that the Soviet posi-
tion remains the moratorium proposal
they first advanced 2 years ago, we are
hopeful that the negotiations will bring
more forthcoming stance. Clearly, both
sides have a stake in reaching an
equitable and verifiable agreement that
improves mutual security and
confidence.

As the talks begin, we are resolved
to pursue them with care and patience.
Progress depends not only on the skill
our negotiators but on NATO's resolve
to continue its preparations to deploy
the missiles that will offset Soviet ad-
vantages. These preparations are the ii
cehtiye that brought the Soviets to the
negotiations and that will encourage
them now to take a serious position.
Parallel implementation of moderniza-
tion and negotiation, as foreseen in the
1979 NATO decision, offers the only
hope for an agreement that will assure
our security for years to come. And
Western unity remains the best
guarantee that the longest period of
peace known by Europe in this century
will endure.

'Press release 407 of Dec. 2, 1981.

U.S. Negotiator at INF Talks

Paul H. Nitze was born in Amherst. Mass.,
on January 16, 1907. He graduated rum
laude from Harvard (1928) and subsequently
joined the New York investment banking
firm of Dillon Read and Company. In 1941 he
left his position as Vice President of that firm
to become financial director of the Office of

the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.
He was Chief of the Metals and Minerals
Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare
(1942-43) and then became Director of
Foreign Procurement and Development for
the Foreign Economic Administration. Dur-
ing 1944-46, Mr. Nitze was vice chairman of
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey; Presi-
dent Truman awarded him the Medal of
Merit for service to the nation in this
capacity.

For the next 7 years, he served with the
Department of State, first as Deputy Director
of the Office of International Trade Policy
and then as Deputy to the Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs (1948). In August
1949, he became Deputy Director of the
Department's Policy Planning Staff ami
I lirector the following year.

Mr. Nitze left the Federal Government in
1953 to heroine President of the Foreign

Service Educational Foundation in
Washington, D.C. In January 1961, he was
appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense ft
International Security Affairs, and in
November 1963, he became Secretary of tin
Navy. In July 1967, he assumed the position
as Deputy Secretary of Defense. He resigne
in January 1969 and the following spring w;
appointed the representative of the Secreta)
of Defense to the U.S. delegation to the
SALT negotiations. He held this position urn
til June 1974 at which time he resigned.

Mr. Nitze was serving as Chairman of
Policy Studies of the Committee on the Presl
ent Danger when President Reagan ap-
pointed him to head the U.S. delegation to I
the intermediate-range nuclear force negoti;!
tions on September 24. 1981. The following |
November 20, he was accorded the personal
rank of Ambassador while serving as head (I
that delegation.

30

Department of State Bullet

ARMS CONTROL

I.S. Consults With
n INF Negotiating

NATO's Special Consultative Group
d in Brussels November 20, 1981, to
nsult on the development of the U.S.
gotiating position, on the U.S. -Soviet
clear iirms cunt rut talks. At tin con-
ision of that meeting, Assistant Secre-
ry for European Affairs Lawrence S.
igli burger and Director of the Depart-
mt's Bureau of Politico-Military
fairs Richard R. Burt made the follow-
g statements.

5SISTANT SECRETARY
\GLEBURGER

day marks the culmination of ex-
ustive alliance preparations for the
coming U.S. -Soviet negotiations,
sed on the two-track decision of
•cember 1979.

The intensity of the consultations
ice the Rome ministerial meeting in
ly symbolizes the American commit-
jnt to allied interests, as well as the
mmon desire of the United States and
allies to achieve genuine arms con-
>1. These consultations played an in-
luable role in developing the U.S.
gotiating position.

That position, as set forth by the
esident earlier this week, is that the
lited States will agree to cancel the
ui to deploy Pershing II and ground-
inched cruise missiles if the Soviets

dismantle their SS-20 missiles and
.ire the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles whose
vice, as the Soviets say, has expired
d which the Soviets claim are being
Dlaced by the SS-20s.

The United States believes the first
ase of negotiations should focus on
id-based intermediate-range nuclear
•ce (INF) missiles in the interest of
■ilitating early agreement. Reductions
other nuclear systems could be sought
a subsequent phase.

The U.S. position is based on the
cember 1979 decision, which was
'ide in the light of the Soviet buildup
thf land-based missile threat to the
ies. If that threat is eliminated, the
ijiance could forego its modernization
:ogram.

With today's meeting of the Special
[nsultative Group and NATO perma-
Int representatives and through con-
■jltations preceding today, the United

Allies
Position

States will be entering the negotiations
fully and firmly supported by its allies.
Close consultations in the Special Con-
sultative Group will, of course, continue
once the negotiations commence.

Alliance cohesion on arms control
and alliance resolve on modernization
have brought the Soviets to the
negotiating table. Based on alliance con-
sultations, President Reagan has made a
bold and genuine offer, which, if ac-
cepted by the Soviets, would constitute a
historic step and enhanced stability be-
tween East and West.

As we have already indicated, the
United States is disappointed by the in-
itial Soviet press reaction but remains
hopeful that Soviet leaders will not
discard this important opportunity to
further the cause of peace. The Presi-
dent has offered the Soviets a fair and
reasonable proposal which provides the
basis for a far-reaching agreement. The
United States will negotiate in good
faith. We will, therefore, patiently ex-

plain our position and consider the pro-
posals of our Soviet counterparts, as
President Reagan made clear. The
United States is ready to reach agree-
ment as quickly as possible. All that is
required is that the Soviets be equally
reasonable and forthcoming.

Implementation of NATO's moderni-
zation decision will proceed in parallel
with the negotiations. The alliance will
alter its program only in the event of a
concrete agreement.

MR. BURT

The paper entitled "U.S. -Soviet INF
Systems: A Response to Soviet Claims"
[see accompanying article with table] is
an effort to amplify on the remarks
made by President Reagan earlier this
week in his speech. It is really the first
official response to President Brezhnev's
claim that there is a balance in what the
Soviets call "medium"-range systems and
demonstrates that these claims are a
manipulative and deceptively selective
use of data designed to conceal the large
and growing Soviet advantage in the
category of INF systems. If truly com-
parable systems are counted in an 'objec-
tive and impartial manner, what

U.S.-Soviet INF Systems:
A Response to Soviet Claims

In his speech on November 18, the
President said that Soviet claims on the
current balance of intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF) are wrong. The
President stated that by any objective
measure, the Soviet Union has an over-
whelming advantage on the order of six
to one.

The six to one ratio that the Presi-
dent used is based on a comparison of
those U.S. systems often cited by the
Soviets as "medium"-range systems and
those Soviet systems which the Soviets
identify as "medium"-range, as well as

additional Soviet systems which have
ranges equivalent to or greater than the
listed U.S. systems. Of such systems,
the United States has a total of approx-
imately 560 aircraft and no missiles,
while the Soviet total numbers over
3,800 missiles and aircraft.

As the charts used by the Preside! it
indicated, the six to one ratio did not in-
clude allied systems on either side. If
such systems were included, the Soviet
Union would still enjoy an overwhelming
advantage in intermediate-range nuclear
forces. ■

U.S. Systems

F-lll

F-4

A-6/A-7
FB-111
(U.S. based)

Total

164

265

68

63

650

Soviet Systems

SS-20

250

SS-4/5

350

SS- 12/22

100

Backfire

45

Badger/Blinder

350

Fencer/Flogger/Fitter

2,700

SS-N-5

30

Total

3,825

luary 1982

31

CANADA

emerges is not a balance but, as Presi-
dent Reagan noted earlier this week, a
Soviet advantage of about six to one. As
you can see from our analysis, their
alleged claim of about 1,000 systems on
each side hides the Soviet monopoly in
the most threatening category of
systems — long-range systems. The table
shows the Soviets have about 600
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles, with a
total of about 1,100 warheads. NATO
deploys no comparable missiles.

In addition, Soviet claims that a
balance exists date back at least to 1979.
Since then they deployed some 350 new
SS-20 warheads while NATO deployed
none. Even if a balance existed in
1979 — and it emphatically did not at
that time— these additional deployments
make Soviet claims completely unten-
able. In fact, these additional
deployments have only increased their
preponderance in these systems.

Several other flaws in the Soviet
claims are worth noting and here, I
think, the table is useful. What we have
done in this table is essentially taken the
Soviet definition for the United States of
"medium"-range and applied those same
criteria to Soviet systems and come up
with a figure that compares comparable
systems by range.

For example, the Soviets include
American carrier-based aircraft, like the
A-6s and A-7s, but count none of their
own sea-based systems. Nor do they
count Soviet naval aviation aircraft
bases in the western Soviet Union. They
compare NATO aircraft with ranges or
combat radii of less than 1,000 kilo-
meters, like the U.S. F-4, with the
4,000-kilometer radius Backfire bomber.

The roughly 2,700 nuclear-capable
Soviet Fencer, Flogger, and Fitter air-
craft in Eastern Europe and the western
Soviet Union are not counted by Presi-
dent Brezhnev, although they have capa-
bilities and ranges similar to the F-4.

Looking at this one table — and there
are other tables that can be developed
and have been developed by the Special
Consultative Group to examine different
elements of the balance — the conclusion
is that if one counts Soviet systems and
comparable American systems, one does
arrive at not a balance but at a highly
lopsided situation, which President
Reagan noted can lead to a balance of
six to one to the Soviet's advantage. ■

Canadian Investment Policy
and U.S. Responses

by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr.

Excerpt from a statement before the
Subcommittees on Inter -American Af-
fairs and International Economic Policy
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on October 21, 1981. Mr. Johnston is Act-
ing Assistant Secretary for Economic
and Business Affairs.1

U.S. investment policy has, for many
years, been based on the fundamental
premise that an open international in-
vestment system, responding to market
forces, provides the most efficient alloca-
tion of global resources. When capital is
free to move without hindrance, all na-
tions can benefit through expanding
world output. As a corollary, U.S.
Government policy is to minimize in-
tervention in the private sector decision-
making process.

Another basic tenet, which we have
strongly supported, particularly for ex-
isting investment, is the principle of na-
tional treatment— foreign investors
should be treated no less favorably than
domestic investors in like situations. We
have worked bilaterally and multilateral-
ly to gain acceptance of this principle.
Its major international embodiment to
date is in a declaration and related deci-
sion adopted by the industrial
democracies in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in 1976.

The adoption of restrictive invest-
ment and trade policies by our neighbor
and largest trading partner is a matter
of particular concern which poses fun-
damental issues for the developed coun-
try members of the OECD, particularly
the United States.

Our concerns center on two
areas— the restrictive and discrim-
inatory policies in the proposed national
energy program and the activities of the
existing Foreign Investment Review
Agency (FIRA).

National Energy Program

Canada announced its national energy
program about a year ago. The basic
policy is to be implemented by two
major pieces of legislation— Bill C-48, or
the Canada Oil and Gas Act. Bill C-48
may pass into law within weeks. The
Energy Security Act is currently only in
discussion draft form.

Our key concern about the national
energy program is not its objective— the
well published "Canadianization"— but its
discriminatory and unfair treatment of
foreign investors. The following ele-
ments of the program are of most con-
cern.

• The 25% crown share, or
"back-in," in existing oil and gas
discoveries in federal or "Canada" lands.
This changes the rules of the game for
foreign firms which have already in-
vested in exploration and development
of Canadian energy resources. Although
the Canadian Government has now
agreed to pay a portion of the explora-
tion costs incurred by the companies on
Canada lands, the compensation now
being considered will almost certainly bi
inadequate to meet the expenses in-
curred by the firms and would not, in
our view, be compatible with interna-
tional standards in this regard.

• The old system of depletion
allowances available to all has been
replaced by the petroleum incentives
program. Under this program the level
of Canadian ownership determines the
amount of exploration grants awarded
to a company, with the maximum grant
awarded to companies with Canadian
ownership of 65% or higher.

• The Committee on Industrial and
Regional Benefits has as its objective in
creasing the participation of Canadian
firms in major projects and increasing
procurement of Canadian goods and
services in the energy sector. The open
tions of the committee may be in conflk
with the provisions of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT).

• The Canadian Government may
take nationality into account in future
natural gas export decisions.

We have had numerous consulta-
tions with the Canadians on the nations
energy program— in Ottawa at the
economic summit, here in Washington,
last month in Grand Rapids, and last
week when Secretary [of the Treasury !
Donald T.] Regan went to Ottawa. We
have been joined by other nations in ex-
pressing concern over the national
energy program in the OECD, where wj
have formally initiated discussion of
those elements of the program which
are regarded as derogations from
national treatment.

32

Department of State Bulleti

CANADA

ireign Investment Review Agency

le Foreign Investment Review Agency
IRA) is a screening agency which
refully monitors incoming invest-
:nts. We have not challenged FIRA's
istence of its basic premise — to review
vard investment— although we and
nada itself acknowledge it as an ex-
Dtion to the national treatment prin-
]e. Our problems center on its opera-
ns.

First, in judging an application by a
eign investor, FIR A applies a vague
ndard— whether there is significant
lefit to Canada.

Second, because of the way FIRA
w operates, its very existence un-
ubtedly discourages many would-be in-
5tors. In many cases the FIRA ex-
icts "undertakings" from prospective
'estors before approving an invest-
;nt proposal. These are legally en-
•ceable agreements, or performance
}uirements, and take the form of
irket-distorting Canadian sourcing re-
irements, export commitments, im-
rt restrictions, requirements to hire
;cified levels of Canadian manage-
:nt and labor, obligations to more pro-
:tive facilities from the United States
Canada, obligations to transfer
:ents and know-how to Canada with-
; charge, and other commitments
ich run counter to generally accepted
ernational practices. These measure-
nts have potentially serious distorting
ects on investment and trade flow
ween the United States and Canada.

Though FIRA is essentially aimed at
v investment, it also reviews changes
ownership of Canadian subsidiaries of
eign firms, even when the changes
re no impact on Canada. This could
ur when two American firms merge
when an American firm wishes to sell
Canadian subsidiary to another non-
nadian firm. These transfers are fre-
:ntly disapproved by FIRA, even in
lations where there is no change in

level of Canadian ownership. This
lA policy has the effect of depressing

value of U.S. firms' assets in
lada.

As with the national energy pro-
.m, we have had many discussions

with the Canadian Government on
FIRA. We intend to continue the con-
sultative process and to assist those U.S.
firms which are adversely and unfairly
affected by FIRA's operations.

There have been some recent re-
ports that Ottawa is not now pressing
earlier proposals for expanding FIRA's
mandate to review and monitor already
established foreign investments in
Canada. This is certainly a positive
development, because such an expansion
of FIRA's mandate would have been a
serious new derogation from interna-
tional norms. We also understand that
the FIRA is considering adopting a
policy of more explicitness and openness
in its decisionmaking process, in par-
ticular, giving the reasons for disap-
provals. This would also be a positive
step.

We are now engaged in an extensive
effort to obtain information on in-
dividual companies' experiences with
FIRA. Once we have a firm basis to
present our views to Ottawa and,
possibly, to international organizations
which oversee investment matters, we
can be more specific with respect to
FIRA. We must, of course, avoid
jeopardizing individual companies' rela-
tions with Canada, and thus the fact-
finding process is very difficult.

U.S. Response to Canadian Policies

The rising concern in the United States
regarding discriminatory Canadian in-
vestment and trade policies has engen-
dered a wide-ranging and, at times,
vociferous debate on how we should re-
spond. The concerns over Canadian in-
vestment policies expressed here in Con-
gress and by U.S. business and labor
groups are valid, and we share them.
Several pieces of legislation have been
introduced in Congress. Various pro-
posals call for restrictions on investment
in specific sectors, greater screening of
foreign investment, and similar meas-
ures which endeavor to establish
reciprocity or to retaliate.

There are major risks in using the
Canadian measures as a rationale to im-
pose restrictions on inward investment
in the United States. We should proceed
cautiously in adopting restrictive policies
as retaliatory measures.

First, such measures might adversely
affect broader U.S. interests. We should
not reject the jobs, new technology, and
management skills that foreign invest-
ment here can supply.

Second, the United Suites is a large

investor abroad and a major force in in-
ternational trade. We have an important
interest in maintaining maximum free-
dom of investment and capital flows in
the world economy. U.S. economic
policies have a major impact on those of
other countries, and we do not want to
send the wrong signal to others about
our intentions or to give others a peg on
which to hand their own interest in
discriminatory measures.

Third, we want to insure that our
response is appropriate, consistent with
international norms, and effective. We
are clearly being served by policies that
strive to eliminate foreign practices that
depart from desirable international
norms than by policies of retaliation
which could weaken these norms. Our
response to date has included bilateral
and multilateral elements.

Bilateral Elements

Although some elements of the national
energy program have been implemented
by the Canadian Government, the pro-
gram has not yet been formally enacted.
There remains an opportunity, there-
fore, to continue the consultative proc-
ess and to avoid further discrimination.
Also, as I indicated, the Canadian Gov-
ernment has recently not been pressing
for an extension of FIRA's mandate. We
need to convince the Canadian Govern-
ment that it is in our mutual interest to
moderate those aspects of FIRA's policy
and operations which discriminate
against foreign firms.

As I mentioned earlier, we have met
with Canadian officials on several occa-
sions to enumerate our concerns on the
national energy program and on FIRA.

Multilateral Elements

We invoked the consultation provisions
of the OECD investment declaration in
March 1980. In an initial discussion, a
significant number of OECD members
joined us in questioning Canada about
the intent of its policies, asking
specifically how they related to the 1976
decision and a subsequent decision taken
in 1979 to extend, not contract, the
national treatment principle. Further
discussion is scheduled in the OECD In-
vestment Committee in December.
Moreover, we see the Canadian

luary 1982

33

ECONOMICS

measures as part of an emerging pat-
tern of investment restrictions, concen-
trated largely in the newly industrial-
izing countries but finding echoes in one
or two OECD countries in addition to
Canada. In order to limit this pattern,
the United States has sought inter-
national discussion of a number of in-
vestment issues, notably national treat-
ment and imposition of performance re-
quirements similar to those required by
FIRA in a number of organizations, in-
cluding the World Bank, the GATT, and
the OECD itself. Most recently, at a
special meeting in the OECD on October
12-13, we won the agreement of other
participants to reinvigorate the organ-
ization's work on investment focusing on
the general issues I have discussed this
afternoon.

Finally, we are cooperating with the
Interior Department in their review of
Canada's status as a reciprocal country
under the terms of the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920. In that review, the
criteria and procedures must not only be
applicable to the current policies of
Canada but also be applicable to other
countries, whether or not currently
deemed reciprocal. We have recently
given Interior our detailed views on
how a decision on reciprocity might be
reached.

In conclusion, I want to assure you
that the State Department fully shares
the repeatedly expressed view that U.S.
investors abroad should receive the
same fair and nondiscriminatory treat-
ment that we accord to foreign investors
here. For our part, we intend to work
toward that goal and to make every ef-
fort to achieve a balanced and mutually
beneficial trade and investment relation-
ship with our Canadian neighbor. We ex-
pect to work closely with Congress to
achieve this goal.

Voluntary International
Guidelines on Antitrust

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The Conference on Restrictive
Business Practices completed negotiation
of a set of principles and rules for the
control of restrictive business practices
in April 1980, and the recommendations
were adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in December 1980. In the
following joint letter of November 9,
1981, the Departments of State and
Justice announced and explained these
guidelines to American businessmen and
other interested parties.

On December 5, 1980, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Set of Multi-
laterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices. The Principles and Rules are a set
of recommendations for governments and
enterprises to consider in dealing with re-
strictive business practices and promoting
competition. In the United States these sub-
jects are dealt with under the antitrust laws.
A copy of the text itself and interpretive "Q's
and A's" prepared by the Department of
State and Justice are attached for your infor-
mation.

Several important elements of the Prin-
ciples and Rules are summarized below:

• The recommendations contained in the
Principles and Rules are not legally binding
on governments or enterprises, nor do they
alter existing concepts of jurisdiction;

• The Principles and Rules do not
displace or change the U.S. antitrust laws, or
those of any other country, unless they are
incorporated in that country's national law;

• The Principles and Rules apply equally
to all enterprises, whether privately or state-
owned;

• Governments are urged to ensure
treatment of enterprises which is "fair,
equitable, on the same basis to all enter-
prises, and in accordance with established
procedures of law," meaning that both
foreign and domestic enterprises are to be
treated in the same manner;

• Except under certain circumstances,
the Principles and Rules do not call into ques-
tion normally legitimate intracorporate prac-
tices, such as between parent and subsidiary
firms;

• An Intergovernmental Group of Ex-
perts is created which has specific functions
involving research and multilateral consulta-
tion on the use and implementation of the
Principles and Rules. It is prohibited from
acting like a tribunal or otherwise passing
judgment on the enterprises in connection
with specific business transactions. It will
assist in organizing technical assistance, ad-
visory and training programs on restrictive

business practices, particularly for developin
countries.

The U.S. Government participated activi
ly in the negotiations leading to the agreed
text. We believe that the recommendations i
contains will contribute to a freer and fairer
more open and competitive international
trading environment. Accordingly, the U.S.
Government commends the provisions of th(
Principles and Rules to all U.S. enterprises
representing a multilaterally-agreed set of
voluntary guidelines in the antitrust field. It
should be noted that the Principles and Rul(
are not a Treaty or Executive Agreement
and are not legally binding.

The U.S. Government closely consulted
with private sector representatives through
out the negotiation of the Principles and
Rules to ensure that they were fair and
balanced. We continue to welcome comment
on the use, citation and application of the
Principles and Rules by enterprises and
foreign governments.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Hormats
Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs
Department of State

William F. Baxter
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division
Department of Justice

David R. Robinson
The Legal Adviser
Department of State

Questions and Answers Regarding the
U.N. Multilateral^ Agreed Equitable Set
of Principles and Rules for the Control ol
Restrictive Business Practices

Q. What is the set of U.N. Principles
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive
Business Practices?

A. The principles and rules were negot
ated by U.N. conferences meeting in Genev
in 1979 and 1980; they were adopted
unanimously as a recommendation by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 5, 19!
The U.S. Government participated actively
these negotiations and endorsed their adop
tion by the General Assembly. The principli
and rules are intended to set forth an inter
national consensus concerning restrictive
business practices, which generally include,
but are not limited to, practices prohibited
U.S. antitrust law. In the view of the U.S.
Government, the principles and rules are
compatible with our own laws.

34

Q. To whom are the principles and
rules addressed?

Department of State Bulle'

ECONOMICS

A. The principles and rules are recom-
nendations addressed primarily to member
;tates of the United Nations. However, they
ire also addressed to the U.N. Secretariat,
>articularly the Secretariat of the U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development
UNCTAD) in Geneva, which is to carry on
idditional technical work in this field. Lastly,
hey are addressed through states to all
nterprises engaged in international com-
nerce, whether state owned, privately
iwned, or hybrid. All enterprises are "encour-
.ged" to act consistently with the principles
nd rules dealing with enterprise conduct.

Q. What is the legal status of the prin-
iples and rules?

A. The principles and rules are not legal-
f binding; that is, they are neither a treaty
lor an Executive agreement. Rather, they
re recommendations for voluntary behavior
ddressed to government [referred to as
states" in the principles and rules and here-
fter in these questions and answers] and
assed on to enterprises. Of course, they may
e incorporated into national legislation, par-
icularly by developing countries which do not
et have an antitrust law.

Q. How does the U.S. Government
iew the principles and rules?

A. The United States participated active-
/ in the years of negotiations preceding their
doption by the U.N. General Assembly,
heir broad purpose — to reduce restraints of
■ade by private and state enterprises — is
jmpatible with general U.S. policy in the
eld of international trade and, thus, eomple-
lents the latest round of negotiations under
le General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
'hich contributed toward minimizing govern-
lent trade and tariff restrictions.

The United States believes that the prin-
ples and rules, embodying procompetitive,
•ee market concepts can help in promoting
lir competition in international trade. The
scommendations contained in the principles
nd rules should provide a common inter-
ational framework for enhancing the ability
f all countries, particularly developing coun-
ties, to deal with restrictive business prac-
ces.

The principles and rules provide certain
uidelines for states in their control of
sstrictive business practices (detailed in
sveral sections which follow) which should
i of value to U.S. businesses in their rela-
ons with foreign governments.

Q. What are the primary recommenda-
ons for states?

A. States are urged to adopt or
trengthen their domestic antitrust laws; to
^operate with other states as to enforcement
itions and the exchange of information; to
rosecute offenses within their competence
lat are injurious to international trade and
svelopment; to treat all enterprises fairly,
suitably, and on the same basis; and to pro-
!Ct the confidentiality of trade secrets ob-
lined by their authorities during antitrust in-
sstigations.

Q. What are the primary recommenda-
tions which states are asked to make to
enterprises?

A. States are urged to recommend that
enterprises comply with antitrust rules and
policies of the countries in which they
operate. Enterprises should be willing to con-
sult with antitrust officials in such countries
and to provide necessary information. Enter-
prises should avoid cartel agreements with
rival firms (recognizing that firms under com-
mon control are not rivals and taking into ac-
count any acceptance of cartel practices
under applicable national law or intergovern-
mental agreements) in accordance with the
provisions of Sections D(3) and B(9). They
should also not abuse a dominant position of
market power when the enterprise is in a
position by itself or acting together with a
few other enterprises to control the relevant
market for particular goods or services in
accordance with the provisions of Section
D(4).

Q. How do the principles and rules
affect relations between a parent firm and
its foreign subsidiary?

A. Section B(3) of the principles and
rules includes within the meaning of "enter-
prises," ". . . their branches, subsidiaries,
affiliates, or other entities directly or indirect-
ly controlled by them." Sections D(3) and
D(4), referring to vertical and horizontal
abuses, generally allow normal intraenter-
prise relations to be carried on without con-
cern that such behavior might constitute
restrictive business practices. Section D(3)
excludes from its listing of harmful effects
those which might arise when enterprises
deal with each other ". . . in the context of an
economic relationship wherein they are under
common control. . . ." Section D(4) includes
what has been termed a "rule of reason" foot-
note which enumerates four factors to ex-
amine in judging whether acts or behavior
are abusive or not. One of these, factor (a),
provides that certain acts are generally not
abusive if they are "appropriate in the light
of the organizational, managerial and legal
relationship among the enterprises con-
cerned, such as in the context of relations
within an economic entity and not having re-
strictive effects outside the related enter-
prises." The purpose of the last clause is to
provide the additional test of effect outside of
the parent-subsidiary relationships; that is, if
a practice limits access to markets or other-
wise unduly restrains competition outside of
the related enterprises, it may fall within
those discouraged under Section D(4).

Q. Are foreign firms treated differently
than domestic ones?

A. Although transnational enterprises
are referred to generally at several places in
the text, Section E(3) explicitly deals with the
subject of how states, in their control of
restrictive business practices, should treat
enterprises. States are called upon to ". . . en-
sure treatment of enterprises which is fair,
equitable, on the same basis to all enter-
prises, and in accordance with established
procedures of law." In addition, such "laws

and regulations should be publicly and readily
available."

Section C(7) deals with the issue of
"preferential or differential treatment for
developing countries." The section provides
that states, particularly developed countries,
should take into account the development,
financial, and trade needs of developing coun-
tries in their control of restrictive business
practices.

Q. Does the mode of ownership of an
enterprise affect how it is treated under
the principles and rules?

A. No. The principles and rules define
enterprises as "firms, partnerships, corpora-
tions, companies, other associations, natural
or juridical persons, or any combination
thereof, irrespective of the mode of creation
or control or ownership, private or State,
which are engaged in commercial
activities. . . ." (see Section B(3)). Thus, all
commercial enterprises are covered by the
recommendations of the principles and rules.

Q. What future action can be expected
by the United Nations in this field?

A. The principles and rules establish an
intergovernmental group of experts that will
meet under UNCTAD auspices in Geneva
once a year. The functions of the intergovern-
mental group are specified in Section G(ii).
The experts are prohibited from sitting in
judgment on the behavior of any individual
enterprises or governments in connection
with a specific business transaction.

The United Nations is to publish an an-
nual report on antitrust developments, based
on annual reports from all nations active in
this field. A compendium of all antitrust laws
in force is to be published, studies and con-
ferences are to be arranged, and the experts
are to help in developing a technical assist-
ance program for developing countries. If
asked, UNCTAD will provide conference
facilities for nations wishing to have private
consultations on antitrust issues of common
concern. Lastly, the United Nations is to con-
vene a review conference in 1985 to re-
examine the principles and rules and their
operation. The U.S. Government anticipates
active participation in the review conference
as well as the meetings of the intergovern-
mental group of experts.

Q. To whom in the U.S. Government
should inquiries concerning the principles
and rules be addressed?

A. Inquiries, as well as information with
regard to the use, citation and application of
the principles and rules by enterprises and
foreign governments, are welcome. They
should be addressed to the Director of the
Office of Business Practices, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, or to the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and
Business Affairs, of the U.S. Department of
State, Washington, D.C., 20520,
(202)632-1486 and (202)632-0242, respective-
ly, or to the Chief, Foreign Commerce Sec-
tion, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C., 20530,
(202)633-2464. ■

nuary 1982

35

EUROPE

Preserving Western Independence
and Security

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Address before the North Atlantic
Assembly in Munich, West Germany, on
October 15, 1981. Ambassador
Eagleburger is Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs.

We Americans watch with interest
and— let us admit it— some apprehen-
sion, as Western Europeans increasingly
focus on the complex and emotional
issue of nuclear weapons and their
deployment in Europe. We watch with a
good deal of sympathy since there can
be no question about the profound im-
portance of avoiding nuclear catas-
trophe. All previous human tragedies
would pale by comparison with the total
devastation a third world war would
bring. Neither the plagues of the Middle
Ages, nor the terrible trench warfare of
the First World War, nor even the 40
million deaths in World War II approach
the death and destruction which a
nuclear holocaust would bring in its
wake.

Precisely because the prevention of
nuclear war is so terribly important, we
are concerned about pressures— some
well intentioned, some not so well inten-
tioned— to change a policy which has
prevented war for over 30 years. Many
of my countrymen wonder whether the
debate now taking place here is a funda-
mental challenge to the principles which
have guided us for over 30 years or a
discussion about tactics, accompanied by
an acceptance of most of the traditional
premises about Western security.

While the debate is, as it should be,
fundamentally between and among
Europeans, we Americans cannot re-
main totally aloof from it. America's
well-being— as well as Europe's— is at
stake. In a most profound sense, you are
discussing the security of the United
States. Just as Americans were inex-
tricably caught up in the first two World
Wars on this Continent, so, now, the sur-
vival and well-being of over 200 million
Americans depends on the conclusions
you reach.

It seems to me that despite the com-
plexity of the issues and the diversity of
views, the debate of which I spoke is
basically over two fundamentally differ-
ent paths— paths which could profoundly

affect the course of history through the
end of this century and beyond.

A number of Europeans are now
arguing vigorously for a new approach
to security. They do so for a variety of
reasons. However, to this observer's
eye, at least, those who espouse a new
approach seem to agree on certain
fundamentals. I don't want to over-
simplify, but the central thrust of the
argument seems to be that the West
should now stress arms control more
than defense programs in the search for
security. Many also argue that we
should pursue this process through
gestures of unilateral goodwill, for ex-
ample, by canceling such defense pro-
grams as deployment of theater nuclear
forces (TNF). And some go further to
urge that Europe try to find a less
dangerous middle ground between the
two superpowers.

Others in Europe argue for con-
tinuity. They believe that war can best
be deterred and independence preserved
through adequate defense efforts. They
believe arms control can only yield
serious results if we proceed from a base
of strength and confidence, and if we in-
sist on equality. Finally, they believe
Europe and America's fate must be inex-
tricably linked, strategically and
politically.

Let me say at once that I under-
stand the concerns of at least some of
those who argue for a change in the
West's approach. For 30 years— until the
mid-1970s— most Europeans were con-
vinced that the United States was a
world power without peer and that it
would, in a crunch, defend Europe be-
cause it was in its self-interest to do so.
U.S. inability to bring the war in Viet-
nam to a successful conclusion, our in-
ternal torment over Watergate and
subsequent paralysis in Angola,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, culminating
with the year-long agony of the hostage
crisis in Iran, have undermined that
confidence. Thus some wonder not only
about our military power but also
whether, in some profound way, we
have lost the will to withstand the
Soviet Union even if we have the power-
to do so.

Now, ironically, from some of the
same sources, we see a concern that
United States may overdo its efforts to

restore its military power and face up to
Soviet challenges. These concerns, in
combination, have produced a view-
popular among some— that the United
States would be all too ready to get into
a war yet bent on confining it to
Europe. The result is a mixture of fear
and wishful thinking.

• Fear of the Soviet Union as an ag
gressive, imperialist power intent on im-
posing its will on Europe. Fear of an er-
ratic, unpredictable United States which
might, through accident, weakness,
overconfidence, or unnecessary confron-
tation precipitate a nuclear war in its
vacillating and disjointed efforts to halt
Soviet expansion. And finally fear that
both powers would share an interest in
limiting war to Europe, thus further
reducing the inhibitation on confronta-
tion.

• And wishful thinking that some-
how through demonstrations of goodwil
toward the Soviet Union, even if dis-
tancing itself from the United States,
Europe can create a more secure en-
vironment for itself.

The central problem with this ap-
proach is that it ignores critical realities
about both the Soviet Union and the
United States. With regard to the Soviet
Union, let us look at the record compilei
during the late 1960s and the 1970s, a
period of detente— a period in which
there was supposed to have been mutua
restraint.

• The United States abolished the
draft, reduced the size of its armed
forces, and decreased its real military
spending. The Soviets increased their
military forces by one-third— to 4.8
million men, more than double that of
the United States— and expanded their
real military spending by more than
50%. Are those gestures of goodwill?

• The Soviets increased their inven-
tory of tanks to some 50,000, compared
to just 11,000 American tanks. They
transformed their navy from a coastal
defense force to an open ocean fleet, in-
creasing the number of large surface
combatants by 40%, just as the United
States decreased the number of ships in:
its fleet by 40%. Is that reciprocity?

• During a period when NATO
deployed no new long-range theater
nuclear forces, the Soviet Union
deployed over 750 warheads on their
new SS-20 missiles. And the Soviets in-i
creased their strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles nearly 600%. Is that restraint?

• As countries and whole continent
were liberated from the yoke of Wester

36

Department of State Bulleti

EUROPE

Dlonialism, the Soviet Union and its
roxies moved in with new forms of im-
erialism and intervention— Vietnam in-
) Kampuchea and Laos, the Soviet

nion into Afghanistan, Cuba into
frica and Latin America. While the
test has endeavored to meet the real
Beds of the developing countries
irough food, loans, and other economic

sistance, the Soviets have eoncen-
ated on exports of weapons and Marx-
t-Leninist regimes— which in turn have

oven disastrous failures in meeting the

actical needs of their people. Is this a
mtribution to development and
•ogress?

• As the West is swept by anti-
jfense and antinuclear demonstrations,
ie Soviet Union exposes its own people

a massive display of military films
id propaganda and represses any
lblic expression of concern about the
ist sums devoted to a military buildup,
ven as the Federal Republic of Ger-
any demonstrates its genuine goodwill
id humanitarianism throughout the
orld, the German Democratic Republic
■eaches peace in the West, seeks to
duce inter-German contacts, directs a
scade of shrill propaganda against
leralization in neighboring Poland, and
fakes its most particular export to the
Iveloping countries training in the tac-
js of the secret police. Is that the spirit

detente?

• While the West endeavors to cope
th the overwhelming human tragedy
some 10 million refugees from op-
essive Communist regimes in Viet-

m, Kampuchea, Laos, Afghanistan,
hiopia, and Cuba, the Soviets and
eir allies create still more refugees and
solve themselves of any responsibility
• their care. Is this concern for
manity?

Not only have the Soviets failed to
ciprocate the self-restraint and
sitive efforts of the West, they have
so shown open disregard for solemn in-
■national agreements.

• They have failed to live up to
her the security or human rights
;dges of the Helsinki Final Act, even
resting a group trying to monitor
viet compliance with the Helsinki ac-

irds.

| • They may well have violated the
[•neva protocol and the Biological
Weapons Convention.

• They and their proxies have used
(irce in blatant contempt of the U.N.
darter itself.

[ If an approach based on fear and
\shful thinking ignores critical facts

about the Soviet Union, is this approach
forced on Europe because of a perma-
nent change in the United States? Is
Europe condemned to a policy of ap-
peasement because of some new struc-
tural fault in American strength and
will? I urge you to look across the Atlan-
tic for your answer.

The spirit of the American people
has revived. As President Reagan said
in his speech at West Point in May,
America's era of self-doubt is now

While the West has
endeavored to meet the
real needs of the
developing

countries . . . the Soviets
have concentrated on ex-
ports of weapons and
Marxist-Len in ist
regimes. . . .

behind us. We, too, had hoped that the
Soviets were prepared to reciprocate our
restraint with restraint of their own.
Their proven unwillingness to do so has
left us no choice but to increase substan-
tially our defense spending to match the
Soviet effort and to reinvigorate our
efforts to resolve critical crises through
peaceful means. We have the will and
the resources to do so.

Most fundamentally the United
States rejects the idea that there is no
alternative between surrender of our in-
dependence and nuclear confrontation.
We have a clear vision of what the
future requires. It proceeds from the
principles which have served the Atlan-
tic alliance so well for over 30 years.

During this period, we witnessed
over 150 wars in other parts of the
world. This was a time when Europe
faced an ever more heavily armed
hostile power in close proximity. We
must ask ourselves: How was peace
secured? How has it been maintained?

In the middle of the 20th century
the ever-quickening pace of conflict in
Europe was brought to a halt by an
alliance based on two qualities— shared
values and a recognition that our securi-
ty was inextricably linked. Each quality
strengthens the other. Our commitment

to one another's security is all the more
real and lasting because we stand for—
and would fight for— common values.
Our values are all the more precious be-
cause those who would threaten us
display utter contempt for our concept
of society and the individual.

Just as Secretary Haig, in his recent
Berlin speech, called for rededication to
our shared values, we must also return
to first principles with regard to our
security. Amidst the controversies of the
day— TNF, Poland, defense budgets,
Southwest Asia— we all tend to lose
sight of the foundation of our security.
In fact, we cannot hope to overcome to-
day's problems unless our policies are
built firmly on that foundation.

The Foundation of Peace

Five principles have guaranteed peace in
Europe over the past three decades. If
we stand by them, they can continue to
do so through the end of this century
and beyond.

First, alliance security is indivisible.

Second, our strategy is to deter war
at any level.

Third, the burdens of our alliance
must be shared.

Fourth, we must negotiate from a
basis of equality, confidence, and
strength.

Fifth, our political independence re-
quires that we sustain a military
balance.

Let me examine each of these tradi-
tional principles in today's context.

Our first principle is the in-
divisibility of alliance security. Who-
ever threatens one of us threatens all.
This has been and remains the source of
our collective strength.

Can anyone really deny that the
strategic arsenal of the United States is
the ultimate guarantor of European
security? Although trends in strategic
capabilities have favored the Soviets in
recent years, we now are taking steps to
maintain a versatile and viable strategic
force that will continue to command
Moscow's respect. That is the meaning
of the comprehensive program an-
nounced by President Reagan earlier
this month.

To form a bridge to America's
strategic forces, the alliance must imple-
ment the December 1979 decision to
modernize its theater nuclear forces.
The placement of modernized U.S.
nuclear systems in Europe is a response

Jnuary 1982

37

EUROPE

to allied concerns that the Soviet Union
is creating the means to devastate or in-
timidate Europe with theater nuclear
weapons while holding the United States
at bay with its strategic forces. TNF
modernization will end Soviet hopes of
regionalizing a nuclear conflict based on
an ability to strike the European allies
from a Russian sanctuary.

The essential idea behind TNF
modernization— like that behind the
maintenance of 300,000 American
soldiers in Europe— is to remove any
doubt the Soviets might have about the
U.S. strategic commitment to NATO.
The Soviets have no higher goal than
undoing the December 1979 decision,
leaving themselves with an undeterred
capability to wage or threaten nuclear
war in Europe. While we welcome
debate about TNF, opponents must face
up to the fact that the strategic link that
has helped bring peace and stability to
Europe would be severely strained if
they had their way.

The Soviets neither understand nor
accept that indivisibility of our security.
They do not see why the United States
is unwilling to draw a clear distinction
between its security and that of its
allies— the former sacred, the latter ex-
pendable. They are surprised that
Americans are no less alarmed than
Europeans by the SS-20, a system
specifically designed to threaten Europe
but not the United States. Indeed, in re-
cent months senior Soviet officials have
said flatly to us that U.S. forces in
Europe that could strike the Soviet
Union from Europe could not be equated
with Soviet forces than can only strike
the European allies. We, in turn, have
told them bluntly that the Soviet nuclear
threat to America's allies is a threat to
America itself.

The second principle which has
sustained peace for 30 years is that
the aim of our strategy is to deter
war. Ours is a strictly defensive alliance.
We have everything to lose and nothing
to gain from war. Our strategy is defen-
sive, our equipment is defensive, our
forces train solely to defend. In contrast,
the Soviets train, plan, and are equipped
to thrust into Western Europe. Their
50,000 tanks are hardly necessary to de-
fend against NATO forces whose only
mission is to safeguard our own ter-
ritory.

Throughout the postwar period,
NATO has chosen to rely on a strategy
of flexible response to deter aggression.
Knowing that our conventional forces
might be insufficient to withstand an

38

onslaught from larger Soviet forces, we
have depended heavily on nuclear deter-
rence. We have always known that the
best way to avoid nuclear war was to
close the gap in conventional forces. To-
day that gap is still serious. But where
is the support for improved conventional
forces from those who seem so con-
cerned about nuclear war?

Increasingly one hears criticism in
Europe of the so-called warfighting doc-
trine of the United States. This criticism
is more vocal, I might add, than that
directed against Soviet warfighting doc-
trine, the object of which is the very
European territory Americans would die
to defend. Having forces trained and
equipped for combat hardly implies that
the horror of war is being ignored. Hav-
ing nuclear weapons that are secure,
survivable, modern, and capable of
destroying targets valued by the adver-
sary hardly suggests that the decision to
use such weapons would be any less
grave. Indeed, possessing the means to
hold Soviet territory at risk is the only
way to convince the Soviets that war-
fighting is fraught with danger for them.

I hear time and again that the
United States is increasing the stockpile
of nuclear weapons in Europe in order
to wage nuclear war here, while in-
sulating the United States itself from
nuclear holocaust. That disgusting claim
ignores the several hundreds of thous-
ands of American troops stationed in
Europe who would also be victims of
such a conflict. It also ignores some
fundamental facts. I can understand con-
cern with the numbers of nuclear
weapons on this Continent. But I never
hear reference to the fact that last year
the United States withdrew 1,000
nuclear weapons from Europe without
replacement. Moreover, those that we
are deploying as a result of the
December 1979 TNF decision are not
battlefield weapons at all and, in fact,
will replace weapons now in Europe.
The United States is thus reducing the
number of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Our third principle is that the
burdens of our alliance should be
shared. This is an inescapable con-
sequence of the first two principles. Just
as each ally benefits from the security
that results from a collective commit-
ment and from deterrence, so must each
uphold its responsibilities to the common
defense effort. This is a practical imper-
ative as much as a moral duty. So great
is the threat that we cannot safely do

without the efforts and resources of any
ally, no matter its size. Nor can we ask
some nations to bear disproportionate
risks while all expect to share in the
benefits of credible deterrence.

Indeed, the thought that any of us,
on a national basis, can elude the risks
of our dangerous world is an illusion. If
deterrence fails, none can hope to be
spared, least of all my own country.
While policies differ among various allie;
on the question of peacetime deploymen
of nuclear weapons, neither the risks we
face nor the shelter of deterrence make;
such distinctions. Those who do not hav
nuclear deterrent forces on their terri-
tory owe their security, in large
measure, to those who do. None could
escape the devastation of a nuclear war
whether they have nuclear weapons on
their soil or not. An ally can opt out of
its deterrent responsibilities only at a
cost to the security of its allies and
itself. Sharing risks reduces risks. At
the Rome ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council last May, allianc
members acknowledged the danger we
face and committed themselves to make
available whatever it takes to restore a
military balance.

The burden of defense is heavy on
the shoulder of our peoples, especially ii
these times of economic trouble. No one
feels this weight more than my own
countrymen— who have consistently
devoted a higher share of their gross m
tional product to defense than other
NATO countries. In recent years we dk
more than others but less than is
necessary. President Reagan now has
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a
major increased effort to rebuild our
military strength, while cutting painfull
into nondefense programs in order to
restore national economic health.

We know European leaders are wel
aware of the gap that must be filled by
increased defense spending. We urge
our European friends to make even
greater efforts to generate the necessar
funding. The underlying strength of
your economies certainly makes this
economically possible if there is suffi-
cient political will.

The serious challenge to alliance
security in Southwest Asia has added
another dimension to the principle of
shared responsibilities; 51% of Europe's
oil comes from the Persian Gulf, a
region facing internal stresses and a
growing Soviet threat. Even though
only 12% of America's oil comes from
the gulf, the United States has acceptei

Department of State Bulleti

EUROPE

, special responsibility to meet this
hallenge and is strengthening its
apabilities to protect vital Western in-
erests in that region.

There is no lack of opportunity for
he allies to join the effort: Some can in-
rease their own deployments to the
rea; some can support the transit of
J.S. forces sent to Southwest Asia; and
ome can increase their assistance for
'urkey and others directly menaced by
he Soviets.

The fourth principle of our securi-
y is our desire for serious arms con-
rol negotiations combined with our
ecognition that results will only come
E we negotiate from a basis of equali-
y, strength, and confidence. The
vidence for this proposition is over-
whelming. The alliance's decision to
lodernize its theater nuclear forces
aused the Soviets to reverse their
afusal to negotiate and for the first
me to offer limits on their own theater
)rces. Let me repeat this. The Soviets
'ould not even agree to negotiate until
fe decided to move ahead with our own
eployments. We now face a hard and
robably lengthy negotiation. The pros-
ects for success depend, above all, on
hether the Soviets believe us when we
ly that our program can be affected
ily as a result of an equal and
erifiable arms control agreement.

Ironically, the real enemies of arms
)ntrol are those who often are the
udest in its support. Those who under-
line the common commitment to both
■acks of TNF, in fact, are undermining
ny hope of success in arms control,
here is an inescapable logic to this posi-
on which no amount of rhetoric can
sscure.

My government is applying to
xategic arms limitations the same com-
piling approach that the alliance
iopted with respect to TNF. We are in-
lring that our strategic programs give
a solid base from which to negotiate
;rious reductions. President Reagan is
jmmitted to significant strategic arms
eductions; we hope to be able to begin
gotiations sometime during the first
.If of next year. We don't want
iregulated competition. But the Soviets
ust be convinced— and I think are be-
ig convinced— that Americans have the
:solve to reverse the trends that have
vored the Soviet Union for more than
decade and to establish an overall
dance.

The principle of negotiation from

confidence, unity, and strength also has
been vividly demonstrated in the Madrid
CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] follow-on
meeting. Through cohesion, firmness,
patience, and a strong negotiating posi-
tion, we have brought the Soviets some
distance toward our proposals for a
meaningful European disarmament con-
ference and an equally significant out-
come on human rights. For example,
they have come closer to agreeing that
confidence-building measures should
apply to Soviet territory up to the Urals
and thus to all of Europe. This would be
a development of historic political impor-
tance and substantial benefit to our
security. If, in the end, the Soviets
refuse, they will in effect be saying that
their part of Europe should be exempt
from the rules they would apply to the
rest of the Continent. Since the Soviet
Union is the threat to European securi-
ty, the need for confidence-building
measures is nowhere greater than on
Soviet territory. The only way to get the
Soviets committed to a European disar-
mament conference genuinely aimed at
enhancing security is to convince them
that we won't agree to a conference
without such a mandate nor to an out-
come in Madrid which slights human
rights.

The Harmel report of 1976 pro-
claimed that military security is "the

. . . the Soviets must be
convinced . . . that
Americans have the
resolve to reverse the
trends that have favored
the Soviet Union for
more than a decade and
to establish an overall
balance.

necessary condition for effective policies
directed towards a greater relaxation of
tensions." That observation was made
when hopes were highest that the East
could be brought to share our commit-
ment to moderation and restraint. By
the time of the Rome ministerial
meeting, some 14 years after the

Harmel report, hope had given way to
disappointment and frustration. In the
intervening period, growth in Soviet
military capabilities was spectacular,
while we in the West failed to heed
Harmel's wise prescription. We have not
abandoned the goal of constructive rela-
tions with the East, but we must now
realize that we haven't given the Soviets
enough incentive to pursue this same
goal.

The fifth principle which must con-
tinue to guide us is the inextricable
linkage between sustaining a military
balance and our political indepen-
dence. Deterrence has served us well, so
well that the threat seems almost
unreal— a receding memory for some, a
distant abstraction for others. But it is
worth noting that just a few months ago
100,000 Soviet troops conducted a
military exercise on Poland's borders at
the very moment the Polish trade union,
Solidarity, was meeting. The Helsinki
Final Act forbids its signatories from
threatening the use of force. It is clear
that neither time nor the pledge of
restraint has reduced the readiness of
the Soviet leadership to use military
power to influence political decisions.
The 25th anniversary of the Hungarian
revolution next week and the second an-
niversary of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December remind us of a
single fact: The Soviet Union remains
determined to dictate the destinies of
other nations.

As critical as the U.S. strategic com-
mitment is for deterrence, it is no less
important politically. The Soviet Union
has long harbored the hope that the
United States could be effectively re-
moved from the European scene, leaving
Soviet military supremacy as the
backdrop of European politics. For
European governments to take decisions
under the threat of overwhelming Soviet
military power would be paralyzing in
peacetime, dangerous in a crisis, and
fatal in a conflict.

Nations which value their in-
dependence must sustain the means to
defend it. We cannot expect to maintain
our freedom and democratic values
through appeals to the goodwill of those
who would suppress them.

Agenda for the Future

As I noted at the outset, we can apply
these five principles to the future or we
can change course in fundamental ways.
If we decide to stay on course, our agen-
da for the future will require effort and
sacrifice. But it also will be full, rich,

jnuary 1982

39

EUROPE

and promising. Above all it will require
that we move from principle to practice,
that we take concrete steps to imple-
ment our overall approach. Specifically it
will mean:

In defense, the United States must
sustain the substantial program of con-
ventional and nuclear force improve-
ments we have launched. Our allies also
must increase their defense contribution
based on the pressing need to close ob-
vious gaps.

In arms control, we will begin TNF
negotiations on November 30th, we will
resume the CSCE discussions this
month, and we expect to start strategic
arms reduction talks in the first half of
next year. By approaching this agenda
from a basis of confidence and strength,
we can work toward significant limita-
tions and reductions.

In areas of current or potential
crisis, we can apply Western strength
to building restraint and resolving prob-
lems. Here too the agenda is rich: gain-
ing independence for Namibia and
security for an Angola free of outside
forces, the restoration of independence
and nonalignment for Afghanistan and
Kampuchea, stability and growth for
Central America, a permanent peace in
the Middle East. We and other nations
have made positive and practical pro-
posals in each area, while the Soviet
Union and its allies have encouraged in-
transigence and tension.

Our overall objective should be a
new era in which all nations act with
restraint and responsibility, in which
change proceeds peacefully in a frame-
work of internationally recognized
norms and without damage to the vital
interests of any nation. If we are wise,
history is on our side. As the NATO
ministers stated in their communique of
May 5th:

The more constructive East-West rela-
tionship which the Allies seek requires tangi-
ble signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to
abandon the disturbing build-up of its mili-
tary strength, to desist from resorting to
force and intimidation and to cease creating
or exploiting situations of crisis and instabili-
ty in the Third World.

With our balanced program designed
to restore Western strength and to pro-
ceed with positive arms control and
other diplomatic initiatives, we can hope
to bring about this greater Soviet
restraint.

The Situation in Poland

Following is Secretary Haig's state-
ment and question-and-answer session
with news correspondents in Brussels,
Belgium on December IS, 1981.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT1

I want to share with you today our in-
formation on the Polish situation and ex-
plain our approach on the evolving situa-
tion there as we know it now. The facts
are these:

• Early this morning the Prime
Minister announced that Polish security
forces began "interning" Solidarity, dissi-
dent and party leaders in Warsaw; we
have reports that similar actions are be-
ing taken in other Polish cities as well.

• Simultaneously Polish communica-
tions were cut within the country and
with the outside world.

• Polish security forces have been
dispatched to key offices and facilities,
including union headquarters.

• Air traffic in and out of Poland
has been restricted and, for the time be-
ing, foreigners are not being permitted
to enter the country.

• In sum, what amounts to martial
law has been instituted in Poland.

Of course, we have no way of pre-
dicting what the outcome of these
developments will be.

Our Charge in Warsaw has been
assured by a senior Polish Foreign Office
official, and there will be no return to
the situation which existed in Poland
prior to August 1980. That, you will
recall, is when the Government agreed

to accept major reforms under pressure
from the Solidarity labor movement. Ot
Charge was told by the Polish official tc
day that reforms would continue. That,
of course, remains to be seen.

Pending further information, it
would be unwise to say too much at thi:
time. Nevertheless, I must emphasize
that we are seriously concerned about
the decision to impose martial law; as
we have said before, the political exper
ment underway in Poland should be
allowed to proceed unimpeded. The
potential instabilities in Poland which
could arise from the imposition of mar-
tial law are obvious to all.

For this reason, the U.S. Govern-
ment reiterates that the Polish people
should find a solution to their current
difficulties through a process of negotia
tion and compromise among the parties
involved. Above all, they should be per-
mitted to do so without any outside in-
terference.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION

Q. Does the United States see any sij
of direct or indirect Soviet involve-
ment in these measures?

A. It is clear that the stridency of
Soviet statements in recent days with
respect to the Solidarity movement has
increased quite noticeably. On the othe
hand, as of this moment, we do not see
any signs of direct Soviet involvement
the events as they've unfolded. Clearly;
the Soviets have a capability to watch
carefully— and more carefully than we
do — internal developments as they

But, if we desert the principles that
have preserved peace for 30 years, then
who can, with confidence, predict the
future? The lesson we should have
learned from the 1930s is that weak-
ness, vacillation, and appeasement start
a process which, more often than not,
leads to tragedy. The aggressive govern-
ment keeps pushing until it miscalcu-
lates, oversteps, and compels a military
response or capitulation.

Those who genuinely wish to avoid
nuclear confrontation must see that the

only rational course is to act now— as \\
have so steadily and successfully for
almost four decades— to make clear to
the Soviet Union that their expansionis j
policies cannot succeed. The age of
empire has passed. Forty -three years
ago this month, Neville Chamberlain
traveled to this city in search of 'peace
for our time, peace with honor." Withii
months Europe was once again at war.
A combination of fear, wishful thinking
and misguided idealism led to disaster.
It must never happen again. ■

40

Department of State Bulle

EUROPE

evolve and, therefore, it is too early to
say.

Q. Has there been any buildup of
Soviet forces near Poland?

A. Not that have been picked up by
Western intelligence sources. I have
oeen in touch with my counterparts in
our allied Governments — those with ma-
jor concerns and especially those with
responsibilities for assistance levels to
Poland. None of us have ascertained any
Soviet readiness measures which would
pe a source of alarm — additional
alarm — but we continue to watch the
situation most carefully. As a matter of
fact, I want you to know that since 3
i/clock this morning, I have been in
j;ouch with the foreign ministers of our
allied governments, the Secretary-
General of NATO, with President
Reagan, with Vice President Bush, of
;:ourse with Judge Clark, my Deputy,
imd with the National Security Council
lis well. We have continued that level of
Consultations throughout the day.

Q. In your statement earlier that
vas read by Dean, and perhaps you
lave reiterated now, you talked about
li process of negotiation and com-
promise as the root for solution. Does
lhat word compromise suggest a U.S.
lesire for the Polish Prime Minister
o back off from the martial law
losture that he has introduced?

A. The broad objective included in
he term "compromise" should not be in-
erpreted as any specific course of action
hat the United States would seek to im-
>ose on the internal affairs of the Polish
overnment other than as a broad ex-
iression of concern.

Q. Ten Ministers of Foreign
Affairs are going to meet tomorrow in
London. Do you plan to meet with
ihem?

A. The Economic Community? That
s a longstanding scheduled meeting —
[ocusing on economic events within the
■ommunity.

Q. Will you take the opportunity
o —

A. No, I don't anticipate doing so.
as I understand it, the political directors
tf the NATO nations will convene here
it NATO headquarters tomorrow after-
loon and the United States, of course,
vill be represented at that meeting.

Q. You expressed a desire not to
nterfere with Polish affairs. And you

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
DEC. 15, 19813

It was reported at 4:00 a.m. EST (10:00
a.m. Warsaw time) that Warsaw re-
mains outwardly calm but with heavy
military and police presence in the
streets. Overnight we received increas-
ing reports of strike activities at major
industrial installations in Poland, but
their extent and degree of coordination
remain unclear. While police and
military personnel have been observed
around striking enterprises, there have
been no reports of violence or confronta-
tions. Telephone and telex communica-
tions remain out, and our Embassy has
learned that Warsaw Airport, contrary
to previous reports, will not reopen to-
day.

There are also reports that deten-
tions are widespread and continuing. We
had a report yesterday that [Lech]
Walesa had been detained. AFP this
morning reports from Stockholm that
Walesa has been arrested for refusing to
negotiate with the military government.

The Military Council of National
Salvation insisted yesterday that martial
law was necessary to avoid civil war but
said there would be no return to the pre-
August 1980 system of rule. The State
Council, meanwhile, offered clemency to
all detainees provided they give a writ-
ten pledge of loyalty to the regime.

Warsaw

Virtually no one was on the street after
the curfew deadline of 10:00 p.m. There
are reports of strikes at three of the
largest industrial plants in Warsaw. At
the Huta Warszawa steel mill, police
were seen peacefully escorting small
groups of workers off the grounds Mon-
day evening. There are reports of
workers occupying the Ursus tractor
factory. A sit-in strike at the FSO auto-
mobile factory is also in progress.

Southern Poland

We have a report that the Katowice
Steel Mill has been occupied by its
workers, and Polish military units are in
the area. There have also been reports
of strikes and of the organization of
strike committees that have been set up
to coordinate strikes at coal mines in the
Silesian region. In Krakow, workers
have occupied the giant Lenin Steel
Works. The plant was reportedly sur-
rounded by police and military person-
nel.

Baltic Coast

A Solidarity strike committee has re-
portedly been established in the Lenin
shipyards in Gdansk to direct union
operations and coordinate strikes. The
Paris Commune shipyard is also re-
portedly occupied.

also said political experiment should
be allowed to continue unimpeded. If
the experiment, despite the assurances
of the Charge, is not allowed to con-
tinue unimpeded or in any way, will
the United States accept that with
equanimity? Would it take any action
or make any statement about it?

A. It is, of course, too early to say
what actions the United States would
take in the event that there is an inter-
nal repression of the kind your question
suggested. However, let me assure you
that we have been viewing this situation
in Poland for a number of months now,
and we have considered a number of
potential outcomes, both good and bad,
and at the appropriate time, we will be
prepared to announce it.

Q. Can I follow up with a ques-
tion? Did the Charge tell something to
the Polish official as well as hearing
from him? Did he express an American
attitude this morning and, if so, what
was it?

A. No, our attitude is a longstand-
ing one. It was the one I reiterated this
morning in an official statement and
have just spoken to here. I understand
that the message conveyed to our At-
tache was also conveyed to a number of
foreign governments by the Polish
Government's Foreign Office.

Q. Did they initiate the contacts
then?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been in touch with
the Russians in any way?

A. I have suggested that Foreign
Minister — Ambassador Dobrynin be ad-
vised in Washington by the State De-
partment of our concern and about the
importance of nonintervention at this
time.

Q. What is the NATO position as
well as the U.S. position in the event
the Soviets do use military force,
whether there would be any kind of
military or some kind of economic and
diplomatic response from the Alliance?

anuary 1982

41

EUROPE

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
DEC. 16, 198P

The situation in Poland remains much as
it was yesterday and continues to be a
matter of the gravest concern.

We have received reports of
numerous strikes in response to the im-
position of martial law and the detention
of union leaders. There have reportedly
been outbreaks of smallscale violence,
but we are not able to confirm them.
The Polish military remains active, but
we have not seen evidence of unusual
Soviet military activities.

In particular, we cannot confirm
reports that Soviet transport planes
have landed in Poland, and we have no
evidence concerning reports of blood-
shed or loss of life.

It is our position that the Polish peo-
ple should settle their current difficulties
through a process of negotiation and
compromise, without outside inter-
ference. We have made these views
known to Polish authorities and to the
government of the Soviet Union. Soviet
military intervention in Poland would
have a severe and lasting effect on East-
West relations.

This morning, Assistant Secretary
Eagleburger met with Polish Am-
bassador Spasowski to reiterate our con-
cerns about the course of events in
Poland. The following specific topics
were raised:

• We are instituting the same
restrictions on movement of Polish diplo-
mats in the United States that have
been established for our officials in
Poland.

• We are seriously concerned that
large numbers of people have been "in-
terned" and with reports that Walesa is
not a free agent. If this is true, it will be
hard to reconcile with the Government's
commitment to continuation of the
reform process and to political solutions.

In general, we do not see how the
martial law regime abridgments of civil
liberties can be reconciled with the
Polish People's Republic's commitments
as a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act.

Ambassador Spasowski was given a
copy of the Senate Resolution on Poland
which was passed by a vote of 97 to 0
on the evening of December 15.

A. I don't think it serves any useful
purpose to characterize the nature of the
collective Western response in the event
of such a contingency. It is our hope, of
course, that such an event does not take
place, but we've reiterated repeatedly in
the past that should it take place, the
consequences would be very serious and
longlasting.

Q. Have you changed your travel
plans? Do you have any certainty
about them now?

A. I think I will make a decision
later this evening based on develop-
ments as they occur. Clearly, this is a
serious situation and one that may re-
quire my presence in Washington.

Q. Two days ago at the NATO
meeting, you seemed optimistic about
the general situation. Did you know
what has happened in Poland might
happen now?

A. Did we have information that the
events that have unfolded today were
going to occur? I would say, in general,
that all the Washington parties were
surprised. I know the United States
was, in the context of immediately
available information to us. That is not
to suggest that we were not clearly cog-
nizant of a growing level of tension be-
tween Solidarity and the party which in-
volved some active participation by the
church as well over an extended period.
This had caused all of us to raise our
level of concern about the internal situa-
tion in Poland, but we had no informa-
tion to suggest that this sweeping im-
position of martial law would take place
the way it did, and I think the Foreign
Ministers that I have spoken to today—
and there have been a number— had no
information either to suggest this action.

Q. Do you think that the Polish
Government was looking for oppor-
tunity to impose martial law?

A. I can't say. Clearly, the state-
ment made by the Prime Minister this
morning was one which suggested that,
I think, in his own terms, Poland was on
an abyss and that this was necessary ac-
tion. The reassurances we've had from
the Polish Government this afternoon,
we are going to watch very carefully
with the hope that they will be lived up
to.

Q. Is there anything that the
United States can do in any way that
might help diffuse the evolving crisis
in Poland?

A. I don't know, at this moment,
whether there is anything we can do

other than to express our concern abou
the situation, as we have done — to con-
tinue to watch it very, very carefully.
Beyond that, I don't think it serves any
useful purpose.

Q. Do you have any more informa
tion on what is happening in cities
other than Warsaw and what the rea<
tion of the military in Poland is?

A. The information we have is that
this is a countrywide movement and th;
it involves extensive use of security
forces and police, but that military unit
are also involved primarily in a standby
status. But there has been some
substantial readiness taken by Polish
military forces.

Q. In case of complete crackdowi
on Solidarity, in your opinion, which
one should be the target of Western
reaction — the Soviet Union or Poland

A. Again, I don't think it serves ar
useful purpose to get into future con-
tingencies which we may or may not be
faced with. Hopefully, we will not.

Q. Do we know the whereabouts
of Lech Walesa at this point?

A. No.

Q. Would you suggest introduc-
tion of the food aid and economic aid

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
DEC. 17, 19814

The American Embassy in Warsaw has
advised the Department of State that,
although there have been no known in-
cidents involving U.S. citizens in Polan |
nor any evidence of hostility toward
them, the general situation in that coui |
try is uncertain and unstable.

The imposition of martial law and
the disruption of communications,
together with severe restrictions placer j
by the security forces on access to the
American Embassy and on the ability c
Embassy personnel to travel and deal
with consular problems, make it imposi
ble for our Embassy and consulates to
extend normal welfare and protection
services to U.S. citizens in Poland.

Accordingly, the Department adviS'
American citizens in Poland who have
no compelling reason to remain there
that they may wish to leave the countr
All American citizens who prefer to re-
main in Poland are advised to exercise
prudence in their activities and to avok
unnecessary travel.

42

Department of State Bullet

EUROPE

hat some Western countries are lean-
ng toward?

A. Clearly, this is a matter which
all have to be considered very carefully
i the light of events which will unfold
i the hours ahead.

Q. What I meant in the attitude of
he armed forces in case of— do you
ave any information on that point?

A. No, I have no information.

Q. When you said earlier in your
pening remarks about the Polish ex-
eriment is underway and whether it
hould be allowed to continue unim-
eded without any outside forces, do
ou have any concern that the Poles or
Ioscow will see this as American in-
erference or meddling in Polish
ffairs?

A. I think the United States and the
/est at large as a result of very careful
oordination, from the outset of the
vents of August of 1980, have assumed
le posture of nonintervention which we
ave pursued very assiduously over the
itervening months, and I think it would
e hard by any measure of objective
•iteria to suggest that the West and the
nited States have been guilty of inter-
antion in internal Polish affairs. What
e have done is increasingly insist that
thers must not also become engaged.

Q. You are not going to take part
i that meeting tomorrow afternoon,
re you?

A. No, these are Political Directors
id we will be represented there at the
ppropriate level and Ambassador
agleburger as our Political Director.

Q. Has any increased readiness
een reported to you on the part of
ther Warsaw forces?

A. No, none at all.

Q. Would you qualify the situation
>day or the initiatives taken tonight
s an internal affair for Poland?

A. Would I?

Q. Would you qualify the internal
leasures or—

A. Thus far, it clearly involves only
le internal forces — Polish forces. It's
io early to say, whether it goes beyond
lat.

Fourth Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 23, 1981 '

In accordance with the provision of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past six-
ty days toward reaching a negotiated settle-
ment of the Cyprus problem.

The intercommunal negotiations between
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot repre-
sentatives under the chairmanship of the
United Nations Secretary General's Special
Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo
Gobbi, are continuing to explore issues of
mutual concern. Following an interrupted
schedule earlier this year when both Greek
and Turkish Cypriots prepared for and held
elections, intercommunal negotiations have
resumed on a more frequent schedule with
weekly sessions since July 29. The
negotiating atmosphere has remained con-
genial and constructive.

This period has been marked by substan-
tive presentations in the negotiations by both
sides. The Turkish Cypriot negotiator submit-
ted proposals on August 5 and the Greek
Cypriot representative on September 9.

These proposals are comprehensive in scope
addressing the basic constitutional and ter-
ritorial questions that lie at the core of the
disagreements dividing Cyprus.

We have welcomed developments of this
nature as indicative of a continuing commit-
ment by both communities to resolve their
differences by peaceful negotiation and a
spirit of compromise. We hope that during
the period ahead the discussion under the
aegis of United Nations Secretary General
Waldheim will lead to a just, fair and lasting-
resolution of the Cyprus problem. The inter-
communal negotiations have now passed the
one-year mark, and it is time for the parties
to reinvigorate their efforts to bring the
hopes stimulated by their inception to frui-
tion.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Sept. 28, 1981). ■

Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos I

'Press release 422 of Dec. 14, 1981.
! 2Press release 422A of Dec. 14, 1981.
I 3Read to news correspondents by De-
irtment spokesman Dean Fischer.
'. 4Made available to news correspondents
/ Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

Their Majesties King Juan Carlos I
and Queen Sophia of Spain made a State
visit to Washington, B.C., October 12-16,
1981. Following are remarks made at the
welcoming ceremony on October 13 and
remarks made to reporters following
meetings on the same day.1

WELCOMING CEREMONY2

President Reagan

Your Majesty, it gives me great pleasure
to welcome you and Queen Sophia to the
United States. We welcome you as
monarch of Spain and as a champion of
democracy.

Yesterday, we celebrated Columbus
Day. Some 489 years ago, three ships
sailing under the Spanish flag and com-
missioned by King Ferdinand and Queen
Isabella made a discovery that irrevers-
ibly altered the course of history and
marked the emergence of Spain as a
world power. It's fitting that one who
traces his lineage to Ferdinand and
Isabella now leads Spain into a new era
of democracy and freedom. We applaud
the sensible path toward political liberty

that you've chosen and the skill and, if I
may add, personal courage that you've
demonstrated in reaching your goal.

On July 1st, I met with your Foreign
Minister, Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, and
he emphasized that Spain is moving
toward joining the major European in-
stitutions. This, too, we applaud. We
look forward to Spain's complete inte-
gration into the Western community of
nations. Already, the Spanish Govern-
ment is playing a leading role in the
struggle to combat terrorism on the
European Continent. Such initiative is
well appreciated here.

Spain's growing presence cannot
help but strengthen the bond that exists
between our two peoples. Americans will
never forget the all important assistance
Spain was during our struggle for in-
dependence and freedom.

So now, when we offer the Spanish
people our hands and our hearts, we do
so out of gratitude for all that Spain has
done for us. Those of us from the
western United States understand
perhaps more than other Americans the
magnitude of Spain's contribution.
Spaniards explored the length and

inuary 1982

43

EUROPE

King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sophia

breadth of the southern and western
United States, settling or passing
through 16 of the present States of the
Union. My own California is a wonderful
example of Spain's lasting cultural gift.
Catholic missions still stand in testimony
to this magnificent cultural and spiritual
contribution to the world. Spanish archi-
tecture is everywhere, and California's
constitution was written in two
languages — Spanish and English.

At my first inauguration as Gover-
nor of California, I took the oath of
office with my hand on a Bible brought
to California by Father Junipero Serra,
a Spaniard whose unselfish devotion to
God is an inspiration to all Americans.
Those things and our many citizens
whose family trees are rooted in Spain
have had a major impact on the
American character.

In 1883, one of our great poets,
Walt Whitman, commented on Hispanic
traits and the American identity. He
said, "No stock shows a grander historic
retrospect — grander in religiousness and
loyalty, or for patriotism, courage,
decorum, gravity, and honor."

Today, we know that the traits Walt
Whitman described a century ago well
characterize the leadership of King Juan
Carlos. We welcome you, Your Majes-
ties, and are grateful for your dedication
to your country anil to your ideals. You
have the admiration and respect of the
American people, and you honor us with
your visit.

44

King Juan Carlos

Mr. President, the Queen and I offer our
sincere thanks for your very warm
greetings. It has given us great pleasure
to be able to accept your most kind
invitation and to be here today in your
great country.

We officially begin our visit at this
ceremony with our hearts and spirits
working toward the pleasant task of
bringing our peoples and our two coun-
tries together in a felicitous and produc-
tive cooperation based on our common
interests and goals.

From the vantage points afforded us
by our respective national characteristics
and destinies, we are witnessing an in-
creasingly closer weave in the fabric of
our relationship — a relationship whose
goal is the progress and well-being of
our people within the global context of
the noble principles of peace, under-
standing, freedom, and prosperity for all
mankind.

We also wish at this time to express
to the American people the Spanish
people's message of sincere friendship.
For the world and for my country, you
embody the great American democracy
which during its two centuries of exist-
ence, in times of peace as well as times
of hardship, has succeeded in defending
and upholding the timeless values of
justice and the dignity of man.

In this task, you will always have
the understanding and support of my
country, which with its new democratic
vitality, with faith and hope, has set out
upon the path leading to full integration
in the Western World to which it
belongs.

Here at the portico of the White
House, whose architecture reflects the
austere solemnity, the traditional virtue
of the pioneers who founded the
American nation, the Queen and I thank
you and Mrs. Reagan for your cordial
welcome.

REMARKS TO REPORTERS2

President Reagan

His Majesty Juan Carlos and I have just
completed a stimulating and instructive
session of talks, during which we
touched on some of the most critical
international issues of the day.

We discussed the East-West situa-
tion, the importance of forging even
closer Western unity and cohesion in the
face of a determined Soviet challenge.
We spent considerable time comparing
notes on the Middle East and the in-
terest which our two countries share in
promoting peace and stability in that
troubled region, so recently shaken by

the tragic death of Egyptian President
Sadat. We talked about Latin America
and the Caribbean Basin, an area wher
owing to the wealth of Hispanic cultun
and historical ties, Spanish insights are
especially valuable.

Most important, my talks with His
Majesty merely confirmed that — what
and millions of my fellow Americans
already knew — that Spain has a wise
and courageous chief of state, whose
leadership in developing his country's
democratic institutions has earned the
world's profound respect.

Your Majesty, I take this oppor-
tunity to reiterate in public what I hav
expressed to you in private. The Unite
States enormously admires the strides
which you and your countrymen have
taken toward creating a vital and
vibrant democracy in so short a time. 1
fully supporting that democracy, we cc
sider Spain not only a major strategic
partner but a close friend, and we look
forward to working, even more closely
with your government as Spain con-
tinues to pursue full integration with
Europe and the West.

I speak for all Americans when I s,
that I hope you and your gracious Quei
will soon return to our shores. You'll bn
particularly welcome not only here in
Washington but in those many parts of'
our country where Spanish culture and
language have contributed so enduring]
to our own history and heritage.

King Juan Carlos

I want to thank you for those kind
words for which I am extremely grate-
ful. But I want to tell you, and publicly
to tell you, that without the help of the
Spanish people, I would not have been
able, in the beginning, to do what Spaii
achieved and what I achieved with then

I want to express again to the Pres
dent and Mrs. Reagan our gratitude foi
the invitation and for the hospitality we
are receiving. Our visit to Washington
couldn't have started better. I'm not
referring to the weather, but to the
most cordial and personal relationship
that has developed in this, our first visis

As the President told you, we dis-
cussed different matters around the
world and, above all, the relationship
between Spain and the United States,
that can't be in a better way and in a
better moment.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 19, 1981,
which also includes dinner toasts made on
Oct. 13, 1981.

2Made on the Soutli Lawn of the White
House. ■

Department of State Bulleti

/IIDDLE EAST

J.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation

OINT PRESS STATEMENT,
10V. 30, 1981

sraeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon is
isiting the United States at the invita-
on of Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
/einberger. The Secretary and the
[mister met today to discuss security
Nations between their two countries.

The Secretary and the Minister, hav-
lg affirmed the common bonds of
iendship between the United States
ad Israel and having stressed the
lutual security relationship that exists
3tween the two countries, will sign to-
ay a memorandum of understanding
stween the governments on strategic
>operation.

The agreement is designed to enable
le two countries to act cooperatively,
provide each other military assistance
cope with threats to the security of
le entire region caused by the U.S.S.R.
• Soviet-controlled forces introduced
om outside the region into the region,
he strategic cooperation is not directed
any state or group of states within
e Middle East.

In accordance with the memoran-
lm of understanding, the Secretary
id the Minister discussed the composi-
Dn and the schedule of meetings of the
ordinating council and the joint work-
g groups established by the agree-
ent, as well as the mode of implemen-
tion of the agreement. The first
eeting of the coordinating council is
heduled for January 1982.

The Governments of the United
ates and Israel believe that this agree-
ent on strategic cooperation reaffirms
e common bonds of friendship between
em.

Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon in-
ted Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
visit Israel next year, and the Secre-
ry accepted the invitation with
easure.

The Secretary and the Minister also
dressed questions of U.S. military
sistance to Israel, including measures
make Israeli industry more competi-
'e in bidding on U.S. contracts.

MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING,
NOV. 30, 1981

Preamble

This Memorandum of Understanding
reaffirms the common bonds of friendship
between the United States and Israel and
builds on the mutual security relationship
that exists between the two nations. The Par-
ties recognize the need to enhance strategic
cooperation to deter all threats from the
Soviet Union to the region. Noting the long-
standing and fruitful cooperation for mutual
security that has developed between the two
countries, the Parties have decided to
establish a framework for continued consulta-
tion and cooperation to enhance their national
security by deterring such threats to the
whole region.

The Parties have reached the following
agreements in order to achieve the above
aims.

Article I

United States-Israeli strategic cooperation, as
set forth in this Memorandum, is designed
against the threat to peace and security of
the region caused by the Soviet Union or
Soviet-controlled forces from outside the
region introduced into the region. It has the
following broad purposes:

A. To enable the Parties to act coopera-
tively and in a timely manner to deal with the
above mentioned threat;

B. To provide each other with military
assistance for operations of their forces in
the area that may be required to cope with
this threat;

C. The strategic cooperation between the
Parties is not directed at any State or group
of States within the region. It is intended
solely for defensive purposes against the
above mentioned threat.

Article II

1. The fields in which strategic cooperation
will be carried out to prevent the above men-
tioned threat from endangering the security
of the region include:

A. Military cooperation between the Par-
ties, as may be agreed by the Parties;

B. Joint military exercises, including
naval and air exercises in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea, as agreed upon by the
Parties;

C. Cooperation for the establishment and
maintenance of joint readiness activities, as
agreed upon by the Parties;

D. Other areas within the basic scope and
purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly
agreed.

2. Details of activities within these fields
of cooperation shall be worked out by the
Parties in accordance with the provisions of
Article III below. The cooperation will in-
clude, as appropriate, planning, preparations,
and exercises.

Article III

1 . The Secretary of Defense and the Minister
of Defense shall establish a Coordinating
Council to further the purposes of this
Memorandum:

A. To coordinate and provide guidance to
Joint Working Groups;

B. To monitor the implementation of
cooperation in the fields agreed upon by the
Parties within the scope of this agreement;

C. To hold periodic meetings, in Israel
and the United States, for the purposes of
discussing and resolving outstanding issues
and to further the objectives set forth in this
Memorandum. Special meetings can be held
at the request of either Party. The Secretary
of Defense and Minister of Defense will chair
these meetings whenever possible.

2. Joint Working Groups will address the
following issues:

A. Military cooperation between the Par-
ties, including joint U.S. -Israeli exercises in
the eastern Mediterranean Sea;

B. Cooperation for the establishment of
joint readiness activities including access to
maintenance facilities and other infrastruc-
ture, consistent with the basic purposes of
this agreement;

C. Cooperation in research and develop-
ment, building on past cooperation in this
area;

D. Cooperation in defense trade;

E. Other fields within the basic scope and
purpose of this agreement, such as questions
of prepositioning, as agreed by the Coordi-
nating Council.

3. The future agenda for the work of the
Joint Working Groups, their composition, and
procedures for reporting to the Coordinating
Council shall be agreed upon by the Parties.

Article IV

This Memorandum shall enter into force upon
exchange of notification that required pro-
cedures have been completed by each Party.
If either Party considers it necessary to ter-
minate this Memorandum of Understanding,

■nuary 1982

45

MIDDLE EAST

it may do so by notifying the other Party six
months in advance of the effective date of
termination.

Article V

Nothing in the Memorandum shall be con-
sidered as derogating from previous agree-
ments and understandings between the Par-
ties.

Article VI

The Parties share the understanding that
nothing in this Memorandum is intended to
or shall in any way prejudice the rights and
obligations which devolve or may devolve
upon either Government under the Charter of
the United Nations or under international
law. The Parties reaffirm their faith in the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and their aspiration to live in
peace with all countries in the region.

For the Government
of the United States:

i ' \-i ak W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

For the Government
of Israel:

Ariel Sharon
Minister of Defense ■

President Asks
Americans
to Leave Libya

The following statement was made by
Acting Secretary William P. Clark on
December 10, 1981.

On behalf of the President, I met today
with the congressional leadership and
communicated with the chief executive
officers of American corporations which
have American personnel in Libya. I dis-
cussed Libya's well-known efforts over
the course of many years to undermine
U.S. interests and those of our friends,
as well as Libya's support for inter-
national terrorism. In the past 6 months,
Libya has broadened and accelerated its
efforts to undermine neighboring states
and to work against U.S. interests. As a
consequence, the security climate for
American citizens in Libya has
worsened.

Because of the danger which the
Libyan regime poses to American
citizens, the President calls upon all
Americans to leave Libya as soon as
possible. In light of the increased risk,
U.S. passports are being invalidated for
travel to Libya, effective immediately. I
want to make clear that the President is
prepared to take other available legal
measures to require that Americans
leave Libya should that become
necessary.

The United States recognizes the
gravity of these steps but believes that
Libyan actions oblige us to take them.
Indeed, it would be irresponsible for the
U.S. Government to do less. ■

U.S. and Israel

Review

MFO Participation

U.S.-ISRAEL STATEMENT,
DEC. 3, 19811

The United States and Israel note the
decision of the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, and the Netherlands to contribute
*(i t In' mull inat i' mal t'< >rce and observers

(MFO) to be established in accordance
with the Treaty of Peace Between
Egypt and Israel.2

The United States and Israel re-
viewed the participation of these four
countries in light of the following
clarifications which they have provided
to the United States on November 26,
1981:

• That they recognize that the funt
tion of the MFO is as defined in the rel
vant Egyptian-Israeli agreements and
includes that of insuring freedom of
navigation through the Strait of Tiran
accordance with Article V of the Treat
of Peace; and

• That they have attached no polit
cal conditions, linked to Venice or othe
wise, to their participation.

The United States and Israel undei ;
stand that the participation of the four
and any other participating state is
based upon the following.

• The basis for participation in the
MFO is the Treaty of Peace Between
Egypt and Israel originated in the Can!
David accords and the protocol signed
between Egypt and Israel and witnesst {
by the United States on August 3, 198
based upon the letter from President
Carter to President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin of March 26, 1979.

• All of the functions and respon-
sibilities of the MFO and of its constitu
ent elements, including any contingent:
that may be formed through European
participation, are defined in the Treaty
of Peace and protocol, and there can bi
no derogation or reservation from any
of them. As provided in the protocol, a
participants in the MFO undertake to
conduct themselves in accordance with
the terms of the protocol under the
direction of the Director General ap-
pointed by Egypt and Israel. The MFO
shall employ its best efforts to prevent
any violation of the terms of the Treat;
of Peace. The functions of the MFO wi
specifically include the following in
accordance with the Treaty of Peace ai
the protocol:

(a) Operation of checkpoints, re-
connaissance patrols, and observation
posts along the international boundary
and Line B, and within Zone C;

(b) Periodic verification of the im
plementation of the provisions of Anne
I will be carried out not less than twice I
a month unless otherwise agreed by tffl \
parties;

46

Department of State Bullet

MIDDLE EAST

(c) Additional verifications within
48 hours after the receipt of a request
from either party; and

(d) Insuring the freedom of naviga-
tion through the Strait of Tiran in ac-
cordance with Article V of the Treaty of
Peace.

The United States understands and
appreciates the concerns expressed by
the Government of Israel regarding the
statements made by the four European
contributors in explaining their decision
to participate in the MFO to their own
legislatures and publics. The United
States recognizes that some positions set
forth in the statements are at variance
with its own positions with respect to
the future of the peace process, as well
is with positions held by Israel as a par-
:y to the Treaty of Peace. The United
States and Israel recognize that the
oositions held on any other aspects of
:he problem in the area by any state
■vhich agrees to participate in the MFO
lo not affect the obligation of that state
,o comply fully with the terms of the
protocol which was negotiated in accord-
ince with the letter from President
barter to President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin of March 26, 1979, and
vhich is designed to help implement the
Treaty of Peace, which was concluded
mrsuant to the Camp David accords.

The Treaty of Peace, in accordance
vith which the MFO is established,
epresents the tirst step in a process
igreed on at Camp David whose ulti-
nate goal is a just, comprehensive, and
lurable settlement of the Middle East
ontlict through the conclusion of peace
reaties based on Security Council
lesolutions 242 and 338. The United
States and Israel reiterate their commit-
nent to the Camp David accords as the
mly viable and ongoing negotiating
irocess. They renew their determination
o make early meaningful progress in
he autonomy talks.

Pursuing Peace and Security
in the Middle East

■Read to news correspondents by acting
lepartment spokesman Alan Romberg. The
pint statement was released simultaneously
i Israel.

-Fur text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of
lay 1979. ■

by Nicholas A. Veliotes

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
October 21, 1981. Mr. Veliotes is Assist-
ant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs. 1

I welcome the opportunity to come
before you to discuss U.S. policy toward
the Middle East and Persian Gulf area.
In recent years, my predecessors and
other State Department representatives
have come before this subcommittee in
testimony emphasizing the importance
of events in the Middle East to a range
of critical U.S. national interests. There
is no question that the persistent and
successful pursuit of comprehensive and
balanced U.S. policy in the Middle East
and Persian Gulf is critical:

• To our national security through
the preservation of a global strategic
balance which will permit free and in-
dependent societies to pursue their
aspirations;

• To checking the spread of Soviet
influence in this strategic region and, by
extension, elsewhere in the world;

• To fulfilling effectively the in-
escapable responsibility of the United
States to work for the resolution of
conflicts in the region which threaten in-
ternational security and the well-being
of countries and peoples of the region;

• To assuring the security and
welfare of the State of Israel and of
other important friendly nations in the
region;

• To preserving and fostering our
critical interests in access to the region's
oil; and

• To supporting other major
economic interests, including: access to
markets for American goods and ser-
vices, cooperation with the wealthier
states in the region to maintain a sound
international financial order, and assist-
ing the orderly economic development of
the region.

The Search for Peace

While the Middle East and Persian Gulf
region poses many complexities and

many challenges for our foreign policy
and our national security policy— and
our responses to a variety of tensions,
crises, and opportunities must be varied
yet internally consistent— there are two
central themes of our policy approach.
We seek peace and we seek security for
the region, both to promote our own
policy and to permit all its peoples to
pursue their welfare. In this context:

• We are pursuing a just and com-
prehensive Middle East peace vigorously
and with determination. We will do so
within the framework of the Camp
David agreements which, in turn, derive
their validity from U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242. In recent months, we
have made significant progress in the
furtherance of that process through suc-
cessful negotiation with Egypt and
Israel of the arrangements for final
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in
April 1982. We are completing arrange-
ments for the multinational force of
observers which will be a key factor in
the implementation of that agreement.
We are confident that both Israel and
Egypt are firmly set on the course of
full implementation of their treaty of
peace.

• We have, at the same time, re-
sumed trilateral negotiations with Egypt
and Israel on the establishment of the
autonomy regime for the West Bank and
Gaza. These initial meetings in this
phase of the autonomy negotiations have
moved forward in a cordial and business-
like spirit. And we are now moving to
intensify and accelerate these negotia-
tions, looking to early achievement of an
agreement which will offer the basis for
the Palestinian participation that is
necessary for successful conclusion of an
arrangement permitting the establish-
ment of a transitional regime in the
West Bank/Gaza. We regard it as impor-
tant that we be able to demonstrate, in
the near future, the tangible results of
this process to those who have opposed
or doubted its effectiveness.

• We will continue to be engaged in
efforts to support the Government and
people of Lebanon, to resolve Lebanon's
problems, and to move toward national
reconciliation and greater security.
Lebanon remains a potential flashpoint

47

MIDDLE EAST

in the region, and we are working vigor-
ously to consolidate the fragile cease-fire
arranged by Ambassador Habib [the
President's special emissary to the Mid-
dle East] last July and to support the
Bayt-ad-Din process aimed at improving
the internal situation. We attach par-
ticular importance to this Arab-
sponsored process which offers the best
prospect for creating conditions for a
phased, orderly withdrawal of Syrian
forces to begin. We will be giving con-
sideration to a further visit to the region
by Ambassador Habib in the context of

region. We fully share with friendly
states in the region the concern about
the threats to security posed by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
chaos in Iran, the Soviet position in the
Horn of Africa, Libyan pressures
against neighboring states, and the re-
cent tripartite alliance of Libya, South
Yemen, and Ethiopia. We have taken
steps to build the confidence of key
states in our commitment to their securi-
ty from Soviet and Soviet-supported ex-
ternal threats and from Soviet exploita-
tion of conflict and instability.

We seek peace and we seek security for the
region, both to promote our own policy and to per-
mit all its peoples to pursue their welfare.

his continuing mission for the President.

• We will continue to support the
resolution of the war between Iran and
Iraq by negotiation and in a manner con-
sistent with the principles of interna-
tional law, including nonintervention in
internal affairs of another state, support
for the territorial integrity of both com-
batants, and freedom of navigation. We
have been and will remain impartial in
this conflict in an effort to underline the
importance we attach to the independ-
ence and security of the states of the
gulf and the interest of the international
community in mutual respect and
balance in relationships among them.

As we intensify our efforts to move
the Middle East peace process forward,
we recognize that the parties directly
concerned and the other Middle East na-
tions with a profound interest in this
critical issue face difficult decisions. A
spirit of accommodation will be essential
if peace is to be achieved. It is clear that
these difficult decisions can be more easi-
ly taken if the states concerned feel
secure and confident in U.S. support for
their security.

Regional Security

From its first days in office, this Ad-
ministration has moved forward
vigorously in pursuit of the second main
thrust of our Middle East/Persian Gulf
policy, bolstering the security of the

At a time of budget stringencies, we
have, with considerable sacrifice, in-
creased the national resources for our
own military to accelerate the develop-
ment of their capability to better deter
threats to the region and to respond to
contingencies in which friendly states in
the Middle East and the gulf might need
and request our help. We have increased
our military deployments to the region.
We have at the same time significantly
increased our security assistance to
friendly strategic states in the region to
better enable them to provide for their
own defense and resist external
pressures.

We have taken decisions to provide
military equipment which we believe
necessary to develop adequately the
defense capability of key critical states.
We have continued our significant
security relationship with Israel. We
have increased the flow of U.S. military
equipment and training to Egypt. In the
context of a longstanding security
assistance relationship and a critical
U.S. interest in the security of gulf oil
fields, we have proposed to the Congress
the sale of air defense enhancement
equipment, including AW ACS [airborne
warning and control system], to Saudi
Arabia. We have carried forward and, to
the extent possible with available
resources, intensified our military supply
relationships with Morocco and Tunisia,
with Jordan and with the states on the
Arab side of the Persian Gulf. We will

continue to be engaged with an attentive
to the concerns and priority needs of
these friends.

We believe we have strengthened
the perception among friendly states in
the region that the United States is
dedicated to the area's security. We are
and will be a strong and reliable part-
ner. As we move forward to improve th<
security environment in the region and
to build our security cooperation with
key states there, we recognize that
sound and sustained progress toward
Middle East peace is essential if our
strategy of enhancing the region's
security is to be fully and effectively
achieved, if the opportunities for
stimulating instability and exploiting
grievances are to be reduced and
eliminated. Indeed, central to this Ad-
ministration's approach to the Middle
East is the recognition that progress
toward Middle East peace and progress
in building regional security are inex-
tricably interrelated and mutually rein-
forcing.

Nowhere is this shown more clearly
than in our relationship with Israel. We
are earnestly seeking, through the peac
process set in train by the historic
agreements reached at Camp David, to
achieve a situation in the hopefully not-
far-distant future whereby Israel will
finally be able to live at peace with all it
neighbors. At the same time, we are
committed to the security of Israel and,
to the extent that we are able to
demonstrate that fact, Israel will feel
more secure in making the accommoda-
tions necessary to any successful
negotiation. Beyond that, during Prime
Minister Begin's recent visit we were
able to begin a process of discussions tc
identify areas in which we and Israel
may act in concert, recognizing certain
political constraints, to enhance our
strategic posture in meeting external
threats to the area. I would like to em-
phasize the President's remarks in
receiving Prime Minister Begin when h
said: "As we consult . . . rest assured
that the security of Israel is a principal
objective of this Administration and thi
we regard Israel as an ally in our search
for regional stability."

Just as the security and welfare of
Israel are key to our pursuit of peace
and security in the region, the strength
and confidence of Egypt are central to
the attainment of our priority objective

48

Department of State Bullet

MIDDLE EAST

in the Middle East. In the wake of the
tragic assassination of President Sadat,
vve are confident that Egypt under
President Mubarak is moving forward in
Drder and continuity and calm and
confidence to pursue Egypt's key and
constructive role in the region. We have
nanifested in word and deed our
confidence in and support for the new
Egyptian leadership. We are sensitive to
Egypt's concerns about the threats
which it and its neighbors face from
L,ibya and are determined to be suppor-
tive of Egypt's measured response to
,his challenge. We are confident that our
security cooperation with Egypt will
oroceed apace in the interest of improv-
ng the strategic environment for the en-
tire region. We are confident that Egypt
vill proceed with us and with Israel in a
ietermined pursuit through the Camp
David framework of a comprehensive
ind durable Middle East peace.

Our policy will continue to reflect
he important economic element in our
•elationship with the area, which:

• Is a critical source of oil for our
country and for our allies;

• Is an increasingly important
narket for American goods and ser-
•ices;

• Contains wealthy oil-exporting na-
lions that have become an important
iorce in international finance; and

• Contains strategically important
mt economically weak countries whose
irderly development is critical to the
tability of the region.

We are determined to work closely
with those Middle East oil exporters
who perceive with us a common respon-
ibility of consumers and producers to
naintain orderly oil markets. We will
lontinue to promote the transfer of
American technology and the sale of
J.S. goods and services to build on the
.lready strong base of economic
;ooperation between the United States
jnd the Middle East. Through our
lilateral economic assistance programs
.nd through our participation in interna-
jional lending institutions, we remain
jommitted to devoting a very substantial
jortion of our worldwide economic
assistance to help key countries in and

Claims Against Iran

The U.S. agent at the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal in The Hague filed on
November 18, 1981, with the Tribunal a
claim against Iran on behalf of some
3,000 American citizens and corpora-
tions whose claims against the Govern-
ment of Iran are in a total amount of
less than $250,000 each. The U.S. claim
seeks an award of "at least $180 million"
in compensation for the losses suffered
by these U.S. nationals. This action
represents the initial step to protect the
legal rights of the individual claimants
and of the United States in the resolu-
tion of such claims against Iran. The
United States continues to hope that an
early agreement can be negotiated with
Iran to settle these claims by a lump-
sum payment from Iran.

As part of the negotiations which led
to the release of the American hostages
in Tehran in January 1981, the United
States and Iran agreed to establish the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to arbitrate
the claims of U.S. nationals against the
Government of Iran and of Iranian na-
tionals against the United States. Claims
covered by the agreement are those aris-
ing out of debts, contracts, expropria-
tions, or other measures affecting prop-
erty rights. The Tribunal has been estab-
lished at The Hague and began receiving
statements of claim on October 20, 1981;
all claims must be filed no later than
January 19, 1982. A $1 billion security
account has been established in the

Netherlands to secure the payment of
Tribunal awards in favor of U.S. na-
tionals.

The agreements reached in Algiers
provide that U.S. nationals whose total
claims amount to $250,000 or more will
represent themselves before the
Tribunal, while those claims of less than
$250,000 will be presented by the
government. Since last spring, the
Department of State has been register-
ing the smaller claims of U.S. nationals
to prepare for their submission to the
Tribunal and has provided information
concerning the claims to the Govern-
ment of Iran for the purpose of ini-
tiating negotiations on a lump-sum set-
tlement. In the absence of a response
from Iran to date, the United States
filed its claim on November 18, 1981, to
insure that these U.S. claimants are ap-
propriately protected.

The Department will be publishing in
the Federal Register that any U.S. na-
tional with claims against Iran of less
than $250,000 who have not yet .
registered their claims must do so no
later than December 1, 1981. This dead-
line is necessary to assure that the
details of any additional claims can be
put into the proper form for filing with
the Tribunal before the January 19
deadline.

Press release 393 of Nov. 18, 1981.

bordering on this area— Israel, Egypt,
India, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey— to
strengthen their economies and provide
a better economic life for their peoples.
We intend to continue working closely
with wealthy states in the area in our
effort to assist the needier countries of

the region as well as working with these
wealthy states in the broader task of
strengthening the international financial
order.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

anuary 1982

49

MIDDLE EAST

Visit of Jordanian King Hussein

His Majesty King Hussein I of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made a
state visit to the United States November
1-12, 1981. While in Washington, D.C.,
November 1-5, he met with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following are remarks made at the
welcoming ceremony on November 2. '

President Reagan

It is a distinct pleasure and an honor to
welcome Your Majesties to Washington.
I've been looking forward to meeting
King Hussein longer than I've been
President. One of the advantages of age
is the perspective it gives to looking
back. I've watched King Hussein from a
distance for many years, watched as he
ascended the throne and accepted great
responsibility while still in his teens.
And in the years since, he's proved
himself time and again a brave man and,
I might add, a wise leader.

Our friendship with King Hussein
has stood the test of time. It's based on
shared interests but also on common
values and mutual respect. During the
three decades that he has led Jordan,
America has maintained an unwavering
dedication to the search for Middle East
peace. And over these many years, King
Hussein has been our friend. Such loyal-
ty is not lightly regarded by the people
of the United States.

Let it be understood that America
seeks peace with honor and security for
all the states and people of the region,
undoubtedly a similar goal to your own.
Yet at this moment, there's much to
discuss about how to reach our mutual
goal. Recent tragic events make it even
more imperative that we work together
if solutions are to be found.

Today, let us achieve an understand-
ing about ourselves and then reaffirm to
the world that there are no differences
between us that we cannot overcome
and none that will lessen the friendship
between the United States and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

For our part, no one should doubt
that the preservation of Jordan's securi-
ty, integrity, and its unique and endur-
ing character remains a matter of
highest importance. Your Majesty, over
the years your concern for the well-
being of your people, your creative

statesmanship, and your good sense
have enriched Jordan. Under your
leadership, the Jordanian economy has
yielded fruit, literally and figuratively, to
all the citizens of Jordan. And in Jordan
today, the private sector is thriving, and
the standard of living is increasingly a
model for developing nations.

In the last two decades, the literacy
rate rose from 32 to 70 percent. Edu-
cated Jordanians now fill skilled jobs all
over the Middle East. Meanwhile, unem-
ployment has almost disappeared, and
Jordan boasts an average annual
economic growth rate of 9%. Your suc-
cess offers hope that people who've
known grievous adversity can rise above
their conflicts to build a new life.
Similarly, there are tremendous oppor-
tunities for economic betterment in your
region, while political problems work
themselves out.

Given freedom to do so, people who
live in such proximity will interact to
better themselves, even though divided
by politics. Such peaceful interactions
should be applauded. Furthermore, the
United States encourages any mutually
beneficial economic cooperation between
nations. The problems of water and
transportation, for example, are areas of
potential benefit to you and your neigh-
bors if a farsighted approach is taken.

There are, however, other forces
which seek to widen and exploit the divi-
sions among the peoples of the Middle
East. Tension and conflict both reflect
and increase the power and influence of
such hateful forces. When focusing on
the internal problems of the region, we
must never lose sight of the role of ex-
ternal powers in aggravating those prob-
lems.

In your book Uneasy Lies the Head,
you proclaimed: "I fear only God." In
your life you've demonstrated this
courage in so many ways — as a pilot, as
a soldier, and, most important, as a
statesman. But the point of that state-
ment is not alone that you are brave but
that you are devout. It highlights your
belief in and respect for the Supreme
Being who's Father of us all. Americans
admire such values.

Years ago, your grandfather. King
Abdullah, a giant in the Arab world, in
his memoirs wrote: "It is the duty of all
Arabs to bear witness to the world that
they possess a place and constitute an
entity among the nations of the world
and that they stand today at the side ol
the democracies in the contest between
fear-inspiring communism and popular
democracy."

During your reign you have demon-
strated the wisdom of your grandfathei
by maintaining a perspective on poten-
tial dangers while still providing leader
ship on the immediate issues confrontii
you and your neighbors.

The United States is concerned
about outside threats to the Middle
East, as well as those issues which mos
directly affect the people of the Middle
East. We're sincerely attempting to do
all that can be done to end the ongoing
tragedy that has plagued that area of
the world. A lasting peace is in our in-
terest, just as it is in the interest of all
people of good will. Respecting our
differences and knowing you as we do,
we're confident that you share our heai
felt desire for peace and stability. Your
courage and integrity earned this trust
and respect long ago.

The story is told that early in your
reign, you decided to stay the night at
Bedouin encampment which was under
threat of attack. And while walking in
the darkness, you heard the voice of ar
elder tribesman proclaim from inside a
tent: "Abdullah would be proud of his
grandson." We think that's even truer
today, and we want you to know that
we, too, are proud, proud to have you ;
a friend.

King Hussein

It's, indeed, a moving moment for me a
I express my sincere gratitude for the
warm welcome to both Noor and mysel
and to our Jordanian colleagues who ar
with us today.

It is a great pleasure for us to be
once again in the United States of
America in response to your kind invito
tion and to visit with you, the leader of
this great nation. This year, indeed,
marks the 25th anniversary of a unique
relationship between the United States
and Jordan, unique in its length and
durability. It is a relationship seasoned
by time and trouble. I recognized, as th

50

Department of State Bullet

MIDDLE EAST

Jordan— A Profile

eography

rea (East Bank): 35,000 sq. mi. Capital:

mman (pop. 648,000). Other Cities: Az-

arqa (215,000), Irbid (112,000).

eople

opulation (East Bank): 2.2 million (1980
nsus). Annual Growth Rate: 3.9% (1978
t). Ethnic Groups: Mostly Arab; small
>mmunities of Circassians, Armenians, and
urds. Religions: Sunni Moslem (95%),
hristian (5%). Languages: Arabic (official),
nglish. Literacy: 70%.

overnment

fficial Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
in. Type: Constitutional monarchy. Inde-
ndence: May 25, 1946. Constitution:

inuary 8, 1952. Branches: Executive — king
hief of state), prime minister (head of
)vernment), Council of Ministers (cabinet).

•gislative — bicameral National Assembly
ppointed 30-member Senate and elected

-member Chamber of Deputies). Judicial —
vil, religious, special courts. Political Par-
is: Only the government-sponsored Arab
ational Union is officially recognized. Suf-
age: Males over 20. Administrative Divi-
ons: Eight governorates.

conomy

DP (1979): $2.3 billion. Annual Growth
ite: 9%. Per Capita GDP (1979): $1,060.
verage Inflation Rate: 14% (1973-79).
itural Resources: Phosphate, potash.
agriculture: Wheat, fruit, vegetables, olive

oil. Industries: Phosphate, petroleum mining,
cement production. Trade (1979): Exports —
$2.75 million: fruits, vegetables, phosphates.
Major Markets — Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, India. Imports — $1.9
billion: machinery, transportation equipment,
cereals, petroleum products. Major Sup-
pliers—U.S., U.K., F.R.G., Japan, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria. Official Exchange Rate
(1979): 1 Jordanian dinar= US$3,333. U.S.
Economic Aid Received: $1.3 billion
(1952-79).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and several of its specialized agencies

(e.g., FAO, IAEA, WHO, World Bank, IMF),
Islamic Conference, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Jordan: Chief of State— King Hussein I;
Prime Minister— Mudhar Badran, Minister of
Foreign Affairs— Marwan al-Kasim, Ambas-
sador to the U.S.— Abdul Hadi Majali.
United States: Ambassador to Jor-
dan—Richard N. Viets. ■

'

ader of Jordan, 25 years ago, that the
dues and principles on which your na-
m's foundations were created were the
me ones which are so dear to the
abs and which were the foundations
the Arab awakening and resolve from
e beginnings of this century.

It was my commitment to those
eals and principles that prompted me
proudly seek the establishment and
nsolidation of a friendship between
ir nations a quarter of a century ago.
eaningful and dynamic relations must
ways be based on mutual understand-
g. Throughout these eventful years,
/e been totally committed to both the
mse of the Arab people, which is my
iuse and motivation, and to a realiza-
3n that it is an honorable and just

cause. I deemed it my duty to present it
and defend it and explain it to the best
of my ability.

I'm a firm believer in the proverb
that says you can hide the truth from all
the people half the time, half the people
all the time, but not all of the people all
of the time, and that justice must in-
evitably, finally prevail. We must not
permit the distortions of others to
become a barrier to the understanding
on which our relationship is based.

I know you to be a man of honor,
dedicated to the highest of ideals and
principles. I know also that you have the
courage of your convictions. You have
displayed this throughout your public life
and, because of it, have the respect of
those who know you. I am confident that
working together with all who truly seek

peace and security for the people of the
Middle East, that these qualities will
provide the source of strength which
that goal requires.

At this most turbulent and critical of
times, I see in jeopardy not only Arab
rights and legitimate interests but a
threat to the very Arab identity and the
rights of future Arab generations. I also
see the larger threats to world peace, as
well as to the vital interests of all those
concerned with the security of our
region, including the United States of
America.

I hope that at this time I shall be
able to present our case convincingly in
the interest of us all and thus achieve
greater mutual understanding. In doing
so, we can pave the way toward formu-
lating proper policies and build once
more lasting and strengthened relations
between us, based on clear and solid
foundations. It's a great task and a
great challenge. It is, indeed, a duty.
Despite the difficulties that surround us
at this most critical juncture, I am opti-
mistic, and I am determined. I am hope-
ful that upon my return home, I shall be
able to carry to my people and to my
colleagues at the next Arab summit
promising impressions and favorable
news.

I can but do my best in these coming
days. I hope it will be adequate, for
what is at stake is both of our national
interests and the future of so many. I
am confident that on the basis of our
long, close friendship and with courage,
dedication, and God's blessing, we
can — and, indeed, must — successfully
meet the challenge before us.

We are deeply in your debt for your
friendship and the warmth of your
welcome. May God bless you, protect
you, guide your steps in leading the
great American people toward a
brighter future and in serving the cause
of all mankind.

'Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 9, 1981,
which also includes toasts made at the state
dinner on Nov. 2 and remarks by the Presi-
dent and the King upon the latter's departure
from the White House on Nov. 3). ■

51

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia

by Richard R. Burt

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, Oceans, International
Operations, and Environment of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November 10, 1981. Mr. Burt is Director
of the Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs. l

Witnesses appear before the Congress
on a whole host of subjects. But there is
no subject of greater urgency than that
we are here to discuss today. Over the
past 5 years and perhaps longer,
weapons outlawed by mankind, weapons
successfully banned from the battlefields
of the industrialized world for over five
decades, have been used against un-
sophisticated and defenseless people in
campaigns of mounting extermination
which are being conducted in Laos,
Kampuchea, and more recently in
Afghanistan.

Reports of the use of lethal chemical
weapons in Southeast Asia began to ap-
pear in 1976, although the initial attacks
may, in fact, predate that by several
years. The sites of these first attacks
were in remote highlands of Laos, 6
weeks by jungle track from the nearest
neutral territory. The targets were the
villages of the highland tribes, such as
the Hmong, traditionally resistant to the
lowland Pathet Lao. The victims were
the inhabitants of these villages — men,
women, and children, particularly the
children, who proved least able to resist
the lethal effects of the poisons being
employed against them.

In succeeding years the attacks
multiplied and spread, first to Kam-
puchea and then to Afghanistan.
Reports were necessarily fragmentary,
incomplete, and episodic. The sources
were the victims themselves or the
refugee workers, doctors, nurses, and
journalists who had spoken with those
who survived the long trek from the
deserted villages, the poisoned wells,
and the deadly fruit of their homeland to
safe havens in Thailand.

As information accumulated, it was
clear to the U.S. Government that some-
thing important and sinister was occur-
ring, but it was not clear precisely what.
Repeated stories from rural peoples in
widely separated regions, in different
countries, all correlated with each other.
This made it impossible to discount
these reports as self-serving inventions
by dissident elements in conflict with the
local regime. Yet while, over time, we

52

felt compelled to credit these reports as
true, we remained puzzled by them for
two reasons:

First, because analysis of samples
taken from the areas of attack — samples
of vegetation, clothing, and human
tissue — had shown no detectable traces
of any known chemical agent; and

Second, because the extent and se-
quence of the signs and symptoms
reported were also inconsistent with the
effects of any known chemical agent or
combination of such agents.

In 1979, despite these remaining
gaps in our evidence, the State Depart-
ment, with the support of other agen-
cies, began to take several important
steps.

• We set up an interagency commit-
tee to coordinate the government's work
on chemical weapons use and worked
with the intelligence community to
devote greater resources to the develop-
ment and analysis of information on the
subject.

• We began to brief other govern-
ments on this issue and to encourage
them to develop and share with us their
own information on these attacks.

• We began to express our concerns
publicly and to seek wider international
action.

As a result of these steps, we suc-
ceeded last fall in securing a favorable
vote in the U.N. General Assembly-
over the vehement opposition of the
U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and their allies-
mandating a U.N. investigation of
reports of chemical weapons use.

A second result of these steps was
the decision, by a group of U.S. Govern-
ment scientists and experts on the U.S.
interagency committee on chemical
weapons use, to take a fresh look at
reporting on chemical weapons use from
the beginning and, in particular, to re-
examine the pattern of the attacks and
the resultant symptoms.

Pattern of Attacks and Symptoms

Many of the reported attacks, particular-
ly in Laos, did follow a pattern— not an
invariable pattern but one with consis-
tent elements from report to report.
These attacks were conducted by low,
slow-flying aircraft, sometimes identified
as an AN-2 — a Soviet biplane used as a
crop duster in the U.S.S.R. The plane
would release a cloud, often described as
yellow, sometimes orange, red, or other
tints. The cloud would descend upon a

village or upon people in the neighbo:
rice paddies. The cloud seemed to be
made up of small particles which woi
make sounds, when falling on rooftop
or vegetation, similar to that made b.
rain. It came to be called, by its victi
the "yellow rain."

For those directly exposed to this
yellow rain, its effect was quick and
dramatic. They would experience an
ly onset of violent itching, vomiting,
ziness, and distorted vision. Within a
short time they would vomit blood-
tinged material, then large quantities
bright red blood. Within an hour the;
would die, apparently of shock and ti
massive loss of blood from the stoma
Those on the periphery of the at-
tack, or under shelter, or those who
returned to the village after an attac
and ate contaminated food, would ex
perience similar symptoms over a lor
period, accompanied by bloody diarrl
These people, too, would often die-
after a week or two of agony— of
dehydration.

These symptoms in this order caj
be explained by positing the use of ai
known chemical agent, either of the
blistering type, such as the mustard j
of World War I, or of the more modt
nerve agents. Similar symptoms, hov
ever, have been reported in natural o
breaks of toxin poisoning of a certain
type, specifically trichothecene toxins
Toxins are biologically produced
chemical substances, poisons which a
pear in nature, on grain for instance,
some locales these pose serious hazar
to public health.

The U.S. Government scientists i
experts on the chemicals weapons usi
committee combined their hypothesis
trichothecene poisoning based upon t
symptomalogy of reported chemical
weapons attacks with a review of the
literature which revealed that the So'
Union had a long experience in the fii
of trichothecene toxicology, and had
done much research, including researl
into the massive production of triehot
cene toxins. Some such research had,
fact, been done in Soviet institutes
under military control and with connd
tions to the Soviet chemical weapons
program. We concluded, therefore, t.H
we should begin to look for evidence <l
possible toxin use. As a first step in t
direction, we started to reanalyze
samples already tested for other
chemical agents for the presence of
toxins.

So far I have been citing evidence
mainly from Southeast Asia and par- I
ticularly Laos, where the yellow rain I
tacks were first reported and where I
they have been conducted most

Department of State Bu ll€ »

MILITARY AFFAIRS

iystematically. In Kampuchea growing
eports in recent years suggest that a
vide range of chemical warfare agents
ire in use, including "yellow rain."
Cyanide, for instance, has been
liscovered in wells. Vietnamese soldiers
lave been captured poisoning the wells
if refugee camps on the Thai border.

In Afghanistan, too, the evidence of
hemical weapons use has been rising.
Ve are today in much the same posi-
ion— in terms of our ability to establish
i pattern of such use and to identify
pecific agents being employed in
Afghanistan — as we were in 1979
egarding Southeast Asia. We have
mmerous eyewitness reports — of vic-
ims, of journalists — we have sensitive
ntelligence of technical and human
irigin, and we have testimony of those
vho have fought on the Soviet side.
Sased upon this information, we are cer-
ain that chemical weapons are being
ised in Afghanistan. These include ir-
itants, new and as yet unidentified in-
apacitants, and familiar lethal agents,
ncluding nerve gas. A number of
ormer Afghan military officers, trained
a the Soviet Union in chemical warfare,
lave identified lethal agents brought in-
o Afghanistan, have pinpointed the
ites where these are stored, and have
pecified when they have been used,
hese reports are corroborated by
eports from refugees and victims of
hese same attacks.

'hysical Evidence in Southeast Asia

Ve do not, as yet, have physical
vidence of chemical warfare in Afghani-
tan; in Southeast Asia we do. The first
et of samples we subjected to test for
richothecene toxins was taken from a
age in Kampuchea. It was collected
L'ithin a day of an attack on the village
vhich killed people in the same brutal
rianner I have described. The results of
hat analysis, as you are already aware,
howed that:

• The leaf and stem in question con-
ained levels of trichothecene mycotox-
hs 20 times higher than that found in
'atural outbreaks;

• The trichothecene mycotoxins
bund do not occur naturally in the com-
■ ination identified in Southeast Asia;

• In parts of the world where these
nycotoxins do appear naturally, they do
o in combination with certain other tox-
ins which were not present in this sam-
ile; and

• The effect of these trichothecene
nycotoxins on man and animals is the
ymptomatology I have described. These
joxins produce all the symptoms I have

anuary 1982

mentioned, and they are not known to
produce any symptoms not reported.
The fit, in other words, was perfect.

Others here are better qualified to
discuss the technical process of analysis
and to interpret the results for you. The
significance of this discovery, however,
can be simply stated. We had solved the
mystery. We had fitted together the jig-
saw puzzle which had bedeviled us for 5
years. We now knew what was causing
the bizarre and brutal deaths of Laotian
and Kampuchean villagers. We had
ascertained that a completely new class
of weapons had been developed and was
in use.

In the past few weeks we have com-
pleted analysis of further samples from
both Kampuchea and Laos. The results
have confirmed our earlier findings and
reinforce the conclusions we have drawn
from them. One of these new samples
was of water, taken from the same
Kampuchean village at the same time as
the set of leaves and stems, which was
first analyzed positively for trichothe-
cenes. The other two samples are from
sites of separate attacks in Laos, one of
which was provided to us for analysis by
Congressman Jim Leach [of Iowa].

All three of these samples reveal
very high quantities of trichothecene
mycotoxins, quantities even higher than
in the first sample. Both of the samples
of yellow powder from Laos were
scraped from rocks, not naturally a
medium for high levels of toxins. One of
the Laos samples, for example, con-
tained 150 parts per million of T2 toxin.
This is almost 50 times higher than the
level of T2 in the original sample from
Kampuchea. The water sample from
Kampuchea contained 66 parts per
million of deoxynivalenol.

In addition to samples collected from
sites of reported attacks, we have also
obtained samples of background soil and
vegetation of the same species as
originally tested from near the same
area in Kampuchea. These were tested
by the same analytical technique and
found to be free of any trichothecenes,
thus further confirming the absence of
natural occurrence of these toxins in
that region.

Dr. Watson [Army Surgeon
General's office] is prepared to discuss
the detailed results of these latest tests,
and their significance. Again, however,
the basic conclusion is a straightforward
one: We have confirmed the use of toxin
weapons in Laos as well as Kampuchea.

Ever since the U.S. Government
began to voice its concerns over reports
of chemical weapons use, critics have
demanded that we produce the smoking
gun. The testimony of victims, of
witnesses, or refugee military officers

who had engaged in chemical warfare
activities, and the technical intelligence
was not enough. Those who did not
believe said they would not believe — un-
less we produced a smoking gun,
physical proof.

We now have the smoking gun. We
now have four separate pieces of
physical evidence. We may soon have
more as, I regret to say, chemical at-
tacks have been reported in Laos and
Kampuchea within the last month. We
are taking every step to make this evi-
dence widely available in order that

We have confirmed
the use of toxin weapons
in Laos as well as
Kampuchea.

others can form their own conclusions.
There will always be those who will not
believe. We are persuaded, however,
that any person, any government, any
journalist who approaches this issue
with an open mind, who travels to the
borders of conflict and seeks out victims
and those who have treated them, that
anyone who conducts his own inquiry,
will come to the same conclusions we
have.

Having answered one question which
bedeviled us for 5 years, we have
opened up a new set of unanswered
questions. Toxins are one type of
chemical weapons in use in Southeast
Asia. But there are other chemical war-
fare agents in use there and in Afghani-
stan, which we have yet to identify. The
trichothecene mycotoxins we have
discovered are a highly lethal mixture.
But we are not certain that this is the
only type of toxins in use, and we are
not certain precisely why this combina-
tion has been chosen or what other com-
binations we may yet discover.

We are also addressing ourselves to
the question of why toxins have been
developed and used as a weapon, when
other lethal chemical warfare agents are
available, off the shelf, so to speak.

There seem a variety of factors that
make toxin weapons particularly effec-
tive against the rural, defenseless
peoples of nations like Laos and Kam-
puchea. The violence of the death— with
victims experiencing severe vomiting,
diarrhea, extreme irritation of the eyes
and skin and respiratory system, and

53

MILITARY AFFAIRS

often dying rapidly; the ease in which
the powder can be carefully applied to a
limited area; and the survival rate of
those on the periphery, who can report
what they have seen, all contribute to
making this type of weapon suitable for
driving people from their homes and
villages and insuring that they stay
away. The limited protection needed by
those who must handle this material —
gloves and a simple face mask, as op-
posed to a complete protective suit, and
the simple method of delivery, such as
crop-dusting aircraft — contributes to its
attractiveness as an effective weapon of
terror. Finally, the difficulty in detecting
and identifying the toxins contributes to
its attractiveness. It has, after all, taken
the U.S. Government, with all the tech-
nical resources at its disposal, 5 years
and many thousands of man-hours to
discover the true nature of "yellow rain."

Issue of Responsibility

I have so far addressed the question of
chemical weapons use but not the issue
of who is responsible for their use. The
Soviet Union is, of course, directly in-
volved in the fighting in Afghanistan
and thus in the use of chemical weapons
in that country. In Laos and Kam-
puchea, on the other hand, these
weapons would seem to be employed by
indigenous forces — the Vietnamese,
Laotians, and Kampucheans.
Nonetheless, the links to the Soviet
Union are strong.

• The Soviets are providing exten-
sive military assistance and advice in
Laos, Kampuchea, and to the Viet-
namese forces fighting there. The
Soviets certainly know what is happen-
ing and are in a position to stop it if
they chose.

• The Soviets are advising and con-
trolling chemical warfare activity in
Southeast Asia. Soviet chemical experts
have inspected a number of chemical
weapons storage facilities there. Both
lethal and nonlethal chemicals are be-
lieved to be stored at these sites and are
transported between storage facilities
and ordnance camps or field use areas
as needed.

• There exists, in so far as we are
aware, no facilities in Southeast Asia
capable of producing the mold and ex-
tracting the mycotoxins in the quantities
in which they are being used.

• Such facilities do exist in the
Soviet Union, including microbiological
plants under military control and with
heavy military guard.

• The Soviets have resisted every

54

effort to mount an impartial investiga-
tion of chemical weapons use in South-
east Asia and Afghanistan.

For over 2 years we have sought,
and failed to receive, from the Soviet
Union an explanation of the anthrax out-
break at Sverdlovsk. We have also
raised with the Soviet Union our con-
cerns regarding chemical weapons use in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. More
recently, we have raised these issues
again in the context of new information
on the use of toxins. We have still not
received a substantive response.

The use of toxins as warfare agents
in Southeast Asia has grave implications
for present and future arms control ar-
rangements. As biologically produced
chemical substances, toxins fall within
the prohibitions of both the 1925 Geneva
protocol, forbidding the use of chemical
weapons in warfare, and the 1972 Bio-
logical Weapons Convention, which for-
bids the production, stockpiling, or
transfer of toxin weapons. These agree-
ments, signed by both the Soviet Union
and Vietnam, and the customary inter-
national law, which has developed out of
the former, are being flagrantly
violated.

A common feature of the Geneva
protocol and the Biological Weapons
Convention is that neither contains any
provisions for verification and neither
contains adequate mechanisms for
resolving issues of compliance. It is too
early to determine the full consequences
of the use of chemical and toxin warfare
agents for future arms control arrange-
ments. There should be no doubt, how-
ever, that the U.S. Government will in-
sist that any future arms control agree-
ments contain whatever provisions are
needed to permit verification and to in-
sure that questions of compliance are
dealt with seriously. The day the United
States signs unverifiable arms control
agreements is over. Let us hope that the
day when others urge us to do so in the
cause of relaxed tensions or increased
international goodwill is over as well.
For nothing increases tension or poisons
goodwill more than the lack of com-
pliance with agreements concluded.

U.S. Steps

Let me next turn to the steps we have
taken as a result of the new information
on toxin use. As I have noted we have
raised this issue again with the Soviet
Union, to no effect. We have raised the
issue with Vietnam and Laos, also with-
out effect. We have made our evidence
available to the United Nations and to
all its member countries. We have sent

our experts to a number of European
capitals and to New York, where they
met with the U.N. experts. We have in
dicated our hope that the U.N. experts
continue their inquiry and travel at leas
to all of those countries neighboring the
scenes of conflict — they have just visite
Thailand, and Pakistan has offered an
invitation as well — to interview refugee
and other sources. We have also en-
couraged other nations and other
private organizations, including journal-
ists, to mount their own inquiries into
what is going on in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan.

Our objective is to stop these at-
tacks. We will keep this issue before th
world community and on the interna-
tional agenda as long as we need to do
so. For the present, we believe priority
should be given to the U.N. inquiry. A
vote in the General Assembly on
whether to extend the mandate for tha
investigation will be taken in the next t
weeks. It is very important that this be
done.

We are also reviewing other means
to focus world opinion on this issue. If
we are to succeed, we must make sure
this is not simply perceived as a
U.S. -Soviet contest from which others
can disengage. This means we must in-
sure our evidence is made as widely
available as possible, while avoiding an;
appearance of engaging in a propagand
campaign. For if our efforts are to hav<
any utility, others must take this infor-
mation as seriously as we.

There is reason they should. For
over 50 years, as I have said, chemical
weapons have been successfully banned
from the battlefields of the industrialize
world. This success is due, I expect, as
much to the deterrent effect of possible
retaliation as to respect for the sanctitj
of international law. What is going on
today in Afghanistan and Southeast
Asia is not an East- West issue. It is an
issue of universal import with particula I
consequences for those countries least I
prepared to defend against the use of
chemical and biological agents. It is ouil
task to put our information at the
disposal of the world community. It is
the response of the world community —
not just that of the U.S. Government, i'
friends, and allies— which will, in the
end, determine whether these attacks
continue and proliferate or are halted
forever.

•The complete transcript of the hearings '
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offic
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulleti

ERRORISM

fhe Impact of
nternational Terrorism

/ Frank H. Perez

Address before the "Conference on
iolence and Extremism: A Leadership
esponse" in Baltimore on October 29,
'81. Mr. Perez is Acting Director of the
f,cefor Combatting Terrorism.

le decade of the 1970s has been
:scribed as the terror decade. Since we
;gan keeping statistics in 1968, there
ere 6,700 international terrorist in-
dents through 1980 in which 3,700
feople were killed and about 7,500
Sounded. This violence continues to
fecalate annually, and this trend exhibits
k) signs of abating. During 1980 there
[ere 760 international terrorist in-
dents, which resulted in more casu-
fties than in any year since we began
feeping statistics. Last year 642 people
Sere killed in international terrorist at-
Icks; 1,078 were wounded. The statis-
ts last year reflect the trend over the
list few years toward increasing death
Sid injury from terrorist attacks,
tnerican citizens and U.S. interests re-
lain a primary target — of the 760 acts,
[8, or 38%, were directed against
nericans or American property.

Terrorism is an ever-growing men-
e to the civilized community of na-
»ns. It is an assault on civilization itself
d threatens our vital national interests
well of those of our closest allies and
iends. The terrorist believes that by
urdering, bombing, and kidnapping, he
n damage or destroy established in-
itutions and bring about the radical
anges he seeks. Terrorism is abnormal
cause it frequently chooses as its
rgets and its weapons innocent non-
mbatants — passengers on airplanes;
iildren in a schoool or on a bus; wor-
ippers in a church, synagogue, or
)sque; businessmen kidnapped for ran-
m; and so often the indiscriminate kill-
l and injury of people who happen to
at the scene of a terrorist incident,
le victims are cynically used as tools to
in resources to support the terrorists'
'restructure, to create fear and ap-
ehension in the population, to black-
nil governments, and to promote the
Irrorists' cause by the publicity which
Slvays accompanies spectacular terrorist
its.

Terrorism is a threat to the social

and political fabric of Western demo-
cratic societies, as well as a clear viola-
tion of the human rights of the individ-
ual. By attempting to destablize or
destroy established institutions, the ter-
rorist is seeking to bring down the very
structures within society which foster
and nurture human rights. A contemp-
orary example is Spain where the ac-
tions of Basque terrorists threaten to
bring down the still fragile democracy
won by the Spanish people after so
many years of dictatorship. The replace-
ment of the civilian constitutional
government by a military regime in
Turkey last year was due in large
measure to the inability of the civilian
government to cope with the serious ter-
rorism problems confronting Turkey.

Attacks on diplomats and diplomatic
facilities have been increasing steadily
over the past decade, and this trend has
adversely affected the conduct of
diplomacy. Since 1968 there have been
more than 3,000 attacks on diplomats
worldwide, with more than 300 diplo-

Terrorism is a
threat to the social and
political fabric of
Western democratic
societies, as well as a
clear violation of the
human rights of the
individual.

mats killed and more than 800 wounded;
20 ambassadors from 12 countries have
been assassinated, including 5 American
ambassadors. Whereas there were 200
attacks worldwide against diplomats in
1970, in 1980 there were twice as many.
Last year alone witnessed over 100 at-
tacks against U.S. diplomats and
facilities. There were some 70 forcible
incursions into diplomatic facilities
around the world between 1970 and
1980. Interestingly enough, more than
half of them occurred since 1979 when
our embassy in Tehran was seized, sug-
gesting that successful terrorist act

created a model for other terrorists to
emulate.

A recent phenomenon has been the
resurgence of right-wing terrorism after
a period of relative inactivity. Right-
wing terrorism is usually perpetrated
anonymously by groups with few or no
articulated goals. These groups tend to
be motivated by a desire to terrorize or
destroy specific targets. Ring-wing ter-
rorists were responsible for last year's
bombings at the Oktoberfest in Munich
and at the Bologna train station, both of
which caused mass casualities and at-
tracted much international attention.

There has also been an increase in
terrorism directed against religious
figures and facilities. The attack on
Pope John Paul II; bombings at
churches and mosques in the Philippines
and in Egypt; attacks on synagogues in
Paris, Vienna, and most recently Ant-
werp; and the assassination attempt on
the Greek Catholic patriarch in Lebanon
in February are all examples of this
trend.

Terrorism is a global phenomenon,
although interestingly enough it does
not seem to be a problem in the Soviet
Union or in the countries of East Euro-
pean allies. Western Europe, on the
other hand, remains a battleground for
international and domestic terrorists.
Recently we have witnessed the re-
emergence of terrorist activity directed
against U.S. officials in Western Europe
with the bombing at Ramstein Air Base,
the assassination attempt on the U.S.
Army European Commander in Heidel-
berg, and the attack on the residence of
our consul general in Frankfurt. The
level of violence has escalated to un-
precedented levels in Central America
and has resulted in the death and injury
of a number of American citizens this
year. Terrorism in the Middle East also
continues at exceedingly high levels,
especially in Lebanon, where a recent
series of car bombs resulted in the
deaths of many innocent people. Arme-
nian terrorists have increased their at-
tacks on Turkish diplomats, as evidenced
by the recent takeover of the Turkish
consulate in Paris. To date, some 20
Turkish diplomats and members of their
families have been killed by Armenian
terrorists. The savage attack on Presi-
dent Sadat by Muslim extremists sad-
dened the civilized world. These are but
a few examples of recent terrorist acts
which unfortunately are likely to con-
tinue.

The United States is not immune
from terrorism, although the level of
terrorist violence is relatively low in

luary 1982

55

TERRORISM

comparison to the threat faced abroad.
The major domestic terrorist group is
the FALN— the Puerto Rican National
Liberation Group— which has been ac-
tive in bombings and assassinations. The
principal cause of current U.S. domestic
terrorism, however, stems from terrorist
attacks against foreign government
establishments by dissident elements.
For example, anti- Yugoslav Croatian
separatists have engaged in terrorism in
this country, and earlier this year eight
members of the Croatian National
Resistance were arrested on charges of
arson, murder, and extortion. Some 21
Croatians and a lesser number of Serbs
are now incarcerated in U.S. jails
because of their terrorist activities.
Armenian terrorists were responsible
for the recent bombing of the Turkish
mission to the United Nations. Anti-
Castro Cuban exiles have carried out
terrorist attacks in the United States,
including the murder of a Cuban U.N.
diplomat in New York last year as well
as the bombings of the Soviet and
Cuban missions to the United Nations.

U.S. Strategy

The Reagan Administration has adopted
a firm policy to combat international ter-
rorism. We will resist terrorist blackmail
and pursue terrorists with the full force
of the law. We will not pay ransom, nor
release prisoners, and we will not
bargain for the release of hostages. To
make concessions to terrorist blackmail
only jeopardizes the lives and freedom of
additional innocent people. We en-
courage other governments to take a

We will not pay ransom,
nor release prisoners,
and we will not bargain
for the release of hos-
tages. . . . We encourage
other governments to
take a similarly strong
stance on terrorism.

similarly strong stance on terrorism.
When American citizens are taken
hostage, we look to the host government
to exercise its responsibility under inter-
national law to protect them, but at the
same time we urge the government not

56

to give in to terrorist blackmail. This
Administration has made it clear that
the United States will use all political,
economic, diplomatic, and military
resources at our disposal to respond to
state-supported acts of terrorism
directed against us such as we recently
experienced in Iran. Our recent closing
of the Libyan People's Bureau in
Washington was a warning to Libya
that we will not tolerate their terrorist
acts.

The U.S. Government's strategy for
combatting international terrorism in-
volves three basic elements:

• Measures to prevent terrorist at-
tacks;

• Measures for effectively reacting
to terrorist incidents; and

• Seeking an international consen-
sus against terrorism.

In seeking to prevent acts of ter-
rorism, we have placed great emphasis
on improving our intelligence on ter-
rorist groups. If we have warning of an
impending terrorist attack, we can take
the necessary preventive measures to
thwart it. We are, in fact, regularly
receiving reports of possible terrorist
acts which have allowed us to take ap-
propriate countermeasures.

The U.S. Government is also giving
great emphasis to enhancing the securi-
ty of our personnel and facilities abroad.
We have undertaken a security enhance-
ment program for our overseas posts
which is designed to reduce their
vulnerability. In the decade of the 1970s
we stressed protection against small ter-
rorist attacks. However, as a result of
our experiences in Tehran, Islamabad,
and Tripoli in 1979, we are now also
stressing defense against mob attacks.
We are constructing safe havens in our
embassies and consulates, improving
building access controls, installing
nonlethal denial systems, and concen-
trating on other life-saving measures.
We have already conducted major
surveys at our most threatened posts,
and major construction projects are now
getting underway. Our plan over the
next few years is to significantly
upgrade security at about 125 of our
most threatened posts.

We have also instituted a 2-day
seminar called "Coping With Violence
Abroad." All officials serving abroad are
required to attend this course, and the
adult dependents over 14 years of age
are also invited to attend. This course
advises our people on how to reduce
their vulnerability to terrorist attacks,
how to protect their residences, and also
what to expect if they are taken
hostage.

Despite our efforts to avoid acts of
terrorism, we are still likely to be faced
with terrorist violence. It is, therefore,
important to have a capability to re-
spond quickly and effectively. All of the
Federal Government agencies which
may have to react to acts of terrorism
have developed response capabilities. Al
of them have command centers, and
these are linked together to manage an;
particular crisis. These agencies also
conduct various contingency exercises fc
test our response capabilities against a
variety of different scenarios.

Another important aspect of our
response capability is the ability to re-
spond with force should that be neces-
sary. In the United States, most major
cities have SWAT [special weapons and
tactics] teams, and each district of the
Federal Bureau of Investigations has its
own SWAT team. The rescue missions
which were conducted at Entebbe,
Mogadishu, and the Iranian Embassy in
London last year, as well as a number c
aircraft incidents, emphasize the need
for an effective assault capability shoulc
force prove necessary. The United
States has dedicated military forces
which could be used should the need
arise. Late last year the Department of
Defense announced the creation of the
Joint Counter-Terrorist Task Force.
Although we consider the use of force ill
resolving a terrorist incident a measure
of last resort, it is important to have
these capabilities should they be needed.

The Need for International
Cooperation

No nation can cope with international
terrorism by itself. International coop-
eration is essential if we are to deal
effectively with the threat. The interna-
tional community, through international
organizations such as the United Na-
tions, must act together to express its
complete and unified condemnation of
terrorism, especially those acts which
are sponsored by governments them-
selves. We are working with other na-
tions to establish a consensus under in-
ternational law that acts of terrorism
are equally abhorrent to all nations of
the world and that those persons who
commit such acts must be brought to
justice. The United States has supportec
existing U.N. conventions outlawing ter-
rorist acts: the Hague convention
against hijacking, the Montreal conven-
tion against aircraft sabotage, the New
York Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons, the Conven-
tion on the Physical Protection of

Department of State Bulletii

UNITED NATIONS

clear Materials, and the Convention
ainst the Taking of Hostages. We
re encouraged all nations to become
ties to these conventions, which
ablish an international scheme whose
ective is to bring terrorists to justice.

are exploring ways of strengthening
se conventions to include consultative

enforcement mechanisms. The
ited States also favors the drafting of
litional U.N. conventions to cover
>se terrorist acts, such as assassina-
is, which are not included in existing
iventions.

The United States also has been
rking closely with its economic sum-
partners— Canada, the United
igdom, West Germany, Italy, France,

Japan — on measures to deal with in-
national terrorism. At the most re-
t summit in Ottawa last July, a state-
nt on terrorism was issued calling for
anced cooperation on terrorism. It

proposed the suspension of all
hts to and from Afghanistan in im-
nentation of the Bonn declaration on
eking, unless Afghanistan meets its
rnational obligations to bring to
ice the hijackers of a Pakistani
iner hijacked last March. The Bonn
laration was adopted by the summit
rers in 1978.

Government-condoned and -spon-
?d acts of terrorism are a particularly
sgious form of terrorism. Countries
l as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
ya — which directly or indirectly spon-

train, finance, or arm ter-
sts — must be made to understand
; their bahavior is unacceptable in a
Id seeking peace, prosperity, and
)ility.

elusion

onclusion, let me emphasize that the
)lem of dealing with international
orism is complex and difficult. There
3 single answer or solution to be
id. It is clear, however, that the
ted States must work with other
minded nations to reduce the cycle
jrrorist violence, death, and destruc-

that now plagues so many parts of
world. If the civilized world fails to

effectively with this vexing prob-

the terrorists will only be encour-
1 to continue their violent criminal

in the hope of bringing about the
cal political changes which they
:. Above all we would not want to
the terrorism which is plaguing the
die East, Western Europe, and
n America spill over to our
-es. ■

Afghan Situation and
Implications for Peace

Following are a statement by U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane
J. Kirkpatrick made in the General
Assembly November 18, 1981, the text of
the resolution adopted by the General
Assembly on November 18, and a Depart-
ment statement of November 19.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK,
NOV. 18, 19811

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
launched on Christmas Eve nearly 2
years ago, was a momentous event that
altered the climate and, indeed, the
course of world politics. The invasion
was a grave violation of the U.N.
Charter, which enjoins all members to
". . . refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state. ..." As
such, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
shook the very foundations of world
order.

The far-reaching consequences of
this event should by now be apparent to
all of us. It had a shattering effect upon
the prospects for the continued stability
of South Asia and the Persian Gulf,
deepening anxieties throughout this vital
region and raising the specter of a wider
conflict. It also severely aggravated ten-
sions between East and West. More
than any single event in recent years,
the Soviet invasion impelled a wide-
spread reassessment of the world situa-
tion based upon a new and more sober
appreciation of the danger that the
policies of the Soviet Union now pose to
global stability and world peace. The in-
vasion thus marked a watershed in the
postwar era, bringing to a definitive con-
clusion a period of optimism concerning
the evolution of Soviet policy and inten-
tions.

Nowhere, of course, have the conse-
quences been more immediately or
harshly felt than in Afghanistan itself.
No sector of Afghan society has been
spared the consequences of the Soviet
occupation and the ruthless effort to im-
pose upon the Afghan people a Com-
munist totalitarian system — an effort
that began in 1978 with the initial Com-
munist coup overthrowing the Daoud
government. Almost 3 million people-
about one-fifth of the entire Afghan
population — have been forced to flee

their country and now constitute the
largest single refugee group in the
world. Tens of thousands of people have
been killed. Afghanistan's educated class
has been decimated. Whole villages have
been destroyed, their inhabitants killed
or forced to flee. Mosques have been
desecrated and religious leaders jailed or
murdered. Schools have been turned in-
to centers of political indoctrination. The
country's economic and social infrastruc-
ture of roads, power and communication
networks, hospitals, and educational in-
stitutions have been badly damaged and
in many instances completely destroyed.

It is rarely noted that Afghanistan
made significant economic and social
progress during the decade of
democratic freedoms and representative
government brought about the 1964 con-
stitution. All this — and more — has now
been undone.

There have been many attempts in
the past to conquer Afghanistan. But
nothing in the country's long history —
with the possible exception of the devas-
tating attacks more than 750 years ago
by Genghis Khan— resembles the
destruction wreaked in Afghanistan
since 1978.

The Soviet Union and the Kabul
regime have tried to conceal this
destruction by sealing the country off
from journalists and other foreign
observers and from humanitarian
organizations, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Never-
theless, the truth about the situation
there and about the terrible human
suffering is becoming known to the
world.

How far the Soviets are willing to
go in their war against Afghanistan is
indicated by the kind of weapons they
have used there, including little booby-
trap mines which the Soviets scatter by
the thousands along the paths used by
the refugees and other civilians. These
mines are frequently disguised as or-
dinary household items or toys. Chil-
dren, naturally the least wary, are the
ones most likely to pick them up. If they
do, they risk being killed or having their
limbs blown off.

On April 10 of this year, the Soviet
Union signed an international conven-
tion prohibiting the use of such
weapons. At the time, its permanent
representative to the United Nations

Jary 1982

57

UNITED NATIONS

called the convention "an illustrative ex-
ample of the possibility of reaching
agreements on measures aimed at curb-
ing the arms race." The real "illustrative
example," however, is contained in the
Soviets' continued use in Afghanistan of
the kind of antipersonnel weapons pro-
hibited by the treaty. It is an example
that illustrates both the character of the
Soviet Union's involvement in Afghani-
stan and its attitude — in this instance,
at least — toward a treaty obligation.

In this connection, there are many
reports from refugees and other victims
of the Soviet invasion that lethal and in-
capacitating chemical weapons are being
used in Afghanistan, in violation of both
the Geneva protocol of 1925 and the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention of 1972.

It is not possible to justify the Soviet
actions in Afghanistan according to any
meaningful interpretation of interna-
tional law. The sole exception to the pro-
scription against the use of force in in-
ternational relations is provided for in
Article 51 of the charter, which affirms
"... the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United
Nations. . . ." But not even the Soviet
Union itself has suggested that it has
been the victim of an armed attack.

Moreover, it is hard to imagine how
Afghanistan might conceivably have
posed a threat to the Soviet Union. For
decades the Soviet Union had pro-
claimed to the whole world, repeatedly,
that its relations with Afghanistan were
a model of peaceful coexistence, a prime
example of neighborly relations between
a small country and a big country, each
with different systems of government
and social structures but living together
in peace without interference. Since
1921 the two countries had signed
numerous treaties, affirming and
reaffirming Moscow's respect for
Afghanistan's independence and terri-
torial integrity and promising noninter-
ference in Afghan affairs. It should not
be forgotten, furthermore, that Afghani-
stan was a member of the nonaligned
movement and was not involved in any
relationships that Moscow might look
upon with concern.

How, then, could it have posed a
threat? The argument is advanced that
the Soviet Union felt threatened by the
turmoil inside Afghanistan. But aside
from student riots fomented by Babrak
Karmal and his followers in 1965 and a
brief period of unrest following the
bloodless Daoud coup in 1973, there was
no turmoil at all in Afghanistan before
April 27, 1978— before, that is to say,

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
NOV. 19, 19813

Yesterday the U.N. General Assembly
passed by a vote of 116 to 23 a resolu-
tion calling for the immediate
withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan. It also called for restora-
tion of independence and self-
determination to that beleaguered coun-
try and the right of the Afghan refugees
to return.

The resolution passed by an even
larger margin or majority than two
similar resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly in 1980 opposing
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

This new action by the United Na-
tions is a strong reaffirmation that the
great majority of nations are unalterably
opposed to this invasion and occupation
of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and
demand a settlement based on
withdrawal of Soviet troops and respect
for international law.

the Communists violently seized power
in Kabul and, with the help of growing
numbers of Soviet "advisers," began for-
cibly to impose upon the people of
Afghanistan a foreign ideology and a
totalitarian system.

It is also suggested by apologists for
the invasion that the Soviet Union
feared that a tide of Islamic funda-
mentalism might sweep from Afghani-
stan into its central Asian provinces.
But even if this were true, it would
hardly justify the Soviet invasion. In
fact, the Afghans are a devout people,
but they have not tried to impose their
beliefs on others, and historically they
have allowed minority faiths to live
peacefully within their midst. This at-
titude of tolerance is characteristic of
the Afghans except when their faith
itself is attacked, as it now is by com-
munism. They are not tolerant, nor
should they be, of an attack upon their
freedom, independence, and identity, of
which their religion is an important part.
But there should be no doubt whatso-
ever that the threat in this instance is
to — not from — the people of Afghani-
stan.

The Soviet Union also claims, of
course, that its forces were invited in by
the Kabul regime, which invoked its
right to self-defense under Article 51.
But so far, neither the Soviet Union nor

the Kabul regime has produced a shrec
of evidence to prove that such an invit;
tion was ever issued. It is hard to imaj;
ine what kind of evidence they could
produce since, as we know, the invasio
preceded the installation of Babrak Ka
mal, who wasn't even in Afghanistan a
the time his predecessor was over-
thrown and killed by invading Soviet
troops. Of late, Babrak Karmal has
taken the line that the invitation was
issued by the Afghan Communist Part;
This, of course, is actually an admissio
that the invitation was not issued by a
government.

The Kabul regime, moreover, has l
legitimacy whatsoever in the eyes of tl
Afghan people. It exists only by virtue
of Soviet actions and is, in fact, mereh
an appendage of Moscow. Soviet perse
nel direct virtually all aspects of its ad
ministration, including the Ministries c
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Infi
mation and Culture, Justice, and Eco-
nomic Planning. Since 1979 Soviet per
sonnel have also commanded the Afgh
Army down to the brigade level and
sometimes down to the company level.
The Soviets even control Afghanistan's
natural resources, in particular natural
gas, which are extracted in a one-sided
barter arrangement in exchange for
goods used to sustain the Kabul regimi

Suspicions have been raised that tr
Kabul regime may also have acceded, i
a treaty signed earlier this year, to the
annexation by the Soviet Union of at
least a part of the Wakhan corridor, tr
narrow strip of land that joins Afghani
stan with China. A de facto annexation
has already taken place since the area-
from which the indigenous Kirghiz trib
have been forced to flee — is now under
the control of the Soviet Army.

Given the Kabul regime's utter sub
servience to Moscow, it is hardly sur-
prising that it should have no base of
support among the Afghan people. It is
propped up by 85,000 Soviet troops. Y
the freedom fighters — poorly armed ar
trained and virtually defenseless again! I
some of the most sophisticated weapon,
in the Soviet arsenal — have been able t
deny the Soviets control of perhaps 90'
of the countryside and have made then
contest many of the most important
cities. In a desperate attempt to stem
the disintegration of the Afghan Army
the regime has offered many times nor
mal pay to former enlisted men. Yet st
they do not turn up, while draft-age mi
continue to slip out of the cities to join
the resistance, and whole units of the
army desert en masse. The regime has

58

Department of State Bullet

UNITED NATIONS

}peatedly offered amnesty to refugees
10 would return to Afghanistan from
:ile. Yet every week the refugee
nters in Pakistan and Iran swell by
e thousands.

What is clear today was clear in
179. Then, as now, the Kabul regime
as not threatened by an outside power,
stifying defense under Article 51 but
is, in fact, threatened by a popular
•rising, a spontaneous popular uprising
the nation — of the people in whom
.tionhood inheres, and solely inheres,
the absence of a legitimate govern-
ent. It was an uprising against a
gime that had slaughtered its own
ople, destroyed their homes, sent
nost half a million people fleeing into
ile, and delivered the country to an
en force — an uprising that continues
this very day against the present
gime and its Soviet masters.

It is this uprising and this uprising
me that is justified to invoke the right
self-defense, for it is defending the in-
pendence and very existence of the
ghan nation against a foreign and
utal domination.

Small wonder, then, that the Soviet
lion is doing whatever it can to
scure the truth about Afghanistan.
iere is no other way to understand the
arge— repeated by the Soviet Foreign
nister before this body in Septem-
r — that the real source of the conflict
Afghanistan is foreign interference by
3 United States and China. This
arge is ludicrous but also revealing,
• it shows the lengths the Soviet
lion is forced to go to conceal the real
ture of its policy.
! There are only two realities in
ghanistan today; the Soviet occupa-
n and the Afghan nation, and neither
compatible with the other. The Soviet
liion can conquer Afghanistan only by
sminating the Afghan nation. This, the
jbrld must not permit to happen, for if
If ghanistan is vanquished, no independ-
pt nation will be safe.

The draft resolution now before us,
Be its predecessors, seeks an end to the
ccupation of Afghanistan. It calls for:

• Immediate withdrawal of all
eign troops;

• Restoration of the sovereignty,
t-ritorial integrity, and nonalignment of
^'ghanistan;

' Restoration of the right of the
fi'ghan people to choose their own form
^government and economic and social
sstem, free from outside intervention,
isrcion, or restraint; and

• Return of the refugees to their
homeland.

My government is firmly committed
to these terms. The struggle of the
Afghan nation for survival is consistent
with the basic and most cherished pur-
poses of the United Nations, which are
to protect national independence and to
maintain world peace.

It is only fitting, therefore, that the
United Nations should affirm the basic
and most cherished purpose of the
Afghan nation, which is to regain its an-
cient homeland so that it may once
again be independent and live in peace.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 36/34,
NOV. 18, 19812

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The
situation in Afghanistan and its implications
for international peace and security,"

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14
January 1980 and 35/37 of 20 November
1980, adopted at the sixth emergency special
session and the thirty-fifth session, respec-
tively,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and the
obligation of all States to refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of any
State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right
of all peoples to determine their own form of
government and to choose their own
economic, political and social system free
from outside intervention, subversion, coer-
cion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing
foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in
contravention of the above principles, and its
serious implications for international peace
and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the in-
ternational community over the continued
and serious sufferings of the Afghan people
and over the magnitude of social and
economic problems posed to Pakistan and
Iran by the presence on their soil of millions
of Afghan refugees, and the continuing in-
crease in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a
political solution of the grave situation in
respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the
Secretary-General, particularly of the ap-
pointment of his Personal Representative,

Recognizing the importance of the ini-
tiatives of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and the efforts of the Movement
of Non-aligned Countries for a political solu-
tion of the situation in respect of
Afghanistan,

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political in-
dependence and non-aligned character of
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solu-
tion of the problem;

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo-
ple to determine their own form of govern-
ment and to choose their economic, political
and social system free from outside interven-
tion, subversion, coercion or constraint of any
kind whatsoever;

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of
the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. Also calls upon all parties concerned
to work for the urgent achievement of a
political solution, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the present resolution, and the
creation of the necessary conditions which
would enable the Afghan refugees to return
voluntarily to their homes in safety and
honour;

5. Renews its appeals to all States and
national and international organizations to
continue to extend humanitarian relief
assistance, with a view to alleviating the
hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-
ordination with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees;

6. Expresses its appreciation of the ef-
forts of the Secretary -General in the search
for a solution to the problem and requests
him to continue these efforts with a view to
promoting a political solution, in accordance
with the provisions of the present resolution,
and the exploration of securing appropriate
guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of
use of force, against the political in-
dependence, sovereignty, territorial integrity
and security of all neighbouring States, on
the basis of mutual guarantees and strict
non-interference in each other's internal af-
fairs and with full regard for the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to
keep Member States and the Security Council
concurrently informed of the progress
towards the implementation of the present
resolution and to submit to Member States a
report on the situation at the earliest ap-
propriate opportunity;

8. Decides to include in the provisional
agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item
entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for internal peace and security."

'USUN press release 120.

2 Adopted by the General Assembly on
Nov. 18 by a vote of 116(U.S.)-23, with 12
abstentions.

3 Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

"

uary 1982

59

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council Votes
on Golan Heights
Situation

Following are the text of U.N.
Security Council resolution 497 adopted
on December 1 7 opposing the Israeli
Government's decision to annex the
Golan Heights and a Department state-
ment of December 18 supporting that
resolution.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 4971

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter of 14
December 1981 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the Syrian Arab Republic con-
tained in document S/14791,

Reaffirming that the acquisition of terri-
tory by force is inadmissible, in accordance
with the United Nations Charter, the prin-
ciples of international law, and relevant
Security Council resolutions,

1. Decides that the Israeli decision to im-
pose its laws, jurisdiction and administration
in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null
and void and without international legal
effect;

2. Demands that Israel, the occupying
Power, should rescind forthwith its decision;

3. Determines that all the provisions of
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
12 August 1949 continue to apply to the
Syrian territory occupied by Israel since June
1967;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council on the imple-
mentation of this resolution within two weeks
and decides that in the event of non-
compliance by Israel, the Security Council
would meet urgently, and not later than 5
January 1982, to consider taking appropriate
measures in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT2

I have a statement on Israel's deci-
sion on December 14, through Knesset
legislation, to extend its law, jurisdic-
tion, and administration to the occupied
Golan region. As you know, we have
stated that we do not recognize Israel's
action, which we consider to be without
international legal effect. Their action is
inconsistent with both the letter and the
spirit of U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338. We continue to
believe that the final status of the Golan
Heights can only be determined through
negotiations between Syria and Israel

based upon Resolutions 242 and 338.

We, therefore, joined with the rest
of the Security Council in voting for a
resolution opposing Israel's action and
making it clear it is without interna-
tional legal effect.

The Israeli action was taken with no
advance notice to us or discussion with
us. We are particularly disappointed
that the Government of Israel took this
action just as we were facing a serious
political crisis in Poland and only a few
weeks after we signed a memorandum
of understanding on strategic coopera-
tion. The spirit of that agreement ob-
liged each party to take into considera-
tion in its decisions the implications for
the broad policy concerns of the other.
We do not believe that spirit was upheld
in the case of Israel's decision on the
Golan.

With this in mind, the President has
instructed Secretary [Caspar S.] Wein-

berger and Secretary Haig not to pro-
ceed at this time with discussions intend
ed to implement the memorandum of
understanding signed on November 30
of this year. This means we will not hol<
next month's scheduled meeting of the
coordinating council as set up in the
memorandum of understanding.

In addition, the President has decid-
ed that the United States will not, for
the moment, proceed with further
discussions on some Israeli proposals fo
promoting Department of Defense pur-
chases of defense-related goods and
services in Israel, on authorizing Israel
to use some FMS [foreign military sale;
funds to purchase Israeli-produced goo(
and services, or on the possible use of
FMS by third countries to purchase
Israeli defense items and services.

'Adopted by unanimous vote.
2 Read to news correspondents by Depar
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

Libya: A Source of
International Terrorism

by Kenneth Adelman

Statement made in the U.N. General
Assembly on October 9, 1981. Am-
bassador Adelman is Deputy U.S.
Representative to the United Nations. l

In the space of a few minutes, it is
scarcely possible even to outline an ade-
quate, factual response to the vicious
diatribe, to the tissue of lies delivered in
this assembly of nations 2 days ago by
the representative of Qadhafi's Libya.

I speak for my delegation and my
government, of course, but more than
that, I speak for the American people
and, indeed, for the tens of millions
everywhere in the world who today are
mourning the death of an authentic
Arab hero, Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt,
whose nobility and boundless courage in
the great cause of peace will stand
forever in such stark and devastating
contrast to the violence, the destruction,
the terrorism that are hallmarks of
Qadhafi's Libya.

It was Qadhafi, of course, who made
a standing offer of $1 million for anyone
able and willing to murder Anwar al-
Sadat — an unprincipled incitement of
vile criminality quite rare in the world

aside from the acts by the likes of
Ghengis Khan, Hitler, or Stalin. Yet it
the appropriate mark of one who has
chosen to spearhead violence, aggres-
sion, and terrorism in every corner of
the world. That record is plain. It is
grim. And it is documented many time
over.

The technique used by Libya is tha
of Orwellian inversion of the truth — at
tribution to my government of the ver
crimes against peace and justice and
human rights of which Libya — on the
record — is guilty beyond question.

The Libyan representative spoke o
the "terrorist nature" of my governme
its practice of "physical liquidation." Tl
claim is outrageous. The source makes
more so.

Funding Terrorism

No reasonable person in this hall can
any longer doubt that Libya is a major
source for the funding of international
terrorism. This funding is impossible tl
estimate accurately, but most accounts
place it at hundreds of millions of doll;>
annually.

More than a dozen training camps
are reportedly located in Libya for the

60

Department of State Bulle i

UNITED NATIONS

■aining of expatriates, mostly Africans
iid Asians, in terrorist practices,
.ccording to the scholar, Claire Ster-
.\g, in The Terror Network — a work
(den with specifics — Qadhafi made his
:-st investment in Palestinian terrorism
jiroad by providing the funds, arms,
ad training for the Munich Olympic
lassacre in 1972.

The list goes on. He funded the
Jaly-Libya Association until it was
utlawed by the Italian Government as a
irrorist front. In charge of this associa-
»n was Claudio Mutti, one of Italy's
liown Nazi terrorists, who was jailed in

•80 for his alleged role in the Bologna
tilroad station bombing. Mutti's close
jsociate, now serving a life sentence
:r terrorism, had picked up a 100,000
\e payoff from the Libyan Embassy in
bme just before gunning down two
jtlicemen in 1975. Mutti's heroes were
jtler and Mussolini and Qadhafi. The
Ibyans also funded the Fascist
.vanguardia Nazionale, whose posters
soke for themselves: "We are with you
iToic Arabs-Palestinian people, and not
' th the dirty, fat Jews."

Today this terror network extends
lorn Argentina through virtually all of
'estern Europe, to Indonesia, the
hilippines, and Thailand. The work is
(ten conducted through Libyan
dplomatic missions. The terrorists are
Iralded and welcomed home. Members
< the Black September and Japanese
]?d Army have been given safe haven
i Libya after conducting successful ter-
irist operations abroad. Qadhafi's at-
Impts to unseat other Arab
kders — notably in Egypt and Sudan
It not limited to those two — make a
lockery of his pan-Arab rhetoric.

Qadhafi's use of diplomatic facilities
| support bases for terrorist operations
ad of his intelligence services as inter-
itional terrorist instruments make a

ockery of diplomatic immunity,
ttdhafi's claim of the right to murder

byan dissidents on foreign soil — such
} the February attack in a Rome air-
;>rt on anti-Qadhafi Libyans, possibly
•en in the United States— makes a

ockery of the Libyan speech of

ednesday.

Strangely, Qadhafi himself is more
irthright than his representative. I

uite from a speech of March 2 of this

>ar: "It is the duty of the Libyan people

instantly to liquidate their

pponents ... the physical and final li-

lidation of the opponents of popular

authority" — meaning his dictatorial
authority — "must continue at home and
abroad, everywhere."

The announcement made in Tripoli
last August of the desire to "undertake
the physical liquidation of" hostile in-
dividuals "beginning with Ronald
Reagan" beggars either response or
comment.

Libyan Expansionism

A second and related Libyan charge was
of America's "ambitious designs for
hegemony . . . which constitute a
flagrant threat to international peace
and security," this coming from a leader
who maintains an expeditionary force of
7,000 troops in neighboring Chad.

Libya's announcement last December
of merger with Chad was an expression
of Qadhafi's aggressive intention to ab-
sorb his African neighbors in a Libyan-
dominated state. Just 2 days ago, press
reports indicated that Qadhafi was
escalating the conflict in Chad by dis-
patching columns of reinforcements and
Soviet-built bombers to strengthen his
troops fighting in that tragic battle.
Shortly after his initial invasion, Qadhafi
himself said: "We consider [Niger] sec-
ond in line to Chad."

This is no bilateral issue between the
United States and Libya. It is, rather,
an issue between Libya and its
neighbors. I can do no better than to
cite African outrage over this Libyan ex-
pansionism. In January of this year, an
ad hoc committee of the Organization of
African Unity issued a communique con-
demning the proposed merger anil call-
ing for the immediate withdrawal of Lib-
yan troops. Senegal, Equatorial Guinea,
and The Gambia broke diplomatic rela-
tions with Libya in 1980. Mauritania,
Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger strong-
ly objected to the transformation of Lib-
yan embassies into "peoples bureaus"
last year and reacted by expelling the
Libyan diplomats from their countries.
Kenya and Upper Volta refused to allow
the establishment of "peoples bureaus"
at all.

Sudan has long considered Libya
responsible for a series of unsuccessful
coup attempts and aggressions in quite

recent times. On June 25, 1981, accusing
the Libyans of involvement in an explo-
sion at the Embassy of Chad in Khar-
toum, Sudan expelled all Libyan
diplomats.

And this is just the beginning. Presi-
dent Kountche of Niger— who addressed
this assembly last week — President
Traore of Mali, and President Nimeiri of
Sudan have charged the Libyans with
attempts to overthrow their govern-
ments. The Governments of Senegal and
The Gambia have charged the Libyans
with imprisoning their nationals and put-
ting them into military training against
their wills.

The civilian, democratically elected
Government of Ghana charged Libya
with internal subversion when it ex-
pelled Libyan diplomats. The universally
respected former President of Senegal,
Leopold Senghor, has stated that Libyan
forces are "designed to destroy Africa
south of the Sahara and create a vast
Libyan empire."

Despite his love of revolution and
violence for their own sake, Qadhafi has
given assistance to some governments in
countering dissidents. Characteristically,
he had done so with the most savage of
governments, those of the Central-
African Empire under Bokassa and
Uganda under Amin. According to
Claire Sterling, there were 200 Libyan
soldiers in Bokassa's army when he was
overthrown in 1979, and Qadhafi dis-
patched 2,500 Libyan soldiers to help
the bloodthirsty Amin in his last stand
in 1979. Both assistance programs, _ for-
tunately for the Central African and
Ugandan people, were failures.

Arms Purchases

Third, the Libyan representative
charged that "the goal of the United
States now is to militarize the world"
while Libya stands for "total disarma-
ment" and the end of the "arms race."

This is, indeed, Orwellian inver-
sion— in its extreme form. The regional
arms race in northern Africa has been
spurred precisely by Libya. This coun-
try, with its small population of under 3
million persons, purchased $5 billion
worth of arms between 1974 and 1978,
of which $3.6 billion originated in the
Soviet Union. Recently, according to .Ms.
Sterling, Qadhafi made the biggesl arms
ileal of our time with the Soviet
Union— a $12 billion order for tanks,
planes, artillery, and missile systems.
This comes to $600 worth of offensive

• nuary 1982

61

UNITED NATIONS

armaments for every man, woman, and
child in the country. And $6,000 worth
apiece for his army of 22,000. One
observer wrote October 8 in The Wall
Street Journal that "the amount of
Soviet Weapons in Libya is approx-
imately five times that required by the
Libyan Army."

Where are these weapons headed?
To terrorist, destabilization, and
cooperative groups around the
world — small arms to the Baader-
Meinhof gang, ammunition to Burundi,
various weapons to Benin, Soviet-made
armored vehicles to Djibouti, equipment
to guerrillas in Somalia and Oman as
part of what Qadhafi calls "a strategic
counter-offensive against American im-
perialism."

"Nonalignment"

Fourth, the Libyans claim that the
United States "aims at pressuring"
Libya "to abandon its nonalignment." No
such pressuring has taken place. None,
indeed, is needed.

Col. Qadhafi himself feigns no
substantive nonalignment. In an inter-
view in December 1979, he stated that
"the Soviets are our friends" and "those
who side with America will be our
enemies."

Last September, Libya signed yet
another arms agreement with the Soviet
Union. Today there are 2,500 Soviet ad-
visers in Libya. They alone control the
MiG-25s; they alone operate the missile
systems. Airstrips have been built to ac-
commodate the gigantic Soviet Antonov
planes transporting personnel and spare
parts. One thousand Libyan soldiers a
year — all this according to Ms. Ster-
ling—are being trained in the Soviet
Union and some 3,000 in Bulgaria.

More disturbing to Libya's neighbors
is the wide perception of Libya as a
staging ground for Soviet military
adventurism in the Persian Gulf region
and as a funnel through which to pour
arms and material to groups around the
globe who are dedicated to terrorism, to
the overthrow of their governments.

Fifth, Libya accuses the United
States of leading the effort "to exploit
the situation" in Afghanistan, charging
that we and our "allies have no intention
of accepting a peaceful solution to this
issue." I would point out that the

Afghan people themselves have "no in-
tention of accepting a peaceful solution
to this issue" as they continue to oppose
the 85,000 Soviet invaders of their land.
If one claims with any fidelity to be
a true revolutionary, a true champion of
self-determination and nonaggression, a
true leader of Islamic people, then one
would have to support wholeheartedly
the Afghan liberation fighters in their
noble struggle. But where is Col.
Qadhafi in this conflict? Why no castiga-
tion of these invaders and suppressors
of Islamic people longing to be free, to
control their own destiny?

Human Rights Situation

Sixth and most ludicrous, Libya claims
the United States displays a "disdain of
human rights." This is blatantly false.
My nation was founded as and continues
to be the mecca of liberty around the
globe. It is precisely because America
stands in the forefront of the defense of
human rights that I am delivering this
reply to Libya, that my government is
trying to stem the terrorism and expan-
sionism from Libya.

There is no greater human right
than the right not to be assassinated,
bombed, or tortured by terrorists, or the
right not to be taken over by external
aggressors.

The human rights record in Libya is
deplorable. Col. Qadhafi said in that
December 1979 interview that his coun-
try had "no parliament, no representa-
tion." Since the beginning of 1980, there
have been constant reports of a
widespread campaign of arrests and tor-
ture, including the arrest of more than
2,000 persons and execution or torture
of hundreds more.

Reports — hard to document since
Libya is a closed society with no opposi-
tion allowed — tell of political prisoners
beaten and degraded. Amnesty Interna-
tional tells of the cofounder of the
Ba'ath movement dying in detention in
February 1980 and reports: "Some of
those detained are believed to be held in-
communicado by branches of the in-
telligence services, where torture and
maltreatment frequently occur."

None of this internal repres-
sion— nor its external manifestation,
since at least 11 expatriate Libyan
dissidents have been assassinated in re-
cent months by hit squads of young

'■

Qadhafi militants — is surprising. Indeed
the cruelty has been publicly proclaimed
In February 1980, the third conference'
of the revolutionary councils issued a I
resolution charging these councils withj
the "liquidation of the elements that
hinder the revolution." Later the head d
the Libyan diplomatic mission in Loncfl
boasted of the external assassinations
and warned that more were planned.

Other Misrepresentations

Although the catalogue of misrepresen-
tations is now complete, I would be
remiss if I were not to mention in pass-
ing two additional maddening lies in the-
Libyan statement.

The first concerns Libya's well-won
allegations of U.S. "aggression" in the
shooting down of two Libyan aircraft
last August. The incident, of course,
took place fully 60 nautical miles off tl
shores of Libya, well within universall;
recognized international waters. And
U.S. aircraft did not fire until fired
on — a fact that Qadhafi himself has ad-
mitted and, indeed, boasted of.

Then, too, the Libyan representativ
accused the United States of engaging
in "bacteriological war against the
friendly people of the Republic of Cuba.
This is the third Friday evening runninj
when this particular untruth stands to
be rebutted. It is not necessary to go j
through the entire litany of demon-
strable, thoroughly documented untrutl
a third time. The record, by now, speal<
for itself.

I am delivering this response today
because the chief of our delegation, An
bassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, is in Cairo
attending the funeral services of Presi-
dent Anwar al-Sadat — a towering
figure, as she observed last Tuesday in
this hall, whose extraordinary career a:
a statesman and peacemaker proves th
heroism still lives in the contemporary
age.

The obscene celebration in Libya ol
this hero's tragic murder must go
without extended comment. They offer
the sensibilities of our delegation in thi
hall, of the American people, and — I a
say with real confidence — of civilized
people everywhere.

■USUN press release 66.

62

Department of State Bullet

UNITED NATIONS

U.N. Conference on New and
Renewable Sources of Energy

The U.N. Conference on New and
Renewable Sources of Energy was held in
Nairobi, Kenya, August 10-21, 1981.
Following are a statement by Stanton D.
Anderson, head of the U.S. delegation,
made at the conference on August 13,
President Reagan's letter to the Presi-
dent of the conference (J. H. Okwanyo,
Kenya's Minister for Energy) of August
10, and the text of the program of action,
which was unanimously adopted on
August 21.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
ENERGY CONFERENCE,
AUG. 10, 1981

This conference is testament to our shared
convicition that the energy problems faced by
all nations can be transformed, through
foresight and statesmanship, into oppor-
tunities for industry, employment, and pros-
perity. This conference will gauge our com-
mon determination to deal with our energy
problems and the difficult task of finding and
exploiting new energy sources.

The United States has made considerable
progress in the development and diffusion of
new and renewable energy technologies.
Thousands of private companies, citizens'
groups, and individuals are now involved in
the research, manufacture, and marketing of
new energy systems. We will continue to
share our experience with other nations as
we also benefit from theirs. We attach high
priority to the energy needs of developing
countries and intend to emphasize innovative
energy projects in our development assis-
tance programs.

This conference has the chance to become
a milestone for cooperation. To achieve this,
we need the serious and responsible efforts of
all countries, supported by well-conceived
regional and global initiatives. With imagina-
tion, a cooperative spirit, and hard work, we
can insure that all countries have sustainable
and abundant energy resources.

In this spirit, Mr. President, I sincerely
wish you and all assembled delegates a suc-
cessful conference.

AMBASSADOR ANDERSON,
AUG. 13, 1981

Allow me, on behalf of my government,
to pay special tribute to the statesman-
ship and foresight of President Daniel T.
arap Moi and the Government of Kenya.
Kenya was among the first to see the
necessity of this conference. In this
beautiful city of Nairobi, with the
reassuring presence and inspiring com-
mitment of Prime Ministers Indira Gan-
dhi [India], Thorbjorn Falldin [Sweden],
Pierre Trudeau [Canada], and Edward
Seaga [Jamaica], we have an opportuni-
ty to harness the expertise of diplomats
and the knowledge of experts to address
vital aspects of the global energy situa-
tion.

I am certain, Mr. President, that
under your leadership the conference
will proceed in the spirit of cooperation
and realism.

In important ways, this conference
has opened with great promise of ac-
complishment. The preparatory process
has brought together experts in many
disciplines under the dynamic leadership
of Secretary General Iglesias and the
wise guidance of Chairman Taniguchi.
Members of the preparatory committee
produced an impressive body of work on
the state of new and renewable energy.
This work is, in and of itself, an ex-
cellent beginning toward meeting the
energy needs of all countries.

The energy adversity we all ex-
perience must not become an adversary
contest. The varied experiences and
perspectives with which each of us
assesses the energy problem are not
signs of division but signs of positive
and healthy diversity.

Emerging Consensus

From this diversity a consensus is
emerging on the basic elements of the
global energy problem and challenge.

First, the energy problem is global
in scope, and the energy market is inter-
national in nature. This challenges us to
create a worldwide economic setting
favorable for energy investment, ex-
ploration, and production. It requires us
to pursue demand-side energy policies

63

UNITED NATIONS

that foster conservation, efficiency, and
oil substitution, and supply-side policies
to release the world's considerable
potential for energy resources develop-
ment and trade.

Second, effective energy policy
begins at home. Global cooperation must
be a corollary and not a substitute for
sound energy policy decisions made by
committed national governments. The
solutions lie not in apportioning blame
nor in determining a priori which
sources of energy are most appropriate
for each country. Meeting the energy
needs of the future is not a problem
which the developing countries alone
must face nor is it a problem which the
developed countries alone can resolve. It
is a challenge that we must address
together, irrespective of ideology, stage
of development, or form of economic
system.

Third, the world is overly dependent
on a single energy source— oil— and even
short-term disruptions in supplies can
cause serious economic and social
dislocations. Over the medium and long
terms, the world must transit from over-
reliance on one energy source to the
utilization of a wide variety of sources.
We must realize that there is no
substitute to energy alternatives.

Fourth, the developing countries
face a special challenge in their process
of modernization. They must be able to
achieve an energy transition without ag-
gravating an already debilitating
dependence on imported petroleum.

Fifth, the energy problem affects
both men and women whatever their life
styles or occupations. Both men and
women should participate in the for-
mulation and implementation of national
energy programs. Energy policies should
enable women to have access to new
technologies and take into account the
particular impact that the transition will
have on women dependent mainly on
traditional fuel supplies.

We must not delude ourselves by the
present, relatively favorable short-term
oil market situation. In our journey to a
new energy future— in our long odyssey
of transition— we must turn a deaf ear
to the soothing, beguiling sirens' song of
"all is well."

We must be realistic. The decline of
oil consumption in 1980 was not due to a
shift to renewable energy sources. The
oil market situation remains fragile, and
the prospect of stability depends on

avoiding complacency and upon sound
energy responses by both consuming and
producing countries.

Our vision must transcend the pres-
ent circumstances. Long as the process
of transition may be, there is no turning
back.

We must understand that the energy
problem is not solely due to dwindling
petroleum resources. Supplies of other
traditional, even renewable, sources of
energy are diminishing as well— with
adverse social and environmental im-
pacts. In many countries, the over-
whelming majority of the people depend
on firewood for their chief source of
fuel. As a result, millions of hectares of
the world's forests are disappearing
every year. At the present rate, almost
half of the remaining forests in the
developing countries will be lost by the
end of the century. Deforestation leads
to a downward spiral of ecological
degradation, loss of crop land, and
worsening poverty. The precipitous
decline in fuelwood supply dispropor-
tionately affects the world's
poor— especially women.

The imperatives of need speak for
themselves. The challenge now to the
world community is to approach the
transition in a consistent and pragmatic
manner. Necessity must not become a
convenient excuse to yield to the im-
peratives of command economics or to
uneconomic alternatives. We must guard
against the replacement of crippling
dependence on imported hydrocarbons
with an equally debilitating collection of
subsidized and uneconomic new and
renewable energy projects. We believe
that the solution lies in the long-term
reliance on open energy markets in
which ingenuity and enterprise can
flourish.

There is no lack of energy on planet
Earth. Renewable resources are more
than sufficient to meet all foreseeable
needs, irrespective of pressures on finite
resources— provided we encourage men
and women to innovate and invent and
to utilize science and technology for the
benefit of humankind.

The findings of the preparatory pro-
cess have demonstrated the remarkable
ingenuity of scientists as well as laymen,
community groups, and private enter-
prises in bringing to the marketplace of
ideas new technologies and modern ap-
plications of old ones. This is a unique

encounter of the old and the new, whe
people revive from the past what has
permanent value and reach for creativ
ideas to chart their energy future. A
new technology such as photovoltaic
generation of electricity is a spinoff oi
the space age, other renewable
technologies are as traditional as the
windmill. Both are testimony to huma
ingenuity to invent and adapt. Ingenu
is a precious resource which we cannc
restrain by rigid policies that stifle in-
dividual initiative. Instead, we must
maintain true rewards that encourage
creativity.

For our part, this means freedom
for private enterprise in a free marke
system. We believe that sound econoi
ics in the field of energy do not eman
from rigid, preconceived ideas but frc
allowing all forms of energy to comp(
in the marketplace.

The market system is our way, bi
we also recognize the complexities in
global energy balance and respect tht
pluralistic approaches that the Unitec
Nations symbolizes. Over the long ru
different approaches will test their ot I
measure.

In addressing the global energy
situation, this conference will give
special attention to the very serious
energy problems faced by the develof i
countries. In this, we must all cooper

• This cooperation means workir !
together to assist countries in energy
assessments to fashion sound nations
energy policies.

• Cooperation means increased e j
forts to accelerate exploration and
greater utilization of indigenous ener I
sources.

• Cooperation means working wi
the private sector in both its interna-
tional and national dimensions.

• Cooperation means removing
disincentives to foreign investment ir
energy.

• And cooperation means that
multilateral resources should comple-
ment and catalyze rather than display
flows from the private sector.

Energy and the U.S. Economy

Secure and adequate supplies of ener
must play a paramount role in the
revitalization and progress of the U.k
economy. In recent years, the levelin;
off of domestic oil production and th( I
creased price of imported oil have
spurred the search for energy alter-
natives and new methods of fuel effk >
cy and conservation.

64

Dpnartmfint of State Bull I

UNITED NATIONS

The last decade has seen a great
imber of initiatives to develop and
mmercialize new and renewable
lergy sources. Thousands of com-
mies, private citizens' groups, and in-
viduals are now involved in research,
tailing, installing, and servicing energy
stems based on alternative energy
urces.

At present, renewable energy
urces meet more than 6% of U.S.
ergy needs; this corresponds to about

) of the energy produced in the
lited States. Reasonable projections
Idicate that renewables will play an in-
leasing role in meeting the country's
jfergy needs— close to 8% in 1990 and
Jer 10% by the year 2000.
^Alternative energies are becoming
Hcome participants in the marketplace
Icause new energy systems are less
trmful to the environment and are
feponsive to dispersed energy needs,
ley are also technically feasible, and
Biny are cost competitive with conven-
Knal fuels.

i In the U.S. energy transition,
jivate industry will play the major role,
(provides the financial, managerial,
Id technological impetus necessary to
fcb the potential of nonconventional
jergy sources and thereby alter the
Lntry's energy mix.
I In the realm of private initiative are
I? efforts of thousands of community
limps, nonprofit organizations,
imperatives, and citizens' associations,
ley may be small local action organiza-
Ins working on their own self-help pro-
mts or nationwide voluntary associa-
ins with tens of thousands of members
inseminating information on renewable
eergy systems.

I At the national level, the Federal
(ivernment has been supporting the
cvelopment of new and renewable
Surces of energy in four principal ways.

First, by deregulating oil and per-
tting increases in natural gas prices,
1 have dramatically enhanced the com-
f|titive position of renewables.

Second, to assist a fledgling in-
cstry the United States has adopted-
Eld will maintain until scheduled expira-
tin— a series of tax incentives for cer-
tin investments in renewable energy in-
sulation and equipment.

Third, we are removing many of the
iriibiting regulations and rules that
live slowed the development and use of
i w and renewables.

Fourth, we will provide ongoing
(Ivernment support for long-term, basic

research that is too risky for private
firms to undertake.

The overriding concern of the U.S.
Government is to establish sound and
stable policies that encourage individuals
and groups, in the public and private
sectors, to produce and use all energy
sources wisely and efficiently.

Energy cooperation will continue to
be an essential ingredient of our
political, economic, and commercial rela-
tions with both developed and develop-
ing countries, with oil-exporting as well
as oil-importing nations.

Our rationale is threefold. First,
more abundant energy supplies lessen
international economic and political ten-
sions. Second, increased availability of
overall energy resources is indispensable
to the healthy economic growth of all
countries. Third, new and renewable
energy sources create markets for new
technologies and services.

U.S. Assistance Programs

We are especially conscious of the
energy needs of the developing coun-
tries, and we will continue to devote
bilateral development aid to areas of
greatest need. In its bilateral develop-
ment assistance program, the United
States has given high priority to energy
and intends to increase significantly its
total level of funding for energy-related
activities. I am especially pleased to an-
nounce that the budget for the U.S.
Agency for International Development
(AID) includes plans to double funding
for new and renewable sources of
energy. The new funding level will ex-
ceed $70 million for the next fiscal year.
In addition, our Congress has recently
passed legislation authorizing an addi-
tional $4.0 million earmarked for a solar
international program.

U.S. bilateral energy assistance pro-
grams respond to the distinct dimen-
sions of the energy problem as defined
by the developing countries. While our
AID program is tailored to individual
country needs and acts as a catalyst for
investment, its principal activities fall in
four major areas:

• The assessment of needs, uses,
and resources to assist countries to for-
mulate sound energy policies;

• The training of personnel and
development of institutions to formulate
and implement such policies;

• The site testing, demonstration,
and evaluation of new energy
technologies; and

• Increasing energy supplies, both

conventional and renewable, with signifi-
cant attention to fuelwood projects.

The trade and development program
of the U.S. Government is a corollary of
our bilateral assistance efforts. Through
assistance to commercial projects in
developing countries it facilitates the
transfer of U.S. energy technology.

Multilateral institutions and develop-
ment banks have a major role to play in
assisting the energy transition. The
United Nations and its family of agen-
cies are involved in most aspects of new
and renewable energy development and
utilization. Through rationalization of
work, greater economy and redeploy-
ment of resources, the United Nations'
efforts could become a cutting edge of
change in the international energy tran-
sition. The United States is committed
to working out at this conference ways
in which the international community
can augment its efforts to make
renewable resources available to
developing countries.

We believe multilateral development
banks are most effective when they also
generate and enhance investment from
the private sector. The World Bank is
already playing an active role in the
development of new and renewable
sources of energy. And it can do more.
We have encouraged the Bank to ex-
amine its priorities and procedures in
order to make more capital available for
energy development. We believe that
much can be done now within the ex-
isting Bank structure. Increased
cooperation and cofinancing among the
Bank, other multilateral institutions, and
the private sector should allow existing
resources to be used more efficiently
and should mobilize greater amounts of
capital for important energy investment
needs. Similarity, the United States
believes that regional development
banks should review their priorities and
procedures in order to devote increased
finanical resources for energy develop-
ment.

Finally, the United States stands
ready to explore other avenues that will
augment energy lending. In this regard,
we hope oil exporting countries can in-
crease their investment in developing
countries, and— in a spirit of partner-
ship—we are willing to discuss institu-
tional means that may facilitate this ef-
fort.

The essence of cooperation among

luary 1982

65

UNITED NATIONS

countries preparing for the energy
future lies not in erecting intricate
edifices but in building solid foundations,
at the local and national level, for in-
dividual as well as joint actions.

Cooperation should never detract
from our resources— it should augment
them. Such cooperation was the
hallmark of the long preparatory process
for this conference. I trust the long-
range effects of the program of action
we adopt here will be greater than the
sum total of our individual contributions.

The path of energy transition is yet
to be traversed. It is a journey we have
just begun, an odyssey, which will be
marked by many changes of fortune. It
is a long path; there are no shortcuts,
but there may be many dead ends. We
are all companions on this journey. Each
of us, as we forge ahead, must help
others who fall behind, for anyone who
stays behind slows down all of us.

Along the path of energy transition,
this conference will be an important
benchmark. We have learned from the
experience of other countries as we have
shared ours with them. This exchange of
experience should help us all to make
free and fully informed choices about
our energy future. We are discovering
advances in alternative energy
technologies that other countries have
made, and we are relating our own
achievements. This is a true and free
transfer of technology. The lessons we
learn, the advice we hear, will, I am cer-
tain, influence our own thinking,
policies, and practices in the years to
come.

Because in the final analysis, the
policies and efforts of each individual
country — the total national effort — will
determine the scope and nature of global
cooperation on the energy front. Exper-
tise is important; knowledge is indispen-
sable; experience is instructive; private
flows of capital are vital; development
assistance can aid; and multilateral coor-
dination can support. But none can
substitute for self-reliant endeavor that
we each in turn must pledge to one
another and to ourselves. On the global
energy front, the country that helps
itself aids all the others in turn.

PROGRAM OF ACTION,
AUG. 21, 1981

INTRODUCTION

1. A fundamental purpose of the United Na-
tions is to achieve international co-operation
in solving global problems of an economic,
social, cultural or humanitarian character.
The Declaration and the Programme of Ac-
tion on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States and
the resolutions on development and interna-
tional co-operation (General Assembly resolu-
tions 3201 (S-VI), 302 (S-VI), 3281 (XXIX)
and 3362 (S-VII) call, inter alia, for the
equitable, full and effective participation on
the basis of sovereign equality of all countries
in the solving of world economic problems in
the common interest of all countries, bearing
in mind the necessity to ensure the ac-
celerated development of all developing coun-
tries.

2. The adoption of the International Develop-
ment Strategy for the Third United Nations
Development Decade was an important step
in the promotion of international co-operation
for development and reaffirmed the commit-
ment of the international community to ac-
celerate the development of developing coun-
tries. In this context, it was. inter alia,
agreed that:

"In order to create conditions more
favourable to the development of the develop-
ing countries and the growth of the world
economy in general, efforts for the develop-
ment and expansion of all energy resources
of the world should be intensified in search of
a long-term solution to the energy problem.
The international community will have to
make substantial and rapid progress in the
transition from the present international
economy based primarily on hydrocarbons. It
will have to rely increasingly on new and
renewable sources of energy, seeking to
reserve hydrocarbons for non-energy and
non-substitutable uses. In view of the finite
supply of fossil fuels in the world economy
and the often wasteful and inefficient utiliza-
tion of those resources, effective measures
for their conservation will have to be urgent-
ly adopted and/or improved, in particular by
developed countries which consume the major
share of the world's hydrcarhon production."

3. In convening the United Nations Con-
ference on New and Renewable Sources of
Energy, the General Assembly defined its ob-
jectives in resolution 33/148 of 20 December
1978 and called, in particular, for the elabora-
tion of measures for concerted action
designed to promote the development and
utilization of new and renewable sources of
energy,1 with a view to contributing to
meeting future over-all energy requirements,
especially those of the developing countries.
in particular in the context of efforts aimed
at accelerating the development of the
developing countries.

4. The General Assembly subsequently decid-
ed that the Conference should consider the

66

adoption of a programme of action in the
area of new and renewable sources of energ
that would, inter alia, contain concrete
operational measures for subregional and in
ternational co-operation in this area.

5. The Conference had before it for con-
sideration the reports of technical panels an
consultants on the new and renewable
sources of energy, the report of the ad hoc
groups of experts on selected policy issues,
the report of the Synthesis Group, com-
prehensive reports of the relevant organs ai
organizations as well as the regional commii
sions of the United Nations system. In add!
tion, national papers were presented by
Governments wishing to do so.

6. It is in this context that the United Na-
tions Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy met in Nairobi from 10 i
21 August 1981 and adopted this Programr
of Action, to be called the "Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action for the Development and
Utilization of New and Renewable Sources
Energy."

A. Energy Transition

7. The challenge and the opportunity con-
fronting the international community is to
achieve an orderly and peaceful energy trai
sition from the present international econoi j
based primarily on hydrocarbons [petroleun
and gas] to one based increasingly on new
and renewable sources of energy in a mann
which, consistent with the needs and option
of individual countries, is socially equitable,
economically and technically viable and en-
vironmentally suitable. The transition must
be based on technological commercial, final
cial and monetary modalities consistent witl
the determination of Governments to
establish a New International Economic
Order, to accelerate the development of
developing countries and to promote balanc (
global development. An effective energy tr;
sition must conform with the principles of f
and permanent sovereignty of each country
over its natural resources and should be im-
plemented in accordance with its national
plans and priorities.

8. The issue is not whether an energy trait:
tion will take place but whether the interna
tional community will achieve it in an order
peaceful, progressive, just and integrated
manner. This transition entails the ra-
tionalization of the energy development pro
ess. In view of the often wasteful and ineffi
cient utilization of hydrocarbon resources b;
some countries as well as their finite supply
and depletable nature it has become clear
that the previous assumption of abundant a
cheap energy is not valid any longer.
Hydrocarbon resources will no longer be
available at the traditionally low levels of
earlier years. At the same time, future de-
mand for energy will increase not only in in,
dustrialized countries but also much more
dramatically in developing countries. If the
global demand for energy is to be met, it w
require a shift away from the current ex-
cessive reliance on hydrocarbons towards a
more diversified mix of energy sources. It |

Department of State Bullet

11

UNITED NATIONS

also require significant and continuing
gress in the efficient and rational use of
liable resources. In this context, energy
ining should play a significant role.
It is equally clear that patterns of con-
lption with the effect of giving access to
rgy to a limited number of countries or to
iw within countries are not compatible
h the agreed goals of the international
lmunity.

There is a common interest shared by all
ntries in ensuring an effective energy
isition, which is of critical importance to
future of all mankind. Such a transition,
ised on equitable and open co-operation,
ild offer new opportunities for ae-
rating economic and social development
ieveloping countries in particular, and
[icing the present pattern of economic and
inological dependence. Therefore, continu-
adjustments and institutional and struc-
il changes in international economic rela-
is are required, taking into account the
Is and objectives of the New International
momic Order. What is needed now is for
ions to demonstrate the necessary political
to respond to the challenge and seize the
ortunities presented.
In this regard the developed countries
e a particular responsibility to manifest
r political will and use their economic and
lagerial potential to support efforts aimed
n effective energy transition. All coun-
s should adapt themselves to such a tran-
>n, which often involves high-cost ad-
ments required to sustain and raise levels
■conomic growth. For developing coun-
s, an effective energy transition may in-
'e the question of economic survival, and
•eased energy availabilities will be essen-
if a rate and pattern of growth necessary
tieet their social and economic develop-
lt objectives is to be attained. Effective
ievement of this energy transition should
/iewed as an essential element for assur-
sustained growth of the international
nomy, in a manner that, consistent with
needs and options of individual countries,
.•clinically and economically feasible,
ally equitable and environmentally sus-
lable and for safeguarding world peace
stability. Attention is also drawn to the
^relationship between the development of
' and renewable sources of energy and
ader issues, such as genuine disarmament,
his regard, concrete progress towards the
Is of general and complete disarmament
er effective international control, in-
ling the urgent implementation of
isures of disarmament, would release
stantial additional resources which could
Jtilized for social and economic
elopment — including new and renewable
rces of energy — particularly for the
efit of the developing countries.
Bearing in mind the importance of
rgy for development and the growing
rgy- requirements of the developing mini-
's, it is recognized that these re-
rements, if not met adequately, will hinder
process of their economic and social
elopment. While efficient use of energy

should be an objective for all countries, it
should be kept in mind that the exploration,
development, expansion and processing of all
energy resources of the developing countries
must be intensified in a manner commen-
surate with their development objectives and
thereby contribute to the growth of the world
economy. For this purpose, adequate finan-
cial, technical and human resources should be
generated. It is recognized that the success i if
an effective energy transition will depend, in-
ter a! in, upon the extent to which the critical
issues of mobilization of financial resources
for, and transfer of technology available to,
in particular, developing countries can be ef-
fectively tackled.

13. The ultimate aim of socio-economic
development is the constant improvement of
the living conditions of the entire population.
The successful achievement of the energy
transition has direct implications for shelter,
physical infrastructure, health, sanitation,
nutrition and general well-being in rural and
urban communities. It should aim at the
generation of improved productivity, better
income earning opportunities and increased
employment through local manufacture and
maintenance services, in both rural and urban
sectors. At the same time, it should include,
where appropriate, provisions to ensure ade-
quate supplies of energy in case of acute
shortage of energy for subsistence. The
energy transition must include consideration
of the social dimensions, including the role of
women as agents in and beneficiaries of the
process of development, in view of their
special burdens as producers and users of
energy, particularly in rural areas. The
energy transition should take place in a man-
ner which recognizes the existence of com-
peting demands for basic resources and the
need to optimize their usage. The energy
transition should take place in a manner
which would not cause harmful changes in
the environment but would, insofar as possi-
ble, improve environmental conditions.

14. In order to ensure the energy transition,
in addition to actively developing all types of
energy sources, effective measures for the
conservation of energy, including the max-
imum efficiency of energy utilization, will
have to be urgently adopted and/or improved,
in particular by developed countries. The
benefits to be derived from a more rational
use of energy can, in some cases, contribute
significantly to the effect brought about by
the development of new and renewable
sources of energy.

15. The development and utilization of new
and renewable sources of energy must be
viewed in the context of the energy transi-
tion. New and renewable sources of energy
can make a significant contribution, but their
role and potential in the short term should
not be overstated. It has been estimated that
new and renewable sources of energy at pres-
ent meet some 15 per cent of global energy
requirements. In the foreseeable future,
hydrocarbon supplies will continue to play a
very important role in meeting the global

energy demand, but, over time, that role will
decline. To facilitate the energy transition, a
process should now be set in motion to en-
sure the most efficient identification, explora-
tion, assessment, development and utilization
of energy sources, including new and
renewable sources of energy. In this context,
the potential of new and renewable sources
of energy must be considered as a dynamic
variable, that will tend to increase with the
refinement, development and popularization
of technologies.

16. The concept of new and renewable
sources of energy as embraced by the
General Assembly in resolution 33/148 of the
Nairobi Conference encompasses a
heterogeneous range of energy forms, as well
as a wide range of associated technologies of
different degrees of maturity, from those
proven and in operation to those on the fron-
tier of scientific knowledge. It is clear that
the dynamic scientific and technological prog-
ress in the field in conjunction with the
developments in the over-all energy situation,
is an essential factor to be constantly scanned
in the process of assessing the new and
renewable sources of energy potential. In this
context, there is a need to utilize the proven
technologies to the fullest extent possible. Of
equal importance is an early involvement of
all countries, commensurate with their
abilities, in the research and development,
assimilation adaption, development and ■
utilization of the new and renewable sources
of energy. To this end, effective and efficient
international co-operation should be under-
taken to assist national action at the govern-
mental and, where appropriate, at the non-
governmental level in recipient countries in
research, development, pre-investment and
investment efforts, as required, so that the
full potential of new and renewable sources
of energy is realized.

17. The development and utilization of new
and renewable sources should be a common
objective for all countries of the world. New
and renewable sources of energy are not
necessarily more suited to satisfy the energy
needs of developing countries than those of
industrialized countries. The development of
such sources should, therefore, not be inter-
preted as a rationale for limiting the access
of developing countries to conventional
sources of energy, which will continue to play
a very important role in their development.

18. The development of new and renewable
sources of energy opens up the prospect of
increasing indigenous energy supply and
thereby contributing to greater self-
sufficiency. The development of new and
renewable sources of energy also creates new
options to respond to the energy re-
quirements of the rural, industrial, transport
and other domestic sectors, in accordance
with national goals and priorities and pro-
vides for a more diversified and decentralized
pattern of energy supply.

19. Like any energy source or product, new
and renewable sources of energy are

uary 1982

67

UNITED NATIONS

themselves both an "input" and an "output" of
the development process. The role of new
and renewable sources of energy should be
perceived as a dynamic interaction between
resources, technologies and present and
future requirements for energy, all serving
national objectives for economic and social
development.

B. Framework for National Action

20. All Governments recognize the need to
undertake efforts to promote the develop-
ment and utilization of new and renewable
sources of energy in accordance with their
national plans and priorities. The primary
responsibility for promoting the development
and utilization of new and renewable sources
of energy rests with individual countries. The
strengthening of national capacities should
embrace elements such as:

(a) Assessment of new and renewable
energy sources, including surveying and map-
ping programmes, to provide the necessary
information and data base for planning and
decision-making with respect to over-all
energy development;

(b) Preparation of a policy framework for
defining the role of new and renewable
sources of energy and determining priorities;

(c) Establishment or strengthening of ap-
propriate national institutional arrangements;

(d) Adequate research and development
programmes to support the scientific and
technical capacity to develop, choose and
adapt technologies, including testing and
demonstration facilities and research focal
points in new and renewable sources of
energy;

(e) Specific programmes to promote the ex-
ploration, development and utilization of new
and renewable sources of energy, taking into
account, as appropriate, social, economic and
environmental considerations;

(f) Programmes to encourage the efforts of
national public and private entities in in-
terested countries, as appropriate, to expand
the development and utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy;

(g) Mobilization of adequate resources;

(h) Availability of qualified personnel, to in-
clude specialized education and training pro-
grammes equally accessible to men and
women;

(i) Development or strengthening of in-
dustrial capacity to manufacture, adapt,
repair and maintain energy-related equip-
ment.

In this regard, international co-operation is
indispensable and should be directed to assist
and support national efforts. Developed coun-
tries bear a special responsibility to ensure
that both their bilateral and multilateral ef-
forts contribute actively to this end. Other
countries in a position to do so should also
continue to promote efforts in this regard.

21. Efforts designed to explore and develop
conventional energy resources must be con-
tinued, together with efforts designed to ex-
plore and develop new and renewable sources
of energy. This must also be accompanied by
efforts aimed at the rational use of energy
wherever possible and particularly in the
developed coutries.

68

C. Objectives

22. The fundamental objective of this Pro-
gramme of Action is to promote concerted ac-
tion in the context of the energy transition,
the development and utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy with a view to
helping meet future over-all energy re-
quirements, especially those of developing
countries. This Programme of Action should
be viewed as an integral part of the efforts of
the international community to accelerate the
development of developing countries as set
forth, inter alia, in the International
Development Strategy for the Third United
Nations Development Decade, and the rele-
vant declarations and resolutions related to
the establishment of the New International
Economic Order.

23. The Programme of Action is directed to
the achievement of the following objectives:

(a) To strengthen international co-operation
for the promotion and intensification of
research and development of technologies
related to new and renewable sources of
energy and to facilitate the transfer and
adaptation of technology from developed to
developing countries, in order to strengthen
the indigenous scientific and technological
capacity, including the capacity for the pro-
duction of capital goods in developing coun-
tries;

(b) To stimulate the mobilization of addi-
tional and adequate financial resources from
developed countries, international financial
institutions and other international organiza-
tions and the private sector, as appropriate,
to the developing countries for the develop-
ment of new and renewable sources of
energy through programmes and projects at
the national, subregional, regional and inter-
national levels. Other countries in a position
to do so should also continue to make efforts
in this regard;

(c) To provide, through international co-
operative efforts, for the exchange of infor-
mation and manpower training, particularly
in the developing countries, as well as to pro-
mote their ability to undertake energy
resource evaluation and energy planning in
order to accelerate the introduction of new
and renewable sources of energy in their
energy balances;

(d) To promote and provide support for:

(i) The attainment of the national objec-
tives and priorities established by developing
countries in the field of new and renewable
sources of energy, related to the strengthen-
ing of their national capabilities and institu-
tional infrastructures for the effective incor-
poration of new and renewable sources of
energy into national policy and planning proc-
esses;

(ii) The drawing up and implementation
of new and renewable sources of energy pro-
grammes and projects in the context of over-
all energy plans by all countries and, in par-
ticular, by developing countries;

(e) To provide, as requested, and as ap-
propriate, assistance and support for co-
operative efforts among developing countries;

(f) To specify measures designed to

heighten international awareness of the ad-
vantages, potential and economic viability o
new and renewable sources of energy, and
support efforts of all countries to take
necessary steps to bring about the maximui
feasible development of new and renewable
sources of energy, taking special account ol
the stage of development reached in the
various technologies and of their socio-
cultural and environmental impact.

24. The successful implementation of the
Programme of Action will require the conb
uing commitment and efforts of Govern-
ments. The organs, organizations and bodit
of the United Nations system will assist ap
propriately in the implementation of the Pi
gramme. In certain countries, non-
governmental entities will also have a sign
cant role to play. All these measures shoul
be taken with due regard to the necessity '
promote the full participation of men and
women on an equal basis in the realization
the foregoing objectives. Such participatio)
should thus receive due consideration in ar
national energy strategy or implementatio
thereof. In this context, it is necessary to
designate adequate mechanisms for the im
plementation, monitoring, follow-up and
evaluation of the action taken to carry out
the Programme of Action.

MEASURES FOR CONCERTED
ACTION

25. The objectives set out in the preceding
section will be most effectively met if effoi
undertaken at the subregional, regional ani
international levels are supportive of natio:
efforts. The Conference preparatory proce
has involved examination of general policy
measures applicable to all sources as well <
measures specific to each individual source
with a view to determining areas for con-J
certed action.

A. Policy Measures

26. On the basis of the results of the
preparatory process, the Conference iden- 'A
tified five broad policy areas for concerted B
tion with the support of the international ''
community according to national plans and *
priorities:

(a) Energy assessment and planning; u

(b) Research, development and demonsti ■
tion;

(c) Transfer, adaptation and application n
mature technologies;

(d) Information flows;

(e) Education and training.

Every effort should be made to ensure tha
the concerted action in the above-mentione
areas involves and benefits men and wome
equally.

1. Energy Assessment and Planning

27. The role of each and every source of i
energy, including new and renewable soup I
of energy and conservation, in meeting tht
needs of countries can best be determined
the context of national energy planning, ai
essential element of which is national ener

Department of State Bulle

UNITED NATIONS

»ssment. It is an especially acute problem
1 respect to the data infrastructure per-

ing to energy demand and resource inven-
es, as well as the impact on the ecology,
ch can provide the basis for assessing the
lible future role of new and renewable
rgy sources and related technologies, as

as developing national energy policy and
is. Action is required as follows:

) Map, survey and undertake other ap-
jriate activities to determine the full
je of physical resource endowment, using,
never possible, standardized methodol-
s for data collection, processing and stor-
and dissemination;

) Determine in a dynamic way energy
oly and demand and energy balances, in-
ing projections of future energy re-
ements;

i Identify and keep under review mature
near-term promising energy technologies
'ell as ongoing research, development and
onstration activities and assess their
lomic, socio-cultural and environmental
5, potential and benefits;
i Strengthen and/or establish institutional
istructure to collect, maintain, analyse,
' ;ify and disseminate information on all
ibove as well as information pertaining to
oolicy, programme and project decision-
ing process; the legislative framework
related procedures (and their impact on
gy supply and use patterns), and the
ability of financing.

esearch. Development and
onstration

The pace and extent of the contribution
' ;w and renewable sources of energy and
' ed technologies will depend to a large ex-
' on scientific research directed towards
development and widespread utilization,
e such research is expanding rapidly
id wide, co-ordination and information
ung is poor, duplication is widespread and
. un important aspects are relatively
iscted and receive few resources.
l;over, the bulk of current research is be-
i arried out in developed countries, and
li of it will have to be extensively adapted
use in developing countries. In addition
sustained indigenous research work
ild be actively stimulated. The following
is of measures to which international co-
ition should be directed are needed in
|r to enhance the indigenous scientific and
liological capabilities of developing coun-
|, enabling them to exploit their own
irce potential fully and independently
!to enter into collaborative research,
'lopment and demonstration efforts,
h should be closely co-ordinated with
ation and training programmes:

Select promising technologies with a
to launching concerted efforts to ac-
hate their development, increase their
effectiveness and widen their applicabili-

Identify the research needed concerning

the economic, social and environmental im-
plications of emerging technologies, including
employment potentials;

(c) Establish or strengthen institutional
machinery and national and regional capacity,
including the private sector, where ap-
propriate, for undertaking and co-ordinating
research, development and demonstration ac-
tivities, on the basis of a review initially to be
undertaken at national, subregional and
regional levels to of present capabilities and
existing resources to respond to identified
needs and priorities, in particular to those of
developing countries; this review could later
be extended to the global level with a view to
the consideration of the need for a global
research and development network around
one or several lead institutions;

(d) Establish or strengthen institutional
machinery to provide links between research
and development activities and the produc-
tion sector (public investments, industrial
property systems, etc.);

(e) Consider the establishment of testing
programmes to increase the ability of pro-
spective consumers, producers and investors
to make informed decisions regarding
technological options;

(f) Establish criteria for technical and
economic evaluation of new technologies that
will help national experts to identify their
potential at specific locations;

(g) Identify and implement demonstration
projects relating to new and renewable
energy technologies, including those which
can be undertaken on a collaborative basis,
taking into consideration the benefits in
terms of stimulating further related research
and development, the training of specialists
and increased industrialization.

3. Transfer, Adaptation and Application of
Mature Technologies

29. There are a number of technologies utiliz-
ing new and renewable sources of energy
which have reached a stage of maturity at
which little or no further research and
development is required for their widespread
utilization. Channels and procedures for the
widespread transfer of technology to all coun-
tries, under conditions of mutual benefit to
all parties, taking into account the special
needs of developing countries, need to be
established and supported through interna-
tional co-operation, particularly in those cases
where such technology originates in the
developed countries. In this context, account
should be taken of agreements to be reached
within the framework of UNCTAD [U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development] with
regard to the International Code of Conduct
on the Transfer of Technology. Furthermore,
issues related to the climatic, cultural and in-
stitutional settings within which the tech-
nology is to be applied and the managerial
aspects associated with its introduction and
full operation in industry, agriculture,
transport and human settlements will need to
be taken into account by those who have to
decide on the application of the technology.
In addition, comprehensive analysis of its
economic and social costs and benefits as well
as of its environmental effects are needed.

The following measures are required in order
to accelerate the application and adaptation
as well as the transfer of mature technologies
under conditions of mutual benefit to all par-
ties, taking into account the special needs of
developing countries, and to enhance their
contribution to total energy supply:

(a) Identify and keep under review with
respect to mature technologies utilizing new
and renewable sources of energy their role
within sectoral programmes and, where ap-
propriate, establish or strengthen institu-
tional arrangements to promote their applica-
tion;

(b) Strenghten and/or establish measures to
promote and facilitate the accelerated
transfer of technology on new and renewable
sources of energy, especially from developed
to developing countries, in order to enhance
the contribution of these energies to the total
energy supply of developing countries;

(c) Support measures to increase economic
and technical co-operation among developing
countries, including the undertaking of joint
programmes of activities;

(d) Develop national capabilities to under-
take, inter alia, the manufacture adaptation,
management, repair and maintenance of
devices and equipment related to technologies
for the assessment and utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy;

(e) Strengthen the ability of developing
countries to make financial and technical
evaluations of the different elements of the
technologies, thereby enabling them to better
assess, select, negotiate, acquire and adapt
technologies required in order to utilize new
and renewable sources of energy;

(f) Formulate innovative schemes for in-
vestments related to manufacture of equip-
ment for new and renewable sources of
energy, including the establishment of joint
industrial programmes among interested
countries for the manufacture and commer-
cialization of capital goods;

(g) Strengthen national capacity to review
and assess domestic, fiscal, regulatory, socio-
cultural and other policy aspects required to
accelerate the introduction of technologies
related to new and renewable sources of
energy;

(h) Support as appropriate demonstration
projects related to the application of new and
renewable sources of energy technologies
prior to a decision on commercial operation
and widespread implementation.

4. Information Flows

30. The availability of adequate information
is a prerequisite for sound decision-making
for development policy and planning and for
co-ordinated and effective basic and applied
scientific and technological research. The
need for improved information flows on
energy generally and on new and renewable
energy sources, in particular, must be viewed
within the broader context of global informa-
tion sharing and exchange in all relevant sec-
tors.

31. Access to information pertaining to the
development and utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy raises particular

iary 1982

UNITED NATIONS

issues and problems associated with the
newness of much of the subject-matter and
the rapid pace of development in the area. A
series of measures are called for along the
following lines:

(a) Identify currently available information
systems and services and assess their
capability to provide the required categories
of information on the development and
utilization of new and renewable sources of
energy, in a manner and form suitable to dif-
ferent types of users, taking into account ex-
isting studies in that area;

(b) Establish and/or strengthen national,
subregional and regional energy information
centres, preferably based on existing data
banks or with institutions of research and
learning, with related programmes of
workshops, seminars and other information
services, and integrate them into regional
networks, which could later be joined into a
global information network, where and when
it may be deemed necessary and feasible;

(c) Develop and make use of standardized
methodologies, terminologies, procedures
and, where feasible, equipment (software and
hardware) for the collection and dissemina-
tion of information to facilitate the linkage of
data centers and systems;

(d) Support measures which ensure the
maximum availability of technological infor-
mation contained in patent documents.

5. Education and Training

32. The establishment, development, opera-
tion, maintenance and dissemination of new
energy systems requires skilled scientific and
technical manpower and increased public
awareness and support. Specific education
and training programmes are required, not
only in schools and universities but also for
the training of decisionmakers, planners,
managers, extension workers and the general
public as well as facilities for the training of
specialized personnel. Those programmes,
while taking into account the special needs
relating to technologies utilizing new and
renewable energy within the framework of
broader energy programmes, must be viewed
in the context of the general educational
system.

33. In order to help meet the required educa-
tional and training needs, the following ac-
tions are called for:

(a) Support national efforts to estimate the
requirements for the various categories of
trained personnel;

(b) Assess the capability of existing institu-
tions to undertake the training of required
personnel, and strengthen institutional in-
frastructure accordingly, paying special at-
tention to the training of teachers and
trainers;

(c) Co-ordinate and promote the exchange
of information on educational systems,
teaching materials, training programmes and
technical experience relating to new and
renewable sources of energy, between
developed and developing countries and par-
ticularly among developing countries;

(d) Support efforts directed at the

70

establishment or strengthening of national,
subregional and regional training and educa-
tional centers;

(e) Establish training programmes for
decision-makers, planners, managers and ex-
tension workers;

(f) Establish programmes to increase the
awareness of the general public of the oppor-
tunities that exist for using new and
renewable sources of energy, especially in
small-scale, decentralized applications, involv-
ing the general educational system and the
mass media so as to ensure the full and effec-
tive participation of the entire population at
all stages of the development process.

B. Specific Measures

34. In preparation for this Conference,
panels of technical experts reviewed the
status of technologies for new and renewable
sources of energy and the prospects for their
early use, and suggested specific activities at
the national and international levels needed
to realize the full potential of these
technologies. This unprecedented review
should lead to a new appreciation of the con-
tribution that new and renewable sources of
energy can make to meet the growing energy
requirements of both developed and develop-
ing countries. Understandably, the diversity
of energy resource endowments, of demands
for various end-uses, and of economic factors
affecting each application, precludes the
universal application of a single solution for
all countries.

35. Within the above-mentioned broad policy
area, specific measures are needed. Many of
the areas of new and renewable sources of
energy considered during the Conference
preparatory process are in a stage of scien-
tific and technological evolution. Therefore,
the findings and related priorities and
measures must be kept under review, bearing
in mind that technologies used on a
widespread basis should be cost effective,
technically appropriate, socially and en-
vironmentally sound and affordable by the
users; also technologies that show good
future prospects either for local or for wider
use should be promoted through development
and demonstration projects even if these are
not cost effective at present. With this in
mind, the Conference, after due consideration
of the results of the preparatory process,
recommends the following measures at the
national, subregional, regional and interna-
tional levels as indications of broader ac-
tivities in the context of such comprehensive
programmes as may subsequently be
developed. The measure listed in paragraphs
36 to 45 below are source-specific. The
measures listed in section A above (such as
energy assessment and planning, programme
appraisal, demonstration, standardization and
education and training) relate to all energy
sources. They are therefore not repeated in
each source section below, but should be ex-
plicity considered among actions to be taken
in reference to each energy source.

1. Hydropower

36. Bearing in mind the immense and unus«
hydro potential that exists, especially in
developing countries, and the current avail-
ability and widespread use of hydrotech-
nology for the multipurpose exploitation of
the water resources, the following specific a
tions have been identified;

(a) Assessment and Planning

(i) Evaluate river hydro potential using
stream records and apply existing and
developed new methodologies to determine
stream flow at ungauged sites;

(ii) Establish criteria for the evaluation
and integration of small, lowhead, as well a
large-scale hydro resources within the con-
text of over-all energy development and
multipurpose programmes;

(iii) Support studies of the relation be-
tween the use of dams for power generatioi
and for other purposes.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

(i) Establish and/or strengthen research i
development and demonstration capacities c I
national Governments for assessing, selectii |
and adapting relevant hydropower
technologies;

(ii) Intensify research into ecological co I
sequences caused by hydro development.

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

(i) Standardize design and performance "
specifications for hydro equipment and
facilities as far as possible and make optimi ,i
use of package designs for small-scale plant
suitable for replication and widespread use,
consistent with national needs and practices1'

(ii) Adopt measures designed to ac-
celerate the widespread utilization of small- l;
scale (including micro) hydropower systems:1'

(iii) Conduct pre-investment studies
related to enhancing the industrial
capabilities of developing countries to desig '• I
adapt and manufacture hydropower equip- ';
ment with a view to identifying the most
promising projects;

(iv) Support the design, production
and/or adaptation of hydro equipment and
civil engineering survey and design pro-
cedures, especially in developing countries;

(v) Support the collaborative efforts of
interested developing countries in large-seal
joint projects, which could include the inter-
connection of electrical networks.

Department of State Bullet!

UNITED NATIONS

Fuelwood and Charcoal

Bearing in mind that fuelwood, including
ircoal, constitutes an important source of
;rgy for large populations especially in the
•al areas of developing countries; that ade-
ite management of forest resources to pro-
e fuel, food and timber requires the
essment of projected supply and demand
1 the identification of deficit areas; that
ir proper role must be seen in the context
the over-all energy requirements and the
ticular problems of rural areas of most
■eloping countries, and notwithstanding
incial feasibility, especially in agroforestry
terns, and that broad-based support and
ticipation of men and women in the
^elopment, management and efficient use
'uelwood are essential, taking into account
need for maintaining the ecological
ince, the following specific actions have
n identified:

i) Assessment and Planning

(i) Assess and evaluate forest resources
)»rder to estimate their present and future
Stainable yield of fuelwood, to identify
f cit areas and areas in which reafforesta-
I is both urgent and practicable;

)) Research, Development and
Inonstration

(i) Intensify and/or establish basic and ap-
Id research on more productive species;
(ii) Support and promote work aimed at
J roving the efficiency of stoves and cook-
l utensils, develop low-cost stoves and pro-
le their widespread use, taking into ac-
Int social and cultural acceptability;
(iii) Improve the preprocessing of fuels,
ading those presently wasted such as
;s, branches, and dry leaves, for use in
ct combustion and other processes and
rove the conversion efficiency of charcoal-
ing;

(iv) Develop promising fuelwood and
-coal substitutes or supplements utilizing
sr new and renewable sources of energy.

) Transfer, Adaptation and
ilication of Mature Technologies

! (i) Improve and/or establish forest
liagement practices;

(ii) Increase and/or establish reforestation
I afforestation programmes with selected
lj tested species;

j(iii) Promote and support programmes,
P,ects and activities to establish large-scale
iitations, including afforestation in deficit
•is and wood lots, establish distribution,
»;rol and pricing policies, and improve con-
iiion and utilization technologies (charcoal
"luction and gasification, kilns, ovens).

3. Biomass

38. Bearing in mind that considerable infor-
mation and experience is available on biomass
production and conversion systems within the
international community and that the further
evaluation of the potential of biomass
resources requires the development and
utilization of specific assessment techniques
in order to determine their quantitative and
qualitative potential, the following specific ac-
tions have been identified:

(a) Assessment and Planning

(i) Assess and evaluate biomass
resources, with special attention to the iden-
tification and development of plant species,
specifically for energy conversion, taking into
account the crucial role that can be played by
the recycling of organic matter in sustaining
biomass productivity.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

(i) Initiate and/or intensify basic and ap-
plied research and development on specific
aspects of biotechnology and bio/ther-
mochemical conversion systems and on the
use of byproducts as fertilizers and animal
feed;

(ii) Accelerate the utilization of biomass
resources for energy production through the
initiation of and/or support for demonstration
schemes such as biomethanation of manures,
agricultural residues and other organic
materials in different regions of the world;
integration of biomethanation and ethanol
production; small-scale gasifiers and sta-
tionary engines; electricity production, using
gasifiers and engine generators and including
short-rotation forestry in energy farms;
gasification and indirect liquefaction to pro-
duce synthetic liquid fuels from lignocellulosic
materials.

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

(i) Accelerate the utilization of biomass
resources for energy production through the
initiation of and/or support for the utilization
of mature technologies such as: direct com-
bustion; gasification, biomethanation of
manure and municipal and industrial waste,
including collection and handling; alcohol pro-
duction from sugars and starches; anaerobic
microbiological processes and the production
of fuels from vegetable oils, giving due con-
sideration to possible implications for food
and fertilizer production and other en-
vironmental and economic considerations.

4. Solar Energy

39. Bearing in mind that solar energy
technologies are rapidly evolving and that
some are on the threshold of large-scale and
extensive applications in developing and
developed countries alike, and that several
solar applications have reached a mature
state of technical development and are
therefore ready under certain conditions for
implementation, among them domestic and

industrial water-heating with flat-plate collec-
tors, low-pressure steam production, small-
scale solar ponds for low temperature process
heat production, solar crop and timber dry-
ing, active and passive space-heating and
cooling, water pumping (thermal and
electric), water desalination, telecommunica-
tions and certain other applications of solar
photovoltaic systems— the following specific
actions have been identified;

(a) Assessment and Planning

Evaluate the solar resource through:

(i) Use of exisiting data supplemented by
support for meteorological surveys, radiation
and other relevant data collections using
ground-based measuring stations, satellites
and reliable photo-interpretation techniques
for all climatic conditions;

(ii) Development and application of
methodologies to estimate radiation data
based, for instance, on space and time cor-
relation functions;

(iii) Preparation of guidelines for the
assessment of solar energy potential in
various climatic zones;

(iv) Support for the preparation of na-
tional solar resources maps and data to be in-
corporated in a world solar atlas on the
global distribution of solar radiation.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

Initiate, intensify and support research,
development and demonstration in promising
applications, especially those which are small
and decentralized, in order to reach a level of
deveiopment sufficient for widespread utiliza-
tion such as: solar cooking, solar electricity
production (thermal and photovoltaic), solar
air conditioning and refrigeration, solar in-
dustrial process heat, synthetic fuel produc-
tion and solar crop drying. Among the main
areas for research development are material
and thermal sciences, photochemical conver-
sion, durability and reliability of products,
design and adaptation of processes, system
analysis and control, storage systems and
social acceptability.

fuary 1982

71

UNITED NATIONS

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

(i) Initiate and/or support national pro-
grammes for the widespread use of mature
solar energy technologies;

(ii) Study the problems associated with
the widespread use of solar energy such as
those relating to right of access to sunlight,
transfer of development rights, building
codes and warranties. Insurance of solar
devices should be explored.

(iv) Encouraging appropriate small-scale
uses, especially for small or remote resource
sites.

5. Geothermal Energy

40. Bearing in mind that important and
unevaluated geothermal resources exist in
many countries, substantial effort is required
to develop their energy potential. The follow-
ing specific actions have been identified:

(a) Assessment and Planning

Identify and evaluate the resources by:

(i) Utilizing all appropriate geological,
geochemical and geophysical techniques;

(ii) Utilizing, where applicable, oil and
gas exploration data in the identification and
assessment of geothermal energy prospects;

(iii) The preparation and periodic revision
of national and regional assessments of
geothermal potential.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

Uncertain research and development in:

(i) Drilling technology;

(ii) High, medium and low enthalphy
geothermal systems;

(iii) Multipurpose developments;

(iv) Stimulation techniques;

(v) Geopressurized systems;

(vi) Hot dry rock system;

(vii) Rock properties under high
temperatures, and heat transfer in solid and
fractured media;

(viii) Chemical recovery and effluent
disposal;

(ix) Material selection and scaling con-
trol;

(x) Binary and other alternative genera-
tion systems;

(xi) Problems of subsidence, gaseous
emissions and other environmental impacts.

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

Promote geothermal applications by:

(i) Supporting the initial stages of ex-
ploration for promising sites;

(ii) Encouraging the location of ap-
propriate activities near the source;

(iii) Encouraging integrated heat and
power projects;

72

6. Wind Energy

41. Bearing in mind that wind energy has
been one of the few forms of renewable
energy which have traditionally been prac-
tical and cost effective, that several wind
technologies have been available for a long
time — namely, windmills for shaft power and
wind energy for sea transport — and that
wider use of the resource, based on
technological advance and changes in the
energy structures, could make an important
contribution to future energy needs, the
following specific actions have been iden-
tified:

(a) Assessment and Planning

Assess the resource by:

(i) Improving and supporting increased
collection of wind data at standard heights in
forms appropriate for the evaluation of its
potential as an energy source, using stand-
ardized instrumentation, methods and
analysis and, where applicable, for all climatic
conditions;

(ii) Support for the preparation of na-
tional wind power resource maps and data to
be incorporated in a world wind atlas, in-
cluding data on the occurrence of extreme
wind speeds.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

(i) Initiate and support research, develop-
ment and demonstration in such promising
technologies as: wind machines rated at
0.1-100 KW, especially for rural applications
where a variable output is acceptable, in par-
ticular for water pumps and wind turbines
coupled with conventional power supplies or
storage systems so as to yield reliable stand-
alone systems (in the range 10-100 KW);
larger wind turbines and arrays suitable for
integration in networks in order to conserve
conventional fuels or hydropower;

(ii) Support research and development on
wind characteristics for siting design and op-
eration of windmills, rotor design, materials,
storage systems, wind turbine — storage
system matching environmental impact, safe-
ty standards and social acceptability.

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

Promote national programmes for the
widespread use of mature wind energy
technologies.

7. Oil Shale and Tar Sands

42. Bearing in mind the vast proven and pr<
spective reserves of oil shale and tar sands,
including both surface and deeply buried
deposits, and the currently available
technology and that these resources are
already being used in some countries to pro-
duce oil as a primary energy product to be
used directly in helping to satisfy consump-
tion needs or to be converted to thermal
energy either by direct combustion or
through production of liquid fuel, the follow-
ing specific actions have been identified:

(a) Assessment and Planning

Initiate and intensify resource assessment t

(i) Reviewing and indexing possible oc-
currences, using the existing literature on
geological and mineral exploration;

(ii) Standardizing evaluation and
measurement procedures.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

Undertake research and development on:

(i) Adapting capacity of shale retorting
with particular references to the end uses;

(ii) The environmental consequences on
land and water resources of production and
waste disposal;

(iii) Extraction and recovery methods. I

?'.*!&#*£

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

Initiate and/or support national programm*
for widespread use of mature oil shale and
tar sands energy technologies.

8. Ocean Energy

43. Bearing in mind that several conversio
technologies based on ocean energy system
have potential for generating electrical
power, the following specific actions have
been identified:

(a) Assessment and Planning

Assess the ocean energy resource by identi
ing sites of potential Ocean Thermal Energ
Conversion (OTEC), tidal and wave energy
utilizing archival data and other existing in
formation as well as by undertaking OTEC
tidal and wave energy surveys through the,
joint efforts of oceanographic and
meteorological organizations.

Department of State Bulle

UNITED NATIONS

) Research, Development and
lonstration

i) Initiate or continue research and
lopment in such areas as:

• Aquaculture based on nutrient-rich
waters, floating, land-based and shelf-

d ocean systems directed to the produc-

of electricity, fresh water and energy-

lsive products;

Ocean wave systems including

lical solutions suited for the trade wind

ii) Accelerate the application of ocean
gy systems when this appears justified,
xample by:

An extension of existing facilities,
•e feasible, for use as regional or interna-
.1 demonstration sites;

Efforts directed at isolated corn-
ties.

raught Animal Power

bearing in mind that draught animal
|r is still a major source of energy, par-
irly in the rural areas of certain develop-
ountries, the following specific actions
been identified:

Assessment and Planning

urce assessment and planning through:

) Collection of basic data on distribution
ecies, breeds, draught capabilities, the
t of energy on crop yields, agricultural
ments, harnessing devices and existing
fht animal power technologies;
i) Consideration of animal power as a
energy input in agricultural planning.

Research, Development and
mstration

irch and development activities in the
ring areas:

) The design, development, testing and

ation of agricultural implements, animal-

n vehicles, harnesses and hitching

es so as to enhance the productivity of

;ht animals;

i) Appropriate breeding schemes,

;ht animal feeding and management,

r and improvement of pastures.

Transfer, Adaptation and
ication of Mature Technologies

ier to ensure more efficient application,
s appropriate, measures should be taken
)port ongoing draught animal pro-
mes in developing countries.

eat

earing in mind that small and large-
peat technology is well established, is
illy site-specific, and offers a viable
lative to fuelwood for domestic purposes
an be used in suitable boilers as an
lative to other fuels for the generation
dium- to large-scale heat or power and
n many countries this resource has not
adequately surveyed, the following
ic actions have been identified:

Assessment and Planning

Initiate and/or expand the data base

on the availability of peat to evaluate its
potential;

(ii) Support the selection of suitable peat
production areas, taking into consideration
economic, employment and other social and
environmental factors as well as the location
of potential consumers.

(b) Research, Development and
Demonstration

(i) Develop and improve technologies for
peat production, particularly in tropical and
sub-tropical vegetation zones, as well as com-
bustion and processing, including gasification
and liquefaction processes;

(ii) Conduct studies on alternative uses of
peat;

(iii) Promote research in the utilization of
cutaway peatlands for production of fuelwood
and timber for industry, agricultural use, etc.

(c) Transfer, Adaptation and
Application of Mature Technologies

Promote measures to encourage the in-
dustrial use of peat and its use domestically,
particularly as a replacement for fuelwood
and charcoal in the sod, briquette and pellet
forms.

IMPLEMENTATION
AND MONITORING

46. The preceding section outlined the
measures required to promote the develop-
ment and utilization of new and renewable
sources of energy. The effective implementa-
tion of those measures for concerted action
will require:

A. The identification of selected priority
areas requiring urgent action within the
framework of the measures for concerted ac-
tion;

B. Institutional arrangements for im-
plementation and monitoring, to include:

(a) An intergovernmental body;

(b) Co-ordination mechanisms;

(c) Task forces for implementing specific
programmes and projects of the Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action;

(d) Secretariat support;

(e) Regional and subregional action;

(f) Economic and technical co-operation
among developing countries;

(g) Intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations.

C. The mobilization of financial resources
for the implementation of the Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action.

A. Areas for Priority Action

47. The Conference agrees that, in order to
establish priorities in the field of new and
renewable sources of energy, it is necessary
to consider a large number of parameters
such as the availability of resources, the state
of development of the technology involved,
the size, type, geographical location and time-
frame of the energy requirements, the char-
acteristics of the end users, as well as social,
economic, environmental and technical con-
siderations, the potential of increased energy
efficiency and conservation and the relative

impact on the energy transition. In this con-
text, the Conference decided that priority ac-
tions should cover all policy areas listed in
paragraph 26 in order to ensure coverage of
the full range of the Programme of Action,
but that within each policy area priority is to
be assigned to certain types of actions and
programmes, which are deemed to require
more urgent action, consistent with national
needs, in the context of international co-
operation. In particular, the Conference
recognizes that meeting rural energy re-
quirements within the context of integrated
rural development programmes, including
agricultural production and transportation,
small-scale and rural industries, household re-
quirements and socio-cultural aspects such as
education, health care and communications, is
of great urgency, especially for developing
countries.

48. The Conference recommends that the in-
ternational community and the United Na-
tions system, in particular, should develop
and implement programmes and projects in
the areas for priority actions. To this end, the
efforts of the international community should
be in accordance with the explicit requests,
needs and priorities of the country, or coun-
tries concerned. Every effort should be made
to ensure that the above programmes involve
and benefit men and women equally.

49. In accordance with these concepts, the
Conference agrees that urgent action is re-
quired in the areas outlined below, particular-
ly in least developed countries, on the
understanding that such actions represent on-
ly a first step towards the implementation of
the Nairobi Programme of Action. The Pro-
gramme of Action will be kept under regular
review so as to make such adjustments as
may be necessary in the light of emerging
needs as they are identified. It will also be
necessary to establish specific aims and objec-
tives, both in respect of time and measurable
execution of programmes and projects, so as
to ensure an adequate review and evaluation
of the progress made in implementing the
Nairobi Programme of Action for the
Development and Utilization of New and
Renewable Sources of Energy.

1. Energy Assessment and Planning

50. The Conference recommends that interna-
tional co-operation by all Governments and
competent national, subregional, regional and
international institutions should be directed
to the assistance and the support of national
efforts, particularly of developing countries,
to assess new and renewable energy sources,
needs and technologies within the total
energy context and to develop energy pro-
grammes and plans consistent with national
development objectives.

51. One goal of the programme is that, dur-
ing the present decade, all countries wishing
to do so will be in a position to formulate and
implement national energy strategies as an
integral part of their development planning.
To that end countries may wish to designate
immediately national energy assessment and
planning focal points to begin the process of
preparing inventories of resources, needs and

;ary 1982

73

UNITED NATIONS

technologies as well as estimates of supply
and demand according to end-use, in order to
identify areas for near or longer-term action,
including international co-operation. National
surveys of appropriate new and renewable
energy resources and of energy requirements
should be completed as soon as possible.
While the development of the necessary
qualified personnel is a long-term process,
early identification of projected national
needs would provide the basis for the for-
mulation of specific national and international
programmes to respond to those needs.
52. Priority programmes in this policy area
should include support and assistance in the
following areas:

(a) Strengthening of national capacity for
data gathering, energy assessment and plan-
ning, including the strengthening or
establishment of the appropriate institutional
infrastructure, the training of required per-
sonnel, and the preliminary identification and
formulation of proposals for external
assistance on the basis of national needs.

(b) Comprehensive national energy planning
efforts, including sectoral studies of energy
supply and demand and preparation of na-
tional energy balances. Such planning efforts,
including assessment of natural resources for
energy, should be based on reliable data and
should take into account the dynamics of the
situation and distinguish between competing
and multiple uses of particular resources;

(c) Identification and assessment of new
and renewable energy resources, including
the need for exploration, and their potential
contribution to the total energy supply,
through appropriate national surveys;

(d) Evaluation of existing technologies and
local capacities for developing and utilizing
different sources of energy with a view to
determining specific measures necessary bet-
ter to promote and utilize such sources of
energy for specific end-uses, in particular
new and renewable sources of energy.

2. Research, Development
and Demonstration

53. The Conference recommends that interna-
tional co-operation by all Governments and
competent national, subregional, regional and
international institutions should be directed
to the assistance and the support of efforts
primarily at the national level, and particular-
ly of developing countries, to initiate and/or
enhance research, development and
demonstration activities in the field of new
and renewable sources of energy. Such
research, development and demonstration ef-
forts should include periodic assessment of
the state of the art of the various
technologies, including application-oriented
fundamental research, in order to promote
the accelerated development and effective
use of new and renewable sources of energy.
To this effect, the Conference recommends
that measures be considered and adopted,
where appropriate, to strengthen and/or
establish national, subregional, regional or in-
ternational programmes for research,
development and demonstration in

technological and non-technological fields
related to new and renewable sources of
energy.

54. The following priority programmes have
been identified. Some of the measures listed
under either (a) or (b) below may be ap-
plicable to both headings. Although no
specific heading is made for special cases,
such as small islands, it is understood that
priority research and development efforts
and appropriate demonstration projects
should take into account their special energy
needs.

(a) Rural Energy

(i) Identification of fast-growing species
for fuelwood production, reforestation and af-
forestation, especially in areas short of
fuelwood;

(ii) Development of more efficient low-
cost stoves and charcoal production proc-
esses;

(iii) Development of promising new and
renewable sources of energy technologies
suitable for replication and widespread use
that are able to compete technically and
economically with conventional alternatives,
in a given region, and are ecologically sound
and socially acceptable especially for such
purposes as cooking, crop drying, pumping
and agro-industries;

(iv) Improvement of equipment used in
conjunction with draught animals;

(v) Evaluate existing and develop new
bio-technological processes based on manure
and other organic materials for the produc-
tion of mechanical and electrical power, heat
and light, as well as small-scale gasifiers
based on thermo-chemical processes to fuel
engines;

(vi) Develop new or improved technol-
ogies based on new and renewable sources of
energy for harvesting, preserving and proc-
essing food and for using agricultural and
forest residues for energy purposes. Such
development should involve the major end-
users.

(b) Urban and Industrial Energy

(i) Intensification of research in solar
technologies for domestic and industrial use,
especially in the areas of heat and power
generation, solar passive architecture, solar
refrigeration, air conditioning and water
desalination;

(ii) Intensify research for the production
of fuels from biomass and the processing and
use of urban and agro-industrial wastes for
energy and other purposes;

(iii) Undertake research and development
in the areas of multipurpose development of
hydro and geothermal energy, including drill-
ing technologies;

(iv) Intensify research, development and
demonstration in increased energy efficiency
and conservation as well as in the area of
energy storage systems.

3. Transfer, Adaptation and Application of
Mature Technologies

55. The Conference recommends that interna-
tional co-operation by all Governments and

competent national, subregional, regional ;
international institutions should be directe
to the assistance and the support of the irr
plementation of national energy programn
for the widespread utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy, particularly
the developing countries. The following
priority areas have been identified:

(a) General Programmes

(i) Designation, strengthening and/or
establishment of national, subregional or
regional centres to serve as focal points f<
transferring and adapting new and renew
sources of energy technologies. These foe-
points could be based on a source and/or i
use specific approach as appropriate. Fiel
testing, demonstration and evaluation of i
plete systems, in the context in which the
are to be used and in accordance with loc
energy characteristics are included withit
transfer and adaption functions of these <
tres. Such centres should work in co-
operation with local industry and also ser I
for information, education and training p
poses, and could later be integrated into
subregional, regional and international nt
works;

(ii) Establishment and development a
national, subregional and regional levels i
the capacity for the manufacture, operati
maintenance, marketing and managemen
equipment and spare parts related to the
of new and renewable sources of energy.

(b) Rural Energy

Of particular concern to developing couni
is the need for taking urgent measures a
at alleviating the acute domestic energy i
ply problem, particularly the fuelwood cr
which is assuming alarming dimensions. '
goal of the Nairobi Programme of Actior
that during the present decade countries
undertake planned programmes with a v
to ensuring that the energy needs of the
rural areas can be met on a sustainable t
To that end the following priority action;
transferring, adapting and applying mati
technologies in rural areas have been ide
tified:

(i) Widespread application of improve
practices and technologies for the conser
tion and more effective use of natural
forestry resources;

(ii) Establishment and acceleration o
grammes for large-scale reforestation ar
forestation with selected and tested spec
as well as for smaller scale wood lots an>
plantations of energy crops, particularly
arid, semi-arid and deficit regions, as pa
an effort to increase five-fold the annual il
of fuelwood planting and to meet effectii
and sustainably the demand for biomass I
by the year 2000;

(iii) Generalized rural application of !l
ly available new and renewable sources i|
energy, in particular integrated systems
where feasible, using mature or proven I
technologies;

(iv) Adoption of programmes to expsl
the application of improved techniques f

74

Department of State Bu til

UNITED NATIONS

izing draught animal power, including im-
ved husbandry practices.

:) Urban and Industrial Energy

>rder to help meet the growing industrial
urban energy demand in many countries,
larticular that brought about by develop-
it and industrialization efforts of develop-
countries, and to diversify the energy
ply base, efforts are needed to increase
lificantly the contribution of new and
ewable sources of energy to urban and in-
trial energy requirements. To that end the
)wing priority areas have been identified:

(i) Expand, where appropriate, the utiliza-
of small and large-scale hydro resources,
thermal resources and associated
ismission systems;

(ii) Initiate and encourage the wider ap-
ation of active and passive solar heating
cooling systems for domestic, commercial
industrial purposes;

(iii) Initiate and implement programmes
romote the use of urban and industrial
tes for energy and other purposes;
(iv) Initiate and implement programmes
ccelerate the incorporation of congenera-
and total energy systems in the in-
:rial sectors and other such energy effi-
cy and conservation programmes.

nformation Flows, Education and
ining

The Conference recognizes that to in-
se significantly the utilization of new and
wable sources of energy, it is of vital im-
ance to stimulate, support and assist ac-
ly the implementation of education and
ling programmes at all levels, particular-
developing countries, and to promote
exchange and sharing of information to
fullest and freest extent possible between
loped and developing countries and
ng developing countries, as well as pro-
nmes for the enhancement of public
reness of the energy situation. To these
, the following priority actions have been
tified;

|i Designation, strengthening and/or
blishment of national, subregional or
jonal centres to serve as focal points for
mation, education and training at all
is in the field of new and renewable
(tees of energy. These focal points could
I serve for the transfer, adaptation,
'luation and demonstration of technologies;
ft Establishment of education and training
"^Tammes in the following areas, in order
■nsure a self -generating capacity and to
ft personnel requirements in such areas of
tertise:

ji) Courses on energy assessment, plan-
H and utilization for personnel of institu-
1 dealing with those responsibilities, as
Ej as for decision-makers and personnel of
t| financial institutions;

ii) Specialized courses to train scientists,
ineers and qualified technicians to select,
>jrn, construct, test, operate, maintain and
bate equipment and installations needed
itilize new and renewable sources of

>'gy;

(c) Establishment of effective systems of in-
formation on new and renewable sources of
energy at the national level which should be
closely linked with information systems and
networks at the subregional, regional and in-
ternational levels utilizing existing informa-
tion systems at all these levels to the max-
imum extent possible.

B. Institutional Arrangements

57. Adequate institutional mechanisms are
needed to ensure the effective mobilization
and co-ordination of the resources required
for the development of new and renewable
sources of energy as well as the implementa-
tion of the measures contained in the Nairobi
Programme of Action. Further, the United
Nations system and other international
organizations should help ensure that ap-
propriate assistance will be available to
Governments for pursuing projects in the
field of new and renewable sources of energy.

58. To this end, the Conference recommends
to the General Assembly the following ar-
rangements, drawing to the fullest extent
possible on the resources available within the
United Nations:

1. Intergovernmental Body

59. There should be an intergovernmental
body in the United Nations specifically con-
cerned with new and renewable sources of
energy and entrusted with guiding and
monitoring the implementation of the Nairobi
Programme of Action. For this purpose, this
body should be open to the participation of all
States as full members and should submit its
reports and recommendations to the General
Assembly through the Economic and Social
Council, which may transmit to the Assembly
such comments on the report as it may deem
necessary, particularly with regard to co-
ordination. The recommendation of the
General Assembly on the report of the com-
mittee would be transmitted for follow-up to
the organs, organizations and bodies of the
United Nations system, as well as to Govern-
ments and the international community.

60. The intergovernmental body would, inter
alia, undertake the following functions:

(a) To recommend policy guidelines for dif-
ferent organs, organizations and bodies
within the United Nations system in regard
to new and renewable sources of energy, on
the basis of the Nairobi Programme of Ac-
tion;

(b) To formulate and recommend action-
oriented plans and programmes for carrying
out the Nairobi Programme of Action in ac-
cordance with the priorities identified in
paragraphs 47 to 56 above;

(c) To keep under review and modify as
may be necessary the priorities established in
paragraphs 47 to 56 above;

(d) To review and assess trends and policy
measures related to the development and
utilization of new and renewable sources of
energy, with a view to increasing their con-
tributions to meeting future over-all energy
requirements;

(e) To promote the mobilization of the
resources required in the implementation of

the Nairobi Programme of Action;

(0 To recommend guidelines to the financial
< irgans, organizations and bodies of the
United Nations system in the financing of the
activities related to the implementation of the
measures of the Nairobi Programme of Ac-
tion, and to help ensure the implementation
of the measures listed in this section of the
Programme of Action relating to financial
resources;

(g) To monitor the implementation and help
ensure co-ordination of the measures
established in the Nairobi Programme of Ac-
tion as well as of the activities of the organs,
organizations and bodies of the United Na-
tions system in the field of new and
renewable sources of energy;

(h) To be informed of, draw upon and con-
tribute to the work and expertise of govern-
mental and other intergovernmental institu-
tions in the fields of new and renewable
sources of energy;

(i) To review the activities of the United
Nations system in the field of new and
renewable sources of energy and the im-
plementation of the Nairobi Programme of
Action, and where necessary make recom-
mendations on the adaption of the Nairobi
Programme of Action.

61. It is necessary that there should be con-
tinuity between the preparatory process for
the United Nations Conference on New and
Renewable Sources of Energy and the
launching of the Nairobi Programme of Ac-
tion. Accordingly, and without prejudice to
final institutional arrangements, the Con-
ference recommends that the immediate
launching of the implementation of the
Nairobi Programme of Action should be en-
trusted to a committee patterned on the Pre-
paratory Committee for the United Nations
Conference on New and Renewable Sources
of Energy. This committee will hold one ses-
sion only and that in 1982, which would not
last more than two weeks. On that occasion,
the committee would be entrusted with the
functions and responsibilities detailed in
paragraph 60 above. It will report to the
General Assembly at its thirty-seventh ses-
sion through the Economic and Social Coun-
cil, which may transmit to the Assembly such
comments on the report as it thinks
necessary. The final decision on further in-
stitutional measures will be taken by the
General Assembly at its thirty-seventh ses-
sion.

2. Co-ordination Mechanisms

62. The United Nations system should fully
participate in and support the implementation
of the Nairobi Programme of Action, with
due consideration to national plans and
priorities, so as to ensure its successful im-
plementation. It is imperative to increase the
responsiveness of the system in this respect,
as well as to provide for the co-ordinated ac-
tion of the organs, organizations and bodies
of the United Nations system in the develop-
ment of new and renewable sources of
energy. Such institutions should organize

uary 1982

75

UNITED NATIONS

their work and rationalize their activities ac-
cording to established priorities in such a way
as to meet the need for implementing the
Nairobi Programme of Action.

63. The Director-General for Development
and International Economic Co-operation,
acting under the authority of the Secretary-
General who chairs the Administrative Com-
mittee on Co-ordination, would be entrusted
with the task of co-ordinating the contribu-
tions of the organs, organizations and bodies
of the United Nations system within the
framework of his mandate as defined by the
General Assembly in its resolutions 32/197
and 33/202. In order to ensure the necessary
co-operation and co-ordination for the im-
plementation of the Nairobi Programme of
Action, co-ordinating capacity for new and
renewable sources of energy in the Office of
the Director-General, who would exercise the
supervisory role, should be provided for,
making full and efficient use of resources
already existing within the United Nations
and subject to the normal procedures of the
General Assembly. All organs, organizations
and bodies of the United Nations system are
called upon to co-operate with the Director in
the accomplishment of his over-all co-
ordination tasks.

64. Specialized intergovernmental organiza-
tions and institutions related to the field of
new and renewable sources of energy are in-
vited to extend their co-operation in order to
strengthen the co-operative action of the in-
ternational community and to ensure that
further resources are made available for the
development of new and renewable sources of
energy.

65. United Nations resident co-ordinators,
designated by the Secretary-General in ac-
cordance with General Assembly resolution
34/213 with the consent of the Governments
concerned, should provide a focal point for
new and renewable sources of energy ac-
tivities at the national level in consultation
with the country representatives of the
organizations concerned.

3. Task Forces for Implementing Specific
Programmes and Projects of the Nairobi
Programme of Action

66. Since the activities that will have to be
carried out in the field of new and renewable
sources of energy will require actions that
differ widely in nature, size, complexity and
level of application, adequate mechanisms
may be devised to undertake specific actions
related to the implementation of the Nairobi
Programme of Action at the appropriate
level.

67. In this connexion, and in cases where
other machinery within the United Nations
system cannot effectively undertake a
specific task or programme, the intergovern-
mental body may recommend the establish-
ment of ad hoc task forces tailored to the re-
quirements of specific time-limited tasks
related to the research, development,
demonstration, application and utilization of
new and renewable sources of energy on a
sectoral or cross-sectoral basis, from among

76

the organs, organizations and bodies of the
United Nations system and other appropriate
intergovernmental organizations, in consulta-
tion with these bodies. Other appropriate in-
stitutions may be invited to participate in
these task forces.

4. Secretariat Support

68. The intergovernmental body will require

a range of secretariat services in carrying out
its functions as defined in paragraph 60
above. The co-ordinating functions of the
secretariat shall be carried out in accordance
with paragraph 63 above. The Secretary-
General is requested to make recommenda-
tions to the thirty-sixth session of the
General Assembly on the most effective and
efficient arrangements for carrying out the
substantive services required, including the
possibility of a small separate secretariat unit
for new and renewable sources of energy,
making full and efficient use of resources
available in the United Nations, subject to the
normal procedures of the General Assembly.

5. Regional and Subregional Action

69. One of the tasks of international co-
operation with respect to the development of
new and renewable sources of energy in-
cludes support to regional and subregional ef-
forts for implementing the Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action.

70. In this context, whenever appropriate and
necessary, the strengthening of regional com-
missions, and regional development banks,
support for regional programmes relevant to
new and renewable sources of energy and the
establishment of intergovernmental bodies
should be undertaken in order to facilitate
the implementation of the Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action.

71. Priority attention should be given to the
following:

(a) Support of resource evaluation,
research, development and demonstration,
training, energy planning and identification
of regional or subregional projects for the
development of new and renewable sources of
energy;

(b) These activities should be developed and
carried out through the establishment of
specialized institutions and/or the strengthen-
ing of the ones existing in the countries of
each region, which would co-operate in order
to achieve a more effective implementation of
their respective regional programmes;

(c) The strengthening and/or establishment
of regional information networks which could
connect with the international information
networks and focus at the regional level on
technologies and application and on the cen-
tralization and diffusion of information on
equipment, its use and its limits;

(d) Organization of joint research and
development activities related to promising
technologies;

(e) The feasibility and usefulness of organiz-
ing regional demonstration and pilot projects
and installations designed both to test ap-
plication and to disseminate information on

technologies related to new and renewable
sources of energy;

(f) Development of pre-investment activit
designed to provide a basis for the ac-
celerated implementation of technologies f(
the utilization of new and renewable sourct
of energy;

(g) The strengthening and support of
regional efforts directed at the transfer an
diffusion of technologies;

(h) Undertaking of joint industrial activit
for the production of energy-related capita
goods; and

(i) The organization of technical meeting:
seminars, conferences, study tours and liki
events with a view to facilitating and
developing exchanges of information and e
perience on the utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy.

6. Economic and Technical
Co-operation Among Developing
Countries

72. Developing countries seek to enhance
their collective self-reliance in various are;
which are in their mutual benefit, through
programmes of economic and technical co-
operation in such areas as exchange of inf
mation, joint ventures in project develop-
ment, joint efforts in research, developmei
demonstration and adaptation of technolog
for new and renewable sources of energy,
and technical assistance, to supplement th>
indispensable action to be undertaken by t
international community.

73. In this context, the international com-
munity will take measures to provide, as a
propriate, support and assistance to the ef
forts of developing countries to accelerate
operation among themselves in the field of
new and renewable sources of energy.

7. Intergovernmental and
Non-governmental Organizations

74. Intergovernmental and non-governmei
organizations can make a useful eontributi
to the successful implementation of the Pr
gramme of Action and are requested to
review their activities to determine how tl
can best support and contribute to the im-
plementation of the Nairobi Programme o |
Action.

75. Non-governmental organizations in boi
the developing and developed countries ca
contribute in various ways to the impleme
tion of the Nairobi Programme of Action,
this regard, Governments and financial ag
cies are encouraged to draw, as appropria
upon the expertise and support of non-
governmental organizations in the implem
tation of projects in the field of new and
renewable sources of energy.

C. Mobilization of Financial Resources
the Implementation of the Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action

76. The implementation of the Nairobi Pn
gramme of Action requires the mobilizatic
of additional and adequate resources. Eac!
country will continue to bear the main
responsibility for the development of its n
and renewable sources of energy which w<

Department of State Bulk

UNITED NATIONS

,ire vigorous measures for a fuller
ilization of its domestic financial and
r resources. In pursuing national pro-
lines potential applications at the
anal and international levels should also
3nsidered where appropriate. The im-
ientation of the Nairobi Programme of
on requires additional and adequate inter-
>nal financial resources, both public and
ite, from all developed countries, interna-
il financial institutions and other interna-
il organizations. Developing countries in
sition to do should also continue to pro-
assistance to other developing countries,
i financial resources would be used to
ort national efforts of developing coun-
aimed at the development of new and
wable sources of energy, within the con-
of the Nairobi Programme of Action. Ef-
should be made to increase concessional
3 allocated to the financing of projects
programmes in the field of new and
wable sources of energy in developing
tries in accordance with their national
3 and priorities. Particular attention
Id be given to the need for accelerated
lopment of the least developed countries
ather developing countries where
lopment needs and problems are
test.

Tie development of new and renewable
:es of energy involves numerous types of
rtakings, ranging from supporting ac-
, including national assessment of new
-enewable sources of energy for over-all
^y development and pre-investment ac-
es, to capital investment in projects and
rammes.

'he supporting actions include, in addi-
to the assessment of new and renewable
jy resources, such areas as strengthen-
f the relevant national institutional in-
ructure, data collection, training and
ition, research, development and
instration, etc., while the pre-investment
ities encompass feasibility studies,
Ti and engineering, etc.
'he magnitude of the demand for financ-
uch types of actions or activities is
dy considerable and will increase in the
> to come, particularly with the im-
entation of the Nairobi Programme of
in.

n addition to the financing of supporting
ns and pre-investment activities, it is of
l mount importance to promote the financ-
| if capital investment in the field of new
i renewable sources of energy in develop-
j ountries.

. 'he financing requirements for these pur-
! 3 are of a very significant magnitude and
i expected that such requirements will
i ' progressively as new and renewable
i:es of energy become, on a wide scale,
Mically and economically more and more
ible. This should make it possible to at-
i greater amounts of traditional interna-
i.l development financing, including con-
sonal financing, as well as commercial

financing for development projects of new
and renewable sources of energy in the
developing countries.

82. Consistent with national development
plans and priorities, Governments should con-
sider developing and implementing policies
and programmes which serve to promote the
contribution of new and renewable sources of
energy to total energy supplies and en-
courage a transition from excessive
dependence on non-renewable sources.

83. Joint ventures in activities related to new
and renewable sources of energy should be
based on sound economic considerations con-
sistent with national plans and priorities. Ef-
forts should be made by interested countries
to promote, as appropriate, an environment
conducive to an increase in net flow of non-
concessional capital and a mobilization of
domestic resources required for contributing
to the financing needs of new and renewable
sources of energy in the developing countries,
in the framework of their national plans and
policies.

84. All countries might also examine gaps in
which regional co-operation can be supportive
of efforts undertaken at the national level.

85. For the purpose of undertaking the
various activities in line with the Nairobi Pro-
gramme of Action, the financial mechanisms
and institutions of the United Nations system
should be provided with additional and ade-
quate funds to meet the growing re-
quirements for preliminary supporting ac-
tions and pre-investment activities related to
the development of new and renewable
sources of energy in developing countries. In
this context, it is necessary to improve ex-
isting mechanisms and institutions with a
view to enhancing their effectiveness and ef-
ficiency. Specific and additional resources
should be directed through such channels as
the United Nations Development Programme,
the Revolving Fund for the Exploration of
Natural Resources, the interim financial ar-
rangements for science and technology, the
UNDP Energy Account and others directly
or indirectly involved, in accordance with na-
tional plans and priorities. Consideration
might also be given to establishing on a
voluntary basis new financing mechanisms
for the development of new and renewable
sources of energy in the developing countries
within the United Nations system if and
when necessary.

86. Within over-all efforts to ensure the
growth of official development assistance, all
developed countries will emphasize the
development and utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy as one of the
priority areas in their international co-
operation and development assistance. Other
countries in a position to do so should also
continue to make efforts in this regard. In ac-
cordance with its mandate, as described in
paragraph 60 above, the intergovernmental
body should keep under review the financial
needs of the field of new and renewable
sources of energy and suggest measures to
meet these needs.

87. In order to secure access to the widest
possible range of financial resources, interna-
tional and regional development financial

organizations and institutions, in particular
the World Bank, are urged to provide addi-
tional and adequate resources specifically for
large-scale supporting actions, pre-investment
and investment activities in the field of new
and renewable sources of energy, in accord-
ance with national priorities.

88. These financial mechanisrr s and institu-
tions are urged to respond more widely and
effectively to national requests, as well as to
requests from the subregional, regional and
international organizations engaged in the
development of the new and renewable
sources of energy in developing countries,
according to the priorities established in the
Nairobi Programme of Action and in
response to recommendations from the in-
tergovernmental body as regards its im-
plementation.

89. Financial requirements for over-all
energy investment will continue to grow at a
fast rate during the coming years. According
to studies undertaken by a World Bank ex-
pert group, during the period 1981-1985 total
annual energy investment needs of all
developing countries will be of the order of
$54 billion. Investments in new and
renewable sources of energy will account for
a substantial and growing proportion of in-
vestment needs. While developing countries
will continue to bear the main responsibility
for their development, which would require
vigorous measures for a fuller mobilization of
their domestic financial and other resources,
external financial resources, private and
public, particularly concessional flows and of-
ficial development assistance, will constitute
nevertheless an indispensable element of sup-
port for the developing countries' own ef-
forts.

90. In view of the urgency of meeting the
developing countries' needs in this respect,
early and specific measures will have to be
taken for purposes of financing supporting
actions, pre-investment and investment ac-
tivities as warranted by the progress of proj-
ect preparation efforts. To this end, the
World Bank and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme should be invited to under-
take a joint study for making as accurate an
estimate as possible of the supporting actions
and pre-investment requirements for new and
renewable sources of energy in the develop-
ing countries in the 1980s to be completed as
soon as possible and, if practical, by the end
of 1981.

91. In the course of the United Nations Con-
ference on New and Renewable Sources of
Energy held in Nairobi, many countries in-
dicated their willingness to make more
resources available for the financing of the
development and utilization of new and
renewable sources of energy. In order to
generate additional funding and to encourage
co-financing of new and renewable sources of
energy, the Conference recommends that, at
the global, regional and subregional levels,

nary 1982

77

UNITED NATIONS

multilateral and bilateral donors and in-
terested recipient countries should consider
convening, where appropriate, consultative
meetings to review and facilitate concerted
action in this field, bearing in mind the need
to avoid duplication of efforts and taking
fully into account national plans and
priorities. These consultative meetings should
address the priority areas identified by the
Nairobi Programme of Action, and deal par-
ticularly with financing the promotion of
research, demonstration and development ac-
tivities in new and renewable sources of
energy.

92. These consultations should take into ac-
count the guidelines recommended by the in-
tergovernmental body which should be kept
informed of activities for increasing and im-
proving the efficiency of financial and
technical assistance for the development and
utilization of new and renewable sources of
energy in developing countries.

93. The Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy in his report to the
General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session
should indicate progress made towards the
implementation of the consultative meetings
mentioned above.

94. In addition, the Conference urges all in-
terested parties to accelerate consideration of
other possible avenues that would increase
energy financing, including, inter alia, the
mechanisms being examined in the World
Bank, such as an energy affiliate.

95. In order to enhance the efforts of
developing countries towards greater collec-
tive self-reliance, the implementation of the
Nairobi Programme of Action should reflect
their commitments to utilize fully their own
capabilities in the field of new and renewable
sources of energy. In this respect, the inter-
national community should support and
enhance the actions of economic and technical
co-operation among developing countries as
appropriate and especially as regards the
areas of supporting actions, pre-investment
and investment activities in the field of new
and renewable sources of energy.

The Situation in Kampuchea

1 For the purposes of this conference,
new and renewable sources of energy are
defined as solar, geothermal and wind power,
tidal power, wave power and thermal gra-
dient of the sea, biomass conversion,
fuelwood, charcoal, peat, energy from
draught animals, oil shale, tar sands, and
hydropower. ■

Following are a statement by
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, made in the U.N. General
Assembly on October 19, 1981, and the
text of the resolution adopted by the
General Assembly on October 21.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK,
OCT. 19, 19811

Our purpose in meeting here today is
both clear and urgent:

• To uphold the right of the
Kampuchean people, as of all people, to
self-determination;

• To restore Kampuchea's sovereign
identity and national independence; and

• To bring stability, peace, and
development to Southeast Asia, an area
that has suffered destruction, violence,
and death for too long.

In each of its two preceding ses-
sions, the General Assembly, by over-
whelming majorities, has found the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in viola-
tion of fundamental provisions of the
U.N. Charter — the inviolability of the
sovereignty, independence, and terri-
torial integrity of nations; noninter-
ference in the internal affairs of other
nations; and the inadmissibility of the
threat or use of force in international
relations. A conference mandated by last
year's Assembly has reaffirmed these
findings and proposed a program to
restore Kampuchea's independence, its
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and
to allow Kampuchean people freely to
choose their own form of government.

Almost 3 years have passed since
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, sup-
ported and financed by the Soviet
Union, first invaded and occupied Kam-
puchea, and nearly 200,000 Vietnamese
troops still occupy that grief-stricken
country. The people of Kampuchea,
ravaged by a succession of horrors,
including three decades of war and the
savage devastation of Pol Pot, must now
endure conquest and occupation by their
historic adversaries. Vietnamese forces
and administrators stand above the law.
They deny all human rights to the con-
quered Khmer people. Vietnamese pene-
tration of the country is broad and deep.
Vietnamese advisers work in Phnom
Penh and in rural areas; each Khmer
province has a sister province in Viet-
nam to "assist" it. All ministries have

•1

Vietnamese advisers who hold final <
sionmaking power. Kampucheans wi
to work for the Vietnamese puppet
regime have been paid in internatior
provided relief commodities; rural
Khmer not employed by the regime
left to fend for themelves.

Naturally, economic breakdown
accompanied Vietnam's alien, impe-
rialistic government. An unofficial \i
bridge spanning the Thai-Kampucb
border, and established over the obj
tions of Vietnamese authorities, has
rescued some 1 million Khmer from
starvation.

But while the people of Kampuc
are the principal victims of Vietnarr
aggression, they are not the only vi'
tims. The people of Vietnam itself—
indeed, all the people of Southeast
Asia — suffer from the oppressive tj
ny of the Vietnamese Government,
pursuit of an unpopular war has cai ji
widespread misery within Vietnam; |i
imperialist adventures have necessii I
escalation of the already scandalous ji
level of oppression inside Vietnam, it
surprisingly, then, thousands of Vie |
namese continue to flee their counti I
each month, risking pirates, storms
reject n mi; citing government repres; o
unreasonable controls on daily life, ,
stepped up military conscription am K
teriorating economic conditions as t ii
reasons for leaving. Once again, mi: u
and insecurity engulf the region, an :
people of non-Communist Southeasi 'I
Asia, having only recently emerged 61
a conflict of 30 years' duration, fact I
precarious future as their governmi is
divert resources sorely needed for I
development to strengthen their
defenses against the possibility of f> I '
ther Vietnamese expansionism.

Vietnam's aggression also confr 'tJ
the rest of us here in the United Ns M
with a grave challenge. If Vietnam n1
invade, subjugate, and occupy a
neighboring state by brute force am' I
with impunity and retain the prize < ■
aggression, then the security of all
members of this Assembly is substa U
ly diminished. Aggression feeds on '•
gression: It is the great lesson and e
warning of history. It is hardly
necessary to note that aggression isW
more tolerable because its perpetra,ks
claim to have been "invited in" by a J j
regime that did not exist until it wa'sd
up by those same aggressors. Vietntis

78

Department of State Bui

UNITED NATIONS

Dns threaten to establish an ominous
:edent whose consequences should be
special concern to the smaller,
aligned members of this body.
How has the Socialist Republic of
,nam justified this travesty against
Kampuchean people? What defense
it offered for this threat to its other
;hbors in Southeast Asia, this affront
le vital principles of international
:r, reaffirmed in this case specifically
wo General Assemblies? It has
vered as tyrants always do: with a
it lie, for tyranny abhors truth and is
ained only by lies.
Representatives of Vietnam have
londed to the clearly expressed will
le overwhelming majority of the
nbers of this Organization by accus-
that majority of interference in
ipuchean affairs. They have rejected
legitimate role of the United Nations
jeking a solution to this international
;edy and have attempted to portray
;nam's aggression as a rescue mis-
undertaken at the behest of the
g Samrin regime. Vietnamese ef-
s to justify their invasion and oc-
ition of Kampuchea are both dis-
■nuous and incredible and only serve
ring their nation into further
epute.

Vietnam's claim to have acted at the
sst of the Heng Samrin regime is ab-
1 on its face. The Heng Samrin
me — which according to Hanoi in-
d Vietnamese forces into Kampuchea
whose permission Hanoi piously
ns is required in order to withdraw
Siamese forces from Kampuchea — is,
ourse, a Vietnamese creation whose
er is maintained by Vietnamese
pons. That government did not even
t at the time of the invasion; its so-
id invitation to the Socialist Republic
'ietnam had to be issued retroactive-
ifter the Vietnamese forces had
ady invaded and occupied Kam-
nea. In this, as in other respects, the
:namese invasion of Kampuchea is
singly, tragically analogous to the
iet invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed,
new imperialism can be recognized
ywhere by its aggressiveness, its
3nce, its contempt for truth.
Vietnam's attempt to pose as the
r-ator of the Kampuchean people is a
:icularly clumsy masquerade that has
ed no one. All of us remember that it
i precisely that Government of Viet-
) that assisted the accession of the
Pot regime to power in the first
e. All of us remember that, at a time
•n many of our governments were
[3rly critical of the Pol Pot regime for
lotorious human rights violations, it

was the Government of Vietnam that
staunchly defended Pol Pot's human
rights record. In this and in other
forums, Vietnam persisted in its defense
of the Pol Pot regime, right up to its in-
vasion of Kampuchea late in 1978. Thus,
Vietnam's contention that its invasion of
Kampuchea was prompted by a
solicitude for human rights of the Kam-
puchean people is the kind of falsehood
that is as offensive as it is egregious.

Instead of rescuing the Kampuchean
people from oppression, the Vietnamese
have demonstrated a cruel, cynical
disregard for their welfare. It was Viet-
nam's invasion which precipitated a
massive famine throughout Kampuchea,
bringing starvation and further devasta-
tion to a people that already had suf-
fered all too much. It was Vietnamese-
imposed authorities who then
endeavored, first to deny the very fact
of the famine to potential donors of
relief outside of Kampuchea and then to
obstruct the efforts of international
organizations and other donors to pro-
vide desperately needed relief to the
people of Kampuchea.

This callous policy has forced hun-
dreds of thousands of Khmer to flee
their ancestral homes for Thailand and
for the border no-man's land. By, in ef-
fect, hurling these Khmer on their
neighbor's doorstep, Vietnam and its
Kampuchean puppet regime have ab-
dicated the most basic responsibilities of
government. Th£t the refugees who
have left Kampuchea for Thailand, or
for the relative safety of the Thailand-
Kampuchea border, remain there for
fear of returning to Vietnam-dominated
Kampuchea is the clearest possible
demonstration of the true character of
Vietnam's self-styled "liberation."

It is a marvelous tribute to the
United Nations that its specialized agen-
cies have been able to meet this massive
humanitarian challenge. When I visited
the border camps last August, I felt and
have said repeatedly that seeing their
good work made me proud of the United
Nations and proud of my country's con-
tribution to the agencies that carry it
out. I was, therefore, especially pleased
when that great honor — the Nobel Prize
for Peace — was awarded to the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. The High Commissioner,
Mr. Poul Hartling, and those who assist
him deserve the gratitude of the interna-
tional community for their efforts on
behalf of the victims of war and political
tyranny.

Reviewing the arguments advanced
by Hanoi to justify its aggression, one
can only marvel at their lameness, their
utter lack of plausibility. In fact, no
arguments, however artfully con-
structed, could possibly obscure the
reality that the Government of Vietnam,
financed and supported by the Soviet
Union, has conquered a member state of
this Organization. It refused to comply
with repeated General Assembly resolu-
tions calling on it to withdraw its forces.
It refused to attend the International
Conference on Kampuchea mandated by
the General Assembly to seek a solution
to the Kampuchean problem. It pro-
foundly compromised its own integrity
and independence by making itself an in-
strument of Soviet ambition in Asia.

A majority of the nations of the
world have clearly asserted and
reiterated that they will not acquiesce in
Vietnam's aggression. Neither will they
forget it. They have rejected Vietnam's
threadbare rationalizations and have for-
mulated a concrete program to restore
Kampuchea's independence, territorial
integrity, and sovereignty, a program
which will allow the Kampuchean people
to choose their own government. The
declaration of the International Con-
ference on Kampuchea, held last July,
judiciously addresses the needs of all
parties and provides a reasonable, prac-
tical, and wholly honorable basis for a
negotiated settlement of the Kam-
puchean problem:

• It calls for a U.N. -supervised
withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Kampuchea.

• It makes full provision for the
legitimate security needs of all the coun-
tries of the region, including Vietnam.

• It contains safeguards to insure
that armed Kampuchean factions would
be unable to prevent, disrupt, intimidate,
or coerce the outcome of free elections.

• It emphasizes the need for an in-
dependent Kampuchea to remain neutral
and nonaligned.

• And it calls upon the Government
of Vietnam to participate in the
negotiating process that can lead to a
peaceful solution to the Kampuchean
problem and a restoration of peace and
stability to Southeast Asia.

In addition, through its ad hoc com-
mittee and through the possibility of its
reconvening whenever needed, the con-
ference represents a continuing
mechanism to negotiate a settlement in
Kampuchea.

The declaration of the International
Conference on Kampuchea was for-

ary 1982

79

UNITED NATIONS

mulated by the countries of the region
with the advice and unanimous approval
of the delegations present, who comprise
a majority of the U.N. membership. We
believe the General Assembly should
now formally express its strong support
for the declaration by its vote on the
present resolution. We call upon the
Government of Vietnam and its Soviet
patron to heed this Assembly's urgent
plea for justice and compassion and to
join in negotiations designed to resolve
the tragic plight of the people in Kam-
puchea and end the threat to the peace
and stability of Southeast Asia. Surely,
the Kampuchean people, and all the peo-
ple of Southeast Asia, are entitled to
more from life than endless conflict and
constant turmoil. Surely they deserve
our unremitting efforts to restore peace,
independence, and security to their
strife-torn region.

The principles of self-determination,
of national independence, of nonaggres-
sion — the principles on which this
Organization was founded — have never
been more centrally involved than here,
in the continuing occupation of Kam-
puchea. The integrity of the United Na-
tions, as well as the well-being of the
Kampuchean people, are, therefore, in-
volved here this morning.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 36/5,
OCT. 21, 1981-

The General Assembly,

Ri calling its resolutions 34/22 of 14
November 1979 and 35/6 of 22 October L980,

Taking note of the report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of
General Assembly resolution 35/6,

II elcuming the convening of the Interna-
tional Conference on Kampuchea, held at
United Nations Headquarters from 13 to 17
July 1981, as a step forward towards a com-
prehensive political settlement of the Kam-
puchean problem,

Noting the joint statement issued in
Singapore on 4 September 1981 by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, Mr. Son Sarin and Mr.
Khieu Samphan concerning their agreement,
in principle to form a coalition.

Bearing in mind the Declaration on Kam-
puchea and resolution 1 (I) adopted by the
Conference on 17 July 1981, as contained in
the report of the Conference.

Deploring thai foreign armed interven-
tion continues and that foreign forces have
not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus
causing continuing hostilities in that country
and seriously threatening international peace
and security.

Greatly concerned that the continuing
deployment of foreign forces in Kampuchea
near the Thai-Kampuchean border has
heightened tension in the region.

Gravely disturbed that the continued
fighting and instability in Kampuchea have
forced more Kampucheans to flee to the Thai-
Kampuchean border in search of food and
safety,

Recognizing that the assistance extended
by the international community has continued
to reduce the widespread food shortages and
health problems of the Kampuchean people,

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable
right of the Kampuchean people who have
sought refuge in neighboring countries to
return safely to their homeland,

Emphasizing further that no effective
solution to the humanitarian problems can be
achieved without a just and lasting political
settlement of the Kampuchean conflict,

Convinced that, to bring about durable
peace in South-East Asia, there is an urgent
need for a comprehensive political solution to
the Kampuchean problem which will provide
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and
ensure respect for the sovereignty, in-
dependence, territorial integrity and neutral
and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, as well
as the right of the Kampuchean people to
self-determination free from outside in-
terference,

( 'onvinced further that, after the com-
prehensive political settlement of 'he Kam-
puchean question through peaceful means.
the countries of the South-East Asian region
can pursue efforts to establish a zone of
peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East
Asia so as to lessen international tensions
and to achieve lasting peace in the region,

Reaffirm i hi/ the need for all States to
adhere strictly to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, which call for
respect for the national independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
States, non-intervention and non-interference
in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse
to the threat or use of force, and peaceful
settlement of disputes,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22 and
35/6 and calls for their full implementation;

2. Reiterates its conviction that the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam-
puchea, the restoration ami preservation of
its independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the right of the Kampuchean peo-
ple to determine their own destiny and the
commitment by all States to non-interference
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of
Kampuchea are the principal components of
any just and lasting resolution to the Kam-
puchean problem;

3. Approves the report of the Interna-
tional Conference on Kampuchea and adopts:

l") The Declaration of Kampuchea,
which includes four elements of negotiations
for a comprehensive political settlement of
the Kampuchean problem;

(M Resolution 1 (I) in which the Con-
ference, inter alia, established the Ad Hoc
Committee of the International Conference
on Kampuchea;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to con-
sult with, to assist and to provide the Con-
ference and the Ad Hue Committee with the

necessary facilities to carry out their func
tions;

5. Authorizes the Ad Hue Committee
convene during regular sessions of the
General Assembly in order to carry out it
tasks;

6. Further requests the Secretary-
General to undertake a preliminary study
the possible future role of the United Na-
tions, taking into account the mandate of
Ad Hoc Committee and the elements of
negotiations for a comprehensive political
tlement as set out in paragraph 10 of the
Declaration on Kampuchea;

7. Expresses its appreciation to the
Secretary -General for taking appropriate
steps in convening the Conference;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to
follow the situation closely and to exercis I
good offices in order to contribute to a cc •
prehensive political settlement;

9. Decides to reconvene the Conferer
at an appropriate time in accordance wit]
Conference resolution 1 (I);

10. Urges all States of South-East Ah
and others concerned to attend future set •
sions of the Conference;

11. Requests the Conference to repor :
the General Assembly on its future sessio l

12. Expresses its deep appreciation U
donor countries, the United Nations and i
agencies and other national and internatit
humanitarian organizations which have
rendered relief assistance to the Kampucl
people, and appeals to them to continue t<
assist Kampucheans who are still in need,
especially those along the Thai-Kampuche
border and in the holding centers in Thail,

13. Deeply appreciates the efforts of t
Secretary-General in co-ordinating
humanitarian relief assistance and in mon
ing its distribution, and requests him to ci
tinue such efforts as are necessary to dea
with the situation;

14. Urges the countries of South-East
Asia, once a comprehensive political soluti
to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved. t<
exert renewed efforts to establish a zone i
peace, freedom and neutrality in South-Es
Asia;

15. Expresses the hope that, following
comprehensive political solution, an in-
tergovermental committee will be establisl
to consider a programme of assistance to
Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its
economy and for the economic and social
development of all States of the region;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to
submit to the General Assembly at its tliir
seventh session a report on the implement
tion of the present resolution;

17. Decides to include in the provision*
agenda of its thirty-seventh session the ite
entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea."

'USUN press release 77.

-Adopted by the General Assembly by
vote of inn (U.S.) to 25. with l!l
abstentions. ■

80

Department of State Bulle ■

UNITED NATIONS

thiopia

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Statement before the U.N. General
sembly on October 2, 1981. Ambas-
ior Kirkpatrick is U.S. Permanent
■presentative to the United Nations.1

peak this afternoon less in reply than
protest against the speech made
sterday by the Ethiopian Minister of
reign Affairs. His strident and
uperative attack on the United States
mt beyond even what we have come to
pect from such quarters.

The remarks of the Ethiopian
reign Minister represent an extreme
ample of what is known as the
wellian inversion of the truth. The
ttern is a simple one: He accuses
lers of committing crimes which have,
fact, been perpetrated by his own
jime and by those countries with
lich his regime is allied.

He speaks, for example, of "the ex-
•mination of Africans" by "sabre-
;tling warmongers (who) are either
ectly or through their paid agents
^aged in a savage massacre of men,
men, and children around the

[be— and all this in the name of
tice and democracy." In fact, it is his
n regime that is guilty of the very
ragery of which he speaks.

ports of Crimes

inesty International estimates that
ne 30,000 persons in Ethiopia were
nmarily executed for political reasons
;ween 1974 and 1978—10,000 in 1977
ne. During the so-called Red Terror,
ich climaxed in February 1978, the
hiopian police and army squads
irdered some 5,000 grade school, high
jiool, and university students and im-
iSsoned some 30,000 others — this is a
untry whose entire student population
,s only 36,000 10 years ago.

Again, according to Amnesty Inter-
itional, 12-year-old children were
nong those immersed in hot oil, sexual-
tortured, or flung out of windows and
t to die in the streets. Amnesty Inter-
tional reports that the relatives of the
ildren were prohibited by state edict
)m mourning, yet at the same time
?re encouraged to buy back the body
" burial — a practice that came to be
lied "paying for the bullet." All this

wholesale massacre was committed in
the name of justice and democracy — in
the name of a liberating revolution.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister told
us that his country's "epochmaking
popular revolution . . . ushered in an era
of prosperity and equality." Yet the
respected African scholar Colin Legum
wrote of Ethiopia at the end of 1978
that, "There are today perhaps a hun-
dred times the number of political
prisoners than in the worst period of the
late Emperor Haile Selassie's rule."

There are at least 300-400 arrests
every week in Addis Ababa alone. Many
of those arrested simply disappear and
are presumed executed. Last year
Amnesty International published the
names of a number of long-term promi-
nent political prisoners whose food,
brought in daily, had been turned away
by prison officials in 1979. This usually
meant that the prisoner had been sum-
marily executed. Amnesty's request for
information about several prominent
"disappeared political prisoners" and its
separate appeal for information about
Pastor Gudina Tumsa have gone
unanswered. So have its protests against
the arrest and torture of church
members.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Ethiopia accused the United States of
"stifling progressive movements, under-
mining sovereign states," and engaging
in a "massive military buildup" that has
increased tensions in the region. Yet it
is his own regime that is engaged in a
war against its own ethnic minorities —
among them the Eritreans, the Somalis,
and the Tigreans. It is his own regime
that received from the Soviet Union
more than $1 billion in military equip-
ment in late 1977 and early 1978—
which is over twice as much military aid
as the United States provided to that
country during a quarter of a century
under the late Haile Selassie. It is his
own regime that now hosts — and
depends upon for its survival — some
15,000 Cuban military personnel and
some 1,000-1,500 Soviet military ad-
visers.

Charges of Intervention

In a characteristic attempt to find
scapegoats to account for the failure of
his own regime, the Ethiopian Foreign
Minister charged that the "imperialist
forces" are preventing his country from

devoting itself to the tasks of develop-
ment. The truth is exactly the reverse.
It is his regime's devotion to war — and
to the imposition of totalitarian rule
over its population — that is responsible
for the diversion of its energies and
resources from the tasks of develop-
ment. Indeed, its policies have caused so
much hardship and disruption that more
than a million and a half people have
been forced to flee to neighboring coun-
tries to seek refuge.

In addition, the Ethiopian Foreign
Minister speaks of lasting peace being
restored in Afghanistan and Kampuchea
"only if the people concerned are left on
their own without any form of im-
perialist meddling." I do not take issue
with that statement. But, surely,
everyone in this hall knows that the only
"imperialist meddling" in Afghanistan is
being done by some 85,000 Soviet troops
against whom the entire Afghan popula-
tion is engaged in heroic resistance. And
it should not be necessary to point out
that Kampuchea is occupied today by
200,000 troops from Vietnam. These are
the "imperialist meddlers." The Govern-
ment of Ethiopia is integrated into this
imperialistic network through friendship
treaties, including military clauses, with
the Soviet Union, Libya, and South
Yemen.

Biological Warfare

The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs has repeated the charge that the
United States is using biological warfare
against the people of Cuba. The
American delegation dealt with this sub-
ject at length on September 25 when we
pointed out that Cuban health officials,
themselves, had told officials of the Pan
American Health Organization,
American diplomats in Havana, and
tropical health specialists, both in the
United States and other countries, that
the current epidemic of dengue fever in
Cuba had been introduced into the coun-
try by Cuban troops returning from
Africa.

It was only after this quiet consulta-
tion that Fidel Castro decided to blame
the disease on the United States. The
Ethiopian Foreign Minister has now
repeated that lie. He adds to this the
charge of racism and asserts that the
World Health Organization has reached
the conclusive verdict that no such
disease exists in Africa. In fact, Profes-
sor Wilbur Downs of Yale University, an
international distinguished authority on

81

UNITED NATIONS

the subject, has written a book, entitled
Arthropod Borne Viruses of Vertebrates,
that dengue virus type one and type two
are found in West Africa as far south as
South Africa, meaning in the Angola
area. And tne American Public Health
Association states in the book, Control
of Communicable Diseases in Man, that
the dengue viruses "have been recovered
from West Africa," meaning in the
Angola area.

These unfounded charges against
the United States are particularly
unseemly in light of the fact that the
United States, through the Pan
American Health Organization, has pro-
vided hundreds of tons of a pesticide to
fight that self-same epidemic in Cuba.

Conclusion

The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs has decried a "crisis of consensus"
in the United Nations, a crisis he
characteristically blames on the United
States. But the true crisis on consensus
is rooted in the Orwellian falsehoods
spread by countries that are concerned
principally with shifting the blame onto
others for their own internal failures
and external acts of aggression. A real
consensus must be based upon a spirit of
cooperation and a genuine commitment
to the truth. We remain committed to
that kind of consensus, but we cannot sit
by silently when the "big lie" echoes in
these chambers.

U.N. Conference on
Least Developed Countries

1 USUN press release 60.

The UN. Conference on Least
Developed Countries was held in Paris
September 1-U, 1981. Following is a
statement by M. Peter McPherson, Ad-
ministrator of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) and head of
the U.S. delegation, made in the con-
ference on September 2.

In a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, I would like to outline
today — particularly for the distinguished
representatives of the least developed
countries — the approach of my govern-
ment to their developmental needs in
the decade ahead.

The international community has
long recognized the special development
problems of the poorest countries. We
also know that we need to take special
measures to assist these countries in
their development efforts. To this end,
the United States has already taken
many practical steps in its international
economic and aid policies. We are com-
mitted to continue these efforts. We will
participate actively with other delega-
tions to develop a realistic "substantial
new program of action."

Shared Constraints of the Least
Developed Countries

Of the many challenges facing the inter-
national community in the 1980s, those
facing you — the least developed coun-
tries— are among the most difficult.
Your capacity to respond to these
challenges will vary. While your coun-
tries are similar in terms of relative
poverty and low levels of literacy and in-
dustrialization, they are very diverse in
terms of economic and social structures
and natural resource endowment.
Moreover, the particular problems and
constraints you face, and the actions and
policies you have adopted to address
them, also differ markedly from country
to country. Therefore, as was apparent
in the country reviews that preceded
this conference, any effective action pro-
gram must be geared to your individual
needs.

The most widely shared constraints
in your countries seem to be insufficient
development of your human resources,
weak institutional bases, and inade-
quacies in your physical infrastructure.
These constraints inhibit broad progress

in promoting development objectives in
specific sectors. Moreover, they limit
your capacity to respond to the
challenges you face. These constaints
also limit, to varying degrees, your
ability to participate in international
trade and to use larger amounts of
economic assistance effectively.

As a result of these constraints,
most of you face serious problems in m<
jor sectors of your economies.

• In agriculture, growth in food pr<
duction has often fallen short of popula-
tion growth. This adversely affects
nutrition and productivity.

• In energy, increased deforestatioi
has compounded the problems created
by the oil-price increases of recent year:
It also contributes to long-term en-
vironmental degradation.

• In industry, low productivity
limits the effective competition with im-
ports or development of exports.

These problems are not insurmount-
able. The progress made by many devel-
oping countries over the last 20 years is
impressive. This offers hope that
substantial progress is possible for all
countries — even the poorest.

Not long ago, the development pros-
pects of many countries — now called
"middle-income" or "newly industri-
alized"— were considered bleak. But
through their own unstinting commit-
ment and efforts and with support of
the international community, they are
now often in a position to help others.

While the development process is
complex and often uneven, one point is
clear: The economic peformance of
developing countries has been deter-
mined primarily by their own economic
policies and budget allocations. The in-
ternational community can serve as an
important, and sometimes even an
essential, catalyst to development where
appropriate economic policies and
budget allocations are in place.
However, foreign aid can never be a
substitute for the countries' own efforts.
Where policies distort or hinder the ef-
fective operation of the economy,
economic performance will be poor. Ex-
ternal action can achieve little under
such conditions.

82

Department of State Bulletir

UNITED NATIONS

amples of Success

;riculture gives us, perhaps, the most
imatic illustration. In that sector, ar-
icially low prices have weakened
■mers' incentives and, thus, made food
jblems worse. Current policies that
icourage food production must be
/ersed. This reversal is necessary if
3 growing population of the develop-
r world is to be fed. It is essential for
>st of you here who face low and
metimes declining levels of food pro-
ction and corresponding rising import
sts.

The case of South Asia is an instruc-
e example of what can be done. In In-
i and Pakistan, effective agricultural
licies have resulted in dramatically in-
cased food production. In Bangladesh,
lere food production has been a mat-
- of worldwide concern, the govern-
;nt has undertaken major reforms in
)d and agriculture policy. In recent
ars, total grain production has in-
cased from 13 million tons to over 16
llion tons. Wheat production alone in-
cased tenfold. We are proud to have
en associated with achievements like
sse.

In education, the accomplishments of
;pal again illustrate the importance of
propriate policies. Under the
dicated leadership of His Majesty,
lool enrollment increased from less
in 1% in 1951 to nearly 60% in 1975.
jre recently, Nepal's government has
en promoting local initiative through
centralization. In our view, such
licies that cultivate the talents and
nativity of people are critical to
velopment.

Rapid population growth may be the
)st sensitive of the problems you face,
le success of Indonesia in this area of-
rs hope for progress elsewhere. Since
donesia launched its nationwide family
inning program in 1970, contraceptive
e nationwide has nearly doubled. In
ct, it tripled in some provinces,
preover, the birth rate dropped by
pse to one-third between 1960 and
'80. The Government of Indonesia is
i aring the benefit of its experience and
ethodologies with the officials of other
■veloping countries.

.S. Contributions

oncerted international action, of
lurse, is needed to support your
'velopment. At the same time, people
my own country are now being asked
1 make sacrifices to restore economic
■owth in the context of limited budget

resources. It is, therefore, more impor-
tant than ever to demonstrate that in-
ternational action and resources for
development support effective economic-
policies.

The main contributions that my
government can make to international
action in support of your development
are to:

• Restore noninflationary growth in
our economy and to assist other coun-
tries in doing the same;

• Maintain and work to increase the
openness of our markets to the exports
of the developing countries;

• Maintain substantial levels of con-
cessional assistance to the poorer coun-
tries and to provide such assistance in
forms and under conditions appropriate
to individual countries; and

• Bring the vast resources of the
U.S. private sector more effectively into
the development process.

Restoring growth in the U.S. econ-
omy will result in increased demand for
developing countries' exports of both
manufactured goods and primary com-
modities. Arresting inflation is essential
for the long-term prosperity of all coun-
tries. It will keep down the cost of im-
ports of goods and services by develop-
ing countries, which are essential to
their development.

A liberal trade system is basic to
economic growth in all countries. We
have reaffirmed our strong commit-
ments to maintaining liberal trade pol-
icies and an open multilateral trading
system as established in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

We have also recognized the special
problems which you face in expanding
your trade and have taken the following
steps to promote your exports to us.

• Consistent with your commit-
ments in the Tokyo declaration, we have
undertaken for the least developed coun-
tries an immediate staging of most
Tokyo Round tariff concessions. This is
in contrast to the normal 7-year staging
that applies to other countries.

• Under our generalized system of
preferences, we have given special con-
sideration to products of interest to the
least developed countries — e.g., han-
dicrafts. We have also adopted a de
mini mis rule, which waives the
competitive-need requirement where im-
ports fall below a certain dollar level.
This measure provides a potential
benefit to least developed countries as
small exporters of individual items.

As a result of those actions, as well
as our overall effort to maintain an open
trading system, over 80% of US. im-
ports from the least developed countries
now enter duty free.

We are committed to continue to
resist protectionist pressures. We will
work with all countries to strengthen
the multilateral trade system, recogniz-
ing that this will involve structural adap-
tation to changes in the world economy.

U.S. Assistance

Despite efforts to integrate the develop-
ing countries into the world economy,
many of the poorer countries will need
concessional assistance for some time to
come. We recognize that this is par-
ticularly true of the least developed
countries. This recognition has led to a
significant increase in our assistance to
the least developed countries in recent
years.

• Between 1978 and 1980, U.S.
bilateral economic assistance to the least
developed countries grew from $369
million to $542 million; this represents
an increase of close to 50%. We have
also taken a series of actions which have
increased the capacity of our assistance
programs to respond flexibly to your
special neeas.

• For some years now our economic
assistance to least developed countries
has been provided mostly in the form of
grants. As a result, the grant element of
U.S. assistance to the least developed
countries in 1979 was more than 96%.
As you know , the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
guideline specifies 90%.

• Our food for development pro-
gram provides special benefits to the
least developed countries.

• AID has untied its development
assistance loans and grants to the least
developed countries, permitting procure-
ment of goods and services not only in
the United States but also in other
developing countries.

• We have provided increased fund-
ing of local currency requirements of
development projects.

• We have waived, for specific proj-
ects in the least developed countries, the
norma] host country contribution to
development projects and the normal
time limit on project funding.

Looking ahead, this Administration
has requested a 16% increase in foreign
assistance in fiscal year 1982. This in-
crease was made in spite of the major

nuary 1982

83

UNITED NATIONS

budget reductions essential to carrying
out the President's economic recovery
program. We will make every effort to
win congressional approval of our
foreign assistance programs. This ap-
plies equally to meeting our multilateral
negotiated agreements.

In addition, we will continue our
support of the multilateral development
institutions, including the International
Development Association (IDA), which
has special importance to the least
developed countries. Significantly, we
have just obtained congressional
authorization to participate in the
general capital increase of the World
Bank. Congress has also authorized full
U.S. participation in the sixth replenish-
ment of the IDA. We have also obtained
restoration of amounts cut by Congress
last year in funding for the International
Development Bank and the Asian
Development Bank.

We believe that our bilateral
assistance program addresses your main
development constraints. The main
thrust of our program is to help the
developing countries build their own
capacity to progress by developing and
improving their own institutions. I
believe it is in this area that we can
make a significant and lasting contribu-
tion to the development process. By
these means, developing countries can
improve their capacity to use assistance
effectively and increase their ability to
develop, obtain, or adapt technology to
meet their specific needs. In this way,
they can move closer to self-sustaining
and dynamic development.

In fact, the United States has
worked with developing countries for
many years in their efforts to train their
people, build their basic institutions, and
improve their management of develop-
ment programs. The progress that India
and other developing countries have
made in developing their agricultural in-
stitutions demonstrates what can be
achieved through these mutual efforts.

We believe our institutions have
been a major strength of our own na-
tional development. It is precisely in this
area of institution-building where we can
match your needs with our own
capabilities. The importance we attach
to this is seen in the institutional
development efforts we are mutually
undertaking in many of the countries
represented here.

The sectoral thrust of our bilateral
assistance program will continue to be in
agriculture, human resource develop-
ment, energy, and population. These

areas, in our view, require priority at-
tention to increase the productivity and
incomes of the people in the developing
world — including women, who play an
important economic role in most
developing countries. Programs that
recognize the specific contributions of
women in development increase the ef-
fectiveness and impact of the assistance
effort.

These are also the areas in which we
have demonstrated, through our
bilateral assistance efforts, what suc-
cessful international cooperation can
achieve.

• Within the context of the Club du
Sahel, bilateral donors have undertaken
a major effort to combat desertification
through range management and re-
forestation projects.

• Similarly, the effort to attack
river blindness in the Volta River Basin
of West Africa represents a long-term
multidonor effort to eradicate a major
disabling disease.

• In Bangladesh, our 5-year fer-
tilizer distribution project has supported
major reforms which have put the
distribution of fertilizer into the private
sector. This program, together with fer-
tilizer imports from other donors and
multidonor support of the country's own
productive capacity, has made fertilizer
available to all farmers, a major factor
in Bangladesh's striking progress in food
production.

Similar progress is possible else-
where and in the future. We hope to
continue working with these and other
countries in support of programs that
help address the basic needs of their
people.

Administration and institutional
limitations in your countries sometimes
also hamper your capacity to utilize
foreign aid. In recognition of this prob-
lem, we continually attempt to simplify
and improve the administration of our
aid program. For example, we and other
donors have introduced standard
documentation for project identification
in the Club du Sahel. We are currently
reviewing policies and procedures in our
bilateral aid. Our objective is to further
simplify procedures and increase the
delegation of authority to our represent-
atives in the field. Decisions made in
light of this review will, I believe, in-
crease the efficiency of our assistance
program. They will also enhance our
ability to respond to your particular
needs and circumstances.

Private Sector Contributions

Over the years, the assistance efforts
the U.S. Government have been exten|
sive. However, this contribution to
development is relatively limited com-
pared to the potential of the U.S.
private sector.

The creative energies and en-
trepreneurial initiative of the U.S.
private sector have made a major con
tribution to global economic growth ai
development. This contribution has be
made by a range of entities — from ou
smallest shops and farms to the large:
educational institutions, firms, or priv \
voluntary organizations. Their energie
and initiatives were important to the
development and applications of the
high-yielding varieties of wheat and ri
that have revolutionized food produc-
tion. It is their flexibility which has
reached the women food producers so
often neglected by large national
agricultural programs. It is their in-
genuity which resulted in some recent
major breakthroughs in the effort to
develop a vaccine to prevent malaria.
This disease afflicts more than 200
million people in the developing world
International private institutions have
often spearheaded efforts to develop a
adapt agricultural technology to the cc
ditions of the developing world. An ex
ample is the work of the International
Rice Research Institute with U.S.
private sector support.

This Administration will stimulate
and encourage the U.S. private sector
help create new scientific technologica
breakthroughs. Thus, we will draw up
the combined strength of the U.S. pubi
and private sectors. Through such ap- 1
proaches, my government will contimi'i
to demonstrate the concern and comm!
ment of the American people in assisti
the poorer countries in their develop-
ment efforts. I would hope that other
donors would also provide increased si
port to these efforts. This hope extend
particularly to the oil-exporting coun-
tries and other developing countries in
position to do so. I refer also to the
members of Group D whose develop-
ment assistance efforts to date have
been so limited.

Post-Conference Objectives

Before closing I would like to make tw
points regarding the further work of tl
conference. The first is a call for
realism. Many of the objectives set for

84

Department of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

the developing countries are com-
wdable. However, the pace of prog-
;s envisioned is much faster than ex-
rience suggests is feasible. We should
proach our tasks with determination
t also with realism about what is
lievable in the near term. Similarly,
> demands for increased assistance
ws exceed what many donors are able
provide. These demands may also ex-
;d the economic and institutional
)acity of recipients to use such in-
sases effectively. We hope that the
ibstantial new program of action"
/eloped here will prove useful. We
oe it will guide both the developing
intries and the donors as we work
fether to address the development
)blems you will face in the 1980s. To
useful, it must be realistic.

The second point is on the issue of
,ure country reviews. We recognize
it this is an important question for
iny of you. We also recognize the
ue of an exchange of ideas between
aors and the recipient country. A
logue of this kind can make the
sign of a development program more
table to the circumstances of in-
idual countries. As a result, the
lited States has long supported the
lsultative group process. We believe
it such consultations are most effec-
e when they are geared to the specific
jatiori faced by individual countries.
! believe in open and candid discussion
-.ween donors and the recipient coun-

of its problem and policies, as well as
i specific donor contribution to their
/elopment process.

This conference offers an important
portunity for the international com-
mity to identify and discuss the
Bcific developmental problems which
:e you individually. It is also an oppor-
lity to explore ways in which these
Dblems can be addressed. Progress, of
arse, will not always be rapid or even.
■vertheless, I firmly believe that the
cade of the 1980s will be one of prog-
3S and growth in the least developed
intries. We will achieve that goal by
mulating and utilizing the talent and
tiative of your own people in concert
th the contributions and efforts of the
ernational community both public and
ivate. We pledge to work closely with
3 other delegates of this conference to
velop a useful plan of action. Such a
in will permit the international com-
mity to take practical steps in support
your efforts to improve the economic
d social welfare of your people. ■

U.S. Ratifies Protocol I
of Treaty of Tlatelolco

On May 26, 1977, President Jimmy
Carter signed Protocol I to the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America (treaty of Tlatelolco);
at the request of President Reagan, the
Senate gave its advice and consent to the
ratification of that treaty, subject to cer-
tain understandings, on November 13,
1981. President Reagan signed the in-
strument of ratification on November 19,
1981, and Secretary Haig formally
deposited the U.S. instrument of ratifica-
tion during a ceremony in Mexico City
on November 23, 1981.

Following are Secretary Haig's
remarks made on that occasion, the text
of Protocol I to the treaty of Tlatelolco,
and the Senate understandings attached
to the treaty.1

SECRETARY HAIG'S STATEMENT2

Last week President Reagan described
the control of nuclear weapons as an
essential part of an American program
for peace. It is my privilege today to
take this program one step further as
the United States deposits the instru-
ment of ratification of Protocol I to the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America. By adhering
to Protocol I, the United States under-
takes not to test, use, produce, or deploy
nuclear weapons anywhere within the
zone of the Latin American treaty. Our
action today, combined with our earlier
adherence to Protocol II, completes for-
mal U.S. involvement in the process of
establishing such a zone.

The United States is proud to par-
ticipate in this pioneering achievement.
The Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
speaks to the finest aspirations of the
hemisphere. It embodies our yearning
for peace by prohibiting the most terri-
ble instrument of war. It strengthens
the cause of nuclear nonproliferation
that must be a priority for all nations. It
demonstrates that patient but imag-
inative diplomacy can, indeed, advance
us toward a more secure future. It
testifies to the vision and dedication of
the nations that conceived it. Finally, it
is a great tribute to the unique role of
Mexico that the pact will be known to
history as the treaty of Tlatelolco.

The treaty of Tlatelolco— the effort
to establish a nuclear-free zone for Latin
America — has a significance that goes
beyond our hemisphere. The zone, when
fully realized, will help to stabilize world
politics and reduce the risk of war. The
treaty is already being studied as a
possible model for use in other regions
of the world exposed to the threat of
nuclear proliferation.

The progress we celebrate in this
ceremony does not complete the task.
Other states have yet to adhere to the
treaty and to take steps to fulfill its
promise. But we are pleased to join your
request for the cherished goal of a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin
America.

PROTOCOL I

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished
with full powers by their respective Govern-
ments,

Convinced that the Treaty for the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, negotiated and signed in accordance
with the recommendations of the General
Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution
1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,
represents an important step towards ensur-
ing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware that the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but,
rather, a means of achieving general and
complete disarmament at a later stage, and

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in
their power, towards ending the armaments
race, especially in the field of nuclear
weapons, and towards strengthening a world
at peace, based on mutual respect and
sovereign equality of States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. To undertake to apply the
status of denuclearization in respect of
warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5,
and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in ter-
ritories for which, de jure or de facto, they
are internationally responsible and which lie
within the limits of the geographical zone
established in that Treaty.

Article 2. The duration of this Protocol
shall be the same as that of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America of which this Protocol is an annex,
and the provisions regarding ratification and
denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be
applicable to it.

luary 1982

85

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Article 3. This Protocol shall enter into
force, for the States which have ratified it, on
the date of the deposit of their respective in-
struments of ratification.

In witness whereof the undersigned
Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full
powers, found in good and due form, sign
this Protocol on behalf of their respective
Governments.

SENATE UNDERSTANDINGS

1) That the provisions of the Treaty made ap-
plicable by this Additional Protocol do not
affect the exclusive power and legal com-
petence under international law of a State
adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny
transit and transport privileges to its own or
any other vessels or aircraft irrespective of
cargo or armaments.

2) That the provisions of the Treaty made
applicable by this Additional Protocol do not
affect rights under international law of a
State adhering to this Protocol regarding the
exercise of the freedom of the seas, or
regarding passage through or over waters
subject to the sovereignty of a State.

3) That the understandings and declara-
tions attached by the United States to its
ratification of Additional Protocol II apply
also to its ratification of Additional Protocol I
as follows:

I. That the United States Government
understands the reference in Article 3 of the
treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only
to such legislation as is compatible with the
rules of international law and as involves an
exercise of sovereignty consistent with those
rules, and accordingly that ratification of Ad-
ditional Protocol II by the United States
Government could not be regarded as imply-
ing recognition, for the purpose of this treaty
and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of
any legislation which did not, in the view of
the United States, comply with the relevant
rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes
note of the Preparatory Commission's inter-
pretation of the treaty, as set forth in the
Final Act, that, governed by the principles
and rules of international law, each of the
contracting parties retains exclusive power
and legal competence, unaffected by the
terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-
contracting parties transit and transport
privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Arti-
cle 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against the Contracting
Parties, the United States Government would
have to consider that an armed attack by a
Contracting Party, in which it was assisted

by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incom-
patible with the Contracting Party's corre-
sponding obligations under Article 1 of the
treaty.

II. That the United States Government
considers that the technology of making"
nuclear explosive devices for peaceful pur-
poses is indistinguishable from the technology
of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear
weapons and nuclear explosive devices for
peaceful purposes are both capable of releas-
ing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner
and have the common group of character-
istics of large amounts of energy generated
instantaneously from a compact source.
There tore the United States Government
understands the definition contained in Arti-
cle 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompass-
ing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also
understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict ac-
cordingly the activities of the contracting
parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18.

That the United States Government
understands that paragraph 4 of Article IS of
the treaty permits, and that United States
adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, col-
laboration 1>\ the United States with con-
tracting parties for the purpose of carrying-
out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful
purposes in a manner consistent with a policy
of not contributing to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connec-
tion, the United States Government notes Ar-
ticle V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in
an undertaking to take appropriate measures
to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear explosions would be
made available to non-nuclear-weapons states
part) to that treaty, and reaffirms its willing-
ness to extend such undertaking, on the same
basis, to stales precluded by the present trea-
ty from manufacturing or acquiring any
nuclear explosive device.

III. That the United States Government
also declares that, although not required l>\
Protocol II, it will act with respect to such
territories of Protocol 1 adherents as are
within the geographical area defined in para-
graph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same
manner as Protocol II requires it to act with
respect to the territories of contracting par-
ties.

'The United States is not eligible to sign
the treaty of Tlatelolco but did ratify Pro-
tocol II to the treaty on May 12, 197) (for
text, see Hi i.i.ki i\ of Apr. 29, 1968).

-Press release 400 of Nov. 24, 1981. ■

Visit of

Venezuelan

President

IV//I \lirhlii President l.ins Herrera

Campins made a State visit to
Washington, D.C., November 16-19,
1981, to meet with President Reagan an
other government officials. Following a?
remarks made by Presidents Reagan an
Herrera at the welcoming ceremony ana
to reporters at the conclusion of their
meetings. '

WELCOMING CEREMONY,
NOV. 17, 19812

President Reagan

President Herrera and I had the oppor
tunity to get to know each other at last
month's summit in Cancun. While we
were there, we reaffirmed that our two
nations share common goals and mutua
concerns especially about liberty and
progress in the American family of na-
tions. The challenges facing the people
of the Americas are greater than ever
before. Maintaining independence and
freedom will require the same dedicatio
demonstrated during the struggle for in
dependence that is common to every
American nation.

Venezuela played a unique role in
America's struggle for independence. It
role in the future of the region is no les
important. The great liberator Simon
Bolivar once said: "It is harder to main-
tain the balance of liberty than to en-
dure the weight of tyranny." He
lamented that all too often mankind is
willing to rest unconcerned and accept
things as they are.

If Bolivar were alive today, he woul
be proud indeed of the current genera-
tion of Venezuelans and what it has ac-
complished. In two decades, you have
built a free nation that is a beacon of
hope for all those who suffer oppression
After courageously casting off the
chains of dictatorship, Venezuelans re-
jected the tyranny of left and right and
held firm in their commitment to dignitj
and freedom.

While still in its infancy, your young
democracy withstood a serious challenge
from an external force that still
threatens other emerging nations,
undermining legitimate attempts at
social change in order to exploit chaos

86

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

id promote tyranny. But, clearly, in a
ibute to the decency and values of
>ur people the love of liberty has
•evailed. It is to Venezuela's credit and
keeping with Bolivar's dream that you
•e now helping others overcome similar
lallenges to their freedom and pros-
;rity.

I know that we will stand together
our opposition to the spread to our
lores of hostile totalitarian systems
id in our dedication to true liberty and
jmocracy.

Venezuela's development program,
irticularly in the Caribbean region, is
5 example of humanitarianism and far-
ghtedness that has the highest respect
fid admiration of the people of the
nited States. Your recognition of the
rivate sector's role in development is
luch appreciated here, but this, too, is
l your tradition.

Over a century ago, Andres Bello,
q intellectual giant and a Venezuelan,
oted a relationship between liberty and
nterprise. "Liberty," he suggested,
rives wings to the spirit of enterprise
'herever it meets it. It breathes breath
lto where it does not exist."

We have much to learn from the
eople of Venezuela. Your knowledge of
eveloping nations is invaluable, and I'm
ersonally looking forward to your
ounsel on this vital subject.

Venezuela reaches out today, in the
pirit of Bolivar and Bello — the liberator
nd the educator — to better mankind
nd to unite the freedom-loving peoples
f this hemisphere.

Just a few months ago, President
lerrera, you spoke to the United Na-
ions and eloquently outlined your na-
ion's commitment to principle. There
ou stated: "Venezuelans believe in and
iractice democracy. We do not attempt
o impose our own values and concepts
f society on anyone, but we know that
reedom is the road of history." Let me
ay to you as clearly and directly as I
an, in this expression of Venezuela's
herished goals, you have the firm and
isting support of the people of the
Jnited States of America.

Our two peoples will walk that road
ogether as equals, as friends who share
ommon values. And so, as one
American to another, we bid you a
leartfelt welcome.

'resident Herrera

rhank you on behalf of my wife, the
>eople who accompany me, and in my
iwn name, for your kind words of
velcome. The United States and

Venezuela— A Profile

Geography

Area: 352,143 sq. mi. (about the size of
Texas and Oklahoma). Capital: Caracas (pop.
2.7 million).

People

Population: 16.5 million (1980). Annual
Growth Rate: 3.2%. Ethnic Groups:

Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Arab, German,
Amerindian, African. Religions: Roman
Catholic (96%), Protestant (2%). Languages:
Spanish (official), Indian dialects spoken by
some of the 200,000 Amerindians in the
remote interior. Literacy: 85.6%. Life Ex-
pectancy: 67 years.

Government

Official Name: Republic of Venezuela. Type:
Federal republic. Independence: July 5,
1821. Constitution: Jan. 23, 1961. Branches:
Executive— president (head of government
and chief of state), 24-member Council of
Ministers (cabinet). Legislative — bicameral
Congress (200-member Chamber of Deputies,
49-member Senate). Judicial — 18-member
Supreme Court. Political Parties:
Democratic Action (AD), Social Christian
(COPEI), People's Electoral Movement
(MEP), Movement to Socialism (MAS),
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV). Suf-
frage: Universal and compulsory over 18.
Administrative Divisions: 20 states, 2
federal territories, 1 federal district, and a
federal dependency (72 islands).

Economy

GNP: $59.9 billion (1980). Annual Growth
Rate: -1.2% (1980). Per Capita Income:
$3,639. Average Inflation Rate: 22% (1980).
Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas,
iron ore, gold, other minerals, hydroelectric
power, bauxite. Agriculture: Rice, coffee,

corn, sugar, bananas, and dairy, meat, and
poultry products. Industries: Petrochemicals,
oil refining, iron and steel, paper products,
aluminum, textiles, transport equipment, con-
sumer products. Trade (1980): Exports—
$19.2 billion: petroleum ($18.2 billion), iron
ore, coffee, aluminum, cocoa. Major
Markets— U.S., F.R.G., Japan.
Imports— $11.1 billion: machinery and
transport equipment, manufactured goods,
chemicals, foodstuffs. Major Suppliers— U.S.,
F.R.G., Japan. Official Exchange Rate: 4.28
botivares = US$1.00.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., OAS, IMF, World Bank, IDB, Interna-
tional Cotfee Agreement. Latin American In-
tegration Association (ALADI), Andean pact.
Rio pact, OPEC, Latin American Energj
Organization (OLADE), Latin American
Stale Reciprocal Petroleum Assistance
(ARPEL), Latin American Economic System
(SELA), Andres Bello agreement,
INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Venezuela: President — Luis Herrera Cam-
pins: Foreign Relations — Jose Alberto Zam
brano Velasco; Ambassador to the U.S. —
Marcial Perez-Chiriboga. United States: Am-
bassador to Venezuela — William H. Luers. ■

Venezuela have enjoyed throughout their
history friendly and cordial relations
with inevitable coincidence and
divergences, but with the unalterable
constant of friendship and understand-
ing in a spirit of mutual and strict
respect for the national dignity of our
countries.

Venezuela has acquired a growing
weight in international affairs. Today,
we constitute an obligatory point of
reference for all issues related to
hemispheric dialogue and relations be-
tween the industrialized and the develop-
ing worlds. We follow an honorable, in-
dependent, and serious international
policy, attempting at all times to project

the image of our democratic institutions,
observant of the demands of freedom.

We have attained and consolidated
since 1958 our democratic stability,
following the effort made by our
democratic organizations and the na-
tional armed forces to achieve mutual
understanding and respect and after
overcoming the threats of a Marxist-
inspired subversion that meant to
destabilize our process of democratiza-
tion.

The presence of Venezuela in the
hemisphere and in the world is enhanced
by our position as a producer and ex-
porter of strategically valuable energy

anuary 1982

87

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

resources, our status of promoter and
founder of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, and
holder of a privileged geographical posi-
tion in a region afflicted by international
tensions. We labor indefatigably so that
peace will not suffer impairment or
wrong.

The foreign policy actions of my
government are not characterized by
any kind of notion against, anti,
anything. They are governed by an
unyielding purpose of acting in favor of,
pro, the interests of Venezuela, of Latin
America, of the developing world, and of
all of mankind.

In our observance of this principle,
when we coincide with other nations, we
do not do so in submission. And when
we disagree, it is not because of aver-
sion. When we coincide, it is without
complexes. When we differ, it is without
fear. We are not, and shall not be,
passive subjects or instruments in the
struggle between the superpowers over
the issue of world supremacy.

Our foreign policy is, as you well
know, autonomous and sovereign, as is
fit for a country that is the birthplace of
Simon Bolivar — the liberator, father of
our independence, and fighter of Latin
American integration. It is this intellec-
tual and political legacy that inspires our
domestic and foreign policies.

My visit to this great nation comes
at a precarious moment in world affairs.
I hope that the talks we will hold will
produce more points of coincidence than
discrepancy both on the political and the
social-economic issues.

We shall speak on the tense reality
of the Central American and the Carib-
bean regions, all the complex factors
that affect it and serve as breeding
ground for convulsions resulting from
social imbalances which are seized upon
by political hegemonic aspirations and
destabilizing ideological radicalisms. We
want to preserve this region from the
tensions of bloc politics.

We shall pursue, led by the same
constructive spirit, the dialogue begun in
Cancun on the urgency of making
substantial changes in the present inter-
national economic relations. The peoples
of the world continue to hope to see
global negotiations held within the
framework of the United Nations. And
even if they are to be initially frail, they
will build up gradually as trade develops.

We shall discuss the improvement
and expansion of bilateral relations be-
tween our two countries, both of which
enjoy systems of freely elected

88

democratic governments and a historical
commitment to defend the freedom of
mankind.

Our conversations will be clear in
their wording, specific in their subject
matter and positive in their results. That
is the deepest hope I harbor on the occa-
sion of my visit here.

I thank you, your government, and
your people for this invitation you have
extended to me to hold a dialogue on the
future of our countries, of our continent,
and of peace.

REMARKS TO REPORTERS,
NOV. 18, 19813

President Reagan

President Herrera and I have just con-
cluded a series of productive meetings in
which we reviewed the relations be-
tween our two countries and the interna-
tional situation.

The overall relations between the
United States and Venezuela are ex-
cellent, and we've discovered that both
nations share similar concerns about the
international situation. We took a close
look at development in the Caribbean
Basin region and discussed what can be
done to promote peace, freedom, and
representative government in that part
of the world.

We agreed to pursue the initiative
begun by Venezuela, Mexico, Canada,
and the United States for the Caribbean
Basin region. We will continue, and
strengthen where possible, our in-
dividual assistance programs and en-
courage other states to do likewise. And
furthermore, we agreed that we must
promote the economic and social
development of the hemisphere through
international cooperation. We can be ex-
pected to continue our opposition to any
interference in the internal affairs of
Western Hemisphere countries.

We agreed that efforts must be
made to strengthen democracy, liberty,
and pluralism against extremism and
totalitarianism. We continued discus-
sions we started at Cancun about global
economic relations and exchanged views
on the alternative paths to Third World
development.

Finally, we conducted a comprehen-
sive and forthright review of the rela-
tions between Venezuela and the United
States. We found that there is a high
level of cooperation and respect between
our nations and pledged to continue this
friendly relationship.

In addition to the usefulness of
reviewing these issues, I want to em-
phasize how much I enjoyed sharing the
past 2 days with my friend President

Herrera, with Mrs. Herrera, and the
distinguished delegation that accom-
panied them. We expect to remain in
close contact on matters of crucial im-
portance to peace and to the well-being
of the hemisphere.

President Herrera

Allow me first of all to thank very hea
ily the President of the United States,
my friend Ronald Reagan, for the kind
invitation he extended to me to visit th
great democracy. Allow me to thank h
for the excellent organization of this
visit, for having made possible for us t
have contacts not only at the hignest
level, that of the Presidency of the cou
try, but also at the level of high officia
and personalities coming from the ex-
ecutive and the legislative powers of tl
United States.

We shall return to Venezuela with
our hearts filled with the attentions an
the kindness shown to us by President
Reagan, Mrs. Reagan, and all the
Americans we saw and talked to.

I wish to say that I believe that thi
is a fortunate coincidence — the fact th;
I was here in Washington the morning
of the extraordinary speech made by
President Reagan. And I believe that
this speech will have a great impact
throughout the world, especially in
regard to the need of limiting nuclear
armament in Europe both by the Unite
States and the Soviet Union. I believe
that the four points you stated, Mr.
President, in your speech to the Na-
tional Press Club will be a great con-
tribution to detente. And I must say I
am very happy to have been here this
morning.

We studied the bilateral relations b
tween Venezuela and the United State;
relations which, I must say, are presen
ly at an optimal level. And we reviewec
the need to continue implementing
agreements signed in the past between
our two countries, most of them relate<
to matters of technical exchange.

We also analyzed the difficult
political situation existing in the Centre
American area and the Caribbean. And
must say that I expressed the independ,
ent, dignified, and serious position of
our foreign policies with frankness, ano
I expressed in this way the views of my
government. And allow me to say also,
that I was listened to with respect and
not only with respect but also with cor-,
diality and understanding. And the con-,
cepts of peace, liberty, and democracy
were ever present, were like a backdroi:
to our talks on the area.

Department of State Bulleti

TREATIES

As you know, the line of action of
government, the one we have always
awed, is a line of nonintervention and
Dect for the self-determination of na-
is and the projection of the goods of
locracy and of freedom. And when
spoke about such a delicate situation
;he one existing in El Salvador, we
icided in the need to encourage the
ievement of a democratic way out
t will enable that country to over-
le the subversion coming from Marx-
radical movements.
We know of the great efforts made
;he junta of the government, presided
Jose Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador,
rounded by so many difficulties in
er to achieve an institutional way out
he situation there.
We have ratified the will of the
'ernments of the United States,
lezuela, Mexico, and Canada to pro-
ie an ambitious program of coopera-
i in the area of the Caribbean and
itral America and also a program
jre not only we would participate but
) we would encourage other govern-
its to cooperate in the political,
mral, economic, and social develop-
it of this crucial area.
It has been of utmost importance for
ind the developing nations of the
"Id to have heard throughout my
cs with President Reagan, and again
he speech he made this morning, a
ification of the political will expressed
Dancun, favoring global negotiations
)e held soon, and thus bringing hope
peace through concrete and effective
ions to all developing countries.
And finally, let me insist in extend-
my thanks again for all the kindness
wn by President Reagan, Mrs.
igan, and the team working with
m, to me, my wife, the members of
Venezuelan party, and the special
fits on this trip I made to Wash-
ton. And allow me to say that I ap-
pelate greatly the generous concepts
1 have formulated time and again for
own person, for the government,
nocratic government I preside
er] — a government that tries to
irch for peace, development, par-
.pation, and respect of human rights
irywhere.

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of
;sidential Documents of Nov. 23, 1981,
ich also includes toasts made at the state
ner on Nov. 17. President Herrera spoke
Spanish, and his remarks were translated
an interpreter.

2Held in the East Room of the White
mse.

3Held on the South Lawn of the White
use. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary impor-
tation of private road vehicles. Done at New
York June 4, 1954. Entered into force Dec.
15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Notification of succession deposited: Solomon

Islands, Sept. 3, 1981.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation.
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968.
Entered into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6(505.
Notification of adherence deposited: Antigua
and Barbuda, Nov. 10, 1981.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Ceneva June 27, 1980.'
Signatures: Afghanistan, Sept. 11, 1981;
Congo, Oct. 22, 1981; Gambia, Oct. 23, 1981.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised,
and additional protocols 1 and II. Done at
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July
10, 1974.' TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Guinea, Aug. 13, 1981.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at
Paris Dec. 9, 194S. Entered into force Jan.
12, 1951.-
Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the

Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981.

Human Rights

International covenant on economic, social,

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,

1976.2

Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the

Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981.

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. -
Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981.

Optional protocol to the international cove-
nant on civil and political rights. Adopted at
New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976,.

Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981.

Maritime Matters

Internationa] convention on maritime search

and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Ham-
burg Apr. 27, 1979.'
Accession deposited: Argentina, May is,

1981.

Ratification deposited: Chile, Oct. 7, 1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6,490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975. Enters into force May 22,
1982, except for Art. 51 which enters into
force July 28, 1982.
Acceptances deposited: Ireland, Oct. 27,

1981; Ivory Coast, Nov. 4, 1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.'

Acceptances deposited: Ireland, Oct. 27,
1981; United Arab Emirates, Nov. 2, 1981;
Ivory Coast, Nov. 4. 1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.'

Acceptances deposited Ireland, < let 21 .
1981; United Arab Emirates, Nov. 2, 1981;
Ivory Coast, Nov. 4. 1981.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement to amend the protocol of signa-
ture to the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959, to
supplement the agreement between the
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regard-
ing the status of their forces with respect to
foreign forces stationed in the F.R.G. (TIAS
5351), as amended by the agreement of
Oct. 21, 1971 (TIAS 7259). Signed at Bonn
May 18, 1981. Enters into force 30 days after
the deposit of the last instrument of ratifica-
tion or approval, with effect from Apr. 1,
1974.1

Signatures: Belgium, Canada, France,
F.R.G. , Netherlands, U.K., U.S., May 18,
1981.

Ratifications deposited: Canada, Oct. 9, 1981;
Belgium, Nov. 10, 1981.

Nuclear Free Zone — Latin America

Additional protocol I to the treaty of Feb. 14,

1967 for the prohibition of nuclear weapons

in Latin America. Done at Mexico Feb. 14,

1967.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Nov. 13, 1981.3

Instrument of ratification signed by the

President: Nov. 19, 1981.3

Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 23, 1981.3

Entered into force for the U.S.: Nov. 23,

1981.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention
of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes, as
amended. Done at London May 12, 1954.
Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S.
Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

luary 1982

89

TREATIES

Acceptance deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. 28,
1981.

Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. '
Ratification deposited: France, Nov. 4, 1981.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of in-
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as re-
vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
Entered into force for Articles 1 through 12,
May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973; for
Articles 13 through 30, Apr. 26, 1970; for the
U.S., Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Notification of accession deposited: Zim-
babwe, Sept. 30, 1981.

Property — Industrial — Classification

Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the
purposes of the registration of marks of
June 15. 1957, as revised (TIAS 7419). Done
at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force
Feb. 6, 1979.2
Notification of ratification deposited: F.R.G.,

Oct. 12, 1981."

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization. Done at Stock-
holm July 14, 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Sept. 29,

1981.

Publications

Arrangement relative to the repression of the
circulation of obscene publications. Signed at
Paris May 4, 1910. Entered into force
Sept. 16, 1911. TS 559.

Protocol amending the agreement for the
suppression of the circulation of obscene
publications signed at Paris May 4, 1910, and
annex (TS 559). Done at Lake Success May 4,
1949. Entered into force May 4, 1949; for the
U.S. Aug. 14, 1950. TIAS 2164.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969.2

Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981.

Red Cross

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked members of armed forces at sea.
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2,
1956. TIAS 3363.

Geneva convention relative to the treatment
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.

Geneva convention relative to the protection
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at
Geneva Aug. 12, 1959. Entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956.
TIAS 3365.
Notifications of succession: Solomon Islands,5

St. Lucia,6 Dominica,7 Oct. 30, 1981.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of 12 Aug. 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
3365), and relating to the protection of vic-
tims of international armed conflicts (Protocol
I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8,
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.2
Ratification deposited: Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, Oct. 19, 1981.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered in-
to force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,
1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Kenya, Nov. 13, 1981.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
1980. TIAS 9700.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Oct. 1,

1981.

Slavery

Convention to suppress the slave trade and
slavery. Concluded at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926.
Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S.
Mar. 21, 1929. TS 778.

Protocol amending the slavery convention
signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (TS 778),
and Annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953.
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953 for the Pro-
tocol; July 7, 1955 for Annex to Protocol; for
the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva
Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30,
1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accession deposited: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Nov. 9, 1981.

Space

Agreement governing the activities of states
on the moon and other celestial bodies.
Adopted at New York Dec. 5, 1979.1
Ratifications deposited: Uruguay, Nov. 9,
1981; Chile, Nov. 12, 1981.

Terrorism

International convention against the taking of

hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,

1979.1

Ratifications deposited: Suriname, Nov. 5,

1981; Chile, Nov. 12, 1981.

UNESCO

Constitution of the U.N. Educational, Scier
tific, and Cultural Organization. Concluded
London Nov. 16, 1945. Entered into force
Nov. 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Acceptances deposited: Western Samoa,
Apr. 3, 1981; Bahamas, Apr. 23, 1981.

U.N. Industrial Development Organizatio

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. '
Signatures: Kenya, Oct. 28, 1981; Djibouti,

Oct. 29, 1981.

Ratifications deposited: Ivory Coast, Nov. <

1981; Chile, Nov. 12, 1981; Kenya, Nov. U
1981; Belgium, Nov. 18, 1981.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of tht
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Enten
into force July 1, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, Nov. 16,

1981.

Accession deposited: Israel, Nov. 18, 1981.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into fort
Sept. 3, 1981.2

Signature: Benin, Nov. 11, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Nicaragua, Oct. 27,
1981; Panama, Oct. 29, 1981; Ecuador,
Nov. 9, 1981.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of thi
world cultural and natural heritage. Done a
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: Greece, July 17, 198

BILATERAL

Antigua

Memorandum of understanding providing f<
a radio relay facility in Antigua for relaying
Voice of America programs to areas in the
Caribbean. Signed at St. John's Sept. 12,

1980. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1980.

Bangladesh

Convention for the avoidance of double tax;
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion wit
respect to taxes on income, with exchange (
notes. Signed at Dacca Oct. 6, 1980.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Nov. 18, 1981 (with understandings).

Agreement for cooperation concerning peao
ful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and
agreed minute. Signed at Dacca Sept. 17,

1981. Enters into force on the date on whic
the parties exchange diplomatic notes infori
ing each other that they have complied witr
all applicable requirements for its entry int<
force.

90

Department of State Bulleti

TREATIES

Canada

Yeaty to submit to binding dispute settle-

nent the delimitation of the maritime bound-

ry in the Gulf of Maine Area, as amended,

nth annexed agreements. Signed at Wash-

igton Mar. 29, 1979.

nstruments of ratification exchanged:

lov. 20, 1981.

Intered into force: Nov. 20, 1981.

Colombia

Lgreement for the eradication of foot-and-
louth disease in the areas adjacent to the
Colombian-Panamanian border, with annex,
iigned at Bogota Aug. 8, 1979.
Intered into force: Oct. 10, 1979.

igreement confirming the agreement be-
iveen the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture
nd the U.S. Department of Agriculture for
he control and eradication of foot-and-mouth
isease in certain portions of northwest Co-
>mbia. Effected by exchange of notes at
logota Nov. 27, Dec. 3, 14, and 17, 1973.
Intered into force Dec. 17, 1973. TIAS 7763.

Lgreement amending the agreement of
lov. 27, Dec. 3, 14, and 17, 1973 (TIAS
763) for the control and eradication of foot-
nd-mouth disease in certain portions of
orthwest Colombia. Effected by exchange of
otes at Bogota Apr. 4 and May 8, 1974.
Intered into force May 10, 1974. TIAS 7879.
'erminated: Oct. 10, 1979.

igypt

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-

ion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with

espect to taxes on income. Signed at Cairo

iug. 24, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 31,

981.

lenate advice and consent to ratification:

Jov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding and a

eservation).

Ratified by the President: Dec. 1, 1981 (with

n understanding and a reservation).

nstruments of ratification exchanged: Dec. 1,

981 (with an understanding and a reserva-

ion).

arrangement for the exchange of technical
^formation and cooperation in nuclear safety
natters, with addenda. Signed at Bethesda
,nd Cairo Apr. 27 and June 8, 1981. Entered
ito force June 8, 1981.

'ederal Republic of Germany

Agreement on cooperation in coal liquefaction
ising the SRC-II process. Signed at Wash-
ngton Oct. 5, 1979. Entered into force
)ct. 5, 1979. TIAS 9928.

'rotocol relating to the agreement of Oct. 5,

979, on cooperation in coal liquefaction us-
ng the SRC-II process. Signed at Washing-
on July 31, 1980. Entered into force July 31,

980. TIAS 9928.
?erminated: Aug. 14, 1981.

Agreement relating to the taking of evidence.
Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn
Oct. 17, 1979 and Feb. 1, 1980. Entered into
force Feb. 1, 1980. TIAS 9938.
Applicable to: Land Berlin, Oct. 14, 1981.

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil
Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington July 2, Sept. 4 and 15, 1981. Entered
into force Sept. 15, 1981.

Agreement concerning the listing of reactors
supplied from the F.R.G. to the Taiwan
Power Company on the inventory of the
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]
safeguards agreement of Dec. 6, 1971 (TIAS
7228). Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington Nov. 5, 1981. Entered into Nov.
5, 1981.

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion with respect to taxes on estates, inheri-
tances, and gifts. Signed at Bonn Dec. 3,
1980. '

Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Nov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding).

India

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug.
19, 1977, on procedures for mutual assistance
in connection with matters relating to the
Boeing Company (TIAS 8726), to include
alleged illicit acts pertaining to transactions
between Phillips Petroleum Company and
Cochin Refineries, Ltd. Effected by exchange
of letters at Washington Mar. 28 and
Apr. 17, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 17,
1979.

Israel

Convention with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington Nov. 20, 1975.'

Protocol amending the convention with
respect to taxes on income signed at Wash-
ington on Nov. 20, 1975, with exchanges of
notes. Signed at Washington May 30, 1980. '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Nov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding).
Ratified by the President: Dee. 1, 1981 (with
an understanding).

Italy

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the furnishing of satellite launching ami
associated services for the IRIS payload.
Signed at Washington and Rome July 23 and
29, 1981. Entered into force Sept. Lli, 1981.

Japan

Agreement on cooperation in coal liquefaction
using the SRC-II process. Signed at Wash-
ington July 31, 1980. Entered into force
July 31, 1980. TIAS 9921.
Terminated: Aug. 14, 1981.

Joint determination for reprocessing of
special nuclear material of U.S. origin, with
joint communique and exchange of letters.
Signed at Washington Oct. 30, 1981. Entered
into force Oct. 30, 1981.

Korea

Memorandum of understanding concerning

constructing, equipping, and operating a com
bined, Hardened Tactical Air Control Center
facility at Osan Air Base. Signed at < >san and
SeoulJune 19 and July 20, 1981. Entered in-
to force July 20. 1981.

Memorandum of understanding mi education,
with annex. Signed at Seoul Oct. LIS. 1981.
Entered into force Oct. 28, 1981.

Liberia

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreement,
with annexes. Signed at Monrovia Oct. 15,
1981. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1981.

Malta

Agreement with respect to taxes on income,

with related exchange of notes. Signed at

Valleta Mar. 21, 1980.'

Senate advice anil consent to ratification:

Nov. 18, 1981 (with an amendment and an

understanding).

Mauritius

Agreement concerning trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fibers, with annex. Effected by
exchange of notes at Brussels Oct. 2 and 5,
1981. Entered into force Oct, 5, 1981.

Mexico

Memorandum of understanding to control the
sanitary quality of fresh or fresh-frozen bi-
valve mollusca destined for exportation to the
U.S. Signed at Mexico Mar. 7, 1979. Entered
into force Mar. 7, 1979. TIAS 9424.
Terminated: Oct. 15, 1981.

Memorandum of understanding to control tin1
sanitary quality of fresh or fresh-frozen bi-
valve mollusca destined for exportation to the
U.S. Signed at Washington Oct. 15. 1981.
Entered into force Oct. 15, 1981.

Agreements amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Mexico ( )ct. 14. 1981.
Entered into force Oct. 14. 1981.

Morocco

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with related
notes. Signed at Rabat Aug. 1, 1977. '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Nov. 18, 1981 (with a reservation and an
understanding).

Netherlands

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana ( (ffshore < >il
Port. Effected bj exchange of note.-, at Wash
ington Mar. 9 and Ui. 1981. Entered into
force Nov. 2, 1981.

Norway

Protocol amending the convention for the
avoidance of double taxation and the preven
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxe

anuary 1982

91

CHRONOLOGY

income and property, signed at Oslo on
Dec. 3, 1971 (HAS 7474). '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Nov. 18, 1981 (with an understanding).

Somalia

Agreement on economic and technical
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at
Mogadishu June 14, Oct. 12 and 13, 1981.
Entered into force Oct. 13, 1981.

Spain

Agreement extending the treaty of friendship
and cooperation of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS
8360). Effected by exchange of notes at
Madrid Sept. 4, 1981. Entered into force pro-
visionally Sept. 4, 1981.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Nov. 18, 1981.

Sweden

Arrangement relating to the employment of
dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
Oct. 27 and 30, 1981. Entered into force
Oct. 30, 1981.

Turkey

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes and
agreed minute. Signed at Ankara Sept. 24,
1981. Entered into force Nov. 2, 1981.

November 1981

'Not in force.

2Not in force for the U.S.

3With understandings.

Applicable to Berlin (West).

6Effective from date of accession to
independence, July 7, 1978.

6Effective from date of accession to
independence, Feb. 22, 1979.

'Effective from date of accession to
independence, Nov. 3, 1978. ■

November 1

King Hussein I and Queen Noor of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan make a State
visit to Washington, D.C. Nov. 1-4.

Caribbean nation of Antigua and Barbuda
becomes an independent nation, ending 350
years of British rule.

November 2

U.S. announces it agrees separately with
Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to hold a
3-week coordinated exercise in the Southwest
Asia region. The operation known as "Bright
Star '82" will be conducted in coordination
with each host nation by elements of the U.S.
Armed Forces deploying from the U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps units operating in the In-
dian Ocean.

November 5

At the invitation of the U.S. Government,
H.E. Dr. Lee Chung Oh, Minister of Science
and Technology of the Republic of Korea
visits the U.S. Nov. 5-11 to discuss scientific
and technical cooperation between the two
countries. The Minister held meetings with
the Presidential Science Adviser Dr. George
Keyworth, high-level officials of the Depart-
ments of State and Energy, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and the National
Science Foundation.

November 10

Antigua and Barbuda becomes the 157th
member of the U.N.

November 12

President Reagan sends a notice to the
Federal Register, stating that because the
"internal situation in Iran remains uncertain"
the national emergency with respect to Iran
is to continue in effect beyond the November
14, 1981 expiration date. The national
emergency was declared Nov. 14, 1979 by
former President Jimmy Carter. Under the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, a declaration of emergency is
automatically terminated on its anniversary
date unless prior to that date the President
publishes in the Federal Register and
transmits to the Congress a notice that the
emergency authority is to continue.

In Paris, Charge d'Affaires Christian A.
Chapman escapes unhurt in an unsuccessful
assassination attempt by a gunman.

November 13

By a vote of 109 to 2 (U.S. and Israel) with
34 abstentions, U.N. General Assembly
adopts a resolution which "strongly con-
demns" Israel for its "aggression" in the June
7 attack on a nuclear reactor outside
Baghdad.

November 15

In Bangladesh, Abdus Sattar of the ruling
National Party and acting Chief of State

since President Ziaur was assassinated in
May wins the Presidential election.

November 16

Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins
and Mrs. Campins make a State visit to
Washington, D.C. Nov. 16-19.

November 18

By a vote of 116 to 23 (12 abstentions) U.N.
General Assembly renewed its demand in a
resolution that the "foreign troops" leave
Afghanistan. This is the Assembly's third
vote since Moscow's military intervention in
that country in Dec. 1979.

On behalf of some 3,000 U.S. citizens am
corporations whose claims against the Irania
Government total less than $250,000.00 each
the U.S. Agent at the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal in The Hague files a claim against
Iran.

November 19

Semiannual U.S. -EC high-level consultations
are held at the Department of State Nov.
19-20. Under Secretary for Economic Affair
Myer Rashish and Sir Roy Denman, Directoi
General for External Relations of the Com-
mission of the European Communities, lead
U.S.-EC delegations.

November 20

Sudanese President Gaafar Mohamed
Nimeiri, on a private visit to the U.S., pays <
courtesy call on President Reagan. They
discuss bilateral relations and issues con-
nected with the Middle East and Africa.

Department of State releases figures
showing a Soviet advantage over the U.S. in
intermediate-range nuclear systems. Figures
show that the U.S. has a total of approx-
imately 560 systems while the Soviet Union
total of such systems number over 3,800.

Secretary Haig hosts and speaks at the
Department's Foreign Policy Conference for
Leaders in Teacher Education held at the
Department. The Conference is cosponsored
by the American Association of Colleges for
Teacher Education and the International
Council on Education for Teaching.

To reinforce U.S. commitment to seeking
stability on the Lebanon-Israel border, Presi-
dent Reagan asks special emissary to the
Middle East, Philip Habib, to return to that
area to determine how the U.S. could furthei
help reduce rising tensions and help in im-
proving basic conditions in Lebanon. A date
for Ambassador Habib's departure is set for
some time after the Thanksgiving holiday.

November 21

Soviet State airline Aeroflot is banned from
flying to the U.S. from Nov. 21-28. The ban
is ordered after Aeroflot deviated "from
routes they are required to follow while over-
flying United States territory."

November 23

Agreeing that U.S. -Mexican relations re-
quired a special framework to assure that
matters of mutual concern are appropriately
considered and managed, in a June 1981

92

Department of State Bulletin

PRESS RELEASES

eeting at Camp David, President Reagan
id Mexican President Lopez Portillo formed
Binational Secretarial Commission appoint-
g Secretary Haig and Foreign Secretary
irge Castaheda de la Rosa as cochairman.
t Secretary Castaneda's invitation,
>cretary Haig visits Mexico City Nov. 23-24
r the first meeting of that Commission,
hile there, he presents the Mexican Govern-
ent with the instruments of ratification of
■otocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of
jclear Weapons in Latin America (treaty of
atelolco), unanimously ratified by the
mate on Nov. 13, 1981 and signed by Presi-
mt Reagan on Nov. 19.

More than $122 million were pledged by
er 45 countries for the 1981 program of
e U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
le U.S. alone pledges $80 million.

ovember 24

support of Soviet human rights activist
ndrei Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner,
e U.S. Senate unanimously adopts a resolu-
)n declaring that the Soviet Union must be
■Id responsible for their fate. On November
I, Sakharov and Bonner began a hunger
rike to protest Soviet refusal to allow Liza
lekseyeva to emigrate to the U.S. to join
ikharov's stepson, Alexi Semyonov. The
ro were married last summer in a proxy
remony in the U.S. The resolution calls the
fusal a "flagrant violation" of the Helsinki
:cords.

President Reagan authorizes $30 million
od grant to Poland. During 1981 the U.S.
is provided $765 in credits and food assist-
ice to Poland. The President states that the
ant "reflects the humanitarian concern of
is nation for the well-being of the people of
)land."

ttvember 27

:cretary Haig and Israeli Foreign Minister
itzhak Shamir meet at the Department of
ate to discuss a wide range of issues con-
rning the Middle East as well as discus-
jns related to European participation in the
FO, U.S. -Israel relations, Lebanon, and the
>ace process.

Ambassador Habib departs for the Middle
ast.

ovember 29

ifth annual Conference of Caribbean Trade,
[vestment, and Development is held in
iami, Nov. 29-Dec. 1.

In the first presidential elections in the
ilitarily ruled country of Honduras in more
lan a decade, Liberal Party candidate
oberto Suazo Cordova is elected over his
ational Party opponent Ricardo Zuniga
ugustinus.

President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire
sits Washington, D.C. Nov. 29-Dec. 2 on a
day working visit which is to include talks
ith President Reagan Dec. 1, Secretary of

Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. con-
gressional leaders, and officials of multilateral
financial institutions.

November 30

U.S. -Soviet talks open in Geneva on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces. The chief U.S.
negotiator is Ambassador Paul H. Nitze and
the chief Soviet delegate is Yuli A. Kvitsin-
sky. Other members of the U.S. delegation
include the Deputy head of the delegation,
Maynard W. Glitman, John A. Woodworth,
Office of the Secretary of Defense; William F.
Burns, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Thomas Graham, Jr. and Norman G.
Clyrie, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.

U.S. -Israel announce agreement on a
memorandum of understanding that
recognizes "the need to enhance strategic
cooperation to deter all threats from the
Soviet Union to the region." In a joint state-
ment, Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger and Israeli Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon say that "the agreement is
designed to enable the two countries to act
cooperatively, to provide military assistance
to cope with threats to the security of the en-
tire region caused by the U.S.S.R. or Soviet-
controlled forces introduced from outside the
region into the region." ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.

Date

*365 11/1

*366 11/2

*367 11/2

*368 11/2

*369 11/4

*370 11/5

*371 11/5

*372 10/28

*373 11/5

Subject

Haig: remarks at U.N. Day
reception, Oct. 30.

10th Conference of the U.S.-
Japan Consultative Pro-
gram on the Development
and Utilization of Natural
Resources, Oct. 29-30.

International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), study
groups A&B, Nov. 18.

Haig; remarks at the 21st
annual U.N. concert,
Oct. 31.

Haig: statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

John D. Negroponte sworn
in as Ambassador to Hon-
duras (biographic data).

Haig: press briefing, Cancun,
Oct. 21.

Haig: news conference,
Cancun, Oct. 24.

Advisory Committee on In-
ternational Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Dec. 1.

377

*378

11/12

11/16

*374 11/5 Shipping Coordination Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on radiocommunica-
tions, Dec. 3.

*375 11/9 Foreign policy conference for
leaders in teacher educa-
tion, Nov. 20.

*376 11/9 Conference on Caribbean
trade, investment, and
development, Miami,
Nov. 29-Dec. 1.
Haig: statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Program for the State visit
of Venezuelan President
Luis Herrera Campins,
Nov. 16-19.

*379 11/16 U.S.-EC high-level consulta-
tions held at Department
of State, Nov. 19-20.

*380 11/16 Haig: speech and question-
and-answer session at the
Palm Beach Round Table,
Palm Beach, Fla., Nov. 14.

*381 11/16 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on subdivision, stability,
and load lines and on safe-
ty of fishing vessels,
Dec. 1.

*382 11/16 U.S. Organization for the
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), Dec. 8.
11/16 Anglo-American cooperation

against drug trafficking.
11/17 Harry W. Schlaudeman,

Ambassador to Argentina
(biographic data).

*385 11/17 Langhorne A. Motley, Am-
bassador to Brazil (bio-
graphic data).

*386 11/17 Patricia M. Byrne, Ambassa-
dor to Burma (biographic
data).

*387 11/17 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Am-
bassador to Czechoslovakia
(biographic data).
Raymond C. Ewing, Am-
bassador to Cyprus (bio-
graphic data).
Jerrold Martin North, Am-
bassador to Djibouti (bio-
graphic data).

*390 11/17 Evan Griffith Galbraith, Am-
bassador to France (bio-
graphic data).

*391 11/17 Larry G. Piper, Ambassador
to The Gambia (biographic
data).

*392 11/17 Peterson De Vos, Ambassa-
dor to Guinea-Bissau and
Cape Verde (biographic
data).
393 11/18 U.S. claims against Iran.

383
*384

♦388
*389

11/17

11/17

nuary 1982

93

PUBLICATIONS

394

11/19

Gulf of Maine Boundary
Dispute Settlement Treaty
enters into force between
the U.S. and Canada.

*395

11/19

U.S., Mauritius sign textile
agreement, Oct. 2 and 5.

*396

11/23

David Charles Miller, Jr.
sworn in as Ambassador to
Tanzania (biographic data).

*397

11/23

Alan M. Hardy sworn in as
Ambassador to Equatorial
Guinea, Nov. 3.

398

11/24

Haig: interview on "This
Week," Nov. 22.

•399

11/24

Haig: statement upon arrival
in Mexico City, Nov. 23.

400

11/24

Haig: remarks upon deposit
of U.S. instrument of rati-
fication for Tlatelolco trea-
ty, Mexico, Nov. 23.

*401

11/25

Arthur A. Hartman sworn in
as Ambassador to the
Soviet Union (biographic
data).

*402

11/27

CCITT, study group A and
B, Dec. 10.

*403

11/27

CCITT, study group A,
Dec. 11.

404

11/27

Haig: remarks and question-
and-answer session before
journalists from NATO
countries and Spain,
Nov. 25.

405

11/30

Haig: interview on the
"Today Show."

*Not printed in the Bulletin.

U.S.U.N.

*47

*48

•49

•50
•51

•52

•53

•54

7/27

8/14

8/17

8/20
8/31

9/4

9/15

9/18

55 9/25

Ambassador Kirkpatrick to
visit six Latin American
countries, July 30-Aug. 12.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick to
visit six South Asian coun-
tries, Aug. 16-31.

Ambassador Lichenstein's
statement and letter to the
Special Committee on
Decolonization concerning
Puerto Rico.

Lichenstein: Puerto Rico.

Lichenstein: Angolan
complaint against South
Africa, Security Council.

Adelman: South African
credentials, General
Assembly emergency
special session.

Kirkpatrick: membership of
Vanuatu, General
Assembly.

Adelman: credentials of
representatives of
Democratic Kampuchea,
General Assembly.

U.S. delegation to the 36th
session of the U.N. General
Assembly. ■

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C., 20520.

President Reagan

U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control,
National Press Club, Washington, D.C.,
Nov. 18, 1981 (Current Policy #346).

Opening Statement at Cancun Summit, Inter-
national Meeting on Cooperation and
Development, Cancun, Oct. 22, 1981 (Cur-
rent Policy #335).

Secretary Haig

An Agenda for Cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere, General Assembly of the
Organization of American States, St. Lucia,
Dec. 4, 1981 (Current Policy #351).

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy, House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Nov. 12, 1981
(Current Policy #344).

Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Forces,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Nov. 4, 1981 (Current Policy #339).

Arms Control

Prospects for Arms Control, Eugene V.
Rostow, Director of Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Committee I, U.N.
General Assembly, New York, Oct. 21,
1981 (Current Policy #336).

Asia

Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia, Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs Director Burt, Sub-
committee on Arms Control, Oceans, Inter-
national Operations, and Environment of
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Nov. 10, 1981 (Current Policy #342).

Japan and the United States: A Durable Re-
lationship, Assistant Secretary Holdridge,
Japan-America Society of Washington,
D.C., Oct. 28, 1981 (Current Policy #337).

Africa

The African Private Sector and U.S. Policy,
Assistant Secretary Crocker, Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 19,
1981 (Current Policy #348).

Liberia: The Road to Recovery, Ambassador
Swing, Liberian Shipowners' Council,
Houston, Texas, Oct. 28, 1981 (Current
Policy #343).

Economics

Population Growth, Refugees, and Immigra-
tion, Richard Benedick, Coordinator of Pop-
ulation Affairs, Houston Media Roundtable
on World Issues of the 1980s, Houston,
Oct. 23, 1981 (Current Policy #341).

U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy, Under Seer
tary Rashish, Assistant Secretary Horma
Subcommittee on Trade, House Ways anc
Means Committee, Oct. 29, 1981 (Current
Policy #338).

Trade Patterns of the West— 1980, Lucie
Kornei, Office of Analysis for Western
Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Aug. 25, 1981 (Special Report
#87).

Planetary Product in 1980: A Creative
Pause?, Dr. Herbert Block, Office of
Economic Research, National Foreign
Assessment Center, Central Intelligence
Agency, Aug. 1981 (Pamphlet).

Soviet-West European Natural Gas Pipelim
Assistant Secretary Hormats, Subcommit
tee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and
Government Processes, Senate Committe
on Governmental Affairs, Oct. 14, 1981
(Current Policy #331).

Agriculture in U.S. Foreign Economic Polic
(GIST, Nov. 1981).

Europe

The Alliance at a Crossroad, Bureau of Pol
ico-Military Affairs Director Burt, Friedr
Ebert Foundation, Bonn, Dec. 2, 1981 (C
rent Policy #350).

Background Notes on Denmark, Oct. 1981.

Background Notes on Norway, Oct. 1981.

Middle East

U.S. Proposes Air Defense Package for Sai
Arabia, Bulletin Reprint from Oct. 1981,
Department of State Bulletin.

Terrorism

The Impact of International Terrorism,
Frank H. Perez, Acting Director, Office f
Combatting Terrorism, Conference on
Violence and Extremism: A Leadership
Response, Baltimore, Oct. 29, 1981 (Cur-
rent Policy #340).

Western Hemisphere

Arms Transfers to Latin America, Assistan
Secretary Enders, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs Director Burt, Subcommi
tees on International Security and Scien-
tific Affairs and Inter- American Affairs,
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct. 2
1981 (Current Policy #349).

Background Notes on Brazil, Sept. 1981.

Background Notes on St. Lucia, Nov. 1981.

Background Notes on San Marino, Sept.
1981.

Background Notes on the Solomon Islands,
Oct. 1981.

Background Notes on Venezuela,
Nov. 1981. ■

94

Department of State Bulleti

NDEX

lanuary 1982
(ol. 82, 2058

fghanistan

fghan Situation and Implications for Peace
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution, Depart-
ment statement) 57

se of Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) ... 52

frica

verview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16

.S. Interests in Africa (Crocker) 23

rms Control

^F Negotiations Open in Geneva (Haig) . . .30

'.S. Consults With Allies on INF Negotiating
Position (Burt, Eagleburger) 31

f.S. Ratines Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco
(Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand-
ings) 85

LS. -Soviet INF Systems: A Response to
Soviet Claims 31

Lsia. Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt)
52

irazil. Vice President Bush Visits Latin
America (remarks, toasts, statement) . . 12

lusiness

!anadian Investment Policy and U.S. Re-
sponses (Johnston) 32

'oluntary International Guidelines on Anti-
trust'(joint letter, questions and answers)

anada. Canadian Investment Policy and U.S.
Responses (Johnston) 32

!had. Libyan Involvement in Sudan and Chad
(Lyman) 27

'olorribia. Vice President Bush Visits Latin
America (remarks, toasts, statement) . . 12

ongress

Canadian Investment Policy and U.S. Re-
sponses (Johnston) 32

'ourth Report on Cyprus (message to the
Congress) 43

nternal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the
Congress) 26

jibyan Involvement in Sudan and Chad
(Lyman) • • 27

'ursuing Peace and Security in the Middle
East (Veliotes) ' 47

J.S. Ratines Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco
(Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand-
ings) 85

Jse of Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) ... 52

Cyprus. Fourth Report on Cyprus (message to
the Congress) 43

)eveloping Countries

)verview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16

J.N. Conference on Least Developed Coun-
tries (McPherson) 82

)ominican Republic. Vice President Bush
Visits Latin America (remarks, toasts,
statement) 12

Economics. OAS General Assembly Meets in
St. Lucia (Haig, Department announce-
ment, texts of resolutions) 1

31 Salvador. President Reagan's News Con-
ference of November 10 (excerpts) .... 9

Snergy. U.N. Conference on New and Re-
newable Sources of Energy (Anderson,
President's letter, program of action) . . 63

Ethiopia. Ethiopia (Kirkpatrick) 81

Europe

INF Negotiations Open in Geneva (Haig) . . . 30

Pverview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16

Preserving Western Independence and Securi-
ty (Eagleburger) 36

U.S. Consults With Allies on INF Negotiating
Position (Burt, Eagleburger) 31

U.S.-Soviet INF Systems: A Response to
Soviet Claims 31

Foreign Aid. U.N. Conference on Least De-
veloped Countries (McPherson) 82

Human Rights

OAS General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia
(Haig, Department announcement, texts of
resolutions) 1

The Situation in Kampuchea (Kirkpatrick, text
of resolution) 79

International Law. Claims Against Iran . .49

International Organizations and Confer-
ences. U.N. Conference on New and Re-
newable Sources of Energy (Anderson,
President's letter, program of action) . . 60

Iran. Claims Against Iran 49

Israel

Security Council Votes on Golan Heights
Situation (text of resolution, Department
statement) 60

U.S. and Israel Review MFO Participation
(U.S.-Israel statement) 46

U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation
(joint press statement, memorandum of
understanding) 45

Jordan. Visit of Jordanian King Hussein
(Hussein, Reagan) 50

Kampuchea. The Situation in Kampuchea
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) 79

Latin America and the Caribbean

OAS General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia
(Haig, Department announcement, texts of
resolutions) ■ ■ • • \

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16

U.S. Ratines Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco
(Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand-
ings) 85

Liberia. Liberia: The Road to Recovery
(Swing) 18

Libya

Libya: A Source of International Terrorism
(Adelman) 60

Libyan Involvement in Sudan and Chad
(Lyman) -27

President Asks Americans to Leave Libya
(Clark) 46

Middle East

Overview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16

President Reagan's News Conference of No-
vember 10 (excerpts) 9

President Reagan's News Conference of De-
cember 17 (excerpts) ■ ■ 10

Pursuing Peace ana Security in the Middle
East (Veliotes) ' 47

U.S. and Israel Review MFO Participation
(U.S.-Israel statement) 46

Military Affairs

President Reagan's News Conference of No-
vember 10 (excerpts) 9

U.S., Israel Agree on Strategic Cooperation
(joint press statement, memorandum of
understanding) 45

Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia (Burt) . . .52

Nuclear Policy. Preserving Western Inde-
pendence and Security (Eagleburger) . .36

Organization of American States. OAS
General Assembly Meets in St. Lucia
(Haig, Department announcement, texts of
resolutions) 1

Poland

President Reagan's News Conference of De-
cember 17 (excerpts) 10

The Situation in Poland (Haig, Department
statements) 40

Presidential Documents

Fourth Report on Cyprus (message to the

Congress) 43

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the

Congress) 26

President Reagan's News Conference of No-
vember 10 (excerpts) 9

President Reagan's News Conference of De-
cember 17 (excerpts) 10

U.N. Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy (Anderson, President's

letter, program of action) 63

Visit of Jordanian King Hussein (Hussein,
Reagan) 50

Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos I (President

Reagan, King Juan Carlos I) 43

Visit of Venezuelan President (Herrera,

Reagan) 86

Publications. Department of State 94

Security Assistance. Pursuing Peace and

Security in the Middle East (Veliotes) . . 47

Spain. Visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos I

(President Reagan, King Juan Carlos I) 43

Sudan. Libyan Involvement in Sudan and

Chad (Lyman) 27

Terrorism

The Impact of International Terrorism (Perez)

55

Libya: A Source of International Terrorism

'(Adelman) 60

Treaties

Current Actions 89

U.S. Ratines Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco
(Haig, text of protocol, Senate understand-
ings) 85

U.S.S.R.

Afghan Situation and Implications for Peace
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution, Depart-
ment statement) 57

INF Negotiations Open in Geneva (Haig) ... 30
Overview of Recent Foreign Policy (Haig) . . 16
Preserving Western Independence and Securi-
ty (Eagleburger) 36

U.S. Consults With Allies on INF Negotiating

Position (Burt, Eagleburger) 31

U.S.-Soviet INF Systems: A Response to

Soviet Claims 31

United Nations

Afghan Situation and Implications for Peace
(Kirkpatrick, text of resolution, Depart-
ment statement) 57

Ethiopia (Kirkpatrick) 81

Libya: A Source of International Terrorism

(Adelman) 60

Security Council Votes on Golan Heights Situa-
tion (text of resolution, Department state-
ment) 60

The Situation in Kampuchea (Kirkpatrick, text

of resolution) 79

U.N. Conference on Least Developed Coun-
tries (McPherson) 82

U.N. Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy (Anderson, President's

letter, program of action) 63

Venezuela. Visit of Venezuelan President

(Herrera, Reagan) 86

Zimbabwe. Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(letter to the Congress) 26

Name Index

Adelman, Kenneth 60

Anderson, Stanton D 63

Baxter, William F 34

Burt, Richard R 31, 52

Bush, Vice President 12

Carlos, King Juan, I 43

Clark, William P 46

Crocker, Chester A 23

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 31, 36

Haig, Secretary 1, 16, 30, 40, 85

Herrera Campins, Luis 86

Hormats, Robert I) 34

Hussein, King I 50

Johnston, Ernest B, Jr . . .32

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 57, 79, 81

Lyman, Princeton

McPherson, M Peter 82

Perez, Frank H 55

Reagan, President ... .9, 10, 26, 43, 50, 63, 86

Robinson, Davis R 34

Sharon, Ariel 45

Swing, William Lacy 18

Veliotes, Nicholas A 47

Weinberger, Caspar W

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00 f S1aU>

Imlletm

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82/ Number 2059

February 1982

Poland /1

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2059 / February 1982

Cover: Poland's national seal

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Secretary of State

DEAN FISCHER

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director.

Office of Public Communication

MARTIN JUDGE

Chief. Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Price: 12
issues plus annual index— $21.00 (domestic
$26.25 (foreignl Single copy-$3.75
(domesticl $4.70 (foreign) Index, single
copy— $2.50 (domestic) $3.15 (foreign)

CONTENTS

FEATURE

President's Address on Poland

Situation in Poland (Department Statements)

U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union (President Reagan)

Visit of West German Chancellor Schmidt (Joint Statement)

Secretary's News Conference on Chancellor Schmidt's Visit

Solidarity Day With Poland (Proclamation)

NATO Council Meets on Poland (Secretary Haig, Declaration)

he Secretary

I Interview on "Face the
Nation"

■pica

r The African Private Sector
and U.S. Foreign Policy
(Chester A. Crocker)

) Visit of Zaire President
Mobutu (White House
Statement)

I Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(President Reagan's Letter
to the Congress)

trms Control

Z The Unnecessary War
(Eugene V. Rostow)

tonsillar Affairs

7 Consular Services to U.S.

Citizens (Diego C. Asencio)

Human Rights

46 Bill of Rights Day, Human

Rights Day and Week, 1981
(Proclamation)

Narcotics

46 International Narcotics Control
Strategy (Joseph H.
Linnemann)

49 Anglo-American Cooperation
Against Drug Trafficking

Nuclear Affairs

52 Nuclear Cooperation and

Nonproliferation Strategy
(James L. Malone)

56 IAEA Safeguards System
(Richard T. Kennedy)

Pacific

59 U.S. Interests in the Pacific Island
Region (John H. Holdridge)

Western Hemisphere

Cuba's Renewed Support for
Violence in Latin America

Strategic Situation in Central
America and the Caribbean
(Thomas 0. Enders)

68

80

Treaties

82 Current Actions

Chronology

84 December 1981

Press Releases

86 Department of State

Publications

86 Department of State

Index

last Asia

9 No Sale of Advanced Aircraft
to Taiwan (Department
Statement)

Population

63 Population Growth, Refugees, and
Immigration (Richard Elliot
Benedick)

conomics

) Auto Parts Industry

(Robert D. Hormats)

urope

2 The Alliance at a Crossroad
(Richard R. Burt)

5 Fifth Report on Cyprus

(Message to the Congress)

United Nations

65 Double Standards in Human Rights
(Jeane J. Kirkpatrick)

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,Uaryi982

FEATURE
Poland

President's Address
on Poland

President Reagan's address

to the nation

from the White House

on December 23, 1981.1

At Christmas time every home takes on
a special beauty, a special warmth. That
is certainly true of the White House,
where so many famous Americans have
spent their Christmases over the years.
This fine, old home— the people's
house— has seen so much, been so much
a part of all our lives and history. It has
been humbling and inspiring for Nancy
and me to be spending our first Christ-
mas in this place.

We've lived here as your tenants for
almost a year now. And what a year it's
been. As a people, we've been through
quite a lot, moments of joy, of tragedy,
and of real achievement— moments that
I believe have brought us all closer
together.

G. K. Chesterton once said that the
world would never starve for wonders;
but only for the want of wonder. At this
special time of year we all renew our

Since martial law was declared in
December 1981, strikes and demonstrations
have occurred throughout Poland.
Thousands of Polish citizens, from all
walks of life, have been detained by the
authorities. Here in Warsaw in December,
armored personnel carriers passed by the
Academy of Science and the statue of
Nicholas Copernicus.

(UPI photo)

sense of wonder in recalling the story of
the first Christmas in Bethlehem nearly
2,000 years ago. Some celebrate Christ-
mas as the birthday of a great and good
philosopher and teacher. Others of us
believe in the divinity of the child born
in Bethlehem; that he was and is the
promised Prince of Peace.

Yes, we have questioned why he
who could perform miracles chose to
come among us as a helpless babe. But
maybe that was his first miracle, his
first great lesson that we should learn to
care for one another. Tonight, in
millions of American homes, the glow of
the Christmas tree is a reflection of the
love Jesus taught us. Like the shepherds
and wisemen of that first Christmas, we
Americans have always tried to follow a
higher light, a star, if you will. At lonely
campfire vigils along the frontier, in the
darkest days of the Great Depression,
through war and peace, the twin
beacons of faith and freedom have
brightened the American sky. At times
our footsteps may have faltered, but
trusting in God's help we've never lost
our way.

Just across the way from the White
House stand the two great emblems of
the holiday season— a menorah, symbol-
izing the Jewish festival of Hanukkah,
and the national Christmas tree, a

beautiful, towering blue spruce from
Pennsylvania. Like the national Christ-
mas tree, our country is a living, grow-
ing thing planted in rich American soil.
Only our devoted care can bring it to full
flower. So let this holiday season be for
us a time of rededication. Even as we
rejoice, however, let us remember that
for some Americans this will not be as
happy a Christmas as it should be. I
know a little of what they feel. I re-
member one Christmas eve during the
Great Depression, my father opening
what he thought was a Christmas
greeting. It was a notice that he no
longer had a job.

Over the past year, we have begun
the long, hard work of economic re-
covery. Our goal is an America in which
every citizen who needs and wants a job
can get a job. Our program for recovery
has only been in place for 12 weeks now,
but it is beginning to work; with your
help and prayers it will succeed. We are
winning the battle against inflation, run-
away government spending, and taxa-
tion. And that victory will mean more
economic growth, more jobs, and more
opportunity for all Americans.

A few months before he took up
residence in this house, one of my
predecessors, John Kennedy, tried to
sum up the temper of the times with a
quote from an author closely tied to
Christmas, Charles Dickens. We were
living, he said, in "the best of times and
the worst of times." In some ways, that
is even more true today. The world is
full of peril as well as promise. Too
many of its people, even now, live in the
shadow of want and tyranny.

Events in Poland

As I speak to you tonight, the fate of a
proud and ancient nation hangs in the
balance. For a thousand years, Christ-
mas has been celebrated in Poland, a
land of deep religious faith. But this
Christmas brings little joy to the
courageous Polish people. They have
been betrayed by their own government.

The men who rule them, and their
totalitarian allies, fear the very freedom
that the Polish people cherish. They
have answered the stirrings of liberty
with brute force— killings, mass arrests,

The tragic events now
occurring in Poland . . .
have been precipitated
by public and secret
pressure from the Soviet
Union.

and the setting up of concentration
camps. Lech Walesa and other Solidari-
ty leaders are imprisoned, their fate
unknown. Factories, mines, universities,
and homes have been assaulted. The
Polish Government has trampled under-
foot solemn commitments to the U.N.
Charter and the Helsinki accords. It has
even broken the Gdansk agreement of
August 1980, by which the Polish
Government recognized the basic right
of its people to form free trade unions
and to strike.

The tragic events now occurring in
Poland, almost 2 years to the day after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have
been precipitated by public and secret
pressure from the Soviet Union. It is no
coincidence that Soviet Marshal Kulikov,
chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, and
other senior Red Army officers were in
Poland while these outrages were being
initiated. And it is no coincidence that
the martial law proclamations imposed
in December by the Polish Government
were being printed in the Soviet Union
in September.

The target of this repression is the
Solidarity movement. But in attacking
Solidarity, its enemies attack an entire
people. Ten million of Poland's thirty-six
million citizens are members of Solidari-
ty. Taken together with their families,
they account for the overwhelming ma-

jority of the Polish nation. By persecut
ing Solidarity, the Polish Government
wages war against its own people.

I urge the Polish Government and
its allies to consider the consequences
their actions. How can they possibly
justify using naked force to crush a pe
pie who ask for nothing more than the
right to lead their own lives in freedon
and dignity? Brute force may intimida
but it cannot form the basis of an en-
during society and the ailing Polish
economy cannot be rebuilt with
terror tactics.

Poland needs cooperation between
its government and its people— not mil
tary oppression. If the Polish Govern-
ment will honor the commitments it hi
made to basic human rights in docu-
ments like the Gdansk agreement, we
America will gladly do our share to he.
the shattered Polish economy, just as a
helped the countries of Europe after
both world wars. It is ironic that we
offered— and Poland expressed interesi
in accepting — our help after World
War II. The Soviet Union intervened
then and refused to allow such help to
Poland.

But if the forces of tyranny in
Poland— and those who incite them fro
without— do not relent, they should
prepare themselves for serious conse-
quences. Already, throughout the free
world, citizens have publicly demon-
strated their support for the Polish pec
pie. Our government and those of our
allies have expressed moral revulsion a
the police state tactics of Poland's op-
pressors. The church has also spoken
out in spite of threats and intimidation

U.S. Response

But our reaction cannot stop there. I
want emphatically to state tonight that
if the outrages in Poland do not cease,
we cannot and will not conduct "busine
as usual" with the perpetrators and
those who aid and abet them. Make no
mistake: Their crime will cost them
dearly in their future dealings with
America and free peoples everywhere.

Department of State Bullet

FEATURE
Poland

I do not make this statement lightly
- without serious reflection. We have
;en measured and deliberate in our
action to the tragic events in Poland.
re have not acted in haste, and the
;eps I will outline tonight— and others
e may take in the days ahead— are
rm, just, and reasonable.

In order to aid the suffering Polish
;ople during this critical period, we will
mtinue the shipment of food through
'ivate humanitarian channels but only
) long as we know that the Polish peo-
e themselves receive the food.

The neighboring country of Austria
as opened its doors to refugees from
oland. I have, therefore, directed that
.meriean assistance, including supplies
f basic foodstuffs, be offered to aid the
.ustrians in providing for these
rfugees.

But to underscore our fundamental
pposition to the repressive actions
iken by the Polish Government against
s own people, the Administration has
jspended all government-sponsored
lipments of agricultural and dairy
roducts to the Polish Government. This
jspension will remain in force until ab-
alute assurances are received that dis-
-ibution of these products is monitored
nd guaranteed by independent agen-
ies. We must be sure that every bit of
)od provided by America goes to the
olish people — not to their oppressors.

The United States is taking im-
lediate action to suspend major ele-
lents of our economic relationships
'ith the Polish Government.

• We have halted the renewal of the
IxportTmport Bank's line of export
redit insurance to the Polish Govern-
lent.

• We will suspend Polish civil avia-
ion privileges in the United States.

• We are suspending the right of
'oland's fishing fleet to operate in
imerican waters.

• And we are proposing to our
Hies the further restriction of high-
echnology exports to Poland.

These actions are not directed
against the Polish people. They are a
warning to the Government of Poland
that free men cannot and will not stand
idly by in the face of brutal repression.
To underscore this point, I have written
a letter to General Jaruzelski, head of
the Polish Government. In it, I outlined
the steps we are taking and warned of
the serious consequences if the Polish
Government continues to use violence
against its populace. I've urged him to
free those in arbitrary detention, to lift
martial law, and to restore the inter-
nationally recognized rights of the Polish
people to free speech and association.

The Soviet Union, through its
threats and pressures, deserves a major
share of blame for the developments in
Poland. So I have also sent a letter to
President Brezhnev urging him to per-
mit the restoration of basic rights in
Poland, provided for in the Helsinki
Final Act. In it, I informed him that, if
this repression continues, the United
States will have no choice but to take
further concrete political and economic
measures affecting our relationship.

Worldwide Spirit of Solidarity

When 19th century Polish patriots rose
against foreign oppressors, their rallying
cry was "For our freedom and yours."
That motto still rings true in our time.
There is a spirit of solidarity abroad in
the world tonight that no physical force
can crush. It crosses national boundaries
and enters into the hearts of men and
women everywhere. In factories, farms,
and schools, in cities and towns around
the globe, we the people of the free
world stand as one with our Polish
brothers and sisters. Their cause is ours,
and our prayers and hopes go out to
them this Christmas.

Yesterday, I met in this very room
with Romuald Spasowski, the distin-
guished former Polish Ambassador who
has sought asylum in our country in pro-
test to the suppression of his native
land. He told me that one of the ways
the Polish people have demonstrated
their solidarity in the face of martial law
is by placing lighted candles in their win-
dows to show that the light of liberty
still glows in their hearts.

Ambassador Spasowski requested
that, on Christmas eve, a lighted candle

U.S. Ambassador to Poland

Francis J. Meehan was born February 14,
1924, in East Orange, New Jersey. He
received an M.A. from the University of
Glasgow (1945) and an M.P.A. from Harvard
(1957). He served in the U.S. Army from
1945 to 1947.

Ambassador Meehan joined the Foreign
Service in 1951 and has served in Frankfurt,
Hamburg, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and at the
Department of State. In addition, he was
deputy executive secretary of the Depart-
ment (1967-68), deputy chief of mission in
Budapest (1968-72), counselor for political af-
fairs in Bonn (1972-75), and deputy chief of
mission in Vienna (1975-77), and in Bonn
(1977-79). He was ambassador to
Czechoslovakia (1979-80).

He was sworn in as Ambassador to
Poland on October 8, 1980. Ambassador
Meehan speaks French, German, and Rus-
sian. ■

ebruary 1982

will burn in the White House window as
a small but certain beacon of our soli-
darity with the Polish people. I urge all
of you to do the same tomorrow night,
on Christmas eve, as a personal state-
ment of your commitment to the steps
we are taking to support the brave peo-
ple of Poland in their time of troubles.
Once, earlier in this century, an evil
influence threatened that the lights were
going out all over the world.

Let the lignt of millions of candles in
American homes give notice that the
light of freedom is not going to be ex-
tinguished. We are blessed with a free-
dom and abundance denied to so many.
Let those candles remind us that these
blessings bring with them a solemn obli-
gation—an obligation to the God who
guides us, an obligation to the heritage
of liberty and dignity handed down to us
by our forefathers, and an obligation to
the children of the world, whose future
will be shaped by the way we live our
lives today.

Christmas means so much because
of one special child. But Christmas also
reminds us that all children are special,
that they are gifts from God, gifts
beyond price that mean more than any
presents money can buy. In their love
and laughter, in our hopes for their
future, lies the true meaning of
Christmas.

So, in a spirit of gratitude for what
we have been able to achieve together
over the past year, and looking forward
to all that we hope to achieve together
in the years ahead, Nancy and I want to
wish you all the best of holiday seasons.
As Charles Dickens, whom I quoted a
few moments ago, said so well in A
Christmas Carol, "God bless us, every
one."

Situation in Poland

■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 28, 1981.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS

Dec. 18, 19811

We are deeply concerned for the leaders
of Solidarity and the thousands of other
prisoners being held in Poland. Our
reports indicate that many of these
prisoners are being held in inadequate
facilities and are not being accorded
humane treatment. It is also extremely
disturbing that the leader of Solidarity
[Lech Walesa] is being held under de
facto house arrest and that he has not
been allowed to make a public statement
to reassure the world about his welfare.
We call on the Polish Government to
release the prisoners, whose only crime
has been their attempt to exercise those
civil and political rights enshrined in
many international documents to which
that country is party and to allow Lech
Walesa to speak to his countrymen and
to the world.

Dec. 18, 19811

Polish workers continue to defy the
strike-breaking regime in several trouble
spots, especially in the Silesian coalfields
where miners still occupy several mine
shafts and have threatened to sabotage
the mines, according to unconfirmed
reports. Workers also appear to have
barricaded themselves in some of the
buildings at the Lenin shipyard in
Gdansk. In Warsaw yesterday, several
hundred demonstrators were dispersed
by security forces using clubs and tear
gas.

A high-level Polish Government of-
ficial informed our embassy that there
were strikes in 43 enterprises in eight
provinces yesterday. The official also
claimed that no more than 4,000 persons
were detained. Other reports, of course,
give higher figures. A Polish television
news program reported that seven
miners were killed in an incident involv-
ing the militia and the army at a coal
mine in Katowice.

The present situation continues to
of great concern because it is now clea
that the martial law regime has adopte
a policy of using violence to restore lav
and order, and as the President said
yesterday: "Violence invites violence ar
threatens to plunge Poland into chaos.'

Dec. 19, 19811

We continue to watch events in Poland
with great concern, particularly the us(
of violence against persons who attemr.
to exercise their civil and political
rights — rights set forth in the Helsinki
Final Act of which Poland is a
signatory. We again call for the release
of political prisoners.

Increasingly a pattern is emerging
of using Polish Army forces to seal off
public areas and workplaces from out-
side interference while the armed secur
ty forces of the Ministry of Interior
engage in often violent acts of intimida
tion and repression against protesting
workers, students, and intellectuals.

There are unconfirmed reports that
more people may have been killed in th
clashes between strikers and militarizec
police and army units in Katowice than
has been reported by the official Polish
media. We call upon the Polish Govern-
ment to cease its repressive attacks on
Polish workers.

Warsaw was calm yesterday follow-
ing the demonstrations on December 17
A funeral mass for a Solidarity activist
who died of natural causes was attende'
by a crowd of approximately 3,000
which dispersed without incident followi
ing the service. Our embassy has
reported that things are quiet in War-
saw today, and there is no evidence of
strike activity.

The Military Council has proposed
that the government limit the activities
of workers' councils until the political
situation is stabilized. Presumably, the
council is concerned about Solidarity

Department of State Bulletii

FEATURE
Poland

>mination of these instruments of
Drkers' self-management.

Trybuna Ludu on December 18
ports that in "militarized" enterprises
id industry, the work week may be ex-
nded to 6 or even 7 days and the
arking day to 12 hours. Another item
iscribed new travel restrictions on
)les except when they travel between
eir home and their place of work.

Dec. 21, 19811

Our embassy reports that Warsaw ap-
pears calm this morning. Despite recent
severe weather, including a heavy snow
storm yesterday, streets are clear and
transportation appears normal.
We still have only fragmen-
tary— and belated — reports from other
major urban centers. These suggest con-
tinuing resistance to martial law in some
areas and continued use of force in some
instances by the authorities. There are
also unconfirmed reports concerning the
arrest of some priests. We note that

These factory workers struck at the Lenin
shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980. A
month later in Gdansk, the new independ-
ent labor unions forged a single national
labor organization. Solidarity. It won legal
status the following October.

(UP] photo)

Vatican representatives are now in War-
saw conferring with Polish church of-
ficials.

In Silesia strikes appear to be con-
tinuing in perhaps as many as 20 coal
mines, with a major confrontation
reported in one. Warsaw radio stated

ibruary 1982

Sunday morning the Solidarity activists
had blown up the entrance to the
Ziemowit coal mine "trapping 1,300
miners below" but did not repeat the
report, which had been picked up by
TASS in the evening. We have no con-
firmation of this report.

Major enterprises in Katowice, in-
cluding the Huta Katowice steelworkers,
were reportedly on strike at least
through December 18, although police
were said to have arrested nearly all the
regional Solidarity leadership on the
night of December 12-13.

Western and Polish eyewitnesses
reported strikers remained inside the
Lenin steel mill outside Krakow after
two attempts by security forces to
dislodge them.

In Gdansk, Gydnia, and Szczecin,
shipyard workers have been told not to
report to work until after Christmas.
Governmental officials have confirmed
that workers in Gdansk have taken over
a building filled with flammable
material.

We are unable to confirm reports
that Lech Walesa has been moved to
Warsaw military district headquarters
from a villa south of the capital.

Dec. 22, 19811

There have been no major developments
that we are aware of in Poland. We are
continuing to follow events closely and
remain deeply concerned about the
widespread suspension of civil liberties,
mass internments, and use of violence
against striking workers.

At a press conference in Warsaw
yesterday, a spokesman for the govern-
ment stated that approximately 5,000
Poles have been detained since the start
of the martial law regime. He also
claimed that some detainees have
already been released. We cannot con-
firm the 5,000 figure cited by the Polish
authorities but note that estimates of
the number of Polish citizens detained
have ranged much higher.

The spokesman admitted that strikes
are continuing among the coal miners at
the Ziemowit and Piast mines in Silesia,

*"''

Lech Walesa is the 37-year-old leader of
the Solidarity labor movement and an elec-
trician by trade. He has been detained by
Polish authorities in a undisclosed location
since Solidarity's activities were suspended
and martial law was imposed in December
1981.

(UPI photo)

with approximately 3,000 miners said t<
be participating. We understand that
priests were able to conduct masses at
the mines yesterday and that miners'
families have brought them food.

At this government press con-
ference, it was also stated that Lech
Walesa remains under detention in Wa
saw but was visited on Sunday by a
priest, who said mass, and by his wife
and children. It was stated that WalesE
will be released "as soon as the situatio
allows." We understand that Walesa is
in good health.

The Military Council warned privat
farmers on December 21 (in Try buna
Luda) that lagging food deliveries to th
state might compel it to reinstitute con
pulsory deliveries. If this were carried
out, it would mark an end to the
agricultural policy pursued during the
past year which sought to convince
private farmers that they would be a
permanent part of the system.

Although the labor situation in Poz
nan is reported to be relatively calm ar
factories appear to be in operation, the
food supplies are declining. Milk, bread
and eggs are scarce or unavailable, anc
long food lines were in evidence.

Warsaw and Krakow were quiet
yesterday. In Krakow the food situatio
appears to be somewhat better than in
Poznan. Warsaw appears to have the
best food situation of these three cities
as the authorities are making available
large stocks of meat, eggs, and carp, tl
favorite fish for Christmas. Our embas:
reports an exceptionally good supply ol
meat in the showcase, "Supersam,"
market, with long lines in evidence thei
and throughout Warsaw.

We have no reliable information on
the food siutation in other parts cf
Poland.

Dec. 23, 19811

Strikes apparently continue in two ma-
jor coal mines in Silesia and the oil
refinery in Gdansk as well as other loc<
tions, but there are no reports of majoi
new developments in Poland.

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Poland

Reuters reports that [Gen. Wojciech]
iruzelski is preparing a television ad-
ress to the nation for delivery possibly
5 early as today. We cannot confirm
lis.

According to PAP [Polish news
jency] there was a Politburo meeting
n December 22 during which party
:aders reportedly discussed the political
rid social situation in Poland and
larted the duties of the party during
lartial law.

The Ministry of the Interior has
ecided to lift the curfew for the night
f December 24-25 throughout the coun-
•y to facilitate attendance at Christmas
ve midnight mass. However, there is
o sign that any of the thousands of de-
linees will be released, and we do not
et have any word on whether repre-
sntatives of the International Commit-
;e of the Red Cross have been allowed
) visit any of the detention camps.

Warsaw television on December 22
nnounced the prosecution of three men
ccused of attempting to burn the civil
lilitia station in Gdansk. This is the
rst official admission of the extent of
nrest in the city.

We have no further information on
le whereabouts of Lech Walesa.

lee. 24, 1981 '

/e have not yet received any official
olish or Soviet reaction to the Presi-
ent's Christmas address last night. I
m not going to have any comment on
is letters to Gen. Jaruzelski and Chair-
lan Brezhnev.

The Polish Ambassador to Japan,
>r. Zdzislaw Rurarz, his wife Januna,
nd his daughter Eva came to our em-
assy in Tokyo on December 23 and for-
lally sought asylum in the United
tates. After notification to the
apanese Government, they were issued
isas permitting them to enter the
Inited States and are now enroute.

The Polish Government announced
hat the strike at the Katowice steel mill
ras broken yesterday and claimed that
here were no casualties. Meanwhile
trikes in Gdansk continued and there

are also reports of a strike in the fer-
tilizer plant in Pulawy.

The address to the nation that Gen.
Jaruzelski was reportedly scheduled to
make yesterday has been postponed. We
do not know the reason for this.

In an apparent effort to affect
Polish public opinion and defuse increas-
ingly broad and stinging world criticism
of the repressive actions of the martial
law regime, Polish media are portraying
current conditions in Poland as return-
ing to normal.

We continue to receive reports from
our embassy and from our two con-
sulates in Krakow and Poznan that
American citizens have not been har-
assed or molested in any way. Despite
the travel restrictions on our officials in
Poland, American citizens visiting or
studying in Poland have unhampered ac-
cess to the embassy and consulates.
Polish citizens, however, continue to be
denied access to our consular officer by
the Polish police.

Dec. 28, 19811

According to recent reports from War-
saw, a number of convictions of local
union leaders have been announced by
Polish provincial courts, with sentences
ranging from 6 months in the case of
continuation of strike activity after the
imposition of martial law to 3V2 years
given to the organizers of a sit-in strike
at an electronics factory.

We note the statement made by
Gen. Jaruzelski in his speech of
December 24, denying that those ar-
rested and detained are suffering from
harsh treatment. We urge the Polish
authorities to grant an international Red
Cross delegation full access to those in
detention so that their whereabouts and
their condition can be verified.

Dec. 29, 19812

We have noted statements by Polish of-
ficials that the period of martial law will
be prolonged not by conditions in Poland

These Warsaw citizens waited at a tram stop during the 1-hour general strike in
October 1981.

1 1 I'i photo)

ebruary 1982

but by Western economic sanctions. This
line of reasoning is absurd. These sanc-
tions were applied as the result of the
ruthless suppression of human and civil
rights in Poland by the Military Council.
We are, as we have stated, prepared to
reexamine our position once martial law
is lifted, prisoners are released, and gen-
uine negotiations in a free atmosphere
are underway among the leading
elements of Polish society, including
Solidarity.

We are concerned also about new
reports of arrests and trials of workers
who allegedly were local strike
leaders — arrests which continue the pat-
tern of intimidation begun on Decem-
ber 13. We again urge the Polish
authorities to grant full access to all
those in detention so that their
whereabouts and condition can be
verified.

It is clear that passive resistance re-
mains widespread in Poland and that the
majority of the Polish people opposes
this repression of their civil and human
rights. Thus, while military rule can
make the streets quieter, the major
problems which Poland faces cannot be
solved by subjugating its people. Only a
return to genuine internal negotiations
and conciliation can put Poland back on
the path to solving its own problems,
and it is only such a policy that free
peoples in the West can be expected to
support.

Dec. 30, 19811

A spokesman of the Military Council
told foreign correspondents yesterday in
Warsaw that Poland remains in an of-
ficial state of war. It is a startling spec-
tacle to see a state professing to repre-
sent the working class declaring a state
of war against its own workers.

Solidarity has clearly shown itself to
be an extremely broad-based workers'
movement in which over 10 million
Polish working men and women have
sought to gain a meaningful and
legitimate voice in decisions which affect
their lives. The tragic repression of this
popular force can only be described as a

U.S. Measures Taken
Against the
Soviet Union

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT
DEC. 29, 19811

The Soviet Union bears a heavy and
direct responsibility for the repression in
Poland. For many months the Soviets
publicly and privately demanded such a
crackdown. They brought major
pressures to bear through now-public
letters to the Polish leadership, military
maneuvers, and other forms of intimida-
tion. They now openly endorse the sup-
pression which has ensued.

Last week I announced that I had
sent a letter to President Brezhnev urg-
ing him to permit the restoration of
basic human rights in Poland as provid-
ed for in the Helsinki Final Act. I also
informed him that, if the repression con-
tinued, the United States would have no
choice but to take further concrete
political and economic measures affect-
ing our relationship.

The repression in Poland continues,
and President Brezhnev has responded
in a manner which makes it clear the
Soviet Union does not understand the
seriousness of our concern and its
obligations under both the Helsinki Final
Act and the U.N. Charter. I have,
therefore, decided to take the following
immediate measures with regard to the
Soviet Union.

• All Aeroflot service to the United
States will be suspended.

• The Soviet Purchasing Commis-
sion is being closed.

• The issuance or renewal of
licenses for the export to the U.S.S.R.
of electronic equipment, computers, and
other high-technology materials is being
suspended.

• Negotiations on a new long-term
grains agreement are being postponed.

• Negotiations on a new U.S.-Sovie
maritime agreement are being suspend-
ed, and a new regime of port-access coi
trols will be put into effect for all Sovie
ships when the current agreement ex-
pires on December 31.

• Licenses will be required for ex-
port to the Soviet Union for an expand-
ed list of oil and gas equipment. Is-
suance of such licenses will be suspend-
ed. This includes pipelayers.

• U.S. -Soviet exchange agreements
coming up for renewal in the near
future, including the agreements on
energy and science and technology, will
not be renewed. There will be a com-
plete review of all other U.S. -Soviet ex-
change agreements.

The United States wants a construe
tive and mutually beneficial relationship:
with the Soviet Union. We intend to
maintain a high-level dialogue. But we
are prepared to proceed in whatever
direction the Soviet Union decides
upon — toward greater mutual restraint
and cooperation or further down a hars
and less rewarding path. We will watch
events in Poland closely in coming days
and weeks. Further steps may be
necessary, and I will be prepared to tak
them. American decisions will be deter-
mined by Soviet actions.

Secretary Haig has been in com-
munication with our friends and allies
about the measures we are taking and
explained why we believe such steps an
essential at this time.

Once again I call upon the Soviet
Union to recognize the clear desire of
the overwhelming majority of the Polisl
people for a process of national recon-
ciliation, renewal, and reform.

'Made at the Century Plaza Hotel in Lo;
Angeles (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 4 1982).H

FEATURE
Poland

eactionary, indeed counterrevolu-
onary, act.

We remain concerned about the
mny thousands of detainees who are
ow being held in Polish camps,
.lthough some reportedly have been
sleased, thousands remain under arrest
1 uncertain conditions and for undeter-
lined periods and without having been
igally charged.

We urge the Polish Government to
llfill its obligations under the Helsinki
inal Act by releasing those so-called de-
linees now. Only in this way can the
olish authorities make good on their
xpressed intention to return to condi-
ons in which a genuine national
ialogue can take place.

We note that several decisions by
rovincial and military district courts for
iolations of martial law provisions were
nnounced on Polish television on
•ecember 29. These range from 8 years
i a case involving the transportation of
laflets to 3 years for preparing and pro-
aiming strike actions in a factory. Such
arsh and repressive punishments for
le exercise of rights taken for granted
i most of the world are deplorable.

Finally, we want to express our
eep concern over the fact that Voice of
merica's Polish language broadcasts to
oland are now being heavily jammed,
uch jamming, which we have confirmed
3 originating in the Soviet Union, is a
iolation at least in spirit of the Helsinki
inal Act, a clear violation of Article 35
f the International Telecommunication
onvention of 1973, and a violation of
rticle 19 of the U.N. Human Rights
'eclaration.

The refusal by the Soviet authorities
) permit their own citizens, and now
le people of Poland as well, to know
le facts about events in Poland and
Isewhere is a renewed demonstration of
le glaring weaknesses of the Soviets'

housands of women and children marched
j Warsaw in July 1981 protesting food
hortages. Earlier, in the spring, Polish
uthorities had instituted a national ration-
ig program.

JPI photo)

i ••> <a* w«*^,

ebruary 1982

own system and of the regime they have
imposed on Poland.

Dec. 31, 19812

Despite press reports that the Military
Council in Poland is establishing groups
of experts to draw up programs of
social, economic, and political reforms,
the actual situation at this moment is
that martial law has not been lifted,
thousands of Poles remain under deten-
tion, and internal communications in
Poland have not been restored. Travel
within Poland is controlled, the mails
are uncertain, and the use of the
telephone — with rare exceptions — im-
possible.

Furthermore local elections sched-
uled for February have been indefinitely
postponed. The United States would
welcome immediate steps by the Polish
authorities to restore to the Polish peo-
ple the ability to participate directly in
decisions which affect their lives and
Poland's future.

Jan. 4, 19821

We have noted recent assertions by
Polish officials that normalization is tak-
ing hold. While harsh military rule can
make the streets quieter for a time in
that unhappy land, martial law can
never lead to normalcy.

Release of the thousands of political
prisoners together with internal negotia-
tions and restoration of internationally
recognized rights could begin a process
leading to normalcy, but we have as yet
seen no evidence that the Polish
authorities are prepared to return their
troops to barracks and take the path of
political wisdom.

Jan. 5, 19821

We note with concern the number of
Solidarity trade union leaders who have
been put on trial by Poland's martial law
authorities in recent days. Some have
been given harsh sentences of up to 7
years. Yesterday the first trials began in
Warsaw, ironically in the same court-

Defense Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski
became Poland's Prime Minister in
February 1981 and the following October
replaced Stanislaw Kania as the Com-
munist Party leader. In mid-December, he
declared martial law and military rule
throughout the country.

(UPI photol

house where Solidarity was officially
registered as a legal organization not so
long ago.

Even as these trials take their
foreordained course, Polish leaders are
stating publicly that they are looking
forward to self-governing and independ-
ent trade unions in Poland. We cannot
give credence to these assertions when
courts throughout Poland are rendering
stiff sentences under summary pro-
cedure for union activity.

Jan. 7, 19821

The United States has not softened its
stance on the need for a Western
response to the Polish situation. In fact,
the United States is exercising its
leadership through the example of its
own actions and in consultations with
allies.

Progress is being made. The Euro-
pean Communities foreign ministers'
communique was the strongest state-
ment yet out of Europe. There was fur-
ther convergence as a result of the
Schmidt (Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of
West Germany) visit.

Our aim now in the NATO
ministerial is to create a U.S. -European
consensus and a common strategy. This
will provide a basis for coordinated ac-
tion. We have never expected the allies
to take the same steps as we, at the
same time. We're moving in the same
direction. The United States will con-
tinue its leadership effort as long as the
situation in Poland requires it.

Jan. 8, 19821

Under Secretary [for Political Affairs
Walter J.] Stoessel called in Soviet Am-
bassador Dobrynin yesterday to make a
formal protest on the jamming of Voice
of America (VOA) Polish-language
broadcasts from facilities inside the
Soviet Union. The Under Secretary said
that we consider this activity to be total-
ly unacceptable and demanded that it
cease immediately.

Jamming is incompatible with the
U.S.S.R.'s commitments under the
Helsinki Final Act and a direct violation
of Article 35 of the International
Telecommunication Convention and Arti|
cle 19 of the U.N. Human Rights
Declaration.

The Under Secretary, in our de-
marche, categorically rejected charges
made by the Soviet official media that
VOA broadcasts constitute subversive
activity directed at Poland and other
Soviet-bloc nations; VOA carries objec-
tive news and information denied the
Polish and Soviet peoples by their own
government-controlled media.

10

FEATURE
Poland

n. 11, 19822

;spite some cosmetic changes, most
tably in the area of transportation and
mmunication, the harsh and brutal
irtial law restrictions imposed by
dish authorities remain in force,
lousands of Poland's workers, farmers,
d intellectuals have been behind bars
t almost a month as political prisoners
t without having been formally charg-

ed with anything. A Stalinist-type proc-
ess of verification is being carried on
throughout the country in which com-
mon workers are being threatened with
the loss of their jobs and access to ration
coupons should they not renounce
Solidarity. As Archbishop Glemp
[Primate of Poland] has stated, such ac-
tions are immoral and unethical and
need not bind the consciences of those
who signed them.

Long food lines have been a common sight
throughout Poland. This one is outside a
Gdansk supermarket in October 1981.

(UPI photo)

<bruary 1982

11

The Polish Government continues to
control access to our embassy and con-
sulates, and our ability to travel around
the country remains heavily restricted.
The travel of average Poles is also
severely limited. The small amount of in-
ternal telephone and telex communica-
tion that is just now being permitted is
under heavy censorship. Communication
with the outside world continues to be
sharply curtailed.

Jan. 13, 19822

A ranking Polish official told Western
reporters in Warsaw yesterday that the
martial law authorities "would like to"
end martial law by February 1. He gave,
however, no indication of a timetable,
nor do we see any signs that martial law
will be ended soon.

In spite of recent marginal im-
provements in the transportation and
communications areas, thousands of
political prisoners are still being held,
and there has been no movement toward
negotiations with Solidarity.

Meanwhile prosecutors are busy
bringing in indictments of strikers,
many of whom are receiving stiff
sentences. Moreover, the martial law
authorities have rolled back gains in
higher education to the pre- August 1980
level.

Over the weekend the Polish
Government forbade foreign citizens to
enter Western embassies of countries
other than their own. We immediately
protested in Warsaw and expected that
this new practice will shortly be stopped.

Last night, Warsaw time, the am-
bassadors of the vast majority of NATO
countries did not attend the traditional
New Year diplomatic reception hosted
by the Chairman of the Council of State.
Business as usual is impossible while
martial law remains in effect.

Visit of West German
Chancellor Schmidt

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer.

2Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the
Federal Republic of Germany visited
Washington, D.C., January 4-6, 1982, to
meet with President Reagan and other
government officials.

Following is the joint statement
issued January 5. 1

The President and the Chancellor on Janu-
ary 5, 1982 held extensive talks in which
Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister
Genscher participated. The Chancellor also
met with Vice President Bush, Secretary
Weinberger, and senior Administration
officials and with leaders of Congress.

The President and the Chancellor had a
thorough exchange of views on the situation
in Poland. They expressed grave concern
about the imposition of martial law, which
has resulted in the suppression of the funda-
mental rights of Polish citizens in violation of
international agreements, including the Final
Act of Helsinki, the United Nations Charter
and the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.

The Chancellor informed the President
about the final communique issued by the
Foreign Ministers of the member countries of
the European Communities on January 4.
The President welcomed this statement.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
on their analysis of the Polish situation. They
noted that contrary to the undertaking of the
Polish leadership to reestablish liberty and
the process of reform, repression and viola-
tion of basic human rights in Poland con-
tinues.

The President and the Chancellor call
again on the Polish authorities to end the
state of martial law, to release those arrested
and to restore the dialogue with the Church
and Solidarity.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
that developments in Poland demonstrate
once again the obvious inability of the com-
munist system to accept those changes
necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations
of their peoples. This endangers public
confidence in cooperation between East and
West and seriously affects international rela-
tions and stability.

They both noted the responsibility of the
Soviet Union for developments in Poland and
expressed concern about the serious pressure
it is bringing to bear against Polish efforts
for renewal. They insist Poland be allowed tc
resolve its problems without external inter-
ference.

The President and the Chancellor reiter-
ated their position that any military inter-
vention in Poland would have the gravest
consequences for international relations and
would fundamentally change the entire inter-
national situation.

The President explained the economic
measures taken by the United States with
regard to the Soviet Union. The Chancellor
informed the President that the Federal
Republic, together with its partners in the
European Community, will undertake close
and positive consultations in this regard with
the United States and with other Western
states in order to define what decisions will
best serve their common objectives and avoic
any step which could undermine their respec-
tive actions. They welcomed the agreement
of the NATO Allies to hold a special Foreign
Ministers' meeting in Brussels next week for
further discussion of these matters.

The Chancellor drew the President's at-
tention to the resolution passed on Decem-
ber 18, 1981, in which the Bundestag, in
agreement with the Federal Government,
decided to hold in abeyance official economic
aid to Poland as long as the present regime
continues its oppression of the Polish people.
The President reiterated his previous state-
ment that further assistance by the United
States to the Government of Poland is not
possible under present circumstances. The
President and the Chancellor expressed their
hope that the course of developments in
Poland would permit their countries to
review these decisions.

The President and the Chancellor ex-
pressed their solidarity with the Polish peoph
and their readiness to continue humanitarian
aid provided that it directly benefits the peo-
ple. In this context, the President informed
the Chancellor that American labor and othei
private groups are working together to
organize a day of solidarity with the Polish
people on January 30.

12

FEATURE
Poland

In view of the grave developments in
)land, which constitute a serious violation of
E Helsinki Final Act, the President and the
lancellor agreed that the Madrid Con-
rence on the implementation of the Helsinki
nal Act should deal with the situation as
on as possible at the level of Foreign
inisters. They will take action as ap-
opriate within the framework of the United
itions with a view to denouncing the viola-
>n of human rights as well as acts of
)lence. Other measures will be considered
the situation in Poland develops.
They welcomed the initiatives by the
oropean Parliament and the US Congress
establish March 21 as "Afghanistan Day"
express common hope and support for the

&

L

*>ple of Afghanistan, agreed that the Soviet
cupation of Afghanistan must end, and
■manded the withdrawal of Soviet troops
om Afghanistan and respect for the right of
« Afghan people to choose an independent
id non-aligned government.

The President and the Chancellor
iderlined the significance of arms control as
) indispensable element of their common
•curity policy. They reaffirm their deter-
ination to continue their efforts for effective
|-ms control. In this context the Chancellor
iqaressed his deep appreciation of the Presi-
pnt's speech of November 18, 1981, and
elcomed the initiatives for a comprehensive
ms control policy it contains.

The President and the Chancellor also
stressed the great importance of current
economic issues. In this context, the
Chancellor referred to the danger of a
worldwide depression and ensuing far-
reaching political hazards that may arise if
the industrial countries fail to agree on a
common strategy to combat unemployment.
The Chancellor emphasized in particular the
strategic significance of social and economic
stability in the industrial countries of the
West as an important element in the
maintenance of a stable East-West balance.

The President and the Chancellor agreed
that protectionism is to be rejected and
stated their resolve to work for a maximum
degree of freedom in international trade.

They also noted that their governments
were following policies aimed at reducing
significantly the level of interest rates
through control of budget deficits, combatting
inflation and overcoming the recession.

The two leaders emphasized the impor-
tance of close bilateral and multilateral con-

sultations at all levels between the members
of the Western Alliance.

The President and the Chancellor
underlined the close and trusting relationship
between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany. They agreed on the
need to maintain and deepen US-German
friendship by furthering and broadening
mutual contacts and, in particular, a better
understanding among the members of the
younger generation.

To this effect, they noted with satis-
faction that Secretary of State Haig and
Foreign Minister Genscher have named coor-
dinators in their respective departments for
American-German relations. In the State
Department the duties have been assigned to
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs. In
the Foreign Office the duties will be assumed
by Minister of State, Dr. Hildegard Hamm-
Bruecher.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 11, 1982.

Secretary's News Conference on
Chancellor Schmidt's Visit

Secretary Haig held a news con-
ference on January 6, 1982, to brief news
correspondents on President Reagan's
meeting with West German Chancellor
Schmidt.

I wanted to take this opportunity this
morning to provide an on-the-record
overview of the just completed visit of
[West German] Chancellor Schmidt, with
special focus on the relationship of that
visit to ongoing events in Poland, and to
summarize for you in general and to
answer your questions on the Polish
situation as it now stands and events
related to it.

First, I think it's important that we
understand that the visit of the
Chancellor, which was scheduled before
the Polish crisis and which in his own
terms was designed to exchange views
with President Reagan on the interna-

tional economic situation, of course, took
on a different character in the wake of
the crisis in Poland. And, therefore, a
large portion of the discussions between
the two leaders focused on the Polish
situation itself.

At the conclusion of it, a joint state-
ment by President Reagan and
Chancellor Schmidt was released yester-
day afternoon, which I think encom-
passes in a very detailed way the overall
character of the discussions and the
close accord that was arrived at between
the two leaders. Certainly first and fore-
most within that broad term "accord"
was a common assessment of what is
happening in Poland and why it is hap-
pening and a common view between the
two leaders that the Soviet Union bears
a heavy responsibility for the situation in
Poland today.

ebruary 1982

13

We were fortunate that the meeting
itself between the two leaders occurred
at a time when there was a meeting of
the Ten [the ten members of the Euro-
pean Communities— Belgium, Denmark,
France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, United Kingdom] in
Europe, attended by Foreign Minister
Genscher, representing the Federal
Republic of Germany. And the Foreign
Minister flew from that meeting here to
Washington and provided President
Reagan and the Chancellor with a de-
tailed report of the outcome of that
meeting.

That meeting itself represented a
very positive outcome and reflected a
general consensus within the Ten on the
situation in Poland, the responsibility of
the Soviet Union, and I think agreed
with the position taken by President
Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt both— a
common position— on what was
necessary in Poland today to remedy the
current unsatisfactory state of affairs.

First, an immediate lifting of mar-
tial law;

Second, a release of the prisoners;
and

Third, national reconciliation
through compromise and negotiation
among Solidarity, specifically, the church
and the government and party.

The discussions between the Presi-
dent and Chancellor Schmidt also
touched upon the subject of economic
sanctions, respective policies vis-a-vis
the Government of Poland on the one
hand and the Soviet Union on the other,
and both agreed to pursue intensive con-
sultations on a bilateral basis as well as
collectively within the existing fora to
deal with this subject.

As you know, there will be a NATO
Foreign Ministers meeting on the 11th
in Brussels at which I will represent the
U.S. Government. I had an opportunity
during Foreign Minister Genscher's for-
tuitous visit here to discuss that
meeting, which we hope will further con-

solidate and unify the Western ap-
proaches to the Polish question.

I am not going to go through the
joint statement that was published
yesterday afternoon, but I would hope
that you would focus your attention to
that statement. I hope all here have a
copy of it. I think in general and in sum-
mary that I speak for President Reagan
in emphasizing his great sense of satis-
faction with the outcome of this visit,
with the rapport which has existed from
the outset of this Administration that he
has established with Chancellor Schmidt,
and with his sense of confidence that
Western unity, Western solidarity, re-
mains the essential aspect of the out-
come of the Polish crisis. And that what
we are really witnessing— and we must
continually keep that fact in mind in our
analysis and observations— is a profound
failure in the East and not disarray in
the West.

Q. The President said after his
meeting with the Chancellor yesterday
that if the alliance fails to insist that
the Soviet Union stop pressuring
Poland directly and indirectly, the
gravest consequences for international
relations could ensue. Would you
elaborate on that?

A. I think the words were very
carefully chosen, and they say precisely
what they mean in the context of the
obligation of the Soviet Union not to be
an advocate, as it has been publicly and
officially, of repression in Poland; and a
joint assessment that the Soviet leader-
ship has an obligation to abide by the
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act,
whether these violations occur within
what is referred to as the Western
world or the Eastern world.

Q. In his news conference yester-
day. Chancellor Schmidt left me with
the impression that even if the situa-
tion continues as it is today in Poland,
that the United States will return to
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear
forces] talks in Geneva a week from
today. Is that a correct impression?

A. This was a topic that was dis-
cussed with considerable care between
President Reagan and Chancellor
Schmidt. Both leaders believe that thes<
INF talks constitute a very special cate-
gory of East- West relations, and, as
such, they must be dealt with outside
the context of what we would refer to e
more normal East- West relationships b<
cause there are fundamental advantage
to the West as well as the East in the
continuation of a dialogue seeking con-
trol of nuclear armaments.

I would suggest that both leaders
concluded that there should be a con-
tinuation of this dialogue, except under
the most exceptional of circumstances,
and I don't include the current situation
to include that.

Q. And how about your meeting
with Foreign Minister Gromyko? Is
that also still on schedule?

A. That meeting, which is schedule'
for the 27th of this month in Geneva, w
are looking at very carefully in the con-
text of the current sitation and events
which will occur between now and then.
But I would underline also the position
of President Reagan in a recent inter-
view in which he was asked about the
importance of summitry. I know that
the President feels very, very strongly
that perhaps in time of crisis com-
munication between governments is
more, rather than less, important, and
we intend to maintain communications.

That does not give you a firm com-
mitment to go ahead with the meeting
because there are a number of uncer-
tainties facing us in Poland which could
have an impact on the decision. But, as
of now, the inclination would be to be
sure that lines of communication are
maintained.

Q. Could you explain the rational
behind setting up a high-level special
coordinator for American-German
relations as opposed to American-
French, American-Italian?

A. I think both governments have
felt that generation gaps, if you will,
sometimes contribute to a lack of ap-

14

Department of State Bulleti

FEATURE
Poland

•opriate communication, especially
nong our young, and we are seek-
g — and the President has agreed with
proposal made by the Federal Repub-
: — to establish a special approach to a
hole host of German- American ac-
uities, both unofficial and government
lonsored, designed to be sure that the
storic and traditional friendship and
iderstanding between the German peo-
e, and especially the youth, and the
merican people, and especially the
mth, are facilitated and augmented,
lat's in general the purpose of this. It
as agreed to in general before this
eeting as a result of a common assess-
ent, and it was formalized in the joint
atement.

Q. You were asked a question a
oment ago about the possibility of
tur meeting Gromyko at the end of
e month, and in your answer you
ised the issue of summitry and then
Idressed yourself to that possibility,
ow is one to understand that? Were
iu talking about summitry between
iiirself and —

A. I was talking about communica-
)n in general at high levels, whether it
! at the summit or at the Foreign
inister and Secretary of State level,
at clearly it is the President's view
at while this is desirable at all times,
times of crises such communication
ay be even more important.

I think that's why the President said
answer to a question, "Will events in
Dland affect whether or not you have a
immit with Chairman Brezhnev," he
lid, "It may and it may not," if you will
;call, in a recent interview. The point I
ant to make is that the President is
ery sensitive to the requirement to
iaintain rather than to terminate com-
lunications in time of crisis.

Q. Have the two sides exchanged
lessages on the possibility of a sum-
lit since the Polish crisis began?

A. No.

Q. Given what we know about
'hat Chancellor Schmidt said before
anting to meet with President

Reagan, to what can you point to say
that there has been any change in the
West German position on Poland and
on the Soviet Union? Has there been
any change since the meeting?

A. I think I would refer you first
and foremost to the joint statement. It
speaks for itself, and it expresses a com-
mon point of view on a number of very
specific issues which had been the source
of rather hyperactive press speculation
prior to the visit.

I think as is the case in all visits of
this kind, and discussions, the views of
the participants are shaped by the ex-
changes that occur. On the other hand,
in this instance it's also very clear that
some of the differences that were specu-
lated about before the visit did not really
exist at all in the first instance.

I think in that regard it would be
very well to refer back to the statement
of the Chancellor to the Bundestag and
the resolution of the West German
Bundestag. If one will read that very
carefully, they will see a very, very close
alignment of the West German view
with the American view from the outset
of this crisis.

Q. Talking about communications,
the German Government tries, ob-
viously in one way, to obtain the reali-
zation of the three principles men-
tioned in the communique by having
contact with the Polish leader-
ship—the visit of Mr. Rakowski
[Polish Deputy Prime Minister
Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski] with Mr.
Genscher in Germany. I wonder
whether you, the American Govern-
ment considers the possibility also to
use that channel and having direct
high-level contacts between your
government and the Polish leadership
at the moment?

A. I don't know of any bias against
such communications here, but we've
been well served by Ambassador
Meehan's [U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Francis Meehan] contacts, both with the
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
in Warsaw. He's had several detailed
meetings. He had a meeting following
the meeting of the Ten with the Prime
Minister in which similar exchanges
were provided.

I think the important thing for us to
understand in this respect is that re-
gardless of the view you have of the role
of the current government or the ruling
junta — which, as I understand, is four
military men and four civilian leaders —
that the consequences of their action, if
it were to continue, are going to result
in a worsening of their relationships
with the Western world at large and
with the United States in particular.

With respect to Western policies on
Poland itself, I think there's a clear con-
vergence of views on actions to be taken
with respect to Poland — future credits,
government-to-government assistance,
all of which have been placed in jeopar-
dy— and also the concurrent need recog-
nized, I think, by all Western leaders
that we have an obligation to provide for
the humanitarian aspects of this crisis
and to do so in a way that we can be
assured that such Western assistance
will go to the people of Poland and not
to a repressive regime which would be
reinforced by such assistance.

sbruary 1982

15

Q. I have a number of specific
items. One, do you expect either at the
NATO meeting or in that same time
period any concerted action or parallel
actions by the allies on sanctions
against the Soviet Union? And, sec-
ondly, is it possible to flesh out the
references in the communique to: one,
a foreign ministers level meeting of
the CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] conference;
and, secondly, of raising the Polish
matter within the framework of the
United Nations?

A. I think first with respect to the
upcoming NATO meeting at foreign
minister level, I would say that what we
are looking for is a convergence of as-
sessment, much as we did in a bilateral
sense with the Chancellor's visit here
and our earlier discussion. I would hope
for a vigorous and robust and realistic
common assessment on Monday.

With respect to Poland, as I say,
and our relationships with the Polish
Government, I would anticipate some
substantial convergence of view.

With respect to the question of eco-
nomic sanctions against the Soviet
Union, clearly each member government
has an entirely different set of problems
and a different set of assets with which
they can deal with this subject. I would
not anticipate a uniform outcome on
that very difficult issue. I would antici-
pate, however, very clear language with
respect to Soviet responsibility for
events and Soviet obligations to deal
with those events and clearly a reitera-
tion of the consequences of Soviet in-
volvement in even greater repression as
well as a continuing repression.

Now, you raised two other aspects
that I want to answer because the one
had to do with the CSCE meeting and
the call— an urgent call— which we sup-
port, and which the President and the
Chancellor discussed, and which the
meeting of the Ten also suggested.
Clearly, you know that such meetings in-
volve not just the Western nations — the
Ten or the NATO family of nations; they
involve the nonaligned and they involve
the Soviet Union.

16

So there is no way of predicting
whether or not such a meeting will oc-
cur. But I do believe if the Soviet Union
refused to attend such a meeting that
this is a clear signal for the world to
assess, in the context of their adherence
to the spirit of the Helsinki fora and
ongoing discussions related to the Final
Act, as well as their current state of
mind with respect to the crisis in
Poland.

Now, the last one, the reference to
the United Nations in the joint state-
ment yesterday, was not designed to
outline a specific body of the United Na-
tions but generally that at the ap-
propriate time that we would be
prepared to joint in an effort to bring
the Polish crisis to the attention of the
world body. And whether that would be
in the humanitarian area and the bodies
associated with humanitarian problems
remains to be seen, but I would expect
that would be the case.

Q. At this point does the United
States want West Germany to impose
economic sanctions against the Soviet
Union?

A. I would say the answer to that
question is that we recognize that the
West German Government is operating
from a rather different base with respect
to the economic impact of actions that
they may or may not take vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. What we are seeking is a
clear recognition— which I think the
Chancellor's visit confirmed— of Soviet
responsibility and obligations associated
with events in Poland and that the over-
all relationship between Western
governments and the Soviet Union will,
in the final analysis, be determined by
Soviet conduct in this crisis.

You know there has been a number
of viewpoints suggesting that the
Soviets bear no responsibility, that this
is exclusively an internal matter in
Poland. The facts and joint assessments
contribute to precisely the opposite con-
clusion. And that was arrived at bilater-
ally here, although I don't think it re-
quired particular education on the part

of either of the leaders. I think they
came into the meeting with that assump
tion.

Q. If I understand you correctly,
you are saying that we do not want tc
pursue business as usual with the
Russians and that it's OK with us if
the Germans do.

A. That's not at all what I said.
What I said was we are not asking for
lock-step treatment of this problem
given our differing bases. Business as
usual, we would hope, would not be car
ried out in this current climate under
any set of circumstances; and I think
yesterday's statement is anything but ai
affirmation of business as usual.

Q. Can you explain — when we hac
a briefing in this very room about the
differences between the way the
Soviets were communicating with us
and with the Germans and the fact
that there was a gap in the way the
German Government looked at this
event, while we wanted the same
three conclusions — that their analysis
was quite different from ours. Now,
what happened? Did we learn some-
thing from Schmidt, or did Schmidt
learn something from us? What
brought about the great accord be-
tween leaders?

A. I hope we both learned from
each other. I know we always do. Well,
first, let me point out that we definitely
did get a greater appreciation for
Chancellor Schmidt's attitude on this
Polish crisis; and I think we all learned,
as a result of his expositions here and
his reference to his Bundestag speech, ii
which he complained bitterly— and I
think with justification— seemed to have
dropped on a disappearing cloud in the
Western press and in the American
press, and he expressed disappointment
that no one in the American press
looked very carefully at that statement.

I think in that sense we could take
justified criticism not only in the
Western press and American press but
here in the Department as well. There
are always some differences in nuance

FEATURE
Poland

:tween different levels of contact, and
at's the great value of having two
aders sit down. And in that context I
ink both the President and Chancellor
Amidt had their own views modified
id shaped by the exchanges.

In the case of Chancellor Schmidt, I
ould not want to attribute it to the
scussions here or to a clarification of
ews that he has had prior to coming
;re. I think his Bundestag speech cer-
inly would justify the latter theory—
at he already had those views.

Q. He seemed to imply yesterday
lat one of the things he had learned
om President Reagan is that he does
ive a tremendously deep reservation
tout imposing a grain embargo. Did
e President tell him that basically
e're not going to impose a grain em-
irgo? And, if not, what specific ac-
ots can we expect at Brussels next
eek?

A. No. I don't think the President
ggested for a moment that it might
>t be necessary in the period ahead to
ew the full range of American-Soviet
lationships beyond those which have
ready been affected as being matters
at would have to be considered. But I
ink both leaders expressed the view
at economic sanctions per se indeed in-
ilve some liabilities and have limited
lpact when political decisions are made
capitals. You can only expect so much
om them in near-term policy manage-
-ent.

You know the President's longstand-
g view with respect to grain itself, and
at is that he does not feel that it's con-
ructive to isolate one segment of our
isiness and impose a burden on one
gment of American society in dealing
ith the economic sanction question but
.ther he would approach it from a very
•oadly based sanction.

Now, in that context, the situation
is yet to develop in such a way that
ich a conclusion would be appropriate
either the President's view or in mine;
id I think Chancellor Schmidt shares
iat same attitude. But both recognize

Solidarity Day With Poland

PROCLAMATION,
Jan. 20, 19821

Solidarnosc, the Polish free trade union
Solidarity Movement, was born not only of
the failure of the Polish Government to meet
the needs of its people but also from a tradi-
tion of freedom preserved and nourished by
the proud Polish people through two cen-
turies of foreign and domestic tyranny.

Solidarity symbolizes the battle of real
workers in a so-called workers' state to sus-
tain the fundamental human and economic
rights they began to win in Gdansk in
1980 — the right to work and reap the fruits
of one's labor, the right to assemble, the right
to strike, and the right to freedom of expres-
sion. Solidarity sought to address and to
resolve Poland's deep-rooted economic ills; it
acted in good faith and pursued a path of
constructive dialogue with the Polish Govern-
ment.

Despite these peaceful efforts on the part
of Solidarity, a brutal wave of repression has
descended on Poland. The imposition of mar-
tial law has stripped away all vestiges of
newborn freedom. Authorities have resorted
to arbitrary detentions, and the use of force,
resulting in violence and loss of live; the free
flow of people, ideas and information has
been suppressed; the human rights clock in
Poland has been turned back more than 30
years. The target of this repression is the
Solidarity Movement but in attacking Solidar-
ity its enemies attack an entire people. Ten
million of Poland's thirty-six million citizens
are members of Solidarity. Taken together
with their families, they account for the over-
whelming majority of the Polish nation. By
persecuting Solidarity, the Polish military
government wages war against its own peo-
ple.

History shows us that stability in Europe
is threatened when Poland is suppressed. The
hearts and minds of free people everywhere
stand in Solidarity with the people of Poland
in the hour of their suffering.

We hold in high esteem the leadership
and objectives of Lech Walesa, the head of
Solidarity, and we express our grave concern

for his present well-being. As Americans we
feel a special affinity with Solidarity and the
basic human values it seeks to uphold, in
keeping with the long tradition of Polish-
American friendship and freedom. President
Wilson's advocacy of self-determination for
the Polish people helped to bring about a
rebirth of the Polish nation earlier in this
century. America stands ready today to pro-
vide generous support and assistance to a
Poland which has returned to a path of genu-
ine internal reconciliation.

There is a spirit of Solidarity abroad in
the world today that no physical force can
crush. It crosses national boundaries and
enters into the hearts of men and women
everywhere. In factories, farms, and schools,
in cities and towns around the globe, we the
people of the Free World stand as one with
our Polish brothers and sisters. Their cause is
ours.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby designate January 30, 1982, as
Solidarity Day. I urge the people of the
United States, and free peoples everywhere,
to observe this day in meetings, demonstra-
tions, rallies, worship services and all other
appropriate expressions of support. We will
show our Solidarity with the courageous peo-
ple of Poland and call for an end to their
repression, the release of all those arbitrarily
detained, the restoration of the international-
ly recognized rights of the Polish people, and
the resumption of internal dialogue and rec-
onciliation in keeping with fundamental
human rights.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this twentieth day of January, in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-two, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and sixth.

Ronald Reagan

Text from White House press release. I

sbruary 1982

17

the extreme importance of grain as an
economic sanction in American-Soviet
relationships.

Q. But it sounds like both are do-
ing what Russell Long used to say
about taxes: "Don't tax you, don't tax
me; tax that fellow behind the tree."
And that in each instance everybody is
saying: "I don't want to give up my
meetings; I don't want to give up my
economic leverage. You do it, or we'll
just talk about it."

A. No. I don't think that's the case
at all. I think the case is to recognize the
limitations of the act— to recognize there
are two sides to it— to recognize that
one nation cannot apply, as we learned
in the post-Afghan grain embargo, as
limited as it was —and it was limited—
that unless you approach it either on a
broad front nationally— and pehaps even
more importantly in the case of grain,
internationally— that other grain pro-
ducers do not support the action, that in
the long run it will fall of its own weight
because of the contradictions and incon-
sistencies that it poses.

Q. The Chancellor several times
and now you have raised this issue of
the American press not reporting his
Bundestag speech and his resolution.

A. I think I quoted it. That was in
that regard.

Q. Yes. You added some thoughts
of your own. I would like to ask
whether anybody has researched this.
Both the Bundestag speech and the
resolution were the main topics, the
lead topics, of the lengthy article in
The Washington Post the following
day and The New York Times — two
newspapers which I assume the Em-
bassy here reads— and while this is
not the American press per se, cer-
tainly they're major newspapers. Why
is this being done? Why is this being
said?

A. Simply because it was so said,
and I have so stated to you it was said.
Now—

Q. But these events were reported
in the Post.

A. I think the main point the
Chancellor was trying to make— and
with some justification— is that there's a
certain tendency— and I don't attribute
this to the press per se; I attribute it to
those who talk to the press, those who
are very much engaged and concerned
about the situation in Poland— that
there's a tendency for us to sometimes
even masochistically attribute events in
Poland to failures in the West. The
fundamental reality of Poland is a
failure of the Marxist/Leninist system.
And if we turn it into a failure of the
Western system, I think it would be an
abuse of our own common interests—
but, also, somewhat of an abuse of
reality— and I don't mean to suggest by
that that there haven't been differences.
There have always been on unpro-
grammed or on unanticipated interna-
tional events. And I don't even put that
in this category because we have long
been involved in mutual consultations on
the likelihood of a crisis in Poland, cer-
tainly over the last year.

Now, don't misread what I said or
what I said the Chancellor said subjec-
tively. The point is that he felt— and I
think with justification— that he had
taken a rather robust early position on
the crisis in Poland 6 days after the
crisis happened, and he was one of the
first Western leaders to be out on
record. And he was probably sensitive,
as I would be were I he, of a lot of
criticism to suggest that he was less
than robust.

Now, be that as it may, that's not
the issue. The issue today is: "Where are
we today?" And we are today as cited in
the joint statement that was released
yesterday, and I would suggest that that
reflects a high degree of unanimity be-
twen the United States and West Ger-
many on the Polish question.

Q. If the Marxist/Leninist
system — as you describe it now— is
such a failure, why is the United
States holding out the prospect of aid
if things ease?

A. I think it's awfully important to
recognize that there are values in
Western societies that cannot be cast
aside, even in the context of fundamen-
tal interests; and one of those values is
to assist people who are facing starva-
tion and deprivation, and in this contex
what we are talking about is making
such assistance conditional in several
respects— one, in the context of being
sure that it gets to the people and does
not become an asset for further repres-
sion by government; and, secondly, to \
sure that it is a contributor to the proc
ess or the outcome that we are seeking
to achieve in terms of the maintenance
of the freedom of Solidarity, the
influence and autonomy of the church,
and a reconciliation which we hope
would continue the process of rejuvena-
tion internally in Poland.

Q. Does the second paragraph in
page 3 of the joint statement mean
that West Germany will participate ii
the pipeline project with Russia over
the U.S. objection?

A. Thus far, as you know, the
governments involved in this essentialh
private-sector endeavor have not posed
any objections to a continuation of the
project. I make no secret of the fact th;
the U.S. Government views this project
with great skepticism and concern. We
have expressed that concern repeatedly
We have suggested other alternatives-
which thus far have not been convinc-
ing—and we are continuing to consult c
our concerns about this pipeline.

'Press release 11.

18

FEATURE
Poland

MATO Council Meets on Poland

Secretary Haig was in Brussels
January 10-12, 1981, to attend a special
ministerial session of the- North Atlantic
Council concerning events in Poland
January 11).

Following are the declaration issued
it the conclusion of this session and the
Secretary's remarks at the International
Dress Center.

)ECLARATION,

AN. 11, 1982

. The Allied Governments condemn the
"nposition of martial law in Poland and
enounce the massive violation of human
ights and the suppression of fundamental
ivil liberties in contravention of the United
Jations Charter, the Universal Declaration
n Human Rights and the Final Act of
lelsinki.

2. The process of renewal and reform
/hich began in Poland in August 1980 was
matched with sympathy and hope by all who
ielieve in freedom and self-determination; it
esulted from a genuine effort by the over-
whelming majority of the Polish people to
.chieve a more open society in accordance
vith the principles of the Final Act of
lelsinki.

3. The imposition of martial law, the use
>f force against Polish workers, with the
housands of internments, the harsh prison
sentences and the deaths that followed, have
leprived the Polish people of their rights and
'reedoms, in particular in the field of trade
anions. These acts threaten to destroy the
jasis for reconciliation and compromise which
ire necessary to progress and stability in
Poland. They are in clear violation of Polish
commitments under the Helsinki Final Act,
oarticularly the principle relating to respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Developments in Poland demonstrate once
again the rigidity of the Warsaw Pact
regimes with respect to those changes
necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations
of their peoples.1 This endangers public con-
fidence in cooperation between East and
West and seriously affects international rela-
tions.

4. The Allies deplore the sustained cam-
paign mounted by the Soviet Union against
efforts by the Polish people for national
renewal and reform, and its active support
for the subsequent systematic suppression of
those efforts in Poland. These acts cannot be
reconciled with the Soviet Union's inter-
national undertakings, and in particular with
the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki,
especially those dealing with sovereignty,
non-intervention, threat of force and self-
determination. The Soviet Union has no right
to determine the political and social develop-
ment of Poland.

5. The Allies call upon the Polish leader-
ship to live up to its declared intention to re-
establish civil liberties and the process of
reform. They urge the Polish authorities to
end the state of martial law, to release those
arrested and to restore immediately a dia-
logue with the church and Solidarity. Only
with reconciliation and genuine negotiations
can the basic rights of the Polish people and
workers be protected, and the economic and
social progress of the country be secured.
Poland could then expect to enjoy fully the
benefits of stability in Europe and of con-
structive political and economic relations with
the West.

6. The Allies call upon the Soviet Union
to respect Poland's fundamental right to
solve its own problems free from foreign in-
terference and to respect the clear desire of
the overwhelming majority of the Polish
people for national renewal and reform.
Soviet pressure, direct or indirect, aimed at
frustrating that desire, must cease. The
Allies also warn that if an outside armed
intervention were to take place it would have
the most profound consequences for inter-
national relations.

7. In their communique of 11th
December, 1981, NATO ministers reaffirmed
their commitment to work for a climate of
confidence and mutual restraint in East-West
relations; what has since happened in Poland

has great significance for the development of
security and co-operation in Europe. The per-
sistence of repression in Poland is eroding
the political foundation for progress on the
full agenda of issues which divide East and
West.

8. The Allies remain committed to the
policies of effective deterrence and the pur-
suit of arms control and in particular have
welcomed the initiatives contained in Presi-
dent Reagan's 18th November speech. The
Soviet Union will bear full responsibility if its
actions with regard to Poland and failure to
live up to existing international obligations
damage the arms control process. A return to
the process of real reforms and dialogue in
Poland would help create the atmosphere of
mutual confidence and restraint required for
progress in negotiations in the field of arms
control and limitations, including the Geneva
talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces
due to resume on 12th January.

9. In view of the grave developments in
Poland, which constitute a serious violation of
the Helsinki Final Act, the Allies agreed that
the Madrid Conference should deal with the
situation as soon as possible at the level of
foreign ministers.

10. The Allies will also intensify their
efforts to bring to the attention of world
public opinion and international organiza-
tions, including the United Nations and its
specialized agencies such as the International
Labor Organization, the violation of human
rights and acts of violence in Poland.

11. Each Ally will, in accordance with its
own situation and legislation, identify
appropriate national possibilities for action in
the following fields:

(a) Further restrictions on the
movements of Soviet and Polish diplomats,
and other restrictions on Soviet and Polish
diplomatic missions and organizations;

(b) Reduction of scientific and technical
activities or non-renewal of exchange
agreements. Meanwhile the Allies emphasize:

• Their determination to do what lies in
their power to ensure that the truth about
events in Poland continues to reach the
Polish people despite the obstacles created by
the authorities in Warsaw and Moscow in
direct contravention of their obligations
under the Helsinki Final Act;

ebruary 1982

19

• Their resolve that the quality of their
relations with the military regime in Poland
should reflect the abnormal nature of the
present situation and their refusal to accept
it as permanent;

• Their willingness to contribute, with
other Governments, to the solution of the
problem of Polish citizens now abroad and
unable or unwilling to return to their own
country.2

12. The Allies recognize the importance
of economic measures to persuade the Polish
authorities and the Soviet Union of the
seriousness of Western concern over develop-
ments in Poland, and stress the significance
of the measures already announced by Presi-
dent Reagan.2

13. Regarding economic relations with
Poland, the Allies:

• Noted that future commercial credits
for goods other than foods will be placed in
abeyance;

• Noted that the question of holding
negotiations about the payments due in 1982
on Poland's official debts should, for the time
being, be held in suspense;

• Affirmed their willingness to continue
and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish
people for distribution and monitoring by
non-governmental organizations to ensure
that it reaches the people for whom it is
intended;

• Noted that those Allies which sell food
to Poland will seek the clearest possible
Polish commitments with regard to the use of
the food.2

14. In the current situation in Poland,
economic relations with Poland and the
Soviet Union are bound to be affected. Soviet
actions towards Poland make it necessary for
the Allies to examine the course of future
economic and commercial relations with the
Soviet Union. Recognizing that each of the
Allies will act in accordance with its own
situation and laws, they will examine
measures which could involve arrangements
regarding imports from the Soviet Union,
maritime agreements, air services agree-
ments, the size of Soviet commercial repre-
sentation and the conditions surrounding ex-
port credits.2

15. The Allies will maintain close con-
sultations on the implementation of their
resolve not to undermine the effect of each
other's measures.

16. In addition to agreeing to consult on
steps to be taken in the near future, the
Allies will also reflect on longer-term East-
West economic relations, particularly energy,
agricultural commodities and other goods and
the export of technology, in light of the
changed situation and of the need to protect
their competitive position in the field of
military and technological capabilities.2

SECRETARY'S REMARKS,
JAN. 12. 19823

The beginning of a new year is always a
moment for reflection and resolve. As
we in the West reflect upon our societies
and resolve to improve them, we should
recall the principles that sustain our
governments, our law, and our behavior
toward each other. Our idea of a just
community is founded upon respect for
the rights of the individual, including
freedom of expression, freedom of
choice, and freedom of association.

We believe that the rights of free
men sustain the creativity of civilization.
The arts, science, and technology of the
West flourish because creative talents
can develop undisturbed. And our enor-
mous material abundance comes from
the cooperative efforts of free men and
women working together.

An ancient scholar once wrote that
"history is philosophy drawn from
examples." The philosophy of freedom
that unites the Western community of
nations is an enduring theme of Euro-
pean history. Already in this decade,
Poland, a nation steeped in 1,000 years
of European culture, has given us an ex-
ample of the link between liberty and
creativity. The Polish people sought the
dignity of the workplace through free
association in their union Solidarity in

20

order to resolve their mounting eco-
nomic problems. Such dignity meant,
above all, respect for the individual, his
talents, and his right to a just reward
for his work.

The Polish search for reform was a
peaceful movement. Solidarity respected
both Poland's geographic situation and
the imperatives for social progress. This
example of peaceful change in the
world's most heavily armed continent
would surely have contributed to a more
legitimate and secure international
order.

After 18 months of achievement,
Solidarity is now being violently sup-
pressed. In a grotesque parody of their
own propaganda, the Communist author
ities are employing the police power of
the state to oppress the very workers
they are pledged to protect. Fear is
widespread. Thousands remain in jail.
Tens of thousands are being forced to
violate their consciences, a practice
described by His Holiness the Pope as
"the most painful blow inflicted on
human dignity." Once again, a knock at
the door heralds the arrival of the secret
police. Poland today exemplifies the
historic failure of Soviet-style com-
munism to produce either bread or
freedom.

Myths and Realities

Poland's future now hangs in the
balance. Will there be reform or reac-
tion, a renewal of hope, or a deepening
of despair? This is not a question for
Poland alone. The poet Schiller wrote
that "world history is the world's court
of judgment." The historic events in
Poland with their far-reaching implica-
tions demand a judgment by the West.
We must not let our judgment be
confused by four myths about Poland:

• First, that Solidarity brought
about its own suppression through ex-
cessive ambition;

• Second, that the Soviet Union did
not intervene in Poland and is, there-
fore, not accountable;

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Poland

• Third, that Poland's rulers are
cting out of laudable national consider-
tions; and

• Fourth, that the West can and
hould do nothing because what hap-
ened in Poland is strictly an internal
ffair.

Each of these myths is belied by
eality.

First. The first myth is that the
rutality which began on December 13
/as provoked by the excesses of Soli-
arity itself. The reality was different,
'or months prior to the sudden imposi-
ion of martial law, Solidarity worked
trenuously to halt strikes and prevent
haos. Lech Walesa traveled from city
o city, from factory to factory, calling
jr people to return to work. His call
/as heard. After March 1981, strikes in
'oland never exceeded a small fraction
f the work force. After August 1981,
he Polish Government's own statistics
ecorded increasing production.

Solidarity's search for stability was
iot reciprocated. The Jaruzelski govern-
ment had planned a different course. Its
nly contribution to the call for national
ialogue was the introduction of a law to
orbid strikes, making confrontation in-
vitable.

The contrast could not be greater
letween the victims and the conspi-
ators. On the one side, the Solidarity
eaders, representing a free association
if workers, were caught virtually intact
n a single building. On the other side, a
government claiming to protect the
vorkers prepared so well to impose filar-
ial law that its plans have been accu-
rately described in the Soviet Union as
brilliantly conspired."

Second. The second myth is that the
oviet Union did not intervene in Poland
ind, therefore, should not be held
iccountable. The reality was different.
\fter August 1980, Poland was sub-
ected to a continuous campaign of
Moscow's pressures, threats, and in-
imidation— including military maneu-
/ers. All of these actions were intended
explicitly to halt the process of reform.

The secret preparations were even
more ominous. It is known that as early
as last March the Soviets were arguing
for the imposition of martial law. In
September the martial law decree itself
was printed in the Soviet Union. And
the commander of the Warsaw Pact
forces, a Soviet marshal, was positioned
in Poland both prior to martial law and
during its execution.

Can anyone seriously be surprised
by the Soviet role? Have we forgotten
earlier episodes in Poland, East Ger-
many, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia?
The use of force on a nationwide scale
against the Polish people today takes
place only because the Soviet Union
instigated it, supports it, and encourages
it.

Third. The third myth is that we
are witnessing a Polish attempt to
establish law and order in the hope of
forestalling an otherwise inevitable
Soviet military intervention. In a cruel
paradox, we are asked to believe that
martial law, like Solidarity itself, is a
purely national phenomenon, inspired by
a high national purpose. It follows,
therefore, that we must somehow be
prepared to accept what is happening in
Poland today because it is a lesser evil.

The reality is different. Regardless
of motivation, a Soviet-trained military
man is suppressing his own people under
the pressure of the Soviet Union. As the
Polish bishops put it: "Our suffering is
that of the entire nation, terrorized by
military force." The loss of liberty in
Poland is no less keenly felt because a
Polish general, rather than a Soviet
general, is in charge.

Fourth. The fourth myth is that
Poland's misfortunes are strictly an in-
ternal affair, that the West has no right
to judge the situation nor to take any
action that might affect it. The reality is
different. The Soviet Union and Poland
both signed the Helsinki Final Act of
1975. All the signatories were obligated
to nurture conditions of freedom and
diversity, thereby encouraging our

peoples to resolve the problems dividing
Europe. The standards of freedom and
diversity established at Helsinki have
been violated. The process begun at
Helsinki has been put in jeopardy. We
have both a right and an obligation to
point out this danger.

For centuries the Poles have known
the bitterness of aggression. Instigated,
aided, and abetted by the Soviet Union,
the suppression of Poland's search for
social justice is taking place today. Once
again the dictates of a foreign power are
determining the shape of Polish society.

Strategy for the West

The people of Poland are now looking to
the West. We must give them clear and
unequivocal evidence of our support. But
our policies must be practical as well,
taking into account Polish and Soviet
realities. We want real progress, not
just empty posturing.

My President and other Western
leaders have, therefore, stated that we
seek an end to martial law and repres-
sion, release of political prisoners, and
the restoration of those rights— as prom-
ised in the Helsinki Final Act— that pro-
tect the independence of a trade union
movement and the church. Only in this
way can the basis be established for
reconciliation through negotiation within
Polish society.

The outcome of such a negotiation is
entirely a matter for the Polish people.
Nonetheless, under the Helsinki accord,
we must counter the external and inter-
nal pressures which impede the recon-
ciliation and reform so clearly desired by
the citizens of Poland.

These are realistic objectives based
on both the situation in Poland and
East-West relationships. The desire for
dignity in the workplace, embodied by
Solidarity, cannot be eradicated. The
brutal suppression of Poland's first free
union has provoked profound outrage
throughout Polish society. Resistance
exists.

21

The Polish economy will not revive
without the cooperation of the Polish
worker, upon whom the brunt of the
repression has fallen. And the growing
problems of Poland cannot be resolved
alone. The Polish Government should
not expect our assistance while repres-
sion continues. Moscow can also be
made aware of the benefits of restraint.
Neither assumption of Poland's economic
burdens nor military intervention are
easy decisions for a Soviet Union with
such problems as a weakening economy
and war in Afghanistan. Clearly,
Moscow wants to sustain economic and
other elements of cooperation with the
West.

Prudent Western leadership can help
to achieve a greater degree of modera-
tion in Poland so that the necessary
process of reform may continue. With
this in mind, President Reagan has
taken serious steps to signal both the
Polish and Soviet Governments of our
concern. He has also reserved additional
action in the hope of deterring both fur-
ther repression and Soviet intervention.

• All future credits and govern-
ment-to-government assistance will be
denied the Polish regime until progress
resumes. At the same time the United
States will continue to provide food,
medicine, and other humanitarian
assistance through private institutions
or other arrangements that guarantee
delivery to the Polish people and not the
regime. The President has also stated
that we are prepared to offer significant
help if the path of reconciliation and
reform is chosen and pursued, of course,
with meaningful acts and not just ges-
tures to delude the West.

• President Reagan brought to
President Brezhnev's attention our
fundamental concerns; the response was
negative. The United States has, there-
fore, initiated a number of actions,
primarily in the economic field, which
will penalize the Soviet Union. The

President is prepared to go further, if
necessary. At the same time, Moscow
has been informed of our desire to pur-
sue a more constructive path, if the
Soviet Union will reciprocate.

The United States is not alone.
Yesterday, the North Atlantic Council
condemned developments in Poland. In a
special ministerial declaration, they
made clear that both the Soviet Union
and the Polish Government have vio-
lated the Final Act of Helsinki and other
international standards. The allies left
no doubt that repression in Poland is
eroding the foundation for East-West
progress.

The United States and its partners
stated that the current situation in
Poland is bound to affect their economic
relations with both Poland and the
Soviet Union. They stressed the sig-
nificance of the measures already
announced by President Reagan. In this
spirit, the members of the council re-
solved not to undermine the effect of
each other's measures. And they agreed
to identify appropriate national possi-
bilities for action across a broad front,
including an examination of the course
of future economic and commercial rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.

Far-Reaching Implications

Thus it is clear that events in Poland
have a significance beyond the tragic
fate of that country. A repressed Poland
is not a factor for stability in Europe.
Only respect for internationally recog-
nized rights can form the basis for na-
tional reconciliation and reform to
rescue Poland from the abyss of despair.

Once again, the Polish events have
revealed a faultline in the political
geography of the East. Once again, an
ideology has been discredited. Funda-
mental disregard for individual rights
has brought about a basic failure in
social creativity. The attempt to ignore
this prevailing weakness in Soviet-style

communism by resort to force is a
source of great danger in the nuclear
era. Far from being inconsistent with
constructive East-West relations, reforn
in the East is the basis for greater
legitimacy, stability, and security
throughout Europe.

The Polish situation also challenges
the credibility of the West. We also
stand at a crossroads. Do we want a
world characterized by growing free-
dom, cooperation, and security or in-
creasing repression, confrontation, and
fear? Are we going to see free nations
acting to help expand liberty and peace
or will international change be dom-
inated by totalitarian forces?

For well over a year, the alliance
has stated that there would be serious
consequences if the Soviet Union inter-
vened to reverse an entirely peaceful
dialogue in Poland. Soviet responsibility
for present events is clear. A Western
failure to act would not only assist the
repression of the Polish people but also
diminish confidence about our reactions
to future events in Poland and else-
where. Stable relations between East
and West depend upon what Chancellor
Schmidt has called "calculability." The
Soviets must know that there can be
negative or positive consequences,
depending on their conduct. Poland is a
test case, and European history teaches
that the greatest mistake in dealing with
heavily armed aggressors is to ignore
their violations of international agree-
ments and to act as though nothing had
happened.

Beyond the fate of Poland, beyond
East- West relations, we must ultimately
ask ourselves what these developments
mean for our self-respect if we do not
respond together. The West is often
accused of being merely a collection of
consumer societies. Are we so sated or
intimidated that we fear to defend the
values that make life worth living?

22

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE
Poland

The Soviet Union has proclaimed for
nany years that there is no contradic-
tion between the pursuit of detente and
deological competition. And Moscow has
ilways supported the spread of
Marxism-Leninism. Are freedom and
democracy less a part of our policy? Do
vve imagine that we can purchase peace
Dy silence and inaction? Poland should
remind us that in the battle for the
minds of men, the best arguments are to
oe found on our side. The existence of
successful industrial democracies in the
West is a striking rebuke to Soviet-style
:ommunism. Our persistent progress,
even with all of our faults, means that
;he Soviet system is neither necessary
lor inevitable. After all, the Polish
Deople sought nothing more than free
issociation, the dignity of labor, and
■espect for the individual— rights that
we in the West sometimes take for
granted.

Poland should also change our think-
ng about world affairs. For over 60
/ears, each new Marxist-Leninist regime
las been greeted by some in the West
vith fresh hopes and expectations.
Then, as the urge for social justice and
Ereedom which helped bring them to
Dower in the first place was suppressed,
disillusionment set in. It took 20 years
}r more of Stalinism before many
Western observers saw the reality of the
Soviet Union. It took just a year after
:he North Vietnamese takeover of South
Vietnam and Kampuchea for under-
standing of that supposedly progressive
regime. We are still learning about this
orand of totalitarianism as the evidence
mounts of the yellow rain of terror in
Southeast Asia and Soviet complicity.
Some still do not understand what is
happening in Nicaragua or what is at
stake in El Salvador.

The greatest danger to the West to-
day may be the tendency to apply dif-
ferent standards to the behavior of the
East and the West. No matter how
much Communist repression, no matter
how many Soviet nuclear missiles, no
matter how many Afghanistans and
Polands, some would still put pressure
on the West to improve relations with
the Soviet Union— rather than to de-
mand from Moscow the moderation of
its behavior.

The common sense of our citizens
rejects this double standard. Above all,
the crime against the Polish people has
outraged the workers of the world. A
state supposedly founded on the
workers' movement is actively suppress-
ing a workers' movement 10 million
strong. The Polish workingman is the
target— and the victim. His voice has
been silenced. His productive energies
have been sapped. His labor is being
forced. His chosen leaders have been im-
prisoned. His hopes are being sacrificed
because they do not fit with Soviet plans
for maintaining absolute control over the
countries of Eastern Europe.

It is, therefore, appropriate that our
unions are taking the lead— with
churches and other private groups — to
honor the Polish people on January 30.
This gesture of mass solidarity will
represent a major expression of moral
support. It will also demonstrate to the
Soviets and their friends that the
crushing of human rights will not be
ignored. Such an expression of moral
support will be equally important as a
celebration of freedom.

My country is a child of European
civilization. The American people share
your outrage about the trampling of a
nation in the center of Europe, because
it has dared to assert its Europeanness.
We can disagree about which events in
the world are central to the security of
the alliance and which are peripheral to

its purposes; but surely there can be no
disagreement that events in Poland
touch the core of the conscience of the
alliance.

We have spoken with one voice
about these events. Yesterday, we
created a clear and united framework
for action. Now we must act. Winston
Churchill once observed that "the world
is divided into peoples that own the
governments and governments that own
the peoples." Poland challenges us to
remember our values and to advocate
them. In the final analysis, only we, the
people of the world that own the govern-
ments, are the guarantors of both peace
and freedom.

'The Greek delegation reserved its posi-
tion on this sentence.

2The Greek delegation reserved its posi-
tion on this paragraph.

3Press release 15. ■

rebruary 1982

23

THE SECRETARY

Secretary Interviewed on
"Face the Nation"

Secretary Haig was interviewed on
CBS's "Face the Nation" by George Her-
man, CBS News; John Wakott, News-
week; arid Robert Pierpoint, CBS News,
on December 20, 1981. i

Q. A number of reports tell us
that the Soviet Union has supplied
technical assistance, advice, some sup-
plies, all kinds of help and encourage-
ment in the martial law imposed in-
side Poland. Are they not in a sense
involved? Are they not an involved
party in the martial law in Poland?

A. I think, as the President said in
his statement this week, there's no ques-
tion about Soviet cooperation and sup-
port for the activities going on in Poland
today. Just as the Polish authorities
must be held responsible for the ex-
cesses of the situation, so too must the
Soviet Union.

Q. Does that mean that if there
are any sanctions imposed against
Poland, they should similarly be im-
posed against the country that is sup-
porting it and pressing it on — the
Soviet Union?

A. With respect to actions that will
be taken in the future, either with
regard to the Polish Government or the
Soviet Union, I would prefer to let
events speak for themselves.

Q. My question was: Since the
Soviet Union is involved, as you say,
in what is going on inside Poland, if
we apply sanctions against Poland,
should we apply them equally and at
the same time against the Soviet
Union? And your answer was, in
effect, that we'll have to let conditions
develop.

What I am trying to get at now is,
can you give us your thinking about
the policy which will guide the
American side of these actions?

A. I think our policy thus far, and
the President's policy in particular, has
been one to avoid excesses and the,
perhaps, preoccupation with contem-
porary muscle tone and be influenced by
the historic significance of the events
with which we are dealing.

These are very important events and
the situation is, in the President's words,
grave. Today, for example, the Polish
Ambassador to Washington [Romuald

24

Spasowski] has formally requested
asylum here in the United States. He
will be making an announcement to that
effect this afternoon at the Department
of State. This will involve his request for
asylum for his wife, his daughter, and
his son-in-law. I think his own remarks
this afternoon will speak to the serious-
ness of this problem.

What is very important at this time
is that we Americans keep the historic
significance of the events before us and
not the contemporary give-and-take of
the situation, and that we apply all of
the leverage available to us. In some
respects it is limited, but it is not insig-
nificant to effect moderation, negotia-
tion, and, hopefully, conciliation among
the peoples and the parties in Poland.

Q. Given facts like the one you've
just provided us, do you think there's
any hope that some of what Solidarity
has achieved in Poland can be saved?
And what do you think the United
States and its allies can do to preserve
some of the reforms made in Poland?

A. I think in the first instance we
cannot accept a doomsday theory that
all is lost and it is inevitably lost. After
all, there's been 18 months of toleration
in dialectic form, and thus far, until this
recent crisis, the Soviet Union and the
party in Poland have accepted historic
change in the normal way of doing
business.

We must hope that those same con-
straints that have operated in the past
will continue to influence the outcome of
the situation in Poland and do all we can
to be sure that these pressures continue.

Q. Before I go on to my first ques-
tion, you've dropped kind of a bomb-
shell here about Ambassador
Spasowski, and I assume — but I
would like to have you confirm
it — that we will grant him and his
family asylum.

A. He made the request yesterday
afternoon, and the President personally
ordered the government to move
promptly to provide asylum and protec-
tion for the Ambassador and his family.

Q. I assume that they will disap-
pear from sight after this afternoon's
appearance at the State Department?

A. We are going to be very con-
scious of the safety and well-being of
this individual.

Q. I would like to go on and ask
you, as my first major question: You
said that the United States must apply
all leverage available to us in this
situation. What leverage do we really
have at this time?

A. Without labeling particular
levers, which sometimes is self-defeating
and lessens the impact when they're ap-
plied, they involve political, economic,
and, of course, security-related assets.

Q. By security-related assets, you
sound like you might be hinting at
some kind of military leverage that we
might apply against the Soviets.

A. I think it's important that, at a
time like this, no public official describe
in detail either what we will or what we
will not do as events unfold.

Q. Let me take you back to
another thing you said. You talked
about how the Soviet Union and the
Communist Party inside Poland had
showed considerable accommodation
to the new freedoms in Poland.
Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you,
but it implies to me just a little bit
that you feel that Solidarity over-
stepped itself, perhaps, when it called
for a referendum to overthrow the
government.

A. I think it's important that we not
give too much weight to the contem-
porary excuse for the crackdown in
Poland as being the consequence of ex-
cess exuberance or radicalism within the
Solidarity movement.

Clearly, from the outset the Soviet
Union has been insisting on a crackdown
and urging the Polish Government to
crack down. Up until this point they've
been able to blunt those pressures. The
fact that this call for a referendum oc-
curred very, very recently belies the fact
that it was, in fact, the triggering
mechanism. The plans put in place in
Poland that were implemented last
Saturday had been in preparation for an
extended period.

Q. Did we know about them all
along?

A. We were clearly conscious of the
likelihood that the initial repression
would come from Polish security and
military forces.

Q. Do you have some sort of a
feeling what it is that the Polish
Government under Prime Minister or
General Jaruzelski wants out of all
this? What kind of a Poland it wants?

A. I think his actions will determine
the answer to that question. I hope they
will reflect a consciousness on the Prime

\

:

THE SECRETARY

Minister's part that a rejuvenation, if
1 ou will, or a reform has been under-
lay, leading toward greater liberties,
nd that those improvements must be
j 'reserved.

They have, after all, assured us— the
'olish Government has— that is their in-
ention. Thus far their actions belie the
■• redibility of that.

Q. So do you have any feeling how
ar back they may roll things? Origi-

I ially they said they would hold to the
greements of August 1980. Now you

j eem to imply that they're going to
oil things back even further than

I hat.

A. One can only look to the actions
hat are underway today: repression,

. iolence, imprisonment without due
ause, termination of the right of the
'olish people to travel, suppression of
he free press— to the degree there ever
^as one but certainly those of more in-

1 lependent character. All of these things
.re very worrisome from the standpoint

I f the ultimate intentions of Prime

i Minister Jaruzelski.

Q. You talked about putting it in
•erspective. Is this another Hungary,
nother Czechoslovakia, another in the
eries that we've seen of Soviet slap-
lowns of movements of this kind?
A. I think it's important for the

; American people to recognize this is not
, Hungary or a Czechoslovakia. It's
omething far more profound in historic
erms. We've witnessed for 18 months a
aosening up of political reins of suppres-
ion in Poland. The previous incidents
vere more, I think, associated with eco-
lomic deprivation, food shortages, or

repression, per se. This represents a pro-
ound challenge to the Marxist-Leninist

hystem of traditional control, and for
hat reason it is all the more dangerous,
t does constitute a vital threat to the in-
erests of the Soviet Union. For all
hese reasons we should not draw

historic parallels in a precise sense.

Q. Given what you've just said
i bo u I the historic nature of the
l.'hange in Poland, how can the United
states continue to do business with
;;he Soviet Union as usual, providing
jrain that they need, high technology
that they need and can't produce for
ithemselves, in light of what you've
ilready said is their role in this
crackdown in Poland?

A. It's a very important question,
ind one that events may force us to deal
with in the days and hours ahead. Thus
far, however, I think it is vitally impor-
tant that we preserve the leverage we

have available to bring about outcomes
internally in Poland, which meet the in-
terests of the Polish people and the
values to which we aspire.

Q. Let me just follow that up by
asking: Even before the crackdown by
Jaruzelski, the Polish economy was in
tatters. Do you think that this brand
of martial law being practiced today in
Poland is going to restore the Polish
economy without some more overt
Soviet economic and political inter-
vention?

A. One could draw a very valid case
that it will aggravate the situation.
Clearly, Poland has been at an economic
standstill since these events occurred a
week ago. Incidentally, that's another
reason why we must recognize that
there are still events to occur which will
influence the outcome of this situation.
Thus far we are watching the conse-
quences of the ideological implications of
the crackdown. Within a matter of days
or hours we will begin to see economic
deprivation begin to socialize this situa-
tion, not just merely keep it ideological
in consequences. In that sense, again we
have levers and we have assets with
which we can influence the situation,
hopefully in the direction of moderation.

Q. Do you have any information on
what has happened to the leadership
of Solidarity, particularly Lech Walesa
himself, that you could pass on to us?
You sound like you have some kind of
knowledge about the possibility that
he might be surfaced or something.

A. It is our understanding from a
host of related intelligence reports that
Mr. Walesa is in confinement outside the
outskirts of Warsaw under government
control. We also have had some reports
that he continues to remain the inde-
pendent figure that he has proven to be
thus far.

Q. But he is not cooperating with
the military regime?

A. We've seen no signs of coopera-
tion. We would hope that the Polish
authorities would permit Mr. Walesa to
bring his experience and wisdom to bear
in this situation.

Q. The third force that's generally
mentioned inside Poland is their own
Catholic Church, Archbishop Josef
Glemp. Do you see any signs that they
are in any position— are things close
enough to equilibrium so that the
third party could do some good here,
pushed on, of course, by the Pope who
is a Pole himself?

A. This is an anguishing problem
for the church, of course, with its great
emphasis on the moral values and the
humanitarian aspects of this tragedy.
But the church in Poland plays an ex-
tremely important role, and thus far I
think it has been an extremely construc-
tive role.

In the days ahead we would hope
that their influence on the situation
would continue to be one which urges
conciliation and negotiation and com-
promise, and not the total crushing of
the Solidarity movement.

Q. Let me ask you a question that
I think is sort of behind everybody's
questions and in everybody's mind
about this: Do you see Poland becom-
ing a blazing sort of Armageddon?
Everybody remembers Poland in
World War II. Do you see Poland
bringing things into a terrible collapse
in a bloody outcome of some kind?

A. A situation which embodies the
ingredients that this situation embodies
is replete with grave dangers for peace
and stability. Of course, the potential for
that continues to exist. We would hope
that the obligation of the government—
and of the Soviet Union— to work to pre-
vent such an outcome is recognized in
both circles.

Q. I think maybe we ought to try
to switch our focus, because this pro-
gram never is quite long enough. As
you are well aware, Prime Minister
Begin and the Israeli Government
have issued this morning some rather
strong statements. They have canceled
the so-called strategic relationship
with the United States, and they are
indicating they can get along without
our help.

I'm wondering if you have any
reaction to the possibility that now
Israel may go ahead and annex the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and
refuse to surrender the Sinai. And if
that happens, what is our response go-
ing to be?

A. Let me address the major issue
first. You know, Israel has been, is to-
day, and will remain a close friend of
the United States. President Reagan
recognizes— perhaps far more than any
President in recent history— the vital im-
portance of our obligations to the people
of Israel and our guarantees to the sur-
vival of that state. Nothing has changed.

Now, it is always the case that dif-
ferences occur, even among very good
friends; and this is just such a differ-
ence. The task of American diplomacy in
the days ahead is to work to resolve

:ebruary 1982

25

THE SECRETARY

these issues, not to exacerbate them. I
would hope that the rhetoric and the de-
meanor of both governments would
recognize the overall imperative of our
continuing cordiality and interrelation-
ship.

I anticipate that Israel will live
religiously by the obligations of the
Camp David accords, will return the
Sinai on schedule, and will continue, as
it has in recent months, to participate as
an active and cooperative member of the
autonomy process. I'm very optimistic
that today's storm clouds will pass, as
they have.

Q. Are you equally confident that
the Israelis will refrain from moving
against the Palestinian positions in
southern Lebanon and re-igniting the
conflict there?

A. I think it's important that Ameri-
cans recognize that Palestinian locations
overlooking the northern borders of
Israel have been a constant irritation
over an extended period. The recently
established cease-fire, or cessation of
hostilities, has been a welcome relief in a
pattern of historic trouble and danger
for Israel.

I have been very conscious of great
incentives in Israel to take military ac-
tion and to remove that danger, from
their subjective point of view. But it is
also important at this time in the peace
process that restraint be exercised by
Israel, by the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), by the parties in
Lebanon, and by Syria. I'm very happy
that, thus far, restraint has manifested
itself. The recent trip of Ambassador
Habib [President's special emissary to
the Middle East], directed by the Presi-
dent, has reassured us that all of the
parties are very, very pleased with the
cessation of hostilities and are going to
work together to retain that situation.

Q. Let me ask you what happened
to make everything so smooth, soft,
and sweet since the day when you first
heard about the Israeli announcement
and said, "We regret this very surpris-
ing announcement which we first read
about today. It is not consistent with
Resolution 242 of the United Nations,
which is the fundamental resolution
underlying the peace process." [U.S.
Defense] Secretary Weinberger called
it "provocative and destabilizing."
Now, all of a sudden it is part of our
friendship with Israel, or what?

A. No, my remarks with respect to
our historic relationship with Israel
should in no way be interpreted as a
whitewash of the concern and disap-

proval that we felt— and expressed— on
this recent annexation action. On the
other hand, one must keep clearly in
mind that the longstanding policies of
this country represent not only the vital
interests of Israel but of the United
States as well. And it is our task now,
having spoken, having joined in a reso-
lution of condemnation at the United
Nations, having held in suspension the
recent MOU, or Memorandum of Under-
standing, on Israeli-American strategic
cooperation, the time has come now for
the leadership in both countries to get to
work to repair the damage—

Q. And to bring the "sinner" back
into the fold?

A. —and above all, to continue with
this peace process, which this action
tended to put in jeopardy, and that's the
reason for our concern.

Q. Do you have any feeling at all
that this was designed to happen at a
time when the U.S. Government was
so deeply preoccupied with Poland,
that Mr. Begin pulled this out of his
hospital room and thrust it on the
floor of the Knesset in such a hurry
while we were totally preoccupied
with Poland?

A. I'm not going to label tactics or
motives in this particular case. There
are perhaps historic precedents. But I
think it is important to recognize that
the fact of the action did constitute a
threat to the peace process. Therefore,
we had an obligation, the President felt
very strongly, not to create an atmos-
phere in which blank checks are
available for the leadership in Israel, and
that they have mutual obligations as
well.

Q. You talk about getting on with
the peace process, and, obviously, it is
now in some jeopardy. There have
been suggestions that maybe it is time
to appoint a special high-level negotia-
tor to help out between Egypt and
Israel. Have you decided to do that,
and if so, who will it be?

A. We've kept this option steadily in
mind throughout the autonomy discus-
sions that have been underway now for
several months; and the moment the
President feels that the appointment of
a higher level U.S. representative will
make a constructive contribution to the
outcome, I can assure you he will take
that step.

Q. But it's not yet?

A. At this point, we are assessing
the progress made, and decisions on that

I

issue will probably be forthcoming in
maybe a month or two.

Q. Do you have any new informa-
tion on the kidnaping of the American
General, General Dozier, in Verona?
And would the United States be will-
ing to be a party, in a sense— a third
party or whatever— in any negotiations
to secure his release from the ter-
rorists?

A. We are following this situation
moment by moment, and the President
is, personally. I spoke to him a few
moments before this show. As you
know, he feels very, very strongly not
only about the despicable character of
this act but the overall subject of inter-
national terrorism. It is always prudent,
with respect to the second part of your
question, to never lay out your plans
before the fact, and we will not do so in
this case.

Q. While we are on international
terrorists, let me bring up the word
"Libya" to you, and ask you if you
have anything new on their "hit
squads"? Are you under new, special
protection, or are you beginning to
relax a little bit?

A. I've had some recent jokes on
that subject at home. We continue to be
very alert to the dangers of assassina-
tion attempts on high American officials.
We continue to be because we know that
those dangers continue.

Q. In that same vein, there has
been a great deal of skepticism recent-
ly about these reports of assassination
plots. You clearly believe the reports
to be true, or true enough, that
prudence is indicated, and yet you
have produced no evidence— and cer-
tainly no arrests— to back this up.

Q. I'm going to have to cut you
off. Can you give us a one-word
answer?

A. The one-word answer to that is
"hogwash."

1 Press release 426.1

26

Department of State Bulletin

\FRICA

rhe African Private Sector
and U.S. Foreign Policy

y Chester A. Crocker

Address before the Council on
oreign Relations in Chicago on
'ovember 19, 1981. Mr. Crocker is As-
.stant Secretary for African Affairs.

[y subject today is Africa's economic
lemma and this Administration's
;sponse to a problem which endangers
tal U.S. interests. My text is that
)metimes controversial phrase, the
nvate sector. The headlines which an-
3unced President Reagan's speech in
hiladelphia before the Cancun summit
lanaged to convey the impression that
ir foreign economic policy toward the
hird World consists in large part of
uffing multinational capitalism down
le throats of reluctant Socialists. I am
ere to assure you that this is a very
dsleading oversimplification.

A careful reading of the President's
atements on the occasion of the Can-
in summit reveals that he emphasized
vo points of particular relevance to
Svelopment policy.

• First, he noted that economic
■eedom— "freedom to choose, to own
roperty, to work at a job of [one's]
loice, and to invest in a dream for the
iture"— is an ingredient vital to econ-
mic success.

• Second, he stressed the impor-
ince of individuals. "Individual farmers,
iborers, owners, traders and mana-
ers," he said at Cancun, ". . . are the
eart and soul of development."

Of course, this invocation of produc-
ve individualism and economic freedom
sflects good and long-established Re-
ublican beliefs. We offer no apology for
nem. But I would also emphasize that it
lso reflects a growing, bipartisan, inter-
ational consensus, shared by experts
nd practitioners of development as well
s politicians, about development policies
nd aid programs in places like Africa,
'his consensus is found among liberals
s well as conservatives and is increas-
igly apparent in the south as well as
he north. It reflects a concern which
as little to do with multinational cor-
iorations, which for better or worse (in
ny view it is for worse) are barely pres-
nt in most countries in Africa. Rather,
; is a concern for small economic units
nd for individuals who must realize

their productive potential if development
is to occur in the poor countries.

Africa's Economic Dilemma

Let me digress briefly to note two
familiar aspects of Africa's condition:
poverty and diversity. Africa has the
worst economic growth rate of any con-
tinent. It contains two-thirds of those
countries certified by the United Nations
as the very poorest. It is the only conti-
nent which is afflicted with declining per
capita food production. An alarming pro-
portion of African countries, including
several of major strategic importance,
are caught in a merciless squeeze be-
tween soaring oil prices, stagnating ex-
port production, and ever-mounting
debt.

Yet for all its problems, Africa has
both great human potential and vast,
largely untapped mineral and agricul-
tural wealth. The most populous black
African country, Nigeria, is our second
largest source of imported oil. Southern
Africa— from Zaire to the Cape— con-
tains mineral wealth of great importance
to both the U.S. and European econo-
mies. Africa has great plains and valleys
with major agricultural potential and un-
tapped hydroelectric capacity beyond
that of any other continent.

Africa's unsatisfactory economic per-
formance is rooted in many factors, in-
cluding an often harsh environment,
postindependence civil turmoil, and lack
of both human and physical infra-
structure. I do not want to underem-
phasize these factors. But it must also
be realized that these handicaps have all
too often been compounded by ques-
tionable government policies.

Perhaps most important, trade and
exchange rate policies of many African
countries have systematically discrimi-
nated against agriculture, holding down
the returns to producers of both food
and export crops while raising the prices
of imports and consumer goods. Pro-
ducers of traditional exports like coffee,
cocoa, and sisal frequently receive far
less than the real value of their crops,
while they pay inflated prices for even
such basic implements as animal-drawn
plows and engines used in irrigation.

This discrimination against domestic
agriculture is reinforced by government-
controlled marketing, common to many

African countries, which operates to
keep farm prices low as a way of reduc-
ing prices to the urban population. The
result has been one major cause of
declining per capita food production and
increased dependence on food imports.
As food imports increased, African
governments subsidized the local selling
price of these imports, again to keep ur-
ban prices down. The result has con-
tributed to spiraling budget deficits
which are now becoming untenable, even
as the removal of subsidies causes politi-
cal tension.

Industrial policies offer another ex-
ample. In the postindependence period,
most African countries combined na-
tionalization with the creation of public
enterprises. These state-owned firms
were in many cases called upon to in-
crease employment, to deliver goods at
low prices to key groups, and, in short,
to do everything but produce economic
returns. Governments often intended
that public enterprises operate economi-
cally and provide revenue, but, over
time, political pressure for low prices
and constant shortfalls in revenue led to
their being starved of returns to cover
depreciation and capital investment. As
a result, Africa is strewn with so-called
parastatals [state-owned enterprises]
that are seriously undercapitalized and
rundown.

Economic policy in Africa often
derived from social goals or represented
carryover from colonial practice, as in
the use of government marketing boards
for agricultural goods. Government na-
tionalization of foreign firms and in-
volvement in new enterprises was also
designed to substitute for the genuine
lack of an indigenous private sector at
the time of independence. All too often
commercial activity was, in the colonial
era, controlled by ethnic minorities
(whether Lebanese as in West Africa or
Indians in the East) which raised na-
tionalistic emotions. But the record
makes clear that replacing such ele-
ments with bureaucracies is rarely work-
able. (We should bear in mind that
bureaucrats, too, can be predatory,
especially when they act to protect
favored clienteles at the expense of
others with less political clout.) In
general, governments have not been able
to provide the goods and services that a
thriving private sector could. As a result
(and in part because of the pricing
policies mentioned earlier) the rural
areas of many African countries are
starved for goods.

In summary the productive sectors
in Africa have been overregulated and
underassisted. All too often, farmers

abruary 1982

27

AFRICA

have their prices held down and their
marketing freedom restricted, typically,
imports are closely controlled and li-
censed, the public sector overwhelms the
private, and conflicting social goals in-
terfere with the operation and capitaliza-
tion of even essential industries.

The full cost of these policies to the
economies of Africa was masked for a
long time by periods of high prices for
some African commodities, heavy
foreign borrowing, and foreign
assistance. But with the slowdown of
economies in Africa's industrialized
country markets, falling prices for many
primary products, escalating debt serv-
ice costs, and sharply rising oil prices,
African countries are today facing an
economic crisis of enormous magnitude.
In some cases debts are staggering.
Often foreign exchange shortages are so
great that imports of spare parts and
other essential goods must be controlled.
The weight of public subsidies and obli-
gations is so great as to choke off invest-
ment and prevent adequate maintenance
for existing activities.

More and more African countries
must seek short-term balance-of-pay-
ments help from institutions like the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and debt
rescheduling from both public and
private creditors. But in country after
country, it is becoming apparent that
this is not enough, that something more
fundamental is needed to pull Africa out
of this most dangerous situation.

Unsatisfactory Results of Foreign Aid
to Date

We need to ask ourselves about the role
of outside influences on these events, in-
cluding the role of foreign aid. Total
economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa,
bilateral and multilateral, is now running
at the rate of approximately $9 billion a
year. Of this, the U.S. share, including
our contribution to the World Bank and
other multilaterals, is approximately
10%. Given the situation described
above, the effectiveness of this con-
siderable effort clearly leaves something
to be desired.

Foreign aid, to be sure, has accomp-
lished a great deal. These accomp-
lishments include:

• The enormous development of
human resources in Africa since inde-
pendence, when there were practically
no universities or university graduates;

• The building of agricultural
research and extension services for food
production, when previously these only
existed for export crops;

• The creation of basic infrastruc-
ture such as roads and railroads into
some hitherto isolated areas unable to
market crops and minerals;

• The exploration and documenta-
tion of Africa's economic potential; and

• The conquering of several major
diseases and the development of basic
health infrastructure.

All of these accomplishments owe
much to foreign aid and to technical
cooperation between Western and Afri-
can governments. Nor should one expect
instant results in a field as complex as
economic development, and the 20 years
or so in which we have been involved
seriously in aid to Africa is an instant in
the historical development of modern
economies.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that we,
the donors, in close dialogue with
African decisionmakers themselves, need
to adjust our own policies to deal more
effectively with the African crisis. One
problem is that international aid trends
and policies have pursued a somewhat
erratic course. Well-intentioned theories
have been developed with excessive zeal,
pressed upon African governments, then
abandoned before they could be fairly
tested. Aid donors must learn to adapt
new policies without automatic, whole-
sale rejection of the old.

The development policy emphasis of
the 1970s was basic human needs.
Pioneered in the United States but wide-
ly adopted by others, it resulted from
liberal impatience over the fact that
economic growth is an uneven process
and from a genuine and well-placed con-
cern that some economic programs were
not benefiting the majority population in
developing countries. But in its more
elaborate forms this policy became
divorced from the recognition that pro-
ductivity— economic growth — is a sine
qua non for development.

All too often, therefore, foreign aid
in the last decade has created elaborate
pilot projects which foreign countries
can barely keep in operation, must less
replicate. The maintenance costs of com-
plex service-oriented projects and, in-
deed, of much of the basic infrastructure
that was created, in the absence of
economic growth, have become un-
manageable. One study has suggested
that old irrigation systems in Africa may
be falling into disrepair at about the
same rate that donors are building new
ones at great expense.

Without throwing out all we have
learned about the basic human needs of
food, health, and education, nor aban-
doning all the programs we have now

underway to build up African institu-
tions, we must look afresh at the way
our aid reaches or does not reach the
productive sectors and how we can link
social and humanitarian concerns once
again with sound growth policies.

Reassessing Development Policy

Recognition of unsatisfactory perform-
ance by African countries and donors
alike has led in fact to a healthy and
broad-based reexamination of develop-
ment policies for Africa. As I noted
earlier, this reexamination is coming
from several quarters. It comes from
those as concerned with equity as with
growth, from those long and deeply in-
volved with African problems and ac-
complishments, as well as from those in
bank and donor offices fretting over
debts and deficits. And there is a grow-
ing consensus about the inadequate at-
tention that has been given to the pro-
ductive sectors. Some examples of this
reassessment are these.

• Uma Lele, a development special-
ist deeply concerned with equity, argues
in a recent article in Science Magazine
that foreign-funded rural development
projects have overburdened weak public
bureaucracies, without doing nearly
enough to train policy-level managers,
the shortage of which is, ironically, a
fundamental cause of bureaucratic weak-
ness and inadequate rural growth.

• In another critique, anthropologist
Thayer Scudder, who has long worked
with World Bank projects, argues that
international planners have too often im-
posed development from above. Scudder
writes, "Planners are ignoring the
private sector and its involvement." He
continues, "Though I am stressing here
the involvement of small- and medium-
sized private sector operators — the fam-
ily firm whether farm or business — the
same applies to larger businesses."

• The World Bank at recent interna-
tional meetings has called for caution in
funding of new projects and new institu-
tions in this period of economic crisis in
Africa. In many cases, the bank is now
recommending nonproject forms of aid
that can be disbursed quickly to rehabili-
tate old and decaying infrastructure,
that will go more directly to the produc-
tive sectors and be used in conjunction
with policy reforms related to growth.

• Most impressive is the response of
the Africans themselves. Increasingly
we observe nominally Marxist govern-
ments from Guinea to Mozambique seek-
ing increased private trade and invest-
ment from the West to stimulate growth

28

Department of State Bulletin

md employment. Governments like Mali,
with a strong Socialist tradition, have
announced their intention to reduce the
ole of parasta tal corporations and
evive private sector activity in both
agriculture and industry.

• Meeting in Lagos in 1980, the
leads of state of the Organization of
African Unity endorsed a "Plan of Ac-
ion" to achieve far-reaching economic
joals. More recently, and in response to
deepening economic problems, the
African governors of the World Bank
ommissioned a report (Accelerated
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Agenda for Action) to propose means by
which the attainment of the Lagos plan's
objectives could be accelerated. The con-
lusions of this report, billed as a "new
social compact," call for a doubling of
foreign aid to Africa but emphasize that
increased aid must be accompanied by
policy changes to provide more incen-
tives— such as higher prices for
farmers— for the productive sectors of
African economies.

With the nature of the African
development dilemma more clearly in
mind we can, I believe, reach a more
satisfactory definition of "private sector"
than the stereotype limited to multi-
national corporations. As the World
Bank report notes, in Africa the most
mportant aspect of the private sector is
the small producer — the artisan, the
ousinessman, the trader, the road
ouilder, the fisherman, the cooperative,
and above all the farmer, whether he is
producing food or export crops.

Growing emphasis on policy reform,
a major feature of the recent World
Bank report on Africa, is based on the
assumption that no amount of aid can
help if governments are suffocating their
own productive elements. But it also
assumes that aid can, through a range
of instruments, support and encourage
governments that are willing to embark
on self-help efforts which often involve a
high degree of political risk.

Inappropriate economic policies are
at least partially responsible for the per-
vasive balance-of-payments problems in
African nations. In the context of
balance-of-payments adjustment, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund is the oldest
and most effective practitioner of the art
of encouraging policy reform. It offers
significant temporary financial support
to governments that agree to undertake
economic reforms required to restore
financial equilibrium and growth. The
World Bank and other bilateral and
multilateral donors can, particularly if

they work together, offer much addi-
tional support.

It should be obvious from what has
been said that emphasis on the produc-
tive sectors, usually private, does not
mean a total rejection of a government
role. It remains a valid truism that each
country must work out the mix between
private and public sector in accordance
with its own priorities. Good govern-
ment is what policy reform is all about.
Certainly we remember from our own
history that government played a major
part in setting the stage for successful
capitalism. One of our own greatest suc-
cess stories— agriculture— is also one
sector of the U.S. economy where
government's involvement has been both
long and creative, providing at various
times infrastructure, technical
assistance, research and extension, and
direct financial support.

Implications for U.S. Policy in Africa

Where does this lead us? Several new
approaches to U.S. aid and development
policy are evolving within the Ad-
ministration. All would emphasize eco-
nomic growth and assistance to the pro-
ductive sectors. I hope I have made it
clear that in the African context, the

AFRICA

term "private sector" includes both the
highly capitalized, multinational sector
and the more widespread phenomenon
of small producers. We must never
forget, in discussing development, that
our mainstream economic interaction
with African economies comes over-
whelmingly through the private sector,
through our markets and investments,
and that U.S. banks and corporations
are our most potent agents of economic
growth.

Our policies will emphasize working
more closely with other institutions as
well as with governments to encourage
policy reforms which free the productive
sectors to produce both more food and
more growth. In addition, we will struc-
ture our programs to utilize wherever
possible the potential of the U.S. private
sector and encourage it to play a greater
role in Africa.

Let me describe a policy framework
in relation to what I see as the three
broad economic categories of sub-
Saharan African countries. The first
category, unfortunately not yet very
numerous, consists of those countries
with relatively healthy market
economies, in many (but not all) cases
supported by oil or mineral wealth.
These include Nigeria, Gabon,

Visit of Zaire President Mobutu

President Sese Seko Mobutu made a
private visit to the United States
November 29-December 8, 1981. While in
Washington, D.C., November 30-
December 3, he met with President
Reagan and other government officials.

Following is a White House state-
ment issued December l.1

President Reagan met for 45 minutes
this afternoon with President Sese Seko
Mobutu of Zaire in the Oval Office. He
welcomed the opportunity to learn more
about the interests and concerns of this
important African country and friend of
the United States. The meeting was
friendly and open. Among the issues
discussed were Namibia and Chad,
where the President praised Zaire's con-
tribution to a peaceful solution. They
also discussed Zaire's need for the
cooperation of friendly states, including
the United States and our European
allies as well as international organiza-
tions, in working to develop its economy
and reinforce its national security.

There was a mutual understanding
of the need for strengthening Zaire's
economic institutions and the armed
forces. The President told President
Mobutu that the United States is
prepared to help Zaire achieve its
development and security goals while
recognizing that those goals require
some difficult decisions, such as those
now being taken and planned by the
Zairian Government, particularly in im-
proved administration. There was agree-
ment on the importance of the private
sector as a force for economic develop-
ment.

The President wished President
Mobutu well during his meetings with
Members of Congress and the business
community and visits to other parts of
the United States.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 7, 1981 (last
paragraph of statement omitted here). ■

February 1982

29

AFRICA

Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Botswana, Zim-
babwe, and, of course, South Africa.
Here we can pursue our mutual econom-
ic interests mainly through improved
trade and investment policies. These in-
clude elimination of legal and regulatory
disincentives to U.S. businessmen
operating abroad, including the revised
tax policy already enacted, proposed
revision of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, and proposed legislation to
permit export trading companies. We
are also reinvigorating our trade promo-
tion efforts and making the facilitation
of U.S. business activities abroad a
primary concern of American Ambas-
sadors.

In some countries unique bureau-
cratic mechanisms may be called for.
The best example in Africa is Nigeria,
where the Joint Agricultural Con-
sultative Committee has been estab-
lished. The joint committee is an associa-
tion of U.S. and Nigerian Governments
and agribusiness firms formed in
response to Nigeria's keen desire to
overcome an alarming food deficit. It
has already resulted in proposals for
substantial new U.S. trade and invest-
ment in a country where at present we
run a massive trade deficit— our second
largest anywhere last year— because of
oil imports.

Unfortunately, perhaps, Nigeria is
atypical. The "average" African country
is a non-oil less developed country
characterized by moderate to severe
economic difficulties, small market size,
and little to attract the transnational en-
trepreneur. In these countries the term
private sector means primarily the small
operators and institutions mentioned
earlier.

Here our policy must continue to
emphasize concessional assistance but
focused more on the productive sectors.
As suggested above, aid can encourage
and support policy reforms. We can
stretch official aid dollars by financing
feasibility studies and otherwise en-
couraging the U.S. private sector to get
involved in the development process, as
for example through cofinancing of
profitable, development-oriented proj-
ects. Direct participation by commercial
institutions will make it more likely that
development projects contribute to real
growth. The new Bureau for Private
Enterprise of the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development is already in the
process of developing new programs in
these areas.

Direct participation by the U.S.
private sector in development activities
can have a number of additional
beneficial effects. Aid can, as the Euro-
peans have discovered, serve as a

valuable means of encouraging business
in high-risk environments typical of less
developed countries everywhere— for ex-
ample, by providing technical assistance
and seed capital for joint venture oppor-
tunities. And the participation of
business can serve as an important
source of technology transfer, enhancing
indigenous entrepreneurship and
managerial skill.

This approach will involve a con-
siderable shift away from the govern-
ment-to-government aid programs
favored exclusively in recent years. It
will not mean a wholesale, indiscrimi-
nate rejection of "orthodox" project aid.
Such assistance will continue to be vital,
with emphasis on food production and
human resource development— including
management capacity in both public and
private sectors.

Finally there is a third category of
countries, the least developed countries.
As currently defined by the United Na-
tions, these have per capita GNP lower
than $220; 21, or two-thirds of them, are
in Africa. Some, such as Somalia and
Sudan, are of major geopolitical signifi-
cance, and all have the potential to
develop. But it cannot be denied that
most least developed countries have
been dealt a bad hand by history and en-
vironment. Many are landlocked, and all
too often their boundaries, drawn at the
Congress of Berlin, accord with neither
economic nor political reality.

Some of the new approaches to aid
policy mentioned above are applicable to
these countries, all of which do have im-
portant agricultural sectors typically
afflicted with severe overregulation. But
generally speaking, aid policy in the
least developed countries will continue
to be somewhat different, with more em-
phasis on humanitarian requirements
(especially where refugees are present),
regional integration (particularly vital
for the small and landlocked), and basic
institution building.

Finally, I would emphasize that the
Administration's emphasis on our own
domestic economic recovery and growth
will benefit virtually all less developed
countries. Combined with vigorous em-
phasis on free trade, an expanding U.S.
economy will strengthen markets for our
African friends, whether they are pro-
ducers of commodities (typically the case
today) or nascent manufacturers. The
United States currently absorbs about
one-half of all manufactured goods that
non-OPEC developing countries export
to the industrialized world, even though
our market is only one-third the in-
dustrialized world market. And as Presi-
dent Reagan noted before Cancun, every
1% reduction in our interest rates due to

lower inflation improves the balance of
payments of developing countries by $1
billion.

The urgency of our own domestic
recovery program dictates that, for the
next few years, budgetary restraint will
be a matter of highest priority. Because
of this, there is little chance that our
official foreign assistance outlays will in-
crease dramatically in the near future. It
is, therefore, all the more important that
we redouble our efforts to make our
development policies more effective.

Conclusion

I have outlined a spectrum of policies
designed to respond to Africa's varied
conditions. It assumes three major in-
novations:

• More support for policy reform
that will stimulate the indigenous pro-
ductive sectors;

• More direct private sector par-
ticipation in development; and

• More integration of foreign aid
with foreign trade and investment
policies.

This approach will demonstrate our
conviction that the "private sector," writ
large, involves most Africans, must be
encouraged by government if growth is
to occur, and can be helped by aid pro-
grams as well as by interaction with the
foreign private sector. I care deeply
about this subject because I know that
the growth of healthy economic systems
in Africa will in the long run do more
than anything else to reduce the pros-
pects for contagious regional conflict
and externally based destabilization of
shaky governments. We are convinced
that African economic security, like
other dimensions of security, is a central
ingredient in reaching the goal of a con-
tinent of stable and friendly states.

In the years ahead, as we and other
donors rethink with African leaders the
dilemmas of development, we must
operate with empathy and sensitivity.
Development does not occur in a
vacuum. Seldom in history have young
governments faced such an awesome
and simultaneous mixture of challenges
as those in Africa — imperatives of
growth, equity, dignity, stability, and in-
stitution building. Economic policy re-
form cannot work unless it is politically
feasible for decisionmakers to take
tough decisions. We recognize this real-
ity. Our approach, therefore, will be
summed up by the phrase: Let's do the
most to help those who help them-
selves. ■

30

AFRICA

nternal Situation in Zimbabwe

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
DEC. 17, 19811

In accordance with the provisions of Section
720 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1980, I am
submitting the following report on the inter-
nal situation in Zimbabwe.

One of the more significant events to
ake place since the submission of the last
Report to the Congress was the unanimous
decision handed down by the Zimbabwe
Supreme Court which held that the War Vic-
;ims Act, introduced shortly after in-
dependence to replace the Victims of Ter-
rorism Act, was constitutional. The latter Act
nad been introduced by the former govern-
ment to encourage commercial farmers to
stay in the country by providing compensa-
tion in the event they suffered property
damage as a result of military action. The
new law which provides for relief only in case
of death or injury, but not property loss, was
enacted because of government's fear of be-
ing financially overwhelmed by new claims
for compensation— loss of cattle by peasant
farmers for example— which would have had
to be honored under the old Act. This land-
mark decision was precipitated by a suit in
which the plaintiff argued that application of
the War Victims Act constituted an un-
constitutional acquisition by the government
of property (a claim for compensation that
had occurred under the old Act) without ade-
quate compensation.

This court case, like the one in which
former Cabinet Minister Edgar Tekere was
acquitted, again demonstrated the govern-
ment's resolve to adhere to the Lancaster
House Constitution and to the due process of
law. Owing to the importance of this case the
government selected a renowned South
African attorney to represent it in the pro-
ceedings.

Some whites will no doubt see the Court's
decision as eroding the protection of their
property rights. This in turn, will lead to in-
creased speculation on the part of many that
the stage has now been set for the govern-
ment to deprive large landowners of their
property and give it to squatters. Any such
government action, however, would clearly
constitute an unjustified extension of the
precedent in this case and would directly con-
flict with explicit constitutional prohibitions
against the acquisition and redistribution of
land without adequate compensation.

On the economic side the agricultural sec-
tor continues to lead the field in terms of out-
put and is followed by construction and retail
sales. The government, however, is still faced
with a difficult balance of payment situation
and foreign exchange deficiencies, and there
are still serious shortages of skilled and ex-
perienced manpower.

Zimbabwe's banking and financial institu-
tions have repeatedly demonstrated the abili-
ty to adapt to changed circumstances. They
have continued to do so since independence
and the phenomenon is evidenced by the
speed with which these institutions have
taken advantage of recent opportunities to
participate in international arrangements
with foreign banks. Mainly because of
government's strict management of its exter-
nal debt and its tight-fisted spending policies,
Western banking institutions have come to
regard Zimbabwe as one of the more credit-
worthy countries in Africa. Citibank recently
became the second U.S. bank to open an of-
fice in Salisbury.

After hitting record lows the Zimbabwe
stock market, long considered one of the key
indexes of business confidence in the country,
is presently enjoying a modest recovery. This
development was probably triggered by in-
creases in fuel supplies and the prospects for
considerable improvements in economic and
commercial relations with South Africa,
which continues to be Zimbabwe's main
trading partner. The realization by the
government that the country has attracted
very little foreign investment since in-
dependence and the resulting efforts to
create a more favorable investment climate
could be strong catalysts for restoring in-
vestor confidence in the future of private
enterprise in Zimbabwe. This in turn, could
lead to the long-term recovery of the stock
market.

Politically, it appears that post-election
euphoria is beginning to wane, and with it,
some of ZANU's [Zimbabwe African National
Union] early popularity. The government's
very deliberate and pragmatic approach to
land resettlement and the rising cost of living
are primarily responsible for much of the
criticism being directed at it. The govern-
ment, believing that it is being judged too
harshly, is sensitive to criticism and has
shown little tolerance for its critics, Ian
Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa in par-
ticular.

A recently introduced order requiring
prior notification to the Minister of Home Af-
fairs of the intent to hold public political
gatherings has the potential for seriously
restricting the opposition's ability to present
dissenting views. The Minister of Home Af-
fairs, acting on the strength of this new
measure, recently refused permission for a
Muzorewa-sponsored rally to be held in
Bulawayo, but granted permission to
ZANUPF [Zimbabwe African National
Union/Patriotic Front] and ZAPU [Zimbabwe
African People's Union], partners in the
government coalition, to hold political
meetings in Bulawayo on the same day. This
order was also recently cited as justification
for preventing ZAPU-oriented youth from
carrying out a demonstration in support of
the anniversary of the Soviet revolution.

These new restrictive measures appear
unwarranted unless there is evidence not yet
made public that Prime Minister Mugabe's
government is being more threatened than it
appears to be by opposition politicians. From
all outward appearances, the Prime Minister
is still firmly in control and the threat of
political instability continues to diminish.

Prime Minister Mugabe has continued to
take steps to reassure the whites by reaffirm-
ing his commitment to reconciliation and by
stressing the point that Zimbabwe's brand of
socialism would not be built on the basis of
destroying the present economic infrastruc-
ture, but by preserving that structure. At the
same time, however, he does not hestitate to
castigate those whites who, according to him,
have not changed their negative racial at-
titudes. His decision to fire Health Minister
Herbert Ushewokunze, considered one of the
more provocatively radical Cabinet members,
has been a significant boost to white morale.

The exercise designed to integrate the
two former guerrilla armies and the former
Rhodesian forces into a single army, which
was organized and directed by the British,
has been sucessfully completed. The entire
operation took 18 months and involved ap-
proximately 58,000 troops. The success of
this operation reflects credit on the British,
Prime Minister Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo and
the white leadership of the former Rhodesian
forces. It has also laid to rest the problem of
force amalgamation which was one of the
most intractable issues in the Anglo-
American and Lancaster House settlement
efforts.

Prime Minister Mugabe continues to view
a Namibian settlement as an urgent issue,
and he has stated publicly that Zimbabwe
supports recent Contact Group efforts to
bring about independence. Zimbabwe's
balanced position on key regional issues is im-
portant to us in seeking a Namibian settle-
ment and pursuing other U.S. objectives in
Africa.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Charles H.
Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, and Clement J. Zablocki,
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 21, 1981). ■

February 1982

31

ARMS CONTROL

The Unnecessary War

by Eugene V. Rostow

Address at the Winston Churchill
Lecture of the English-Speaking Union
in London on November 30, 1981. Mr.
Rostow is Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

This ceremony gives me pleasure at
many levels. I believe in the English-
Speaking Union and value the compli-
ment of your invitation to speak tonight.

What makes this evening singular,
however, is that I have been asked to
give a lecture in honor of Winston
Churchill. The only occassion in my life
which made my skin tingle with com-
parable feeling was the challenge of
writing and delivering a 4th of July ora-
tion in honor of Thomas Jefferson from
the steps of Monticello.

Both Churchill and Jefferson are
heroes in the Pantheon of the English-
speaking peoples. The heroism of these
giants is not simply that they had the
courage to fight against odds in times of
trouble; there are many heroes of whom
that could be said. Their special quality
is that they had the gift of words as well
as the gift of action. What they did and

vehemence these days behind the Iron
Curtain and in other parts of the world
ruled by tyrants or oligarchs. The
themes which cluster around the idea of
liberty lie just below the surface of the
political and military problems which
preoccupy our foreign offices. And they
dominate the psychological and educa-
tional tasks which constitute at least
half the agenda of our governments in
the realm of foreign affairs.

Nominally, my subject tonight, in
Churchill's compelling phrase, is "the un-
necessary war" — the war we must pre-
vent. Churchill proposed the phrase as
the name for what is generally called the
"Second World War." It commands us to
remember that if the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union had acted wisely during the
1930s, the war could never have taken
place. After Hitler came to power,
Churchill urged a course with all his
magnificent resources of reason,
historical knowledge, experience, elo-
quence, and wit. He was denounced for
his pains as a senile, drunken war
monger who saw Huns under every bed.
His critics — they were numerous and
influential — dismissed him as a romantic

Until the Soviet Union joins us in agreements
which could genuinely remove the menace of
nuclear war from world politics . . . there can be
no escape from nuclear deterrence. . . .

what they said are woven together into
an epic whole. Like the other great epics
of our tradition, Churchill and Jefferson
will remain part of the living faith not
only of the English-speaking peoples but
of all the peoples in the world who share
the creed of liberty, equality, and frater-
nity— the rights of man.

That faith is the heart of what I
have to say tonight. It is embodied in
many famous slogans — in the motto of
the French Revolution I have just re-
called; in Jefferson's "unalienable rights
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness"; in the four freedoms of
Churchill and Frankin Roosevelt; and in
the natural human and civil rights men
and women are claiming with increasing

who still lived in the days before 1914,
besotted by endless quantities of cham-
pagne or brandy or both. To adapt one
of Churchill's best phrases, "Some cham-
pagne; some brandy." Nonetheless, he
was kept in the wilderness until the war
had started and was nearly lost.

Both World Wars did terrible
damage to the fabric of our civilization.
The twin evils of fascism and com-
munism were among their progeny. But
a third world war in a nuclear environ-
ment would be far, far worse. We must
not fail to prevent war this time, as As-
quith and Grey failed before 1914, and
as Churchill and Roosevelt failed before
1939. President Reagan made it clear in
his speech of November 18 that this is

the dominant idea of American foreign
policy today.

The situation we confront resembles
that of the 1930s in many ways. But it i
significantly different too — more
dangerous, more volatile, and far more
difficult to control by the polite warn-
ings and veiled threats of old-fashioned
European diplomacy.

The Indivisibility of Peace

My thesis tonight is simple: Peace has
now become truly indivisible, in the
memorable words of a Soviet foreign
minister 45 years ago. It is a thesis en-
tirely appropriate for us to consider on
the first day of a new round of Soviet-
American talks on the reduction of
nuclear weapons. The pervasive menace
of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the ap
parently inexorable spread of nuclear
weapons create profound political in-
stabilities. But nuclear weapons are not
the only factors of disequilibrium in the
world. Conventional warfare, subver-
sion, and terrorism have become
epidemic and commonplace. Their in-
fluence, added to that of the nuclear
arsenals, has transformed world politics
into a witches' brew for a reason which
becomes more obvious and more omi-
nous every day: because the wall be-
tween conventional and nuclear war can
never be impermeable, no matter how
high we make it. Small wars can beconu
big ones at least as readily as in the
days when archdukes were assassinated
at Sarejevo, and Danzig was the center
of world concern. It is now apparent
that arms control agreements are hardl}
worth having if they make the world
safe for conventional warfare, terrorism
and the movement of armed bands
across international frontiers.

Consider, for example, an issue nov
before our governments. The Soviet
Union has revived its old proposal for a
U.N. General Assembly declaration ban-
ning the first use of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet goal is transparent. They
know as we do that the recovery and
renaissance of the NATO allies, Japan,
and many other countries since 1945
have depended on the credible threat of
the United States to use its full military
capability, including nuclear weapons if
necessary, in defense of its allies and
other supreme interests against conven-
tional as well as nuclear attack. That is
what nuclear deterrence and the

32

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

merican nuclear umbrella are about;
le belief throughout the world — and
irticularly in the higher circles of the
pviet Union — that nuclear weapons
ould be used, however reluctantly, if
ey were needed, for example, to stop a
assive invasion of Western Europe,
ntil the Soviet Union joins us in
p-eements which could genuinely
move the menace of nuclear war from
orld politics altogether — a goal to
hich the United States has been pas-
Dnately committed since we offered the
aruch plan in 1946 — there can be no
,cape from nuclear deterrence when
e supreme interests of the United
cates and the free world are threatened
aggression.

The sound and reasonable response
the Western allies to the Soviet pro-
isal for a ban on the first use of
lclear weapons, therefore, should be an
)peal for a rededication of the entire
orld community to the principles of the
.N. Charter against any form of ag-
■ession, whether conducted by nuclear
conventional force or by the move-
ent of armed bands across interna-
anal frontiers. This appeal should be
mpled with a corresponding rededica-
on to the goal of bringing nuclear
lergy under more effective interna-
onal control in order to permit the
dlest possible use of nuclear energy for
eaceful purposes and end the danger of
aclear weapons proliferation. The
aruch plan, you will recall, would have
.aced what was then an American
aclear monopoly into the hands of a
.N. agency. The means proposed in the
aruch plan are obsolete now, but its
aimating ideas remain important.

No lesser steps could begin the in-
ispensable process of restoring world
ublic order. The decline of world public
rder and the specter of nuclear anarchy
eyond it are the greatest of all the
ireats to the peace. The best available
'ay to deal with that threat is through
iternational cooperation in enforcing
ie rules of peace embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations. They
onstitute the only available code of
etente — and the only possible code of
etente.

There is no blinking the fact that the
oviet Union risks war in its campaigns
f expansion all over the world. Those
ampaigns use aggressive war as an in-
trument of national policy; they are car-
ied on by methods which violate the
ales of the charter governing the inter-
ational use of force. No one claims that
lie Soviet Union initiates all the trouble
i the world. But it does take advantage

of trouble in order to expand its sphere
of influence. The Soviet campaigns of
expansion have gone too far. They now
threaten the world balance of power on
which the ultimate safety of the
Western nations depends, and, there-
fore, they touch nerves of immense sen-
sitivity.

Western Public Opinion

The men and women on the Clapham
omnibus know this in their bones. That
is why there is so much concern about
war in Western public opinion. The cur-
rent wave of anxiety about the possibili-
ty of war is natural and reasonable. We
all share it. But we cannot allow it to
paralyze us. The pervasiveness of anxie-
ty is not a sign of cowardice or pacifism
but a normal symptom of the fact that
public opinion has reluctantly begun to
acknowledge the true condition of world
politics.

The turbulence of our public opinion
does not prove that there is something
wrong with the younger generation, that
our moral fiber has been ruined by the
welfare state, or that the leaders of our
churches and peace movements are all
Communists or fellow travelers or their
innocent dupes. Of course the Com-
munists are trying to manipulate the
feelings of people about war and to
harness them to a political movement
that would serve the ends of the Soviet
Union.

But Communists have never con-
trolled our politics in the West, and they
will not succeed now. We cannot ignore
their activities. But we should not be un-
duly agitated about them, either.

After all, the anxiety of public opin-
ion about war is not manifested only in
demonstrations against the presence of
troops and weapons and in expressions
of the perfectly correct view that there
is insanity in the continued accumulation
of weapons, especially nuclear weapons.
There are other expressions of that anx-
iety and concern, equally significant and
much more realistic. Throughout the
West, people are coming to the conclu-
sion that their governments must stop
the process of Soviet expansion before
it explodes into general war. They know
that peace cannot be achieved by unilat-
eral disarmament. And they recognize
the wisdom of the old Russian proverb,
"If you make yourself into a sheep, you
will find a wolf nearby." Sadly and
without jingoism, our people support
their governments in policies which seek
to prevent war while there is still time
to do so by peaceful means.

As a result, the North Atlantic allies
and many other nations are following
the broad lines of policy Churchill
counselled in vain before the Second
World War. They are restoring the
military balance which has eroded dur-
ing the last decade. And they are resum-
ing the quest for peace through negotia-
tion with the Soviet Union. They realize
how little has been accomplished by
arms control and disarmament treaties

The decline of world
public order and the
specter of nuclear anar-
chy beyond it are the
greatest of all the
threats to the peace.

in the past. Nonetheless, without illusion
or euphoria, they wish to be certain that
no conceivable opportunity for peace is
ignored. Therefore, they welcome Presi-
dent Reagan's effort to persuade the
leaders of the Soviet Union that it is in
the highest interest of the Soviet state
and of all other states — and, indeed, in
the highest interest of humanity itself —
to accept the obligation which history
has thrust upon the Soviet Union and
the United States.

If we are to retreat, step by cautious
step, from the brink of the abyss, the
United States and the Soviet Union
must lead the way, together. This duty
can be translated into two simple
axioms.

• The United States and the Soviet
Union should reach verifiable arms
reduction agreements which give each
side an equal deterrent capacity.

• World public order should be
restored in conformity with the rules
upon which the United Nations agreed
in San Francisco at the end of a terrible
war they had barely won.

These two propositions are closely
related. Together they define the objec-
tives of the United States as we ap-
proach these nuclear arms negotiations.
We hope the Soviet Union will come to
agree with us and to accept these prin-
ciples as major premises for a process of
Soviet-American cooperation which has
now become imperative.

ebruary 1982

33

ARMS CONTROL

Preparing for Arms Control
Negotiations

The two principles I have tried to for-
mulate are the essence of President
Reagan's methodical approach to the
task of preparing for the nuclear arms
control negotiations. If the Soviet Union
accepts the principle of equal deter-
rence, it should be possible for carefully
worked out and verifiable agreements to
improve the security position of the
West as a whole. By allowing each side
to maintain equal deterrence, nuclear
arms agreements should prevent any
form of coercive predominance. They
could, therefore, result in a somewhat
more stable environment, at least in
restraining the potential escalation of
conventional force conflicts. Under con-
temporary circumstances, however, this
is an insufficient goal and probably an il-
lusory one. But it should give diplomacy
an opportunity to press for the ultimate
fulfillment of agreement on the second
principle, that of mutual and reciprocal
respect for the rules of the charter
regarding the international use of force.
As President Reagan has pointed out, a
double standard in this regard is simply
not viable.

Sometimes the Soviet spokesmen
say that the American position would re-
quire the Soviet Union to give up a
foreign policy rooted in its nature as a
society and a state. This is not the case.
So far as the United States is con-
cerned, the Soviet Union is free to
preach the gospel of communism
throughout the world. But we cannot ac-
cept its claim of a right to propagate its
faith with a sword. All the United States
urges is that, with regard to the interna-
tional use of force, the Soviet Union
follows the same rules which all states
accepted when they became signatories
of the U.N. Charter. There can be no
peace until those rules are equally and
reciprocally obeyed.

Thus far, there have been no signs
of progress in that effort. Soviet
behavior, diplomacy, and propaganda re-
main what they have been for a long
generation. The Soviet submarine
caught in the approaches to a Swedish
naval base is hardly an encouraging
omen. We have no choice but to
persevere, however, in seeking to reach
the Russian people and the other peoples
of the Soviet Union with every resource
of our intelligence and imagination while
the expansionist policies of the Soviet
Government are restrained by the calm
deployment of deterrent force. We know
that more than 60 years of Soviet rule

34

have not destroyed the love of liberty
and justice in Russia and that the
peoples of Eastern Europe, who have
always been of the West, remain an in-
tegral part of the European culture and
policy. So long as we in the West are
strong, confident, and determined, the
forces of hope in the East will not sink
back into despair.

The analysis I have just summarized
is adequate and accurate, I believe, so
far as it goes. But it does not go very
far. Rationally, it is easy to prescribe
the course the NATO allies and the
Soviet Union should follow now, just as
it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to
agree that the United Kingdom, France,
the Soviet Union, and the United States
could have prevented the Second World
War. The important question about the
1930s is not what should have been
done— the answer to that question is
self-evident — but why Churchill and
Roosevelt, two towering politicians at
the height of their powers, failed to per-
suade their countrymen to follow their
lead. That, I believe, is the principal
question on the agenda of Western
foreign policy today, and it is the issue
to which I shall devote the remainder of
this lecture. What are the limits of
reason in dealing with the issues before
us? Is there any chance that reason can
be made to prevail? How do we per-
suade the Soviet Union that it too
should obey the rules of the charter,
give up the dream of empire, and join
the Western nations in seeing to it that
the charter rules are generally respected
throughout the world? Can we hope to

. . . the Soviet Union
deploys a new SS-20
every 5 days.

persuade the Soviet Union, or only to
contain it, as George Kennan has con-
tended, until the benign influence of
Russian high culture — and of exposure
to the West — bring about a mellowing of
Soviet policy? And finally, how can our
efforts of persuasion be organized and
carried out by methods compatible with
the rules of our being?

The Human Element

The questions I have posed surely in-
clude matters of diplomacy and strategy
which would have been familiar to

i

Thucydides or Machiavelli. But their im
plications transcend the abstractions of
political theory or the cool detachment
of the cynic. The balance of power is nc
all that is at stake in the world crisis
which has come about through our blinc
ness and negligence. Churchill com-
mented once that Marlborough and
Wellington had changed the course of
history, permitting two centuries of
British primacy which were hardly com
pelled by economics or demography. It
heresy, I know, to ask such a question
a Churchill lecture, but — issues of na-
tional loyalty and national pride apart -
would Western civilization have been
fundamentally different if Marlborough
had lost at Blenheim and Wellington at
Waterloo? That kind of speculation can
hardly arise about the outcome of the
cold and not-so-cold war. No one can
contemplate the possibility of nuclear
war with any feelings but those of hor-
ror and disgust. And no one could
describe the architects of the Gulag
Archipelago as Saint Simon and Nancy
Mitford describe the denizens of Ver-
sailles in the day of the Sun King. Witl
divided and uneasy minds, the nations
the West have finally embarked on a
Churchillian effort to prevent war. We
have taken this step not only to protect
our national independence and avert
nuclear devastation but to preserve the
creed and hope of liberty for ourselves
and for all who cherish it. Many people
seem to think that nuclear war could be
averted by Western surrender. But tha
course is unthinkable. Moreover, it
would not work.

Many believe that the ideal of in-
dividual freedom has had its run in the
bleak chronicle of human history and
that social pluralism will soon be forced
to yield to one version or another of tht
all-embracing state.

This every child of the Anglo-
American culture must deny. The view
that the state exists to protect individu;
freedom has always been at war with
the ideology of Leviathan; that war will
never end. Man yearns for freedom, bu
freedom is lonely. Man also yearns for
security and companionship. Sometimes
he seems willing to pay the price of
slavery for them. It may be that even ii
the West some people are willing to ac-
cept such societies, at least for a time.

But there is no reason to lose faith
in our humane ideals. During the last
generation, behind the shield of collec-
tive self-defense backed by the America
nuclear weapon, democracy has enjoyec
a renaissance in Germany, Japan, and
many other countries, and its values an

Department of State Bullet!

.

ARMS CONTROL

aining ground throughout the world,
/e speak with many voices, as free men
nd women always do. But beneath the
lrbulence of these lively sounds there is
biding unity and ample strength. In
leir vast majorities, the people of the
/est remain loyal to the code of values
) which they have been bred. For the
Inglish-speaking peoples, that tradition
oes beyond the enlightenment of the
8th century to the roots of our political
berty in the common law and the
Inglish constitution and to the roots of
ur moral freedom in the heritage of the
ild and New Testaments and the
lemory of Greece and Rome. In other
arts of the West, of course, the
oncordia of the community includes
trong elements of the Roman law and
lie Roman culture in both its ancient
nd its modern manifestations.

Today that tradition faces the
hallenge of a new Minotaur. And today,
nee more, those who love freedom must
ally to its defense.

or to explain to others why those prop-
ositions are wrong. We are simply not
equipped to contest the propaganda of
Newspeak. In the end, we deal with it as
if it were the argument of a parliamen-
tary opposition. That is all we know how
to do.

Let me give you an example of cen-
tral importance to my thesis tonight. We
are being bombarded at the moment by
the breathtaking claim that the NATO
allies, and the United States in par-
ticular, are seeking to disturb a stable

The Military Balance

Or let us look at another aspect of the
Soviet thesis— the actual state of the
military balance and especially the
balance in intermediate range nuclear
weapons in and near Europe. Year after
year, the Soviet Union tells us that there
are roughly 1,000 weapons of this kind
on each side and that the NATO decision
to deploy modern nuclear weapons in
Europe is a destabilizing quest for
nuclear superiority in preparation for

The United States may have a slight lead
in. . . warheads, but the Soviet Union has moved
ahead in every other measure of the destructive
power of nuclear weapons and is adding to its
arsenal at a rapid rate.

"he Threat Today

Jut the threat we face is more than the
hreat of arms and the challenge of
deology. Sir Isaiah Berlin uses a simple
ihrase to sum up the most fundamental
lifference between societies devoted to
he freedom of the individual and
ocieties in which the state manipulates
he individual in the name of a greater
jood: the difference between "Freedom
rom" and "Freedom to." We believe
vith Sir Isaiah in "Freedom from"; that
s, we believe in the autonomy of man as
i good in itself and the most important
•ightful goal of organized society. It
'ollows that we must also believe with
lefferson that "the just powers of
government derive from the consent of
'he governed." If this is so, high prin-
:iples of ethical responsibility should
govern the discourse among men and
women which is the source of public
opinion and thus the predicate for their
consent. Democracy is impossible unless
we speak to each other with civility and
scrupulous respect for the truth as best
we can perceive the truth.

As George Orwell saw so clearly, the
most important distinction between free
societies and modern tyranny is a totally
different attitude toward the problem of
truth. This difference is why our efforts
at propaganda, even in wartime, are so
different, defensive, and ineffective.
Everyday we read and hear propositions
as bizarre as those of Orwell's
Newspeak. We find it almost impossible
to offset their impact on our own minds

equilibrium of world power, gain
military superiority over the Soviet
Union, and start a nuclear war to
destroy the Soviet regime. Sometimes
an additional detail is added for Euro-
pean consumption— that the United
States is planning to fight the nuclear
war entirely in Europe and to its last al-
ly. Soviet spokesmen addressing the
United States say the opposite— that if
the Soviet Union is hit by a nuclear
missile, it will pay no attention to the
calling card attached to the weapons but
respond at once with all its missiles
against the continental United States.

How can these contentions be
answered? Can anyone really believe
that the American people miss Vietnam
and are looking for an excuse to start
another such campaign, this time with
nuclear weapons, or even a third world
war on a much larger and more exciting
scale than Vietnam? Can anyone sup-
pose we are bored because our univer-
sities are quiet and busy, preoccupied
with education rather than with antiwar
protests? Can anyone imagine that an
American President could contemplate
the use of force for any reason except
the most austere sense of duty and
obligation, knowing that President
Truman's political career was ruined by
the Korean war as President Johnson's
was destroyed by Vietnam and, indeed,
that every major war and most minor
wars in American history became
politically unpopular in the end?

nuclear war. There is irony in this claim.
The magic figure remains near 1,000
although the Soviet Union deploys a new
SS-20 every 5 days. And the Soviet
Union has not yet offered a detailed
statistical table to support its charges,
although its most recent effort, a
pamphlet called The Threat to Europe,
begins to approach that point.

But Soviet spokesmen have said
enough to make the statistical fallacies
of their argument apparent. For exam-
ple, they count only SS-20 missiles
deployed in European Russia, although
many of these missiles located beyond
the Urals can reach targets in Western
Europe without difficulty. And they
count certain American planes in mak-
ing their calculations but exclude Soviet
planes of the same type. Mr. Brezhnev's
proposal, made at Bonn last week, sim-
ply offers to move some SS-20 missiles
from European Russia to Siberia— a
proposal without substance or interest
to the West. It would hardly increase
the security of NATO to transfer these
missiles to locations from which they
could threaten Japan or the Middle East
or be returned to their original posi-
tions. All the studies I have seen con-
firm the judgment of the International
Institute of Strategic Studies that Soviet
superiority in this particularly threaten-
ing category of nuclear weapons is more
than 3 to 1, so that even the full deploy-
ment of the American weapons sched-
uled for Europe could not produce
anything like equality, to say nothing of
"superiority."

February 1982

35

ARMS CONTROL

The record is not notably different
in the field of intercontinental nuclear
weapons. There, too, the Soviet Union
claims that parity exists and that
American plans to restore its deterrent
capacity are "destabilizing." There, too,
the Soviet Union is engaged in an active
program of improvement and expansion
while the United States has, until
recently, been passive. The United
States may still have a slight lead in the
total number of warheads, but the
Soviet Union has moved ahead in every
other measure of the destructive power
of nuclear weapons and is adding to its
arsenal at a rapid rate. Unless the
United States does add to its forces, the
balance will shift irrevocably against the
West.

NATO Objectives and Soviet Strategy

Nevertheless, the charges continue to be
made. The problems the NATO allies
face together at this juncture have
nothing to do with the fantasies of
Soviet propaganda. We do not have to
choose between protecting our interests
and fighting a nuclear war or any other
kind of war, in Europe or elsewhere.
That is a false dichotomy. The sole ob-

The highest objec-
tive of Soviet strategy is
to separate Western
Europe from the United
States.

ject of U.S. and NATO policy is to pro-
tect our common interests by restoring
stability without war. There is no reason
to doubt our capacity to protect the
future of liberty in peace, by the
methods of alliance diplomacy backed by
deterrent military power. The NATO
allies, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
China and other countries which oppose
Soviet hegemony have ample power and
potential power to stop the process of
Soviet expansion. With Poland in the
process of undergoing profound social
changes, this is hardly the time to bend
our knees to the power and ideology of
the Soviet Union as the wave of the
future.

The highest objective of Soviet
strategy is to separate Western Europe

from the United States. If Western
Europe could be brought within the
Soviet domain, the geopolitical theorists
of the Soviet Union believe, Japan,
China, and many other nations would
draw the necessary conclusions, and the
United States would be left isolated and
impotent. The enormous Soviet effort in
the field of intermediate-range missiles
is intelligible only in the perspective of
this Soviet doctrine. In that perspective,
it is all too intelligible. The objective, as
always, is to decouple the United States
from Europe. The scenario would follow
these lines: the subliminal radiations of
the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear
arsenal would induce panic in Europe
while the growing Soviet long-range
arsenal would paralyze any possibility of
an American strategic response. Presto
and checkmate. The Japanese, Chinese,
and many other nations would follow
suit.

This was the nightmare which
started to provoke deep European and
American concern 5 or 6 years ago. The
Soviet SS-20s had begun to impinge
upon our consciousness. Henry Kis-
singer's Brussels warning in 1977
dramatized the issue. But the anxiety
would have been the same if Mr. Kis-
singer had never spoken. The danger of
decoupling Europe from the United
States is implicit in the changing overall
intercontinental nuclear balance between
the Soviet Union and the United States,
weakening the counterweight which has
kept superior Soviet conventional forces
at bay since 1945. After a year or two of
discussion, NATO decided that the
United States should deploy American
intermediate-range land-based missiles
in Europe and at the same time
negotiate with the Soviet Union about
removing the threat to Europe arising
from the existence of these first-strike
and particularly devastating missiles.

The reasoning behind the NATO
decision parallels the argument which
has persuaded the United States to keep
large American conventional forces in or
near Europe. There has been periodic
political agitation in the United States
for a reduction of our conventional
forces in Europe and for exclusive
reliance on intercontinental nuclear
weapons to protect Europe against
Soviet pressures. But proposals of this
kind have been firmly and repeatedly re-
jected. The United States wishes not
only to make the nuclear guaranty clear
and credible but to be in a position to
respond appropriately to threats across
the entire spectrum of threat or attack.
To remove American forces from
Europe would escalate every conflict

there instantly to the nuclear level. As
President Reagan pointed out on
November 18, the purpose of deploying
American intermediate-range nuclear
weapons on European soil is to remove
all doubt about the credibility of the
American intercontinental nuclear
guaranty to Europe both in Europe and
in the Soviet Union. As a result, the risk
of war by miscalculation would be re-
duced.

The problem of the intermediate-
range nuclear weapons must be exam-
ined in the SALT context, as the North
Atlantic Council has declared, because
the line between intermediate-range and
intercontinental nuclear forces is not
clear cut. Intercontinental weapons can
also be aimed at targets in Europe,
Japan, or the Middle East. And some
weapons normally classified as theater
weapons can be used under certain cir-
cumstances on intercontinental missions.
While much could be accomplished by
successful intermediate-range nuclear
force talks, both in reducing weapons
and contributing to crisis stability, the
ultimate security of the NATO allies will
continue to rest on the reliability of the
U.S. strategic guaranty.

When I was a student at King's, the
great Alfred Marshall had gone, but the
young dons still faithfully took their
texts from his books and lectures. One
of their favorites, I recall, is appropriate
to our problem tonight. Marshall liked to
say, "Trees do not grow to the sky." He
was talking about firms and trade
unions and the checks and balances of
economic life. But his observation ap-
plies also to empires.

The Soviet Union is still in the im-
perial mood which the other imperial
powers have long since given up with
relief and conviction. Those nations have
discovered what Benthan pointed out
long ago — that the imperial powers had
no right to govern the peoples they had
conquered; that they gained nothing
from their efforts; and, as Sir Norman
Angell concluded much later, that im-
perialism is extremely expensive. An
Italian minister summed up the problem
of costs in the late 1940s: "Italy has lost
the war," he said, "but in compensation
it has lost its empire." The former im-
perial powers have learned that it is
more profitable and more satisfactory all
around to make money, not war.

If we take the Soviet drive to be the
Hegelian thesis, it has already
stimulated a normal antithesis— a coali-
tion of nations determined to retain
their independence. In the nature of

36

Department of State Bulletin

CONSULAR AFFAIRS

lings, the forces of the antithesis are
)und to prevail. Can the Soviet Union
^knowledge that fact and accept the in-
stable gracefully— as gracefully as the
nited Kingdom or the Netherlands
elcomed the end of empire after World
far II? Will the last surviving tradi-
onal empire join the other nations in
eking the world order anticipated by
le Charter of the United Nations— a
orld order based on the equality of
;ates large and small and on the rule
pat no state use force to attack the ter-
l torial integrity and political in-
:ependence of any other state and on
aspect for the principle of the self-
'etermination of peoples?

legotiating With the Soviets

a our view, those are the ultimate ques-
ons of world politics today. The
nswers to those questions are in the
list. All I can tell you tonight is that
lie United States and its allies view the
rocess of arms control negotiations as a
ossible key to the riddle of the future,
irms control negotiations have no
lagic in themselves. Negotiating with
tie Soviet Union is a rough sport, and a
atisfactory outcome is hardly
•uaranteed. But we cannot ignore what
lay be an opportunity for progress
award peace. The Soviet policy of ex-
■ansion, fueled by the extraordinary
Towth of the Soviet armed forces, and
iarticularly of its nuclear forces, has
iroduced a situation of growing tension
,nd instability. The efforts of the Soviet
Jnion to split the West and to prevent
Vestern modernization of its defenses
vill surely fail. Ever since 1945, the
Jnited States has appealed to the Soviet
Jnion for cooperation between us — in
naking the offer of the Marshall plan
ind the Baruch plan and on many other
>ccasions, too. President Reagan re-
lewed that appeal on November 18 with
jreat force, as the only rational way out
}f the nuclear dilemma both camps now
confront. The fruits of SALT I and
SALT II have turned to ashes in our
mouths. The decade which began 10
years ago with the high hopes of detente
became the worst decade of the entire
cold war. The cold war is no longer a
peripheral matter of border skirmishes,
a cloud no larger than a man's hand, but
the dominant problem of world politics.
We approach the task of negotiation
determined not to confuse our hopes
with reality. We know that the Soviet
Union, like most other countries, has at
least two cultures — the culture of
Catherine the Great and the culture of

Ivan the Terrible; the Russian culture of
inspiring intellectual quality and moral
distinction; the culture of Tolstoy,
Turgenev, Chekhov, and their modern
successors, as well as the culture of
Oriental despotism now in the ascend-
ant. From long experience we know that
a Soviet spokesman was right when he
said, "We are neither pacifists nor
philanthropists."

But there are positive elements in
the situation which ought to lead the
Soviet leaders to choose a policy of
stability in their relationship with the
West: the situation in Poland and the
apparently insoluble problems of the
Soviet economy, to mention only two. In
part, Soviet economic problems are the
result of difficulties which all modern
economies share— the insatiable and
astronomic claims of science against the
defense budget. In part, however, they

represent factors peculiar to the system
of Soviet planning.

I can sum up all I have tried to say
tonight in four simple propositions. They
were put very well, early in the nuclear
age, by a distinguished English social
scientist. First, the secret is out of the
laboratory and can never be returned.
Any industrial country can make nuclear
weapons. Secondly, it follows for ob-
vious reasons of prudence that the
Western nations cannot give up nuclear
weapons. Third, nuclear war is un-
thinkably destructive, and the West
must find ways to protect its freedom
and security and at the same time pre-
vent nuclear war. From these three
propositions we draw a conclusion we
regard as inescapable, because small
wars sometimes become big. The goal of
policy must be not simply the avoidance
of nuclear war but the elimination of all
international war. ■

Consular Services to U.S. Citizens

by Diego C. Asencio

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Operations of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on Novem-
ber 4, 1981. Ambassador Asencio is As-
sistant Secretary for Consular Affairs. '

I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before this body to discuss the services
provided by the Department of State for
American citizens abroad. The Bureau of
Consular Affairs is the "service arm" of
the Department of State. Most
American citizens have their only direct
contact with the Department of State
through consular activities — meeting a
foreign friend, student, or businessman
arriving here by visa; receiving a U.S.
passport to travel abroad; or seeking our
assistance for a friend or relative in dif-
ficulty or crisis abroad. Last year, our
total of individual services in these fields
exceeded 13 million. We are gratified by
the expressions of appreciation our of-
ficers receive and by the accolade of
"good job" bestowed recently by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office. We have made
progress over the past several years, but
we are, of course, neither satisfied nor
complacent.

Part of our improvement since this
subcommittee received an assessment of
our operation about 4 years ago has
been in organizing ourselves to do the
job.

Creation of the Office of
Overseas Citizens Services

In 1978 we formed a new directorate-
Overseas Citizens Services (OCS). The
name and the focused responsibilities
came about as the result of a reorganiza-
tion in the bureau. Major elements of
services to citizens abroad were com-
bined under a single directorate to pro-
vide rapid response and centralized
authority and to more effectively utilize
available resources.

Despite some problems, particularly
at the beginning, the reorganization is a
success. The "beginning," incidentally,
took place the weekend before the
Jonestown, Guyana, catastrophe.
Everyone was given a baptism of lire
coping with the enormous public in-
terest, citizen distress, and attendant
workload generated by that tragic event.

In 1977 the subcommittee was ad-
vised of significant increases that had
been taking place in all aspects of con-
sular work, but particularly in the area
of services to American citizens. Case-
loads continue to challenge our pro-
cedures and resources. In FY 1977 our
Foreign Service posts performed about
2.1 million citizen services. In FY 1980,
they performed about 2.9 million such
services. These included the issuance of
225,000 passports abroad, approximately
200,000 welfare and whereabouts ac-
tions of all kinds (searches/missing per-

Pebruary 1982

37

CONSULAR AFFAIRS

sons, emergency messages, emergency
money transfers, repatriations, medical
evacuations, etc.), 12,000 seamen serv-
ices, 5,800 arrest cases, 987,000 notarial
services, 25,000 estate/property cases,
7,200 death cases, and 950,000 "other
agency" cases (Social Security, Veterans
Administration, and so forth). It is
noteworthy that despite the enormous
caseload increase, work hours expended
on citizen services abroad increased by
less than 200,000 (from 1,460,000 to
1,648,000) in the 1977-80 period. Ob-
viously our consular personnel are work-
ing faster and harder. We in the Depart-
ment have attempted to facilitate and
expedite their work by giving them
authority to make their own decisions in
some cases that previously had required
referral to Washington for action (lost
passport cases, for example).

Statistics can impress. They can also
bore, so I will briefly touch on some of
the relatively recent developments in the
citizen services area that should be of in-
terest to the subcommittee.

We are very much aware that, as
the name implies, OCS is a service
organization. Our Foreign Service and
Civil Service officers are public servants.
The public knows this, and the public, as
well as their elected representatives, ex-
pect service. We make an earnest effort
to meet all needs courteously, with
understanding and ingenuity. Con-
straints are the limits of personnel,
time, statutes, and regulations. Even
when requests are exaggerated, un-
reasonable, or occasionally illegal, we try
to divert or refuse them tactfully. We
also seek to remove constraints to meet
old or new needs.

Emergency Medical
and Financial Assistance

For example, with the encouragement
and support of this subcommittee, we
obtained statutory authority in 1978 to
provide emergency medical and financial
assistance to destitute Americans
abroad. This was accomplished through
an amendment of the 1977 statute that
had enabled us to provide emergency
medical and dietary assistance to
Americans imprisoned abroad. Our con-
sular officers are, thus, now in a position
to do something when, for example, a
citizen has not received his monthly
Social Security check, has no other
funds and no other means of obtaining
any. The consular officer can advance
funds upon signing of a promissory note.
Persons who need emergency medical

attention and are without money and
without any way of getting money need-
ed to obtain such care can also be given
a loan for the medical attention.

Incarcerated Americans

We have also focused more clearly on
our responsibilities to Americans im-
prisoned abroad. Our consular officers
visit them at regular intervals. The fre-
quency depends largely on local condi-
tions. We are concerned that those im-
prisoned are treated humanely and given
an adequate diet and any medical assist-
ance that may be needed. Finally, we at-
tempt to interest the host government in
negotiating a prisoner exchange treaty if
circumstances point to the need for such
a treaty. In the past several years, we
have negotiated such treaties with Mex-
ico, Canada, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, and
Turkey and are currently negotiating
with France and Thailand.

There are now about 1,800
Americans incarcerated abroad, about
35% of whom were arrested on drug-
related charges. There has been a
decline in the percentage of Americans
imprisoned on drug charges. We expect
this has in part been the result of our in-
tensive public affairs campaigns to sen-
sitize the traveling public to this prob-
lem.

The negotiations of consular treaties
has also been given greater attention.
Although most countries are signatories
to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, the convention lacks the
specificity needed to assure that the
rights of our citizens will be fully
respected should they get into difficulties
abroad. Over the past 3 years we have
concluded treaties with the German
Democratic Republic and the People's
Republic of China. Active negotiations
are underway with Yugoslavia, the
United Kingdom, and Italy.

Travel Advisory Program

We have also centralized and expanded
our travel advisory program reflecting,
in part, the unstable conditions in many
parts of the world. Hundreds of ad-
visories have been sent during the past 4
years. These notices go to Foreign Serv-
ice posts and passport agencies and to a
number of travel organizations and
publications. The advisories concern
such matters as political or civil unrest
in certain countries, contagious diseases,
visa requirements, hotel shortages, and
other conditions or situations a pro-
spective traveler should know about

before traveling. In addition to sending
the advisories, we reply to dozens of
telephone calls every day from persons
interested in traveling to a particular
country or countries and wanting to
know what, if any, advice we can offer
them.

The Public Program

In an intense effort to make our service:
known to the public, we have embarked
on a broad-ranged public awareness
"outreach" program. This year we held
briefings both in Washington and in
eight regional cities throughout the
United States for congressional staffers
to inform them of our services, how to
make use of our various resources and
personnel, and to learn of ways in whicl
we can be more responsive to congres-
sional requests for information. This
public program covers activities ranging
from seminars with public groups inter-
ested in our services (principally the
travel industry and academic institu-
tions) to the dissemination of informa-
tion through a number of bureau
publications.

We are proud of the fact that one o:
our publications, "Your Trip Abroad,"
was recently named by a private organi-
zation as one of the 25 best publications
of the U.S. Government. In addition, we
are also now in the process of develop-
ing a new edition of a publication con-
cerning arrests and drugs overseas. Our
public service announcements, which err
phasize careful preparation and self-help
prevention of problems by the traveler,
have been distributed to 450 television
stations and 2,000 radio stations.

Finally, we take every opportunity
to explain our services through the daily
requests for information we receive
from the mass media on specific and
general consular problems. The consis-
tent underlying themes in our public
awareness programs are that an in-
formed public is a better protected
public and that problem prevention
directly benefits not only the public but
our consular offices and resources.

At the beginning of my statement I
mentioned Jonestown. While the suicide:
and murders there can hardly be char-
acterized as typical of the work we nor-
mally deal with, it does provide an ex-
ample that we must be prepared to deal
with mass disaster as well as individual
tragedy. Since Jonestown, we have re-
sponded, I believe capably, to many
disasters on short notice such as the
very severe Italian earthquake that oc-
curred during Thanksgiving week of last

38

Department of State Bulletir

EAST ASIA

ear and the 1980 Polish airlines crash
ear Warsaw in which 25 Americans
ere killed, including the entire national
mateur boxing team. We participate ac-
vely in all emergency task forces
)rmed within the Department in re-
ponse to major disasters and foreign
olicy crises. We initiate, prod, or de-
land whenever necessary to insure that
itizen interests, including those here at
ome, are fully considered. We were
lost recently represented by OCS in the
ontingency planning in the aftermath of
ie assassination of President Sadat.

'rivacy Act and FOIA

have purposely not elaborated in this
tatement on the 1978 Jonestown
pisode, which I understand the sub-
ommittee will address later in the hear-
igs with other Department witnesses,
lowever, in the overall context of these
earings, I would like to briefly mention
ur continuing review of the effects that
he Privacy Act and the Freedom of In-
ormation Act (FOIA) have had on our
perations.

A survey conducted by the Depart-
nent in 1979 confirmed that most of the

rivacy Act concerns of our posts were
a the consular area. In a letter to Chair-
nan Zablocki of the Committee on

oreign Affairs [December 12, 1979], the
)epartment stated that consular officers
fee! that the Act has a chilling effect on
heir ability to offer opinions, comment
,nd analysis which is necessary to ade-
[uately perform their consular functions
ind which is necessary for end users in
he Department to adequately under-
;tand what is happening abroad."
following that letter, the Department
idvised all Foreign Service posts of
vays by which reporting officers could
seek to meet their obligations to keep
;he Department fully informed without
nolating the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
\s a result of experience with Jones-
;own, consular officers are particularly
ilert to their protection and welfare
-esponsibilities toward U.S. citizens in
groups that could be considered some-
what similar to the People's Temple.

The Privacy Act and the FOIA un-
loubtedly serve legitimate purposes. At
imes, they remain inhibiting factors,
)ut they are not a severe obstacle to the
Derformance of our functions. Increasing
workloads are far more serious.

Increasing Workloads

Workloads at our consular posts will
continue to rise. The strengthening of

No Sale of Advanced Aircraft
to Taiwan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JAN. 11, 19821

Since the beginning of this Administra-
tion, the President has been conscious of
the need to carry forward the unofficial,
people-to-people relationship between
the United States and Taiwan, and he
has expressed on many occasions his
personal concern for the continued well-
being of the people of Taiwan. This Ad-
ministration has attached a high value to
fulfilling the longstanding policy of the
U.S. Government with respect to pro-
viding such defense articles as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain
a sufficient self-defense capability.
Concerned agencies of the U.S.
Government, including the Departments
of State and Defense and other national
security elements, have been addressing
the question of Taiwan's defense needs
over a period of many months and have
taken into careful consideration the
many factors which bear on the

judgments which must be made in im-
plementing this policy. On the basis of
this study, the Administration has
already taken steps to sell Taiwan items
necessary for self-defense. We anticipate
further steps of this sort.

A judgment has also been reached
by the concerned agencies on the ques-
tion of replacement aircraft for Taiwan.
Their conclusion is that no sale of ad-
vanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan is re-
quired because no military need for such
aircraft exists. Taiwan's defense needs
can be met as they arise, and for the
foreseeable future, by replacing aging
aircraft now in the Taiwan inventory
with comparable aircraft and by exten-
sion of the F-5E coproduction line in
Taiwan. The details have not yet been
worked out. The President has approved
these recommendations.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

the dollar and lower air fares are serv-
ing as a stimulant to more foreign
travel, and this is reflected in recent
substantial increases in passport work-
loads. Foreign trade and investment ac-
tivities are increasingly important and
geographically diversified. The greater
the number of Americans traveling or
living abroad, the greater the American
service workloads both at home and
abroad.

The consular function is no excep-
tion to the Administration's determina-
tion to constrain the use of resources,
including personnel. We are doing our
part. Our emphasis, in the immediate
future, will be on initiatives and im-
provements in consular operations that
will, in particular, save time and money
or, at the very least, will not involve
augmenting the need for increases of
either. The pending nonimmigrant visa
waiver bill is a significant step toward
saving personnel. Among other things it
would "free up" resources that could be
used more productively elsewhere.

Extension of the period of validity of
U.S. passports to 10 years as recently
approved by the House would also be a
time-saver. We are also working on a
revision of all of the Foreign Affairs
Manuals used by consular personnel
abroad. Our objective is to make the

manuals simple and useful tools that will
facilitate and expedite the officer's work.
The irony of the manuals today is that,
in many respects, they are so cumber-
some, outdated, and difficult to use that
they increase work rather than ease it.
Automation of additional facets of the
consular operation, here and abroad, is
one of our highest priorities and should
permit us to make better use of the
available resources.

We are constantly improving our
training courses at all levels — from first
tour vice consuls through senior officers.
We are stressing increased career
recognition toward those who meet our
highest standards.

I am confident that our personnel
will continue to display those qualities of
dedication and hard work that our
citizens have come to expect and that
have won them accolades in the past.
Obviously, we do not meet all of our
standards all of the time. But I assure
you we try.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

:ebruary 1982

39

ECONOMICS

Auto Parts Industry

by Robert D. Horrnats

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Trade of the Senate
Finance Committee on December 1, 1981.
Mr. Horrnats is Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs.1

I would like to thank the subcommittee
for inviting me to take part in its review
of the current state of the U.S. auto in-
dustry and related issues in the area of
international trade and investment. I
would like to concentrate my remarks
on a subject of major interest to the
U.S. auto industry and to me person-
ally— recent developments affecting our
auto parts manufacturers. I have a par-
ticular interest in this because I was
directly involved in earlier efforts to
assist our auto parts companies while
serving as Deputy Trade Represent-
ative. I understand that the subcommit-
tee wishes me to comment on the results
achieved to date from the perspective of
that experience.

The automotive parts and com-
ponents sector is suffering from the
depression which has hit the automobile
industry as a whole. Employment among
the approximately 2,000 firms in this
sector has dropped by as much as
500,000 since January 1979. Sales have
been soft for the last year and a half,
and most parts firms are now operating
below capacity, which is unusual in this
sector. The auto parts companies conse-
quently face a familiar financial dilem-
ma. They want to invest substantial
capital in efficient, low-cost production
facilities in order to meet increasingly
effective foreign competition. Reduced
sales and high interest rates, however,
make that investment exceptionally dif-
ficult to undertake, and Jerry Dempsey,
President of Borg- Warner, has warned
that as many as two-thirds of the ex-
isting parts companies may be gone by
the next decade.

In order to help the auto parts in-
dustry cope with these pressures, two
trade policy objectives of major impor-
tance have been pursued by the United
States over the past few years. First,

we have sought greater access for
U.S. -made parts to the Japanese market
and to the so-called aftermarket for
replacement parts for Japanese cars sold
in the United States. Second, we have
favored economically viable
Japanese-U.S. joint ventures or Jap-
anese licensing agreements with U.S.
parts producers.

Efforts to Increase Parts Sales

Efforts by the United States to increase
sales of auto parts to be used in Jap-
anese-built cars and as replacement
parts for Japanese cars in the United
States date back almost 2 years. In
April 1980, the United States asked the
Government of Japan to eliminate im-
port duties altogether on all automobile
parts, including original equipment com-
ponents and replacement parts. After
extensive negotiations, the Japanese ob-
tained Diet approval for the elimination
of tariffs on 38 automotive parts
categories and for a substantial reduc-
tion of the tariff on tires and tire cases.
These reductions — which went into ef-
fect on April 1, 1981 — were on items
the U.S. Government, in consultation
with the U.S. industry, had identified as
of greatest interest to our firms. Our
own export data indicate that U.S. ex-
ports of these products to Japan
amounted to about $100 million in 1980.
We were unsuccessful in persuading the
Japanese to abolish duties on carpeting;
the Japanese argued that carpeting is a
product category destined largely for
nonautomotive consumption.

In addition to seeking tariff reduc-
tions, we and the Japanese Government
sponsored an auto parts purchasing mis-
sion, which met with U.S. automotive
parts firms in September 1980 to ex-
plore the possibilities of negotiating con-
tracts for auto parts. The results of this
auto parts mission are being monitored
by the Trade Facilitation Committee,
chaired by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce and the Japanese Ministry of In-
ternational Trade and Industry (MITI).

The Japanese forecast last year, in
conjunction with the auto parts mission,
that their imports of U.S. auto parts

would rise to some $300 million in 1981
They reaffirmed this forecast after a
Trade Facilitation Committee follow-up
meeting last January.

On balance, however, the results of
this effort in terms of auto parts expor
have been extremely disappointing. It i
clear that the $300 million forecast will
not be realized and that our parts ex-
ports to Japan will probably decrease ii
comparison with last year. Official data
prepared by the Japanese authorities ir
dicate that their imports of the producl
covered by the $300 million forecast
totaled only $64 million during the first
6 months of this year. Even this total
depends on the inclusion of chemical
catalysts and cattle leather, of which a
substantial portion probably are destint
for nonautomotive uses. Similarly, the
latest Commerce survey of the U.S. au
parts firms involved in the parts missic
indicated that the mission has not
generated a steady stream of new
orders. Eighty percent of the firms
responded to the survey this year and
only 12% of them felt that the mission
had been very productive. We have bee
able to identify only $5.5 million in ac-
tual new business. This contrasts stark
with a recent report by the Mitsubishi
Bank that total Japanese auto parts ex
ports reached $3.8 billion in 1980, up
nearly 30% from 1979, of which about
$1.8 billion were to the United States.

In order to understand the difficult
of penetrating the Japanese parts
market, it is useful to understand cer-
tain basic structural problems. These in
elude the high cost of transportation to
Japan, the strict — and sometimes overl
strict — quality standards demanded by
the Japanese automakers, and the basic
management relationship between
Japanese automobile producers and the
"family" of parts suppliers. Most
Japanese auto plants maintain minimal
on-site parts inventories, and suppliers
are expected to make deliveries on tighi
schedules, often several times a day.
Tariff eliminations alone, as I have
testified in the past, cannot offset such
fundamental problems in expanding ac-
cess to the Japanese home market. An
active effort by the Japanese Govern-

40

ECONOMICS

nent and the Japanese companies— as
veil as by U.S. parts manufacturers— is
lecessary.

It is fair to say that the efforts of
he Japanese Government and the
(apanese private sector to boost imports
f U.S.-made parts have not been
satisfactory. The surveys of U.S. auto
>arts firms suggest that many Japanese
'irms involved in last year's parts mis-
;ion may have been more interested in
ixpanding their sales here than finding
lew U.S. suppliers.

It appears that Japanese automotive
ndustry officials may have come to
>elieve that the Japan's unilateral volun-
ary restraint on automobiles has re-
ieved the Japanese industry of any need
;o pursue seriously opportunities to buy
luto parts here. It would be extremely
infortunate if they persisted in this
/iew. We have been led to believe that
;he Japanese auto industry was gen-
inely desirous of helping U.S. industry
:o make it through its present crisis.
The Japanese export restraint— limited
as it is— cannot comprise the whole ef-
fort to deal with the trade-related
aspects of that crisis. As I testified
oefore this subcommittee last January,
substantial increases in Japanese pur-
chases of U.S. parts would be both
reasonable and appropriate. The Ad-
ministration will continue to urge the
Japanese to accept, and to act on the
basis of, this point— particularly in the
meetings of the Trade Facilitation Com-
mittee which will take place in Tokyo
later this month.

In view of the inherent marketing
difficulties facing firms trying to export
parts to Japan, the "aftermarket" for
U.S.-made replacement parts for
Japanese cars here in the United States
may be more important in the near term
for the U.S. parts companies. It has
been estimated that the market for such
items as batteries, lights, fan belts, tires,
starters, and so on could amount to $1.8
billion over the next 5 years. This
market is one in which U.S. firms should
be able to compete actively and suc-
cessfully. But it has been very hard for
American firms to penetrate this
market, and Japanese firms appear
reluctant to fully cooperate with them,
while Japanese parts sell vigorously. The
same structural argument to which
Japan points to explain why U.S. parts

do not sell well in Japan does not apply
to the replacement market.

Because the "aftermarket" looks like
such a promising area for additional
U.S. parts sales, it should be given
priority attention by Japanese firms and
by the Trade Facilitation Committee.
Opening up this market to U.S. firms
can be highly beneficial, and it will help
to offset the attraction of more restric-
tive and distortive approaches to the
automotive industry's troubles. Japan,
which professes to support an open
trading system, undermines its credibili-
ty by failing to take advantage of oppor-
tunities to permit and actively to help
U.S.-made parts to compete in both the
original equipment and replacement part
markets.

Investment

We had also hoped that Japanese parts
firms would consider viable joint ven-
tures and licensing for parts production
here in the United States. The Japanese
Government sponsored a second mission
last year for Japanese firms interested
in such possibilities. The major objective
of that mission was to encourage joint
production ventures or licensing of parts
production, to permit our own com-
panies to prepare more rapidly to pro-
duce parts for the new generation of
"world cars" coming onto the market. To
date, however, the investment mission
has produced no concrete results in
terms of new joint ventures or licensing
involving U.S. firms. My own view is
that licensing remains a particularly
promising approach to ensuring U.S.
firms' access to the aftermarket and is
one which should be pursued vigorously
in our discussions with the Japanese in
the Trade Facilitation Committee and
elsewhere.

The only new investment projects
we have identified are the opening of a
new plant in Ohio by Stanley Electric of
Japan to supply electrical parts to Hon-
da's new auto assembly plant and other
automakers and a joint venture by Hon-
da and two Japanese parts firms to build
seats and mufflers for the Honda plant.
The latter project will employ some 200
workers. Both the Honda auto plant and
Nissan's truck plant in Tennessee are
expected to procure initially about 40%
of their inputs, by value, from U.S. sup-
pliers, with the possibility of future in-
creases in such procurement.

Conclusion

For the last 2 years I have been urging
that Japan, in its own long-term interest
and in ours, buy more U.S. parts and
undertake economic coproduction and
licensing arrangements with U.S. firms.
Are we to conclude that Japan believes
that the short-term actions they have
taken on auto exports represent a final
and adequate response on its part, and
that the mutually beneficial and ex-
tremely reasonable objectives of increas-
ing U.S. parts sales to Japan and to the
replacement market and of promoting
joint ventures and licensing agreements,
can now be virtually neglected? If so,
that is extremely short-sighted. If the
Japanese want to provide convincing
evidence that mutually beneficial trade
in this sector is possible, they have a
strong interest in providing oppor-
tunities for U.S. parts producers to com-
pete in Japan and in the replacement
market— and assist rather than impede
their efforts to do so — and to undertake
economically attractive licensing and
coproduction here. Japan's new foreign
minister and MITI minister have both
stressed the need for a broader opening
of Japan's market. The above-mentioned
measures — in conjunction with others in
the agricultural and manufactured goods
sectors— would be an excellent begin-
ning.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

February 1982

41

EUROPE

The Alliance at a Crossroad

by Richard R. Burt

Address before the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation in Bonn, West Germany, on
December 2, 1981. Mr. Burt is Director
of the Bureau of Politico-Military Af-
fairs.

Forty-eight hours ago the United States
and the Soviet Union opened a new and
important negotiation. A negotiation
unlike any we or they have embarked
upon before. As with SALT [Strategic-
Arms Limitation Talks], these talks are
about nuclear weapons. But unlike
SALT, the United States in this forum
is seeking limits on weapons which can-
not strike American territory. The
Soviet Union, in this new forum, is seek-
ing limits on prospective American
weapons which are to be located outside
the United States. Three decades of
history have lead to this unique negotia-
tion and to the unique structure for
European security which it is designed
to strengthen. To fully grasp the signifi-
cance of this negotiation, and to eval-
uate its prospects, one must go back in-
to that history.

Legacy of Postwar Era

Perhaps the central legacy of the
postwar era is that in 1981—36 years
after the conclusion of conflict in
Europe— there remain here one-quarter
of a million American troops. These
American soldiers are still in Europe
because the experience of the first half
of this century convinced Americans
that they would inevitably be drawn into
any war in Europe and that they, there-
fore, should act to prevent such a war
from erupting. These American soldiers
are still welcomed in Europe because
that same bitter experience has per-
suaded thoughtful Europeans that an
equilibrium cannot be maintained on
their continent without the engagement
of American power.

To those who have lived through the
postwar era, these truths seem self-
evident. The present always appears the
predestined result of an ineluctable past.
In retrospect, the great landmarks of
modern European history seem to
march in one direction:

1949— The North Atlantic Treaty;
1951— The creation of NATO's in-
tegrated military command;

42

1955-The Federal Republic of Ger-
many's entry into NATO;

i 967 -The creation of NATO's
Nuclear Planning Group and NATO's
adoption of the strategy of flexible
response;

1979— NATO's decision to modernize
its intermediate-range nuclear forces
and to engage the Soviets in an effort to
limit such systems; and

1981-fhe opening of U.S.-Soviet
negotiations of intermediate-range
nuclear forces.

These moments were not, however,
the products of blind historical forces.
They were the work of men of vision.
These dates are not signposts on a one-
way street to the present. Rather they
mark crossroads at which Western na-
tions chose one path and rejected others.
Today, we stand at another crossroad.
Today, men of vision must once again
chart a course into the unknown, their
only guide to the future an understand-
ing of the past.

In fashioning the institutions and the
doctrine upon which the defense of

After the failure of the
effort to create an in-
dependent European
defense, the United
States reluctantly con-
cluded that its continued
military presence in
Europe was a necessary
prerequisite to a viable
collective defense.

Europe now rests, the Western com-
munity of nations examined, pursued,
and ultimately rejected other courses.
As our peoples reexamine very similar
alternatives today, it is worth recalling
what was rejected in the past and why.
The defense of Europe today rests
upon three pillars: collective security,
nuclear deterrence, and American en-
gagement. When first propounded, each
of these concepts was revolutionary. To-
day they are again controversial, not

because they have failed but because
they have succeeded so well. Although
debate in Europe has focused on
intermediate-range missiles, the effect
has been to throw into question the
much more fundamental underpinnings
of Western security.

This debate is to be welcomed. The
concepts upon which the West bases its
security cannot retain their vitality if
they are not challenged and revalidated
by each successive generation. The in-
stitutions upon which the West depends
for its defense cannot retain vitality if
they are not forced to justify, to those
who must support them, their continued
existence.

In the early postwar years, before
the West turned to dependence upon col-
lective defense, Western governments
sought, in good faith, an accommodation
with the Soviet Union, an accommoda-
tion which would have poured massive
U.S. economic assistance into Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, reunified
Germany, left all Europe without the
presence of foreign troops, and elim-
inated the need for military alliances.
The Soviets rejected this accommoda-
tion. Their behavior in Poland, in their
occupation zone of Germany, and
throughout Eastern Europe conclusively
demonstrated to the Western peoples
that an unarmed accommodation with
the Soviet Union could only be had at
the price of Soviet domination. In the
wake of the Berlin blockade and of the
Soviet-engineered coup in Czechoslo-
vakia, the West turned to collective
security and concluded the North Atlan-
tic Treaty.

That treaty ushered in an era of
American engagement in European
security. At the conclusion of the war in
1945, the United States had begun the
massive withdrawal of its forces from
Europe. Well into the 1950s the United
States intended to complete this with-
drawal and to turn the defense of
Europe over to Europe. In the early
1950s, the United States encouraged the
creation of an independent European de-
fense force. Europe had then, and has
today, the manpower, wealth, and talent
to provide unaided for its own defense.
Yet only the United States proved able
to provide the catalytic core around
which an effective alliance force could be
formed. After the failure of the effort to
create an independent European de-
fense, the United States reluctantly con-

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

eluded that its continued military
presence in Europe was a necessary
prerequisite to a viable collective
defense.

In the later 1950s and early 1960s,
debate centered on the place of nuclear
weapons in the alliance's defense and of
the United States in providing that ele-
ment of the defense. Here, too, alterna-
tives were tried, and here, too, fun-
damental decisions were made which
shape the world we live in and the
debates we are engaged in today.

Initially it was NATO's intention to
create a conventional defense of Europe
sufficient to match Soviet capabilities
and to' counterbalance the Soviet
geographic advantages. Such a Western
force was designed. Alliance members
agreed upon goals for its achievement.
But these goals were not met, and
within a short time of their adoption
there was general agreement that they
would never be. The creation of a
peacetime military establishment fully
sufficient for the conventional defense of
Europe has consistently proved beyond
the political capacity of democratic,
pluralistic societies.

In consequence, the alliance turned
early on to nuclear weapons to provide
• the deterrent capability which its con-
ventional forces, by themselves, lacked.
Only by asserting a willingness to em-
ploy nuclear weapons, if need be, in the
defense of Europe, could NATO prevent
the continued disparity in conventional
capabilities from inviting aggression or
facilitating intimidation.

There was also debate in the 1950s
and 1960s regarding participation in any
alliance nuclear force. The British and
the French developed nuclear cap-
abilities of their own, and the United
States offered Germany and other allies
participation in a multilateral nuclear
force. By the end of the 1960s, it was
generally concluded that the U.K. and
French systems contributed to Western
security and to the credibility of NATO's
deterrent posture, but that they were
not and could never be an adequate sub-
stitute for a continuing American
nuclear guarantee.

The West's last great nuclear debate
thus culminated, in 1967, in the creation
of an institution designed to resolve the
issue of nuclear participation and to
manage the alliance's nuclear posture.
This institution was the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group. That debate also resulted,
in that same year, in the enunciation of
a strategy designed to extend the deter-
rent capability of American nuclear
weapons to Europe while leaving the

alliance many other alternatives, in
times of crisis, short of a resort to
nuclear weapons, that strategy was flex-
ible response.

The critical element of this strategy
is the concept of extended deterrence
which links the power of the United
States to the defense of Europe. Ex-
tended deterrence translates America's
political commitment to regard an attack
on Europe as an attack on America into
military planning and capabilities. As a
result, American forces are not struc-
tured or trained solely to protect
America, nor American nuclear weapons
designed solely to prevent nuclear attack
upon America. The mission of American
forces has been extended to deterrence
of attacks against the alliance as a whole
and to deterrence of intimidation or
threat of force directed against any of
its members.

In extending the umbrella of Ameri-
can power over Europe, a balance had
to be established between forces in place
and forces on call. If the United States
put in Europe the force needed for a
sustainable defense, the cost would be
unacceptable to the American people
and the level of American presence
unbearable to the European public. If,
on the other hand, the United States
limited its commitment to European
security solely to the promise of as-
sistance in time of conflict, that commit-
ment would lack the needed deterrent
effect.

Over three decades an acceptable
and effective balance between forces in
place and forces on call has been estab-
lished. This balance anchors each major
element of American military power to
the European Continent. The U.S. Army
maintains the equivalent of over five
divisions in Europe. The U.S. Air Force
has here three tactical air forces. The
U.S. Navy has two carrier battle groups
in European waters. U.S. forces in
Europe are equipped with both conven-
tional and nuclear capabilities. Thus
American troops in Europe are much
more than mere tokens of the U.S. com-
mitments, while remaining much less
than the full commitment.

The Need for a Coherent
Structure of Defense

Over the past 30 years the West has cre-
ated the structure of collective security I
have described. It has developed the
military capabilities needed to sustain
that structure, relying upon a combina-
tion of extended deterrence and forces
in place. It has elaborated a strategy ap-
propriate to that structure and to that
combination of forces, the strategy of
flexible response. In debating the con-
tinued validity of this legacy, one should
recognize its fundamental unity and the
interdependence of its elements. If the
American strategic deterrent does not
remain Europe's ultimate guarantee, the
strategy of flexible response is no longer

Director, Politico-Military Affairs

Richard R. Burt is the former national securi-
ty affairs correspondent for The New York
Times. He covered foreign policy and defense
issues in Washington, D.C., including the
State Department, the Pentagon, the Na-
tional Security Council, the Central In-
telligence Agency, and Capitol Hill.

He has also served as a research fellow at
the Center for Foreign Policy Research,
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studies, and lectured regularly at
Georgetown University, the Foreign Service
Institute, and the National War College. He
was assistant director of the International In-
stitute for Strategic Studies in London.

Mr. Burt is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, the American Council on
Germany, the Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, and the American Committee
of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies.

Mr. Burt's appointment as Director of the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs was an-
nounced February 3, 1981. ■

February 1982

43

EUROPE

viable. If flexible response is no longer
viable, the West can no longer confident-
ly rest its defense upon the structure of
collective security.

Should there be any doubt that
Europe requires, in 1981 as in 1949, a
coherent structure for defense, one need
only study the training, the deployment,
and the military doctrine of Soviet
forces. Whatever their present inten-
tions, the Soviets have designed and
trained a force to attack, not to defend.
Whatever their ultimate plans, the
Soviets have deployed their forces to
seize territory, not to hold it.

Should there exist any doubt that
Western Europe, in 1981 as in 1949,
must be secured not only against attack
but against intimidation and threat of
force, one has only to read the daily
newspapers. Soviet public statements,
directed to Western European audi-
ences, consistently emphasize Russia's
capability to destroy Europe, while, of
course, promising not to do so unless
necessary. When Soviet spokesmen, on
visit to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, talk about the nuclear destruction

Whatever their present
intentions, the Soviets
have designed and
trained a force to at-
tack, not to defend.

of Hamburg, Cologne, and Bonn, is
there any mistaking their meaning? If
the Soviets speak this way at a time
when they cannot safely attack Western
Europe, what tone would they adopt in
other circumstances?

How, then, is the alliance to respond
to Soviet behavior? By mirroring it? By
adopting a nuclear warfighting strategy?
By restructuring our forces for offensive
military operations? By engaging in the
rhetorical bombast of blatant nuclear
blackmail? This is how the Soviets claim
we are responding in an effort to trans-
fer their characteristic attitudes to us.

Yet despite the provocations of
Soviet propaganda, and despite the
steady buildup of Soviet military power,
the alliance has remained faithful to its
principles.

• NATO remains a defensive alli-
ance. Western armed forces are de-
signed to protect our freedom and in-
dependence, not to expand our influence
or intimidate our adversaries.

• NATO will never initiate the use
of force. No conflict at any level will
ever be begun by NATO; no interna-
tional border will ever be violated by
NATO forces.

• NATO's strategy is one of deter-
rence. The purpose of NATO forces is,
by their existence and known cap-
abilities, to deny to any potential adver-
sary the prospect of securing advantage
through military action at any level.

• NATO will always negotiate. The
West will always be willing to relieve
the causes of tension through negotia-
tion and to reduce the burden and risks
of defense through verifiable arms con-
trol agreements based upon equality of
rights and limitations.

Over the past several years the
alliance has continued to act in accord-
ance with these principles. Two years
ago, for example, the alliance decided to
modernize nuclear forces in Europe
through the deployment by the United
States of cruise missiles and the replace-
ment of the Pershing ballistic missile by
a new model of longer range. This deci-
sion was taken in order to reinforce the
alliance's structure of collective security,
to maintain the credibility of America's
extended deterrent, and to support the
alliance's strategy of flexible response.
This decision represented continuity, not
change.

• These deployments would give the
alliance no capability it did not previous-
ly have, for as the Soviets never cease
to remind us, there are other systems in
Europe which can strike Soviet ter-
ritory.

• These deployments would not put
Soviet strategic forces at risk, for those
forces are for the most part beyond the
range of these new systems.

• These deployments would not in-
crease the risk of a nuclear war limited
to Europe but on the contrary serve to
remind the Soviets that they cannot
hope to limit a nuclear war to the ter-
ritory of others.

• These deployments have not been
forced upon Europe but were rather ar-
rived at though a true process of con-
sultation and in response to a need felt
at least as keenly on this side of the
Atlantic as on mine.

• These deployments have not set
back the prospects of arms control but,

44

on the contrary, have forced the Soviet
Union to accept, in principle at least, the
need to limit its nuclear weapons
targeted in Europe.

• These deployments are not de-
signed to isolate the United States from
Europe but rather to reinforce the
strategic unity of the alliance and induce
the Soviet Union to treat the security of
Western Europe on equal terms with its
own.

The decisions made by President
Reagan this summer on strategic forces
are equally important for the people of
Europe. The alliance decision of 1979 is
designed to more securely link America's
strategic deterrent to the security of
Europe. But only through the modern-
ization of U.S. strategic forces can the
United States continue to extend a
credible deterrent over Europe. The
steps which the United States is under-
taking at President's Reagan's direc-
tion— building a new bomber, accel-
erating the development of a new
submarine-launched ballistic missile, im-
proving America's strategic command
and control system, and modernizing our
land-based missile force with the deploy-
ment of MX missiles— are all designed to
provide America a secure second-strike
capability, one which cannot be pre-
empted or neutralized. It is this secure
second-strike capability upon which the
West's defense ultimately rests.

While moving to sustain the NATO
system of extended deterrence, Presi-
dent Reagan has also taken steps to give
substance to the alliance's commitment
to meaningful arms control. On Novem-
ber 18 he proposed new negotiations on
strategic forces, beginning as early as
possible in the new year. He intends
that these negotiations build upon the
accomplishments of the past but also go
well beyond them toward the achieve-
ment of significant reductions in stra-
tegic arms on both sides.

President Reagan reemphasized on
that same occasion the U.S. desire to
see reductions in conventional force
levels in Europe, to an equal ceiling for
both East and West. He reaffirmed our
desire to see agreement at the CSCE
[Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe] review conference in
Madrid on the convening of a conference
on disarmament in Europe. Most
significantly, he proposed that the
United States and the Soviet Union
agree, in the negotiations on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces which have
just begun, to eliminate the long-range
Soviet missiles capable of threatening

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

Europe and to cancel the alliance's plans
to deploy long-range American missiles.
The details of this proposal are now
being put to the Soviet Union. The
Soviets for their part will be putting
their proposals to us. These we will ex-
amine seriously and consider upon their
merits. We have entered these negotia-
tions in good faith, as President Reagan
has emphasized. We hope the Soviet
leaders for their part will consider with
equal care the offer we have put to
them.

The substance of the Soviet position
on this issue, as publicly expressed by
them to date, is familiar to you. They
maintain that they need over 1,100 long-
range missile warheads capable of strik-
ing Europe because the United States
maintains aircraft in Europe. They do
not explain why their own aircraft in
Europe— more numerous than those of
the United States— do not suffice to
counter this threat. They do not explain
why they need twice the number of
missile warheads in 1981 to counter the
same number of American aircraft as
were in Europe in 1975.

The Soviets also argue that they re-
quire military forces to counter threats
from other nations. They thus claim the
right not to parity with the United
States but to parity with every potential
adversary combined. To grant them this
right would be to legitimize global Soviet
hegemony, for, as we know, total securi-
ty for any one nation means total in-
security for all others.

That the Soviet Union puts forward
such implausible argumentation is
understandable, for their case is weak
and their military buildup is coming
under increasing scrutiny around the
world. The Soviet Union cannot, how-
ever, expect to secure at the conference
table that military superiority which
they have pursued through military pro-
grams for the past decade or more. We
are hopeful, therefore, that the Soviets
will ultimately be induced, both in
negotiations on intermediate-range
missiles and on strategic nuclear forces,
to accept a negotiated balance based
upon parity between our two countries
at much lower levels of military effort
and risk.

I noted in opening that the West to-
day stands at another crossroad. In the
past, Europe chose collective defense
over a one-sided accommodation with
the Soviet Union. In the past Europe
chose an Atlantic alliance over a Euro-

pean defense force. In the past Europe
chose to rely on a deterrent, rather than
a warfighting strategy. Today these
same choices are once again posed. To-
day men of vision must again lead their
nations on a course which will maintain
the peace and preserve freedom. Today
we must ask ourselves whether the
choices of another generation remain
valid for its successors.

Has the world changed so much that
the Soviet Union could be trusted not to
take advantage of its geopolitical situa-
tion to dominate an undefended Europe?
I can think of little in recent Soviet be-
havior—whether in Afghanistan or in
the tone in which its leaders habitually
address Western Europe— which sup-
ports this view.

Has Western Europe evolved, in its
quest for unity, to the point where it can
sustain its own defense unaided? If such
a movement were to manifest itself in
Europe, I can assure you that the
United States would interpose no
obstacles. America has supported every
step toward European unification, and it
has accepted, with equanimity and good
grace, I think it fair to say, whatever
diminution of U.S. influence has re-
sulted. Without denying that the
American military presence in Europe
brings with it influence and prestige, I
can safely say that the American people
would not sustain these forces here
1 day beyond that point at which they
were no longer needed or wanted.

If America has no desire to outstay
its welcome in Europe, however, neither

do we entertain the slightest intention of
abandoning our commitment to it— a
commitment which I believe is as vital to
our common security today as it was in
1949, when first extended. Neither do I
believe that the people of Europe, when
they examine the alternatives, will aban-
don a structure for European security
which has given them the longest period
of peace, prosperity, and freedom in
their history, and in that of mankind.

Clearly we cannot take the current
nuclear debate in Europe lightly. Clearly
those of us who believe in a structure of
peace based upon collective security
must once again make our case. Clearly
those of us who believe that such a
structure can only be held together
through the extension by the United
States of a nuclear guarantee to Europe,
must once again contend with the alter-
natives. Yet when those alternatives are
examined— a Europe undefended and
subject to Soviet intimidation or a
Europe united in its own defense— I can
only conclude that the first is undesir-
able and the second, for the present,
unattainable. Thus, at the risk of once
again being misinterpreted, let me con-
clude, as I did on a similar occasion in
Brussels 2 months ago, that for me, and
for my government, there is no other
choice but to sustain the alliance struc-
ture we have inherited and to maintain
the alliance strategy which gives it
life.B

Fifth Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
DEC. 3, 19811

In accordance with the provision of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past 60
days toward reaching a negotiated settlement
of the Cyprus problem.

The intercommunal negotiations between
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have
taken a significant step. Both sides accepted
presentation of a United Nations "evaluation"
of the status of the intercommunal talks on
November 18. The "evaluation," although not
a formal proposal, embodies ideas and con-
cepts which may prove useful for the parties
in their decision of outstanding issues.

Following the presentation of proposals
earlier this summer by the Turkish Cypriots
(August 5) and the Greek Cypriots
(September 9), the development of the United

Nations "evaluation" signals continuing prog-
ress toward a negotiated settlement of the
Cyprus problem. The United Nations, the
Special Representative of the Secretary
General, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, and the
participating parties are to be commended for
their efforts. We hope that both parties will
seize the opportunity offered by the United
Nations "evaluation" to devote renewed
energy to resolving their differences by
peaceful negotiation in a spirit of com-
promise.
Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 7, 1981). ■

February 1982

45

HUMAN RIGHTS

NARCOTICS

Bill of Rights Day,
Human Rights Day
and Week, 1981

A PROCLAMATION1

On December 15, 1791, our Founding
Fathers rejoiced in the ratification of the first
ten amendments to the Constitution of the
United States — a Bill of Rights which has
helped guarantee all Americans the liberty
which we so cherish.

One hundred and fifty-seven years later,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, an effort aimed at securing basic
human rights for the people of all nations.

Each of these great documents was born
after the bloodshed of a bitter war. We
remember the great sacrifices Americans
have made for 200 years, from the Revolu-
tionary War, in which our ancestors pledged
"their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred
honor," to the wars of this century, in which
hundreds of thousands of young Americans
and millions of others gave their lives on the
battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa in the
struggle for freedom. And yet, even today, as
we celebrate Bill of Rights Day and Human
Rights Day, we all are only too well aware
that the individual rights declared in these
documents are not yet respected in many na-
tions.

We have learned that the lesson our
Founding Fathers taught is as true today as
it was two centuries ago — liberty depends
not upon the state but upon the people.
Liberty thrives in the free association of
citizens in free institutions: families, church-
es, universities, trade unions, and a free
press.

Mankind's best defense against tyranny
and want is limited government — a govern-
ment which empowers its people, not itself,
and which respects the wit and bravery, the
initiative, and the generosity of the people.
For, above all, human rights are rights of in-
dividuals: rights of conscience, rights of
choice, rights of association, rights of emigra-
tion, rights of self-directed action, and the
right to own property. The concept of a na-
tion of free men and women linked together
voluntarily is the genius of the system our
Founding Fathers established.

We will continue to strive to respect
these rights fully in our own country and to
promote their observance abroad. We could
have no greater wish for mankind than that
all people come to enjoy these rights.

This year, after nearly 20 years of effort,
the United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sion and the UN General Assembly have ap-
proved a declaration of the elimination of all
forms of discrimination based on religion. It
begins with words Americans will find
familiar, "Everyone will have the right to

freedom of thought, conscience and religion."
It declares that parents must have the right
to teach their children to worship God and
that all religions must have the right to teach
their faith, to train their clergy, and to
observe their customs and holidays.

We in America are blessed with rights
secured for us by the sacrifices of our
forefathers, but we yearn for the day when
all mankind can share in these blessings.
Never is there any excuse for the violation of
the fundamental rights of man — not at any
time or in any place, not in rich countries or
poor, not under any social, economic or
political system.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1981 as
Human Rights Day and December 15, 1981,
as Bill of Rights Day, and call on all

Americans to observe the week beginning
December 10, 1981 as Human Rights Week.
During this week, let each of us give special
thought to the blessings we enjoy as a free
people and let us dedicate our efforts to mak-
ing the promise of our Bill of Rights a living
reality for all Americans and, whenever
possible, for all mankind.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this 4th day of December, in the
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-one, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and sixth.

Ronald Reagan

■No. 4885 of Dec. 4, 1981 (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Dec. 14). ■

International Narcotics
Control Strategy

by Joseph H. Linnemann

Statement before the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs on
November 13, 1981. Mr. Linnemann is
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Narcotics Matters. 1

I am pleased to appear before you today
to discuss the Department of State's role
in our efforts to control illicit narcotics.
Events of the past year, both in the
United States and abroad, have rein-
forced our view that international nar-
cotics control is an integral part of U.S.
foreign relations. As President Reagan
emphasized in New Orleans on
September 28, an attack on drug traf-
ficking is "one of the single most impor-
tant steps that can lead to a significant
reduction in crime." A key element of
the antinarcotic strategy the President
outlined was "a foreign policy that
vigorously seeks to interdict and
eradicate illicit drugs wherever
cultivated, processed, or transported."
Toward this goal, he announced the
creation of a special council on narcotics
control to coordinate efforts to stop the
drug flow into this country.

Within that context, I welcome this
opportunity to present the Department's

overall international narcotics control
strategy and describe some of our
specific programs.

Background

First, let me put it in relative fiscal
terms. Illicit drug sales in the United
States are estimated by the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) to ex-
ceed $80 billion a year. In contrast, the
overall Federal budget devoted to the
suppression of drug abuse is under $1
billion. Approximately 95% of that
amount is expended here in the United
States for law enforcement, demand
reduction, and addict rehabilitation. The
remainder is devoted largely to inter-
national programs planned and imple-
mented by the Department of State's
Bureau of International Narcotics Mat-
ters. For FY 1981, our budget totaled
$35.9 million.

The Department's primary goal in
coordinating our international effort is
to motivate and assist foreign govern-
ments in curtailing the production of
illicit drugs at their sources and to
immobilize major traffickers who
smuggle these drugs into the United
States. Since the appointment of the
Department's Special Adviser on Nar-
cotics Matters in 1971, we have placed
highest priority on those drugs that

46

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

have the most serious health, social, and
economic consequences; i.e., heroin, co-
caine, and marijuana.

The bureau follows a three-pronged
aproach in pursuing that goal. It can be
characterized as:

• Illicit production control and inter-
diction through enforcement;

• Drug income alternatives where
necessary; and

• Demand reduction and prevention.

Underpinning these approaches is a
sustained diplomatic effort by the
Department and our overseas missions
to secure the cooperation of producing
and transit countries in the global fight
against drug abuse. Unless we insure a
cooperative international environment,
other U.S. agencies, such as the DEA,
the Customs Service, or the Coast
Guard, could not operate effectively with
their foreign counterparts. More
specifically, the Department, through
government-to-government agreements
and appropriate international agencies,
seeks to provide the legal and organiza-
tional framework (for seizure of illicit
assets, mutual judicial assistance, ship
boardings, U.N. drug control conven-
tions, etc.) within which much of our in-
ternational effort operates.

The principal focus of the bureau's
effort, within these three general ap-
proaches, is direct technical assistance.
In FY 1981, it obligated $26.2 million
for country programs.

I would now like to go into a review
of the environment of illicit drug
activities in Asia and Latin America and
how our individual country programs are
designed to counter them.

Southeast Asia

As a result of the excellent growing con-
ditions for poppies in 1981, the produc-
tion of opium from the three countries
of the Golden Triangle (Thailand,
Burma, and Laos2) rose from an esti-
mated 200 metric tons in 1980 to an
estimated 600 metric tons in 1981.
Unless there is a significant climatic
change, the 1982 production could equal
or exceed the 1981 figures.

Thailand. The Royal Thai Govern-
ment, however, has promised to carry
out eradication programs in 10 zones in
northern Thailand that, as a result of
U.N. crop substitution programs, are
designed "opium free." We recognize
that, in terms of gross amounts, eradica-
tion of poppy fields in these 10 zones is
less than ideal. However, if the eradica-

tion is carried out effectively, it will
indicate to the poppy growers in other
villages that their government is serious
in its commitment ultimately to
eradicate all opium poppies grown
within its borders. This could have a
deterrent effect on poppy planting even
in areas where economic and social
development have not yet achieved the
level deemed necessary for the govern-
ment to mount similar programs.

Another aspect of the narcotics
problem has, over the past 6 months,
shown marked improvement in the
Golden Triangle; there has been a
decline in availability or lack of precur-
sor chemicals (e.g., acetic anhydride),
used to refine opium into heroin.
Reports from northern Thailand indicate
that as a result of Thai Government
efforts the amount of acetic anhydride
reaching the northwest border refineries
has dropped significantly; the refineries
are having considerable difficulty con-
verting the bumper stocks of raw opium
into heroin. We have encouraged the
Thai Government to continue restricting
the illegal use of this chemical. At the
same time we have encouraged them to
increase surveillance activity on the
Thai/Malaysian border to prevent a com-
pensating increase in the number of
heroin refineries in that area, since
precursor chemicals come into Thailand
across the Malaysian border. The Malay-
sian Government is also attempting to
make it more difficult for these
chemicals to enter th country either
legally or illegally.

The Thai Government has made
repeated promises to arrest the
notorious "drug warlord" Chang Ch'i-fu,
leader of the Shan United Army (SUA),
and has also posted a $25,000 reward
for his capture. The SUA is estimated to
control some 70% of Golden Triangle
heroin refining. Chang Ch'i-fu resides in
a fortified area with several hundred
armed guards near a small village in
northern Thailand. The Thai Govern-
ment is quite aware of Chang's location
and activities but has been unable to do
much about arresting him.

Burma. In Burma, the bureau's
assistance programs focus primarily on
contract maintenance for the fixed wing
and rotary aircraft provided several
years ago for narcotics programs. We in
the bureau, with the Burmese Govern-
ment, are aware that ultimately long-
term success in reducing the production
of opium and heroin in Burma must
combine rural development and crop
substitution with enforcement and

eradication. The recent visit to the
United States of the Burmese Deputy
Minister of Agriculture underscores the
importance the Government of Burma
places on such programs.

Large-scale enforcement operations
against opium refineries have made suc-
cessful use of aircraft to ferry personnel
to staging areas. Bureau-funded aircraft
have also been used in support of poppy
destruction programs in inaccessible
areas.

U.S. Support Programs. To

counter the narcotics problem in
Southeast Asia, the bureau supports
programs in enforcement, crop substitu-
tion, and demand reduction. In FY 1981
it budgeted $7.7 million for Thailand,
Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The
majority of the funds go to Thai and
Burmese programs. In addition, bureau
funding has encouraged regional en-
forcement cooperation through funding
of police training for students from
ASEAN (Association of South East
Asian Nations) countries and activities
of the Colombo plan drug advisory pro-
gram.

In Southeast Asia there are six U.S.
Government employees in narcotics-
related positions. Two employees are
career Foreign Service officers who
staff the Narcotics Control Unit in
Bangkok. In addition, in Thailand there
is a U.S. Customs officer (detailed to the
bureau), an American electronics
specialist, an American aviation
maintenance specialist, and an American
demand reduction specialist (detailed to
the bureau). We believe that the com-

. . . most of the heroin
now being smuggled into
the eastern United
States is from Southwest
Asia.

bined efforts of our enforcement, de-
mand reduction treatment, and crop
substitution programs have the greatest
chance of long-term success in reducing
the growth and refining of opium and
the trafficking and use of narcotics in
Southeast Asia.

February 1982

47

NARCOTICS

Local commitments to do something
about the problem are clearly growing in
Southeast Asia— but at an uneven pace.
The Governments of Burma, Thailand,
and Malaysia all recognize that they
have a serious narcotics abuse problem
among their own youth. Indonesia has
less of a problem and less concern. All
four countries recognize that they are
major narcotics trafficking centers and,
in the cases of Burma and Thailand,
major growing areas as well. The ac-
tivities of the four governments vary,
however. In Thailand our greatest dif-
ficulty is in encouraging Thai motivation
and action to follow through on their
promises. Opium eradication has been
promised in Thailand for several years.
This year, if the Thai Government
fulfills its current commitment to us,
will be the first year that any significant
eradication has taken place — albeit in a
limited area. In Burma the motivation
exists to do something about the grow-
ing of opium. However, the Burmese
Government is unable to exercise effec-
tive control over most of the opium-
producing areas.

Southwest Asia

Although the focus of this hearing is on
Southeast Asia and Latin America, I
would like to make a brief reference to
Southwest Asia in order to keep the
other two areas in context.

The recent arrest here in
Washington of four Pakistani heroin
traffickers and their American contact
points up the fact that most of the
heroin now being smuggled into the
eastern United States is from Southwest
Asia. Because we have no access now to
the opium growing areas of Afghanistan
and Iran, we do not have reliable
estimates either of how much opium is
being produced in either country or how
much of the opium produced there
reaches the United States as heroin.

Opium production in Pakistan for
the past 2 years has been in the 100-125
ton range, down from the record
700-800 ton 1979 crop. Three factors
account for this: 1) a government ban on
poppy cultivation in the "settled" areas,
which produced 300 tons of the 1979
crop; 2) farmers' depressed prices
because of larger stocks remaining from
the 1979 crop; and 3) adverse weather
conditions.

We cannot do anything directly
about production in Afghanistan and
Iran, so we are concentrating our cur-
rent efforts on encouraging enforcement

of the Government of Pakistan's ban on
cultivation in additional areas of the
Northwest Frontier Province and in in-
terdicting heroin trafficking en route
from Southwest Asia to the United
States as it passes through Turkey and
Western Europe.

Latin America

I would like to turn now to the current
narcotics situation in Latin America.
Latin Americans, because of their
geographical proximity and cultural ties,
are much more attuned to our society
than the more distant Asians. They are,
for example, aware of the perceived am-
bivalent attitude toward drug abuse
among major elements of our popula-
tion. This relative familiarity with the
controversy over drug use here adds a
unique complication to our programs in
Latin America. We frequently must seek
to convince influential private and public
figures of the bona fides of U.S. motives
when we urge them to take strong and
politically difficult measures to control
illicit production and trafficking to the
United States — the ready market for
lucrative exports from their frequently
weak economies. Otherwise responsible
Colombian businessmen, for example,
have charged that our desire to
eliminate Colombian marijuana produc-
tion is designed to "protect the U.S.
marijuana producers' market."

Latin America's importance as prime
supplier of illicit cocaine and marijuana
for the U.S. market has increased as
production has expanded in Bolivia,
Peru, and Colombia. The latter is also a
major trafficking country. Trafficking
has proven to be a devastating social
and economic problem for the small
Caribbean states — Bahamas, Jamaica,
etc. — through which the bulk of the il-
licit drug flow passes en route to the
United States. It is, therefore, a
bilateral political problem for the United
States in an area already sensitive
because of economic and security
threats. With this in mind, let me give
you a progress report on our current
Latin American programs.

In FY 1981, $17.1 million, or over
60% of our overall country program
assistance, was expended for our Latin
American initiatives.

Mexico. Mexico historically has
taken great pride in maintaining its in-
dependence from the United States and
traditionally has accepted no U.S.
economic assistance. However, as the
magnitude of illegal narcotics production
grew in Mexico during the 1960s and

U.S. concern increased, and given the
Mexican perception that American de-
mand created the narcotics problem, the
Mexicans felt that U.S. assistance in
sharing the costs of the massive control
program was appropriate.

The narcotics eradication program
which we undertook in cooperation with
the Mexican Attorney General's office
has become our largest international
narcotics control initiative. Over a
10-year period, the United States has in-
vested more than $95 million of interna-
tional narcotics control funds in this
joint venture. Although we do not have
access to Mexican budgetary figures, we
estimate that they are currently spend-
ing three to four times as much as we
are on the program. Our major expense
has been for aircraft and aviation
maintenance. No U.S. assistance has
been needed for crop substitution, since
opium growing on a large scale is a re-
cent phenomenon, and the Mexican
Government does not feel obligated to
provide aid to growers it puts out of
business (in marked contrast to the
situation in traditional producer coun-
tries).

The key to the success of the
eradication campaign in Mexico was the
government's November 1975 decision to
use herbicides. They had never been
used in a nationwide campaign for nar-
cotics control, but ad hoc manual
eradication had not been equal to the
task— even when helicopter logistical
support in 1975 doubled the amount
eradicated. In 1975, an estimated 65
tons of opium was grown, producing 6.5
tons of heroin. At the high point in the
eradication campaign, 1977, some 10,000
hectares of opium (enough to produce 10
tons of heroin) were destroyed. By 1980,
less than one ton of Mexican heroin
entered the United States. There are,
however, recent indications that heroin
production is increasing, as the Mexican
poppy growers use more and more
sophisticated means to avoid detection
and thus eradication.

Colombia. Colombia continues to be
the major processor of cocaine hydro-
chloride, supplying at least 50% of the
U.S. and world markets. (Nearly al! of
the cocaine is, however, produced from
coca derivatives originating in Peru and
Bolivia.) Colombia also provides an
estimated 70% of the marijuana
smuggled to the United States. Our con-
tributions to the international narcotics
control programs in Colombia totaled
$32 million through 1981. (This total is
somewhat misleading, however, since it

48

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

includes a "one-shot" amount of $16
million, which Congress mandated for
Colombia for FY 1980. These funds have
been apportioned among Colombia's
three armed forces, the National Police,
and the Customs Service, principally to
procure narcotics interdiction related
commodities.) The FY 1981 program ex-
tends support at a level of $3.6 million.

The majority of this new funding
($1.7 million) will be used to assist the
National Police— since May 1980 the
primary Colombian Government agency
for narcotics enforcement. Since the
first of January 1981, the National
Police has deployed more than 1,000
men throughout the country in new anti-
narcotics units, launching an increas-
ingly effective interdiction campaign.
Lesser, but still substantial amounts,
will support the Customs Service,
Ministry of Justice activities, and the
Attorney General's office.

With regard to marijuana and with
reference to my earlier remarks, I would
note that the single most effective solu-
tion to the massive Colombian export of
this narcotic is an eradication effort.
Enforcement and interdiction alone
simply cannot suppress the flow. Our
ultimate objective is, therefore, to
cooperate in an eradication program in
Colombia. However, we are hindered by
a legal prohibition against working
toward eradication internationally
through herbicidal spraying. Until pro-
gress on this front is brought about, we
will not be able to convince the Colom-
bians to agree to undertake the most
potentially effective antimarijuana cam-
paign.

Ecuador. The bureau has main-
tained a program in Ecuador because of
the country's importance as a trafficking
link for coca derivatives and cocaine
moving from Bolivia and Peru to Colom-
bia (and ultimately the United States).
We have provided commodity and train-
ing support for narcotics control pro-
grams to the Customs Military Police
and the National Police. At various
points from 1974 to 1979, limited fund-
ing was also committed to the Ministries
of Health and Education for drug abuse
education programs. In September 1980
a program agreement was signed with
the newly formed National Directorate
for the Control of Illicit Narcotics
(DINACTIE) in the Attorney General's
office. To date these limited funds have
been dedicated to drug abuse education
programs. However, the DINACTIE is
also charged with the investigation of

February 1982

major traffickers operating in Ecuador.
While the group is still in the formative
stages, there is substantial potential.
Thus, in FY 1981 the international nar-
cotics control program modestly sup-
ports this operational and enforcement
side of DINACTIE also.

Peru. Since 1978 the Department
has been working with the Government
of Peru to support programs designed to
reduce the production and trafficking in
illegal narcotics at their source. The
U.S. Government has provided a total of
almost $7 million in assisting the Peru-
vian narcotics control program. While
the initial thrust of our support was
weighted heavily in favor of enforce-
ment activities, the current trend is
toward a balanced program of enforce-
ment, education, and income substitution
as a more effective strategy to combat
the problem.

We have entered into project agree-
ments with a variety of Peruvian agen-
cies involved in the narcotics control
effort. We are especially interested in
enhancing the operational and in-
telligence coordination among all Peru-
vian narcotics enforcement agencies.
Among these groups, the Peruvian In-
vestigative Police and the Guardia Civil
have been the principal recipients of
U.S. aid. The police have received $1

million in U.S. financial assistance and
the Guardia Civil $740,000 over a 3-year
period (FY 1978-FY 1980).

Our other programs in Peru include
assistance to the Guardia Republicana
and the Peruvian Customs Service. The
former is involved with border control
and the latter with normal export/import
control activities. We have also been
cooperating with the Ministry of Educa-
tion in a modest drug abuse education
and prevention program within Peru.

As noted, our long-term thrust in
Peru is a balanced, integrated program.
In 1981 a major and unique step for-
ward was made with the inauguration of
the Upper Huallaga Valley project. This
area of Peru is the country's largest
single source of illicit coca production
and has been the target of previous
limited bureau-supported eradication
activities. The recent quantum step for-
ward is a joint effort by the bureau, AID
(Agency for International Development),
and the Government of Peru which tar-
gets an estimated 17,000 hectares of
illicit coca cultivation in the valley. This
5-year agricultural development and
coca substitution project is the first U.S.
Government-supported experiment in
which the long-advocated strategy of
coordinating the bureau's support for en-
forcement with AID's development
assistance will be implemented. The AID

Anglo-American Cooperation Against
Drug Trafficking

The United Kingdom and the United
States have agreed by an exchange of
notes to strengthen their cooperation to
suppress the unlawful importation of
narcotic drugs into the United States.
Such international cooperation is
recognized in the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs of 1961.

Under the terms of the new agree-
ment, the authorities of the United
States may board in the Gulf of Mexico,
Caribbean Sea, and in the area of up to
150 miles off the Atlantic coast of the
United States private vessels flying the
British flag in instances where they
reasonably believe that the vessel has on
board a cargo of drugs for importation
into the United States in violation of
U.S. laws. Thereafter, if U.S. authorities
still consider that a narcotics offense is
being committed, they are empowered to
search the vessel. If the search is suc-
cessful, U.S. authorities may seize the
vessel and take it to a U.S. port.

Her Majesty's Government will be
promptly informed of all actions taken
by U.S. authorities and has the right,
within specified periods, to object to the
further detention of any vessel and to
the prosecution of any U.K. national. On
receipt of such an objection U.S.
authorities have agreed to release the
vessel or individual concerned.

Also, compensation may be payable
for any loss or injury suffered as a result
of any action taken by the United States
in contravention of the terms of this
agreement, or for any other improper or
unreasonable action taken by the United
States pursuant to this agreement.

The two countries have cooperated,
in the past, to stamp out this trade, but
both sides considered that such coopera-
tion should have a more solid basis in
the future.

Press release 383 of Nov. 16, 1981.

49

NARCOTICS

project, which was signed with the
Government of Peru on September 15,
calls for a loan and grant of $18 million
to finance a program of combined
agricultural research and extension
credit, and other developmental ac-
tivities in the Upper Huallaga. The
bureau plans, contingent upon annual
appropriations, to expend $15-20 million
on enforcement and eradication of illicit
coca in this and other areas of Peru over
the same 5-year period.

Bolivia. U.S. international narcotics
control assistance to Bolivia began in
FY 1975 with a small pilot project to in-
vestigate the potential for a crop
substitution program. Bilateral
agreements were subsequently signed in
1977 for two different areas of activity:
expanded investigations of alternate
crops and assistance to the National
Directorate for the Control of
Dangerous Substances for narcotics con-
trol per se. Further agreements were
signed in 1978 and 1979.

The long-term goal of both the alter-
nate crops and control projects was to
reduce coca production in Bolivia to the
level required for legal internal use and
drug manufacture and to severely curtail
illicit exploitation of coca leaves.

The experimental and study phase of
the agricultural development project was
essentially completed by the end of
1980. Earlier in the same year, AID had
prepared a draft project paper for a full-
scale agricultural diversification project
in the Chapare region. Consideration of
this project was suspended after the
military coup d'etat in Bolivia in July
1980.

The bureau has maintained, how-
ever, a substantially reduced level of
assistance to the Bolivian counterpart
agency, Proyecto de Desarrollo
"Chapare-Yungas" (PRODES). We have
sought to maintain PRODES as a viable
institution in order to have in place an
organization that could resume a diver-
sification program quickly should the
government demonstrate a capacity for
narcotics enforcement in the future.

As to the future, the United States
has, of course, just taken the first step
toward normalizing relations with
Bolivia, based, inter alia, on some
positive signs on the antinarcotics front.
However, any return to a full bureau
program is dependent on further
demonstration that the current Bolivian
Government is seriously committed to

erasing the legacy of the past and
undertaking effective action to combat
both the production of and trafficking in
cocaine.

Brazil. Since 1979, Brazil has
shown evidence of becoming an impor-
tant cocaine transshipment country and
the principal source for acetone and
ether used in cocaine refinement in
Bolivia. Fairly sophisticated drug
distribution networks transship cocaine
from Bolivia through Brazil for ultimate
sale in the United States and Europe.
Our goal is to assist Brazilian authorities
in curtailing the processing and
transshipment of coca derivatives.

In September 1981, the United
States signed a project agreement with
the Federal Police, which is under the
Ministry of Justice and is the agency
within the Brazilian Government with
primary responsibility for narcotics con-
trol. Approximately $200,000 will sup-
port interdiction operations aimed at
disrupting trafficking at selected spots
in key border areas. The components of
this project will be primarily river patrol
craft and telecommunications equip-
ment.

If the results of this new cooperative
operation are positive, we plan to con-
tinue to support the Federal Police in its
border interdiction program.

The Caribbean. Trafficking routes
for at least 70% of the cocaine and mari-
juana and a major portion of the illicitly
produced dangerous drugs entering the
United States pass through the Carib-
bean. General aviation aircraft and
marine vessels are the most common
mode of trafficking, but commercial
aviation is also used, particularly for
cocaine. Traffickers often operate from
bases in countries where they have
established a working relationship with
government officials. Many landing and
refueling operations which are vital to
the traffickers operate as legitimate
businesses, or with very transparent
camouflage. Furthermore, genuine
shortages of local enforcement resources
and the innumerable isolated airstrips
and harbors from which traffickers can
operate help to produce an environment
that is truly hostile to interdiction
efforts.

The impact of this flow on the
United States— especially Florida— has
long been obvious. The Attorney General
of Florida reportedly has described the
trade in cocaine, marijuana, and illicit

Quaaludes as "the biggest retail business
in our State," amounting to approx-
imately $7 billion per year. But the
affected Caribbean countries are only
now beginning to perceive the serious
social, political, and economic problems
for themselves stemming from the traf-
fic.

We are undertaking a Caribbean
regional narcotics program aimed at
establishing a basis for better coordina-
tion between the Caribbean countries,
particularly Haiti, the Bahamas, the
Turks and Caicos, and U.S. enforcement
agencies (i.e., DEA, Coast Guard, and
Customs). The main thrust of this fund-
ing is to improve interdiction results in
the Caribbean, pursuing eradication
efforts if deemed feasible, and opera-
tional support efforts.

Jamaica has a special place in our
Caribbean strategy because, in addition
to being a logistical stopover for transit-
ing traffickers, it is the only significant
narcotics source country in the area.
Approximately 10% of the marijuana
smuggled into the United States is
grown in Jamaica.

Marijuana, known as ganja on the
island, is widely used among Jamaicans.
Complicating the situation, Rastafarians
and the members of the Ethiopian Zion
Coptic Church, religious groups native
to the island, use marijuana in their
liturgies.

Until recently, Jamaica's economy
had followed a downward spiral for
several years. Currently, income from
marijuana cultivation and trafficking has
risen to a point where it may be sur-
passing that of any one of Jamaica's
traditional foreign exchange earners.
Most Jamaicans have benefited eco-
nomically, at least indirectly, from the
marijuana trade. As a recent Business
Week article noted:

In recent years, local marijuana traders have
replaced U.S. tourists as major suppliers of
dollars for Jamaica's dwindling foreign cur-
rency reserves. "Washington's crackdown on
gaenja is really hurting us," says one
Kingston merchant. "Some people call it dirty
money, but until the tourist industry is reviv-
ed, many of us can't get along without it."

We are, of course, prepared to assist
the Jamaicans in interdicting trafficking
through and from the island and in con-
trolling the production of marijuana
surplus to that of Jamaica's own domes-
tic consumption.

50

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

Functional Activities

I would like to end my discussion of
specific geographic areas here and move
on to a few functional activities which
touch equally on several areas of the
world: narcotics demand reduction,
which I have referred to previously in
connection with individual country pro-
grams, international narcotics control
training, and our support for multi-
lateral programs.

Demand Reduction. In FY 1981,
the bureau provided $1.5 million to sup-
port programs designed to reduce de-
mand for illicit drugs in countries which
are involved in the production or transit
of drugs destined for the United States.

We have found that the existence of
a demand reduction program enhances
the awareness of local public leaders of
the potential or actual threat drug abuse
poses to the host society. This in turn
strengthens the government's commit-
ment to the production and trafficking
control programs which the bureau
emphasizes. We have also found,
particularly in producing countries, that
stable populations of illicit drug con-
sumers provided an additional economic
incentive to illicit producers. These
addicts are a ready local market for
relatively unrefined drugs, like opium,
and serve as a hedge against fluctua-
tions of the international drug market.
Finally, large numbers of chronic con-
sumers of illicit drugs may destabilize
societies friendly to the United Staes by
reducing the availability of effective
manpower in the workplace; supporting
corruption, criminal trafficking ele-
ments, and other drug-related crime;
and exacerbating other economic and
social problems.

International Narcotics Control
Training. Bureau-funded training activ-
ities are aimed primarily at improving
the enforcement capability of foreign
narcotics officials and are designed to in-
crease professional cooperation between
U.S. enforcement authorities and those
of other countries.

Most of the training is carried out
by DEA and Customs in time-tested
courses and in special programs de-
signed to meet specific requirements.
Both agencies conduct advanced courses
for high-level foreign officials in their
U.S. training centers, while training for
line officials is generally offered abroad
in special in-country programs. Begin-
ning in FY 1982, DEA will conduct its

advanced international narcotics control
training at the Federal Law Enforce-
ment Training Center at Glynco,
Georgia. DEA and Customs also provide
courses to improve domestic training
capabilities of responsible agencies in the
cooperating nations. During FY 1981,
DEA and Customs provided training to
over 1,000 foreign participants in
courses overseas and in the United
States.

Bureau-funded training also includes
the executive observation program,
through which senior foreign govern-
ment officials involved in narcotics con-
trol activities visit this country. Besides
exposing these key visitors to U.S. agen-

Colombia continues
to be the major proc-
essor of cocaine
hydrochloride, supply-
ing at least 50% of the
U.S. and world markets.

cies and procedures, this program
develops personal ties of communication
and cooperation between U.S. and
foreign government officials. During FY
1981, the bureau funded the visits of 12
senior government officials from nine
countries.

Multilateral Programs. So far I

have spoken mainly of our bilateral nar-
cotics control efforts. But we also work
through various multilateral agencies
and contribute to the U.N. Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). I
would like to cite here an important re-
cent development by which the U.N.
drug control system will assist us in
reducing a major form of drug abuse in
the United States.

One of the most popular illicit
pharmaceuticals here is methaqualone,
most frequently marketed under the
trade name Quaalude. Hospital emer-
gency room mentions of methaqualone
during the first three quarters of 1980
totaled 3,374, up almost 100% from the
same period in 1979. Although most of
the illicit methaqualone has been
smuggled from Europe to clandestine
laboratories in Colombia for entab-
letting, it appears that, in the near
future, Colombia may no longer be a
major supplier.

For some time, we have urged the
Colombian Government to ratify the
U.N. Psychotropic Substances Conven-
tion of 1971, the international agree-
ment under which the shipment of licit
raw materials for methaqualone, which
is later diverted to illicit production, can
be controlled. The convention has
serious implications for domestic
pharmaceutical industries which makes
ratification a sensitive economic issue.
As you know, the U.S. Senate did not
ratify the convention until last year. The
Colombian legislature did so in
September 1980, and final ratification is
expected by the end of 1981. Colombia
will soon be able to notify the U.N. Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs that licit im-
ports of the raw materials for metha-
qualone are prohibited. Exporting coun-
tries, in this case the Federal Republic
of Germany and Switzerland, would then
be obliged to halt shipments to Colombia
and, in doing so, cut off supplies now
diverted to the clandestine laboratories
which supply the U.S. market.

The United Nations own program
activities to control illicit drugs are
funded through voluntary contributions
given to UNFDAC by the United States
and several other countries. Since its
establishment in 1971, UNFDAC has
helped to emphasize the fact that the
problems of drug abuse know no na-
tional boundaries and, therefore, require
worldwide cooperation. UNFDAC has
also been able to work with countries
whose cooperation is vital to U.S. nar-
cotics control interests, but where
political circumstances inhibit U.S.
bilateral assistance.

The bureau hopes to make another
contribution to the fund in FY 1982.
UNFDAC's 1982 program will support
crop substitution projects in countries
which are the main producers of illegal
opium, notably Burma, Thailand, Laos,
and Pakistan. With the support of Con-
gress, we intend to pursue our efforts to
suppress illicit narcotics production and
trafficking as close to the sources of
illicit narcotics substances as possible.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

2Since 1975, the Lao Government has
limited the size of the U.S. Embassy to a
small number of people who are prohibited
from leaving the capital city of Vientiane
without permission. Therefore, there is no
U.S. program in Laos at the present time.

February 1982

51

NUCLEAR POLICY

Nuclear Cooperation and
Nonproliferation Strategy

by James L. Malone

Address submitted to the annual con-
ference on the Atomic Industrial Forum
in San Francisco on December 1, 1981.
Mr. Malone is Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and International Environmen-
tal and Scientific Affairs.

Today I would like to review for you the
progress of the Administration's nuclear
cooperation and nonproliferation policy
since President Reagan's July 16 general
statement on this subject. I know that
most of you are familiar with that docu-
ment and have followed closely the
speeches and policy statements of other
Administration representatives over the
past several months. Therefore, I felt
that, after some brief general comments
on the principles that are guiding our
approach, it would probably be most
useful at this point for you to have a
preliminary report on a number of the
specific cases with which we have been
dealing and to hear how the Administra-
tion believes each individual case fits in-
to its overall policy framework.

The past year has been an exciting
time for those of us who have been in-
volved in the evolution of a new
American strategy on nuclear coopera-
tion and nonproliferation. One result of
our efforts has been the initiation of a
heightened level of exchange between
nuclear industry and the government.
This is something that we will need to
pursue and strengthen from both sides.
For our part, we recognize that national
and world public opinion about our
policies will make a decisive contribution
to their success or failure. Public judg-
ment will be formed in the first instance
by a process of debate and discussion
among those, like you, who have a
special knowledge of, and involvement
in, these issues. And we also recognize
that, for the success of its decision-
making process, the nuclear industry of
the United States must be confident that
it has a solid understanding of the direc-
tion of its government's nuclear policies.

Principles Guiding U.S. Approach

At the outset I want to lay to rest one
possible misperception, entertained in
some quarters, of the bottom line on
U.S. nonproliferation policy. It is, of

course, true that we intend to enhance
the international competitiveness of U.S.
nuclear exports by all appropriate
means. Assisting U.S. firms to compete
on a more equal, nondiscriminatory basis
with nuclear suppliers from other coun-
tries in meeting peaceful nuclear power
needs is not only a legitimate activity of
any U.S. administration, it is one to
which the present occupant of the White
House has directed the urgent attention
of the several agencies involved.

It is also true that, in contrast to the
uniform approach that held sway
previously, our approach will be a more
differentiated one. It was, perhaps,
natural that over the years there arose a
tendency in U.S. nonproliferation and
nuclear export policy to seek to treat all
customers alike and to expect that the
inflexible and nondiscriminatory rule of
law that guides our affairs at home could
somehow be universally applied to
regulate our decisions on nuclear ex-
ports. Of course, in the real world, it
turns out that potential customers for
our nuclear exports are characterized by
an extreme disparity in their non-
proliferation merit and run the gamut
from those countries whose sense of
responsibility on this issue is no less
than our own to those with whom we
could not consider nuclear cooperation
at all. It is precisely this diversity that
our new policy is designed to recognize
in full.

However, it is most definitely not
true — and this is a point to which I par-
ticularly want to draw your atten-
tion— that the Reagan Administration is
less concerned than its predecessors
about the threat of nuclear proliferation.
There is no more terrifying prospect
than that nuclear arms might one day be
in the hands of a government that would
seek its desperate ends by using them.
The imperatives of our own security on
this score are self-evident: For the
United States there is no alternative to
a full commitment to preventing the fur-
ther spread of nuclear weapons.

In our bilateral discussions on mat-
ters of nuclear commerce and non-
proliferation — which I will examine in
more detail shortly — it has been clear to
our counterparts from other countries
that the Reagan Administration's orien-
tation on this critical issue extends for-

ward the straight line of American
policy concern that goes back to the
beginning of the atomic age. In our
confidential diplomatic exchanges, the
concrete direction of our policy is
necessarily more fully and candidly
revealed than in public statements by
government officials. It should be evi-
dent to those who keep a close watch on
the public results of such meetings and
who can read carefully between the lines
that there is no indication from this
quarter that the United States may be
dropping its guard or relaxing its con-
cern about the need to avert nuclear
proliferation. Quite the contrary.

While our concern is in no way
diminished, our approach, as you know,
has been significantly altered in several
regards. A few moments ago, I men-
tioned our intention to reestablish the
competitiveness of American nuclear ex-
ports. Maintaining the economic health
of this major industry is in itself a very
important objective, both for the
domestic energy role the industry must
be in a position to play over the next
decades and for the overall contribution
we need it to make to the economy with
regard to jobs and our balance of trade.

But the really decisive consideration
is the fact that, in order to influence the
development of nuclear energy around
the world, in order to insure that that
development is proliferation safe, we
must be a leading participant in it. If we
are not, not only do we risk the pro-
gressive atrophy of this country's tech-
nological capabilities, the loss of jobs at
home, and the weakening of our
payments position, we also risk that
countries will go their own ways in mat-
ters of nuclear development to the detri-
ment of our nonproliferation objectives.
U.S. leadership has played a key role in
raising international awareness about
nuclear proliferation and in helping to
create a system that is able to give
governments a real measure of
confidence that their neighbors are not
building nuclear weapons. It is impor-
tant to realize that the critical factor in
enabling the United States to make such
a contribution has not in the first in-
stance been the correctness of our posi-
tion but rather the influence we were
able to muster by virtue of our role as a
technology and trade leader in interna-
tional nuclear commerce.

Unfortunately, there is a recurring
tendency to turn away from the complex
and difficult burdens of involvement— to
adopt an above-the-battle stance in
which the United States is more con-
cerned with insuring that its own hands

52

Department of State Bulletin

NUCLEAR POLICY

are clean than with coping with the
threat of proliferation as it exists in an
often messy and complex world — but in
the long run we have inevitably found
such an attitude to be unrealistic. The
Reagan Administration's nuclear export
policy is a return to realism.

With the foregoing description of
our policy's conceptual basis in mind, I
would now like to turn to a review of
several of the specific country-related
issues that have been prominent on our
agenda over the past months.

Country-Related Issues

Japan. A number of years ago the
Japanese — with an eye, no doubt, to
their future energy security and in keep-
ing with their desire to be in the fore-
front of technological development — de-
cided to construct a pilot-scale nuclear
reprocessing plant at Tokai-Mura. How-
ever, before completion of the plant,
U.S. views concerning the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel had undergone
significant change. In 1977, as the Tokai
reprocessing facility was ready to start
operation, the United States was en-
gaged in a full-scale effort to discourage
reprocessing worldwide. Just at that
time the Japanese were seeking U.S.
consent, in accordance with our agree-
ment for cooperation, to reprocess
U.S. -origin spent fuel in their new
facility.

The result was a sharp disagreement
between the two governments. At one
point, the then Prime Minister of Japan
characterized the Tokai-Mura issue as
the most disturbing element in
U.S. -Japanese relations. But, given the
overall closeness of U.S. -Japanese in-
terests and the strength of Japan's non-
proliferation credentials, a compromise
was ultimately reached that allowed
Japan to process up to 99 metric tons of
U.S. -origin spent fuel over a 2-year
period. This agreement was subsequent-
ly extended and augmented to permit
operation of the plant through the end
of October of this year. The Tokai-Mura
issue was thus one of the first that the
new Administration had to face.

In July the President announced
that the United States would not seek to
inhibit reprocessing of spent reactor fuel
in countries with advanced nuclear
power programs and where it did not
create a proliferation risk. With the
President's new policy in mind, we were
able to negotiate a new arrangement
with the Japanese before the end of Oc-
tober. It will enable Japan to operate
the Tokai facility through the end of

February 1982

1984 and to reprocess U.S. -origin spent
fuel up to the annual design capacity of
the plant.

Japan's impeccable nonproliferation
credentials and the special contribution
it has made, in cooperation with the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), to developing new techniques
and instrumentation to advance the safe-
guardability of reprocessing plants make
it clear that Japan meets the standards
set forth by President Reagan. The ar-
rangements we reached with Japan take
full account of our proliferation concerns
while at the same time demonstrating
that the United States will be a reliable
partner in its nuclear commerce with na-
tions which include our most valued
friends and allies.

Switzerland. One of the most im-
portant and illustrative developments of
the past several months was the decision
to approve two pending Swiss requests
to retransfer a total of approximately 40
metric tons of spent fuel for reprocess-
ing in France. The handling of these
"subsequent arrangement" cases is not
only indicative of our announced inten-
tion to approve requests like these from
Switzerland but also of our commitment
to act expeditiously so that our trading
partners will be able to make reliable
long-term plans and projections.

In this context, where we are
endeavoring to reestablish an American

There is no more terrify-
ing prospect than that
nuclear arms might one
day be in the hands of a
government that would
seek its desperate ends
by using them.

reputation as a predictable and punctual
contractual partner, we have begun to
see signs of renewed interest on a
governmental level in nuclear coopera-
tion with the United States. With
Sweden, for example, we hope soon to
move to reopen discussions on exploring
a basis for amending the nuclear
cooperation agreement between the two
countries. And we expect shortly to sign
and then submit for congressional con-
sideration the draft of a similar agree-
ment that the United States and
Norway have initialed.

Mexico. As you know, Mexico is
currently making great strides in
economic development and is playing an
increasingly important role in this hemi-
sphere and in the world, especially with
regard to international trade and
energy. In agriculture, for example, our
two countries provide each other with
significant quantities of a number of
products to the considerable benefit of
our respective populations. We look
ahead to the continued development of
the Mexican economy both as an ex-
panded market for American products
and as a supplier of a range of imports
to the United States.

It seems to me that U.S. -Mexican
relations are currently on a particularly
good footing and are based on a realistic
respect for each other's accomplishments
and interests. The close personal rela-
tionship between President Reagan and
President Lopez Portillo has been a ma-
jor element in our improved relationship.

Last week Secretary Haig was in
Mexico for talks on a range of bilateral
topics. The discussions, which included
matters of nuclear cooperation, con-
cerned ways in which the United States
and Mexico could work together to max-
imize the benefit which we both draw
from the especially close relationship of
our two countries.

In nuclear matters, Mexico has
established a solid cadre of scientists
and technicians and maintains very high
academic and research standards in the
nuclear field. Moreover, the Mexican
Government has made a farsighted deci-
sion to invest a portion of the revenues
from its abundant petroleum resources
in the long-range development of nuclear
power.

For our part, we hope to be able to
work together with the Mexicans to find
ways to expand cooperation between our
countries in the peaceful uses of the
atom. And given this Administration's
commitment to domestic energy inde-
pendence, to removing impediments to
the long-term expansion of nuclear
power, and to encouraging the general
health of the U.S. reactor industry, I
believe that the United States will be
perceived as an attractive partner for
cooperative programs that will stretch
out to the end of this century. No
foreign customer of ours is likely to face
a situation some years down the road in
which he ends up bearing the expense of
subsidizing a nuclear industry whose
modest domestic market has, in the
meantime, largely dried up. In short,
there today is ground for optimism that
the United States and Mexico can look

53

NUCLEAR POLICY

forward to a significant level of com-
merce in nuclear technology as well as in
more traditional areas of trade.

During his visit there last week,
Secretary Haig deposited our instrument
of ratification of Protocol I of the treaty
of Tlatelolco — a step which had been
long awaited by the Mexicans and other
Latin American governments. Our
ratification had been unanimously ap-
proved by the Senate in accordance with
the request the President made in his
July 16 statement. This action was a
token of the deep interest we share with

The United States and Brazil
entered into a bilateral agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation in 1972.
Brazil subsequently contracted with
Westinghouse for the construction of its
first power reactor, Angra I, and with
the Atomic Energy Commission (more
recently the Department of Energy) for
enrichment of fuel for that reactor. A
provision of the enrichment services con-
tract called for a financial penalty if
Brazil were to turn to another source
for enrichment during the life of the
contract.

[Mexico] has made a farsighted decision to invest a
portion of the revenues from its abundant
petroleum resources in the long-range development
of nuclear power.

Mexico in keeping the region free from
nuclear armaments.

Mexico has made a strong commit-
ment to the cause of nonproliferation.
We have now made an equally strong
commitment to reestablishing the United
States as an attractive and reliable com-
petitor in this field and there thus seems
to be no reason to prevent our reaching
mutually satisfactory arrangements with
the Mexicans that would allow U.S.
firms a fair chance at participation in
the Mexican program.

Although companies from a number
of other countries are also interested in
a share in the Mexican nuclear energy
undertakings, a U.S. Government team
in which I am participating will shortly
be in Mexico to discuss nuclear coopera-
tion matters. We will be able to present
a strong brief in favor of U.S. involve-
ment, for with its unequaled academic,
research, and industrial resources in the
nuclear area, and its government's com-
prehensive commitment to support of
nuclear export initiatives like this one, I
think the United States will be in a posi-
tion to compete aggressively.

Brazil. The case of Brazil casts an
informative light on the dynamics of the
flexible approach we have adopted in
such circumstances. Our objective has
been to keep options open on both sides
as we attempt to find equitable ar-
rangements that would serve our non-
proliferation goals while establishing a
framework that would permit nuclear
cooperation between the two nations.

54

In 1979 Brazil applied for an export
license for the first fuel reload for
Angra. Since then that license has re-
mained pending while the two govern-
ments have been discussing the applica-
tion of several export criteria estab-
lished by the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act of 1978 and, in particular, the re-
quirement that IAEA safeguards be
maintained on all Brazilian nuclear ac-
tivities.

The requirements of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act were clearly in-
tended in the first place to insure that
exported U.S. materials were not mis-
used and, beyond that, to encourage
those who might want our exports to ac-
cede to a wide-reaching nonproliferation
commitment. In other words, withhold-
ing of U.S. nuclear materials, equip-
ment, and technology was intended as a
lever to move other nations in our
desired nuclear nonproliferation direc-
tions. But there is something important
to keep in mind with regard to any
leverage tool, especially when dealing
with other sovereign nations: In order to
use it effectively, you must know its
limits.

For example, I have never been con-
vinced that it is possible to reach a satis-
factory conclusion to a process of
negotiation with another country if you
try to back the other party publicly
against a wall. This is not to say that it
is not proper for the United States to
specify conditions for its exports. But it
is to say that our export policy can be

only one, ancillary inducement; there
must be additional, publicly palatable
reasons for a country's decision.

Given Brazil's need for fuel reload
material on a timely basis to avoid inter-
ruption in the Angra reactor's operation
and Brazil's reluctance, so far, to pro-
vide safeguards assurances beyond the
scope of the 1972 bilateral agreement, it
became evident that it would not be
possible in the available time to resolve
the complex safeguards issue and other
aspects of our statutory requirements.
At the same time it was judged that fur-
ther efforts on both sides offered a
worthwhile chance that agreement could
eventually be reached between the two
sides.

Under these circumstances the
Department of State recommended that
the prospects of reconciling the positions
of the two parties would be best served
by preservation of a nonconfrontational
environment for our ongoing talks and
that, therefore, Brazil should be permit-
ted to obtain elsewhere the single fuel
load now needed for Angra I without
liability for the termination changes that
the contract would otherwise have re-
quired. This decision was conveyed to
the Government of Brazil by Vice Presi-
dent Bush during his recent visit there.
We feel that it has created conditions
conducive to continuation of good faith
discussions between the two countries
about the conditions under which a
mutually beneficial and enduring nuclear
supply relationship could proceed.

We have been guided in this situa-
tion by the need to be flexible in pursuit
of our nonproliferation goals and by the
conclusion that, in the final analysis, the
real incentives for a country like Brazil
to accede to a full-scope safeguards
regime are likely to be similar to those
that would apply to any nation in these
concrete circumstances: a recognition
that halting the spread of nuclear ex-
plosives and the preservation of Latin
America as a nuclear-free region are
squarely in Brazil's own national in-
terests.

Egypt. The recent conclusion of an
agreement for nuclear cooperation be-
tween Egypt and the United States is
important for two reasons. First, it will
open the door to participation by
American firms in the plans of the
Egyptian Government for peaceful
nuclear development. The United States
has a serious and long-term commitment
to the economic development of Egypt.
Therefore, we welcome the opportunity
to extend our field of cooperative activi-
ty there to the development of the

Department of State Bulletin

NUCLEAR POLICY

ivilian uses of nuclear energy. We
ecognize that nuclear suppliers from
ther countries will also be competing
or a share in Egypt's program, but I
,m confident that with regard to price,
echnological quality, and financial
erms, U.S. companies will be in a posi-
ion to make an attractive offer.

Second, and perhaps even more im-
iortant, is the fact that this agreement
or cooperation with Egypt demon-
trates that the strictest nonprolifera-
ion arrangements can be adequately ac-
ommodated in an agreement that also
irovides fully for peaceful nuclear
levelopment. The example set by the
Jnited States and Egypt in this regard
ould be extremely important as a model
or relations with other countries in this
•egion and beyond. In this, as well as in
ither matters having significant implica-
ions for peace in the Middle East, the
eadership of Egypt has again demon-
;trated its considerable sense of respon-
ibility.

South Africa. The issue of fuel sup-
)ly for the French-built reactors at
{.oeberg in South Africa has been much
n the press lately. (In this connection, I
vas recently reminded that we often
lear what we are predisposed to hear:
Someone, apparently ready to believe
;he worst about the South African
luclear situation, was quoting the State
Department spokesman and printed it as
'South Africa's covert reactors, instead
)f Koeberg reactors.") In any event, I
vould like to briefly review the South
African case and bring you up to date on

Since 1974 the United States has
lad a contract to provide enrichment
services for the Koeberg fuel, beginning
;his year. However, since 1975, the
United States has not authorized nuclear
fuel exports to South Africa.

The consistent U.S. position— and it
is one that the Reagan Administration
has reiterated— has been that the
United States would not be able to
engage in nuclear cooperation with
South Africa unless that country
adhered to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and accepted international
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.

Our objective has been to encourage
South Africa to make a comprehensive
nonproliferation commitment. Such a
development would not only serve our
overall, worldwide nonproliferation
goals, it would have a specific impact in
Africa. The United States believes that
the international safeguards system of
the IAEA provides the best available
means for furnishing verifiable

assurance that a country's nuclear ac-
tivities are not being directed to
weapons purposes. Bringing South
Africa into such a system would make a
real contribution to regional stability and
the cause of nonproliferation.

Our policy in southern Africa is
designed, both with regard to regional
issues like Namibia and issues like the
nuclear one, to work toward solutions
that will defuse tensions on all sides and
lead to a more relaxed perception for all
parties that their long-term national in-
terests are secure.

As part of our efforts, within the
past several months the United States
and South Africa have exchanged visits
of working-level technical teams who
have carried out an in-depth investiga-
tion of the application of safeguards to
enrichment plants. This question has
been a critical one since the objection to
comprehensive international safeguards
that has been most frequently put for-
ward by the South Africans has been
that the inspection process would pose a
danger to the commercial integrity of
their indigenously developed enrichment
process. Though the future of our
overall relationship in nuclear coopera-
tion matters still remains unresolved at
this point, good progress has been made
on this question of safeguarding enrich-
ment plants, and the United States cer-
tainly remains ready to proceed in good
faith to work to resolve remaining prob-
lems.

Pakistan. The case of Pakistan
touches closely on our nonproliferation
policy, although the United States, of
course, does not engage in nuclear

intended result of dissuading Pakistan
from its pursuit of a nuclear weapons
option.

But for the unprovoked Soviet ag-
gression in Afghanistan, matters might
have continued as they were, with Paki-
stan proceeding toward the testing of a
nuclear device and our two countries
fundamentally estranged over the issue.
However, 2 years ago at the time of the
Soviet invasion, it was immediately
recognized that the situation had been
fundamentally altered. It became
necessary to attempt to address Paki-
stan's legitimate and urgent security
concerns, most directly by assisting it to
improve its conventional military capa-
bilities. Those who argue that, in any
event, Pakistan could never hope to
counter a Soviet move against it, forget
the lesson of Yugoslavia or, for that
matter, the lesson of Switzerland in
World War II. They also ignore the pro-
found implications for our security of a
Soviet attack on still another nation in
this vital region of the world.

With this in mind the Reagan Ad-
ministration moved decisively to work
out an assistance package with the
Government of Pakistan. We believe
that this assistance— which is in the
strategic interest of the United States-
will make a significant contribution to
the well-being and security of Pakistan
and that it will be recognized as such by
that government. We also believe that,
for this reason, it offers the best pros-
pect of deterring the Pakistanis from
proceeding with the testing or acquisi-
tion of nuclear explosives. For we have
left the Pakistanis in no doubt that such

The consistent U.S. position . . . has been that the
United States would not be able to engage in
nuclear cooperation with South Africa unless that
country adhered to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and accepted international safeguards. . . .

cooperation with that country. As you
know, the United States terminated all
assistance, military and economic, to
this long-time ally as a result of Paki-
stan's nuclear program — a program that
was intended to put that country in posi-
tion to develop nuclear explosives. How-
ever, our aid cutoff pursuant to the
Symington amendment did not have the

a move on their part would necessarily
and fundamentally alter the premises of
our new security relationship with them.

Australia. As many of you know,
for some years Australia has been con-
sidering the acquisition of a uranium
enrichment capability that would enable
that country to take better advantage of
its abundant natural uranium deposits.
Australia is also a close friend and long-

55

NUCLEAR POLICY

standing ally of the United States and
has superb nuclear nonproliferation
credentials. In fact, Australia has played
an important role in international efforts
to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and has a very strict nuclear
export policy. A number of advanced
nuclear supplier countries are actively
pursuing participation in this project
which would, of course, involve sharing
their enrichment technology with
Australia.

In this context and after extensive
study, the United States last month
made a decision to offer U.S. enrichment
technology to Australia if suitable ar-
rangements can be worked out between
us. It should be noted that any transfer
of U.S. technology under such a pro-
gram would naturally be subject to U.S.
statutory requirements and safeguards
and would be consistent with our overall
nonproliferation policy.

While questions like the Australian
one are examined on a case-by-case basis
and should not be taken as setting a
precedent applicable to other instances,
it is nevertheless worth pointing out that
to have foreclosed the opportunity to
cooperate with Australia would not only
have risked the general alienation of one
of our closest friends and allies, it would
also have tended to diminish our
influence and ability to work together
with the Australians on matters of
nuclear proliferation concern.

Conclusion

Time will tell whether our action on
Australia and in the other examples I
have just presented will have borne
fruit. For, even after almost a year in
office, we must recognize that what we
have done so far is only a beginning. In-
deed, it could be argued— and here I
return to some of the candor I prom-
ised—that toward its end the Carter Ad-
ministration was already heading in
some of the directions which we have
followed. That, in fact, is entirely true-
reality is an insistent teacher and even-
tually brings us all into line, one way or
another— but I would submit that what
matters is not only the isolated decision
in itself but also the whole policy context
in which it occurs. Often the question is
not so much the direction indicated in a
specific decision as the support and em-
phasis the decision receives from the
overall orientation and consistency of an
administration's policies.

In the wake of India's 1974 detona-
tion it was understandable that the
United States was impelled to impose
strict controls on exports of sensitive
nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology. But, as I think most
observers came to realize, we went too
far when these restrictions extended to
our closest allies and industrial partners
and, as a result, we began slipping in
terms of our nuclear industry's ability to
compete at the international level. This
is now being changed.

What has not changed is our com-
mitment to a strict nuclear export policy
when it comes to countries in unstable
areas that are real proliferation risks.
There is simply no alternative here, nor
would we for a moment consider one.

But there is another, even more im-
portant point I have to make in this con-
nection: At base, proliferation is a politi-
cal problem. A given country, is not, in
the first instance, a proliferation threat
by virtue of advanced industrial and
nuclear capabilities— by contrast many
of the advanced industrial nations of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development could acquire nuclear
weapons in short order if they so

wished— but rather because its govern-
ment has made a political decision to
seek nuclear arms based on its percep-
tion of the national security situation it
faces. In other words, it is not possible
to address the proliferation problem ex-
clusively in terms of seeking to restrict
potential proliferator's capabilities; ther
are just too many nations that, given th
political will, can hardly be prevented
from acquiring the necessary technologi
cal and industrial wherewithal in the
long run.

So, while we will continue to follow
a most restrictive export policy toward
potential proliferators, we must add to
that a realistic pursuit of similar
restraint on the part of other nuclear
supplier nations and, above all, a deter-
mination to address the underlying
causes of insecurity that may motivate
some nations to seek a nuclear weapon;
option in the first place. These latter
two activities are the proper task of
diplomacy and will inevitably require th
patience and persistence to apply a
strategy that is nonconfrontational, flex
ible, and often indirect in its means but
uncompromising in its objective. ■

IAEA Safeguards System

by Richard T. Kennedy

Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on December 2,
1981. Mr. Kennedy is Under Secretary
for Management.1

It is important, at the outset, to under-
stand what International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards are and what
they are not. They are a system of pro-
cedures including records, reports, and
inspections by which the IAEA can
verify that specified material and
facilities are not being diverted from
their declared peaceful purposes. IAEA
safeguards are a critical and indispensa-
ble component of the worldwide non-
proliferation effort, but they are not the
totality of that effort.

IAEA safeguards are, principally, a
detection and warning rather than a
prevention or reaction mechanism. The
IAEA has no capability to physically
prevent diversion and has limited en-
forcement authority. It has no authority
or capability to search for nuclear ac-
tivities away from defined locations.

And IAEA safeguards do not involve
political judgments by the IAEA as to
the dependability or sincerity of non-
proliferation commitments.

There are clear limitations on how
the IAEA can fulfill the specific tasks
with which it is entrusted. The Agency
does not have power, for example, to df
mand plant shutdowns. The Agency's
rights on a range of specific questions,
such as designation of inspectors, are
subject to limitations. Substantial
amounts of information received or col-
lected by the IAEA are classified and,
thus, not publicly releaseable by the
Agency.

These points have sometimes been
cited as criticisms of the IAEA.
However, the general limitations on the
Agency's role are simply facts of inter-
national relations, understood from the
outset by all concerned. The safeguards
system entails a unique compromise of
sovereign rights by many nations, and il
is certainly no surprise that this com-
promise is subject to specific limitations
We must assure that these safeguards
do accomplish their defined role, while
pursuing other elements of nonprolifera

56

NUCLEAR POLICY

on policy such as intelligence efforts,
3curity relationships, treaty com-
litments— particularly the NPT—
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]
jstraint in supply of sensitive nuclear
mterial and technology, and upgrading
ational physical protection capabilities
) deal with aspects of the problem not
ddressed by IAEA safeguards.
With regard to the specific
ifeguards rights and activities of the
\EA and to the question of the Agen-
t's effectiveness, I do not believe an
ostract listing of limitations is the best
pproach to analysis or evaluation,
.ather, we should ask the following
uestions:

• Does the IAEA have an adequate
'ga\ basis for application of effective
ifeguards?

• Do the detailed arrangements
fleet an appropriate balance of effec-

veness of safeguards and protection of
le valid economic, safety, and pro-
rietary interests of the operators?

• Does the IAEA have the motiva-
on, means, and capabilities to imple-
lent reasonably effective safeguards?

• Does the political context in which
\EA safeguards operate allow the ef-
ctive implementation of its inspection,
nalysis, and reporting functions?

I believe the answer to all these
iestions is, generally, yes. But actual
-the-field application, while improving,
uneven and often falls short of what
lould, in principle, be done. It has
iken sustained efforts by the United
tates and other interested countries to
jhieve the progress, to date, and there
re problems and weaknesses which
eed further work to improve the Agen-
y's effectiveness and to keep pace with
uclear power developments.

iackground and Considerations

'he IAEA's task has been rapidly
hanging, both quantitatively and
ualitatively. IAEA safeguards were in-
tially applied mainly to research react-
ors, then to an increasing number of
tower reactors. The safeguards task in
he case of research reactors and light
vater moderated power reactors was
datively straightforward: the counting
ind identification of a modest number of
liscrete fuel elements. Also, exact
,echnical standards for safeguards were
lot provided.

In recent years, safeguards have
Deen applied to a rapidly increasing
number of states and facilities. Perhaps,
more importantly, some of the

ebruary1982

safeguarded facilities have presented a
much more complex safeguards problem.
Large amounts of material in various
forms are present in or flow through
"bulk handling" facilities. In particular,
fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and
enrichment plants pose substantial
challenges for safeguards. On-line re-
fueled power reactors pose more com-
plex safeguards problems than do other
types, because of continuous fuel
movements. The political context of
safeguards has also, in some ways,
become more sensitive, particularly with
the spread of significant nuclear
facilities to regions of possible prolifera-
tion risk.

The U.S. effort in the safeguards
area has had several main components.

First, we have engaged in a con-
certed effort over several years to per-
suade the Agency to design its
safeguards approaches to counter
specific diversion scenarios. We also
have supported the establishment of
safeguards detection goals, in terms of
quantities and times. Only with such
goals can uniform and effective
safeguards procedures be established.
This effort has largely succeeded. The
IAEA has adopted this diversion-
scenario orientation and a very demand-
ing set of goals. These goals are, to
some degree, arbitrary and are not ac-
cepted, or even appropriate, as formal
requirements. Their use, however,
represents clear progress in the IAEA's
concept of its task.

Second, we have pressed for more
regular and self -critical analysis by the
Agency Secretariat of Inspection results.
We believe this is crucial both to iden-
tification of necessary improvements
and to informative reporting by the
IAEA to its Board of Governors. A ma-
jor step in this connection was the
establishment, in the last few years, of a
highly competent internal evaluation
unit and the preparation of an annual
safeguards implementation report. This
report provides extensive information on
safeguards activities at specific facility
types, on the degree of achievement of
objectives, and on improvements needed.
The Director General has increased his
specific reporting to the Board of Gover-
nors on matters of safeguards interest.

Third, we have supported a sharp
increase in safeguards resources. The in-
crease in the safeguards staff has been
very rapid over the last several years,
going from 100 in 1976 to 220 in 1981.
The budget for safeguards has increased
from $6.4 million to $25 million in that

period. An extensive U.S. program of
technical support to the IAEA is now
paying off in the procurement and field
use of some 10 types of safeguards in-
struments, as well as in the application
of various systems studies, data han-
dling systems, and standardization ef-
forts. This support program has helped
to induce several other countries, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, Germany,
Canada, and the Soviet Union, to in-
stitute similar measures.

Other elements of our effort have in-
cluded support for appointment of com-
petent and highly motivated staff. In
this connection, we are pleased that the
IAEA has recently appointed an ex-
tremely capable Director General, Mr.
Hans Blix of Sweden, to succeed the
long-time distinguished Director General
Dr. Sigvard Eklund. The United States
also makes diplomatic approaches to en-
courage other countries to increase their
support of effective IAEA safeguards.

Effectiveness of Safeguards

When cooperation in peaceful nuclear
power started in a serious way in the
late 1950s, the United States made ex-
tensive supply arrangements which pro-
vided us rights to inspect the supplied
items to assure that they had not been
diverted from peaceful purposes. The
IAEA was established in 1957 and em-
powered to apply safeguards to items
supplied through it and in other cases as
requested. The IAEA's safeguards
rights and responsibilities are not set
out in a single worldwide instrument but
are established under agreements be-
tween individual states and the IAEA.
These can be either trilateral
agreements — a supplier, a recipient, and
the IAEA — or bilateral agreements, in-
volving only the inspected state and the
IAEA. Since the entry into force of the
nonproliferation treaty, over 100 states
have concluded bilateral safeguards
agreements with the IAEA covering all
nuclear activities in the state.

Safeguards agreements pursuant to
the NPT all closely follow an extensively
negotiated model agreement. It provides
an adequate basis for safeguards ap-
plication. It also provides various provi-
sions which deal with potential concerns
of operators. The older guidelines for
non-NPT type agreements are less
specific on many points such as objec-
tives of safeguards. These agreements
do not limit inspection man-days. Some
early agreements had deficiencies such
as inadequate provisions with regard to

57

NUCLEAR POLICY

duration of the agreement. Such defi-
ciencies have been corrected in recent
non-NPT agreements, and we are
satisified that they, too, provide an ade-
quate basis for safeguards application.

Under either type of safeguards
agreement, more detailed safeguards ar-
rangements are worked out for in-
dividual facilities. These, unlike the basic
agreements, are not public documents.
Our understanding is that provisions in
these "facility attachments" have evolved
and improved over time; for example,
older ones, in some cases, did not pro-
vide explicitly for use of safeguards
equipment such as cameras. Parties to
these early agreements, however, have
generally accepted that technical ad-
vances should be applied under existing
agreements. Also, these documents can
be amended by the state and IAEA, and
the IAEA frequently requests such up-
dating. We believe that this updating
has had considerable success. Never-
theless, improvement of some old ar-
rangements still is necessary.

Based on our present understanding,
recent and updated facility attachments
are designed to address the relevant
diversion scenarios and do provide the
IAEA with adequate rights and means
to apply safeguards. For example, at
several bulk handling facilities con-
tinuous inspection is permitted.

Criticism of Legal Provisions

That inspected States must agree to the
designation of individual inspectors has
been presented as a major defect. We do
not believe this is the case. Operators or
inspected States have a legitimate in-
terest in being able to avoid the designa-
tion of individuals objectionable to them,
for instance, for physical security
reasons. In fact, the U.S. Senate con-
sidered this provision to be an important
protection for the United States under
our own safeguards agreement with the
IAEA.

Safeguards agreements also contain
a provision protecting against overuse of
the right to refuse designation of an in-
spector. In practice, designation of in-
spectors has not been a w 'despread or
serious problem to the IAEA and has
not prevented inspections of any State
or facility. However, the Director
General has reported to the Board that
delays in acceptance of inspectors, in
some instances, have complicated the
IAEA's task by preventing optimal use
of manpower.

Staff and Budget

With regard to the motivation, re-
sources, and capability of the IAEA to
apply effective safeguards, I have out-
lined the increases in staff and budget.
A measure of the adequacy of the
resources available is the comparison of
inspection provisions in facility at-
tachments to actual implemented inspec-
tions. Of those inspection man-days pro-
vided in the facility attachments, only
about 50% have been implemented in
the last year due, in large part, to
resource limitations. This is a situation
clearly needing improvement. The IAEA
projects approximately 70% implementa-
tion in the next year or two, and we
strongly support efforts toward that
end.

The top management of the IAEA is
highly competent and motivated, and
there are many excellent and committed
staff at all levels. But as with any large
organization, improvements can be made
to assure against significant mistakes or
omissions by the staff in conducting in-
spections and analysis. It is important
that adequate redundancies and
crosschecks are built into the system.
While more remains to be done, the
IAEA is making progress in this regard.
The establishment of the evaluation unit
mentioned earlier is a case in point. We
expect the new Director General to con-
tinue the improvements of IAEA effi-
ciency and effectiveness.

Political Considerations

The political context for IAEA
safeguards also is critical. There are
many considerations such as degree of
cooperation from inspected states, any
vulnerability of individual inspectors to
political pressure, ability of IAEA
management to resist possible pressure
from inspected states on specific points,
and general support of safeguards func-
tions by the Board of Governors. De-
tailed discussion of each of these factors
is not possible in the time available. The
overall situation with regard to such fac-
tors, however, is good. Inspected states,
generally, are quite cooperative. In those
cases where a state may not be
cooperative, the Director General can
have confidence he will be backed by a
large majority of the Board of Gover-
nors. The Board plays a very important
role in policymaking, and its present size
and composition allows effective func-
tioning. The IAEA staff performs well
in terms of reporting to the Board on
difficulties encountered. The Secretariat
also is able to resist pressure to dismiss

individual inspectors and, thus, to pro-
vide reasonable job security.

Differences between the developing
and developed countries increasingly an
evident in the IAEA. The G-77 [Group
of 77] countries are pressing for expan-
sion of the Board of Governors, in-
creased technical assistance funded as a
regular budget item, and more hiring ol
individuals from developing countries fc
positions within the IAEA Secretariat.
Where the developing countries can
make a reasonable case for change, sue
as in more consideration of qualified in-
dividuals from these countries in Agenc
appointments, we should be responsive.
But we must also make clear, from the
start, our opposition to changes which
would weaken the IAEA's ability to pet
form its functions. We have opposed
changing the current voluntary funding
of technical assistance, and we have op-
posed any further expansion of the
Board.

We need to resist the intrusion into
IAEA matters of extraneous political
factors, as occurred last September
when the general conference debated
whether to suspend Israel from the
Agency. Such politicization, ultimately,
could threaten the ability of the Agency
to perform its tasks and, especially, its
vital safeguards mission. For now,
however, these disputes have not under
mined safeguards, and we are guardedl;
optimistic that a large majority of IAEJ
Member States will continue to
recognize that an effective IAEA is in
their own security interest and is an in-
dispensable requirement for the ex-
panded international nuclear commerce
many of them seek.

Conclusion

It is sometimes suggested that there is ;
contradiction between the safeguards
and "promotional" functions of the
IAEA. I do not believe this so. The
Agency is not an operator of activities
which it safeguards, nor does it have an
economic interest in them. The "promo-
tional" programs provide basic informa-
tion in areas such as reactor safety,
waste management, or reactor siting, or
involve relatively modest technical
assistance projects. These programs are
one way of implementing Article IV of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
which committed the developed coun-
tries to aid the developing ones in ac-
quiring the benefits of nuclear energy.
In the eyes of many of these developing
countries such participation and
assistance, therefore, is a necessary part

58

PACIFIC

' the broader nonproliferation bargain.
ius, rather than weakening the
feguards system, so-called promotional

\ 'Ograms help to maintain the global
>litical support that the system
.sumes.

President Reagan has made clear
at we strongly support the IAEA. We

Just continue to recognize the unique
iture and contribution of this interna-
)nal body. We have taken various
eps and plan to take still others to
rengthen the Agency. Very important
•ogress has been made by the IAEA in
e recent past, but, it still confronts im-
>rtant problems. Our objective, in sup-
>rt of the new Director General, must
■ to make it as good and effective an
ganization as possible, recognizing the
ntinual need to do even better. I
armly welcome the past and present
terest of this Committee in IAEA
ifeguards and will work closely with
)u in the continued support and further
iprovement of this essential element of
ir nonproliferation effort.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
.1 be published by the committee and will
available from the Superintendent of

ocuments, U.S. Government Printing Of-

•e, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Interests in

the Pacific Island Region

by John H. Holdridge

Statement before the House Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs on
December 3, 1981. Ambassador
Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.1

I am pleased to appear before the com-
mittee today to respond to questions you
may have on how American territories
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands (TTPI) relate to our foreign
policy in the Pacific Island region.
Before dealing with these concerns, I
think it is incumbent on me to describe
the context in which our territories live
and act.

The Pacific Island region embraces
.an area of some 25 million square
"miles — about one-sixth of the Earth's
surface. It ranges some 6,000 miles east
to west — from French Polynesia to near
the Philippines — and a little less north
to south — from Hawaii to the shores of
New Zealand. It is a region of ocean; its
land area is slightly less than that of
Texas; its population is approximately 5
million.

It is, then, a region of vast dis-
tances, dotted by islands and atolls. It is
well-known to us — in myth and in
memories of the Second World War.
Neither, however, is sufficient to give an
accurate picture of the area or its
aspirations and problems today.

Change and Development

The past 20 years have seen the region
change from one in which colonial
dependence was the norm to one in
which independence is the rule. Western
Samoa attained independence in 1962;
since then nine sovereign nations and
two freely associated states have joined
the community of nations. This process
has occurred with almost no violence
and a minimal of turmoil. The United
States has watched it with sympathy, in-
terest, and respect.

The new states face a battery of
problems, some common to developing
nations, others peculiar to their
geography. Distance and isolation insure
that imports, and especially fuel im-
ports, are dear. Shipping and com-
munications are difficult and costly.

The region is poor in agricultural
and mineral resources. Except for the
larger countries, land available for food
production is limited relative to popula-
tion. And population is increasing at a
rapid rate in many of the countries.

Foreign economic assistance remains
critical to the islands' well-being.
Australia and New Zealand provide the
bulk, with additional inputs from
multilateral sources and from such
bilateral sources as the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and
the Federal Republic of Germany.

International Actions and Initiatives

Despite economic constraints, the island
states have made remarkable strides
since independence not only to raise
their national products and to provide
essential services to their peoples but to
define their sense of nationhood and to
act upon it.

They have successfully set up -or
developed a number of regional
organizations, wisely realizing that their
voices would be better heard in concert.
Three of the most significant are the
South Pacific Commission, the South
Pacific Forum, and the Pacific Island
Development Program. The United
States, the American territories in the
Pacific, and the Government of the
TTPI participate in some of these
organizations.

Beyond the region the island nations
are primarily involved with Western
countries and Japan — countries which
have historically played a critical role in
the area. Foremost among these are
Australia and New Zealand, by virtue of
proximity, longstanding ties to many of
the countries, and trade and aid relation-
ships. The United Kingdom retains a
role through the Commonwealth, with
which all new South Pacific nations are
affiliated; France through its territories.
Japan is important as a trading partner
and a source of investment capital.

The Soviet Union has not fared well
in the area; island countries have not
been receptive to dealings with the
U.S.S.R., and Soviet presence in the
region is minimal.

59

PACIFIC

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Five island states— Papua New
uinea, Fiji, Western Samoa, Solomon
slands, and Vanuatu— have joined the
nited Nations: others participate in
,N. regional and technical organiza-
ons.

S. Interests

he Pacific Island region is important to
le United States in many ways,
hrough it passes the lines of com-
mnication between the United States
nd Asia, Australia, and New Zealand,
reas under our jurisdiction— Hawaii,
uam, American Samoa, and the
TPI — are part of the region. The
jgion's vast ocean area includes major
ina fishing grounds.

It is in our interest that:

• The region remain stable,
eaceful, and friendly to the United
tates and its allies;

• The region develop politically,
)cially, and economically free of Soviet
r other adverse influence;

• The U.S. territories, the emerging
ates of the TTPI, and Hawaii have
iendly and cooperative relations with
leir Pacific Island neighbors; and

• The United States have non-
iscriminatory access to the region's
larine resources.

In light of the far-reaching changes
hich have taken place in the region, we
ave taken or are taking the following
:eps to protect our interests by:

• Increasing our diplomatic
^presentation;

• Welcoming an increasing flow of
land leaders to the United States;

• Supporting islanders' interests in
jgional cooperation;

• Coordinating closely with
ustralia and New Zealand;

• Devising a modest, economical,
nd effective Agency for International
•evelopment program (with an FY 1981
udget of $4.2 million);

• Resolving U.S. claims to 25 small
lands in the territories of four island
tates, without prejudice to our security
r commerce;

• Setting up a Peace Corps program
welcomed by island countries;

• Supporting the ATS-1 satellite to
ssist international communications in
he region;

• Developing an International Com-
uinication Agency program of ex-
hange visitors which has had a very
'Ositive impact on island leaders;

• Supporting U.S. Navy ship visits
which have been uniformly well re-
ceived; and

• Pursuing resolution of the
Micronesian status negotiations not only
to insure that our relations with Palau,
the Federated States of Micronesia, and
the Marshall Island's are founded on
friendship and mutual respect but to in-
sure that our strategic defense interests
in the North Pacific are protected in the
years to come.

Status of U.S. Relations

Our relations with the island countries
have been marked by friendship and
cooperation. We share a common con-
cern for liberty, a common dedication to
democracy. It is not, then, surprising
that the island nations have joined with
us in working toward common objec-
tives.

In the United Nations, following the
brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
island members were forthright in con-
demning the U.S.S.R. In protest, they
closed their ports to Soviet vessels, and
they also supported the boycott of the
Moscow Olympics.

One island nation— Fiji— deserves
special mention for the support it has
provided to Middle East peacekeeping
efforts. Since 1978 Fiji has provided an
infantry battalion to the U.N. force in
Lebanon. Recently Fiji became the first
country anywhere in the world to com-
mit itself to providing a battalion to the
multinational force and observers which
we are organizing in the Sinai.

The island states have also helped to
smooth the path of political evolution in
Micronesia by extending the hand of
friendship to the new Governments of
the TTPI and welcoming them into
regional councils. The three govern-
ments party to the compact have been
accepted as associate members of the
South Pacific Commission and one — the
Federated States of Micronesia — has
been accorded observer status in the
South Pacific Forum.

In closing this section of my
remarks, I believe it is useful to stress
not only the good relations we enjoy
with the Pacific Island region but to
stress that how we conduct our relations
with them in the future is of paramount
importance. It is not just a matter of
what we do but how we comport
ourselves in doing it. We must eschew
any form of condecension — so easy
when we are 226 million people strong
and a superpower. We must show that
we consider their interests in the execu-

PACIFIC

tion of our own political goals in the
Pacific and consider them thoughtfully
even when we differ on specific issues.
We must continue to consult with them
individually and increasingly through
regional cooperative organizations. We
must continue to coordinate our
assistance with that of other donors,
although we will pursue that coordina-
tion in accordance with our own objec-
tives and with those of island leaders.
We must avoid creating great power
rivalry in the area and continue to deny
our adversaries the opportunity to ex-
ploit the island region for their own pur-
poses.

American Territories and the TTPI

Let me turn now to our territories and
the TTPI and make a few observations
about how they relate to our interests in
the region.

The areas under U.S. jurisdiction
are part of the region and constitute an
important reason for us to be concerned
with the stability and prosperity of the
new island nations. The security and
well-being of our territories, the TTPI,
and of the State of Hawaii are inevitably
affected by the state of the region as a
whole.

The territories of Guam and
American Samoa and the four subdivi-
sions of the TTPI— the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, the
Marshall Islands, and Palau— are all ac-
tive participants in regional affairs.
Their leaders are personally acquainted
with most of their counterparts in the
new nations to the south, and, increas-
ingly, they exchange ideas on issues of
mutual interest.

As integral members of the
American political community, the ter-
ritories are in a position to play a
valuable role as links between the
United States and the island countries.
As island areas they share many of the
interests and peculiar development prob-
lems of the new nations in the South
Pacific. Their traditional cultures are
part of the unique heritage of the Pacific
Island peoples. They can contribute from
their own experience to the region's ef-
forts to advance the well-being of the
island peoples and can, in turn, draw on
the experience of their neighbors to the
south.

We have, indeed, already benefited
from contributions which the territories
have made to our foreign policy ac-
tivities in the region. American Samoa
Governor Peter Coleman and his staff

61

PACIFIC

advised and assisted in the negotiation
of the four treaties to settle disputed
U.S. claims to islands in the Pacific.
Their knowledge of the region and of
their fellow islanders facilitated working
out arrangements that were of benefit
both to the United States and to
American Samoa itself. Governor Paul
Calvo of Guam has taken an active in-
terest in strengthening ties with Guam's
island neighbors through the organiza-
tion of the Conference of Pacific Basin
Chief Executives. Guam, the Northern
Marianas, and American Samoa have
joined with Hawaii to form the Pacific
Basin Development Council, which spon-
sors programs to further the economic
advancement of the territories. The
council's work — in such fields as energy
and communications — may also provide
techniques that can be usefully adapted
by the other island nations.

With respect to the TTPI, the Ad-
ministration's interdepartmental group
on Micronesia earlier this year con-
ducted an extensive policy review. A
basic conclusion of that review, which
the President approved, was to reaffirm
the position of the last three Administra-
tions that the trusteeship should be ter-
minated. After a thorough examination
of the available political status options in
light of our political, economic, and
defense interests in the area, the Presi-
dent has determined that the status of
free association best meets our needs
and the desires of the peoples of
Micronesia.

I should note that the views of the
Congress were taken into account dur-
ing the policy review. Furthermore both
House and Senate staff members attend-
ed the recent negotiating round at Maui,
Hawaii, during which we communicated
the results of the policy review to the
Micronesian Governments and suc-
cessfully reestablished the negotiating
process.

The Compact of Free Association,
initialed last year, provides for a status
distinguishable both from independence
and from an extension of U.S.
sovereignty. Under the compact, the
Micronesian Governments would enjoy
full internal self-government and
substantial authority in foreign affairs;
plenary defense rights and respon-
sibilities would remain vested in the
United States for a period of 15 years,
and we would have the rights of
strategic denial and base rights or op-
tions for an even longer period.

While the Administration has ac-
cepted the compact as the basis for our
future relationship with Micronesia, we

62

still have a series of technical
agreements to complete, then a rather
involved approval process in Micronesia
and before the Congress of the United
States, and finally an approach to the
United Nations.

In order to prepare the Micronesian
Governments to assume the foreign af-
fairs responsibilities which they would
have under the compact, we have
assisted and encouraged them to become
more involved in foreign affairs ac-
titivies which directly concern them.
This includes participation in interna-
tional conferences — such as the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea and
the World Administration Radio Con-
ference— and the negotiation of interna-
tional agreements with foreign govern-
ments. The Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia, for ex-
ample, have concluded economic
assistance agreements with Japan, and
the Marshall Islands also has a fishery
agreement with Japan. The United
States, of course, retains ultimate
authority over the foreign affairs of the
TTPI while the trusteeship agreement
remains in effect, and foreign affairs ac-
tivities of the Micronesian Governments
are subject to U.S. review and approval
on a case-by-case basis.

With the Micronesian status negotia-
tions so far advanced, we have also
given attention to the question of how
the U.S. Government will manage the
new relationship contemplated in the
compact. This was another of the ques-
tions addressed by the Administration's
policy review.

In dealing with this issue, we con-
sidered several factors. The freely
associated states will be members of the
international community in their own
right. Their sovereignty will be recogniz-
ed by the compact. They will manage
their own foreign relations, subject to
the limitation stemming from the
defense rights retained by the United
States.

At the same time, the freely
associated states will have close and en-
during ties to the United States. They
will have a guarantee of U.S. financial
assistance for a period of at least 15
years and will benefit from certain U.S.
Federal programs, otherwise available
only to areas under U.S. sovereignty
and will, of course, be defended by the
United States.

Weighing these factors carefully, we
decided an interagency office should be
created to oversee our post-trusteeship
relations with Micronesia. The office

would be located in the Department of
State, in keeping with the new interna-
tional status of the Micronesian Govern
ments, and the Defense and Interior
Departments, along with other depart
ments as necessary, will share with
State in the management and staffing c
the office in order to provide the
necessary expertise and direction for al
aspects of the new relationship. The ne
office will report through an interdepar
mental group and the National Security
Council to the President. The details of
the proposed arrangement will be the
subject of further study. We are plan-
ning to consult this committee in the
course of that study.

'The complete transcript of the hearing;
will be published by the committee and wiM
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulletir

•OPULATION

opulation Growth, Refugees,
nd Immigration

Richard Elliot Benedick

Address before the "Houston Media
rundtable on World Issues of the 1980s"
Houston on October 23, 1981.
mbassador Benedick is Coordinator of
ypulation Affairs.

have been told that one of the most an-
>ying characteristics of a professional
plomat is that his conversation con-
nually waivers between a cliche and an
discretion. I hope that my remarks to-
ly will not fall into either category, but
would like to speak frankly, drawing
1 some experience in foreign affairs,
>out one of the most serious issues of
ir time: the growth of world popula-
}n.

Many in this room today are
•ivileged to be witness at a unique
storical phenomenon— one that has
;ver occurred before and will never oc-
ir again: a doubling and then a
doubling of the population of this
anet within the span of a single human
etime. To put this into perspective:
etween now and the end of this cen-
ry— less than 20 years away— the
orld's population, barring unforeseen
.tastrophe, will probably increase from
>out 4.5 billion to over 6 billion, an in-
ement which approximates the total
ipulation of the world as recently as
(30. This is equivalent to adding 20
;w countries of the size of Bangladesh
id about as poor as the people of that
•untry, for 90% of this population
•owth will occur in the world's low-
come countries. This means that the
dustrialized north, which as recently as
}50 accounted for one-third of the
orld's population, will fall to about one-
fth in less than two more decades.

Put another way: In the next 20
jars, the number of young adults (age
)-39) in the north will grow by 17
illion— in the south, by 600 million,
hese are the young people who will be
oking for jobs, be available for military
:rvice or the blandishments of ex-
■emists, and who themselves will be
saring children.

Let us be very clear about these
umbers. They are not the nightmare
intings of neo-Malthusian doomsayers:
hose young adults are already born,
nd the population projections already

take account of the fertility declines and
slower growth rates so widely heralded
in the popular press in recent months-
reports which have led some to proclaim
that population growth is no longer a
major concern.

In fact, even assuming a continued
slowing of population growth rates,
there will be considerably more people
added to the world's total in 1999 than
were added last year— because of the
larger base and because of the little
understood phenomenon of demographic
momentum. For tomorrow's parents are
already born, and even if they have
fewer children than the current genera-
tion, their sheer numbers are so great
that it will take many decades before a
given country's population ceases to in-
crease.

As an example, the population of
Mexico, which in 1920 was approximate-
ly 15 million, has grown to 70 million.
But this is only the beginning. Mexican
women currently bear, on the average,
more than five children during their
lifetime. Even if this number could
decline within the next 20 years to an
average of a little over two children per
woman (the "replacement level of fertili-
ty"), the population of Mexico would
nevertheless continue to grow over the
following decades and would not level
off until it reached about 180 million
around the middle of the next cen-
tury—from 15 million to 180 million in
130 years.

Moreover, if family planning and
development efforts are less successful
and if the two-child norm is not reached
until 2020, the eventual population
would exceed 250 million. A 20-year
delay in achieving the two-child average
translates into an increment of popula-
tion which is, coincidentally, equal to the
total current population of Mexico.
Where the eventual population will fall
within this range depends on the point
at which the average of two children per
woman is reached. Again, let me em-
phasize that these are not worst-case
assumptions; as demographers have told
me, "you may as well argue with a
multiplication table."

Flow of Refugees and Immigrants

Against this background, the current
worldwide wave of refugees and im-
migration can be seen as one manifesta-
tion of the new demographic reality.
This poses special problems for the
United States, since we are the pre-
ferred destination of many of the world's
displaced. Other potential host countries
are becoming increasingly less hospitable
due to concerns about cultural
divisiveness which may accompany
newcomers and because of economic
competition with the domestic labor
force.

The United States is currently ex-
periencing a demographic impact from
immigration comparable to that of the
great waves of European migration to
this country in the years preceding
World World I. Nearly half of our an-
nual population increase is now ac-
counted for by immigration. A recent
demographic study indicates that, if
total immigration (legal and illegal) con-
tinues at anywhere near current levels
(estimated at 750,000 to 1 milllion per
year), post-1980 immigrants and their
descendants could account for 15%-20%
of our total population by 2030 — or up
to 40% by 2080.

I do not mean to imply a facile
determinism here, particularly with
respect to the refugee situation; no one
would argUe, for example, that popula-
tion growth explains the outflow of
refugees from Indochina or Cuba. There
is, however, abundant evidence that
population pressures can add significant-
ly to the potential for political instabili-
ty, communal strife, or international
conflict — conditions that readily
generate refugees. These demographical-
ly influenced factors of instability in-
clude:

• Differential growth rates among
different ethnic or religious groups,
which can intensify communal frictions;

• The almost unbelievable urban ex-
plosion currently underway in the Third
World, a phenomenon which may bring
Mexico City to a population of 30 million
by the year 2000; Rio de Janeiro, Bom-
bay, and Calcutta to approximately 20
million; Tehran, Cairo, and Karachi to
the 14-16 million range; and turn a
large number of urban areas from small
towns to mega-cities within a relatively
short timespan: for example, Baghdad
and Lima from 600,000 in 1950 to 11-12
million in 2000, Kinshasa and Lagos
from 200,000-300,000 to over 9 million;

63

POPULATION

• New jobs will need to be created
for hundreds of millions of additional en-
trants to labor markets of developing
countries; and

• The proportion of socially volatile
youth in Third World populations will be
over 40% , constituting a rapidly growing
urban proletariat, packed into miserable
shantytowns close by the gleaming
skyscrapers and villas of the large cities.

These factors increase the probabili-
ty of a growing gap between rich and
poor— not only on an international scale
but also, ominously, within countries
themselves. In northeast India, com-
munal massacres erupted in the summer
of 1980 in Assam and Tripura, resulting
from the influx of aliens from over-
populated Bengal and Nepal. In Brazil,
the Minister of Justice has explicitly
cited excessive population growth as an
underlying cause of rising urban crime
and violence especially involving young
people. And a recent study by a North-
western University professor postulates
that major revolutions in Europe from
1500 to 1900 were preceded by periods
of rapid population growth, which
heightened tensions and upset delicate
political and economic balances.

Many observers conclude that there
is an unmistakable connection: Popula-
tion pressures limit the options to
governments for providing essential
services and meeting the expectations of
their people. The potential for frustra-
tion and accompanying sociopolitical ten-
sions, and for creation of refugees, ap-
pears to be growing.

Turning to immigration, the
pressures are primarily economic —
poverty and the relative attraction of
economic opportunities in another coun-
try—and here the link with population
growth is even more striking. The Inter-
national Labour Office estimates that,
within the next 20 years, at least 600
million new jobs will have to be created
in the Third World if the new generation
of young adults is to be employed. This
is more than the total labor force of the
industrialized North today and comes on
top of existing unemployment or
underemployment of perhaps 30% in the
Third World. The costs of creating this
number of new jobs are obviously enor-
mous, and yet, at the same time, scarce
capital will have to be diverted from in-
vestment to consumption just to feed
and care for the growing numbers.

Third World economies may not be
able to grow fast enough to absorb this
expanding labor surplus. To look again
at Mexico, the work force there is grow-
ing by approximately 3.5% annually.

Demographic Momentum: Possible Paths of Mexican Population Growth

Millions
of Persons

400 r

350

300 -

250 -

200

357 million*

253 million*

179 million*

Year

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

A Year replacement-level fertility is reached.

After replacement-level fertility is reached, a population continues to ex-
pand for several decades but eventually stops growing Replacement-
level fertility usually equals a little over 2 children per woman. Based on
1975-80 data. Mexican women are currently bearing, on the average,
5 2 children per woman

* Population size at stabilization.

Source Tomas Frejka. The Population Council

Even assuming some productivity in-
crease and an annual out- migration of
250,000, the economy would still have to
grow in real terms by at least 6.5% per
year in order to employ the newcomers
to the labor market. Or the case of
Haiti: Even if we and others would ac-
cept 140,000 emigrants per year, this
would only represent the annual popula-
tion increase and would not, in itself,
relieve current underemployment and
poverty.

The Need for Increased National and
Multinational Efforts

In sum, the unprecedented phenomenor
of rapid population growth in the Third
World has implications both for the con
tinuation of relative poverty and for
potential social unrest and political in-
stability— both of which, in turn, in-
fluence the current and possible future
flow of emigrants and refugees.

The situation is serious, but it is noi
hopeless. Several U.N. and other inter-
national conferences have, in recent

64

UNITED NATIONS

";ars, reaffirmed the basic human right
families to make informed decisions
1 the number and spacing of their
lildren and the corollary responsibility
' governments to provide these families
ith the information and the means to
) so. A number of developing coun-
ies — with widely varying religious,
litical, and economic backgrounds —
ive made significant progress, through
luntary family planning programs, in
inging down birth rates. These include
lina, Mexico, South Korea, Tunisia,
Mombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and
ngapore.

But much greater efforts are needed
the future by the individual countries
ncerned as well as by the international
>mmunity. The problem requires high
•iority political attention and, as our
scussion of demographic momentum
dicates, a greater sense of urgency
om the world's leaders.

The only effective and humane solu-
sn to the conditions underlying the
essures which create refugees and
igrants lies in accelerated economic
•owth combined with concerted efforts
reduce fertility through voluntary
mily planning. In this context, the
.N. system has an indispensable role to
ay, both because population is a global
sue and because it is still a subject of
me political, religious, and cultural
insitivity in some regions. I am sure
>u all know about the activities of
any U.N. agencies which bear on this
mplex of issues: the World Bank, U.N.
evelopment Program, Food and
griculture Organization, International
abour Office, World Health Organiza-
Dn, and the U.N. High Commissioner
r Refugees, which just 2 weeks ago
as awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for its
ork. But I would like to direct your at-
ntion this morning to another, perhaps
sser known, institution — one which
st the Nobel Prize this year in what I
iderstand was a close vote: I refer to
te U.N. Fund for Population Activities
JNFPA).

This organization, headquartered in
ew York, has been in existence only 12
:ars, but it has pioneered in over 100
mntries in introducing population and
imily planning concepts into develop-
ent strategies. Administered by a
atholic from the Philippines — Dr.
afael Salas— UNFPA is, from my per-
)nal experience, one of the most effec-
ve and innovative of U.N. agencies. It
is even engaged the Vatican in a con-
active dialogue on population matters.
lith strong U.S. support, the UNFPA

has expanded from an initial $2 million
program to approximately $140 million
in population assistance in the current
year. It is an institution which deserves
your attention and your support.
To conclude, rapid population
growth is an issue which many serious
observers — including former U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany,
former World Bank President Robert

McNamara, and Dr. Norman Borlaug,
father of the Green Revolution — have
characterized as one of the gravest
threats to the future of life on this
planet as we know it. This generation
bears a particularly heavy responsibility,
at this point in history, to our children
and grandchildren. I am optimistic that
we — as individuals, as nations, and as
an international community — will rise to
this responsibility. ■

Double Standards in Human Rights

by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Statement before the Third Commit-
tee of the UN. General Assembly in New
York on November 2U, 1981. Ambassador
Kirkpatrick is U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations.1

The Government of the United States
was founded squarely and explicitly on
the belief that the most basic function of
government is to protect the rights of
its citizens. Our Declaration of In-
dependence states, "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness." It adds, "To secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed."

These notions— that the individual
has rights which are prior to govern-
ment, that protection of these rights is
the very purpose of the existence of
government, that the just powers of
government depend on the consent of
the governed— are the essential core of
the American creed. That being the
case, we naturally believe that the
United Nations has no more important
charge than the protection and expan-
sion of the rights of persons. The
charter commits the United Nations to
this task; several bodies in the United
Nations are explicitly devoted to it.

My government stands always ready
to join other nations in any serious effort
that will expand the perimeters of liber-
ty, law, and opportunity. We believe
that the rights of individuals are most
effectively promoted and expanded by
and through democratic political institu-
tions—where governments are elected
through periodic competitive elections,

elections that feature freedom to
criticize government, to publish
criticisms, to organize opposition, and
compete for power. Human rights viola-
tions may occur even in such systems,
but they are relatively few and readily
corrected. The reason that popular
governments protect human rights best
is that people do not impose tyrants
upon themselves. Tyrants impose them-
selves upon people.

There would be no serious human
rights abuses if all peoples enjoyed self-
government and democracy. The .
dynamics of freedom and political com-
petition could be relied upon to work to
protect minorities, dissenters, and critics
against the arbitrary use of govern-
ments' powers against them. But, unfor-
tunately, many— perhaps even most-
people do not live in democracies but
live instead under rulers whom they
have not chosen and who cannot be
counted upon to respect their rights.

Governments, moreover, are not the
only source of oppression and tyranny.
Serious political philosophers such as
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Baron
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and their
medieval predecessors, among others,
understood that human rights exist inde-
pendently of government and that
human rights violations exist independ-
ently of government as well; that human
rights can be and are violated by private
violence as well as by public coercion. A
government of laws protects and ex-
pands rights because it protects in-
dividuals against private violence.

Because human rights can be
violated by individuals and groups as
well as by governments, the protection
of human rights should necessarily have
a double focus. It should take account of
all major sources of abuse: violations by
government and violations by private
violence, including organized private

Jbruary 1982

65

UNITED NATIONS

violence. Tyranny and anarchy alike are
incompatible with freedom, security, and
the enjoyment of opportunity.

Fair and Reasonable Judgment

It is, of course, not enough for the par-
tisans of freedom to define the character
and identify the sources of human rights
violations. A serious commitment to
human rights by this or any group also
requires that one's judgment be fair and
reasonable. Fair judgment of a country's
human rights practices would judge all
by the same moral standards. A
reasonable judgment requires that all
nations be judged by criteria relevant to
their specific character and situation.
Thus, it is not fair to judge one nation
or group by the Sermon on the Mount
and all other nations on the curve; it is
not reasonable to judge peaceful coun-
tries with a long experience of self-
government by the same standards as
strife-torn countries with weak legal and
political institutions. And it is neither
fair nor reasonable to judge the human
rights violations of some nations harsh-
ly, while ignoring entirely the gross
abuses of other peoples.

Although these principles would ap-
pear to be almost self-evident, some
curious practices have grown up in re-
cent years around the standard of
human rights, as some persons and
some governments have attempted to
use human rights less as a standard and
a goal than as a political weapon; less to
expand the domains of freedom and law
than to expand the scope of their
hegemony.

To bring about this transformation
of function, an effort has been mounted
to deprive the concept of human rights
of specific meaning by pretending that
all objects of human desire are "rights"
which can be had, if not for the asking
then at least for the demanding. The
proliferation of "rights" — to a happy
childhood, to self-fulfillment, to
development — has proceeded at the
same time that the application of human
rights standards has grown more
distorted and more cynical.

No aspect of U.N. affairs has been
more perverted by politicization of the
last decade than have its human rights
activities. In Geneva and in New York,
human rights has become a bludgeon to
be wielded by the strong against the
weak, by the majority against the
isolated, by the blocs against the
unorganized. South Africa, Israel, and
the non-Communist nations of South
America have been the principal targets
of U.N. human rights condemna-
tion—South Africa on grounds of apar-
theid, Israel on grounds of alleged prac-

66

tices in the West Bank and in the ter-
ritories occupied in the 1967 war, and
assorted non-Communist Latin
American countries because, in addition
to being nondemocratic, they have been
unorganized and unprotected in this
body in which from time to time moral
outrage is distributed much like violence
in a protection racket.

My government believes that apar-
theid is a morally repugnant system
which violates the rights of black
peoples and colored who live under it. It
is one system through which the in-

The reason that
popular governments
protect human rights
best is that people do
not impose tyrants upon
themselves. Tyrants im-
pose themselves upon
people.

habitants of one country are denied
equal access to freedom, economic op-
portunity, and equal protection of the
laws. It is one system by which one rul-
ing minority refuses to share power and
profits from its possession of monopoly
power. As such, it is reprehensible. It
cannot be condoned by governments and
people who believe in government based
on the consent of the governed, freely
expressed in competitive elections in
which all citizens are permitted to par-
ticipate.

But let us be clear, apartheid is not
the only system for denying people the
enjoyment of freedom, the right to
choose and criticize their rulers, the rule
of law, the opportunity for a good job, a
good education, a good life. There are
other grounds on which other regimes in
the last decade have denied their citizens
dignity, freedom, equal protection of the
law, material well-being and even life;
other regimes that have more cruelly
and more brutally repressed and
slaughtered their citizens.

In my government's view, it is en-
tirely appropriate that the agencies of
the United Nations should condemn the
spirit and the practice of apartheid and
deplore its human consequences, pro-
viding, of course, that the same bodies
of the United Nations demonstrate a
serious moral concern for freedom,

equality, and law. But the record of
human rights in the United Nations
belies the claim to moral seriousness
that would fully justify its judgments.
The human rights agencies of the
United Nations were silent while 3
million Kampucheans died in Pol Pot's
murderous utopia; the human rights
agencies of the United Nations were
silent while a quarter of a million Ugan
dans died at the hands of Idi Amin. Tb
human rights organizations of the
United Nations have been silent about
the thousands of Soviet citizens denied
equal rights, equal protection of the lav
denied the right to think, write, publish
work freely, or to emigrate to some
place of their own choosing. As we mei
here, Andrey Sakharov, one of the
world's most distinguished physicists
and bravest men, who has been confint
to exile in Gorky, has entered upon a
hunger strike to protest the refusal of
the Soviet Government to allow his
daughter-in-law to emigrate. But the
United Nations is silent.

Violations in Cuba

The activities of the United Nations wi
respect to Latin America offer a par-
ticularly egregious example of moral
hypocrisy. Four countries of Latin
America were condemned for one or
another human rights violation during
the last General Assembly; resolutions
condemning El Salvador, Guatemala,
Chile, and Bolivia were voted last wint
in Geneva during the sessions of the
Human Rights Commission. Doubtless,
some of these countries, some of these
governments, are guilty as charged.

But the moral standing of their
judges is undermined by their studious
unconcern with the much larger viola-
tions of human liberty elsewhere in
Latin America by the Government of
Cuba. That government has driven ove
one million of its citizens into exile. It
has incarcerated more political prisonei
than any other Latin American nation.
It has repressed freedom, denied equal
ty, and, incidentally, deprived its citizei
of what is termed here the right to
development— a talent for which Cubai
had demonstrated a large capacity, pri<
to Fidel Castro's "liberating" revolution

An especially instructive example o
the quality of human rights in Cuba is
the fate of Cuba's poets— virtually all c
whom are in exile or in jail. Among th€
former are Heberto Padilla, winner of
the National Union of Writers and Ar-

Department of State Bulleti

UNITED NATIONS

sts of Cuba (UNEAC) prize for poetry
i 1968; Reinaldo Arenas, author of the
ovel Hallucinations, which was a best
;ller in Europe; Rogelio Llopis, whose
lort stories have been translated into
nglish, German, Polish, and
ungarian; Edmundo Desnoes; Antonio
enitez Rojo, whose stories won a
NEAC prize in 1968 and who, until he
night asylum in Paris in mid- 1980, was
le director of publications for Casa de
,s Americas; Jose Triana, recipient of a
asa award for his play La Noche de los
sesinos (1965).

Less fortunate even than the poets
ho have been driven from their native
.nd are those who rot in jail. Two of
lese cases are known and discussed all
/er the world by those who value free-
Dm and respect human creativity.
ngel Cuadra is an internationally cele-
-ated poet whose works have been
■anslated into English, German, and
ussian. He was arrested and charged
ith conduct "against the security of the
.ate" after having unsuccessfully sought
jrmission to emigrate from Cuba in
967. Having served two-thirds of a
5-year sentence, he was paroled in
976; but then an anthology of his
egiac, apolitical poetry, entitled
npromptu, was published in the United
tates and, as a result, his parole was
evoked. From prison, Angel Cuadra
rote to the exiled poet Juana Rosa Pita

May 1979, "There was no legal basis
>r this new reprisal against me. Only
lat I am a poet; that the world speaks
y name; that I do not renounce my
>ng. I do not put it on bended knees,
Dr do I use it for other political or par-
san ends, but only literary, universal,
meless ones." After participating in
dson "rehabilitation programs," Cuadra
as to be released again in July 1979.
owever, when the authorities learned
lat he had managed to smuggle out the
lanuscript of a new collection of his
aetry which appeared in English
•anslation under the title A Correspond-
ice of Poems, they transferred him to
oniato prison instead of releasing him.
nder a constitutional provision giving
jtroactive effect to penal laws favoring
risoners, Cuadra is entitled by Cuba's
wn laws to be set free; according to
peir constitutional norm, he has served
is sentence. Nonetheless, his attempts

secure a court order for release have
died.

One of the most pathetic cases of all
is that of the poet Armando Valladares,
whose case, by the way, was described
in length in Le Monde November 13. At
the time of his arrest in 1960, Mr.
Valladares was 23 years old. He was
already writing poetry and painting, but
at this young age he was not as yet
published. After his incarceration, he
continued to write and to draw, wher-
ever possible. His poetry has been
published in several languages in two
volumes, the first entitled From My
Wheelchair, the second, The Heart With
Which I Live. His book, Prisoner of
Castro, was published in both Spanish
and French.

In recognition of Mr. Valladares'
writing and his talent as a poet, the
French PEN Club invited Mr.
Valladares to become a member in 1979,
and in the following year, 1980, awarded
Mr. Valladares its "Liberty Prize." As a
reprisal for the publication of these
works, in 1979 Mr. Valladares was
moved to the remote prison of Boniato,
and deprived of his possessions, in-
cluding all his books and his Bible. He is
currently confined at Combinado des
Este prison. As further reprisals for
having written his book and poetry, his
elderly parents and sister, having re-
ceived permission to emigrate, were told
that they would be allowed to leave only
if Valladares were to write a letter to
the foreign press denouncing the
publication of his work. In a letter sent
to PEN in 1980, Valladares wrote that
such a letter would be the equivalent to
"committing moral and spiritual suicide,"
and he refused to write it.

Mr. Valladares has never had
specific charges brought against him. He
has not violated any of Cuba's laws or
regulations. He did not participate in
any terrorist activities; no munitions,
arms, or explosives were ever found in
his home or in his possession. The sole
reason for his 20 years of imprisonment
is that he did not share the Cuban
Government's ideology and, further-
more, that he refused to submit to its
rehabilitation programs. In August 1974,
the prison director ordered that no food
be given to Mr. Valladares and, after 49
days of such imprisonment and punish-
ment, he was left a total invalid. This is,
of course, a direct violation of Article 5
of the Universal Declaration, regarding
cruel punishment.

Armando Valladares has been
officially adopted by Amnesty Interna-
tional as a prisoner of conscience and
Amnesty International has submitted
numerous appeals on his behalf. The In-
ternational PEN Club has also appealed
for his release, as well as the London-
based Writers and Scholars Interna-
tional and many other human rights
organizations all over the world. On
November 12, 1980, the French PEN
Club wrote to the Cuban ambassador in
Paris but received no reply.

The Venezuelan Government has
repeatedly asked for the release of Mr.
Valladares. In 1979, a Venezuelan
official met with Carlos Rafael
Rodriquez, Vice Prime Minister of Cuba,
to ask for Valladares' release. During
the nonaligned conference held in
Havana during the fall of 1979, the
same official met with Fidel Castro and
pleaded again for Valladares' release on
humanitarian grounds. Since then, the
President of Venezuela, Herrera Cam-
pins, has also explored the possibility of
gaining Valladares' release through
various Cuban Government channels.
But all attempts have failed.

Conclusion

What are we to think of defenders of
human rights who ignore the victims of
major tyrants and focus all their ferocity
on the victims of minor tyrants? Nothing
is more necessary with respect to the
treatment of human rights questions in
the United Nations than to affirm and to
adhere to a single standard. For if we
do not have a single standard, then our
resolutions and recommendations are
merely tendentious political statements
without moral content. Either we con-
sistently uphold the right of all people to
be free, regardless of the kind of system
they live under, or we do not, ourselves,
have the right to talk about human
rights and to make recommendations
that we expect others will follow.

In a word, nothing less than the
moral integrity of the United Nations is
at issue in our deliberations here.
Nothing less than the commitment of
this organization to its own reason for
being is at stake.

■U.S. U.N. Press release 130.

ebruary1982

67

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Cuba's Renewed Support for
Violence in Latin America

Following is the text of a research paper
presented to the Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee by
the Department of State, December 14,
1981.

PREFACE

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy
for Latin America and the Caribbean
would be incomplete without in-depth
analysis of Cuba's role in the region.
Some of Cuba's international activities
have received publicity and attention,
but much has taken place out of the
public view. While understanding the
full range of Cuba's activities abroad is
obviously essential for governments
engaged in foreign policy planning, the
general public is often uninformed about
the nature and extent of Cuba's involve-
ment in other countries. This study of
Cuban activities in Latin America and
the Caribbean is being issued in the in-
terest of contributing to better public
understanding of U.S. foreign policy and
developments in the region.

The focus of this study is Cuba's ac-
tivities in the Americas. It does not at-
tempt to give a description of conditions
in the countries in which Cuba is active
or to analyze why violent groups develop
but instead examines the degree to
which Cuba is directly engaged in efforts
to destabilize its neighbors by promoting
armed opposition movements. Cuba is
clearly not the sole source of violence
and instability in the region, but Cuban
activities militarize and internationalize
what would otherwise be local conflicts.
In a region whose primary needs are for
economic development, social equity, and
greater democracy, Cuba is compound-
ing existing problems by encouraging
armed insurrection.

This report describes Cuban ac-
tivities that are either publicly known or
can be revealed without jeopardizing in-
telligence sources and methods. Cuban
involvement is not limited to the ex-
amples contained in this study.

SUMMARY

A country-by-country examination of
Cuba's activities in Latin America and
the Caribbean makes clear that Cuba
has renewed its campaign of the 1960s
to promote armed insurgencies. In par-
ticular, Cuba has stepped up efforts to
stimulate violence and destabilize its
neighbors, turning away from its earlier
policy of strengthening normal diplo-
matic relations in the hemisphere.
Since 1978, Cuba has:

• Worked to unite traditionally
splintered radical groups behind a com-
mitment to armed struggle with Cuban
advice and material assistance;

• Trained ideologically committed
cadres in urban and rural guerrilla war-
fare;

• Supplied or arranged for the sup-
ply of weapons to support the Cuban-
trained cadres' efforts to assume power
by force;

• Encouraged terrorism in the hope
of provoking indiscriminate violence and
repression, in order to weaken govern-
ment legitimacy and attract new con-
verts to armed struggle; and

• Used military aid and advisers to
gain influence over guerrilla fronts and
radical governments through armed pro-
Cuban Marxists.

Unlike Che Guevara's attempts dur-
ing the 1960s, Cuban subversion today is
backed by an extensive secret intelli-
gence and training apparatus, modern
military forces, and a large and sophisti-
cated propaganda network. Utilizing
agents and contacts nurtured over more
than 20 years, the Castro government is
providing ideological and military train-
ing and material and propaganda sup-
port to numerous violent groups, often
several in one country.

Cuba is most active in Central
America, where its immediate goals are
to exploit and control the revolution in
Nicaragua and to induce the overthrow
of the Governments of El Salvador and
Guatemala. At the same time, Cuba is
working to destabilize governments else-
where in the hemisphere. Cuba provides
advice, safehaven, communications,
training, and some financial support to

several violent South American
organizations. In the Caribbean, Cuban
interference in the post-election period
has been blunted in Jamaica, but
Grenada has become a virtual Cuban
client.

Cuba's new drive to promote armec
insurgency does not discriminate be-
tween democracies and dictatorships.
And attempts by Cuba to destabilize
governments occur in spite of the ex-
istence of diplomatic ties.

This long-range campaign is direct*
by the Cuban Communist Party, which
oversees farflung operations that inclu(
secret training camps in Cuba, intelli-
gence officers abroad, training prograrr
for select foreign students, networks fc
covert movement of personnel and
material between Cuba and abroad, an(
propaganda support.

Cuba's enormous investment of
energy, money, and agents in this cam-
paign would not be possible without
Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now tota
ing over $8 million a day, enables Cuba
to maintain the best equipped and
largest per capita military forces in
Latin America and to channel substan-
tial resources abroad. In return, Cuba
usually is careful not to jeopardize ongc
ing government relationships in Latin
America important to the Soviet Union

The scope of Cuba's activities in the
hemisphere has prevented Cuba from
always keeping covert operations hid-
den. For instance, during 1981 alone:

• In Nicaragua, Cuba has quietly ii
creased its presence to 5,000 personnel,
including more than 1,500 security and
military advisers;

• In El Salvador, Cuba's key role i
arming the Salvadoran guerrillas was
exposed, and Castro admitted supplying
arms;

• In Costa Rica, a Special Legisla-
tive Commission documented Cuba's rol
in establishing an arms supply network
during the Nicaraguan civil war and
found the network was later used to
supply Salvadoran insurgents; and

• In Colombia, Cuba was
discovered to have trained guerrillas at-
tempting to establish a "people's army."

68

Department of State Bulletii

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Cuba's new policies abroad and its
action to emigration pressures at
me have reversed the trend in Latin
nerica toward normalization of rela-
ins with Cuba. During the last 2 years,
)lombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica
spended or broke relations with Cuba,
jnezuela, Peru, and Ecuador withdrew
eir ambassadors from Havana.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not
e sole source of instability. The origins
occasional violent conflict in Latin
-nerica lie in historical social and eco-
>mic inequities which have generated
jstrations among a number of people,
istained economic growth over the
st 20 years and resilient national in-
tutions, however, have limited the ap-
al of radical groups. But in some
untries, particularly the small nations
Central America, dislocations result-
sj from rapid growth compounded
isting tensions, leading to the
lergence in several countries of radical
ovements, which often originated with
ustrated elements of the middle class,
ibsequent economic reversals have sub-
:ted already weak institutions to addi-
>nal stress, making these countries
ore vulnerable to the appeals of radical
oups backed by Cuba.

Cuba is quick to exploit legitimate
ievances for its own ends. But its
rategy of armed struggle is not based
i appeals to the "people." Instead,
utba concentrates on developing self-
•oclaimed "vanguards" committed to
olent action. Revolutions, according to
lis approach, are made by armed
volutionaries.

Cuba's readiness to train, equip, and
ivise those who opt for violent solu-
ons imposes obstacles to economic
ogress, democratic development, and
;lf -determination in countries faced
ith growing economic difficulties. The
jiraling cycle of violence and counter-
olence which is central to Cuba's policy
nly exacerbates the suffering of or-
inary people and makes necessary ad-
istments more difficult.

Cuba's renewed campaign of
iolence is of great concern to many
Duntries, including the United States.
uba should not escape responsibility for
s actions. Exposing Cuba's efforts to
romote armed struggle will increase
ae costs to Cuba of its intervention.

'OLICIES

Vhen it first came to power, the Castro
,egime had its own theory of how to
jpread revolution: to reproduce else-

where the rural-based guerrilla warfare
experience of Castro's 26th of July
Movement in Cuba. In Che Guevara's
words, the Andes would become the
Sierra Maestra of South America.

Initial attempts to repeat Cuba's
revolution elsewhere failed decisively.
During the late 1960s, the Castro
regime gradually reined in its zealots.
Without abandoning its ideology or its
ties to radical states and movements,
Cuba began to pursue normal
government-to-government relations in
the hemisphere. By the mid-1970s
Cuba's isolation in the Americas eased,
and full diplomatic or consular relations
were reestablished with a number of
countries.

But diplomacy proved unable to
satisfy the Castro government's ambi-
tions. First in Africa and now in Latin
America and the Caribbean, Cuba's
policy has again shifted to reemphasize
intervention.

On July 26, 1980, Fidel Castro
declared that the experiences of Guate-
mala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia
teach us that there is no other way than
revolution, that there is no other "for-
mula" than "revolutionary armed strug-
gle." Castro's statement was an attempt
to justify publicly what Cuban agents
had been doing secretly since 1978: step-
ping up support for armed insurgency in
neighboring countries.

This study traces the development of
this latest phase in Cuba's foreign policy.

Early Failures. The original Cuban
theory held that a continental Marxist
revolution could be achieved by estab-
lishing armed focal points (focos) in

In seeking indigenous groups with
which to cooperate, the Cubans rejected
the orthodox Latin American Com-
munist parties, which they regarded as
ineffectual. Instead, they lent their sup-
port to more militant groups dedicated
to armed violence even when their
Marxism was not fully articulated.

The Soviet Union was suspicious of
Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence,
preferring to work through established
Moscow-line Communist parties.
Disagreement over this issue was a
serious point of friction for several
years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy
of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud,
arguing that it implicitly undercut the
legitimacy of aiding "national liberation"
struggles. At the 1966 tricontinental
conference, Cuba sought to enlist North
Vietnam and North Korea and create a
more aggressive revolutionary interna-
tionalism.

None of the Latin American in-
surgencies fomented by Havana, how-
ever, aroused much popular support.
The most severe blow to Cuba's policy
during this period came in Bolivia in
1967, when Che Guevara's guerrilla band
was opposed by both the peasantry and
the Bolivian Communist Party.

After this maverick approach failed
to establish a continental revolution,
Cuban foreign policy moved into closer
conformity with that of the Soviet
Union. Castro endorsed the 1968 Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia and accepted
Soviet views on East- West relations.
Within the hemisphere, Cuba generally
conformed to the Soviet approach of
fostering state-to-state relations with
several Latin American countries.

Cuban subversion today is backed by an extensive
secret intelligence and training apparatus, modern
military forces, and a large and sophisticated prop-
aganda network.

several countries. Operating in rural
areas, small bands of guerrillas could in-
itiate struggles that would spread
throughout the continent.

In 1959, Castro aided armed expedi-
tions against Panama, the Dominican
Republic, and Haiti. During the early
and mid-1960s, Guatemala, Colombia,
Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced
serious Cuban-backed attempts to
develop guerrilla focos.

The Turn to Africa. In the

mid-1970s, Cuba renewed its penchant
for direct intervention, not in Latin
America but in Africa.1

• In Angola, 20,000 Cuban troops,
supported by Soviet logistics and
materiel, assured the supremacy of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, which had the strongest ties to
Moscow of the three movements com-

ebruary1982

69

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

peting for power after Portugal's with-
drawal.

• In Ethiopia, the integration of
Soviet and Cuban operations was even
more complete, with the Soviets pro-
viding overall command and control,
materiel, and transport for 13-15,000
Cuban troops fighting against Somali
forces.

The Moscow-Havana Axis. These
African operations gave evidence of
Cuba's military value to the Soviet
Union. In areas of the Third World

Union. By intervening in behalf of
armed struggle in Latin America, Cuba
injects East-West dimensions into local
conflicts.

METHODS

Even when pursuing an open policy in
the 1970s of establishing normal diplo-
matic relations with a number of Latin
American countries, Cuba retained its
clandestine ties with remnants of the in-

Cuba's enormous investment of energy, money,
and agents . . . would not be possible without
Soviet help. Soviet assistance . . . totals over $8
million a day. . . .

where the Soviets were under con-
straints not binding on Cuba, Havana
could portray its actions as an out-
growth of its own foreign policy of sup-
port for "national liberation
movements."

Cuba's extensive and costly activities
overseas would have been impossible,
however, without Soviet aid. The Cuban
armed forces, some 225,000 strong, with
new sophisticated weaponry from the
Soviet Union, became a formidable
offensive military machine. Soviet aid
and subsidies to the Cuban economy
have climbed to more than $3 billion an-
nually or about one-fourth of Cuba's
gross national product. In December

1979, at a time when Soviet oil
deliveries to Eastern Europe were being
cut back and prices raised, Castro an-
nounced that the Soviet Union had
guaranteed Cuba's oil needs through
1985 at a price roughly one-third that of
the world market. The Soviet Union also
pays up to four and five times the world
price for Cuban sugar.2

In return, Cuba champions the no-
tion of a "natural alliance" between the
Soviet bloc and the Third World in the
nonaligned movement. At the Cuban
Communist Party Congress in December

1980, Castro explicitly endorsed the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and
defended the Soviet "right" to intervene
in Poland. He also reiterated that Cuba
is irrevocably committed to communism
and to supporting "national liberation"
struggles around the world.

Cuba's policies abroad are thus
linked to its relationship to the Soviet

surgents and other pro-Cuban elements
in Latin America, providing asylum,
propaganda, some training, and other
support. Between 1970 and 1973, Cuba's
security services moved arms and agents
into Chile. At the same time, Cubans
helped organize President Allende's per-
sonal security and trained many leaders
of the Chilean Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left.

Cuba's renewed campaign to pro-
mote insurgencies draws on these con-
tacts and experiences and combines
several different elements.

Sophisticated Strategy. Learning
from Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia,
Cuban doctrine now emphasizes the
need to enlist support for armed strug-
gle through advanced training of local
guerrilla cadres, sustained aid and ad-
vice, and extensive propaganda ac-
tivities. The foco approach of the
1960s— when a Cuban-sponsored team
in the field was considered enough to
spark insurrection— has given way to a
more sophisticated strategy involving
extensive commitments and risks.

Soviet Support. A major difference
from the 1960s is that, instead of throw-
ing up obstacles, the Soviet Union
generally has backed Cuban efforts to in-
corporate nondoctrinaire groups into
broad political-military fronts dedicated
to armed struggle. Particularly in Cen-
tral America, Soviet ties to local Com-
munist parties and bloc relationships
have been used to favor insurrectionary
violence. For example, a senior Soviet
Communist Party functionary traveled

I

to Panama in August 1981 to discuss
strategy for Central America with
Cuban officials and leaders of Central
American Communist parties. The
Soviet Union has also used its extensiv ,,
propaganda network selectively to dis-
credit governments and build support
for armed opposition groups.

Allowing Havana to take the lead i
the hemisphere enables Moscow to ma
tain a low profile and cultivate state-to
state relations and economic ties with
major countries like Brazil and Argen-
tina.

Cuba, in turn, is generally cautious
not to undercut the Soviet Union whei
the Soviets have established valued rel
tionships. In Peru, for example, Cuba
has been careful to exercise restraint 1
avoid prejudicing the status of the 300
Soviet officials there or jeopardizing tr
Soviet Union's arms supply arrange-
ment.

Central Control. Most of the cove
operations in support of this strategy
are planned and coordinated by the
America Department of the Cuban Coi
munist Party, headed by Manuel Pinei
Losada. The America Department
emerged in 1974 to centralize opera-
tional control of Cuba's covert activitie
The department brings together the e>
pertise of the Cuban military and the
General Directorate of Intelligence int(
a farflung operation that includes seen
training camps in Cuba, networks for
covert movement of personnel and
materiel between Cuba and abroad, an
sophisticated propaganda support.

Agents of the America Departmen
are present in every Cuban diplomatic
mission in Latin America and the Caril
bean— in at least five recent instances
the person of the ambassador or charg
d'affaires. America Department official;
frequently serve as employees of Cuba
official press agency, Prensa Latina, o:
Cubana Airlines, the Cuban Institute o
Friendship with People, and other ap-
parently benign organizations. When t(
great an identification with Cuba prove
counterproductive, Cuban intelligence
officers work through front groups,
preferably those with non-Cuban leadei
ship.3

Cuban military intelligence personn
selected for clandestine operations in
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle
East go through an elaborate training
program conducted by Cuban, Soviet,
East German, and Czech instructors in
Havana, with special sessions in sur-
rounding cities. In addition to the
language and customs of the area to

70

Department of State Bulleti

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ich they are assigned, and typical in-
igence operations such as infiltration
icedures and photography techniques,
Cubans are instructed in handling
)losives. To disguise their true oc-
>ation, the intelligence agents are also
tructed in civilian skills such as auto-
tive mechanics, carpentry, and heavy
lipment operation.

Armed Struggle. The new Cuban
snsive relies heavily on violence. In
line, Cuba's strategy is to:

• Unite traditionally splintered radi-
groups behind a commitment to

ned struggle with Cuban advice and
terial assistance;

• Train ideologically committed
Ires in urban and rural guerrilla war-
es

• Supply or arrange for the supply
weapons to support the Cuban-trained
Ires' efforts to assume power by

ce;

• Encourage terrorism in the hope
provoking indiscriminate violence and
)ression and generalized disorder in
ler to weaken government legitimacy
d attract new converts to armed
uggle; and

• Use military aid and advisers to
in influence over guerrilla fronts and
iical governments through armed pro-
ban Marxists.

The application of this strategy is
monstrated in detail in the case
idies that follow. It should be noted,
wever, that Cuba sometimes empha-
es certain tactics over others. In pur-
ing its long-term strategy, Cuba con-
itrates initially on building a network
loyal cadres. When local extremist
oups are not capable of or committed
armed struggle, Cuba generally draws

them in support of active insurgen-
;s elsewhere while developing their
pacity and willingness for agitation in
eir homeland. In addition, foreign
licy concerns may deter Cuba from
omoting armed struggle in a particu-
* country. For example, Cuba at-
mpts to avoid activities which could
Dpardize its relations with the Mexican
>vernment since Castro seeks Mexico's
pport to avoid isolation in the
imisphere.4

Propaganda. Cuba's extensive
ltural exchange and propaganda ac-
uities are tailored to support covert
>erations and elicit support for armed
niggle.6 For example, during the past
;ar, Cubans have used Mexico as a
ise for coordination of propaganda on

behalf of insurgents in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Colombia. Radio Havana
and other Cuban media recently have
publicized statements by Chilean Com-
munist Party leaders urging unity of the
Chilean left and calling for armed action
to topple Chile's government. Radio
Havana has directed broadcasts to Para-
guay urging the overthrow of the Para-
guayan Government.

Sports competitions, youth and
cultural festivals, and special scholar-
ships to Cuba provide channels to iden-
tify potential agents for intelligence and
propaganda operations. In Ecuador,
Cuban Embassy officers in Quito used
their ties with Ecuadoran students to
try to orchestrate pro-Cuba demonstra-
tions when the Government of Ecuador
threatened to suspend relations after
Cuba's forcible and unauthorized occupa-
tion in February 1981 of the Ecuadoran
Embassy in Havana, following its
seizure by a group of Cubans seeking to
leave Cuba.

Military Training. Witnesses and
former trainees have described several
camps in Cuba dedicated specifically to
military training, including one in Pinar
del Rio Province and another near
Guanabo, east of Havana. The camps
can accommodate several hundred
trainees. Groups from El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Hon-
duras, Colombia, Grenada, the
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti,
Chile, and Uruguay have been trained in
these facilities during the past 2 years.6

Recruits are normally provided false
documentation (sometimes Cuban pass-
ports) by Cuban agents in third coun-
tries and are flown to Cuba on civil air-
craft under cover as "students" or other
occupations. Panama has been used as a
regular transit point for Central and
South Americans to and from military
training in Cuba.7

Once in Cuba, trainees generally are
taken immediately to the guerrilla train-
ing camps where they usually are
grouped according to nationality and the
organization for which they are being
trained in order to promote a sense of
cohesiveness and esprit de corps.

Training normally lasts 3-6 months
and consists of instruction by Cuban
cadres in sabotage, explosives, military
tactics, and weapons use. Although
military training is frequently tied close-
ly to operational requirements— the
M-19 guerrillas who landed in Colombia
in early 1981 did so immediately upon

completion of their military instruction
in Cuba— witnesses report that political
indoctrination is also included in the cur-
riculum.

Many Cuban instructors are active
military officers and veterans of Cuban
expeditionary forces in Africa. Soviet
personnel have been reported at these
camps, but they apparently do not par-
ticipate directly in the guerrilla training.

Political Training. Each year Cuba
offers hundreds of scholarships to
foreign students. All Cuban mass organi-
zations operate schools in organizational
work and indoctrination open to care-
fully selected foreign students.8 In addi-
tion, some 11,000 non-Cuban secondary
school students, mostly teenagers, were
enrolled in 1980 in 15 schools on the Isle
of Youth alone. Cuba does not publicize
complete foreign enrollment statistics
nor does it release the names of those
trained. From the eastern Caribbean
alone, close to 300 students are current-
ly in Cuba studying technical and aca-
demic subjects. The study of Marxism-
Leninism is compulsory in many courses,
and military affairs is compulsory in
some. When governments have turned
down Cuban scholarship offers, as oc-
curred recently in Belize and Dominica,
Cuba has gone ahead and concluded
private agreements. Local Marxist-
Leninist groups with ties to Cuba play a
major role in selecting those students
who receive scholarships.

In sum, the infrastructure for Cuba's
intensified revolutionary agitation in
Latin America is a multifaceted yet
carefully coordinated mechanism. The
Cuban Communist Party, through its
America Department, provides cohesion
and direction to a complex network that
consists of intelligence officers, elements
of Cuba's foreign ministry, armed
forces, mass organizations, commercial
and cultural entities, and front groups.

This extensive apparatus is designed
to support one objective: a systematic,
long-range campaign to destabilize
governments.

CASE STUDIES

The Cuban activities described in the
case studies which follow must be con-
sidered to understand developments
within the countries in question. How-
ever, the focus of the case studies is
Cuban involvement in each country.
Readers should, therefore, guard against
assuming that the cases below provide a

bruary 1982

71

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

comprehensive picture of the general
situation in the country where the
events described have taken place.

Central America

Nicaragua. In July 1979, internal
and external factors converged to bring
about the triumph of the anti-Somoza in-
surrection and the subsequent domina-
tion of the new Nicaraguan Government
by the Cuban-trained leadership of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN). These events provided a key
test for Cuba's new mechanisms and
strategy for promoting armed pro-Cuban
movements in this hemisphere.

Opposition to Somoza's authoritarian
rule in the late 1970s was widespread.
The 1978 killing of Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, publisher of Nicaragua's
most respected newspaper, La Prensa,
converted many Nicaraguans to the
armed opposition of which the FSLN
was the core; FSLN assurances on
democracy and pluralism were accepted
by newly allied political moderates and
private businessmen. Internationally,
sympathy for the struggle against
Somoza led Venezuela, Panama, and
Costa Rica to aid the insurgents, while
Somoza stood practically without
friends.

This environment enabled Cuba to
disguise the extent of its support for the
FSLN and avoid disrupting the fragile
alliances between the FSLN and other
opponents of Somoza. Behind the
scenes, Cuba played an active role in
organizing the FSLN and in training
and equipping it militarily.

Cuba had provided some training
and arms to the FSLN in the early
1960s. Until late 1977, however, Cuban
support consisted mainly of propaganda
and safehaven.

In 1977 and early 1978, a high-
ranking America Department official,
Armando Ulises Estrada,9 made
numerous secret trips to facilitate the
uprising by working to unify the three
major factions of the FSLN. Stepped-up
Cuban support to the Sandinistas was
conditioned on effective unity. During
the XI World Youth Festival in Havana
in late July 1978, the Cubans announced
that the unification of the three factions
had been achieved and urged Latin
American radicals present at the
meeting to demonstrate solidarity with
the FSLN by staging operations in their
own countries.

At the same time, Estrada concen-
trated on building a supply network for
channeling arms and other supplies to

guerrilla forces. International sympathy
for the struggle against Somoza provid-
ed a convenient facade for Cuban opera-
tions. In preparation for the first FSLN
offensive in the fall of 1978, arms were
flown from Cuba to Panama, trans-
shipped to Costa Rica on smaller planes,
and supplied to Nicaraguan guerrillas
based in northern Costa Rica. To moni-
tor and assist the flow, the America
Department established a secret opera-
tions center in San Jose. By the end of
1978, Cuban advisers were dispatched to
northern Costa Rica to train and equip
the FSLN forces with arms which began
to arrive direct from Cuba. FSLN guer-
rillas trained in Cuba, however, con-
tinued to return to Nicaragua via
Panama.

In early 1979, Cuba helped organize,
arm, and transport an "internationalist
brigade" to fight alongside FSLN guer-
rillas. Members were drawn from
several Central and South American ex-
tremist groups, many of them experi-
enced in terrorist activities. Castro also
dispatched Cuban military specialists to
the field to help coordinate the war
efforts. Factionalism threatened San-
dinista unity again in early 1979, and
Castro met personally with leaders of
three FSLN factions to hammer out a
renewed unity pact.

Cuba presently is
using Nicaraguan ter-
ritory to provide train-
ing and other facilities
to guerrillas active in
neighboring countries.

When the insurgents' final offensive
was launched in mid-1979, Cuban
military advisers from the Department
of Special Operations, a special military
unit, were with FSLN columns and
maintained direct radio communications
to Havana. A number of Cuban advisers
were wounded in combat and were
evacuated to Cuba via Panama.

The operations center run by the
America Department in San Jose was
the focal point for coordination of Cuba's
support. After the triumph of the anti-
Somoza forces in July 1979, the chief of
the center, Julian Lopez Diaz, became
Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua. One of
his America Department assistants in

San Jose, Andres Barahona, was redoc
mented as a Nicaraguan citizen and
became a top official of the Nicaraguar
intelligence service.

Castro has counseled the Sandinist
to protect their Western ties to keep tl
country afloat economically. But to in-
sure that the FSLN could move to don
nate the Nicaraguan Government, Cub
has acted quickly to build up Sandinist
military and security forces.

Since July 1979, Cuba has providec
substantial military, technical, and
political assistance. Some 5,000 Cuban
advisers, teachers, and medical person
nel work at all levels of the military ar
civilian infrastructures.10 Of this
number, more than 1,500 military and
security advisers are actively providinj
military instruction and combat trainir
instruction in intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities; instruction on
security protection for the FSLN leadt
ship; and advice on organization of the
Nicaraguan police force. In addition,
Nicaragua has received within the pas
year approximately $28 million worth
military equipment from the U.S.S.R.,
Eastern Europe, and Cuba. This has ii
eluded tanks, light aircraft, helicopters
heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles,
antiaircraft weapons, hundreds of
military transport vehicles, as well as
tons of small arms and ammunition.

Cuba presently is using Nicaragua
territory to provide training and other
facilities to guerrillas active in neighbc
ing countries. The Cuban Ambassador
Nicaragua and other America Depart-
ment officials frequently meet with Ce
tral American guerrillas in Managua t<
advise them on tactics and strategy. Ir
dividual Sandinista leaders have par-
ticipated in such meetings and have mi
independently with Guatemalan and
Salvadoran insurgents. The FSLN alsc
has cooperated in a joint effort by Cub;
and Palestinian groups to provide mili-
tary training in the Mideast to selected
Latin American extremists. Some San-
dinistas were themselves trained by tht
Palestine Liberation Organization, whic
maintains an embassy in Nicaragua.

Between October 1980 and Februai
1981, Nicaragua was the staging site f(
a massive Cuban-directed flow of arms
to Salvadoran guerrillas. Arms destinei
for Salvadoran and Guatemalan guer-
rillas continue to pass through
Nicaragua.

El Salvador. Before 1979, Cuban
support to Salvadoran radicals involvec
training small numbers of guerrillas,

72

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ividing modest financial aid, and serv-
as a political conduit between Salva-
•an extremists and Communists out-
e the hemisphere.
During the Nicaraguan civil war,
ba concentrated on support for the
LN. After the fall of Somoza, Cuba
fan intense efforts to help pro-Cuban
jrrillas come to power in El Salvador.
ien a reform-minded, civil-military
/eminent was established in October
19, Cuba's first priority was to tighten
i political organization and unity of El
vador's fragmented violent left. At
it, arms shipments and other aid from
ba were kept low as the Cubans in-
ted on a unified strategy as the price
increased material support. To forge
ty, Cuba sponsored a December 1979
eting in Havana that resulted in an
;ial unity agreement among the
med Forces of National Resistance
\HN), the Popular Liberation Forces
3L), and the Communist Party of El
Ivador (PCES), which had itself
med an armed wing at Cuban and
yiet insistence. In late May 1980,
er more negotiations in Havana, the
pular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was
nitted into the guerrilla coalition.
The new combined military com-
nd assumed the name of the Unified
volutionary Directorate (DRU). Dur-

• this period, Cuba also coordinated

• development of clandestine support
works in Honduras, Costa Rica, and
laragua, sometimes using arms supply
chanisms established during the
:araguan civil war.

With unified tactics and operations
jv possible, Cuba began to assist the
srrillas in formulating military
ategy. Cuban specialists helped the
tU devise initial war plans in the sum-
t of 1980. The Cubans influenced the
errillas to launch a general offensive
January 1981. After the offensive
led, guerrilla leaders traveled to
ivana in February 1981 to finalize a
■ategy to "improve our internal mili-
-y situation" by engaging in a
sgotiating maneuver" to gain time to
jroup.11

Cuba provided few weapons and am-
jnition to Salvadoran guerrillas from
. own resources but played a key role
coordinating the acquisition and
livery of arms from Vietnam,
;hiop'ia, and Eastern Europe through
icaragua.12 After the unmasking of
is network, Cuba and Nicaragua
duced the flow in March and early
pril. Prior to a guerrilla offensive in

August an upswing in deliveries oc-
curred. The arms flow continues via
clandestine surface and air routes. In ad-
dition, the Cubans over the past year
have established a network of small
ships to deliver arms to Salvadoran in-
surgent groups.

Cuba also assists the Salvadoran
guerrillas in contacts with Arab radical
states and movements to arrange
military training and financing for arms
acquisitions. In September 1980, Cuba
laundered $500,000 in Iraqi funds for
the Salvadoran insurgents. In March
1981, the Salvadoran Communist Party
Secretary General, Shafik Handal,
visited Lebanon and Syria to meet with
Palastinian leaders. Cuba also coor-
dinates the training of a relatively small
number of Salvadoran guerrillas in
Palastinian camps in the Mideast.

Cuban training of Salvadoran guer-
rillas increased sharply in 1980 as Cuba
concentrated on building a trained army
able to mount major offensives. A
typical 3-month training program includ-
ed courses in guerrilla tactics;
marksmanship and weapons use; field
engineering; demolition; fortification
construction; land navigation; use of ar-
tillery and mines. One observer reported
seeing groups up to battalion size
(250-500 men) under instruction, sug-
gesting that some guerrillas trained as
integral units.13

Cuba has provided selected guer-
rillas more intensive training on
specialized subjects. A former FPL
guerrilla who defected in fall 1981
reported that during 1980 he had re-
ceived 7 months of military training in
Cuba, including instruction in scuba div-
ing and underwater demolition. Soviet
scuba equipment was used. The group
trained as frogmen called themselves
"combat swimmers" and were told that
their mission was to destroy dams,
bridges, port facilities, and boats.

Cuba also gives political, organiza-
tional, and propaganda support to the
guerrillas. Cuban diplomatic facilities
worldwide help guerrilla front groups
with travel arrangements and contacts.
The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina,
has handled communications for guer-
rilla representation abroad. Cuba and
the Soviet Union have pressed Com-
munist parties and radical groups to
support the insurgency directly, and
through solidarity organizations with
propaganda and facilities (office space,
equipment, etc.).

The Salvadoran insurgents have
publicly stressed the importance of
solidarity groups. A member of the
FPL, Oscar Bonilla, who attended the
Fourth Consultative Meeting in Havana
of the Continental Organization of Latin
American Students (OCLAE), a Cuban
front group, told Radio Havana in
August 1981 that OCLAE "has been the

. . . the Cubans . . . have
established a network of
small ships to deliver
arms to Salvadoran in-
surgent groups.

most important means of solidarity of all
the peoples and has gotten us ready to
form an anti-interventionist student
front in El Salvador, Central America
and the Caribbean. ... We believe that
it is good to carry out immediate plans
for actions which will permit us to stop
an imperialist intervention in El
Salvador. In this respect, the students of
Latin America will have to confront and
attack U.S. interests so that the United
States will see how the Latin American
and Caribbean student movement
responds to an aggression by im-
perialism in El Salvador."

With Soviet assistance, Cuba has or-
chestrated propaganda to distort the
realities of the Salvadoran conflict.
Unattributed foreign media placements
and efforts to organize protests against
the Salvadoran Government and U.S.
policy, which have accompanied official
propaganda, stress the theme of U.S. in-
tent to intervene militarily in El
Salvador.

Unfounded claims and accusations
originated by the Salvadoran guerrillas
are routinely replayed to a regional and
world audience by Cuba's Radio Havana
or Prensa Latina, then echoed by the
official Soviet Press Agency TASS,
Radio Moscow, and Eastern European
media. For example, a false report of a
U.S. soldier killed in El Salvador that
resounded widely in Cuban/Soviet propa-
ganda during 1980 was traced finally to
the Salvadoran Communist Party. This
rumor was to support an even bigger lie:
that hundreds of U.S. soldiers were in
El Salvador, building U.S. bases, and
herding peasants into Vietnam-style
strategic hamlets.14

bruary 1982

73

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Guatemala. Castro has stepped up
Cuba's support to Guatemalan guerrillas
whom he has aided with arms and train-
ing since he came to power.

As elsewhere, Cuba has influenced
divided extremist groups to unite and
has conditioned increased Cuban aid on
a commitment to armed struggle and a
unified strategy. During 1980, discus-
sions about a unity agreement were held
among leaders of the Guerrilla Army of
the Poor (EGP), the Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR), the Organization of Peo-
ple in Arms (ORPA), and the dissident
faction of the Guatemalan Communist
Party (PGT/D). At the invitation of San-
dinista leaders, representatives of the
four groups met in Managua under
strict security to continue discussions. In
November 1980, the four organizations
signed a unity agreement in Managua to
establish the National Revolutionary
Union (with a revolutionary directorate
called the General Revolutionary Com-
mand—CGR). Manuel Pineiro Losada,
Chief of the America Department, and
Ramiro Jesus Abreu Quintana, head of
its Central American Division, repre-
sented Fidel Castro at the signing cere-
mony. Following the signing of the unity
agreement, representatives of the CGR
traveled to Havana to present the docu-
ment to Castro. ORPA publicized the
agreement in a communique issued
November 18, 1980. All parties agreed it
was significant that the unity agreement
was the first such document signed on
Central American soil.

After this unity agreement was con-
cluded, Cuba agreed to increase military
training and assistance. A large number
of the 2,000 or more guerrillas now ac-
tive have trained in Cuba. Recent
military training programs have included
instruction in the use of heavy weapons.

During the past year, arms have
been smuggled to Guatemala from
Nicaragua passing overland through
Honduras. The guerrilla arsenal now in-
cludes 50mm mortars, submachine guns,
rocket launchers, and other weapons.
Captured M-16 rifles have been traced
to U.S. forces in Vietnam. On June 26,
1981, Paulino Castillo, a 28-year-old
guerrilla with ORPA, told newsmen in
Guatemala that he was part of a 23-man
group of Guatemalans that underwent 7
months of training in Cuba, beginning
around February 1980. His group was
divided into sections for urban and rural
combat training in explosives and fire-
arms use. To get to Cuba, Castillo
traveled to Costa Rica from Guatemala
by public bus. In Costa Rica, a go-be-
tween obtained a Panamanian passport

for Castillo to enter Panama. In
Panama, other contacts equipped him
with a Cuban passport and he continued
on to Cuba. Castillo returned to
Guatemala via Nicaragua to rejoin the
guerrillas. He later surrendered to a
Guatemalan army patrol.

Guatemalan guerrillas have col-
laborated with Salvadoran guerrillas. In
January 1981, the EGP, ORPA, FAR,
and the PGT/D circulated a joint bulletin
announcing the intensification of their
activities in support of the general offen-
sive in El Salvador. The Salvadorans in
turn have provided the Guatemalans
with small quantities of arms.

Unity has not been fully achieved, as
the four groups have not yet carried out
plans to establish a political front group.
The joint military strategy, however, is
being implemented. The guerrillas have
stepped up terrorist actions in an effort
to provoke repression and destabilize the
government. For example, the EGP took
responsibility for placing a bomb in one
of the pieces of luggage that was to
have been loaded onto a U.S. Eastern
Airlines plane on July 2. The bomb ex-
ploded before being loaded, killing a
Guatemalan airport employee.

Costa Rica. Cuba took advantage of
Costa Rica's strong popular and govern-
mental opposition to Somoza's
authoritarian government and of Costa
Rica's open democratic society to estab-
lish and coordinate a covert support net-
work for guerrilla operations elsewhere
in Central America. The apparatus was
established during the course of the
Nicaraguan civil war and maintained
clandestinely thereafter. Costa Rica was
well disposed toward groups that op-
posed Somoza, including the Sandinista
guerrillas. Aid provided by Panama and
Venezuela was openly tunneled through
Costa Rica to the Nicaraguan rebels.
Cuba, however, kept its role largely hid-
den.

A Special Legislative Commission
established in June 1980 by the Costa
Rican legislature revealed Cuba's exten-
sive role in arming the Nicaraguan guer-
rillas. The commission determined that
there were at least 21 flights carrying
war materiel between Cuba and Llano
Grande and Juan Santamaria Airports in
Costa Rica.15

Costa Rican pilots who made these
flights reported that Cubans frequently
accompanied the shipments. Although
Cubans were stationed at Llano Grande,
their main operations center for coor-
dinating logistics and contacts with the
Sandinistas was set up secretly in San
Jose and run by America Department

official Lopez Diaz. The Special Legisla
tive Commission estimated that a
minimum of 1 million pounds of arms
moved to Costa Rica from Cuba and
elsewhere during the Nicaraguan civil
war, including anti-aircraft machine-
guns, rocket launchers, bazookas, and
mortars. The commission also estimate*
that a substantial quantity of these
weapons remained in Costa Rica after
the fall of Somoza in July 1979.

The Special Legislative Commissioi
concluded that after the Nicaraguan ci
war had ended, "arms trafficking
[began], originating in Costa Rica or
through Costa Rican territory, toward
El Salvador, indirectly or using Hon-
duras as a bridge." Through 1980 and
to 1981 traffic flowed intermittently
through Costa Rica to El Salvador,
directed clandestinely by the Cubans.

In the summer of 1979, the Cuban;
and their paid agent, Fernando Carras
Illanes, a Chilean 'national residing in
Costa Rica, along with several Costa
Ricans previously involved in the
logistics effort for the FSLN, agreed tc
continue smuggling arms to Salvadorat
guerrillas. The Cubans arranged for ac
quisition of some of the arms and am-
munition remaining in Costa Rica from
the Nicaraguan airlift to supply the
Salvadoran insurgents.

This new Cuban operation was coo*
dinated from San Jose, first from their
secret operations center, then later
directly from the Cuban Consulate. The
major coordinator, until his expulsion
from Costa Rica in May 1981 following
the break in consular relations between
Costa Rica and Cuba, was Fernando
Pascual Comas Perez of the America
Department. Comas worked directly fo:
Manuel Pineiro and had the cover title
of Cuban Vice Consul in San Jose.
Cuban agents made arrangements to
store arms for transshipment to El
Salvador and to help hundreds of
Salvadoran guerrillas pass through
Costa Rica in small groups on their waj
to training in Cuba. Cuban operations
have been facilitated by Costa Rica's
three Marxist-Leninist parties, which
have provided funds, safehaven,
transportation, and false documents.16

Terrorism had been virtually
unknown in Costa Rica until March 198!
except for scattered incidents of largely
foreign origin. The first Costa Rican ter
rorists made their appearance in March
when they blew up a vehicle carrying a
Costa Rican chauffeur and three Marine
security guards from the U.S. Embassy
in San Jose. In April, four terrorists
from the same group were captured

j

-

C;

■

74

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

er machine-gunning a police vehicle.
June, the group murdered three
icemen and a taxi driver. Costa Rican
horities have arrested some 20 ac-
ed terrorists and are continuing to in-
,tigate leads linking them to South
lerican terrorist groups such as the
dentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan
Damaros, and Colombia's M-19, and
Cuba itself. Two of the accused ter-
ists are known to have received train-
in the Soviet Union.

Director of the Judicial Investigation
Ionization Eduardo Aguilar Bloise
i a press conference August 12 that
itured terrorist documents indicated
t two Costa Rican peasants had been
en "ideological/military training" in
ba and returned to work in the Atlan-
coastal zone of Costa Rica. The docu-
nts indicate that the two were in
ba from 8 to 12 months— possibly in
J8— and were financed by the terrorist

up known popularly in Costa Rica as
e family." Aguilar said he did not dis-
tnt the possibility that others had
■n trained in Cuba.

Although most of Costa Rica's
rxist-Leninist parties have advocated
eaceful line in respect to Costa Rica,
i group with close ties to Cuba — the
volutionary Movement of the People
RP) — while disavowing responsibility

terrorist acts, has spoken of them as
i\\ intentioned." Some of the arrested
rorists are known to have belonged to

MRP at one time. On November 5,

Office of National Security an-
mced the discovery of a terrorist cell
irly connected with the MRP. Among

arms and terrorist paraphernalia
ifiscated was an Uzi submachinegun
,h silencer. Earlier, the authorities
i confiscated a "plan for Guanacaste"
m an MRP official which noted such
ectives as "prevent the electoral proc-

from developing in a festive at-
sphere" and "the taking of power by

armed people." The head of the
IP has traveled many times to Cuba,
i Cuba has given training to other
IP leaders.

Honduras. Cuba provided
amilitary training to a small number
Hondurans in the early 1960s, but
ations with Honduran radicals were
ained until the late 1970s. Cuba then
:umed military training for members
the Honduran Communist Party
]H) and integrated them into the "in-
nationalist brigade" fighting in the
:araguan civil war. After the war,
)H members returned to Cuba for ad-
ional training.

Since then Cuba has concentrated
primarily on developing Honduras as a
conduit for arms and other aid to guer-
rillas active elsewhere in Central
America. In January 1981, Honduran
officials discovered a large cache of con-
cealed arms intended for Salvadoran
guerrillas, which included M-16 rifles
traced to Vietnam. Smuggled arms have
continued to be intercepted.

While considering Honduras a useful
support base for insurgencies elsewhere,
Cuba is also working to develop the
capacity for insurrection within Hon-
duras. In the normal pattern, Havana
has urged splintered extremist groups in
Honduras to unify and embrace armed
struggle. While holding back from levels
of support given to Salvadoran and
Guatemalan guerrillas, Cuba has in-

. . . Havana has urged
splintered extremist
groups in Honduras to
unify and embrace
armed struggle.

creased its training of Honduran ex-
tremists in political organization and
military operations. Cuba has also prom-
ised to provide Honduran guerrillas
their own arms, including submachine-
guns and rifles.

On November 27, Honduran authori-
ties discovered a guerrilla safehouse on
the outskirts of Tegucigalpa. Two guer-
rillas were killed in the resulting shoot-
out, including a Uruguayan citizen.
Nicaraguans as well as Hondurans were
captured at the house, where a substan-
tial arsenal of automatic weapons and
explosives was seized. Incriminating
documents, including notebooks which
indicate recent attendance in training
courses in Cuba, were also confiscated.
One of those arrested, Jorge Pinel
Betancourt, a 22-year-old Honduran,
told reporters the group was headed for
El Salvador to join Salvadoran guer-
rillas. Two additional guerrilla safe-
houses located in La Ceiba and San
Pedro Sula were raided on November
29, and authorities seized sizable arms
caches, explosives, and communications
equipment. These arms may have been
destined for use within Honduras.

The Caribbean

Jamaica. In the late 1970s, Jamaica
became a special target for Cuba. Fidel
Castro and other Cuban officials
developed close relationships with impor-
tant members of the People's National
Party, which governed Jamaica from
1973 until 1980. Cuban security person-
nel trained Jamaican security officers in
Cuba and Jamaica, including members of
the security force of the office of the
Prime Minister. Cuba also trained about
1,400 Jamaican youths in Cuba as con-
struction workers through a "brigadista"
program. Political indoctrination in Cuba
formed part of this group's curriculum.
A considerable number of these
Jamaican youths received military train-
ing while in Cuba, including instruction
in revolutionary tactics and use of arms.

During this same period, the Cuban
diplomatic mission in Jamaica grew.
Most of the embassy staff, including
former Ambassador Ulises Estrada,
were Cuban intelligence agents. Ulises
Estrada, who had served as a deputy
head of the America Department for 5
years, had a long history of involvement
in political action activities and intelli-
gence operations and went to Jamaica in
July 1979, after playing a major role in
Cuba's involvement in the Nicaraguan
civil war.

Cuba was instrumental in smuggling
arms and ammunition into Jamaica. A
Cuban front corporation (Moonex Inter-
national, registered in Lichtenstein, with
subsidiaries in Panama and Jamaica)
was discovered in May 1980 to be the
designated recipient of a shipment of
200,000 shotgun shells and .38 caliber
pistol ammunition shipped illegally to
Jamaica from Miami. Jamaican authori-
ties apprehended the local manager of
the corporation, accompanied by the
Jamaican Minister of National Security
and Cuban Ambassador Estrada, as the
manager was attempting to leave the
country, in defiance of police instruc-
tions, on a private plane. The manager
subsequently paid a fine of U.S.
$300,000 set by a Jamaican court.

In 1980, weapons were reported
stockpiled in the Cuban Embassy for
possible use by Jamaicans during the
election campaign. M-16 rifles then ap-
peared in Jamaica for the first time and
were used in attacks against supporters
of the opposition Jamaican Labour Party
(JLP) and the security forces. Over 70 of
these weapons have been found by
Jamaican authorities. Some of the
M-16s found in Jamaica have serial

75

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

numbers in the same numerical series as
captured M-16s shipped to Salvadoran
guerrillas from Vietnam.

Ambassador Ulises Estrada was
withdrawn from his post in November
1980, at the request of the newly elected
JLP government. In January 1981, the
Jamaican Government terminated the
"brigadista" program and recalled
Jamaican students remaining in Cuba
under this program. The government
decided to maintain diplomatic relations
but warned Cuba to stop its interference
in Jamaican affairs. Cuba continued to
maintain some 15 intelligence agents at
the Cuban Embassy in Kingston. On Oc-
tober 29, the government broke diplo-
matic relations with Cuba, citing Cuba's
failure to return three Jamaican fugitive
criminals as the immediate cause for this
action. On November 17, the govern-
ment publicly detailed Cuba's role in pro-
viding covert military training under the
curtailed "brigadista" program.

Guyana. In 1978, as many as 200
Cuban technicians, advisers, and medical
personnel were stationed in Guyana.
However, while claiming fraternal rela-
tions with Guyana's Government, Cuba
maintained contact with radical opposi-
tion groups. Guyanese authorities
suspected the Cubans of involvement in
a crippling sugar strike. In August 1978,
five Cuban diplomats were expelled for
involvement in illegal activities.

Cuban military advisers have provid-
ed guerrilla training outside Guyana to
members of a small radical Guyanese op-
position group, the Working People's

In 1980, weapons
were stockpiled in the
Cuban Embassy for
possible use by
Jamaicans during the
election campaign.

Alliance. Five of the seven members of
the Cuban Embassy are known or sus-
pected intelligence agents.

Grenada. Cuban influence in
Grenada mushroomed almost immediate-
ly after the March 1979 coup led by the
New Jewel Movement of Maurice
Bishop. Bishop and his closest colleagues
were Western-educated Marxist radicals,

and they turned for help to Fidel Castro,
who proved willing to provide
assistance.

To allow close Cuban supervision of
Grenadian programs, a senior intelli-
gence officer from the America Depart-
ment, Julian Torres Rizo, was sent to
Grenada as ambassador. Torres Rizo has
maintained intimate relations with
Bishop and other People's Revolutionary
Government ministers, such as Bernard
Coard.

The Grenadian Government has
followed a pro-Soviet foreign policy line.
Cuban and Grenadian voting records in
international organizations have been
nearly identical, so much so that they
alone of all Western Hemisphere nations
have voted against U.N. resolutions con-
demning the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan.

Cuban aid to Grenada has been most
extensive in those areas which affect the
security of its client government and the
island's strategic usefulness to Cuba.
Cuba has advisers on the island offering
military, technical, security, and propa-
ganda assistance to the Bishop govern-
ment. Many Grenadians have been sent
to Cuba for training in these areas. Last
year journalists observed Cuban officials
directing and giving orders to Grenadian
soldiers marching in ceremonies in St.
George's.

Cuba is aiding the construction of a
75-kilowatt transmitter for Radio Free
Grenada. Grenada's state-controlled
press, enjoying a government-enforced
monopoly, currently hews to a strict
"revolutionary" line. Indications are that
the new transmitter will continue this
emphasis while providing facilities for
beaming Cuban and Soviet-supplied
propaganda into the Caribbean and
South America.

Cuba's largest project in Grenada is
the construction of a major airfield at
Point Salines on the southern tip of the
island. Cuba has provided hundreds of
construction workers and Soviet equip-
ment to build the airfield. This airfield,
according to Grenadian Government
statements, is required to bring tourism
to its full economic potential and will be
used as a civilian airport only. Many
questions have been raised, however,
about the economic justification for the
project. The Grenadian Government has
ignored requests for a standard project
analysis of economic benefits. The
planned 9,800-foot Point Salines run-
way, moreover, has clear military poten-
tial. Such an airfield will allow opera-
tions of every aircraft in the Soviet/
Cuban inventory. Cuba's MiG aircraft

and troop transports will enjoy a grea
radius of operation. The airport will g
Cuba a guaranteed refueling stop for
military flights to Africa.

Bishop himself has given an impli<
endorsement of future military use of
the airfield. A March 31, 1980, News-
week report quoted Bishop's comment
to a U.S. reporter: "Suppose there's a
war next door in Trinidad, where the
forces of Fascism are about to take c<
trol, and the Trinidadians need exterr
assistance, why should we oppose any
body passing through Grenada to assi
them?"

Dominican Republic. With its
renewed commitment to armed strug]
Cuba's interest in the Dominican
Republic has revived. Since early 198*
the Cubans have been encouraging ra
cals in the Dominican Republic to unii
and prepare for armed actions. Cubar
intelligence officials, like Omar Cordol
Rivas, chief of the Dominican Republi
desk of the America Department, mal
periodic visits to the island.

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and othe
Communist countries have mounted e
tensive training programs for Dominit
students. In July 1981, the Moscow-lh
Dominican Communist Party (PCD) fc
the first time publicized the Soviet
scholarship program. Some 700
Dominican students are currently stuc
ing at Soviet universities, principally
Patrice Lumumba University, with
another 75 in five other Communist
states (Bulgaria, Cuba, the German
Democratic Republic, Hungary, and
Romania). The PCD itself selects the
more than 100 students who begin tht
Soviet program each year.

At the same time, the Soviet Unic
has been pressuring the PCD to unite
with other extreme left organizations.
The PCD and the pro-Cuban Dominica
Liberation Party receive funds from
both Cuba and the Soviet Union and
send significant numbers of their
members and potential sympathizers f
academic and political schooling as we
as military training in Communist cou
tries. Cuba also has given military in-
struction to many members of small e:
tremist splinter groups like the Social
Workers Movement and the Socialist
Party.

South America

Colombia. Since the 1960s, Cuba
has nurtured contacts with violent ex-
tremist groups in democratic Colombi;
During the 1970s, Cuba established fu

76

Department of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

■lomatic relations with Colombia;
ban involvement with Colombian
'olutionaries was fairly limited,
hough Cuba provided some training to
errilla leadership. Many leaders of the
ril 19 Movement (M-19), including the
tnder, Jaime Bateman — who also at-
ided a Communist cadre school in
iscow — were trained in Cuba. Leaders
the National Liberation Army (ELN)
i the Moscow-oriented Revolutionary
med Forces of Colombia (FARC) also
:eived Cuban instruction.

Cuban assistance to Colombian guer-
as was stepped up after the February
SO seizure of the Dominican Republic
ibassy in Bogota. A number of diplo-
.ts, including the U.S. Ambassador,
re taken hostage by M-19 terrorists.

part of a negotiated settlement, the
rorists were flown on April 17, 1980,
Cuba, where the remaining hostages
re released and the terrorists were
•en asylum.

During mid- 1980, Cuban intelligence
icers arranged a meeting of Colom-
,n extremists, attended by represente-
es from the M-19, FARC, ELN, and
ler Colombian radical groups, to
cuss a common strategy and tactics.
e M-19 had previously held talks with
! Nicaraguan FSLN on ways to
lieve unity of action among guerrilla
>ups in Latin America. Although the
■eting did not result in agreement by
lombian guerrillas on a unified
ategy, practical cooperation among
! guerrilla organizations increased.

In late 1980, the M-19 set in motion
arge-scale operation in Colombia with
ban help. In November, the M-19
it guerrillas to Cuba via Panama to
jin training for the operation. The
3up included new recruits as well as
;mbers who had received no prior
litical or military training. In Cuba the
errillas were given 3 months of
litary instruction from Cuban army in-
ductors, including training in the use
explosives, automatic weapons, hand-
hand combat, military tactics, and
mmunications. A course in politics and
;ology was taught as well. Members of
; M-19 group given asylum in Cuba
;er the takeover of the Dominican
public Embassy also participated in
i training program.

In February 1981, some 100-200
med M-19 guerrillas reinfiltrated into
ilombia from Panama by boat along
z Pacific coast. The guerrillas' mission
establish a "people's army" failed. The
-19 members proved to be poorly
uipped for the difficult countryside,

and the Cuba-organized operation was
soon dismantled by Colombian
authorities. Among those captured was
Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the M-19
leader who had directed the Dominican
Republic Embassy takeover and then
fled to Cuba. Cuba denied any involve-
ment with the M-19 landings but did not
deny training the guerrillas.17

Cuba's propaganda support for Co-
lombian terrorists was impossible to
deny. When a group apparently con-
sisting of M-19 dissidents kidnaped an
American working for a private religious
institute, Cuba implicitly supported the
terrorists' action through Radio Havana
broadcasts beamed to Colombia in
February 1981, which denounced the in-
stitute workers as "U.S. spies." Radio
Moscow picked up the unfounded ac-
cusation to use in its Spanish broadcasts
to Latin America. The American was
later murdered by the kidnapers.18

Colombia suspended relations with
Cuba on March 23, in view of the clear
evidence of Cuba's role in training M-19
guerrillas. President Turbay commented
in an August 13 New York Times inter-
view: ". . . When we found that Cuba, a
country with which we had diplomatic
relations, was using those relations to
prepare a group of guerrillas to come
and fight against the government, it was
a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was
like sending ministers to Washington at
the same time you are about to bomb
ships in Hawaii."

Chile. After Allende's fall in 1973,
Castro promised Chilean radicals "all the
aid in Cuba's power to provide." Al-
though Cuban officials maintained
regular contact with many Chilean ex-
iles, divisions among the exiles inhibited
major operations. The Moscow-line
Chilean Communist Party (PCCH),
holding the position that revolutionary
change could be accomplished by non-
violent means, was critical of "left-wing
forces" like the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR) with which Cuba had
close relations.

Throughout the 1970s, members of
the MIR received training in Cuba and
in some cases instructed other Latin
America revolutionaries. This training
ranged from political indoctrination and
instruction in small arms use to sophisti-
cated courses in document fabrication,
explosives, code writing, photography,
and disguise. In addition, Cuban instruc-
tors trained MIR activists in the Mideast
and Africa.

With its renewed commitment to
armed struggle, Cuba increased its
training of Chileans beginning in 1979.
By mid-1979, the MIR had recruited
several hundred Chilean exiles and sent
them to Cuba for training and eventual
infiltration into Chile. At the same time,
members of the MIR who had been liv-
ing and working in Cuba since Allende's
overthrow began to receive training in
urban guerrilla warfare techniques. The
training in some cases lasted as long as
7 months and included organization and
political strategy, small unit tactics,
security, and communications.

Once training was completed, Cuba
helped the terrorists return to Chile,
providing false passports and false iden-
tification documents. By late 1980, at
least 100 highly trained MIR terrorists
had reentered Chile, and the MIR had
claimed responsibility for a number of
bombings and bank robberies. Cuba's
official newspaper, Granrna, wrote in
February 1981 that the "Chilean Re-
sistance" forces had successfully con-
ducted more than 100 "armed actions" in
Chile in 1980.

By late 1979, the PCCH was re-
evaluating its position in light of events
in Nicaragua, where the fragmented
Nicaraguan Communist Party emerged
from the civil war subservient to the
FSLN. In December 1980, PCCH leader
Luis Corvalan held talks in Cuba with
Fidel Castro, who urged Corvalan to
establish a unified Chilean opposition.
During the Cuban Party Congress that
month, Corvalan delivered a speech
which sketched a new party line calling
for armed struggle to overthrow the
Chilean Government and for coordina-
tion of efforts by all parties, including
the violent left. In January 1981, Cor-
valan commended MIR terrorist acts as
"helpful" and stated that the PCCH was
willing not only .to talk with MIR repre-
sentatives but also to sign agreements
with the group. Several days after this
offer, Corvalan signed a unity agree-
ment with several Chilean extremist
groups, including the MIR.

Until January 1981, when the new
PCCH policy evidently had been ironed
out and validated by the agreement for
a broad opposition coalition, Corvalan's
statements were issued from such places
as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Cuba,
and Peru — but never from Moscow.
Within 2 weeks of the agreement, how-
ever, Moscow showed its implicit ap-
proval of the policy change and began
broadcasting in Spanish to Latin
America— and to Chile in particular—
PCCH explanations of the new policy

bruary 1982

77

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

and calls for mass resistance and acts of
terrorism to overthrow the Chilean
Government.

Terrorist activities by MIR comman-
dos operating in Chile have increased
substantially during the past year. These
have included increased efforts by MIR
activists to establish clandestine bases
for rural insurgency, killings of police-
men, and a number of assassination at-
tempts against high government
officials.

Argentina. The Cubans have a long
history of association with, encourage-
ment of, and active backing for ter-
rorism in Argentina. The Cubans were
linked to the two groups responsible for
unleashing the wave of leftist terrorism
that swept Argentina in the early and
mid-1970s, the Montoneros and the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Cuba
backed these organizations with advice
on tactics and instructions on recruiting
operations and with training in Cuba in
urban and rural guerrilla techniques.
During the height of Argentine ter-
rorism, the Cubans used their embassy
in Buenos Aires to maintain direct
liaison with Argentine terrorists.

The Argentine terrorists were vir-
tually defeated by 1978. In that year,
Castro permitted the Montonero na-
tional leadership to relocate its head-
quarters in Cuba. Today, the Montonero
top command, its labor organization, and
its intelligence organization, among
other units, are all located in Cuba. The
Cubans facilitate the travel and com-
munications of Montoneros, supplying
them with false documentation and ac-
cess to Cuban diplomatic pouches. Mon-
toneros have been among the Latin
American guerrillas trained in guerrilla
warfare over the past year in the Mid-
east as part of a cooperative effort be-
tween Palestinian groups and Cuba.

Following the move of their high
command to Havana, the Montoneros
made repeated attempts to reinfiltrate
Argentina. In late 1979, small groups of
infiltrators eluded detection and were
able to carry out several terrorist ac-
tions, including four murders. Subse-
quent attempts by the Montoneros to
infiltrate terrorists in early 1980 proved
unsuccessful.

With Cuban support, Montoneros
are active outside Argentina. Cuban-
trained Montoneros were among the
members of the "internationalist
brigade" that Cuba supported in
Nicaragua in 1979. This connection was
highlighted when Montonero leader
Mario Firmenich attended the first an-

niversary of the July 1979 victory, wear-
ing the uniform of a Sandinista com-
mander. Montoneros have been active
elsewhere as well. Montoneros largely
staffed and administered Radio Noticias
del Continente, which broadcast Cuban
propaganda to Central and South
America from San Jose until it was
closed by the Costa Rican Government
in 1981, after war materiel was dis-
covered on its installations.

Uruguay. After the failure of the
urban insurgency organized in the early
1970s by the National Liberation Move-
ment (MLN-Tupamaros), several hun-
dred Tupamaros went to Cuba. During
the mid-1970s, Cuba provided some of
them with training in military and ter-
rorist tactics, weapons, and intelligence.
Several of these former Tupamaros
subsequently assisted Cuba in running
intelligence operations in Europe and
Latin America. Some participated in the
Cuban-organized "internationalist
brigade" that fought in the Nicaraguan
civil war.

Cuba continues to provide propa-
ganda support for the Tupamaros and
the Uruguayan Communist Party. Radio
Havana reported on June 30, 1981, that
the leader of the Communist Party of
Uruguay attended a ceremony "in soli-
darity with the Uruguayan people's
struggle" at the headquarters of the
Cuban State Committee for Material and
Technical Supply in Havana. Pro-Cuban
Uruguayan leaders are given red carpet
treatment when they visit Havana and
are usually received by at least a
member of the Cuban Politburo.

POSTSCRIPT

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence
has had a negative impact on Cuba's
relations with its neighbors. Cuba's
policies abroad and its reaction to
emigration pressures at home have
reversed the trend in Latin America
toward normalization of relations.
Although the Castro government has
developed close ties to Nicaragua and
Grenada, Cuba finds itself increasingly
isolated throughout the Americas.

Peru nearly broke relations and
removed its ambassador in April 1980,
when the Cuban Government encour-
aged Cubans eager to leave the island to
occupy the Peruvian Embassy. After
more than 10,000 Cubans crowded into
the embassy compound, Castro thwarted
efforts by concerned governments to
develop an orderly departure program
and opened the port of Mariel to emigra-

tion, also expelling many criminals anc
the mentally ill, and ultimately allowin
more than 125,000 people to leave und
sometimes perilous conditions. But Cu'
still refuses to issue safe conduct pass<
to the 14 Cubans who remain cloistere
in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana tc
day.

Cuba's neighbors were further
shocked when Cuban MiG-21s sank th
Bahamian patrol boat "Flamingo" on
May 10, 1980, in an unprovoked attacl
in Bahamian coastal waters. Subseque
ly, four Bahamian seamen were
machinegunned while trying to save
themselves after their vessel sank. Thi
bodies were never recovered. U.S. Co;
Guard aircraft were harassed by Cuba
MiGs while searching for survivors at
the request of the Bahamian Govern-
ment.

Relations between Venezuela and
Cuba deteriorated badly in 1980, prin-
cipally over the asylum issue, to the
degree that Venezuela removed its am
bassador from Havana. In November
1980, Jamaica expelled the Cuban Am
bassador for interference in Jamaica's
internal affairs and in October 1981
broke diplomatic relations. Colombia
suspended relations in March 1981 ove
Cuba's training of M-19 guerrillas.
Cuba's handling of an incident in whicl
a group of Cubans demanding asylum
forcibly occupied Ecuador's Embassy i
Havana prompted Ecuador to remove
ambassador from Cuba in May 1981.
Also in May, Costa Rica severed its ex
isting consular ties with Cuba, expellin
Cuban officials active in coordinating
support networks for Central America
insurgents.

Today, outside the English-speak in
Caribbean, only Argentina, Panama,
Mexico, and Nicaragua conduct relativ
ly normal relations through resident ai
bassadors in Havana. Use of Panama £
a transit point for Colombian guerrillas
however, led Panama to reassess its
relations with Cuba and resulted in
sharp public criticism of Cuba's "mani-
fest disregard for international stand-
ards of political co-existence" by a high
Panamanian Government official.

'Cuba's military and political activities i
Africa are intense and wideranging. Cuba
still maintains expeditionary forces of at lea
15-19,000 in Angola and 11-15,000 in
Ethiopia. Cuba has military and security ad-
viser contingents in a number of other
African countries and in South Yemen.

2According to the World Bank, Cuba's
per capita annual growth rate averaged
minus 1.2% during the period 1960-78.
Cuban economic performance ranked in the
lowest 5% worldwide and was the worst of

78

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Socialist countries. Only massive infusions
Soviet aid have kept consumption levels
n plummeting. Cuba today depends more
vily on sugar than before 1959. The in-
trial sector has been plagued by mis-
lagement, absenteeism, and serious short-
s in capital goods and foreign exchange.
> economic picture is so bleak that in 1979,

again in October 1981, the Cuban leader-
) had to warn that 10-20 more years of
rifice lie ahead.

sCuba maintains some front organizations
up in the 1960s. One of these, the Con-
stat Organization of Latin American
dents, still holds irregular congresses of
lent leaders from Latin America and the
ibbean (the most recent in Havana in
rust 1981) and publishes a monthly journal
ributed by the Cuban Government.
■•Although Cuba is not involved in actions
:ctly threatening to Mexican internal
jility, Cuba has taken advantage of Mex-
3 open society and its extensive presence
re— Cuba's Embassy in Mexico City is its
jest diplomatic mission in the hemi-
ere — to carry out support activities for in-
gencies in other countries. Mexico is a
icipal base for Cuban contacts with repre-
tatives of several armed Latin American
ups on guerrilla strategy, logistical sup-
t, and international activities.

*>Prensa Latina, the press agency of the
>an Government, has field offices in 35
ntries, including 1 1 Latin American and
ibbean countries, and combines news
hering and propaganda dissemination with
diligence operations. Radio Havana, Cuba's
rtwave broadcasting service, transmits
-e than 350 program hours per week in
it languages to all points of the world.
>a also transmits nightly mediumwave
inish-language broadcasts over "La Voz de
)a," a network of high-powered trans-
fers located in different parts of Cuba. In

Caribbean alone, Radio Havana's weekly
adcasts include 14 hours in Creole to
ti; 60 hours in English; 3 hours in French;
I 125 hours in Spanish. Prensa Latina and
iio Havana, in close coordination with
SS and Radio Moscow, regularly use dis-
>rmation to distort news reports trans-
ted to the region, especially those con-
ning places where Cuban covert activities

most intense.

6Latin Americans are not the only
inees. In a May 1978 Reuters interview
lished in Beirut, Abu Khalaf, a leader of

military branch of Al Fatah, confirmed
t Palestinian agents have received train-
in Cuba since the late 1960s. Palestinian
anizations, with Cuban assistance, have
iprocated by training various Latin
lerican groups in the Middle East. Libya,
ich hosted a meeting of Latin American

eration movements" January 25-Febru-

1, 1979, also has trained some Latin
lerican extremists.

'Public exposure in March 1981 of the
! of Panama as a transit point for Colom-
n guerrillas trained in Cuba led to sharp

criticism of Cuba by the Panamanian Govern-
ment. Panama imposed greater controls on
activities of exiled Central and South
Americans, and the transit of guerrillas
through Panama appears to have ceased, at
least temporarily.

"Courses in agitation and propaganda
open to foreigners include the Central Union
of Cuban Workers' Lazaro Pena Trade Union
Cadre School and similar courses run by the
Union of Young Communists, the Cuban
Women's Federation, the National Associa-
tion of Small Farmers, and the Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution. Even the
Cuban Communist Party offers special
courses for non-Cubans in party provincial
schools and in the Nico Lopez National Train-
ing School, its highest educational institution.
The Cuban press reported graduation
ceremonies July 17, 1981, for this year's 70
Cuban graduates and announced that 69
foreigners had also attended advanced
courses at the Nico Lopez school. Foreign
students represented political organizations
from Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru,
Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile,
Grenada, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Sao
Tome y Principe, and South Yemen. Official
Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma
labeled their presence "a beautiful example of
proletarian internationalism." Courses of in-
struction at the Nico Lopez school, which is
chaired by senior party leaders, include
"political training for journalists," "political
training for propagandists," economics, and
ideology.

9Ulises Estrada was given his first am-
bassadorial post in Jamaica following the July
1979 victory of anti-Somoza forces (see
Jamaica case study). He is currently Cuba's
ambassador to South Yemen.

10The very quantity of Cuban advisers
has caused resentment among nationalist
Nicaraguans, leading to sporadic outbursts of
anti-Cuban feelings. On June 3, 1981, the
FSLN announced that 2,000 Cuban primary
school teachers presently in Nicaragua would
return to Cuba in July, at the mid-point of
Nicaragua's academic year. The Nicaraguan
Education Minister announced on June 18
that 800 of those departing would return in
September after vacations in Cuba, while
Cuba would replace the other 1,200 teachers
in February. By November 1981, however, all
2,000 Cuban teachers had returned to Nica-
ragua.

"A guerrilla document outlining this
strategy was found in Nicaragua in February
1981. Guerrilla representatives later con-
firmed its authenticity to Western Europeans
with the disclaimer that the strategy
elaborately developed in the paper had been
rejected.

12The Cuban role as arms broker to the
DRU since 1979 has been documented in the
Department of State Bulletin Article en-
titled Communist Interference in El Salvador,
March 1981 issue. In April 1981, when

Socialist International representative
Wischnewski confronted Castro with the
evidence in the report, Castro admitted to
him that Cuba had shipped arms to the guer-
rillas. In discussions with several Inter-
Parliamentary Union delegations at the
September 1981 IPU conference in Havana,
Castro again conceded that Cuba had sup-
plied arms.

13Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez tacitly admitted that Cuba was
providing military training to Salvadoran
guerrillas in an interview published in Der
Spiegel on September 28, 1981.

14 At the time these reports first ap-
peared, the United States was providing
neither arms nor ammunition to El Salvador.
In January 1981, the United States respond-
ed to the Cuban-orchestrated general offen-
sive by sending some military assistance and
later sent American military trainers, whose
number never exceeded 55. There are no
U.S. combatants, bases, or strategic hamlets
in El Salvador. TASS continues to report
falsely that "hundreds" of U.S. military per-
sonnel are in El Salvador and participate in
combat.

15The commission's report was issued
May 14, 1981.

16In a recorded interview broadcast by
Radio Havana on June 16, 1981, Eduardo
Mora, Deputy Secretary General of Costa
Rica's Popular Vanguard Party (the Moscow-
line traditional Communist party, the least
disposed to violence of the country's several
Marxist parties and splinter groups) ex-
plained his party's position: "We establish ties
with all revolutionary organizations in Cen-
tral America. We have close ties and are will-
ing to give all the aid we possibly can in
accordance with the principles of proletarian
internationalism because we believe that the
struggle of the Central American people is
the struggle of our own people."

"Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez explained in an interview pub-
lished in Der Spiegel on September 28, 1981,
why Cuba had not denied training the M-19
guerrillas: "We did not deny this because in
the past few years many people came to our
country for various reasons to ask for train-
ing. We did not deny this desire. If a revolu-
tionary for Latin America wishes to learn the
technique and organization of resistance for
his own self-defense, we cannot refuse in
view of the brutal oppression. This also holds
true for the Salvadorans."

18The U.S. citizen killed, Chester Allen
Bitterman, was working for the Summer In-
stitute of Linguistics, a religious group which
develops written forms of indigenous
languages. ■

bruary 1982

79

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Strategic Situation in Central
America and the Caribbean

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
December 14, 1981. Ambassador Enders
is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs.1

Major Developments

There are four major developments that
have come together to create what can
only be described as a state of danger in
the Caribbean Basin.

One is the new Cuban strategy for
uniting the left in the countries of the
region, committing it to violence, arm-
ing it, training it in warfare, and at-
tempting to use it for the destruction
of existing governments. I say new be-
cause it is only 3 years ago that the
policy was adopted. Prior to 1978 — for
some 10 years since the death of Che
Guevara on an Andean hillside — Cuba
had made a sustained effort to portray
itself as a member of the international
community not unlike others, carrying
on state-to-state relations through em-
bassies, emphasizing trade and cultural
contacts.

Observing this pattern, many in this
and other countries of the hemisphere
began to hope that revolutionary Cuba
was on the way to becoming a status-
quo nation. The 1970s, of course, were
marked by Cuban intervention in Africa
on a continent-wide scale. But, it was
argued, Africa was a special case.

The turn came in 1978, when Cuba
decided to back the insurrection in
Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent
to many that a new Cuban strategy was
in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like
a case all of its own. But then the same
thing was tried in El Salvador, in
Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is being
tried in Honduras.

We have attempted to identify and
illustrate the full scope of this new
Cuban strategy in a research paper,
which I would like to submit to the com-
mittee for its study. The paper is based
on both public and intelligence sources.
It was not written to make sensational
revelations, and it does not. But I
wonder how many Americans are aware
of the sweep and the sophistication of
what is going on. In many countries of
the region, Cuba is attempting no less

80

than to construct a machine to destroy
the established governments.

The pattern is always the same. For
years the radical left in the area has
been divided by disagreement over tac-
tics. The old-line Comintern parties
argued patience: You only had to wait
for Marx's famous objective conditions
to emerge, and the revolution would oc-
cur. Other factions were for setting up
Che Guevara-style focos: put some
armed guerrilleros into the countryside
and their presence will radicalize the
peasants. Others were for guerra pro-
longada: discredit the regime by hitting
the economy. Still others advocated
spectacular kidnapings and assassina-
tions.

Under the new strategy Cuba is ap-
proaching each of these groups, often
calling them to Havana. Cuba offers to
supply — or arrange for the supply
of — arms and training. But there are
conditions: The left must unite; it must
create a single directorate for command
and control; it must commit to a single
strategy — which often is written out and
approved by Castro personally. And that
strategy is always the same: armed
struggle against the established govern-
ment.

It is important to be clear about the
effects of this process. It enhances
Cuba's role as the guide — and some-
times as the arbiter — of each revolu-
tionary movement. It increases the
pressure on democratic movements on
the left to make common cause with the
men with the guns rather than face
blame as the obstacle to the unity of the
left. Once unity on the left has been
created, democratic socialists in the
hemisphere and in Europe face the
dilemma of whether or not to support it.
Many have supported such move-
ments— only to learn with bitterness
that their money and political backing
are welcome; their ideas are not.

This is not only history. The process
goes on. In Honduras, Cuba has just
now completed the same unification
operaton: Parties have been joined
together in a national directorate com-
mitted to armed struggle. A new at-
tempt to overthrow an established
government by force is underway.

The democracies in the hemisphere
have had to break, suspend, or down-
grade relations with Cuba: Colombia,
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru,
and Ecuador.

The second development is the
economic and social crisis in the
region. It also began in 1978, just as
Castro was launching his new policy ol
intervention.

For the past two generations, mos
of the Central American countries and
many of the islands compiled an envial
record of economic and social change.
But in 1978 a serious deterioration
began. Prices for export commodities-
coffee, sugar, cocoa — began to decline
sharply. Prices for imported oil and in
ported capital kept going up. With
slowed economic growth in the industi
world, tourism stagnated. Run-on crec
crunches resulted. Some countries are
bankrupt. Others are threatened with
bankruptcy. In two, Cuban-assisted in
surrections are destroying power plan
bridges, and crops and attempting to
disrupt the tourist trade.

The result is a grave, general
economic crisis bringing with it misery
and despair formany millions of peop'i
in the region. Coinciding as it does wii
the Cuban drive to unify the left and
commit it to violence, economic crisis
creates great potential political
vulnerability throughout the area.

The third factor is developing tb
role of Nicaragua as a platform for i
tervention throughout Central
America. We have watched with
deepening concern as Nicaragua has
moved away from pledges of political
pluralism toward a repressive, one-par
state. At the same time it is greatly e>
panding its army and building up an ir
ventory of heavy arms. It continues to
be deeply involved in logistics and oth*
support for the insurgency in El
Salvador.

The United States and a number o
other countries have tried to provide a
alternative to these trends, notably by
providing economic aid but also by ma:
taining political contacts. Since 1979 tl
United States alone gave $120 million
assistance. Recently, we tried by diplo-
matic means to achieve a rapprocheme
with Managua. And we don't close the
door on future attempts.

But, frankly, there is little to show
for our efforts. Indeed, I wonder
whether any of the democratic countri<
that have supported Nicaragua can cla:
to have slowed down, much less to hav
stopped the negative trends.

There are more than 1,500 Cuban
military and security advisers in Nica-
ragua, twice as many as there were at
the start of the year. More tanks are
reported on their way. Preparations fo
the receipt of MiGs are well advanced.

Department of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A final factor is the special impor-
e of the struggle in El Salvador
the future of the area. El Salvador
e second largest Central American
: in population and, in the past, has
aved a relatively high level of eco-
ic development.

But El Salvador is important not
for itself. There are underway
e two critical experiments in reform:
in land tenure, the other in the crea-
of democratic institutions and
lgthening the political center. If
2 reforms are defeated by arms,
pects for peaceful change elsewhere
be seriously set back,
rhere is something else. If, after
ragua, El Salvador is captured by a
nt minority, what state in Central
irica will be able to resist? How long
:d it be before the major strategic
interests — the canal, sea lanes, oil
lies — were at risk?

Strategy

neet and overcome these challenges
United States must also have a com-
lensive strategy. Let me summarize
fly the line of action we are now
doping.

First, we must make sure that our
ids have the means to defend
nselves. El Salvador and Honduras
the two most threatened countries,
buildup in Nicaragua menaces both;
eting of El Salvador's economy by
iraguan-supported insurgents creates
uation of emergency in that country.
1 need more resources — above all,
iomic but military as well. We will
onsulting with the Congress on how
:an best provide help.

Second, we must join with others
elp provide the Caribbean Basin
ntries the opportunity to achieve
j-term prosperity. President Reagan
"eparing for submission to the Con-
is early next year a far-reaching
cage of proposals. Because the
kets in the countries of the basin are
mall, investment other than in
lies is often unattractive. But if in-
x>rs could be sure of unimpeded ac-
s to outside markets, particularly to
jvast U.S. market, at least for a
ined period of time, then investment
Ihe area becomes more interesting.
I skilled and relatively low-cost labor
|he area becomes an attraction. We
developing proposals for one-way
I; trade arrangements and for invest-
iit incentives; there will also be provi-
\i for preventing abuses. At the same

time we will present proposals for
emergency financial assistance to tide
countries over until they can take ad-
vantage of the new opportunities to
begin earning their own way.

Third, we must not falter in our
pursuit of democratic values, for they
assure the legitimacy of governments
we hope to help. In a free, open elec-
tion with broad participation, Honduras
chose a new government last month.
Costa Rica, whose deeply rooted demo-
cratic institutions are helping it to
weather a brutal economic crisis without
violence, goes to the polls in February.
El Salvador will follow with elections for
a constituent assembly— the first step in
creating representative, constitutionally
bound government in that nation. In
Central America only the Nicaraguan
Government refuses to go before the
people.

Let me, in this regard, make a
remark on the subject of proposals for
negotiation between the government and
the insurgents. Members of the Frente
Democratico Revolucionario (FDR) say
they want to talk about "restructuring
the army" and "establishing a new
order." In their view such changes are
conditions precedent to elections.

But the establishment of a new
order and the status of the army are
among the subjects for the constituent
assembly to be elected in March. Why
should they only be debated and decided
with the insurgents and not with the
campesinos, the labor unions, and the
political parties? Why shouldn't the FDR
have— only have— the representation in
the assembly it can get by campaigning?

In July the United States said it
would facilitate contacts and discussions
on election issues. In September we sent
a group to El Salvador and talked to all
interested in talking to us, including the
Novimiento Nacional Revolucionario
(MNR), a member of the FDR. The
representative of another member of the
FDR has asked to see us in Washington
this week, and we are receiving him on
the same basis. If there are opposition
elements who believe in a democratic
solution, we will help them participate in
the electoral process. But it would be
wrong to assist those— in negotiations
or otherwise— who are committed to the
destruction of democracy.

Fourth, we must continue the pur-
suit of justice for the countries of the
area. Lawlessness from both the left
and right has been a major weakness in
El Salvador. But the government is

making progress in bringing it under
control. Violent deaths other than in
combat as reported each week by our
Embassy in San Salvador are down by
more than a half since last year. I do not
want to give you the impression that our
weekly figures are complete but the
trend is significant. Progress is un-
mistakable. I wonder whether the in-
surgents have made any contribution to
that progress at all. For they claim that
their violence is justified by a higher
goal.

Fifth, our emphasis should be on
collective action. Last week the
Organization of American States voted
22 to 3 with 4 abstentions in support of
free elections as a means to a political
solution in El Salvador. In the same
forum Secretary Haig has suggested
that all countries in Central America
should address the arms race that now
threatens in Central America as a result
of Nicaraguan imports of heavy weapons
and the Cuban military adviser presence
in Nicaragua. Should more serious
threats emerge, it is in collective securi-
ty that we should seek solutions.

Finally, we must communicate to
Cuba that the costs of escalating its
intervention in the region will be very
high. We have readied measures to pre-
vent another Mariel sealift should Cuba
again seek to utilize the longings of its
own citizens to harm this country. We
are tightening the economic embargo.
We are preparing creation of a radio
devoted to Cuba news and beamed to
the island, so that Cubans can be better
able to hold their government account-
able for its actions. Our underlying
message is clear: We will not accept, we
do not believe the countries of the
region will accept, that the future of the
Caribbean Basin be manipulated from
Havana. It must be determined by the
countries themselves.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

,)ruary 1 982

81

TREATIES

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of principles and objectives of the Antarctic
treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at London Oct.
7, 1977.'
Notification of approval: Argentina, Oct. 16,

1979.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, Dec. 2, 1981. 2

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague
Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14,
1971. TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, Dec. 2, 1981.2

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text
of the convention on international civil avia-
tion (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Mon-
treal Sept. 30, 1977. '

Protocol relating to an amendment to the
convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Sept. 30,
1977.1

Protocol relating to an amendment to the
convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1980.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 16, 1981.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980. »
Signatures: Egypt, Niger, Oct. 19, 1981;
European Economic Community, Liberia,
Oct. 21, 1981; Papua New Guinea, Somalia,
Oct. 27, 1981; Senegal, Nov. 11, 1981;
Botswana, Nov. 18, 1981; Republic of Korea,
Nov. 27, 1981; Kuwait, Dec. 1, 1981; Chad,
Yemen (Aden), Dec. 16, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Ethopia,
Nov. 19, 1981; Gabon, Nov. 30, 1981; Malawi,
Dec. 15, 1981.

Conservation

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Dec. 16, 1981.

Cultural Property

Statutes of the International Centre for the
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of
Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi
Nov. -Dec. 1956, as amended at Rome Apr.
24, 1963 and Apr. 14-17, 1969. Entered into

force May 10, 1958; for the United States

Jan. 20, 1971. TIAS 7038.

Accession deposited: Finland, July 3, 1981.

Cultural Relations-UNESCO

Protocol to the agreement on the importation
of educational, scientific, and cultural
materials of Nov. 22, 1950 (TIAS 6129).
Adopted at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered
into force Jan. 2, 1982.3
Signature: New Zealand, Nov. 9, 1981.
Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, Nov. 13,
1981.

Education— UNESCO

Convention on the recognition of studies,

diplomas, and degrees concerning higher

education in the states belonging to the

Europe Region. Done at Paris, Dec. 21,

1979.1

Ratifications deposited: Israel, Aug. 13, 1981;

German Democratic Republic, Aug. 26, 1981.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.
TIAS 9614.
Ratification deposited: Italy, Nov. 27, 1981.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention
on facilitation of international maritime traf-
fic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Done at London
Nov. 19, 1973.1
Acceptance deposited: Ireland, Oct. 20, 1981.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force
Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
TIAS 9725.
Accessions deposited: Gabon, Oct. 14, 1981;

Italy, Nov. 27, 1981.

North Atlantic Treaty

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the
accession of Spain. Opened for signature at
Brussels Dec. 10, 1981. Enters into force
when each of the parties to the North Atlan-
tic Treaty has notified the U.S. Government
of its acceptance.1

Signed: U.S., Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, F.R.G., Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Turkey, U.K., Dec. 10, 1981.

Refugees

Convention relating to the status of refugees,

with schedule and annex. Signed at Geneva

July 28, 1951. Entered into force Apr. 22,

1954.3

Accession deposited: Japan, Oct. 3, 1981.6

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Enter
into force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980.
Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Nov. 23 B

1981.

Space

Convention on registration of objects
launched into outer space. Done at New Y
Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15
1976. TIAS 8480.

Accession deposited: Republic of Korea,
Oct. 14, 1981.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of crimes against internationally pre
tected persons, including diplomatic agent
Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Enterei
to force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: Gabon, Oct. 14,
1981.

International convention against the takir
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 197
Accession deposited: Kenya, Dec. 8, 1981.

U.N. Charter

Charter of the U.N. and Statute of the In

national Court of Justice. Signed at San

Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into for

Oct. 24, 1945. TS 993.

Admitted to membership: Antigua and

Barbuda, Nov. 25, 1981.

U.N. Industrial Development Organizati

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develo
ment Organization with annexes. Adopted F
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.1
Ratifications deposited: Somalia, Nov. 20,
1981; Colombia, Nov. 25, 1981; Paraguay,
Dec. 2, 1981; United Arab Emirates, Dec.
1981; Mauritius, Dec. 9, 1981.
Signature: United Arab Emirates, Dec. 4,

1981.

Whaling

International whaling convention and

schedule of whaling regulations, with 195€

protocol. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 194(

Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS

1849.

Notification of adherence deposited: Keny;

Dec. 2, 1981.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of tb
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144)
Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Enter
into force July 1, 1981; provisionally for th
U.S. July 1,1981.
Ratification deposited: Spain, Dec. 7, 1981

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into fop
Sept. 3, 1981.3
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, Oct. 5,

1981.

82

Department of State Bulle

TREATIES

rid Health Organization

endments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
istitution of the World Health Organiza-
L Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976.1
eptance deposited: Mongolia, Nov. 10,
1.

.ATERAL

;entina

ivention for the avoidance of double taxa-
. and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
)ect to taxes on income and capital, with
ted protocol. Signed at Buenos Aires
il, 1981.1
ate advice and consent to ratification:

. 16, 1981 (with reservations and
erstanding).

igladesh

ivention for the avoidance of double taxa-
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
)ect to taxes on income, with exchange of
3S. Signed at Dacca Oct. 6, 1980.1
;rument of ratification signed by the
sident: Dec. 4, 1981 (with under-
ldings).

zil

ord of discussions concerning salted cattle
:s and manufactured leather products,
led at Rio de Janeiro Nov. 6, 1981.
ers into force subject to exchange of let-
; advising formal approval of the respec-
governments.

lada

tal convention, with detailed regulations,
ned at Ottawa and Washington Sept. 10
14, 1981.
ered into force: January 1, 1982.

ter of agreement concerning narrative
>rd telecommunication interface ar-
guments, with appendices. Signed at Ot-
a and Washington Sept. 15 and Oct. 22,
1. Entered into force Oct. 22, 1981.

tocol on cooperation in nuclear safety
;ters. Signed at Washington Oct. 17, 1981.
;ered into force Oct. 17, 1981.

■eement relating to relief from double in-
ie tax on shipping profits. Effected by ex-
nge of letters at Beijing Nov. 18, 1981.
;ered into force Nov. 18, 1981; effective
. 1, 1981.

ombia

■eement relating to the reestablishment,
ration, and maintenance of the rawin-
de observation stations at Bogota and on
i Andres Island, with memorandum of ar-
gement. Effected by exchange of letters
Bogota Apr. 28 and Sept. 8, 1981. Entered
> force Sept. 8, 1981.

tradition treaty, with annex. Signed at

shington, Sept. 14, 1979.1

tate advice and consent to ratification:

:. 2, 1981.

Mutual legal assistance treaty, with exchange

of notes. Signed at Washington Aug. 20,

1980.1

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Dec. 2, 1981.

Czechoslovakia

Agreement amending and extending the air
transport agreement of Feb. 28, 1969, as
amended and extended (TIAS 6644, 7356,
7881, 8869, 9935). Effected by exchange of
notes at Prague Sept. 11 and 30, 1981.
Entered into force Sept. 30, 1981; effective
Jan. 1, 1981.

Egypt

Project grant agreement relating to Cairo
water supply, with annex. Signed at Cairo
Sept. 22, 1981. Entered into force Sept. 22,
1981.

Federal Republic of Germany

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion with respect to taxes on estates, in-
heritances, and gifts. Signed at Bonn Dec. 3,
1980.1

Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Dec. 3, 1981 (with an under-
standing).

Agreement concerning the support of
U.S.AFE A-10 aircraft at Forward
Operating Locations (FOLS) in the territory
of the F.R.G., with related letter. Signed at
Bonn and Ramstein Nov. 5 and 9, 1981.
Entered into force Nov. 9, 1981; effective
Oct. 1, 1979.

Memorandum of understanding on the project
of active magnetospheric particle tracer ex-
plorers. Signed at Washington Oct. 15, 1981.
Entered into force Oct. 15, 1981.

Guatemala

Cooperative agreement to assist the Govern-
ment of Guatemala in execution of an eradi-
cation program of the Mediterranean fruit fly
(MEDFLY). Signed at Guatemala Oct. 22,
1981. Entered into force Oct. 22, 1981.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 19, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8726), on
procedures for mutual assistance in connec-
tion with matters relating to the Boeing
Company, to include investigation of alleged
illicit acts of Goodyear India Ltd. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington, Nov. 18
and Dec. 10, 1981. Entered into force Dec.
10, 1981.

International Cotton Advisory Committee

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S.
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Washington Mar. 28 and
May 1, 1974. Entered into force May 1, 1974.
TIAS 8077.
Terminated: Jan. 1, 1982.

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S.
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington Nov. 17 and
19, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982.

Israel

Memorandum of understanding on strategic
cooperation. Signed at Washington Nov. 30,
1981. Enters into force upon exchange of
notification that required procedures have
been completed by each party.

Jamaica

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with exchange of
notes. Signed at Kingston, May 21, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 29, 1981.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 16, 1981 (with reservation and
understanding).

Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Dec. 22, 1981 (with reservation
and understanding).

Exchange of ratifications: Dec. 29, 1981.
Entered into force: Dec. 29, 1981.

Protocol amending the convention for the
avoidance of double taxation and the preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income, signed at Kingston on May 21, 1980,
with exchange of notes. Signed at Kingston
July 17, 1981. Entered into force Dec. 29,
1981.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 16, 1981.

Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Dec. 22, 1981.
Exchange of ratifications: Dec. 29, 1981.
Entered into force: Dec. 29, 1981.

Jordan

Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Effected by exchange of
notes at Amman Mar. 10 and May 7, 1981.
Entered into force May 7, 1981.

Korea

Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8456) relating to scien-
tific and technical cooperation. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 3 and
6, 1981. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1981.

Malta

Agreement with respect to taxes on income,
with related exchange of notes. Signed at
Valletta Mar. 21, 1980.1
Instrument of ratification signed by
the President: Dec. 3, 1981 (with an amend-
ment and an understanding).

Mexico

Cooperative agreement relating to construc-
tion of a laboratory to assist the Government
of Mexico in combating the Mediterranean
fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed at Washington
and Mexico Aug. 17, 1978. Entered into force
Aug. 17, 1978. TIAS 10010.
Terminated: Oct. 22, 1981.

Agreement amending the cooperative agree-
ment of Aug. 17, 1978 (TIAS 10010). Signed

iruary 1982

83

TREATIES

CHRONOLOGY

at Washington and Mexico Nov. 12, 1980.

Entered into force Nov. 12, 1980. TIAS

10010.

Terminated: Oct. 22, 1981.

Cooperative agreement relating to provision
of services to assist in eradication of the
Mediterranean fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed
at Guatemala Oct. 22, 1981. Entered into
force Oct. 22, 1981.

Minute 266 of the International Boundary
and Water Commission extending the effect
of Minute 263 (TIAS 9896) relating to
emergency deliveries of Colorado River
waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at Ciudad
Juarez Aug. 3, 1981. Entered into force
Nov. 13, 1981.

Agreement amending the agreement of June
2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to additional
cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Dec. 4, 1981. Entered into
force Dec. 4, 1981.

Morocco

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with related
notes. Signed at Rabat Aug. 1, 1977. Entered
into force Dec. 30, 1981.
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Dec. 4, 1981 (with a reservation
and an understanding).
Exchange of ratifications: Dec. 30, 1981.
Entered into force: Dec. 30, 1981.

Netherlands

Extradition treaty. Signed at The Hague
June 24, 1980.1

Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 2, 1981.

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters, with exchange of notes. Signed at The
Hague June 12, 1981. '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 2, 1981.

New Zealand

Agreement relating to the employment of
dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of notes at Wellington
Nov. 16 and 23, 1981. Entered into force
Nov. 23, 1981.

Norway

Protocol amending the convention for the
avoidance of double taxation and the preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income and property, signed at Oslo on
Dec. 3, 1971 (TIAS 7474). Signed at Oslo
Sept. 19, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by
the President: Dec. 3, 1981 (with an under-
standing).

Exchange of ratifications: Dec. 15, 1981.
Entered into force: Dec. 15, 1981.

Agreement relating to the employment of
dependents of official government employees.
Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo
Apr. 15 and July 21, 1981. Entered into force
July 21, 1981.

Oman

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange
of notes at Muscat Apr. 4 and May 14, 1981.
Entered into force May 14, 1981.

Pakistan

Implementing agreement regarding the con-
solidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owed to the Agency for International
Development. Signed at Islamabad Aug. 18,
1981.
Entered into force: Sept. 7, 1981.

Philippines

Extradition treaty, with appendix. Signed at
Washington Nov. 27, 1981. Enters into force
30 days after the exchange of instruments of
ratification.

Convention with respect to taxes on income.

Signed at Manila Oct. 1, 1976.1

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Dec. 16, 1981 (with understanding and reser-
vations).

Spain

Agreement extending the treaty of friendship
and cooperation of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS
8360). Effected by exchange of notes at
Madrid Sept. 4, 1981. '
Ratified by the President: Dec. 3, 1981.

Switzerland

Agreement relating to the agreement of
Oct. 17, 1980 (TIAS 10056), establishing
rights, privileges, and immunities of the
delegation to the negotiations concerning
theater nuclear forces. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bern Nov. 11 and 20, 1981.
Entered into force Nov. 20, 1981.

Thailand

Agreement between the U.S. and Thailand
amending the agreement of October 4, 1978,
as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462, 9643, 9717,
9937), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and textile products.
Effected by exchange of letters at Bangkok
Oct. 26 and Nov. 4, 1981. Entered into force
Nov. 4, 1981.

Togo

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government through
the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., with an-
nexes and agreed minute. Signed at Lome
Sept. 18, 1981. Entered into force Dec. 7,
1981.

United Kingdom

Reciprocal fisheries agreement, with agree
minute. Signed at London Mar. 27, 1979. '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Dec. 16, 1^81.

Agreement to facilitate the interdiction by
the U.S. of vessels of the U.K. suspected o
being engaged in trafficking in drugs. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at London
Nov. 13, 1981. Entered into force Nov. 13,
1981.

World Tourism Organization

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex
change of letters at Madrid Feb. 24 and 2E
1977. Entered into force Feb. 25, 1977; ef:
tive Jan. 1, 1977. TIAS 8565.
Terminated: Jan. 1, 1982.

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex
change of notes at Madrid Sept. 23 and
Oct. 27, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1982.

'Not in force.

2With reservation.

3Not in force for the U.S.

4For the Kingdom in Europe.

5With understandini

6With declaration.

igs.

December 1981

December 1

On July 20, 1981, in Ottawa, Heads of Stai
and Governments of the seven economic st
mit countries declared that unless the Babi
Karmal Regime took steps to comply with
Afghanistan's international obligations by
traditing or persecuting, under the Hague
convention, the hijackers of the PIA aircra
they propose that all flights to and from
Afghanistan be suspended in implementati<
of the Bonn Declaration. Because there wa
no reply from Afghan authorities, France,
the F.R.G., and the U.K., the only countrie
among the seven to whose territories Ariar
Afghan Airlines fly, agree with members o
the seven to denounce their air services
agreements with Afghanistan.

December 2

Secretary Haig heads U.S. delegation to tb
11th regular session of the General Assemt
meeting of the Organization of American
States held at Castries, St. Lucia, Dec. 2-1
During the meeting the General Assembly
passes a resolution (Dec. 10) on El Salvadoi
endorsing the democratic electoral process
that country and a resolution on human
rights on the same day.

Deputy Secretary Clark makes an offici
visit to London (Dec. 2) and to Dublin (Dec.

84

CHRONOLOGY

r consultations with heads of Govern-
, and to Bonn (Dec. 6-7) for consulta-
as well as to address the Congress of
European Democratic Union.

ember 3

and Israel issue a joint statement
ltaneously in Washington and in Israel
d at bringing European troops— U.K.,
, France, and the Netherlands— into the
ekeeping force (Multinational Force and
rvers— MFO) that will patrol the Sinai
■ Israel's April withdrawal.
)n behalf of President Reagan, Secretary
; transmits the 11th semiannual report on
ementation of the Helsinki Final Act for
period of June 1 through November 30,

, to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Con-
sional Commission on Security and
seration in Europe (CSCE).

jmber 7

;ralian Deputy Prime Minister J. Douglas
lony visits Washington, D.C. Dec. 7-9
■onsultations with senior Administration
ials on international economic and trade
cers.

President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus
es a working visit to Washington, D.C.
7-8 for discussions with President
jan and Secretary Haig, and meetings
'members of the House and Senate
iign Relations Committees.

ember 8

following newly appointed Ambassadors
ented their credentials to President
jan: Hubert Ordias-Souna of Gabon,
aoko Marc Garango of Upper Volta,
ib Ben Yahia of Tunisia, Tadhg F.
illivan of Ireland, Allan Ezra Gotlieb of
ada, and Hudson Kemul Tannis of St.
:ent and the Grenadines.
Secretary Haig departs Washington to at-
1 the semiannual meeting of the North
.ntic Council and to make a 6-nation trip
le Near East and South Asia to include
countries of Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, In-
Egypt, and Morocco.

ember 10

oehalf of President Reagan, Deputy
retary Clark asks all Americans in Libya
?ave immediately and invalidated
erican passports to that country because
>ya has broadened and accelerated its ef-
s to undermine neighboring states and to
k against U.S. interests."
The North Atlantic Council ministerial
rting is held in Brussels Dec. 10-11. A
it communique is issued Dec. 11 expres-
l that the Alliance is committed to "safe-
rding the peace" and is working to
iblish through "constructive dialogue" a
mate of confidence and mutual restraint in
jt-West relations" in order to achieve
tente and progress in arms control and
irmament." The communique goes on to
te that "in light of the Soviet Union's con-
aed military build-up and as long as a -.olid
ndation of trust has not beer established,"
Ministers "have no choice . to dissuade
potential aggrf - by nv ' J it clear

that they have the strength and the will to
resist."

In a declaration on INF modernization,
also issued on Dec. 11, the Ministers express
support of the U.S. negotiating approach and
express "conviction that a positive outcome of
these negotiations would contribute to
greater East-West stability and progress in
other East-West arms control negotiations."
A joint declaration on terrorism issued con-
demns such acts as a "flagrant violation of
human dignity and rights."

December 1 1

U.N. Security Council announces it is recom-
mending to the General Assembly that Javier
Perez de Cuellar of Peru be chosen as 5th
Secretary General of the U.N. He will suc-
ceed Kurt Waldheim of Austria.

Argentine President Roberto Eduardo
Viola is ousted by that country's ruling junta.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) cuts oil prices by between
$.20-$.70 a barrel and rejects Libya's request
to impose sanctions against U.S. oil firms
that withdrew from that country.

December 13

Poland's Prime Minister and Communist Par-
ty leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, declares
a state of martial law and military rule in
that country.

December 14

Reagan Administration announces suspension
of pending aid to Poland including $100
million worth of feed and food grains in reac-
tion to the military crackdown on the free
trade union movement.

Israeli Parliament passes legislation ex-
tending its law, jurisdiction, and administra-
tion to the occupied region of the Golan
Heights. Reagan Administration states that
the action is a violation of the Camp David
peace accords.

After a hunger strike by Soviet human
rights activist Andrei Sakharov and his wife,
Liza Alekseyeva is issued a passport to
emigrate to the U.S. to join her husband.

Secretary Haig cancels a 6-nation trip to
the Near East and South Asia and returns to
Washington from Brussels because of U.S.
concern over the situation in Poland.

December 15

By unanimous vote (15-0) the U.N. Security
Council extends the mandate of the U.N.
peacekeeping forces in Cyprus for another 6
months.

December 17

By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil adopts a resolution opposing the Israeli
Government's decision to extend its laws,
jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan
Heights.

By a vote of 121 to 2 (U.S. and Israel)
with 20 abstentions, the U.N. General
Assembly declares that the Israeli move ex-
tending its laws, jurisdiction, and administra-
tion to the Golan Heights is "null and void
and has no legal validity whatsoever."

Gambia and Senegal sign a treaty of
unification establishing a Senegambia con-
federation. Senegalese officials state that the
treaty will be debated by Parliaments of both
nations prior to ratification.

December 18

President Reagan orders indefinite suspen-
sion of discussions intended to implement a
memorandum of understanding with Israel on
military strategic cooperation that was in-
tended to counter Soviet threats to the Mid-
dle East because Israel failed to notify the
U.S. of its actions on the Golan Heights and
failed to consider U.S. concerns. In addition,
he postpones further discussions on some
Israeli proposals for promoting Department
of Defense purchases of defense related
goods and services in Israel, authorization of
foreign military sales (FMS) funds to be used
by Israel to purchase Israeli-produced goods
and services, and on the possible use of FMS
by third countries to purchase Israeli defense
items and services.

December 20

Poland's Ambassador to Washington,
Romuald Spasowski, asks for and is granted
political asylum in the U.S.

Arriving at Boston's Logan International
Airport, Liza Alekseyeva is reunited with her
husband Alexi Semyonov.

December 23

President Reagan announces economic sanc-
tions against the Polish Government which
will include:

• Suspension of all U.S. Government-
sponsored agricultural and dairy shipments to
the Polish Government;

• Stopping renewal of Poland's export
credit with the U.S. Export-Import Bank;

• Suspension of Polish civil aviation
privileges;

• Suspension of Polish fishing rights in
U.S. waters; and

• Proposing to U.S. allies further restric-
tion of high-technology exports to Poland.

Polish Ambassador to Japan, Dr.
Zdzislaw Rurarz, and his family requests and
is granted political asylum in the U.S.

December 29

President Reagan announces a series of
measures to be taken against the Soviet
Union for its "heavy and direct responsibility
for the repression in Poland" which are as
follows:

• Suspension of export licenses for elec-
tronic equipment and computers;

• Suspension of all Aerojlot service to
the U.S.;

• Closing of Soviet purchasing commis-
sion;

• Postponement of negotiations on a new
long-term grains agreement;

• Suspension of negotiations on a new
U.S. -Soviet maritime agreement;

• Suspension of issuance of licenses for
oil and gas equipment exports; and

85

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

• Complete review of all U.S.-Soviet ex-
change agreements and halt of renewal of ex-
change agreements on energy and science
and technology.

President Reagan signs into law legisla-
tion authorizing U.S. participation in the
Sinai peacekeeping forces — Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) — participation
resolution.

December 31

Former military leader of Ghana, Flight Lt.
Jerry Rawlings, overthrows the civilian
government of President Hilla Limann. ■

Department off State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.

•406

Date

12/1

407 12/2

*408

12/1

409

12/4

*410

12/4

*411

12/4

*412

12/4

»413 12/4

•414 12/7

*415
*416

12/7
12/7

*417 12/8

*418

12/4

*419

12/9

*420

12/9

*421 12/14

422 12/14

Subject

Haig: address at Freedom
Foundation, Valley Forge,
Pa., Nov. 28.

Haig: statement on opening
of INF negotiations,
Nov. 30.

Haig: interview by corre-
spondents for German
television (Berlin), Nov. 30.

Haig: address before the
OAS General Assembly,
St. Lucia.

U.S., People's Republic of
China amend textile visa
system, Oct. 20 and 21.

U.S., Thailand amend bi-
lateral textile agreement.

U.S., Thailand amend textile
agreement, Oct. 26 and
Nov. 4.

U.S., Poland civil aviation
agreement extended,
Mar. 31, 1983.

U.S., Korea amend textile
agreement, Nov. 25 and
27.

U.S., Brazil amend bilateral
cotton agreement.

U.S., Pakistan amend textile
agreement, Oct. 28 and
Nov. 3.

Haig: briefing on board
Air Force jet to St. Lucia,
Dec. 3.

Haig: press briefing, St.
Lucia, Dec. 2.

Haig: arrival remarks,
Brussels.

Peter A. Sutherland, Am-
bassador to Bahrain (bio-
graphic data).

Edwin Gharst Corr, Am-
bassador to Bolivia (bio-
graphic data).

Haig: statement and
question-and-answer
session on Polish situation,
Brussels, Dec. 13.

*423 12/15 Haig: remarks upon arrival
from Brussels, Dec. 14.

*424 12/16 Fernando E. Rondon, Am-
bassador to the Democratic
Republic of Madagascar
(biographic data).

*425 12/15 Francis Terry McNamara

sworn in as Ambassador to
Gabon and Sao Tome and
Principe (biographic data).
426 12/20 Haig: interview on "Face
the Nation."

*427 12/22 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Sub-
committee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on radio-
communication, Jan. 7.

*428 12/22 Advisory Committee on

International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Jan. 12.

*429 12/22 Advisory Committee on

International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Jan. 12.

*430 12/22 International Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), study group 5,
Jan. 12.

*431 12/22 CCIR, study group 6,
Jan. 12.

*432 12/30 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph
and Telephone Consult-
ative Committee (CCITT),
study group A, Jan. 14.

*433 12/18 Kenneth Lee Brown sworn
in as Ambassador to the
People's Republic of the
Congo (biographic data).

*434 12/30 Frank V. Ortiz sworn in as
Ambassador to Peru
(biographic data).

*435 12/30 Charles H. Price II, Am-
bassador to Belgium (bio-
graphic data).

*436 12/30 Thomas Aranda, Jr., sworn in
as Ambassador to Uruguay
(biographic data).

*437 12/30 CCITT, study groups A & B,
Jan. 14.

*438 12/30 Advisory Committee on

Oceans and International
Environment and Scientif-
ic Affairs, Jan. 7.

*439 12/30 Advisory Committee to the
U.S. National Section of
the International Commis-
sion for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas, Jan. 19.

*440 12/31 Milan D. Bish sworn in as
Ambassador to Barbados
(biographic data).

*441 12/31 Gerald E. Thomas sworn in
as Ambassador to Guyana
(biographic data).

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart
ment of State publications are available fr<
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C, 20520.

President Reagan

Situation in Poland, Washington, D.C, De
23, 1981 (Current Policy #357).

Secretary Haig

Interview on "Face the Nation," Washingt'
D.C, Dec. 20, 1981 (Current Policy #35£

East Asia

Background Notes on South Korea, Nov.
1981.

Europe

Background Notes on the German
Democratic Republic, Nov. 1981.

General

The Human Factor in Shaping Foreign Po
cy, Deputy Secretary Clark, 33d Annual
Student Conference on U.S. Affairs, We
Point, Nov. 18, 1981 (Current Policy #35

Narcotics

International Narcotics Control, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Linnemann, Perman
Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, No
13, 1981 (Current Policy #345).

Oceans

Nuclear Cooperation and Nonproliferation
Strategy, Assistant Secretary Malone, su
mitted to Atomic Industrial Forum, San
Francisco, Dec. 1, 1981 (Current Policy
#354).

South Asia

Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation, Eliza
Van Hollen, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Dec. 1981 (Special Report #91)

United Nations

Double Standards in Human Rights, Amba;
sador Kirkpatrick, Third Committee, U.N
General Assembly, New York, Nov. 24,
1981 (Current Policy #353).

Western Hemisphere

Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in
Latin America, research paper presented
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere A
fairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committe
Dec. 14, 1981 (Special Report #90).

Strategic Situation in Central America and
the Caribbean, Assistant Secretary Endei
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere A
fairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committe
Dec. 14, 1981 (Current Policy #352).

Background Notes on Dominica, Nov. 1981.

86

Department of State Bullet

NDEX

:ebruary 1982
(o\. 82, No. 2059

frica. The African Private Sector and U.S.

Foreign Policy (Crocker) 27

rms Control

he Alliance at a Crossroad (Burt) 42

he U necessary War (Rostow) 32

sia. International Narcotics Control Strategy

(Linnemann) 46

hina. No Sale of Advanced Aircraft to

Taiwan (Department statement) 39

ongress

uto Parts Industry (Hormats) 40

onsular Services to U.S. Citizens (Asencio) 37
uba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin

America 68

ifth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 45

iternal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the

Congress) 31

AEA Safeguards System (Kennedy) 56

nternational Narcotics Control Strategy

(Linnemann) 46

trategic Situation in Central America and the

Caribbean (Enders) 80

S. Interests in the Pacific Island Region

(Holdridge) 59

onsular Affairs. Consular Services to U.S.

Citizens (Asencio) 37

uba

uba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin

America 68

Jouble Standards in Human Rights (Kirk-
patrick) 65

trategic Situation in Central America and the

Caribbean (Enders) 80

yprus. Fifth Report on Cyprus (message to

the Congress) 45

conomics

he African Private Sector and U.S. Foreign

Policy (Crocker) 27

uto Parts Industry (Hormats) 40

urope

he Alliance at a Crossroad (Burt) 42

he Unnecessary War (Rostow) 32

ermany

ecretary's News Conference on Chancellor

Schmidt's Visit 13

isit of West German Chancellor Schmidt

(joint statement) 12

luman Rights

3ill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and

Week, 1981 (proclamation) 46

)ouble Standards in Human Rights (Kirk-

patrick) 65

mmigration. Population Growth, Refugees,

and Immigration (Benedick) 63

lapan. Auto Parts Industry (Hormats) ... .40

Latin America and the Caribbean

Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin
America 68

International Narcotics Control Strategy
(Linnemann) 46

Strategic Situation in Central America and the
Caribbean (Enders) 80

Middle East

International Narcotics Control Strategy
(Linnemann) 46

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 24

Narcotics

Anglo-American Cooperation Against Drug
Trafficking 49

International Narcotics Control Strategy
(Linnemann) 46

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Alliance at a Crossroad (Burt) 42

NATO Council Meets on Poland (Haig, declar-
ation) 19

Nuclear Policy

IAEA Safeguards System (Kennedy) 56

Nuclear Cooperation and Nonproliferation
Strategy (Malone) 52

Pacific. U.S. Interests in the Pacific Island
Region (Holdridge) 59

Poland

NATO Council Meets on Poland (Haig, declar-
ation) 19

President's Address on Poland 1

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 24

Secretary's News Conference on Chancellor
Schmidt's Visit 13

Situation in Poland (Department state-
ments) 4

Solidarity Day With Poland (proclama-
tion) 17

U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet
Union (Reagan) 8

Visit of West German Chancellor Schmidt
(joint statement) 12

Population. Population Growth, Refugees,
and Immigration (Benedick) 63

Presidential Documents

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and
Week, 1981 (proclamation) 46

Fifth Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 45

Internal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the
Congress) 31

President's Address on Poland 1

Solidarity Day With Poland (proclamation) . 17

U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union
(Reagan) 8

Publications. Department of State 86

Refugees. Population Growth, Refugees, and
Immigration (Benedick) 63

Terrorism. Secretary Interviewed on "Face
the Nation" . . . . ' 24

Treaties

Anglo-American Cooperation Against Drug
Trafficking 49

Current Actions 82

IAEA Safeguards System (Kennedy) 56

U.S.S.R.

The Alliance at a Crossroad (Burt) 42

NATO Council Meets on Poland (Haig, decla-
ration) 19

President's Address on Poland 1

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 24

Secretary's News Conference on Chancellor
Schmidt's Visit 13

U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union
(Reagan) 8

The Unnecessary War (Rostow) 32

United Kingdom. Anglo-American Coopera-
tion Against Drug Trafficking 49

United Nations. Double Standards in Human
Rights (Kirkpatrick) 65

Zaire. Visit of Zaire President Mobutu (White
House statement) 29

Zimbabwe. Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(letter to the Congress) 31

Name Index

Asencio, Diego C 37

Benedick, Richard Elliot 63

Burt, Richard R 42

Crocker, Chester A 27

Enders, Thomas 0 80

Haig, Secretary 13,19,24

Holdridge, John H 59

Hormats, Robert D 40

Kennedy. Richard T 56

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 65

Linnemann, Joseph H 46

Malone, James L 52

Reagan, President 1,8,17,31,45,46

Rostow, Eugene V 32

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

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Department

B •■

v of state -g-^w j (|

bulletin

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2060

March 1982

' **^

AjL^diil <*<W*»r$a>

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2060 / March 1982

The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Secretary of State

DEAN FISCHER

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

MARTIN JUDGE

Chief. Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
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CONTENTS

lU^'Uil ^^UwKtdi;

FEATURE

1 The United States and Afghanistan (Louis J. Smith)

13 Background on Afghanistan

17 Situation in Afghanistan (President Reagan)

1 8 Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation (Eliza Van Holleri)

The President

26 News Conference of January 19

(Excerpts)

The Secretary

27 Current International Develop-

ments

28 Visits to Europe and the Middle

East

29 Interview for U.S. News & World

Report
32 Poland Has Not Perished

Africa

34 Angola (Department Statements)

Economics

35

41

43

U.S. -European Economic Rela-
tions (Robert D. Hormats)

Development Bank Lending to
Guatemala (Ernest B. Johnston)

Agricultural Trade With the
European Community (Robert
D. Hormats)

Europe

46 U.S. and Europe: Partnership for
Peace and Freedom (Lawrence
S. Eagleburger)

49 Poland: Financial and Economic
Situation (Background Paper)

52 Situation in Poland (Department

Statements)

Immigration

53 Change Proposed in Immigrant

Numbers (Diego C. Asencio)

Oceans

54 U.S. Policy and the Law of the

Sea (President Reagan)

Pacific

55 Republic of Nauru

United Nations

58 Worldwide Response to the Inter-
national Year of the Disabled
Persons (Alan A. Reich)

Western Hemisphere

61 The Case for U.S. Assistance to

El Salvador (Thomas 0.
Enders)

62 Congressional Certification for El

Salvador (Department State-
ment)

64 Democracy and Security in the

Caribbean Basin (Thomas 0.
Enders)

65 Nicaraguan Travel Advisory (De-

partment Announcement)

Treaties

67 Current Actions

Chronology

70 January 1982

Press Releases

70 Department of State

71 U.S.U.N.

Publications

72 Department of State
72 GPO Sales

Index

APR

TI982

■ ■ ■''■:■ ■

Although Afghanistan is primarily an
agricultural country, only about 12% of the
land is considered suitable for farming.
Here, an Afghan farmer harvests grain.
The field was irrigated with the help of
U.S. assistance.

(Foreign Operations Administration photo)

FEATURE

Aii^'Uil <Jfgtm&ay

The United States

and

Afghanistan

i

:■..■-■

n 1979 the kidnapping and death of
U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in
February and the sudden invasion by
Soviet forces the following December
aroused the world's interest in
Afghanistan. Until then, most
Americans had, at best, a vague and
somewhat romantic perception of
Afghanistan as a wild and forbidding
land of mountains and deserts, of fierce
and colorful tribesmen controlling the
mountain passes through the Hindu
Kush. Few Americans had visited
Afghanistan and, to the extent that
there was a general perception of
Afghanistan in the United States, it was
shaped and colored by Rudyard Kipling's
tales of the Pathan tribesmen of the
Khyber Pass and the Northwest Fron-
tier and by James A. Michener's novel of
the nomadic caravans that wound
through the mountains and fabled cities
of Central Asia.

Until the Second World War, the of-
ficial U.S. view of Afghanistan was
similarly unsophisticated. For more than
two decades after the United Kingdom
recognized the independence of
Afghanistan in 1919, American officials
cautiously received Afghan overtures for
the establishment of full diplomatic rela-
tions. Diplomatic recognition was ex-
tended to Afghanistan in 1934, but the
first U.S. Legation was not opened in
Kabul until 1942. From the perspective
of Washington during the 1920s and
1930s, there seemed little common

ground for fruitful relations between
Afghanistan and the United States. To
American officials, Afghanistan ap-
peared remote, inaccessible, small, poor,
and alien to Western culture. There was
no tradition of past contacts to build
upon and no untapped lucrative market
to lure American commerce. Officials in
Washington were also concerned that
conditions in Afghanistan were so
primitive and dangerous that the safety
of American citizens and property could
not be guaranteed in the event of nor-
mal relations. Beyond that, Afghanistan
was seen as a traditional sphere of
British influence, and the British hinted
that they were not inclined to open that
sphere, despite British recognition of
Afghan independence in 1919.

The Second World War reempha-
sized the strategic significance of
Afghanistan as the gateway to South
Asia. With German forces pushing into
the Caucasus in 1942 and German
agents active in Afghanistan, the United
States moved to establish a legation in
Kabul. The United States emerged from
World War II with some firsthand
understanding of Afghanistan and with
international prestige and an inclination
to play a larger role in world affairs.

In 1948 the United States and
Afghanistan upgraded relations and ex-
changed ambassadors. The two countries
settled into a relationship which en-
dured, with some fluctuations, until

1978. Afghanistan became a steady reci-
pient of U.S. developmental aid, and a
limited commercial relationship
developed between the two countries.
One issue which periodically clouded
U.S.-Afghan relations was the troubled
relationship between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the latter an ally of the United
States. The United States attempted to
mediate the "Pushtunistan" problem that
divided Afghanistan and Pakistan, but
the problem proved intractable and
helped to push Afghanistan increasingly
into the sphere of influence of the Soviet
Union. Ultimately, the Soviet embrace
became suffocating, and a belated at-
tempt by President Mohammad Daoud
in 1978 to draw back led first to the
establishment of a Marxist regime in
Kabul and then, at the end of 1979, to a
full-scale Soviet invasion. U.S. policy, in
response to the Soviet invasion, re-
mained one of support for the traditional
efforts of the Afghan people to establish
and maintain their independence.

First
Contacts

X here were few recorded instances of
contacts between Americans and
Afghans before the 20th century.
Afghanistan was established as a coun-
try in 1747. During much of its ex-
istence, Afghanistan has had to struggle

Silhouette by Auguste Edouart of Josiah
Harlan, "late aid de camp to Dost
Mahomed, Ameer of Cabul." Harlan, an
adventurer who during the middle decades
of the 19th century served the East India
Company and a number of South Asian
Courts, was one of the few Americans
known to have been in Afghanistan during
that century.

(On loan to the National Portrait Gallery. Smithsonian In-
.n anonymous lender)

to maintain a separate identity.
Throughout most of the 19th century, it
precariously balanced expansionist
pressure from Russia in the north
against that of British India from the
south. By the end of the century, Britis
influence in Kabul was predominant, as
a result of two Anglo- Afghan wars.
With British encouragement, the
Kingdom of Afghanistan closed its
border to nearly all foreign influence.
The Muslim state was particularly
uninterested in feelers received from
American mission societies in the late
decades of the 19th century. The closes
the Protestant societies came to
penetrating the forbidden kingdom was
the stationing of a missionary near the
Afghan border in India. Although he
failed in his petition to the Government
of British India for permission to enter
Afghanistan, he succeeded in translatin
the Bible into Afghan dialects to be
smuggled into Afghanistan.

The first American with more than
passing contact with Afghanistan was
Josiah Harlan, a colorful adventurer
who had served the East India Compar
and a number of South Asian courts
during the middle decades of the 19th
century. Harlan, who as a young man
apparently had left the United States
under a legal cloud, came into contact
with Afghanistan in the 1830s while
in the service of Maharajah Ranjit
Singh, prince of the Punjab. Harlan's ir
trigues took him into Afghanistan
disguised as a dervish in an attempt to
start a revolution, and he later succeed
ed in bribing the brother of Amir Dost
Mohammed to prevent a war. He
ultimately came into the service of Dos
Mohammed and helped prepare the
Afghan infantry for victory over the
Sikhs in the battle of Jamrud in 1837.
He returned to Philadelphia in 1841 am
served in the Army of the Potomac dm
ing the American Civil War. Harlan's
service with the court of Dost
Mohammed represented a very visible
and prominent American contact with
Afghanistan, but it was an isolated, in-
dividual experience and an exception tc
the almost total lack of contact betweei
the United States and Afghanistan unt.
the 20th century.

C

FEATURE

yjLU^'iiil i>

]am$\a\)

"he Question
>f Recognition

i. he question of official contact be-
ween the United States and
fghanistan did not arise until the con-
lusion of the third of the Anglo-Afghan
'ars in 1919. In the treaty of Rawalpin-
i of August 1919, the United Kingdom
ecognized Afghanistan's independence,
ang Amanullah then set about the task
f securing recognition from and
stablishing diplomatic representation
nth the rest of the international com-
lunity. The Soviet Union extended
ecognition immediately in 1919. By
923 Iran, the United Kingdom, Turkey,
taly, and France had also established
all diplomatic relations with
lfghanistan. As a result of King
imanullah's tour of Europe in state in
927, Finland, Latvia, Liberia, Poland,
Switzerland, Egypt, and Japan joined
he list of countries recognizing
Afghanistan. The United States was
onspicuous in its cautious approach to
Drmal recognition of Afghanistan.

In 1921 King Amanullah had dis-
latched an Afghan mission headed by
ilohammed Wali Khan to Western
Europe and the United States to pro-
>ose formally the establishment of
liplomatic relations. On July 18, 1921,
Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes
vrote to President Harding that the
Vfghan mission had arrived in
Washington after having been received
n Paris by the French Government,
iughes noted that the British Govern-
nent had no objection to a similarly
■.ourteous reception in Washington but
:ontinued to view Afghanistan as part of
ts sphere of political influence.
Secretary Hughes met with the mission
)n July 21 and later reported to the
President that there was little commer-
cial incentive for closer relations with
Afghanistan. Harding received the mis-
sion on the same day, and Wali Khan
delivered a letter from King Amanullah
announcing his accession and expressing
lis wish for friendly relations between
Afghanistan and the United States. On
luly 29, President Harding responded by
letter to King Amanullah congratulating
him on his accession but noting that the

matter of diplomatic relations "must be
reserved for further consideration."
Although the Harding Administration
did not extend formal recognition to
Afghanistan, the view developed in
Washington that, in receiving the mis-
sion of Wali Khan and responding to
King Amanullah's letter, President
Harding had accorded informal recogni-
tion to the Afghan Government.

The Government of Afghanistan
quickly demonstrated that it still sought
formal recognition from the United
States. On August 21, 1921, the
American charge in Tehran, Cornelius
Van H. Engert (later to be the first resi-
dent American Minister accredited to
Afghanistan) reported that the Afghan
Legation in Iran had approached him to
encourage American interest in oil ex-
ploration in Afghanistan. Engert asked
for instructions, and the Department of
State responded that although formal
recognition had not been extended to
Afghanistan, the overture by the Afghan
mission had laid a firm enough basis for
Engert to proceed informally with his
contacts in the Afghan Legation. Engert
did so and received an invitation from
King Amanullah to visit Afghanistan.
From May to July 1922, Engert was a
guest of the government in Kabul. He
returned to Washington with another re-
quest from King Amanullah for the
United States "to take cognizance of the
independence of Afghanistan at an early
date and to enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with it." In a memorandum of
December 22, 1922, Engert passed on
that request along with observations
about the Afghan people and the
primitive living conditions in the country
which tended to confirm some of the
preconceptions held in Washington. He
noted the hospitality and cheerfulness of
the Afghan people but also emphasized
their primitive and warlike nature.
Engert's account reflected a strong
cultural bias and tended to describe con-
ditions in the mountainous tribal areas
rather than in the major cities such as
Kabul.

The United States remained reluc-
tant throughout the 1920s to establish
formal relations with the country
described in Engert's memorandum. The
channel for contact between the United

States and Afghanistan became the
American Embassy in Paris, through
which the Afghan Legation periodically
renewed the request for diplomatic rela-
tions. The United States, in turn, dealt
with Afghanistan through its Paris Em-
bassy to request support for the
Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 and to in-
form Afghanistan of joint efforts to
resolve the conflict in Manchuria in
1929. During the period, the first, ten-
tative commercial contacts began to
develop between the United States and
Afghanistan. In 1930-31 an American
firm sold 68 trucks to the Afghan
Government for $121,000.

In 1930 Wallace Smith Murray,
Chief of the Division of Near Eastern
Affairs in the Department of State,
wrote to Congressman A.J. Sabath of Il-
linois explaining that the United States
still felt unable to recognize
Afghanistan. He cited the lack of
capitulatory rights or other safeguards
for the protection of foreigners under
the local law. He added that
Afghanistan had long been an arena of
struggle between the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union for control of the
gateway to India, and he felt that while
that struggle continued "no foreign lives
in the country can be protected and no
foreign interests guaranteed."

Establishment
off Diplomatic
Relations

W hen Afghanistan renewed its re-
quest for recognition in 1934 in a
June 28 letter to President Roosevelt
from King Mohammed Zahir Shah, the
Roosevelt Administration was prepared
to reconsider the question. King Zahir's
letter announced his accession and ex-
pressed his desire to strengthen political
and economic relations with the United
States. William Phillips, Acting
Secretary of State, explained, in a letter
to President Roosevelt on August 21:

Our failure to recognize the Government
of Nahir Shah was due largely to the fact

March 1982

that this Government was never formally
notified of the abdication of Amanullah and
the accession of Nahir Shah; moreover, we
have been naturally conservative on the sub-
ject of establishing relations with
Afghanistan owing to the primitive conditions
of the country, the lack of capitulatory or
other guarantees for the safety of foreigners,
and the absence of any important American
interests.

Phillips added, however, that peace
and progress seemed to have been
established in Afghanistan, the young
king was popular, his two uncles pru-
dent, and recognition by the United
States was genuinely sought. "Since the
present regime appears to be a stable
one, I can see no reason why we should
withhold recognition." Roosevelt agreed,
and in an August 21 letter to King Zahir
he extended U.S. recognition:

I cordially reciprocate the sentiments
which you express, and, in extending recogni-
tion to Your Majesty's Government, take this
opportunity of assuring you of my hope that
friendly relations will always exist between
the United States and Afghanistan.

When U.S. Ambassador Jesse
Straus conveyed President Roosevelt's
letter concerning recognition to Shah
Wali in Paris, the Afghan Minister ex-
pressed the hope that these relations
might be established on a permanent
basis as soon as possible and that to that
end a treaty of friendship should be con-
cluded. The United States countered this
request with an offer of a less formal
treaty of friendship, like that which had
been signed with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in 1933. Such an agreement had
laid the basis for diplomatic and consular
representation but had not provided for
an exchange of representatives.
Afghanistan preferred full diplomatic
relations but was prepared to sign the
agreement proposed by the United
States except for a clause calling for
"most-favored-nation" treatment with
respect to commerce. Afghanistan had
not signed such an agreement with any
other nation and did not feel able to
establish a different precedent. Negotia-
tions followed, and Ambassador Straus
and Ali Mohammed Khan, Afghan
Minister in London, signed a treaty of
friendship in Paris on March 26, 1936,

that was limited largely to diplomatic
practice and protection of citizens.

Although this treaty did not involve
a formal exchange of diplomatic
representation, William H. Hornibrook,
U.S. Minister to Iran, was given a con-
current appointment as Minister to
Afghanistan. Hornibrook continued to
reside in Tehran. He resigned in March
1936 and was not replaced as Minister in
Tehran until Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., was
assigned responsibility for Afghanistan
as well as Iran in February 1940.

During the negotiations for the trea-
ty of friendship, Afghanistan sought to
interest the United States in establishing
a permanent legation in Afghanistan by
offering an exclusive concession to
develop potential oil resources.
The Afghan Foreign Minister told
Hornibrook during a visit to Kabul in
May 1935 that "for obvious reasons"
Afghanistan could not give the conces-
sion to either the United Kingdom or
the Soviet Union, but that those powers
would not favor giving it to the Germans
or the Japanese. Afghanistan, therefore,
looked to the United States for oil
development, and a year later granted
the Inland Oil Exploration Company a
75-year concession. The government
hoped that the concession would draw a
sizable number of Americans to
Afghanistan and lead to the establish-
ment of an American Legation in Kabul.
Inland Oil began exploration in 1937, but
in June 1938 the company cancelled the
concession, calling the project unfeasible
in light of the worsening international
situation.

World War II altered Afghanistan's
role in world affairs. German influence
increased throughout the 1930s as
technicians and capital moved into the
country to help develop the economy.
German intelligence activities in
Afghanistan grew apace, and by the out-
break of war in Europe in 1939 serious
concern had developed in London and
Moscow about German interests in
Afghanistan even though Afghanistan
maintained its neutrality. The United
States began to share this concern after

Charge d'Affaires Charles W. Thayer
opened the U.S. Legation in Afghanistan
June 1942.

the German invasion of the Soviet
Union. The Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor brought the United States into
the war in December 1941, and global
strategic considerations took on a new
importance in Washington. The Germar
drive into the Caucasus in 1942 threat-
ened Allied communications with the
Soviet Union and redoubled the strategi
significance of Afghanistan. It remainec
neutral, but its neutrality was condi-
tioned by traditional antipathy to major
Allied powers— the United Kingdom an<
the Soviet Union— as well as recent Get
man economic influence. The United
States found it timely and important to
act upon the longstanding invitation to
open a legation in Kabul.

Negotiations for the establishment
of a legation were quickly concluded in

FEATURE

• Jl^'(W <^b<wfcla»?

n February 1943, Abdul Hussein Aziz
lecame the first Afghan Minister to the
Jnited States.

L942, and Charles W. Thayer, who was
hen serving in the Soviet Union, was
lesignated Third Secretary of Legation
ind ordered to proceed to Kabul and
jpen the post. After an adventurous
overland trip from Iran, Thayer arrived
n Kabul at the end of May and received
i warm reception from the Afghan
Government. Thayer, who noted in his
iiary that he felt he was leaving civiliza-
tion when he left Iran, found
Afghanistan a pleasant surprise. The
country was beautiful, the people friend-
ly, and the government anxious to
establish good relations with the United
States. Thayer was received by the
Foreign Minister and opened the lega-
tion in Kabul on June 6, 1942. On June
11, he had an interview with Prime
Minister Muhammed Hashim, who

The U.S. Embassy residence in Kabul, a one-story structure on about 3 acres of land, has
housed all of the U.S. Ambassadors to Afghanistan. (State Department photo)

looked beyond the war to the possibility
of American assistance to help develop
Afghanistan. In July, Cornelius Engert,
who had been appointed Minister to
Afghanistan on May 2, joined Thayer in
Kabul and the legation was fully staffed.

In the United States, the diplomatic
representatives of Turkey handled the
interests of Afghanistan after 1930. On
July 9, 1942, Mohammed Omar Khan
was recognized as Honorary Consul of
Afghanistan at New York. In September
1942 the Afghan Government conveyed
to Minister Engert a desire to open a
legation in Washington. The Department
of State responded favorably, and
Afghanistan appointed Abdul Hussein
Aziz Minister to the United States in
February 1943. On June 4, 1943, Aziz
presented his credentials to President
Roosevelt.

In 1948 the process of establishing
diplomatic representation was completed
with the upgrading of the legations to
embassies. On June 5 Ely C. Palmer,
who had been in Kabul since 1945, was
appointed first U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan. Afghanistan, in turn, in-
dicated the importance it attached to
relations with the United States by ap-
pointing Mohammed Nairn Khan, first
cousin of the King, as Ambassador to
the United States.

On June 5, 1948, Ely E. Palmer was ap-
pointed the first U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan.

March 1982

Post-War
Relations

X he United States emerged from the
Second World War in a position to exert
considerable influence in South Asia.
The United Kingdom was at the point of
withdrawing from the subcontinent, and
the Soviet Union was busy rebuilding its
economy and consolidating its new em-
pire in Eastern Europe. Afghanistan
looked to the United States after the
war for development aid and technical
assistance to replace the technicians and
capital which Germany had begun to
provide before the war. The United
States, however, in assuming its new
global responsibilities, confronted enor-
mous demands upon American assist-
ance from the war-torn countries of
Western Europe and Asia. Until these
more pressing demands were met, little
could be spared for Afghanistan, which
had suffered no such wounds. The
United States did become, during and
after the war, the major market for
karakul skins, which, along with fresh
and dried fruit, constituted the leading
export items for Afghanistan. Before
karakul skins declined in fashion later in
the 1950s, Afghanistan had built up a
$20 million credit in the United States.

The

Helmand Valley

Project

X he most significant American con-
tribution to development in Afghanistan
during the years immediately following
the war began as a private venture. In
late 1945 negotiations opened between
the Afghan Government and Morrison-
Knudsen, an engineering firm based in
Boise, Idaho, for the construction of a
comprehensive system of canals, dams,
reservoirs, and power plants in the Hel-
mand River Valley of southern Afghani-
stan. The Helmand River is the longest
in Afghanistan, and the object of the
project was to control its flow, tap its
energy, and convert the lower Helmand
Valley into the granary it had been cen-
turies before. The negotiation between
Morrison-Knudsen and the Afghan

Government led to the establishment of
Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan Incor-
porated, with headquarters in San Fran-
cisco. Morrison-Knudsen engineers
surveyed the Helmand Valley and
estimated that the river could be tamed
and the desert brought into bloom with
the construction of two dams and an ex-
tensive canal system, at a total
estimated cost of $63.7 million. On this
optimistic assumption the project was
begun.

Once undertaken, the Helmand
Valley project proved difficult, costly,
and disappointing. Despite the good in-
tentions of all involved and the profes-
sional skill of the American engineers, in
the end the project seriously tarnished
the U.S. reputation for efficiency and
technical expertise. The project also
became, over the years, a nagging irri-
tant and an embarrassment in relations
between the United States and
Afghanistan.

The project was plagued from the
start by problems and dubious assump-
tions, including the idea that nomads in
the area could be induced to settle on
and farm the land reclaimed by irriga-
tion. Among the other problems were
local resistance to the construction of
dams and canals, inadequate preliminary
surveys, bureaucratic obstacles in Kabul,
and the fact that all equipment involved
in the project had to be shipped from
the United States. Despite the attempts
to cut expenses, costs mounted above
estimates, and the credit surplus ac-
cumulated through the sale of karakul
skins was used quickly.

Beginning of
U.S. Aid

X. he problems and costs engendered
by the Helmand Valley project caused
the Afghan Government to turn to the
U.S. Government for support. In re-
sponse to a request for more than $100
million for the completion of Helmand
Valley and other projects, the Export-
Import Bank approved a $21 million

President Truman with Prime Minister
Shah Mahmud during the latter's visit to
the United States in 1951. With them is
Charge d'Affaires Aziz.

loan in November 1949. In 1952 another
loan of $18.5 million was negotiated to
enable Morrison-Knudsen to complete
work on the project. In 1951 the Boghra
canal system was completed, and at the
request of the Afghan Government,
Morrison-Knudsen took over the
engineering obligations previously
assumed by the government. By April
1953 the 145-foot-high Arghandab Dam
and the 300-foot-high Kajaki Dam were
completed. Technical problems, however
limited the effectiveness of the project
which irrigated only 170,000 acres, most
of which were already being farmed.

The Helmand Valley project began
the involvement of the U.S. Government
in the development program in Afghani-
stan. On February 9, 1951, the United
States and Afghanistan signed their firs
Point IV technical assistance agreement
and in December 1952 Technical
Cooperation Administration advisers
began to arrive to work on the Helmand
Valley project. The technical cooperation
program agreement signed on June 30,
1953, became a model for similar
agreements renewed annually for the
next 24 years. Loans were extended to
Afghanistan in 1953 for the purchase of
American wheat, and, under the
guidance of the International Coopera-
tion Administration, the U.S. foreign aid
program in Afghanistan was broadened
to include education and transportation
projects as well as agricultural and
technical assistance. By 1955 the level oi
U.S. aid to Afghanistan was more than
double that of the next largest contribu-
tor, the Soviet Union. By that point,
however, the level of Soviet aid was in-
creasing rapidly, and a serious problem
had developed to color relations between
the United States and Afghanistan.

Department of State

FEATURE

yJL^'Lxil <-

}nv\s\a\)

The Pakistan Factor

X he establishment of the nation of
Pakistan in 1947 had a major impact
jpon relations between the United
States and Afghanistan. From the
imtset relations between Afghanistan
ind Pakistan were troubled. Pakistan in-
lerited, as its border with Afghanistan,
the frontier established in 1893 by Sir
Mortimer Durand on behalf of British
India. Afghanistan had accepted the
Durand line in 1893 under British
pressure, but Afghan Governments
thereafter had reserved an irredentist
:laim to the Pushtu-speaking Pathan
tribal areas which lay to the east of the
Durand line. The creation in 1947 of
what the Afghans viewed as the ar-
tificial state of Pakistan threw into
sharp relief the Afghan claims to the
Pathan tribal areas in Pakistan.
Afghanistan felt that the Pushtu-
speaking homelands should be united

The fabled Khyber Pass links Afghanistan with Pakistan and has been the subject of
numerous authors such as Rudyard Kipling and James Michener.

with the Afghan state, or, that at a
minimum, they should be granted inde-
pendence as the separate state of
"Pushtunistan."

The Government of Pakistan did not
look favorably upon the proposals for
territorial changes. The conditions in-
volved in the establishment of Pakistan
made such changes difficult, and the
Karachi government rejected pressure
from Afghanistan on an issue which it
felt had been settled in 1893. The
Government of Pakistan dealt with the
Pathan tribes living in the country as
the British had— granting them a good
deal of local autonomy and providing
subsidies. Afghanistan countered by
agitating through local tribal leaders,
such as the Fakir of Ipi, for the
establishment of a separate Pushtu
state.

The tenor of relations between Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan, as a result of

the Pushtunistan issue, was set in 1947
when Afghanistan cast the lone vote in
the United Nations against the admis-
sion of Pakistan. The two countries ex-
changed ambassadors in 1948 but con-
tinued a propaganda war on the
Pushtunistan issue. In 1950 the first
significant breach in relations occurred
when Pakistan closed its border to
"blockade" Afghanistan in response to
Afghan incursions across the Durand
line. The blockade represented a serious
threat to landlocked Afghanistan which
depended at that point upon transit
through Pakistan for its commerce.

The United States saw the
Pushtunistan dispute as potentially
disruptive to the stability of the area
and, without pronouncing on the merits
of the issue, attemped on several occa-
sions to mediate in the dispute. U.S. ef-
forts to mediate failed, as did mediation
efforts of Muslim states such as Egypt,
Turkey, and Iran.

March 1982

Prime Minister Daoud

X^ rime Minister Daoud, who shaped
Afghanistan's course for 15 of the past
30 years, came to power in 1953 as a
result of a bloodless palace revolt. A
cousin of King Zahir, Daoud came to of-
fice determined to reorient some of
Afghanistan's policies and to energize
others. He was concerned about the
sluggishness of the Helmand Valley pro;
ect, anxious to increase the pace of
social and economic reform in
Afghanistan, and determined to push
harder on the Pushtunistan issue. His
concern about the Helmand Valley proj-
ect led him to replace some of the
Afghan administrators responsible for
the project and to work with the
American Embassy to intensify the ef-
fort to improve the project. His desire
for economic reform and for the
modernization of Afghanistan's anti-
quated armed forces also led him to turn
to the United States for support.

The U.S. response to Daoud's re-
quests for support on the Pushtunistan
issue was to continue to advise him to
try to work the matter out amicably
with Pakistan. American officials sug-
gested that it probably would prove
easier to reach agreement if the two
countries were allied together in a
system of regional security. Vice Presi-
dent Nixon visited Afghanistan
December 4-6, 1953, and attempted to
persuade the Daoud government of the
wisdom of alliance with Pakistan and
Iran. He found, however, the Afghan
Government anxious to persuade the
United States that the Pushtunistan
dispute prevented Afghanistan from
agreement with Pakistan.

Collective

Security

in South Asia

tjy 1953 the Pushtunistan dispute
began to be overlaid by "cold war" pres-
sures upon the South Asia area. The
United States, guided by Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, pushed for the

development of a "northern tier" collec-
tive security bulwark against Soviet ex-
pansion into the area. In 1954 the
bulwark began to take shape as Turkey
and Pakistan signed a pact of mutual
defense. Afghanistan looked on with
concern as the United States and
Pakistan signed a mutual security agree-
ment in 1954 which provided for exten-
sive military aid to Pakistan. In 1955 the
Baghdad pact pulled together Iran,
Turkey, Pakistan, and, for a time, Iraq
in the system of regional security which
Dulles had worked to create. In Afghani-
stan Prime Minister Daoud, who had
declined to participate in the collective
security agreement, denounced the
Baghdad pact.

Afghanistan Turns
to the U.S.S.R.

./Afghanistan responded to the
U.S. -Pakistan mutual security agree-
ment in 1954 by requesting similar
military aid to develop Afghan armed
forces. Afghanistan looked upon the
modern weapons being provided to
Pakistan as a threat to India or
Afghanistan rather than the Soviet
Union. The United States, in turn, felt
that unless Afghanistan could turn away
from its traditional neutrality and join a
system of regional security, Washington
could not offend Pakistan and risk
regional stability by providing arms to
Afghanistan. Daoud turned, therefore,
to Moscow. In August 1956 Afghanistan
negotiated an agreement with the Soviet
Union for the provision of $25 million in
modern arms. In addition, the Soviet
Union agreed to assist in the construc-
tion or expansion of three military air-
fields in Afghanistan. With Soviet arms
came Soviet military advisers and
dependence upon the Soviet Union for
spare parts, new technology, and addi-
tional military aid. The 1956 arms agree-
ment began the longstanding Soviet in-
fluence over the Afghan military
establishment which has not been relin-
quished.

The Soviet Union's economic rela-
tionship with Afghanistan also expanded
during this time. In July 1950,
Afghanistan had negotiated a 4-year
barter-agreement with the Soviet Union

to offset the border closing by Pakistan.
By the terms of the agreement, the
Soviet Union agreed to export petro-
leum products, cotton cloth, sugar, and
other commodities to Afghanistan in
return for Afghan wool and raw cotton.
The Soviet Union also offered to con-
struct gasoline storage facilities and to
take over oil exploration in northern
Afghanistan from a Swedish company.
By 1952 Afghan-Soviet trade had dou-
bled, and the reopening of the Pakistan
border to normal commerce did not
reverse the pattern.

Riots in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
growing out of the Pushtunistan issue,
closed the border again for 5 months
during 1955. Afghanistan asked the
United States for assistance to build a
new transit route through Iran to a Per-
sian Gulf port to replace the vulnerable
connection through Pakistan. The
United States and Iran replied that con-
struction of such a route would be im-
practical and prohibitively expensive.
Daoud then asked the Soviet Union to
renew the 1950 transit agreement and
on June 21, 1955, a 5-year extension of
the agreement was signed. In December
1955 Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin
and Communist Party Secretary
Khrushchev stopped in Kabul as part of
a highly publicized tour of South Asia.
They publicly endorsed Afghanistan's
position on Pushtunistan, and the Soviet
Union agreed to grant a $100 million,
long-term development loan to
Afghanistan to be used for jointly
agreed projects. At the same time,
Prime Minister Daoud announced a
10-year extension of the 1931 Soviet-
Afghan treaty of neutrality and nonag-
gression.

By 1956 Daoud was fully embarked
upon his "big gamble," which involved
accelerating Afghan development by ac-
cepting a heavy infusion of Soviet aid,
while encouraging enough aid from the
West to maintain a semblance of
neutrality. The Soviet Union, at the
same time, launched in Afghanistan the
largest Soviet aid program outside of
Eastern Europe on the presumption that
such aid would establish a predominant

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

ALU^'LiLl ^A&awshax)

The Daoud
and Eisenhower
Visits

R

ecretary of State John Foster Dulles and
ice President Richard M. Nixon greet
rime Minister Mohammad Daoud as he ar-
ives in Washington in 1958 for a 12-day
jur of the country. At the conclusion of
laoud's visit, the United States endorsed
tie Afghan "traditional policy of neutrality
nd independence."

'rime Minister Daoud and Secretary Dulles
ign a cultural agreement.

soviet influence in Kabul. The United
states, which saw a relative decline in
\merican influence in Kabul during the
L950s, recognized that Afghanistan
would not abandon its traditional
leutrality. U.S. officials hoped, by main-
lining a credible aid program in
Afghanistan, to prevent Daoud from
slipping too deep into the Soviet em-

ulations between the United States
and Afghanistan during the last years of
the Eisenhower Administration and dur-
ing the Kennedy Administration were
highlighted by efforts to present the
United States as a credible balance to
the mounting weight of Soviet involve-
ment and influence in Afghanistan. This
involved an exchange of official visits
and an effort to upgrade and improve
the U.S. aid program. Afghanistan
benefited from increased aid from the
United States as well as the Soviet
Union, and Prime Minister Daoud and
the Afghan Government were eager to
see the United States establish a more
visible, supportive role.

The exchange of official visits began
with the arrival of Prime Minister
Daoud on June 24, 1958. Daoud re-
mained in Washington until June 27,
after which he began a 12-day coast-to-
coast tour of the country. In the joint
statement issued in Washington at the
conclusion of Daoud's visit, the United
States endorsed the Afghan "traditional
policy of neutrality and independence."

Official Afghan Visits
to the United States

Prime Minister Shah Mahmud paid two
unofficial visits to the United States on
August 7-9, 1947, and April 20-26,
1951.

Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud
paid an official visit, June 24-27, 1958.
He signed a cultural agreement with the
United States on June 26 and addressed
both Houses of Congress on June 25.

King Mohammed Zahir Shah and
Queen Homaira paid a state visit,
September 4-16, 1963. They were in
Washington between September 5-7.

Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim
Maiwandwal paid an official visit, March
25 through April 9, 1967. He met with
President Lyndon B. Johnson and other
U.S. officials in Washington, March
28-30. ■

During his "Peace and Friendship in
Freedom" tour, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower arrives in Afghanistan for a
6-hour visit December 9, 1959. The Presi-
dent and his daughter-in-law Barbara are
welcomed by King Mohammed Zahir (right).

( K- >> al Afghan News .Service photo; Eisenhower Library)

Daoud was assured of the continuing
readiness of the United States to -be of
assistance to Afghanistan in its objective
of developing the resources of the coun-
try for the welfare of the people. To this
end, the United States pledged continu-
ing support for the Helmand Valley proj-
ect, the development of Afghan civil
aviation, surface transportation projects,
and the Afghan education system.

On December 9, 1959, President
Eisenhower stopped in Kabul for a
6-hour visit during his "peace and friend-
ship in freedom" tour. Eisenhower's visit
had an impact out of proportion to the
length of the stay involved. He was
welcomed in Afghanistan as a war hero
and a great world figure. His visit had
been eagerly solicited by the Daoud
government, which gave prominent
publicity to the first visit by an
American chief of state to Afghanistan.
King Zahir, Prime Minister Daoud, and
all of the leading members of the
Afghan Government met Eisenhower at
the airport, and the motorcade into
Kabul passed through cheering crowds
of villagers and school children waving
Afghan and American flags. Meeting
with Daoud and the King, Eisenhower
stressed his belief that all nations should
solve their own regional problems. The
visit, though brief, was a great symbolic
success. The visit did demonstrate the
delicate balance of Afghan foreign
policy, however. The Afghan planes that

March 1982

escorted the President's plane were
Soviet-made MiG-17s, the honor guard
was armed with Soviet arms and rode in
Soviet trucks, and the roads along which
the crowds gathered were paved by
Soviet equipment.

Expanding U.S.
Assistance

An 1959 newly appointed American
Ambassador Henry Byroade vigorously
approached the task of upgrading the
U.S. assistance program to Afghanistan.
To assess the problems of the ailing Hel-
mand Valley project, Byroade brought in
American technicians familiar with
similar problems in the Colombia River
Basin. Under a new agreement signed
between the United States and Afghani-
stan in February 1960, technicians from
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation assisted
the efforts of the Afghan Construction
Unit, with financing from the Interna-
tional Cooperation Administration, on a

Official U.S. Visits
to Afghanistan

Vice President Richard M. Nixon was
the first senior American official to pay
an official visit to Afghanistan. He
visited Kabul on December 5, 1953, dur-
ing a 70-day, 19-nation tour of Asia and
the Middle East.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was the only
U.S. President to visit Afghanistan. He
met informally with King Mohammed
Zahir on December 9, 1959, during a
3-week, 12-nation goodwill tour.

William P. Rogers was the first
Secretary of State to visit Afghanistan.
He stopped there on May 25, 1969, en
route from a meeting in Bangkok with
the SEATO [South-East Asia Treaty
Organization] Council of Ministers, and
en route to a meeting of the CENTO
[Central Treaty Organization] Council of
Ministers in Tehran. Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger paid two official
visits to Afghanistan: November 1, 1974,
and August 8, 1976. ■

10

variety of projects to improve the Hel-
mand Valley complex. The total U.S. aid
expended in Afghanistan between 1950
and 1958 was $112.5 million. Thereafter,
the level of aid increased to an average
of $22 million per year during the 1960s.
To some extent, U.S. and Soviet
assistance projects dovetailed in
Afghanistan. The United States built the
commercial airport at Qandahar, but the
international airport at Kabul was con-
structed in part by Soviet technicians
and the remainder by Americans. The
network of roads built by the United
States in the southern part of
Afghanistan tied in with those built by
the Soviet Union in the north.

The expanded U.S. aid program in
Afghanistan was dealt a serious blow on
September 6, 1961, when the continuing
quarrel between Afghanistan and
Pakistan closed the border again. On Oc-
tober 19 President Kennedy's special en-
voy, Ambassador Livingston T. Mer-
chant, arrived in Karachi in an effort to
mediate the dispute in the interest of
reopening the border. Merchant traveled
between Karachi and Kabul until
November 7 when he abandoned the ef-
fort as hopeless. The border remained
closed until after Prime Minister Daoud
stepped down from office in March
1963. The border closure stalled several
American construction projects in Af-
ghanistan, such as the Kabul-Qandahar
road, as American heavy equipment re-
mained undelivered in Pakistan ports.
American wheat intended for
Afghanistan rotted in warehouses in
Pakistan, and several million dollars in
aid material provided by the Agency for
International Development also re-
mained in Pakistan. As a consequence,
Afghanistan increased its dependence
upon the Soviet Union for a trade outlet
and aid materiel. The Pakistan-Afghan
border was not reopened until May
1963, and the U.S. aid program re-
sumed. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
took note of the resumption of normal
diplomatic and commercial relations be-
tween Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Visit of
King Zahir

X he expansion of U.S. economic
assistance to Afghanistan was high-
lighted by a visit of King Zahir to the

United States in 1963. King Zahir and
Queen Homaira arrived in Williamsburg
Virginia, on September 4, 1963, for the
start of a 2-week visit which took them
across the country. President John F.
Kennedy received the King and Queen
Washington on September 5 and ac-
corded them a reception which included
an open car motorcade through Wash-
ington, a state dinner, and a fireworks
display. As with the Eisenhower visit t<
Afghanistan, the object was to garner i
much publicity as possible from the visi
In the joint communique issued as King
Zahir left Washington on September 7,
"President Kennedy assured His Majesl
of the continuing desire of the United
States to cooperate with Afghanistan ii
economic and technical fields." The corr
munique noted Afghanistan's traditiona
policy of safeguarding its independence
through nonalignment and added that
"the United States for its part places
great importance on Afghanistan's con-
tinued independence and national in-
tegrity."

Their Majesties King Mohammed Zahir an
Queen Homaira made a State visit to the
United States in September 1963. The Kin;
and Queen are welcomed by President Joh
F. Kennedy and Eunice Kennedy Shriver a
White House ceremonies.

Department of State Bulletir

FEATURE

yJLu^'Liil <-

)dm\$\a\)

ling Zahir and President Kennedy attend a
Itate dinner hosted by the latter.

Afghanistan Between
East and West:
1963-78

:M*Bv 1963 relations between the United
States and Afghanistan had settled into
1 pattern which varied little until 1978.
As Afghanistan made a major effort to
Tiodernize itself with outside assistance,
;he Soviet Union and the United States
;acitly recognized their varying roles in
Afghan development. Afghanistan
'eceived substantial assistance from the
Soviet Union, more moderate aid from
the United States. Total U.S. aid ex-
pended on Afghanistan between 1959
and 1971 was $300 million, including
$127 million in PL 480 assistance. The
total of U.S. aid to Afghanistan for that
period ranked second behind the Soviet
Union, which provided roughly twice as
much, and well ahead of West Germany,
the next largest contributor. In 1970,
however, the Soviet Union had 1,050
foreign assistance personnel in
Afghanistan, exclusive of military ad-
visers, the United States 105. At the
time an additional 140 American Peace
Corps volunteers were in Afghanistan.
The Peace Corps contingent was an

effective, popular form of U.S. support
for Afghanistan. The first group of
volunteers, which arrived in September
1962, was limited by Afghanistan to 9,
but the program proved so popular and
successful that the number accepted
quickly grew to 200. Peace Corps
volunteers, who served in Afghanistan
until 1979, worked with Afghan officials
and technicians, helping to train a cadre
of leaders who could implement the
development programs.

After 10 years in power, Prime
Minister Daoud resigned from office
under pressure in March 1963. He was
succeeded by five Prime Ministers all
generally viewed as more pro- Western.
Some of them were undoubtedly more
inclined than Daoud to look toward the
United States for support. This was
true, for example, of Prime Minister
Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, who
served as Prime Minister from October
1963 to November 1967. Maiwandwal
had previously served as Ambassador to
the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Pakistan. Soviet officials in Kabul
spoke openly of him as the U.S. "man."
In 1973 Daoud returned to power; on
July 17 he led a coup d'etat, overthrew
King Zahir, and established himself as
the first President of the Republic of
Afghanistan.

All of the Afghan leaders of the
period, Maiwandwal included, were com-
mitted to the economic development and
modernization of Afghanistan, and the
Soviet Union provided the primary sup-
port for such development. In broad
terms the character of the relationship
between the United States and Afghani-
stan varied little until 1978, whatever
the outlook of the leadership of the
country.

Soviet influence in Afghanistan con-
tinued to grow as the level of Soviet in-
volvement in the Afghan economy in-
creased. In 1968 the Soviet Union com-
pleted the construction of a natural gas
pipeline from Afghanistan into the
Soviet Union. Moscow agreed to pur-
chase petroleum and natural gas being
developed by Soviet exploration teams in
northern Afghanistan. The Soviet Union
funded large housing developments,
electrical transmission lines, and a road
system which also linked Afghanistan
with the Soviet Union.

U.S.-Afghan
Relations

increasing Soviet programs and in-
fluence in Afghanistan were not
matched by the more modest U.S. aid
programs. The United States, however,
remained a critical balancing factor
for Afghanistan. Prime Minister
Maiwandwal visited the United States
March 25-April 9, 1967, meeting with
President Lyndon Johnson, who once
again endorsed Afghanistan's neutrality
and independence. On May 25, 1969,
William P. Rogers became the first
Secretary of State to visit Afghanistan.
He used the occasion to express U.S.
friendship for Afghanistan. Vice Presi-
dent Agnew made a similar stop in
January 1970. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger made well-publicized stops in
Kabul on November 1, 1974, and August
8, 1976. The purpose of these visits was
essentially to demonstrate continuing
American interest in and commitment to
Afghanistan. U.S.-Afghan relations were
stable, friendly, and based on U.S.
respect for Afghan's independence and
its striving for economic self-reliance.
Technical cooperation and agricultural
commodities agreements were renewed
annually. U.S. aid to Afghanistan re-
mained focused upon agricultural,
transportation, and educational
developments. Occasional items were
added to the agenda, such as the
1970-72 drought in Afghanistan for
which the United States provided relief,
and the drug problem, which involved
the production of opium by Afghan
farmers.

Establishment of
a Pro-Communist
Afghan Regime

O

'n April 27, 1978, the government of
President Daoud was overthrown in a
coup d'etat and replaced by a govern-
ment formed by the pro-Communist Peo-
ple's Democratic Party led by Prime
Minister Nur Muhammed Taraki and
Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Kamal.
Daoud, who had courted Soviet support
throughout his career, had brought the
country too close to Soviet dominance.

March 1982

11

He tried to reverse the trend shortly
before the coup by arresting leftist
leaders in Kabul, but this maneuver
failed. On April 30 the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed.

The initial American reaction to the
coup was cautious. Serious doubts
developed immediately about the in-
dependence and neutrality of the new
Afghan Government, but on May 7 the
Department of State announced that the
United States would maintain relations
with the new regime. Despite some sen-
timent in Congress for terminating
assistance to a "Communist" government
under a provision of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the Jimmy
Carter Administration continued
American aid programs. Government of-
ficials also avoided identifying the new
regime as Communist or Communist-
supported.

Gradually, however, as it became
evident that the Taraki government was
closely aligned with the Soviet Union,
U.S. -Afghan relations began to deteri-
orate. In Moscow on December 5, 1978,
Taraki signed a 20-year treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation with the Soviet
Union. The treaty established a perma-
nent Soviet-Afghan intergovernmental
commission on economic cooperation. In
the circumstances, continued American
influence in Afghanistan seemed very
unlikely.

Death of
Ambassador Dubs

B

>y the beginning of 1979, however,
the U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan,
Adolph Dubs, had opened new channels
to the Afghan Government and had
established a quiet, but useful, dialogue
concerning developments in Afghan-
istan. On February 14, without warning,
Dubs was kidnapped and taken to a
Kabul hotel by men described by the
Afghan Government as terrorists pro-
testing Pushtu domination of the coun-
try. The terrorists called for the release
of certain prisoners held by the govern-
ment and allegedly established a time
limit on their demands. Despite pleas
from the U.S. Embassy to avoid the use
of force, Afghan forces stormed the

12

hotel room within moments of the
alleged ultimatum; Ambassador Dubs
was wounded in the assault and died
soon after. The embassy reported to
Washington that the assault was
ordered and directed by Soviet advisers
on the scene. The United States im-
mediately protested the Afghan handling
of the kidnapping.

The United States reassessed its
relations with Afghanistan in the wake
of Ambassador Dubs' death. On Febru-
ary 22, the White House announced that
President Carter planned to severely
reduce U.S. development assistance for

1979 and 1980. Throughout the spring
and summer of 1979, American officials
repeatedly expressed concern about the
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. On
August 2, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presi-
dent Carter's adviser on national securi-
ty affairs, stated that the United States
expected the Soviet Union to "abstain
from intervention and from efforts to
impose alien doctrines on deeply
religious and nationally conscious
peoples."

Soviet Invasion
of Afghanistan

XT olitical conditions in Afghanistan
became increasingly chaotic, and reports
reaching Washington in September 1979
indicated increasing Soviet military ac-
tivity along the Soviet-Afghan border.
During a news briefing on Septem-
ber 19, Department of State spokesman
Hodding Carter indicated U.S. concern:
"That is that the United States is op-
posed to any intervention in Afghani-
stan's internal affairs, that our concern
about the security and the stability of
this region in which Afghanistan falls is
a matter of longstanding public
position."

The remaining basis for an
American relationship with the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan was swept away on
December 25-27, 1979, when the Soviet
Union, lending purported support to an
impending coup against the Afghan
Government of Hafizullah Amin, airlift-
ed thousands of Soviet troops into
Afghanistan. In a statement issued on
December 26, the Department of State
urged members of the international com-
munity to condemn "such blatant
military interference" in the internal af-
fairs of a sovereign state. In a meeting
with reporters on December 28, Presi-
dent Carter condemned the invasion as a
"blatant violation" of internationally ac-
cepted rules of behavior and a "grave
threat" to peace.

The Soviet invasion destroyed the
last pretense of Afghan independence
and established a puppet regime directly
subservient to the Soviet Union. The in-
vasion also, however, intensified the na-
tional struggle, which had begun after
the Marxist coup d'etat, to regain the in-
dependence which had always been so
highly prized by the Afghan people. The
United States has great sympathy for
the efforts of the Afghan people to
regain their independence and supports
U.N. Security Council Resolution 462,
adopted January 7, 1980, which calls for
"the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Afghanistan." ■

This study was prepared by Louis J.
Smith of the Asian Division. Office of the
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs.

FEATURE

yjL'ui-'ljiil ^fewsty;

Background on
Afghanistan

PEOPLE

Afghanistan's ethnically and linguistical-
ly mixed population reflects its location
astride historic trade and invasion
routes that lead from Central Asia into
the Middle East and the Indian Subcon-
tinent. Pushtun (Pathan), Tajik, Uzbek,
Turkoman, Hazara, and Aimaq ethnic
groups constitute the bulk of the Afghan
population, with small groups of other
peoples represented. The dominant
ethnic group, the Pushtuns, make up
about 40% of the population. Afghan
Persian (Dari) and Pushtu are the prin-
cipal languages, with Turkoman and
Uzbeki spoken widely in the north.

Afghanistan is a Muslim country.
Religion pervades all aspects of life, and
religious doctrine and codes provide the
principal means of controlling conduct
and settling legal disputes. Except for
small populations in principal cities,

most people are engaged in agriculture
and are divided into clan and tribal
groups, following centuries-old customs
and religious practices.

GEOGRAPHY

Afghanistan's climate is typical of Asia's
higher regions, with cold winters and
hot, dry summers. Characteristic of the
climate is the range of temperature
change within short periods, from
season to season and from place to
place. For example, a summer sunrise
temperature in Kabul (at 1,829 m. —
6,000 ft.) of 16°C (60°F) may reach
38°C (100°F) by noon. Kabul's mean
January temperature is 0°C (32°F). On-
ly 144 kilometers (90 mi.) away in the
lowland plains of Jalalabad (549 m. —
1,800 ft.), summer temperatures reach
46°C (115°F). Precipitation, most of
which occurs between October and
April, rarely exceeds 38 centimeters
(15 in.).

The principal cities of Afghanistan
are the capital, Kabul, in the east; Kan-
dahar, in the south; Herat, near the Ira-
nian border in the west; and Mazar-i-
Sharif, near the Soviet border in the
north. Other towns with modest in-
dustrial bases, such as Kunduz, Baghlan,
and Pul-i-Khomri, are growing slowly.

HISTORY

Afghanistan, often called the crossroads
of Central Asia, has had a turbulent
history. In 328 B.C., Alexander the
Great entered the territory of present-
day Afghanistan, then part of the an-
cient Persian Empire, and crossed the
Helmad River and the Hindu Kush to
capture Bactria (present-day Balkh). His
invasion was followed by those of the
Scythians, White Huns, and Turks. In
A.D. 652, Afghanistan fell to the Arabs,
who brought the new religion of Islam.

The Arabs gave way to the Persians.
who controlled the area until A.D. 998,
when they were conquered by the Turkic
Ghaznavids. Mahmud of Ghazni (A.D.
988-1030) established his capital, Ghaz-
ni, as a great cultural center and a base
for his frequent invasions of India.
Following Mahmud's short-lived dynasty,

March 1982

13

various princes attempted to rule sec-
tions of Afghanistan, until the ravishing
invasions of Ghengis Khan, whose ar-
mies destroyed many cities, including
Herat, Ghazni, and Balkh, and laid
waste to fertile agricultural areas.

Afghanistan was devastated again in
the 14th century — this time by the inva-
sion of Tamerlane, who incorporated
Afghanistan into his vast Asian empire.
In the early 16th century, Afghanistan
came under the rule of Babar Shah
(1483-1530), a descendant of both
Ghengis and Tamerlane, and founder of
India's Mogul dynasty. Babar is buried
in Kabul, his favorite city.

Modern Afghanistan was founded in
1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, a
Pushtun prince who consolidated chief-
tainships, petty principalities, and
fragmented provinces into one country.
Until the first Marxist coup in 1978,
Afghanistan's rulers were from branches
of the Durrani tribe and, since 1818,
from that tribe's Mohammadzai clan.

European Influence

During the 19th century, as British
power expanded and Russia moved into
Central Asia, the history of Afghanistan
was influenced significantly by European
countries. British efforts to secure a
stronger position to counter Russian
influence in Persia (Iran) and Central
Asia led to the first Anglo-Afghan war,
1838-1842.

British geopolitical concern over
Russian advances in Central Asia and
Afghan dealings with Russia resulted in
the second Anglo- Afghan war (1878-80),
which brought the Amir Abdur Rahman
to the throne. This ruler agreed to
British control of Afghanistan's foreign
affairs.

World War I

During World War I, Afghanistan re-
mained neutral despite German efforts
to have the Afghans foment trouble
along the borders of British India.
Amanullah, who succeeded to the throne
in 1919 following his father Habibullah's

assassination, sought to terminate
British control of Afghanistan's foreign
affairs. This resulted in the third Anglo-
Afghan war, lasting only a few months.
Some initial Afghan successes persuaded
the war-weary British to allow
Afghanistan to conduct its own external
affairs. This event is celebrated on
August 19 as Afghan Independence Day,
even though Afghanistan never actually
was colonized by the British.

Reform and Reaction

After the third Anglo-Afghan war, King
Amanullah began making changes in his
country. Moving from its traditional
isolation, Afghanistan entered into
diplomatic relations with the world's
principal nations. In 1927, the King
made an extensive tour of Europe and
Ataturk's Turkey, an experience which
prompted him to try to modernize
Afghanistan. His modernization efforts,
which included abolishing the traditional
Muslim veil for women, alienated many
tribal and religious leaders. This
development, with the depletion of the
national treasury and the deterioration
of his army, made him easy prey for the
Bacha-i-Saqao ("son of a water carrier"),
a brigand who captured Kabul and
declared himself king early in 1929, styl-
ing himself as "Habibullah II." With
Pushtun tribal support. Prince Nadir
Khan defeated the Bacha-i-Saqao on Oc-
tober 10, 1929, and was declared king,
returning the crown to the Durrani
tribe.

His son, Mohammad Zahir Shah,
succeeded to the throne on November 8,
1933, after the assassination of Nadir
Shah by a fanatical follower of the
previous dynasty. Nadir Shah's brothers
were Prime Ministers through 1952, and
Zahir Shah's cousins, Sardar Mohammad
Daoud and Sardar Mohammad Main,
were Prime Minister and Deputy Prime
Minister/Foreign Minister from 1953
until March 1963.

Using the 1964 Constitution as the
vehicle, Zahir dismissed the strong-
willed Daoud and introduced a program
of social and political reform under a

14

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

ij U^Liil v%baw5kay

iff**

I

% J

,■.•■ ??m{i:: ...

>'.'••'••• — "sum

X

ifetiS

K

View of the Pulikhashti Mosque and Kabul River which winds through the city of Kabul.

Winaret of Jam in the mountainous center
)f Afghanistan, mem photo)

more liberal parliamentary rule. In prac-
tice, the "experiment in democracy" pro-
duced few lasting reforms and frequent
executive-legislative deadlocks delayed
or blocked vital legislation. Under this
more relaxed rule, which allowed
political expression but which did not
provide for a legalized political party
system, the country's moderate
reformers were overshadowed increas-
ingly by extremists of both the left and
right. A serious 2-year drought in
1971-72 worsened the economy.

The Daoud Republic

Amid charges of corruption and
malfeasance, the monarchy was removed
from power by a virtually bloodless
military coup led by former Prime

Minister Mohammad Daoud on July 17,
1973. The 1963 Constitution was
abrogated, and Afghanistan was
declared a Republic with Daoud as its
first President and Prime Minister.

The April 1978 Coup

Although he put forward a new Con-
stitution in 1977, Daoud's inability to
carry through badly needed economic
and social reforms resulted in the "Great
Saur Revolution" of April 27-28, 1978,
and the establishment of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan, with Nur
Mohammad Taraki as Secretary-General
of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA — a coalition of the
Marxist Khalq and Pareham parties),

March 1982

15

President of the Revolutionary Council,
and Prime Minister. In March 1979,
Hafizullah Amin was named Prime
Minister.

Opposition to the Marxist govern-
ment developed almost immediately and
subsequently grew into a countrywide
insurgency. Differences between the

leaders also surfaced early and resulted
in the exile of the Parcham group and
many purges and imprisonments. About
IV2 years after coming to power, the in-
party factionalism erupted in September
1979, in a show-down between the two
top leaders, Nur Mohammad Taraki and
Hafizullah Amin, resulting in the death
of Taraki and the assumption of power
by Amin. ■

A Profile

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective — Afghan(s).
Population (1982 est.): 13.5 million. Annual
growth rate: Negative because of current
conditions. Density (est.): 21/sq. km. (51.9/sq.
mi.). Ethnic groups: Pushtun (Pathan), Tajik,
Uzbek, Hazara, Aimaq, Turkoman. Religions
(est.): Sunni Muslim 80%, Shi'a Muslim 20%.
Languages: Dari (Afghan Persian), Pushtu.
Literacy: Less than 10%. Life expectancy
(1978 est.): 40 yrs. Work force: Number can-
not be estimated because of the Soviet occu-
pation and the Afghan resistance; mostly
agricultural and rural.

Geography

Area: 647,497 sq. km. (260,000 sq. mi.);
about the size of Texas. Cities (1978 est.
pop.): Capital— Kabul (pop. 800,000). Other
cities— Kandahar (230,000); Herat (150,000);
Mazar-i-Sharif (100,000). Terrain: Mostly
mountains and arid desert. Climate: Cold
winters and hot, dry summers.

Government

Type: Afghanistan terms itself a "Democratic
Republic." Independence: August 19, 1919.

Organization: The Revolutionary Coun-
cil, headed by a President, is the supreme
governmental body. Cabinet Members (Coun-
cil of Ministers) are charged with day-to-day
operations of various ministries. A strong,
powerful Soviet advisory presence affects all
ministries. Major policy decisions are made,
with strong Soviet influence, by the Politburo
and Secretariat of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Political party: The PDPA is the only
party permitted to function.

Flag: Adopted in April 1981, the flag has

three horizontal black, red, and green stripes,
with an emblem in the upper left corner. The
emblem consists of an arch and a pulpit on a
green background; an open book; sunrays and
heads of wheat; black, red, and green ribbons
and a 5-pointed star.

Economy

Much of the economy is nonmonetized, and
statistics, never considered reliable, are even
less so due to the disruptions of the insurgen-
cy-

GNP: $2.07 billion (Afghan est. for
1981-82 at current conversion rate of 58
Afghanis= US$1). Per capita GNP: $153.
Inflation rate 1981: 25-30%.

Natural resources: Natural gas, oil, coal,
copper, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron,
salt, precious and semiprecious stones.

Agricultural products: Wheat, cotton,
fruit, nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton.

Industry: Small-scale production of tex-
tiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, and ce-
ment for domestic use only; handwoven
carpets for export.

Trade (1981): Exports— $670 million:
natural gas, fruits, nuts, hides, skins and
other animal products, and carpets. Major
markets— USSR 60%, Eastern bloc nations,
India, Pakistan, OECD. Imports— $562
million: petroleum, vehicles and parts, sugar,
vegetable oil, pharmaceuticals, and textiles.
Major suppliers— USSR 53%, Eastern bloc
nations, India, Pakistan, OECD, Japan.

Official exchange rate (IFS 10/81): 58
Afghanis=US$l.

Economic aid received. Total — more
than $1.6 billion since 1950, principally from
the USSR. US aid— $500 million since 1950;
none since 1979.

Membership in international organiza-
tions: UN and most of its specialized agen-
cies, World Bank, Asian Development Bank
(ADB), INTELSAT.

Hand-loomed rugs are still a major in-
dustry in Afghanistan.

The ancient Bala Hisar Fort in Kabul.

imrlfflJOTi'ffi

rv^iirawu;

The Mosque of Ali in the town of Mazar-i-
Sharif.

16

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

\JL^'Liil *~

gwmsfay

Situation in Afghanistan

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 27, 19811

Our current concern regarding Poland should not cause us to forget that 2
years ago today, massive Soviet military forces invaded the sovereign coun-
try of Afghanistan and began an attempt to subjugate one of the most
fiercely independent peoples of the world. Despite the presence of 90,000
Soviet combat troops — a recent increase of some 5,000 — the courageous
people of Afghanistan have fought back. Today they effectively deny Soviet
forces control of most of Afghanistan. Efforts by the Soviets to establish a
puppet government in the Soviet image, which could govern a conquered
land, have failed. Soviet control extends little beyond the major cities, and
even there the Afghan freedom-fighters often hold sway by night and
sometimes even by day. The battle for Afghan independence continues.

But the gallant efforts of the people of Afghanistan to regain their in-
dependence have come at great cost. Almost 3 million Afghan refugees, a
fifth of the preinvasion population of Afghanistan, have fled their homes
and have taken refuge across the border, largely in Pakistan. Those who
have remained at home have become the unfortunate victims not only of
the dislocations of war but also of indiscriminate Soviet attacks on civilians.
So while we express our admiration for those who fight for the freedom we
all cherish, we must also express our deep sympathy for those innocent vic-
tims of Soviet imperialism who, because of the love of freedom of their
countrymen, have been forced to flee for their lives.

On three separate occasions, most recently on November 18, 1981, the
U.N. General Assembly passed, by overwhelming margins, resolutions
aimed at Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government and the
American people join in the broad international condemnation of the Soviet
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Just as in Poland we see the use of
intimidation and indirect use of power to subjugate a neighboring people, in
Afghanistan we see direct aggression in violation of the U.N. Charter and
other principles governing the conduct among nations.

While extending our admiration and sympathy to the people of
Afghanistan, we also call upon the Soviet Union to avail itself of proposals
set forth by the community of nations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan so that an independent and nonaligned nation can be
reestablished with a government responsive to the desires of the people, so
that the millions of Afghans who have sought refuge in other countries can
return with honor to their homes. As long as the Soviet Union occupies
Afghanistan in defiance of the international community, the heroic Afghan
resistance will continue, and the United States will support the cause of a
free Afghanistan.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 4, 1982.

/larch 1982 17

FEATURE

iJL^'Uc/ VT$bayi$tdt}

Afghanistan:
2 Years of
Occupation

The following paper was written by
Eliza Van Hollen of the Bureau of In-
telligence and Research in December
1981. It is a sequel to two reports on
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
published in the Bulletin in March 1981
and October 1981.

Summary

Two years after the Soviets invaded Af-
ghanistan, the resistance to their mili-
tary occupation and the Babrak Karmal
government, which they installed, con-
tinues to mount. The extent of the area
under the control of the freedom fighters
(mujahidin) has increased steadily, de-
spite Soviet military repression. The re-
gime's top-priority political program to
undermine popular support for the resist-
ance movement has made little headway,
and the Kabul government remains iso-
lated and ineffectual.

The problems that have plagued the
Soviets and the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) from the beginning
of the Soviet occupation have grown
worse. Two years of harsh, often terror-
izing, military campaigns have multiplied
the regime's enemies. The shortage of
military manpower has worsened. The
bitter feuding within the People's Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) con-
tinues to erode the government's small
political base. Opposition to the Soviet
presence has even spread to the top lev-
els of the party and government.

The Afghan nationalist movement
has made considerable progress in con-
solidating its position in Afghanistan and
improving its military capabilities. It

A Soviet BMD armored personnel carrier
with Soviet troops patrols the streets of
downtown Kabul after the Soviet invasion.

continues, however, to be highly frag-
mented and, therefore, lacks the advan-
tage of centralized strategic planning and
the international stature of a viable al-
ternative national political movement.
Perhaps the greatest liability growing
out of the lack of cohesion in the resist-
ance is that it encourages Moscow's cal-
culations that it can exploit the many
ethnic and tribal divisions to its ultimate
advantage.

The war in Afghanistan has badly
tarnished Moscow's reputation both be-
cause of the Soviets' callous disregard for
the Afghan people's right to self-determi-
nation and because of the ability of the
Afghan mujahidin to fight the Soviet oc-
cupation force to a standstill. Accumulat-
ing evidence of Soviet use of chemical
warfare in Afghanistan throughout their
2-year occupation also is arousing inter-
national condemnation.

There are numerous signs that the
Soviets have a more realistic apprecia-
tion of their difficulties now than they
had a year ago and that they are search-
ing for a new political formula with
greater popular appeal. This perception
could result in some reshuffling of offi-
cials and efforts to broaden the political
base of the government. Any made-in-
Moscow coalition, however, would be
likely to arouse the same hostility as the
current regime, as long as Soviet occupa-
tion forces remained in Afghanistan.

Even if Moscow were able to coopt
non-Communist elements into a broad-
ened government, the regime's depen-
dence on the Soviet military presence
would quickly vitiate any political gains.
Indeed, the recent introduction of more
Soviet troops into Afghanistan, while not
a massive reinforcement, underscores
Moscow's continuing commitment to a
military solution.

Moscow and Kabul agreed in Au-
gust, after considerable tactical maneu-
vering, to an active role for the United
Nations in seeking a political settlement

19

of the Afghan problem. There is no indi-
cation, however, that the Soviets or their
Afghan surrogates are prepared to yield
on key substantive issues. The over-
whelming international consensus de-
manding withdrawal of "the foreign
troops" from Afghanistan was reaffirmed
by a 116 to 23 vote in the U.N. General
Assembly this fall. This margin repre-
sents an increase of four affirmative
votes over the tally in November 1980
and of seven votes over the original bal-
lot in January 1980.

The most recent U.N. vote demon-
strates that, contrary to evident Soviet
expectations, the international commu-
nity is not allowing the Afghanistan issue
to fade from view. Likewise, the ever-
increasing refugee population in Pakis-
tan— it has doubled since last December
to a total of 2.5 million — and the continu-
ing stream of defections from the Afghan
Government and military serve to keep
attention focused on this troubled land.

Moscow is willing to pay the price of
international censure and apparently an-
ticipates that a policy based on attrition
and force eventually will achieve its ob-
jectives. Historical experience with So-
viet aggression argues against hopes for
a negotiated solution, but the tenacity of
the Afghan resistance and the persist-
ence of international protest represent
unprecedented historical circumstances
that clearly have upset Soviet calcula-
tions. In these circumstances, the Sovi-
ets may yet find that their long-term
political interests are better served by
regional stability through the restoration
of Afghan independence and nonalign-
ment.

Regime's Authority Shrinking

According to a former planning director
in the Prime Minister's office, who de-
fected to Pakistan in August 1981, 90% of
Afghanistan's districts are under resist-
ance control. The ex-official had attended
a secret conference in Kabul in June at
which provincial governors had given
gloomy assessments of the situation in
their respective jurisdictions. While 90%
may be an exaggeration, the erosion of
government authority has been corrobo-
rated by foreign journalists who traveled
with the mujahidin in the spring and
summer of 1981. They describe being able
to move freely, even in the daytime, in

20

areas where a year earlier the presence
of government security forces had neces-
sitated extreme caution.

The much publicized, unsuccessful ef-
forts of Soviet /Afghan troops to dislodge
the mujahidin from strongholds in the
Panjsher Valley (northeast of Kabul) and
from the Paghman area (only 12 miles
from the capital) illustrate the immense
difficulties confronting the Soviets as
they try to wrest strategic areas from
the resistance.

Furthermore, the mujahidin have
demonstrated during 1981 an impressive
capability to bring the war to the major
cities, where control is of paramount im-
portance to the Babrak regime. The free-
dom fighters virtually held Qandahar for
much of the summer and early fall; they
have kept Herat in periodic turmoil; even
in Kabul nightly gun battles, frequent as-
sassinations, and intensifying attacks on
government and Soviet installations at-
test to a significant mujahidin presence
despite tight security and repeated
house-to-house searches.

In the many areas of the country
where the liberation movement exercises

control, resistance leaders have set up
their own administration, making laws,
collecting taxes, dispensing justice, and
providing services. Even in areas under
nominal government authority (main-
tained by a military presence), the resist
ance often runs parallel governments. In
the cities of Qandahar and Herat, for ex-
ample, the mujahidin dictate curfew
hours, establish price controls, and levy
taxes. In almost all areas the dividing
line between government and resistance
authority will be even more clearly
drawn at the edge of an important town,
with the mujahidin controlling traffic,
manning roadblocks, and levying duties
just beyond this line. This is the situatioi
that prevails just outside of Kabul. Local
civilian and military authorities often
buy a tenuous peace from the freedom
fighters by supplying weapons and am-
munition to them.

The mujahidin are also engaged in
an ongoing battle with the regime for
control over the major roads. They con-
duct ambushes of supply convoys on all
the important routes, including the vital
links between the Soviet border and

Afghan resistance fighters survey the
mountainous terrain, monitoring Soviet
and Afghan forces air and ground
movements.

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

yJCu^'Uil <»

lffidW$\a)

Kabul. Recently, in an effort to protect
the supply network, government forces
have begun to clear away buildings and
trees, which afford protective cover to
the mujah idin , in a wide swath along the
roads running north and south from
Kabul.

DRA/Soviet Offensive to Counter the
Resistance

Political Policy. From the early
days of the Babrak regime and the So-
viet occupation, the authorities have re-
lentlessly pursued the related political
and military goals of establishing the
legitimacy of the Babrak government
and defeating the nationalist military
forces. Over the long run, the political/
propaganda war is as important as mili-
tary action and could ultimately be the
decisive contest. If the population at
large can be persuaded to drop its sup-
port for the resistance and accept a gov-
ernment that has Moscow's blessing, the
mujahidin will become isolated and vul-
nerable. That the Soviets are aware of
the importance of the political struggle is
clear from the enormous effort they have
undertaken to try to establish the legiti-
macy of the current regime and to con-
vince the population of the regime's good
faith with respect to such key issues as
Islam, nationalities policy, amnesty for
refugees, and a revised land reform pro-
gram.

The cornerstone of the political
policy has been the formation of a Na-
tional Fatherland Front (NFF), an um-
brella organization composed initially of
12 institutions representing such ele-
ments of the population as trade unions,
agricultural cooperatives, youth,
women, writers, journalists, artists,
scholars and religious leaders, and the
tribes. Many of the founding organiza-
tions were either formed or held their
first national meeting after a Decem-
ber 27, 1980, conference which launched
the campaign to establish the NFF.

The founding congress of the front
was finally held on June 15 after several
postponements. It was portrayed as a
contemporary version of a Loya Jirga — a
traditional assembly of Afghanistan's
tribal leaders convoked to make historic
decisions. As such, it was intended to
legitimize the Babrak regime. Indeed, in
his "fundamental statement" to the NFF

congress, Karmal claimed that the forma-
tion of the NFF was evidence of: "the
normalization of the situation" in Afghan-
istan; the unified support of all "patriotic
forces" for PDPA principles; the "frater-
nity" of all of Afghanistan's social classes
and ethnic groups; and the ability of the
regime to solve difficult problems and
create a new society.

A massive political and propaganda
effort was devoted to creating the NFF
and its constituent members, and the
founding congress was portrayed as a
momentous historic occasion. When the
congress was finally held, however, it
was generally recognized to be a sham.
Relatively little has been heard of it
since. Indeed, it was not until over 4
months later that an NFF committee
was formed for Kabul Province.

Another important political move
during 1981 was the creation of a Minis-
try of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs to
replace the former Ministry of Border
and Tribal Affairs. The new ministry in-
stitutionalizes the regime's nationalities
policy to promote local language and cul-
ture. Like its Soviet model, this policy is
designed to appeal to a sense of ethnic
uniqueness. It is, in effect, a policy of di-
vide and rule that could become an effec-
tive weapon for the Soviets in a country
where minority ethnic groups have tradi-
tionally not been given due recognition.

The regime reintroduced land re-
form in August but revised the regula-
tions to offer exemption from land confis-
cation in return for support for the
Babrak regime. The exemptions are
skewed to appeal to such key groups as
the clergy, military officers, and tribal
leaders. The incentives probably will
have little impact as they are meaning-
less in the many areas where the govern-
ment is too weak to impose a land reform
program.

In September, the Presidium of the
Revolutionary Council approved a new
law on local organs of state power and
administration and a new Council of Min-
isters law, which will strengthen and ex-
pand the role of the state in Afghan
society. The "local organs" measure em-
bodies the Soviet principle of "demo-
cratic centralism" in a system of local
councils, which are portrayed as tradi-
tional jirgas. The regime claims the new
law will reinforce democracy, but, in ef-
fect, it strengthens party control: Only

the PDPA and PDPA auxiliary organiza-
tions can nominate candidates for elec-
tion to the local councils.

There is no indication that these po-
litical measures have attracted support
for the government. But the Soviets take
a long-range view; many of these actions
demonstrate that Moscow is counting on
long-term benefits from the Sovietization
of the Afghan Government and party
machinery.

Defense Policy. The Soviets are
clearly under pressure to produce more
immediate results from their military
campaigns. During the first half of 1981,
political strategy seemed to have the
higher priority, but by midsummer it be-
came clear that the deteriorating secu-
rity situation once again had become the
paramount concern.

In August, the Afghan regime estab-
lished new defense councils at the na-
tional, provincial, and district levels to
concentrate all aspects of defense under
strict party control. Announcing the for-
mation of the new councils at a meeting

The lack of recruits is
essentially a political
problem and highlights
the absence of govern-
ment authority
throughout most of the
country.

of armed forces party activists, Babrak
Karmal spoke of "troublesome and diffi-
cult conditions" and "increasing armed
actions by counterrevolutionary ele-
ments." He said it was imperative for all
forces to go on the offensive.

New defense councils, however, will
not solve the overriding military prob-
lem— the critical shortage of manpower
for the Afghan Army, which stands at
about 30,000 out of a normal strength of
about 100,000. The lack of recruits is es-
sentially a political problem and high-
lights the absence of government author-
ity throughout most of the country.

March 1982

21

Perhaps the Soviets' most serious
miscalculation when they invaded Af-
ghanistan in December 1979 was a belief
that they could reverse the already far-
advanced disintegration of the Afghan
armed forces. This process has not only
continued but has accelerated. Various
counteracting measures — for example,
the January 1981 conscription law, which
lowered the draft age and extended the
obligatory tour of duty, and the Septem-
ber mobilization of all reservists up to
age 35 — have not helped.

Because of Afghanistan's mandatory
service laws, the mobilization in Septem-
ber covered virtually the entire male
population in the stipulated age bracket.
The announcement provoked antigovern-
ment demonstrations among students;
eligible males took off for the hills, emp-
tying government and business offices.
The regime immediately began to back-
track and announced a number of exemp-
tions. It also quickly revised downward
from 450,000 to 85,000 its estimates of
eligible reservists. As the year ends, the
results of the callup are unlikely to pro-
duce more than 15,000-20,000 able-
bodied men, many of whom will desert as
soon as possible. As it has throughout the
past 2 years, the government must rely
on press gangs to enforce the directive.

The September callup was obviously
prompted by the scheduled discharge in
December of perhaps half of the army's
enlisted men. The government would
prefer not to discharge any of those cur-
rently serving It needs the men, but it
also does not want to make available to
the mu jah idin such a large pool of
trained soldiers. Nevertheless, it went
ahead with the discharge announcement
on December 4, probably because it
feared an explosive reaction to a further
extension of service. Every effort, how-
ever, is being made to insure that those
who are officially discharged actually re-
main in the army or related security ser-
vices.

The ineffectiveness of the Afghan
Army has forced the Soviets to assume
the lion's share of the burden of pacifica-
tion. The events of 1981 suggest, how-
ever, that Soviet military operations in
Afghanistan have been ineffective. They
failed to dislodge the inn jah id in from
their strongholds and have been unable
to organize a successful defense against
mujahidin ambush operations even on

the main road from the Soviet border to
Kabul.

There are numerous signs that the
Soviets are concerned about the progress
of the war. They have recently intro-
duced additional troops into the country
and, while the number — about 5,000 — is
not large, it suggests that the Soviets
think their forces are spread too thin to
counteract the growing resistance. A
high-level Soviet military delegation led
by Deputy Defense Minister Sokolov has,
as of mid-December, been in Kabul for a
protracted stay. This visit, combined
with a recent intensification of offensive
operations, indicates that Soviet military
authorities in Afghanistan are currently
under pressure to produce results.

There is growing concern that this
pressure will lead to an increased use of
chemical warfare by the Soviets. Evi-
dence of the use of lethal and casualty-
producing chemical agents against the
mujahidin is mounting. The most fre-
quent application of these toxic agents is
against mujahidin bases inside mountain
caves, which are otherwise inaccessible
to conventional aircraft or helicopter
attack.

The failure of Soviet forces to
achieve their objectives in Afghanistan
can be explained by factors that are in-
herent in a confrontation between a large
bureaucratic military machine in a for-
eign land and small mobile guerrilla units
operating on their home ground. Poor
Soviet morale also contributes to the lack
of Soviet success as does the collusion be-
tween Afghan army personnel and the
mujahidin.

The People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan: A House Divided

For the Soviets, the most frustrating as-
pect of their failures in Afghanistan must
be their continuing inability to achieve a
truce between the two principal factions
of the ruling party, the Khalqis and Par-
chamis. The deep-seated feud, which
dates from the early days of the party in
the late 1960s, has continued to rage
throughout the past year. The numeric-
ally superior Khalqis are struggling to
regain some of the power they lost when
the Soviets installed Babrak's Parchamis
at the time of the invasion. The Parcha-
mis would like a thorough purge of the
Khalqis, but the Soviets, mindful of

Khalq strength in the military forces,
continue to seek a reconciliation and have
insisted on maintaining leading Khalqis
in top positions.

The feuding was particularly intense
during the weeks preceding the sixth
plenum of the PDPA in June and a con-
current meeting of the Revolutionary
Council to effect party and government
organizational changes. The most impor-
tant task was to name a prime minister, a
job previously held by Babrak in addition
to his duties as President and General
Secretary of the PDPA. The Soviets may
have hoped to use this change to achieve
a better Khalq-Parcham balance; cer-
tainly the Khalqis lobbied hard to im-
prove their position. Compromise, how-
ever, proved elusive. In the end the
Soviets stuck by the Parchamis. The
leading Parcham contender, Sultan Ali
Keshtmand, became prime minister and
the concurrent expansion of various
party and government bodies also gave
additional advantages to the Parcham
faction.

The reorganization in June further
exacerbated the split and led to renewed
indications that the Khalqis, in their
anger at the Soviets and the Parchamis,
are cooperating with the mujahidin. In
Babrak's mid- August speech to armed
forces party activists, he lashed out at
party factionalism, which he said was
hindering efforts to improve military ef-
fectiveness.

Reports of a reactivated power
struggle within the PDPA leadership in
late November and early December were
fueled by the prolonged absence from
Kabul of Prime Minister Keshtmand,
who spent almost 2 months in Moscow
following an official visit to Bulgaria.
Keshtmand's name was not mentioned in
the Afghan media during his absence.
His return to Kabul on December 13 was
a week too late to attend the seventh
party plenum on December 7. The pro-
ceedings of this plenum have not been
published, but the meeting is believed to
have been preoccupied with the issue of
party disunity and indiscipline.

The most disruptive factor on the
political scene continues to be the Khalq
effort to stage a comeback, but there are
also periodic reports of splits within the
Parcham faction that pit Keshtmand

22

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

JUu^'Ul/ <~4foh

'dvislay

against Babrak. In spite of speculation
that the Soviets are seeking an alterna-
tive to Babrak, however, their public
support of him as of mid-December does
not suggest that they are prepared to
abandon him. On December 15, Babrak
left Kabul to pay a state visit to Bulga-
ria. He stopped in Moscow en route to
present Brezhnev with the Afghan Sun
of Freedom Order in connection with the
Soviet leader's 75th birthday.

Internecine fighting is not likely to
abate. In view of the deteriorating secu-
rity situation and the obvious failure of
party and government policies, it is not
surprising that the beleaguered leader-
ship is wracked by mutual recrimina-
tions. It is becoming apparent that many
top leaders want the Soviets to leave and
are trying to distance themselves from
the odious symbol of close association
with the Soviet occupation.

In late 1981, the Afghan regime ap-
pears to be making a renewed effort to
draw prominent members of former gov-
ernments into participation in a more
broadly based government. Although
they may succeed with one or two fig-
ures who may have become dissatisfied
with exile life, this approach is not likely
to be very productive.

There are also reports of efforts to
form a new party that would subsume
the Khalq-Parcham problem. The Par-
chamis themselves have sponsored a
major party recruitment drive through-
out the year to reduce Khalq influence
within the PDPA by significantly enlarg-
ing and broadening its membership. A
high party official claimed in February
1981 that party membership had in-
creased by 25% in the preceding 6
months. Babrak told the fifth party
plenum in March that the character of
the party was changing and that 25-30%
of the new members were workers and
farmers. At the sixth party plenum in
June, Karmal stated that "thousands of
the best representatives of workers,
peasants, craftsmen, employees, intelli-
gentsia, students, and other social strata
have been admitted to the party proba-
tionary membership."

Given the hazards associated with
party membership (members are auto-
matic targets for the mujahidin assas-
sins), the recuitment drive is likely to

Mujahidin camp in Afghanistan: in the background are captured Afghan army trucks.

have been less successful than Babrak
claims. The lack of published, official fig-
ures on the size of the party suggests
that it remains small.

Nationalist Resistance Movement

In contrast to the "sinking ship syn-
drome" that is undercutting morale in
party and government circles, the morale
of the mujahidin remains high, according
to foreign visitors who have traveled
with them recently. The freedom fighters
can look back on a successful year during
which they have put the regime increas-
ingly on the defensive. The military situ-
ation remains a standoff, but one in
which the initiative appears to lie with
the mujahidin, although the Soviets re-
tain the advantage of vastly superior
firepower.

The major source of strength for the
freedom fighters continues to be the
overwhelming support they receive from
the Afghan people, regardless of ethnic
group or tribal affiliation. The Afghan
people have suffered terribly during the
past 2 years. Villages suspected of har-
boring m ujah idin have been demolished
in ground attacks and repeated aerial
bombardment from helicopter gunships.
In spite of high civilian casualties and the
regime's constant flow of propaganda to
discredit the resistance, the nationalist
movement has continued to grow.

An important development, which
has strengthened the effectiveness of the
mujahidin, has been greater cooperation
among resistance forces in the field. In a
growing number of instances, including
the campaigns in the Panjsher and at

March 1982

23

y

Afghan villagers eyeing unexploded Soviet
antipersonnel bomb. Such bombs, contain-
ing thousands of pieces of shrapnel,
destroy farmlands as well as buildings.

Paghman, freedom fighters from outside
the immediate battle zone have come to
help. Cooperation among resistance units
has led to a more sophisticated military
strategy.

The nationalist successes during
1981 are the result, in part, of more and
better weapons acquired largely through
raids on military supply convoys and ac-
cess to Afghan army stocks. Although
the mujahidin are seeking aid through-
out the Islamic world and the West, for-
eign visitors have observed during the
past year that recent media reporting
has greatly exaggerated the extent of ex-
ternal assistance. In many parts of the

country, the mujahidin are still seriously
underarmed in relation to the numbers of
potential fighters.

While the resistance movement
clearly has grown stronger and more ef-
fective throughout the year, the limits of
its capabilities are clear. The mujahidin
cannot mount a sustained offensive
against a Soviet stronghold; they cannot
drive Soviet forces away from major
bases or the major cities; and to date
they have not been able to take complete
control of a provincial capital. If the
mujahidin push too far — if they threaten
to banish all symbols of Kabul's authority
in a province — they, or more likely the
local civilian population, inevitably will
be subjected to ruthless retaliation.

The mujahidin have made great
strides in cooperating within a given
area and have taken tentative steps to-
ward establishing a coordinating leader-
ship council in common cause against the
Soviets, but the resistance movement as
a whole remains fragmented. It thus
lacks the strategic advantages of national
coordination. Furthermore, liberation
forces occasionally fight each other to es-
tablish territorial preeminence. To suc-
ceed, these efforts at coordination will

The Soviets are lay-
ing the groundwork for
a permanent, predomi-
nant role in Afghan af-
fairs.

require setting aside deep divisions be-
tween fundamentalists and moderates,
traditionalists and leftists, tribal chief-
tains and mullahs, Pushtuns and minor-
ity ethnic groups, and among numerous
rival tribes.

Soviet Long-Range Plans

The Soviets are laying the groundwork
for a permanent, predominant role in Af-
ghan affairs. This effort is reflected in

the numerous major steps taken during
1981 to remake party and government in-
stitutions in the Soviet image. It is also
evident in the large numbers of Afghan
students dispatched to the Soviet Union
for higher education and technical train-
ing and in the steady stream of technical
and educational delegations traveling be-
tween the two countries.

Afghanistan is also becoming more
dependent on the Soviet Union for eco-
nomic assistance and trade. In November
1980, Babrak stated that Moscow was
supplying 80% of Afghanistan's foreign
aid. In a recent article in Pravda, the pa-
per's correspondent in Afghanistan re-
ported that trade turnover between the
two countries had doubled in the last 5
years and that trade would treble by
1985.

Most official pronouncements on the
•Afghan economy are optimistic. The re-
port on the 1981 budget delivered in
March by then Deputy Prime Minister
Keshtmand painted a relatively rosy pic-
ture, as did his economic report to the
Revolutionary Council in September. But
Keshtmand's speech to a seminar for local
government officials in August revealed
that the war has caused considerable eco-
nomic paralysis. At that time, he indi-
cated major concern about the collapse of
the transportation system, about the
shutting down of many factories and
mines, and about inflation, which has
risen sharply due to growing shortages.

The breakdown of the Afghan econ-
omy may make Afghanistan an expensive
investment for the Soviets, at least in the
short term. With much of the country in
resistance hands, the government cannot
collect taxes. The war has also caused a
drop in agricultural production, which
normally is a source of foreign exchange.
On the plus side for the Soviets, how-
ever, they continue to receive natural gas
from Afghanistan at a price well below
what Moscow is asking from the West
Europeans for natural gas from Siberia.
Moscow's long-range planning undoubt-
edly envisions further integration of Af-
ghanistan's economy with that of the
Soviet Union.

24

Department of State Bulletin

FEATURE

yjUu^'Lal i*

\ldm$\a\)

International Spotlight on Afghanistan

The primary objective of the Babrak re-
gime's foreign policy has been to obtain
international recognition of the legiti-
macy of the government (and by exten-
sion of the Soviet presence that is re-
quired to keep the regime in power). This
policy was formalized in the May 14,
1980, proposals, which were modified on
August 24, 1981, and is based on the con-
tention that the resistance movement is a
creation of outside powers. Accordingly,
both sets of proposals require the cessa-
tion of all resistance as a precondition wi-
the beginning of the withdrawal of
Soviet troops.

In November 1981, the international
community once again demonstrated by a
third overwhelming vote in the United
Nations that it rejects the Babrak gov-
ernment's claim to legitimacy. The reso-
lution also authorized U.N. Secretary
General Waldheim to continue U.N. ef-
forts to seek a political settlement. The
U.N. mission, originally mandated in No-
vember 1980, and other international ef-
forts to find an opening for a negotiated
solution — such as the proposals put forth
by the European Community — reflect
widespread international concern over
the continuing Soviet occupation.

In February 1981, UN. Secretary
General Waldheim appointed then Under
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar as
his personal representative to seek a po-
litical settlement. Perez de Cuellar trav-
eled to Kabul and Islamabad in April and
again in early August. Following the
August visit, Afghanistan announced on
August 24 a modification of its proce-
dural conditions. It agreed to trilateral
talks and to UN. participation, whereas
previously it had insisted on separate bi-
lateral talks with Pakistan and Iran and
had not publicly accepted an active role
for the United Nations. Subsequently,
during the autumn U.N. session,
Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar met sepa-
rately with the Foreign Ministers of
Pakistan and Afghanistan and their rep-
resentatives in New York.

It is not clear whether Perez de
Cuellar, as UN. Secretary General, will
continue to take personal charge of this
mission or whether he will name a repre-
sentative. In either event, further U.N.

visits to both countries are anticipated.
Perez de Cuellar's intimate involvement
in the Afghanistan problem should insure
that it will receive priority attention.

Afghanistan's August 24 proposals
also dealt with the plan of the European
Economic Community, which had been
presented to Moscow by the British For-
eign Secretary, Lord Carrington, on
July 6. This initiative called for a two-
stage international conference to settle
the Afghan question. The Soviets and the
Afghans rejected this plan, presumably
because it excluded Afghan representa-
tion altogether from the first stage and
left the Babrak regime's status unclear.
The August 24 proposals entertain the
possibility of an international conference,
but one which would seat the Babrak re-
gime as the sole legitimate representa-
tive of the Afghan people. There has
been no indication that the Soviets or the
Babrak regime are willing to make con-
cessions on any of the key substantive is-
sues, including that of the withdrawal of
Soviet troops.

Meanwhile, the Babrak regime,
guided by its Soviet sponsors, has been
trying other ploys to bolster its claim to
legitimacy. The warm reception which
Moscow gave Karmal during his state
visit in October 1980 clearly was de-
signed to enhance his international stat-
ure. Likewise Karmal's visit to Czecho-
slovakia in June 1981 had a similar
purpose, all the more obvious as it was
timed to occur immediately after the
founding congress of the NFF; the con-
gress was to have demonstrated conclu-
sively Karmal's claim to popular support
in Afghanistan. Karmal also participated
in the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union's 26th congress in February-March
and was received by Brezhnev in the
Crimea in July. The year was capped by
the Afghan award presented to Brezhnev
and by Barak's state visit to Bulgaria.
A more difficult problem for the re-
gime has been to demonstrate that con-
ditions in Afghanistan are sufficiently
settled to allow foreigners to visit Kabul
safely. From November 18 to 20, the
DRA staged a major propaganda event

to prove this point by hosting the 10th
Conference of the Presidium of the Afro-
Asian People's Solidarity Organization, a
Soviet-front organization. The timing of
the AAPSO conference indicates that it
was designed to offset the bad press
emanating from the Afghan debate and
resolution at the United Nations, which
was taking place simultaneously. The
AAPSO delegates demonstrated full sup-
port for their host, but the extremely
heavy security measures surrounding
their visit must have made them uneasy.
Furthermore, in spite of the security, the
mujahidin fired several rockets at the
Intercontinental Hotel, the site of the
conference; there were no direct hits but
some damage was done.

The international community is not
impressed by efforts to dignify Babrak
Karmal and to portray the situation in
Afghanistan as stable. Objective observ-
ers find the swelling refugee population
in Pakistan and Iran more revealing of
the true state of affairs. Afghans in
Pakistan now constitute the largest refu-
gee population in the world; their num-
bers doubled during 1981 to about 2.5
million. The refugee population in Iran
has also grown considerably and is now
estimated at about 1 million.

Included among the refugees are
many military defectors and an increas-
ing number of former regime officials
who testify to intolerable Soviet control
over government ministries and the
worsening security situation throughout
the country.

It should be clear to Moscow that Af-
ghanistan will not disappear as an issue
of major international concern. On the
contrary, the rising volume of "inside Af-
ghanistan" reporting by foreign journal-
ists who travel with the mujakidin has
contributed significantly to a greater
awareness of Soviet repression and of the
war of liberation being fought by the re-
sistance. On December 16, the European
Parliament passed a resolution declaring
the European intention to commemorate
March 21, 1982, as Afghanistan Day.
March 21 is the Afghan New Year and is
traditionally celebrated by Afghans as
their national day. Free nations around
the world are expected to follow the
European lead in making Afghanistan
Day a demonstration of overwhelming in-
ternational solidarity with the Afghan
people in their struggle against Soviet
occupation. ■

March 1982

25

THE PRESIDENT

News Conference
of January 19
(Excerpts)

Q. It has been 3 weeks now since you
announced the sanctions against the
Soviet Union in connection with
Poland. What effect, if any, have they
had? If they haven't had any effect,
what next and when?

A. I think they have had an effect,
although there's no question the situa-
tion in Poland is deteriorating. They
have tried to present it as moderating.
It isn't. The people are still imprisoned.
There is no communication with
Solidarity or between the military
government and the people, and the
military law is still in effect. We think,
however, that there has been an impres-
sion made, and we have held back on
some things additionally that we can
do — things that we will consider that
can add to the steps that we've already
taken.

I've had a lengthy communication
from the Pope. He approves what we
have done so far; he believes that it has
been beneficial. And yet, we're not going
to wait forever for improvement in the
situation there. We have other steps
that we can take.

Q. Now that Secretary Haig is
back from the Mideast, do you know
of any new, concrete grounds for op-
timism about reaching an agreement
on the Palestinian autonomy issue?
And do you regard as crucial reaching
some sort of agreement before April,
when the Israelis are scheduled to
complete the withdrawal from the
Sinai?

A. There's no question about that
being the toughest problem in a Middle
East settlement. We won't set a
deadline of any kind on when that must
be decided. The Secretary has been on a
factfinding trip and will be there again,
although no date has been set for that.

We want to help if we can, if we can
come up with some ideas that might be
helpful in the autonomy talks. That is
the next step under the Camp David
process. And so, as I say, we won't set a

deadline, but we're most hopeful that we
can be of help and that they will, at
least by the Sinai time, get down to,
let's say, a kind of a plan for proceeding.

Q. We know that in the next few
months you're going to be very in-
terested in having more money for
defense spending, and I wonder if you
could explain philosophically the basic
cause of this. Is it to be able to deter
Soviet aggression or as a negotiating
technique with the Soviet Union? And
is there a concern that weapons pro-
duced may eventually be weapons
used?

A. I hope and pray with all my
might that the weapons won't be used. I
also happen to believe that that is the
purpose. If military defense is well done,
it doesn't have to be used. And we've
never gotten in a war because we were
too strong. But the purpose of this
military program, we're engaged in
rebuilding something that was allowed
to deteriorate very badly over recent
years. We are way behind where we
should be now. Our economic problem,
with regard to budgets and all, would be
minimal today if we were simply carry-
ing on with a defense establishment that
had been properly maintained.

I might also point out that with all
the argument and concern over that in
these times of economic stress, that
we're spending a smaller percentage of
the gross national product on the
military than has been spent in many,
many years past in peacetime.

But the purpose is if we're to sit
down with the enemy — potential
enemy — and talk arms reductions, which
we're doing right now, we're going to be
far more successful if that adversary
knows that the alternative is a buildup
to a commensurate level with him on our
side.

Up until now, in previous negotia-
tions, they haven't had to make any con-
cessions, because we were unilaterally
disarming. But now I think it's all ex-
plained in a cartoon that one of your
publications used some time ago, and
that was Brezhnev speaking to a general
in his own army, and he said: "I liked
the arms race better when we were the
only ones in it."

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Jan. 25, 1982. ■

26

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

Current International Developments

Secretary Haig's statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
February 2, 1982.1

I welcome this opportunity to discuss re-
cent international developments, specifi-
cally the situation in Poland and its im-
pact on East- West relations. Today's
hearing also offers me the chance to
review the results of my recent trip to
the Middle East and to discuss briefly
several other aspects of American
foreign policy.

East-West Relations and Poland

Let me begin by commenting on East-
West relations and my meeting last
week with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko. Ever since taking office, the
President has stressed our desire for a
constructive and mutually beneficial rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union. At the
same time, we have made clear to
Moscow that such a relationship must be
based on greater Soviet restraint,
especially in the use of force or the
threat of violence. The Soviet role in
Poland and elsewhere, specifically
Moscow's lack of restraint, was, there-
fore, uppermost in my discussions with
Mr. Gromyko.

No subject, including Poland, was
omitted from our talks. During 8 hours
of wide-ranging exchanges, we reviewed
the situation in Afghanistan, Cuba, and
southern Africa. Bilateral issues, in-
cluding human rights and the plight of
dissidents and minorities in the Soviet
Union, were also covered.

We also had a detailed discussion of
arms control. This gave me an oppor-
tunity to explain the rationale behind
President Reagan's initiative last
November for zero levels of medium-
range missiles to reduce tension over
nuclear arms in Europe. I noted that the
United States is actively preparing for
START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks] negotiations, which we will in-
itiate when conditions permit.

' Time and again, I emphasized that
Soviet use of force or the threat to use
force in order to frustrate peaceful
change posed the greatest danger to our
mutual interests. Soviet complicity in
the Polish crisis, coming while Soviet
troops occupy Afghanistan and

Moscow's arms flood Cuba, undermines
the very basis for productive East-West
relations.

The meeting provided a timely and
important exchange of views. The Presi-
dent has pointed out that in time of
crises, clear communication between the
United States and the Soviet Union is
essential. There can be no mistaking our
concern on recent Soviet actions,
especially in Poland.

We are witnessing in Poland today
events of historic magnitude. It is
crucial that we understand what is hap-
pening, what it means to East- West
relations, and what we can do to in-
fluence the situation. Our policy is based
on three principles for action.

First, the Polish crisis is far from
over. It represents a profound failure of
Soviet-style communism that has
affected the very basis of productivity in
Poland. The Polish economy continues to
decline. It can be revived only with the
cooperation of the Polish worker— on
whom the brunt of repression has fallen.
But General Jaruzelski does not seem
prepared to answer the vexing questions
of when martial law will be lifted or how
national reconciliation can begin. Until
he does, passive and not so passive
resistance will probably increase.

Second, the West can and must act
to influence the situation. Prudent and
realistic action can encourage both War-
saw and Moscow to reconsider their
march toward the abyss in Poland.

/ emphasized [to Foreign
Minister Gromyko] that
Soviet use of force or the
threat to use force . . .
posed the greatest
danger to our mutual in-
terests.

Moreover, our handling of the Polish
crisis will have far-reaching implications
for Western credibility. If we do not
take serious actions commensurate with
our concern, then the Soviets might be

encouraged to test our resolve at other
critical points in the world.

Third, we must bear in mind that in-
dividual national action becomes much
more meaningful, especially for Moscow,
in the context of allied unity. Fifteen
sovereign nations have never found it
easy to act in concert but this must be
our goal. It would indeed be tragic if
Poland's misfortune becomes the instru-
ment of allied disunity.

Based on these principles, the Presi-
dent has fashioned a two-track strategy,
imposing unilateral sanctions and seek-
ing unified allied action. Both efforts are
well underway.

President Reagan has declared that
we seek an end to repression, a release
of political prisoners, and a restoration
of those rights, as promised in the
Helsinki Final Act, that protect the inde-
pendence of the union movement and
the church. Only in this way can the
basis be established for reconciliation
through negotiations within Polish
society.

The United States has made clear
that we will not do business as usual
with either Poland or the Soviet Union
while repression in Poland continues. In
December, the President announced a
series of economic sanctions against
both Poland and the Soviet Union. He
warned that we would prepare further
measures, if necessary.

The United States is not alone.
Following President Reagan's December
29 statement, the 10 member nations of
the European Community met to con-
sider the situation. Just 2 weeks ago, an
unprecedented special meeting of the
North Atlantic Council condemned the
Soviet Union's sustained campaign
against the Polish people, which violates
numerous principles of the Final Act of
Helsinki. The allies agreed to a number
of economic measures, such as holding
future commercial credits for goods
other than food in abeyance and sus-
pending negotiations to reschedule the
Polish debt. The allies pledged not to
undercut each other's actions. Signifi-
cantly, the allies have begun the task of
identifying possibilities for future action
across a broad front, including an exami-
nation of the course of future economic
and commercial relations with the Soviet
Union.

On February 3, the North Atlantic
Council will gather again to consider fur-
ther action. A session of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe

March 1982

27

THE SECRETARY

will also resume in Madrid on February
9 and Polish and Soviet actions will be
condemned by many Western foreign
ministers.

But the allied pressure has not all
been negative. The West has indicated
its readiness to help revive Poland's
shattered economy when the Polish peo-
ple regain their rights.

Allied support is essential if we are
to bring meaningful pressure to bear on
the Soviets and their Polish dependents.
I believe the unity the West has so far
displayed comes as an unpleasant sur-
prise to the Soviets. Continued unity
and concrete pressure— coupled with our
positive offer to help the Polish econ-
omy—offer the best prospect for affect-
ing the future of freedom in Poland.

Middle East

Though Poland will continue to dominate
the news, I would like to comment brief-
ly on the Middle East. My two visits had

Secretary Haig Visits
Europe and the
Middle East

During January 1982, Secretary Haig
made two trips to Europe and the Mid-
dle East.

He departed Washington, D.C.,
January 10 to attend a special
ministerial session of the North Atlantic
Council in Brussels concerning events in
Poland (January 10-12). ' He then was in
Cairo (January 12-14) and Jerusalem
(January 14-15) to discuss the peace
process with Egyptian and Israeli of-
ficials.2 He returned to Washington,
D.C., January 15.

Secretary Haig departed
Washington, D.C., January 24 on his
second trip. He was in Geneva January
25-27, where he met with Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko.3 He then
went to Jerusalem (January 27-28) and
Cairo (January 28-29) to explore the
possibility for progress in the Palestinian
autonomy talks.4 The Secretary returned
to the United States January 29 via
London.5

■For text of NATO declaration of Jan. 11
and the Secretary's remarks on Jan. 12, see
BULLETIN of February 1982, p. 19.

2Press releases 19, 20, 21, and 27.

3Press releases 28 and 34.

4Press releases 35, 36, and 41.

5Press release 37. ■

as their central purpose the strengthen-
ing of the Camp David peace process.
This process is the only practical way to
make progress toward the achievement
of a just and durable peace.

Since assuming office, we have
worked to support the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty and to facilitate the talks
on Palestinian autonomy. We have at
long last resolved the remaining issues
concerning the deployment and composi-
tion of the multinational force and

All of the countries
in the Caribbean are
confronted by a growing
threat from Cuba and
its new-found ally
Nicaragua.

observers (MFO) in the Sinai. We were
also able to ease Israeli concerns over
freedom of navigation in the Strait of
Tiran by confirming the role of the MFO
in that area— with Egyptian agreement.
The force itself should be deployed by
March 20, resulting in final Israeli with-
drawal on April 25.

Another purpose of both visits was
to urge both Egypt and Israel to intensi-
fy their efforts to reach agreement on
autonomy. In 30 hours of intense discus-
sion, I worked with the leaders of Egypt
and Israel to make progress on a decla-
ration of principles. This declaration
would establish the framework for in-
viting the Palestinian Arabs to join with
us in negotiating the detailed agreement
to a self-governing authority— as speci-
fied in the Camp David accords.

After analyzing the issues and differ-
ences, my trip last week gave me the op-
portunity to suggest certain ideas on
how gaps between Egypt and Israel
might be bridged. These ideas are now
being considered by the parties. Hard
work and intellectual ingenuity will be
required of both sides to bridge the
great differences that divide them. We
have agreed together to strive for a
declaration of principles as soon as
possible but without artificial deadlines.

Both President Mubarak and Prime
Minister Begin have pledged to join with
us in a good faith effort to achieve suc-
cess. To encourage momentum, the
President has approved my proposal to
ask former Assistant Secretary for Con-
gressional Relations Richard Fairbanks

to work full time on this effort. His ex-
periences on my second visit have
already introduced him to the complex-
ities of this vital negotiation.

These visits have also been useful in
easing friction between Egypt and
Israel. As the Sinai withdrawal date ap-
proached, both sides began to doubt
each other's intentions. Israel has been
reassured that both the United States
and Egypt are firmly committed to the
Camp David process beyond the April
withdrawal. Egypt has been reassured
that Israel will withdraw on schedule
and that the United States will be a full
partner in the autonomy negotiations.

My trips to Cairo also provided the
opportunity for intensive and wide-
ranging discussions with President
Mubarak on matters of mutual concern.
The President's dedication to the welfare
of his people is matched by his dedica-
tion to peace. His meeting with Presi-
dent Reagan this week will mark
another significant step in the develop-
ment of the close partnership between
our two countries.

Caribbean Basin

Confidence in the United States, funda-
mental to our relations in the Middle
East, is also at stake in the Western
Hemisphere. We face two distinct but
related challenges: first, the economic
and social upheavals that mark the
development process; second, the threat
to democracy and individual rights from
the forces of totalitarianism in Cuba and
elsewhere, supported by the Soviet
Union.

The United States has begun to
meet these challenges, working with the
leaders of Mexico, Canada, and Vene-
zuela. The President has proposed the
Caribbean Basin initiative to assist coun-
tries facing severe economic problems.
The American part of the package in-
cludes trading opportunities, investment
incentives, and increased financial assist-
ance. The President will soon be bring-
ing parts of this package before the Con-
gress for support.

All of the countries in the Caribbean
are confronted by a growing threat from
Cuba and its new-found ally Nicaragua.
Cuba is systematically expanding its
capacity to project military power
beyond its own shores. The arrival this
year of a second squadron of MiG-23/
Floggers and the 63,000 tons of war
supplies imported from the Soviet Union
last year come on top of what was

28

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

already by far the largest air, land, and
sea inventory of the region.

Nicaragua is being exploited as a
base for the export of subversion and
armed intervention throughout Central
America. Inside Nicaragua, Soviet, East
European, and Cuban military advisers
are building Central America's largest
military establishment with Soviet-
supplied arms. Outside Nicaragua, the
clandestine infiltration of arms and
munitions into El Salvador is again ap-
proaching the high levels recorded just
before last year's "final offensive."

The United States has tried to com-
municate with Cuba and Nicaragua. We
have offered a way out of confrontation.
We have sought explanations for the
massive military buildups that consume
the scarce resources of development.
The answer has been greater internal
repression, acceleration of arms build-
ups, and a strengthening of links to the
U.S.S.R.

The threat to democracy from op-
ponents of peaceful change is particular-
ly acute in El Salvador. The Duarte
government is committed to political
reform, free elections, and economic
development. Its opponents, supported
by Nicaragua and Cuba, are determined
to win by force what they could not
achieve by the ballot.

The United States is not alone in its
support of the Salvadoran Government.
At the meeting of the Organization of
American States in St. Lucia last
December, 22 of 29 nations voted in
favor of the Salvadoran program for
elections — only three voted against. A
collective response to the danger is
emerging within Central America with
the formation on January 19 of the Cen-
tral American Democratic Community.
Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador
were joined on January 27 by Venezuela,
Colombia, and the United States to help
carry through the democratic transfor-
mation of El Salvador. Cooperating with
our friends and allies in the region, we
will do whatever is necessary to contain
the threat.

Other Recent Efforts

This brief review of events in Europe,
the Middle East, and the Caribbean
should not distract us from other highly
significant aspects of our policy. To cite
a few recent actions:

• We have helped to revive the

negotiations on Namibia that had effec-
tively collapsed, and we are actively
engaged with our allies, the front-line
states, and South Africa in a realistic
effort to obtain a settlement that could
lead to independence for Namibia in
1982.

• We are supporting the restoration
of peace in Chad under auspices of the
Organization of African Unity, thereby
displacing Libyan influence and military
forces there.

• As a part of our firm stand
against Libyan support for international
terrorism, we have increased support for
Libya's threatened neighbors.

• We continue to support efforts to

achieve a negotiated settlement in the
Western Sahara.

• We have given our full support to
efforts of the Association of South East
Asian Nations to reverse the Viet-
namese occupation of Kampuchea, and
we have sought to maintain military
strength in the area to balance the ever-
growing Soviet military presence in
northeast Asia and in Vietnam.

• Finally, in a period of depressed
economic activity worldwide, we are
working diligently to prevent emergence
of protectionism and to support recipro-
cal policies of free trade.

'Press release 40.

Secretary Interviewed for
U.S. News & World Report

Secretary Haig was interviewed for
U.S. News & World Report, published
February 1, 1982.

Q. The Administration initially took a
strong stand in favor of linkage— the
idea that cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union
must be contingent on good behavior
by the Russians. In light of this, why
are you now continuing arms talks
with Russia and even contemplating a
summit conference, despite Soviet
complicity in the repression of the
Poles?

A. First, let me emphasize une-
quivocally that we have not abandoned
linkage in the Polish situation.

With respect to the topic of the INF
talks— on intermediate-range nuclear
forces in Europe — and the continuation
of those talks, it is clear that the Presi-
dent believes, as I do, that these talks
are more advantageous to the West than
they are to the Soviet Union. And I
don't know any reason why linkage
across a broad front in our relationship
with the Soviet Union should mean a
disadvantage for the West.

The INF talks, after all, are clearly
in our interests — given the current
missile balance in Western Europe and
the threats to Europe involving the
SS-20 and other Soviet systems. Beyond
that, there's a political-psychological
aspect to the question: It would not
serve our purpose to substitute
demonstrations on nuclear armaments
for demonstrations against the Polish
crackdown.

Q. Does the same reasoning apply
to START — the strategic arms reduc-
tion talks? Do you still expect these to
begin this spring?

A. Both the INF and START talks
are influenced by the overall climate and
sense of mutual confidence between the
United States and Moscow. That climate
has been badly disturbed by the current
situation in Poland, and it clearly would
have an impact not only on the opening
of the START talks but on the conduct
of the talks themselves.

At this time we are continuing to
prepare ourselves as rapidly as possible
for an early initiation of START but not
without careful consideration of the im-
pact of the Polish situation, which will
clearly influence both timing and
substance.

Q. There is continued talk in
Washington of the President's interest
in a summit meeting with President
Brezhnev. Is there danger that the
Soviets will see this as a sign that the
United States is indifferent to the
Polish crisis?

A. No. I think it's awfully impor-
tant that we sort out the President's
view on the principle of summitry from
the question of a summit in the near
future with President Brezhnev. The
President has very clearly emphasized
the point that an international crisis may
make high-level talks more urgent, but
that's a reflection on principle, not
necessarily a guide to the current situa-
tion.

The President has also made the

March 1982

29

THE SECRETARY

point of principle that summitry must be
well prepared and that the participants
must have a fairly good expectation of
the outcome under normal circum-
stances.

In the current climate, I see no pros-
pect for an early summit.

Q. Do you expect the sanctions
that we are imposing against the
Soviet Union on the Polish issue to be
truly effective or are they just sym-
bolic acts?

A. We have already taken a
number of steps of which you are aware.
There are many others under considera-
tion which can be implemented if the
situation continues to deteriorate. And I
would describe the situation today as
continuing to deteriorate, even though
there have been some surface gestures
toward a loosening up of the martial law
restrictions. These gestures do not stand
up to close examination. They are no
more than token measures.

It's not so much a question of
whether our sanctions are effective.
Clearly, there are limitations. Even if
every measure available to us were to be
undertaken, it is questionable whether
we could undo a firm Soviet decision to
destroy the Solidarity movement and
perhaps go beyond that into other
segments of the Polish society, such as
the church. At the same time, there is
no reason to believe that the restraints
that influenced the U.S. S.R. for 18
months prior to the crackdown have
disappeared simply because the
crackdown has started.

We don't have the luxury in the
West to say that we should not react
because our measures may not work. It
is not only a question of what may work;
it is a question of principle whether we
will act to uphold the values which we
espouse.

Q. You're suggesting that if the
present trend continues, we must
move to more severe measures —

A. The President has made that
clear.

Q. Can the United States ask its
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to restrict their in-
dustrial trade with Russia— which is
so important to them— without plac-
ing a comparable restriction on
American agricultural sales to the
Soviet Union?

A. We cannot have a double stand-
ard within the alliance. You will note
that in the NATO communique, specific

areas for possible sanctions were listed.
They included trade, agricultural com-
modities, energy, technology, as well as
those areas of financial support which
we've already largely agreed upon.

I also think it's important that fur-
ther expansions of sanctions will be on a
broad front, underlining the President's
view that one segment of our society
should not be penalized in applying sanc-
tions.

Q. Are you concerned that the
burgeoning antinuclear peace move-
ment in Europe may lead to an
unraveling of the Atlantic alliance?

A. I think that European sen-
sitivity— and American sensitivity — to
the nuclear question requires that it be
handled with great care. Many serious-
minded people have important questions
about nuclear weapons, and the leader-
ship in our various capitals has a respon-
sibility not only to answer these ques-
tions but to deal with them in a serious
and responsible way.

Despite the recent demonstrations, I
do not believe that they represent the
mainstream of thought among the
various European publics. Sensitivity
varies according to country. I think it is
a manageable problem.

Q. What do you see as the root
cause of the European peace move-
ment?

A. I would not equate it to
neutralism or pacifism, as some have
done. I would attribute it to a great sen-
sitivity to all things nuclear, a fear
among environmentalists of the dangers
emanating from peaceful uses of nuclear
energy as well as a perception of excess
weaponry on both sides.

If one looks at West Germany today
and the concentration of Western
nuclear weapons in that country, it is a
matter of great concern to all West Ger-
mans that proliferation continues.

There are other aspects of this ques-
tion which have aggravated it, such as a
change in the strategic balances. Until
recently the West could sit rather com-
placently behind a shield of overwhelm-
ing American superiority. That picture
has changed, not only in central
strategic systems but more recently and
more dramatically as a result of the
development of the Soviet SS-20 — what
we call intermediate-range missilery.

Q. There has been a rise here at
home of complaints that Europeans
don't contribute enough to their own
defense. Is there any danger of an
anti-European backlash in this coun-
try, demanding a withdrawal of
American troops from the Continent?

A. If these tendencies are not in-
telligently handled, there could be very
serious consequences for the future of
the Atlantic alliance.

On the other hand, I've been hearing
predictions of the alliance's demise for
the 33-plus years of its existence. Hav-
ing been very closely associated with
NATO, I do not visualize such an out-
come, and the discussions on the Polish
question were very reassuring. Any ob-
jective observer would have to agree
that substantial consensus was achieved.
This was clear evidence of continuing
unity, a common approach, and a con-
vergence of interests.

National interests sustain the vitality
of the alliance, and those interests have
not changed today. If anything, the in-
terdependence between the United
States and those who share our values
around the world has grown in historic
terms. The continued vitality of the
alliance is, therefore, more important to-
day than it was at the time of its incep-
tion, when the United States enjoyed
unilateral nuclear supremacy, unrivaled
industrial advantages, and armed serv-
ices second to none.

Q. Many Americans seem to feel,
however, that the United States is
more concerned about the Soviet
threat to Europe than the Europeans
are. Does this view have any validity?

A. I would have a hard time ac-
cepting that thesis, having lived in
Europe. Our problem in Europe is not
their lack of concern about the threat
but rather their oversensitivity to their
vulnerability to that threat, which I
found to be far more extensive than our
own.

Q. Hasn't the Administration con-
tributed somewhat to Europe's nuclear
jitters with talk about winning limited
nuclear wars and the possible
demonstrative firing of a missile and
so on?

A. I don't know any responsible
public official who has commented on
winning a limited nuclear war.

On the other hand, I think it is also
important that when public officials are
asked a question, they answer that ques-
tion as honestly and as directly as possi-
ble.

In hindsight, there are a number of
things that the United States has done
over the last year that probably I would
have wished to see us do differently, but
I have suggested more than once that
none of us has a monopoly on either
morality or wisdom.

30

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

Q. Some people have argued that
the West, in effect, wrote off Poland
and Eastern Europe at Yalta and that
we're being unrealistic, if not
hypocritical, by trying now to under-
mine Soviet domination of that area.
What is your reaction to that argu-
ment?

A. That's a very self-defeating
distortion of the Yalta and the Potsdam
agreements, and I would refer to anyone
who makes that point to the agree-
ments. There was a clear obligation by
the signatories to provide for the self-
determination of the peoples of Eastern
Europe through the franchise and the
regular exercise of that franchise. The
Soviet Union ignored the obligations of
Potsdam and Yalta almost as soon as
the ink dried on the documents.

Soviet performance in Poland today
is also totally at odds with the provisions
and mutual obligations of the Helsinki
accords of 1975. And we have not only
the right but the firm obligation to pro-
test their violation.

Q. Now that you have announced
a decision not to sell more-advanced
fighter planes to Taiwan, are the
Chinese prepared to resume the move-
ment toward strategic cooperation
with the United States?

A. Clearly the decision has been
received in Taiwan with disappointment
but with accompanying calm.

As for Beijing, Assistant Secretary
[for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] John
Holdridge has just returned from discus-
sions which were held simultaneously
with our announcement. I would say the
results of those discussions lead us to
believe that relationships between
Washington and Beijing will continue on
a sound track and, hopefully, will be im-
proved in the period ahead.

Q. As you know, a number of con-
servatives allege that by not giving
Taiwan what it requested, the Presi-
dent is betraying a personal com-
mitment—

A. I think this is a very unfair
charge to make against President
Reagan. No one has espoused more
clearly the reality that you cannot make
new friends by abandoning old friends,
and this was a difficult decision for the
President.

On the other hand, I think he was
persuaded by the overwhelming con-
vergence of views among his advisers
that this was the right decision. I know
he is convinced, as I am, that it was the
right decision. It is a decision which is in
complete conformity with the obligations

of our internal regulations, and it is a
decision which will continue to meet the
defense needs of the people of Taiwan.

Q. You have recently taken a trip
to the Middle East and are about to
take another. Is there any prospect of
your engaging in a kind of shuttle
diplomacy to advance the talks on the
future of the West Bank in Israel?

A. First, let me tell you I made the
trip to the Middle East essentially as a
factfinding effort. I think I described it
that way before, during, and after the
visits to Egypt and Israel. I felt that we
had an obligation on the American side,
as full partners in this autonomy proc-
ess, to assess the status of these talks.

I do not think that situation lends
itself to shuttle diplomacy. These prob-
lems are only going to be solved if there
is political will at the highest level to
solve them and if an unusual degree of
intellectual ingenuity is applied by the
parties themselves. There is no magic
American formula to bridge these dif-
ferences.

Q. If a breakthrough does not
come in the autonomy talks before
April, when Israel is scheduled to
withdraw from the Sinai, won't the
pressures on Egypt and Israel to reach
an agreement let up somewhat?

A. I agree with that thesis. There
are others, however, who feel that the
requirements and tensions associated
with the return of the Sinai have
overloaded the process and that, after
the return of the Sinai, the air will be
cleared and perhaps more objective ap-
proaches can be undertaken.

Serious men can disagree on the
question of timing. I believe that the
time is ripe to overcome some of the
obstacles. It does not mean that we
would have to achieve an agreement
before the return of the Sinai, but,
hopefully, we could make further prog-
ress toward agreement.

Q. Do you expect to revive the
strategic cooperation agreement with
Israel anytime soon? Or will Israel
have to cancel its annexation of the
Golan Heights first?

A. We would hope that over time
the spirit of mutual trust will be
reestablished. But we have never
established conditions, and I do not
believe that in the conduct of affairs be-
tween sovereign states that tactic is pro-
ductive. It is usually counterproductive.

Q. But revival of the agreement
would depend on the behavior of the
Israeli Government —

A. Clearly, in the period ahead.

Q. Can the United States hope to
expand its strategic cooperation with
the Arab states without resolving the
Palestinian question?

A. Clearly, the Golan Heights ac-
tion was a setback. That is one of the
reasons why the United States took the
position it did. It was not only as a
result of objective analysis of the act but
in consideration of the costs to the peace
process and to American relationships
with the Arab world.

With respect to the subject of
strategic cooperation, it is clear that this
is justified on its own merits. The
moderate Arab states are as threatened
by external danger as they are threat-
ened by their perception of Israeli in-
transigence on the Palestinian question;
this is a reality. We have seen several
firsthand instances of the vulnerability
of the various Arab regimes to either
Soviet-sponsored or radical extremist
threats. I think that it's in the interests
of all of the moderate Arab leaders to
work in close collaboration with us and
each other to deal with such a problem.
That is not to say that events related to
the Arab-Israeli dispute do not have an
impact, because they have and- will con-
tinue to have an impact.

Q. Have the measures the United
States has taken against Muammer
Qadhafi in Libya had any effect as yet?

A. It is too soon to say whether or
not the President's decision to ask
American citizens to leave Libya has had
any effect. Clearly, we continue to see
signs of Libyan mischief, interven-
tionism, and troubling activity in the
Continent of Africa and worldwide. This
would suggest that perhaps further
steps should be contemplated. I do not
ever believe it serves a useful purpose to
air publicly what we may or may not do
in the period ahead.

Q. This Administration has en-
gaged in threatening rhetoric not only
against Libya's Qadhafi but also
against Cuba's Castro, because of his
support for Marxist guerrillas in Cen-
tral America. What has been done to
back up our words in either case?

A. I think the rhetoric was justified
and continues to be justified. With
respect to Cuba, it is clear that a
number of things have been set in train
in the course of the last year designed to
deal with Cuban activity in the
hemisphere. And I think in the period
ahead more will be evident — political,
economic, and security-related steps.

Q. Isn't there danger of the
United States looking like a helpless

Morch 1Q«0

31

THE SECRETARY

giant that can't even deal effectively
with midgets such as Libya and Cuba?

A. I think that's always a risk, but
we've experienced it for the last 5 years.
The results contributed to a change in
the leadership in Washington because
the United States appeared unable to
deal with Cuban intervention in Angola,
Ethiopia, Yemen, the Libyan activity
and terrorism.

I think the American people expect
their President to deal with these ques-
tions, and I know he intends to do so.

Q. How would you characterize
the present situation in El Salvador?
Are the Marxist guerrillas winning or
losing?

A. The government has become
somewhat more effective. They have
forced a change in the modus operandi
of the guerrillas. The rebels have been
moving from indiscriminate terrorism
and larger operations to operations
designed to affect the economic in-
frastructure of the country, such as the
power grid and the transportation grid.

There has been other progress. We
have a schedule of elections. We have
had some remarkable political support in
recent months for a peaceful outcome in
El Salvador to include the electoral proc-
ess. Twenty-two out of 29 nations in the
Organization of American States sup-
ported the election and rejected the con-
cept of external intervention in
Salvadoran affairs. Only three voted
against it.

There is a growing concern among
all of the nations in Central America and
in the hemisphere at large that the
changes in the Sandinista government in
Nicaragua are a grave threat to
hemispheric peace and stability.

Q. Will future actions by the
United States in Central America be
joint actions?

A. The President has emphasized
from the outset that he wishes to avoid
the perception of the behemoth of the
North serving as a self-appointed
policeman for the hemisphere.

He has felt that we must work
toward concerted action by the other
member states of the hemisphere,
especially those that are locally affected.
And he has done so. That doesn't mean
that you get results overnight. It means
that you work patiently — and progress
has been substantial.

Q. Why has the Administration
had so much trouble getting its act
together in managing foreign policy,
as evidenced by the recent changeover
in the national security machinery at
the White House?

A. Every Administration has
tinkered with its mechanism, both in
terms of personalities and organizational
procedures. We would be very remiss
were we not to learn from the lessons of
the first 12 months.

I also dispute the idea that we
haven't got our foreign policy act
together. We do have our foreign policy
act together. We've had some problems
with too many voices, and we've had
what might be called integrative prob-
lems between departments.

Q. Is the President's new Na-
tional Security Adviser, William
Clark, qualified for that job with only
a year's experience as Deputy
Secretary of State?

A. He has had a year of intimate
exposure to every foreign policy issue
before us. I would ask you to go back
and look in the history books, and you
will find that some of our most effective
public servants have come from the
practice of law — civil litigation — and
they've made remarkable contributions.
Bill Clark is a very quick study.

Q. Looking back over the past
year, some critics paint this picture of
the results of the Administration's
foreign policy: the United States and
the Soviet Union at dagger's point,
NATO in its worst crisis ever, future
relations with China uncertain, Marx-
ist guerrillas on the march in Central
America. How does that strike you?

A. It sounds very much to me like
every January over the past decade. It
is very clear that America's post-
Vietnam, post- Watergate approach to in-
ternational affairs set in train problems
which do not lend themselves to over-
night solution.

Critics of American foreign policy
must view our actions in historic
perspective. We have reestablished that
we will not be passive in the face of
unacceptable Soviet behavior worldwide.
We have dedicated ourselves to the
strengthening of our alliances — and I do
not believe the Atlantic alliance is
weaker today than at any time in its
history. We have shown clearly to friend
and foe that the United States does
stand for values which it intends to pur-
sue vigorously. Finally, we have reaf-
firmed that we do have obligations that
go beyond our shores and that in a
changing world those obligations can
best be met by a concert of collective ac-
tion by those who have equal stakes in
the outcome.

On balance, these accomplishments
have made for a good year, but much re-
mains to be done. ■

Poland Has
Not Perished

Address at the Solidarity Day rally
in Chicago on January 30, 1982.1

It is with a deep sense of humility that I
address this gathering. Throughout the
United States, Americans are showing
that Poland matters to them. Not only
Americans of Polish descent but their
neighbors and friends care about events
in a far-off country. Not only Americans
but peoples in many states around the
world are marking this moment in
behalf of Poland.

We know that Poland is a nation
steeped in 1,000 years of European
culture. It has nourished the civilization
from which we draw our own roots as
Americans. And our youth stand guard
in Europe today, defending our freedom
and the freedom of our allies for pos-
terity.

What happens in Poland is, there-
fore, not the affair of a distant country
of which we know nothing and care less.
In an age of materialism, when statistics
and machines seem to matter most, the
people of Poland remind us of the simple
dignity of the workplace that is the
birthright of every worker. In a time
when philosophers debate the best social
system for mankind, the people of
Poland remind us that man requires
freedom if he is to be truly creative. In a
world thirsting for change, the people of
Poland have shown that change can be
most promising when it is peaceful.

What was the achievement of
Poland known as Solidarity? It embodied
an entire nation's search for dignity in
the workplace, for freedom, for self-
determination. It offered hope that the
release of creative talents long sup-
pressed could rescue Poland from its
mounting economic problems. It seemed
possible at last that in the midst of the
world's most heavily armed continent,
Poland would emerge as a symbol of
hope instead of tragedy.

After 18 months, Solidarity has been
violently suppressed. December 13,
1981, began the descent for Poland and
for the world. The Communist author-
ities, mocking their own propaganda,
threw the armed machinery of the state
against the worker. The results are clear
for all to see. Instead of dignity, there is

THE SECRETARY

degradation. Instead of truth, there is
violation of conscience. Instead of free-
dom, there is fear.

The Polish Government and its ally,
the Soviet Union, have been unable to
produce either bread or freedom. They
have been more adept at producing
falsehoods.

First, we are told that Solidarity
itself brought about its own suppression
through excesses that endangered
Poland's entire economy. Has the Polish
Government forgotten its own statistics,
which recorded increasing production
after August of 1981? Does it expect the
world to forget the heroic figure of Lech
Walesa, who declines to cooperate in the
soiling of Solidarity's record?

Second, we are told that the Soviet
Union did not intervene in Poland and
had nothing to do with the suppression
of Solidarity. But does Moscow expect
the world to forget its pressures,
threats, and intimidation— including its
military maneuvers? Can we forget that
these actions were intended explicitly to
halt the progress of reform? Can we
ignore the evidence of secret prepara-
tions for martial law, including the
printing of the decree itself in the Soviet
Union? The use of force against the
Polish people today takes place because
Moscow wanted it, because Moscow sup-
ports it, and because Moscow encour-
ages it.

Third, we are told that General
Jarulzelski's regime deserves support
because the "state of war" in Poland is
the act of Polish nationalists, concerned
that something worse will happen unless
Communist-style law and order are
established. Let us listen instead to the
Polish bishops who described the entire
nation as terrorized by military force. Is
this terror more justifiable because a
Polish general, rather than a Soviet
general, signs the decrees?

Fourth, we are told that Poland's
misfortunes are none of our business,
that we have no right to judge the situa-
tion nor to influence it. Let us listen
instead to the voice of reason, the voices
of Polish intellectuals and artists who
wrote: "We declare that the decision to
introduce the state of war in Poland on
December 13, 1981, has broken the basic
principle of international law for self-
determination." This judgment of the
Polish intellectuals is well-founded. The
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by
both Poland and the Soviet Union, is

based on this principle. It sets standards
of freedom and diversity. Can we afford
to forget that the violation of this act
affects the very basis of East-West rela-
tions? Can we afford to ignore the pat-
tern of intervention and violence that
marks Soviet policy not only in Eastern
Europe but in Afghanistan and else-
where?

As we stand here today, the people
of Poland look to us for support in their
hour of need. We must give our support
not only because it matters to them but
also because it matters to us. We must
set practical policies with realistic objec-
tives.

President Reagan and other
Western leaders have declared that we
seek an end to repression, a release of
political prisoners, and a restoration of
those rights, as promised in the Helsinki
Final Act, that protect the independence
of the union movement and the church.
Only in this way can the basis be
established for reconciliation through
negotiation within Polish society.

These are not foreign demands made
in America or elsewhere to be imposed
on Poland. Since the imposition of the
state of war, the men of reason in
Poland have demanded an end to con-
frontation with the nation. The men of
faith have demanded to know the truth
behind the suppression of liberty. The
men of Solidarity have demanded that
General Jarulzelski fulfill his statement
before the national assembly that "Trade
unions in Poland will be as the working
people wish them to be."

We must face the fact that today
both the Polish and the Soviet Govern-
ments are ignoring these just demands
of the Polish people. They seem deter-
mined to plunge further into the abyss.
But their course is not without cost.
And when they reckon the cost, a
degree of moderation may be possible.

The United States has made clear
that we will not do business as usual
with either Poland or the Soviet Union
while repression in Poland continues.
We have also made evident that Poland
is not merely an incident to put behind
us. It has cast a long and dark shadow
over East- West relations.

The United States is not alone. Our
allies in the North Atlantic Council have
already taken some steps. They have
begun the task of identifying possibilities
for action across a broad front, including
an examination of the course of future
economic and commercial relations with

the Soviet Union. At the same time, the
West has indicated its readiness to help
revive Poland's shattered economy when
the Polish people regain their rights.

Make no mistake. These tragic
events in the East have a profound
meaning for us in the West. Our pro-
gress, despite all of our faults, is a
striking rebuke to the Soviet system.
After all, what the Polish people sought

As the trustees of peace
and freedom, it is only
through our strength
and resolve, our passion
for the defense of our
liberties, that we earn
the right to say to the
Polish people: The day
will dawn after the ter-
ror of the night.

was no more than we take for granted,
as natural to us as the air we breathe.

This cruel suppression of freedom
reminds us, as the Polish bishops wrote,
that "Real peace stems from respect for
freedom and the correct understanding
of everyone's right to freedom." As the
trustees of peace and freedom, it is only
through our strength and resolve, our
passion for the defense of our liberties,
that we earn the right to say to the
Polish people: The day will dawn after
the terror of the night.

Ladies and gentlemen, Poland has
not perished. Poland cannot perish. The
exponents of Marxist-Leninism in War-
saw or Moscow, who pride themselves
on knowledge of the laws of history,
have ignored this basic truth. The sight
of a peaceful people seeking peaceful
change has terrified them. But the
actions of these fearful men will not
deprive the Poles of their faith, their
courage, or their sacred dreams. Change
will come. Hope will be reborn. And
Poland will truly be Poland again.

Jeszcze Polska Nie Zgniela. [Poland
has not perished.]

'Press release 39 of Feb. 2, 1982.

March 1982

33

AFRICA

Angola

DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS

Dec. 9, 19811

The Secretary met with UNITA [Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence
of Angola] leader Jonas Savimbi yester-
day afternoon. This meeting is the
culmination of a series of talks that Dr.
Savimbi has held in the State Depart-
ment last week and this. He met with
Under Secretary [for Political Affairs
Walter J.] Stoessel and Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs [Chester
A.] Crocker and others last week.
This Administration has been open

to talk with all the parties to the conflict
in southern Africa and this obviously in-
cludes UNITA, which we regard as a
legitimate political force in Angola which
must be taken into account if peace is to
return to the region. The Secretary and
other officials informed Dr. Savimbi of
our wish to see all Cuban and other
foreign forces leave Angola and our
belief that this must take place if a
necessary climate of security is to return
to the region. Dr. Savimbi, for his part,
reiterated his commitment to a political
solution to the civil war in Angola.

Dec. 18, 198P

I would like to comment on two recent
developments relating to Angola.

First, you will recall President Dos

("• .SIBiti

CONGO

.OndanguB

NAMIBIA

(International Territory 1

□ ATCIIIflMA *"^

BOTSWANA

a.

Santos' announcement on December 10
that the Government of Angola is ready
to talk to the U.S. Government on mat-
ters of mutual interest. We consider this
an important and very positive state-
ment to which we have responded in a
similarly positive manner through
diplomatic channels.

Second, I want to comment on the
Clark amendment. As you know, the re-
cent House-Senate conference resulted
in leaving the Clark amendment on the
books. This has no practical effect as far
as we are concerned since, as we have
said consistently, there are no plans to
provide assistance to any of the forces
inside Angola. Nonetheless, the restric-
tions on the President's power in foreign
affairs imposed by the Clark amendment
remain unacceptable to this Administra-
tion. The President's authority to con-
duct foreign affairs is a matter of princi-
ple upon which we will not compromise.
For this reason we asked the Senate
conferees not to work out compromise
language with the House, and we have
reserved our right to move for clean
repeal of the Clark amendment during
the next session.

Dec. 24, 19812

We have seen the Portuguese press
reports that the United States is sup-
porting 2,000 Angolan rebels based in
Zaire and is providing assistance to
UNITA. These reports are totally
without foundation. The reports smack
of a deliberate disinformation effort to
revive groundless accusations made a
few years ago of U.S. support for
Angolan opposition groups. We have
previously emphasized that we are work-
ing to achieve peaceful solutions to the
problems of southern Africa.

In this connection, let me reiterate
that we hope to deepen our dialogue
with the Angolan Government and have
responded positively to Angolan Presi-
dent Dos Santos' statement that Angola
is prepared to talk with us. Our recent
discussions with Jonas Savimbi, leader
of UNITA, also focused on our commit-
ment to achieving political, rather than
military, solutions to regional problems.
Dr. Savimbi expressed support for our
efforts to achieve a peaceful solution.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

2Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

34

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

U.S.-European Economic
Relations

by Robert D. Hormats

Address before the Mid-America
Committee in Chicago on December 16,
1981. Mr. Hormats is Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business Af-
fairs.

The United States and Western Europe
are facing a critical period in our rela-
tions as stresses build on important eco-
nomic, political, and security issues.
Management of these issues will be
difficult and complex, and problems in
one area can complicate and sour the at-
mosphere for resolution of those in the
others.

I want to talk today about one ele-
ment of the triad — transatlantic eco-
nomic relations. It is no secret that our
economic relations with Europe today
are seriously strained. Over the past 30
years we have had periods of severe eco-
nomic friction, but we have worked
together in our self-interest and in the
interest of the alliance to find solutions,
contain the fallout, and move ahead. To-
day, against a background of economic
and social pressures and problems in the
world economy, the economic issues be-
tween us appear more difficult to resolve
and the potential for damage greater.

Yet U.S.-European economic rela-
tions are a cornerstone of prosperity on
both sides of the Atlantic and of
Western security. Our objective must be
to resolve differences successfully and
build a more confident and vigorous
partnership that contributes to our
mutual prosperity, serves our common
interests, and helps shape a more pros-
perous world economy.

Current Situation

Economic problems in Europe are
serious. Unemployment is high — his-
torically high since Marshall plan days —
and falls heavily on people under 25
years of age. Growth is either negative
or disappointingly slow. And inflation is
stubbornly resistant to policies to reduce
it. Social pressures are growing. The im-
pact of imports on sensitive, less-
competitive, often labor-intensive Euro-
pean industries further aggravates con-
cerns. Europeans are deeply and in-
creasingly pessimistic about their na-
tions' economic prospects. Prolonged

March 1982

economic stagnation has brought
political uncertainty and weakened
governments. In short, Europe appears
to be losing confidence in itself and its
future.

In the United States, unemployment
is high, big industries are operating well
below capacity, and farm incomes are
low. Feelings run high about other na-
tions' use of subsidies or import restric-
tions which limit U.S. manufactured and
agricultural products in foreign markets.

Because of the economic problems
on both sides of the Atlantic, U.S.-Euro-
pean economic disputes are sharper and
more difficult to manage than they
would be if times were not so hard. In
their weakened state, some European

Further complicating the situation is
the fact that those who lived through
the political strife and the economic divi-
sions of the interwar period and the
great age of European-American cooper-
ation and who constructed the NATO
alliance, the Atlantic economic partner-
ship, and the European Community, are
gradually being succeeded by a new
generation to whom the similarity of
U.S.-European interests is no longer
self-evident. Their primary attention and
the major part of their careers have
been directed to addressing pressing na-
tional issues, and they do not consult in-
ternationally as instinctively as those
who together rebuilt the world in the
postwar period.

History of U.S.-European
Economic Cooperation

Can we today find inspiration for resolv-
ing our economic differences by looking

Economic problems in Europe are serious.
Unemployment is high . . . growth is either
negative or disappointingly slow. And inflation is
stubbornly resistant to policies to reduce it.

In the United States, unemployment is high,
big industries are operating well below capacity,
and farm incomes are low.

governments cannot, or are reluctant to,
take unpopular corrective measures and
are finding it more difficult to resist
pressures to solve domestic problems
through import restrictions or export
subsidies. And, the authority of Euro-
pean Community institutions to deal
with these problems has been sapped by
the political weakness of member
governments and the lack of a consensus
among them.

These economic issues are set
against a backdrop of increased tension
between the United States and Europe
over political-security issues: East- West
relations, arms control, and Mideast
peace. These problems have origins
separate from our economic differences
and would remain even if those differ-
ences were solved. But such problems,
combined with those in the economic
area, put a heavy burden on the Atlantic
relationship; while their origins are not
linked and solutions should not be, they
are linked in the public mind. The
management of each affects the environ-
ment for the management of the others.

back at the economic principles that
guided us for more than two decades in
the postwar period — when Europe and
the United States prospered mightily
and optimism was high? Or have these
principles lost relevance for these
difficult and uncertain times?

In the early 1940s, even while the
bombs were falling, leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic looked ahead to the
peace and developed plans for the in-
stitutions that would be necessary for a
peaceful and a prosperous world. They
were guided by the political and eco-
nomic lessons of the anarchic interwar
years. Americans and Europeans collab-
orated to create the core international
institutions that today govern economic
relations among nations.

• The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) laid down rules of the
road to promote nondiscriminatory trade
and the progressive reduction of trade
barriers.

• The International Monetary Fund

35

ECONOMICS

(IMF) laid down rules to promote ex-
change rate stability and a multilateral
system of payments supporting the
growth of trade.

• The International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) was
to encourage productive international in-
vestment for economic recovery and
growth.

To these core institutions were later
added the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which
evolved into the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) as a forum for the industrialized
democracies to consult and coordinate
economic policies.

This was followed by the creation in
1957 of the European Community — a
remarkable product of political/economic
compromise — as an economic structure
that would bind European nations in
peaceful cooperation. The judgment was
widely accepted that European nations
would have a better chance of bringing
prosperity to their citizens by creating a
common market than by maintaining
barriers to trade among one another.
U.S. -EC cooperation helped to buttress
the NATO alliance and our common
prosperity, the multilateral economic in-
stitutions, and the principles on which
they were based. Indeed, the proud
tradition of U.S. -EC cooperation is not
only that it has addressed bilateral prob-
lems successfully but that it also has im-
proved the performance of, and pro-
moted the principles of openness and
nondiscrimination in, the world economy
for the broader global good.

The philosophy underlying these in-
stitutions was to let the marketplace
operate with a minimum of barriers to
the flow of goods, services, and capital
across national boundaries in order to
maximize the gains from international
exchange — that is, to reintegrate
economies on the basis of increasingly
open commercial and financial ties and
to unwind the restrictions of the prewar
period.

This was in reaction to, and in sharp
contrast with, behavior in the interwar
years, when governments used an array
of trade and payments restrictions in
vain attempts to improve their individual
situations at the expense of their neigh-
bors. The deluge that followed engulfed
them all.

Support for an open economic
system promoting opportunity for
private persons to respond to market in-
centives and to compete with one
another within and across borders
flowed naturally from and reinforced the

basic political and social values of the
United States and its European allies:
individual freedom, limited government,
and open exchange of ideas.

Multilateral trade and financial in-
stitutions—which embodied this ap-
proach—were to encourage economic
cooperation and consultation among
sovereign nations and develop rules for
the orderly resolution of conflicting in-
terests. This would help to take eco-
nomic disputes out of the political arena.

The success and the benefits of this
approach and these institutions are well
known: Until the early 1970s, the in-
dustrialized democracies of Europe and
North America enjoyed an unparalleled
expansion of trade and international in-
vestment and the longest period of sus-
tained, rapid, and broadly based eco-
nomic growth in history. The result was
rising employment, rising production,
and rising levels of personal well-being.

The United States played an historic
leadership role in the progress achieved
in that period. We were pioneers in
building the institutions of multilateral
cooperation, and we provided substantial
financing for the reconstruction of
Europe and Japan and the development
of poorer countries. We practiced liberal
trade policies while accepting that others
were not in a position to reciprocate ful-
ly. We acted as banker to the rest of the
world. In short, we used our economic
strength and influence to help promote
recovery and growth abroad and to
shape a world order compatible with our
values and our long-term economic,
political, and security interests.

Emerging Internal Problems

The impressive record of the first 25
postwar years conceals problems which
began to develop in the latter part of
that period and are having adverse
effects today. As growth gained momen-
tum, it was, perhaps, assumed to be in-
evitable for the future. As growth con-
tinued, governments were publicly called
on, and felt freer, to pursue distributive
objectives in order to help those who
had not participated as fully in the bene-
fits that growth had provided for the
majority and to work toward other
social and environmental goals.

Increasingly, political or social
criteria were substituted for economic
criteria in the distribution of wealth.
Subsidies to industries and farms in-
creased, regulations to reduce pollution
and improve health and safety standards
were adopted, protection of weak in-
dustries against foreign competition

became more common, and measures
were taken which reduced the mobility
of labor and capital.

Together these created rigidities for
individuals and firms, and thus impeded
adjustment to economic change. The
costs to efficiency and growth were seen
as both affordable and as a relatively
small price to pay for the broader bene-
fits to society or important parts
thereof, which many of these programs
were designed to bring. Political leaders
often saw these programs as important
to their continued tenure in office.

As a result, even as income was
growing steadily in the 1950s and 1960s,
an inflationary bias was being built into
Western economies by the cumulative
effect of these measures. Because full
employment is a goal of the electorate in
Western countries— and most leaders
have preferred to avoid action to curb
inflation if the short-term cost is in-
creased unemployment— the inflationary
bias was accentuated. The result has
been a continuing upward secular trend
in prices, a rising base which was then
propelled sharply upward by internal
and external shocks.

The same instincts which led govern-
ments to pursue social goals through
measures that increased costs and
rigidities also caused them to try to pro-
tect their citizens from the full impact of
inflation. In the 1970s, when already in-
creasing inflation was exacerbated and
amplified by sharp oil price increases,
this effort led to policies whose long-
term costs are now becoming evident.
Indexation of wages and savings instru-
ments, export subsidies to offset cost in-
creases, price and wage controls, regula-
tion of prices of such items as oil and
petroleum products — even in the face of
scarcity and increasing world prices —
were all designed to insulate economies
or certain groups therein from the im-
pact of inflation or the need to adjust to
changes in prices and to domestic and
international competition.

If there is pessimism about economic
prospects in the West today, the diffi-
culty of coming to grips with deeply
embedded inflation in ways that do not
involve high levels of unemployment
must surely be a principal reason. The
problem in Europe is particularly
serious. While most Western countries
have implemented defensive measures
that create economic rigidities, the
Europeans — impelled by social
pressures — have tended to use more of
them than the United States or Japan.
And they find them more difficult to

36

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

eliminate. As a result, European adjust-
ment to rising international competition
and changes in factor costs such as
energy has lagged behind that of the
United States and Japan. Because of
structural rigidities, the job faced by
European leaders of stimulating growth
without intensifying inflation or reducing
inflation without intensifying unemploy-
ment is extremely difficult. This situa-
tion adds further to pressures for pro-
tection and subsidy.

Particularly in periods of economic
difficulty, it is hard for popularly elected
governments to permit electorates to en-
dure short-term hardships, even though
such hardships may be necessary to cor-
rect economic difficulties and permit ad-
justment to changing economic condi-
tions. The problem for many European
countries today is that at precisely the
moment when unpopular short-term
measures are needed to correct prob-
lems and contribute to stronger
economies in the longer term, many
governments are so weak — in part be-
cause of these very economic prob-
lems—that they cannot implement such
measures.

U.S. -European Community
Economic Cooperation

While the confidence and optimism of
the 1950s and 1960s have given way to
uncertainty and gloom in much of
Western Europe, the practice of close
U.S. -European consultation has per-
sisted, as has the search for accommoda-
tion. Protectionism has been held in
check and the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations has been completed based
on strong U.S. -EC cooperation. Energy
cooperation, within the International
Energy Agency and the EC, continues
strong. In the period following the first
oil shock, the West recognized, clearly,
the need for a common approach, aware
that a mad scramble for energy supplies
or failure to reduce vulnerability
through additional production, conserva-
tion, and a collective approach to shar-
ing would damage Western economies
and the alliance.

A fundamental principle of
U.S. -European cooperation is that both
sides fail if either tries to escape its
problem by shifting the burden to its
partners — the powerful lesson of the
1930s. But pressures are intense in
Europe to break out of the prolonged
stagnation. Because many Europeans
despair of the possibility of a vigorous
domestic recovery, there are growing

March 1982

demands for insulating the Community,
or individual members, from foreign
competition — especially from Japan and
the developing countries — and increas-
ing subsidies to support exports. These
demands, and European reaction to
them, are at the heart of U.S. trade
problems with the Community.

Agriculture. The agricultural
policies of the United States and the EC
are inspired by different economic phi-
losophies. The U.S. farm program is de-
signed to interfere as little as possible in
international agricultural markets. When
prices are low, the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) takes over, and along
with farmers, holds surplus U.S. produc-

A fundamental prin-
ciple of U.S. -European
cooperation is that both
sides fail if either tries
to escape its problem by
shifting the burden to its

partners the powerful

lesson of the 1930s.

tion; it does not dampen world prices by
subsidizing exports. Our farmers hold
the world's largest grain reserves, thus
contributing to world food security and
international price stability.

The EC's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) is based on high price sup-
ports. It has no production controls and
protects prices by variable levies at the
border. It has created burdensom
surpluses and serious budget problems
for the Community. By subsidizing ex-
ports, it has artificially stimulated large-
scale European exports in such products
as wheat, sugar, and meat. This limits
market opportunities for products of
such countries as the United States,
which compete without subsidies.

We recognize the importance of the
CAP to the origins of the Community
and to its continued cohesion. Last week
in Brussels, U.S. Cabinet members
stressed that we would not challenge the
fundamental elements of the policies on
which European unity is based. We also
understand the political, social, and
economic conditions under which Euro-
pean agriculture operates, which are
quite different from those in the United
States. But, we are seriously concerned
about the effects of excesses in the CAP.

We fear that the EC is seeking to solve
its internal agricultural overproduction
and budget problems by converting the
CAP into a common export policy based
on extensive subsidies. We are also
deeply disturbed that the EC from time
to time considers measures that would
curb exports into the EC market of soy-
beans and feed grain substitutes. This
would violate their GATT bindings to us.

Some $9 billion in U.S. exports to
the EC and more than $40 billion in
U.S. worldwide sales are at issue in this
area. Serious friction in our bilateral
relations would result, as would in-
creased instability in world markets, if
present EC policy trends continue. We
have made it clear to the Community
that if our legitimate agricultural in-
terests and rights are adversely affected,
we will strongly defend them. However
difficult Europe's internal situation, it
cannot be resolved at the expense of
U.S. agricultural interests.

We welcome the effort within the
Community to reform the CAP, make it
less costly to the Community budget,
and give it a greater market orientation.
It will not be easy for 10 countries with
diverse interests to agree on modifica-
tions to achieve greater efficiency and
reduce cost. But it is a reasonable and
sustainable course of action over the
long run.

Steel. Steel, like the CAP, is not a
new problem for U.S.-European rela-
tions. It is reemerging with intensity at
the present time because the industry on
both sides of the Atlantic faces serious
difficulties. The basic problem is world
over capacity. The European and U.S.
steel industries need to rationalize and
modernize to be competitive. That proc-
ess is going on. The U.S. industry is re-
structuring with its own resources. The
European industry is also restructuring.
In some cases this has been done
through dramatic, large-scale plant clos-
ings and layoffs. In others, progress is
slow and uneven, and large and continu-
ing infusions of public funds continue.

One result of the pace and method
of rationalization in European steel has
been constant friction over subsidized
steel exports from EC countries to the
United States. These exports bite hard
when our own industry is suffering and
have led the U.S. industry to threaten to
file countervailing duty suits.

A modernized, restructured steel in-
dustry on both sides of the Atlantic
would be a healthy development. That
will take time. We cannot ask the U.S.

37

ECONOMICS

industry to wait indefinitely while sub-
sidized imports hurt their own efforts to
rationalize. We can, however, work with
Europe to make the trigger price
mechanism work more effectively and
thus permit time for restructuring with-
out new trade disputes or distortions.

If, however, suits are filed, we will,
as in the past, insure that the pro-
cedures used by the U.S. Government
are scrupulously fair. And we believe it
in the interests of the United States and
Europe that this issue not be linked to
others; it should not be allowed to sour
the climate for, or divert us from, pursu-
ing constructive solutions to other
issues.

Export Credit Subsidies. Exports
can be subsidized directly; they can also
be subsidized through the use of govern-
ment export credits at interest rates
well below market levels. In either case
they are a source of trade friction. We
have been pressing hard to secure agree-
ment among the major trading countries
to bring officially supported export
credits to market rates.

This issue, like the other divisive
subsidy issues, has potential for trouble
in U.S. -EC economic relations. Happily,
the issue has been defused, temporarily
at least, by a 6-month arrangement
recently negotiated in the OECD that
brings interest rates on export credits
closer to market rates. We hope to move
yet closer to market rates when that ar-
rangement expires. But with unemploy-
ment rising in Europe, the prospect is
unclear.

Economic Relations With the East

A potentially divisive issue between the
United States and Europe is the differ-
ence in approach on trade with the
Soviets and Eastern Europe. Western
Europe is relying importantly on
Eastern markets for manufactured
goods, the more so in a period of weak
domestic demand in Western Europe. In
many cases such exports are financed by
attractive credits supported by Western
European governments. For economic
and political reasons, there is also a
greater reluctance in Western Europe
than in the United States to use trade
restrictions to achieve political objec-
tives.

But there is concern in the United
States about the leverage that close
trade ties could provide the Soviets. In
particular the potential leverage provid-
ed the Soviets by the Siberian- Western

European gas pipeline raises serious
concerns. Many Europeans, on the other
hand, view economic links with the East
as having a moderating effect on Soviet
behavior — a judgment viewed with skep-
ticism in the United States — and many
believe that any Soviet threat to inter-
rupt gas supplies would trigger a strong
anti-Soviet reaction in Europe, and that,
in any event, Europe could offset the
effect of any interruption. A high-level
effort to address these issues is under-
way, as failure to face up to these differ-
ences can weaken U.S. -European securi-
ty and economic ties.

A substantial degree of consensus
remains between the United States and
Western Europe concerning the impor-
tance of export controls on strategic ex-
ports. We look to the upcoming high-
level COCOM [Coordinating Committee
for East-West Trade Policy] meeting to
reaffirm the consensus among the
United States, Europe, Japan, and
Canada, and to strengthen our ability to
deny the Soviets the goods and technolo-
gy to enhance their military capability.

Future Agenda

Our relationship with Western Europe—
and, in particular, the Community — re-
mains at the heart of our foreign policy
and our international economic policy.
We need to work out solutions to our
differences, to strengthen the mutual
prosperity which underpins our security
and our efforts to improve social well-
being, and move ahead together to
shape multilateral approaches that will
move the world in positive directions.
Where do we begin? First, there is

Our relationship
with Western Europe —
and in particular, the
Community — remains
at the heart of our
foreign policy and our
international economic
policy.

an important need to recognize the
damage that could be done to U.S. -Euro-
pean economic, political, and security in-
terests if economic issues are not satis-
factorily resolved. Second, we must lift
our sights from the specific problems we

face to what we can achieve in our eco-
nomic relations if we pursue a more ac-
tive, positive, and less defensive ap-
proach to international economic issues.
And, finally, we can try to define certain
basic principles for U.S. -European bi-
lateral and multilateral economic cooper-
ation to enable us to reach our goals.

The dangers in the present situation
are clear. If our economic differences
are permitted to fester, they will spill
over to other economic and noneconomic
elements in our relationship. Powerful
domestic interests are involved on both
sides of the Atlantic. There is enormous
potential for pressures to intensify,
rhetoric to heighten, and restrictions to
spread — inviting retaliation, thrust, and
counterthrust. The end result would be a
downward spiral in world trade and in-
vestment, which would be injurious to
U.S., European, and world growth and
well-being. And this could have poison-
ous effects on international politics, on
prospects for orderly cooperative rela-
tions among the major nations, and on
U.S. -European security.

From time to time during the past
30 years, U.S. -European relations have
been under major stress. But this time it
is particularly serious, both because the
economic problems themselves are
difficult and underlying economic per-
formance is weak, and because many
governments are less able to take the
bold actions necessary to reverse unsat-
isfactory trends. We know that our
political and security aims can be pur-
sued most effectively if U.S. -European
economic relations are in good shape
and our policies are outward looking. It
is clear that statesmanship and popular
understanding are needed to manage
economic issues no less than political
and security issues. They are inter-
related.

What are our goals for U.S. -EC eco-
nomic relations? We want a more confi-
dent and vigorous economic partnership
directed toward resolving current differ-
ences and fostering improved interna-
tional economic conditions. This has
been a U.S. goal throughout the postwar
period: the United States and a unified
Europe as coequal partners, sharing ris-
ing gains from deeper and wider eco-
nomic ties and sharing responsibility —
with Japan, Canada, and increasingly
with the developing nations — for a
healthy world economy.

Growth. The first imperative is re-
stored economic vitality in Europe and
in the United States. The productive
base is there to support a steady expan-
sion in living standards. What is needed

38

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

are domestic economic policies to en-
courage increased productivity and com-
petitiveness, to resist short-term
pressures for protection and subsidy,
and to hold a steady course keyed
toward stable growth. This will require
strong measures, often unpopular. While
the pace of progress may differ from
country to country depending on its cir-
cumstances, the goal of reducing im-
pediments to adjustment and thus
regaining a greater measure of struc-
tural flexibility, will increase confidence
and set a more dynamic course.

European Unity. We support the
objective of European unity as embodied
in the European Community. A strong,
prosperous, and united Europe is impor-
tant to the security and the prosperity
of the United States and the West.

While we may have difficulties with
certain EC policies, the existence of the
Community as the policy entity for, and
representative of, the Ten [members of
the Community] on trade and other eco-
nomic issues is much to be preferred to
trying to maintain economic relations on
these issues with ten countries, with
constant friction among them. The Com-
munity makes trade and other economic
issues more manageable than would be
the case if it did not exist. And, its
historical outward-looking and construc-
tive approach to the world economy has
been essential to the success of the
Tokyo Round, the creation of the Inter-
national Energy Agency, and progress
on a variety of international economic
issues.

We seek to reactivate cooperation
with the EC Commission. Last week's
meeting between Secretaries Haig,
Block, and Baldridge and Ambassador
Brock and key EC commissioners under-
scored this commitment and the impor-
tance we attach to our contact with the
Commission. Future trilateral and bi-
lateral talks on trade will continue this
process.

Trade. We want to work with the
EC to further expand mutually bene-
ficial trade opportunities. The increasing
integration of economies, which was the
source of growth and strength to our
societies in the 1950s and 1960s,
threatens to be reversed by new impedi-
ments and distortions. From time to
time the impact of imports will need to
be cushioned when they cause or
threaten serious injury, but the cushion-
ing should be temporary and the relief
degressive to encourage adaptation.
Free trade today is, in most cases, more
a myth than a reality. But trade expan-
sion rather than contraction must be our

common objective, as must the objective
of avoiding subsidies and other distor-
tions to trade.

Neither the United States nor the
EC has exhausted the potential for gain
in terms of growth and more and better
jobs from specialization, innovation,
competition, and economies of scale. Nor
have we sufficiently recognized the role
of trade as an anti-inflationary tool. The
better we do on trade— and the more we
gear our economies to meet interna-
tional competition— the better able we
will be to maintain growth at low rates
of inflation. Adjustment problems have
increased and will continue with eco-
nomic integration. But these should be
manageable if we pursue national
policies favorable to domestic growth,
share the responsibility for adapting to
economic change, and avoid shifting the
burdens of adjustment to others through
dumping, subsidy, or protection.

Related to our trade performance
must be a vigorous effort to stimulate
research and development in new areas
of science and technology. Collaboration
among our firms and governments can
help them share the costs and benefits of
the enormously expensive research need-
ed for the next generation of technolo-
gy, and enable our industries better to
meet the needs of our societies and bet-
ter compete internationally. This ap-
proach, rather than the more restrictive
approach being pressed by some Euro-
pean countries in such areas as tele-
communications, can lead to mutual
gains.

We want to work together with
Europe to integrate the developing
countries more fully into the world
trading system. These countries must be
encouraged to open their markets fur-
ther and assume a greater share of the
effort for a well-functioning trading
system. Trade is the single most impor-
tant means to growth for developing
countries, and their growth can boost
our own. The EC and the United States
have a common interest in seeing the
trading system evolve so as to share
growing responsibilities and commen-
surate benefits with developing nations.

Investment. We want to work with
the EC to help establish a new frame-
work for international investment. The
multinational corporation, global in out-
look, is operating in a world of nation
states whose outlook is national. The
tension between the global and the na-
tional perspectives has led to increased

government intervention that distorts
trade and investment decisions and
reduces potential gains for the world
economy. Unlike the trade area where
international institutions and rules exist,
there are no such institutions, and few
rules, in the investment area. Countries
are moving in a more nationalist direc-
tion, threatening the sort of friction in-
duced by short-sighted trade policies in
the 1930s.

To the extent that common under-
standings, leading ultimately to common
rules, can be agreed and a broader and
more multilateral approach to a system
of guarantees against political risk for
investors in developing countries can be
developed, many of the uncertainties
that inhibit investment will be reduced
or eliminated. This is an endeavor in
which the United States and EC can
cooperate to our mutual benefit and the
global good.

East-West Trade. On East-West
trade, we need to build on a common ap-
proach to avoid both enhancing Soviet
military capabilities and increasing the
leverage provided the Soviets by
Western dependence on their markets
and energy supplies. We recognize the
importance Western Europeans attach
to commercial relations with the East.
Our objective is to work with Europe to
find an appropriate balance between
commercial and security concerns. But
in light of Soviet performance in
Afghanistan and actions elsewhere, we
believe that security concerns should be
given considerably greater weight. A
tightening of export controls on mili-
tarily critical items and, in particular, on
the technology to make them, will in the
long run reduce the quality and quantity
of Soviet military buildup and the need
for certain Western military expendi-
tures to counter Soviet capabilities.

Energy. The vulnerability of the
Europeans to oil and gas interruptions,
and the potential for the subject to
become a divisive issue in NATO and be-
tween the United States and EC, compel
closer U.S. -European energy coopera-
tion. A common approach to disruptions
or the threat thereof, backed by ade-
quate stocks and surge capacity, and
major efforts to develop alternatives to
unreliable Soviet and Middle East sup-
plies can be a unifying factor within
Europe, among the NATO nations, and
among the industrialized democracies.

We have twice paid the price of com-
placency on energy. Permitting market

March 1982

39

ECONOMICS

forces to stimulate conservation and in-
crease production and minimizing regu-
latory impediments to both can help to
improve further our collective efforts to
reduce energy imports and the frictions
which, from time to time, emerge on
this issue. And continued U.S. and
European efforts to encourage develop-
ing countries to improve the environ-
ment for increased energy production
and to assist them in their efforts to in-
crease domestic and foreign investment
in this area can improve their prospects,
diversify our own sources of energy, and
reduce energy imbalances in the world
economy.

Relations With Developing Na-
tions. Both the United States and
Europe are increasingly and significantly
dependent on developing countries for
markets and raw materials. Their pros-
perity is important to our own. For

Conclusion

There are a few basic principles which
could strengthen the U.S. -European eco-
nomic partnership.

• The first such principle is to re-
frain from shifting the burden of adjust-
ment to one another. We respect and
support the goal of European economic
unity. But we ask that in the process of
reaching an internal consensus which re-
solves the problems of the Ten, Europe
does not shift the burden of adjustment
to its trading partners. Each of us, the
United States and Europe, must be sen-
sitive to the impact of our policies on
others. Our weight in the world
economy demands this.

• A second principle is to seek some
understandings about the degree of
government involvement in international
trade and investment decisions. The
basic premises of the market-oriented

The genius of our economies is that they work
best when we provide adequate incentives for
workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs and permit
them to realize the gains which come from hard
work and innovation.

these reasons, we need to encourage
these countries to reexamine their own
policies to identify impediments to
growth and opportunities for improve-
ment and to determine how to better
their investment climates. Similarly, we
can together find ways for more effec-
tively utilizing our concessional aid,
recognizing that in a period of tight
budgets, it must be channeled to those
who need it most and can use it best.
Working together in such areas as the
Caribbean, southern Africa, and the
Sahel— and on such global problems as
food, deforestation, desertification, and
energy— we can combine trade, aid, and
investment policies in ways that con-
tribute to growth in the developing
nations.

system our countries constructed at the
close of World War II are still valid to-
day. Impediments to adjustment and
distortions to the flow of goods, ser-
vices, and capital cause international
friction and weaken domestic economies.
The United States and Europe have a
better chance of reducing these distor-
tions and impediments, and avoiding
new ones, if we act together and urge
others to take similar action to improve
access to their markets.

• The third principle is to continue
and intensify the process of close
U.S. -European consultation at all

levels— the United States and the Com-
mission; and the United States and
member states; and in the context of
multilateral fora such as the GATT, the
OECD, and the United Nations.

• And fourth, we need to recognize
that despite our internal problems,
doubts, and frustrations, our economies
have proved to be remarkably resilient;
they have created the basis for dramatic
and broadly shared gains in human well-
being. They can regain their dynamism
if impediments to adaptation and change
are reduced and a new era or productivi-
ty growth embarked upon. The genius of
our economies is that they work best
when we provide adequate incentives for
workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs
and permit them to realize the gains
which come from hard work and innova-
tion.

Winston Churchill once said that
"The optimist sees an opportunity in
every danger, and the pessimist sees a
danger in every opportunity." I believe
that it is time, however difficult our com-
mon problems, for the United States and
Europe to reaffirm the great purposes to
which our past partnership has been
dedicated — resolving constructively the
bilateral problems before us, actively
cooperating to serve our mutual in-
terests, and shaping a reinvigorated in-
ternational economy based on principles
which have proved to be successful. We
have before us great opportunities if we
have the confidence and the commitment
actively to pursue them. ■

40

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

Development Bank Lending
to Guatemala

by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr.

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Development Institu-
tions and Finance of the House Commit-
tee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Af-
fairs on December 8, 1981. Mr. Johnston
is Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs. ]

Multilateral Development Bank (MDB)
loans to countries where there are
human rights concerns are examined by
the Interagency Working Group on
Human Rights to determine if they meet
the standard for serving basic human
needs. The working group is chaired by
the Department of State and has
members from the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the Overseas
Private Insurance Corporation, Depart-
ments of the Treasury, Commerce,
Agriculture, Defense, Labor, the
Export-Import Bank, the offices of the
U.S. Executive Directors of the World
Bank, and the IDB [Inter-American
Development Bank]. Loan proposals are
carefully evaluated and discussed, based
on the project documentation available
and guidance developed based on
legislative history and past experience.
Most decisions are fairly straightforward
and reached by consensus.

When the Interagency Group on
Human Rights and Foreign Assistance
was established in February 1977, no
formal guidance existed for determining
if an assistance project served basic
human needs. Thus, guidance was
evolved over time through the examina-
tion and discussion of specific projects.
Subsequent to the July 21 hearing of
this subcommittee on human rights
policy, the Administration furnished, for
the record, the current guidance used by
the working group to determine if a
specific MDB project serves basic human
needs. I have attached a copy of that
guidance to my prepared statement for
your reference, and I will repeat some
pertinent aspects of that guidance in
discussing the determination on the
Guatemalan rural telephone project.

Before discussing the rural
telephone project, I would like to briefly
discuss the Administration's decisions on
three loans to Guatemala approved by
the IDB Board last November. On

September 22, the working group ex-
amined the loan for continuation of the
Chixoy hydroelectric project and agreed
that the project did not primarily serve
basic human needs. Some benefits will
definitely accrue to the poor as a result
of the project. Expansion of rural elec-
trification will become feasible, and the
overall economy will benefit from
decreased demand for imported
petroleum for electric power generation.

However, it could not be clearly
established that the majority of the
benefits would go to the poor. Board ac-
tion on the loan was delayed until
November 11 by complications with com-
plementary financing. On that date, the
United States abstained on the loan
because of concern with the human
rights situation in Guatemala and the
nonbasic human needs finding.

Three Loans Considered as Serving
Basic Human Needs

On November 10, the working group
considered three additional IDB loans to
Guatemala — an animal health project, a
water and sewer project, and the rural
telephone project. It was the consensus
of the group that all three loans should
be considered as serving basic human
needs.

The animal health project is viewed
by the IDB as a sine qua non for the
future Guatemalan cattle herd develop-
ment, and 93% of the cattle farmers are
considered by the IDB as low in-
come— per capita income below $695 at
the end of 1980. The project will also
contribute to keeping Central America
free from hoof-and-mouth disease. The
IDB board approved this loan on
November 19.

The water and sewer project will
contribute to the public health by reduc-
ing morbidity and mortality rate
traceable to waterborne diseases. Low
income groups in intermediate-size
towns will receive 57%-58% of the
benefits of the project. This loan re-
ceived board approval on November 25.

On December 10, the IDB board will
consider a $18 million rural telephone
project for Guatemala. The Administra-
tion has concluded that the United

States should support the loan because
the project will serve basic human
needs.

First, the unique economic,
cultural, and social circumstances of
the recipient country must be con-
sidered in assessing a project. With a
per capita income of $1,110 (1980),
Guatemala ranks among the poorest
countries in the hemisphere. The IDB
estimates that about 68% of the popula-
tion in the specific project area would be
below its low income threshold of $695.
Furthermore, rural income is highly
skewed, and 83% of the agricultural
population receives only 35% of total
rural income.

Underemployment reaches 42% in
some rural areas. In 1980, around 53%
of the Guatemalan population over 15
years of age was illiterate, and func-
tional illiteracy in the countryside may
exceed 75%. Less than 20% of the rural
population has access to potable water
and sewerage service.

Around 70% of the rural population
consists of Indians, many of whom
speak Spanish poorly, if at all. For this
and other reasons, many rural areas are
poorly integrated into the national
economy.

Second, the extent to which the
poor are the beneficiaries of a project
is an important consideration. At pres-
ent, only 26 of 304 municipalities in the
interior of Guatemala have access to
telephone service. The proposed IDB
project will provide service to 168 rural
municipalities and small isolated com-
munities.

The objective of the project is to
provide reliable communications between
rural communities and service and con-
sumer centers so as to increase the
integration of the rural areas into the
national economy. To achieve this objec-
tive, the service provided will be limited
either to public use or use in productive
units, such as farming cooperatives and
small manufacturing firms. It will not be
for residential use.

A total of 974 public and semi-public
telephones will be installed in 17 of the
22 departments of Guatemala. There
will be 214 public telephones for the 168
currently unserviced communities, and
760 semi-public telephones will be placed
in cooperatives and other isolated pro-
ductive units. Regular service will lie
provided to 5,100 productive units and
essential public services in these 168
rural towns, and a reserve of 1,926 lines
for future growth would be established.

Mor,-h iQOO

ECONOMICS

The productive units to be served
range in size from 1 to 30 employees,
with an average size of from 4-5
employees. The percent share by sector
of service utilization indicated by the
IDB survey are agriculture, 16.8%; in-
dustry, 13.2%; commerce, 31.0%; and
services 37.0%.

As noted above, around 68% of the
people in rural areas without service
have incomes below the level defined by
the IDB as low income. This low-income
group will receive benefits both directly
through access to public telephone serv-
ice and indirectly from the increased ef-
ficiency of the productive units serviced.
The IDB estimates that 54.4% of the
project benefits will accrue to the low-
income group.

Third, the development objective
should be not only to expand the
availability of basic goods and set ices
but also to increase the access of tiie
poor to them. The IDB says the purpose
of this project is "... to establish
telephone service in conjunction with the
other services already being supplied to
the rural population, thereby improving
the living conditions of those living in
remote regions of the country. In this
way, there will be adequate communica-
tions facilities in all communities of the
Republic, providing the rural population
with: greater access to education and
culture, greater assurance and reliability
of emergency assistance, and adequate
opportunities for capital investment in
the productive sectors of the coun-
tryside. Finally, the execution of the
project will generate significant savings
in transportation time and costs."

In its survey, the IDB found that in
unserviced areas 10% of the potential
users were obliged to travel to other
municipalities at least once a day for
telephone service. Another 9% had to do
so at least once a week, and 25% more
at least once monthly. In many cases,
this time spent traveling could be saved
for more productive uses.

The World Bank is also on record as
believing that provision of telephone
service can lead to better administration
of regional development, health,
transport, and agricultural programs.
Phone service can also enhance the im-
plementation of other rural projects by

improving communications with sup-
pliers, contractors, and administering
agencies.

Finally, the primary focus of a
basic human needs project should be
secure long-term, self-sustaining
benefits which promote self-reliance.

The IDB project designers consider the
rural telephone service project to be a
vital part of its overall rural develop-
ment strategy for Guatemala, which will

complement investments made to im-
prove basic service infrastructure in the
rural area and help achieve a higher
socioeconomic rate of return from those
investments.

Other projects the IDB has under-
taken in rural Guatemala include rural
water supply and sewerage, rural health
services, housing, education, agriculture,
and transportation.

For the productive units, telephone
service will reduce production losses and

Basic Human Needs
Guidance

Given the economic diversity which
characterizes the developing world, the
basic human needs concept must relate
to varied stages of the development
process and patterns of income distribu-
tion, and ultimately be applied within
the context of each recipient country's
unique economic, cultural, and social cir-
cumstances. It is not feasible to fashion
an explicit definition of basic human
needs which can be uniformly applied in
all developing countries. Thus, the intent
is to describe an approach which pro-
vides guidance in determining whether a
specific multilateral development bank
operation serves basic human needs.

There are three interrelated aspects
of an MDB project which require exami-
nation for a basic human need deter-
mination:

• The intended beneficiaries of the
project;

• The specific needs which are being
served; and

• The manner in which the benefits
are shared.

The Beneficiaries

The extent to which the poor are the
beneficiaries of a project is an important
consideration. In low-income countries,
there is a strong presumption that most
projects will meet basic human needs.
The higher the income levels of the re-
cipient country, the greater the need for
specific information about the bene-
ficiaries. While it is usually difficult to
insure that all benefits are directed ex-

clusively toward the poor, the project
should be weighted in their favor with a
reasonable assurance that a high per-
centage of the benefits will, in fact,
reach the targeted group of poor.

The Needs Being Served

Basic needs are viewed as the minimum
requirements for a decent and produc-
tive survival. The components of such
needs are generally considered to be
adequate levels of food, shelter, and
clothing, as well as services such as
family planning, safe drinking water,
sanitation, health care, and education
and training. The objective should be not
only to expand the availability of such
goods and services, but also to increase
the access of the poorest segments of
the population to them.

Manner of Transfer

The primary focus of a basic human
needs determination for a MDB loan
should be to secure long-term, self-
sustaining benefits which would promote
self-reliance and enable the poor to help
themselves. Progress in improving the
quality of life will be limited unless there
is growth in product and incomes suffi-
cient to expand available resources.

It is also important to give the pro-
motion of employment particular atten-
tion, given both the rapid growth of the
labor force and the fact that increased
employment is the most effective means
for the poor to achieve and sustain
access to essential goods and services.
In order to maximize the benefits to the
unemployed poor, projects should be
designed to utilize labor intensive
technologies where practical. ■

42

nonartmont r\f Qtrato Ri 1 1 lot i n

ECONOMICS

marketing inefficiencies resulting from
lack of communication. There will also
be savings from better coordination of
transport anil delivery service. This, in
turn, can reduce inventory costs. The
end-use consumers will also benefit from
the increased efficiency of the produc-
tive units.

Conclusion

The combination of improvements in the
social infrastructure, increased efficiency
of productive units, and greater integra-
tion into the national economy should
enhance the prospects for long-term self-
sustaining growth in rural Guatemala.
The Administration believes this project
is an important contribution to that
process.

The main factors leading the work-
ing group to conclude that the rural
telephone service project serves basic
human needs are as follows:

• The project is directed toward
poor, rural areas;

• The majority of the benefits from
the project will accrue to the lowest in-
come groups;

• Service will be for public use and
small productive units;

• It will increase access of the poor
to basic services, such as health care;
and

• The project is an integral part of
an overall rural development effort.

Agricultural Trade With
the European Community

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from trie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

by Robert D. Hormats

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the
Senate Agriculture Committee on
December 17, 1981. Mr. Hormats is
Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs.1

I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before this subcommittee to discuss U.S.
agricultural trade with the European
Community (EC), particularly in view of
the December 1 1 meeting of Secretary
Haig and Secretary of Agriculture [John
R.] Block and U.S. Trade Representative
[William E.] Brock with European Com-
mission President Gaston Thorn and
other EC Commissioners. Before
describing this issue in greater detail,
however, I want to discuss the relation-
ship of agricultural issues to our broader
trade relations with the Community and
recent developments in that relationship.
Finally, in response to the
subcommittee's request, I will discuss
briefly the role of the State Department
in ongoing efforts to facilitate
agricultural trade.

Importance of Agricultural Trade

There is scarcely a need to remind this
subcommittee of this Administration's
commitment to building a world trading
system which provides increased oppor-
tunities for agricultural exports. This
flows naturally from the importance of
the role of agricultural trade in total
U.S. trade and in our trade with the
European Community. U.S. agricultural
exports will total about $45 billion in
1981, about 20% of all U.S. exports. Our
agricultural exports to the European
Community in 1980 were $8.9 billion;
total U.S. exports to the EC amounted
to $45 billion. Because EC exports to us
amounted to $27 billion, our overall
positive trade balance was about $17.6
billion — $6.8 billion in agricultural trade
alone. The size of our agricultural ex-
ports reminds us of the very large stake
we have both in maintaining our access
to the European Community market and
in protecting our sales in third markets.

Setting for U.S.-EC Agricultural Trade

Trade, and especially agricultural trade,
does not, of course, take place in a

vacuum. Domestic policies and aspira-
tions define foreign trade and policy
issues on both sides of the Atlantic. Our
domestic agricultural policies largely
reflect our market-oriented economic
philosophy, with use of nonmarket sup-
port prices in only a few commodities,
such as dairy products, sugar, peanuts,
and tobacco. The EC's common agri-
cultural policy was developed in the
1960s primarily to create a unified inter-
nal market, insure increasing farm in-
come, and promote greater self-
sufficiency in food supplies.

The common agricultural policy
assures high guaranteed farm support
prices for virtually all EC agricultural
commodities and for processed fruits
and vegetables, most oilseeds, and a
variety of other products. The policy is
implemented by applying three main
principles.

• Community preferences protect
Community production by means of
tariffs and variable import levies to
bring the prices of imported com-
modities up to EC levels.

• Common pricing policies establish
a single price for commodities through-
out the EC; this in turn requires a
system of border taxes and compen-
satory payments.

• Common financing distributes the
cost of the common agricultural policy
among the member states.

The common agricultural policy
serves political objectives as well, bind-
ing together the original six members of
the European Community. It serves
even today as the most visible linkage
among the 10 member countries.

The original objectives of the com-
mon agricultural policy have largely
been achieved. However, high levels of
incentives and the absence of meaningful
production controls led first to self-
sufficiency and then to large surpluses.
For instance, EC self-sufficiency in
1978-79 was 118% of requirements in
soft wheat, 113% in barley, 124% in
sugar, and 119% in butter. The costs of
this policy have approached staggering
levels — about one-half of 1% of the
Community's gross domestic product.
The EC itself spends over $18
billion — 70% of its budget — to buy and
store agricultural commodities and to

March 1982

43

ECONOMICS

subsidize the export of surplus produc-
tion. The total cost, when member state
expenditures for national farm programs
are included, approaches $40 billion. The
cost to EC consumers, who pay both
high prices for food and subsidize the
export of surplus production through
their taxes, is enormous.

The Community response to the
problems of surplus has been an
aggressive and heavily subsidized export
program. The EC is now the third
largest exporter of wheat, the world's
largest exporter of poultry, and the sec-
ond largest exporter of beef. It is a ma-
jor and growing exporter of dairy prod-
ucts and sugar, as well as processed
agricultural products. Community agri-
cultural trade policies restricting imports
and subsidizing exports cause problems
with both developed and developing
country producers alike. On one hand,
Community tariffs and variable levies
limit the access of efficient agricultural
producers to the EC market. The EC in
the 1960s was a net importer of about
20 million tons of grain per year; in
1980-81 the EC was a net gain ex-
porter. On the other hand, the EC's sub-
sidized exports displace the more effi-
cient producers in third country markets
and depress world prices.

The subsidies code prohibits the use
of export subsidies on certain primary
products which result in the exporting
country gaining more than an equitable
share of world trade or result in prices
below those of other suppliers to the
same market. Although both the United
States and the EC have signed the code,
we differ fundamentally on the proper
role of subsidies. We oppose export sub-
sidies in principle. The EC position is
that their use is acceptable, as long as
the conditions of the subsidies code are
observed. We are presently challenging
in the GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] whether EC export
subsidy practices on wheat flour, sugar,
poultry, and pasta are, in fact, consist-
ent with the code.

Operation of the common agri-
cultural policy has also contributed to in-
ternal EC tension. Although the policy
has general support and all member
states have domestic agricultural in-
terests that benefit, some clearly profit
more than others. Many within Europe
believe that northern European agri-
cultural producers — especially of wheat,
milk, butter, and cheese — have benefited
more than Mediterranean producers of
fruits and vegetables, wine, and
vegetable oils. To the tensions between

producers are added those of budget
contributions. The United Kingdom
renegotiated its budget contributions
after a long and acrimonious debate
centered in part on the cost of support-
ing the common agricultural policy. Divi-
sions between the interests of small
farmers versus larger, more-efficient
farmers complicate the picture. Because
the price support mechanism of the
policy is essentially open ended, without
policy reform, member states will be
faced with the need to raise additional
revenues to maintain the system— a dif-
ficult decision in view of current
economic conditions in Europe.

The common agricultural policy,
once an impetus to increased European
economic integration, is now viewed by
many Europeans as an impediment. The
present operation of the policy will make
it difficult for the Community to address
the challenges of the 1980s and beyond,
such as the accession of Spain and Por-
tugal. These countries are large pro-
ducers of fruits and vegetables, olive oil,
and wine; their accession will bring enor-
mously increased outlays under the
policy.

The debilitating resource drags
represented by the policy also impede
the EC's response to pressures to
address social concerns and structural
adjustment. The industrial crisis in
Europe has sparked demands for in-
creased aids for industrial renewal.
Development assistance for poorer
regions within the Community has fallen
short of expectations of some member
states.

Reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy

Aware of these issues, on May 30, 1980,
the EC Council directed the Commission
to recommend measures for the reform
of the policy. These include:

• Introduction or strengthening of
measures designed to reduce the level of
support for production above target
levels;

• Reduction, but not elimination, of
the gap between EC and U.S. prices for
grain;

• Greater use of direct-income sub-
sidies;

• Use of a wider range of export
mechanisms, such as long-term
agreements, with purchasers and export
credits; and

• Actions to limit imports of grain
substitutes.

Even the limited reform measures
recommended by the Commission appear
unlikely to be accepted by the member
countries, not because they fail to bring
about sufficient structural reform but
because many member states are unwill-
ing to take politically painful steps
affecting their farm sectors.

We have followed the movement
toward this policy reform with great
interest, and I must report to you that
we have been disappointed in many
respects. The intention to move internal
grain prices toward world market levels
is an encouraging sign, but the degree of
reduction in support levels seems inade-
quate to the task, and production tar-
gets are likely to be set too high. If the
EC were to limit imports, especially of
grain substitutes, it would restrict our
trade in corn gluten feed, which
accounts for $600-700 million in U.S.
exports. We are concerned that the
Commission's measures would institu-
tionalize subsidized exports at levels
based on the EC's current market share.
This, coupled with the suggested ag-
gressive export program, would continue
displacement of our exports — and those
of many countries— in third markets in
many products, such as those in which
we have formally challenged EC export
subsidies: wheat flour, poultry, pasta,
and sugar.

U.S. Reaction

It is not surprising that our reaction to
the directions of EC policies and prac-
tices has been strong. Despite our
understanding of the problems faced by
European leaders and the enormous
economic and security stake we have in
a prosperous and strong Europe, the
day has long since passed when the
United States could ignore actions
threatening our markets or lightly
sweep trade problems under the rug of
our security or foreign policy interests.
We have long encouraged European
unity but also meaningful reform of the
common agricultural policy in ways that
do not pass off the costs of internal pro-
grams to trading partners.

With increasing evidence that the
direction and depth of the policy's
reform are inadequate, our efforts are
entering a new phase. Publicly and
privately, we have had to speak out

44

Department of State Bulletin

ECONOMICS

more strongly and clearly than we have
in the past. Thus, in a series of meetings
this year, we have emphasized to the EC
that:

• The United States opposes an
expansive EC export program, based on
continued export subsidies and other
objectionable features that have been
considered, such as long-term supply
agreements unjustified by special
marketing conditions, and increased ex-
port credits for agricultural products;

• We will continue to challenge un-
fair export competition in third markets.
This will include full use of the GATT
dispute settlement procedures and
pressure in other fora, as appropriate.
Thus, we will seek to encourage reform
of the policy by reducing the EC's ability
to substitute exports for meaningful
reform;

• We will continue to take vigorous
measures to protect our access to the
EC market itself and, in line with the
liberal trade policy of this Administra-
tion, seek to improve that access where
possible by arguing for reducing barriers
currently interfering with our ability to
market our products within the Com-
munity.

This message has been brought
forcefully to EC officials by many
members of this Administration.
Secretary Block emphasized our con-
cerns during his contacts earlier this
year with EC agricultural officials, as
did Trade Representative Brock. Secre-
tary Haig stressed this point in his re-
cent discussions in Brussels.

Meeting With Commission
President Thorn

On December 11, Secretaries Haig and
Block and Trade Representative Brock
together called on European Commis-
sion President Thorn and other Commis-
sioners in Brussels. Both sides reviewed
the current situation. For our part, we
reiterated our support for European
unity and assured that we were not chal-
lenging the fundamental elements of the
common agricultural policy but stressed
that we were opposed to certain aspects
of the policy which were having an im-
pact on our agricultural interests. The
EC Commissioners emphasized the im-
portance they attach to maintaining the
policy within the existing framework of
social and food security goals and
stressed that the EC would not seek to
obtain more than an equitable share of
trade in third markets. There were
results of this unprecedented meeting.

• We believe the EC, at the highest
levels, better understands the signifi-
cance we attach to continued and unim-
paired access to the EC market and to
insuring that agricultural trade in third
markets reflects comparative advantage.
They are more aware of the importance
we attach to their efforts to reduce the
adverse impact of the common agri-
cultural policy on the exports of the
United States and more efficient
agricultural producers.

• We expressed our satisfaction that
a tax on vegetable oils had been recently
rejected but concern that the subject
might arise in the future. We reaffirmed
our intention to pursue our rights in the
GATT and to continue to oppose any
efforts to impair our negotiated trade
rights, particularly for soybeans and
corn gluten feed.

• We and the EC confirmed our
commitment to a continuing dialogue on
agricultural trade issues and expressed
our strong mutual desire that these be
resolved in an amicable fashion that
preserves the objectives of both sides.
To this end, we expect to hold further
talks with high-level officials of the Com-
mission in Washington in mid-February.

This meeting was an important step
in the process of underlining, in a clear
and determined fashion, our continuing
problems with the effects of EC agri-
cultural programs. It was not a nego-
tiating session nor did we expect to
resolve our differences on agricultural
trade issues. But it reemphasized the
desire on the part of both sides to con-
tinue a dialogue on economic issues and
represented a further step in the process
of addressing the current trade issues,
notably agriculture.

Despite the better mutual under-
standing, we should be cautious in ex-
pecting immediate results. We agree
with President Thorn that agricultural
issues will be among the most difficult to
resolve. Significant problems still lie
before us. The linkage among EC agri-
cultural policy, social policy, and political
cohesion insures that reform — even in
directions which objective observers con-
sider economically rational — will be
politically sensitive. The pace of reform
will likely be set by the need for consen-
sus. It is also inevitable that changes in
a system of carefully fashioned com-
promises will be resisted by those with
vested interests in the present system.
Altering over 20 years of momentum
will not be any easier for the Commu-
nity than it was for us in 1973 when we
made a major shift from agricultural

price supports, which produced sur-
pluses and subsidized exports, to our
present farm programs. EC officials, no
matter how willing, must obtain the con-
sensus of the 10 member states. We
must also keep a weather eye on the
planned accession of Spain and Por-
tugal, whose Mediterranean products
will place a great stress on the present
mechanisms of the common agricultural
policy.

We cannot expect EC agricultural
prices to move rapidly to world levels,
nor can we expect to see instant dis-
mantling of the agricultural export sub-
sidy system which causes us so many
problems. But there is room for steady
movement in this direction.

Role of the Department of State

The Brussels meeting has, I believe,
marked a step forward by helping create
a political climate conducive to the
resolution of economic problems. It
reflects the State Department's special
role in meshing our trade, economic, and
foreign policy interests. In particular,
we have constantly stressed to the EC
that these agricultural issues must be
satisfactorily resolved or they will im-
pact on broader U.S. -European political
and economic relations.

The State Department also strongly
supports efforts to increase sales of U.S.
farm products abroad by pressing for
reduction or elimination of other coun-
tries' trade barriers. We support our
agricultural exporters in trade disputes
involving such issues as quality, pay-
ment, and sanitary standards. The
Department — through its officials in
Washington and in embassies abroad —
also plays an active and important role
in supporting the Department of Agri-
culture's agricultural export promotion
efforts. Shortly after this Administra-
tion came into office, Secretary Haig
sent a message to our ambassadors
overseas stressing the importance he
personally attaches to the promotion of
agricultural exports as one of the chief
objectives of our embassies. We are
following this message with one calling
special attention to the particular advan-
tages to the United States of promot-
ing sales of value-added agricultural
products.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

March 1982

45

EUROPE

U.S. and Europe: Partnership
for Peace and Freedom

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Address before the European People's
Party conference in Bonn, West Ger-
many on December 7, 1981. Ambassador
Eagleburger is Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs.

The question we are examining
together— what the U.S. -European rela-
tionship means today— is an important
one. It is a question which is being asked
ever more insistently on both sides of
the Atlantic.

I am honored that you have asked
me to discuss the subject with you
today. It is especially flattering to be
asked to do so before a conference of
the European People's Party (EPP). The
EPP itself provides one very clear
response to our common question: You
believe in partnerships of democracy,
both within Europe and across the
Atlantic. We are all aware how much
your parties have contributed over the
years to the causes of European and
Atlantic unity.

Dr. Kohl [Helmut Kohl, Chairman of
the Christian Democratic Union in West
Germany], I am grateful to you and to
Secretary General Piccoli [Flaminio
Piccoli of Italy, Secretary General of the
European Economic Community] for
once again stressing the importance of
U.S. -European ties in your remarks this
morning. Your comments were not free
of criticism, and you made some sugges-
tions for improvements in the Atlantic
relationship. That is the correct
approach. America and Europe are
facing important new problems. It is
essential that we deal with them frankly
and openly.

But you also made clear that the
huge majority of Europeans strongly
support close cooperation between the
United States and Europe. I can assure
you today that the vast majority of
Americans share this goal— be they
doves, cowboys, or underpaid diplomats
such as myself. We wish to improve our
dialogue, deepen our cooperation, and
expand our relations on the basis of
partnership and equality.

I know I speak for President Reagan
and for all Americans in recommitting
myself to our partnership with you here
today. Today I hope to provide an
American view of our relationship. This

view will not be based solely on institu-
tional arrangements which exist between
us. The European-American relationship
does not depend solely— or even
primarily— on our membership in NATO,
in the Organization for European
Cooperation and Development (OECD),
or in any other grouping. More than
anything else, it is based on shared
ideals and interests. If those ideals and
interests change, so, inevitably, will our
relationship. So long as they continue to
be shared on both sides of the Atlantic,
nothing— no matter how immediately
threatening, challenging, or apparently
divisive— will be able to change the
essential nature of our trans- Atlantic
community.

Foundation of Shared Values

The basic foundation for our relation-
ship—our partnership, if you will— is our
shared values. The democratic nations of
Europe and North America have a com-
mon vision of man— a vision which
neither idealizes nor demonizes human
character. We recognize that there are
both good qualities and bad in human
nature. Our free institutions, therefore,

The European-
American relationship
does not depend sole-
ly— or even primar-
ily— on our membership
in NATO . . . or in any
other grouping . . . it is
based on shared ideals
and interests.

protect the liberty in which our better
nature flourishes and guard against the
tyranny in which our worse nature has
free rein.

Our systems are based on a deep
moral respect for the ability of the
individual to choose between right and
wrong and to act responsibly. We uphold
the rights of the individual to speak, to
write, to think, and to worship as he

pleases. We reject theories which would
sacrifice the rights of individuals in
order to construct some Utopian system
of social organization, for we know that
too often those theories have been
asserted as justification for the most
unspeakable crimes. The crimes they
spawn do not lead to a better future;
they only perpetuate the dictatorships of
the present.

As Secretary Haig declared in his
Syracuse speech:

... the Atlantic family of nations is in-
spired by a common faith in the capacity of
all men for self-government. No hereditary
aristocracy, no religious orthodoxy, no mastei
race, no privileged class, no gang of ter-
rorists has a right to rule a people by force.
As free peoples, we obey the laws passed by
governments we have freely chosen. Our
military forces take orders from elected
civilian authority. Our young people enjoy
freedom of thought, able to question even the
worth of their own societies. These deeply
held principles lead us to oppose
aggression, tyranny, and terrorism.

Our commitment to individual rights
and our confidence in the human capac-
ity for self-government distinguish the
West sharply from those regimes that
neither trust their own peoples to
govern themselves nor permit other
countries to enjoy their independence.
The concept of state security that
regards every domestic dissenter and
every independent neighbor as a threat
is outmoded in the modern world, in-
compatible with the deepest human
aspirations, and a threat to international
security. We let our majorities rule and
our minorities dissent. We respect and
honor our artists, poets, musicians,
scientists, and, yes, our social critics.
We do not deport them or send them
into internal exile or psychiatric prisons.
And our lives are richer and our
societies livelier, healthier, and stronger
for it.

We share not only distinctive funda-
mental values but basic common in-
terests. The depressions and world wars
of this troubled century have taught the
nations of Western Europe and North
America that both our prosperity and
our security are indivisible. Divided, we
court disaster; united, we have recorded
a proud history of cooperation and ac-
complishment. Through the Marshall
plan we worked together to reconstruct
the devastated economies of postwar
Europe; through NATO we have to-
gether kept the peace in Europe for a
longer period than ever before in this
century; through coordinated aid we
have started other regions of the world

46

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

on the road to development; and
through the Helsinki accords we have
cooperated to strengthen both inter-
national security and individual freedom
throughout Europe.

But our task today is not simply to
celebrate the ideals we hold in common
or the historic record we have jointly
produced. We must translate those
ideals into the reality of common con-
duct and continue our record of coopera-
tion and accomplishment into the future.
We are proud to build on the legacy of
the preceding generation, the great
architects of the postwar partner-
ship—such figures as Churchill,
Truman, and Adenauer. And we are
confident that the idealistic youth of the
new generation, in their turn, will write
long-honored chapters in the history of
Western cooperation for peace and
freedom. President Reagan, in the pro-
gram for peace he presented last month,
declared that he understands their con-
cerns. We hear the youth of the West
sing "give peace a chance," and that is
precisely what the President proposed.

We also understand the impatience
of young people with the progress made
by free societies, yet we are sure that as
they contemplate the dismal stagnation
of oppressive regimes, they will continue
to give freedom a chance. As we ap-
plaud the advance to democracy of
Greece, Portugal, and Spain; the likely
expansion of our alliance; the spread of
democratic institutions in developing
nations; and the appearance of demo-
cratic movements even within Commu-
nist societies; we renew our faith that
the democratic revolution of the past
two centuries will continue. We look for-
ward to the day when democracy, the
most just and efficient form of govern-
ment, will also be the most common
form of government.

The necessity of European-American
partnership for a democratic future is
reflected in President Reagan's concep-
tion of the foundations of American
foreign policy in the 1980s. That policy
rests first of all on a reborn national
self-confidence and a renewed national
consensus for vigorous defense abroad
of our ideals and interests. A pride and
determination we have not seen in many
years unite the American people, the
Congress, and the executive branch. The
paralyzing doubt, drift, and division of
the post-Vietnam era are over. America
is reassuming the burdens of leadership,
tempered by a new sense of realism. We
know that a clear sense of priorities
must distinguish indispensable tasks
from minor distractions and urgent
threats from petty annoyances. We must

March 1982

combine careful and imaginative
management of our present resources
with investment to expand our future
resources. We know that we can no
more solve all the world's problems
alone than we can isolate ourselves from
them. American interests are insep-
arably linked to those of our partners.
We are willing to lead but know we
must be prudent and cooperate with
others.

Pillars of U.S. Foreign Policy

Upon this basic foundation of renewed
morale rests the four pillars of President
Reagan's foreign policy:

First, the restoration of our

other goals as well. Cooperation with
Europe to make the world economy
work is crucial to American prosperity.
Our NATO allies' programs to modern-
ize their defense forces are an indispen-
sable complement to our own moderniza-
tion programs.

Relations With the U.S.S.R.

Nowhere is the European-American
partnership more essential than in our
efforts to establish a more constructive
relationship with the Soviet Union. For
more than 30 years, the West has
sought to build conditions for coex-
istence with the U.S.S.R. while not
underestimating the differences which
divide us.

This Administration has made it clear to allies
and adversaries alike that the United States would
not retreat in the face of aggression, that we would
maintain an ability to defend basic Western in-
terests, and that we would expect reciprocity from
the Soviets in any agreements we reach.

economic and military strength;

Second, the reinvigoration of our
alliances and the cultivation of new
friendships;

Third, the promotion of progress in
developing countries through peaceful
change; and

Fourth, the construction of a rela-
tionship with the U.S.S.R. characterized
by restraint and reciprocity.

Our emphasis on these four pillars
indicates, first, that our policy is a
balanced one. Secondly, these four pro-
grams are mutually reinforcing elements
in a coherent strategy. Our economic
and military strength supports our
efforts to cooperate with others, to pro-
mote peaceful progress, and to build a
constructive relationship with the Soviet
Union. Peaceful progress in the develop-
ing world not only strengthens our own
economy but removes opportunities for
Soviet intervention. And restraining the
use of force by the Soviets and their
proxies gives the developing nations the
security they need for economic develop-
ment and for the peaceful resolution of
disputes.

European-American partnership is
not only the cornerstone of our efforts
to strengthen all our alliances and
friendships but vital to success of our

This search has been both difficult
and disappointing, and at no time more
so than during the last decade. Despite
U.S. reductions in real military spend-
ing, Soviet military expenditures in-
creased beyond all legitimate defense
needs. Despite historic arms control
agreements, Soviet behavior raised
serious questions about the spirit and
letter of Soviet compliance. Despite
Helsinki, Eastern regimes continued to
erect barriers between East and West
and to violate the rights of individuals,
especially those monitoring compliance
with the accords. Most disturbing of all
was the use of Soviet military power
and Soviet proxies in regions of the
world vital to the economic stability and
political autonomy of Europe and the
United States. We now see 12,000
Cuban troops in Angola; 85,000 Soviet
troops in Afghanistan; 200,000 Viet
namese troops in Kampuchea; and the
transformation of Nicaragua into an
armed camp more powerful than all its
Central American neighbors combined.

President Reagan entered nil ice in
the face of growing concern in America
about Soviet worldwide behavior and
growing Western doubts about Amer-
ican resolve and ability to deal effec-
tively with the new Soviet challenge.

47

EUROPE

This Administration has made it clear to
allies and adversaries alike that the
United States would not retreat in the
face of aggression, that we would main-
tain an ability to defend basic Western
interests, and that we would expect
reciprocity from the Soviets in any
agreements we reach.

But we are also engaging in frank
discussions with the Soviets on every
major issue and on every level, including
correspondence between President
Reagan and President Brezhnev and
meetings between Secretary Haig and
Foreign Minister Gromyko. We have
told them we seek a constructive rela-
tionship based on a secure military
balance, respect for the independence of
others, restraint in the use of force, and
reciprocity in making and fulfilling
agreements. We have explained our
objections to Soviet or Soviet-supported
aggression and subversion. We have
made known our intention to counter
such activity, but we have also ex-
pressed our desire for cooperation in
solving problems peacefully.

The President proposes to build, on
a foundation of strength and resolve, an
effective policy of peace with the
U.S.S.R. There is considerable room for
concrete, lasting agreements between
the United States and the Soviet Union,
and President Reagan is dedicated to
striving to reach those agreements. But
we have no illusions. We do not intend
to seek accords with the Soviet Union
merely for the sake of signing docu-
ments. Nor will we propose atmospheric
improvements, such as summit meet-
ings, when there is no basis for agree- '
ment. We recognize above all that
agreements with the Soviets must rest
securely on the basis of Western unity,
strength, and firmness. The prospects
for a lasting accord depend decisively on
the European- American partnership, on
the success of our societies at home, and
on the effectiveness of our policies
abroad.

In his November 18 address, Presi-
dent Reagan laid out a comprehensive
program for peace. His proposals are an
historic effort to begin the long process
of seeking true reductions in the level of
armaments between East and West. The
President has written personally to
President Brezhnev, proposing that the
United States cancel its deployment of
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise
missiles if the Soviets eliminate their
SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles. Such
an agreement — which we believe to be
both reasonable and achievable — would
be an enormous step toward a more
stable world.

Progress on other aspects of the

President's program — commencement of
negotiations substantially to reduce
strategic nuclear weapons, achievement
of equality at lower levels of conven-
tional forces in Europe, and agreement
on the conference on disarmament in
Europe now being discussed in
Madrid — would also greatly help to
reduce the possibility of military con-
frontation in Europe.

Early Soviet reactions to the Presi-
dent's proposals have been predictable.
In Bonn, President Brezhnev repeated
old ideas. Proposals such as his sugges-
tion of a moratorium, which would per-
petuate Soviet superiority, are aimed
more at European public opinion than at
serious progress in negotiations. But the
Soviet Union has also given some indica-
tions of serious interest. The United
States enters these negotiations with
determination to achieve real results. If
we are patient and persistent, the
Soviets will have ample opportunity to
make good on their professions of peace
and to lift the shadow of fear from all
peoples of Europe. The choice is now
clearly theirs to make. We in the West
have made our position clear, and it is
now up to Moscow to respond in a con-
structive way.

During negotiations on arms control
in the coming months, we should not fail
to recognize that Soviet antagonism to
Western ideals is deeply rooted. Recog-
nizing Soviet ideology for what it is does
not mean that cooperation is impossible.
It means only that we cannot count
upon a convergence of Soviet and
Western political principles or strategic
doctrines. That is why our negotiations
with the Soviets must rest on a firm
foundation of Western solidarity. We
must maintain our unity of purpose and
dedication and work closely to define
clearly those goals we wish to achieve.

For example, now that the Geneva
negotiations on intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF) have begun, it is
important to understand clearly the
meaning of Soviet superiority in in-
termediate nuclear weapons. We must
not allow ourselves to be divided by
Soviet claims about the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
military balance in Europe. The facts
are clear: They have a 6 to 1 advantage
even with aircraft of both sides included.
And we must not accept Soviet conten-
tions that the imbalance will be redress-
ed if SS-20 rockets are deployed behind
the Ural Mountains. Some already are
so deployed and can strike Western
Europe from their present locations.
European security will not be enhanced
by mere movement of these highly
mobile Soviet systems. They must be
dismantled.

Western unity has made possible
solid preparation for the Geneva
negotiations, and continued unity will
bode well for conducting negotiations
successfully. The several years of
alliance consultations on the two-track
NATO decision exemplified what can be
accomplished by Western cooperation.
In these consultations the United States
did not begin with preconceptions about
either the modernization or the negotia-
tion track of our policy. Instead, we
listened to the views of our NATO allies
We adjusted our positions to meet allied
needs. And in the end, we reached a
decision that was in the best sense a tru
ly "Atlantic" undertaking, even though
the negotiations are bilateral.

The United States will exercise the
grave responsibility of conducting these
negotiations, of such vital concern to oui
allies, only while continuing the closest
consultations with them. The example of
intermediate-range nuclear force
negotiations demonstrates how suc-
cessfully Atlantic cooperation can func-
tion if we have a precise idea of our
goals and the means of achieving them.
But let me be clear about one other
point. The decision to deploy our moder-
nized INF weapons in 1983, if we have
not reached an appropriate agreement
with the Soviet Union, is an alliance
decision and an alliance responsibility.
Cooperation and commitment in NATO
are a two-way street.

A Productive Partnership

There are many current examples of
productive European-American partner-
ship at work. Modernization and
negotiation are not the only case of
Western unity in action. Six years ago,
35 European and Atlantic nations reaf-
firmed our common commitment to the
dignity of each individual and to peace
and security as the international en-
vironment in which that dignity can
flourish. No ideology exempts any sig-
natory nation from obligations of the
Helsinki Final Act. The European-
American partnership is actively united
in efforts to make all the provisions of
the act a reality. In the current Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe review meeting in Madrid, we
have together laid the groundwork for a
conference on disarmament in Europe to
discuss effective measures to reduce the
risk that war might begin as a result of
miscalculation or uncertainty. The West
is united in its commitment to a bal-
anced concluding document, including
substantial steps forward in human

48

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

rights as well as a mandate for an effec-
tive security conference.

The deeper significance of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe is revealed by a broader his-
torical perspective. We often refer to
relations between the United States and
the U.S.S.R., between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, as "East-West" relations.
What a tragic misnomer that is. It was
the nations of Eastern Europe and
Russia together with the nations of
Western Europe and America that until
our century historically constituted the
West. They have been bound together
by culture, literature, religion,
philosophy, and centuries of shared
ideals and experience. That is the true
tragedy of the division between what is
called East and West. That is why the
restoration of free movement of people
and information is so important. No
voice has sounded more ringingly on
behalf of the linked causes of arms con-
trol and human rights than that of
Andrey Sakharov. It is especially tragic,
therefore, that he should be suffering
from those very artificial barriers be-
tween peoples he has called upon us to
dismantle. None of us can be indifferent
to his cause or oblivious to efforts made
to silence his brave voice.

Conclusion

In a strange and sad way, the mention
of Andrey Sakharov brings us back to
the opening theme of my remarks — the
relationship between a trans-Atlantic
partnership based on shared values and
individual freedom. We in this room to-
day come from countries with varied his-
tories, cultures, and structures of
government. Our languages differ, as do
our religions. But on one basic principle
there is no dispute — our common belief
in the dignity of the individual human
being. That, I suggest to you, is what
sets us apart. That is why one brave and
committed individual crying out to be
heard brings down upon himself the full
might of the Soviet State, which exiles
and isolates him because it so fears the
contagion might spread. And that is why
we of the Atlantic community should
glory in the fact that our citizens—
whether we agree with their cause or
not — are free to demonstrate against
their governments. What better compar-
ison of the relative strengths of com-
peting systems? What better evidence
that the accomplishments of our part-
nership are but prologue to a new era of
greater freedom for the world's op-
pressed if we can but retain our faith in
ourselves. ■

Poland: Financial and
Economic Situation

Following is a background paper
prepared by the Department of State and
Department of the Treasury on Poland's
financial and economic situation for the
European subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Janu-
ary 27, 1982.

In the early 1970s, Poland embarked on
an ambitious economic development
strategy to modernize its economy and
to increase, substantially, its living
standards. The strategy envisaged a
simultaneous expansion in investment
and consumption. This could only be
undertaken with foreign borrowing,
primarily from the West.

Massive increases in investment
were needed to reorient the economy
away from inefficient import substitu-
tion. Priority emphasis was given to in-
vestment in heavy industry, a strategy
in which imports of capital equipment
from the West figured prominently.
Restructuring the economy also required
the introduction of substantial inputs of
Western technology to increase the
overall efficiency of the productive proc-
ess. Further, the Polish planners be-
lieved it was necessary to develop a
viable export sector to enable Poland to
sell its products in Western markets.

In order to achieve these increases
in output and increased efficiencies, the
Polish authorities felt that Polish
workers needed added incentives to
stimulate the growth of output. To this
end, substantial increases were planned
in both the quality and quantity of goods
which were made available to the Polish
consumer to render effective the en-
hanced monetary incentives which were
offered. It was seen as particularly im-
portant to improve the diet of the Polish
worker. Accordingly, a sharp increase in
food production and food supplies,
especially meat, was planned for by use
of appropriate pricing incentives for the
large private farm sector. In doing so,
Polish authorities also hoped to avoid a
repetition of the food riots of December
1970 and their disruptive effects on the
economy and society.

The Polish planners believed that ac-
cess to Western credits and technology
would permit a rapid expansion of
modern, competitive, efficiently pro-
duced products. These goods were to be

produced in new, or newly modernized,
plants utilizing modern Western
machinery. They were to produce in ac-
cordance with Western standards, and
in some cases, under licensing ar-
rangements with the leading industrial
firms of the West. In this strategy, it
was expected that Polish products would
be sold in Western markets and the
trade deficit, which would be incurred to
obtain the productive inputs from the
West, would soon shift to a trade
surplus, enabling the Poles to repay
their hard currency debts.

Early Results

The Polish economy registered some im-
pressive gains in the early 1970s with
real economic growth averaging 6% per
annum. However, it became apparent by
the middle part of the decade that the
strategy was encountering major dif-
ficulties.

The main problems stemmed from
the fact that Polish authorities made a
number of policy errors. For example,
when the Western recession began in
1974, most East European countries cut
back their hard currency imports from
the West. The Poles, however, like a
number of developing and industrial
countries, continued to adhere to their
ambitious development plan and main-
tained a rapid rate of increased imports
to built their new industrial capacity. As
a result, Poland's trade deficit with the
West widened. By year-end 1975, this
deficit exceeded $2 billion. Between
1975 and 1980, Poland's cumulative cur-
rent account deficit with the West
amounted to a massive $18 billion.

Incorrect income and pricing policies
were also responsible for Poland's eco-
nomic problems. In particular, the Polish
planners tried to insulate the economy
from the inflationary pressures of the
mid-1970s by utilizing subsidies, price
controls, and taxes. These measures in-
creased the degree of distortion which
already existed in the price structure
and exacerbated the financial situation
of enterprises as well. Ultimately, these
distortions reduced the ability of pro-
ductive sectors of the Polish economy to
compete in world markets.

The recession of the industrialized
Western countries impacted severely on

March 1982

49

EUROPE

Poland's economy, as it did on other
economies which geared their growth in
large part to exports to the West. For
example, in the 3-year period
1971-1974, Poland's exports to the West
increased at an average annual rate of
32% in nominal terms; in the period
1974-1977, exports increased at an
average annual rate of 11%.

Contributing to these problems were
Poland's export constraints arising out
of inadequate marketing, servic-
ing— including providing replacement
parts — and advertising expertise. Also,
the Poles did not develop a system of
export incentives to induce managers to
produce for export. The existing system
favored domestic production because
managers found it easier to meet plan-
ners' goals and obtain bonuses by pro-
ducing for domestic consumption rather
than meeting export goals which often
involved more complex quality standards
and were more difficult to achieve.

Poor harvests brought on by 6 con-
secutive years of bad weather and inap-
propriate agricultural policies compound-
ed Poland's economic malaise. The em-
phasis on the expansion of heavy in-
dustry had resulted in a neglect of
agriculture. Moreover, Poland's
agricultural sector was highly vulnerable
to poor weather.

The above elements combined to
produce a 5% average annual rate of
decline in real national income between
1979 and 1981, after 8 years of rapid
growth. During this period Poland, and
other Eastern European members of the
Soviet bloc, ran large trade deficits with
the U.S.S.R. The Soviets also provided
subsidies to Poland and those other
countries through sales of oil and raw
materials to them at prices below world
market levels. These subsidies to the
Eastern European bloc members aver-
aged $5-6 billion in the mid- and
late-1970s, rising to $10 billion in 1979
and $22 billion in 1980.

Polish Debt Accumulation
and Rescheduling

Beginning in the early 1970s, the Poles
financed a large portion of their
economic growth by borrowing from the
West, enjoying relatively easy access to
Western capital markets. As their
development plans began to falter, they
became less able to service their debt.

In 1972, Poland's gross hard curren-
cy debt totaled $1.6 billion. Its debt

Fact Sheet on Polish Debt

• Poland has an external hard cur-
rency debt of approximately $26 billion;
government and government-guaranteed
debt is some $17 billion; private
unguaranteed debt is some $9 billion.

• Of this amount, roughly $20
billion is due to 16 Western countries.

• Polish debt to the United States
totals some $3.15 billion, which is 14%
of the total $26 billion. The breakdown
of this figure is:

Nonguaranteed loans
from private creditors
(primarily commercial banks)

Direct credits and
guarantees by Commodity
Credit Corporation

Export-Import Bank
loan

AID loan

$1.3

$1.6

$ .244
$ .006

• Governments of 16 Western coun-
tries including U.S., U.K., France, West
Germany, Japan, Canada, Switzerland,
and the Netherlands signed a
multilateral agreement in April 1981 to
reschedule 90% of the principal and in-
terest falling due from May 1981 to
December 1981. The U.S. share of this
was $380 million. The official reschedul-
ing totaled $2.3 billion.

• Repayment terms provided for 4
years grace and 4 years repayment, the
latter commencing in 1986.

• These terms are generally com-
parable to those of -other countries which
have found it necessary to reschedule
their debts.

• In response to the Polish repres-
sion in December 1981, the official
creditors recently agreed to hold in
abeyance negotiations with the Poles on
their 1982 debt service pending a nor-
malization of the situation. They also
decided that, in any event, they would
continue to adhere to their long-term
understanding that they will not discuss
the 1982 debt until Poland signs a
rescheduling agreement on its 1981 debt
with the commercial banks.

• The commercial banks of the 16

Western countries have been negotiating
a debt rescheduling agreement with
Poland.

• The terms of this agreement as
we understand them — providing for
rescheduling 95% of principal only, 2.3
billion— appear to be comparable to
those provided by Poland's official
creditors.

• It is also our understanding that
the Government of Poland must pay all
interest due to the commercial banks
prior to signing of that agreement.

• We have heard that this amount is
now on the order of $250 million. We
are in no position to comment one way
or another as to whether the Poles will
meet this payment.

• Total debt outstanding to all
banks is around $15-16 billion; about
$14.5 billion was recorded as of June
1981 for those banks in the reporting
system of the Bank for International
Settlements. However, much of this
would be guaranteed by creditor govern-
ments. After allowance for guarantees,
the commercial bank debt is thought to
be around $9 billion.

• The precise amount of banks'
guarantee-adjusted exposure in in-
dividual countries is reported regularly
only for U.S. and U.K. banks — exposure
in Poland of $1.3 billion and $1 billion,
respectively, as of mid-1981. Around 60
U.S. banks account for the $1.3 billion,
most of which report amounts equal to
less than 5% of their capital, broadly
defined.

• Continental banks have a relative-
ly greater exposure in Poland. The
degree of exposure varies among in-
dividual banks. Some figures have ap-
peared in the press, but we cannot at-
test to their authenticity.

• As for 1982 maturities, we
estimate that Poland's debt service
obligations to official and private
creditors for 1982 total roughly $10.4
billion — $6.8 billion in principal, $2.8
billion in interest, and $0.8 billion in-
terest due on the rescheduled 1981
debt. ■

50

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

;ervice, consisting of $200 million of
>rincipal and $74 million of interest,
mounted to only 15% of its foreign ex-
hange earnings from exports of goods
md services to non-Communist coun-
ries. Poland's imports from non-Com-
nunist countries exceeded its exports to
,hese countries by $1.3-3.3 billion an-
lually between 1973 and 1979 as the
luthorities continued to pursue their
levelopment program. By 1979, Poland's
jxternal hard currency debt stood at $21
million and its debt service— $3.6 billion
n principal and $2.2 billion in interest
jayments— equalled 92% of its hard cur-
rency export earnings. By mid-year
1981, Poland's hard currency debt stood
it approximately $26 billion. It owed
•oughly $20 billion of this to 16 Western
countries— $11 billion to official
•reditors or guaranteed by them, in-
cluding $1.9 billion to the U.S. Govern-
ment and $9 billion of unguaranteed
iebt to private banks, including $1.3
Dillion to U.S. banks.

At the beginning of 1981, it was
estimated that Poland would require
some $11 billion in hard currency financ-
ing to cover its projected trade deficit
for 1981 and to service its debt. Poland
was clearly not in a position to raise
such sums and on March 26, 1981,
Poland notified its creditors that it
would no longer be able to guarantee
payment of its external debts.

The governments and private banks
responded to the Poles by agreeing to
enter into debt rescheduling negotia-
tions. Separate debt rescheduling exer-
cises were organized by the official and
private creditors. Fifteen official
creditor nations (later increased to 16

with the addition of Spain) concluded
negotiations with the Government of
Poland and a multilateral debt resched-
uling agreement was signed in Paris
April 27, 1981. This agreement serves as
an umbrella agreement for subsequent
government-to-government agreements
to reschedule 90% of Poland's debt ser-
vice obligations to these creditors of
both the principal and interest falling
due during the last three-quarters of
1981. These obligations, totaling $2.4
billion, are to be repaid during a 4-year
period beginning in 1985. Interest on the
rescheduled interest is to be charged
during the grace period, 1981-1985. The
U.S. -Poland government-to-government
agreement was signed on August 27,
1981.

Western banks, moving on a parallel
track, established a consortium to
negotiate a debt rescheduling agreement
with the Polish Government by Septem-
ber. The consortium reached an ad
referendum agreement with the Poles
for rescheduling 95% of the principal
($2.3 billion) of their debt falling due
during April-December 1981, over 8
years, including a 4-year grace period.

The consortium of Western banks
set a precondition for signing the docu-
ment, namely that Poland pay all of the
1981 interest— an estimated $700
million— which fell due in the last 9
months of 1981. The Government of
Poland could not completely fulfill this
condition at year's end, and as a result,
the Western banks did not sign the
rescheduling agreement.

External Hard Currency Debt

In 1981, in an effort to meet the condi-
tion of being current on interest
payments to the banks, Poland made
some payments to reduce its arrearages.
In December, Poland requested that the
banks provide a short-term loan which
would be used to pay off remaining in-
terest arrearages. This the banks re-
fused to do, continuing to insist on
repayment in full of all 1981 interest.

Official creditors agreed in
November not to begin negotiations on
rescheduling Poland's 1982 debt service
until Poland signs its 1981 rescheduling
agreement with the commercial banks.
Following the imposition of martial law,
the NATO ministerial meeting of
January 1 1 , called for a suspension of
consideration of debt rescheduling
negotiations for the time being. The of-
ficial creditors, including the United
States, met January 14 and agreed that
rescheduling negotiations will be held in
abeyance.

In addition, the allies have stopped
new commercial credits and restricted
food exports, except humanitarian
assistance, to Poland. The United States
has also taken unilateral measures to
put pressure on Poland and the U.S.S.R.
We have suspended Polish airline land-
ing rights and fishing rights. With
respect to the Soviets, we have:
suspended the sale of oil and gas equip-
ment and technology; suspended action
on validated export licenses for high
technology; suspended negotiations on a
maritime agreement; suspended Aeroflot
service to the United States; postponed
negotiations on a new grains agreement;

Poland's Trade and External Debt with Non-Communist Countries

1972

1973

1974 1975 1976

(billions of U.S.$)

1977 1978

1979

1980

1981
(est.)

Non-Communist

Exports
Imports

Trade balance

1.8
2.0

^02

2.5
4.0

^L5

3.9 4.1
6.0 7.4

^2A -3.3

4.4
7.5

4.9 5.5
7.1 7.5

^22 -2.0

6.3

8.8

^5

7.4
8.8

^L4

5.6
6.5

^ol)

Gross Debt

1.6

2.8

4.6 8.0

11.5

14.0 17.8

21.1

25.0

26.0

Principal Repayment
Interest

0.2
0.1

0.3
0.2

0.5 0.7
0.4 0.5

1.2
0.7

2.0 2.9
0.9 1.5

3.6

2.2

5.6

2.4

6.4
3.3

Debt Service

(as % of exports)

15

19

23 30

42

59 79

92

108 173

January 1982

March 1982

51

EUROPE

closed the KAMA Purchasing Commis-
sion; and not renewed the scientific ex-
change agreement. Our allies have taken
and are considering further actions to
support and complement these U.S.
measures, with the common objective of
putting and keeping pressure on the
Polish and Soviet Governments to per-
mit the process of reform to continue in
Poland.

In this regard, we and our allies
agree that one facet of this pressure is
to continue to try to hold Poland to its
debt obligations to the West. This puts
the Polish Government under significant
economic pressure. The suspension of
consideration of negotiations on
rescheduling 1982 Polish debt allows us
to pursue the collection of those debts.

Outlook

Prior to the events of December 13,
Poland's economic and financial outlook
was extremely grave. GNP declined by
about 15% in 1981, and shortages of
spare parts and raw materials, because
of the inability of the Polish Government
to obtain Western financing, presaged
even further declines without significant
economic reforms.

The Polish Government, prior to the
military crackdown, has designed an in-
itial economic reform and stabilization
program aimed at reversing the decline
and eventually resuscitating Poland's
finances. While progress was slower
than many had hoped, that government
and Solidarity were beginning a dialogue
to bring about economic improvement.
Such a dialogue is, in our view, the only
way we believe that improvement would
have been viable over time. According to
the plan provided by that Polish Govern-
ment to the Western creditors, in
November 1981, Poland would work to
balance its hard currency trade in 1982;
an export surplus would have grown
steadily in succeeding years. By 1985,
the plan projected Poland's export
surplus would be large enough to cover
its interest payments, thereby
eliminating the current account deficit
and Poland's need to borrow in that
year. After 1985, this plan projected a
trade surplus large enough for the Poles
to begin reducing their outstanding
stock of debt. This projected scenario
would have required that Poland be able
to borrow new funds from Western
governments and/or banks until 1986

with the sums needed declining annually.
The amounts it would have needed to
borrow could have been reduced through
continued debt rescheduling. The need
for new financing would have been
greatest in 1982. Even under this pro-
jection, Poland's debt service payments
would have risen again in 1986 when the
debt rescheduled in 1981 begins to fall
due.

Situation in Poland

DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS

Jan. 20, 19821

The martial law authorities continue to
proclaim life is returning to normal in
Poland. There is room for a great deal
of skepticism in light of the facts.

Martial law has been in effect for
more than 5 weeks and there are still no
signs of any substantive dialogue with
the elected leaders of Solidarity.
Thousands remain in detention; their
number reportedly is growing.

In addition to the continued suspen-
sion of many basic rights, severe restric-
tions remain in force. Travel outside of
provincial borders is impossible without
special permission. Foreign travel is
even more out of the question.
Telephone subscribers can make only
local calls, and they are reminded by
recording that conversation is being con-
trolled. Mail from the West is censored.

A curfew is still in effect nationwide.
Parts of Warsaw remain sealed off to
private vehicles. Drivers everywhere are
made to undergo frequent checks of
their identity.

All Western news reports leaving
Poland must go through a single control
point; there are only four telex oper-
ators, and the control point is not
always open. Western reporters remain
severely limited in their ability to travel
throughout Poland.

Many workers continue to be forced

The Poles developed this projection
before the imposition of martial law.
Now it is quite difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to assess what path the Polish
economy will take because of the repres-
sion of the Polish workers, whose sup-
port is needed for lasting economic im-
provement to take place, and the
economic and social disruptions intro-
duced by martial law. ■

to sign loyalty oaths and if they do not,
they are fired because of political
unreliability.

Feb. 1, 19822

Police clashed with demonstrating
youths in Gdansk January 30. According
to official Polish reports, 6 civilians and
8 policemen were injured while 205 per-
sons were arrested. The Gdansk provin-
cial authorities have lengthened the
curfew, and once again suspended enter-
tainment and sporting events, cut
private telephone service, and banned
the use of private automobiles. Large
price increases for food and electricity,
as well as other items, went into effect
in Poland today.

The foregoing seems to suggest that
the situation in Poland remains very
troubled and tense. The martial law
authorities have restored piecemeal
some of the rights of the Poles to com-
municate and interact with each other
but on occasion — as in Gdansk — have
reimposed even more stringent restric-
tions.

Further, martial law leaders appear
still unwilling to enter into negotiations
with the elected leaders of Solidarity.
Without an internal process of recon-
ciliation among the authorities, the
union, and the church, Poland is highly
unlikely to resolve the acute social and
economic crises which it faces.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

2Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

52

Department of State Bulletin

IMMIGRATION

Change Proposed
in Immigrant
Numbers

by Diego C. Asencio

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on January 25, 1982. Ambassador
Asencio is Assistant Secretary for Con-
sular Affairs.1

I am pleased to appear today to
discuss — within the context of the Presi-
dent's proposals for comprehensive
reform of entry of foreigners into the
United States — the numerical limitations
on immigration.

As you know, the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy
made recommendations concerning this
subject. The President's interagency
task force on immigration and refugee
policy carefully considered the select
commission's recommendations and con-
cluded that it should not espouse them.
Instead, as part of the President's pro-
gram, the Administration has proposed
a single change in the existing system of
numerical limitations and does not pro-
pose any changes in the immigrant
selection (preference) system. We
believe that this proposal, which should
be considered in conjunction with the
rest of the President's program, will
supplement the tools with which this
nation can begin to address the multiple
problems posed by illegal immigration.

Canadian and Mexican Immigrants

The Administration proposes to establish
separate limitations of 40,000 each on
immigration from our two continental
neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Under
this proposal natives of each country
would compete only among themselves
for immigration. Each country's 40,000
limitation would be separate not only
from that of the other country but also
from the rest of the world. The existing
preference system would apply to each
of these limitations so that the same
immigrant selection system would apply
to each country and each of the limita-
tions would be apportioned among the
preference classes in the same manner
as at present. I should emphasize that
this proposed change would not result in
any reduction in immigration from other
areas of the world, since the numerical
limitation for all other countries would
be established at 230,000.

An added feature of our proposal is
that there would be provision for the
unused portion (if any) of either of the
two 40,000 limitations to be used by
natives of the other country. Thus, in
the first year of operation, the limit for
each country would be 40,000. If, for
example, during the first year, immigra-
tion from Mexico used the full 40,000
limitation and immigration from Canada
used just 25,000 numbers, in the second
year the limitation for Canada would re-
main at 40,000 but the limitation for
Mexico would be increased by Canada's
unused 15,000 numbers to 55,000. This
calculation would be made every year,
and increases, if any, could be made to
either limitation depending upon actual
usage. Theoretically, there could be in-
creases in both limitations in a given
year if there had been a shortfall under
both limitations during the preceding
year. This latter situation, although
legally possible, would appear to be
unlikely.

The President's proposal takes into
account the very special and unique
ties — social, economic, and
cultural — which exist between the
United States and its two contiguous
neighbors. The proposal represents an
additional element in this Administra-
tion's concerted and integrated plan to
regain control over our borders. The
increased limitations for Canada and,
particularly, for Mexico would reflect
our close relationships with both while
providing an additional opportunity to
reduce or deter illegal immigration by
opening a supplementary channel for
legal immigration to the United States.

Other Changes Opposed

Other than this one change, the Ad-
ministration is opposed to further
changes in the overall system of limita-
tions. Total legal immigration has three
components — (1) immediate relatives
and special immigrants, (2) preference
and nonpreference immigrants, and (3)
refugees. Two of these are already sub-
ject to numerical limitations. Preference
and nonpreference immigrants are sub-
ject to a fixed annual limitation — now
270,000 (which would rise to 310,000
under the Administration's proposal for
establishing separate limitations for
Canada and Mexico). Refugees are sub-
ject to the limitation established annual-
ly by the President after consultation
with the Congress. Only immediate
relatives and special immigrants are not
subject to a numerical limitation.

We believe that this system is sound
and should not be disturbed. First, we
can see no need or basis for imposing an

annual limitation on immediate relatives
and special immigrants. The special
immigrant classes — returning residents,
ministers of religion, former U.S.
Government employees, certain ex-
patriated women, and certain former
employees in the Panama Canal — are
statistically insignificant, and there is no
likelihood of there being any meaningful
increase in the totals. The only signif-
icance of their being numerically exempt
is that the relatively few applicants who
qualify in these classes can immigrate
without undue delay.

As to the "immediate relatives" — the
spouses and children of citizens and
parents of adult citizens — there appears
to be a consensus that these classes
should be granted the highest degree of
benefit under the immigration laws. This
has traditionally included exemption
from numerical limitations for spouses
and children and, since 1965, for
parents. Action now to impose a
numerical limitation on these classes of
immigrants would certainly be seen as a
step away from the principle of imme-
diate family reunification. Also, the very
imposition of a numerical limitation
raises the possibility of a backlog of
applicants, unless the limitation is set at
a figure so large that it becomes mean-
ingless.

With respect to refugees, the
Department believes that the existing
provisions of law are appropriate and
should be retained. While there is not a
fixed, permanent numerical limitation on
refugee admissions, there is an annual
limitation set by the President in con-
sultation with the Congress. The annual
consultations provide a means for
establishing the authorized level of
refugee admissions each year based on a
careful analysis of domestic and foreign
policy requirements. The system pro-
vides adequate control over the number
of refugees who are actually admitted
each year without imposing a rigid ceil-
ing which could inhibit the President's
ability to respond to changing foreign
and domestic circumstances.

In summary, we believe that the
establishment of an absolute ceiling
would produce an excessive rigidity in
our immigration system. Such a rigidity
might be necessary if the figure for the
absolute limit were arrived at through a
scientific analysis. This has not been
done, to my knowledge, and I am not
certain that it can be done.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■

March 1982

53

OCEANS

U.S. Policy and the
Law of the Sea

Following are a statement by Presi-
dent Reagan announcing the U.S. deci-
sion to return to the Law of the Sea
negotiations and a White House Fact
Sheet outlining U.S. policy, both of
January 29.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT1

The world's oceans are vital to the
United States and other nations in
diverse ways. They represent waterways
and airways essential to preserving the
peace and to trade and commerce. They
are major sources for meeting increas-
ing world food and energy demands and
promise further resource potential. They
are a frontier for expanding scientific
research and knowledge; a fundamental
part of the global environmental
balance; and a great source of beauty,
awe, and pleasure for mankind.

Developing international agreement
for this vast ocean space, covering over
half of the earth's surface, has been a
major challenge confronting the inter-
national community. Since 1973, scores
of nations have been actively engaged in
the arduous task of developing a com-
prehensive treaty for the world's oceans
at the Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea. The United States has
been a major participant in this process.

Serious questions had been raised in
the United States about parts of the
draft convention and, last March, I
announced that my Administration
would undertake a thorough review of
the current draft and the degree to
which it met U.S. interests in the
navigation, overflight, fisheries, en-
vironmental, deep seabed mining, and
other areas covered by that convention.
We recognize that the last two sessions
of the conference have been difficult,
pending the completion of our review.
At the same time, we consider it impor-
tant that a Law of the Sea treaty be
such that the United States can join in
and support it. Our review has con-
cluded that while most provisions of the
draft convention are acceptable and con-
sistent with U.S. interests, some major
elements of the deep seabed mining
regime are not acceptable.

I am announcing today that the
United States will return to those
negotiations and work with other coun-
tries to achieve an acceptable treaty. In
the deep seabed mining area, we will
seek changes necessary to correct those

unacceptable elements and to achieve
the goal of a treaty that will:

• Not deter development of any
deep seabed mineral resources to meet
national and world demand;

• Assure national access to these
resources by current and future qualified
entities to enhance U.S. security of
supply, to avoid monopolization of the
resources by the operating arm of the
international authority, and to promote
the economic development of the
resources;

• Provide a decisionmaking role in
the deep seabed regime that fairly
reflects and effectively protects the
political and economic interests and
financial contributions of participating
states;

• Not allow for amendments to
come into force without approval of the
participating states, including, in our
case, the advice and consent of the
Senate;

• Not set other undesirable prece-
dents for international organizations;
and

• Be likely to receive the advice and
consent of the Senate. In this regard,
the convention should not contain provi-
sions for the mandatory transfer of
private technology and participation by
and funding for national liberation
movements.

The United States remains com-
mitted to the multilateral treaty process
for reaching agreement on law of the
sea. If working together at the con-
ference we can find ways to fulfill these
key objectives, my Administration will
support ratification.

I have instructed the Secretary of
State and my Special Representative for
the Law of the Sea Conference [James
L. Malone, Chairman of the U.S. delega-
tion], in coordination with other respon-
sible agencies, to embark immediately on
the necessary consultations with other
countries and to undertake further
preparations for our participation in the
conference.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET1

Today the President announced his deci-
sion that the United States will return
to the negotiations at the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea and
work with other countries to achieve an
acceptable treaty for the world's oceans.
This follows a comprehensive inter-
agency review of U.S. Law of the Sea
objectives and interests as they relate to
the current draft convention.

Preparations for the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea began
in 1969. The first substantive session of
the conference was convened in Caracas,
Venezuela, in 1974. Ten sessions of the
conference have been held since then to
develop a consensus agreement on provi-
sions covering the full range of ocean
interests. These include:

• Exploration and exploitation of
deep seabed mineral resources;

• Extent and nature of coastal state
jurisdiction over living resources;

• Extent of coastal state jurisdiction
over the resources of the continental
margin;

• Limits of the territorial sea;

• Navigation and overflight rights
on the high seas, in territorial seas, in
straits, and in archipelagoes;

• Delimitation of boundaries be-
tween opposite and adjacent states;

• The rights of landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states;

• Protection of the marine environ-
ment;

• Freedom on marine scientific
research; and

• Peaceful settlement of disputes.

Over 150 nations have participated
in this effort. By 1980, the conference
had reached agreement on all but four
outstanding issues: the delimitation of
the outer edge of the continental
margin, participation of regional
organizations in the treaty, establish-
ment of a preparatory commission, and
grandfather rights for existing deep
seabed miners. Most participants ex-
pected that the negotiations would con-
clude in 1981.

Serious concerns had been raised
within the United States, however,
specifically with respect to the deep
seabed mining provisions of the draft
convention. The proposed treaty has
some unacceptable elements. Conse-
quently, on March 2, 1981, the Admin-
istration announced that it was initiating
a comprehensive review of U.S. law of
the sea policy.

The United States sought to insure
that there was sufficient time for the
review of the proposed draft convention
before negotiations were concluded. The
conference proceeded with technical
drafting work and discussion of several
outstanding issues during a 5-week ses-
sion in March and April 1981. In August
1981, the conference reconvened in
Geneva for 5 weeks during which the
United States aired a series of substan-
tive concerns with respect to the deep
seabed provisions of the draft conven-
tion. The United States sought to elicit

54

Department of State Bulletin

PACIFIC

candid reactions to areas of its concern
and to explore the kinds of solutions
that could reasonably be expected to
result from further negotiations. The
next session of the conference begins in
early March.

U.S. concerns about the draft con-
vention center on those issues of access,
development decisionmaking, and other
provisions noted in the President's state-
ment. Particular elements of the deep
seabed provisions that give rise to U.S.
concerns include:

• Policymaking in the seabed
authority would be carried out by a one-
nation, one-vote assembly;

• The executive council which would
make the day-to-day decisions affecting
access of U.S. miners to deep seabed
minerals would not have permanent or
guaranteed representation by the United
States, and the United States would not
have influence on the council commen-
surate with its economic and political
interests;

• A review conference would have
the power to impose treaty amendments
on the United States without its con-
sent;

• The treaty would impose artificial
limitations on seabed mineral produc-
tion;

• The treaty would give substantial
competitive advantages to a supra-
national mining company — the Enter-
prise;

• Private deep seabed miners would
be subject to a mandatory requirement
for the transfer of technology to the
Enterprise and to developing countries;

• The new international organiza-
tion would have discretion to interfere
unreasonably with the conduct of mining
operations, and it could impose poten-
tially burdensome regulations on an in-
fant industry; and

• The treaty would impose large
financial burdens on industrialized coun-
tries whose nationals are engaged in
deep seabed mining and financial terms
and conditions which would significantly
increase the costs of mineral production.

The deep seabed offers a potentially
important alternative source of minerals.
While current world demand and metals
markets do not justify commercial-scale
development at this time, multinational
consortia have invested substantial
amounts to develop technology and to
prospect. When economic factors
become favorable, deep seabed mining is
likely to be an important undertaking.

Republic of Nauru

PEOPLE

The population includes more than 4,000
indigenous Nauruans, nearly 2,000
workers from other Pacific islands, and
1,500 Europeans and Chinese. The in-
habitants live in small settlements scat-
tered throughout the island. Nauruans
are a mixture of the three basic Pacific
ethnic groups: Melanesian, Micronesian,
and Polynesian. Through centuries of in-
termarriage, a homogeneous people
evolved. Their language, a fusion of
elements from the Gilbert, Caroline,
Marshall, and Solomon Islands, is
distinct from all other Pacific languages.
Most of the people speak English, and
all understand it. All Nauruans are pro-
fessed Christians.

Education is free and compulsory
for Nauruan children between ages 6
and 16 and between 6 and 15 for non-
Nauruan children. In addition, numerous
government scholarships are given for
students to attend boarding schools and
universities abroad, principally in
Australia. Literacy is virtually universal.

In the past 100 years, the existence
of the Nauruans as a people has been
threatened on several occasions. Tribal
disputes in the 1870s reduced the
population to fewer than 1,000 after 10
years of strife. An influenza epidemic in
1919 reduced the population by one-third
in a few weeks. During World War II,
the Nauruan community again lost two-
thirds of its population when the
Japanese deported many Nauruans to
the Caroline Islands to build airstrips.
Since the war, however, the Nauruan
population has increased from 1,300 to
7,700.

GEOGRAPHY

Nauru, an oval island in the west-central
Pacific Ocean, lies 53 kilometers (33 mi.)
south of the Equator, 3,520 kilometers
(2,200 mi.) northeast of Sydney,
Australia, and 3,912 kilometers (2,445
mi.) southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. The
island is about 19 kilometers (12 mi.) in
circumference and contains 21 square
kilometers (8 sq. mi.) of land.

Nauru is one of the three great
phosphate-rock islands of the Pacific (the
other two are Ocean Island, part of the
Gilbert Islands, and Makatea Island in
French Polynesia). The coast has a

sandy beach rising gradually to form a
fertile section several hundred meters
wide encircling the island. A coral reef
reaches 60 meters (200 ft.) above sea
level on the inner side of the fertile
area. An extensive plateau bearing high-
grade phosphate is above the cliff.

The climate is hot but not unpleas-
ant. Temperatures range between 24°C
(76°F) and 33°C (93°F) and the humidi-
ty, between 70% and 80%. The average
annual rainfall is 45 centimeters (18 in.),
but it fluctuates greatly. For example, in
1950 only 30 centimeters (12 in.) of rain
fell, but in 1930 and 1940, rainfall
measured more than 457 centimeters
(180 in.).

Nauru has no capital city; Parlia-
ment House and government houses are
on the coast and opposite the airport in
Yaren District.

HISTORY

Little is known of Nauru's early history.
The origin of the inhabitants and the cir-
cumstances of their coming are
unknown, but they are believed to be
castaways who drifted there from some
other island.

The island was discovered in 1798 by
John Fearn, captain of the British whal-
ing ship "Hunter," on a voyage from
New Zealand to the China Sea. He noted
that the attractive island was "extremely
populous" with many houses and named
it Pleasant Island.

The isolated island remained free of
European contact for much longer than
other Pacific islands. During the 19th
century, however, European traders and
beachcombers established themselves
there. The Europeans were useful to the
Nauruans as intermediaries with visiting
ships; however, the Europeans obtained
firearms and alcohol for the islanders,
exacerbating their intertribal warfare.

Pleasant Island came under German
control in 1881 under an Anglo-German
Convention and reverted to its native
name, Nauru. By 1881, when the Ger-
mans first sent an administrator to the
island, continual warring between the 12
tribes had reduced the population from
about 1,400 in 1842 to little more than
900. Alcohol was banned and arms and
ammunition confiscated in an effort to
restore order. With the arrival in 1899
of the first missionaries, Christianity

■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Feb. 1, 1982.1

March 1982

55

PACIFIC

l

i

SOUTH PACIFIC

OCEAN

Nauru local

govtmmant comic

(Domaniab)

•' L

Pmcit

Otto

■

*

NAURU

*

\

V-

NAURU

Internal administrative boundary

and Western education were introduced.
The translation of the Bible into
Nauruan standardized the language.

When World War I broke out in
1914, German authorities surrendered
Nauru to an Australian expeditionary
force that landed on the island, and in
1919 Germany formally renounced its
title to the island. A League of Nations
mandate was granted to Australia, Brit-
ain, and New Zealand, and Nauru was
thereafter administered by Australia on
behalf of the three governments.

The island's rich deposits of high-
grade phosphates had been discovered

during the German administration, and
a British company, the Pacific
Phosphate Company, mined the deposits
under license from Nauruan landowners.
After the establishment of the mandate,
the three governments purchased the
company's interests and appointed a
phosphate commissioner for each
government to run the industry.

In 1940, during World War II, Ger-
man raiders sank British phosphate
ships waiting off the island and shelled
the phosphate installations. Less than a
year later, the Japanese bombed Nauru,

landing there in August 1942. In 1943,
they restored the phosphate works and
built an airstrip. Later that year, 1,200
of the 1,800 Nauruans were deported to
Truk Island in the Carolines to build an
airstrip. The only survivors of the brutal
treatment by the Japanese on Truk were
737 Nauruans, who returned to Nauru
on January 31, 1946 — among them was
Hammer DeRoburt, current president of
Nauru. Those who had stayed behind on
Nauru also suffered privations, ag-
gravated by food shortages that became
even more acute when Japanese supply
ships were sunk in 1944.

After the war, Australia restored
the Nauruan settlements and phosphate
mining resumed. On November 1, 1947,
the United Nations made Nauru a trust
territory of Australia, New Zealand, and
Great Britain, again under Australian
administration.

The political advancement of the
Nauruans began in December 1951 when
the Council of Chiefs, a largely
hereditary body with no powers, was
replaced by the Nauru Local Govern-
ment Council. The council's formation
and the emergence of strong leaders,
particularly Timothy Detudamo and
Hammer DeRoburt, accelerated the
Nauruans' desire to control their own af-
fairs. They began to press their claim
for independence and ownership of the
phosphate industry.

Throughout the 1960s, the Nauruans
were given an increasing share in the
island's administration. In 1966 the
Legislative and Executive Councils were
established and a large measure of inter-
nal self-government was granted. In the
following year, agreement was reached
that Nauru should become an indepen-
dent republic, and on January 31, 1968,
the trusteeship agreement was ter-
minated and independence was
celebrated. The date chosen for the in-
auguration was the 22d anniversary of
the return from Truk of the islanders
deported by the Japanese.

Independence negotiations included
an agreement for the sale of the assets
of the British Phosphate Company at a
cost of $21 million over 3 years. In July
1970, the Nauru Phosphate Corporation
took over full control of the phosphate
operations.

GOVERNMENT

Nauru's constitution, adopted by an
elected constitutional convention on
January 29, 1968, and amended May 17,
1968, established a republic with a

56

Department of State Bulletin

PACIFIC

tarliamentary system of government.

The unicameral Nauruan Parliament
as 18 members, elected for 3-year
erms. Voting is compulsory for all
vlauruans over age 20. The island is
ivided into eight electoral districts,
nost electing two members. After each
ection, Parliament elects the republic's
iresident, who chooses and serves as ex-
cutive of the five- or six-member
cabinet. The president is thus head of
tate and de facto prime minister.

For local government, Nauru is
livided into 14 administrative districts,
governed by the Nauru Local Govern-
nent Council (NLGC). Much overlap has
leveloped between the central and local
overnment — many members of Parlia-
nent are also councilors and President
DeRoburt has served as head chief of
he NLGC since 1956.

The judicial arm of government is
omposed of the Supreme Court,
(resided over by a chief justice; the
District 'Court, presided over by a resi-
ient magistrate; and the Family Court.

'OLITICAL CONDITIONS

5oon after independence, Hammer
DeRoburt was elected the first presi-
lent. He was reelected in May 1971 and
December 1973. In December 1976, Ber-
lard Dowiyogo was elected president.
Eleven months later, on October 7,
977, he dissolved Parliament to seek a
nandate for his government because ex-
3resident DeRoburt had refused to ac-
ept the 1976 election as constitutional.
Uthough he received the mandate, his
leriod of control was limited, and in
\pril 1978 he resigned under pressure
rom DeRoburt's supporters. Dowiyogo's
uccessor, Lagumot Harris, remained in
iffice only 2 weeks before resigning. In
he election following Harris' resigna-
ion, DeRoburt again became president,
ind he was reelected in December 1980.
Although Nauru has no political parties,
hese presidential changes indicate that
i cohesive majority and minority have
leveloped among the members of Parlia-
nent.

Principal Government Officials

Resident — Hon. Hammer DeRoburt
Minister for Works; Minister Assistant

to the President— Hon. Buraro

Detudamo
Minister for Finance— Hon. Kenas Aroi
Minister for Justice — Hon. Joseph

Detsimea Audoa
Minister of Health and Education — Hon.

Lawrence Stephen

ECONOMY

Nauru has based its economy on ex-
ploiting its phosphate deposits, which
are among the richest in the world. It
exports about 1.8 million metric tons
(MT) a year, and its gross national prod-
uct (GNP) varies with the world market
price of phosphate.

Phosphate resources total some 40.5
million MT. At the present rate of
removal, these resources are expected to
be exhausted within the next 10 years.
Revenue from the phosphate sales is in-
vested in long-term trust funds

established to take care of the Nauruans
when the phosphate is depleted. About
$4.50 out of each $6.00 that the
Nauruans receive from phosphate
revenues is invested in these funds.

Nauru has no taxes, and costs of
government and the large statutory
trust fund for the future are paid from
phosphate revenues. In recent years,
however, the country has undertaken a
broad program of investment ami
various enterprises. Its national airline
owns and operates three jet
airplanes — two 727s and one
737 — which fly from Australia to Japan

A Profile

People

NATIONALITY: Noun and adjec-
tive— Nauruan(s). POPULATION (1979
est.): 7,700. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
LAST 5 YRS.: 0.8%. ETHNIC GROUPS:
Nauruan 58%, other Pacific island peoples
26%, Chinese 8%, European 8%.
RELIGIONS: Christian-Nauruan Congrega-
tional Church, Nauru Independence
Church, Roman Catholic Church.
LANGUAGES: Nauruan, a distinct Pacific
language (official): English widely
understood and spoken. EDUCATION:
Years compulsory — ages 6-16 for
Nauruans, ages 6-15 for others; free.
Literacy— 99%.

Geography

AREA: 20.7 sq. km. (8 sq. mi.). CITIES:
No capital city; government offices in
Yaren District. TERRAIN: Raised coral
reefs, composed largely of phosphate-
bearing rock. CLIMATE: Tropical mon-

Government

TYPE: Republic. CONSTITUTION:

Jan. 29, 1968. INDEPENDENCE: Jan. 31,

1968.

BRANCHES: Executive— president
(head of state; de facto prime minister)
elected by Parliament. Legislative —
unicameral Parliament; 18 members elected
every 3 yrs. Judicial — Supreme Court,
District Court, Family Court.

SUBDIVISIONS: 14 administrative
districts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUF-
FRAGE: Universal and compulsory for all
adult citizens.

NATIONAL HOLIDAYS: In addition
to religious holidays, 3 national
holidays — Independence Day, Jan. 31; Con-
stitution Day, May 17; and Angam Day,
Oct. 26.

FLAG: Royal blue field with a gold
stripe across the center representing the
Equator. In the lower left quarter, below
the gold stripe, a 12-pointed white star in-
dicates the country's position in relation to
the Equator and symbolizes the original 12
tribes of Nauru.

Economy

Nauru does not publish GNP, export, or
import figures, so these figures are
estimates.

GNP: More than $155.4 million; varies
gTeatly with world price of phosphate.
PER CAPITA INCOME: $21,400.

AGRICULTURE: Negligible.

INDUSTRY: Phosphate mining.

TRADE (1979): Exports— $75,343
million: phosphate. Imports— $11,826
million: food, water, other necessities. Ma-
jor trade partners — Australia, New
Zealand.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: Nauru
uses Australian currency; 1 Australian $ =
US$1.12.

FISCAL YEAR: July 1-June 30.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: Special member of
Commonwealth of Nations; South Pacific
Forum; South Pacific Commission; Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union; Universal
Postal Union; International Civil Aviation
Organization; INTERPOL: Economic and
Social Council for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP).

March 1982

57

UNITED NATIONS

and from Fiji to Guam, Manila, and
Hong Kong. They also serve Taipei,
Honiara, Apia, Noumea, Majuro, and
Tarawa. The shipping company owns
five ships and charters two. It has serv-
ices from Australia through the South
Pacific islands and from San Francisco
and Honolulu to the Marshall, Caroline,
and Mariana Islands.

A 48-room hotel provides accom-
modations for tourists and business
visitors. In Melbourne, Australia, the
Nauruan Government has built Nauru
House, a $48 million, 52-story office
complex.

Because it has no taxes, Nauru has
established a finance industry, with
legislation facilitating incorporation by
nonnationals.

The government subsidizes all im-
ports so that food and other necessities
are available at a nominal cost. Virtually
everything must be imported, including
fresh water brought from Australia as
ballast in the vessels that take the
phosphate from Nauru.

Of Nauru's limited plateau area,
about 202-243 hectares (500-600 acres)
are available for cultivation. Coconuts
are the mam crop and small quantities
of vegetables are grown, principally by
the Chinese population. Pigs and
chickens are raised and fish are caught
along the coast from canoes. All other
food is imported.

Electricity is available throughout
the island from the Nauru Phosphate
Company, and housing is available at
nominal rent. A short railroad carries
the phosphate from the mines in the in-
terior to the coast, and a paved road
circles the island.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

At the request of the Nauru Govern-
ment, the status of "special member" of
the Commonwealth of Nations was
devised in November 1968 for the
Republic of Nauru. As a special member,
Nauru is not represented at meetings of
the Commonwealth heads of government
but may participate in all Common-
wealth functional meetings and activities
and is eligible for Commonwealth
technical assistance, usually in the form
of advice on phosphate marketing.
Nauru has not applied for U.N.
membership but is active in several U.N.
agencies and organizations including the
Universal Postal Union, the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, and the
U.N. Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific. Nauru also

belongs to regional organizations such as
the South Pacific Commission and the
group of Pacific Commonwealth coun-
tries called the South Pacific Forum and
its offshoot, the South Pacific Bureau
for Economic Cooperation. Nauru is also
a member of the International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Nauru has no embassies abroad but
is represented by an honorary consul
general in San Francisco, honorary con-
suls in Hawaii and Guam, and an
honorary representative in Saipan (U.S.
Trust Territory). The U.S. Ambassador
to Australia, residing in Canberra, is
also accredited to Nauru. Neither the
Agency for International Development
(AID), the Peace Corps, nor any other
international aid program is active on
the island.

Defense

Nauru does not belong to any defense
pact or treaty. Australia assures Nauru's

defense, but no formal agreement exists.
Nauru has no defense forces, but a
police force, headed by a director of
police, maintains order on the island.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador (resident in Canberra,
Australia)— Robert D. Nesen

Deputy Chief of Mission— Stephen R.
Lyne

The U.S. Embassy in Australia
is at Moonah Place, Canberra (tel.
062-73-3711). ■

The information on this country is taken
from one of a series of Background Notes
on about 165 countries of the world, edited
by Joanne Reppert Reams of the Bureau of
Public Affairs.

A one-year subscription (about 60
Notes) is available for $16 from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
20402.

Worldwide
Response to the
International
Year of
Disabled Persons

by Alan A. Reich

Statement before the U.N. General
Assembly on December 7, 1981. Mr.
Reich is Adviser to the U.S. Delegation
to the United Nations and President of
the U.S. Council for the International
Year of Disabled Persons.1

The United Nations, by proclaiming
1981 the International Year of Disabled
Persons (IYDP), has aroused the hopes
and aspirations of fully a billion people
comprising the world's "disability
family." This family is made up of one-
half billion persons who are disabled
themselves plus, at least, an equal
number of family members who also live
with the limitations and challenges of
our disabilities. Thanks to the vision and
leadership of the member nations, the
Secretary General and the Secretariat,
and the agencies of the U.N. system, the

I

\

\yj

1981

disability family can now look more op-
timistically to the future. The response
to the challenge of the IYDP has been
gratifying. But having accepted the
challenge and the responsibility, we
must now intensify our efforts, for the
serious problems of disability do not eni
with the IYDP.

By promoting its five-point IYDP
program, the United Nations has
stimulated commitment and purposeful
action by governments, U.N. agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and
concerned individuals throughout the
world. While their responses have
varied, reflecting differing social struc-
tures, stages of development, and levels
of resources, several significant common
themes have emerged. They include an
outpouring of compassion, a recognition
that disabled persons are an important
resource, and the active involvement of
disabled persons themselves.

In the United States, the IYDP ini-
tiative has led to significant programs

58

Department of State

UNITED NATIONS

and results. As President Reagan stated
in his proclamation on February 6, 1981,
"All of us stand to gain when those who
are disabled share in America's oppor-
tunities." At the Government level, 42
agencies have undertaken activities
aimed at bringing Americans with
disabilities more fully into the main-
stream. Their efforts have included
reviewing hiring practices, streamlining
legislation as it relates to disability, and
carrying out special information pro-
grams. Of equal importance, the Govern-
ment has encouraged the U.S. private
sector to take advantage of the IYDP
opportunity.

The Private Sector

The private sector — comprised of
disability, business, religious, labor,
youth, women's, professional, and other
organizations — has responded with vigor
and enthusiasm. The concept of partner-
ship— between the disabled and non-
disabled; between Government and the
private sector; and between organiza-
tions at the national, State, and local
levels— has been a dominant theme. The
IYDP mission in the United States,
adopted jointly by the Government and
the private sector, has been to increase
public understanding of the needs and
potential contribution of disabled per-
sons and to accelerate progress toward
long-term goals.

The corporate and disability com-
munities together formed the U.S. Coun-
cil, funded by nongovernmental sources.
Its purposes has been to carry the IYDP
challenge to towns and cities of
America, where our 35 million citizens
with physical or mental disabilities go
about their lives. In more than 1,850
communities, partnership committees of
disabled and nondisabled persons have
been formed. They have identified needs,
set goals, and undertaken programs to
meet their goals. Governors of all 50
States, more than 330 national organiza-
tions, and 270 leading corporations have
joined in this partnership program.

Demonstrating tremendous cor-
porate social responsibility, America's
corporations have provided resources
and enlightened leadership. They have
realized that bringing disabled persons
into the economic mainstream is in their
own best interest. Xerox Corporation,
last month, donated $3 million worth of
sophisticated reading machines for the
blind to 100 university libraries.

Nationwide Involvement

In American communities, people from
all walks of life have advanced the U.N.
IYDP theme of "full participation of
disabled persons." They have made
public buildings and facilities more ac-
cessible, developed special transporta-
tion systems, modified churches and
parks to accommodate disabled persons,
facilitated voting by disabled individuals,
passed new ordinances on housing for
disabled persons, held job fairs to bring
together employers and disabled job
seekers, and have carried out' locally
devised awareness programs. A common
theme throughout America has been en-
couraging self-reliance and self-help ini-
tiatives.

In the United States, the observance
has been marked by strong and en-
thusiastic involvement of disabled per-
sons themselves. They have been
stimulated by the IYDP to assume
greater leadership in shaping their own
destinies. Through a nationwide adver-
tising and media campaign aimed at
changing attitudes, the public has gained
a greater appreciation of the contribu-
tion of disabled persons. The result is
that future efforts will be based less on

the country, the participants urged,
unanimously, that the IYDP momentum
be continued. This initiative is of the
healthiest kind. It is based on the feel-
ings of people, most of them disabled, at
the grassroots level— in the towns and
cities of America. It is based on the
voluntary spirit of citizens. The response
to date to the unanimous resolution at
this conference has been two-fold:

First, it is my great privilege to an-
nounce today, an important initiative to
follow through on the IYDP. In January,
a new nongovernmental organization—
The National Office On Disability— will
be opened in Washington, D.C. Its pur-
pose will be to encourage and support
the continuation of the momentum of
the IYDP in the United States. Launch-
ing of this organization is made possible
by a generous contribution of a leading
American corporation.

Secondly, a resolution has been in-
troduced in the Congress to designate
1982 the national year of disabled per-
sons. The United States is following the
leadership of other nations— in Africa
and in South America— which first
developed plans for designating 1982
their national year of disabled persons.

The significance of the year in the United
States was expressed by one seriously disabled per-
son, "Never again do I need to take a back seat or
to stay at home; I now feel I can participate like
anyone else. I am grateful that the IYDP helped to
open opportunity for me. The IYDP has given me
dignity. "

March 1982

charity and more on recognition that
disabled persons are important con-
tributors to society. The significance of
the year in the United States was ex-
pressed by one seriously disabled per-
son: "Never again do I need to take a
back seat or to stay at home; I now feel
I can participate like anyone else. I am
grateful that the IYDP helped to open
opportunity for me. The IYDP has given
me dignity."

None of us anticipated that the
IYDP would be an end. The serious
problems of the disability family go on.
The IYDP has given impetus to new
beginnings. It has accelerated progress.
Attitudinal barriers are coming down.
At a recent conference in Washington of
IYDP representatives appointed by
governors of all 50 States and of com-
munity representatives from throughout

This designation will help further full
participation of disabled persons at the
national, State, and local levels.

International Organizations

Americans are not unmindful of the fact
that the problems of disability are com-
pounded in the developing nations. The
greater seriousness of disability among
those in poverty and in less fortunate
circumstances is apparent to us in our
own country. We are, therefore, greatly
pleased by the initiatives of the United
Nations and its agencies which have
taken advantage of the IYDP to launch
long-term programs. The World Health
Organization, for example, is now in-
cluding the problems of disability within
its long-term program of "Health For

59

UNITED NATIONS

All By the Year 2000." This initiative of-
fers promise for concerted efforts,
among others, to prevent and eventually
eliminate certain disabling conditions af-
fecting more than 5 million newborn
children in the world annually.

We are inspired by the new efforts
of UNICEF [United Nations Children's
Fund] to insure that disabled children
have a better chance at life. There is
hope for many in UNESCO's [United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization] new programs to
reduce the burden of dependency
through greater educational opportunity
for disabled children. The International
Labor Office's expanded efforts to pro-
vide technical rehabilitation assistance
will have a radiating impact in years to
come; there now is greater recognition
that organized labor has a real stake in
reducing disability. The U.N. Develop-
ment Program has brought about
realization in many countries of the im-
portance of including disabled persons in
the development process. These few ex-
amples are encouraging to us all.

The IYDP Secretariat efforts in
Vienna, under the direction of Assistant
Secretary-General Mrs. Leticia Shahani,
to promote the ongoing work of the na-
tional committees formed in 127 nations,
will continue to pay dividends. Despite
limited resources, the Secretariat has
played a key role in expanding
worldwide concern for disabled persons.

Among the 800 international
nongovernmental organizations affiliated
with the United Nations, there has been
enthusiastic response to the IYDP
challenge. To cite an example again,
Rotary International, which has 10,000
clubs in 150 countries, has undertaken
many activities. They include a project
of the Rotary Club of Randolph,
Massachusetts, which provided a
specially-equipped bus for disabled youth
to attend camp, and they include a proj-
ect of the Rotary Club of Raniginj, In-
dia, which sponsored a polio immuniza-
tion campaign for 2,400 children. Most

importantly, Rotary and many other
nongovernmental organizations have
made long-term plans to continue their
commitment after 1981.

Conclusion

By proclaiming this year, the United Na-
tions has done much to improve the
human condition. This is a central role
of the United Nations. But, we would
not do justice to this U.N. initiative if
we did not also recognize another impor-
tant contribution of the IYDP. By focus-
ing worldwide attention on this human
concern, the United Nations has opened
an important area of transnational com-
munication across political boundaries on
a common problem affecting all people.
This communication will continue. It will
further international cooperation and im-

By proclaiming this
year [the IYDP], the
United Nations has done
much to improve the
human condition.

prove the climate for resolving other dif-
ferences peacefully. Interactions among
the 127 national committees, the
worldwide consideration of the world
draft plan of action growing out of the
IYDP, and the ongoing communication
in the area of disability among
nongovernmental organizations will con-
tribute to the climate of peace and
cooperation among nations. I am
reminded of the words inscribed here in
the General Assembly building: "Since
wars begin in the minds of men, it is in
the minds of men that the defenses of
peace must be constructed." The IYDP
is an idea born in the minds of men
which is helping to build the human
foundations of the structure of peace.
These two results of the IYDP—
new commitment to improve the human
condition and opening a new area of
transnational communication — are
marvelous testimony to the moral force
of the United Nations. The voluntary
response throughout the world to the
challenge and opportunity demonstrate

the United Nations tremendous capacity
to stimulate purposeful action and com-
mitment. With limited funds, the United
Nations has fostered programs with far-
reaching implications in all countries.
IYDP success is not in what was done
but in what was started. By focusing at-
tention, the United Nations has created
opportunity— the continuing oppor-
tunity—for us all to attack the serious
problems of disability on an ongoing
basis.

And, let us no longer question the
value of international year observances.
The IYDP has demonstrated it can,
through them, unleash tremendous
human and organizational potential. As
we look ahead to another signal
year— the bimillennium— the continuing
response to the IYDP can be a beacon o
hope.

Speaking on behalf of the world's
disability family, I applaud the IYDP ini-
tiative. We commend and thank the
distinguished member nation repre-
sentatives. As my predecessor this
morning, the distinguished delegate
from the Philippines, Mrs. Marcos,
stated, "Human problems demand
human solutions." I urge you and the
other leaders of our United Nations to
continue and intensify the quest for
human solutions to the staggering
human problems of disability. By
challenging the world and by taking on
this responsibility, you have become
champions of the disabled. We need you
as partners. We need your vision and
your leadership. We need your continu-
ing concern, compassion, and commit-
ment.

You are giving us opportunity. You
are inspiring hope. Please keep up the
momentum! Together we can make our
planet more livable!

'U.S. U.N. press release 146. I

60

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Case for U.S. Assistance
to El Salvador

by Thomas O. Enders

Statements before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the House Ap-
propriations Committee on February 1,
1982, and the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Foreign
AJfairs Committee on February 2. Am-
bassador Enders is Assistant Secretary
for Inter- American Affairs.1

FEB. 1, 1982

The President is expected shortly to sign
a determination under Section 506(A) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, allocating up to $55 million in
emergency security assistance to El
Salvador. This assistance will be in the
form of U.S. military materiel, services,
and training. Why was this action taken?

There is an unforeseen emergency
requiring immediate security
assistance.

After the failure of their much-
heralded "final offensive" in January
1981, insurgent cadres appear to have
rethought their strategy, concluding that
the FMLN/FDR [Farabundo Marti Na-
tional Liberation Front/Revolutionary
Democratic Front] did not have the
broad popular support necessary to
achieve victory by frontal attack on the
government and armed forces. They
abandoned the strategy of building
popular support and, instead, turned to
attacking the economy in a "guerra pro-
longada," or war of attrition. The new
strategy calls for hit-and-run attacks
against small military units and lightly
defended economic targets, such as
bridges, electrical transmission lines,
and dams. The intention is to damage
severely an economy that was already in
crisis and to undermine the morale of
the government and popular confidence
in it. Since then, attacks on El
Salvador's economic infrastructure have
caused almost $50 million in damage to
electrical and communications systems,
bridges, and rail lines, bringing in-
creased hardship to the Salvadoran
people.

We watched this tactic develop, con-
cluding by year's end that it was en-
dangering not the Salvadoran Armed
Forces but people's livelihood. An
economic emergency was resulting.

Meanwhile Nicaragua was being
transformed into an ever more efficient
platform for supporting insurgency in El
Salvador. We have watched as the
FMLN headquarters unit was developed
on Nicaraguan soil, clandestine logistics
routes perfected, and guerrilla training
camps set up. The number of Cuban
military and security advisers in
Nicaragua doubled during 1981 to be-
tween 1,800 and 2,000. Munitions and
weapons resupply to the insurgents in
El Salvador is again approaching levels
reached before the "final offensive."
Nicaragua also brought in modern tanks
and is preparing for the introduction of
supersonic aircraft, thus acquiring an of-
fensive capability. Nicaragua has become
a two-fold threat to its neighbors— as
the support system for insurrection and
because of the development of its offen-
sive capacity.

Another factor is the FMLN/FDR's
use of force and intimidation to disrupt
the election campaign that began last
week and will conclude March 28 with
voting for a constituent assembly. This
will be El Salvador's first step toward
the establishment of a fully legitimate
government — one elected by the people.
After nearly 50 years of military rule,
this is a bold but vulnerable move. The
guerrilla FMLN is determined to
sabotage and block the establishment of
an elected government.

Finally we faced an emergency of an
even more urgent character. In the early
morning of January 27, a guerrilla at-
tack on the Ilopango Air Base outside
San Salvador severely damaged a large
part of the Salvadoran Air Force —
including a number of the Huey
helicopters we provided to El Salvador
early last year at the direction of
Presidents Carter and Reagan. The
Hueys are El Salvador's only transport
helicopters, and they are critically im-
portant to the mobility and rapid
response capability of the Salvadoran
Army — even more so in the wake of
bridge and rail sabotage. The guerrilla
success on January 27 will undoubtedly
be followed by additional high-visibility

raids on key military and civilian
targets. Unless the helicopters are
replaced quickly, the Salvadoran Armed
Forces will be unable to respond effec-
tively.

The magnitude of the military and
economic challenge from the guerrillas
could not be foreseen at the time the
Administration's revised FY 1982 secu-
rity assistance request was submitted to
the Congress in early 1981. As a result,
we have had to commit all of the $25
million in foreign military sales credits
and military assistance program grants
made available by the Congress in the
1982 appropriation. Most of this
assistance — $15 million — is financing
the training in the United States of
some 500 Salvadoran officer candidates
and the 1,000 members of a second
quick-reaction battalion. Additional
junior officers are essential to a modest
expansion of the army; enlisted
volunteers are plentiful, trained officers
are not. Over the longer term, this train-
ing will improve Salvadoran military
capability and command and control. It
was not designed to meet, and will not
meet, the short-term threat so graphical-
ly illustrated by the Ilopango attack. But
having fully committed available funds,
we have no means of replacing the
equipment lost in that attack or of sup-
plying the weapons, ground vehicles,
and communications gear urgently
needed now to meet the mounting guer-
rilla effort to sabotage the elections. To
withhold 506(A) assistance at this point
would be to abandon El Salvador.

The decisive battle for Central
America is underway in El Salvador.

Cuba is systematically expanding its
capacity to project military power
beyond its own shores. The arrival this
year of a second squadron of
MiG-23/Floggers and the 63,000 tons of
war supplies imported from the Soviet
Union in 1981 have added substantially
to an air, land, and sea arsenal that was
already the area's most powerful.

Nicaragua is being exploited as a
base for the export of subversion and
armed intervention throughout Central
America.

If, after Nicaragua, El Salvador is
captured by a violent minority, who in
Central America would not live in fear?
How long would it be before major
strategic U.S. interests— the canal, sea
lanes, oil supplies — were at risk?

For most of its life as a nation, our

March 1982

61

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

country has faced no threat from its
neighbors. But unless we act decisively
now, the future could well bring more
Cubas — totalitarian regimes so linked to
the Soviet Union that they become fac-
tors in the military balance and so in-
competent economically that their
citizens' only hope becomes that of one
day migrating to the United States.

If we do not sustain the struggle
now, we shall fall back into that terri-
ble vicious circle in which in Central
America the only alternative to right-
wing dictatorship is left-wing dic-
tatorship.

Gen. Romero's traditionalist military
government was overturned 2 years ago
by a military-civilian coalition committed
to reform — land reform and the
transformation of El Salvador into a
democracy. We supported the reforms
then; we support them now. And real
progress has been made — for all the
civil strife, even though there is a long
way to go, above all in bringing violence
under control.

Let me say a word more about
violence before closing. Violence has
always been high in El Salvador, but it
became epidemic after the extreme left
obtained outside support for armed war-
fare. The issue of violence and counter-
violence has been and is at the center of
our dealings with the Salvadoran Gov-
ernment. Some of it has been brought
under control. Charges against the
murderers of our countrywomen are
about to be brought — at last our best
estimates show a steady decline in non-
combatant deaths over the past year. A
thousand officers and men from the
security forces have been transferred,
punished, or retired; the extremist
organization ORDEN [Nationalist Demo-
cratic Organization] abolished.

But it is not necessary to believe
every alleged massacre story — in par-
ticular reports by the insurgent radio
station of the killing of more than 900
people in Morazan appear highly exag-
gerated— to know that massive prob-
lems remain. This morning's report of
the killing of 17 alleged guerrillas in San
Salvador is a case in point. We do not
know whether this was a guerrilla
organization or not, whether arms were
seized or not, but we are not ready to
buy the notion that a firefight occurred
and deeply deplore the excessive

violence used against those involved.
And, of course, violence by the guer-
rillas— who boast of the casualties they
inflict — goes on.

Our intention is to keep up the
pressure, to get the problem of violence
under as much control as it can be in cir-
cumstances of civil strife, in order to
promote the full scope of our interests in
the region, interests we believe are
widely shared in this country — defense

Congressional Certification
for El Salvador

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JAN. 28, 19821

The President, today, signed a Presiden-
tial Determination and is submitting to
the Congress a certification under Sec-
tion 728 of the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of
1981 (PL97-113). This Act states that a
wide range of security assistance may be
provided and certain military personnel
assigned to El Salvador only if the
President makes a specific certification.
Briefly stated, the points for certifica-
tion are that the Government of El
Salvador is:

• Making a concerted and signifi-
cant effort to comply with international-
ly recognized human rights;

• Achieving substantial control over
all elements of its own armed forces;

• Making continued progress in im-
plementing essential economic and
political reforms;

• Committed to the holding of free
elections at an early date; and

• Making good faith efforts to in-
vestigate the murder of six U.S. citizens
in El Salvador.

The Administration's certification is
accompanied by a brief justification on
each of the points to be certified, and
the Administration's position can be
amplified through congressional hear-
ings at the appropriate congressional
subcommittee's discretion. Open hear-
ings have been called by Senator [Jesse
A., R-North Carolina] Helms for Mon-
day, February 1 from 10 a.m. to noon,
and by Congressman [Michael D.,
D-Maryland] Barnes for February 2 at 2
p.m.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg.B

62

of our national security interests against
the Soviet/Cuban challenge and promo-
tion of democratic, open societies in our
immediate neighborhood.

FEB. 2, 1982

I welcome this opportunity to address
the Central American crisis, with
specific reference to El Salvador and to
the certification required under law. The
Administration is committed to the goals
set out in the Foreign Assistance Act
with regard to El Salvador. As we
understand it, the act says, yes, there is
a challenge to our national security, so
military and economic assistance are re-
quired. But yes, we must also use our
assistance to help El Salvador control
violence, make land reform work,
develop a democratic process, bring
murderers to justice.

The certification the President made
last week shows that there has indeed
been substantial progress toward each of
the goals laid out in law.

Human Rights

The law requires us to certify that El
Salvador is "making a concerted and sig-
nificant effort to comply with inter-
nationally recognized human rights," and
"is achieving substantial control over all
elements of its armed forces." It does
not say that human rights problems
must be eliminated. But it does demand
progress.

There is -no question that the human
rights situation is troubled, as is detailed
in our annual report just submitted to
the Congress. The explosion of violence
and eounterviolenee following the ex-
treme left's receipt of outside support
for guerrilla warfare has accentuated
already high historic levels of violence,
strained the system of justice to the
breaking point, and eroded normal social
constraints against violence. Countless
violations of human rights have arisen
from partisan animosities of both left
and right, personal vendettas, retalia-
tions, provocations, intimidation, and
sheer brutality. The breakdown has been
profound; the society will take years to
heal.

Accurate information is hard to
establish. Responsibility for the over-
whelming number of deaths is never
legally determined nor usually ever
accounted for by clear or coherent evi-
dence; 70% of the political murders
known to our Embassy were committed

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

by unknown assailants. And there is
I much special pleading. For example, the
Legal Aid Office of the Archbishopric,
I often cited by the international media
land human rights organizations, lists no
victims of guerrilla and terrorist
violence from the left. In January,
Apostolic Delegate Rivera y Damas
deprived the Legal Aid Office of any
right to speak on behalf of the Arch-
bishopric. The prejudice of the other
main organization that collects
statistics— the Central American Univer-
sity—is virtually explicit in its inclusion
of a category on "ajusticiados," referring
to persons killed by the guerrillas as
having been "justly executed." The
organization that calls itself the Human
Rights Commission— which occasionally
issues statistics from outside the coun-
try—has become an insurgent propagan-
da vehicle and has no credibility.

Most difficult to assess of all are the
repeated allegations of massacres. The
ambiguity lies in the fact that there are
incidents in which noncombatants have
suffered terribly— at the hands of guer-
rillas, rightist vigilantes, government
forces, or some or all of them — and that
the insurgents have also repeatedly
fabricated or inflated alleged mass
murders as a means of propaganda.
Last year, in a widely publicized case,
the massacre of a thousand people in a
cave was related by Radio Venceremos
(and picked up in our media) in con-
vincing detail, until it was determined
that there are no large caves in the
region where the atrocity supposedly
occurred. More recently, our press pub-
lished a detailed account of how
American Green Berets had witnessed
Salvadoran soldiers torturing prisoners.
A careful investigation showed this
report to be an FDR/FMLN fabrication.
On the other hand, I do not accept that
19 people died in a firefight in San
Salvador 2 nights ago: Whether or not
there were weapons found, or the people
were members of the insurgent groups,
I deeply deplore the excessive violence
of the Salvadoran forces in this incident.

We sent two Embassy officers to in-
vestigate last week's reports of a
massacre in the Morazan village of El
Mozote. While it is clear that an armed
confrontation between guerrillas occupy-
ing El Mozote and attacking government
forces occurred last December, no evi-
dence could be found to confirm that
government forces systematically mas-
sacred civilians in the operation zone,
nor that the number of civilians killed
even remotely approached the 733 or
926 victims variously cited in press

reports. In fact, the total population of
El Mozote canton last December is
estimated locally at only 300, and there
are manifestly a great many people still
there.

So we must be careful. We try to in-
vestigate every report we receive. And
we use every opportunity to impress on
the El Salvador Government and army
that we are serious about practicing
human rights; and so must they be.

Results are coming slowly, but they
are coming. Since October 1979, the
Salvadoran authorities have done much
more than repeatedly emphasize to
officers and men the need to protect
human rights. They have:

• Broken traditional links between
large landowners and the security forces
by outlawing the paramilitary organiza-
tion ORDEN;

• Promulgated a military code of
conduct that highlights the need to pro-
tect human rights;

• Transferred, retired, cashiered, or
punished over 1,000 soldiers for various
abuses of authority or for their coopera-
tion with the violent right; and

• Gradually reasserted control over
scattered local security force personnel
by strengthening the authority of the
High Command and repeated command
discipline efforts.

In consequence, the level of noncom-
bat violence— to judge by our best
estimates and the trends even in opposi-
tion groups' figures— appears to have
declined by more than half over the last
year and this despite the fact that the
guerrilla FMLN boasted on Radio Ven-
ceremos that it inflicted more than 2,000
casualties in the last 7 months of 1981.

But let me make this clear. Control
of violence is at the center of our rela-
tionship with the Salvadoran Govern-
ment. We mean to see it reduced to the
minimum levels consistent with the
existing civil strife.

Reforms

The law asks us to certify that El
Salvador "is making continued progress
in implementing essential economic and
political reforms, including the land
reform program." Progress in land
reform has been substantial. Estates
larger than 1,235 acres have been
distributed to farmers who work on
them. Compensation to former owners is
being made. A second part of the pro-
gram transfers ownership of small farms

to tenants and sharecroppers. The titling
process has accelerated since mid-year
and provisional titles are now being
issued at the rate of 4,000 per month.

In response to the government's re-
quest, the largest campesino organiza-
tion, the Union Comunal Salvadorena
(UCS), representing over 100,000
peasants, submitted a report in
December detailing the many problems
with the program which remain to be
addressed in the months ahead. When
this report was used by others to
criticize land reform implementation, the
UCS went out of its way to emphasize
that the government was responsive to
its concerns and that the union expected
to participate "massively" in the election.
In its letter of January 25, 1981, the
UCS said:

As for the Agrarian Document that was
presented in an updated form to President
Duarte by UCS in December 1981, dealing
with the implementation of Decree 207, we
note that many of the suggestions bearing
therein have been taken into account by the
Government. . . . This document was pre-
sented without any intention of giving
ammunition to the enemies of the Land
Reform Process. . . .

From December 1, 1981, the system of
liaison between the Armed Forces and the
UCS began to function and now we can rely
on a high ranking responsible person who has
a direct connection with the Ministry of
Defense . . . the political consciousness of
the Salvadoran campesinos has changed sub-
stantially, influenced by the agrarian changes
that have taken place lately ... we under-
stand that the vote is the weapon of democ-
racy and at this time the elections will mean
for us the definitive bond cementing our land
tenure.

Elections

The law asks that we certify that the
government is "committed to the holding
of free elections at an early date." This
is incontestably the case. Preparations
for constituent assembly elections on
March 28, 1982, are well advanced. The
new electoral law promulgated in
December was drawn up after thorough
discussion among the participating
political parties. Eight parties, ranging
from the nonviolent left to the far right,
are now participating in the election.
Momentum is growing. The independent
labor group of campesinos and trade
unions (UPD) and the businessmen's-
association (ANEP) have appealed for
the public to vote. Just a week ago, the
Council of Bishops of El Salvador's
Catholic Church stated:

We see in the elections ... a possible

beginning of a solution ti> the current

March 1982

63

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

crisis. . . . Through this Constituent
Assembly election, we will pass from a de
facto government to a constitutional govern-
ment, which is of fundamental importance for
the development of the country's life. ... It
would be ideal for all citizens to participate in
the elections. That is why we regret that
some of our brothers are rejecting them.

In December, the Organization of
American States General Assembly gave
an overwhelming 22-3-4 endorsement of
the Salvadoran election process. The
new Central American Democratic Com-
munity represents a similar endorsement
of democratic principles and institutions
by El Salvador and its near neighbors.

The law also asks us to certify that:

... to this end [that is, to the end of
early free elections], [the government] has
demonstrated its good faith efforts to begin
discussions with all major political factions in
El Salvador which have declared their will-
ingness to find and implement an equitable
solution to the conflict, with such solution to
involve commitment to (A) a renouncement of
further military or paramilitary activity; and
(B) the electoral process with internationally
recognized observers.

The FDR/FMLN is certainly not
committed to the current electoral proc-
ess. The guerrillas have burned town
halls, threatened to kill anyone found
with voting ink on his finger, and
assassinated and intimidated local
officials and candidates.

Nor is the FDR/FMLN committed to
elections in the future. An apparently
authoritative December statement says
only that there should be a "plebiscite"
to ratify the government after the guer-
rillas have gained a share of power. This
plebiscite, which would take place only
after 6 months had passed, would not
offer voters a choice between competing
slates, in other words, with some
cosmetics, the Nicaraguan model.

President Duarte, in contrast, has
invited all political parties and groups to
renounce violence and participate in the
elections after an advance dialogue on
the ground rules. The Communist and
Social Democratic parties were both for-
mally recognized and invited to par-
ticipate. Nonetheless, the FDR/FMLN
refused even to discuss electoral ground
rules.

Apostolic Administrator Rivera y
Damas in his January 10 homily said
that:

. . . not to believe in elections or not to
see in them a solution gives no right to resort

to blackmail and fraud on one hand, or
sabotage on the other. I believe that voters
have the right to express what they feel.

National Security Interests

But the Foreign Assistance Act ex-
presses the need to defend our national
security interests, as well as to further
our humanitarian and political values.
The Caribbean Basin is at our southern
border. Everything from migration to
geopolitics, and from common sense to
narcotics, dictates that we not ignore it.
The Administration, the Congress, the
American people must confront the
problems of the area together.

There is no mistaking that the
decisive battle for Central America is
underway in El Salvador.

Vicious Circle of Dictatorships

There is something else. If we do not
sustain the struggle now, we shall fall
back into that terrible vicious circle in
which in Central America the only alter-
native to right-wing dictatorship is left-
wing dictatorship.

General Romero's traditionalist mili-
tary government was overturned 2 years
ago by a military-civilian coalition com-
mitted to reform — land reform and the
transformation of El Salvador into a
democracy. We supported the reforms
then, we support them now. And real
progress has been made for all the civil
strife, even though there is a long way
to go — above all in bringing violence
under control.

Some are proposing that we now cut
off aid to El Salvador. I do not see how
that would advance the goals embodied
in the Foreign Assistance Act, whether
they be security, democracy, or human
rights. Clearly, the hope for democracy
would be extinguished. The Soviet Union
and Cuba would have a new opening to
expand their access to the American
mainland. And I wonder how it would
promote human rights to make El
Salvador into another Nicaragua.

■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Democracy and
Security in the
Caribbean Basin

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
February 1, 1982. Ambassador Enders
is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
A merican Affairs. 1

This hearing comes at a moment when it
is vital to clarify and affirm what the
United States should seek to achieve in
Central America as a whole and in El
Salvador in particular. Perhaps then we
should start from fundamentals. We
believe that a responsible American
policy must have two pillars:

• Defense of our national security
interests;

• Support for freedom and (where
necessary) social reform, allied to
economic development.

There can be no mistaking that our
national security interests are being
challenged.

• Cuba is systematically expanding
its capacity to project military power
beyond its own shores. The arrival this
year of a second squadron of MiG-23/
Floggers and the 63,000 tons of war
supplies imported from the Soviet Union
last year come on top of what was
already by several times the largest air,
land, and sea inventory of the region.

• Nicaragua is being exploited as a
base for the export of subversion and
armed intervention throughout Central
America. Inside Nicaragua, Soviet, East
European, and 1,800-2,000 Cuban
military advisers are building Central
America's largest military establishment
with Soviet arms; outside Nicaragua, the
clandestine infiltration of arms and
munitions into El Salvador is again
approaching the high levels recorded
just before last year's "final offensive."

• The decisive battle for Central
America is underway in El Salvador. If,
after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured
by a violent minority, who in Central
America would not live in fear? How
long would it be before major strategic
U.S. interests — the canal, sea lanes, oil
supplies — were at risk?

For most of its life as a nation, our
country has faced no threat from its
neighbors. But, unless we act decisively

64

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

iow, the future could well bring more
]ubas: totalitarian regimes so linked to
he Soviet Union that they become fac-
tors in the military balance, and so
ncompetent economically that their
:itizens' only hope becomes that of one
day migrating to the United States.

This brings me to the second pillar
jf our policy. The sharing of political
oower through democratic institutions
ind the overcoming of violence and
ooverty are not only fundamental for us,
;hey are also fundamental for our
neighbors.

• An acute economic crisis has
ngulfed the entire Caribbean Basin. As

the world economy slid into recession,
these small and vulnerable economies
felt the shock hard. Democracy is hard
to achieve or maintain in times of bitter
economic hardship, particularly if great
inequalities in social and economic op-
portunity persist.

• Lawlessness from the violent right
frequently compounds the problems
created by insurgent violence and exter-
nal intervention. The fragility of institu-
tions under political and economic stress
can create chain reactions of disorder
and abuse that feed dictatorship.

• Faith in representative democracy
and government institutions will erode if
these trends continue. Yet in societies as
deeply divided as those in Central
America, only pluralistic institutions can
enable people to live with each other
without violence.

Rather than sacrifice either our
interests or our values— either support
for democracy or security— we must find
a way to assert both, so that we can
check the Communist drive for power
yet help the region develop in a humane
and democratic way, using the state of
danger to help the people of Central
America realize their political and social
aspirations.

It is in this spirit that the Admin-
istration understands the conditions on
aid to El Salvador contained in the
Foreign Assistance Act. Yes, there is a
challenge to our national security, so
military and economic assistance are re-
quired. But yes, we must also use our
assistance to help El Salvador control
violence, make land reform work,
develop a democratic process, bring
murderers to justice. I do not mean to
say that we would have expressed the
objectives precisely as they are ex-
pressed in the legislation, but our goals
are the same.

The certification the President has

just made [January 28, 1982] shows that
there has indeed been substantial prog-
ress toward each of the desired goals
laid out in law.

• Thanks to efforts by the military
command, the levels of violence against
noncombatants have fallen; all sides
agree that the trend is downward.

• For all the inherent administrative
and political difficulties, land
reform— the most comprehensive pro-
gram of land reform ever attempted in
Latin America— is moving ahead.

• Despite violence and the absence
of deep-rooted democratic traditions, the
electoral process is gathering momen-
tum. Eight parties have entered the
campaign that officially opened last
Thursday. Important elements of the
Salvadoran society, including the church
and peasant organizations, have come
out strongly in support of elections. But
the guerrillas have refused to test out
their strength at the ballot box.

• The Salvadoran Government has
made major progress in its investigation
of the murder of the four American
church women. We expect indictments
based on a strong case very shortly,
maybe as early as this week.

This is clearly not enough. More is
needed, especially on the problem of
violence. But a lot has been achieved in
the midst of an externally supported in-
surgency in a deeply divided country.

Some few would argue that El
Salvador is not reforming itself fast
enough and we should cut off aid. But
that would defeat the goals both the
Congress and the Administration are
pursuing. All hope of achieving function-
ing democracy in El Salvador would
vanish. The Soviets and Cubans would
have a new opening to expand their
power on the American mainland. And it
would be hard to argue that
Nicaraguanizing El Salvador would be
an effective way to promote human
rights.

But there is another basis for action.
Two years ago, a new Salvadoran
Government committed itself to political
reform— free elections— and land
reform. The United States supported it
then. It supports it now. With our help:

• The Government of El Salvador is
working toward democracy and the
scheduled elections; the violent
FDR/FMLN [Democratic Revolutionary
Front/Farabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front] opposition is trying to
sabotage the election process.

• The Government of El Salvador is
pursuing economic development and

reform; the violent FDR/FMLN opposi-
tion is waging economic warfare.

• The Government of El Salvador
has made measurable progress in con-
trolling violence; the violent FDR/FMLN
opposition boasts of having inflicted
2,000 casualties in the last 7 months of
1981.

Power of Democracy

Sometimes Americans underestimate the
power of democracy in this area. That is
a mistake. The Caribbean Basin has far
more democratic than repressive states.
The resilience of more than a century of

Nicaraguan Travel Advisory

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT,
JAN. 29, 19821

Today, we are issuing the following
travel advisory on Nicaragua. The
Department advises Americans who may
be planning to travel to Nicaragua that
as of January 25, 1982, travel to the en-
tire Department of Zelaya has been
restricted, as the area has become a
restricted military zone. These travel
restrictions to the east coast of
Nicaragua apply to everyone —
Americans, other foreigners, and
Nicaraguans. The Government of
Nicaragua will not permit any travel to
the Department of Zelaya without
special permission of the Ministry of the
Interior, and that permission has been
difficult to obtain. Consequently, the
Atlantic half of Nicaragua is now off
limits for security reasons.

As a point of explanation, this most
recent action by the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment follows a number of other
measures that it has taken against its
largely English-speaking Miskito Indian
East Coast population. In addition to
restricting travel and declaring the area
a "military zone," the Government has
recently seized the leading independent
radio station in the area, expelled
religious workers from the region, and
effectively prohibited the circulation of
La Prensa from the East Coast. We
have also noted a new exodus of Miskito
Indian refugees to Honduras. There are
also numerous though unconfirmed
reports of repressive tactics by govern-
ment forces.

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

March 1982

65

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

democracy has enabled Costa Rica to
hold up magnificently under the pres-
sures of a brutal economic crisis. Hon-
duras—where Chairman Helms [Jesse
Helms, Chairman of the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs]
and I have just been to attend the
inauguration of a new and democrat-
ically elected president— shows that if
given a chance people are eager to see
their leaders elected democratically.

The democracies of the area are
beginning to realize that they will re-
main democracies only if they stand
together. Within Honduras the Cubans
are trying to unify the left and start
another insurgency, while across the
border Nicaragua is building up the big-
gest and best equipped army in Central
American history. To Nicaragua's south,
Costa Ricans are watching the Sandin-
istas organize military operations in
Costa Rica's own rich and largely unde-
fended Guanacaste Province and won-
dering what will happen when more
Soviet-built tanks and perhaps MiG's
appear next door. In El Salvador, in-
surgents are escalating their violence
and terror, doing everything to prevent
the elections from being held— including
threats of death to candidates and
voters.

In response to this situation, Costa
Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador
formed— on January 19— the Central
American Democratic Community to de-
fend their values and seek the support
of other democratic states. On January
27, on the occasion of Honduran Presi-
dent Suazo's inauguration, three democ-
racies—Venezuela, Colombia, the United
States— responded. The six will meet
regularly:

• To help carry through the
democratic transformation in El
Salvador and protect free institutions
elsewhere;

• To overcome the region-wide
economic crisis fueled by the recession
in the world economy and by terrorism;

• To attempt to head off the arms
race Nicaragua seems determined to
impose on its neighbors; and

• To be ready to use the resources
of the Inter-American system to defend
against armed aggression.

These steps are part of a collective
approach to the area's problems, an

approach proposed by Secretary Haig at
the meeting of the Organization of
American States (OAS) in St. Lucia last
December and evident in the OAS
General Assembly's endorsement of elec-
tions in El Salvador by a 22-3 vote. The
democracies are banding together to de-
fend their values and their security in a
time of rising danger.

Rising Dangers

For the dangers are rising fast. We have
tried to communicate with Cuba, to con-
vince Castro of the dangers of confron-
tation. But the Cubans are accelerating
their acquisition of intimidating arma-
ments; they are aggressively pushing
their policy of organizing and supporting
violent insurgencies throughout Central
America.

We have tried to communicate with
the Nicaraguans, to offer a way out of
confrontation if they would restrain
their military buildup and cease their
support of insurgency in El Salvador.
But the Nicaraguan response has been
to move toward greater internal repres-
sion—for their large Miskito Indian
minority, for the remaining free radio
stations and press, for the church, for
democratic leaders and business-
men—and to accelerate their buildup of
heavy arms and to bring in more Cuban
and Soviet advisers, while exporting
more arms to rebels in neighboring
countries.

In El Salvador the insurgents talk
peace but throw bombs. The attack last
week against Ilopango Airport, con-
tinued attacks on the economic infra-
structure, stepped up arms flow, all in-
dicate intensified military action aimed
at disrupting the electoral process.

The Caribbean Basin is right on our
borders. We cannot, even if we wanted
to, turn our back on it. The Administra-
tion, the Congress, the American people

are all confronted with the problems of
the area. Together we must find a solu-
tion.

What the Administration sug-
gests— to gain the initiative and make
sure the area's besieged and aspiring
democracies survive — is to:

• Support the fledgling Central
American Democratic Community in its
efforts to protect democracy and pro-
mote the common welfare, defense, and
development. We must act both indi-
vidually and through the Inter-Americar
system.

• Provide increased military assist-
ance to El Salvador and Honduras, the
two most threatened states. We expect
in the immediate future to use emer-
gency authority to draw on Department
of Defense stocks for approximately $55
million to replace lost aircraft, and to
assure that the Government of El
Salvador has the means to defend
against the attacks on its economy and
to protect the electoral process.

• Provide emergency financial
assistance to a number of states in the
basin suffering from economic catas-
trophe. The Administration will shortly
forward its proposal to the Congress.

• Strengthen, along with our part-
ners in the Nassau group — Venezuela,
Mexico, and Canada — international
cooperation to help the Caribbean Basin
as a whole achieve long-term prosperity;
the Administration will shortly send
specific proposals in trade and invest-
ment to the Congress.

And as we move forward on these
items, we must redouble our efforts in
El Salvador to help bring the violence
under control and push forward with
land reform. Simultaneously we must
help all countries of the area to choose
legitimate governments through elec-
tions. Americans will not permit Central
America's future to be decided in
Moscow or Havana. Neither will they
support solutions that are inherently
undemocratic or unjust.

J

.

1 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent ot
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

66

FREATiES

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Vgrieulture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute

or Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at

Washington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force

)ec. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919.

Signatures: Dominica, Sept. 29, 1981; St.

_iucia, Dec. 9, 1981; Suriname, Nov. 20,

.981.

Ratifications deposited: Dominica, Sept. 29,

.981; St. Lucia, Dec. 9, 1981; Suriname,
Nov. 20, 1981.

iills of Lading

nternational convention for the unification of
•ertain rules relating to bills of lading and
>rotocol of signature. Done at Brussels
\ug. 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2,

'931; December 29, 1937 for the U.S. TS

31.

Notification that it continues to be bound:

Solomon Islands, Sept. 17, 1981.

'rotocol to amend the international conven-

.ion for the unification of certain rules of law

•elating to bills of lading signed at Brussels

Aug. 25, 1924 (TS 931). Done at Brussels

^eb. 23, 1968. Entered into force June 23,

.977.'

Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, Oct. 21,

.981.

biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
nent, production, and stockpiling of
>acteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
tnd on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.
HAS 8062.
Accessions deposited: Kenya, Tonga,

Sept. 30, 1981.

Child Abduction

Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980. Enters into force on the first
day of the third calendar month after the
deposit of the third instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession.
Signatures: Canada, France, Greece, Switzer-
land, Oct. 25, 1980; U.S., Dec. 23, 1981;
Belgium, Jan. 11, 1982.

Collisions

International convention for the unification of

certain rules relating to collisions at sea, and

protocol of signature. Signed at Brussels

Sept. 23, 1910. Entered into force Mar. 1,

1913.'

Notification that it continues to be bound:

Solomon Islands, Sept. 17, 1981.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.2

Ratifications deposited: Finland, Dec. 30,

1981; U.K., Dec. 31, 1981; Mali, Jan. 11,

1982.

Acceptance deposited: India, Dec. 22, 1981.

Signature: Yugoslavia, Jan. 7, 1982.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in en-
dangered species of wild fauna and flora,
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS
8249.

Accession deposited: Guinea, Sept. 21, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Bangladesh, Nov. 20,
1981.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations.

Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into

force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24,

1969. TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Mozambique, Nov. 18,

1981.

Containers

Amendments to Annex I of the international
convention for safe containers, 1972 (TIAS
9037). Adopted by the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee at London Apr. 2, 1981. Entered into
force Dec. 1, 1981.

Customs

Amendments to the annexes to the customs
convention on the international transport of
goods under cover of TIR carnets of Nov. 14,
1975. Adopted by the Administrative Com-
mittee for the TIR Convention of 1975 at
Geneva: Oct. 20, 1978. Entered into force
Aug. 1, 1979; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
Oct. 18, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1,
1980; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
July 3, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1981;
for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.

Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into

force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,

1972. TIAS 7502.

Accession deposited: Mozambique, Nov. 18,

1981.3

Finance-African Development Fund

Agreement establishing the African Develop-
ment Fund, with schedules. Done at Abidjan
Nov. 29, 1972. Entered into force June 30,
1973; for the U.S. Nov. 18, 1976. TIAS 8605.
Accession deposited: Austria, Dec. 30, 1981.

Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done

at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force

July 18, 1978.1

Ratification deposited: Barbados, Nov. 5,

1981."

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.1
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Jan. 14, 1982.

International covenant on economic, social,

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,

1976.1

Ratification deposited: Egypt, Jan. 14, 1982.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial
and extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15,
1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS
6638.
Ratification deposited: Italy, Nov. 25, 1981.

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the con-
stitution of the International Labor Organiza-
tion. (Constitution of the International Labor
Organization Instrument of Amendment,
1946.) Adopted by the International Labor
Conference at its 29th session at Montreal
Oct. 9, 1946. TIAS 1868.
Acceptance deposited: Belize, Nov. 17, 1981.

Maritime Matters

Amendment to article VII of the convention
on facilitation of international maritime traf-
fic, 1965. Done at London Nov. 19, 1973.2
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, Dec. 4, 1981.

International convention on maritime search
and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Ham-
burg Apr. 27, 1979.2
Ratification deposited: Norway, Dec. 9, 1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force May 22,
1982, except for Art. 51 which enters into
force July 28, 1982.

Acceptance deposited: Philippines, Nov. 17,
1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.2
Acceptance deposited: Philippines, Nov. 17,

1981.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.2

Acceptance deposited: United States,
Nov. 17, 1981.

North Atlantic Treaty

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the

accession of Spain. Done at Brussels Dec. 10,

1981.2

Ratification deposited: Canada, Jan. 8, 1982.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and

March 1982

67

TREATIES

Moscow, July 1, 1968. Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea,
Jan. 25, 1982.

Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American
States. Signed at Bogota Apr. 30, 1948.
Entered into force Dec. 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.
Signatures: Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Dec. 3, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Antigua and
Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Dec. 3, 1981.

Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the
Organization of American States. Signed at
Buenos Aires Feb. 27, 1967. Entered into
force Feb. 27, 1970. TIAS 6847.
Signatures: Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Dec. 3, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Antigua and
Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Dec. 3, 1981.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.

Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered

into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter

II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29,

1978.5 TIAS 8733.

Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, Nov. 25,

1981.

Pollution

Convention on long-range transboundary air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.2
Ratification deposited: Canada, Dec. 15,
1981.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969.1
Accession deposited: China, Dec. 29, 1981.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered in-
to force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,
1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Japan, Jan. 1, 1982.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,

1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered
into force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: France, Dec. 8,
1981; Canada, U.K., Dec. 31, 1981.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,

1980. TIAS 9700.

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Nov. 6,
1981; Philippines, Dec. 15, 1981.

Salvage

Convention for the unification of certain rules
with respect to assistance and salvage at sea.
Signed at Brussels Sept. 23, 1910. Entered
into force Mar. 1, 1913. TS 576.
Notification that it continues to be bound:
Solomon Islands, Sept. 17, 1981.

Shipping

U.N. convention on the carriage of goods by
sea, 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 31, 1978.2
Accession deposited: Romania, Jan. 7, 1982.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities
of states in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.
Ratification deposited: India, Jan. 18, 1982.

Convention on registration of objects
launched into outer space. Done at New York
Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15,
1976. TIAS 8480.
Accession deposited: India, Jan. 18, 1982.

Agreement governing the activities of states
on the moon and other celestial bodies. Done
at New York Dec. 5, 1979.2
Signature: India, Jan. 18, 1982.

Telecommunications

Final Acts of the World Administration Radio
Conference for the planning of the
broadcasting-satellite service in frequency
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3)
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with an-
nexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979. '
Approval deposited: Greece, Sept. 10, 1981.

Trade

Protocol supplementary to the Geneva (1979)
protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (TIAS 9629). Done at Geneva Nov.
22, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, June 23, 1981;
Zaire, Nov. 11, 1981.

Agreement on implementation of article VII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (customs valuation). Done at Geneva
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1981.

Protocol to the agreement on implementation
of article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Nov. 1,
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptance: Brazil, June 23, 1981.46

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1982.
Acceptance: U.S., Dec. 29, 1981.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.2
Signatures: Fiji, Dec. 21, 1981; Central
African Republic, Jan. 8, 1982.
Ratifications deposited: Fiji, Dec. 21, 1981;
Central African Republic, Jan. 8, 1982.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the first extension of the

food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015).

Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered

into force July 1, 1981. 7

Ratifications deposited: Austria, Dec. 29,

1981; Ireland, Dec. 30, 1981; U.K., Dec. 31,

1981; U.S., Jan. 12, 1982.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Dec. 16, 1981.

Instrument of ratification signed by the

President: Jan. 12, 1982.

Entered into force definitively for the U.S.:

Jan. 12, 1982.

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the

wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).

Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered

into force July 1, 1981. 7

Accession deposited: Bolivia, Dec. 23, 1981.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Dec. 22,

1981; Austria, Dec. 29, 1981; Ireland,

Dec. 30, 1981; U.K., Dec. 31, 1981; U.S.,

Jan. 12, 1982.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Dec. 16, 1981.

Instrument of ratification signed by the

President: Jan. 12, 1982.

Entered into force definitively for the U.S.:

Jan. 12, 1982.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981.1

Ratifications deposited: Romania, Jan. 7,
1982; Colombia, Jan. 19, 1982.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income and capital, with
related protocol. Signed at Buenos Aires
May 7, 1981.

Instrument of ratification signed by thd
President: Jan. 12, 1982 (with reservations
and an understanding).

China

Consular convention, with exchange of notes.
Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Dec. 11, 1981.

68

TREATIES

Instrument of ratification signed by the

President: Jan. 4, 1982.

Instruments of ratification exchanged:

Beijing, Jan. 19, 1982.

Entered into force: Feb. 19, 1982.

Agreement modifying the consular conven-
tion of Sept. 17, 1980. Effected by exchange
of notes at Beijing Jan. 17, 1981.
Entered into force: Feb. 19, 1982.

Colombia

Extradition treaty, with annex. Signed at
Washington Sept. 14, 1979.2
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Jan. 4, 1982.

Mutual legal assistance treaty, with exchange

of notes. Signed at Washington Aug. 20,

1980.2

Instrument of ratification signed by the

President: Jan. 4, 1982.

Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bogota Dec. 16, 1981. Entered into
force Dec. 16, 1981.

Cuba

Agreement extending the provisional applica-
tion of the maritime boundary agreement of
Dec. 16, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington, Dec. 16 and 28, 1981.
Entered into force Dec. 28, 1981.

Czechoslovakia

Agreement amending and extending the air
transport agreement of Feb. 28, 1969, as
amended and extended (TIAS 6644, 7356,
7881, 8868, 9935). Effected by exchange of
notes at Prague Dec. 7 and 30, 1981.
Entered into force Dec. 30, 1981.

Denmark

Agreement relating to the reciprocal accept-
ance of airworthiness certifications. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington Jan. 6,
1982. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1982.

Ecuador

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Sept. 18, 1975, as extended
(TIAS 8282, 9942), relating to the
cooperative program in Ecuador for the
observation and tracking of satellites and
space vehicles. Effected by exchange of notes
at Quito Dec. 3 and 4, 1981. Entered into
force Dec. 4, 1981.

Egypt

Agreement for cooperation concerning
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex
and agreed minute. Signed at Washington
June 29, 1981.
Entered into force: Dec. 29, 1981.

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855), with agreed
minutes. Signed at Cairo Dec. 21, 1981.
Entered into force Dec. 21, 1981.

Haiti

Hurricane warning agreement, with
memorandum of arrangement. Effected by
exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Dec. 22,
1981. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1981.

Hungary

Program of cooperation and exchanges in
culture, education, science, and technology
for 1982 and 1983, with annex. Signed at
Washington Dec. 4, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1982.

Indonesia

Agreement for cooperation concerning
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex
and agreed minute. Signed at Washington
June 30, 1980.
Entered into force: Dec. 30, 1981.

Inter-Parliamentary Union

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S.
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Geneva Sept. 17 and
Oct. 27, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 27,
1981; effective Jan. 1, 1981.

Korea

Arrangement for the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in regulatory
and safety research matters, with appendices
and patent addendum. Signed at Washington
Nov. 10, 1981. Entered into force Nov. 10,
1981.

Netherlands

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters, with exchange of notes. Signed at The
Hague June 12, 1981.2
Instrument of ratification signed by the

President: Jan. 4, 1982.

Extradition treaty. Signed at The Hague
June 24, 1980.2

Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Jan. 4, 1982.

Peru

Memorandum of understanding relating to
cooperative efforts to protect crops from

plant pest damage and plant diseases. Signed
at Lima Nov. 30, 1981. Entered into force
Nov. 30, 1981.

Philippines

Convention with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Manila Oct. 1, 1976.
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Jan. 20, 1982 (with reservations
and understandings).

Poland

Memorandum of understanding on scientific
and technological cooperation, with annexes.
Signed at Washington Dec. 11, 1981. Entered
into force Dec. 11, 1981.

Romania

Agreement extending the agreement of Dec.
4, 1973, as renewed and extended, relating to
civil air transport (TIAS 7901, 9431). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest
Aug. 11 and Dec. 21, 1981. Entered into
force Dec. 21, 1981.

Senegal

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan.
30 and Feb. 5, 1981 (TIAS 10088), regarding
the establishment and operation of a space
vehicle tracking and communication facility in
connection with the space shuttle. Effected
by exchange of notes at Dakar Nov. 30 and
Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force Dec. 22,
1981.

Sweden

Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Dec. 4 and 23, 1981.
Entered into force Dec. 23, 1981.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of June 19, 1973, as extended, on
cooperation in studies of the world ocean
(TIAS 7651, 9008, 9349). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Moscow Dec. 14 and 15,
1981. Entered into force Dec. 15, 1981.

United Kingdom

Reciprocal fisheries agreement, with agreed
minute.2 Signed at London Mar. 27, 1979.
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Jan. 12, 1982.

'Not in force for the U.S.

2Not in force.

3With statement.

4With reservations.

5Chapter II not in force for the U.S.

6Witn declaration.

7Provisionallv for the U.S. ■

March 1982

69

CHRONOLOGY

PRESS RELEASES

January 1982

January 4

State Department releases 12-page
chronology on Soviet and Soviet-proxy in-
volvement in the Polish crisis which traces
the evolution of the crisis between July 1980
and Dec. 1981. A 5-page appendix lists
specific Soviet warnings about developments
in that country and includes excerpts from a
Soviet Communist Party Central Committee
letter to the Polish Party.

President Reagan names Deputy Secre-
tary William P. Clark as his National Securi-
ty Adviser to replace Richard V. Allen, who
resigned.

January 5

During a private trip to the U.S., West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visits
Washington, D.C., to meet with President
Reagan for extensive talks. Secretary Haig
and Foreign Minister Genscher also attend
the meeting. The Chancellor and the Presi-
dent issue a joint statement at the end of the
visit. They agree that Moscow is responsible
for events in Poland and again warn that
"any military intervention" would cause "the
gravest consequences" in international rela-
tions and "would fundamentally change the
entire international situation."

While in Washington, the Chancellor also
meets with the Vice President, Secretary
Weinberger, senior Administration officials,
and leaders of Congress.

January 8

The President announces his intention to
nominate Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., as Deputy
Secretary of State to succeed William P.
Clark and Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger to succeed
Ambassador Stoessel.

January 10

Secretary Haig departs Washington to make
official visits to Brussels, Jan. 10-12; Cairo,
Jan. 12-14; and Jerusalem, Jan. 14-15.

January 11

NATO foreign ministers meet at a special
session in Brussels and issue a declaration
condemning the "imposition of martial law in
Poland, the Soviet Union's support for the
Warsaw regime's action," and calling "upon
the Soviet Union to respect Poland's funda-
mental right to solve its own problems free
from foreign interference and respect the
clear desire of the overwhelming majority of
the Polish people for national renewal and
reform."

January 13

The following newly appointed Ambassadors
presented their credentials to President
Reagan: Dauda Sulaiman Kamara of Sierre
Leone; Thomas Klestil of Austria; and Paul
Pondi of Cameroon.

January 18

U.S. military attache Lt. Col. Charles Robert

Ray is slain outside his home in Paris. The
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
claims responsibility for the assassination.

January 19

Meeting in Costa Rica, foreign ministers of
El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras issue
a resolution announcing the formation of the
Central American Democratic Community.

January 20

By a vote of 9 to 1 (U.S. veto), with 5 absten-
tions, U.N. Security Council votes on a re-
vised draft resolution condemning Israel for
its failure to comply with Security Council
Resolution 497 and General Assembly Resolu-
tion 36/226B, and calls on all member states
to "consider applying concrete and effective
measures in order to nullify the Israeli annex-
ation of the Syrian Golan Heights and to
refrain from providing any assistance or aid
to and cooperation with Israel, in all fields, in
order to deter Israel in its policies and prac-
tices of annexation."

President Reagan signs a proclamation
designating January 30, 1982, as Solidarity
Day for Poland.

January 24

Secretary Haig departs Washington to make
official visits to Geneva to meet with Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko for talks concern-
ing Soviet involvement in Poland and
Afghanistan, Jan. 25-27; Jerusalem, Jan.
27-28 and Cairo, Jan. 28-29 to continue a
factfinding mission on how best to proceed
toward an autonomy agreement for the
Palestinians; and to London, Jan. 29.

January 25

Polish Parliament ratifies martial law decree
issued December 13 by Gen. Jaruzelski.

January 26

Finnish Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto wins
Presidential elections in Finland succeeding
President Urho Kekkonen.

January 28

Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier is rescued from
terrorists by the Italian police. The General
had been held captive by members of the Red
Brigades for 42 days.

January 29

Venezuela, Colombia, and the United States
and the Central American Democratic Com-
munity— Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Hon-
duras— meet in Tegucigalpa and issue a
statement of common views expressing pro-
moting democracy, economic support, and use
of the inter-American system to defend
against aggression.

President Reagan announces that the
U.S. will return to the negotiations at the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
which were suspended last March pending
U.S. review of the draft convention.

January 30

Solidarity Day for Poland — a worldwide day
of protest against military rule in that coun-
try.B

No.

Date

*442

1/5

*443

1/5

*444

1/5

*1

*2

*3

*4

•5

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Haig: remarks at Christmas
tree ceremony, Dec. 21.

Haig: interview on CBS-TV
morning news, Dec. 24.

Haig: address before the
World Affairs Council of
Northern California, San
Francisco, Dec. 29.

John E. Dolibois, U.S. Am-
bassador to Luxembourg
(biographic data).

William J. Dyess, U.S. Am-
bassador to the Nether-
lands (biographic data).

Paul Heron Robinson, Jr.,
U.S. Ambassador to
Canada (biographic data).

Keith F. Nyborg, U.S. Am-
bassador to Finland (bio-
graphic data).

Harry E. Bergold, U.S. Am-
bassador to Hungary (bio-
graphic data).

Francis J. Meehen, U.S. Am
bassador to Poland (bio-
graphic data).

Franklin S. Forberg, U.S.
Ambassador to Sweden
(biographic data).

Robert Strausz-Hupe, U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey
(biographic data).

Arthur A. Hartman, U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet
Union (biographic data).

Melvin Herbert Evans swon
as Ambassador to Trinidac
and Tobago, Dec. 4 (bio-
graphic data).

Haig: news conference.

1982 foreign fishing alloca-
tions.

Francois M. Dickman, U.S.
Ambassador to Kuwait
(biographic data).

Haig: remarks to investment
and trade commission to
Africa, Jan. 8.

Haig: remarks at the Inter-
national Press Center,
Brussels.

Haig: question-and-answer
session following remarks
in Brussels.

Haig: interview on the
"Today Show"

Haig: statement upon arrival
in Brussels, Jan. 10.

Haig: press conference,
NATO headquarters, Brus-
sels, Jan. 11.

'10

11
'12

'13

'14

15

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1/5

1/5

1/5

1/5

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16

1/12

17

1/12

18

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70

PRESS RELEASES

1/19 Haig, Hassan Ali: remarks at
arrival, Cairo, Jan. 12.

1/18 Haig, Hassan Ali: statement
following meeting with
President Mubarak, Cairo,
Jan. 13.

1/18 Haig: remarks following

meeting with Prime Min-
ister Begin, Jerusalem,
Jan. 14.

1/18 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Committee
on Ocean Dumping,
Jan. 26.

1/18 SCC, Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group
on safety of navigation,
Feb. 3.

1/18 International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), work-
ing party of integrated
services digital network,
Jan. 28.

1/18 Advisory Committee on In-
ternational Intellectual
Property, international in-
dustrial property panel,
Feb. 9.

1/27 Haig: press conference after
NAC ministerial, Brussels,
Dec. 11.

1/19 Haig, Shamir: news confer-
ence, Tel Aviv, Jan. 15.

1/25 Haig: arrival statement,
Geneva, Jan. 24.

1/27 U.S., Singapore amend tex-
tile agreement, Aug. 24
and 27.

1/27 U.S., Singapore sign textile
agreement, Aug. 21.

1/27 U.S., Singapore amend tex-
tile agreement, Dec. 18.

1/27 U.S., Singapore amend tex-
tile agreement, Aug. 19.

1/27 Haig, Thorn: press con-
ference, Brussels, Dec. 11.

1/27 Haig: press conference,
Geneva, Jan. 26.

*Not printed in the Bulletin. I

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.

No. Date Subject

*56 9/25 Kirkpatrick: admission of

Belize, General Assembly.

*57 9/25 Adelman: biological warfare
against Cuba, General
Assembly.

"58

59
60

"61

*68

*69

'70

*71

*72

♦73
*74
*75

"76

77

'78

9/30

9/24
10/2

10/6

62

10/7

63

10/8

64

10/9

65

10/7

66

10/9

67

10/9

10/12

10/13

10/14

10/14

10/14

10/16

10/16
10/19

10/19

79

10/20

80

10/20

81

10/20

82

10/21

83

10/21

84

85

10/26

*86

*87

10/27

10/27

Kirkpatrick: Indochina
refugees, U.S. House of
Representatives Judiciary
Committee, Sept. 29.
Western five contact group
joint statement on Namibia.

Kirkpatrick: human rights in
Ethiopia, General
Assembly.

Kirkpatrick: death of
Egyptian President Sadat,
General Assembly.

Schifter: racial discrim-
ination, Committee III.

Adelman: Nicaragua, General
Assembly.

Gershman: self-determina-
tion, Committee III.

Christopher: human rights,
Committee III.

Adelman: Libya, General
Assembly.

Lichenstein: El Salvador and
military exercise in Carib-
bean, General Assembly.

Ireland: U.N. program
budget for 1982-83, Com-
mittee V.

Sherman: foreign economic
activities in dependent
areas, Committee IV.

Gershman: Puerto Rico and
self-determination in the
Soviet Union, Committee
III.

Gershman: self-determination
in Soviet bloc countries,
Committee III.

Gray: mercenaries committee
report, Committee VI,
Oct. 13.

[Not issued.]

[Not issued.]

Gershman: report of the
Committee on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination,
Committee III.

Gershman: (same as above).

Kirkpatrick: situation in
Kampuchea, General
Assembly.

Lichenstein: right of reply,
Special Political Commit-
tee.

Sorzano: economic coopera-
tion, Committee II.

Adelman: right of reply,
Committee I.

Adelman: (same as above).

Rostow: disarmament, Com-
mittee I.

Oilman: information, Special
Political Committee.

[Not issued.]

Oilman: excavations in Je-
rusalem, Special Political
Committee.

Sherman: Guam and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Committee
IV.

Adelman: disarmament,
Committee I.

•88

10/29

*89

10/29

*90

10/28

*91

10/30

*92

10/29

*93

10/30

*94

10/30

*95

10/30

*96

11/2

*97

11/3

*98

11/2

*99

11/3

•100

11/4

*101

11/4

•102

11/5

•103

11/5

•104

11/12

'105

11/6

•106

11/9

•107

11/9

•108

11/10

•109

11/10

•110 11/11

♦111

11/11

•112

11/12

♦113

11/12

•114

11/12

*115

11/13

♦116 11/13

•117 11/13

•118 11/18

Schifter: torture, Com-
mittee III.

U.S. position on excavations
in Jerusalem.

Adelman: right of reply,
Committee I.

Novak: religious intolerance,
Committee III.

Lichenstein: outer space,
Special Political Commit-
tee.

Christopher: Western
Sahara, Committee IV.

Gershman: right of reply,
Committee III.

Adelman: right of reply,
Committee I.

Clark: transnational cor-
porations, ECOSOC.

Gershman: development,
Committee III.

Adelman: right of reply,
Committee I.

Sherman: territories, Com-
mittee IV.

Sorzano: environment,
ECOSOC.

Fields: right of reply,
Committee I.

Reynolds: women, Commit-
tee III.

Kirkpatrick: global negotia-
tions, General Assembly.

Sherman: economic activ-
ities, Committee IV.

Caputo: U.N. pension fund,
Committee V.

Lichenstein: UNRWA,
Special Political Commit-
tee.

Sherman: Western Sahara,
Committee IV.

Adelman: IAEA report.
General Assembly.

Lichenstein: membership of
Antigua and Barbuda,
Security Council.

Lichenstein: membership of
Antigua and Barbuda,
General Assembly.

Adelman: IAEA report,
General Assembly.

Sorzano: operational activ-
ities. Committee II.

Kirkpatrick: Israeli attack on
Iraqi nuclear facility, Gen-
eral Assembly.

Adelman: right of reply,
Committee I.

Lichenstein: peacekeeping
operations, Special Political
Committee.

Adelman: chemical and bac-
teriological weapons, Com-
mittee I.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick ad-
mitted to hospital for
routine tests.

Douglas: UNHCR, Commit-
tee III.

March 1982

71

PUBLICATIONS

*119

11/17

120

11/18

*121

11/19

*122

11/19

*123

11/10

*124

11/20

*125

11/20

*126

11/23

*127

11/23

*128

11/16

*129

11/25

*130

11/24

*131

11/24

•132

11/25

*133

11/25

*134

11/24

*135

12/1

*136

12/2

♦137

11/30

*138 11/30

*139 12/1

*140

12/2

*141

12/3

*142

12/3

•143

12/4

*144

12/4

*145

12/4

146

12/7

*147 12/9

"148 12/9

*149 12/10

Sherman: American Samoa,

Committee IV.
Kirkpatrick: Afghanistan,

General Assembly.
Adelman: Indian Ocean

report, Committee I.
Feldman: right of reply,

Committee III.
Fields: disarmament,

Committee I.
Adelman: world disarmament

campaign, Committee I.
Adelman: reduction of mili-
tary budgets, Committee I.
Lichenstein: occupied ter-
ritories, Special Political

Committee.
Sherman: Guam, Committee

IV.
Sherman: TTPI, Committee

IV.
Adelman: neutron weapons,

Committee I.
Kirkpatrick: human rights,

Committee III.
Cooper: disarmament and

development, Committee I.
Oilman: drug abuse control.

Committee III.
Sherman: decolonization.

General Assembly.
Johnson: colonialism, apart-
heid, and foreign aggres-
sion, Committee III.
Sherman: colonialism,

General Assembly.
Gershman: totalitarianism,

Committee III.
Adelman: apartheid in

South Africa, General

Assembly.
Gerson: Israeli practices

in the occupied territories,

Special Political Commit-
tee.
Kirkpatrick: human rights in

El Salvador, Committee

III.
Gershman: right of reply,

Committee III.
Lichenstein: information,

Special Political Commit-
tee.
Sherman: Palestine,

General Assembly.
Fields: arms control talks,

Committee I.
Gershman: human rights

in Chile, Committee III.
Gershman: right of reply,

Committee III.
Reich: International Year

of Disabled Persons,

General Assembly.
Adelman: cooperation

with the OAU, General

Assembly.
Adelman: chemical and

biological weapons, General

Assembly.
Sherman: Palestine,

General Assembly.

'150 12/4 Kirkpatrick: Middle East,

General Assembly.
'151 12/16 Adelman: apartheid,

General Assembly.
'152 12/16 Adelman: information,

General Assembly.
'153 12/16 Adelman: refugees,

General Assembly.
'154 12/16 Sorzano: El Salvador,

ECOSOC.
"155 12/16 Adelman: extradition of

Zaid Abu Eain, General

Assembly.
'156 12/17 Lichenstein: Golan

Heights, Security Council.
'157 12/17 Adelman: Middle East,

General Assembly.
'158 12/18 Papendorp: 1982-83

budget, Committee V.
'159 12/18 Adelman: 1982-83

budget, General Assembly.
"160 12/18 Lichenstein: UNIFIL,

Security Council.

"Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Haig

Poland and the Future of Europe, Inter-
national Press Center, Brussels, Jan. 12,
1982, incorporating President Reagan's
statement of Dec. 29, 1981, and the North
Atlantic Council declaration of Jan. 11,
1982 (Current Policy #362).

News conference of Jan. 6, 1982, incorpo-
rating President Reagan's and West Ger-
man Chancellor Schmidt's joint statement
of Jan. 5, 1982 (Current Policy #359).

Africa

Background Notes on Liberia (Dec. 1981).

Economics

U.S. -European Economic Relations, Assistant
Secretary Hormats, Mid-American Commit-
tee, Chicago, Dec. 16, 1981 (Current Policy
#361).

International Aspects of U.S. Economic Poli-
cy, Under Secretary Rashish, World Bank-
ing Conference, London, Dec. 15, 1981
(Current Policy #360).

Europe

U.S. and Europe: Partnership for Peace and
Freedom, Assistant Secretary Eagleburger,
European People's Party Conference, Bonn,
Dec. 7, 1981 (Current Policy #355).

Soviet and Soviet-Proxy Involvement in Po
land, chronology for July 1980-81, with ap-
pendix of Soviet statements on Poland, Jan
1982 (Special Report #94).

Implementation of Helsinki Final Act:
Eleventh Semiannual Report, June 1,
1981-November 30, 1981, released Dec.
1981 (Special Report #89).

Background Notes on Andorra (Dec. 1981).

South Asia

U.S. Cooperation With Pakistan: Shared
Security Interests, Under Secretary
Buckley and AID Administrator McPher-
son, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Nov. 12, 1981 (Current Policy #347). ■

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20102. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent oj
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the
Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS
9910. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9910.)

Space Cooperation— Shuttle Contingency
Landing Sites. Agreement with Japan.
TIAS 9915. 6pp. $1.50 (Cat. No.
S9.10:9915.)

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agree-
ment with the International
Hydrographic Bureau. TIAS 9922. 4pp.
$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9922.)

Shipping— Equal Access to Government-
Controlled Cargoes. Agreement with
Brazil. TIAS 9923. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9923.)

Oceanography— Deep Sea Drilling Pro
ject. Memordandum of Understanding
with Japan. TIAS 9925. 15pp. $2. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9925.)

Grain Trade. Agreement with the People's
Republic of China. TIAS 9930. 18pp. $2.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9930.)

Energy— Research and Development.
Memorandum of Understanding with
Finland. TIAS 9932. 14pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9932.)

Space Cooperation— Launch Assistance.
Agreement with Japan. TIAS 9940. 7pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9940.)

Economic Assistance— Stability Grant.
Agreement with Israel. TIAS 9941. 7pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9941.)

Navigation— Long Range Aid to Loran
C Stations Near St. Mary's River,
Michigan-Ontario. TIAS 9944. Agree-
ment with Canada. 6pp. $1.50 (Cat. No.
S9.10:9944.)

72

Department of State Bulletin

PUBLICATIONS

'eace Corps. Agreement with the Turks and
Caicos Islands. TIAS 9945. 6pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9945.)

Whaling— Amendments to the Schedule to
the International Whaling Convention
of 1946. Adopted at the Thirty-second
Meeting of the International Whaling
Commission. TIAS 9946. 17pp. $2. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9946.)

Economic Cooperation. Memorandum

of Understanding with the Commission of
the Cartagena Agreement. TIAS 9953.
9pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9953.)

3eace Corps. Agreement with St. Lucia.
TIAS 9954. 6pp. $1.50 (Cat. No.
S9.10:9954.)

Headquarters of the United Nations.
Agreement with the United Nations.
TIAS 9955. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9955.)

\viation— Transport Services. Agree
ment with New Zealand. TIAS 9956.
13pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9956.)

Claims— U.S. Ship "Liberty". Agree-
ment with Israel. TIAS 9957. 4pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9957.)

rrade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 9958.
3pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9958.)

Postal— Express Mail Service. Agree-
ment, with detailed regulations, with the
People's Republic of China. TIAS 9959.
50pp. $3. (Cat. No. S9.10.9959.)

Criminal Investigations. Agreement
with Algeria. TIAS 9960. 4pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9960.)

Trade— Procurement in Telecommunica-
tions. Agreement with Japan. TIAS
9961. 27pp. $2.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9961.)

Narcotic Drugs— Additional Cooper-
ative Arrangements to Curb Illegal
Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS
9963. 5pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9963.)

Industrial Property Protection. Agree-
ment with the World Intellectual Proper-
ty Organization. TIAS 9964. 3pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9964.)

Visas— Crew Members of Aircraft and
Vessels. Agreement with the People's
Republic of China. 5pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9965.) TIAS 9965.

Defense— Prestockage and Reinforce-
ment. Memorandum of Understanding
with Norway. TIAS 9966. 5pp. $1.50.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9966.)

Fisheries— Shellfish Sanitation. Mem-
orandum of Understanding with New
Zealand. TIAS 9968. 10pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9968.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement
with Kenya. TIAS 9969. 14pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9969.)

Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1959, Partial
Revision— Aeronautical Mobile (R)
Service. Agreement with Other Govern-
ments. TIAS 9920. 166pp. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9920.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Sierra Leone. TIAS 9939. 3pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9939.)
Atomic Energy— Radioactive Waste Man-
agement. Agreement with Belgium.

TIAS 9970. 12pp. $2. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9970.)
Employment. Agreement with the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland. TIAS 9971. 5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.

S9.10:9971.)
Universal Postal Union. Multilateral. TIAS

9972. 473pp. (Cat. No. S9.10:9972.)
Universal Postal Union— Money Orders

and Postal Travellers' Checks. Conven-
tion with Other Governments. TIAS

9973. 164pp. $5.50. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9973.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Motor Vehicle
Tax. TIAS 9974. Agreement with
Austria. TIAS 9974. 7pp. $2. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9974.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Hide Exports and
Other Trade Matters. Agreement with
Argentina. TIAS 9976. 4pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:9976.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Agricultural
Products Exports. Arrangement with
Austria. TIAS 9977. 16pp. $2.25. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9977.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Tariff Reduc-
tions. Memorandum of Understanding
with Canada. TIAS 9978. 10pp. $2. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9978.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
the Commission of the Cartagena Agree-
ment. TIAS 9979. 9pp. $2. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9979.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Cheeses. Agree-
ment with Canada. TIAS 9980. 9pp. $2.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9980.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
the Dominican Republic. TIAS 9981. 8pp.
$2. (Cat. No. S9.10:9981.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Agricultural
Products. Agreement with the European
Communities. TIAS 9982. 13pp. $2. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9982.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Table Grapes.
Agreement with the European Com-
munities. TIAS 9983. 6pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9983.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Beer Containers
and Beer. Agreement with the European
Communities. TIAS 9984. 4pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9984.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Chemicals. Agree-
ment with the European Communities.
TIAS 9985. 3pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9985.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Chemical Conces-
sion. Agreement with the European
Communities. TIAS 9986. 2pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9986.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Silk. Agreement
with the European Communities. TIAS

9987. 3pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9987.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Cheeses. Agree-
ment with Finland. TIAS 9988. 8pp. $2.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9988.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Import Restric-
tions. Agreement with Finland. TIAS
9989. 3pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9989.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Alcoholic
Beverages. Agreement with Finland.
TIAS 9990. 5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9990.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Non-Tariff Mat-
ters. Agreement with the Hungarian
People's Republic. TIAS 9991. 14pp. $2.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9991.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Tariff Matters.
Agreement with the Hungarian People's
Republic. TIAS 9992. 57pp. $4. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9992.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
Iceland. TIAS 9993. 8pp. $2. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9993.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
India. TIAS 9994. 14pp. $2. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9994.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Peas and Beans.
Agreement with Japan. TIAS 9995. 3pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9995.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Agricultural and
Wool Products. Agreement with Japan.
TIAS 9996. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9996.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Cheeses. Agree-
ment with Norway. TIAS 9997. 8pp. $2.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9997.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Turkey Rolls.
Agreement with Norway. TIAS 9998.
3pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9998.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Memorandum of
Understanding with Pakistan. TIAS

9999. 17pp. $2.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9999.)
Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral

Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS

10000. 9pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:10000.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
the Polish People's Republic. TIAS

10001. 6pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10001.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
Portugal. TIAS 10002. 8pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:10002.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Cheese and Other
Agricultural Products. Agreement with
Sweden. TIAS 10003. 9pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9.10:10003.)

March 1982

73

PUBLICATIONS

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Motor Vehicles.

Agreement with Switzerland. TIAS
10004. 5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10004.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations — Cheeses. Agree-
ment with Switzerland. TIAS 10005.
12pp. $2. (Cat. No. S9.10:10005.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations — Beef. Agreement
with Switzerland. TIAS 10006. 6pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10006.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations— Chemicals. Agree-
ment with Switzerland. TIAS 10007.
4pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10007.)

Postal — Express Mail Service. Agreement
with Switzerland. TIAS 10008. 28pp.
$2.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10: 10008.)

Safety of Life at Sea, 1974. Protocol with
Other Governments. TIAS 10009. 55pp.
$4. (Cat. No. S9.10:10009.)

Energy Cooperation. Memorandum of
Understanding with Italy. TIAS 10011.
38pp. $2.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:10011.)

Energy— Research and Development.

Agreement with Venezuela. TIAS 10012.
35pp. $2.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10012.)

Disaster Assistance. Agreement with Mex-
ico. TIAS 10013. 11pp. $2. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10013.)

Energy— Coal Combustion Emissions.
Agreement with Other Governments.
TIAS 10014. 26pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:10014.)

Food Aid Convention, 1980. Agreement
with Other Governments. TIAS 10015.
60pp. $4. (Cat. No. S9. 10:10015.)

Peace Corps. Agreement with St. Vincent
and the Grenadines. TIAS 10017. 7pp.-
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10017.)

Atomic Energy— Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy. Agreement with Morocco. TIAS
10018. 45pp. $3. (Cat. No. S9.10:10018.)

Trade— Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. Agreement with
New Zealand. TIAS 10019. 12pp. $2.
(Cat. No. S9.10:10019.)

North Pacific Fur Seals. Protocol with
Other Governments. TIAS 10020. 18pp.
$2.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:10020.)

Pollution— Marine Environment. Agree-
ment with Mexico. TIAS 10021. 42pp.
$2.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10021.)

Economic Assistance— Fertilizer Promo-
tion. Agreement with India. TIAS
10022. 28pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10022.)

Economic Assistance— Agricultural Pro-
duction Increase. Agreement with
India. TIAS 10023. 15pp. $2.25. (Cat.
No. S9.10:10023.)
Fisheries— Albacore Tuna Off the Pacific
Coasts of the United States and
Canada. Interim Arrangement with
Canada. TIAS 10024. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat
No. S9.10:10024.)

Economic Assistance — School Construc-
tion. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS
10026. 23pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10026.)
Economic Assistance— Rural Vocation
Education. Agreement with Portugal.
TIAS 10027. 25pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10027.)
Panama Canal Treaty— Implementation of
Article IV. Agreement with Panama.
TIAS 10032. 126pp. $4.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10.-10032.)
Commissary and Post Exchange. Agree-
ment with Panama. TIAS 10033. 7pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10033.)
Postal Services. Agreement with Panama.
TIAS 10034. 6pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10034.)
Conservation— Barro Colorado Nature
Monument. Agreement with Panama.
TIAS 10036. 8pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10036.)
Science Cooperation. Agreement with

Panama. TIAS 10037. 15pp. $2.75. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:10037.)
Health. Agreement with Panama. TIAS
10038. 10pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10038.)
Activities of the United States in Panama.
Agreement with Panama. TIAS 10039.
18pp. $2.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:10039.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
TIAS 10041. 6pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10041.)
Cultural Relations— Library and Museum.
Agreement with Panama. TIAS 10042.
8pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10042.)
Panama Canal Treaty— Combined Board.
Agreement with Panama. TIAS 10043.
6pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:10043.)
Panama Canal Treaty— Coordinating Com-
mittee. Agreement with Panama. TIAS
10044. 5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10044.)
Panama Canal Treaty— Joint Committee.
Agreement with Panama. TIAS 10045.
7pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10045.)
Panama Canal Treaty— Consultative Com-
mittee. Agreement with Panama. TIAS
10046. 6pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:10046.)
Property Transfer— Housing. Agreement
with Panama. TIAS 10048. 6pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:10048.)
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Agreement with
Niger. TIAS 10049. 4pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:10049.)

Defense— Use of Facilities in the Azores.

Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 10050
5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10050.)
South Pacific Commission. Memorandum o

Understanding with Other Governments

TIAS 10051. 5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.

S9.10:10051.)
South Pacific Commission. Agreement wit!

Other Governments. TIAS 10052. 3pp.

$1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:10052.)
Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil

Uses and Nuclear Activities

Safeguards. Agreement with Indonesia.

TIAS 10053. $1.75. (Cat. No.

S9.10:10053.)
Agriculture — Science and Technology.

Memorandum of Understanding with

Zimbabwe. TIAS 10054. 4pp. $1.75. (Cai

No. S9.10:10054.)
Privileges and Immunities — Theatre

Nuclear Forces Delegation. Agreement

with Switzerland. TIAS 10056. 4pp.

$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10056.)
Cultural Relations— Exchanges for 1981-

1982. Agreement with the People's

Republic of Bulgaria. TIAS 10058. 20pp.

$2.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10: 10058.)
Aviation — Air Transport Services. Agree-
ment with the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS

10059. 40pp. $2.75. (Cat. No.

S9. 10:10059.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wit!

Egypt. TIAS 10060. 18pp. $2.25. (Cat.

No. S9. 10: 10060.)
Agriculture — Soil Survey. Agreement with

Nigeria. TIAS 10062. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat.

No. S9. 10:10062.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Indonesia. TIAS 10063. 18pp. $2.25. (Cai

No. S9. 10:10063.)
Narcotic Drugs— Additional Cooperative

Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.

Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 10064.

5pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10064.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with

Somalia. TIAS 10065. 9pp. $1.75. (Cat.

No. S9. 10:10065.)
Scientific Cooperation — Science and

Technology. Agreement with Egypt.

TIAS 10066. 9pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.

S9.10:10066.)
International Military Education and

Training (IMET). Agreement with

Dominica. TIAS 10069. 5pp. $1.75. (Cat.

No. S9.10:10069.)
Finance — Investment Guaranties. Agree-
ment with Lebanon. TIAS 10070. 10pp.

$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10070.)
Judicial Procedure — Abolishing Require-
ment of Legislation for Foreign Fublic

Documents. Convention with Other

Governments. TIAS 10072. 7pp. $1.75.

(Cat. No. S9. 10: 10072.)
Defense — Storage of Materiels. Agreement

with the Netherlands. TIAS 10073. 6pp.

$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10073.)
Finance — Gold Exchange. Agreement with

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland. TIAS 10074. 9pp.

$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:10074.)B

74

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX

March 1982
Volume 82, No.

2060

(Van

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation (.«..
Hollen) . . .

Background on..

Situation in Afghanistan (Reagan) . ....... U

The United States and Afghanistan (Smith) . 1

Agriculture. U.S.-European Economic Rela-
tions (Hormats) • • • ■••■°?

Angola. Angola (Department statements) . 34

Arms Control

President Reagan's News Conference of Jan-
uary 19 (excerpts) ... ■ •••■• ^

U S and Europe: Partnership for Peace and
Freedom (Eagleburger) ...... . . •

China. Secretary Interviewed tor U.Zs
& World Report

Agricultural Trade With the European Com

Latin American and the Caribbean

Current International Developments (Haig) 11
Democracy and Security in the Caribbean

Basin '(Enders) • • ■ •• • • ™

Law of the Sea. U.S. Policy and the Law of

the Sea (Reagan) 54

Middle East tnl..,,

Current International Developments (Haig) 27
President Reagan's News Conference ot Jan-

. 26

,llenl uary 19 (excerpts) . .

' ' Afghanistan 14 Secretary Haig Visits Europe and the Middle

East 6°

Secretary interviewed for U.S. News & World
Report

Monetary Affairs. Poland: Financial and Eco-
nomic Situation (background paper) . . .49

Nauru. Republic of Nauru ••■•■••■. ,-55

Nicaragua. Nicaraguan Travel Advisory (De-
partment announcement) . • -65

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. U.b
and Europe: Partnership for Peace and
Freedom (Eagleburger) . • • ■ • -46

Oceans. U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea
(Reagan) 54

Poland

46
News
...29

munity

(Hormats} 43 Current International Developments (Haig) 27

>'.".' ■ . __. i.. cl cl.. •>.!»■. ■-, i__j. n: :„1 o„rl TT^innmic Situation

Assistance to El Salvador
. 61
Numbers

in Immigrant

Poland: Financial and Economic Situation

(background paper) 49

Poland Has Not Perished . • ■ ; v "*

The Case for U.S
(Enders) ....

Cha[fseencio)posed '". :.".".".'6::':: "53 vzz^to^wMCod**** of j»

Current International Developments (Haig) 27
and Security in the Caribbean

Democracy «..- — — „

Basin (Enders) • • • ■ • ■ • °°

Development Bank Lending to Guatemala

(Johnston) ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ • • • -4,1

Developing Countries. Development Bank

Lending to Guatemala (Johnston) 41

Economics __ ,

Development Bank Lending to Guatemala

(Johnston) .- • • ■ • ■ v.

Poland: Financial and Economic 6

(background paper) . ... .....

Economic Relations (Hor

49

News &
29

Relations
35

Situation
49

U S. -European Economic Keiauons <nm-

mats) 6i>

El Salvador ,

The Case for U.S. Assistance to El Salvador

(Enders) • • • • • ■ •■■.•• \bl

Congressional Certification for El Salvador

(Department statement) ■■■-••■ b£

Secretary Interviewed for U.S.

World Report .•

Energy. U.S.-European Economic

(Hormats)

Europe

Poland: Financial and Economic

Secretery^Haig vtlte Europe and the Middle

Fast ^°

Secretary interviewed for U.S. News & World

Report ■■ ■■■ • ■ • ri

U S. and Europe: Partnership for Peace and
Freedom (Eagleburger) ....... • ■ • 4b

U.S.-European Economic Relations (Hor-
mats) : • ■ , • A/ ' j

European Communities. Agricultural Trade
With the European Community (Hor-
mats) ,■ V ' ' J-" ' ;

Foreign Aid. Development Bank Lending to
Guatemala (Johnston) . . ■ • ■ • ■ • • 41

Guatemala. Development Bank Lending to
Guatemala (Johnston) 41

Human Rights ,

The Case for U.S. Assistance to El Salvador
(Enders) n'V l

Development Bank Lending to Guatemala
(Johnston) ••.•••;•

Immigration. Change Proposed in Immi-
grant Numbers (Asencio) ™

uary 19 (excerpts) 26

Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News

& World Report ■ • ■ • • zy

Situation in Poland (Department state-
ments) 5Z

Presidential Documents

Situation in Afghanistan (Reagan) . . . ...II

U.S. Policy and the Law ot the hea

(Reagan) 54

Publications

Department of State '£

GPO Sales .

Security Assistance. Congressional Certi-
fication for El Salvador (Department

statement) bl

Trade

Agricultural Trade With the European Com-
munity (Hormats) ■■•■■. • • is

U.S.-European Economic Relations (Hor-
mats) 35

Travel. Nicaraguan Travel Advisory (Depart-
ment announcement) °5

Treaties. Current Actions 6/

it c O D

Current international Developments (Haig) 27

Poland Has Not Perished ■ • •<"

President Reagan's News Conference ot Jan-
uary 19 (excerpts) ■•••■ *«

Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News & World

Report • ■ Xn

Situation in Afghanistan (Reagan) 1 1

U S. and Europe: Partnership for Peace and

Freedom (Eagleburger) 4b

United Nations

U S Policy and the Law of the Sea (Reagan) 54

Worldwide Response to the International Year

of Disabled Persons (Reich) o»

Nam£ Index

Asencio, Diego C • • ^3

Eagleburger, Lawrence S • ■ • « °

Enders, Thomas 0 ohol'to

Haig, Secretary ^''f'

Hormats, Robert D &■ ™

Johnston, Ernest B • • • • • £1

Reagan, President ' =«

Reich, Alan A &°

Smith, Louis J *

Van Hollen, Eliza l*

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